,transcriber's note3 ,a carat character 77 indicates that the following letter is superscripted4 ,a list of changes to the text is at the end of the e-book4 ,,essays ,,in ,,radical ,,empiricism by ,,william ,,james ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,by ,william ,james ,,the ,,varieties ,,of ,,religious ,,experience3 ,a ,,study ,,in ,,human ,,nature4 ,gifford ,lectures delivered at ,edinburgh in #aija-aijb4 #hvo4 ,new ,york1 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #aijb4 ,,pragmatism3 ,a ,,new ,,name ,,for ,,some ,,old ,,ways ,,of ,,thinking3 ,,popular ,,lectures ,,on ,,philosophy4 #hvo4 ,new ,york1 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #aijg4 ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,truth3 ,a ,,sequel ,,to ,,pragmatism4 #hvo4 ,new ,york1 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #aiji4 ,a ,,pluralistic ,,universe3 ,,hibbert ,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,present ,,situation ,,in ,,philosophy4 #hvo4 ,new ,york1 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #aiji4 ,,some ,,problems ,,of ,,philosophy3 ,a ,,beginning ,,of ,,an ,,introduction ,,to ,,philosophy4 #hvo4 ,new ,york1 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #aiaa4 ,,essays ,,in ,,radical ,,empiricism4 #hvo4 ,new ,york1 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #aiab4 ,,the ,,will ,,to ,,believe1 ,,and ,,other ,,essays ,,in ,,popular ,,philosophy4 #abmo4 ,new ,york1 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #ahig4 ,,memories ,,and ,,studies4 #hvo4 ,new ,york1 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #aiaa4 ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,psychology4 #b vols41 #hvo4 ,new ,york3 ,henry ,holt ,co4 ,london3 ,macmillan ,co4 #ahij4 ,,psychology3 ,,briefer ,,course4 #abmo4 ,new ,york3 ,henry ,holt ,co4 ,london3 ,macmillan ,co4 #ahib4 ,,talks ,,to ,,teachers ,,on ,,psychology3 ,,and ,,to ,,students ,,on ,,some ,,of ,,life',s ,,ideals4 #abmo4 ,new ,york3 ,henry ,holt ,co4 ,london1 ,bombay1 and ,calcutta3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 #ahii4 ,,human ,,immortality3 ,,two ,,supposed ,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,doctrine4 #afmo4 ,boston3 ,houghton ,mifflin ,co4 ,london3 ,archibald ,constable ,co4 #ahih4 ,,the ,,literary ,,remains ,,of ,,henry ,,james4 ,edited1 with an ,introduction1 by ,william ,james4 ,with ,portrait4 ,crown #hvo4 ,boston3 ,houghton ,mifflin ,co4 #ahhe4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,,essays ,,in ,,radical ,,empiricism by ,,william ,,james ,illustration ,longmans1 ,green1 and ,co ,fourth ,avenue #cjth ,street1 ,new ,york ,london1 ,bombay and ,calcutta #aiab ,copyright1 #aiab1 by ,henry ,james ,jr4 ,all ,rights ,reserved ,,editor',s ,,preface ,the present volume is an attempt to carry out a plan which ,william ,james is known to have formed several years before his death4 ,in #aijg he collected reprints in an envelope which he inscribed with the title ',essays in ,radical ,empiricism'2 and he also had duplicate sets of these reprints bound1 under the same title1 and deposited for the use of students in the general ,harvard ,library1 and in the ,philosophical ,library in ,emerson ,hall4 ,two years later ,professor ,james published ,the ,meaning of ,truth and ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 and inserted in these volumes several of the articles which he had intended to use in the ',essays in ,radical ,empiricism4' ,whether he would nevertheless have carried out his original plan1 had he lived1 cannot be certainly known4 ,several facts1 however1 stand out very clearly4 ,in the first place1 the articles included in the original plan but omitted from his later volumes are indispensable to the understanding of his other writings4 ,to these articles he repeatedly alludes4 ,thus1 in ,the ,meaning of ,truth 7p4 #abg71 he says3 ,this statement is probably excessively obscure to any one who has not read my two articles ',does ,consciousness ,exist8' and ',a ,world of ,pure ,experience4' ,other allusions have been indicated in the present text4 ,in the second place1 the articles originally brought together as ',essays in ,radical ,empiricism' form a connected whole4 ,not only were most of them written consecutively within a period of two years1 but they contain numerous cross-references4 ,in the third place1 ,professor ,james regarded 'radical empiricism' as an independent doctrine4 ,this he asserted expressly3 ,let me say that there is no logical connexion between pragmatism1 as ,i understand it1 and a doctrine which ,i have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism4' ,the latter stands on its own feet4 ,one may entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist4 7,pragmatism1 #aijg1 ,preface1 p4 ix47 ,finally1 ,professor ,james came toward the end of his life to regard 'radical empiricism' as more fundamental and more important than 'pragmatism4' ,in the ,preface to ,the ,meaning of ,truth 7#aiji71 the author gives the following explanation of his desire to continue1 and if possible conclude1 the controversy over pragmatism3 ,i am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to which ,i give the name of radical empiricism1 and it seems to me that the establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail 7p4 xii74 ,in preparing the present volume1 the editor has therefore been governed by two motives4 ,on the one hand1 he has sought to preserve and make accessible certain important articles not to be found in ,professor ,james's other books4 ,this is true of ,essays ,i1 ,,ii1 ,,iv1 ,v1 ,,viii1 ,,ix1 ,x1 ,,xi1 and ,,xii4 ,on the other hand1 he has sought to bring together in one volume a set of essays treating systematically of one independent1 coherent1 and fundamental doctrine4 ,to this end it has seemed best to include three essays 7,,iii1 ,,vi1 and ,,vii71 which1 although included in the original plan1 were afterwards reprinted elsewhere2 and one essay1 ,,xii1 not included in the original plan4 ,essays ,,iii1 ,,vi1 and ,,vii are indispensable to the consecutiveness of the series1 and are so interwoven with the rest that it is necessary that the student should have them at hand for ready consultation4 ,essay ,,xii throws an important light on the author's general 'empiricism1' and forms an important link between 'radical empiricism' and the author's other doctrines4 ,in short1 the present volume is designed not as a collection but rather as a treatise4 ,it is intended that another volume shall be issued which shall contain papers having biographical or historical importance which have not yet been reprinted in book form4 ,the present volume is intended not only for students of ,professor ,james's philosophy1 but for students of metaphysics and the theory of knowledge4 ,it sets forth systematically and within brief compass the doctrine of 'radical empiricism4' ,a word more may be in order concerning the general meaning of this doctrine4 ,in the ,preface to the ,will to ,believe 7#ahih71 ,professor ,james gives the name radical empiricism to his philosophic attitude1 and adds the following explanation3 ,i say 'empiricism1' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience2 and ,i say 'radical1' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis1 and1 unlike so much of the halfway empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism1 it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square 7pp4 vii-viii74 ,an 'empiricism' of this description is a philosophic attitude or temper of mind rather than a doctrine1 and characterizes all of ,professor ,james's writings4 ,it is set forth in ,essay ,,xii of the present volume4 ,in a narrower sense1 'empiricism' is the method of resorting to particular experiences for the solution of philosophical problems4 ,rationalists are the men of principles1 empiricists the men of facts4 7,some ,problems of ,philosophy1 p4 #ce2 cf4 also1 ibid41 p4 #dd2 and ,pragmatism1 pp4 #i1 #ea47 ,or1 since principles are universals1 and facts are particulars1 perhaps the best way of characterizing the two tendencies is to say that rationalist thinking proceeds most willingly by going from wholes to parts1 while empiricist thinking proceeds by going from parts to wholes4 7,some ,problems of ,philosophy1 p4 #ce2 cf4 also ibid41 p4 #ih2 and ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 p4 #g47 ,again1 empiricism remands us to sensation4 7,op4 cit41 p4 #bfd47 ,the empiricist view insists that1 as reality is created temporally day by day1 concepts 444 can never fitly supersede perception4444 ,the deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience4 7,some ,problems of ,philosophy1 pp4 #ajj1 #ig47 ,empiricism in this sense is as yet characteristic of ,professor ,james's philosophy as a whole4 ,it is not the distinctive and independent doctrine set forth in the present book4 ,the only summary of 'radical empiricism' in this last and narrowest sense appears in the ,preface to ,the ,meaning of ,truth 7pp4 xii-xiii72 and it must be reprinted here as the key to the text that follows4#a ,radical empiricism consists 7#a7 first of a postulate1 7#b7 next of a statement of fact1 7#c7 and finally of a generalized conclusion4 7#a7 ,the postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience4 7,things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum1 but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate47 ,this is the principle of pure experience as a methodical postulate4 7,cf4 below1 pp4 #aei1 #bda47 ,this postulate corresponds to the notion which the author repeatedly attributes to ,shadworth ,hodgson1 the notion that realities are only what they are 'known as4' 7,pragmatism1 p4 #ej2 ,varieties of ,religious ,experience1 p4 #ddc2 ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #dc1 #aah47 ,in this sense 'radical empiricism' and pragmatism are closely allied4 ,indeed1 if pragmatism be defined as the assertion that the meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical experience1 444 the point lying in the fact that the experience must be particular rather than in the fact that it must be active 7,meaning of ,truth1 p4 #baj72 then pragmatism and the above postulate come to the same thing4 ,the present book1 however1 consists not so much in the assertion of this postulate as in the use of it4 ,and the method is successful in special applications by virtue of a certain statement of fact concerning relations4 7#b7 ,the statement of fact is that the relations between things1 conjunctive as well as disjunctive1 are just as much matters of direct particular experience1 neither more so nor less so1 than the things themselves4 7,cf4 also ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 p4 #bhj2 ,the ,will to ,believe1 p4 #bgh47 ,this is the central doctrine of the present book4 ,it distinguishes 'radical empiricism' from the ordinary empiricism of ,hume1 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 etc41 with which it is otherwise allied4 7,cf4 below1 pp4 #db-dd47 ,it provides an empirical and relational version of 'activity1' and so distinguishes the author's voluntarism from a view with which it is easily confused--the view which upholds a pure or transcendent activity4 7,cf4 below1 ,essay ,,vi47 ,it makes it possible to escape the vicious disjunctions that have thus far baffled philosophy3 such disjunctions as those between consciousness and physical nature1 between thought and its object1 between one mind and another1 and between one 'thing' and another4 ,these disjunctions need not be 'overcome' by calling in any extraneous trans-empirical connective support 7,meaning of ,truth1 ,preface1 p4 xiii72 they may now be avoided by regarding the dualities in question as only differences of empirical relationship among common empirical terms4 ,the pragmatistic account of 'meaning' and 'truth1' shows only how a vicious disjunction between 'idea' and 'object' may thus be avoided4 ,the present volume not only presents pragmatism in this light2 but adds similar accounts of the other dualities mentioned above4 ,thus while pragmatism and radical empiricism do not differ essentially when regarded as methods1 they are independent when regarded as doctrines4 ,for it would be possible to hold the pragmatistic theory of 'meaning' and 'truth1' without basing it on any fundamental theory of relations1 and without extending such a theory of relations to residual philosophical problems2 without1 in short1 holding either to the above 'statement of fact1' or to the following 'generalized conclusion4' 7#c7 ,the generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience4 ,the directly apprehended universe needs1 in short1 no extraneous trans-empirical connective support1 but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure4 ,when thus generalized1 'radical empiricism' is not only a theory of knowledge comprising pragmatism as a special chapter1 but a metaphysic as well4 ,it excludes the hypothesis of trans-empirical reality 7,cf4 below1 p4 #aie74 ,it is the author's most rigorous statement of his theory that reality is an experience-continuum4 7,meaning of ,truth1 p4 #aeb2 ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 ,lect4 ,v1 ,,vii47 ,it is that positive and constructive 'empiricism' of which ,professor ,james said3 ,let empiricism once become associated with religion1 as hitherto1 through some strange misunderstanding1 it has been associated with irreligion1 and ,i believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin4 7,op4 cit41 p4 #cad2 cf4 ibid41 ,lect4 ,,viii1 passim2 and ,the ,varieties of ,religious ,experience1 pp4 #eae-ebg47 ,the editor desires to acknowledge his obligations to the periodicals from which these essays have been reprinted1 and to the many friends of ,professor ,james who have rendered valuable advice and assistance in the preparation of the present volume4 ,,ralph ,,barton ,,perry4 ,,cambridge1 ,,massachusetts4 ,january #h1 #aiab4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,the use of numerals and italics is introduced by the editor4 ,,contents ,i4 ,,does ',,consciousness' ,,exist8 #a ,,ii4 ,a ,,world ,,of ,,pure ,,experience #ci ,,iii4 ,,the ,,thing ,,and ,,its ,,relations #ib ,,iv4 ,,how ,,two ,,minds ,,can ,,know ,,one ,,thing #abc ,v4 ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,affectional ,,facts ,,in ,a ,,world ,,of ,,pure ,,experience #acg ,,vi4 ,,the ,,experience ,,of ,,activity #aee ,,vii4 ,,the ,,essence ,,of ,,humanism #aij ,,viii4 ,,la ,,notion ,,de ,,conscience #bjf ,,ix4 ,,is ,,radical ,,empiricism ,,solipsistic8 #bcd ,x4 ,,mr4 ,,pitkin',s ,,refutation ,,of ',,radical ,,empiricism' #bda ,,xi4 ,,humanism ,,and ,,truth ,,once ,,more #bdd ,,xii4 ,,absolutism ,,and ,,empiricism #bff ,,index #bha ,i ,,does ',,consciousness' ,,exist8#b ',thoughts' and 'things' are names for two sorts of object1 which common sense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to each other4 ,philosophy1 reflecting on the contrast1 has varied in the past in her explanations of it1 and may be expected to vary in the future4 ,at first1 'spirit and matter1' 'soul and body1' stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest4 ,but one day ,kant undermined the soul and brought in the transcendental ego1 and ever since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance4 ,the transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist quarters to stand for everything1 in empiricist quarters for almost nothing4 ,in the hands of such writers as ,schuppe1 ,rehmke1 ,natorp1 ,mnsterberg--at any rate in his earlier writings1 ,schubert-,soldern and others1 the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition1 being only a name for the fact that the 'content' of experience is known4 ,it loses personal form and activity--these passing over to the content--and becomes a bare ,bewusstheit or ,bewusstsein berhaupt1 of which in its own right absolutely nothing can be said4 ,i believe that 'consciousness1' when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity1 is on the point of disappearing altogether4 ,it is the name of a nonentity1 and has no right to a place among first principles4 ,those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo1 the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy4 ,during the past year1 ,i have read a number of articles whose authors seemed just on the point of abandoning the notion of consciousness1#c and substituting for it that of an absolute experience not due to two factors4 ,but they were not quite radical enough1 not quite daring enough in their negations4 ,for twenty years past ,i have mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity2 for seven or eight years past ,i have suggested its non-existence to my students1 and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience4 ,it seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded4 ,to deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it--for undeniably 'thoughts' do exist--that ,i fear some readers will follow me no farther4 ,let me then immediately explain that ,i mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity1 but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function4 ,there is1 ,i mean1 no aboriginal stuff or quality of being1#d contrasted with that of which material objects are made1 out of which our thoughts of them are made2 but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform1 and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked4 ,that function is knowing4 ',consciousness' is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are1 but get reported1 are known4 ,whoever blots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for that function's being carried on4 ,i ,my thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world1 a stuff of which everything is composed1 and if we call that stuff 'pure experience1' then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter4 ,the relation itself is a part of pure experience2 one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge1 the knower1#e the other becomes the object known4 ,this will need much explanation before it can be understood4 ,the best way to get it understood is to contrast it with the alternative view2 and for that we may take the recentest alternative1 that in which the evaporation of the definite soul-substance has proceeded as far as it can go without being yet complete4 ,if neo-,kantism has expelled earlier forms of dualism1 we shall have expelled all forms if we are able to expel neo-,kantism in its turn4 ,for the thinkers ,i call neo-,kantian1 the word consciousness to-day does no more than signalize the fact that experience is indefeasibly dualistic in structure4 ,it means that not subject1 not object1 but object-plus-subject is the minimum that can actually be4 ,the subject-object distinction meanwhile is entirely different from that between mind and matter1 from that between body and soul4 ,souls were detachable1 had separate destinies2 things could happen to them4 ,to consciousness as such nothing can happen1 for1 timeless itself1 it is only a witness of happenings in time1 in which it plays no part4 ,it is1 in a word1 but the logical correlative of 'content' in an ,experience of which the peculiarity is that fact comes to light in it1 that awareness of content takes place4 ,consciousness as such is entirely impersonal--'self' and its activities belong to the content4 ,to say that ,i am self-conscious1 or conscious of putting forth volition1 means only that certain contents1 for which 'self' and 'effort of will' are the names1 are not without witness as they occur4 ,thus1 for these belated drinkers at the ,kantian spring1 we should have to admit consciousness as an 'epistemological' necessity1 even if we had no direct evidence of its being there4 ,but in addition to this1 we are supposed by almost every one to have an immediate consciousness of consciousness itself4 ,when the world of outer fact ceases to be materially present1 and we merely recall it in memory1 or fancy it1 the consciousness is believed to stand out and to be felt as a kind of impalpable inner flowing1 which1 once known in this sort of experience1 may equally be detected in presentations of the outer world4 ,the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what1 distinctly1 it is1 says a recent writer1 it seems to vanish4 ,it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness4 ,when we try to introspect the sensation of blue1 all we can see is the blue2 the other element is as if it were diaphanous4 ,yet it can be distinguished1 if we look attentively enough1 and know that there is something to look for4#f ,consciousness 7,bewusstheit71 says another philosopher1 is inexplicable and hardly describable1 yet all conscious experiences have this in common that what we call their content has this peculiar reference to a centre for which 'self' is the name1 in virtue of which reference alone the content is subjectively given1 or appears 444 ,while in this way consciousness1 or reference to a self1 is the only thing which distinguishes a conscious content from any sort of being that might be there with no one conscious of it1 yet this only ground of the distinction defies all closer explanations4 ,the existence of consciousness1 although it is the fundamental fact of psychology1 can indeed be laid down as certain1 can be brought out by analysis1 but can neither be defined nor deduced from anything but itself4#g ',can be brought out by analysis1' this author says4 ,this supposes that the consciousness is one element1 moment1 factor--call it what you like--of an experience of essentially dualistic inner constitution1 from which1 if you abstract the content1 the consciousness will remain revealed to its own eye4 ,experience1 at this rate1 would be much like a paint of which the world pictures were made4 ,paint has a dual constitution1 involving1 as it does1 a menstruum#h 7oil1 size or what not7 and a mass of content in the form of pigment suspended therein4 ,we can get the pure menstruum by letting the pigment settle1 and the pure pigment by pouring off the size or oil4 ,we operate here by physical subtraction2 and the usual view is1 that by mental subtraction we can separate the two factors of experience in an analogous way--not isolating them entirely1 but distinguishing them enough to know that they are two4 ,,ii ,now my contention is exactly the reverse of this4 ,experience1 ,i believe1 has no such inner duplicity2 and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes1 not by way of subtraction1 but by way of addition--the addition1 to a given concrete piece of it1 of other sets of experiences1 in connection with which severally its use or function may be of two different kinds4 ,the paint will also serve here as an illustration4 ,in a pot in a paint-shop1 along with other paints1 it serves in its entirety as so much saleable matter4 ,spread on a canvas1 with other paints around it1 it represents1 on the contrary1 a feature in a picture and performs a spiritual function4 ,just so1 ,i maintain1 does a given undivided portion of experience1 taken in one context of associates1 play the part of a knower1 of a state of mind1 of 'consciousness'2 while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known1 of an objective 'content4' ,in a word1 in one group it figures as a thought1 in another group as a thing4 ,and1 since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to speak of it as subjective and objective both at once4 ,the dualism connoted by such double-barrelled terms as 'experience1' 'phenomenon1' 'datum1' ',vorfindung'--terms which1 in philosophy at any rate1 tend more and more to replace the single-barrelled terms of 'thought' and 'thing'--that dualism1 ,i say1 is still preserved in this account1 but reinterpreted1 so that1 instead of being mysterious and elusive1 it becomes verifiable and concrete4 ,it is an affair of relations1 it falls outside1 not inside1 the single experience considered1 and can always be particularized and defined4 ,the entering wedge for this more concrete way of understanding the dualism was fashioned by ,locke when he made the word 'idea' stand indifferently for thing and thought1 and by ,berkeley when he said that what common sense means by realities is exactly what the philosopher means by ideas4 ,neither ,locke nor ,berkeley thought his truth out into perfect clearness1 but it seems to me that the conception ,i am defending does little more than consistently carry out the 'pragmatic' method which they were the first to use4 ,if the reader will take his own experiences1 he will see what ,i mean4 ,let him begin with a perceptual experience1 the 'presentation1' so called1 of a physical object1 his actual field of vision1 the room he sits in1 with the book he is reading as its centre2 and let him for the present treat this complex object in the common-sense way as being 'really' what it seems to be1 namely1 a collection of physical things cut out from an environing world of other physical things with which these physical things have actual or potential relations4 ,now at the same time it is just those self-same things which his mind1 as we say1 perceives2 and the whole philosophy of perception from ,democritus's time downwards has been just one long wrangle over the paradox that what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once1 both in outer space and in a person's mind4 ',representative' theories of perception avoid the logical paradox1 but on the other hand they violate the reader's sense of life1 which knows no intervening mental image but seems to see the room and the book immediately just as they physically exist4 ,the puzzle of how the one identical room can be in two places is at bottom just the puzzle of how one identical point can be on two lines4 ,it can1 if it be situated at their intersection2 and similarly1 if the 'pure experience' of the room were a place of intersection of two processes1 which connected it with different groups of associates respectively1 it could be counted twice over1 as belonging to either group1 and spoken of loosely as existing in two places1 although it would remain all the time a numerically single thing4 ,well1 the experience is a member of diverse processes that can be followed away from it along entirely different lines4 ,the one self-identical thing has so many relations to the rest of experience that you can take it in disparate systems of association1 and treat it as belonging with opposite contexts4#i ,in one of these contexts it is your 'field of consciousness'2 in another it is 'the room in which you sit1' and it enters both contexts in its wholeness1 giving no pretext for being said to attach itself to consciousness by one of its parts or aspects1 and to outer reality by another4 ,what are the two processes1 now1 into which the room-experience simultaneously enters in this way8 ,one of them is the reader's personal biography1 the other is the history of the house of which the room is part4 ,the presentation1 the experience1 the that in short 7for until we have decided what it is it must be a mere that7 is the last term of a train of sensations1 emotions1 decisions1 movements1 classifications1 expectations1 etc41 ending in the present1 and the first term of a series of similar 'inner' operations extending into the future1 on the reader's part4 ,on the other hand1 the very same that is the terminus ad quem of a lot of previous physical operations1 carpentering1 papering1 furnishing1 warming1 etc41 and the terminus a quo of a lot of future ones1 in which it will be concerned when undergoing the destiny of a physical room4 ,the physical and the mental operations form curiously incompatible groups4 ,as a room1 the experience has occupied that spot and had that environment for thirty years4 ,as your field of consciousness it may never have existed until now4 ,as a room1 attention will go on to discover endless new details in it4 ,as your mental state merely1 few new ones will emerge under attention's eye4 ,as a room1 it will take an earthquake1 or a gang of men1 and in any case a certain amount of time1 to destroy it4 ,as your subjective state1 the closing of your eyes1 or any instantaneous play of your fancy will suffice4 ,in the real world1 fire will consume it4 ,in your mind1 you can let fire play over it without effect4 ,as an outer object1 you must pay so much a month to inhabit it4 ,as an inner content1 you may occupy it for any length of time rent-free4 ,if1 in short1 you follow it in the mental direction1 taking it along with events of personal biography solely1 all sorts of things are true of it which are false1 and false of it which are true if you treat it as a real thing experienced1 follow it in the physical direction1 and relate it to associates in the outer world4 ,,iii ,so far1 all seems plain sailing1 but my thesis will probably grow less plausible to the reader when ,i pass from percepts to concepts1 or from the case of things presented to that of things remote4 ,i believe1 nevertheless1 that here also the same law holds good4 ,if we take conceptual manifolds1 or memories1 or fancies1 they also are in their first intention mere bits of pure experience1 and1 as such1 are single thats which act in one context as objects1 and in another context figure as mental states4 ,by taking them in their first intention1 ,i mean ignoring their relation to possible perceptual experiences with which they may be connected1 which they may lead to and terminate in1 and which then they may be supposed to 'represent4' ,taking them in this way first1 we confine the problem to a world merely 'thought-of' and not directly felt or seen4#aj ,this world1 just like the world of percepts1 comes to us at first as a chaos of experiences1 but lines of order soon get traced4 ,we find that any bit of it which we may cut out as an example is connected with distinct groups of associates1 just as our perceptual experiences are1 that these associates link themselves with it by different relations1#aa and that one forms the inner history of a person1 while the other acts as an impersonal 'objective' world1 either spatial and temporal1 or else merely logical or mathematical1 or otherwise 'ideal4' ,the first obstacle on the part of the reader to seeing that these non-perceptual experiences have objectivity as well as subjectivity will probably be due to the intrusion into his mind of percepts1 that third group of associates with which the non-perceptual experiences have relations1 and which1 as a whole1 they 'represent1' standing to them as thoughts to things4 ,this important function of the non-perceptual experiences complicates the question and confuses it2 for1 so used are we to treat percepts as the sole genuine realities that1 unless we keep them out of the discussion1 we tend altogether to overlook the objectivity that lies in non-perceptual experiences by themselves4 ,we treat them1 'knowing' percepts as they do1 as through and through subjective1 and say that they are wholly constituted of the stuff called consciousness1 using this term now for a kind of entity1 after the fashion which ,i am seeking to refute4#ab ,abstracting1 then1 from percepts altogether1 what ,i maintain is1 that any single non-perceptual experience tends to get counted twice over1 just as a perceptual experience does1 figuring in one context as an object or field of objects1 in another as a state of mind3 and all this without the least internal self-diremption on its own part into consciousness and content4 ,it is all consciousness in one taking2 and1 in the other1 all content4 ,i find this objectivity of non-perceptual experiences1 this complete parallelism in point of reality between the presently felt and the remotely thought1 so well set forth in a page of ,mnsterberg's ,grundzge1 that ,i will quote it as it stands4 ,i may only think of my objects1 says ,professor ,mnsterberg2 yet1 in my living thought they stand before me exactly as perceived objects would do1 no matter how different the two ways of apprehending them may be in their genesis4 ,the book here lying on the table before me1 and the book in the next room of which ,i think and which ,i mean to get1 are both in the same sense given realities for me1 realities which ,i acknowledge and of which ,i take account4 ,if you agree that the perceptual object is not an idea within me1 but that percept and thing1 as indistinguishably one1 are really experienced there1 outside1 you ought not to believe that the merely thought-of object is hid away inside of the thinking subject4 ,the object of which ,i think1 and of whose existence ,i take cognizance without letting it now work upon my senses1 occupies its definite place in the outer world as much as does the object which ,i directly see4 ,what is true of the here and the there1 is also true of the now and the then4 ,i know of the thing which is present and perceived1 but ,i know also of the thing which yesterday was but is no more1 and which ,i only remember4 ,both can determine my present conduct1 both are parts of the reality of which ,i keep account4 ,it is true that of much of the past ,i am uncertain1 just as ,i am uncertain of much of what is present if it be but dimly perceived4 ,but the interval of time does not in principle alter my relation to the object1 does not transform it from an object known into a mental state4444 ,the things in the room here which ,i survey1 and those in my distant home of which ,i think1 the things of this minute and those of my long-vanished boyhood1 influence and decide me alike1 with a reality which my experience of them directly feels4 ,they both make up my real world1 they make it directly1 they do not have first to be introduced to me and mediated by ideas which now and here arise within me4444 ,this not-me character of my recollections and expectations does not imply that the external objects of which ,i am aware in those experiences should necessarily be there also for others4 ,the objects of dreamers and hallucinated persons are wholly without general validity4 ,but even were they centaurs and golden mountains1 they still would be 'off there1' in fairy land1 and not 'inside' of ourselves4#ac ,this certainly is the immediate1 primary1 naf1 or practical way of taking our thought-of world4 ,were there no perceptual world to serve as its 'reductive1' in ,taine's sense1 by being 'stronger' and more genuinely 'outer' 7so that the whole merely thought-of world seems weak and inner in comparison71 our world of thought would be the only world1 and would enjoy complete reality in our belief4 ,this actually happens in our dreams1 and in our day-dreams so long as percepts do not interrupt them4 ,and yet1 just as the seen room 7to go back to our late example7 is also a field of consciousness1 so the conceived or recollected room is also a state of mind2 and the doubling-up of the experience has in both cases similar grounds4 ,the room thought-of1 namely1 has many thought-of couplings with many thought-of things4 ,some of these couplings are inconstant1 others are stable4 ,in the reader's personal history the room occupies a single date--he saw it only once perhaps1 a year ago4 ,of the house's history1 on the other hand1 it forms a permanent ingredient4 ,some couplings have the curious stubbornness1 to borrow ,royce's term1 of fact2 others show the fluidity of fancy--we let them come and go as we please4 ,grouped with the rest of its house1 with the name of its town1 of its owner1 builder1 value1 decorative plan1 the room maintains a definite foothold1 to which1 if we try to loosen it1 it tends to return1 and to reassert itself with force4#ad ,with these associates1 in a word1 it coheres1 while to other houses1 other towns1 other owners1 etc41 it shows no tendency to cohere at all4 ,the two collections1 first of its cohesive1 and1 second1 of its loose associates1 inevitably come to be contrasted4 ,we call the first collection the system of external realities1 in the midst of which the room1 as 'real1' exists2 the other we call the stream of our internal thinking1 in which1 as a 'mental image1' it for a moment floats4#ae ,the room thus again gets counted twice over4 ,it plays two different rles1 being ,gedanke and ,gedachtes1 the thought-of-an-object1 and the object-thought-of1 both in one2 and all this without paradox or mystery1 just as the same material thing may be both low and high1 or small and great1 or bad and good1 because of its relations to opposite parts of an environing world4 ,as 'subjective' we say that the experience represents2 as 'objective' it is represented4 ,what represents and what is represented is here numerically the same2 but we must remember that no dualism of being represented and representing resides in the experience per se4 ,in its pure state1 or when isolated1 there is no self-splitting of it into consciousness and what the consciousness is 'of4' ,its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely1 realized only when the experience is 'taken1' i4e41 talked-of1 twice1 considered along with its two differing contexts respectively1 by a new retrospective experience1 of which that whole past complication now forms the fresh content4 ,the instant field of the present is at all times what ,i call the 'pure' experience4 ,it is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet4 ,for the time being1 it is plain1 unqualified actuality1 or existence1 a simple that4 ,in this naf immediacy it is of course valid2 it is there1 we act upon it2 and the doubling of it in retrospection into a state of mind and a reality intended thereby1 is just one of the acts4 ,the 'state of mind1' first treated explicitly as such in retrospection1 will stand corrected or confirmed1 and the retrospective experience in its turn will get a similar treatment2 but the immediate experience in its passing is always 'truth1'#af practical truth1 something to act on1 at its own movement4 ,if the world were then and there to go out like a candle1 it would remain truth absolute and objective1 for it would be 'the last word1' would have no critic1 and no one would ever oppose the thought in it to the reality intended4#ag ,i think ,i may now claim to have made my thesis clear4 ,consciousness connotes a kind of external relation1 and does not denote a special stuff or way of being4 ,the peculiarity of our experiences1 that they not only are1 but are known1 which their 'conscious' quality is invoked to explain1 is better explained by their relations--these relations themselves being experiences--to one another4 ,,iv ,were ,i now to go on to treat of the knowing of perceptual by conceptual experiences1 it would again prove to be an affair of external relations4 ,one experience would be the knower1 the other the reality known2 and ,i could perfectly well define1 without the notion of 'consciousness1' what the knowing actually and practically amounts to--leading-towards1 namely1 and terminating-in percepts1 through a series of transitional experiences which the world supplies4 ,but ,i will not treat of this1 space being insufficient4#ah ,i will rather consider a few objections that are sure to be urged against the entire theory as it stands4 ,v ,first of all1 this will be asked3 ,if experience has not 'conscious' existence1 if it be not partly made of 'consciousness1' of what then is it made8 ,matter we know1 and thought we know1 and conscious content we know1 but neutral and simple 'pure experience' is something we know not at all4 ,say what it consists of--for it must consist of something--or be willing to give it up6 ,to this challenge the reply is easy4 ,although for fluency's sake ,i myself spoke early in this article of a stuff of pure experience1 ,i have now to say that there is no general stuff of which experience at large is made4 ,there are as many stuffs as there are 'natures' in the things experienced4 ,if you ask what any one bit of pure experience is made of1 the answer is always the same3 ,it is made of that1 of just what appears1 of space1 of intensity1 of flatness1 brownness1 heaviness1 or what not4 ,shadworth ,hodgson's analysis here leaves nothing to be desired4#ai ,experience is only a collective name for all these sensible natures1 and save for time and space 7and1 if you like1 for 'being'7 there appears no universal element of which all things are made4 ,,vi ,the next objection is more formidable1 in fact it sounds quite crushing when one hears it first4 ,if it be the self-same piece of pure experience1 taken twice over1 that serves now as thought and now as thing--so the objection runs--how comes it that its attributes should differ so fundamentally in the two takings4 ,as thing1 the experience is extended2 as thought1 it occupies no space or place4 ,as thing1 it is red1 hard1 heavy2 but who ever heard of a red1 hard or heavy thought8 ,yet even now you said that an experience is made of just what appears1 and what appears is just such adjectives4 ,how can the one experience in its thing-function be made of them1 consist of them1 carry them as its own attributes1 while in its thought-function it disowns them and attributes them elsewhere4 ,there is a self-contradiction here from which the radical dualism of thought and thing is the only truth that can save us4 ,only if the thought is one kind of being can the adjectives exist in it 'intentionally' 7to use the scholastic term72 only if the thing is another kind1 can they exist in it constitutively and energetically4 ,no simple subject can take the same adjectives and at one time be qualified by it1 and at another time be merely 'of' it1 as of something only meant or known4 ,the solution insisted on by this objector1 like many other common-sense solutions1 grows the less satisfactory the more one turns it in one's mind4 ,to begin with1 are thought and thing as heterogeneous as is commonly said8 ,no one denies that they have some categories in common4 ,their relations to time are identical4 ,both1 moreover1 may have parts 7for psychologists in general treat thoughts as having them72 and both may be complex or simple4 ,both are of kinds1 can be compared1 added and subtracted and arranged in serial orders4 ,all sorts of adjectives qualify our thoughts which appear incompatible with consciousness1 being as such a bare diaphaneity4 ,for instance1 they are natural and easy1 or laborious4 ,they are beautiful1 happy1 intense1 interesting1 wise1 idiotic1 focal1 marginal1 insipid1 confused1 vague1 precise1 rational1 casual1 general1 particular1 and many things besides4 ,moreover1 the chapters on ',perception' in the psychology-books are full of facts that make for the essential homogeneity of thought with thing4 ,how1 if 'subject' and 'object' were separated 'by the whole diameter of being1' and had no attributes in common1 could it be so hard to tell1 in a presented and recognized material object1 what part comes in through the sense-organs and what part comes 'out of one's own head'8 ,sensations and apperceptive ideas fuse here so intimately that you can no more tell where one begins and the other ends1 than you can tell1 in those cunning circular panoramas that have lately been exhibited1 where the real foreground and the painted canvas join together4#bj ,descartes for the first time defined thought as the absolutely unextended1 and later philosophers have accepted the description as correct4 ,but what possible meaning has it to say that1 when we think of a foot-rule or a square yard1 extension is not attributable to our thought8 ,of every extended object the adequate mental picture must have all the extension of the object itself4 ,the difference between objective and subjective extension is one of relation to a context solely4 ,in the mind the various extents maintain no necessarily stubborn order relatively to each other1 while in the physical world they bound each other stably1 and1 added together1 make the great enveloping ,unit which we believe in and call real ,space4 ,as 'outer1' they carry themselves adversely1 so to speak1 to one another1 exclude one another and maintain their distances2 while1 as 'inner1' their order is loose1 and they form a durcheinander in which unity is lost4#ba ,but to argue from this that inner experience is absolutely inextensive seems to me little short of absurd4 ,the two worlds differ1 not by the presence or absence of extension1 but by the relations of the extensions which in both worlds exist4 ,does not this case of extension now put us on the track of truth in the case of other qualities8 ,it does2 and ,i am surprised that the facts should not have been noticed long ago4 ,why1 for example1 do we call a fire hot1 and water wet1 and yet refuse to say that our mental state1 when it is 'of' these objects1 is either wet or hot8 ',intentionally1' at any rate1 and when the mental state is a vivid image1 hotness and wetness are in it just as much as they are in the physical experience4 ,the reason is this1 that1 as the general chaos of all our experiences gets sifted1 we find that there are some fires that will always burn sticks and always warm our bodies1 and that there are some waters that will always put out fires2 while there are other fires and waters that will not act at all4 ,the general group of experiences that act1 that do not only possess their natures intrinsically1 but wear them adjectively and energetically1 turning them against one another1 comes inevitably to be contrasted with the group whose members1 having identically the same natures1 fail to manifest them in the 'energetic' way4#bb ,i make for myself now an experience of blazing fire2 ,i place it near my body2 but it does not warm me in the least4 ,i lay a stick upon it1 and the stick either burns or remains green1 as ,i please4 ,i call up water1 and pour it on the fire1 and absolutely no difference ensues4 ,i account for all such facts by calling this whole train of experiences unreal1 a mental train4 ,mental fire is what won't burn real sticks2 mental water is what won't necessarily 7though of course it may7 put out even a mental fire4 ,mental knives may be sharp1 but they won't cut real wood4 ,mental triangles are pointed1 but their points won't wound4 ,with 'real' objects1 on the contrary1 consequences always accrue2 and thus the real experiences get sifted from the mental ones1 the things from our thoughts of them1 fanciful or true1 and precipitated together as the stable part of the whole experience-chaos1 under the name of the physical world4 ,of this our perceptual experiences are the nucleus1 they being the originally strong experiences4 ,we add a lot of conceptual experiences to them1 making these strong also in imagination1 and building out the remoter parts of the physical world by their means2 and around this core of reality the world of laxly connected fancies and mere rhapsodical objects floats like a bank of clouds4 ,in the clouds1 all sorts of rules are violated which in the core are kept4 ,extensions there can be indefinitely located2 motion there obeys no ,newton's laws4 ,,vii ,there is a peculiar class of experiences to which1 whether we take them as subjective or as objective1 we assign their several natures as attributes1 because in both contexts they affect their associates actively1 though in neither quite as 'strongly' or as sharply as things affect one another by their physical energies4 ,i refer here to appreciations1 which form an ambiguous sphere of being1 belonging with emotion on the one hand1 and having objective 'value' on the other1 yet seeming not quite inner nor quite outer1 as if a diremption had begun but had not made itself complete4#bc ,experiences of painful objects1 for example1 are usually also painful experiences2 perceptions of loveliness1 of ugliness1 tend to pass muster as lovely or as ugly perceptions2 intuitions of the morally lofty are lofty intuitions4 ,sometimes the adjective wanders as if uncertain where to fix itself4 ,shall we speak of seductive visions or of visions of seductive things8 ,of wicked desires or of desires for wickedness8 ,of healthy thoughts or of thoughts of healthy objects8 ,of good impulses1 or of impulses towards the good8 ,of feelings of anger1 or of angry feelings8 ,both in the mind and in the thing1 these natures modify their context1 exclude certain associates and determine others1 have their mates and incompatibles4 ,yet not as stubbornly as in the case of physical qualities1 for beauty and ugliness1 love and hatred1 pleasant and painful can1 in certain complex experiences1 coexist4 ,if one were to make an evolutionary construction of how a lot of originally chaotic pure experiences became gradually differentiated into an orderly inner and outer world1 the whole theory would turn upon one's success in explaining how or why the quality of an experience1 once active1 could become less so1 and1 from being an energetic attribute in some cases1 elsewhere lapse into the status of an inert or merely internal 'nature4' ,this would be the 'evolution' of the psychical from the bosom of the physical1 in which the esthetic1 moral and otherwise emotional experiences would represent a halfway stage4 ,,viii ,but a last cry of non possumus will probably go up from many readers4 ,all very pretty as a piece of ingenuity1 they will say1 but our consciousness itself intuitively contradicts you4 ,we1 for our part1 know that we are conscious4 ,we feel our thought1 flowing as a life within us1 in absolute contrast with the objects which it so unremittingly escorts4 ,we can not be faithless to this immediate intuition4 ,the dualism is a fundamental datum3 ,let no man join what ,god has put asunder4 ,my reply to this is my last word1 and ,i greatly grieve that to many it will sound materialistic4 ,i can not help that1 however1 for ,i1 too1 have my intuitions and ,i must obey them4 ,let the case be what it may in others1 ,i am as confident as ,i am of anything that1 in myself1 the stream of thinking 7which ,i recognize emphatically as a phenomenon7 is only a careless name for what1 when scrutinized1 reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing4 ,the ',i think' which ,kant said must be able to accompany all my objects1 is the ',i breathe' which actually does accompany them4 ,there are other internal facts besides breathing 7intracephalic muscular adjustments1 etc41 of which ,i have said a word in my larger ,psychology71 and these increase the assets of 'consciousness1' so far as the latter is subject to immediate perception2#bd but breath1 which was ever the original of 'spirit1' breath moving outwards1 between the glottis and the nostrils1 is1 ,i am persuaded1 the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness4 ,that entity is fictitious1 while thoughts in the concrete are fully real4 ,but thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are4 ,i wish ,i might believe myself to have made that plausible in this article4 ,in another article ,i shall try to make the general notion of a world composed of pure experiences still more clear4 ,,footnotes3 #b ,reprinted from the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #ah1 ,september #a1 #aijd4 ,for the relation between this essay and those which follow1 cf4 below1 pp4 #ec-ed4 ,,ed4 #c ,articles by ,baldwin1 ,ward1 ,bawden1 ,king1 ,alexander and others4 ,dr4 ,perry is frankly over the border4 #d ,similarly1 there is no activity of 'consciousness' as such4 ,see below1 pp4 #agj ff41 note4 ,,ed4 #e ,in my ,psychology ,i have tried to show that we need no knower other than the 'passing thought4' ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,i1 pp4 #cch ff4 #f ,g4 ,e4 ,moore3 ,mind1 vol4 ,,xii1 ,n4 ,s41 #aijc1 p4 #dej4 #g ,paul ,natorp3 ,einleitung in die ,psychologie1 #ahhh1 pp4 #ad1 #aab4 #h ,figuratively speaking1 consciousness may be said to be the one universal solvent1 or menstruum1 in which the different concrete kinds of psychic acts and facts are contained1 whether in concealed or in obvious form4 ,g4 ,t4 ,ladd3 ,psychology1 ,descriptive and ,explanatory1 #ahid1 p4 #cj4 #i ,for a parallel statement of this view1 cf4 the author's ,meaning of ,truth1 p4 #di1 note4 ,cf4 also below1 pp4 #aif-aig4 ,,ed4 #aj ,for the author's recognition of concepts as a co-ordinate realm of reality1 cf4 his ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #db1 #aie1 note2 ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 pp4 #cci-cdj2 ,some ,problems of ,philosophy1 pp4 #ej-eg1 #fg-gj2 and below1 p4 #af1 note4 ,giving this view the name 'logical realism1' he remarks elsewhere that his philosophy may be regarded as somewhat eccentric in its attempt to combine logical realism with an otherwise empiricist mode of thought 7,some ,problems of ,philosophy1 p4 #ajf74 ,,ed4 #aa ,here as elsewhere the relations are of course experienced relations1 members of the same originally chaotic manifold of non-perceptual experience of which the related terms themselves are parts4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #db4 #ab ,of the representative function of non-perceptual experience as a whole1 ,i will say a word in a subsequent article3 it leads too far into the general theory of knowledge for much to be said about it in a short paper like this4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #eb ff4 #ac ,mnsterberg3 ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #dh4 #ad ,cf4 ,a4 ,l4 ,hodder3 ,the ,adversaries of the ,sceptic1 pp4 #id-ii4 #ae ,for simplicity's sake ,i confine my exposition to 'external' reality4 ,but there is also the system of ideal reality in which the room plays its part4 ,relations of comparison1 of classification1 serial order1 value1 also are stubborn1 assign a definite place to the room1 unlike the incoherence of its places in the mere rhapsody of our successive thoughts4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #af4 #af ,note the ambiguity of this term1 which is taken sometimes objectively and sometimes subjectively4 #ag ,in the ,psychological ,review for ,july #aijd1 ,dr4 ,r4 ,b4 ,perry has published a view of ,consciousness which comes nearer to mine than any other with which ,i am acquainted4 ,at present1 ,dr4 ,perry thinks1 every field of experience is so much 'fact4' ,it becomes 'opinion' or 'thought' only in retrospection1 when a fresh experience1 thinking the same object1 alters and corrects it4 ,but the corrective experience becomes itself in turn corrected1 and thus experience as a whole is a process in which what is objective originally forever turns subjective1 turns into our apprehension of the object4 ,i strongly recommend ,dr4 ,perry's admirable article to my readers4 #ah ,i have given a partial account of the matter in ,mind1 vol4 ,x1 p4 #bg1 #ahhe reprinted in ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #a-db1 and in the ,psychological ,review1 vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #aje1 #ahie partly reprinted in ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #dc-ej4 ,see also ,c4 ,a4 ,strong's article in the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #bec1 ,may #ab1 #aijd4 ,i hope myself very soon to recur to the matter4 ,see below1 pp4 #eb ff4 #ai ,cf4 ,shadworth ,hodgson3 ,the ,metaphysic of ,experience1 vol4 ,i4 passim2 ,the ,philosophy of ,reflection1 bk4 ,,ii1 ch4 ,,iv1 #c4 ,,ed4 #bj ,spencer's proof of his ',transfigured ,realism' 7his doctrine that there is an absolutely non-mental reality7 comes to mind as a splendid instance of the impossibility of establishing radical heterogeneity between thought and thing4 ,all his painfully accumulated points of difference run gradually into their opposites1 and are full of exceptions4 ,cf4 ,spencer3 ,principles of ,psychology1 part ,,vii1 ch4 ,,xix4 #ba ,i speak here of the complete inner life in which the mind plays freely with its materials4 ,of course the mind's free play is restricted when it seeks to copy real things in real space4 #bb ,but there are also mental activity trains1 in which thoughts do work on each other4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #ahd1 note4 ,,ed4 #bc ,this topic is resumed below1 pp4 #acg ff4 ,,ed4 #bd ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,i1 pp4 #bii-cje4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #afi-aga 7note74 ,,ii ,a ,,world ,,of ,,pure ,,experience#be ,it is difficult not to notice a curious unrest in the philosophic atmosphere of the time1 a loosening of old landmarks1 a softening of oppositions1 a mutual borrowing from one another on the part of systems anciently closed1 and an interest in new suggestions1 however vague1 as if the one thing sure were the inadequacy of the extant school-solutions4 ,the dissatisfaction with these seems due for the most part to a feeling that they are too abstract and academic4 ,life is confused and superabundant1 and what the younger generation appears to crave is more of the temperament of life in its philosophy1 even though it were at some cost of logical rigor and of formal purity4 ,transcendental idealism is inclining to let the world wag incomprehensibly1 in spite of its ,absolute ,subject and his unity of purpose4 ,berkeleyan idealism is abandoning the principle of parsimony and dabbling in panpsychic speculations4 ,empiricism flirts with teleology2 and1 strangest of all1 natural realism1 so long decently buried1 raises its head above the turf1 and finds glad hands outstretched from the most unlikely quarters to help it to its feet again4 ,we are all biased by our personal feelings1 ,i know1 and ,i am personally discontented with extant solutions2 so ,i seem to read the signs of a great unsettlement1 as if the upheaval of more real conceptions and more fruitful methods were imminent1 as if a true landscape might result1 less clipped1 straight-edged and artificial4 ,if philosophy be really on the eve of any considerable rearrangement1 the time should be propitious for any one who has suggestions of his own to bring forward4 ,for many years past my mind has been growing into a certain type of ,weltanschauung4 ,rightly or wrongly1 ,i have got to the point where ,i can hardly see things in any other pattern4 ,i propose1 therefore1 to describe the pattern as clearly as ,i can consistently with great brevity1 and to throw my description into the bubbling vat of publicity where1 jostled by rivals and torn by critics1 it will eventually either disappear from notice1 or else1 if better luck befall it1 quietly subside to the profundities1 and serve as a possible ferment of new growths or a nucleus of new crystallization4 ,i4 ,,radical ,,empiricism ,i give the name of 'radical empiricism' to my ,weltanschauung4 ,empiricism is known as the opposite of rationalism4 ,rationalism tends to emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of being4 ,empiricism1 on the contrary1 lays the explanatory stress upon the part1 the element1 the individual1 and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction4 ,my description of things1 accordingly1 starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order4 ,it is essentially a mosaic philosophy1 a philosophy of plural facts1 like that of ,hume and his descendants1 who refer these facts neither to ,substances in which they inhere nor to an ,absolute ,mind that creates them as its objects4 ,but it differs from the ,humian type of empiricism in one particular which makes me add the epithet radical4 ,to be radical1 an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced1 nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced4 ,for such a philosophy1 the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations1 and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system4 ,elements may indeed be redistributed1 the original placing of things getting corrected1 but a real place must be found for every kind of thing experienced1 whether term or relation1 in the final philosophic arrangement4 ,now1 ordinary empiricism1 in spite of the fact that conjunctive and disjunctive relations present themselves as being fully co-ordinate parts of experience1 has always shown a tendency to do away with the connections of things1 and to insist most on the disjunctions4 ,berkeley's nominalism1 ,hume's statement that whatever things we distinguish are as 'loose and separate' as if they had 'no manner of connection1' ,james ,mill's denial that similars have anything 'really' in common1 the resolution of the causal tie into habitual sequence1 ,john ,mill's account of both physical things and selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities1 and the general pulverization of all ,experience by association and the mind-dust theory1 are examples of what ,i mean4#bf ,the natural result of such a world-picture has been the efforts of rationalism to correct its incoherencies by the addition of trans-experiential agents of unification1 substances1 intellectual categories and powers1 or ,selves2 whereas1 if empiricism had only been radical and taken everything that comes without disfavor1 conjunction as well as separation1 each at its face value1 the results would have called for no such artificial correction4 ,radical empiricism1 as ,i understand it1 does full justice to conjunctive relations1 without1 however1 treating them as rationalism always tends to treat them1 as being true in some supernal way1 as if the unity of things and their variety belonged to different orders of truth and vitality altogether4 ,,ii4 ,,conjunctive ,,relations ,relations are of different degrees of intimacy4 ,merely to be 'with' one another in a universe of discourse is the most external relation that terms can have1 and seems to involve nothing whatever as to farther consequences4 ,simultaneity and time-interval come next1 and then space-adjacency and distance4 ,after them1 similarity and difference1 carrying the possibility of many inferences4 ,then relations of activity1 tying terms into series involving change1 tendency1 resistance1 and the causal order generally4 ,finally1 the relation experienced between terms that form states of mind1 and are immediately conscious of continuing each other4 ,the organization of the ,self as a system of memories1 purposes1 strivings1 fulfilments or disappointments1 is incidental to this most intimate of all relations1 the terms of which seem in many cases actually to compenetrate and suffuse each other's being4#bg ,philosophy has always turned on grammatical particles4 ,with1 near1 next1 like1 from1 towards1 against1 because1 for1 through1 my--these words designate types of conjunctive relation arranged in a roughly ascending order of intimacy and inclusiveness4 ,a priori1 we can imagine a universe of withness but no nextness2 or one of nextness but no likeness1 or of likeness with no activity1 or of activity with no purpose1 or of purpose with no ego4 ,these would be universes1 each with its own grade of unity4 ,the universe of human experience is1 by one or another of its parts1 of each and all these grades4 ,whether or not it possibly enjoys some still more absolute grade of union does not appear upon the surface4 ,taken as it does appear1 our universe is to a large extent chaotic4 ,no one single type of connection runs through all the experiences that compose it4 ,if we take space-relations1 they fail to connect minds into any regular system4 ,causes and purposes obtain only among special series of facts4 ,the self-relation seems extremely limited and does not link two different selves together4 ,prima facie1 if you should liken the universe of absolute idealism to an aquarium1 a crystal globe in which goldfish are swimming1 you would have to compare the empiricist universe to something more like one of those dried human heads with which the ,dyaks of ,borneo deck their lodges4 ,the skull forms a solid nucleus2 but innumerable feathers1 leaves1 strings1 beads1 and loose appendices of every description float and dangle from it1 and1 save that they terminate in it1 seem to have nothing to do with one another4 ,even so my experiences and yours float and dangle1 terminating1 it is true1 in a nucleus of common perception1 but for the most part out of sight and irrelevant and unimaginable to one another4 ,this imperfect intimacy1 this bare relation of withness between some parts of the sum total of experience and other parts1 is the fact that ordinary empiricism over-emphasizes against rationalism1 the latter always tending to ignore it unduly4 ,radical empiricism1 on the contrary1 is fair to both the unity and the disconnection4 ,it finds no reason for treating either as illusory4 ,it allots to each its definite sphere of description1 and agrees that there appear to be actual forces at work which tend1 as time goes on1 to make the unity greater4 ,the conjunctive relation that has given most trouble to philosophy is the co-conscious transition1 so to call it1 by which one experience passes into another when both belong to the same self4 ,about the facts there is no question4 ,my experiences and your experiences are 'with' each other in various external ways1 but mine pass into mine1 and yours pass into yours in a way in which yours and mine never pass into one another4 ,within each of our personal histories1 subject1 object1 interest and purpose are continuous or may be continuous4#bh ,personal histories are processes of change in time1 and the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced4 ',change' in this case means continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition4 ,but continuous transition is one sort of a conjunctive relation2 and to be a radical empiricist means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all others1 for this is the strategic point1 the position through which1 if a hole be made1 all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions pour into our philosophy4 ,the holding fast to this relation means taking it at its face value1 neither less nor more2 and to take it at its face value means first of all to take it just as we feel it1 and not to confuse ourselves with abstract talk about it1 involving words that drive us to invent secondary conceptions in order to neutralize their suggestions and to make our actual experience again seem rationally possible4 ,what ,i do feel simply when a later moment of my experience succeeds an earlier one is that though they are two moments1 the transition from the one to the other is continuous4 ,continuity here is a definite sort of experience2 just as definite as is the discontinuity-experience which ,i find it impossible to avoid when ,i seek to make the transition from an experience of my own to one of yours4 ,in this latter case ,i have to get on and off again1 to pass from a thing lived to another thing only conceived1 and the break is positively experienced and noted4 ,though the functions exerted by my experience and by yours may be the same 7e4g41 the same objects known and the same purposes followed71 yet the sameness has in this case to be ascertained expressly 7and often with difficulty and uncertainty7 after the break has been felt2 whereas in passing from one of my own moments to another the sameness of object and interest is unbroken1 and both the earlier and the later experience are of things directly lived4 ,there is no other nature1 no other whatness than this absence of break and this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive relations1 the passing of one experience into another when they belong to the same self4 ,and this whatness is real empirical 'content1' just as the whatness of separation and discontinuity is real content in the contrasted case4 ,practically to experience one's personal continuum in this living way is to know the originals of the ideas of continuity and of sameness1 to know what the words stand for concretely1 to own all that they can ever mean4 ,but all experiences have their conditions2 and over-subtle intellects1 thinking about the facts here1 and asking how they are possible1 have ended by substituting a lot of static objects of conception for the direct perceptual experiences4 ,sameness1 they have said1 must be a stark numerical identity2 it can't run on from next to next4 ,continuity can't mean mere absence of gap2 for if you say two things are in immediate contact1 at the contact how can they be two8 ,if1 on the other hand1 you put a relation of transition between them1 that itself is a third thing1 and needs to be related or hitched to its terms4 ,an infinite series is involved1 and so on4 ,the result is that from difficulty to difficulty1 the plain conjunctive experience has been discredited by both schools1 the empiricists leaving things permanently disjoined1 and the rationalist remedying the looseness by their ,absolutes or ,substances1 or whatever other fictitious agencies of union they may have employed4#bi ,from all which artificiality we can be saved by a couple of simple reflections3 first1 that conjunctions and separations are1 at all events1 co-ordinate phenomena which1 if we take experiences at their face value1 must be accounted equally real2 and second1 that if we insist on treating things as really separate when they are given as continuously joined1 invoking1 when union is required1 transcendental principles to overcome the separateness we have assumed1 then we ought to stand ready to perform the converse act4 ,we ought to invoke higher principles of disunion1 also1 to make our merely experienced disjunctions more truly real4 ,failing thus1 we ought to let the originally given continuities stand on their own bottom4 ,we have no right to be lopsided or to blow capriciously hot and cold4 ,,iii4 ,,the ,,cognitive ,,relation ,the first great pitfall from which such a radical standing by experience will save us is an artificial conception of the relations between knower and known4 ,throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities2 and thereupon the presence of the latter to the former1 or the 'apprehension' by the former of the latter1 has assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome4 ,representative theories put a mental 'representation1' 'image1' or 'content' into the gap1 as a sort of intermediary4 ,common-sense theories left the gap untouched1 declaring our mind able to clear it by a self-transcending leap4 ,transcendentalist theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers1 and brought an ,absolute in to perform the saltatory act4 ,all the while1 in the very bosom of the finite experience1 every conjunction required to make the relation intelligible is given in full4 ,either the knower and the known are3 7#a7 the self-same piece of experience taken twice over in different contexts2 or they are 7#b7 two pieces of actual experience belonging to the same subject1 with definite tracts of conjunctive transitional experience between them2 or 7#c7 the known is a possible experience either of that subject or another1 to which the said conjunctive transitions would lead1 if sufficiently prolonged4 ,to discuss all the ways in which one experience may function as the knower of another1 would be incompatible with the limits of this essay4#cj ,i have just treated of type #a1 the kind of knowledge called perception4#ca ,this is the type of case in which the mind enjoys direct 'acquaintance' with a present object4 ,in the other types the mind has 'knowledge-about' an object not immediately there4 ,of type #b1 the simplest sort of conceptual knowledge1 ,i have given some account in two earlier articles4#cb ,type #c can always formally and hypothetically be reduced to type #b1 so that a brief description of that type will put the present reader sufficiently at my point of view1 and make him see what the actual meanings of the mysterious cognitive relation may be4 ,suppose me to be sitting here in my library at ,cambridge1 at ten minutes' walk from ',memorial ,hall1' and to be thinking truly of the latter object4 ,my mind may have before it only the name1 or it may have a clear image1 or it may have a very dim image of the hall1 but such intrinsic differences in the image make no difference in its cognitive function4 ,certain extrinsic phenomena1 special experiences of conjunction1 are what impart to the image1 be it what it may1 its knowing office4 ,for instance1 if you ask me what hall ,i mean by my image1 and ,i can tell you nothing2 or if ,i fail to point or lead you towards the ,harvard ,delta2 or if1 being led by you1 ,i am uncertain whether the ,hall ,i see be what ,i had in mind or not2 you would rightly deny that ,i had 'meant' that particular hall at all1 even though my mental image might to some degree have resembled it4 ,the resemblance would count in that case as coincidental merely1 for all sorts of things of a kind resemble one another in this world without being held for that reason to take cognizance of one another4 ,on the other hand1 if ,i can lead you to the hall1 and tell you of its history and present uses2 if in its presence ,i feel my idea1 however imperfect it may have been1 to have led hither and to be now terminated2 if the associates of the image and of the felt hall run parallel1 so that each term of the one context corresponds serially1 as ,i walk1 with an answering term of the others2 why then my soul was prophetic1 and my idea must be1 and by common consent would be1 called cognizant of reality4 ,that percept was what ,i meant1 for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and fulfilled intention4 ,nowhere is there jar1 but every later moment continues and corroborates an earlier one4 ,in this continuing and corroborating1 taken in no transcendental sense1 but denoting definitely felt transitions1 lies all that the knowing of a percept by an idea can possibly contain or signify4 ,wherever such transitions are felt1 the first experience knows the last one4 ,where they do not1 or where even as possibles they can not1 intervene1 there can be no pretence of knowing4 ,in this latter case the extremes will be connected1 if connected at all1 by inferior relations--bare likeness or succession1 or by 'withness' alone4 ,knowledge of sensible realities thus comes to life inside the tissue of experience4 ,it is made2 and made by relations that unroll themselves in time4 ,whenever certain intermediaries are given1 such that1 as they develop towards their terminus1 there is experience from point to point of one direction followed1 and finally of one process fulfilled1 the result is that their starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known4 ,that is all that knowing 7in the simple case considered7 can be known-as1 that is the whole of its nature1 put into experiential terms4 ,whenever such is the sequence of our experiences we may freely say that we had the terminal object 'in mind' from the outset1 even although at the outset nothing was there in us but a flat piece of substantive experience like any other1 with no self-transcendency about it1 and no mystery save the mystery of coming into existence and of being gradually followed by other pieces of substantive experience1 with conjunctively transitional experiences between4 ,that is what we mean here by the object's being 'in mind4' ,of any deeper more real way of being in mind we have no positive conception1 and we have no right to discredit our actual experience by talking of such a way at all4 ,i know that many a reader will rebel at this4 ,mere intermediaries1 he will say1 even though they be feelings of continuously growing fulfilment1 only separate the knower from the known1 whereas what we have in knowledge is a kind of immediate touch of the one by the other1 an 'apprehension' in the etymological sense of the word1 a leaping of the chasm as by lightning1 an act by which two terms are smitten into one1 over the head of their distinctness4 ,all these dead intermediaries of yours are out of each other1 and outside of their termini still4 ,but do not such dialectic difficulties remind us of the dog dropping his bone and snapping at its image in the water8 ,if we knew any more real kind of union aliunde1 we might be entitled to brand all our empirical unions as a sham4 ,but unions by continuous transition are the only ones we know of1 whether in this matter of a knowledge-about that terminates in an acquaintance1 whether in personal identity1 in logical predication through the copula 'is1' or elsewhere4 ,if anywhere there were more absolute unions realized1 they could only reveal themselves to us by just such conjunctive results4 ,these are what the unions are worth1 these are all that we can ever practically mean by union1 by continuity4 ,is it not time to repeat what ,lotze said of substances1 that to act like one is to be one8#cc ,should we not say here that to be experienced as continuous is to be really continuous1 in a world where experience and reality come to the same thing8 ,in a picture gallery a painted hook will serve to hang a painted chain by1 a painted cable will hold a painted ship4 ,in a world where both the terms and their distinctions are affairs of experience1 conjunctions that are experienced must be at least as real as anything else4 ,they will be' absolutely' real conjunctions1 if we have no transphenomenal ,absolute ready1 to derealize the whole experienced world by1 at a stroke4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we had such an ,absolute1 not one of our opponents' theories of knowledge could remain standing any better than ours could2 for the distinctions as well as the conjunctions of experience would impartially fall its prey4 ,the whole question of how 'one' thing can know 'another' would cease to be a real one at all in a world where otherness itself was an illusion4#cd ,so much for the essentials of the cognitive relation1 where the knowledge is conceptual in type1 or forms knowledge 'about' an object4 ,it consists in intermediary experiences 7possible1 if not actual7 of continuously developing progress1 and1 finally1 of fulfilment1 when the sensible percept1 which is the object1 is reached4 ,the percept here not only verifies the concept1 proves its function of knowing that percept to be true1 but the percept's existence as the terminus of the chain of intermediaries creates the function4 ,whatever terminates that chain was1 because it now proves itself to be1 what the concept 'had in mind4' ,the towering importance for human life of this kind of knowing lies in the fact that an experience that knows another can figure as its representative1 not in any quasi-miraculous 'epistemological' sense1 but in the definite practical sense of being its substitute in various operations1 sometimes physical and sometimes mental1 which lead us to its associates and results4 ,by experimenting on our ideas of reality1 we may save ourselves the trouble of experimenting on the real experiences which they severally mean4 ,the ideas form related systems1 corresponding point for point to the systems which the realities form2 and by letting an ideal term call up its associates systematically1 we may be led to a terminus which the corresponding real term would have led to in case we had operated on the real world4 ,and this brings us to the general question of substitution4 ,,iv4 ,,substitution ,in ,taine's brilliant book on ',intelligence1' substitution was for the first time named as a cardinal logical function1 though of course the facts had always been familiar enough4 ,what1 exactly1 in a system of experiences1 does the 'substitution' of one of them for another mean8 ,according to my view1 experience as a whole is a process in time1 whereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others that follow upon them by transitions which1 whether disjunctive or conjunctive in content1 are themselves experiences1 and must in general be accounted at least as real as the terms which they relate4 ,what the nature of the event called 'superseding' signifies1 depends altogether on the kind of transition that obtains4 ,some experiences simply abolish their predecessors without continuing them in any way4 ,others are felt to increase or to enlarge their meaning1 to carry out their purpose1 or to bring us nearer to their goal4 ,they 'represent' them1 and may fulfil their function better than they fulfilled it themselves4 ,but to 'fulfil a function' in a world of pure experience can be conceived and defined in only one possible way4 ,in such a world transitions and arrivals 7or terminations7 are the only events that happen1 though they happen by so many sorts of path4 ,the only function that one experience can perform is to lead into another experience2 and the only fulfilment we can speak of is the reaching of a certain experienced end4 ,when one experience leads to 7or can lead to7 the same end as another1 they agree in function4 ,but the whole system of experiences as they are immediately given presents itself as a quasi-chaos through which one can pass out of an initial term in many directions and yet end in the same terminus1 moving from next to next by a great many possible paths4 ,either one of these paths might be a functional substitute for another1 and to follow one rather than another might on occasion be an advantageous thing to do4 ,as a matter of fact1 and in a general way1 the paths that run through conceptual experiences1 that is1 through 'thoughts' or 'ideas' that 'know' the things in which they terminate1 are highly advantageous paths to follow4 ,not only do they yield inconceivably rapid transitions2 but1 owing to the 'universal' character#ce which they frequently possess1 and to their capacity for association with one another in great systems1 they outstrip the tardy consecutions of the things themselves1 and sweep us on towards our ultimate termini in a far more labor-saving way than the following of trains of sensible perception ever could4 ,wonderful are the new cuts and the short-circuits which the thought-paths make4 ,most thought-paths1 it is true1 are substitutes for nothing actual2 they end outside the real world altogether1 in wayward fancies1 utopias1 fictions or mistakes4 ,but where they do re-enter reality and terminate therein1 we substitute them always2 and with these substitutes we pass the greater number of our hours4 ,this is why ,i called our experiences1 taken all together1 a quasi-chaos4 ,there is vastly more discontinuity in the sum total of experiences than we commonly suppose4 ,the objective nucleus of every man's experience1 his own body1 is1 it is true1 a continuous percept2 and equally continuous as a percept 7though we may be inattentive to it7 is the material environment of that body1 changing by gradual transition when the body moves4 ,but the distant parts of the physical world are at all times absent from us1 and form conceptual objects merely1 into the perceptual reality of which our life inserts itself at points discrete and relatively rare4 ,round their several objective nuclei1 partly shared and common and partly discrete1 of the real physical world1 innumerable thinkers1 pursuing their several lines of physically true cogitation1 trace paths that intersect one another only at discontinuous perceptual points1 and the rest of the time are quite incongruent2 and around all the nuclei of shared 'reality1' as around the ,dyak's head of my late metaphor1 floats the vast cloud of experiences that are wholly subjective1 that are non-substitutional1 that find not even an eventual ending for themselves in the perceptual world--the mere day-dreams and joys and sufferings and wishes of the individual minds4 ,these exist with one another1 indeed1 and with the objective nuclei1 but out of them it is probable that to all eternity no interrelated system of any kind will ever be made4 ,this notion of the purely substitutional or conceptual physical world brings us to the most critical of all the steps in the development of a philosophy of pure experience4 ,the paradox of self-transcendency in knowledge comes back upon us here1 but ,i think that our notions of pure experience and of substitution1 and our radically empirical view of conjunctive transitions1 are ,denkmittel that will carry us safely through the pass4 ,v4 ,,what ,,objective ,,reference ,,is4 ,whosoever feels his experience to be something substitutional even while he has it1 may be said to have an experience that reaches beyond itself4 ,from inside of its own entity it says 'more1' and postulates reality existing elsewhere4 ,for the transcendentalist1 who holds knowing to consist in a salto mortale across an 'epistemological chasm1' such an idea presents no difficulty2 but it seems at first sight as if it might be inconsistent with an empiricism like our own4 ,have we not explained that conceptual knowledge is made such wholly by the existence of things that fall outside of the knowing experience itself--by intermediary experiences and by a terminus that fulfils8 ,can the knowledge be there before these elements that constitute its being have come8 ,and1 if knowledge be not there1 how can objective reference occur8 ,the key to this difficulty lies in the distinction between knowing as verified and completed1 and the same knowing as in transit and on its way4 ,to recur to the ,memorial ,hall example lately used1 it is only when our idea of the ,hall has actually terminated in the percept that we know 'for certain' that from the beginning it was truly cognitive of that4 ,until established by the end of the process1 its quality of knowing that1 or indeed of knowing anything1 could still be doubted2 and yet the knowing really was there1 as the result now shows4 ,we were virtual knowers of the ,hall long before we were certified to have been its actual knowers1 by the percept's retroactive validating power4 ,just so we are 'mortal' all the time1 by reason of the virtuality of the inevitable event which will make us so when it shall have come4 ,now the immensely greater part of all our knowing never gets beyond this virtual stage4 ,it never is completed or nailed down4 ,i speak not merely of our ideas of imperceptibles like ether-waves or dissociated 'ions1' or of 'ejects' like the contents of our neighbors' minds2 ,i speak also of ideas which we might verify if we would take the trouble1 but which we hold for true although unterminated perceptually1 because nothing says 'no' to us1 and there is no contradicting truth in sight4 ,to continue thinking unchallenged is1 ninety-nine times out of a hundred1 our practical substitute for knowing in the completed sense4 ,as each experience runs by cognitive transition into the next one1 and we nowhere feel a collision with what we elsewhere count as truth or fact1 we commit ourselves to the current as if the port were sure4 ,we live1 as it were1 upon the front edge of an advancing wave-crest1 and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is all we cover of the future of our path4 ,it is as if a differential quotient should be conscious and treat itself as an adequate substitute for a traced-out curve4 ,our experience1 inter alia1 is of variations of rate and of direction1 and lives in these transitions more than in the journey's end4 ,the experiences of tendency are sufficient to act upon--what more could we have done at those moments even if the later verification comes complete8 ,this is what1 as a radical empiricist1 ,i say to the charge that the objective reference which is so flagrant a character of our experiences involves a chasm and a mortal leap4 ,a positively conjunctive transition involves neither chasm nor leap4 ,being the very original of what we mean by continuity1 it makes a continuum wherever it appears4 ,i know full well that such brief words as these will leave the hardened transcendentalist unshaken4 ,conjunctive experiences separate their terms1 he will still say3 they are third things interposed1 that have themselves to be conjoined by new links1 and to invoke them makes our trouble infinitely worse4 ,to 'feel' our motion forward is impossible4 ,motion implies terminus2 and how can terminus be felt before we have arrived8 ,the barest start and sally forwards1 the barest tendency to leave the instant1 involves the chasm and the leap4 ,conjunctive transitions are the most superficial of appearances1 illusions of our sensibility which philosophical reflection pulverizes at a touch4 ,conception is our only trustworthy instrument1 conception and the ,absolute working hand in hand4 ,conception disintegrates experience utterly1 but its disjunctions are easily overcome again when the ,absolute takes up the task4 ,such transcendentalists ,i must leave1 provisionally at least1 in full possession of their creed4#cf ,i have no space for polemics in this article1 so ,i shall simply formulate the empiricist doctrine as my hypothesis1 leaving it to work or not work as it may4 ,objective reference1 ,i say then1 is an incident of the fact that so much of our experience comes as an insufficient and consists of process and transition4 ,our fields of experience have no more definite boundaries than have our fields of view4 ,both are fringed forever by a more that continuously develops1 and that continuously supersedes them as life proceeds4 ,the relations1 generally speaking1 are as real here as the terms are1 and the only complaint of the transcendentalist's with which ,i could at all sympathize would be his charge that1 by first making knowledge to consist in external relations as ,i have done1 and by then confessing that nine-tenths of the time these are not actually but only virtually there1 ,i have knocked the solid bottom out of the whole business1 and palmed off a substitute of knowledge for the genuine thing4 ,only the admission1 such a critic might say1 that our ideas are self-transcendent and 'true' already1 in advance of the experiences that are to terminate them1 can bring solidity back to knowledge in a world like this1 in which transitions and terminations are only by exception fulfilled4 ,this seems to me an excellent place for applying the pragmatic method4 ,when a dispute arises1 that method consists in auguring what practical consequences would be different if one side rather than the other were true4 ,if no difference can be thought of1 the dispute is a quarrel over words4 ,what then would the self-transcendency affirmed to exist in advance of all experiential mediation or termination1 be known-as8 ,what would it practically result in for us1 were it true8 ,it could only result in our orientation1 in the turning of our expectations and practical tendencies into the right path2 and the right path here1 so long as we and the object are not yet face to face 7or can never get face to face1 as in the case of ejects71 would be the path that led us into the object's nearest neighborhood4 ,where direct acquaintance is lacking1 'knowledge about' is the next best thing1 and an acquaintance with what actually lies about the object1 and is most closely related to it1 puts such knowledge within our grasp4 ,ether-waves and your anger1 for example1 are things in which my thoughts will never perceptually terminate1 but my concepts of them lead me to their very brink1 to the chromatic fringes and to the hurtful words and deeds which are their really next effects4 ,even if our ideas did in themselves carry the postulated self-transcendency1 it would still remain true that their putting us into possession of such effects would be the sole cash-value of the self-transcendency for us4 ,and this cash-value1 it is needless to say1 is verbatim et literatim what our empiricist account pays in4 ,on pragmatist principles therefore1 a dispute over self-transcendency is a pure logomachy4 ,call our concepts of ejective things self-transcendent or the reverse1 it makes no difference1 so long as we don't differ about the nature of that exalted virtue's fruits--fruits for us1 of course1 humanistic fruits4 ,if an ,absolute were proved to exist for other reasons1 it might well appear that his knowledge is terminated in innumerable cases where ours is still incomplete4 ,that1 however1 would be a fact indifferent to our knowledge4 ,the latter would grow neither worse nor better1 whether we acknowledged such an ,absolute or left him out4 ,so the notion of a knowledge still in transitu and on its way joins hands here with that notion of a 'pure experience' which ,i tried to explain in my essay entitled ',does ,consciousness ,exist8' ,the instant field of the present is always experience in its 'pure' state1 plain unqualified actuality1 a simple that1 as yet undifferentiated into thing and thought1 and only virtually classifiable as objective fact or as some one's opinion about fact4 ,this is as true when the field is conceptual as when it is perceptual4 ',memorial ,hall' is 'there' in my idea as much as when ,i stand before it4 ,i proceed to act on its account in either case4 ,only in the later experience that supersedes the present one is this naf immediacy retrospectively split into two parts1 a 'consciousness' and its 'content1' and the content corrected or confirmed4 ,while still pure1 or present1 any experience--mine1 for example1 of what ,i write about in these very lines--passes for 'truth4' ,the morrow may reduce it to 'opinion4' ,the transcendentalist in all his particular knowledges is as liable to this reduction as ,i am3 his ,absolute does not save him4 ,why1 then1 need he quarrel with an account of knowing that merely leaves it liable to this inevitable condition8 ,why insist that knowing is a static relation out of time when it practically seems so much a function of our active life8 ,for a thing to be valid1 says ,lotze1 is the same as to make itself valid4 ,when the whole universe seems only to be making itself valid and to be still incomplete 7else why its ceaseless changing87 why1 of all things1 should knowing be exempt8 ,why should it not be making itself valid like everything else8 ,that some parts of it may be already valid or verified beyond dispute1 the empirical philosopher1 of course1 like any one else1 may always hope4 ,,vi4 ,,the ,,conterminousness ,,of ,,different ,,minds#cg ,with transition and prospect thus enthroned in pure experience1 it is impossible to subscribe to the idealism of the ,english school4 ,radical empiricism has1 in fact1 more affinities with natural realism than with the views of ,berkeley or of ,mill1 and this can be easily shown4 ,for the ,berkeleyan school1 ideas 7the verbal equivalent of what ,i term experiences7 are discontinuous4 ,the content of each is wholly immanent1 and there are no transitions with which they are consubstantial and through which their beings may unite4 ,your ,memorial ,hall and mine1 even when both are percepts1 are wholly out of connection with each other4 ,our lives are a congeries of solipsisms1 out of which in strict logic only a ,god could compose a universe even of discourse4 ,no dynamic currents run between my objects and your objects4 ,never can our minds meet in the same4 ,the incredibility of such a philosophy is flagrant4 ,it is 'cold1 strained1 and unnatural' in a supreme degree2 and it may be doubted whether even ,berkeley himself1 who took it so religiously1 really believed1 when walking through the streets of ,london1 that his spirit and the spirits of his fellow wayfarers had absolutely different towns in view4 ,to me the decisive reason in favor of our minds meeting in some common objects at least is that1 unless ,i make that supposition1 ,i have no motive for assuming that your mind exists at all4 ,why do ,i postulate your mind8 ,because ,i see your body acting in a certain way4 ,its gestures1 facial movements1 words and conduct generally1 are 'expressive1' so ,i deem it actuated as my own is1 by an inner life like mine4 ,this argument from analogy is my reason1 whether an instinctive belief runs before it or not4 ,but what is 'your body' here but a percept in my field8 ,it is only as animating that object1 my object1 that ,i have any occasion to think of you at all4 ,if the body that you actuate be not the very body that ,i see there1 but some duplicate body of your own with which that has nothing to do1 we belong to different universes1 you and ,i1 and for me to speak of you is folly4 ,myriads of such universes even now may coexist1 irrelevant to one another2 my concern is solely with the universe with which my own life is connected4 ,in that perceptual part of my universe which ,i call your body1 your mind and my mind meet and may be called conterminous4 ,your mind actuates that body and mine sees it2 my thoughts pass into it as into their harmonious cognitive fulfilment2 your emotions and volitions pass into it as causes into their effects4 ,but that percept hangs together with all our other physical percepts4 ,they are of one stuff with it2 and if it be our common possession1 they must be so likewise4 ,for instance1 your hand lays hold of one end of a rope and my hand lays hold of the other end4 ,we pull against each other4 ,can our two hands be mutual objects in this experience1 and the rope not be mutual also8 ,what is true of the rope is true of any other percept4 ,your objects are over and over again the same as mine4 ,if ,i ask you where some object of yours is1 our old ,memorial ,hall1 for example1 you point to my ,memorial ,hall with your hand which ,i see4 ,if you alter an object in your world1 put out a candle1 for example1 when ,i am present1 my candle ipso facto goes out4 ,it is only as altering my objects that ,i guess you to exist4 ,if your objects do not coalesce with my objects1 if they be not identically where mine are1 they must be proved to be positively somewhere else4 ,but no other location can be assigned for them1 so their place must be what it seems to be1 the same4#ch ,practically1 then1 our minds meet in a world of objects which they share in common1 which would still be there1 if one or several of the minds were destroyed4 ,i can see no formal objection to this supposition's being literally true4 ,on the principles which ,i am defending1 a 'mind' or 'personal consciousness' is the name for a series of experiences run together by certain definite transitions1 and an objective reality is a series of similar experiences knit by different transitions4 ,if one and the same experience can figure twice1 once in a mental and once in a physical context 7as ,i have tried1 in my article on ',consciousness1' to show that it can71 one does not see why it might not figure thrice1 or four times1 or any number of times1 by running into as many different mental contexts1 just as the same point1 lying at their intersection1 can be continued into many different lines4 ,abolishing any number of contexts would not destroy the experience itself or its other contexts1 any more than abolishing some of the point's linear continuations would destroy the others1 or destroy the point itself4 ,i well know the subtle dialectic which insists that a term taken in another relation must needs be an intrinsically different term4 ,the crux is always the old ,greek one1 that the same man can't be tall in relation to one neighbor1 and short in relation to another1 for that would make him tall and short at once4 ,in this essay ,i can not stop to refute this dialectic1 so ,i pass on1 leaving my flank for the time exposed4#ci ,but if my reader will only allow that the same 'now' both ends his past and begins his future2 or that1 when he buys an acre of land from his neighbor1 it is the same acre that successively figures in the two estates2 or that when ,i pay him a dollar1 the same dollar goes into his pocket that came out of mine2 he will also in consistency have to allow that the same object may conceivably play a part in1 as being related to the rest of1 any number of otherwise entirely different minds4 ,this is enough for my present point3 the common-sense notion of minds sharing the same object offers no special logical or epistemological difficulties of its own2 it stands or falls with the general possibility of things being in conjunctive relation with other things at all4 ,in principle1 then1 let natural realism pass for possible4 ,your mind and mine may terminate in the same percept1 not merely against it1 as if it were a third external thing1 but by inserting themselves into it and coalescing with it1 for such is the sort of conjunctive union that appears to be experienced when a perceptual terminus 'fulfils4' ,even so1 two hawsers may embrace the same pile1 and yet neither one of them touch any other part except that pile1 of what the other hawser is attached to4 ,it is therefore not a formal question1 but a question of empirical fact solely1 whether1 when you and ,i are said to know the 'same' ,memorial ,hall1 our minds do terminate at or in a numerically identical percept4 ,obviously1 as a plain matter of fact1 they do not4 ,apart from color-blindness and such possibilities1 we see the ,hall in different perspectives4 ,you may be on one side of it and ,i on another4 ,the percept of each of us1 as he sees the surface of the ,hall1 is moreover only his provisional terminus4 ,the next thing beyond my percept is not your mind1 but more percepts of my own into which my first percept develops1 the interior of the ,hall1 for instance1 or the inner structure of its bricks and mortar4 ,if our minds were in a literal sense conterminous1 neither could get beyond the percept which they had in common1 it would be an ultimate barrier between them--unless indeed they flowed over it and became 'co-conscious' over a still larger part of their content1 which 7thought-transference apart7 is not supposed to be the case4 ,in point of fact the ultimate common barrier can always be pushed1 by both minds1 farther than any actual percept of either1 until at last it resolves itself into the mere notion of imperceptibles like atoms or ether1 so that1 where we do terminate in percepts1 our knowledge is only speciously completed1 being1 in theoretic strictness1 only a virtual knowledge of those remoter objects which conception carries out4 ,is natural realism1 permissible in logic1 refuted then by empirical fact8 ,do our minds have no object in common after all8 ,yes1 they certainly have ,space in common4 ,on pragmatic principles we are obliged to predicate sameness wherever we can predicate no assignable point of difference4 ,if two named things have every quality and function indiscernible1 and are at the same time in the same place1 they must be written down as numerically one thing under two different names4 ,but there is no test discoverable1 so far as ,i know1 by which it can be shown that the place occupied by your percept of ,memorial ,hall differs from the place occupied by mine4 ,the percepts themselves may be shown to differ2 but if each of us be asked to point out where his percept is1 we point to an identical spot4 ,all the relations1 whether geometrical or causal1 of the ,hall originate or terminate in that spot wherein our hands meet1 and where each of us begins to work if he wishes to make the ,hall change before the other's eyes4 ,just so it is with our bodies4 ,that body of yours which you actuate and feel from within must be in the same spot as the body of yours which ,i see or touch from without4 ',there' for me means where ,i place my finger4 ,if you do not feel my finger's contact to be 'there' in my sense1 when ,i place it on your body1 where then do you feel it8 ,your inner actuations of your body meet my finger there3 it is there that you resist its push1 or shrink back1 or sweep the finger aside with your hand4 ,whatever farther knowledge either of us may acquire of the real constitution of the body which we thus feel1 you from within and ,i from without1 it is in that same place that the newly conceived or perceived constituents have to be located1 and it is through that space that your and my mental intercourse with each other has always to be carried on1 by the mediation of impressions which ,i convey thither1 and of the reactions thence which those impressions may provoke from you4 ,in general terms1 then1 whatever differing contents our minds may eventually fill a place with1 the place itself is a numerically identical content of the two minds1 a piece of common property in which1 through which1 and over which they join4 ,the receptacle of certain of our experiences being thus common1 the experiences themselves might some day become common also4 ,if that day ever did come1 our thoughts would terminate in a complete empirical identity1 there would be an end1 so far as those experiences went1 to our discussions about truth4 ,no points of difference appearing1 they would have to count as the same4 ,,vii4 ,,conclusion ,with this we have the outlines of a philosophy of pure experience before us4 ,at the outset of my essay1 ,i called it a mosaic philosophy4 ,in actual mosaics the pieces are held together by their bedding1 for which bedding the ,substances1 transcendental ,egos1 or ,absolutes of other philosophies may be taken to stand4 ,in radical empiricism there is no bedding2 it is as if the pieces clung together by their edges1 the transitions experienced between them forming their cement4 ,of course such a metaphor is misleading1 for in actual experience the more substantive and the more transitive parts run into each other continuously1 there is in general no separateness needing to be overcome by an external cement2 and whatever separateness is actually experienced is not overcome1 it stays and counts as separateness to the end4 ,but the metaphor serves to symbolize the fact that ,experience itself1 taken at large1 can grow by its edges4 ,that one moment of it proliferates into the next by transitions which1 whether conjunctive or disjunctive1 continue the experiential tissue1 can not1 ,i contend1 be denied4 ,life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected2 often1 indeed1 it seems to be there more emphatically1 as if our spurts and sallies forward were the real firing-line of the battle1 were like the thin line of flame advancing across the dry autumnal field which the farmer proceeds to burn4 ,in this line we live prospectively as well as retrospectively4 ,it is 'of' the past1 inasmuch as it comes expressly as the past's continuation2 it is 'of' the future in so far as the future1 when it comes1 will have continued it4 ,these relations of continuous transition experienced are what make our experiences cognitive4 ,in the simplest and completest cases the experiences are cognitive of one another4 ,when one of them terminates a previous series of them with a sense of fulfilment1 it1 we say1 is what those other experiences 'had in view4' ,the knowledge1 in such a case1 is verified2 the truth is 'salted down4' ,mainly1 however1 we live on speculative investments1 or on our prospects only4 ,but living on things in posse is as good as living in the actual1 so long as our credit remains good4 ,it is evident that for the most part it is good1 and that the universe seldom protests our drafts4 ,in this sense we at every moment can continue to believe in an existing beyond4 ,it is only in special cases that our confident rush forward gets rebuked4 ,the beyond must1 of course1 always in our philosophy be itself of an experiential nature4 ,if not a future experience of our own or a present one of our neighbor1 it must be a thing in itself in ,dr4 ,prince's and ,professor ,strong's sense of the term--that is1 it must be an experience for itself whose relation to other things we translate into the action of molecules1 ether-waves1 or whatever else the physical symbols may be4#dj ,this opens the chapter of the relations of radical empiricism to panpsychism1 into which ,i can not enter now4#da ,the beyond can in any case exist simultaneously--for it can be experienced to have existed simultaneously--with the experience that practically postulates it by looking in its direction1 or by turning or changing in the direction of which it is the goal4 ,pending that actuality of union1 in the virtuality of which the 'truth1' even now1 of the postulation consists1 the beyond and its knower are entities split off from each other4 ,the world is in so far forth a pluralism of which the unity is not fully experienced as yet4 ,but1 as fast as verifications come1 trains of experience1 once separate1 run into one another2 and that is why ,i said1 earlier in my article1 that the unity of the world is on the whole undergoing increase4 ,the universe continually grows in quantity by new experiences that graft themselves upon the older mass2 but these very new experiences often help the mass to a more consolidated form4 ,these are the main features of a philosophy of pure experience4 ,it has innumerable other aspects and arouses innumerable questions1 but the points ,i have touched on seem enough to make an entering wedge4 ,in my own mind such a philosophy harmonizes best with a radical pluralism1 with novelty and indeterminism1 moralism and theism1 and with the 'humanism' lately sprung upon us by the ,oxford and the ,chicago schools4#db ,i can not1 however1 be sure that all these doctrines are its necessary and indispensable allies4 ,it presents so many points of difference1 both from the common sense and from the idealism that have made our philosophic language1 that it is almost as difficult to state it as it is to think it out clearly1 and if it is ever to grow into a respectable system1 it will have to be built up by the contributions of many co-operating minds4 ,it seems to me1 as ,i said at the outset of this essay1 that many minds are1 in point of fact1 now turning in a direction that points towards radical empiricism4 ,if they are carried farther by my words1 and if then they add their stronger voices to my feebler one1 the publication of this essay will have been worth while4 ,,footnotes3 #be ,reprinted from the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,i1 #aijd1 ,no4 #bj1 ,september #bi1 and ,no4 #ba1 ,october #ac4 ,pp4 #eb-gf have also been reprinted1 with some omissions1 alterations and additions1 in ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #ajb-abj4 ,the alterations have been adopted in the present text4 ,this essay is referred to in ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 p4 #bhj1 note #e4 ,,ed4 #bf ,cf4 ,berkeley3 ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 ,introduction2 ,hume3 ,an ,enquiry ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 sect4 ,,vii1 part ,,ii 7,selby-,bigge's edition1 p4 #gd72 ,james ,mill3 ,analysis of the ,phenomena of the ,human ,mind1 ch4 ,,viii2 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill3 ,an ,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 ch4 ,,xi1 ,,xii2 ,w4 ,k4 ,clifford3 ,lectures and ,essays1 pp4 #bgd ff4 #bg ,see ,the ,experience of ,activity1 below1 pp4 #aee-ahi4 #bh ,the psychology books have of late described the facts here with approximate adequacy4 ,i may refer to the chapters on ',the ,stream of ,thought' and on the ,self in my own ,principles of ,psychology1 as well as to ,s4 ,h4 ,hodgson's ,metaphysic of ,experience1 vol4 ,i1 ch4 ,,vii and ,,viii4 #bi ,see ,the ,thing and its ,relations1 below1 pp4 #ib-abb4 #cj ,for brevity's sake ,i altogether omit mention of the type constituted by knowledge of the truth of general propositions4 ,this type has been thoroughly and1 so far as ,i can see1 satisfactorily1 elucidated in ,dewey's ,studies in ,logical ,theory4 ,such propositions are reducible to the ,s-is-,p form2 and the 'terminus' that verifies and fulfils is the ,,sp in combination4 ,of course percepts may be involved in the mediating experiences1 or in the 'satisfactoriness' of the ,p in its new position4 #ca ,see above1 pp4 #i-ae4 #cb ,on the ,function of ,cognition1 ,mind1 vol4 ,x1 #ahhe1 and ,the ,knowing of ,things ,together1 ,psychological ,review1 vol4 ,,ii1 #ahie4 ,these articles are reprinted1 the former in full1 the latter in part1 in ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #a-ej4 ,,ed4 ,these articles and their doctrine1 unnoticed apparently by any one else1 have lately gained favorable comment from ,professor ,strong4 ,a ,naturalistic ,theory of the ,reference of ,thought to ,reality1 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,i1 #aijd4 ,dr4 ,dickinson ,s4 ,miller has independently thought out the same results ,the ,meaning of ,truth and ,error1 ,philosophical ,review1 vol4 ,,ii1 #ahic2 ,the ,confusion of ,function and ,content in ,mental ,analysis1 ,psychological ,review1 vol4 ,,ii1 #ahie1 which ,strong accordingly dubs the ,james-,miller theory of cognition4 #cc ,cf4 ,h4 ,lotze3 ,metaphysik1 #cg-ci1 #ig1 #ih1 #bdc4 #cd ,mr4 ,bradley1 not professing to know his absolute aliunde1 nevertheless derealizes ,experience by alleging it to be everywhere infected with self-contradiction4 ,his arguments seem almost purely verbal1 but this is no place for arguing that point out4 ,cf4 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley2 ,appearance and ,reality1 passim2 and below1 pp4 #ajf-abb4 #ce ,of which all that need be said in this essay is that it also can be conceived as functional1 and defined in terms of transitions1 or of the possibility of such4 ,cf4 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,i1 pp4 #dgc-dhj1 vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #ccg-cdj2 ,pragmatism1 p4 #bfe2 ,some ,problems of ,philosophy1 pp4 #fc-gd2 ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #bdf-bdg1 etc4 ,,ed4 #cf ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ic ff4 #cg ,cf4 ,how ,two ,minds ,can ,know ,one ,thing1 below1 pp4 #abc-acf4 #ch ,the notion that our objects are inside of our respective heads is not seriously defensible1 so ,i pass it by4 #ci ,the argument is resumed below1 pp4 #aja sq4 ,,ed4 #dj ,our minds and these ejective realities would still have space 7or pseudo-space1 as ,i believe ,professor ,strong calls the medium of interaction between 'things-in-themselves'7 in common4 ,these would exist where1 and begin to act where1 we locate the molecules1 etc41 and where we perceive the sensible phenomena explained thereby4 ,cf4 ,morton ,prince3 ,the ,nature of ,mind1 and ,human ,automatism1 part ,i1 ch4 ,,iii1 ,,iv2 ,c4 ,a4 ,strong3 ,why the ,mind ,has a ,body1 ch4 ,,xii4 #da ,cf4 below1 p4 #ahh2 ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 ,lect4 ,,iv-,,vii4 #db ,i have said something of this latter alliance in an article entitled ',humanism and ,truth1' in ,mind1 ,october1 #aijd4 ,reprinted in ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #ea-aja4 ,cf4 also ,humanism and ,truth ,once ,more1 below1 pp4 #bdd-bfe4 ,,iii ,,the ,,thing ,,and ,,its ,,relations#dc ,experience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent4 ,the active sense of living which we all enjoy1 before reflection shatters our instinctive world for us1 is self-luminous and suggests no paradoxes4 ,its difficulties are disappointments and uncertainties4 ,they are not intellectual contradictions4 ,when the reflective intellect gets at work1 however1 it discovers incomprehensibilities in the flowing process4 ,distinguishing its elements and parts1 it gives them separate names1 and what it thus disjoins it can not easily put together4 ,pyrrhonism accepts the irrationality and revels in its dialectic elaboration4 ,other philosophies try1 some by ignoring1 some by resisting1 and some by turning the dialectic procedure against itself1 negating its first negations1 to restore the fluent sense of life again1 and let redemption take the place of innocence4 ,the perfection with which any philosophy may do this is the measure of its human success and of its importance in philosophic history4 ,in the last essay1 ',a ,world of ,pure ,experience1' ,i tried my own hand sketchily at the problem1 resisting certain first steps of dialectics by insisting in a general way that the immediately experienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else4 ,if my sketch is not to appear too naf1 ,i must come closer to details1 and in the present essay ,i propose to do so4 ,i ',pure experience' is the name which ,i gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories4 ,only new-born babes1 or men in semi-coma from sleep1 drugs1 illnesses1 or blows1 may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not yet any definite what1 tho' ready to be all sorts of whats2 full both of oneness and of manyness1 but in respects that don't appear2 changing throughout1 yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points1 either of distinction or of identity1 can be caught4 ,pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation4 ,but the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases1 and these salient parts become identified and fixed and abstracted2 so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions4 ,its purity is only a relative term1 meaning the proportional amount of unverbalized sensation which it still embodies4 ,far back as we go1 the flux1 both as a whole and in its parts1 is that of things conjunct and separated4 ,the great continua of time1 space1 and the self envelope everything1 betwixt them1 and flow together without interfering4 ,the things that they envelope come as separate in some ways and as continuous in others4 ,some sensations coalesce with some ideas1 and others are irreconcilable4 ,qualities compenetrate one space1 or exclude each other from it4 ,they cling together persistently in groups that move as units1 or else they separate4 ,their changes are abrupt or discontinuous2 and their kinds resemble or differ2 and1 as they do so1 they fall into either even or irregular series4 ,in all this the continuities and the discontinuities are absolutely co-ordinate matters of immediate feeling4 ,the conjunctions are as primordial elements of 'fact' as are the distinctions and disjunctions4 ,in the same act by which ,i feel that this passing minute is a new pulse of my life1 ,i feel that the old life continues into it1 and the feeling of continuance in no wise jars upon the simultaneous feeling of a novelty4 ,they1 too1 compenetrate harmoniously4 ,prepositions1 copulas1 and conjunctions1 'is1' 'isn't1' 'then1' 'before1' 'in1' 'on1' 'beside1' 'between1' 'next1' 'like1' 'unlike1' 'as1' 'but1' flower out of the stream of pure experience1 the stream of concretes or the sensational stream1 as naturally as nouns and adjectives do1 and they melt into it again as fluidly when we apply them to a new portion of the stream4 ,,ii ,if now we ask why we must thus translate experience from a more concrete or pure into a more intellectualized form1 filling it with ever more abounding conceptual distinctions1 rationalism and naturalism give different replies4 ,the rationalistic answer is that the theoretic life is absolute and its interests imperative2 that to understand is simply the duty of man2 and that who questions this need not be argued with1 for by the fact of arguing he gives away his case4 ,the naturalist answer is that the environment kills as well as sustains us1 and that the tendency of raw experience to extinguish the experient himself is lessened just in the degree in which the elements in it that have a practical bearing upon life are analyzed out of the continuum and verbally fixed and coupled together1 so that we may know what is in the wind for us and get ready to react in time4 ,had pure experience1 the naturalist says1 been always perfectly healthy1 there would never have arisen the necessity of isolating or verbalizing any of its terms4 ,we should just have experienced inarticulately and unintellectually enjoyed4 ,this leaning on 'reaction' in the naturalist account implies that1 whenever we intellectualize a relatively pure experience1 we ought to do so for the sake of redescending to the purer or more concrete level again2 and that if an intellect stays aloft among its abstract terms and generalized relations1 and does not reinsert itself with its conclusions into some particular point of the immediate stream of life1 it fails to finish out its function and leaves its normal race unrun4 ,most rationalists nowadays will agree that naturalism gives a true enough account of the way in which our intellect arose at first1 but they will deny these latter implications4 ,the case1 they will say1 resembles that of sexual love4 ,originating in the animal need of getting another generation born1 this passion has developed secondarily such imperious spiritual needs that1 if you ask why another generation ought to be born at all1 the answer is3 ',chiefly that love may go on4' ,just so with our intellect3 it originated as a practical means of serving life2 but it has developed incidentally the function of understanding absolute truth2 and life itself now seems to be given chiefly as a means by which that function may be prosecuted4 ,but truth and the understanding of it lie among the abstracts and universals1 so the intellect now carries on its higher business wholly in this region1 without any need of redescending into pure experience again4 ,if the contrasted tendencies which ,i thus designate as naturalistic and rationalistic are not recognized by the reader1 perhaps an example will make them more concrete4 ,mr4 ,bradley1 for instance1 is an ultra-rationalist4 ,he admits that our intellect is primarily practical1 but says that1 for philosophers1 the practical need is simply ,truth4 ,truth1 moreover1 must be assumed 'consistent4' ,immediate experience has to be broken into subjects and qualities1 terms and relations1 to be understood as truth at all4 ,yet when so broken it is less consistent than ever4 ,taken raw1 it is all un-distinguished4 ,intellectualized1 it is all distinction without oneness4 ',such an arrangement may work1 but the theoretic problem is not solved4' ,the question is 'how the diversity can exist in harmony with the oneness4' ,to go back to pure experience is unavailing4 ',mere feeling gives no answer to our riddle4' ,even if your intuition is a fact1 it is not an understanding4 ',it is a mere experience1 and furnishes no consistent view4' ,the experience offered as facts or truths ',i find that my intellect rejects because they contradict themselves4 ,they offer a complex of diversities conjoined in a way which it feels is not its way and which it can not repeat as its own4444 ,for to be satisfied1 my intellect must understand1 and it can not understand by taking a congeries in the lump4'#dd ,so ,mr4 ,bradley1 in the sole interests of 'understanding' 7as he conceives that function71 turns his back on finite experience forever4 ,truth must lie in the opposite direction1 the direction of the ,absolute2 and this kind of rationalism and naturalism1 or 7as ,i will now call it7 pragmatism1 walk thenceforward upon opposite paths4 ,for the one1 those intellectual products are most true which1 turning their face towards the ,absolute1 come nearest to symbolizing its ways of uniting the many and the one4 ,for the other1 those are most true which most successfully dip back into the finite stream of feeling and grow most easily confluent with some particular wave or wavelet4 ,such confluence not only proves the intellectual operation to have been true 7as an addition may 'prove' that a subtraction is already rightly performed71 but it constitutes1 according to pragmatism1 all that we mean by calling it true4 ,only in so far as they lead us1 successfully or unsuccessfully1 back into sensible experience again1 are our abstracts and universals true or false at all4#de ,,iii ,in ,section ,,vi of the last essay1 ,i adopted in a general way the common-sense belief that one and the same world is cognized by our different minds2 but ,i left undiscussed the dialectical arguments which maintain that this is logically absurd4 ,the usual reason given for its being absurd is that it assumes one object 7to wit1 the world7 to stand in two relations at once2 to my mind1 namely1 and again to yours2 whereas a term taken in a second relation can not logically be the same term which it was at first4 ,i have heard this reason urged so often in discussing with absolutists1 and it would destroy my radical empiricism so utterly1 if it were valid1 that ,i am bound to give it an attentive ear1 and seriously to search its strength4 ,for instance1 let the matter in dispute be term ,m1 asserted to be on the one hand related to ,l1 and on the other to ,n2 and let the two cases of relation be symbolized by ,l--,m and ,m--,n respectively4 ,when1 now1 ,i assume that the experience may immediately come and be given in the shape ,l--,m--,n1 with no trace of doubling or internal fission in the ,m1 ,i am told that this is all a popular delusion2 that ,l--,m--,n logically means two different experiences1 ,l--,m and ,m--,n1 namely2 and that although the ,absolute may1 and indeed must1 from its superior point of view1 read its own kind of unity into ,m's two editions1 yet as elements in finite experience the two ,m's lie irretrievably asunder1 and the world between them is broken and unbridged4 ,in arguing this dialectic thesis1 one must avoid slipping from the logical into the physical point of view4 ,it would be easy1 in taking a concrete example to fix one's ideas by1 to choose one in which the letter ,m should stand for a collective noun of some sort1 which noun1 being related to ,l by one of its parts and to ,n by another1 would inwardly be two things when it stood outwardly in both relations4 ,thus1 one might say3 ',david ,hume1 who weighed so many stone by his body1 influences posterity by his doctrine4' ,the body and the doctrine are two things1 between which our finite minds can discover no real sameness1 though the same name covers both of them4 ,and then1 one might continue3 ',only an ,absolute is capable of uniting such a non-identity4' ,we must1 ,i say1 avoid this sort of example1 for the dialectic insight1 if true at all1 must apply to terms and relations universally4 ,it must be true of abstract units as well as of nouns collective2 and if we prove it by concrete examples we must take the simplest1 so as to avoid irrelevant material suggestions4 ,taken thus in all its generality1 the absolutist contention seems to use as its major premise ,hume's notion 'that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences1 and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences4'#df ,undoubtedly1 since we use two phrases in talking first about ',m's relation to ,l' and then about ',m's relation to ,n1' we must be having1 or must have had1 two distinct perceptions2--and the rest would then seem to follow duly4 ,but the starting-point of the reasoning here seems to be the fact of the two phrases2 and this suggests that the argument may be merely verbal4 ,can it be that the whole dialectic consists in attributing to the experience talked-about a constitution similar to that of the language in which we describe it8 ,must we assert the objective double-ness of the ,m merely because we have to name it twice over when we name its two relations8 ,candidly1 ,i can think of no other reason than this for the dialectic conclusion2#dg for1 if we think1 not of our words1 but of any simple concrete matter which they may be held to signify1 the experience itself belies the paradox asserted4 ,we use indeed two separate concepts in analyzing our object1 but we know them all the while to be but substitutional1 and that the ,m in ,l--,m and the ,m in ,m--,n mean 7i4e41 are capable of leading to and terminating in7 one self-same piece1 ,m1 of sensible experience4 ,this persistent identity of certain units 7or emphases1 or points1 or objects1 or members--call them what you will7 of the experience-continuum1 is just one of those conjunctive features of it1 on which ,i am obliged to insist so emphatically4#dh ,for samenesses are parts of experience's indefeasible structure4 ,when ,i hear a bell-stroke and1 as life flows on1 its after image dies away1 ,i still hark back to it as 'that same bell-stroke4' ,when ,i see a thing ,m1 with ,l to the left of it and ,n to the right of it1 ,i see it as one ,m2 and if you tell me ,i have had to 'take' it twice1 ,i reply that if ,i 'took' it a thousand times ,i should still see it as a unit4#di ,its unity is aboriginal1 just as the multiplicity of my successive takings is aboriginal4 ,it comes unbroken as that ,m1 as a singular which ,i encounter2 they come broken1 as those takings1 as my plurality of operations4 ,the unity and the separateness are strictly co-ordinate4 ,i do not easily fathom why my opponents should find the separateness so much more easily understandable that they must needs infect the whole of finite experience with it1 and relegate the unity 7now taken as a bare postulate and no longer as a thing positively perceivable7 to the region of the ,absolute's mysteries4 ,i do not easily fathom this1 ,i say1 for the said opponents are above mere verbal quibbling2 yet all that ,i can catch in their talk is the substitution of what is true of certain words for what is true of what they signify4 ,they stay with the words1--not returning to the stream of life whence all the meaning of them came1 and which is always ready to reabsorb them4 ,,iv ,for aught this argument proves1 then1 we may continue to believe that one thing can be known by many knowers4 ,but the denial of one thing in many relations is but one application of a still profounder dialectic difficulty4 ,man can't be good1 said the sophists1 for man is man and good is good2 and ,hegel#ej and ,herbart in their day1 more recently ,a4 ,spir1#ea and most recently and elaborately of all1 ,mr4 ,bradley1 informs us that a term can logically only be a punctiform unit1 and that not one of the conjunctive relations between things1 which experience seems to yield1 is rationally possible4 ,of course1 if true1 this cuts off radical empiricism without even a shilling4 ,radical empiricism takes conjunctive relations at their face value1 holding them to be as real as the terms united by them4#eb ,the world it represents as a collection1 some parts of which are conjunctively and others disjunctively related4 ,two parts1 themselves disjoined1 may nevertheless hang together by intermediaries with which they are severally connected1 and the whole world eventually may hang together similarly1 inasmuch as some path of conjunctive transition by which to pass from one of its parts to another may always be discernible4 ,such determinately various hanging-together may be called concatenated union1 to distinguish it from the 'through-and-through' type of union1 'each in all and all in each' 7union of total conflux1 as one might call it71 which monistic systems hold to obtain when things are taken in their absolute reality4 ,in a concatenated world a partial conflux often is experienced4 ,our concepts and our sensations are confluent2 successive states of the same ego1 and feelings of the same body are confluent4 ,where the experience is not of conflux1 it may be of conterminousness 7things with but one thing between72 or of contiguousness 7nothing between72 or of likeness2 or of nearness2 or of simultaneousness2 or of in-ness2 or of on-ness2 or of for-ness2 or of simple with-ness2 or even of mere and-ness1 which last relation would make of however disjointed a world otherwise1 at any rate for that occasion a universe 'of discourse4' ,now ,mr4 ,bradley tells us that none of these relations1 as we actually experience them1 can possibly be real4#ec ,my next duty1 accordingly1 must be to rescue radical empiricism from ,mr4 ,bradley4 ,fortunately1 as it seems to me1 his general contention1 that the very notion of relation is unthinkable clearly1 has been successfully met by many critics4#ed ,it is a burden to the flesh1 and an injustice both to readers and to the previous writers1 to repeat good arguments already printed4 ,so1 in noticing ,mr4 ,bradley1 ,i will confine myself to the interests of radical empiricism solely4 ,v ,the first duty of radical empiricism1 taking given conjunctions at their face-value1 is to class some of them as more intimate and some as more external4 ,when two terms are similar1 their very natures enter into the relation4 ,being what they are1 no matter where or when1 the likeness never can be denied1 if asserted4 ,it continues predicable as long as the terms continue4 ,other relations1 the where and the when1 for example1 seem adventitious4 ,the sheet of paper may be 'off' or 'on' the table1 for example2 and in either case the relation involves only the outside of its terms4 ,having an outside1 both of them1 they contribute by it to the relation4 ,it is external3 the term's inner nature is irrelevant to it4 ,any book1 any table1 may fall into the relation1 which is created pro hac vice1 not by their existence1 but by their casual situation4 ,it is just because so many of the conjunctions of experience seem so external that a philosophy of pure experience must tend to pluralism in its ontology4 ,so far as things have space-relations1 for example1 we are free to imagine them with different origins even4 ,if they could get to be1 and get into space at all1 then they may have done so separately4 ,once there1 however1 they are additives to one another1 and1 with no prejudice to their natures1 all sorts of space-relations may supervene between them4 ,the question of how things could come to be anyhow1 is wholly different from the question what their relations1 once the being accomplished1 may consist in4 ,mr4 ,bradley now affirms that such external relations as the space-relations which we here talk of must hold of entirely different subjects from those of which the absence of such relations might a moment previously have been plausibly asserted4 ,not only is the situation different when the book is on the table1 but the book itself is different as a book1 from what it was when it was off the table4#ee ,he admits that such external relations seem possible and even existing4444 ,that you do not alter what you compare or rearrange in space seems to common sense quite obvious1 and that on the other side there are as obvious difficulties does not occur to common sense at all4 ,and ,i will begin by pointing out these difficulties4444 ,there is a relation in the result1 and this relation1 we hear1 is to make no difference in its terms4 ,but1 if so1 to what does it make a difference8 ,doesn't it make a difference to us onlookers1 at least8 and what is the meaning and sense of qualifying the terms by it8 ,surely the meaning is to tell the truth about their relative position4#ef ,if1 in short1 it is external to the terms1 how can it possibly be true of them8 ,is it the 'intimacy' suggested by the little word 'of1' here1 which ,i have underscored1 that is the root of ,mr4 ,bradley's trouble8 444 ,if the terms from their inner nature do not enter into the relation1 then1 so far as they are concerned1 they seem related for no reason at all4444 ,things are spatially related1 first in one way1 and then become related in another way1 and yet in no way themselves are altered2 for the relations1 it is said1 are but external4 ,but ,i reply that1 if so1 ,i can not understand the leaving by the terms of one set of relations and their adoption of another fresh set4 ,the process and its result to the terms1 if they contribute nothing to it ,surely they contribute to it all there is 'of' it6 seem irrational throughout4 ,if 'irrational' here means simply 'non-rational1' or nondeductible from the essence of either term singly1 it is no reproach2 if it means 'contradicting' such essence1 ,mr4 ,bradley should show wherein and how4 ,but1 if they contribute anything1 they must surely be affected internally4 ,why so1 if they contribute only their surface8 ,in such relations as 'on' 'a foot away1' 'between1' 'next1' etc41 only surfaces are in question4 444 ,if the terms contribute anything whatever1 then the terms are affected inwardly altered8 by the arrangement4444 ,that for working purposes we treat1 and do well to treat1 some relations as external merely ,i do not deny1 and that of course is not the question at issue here4 ,that question is 444 whether in the end and in principle a mere external relation i4e41 a relation which can change without forcing its terms to change their nature simultaneously is possible and forced on us by the facts4#eg ,mr4 ,bradley next reverts to the antinomies of space1 which1 according to him1 prove it to be unreal1 although it appears as so prolific a medium of external relations2 and he then concludes that ,irrationality and externality can not be the last truth about things4 ,somewhere there must be a reason why this and that appear together4 ,and this reason and reality must reside in the whole from which terms and relations are abstractions1 a whole in which their internal connection must lie1 and out of which from the background appear those fresh results which never could have come from the premises4 ,and he adds that ,where the whole is different1 the terms that qualify and contribute to it must so far be different4444 ,they are altered so far only ,how far8 farther than externally1 yet not through and through8 but still they are altered4444 ,i must insist that in each case the terms are qualified by their whole ,qualified how8--,do their external relations1 situations1 dates1 etc41 changed as these are in the new whole1 fail to qualify them 'far' enough81 and that in the second case there is a whole which differs both logically and psychologically from the first whole2 and ,i urge that in contributing to the change the terms so far are altered4 ,not merely the relations1 then1 but the terms are altered3 und zwar 'so far4' ,but just how far is the whole problem2 and 'through-and-through' would seem 7in spite of ,mr4 ,bradley's somewhat undecided utterances#eh7 to be the full ,bradleyan answer4 ,the 'whole' which he here treats as primary and determinative of each part's manner of 'contributing1' simply must1 when it alters1 alter in its entirety4 ,there must be total conflux of its parts1 each into and through each other4 ,the 'must' appears here as a ,machtspruch1 as an ipse dixit of ,mr4 ,bradley's absolutistically tempered 'understanding1' for he candidly confesses that how the parts do differ as they contribute to different wholes1 is unknown to him4#ei ,although ,i have every wish to comprehend the authority by which ,mr4 ,bradley's understanding speaks1 his words leave me wholly unconverted4 ',external relations' stand with their withers all unwrung1 and remain1 for aught he proves to the contrary1 not only practically workable1 but also perfectly intelligible factors of reality4 ,,vi ,mr4 ,bradley's understanding shows the most extraordinary power of perceiving separations and the most extraordinary impotence in comprehending conjunctions4 ,one would naturally say 'neither or both1' but not so ,mr4 ,bradley4 ,when a common man analyzes certain whats from out the stream of experience1 he understands their distinctness as thus isolated4 ,but this does not prevent him from equally well understanding their combination with each other as originally experienced in the concrete1 or their confluence with new sensible experiences in which they recur as 'the same4' ,returning into the stream of sensible presentation1 nouns and adjectives1 and thats and abstract whats1 grow confluent again1 and the word 'is' names all these experiences of conjunction4 ,mr4 ,bradley understands the isolation of the abstracts1 but to understand the combination is to him impossible4#fj ,to understand a complex ,,ab1 he says1 ,i must begin with ,a or ,b4 ,and beginning1 say with ,a1 if ,i then merely find ,b1 ,i have either lost ,a1 or ,i have got beside ,a1 the word 'beside' seems here vital1 as meaning a conjunction 'external' and therefore unintelligible something else1 and in neither case have ,i understood4#fa ,for my intellect can not simply unite a diversity1 nor has it in itself any form or way of togetherness1 and you gain nothing if1 beside ,a and ,b1 you offer me their conjunction in fact4 ,for to my intellect that is no more than another external element4 ,and 'facts1' once for all1 are for my intellect not true unless they satisfy it4444 ,the intellect has in its nature no principle of mere togetherness4#fb ,of course ,mr4 ,bradley has a right to define 'intellect' as the power by which we perceive separations but not unions--provided he give due notice to the reader4 ,but why then claim that such a maimed and amputated power must reign supreme in philosophy1 and accuse on its behoof the whole empirical world of irrationality8 ,it is true that he elsewhere attributes to the intellect a proprius motus of transition1 but says that when he looks for these transitions in the detail of living experience1 he 'is unable to verify such a solution4'#fc ,yet he never explains what the intellectual transitions would be like in case we had them4 ,he only defines them negatively--they are not spatial1 temporal1 predicative1 or causal2 or qualitatively or otherwise serial2 or in any way relational as we navely trace relations1 for relations separate terms1 and need themselves to be hooked on ad infinitum4 ,the nearest approach he makes to describing a truly intellectual transition is where he speaks of ,a and ,b as being 'united1 each from its own nature1 in a whole which is the nature of both alike4'#fd ,but this 7which1 pace ,mr4 ,bradley1 seems exquisitely analogous to 'taking' a congeries in a 'lump1' if not to 'swamping'7 suggests nothing but that conflux which pure experience so abundantly offers1 as when 'space1' 'white' and 'sweet' are confluent in a 'lump of sugar1' or kinesthetic1 dermal1 and optical sensations confluent in 'my hand4'#fe ,all that ,i can verify in the transitions which ,mr4 ,bradley's intellect desiderates as its proprius motus is a reminiscence of these and other sensible conjunctions 7especially space-conjunctions71 but a reminiscence so vague that its originals are not recognized4 ,bradley in short repeats the fable of the dog1 the bone1 and its image in the water4 ,with a world of particulars1 given in loveliest union1 in conjunction definitely various1 and variously definite1 the 'how' of which you 'understand' as soon as you see the fact of them1#ff for there is no 'how' except the constitution of the fact as given2 with all this given him1 ,i say1 in pure experience1 he asks for some ineffable union in the abstract instead1 which1 if he gained it1 would only be a duplicate of what he has already in his full possession4 ,surely he abuses the privilege which society grants to all us philosophers1 of being puzzle-headed4 ,polemic writing like this is odious2 but with absolutism in possession in so many quarters1 omission to defend my radical empiricism against its best known champion would count as either superficiality or inability4 ,i have to conclude that its dialectic has not invalidated in the least degree the usual conjunctions by which the world1 as experienced1 hangs so variously together4 ,in particular it leaves an empirical theory of knowledge#fg intact1 and lets us continue to believe with common sense that one object may be known1 if we have any ground for thinking that it is known1 to many knowers4 ,in the next essay ,i shall return to this last supposition1 which seems to me to offer other difficulties much harder for a philosophy of pure experience to deal with than any of absolutism's dialectic objections4 ,,footnotes3 #dc ,reprinted from ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #b1 ,january #ai1 #aije4 ,reprinted also as ,appendix ,a in ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 pp4 #cdg-cfi4 ,the author's corrections have been adopted in the present text4 ,,ed4 #dd ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley3 ,appearance and ,reality1 second edition1 pp4 #aeb-aec1 #bc1 #aah1 #ajd1 #ajh-aji1 #egj4 #de ,compare ,professor ,mac,lennan's admirable ,auseinandersetzung with ,mr4 ,bradley1 in ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,i1 #aijd1 pp4 #djc ff41 especially pp4 #dje-djg4 #df ,hume3 ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 ,appendix1 ,selby-,bigge's edition1 p4 #fcf4 #dg ,technically1 it seems classable as a 'fallacy of composition4' ,a duality1 predicable of the two wholes1 ,l--,m and ,m--,n1 is forthwith predicated of one of their parts1 ,m4 #dh ,see above1 pp4 #db ff4 #di ,i may perhaps refer here to my ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,i1 pp4 #dei ff4 ,it really seems 'weird' to have to argue 7as ,i am forced now to do7 for the notion that it is one sheet of paper 7with its two surfaces and all that lies between7 which is both under my pen and on the table while ,i write--the 'claim' that it is two sheets seems so brazen4 ,yet ,i sometimes suspect the absolutists of sincerity6 #ej ,for the author's criticism of ,hegel's view of relations1 cf4 ,will to ,believe1 pp4 #bgh-bgi4 ,,ed4 #ea ,cf4 ,a4 ,spir3 ,denken und ,wirklichkeit1 part ,i1 bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 ,,iv 7containing also account of ,herbart74 ,,ed4 #eb ,see above1 pp4 #db1 #di4 #ec ,here again the reader must beware of slipping from logical into phenomenal considerations4 ,it may well be that we attribute a certain relation falsely1 because the circumstances of the case1 being complex1 have deceived us4 ,at a railway station we may take our own train1 and not the one that fills our window1 to be moving4 ,we here put motion in the wrong place in the world1 but in its original place the motion is a part of reality4 ,what ,mr4 ,bradley means is nothing like this1 but rather that such things as motion are nowhere real1 and that1 even in their aboriginal and empirically incorrigible seats1 relations are impossible of comprehension4 #ed ,particularly so by ,andrew ,seth ,pringle-,pattison1 in his ,man and the ,cosmos2 by ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 in chapter ,,xii 7,the ,validity of ,judgment7 of his ,theory of ,knowledge2 and by ,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller1 in his ,humanism1 essay ,,xi4 ,other fatal reviews 7in my opinion7 are ,hodder's1 in the ,psychological ,review1 vol4 ,i1 #ahid1 p4 #cjg2 ,stout's in the ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 #aija-b1 p4 #a2 and ,mac,lennan's in ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,i1 #aijd1 p4 #djc4 #ee ,once more1 don't slip from logical into physical situations4 ,of course1 if the table be wet1 it will moisten the book1 or if it be slight enough and the book heavy enough1 the book will break it down4 ,but such collateral phenomena are not the point at issue4 ,the point is whether the successive relations 'on' and 'not-on' can rationally 7not physically7 hold of the same constant terms1 abstractly taken4 ,professor ,a4 ,e4 ,taylor drops from logical into material considerations when he instances color-contrast as a proof that ,a1 'as contra-distinguished from ,b1 is not the same thing as mere ,a not in any way affected' 7,elements of ,metaphysics1 p4 #ade74 ,note the substitution1 for 'related' of the word 'affected1' which begs the whole question4 #ef ,but is there any sense1 asks ,mr4 ,bradley1 peevishly1 on p4 #egi1 and if so1 what sense in truth that is only outside and 'about' things8 ,surely such a question may be left unanswered4 #eg ,appearance and ,reality1 second edition1 pp4 #ege-egf4 #eh ,i say 'undecided1' because1 apart from the 'so far1' which sounds terribly half-hearted1 there are passages in these very pages in which ,mr4 ,bradley admits the pluralistic thesis4 ,read1 for example1 what he says1 on p4 #egh1 of a billiard ball keeping its 'character' unchanged1 though1 in its change of place1 its 'existence' gets altered2 or what he says1 on p4 #egi1 of the possibility that an abstract quality ,a1 ,b1 or ,c1 in a thing1 'may throughout remain unchanged' although the thing be altered2 or his admission that in red-hairedness1 both as analyzed out of a man and when given with the rest of him1 there may be 'no change' 7p4 #ehj74 ,why does he immediately add that for the pluralist to plead the non-mutation of such abstractions would be an ignoratio elenchi8 ,it is impossible to admit it to be such4 ,the entire elenchus and inquest is just as to whether parts which you can abstract from existing wholes can also contribute to other wholes without changing their inner nature4 ,if they can thus mould various wholes into new gestaltqualitten1 then it follows that the same elements are logically able to exist in different wholes whether physically able would depend on additional hypotheses2 that partial changes are thinkable1 and through-and-through change not a dialectic necessity2 that monism is only an hypothesis2 and that an additively constituted universe is a rationally respectable hypothesis also4 ,all the theses of radical empiricism1 in short1 follow4 #ei ,op4 cit41 pp4 #egg-egi4 #fj ,so far as ,i catch his state of mind1 it is somewhat like this3 ',book1' 'table1' 'on'--how does the existence of these three abstract elements result in this book being livingly on this table4 ,why isn't the table on the book8 ,or why doesn't the 'on' connect itself with another book1 or something that is not a table8 ,mustn't something in each of the three elements already determine the two others to it1 so that they do not settle elsewhere or float vaguely8 ,mustn't the whole fact be pre-figured in each part1 and exist de jure before it can exist de facto8 ,but1 if so1 in what can the jural existence consist1 if not in a spiritual miniature of the whole fact's constitution actuating every partial factor as its purpose8 ,but is this anything but the old metaphysical fallacy of looking behind a fact in esse for the ground of the fact1 and finding it in the shape of the very same fact in posse8 ,somewhere we must leave off with a constitution behind which there is nothing4 #fa ,apply this to the case of 'book-on-table'6 ,w4 ,j4 #fb ,op4 cit41 pp4 #egj1 #egb4 #fc ,op4 cit41 pp4 #efh1 #efi4 #fd ,op4 cit41 p4 #egj4 #fe ,how meaningless is the contention that in such wholes 7or in 'book-on-table1' 'watch-in-pocket1' etc47 the relation is an additional entity between the terms1 needing itself to be related again to each6 ,both ,bradley 7op4 cit41 pp4 #cb-cc7 and ,royce 7,the ,world and the ,individual1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #abh7 lovingly repeat this piece of profundity4 #ff ,the 'why' and the 'whence' are entirely other questions1 not under discussion1 as ,i understand ,mr4 ,bradley4 ,not how experience gets itself born1 but how it can be what it is after it is born1 is the puzzle4 #fg ,above1 p4 #eb4 ,,iv ,,how ,,two ,,minds ,,can ,,know ,,one ,,thing#fh ,in the essay entitled ',does ,consciousness ,exist8' ,i have tried to show that when we call an experience 'conscious1' that does not mean that it is suffused throughout with a peculiar modality of being 7'psychic' being7 as stained glass may be suffused with light1 but rather that it stands in certain determinate relations to other portions of experience extraneous to itself4 ,these form one peculiar 'context' for it2 while1 taken in another context of experiences1 we class it as a fact in the physical world4 ,this 'pen1' for example1 is1 in the first instance1 a bald that1 a datum1 fact1 phenomenon1 content1 or whatever other neutral or ambiguous name you may prefer to apply4 ,i called it in that article a 'pure experience4' ,to get classed either as a physical pen or as some one's percept of a pen1 it must assume a function1 and that can only happen in a more complicated world4 ,so far as in that world it is a stable feature1 holds ink1 marks paper and obeys the guidance of a hand1 it is a physical pen4 ,that is what we mean by being 'physical1' in a pen4 ,so far as it is instable1 on the contrary1 coming and going with the movements of my eyes1 altering with what ,i call my fancy1 continuous with subsequent experiences of its 'having been' 7in the past tense71 it is the percept of a pen in my mind4 ,those peculiarities are what we mean by being 'conscious1' in a pen4 ,in ,section ,,vi of another essay#fi ,i tried to show that the same that1 the same numerically identical pen of pure experience1 can enter simultaneously into many conscious contexts1 or1 in other words1 be an object for many different minds4 ,i admitted that ,i had not space to treat of certain possible objections in that article2 but in the last essay ,i took some of the objections up4 ,at the end of that essay ,i said that still more formidable-sounding objections remained2 so1 to leave my pure-experience theory in as strong a state as possible1 ,i propose to consider those objections now4 ,i ,the objections ,i previously tried to dispose of were purely logical or dialectical4 ,no one identical term1 whether physical or psychical1 it had been said1 could be the subject of two relations at once4 ,this thesis ,i sought to prove unfounded4 ,the objections that now confront us arise from the nature supposed to inhere in psychic facts specifically4 ,whatever may be the case with physical objects1 a fact of consciousness1 it is alleged 7and indeed very plausibly71 can not1 without self-contradiction1 be treated as a portion of two different minds1 and for the following reasons4 ,in the physical world we make with impunity the assumption that one and the same material object can figure in an indefinitely large number of different processes at once4 ,when1 for instance1 a sheet of rubber is pulled at its four corners1 a unit of rubber in the middle of the sheet is affected by all four of the pulls4 ,it transmits them each1 as if it pulled in four different ways at once itself4 ,so1 an air-particle or an ether-particle 'compounds' the different directions of movement imprinted on it without obliterating their several individualities4 ,it delivers them distinct1 on the contrary1 at as many several 'receivers' 7ear1 eye or what not7 as may be 'tuned' to that effect4 ,the apparent paradox of a distinctness like this surviving in the midst of compounding is a thing which1 ,i fancy1 the analyses made by physicists have by this time sufficiently cleared up4 ,but if1 on the strength of these analogies1 one should ask3 ,why1 if two or more lines can run through one and the same geometrical point1 or if two or more distinct processes of activity can run through one and the same physical thing so that it simultaneously plays a rle in each and every process1 might not two or more streams of personal consciousness include one and the same unit of experience so that it would simultaneously be a part of the experience of all the different minds8 one would be checked by thinking of a certain peculiarity by which phenomena of consciousness differ from physical things4 ,while physical things1 namely1 are supposed to be permanent and to have their 'states1' a fact of consciousness exists but once and is a state4 ,its esse is sentiri2 it is only so far as it is felt2 and it is unambiguously and unequivocally exactly what is felt4 ,the hypothesis under consideration would1 however1 oblige it to be felt equivocally1 felt now as part of my mind and again at the same time not as a part of my mind1 but of yours 7for my mind is not yours71 and this would seem impossible without doubling it into two distinct things1 or1 in other words1 without reverting to the ordinary dualistic philosophy of insulated minds each knowing its object representatively as a third thing1--and that would be to give up the pure-experience scheme altogether4 ,can we see1 then1 any way in which a unit of pure experience might enter into and figure in two diverse streams of consciousness without turning itself into the two units which1 on our hypothesis1 it must not be8 ,,ii ,there is a way2 and the first step towards it is to see more precisely how the unit enters into either one of the streams of consciousness alone4 ,just what1 from being 'pure1' does its becoming 'conscious' once mean8 ,it means1 first1 that new experiences have supervened2 and1 second1 that they have borne a certain assignable relation to the unit supposed4 ,continue1 if you please1 to speak of the pure unit as 'the pen4' ,so far as the pen's successors do but repeat the pen or1 being different from it1 are 'energetically'#gj related to it1 it and they will form a group of stably existing physical things4 ,so far1 however1 as its successors differ from it in another well-determined way1 the pen will figure in their context1 not as a physical1 but as a mental fact4 ,it will become a passing 'percept1' my percept of that pen4 ,what now is that decisive well-determined way8 ,in the chapter on ',the ,self1' in my ,principles of ,psychology1 ,i explained the continuous identity of each personal consciousness as a name for the practical fact that new experiences#ga come which look back on the old ones1 find them 'warm1' and greet and appropriate them as 'mine4' ,these operations mean1 when analyzed empirically1 several tolerably definite things1 viz43 #a4 ,that the new experience has past time for its 'content1' and in that time a pen that 'was'2 #b4 ,that 'warmth' was also about the pen1 in the sense of a group of feelings 7'interest' aroused1 'attention' turned1 'eyes' employed1 etc47 that were closely connected with it and that now recur and evermore recur with unbroken vividness1 though from the pen of now1 which may be only an image1 all such vividness may have gone2 #c4 ,that these feelings are the nucleus of 'me'2 #d4 ,that whatever once was associated with them was1 at least for that one moment1 'mine'--my implement if associated with hand-feelings1 my 'percept' only1 if only eye-feelings and attention-feelings were involved4 ,the pen1 realized in this retrospective way as my percept1 thus figures as a fact of 'conscious' life4 ,but it does so only so far as 'appropriation' has occurred2 and appropriation is part of the content of a later experience wholly additional to the originally 'pure' pen4 ,that pen1 virtually both objective and subjective1 is at its own moment actually and intrinsically neither4 ,it has to be looked back upon and used1 in order to be classed in either distinctive way4 ,but its use1 so called1 is in the hands of the other experience1 while it stands1 throughout the operation1 passive and unchanged4 ,if this pass muster as an intelligible account of how an experience originally pure can enter into one consciousness1 the next question is as to how it might conceivably enter into two4 ,,iii ,obviously no new kind of condition would have to be supplied4 ,all that we should have to postulate would be a second subsequent experience1 collateral and contemporary with the first subsequent one1 in which a similar act of appropriation should occur4 ,the two acts would interfere neither with one another nor with the originally pure pen4 ,it would sleep undisturbed in its own past1 no matter how many such successors went through their several appropriative acts4 ,each would know it as 'my' percept1 each would class it as a 'conscious' fact4 ,nor need their so classing it interfere in the least with their classing it at the same time as a physical pen4 ,since the classing in both cases depends upon the taking of it in one group or another of associates1 if the superseding experience were of wide enough 'span' it could think the pen in both groups simultaneously1 and yet distinguish the two groups4 ,it would then see the whole situation conformably to what we call 'the representative theory of cognition1' and that is what we all spontaneously do4 ,as a man philosophizing 'popularly1' ,i believe that what ,i see myself writing with is double--,i think it in its relations to physical nature1 and also in its relations to my personal life2 ,i see that it is in my mind1 but that it also is a physical pen4 ,the paradox of the same experience figuring in two consciousnesses seems thus no paradox at all4 ,to be 'conscious' means not simply to be1 but to be reported1 known1 to have awareness of one's being added to that being2 and this is just what happens when the appropriative experience supervenes4 ,the pen-experience in its original immediacy is not aware of itself1 it simply is1 and the second experience is required for what we call awareness of it to occur4#gb ,the difficulty of understanding what happens here is1 therefore1 not a logical difficulty3 there is no contradiction involved4 ,it is an ontological difficulty rather4 ,experiences come on an enormous scale1 and if we take them all together1 they come in a chaos of incommensurable relations that we can not straighten out4 ,we have to abstract different groups of them1 and handle these separately if we are to talk of them at all4 ,but how the experiences ever get themselves made1 or why their characters and relations are just such as appear1 we can not begin to understand4 ,granting1 however1 that1 by hook or crook1 they can get themselves made1 and can appear in the successions that ,i have so schematically described1 then we have to confess that even although 7as ,i began by quoting from the adversary7 'a feeling only is as it is felt1' there is still nothing absurd in the notion of its being felt in two different ways at once1 as yours1 namely1 and as mine4 ,it is1 indeed1 'mine' only as it is felt as mine1 and 'yours' only as it is felt as yours4 ,but it is felt as neither by itself1 but only when 'owned' by our two several remembering experiences1 just as one undivided estate is owned by several heirs4 ,,iv ,one word1 now1 before ,i close1 about the corollaries of the views set forth4 ,since the acquisition of conscious quality on the part of an experience depends upon a context coming to it1 it follows that the sum total of all experiences1 having no context1 can not strictly be called conscious at all4 ,it is a that1 an ,absolute1 a 'pure' experience on an enormous scale1 undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing4 ,this the post-,kantian idealists have always practically acknowledged by calling their doctrine an ,identittsphilosophie4 ,the question of the ,beseelung of the ,all of things ought not1 then1 even to be asked4 ,no more ought the question of its truth to be asked1 for truth is a relation inside of the sum total1 obtaining between thoughts and something else1 and thoughts1 as we have seen1 can only be contextual things4 ,in these respects the pure experiences of our philosophy are1 in themselves considered1 so many little absolutes1 the philosophy of pure experience being only a more comminuted ,identittsphilosophie4#gc ,meanwhile1 a pure experience can be postulated with any amount whatever of span or field4 ,if it exert the retrospective and appropriative function on any other piece of experience1 the latter thereby enters into its own conscious stream4 ,and in this operation time intervals make no essential difference4 ,after sleeping1 my retrospection is as perfect as it is between two successive waking moments of my time4 ,accordingly if1 millions of years later1 a similarly retrospective experience should anyhow come to birth1 my present thought would form a genuine portion of its long-span conscious life4 ',form a portion1' ,i say1 but not in the sense that the two things could be entitatively or substantively one--they cannot1 for they are numerically discrete facts--but only in the sense that the functions of my present thought1 its knowledge1 its purpose1 its content and 'consciousness1' in short1 being inherited1 would be continued practically unchanged4 ,speculations like ,fechner's1 of an ,earth-soul1 of wider spans of consciousness enveloping narrower ones throughout the cosmos1 are1 therefore1 philosophically quite in order1 provided they distinguish the functional from the entitative point of view1 and do not treat the minor consciousness under discussion as a kind of standing material of which the wider ones consist4#gd ,,footnotes3 #fh ,reprinted from ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #g1 ,march #cj1 #aije4 #fi ,a ,world of ,pure ,experience1 above1 pp4 #ci-ia4 #gj ,for an explanation of this expression1 see above1 p4 #cb4 #ga ,i call them 'passing thoughts' in the book--the passage in point goes from pages #ccj to #cdb of vol4 ,i4 #gb ,shadworth ,hodgson has laid great stress on the fact that the minimum of consciousness demands two subfeelings1 of which the second retrospects the first4 7,cf4 the section ',analysis of ,minima' in his ,philosophy of ,reflection1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #bdh2 also the chapter entitled ',the ,moment of ,experience' in his ,metaphysic of ,experience1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #cd47 ',we live forward1 but we understand backward' is a phrase of ,kierkegaard's which ,hffding quotes4 ,h4 ,hffding3 ,a ,philosophical ,confession1 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,ii1 #aije1 p4 #hf4 #gc ,cf4 below1 pp4 #aig1 #bjb4 #gd ,cf4 ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 ,lect4 ,,iv1 ',concerning ,fechner1' and ,lect4 ,v1 ',the ,compounding of ,consciousness4' ,v ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,affectional ,,facts ,,in ,a ,,world ,,of ,,pure ,,experience#ge ,common sense and popular philosophy are as dualistic as it is possible to be4 ,thoughts1 we all naturally think1 are made of one kind of substance1 and things of another4 ,consciousness1 flowing inside of us in the forms of conception or judgment1 or concentrating itself in the shape of passion or emotion1 can be directly felt as the spiritual activity which it is1 and known in contrast with the space-filling objective 'content' which it envelopes and accompanies4 ,in opposition to this dualistic philosophy1 ,i tried1 in the first essay to show that thoughts and things are absolutely homogeneous as to their material1 and that their opposition is only one of relation and of function4 ,there is no thought-stuff different from thing-stuff1 ,i said2 but the same identical piece of 'pure experience' 7which was the name ,i gave to the materia prima of everything7 can stand alternately for a 'fact of consciousness' or for a physical reality1 according as it is taken in one context or in another4 ,for the right understanding of what follows1 ,i shall have to presuppose that the reader will have read that essay4#gf ,the commonest objection which the doctrine there laid down runs up against is drawn from the existence of our 'affections4' ,in our pleasures and pains1 our loves and fears and angers1 in the beauty1 comicality1 importance or preciousness of certain objects and situations1 we have1 ,i am told by many critics1 a great realm of experience intuitively recognized as spiritual1 made1 and felt to be made1 of consciousness exclusively1 and different in nature from the space-filling kind of being which is enjoyed by physical objects4 ,in ,section ,,vii4 of the first essay1 ,i treated of this class of experiences very inadequately1 because ,i had to be so brief4 ,i now return to the subject1 because ,i believe that1 so far from invalidating my general thesis1 these phenomena1 when properly analyzed1 afford it powerful support4 ,the central point of the pure-experience theory is that 'outer' and 'inner' are names for two groups into which we sort experiences according to the way in which they act upon their neighbors4 ,any one 'content1' such as hard1 let us say1 can be assigned to either group4 ,in the outer group it is 'strong1' it acts 'energetically' and aggressively4 ,here whatever is hard interferes with the space its neighbors occupy4 ,it dents them2 is impenetrable by them2 and we call the hardness then a physical hardness4 ,in the mind1 on the contrary1 the hard thing is nowhere in particular1 it dents nothing1 it suffuses through its mental neighbors1 as it were1 and interpenetrates them4 ,taken in this group we call both it and them 'ideas' or 'sensations'2 and the basis of the two groups respectively is the different type of interrelation1 the mutual impenetrability1 on the one hand1 and the lack of physical interference and interaction1 on the other4 ,that what in itself is one and the same entity should be able to function thus differently in different contexts is a natural consequence of the extremely complex reticulations in which our experiences come4 ,to her offspring a tigress is tender1 but cruel to every other living thing--both cruel and tender1 therefore1 at once4 ,a mass in movement resists every force that operates contrariwise to its own direction1 but to forces that pursue the same direction1 or come in at right angles1 it is absolutely inert4 ,it is thus both energetic and inert2 and the same is true 7if you vary the associates properly7 of every other piece of experience4 ,it is only towards certain specific groups of associates that the physical energies1 as we call them1 of a content are put forth4 ,in another group it may be quite inert4 ,it is possible to imagine a universe of experiences in which the only alternative between neighbors would be either physical interaction or complete inertness4 ,in such a world the mental or the physical status of any piece of experience would be unequivocal4 ,when active1 it would figure in the physical1 and when inactive1 in the mental group4 ,but the universe we live in is more chaotic than this1 and there is room in it for the hybrid or ambiguous group of our affectional experiences1 of our emotions and appreciative perceptions4 ,in the paragraphs that follow ,i shall try to show3 7#a7 ,that the popular notion that these experiences are intuitively given as purely inner facts is hasty and erroneous2 and 7#b7 ,that their ambiguity illustrates beautifully my central thesis that subjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an experience is aboriginally made of1 but of its classification4 ,classifications depend on our temporary purposes4 ,for certain purposes it is convenient to take things in one set of relations1 for other purposes in another set4 ,in the two cases their contexts are apt to be different4 ,in the case of our affectional experiences we have no permanent and steadfast purpose that obliges us to be consistent1 so we find it easy to let them float ambiguously1 sometimes classing them with our feelings1 sometimes with more physical realities1 according to caprice or to the convenience of the moment4 ,thus would these experiences1 so far from being an obstacle to the pure experience philosophy1 serve as an excellent corroboration of its truth4 ,first of all1 then1 it is a mistake to say1 with the objectors whom ,i began by citing1 that anger1 love and fear are affections purely of the mind4 ,that1 to a great extent at any rate1 they are simultaneously affections of the body is proved by the whole literature of the ,james-,lange theory of emotion4#gg ,all our pains1 moreover1 are local1 and we are always free to speak of them in objective as well as in subjective terms4 ,we can say that we are aware of a painful place1 filling a certain bigness in our organism1 or we can say that we are inwardly in a 'state' of pain4 ,all our adjectives of worth are similarly ambiguous--,i instanced some of the ambiguities in the first essay4#gh ,is the preciousness of a diamond a quality of the gem8 or is it a feeling in our mind8 ,practically we treat it as both or as either1 according to the temporary direction of our thought4 ',beauty1' says ,professor ,santayana1 'is pleasure objectified'2 and in ,sections #aj and #aa of his work1 ,the ,sense of ,beauty1 he treats in a masterly way of this equivocal realm4 ,the various pleasures we receive from an object may count as 'feelings' when we take them singly1 but when they combine in a total richness1 we call the result the 'beauty' of the object1 and treat it as an outer attribute which our mind perceives4 ,we discover beauty just as we discover the physical properties of things4 ,training is needed to make us expert in either line4 ,single sensations also may be ambiguous4 ,shall we say an 'agreeable degree of heat1' or an 'agreeable feeling' occasioned by the degree of heat8 ,either will do2 and language would lose most of its esthetic and rhetorical value were we forbidden to project words primarily connoting our affections upon the objects by which the affections are aroused4 ,the man is really hateful2 the action really mean2 the situation really tragic--all in themselves and quite apart from our opinion4 ,we even go so far as to talk of a weary road1 a giddy height1 a jocund morning or a sullen sky2 and the term 'indefinite' while usually applied only to our apprehensions1 functions as a fundamental physical qualification of things in ,spencer's 'law of evolution1' and doubtless passes with most readers for all right4 ,psychologists1 studying our perceptions of movement1 have unearthed experiences in which movement is felt in general but not ascribed correctly to the body that really moves4 ,thus in optical vertigo1 caused by unconscious movements of our eyes1 both we and the external universe appear to be in a whirl4 ,when clouds float by the moon1 it is as if both clouds and moon and we ourselves shared in the motion4 ,in the extraordinary case of amnesia of the ,rev4 ,mr4 ,hanna1 published by ,sidis and ,goodhart in their important work on ,multiple ,personality1 we read that when the patient first recovered consciousness and noticed an attendant walk across the room1 he identified the movement with that of his own4 ,he did not yet discriminate between his own movements and those outside himself4#gi ,such experiences point to a primitive stage of perception in which discriminations afterwards needful have not yet been made4 ,a piece of experience of a determinate sort is there1 but there at first as a 'pure' fact4 ,motion originally simply is2 only later is it confined to this thing or to that4 ,something like this is true of every experience1 however complex1 at the moment of its actual presence4 ,let the reader arrest himself in the act of reading this article now4 ,now this is a pure experience1 a phenomenon1 or datum1 a mere that or content of fact4 ',reading' simply is1 is there2 and whether there for some one's consciousness1 or there for physical nature1 is a question not yet put4 ,at the moment1 it is there for neither2 later we shall probably judge it to have been there for both4 ,with the affectional experiences which we are considering1 the relatively 'pure' condition lasts4 ,in practical life no urgent need has yet arisen for deciding whether to treat them as rigorously mental or as rigorously physical facts4 ,so they remain equivocal2 and1 as the world goes1 their equivocality is one of their great conveniences4 ,the shifting place of 'secondary qualities' in the history of philosophy#hj is another excellent proof of the fact that 'inner' and 'outer' are not coefficients with which experiences come to us aboriginally stamped1 but are rather results of a later classification performed by us for particular needs4 ,the common-sense stage of thought is a perfectly definite practical halting-place1 the place where we ourselves can proceed to act unhesitatingly4 ,on this stage of thought things act on each other as well as on us by means of their secondary qualities4 ,sound1 as such1 goes through the air and can be intercepted4 ,the heat of the fire passes over1 as such1 into the water which it sets a-boiling4 ,it is the very light of the arc-lamp which displaces the darkness of the midnight street1 etc4 ,by engendering and translocating just these qualities1 actively efficacious as they seem to be1 we ourselves succeed in altering nature so as to suit us2 and until more purely intellectual1 as distinguished from practical1 needs had arisen1 no one ever thought of calling these qualities subjective4 ,when1 however1 ,galileo1 ,descartes1 and others found it best for philosophic purposes to class sound1 heat1 and light along with pain and pleasure as purely mental phenomena1 they could do so with impunity4#ha ,even the primary qualities are undergoing the same fate4 ,hardness and softness are effects on us of atomic interactions1 and the atoms themselves are neither hard nor soft1 nor solid nor liquid4 ,size and shape are deemed subjective by ,kantians2 time itself is subjective according to many philosophers2#hb and even the activity and causal efficacy which lingered in physics long after secondary qualities were banished are now treated as illusory projections outwards of phenomena of our own consciousness4 ,there are no activities or effects in nature1 for the most intellectual contemporary school of physical speculation4 ,nature exhibits only changes1 which habitually coincide with one another so that their habits are describable in simple 'laws4'#hc ,there is no original spirituality or materiality of being1 intuitively discerned1 then2 but only a translocation of experiences from one world to another2 a grouping of them with one set or another of associates for definitely practical or intellectual ends4 ,i will say nothing here of the persistent ambiguity of relations4 ,they are undeniable parts of pure experience2 yet1 while common sense and what ,i call radical empiricism stand for their being objective1 both rationalism and the usual empiricism claim that they are exclusively the 'work of the mind'--the finite mind or the absolute mind1 as the case may be4 99 99 99 99 99 ,turn now to those affective phenomena which more directly concern us4 ,we soon learn to separate the ways in which things appeal to our interests and emotions from the ways in which they act upon one another4 ,it does not work to assume that physical objects are going to act outwardly by their sympathetic or antipathetic qualities4 ,the beauty of a thing or its value is no force that can be plotted in a polygon of compositions1 nor does its 'use' or 'significance' affect in the minutest degree its vicissitudes or destiny at the hands of physical nature4 ,chemical 'affinities' are a purely verbal metaphor2 and1 as ,i just said1 even such things as forces1 tensions1 and activities can at a pinch be regarded as anthropomorphic projections4 ,so far1 then1 as the physical world means the collection of contents that determine in each other certain regular changes1 the whole collection of our appreciative attributes has to be treated as falling outside of it4 ,if we mean by physical nature whatever lies beyond the surface of our bodies1 these attributes are inert throughout the whole extent of physical nature4 ,why then do men leave them as ambiguous as they do1 and not class them decisively as purely spiritual8 ,the reason would seem to be that1 although they are inert as regards the rest of physical nature1 they are not inert as regards that part of physical nature which our own skin covers4 ,it is those very appreciative attributes of things1 their dangerousness1 beauty1 rarity1 utility1 etc41 that primarily appeal to our attention4 ,in our commerce with nature these attributes are what give emphasis to objects2 and for an object to be emphatic1 whatever spiritual fact it may mean1 means also that it produces immediate bodily effects upon us1 alterations of tone and tension1 of heart-beat and breathing1 of vascular and visceral action4 ,the 'interesting' aspects of things are thus not wholly inert physically1 though they be active only in these small corners of physical nature which our bodies occupy4 ,that1 however1 is enough to save them from being classed as absolutely non-objective4 ,the attempt1 if any one should make it1 to sort experiences into two absolutely discrete groups1 with nothing but inertness in one of them and nothing but activities in the other1 would thus receive one check4 ,it would receive another as soon as we examined the more distinctively mental group2 for though in that group it be true that things do not act on one another by their physical properties1 do not dent each other or set fire to each other1 they yet act on each other in the most energetic way by those very characters which are so inert extracorporeally4 ,it is by the interest and importance that experiences have for us1 by the emotions they excite1 and the purposes they subserve1 by their affective values1 in short1 that their consecution in our several conscious streams1 as 'thoughts' of ours1 is mainly ruled4 ,desire introduces them2 interest holds them2 fitness fixes their order and connection4 ,i need only refer for this aspect of our mental life1 to ,wundt's article ',ueber psychische ,causalitt1' which begins ,volume ,x4 of his ,philosophische ,studien4#hd ,it thus appears that the ambiguous or amphibious status which we find our epithets of value occupying is the most natural thing in the world4 ,it would1 however1 be an unnatural status if the popular opinion which ,i cited at the outset were correct4 ,if 'physical' and 'mental' meant two different kinds of intrinsic nature1 immediately1 intuitively1 and infallibly discernible1 and each fixed forever in whatever bit of experience it qualified1 one does not see how there could ever have arisen any room for doubt or ambiguity4 ,but if1 on the contrary1 these words are words of sorting1 ambiguity is natural4 ,for then1 as soon as the relations of a thing are sufficiently various it can be sorted variously4 ,take a mass of carrion1 for example1 and the 'disgustingness' which for us is part of the experience4 ,the sun caresses it1 and the zephyr wooes it as if it were a bed of roses4 ,so the disgustingness fails to operate within the realm of suns and breezes1--it does not function as a physical quality4 ,but the carrion 'turns our stomach' by what seems a direct operation--it does function physically1 therefore1 in that limited part of physics4 ,we can treat it as physical or as non-physical according as we take it in the narrower or in the wider context1 and conversely1 of course1 we must treat it as non-mental or as mental4 ,our body itself is the palmary instance of the ambiguous4 ,sometimes ,i treat my body purely as a part of outer nature4 ,sometimes1 again1 ,i think of it as 'mine1' ,i sort it with the 'me1' and then certain local changes and determinations in it pass for spiritual happenings4 ,its breathing is my 'thinking1' its sensorial adjustments are my 'attention1' its kinesthetic alterations are my 'efforts1' its visceral perturbations are my 'emotions4' ,the obstinate controversies that have arisen over such statements as these 7which sound so paradoxical1 and which can yet be made so seriously7 prove how hard it is to decide by bare introspection what it is in experiences that shall make them either spiritual or material4 ,it surely can be nothing intrinsic in the individual experience4 ,it is their way of behaving towards each other1 their system of relations1 their function2 and all these things vary with the context in which we find it opportune to consider them4 ,i think ,i may conclude1 then 7and ,i hope that my readers are now ready to conclude with me71 that the pretended spirituality of our emotions and of our attributes of value1 so far from proving an objection to the philosophy of pure experience1 does1 when rightly discussed and accounted for1 serve as one of its best corroborations4 ,,footnotes3 #ge ,reprinted from ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #aa1 ,may #be1 #aije4 #gf ,it will be still better if he shall have also read the essay entitled ',a ,world of ,pure ,experience1' which follows the first and develops its ideas still farther4 #gg ,cf4 ,the ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,,ii1 ch4 ,,xxv2 and ,the ,physical ,basis of ,emotion1 ,the ,psychological ,review1 vol4 ,i1 #ahid1 p4 #eaf4 #gh ,see above1 pp4 #cd1 #ce4 #gi ,page #ajb4 #hj ,cf4 ,janet and ,sailles3 ,history of the ,problems of ,philosophy1 trans4 by ,monahan1 part ,i1 ch4 ,,iii4 #ha ,cf4 ,descartes3 ,meditation ,,ii2 ,principles of ,philosophy1 part ,i1 ,,xlviii4 #hb ,cf4 ,a4 ,e4 ,taylor3 ,elements of ,metaphysics1 bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 ,,iv4 #hc ,cf4 ,k4 ,pearson3 ,grammar of ,science1 ch4 ,,iii4 #hd ,it is enough for my present purpose if the appreciative characters but seem to act thus4 ,believers in an activity an sich1 other than our mental experiences of activity1 will find some farther reflections on the subject in my address on ',the ,experience of ,activity4' ,the next essay4 ,cf4 especially1 p4 #afi4 ,,ed4 ,,vi ,,the ,,experience ,,of ,,activity#he ,,brethren ,,of ,,the ,,psychological ,,association3 ,in casting about me for a subject for your ,president this year to talk about it has seemed to me that our experiences of activity would form a good one2 not only because the topic is so naturally interesting1 and because it has lately led to a good deal of rather inconclusive discussion1 but because ,i myself am growing more and more interested in a certain systematic way of handling questions1 and want to get others interested also1 and this question strikes me as one in which1 although ,i am painfully aware of my inability to communicate new discoveries or to reach definitive conclusions1 ,i yet can show1 in a rather definite manner1 how the method works4 ,the way of handling things ,i speak of1 is1 as you already will have suspected1 that known sometimes as the pragmatic method1 sometimes as humanism1 sometimes as ,deweyism1 and in ,france1 by some of the disciples of ,bergson1 as the ,philosophie nouvelle4 ,professor ,woodbridge's ,journal of ,philosophy#hf seems unintentionally to have become a sort of meeting place for those who follow these tendencies in ,america4 ,there is only a dim identity among them2 and the most that can be said at present is that some sort of gestation seems to be in the atmosphere1 and that almost any day a man with a genius for finding the right word for things may hit upon some unifying and conciliating formula that will make so much vaguely similar aspiration crystallize into more definite form4 ,i myself have given the name of 'radical empiricism' to that version of the tendency in question which ,i prefer2 and ,i propose1 if you will now let me1 to illustrate what ,i mean by radical empiricism1 by applying it to activity as an example1 hoping at the same time incidentally to leave the general problem of activity in a slightly--,i fear very slightly--more manageable shape than before4 ,mr4 ,bradley calls the question of activity a scandal to philosophy1 and if one turns to the current literature of the subject--his own writings included--one easily gathers what he means4 ,the opponents cannot even understand one another4 ,mr4 ,bradley says to ,mr4 ,ward3 ,i do not care what your oracle is1 and your preposterous psychology may here be gospel if you please2 444 but if the revelation does contain a meaning1 ,i will commit myself to this3 either the oracle is so confused that its signification is not discoverable1 or1 upon the other hand1 if it can be pinned down to any definite statement1 then that statement will be false4#hg ,mr4 ,ward in turn says of ,mr4 ,bradley3 ,i cannot even imagine the state of mind to which his description applies4444 ,it reads like an unintentional travesty of ,herbartian psychology by one who has tried to improve upon it without being at the pains to master it4#hh ,mnsterberg excludes a view opposed to his own by saying that with any one who holds it a ,verstndigung with him is grundstzlich ausgeschlossen2 and ,royce1 in a review of ,stout1#hi hauls him over the coals at great length for defending 'efficacy' in a way which ,i1 for one1 never gathered from reading him1 and which ,i have heard ,stout himself say was quite foreign to the intention of his text4 ,in these discussions distinct questions are habitually jumbled and different points of view are talked of durcheinander4 7#a7 ,there is a psychological question3 ,have we perceptions of activity8 and if so1 what are they like1 and when and where do we have them8 7#b7 ,there is a metaphysical question3 ,is there a fact of activity8 and if so1 what idea must we frame of it8 ,what is it like8 and what does it do1 if it does anything8 ,and finally there is a logical question3 7#c7 ,whence do we know activity8 ,by our own feelings of it solely8 or by some other source of information8 ,throughout page after page of the literature one knows not which of these questions is before one2 and mere description of the surface-show of experience is proferred as if it implicitly answered every one of them4 ,no one of the disputants1 moreover1 tries to show what pragmatic consequences his own view would carry1 or what assignable particular differences in any one's experience it would make if his adversary's were triumphant4 ,it seems to me that if radical empiricism be good for anything1 it ought1 with its pragmatic method and its principle of pure experience1 to be able to avoid such tangles1 or at least to simplify them somewhat4 ,the pragmatic method starts from the postulate that there is no difference of truth that doesn't make a difference of fact somewhere2 and it seeks to determine the meaning of all differences of opinion by making the discussion hinge as soon as possible upon some practical or particular issue4 ,the principle of pure experience is also a methodical postulate4 ,nothing shall be admitted as fact1 it says1 except what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient2 and for every feature of fact ever so experienced1 a definite place must be found somewhere in the final system of reality4 ,in other words3 ,everything real must be experienceable somewhere1 and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real4 ,armed with these rules of method let us see what face the problems of activity present to us4 ,by the principle of pure experience1 either the word 'activity' must have no meaning at all1 or else the original type and model of what it means must lie in some concrete kind of experience that can be definitely pointed out4 ,whatever ulterior judgments we may eventually come to make regarding activity1 that sort of thing will be what the judgments are about4 ,the first step to take1 then1 is to ask where in the stream of experience we seem to find what we speak of as activity4 ,what we are to think of the activity thus found will be a later question4 ,now it is obvious that we are tempted to affirm activity wherever we find anything going on4 ,taken in the broadest sense1 any apprehension of something doing1 is an experience of activity4 ,were our world describable only by the words 'nothing happening1' 'nothing changing1' 'nothing doing1' we should unquestionably call it an 'inactive' world4 ,bare activity then1 as we may call it1 means the bare fact of event or change4 ',change taking place' is a unique content of experience1 one of those 'conjunctive' objects which radical empiricism seeks so earnestly to rehabilitate and preserve4 ,the sense of activity is thus in the broadest and vaguest way synonymous with the sense of 'life4' ,we should feel our own subjective life at least1 even in noticing and proclaiming an otherwise inactive world4 ,our own reaction on its monotony would be the one thing experienced there in the form of something coming to pass4 ,this seems to be what certain writers have in mind when they insist that for an experient to be at all is to be active4 ,it seems to justify1 or at any rate to explain1 ,mr4 ,ward's expression that we are only as we are active1#ij for we are only as experients2 and it rules out ,mr4 ,bradley's contention that there is no original experience of anything like activity4#ia ,what we ought to say about activities thus elementary1 whose they are1 what they effect1 or whether indeed they effect anything at all--these are later questions1 to be answered only when the field of experience is enlarged4 ,bare activity would thus be predicable1 though there were no definite direction1 no actor1 and no aim4 ,mere restless zigzag movement1 or a wild ,ideenflucht1 or ,rhapsodie der ,wahrnehmungen1 as ,kant would say1#ib would constitute an active as distinguished from an inactive world4 ,but in this actual world of ours1 as it is given1 a part at least of the activity comes with definite direction2 it comes with desire and sense of goal2 it comes complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to1 and with the efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes2 and it is in complex experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents1 and of passivity as opposed to activity arise4 ,here also the notion of causal efficacy comes to birth4 ,perhaps the most elaborate work ever done in descriptive psychology has been the analysis by various recent writers of the more complex activity-situations4#ic ,in their descriptions1 exquisitely subtle some of them1#id the activity appears as the gestaltqualitt or the fundirte inhalt 7or as whatever else you may please to call the conjunctive form7 which the content falls into when we experience it in the ways which the describers set forth4 ,those factors in those relations are what we mean by activity-situations2 and to the possible enumeration and accumulation of their circumstances and ingredients there would seem to be no natural bound4 ,every hour of human life could contribute to the picture gallery2 and this is the only fault that one can find with such descriptive industry--where is it going to stop8 ,ought we to listen forever to verbal pictures of what we have already in concrete form in our own breasts8#ie ,they never take us off the superficial plane4 ,we knew the facts already--less spread out and separated1 to be sure--but we knew them still4 ,we always felt our own activity1 for example1 as 'the expansion of an idea with which our ,self is identified1 against an obstacle'2#if and the following out of such a definition through a multitude of cases elaborates the obvious so as to be little more than an exercise in synonymic speech4 ,all the descriptions have to trace familiar outlines1 and to use familiar terms4 ,the activity is1 for example1 attributed either to a physical or to a mental agent1 and is either aimless or directed4 ,if directed it shows tendency4 ,the tendency may or may not be resisted4 ,if not1 we call the activity immanent1 as when a body moves in empty space by its momentum1 or our thoughts wander at their own sweet will4 ,if resistance is met1 its agent complicates the situation4 ,if now1 in spite of resistance1 the original tendency continues1 effort makes its appearance1 and along with effort1 strain or squeeze4 ,will1 in the narrower sense of the word1 then comes upon the scene1 whenever1 along with the tendency1 the strain and squeeze are sustained4 ,but the resistance may be great enough to check the tendency1 or even to reverse its path4 ,in that case1 we 7if 'we' were the original agents or subjects of the tendency7 are overpowered4 ,the phenomenon turns into one of tension simply1 or of necessity succumbed-to1 according as the opposing power is only equal1 or is superior to ourselves4 ,whosoever describes an experience in such terms as these describes an experience of activity4 ,if the word have any meaning1 it must denote what there is found4 ,there is complete activity in its original and first intention4 ,what it is 'known-as' is what there appears4 ,the experiencer of such a situation possesses all that the idea contains4 ,he feels the tendency1 the obstacle1 the will1 the strain1 the triumph1 or the passive giving up1 just as he feels the time1 the space1 the swiftness or intensity1 the movement1 the weight and color1 the pain and pleasure1 the complexity1 or whatever remaining characters the situation may involve4 ,he goes through all that ever can be imagined where activity is supposed4 ,if we suppose activities to go on outside of our experience1 it is in forms like these that we must suppose them1 or else give them some other name2 for the word 'activity' has no imaginable content whatever save these experiences of process1 obstruction1 striving1 strain1 or release1 ultimate qualia as they are of the life given us to be known4 ,were this the end of the matter1 one might think that whenever we had successfully lived through an activity-situation we should have to be permitted1 without provoking contradiction1 to say that we had been really active1 that we had met real resistance and had really prevailed4 ,lotze somewhere says that to be an entity all that is necessary is to gelten as an entity1 to operate1 or be felt1 experienced1 recognized1 or in any way realized1 as such4#ig ,in our activity-experiences the activity assuredly fulfils ,lotze's demand4 ,it makes itself gelten4 ,it is witnessed at its work4 ,no matter what activities there may really be in this extraordinary universe of ours1 it is impossible for us to conceive of any one of them being either lived through or authentically known otherwise than in this dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles and overcoming or being overcome4 ,what 'sustaining' means here is clear to anyone who has lived through the experience1 but to no one else2 just as 'loud1' 'red1' 'sweet1' mean something only to beings with ears1 eyes1 and tongues4 ,the percipi in these originals of experience is the esse2 the curtain is the picture4 ,if there is anything hiding in the background1 it ought not to be called activity1 but should get itself another name4 ,this seems so obviously true that one might well experience astonishment at finding so many of the ablest writers on the subject flatly denying that the activity we live through in these situations is real4 ,merely to feel active is not to be active1 in their sight4 ,the agents that appear in the experience are not real agents1 the resistances do not really resist1 the effects that appear are not really effects at all4#ih ,it is evident from this that mere descriptive analysis of any one of our activity-experiences is not the whole story1 that there is something still to tell about them that has led such able writers to conceive of a ,simon-pure activity1 of an activity an sich1 that does1 and doesn't merely appear to us to do1 and compared with whose real doing all this phenomenal activity is but a specious sham4 ,the metaphysical question opens here2 and ,i think that the state of mind of one possessed by it is often something like this3 ,it is all very well1 we may imagine him saying1 to talk about certain experience-series taking on the form of feelings of activity1 just as they might take on musical or geometric forms4 ,suppose that they do so2 suppose we feel a will to stand a strain4 ,does our feeling do more than record the fact that the strain is sustained8 ,the real activity1 meanwhile1 is the doing of the fact2 and what is the doing made of before the record is made4 ,what in the will enables it to act thus8 ,and these trains of experience themselves1 in which activities appear1 what makes them go at all8 ,does the activity in one bit of experience bring the next bit into being8 ,as an empiricist you cannot say so1 for you have just declared activity to be only a kind of synthetic object1 or conjunctive relation experienced between bits of experience already made4 ,but what made them at all8 ,what propels experience berhaupt into being8 ,there is the activity that operates2 the activity felt is only its superficial sign4 ,to the metaphysical question1 popped upon us in this way1 ,i must pay serious attention ere ,i end my remarks2 but1 before doing so1 let me show that without leaving the immediate reticulations of experience1 or asking what makes activity itself act1 we still find the distinction between less real and more real activities forced upon us1 and are driven to much soul-searching on the purely phenomenal plane4 ,we must not forget1 namely1 in talking of the ultimate character of our activity-experiences1 that each of them is but a portion of a wider world1 one link in the vast chain of processes of experience out of which history is made4 ,each partial process1 to him who lives through it1 defines itself by its origin and its goal2 but to an observer with a wider mind-span who should live outside of it1 that goal would appear but as a provisional halting-place1 and the subjectively felt activity would be seen to continue into objective activities that led far beyond4 ,we thus acquire a habit1 in discussing activity-experiences1 of defining them by their relation to something more4 ,if an experience be one of narrow span1 it will be mistaken as to what activity it is and whose4 ,you think that you are acting while you are only obeying someone's push4 ,you think you are doing this1 but you are doing something of which you do not dream4 ,for instance1 you think you are but drinking this glass2 but you are really creating the liver-cirrhosis that will end your days4 ,you think you are just driving this bargain1 but1 as ,stevenson says somewhere1 you are laying down a link in the policy of mankind4 ,generally speaking1 the onlooker1 with his wider field of vision1 regards the ultimate outcome of an activity as what it is more really doing2 and the most previous agent ascertainable1 being the first source of action1 he regards as the most real agent in the field4 ,the others but transmit that agent's impulse2 on him we put responsibility2 we name him when one asks us ',who's to blame8' ,but the most previous agents ascertainable1 instead of being of longer span1 are often of much shorter span than the activity in view4 ,brain-cells are our best example4 ,my brain-cells are believed to excite each other from next to next 7by contiguous transmission of katabolic alteration1 let us say7 and to have been doing so long before this present stretch of lecturing-activity on my part began4 ,if any one cell-group stops its activity1 the lecturing will cease or show disorder of form4 ,cessante causa1 cessat et effectus--does not this look as if the short-span brain activities were the more real activities1 and the lecturing activities on my part only their effects8 ,moreover1 as ,hume so clearly pointed out1#ii in my mental activity-situation the words physically to be uttered are represented as the activity's immediate goal4 ,these words1 however1 cannot be uttered without intermediate physical processes in the bulb and vagi nerves1 which processes nevertheless fail to figure in the mental activity-series at all4 ,that series1 therefore1 since it leaves out vitally real steps of action1 cannot represent the real activities4 ,it is something purely subjective2 the facts of activity are elsewhere4 ,they are something far more interstitial1 so to speak1 than what my feelings record4 ,the real facts of activity that have in point of fact been systematically pleaded for by philosophers have1 so far as my information goes1 been of three principal types4 ,the first type takes a consciousness of wider time-span than ours to be the vehicle of the more real activity4 ,its will is the agent1 and its purpose is the action done4 ,the second type assumes that 'ideas' struggling with one another are the agents1 and that the prevalence of one set of them is the action4 ,the third type believes that nerve-cells are the agents1 and that resultant motor discharges are the acts achieved4 ,now if we must de-realize our immediately felt activity-situations for the benefit of either of these types of substitute1 we ought to know what the substitution practically involves4 ,what practical difference ought it to make if1 instead of saying navely that ',i' am active now in delivering this address1 ,i say that a wider thinker is active1 or that certain ideas are active1 or that certain nerve-cells are active1 in producing the result8 ,this would be the pragmatic meaning of the three hypotheses4 ,let us take them in succession in seeking a reply4 ,if we assume a wider thinker1 it is evident that his purposes envelope mine4 ,i am really lecturing for him2 and although ,i cannot surely know to what end1 yet if ,i take him religiously1 ,i can trust it to be a good end1 and willingly connive4 ,i can be happy in thinking that my activity transmits his impulse1 and that his ends prolong my own4 ,so long as ,i take him religiously1 in short1 he does not de-realize my activities4 ,he tends rather to corroborate the reality of them1 so long as ,i believe both them and him to be good4 ,when now we turn to ideas1 the case is different1 inasmuch as ideas are supposed by the association psychology to influence each other only from next to next4 ,the 'span' of an idea or pair of ideas1 is assumed to be much smaller instead of being larger than that of my total conscious field4 ,the same results may get worked out in both cases1 for this address is being given anyhow4 ,but the ideas supposed to 'really' work it out had no prevision of the whole of it2 and if ,i was lecturing for an absolute thinker in the former case1 so1 by similar reasoning1 are my ideas now lecturing for me1 that is1 accomplishing unwittingly a result which ,i approve and adopt4 ,but1 when this passing lecture is over1 there is nothing in the bare notion that ideas have been its agents that would seem to guarantee that my present purposes in lecturing will be prolonged4 ,i may have ulterior developments in view2 but there is no certainty that my ideas as such will wish to1 or be able to1 work them out4 ,the like is true if nerve-cells be the agents4 ,the activity of a nerve-cell must be conceived of as a tendency of exceedingly short reach1 an 'impulse' barely spanning the way to the next cell--for surely that amount of actual 'process' must be 'experienced' by the cells if what happens between them is to deserve the name of activity at all4 ,but here again the gross resultant1 as ,i perceive it1 is indifferent to the agents1 and neither wished or willed or foreseen4 ,their being agents now congruous with my will gives me no guarantee that like results will recur again from their activity4 ,in point of fact1 all sorts of other results do occur4 ,my mistakes1 impotencies1 perversions1 mental obstructions1 and frustrations generally1 are also results of the activity of cells4 ,although these are letting me lecture now1 on other occasions they make me do things that ,i would willingly not do4 ,the question ,whose is the real activity8 is thus tantamount to the question ,what will be the actual results8 ,its interest is dramatic2 how will things work out8 ,if the agents are of one sort1 one way2 if of another sort1 they may work out very differently4 ,the pragmatic meaning of the various alternatives1 in short1 is great4 ,it makes no merely verbal difference which opinion we take up4 ,you see it is the old dispute come back6 ,materialism and teleology2 elementary short-span actions summing themselves 'blindly1' or far foreseen ideals coming with effort into act4 ,navely we believe1 and humanly and dramatically we like to believe1 that activities both of wider and of narrower span are at work in life together1 that both are real1 and that the long-span tendencies yoke the others in their service1 encouraging them in the right direction1 and damping them when they tend in other ways4 ,but how to represent clearly the modus operandi of such steering of small tendencies by large ones is a problem which metaphysical thinkers will have to ruminate upon for many years to come4 ,even if such control should eventually grow clearly picturable1 the question how far it is successfully exerted in this actual world can be answered only by investigating the details of fact4 ,no philosophic knowledge of the general nature and constitution of tendencies1 or of the relation of larger to smaller ones1 can help us to predict which of all the various competing tendencies that interest us in this universe are likeliest to prevail4 ,we know as an empirical fact that far-seeing tendencies often carry out their purpose1 but we know also that they are often defeated by the failure of some contemptibly small process on which success depends4 ,a little thrombus in a statesman's meningeal artery will throw an empire out of gear4 ,i can therefore not even hint at any solution of the pragmatic issue4 ,i have only wished to show you that that issue is what gives the real interest to all inquiries into what kinds of activity may be real4 ,are the forces that really act in the world more foreseeing or more blind8 ,as between 'our' activities as 'we' experience them1 and those of our ideas1 or of our brain-cells1 the issue is well-defined4 ,i said a while back#ajj that ,i should return to the 'metaphysical' question before ending2 so1 with a few words about that1 ,i will now close my remarks4 ,in whatever form we hear this question propounded1 ,i think that it always arises from two things1 a belief that causality must be exerted in activity1 and a wonder as to how causality is made4 ,if we take an activity-situation at its face-value1 it seems as if we caught in flagrante delicto the very power that makes facts come and be4 ,i now am eagerly striving1 for example1 to get this truth which ,i seem half to perceive1 into words which shall make it show more clearly4 ,if the words come1 it will seem as if the striving itself had drawn or pulled them into actuality out from the state of merely possible being in which they were4 ,how is this feat performed8 ,how does the pulling pull8 ,how do ,i get my hold on words not yet existent1 and when they come by what means have ,i made them come8 ,really it is the problem of creation2 for in the end the question is3 ,how do ,i make them be8 ,real activities are those that really make things be1 without which the things are not1 and with which they are there4 ,activity1 so far as we merely feel it1 on the other hand1 is only an impression of ours1 it may be maintained2 and an impression is1 for all this way of thinking1 only a shadow of another fact4 ,arrived at this point1 ,i can do little more than indicate the principles on which1 as it seems to me1 a radically empirical philosophy is obliged to rely in handling such a dispute4 ,if there be real creative activities in being1 radical empiricism must say1 somewhere they must be immediately lived4 ,somewhere the that of efficacious causing and the what of it must be experienced in one1 just as the what and the that of 'cold' are experienced in one whenever a man has the sensation of cold here and now4 ,it boots not to say that our sensations are fallible4 ,they are indeed2 but to see the thermometer contradict us when we say 'it is cold' does not abolish cold as a specific nature from the universe4 ,cold is in the arctic circle if not here4 ,even so1 to feel that our train is moving when the train beside our window moves1 to see the moon through a telescope come twice as near1 or to see two pictures as one solid when we look through a stereoscope at them1 leaves motion1 nearness1 and solidity still in being--if not here1 yet each in its proper seat elsewhere4 ,and wherever the seat of real causality is1 as ultimately known 'for true' 7in nerve-processes1 if you will1 that cause our feelings of activity as well as the movements which these seem to prompt71 a philosophy of pure experience can consider the real causation as no other nature of thing than that which even in our most erroneous experiences appears to be at work4 ,exactly what appears there is what we mean by working1 though we may later come to learn that working was not exactly there4 ,sustaining1 persevering1 striving1 paying with effort as we go1 hanging on1 and finally achieving our intention--this is action1 this is effectuation in the only shape in which1 by a pure experience-philosophy1 the whereabouts of it anywhere can be discussed4 ,here is creation in its first intention1 here is causality at work4#aja ,to treat this offhand as the bare illusory surface of a world whose real causality is an unimaginable ontological principle hidden in the cubic deeps1 is1 for the more empirical way of thinking1 only animism in another shape4 ,you explain your given fact by your 'principle1' but the principle itself1 when you look clearly at it1 turns out to be nothing but a previous little spiritual copy of the fact4 ,away from that one and only kind of fact your mind1 considering causality1 can never get4#ajb ,i conclude1 then1 that real effectual causation as an ultimate nature1 as a 'category1' if you like1 of reality1 is just what we feel it to be1 just that kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal4 ,we have the whole butt and being of it in our hands2 and the healthy thing for philosophy is to leave off grubbing underground for what effects effectuation1 or what makes action act1 and to try to solve the concrete questions of where effectuation in this world is located1 of which things are the true causal agents there1 and of what the more remote effects consist4 ,from this point of view the greater sublimity traditionally attributed to the metaphysical inquiry1 the grubbing inquiry1 entirely disappears4 ,if we could know what causation really and transcendentally is in itself1 the only use of the knowledge would be to help us to recognize an actual cause when we had one1 and so to track the future course of operations more intelligently out4 ,the mere abstract inquiry into causation's hidden nature is not more sublime than any other inquiry equally abstract4 ,causation inhabits no more sublime level than anything else4 ,it lives1 apparently1 in the dirt of the world as well as in the absolute1 or in man's unconquerable mind4 ,the worth and interest of the world consists not in its elements1 be these elements things1 or be they the conjunctions of things2 it exists rather in the dramatic outcome in the whole process1 and in the meaning of the succession stages which the elements work out4 ,my colleague and master1 ,josiah ,royce1 in a page of his review of ,stout's ,analytic ,psychology#ajc has some fine words on this point with which ,i cordially agree4 ,i cannot agree with his separating the notion of efficacy from that of activity altogether 7this ,i understand to be one contention of his7 for activities are efficacious whenever they are real activities at all4 ,but the inner nature both of efficacy and of activity are superficial problems1 ,i understand ,royce to say2 and the only point for us in solving them would be their possible use in helping us to solve the far deeper problem of the course and meaning of the world of life4 ,life1 says our colleague1 is full of significance1 of meaning1 of success and of defeat1 of hoping and of striving1 of longing1 of desire1 and of inner value4 ,it is a total presence that embodies worth4 ,to live our own lives better in this presence is the true reason why we wish to know the elements of things2 so even we psychologists must end on this pragmatic note4 ,the urgent problems of activity are thus more concrete4 ,they are all problems of the true relation of longer-span to shorter-span activities4 ,when1 for example1 a number of 'ideas' 7to use the name traditional in psychology7 grow confluent in a larger field of consciousness1 do the smaller activities still co-exist with the wider activities then experienced by the conscious subject8 ,and1 if so1 do the wide activities accompany the narrow ones inertly1 or do they exert control8 ,or do they perhaps utterly supplant and replace them and short-circuit their effects8 ,again1 when a mental activity-process and a brain-cell series of activities both terminate in the same muscular movement1 does the mental process steer the neural processes or not8 ,or1 on the other hand1 does it independently short-circuit their effects8 ,such are the questions that we must begin with4 ,but so far am ,i from suggesting any definitive answer to such questions1 that ,i hardly yet can put them clearly4 ,they lead1 however1 into that region of panpsychic and ontologic speculation of which ,professors ,bergson and ,strong have lately enlarged the literature in so able and interesting a way4#ajd ,the results of these authors seem in many respects dissimilar1 and ,i understand than as yet but imperfectly2 but ,i cannot help suspecting that the direction of their work is very promising1 and that they have the hunter's instinct for the fruitful trails4 ,,footnotes3 #he ,president's ,address before the ,american ,psychological ,association1 ,philadelphia ,meeting1 ,december1 #aijd4 ,reprinted from ,the ,psychological ,review1 vol4 ,,xii1 ,no4 #a1 ,jan41 #aije4 ,also reprinted1 with some omissions1 as ,appendix ,b1 ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 pp4 #cgj-cid4 ,pp4 #aff-afg have also been reprinted in ,some ,problems of ,philosophy1 p4 #bab4 ,the present essay is referred to in ibid41 p4 #bai1 note4 ,the author's corrections have been adopted for the present text4 ,,ed4 #hf ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods4 #hg ,appearance and ,reality1 second edition1 pp4 #aaf-aag4--,obviously written at ,ward1 though ,ward's name is not mentioned4 #hh ,mind1 vol4 ,,xii1 #ahhg1 pp4 #egc-egd4 #hi ,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 vol4 ,,vi1 #ahig1 p4 #cgi4 #ij ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bde4 ,one thinks naturally of the peripatetic actus primus and actus secundus here4 ,actus autem est duplex3 primus et secundus4 ,actus quidem primus est forma1 et integritas sei4 ,actus autem secundus est operatio4 ,thomas ,aquinas3 ,summa ,theologica1 edition of ,leo ,,xiii1 7#ahid71 vol4 ,i1 p4 #cia4 ,cf4 also ,blanc3 ,dictionnaire de ,philosophie1 under 'acte4' ,,ed4 #ia ,appearance and ,reality1 second edition1 p4 #aaf4 #ib ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 ,werke1 7#aije71 vol4 ,,iv1 p4 #aaj 7trans4 by ,max ,mller1 second edition1 p4 #abh74 #ic ,i refer to such descriptive work as ,ladd's 7,psychology1 ,descriptive and ,explanatory1 part ,i1 chap4 ,v1 part ,,ii1 chap4 ,,xi1 part ,,iii1 chaps4 ,,xxv and ,,xxvi72 as ,sully's 7,the ,human ,mind1 part ,v72 as ,stout's 7,analytic ,psychology1 book ,i1 chap4 ,,vi1 and book ,,ii1 chaps4 ,i1 ,,ii1 and ,,iii72 as ,bradley's 7in his long series of analytic articles on ,psychology in ,mind72 as ,titchener's 7,outline of ,psychology1 part ,i1 chap4 ,,vi72 as ,shand's 7,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 ,,iii1 #ddi2 ,,iv1 #dej2 ,,vi1 #bhi72 as ,ward's 7,mind1 ,,xii1 #fg2 #efd72 as ,loveday's 7,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 ,x1 #dee72 as ,lipps's 7,vom ,fhlen1 ,wollen und ,denken1 #aijb1 chaps4 ,,ii1 ,,iv1 ,,vi72 and as ,bergson's 7,revue ,philosophique1 ,,liii1 #a7--to mention only a few writings which ,i immediately recall4 #id ,their existence forms a curious commentary on ,prof4 ,mnsterberg's dogma that will-attitudes are not describable4 ,he himself has contributed in a superior way to their description1 both in his ,willenshandlung1 and in his ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 part ,,ii1 chap4 ,,ix1 #g4 #ie ,i ought myself to cry peccavi1 having been a voluminous sinner in my own chapter on the will4 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,,ii1 chap4 ,,xxvi4 #if ,cf4 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 second edition1 pp4 #if-ig4 #ig ,cf4 above1 p4 #ei1 note4 #ih ,verborum grati3 ,the feeling of activity is not able1 qu feeling1 to tell us anything about activity 7,loveday3 ,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 vol4 ,x1 #aija1 p4 #dfc72 ,a sensation or feeling or sense of activity 444 is not1 looked at in another way1 an experience of activity at all4 ,it is a mere sensation shut up within which you could by no reflection get the idea of activity4444 ,whether this experience is or is not later on a character essential to our perception and our idea of activity1 it1 as it comes first1 is not in itself an experience of activity at all4 ,it1 as it comes first1 is only so for extraneous reasons and only so for an outside observer 7,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 second edition1 p4 #fje72 ,in dem ,ttigkeitsgefhle liegt an sich nicht der geringste ,beweis fr das ,vorhandensein einer psychischen ,ttigkeit 7,mnsterberg3 ,grundzge der ,psychologie74 ,i could multiply similar quotations and would have introduced some of them into my text to make it more concrete1 save that the mingling of different points of view in most of these author's discussions 7not in ,mnsterberg's7 make it impossible to disentangle exactly what they mean4 ,i am sure in any case1 to be accused of misrepresenting them totally1 even in this note1 by omission of the context1 so the less ,i name names and the more ,i stick to abstract characterization of a merely possible style of opinion1 the safer it will be4 ,and apropos of misunderstandings1 ,i may add to this note a complaint on my own account4 ,professor ,stout1 in the excellent chapter on ',mental ,activity1' in vol4 ,i of his ,analytic ,psychology1 takes me to task for identifying spiritual activity with certain muscular feelings and gives quotations to bear him out4 ,they are from certain paragraphs on 'the ,self1' in which my attempt was to show what the central nucleus of the activities that we call 'ours' is4 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,i1 pp4 #bii-cje4 ,i found it in certain intracephalic movements which we habitually oppose1 as 'subjective1' to the activities of the transcorporeal world4 ,i sought to show that there is no direct evidence that we feel the activity of an inner spiritual agent as such 7,i should now say the activity of 'consciousness' as such1 see the first essay1 ',does ,consciousness ,exist8'74 ,there are1 in fact1 three distinguishable 'activities' in the field of discussion3 the elementary activity involved in the mere that of experience1 in the fact that something is going on1 and the farther specification of this something into two whats1 an activity felt as 'ours1' and an activity ascribed to objects4 ,stout1 as ,i apprehend him1 identifies 'our' activity with that of the total experience-process1 and when ,i circumscribe it as a part thereof1 accuses me of treating it as a sort of external appendage to itself 7,stout3 op4 cit41 vol4 ,i1 pp4 #afb-afc71 as if ,i 'separated the activity from the process which is active4' ,but all the processes in question are active1 and their activity is inseparable from their being4 ,my book raised only the question of which activity deserved the name of 'ours4' ,so far as we are 'persons1' and contrasted and opposed to an 'environment1' movements in our body figure as our activities2 and ,i am unable to find any other activities that are ours in this strictly personal sense4 ,there is a wider sense in which the whole 'choir of heaven and furniture of the earth1' and their activities1 are ours1 for they are our 'objects4' ,but 'we' are here only another name for the total process of experience1 another name for all that is1 in fact2 and ,i was dealing with the personal and individualized self exclusively in the passages with which ,professor ,stout finds fault4 ,the individualized self1 which ,i believe to be the only thing properly called self1 is a part of the content of the world experienced4 ,the world experienced 7otherwise called the 'field of consciousness'7 comes at all times with our body as its centre1 centre of vision1 centre of action1 centre of interest4 ,where the body is is 'here'2 when the body acts is 'now'2 what the body touches is 'this'2 all other things are 'there' and 'then' and 'that4' ,these words of emphasized position imply a systematization of things with reference to a focus of action and interest which lies in the body2 and the systematization is now so instinctive 7was it ever not so87 that no developed or active experience exists for us at all except in that ordered form4 ,so far as 'thoughts' and 'feelings' can be active1 their activity terminates in the activity of the body1 and only through first arousing its activities can they begin to change those of the rest of the world4 ,cf4 also ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 p4 #cdd1 note #h4 ,,ed4 ,the body is the storm centre1 the origin of co-ordinates1 the constant place of stress in all that experience-train4 ,everything circles round it1 and is felt from its point of view4 ,the word ',i1' then1 is primarily a noun of position1 just like 'this' and 'here4' ,activities attached to 'this' position have prerogative emphasis1 and1 if activities have feelings1 must be felt in a peculiar way4 ,the word 'my' designates the kind of emphasis4 ,i see no inconsistency whatever in defending1 on the one hand1 'my' activities as unique and opposed to those of outer nature1 and1 on the other hand1 in affirming1 after introspection1 that they consist in movements in the head4 ,the 'my' of them is the emphasis1 the feeling of perspective-interest in which they are dyed4 #ii ,enquiry ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 sect4 ,,vii1 part ,i1 ,selby-,bigge's edition1 pp4 #fe ff4 #ajj ,page #agb4 #aja ,let me not be told that this contradicts the first essay1 ',does ,consciousness ,exist8' 7see especially page #cb71 in which it was said that while 'thoughts' and 'things' have the same natures1 the natures work 'energetically' on each other in the things 7fire burns1 water wets1 etc47 but not in the thoughts4 ,mental activity-trains are composed of thoughts1 yet their members do work on each other1 they check1 sustain1 and introduce4 ,they do so when the activity is merely associational as well as when effort is there4 ,but1 and this is my reply1 they do so by other parts of their nature than those that energize physically4 ,one thought in every developed activity-series is a desire or thought of purpose1 and all the other thoughts acquire a feeling tone from their relation of harmony or oppugnancy to this4 ,the interplay of these secondary tones 7among which 'interest1' 'difficulty1' and 'effort' figure7 runs the drama in the mental series4 ,in what we term the physical drama these qualities play absolutely no part4 ,the subject needs careful working out2 but ,i can see no inconsistency4 #ajb ,i have found myself more than once accused in print of being the assertor of a metaphysical principle of activity4 ,since literary misunderstandings retard the settlement of problems1 ,i should like to say that such an interpretation of the pages ,i have published on ,effort and on ,will is absolutely foreign to what ,i meant to express4 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,,ii1 ch4 ,,xxvi4 ,i owe all my doctrines on this subject to ,renouvier2 and ,renouvier1 as ,i understand him1 is 7or at any rate then was7 an out and out phenomenist1 a denier of 'forces' in the most strenuous sense4 ,cf4 ,ch4 ,renouvier3 ,esquisse d'une ,classification ,systmatique des ,doctrines ,philosophiques 7#ahhe71 vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #cij-cib2 ,essais de ,critique ,gnrale 7#ahei71 vol4 ,,ii1 ix1 xiii4 ,for an acknowledgment of the author's general indebtedness to ,renouvier1 cf4 ,some ,problems of ,philosophy1 p4 #afe1 note4 ,,ed4 ,single clauses in my writing1 or sentences read out of their connection1 may possibly have been compatible with a transphenomenal principle of energy2 but ,i defy anyone to show a single sentence which1 taken with its context1 should be naturally held to advocate that view4 ,the misinterpretation probably arose at first from my defending 7after ,renouvier7 the indeterminism of our efforts4 ',free will' was supposed by my critics to involve a supernatural agent4 ,as a matter of plain history the only 'free will' ,i have ever thought of defending is the character of novelty in fresh activity-situations4 ,if an activity-process is the form of a whole 'field of consciousness1' and if each field of consciousness is not only in its totality unique 7as is now commonly admitted7 but has its elements unique 7since in that situation they are all dyed in the total7 then novelty is perpetually entering the world and what happens there is not pure repetition1 as the dogma of the literal uniformity of nature requires4 ,activity-situations come1 in short1 each with an original touch4 ,a 'principle' of free will if there were one1 would doubtless manifest itself in such phenomena1 but ,i never saw1 nor do ,i now see1 what the principle could do except rehearse the phenomenon beforehand1 or why it ever should be invoked4 #ajc ,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 vol4 ,,vi1 #ahig2 cf4 pp4 #cib-cic4 #ajd ,cf4 ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 ,lect4 ,,vi 7on ,bergson72 ,h4 ,bergson3 ,creative ,evolution1 trans4 by ,a4 ,mitchell2 ,c4 ,a4 ,strong3 ,why the ,mind has a ,body1 ch4 ,,xii4 ,,ed4 ,,vii ,,the ,,essence ,,of ,,humanism#aje ,humanism is a ferment that has 'come to stay4'#ajf ,it is not a single hypothesis or theorem1 and it dwells on no new facts4 ,it is rather a slow shifting in the philosophic perspective1 making things appear as from a new centre of interest or point of sight4 ,some writers are strongly conscious of the shifting1 others half unconscious1 even though their own vision may have undergone much change4 ,the result is no small confusion in debate1 the half-conscious humanists often taking part against the radical ones1 as if they wished to count upon the other side4#ajg ,if humanism really be the name for such a shifting of perspective1 it is obvious that the whole scene of the philosophic stage will change in some degree if humanism prevails4 ,the emphasis of things1 their foreground and background distribution1 their sizes and values1 will not keep just the same4#ajh ,if such pervasive consequences be involved in humanism1 it is clear that no pains which philosophers may take1 first in defining it1 and then in furthering1 checking1 or steering its progress1 will be thrown away4 ,it suffers badly at present from incomplete definition4 ,its most systematic advocates1 ,schiller and ,dewey1 have published fragmentary programs only2 and its bearing on many vital philosophic problems has not been traced except by adversaries who1 scenting heresies in advance1 have showered blows on doctrines--subjectivism and scepticism1 for example--that no good humanist finds it necessary to entertain4 ,by their still greater reticences1 the anti-humanists have1 in turn1 perplexed the humanists4 ,much of the controversy has involved the word 'truth4' ,it is always good in debate to know your adversary's point of view authentically4 ,but the critics of humanism never define exactly what the word 'truth' signifies when they use it themselves4 ,the humanists have to guess at their view2 and the result has doubtless been much beating of the air4 ,add to all this1 great individual differences in both camps1 and it becomes clear that nothing is so urgently needed1 at the stage which things have reached at present1 as a sharper definition by each side of its central point of view4 ,whoever will contribute any touch of sharpness will help us to make sure of what's what and who is who4 ,anyone can contribute such a definition1 and1 without it1 no one knows exactly where he stands4 ,if ,i offer my own provisional definition of humanism#aji now and here1 others may improve it1 some adversary may be led to define his own creed more sharply by the contrast1 and a certain quickening of the crystallization of general opinion may result4 ,i ,the essential service of humanism1 as ,i conceive the situation1 is to have seen that though one part of our experience may lean upon another part to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may be considered1 experience as a whole is self-containing and leans on nothing4 ,since this formula also expresses the main contention of transcendental idealism1 it needs abundant explication to make it unambiguous4 ,it seems1 at first sight1 to confine itself to denying theism and pantheism4 ,but1 in fact1 it need not deny either2 everything would depend on the exegesis2 and if the formula ever became canonical1 it would certainly develop both right-wing and left-wing interpreters4 ,i myself read humanism theistically and pluralistically4 ,if there be a ,god1 he is no absolute all-experiencer1 but simply the experiencer of widest actual conscious span4 ,read thus1 humanism is for me a religion susceptible of reasoned defence1 though ,i am well aware how many minds there are to whom it can appeal religiously only when it has been monistically translated4 ,ethically the pluralistic form of it takes for me a stronger hold on reality than any other philosophy ,i know of--it being essentially a social philosophy1 a philosophy of 'co1' in which conjunctions do the work4 ,but my primary reason for advocating it is its matchless intellectual economy4 ,it gets rid1 not only of the standing 'problems' that monism engenders 7'problem of evil1' 'problem of freedom1' and the like71 but of other metaphysical mysteries and paradoxes as well4 ,it gets rid1 for example1 of the whole agnostic controversy1 by refusing to entertain the hypothesis of trans-empirical reality at all4 ,it gets rid of any need for an absolute of the ,bradleyan type 7avowedly sterile for intellectual purposes7 by insisting that the conjunctive relations found within experience are faultlessly real4 ,it gets rid of the need of an absolute of the ,roycean type 7similarly sterile7 by its pragmatic treatment of the problem of knowledge a treatment of which ,i have already given a version in two very inadequate articles4#aaj ,as the views of knowledge1 reality and truth imputed to humanism have been those so far most fiercely attacked1 it is in regard to these ideas that a sharpening of focus seems most urgently required4 ,i proceed therefore to bring the views which ,i impute to humanism in these respects into focus as briefly as ,i can4 ,,ii ,if the central humanistic thesis1 printed above in italics1 be accepted1 it will follow that1 if there be any such thing at all as knowing1 the knower and the object known must both be portions of experience4 ,one part of experience must1 therefore1 either 7#a7 ,know another part of experience--in other words1 parts must1 as ,professor ,woodbridge says1#aaa represent one another instead of representing realities outside of 'consciousness'--this case is that of conceptual knowledge2 or else 7#b7 ,they must simply exist as so many ultimate thats or facts of being1 in the first instance2 and then1 as a secondary complication1 and without doubling up its entitative single-ness1 any one and the same that must figure alternately as a thing known and as a knowledge of the thing1 by reason of two divergent kinds of context into which1 in the general course of experience1 it gets woven4#aab ,this second case is that of sense-perception4 ,there is a stage of thought that goes beyond common sense1 and of it ,i shall say more presently2 but the common-sense stage is a perfectly definite halting-place of thought1 primarily for purposes of action2 and1 so long as we remain on the common-sense stage of thought1 object and subject fuse in the fact of 'presentation' or sense-perception--the pen and hand which ,i now see writing1 for example1 are the physical realities which those words designate4 ,in this case there is no self-transcendency implied in the knowing4 ,humanism1 here1 is only a more comminuted ,identittsphilosophie4#aac ,in case 7#a71 on the contrary1 the representative experience does transcend itself in knowing the other experience that is its object4 ,no one can talk of the knowledge of the one by the other without seeing them as numerically distinct entities1 of which the one lies beyond the other and away from it1 along some direction and with some interval1 that can be definitely named4 ,but1 if the talker be a humanist1 he must also see this distance-interval concretely and pragmatically1 and confess it to consist of other intervening experiences--of possible ones1 at all events1 if not of actual4 ,to call my present idea of my dog1 for example1 cognitive of the real dog means that1 as the actual tissue of experience is constituted1 the idea is capable of leading into a chain of other experiences on my part that go from next to next and terminate at last in vivid sense-perceptions of a jumping1 barking1 hairy body4 ,those are the real dog1 the dog's full presence1 for my common sense4 ,if the supposed talker is a profound philosopher1 although they may not be the real dog for him1 they mean the real dog1 are practical substitutes for the real dog1 as the representation was a practical substitute for them1 that real dog being a lot of atoms1 say1 or of mind-stuff1 that lie where the sense-perceptions lie in his experience as well as in my own4 ,,iii ,the philosopher here stands for the stage of thought that goes beyond the stage of common sense2 and the difference is simply that he 'interpolates' and 'extrapolates1' where common sense does not4 ,for common sense1 two men see the same identical real dog4 ,philosophy1 noting actual differences in their perceptions1 points out the duality of these latter1 and interpolates something between them as a more real terminus--first1 organs1 viscera1 etc42 next1 cells2 then1 ultimate atoms2 lastly1 mind-stuff perhaps4 ,the original sense-termini of the two men1 instead of coalescing with each other and with the real dog-object1 as at first supposed1 are thus held by philosophers to be separated by invisible realities with which1 at most1 they are conterminous4 ,abolish1 now1 one of the percipients1 and the interpolation changes into 'extrapolation4' ,the sense-terminus of the remaining percipient is regarded by the philosopher as not quite reaching reality4 ,he has only carried the procession of experiences1 the philosopher thinks1 to a definite1 because practical1 halting-place somewhere on the way towards an absolute truth that lies beyond4 ,the humanist sees all the time1 however1 that there is no absolute transcendency even about the more absolute realities thus conjectured or believed in4 ,the viscera and cells are only possible percepts following upon that of the outer body4 ,the atoms again1 though we may never attain to human means of perceiving them1 are still defined perceptually4 ,the mind-stuff itself is conceived as a kind of experience2 and it is possible to frame the hypothesis 7such hypotheses can by no logic be excluded from philosophy7 of two knowers of a piece of mind-stuff and the mind-stuff itself becoming 'confluent' at the moment at which our imperfect knowing might pass into knowing of a completed type4 ,even so do you and ,i habitually represent our two perceptions and the real dog as confluent1 though only provisionally1 and for the common-sense stage of thought4 ,if my pen be inwardly made of mind-stuff1 there is no confluence now between that mind-stuff and my visual perception of the pen4 ,but conceivably there might come to be such confluence2 for1 in the case of my hand1 the visual sensations and the inward feelings of the hand1 its mind-stuff1 so to speak1 are even now as confluent as any two things can be4 ,there is1 thus1 no breach in humanistic epistemology4 ,whether knowledge be taken as ideally perfected1 or only as true enough to pass muster for practice1 it is hung on one continuous scheme4 ,reality1 howsoever remote1 is always defined as a terminus within the general possibilities of experience2 and what knows it is defined as an experience that 'represents' it1 in the sense of being substitutable for it in our thinking because it leads to the same associates1 or in the sense of 'pointing to it' through a chain of other experiences that either intervene or may intervene4 ,absolute reality here bears the same relation to sensation as sensation bears to conception or imagination4 ,both are provisional or final termini1 sensation being only the terminus at which the practical man habitually stops1 while the philosopher projects a 'beyond' in the shape of more absolute reality4 ,these termini1 for the practical and the philosophical stages of thought respectively1 are self-supporting4 ,they are not 'true' of anything else1 they simply are1 are real4 ,they 'lean on nothing1' as my italicized formula said4 ,rather does the whole fabric of experience lean on them1 just as the whole fabric of the solar system1 including many relative positions1 leans1 for its absolute position in space1 on any one of its constituent stars4 ,here1 again1 one gets a new ,identittsphilosophie in pluralistic form4#aad ,,iv ,if ,i have succeeded in making this at all clear 7though ,i fear that brevity and abstractness between them may have made me fail71 the reader will see that the 'truth' of our mental operations must always be an intra-experiential affair4 ,a conception is reckoned true by common sense when it can be made to lead to a sensation4 ,the sensation1 which for common sense is not so much 'true' as 'real1' is held to be provisionally true by the philosopher just in so far as it covers 7abuts at1 or occupies the place of7 a still more absolutely real experience1 in the possibility of which to some remoter experient the philosopher finds reason to believe4 ,meanwhile what actually does count for true to any individual trower1 whether he be philosopher or common man1 is always a result of his apperceptions4 ,if a novel experience1 conceptual or sensible1 contradict too emphatically our pre-existent system of beliefs1 in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it is treated as false4 ,only when the older and the newer experiences are congruous enough to mutually apperceive and modify each other1 does what we treat as an advance in truth result4 ,having written of this point in an article in reply to ,mr4 ,joseph's criticism of my humanism1 ,i will say no more about truth here1 but refer the reader to that review4#aae ,in no case1 however1 need truth consist in a relation between our experiences and something archetypal or trans-experiential4 ,should we ever reach absolutely terminal experiences1 experiences in which we all agreed1 which were superseded by no revised continuations1 these would not be true1 they would be real1 they would simply be1 and be indeed the angles1 corners1 and linchpins of all reality1 on which the truth of everything else would be stayed4 ,only such other things as led to these by satisfactory conjunctions would be 'true4' ,satisfactory connection of some sort with such termini is all that the word 'truth' means4 ,on the common-sense stage of thought sense-presentations serve as such termini4 ,our ideas and concepts and scientific theories pass for true only so far as they harmoniously lead back to the world of sense4 ,i hope that many humanists will endorse this attempt of mine to trace the more essential features of that way of viewing things4 ,i feel almost certain that ,messrs4 ,dewey and ,schiller will do so4 ,if the attackers will also take some slight account of it1 it may be that discussion will be a little less wide of the mark than it has hitherto been4 ,,footnotes3 #aje ,reprinted from ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #e1 ,march #b1 #aije4 ,also reprinted1 with slight changes in ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #aba-ace4 ,the author's corrections have been adopted for the present text4 ,,ed4 #ajf ,written apropos of the appearance of three articles in ,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 vol4 ,,xiv1 ,no4 #ec1 ,january1 #aije3 ',absolute' and ',relative' ,truth1 ,h4 ,h4 ,joachim2 ,professor ,james on ',humanism and ,truth1' ,h4 ,w4 ,b4 ,joseph2 ,applied ,axioms1 ,a4 ,sidgwick4 ,of these articles the second and third continue the humanistic 7or pragmatistic7 controversy1 the first deeply connects with it4 ,,ed4 #ajg ,professor ,baldwin1 for example4 ,his address ',on ,selective ,thinking' 7,psychological ,review1 vol4 ,v1 #ahih1 reprinted in his volume1 ,development and ,evolution7 seems to me an unusually well-written pragmatic manifesto4 ,nevertheless in ',the ,limits of ,pragmatism' 7ibid41 vol4 ,,xi1 #aijd71 he 7much less clearly7 joins in the attack4 #ajh ,the ethical changes1 it seems to me1 are beautifully made evident in ,professor ,dewey's series of articles1 which will never get the attention they deserve till they are printed in a book4 ,i mean3 ',the ,significance of ,emotions1' ,psychological ,review1 vol4 ,,ii1 #ahie1 p4 #ac2 ',the ,reflex ,arc ,concept in ,psychology1' ibid41 vol4 ,,iii1 #ahif1 p4 #ceg2 ',psychology and ,social ,practice1' ibid41 vol4 ,,vii1 #aijj1 p4 #aje2 ',interpretation of ,savage ,mind1' ibid41 vol4 ,,ix1 #aijb1 p4 #bag2 ',green's ,theory of the ,moral ,motive1' ,philosophical ,review1 vol4 ,i1 #ahib1 p4 #eic2 ',self-realization as the ,moral ,ideal1' ibid41 vol4 ,,ii1 #ahic1 p4 #feb2 ',the ,psychology of ,effort1' ibid41 vol4 ,,vi1 #ahig1 p4 #dc2 ',the ,evolutionary ,method as ,applied to ,morality1' ibid41 vol4 ,,xi1 #aijb1 pp4 #ajg1 #cec2 ',evolution and ,ethics1' ,monist1 vol4 ,,viii1 #ahih1 p4 #cba2 to mention only a few4 #aji ,the author employs the term 'humanism' either as a synonym for 'radical empiricism' 7cf4 e4g41 above1 p4 #aef72 or as that general philosophy of life of which 'radical empiricism' is the theoretical ground 7cf4 below1 p4 #aid74 ,for other discussions of 'humanism1' cf4 below1 essay ,,xi1 and ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 essay ,,iii4 ,,ed4 #aaj ,omitted from reprint in ,meaning of ,truth4 ,the articles referred to are ',does ,consciousness ,exist8' and ',a ,world of ,pure ,experience1' reprinted above4 #aaa ,in ,science1 ,november #d1 #aijd1 p4 #eii4 #aab ,this statement is probably excessively obscure to any one who has not read my two articles1 ',does ,consciousness ,exist8' and ',a ,world of ,pure ,experience4' #aac ,cf4 above1 p4 #acd2 and below1 p4 #bjb4 #aad ,cf4 above1 pp4 #acd1 #aig4 #aae ,omitted from reprint in ,meaning of ,truth4 ,the review referred to is reprinted below1 pp4 #bdd-bfe1 under the title ,humanism and ,truth ,once ,more4 ,,ed4 ,,viii ,,la ,,notion ,,de ,,conscience#aaf ,je voudrais vous communiquer quelques doutes qui me sont venus au sujet de la notion de ,conscience qui rgne dans tous nos traits de psychologie4 ,on dfinit habituellement la ,psychologie comme la ,science des faits de ,conscience1 ou des phnomnes1 ou encore des tats de la ,conscience4 ,qu'on admette qu'elle se rattache des moi personnels1 ou bien qu'on la croie impersonnelle la faon du moi transcendental de ,kant1 de la ,bewusstheit ou du ,bewusstsein berhaupt de nos contemporains en ,allemagne1 cette conscience est toujours regarde comme possdant une essence propre1 absolument distincte de l'essence des choses matrielles1 qu'elle a le don mystrieux de reprsenter et de connatre4 ,les faits matriels1 pris dans leur matrialit1 ne sont pas prouvs1 ne sont pas objets d'exprience1 ne se rapportent pas4 ,pour qu'ils prennent la forme du systme dans lequel nous nous sentons vivre1 il faut qu'ils apparaissent1 et ce fait d'apparatre1 surajout leur existence brute1 s'appelle la conscience que nous en avons1 ou peut-tre1 selon l'hypothse panpsychiste1 qu'ils ont d'eux-mmes4 ,voil ce dualisme invtr qu'il semble impossible de chasser de notre vue du monde4 ,ce monde peut bien exister en soi1 mais nous n'en savons rien1 car pour nous il est exclusivement un objet d'exprience2 et la condition indispensable cet effet1 c'est qu'il soit rapport des tmoins1 qu'il soit connu par un sujet ou par des sujets spirituels4 ,objet et sujet1 voil les deux jambes sans lesquelles il semble que la philosophie ne saurait faire un pas en avant4 ,toutes les coles sont d'accord l-dessus1 scolastique1 cartsianisme1 kantisme1 no-kantisme1 tous admettent le dualisme fondamental4 ,le positivisme ou agnosticisme de nos jours1 qui se pique de relever des sciences naturelles1 se donne volontiers1 il est vrai1 le nom de monisme4 ,mais ce n'est qu'un monisme verbal4 ,il pose une ralit inconnue1 mais nous dit que cette ralit se prsente toujours sous deux aspects1 un ct conscience et un ct matire1 et ces deux cts demeurent aussi irrductibles que les attributs fondamentaux1 tendue et pense1 du ,dieu de ,spinoza4 ,au fond1 le monisme contemporain est du spinozisme pur4 ,or1 comment se reprsente-t-on cette conscience dont nous sommes tous si ports admettre l'existence8 ,impossible de la dfinir1 nous dit-on1 mais nous en avons tous une intuition immdiate3 tout d'abord la conscience a conscience d'elle-mme4 ,demandez la premire personne que vous rencontrerez1 homme ou femme1 psychologue ou ignorant1 et elle vous rpondra qu'elle se sent penser1 jouir1 souffrir1 vouloir1 tout comme elle se sent respirer4 ,elle peroit directement sa vie spirituelle comme une espce de courant intrieur1 actif1 lger1 fluide1 dlicat1 diaphane pour ainsi dire1 et absolument oppos quoi que ce soit de matriel4 ,bref1 la vie subjective ne parat pas seulement tre une condition logiquement indispensable pour qu'il y ait un monde objectif qui apparaisse1 c'est encore un lment de l'exprience mme que nous prouvons directement1 au mme titre que nous prouvons notre propre corps4 ,ides et ,choses1 comment donc ne pas reconnatre leur dualisme8 ,sentiments et ,objets1 comment douter de leur htrognit absolue8 ,la psychologie soi-disant scientifique admet cette htrognit comme l'ancienne psychologie spiritualiste l'admettait4 ,comment ne pas l'admettre8 ,chaque science dcoupe arbitrairement dans la trame des faits un champ o elle se parque1 et dont elle dcrit et tudie le contenu4 ,la psychologie prend justement pour son domaine le champ des faits de conscience4 ,elle les postule sans les critiquer1 elle les oppose aux faits matriels2 et sans critiquer non plus la notion de ces derniers1 elle les rattache la conscience par le lien mystrieux de la connaissance1 de1 l'aperception qui1 pour elle1 est un troisime genre de fait fondamental et ultime4 ,en suivant cette voie1 la psychologie contemporaine a ft de grands triomphes4 ,elle a pu faire une esquisse de l'volution de la vie consciente1 en concevant cette dernire comme s'adaptant de plus en plus compltement au milieu physique environnant4 ,elle a pu tablir un paralllisme dans le dualisme1 celui des faits psychiques et des vnements crbraux4 ,elle a expliqu les illusions1 les hallucinations1 et jusqu' un certain point1 les maladies mentales4 ,ce sont de beaux progrs2 mais il reste encore bien des problmes4 ,la philosophie gnrale surtout1 qui a pour devoir de scruter tous les postulats1 trouve des paradoxes et des empchements l o la science passe outre2 et il n'y a que les amateurs de science populaire qui ne sont jamais perplexes4 ,plus on va au fond des choses1 plus on trouve d'nigmes2 et j'avoue pour ma part que depuis que je m'occupe srieusement de psychologie1 ce vieux dualisme de matire et de pense1 cette htrognit pose comme absolue des deux essences1 m'a toujours prsent des difficults4 ,c'est de quelques-unes de ces difficults que je voudrais maintenant vous entretenir4 ,d'abord il y en a une1 laquelle1 j'en suis convaincu1 vous aura frapps tous4 ,prenons la perception extrieure1 la sensation directe que nous donnent par exemple les murs de cette salle4 ,peut-on dire ici que le psychique et le physique sont absolument htrognes8 ,au contraire1 ils sont si peu htrognes que si nous nous plaons au point de vue du sens commun2 si nous faisons abstraction de toutes les inventions explicatives1 des molcules et des ondulations thres1 par exemple1 qui au fond sont des entits mtaphysiques2 si1 en un mot1 nous prenons la ralit navement et telle qu'elle nous est donne tout d'abord1 cette ralit sensible d'o dpendent nos intrts vitaux1 et sur laquelle se portent toutes nos actions2 eh bien1 cette ralit sensible et la sensation que nous en avons sont1 au moment o la sensation se produit1 absolument identiques l'une l'autre4 ,la ralit est l'aperception mme4 ,les mots murs de cette salle ne signifient que cette blancheur frache et sonore qui nous entoure1 coupe par ces fentres1 borne par ces lignes et ces angles4 ,le physique ici n'a pas d'autre contenu que le psychique4 ,le sujet et l'objet se confondent4 ,c'est ,berkeley qui le premier a mis cette vrit en honneur4 ,esse est percipi4 ,nos sensations ne sont pas de petits duplicats intrieurs des choses1 elles sont les choses mmes en tant que les choses nous sont prsentes4 ,et quoi que l'on veuille penser de la vie absente1 cache1 et pour ainsi dire prive1 des choses1 et quelles que soient les constructions hypothtiques qu'on en fasse1 il reste vrai que la vie publique des choses1 cette actualit prsente par laquelle elles nous confrontent1 d'o drivent toutes nos constructions thoriques1 et laquelle elles doivent toutes revenir et se rattacher sous peine de flotter dans l'air et dans l'irrel2 cette actualit1 dis-je1 est homogne1 et non pas seulement homogne1 mais numriquement une1 avec une certaine partie de notre vie intrieure4 ,voil pour la perception extrieure4 ,quand on s'adresse l'imagination1 la mmoire ou aux facults de reprsentation abstraite1 bien que les faits soient ici beaucoup plus compliqus1 je crois que la mme homognit essentielle se dgage4 ,pour simplifier le problme1 excluons d'abord toute ralit sensible4 ,prenons la pense pure1 telle qu'elle s'effectue dans le rve ou la rverie1 ou dans la mmoire du pass4 ,ici encore1 l'toffe de l'exprience ne fait-elle pas double emploi1 le physique et le psychique ne se confondent-ils pas8 ,si je rve d'une montagne d'or1 elle n'existe sans doute pas en dehors du rve1 mais dans le rve elle est de nature ou d'essence parfaitement physique1 c'est comme physique qu'elle m'apparat4 ,si en ce moment je me permets de me souvenir de ma maison en ,amrique1 et des dtails de mon embarquement rcent pour l',italie1 le phnomne pur1 le fait qui se produit1 qu'est-il8 ,c'est1 dit-on1 ma pense1 avec son contenu4 ,mais encore ce contenu1 qu'est-il8 ,il porte la forme d'une partie du monde rel1 partie distante1 il est vrai1 de six mille kilomtres d'espace et de six semaines de temps1 mais relie la salle o nous sommes par une foule de choses1 objets et vnements1 homognes d'une part avec la salle et d'autre part avec l'objet de mes souvenirs4 ,ce contenu ne se donne pas comme tant d'abord un tout petit fait intrieur que je projetterais ensuite au loin1 il se prsente d'emble comme le fait loign mme4 ,et l'acte de penser ce contenu1 la conscience que j'en ai1 que sont-ils8 ,sont-ce au fond autre chose que des manires rtrospectives de nommer le contenu lui-mme1 lorsqu'on l'aura spar de tous ces intermdiaires physiques1 et reli un nouveau groupe d'associs qui le font rentrer dans ma vie mentale1 les motions par exemple qu'il a veilles en moi1 l'attention que j'y porte1 mes ides de tout l'heure qui l'ont suscit comme souvenir8 ,ce n'est qu'en se rapportant ces derniers associs que le phnomne arrive tre class comme pense2 tant qu'il ne se rapporte qu'aux premiers il demeure phnomne objectif4 ,il est vrai que nous opposons habituellement nos images intrieures aux objets1 et que nous les considrons comme de petites copies1 comme des calques ou doubles1 affaiblis1 de ces derniers4 ,c'est qu'un objet prsent a une vivacit et une nettet suprieures celles de l'image4 ,il lui fait ainsi contraste2 et pour me servir de l'excellent mot de ,taine1 il lui sert de rducteur4 ,quand les deux sont prsents ensemble1 l'objet prend le premier plan et l'image recule1 devient une chose absente4 ,mais cet objet prsent1 qu'est-il en lui-mme8 ,de quelle toffe est-il fait8 ,de la mme toffe que l'image4 ,il est fait de sensations2 il est chose perue4 ,son esse est percipi1 et lui et l'image sont gnriquement homognes4 ,si je pense en ce moment mon chapeau que j'ai laiss tout l'heure au vestiaire1 o est le dualisme1 le discontinu1 entre le chapeau pens et le chapeau rel8 ,c'est d'un vrai chapeau absent que mon esprit s'occupe4 ,j'en tiens compte pratiquement comme d'une ralit4 ,s'il tait prsent sur cette table1 le chapeau dterminerait un mouvement de ma main3 je l'enlverais4 ,de mme ce chapeau conu1 ce chapeau en ide1 dterminera tantt la direction de mes pas4 ,j'irai le prendre4 ,l'ide que j'en ai se continuera jusqu' la prsence sensible du chapeau1 et s'y fondra harmonieusement4 ,je conclus donc que1--bien qu'il y ait un dualisme pratique--puisque les images se distinguent des objets1 en tiennent lieu1 et nous y mnent1 il n'y a pas lieu de leur attribuer une diffrence de nature essentielle4 ,pense et actualit sont faites d'une seule et mme toffe1 qui est l'toffe de l'exprience en gnral4 ,la psychologie de la perception extrieure nous mne la mme conclusion4 ,quand j'aperois l'objet devant moi comme une table de telle forme1 telle distance1 on m'explique que ce fait est d deux facteurs1 une matire de sensation qui me pntre par la voie des yeux et qui donne l'lment d'extriorit relle1 et des ides qui se rveillent1 vont la rencontre de cette ralit1 la classent et l'interprtent4 ,mais qui peut faire la part1 dans la table concrtement aperue1 de ce qui est sensation et de ce qui est ide8 ,l'externe et l'interne1 l'tendu et l'intendu1 se fusionnent et font un mariage indissoluble4 ,cela rappelle ces panoramas circulaires1 o des objets rels1 rochers1 herbe1 chariots briss1 etc41 qui occupent l'avant-plan1 sont si ingnieusement relis la toile qui fait le fond1 et qui reprsente une bataille ou un vaste paysage1 que l'on ne sait plus distinguer ce qui est objet de ce qui est peinture4 ,les coutures et les joints sont imperceptibles4 ,cela pourrait-il advenir si l'objet et l'ide taient absolument dissemblables de nature8 99 99 99 99 99 ,je suis convaincu que des considrations pareilles celles que je viens d'exprimer auront dj suscit1 chez vous aussi1 des doutes au sujet du dualisme prtendu4 ,et d'autres raisons de douter surgissent encore4 ,il y a toute une sphre d'adjectifs et d'attributs qui ne sont ni objectifs1 ni subjectifs d'une manire exclusive1 mais que nous employons tantt d'une manire et tantt d'une autre1 comme si nous nous complaisions dans leur ambigut4 ,je parle des qualits que nous apprcions1 pour ainsi dire1 dans les choses1 leur ct esthtique1 moral1 leur valeur pour nous4 ,la beaut1 par exemple1 o rside-t-elle8 ,est-elle dans la statue1 dans la sonate1 ou dans notre esprit8 ,mon collgue ,harvard1 ,george ,santayana1 a crit un livre d'esthtique1#aag o il appelle la beaut le plaisir objectifi2 et en vrit1 c'est bien ici qu'on pourrait parler de projection au dehors4 ,on dit indiffremment une chaleur agrable1 ou une sensation agrable de chaleur4 ,la raret1 le prcieux du diamant nous en paraissent des qualits essentielles4 ,nous parlons d'un orage affreux1 d'un homme hassable1 d'une action indigne1 et nous croyons parler objectivement1 bien que ces termes n'expriment que des rapports notre sensibilit motive propre4 ,nous disons mme un chemin pnible1 un ciel triste1 un coucher de soleil superbe4 ,toute cette manire animiste de regarder les choses qui parat avoir t la faon primitive de penser des hommes1 peut trs bien s'expliquer 7et ,m4 ,santayana1 dans un autre livre tout rcent1#aah l'a bien explique ainsi7 par l'habitude d'attribuer l'objet tout ce que nous ressentons en sa prsence4 ,le partage du subjectif et de l'objectif est le fait d'une rflexion trs avance1 que nous aimons encore ajourner dans beaucoup d'endroits4 ,quand les besoins pratiques ne nous en tirent pas forcment1 il semble que nous aimons nous bercer dans le vague4 ,les qualits secondes elles-mmes1 chaleur1 son1 lumire1 n'ont encore aujourd'hui qu'une attribution vague4 ,pour le sens commun1 pour la vie pratique1 elles sont absolument objectives1 physiques4 ,pour le physicien1 elles sont subjectives4 ,pour lui1 il n'y a que la forme1 la masse1 le mouvement1 qui aient une ralit extrieure4 ,pour le philosophe idaliste1 au contraire1 forme et mouvement sont tout aussi subjectifs que lumire et chaleur1 et il n'y a que la chose-en-soi inconnue1 le noumne1 qui jouisse d'une ralit extramentale complte4 ,nos sensations intimes conservent encore de cette ambigut4 ,il y a des illusions de mouvement qui prouvent que nos premires sensations de mouvement taient gnralises4 ,c'est le monde entier1 avec nous1 qui se mouvait4 ,maintenant nous distinguons notre propre mouvement de celui des objets qui nous entourent1 et parmi les objets nous en distinguons qui demeurent en repos4 ,mais il est des tats de vertige o nous retombons encore aujourd'hui dans l'indiffrenciation premire4 ,vous connaissez tous sans doute cette thorie qui a voulu faire des motions des sommes de sensations viscrales et musculaires4 ,elle a donn lieu bien des controverses1 et aucune opinion n'a encore conquis l'unanimit des suffrages4 ,vous connaissez aussi les controverses sur la nature de l'activit mentale4 ,les uns soutiennent qu'elle est une force purement spirituelle que nous sommes en tat d'apercevoir immdiatement comme telle4 ,les autres prtendent que ce que nous nommons activit mentale 7effort1 attention1 par exemple7 n'est que le reflet senti de certains effets dont notre organisme est le sige1 tensions musculaires au crne et au gosier1 arrt ou passage de la respiration1 afflux de sang1 etc4 ,de quelque manire que se rsolvent ces controverses1 leur existence prouve bien clairement une chose1 c'est qu'il est trs difficile1 ou mme absolument impossible de savoir1 par la seule inspection intime de certains phnomnes1 s'ils sont de nature physique1 occupant de l'tendue1 etc41 ou s'ils sont de nature purement psychique et intrieure4 ,il nous faut toujours trouver des raisons pour appuyer notre avis2 il nous faut chercher la classification la plus probable du phnomne2 et en fin de compte il pourrait bien se trouver que toutes nos classifications usuelles eussent eu leurs motifs plutt dans les besoins de la pratique que dans quelque facult que nous aurions d'apercevoir deux essences ultimes et diverses qui composeraient ensemble la trame des choses4 ,le corps de chacun de nous offre un contraste pratique presque violent tout le reste du milieu ambiant4 ,tout ce qui arrive au dedans de ce corps nous est plus intime et important que ce qui arrive ailleurs4 ,il s'identifie avec notre moi1 il se classe avec lui4 ,ame1 vie1 souffle1 qui saurait bien les distinguer exactement8 ,mme nos images et nos souvenirs1 qui n'agissent sur le monde physique que par le moyen de notre corps1 semblent appartenir ce dernier4 ,nous les traitons comme internes1 nous les classons avec nos sentiments affectifs4 ,il faut bien avouer1 en somme1 que la question du dualisme de la pense et de la matire est bien loin d'tre finalement rsolue4 ,et voil termine la premire partie de mon discours4 ,j'ai voulu vous pntrer1 ,mesdames et ,messieurs1 de mes doutes et de la ralit1 aussi bien que de l'importance1 du problme4 ,quant moi1 aprs de longues annes d'hsitation1 j'ai fini par prendre mon parti carrment4 ,je crois que la conscience1 telle qu'on se la reprsente communment1 soit comme entit1 soit comme activit pure1 mais en tout cas comme fluide1 intendue1 diaphane1 vide de tout contenu propre1 mais se connaissant directement elle-mme1 spirituelle enfin1 je crois1 dis-je1 que cette conscience est une pure chimre1 et que la somme de ralits concrtes que le mot conscience devrait couvrir1 mrite une toute autre description1 description1 du reste1 qu'une philosophie attentive aux faits et sachant faire un peu d'analyse1 serait dsormais en tat de fournir ou plutt de commencer fournir4 ,et ces mots m'amnent la seconde partie de mon discours4 ,elle sera beaucoup plus courte que la premire1 parce que si je la dveloppais sur la mme chelle1 elle serait beaucoup trop longue4 ,il faut1 par consquent1 que je me restreigne aux seules indications indispensables4 99 99 99 99 99 ,admettons que la conscience1 la ,bewusstheit1 conue comme essence1 entit1 activit1 moiti irrductible de chaque exprience1 soit supprime1 que le dualisme fondamental et pour ainsi dire ontologique soit aboli et que ce que nous supposions exister soit seulement ce qu'on a appel jusqu'ici le contenu1 le ,inhalt1 de la conscience2 comment la philosophie va-t-elle se tirer d'affaire avec l'espce de monisme vague qui en rsultera8 ,je vais tcher de vous insinuer quelques suggestions positives l-dessus1 bien que je craigne que1 faute du dveloppement ncessaire1 mes ides ne rpandront pas une clart trs grande4 ,pourvu que j'indique un commencement de sentier1 ce sera peut-tre assez4 ,au fond1 pourquoi nous accrochons-nous d'une manire si tenace cette ide d'une conscience surajoute l'existence du contenu des choses8 ,pourquoi la rclamons-nous si fortement1 que celui qui la nierait nous semblerait plutt un mauvais plaisant qu'un penseur8 ,n'est-ce pas pour sauver ce fait indniable que le contenu de l'exprience n'a pas seulement une existence propre et comme immanente et intrinsque1 mais que chaque partie de ce contenu dteint pour ainsi dire sur ses voisines1 rend compte d'elle-mme d'autres1 sort en quelque sorte de soi pour tre sue et qu'ainsi tout le champ de l'exprience se trouve tre transparent de part en part1 ou constitu comme un espace qui serait rempli de miroirs8 ,cette bilatralit des parties de l'exprience1-- savoir d'une part1 qu'elles sont avec des qualits propres2 d'autre part1 qu'elles sont rapportes d'autres parties et sues--l'opinion rgnante la constate et l'explique par un dualisme fondamental de constitution appartenant chaque morceau d'exprience en propre4 ,dans cette feuille de papier il n'y a pas seulement1 dit-on1 le contenu1 blancheur1 minceur1 etc41 mais il y a ce second fait de la conscience de cette blancheur et de cette minceur4 ,cette fonction d'tre rapport1 de faire partie de la trame entire d'une exprience plus comprhensive1 on l'rige en fait ontologique1 et on loge ce fait dans l'intrieur mme du papier1 en l'accouplant sa blancheur et sa minceur4 ,ce n'est pas un rapport extrinsque qu'on suppose1 c'est une moiti du phnomne mme4 ,je crois qu'en somme on se reprsente la ralit comme constitue de la faon dont sont faites les couleurs qui nous servent la peinture4 ,il y a d'abord des matires colorantes qui rpondent au contenu1 et il y a un vhicule1 huile ou colle1 qui les tient en suspension et qui rpond la conscience4 ,c'est un dualisme complet1 o1 en employant certains procds1 on peut sparer chaque lment de l'autre par voie de soustraction4 ,c'est ainsi qu'on nous assure qu'en faisant un grand effort d'abstraction introspective1 nous pouvons saisir notre conscience sur le vif1 comme une activit spirituelle pure1 en ngligeant peu prs compltement les matires qu' un moment donn elle claire4 ,maintenant je vous demande si on ne pourrait pas tout aussi bien renverser absolument cette manire de voir4 ,supposons1 en effet1 que la ralit premire soit de nature neutre1 et appelons-la par quelque nom encore ambigu1 comme phnomne1 donn1 ,vorfindung4 ,moi-mme j'en parle volontiers au pluriel1 et je lui donne le nom d'expriences pures4 ,ce sera un monisme1 si vous voulez1 mais un monisme tout fait rudimentaire et absolument oppos au soi-disant monisme bilatral du positivisme scientifique ou spinoziste4 ,ces expriences pures existent et se succdent1 entrent dans des rapports infiniment varis les unes avec les autres1 rapports qui sont eux-mmes des parties essentielles de la trame des expriences4 ,il y a ,conscience de ces rapports au mme titre qu'il y a ,conscience de leurs termes4 ,il en rsulte que des groupes d'expriences se font remarquer et distinguer1 et qu'une seule et mme exprience1 vu la grande varit de ses rapports1 peut jouer un rle dans plusieurs groupes la fois4 ,c'est ainsi que dans un certain contexte de voisins1 elle serait classe comme un phnomne physique1 tandis que dans un autre entourage elle figurerait comme un fait de conscience1 peu prs comme une mme particule d'encre peut appartenir simultanment deux lignes1 l'une verticale1 l'autre horizontale1 pourvu qu'elle soit situe leur intersection4 ,prenons1 pour fixer nos ides1 l'exprience que nous avons ce moment du local o nous sommes1 de ces murailles1 de cette table1 de ces chaises1 de cet espace4 ,dans cette exprience pleine1 concrte et indivise1 telle qu'elle est l1 donne1 le monde physique objectif et le monde intrieur et personnel de chacun de nous se rencontrent et se fusionnent comme des lignes se fusionnent leur intersection4 ,comme chose physique1 cette salle a des rapports avec tout le reste du btiment1 btiment que nous autres nous ne connaissons et ne connatrons pas4 ,elle doit son existence toute une histoire de financiers1 d'architectes1 d'ouvriers4 ,elle pse sur le sol2 elle durera indfiniment dans le temps2 si le feu y clatait1 les chaises et la table qu'elle contient seraient vite rduites en cendres4 ,comme exprience personnelle1 au contraire1 comme chose rapporte1 connue1 consciente1 cette salle a de tout autres tenants et aboutissants4 ,ses antcdents ne sont pas des ouvriers1 ce sont nos penses respectives de tout l'heure4 ,bientt elle ne figurera que comme un fait fugitif dans nos biographies1 associ d'agrables souvenirs4 ,comme exprience psychique1 elle n'a aucun poids1 son ameublement n'est pas combustible4 ,elle n'exerce de force physique que sur nos seuls cerveaux1 et beaucoup d'entre nous nient encore cette influence2 tandis que la salle physique est en rapport d'influence physique avec tout le reste du monde4 ,et pourtant c'est de la mme salle absolument qu'il s'agit dans les deux cas4 ,tant que nous ne faisons pas de physique spculative1 tant que nous nous plaons dans le sens commun1 c'est la salle vue et sentie qui est bien la salle physique4 ,de quoi parlons-nous donc si ce n'est de cela1 de cette mme partie de la nature matrielle que tous nos esprits1 ce mme moment1 embrassent1 qui entre telle quelle dans l'exprience actuelle et intime de chacun de nous1 et que notre souvenir regardera toujours comme une partie intgrante de notre histoire4 ,c'est absolument une mme toffe qui figure simultanment1 selon le contexte que l'on considre1 comme fait matriel et physique1 ou comme fait de conscience intime4 ,je crois donc qu'on ne saurait traiter conscience et matire comme tant d'essence disparate4 ,on n'obtient ni l'une ni l'autre par soustraction1 en ngligeant chaque fois l'autre moiti d'une exprience de composition double4 ,les expriences sont au contraire primitivement de nature plutt simple4 ,elles deviennent conscientes dans leur entier1 elles deviennent physiques dans leur entier2 et c'est par voie d'addition que ce rsultat se ralise4 ,pour autant que des expriences se prolongent dans le temps1 entrent dans des rapports d'influence physique1 se brisant1 se chauffant1 s'clairant1 etc41 mutuellement1 nous en faisons un groupe part que nous appelons le monde physique4 ,pour autant1 au contraire1 qu'elles sont fugitives1 inertes physiquement1 que leur succession ne suit pas d'ordre dtermin1 mais semble plutt obir des caprices motifs1 nous en faisons un autre groupe que nous appelons le monde psychique4 ,c'est en entrant prsent dans un grand nombre de ces groupes psychiques que cette salle devient maintenant chose consciente1 chose rapporte1 chose sue4 ,en faisant dsormais partie de nos biographies respectives1 elle ne sera pas suivie de cette sotte et monotone rptition d'elle-mme dans le temps qui caractrise son existence physique4 ,elle sera suivie1 au contraire1 par d'autres expriences qui seront discontinues avec elle1 ou qui auront ce genre tout particulier de continuit que nous appelons souvenir4 ,demain1 elle aura eu sa place dans chacun de nos passs2 mais les prsents divers auxquels tous ces passs seront lis demain seront bien diffrents du prsent dont cette salle jouira demain comme entit physique4 ,les deux genres de groupes sont forms d'expriences1 mais les rapports des expriences entre elles diffrent d'un groupe l'autre4 ,c'est donc par addition d'autres phnomnes qu'un phnomne donn devient conscient ou connu1 ce n'est pas par un ddoublement d'essence intrieure4 ,la connaissance des choses leur survient1 elle ne leur est pas immanente4 ,ce n'est le fait ni d'un moi transcendental1 ni d'une ,bewusstheit ou acte de conscience qui les animerait chacune4 ,elles se connaissent l'une l'autre1 ou plutt il y en a qui connaissent les autres2 et le rapport que nous nommons connaissance n'est lui-mme1 dans beaucoup de cas1 qu'une suite d'expriences intermdiaires parfaitement susceptibles d'tre dcrites en termes concrets4 ,il n'est nullement le mystre transcendant o se sont complus tant de philosophes4 ,mais ceci nous mnerait beaucoup trop loin4 ,je ne puis entrer ici dans tous les replis de la thorie de la connaissance1 ou de ce que1 vous autres ,italiens1 vous appelez la gnosologie4 ,je dois me contenter de ces remarques courtes1 ou simples suggestions1 qui sont1 je le crains1 encore bien obscures faute des dveloppements ncessaires4 ,permettez donc que je me rsume--trop sommairement1 et en style dogmatique--dans les six thses suivantes3 99 99 99 99 99 #ao ,la ,conscience1 telle qu'on l'entend ordinairement1 n'existe pas1 pas plus que la ,matire1 laquelle ,berkeley a donn le coup de grce2 #bo ,ce qui existe et forme la part de vrit que le mot de ,conscience recouvre1 c'est la susceptibilit que possdent les parties de l'exprience d'tre rapportes ou connues2 #co ,cette susceptibilit s'explique par le fait que certaines expriences peuvent mener les unes aux autres par des expriences intermdiaires nettement caractrises1 de telle sorte que les unes se trouvent jouer le rle de choses connues1 les autres celui de sujets connaissants2 #do ,on peut parfaitement dfinir ces deux rles sans sortir de la trame de l'exprience mme1 et sans invoquer rien de transcendant2 #eo ,les attributions sujet et objet1 reprsent et reprsentatif1 chose et pense1 signifient donc une distinction pratique qui est de la dernire importance1 mais qui est d'ordre ,,fonctionnel seulement1 et nullement ontologique comme le dualisme classique se la reprsente2 #fo ,en fin de compte1 les choses et les penses ne sont point foncirement htrognes1 mais elles sont faites d'une mme toffe1 toffe qu'on ne peut dfinir comme telle1 mais seulement prouver1 et que l'on peut nommer1 si on veut1 l'toffe de l'exprience en gnral4 ,,footnotes3 #aaf ,a communication made 7in ,french7 at the ,fifth ,international ,congress of ,psychology1 in ,rome1 ,april #cj1 #aije4 ,it is reprinted from the ,archives de ,psychologie1 vol4 ,v1 ,no4 #ag1 ,june1 #aije4 ,cette communication est le rsum1 forcment trs condens1 de vues que l'auteur a exposes1 au cours de ces derniers mois1 en une srie d'articles publis dans le ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 #aijd et #aije4 ,the series of articles referred to is reprinted above4 ,,ed4 #aag ,the ,sense of ,beauty1 pp4 #dd ff4 #aah ,the ,life of ,reason vol4 ,i1 ,reason in ,common ,sense1 p4 #adb4 ,,ix ,,is ,,radical ,,empiricism ,,solipsistic8#aai ,if all the criticisms which the humanistic ,weltanschauung is receiving were as sachgemss as ,mr4 ,bode's1#abj the truth of the matter would more rapidly clear up4 ,not only is it excellently well written1 but it brings its own point of view out clearly1 and admits of a perfectly straight reply4 ,the argument 7unless ,i fail to catch it7 can be expressed as follows3 ,if a series of experiences be supposed1 no one of which is endowed immediately with the self-transcendent function of reference to a reality beyond itself1 no motive will occur within the series for supposing anything beyond it to exist4 ,it will remain subjective1 and contentedly subjective1 both as a whole and in its several parts4 ,radical empiricism1 trying1 as it does1 to account for objective knowledge by means of such a series1 egregiously fails4 ,it can not explain how the notion of a physical order1 as distinguished from a subjectively biographical order1 of experiences1 ever arose4 ,it pretends to explain the notion of a physical order1 but does so by playing fast and loose with the concept of objective reference4 ,on the one hand1 it denies that such reference implies self-transcendency on the part of any one experience2 on the other hand1 it claims that experiences point4 ,but1 critically considered1 there can be no pointing unless self-transcendency be also allowed4 ,the conjunctive function of pointing1 as ,i have assumed it1 is1 according to my critic1 vitiated by the fallacy of attaching a bilateral relation to a term a quo1 as if it could stick out substantively and maintain itself in existence in advance of the term ad quem which is equally required for it to be a concretely experienced fact4 ,if the relation be made concrete1 the term ad quem is involved1 which would mean 7if ,i succeed in apprehending ,mr4 ,bode rightly7 that this latter term1 although not empirically there1 is yet noetically there1 in advance--in other words it would mean that any experience that 'points' must already have transcended itself1 in the ordinary 'epistemological' sense of the word transcend4 ,something like this1 if ,i understand ,mr4 ,bode's text1 is the upshot of his state of mind4 ,it is a reasonable sounding state of mind1 but it is exactly the state of mind which radical empiricism1 by its doctrine of the reality of conjunctive relations1 seeks to dispel4 ,i very much fear--so difficult does mutual understanding seem in these exalted regions--that my able critic has failed to understand that doctrine as it is meant to be understood4 ,i suspect that he performs on all these conjunctive relations 7of which the aforesaid 'pointing' is only one7 the usual rationalistic act of substitution--he takes them not as they are given in their first intention1 as parts constitutive of experience's living flow1 but only as they appear in retrospect1 each fixed as a determinate object of conception1 static1 therefore1 and contained within itself4 ,against this rationalistic tendency to treat experience as chopped up into discontinuous static objects1 radical empiricism protests4 ,it insists on taking conjunctions at their 'face-value1' just as they come4 ,consider1 for example1 such conjunctions as 'and1' 'with1' 'near1' 'plus1' 'towards4' ,while we live in such conjunctions our state is one of transition in the most literal sense4 ,we are expectant of a 'more' to come1 and before the more has come1 the transition1 nevertheless1 is directed towards it4 ,i fail otherwise to see how1 if one kind of more comes1 there should be satisfaction and feeling of fulfilment2 but disappointment if the more comes in another shape4 ,one more will continue1 another more will arrest or deflect the direction1 in which our experience is moving even now4 ,we can not1 it is true1 name our different living 'ands' or 'withs' except by naming the different terms towards which they are moving us1 but we live their specifications and differences before those terms explicitly arrive4 ,thus1 though the various 'ands' are all bilateral relations1 each requiring a term ad quem to define it when viewed in retrospect and articulately conceived1 yet in its living moment any one of them may be treated as if it 'stuck out' from its term a quo and pointed in a special direction1 much as a compass-needle 7to use ,mr4 ,bode's excellent simile7 points at the pole1 even though it stirs not from its box4 ,in ,professor ,hffding's massive little article in ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1#aba he quotes a saying of ,kierkegaard's to the effect that we live forwards1 but we understand backwards4 ,understanding backwards is1 it must be confessed1 a very frequent weakness of philosophers1 both of the rationalistic and of the ordinary empiricist type4 ,radical empiricism alone insists on understanding forwards also1 and refuses to substitute static concepts of the understanding for transitions in our moving life4 ,a logic similar to that which my critic seems to employ here should1 it seems to me1 forbid him to say that our present is1 while present1 directed towards our future1 or that any physical movement can have direction until its goal is actually reached4 ,at this point does it not seem as if the quarrel about self-transcendency in knowledge might drop8 ,is it not a purely verbal dispute8 ,call it self-transcendency or call it pointing1 whichever you like--it makes no difference so long as real transitions towards real goals are admitted as things given in experience1 and among experience's most indefeasible parts4 ,radical empiricism1 unable to close its eyes to the transitions caught in actu1 accounts for the self-transcendency or the pointing 7whichever you may call it7 as a process that occurs within experience1 as an empirically mediated thing of which a perfectly definite description can be given4 ',epistemology1' on the other hand1 denies this2 and pretends that the self-transcendency is unmediated or1 if mediated1 then mediated in a super-empirical world4 ,to justify this pretension1 epistemology has first to transform all our conjunctions into static objects1 and this1 ,i submit1 is an absolutely arbitrary act4 ,but in spite of ,mr4 ,bode's mal-treatment of conjunctions1 as ,i understand them--and as ,i understand him--,i believe that at bottom we are fighting for nothing different1 but are both defending the same continuities of experience in different forms of words4 ,there are other criticisms in the article in question1 but1 as this seems the most vital one1 ,i will for the present1 at any rate1 leave them untouched4 ,,footnotes3 #aai ,reprinted from ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #i1 ,april #bg1 #aije4 #abj ,b4 ,h4 ,bode3 ',pure ,experience' and the ,external ,world1 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,ii1 #aije1 p4 #abh4 #aba ,vol4 ,,ii1 #aije1 pp4 #he-ib4 ,x ,,mr4 ,,pitkin',s ,,refutation ,,of ',,radical ,,empiricism'#abb ,although ,mr4 ,pitkin does not name me in his acute article on radical empiricism1#abc 444 ,i fear that some readers1 knowing me to have applied that name to my own doctrine1 may possibly consider themselves to have been in at my death4 ,in point of fact my withers are entirely unwrung4 ,i have1 indeed1 said#abd that 'to be radical1 an empiricism must not admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced4' ,but in my own radical empiricism this is only a methodological postulate1 not a conclusion supposed to flow from the intrinsic absurdity of transempirical objects4 ,i have never felt the slightest respect for the idealistic arguments which ,mr4 ,pitkin attacks and of which ,ferrier made such striking use2 and ,i am perfectly willing to admit any number of noumenal beings or events into philosophy if only their pragmatic value can be shown4 ,radical empiricism and pragmatism have so many misunderstandings to suffer from1 that it seems my duty not to let this one go any farther1 uncorrected4 99 99 99 99 99 ,mr4 ,pitkin's 'reply' to me1#abe 444 perplexes me by the obscurity of style which ,i find in almost all our younger philosophers4 ,he asks me1 however1 two direct questions which ,i understand1 so ,i take the liberty of answering4 ,first he asks3 ,do not experience and science show 'that countless things are#abf experienced as that which they are not or are only partially8' ,i reply3 ,yes1 assuredly1 as1 for example1 'things' distorted by refractive media1 'molecules1' or whatever else is taken to be more ultimately real than the immediate content of the perceptive moment4 ,secondly3 ,if experience is self-supporting#abg 7in any intelligible sense7 does this fact preclude the possibility of 7a7 something not experienced and 7b7 action of experience upon a noumenon8 ,my reply is3 ,assuredly not the possibility of either--how could it8 ,yet in my opinion we should be wise not to consider any thing or action of that nature1 and to restrict our universe of philosophic discourse to what is experienced or1 at least1 experienceable4#abh ,,footnotes3 #abb ,reprinted from the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #bf1 ,december #bj1 #aijf2 and ibid41 vol4 ,,iv1 ,no4 #d1 ,february #ad1 #aijg1 where the original is entitled ,a ,reply to ,mr4 ,pitkin4 ,,ed4 #abc ,w4 ,b4 ,pitkin3 ,a ,problem of ,evidence in ,radical ,empiricism1 ibid41 vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #bd1 ,november #bb1 #aijf4 ,,ed4 #abd ,above1 p4 #db4 ,,ed4 #abe ,in ,reply to ,professor ,james1 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 vol4 ,,iv1 ,no4 #b1 ,january #ag1 #aijg4 ,,ed4 #abf ,mr4 ,pitkin inserts the clause3 'by reason of the very nature of experience itself4' ,not understanding just what reason is meant1 ,i do not include this clause in my answer4 #abg ,see above1 p4 #aic4 ,,ed4 #abh ,elsewhere1 in speaking of 'reality' as conceptual or perceptual experiences1 the author says3 ,this is meant merely to exclude reality of an 'unknowable' sort1 of which no account in either perceptual or conceptual terms can be given4 ,it includes1 of course1 any amount of empirical reality independent of the knower4 ,meaning of ,truth1 p4 #ajj1 note4 ,,ed4 ,,xi ,,humanism ,,and ,,truth ,,once ,,more4#abi ,mr4 ,joseph's criticism of my article ',humanism and ,truth'#acj is a useful contribution to the general clearing up4 ,he has seriously tried to comprehend what the pragmatic movement may intelligibly mean2 and if he has failed1 it is the fault neither of his patience nor of his sincerity1 but rather of stubborn tricks of thought which he could not easily get rid of4 ,minute polemics1 in which the parties try to rebut every detail of each of the other's charges1 are a useful exercise only to the disputants4 ,they can but breed confusion in a reader4 ,i will therefore ignore as much as possible the text of both our articles 7mine was inadequate enough7 and treat once more the general objective situation4 ,as ,i apprehend the movement towards humanism1 it is based on no particular discovery or principle that can be driven into one precise formula which thereupon can be impaled upon a logical skewer4 ,it is much more like one of those secular changes that come upon public opinion over-night1 as it were1 borne upon tides 'too full for sound or foam1' that survive all the crudities and extravagances of their advocates1 that you can pin to no one absolutely essential statement1 nor kill by any one decisive stab4 ,such have been the changes from aristocracy to democracy1 from classic to romantic taste1 from theistic to pantheistic feeling1 from static to evolutionary ways of understanding life--changes of which we all have been spectators4 ,scholasticism still opposes to such changes the method of confutation by single decisive reasons1 showing that the new view involves self-contradiction1 or traverses some fundamental principle4 ,this is like stopping a river by planting a stick in the middle of its bed4 ,round your obstacle flows the water and 'gets there all the same4' ,in reading ,mr4 ,joseph1 ,i am not a little reminded of those ,catholic writers who refute ,darwinism by telling us that higher species can not come from lower because minus nequit gignere plus1 or that the notion of transformation is absurd1 for it implies that species tend to their own destruction1 and that would violate the principle that every reality tends to persevere in its own shape4 ,the point of view is too myopic1 too tight and close to take in the inductive argument4 ,you can not settle questions of fact by formal logic4 ,i feel as if ,mr4 ,joseph almost pounced on my words singly1 without giving the sentences time to get out of my mouth4 ,the one condition of understanding humanism is to become inductive-minded oneself1 to drop rigorous definitions1 and follow lines of least resistance 'on the whole4' ,in other words1 ,mr4 ,joseph may probably say1 resolve your intellect into a kind of slush4 ,even so1 ,i make reply1--if you will consent to use no politer word4 ,for humanism1 conceiving the more 'true' as the more 'satisfactory' 7,dewey's term7 has to renounce sincerely rectilinear arguments and ancient ideals of rigor and finality4 ,it is in just this temper of renunciation1 so different from that of pyrrhonistic scepticism1 that the spirit of humanism essentially consists4 ,satisfactoriness has to be measured by a multitude of standards1 of which some1 for aught we know1 may fail in any given case2 and what is 'more' satisfactory than any alternative in sight1 may to the end be a sum of pluses and minuses1 concerning which we can only trust that by ulterior corrections and improvements a maximum of the one and a minimum of the other may some day be approached4 ,it means a real change of heart1 a break with absolutistic hopes1 when one takes up this view of the conditions of belief4 ,that humanism's critics have never imagined this attitude inwardly1 is shown by their invariable tactics4 ,they do not get into it far enough to see objectively and from without what their own opposite notion of truth is4 ,mr4 ,joseph is possessed by some such notion2 he thinks his readers to be full of it1 he obeys it1 works from it1 but never even essays to tell us what it is4 ,the nearest he comes to doing so is where#aca he says it is the way we ought to think1 whether we be psychologically compelled to or not4 ,of course humanism agrees to this3 it is only a manner of calling truth an ideal4 ,but humanism explicates the summarizing word 'ought' into a mass of pragmatic motives from the midst of which our critics think that truth itself takes flight4 ,truth is a name of double meaning4 ,it stands now for an abstract something defined only as that to which our thought ought to conform2 and again it stands for the concrete propositions within which we believe that conformity already reigns--they being so many 'truths4' ,humanism sees that the only conformity we ever have to deal with concretely is that between our subjects and our predicates1 using these words in a very broad sense4 ,it sees moreover that this conformity is 'validated' 7to use ,mr4 ,schiller's term7 by an indefinite number of pragmatic tests that vary as the predicates and subjects vary4 ,if an ,s gets superseded by an ,,sp that gives our mind a completer sum of satisfactions1 we always say1 humanism points out1 that we have advanced to a better position in regard to truth4 ,now many of our judgments thus attained are retrospective4 ,the ,s'es1 so the judgment runs1 were ,,sp's already ere the fact was humanly recorded4 ,common sense1 struck by this state of things1 now rearranges the whole field2 and traditional philosophy follows her example4 ,the general requirement that predicates must conform to their subject1 they translate into an ontological theory4 ,a most previous ,subject of all is substituted for the lesser subjects and conceived of as an archetypal ,reality2 and the conformity required of predicates in detail is reinterpreted as a relation which our whole mind1 with all its subjects and predicates together1 must get into with respect to this ,reality4 ,it1 meanwhile1 is conceived as eternal1 static1 and unaffected by our thinking4 ,conformity to a non-human ,archetype like this is probably the notion of truth which my opponent shares with common sense and philosophic rationalism4 ,when now ,humanism1 fully admitting both the naturalness and the grandeur of this hypothesis1 nevertheless points to its sterility1 and declines to chime in with the substitution1 keeping to the concrete and still lodging truth between the subjects and the predicates in detail1 it provokes the outcry which we hear and which my critic echoes4 ,one of the commonest parts of the outcry is that humanism is subjectivistic altogether--it is supposed to labor under a necessity of 'denying trans-perceptual reality4'#acb ,it is not hard to see how this misconception of humanism may have arisen2 and humanistic writers1 partly from not having sufficiently guarded their expressions1 and partly from not having yet got round 7in the poverty of their literature7 to a full discussion of the subject1 are doubtless in some degree to blame4 ,but ,i fail to understand how any one with a working grasp of their principles can charge them wholesale with subjectivism4 ,i myself have never thought of humanism as being subjectivistic farther than to this extent1 that1 inasmuch as it treats the thinker as being himself one portion of reality1 it must also allow that some of the realities that he declares for true are created by his being there4 ,such realities of course are either acts of his1 or relations between other things and him1 or relations between things1 which1 but for him1 would never have been traced4 ,humanists are subjectivistic1 also in this1 that1 unlike rationalists 7who think they carry a warrant for the absolute truth of what they now believe in in their present pocket71 they hold all present beliefs as subject to revision in the light of future experience4 ,the future experience1 however1 may be of things outside the thinker2 and that this is so the humanist may believe as freely as any other kind of empiricist philosopher4 ,the critics of humanism 7though here ,i follow them but darkly7 appear to object to any infusion whatever of subjectivism into truth4 ,all must be archetypal2 every truth must pre-exist to its perception4 ,humanism sees that an enormous quantity of truth must be written down as having pre-existed to its perception by us humans4 ,in countless instances we find it most satisfactory to believe that1 though we were always ignorant of the fact1 it always was a fact that ,s was ,,sp4 ,but humanism separates this class of cases from those in which it is more satisfactory to believe the opposite1 e4g41 that ,s is ephemeral1 or ,p a passing event1 or ,,sp created by the perceiving act4 ,our critics seem on the other hand1 to wish to universalize the retrospective type of instance4 ,reality must pre-exist to every assertion for which truth is claimed4 ,and1 not content with this overuse of one particular type of judgment1 our critics claim its monopoly4 ,they appear to wish to cut off ,humanism from its rights to any retrospection at all4 ,humanism says that satisfactoriness is what distinguishes the true from the false4 ,but satisfactoriness is both a subjective quality1 and a present one4 ,ergo 7the critics appear to reason7 an object1 qu true1 must always for humanism be both present and subjective1 and a humanist's belief can never be in anything that lives outside of the belief itself or ante-dates it4 ,why so preposterous a charge should be so current1 ,i find it hard to say4 ,nothing is more obvious than the fact that both the objective and the past existence of the object may be the very things about it that most seem satisfactory1 and that most invite us to believe them4 ,the past tense can figure in the humanist's world1 as well of belief as of representation1 quite as harmoniously as in the world of any one else4 ,mr4 ,joseph gives a special turn to this accusation4 ,he charges me#acc with being self-contradictory when ,i say that the main categories of thought were evolved in the course of experience itself4 ,for ,i use these very categories to define the course of experience by4 ,experience1 as ,i talk about it1 is a product of their use2 and yet ,i take it as true anteriorly to them4 ,this seems to ,mr4 ,joseph to be an absurdity4 ,i hope it does not seem such to his readers2 for if experiences can suggest hypotheses at all 7and they notoriously do so7 ,i can see no absurdity whatever in the notion of a retrospective hypothesis having for its object the very train of experiences by which its own being1 along with that of other things1 has been brought about4 ,if the hypothesis is 'satisfactory' we must1 of course1 believe it to have been true anteriorly to its formulation by ourselves4 ,every explanation of a present by a past seems to involve this kind of circle1 which is not a vicious circle4 ,the past is causa existendi of the present1 which in turn is causa cognoscendi of the past4 ,if the present were treated as causa existendi of the past1 the circle might indeed be vicious4 ,closely connected with this pseudo-difficulty is another one of wider scope and greater complication--more excusable therefore4#acd ,humanism1 namely1 asking how truth in point of fact is reached1 and seeing that it is by ever substituting more satisfactory for less satisfactory opinions1 is thereby led into a vague historic sketch of truth's development4 ,the earliest 'opinions1' it thinks1 must have been dim1 unconnected 'feelings1' and only little by little did more and more orderly views of things replace them4 ,our own retrospective view of this whole evolution is now1 let us say1 the latest candidate for 'truth' as yet reached in the process4 ,to be a satisfactory candidate1 it must give some definite sort of a picture of what forces keep the process going4 ,on the subjective side we have a fairly definite picture--sensation1 association1 interest1 hypothesis1 these account in a general way for the growth into a cosmos of the relative chaos with which the mind began4 ,but on the side of the object1 so to call it roughly1 our view is much less satisfactory4 ,of which of our many objects are we to believe that it truly was there and at work before the human mind began8 ,time1 space1 kind1 number1 serial order1 cause1 consciousness1 are hard things not to objectify--even transcendental idealism leaves them standing as 'empirically real4' ,substance1 matter1 force1 fall down more easily before criticism1 and secondary qualities make almost no resistance at all4 ,nevertheless1 when we survey the field of speculation1 from ,scholasticism through ,kantism to ,spencerism1 we find an ever-recurring tendency to convert the pre-human into a merely logical object1 an unknowable ding-an-sich1 that but starts the process1 or a vague materia prima that but receives our forms4#ace ,the reasons for this are not so much logical as they are material4 ,we can postulate an extra-mental that freely enough 7though some idealists have denied us the privilege71 but when we have done so1 the what of it is hard to determine satisfactorily1 because of the oppositions and entanglements of the variously proposed whats with one another and with the history of the human mind4 ,the literature of speculative cosmology bears witness to this difficulty4 ,humanism suffers from it no more than any other philosophy suffers1 but it makes all our cosmogonic theories so unsatisfactory that some thinkers seek relief in the denial of any primal dualism4 ,absolute ,thought or 'pure experience' is postulated1 and endowed with attributes calculated to justify the belief that it may 'run itself4' ,both these truth-claiming hypotheses are non-dualistic in the old mind-and-matter sense2 but the one is monistic and the other pluralistic as to the world process itself4 ,some humanists are non-dualists of this sort--,i myself am one und zwar of the pluralistic brand4 ,but doubtless dualistic humanists also exist1 as well as non-dualistic ones of the monistic wing4 ,mr4 ,joseph pins these general philosophic difficulties on humanism alone1 or possibly on me alone4 ,my article spoke vaguely of a 'most chaotic pure experience' coming first1 and building up the mind4#acf ,but how can two structureless things interact so as to produce a structure8 my critic triumphantly asks4 ,of course they can't1 as purely so-named entities4 ,we must make additional hypotheses4 ,we must beg a minimum of structure for them4 ,the kind of minimum that might have tended to increase towards what we now find actually developed is the philosophical desideratum here4 ,the question is that of the most materially satisfactory hypothesis4 ,mr4 ,joseph handles it by formal logic purely1 as if he had no acquaintance with the logic of hypothesis at all4 ,mr4 ,joseph again is much bewildered as to what a humanist can mean when he uses the word knowledge4 ,he tries to convict me#acg of vaguely identifying it with any kind of good4 ,knowledge is a difficult thing to define briefly1 and ,mr4 ,joseph shows his own constructive hand here even less than in the rest of his article4 ,i have myself put forth on several occasions a radically pragmatist account of knowledge1#ach the existence of which account my critic probably does not know of--so perhaps ,i had better not say anything about knowledge until he reads and attacks that4 ,i will say1 however1 that whatever the relation called knowing may itself prove to consist in1 ,i can think of no conceivable kind of object which may not become an object of knowledge on humanistic principles as well as on the principles of any other philosophy4#aci ,i confess that ,i am pretty steadily hampered by the habit1 on the part of humanism's critics1 of assuming that they have truer ideas than mine of truth and knowledge1 the nature of which ,i must know of and can not need to have re-defined4 ,i have consequently to reconstruct these ideas in order to carry on the discussion 7,i have e4g4 had to do so in some parts of this article7 and ,i thereby expose myself to charges of caricature4 ,in one part of ,mr4 ,joseph's attack1 however1 ,i rejoice that we are free from this embarrassment4 ,it is an important point and covers probably a genuine difficulty1 so ,i take it up last4 ,when1 following ,schiller and ,dewey1 ,i define the true as that which gives the maximal combination of satisfactions1 and say that satisfaction is a many-dimensional term that can be realized in various ways1 ,mr4 ,joseph replies1 rightly enough1 that the chief satisfaction of a rational creature must always be his thought that what he believes is true1 whether the truth brings him the satisfaction of collateral profits or not4 ,this would seem1 however1 to make of truth the prior concept1 and to relegate satisfaction to a secondary place4 ,again1 if to be satisfactory is what is meant by being true1 whose satisfactions1 and which of his satisfactions1 are to count8 ,discriminations notoriously have to be made2 and the upshot is that only rational candidates and intellectual satisfactions stand the test4 ,we are then driven to a purely theoretic notion of truth1 and get out of the pragmatic atmosphere altogether4 ,and with this ,mr4 ,joseph leaves us--truth is truth1 and there is an end of the matter4 ,but he makes a very pretty show of convicting me of self-stultification in according to our purely theoretic satisfactions any place in the humanistic scheme4 ,they crowd the collateral satisfactions out of house and home1 he thinks1 and pragmatism has to go into bankruptcy if she recognizes them at all4 ,there is no room for disagreement about the facts here2 but the destructive force of the reasoning disappears as soon as we talk concretely instead of abstractly1 and ask1 in our quality of good pragmatists1 just what the famous theoretic needs are known as and in what the intellectual satisfactions consist4 ,mr4 ,joseph1 faithful to the habits of his party1 makes no attempt at characterizing them1 but assumes that their nature is self-evident to all4 ,are they not all mere matters of consistency--and emphatically not of consistency between an ,absolute ,reality and the mind's copies of it1 but of actually felt consistency among judgments1 objects1 and manners of reacting1 in the mind8 ,and are not both our need of such consistency and our pleasure in it conceivable as outcomes of the natural fact that we are beings that develop mental habits--habit itself proving adaptively beneficial in an environment where the same objects1 or the same kinds of objects1 recur and follow 'law'8 ,if this were so1 what would have come first would have been the collateral profits of habit1 and the theoretic life would have grown up in aid of these4 ,in point of fact this seems to have been the probable case4 ,at life's origin1 any present perception may have been 'true'--if such a word could then be applicable4 ,later1 when reactions became organized1 the reactions became 'true' whenever expectation was fulfilled by them4 ,otherwise they were 'false' or 'mistaken' reactions4 ,but the same class of objects needs the same kind of reaction1 so the impulse to react consistently must gradually have been established1 with a disappointment felt whenever the results frustrated expectation4 ,here is a perfectly plausible germ for all our higher consistencies4 ,nowadays1 if an object claims from us a reaction of the kind habitually accorded only to the opposite class of objects1 our mental machinery refuses to run smoothly4 ,the situation is intellectually unsatisfactory4 ,to gain relief we seek either to preserve the reaction by re-interpreting the object1 or1 leaving the object as it is1 we react in a way contrary to the way claimed of us4 ,neither solution is easy4 ,such a situation might be that of ,mr4 ,joseph1 with me claiming assent to humanism from him4 ,he can not apperceive it so as to permit him to gratify my claim2 but there is enough appeal in the claim to induce him to write a whole article in justification of his refusal4 ,if he should assent to humanism1 on the other hand1 that would drag after it an unwelcome1 yea incredible1 alteration of his previous mental beliefs4 ,whichever alternative he might adopt1 however1 a new equilibrium of intellectual consistency would in the end be reached4 ,he would feel1 whichever way he decided1 that he was now thinking truly4 ,but if1 with his old habits unaltered1 he should simply add to them the new one of advocating humanism quietly or noisily1 his mind would be rent into two systems1 each of which would accuse the other of falsehood4 ,the resultant situation1 being profoundly unsatisfactory1 would also be instable4 ,theoretic truth is thus no relation between our mind and archetypal reality4 ,it falls within the mind1 being the accord of some of its processes and objects with other processes and objects--'accord' consisting here in well-definable relations4 ,so long as the satisfaction of feeling such an accord is denied us1 whatever collateral profits may seem to inure from what we believe in are but as dust in the balance--provided always that we are highly organized intellectually1 which the majority of us are not4 ,the amount of accord which satisfies most men and women is merely the absence of violent clash between their usual thoughts and statements and the limited sphere of sense-perceptions in which their lives are cast4 ,the theoretic truth that most of us think we 'ought' to attain to is thus the possession of a set of predicates that do not contradict their subjects4 ,we preserve it as often as not by leaving other predicates and subjects out4 ,in some men theory is a passion1 just as music is in others4 ,the form of inner consistency is pursued far beyond the line at which collateral profits stop4 ,such men systematize and classify and schematize and make synoptical tables and invent ideal objects for the pure love of unifying4 ,too often the results1 glowing with 'truth' for the inventors1 seem pathetically personal and artificial to bystanders4 ,which is as much as to say that the purely theoretic criterion of truth can leave us in the lurch as easily as any other criterion4 ,i think that if ,mr4 ,joseph will but consider all these things a little more concretely1 he may find that the humanistic scheme and the notion of theoretic truth fall into line consistently enough to yield him also intellectual satisfaction4 ,,footnotes3 #abi ,reprinted without change from ,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 vol4 ,,xiv1 ,no4 #ed1 ,april1 #aije1 pp4 #aij-aih4 ,pages #bde-bdg1 and pp4 #bfa-bfe1 have also been reprinted in ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #ed-eg1 and pp4 #ig-ajj4 ,the present essay is referred to above1 p4 #bjc4 ,,ed4 #acj ',humanism and ,truth' first appeared in ,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 vol4 ,,xiii1 ,no4 #eb1 ,october1 #aijd4 ,it is reprinted in ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 pp4 #ea-aja4 ,cf4 this article passim4 ,mr4 ,h4 ,w4 ,b4 ,joseph's criticism1 entitled ,professor ,james on ',humanism and ,truth1' appeared in ,mind1 ,n4 ,s41 vol4 ,,xiv1 ,no4 #ec1 ,january1 #aije4 ,,ed4 #aca ,op4 cit41 p4 #cg4 #acb ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bda-bdc4 #acc ,op4 cit41 p4 #cb4 #acd ,this ,mr4 ,joseph deals with 7though in much too pettifogging and logic-chopping a way7 on pp4 #cc-cd of his article4 #ace ,compare some elaborate articles by ,m4 ,le ,roy and ,m4 ,wilbois in the ,revue de ,mtaphysique et de ,morale1 vols4 ,,viii1 ,,ix1 and ,x1 #aijj1 #aija1 and #aijb4 #acf ,cf4 ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 p4 #fd4 #acg ,joseph3 op4 cit41 p4 #cf4 #ach ,most recently in two articles1 ,does ',consciousness' ,exist8 and ,a ,world of ,pure ,experience4 ,see above1 pp4 #a-ia4 #aci ,for a recent attempt1 effective on the whole1 at squaring humanism with knowing1 ,i may refer to ,prof4 ,woodbridge's very able address at the ,saint ,louis ,congress1 ,the ,field of ,logic1 printed in ,science1 ,n4 ,y41 ,november #d1 #aijd4 ,,xii ,,absolutism ,,and ,,empiricism#adj ,no seeker of truth can fail to rejoice at the terre--terre sort of discussion of the issues between ,empiricism and ,transcendentalism 7or1 as the champions of the latter would probably prefer to say1 between ,irrationalism and ,rationalism7 that seems to have begun in ,mind4#ada ,it would seem as if1 over concrete examples like ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,haldane's1 both parties ought inevitably to come to a better understanding4 ,as a reader with a strong bias towards ,irrationalism1 ,i have studied his article#adb with the liveliest admiration of its temper and its painstaking effort to be clear4 ,but the cases discussed failed to satisfy me1 and ,i was at first tempted to write a ,note animadverting upon them in detail4 ,the growth of the limb1 the sea's contour1 the vicarious functioning of the nerve-centre1 the digitalis curing the heart1 are unfortunately not cases where we can see any through-and-through conditioning of the parts by the whole4 ,they are all cases of reciprocity where subjects1 supposed independently to exist1 acquire certain attributes through their relations to other subjects4 ,that they also exist through similar relations is only an ideal supposition1 not verified to our understanding in these or any other concrete cases whatsoever4 ,if1 however1 one were to urge this solemnly1 ,mr4 ,haldane's friends could easily reply that he only gave us such examples on account of the hardness of our hearts4 ,he knew full well their imperfection1 but he hoped that to those who would not spontaneously ascend to the ,notion of the ,totality1 these cases might prove a spur and suggest and symbolize something better than themselves4 ,no particular case that can be brought forward is a real concrete4 ,they are all abstractions from the ,whole1 and of course the through-and-through character can not be found in them4 ,each of them still contains among its elements what we call things1 grammatical subjects1 forming a sort of residual caput mortuum of ,existence after all the relations that figure in the examples have been told off4 ,on this existence1 thinks popular philosophy1 things may live on1 like the winter bears on their own fat1 never entering relations at all1 or1 if entering them1 entering an entirely different set of them from those treated of in ,mr4 ,haldane's examples4 ,thus if the digitalis were to weaken instead of strengthening the heart1 and to produce death 7as sometimes happens71 it would determine itself1 through determining the organism1 to the function of kill instead of that of cure4 ,the function and relation seem adventitious1 depending on what kind of a heart the digitalis gets hold of1 the digitalis and the heart being facts external and1 so to speak1 accidental to each other4 ,but this popular view1 ,mr4 ,haldane's friends will continue1 is an illusion4 ,what seems to us the existence of digitalis and heart outside of the relations of killing or curing1 is but a function in a wider system of relations1 of which1 pro hac vice1 we take no account4 ,the larger system determines the existence just as absolutely as the system kill1 or the system cure1 determined the function of the digitalis4 ,ascend to the absolute system1 instead of biding with these relative and partial ones1 and you shall see that the law of through-and-throughness must and does obtain4 ,of course1 this argument is entirely reasonable1 and debars us completely from chopping logic about the concrete examples ,mr4 ,haldane has chosen4 ,it is not his fault if his categories are so fine an instrument that nothing but the sum total of things can be taken to show us the manner of their use4 ,it is simply our misfortune that he has not the sum total of things to show it by4 ,let us fall back from all concrete attempts and see what we can do with his notion of through-and-throughness1 avowedly taken in abstracto4 ,in abstract systems the through-and-through ,ideal is realized on every hand4 ,in any system1 as such1 the members are only members in the system4 ,abolish the system and you abolish its members1 for you have conceived them through no other property than the abstract one of membership4 ,neither rightness nor leftness1 except through bi-laterality4 ,neither mortgager nor mortgagee1 except through mortgage4 ,the logic of these cases is this3--,if ,a1 then ,b2 but if ,b1 then ,a3 wherefore if either1 ,both2 and if not ,both1 ,nothing4 ,it costs nothing1 not even a mental effort1 to admit that the absolute totality of things may be organized exactly after the pattern of one of these through-and-through abstractions4 ,in fact1 it is the pleasantest and freest of mental movements4 ,husband makes1 and is made by1 wife1 through marriage2 one makes other1 by being itself other2 everything self-created through its opposite--you go round like a squirrel in a cage4 ,but if you stop and reflect upon what you are about1 you lay bare the exact point at issue between common sense and the through-and-through school4 ,what1 in fact1 is the logic of these abstract systems8 ,it is1 as we said above3 ,if any ,member1 then the ,whole ,system2 if not the ,whole ,system1 then ,nothing4 ,but how can ,logic possibly do anything more with these two hypotheses than combine them into the single disjunctive proposition--,either this ,whole ,system1 just as it stands1 or ,nothing at all4 ,is not that disjunction the ultimate word of ,logic in the matter1 and can any disjunction1 as such1 resolve itself8 ,it may be that ,mr4 ,haldane sees how one horn1 the concept of the ,whole ,system1 carries real existence with it4 ,but if he has been as unsuccessful as ,i in assimilating the ,hegelian re-editings of the ,anselmian proof1#adc he will have to say that though ,logic may determine what the system must be1 if it is1 something else than ,logic must tell us that it is4 ,mr4 ,haldane in this case would probably consciously1 or unconsciously1 make an appeal to ,fact3 the disjunction is decided1 since nobody can dispute that now1 as a matter of fact1 something1 and not nothing1 is4 ,we must therefore1 he would probably say1 go on to admit the ,whole ,system in the desiderated sense4 ,is not then the validity of the ,anselmian proof the nucleus of the whole question between ,logic and ,fact8 ,ought not the efforts of ,mr4 ,haldane and his friends to be principally devoted to its elucidation8 ,is it not the real door of separation between ,empiricism and ,rationalism8 ,and if the ,rationalists leave that door for a moment off its hinges1 can any power keep that abstract1 opaque1 unmediated1 external1 irrational1 and irresponsible monster1 known to the vulgar as bare ,fact1 from getting in and contaminating the whole sanctuary with his presence8 ,can anything prevent ,faust from changing ,am ,anfang war das ,wort into ,am ,anfang war die ,that8 ,nothing in earth or heaven4 ,only the ,anselmian proof can keep ,fact out of philosophy4 ,the question1 ,shall ,fact be recognized as an ultimate principle8 is the whole issue between the ,rationalists and the ,empiricism of vulgar thought4 ,of course1 if so recognized1 ,fact sets a limit to the through-and-through character of the world's rationality4 ,that rationality might then mediate between all the members of our conception of the world1 but not between the conception itself and reality4 ,reality would have to be given1 not by ,reason1 but by ,fact4 ,fact holds out blankly1 brutally and blindly1 against that universal deliquescence of everything into logical relations which the ,absolutist ,logic demands1 and it is the only thing that does hold out4 ,hence the ire of the ,absolutist ,logic--hence its non-recognition1 its 'cutting' of ,fact4 ,the reasons it gives for the 'cutting' are that ,fact is speechless1 a mere word for the negation of thought1 a vacuous unknowability1 a dog-in-the-manger1 in truth1 which having no rights of its own1 can find nothing else to do than to keep its betters out of theirs4 ,there are two points involved here3 first the claim that certain things have rights that are absolute1 ubiquitous and all pervasive1 and in regard to which nothing else can possibly exist in its own right2 and second that anything that denies this assertion is pure negativity with no positive context whatsoever4 ,take the latter point first4 ,is it true that what is negative in one way is thereby convicted of incapacity to be positive in any other way8 ,the word ,fact is like the word ,accident1 like the word ,absolute itself4 ,they all have their negative connotation4 ,in truth1 their whole connotation is negative and relative4 ,all it says is that1 whatever the thing may be that is denoted by the words1 other things do not control it4 ,where fact1 where accident is1 they must be silent1 it alone can speak4 ,but that does not prevent its speaking as loudly as you please1 in its own tongue4 ,it may have an inward life1 self-transparent and active in the maximum degree4 ,an indeterminate future volition on my part1 for example1 would be a strict accident as far as my present self is concerned4 ,but that could not prevent it1 in the moment in which it occurred1 from being possibly the most intensely living and luminous experience ,i ever had4 ,its quality of being a brute fact ab extra says nothing whatever as to its inwardness4 ,it simply says to outsiders3 ',hands off6' ,and this brings us back to the first point of the ,absolutist indictment of ,fact4 ,is that point really anything more than a fantastic dislike to letting anything say ',hands off'8 ,what else explains the contempt the ,absolutist authors exhibit for a freedom defined simply on its negative side1 as freedom from1 etc48 ,what else prompts them to deride such freedom8 ,but1 dislike for dislike1 who shall decide8 ,why is not their dislike at having me from them1 entirely on a par with mine at having them through me8 ,i know very well that in talking of dislikes to those who never mention them1 ,i am doing a very coarse thing1 and making a sort of intellectual ,orson of myself4 ,but1 for the life of me1 ,i can not help it1 because ,i feel sure that likes and dislikes must be among the ultimate factors of their philosophy as well as of mine4 ,would they but admit it6 ,how sweetly we then could hold converse together6 ,there is something finite about us both1 as we now stand4 ,we do not know the ,absolute ,whole yet4 ,part of it is still negative to us4 ,among the whats of it still stalks a mob of opaque thats1 without which we cannot think4 ,but just as ,i admit that this is all possibly provisional1 that even the ,anselmian proof may come out all right1 and creation may be a rational system through-and-through1 why might they not also admit that it may all be otherwise1 and that the shadow1 the opacity1 the negativity1 the from-ness1 the plurality that is ultimate1 may never be wholly driven from the scene4 ,we should both then be avowedly making hypotheses1 playing with ,ideals4 ,ah6 ,why is the notion of hypothesis so abhorrent to the ,hegelian mind8 ,and once down on our common level of hypothesis1 we might then admit scepticism1 since the ,whole is not yet revealed1 to be the soundest logical position4 ,but since we are in the main not sceptics1 we might go on and frankly confess to each other the motives for our several faiths4 ,i frankly confess mine--,i can not but think that at bottom they are of an sthetic and not of a logical sort4 ,the through-and-through universe seems to suffocate me with its infallible impeccable all-pervasiveness4 ,its necessity1 with no possibilities2 its relations1 with no subjects1 make me feel as if ,i had entered into a contract with no reserved rights1 or rather as if ,i had to live in a large seaside boarding-house with no private bed-room in which ,i might take refuge from the society of the place4 ,i am distinctly aware1 moreover1 that the old quarrel of sinner and pharisee has something to do with the matter4 ,certainly1 to my personal knowledge1 all ,hegelians are not prigs1 but ,i somehow feel as if all prigs ought to end1 if developed1 by becoming ,hegelians4 ,there is a story of two clergymen asked by mistake to conduct the same funeral4 ,one came first and had got no farther than ,i am the ,resurrection and the ,life1 when the other entered4 ,i am the ,resurrection and the ,life1 cried the latter4 ,the through-and-through philosophy1 as it actually exists1 reminds many of us of that clergyman4 ,it seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak for the vast slow-breathing unconscious ,kosmos with its dread abysses and its unknown tides4 ,the freedom we want to see there is not the freedom1 with a string tied to its leg and warranted not to fly away1 of that philosophy4 ,let it fly away1 we say1 from us6 ,what then8 ,again1 ,i know ,i am exhibiting my mental grossness4 ,but again1 ,ich kann nicht anders4 ,i show my feelings2 why will they not show theirs8 ,i know they have a personal feeling about the through-and-through universe1 which is entirely different from mine1 and which ,i should very likely be much the better for gaining if they would only show me how4 ,their persistence in telling me that feeling has nothing to do with the question1 that it is a pure matter of absolute reason1 keeps me for ever out of the pale4 ,still seeing a that in things which ,logic does not expel1 the most ,i can do is to aspire to the expulsion4 ,at present ,i do not even aspire4 ,aspiration is a feeling4 ,what can kindle feeling but the example of feeling8 ,and if the ,hegelians will refuse to set an example1 what can they expect the rest of us to do8 ,to speak more seriously1 the one fundamental quarrel ,empiricism has with ,absolutism is over this repudiation by ,absolutism of the personal and sthetic factor in the construction of philosophy4 ,that we all of us have feelings1 ,empiricism feels quite sure4 ,that they may be as prophetic and anticipatory of truth as anything else we have1 and some of them more so than others1 can not possibly be denied4 ,but what hope is there of squaring and settling opinions unless ,absolutism will hold parley on this common ground2 and will admit that all philosophies are hypotheses1 to which all our faculties1 emotional as well as logical1 help us1 and the truest of which will at the final integration of things be found in possession of the men whose faculties on the whole had the best divining power8 ,,footnotes3 #adj ,reprinted from ,mind1 vol4 ,,ix1 ,no4 #cd1 ,april1 #ahhd4 #ada ,in #ahhd4 #adb ,life and ,mechanism1 ,mind1 vol4 ,,ix1 #ahhd4 #adc ,cf4 ,p4 ,janet and ,g4 ,sailles3 ,history of the ,problems of ,philosophy1 trans4 by ,monahan1 vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #bge-bgh2 #cje-cjg4 ,,ed4 ,,index ,,absolute ,,idealism3 #df1 #fj1 #ii1 #ajb1 #acd1 #aie1 #bef ff41 ,essay ,,xii4 ,,activity3 x1 ,essay ,,vi4 ,,affectional ,,facts3 #cd ff41 ,essay ,v1 #bag ff4 ,,agnosticism3 #aie4 ,,appreciations4 ,see ,,affectional ,,facts4 ,,bergson1 ,h43 #aef1 #ahh4 ,,berkeley3 #aj-aa1 #dc1 #gf1 #gg1 #bab1 #bcb4 ,,bode1 ,b4 ,h43 #bcd ff4 ,,body3 #gh1 #hd ff41 #aec1 #bba4 ,,bradley1 ,f4 ,h43 #fj1 #ih1 #ii1 #ajj1 #ajg ff41 #aeg1 #afb4 ,,cause3 #afc1 #agd1 #aha ff4 ,,change3 #afa4 ,,cognitive ,,relation3 #eb ff4 ,see also under ,,knowledge4 ,,concepts3 #ae ff41 #bb1 #cc1 #ed ff41 #fe ff4 ,,conjunctive ,,relations3 x1 #dd ff41 #ei1 #gj1 #id1 #ajd1 #ajg ff41 #aag ff41 #afc1 #bdj4 ,,consciousness3 xi1 ,essay ,i1 #ge1 #hj1 #abg ff41 #aci ff41 #aed1 #ahd1 ,essay ,,viii4 ,,continuity3 #dh ff41 #ei1 #gj1 #id4 ,,democritus3 #aa4 ,,descartes3 #cj4 ,,dewey1 ,j43 #ec1 #aef1 #aia1 #bjd1 #bdg1 #bfj4 ,,disjunctive ,,relations3 x1 #db ff41 #aje1 #ajg ff4 ,,dualism3 #aj1 #bjg ff41 #bbe1 #beg4 ,,empiricism3 iv-v1 vii-xiii1 #da1 #df-dg1 ,essay ,,xii4 ,see also under ,,radical ,,empiricism4 ,,epistemology3 #bci4 ,see also under ,,knowledge4 ,,ethics3 #aid4 ,,experience3 vii1 xii1 #h ff41 #ec1 #fb1 ff41 #ga1 #hj1 #hg1 #ib1 #baf1 #bbd1 #bcc1 #bdb1 #bdc4 ,see also under ,,pure ,,experience4 ,,external ,,relations3 #aaj ff4 ,see also under ,,relations1 and ,,disjunctive4 ,,feeling4 ,see under ,,affectional ,,facts4 ,,free ,,will3 #ahe4 ,,haldane1 ,j4 ,s43 #bff ff4 ,,hegel3 #ajf1 #bgf1 #bgg4 ,,herbart3 #ajf4 ,,hobhouse1 ,l4 ,t43 #aji4 ,,hodder1 ,a4 ,l43 #bb1 #aji4 ,,hodgson1 ,s43 ix1 #dh4 ,h,,ffding1 ,h43 #bch4 ,,humanism3 #ij1 #aef1 ,essay ,,vii1 ,essay ,,xi4 ,,hume3 x1 #db1 #dc1 #ajc1 #agd4 ,,idealism3 #ci1 #dj1 #acd1 #bai1 #bda1 #bef4 ,,ideas3 #ee ff41 #gc1 #agg1 #bji4 ,,identity1 ,philosophy of3 #acd1 #aig1 #bjb4 ,,indeterminism3 #ij1 #bgd4 ,,intellect3 #ig ff4 ,,joseph1 ,h4 ,w4 ,b43 #bjc1 #bdd ff4 ,,kant3 #a1 #cg1 #afb1 #bjf4 ,,kierkegaard3 #bch4 ,,knowledge3 #d1 #be1 #ef ff41 #fh ff41 #hg-hh1 #aif ff41 #bca4 ,see also under ,,cognitive ,,relation1 ,,objective ,,reference4 ,,life3 #hg1 #afa4 ,,locke3 #aj4 ,,logic3 #bfi ff4 ,,lotze3 #ei1 #ge1 #afg4 ,,materialism3 #agi1 #bcb4 ,,mill1 ,j4 ,s43 x1 #dc1 #gf4 ,,mill1 ,,james3 #dc4 ,,miller1 ,d43 #ed4 ,,minds1 their ,conterminousness3 #gf ff41 ,essay ,,iv4 ,,monism3 vii1 #bjh1 #bfg ff4 ,,moore1 ,g4 ,e43 #f-g4 ,m,,nsterberg1 ,h43 #a1 #ah-bj1 #aeh4 ,,natorp1 ,p43 #a1 #g-h4 ,,naturalism3 #if4 ,,neo-,,kantism3 #e-f4 ,,objective ,,reference3 #fg ff4 ,,objectivity3 #bc ff41 #gi4 ,,panpsychism3 #hi1 #ahh4 ,,parallelism3 #baj4 ,,perception3 #aa ff41 #ag1 #cc1 #fe1 #gh1 #hb ff41 #aig1 #bjj1 #baa ff4 ,,perry1 ,r4 ,b43 #bd4 ,,physical ,,reality3 #ad1 #bb1 #cb1 #abd ff41 #aci ff41 #adi ff41 #aed1 #baa ff41 #bbi1 #bce4 ,,pitkin1 ,w4 ,b43 #bda ff4 ,,pluralism3 #hi1 #ij1 #aaj4 ,,pragmatism3 iv1 x1 xi-xii1 #aa1 #gb1 #ig ff41 #aef1 #aei1 #agf1 #bdb1 #bfa4 ,,primary ,,qualities3 #adg4 ,,prince1 ,m43 #hh4 ,,pringle-,,pattison1 ,a4 ,s43 #aji4 ,,psychology3 #bjf1 #bji ff4 ,,pure ,,experience3 #d1 #bc1 #bf-bg1 #ce1 ,essay ,,ii1 #gd1 #ij1 #ic ff41 #if4 #aba1 #abc1 #acd1 #ace1 #ach1 #aci1 #afj1 #aic1 #bjj1 #bbf ff41 #beg4 ,,radical ,,empiricism3 iv-v1 vii1 ix-xiii1 #da ff41 #dg1 #dh1 #fi1 #gf1 #hi1 #ia1 #ajg1 #aji1 #aba1 #adh1 #aef1 #aei1 #ahb1 #bce1 #bcg1 #bch1 #bci1 #bda1 #bdb4 ,,rationalism3 #da1 #if ff41 #bcg1 #bff4 ,,realism3 #af1 #dj1 #gf1 #hb ff4 ,,rehmke1 ,j43 #a4 ,,relations3 x1 #af1 #be1 #db ff41 #ga1 #ha1 ,essay ,,iii1 #adh1 #bfh4 ,see also under ,,conjunctive and ,,disjunctive4 ,,religion3 xiii1 #aid4 ,,renouvier3 #ahd-ahe4 ,,representation3 #fa1 #aif ff41 #bab ff4 ,see also under ,,substitution4 ,,royce1 ,j43 #ba1 #aeh1 #ahf-ahg1 #aie4 ,,santayana1 ,g43 #adc1 #bah4 ,,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s43 #aji1 #aia1 #bjd1 #bdi1 #bfj4 ,,schubert-,,soldern1 ,r4 ,v43 #b4 ,,schuppe1 ,w43 #a4 ,,secondary ,,qualities3 #adf1 #bai4 ,,self3 #de1 #df1 #id1 #abh ff4 ,,sensation3 #cj1 #bja4 ,,sidis1 ,b43 #add4 ,,solipsism3 ,essay ,,ix4 ,,space3 #cj-ca1 #hd1 #id1 #aaj1 #aad4 ,,spencer1 ,h43 #add4 ,,spinoza3 #bjh4 ,,spir1 ,a43 #ajf4 ,,stout1 ,g4 ,f43 #aji1 #aeh4 ,,strong1 ,c4 ,a43 #ed1 #hh1 #hi1 #ahh4 ,,subjectivity3 #bc ff41 #bcd ff41 #bea ff4 ,,substitution3 #fb ff41 #ajd1 #bja4 ,,taine3 #bj1 #fb4 ,,taylor1 ,a4 ,e43 #aaa4 ,,teleology3 #agi4 ,,things3 #a1 #i ff41 #bh ff41 #cg1 ,essay ,,iii1 #bji4 ,,thought3 #a1 #bb1 #bh ff41 #cg1 #bac4 ,see also under ,,knowledge4 ,,time3 #bg1 #id4 ,,transcendentalism3 #ci1 #eb1 #fg1 #ga1 #ge1 #bci4 ,,truth3 #bd1 #ih1 #aib1 #bjb ff41 #bdg ff4 ,,ward1 ,j43 #aeg1 #afb4 ,,will3 #afe1 #ahd4 ,,woodbridge4 ,f4 ,j4 ,e43 #aif4 ,,worth3 #ahf-ahg4 ,,wundt1 ,w43 #aeb4 ,the ,riverside ,press ,,printed ,,by ,h4 ,o4 ,,houghton ,,co4 ,,cambridge1 ,,mass4 ,u4 ,s4 ,a4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's note3 ,the following changes were made to the text4 ,page #ih3 ,yet when so broken it is less consistent then ever4 ,changed to ,yet when so broken it is less consistent than ever4 ,page #ahj3 some comtemptibly small process on which success depends4 ,changed to some contemptibly small process on which success depends4 ,note #ic3 ,,xxv aud ,,xxvi ,changed to ,,xxv and ,,xxvi ,note #aja3 ',does ,consciousuess ,exist8' ,changed to ',does ,consciousness ,exist8' ,note #aji3 either as a syuonym for 'radical empiricism' ,changed to either as a synonym for 'radical empiricism' ,note #aji3 ,for other discussions of 'humauism1' ,changed to ,for other discussions of 'humanism1' ,note #acj3 ',humanism and ,truth' first appeared iu ,changed to ',humanism and ,truth' first appeared in