,,philosophies ,,ancient ,,and ,,modern 
,,rationalism         99       99       
99       99       99  ,,religions3      
,,ancient ,,and ,,modern   ,animism4 ,by
 ,,edward ,,clodd1 author of ,the ,story
 of ,creation4  ,pantheism4 ,by ,,james 
,,allanson ,,picton1 author of ,the     
,religion of the ,universe4  ,the       
,religions of ,ancient ,china4 ,by      
,professor ,,giles1 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor
 of ,chinese in the ,university of      
,cambridge4  ,the ,religion of ,ancient 
,greece4 ,by ,,jane ,,harrison1         
,lecturer at ,newnham ,college1         
,cambridge1 author of ,prolegomena to   
,study of ,greek ,religion4  ,islam4 ,by
 the ,rt4 ,hon4 ,,ameer ,,ali ,,syed1 of
 the ,judicial ,committee of ,his       
,majesty's ,privy ,council1 author of   
,the ,spirit of ,islam and ,ethics of   
,islam4  ,magic and ,fetishism4 ,by ,dr4
 ,a4 ,c4 ,,haddon1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,lecturer 
on ,ethnology at ,cambridge ,university4
  ,the ,religion of ,ancient ,egypt4 ,by
 ,professor ,w4 ,m4 ,,flinders ,,petrie1

 ,f4,r4,s4  ,the ,religion of ,babylonia
 and ,assyria4 ,by ,,theophilus ,g4     
,,pinches1 late of the ,british ,museum4
  ,early ,buddhism4 ,by ,professor      
,,rhys ,,davids1 ,,ll4,d41 late         
,secretary of ,the ,royal ,asiatic      
,society4  ,hinduism4 ,by ,dr4 ,l4 ,d4  
,,barnett1 of the ,department of        
,oriental ,printed ,books and ,,mss41   
,british ,museum4  ,scandinavian        
,religion4 ,by ,,william ,a4 ,,craigie1 
,joint ,editor of the ,oxford ,english  
,dictionary4  ,celtic ,religion4 ,by    
,professor ,,anwyl1 ,professor of ,welsh
 at ,university ,college1 ,aberystwyth4 
,the ,mythology of ,ancient ,britain and
 ,ireland4 ,by ,,charles ,,squire1      
author of ,the ,mythology of the        
,british ,islands4  ,judaism4 ,by       
,,israel ,,abrahams1 ,lecturer in       
,talmudic ,literature in ,cambridge     
,university1 author of ,jewish ,life in 
the ,middle ,ages4  ,the ,religion of   
,ancient ,rome4 ,by ,,cyril ,,bailey1   
,m4,a4  ,shinto1 ,the ,ancient ,religion

 of ,japan4 ,by ,w4 ,g4 ,,aston1        
,c4,m4,g4  ,the ,religion of ,ancient   
,mexico and ,peru4 ,by ,,lewis ,,spence1
 ,m4,a4  ,early ,christianity4 ,by ,s4  
,b4 ,,black1 ,professor at ,m',gill     
,university4  ,the ,psychological       
,origin and ,nature of ,religion4 ,by   
,professor ,j4 ,h4 ,,leuba4  ,the       
,religion of ,ancient ,palestine4 ,by   
,,stanley ,a4 ,,cook4  ,manicheeism4 ,by
 ,f4 ,c4 ,,conybeare4 7,shortly47       
,,philosophies   ,early ,greek          
,philosophy4 ,by ,a4 ,w4 ,,benn1 author 
of ,the ,philosophy of ,greece1         
,rationalism in the ,nineteenth         
,century4  ,stoicism4 ,by ,professor    
,,st4 ,,george ,,stock1 author of       
,deductive ,logic1 editor of the        
,apology of ,plato1 etc4  ,plato4 ,by   
,professor ,a4 ,e4 ,,taylor1 ,st4       
,andrews ,university1 author of ,the    
,problem of ,conduct4  ,scholasticism4  
,by ,father ,,rickaby1 ,s4,j4  ,hobbes4 
,by ,professor ,a4 ,e4 ,,taylor4        
,locke4 ,by ,professor ,,alexander1 of  

,owens ,college4  ,comte and ,mill4 ,by 
,t4 ,,whittaker1 author of ,the         
,neoplatonists1 ,apollonius of ,tyana   
and other ,essays4  ,herbert ,spencer4  
,by ,w4 ,h4 ,,hudson1 author of ,an     
,introduction to ,spencer's ,philosophy4
  ,schopenhauer4 ,by ,t4 ,,whittaker4   
,berkeley4 ,by ,professor ,,campbell    
,,fraser1 ,d4,c4,l41 ,,ll4,d4           
,swedenborg4 ,by ,dr4 ,,sewall4         
,nietzsche3 ,his ,life and ,works4 ,by  
,,anthony ,m4 ,,ludovici4  ,bergson4 ,by
 ,,joseph ,,solomon4  ,rationalism4 ,by 
,j4 ,m4 ,,robertson4  ,lucretius and the
 ,atomists4 ,by ,,edward ,,clodd4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,,rationalism  ,by ,j4 ,m4 ,,robertson  
,,author ,,of ',a ,,short ,,history ,,of
 ,,freethought' ',,letters ,,on         
,,reasoning1' ,,etc4   ,,london         
,,constable ,,and ,,company ,,ltd #aiab 
,,contents                              
,,page  #a4 ,,the ,,term                
#a   #b4 ,,the ,,practical ,,position   
#g   #c4 ,,the ,,religious ,,challenge  

#ab   #d4 ,,the ,,philosophical         
,,challenge            #bj   #e4 ,,the  
,,skeptical ,,religious ,,challenge     
#bg   #f4 ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,reason 
#cg   #g4 ,,the ,,test ,,of ,,truth     
#dg   #h4 ,,ultimate ,,problems         
#fb   #i4 ,,ideals                      
#gf     ,,rationalism      #a4 ,,the    
,,term   ,the names 'rationalist' and   
'rationalism' have been used in so many 
senses within the past three hundred    
years that they cannot be said to stand 
quite definitely for any type or school 
of philosophic thought4 ,for ,bacon1 a  
'rationalist' or rationalis was a       
physician with a priori views of disease
 and bodily function2 and the           
,aristotelian humanists of the          
,helmstadt school were named            
rationalistas about the same period by  
their opponents4 ,a little later some   
,continental scholars applied the name  
to the ,socinians and deists2 and later 
still it designated1 in ,britain1 types 
of ,christian thinkers who sought to    

give a relatively reasoned form to      
articles of the current creed which had 
generally been propounded as mysteries  
to be taken on faith4 ,the claim to     
apply 'reason' in such matters was by   
many orthodox persons regarded as in    
itself impious1 while others derided the
 adoption of the title of 'rationalist' 
or 'reasonist' by professing ,christians
 as an unwarranted pretence of superior 
reasonableness4 ,used in ethics1 the    
label 'rationalism' served in the       
earlier part of the eighteenth century  
to stigmatise1 as lacking in evangelical
 faith1 those ,christians who sought to 
make their moral philosophy quadrate    
with that of 'natural religion4' ,later 
in the century1 though in ,england we   
find the status of 'rational' claimed   
for orthodox belief in miracles and     
prophecies as the only valid evidence   
for ,christianity1#a rationalism became 
the recognised name for the critical    
methods of the liberal ,german          
theologians who sought to reduce the    

supernatural episodes of the ,scriptures
 to the status of natural events        
misunderstood2 and several professed    
histories of modern 'rationalism' have  
accordingly dealt mainly or wholly with 
the developments of ,biblical criticism 
in ,germany4  ,new connotations1        
however1 began to accrue to the terms in
 virtue of the philosophical procedure  
of ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason1  
though his ,religion within the ,bounds 
of ,simple blossen ,reason went far to  
countenance the current usage2 and when 
,hegel subsequently proceeded to        
identify 7at times7 reason with the     
cosmic process1 there were set up       
implications which still give various   
technical significances to 'rationalism'
 in some academic circles4 ,in the      
brilliant work of ,professor ,william   
,james on ,pragmatism1 for instance1 the
 term is represented as connoting1 in   
contrast to the thinking of             
'tough-minded' empiricists1 that of a   
type or school of 'tender-minded' people

 who are collectively--                 
',rationalistic 7going by principles7   
,intellectualistic      ,idealistic     
,optimistic      ,religious             
,free-willist      ,monistic            
,dogmatical4'   ,yet it is safe to say  
that in ,britain1 for a generation back1
 the name has carried to the general    
mind only two or three of the           
connotations in ,professor ,james's     
list1 and much more nearly coincides    
with his contrary list characterising   
'the tough-minded'3--                   
',empiricist 7going by facts7           
,sensationalistic      ,materialistic   
,pessimistic      ,irreligious          
,fatalistic      ,pluralistic           
,skeptical'   --though here again the   
item 'pluralistic' does not chime with  
the common conception1 and 'pessimistic'
 is hardly less open to challenge4      
',intellectualistic' appears to be aimed
 at ,hegelians1 but would be understood 
by many as describing the tendency to   
set up 'reason' against 'authority'2 and

 ,professor ,james's 'rationalists1' who
 would appear to include thinkers like  
his colleague ,professor ,royce1 would  
not be so described in ,england by many 
university men1 clergymen1 or           
journalists4 ,the name 'rationalist1' in
 short1 has come to mean for most people
 in this country very much what         
'freethinker' used to mean for those who
 did not employ it as a mere term of    
abuse4 ,it stands1 that is to say1 for  
one who rejects the claims of           
'revelation1' the idea of a personal    
,god1 the belief in personal            
immortality1 and in general the         
conceptions logically accruing to the   
practices of prayer and worship4        
,perhaps the best name for such persons 
would be 'naturalist1' which was already
 in use with some such force in the time
 of ,bodin and ,montaigne4 ,kant1 it may
 be remembered1 distinguished between   
'rationalists1' as thinkers who did not 
deny the possibility of a revelation1   
and 'naturalists' who did4 ,but though  

'naturalism1' has latterly been         
recognised by many as a highly          
convenient term for the view of things  
which rejects 'supernaturalism1' and    
will be so used in the present          
discussion1 the correlative 'naturalist'
 has never1 so to speak1 been           
naturalised in ,english4 ,for one thing1
 it has been specialised in ordinary    
language in the sense of 'student of    
nature1' or rather of what has come to  
be specially known as 'natural          
history'--in particular1 the life of    
birds1 insects1 fishes1 and animals4    
,and1 further1 the term 'naturalism1'   
like every other general label for a way
 of thinking1 is liable to divagations  
and misunderstandings4 ,some thinkers   
7known to the present writer only       
through the accounts given of them by   
others7 appear to formulate as a        
philosophic principle the doctrine that 
the best way to regulate our lives is to
 find out how the broad processes of    
',nature' is tending1 and to conform to 

it alike our ideals and our practice4   
,the notion is that if1 say1 ,nature    
appears to be making for the            
extermination of backward races1 we     
should try to help the process forward4 
,it is doubtful whether more than a very
 small number of instructed men have    
ever entertained such a principle4 ,it  
is certainly not the expression of the  
philosophy of those ancients who sought 
to 'live according to ,nature'2 and it  
would certainly not have been assented  
to by such modern 'naturalists' as      
,spencer and ,huxley and ,mill4 ,but if 
the principle is current at all1 it     
makes the name of 'naturalist' as       
ambiguous philosophically as            
'rationalist' can be4#b  ,and similar   
drawbacks attach to another set of terms
 which have much to recommend           
them--'positive1' 'positivist1' and     
'positivism4' ,they stand theoretically 
for 7#a7 the provable1 7#b7 the attitude
 of the seeker for intelligible proof in
 all things1 7#c7 the conviction that   

the rights of reason are ultimate and   
indefeasible4 ,but here again1 to say   
nothing of the equivoque of 'positive1' 
we are met by a claim of pre-emption1   
the claim of ,comte to associate the    
'ism' specifically with his system1     
theoretic and practical4 ,and for the   
majority of men with positivist         
proclivities1 the gist of the 'practical
 application' of ,comte is incompatible 
with the positive spirit4 ,positivism   
with a capital ,p is thereby made for   
them1 as it was for ,littr1 something   
alien to positivism as the free         
scientific spirit would seek to shape   
it4 ,and a wrangle over the ownership of
 the word would be a waste of time4     
,,footnotes3  #a ,see ,a ,full ,answer  
to a late ,view of the ,internal        
,evidence of the ,christian ,religion1  
in a ,dialogue between a ,rational      
,christian and his ,friend4 ,london1    
#aggg4 ,the orthodox writer deals       
severely with some lines of ,christian  
apologetics which have since had vogue4 

#b ,the somewhat awkward term           
'naturalistic1' which is sometimes      
useful1 is hereinafter used in relation 
to the sense above given for            
'naturalism4'      #b4 ,,the ,,practical
 ,,position   ,the usages being so1 most
 of us who can answer to the term       
'rationalist' may reasonably let its    
general force be decided for us by the  
stream of tendency in ordinary speech2  
and1 recognising the existence of other 
applications1 one may usefully seek to  
give a philosophic account of what its  
adoption seems to involve4 ,that is to  
say1 the present treatise does not      
undertake to present1 much less to      
justify1 all the views which have ever  
been described as 'rationalistic1' but  
merely to present current rationalism in
 the broad sense indicated1 as on the   
one hand an outcome of tendencies seen  
at work in the earlier movements so     
named1 and on the other hand as         
apparently committing its               
representatives to a certain body or    

class of conclusions4 ,for there is this
 capital element in common for all the  
stirrings known by the name of          
rationalism1 that they stand for        
'private judgment' as against mere      
tradition or mere authority4 ,early     
'rationalists' might indeed seek to put 
a quasi-rational form upon tradition1   
and to give reasons for recognising     
authority4 ,but in their day and degree 
they had their active part in the       
evolution of the critical faculty1      
inasmuch as they outwent the line of    
mere acquiescence2 and views which      
to-day form part of uncritically        
accepted creeds were once products of   
innovating 7however fallacious7         
reasoning4 ,there is no saltum mortale  
in the evolution of thought4 ,the very  
opponents of the rationalist often claim
 to be more rational than he1 and must  
at least use his methods up to a certain
 point4 ,this is done even by the       
quasi-skeptical school1 of whom some    
claim to subordinate reason to some     

species of insight which they either    
omit to discriminate intelligibly from  
the process of judgment1 or do not admit
 to need its sanction4  ',rationalism1' 
then1 is to be understood relatively4   
,to be significant to-day1 accordingly1 
it should stand first and last for the  
habit and tendency to challenge the     
doctrines which claim 'religious' or    
sacrosanct authority--to seek by        
reflection a defensible theory of things
 rather than accept enrolment under     
traditional creeds which demand         
allegiance on supernaturalist grounds4  
,of such thinkers the number is daily   
increasing4 ,there are now1 probably1   
tens of thousands of more or less       
instructed men and women in this country
 who would call themselves rationalists 
in the broad sense above specified as   
now generally current4 ,they are all1   
probably1 ,darwinians or evolutionists1 
mostly 'monists' in ,spencer's way1     
'determinists' in the philosophic sense 
of that term if they have worked at the 

'free-will' problem at all1 and         
non-believers in personal immortality4  
,very few1 at least1 bracket the term   
'rationalist' with 'spiritualist' in    
describing themselves3 the two          
tendencies nearly always divide sharply1
 though it cannot be said that in strict
 logic they are mutually exclusive4 ,of 
most1 the philosophic attitude          
approximates broadly to that of         
,spencer1 though many recognise and avow
 the inexpertness of ,spencer's         
metaphysic4 ,only a few1 probably1 if   
any1 could properly be termed 'skeptics'
 in the strict philosophic sense of     
doubters of all inferences4 ,that is a  
mental attitude more often professed by 
defenders of 'revelation1' as ,pascal   
and ,huet1 who seek to make the judgment
 despair of itself in preparation for an
 act of assent which is already         
discredited by such despair4 ,yet it    
belongs to the rationalistic attitude to
 be ready1 in consistency1 to analyse   
all one's own convictions and listen    

candidly to all negations of them4 ,a   
belief in the possibility of rational   
certitude is implicit in every process  
of sincere criticism2 but the           
discrimination or gradation of          
certitudes is the task of rational      
philosophy4  ,as we shall see1          
quasi-rational certitude as regards the 
process of evolution is challenged from 
two points of view by professed         
believers in the reality of that        
process4 ,one school argues that        
scientific conclusions are all uncertain
 because the ultimate assumptions of    
science are unverifiable1 and that1     
accordingly1 religious assumptions1     
being neither more nor less rational    
than others1 may 'reasonably' stand4    
,others argue that the process of       
judgment or reasoning which is held to  
establish scientific truth is not       
adequate to any theory of               
interpretation2 and that1 accordingly1  
some species of divination--which in the
 terms of the case eludes judgment--is  

to be relied on4 ,such thinkers         
ostensibly profess to 'reason' to the   
effect that reasoning is invalid4       
,against them1 those who claim to hold  
by reason as the totality of judgment   
may fitly call themselves by the name   
'rationalist4'  ,given such a general   
attitude1 then1 to what philosophic form
 is it justifiably to be reduced8 ,those
 who have longest meditated the question
 will perhaps be the least quick to give
 a precise and confident answer4 ,if    
training in the scrupulous use of reason
 sets up any mental habit in face of    
large problems1 it is the habit of      
tentative approach2 and the rationalist 
of to-day should be a much less readily 
self-satisfied thinker than the former  
claimants to the name4 ,professor       
,james1 indeed1 is able to reconcile an 
ostensible certainty of rightness of    
method and result with much experience  
in investigation4 ',a pragmatist1' he   
tells us1 'turns his back resolutely and
 once for all upon a lot of inveterate  

habits dear to professional             
philosophers4 ,he turns away from       
abstraction and insufficiency1 from     
verbal solutions1 from fixed principles1
 closed systems1 and pretended absolutes
 and origins4' ,one is delighted to hear
 it2 but it is perhaps the course of    
prudence for most of us to doubt our    
power of getting entirely clear of      
inveterate habits4#c ,scrutiny of       
philosophic literature fails to reveal  
any one who entirely succeeded in it1   
even slowly4 ,a constant concern for    
revision1 then1 would seem to be forced 
upon the professed rationalist1 who     
knows how often the appeal to reason has
 yielded mere modifications of error1   
one unjustifiable credence ousting      
another4 ',knows1' one says1 because the
 error is provable to the satisfaction  
of the judgment which seeks certainty4  
,such negative knowledge is the promise 
of positive4  ,,footnote3  #c           
',pragmatism' soon becomes 'she' in     
,professor ,james's hands4 ,mr4         

,schiller seems to prefer 'it'2 but he  
too makes much play with pragmatism as  
an entity4 ,whatever be the amount of   
'abstraction' involved1 the verbal      
method savours of very old-established  
malpractices4      #c4 ,,the ,,religious
 ,,challenge   ,it is fitting1 then1 at 
the very outset to make a critical      
scrutiny of the implications of our     
term4 ,rationalism1 broadly1 implies the
 habitual resort to reason1 to          
reflection1 to judgment4 ,the           
rationalist1 in effect1 says1 ',that    
which ,i find to be incredible ,i must  
disbelieve1 whatever prestige may attach
 to its assertion2 that which ,i find to
 be doubtful or inconceivable ,i will so
 describe4 ,finding the practice of     
prayer to be incompatible not only with 
any sincere belief in natural law1 but  
with the professed religious beliefs of 
the more educated of those who resort to
 it1 ,i will not pray4 ,seeing all      
religions to be but halting             
manipulations of the guesses and        

intuitions of savages1 to be still as   
uncritically credulous in their         
affirmations as they are blind in their 
denials1 and to be thus mere loose      
modifications of older beliefs felt to  
be astray1 ,i will go behind them all   
for my own theory of things1 getting all
 the help ,i can alike from those who   
have reasoned most loyally on the deeper
 problems involved1 and from those who  
have striven most circumspectly to      
understand the process of causation in  
the universe4'  ,so far1 the procedure  
is one of rejecting demonstrably        
fallacious beliefs in regard to the     
general order of things1 substantially  
on the lines on which tested and        
testable conclusions have been          
substituted for old delusions in what we
 term 'the sciences4' ,at every step the
 rationalist is assailed1 just as were  
and are the reformers of the sciences2  
first by angry epithets1 then by bad    
arguments as to 'evidence1' then by     
cooler attempts to demonstrate that his 

method will lead to moral harm1 whether 
or not to present or future punishment  
at the hands of an angry ,god4 ,in      
particular he is assured that on his    
principles there can be no restraint    
upon men's evil proclivities2 and that  
even the most thoughtful man runs       
endless dangers of wrong-doing when he  
substitutes his private judgment for the
 'categorical imperative' embodied      
either in religious codes or in the     
current body of morality4#d ,to such    
representations the critical answer is  
that undoubtedly the application of     
reason to moral issues incurs the risks 
of fallacy which beset all reasoning in 
science so-called2 but that1 on the     
other hand1 every one of those risks    
attaches at least equally to all        
acceptance of 'authoritative' teaching4 
,galileo could not well err worse than  
ancient ,semites or ,christian priests  
in matters scientific2 and ,clifford    
could not conceivably div agate more    
dangerously in morals than did the      

plotters and agents of the ,massacre of 
,st4 ,bartholomew4 ,even if we put out  
of the account the overwhelming record  
of undenied wickedness wrought in the   
name of ,god and faith1 there never has 
been1 and there is no prospect of our   
ever seeing1 unanimity of moral opinion 
among even the most disciplined types of
 religious believers in 'authority4'    
,even in the ,catholic ,church it would 
be difficult to find any two men of     
judicial habit of mind who agree in all 
points as to what is 'right4'  ,nor is  
the rationalist's position a whit more  
open to utilitarian criticism 7for his  
religious opponents1 it will be         
observed1 are narrowly utilitarian even 
in professing to combat his             
utilitarianism7 when he is challenged   
upon his acceptance of 'the voice of    
conscience1' otherwise the 'categorical 
imperative4' ,the ,kantian argument on  
that head is a fallacy of shifting      
terms4 ,mental hesitation as to obeying 
the sense of 'ought' is the proof of the

 vacillation of the perception of       
'oughtness4' ,when ,i feel1 first1 that 
,i 'ought' to forgive a peculator1 and  
then that ,i 'ought' to give him up to  
'justice'2 or1 alternatively1 that ,i   
ought to rise earlier1 and1 again1 that 
,i may as well enjoy more sleep1 ,i have
 reduced the 'categorical imperative' to
 the last term in a calculation4 ,and   
exactly the same thing is done by the   
believer who is perplexed as to the     
'voice of ,god4' ,religious history and 
biography are full of avowals1 on the   
one hand1 of the murderous clash of     
convictions alike resting on            
'revelation' of all kinds1 and1 on the  
other hand1 of the agonies of zealots   
'wrestling in prayer' to know what is   
really the divine will4#e ,cromwell's   
life illustrates both orders of dilemma1
 with a sufficiency of resultant moral  
evil to arrest propaganda on the side of
 faith4 ,and the philosopher of the     
'categorical imperative' miscarries as  
instructively as does the soldier of    

divine will4 ,kant1 on the one hand1    
vetoes even the telling of a lie to a   
would-be murderer to put him astray1    
and1 on the other hand1 commends to     
'enlightened' clergymen the systematic  
preaching of their religion in a double 
sense1 because populus vult decipi4 ,the
 'categorical imperative1' as propounded
 by him1 is a form of self-deception4   
,when1 again1 the psychic facts are     
critically faced and the 'categorical   
imperative' is rationally recognised as 
either the sum of the persisting moral  
judgments or the mere verbalism that we 
ought to do what we feel we ought to do1
 the rationalist is still at no         
disadvantage1 utilitarian or other4 ,it 
is not there that his tether tightens4  
,religious morality1 as finally ratified
 by the more thoughtful among religious 
men1 is but the endorsement of 'natural'
 morality4 ,there is not one social     
commandment1 as distinguished from      
religious or ritualist dogma1 that did  
not emerge as a prescription of the     

natural moral sense1 primitive or       
otherwise--a supererogatory proof that  
the religious prescriptions are from the
 same source4 ,all surviving religious  
ethic is to-day actually accredited as  
such1 precisely because--and only in so 
far as--it conforms to natural judgment4
 ,without resort to that tribunal1 the  
religionist could not discriminate      
between the sanction of the sixth       
commandment and the law of the levirate1
 which he has cancelled4  ,the religious
 sanction1 therefore1 is logically null1
 in terms of the religious man's own    
mental processes4#f ,there is left him1 
to discredit the rationalist1 only the  
threat that the ,god whom he terms      
infinitely good will or may punish the  
unbeliever for not believing on the     
strength of a ,bible packed with        
incredible narrative and indefensible   
doctrine4 ,the anti-rationalist position
 is thus reduced to ',pascal's          
wager'--at once the most childish and1  
from the standpoint of other and nobler 

religious thought1 the most irreligious 
argument ever advanced by a competent   
intelligence on the side of faith4      
,pascal's thesis is that if the         
unbeliever is wrong1 he runs a frightful
 risk of future torment2 whereas1 if he 
should after all be right1 he will be no
 worse off after death for having       
believed4 ,so the 'belief' required of  
him is a simple mindless and faithless  
conformity to a conditional threat4 ,to 
such moral perversity can religion      
persuade4  ,to ,pascal's wager there    
have been many retorts4 ,mill declared  
that if a ,god should doom him to hell  
for having been unable to believe in    
such a ,god1 'to hell he would          
go'--glad1 by implication1 not to be in 
heaven4 ,mansel's sole answer was a     
puerile attempt at a pious sneer4       
,clifford1 in effect1 denounced the     
,pascalian appeal for what it was1 a    
base appeal to fear4#g ,but it is       
unnecessary to resort to such logical   
supererogation4 ,there are two obvious  

and decisive rebuttals to ,pascal's     
doctrine on purely logical ground4      
,firstly1 his thesis is available to the
 ,moslem or the polytheist no less than 
to the ,christian2 and when put from    
either of these sides it leaves the     
,christian running the very risk with   
which he menaces the unbeliever4 ,he may
 have chosen the wrong ,god4 ,secondly1 
the hypothetical ,good ,god1 if in any  
intelligible sense worthy of the name1  
would conceivably be as likely to send  
,pascal to hell for dishonouring him as 
to send the honest atheist there for    
refusing to make-believe4 ,the pietist  
has dishonoured himself to no purpose4  
,the a posteriori argument for religious
 conformity has thus come to nothing2   
and the process of argument has revealed
 the religio-utilitarian champion of    
morality as traitor to that cause4      
,there is left him1 indeed1 the plea    
that religious fears and sanctions are  
good for the ill-disposed believer1 who 
ought1 therefore1 not to be             

disillusioned4 ,as regards the simple   
dogma of deity1 the position has the    
emphatic support of ,voltaire4 ,but     
,voltaire declined to use the favourite 
menaces of faith1 as do many            
religionists of to-day2 and if those    
menaces are to be rationally vindicated1
 there must first be raised the question
 whether they could not be improved upon
 for the purpose professed4 ,leaving    
that task to those who affect them1 the 
rationalist may claim to be justified in
 acting on the maxim that honesty is the
 best policy in the intellectual as in  
the commercial life4 ,there has been no 
such historical harvest of moral        
betterment from the religion of fear as 
could induce him of all men to employ it
 as a moral prophylactic4  ,thus far he 
figures as the vindicator of simple     
veracity against those who1 in the name 
of morals1 would make it of no account4 
,he has still to meet1 indeed1 the      
challenge3 ,what of the ill-disposed    
among your own way of thinking8 ,if an  

unbeliever should see his way to gain by
 falsehood or licit fraud1 what should  
deter him8 ,much satisfaction appears to
 be derived by many well-meaning people 
from the propounding of this dilemma4   
,they may or may not be gratified by the
 answer that if a rationalist should not
 be1 by training and bias1 spontaneously
 averse to lying and cheating1 or       
generally unwilling to do otherwise than
 he would be done by1 or sensitive      
enough to the blame of his fellows to   
fear it1 there is indeed no more        
security for his veracity or honesty    
than for that of a typical ,jesuit or a 
pious company promoter4 ,one can but add
 that1 seeing that in the terms of the  
case he began by unprofitably avowing an
 unpopular opinion1 he is presumably1 on
 the average1 rather less likely to lie 
for gain than those who confessedly find
 the sheer fear of consequences a highly
 important consideration in their own   
plan of life1 and who have at the same  
time the promise from their own code of 

plenary pardon for all sins on the      
simple condition of ultimate repentance4
  ,,footnotes3  #d ,even ,professor ,f4 
,h4 ,bradley1 the ablest of living      
,english philosophers1 is responsible   
for the proposition that 'to wish to be 
better than the world is to be already  
on the threshold of immorality'         
7,ethical ,studies1 #ahgf1 p4 #ahj74 ,as
 the book has not been reprinted1       
despite much demand1 it may be inferred 
that the author no longer stands to all 
its positions4  #e ,thus we are told of 
the heroic ,gordon that he was          
'perplexed perpetually1 and perpetually 
in doubt as to the precise will of ,god 
with him' 7,w4 ,s4 ,blunt1 ,gordon at   
,khartoum1 #aiaa1 p4 #hh74  #f ,the     
logical analysis may be carried further1
 as by ,mr4 ,a4 ,j4 ,balfour3--',to     
assume a special faculty which is to    
announce ultimate moral laws can add    
nothing to their validity1 nor will it  
do so the more if we suppose its        
authority supported by such sanctions as

 remorse or self-approval4 ,conscience  
regarded in this way is not ethically to
 be distinguished from any external     
authority1 as1 for instance1 the ,deity1
 or the laws of the land' 7,a ,defence  
of ,philosophic ,doubt1 #ahgi1 p4 #cde74
  #g ,the same might be said of ,mrs4   
,browning's minatory picture of the     
moment's passage        '',twixt the    
dying atheist's negative1      ,and     
,god's face waiting after all'--   round
 the corner with a flail1 belike4       
,religion cannot be more dishonoured    
than by the moral ideals of some of its 
champions4      #d4 ,,the               
,,philosophical ,,challenge   ,but we   
have now clearly imported into the      
rationalist philosophy a principle or   
factor which ostensibly rivals or primes
 reason4 ,the rationalist avows a moral 
bias--an attitude towards his fellows1 a
 moral 'taste1' let us say--which partly
 determines his reasoned judgment4 ,he  
has a conception of goodness in virtue  
of which he finds 'revelation'          

frequently repellent and the popular    
',god' a chimera2 even as the believer  
finds them satisfactory because they are
 in part conformable to his moral and   
speculative bias1 and he has been       
brought up to pretermit judgment beyond 
those limits4 ,this bias appears to be  
partly congenital1 partly acquired2     
though most men are agreed that many who
 reveal a given bias would have         
presented another had they been         
differently trained4 ,certain forms of  
congenital bias1 that is to say1 yield  
more or less easily to others1 specially
 fostered or exercised4 ,whatever be the
 respective force of the generative     
factors1 the fact of bias remains2 and  
there is no escape from the conclusion  
that it operates in regard to           
'intellectual' as well as to 'moral'    
judgments--to judgments1 that is1 of    
causal interpretation or non-moral      
discrimination as well as to judgments  
upon human action4  ,the rationalist1 in
 fact1 is merely a person who in certain

 directions carries the processes of    
doubt1 analysis1 and judgment further   
than do persons of a different habit of 
mind4 ,his neighbour1 who believes in   
',god' or 'the saints' or ,mrs4 ,eddy1  
may chance to carry those processes in  
other directions further than he1--may  
be more reflective and experimental and 
judicious1 for instance1 in matters of  
diet1--may even be an analytical thinker
 in matters of science to which the     
so-called rationalist has given no      
independent thought4 ,there are         
well-known instances of men of science  
who by analysis widen the bounds of     
physical knowledge while accepting1 in  
ways which other men find grotesquely   
uncritical1 loose propositions on       
psychic existence4 ,when sounds are     
heard from furniture1 the rationalist1  
with his naturalistic bias1 looks for   
explanations in terms of physics2 while 
the spiritualist1 even if he chance to  
be a professed physicist1 looks for them
 in terms of speculative psychics4      

,upon a strictly impartial and          
'objective' consideration1 the two kinds
 of bias are seen to be alike forms of  
craving1 desires seeking satisfaction4  
,both inquirers seek for 'causes4' ,but 
one has the habit of seeking causes in  
terms of sequences of known or          
intelligible processes1 capable of      
willed repetition2 the other yearns to  
find proof of the existence of          
non-material personalities in the cosmos
 and in his personal neighbourhood1 and1
 believing in such existence in advance1
 either provisionally or rootedly1 hopes
 to bring others to his way of thinking 
by a demonstration that certain physical
 phenomena are not physically           
producible4 ,and it must be granted him 
that herein he is theoretically at par  
with the man of science--physical or    
moral--who1 having spontaneously framed 
a hypothesis1 seeks to find that facts  
conform to it4 ,every man with a        
hypothesis1 broadly speaking1 wants to  
find that facts are so-and-so4  ,the    

rationalist1 then1 has his bias like    
another4 ,though it takes in part a     
critical or negative form1 it is        
fundamentally as positive as another4   
,he has come to crave for coherence and 
consistency in narratives1 statements1  
explanations1 arguments1 propositions1  
and systems of thought2 even as his     
'contrary' or competitor has come to    
crave for evidence that something       
'supernatural' wields a purposive and   
'intelligent' control1 mediate or       
immediate1 over all things1 using among 
others 'supernormal' means4 ,this       
'contrary' thinker may or may not       
believe in 'spirits' in the ordinary    
sense1 may or may not believe in the    
immortality of human minds2 but if he is
 really to be an opponent of the        
rationalist bias he is to be classed as 
having a bias to traditional or         
authoritative views of the cosmos1 to   
religious as against naturalistic       
explanations of history1 to a conception
 of the human as of the extra-human     

processes in terms of a controlling will
 and purpose4 ,he too1 it is true1 must 
have some craving for coherence and     
consistency--else he could not debate   
and reason at all2 but the other craving
 in him has primed that4  ,it is a      
fallacy1 we may note in passing1 to     
suppose that the 'agnostic' attitude1   
so-called1 is something between the two 
main forms of bias here posited4        
,agnosticism1 logically carried out1 can
 differentiate from other forms of      
rationalism only in local limitation of 
belief2 and in practice it is not often 
found to do even that4 ,the agnostic    
inevitably begins in terms of the       
rationalist bias1 in craving for        
coherence and consistency of statement2 
and his most circumspect negations stand
 for precaution against inconsistent    
credulity4 ,but precisely in virtue of  
that bias1 he is the opponent of the    
supernaturalist bias4 ,he does not in   
effect merely say1 ',i do not know'3 he 
implicitly says ',you do not know' to   

the professor of non-natural knowledge4 
,bias1 then1 being clearly posited1 the 
debate at once turns--as indeed it      
usually does even without formal        
acknowledgment of bias--to a competition
 of claims to consistency4 ,all debate  
presupposes agreement on something4 ,as 
antagonists in religion appeal either to
 ,god-idea or to ,bible1 to probability 
or to usage1 to expediency or to        
authority1 or to historic evidence for  
one revelation as against another1 so   
antagonists upon the fundamentals of    
religion appeal to accepted laws of     
proof1 measures of evidence1 consistency
 of reasoning4 ,the most tenacious of   
traditionists must put his case in a    
'reasoned' form4 ,and therein1 of       
course1 lies the secret of the gradual  
historic dissolution of traditional     
credence in the minds of those who come 
at all within the range of the argument4
 ,every act of reasoning--as priesthoods
 are more or less clearly aware--is a   
concession to the rationalist position  

to begin with2 and only superior skill  
in fence can ostensibly countervail the 
advantage thus given to the disputant   
who claims that reason must determine   
beliefs4 ,reasoning against the validity
 of reason is recognisable as suicidal  
by all who can reason coherently4 ,if   
reason be untrustworthy1 what is the    
value of reasoning to that effect8      
,either you go by reason or you do not4 
,if not1 you are out of the debate1 or  
you are grasping your sword by the      
blade1 a course not long to be persisted
 in4 ,even the skeptical defender of    
religion1 following religious precedent1
 says1 ',come now1 let us reason        
together4'  ,thus we reach the standing 
anomaly that the defence of faith       
against rationalistic criticism         
alternately takes the courses of        
pronouncing the appeal to reason a      
foolish presumption1 and of claiming to 
reason more faithfully than the         
rationalist4 ,the two positions being1  
to say the least1 incompatible from the 

point of view of dialectic1 we must     
fight upon one or the other at a time2  
and1 having briefly dealt with the      
former1 we may fitly consider at greater
 length the latter4 ,the more           
philosophic assailant of the            
rationalist1 we assume1 professes after 
all to stand or fall by reasoning4 ,that
 is to say1 he claims to hold his       
supernaturalist positions in logical and
 moral consistency with his historical  
positions1 his practice as a judge or   
juror1 as a man of science1 as a critic 
in politics1 as a man of honour1 as a   
player of cricket by the rules of the   
game4 ,as a matter of fact1 however1 he 
at times goes about the task by way of  
an undertaking to show1 not that his    
beliefs are well founded in reason1 but 
that no beliefs are2 and that his       
beliefs are therefore at least as valid 
as any one else's4 ,all the while he is 
ostensibly appealing to reason1 to      
judgment4 ,that position in turn must be
 considered4      #e4 ,,the ,,skeptical 

,,religious ,,challenge   ,the          
philosophic issue under this head has   
been usefully cleared for ,english      
readers by ,mr4 ,a4 ,j4 ,balfour in his 
,defence of ,philosophic ,doubt2 and1 in
 another sense1 very usefully for       
rationalists by the same writer in his  
work ,the ,foundations of ,belief4 ,the 
gist of the former treatise is an       
expansion of the proposition of ,hume   
that all moral judgments1 on analysis1  
are found to root in a sentiment or     
bias4 ,in particular1 ,mr4 ,balfour     
argues that all scientific beliefs      
so-called1 however immediately proved1  
rest upon general beliefs which are     
'incapable of proof4' ,it is noteworthy 
that never through the whole treatise   
does ,mr4 ,balfour analyse the concept  
of 'proof1' though his main aim is      
ostensibly to discriminate between      
proved and unproved propositions4 ,it   
may be worth while1 then1 at this stage1
 to note the risks of intellectual      
confusion in connection with the term   

proof4 ,the common conception1 implicit 
in ,mr4 ,balfour's argument1 is that    
concerning a 'proved' thing either we   
have1 or men of science say we have1 a  
right of certainty1 as it were1 which we
 cannot have concerning anything not    
proved or not capable of proof4 ,the    
simple fact is that the very idea of    
proof involves that of uncertainty you  
seek to prove that which is not         
unquestionable4 ,to prove is to probe1#h
 to test4 ,the idea of 'demonstration1' 
which seems commonly to connote special 
certainty1 carries us no further4 ,it   
means a 'showing1' a 'letting you see   
with your own eyes4' ,in geometry1 it   
stands for a chain of reasoning in which
 every step rests upon previous steps   
which ultimately rest upon axioms and   
definitions agreed upon4 ,there the     
process is one of analysis--a showing   
that a proposition formerly unknown as  
such is really contained in or implied  
by propositions known4 ,certainty       
follows4 ,yet there is abundant record  

of 'proofs' or 'tests' which were       
fallacious1 and of ostensible           
demonstrations which were flawed--modes 
of squaring the circle1 for instance4   
,the ultimate in the matter is the      
belief arrived at or evoked2 and the    
significant fact for us is1 that beliefs
 ostensibly so arrived at may be false1 
because the cited proof or evidence is  
erroneous or the demonstration          
inconsequent4  ,certainty1 on the other 
hand1 attaches in the highest degree to 
certain beliefs that1 in the nature of  
the case1 are 'incapable of proof1' that
 is1 of being tested4 ,no belief is more
 certain for all men than the belief    
that they will all die1 though the      
event1 posited as future1 cannot as such
 be 'tested4' ,in this case1 the        
connotation of the word 'proof1'        
nevertheless1 is by common consent      
transferred to the concept of mortality3
 the invariable dying of all previous   
men is allowed to be 'proof1' or        
decisive evidence1 that all living men  

will die to the last generation4 ,in    
regard to some other certainties1 the   
concept of 'proof' is wholly irrelevant4
 ,you cannot 'prove' that you feel a    
pain1 though it is one of the most      
certain of all facts for you while it   
lasts4 ,if1 then1 any general scientific
 or other belief be shown to be         
'incapable of proof1' in this merely    
negative sense 7as distinguished from   
'capable of disproof'71 that is no      
argument against it for any practical or
 philosophic purpose4 ,such a belief is 
that in the 'uniformity of nature1'     
which is held by the same tenure as that
 in the mortality of all men4 ,it cannot
 be 'proved1' either as to the past or  
the future1 in the sense of being       
tested1 save as regards past            
particulars1 which are necessarily a    
small selection from the totality of    
phenomena4 ,for the future1 in the terms
 of the case1 there can be no proof4    
,yet no man has any more doubt as to the
 rising of the sun to-morrow than as to 

his own ultimate death4 ,concerning this
 we are quite certain1 which we cannot  
be as to many things reasonably held to 
have been 'proved4' ,such and such are  
our 'certainties4'  ,what1 then1 is ,mr4
 ,balfour's case against men of         
'science1' and those whom he calls 'the 
,freethinkers'8 ,it may be put under    
three heads4  #a4 ,they are lax1 he     
thinks1 in their conception of proof4   
,as it happens1 he argues against       
,mill's criticism of the syllogism1     
which is that there can be no real      
inference from the premisses of a       
syllogism1 because in the major premiss 
there is already asserted what is       
afterwards asserted in the conclusion4  
,mr4 ,balfour's reply is1 that ',so long
 as in fact we do assert the major      
premiss without first believing the     
conclusion1 so long will the latter be  
an inference from the former4' ,now1    
,mill's express contention is that we   
never do assert the major premiss       
without first believing the conclusion2 

and the dispute resolves itself into one
 as to the proper meaning of            
'inference4' ,mill is at this point     
guarding against erroneous conceptions  
of proof2 his thesis being that the     
'proof' of the conclusion is not given  
in the major1 but in the body of        
evidence on which that is founded1 and  
which carries the conclusion at the same
 time4 ,as the kind of syllogism in     
question is the old one about the       
mortality of ,sokrates1 ,mill here takes
 as 'proof' the evidence which all men  
now reckon sufficient to establish the  
fact of universal human mortality1      
though1 as aforesaid1 it is not         
literally a complete 'proof' at all4    
,mr4 ,balfour is arguing1 if anything   
relevant to his main thesis1 that a     
so-called 'inference' which is merely a 
statement in one particular of what is  
believed of all such particulars1 is a  
'real' inference1 and therefore somehow 
more valid than inferences not so drawn4
 ,perhaps he does not mean this3 if so1 

the argument has no bearing on his main 
case4  ,concerning 'inference1' the     
proper development of ,mill's position  
would be that the processes of reasoning
 properly to be so called are either    
hypotheses still to be tested or beliefs
 held by the tenure of uncontradicted   
experience4 ,and inferences of the      
latter kind are in fact of the most     
various degrees of certainty4 ,we       
'infer' that we shall all die1 not from 
the generalisation that all men are     
mortal1 but from the accepted fact that 
all men hitherto have been4 ,the major  
premiss in the typical syllogism is     
itself the inference4 ,but we also      
infer1 from a much narrower experience1 
that inasmuch as pitchblende1 say1 has  
been found to yield radium in certain   
very small quantities1 other pitchblende
 will do so in future4 ,here the        
certainty is distinctly less3 few men   
would wager heavily on it4 ,and we may  
at once grant to ,mr4 ,balfour that in  
this and many other cases 'scientific   

beliefs' fall far short of 'certainty1' 
as that term is established for us by   
other beliefs4 ,as ,mill put it1        
inference from particulars never can be 
formally cogent4 ,he might have added as
 aforesaid1 that all real inference as  
to events is from particulars1 and that 
formal cogency belongs only to          
mathematics4 ,mr4 ,balfour says he will 
not 'go so far' as ,mill4 ,so that1     
whatever be ,mill's inconsistencies--and
 they are many--,mill was at this point 
somewhat less confident of belief than  
,mr4 ,balfour4  #b4 ,mr4 ,balfour       
impugns what he takes to be 'the most   
ordinary view of scientific philosophy1 
444 that science1 in so far as it       
consists of a statement of the laws of  
phenomena1 is founded entirely on       
observation and experiment1' which      
'furnish not only the occasions of      
scientific discovery1 but also the sole 
evidence of scientific truth--evidence1 
however1 which is considered by most men
 of science not only amply sufficient1  

but also as good as any which can be    
well imagined4'#i ,in this statement    
there are obvious laxities1 which may   
serve as openings for idle dispute4 ,no 
man of science1 surely1 holds that all  
statements of the laws of phenomena are 
equally well 'proved' by observation and
 experiment4 ,they do hold that such a  
proposition as that of 'the uniformity  
of nature1' considered as a 'law of     
phenomena1' is founded on observation   
and experiment1 as fully as any         
proposition of natural mode can be4 ,but
 there is obvious room for ambiguity1   
again1 in the expression 'laws of       
phenomena4' ,let us consider1 for       
instance1  #c4 ,mr4 ,balfour's          
contention that the 'law of universal   
causation' is incapable of proof1 and   
cannot properly be said to be founded on
 observation and experiment4 ,here the  
rationalist may safely grant him his    
whole case--at least the present writer 
does4 ,he is right1 ,i submit1 in his   
criticism of ,mill's ostensible attempt 

to prove that the so-called 'law of     
universal causation' is deduced from    
observation and experiment4 ,i will     
further waive the question whether he   
rebuts the proof offered by ,kant for   
his proposition that 'the judgment of   
sequence cannot be made without the     
presupposition of the judgment of       
causality1' which1 like many of ,kant's 
formulas1 seems to me very awkwardly    
phrased4 ,but ,i advance without        
hesitation the proposition that all     
reflection upon events involves the     
conception of universal causation1 and  
that all reflection upon things involves
 the conception of them in eventu4#aj   
,and this necessary assumption is not as
 such a product of observation and      
experiment1 though we can never exactly 
say how far experience may condition#aa 
our manner of making the assumption4 ,it
 is quite needless to trace the history 
of it in human experience1 for it is    
clearly pre-human4 ,if from a tree you  
fire at and wound a tiger who sees you1 

he will try to get at you1 plainly      
regarding you as the cause of his wound1
 though he may never have been shot or  
seen a shot fired before4 ,the accuracy 
of his inference is worth noting1 though
 he might chance1 of course1 to have    
been wounded by a shot fired by an      
unseen companion of yours4 ,it may      
'reasonably' be 'inferred' 7to use terms
 which ,mr4 ,balfour would probably     
censure71 that man has always obeyed the
 law of thought thus illustrated2 and no
 number of wrong particular inferences  
can affect the inevitableness of his    
assumption that any event has a cause4  
,the concept of cause roots in primary  
animal habit4  ,is this assumption1     
then1 a 'law of phenomena' in ,mr4      
,balfour's sense8 is it to be ruled out1
 on his principles1 as not being founded
 on observation and experiment8 and are 
men of science thereby shown to be wrong
 in holding that every scientific       
statement of the laws of phenomena is so
 founded8 ,i do not see how he can thus 

argue2 for he has expressly contended   
7p4 #ace71 that ',a law of nature refers
 to a fixed relation1 not between the   
totality of phenomena1 but between      
extremely small portions of that        
totality4' ,is a law of phenomena1 then1
 something other than a law of nature8  
,this he cannot mean2 and the conclusion
 is that the so-called 'law of universal
 causation' is not properly to be called
 a law of nature1 or a law at all1      
unless we are so to call a necessary    
element of all reflection upon nature4  
,the dispute here1 in short1 resolves   
itself into a question of terminology2  
and it is quite likely that many men of 
science1 and many freethinkers1 have    
used lax terminology4 ,but as regards   
the reasonableness of their beliefs1 or 
their way of believing1 in contrast with
 those of the supernaturalists whom ,mr4
 ,balfour champions1 he has thus far    
made out no hostile case whatever4 ,and 
when we come to what appear to be his   
conclusions1 they are such as can wring 

no rationalist's withers4 ,our ultimate 
premisses1 he contends1 are incapable of
 proof4 ,granted--if the assumption of  
universal causation is to be termed a   
premiss1 as is that of the uniformity of
 nature4 ,the practical issue for him   
appears to be contained in this passage 
7italics ours73--        ',that men     
ought not to give up on speculative     
grounds the belief in      the          
uniformity of nature1 or any other great
 principle1 ,i hold1      as the reader 
will see if his patience lasts to the   
end of the      volume1 with as much    
persistence as any man4 ,but ,i must    
altogether      take exception to the   
statement1 which is the central point of
 the      argument just stated1 namely1 
that the fact that these principles     
work in practice is any ground for      
believing them to be even               
approximately true' 7p4 #ade74   ,our   
patience may easily stand the suggested 
test1 since ,mr4 ,balfour's book is for 
the most part extremely well written2   

and unless ,i have totally misunderstood
 him1 his conclusions are 7a7 that he   
and we do well to accept the general    
body of accepted scientific doctrines1  
including those of the theory of        
evolution and the uniformity of nature1 
without any ground for believing them to
 be even approximately true2 and 7b7    
that he and his co-believers do equally 
well to hold what he vaguely indicates  
7p4 #cbd7 as 'the ,theological opinions 
to which ,i adhere1' also without 'any  
ground for believing them to be even    
approximately true4' ,in a sentence 7p4 
#cbj7 of which the diction is noticeably
 lax1 he says3--        '444,i and an   
indefinite number of other persons1 if  
we contemplate      ,religion and       
,science as unproved systems of belief  
standing side by      side1 feel a      
practical need for both2 and if this    
need is1 in the      case of those few  
and fragmentary scientific truths by    
which we      regulate our animal       
actions1 or an especially imperious and 

indestructible character--on the other  
hand1 the need for      religious truth1
 rooted as it is in the loftiest region 
of our      moral nature1 is one from   
which we would not1 if we could1 be     
freed4444 ,we are in this matter1' he   
adds1 'unfortunately      altogether    
outside the sphere of ,reason4'         
,,footnotes3  #h ,this is the           
elucidation of the puzzling phrase1 'the
 exception proves the rule1' so often   
fallaciously used4 ,it comes from the   
,latin schoolmen's ',exceptio probat    
regulam1' where the meaning is patent   
enough4  #i ,defence of ,philosophic    
,doubt1 p4 #ac4  #aj ,compare ,professor
 ,royce3--',our intelligent ideas of    
things never consist of mere images of  
things1 but always involve a            
consciousness of how we propose to act  
towards the things of which we have     
ideas' 7,gifford ,lectures1 #aijj1 i4   
#bb74  #aa ,i exclude the possibility   
that 'experience' might be construed to 
mean the entire development of the mind 

from infancy4 ,such a construction would
 reduce the argument to insignificance  
all round4      #f4 ,,the ,,meaning ,,of
 ,,reason   ,the problem as to 'the     
sphere of ,reason' could not be more    
effectually raised4 ,mr4 ,balfour       
clearly implies that there is a sphere  
of ,reason1 but forces a perplexed query
 as to when he believes himself to enter
 it4 ,evidently1 by his own definitions1
 his whole political life is lived      
outside it4 ,alike his generalisations  
from past history1 and his predictions  
of the future1 are such as afford 'no   
ground for believing them to be even    
approximately true'3 those of his       
opponents1 of course1 coming for him    
under the same category4 ,he would1     
perhaps1 hold himself to be in the      
sphere of ,reason when following a      
proposition in mathematics2 but he does 
not admit himself to be there even when 
he consents to believe that he will die1
 and that he had better avoid prussic   
acid4 ',no experience1 however large1'  

he insists 7p4 #ge71 'and no            
experiments1 however well contrived and 
successful1 could give us any reasonable
 assurance that the co-existences or    
sequences which have been observed among
 phenomena will be repeated in the      
future4' ,not 'certainty1' be it        
observed1 but 'any reasonable           
assurance4' ,that is to say1 we have no 
reasonable assurance that we shall die4 
,obviously the extravagance of this     
proposition is calculated4 ,the point is
 that no belief whatever concerning life
 and death and morality and the process 
of nature can be justified by 'reason'2 
and that accordingly no religious belief
 whatever can be discredited on the     
score of being opposed to reason or     
'unreasonable4' ,if not more reasonable 
than the most carefully tested or the   
most widely accepted belief in science1 
or the belief that the sun will rise or 
fire burn to-morrow1 or that we shall   
all die1 it is not less reasonable than 
they4 ,therefore1 believe as your bias  

leads4  ,it is only fair to ,mr4        
,balfour to say that there is nothing   
new in his position1 though probably it 
has never before been quite so violently
 formulated4 ,the ,greek ,pyrrho 7fl4   
#cjj-cej ,b4,c47 argued that almost all 
propositions were doubtful2 and some of 
his followers are said to have been     
consistent enough to doubt whether they 
doubted4 ,in the dialogues of ,cicero we
 find the skeptical method employed1    
with supreme inconsistency1 by the      
official exponents of unbelieved        
doctrines1 to discredit competing       
doctrines4 ,among the pagans it was also
 turned1 with no special religious      
purpose1 against all forms of dogmatic  
doctrine by ,sextus the ,empiric 7fl4   
#bjj-bej ,a4,c472 and in the early      
,christian dialogue of ,minucius ,felix 
a pagan is presented as turning it      
against ,christianity4 ,in the later    
,middle ,ages it is resorted to by      
,cornelius ,agrippa1 previously a great 
propounder of fantastic propositions in 

science1 against the current science of 
his time1 and in favour of a return to  
the simplicity of the early ,christian  
creed4 ,still later1 it was much        
resorted to1 after the ,reformation1 by 
,catholics for the purpose of           
discrediting ,protestantism2 and ,pascal
 and ,huet1 the latter in particular1   
sought to employ it against 'unbelief4' 
,huet left behind him1 as his legacy to 
his church and generation1 what ,mark   
,pattison has termed 'a work of the most
 outrageous skepticism'2 and ,pascal's  
use of the method has left a standing   
debate as to whether he himself was a   
'skeptic4' ,in ,england1 on the         
,protestant side1 ,bishop ,berkeley put 
forth an argument to the effect that the
 ,newtonian doctrine of fluxions        
involved the acceptance of unproved     
'mysteries1' and that those who applied 
it had accordingly no excuse for        
rejecting the mysteries of              
,christianity4  ,finally1 it is fair to 
note that ,mr4 ,balfour's nihilistic    

treatment of reason has a surprising    
sanction in ,hume1 to say nothing of the
 other writers who have practically     
limited reasoning to mathematical       
deduction4 ,that great thinker1 with his
 frequent great carelessness1 wrote that
        ',our conclusions from          
experience of cause and effect are not  
founded on reasoning1 or any process of 
the understanding'      7,inquiry       
concerning the ,human ,understanding1   
,sect4 iv4 ,part ii41      par4 #b74    
',all inferences from experience are    
effects of custom1 not of               
reasoning' 7,sect4 v41 par4 #c74        
',all these spontaneous feelings are a  
species of natural      instincts1 which
 no reasoning or process of the thought 
and      understanding is able either to
 produce or to prevent' 7,ib4 par4      
#f74   ,but ,hume1 be it noted1 would in
 his earlier life have recoiled from    
,mr4 ,balfour's religious               
,irrationalism1 for in his deistic      
period he wrote that the belief in      

,deity is 'conformable to sound reason4'
 ,and1 what is more important1 he in    
effect cancelled his own remarks on     
reason1 above cited1 by writing as      
follows in ,note ,b on the ,inquiry     
cited3--        ',nothing is more usual 
than for writers1 even on moral1        
political1      or physical subjects1 to
 distinguish between reason and         
experience1      and to suppose that    
these species of argumentation 7sic7 are
      entirely different from each      
other4 ,the former are taken for the    
mere result of our intellectual         
faculties1 which1 by considering a      
priori the nature of things1 and        
examining the effects that must         
follow from their operation1 establish  
particular principles of      science   
and philosophy4 ,the latter are supposed
 to be derived      entirely from sense 
and observation1 by which we know what  
has      actually happened from the     
operation of particular objects1 and are
      thence able to infer what will for

 the future result from them4444        
,but notwithstanding that this          
distinction be thus universally         
received1 both in the active and        
speculative scenes of life1 ,i          
shall not scruple to pronounce that it  
is at bottom erroneous1 or      at least
 superficial4'   ,hume1 it will be      
observed1 is not here bent on           
vindicating the rational character of   
direct inference from observation3 he   
had set out in the text by disparaging  
customary thinking as non-rational2 and 
he is now claiming for the 'reasoning'  
man that experience goes a long way to  
generate his reasoning processes4 ',the 
truth is1' he says in his final         
paragraph1 'an inexperienced reasoner   
could be no reasoner at all1 were he    
absolutely inexperienced4' ,it is a     
fragmentary note to a hasty passage2 but
 at least it concedes that reasoning is 
largely a matter of inference from      
experience1 and thus decisively gainsays
 the assertion in the text that no      

inference from experience is an 'effect 
of reasoning1' inasmuch as it says such 
inference is reasoning2 that reasoning  
is a working of the mind on the facts of
 life2 and that the common distinction  
between reasoning and beliefs derived   
direct from experience 'is at bottom    
erroneous1 or at least superficial4'#ab 
,if1 he says in the fourth paragraph of 
the ,note1 ',if we examine those        
arguments which1 in any of the sciences 
above mentioned1 are supposed to be the 
mere effects of reasoning and           
reflection1 they will be found to       
terminate at last in some general       
principle or conclusion for which we can
 assign no reason but observation and   
experience4' ,if an argument be not a   
process of reasoning1 neither word is   
intelligible4 ,if an argument terminates
 7has one end7 in a conclusion founded  
on observation1 and if that observation 
be a 'reason' for a proposition1 then   
arguing is reasoning4  ,if not1 what is 
,mr4 ,balfour's book8 ,by his own       

definition1 that is 'outside the sphere 
of ,reason1' inasmuch as it is a series 
of negative propositions which1 like    
their denied contraries1 must be        
'incapable of proof4' ,what term1 then1 
would he apply to his argument1 if he   
admits that he is arguing8  ,the        
philosophic skeptic1 it would appear1   
has logically overreached himself--a    
very usual consummation4 ,there is      
little sign that any of the religious   
skeptics above named ever made any      
converts to religion2 and there is much 
'reason' to think that they turned many 
to unbelief4 ,mr4 ,balfour from time to 
time speaks of 'reasonable people' and  
of 'absurdity4' ,but he leaves us in the
 dark as to what absurdity means1 and   
his thesis excludes from the            
'reasonable' class alike all religious  
persons and all scientific persons1     
unless1 possibly1 mathematicians as     
such4 ,since there is no 'reasonable    
assurance' for the belief that the sun  
will rise to-morrow1 and politicians    

have no ground in reason for anything   
they say as such1 the mass of the       
ordinary beliefs of educated mankind are
 not reasonable or rational2 and since  
we have no 'reason' for believing in    
either mortality or immortality1 we can 
have no reason for believing 7whether we
 do or not7 in ,mr4 ,balfour1 who       
avowedly believes in both without       
reason4 ,his book1 by implication1 is   
not an appeal to reason1 is not a       
process of reasoning1 and can give no   
'reasonable assurance' of anything1     
positive or negative1 to anybody4 ,all  
this by his own showing4  ,the          
rationalist1 it should seem1 has small  
cause to deprecate such antagonism4 ,he 
could hardly have a more comprehensive  
clearing of the field of dialectic for  
the formulation of his own conception of
 reason and reasoning1 and his own      
appeal to the reason of reasonable      
people4 ,as thus3--  #a4 ,reason is our 
name for 7a7 the sum of all the judging 
processes2 7b7 the act of reflex        

judgment2 7c7 'private judgment' as     
against obedience to authority2 and 7d7 
the state of sanity contrasted with that
 of insanity2 and 'a reason' is a fact  
or motive or surmise which we judge     
sufficient to induce us or others to    
believe or do 7or doubt or not do7      
something without much or any danger of 
error1 failure1 or injury4  #b4         
,reasoning is our name for the process  
of comparing or stating 'reasons why'   
certain propositions or judgments should
 be believed or disbelieved1 or certain 
acts done or not done4  #c4 ,we are     
emphatically 'in the sphere of ,reason' 
when we are reflecting and reasoning1 as
 distinct from merely feeling1          
sensating1 desiring1 or hating2 but even
 the feelings are1 as it were1 part of  
the stuff of ,reason4 ,strictly         
speaking1 we are in the sphere of       
,reason even when we believe what we are
 told to believe on matters outside the 
knowledge of our instructors 7in so far 
as we credit them with greater wisdom   

than our own71 or try to believe that   
what we would like to be true must be   
true because we would like it 7inasmuch 
as we are proceeding reflectively on a  
'reason why'72 though in these cases we 
are reasoning fallaciously--that is1 in 
a way which can lead to manifold error  
and injury4  #d4 ,reasonable is our     
approbatory epithet for an action1      
course1 or person that is guided by     
reasoning which we see to exclude most  
risks of error and injury--save of      
course where the taking of risk of      
injury is assumed4  ,every one of these 
definitions is justified by the         
dictionary to begin with1 though the    
dictionaries1 of necessity1 note further
 conflicting meanings1 as when reason is
 indicated as 'the faculty or capacity  
of the human mind by which it is        
distinguished from the intelligence of  
the lower animals1' or hazily           
distinguished1 on philosophic authority1
 from 'the understanding4' ,but the     
lexicographer loyally notes that a      

reason is 'a thought or consideration   
offered in support of a determination or
 an opinion'2 and that to reason means1 
among other things1 'to reach           
conclusions by a systematic comparison  
of facts1' 'to examine or discuss by    
arguments4' ,these senses are implicit  
in daily usage4  ,the concept of        
,reason1 in short1 must include the     
whole factory of beliefs4 ,the judging  
faculty1 the judging propensity1 is a   
complex of instincts1 experiences1      
inferences1 and necessities of thought4 
,it originates at an animal stage1 and  
conserves to the last animal            
elements--as when1 without any process  
of calculation1 you infer1 as it were   
through the muscular sense1 that a      
top-heavy omnibus is likely to          
overbalance1 or that in riding your     
bicycle round a sharp corner you must   
incline your body inwards4 ,it deals    
with diet and medicine1 art and         
industry1 no less than with theology and
 science and politics4 ,in the former1  

its accepted procedure is obviously a   
set of survivals of more or less tested 
ideas from among an infinity of detected
 mistakes2 and the moral law of the     
intellectual life for the rationalist1  
the principle which best justifies his  
assumption of that name1 is that every  
belief or preference whatever is fitly  
to be tried by all or any of the tests  
by which beliefs have been sifted in the
 past1 or may more effectually be tested
 in the future4 ,we are to do with both 
our religion and our science in general 
what we have done in the past and are   
still doing with our medicine1 our      
sanitation1 our education1 our physics1 
our historiography4  ,without more ado1 
then1 we may proceed to ask how reasons 
for beliefs are ultimately to be        
appraised by reasonable and consistent  
people--in other words1 how beliefs are 
honestly to be justified4  ,,footnote3  
#ab ,so ,kant3 ',thoughts without       
content are void2 intuitions without    
conceptions are blind' 7,kritik der     

reinen ,vernunft1 ed4 ,kirchmann1 #ahgj1
 p4 #ajj72 and ,comte3 ',there is no    
absolute separation between observing   
and reasoning' 7,politique ,positive1   
#ahea1 i4 #ejj74      #g4 ,,the ,,test  
,,of ,,truth   ,it may have been        
observed1 with or without perplexity1   
that ,mr4 ,balfour specified a 'need for
 religious truth' as his ground for     
holding his unspecified 'theological    
beliefs1' this after bracketing         
,religion and ,science as alike         
'unproved systems1' consisting 7by      
implication7 of a body of propositions  
as to which we have not 'any ground for 
believing them to be even approximately 
true4' ,the skeptico-religious          
conception of truth being thus found to 
be as nugatory as that of 'reason' put  
forward from the same quarter1 we are   
compelled to posit one more conformable 
to common sense1 common usage1 and      
common honesty4 ,for the generality of  
instructed men1 truth in secular affairs
 means not merely 'that which is        

trowed1' but 7a7 that which we have     
adequate 'reason' to trow1 and 7b7 that 
of which our acceptance is consistent   
with our way of testing credences of any
 or all other kinds4 ,the ultimate      
criterion of our beliefs1 in short1 is  
the consistency with which we hold them4
  ,by this test the ground is rapidly   
cleared of skeptico-religious           
literature4 ,that puts a spurious       
problem to mask a real one4 ,the        
question for us is not and cannot be    
whether1 seeing that by inference from  
experience some of the beliefs we now   
hold are likely to be found false by    
posterity1 we have any right to accept  
one belief and discredit another4 ,the  
skeptic is himself doing so in this very
 argument1 and all the time4 ,his whole 
intellectual life is one of judgments   
and preferences4 ,there is no           
intellectual life without them4 ,the    
question is whether we have applied to  
any one belief or set of beliefs the    
tests we have applied to others3        

whether1 for instance1 we can honestly  
profess to believe in prayer or the     
doctrine of the ,trinity or heaven and  
hell as we believe in ,gresham's ,law or
 the effects of quinine or the roundness
 of the earth2 whether we have          
criticised the religion in which we were
 brought up as we criticise             
,mohammedanism or any other2 whether we 
have scrutinised the legends of our     
creed as we have scrutinised the legend 
of ,king ,arthur and his ,knights2 or   
whether1 on the other hand1 we hold the 
atomic theory or faith in vaccination by
 mere authority1 while we dispute about 
religious teaching in the schools4      
,this does not mean that we are to apply
 the same kind of test to every kind of 
proposition2 that we are to ask for     
evidence of immortality as we ask for   
evidence of the ,darwinian theory4 ,the 
test is one of consistency4 ,does the   
belief in immortality1 we are to ask1   
consist with either our knowledge or our
 imagination8 ,do we hold it critically 

and coherently or as a mere congeries of
 irreconcilable propositions8 ,do we ask
 ourselves what we mean by 'meeting     
again'8 ,is it anything more than a     
fantasy which we affirm for our own     
comfort or the supposed comfort of      
others1 or for the sake of mere         
conformity with popular sentiment8 ,no  
thoughtful man1 perhaps1 will deny that 
he holds some of his opinions by some   
such easy tenure2 were it only for the  
reason that consistent ascertainment is 
often laborious1 and that common consent
 has to be allowed to take its place in 
regard to many beliefs of plainly       
inferior importance4 ,but religious     
beliefs are not so classed by those who 
seriously debate them2 and here1 if     
ever1 the challenge to scrutiny and     
consistency is imperative4  ,and so     
disturbing is the challenge that for    
centuries past the higher religious     
consciousness has been engaged in an    
unceasing effort to persuade itself and 
its antagonists of the secular or       

mundane reasonableness of its           
supernaturalist creed4 ,religious life  
is seen going on at two widely removed  
standpoints3 one that of the emotional  
believer who knows no conceptual        
difficulties1 and is concerned only to  
maintain in himself and others the      
quasi-ecstatic state of faith2 the other
 that of the would-be reasoner who is   
concerned to secure peace of mind by    
arguing down his own misgivings and the 
positive antagonism of unbelief4        
,between those extremes1 probably1 is   
lived the mass of religious life        
so-called1 untouched either by ecstasy  
or by conceptual unbelief as            
distinguished from passive conformity4  
,but the conflict of the thinking       
minority is unceasing2 and orthodox     
professions of triumph deceive no one   
who is really engaged in the struggle4  
,on both sides it has long been a       
question of balancing 'probabilities1' a
 conflict of 'reasons4' ,bacon1         
declaring that he would 'rather believe 

all the fables in the ,golden ,legend   
and the ,koran than that this universal 
frame is without a mind1' opened a door 
that let in all the forces of doubt4    
,the ,koran is the form in which the    
,god-idea recommended itself to the     
,moslem mind1 as the ,bible is the form 
in which it commended itself to the     
,christian2 and if for each the other is
 always fabulising in detail1 where     
could be the certitude of the common    
doctrine8 ,was mind any likelier to be  
the form of the power of the universe   
than any other of the anthropomorphic   
characteristics of ,jehovah and ,allah  
and ,zeus8 ,however that might be1      
,bacon was appealing to the sheer sense 
of probability2 the ',evidences' of     
,grotius were addressed to the same kind
 of judgment2 and ,pascal's 'wager' was 
a blank appeal to the principle of      
chances plus the instinct of fear4      
,butler1 anxiously striving to reduce   
the straggling deistic controversy to   
its logical bases1 accepted the test of 

probability as the guide of life2 and   
,gladstone1 his last champion1 with all 
his show of sheer faith1 strenuously    
endorses the doctrine4 ,the vital       
question is seen to be1 then1 whether   
the ,butlerian 'believer' or the        
rationalist is the more loyal to that   
standard of probability by which each   
avowedly guides himself4  ,but ,butler1 
in the very act of professedly basing   
his case on probability1 introduced the 
contrary principle4 ,gladstone1 gravely 
reprehending that ,jesuit doctrine      
misleadingly termed ,probabilism--which 
permits of a choice of the less probable
 course in morals and belief--supposed  
himself to be upholding a true          
,probabilism in ,butler4 ,the fact is   
that ,butler1 seeking to checkmate the  
,deists1 committed himself to anomaly as
 a mark of revelation4 ',you believe1'  
he virtually argued1 'in a benevolent   
,god of ,nature1 though ,nature is full 
of ostensible cruelty and heartlessness3
 if these moral anomalies do not stagger

 your deism1 why should anomalies in the
 ,scriptures be for you an argument     
against their being a divine revelation8
 ,should you not rather expect to find  
difficulties in the revelation as in    
,nature8' ,so that the champion of the  
standard of probability ends by putting 
an element of improbability as a mark of
 divine truth4  ,it was long ago pointed
 out that ,butler's argument was thus as
 good for ,islam or any other religion  
as for ,christianity4 ,gladstone framed 
a futile rebuttal to the effect that    
,christianity had marks of truth1 in    
respect of prophecy and miracles1 which 
,islam lacked--a mere stultification of 
the ,butlerian thesis4 ,the ,moslem     
could retort that if his creed succeeded
 more rapidly than the ,christian with  
special marks of anomaly upon it1 those 
were presumably the right anomalies6 ,by
 the ,butlerian analogy of ,nature1 what
 sort of anomalies1 pray1 were to be    
expected in a divine revelation8        
,gladstone actually made it a           

disqualification of ,islam that it had  
succeeded by the sword2 this when his   
own creed had slain more than ever did  
,islam4 ,but on ,butler's principles1   
his plea was vain even if true4 ,if a   
divinely ruled ,nature be red in tooth  
and claw1 why should not the divine     
faith be so likewise8 ,what is the      
lesson1 by deistic analogy1 of the      
volcano8  ,the complete answer to       
,butler1 of course1 lies in stating the 
simple fact that analogy leads          
rationally to the conclusion that all   
the alleged revelations are alike human 
products4 ,if every one in turn is found
 to embody cosmological delusion1       
historical falsity1 fabulous narrative1 
barbarous ethic1 and irrational         
sanctions1 all of which are by each     
believer singly admitted to be the      
normal marks of human stumbling1 the    
case is at an end4 ,the one salient and 
sovereign probability is the one that   
the believer ignores4  ,when this       
mountainous fact is realised1 the full  

force of the ,butlerian argument is seen
 to recoil on its premiss no less than  
on its conclusion4 ,the dilemma that was
 to turn deists into ,christians is     
simply the confutation of all theism4   
,upon none of the tested principles of  
inference now normally acted on by men  
of science1 men of business1 and men of 
affairs1 is it rationally to be inferred
 that the universe is ruled by a        
superhuman ,good ,male ,person1 who     
loves and hates1 punishes and rewards1  
plans and reconsiders1 injures and      
compensates4 ,as little are we entitled 
to infer that it is governed by a       
,superhuman ,bad ,person1 or a number of
 ,superhuman ,persons1 male or female1  
good or bad1 or both4 ,the polytheistic 
and theistic solutions are the natural  
ones for unreflecting ignorance and     
priestly policy1 and the latter remains 
the natural one for reverent ingrained  
prejudice1 alias inculcated faith2 but  
it is only so much sophisticated        
folklore for the student of life1       

nature1 history1 philosophy4 ,the latest
 forms of it are but defecations of the 
earlier4 ,for ,arnold1 trained in       
reverence and avid of reverend          
sanctions1 the deity of his fellows is  
confessedly but a 'magnified non-natural
 man'2 and his substituted              
',something-not-ourselves-which-makes-fo
r-righteousness1' in turn1 is for his   
critics but an evasion of the problem of
 the                                    
something-not-ourselves-which-makes-for-
unrighteousness4  ,in sum1 then1 the    
case for rationalism as against the     
creeds is that they recognise no        
rational test for truth1 and apply none4
 ,they are all1 to say the least1       
grossly improbable in the light of the  
fullest human knowledge2 and the        
acceptance of them means either passive 
disregard of the principle of sufficient
 reason or the habitual employment of   
arguments which upon any other kind of  
issue would be recognised by all        
competent men as at best utterly        

inadequate4 ,theology is the most       
uncandid of all the current sciences2   
its results are the most                
self-contradictory2 its premisses the   
most incoherent4 ,upon those            
theologians1 then1 who accuse the       
rationalist of self-will and prejudice1 
he is forced to retort the charge with a
 double emphasis4 ,they are daily       
disloyal to the ,canon of ,consistency1 
which is for him the moral law of the   
intellectual life4 ,claiming to propound
 the highest truth1 they override all   
the tests by which truth is to be known4
  ,the modern defence of 'faith1'       
whether ,christian or theistic1 is less 
and less an attempt to prove truth of   
doctrine--save as regards the defence of
 historicity2 more and more an attempt  
to prove its usefulness or its          
comfortableness4 ,faith has turned      
utilitarian1 as regards its apologetics4
 ,john ,mill erred somewhat1 indeed1 in 
endorsing the statement that down to his
 time much had been written on the truth

 of religion1 and 'little1 at least in  
the way of discussion or controversy1   
concerning its usefulness4' ,christian  
bishops early learned to claim for their
 creed a gift of prosperity2 and in the 
eighteenth century there was an         
abundance of utilitarian vindication of 
the faith4 ,but latterly this has more  
and more coloured the whole defence4    
,either as a promise of peace or as one 
of comfort and stimulus1 as a plea for  
emotional indulgence or for the joy of  
the sense of deliverance from           
responsibility for sin1 as a guarantee  
for good government or as a condition of
 general progress1 ,christianity is     
defended on any ground rather than on   
that of the truth of its narratives or  
the conformity of its doctrine to good  
sense1 moral or other4 ,and the pleas   
are entertainingly internecine4  ,one   
day we are told that it makes for       
race-survival2 the next1 that it is a   
spiritual stay for races that are dying 
out1 and a great deathbed comfort to    

ex-cannibals1 with a past of many       
murders4 ,a creed which involves a      
cosmology is recommended1 not by such   
arguments as may commend a cosmology1   
but by pleas of subjective agreeableness
 which in any discussion of historic    
fact would be felt to savour of         
trifling4  ,and this simple and         
spontaneous sophistry is in a measure   
kept in countenance by                  
quasi-philosophies such as that of the  
',will to ,believe' and that latterly   
termed ,pragmatism4 ,the former1 as     
brilliantly propounded by the late      
,professor ,james1 amounts simply to    
this1 that in matters on which there is 
no good or sufficient evidence either   
way1 we do well to believe what we would
 like to believe4 ,as the precept comes 
from the thinker who passed on to       
students the counsel of ,pascal         
concerning the opiate value of religious
 practices1#ac it is easy to infer how  
it will tend to be interpreted4 ,and the
 second philosophy is like unto the     

first1 in so far as it conveys1 under   
cover of the true formula that the valid
 beliefs are those which affect action1 
the antinomian hint that if we think we 
have found any belief a help to action1 
it is thereby sufficiently certificated 
as true4  ,the rationalist comment on   
,pragmatism1 thus applied1 is that it   
really discredits the religious beliefs 
of most men1 inasmuch as they never     
relate their faith to action in general1
 would not stake a shilling on a prayer1
 have no working faith in providence1   
and do not in the least desire to pass  
from this life to another4 ,but these   
men do not study philosophy2 while the  
emotional believers1 who really feel    
their faith to be a help in life1 do not
 need the pragmatist's precept1 and     
believe without it4  ,what is true in   
,pragmatism is of the essence of        
,rationalism4 ,our lives at their best  
are made valid for us by our mutual     
trust1 our reciprocal sincerities2 and  
,rationalism consists in the effort to  

extend intellectual and moral sincerity 
to the study of all problems4 ,it may   
permit1 none the less1 of some such     
genial or affectionate glozing of some  
facts as love and friendship tend to set
 up in the relations of persons1        
tolerance taking on the vesture of      
sympathy2 and it no more makes for      
,gradgrindism1 or the belittlement of   
any of the higher joys1 than for        
concentration on the lower4 ,its        
antagonists alternately indict it for   
'gloom' and for licence2 for coldness   
and for ',epicureanism'2 for seeking    
only happiness1 and for turning         
happiness out of doors4 ,the            
contradictions of the indictment tell of
 its collective origin in mere hostility
 of temper4 ,rationalism1 of all codes  
and modes of life-philosophy1 must most 
seek to make the best of life4  ,some   
professed rationalists1 indeed1 at times
 grind in the mills of the ,philistines 
by professing an apprehension lest their
 fellows1 in pursuing truth1 should lose

 sight of beauty2 and such misconceiving
 mentors plead confusedly for some      
formal association of rationalism with  
the arts of feeling1 with poetry1 with  
music1 with drama1 with fiction--as if  
without cultivating these things in the 
name of ,rationalism we should be       
divested of them or discredited as not  
possessing them4 ,the fallacy is of a   
piece with that which identifies        
,christianity with progress in          
civilisation4 ,the rationalistic bias is
 in actual experience found to be as    
compatible with any sthetic bias as with
 the scientific1 specially so called2   
though in point of fact a scientific    
culture is in itself more conducive to  
rationalism in respect of historical and
 ultimate problems than is culture in   
the arts1 which are mostly enjoyed1     
appraised1 and even practised without   
deliberate resort to critical analysis4 
,some rationalists1 again1 have been    
found to contend that the critical      
analysis of things sthetic is           

destructive of sthetic joy--an error of 
errors1 involving blindness to the facts
 that even a science is in itself       
ultimately perceptible as an artistic   
construction1 and that all the arts live
 and renew themselves by the sense of   
truth4 ,the solution of the verbal      
conflict lies in recognising that       
rationalism is after all but a name for 
considerate consistency in the          
intellectual life1 where consistency is 
still so sadly little cultivated1 and   
where established habits and            
institutions tend so powerfully to its  
exclusion2 whereas in the arts there is 
no call for such specific championship4 
,there the very joy of novelty is soon  
potent to overcome the resistance of    
habit--which1 for the rest1 roots in    
structural or acquired limitations not  
greatly dependent upon cultivation or   
neglect of the rationalistic habit4 ,a  
man of science or of critical research  
may be dull to new refinements of       
sthesis where an unscientific           

emotionalist may be sensitive to them4  
,recognising all this1 the balanced     
rationalist will shun as a special sin  
of religion the ritualising of his joys1
 the sectarian extension of his         
differences of credence to the field of 
sthetics4 ,his rationalism as such      
implies no one of the special 'isms' of 
the arts2 though there he may be an     
'ist' like another4 ,for him all art1   
all literature1 all beauty1 is so much  
of ,nature's fruitage2 and ,christian   
cathedral and ,moslem mosque can yield  
him pleasures which ,christian and      
,moslem can never derive from his       
distinctive intellectual work4 ,he may  
even take artistic satisfaction in      
contemplating the figure of the winged  
angel which ,christianity took over from
 ,paganism1 without believing it to be  
the image of a reality1 as so many      
pietists have so childishly done for    
thousands of years4 ',religious' music  
can minister to him in virtue of the    
common psychosis4 ,his very names for   

himself and his intellectual code are   
but insistences on complete inner       
loyalty to a moral law which most men   
profess to obey1 and which all of       
necessity obey in many if not in most   
matters4  ,the time is for him even in  
sight1 as it were1 when most men will   
recognise and live by that law2 and when
 that day comes there will be no more   
need to profess rationalism than to     
profess1 as a creed1 any of the daily   
reciprocities by which society subsists4
 ,but till that day comes he marks      
himself1 and is marked--to his frequent 
discomfort1 it may be--by his           
insistence1 in the deepest matters1 on  
that law of truth which so many still   
persistently subordinate to pleas or    
preferences of authority or habit1      
convention or subjective taste4 ,avowing
 it as his bias1 if so challenged1 he   
claims that it is the bias to perfection
 in the intellectual life as the bias to
 order and sympathy is the bias to      
perfection in the civil4  ,,footnote3   

#ac ,see ,professor ,james's ,principles
 of ,psychology1 #ahia1 ii4 #cba4       
#h4 ,,ultimate ,,problems   ,to a       
surprising degree1 the philosophic      
disputes of the ages turn upon the same 
problems2 and to an extent that is      
nothing short of sinister1 they resolve 
themselves for most of the onlookers1 if
 not of the participants1 into the      
question of the maintenance of the      
popular religion4 ,thus academic theists
 in our own day are found resenting the 
tendency of ancient freethinkers to     
discredit and disestablish the ,gods of 
,olympus1 who for the academics         
themselves1 as for everybody else1 are a
 set of chimeras4 ,are we to infer that 
the current academic philosophies1 even 
where constructive1 are no better       
bottomed than the popular credences they
 seek to shelter8 ,kant's 'critical'    
philosophy was by himself soon turned to
 the account of pulpit religion2 ,fichte
 ended in restating the gospels in terms
 of his pantheistic personal equation2  

,hegel soon attained to the championship
 of the ,prussian ,state ,church2 ,lotze
 has reformulated ,christianity to the  
end of giving it continuance as a creed 
for the educated4 ,nietzsche said with  
substantial truth that the vogue of     
,kant has been that of a philosopher who
 enabled theological teachers to put a  
philosophic face upon a doctrine not    
otherwise presentable to their students2
 and the vogue of ,berkeley in ,england 
has been of a similar kind4  ,in our own
 day the fortunes of new treatises in   
popular philosophy turn upon their      
adaptability to orthodox sophistics4    
,our generation has seen in succession  
7#a7 the absurd work of the late        
,professor ,drummond on ',natural ,law  
in the ,spiritual ,world' welcomed as   
turning the tables on 'science' by      
showing that its doctrines are          
fundamentally at one with those of the  
faith2 7#b7 the still more absurd work  
of ,mr4 ,benjamin ,kidd on ',social     
,evolution' hailed as demonstrating by  

ratiocination that the reasonable course
 for society is not to reason2 and 7#c7 
the incomparably subtler books of ,mr4  
,balfour acclaimed 7whether or not read7
 as proving that reason cannot bite on  
religious opinions1 and that we could   
never enjoy our music and our dinners as
 we do if we thought of ourselves merely
 as evolved from animal forms1 without  
somewhere inserting ,deity as the       
sanction and exemplar of our            
preferences1 sthetic or moral4#ad       
,always the acclamation tells of a      
passion somehow to humiliate 'science1' 
to put reason in the wrong1 to triumph  
over 'negation1' to show that there are 
more things in heaven and earth than are
 dreamt of in any philosophy which does 
not make play with 'spirit1' worship1   
and the supernatural4  ,the cure1       
however1 is never found to be permanent2
 and latterly we see the not very       
accommodating philosophy of ,m4 ,bergson
 grasped at as yielding some kind of    
weapon wherewith to beat back the       

advance of the ever-encroaching         
assailant4 ,sooth to say1 neither the   
analyses nor the syntheses of ,m4       
,bergson are in any way damaging to     
rationalism1 or in any way rationally   
ancillary to supernaturalism4 ,the      
anti-rationalists have clutched eagerly 
at his dictum that reason1 considered as
 a light upon the universe1 is a poor   
thing2 and that there is something in us
 higher than intelligence4 ,apart from  
the disparaging form given              
7gratuitously7 to the content of these  
propositions1 there is nothing in them  
that has not been rationalistically put4
 ,that is to say1 it is a rationalistic 
proposition that new truths are reached 
neither by deduction nor by induction1  
but by a leap of the judgment1 by       
spontaneous guess or hypothesis4 ,what  
then8  ,to say or imply that the        
guessing faculty is something           
incomparably higher than intelligence is
 one of the inconsequences of ,m4       
,bergson1 whose very acute analysis is  

apt to play upon special problems       
without controlling his own dialectic   
procedure4 ,the sobering fact is that   
the false hypotheses are reached in the 
same way as the true1 the wrong guesses 
in the same way as the right1 the       
delusions in the same way as the        
discoveries4 ,the very theses in science
 which ,m4 ,bergson contemns were       
reached by the way which he arbitrarily 
pronounces 'superior' to the way of     
reason4 ,and the court of appeal that   
determines which is which1 is after all 
just that intelligence or reason which  
,m4 ,bergson1 imitating one of the old  
methods he has ably helped to discredit1
 had verbally belittled in merely       
discriminating its function4 ,no        
prerogative whatever can thereby be     
conferred upon either the guessing      
faculty or the guesser as such4 ,the    
'divining' faculty is not more divine   
than another3 it is not really more     
wonderful to catch fish than to cook    
them2 and the gift of establishing      

hypotheses is as rare as the gift of    
framing them4 ,when all is said1 the    
self-confidence of the transcendentalist
 avails for none but himself3 as his own
 craving for countenance shows1 his     
hypothesis must pass muster before      
reason if it is to persuade4  ,and for  
this among other reasons1 ,m4 ,bergson's
 attack upon ,spencer and other         
generalisers in science for their       
'mechanical' way of conceiving evolution
 is no blow to 'science1' as ,m4        
,bergson would probably avow1 though he 
is lax enough to delimit science at     
times in his dialectic4 ,his own way of 
stating evolution is only another mode  
of science4 ,to call 'science'          
superficial is to be so2 for the        
demonstration that any scientific       
doctrine is inadequate must itself be   
science or nothing4 ,and here again ,m4 
,bergson's criticism1 though searching1 
is not new1 however freshly put4 ,in    
respect of his sociology in particular1 
,mr4 ,spencer has been repeatedly so    

criticised2 and it is here alone that   
his limitation of method is really      
serious1 inasmuch as it affects his     
prescriptions4 ,as regards the          
conception of sub-human evolution1 his  
way of reducing the past to 'pieces' of 
evolution is not only not injurious1 it 
was the only way in which evolution in  
,nature could well have been realised by
 men4 ,m4 ,bergson is all for the       
'creative' aspect of evolution1 the     
,living ,now1 the emergence of the      
latest phenomenon as not merely the     
result of the one before1 but the living
 manifestation of the whole4 ,but this  
is simply the instinctive1              
pre-scientific relation to the problem1 
returned to and restored1 as it had need
 be1 to its place in a scientific schema
 from which it had been dropped         
precisely because it led nowhere4  ,m4  
,bergson has suffered1 probably1 from   
the zeal even of instructed exponents1  
to say nothing of the acclamations of   
the amateur2 but perhaps even ,m4       

,bergson1 by reason of his linear mode  
of advance1 misconceives the full       
significance of his own restatements of 
perceptual and conceptual fact4 ,his    
theorem has been represented as         
vindicating the thesis of ,mr4 ,samuel  
,butler's ',luck or ,cunning'--the      
thesis1 namely1 that animal survival and
 progress are to be conceived in terms  
of gift or effort rather than of        
environment2 that ,lamarckism1 once     
more1 is truer than ,darwinism4 ,but the
 argument overlooks the fact that       
,cunning may be envisaged as ,luck2 and 
that ,lamarckism without ,darwinism     
halts far worse than ,darwinism without 
,lamarckism4 ,at best1 the 'living' view
 of evolution is but a complement of the
 other1 a return from analysis to       
outcome4 ,put singly1 it is no addition 
to knowledge4        ',we called the    
chess-board white3 we call it black1'   
the onlooker might say1 with ,browning2 
while the analyst might retort that1    
like the savage1 he was quite conscious 

of the ever-moving point of life1 the   
,living ,now1 but preferred to give his 
mind to the still and spacious past1 and
 'to cut it up into pieces' by way of   
knowing something about the law of      
things1 past1 present1 and future4  ,the
 morally valid element in ,m4 ,bergson's
 insistence on 'creative evolution'     
7again an old term1 by the way7 is the  
vindication of personality as a creative
 form4 ,but this was not necessary as   
regards the rational determinist1 whose 
position really assumed it1 though      
possibly individual determinists may    
have obscured the truth by their        
phraseology4 ,as of old1                
anti-rationalists persist in assuming   
that the determinist view of things1    
mostly accepted by the rationalist1     
impairs character by reducing will to a 
'mechanism4' ,but that is a calculated  
obscuration of the doctrine4 ,it is a   
bad sophism to assert that 'the         
rejection of mechanism by               
non-libertarians is a mere phrase4      

,sooner or later they have to affirm    
that man is mechanically determined4'#ae
 ,it is not so4 ',going ,universe'      
negates ,machine4 ,that concept adheres 
to the schema of those who affirm the   
universe to be made3 ,naturalism        
excludes it4 ,theistic determinism does 
make man a mere vessel1 a tool3 for     
,naturalism he is an individuation of   
the ,living ,all4 ,the intelligent      
determinist never was and never will be 
put out by his conceptual recognition of
 himself as part of an infinite         
sequence2 and he has no need of ,m4     
,bergson's 7untenable7 restatement of   
the problem of free-will and determinism
 to the effect that the will is         
sometimes free and sometimes not4 ,that 
is indeed a hopeless fallacy--an illicit
 inference from the unduly stressed     
re-discovery that new truth is reached  
by a leap and not by a sequence4 ,to say
 that we are 'free' when we have an     
original idea or guess is to miss the   
logical truth set forth by so           

unsophisticated a philosopher as        
,locke--that the concept of 'freedom' is
 irrelevant to every process of thought4
 ,m4 ,bergson insists on the irrelevance
 of spatial terms to psychic processes1 
but overlooks the equal irrelevance of  
terms of preventable personal action4   
,precisely because he is1 so to say1 the
 latest outcome of the universe1 the    
rational determinist will insist upon   
'pulling his weight' and having things  
go1 as far as may be1 in the way he     
prefers4 ,no one's right is better6 ,and
 he can confidently claim that here1    
where he is philosophically at one with 
the thorough-going theist1 he has all   
the possible moral gain from his        
determinism without an iota of the      
theist's perplexity4 ,that gain consists
 in the lead to mercy in human affairs4 
,the theist-determinist is certainly    
not1 as some ,christian rhetoricians    
7ignorant of ,christian history7 affirm 
all determinists must be1 either a      
coward or a licentious knave1 in the    

ordinary sense4 ,augustine and ,luther  
and ,calvin and ,knox were neither1     
though all four were sadly sinful men4  
,but the theistic determinist is open   
always on the one hand to the paralysing
 thought that if he should err he is    
resisting ,god1 and on the other to the 
equally deadly instigation of the       
thought that those who resist him are   
,god's enemies4 ,to escape both snares  
he must turn thorough                   
pantheistnon-theist4 ,and the upshot is 
that the theistic determinist is never  
merciful1 whereas the rational          
determinist is at least under a logical 
compulsion to be so1 however he may     
resist or divagate4 ,he is free to      
defend himself1 and to defend society2  
but in so far as he hates and hurts he  
is illogical1 and in so far as he makes 
punishment retaliation1 or prevention   
punitive1 he is either confounding      
himself or setting lust against light4  
,were there no other betterment from the
 substitution of the non-theistic for   

the theistic relation to ultimate       
problems1 this might be held to outweigh
 all claims on the other side1 to say   
nothing of the simple rationality of the
 negative solution4 ,but that is1 of    
course1 in itself decisive4 ,the        
logically strongest form of the theistic
 case as against the non-theist is that1
 even as he lives and moves in          
gravitation without any subjective      
consciousness of it1 so he may be       
controlled in every thought by a        
transcendent volition4 ,but this        
argument1 which excludes ,m4 ,bergson's 
formula of our occasional 'freedom' of  
will1 equally shelters determinism from 
the contention that we are 'conscious'  
of freedom of thought4 ,even as we are  
demonstrably conditioned by gravitation 
while unconscious of its control1 we are
 demonstrably conditioned by our        
experience and structure as regards even
 our guesses4 ,neither the ignorant nor 
the ungifted man makes the valid new    
hypothesis4  ,there remain for use by   

the theist only the old reproaches that 
a non-theistic philosophy is 'desolate1'
 'negative1' 'materialistic1' and       
incapable of explaining the universe4   
,the last is a mere ignoratio elenchi1  
for the very essence of the non-theistic
 challenge is that every 'explanation of
 the universe' is an imposture1 exposed 
as such either by its                   
self-contradictions or by its evasions4 
,the normal theist either bilks the     
problem of evil by avowing it to be a   
mystery--a thing he cannot explain--or  
falls back on the alternative evasions  
that there cannot be good without evil  
7that is to say1 that good needs evil1  
which is thus good7 or that 'partial ill
 is universal good1' and that evil is   
thus non-ens--which again is a denial of
 any moral problem4 ,to complain of     
'negation' as such while making such    
negations as these is to be more        
entertaining than impressive4  ,and to  
be told that1 in putting aside these    
logomachies1 he is depriving himself of 

intellectual and moral comfort1 is for  
the rationalist no perturbing           
experience4 ,he is what he is because he
 knows the utter inanity of the theistic
 declamation about his putting in place 
of the ',immeasurable ,divine ,eye' a   
'vast bottomless ,eye-,socket'2 knows   
that for the vast mass of mankind the   
imagined ,eye has been a menace of all  
their myriad ills1 that its levin slays 
them like flies1 that the iron has      
entered uncounted millions of souls who 
daily prayed for divine succour4 ,the   
prate of his 'negation' is as childish  
as the complaint of the avowal that we  
cannot reach the planet ,jupiter1 not to
 say the constellation ,hercules3 he    
does but affirm the incontrovertible    
truth that an infinite universe cannot  
be compassed by our thought1 and that to
 assert its permeation by 'mind'--a     
finite process of perception and        
discrimination1 verbally defined as     
transcending both--is to pay ourselves  
with words4 ,to the ,berkeleyan formula 

that existence is only as perceived1 and
 that without perception there can be no
 existence1 he answers1 similarly1 that 
the first proposition means only that we
 perceive what we perceive1 and that the
 second is mere intellectual nullity1 a 
verbal pretence to unthinkable          
knowledge4 ,the further ,zenonian       
frivolity of the denial of an 'external 
world' needs from him no further comment
 than this1 that in the terms of the    
argument 'external' has no meaning1 and 
the proposition1 therefore1 none either4
 ,it may be left to the denier of       
existence 'outside consciousness' to    
tell us where consciousness is4 ,the    
inquiry may perhaps lead him to the     
discovery that he1 the professed foe of 
materialism1 has been limiting          
consciousness to the compass of the     
skull4  ,the ultimate claims of the     
theist to spiritual superiority and     
serenity are oddly bracketed with the   
charges of arrogance and ,epicureanism  
constantly made by him against his      

antagonist4 ,all alike are irrelevant to
 the issue of truth2 and all alike tell 
of other motives than those of          
truth-seeking4 ,those other motives are 
substantially what our theological      
ancestors called 'will-worship1'        
self-pleasing1 the bias of              
pre-supposition1 the aversion to        
surrender4 ,all theistic dialects alike 
sing the song of self-esteem4 ,the      
spiritist pronounces his gainsayer      
'impercipient1' thus inexpensively      
cutting the knot of argument2 and1      
himself a wilful continuator of the     
thought-forms of the savage1 declares   
himself to be transcending the          
earthiness of the sciences in virtue of 
which he is civilised4 ,all this is a   
poor way of proving serenity2 as poor1  
at bottom1 as the perpetual display of  
wrath at gainsaying by men who claim to 
have the backing of ,omnipotence4       
,consciousness of intercourse with the  
supernatural has never ostensibly       
availed to give the common run of       

theists imperturbability in their       
intercourse with the naturalist4  ,and  
if in the stress of controversy the     
rationalist should in turn prove himself
 capable of perturbation1 let him1      
avowing that he claims no supernatural  
stay1 at least plead that he sets up no 
intellectual 'colour line1' and that his
 gospel is after all fraternal enough4  
,once more1 he does but ask the theist  
to take one more step in a criticism    
which he has already carried far1 with  
small trouble to himself4 ,every        
religion sets aside every other3 the    
rationalist only sets aside one more4   
,every theist has negated a million     
,gods save one3 the rationalist does but
 negate the millionth4 ,and in doing    
this1 he is not committing the verbal   
nullity of saying1 ,there is no ,god--a 
formula never fathered by a considerate 
atheist4 ,god1 undefined1x2 and we do   
not say1 ,there is no x4 ,of the defined
 ,god-idea1 whichsoever1 we demonstrate 
the untenableness2 but in giving the    

theist an inconceivable universe we     
surely meet his appetite for the        
transcendent4  ,rationalism1 when all is
 said1 is the undertaking1 in ,george   
,eliot's phrase1 to do without opium4   
,and perhaps the shrewdest challenge to 
it is the denial that the average man   
can so abstain--a denial which may be   
backed by the reminder that the framer  
of the phrase did not4 ,a jurist once   
cheerfully assured the present writer   
that the mass of men will never do      
without alcohol and religion4 ,he was   
not aware that he was adapting a        
,byronic blasphemy4 ,it may be that in a
 world in which most men chronically    
crave alternately stimulants and        
narcotics1 he was in a measure right4   
,but as one of his two necessaries is   
already under a widening medical        
indictment and avoidance1 it may be that
 the other will fare similarly4 ,in any 
case1 is not the ideal a worthy one1 as 
ideals go8  ,,footnotes3  #ad ,it is an 
orthodox writer who applies to this     

ratiocination the tag1 ,credibile est   
quia ineptum est1 dismissing it as 'a   
blending of sceptical analysis with     
credulous assertion' 7,rev4 ,dr4        
,mackintosh1 ,hegel and ,hegelianism1 p4
 #bai74  #ae ,rev4 ,dr4 ,r4 ,mackintosh1
 ,hegel and ,hegelianism1 #aijc1 p4     
#baf4      #i4 ,,ideals   ,ideals1      
obviously1 are part--the best part--of  
our bias3 to that admission we may      
unhesitatingly revert4 ,by his bias the 
rationalist can afford to be tried4     
,intellectually he makes truth his      
paramount consideration1 and morally he 
insists upon the same sincerity in      
things intellectual as men profess to   
practise in honourable intercourse4 ,i  
have heard a distinguished ,christian   
scholar denounce these canons as        
commanding such an outrage as telling a 
child of its mother's shame4 ,the charge
 is an illustration of the strange      
malice of which piety is capable4 ,no   
human being ever proposed to communicate
 all truth of any kind to children2 and 

the limit to the gratuitous telling of  
wounding truth is fixed by normal       
courtesy and sympathy as regards the    
sufferings even of adults4 ,the charge  
is in fact one more illustration of the 
anti-veridical bias of pietism--the need
 to distort and pervert the case against
 the rationalist4  ,and if pietism can  
thus distort the bearing of the         
intellectual canons of rationalism1 much
 more habitually does it distort the    
specific purport of rationalist morals4 
,the fact that naturalism implies       
utilitarianism is transformed into the  
proposition that utilitarianism means   
the subordination of all play of        
sympathy to an incessant calculus of    
profit4 ,as we have seen1 theism and    
,christianity alike do chronically      
subordinate the veridical instinct--a   
moral instinct like another--to lower   
considerations of utility2 and only too 
often in history do we see them         
annulling the instincts of mercy and    
reciprocity by the law of dogma4 ,not by

 propounders of that test is the        
rationalist to be put to shame4 ,the    
very basis of ,christianity1 in fine1 is
 an other-world utilitarianism4 ',what  
profits it a man----8'  ,utilitarianism 
means for him1 in brief1 what it meant  
when it first took shape as a moral     
plea--the testing of traditional moral  
canons1 and their annulment when they   
are seen to be mere survivals of        
barbarism1 sanctioned only by custom and
 religion2 never the substitution of a  
calculus of utility for an accepted     
moral canon in every act of life4 ,any  
general moral rule rationally seen to be
 broadly utilitarian is thereby         
vindicated qua rule2 and to put its     
practice at the hazard of every trying  
emergency would be to sin against the   
very principle of utility4 ,for the     
rest1 the rationalist has his moral bias
 like another2 and in virtue of it1 as  
animating rationalisers of various      
developments1 has been wrought the main 
part of the modern purification of      

working morality1 though the moral      
instinct in religious men has responded1
 and has at times initiated reformation4
 ,it is left to the religionist to argue
 that a bias which has wrought for      
truth1 justice1 and mercy will somehow  
fail to preserve other virtues4 ,no     
reminiscence of the sexual history of   
,christian societies can restrain       
,christian advocates from imputing to   
the spirit of reason a tendency to      
promote promiscuity in the sex relation 
and thus to overthrow 'the family4'     
,holding as they do that the family is  
the keystone of society and             
civilisation1 they in effect argue that 
the practice of rational calculation of 
means and ends will destroy both4       
,pessimism could no further go2 and if  
this be not the height of pessimism it  
is a stress of false-witness which puts 
the accuser outside the pale of         
controversy4 ,as an imputation upon     
known rationalists in general the       
theorem is simply false4 ,the systematic

 revival of ,aryan polygamy has been a  
religious process2 and the freest       
practitioners of sexual choice among    
reasoning unbelievers1 the ,russian     
,nihilists1 have been notoriously       
monogynous4  ,it may be hoped that we   
shall in future hear less and less in   
these matters of the extremities of     
orthodox malice or misgiving1 as we hear
 less and less of the old plea that     
whereas a bad believer may be held in   
moral check by his religious fears1 a   
bad unbeliever will fear only the       
police4 ,the statistics of the jails do 
not encourage that line of apologetics2 
and the records of the ,society for the 
,prevention of ,cruelty to ,children do 
not go to show either that rationalism  
makes parents cruel or that religion    
keeps them kind4 ,the plain truth is    
that upon bad bias law is the main      
check2 and that the most vaunted        
religious methods of developing the good
 bias of the weak have latterly been    
systematically supplemented1 in the     

organisation1 for instance1 of the      
,salvation ,army so called1 by secular  
methods which are the avowal of the     
final and general futility of the       
others4  ,in no other direction are the 
moral ideals of rationalism less fully  
vindicated by the movement of           
civilisation4 ,the humane and scientific
 treatment of criminals has actually    
been antagonised1 in the name of the    
,christian doctrine of sin1 from the    
ranks of the ,howard ,society1          
established to promote such humane      
treatment4 ,rationalism can no other3   
religion seems willing to leave it the  
credit4 ,above all1 the great cause of  
,peace on earth--the very motto 7a      
mistranslation1 as it happens7 cited as 
that of nascent ,christianity--visibly  
depends more and more on the spread of  
rational calculation1 the spirit of     
reason1 rather than on that of faith1   
however faithfully many a good          
,christian continues to plead for it4   
,there is no ,peace ,church3 even       

,quakerism has latterly had its         
war-mongers2 and there is no record in  
history that the doctrine of the        
,fatherhood of ,god ever withheld men   
from fratricidal war4  ,we shall still  
hear1 it may be1 that the intellectual  
pride of rationalism is in tendency     
anti-democratic2 ,gibbon and ,hume being
 cited as cases in point4 ,and the      
rationalist democrat1 shunning the lead 
of his antagonist to panacea-mongering1 
may here at once--or once more--confess 
that the spirit of reason in things     
intellectual is no guarantee for the    
immediate elimination of egoism in human
 relations4 ,christianity has claimed to
 be such a guarantee--with the results  
we know4 ,but it is flatly inconceivable
 that the spirit which challenges all   
authority and anomaly in doctrine can   
tend to conserve either tyranny or      
social and political inequality4 ,the   
very apologists who make the charge are 
the successors and coadjutors of those  
who have charged upon irreligious       

philosophy the generating of the ,french
 ,revolution4 ,anti-democratic          
rationalists there will be1 as there    
have been2 but for every one such there 
are a hundred of the contrary ideal2 and
 it is not in conservative parties that 
they are found to avow themselves4 ,for 
rationalism1 on the side of thought1    
must forever mean liberty1 equality1    
fraternity1 'the giving and receiving of
 reasons1' the complete reciprocity of  
judgment4 ,to all races1 all castes1 it 
makes the same appeal1 being as         
universalist as science1 naming no      
master1 proffering no ritual1 holding   
out no threat4 ,the rationalist1 as     
such1 can have no part in the errant    
,darwinism which would conserve struggle
 because struggle has yielded progress2 
much less in the pseudo-,darwinism which
 would further degrade backward races   
because they have been ill-placed4 ,of  
race-hatred he cannot be guilty without 
infidelity to his first principles4     
,and if all this be termed vaunting1 the

 objector may1 perhaps1 be placated by  
the repeated avowal that neither is     
rationalism proclaimed to be a wholly   
new way for the nations1 nor is the     
rationalist as such acclaimed as the    
monopolist of good4 ,he respectfully    
urges upon the best and ablest followers
 of other flags that under his they will
 not deteriorate or be less cherished2  
that their gifts are precious in his    
eyes2 that he wants their collaboration 
for humanity's sake4 ,his panegyric of  
,reason is but the praise of what is    
wisest and best in man3 his 'ism' is the
 concern to put off dead husks of       
opinion1 to lift all life to the plane  
of light4 ,the religionist may1 if he   
must1 come over with permission to call 
the cultus of truth and sanity a        
religion3 some there are who suppose    
themselves to solve the dispute by that 
means1 as ,spencer thought to solve it  
by inviting ,science and ,religion to   
join hands in an avowal of a common     
ignorance4 ,such eirenicons do not seem 

widely acceptable3 it is really better  
to let words keep their historic        
meanings than wilfully to change their  
values4  ,but if the question be whether
 rationalism is a creed to live by1 an  
ideal to live by1 let these pages be    
taken as giving part of the answer4     
,printed by ,t4 and ,a4 ,,constable1    
,printers to ,his ,majesty at the       
,edinburgh ,university ,press