material from the ,google ,print        
project47        ,,the                  
,,unconstitutionality  ,,of  ,,slavery4 
,,by ,,lysander ,,spooner4  ,,boston3   
,,published ,,by ,,bela ,,marsh1  ,,no4 
#be ,,cornhill4  #ahde4   ,,entered     
according to ,act of ,congress1 in the  
year #ahde1 by ,,lysander ,,spooner1 in 
the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district   
,court of ,massachusetts4   ,,dow       
,,jackson',s ,,anti-,,slavery ,,press4  
,,contents4   ,,chapter ,i4--,,what ,,is
 ,,law8                                 
,,page #e        ,,ii4--,,written       
,,constitutions1                        
#ah       ,,iii4--,,the ,,colonial      
,,charters1                        #bd  
,,iv4--,,colonial ,,statutes1           
#cf         ,v4--,,the ,,declaration    
,,of ,,independence1              #db   
,,vi4--,,the ,,state ,,constitutions    
,,of #aghi4               7,,meaning    
,,of ,,the ,,word ,,free17              
#df       ,,vii4--,,the ,,articles ,,of 
,,confederation1                #fa     

,,viii4--,,the ,,constitution ,,of ,,the
 ,,united ,,states1        #fe          
,,ix4--,,the ,,intentions ,,of ,,the    
,,convention1            #ace           
,x4--,,the ,,practice ,,of ,,the        
,,government1              #ade         
,,xi4--,,the ,,understanding ,,of ,,the 
,,people1             #adg              
,,xii4--,,the ,,state ,,constitutions   
,,of #ahde1             #aej            
,,xiii4--,,the ,,children ,,of ,,slaves 
,,are ,,born ,,free1        #aec        
,,the ,,unconstitutionality ,,of        
,,slavery4     ,,chapter ,i4  ,,what    
,,is ,,law8   ,before examining the     
language of the ,constitution1 in regard
 to ,slavery1 let us obtain a view of   
the principles1 by virtue of which law  
arises out of those constitutions and   
compacts1 by which people agree to      
establish government4  ,to do this it is
 necessary to define the term law4      
,popular opinions are very loose and    
indefinite1 both as to the true         
definition of law1 and also as to the   

principle1 by virtue of which law       
results from the compacts or contracts  
of mankind with each other4  ,what then 
is ,,law8 ,that law1 ,i mean1 which1 and
 which only1 judicial tribunals are     
morally bound1 under all circumstances1 
to declare and sustain8  ,in answering  
this question1 ,i shall attempt to show 
that law is an intelligible principle of
 right1 necessarily resulting from the  
nature of man2 and not an arbitrary     
rule1 that can be established by mere   
will1 numbers or power4  ,to determine  
whether this proposition be correct1 we 
must look at the general signification  
of the term law4  ,the true and general 
meaning of it1 is that natural1         
permanent1 unalterable principle1 which 
governs any particular thing or class of
 things4 ,the principle is strictly a   
natural one2 and the term applies to    
every natural principle1 whether mental1
 moral or physical4 ,thus we speak of   
the laws of mind2 meaning thereby those 
natural1 universal and necessary        

principles1 according to which mind     
acts1 or by which it is governed4 ,we   
speak too of the moral law2 which is    
merely an universal principle of moral  
obligation1 that arises out of the      
nature of men1 and their relations to   
each other1 and to other things--and is 
consequently as unalterable as the      
nature of men4 ,and it is solely because
 it is unalterable in its nature1 and   
universal in its application1 that it is
 denominated law4 ,if it were           
changeable1 partial or arbitrary1 it    
would be no law4 ,thus we speak of      
physical laws2 of the laws1 for         
instance1 that govern the solar system2 
of the laws of motion1 the laws of      
gravitation1 the laws of light1 c41     
c4--,also the laws that govern the      
vegetable and animal kingdoms1 in all   
their various departments3 among which  
laws may be named1 for example1 the one 
that like produces like4 ,unless the    
operation of this principle were        
uniform1 universal and necessary1 it    

would be no law4  ,law1 then1 applied to
 any object or thing whatever1 signifies
 a natural1 unalterable1 universal      
principle1 governing such object or     
thing4 ,any rule1 not existing in the   
nature of things1 or that is not        
permanent1 universal and inflexible in  
its application1 is no law1 according to
 any correct definition of the term law4
  ,what1 then1 is that natural1         
universal1 impartial and inflexible     
principle1 which1 under all             
circumstances1 necessarily fixes1       
determines1 defines and governs the     
civil rights of men8 ,those rights of   
person1 property1 c41 which one human   
being has1 as against other human       
beings8  ,i shall define it to be simply
 the rule1 principle1 obligation or     
requirement of natural justice4  ,this  
rule1 principle1 obligation or          
requirement of natural justice1 has its 
origin in the natural rights of         
individuals1 results necessarily from   
them1 keeps them ever in view as its end

 and purpose1 secures their enjoyment1  
and forbids their violation4 ,it also   
secures all those acquisitions of       
property1 privilege and claim1 which men
 have a natural right to make by labor  
and contract4  ,such is the true meaning
 of the term law1 as applied to the     
civil rights of men4 ,and ,i doubt if   
any other definition of law can be      
given1 that will prove correct in every1
 or necessarily in any possible case4   
,the very idea of law originates in     
men's natural rights4 ,there is no other
 standard1 than natural rights1 by which
 civil law can be measured4 ,law has    
always been the name of that rule or    
principle of justice1 which protects    
those rights4 ,thus we speak of natural 
law4 ,natural law1 in fact1 constitutes 
the great body of the law that is       
professedly administered by judicial    
tribunals3 and it always necessarily    
must be--for it is impossible to        
anticipate a thousandth part of the     
cases that arise1 so as to enact a      

special law for them4 ,wherever the     
cases have not been thus anticipated1   
the natural law prevails4 ,we thus      
politically and judicially recognize the
 principle of law as originating in the 
nature and rights of men4 ,by           
recognizing it as originating in the    
nature of men1 we recognize it as a     
principle1 that is necessarily as       
immutable1 and as indestructible as the 
nature of man4 ,we also1 in the same    
way1 recognize the impartiality and     
universality of its application4  ,if1  
then1 law be a natural principle--one   
necessarily resulting from the very     
nature of man1 and capable of being     
destroyed or changed only by destroying 
or changing the nature of man--it       
necessarily follows that it must be of  
higher and more inflexible obligation   
than any other rule of conduct1 which   
the arbitrary will of any man1 or       
combination of men1 may attempt to      
establish4 ,certainly no rule can be of 
such high1 universal and inflexible     

obligation1 as that1 which1 if observed1
 secures the rights1 the safety and     
liberty of all4  ,natural law1 then1 is 
the paramount law4 ,and1 being the      
paramount law1 it is necessarily the    
only law3 for1 being applicable to every
 possible case that can arise touching  
the rights of men1 any other principle  
or rule1 that should arbitrarily be     
applied to those rights1 would          
necessarily conflict with it4 ,and1 as a
 merely arbitrary1 partial and temporary
 rule must1 of necessity1 be of less    
obligation than a natural1 permanent1   
equal and universal one1 the arbitrary  
one becomes1 in reality1 of no          
obligation at all1 when the two come in 
collision4 ,consequently there is1 and  
can be1 correctly speaking1 no law but  
natural law4 ,there is no other         
principle or rule1 applicable to the    
rights of men1 that is obligatory in    
comparison with this1 in any case       
whatever4 ,and this natural law is no   
other than that rule of natural justice1

 which results either directly from     
men's natural rights1 or from such      
acquisitions as they have a natural     
right to make1 or from such contracts as
 they have a natural right to enter     
into4  ,natural law recognizes the      
validity of all contracts which men have
 a natural right to make1 and which     
justice requires to be fulfilled3 such1 
for example1 as contracts that render   
equivalent for equivalent1 and are at   
the same time consistent with morality1 
the natural rights of men1 and those    
rights of property1 privilege1 c41 which
 men have a natural right to acquire by 
labor and contract4  ,natural law1      
therefore1 inasmuch as it recognizes the
 natural right of men to enter into     
obligatory contracts1 permits the       
formation of government1 founded on     
contract1 as all our governments profess
 to be4 ,but in order that the contract 
of government may be valid and lawful1  
it must purport to authorize nothing    
inconsistent with natural justice1 and  

men's natural rights4 ,it cannot        
lawfully authorize government to destroy
 or take from men their natural rights3 
for natural rights are inalienable1 and 
can no more be surrendered to           
government--which is but an association 
of individuals--than to a single        
individual4 ,they are a necessary       
attribute of man's nature2 and he can no
 more part with them--to government or  
any body else--than with his nature     
itself4 ,but the contract of government 
may lawfully authorize the adoption of  
means--not inconsistent with natural    
justice--for the better protection of   
men's natural rights4 ,and this is the  
legitimate and true object of           
government4 ,and rules and statutes1 not
 inconsistent with natural justice and  
men's natural rights1 if enacted by such
 government1 are binding1 on the ground 
of contract1 upon those who are parties 
to the contract1 which creates the      
government1 and authorizes it to pass   
rules and statutes to carry out its     

objects4#a  ,but natural law tries the  
contract of government1 and declares it 
lawful or unlawful1 obligatory or       
invalid1 by the same rules by which it  
tries all other contracts between man   
and man4 ,a contract for the            
establishment of government1 being      
nothing but a voluntary contract between
 individuals for their mutual benefit1  
differs1 in nothing that is essential to
 its validity1 from any other contract  
between man and man1 or between nation  
and nation4 ,if two individuals enter   
into a contract to commit trespass1     
theft1 robbery or murder upon a third1  
the contract is unlawful and void1      
simply because it is a contract to      
violate natural justice1 or men's       
natural rights4 ,if two nations enter   
into a treaty1 that they will unite in  
plundering1 enslaving or destroying a   
third1 the treaty is unlawful1 void1 and
 of no obligation1 simply because it is 
contrary to justice and men's natural   
rights4 ,on the same principle1 if the  

majority1 however large1 of the people  
of a country1 enter into a contract of  
government1 called a constitution1 by   
which they agree to aid1 abet or        
accomplish any kind of injustice1 or to 
destroy or invade the natural rights of 
any person or persons whatsoever1       
whether such persons be parties to the  
compact or not1 this contract of        
government is unlawful and void--and for
 the same reason that a treaty between  
two nations for a similar purpose1 or a 
contract of the same nature between two 
individuals1 is unlawful and void4 ,such
 a contract of government has no moral  
sanction4 ,it confers no rightful       
authority upon those appointed to       
administer it4 ,it confers no legal or  
moral rights1 and imposes no legal or   
moral obligation upon the people who are
 parties to it4 ,the only duties1 which 
any one can owe to it1 or to the        
government established under color of   
its authority1 are disobedience1        
resistance1 destruction4  ,judicial     

tribunals1 sitting under the authority  
of this unlawful contract or            
constitution1 are bound1 equally with   
other men1 to declare it1 and all unjust
 enactments passed by the government in 
pursuance of it1 unlawful and void4     
,these judicial tribunals cannot1 by    
accepting office under a government1 rid
 themselves of that paramount           
obligation1 that all men are under1 to  
declare1 if they declare any thing1 that
 justice is law2 that government can    
have no lawful powers1 except those with
 which it has been invested by lawful   
contract2 and that an unlawful contract 
for the establishment of government1 is 
as unlawful and void as any other       
contract to do injustice4  ,no oaths1   
which judicial or other officers may    
take1 to carry out and support an       
unlawful contract or constitution of    
government1 are of any moral obligation4
 ,it is immoral to take such oaths1 and 
it is criminal to fulfil them4 ,they    
are1 both in morals and law1 like the   

oaths which individual pirates1 thieves 
and bandits give to their confederates1 
as an assurance of their fidelity to the
 purposes for which they are associated4
 ,no man has any moral right to assume  
such oaths2 they impose no obligation   
upon those who do assume them2 they     
afford no moral justification for       
official acts1 in themselves unjust1    
done in pursuance of them4  ,if these   
doctrines are correct1 then those       
contracts of government1 state and      
national1 which we call constitutions1  
are void1 and unlawful1 so far as they  
purport to authorize1 7if any of them do
 authorize17 any thing in violation of  
natural justice1 or the natural rights  
of any man or class of men whatsoever4  
,and all judicial tribunals are bound1  
by the highest obligations that can rest
 upon them1 to declare that these       
contracts1 in all such particulars1 7if 
any such there be17 are void1 and not   
law4 ,and all agents1 legislative1      
executive1 judicial and popular1 who    

voluntarily lend their aid to the       
execution of any of the unlawful        
purposes of the government1 are as much 
personally guilty1 according to all the 
moral and legal principles1 by which    
crime1 in its essential character1 is   
measured1 as though they performed the  
same acts independently1 and of their   
own volition4  ,such is the true        
character and definition of law4 ,yet1  
instead of being allowed to signify1 as 
it in reality does1 that natural1       
universal and inflexible principle1     
which has its origin in the nature of   
man1 keeps pace every where with the    
rights of man1 as their shield and      
protector1 binds alike governments and  
men1 weighs by the same standard the    
acts of communities and individuals1 and
 is paramount in its obligation to any  
other requirement which can be imposed  
upon men--instead1 ,i say1 of the term  
law being allowed to signify1 as it     
really does1 this immutable and         
overruling principle of natural justice 

it has come to be applied to mere       
arbitrary rules of conduct1 prescribed  
by individuals1 or combinations of      
individuals1 self-styled governments1   
who have no other title to the          
prerogative of establishing such rules1 
than is given them by the possession or 
command of sufficient physical power to 
coerce submission to them4  ,the        
injustice of these rules1 however       
palpable and atrocious it may be1 has   
not deterred their authors from         
dignifying them with the name of law4   
,and1 what is much more to be deplored1 
such has been the superstition of the   
people1 and such their blind veneration 
for physical power1 that this injustice 
has not opened their eyes to the        
distinction between law and force1      
between the sacred requirements of      
natural justice1 and the criminal       
exactions of unrestrained selfishness   
and power4 ,they have thus not only     
suffered the name of law to be stolen1  
and applied to crime as a cloak to      

conceal its true nature1 but they have  
rendered homage and obedience to crime1 
under the name of law1 until the very   
name of law1 instead of signifying1 in  
their minds1 an immutable principle of  
right1 has come to signify little more  
than an arbitrary command of power1     
without reference to its justice or its 
injustice1 its innocence or its         
criminality4 ,and now1 commands the most
 criminal1 if christened with the name  
of law1 obtain nearly as ready an       
obedience1 oftentimes a more ready      
obedience1 than law and justice itself4 
,this superstition1 on the part of the  
people1 which has thus allowed force and
 crime to usurp the name and occupy the 
throne of justice and law1 is hardly    
paralleled in its grossness1 even by    
that superstition1 which1 in darker ages
 of the world1 has allowed falsehood1   
absurdity and cruelty to usurp the name 
and the throne of religion4  ,but ,i am 
aware that other definitions of law1    
widely different from that ,i have      

given1 have been attempted--definitions 
too1 which practically obtain1 to a     
great extent1 in our judicial tribunals1
 and in all the departments of          
government4 ,but these other definitions
 are nevertheless1 all1 in themselves1  
uncertain1 indefinite1 mutable2 and     
therefore incapable of being standards1 
by a reference to which the question of 
law1 or no law1 can be determined4 ,law1
 as defined by them1 is capricious1     
arbitrary1 unstable2 is based upon no   
fixed principle2 results from no        
established fact2 is susceptible of only
 a limited1 partial and arbitrary       
application2 possesses no intrinsic     
authority2 does not1 in itself1         
recognize any moral principle2 does not 
necessarily confer upon1 or even        
acknowledge in individuals1 any moral or
 civil rights2 or impose upon them any  
moral obligation4  ,for example4 ,one of
 these definitions--one that probably   
embraces the essence of all the rest--is
 this3  ,that law is a rule of civil    

conduct1 prescribed by the supreme power
 of a state1 commanding what its        
subjects are to do1 and prohibiting what
 they are to forbear4 ,noah ,webster4   
,in this definition1 hardly any thing1  
that is essential to the idea of law1 is
 made certain4 ,let us see4 ,it says    
that1  ,law is a rule of civil conduct1 
prescribed by the supreme power of a    
state4  ,what is the supreme power1 that
 is here spoken of1 as the fountain of  
law8 ,is it the supreme physical power8 
,or the largest concentration of        
physical power1 whether it exist in one 
man1 or in a combination of men8 ,such  
is undoubtedly its meaning4 ,and if such
 be its meaning1 then the law is        
uncertain2 for it is oftentimes         
uncertain where1 or in what man1 or body
 of men1 in a state1 the greatest amount
 of physical power is concentrated4     
,whenever a state should be divided into
 factions1 no one having the supremacy  
of all the rest1 law would not merely be
 inefficient1 but the very principle of 

law itself would be actually            
extinguished4 ,and men would have no    
rule of civil conduct4 ,this result     
alone is sufficient to condemn this     
definition4  ,again4 ,if physical power 
be the fountain of law1 then law and    
force are synonymous terms4 ,or1        
perhaps1 rather1 law would be the result
 of a combination of will and force2 of 
will1 united with a physical power      
sufficient to compel obedience to it1   
but not necessarily having any moral    
character whatever4  ,are we prepared to
 admit the principle1 that there is no  
real distinction between law and force8 
,if not1 we must reject this definition4
  ,it is true that law may1 in many     
cases1 depend upon force as the means of
 its practical efficiency4 ,but are law 
and force therefore identical in their  
essence8  ,according to this definition1
 too1 a command to do injustice1 is as  
much law1 as a command to do justice4   
,all that is necessary1 according to    
this definition1 to make the command a  

law1 is that it issue from a will that  
is supported by physical force          
sufficient to coerce obedience4  ,again4
 ,if mere will and power are sufficient1
 of themselves1 to establish            
law--legitimate law--such law as        
judicial tribunals are morally bound1 or
 even have a moral right to             
enforce--then it follows that wherever  
will and power are united1 and continue 
united until they are successful in the 
accomplishment of any particular object1
 to which they are directed1 they       
constitute the only legitimate law of   
that case1 and judicial tribunals can   
take cognizance of no other4  ,and it   
makes no difference1 on this principle1 
whether this combination of will and    
power be found in a single individual1  
or in a community of an hundred millions
 of individuals4--,the numbers concerned
 do not alter the rule--otherwise law   
would be the result of numbers1 instead 
of supreme power4 ,it is therefore      
sufficient to comply with this          

definition1 that the power be equal to  
the accomplishment of the object4 ,and  
the will and power of one man are       
therefore as competent to make the law  
relative to any acts which he is able to
 execute1 as the will and power of      
millions of men are to make the law     
relative to any acts which they are able
 to accomplish4  ,on this principle1    
then--that mere will and power are      
competent to establish the law that is  
to govern an act1 without reference to  
the justice or injustice of the act     
itself1 the will and power of any single
 individual to commit theft1 would be   
sufficient to make theft lawful1 as     
lawful as is any other act of injustice1
 which the will and power of            
communities1 or large bodies of men1 may
 be united to accomplish4 ,and judicial 
tribunals are as much bound to          
recognize1 as lawful1 any act of        
injustice or crime1 which the will and  
power of a single individual may have   
succeeded in accomplishing1 as they are 

to recognize as lawful any act of       
injustice1 which large and organized    
bodies of men1 self-styled governments1 
may accomplish4  ,but1 perhaps it will  
be said that the soundness of this      
definition depends upon the use of the  
word state--and that it therefore makes 
a distinction between the supreme power 
of a state1 over a particular act1 and  
the power of an individual over the same
 act4  ,but this addition of the word   
state1 in reality leaves the definition 
just where it would have been without   
it4 ,for what is a state8 ,it is just   
what1 and only what1 the will and power 
of individuals may arbitrarily          
establish4  ,there is nothing fixed in  
the nature1 character or boundaries of a
 state4 ,will and power may alter them  
at pleasure4 ,the will and power of     
,nicholas1 and that will and power1     
which he has concentrated around1 or    
rather within himself1 establishes all  
,russia1 both in ,europe and ,asia1 as a
 state4 ,by the same rule1 the will and 

power of the owner of an acre of ground1
 may establish that acre as a state1 and
 make his will and power1 for the time  
being1 supreme and lawful within it4    
,the will and power1 also1 that         
established a state yesterday1 may be   
overcome to-day by an adverse will and  
power1 that shall abolish that state1   
and incorporate it into another1 over   
which this latter will and power shall  
to-day be supreme4 ,and this latter will
 and power may also to-morrow be        
overcome by still another will and power
 mightier than they4  ,a state1 then1 is
 nothing fixed1 permanent or certain in 
its nature4 ,it is simply the           
boundaries1 within which any single     
combination or concentration of will and
 power1 are efficient1 or irresistible1 
for the time being4  ,this is the only  
true definition that can be given of a  
state4 ,it is merely an arbitrary name  
given to the territorial limits of      
power4 ,and if such be its true         
character1 then it would follow1 that   

the boundaries1 though but two feet     
square1 within which the will and power 
of a single individual are1 for the time
 being1 supreme1 or irresistible1 are1  
for all legal purposes1 a state--and his
 will and power constitute1 for the time
 being1 the law within those limits2 and
 his acts are1 therefore1 for the time  
being1 as necessarily lawful1 without   
respect to their intrinsic justice or   
injustice1 as are the acts of larger    
bodies of men1 within those limits where
 their will and power are supreme and   
irresistible4  ,if1 then1 law really be1
 what this definition would make it1    
merely a rule of civil conduct          
prescribed by the supreme power of a    
state--it would follow1 as a necessary  
consequence1 that law is synonymous     
merely with will and force1 wherever    
they are combined and in successful     
operation1 for the present moment4      
,under this definition1 law offers no   
permanent guaranty for the safety1      
liberty1 rights or happiness of any one4

 ,it licenses all possible crime1       
violence and wrong1 both by governments 
and individuals4 ,the definition was    
obviously invented by1 and is suited    
merely to gloss over the purposes of1   
arbitrary power4 ,we are therefore      
compelled to reject it2 and to seek     
another1 that shall make law less       
capricious1 less uncertain1 less        
arbitrary1 more just1 more safe to the  
rights of all1 more permanent4 ,and if  
we seek another1 where shall we find it1
 unless we adopt the one first given1   
viz4 that law is the rule1 principle1   
obligation or requirement of natural    
justice8  ,adopt this definition1 and   
law becomes simple1 intelligible1       
scientific2 always consistent with      
itself2 always harmonizing with morals1 
reason and truth4 ,reject this          
definition1 and law is no longer a      
science3 but a chaos of crude1          
conflicting and arbitrary edicts1       
unknown perchance to either morals1     
justice1 reason or truth1 and fleeting  

and capricious as the impulses of will1 
interest and power4  ,if1 then1 law     
really be nothing other than the rule1  
principle1 obligation or requirement of 
natural justice1 it follows that        
government can have no powers except    
such as individuals may rightfully      
delegate to it3 that no law1            
inconsistent with men's natural rights1 
can arise out of any contract or compact
 of government3 that constitutional law1
 under any form of government1 consists 
only of those principles of the written 
constitution1 that are consistent with  
natural law1 and man's natural rights2  
and that any other principles1 that may 
be expressed by the letter of any       
constitution1 are void and not law1 and 
all judicial tribunals are bound to     
declare them so4  ,though this doctrine 
may make sad havoc with constitutions   
and statute books1 it is nevertheless   
law4 ,it fixes and determines the real  
rights of all men2 and its demands are  
as imperious as any that can exist under

 the name of law4  ,it is possible1     
perhaps1 that this doctrine would spare 
enough of our existing constitutions1 to
 save our governments from the necessity
 of a new organization4 ,but whatever   
else it might spare1 one thing it would 
not spare4 ,it would spare no vestige of
 that system of human slavery1 which now
 claims to exist by authority of law4#b 
,footnote #a3 ,it is obvious that       
legislation can have1 in this country1  
no higher or other authority1 than that 
which results from natural law1 and the 
obligation of contracts3 for our        
constitutions are but contracts1 and the
 legislation they authorize can of      
course have no other or higher authority
 than the constitutions themselves4 ,the
 stream cannot rise higher than the     
fountain4 ,the idea1 therefore1 of any  
inherent authority or sovereignty in our
 governments1 as governments1 or of any 
inherent right in the majority to       
restrain individuals1 by arbitrary      
enactments1 from the exercise of any of 

their natural rights1 is as sheer an    
imposture as the idea of the divine     
right of kings to reign1 or any other of
 the doctrines on which arbitrary       
governments have been founded4 ,and the 
idea of any necessary or inherent       
authority in legislation1 as such1 is1  
of course1 equally an imposture4 ,if    
legislation be consistent with natural  
justice1 and the natural or intrinsic   
obligation of the contract of           
government1 it is obligatory3 if not1   
not4  ,footnote #b3 ,the mass of men are
 so much accustomed to regard law as an 
arbitrary command of those who          
administer political power1 that the    
idea of its being a natural1 fixed1 and 
immutable principle1 may perhaps want   
some other support than that of the     
reasoning already given1 to commend it  
to their adoption4 ,i therefore give    
them the following corroborations from  
sources of the highest authority4       
,jurisprudence is the science of what is
 just and unjust4--,justinian4  ,the    

primary and principal objects of the law
 are rights and wrongs4--,blackstone4   
,justice is the constant and perpetual  
disposition to render to every man his  
due4--,justinian4  ,the precepts of the 
law are to live honestly2 to hurt no    
one2 to give to every one his           
due4--,justinian  ,blackstone4  ,,law4  
,the rule and bond of men's actions2 or 
it is a rule for the well governing of  
civil society1 to give to every man that
 which doth belong to him4--,jacob's    
,law ,dictionary4  ,laws are arbitrary  
or positive1 and natural2 the last of   
which are essentially just and good1 and
 bind every where1 and in all places    
where they are observed499 99 99 99     
,those which are natural laws1 are from 
,god2 but those which are arbitrary1 are
 properly human and positive            
institutions4--,selden on ,fortescue1   
,c4 #ag1 also ,jacob's ,law ,dictionary4
  ,the law of nature is that which ,god1
 at man's creation1 infused into him1   
for his preservation and direction2 and 

this is an eternal law1 and may not be  
changed4--#b ,shep4 ,abr4 #cef1 also    
,jac4 ,law ,dict4  ,all laws derive     
their force from the law of nature2 and 
those which do not1 are accounted as no 
laws4--,fortescue4 ,jac4 ,law ,dict4    
,no law will make a construction to do  
wrong2 and there are some things which  
the law favors1 and some it dislikes2 it
 favoreth those things that come from   
the order of nature4--#a ,inst4 #ahc1   
#aig4--;,jac4 ,law ,dict4  ,of law no   
less can be acknowledged1 than that her 
seat is the bosom of ,god1 her voice the
 harmony of the world4 ,all things in   
heaven and earth do her homage2 the     
least as feeling her care1 and the      
greatest as not exempted from her       
power4--,hooker4  ,this law of nature   
being coeval with mankind1 and dictated 
by ,god himself1 is of course superior  
in obligation to any other4 ,it is      
binding over all the globe1 in all      
countries1 and at all times3 no human   
laws are of any validity1 if contrary to

 this2 and such of them as are valid1   
derive all their force1 and all their   
authority1 mediately or immediately1    
from this original4--,blackstone1 ,vol4 
#a1 p4 #da4  ,mr4 ,christian1 one of    
,blackstone's editors1 in a note to the 
above passage1 says3  ,lord ,chief      
,justice ,hobart has also advanced1 that
 even an act of ,parliament made against
 natural justice1 as to make a man judge
 in his own cause1 is void in itself1   
for jura natur sunt immutabilia1 and    
they are leges legum--7the laws of      
nature are immutable--they are the laws 
of laws47--,hob4 #hg4  ,mr4 ,christian  
then adds3  ,with deference to these    
high authorities1 7,blackstone and      
,hobart17 ,i should conceive that in no 
case whatever can a judge oppose his own
 opinion and authority to the clear will
 and declaration of the legislature4    
,his province is to interpret and obey  
the mandates of the supreme power of the
 state4 ,and if an act of ,parliament1  
if we could suppose such a case1 should1

 like the edict of ,herod1 command all  
the children under a certain age to be  
slain1 the judge ought to resign his    
office rather than be auxiliary to its  
execution2 but it could only be declared
 void by the same legislative power by  
which it was ordained4 ,if the judicial 
power were competent to decide that an  
act of parliament was void because it   
was contrary to natural justice1 upon an
 appeal to the ,house of ,lords this    
inconsistency would be the consequence1 
that as judges they must declare void1  
what as legislators they had enacted    
should be valid4  ,the learned judge    
himself 7,blackstone7 declares in p4    
#ia1 if the ,parliament will positively 
enact a thing to be done which is       
unreasonable1 ,i know of no power in the
 ordinary forms of the constitution1    
that is vested with authority to control
 it4  ,it will be seen from this note of
 ,mr4 ,christian1 that he concurs in the
 opinion that an enactment contrary to  
natural justice is intrinsically void1  

and not law2 and that the principal1 if 
not the only difficulty1 which he sees  
in carrying out that doctrine1 is one   
that is peculiar to the ,british        
constitution1 and does not exist in the 
,united ,states4 ,that difficulty is1   
the inconsistency there would be1 if the
 ,house of ,lords1 7which is the highest
 law court in ,england1 and at the same 
time one branch of the legislature17    
were to declare1 in their capacity as   
judges1 that an act was void1 which1 as 
legislators1 they had declared should be
 valid4 ,and this is probably the reason
 why ,blackstone admitted that he knew  
of no power in the ordinary forms of the
 7,british7 constitution1 that was      
vested with authority to control an act 
of parliament that was unreasonable1    
7against natural justice47 ,but in the  
,united ,states1 where the judicial and 
legislative powers are vested in        
different bodies1 and where they are so 
vested for the very purpose of having   
the former act as a check upon the      

latter1 no such inconsistency would     
occur4  ,the constitutions that have    
been established in the ,united ,states1
 and the discussions had on the         
formation of them1 all attest the       
importance which our ancestors attached 
to a separation of the judicial1 from   
the executive and legislative           
departments of the government4 ,and yet 
the benefits1 which they had promised to
 liberty and justice from this          
separation1 have in slight only1 if any 
degree1 been realized4--,although the   
legislation of the country generally has
 exhibited little less than an entire   
recklessness both of natural justice and
 constitutional authority1 the records  
of the judiciary nevertheless furnish   
hardly an instance where an act of a    
legislature has1 for either of these    
reasons1 been declared void by its      
co-ordinate judicial department4 ,there 
have been cases1 few and far between1 in
 which the ,united ,state's courts have 
declared acts of state legislatures     

unconstitutional4 ,but the history of   
the co-ordinate departments of the same 
governments has been1 that the judicial 
sanction followed the legislative act   
with nearly the same unerring certainty1
 that the shadow follows the substance4 
,judicial decisions have consequently   
had the same effects in restraining the 
actions of legislatures1 that shadows   
have in restraining the motions of      
bodies4  ,why this uniform concurrence  
of the judiciary with the legislature8  
,it is because the separation between   
them is nominal1 not real4 ,the         
judiciary receive their offices and     
salaries at the hands of the executive  
and the legislature1 and are amenable   
only to the legislature for their       
official character4 ,they are made      
entirely independent of the people at   
large1 7whose highest interests are     
liberty and justice17 and entirely      
dependent upon those who have too many  
interests inconsistent with liberty and 
justice4 ,could a real and entire       

separation of the judiciary from the    
other departments take place1 we might  
then hope that their decisions would1 in
 some measure1 restrain the usurpations 
of the legislature1 and promote progress
 in the science of law and of           
government4  ,whether any of our present
 judges would1 7as ,mr4 ,christian      
suggests they ought17 resign their      
offices rather than be auxiliary to the 
execution of an act of legislation1     
that1 like the edict of ,herod1 should  
require all the children under a certain
 age to be slain1 we cannot certainly   
know4 ,but this we do know--that our    
judges have hitherto manifested no      
intention of resigning their offices to 
avoid declaring it to be law1 that      
children of two years old and under1 may
 be wrested forever from that parental  
protection which is their birthright1   
and subjected for life to outrages which
 all civilized men must regard as worse 
than death4  ,to proceed with our       
authorities3--  ,those human laws that  

annex a punishment to murder1 do not at 
all increase its moral guilt or superadd
 any fresh obligation in the forum of   
conscience to abstain from its          
perpetration4 ,nay1 if any human law    
should allow or enjoin us to commit it1 
we are bound to transgress that human   
law1 or else we must offend both the    
natural and the divine4--,blackstone1   
,vol4 #a1 p4 #db1 #dc4  ,the law of     
nations depends entirely upon the rules 
of natural law1 or upon mutual compacts1
 treaties1 leagues and agreements       
between these several communities2 in   
the construction also of which compacts1
 we have no other rule to resort to1 but
 the law of nature3 7that7 being the    
only one to which all the communities   
are equally subject4--,blackstone1 ,vol4
 #a1 p4 #dc4  ,those rights then which  
,god and nature have established1 and   
are therefore called natural rights1    
such as are life and liberty1 need not  
the aid of human laws to be more        
effectually invested in every man than  

they are2 neither do they receive any   
additional strength when declared by the
 municipal laws to be inviolable4 ,on   
the contrary1 no human legislature has  
power to abridge or destroy them1 unless
 the owner shall himself commit some act
 that amounts to a                      
forfeiture4--,blackstone1 ,vol4 #a1 p4  
#ed4  ,by the absolute rights of        
individuals1 we mean those which are so 
in their primary and strictest sense2   
such as would belong to their persons   
merely in a state of nature1 and which  
every man is entitled to enjoy1 whether 
out of society1 or in it4--,blackstone1 
,vol4 #a1 p4 #abc4  ,the principal aim  
of society 7government7 is to protect   
individuals in the enjoyment of those   
absolute rights1 which were vested in   
them by the immutable laws of nature2   
but which could not be preserved in     
peace without that mutual assistance and
 intercourse1 which is gained by the    
institution of friendly and social      
communities4 ,hence it follows1 that the

 first and primary end of human laws is 
to maintain and regulate these absolute 
rights of individuals4 ,such rights as  
are social and relative result from1 and
 are posterior to1 the formation of     
states and societies2 so that to        
maintain and regulate these1 is clearly 
a subsequent consideration4 ,and        
therefore the principal view of human   
laws is1 or ought always to be1 to      
explain1 protect1 and enforce such      
rights as are absolute2 which1 in       
themselves1 are few and simple3 and then
 such rights as are relative1 which1    
arising from a variety of connexions1   
will be far more numerous and more      
complicated4 ,these will take up a      
greater space in any code of laws1 and  
hence may appear to be more attended to1
 though in reality they are not1 than   
the rights of the former                
kind4--,blackstone1 ,vol4 #a1 p4 #abd4  
,the absolute rights of man1 considered 
as a free agent1 endowed with           
discernment to know good from evil1 and 

with power of choosing those measures   
which appear to him most desirable1 are 
usually summed up in one general        
appellation1 and denominated the natural
 liberty of mankind4 ,this natural      
liberty consists properly in a power of 
acting as one thinks fit1 without any   
restraint or control1 unless by the law 
of nature1 being a right inherent in us 
by birth1 and one of the gifts of ,god  
to man at his creation1 when he endowed 
him with the faculty of free            
will4--,blackstone1 ,vol4 #a1 p4 #abe4  
,moral or natural liberty1 7in the words
 of ,burlamaqui1 ch4 #c1 s4 #ae17 is the
 right1 which nature gives to all       
mankind of disposing of their persons   
and property after the manner they judge
 most consonant to their happiness1 on  
condition of their acting within the    
limits of the law of nature1 and that   
they do not any way abuse it to the     
prejudice of any other                  
men4--,christian's note1 ,blackstone1   
,vol4 #a1 p4 #abf4  ,all the foregoing  

definitions of law1 rights and natural  
liberty1 although some of them are      
expressed in somewhat vague and         
indefinite terms1 nevertheless recognize
 the primary idea1 that law is a fixed  
principle1 resulting from men's natural 
rights2 and that therefore the          
acknowledgment and security of the      
natural rights of individuals constitute
 the whole basis of law as a science1   
and a sine qua non of government as a   
legitimate institution4  ,and yet       
writers generally1 who acknowledge the  
true theory of government and law1 will 
nevertheless1 when discussing matters of
 legislation1 violate continually the   
fundamental principles with which they  
set out4 ,on some pretext of promoting a
 great public good1 the violation of    
individual rights will be justified in  
particular cases2 and the guardian      
principle being once broken down1       
nothing can then stay the irruption of  
the whole horde of pretexts for doing   
injustice2 and government and           

legislation thenceforth become contests 
between factions for power and plunder1 
instead of instruments for the          
preservation of liberty and justice     
equally to all4  ,the current doctrine  
that private rights must yield to the   
public good1 amounts1 in reality1 to    
nothing more nor less than this1 that an
 individual or the minority must consent
 to have less than their rights1 in     
order that other individuals1 or the    
majority1 may have more than their      
rights4 ,on this principle no honest    
government could ever be formed by      
voluntary contract1 7as our governments 
purport to be27 because no man of common
 sense would consent to be one of the   
plundered minority1 and no honest man   
could wish to be one of the plundering  
majority4  ,the apology1 that is        
constantly put forth for the injustice  
of government1 viz41 that a man must    
consent to give up some of his rights1  
in order to have his other rights       
protected--involves a palpable          

absurdity1 both legally and politically4
 ,it is an absurdity in law1 because it 
says that the law must be violated in   
some cases1 in order that it may be     
maintained in others4 ,it is an         
absurdity politically1 because a man's  
giving up one of his rights has no      
tendency whatever to promote the        
protection of others4 ,on the contrary1 
it only renders him less capable of     
defending himself1 and consequently     
makes the task of his protection more   
burdensome to the government4 ,at the   
same time it places him in the situation
 of one who has conceded a part of his  
rights1 and thus cheapened the character
 of all his rights in the eyes of those 
of whom he asks assistance4 ,there would
 be as much reason in saying that a man 
must consent to have one of his hands   
tied behind him1 in order that his      
friends might protect the rest of his   
body against an enemy1 as there is in   
saying that a man must give up some of  
his rights in order that government may 

protect the remainder4 ,let a man have  
the use of both his hands1 and the      
enjoyment of all his rights1 and he will
 then be more competent to his own      
defence2 his rights will be more        
respected by those who might otherwise  
be disposed to invade them2 he will want
 less the assistance and protection of  
others2 and we shall need much less     
government than we now have4  ,if       
individuals choose to form an           
association or government1 for the      
mutual protection of each other's       
rights1 why bargain for the protection  
of an indefinite portion of them1 at the
 price of giving to the association     
itself liberty to violate the equally   
indefinite remainder8 ,by such a        
contract1 a man really surrenders every 
thing1 and secures nothing4 ,such a     
contract of government would be a       
burlesque on the wisdom of asses4 ,such 
a contract never was1 nor ever will be  
voluntarily formed4 ,yet all our        
governments act on that principle2 and  

so far as they act upon it1 they are as 
essentially usurping and tyrannical as  
any governments can be4 ,if a man pay   
his proportion of the aggregate cost of 
protecting all the rights of each of the
 members of the association1 he thereby 
acquires a claim upon the association to
 have his own rights protected without  
diminution4  ,the ultimate truth on this
 subject is1 that man has an inalienable
 right to so much personal liberty as he
 will use without invading the rights of
 others4 ,this liberty is an inherent   
right of his nature and his faculties4  
,it is an inherent right of his nature  
and his faculties to develope themselves
 freely1 and without restraint from     
other natures and faculties1 that have  
no superior prerogatives to his own4    
,and this right has only this limit1    
viz41 that he do not carry the exercise 
of his own liberty so far as to restrain
 or infringe the equally free           
developement of the natures and         
faculties of others4 ,the dividing line 

between the equal liberties of each must
 never be transgressed by either4 ,this 
principle is the foundation and essence 
of law and of civil right4 ,and         
legitimate government is formed by the  
voluntary association of individuals1   
for the mutual protection of each of    
them in the enjoyment of this natural   
liberty1 against those who may be       
disposed to invade it4 ,each individual 
being secured in the enjoyment of this  
liberty1 must then take the             
responsibility of his own happiness and 
well-being4 ,if his necessities require 
more than his faculties will supply1 he 
must depend upon the voluntary kindness 
of his fellow-men2 unless he be reduced 
to that extremity where the necessity of
 self-preservation over-rides all       
abstract rules of conduct1 and makes a  
law for the occasion--an extremity1 that
 would probably never occur but for some
 antecedent injustice4     ,,chapter    
,,ii4  ,,written ,,constitutions4       
,taking it for granted that it has now  

been shown that no rule of civil        
conduct1 that is inconsistent with the  
natural rights of men1 can be rightfully
 established by government1 or          
consequently be made obligatory as law1 
either upon the people1 or upon judicial
 tribunals--let us now proceed to test  
the legality of slavery by those written
 constitutions of government1 which     
judicial tribunals actually recognize as
 authoritative4  ,in making this        
examination1 however1 ,i shall not      
insist upon the principle of the        
preceding chapter1 that there can be no 
law contrary to natural right2 but shall
 admit1 for the sake of the argument1   
that there may be such laws4 ,i shall   
only claim that in the interpretation of
 all statutes and constitutions1 the    
ordinary legal rules of interpretation  
be observed4 ,the most important of     
these rules1 and the one to which it    
will be necessary constantly to refer1  
is the one that all language must be    
construed strictly in favor of natural  

right4--,the rule is laid down by the   
,supreme ,court of the ,united ,states  
in these words1 to wit3  ,where rights  
are infringed1 where fundamental        
principles are overthrown1 where the    
general system of the law is departed   
from1 the legislative intention must be 
expressed with irresistible clearness1  
to induce a court of justice to suppose 
a design to effect such objects4#c  ,it 
will probably appear from this          
examination of the written              
constitutions1 that slavery neither has1
 nor ever had any constitutional        
existence in this country2 that it has  
always been a mere abuse1 sustained1 in 
the first instance1 merely by the common
 consent of the strongest party1 without
 any law on the subject1 and1 in the    
second place1 by a few unconstitutional 
enactments1 made in defiance of the     
plainest provisions of their fundamental
 law4  ,for the more convenient         
consideration of this point1 we will    
divide the constitutional history of the

 country into three periods2 the first  
embracing the time from the first       
settlement of the country up to the     
,declaration of ,independence2 the      
second embracing the time from the      
,declaration of ,independence to the    
adoption of the ,constitution of the    
,united ,states in #aghi2 and the third 
embracing all the time since the        
adoption of the ,constitution of the    
,united ,states4  ,let us now consider  
the first period2 that is1 from the     
settlement of the country1 to the       
,declaration of ,independence4          
,footnote #c3 ,united ,states vs4       
,fisher1 #b ,cranch1 #cij4     ,,chapter
 ,,iii4  ,,the ,,colonial ,,charters4   
,when our ancestors came to this        
country1 they brought with them the     
common law of ,england1 including the   
writ of habeas corpus1 7the essential   
principle of which1 as will hereafter be
 shown1 is to deny the right of property
 in man17 the trial by jury1 and the    
other great principles of liberty1 which

 prevailed in ,england1 and which have  
made it impossible that her soil should 
be trod by the foot of a slave4  ,these 
principles were incorporated into all   
the charters1 granted to the colonies1  
7if all those charters were like those  
,i have examined1 and ,i have examined  
nearly all of them47--,the general      
provisions of those charters1 as will be
 seen from the extracts given in the    
note1 were1 that the laws of the        
colonies should not be repugnant or     
contrary1 but as nearly as circumstances
 would allow1 conformable to the laws1  
statutes and rights of our kingdom of   
,england4#d  ,those charters were the   
fundamental constitutions of the        
colonies1 with some immaterial          
exceptions1 up to the time of the       
revolution2 as much so as our national  
and state constitutions are now the     
fundamental laws of our governments4    
,the authority of these charters1 during
 their continuance1 and the general     
authority of the common law1 prior to   

the revolution1 have been recognized by 
the ,supreme ,court of the ,united      
,states4#e  ,no one of all these        
charters that ,i have examined--and ,i  
have examined nearly all of             
them--contained the least intimation    
that slavery had1 or could have1 any    
legal existence under them4 ,slavery was
 therefore as much unconstitutional in  
the colonies1 as it was in ,england4    
,it was decided by the ,court of ,king's
 ,bench in ,england--,lord ,mansfield   
being ,chief ,justice--before our       
revolution1 and while the ,english      
,charters were the fundamental law of   
the colonies--that the principles of    
,english liberty were so plainly        
incompatible with slavery1 that even if 
a slaveholder1 from another part of the 
world1 brought his slave into           
,england--though only for a temporary   
purpose1 and with no intention of       
remaining--he nevertheless thereby gave 
the slave his liberty4  ,previous to    
this decision1 the privilege of bringing

 slaves into ,england1 for temporary    
purposes1 and of carrying them away1 had
 long been tolerated4  ,this decision   
was given in the year #aggb4f ,and for  
aught ,i see1 it was equally obligatory 
in this country as in ,england1 and must
 have freed every slave in this country1
 if the question had then been raised   
here4 ,but the slave knew not his       
rights1 and had no one to raise the     
question for him4  ,the fact1 that      
slavery was tolerated in the colonies1  
is no evidence of its legality2 for     
slavery was tolerated1 to a certain     
extent1 in ,england1 7as we have already
 seen17 for many years previous to the  
decision just cited--that is1 the       
holders of slaves from abroad were      
allowed to bring their slaves into      
,england1 hold them during their stay   
there1 and carry them away when they    
went4 ,but the toleration of this       
practice did not make it lawful1        
notwithstanding all customs1 not        
palpably and grossly contrary to the    

principles of ,english liberty1 have    
great weight1 in ,england1 in           
establishing law4  ,the fact1 that      
,england tolerated1 7i4e4 did not punish
 criminally17 the ,african slave-trade  
at that time1 could not legally         
establish slavery in the colonies1 any  
more than it did in ,england--especially
 in defiance of the positive            
requirements of the charters1 that the  
colonial legislation should be consonant
 to reason1 and not repugnant to the    
laws of ,england4  ,besides1 the mere   
toleration of the slave trade could not 
make slavery itself--the right of       
property in man--lawful any where2 not  
even on board the slave ship4           
,toleration of a wrong is not law4 ,and 
especially the toleration of a wrong1   
7i4e4 the bare omission to punish it    
criminally17 does not legalize one's    
claim to property obtained by such      
wrong4 ,even if a wrong can be legalized
 at all1 so as to enable one to acquire 
rights of property by such wrong1 it can

 be done only by an explicit and        
positive provision4  ,the ,english      
statutes1 on the subject of the slave   
trade1 7so far as ,i have seen17 never  
attempted to legalize the right of      
property in man1 in any of the thirteen 
,north ,american colonies4 ,it is       
doubtful whether they ever attempted to 
do it any where else4 ,it is also       
doubtful whether ,parliament had the    
power--or perhaps rather it is certain  
that they had not the power--to legalize
 it any where1 if they had attempted to 
do so4#g ,and the cautious and curious  
phraseology of their statutes on the    
subject1 indicates plainly that they    
themselves either doubted their power to
 legalize it1 or feared to exercise it4 
,they have therefore chosen to connive  
at slavery1 to insinuate1 intimate1 and 
imply their approbation of it1 rather   
than risk an affirmative enactment      
declaring that one man may be the       
property of another4 ,but ,lord         
,mansfield said1 in ,somerset's case1   

that slavery was so odious that nothing 
can be suffered to support it1 but      
positive law4--,no such positive law 7,i
 presume7 was ever passed by            
parliament--certainly not with reference
 to any of these thirteen colonies4     
,the statute of #aghh1 7which ,i have   
not seen17 in regard to the slave trade1
 may perhaps have relieved those engaged
 in it1 in certain cases1 from their    
liability to be punished criminally for 
the act4 ,but there is a great          
difference between a statute1 that      
should merely screen a person from      
punishment for a crime1 and one that    
should legalize his right to property   
acquired by the crime4 ,besides1 this   
act was passed after the separation     
between ,america and ,england1 and      
therefore could have done nothing       
towards legalizing slavery in the       
,united ,states1 even if it had         
legalized it in the ,english dominions4 
,the statutes of #agej1 7#bc1 ,george   
#b;d1 ,ch4 #ca17 may have possibly      

authorized1 by implication1 7so far as  
parliament could thus authorize17 the   
colonial governments1 7if governments   
they could be called17 on that coast of 
,africa1 to allow slavery under certain 
circumstances1 and within the           
settlements on that coast4 ,but1 if it  
did1 it was at most a grant of a merely 
local authority4 ,it gave no authority  
to carry slaves from the ,african coast4
 ,but even if it had purported          
distinctly to authorize the slave trade 
from ,africa to ,america1 and to        
legalize the right of property in the   
particular slaves thereafter brought    
from ,africa to ,america1 it would      
nevertheless have done nothing towards  
legalizing the right of property in the 
slaves that had been brought to1 and    
born in1 the colonies for an hundred and
 thirty years previous to the statute4  
,neither the statute1 nor any right of  
property acquired under it1 7in the     
individual slaves thereafterwards       
brought from ,africa17 would therefore  

avail anything for the legality of      
slavery in this country now2 because the
 descendants of those brought from      
,africa under the act1 cannot now be    
distinguished from the descendants of   
those who had1 for the hundred and      
thirty years previous1 been held in     
bondage without law4  ,but the          
presumption is1 that1 even after this   
statute was passed in #agej1 if the     
slave trader's right of property in the 
slave he was bringing to ,america1 could
 have been brought before an ,english   
court for adjudication1 the same        
principles would have been held to apply
 to it1 as would have applied to a case 
arising within the island of ,great     
,britain4 ,and it must therefore always 
have been held by ,english courts1 7in  
consistency with the decision in        
,somerset's case17 that the slave trader
 had no legal ownership of his slave4   
,and if the slave trader had no legal   
right of property in his slave1 he could
 transfer no legal right of property to 

a purchaser in the colonies4            
,consequently the slavery of those that 
were brought into the colonies after the
 statute of #agej1 was equally illegal  
with that of those who had been brought 
in before4#h  ,the conclusion of the    
whole matter is1 that until some reason 
appears against them1 we are bound by   
the decision of the ,king's bench in    
#aggb1 and the colonial charters4 ,that 
decision declared that there was1 at    
that time1 in ,england1 no right of     
property in man1 7notwithstanding the   
,english government had for a long time 
connived at the slave trade47--,the     
colonial charters required the          
legislation of the colonies to be       
consonant to reason1 and not repugnant  
or contrary1 but conformable1 or        
agreeable1 as nearly as circumstances   
would allow1 to the laws1 statutes and  
rights of the realm of ,england4 ,that  
decision1 then1 if correct1 settled the 
law both for ,england and the colonies4 
,and if so1 there was no constitutional 

slavery in the colonies up to the time  
of the revolution4  ,footnote #d3 ,the  
second charter to ,virginia 7#afji7     
grants the power of making orders1      
ordinances1 constitutions1 directions   
and instructions1 so always as the said 
statutes1 ordinances and proceedings1 as
 near as conveniently may be1 be        
agreeable to the laws1 statutes1        
government and policy of this our realm 
of ,england4  ,the third charter        
7#afaa-ab7 gave to the ,general ,court  
power and authority to make laws and    
ordinances so always as the same be not 
contrary to the laws and statutes of our
 realm of ,england4  ,the first charter 
to ,carolina1 7including both ,north and
 ,south ,carolina17 dated #affc1        
authorized the making of laws under this
 proviso--,provided nevertheless1 that  
the said laws be consonant to reason1   
and as near as may be conveniently1     
agreeable to the laws and customs of    
this our kingdom of ,england4  ,the     
second charter 7#affe7 has this proviso4

 ,provided nevertheless1 that the said  
laws be consonant to reason1 and as near
 as may be conveniently1 agreeable to   
the laws and customs of this our realm  
of ,england4  ,the charter to ,georgia1 
7#agcb17 an hundred years after slavery 
had actually existed in ,virginia1 makes
 no mention of slavery1 but requires the
 laws to be reasonable and not repugnant
 to the laws of this our realm4 ,the    
said corporation shall and may form and 
prepare laws1 statutes and ordinances   
fit and necessary for and concerning the
 government of the said colony1 and not 
repugnant to the laws and statutes of   
,england4  ,the charter to ,maryland    
gave the power of making laws1 ,so1     
nevertheless1 that the laws aforesaid be
 consonant to reason1 and be not        
repugnant or contrary1 but 7so far as   
conveniently may be17 agreeable to the  
laws1 statutes1 customs1 and rights of  
this our kingdom of ,england4  ,the     
charter granted to ,sir ,edward ,plowden
 had this proviso4 ,so1 nevertheless1   

that the laws aforesaid be consonant to 
reason1 and not repugnant and contrary1 
7but as convenient as may be to the     
matter in question17 to the laws1       
statutes1 customs and rights of our     
kingdoms of ,england and ,ireland4  ,in 
the charter to ,pennsylvania1 power was 
granted to make laws1 and the people    
were required to obey them1 ,provided   
nevertheless that the said laws be      
consonant to reason1 and be not         
repugnant or contrary1 but1 as near as  
conveniently may be1 agreeable to the   
laws1 statutes1 and rights of this our  
kingdom of ,england4  ,i have not been  
able to find a copy of the charter      
granted to the ,duke of ,york1 of the   
territory comprising ,new ,york1 ,new   
,jersey1 c4 ,but ,gordon1 in his history
 of the ,american ,revolution1 7vol4 #a4
 p4 #dc17 says1 ,the king's grant to the
 ,duke of ,york1 is plainly restrictive 
to the laws and government of ,england4 
,the charter to ,connecticut gave power 
,also from time to time1 to make1 ordain

 and establish all manner of wholesome  
and reasonable laws1 statutes1          
ordinances1 directions and instructions1
 not contrary to the laws of this realm 
of ,england4  ,the charter to the       
,massachusetts ,bay ,colony1 7granted by
 ,william and ,mary17 gave full power   
and authority1 from time to time1 to    
make1 ordain and establish all manner of
 wholesome and reasonable orders1 laws1 
statutes and ordinances1 directions and 
instructions1 either with penalties or  
without1 so as the same be not repugnant
 or contrary to the laws of this our    
realm of ,england4  ,the charter to     
,rhode ,island granted the power of     
making laws1 ,so as such laws1          
ordinances1 constitutions1 so made1 be  
not contrary and repugnant unto1 but 7as
 near as may be7 agreeable to the laws  
of this our realm of ,england1          
considering the nature and constitution 
of the place and people there4  ,several
 other charters1 patents1 c4 that had a 
temporary existence1 might be named1    

that contained substantially the same   
provision4  ,footnote #e3 ,in the case  
of the town of ,pawlet v4 ,clark and    
others1 the court say--  ,let us now see
 how far these principles were          
applicable to ,new ,hampshire1 at the   
time of issuing the charter to ,pawlet4 
,new ,hampshire was originally erected  
into a royal province in the            
thirty-first year of ,charles ,,ii41 and
 from thence until the revolution       
continued a royal province1 under the   
immediate control and direction of the  
crown4 ,by the first royal commission   
granted in #ca ,charles ,,ii41 among    
other things1 judicial powers1 in all   
actions1 were granted to the provincial 
governor and council1 ',so always that  
the form of proceeding in such cases1   
and the judgment thereupon to be given1 
be as consonant and agreeable to the    
laws and statutes of this our realm of  
,england1 as the present state and      
condition of our subjects inhabiting    
within the limits aforesaid 7i4e4 of the

 province7 and the circumstances of the 
place will admit4' ,independent1        
however1 of such a provision1 we take it
 to be a clear principle that the common
 law in force at the emigration of our  
ancestors1 is deemed the birthright of  
the colonies1 unless so far as it is    
inapplicable to their situation1 or     
repugnant to their other rights and     
privileges4 ,a fortiori the principle   
applies to a royal province4--7#i       
,cranch's ,u4 ,state's ,reports1        
#ccb-c47  ,footnote #f3 ,somerset v4    
,stewart4--,lofft's ,reports1 p4 #a to  
#ai1 of ,easter ,term1 #aggb4 ,in the   
,dublin edition the case is not entered 
in the ,index4  ,footnote #g3 ,have     
parliament the constitutional           
prerogative of abolishing the writ of   
habeas corpus8 the trial by jury8 or the
 freedom of speech and the press8 ,if   
not1 have they the prerogative of       
abolishing a man's right of property in 
his own person8  ,footnote #h3 ,mr4     
,bancroft1 in the third volume of his   

history1 7pp4 #dac1 #ad17 says3  ,and   
the statute book of ,england soon       
declared the opinion of its king and its
 parliament1 that 'the trade1' 7by which
 he means the slave trade1 of which he  
is writing17 'is highly beneficial and  
advantageous to the kingdom and the     
colonies4' ,to prove this he refers to  
statute of #agie1 #h and #aj ,wm4 #c1   
ch4 #bf4 7,should be #agig1 #h-i and #aj
 ,wm4 #c1 ch4 #bf47  ,now the truth is  
that1 although this statute may have    
been1 and very probably was designed to 
insinuate to the slave traders the      
personal approbation of parliament to   
the slave trade1 yet the statute itself 
says not a word of slaves1 slavery1 or  
the slave trade1 except to forbid1 under
 penalty of five hundred pounds1 any    
governor1 deputy-governor or judge1 in  
the colonies or plantations in ,america1
 or any other person or persons1 for the
 use or on the behalf of such governor1 
deputy-governor or judges1 to be a      
factor or factor's agent or agents for  

the sale or disposal of any negroes4    
,the statute does not declare1 as ,mr4  
,bancroft asserts1 that the 7slave7     
trade is highly beneficial and          
advantageous to the kingdom and the     
colonies2 but that the trade to ,africa 
is highly beneficial and advantageous1  
c4 ,it is an inference of ,mr4          
,bancroft's that the trade to ,africa   
was the slave trade4 ,even this         
inference is not justified by the words 
of the statute1 considering them in that
 legal view1 in which ,mr4 ,bancroft's  
remarks purport to consider them4  ,it  
is true that the statute assumes that   
negroes will be imported from ,africa   
into ,england1 7where of course they    
were not slaves17 and into the          
plantations and colonies in ,america4   
,but it nowhere calls these negroes     
slaves1 nor assumes that they are       
slaves4 ,for aught that appears from the
 statute1 they were free men and        
passengers1 voluntary emigrants1 going  
to ,england and the plantations and     

colonies as laborers1 as such persons   
are now going to the ,british ,west     
,indies4  ,the statute1 although it     
apparently desires to insinuate or      
faintly imply that they are property1 or
 slaves1 nevertheless studiously avoids 
to acknowledge them as such distinctly1 
or even by any necessary implication2   
for it exempts them from duties as      
merchandize1 and from forfeiture for    
violation of revenue laws1 and it also  
relieves the masters of vessels from any
 obligation to render any account of    
them at the custom houses4  ,when it is 
considered that slavery1 property in    
man1 can be legalized1 according to the 
decision of ,lord ,mansfield1 by nothing
 less than positive law2 that the rights
 of property and person are the same on 
board an ,english ship1 as in the island
 of ,great ,britain2 and that this      
statute implies that these negroes were 
to be imported into ,england1 as well as
 into the ,plantations and colonies in  
,america1 and that it therefore no more 

implies that they were to be slaves in  
the plantations and colonies than in    
,england1 where we know they could not  
be slaves2 when these things are        
considered1 it is perfectly clear1 as a 
legal proposition1 that the statute     
legalized neither slavery in the        
plantations and colonies1 nor the slave 
trade from ,africa to ,america--however 
we may suppose it to have been designed 
to hint a personal approbation1 on the  
part of parliament1 of the actual       
traffic4  ,but lest ,i may be suspected 
of having either misrepresented the     
words of the statute1 or placed upon    
them an erroneous legal construction1 ,i
 give all the words of the statute1 that
 make any mention of negroes1 or their  
importation1 with so much of the context
 as will enable the reader to judge for 
himself of the legal import of the      
whole4  ,the act is entitled1 ,an ,act  
to settle the ,trade to ,africa4 ,sec4  
#a recites as follows3--  ,whereas1 the 
,trade to ,africa is highly beneficial  

and advantageous to this kingdom and to 
the ,plantations and ,colonies thereunto
 belonging4  ,the act contains          
twenty-one sections1 regulating trade1  
duties4 41 like any other navigation    
act4 ,negroes are mentioned only in the 
following instances and connexions1 to  
wit3  ,sec4 #g4 ,and be it enacted by   
the authority aforesaid1 ,that from and 
after the four-and-twentieth day of     
,june1 one thousand six hundred         
ninety-and-eight1 it shall and may be   
lawful to and for any of the subjects of
 his majesty's realms of ,england1 as   
well as the said ,company17,the ,royal  
,african ,company7 to trade from        
,england or any of his majesty's        
plantations or colonies in ,america to  
the coast of ,africa1 between ,blanco   
and ,cape ,mount1 answering and paying a
 duty of ten pounds per centum ad       
valorem for the goods and merchandizes  
to be exported from ,england or any of  
his majesty's plantations or colonies in
 ,america to and for the coast of       

,africa1 between ,cape ,blanco and ,cape
 ,mount1 and in proportion for a greater
 or lesser value1 and answering and     
paying a further sum and duty of ten    
pounds per centum ad valorem1 redwood   
only excepted1 which is to pay five     
pounds per centum ad valorem1 at the    
place of importation upon all goods and 
merchandize 7negroes excepted7 imported 
in 7into7 ,england or any of his        
majesty's plantations or colonies in    
,america1 from the coast of ,africa1    
between ,cape ,blanco and ,cape ,mount  
aforesaid499 99 99 99 ,and that all     
goods and merchandize1 7negroes         
excepted17 that shall be laded or put on
 board any ship or vessel on the coast  
of ,africa1 between ,cape ,blanco and   
,cape ,mount1 and shall be imported into
 ,england or into any of his majesty's  
plantations or colonies aforesaid1 shall
 answer and pay the duties aforesaid1   
and that the master or chief officer of 
every such ship or vessel that shall    
lade or receive any goods or merchandize

 7negroes excepted7 on board of his or  
their ship or vessel between ,cape      
,blanco and ,cape ,mount1 shall upon    
making entry at any of his majesty's    
custom houses aforesaid of the said ship
 or vessel1 or before any goods or      
merchandize be landed or taken out of   
the said ship or vessel 7negroes        
excepted7 shall deliver in a manifest or
 particular of his cargo1 and take the  
following oath1 viz4  ,i1 ,a4,b41 do    
swear that the manifest or particular   
now by me given in and signed1 to the   
best of my knowledge and belief doth    
contain1 signify and express all the    
goods1 wares and merchandizes 7negroes  
excepted7 which were laden or put on    
board the ship called the----1 during   
her stay and continuing on the coast of 
,africa between ,cape ,blanco and ,cape 
,mount1 whereof ,i1 ,a4,b4 am master4   
,sec4 #h4 ,and that the owner or        
importer of all goods and merchandize   
7negroes excepted7 which shall be       
brought to ,england or any of his       

majesty's plantations from any port of  
,africa between ,cape ,blanco and ,cape 
,mount aforesaid shall make entry of all
 such goods and merchandize at one of   
his majesty's chief custom houses in    
,england1 or in such of his majesty's   
plantations where the same shall be     
imported1 c4  ,sec4 #i499 99 99 99 that 
all goods or merchandizes 7negroes      
excepted7 which shall be brought from   
any part of ,africa1 between ,cape      
,blanco and ,cape ,mount aforesaid1     
which shall be unladed or landed before 
entry made and signed and oath of the   
true and real value thereof made and the
 duty paid as aforesaid shall be        
forfeited1 or the value thereof4  ,sec4 
#bj4 ,and be it further enacted by the  
authority aforesaid1 that no governor1  
or deputy-governor of any of his        
majesty's colonies or plantations in    
,america1 or his majesty's judges in any
 courts there for the time being1 nor   
any other person or persons for the use 
or on behalf of such governor or        

deputy-governor or judges1 from and     
after the nine-and-twentieth day of     
,september1 one thousand six hundred and
 ninety-eight1 shall be a factor or     
factor's agent or agents for the said   
,company17,the ,royal ,african ,company7
 or any other person or persons for the 
sale or disposal of any negroes1 and    
that every person offending herein shall
 forfeit five hundred pounds to the uses
 aforesaid1 to be recovered in any of   
his majesty's courts of record at       
,westminster1 by action of debt1 bill1  
plaint or information1 wherein no       
essoign1 protection1 privilege or wager 
of law shall be allowed1 nor any more   
than one imparlance4  ,sec4 #ba4        
,provided that this act shall continue  
and be in force thirteen years1 and from
 thence to the end of the next sessions 
of parliament1 and no longer4  ,even if 
this act had legalized1 7as in reality  
it did not legalize17 the slave trade   
during those thirteen years1 it would be
 impossible now to distinguish the      

descendants of those who were imported  
under it1 from the descendants of those 
who had been previously1 and were       
subsequently imported and sold into     
slavery without law4 ,the act would     
therefore avail nothing towards making  
the existing slavery in this country    
legal4  ,the next statute1 of which ,i  
find any trace1 passed by parliament1   
with any apparent view to countenance   
the slave trade1 was the statute of     
#bc;d ,george ,,ii41 ch4 #ca4           
7#agdi-ej47  ,mr4 ,bancroft has         
committed another still more serious    
error in his statement of the words1    
7for he professes to quote precise      
words17 of this statute4 ,he says1 7vol4
 #c1 p4 #dad17  ,at last1 in #agdi1 to  
give the highest activity to the trade1 
7meaning the slave trade17 every        
obstruction to private enterprize was   
removed1 and the ports of ,africa were  
laid open to ,english competition1 for  
'the slave trade1'--such 7says ,mr4     
,bancroft17 are the words of the        

statute--'the slave trade is very       
advantageous to ,great ,britain4'  ,as  
words are1 in this case1 things--and    
things of the highest legal             
consequence--and as this history is so  
extensively read and received as        
authority--it becomes important1 in a   
legal1 if not historical1 point of view1
 to correct so important an error as    
that of the word slave in this          
statement4 ,the words of the statute are
 not that the slave trade1 but that the 
trade to and from ,africa is very       
advantageous to ,great ,britain4 ,the   
trade to and from ,africa no more means1
 in law1 the slave trade1 than does the 
trade to and from ,china4 ,from aught   
that appears1 then1 from so much of the 
preamble1 the trade to and from ,africa 
may have been entirely in other things  
than slaves4 ,and it actually appears   
from another part of the statute1 that  
trade was carried on in gold1 elephant's
 teeth1 wax1 gums and drugs4  ,from the 
words immediately succeeding those      

quoted by ,mr4 ,bancroft from the       
preamble to this statute1 it might much 
more plausibly1 7although even from them
 it could not be legally7 inferred that 
the statute legalized the slave trade1  
than from those pretended to be quoted  
by him4 ,that the succeeding words may  
be seen1 the title and preamble to the  
act are given1 as follows3  ,an ,act for
 extending and improving the trade to   
,africa4  ,whereas1 the trade to and    
from ,africa is very advantageous to    
,great ,britain1 and necessary for      
supplying the plantations and colonies  
thereunto belonging1 with a sufficient  
number of ,,negroes at reasonable rates2
 and for that purpose the said trade    
7i4e4 the trade to and from ,africa7    
ought to be free and open to all his    
majesty's subjects4 ,therefore be it    
enacted1 c4  ,negroes were not slaves by
 the ,english law1 and therefore the    
word negroes1 in this preamble1 does not
 legally mean slaves4 ,for aught that   
appears from the words of the preamble1 

or even from any part of the statute    
itself1 these negroes1 with whom it is  
declared to be necessary that the       
plantations and colonies should be      
supplied1 were free persons1 voluntary  
emigrants1 that were to be induced to go
 to the plantations as hired laborers1  
as are those who1 at this day1 are      
induced1 in large numbers1 and by the   
special agency of the ,english          
government1 to go to the ,british ,west 
,indies4 ,in order to facilitate this   
emigration1 it was necessary that the   
trade to and from ,africa should be     
encouraged4 ,and the form of the        
preamble is such as it properly might   
have been1 if such had been the real    
object of parliament4 ,such is          
undoubtedly the true legal meaning of   
this preamble1 for this meaning being   
consistent with natural right1 public   
policy1 and with the fundamental        
principles of ,english law1 legal rules 
of construction imperatively require    
that this meaning should be ascribed to 

it1 rather than it should be held to    
authorize anything contrary to natural  
right1 or contrary to the fundamental   
principles of ,british law4  ,we are    
obliged to put this construction upon   
this preamble1 for the further reason   
that it corresponds with the enacting   
clauses of the statute--not one of which
 mentions such a thing as the           
transportation of slaves to1 or the sale
 of slaves in the plantations and       
colonies4 ,the first section of the act 
is in these words1 to wit4  ,that it    
shall and may be lawful for all his     
majesty's subjects to trade and traffic 
to and from any port or place in        
,africa1 between the port of ,sallee in 
,south ,barbary1 and the ,cape of ,good 
,hope1 when1 at such times1 and in such 
manner1 and in or with such quantity of 
goods1 wares and merchandizes1 as he or 
they shall think fit1 without any       
restraint whatsoever1 save as is herein 
after expressed4  ,here plainly is no   
authority given to trade and traffic in 

any thing except what is known either to
 the ,english law1 or the law of nature1
 as goods1 wares or merchandizes--among 
which men were not known1 either to the 
,english law1 or the law of nature4     
,the second section of the act is in    
these words3  ,that all his majesty's   
subjects1 who shall trade to or from any
 of the ports or places of ,africa1     
between ,cape ,blanco and the ,cape of  
,good ,hope1 shall forever hereafter be 
a body corporate and politic1 in name   
and in deed1 by the name of the ,company
 of ,merchants ,trading to ,africa1 and 
by the same name shall have perpetual   
succession1 and shall have a common     
seal1 and by that name shall and may    
sue1 and be sued1 and do any other act1 
matter and thing1 which any other body  
corporate or politic1 as such1 may      
lawfully do4  ,neither this nor any     
other section of the act purports to    
give this ,company1 in its corporate    
capacity1 any authority to buy or sell  
slaves1 or to transport slaves to the   

plantations and colonies4  ,the #bjth   
section of the act is in these words3   
,and be it further enacted by the       
authority aforesaid1 that no commander  
or master of any ship trading to        
,africa1 shall by fraud1 force or       
violence1 or by any other indirect      
practice whatsoever1 take on board1 or  
carry away from the coast of ,africa1   
any negro or native of the said country1
 or commit1 or suffer to be committed1  
any violence on the natives1 to the     
prejudice of the said trade2 and that   
every person so offending shall1 for    
every such offence1 forfeit the sum of  
one hundred pounds of lawful money of   
,great ,britain2 one moiety thereof to  
the use of the said ,company hereby     
established1 and their successors1 for  
and towards the maintaining of said     
forts and settlements1 and the other    
moiety to and for the use of him or them
 who shall inform or sue for the same4  
,now1 although there is perhaps no good 
reason to doubt that the secret         

intention of parliament in the passage  
of this act1 was to stimulate the slave 
trade1 and that there was a tacit       
understanding between the government and
 the slave dealers1 that the slave trade
 should go on unharmed 7in practice7 by 
the government1 and although it was     
undoubtedly understood that this penalty
 of one hundred pounds would either not 
be sued for at all1 or would be sued for
 so seldom as practically to interpose  
no obstacle to the general success of   
the trade1 still1 as no part of the     
whole statute gives any authority to    
this ,company of ,merchants trading to  
,africa to transport men from ,africa   
against their will1 and as this #bith   
section contains a special prohibition  
to individuals1 under penalty1 to do so1
 no one can pretend that the trade was  
legalized4 ,if the penalty had been but 
one pound1 instead of one hundred       
pounds1 it would have been sufficient1  
in law1 to have rebutted the pretence   
that the trade was legalized4 ,the act1 

on its face1 and in its legal meaning1  
is much more an act to prohibit1 than to
 authorize the slave trade4  ,the only  
possible legal inference from the       
statute1 so far as it concerns the      
supplying the plantations and colonies  
with negroes at reasonable rates1 is1   
that these negroes were free laborers1  
voluntary emigrants1 that were to be    
induced to go to the plantations and    
colonies2 and that the trade to and from
 ,africa was thrown open in order that  
the facilities for the transportation of
 these emigrants might be increased4    
,but although there is1 in this statute1
 no authority given for--but1 on the    
contrary1 a special prohibition         
upon--the transportation of the natives 
from ,africa against their will1 yet ,i 
freely admit that the statute contains  
one or two strong1 perhaps decisive     
implications in favor of the fact that  
slavery was allowed in the ,english     
settlements on the coast of ,africa1    
apparently in conformity with the       

customs of the country1 and with the    
approbation of parliament4 ,but that is 
the most that can be said of it4        
,slavery1 wherever it exists1 is a local
 institution2 and its toleration1 or    
even its legality1 on the coast of      
,africa1 would do nothing towards making
 it legal in any other part of the      
,english dominions4 ,nothing but        
positive and explicit legislation could 
transplant it into any other part of the
 empire4  ,the implications1 furnished  
by the act1 in favor of the toleration  
of slavery1 in the ,english settlements1
 on the coast of ,africa1 are the       
following3  ,the third section of the   
act refers to another act of parliament 
divesting the ,royal ,african ,company  
of their charter1 forts1 castles and    
military stores1 canoe-men and          
castle-slaves2 and section thirty-first 
requires that such officers of his      
majesty's navy1 as shall be appointed   
for the purpose1 shall inspect and      
examine the state and condition of the  

forts and settlements on the coast of   
,africa1 in the possession of the ,royal
 ,african ,company1 and of the number of
 soldiers therein1 and also the state   
and condition of the military stores1   
castles1 slaves1 canoes and other       
vessels and things1 belonging to the    
said company1 and necessary for the use 
and defence of the said forts and       
settlements1 and shall with all possible
 despatch report how they find the same4
  ,here the fact is stated that the     
,royal ,african ,company1 7a company    
that had been in existence long previous
 to the passing of this act17 had held  
castle-slaves for the use and defence of
 the said forts and settlements4 ,the   
act does not say directly whether this  
practice was legal or illegal2 although 
it seems to imply that1 whether legal or
 illegal1 it was tolerated with the     
knowledge and approbation of parliament4
  ,but the most distinct approbation    
given to slavery by the act1 is implied 
in the #bhth section1 in these words3   

,that it shall and may be lawful for any
 of his majesty's subjects trading to   
,africa1 for the security of their goods
 and slaves1 to erect houses and        
warehouses1 under the protection of the 
said forts1 c4  ,although even this     
language would not be strong enough to  
overturn previously established         
principles of ,english law1 and give the
 slave holders a legal right of property
 in their slaves1 in any place where    
,english law had previously been        
expressly established1 7as it had been  
in the ,north ,american colonies17 yet  
it sufficiently evinces that parliament 
approved of ,englishmen holding slaves  
in the settlements on the coast of      
,africa1 in conformity with the customs 
of that country4 ,but it implies no     
authority for transporting their slaves 
to ,america2 it does nothing towards    
legalizing slavery in ,america2 it      
implies no toleration even of slavery   
any where1 except upon the coast of     
,africa4 ,had slavery been positively   

and explicitly legalized on the coast of
 ,africa1 it would still have been a    
local institution4  ,this reasoning may 
appear to some like quibbling2 and it   
would perhaps be so1 were not the rule  
well settled that nothing but explicit  
and irresistible language can be legally
 held to authorize anything inconsistent
 with natural right1 and with the       
fundamental principles of a government4 
,that this statute did not legalize the 
right of property in man1 7unless as a  
local principle on the coast of         
,africa17 we have the decision of ,lord 
,mansfield1 who held that it did not    
legalize it in ,england2 and if it did  
not legalize it in ,england1 it did not 
legalize it in any of the colonies where
 the principles of the common law       
prevailed4 ,of course it did not        
legalize it in the ,north ,american     
colonies4  ,but even if it were admitted
 that this statute legalized the right  
of property1 on the part of the slave   
trader1 in his slaves taken in ,africa  

after the passage of the act1 and       
legalized the sale of such slaves in    
,america1 still the statute would be    
ineffectual to sustain the legality of  
slavery1 in general1 in the colonies4   
,it would only legalize the slavery of  
those particular individuals1 who should
 be transported from ,africa to         
,america1 subsequently to the passage of
 this act1 and in strict conformity with
 the law of this act--7a thing1 by the  
way1 that could now be proved in no case
 whatever47 ,this act was passed in     
#agdi-ej1 and could therefore do nothing
 towards legalizing the slavery of all  
those who had1 for an hundred and thirty
 years previous1 been held in bondage in
 ,virginia and elsewhere4 ,and as no    
distinction can now be traced between   
the descendants of those who were       
imported under this act1 and those who  
had illegally been held in bondage prior
 to its passage1 it would be of no      
practical avail to slavery now1 to      
prove1 7if it could be proved17 that    

those introduced into the country       
subsequent to #agej1 were legally the   
property of those who introduced them4  
,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,colonial ,,statutes4 
,but the colonial legislation on the    
subject of slavery1 was not only void as
 being forbidden by the colonial        
charters1 but in many of the colonies it
 was void for another reason1 viz3 that 
it did not sufficiently define the      
persons who might be made slaves4       
,slavery1 if it can be legalized at all1
 can be legalized only by positive      
legislation4 ,natural law gives it no   
aid4 ,custom imparts to it no legal     
sanction4 ,this was the doctrine of the 
,king's ,bench in ,somerset's case1 as  
it is the doctrine of common sense4     
,lord ,mansfield said1 ,so high an act  
of dominion must be recognized by the   
law of the country where it is used499  
99 99 99 ,the state of slavery is of    
such a nature1 that it is incapable of  
being introduced on any reasons1 moral  
or political--but only positive law1    

which preserves its force long after the
 reasons1 occasion1 and time itself from
 whence it was created1 is erased from  
the memory4 ,it is so odious that       
nothing can be suffered to support it   
but positive law4  ,slavery1 then1 being
 the creature of positive legislation   
alone1 can be created only by           
legislation that shall so particularly  
describe the persons to be made slaves1 
that they may be distinguished from all 
others4 ,if there be any doubt left by  
the letter of the law1 as to the persons
 to be made slaves1 the efficacy of all 
other slave legislation is defeated     
simply by that uncertainty4  ,in several
 of the colonies1 including some of     
those where slaves were most numerous1  
there were either no laws at all        
defining the persons who might be made  
slaves1 or the laws1 which attempted to 
define them1 were so loosely framed that
 it cannot now be known who are the     
descendants of those designated as      
slaves1 and who of those held in slavery

 without any color of law4 ,as the      
presumption must--under the ,united     
,states constitution--and indeed under  
the state constitutions also--be always 
in favor of liberty1 it would probably  
now be impossible for a slaveholder to  
prove1 in one case in an hundred1 that  
his slave was descended1 7through the   
maternal line1 according to the slave   
code17 from any one who was originally a
 slave within the description given by  
the statutes4  ,when slavery was first  
introduced into the country1 there were 
no laws at all on the subject4 ,men     
bought slaves of the slave traders1 as  
they would have bought horses2 and held 
them1 and compelled them to labor1 as   
they would have done horses1 that is1 by
 brute force4 ,by common consent among  
the white race1 this practice was       
tolerated without any law4--,at length  
slaves had in this way become so        
numerous1 that some regulations became  
necessary1 and the colonial governments 
began to pass statutes1 which assumed   

the existence of slaves1 although no    
laws defining the persons who might be  
made slaves1 had ever been enacted4 ,for
 instance1 they passed statutes for the 
summary trial and punishment of slaves2 
statutes permitting the masters to      
chastise and baptise their slaves1#i and
 providing that baptism should not be   
considered1 in law1 an emancipation of  
them4 ,yet all the while no act had been
 passed declaring who might be slaves4  
,possession was apparently all the      
evidence that public sentiment demanded1
 of a master's property in his slave4   
,under such a code1 multitudes1 who had 
either never been purchased as slaves1  
or who had once been emancipated1 were  
doubtless seized and reduced to         
servitude by individual rapacity1       
without any more public cognizance of   
the act1 than if the person so seized   
had been a stray sheep4  ,virginia4     
,incredible as it may seem1 slavery had 
existed in ,virginia fifty years before 
even a statute was passed for the       

purpose of declaring who might be       
slaves2 and then the persons were so    
described as to make the designation of 
no legal effect1 at least as against    
,africans generally4 ,and it was not    
until seventy eight years more1 7an     
hundred and twenty-eight years in all17 
that any act was passed that would cover
 the case of the ,africans generally1   
and make them slaves4 ,slavery was      
introduced in #afbj1 but no act was     
passed even purporting to declare who   
might be slaves1 until #afgj4 ,in that  
year a statute was passed in these      
words3 ,that all servants1 not being    
,christians1 imported into this country 
by shipping1 shall be slaves for their  
lives4#aj  ,this word servants of course
 legally describes individuals known as 
such to the laws1 and distinguished as  
such from other persons generally4 ,but 
no class of ,africans imported1 were    
known as servants1 as distinguished from
 ,africans generally1 or in any manner  
to bring them within the legal          

description of servants1 as here used4  
,in #afhb and in #agje acts were again  
passed declaring that all servants1 c41 
imported1 should be slaves4 ,and it was 
not until #agdh1 after slavery had      
existed an hundred and twenty-eight     
years1 that this description was changed
 for the following3  ,that all persons1 
who have been or shall be imported into 
this colony1 c41 c41 shall be slaves4#aa
  ,in #aggf1 the only statute in        
,virginia1 under which the slaveholders 
could make any claim at all to their    
slaves1 was passed as late as #agec1    
7one hundred and thirty-three years     
after slavery had been introduced27 all 
prior acts having been then repealed1   
without saving the rights acquired under
 them4#ab  ,even if the colonial        
charters had contained no express       
prohibition upon slave laws1 it would   
nevertheless be absurd to pretend that  
the colonial legislature had power1 in  
#agec1 to look back an hundred and      
thirty-three years1 and arbitrarily     

reduce to slavery all colored persons   
that had been imported into1 or born in 
the colony within that time4 ,if they   
could not do this1 then it follows that 
all the colored persons in ,virginia1 up
 to #agec1 7only twenty-three years     
before the revolution17 and all their   
descendants to the present time1 were   
and are free2 and they cannot now be    
distinguished from the descendants of   
those subsequently imported4 ,under the 
presumption--furnished by the           
constitution of the ,united             
,states--that all are free1 few or no   
exceptions could now be proved4  ,in    
,north ,carolina no general law at all  
was passed1 prior to the revolution1    
declaring who might be slaves1--7,see   
,iredell's statutes1 revised by         
,martin47  ,in ,south ,carolina1 the    
only statutes1 prior to the revolution1 
that attempted to designate the slaves1 
was passed in #agdj--;after slavery had 
for a long time existed4 ,and even this 
statute1 in reality1 defined nothing2   

for the whole purport of it was1 to     
declare that all negroes1 ,indians1     
mulattoes and mestizoes1 except those   
who were then free1 should be slaves4   
,inasmuch as no prior statute had ever  
been passed1 declaring who should be    
slaves1 all were legally free2 and      
therefore all came within the exception 
in favor of free persons4#ac  ,the same 
law1 in nearly the same words1 was      
passed in ,georgia1 in #aggj4  ,these   
were the only general statutes1 under   
which slaves were held in those four    
,states1 7,virginia1 ,north ,carolina1  
,south ,carolina and ,georgia17 at the  
time of the revolution4 ,they would all1
 for the reasons given1 have amounted to
 nothing1 as a foundation for the       
slavery now existing in those states1   
even if they had not been specially     
prohibited by their charters4  ,footnote
 #i3 ,chastised4 ,an act passed in      
,south ,carolina in #agdj1 authorized   
slaves to sue for their liberty1 by a   
guardian appointed for the purpose4 ,the

 act then provides that if judgment be  
for the slave1 he shall be set free1 and
 recover damages2 but in case judgment  
shall be given for the defendant1 7the  
master17 the said court is hereby fully 
empowered to inflict such corporeal     
punishment1 not extending to life or    
limb1 on the ward of the plaintiff1 7the
 slave7 as they in their discretion     
shall see fit4  ,brevard's ,digest1 vol4
 #b1 p4 #acj4  ,baptised4 ,in #agab     
,south ,carolina passed this act3       
,since charity and the ,christian       
religion which we profess1 obliges us to
 wish well to the souls of all men1 and 
that religion may not be made a pretence
 to alter any man's property and right1 
and that no persons may neglect to      
baptize their negroes or slaves1 or     
suffer them to be baptized1 for fear    
that thereby they should be manumitted  
and set free3 ,be it therefore enacted1 
,that it shall be1 and is hereby        
declared lawful for any negro or ,indian
 slave1 or any other slave or slaves    

whatsoever1 to receive and profess the  
,christian faith1 and be thereunto      
baptised4 ,but that notwithstanding such
 slave or slaves shall receive and      
profess the ,christian religion1 and be 
baptised1 he or they shall not thereby  
be manumitted or set free1 or his or    
their owner1 master or mistress lose his
 or their civil right1 property and     
authority over such slave or slaves1 but
 that the slave or slaves1 with respect 
to his or their servitude1 shall remain 
and continue in the same state and      
condition1 that he or they was in before
 the making of this act4--,grimke1 p4   
#ah4 ,brevard1 vol4 #b1 p4 #bbi4  ,in   
#affg1 the following statute was passed 
in ,virginia3  ,whereas1 some doubts    
have arisen whether children that are   
slaves by birth1 and by the charity and 
piety of their owners made partakers of 
the blessed sacrament of baptism1 should
 by virtue of their baptism be made     
free2 ,it is enacted and declared by    
this grand assembly1 and the authority  

thereof1 that the confering of baptism  
doth not alter the condition of the     
person as to his bondage or freedom2    
that divers masters1 freed from this    
doubt1 may more carefully endeavor the  
propagation of ,christianity by         
permitting children1 though slaves1 or  
those of greater growth1 if capable to  
be admitted to that                     
sacrament4--,hening's ,statutes1 vol4   
#b1 p4 #bfj4  ,footnote #aj3 ,hening1   
vol4 #b1 p4 #bhc4  ,footnote #aa3       
,hening1 vol4 #e1 p4 #edg-h4  ,footnote 
#ab3 ,in #agec ,virginia passed a       
statute1 occupying some twelve or       
fifteen pages of the statute book1 and  
intended to cover the whole general     
subject of slavery4 ,one of the sections
 of this act is as follows3  ,that all  
and every other act and acts1 clause and
 clauses1 heretofore made1 for or       
concerning any matter or thing within   
the provision of this act1 shall be and 
are hereby repealed4--,hening's         
,statutes1 vol4 #f1 p4 #cfi4  ,no       

reservation being made1 by this section1
 of rights acquired under former        
statutes1 and slave property being a    
matter dependent entirely upon statute1 
all title to slave property1 acquired   
under former acts1 was by this act      
annihilated2 and all the slaves in the  
,state were made freemen1 as against all
 prior legislation4 ,and the slaves of  
the ,state were thenceforward held in   
bondage only by virtue of another       
section of the same act1 which was in   
these words3  ,that all persons who have
 been1 or shall be imported into this   
colony1 by sea or land1 and were not    
,christians in their native country1    
except ,turks and ,moors in amity with  
his majesty1 and such who can prove     
their being free in ,england1 or any    
other ,christian country1 before they   
were shipped for transportation hither1 
shall be accounted slaves1 and as such  
be here bought and sold1 notwithstanding
 a conversion to ,christianity after    
their importation4--,hening1 vol4 #f1 p4

 #cef-g4  ,the act also provided1 ,that 
all children shall be bond or free1     
according to the condition of their     
mothers and the particular directions of
 this act4  ,footnote #ac3 ,the         
following is the preamble and the       
important enacting clause of this       
statute of #agdj3  ,whereas1 in his     
majesty's plantations in ,america1      
slavery has been introduced and allowed2
 and the people commonly called negroes1
 ,indians1 mulattos and mestizoes have  
7been7 deemed absolute slaves1 and the  
subjects of property in the hands of    
particular persons2 the extent of whose 
power over such slaves ought to be      
settled and limited by positive laws1 so
 that the slaves may be kept in due     
subjection and obedience1 and the owners
 and other persons having the care and  
government of slaves1 may be restrained 
from exercising too great vigor and     
cruelty over them2 and that the public  
peace and order of this province may be 
preserved3 ,be it enacted1 ,that all    

negroes1 ,indians1 7free ,indians in    
amity with this government1 and negroes1
 mulattos and mestizoes1 who are now    
free1 excepted17 mulattos and mestizoes1
 who now are or shall hereafter be in   
this province1 and all their issue and  
offspring born or to be born1 shall be  
and they are hereby declared to be and  
remain forever hereafter absolute       
slaves1 and shall follow the condition  
of the mother1 c4--,grimke1 p4 #afc-d4  
,brevard1 vol4 #b1 p4 #bbi4             
,,chapter ,v4  ,,the ,,declaration ,,of 
,,independence4   ,admitting1 for the   
sake of the argument1 that prior to the 
revolution1 slavery had a constitutional
 existence1 7so far as it is possible   
that crime can have such an existence17 
was it not abolished by the declaration 
of independence8  ,the ,declaration was 
certainly the constitutional law of this
 country for certain purposes4 ,for     
example1 it absolved the people from    
their allegiance to the ,english crown4 
,it would have been so declared by the  

judicial tribunals of this country1 if  
an ,american1 during the revolutionary  
war or since1 had been tried for treason
 to the crown4 ,if1 then1 the           
declaration were the constitutional law 
of the country for that purpose1 was it 
not also constitutional law for the     
purpose of recognizing and establishing1
 as law1 the natural and inalienable    
right of individuals to life1 liberty   
and the pursuit of happiness8 ,the      
lawfulness of the act of absolving      
themselves from their allegiance to the 
crown1 was avowed by the people of the  
country--and that too in the same       
instrument that declared the            
absolution--to rest entirely upon1 and  
to be only a consequence of the natural 
right of all men to life1 liberty and   
the pursuit of happiness4 ,if1 then1 the
 act of absolution was lawful1 does it  
not necessarily follow that the         
principles that legalized the act1 were 
also law8 ,and if the country ratified  
the act of absolution1 did they not also

 necessarily ratify and acknowledge the 
principles which they declared legalized
 the act8  ,it is sufficient for our    
purpose1 if it be admitted that this    
principle was the law of the country at 
that particular time1 7#aggf7--;even    
though it had continued to be the law   
only for a year1 or even a day4 ,for if 
it were the law of the country even for 
a day1 it freed every slave in the      
country--7if there were1 as we say there
 were not1 any legal slaves then in the 
country47 ,and the burden would then be 
upon the slaveholder to show that       
slavery had since been constitutionally 
established4 ,and to show this1 he must 
show an express constitutional          
designation of the particular           
individuals1 who have since been made   
slaves4 ,without such particular        
designation of the individuals to be    
made slaves1 7and not even the present  
constitutions of the slave ,states make 
any such designation17 all              
constitutional provisions1 purporting to

 authorize slavery1 are indefinite1 and 
uncertain in their application1 and for 
that reason void4  ,but again4 ,the     
people of this country--in the very     
instrument by which they first announced
 their independent political existence1 
and first asserted their right to       
establish governments of their          
own--declared that the natural and      
inalienable right of all men to life1   
liberty and the pursuit of happiness1   
was a self-evident truth4  ,now1 all    
self-evident truths1 except such as may 
be explicitly1 or by necessary          
implication1 denied1 7and no government 
has a right to deny any of them17 enter 
into1 are taken for granted by1 and     
constitute an essential part of all     
constitutions1 compacts and systems of  
government whatsoever4--,otherwise it   
would be impossible for any systematic  
government to be established2 for it    
must obviously be impossible to make an 
actual enumeration of all the           
self-evident truths1 that are to be     

taken into account in the administration
 of such a government4 ,this is more    
especially true of governments founded1 
like ours1 upon contract4 ,it is clearly
 impossible1 in a contract of           
government1 to enumerate all the        
self-evident truths which must be acted 
upon in the administration of law4 ,and 
therefore they are all taken for        
granted1 unless particular ones be      
plainly denied4  ,this principle1 that  
all self-evident truths1 though not     
enumerated1 make a part of all laws and 
contracts1 unless clearly denied1 is not
 only indispensable to the very         
existence of civil society1 but it is   
even indispensable to the administration
 of justice in every individual case or 
suit1 that may arise1 out of contract or
 otherwise1 between individuals4 ,it    
would be impossible for individuals to  
make contracts at all1 if it were       
necessary for them to enumerate all the 
self-evident truths1 that might have a  
bearing upon their construction before a

 judicial tribunal4 ,all such truths are
 therefore taken for granted4 ,and it is
 the same in all compacts of government1
 unless particular truths are plainly   
denied4 ,and governments1 no more than  
individuals1 have a right to deny them  
in any case4 ,to deny1 in any case1 that
 self-evident truths are a part of the  
law1 is equivalent to asserting that    
self-evident falsehood is law4  ,if1    
then1 it be a self-evident truth1 that  
all men have a natural and inalienable  
right to life1 liberty and the pursuit  
of happiness1 that truth constitutes a  
part of all our laws and all our        
constitutions1 unless it have been      
unequivocally and authoritatively       
denied4  ,it will hereafter be shown    
that this self-evident truth has never  
been denied by the people of this       
country1 in their fundamental           
constitution1 or in any other explicit  
or authoritative manner4 ,on the        
contrary1 it has been reiterated1 by    
them1 annually1 daily and hourly1 for   

the last sixty-nine years1 in almost    
every possible way1 and in the most     
solemn possible manner4 ,on the #dth of 
,july1 '#gf1 they collectively asserted 
it1 as their justification and authority
 for an act the most momentous and      
responsible of any in the history of the
 country4 ,and this assertion has never 
been retracted by us1 as a people4 ,we  
have virtually re-asserted the same     
truth in nearly every state constitution
 since adopted4 ,we have virtually      
re-asserted it in the national          
constitution4 ,it is a truth that lives 
on the tongues and in the hearts of all4
 ,it is true we have1 in our practice1  
been so unjust as to withhold the       
benefits of this truth from a certain   
class of our fellow men4--,but1 even in 
this respect1 this truth has but shared 
the common fate of other truths4 ,they  
are generally allowed but a partial     
application4 ,still1 this truth itself1 
as a truth1 has never been denied by us1
 as a people1 in any authentic form1 or 

otherwise than impliedly by our practice
 in particular cases4 ,if it have1 say  
when and where4 ,if it have not1 it is  
still law2 and courts are bound to      
administer it1 as law1 impartially to   
all4  ,our courts would want no other   
authority than this truth1 thus         
acknowledged1 for setting at liberty any
 individual1 other than one having negro
 blood1 whom our governments1 state or  
national1 should assume to authorize    
another individual to enslave4 ,why1    
then1 do they not apply the same law in 
behalf of the ,african8 ,certainly not  
because it is not as much the law of his
 case1 as of others4 ,but it is simply  
because they will not4 ,it is because   
the courts are parties to an            
understanding1 prevailing among the     
white race1 but expressed in no         
authentic constitutional form1 that the 
negro may be deprived of his rights at  
the pleasure of avarice and power4 ,and 
they carry out this unexpressed         
understanding in defiance of1 and suffer

 it to prevail over1 all our            
constitutional principles of            
government--all our authentic1 avowed1  
open and fundamental law4     ,,chapter 
,,vi4  ,,the ,,state ,,constitutions    
,,of #aghi4   ,of all the state         
constitutions1 that were in force at the
 adoption of the constitution of the    
,united ,states1 in #aghi1 not one of   
them established1 or recognized slavery4
  ,all those parts of the state         
constitutions1 7i4e4 of the old thirteen
 states17 that recognize and attempt to 
sanction slavery1 have been inserted1 by
 amendments1 since the adoption of the  
constitution of the ,united ,states4    
,all the states1 except ,rhode-,island  
and ,connecticut1 formed constitutions  
prior to #aghi4 ,those two states went  
on1 beyond this period1 under their old 
charters4#ad  ,the eleven constitutions 
formed1 were all democratic in their    
general character4 ,the most of them    
eminently so4 ,they generally           
recognized1 in some form or other1 the  

natural rights of men1 as one of the    
fundamental principles of the           
government4 ,several of them asserted   
these rights in the most emphatic and   
authoritative manner4 ,most or all of   
them had also specific provisions       
incompatible with slavery4 ,not one of  
them had any specific recognition of the
 existence of slavery4 ,not one of them 
granted any specific authority for its  
continuance4  ,the only provisions or   
words in any of them1 that could be     
claimed by any body as recognitions of  
slavery1 are the following1 viz4  #a4   
,the use of the words our negroes in the
 preamble to the constitution of        
,virginia4  #b4 ,the mention of slaves  
in the preamble to the constitution of  
,pennsylvania4  #c4 ,the provisions1 in 
some of the constitutions1 for          
continuing in force the laws that had   
previously been in force in the         
colonies1 except when altered by1 or    
incompatible with the new constitution4 
#d4 ,the use1 in several of the         

constitutions1 of the words free and    
freemen4  ,as each of these terms and   
clauses may be claimed by some persons  
as recognitions of slavery1 they are    
worthy of particular notice4  #a4 ,the  
preamble to the frame of government of  
the constitution of ,virginia speaks of 
negroes in this connexion1 to wit3 ,it  
charges ,george the ,third1 among other 
things1 with prompting our negroes to   
rise in arms among us1 those very       
negroes1 whom1 by an inhuman use of his 
negative1 he hath refused us permission 
to exclude by law4  ,here is no         
assertion that these negroes were       
slaves2 but only that they were a class 
of people whom the ,virginians did not  
wish to have in the state1 in any       
capacity--whom they wished to exclude by
 law4 ,the language1 considered as legal
 language1 no more implies that they    
were slaves1 than the charge of having  
prompted our women1 children1 farmers1  
mechanics1 or our people with red hair1 
or our people with blue eyes1 or our    

,dutchmen1 or our ,irishmen to rise in  
arms among us1 would have implied that  
those portions of the people of         
,virginia were slaves4 ,and especially  
when it is considered that slavery had  
had no prior legal existence1 this      
reference to negroes authorizes no legal
 inference whatever in regard to        
slavery4  ,the rest of the ,virginia    
constitution is eminently democratic4   
,the bill of rights declares that all   
men are by nature equally free and      
independent1 and have certain inherent  
rights199 99 99 99 namely1 the enjoyment
 of life and liberty1 with the means of 
acquiring and possessing property1 and  
pursuing and obtaining happiness and    
safety4  #b4 ,the preamble to the       
,pennsylvania constitution used the word
 slaves in this connexion4 ,it recited  
that the king of ,great ,britain had    
employed against the inhabitants of that
 commonwealth1 foreign mercenaries1     
savages and slaves4  ,this is no        
acknowledgment that they themselves had 

any slaves of their own2 much less that 
they were going to continue their       
slavery2 for the constitution contained 
provisions plainly incompatible with    
that4 ,such1 for instance1 is the       
following3 which constitutes the first  
article of the ,declaration of ,rights  
of the ,inhabitants1 7i4e4 of all the   
inhabitants7 of the state of            
,pennsylvania4  #a4 ,that all men are   
born equally free and independent1 and  
have certain natural1 inherent and      
inalienable rights1 among which are1 the
 enjoying and defending life and        
liberty1 acquiring1 possessing and      
protecting property1 and pursuing and   
obtaining happiness and safety4  ,the   
#dfth section of the frame of government
 is in these words4  ,the ,declaration  
of ,rights is hereby declared to be a   
part of the constitution of this        
commonwealth1 and ought never to be     
violated on any pretence whatever4      
,slavery was clearly impossible under   
these two constitutional provisions1 to 

say nothing of others4  #b4 ,several of 
the constitutions provide that all the  
laws of the colonies1 previously in     
force1 should continue in force until   
repealed1 unless repugnant to some of   
the principles of the constitutions     
themselves4  ,maryland1 ,new-,york1     
,new-,jersey1 ,south ,carolina1 and     
perhaps one or two others had provisions
 of this character4 ,north ,carolina had
 none1 ,georgia none1 ,virginia none4   
,the slave laws of these three latter   
states1 then1 necessarily fell to the   
ground on this change of government4    
,maryland1 ,new-,york1 ,new-,jersey and 
,south-,carolina had acts upon their    
statute books1 assuming the existence of
 slavery1 and pretending to legislate in
 regard to it2 and it may perhaps be    
argued that those laws were continued in
 force under the provision referred to4 
,but those acts do not come within the  
above description of laws in force--and 
for this reason1 viz4 the acts were     
originally unconstitutional and void1 as

 being against the charters1 under which
 they were passed2 and therefore never  
had been legally in force1 however they 
might have been actually carried into   
execution as a matter of might1 or of   
pretended law1 by the white race4  ,this
 objection applies to the slave acts of 
all the colonies4 ,none of them could be
 continued under this provision4--,none 
of them1 legally speaking1 were laws in 
force4  ,but in particular states there 
were still other reasons against the    
colonial slave acts being valid under   
the new constitutions4 ,for instance1   
,south ,carolina had no statute 7as has 
before been mentioned17 that designated 
her slaves with such particularity as to
 distinguish them from free persons2 and
 for that reason none of her slave      
statutes were legally in force4         
,new-,jersey also was in the same       
situation4 ,she had slave statutes2 but 
none designating the slaves so as to    
distinguish them from the rest of her   
population4 ,she had also one or more   

specific provisions in her constitution 
incompatible with slavery1 to wit3 ,that
 the common law of ,england99 99 99 99  
shall remain in force1 until altered by 
a future law of the legislature2 such   
parts only as are repugnant to the      
rights and privileges contained in this 
charter4 7,sec4 #bb47  ,maryland had    
also1 in her new constitution1 a        
specific provision incompatible with the
 acts on her colonial statute book in   
regard to slavery1 to wit3  ,sec4 #c4   
,that the inhabitants--mark the word1   
for it includes all the                 
inhabitants--that the inhabitants of    
,maryland are entitled to the common law
 of ,england1 and the trial by jury1    
according to the course of that law1 c4 
,this guaranty1 of the common law of    
,england to all the inhabitants of      
,maryland1 without discrimination1 is   
incompatible with any slave acts that   
existed on the statute book2 and the    
latter would therefore have become void 
under the constitution1 even if they had

 not been previously void under the     
colonial charter4  #d4 ,several of these
 state constitutions have used the words
 free and freemen4  ,for instance4 ,that
 of ,south ,carolina provided1 7,sec4   
#ac17 that the electors of that state   
should be free white men4 ,that of      
,georgia 7,art4 #aa17 and that of ,north
 ,carolina 7,art4 #dj17 use the term    
free citizen4 ,that of ,pennsylvania    
7,sec4 #db17 has the term free denizen4 
,these four instances are the only ones 
,i have found in all the eleven         
constitutions1 where any class of       
persons are designated by the term free4
 ,and it will be seen hereafter1 from   
the connexion and manner in which the   
word is used1 in these four cases1 that 
it implies no recognition of slavery4   
,several of the constitutions1 to wit1  
those of ,georgia1 ,south ,carolina1    
,north ,carolina1 ,maryland1 ,delaware1 
,pennsylvania1 ,new-,york--but not      
,virginia1 ,new-,jersey1 ,massachusetts 
or ,new-,hampshire--repeatedly use the  

word freeman or freemen1 when describing
 the electors1 or other members of the  
state4  ,the only questions that can    
arise from the use of these words free  
and freeman1 are these1 viz3 ,are they  
used as the correlatives1 or opposites  
of slaves8 ,or are they used in that    
political sense1 in which they are used 
in the common law of ,england1 and in   
which they had been used in the colonial
 charters1 viz41 to describe those      
persons possessed of the privilege of   
citizenship1 or some corporate          
franchise1 as distinguished from aliens1
 and those not enjoying franchises1     
although free from personal slavery8    
,if it be answered1 that they are used  
in the sense first mentioned1 to wit1 as
 the correlatives or opposites of       
slavery--then it would be argued that   
they involved a recognition1 at least1  
of the existence of slavery4  ,but this 
argument--whatever it might be worth to 
support an implied admission of the     
actual existence of slavery--would be   

entirely insufficient to support an     
implied admission either of its legal1  
or its continued existence4 ,slavery is 
so entirely contrary to natural right2  
so entirely destitute of authority from 
natural law2 so palpably inconsistent   
with all the legitimate objects of      
government1 that nothing but express and
 explicit provision can be recognized1  
in law1 as giving it any sanction4 ,no  
hints1 insinuations1 or unnecessary     
implications can give any ground for so 
glaring a departure from1 and violation 
of all the other1 the general1 and the  
legitimate principles of the government4
 ,if1 then1 it were admitted that the   
words free and freemen were used as the 
correlatives of slaves1 still1 of       
themselves1 the words would give no     
direct or sufficient authority for laws 
establishing or continuing slavery4 ,to 
call one man free1 gives no legal       
authority for making another man a      
slave4 ,and if1 as in the case of these 
constitutions1 no express authority for 

slavery were given1 slavery would be as 
much unconstitutional as though these   
words had not been used4 ,the use of    
these words in that sense1 in a         
constitution1 under which all persons   
are presumed to be free1 would involve  
no absurdity1 although it might be      
gratuitous and unnecessary4  ,it is a   
rule of law1 in the construction of all 
statutes1 contracts and legal           
instruments whatsoever--that is1 those  
which courts design1 not to invalidate1 
but to enforce--that where words are    
susceptible of two meanings1 one        
consistent1 and the other inconsistent1 
with liberty1 justice and right1 that   
sense is always to be adopted1 which is 
consistent with right1 unless there be  
something in other parts of the         
instrument sufficient to prove that the 
other is the true meaning4 ,in the case 
of no one of all these early state      
constitutions1 is there any thing in the
 other parts of them1 to show that these
 words free and freemen are used as the 

correlatives of slavery4 ,the rule of   
law1 therefore1 is imperative that they 
must be regarded in the sense consistent
 with liberty and right4  ,if this rule1
 that requires courts to give an        
innocent construction to all words that 
are susceptible of it1 were not         
imperative1 courts might1 at their own  
pleasure1 pervert the honest meaning of 
the most honest statutes and contracts1 
into something dishonest1 for there are 
almost always words used in the most    
honest legislation1 and in the most     
honest contracts1 that1 by implication  
or otherwise1 are capable of conveying  
more than one meaning1 and even a       
dishonest meaning4 ,if courts could     
lawfully depart from the rule1 that     
requires them to attribute an honest    
meaning to all language that is         
susceptible of such a meaning1 it would 
be nearly impossible to frame either a  
statute or a contract1 which the        
judiciary might not lawfully pervert to 
some purpose of injustice4 ,there would 

obviously be no security for the honest 
administration of any honest law or     
contract whatsoever4  ,this rule applies
 as well to constitutions as to         
contracts and statutes2 for             
constitutions are but contracts between 
the people1 whereby they grant authority
 to1 and establish law for the          
government4  ,what other meaning1 then1 
than as correlatives of slavery1 are the
 words free and freemen susceptible of1 
as they are used in the early state     
constitutions8  ,among the definitions  
given by ,noah ,webster are these3      
,freeman4 ,one who enjoys1 or is        
entitled to a franchise or peculiar     
privilege2 as the freemen of a city or  
state4  ,free4 ,invested with           
franchises2 enjoying certain immunities2
 with of--as a man free of the city of  
,london4  ,possessing without vassalage1
 or slavish conditions2 as a man free of
 his farm--  ,in ,england1 and in the   
,english law throughout1 as it existed  
before and since the emigration of our  

ancestors to this country1 the words    
free and freemen were political terms in
 the most common use2 and employed to   
designate persons enjoying some         
franchise or privilege1 from the most   
important one of general citizenship in 
the nation1 to the most insignificant   
one in any incorporated city1 town or   
company4 ,for instance3 ,a man was said 
to be a free ,british subject--meaning  
thereby that he was a naturalized or    
native born citizen of the ,british     
government1 as distinguished from an    
alien1 or person neither naturalized nor
 native born4  ,again4 ,a man was said  
to be free of a particular trade in the 
city of ,london--meaning thereby1 that  
by the bye-laws of the city of ,london1 
he was permitted to follow that trade--a
 privilege which others could not have  
without having served an apprenticeship 
in the city1 or having purchased the    
privilege of the city government4  ,the 
terms free and freemen were used with   
reference to a great variety of         

privileges1 which1 in ,england1 were    
granted to one man1 and not to another4 
,thus members of incorporated companies 
were called freemen of the company1 or  
free members of the company2 and were   
said to be free of the said company4    
,the citizens of an incorporated city   
were called the freemen of the city1 as 
freemen of the city of ,london4  ,in    
,jacob's ,law ,dictionary the following 
definitions1 among others1 are given of 
the word freemen4  ,freeman--liber      
homo499 99 99 99 ,in the distinction of 
a freeman from a vassal under the feudal
 policy1 liber homo was commonly opposed
 to vassus1 or vassalus2 the former     
denoting an allodial proprietor2 the    
latter one who held of a superior4  ,the
 title of a freeman is also given to any
 one admitted to the freedom of a       
corporate town1 or of any other         
corporate body1 consisting1 among other 
members1 of those called freemen4       
,there are three ways to be a freeman of
 ,london2 by servitude of an            

apprenticeship2 by birthright1 as being 
the son of a freeman2 and by redemption1
 i4e4 by purchase1 under an order of the
 court of aldermen4  ,the customs of the
 city of ,london shall be tried by the  
certificate of the ,mayor and           
,aldermen199 99 99 99 as the custom of  
distributing the effects of freemen     
deceased3 of enrolling apprentices1 or  
that he who is free of one trade may use
 another4  ,elections of aldermen and   
common-councilmen are to be by freemen  
householders4  ,an agreement on         
marriage1 that the husband shall take up
 the freedom of ,london1 binds the      
distribution of the effects4  ,the      
foregoing and other illustrations of the
 use of the words free and freemen1 may 
be found in ,jacob's ,law ,dictionary1  
under the head of ,freeman1 ,london1 c4 
,and this use of these words has been   
common in the ,english laws for         
centuries4 ,the term freeman is used in 
,magna ,charta1 7#abae74 ,the ,english  
statutes abound with the terms1 in      

reference to almost every franchise or  
peculiar privilege1 from the highest to 
the lowest1 known to the ,english laws4 
,it would be perfectly proper1 and in   
consonance with the legal meaning and   
common understanding of the term1 to say
 of ,victoria1 that she is free of the  
throne of ,england1 and of a cobbler1   
that he is free of his trade in the city
 of ,london4  ,but the more common and  
important signification of the words is 
to designate the citizens1 native or    
naturalized1 and those specially        
entitled1 as a matter of political and  
acknowledged right1 to participate in1  
or be protected by the government1 as   
distinguished from aliens1 or persons   
attainted1 or deprived of their         
political privileges as members of the  
state4 ,thus they use the term free     
,british subject--freeman of the realm1 
c4 ,in short1 the terms1 when used in   
political papers1 have a meaning very   
nearly1 if not entirely synonymous1 with
 that which we1 in this country1 now    

give to the word citizen4  ,but         
throughout the ,english law1 and among  
all the variety of ways1 in which the   
words free and freemen are used1 as     
legal terms1 they are never used as the 
correlatives1 or opposites of slaves or 
slavery--and for the reason that they   
have in ,england no such persons or     
institutions1 known to their laws1 as   
slaves or slavery4 ,the use of the words
 free and freemen1 therefore1 do not in 
,england at all imply the existence of  
slaves or slavery4  ,this use of the    
words free and freemen1 which is common 
to the ,english law1 was introduced into
 this country at its first settlement1  
in all1 or very nearly all the colonial 
charters1 patents1 c4 and continued in  
use1 in this sense1 until the time of   
the revolution2 and1 of course1 until   
the adoption of the first state         
constitutions4#ae  ,the persons and     
companies1 to whom the colonial charters
 were granted1 and those who were       
afterwards to be admitted as their      

associates1 were described as freemen of
 said colony1 freemen of said province1 
freeman of said company1 freemen of the 
said company and body politick1 c4 7,see
 charter of ,rhode ,island47  ,many1 if 
not all the charters had a provision    
similar in substance to the following in
 the charter to ,rhode ,island1 viz3    
,that all and every the subjects of us1 
our heirs and successors1    7i4e4 of   
the king of ,england granting the       
charter17 which are    already planted  
and settled within our said colony of   
,providence    ,plantations1 or which   
shall hereafter go to inhabit within the
 said    colony1 and all and every of   
their children which have been born     
there1 or which shall happen hereafter  
to be born there1 or on the    sea going
 thither1 or returning from thence1     
shall have and enjoy all    liberties   
and immunities of free and natural      
subjects1 within any    of the dominions
 of us1 our heirs and successors1 to all
 intents1    constructions and purposes 

whatsoever1 as if they and every of them
    were born within the realm of       
,england4  ,the following enactment of  
,william ,penn1 as proprietary and      
,governor of the ,province of           
,pennsylvania and its territories1      
illustrates one of the common uses of   
the word freeman1 as known to the       
,english law1 and as used in this       
country prior to the revolution--that   
is1 as distinguishing a native born     
citizen1 and one capable of holding real
 estate1 c4 from a foreigner1 not       
naturalized1 and on that account subject
 to certain disabilities1 such as being 
incompetent to hold real estate4        
,and forasmuch as it is apparent that   
the just encouragement of the           
inhabitants of the province1 and        
territories thereunto belonging1 is     
likely to be an effectual way for the   
improvement thereof2 and since    some  
of the people that live therein and are 
likely to come    thereunto1 are        
foreigners1 and so not freemen1         

according to the    acceptation of the  
laws of ,england1 the consequences of   
which may    prove very detrimental to  
them in their estates and traffic1 and  
so    injurious to the prosperity of    
this province and territories thereof4  
,be it enacted1 by the proprietary and  
governor of the province and    counties
 aforesaid1 by and with the advice and  
consent of the    deputies of the       
freemen thereof1 in assembly met1 ,that 
all persons    who are strangers and    
foreigners1 that do now inhabit this    
province    and counties aforesaid1 that
 hold land in fee in the same1 according
    to the law of a freeman1 and who    
shall solemnly promise1 within    three 
months after the publication thereof1 in
 their respective    county courts where
 they live1 upon record1 faith and      
allegiance to    the king of ,england   
and his heirs and successors1 and       
fidelity and    lawful obedience to the 
said ,william ,penn1 proprietary and    
governor    of the said province and    

territories1 and his heirs and assigns1 
according to the king's letters1 patents
 and deed aforesaid1 shall    be held   
and reputed freemen of the province and 
counties aforesaid1    in as ample and  
full a manner as any person residing    
therein4 ,and it    is hereby further   
enacted1 by the authority aforesaid1    
,that when at    any time any person1   
that is a foreigner1 shall make his     
request to    the proprietary and       
governor of this province and           
territories    thereof1 for the         
aforesaid freedom1 the said person shall
 be    admitted on the conditions herein
 expressed1 paying at his admission     
twenty shillings sterling1 and no more1 
any thing in this law1 or any    other  
law1 act or thing in this province1 to  
the contrary in any wise                
notwithstanding4     ,given at ,chester1
 c41 under the hand and broad seal of   
,william    ,penn1 proprietary and      
governor of this province and           
territories    thereunto belonging1 in  

the second year of his government1 by   
the    king's authority4 ,w4 ,,penn4#af 
,up to the time of our revolution1 the  
only meaning which the words free and   
freemen had1 in the ,english law1 in the
 charters granted to the colonies1 and  
in the important documents of a         
political character1 when used to       
designate one person as distinguished   
from another1 was to designate a person 
enjoying some franchise or privilege1 as
 distinguished from aliens or persons   
not enjoying a similar franchise4 ,they 
were never used to designate a free     
person as distinguished from a          
slave--for the very sufficient reason   
that all these fundamental laws presumed
 that there were no slaves4  ,was such  
the meaning of the words free and       
freemen1 as used in the constitutions   
adopted prior to #aghi1 in the ,states  
of ,georgia1 ,north and ,south          
,carolina1 ,maryland1 ,delaware and ,new
 ,york8  ,the legal rule of             
interpretation before mentioned1 viz3   

that an innocent meaning must be given  
to all words that are susceptible of    
it--would compel us to give the words   
this meaning1 instead of a meaning      
merely correlative with slavery1 even if
 we had no other ground than the rule   
alone1 for so doing4 ,but we have other 
grounds4 ,for instance3--,several of    
these constitutions have themselves     
explicitly given to the words this      
meaning4 ,while not one of them have    
given them a meaning correlative with   
slaves1 inasmuch as none of them purport
 either to establish1 authorize1 or even
 to know of the existence of slavery4   
,the constitution of ,georgia 7adopted  
in #aggg7 evidently uses the word free  
in this sense1 in the following article3
     ,art4 #aa4 ,no person shall be     
entitled to more than one vote1 which   
shall be given in the county where such 
person resides1 except as    before     
excepted2 nor shall any person who holds
 any title of    nobility1 be entitled  
to a vote1 or be capable of serving as a

    representative1 or hold any post of 
honor1 profit1 or trust1 in this        
,state1 while such person claims his    
title of nobility2 but if the    person 
shall give up such distinction1 in the  
manner as may be    directed by any     
future legislature1 then1 and in such   
case1 he    shall be entitled to a vote1
 and represent1 as before directed1 and 
enjoy all the other benefits of a ,,free
 citizen4  ,the constitution of ,north  
,carolina1 7adopted in #aggf71 used the 
word in a similar sense1 as follows3    
#dj4 ,that every foreigner1 who comes to
 settle in this ,state1    having first 
taken an oath of allegiance to the same1
 may purchase1    or by other just means
 acquire1 hold1 and transfer land1 or   
other    real estate1 and after one     
year's residence be deemed a ,,free     
citizen4  ,this constitution also       
repeatedly uses the word freeman2       
meaning thereby a free citizen1 as thus 
defined4  ,the constitution of          
,pennsylvania1 7adopted in #aggf17 uses 

the word in the same sense3     ,sec4   
#db4 ,every foreigner1 of good          
character1 who comes to settle    in    
this ,state1 having first taken an oath 
or affirmation of    allegiance to the  
same1 may purchase1 or by other just    
means acquire1    hold and transfer land
 or other real estate2 and after one    
year's    residence1 shall be deemed a  
,,free denizen thereof1 and entitled to 
all the rights of a natural born subject
 of this state1 except that    he shall 
not be capable of being elected a       
representative until after    two year's
 residence4  ,the constitution of ,new  
,york1 7adopted in #aggg17 uses the word
 in the same manner3     ,sec4 #f4 ,that
 every male inhabitant of full age1 who 
has personally    resided in one of the 
counties of this state for six months1  
immediately preceding the day of        
election1 shall at such election be     
entitled to vote for representatives of 
the said county in assembly1    if      
during the time aforesaid he shall have 

been a freeholder1    possessing a      
freehold of the value of twenty pounds1 
within the said    county1 or have      
rented a tenement therein of the yearly 
value of    forty shillings1 and been   
rated and actually paid taxes to the    
,state4    ,provided always1 ,that every
 person who now is a freeman of the     
city of ,albany1 or who was made a      
freeman of the city of ,new ,york1    on
 or before the fourteenth day of        
,october1 in the year of our ,lord      
one thousand seven hundred and          
seventy-five1 and shall be actually     
and usually resident in the said cities 
respectively1 shall be    entitled to   
vote for representatives in assembly    
within his place of    residence4  ,the 
constitution of ,south ,carolina1       
7formed in #aggh17 uses the word free in
 a sense which may1 at first thought1 be
 supposed to be different from that in  
which it is used in the preceding cases3
     ,sec4 #ac4 ,the qualification of   
electors shall be that every free       

white man1 and no other person1 c41     
shall be deemed a person    qualified to
 vote for1 and shall be capable of being
 elected a    representative4  ,it may  
be supposed that here the word free is  
used as the correlative of slavery2 that
 it presumes the whites to be free2 and 
that it therefore implies that other    
persons than white may be slaves4 ,not  
so4 ,no other parts of the constitution 
authorize such an inference2 and the    
implication from the words themselves   
clearly is1 that some white persons     
might not be free4 ,the distinction     
implied is between those white persons  
that were free1 and those that were not 
free4 ,if this were not the distinction 
intended1 and if all white persons were 
free1 it would have been sufficient to  
have designated the electors simply as  
white persons1 instead of designating   
them as both free and white4 ,if        
therefore it were admitted that the word
 free1 in this instance1 were used as   
the correlative of slaves1 the          

implication would be that some white    
persons were1 or might be slaves4 ,there
 is therefore no alternative but to give
 to the word free1 in this instance1 the
 same meaning that it has in the        
constitutions of ,georgia1 ,north       
,carolina and ,pennsylvania4  ,in #agjd 
,south ,carolina passed an act entitled1
 ,an act for making aliens ,,free of    
this part of the ,province4--,this      
statute remained in force until #aghd1  
when it was repealed by an act entitled 
,an act to confer the right of          
citizenship on aliens#ag  ,one more     
example of this use of the word freeman4
 ,the constitution of ,connecticut1     
adopted as late as #ahah1 has this      
provision3     ,art4 #f4 ,sec4 #a4 ,all 
persons who have been1 or shall         
hereafter1    previous to the           
ratification of this constitution1 be   
admitted    freemen1 according to the   
existing laws of this ,state1 shall be  
electors4  ,surely no other proof can be
 necessary of the meaning of the words  

free and freeman1 as used in the        
constitutions existing in #aghi2 or that
 the use of those words furnish no      
implication in support of either the    
'existence'1 or the constitutionality of
 slavery1 prior to the adoption of the  
constitution of the ,united ,states in  
that year4  ,i have found1 in none of   
the ,state constitutions before         
mentioned1 7existing in #aghi17 any     
other evidence or intimation of the     
existence of slavery1 than that already 
commented upon and refuted4 ,and if     
there be no other1 then it is clear that
 slavery had no legal existence under   
them4 ,and there was consequently no    
constitutional slavery in the country up
 to the adoption of the constitution of 
the ,united ,states4  ,footnote #ad3    
,the ,state ,constitutions of #aghi were
 adopted as follows3 ,georgia1 #aggg2   
,south ,carolina1 #aggh2 ,north         
,carolina1 #aggf2 ,virginia1 #aggf2     
,maryland1 #aggf2 ,delaware1 #aggf2     
,pennsylvania1 #aggf2 ,new ,jersey1     

#aggf2 ,new ,york1 #aggg2               
,massachusetts1 #aghj2 ,new ,hampshire1 
#aghc4  ,these early ,constitutions     
ought to be collected and published with
 appropriate notes4  ,footnote #ae3     
,since that time the words free and     
freemen have been gradually falling into
 disuse1 and the word citizen been      
substituted--doubtless for the reason   
that it is not pleasant to our pride or 
our humanity to use words1 one of whose 
significations serves to suggest a      
contrast between ourselves and slaves4  
,footnote #af3 ,dallas's edition of the 
,laws of ,pennsylvania1 vol4 #a1        
,appendix1 page #be4  ,footnote #ag3    
,cooper's edition of the ,laws of ,south
 ,carolina1 vols4 #b and #d4 ,aliens1   
,,chapter ,,vii4  ,,the ,,articles ,,of 
,,confederation4   ,the ,articles of    
,confederation1 7formed in #aggh17      
contained no recognition of slavery4    
,the only words in them1 that could be  
claimed by any body as recognizing      
slavery1 are the following1 in ,art4 #d1

 ,sec4 #a4     ,the better to secure and
 perpetuate mutual friendship and       
intercourse among the people of the     
different ,states in this ,union1    the
 free inhabitants of each of these      
,states1 paupers1 vagabonds    and      
fugitives from justice excepted1 shall  
be entitled to all the    privileges and
 immunities of free citizens in the     
several ,states2    and the people of   
each ,state shall have free ingress and 
regress to    and from any other ,state1
 and shall enjoy therein all the        
privileges    of trade and commerce1    
subject to the same duties1 impositions 
and    restrictions1 as the inhabitants 
thereof respectively4  ,there are       
several reasons why this provision      
contains no legal recognition of        
slavery4  #a4 ,the true meaning of the  
word free1 as used in the ,english law1 
in the colonial charters1 and in the    
,state constitutions up to this time1   
when applied to persons1 was to describe
 citizens1 or persons possessed of      

franchises1 as distinguished from aliens
 or persons not possessed of the same   
franchises4 ,usage1 then1 would give    
this meaning to the word free in this   
section4  #b4 ,the rules of law require 
that an innocent meaning should be given
 to all words that will bear an innocent
 meaning4  #c4 ,the ,confederation was a
 league between states in their         
corporate capacity2 and not1 like the   
constitution1 a government established  
by the people in their individual       
character4 ,the confederation1 then1    
being a league between states or        
corporations1 as such1 of course        
recognized nothing in the character of  
the state governments except what their 
corporate charters or state             
constitutions authorized4 ,and as none  
of the state constitutions of the day   
recognized slavery1 the confederation of
 the state governments could not of     
course recognize it4 ,certainly none of 
its language can1 consistently with     
legal rules1 have such a meaning given  

to it1 when it is susceptible of another
 that perfectly accords with the sense  
in which it is used in the constitutions
 of the states1 that were parties to the
 league4  #d4 ,no other meaning can be  
given to the word free in this case1    
without making the sentence an absurd1  
or1 at least1 a foolish and inconsistent
 one4 ,for instance1--,the word free is 
joined to the word citizen4 ,what reason
 could there be in applying the term    
free to the word citizen1 if the word   
free were used as the correlative of    
slavery8 ,such an use of the word would 
imply that some of the citizens were1 or
 might be slaves--which would be an     
absurdity4 ,but used in the other sense1
 it implies only that some citizens had 
franchises not enjoyed by others2 such1 
perhaps1 as the right of suffrage1 and  
the right of being elected to office2   
which franchises were only enjoyed by a 
part of the citizens4 ,all who were born
 of ,english parents1 for instance1 were
 citizens1 and entitled to the          

protection of the government1 and       
freedom of trade and occupation1 c41 c41
 and in these respects were             
distinguished from aliens4--,yet a      
property qualification was necessary1 in
 some1 if not all the ,states1 to       
entitle even such to the franchises of  
suffrage1 and of eligibility to office4 
,the terms free inhabitants and people  
were probably used as synonymous either 
with free citizens1 or with citizens not
 free--that is1 not possessing the      
franchises of suffrage and eligibility  
to office4  ,mr4 ,madison1 in the #db;d 
,no4 of the ,federalist1 in commenting  
upon the power given to the general     
government by the new constitution1 of  
naturalizing aliens1 refers to this     
clause in the ,articles of              
,confederation2 and takes it for granted
 that the word free was used in that    
political sense1 in which ,i have       
supposed it to be used--that is1 as     
distinguishing citizens and the         
inhabitants or people proper1 from      

aliens and persons not allowed the      
franchises enjoyed by the inhabitants   
and people of the ,states4--,even the   
privilege of residence he assumes to be 
a franchise entitling one to the        
denomination of free4     ,he says3 ,the
 dissimilarity in the rules of          
naturalization1 7i4e4 in    the rules   
established by the separate states1 for 
under the    confederation each state   
established its own rules of            
naturalization17 has long been remarked 
as a fault in our system1    and as     
laying a foundation for intricate and   
delicate questions4 ,in    the fourth   
article of confederation1 it is         
declared1 'that the free    inhabitants 
of each of these states1 paupers1       
vagabonds1 and    fugitives from justice
 excepted1 shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of free       
citizens in the several states2    and  
the people of each state shall1 in every
 other1 enjoy all the    privileges of  
trade and commerce1' c4 ,there is a     

confusion of    language here1 which is 
remarkable4 ,why the terms free         
inhabitants    are used in one part of  
the article1 free citizens in another1  
and    people in another2 or what was   
meant by superadding to 'all            
privileges and immunities of free       
citizens1' 'all the privileges of       
trade and commerce1' cannot easily be   
determined4 ,it seems to be a           
construction scarcely avoidable1        
however1 that those who come under      
the denomination of free inhabitants of 
a state1 although not    citizens of    
such state1 are entitled1 in every other
 state1 to all    the privileges of free
 citizens of the latter2 that is1 to    
greater    privileges than they may be  
entitled to in their own state2 so that 
it may be in the power of a particular  
state1 or rather every state    is laid 
under the necessity1 not only to confer 
the rights of    citizenship in other   
states upon any whom it may admit to    
such rights    within itself1 but upon  

any whom it may allow to become         
inhabitants    within its jurisdiction4 
,but were an exposition of the term     
'inhabitant' to be admitted1 which would
 confine the stipulated    privileges to
 citizens alone1 the difficulty is      
diminished only1 not    removed4 ,the   
very improper power would still be      
retained by each    state1 of           
naturalizing aliens in every other      
state4 ,in one state1    residence for a
 short time confers all the rights of   
citizenship2 in    another1             
qualifications of greater importance are
 required4 ,an alien1    therefore1     
legally incapacitated for certain rights
 in the latter1    may1 by previous     
residence only in the former1 elude his 
incapacity1    and thus the law of one  
state be preposterously rendered        
paramount to    the laws of another1    
within the jurisdiction of the other4   
,we owe it to mere casualty1 that very  
serious embarrassments on this          
subject have been hitherto escaped4 ,by 

the laws of several states1    certain  
description of aliens1 who had rendered 
themselves obnoxious1    were laid under
 interdicts inconsistent1 not only with 
the rights of    citizenship1 but with  
the privileges of residence4 ,what would
 have    been the consequence1 if such  
persons1 by residence1 or otherwise1    
had acquired the character of citizens  
under the laws of another    state1 and 
then asserted their rights as such1 both
 to residence and    citizenship1 within
 the state proscribing them8 ,whatever  
the legal    consequences might have    
been1 other consequences would probably 
have    resulted of too serious a       
nature1 not to be provided against4 ,the
 new    constitution has accordingly1   
with great propriety1 made provision    
against them1 and all others proceeding 
from the defect of the    confederation 
on this head1 by authorizing the general
 government to    establish an uniform  
rule of naturalization throughout the   
,united    ,states4  ,throughout this   

whole quotation ,mr4 ,madison obviously 
takes it for granted that the word free 
is used in the articles of              
confederation1 as the correlative of    
aliens4--,and in this respect he no     
doubt correctly represents the meaning  
then given to the word by the people of 
the ,united ,states4 ,and in the closing
 sentence of the quotation1 he virtually
 asserts that such is the meaning of the
 word free in the new constitution4     
,,chapter ,,viii4  ,,the ,,constitution 
,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states4   ,we come
 now to the period commencing with the  
adoption of the constitution of the     
,united ,states4  ,we have already seen 
that slavery had not been authorized or 
established by any of the fundamental   
constitutions or charters that had      
existed previous to this time2 that it  
had always been a mere abuse sustained  
by the common consent of the strongest  
party1 in defiance of the avowed        
constitutional principles of their      
governments4 ,and the question now is1  

whether it was constitutionally         
established1 authorized or sanctioned by
 the constitution of the ,united        
,states8  ,it is perfectly clear1 in the
 first place1 that the constitution of  
the ,united ,states did not1 of itself1 
create or establish slavery as a new    
institution2 or even give any authority 
to the state governments to establish it
 as a new institution4--,the greatest   
sticklers for slavery do not claim this4
 ,the most they claim is1 that it       
recognized it as an institution already 
legally existing1 under the authority of
 the state governments2 and that it     
virtually guarantied to the states the  
right of continuing it in existence     
during their pleasure4 ,and this is     
really the only question arising out of 
the constitution of the ,united ,states 
on this subject1 viz3 whether it did    
thus recognize and sanction slavery as  
an existing institution8  ,this question
 is1 in reality1 answered in the        
negative by what has already been shown2

 for if slavery had no constitutional   
existence1 under the state              
constitutions1 prior to the adoption of 
the constitution of the ,united ,states1
 then it is absolutely certain that the 
constitution of the ,united ,states did 
not recognize it as a constitutional    
institution2 for it cannot1 of course1  
be pretended that the ,united ,states   
constitution recognized1 as             
constitutional1 any state institution   
that did not constitutionally exist4    
,even if the constitution of the ,united
 ,states had intended to recognize      
slavery1 as a constitutional state      
institution1 such intended recognition  
would have failed of effect1 and been   
legally void1 because slavery then had  
no constitutional existence to be       
recognized4  ,suppose1 for an           
illustration of this principle1 that the
 constitution of the ,united ,states    
had1 by implication1 plainly taken it   
for granted that the state legislatures 
had power--derived from the state       

constitutions--to order arbitrarily that
 infant children1 or that men without   
the charge of crime1 should be          
maimed--deprived1 for instance1 of a    
hand1 a foot1 or an eye4 ,this intended 
recognition1 on the part of the         
constitution of the ,united ,states1 of 
the legality of such a practice1 would  
obviously have failed of all legal      
effect--would have been mere            
surplussage--if it should appear1 from  
an examination of the state             
constitutions themselves1 that they had 
really conferred no such power upon the 
legislatures4 ,and this principle       
applies with the same force to laws that
 would arbitrarily make men or children 
slaves1 as to laws that should          
arbitrarily order them to be maimed or  
murdered4  ,we might here safely rest   
the whole question--for no one1 as has  
already been said1 pretends that the    
constitution of the ,united ,states1 by 
its own authority1 created or authorized
 slavery as a new institution2 but only 

that it intended to recognize it as one 
already established by authority of the 
state constitutions4 ,this intended     
recognition--if there were any          
such--being founded on an error as to   
what the state constitutions really did 
authorize1 necessarily falls to the     
ground1 a defunct intention4  ,we make a
 stand1 then1 at this point1 and insist 
that the main question--the only        
material question--is already decided   
against slavery2 and that it is of no   
consequence what recognition or sanction
 the constitution of the ,united ,states
 may have intended to extend to it4     
,the constitution of the ,united        
,states1 at its adoption1 certainly took
 effect upon1 and made citizens of all  
the people of the ,united ,states1 who  
were not slaves under the state         
constitutions4 ,no one can deny a       
proposition so self-evident as that4    
,if1 then1 the ,state constitutions1    
then existing1 authorized no slavery at 
all1 the constitution of the ,united    

,states took effect upon1 and made      
citizens of all the people of the       
,united ,states1 without discrimination4
 ,and if all the people of the ,united  
,states were made citizens of the       
,united ,states1 by the ,united ,states 
constitution1 at its adoption1 it was   
then forever too late for the state     
governments to reduce any of them to    
slavery4 ,they were thenceforth citizens
 of a higher government1 under a        
constitution that was the supreme law of
 the land1 any thing in the constitution
 or laws of the states to the contrary  
notwithstanding4 ,if the state          
governments could enslave citizens of   
the ,united ,states1 the state          
constitutions1 and not the constitution 
of the ,united ,states1 would be the    
supreme law of the land--for no higher  
act of supremacy could be exercised by  
one government over another1 than that  
of taking the citizens of the latter out
 of the protection of their government1 
and reducing them to slavery4           

,,secondly4  ,although we might stop--we
 yet do not choose to stop--at the point
 last suggested4 ,we will now go        
further1 and attempt to show1           
specifically from its provisions1 that  
the constitution of the ,united ,states1
 not only does not recognize or sanction
 slavery1 as a legal institution1 but   
that1 on the contrary1 it presumes all  
men to be free2 that it positively      
denies the right of property in man2 and
 that it1 of itself1 makes it impossible
 for slavery to have a legal existence  
in any of the ,united ,states4  ,in the 
first place--although the assertion is  
constantly made1 and rarely denied1 yet 
it is palpably a mere begging of the    
whole question in favor of slavery1 to  
say that the constitution intended to   
sanction it2 for if it intended to      
sanction it1 it did thereby necessarily 
sanction it1 7that is1 if slavery then  
had any constitutional existence to be  
sanctioned47 ,the intentions of the     
constitution are the only means whereby 

it sanctions any thing4 ,and its        
intentions necessarily sanction         
everything to which they apply1 and     
which1 in the nature of things1 they are
 competent to sanction4 ,to say1        
therefore1 that the constitution        
intended to sanction slavery1 is the    
same as to say that it did sanction it2 
which is begging the whole question1 and
 substituting mere assertion for proof4 
,why1 then1 do not men say distinctly1  
that the constitution did sanction      
slavery1 instead of saying that it      
intended to sanction it8 ,we are not    
accustomed to use the word intention1   
when speaking of the other grants and   
sanctions of the constitution4 ,we do   
not say1 for example1 that the          
constitution intended to authorize      
congress to coin money1 but that it did 
authorize them to coin it4 ,nor do we   
say that it intended to authorize them  
to declare war2 but that it did         
authorize them to declare it4 ,it would 
be silly and childish to say merely that

 it intended to authorize them to coin  
money1 and to declare war1 when the     
language authorizing them to do so1 is  
full1 explicit and positive4 ,why1 then1
 in the case of slavery1 do men say     
merely that the constitution intended to
 sanction it1 instead of saying         
distinctly1 as we do in the other cases1
 that it did sanction it8 ,the reason is
 obvious4 ,if they were to say          
unequivocally that it did sanction it1  
they would lay themselves under the     
necessity of pointing to the words that 
sanction it2 and they are aware that the
 words alone of the constitution do not 
come up to that point4 ,they1 therefore1
 assert simply that the constitution    
intended to sanction it2 and they then  
attempt to support the assertion by     
quoting certain words and phrases1 which
 they say are capable of covering1 or   
rather of concealing such an intention2 
and then by the aid of exterior1        
circumstantial and historical evidence1 
they attempt to enforce upon the mind   

the conclusion that1 as matter of fact1 
such was the intention of those who     
drafted the constitution2 and thence    
they finally infer that such was the    
intention of the constitution itself4   
,the error and fraud of this whole      
procedure--and it is one purely of error
 and fraud--consists in this--that it   
artfully substitutes the supposed       
intentions of those who drafted the     
constitution1 for the intentions of the 
constitution itself2 and1 secondly1 it  
personifies the constitution as a crafty
 individual2 capable of both open and   
secret intentions2 capable of legally   
participating in1 and giving effect to  
all the subtleties and double dealing of
 knavish men2 and as actually intending 
to secure slavery1 while openly         
professing to secure and establish      
liberty and justice4 ,it personifies the
 constitution as an individual capable  
of having private and criminal          
intentions1 which it dare not distinctly
 avow1 but only darkly hint at1 by the  

use of words of an indefinite1 uncertain
 and double meaning1 whose application  
is to be gathered from external         
circumstances4  ,the falsehood of all   
these imaginings is apparent1 the moment
 it is considered that the constitution 
is not a person1 of whom an intention1  
not legally expressed1 can be asserted2 
that it has none of the various and     
selfish passions and motives of action1 
which sometimes prompt men to the       
practice of duplicity and disguise2 that
 it is merely a written legal           
instrument2 that1 as such1 it must have 
a fixed1 and not a double meaning2 that 
it is made up entirely of intelligible  
words2 and that it has1 and can have1 no
 soul1 no intentions1 no motives1 no    
being1 no personality1 except what those
 words alone express or imply4 ,its     
intentions are nothing more nor less    
than the legal meaning of its words4    
,its intentions are no guide to its     
legal meaning--as the advocates of      
slavery all assume2 but its legal       

meaning is the sole guide to its        
intentions4 ,this distinction is all    
important to be observed2 for if we can 
gratuitously assume the intentions of a 
legal instrument to be what we may wish 
them to be1 and can then strain or      
pervert the ordinary meaning of its     
words1 in order to make them utter those
 intentions1 we can make any thing we   
choose of any legal instrument whatever4
 ,the legal meaning of the words of an  
instrument is1 therefore1 necessarily   
our only guide to its intentions4  ,in  
ascertaining the legal meaning of the   
words of the constitution1 these rules  
of law1 7the reasons of which will be   
more fully explained hereafter17 are    
vital to be borne constantly in mind1   
viz3 #ast1 that no intention in         
violation of natural justice and natural
 right1 7like that to sanction slavery17
 can be ascribed to the constitution1   
unless that intention be expressed in   
terms that are legally competent to     
express such an intention2 and1 #b;d1   

that no terms1 except those that are    
plenary1 express1 explicit1 distinct1   
unequivocal1 and to which no other      
meaning can be given1 are legally       
competent to authorize or sanction any  
thing contrary to natural right4 ,the   
rule of law is materially different as  
to the terms necessary to legalize and  
sanction any thing contrary to natural  
right1 and those necessary to legalize  
things that are consistent with natural 
right4 ,the latter may be sanctioned by 
implication and inference2 the former   
only by inevitable implication1 or by   
language that is full1 definite1        
express1 explicit1 unequivocal1 and     
whose unavoidable import is to sanction 
the specific wrong intended4  ,to       
assert1 therefore1 that the constitution
 intended to sanction slavery1 is1 in   
reality1 equivalent to asserting that   
the necessary meaning1 the unavoidable  
import of the words alone of the        
constitution1 come fully up to the point
 of a clear1 definite1 distinct1        

express1 explicit1 unequivocal1         
necessary and peremptory sanction of the
 specific thing1 human slavery1 property
 in man4 ,if the necessary import of its
 words alone do but fall an iota short  
of this point1 the instrument gives1    
and1 legally speaking1 intended to give 
no legal sanction to slavery4 ,now1 who 
can1 in good faith1 say that the words  
alone of the constitution come up to    
this point8 ,no one1 who knows any thing
 of law1 and the meaning of words4 ,not 
even the name of the thing1 alleged to  
be sanctioned1 is given4 ,the           
constitution itself contains no         
designation1 description1 or necessary  
admission of the existence of such a    
thing as slavery1 servitude1 or the     
right of property in man4 ,we are       
obliged to go out of the instrument1 and
 grope among the records of oppression1 
lawlessness and crime--records          
unmentioned1 and of course unsanctioned 
by the constitution--to find the thing1 
to which it is said that the words of   

the constitution apply4 ,and when we    
have found this thing1 which the        
constitution dare not name1 we find that
 the constitution has sanctioned it1 7if
 at all17 only by enigmatical words1 by 
unnecessary implication and inference1  
by inuendo and double entendre1 and     
under a name that entirely fails of     
describing the thing4 ,every body must  
admit that the constitution itself      
contains no language1 from which alone  
any court1 that were either strangers to
 the prior existence of slavery1 or that
 did not assume its prior existence to  
be legal1 could legally decide that the 
constitution sanctioned it4 ,and this is
 the true test for determining whether  
the constitution does1 or does not1     
sanction slavery1 viz3 whether a court  
of law1 strangers to the prior existence
 of slavery1 or not assuming its prior  
existence to be legal--looking only at  
the naked language of the               
instrument--could1 consistently with    
legal rules1 judicially determine that  

it sanctioned slavery4 ,every lawyer1   
who at all deserves that name1 knows    
that the claim for slavery could stand  
no such test4 ,the fact is palpable1    
that the constitution contains no such  
legal sanction2 that it is only by      
unnecessary implication and inference1  
by inuendo and double-entendre1 by the  
aid of exterior evidence1 the assumption
 of the prior legality of slavery1 and  
the gratuitous imputation of criminal   
intentions that are not avowed in legal 
terms1 that any sanction of slavery1 7as
 a legal institution17 can be extorted  
from it4  ,but legal rules of           
interpretation entirely forbid and      
disallow all such implications1         
inferences1 inuendos and                
double-entendre1 all aid of exterior    
evidence1 all assumptions of the prior  
legality of slavery1 and all gratuitous 
imputations of criminal unexpressed     
intentions2 and consequently compel us  
to come back to the letter of the       
instrument1 and find there a distinct1  

clear1 necessary1 peremptory sanction   
for slavery1 or to surrender the point4 
,to the unprofessional reader these     
rules of interpretation will appear     
stringent1 and perhaps unreasonable and 
unsound4 ,for his benefit1 therefore1   
the reasons on which they are founded1  
will be given4 ,and he is requested to  
fix both the reasons and the rules fully
 in his mind1 inasmuch as the whole     
legal meaning of the constitution1 in   
regard to slavery1 may perhaps be found 
to turn upon the construction which     
these rules fix upon its language4  ,but
 before giving the reasons of this rule1
 let us offer a few remarks in regard to
 legal rules of interpretation in       
general4 ,many persons appear to have   
the idea that these rules have no       
foundation in reason1 justice or        
necessity2 that they are little else    
than whimsical and absurd conceits1     
arbitrarily adopted by the courts4 ,no  
idea can be more erroneous than this4   
,the rules are absolutely indispensable 

to the administration of the justice    
arising out of any class of legal       
instruments whatever--whether the       
instruments be simple contracts between 
man and man1 or statutes enacted by     
legislatures1 or fundamental compacts or
 constitutions of government agreed upon
 by the people at large4 ,in regard to  
all these instruments1 the law fixes1   
and necessarily must fix their meaning2 
and for the obvious reason1 that        
otherwise their meaning could not be    
fixed at all4 ,the parties to the       
simplest contract may disagree1 or      
pretend to disagree1 as to its meaning1 
and of course as to their respective    
rights under it4 ,the different members 
of a legislative body1 who vote for a   
particular statute1 may have different  
intentions in voting for it1 and may    
therefore differ1 or pretend to differ1 
as to its meaning4 ,the people of a     
nation may establish a compact of       
government4 ,the motives of one portion 
may be to establish liberty1 equality   

and justice2 and they may think1 or     
pretend to think that the words used in 
the instrument convey that idea4 ,the   
motives of another portion may be to    
establish the slavery or subordination  
of one part of the people1 and the      
superiority or arbitrary power of the   
other part2 and they may think1 or      
pretend to think1 that the language     
agreed upon by the whole authorizes such
 a government4 ,in all these cases1     
unless there were some rules of law1    
applicable alike to all instruments1 and
 competent to settle their meaning1     
their meaning could not be settled2 and 
individuals would of necessity lose     
their rights under them4 ,the law1      
therefore1 fixes their meaning2 and the 
rules by which it does so1 are founded  
in the same justice1 reason1 necessity  
and truth1 as are other legal           
principles1 and are for that reason as  
inflexible as any other legal principles
 whatever4 ,they are also simple1       
intelligible1 natural1 obvious4 ,every  

body are presumed to know them1 as they 
are presumed to know any other legal    
principles4 ,no one is allowed to plead 
ignorance of them1 any more than of any 
other principle of law4 ,all persons and
 people are presumed to have framed     
their contracts1 statutes and           
constitutions with reference to them4   
,and if they have not done so--if they  
have said black when they meant white1  
and one thing when they meant another1  
they must abide the consequences4 ,the  
law will presume that they meant what   
they said4 ,no one1 in a court of       
justice1 can claim any rights founded on
 a construction different from that     
which these rules would give to the     
contract1 statute1 or constitution1     
under which he claims4 ,the judiciary   
cannot depart from these rules1 for two 
reasons4 ,first1 because the rules      
embody in themselves principles of      
justice1 reason and truth2 and are      
therefore as necessarily law as any     
other principles of justice1 reason and 

truth2 and1 secondly1 because if they   
could lawfully depart from them in one  
case1 they might in another1 at their   
own caprice4 ,courts could thus at      
pleasure become despotic2 all certainty 
as to the legal meaning of instruments  
would be destroyed2 and the             
administration of justice1 according to 
the true meaning of contracts1 statutes 
and constitutions1 would be rendered    
impossible4  ,what1 then1 are some of   
these rules of interpretation8  ,one of 
them1 7as has been before stated17 is1  
that where words are susceptible of two 
meanings1 one consistent1 and the other 
inconsistent1 with justice and natural  
right1 that meaning1 and only that      
meaning1 which is consistent with right1
 shall be attributed to them--unless    
other parts of the instrument overrule  
that interpretation4  ,another rule1 7if
 indeed it be not the same17 is1 that no
 language1 except that which is         
peremptory1 and no implication1 except  
one that is inevitable1 shall be held to

 authorize or sanction any thing        
contrary to natural right4  ,another    
rule is1 that no extraneous or          
historical evidence shall be admitted to
 fix upon a statute an unjust or immoral
 meaning1 when the words themselves of  
the act are susceptible of an innocent  
one4  ,one of the reasons of these      
stringent and inflexible rules1         
doubtless is1 that judges have always   
known that1 in point of fact1 natural   
justice was itself law1 and that nothing
 inconsistent with it could be made law1
 even by the most explicit and          
peremptory language that legislatures   
could employ4--,but judges have always1 
in this country and in ,england1 been   
dependent upon the executive and the    
legislature for their appointments and  
salaries1 and been amenable to the      
legislature by impeachment4 ,and as the 
executive and legislature have always   
enacted more or less statutes1 and had  
more or less purposes to accomplish1    
that were inconsistent with natural     

right1 judges have seen that it would be
 impossible for them to retain their    
offices1 and at the same time maintain  
the integrity of the law against the    
will of those in whose power they were4 
,it is natural also that the executive  
should appoint1 and that the legislature
 should approve the appointment of no   
one for the office of judge1 whose      
integrity they should suppose would     
stand in the way of their               
purposes4--,the consequence has been    
that all judges1 7probably without      
exception17 though they have not dared  
deny1 have yet in practice yielded the  
vital principle of law2 and have        
succumbed to the arbitrary mandates of  
the other departments of the government1
 so far as to carry out their           
enactments1 though inconsistent with    
natural right4 ,but1 as if sensible of  
the degradation and criminality of so   
doing1 they have made a stand at the    
first point at which they could make it1
 without bringing themselves in a direct

 collision with those on whom they were 
dependent4 ,and that point is1 that they
 will administer1 as law1 no statute1   
that is contrary to natural right1      
unless its language be so explicit and  
peremptory1 that there is no way of     
evading its authority1 but by flatly    
denying the authority of those who      
enacted it4 ,they 7the court7 will      
themselves add nothing to the language  
of the statute1 to help out its supposed
 meaning4 ,they will imply nothing1     
infer nothing1 and assume nothing1      
except what is inevitable2 they will not
 go out of the letter of the statute in 
search of any historical evidence as to 
the meaning of the legislature1 to      
enable them to effectuate any unjust    
intentions not fully expressed by the   
statute itself4 ,wherever a statute is  
supposed to have in view the            
accomplishment of any unjust end1 they  
will apply the most stringent principles
 of construction to prevent that        
object's being effected4 ,they will not 

go a hair's breadth beyond the literal  
or inevitable import of the words of the
 statute1 even though they should be    
conscious1 all the while1 that the real 
intentions of the makers of it would be 
entirely defeated by their refusal4 ,the
 rule1 7as has been already stated17 is 
laid down by the supreme court of the   
,united ,states in these words3  ,where 
rights are infringed1 where fundamental 
principles are overthrown1 where the    
general system of the law is departed   
from1 the legislative intention must be 
expressed with irresistible clearness1  
to induce a court of justice to suppose 
a design to effect such                 
objects4--7,united ,states vs4 ,fisher  
et al41 #b ,cranch1 #cij47ah  ,such has 
become the settled doctrine of courts4  
,and although it does not come up to the
 true standard of law1 yet it is good in
 itself1 so far as it goes1 and ought to
 be unflinchingly adhered to1 not merely
 for its own sake1 but also as a        
scaffolding1 from which to erect that   

higher standard of law1 to wit1 that no 
language or authority whatever can      
legalize any thing inconsistent with    
natural justice4#ai  ,another reason for
 the rules before given1 against all    
constructions1 implications and         
inferences--except inevitable ones--in  
favor of injustice1 is1 that but for    
them we should have no guaranty that our
 honest contracts1 or honest laws would 
be honestly administered by the         
judiciary4 ,it would be nearly or quite 
impossible for men1 in framing their    
contracts or laws1 to use language so as
 to exclude every possible implication  
in favor of wrong1 if courts were       
allowed to resort to such implications4 
,the law therefore excludes them2 that  
is1 the ends of justice--the security of
 men's rights under their honest        
contracts1 and under honest legislative 
enactments--make it imperative upon     
courts of justice to ascribe an innocent
 and honest meaning to all language that
 will possibly bear an innocent and     

honest meaning4 ,if courts of justice   
could depart from this rule for the     
purpose of upholding what was contrary  
to natural right1 and could employ their
 ingenuity in spying out some implied or
 inferred authority1 for sanctioning    
what was in itself dishonest or unjust1 
when such was not the necessary meaning 
of the language used1 there could be no 
security whatever for the honest        
administration of honest laws1 or the   
honest fulfilment of men's honest       
contracts4 ,nearly all language1 on the 
meaning of which courts adjudicate1     
would be liable1 at the caprice of the  
court1 to be perverted from the         
furtherance of honest1 to the support of
 dishonest purposes4 ,judges could      
construe statutes and contracts in favor
 of justice or injustice1 as their own  
pleasure might dictate4  ,another reason
 of the rules1 is1 that as governments  
have1 and can have no legitimate objects
 or powers opposed to justice and       
natural right1 it would be treason to   

all the legitimate purposes of          
government1 for the judiciary to give   
any other than an honest and innocent   
meaning to any language1 that would bear
 such a construction4  ,the same reasons
 that forbid the allowance of any       
unnecessary implication or inference in 
favor of a wrong1 in the construction of
 a statute1 forbids also the            
introduction of any extraneous or       
historical evidence to prove that the   
intentions of the legislature were to   
sanction or authorize a wrong4  ,the    
same rules of construction1 that apply  
to statutes1 apply also to all those    
private contracts between man and man1  
which courts actually enforce4 ,but as  
it is both the right and the duty of    
courts to invalidate altogether such    
private contracts as are inconsistent   
with justice1 they will admit evidence  
exterior to their words1 if offered by a
 defendant for the purpose of           
invalidating them4 ,at the same time1 a 
plaintiff1 or party that wishes to set  

up a contract1 or that claims its       
fulfilment1 will not be allowed to offer
 any evidence exterior to its words1 to 
prove that the contract is contrary to  
justice--because1 if his evidence were  
admitted1 it would not make his unjust  
claim a legal one2 but only invalidate  
it altogether4 ,but as courts do not    
claim the right of invalidating statutes
 and constitutions1 they will not admit 
evidence1 exterior to their language1 to
 give them such a meaning1 that they    
ought to be invalidated4  ,i think no   
one--no lawyer1 certainly--will now deny
 that it is a legal rule of             
interpretation--that must be applied to 
all statutes1 and also to all private   
contracts that are to be enforced--that 
an innocent meaning1 and nothing beyond 
an innocent meaning1 must be given to   
all language that will possibly bear    
such a meaning4 ,all will probably admit
 that the rule1 as laid down by the     
supreme court of the ,united ,states1 is
 correct1 to wit1 that where rights are 

infringed1 where fundamental principles 
are overthrown1 where the general system
 of the law is departed from1 the       
legislative intention must be expressed 
with irresistible clearness1 to induce a
 court of justice to suppose a design to
 effect such objects4  ,but perhaps it  
will be said that these rules1 which    
apply to all statutes1 and to all       
private contracts that are to be        
enforced1 do not apply to the           
constitution4 ,and why do they not8 ,no 
reason whatever can be given4 ,a        
constitution is nothing but a contract1 
entered into by the mass of the people1 
instead of a few individuals4 ,this     
contract of the people at large becomes 
a law unto the judiciary that administer
 it1 just as private contracts1 7so far 
as they are consistent with natural     
right17 are laws unto the tribunals that
 adjudicate upon them4 ,all the         
essential principles that enter into the
 question of obligation1 in the case of 
a private contract1 or a legislative    

enactment1 enter equally into the       
question of the obligation of a contract
 agreed to by the whole mass of the     
people4 ,this is too self-evident to    
need illustration4  ,besides1 is it not 
as important to the safety and rights of
 all interested1 that a constitution or 
compact of government1 established by a 
whole people1 should be so construed as 
to promote the ends of justice1 as it is
 that a private contract or a           
legislative enactment should be thus    
construed8 ,is it not as necessary that 
some check should be imposed upon the   
judiciary to prevent them from          
perverting1 at pleasure1 the whole      
purpose and character of the government1
 as it is that they should be restrained
 from perverting the meaning of a       
private contract1 or a legislative      
enactment8 ,obviously written compacts  
of government could not be upheld for a 
day1 if it were understood by the mass  
of the people that the judiciary were at
 liberty to interpret them according to 

their own pleasure1 instead of their    
being restrained by such rules as have  
now been laid down4  ,let us now look at
 some of the provisions of the          
constitution1 and see what crimes might 
be held to be authorized by them1 if    
their meaning were not to be ascertained
 and restricted by such rules of        
interpretation as apply to all other    
legal instruments4  ,the second         
amendment to the constitution declares  
that the right of the people to keep and
 bear arms shall not be infringed4      
,this right to keep and bear arms1      
implies the right to use them--as much  
as a provision securing to the people   
the right to buy and keep food1 would   
imply their right also to eat it4 ,but  
this implied right to use arms1 is only 
a right to use them in a manner         
consistent with natural rights--as1 for 
example1 in defence of life1 liberty1   
chastity1 c4 ,here is an innocent and   
just meaning1 of which the words are    
susceptible2 and such is therefore the  

extent of their legal meaning4 ,if      
courts could go beyond the innocent and 
necessary meaning of the words1 and     
imply or infer from them an authority   
for anything contrary to natural right1 
they could imply a constitutional       
authority in the people to use arms1 not
 merely for the just and innocent       
purposes of defence1 but also for the   
criminal purposes of aggression--for    
purposes of murder1 robbery1 or any     
other acts of wrong to which arms are   
capable of being applied4 ,the mere     
verbal implication would as much        
authorize the people to use arms for    
unjust1 as for just1 purposes4 ,but the 
legal implication gives only an         
authority for their innocent use4 ,and  
why8 ,simply because justice is the end 
of all law--the legitimate end of all   
compacts of government4 ,it is itself   
law2 and there is no right or power     
among men to destroy its obligation4    
,take another case4 ,the constitution   
declares that ,congress shall have power

 to regulate commerce with foreign      
nations1 and among the several states1  
and with the ,indian tribes4  ,this     
power has been held by the supreme court
 to be an exclusive one in the general  
government--and one that cannot be      
controlled by the states4 ,yet it gives 
congress no constitutional authority to 
legalize any commerce inconsistent with 
natural justice between man and man2    
although the mere verbal import of the  
words1 if stretched to their utmost     
tension in favor of the wrong1 would    
authorize congress to legalize a        
commerce in poisons and deadly weapons1 
for the express purpose of having them  
used in a manner inconsistent with      
natural right--as for the purposes of   
murder4  ,at natural law1 and on        
principles of natural right1 a person1  
who should sell to another a weapon or a
 poison1 knowing that it would1 or      
intending that it should be used for the
 purpose of murder1 would be legally an 
accessary to the murder that should be  

committed with it4 ,and if the grant to 
congress of a power to regulate         
commerce1 can be stretched beyond the   
innocent meaning of the words--beyond   
the power of regulating and authorizing 
a commerce that is consistent with      
natural justice--and be made to cover   
every thing1 intrinsically criminal1    
that can be perpetrated under the name  
of commerce--then congress have the     
authority of the constitution for       
granting to individuals the liberty of  
bringing weapons and poisons from       
foreign nations into this1 and from one 
state into another1 and selling them    
openly for the express purposes of      
murder1 without any liability to legal  
restraint or punishment4  ,can any      
stronger cases than these be required to
 prove the necessity1 the soundness1 and
 the inflexibility of that rule of law1 
which requires the judiciary to ascribe 
an innocent meaning to all language that
 will possibly bear an innocent meaning8
 and to ascribe only an innocent meaning

 to language whose mere verbal import   
might be susceptible of both an innocent
 and criminal meaning8 ,if this rule of 
interpretation could be departed from1  
there is hardly a power granted to      
congress1 that might not lawfully be    
perverted into an authority for         
legalizing crimes of the highest grade4 
,in the light of these principles1 then1
 let us examine those clauses of the    
constitution1 that are relied on as     
recognizing and sanctioning slavery4    
,they are but three in number4  ,the one
 most frequently quoted is the third    
clause of ,art4 #d1 ,sec4 #b1 in these  
words3     ,no person1 held to service  
or labor in one state1 under the laws   
thereof1 escaping into another1 shall in
 consequence of any law or    regulation
 therein1 be discharged from such       
service or labor2 but    shall be       
delivered up on claim of the party to   
whom such service or    labor may be    
due4  ,there are several reasons why    
this clause renders no sanction to      

slavery4  #a4 ,it must be construed1 if 
possible1 as sanctioning nothing        
contrary to natural right4  ,if there be
 any service or labor whatever1 to which
 any persons whatever may be held1      
consistently with natural right1 and    
which any person may1 consistently with 
natural right1 claim as his due of      
another1 such service or labor1 and only
 such1 is recognized and sanctioned by  
this provision4  ,it needs no argument  
to determine whether the service or     
labor1 that is exacted of a slave1 is   
such as can be claimed1 consistently    
with natural right1 as being due from   
him to his master4 ,and if it cannot be1
 some other service or labor must1 if   
possible1 be found for this clause to   
apply to4  ,the proper definition of the
 word service1 in this case1 obviously  
is1 the labor of a servant4 ,and we     
find1 that at and before the adoption of
 the constitution1 the persons          
recognized by the state laws as         
servants1 constituted a numerous class4 

,the statute books of the states        
abounded with statutes in regard to     
servants4 ,many seem to have been       
indented as servants by the public      
authorities1 on account of their being  
supposed incompetent1 by reason of youth
 and poverty1 to provide for themselves4
 ,many were doubtless indented as       
apprentices by their parents and        
guardians1 as now4 ,the ,english laws   
recognized a class of servants--and many
 persons were brought here from         
,england1 in that character1 and        
retained that character afterward4 ,many
 indented or contracted themselves as   
servants for the payment of their       
passage money to this country4 ,in these
 various ways1 the class of persons1    
recognized by the statute books of the  
states as servants1 was very numerous2  
and formed a prominent subject of       
legislation4 ,indeed1 no other evidence 
of their number is necessary than the   
single fact1 that persons bound to      
service for a term of years1 were       

specially noticed by the constitution of
 the ,united ,states1 7,art4 #a1 ,sec4  
#b17 which requires that they be counted
 as units in making up the basis of     
representation4 ,there is therefore not 
the slightest apology for pretending    
that there was not a sufficient class   
for the words service or labor to refer 
to1 without supposing the existence of  
slaves4#bj  #b4 ,held to service or     
labor1 is no legal description of       
slavery4 ,slavery is property in man4   
,it is not necessarily attended with    
either service or labor4 ,a very        
considerable portion of the slaves are  
either too young1 too old1 too sick1 or 
too refractory to render service or     
labor4 ,as a matter of fact1 slaves1 who
 are able to labor1 may1 in general1 be 
compelled by their masters to do so4    
,yet labor is not an essential or       
necessary condition of slavery4 ,the    
essence of slavery consists in a        
person's being owned as                 
property--without any reference to the  

circumstances of his being compelled to 
labor1 or of his being permitted to live
 in idleness1 or of his being too young1
 or too old1 or too sick to labor4  ,if 
service or labor were either a test1 or 
a necessary attendant of slavery1 that  
test would of itself abolish slavery2   
because all slaves1 before they can     
render service or labor1 must have      
passed through the period of infancy1   
when they could render neither service  
nor labor1 and when1 therefore1         
according to this test1 they were free4 
,and if they were free in infancy1 they 
could not be subsequently enslaved4  #c4
 ,held to service or labor in one state1
 under the laws thereof4  ,the laws take
 no note of the fact whether a slave    
labors1 or not4 ,they recognize no      
obligation1 on his part1 to labor4 ,they
 will enforce no claim of a master1 upon
 his slave1 for service or labor4 ,if   
the slave refuse to labor1 the law will 
not interfere to compel him4 ,the law   
simply recognizes the master's right of 

property in the slave--just as it       
recognizes his right of property in a   
horse4 ,having done that1 it leaves the 
master to compel the slave1 if he       
please1 and if he can--as he would      
compel a horse--to labor4 ,if the master
 do not please1 or be not able1 to      
compel the slave to labor1 the law takes
 no more cognizance of the case than it 
does of the conduct of a refractory     
horse4 ,in short1 it recognizes no      
obligation1 on the part of the slave1 to
 labor1 if he can avoid doing so4 ,it   
recognizes no claim1 on the part of the 
master1 upon his slave1 for services or 
labor1 as due from the latter to the    
former4  #d4 ,neither service nor labor 
is necessarily slavery2 and not being   
necessarily slavery1 the words cannot1  
in this case1 be strained beyond their  
necessary meaning1 to make them sanction
 a wrong4 ,the law will not allow words 
to be strained a hair's breadth beyond  
their necessary meaning1 to make them   
authorize a wrong4 ,the stretching1 if  

there be any1 must always be towards the
 right4 ,the words service or labor do  
not necessarily1 nor in their common    
acceptation1 so much as suggest the idea
 of slavery--that is1 they do not       
suggest the idea of the laborer or      
servant being the property of the person
 for whom he labors4 ,an indented       
apprentice serves and labors for        
another4 ,he is held to do so1 under a  
contract1 and for a consideration1 that 
are recognized1 by the laws1 as         
legitimate1 and consistent with natural 
right4 ,yet he is not owned as property4
 ,a condemned criminal is held to       
labor--yet he is not owned as property4 
,the law allows no such straining of the
 meaning of words towards the wrong1 as 
that which would convert the words      
service or labor 7of men7 into property 
in man--and thus make a man1 who serves 
or labors for another1 the property of  
that other4  #e4 ,no person held to     
service or labor1 in one state1 under   
the laws thereof4  ,the laws1 here      

mentioned1 and impliedly sanctioned1    
are1 of course1 only constitutional     
laws--laws1 that are consistent1 both   
with the constitution of the state1 and 
the constitution of the ,united ,states4
 ,none others are laws1 correctly       
speaking1 however they may attempt to   
hold persons to service or labor1 or    
however they may have the forms of laws 
on the statute books4  ,this word laws1 
therefore1 being a material word1 leaves
 the whole question just where it found 
it--for it certainly does not1 of       
itself--nor indeed does any other part  
of the clause--say that acts of a       
legislature1 declaring one man to be the
 property of another1 is a law within   
the meaning of the constitution4 ,as far
 as the word laws says any thing on the 
subject1 it says that such acts are not 
laws--for such acts are clearly         
inconsistent with natural law--and it   
yet remains to be shown that they are   
consistent with any constitution        
whatever1 state or national4  ,the      

burden of proof1 then1 still rests upon 
the advocates of slavery1 to show that  
an act of a state legislature1 declaring
 one man to be the property of another1 
is a law1 within the meaning of this    
clause4 ,to assert simply that it is1   
without proving it to be so1 is a mere  
begging of the question--for that is the
 very point in dispute4  ,the question1 
therefore1 of the constitutionality of  
the slave acts must first be determined1
 before it can be decided that they are 
laws within the meaning of the          
constitution4 ,that is1 they must be    
shown to be consistent with the         
constitution1 before they can be said to
 be sanctioned as laws by the           
constitution4 ,can any proposition be   
plainer than this8 ,and yet the reverse 
must be assumed1 in this case1 by the   
advocates of slavery4  ,the simple fact1
 that an act purports to hold persons to
 service or labor1 clearly cannot1 of   
itself1 make the act constitutional4 ,if
 it could1 any act1 purporting to hold  

persons to service or labor1 would      
necessarily be constitutional1 without  
any regard to the persons so held1 or   
the conditions on which they were held4 
,it would be constitutional1 solely     
because it purported to hold persons to 
service or labor4 ,if this were the true
 doctrine1 any of us1 without respect of
 persons1 might be held to service or   
labor1 at the pleasure of the           
legislature4 ,and then1 if service or   
labor mean slavery1 it would follow that
 any of us1 without discrimination1     
might be made slaves4 ,and thus the     
result would be1 that the acts of a     
legislature would be constitutional1    
solely because they made slaves of the  
people4 ,certainly this would be a new  
test of the constitutionality of laws4  
,all the arguments in favor of slavery1 
that have heretofore been drawn from    
this clause of the constitution1 have   
been founded on the assumption1 that if 
an act of a legislature did but purport 
to hold persons to service or labor--no 

matter how1 on what conditions1 or for  
what cause--that fact alone was         
sufficient to make the act              
constitutional4 ,the entire sum of the  
argument1 in favor of slavery1 is but   
this1 viz4 the constitution recognizes  
the constitutionality of laws that hold 
persons to service or labor1--slave acts
 hold persons to service or             
labor1--therefore slave acts must be    
constitutional4 ,this profound syllogism
 is the great pillar of slavery in this 
country4 ,it has1 7if we are to judge by
 results17 withstood the scrutiny of all
 the legal acumen of this nation for    
fifty years and more4 ,if it should     
continue to withstand it for as many    
years as it has already done1 it will   
then be time to propound the following1 
to wit3 ,the state constitutions        
recognize the right of men to acquire   
property2 theft1 robbery1 and murder are
 among the modes in which property may  
be acquired2 therefore theft1 robbery1  
and murder are recognized by these      

constitutions as lawful4  ,no doubt the 
clause contemplates that there may be   
constitutional laws1 under which persons
 may be held to service or labor4 ,but  
it does not follow1 therefore1 that     
every act1 that purports to hold persons
 to service or labor1 is constitutional4
  ,we are obliged1 then1 to determine   
whether a statute be constitutional1    
before we can determine whether the     
service or labor required by it1 is     
sanctioned by the constitution as being 
lawfully required4 ,the simple fact1    
that the statute would hold persons to  
service or labor1 is1 of itself1 no     
evidence1 either for or against its     
constitutionality4 ,whether it be or be 
not constitutional1 may depend upon a   
variety of contingencies--such as the   
kind of service or labor required1 and  
the conditions on which it requires it4 
,any service or labor1 that is          
inconsistent with the duties which the  
constitution requires of the people1 is 
of course not sanctioned by this clause 

of the constitution as being lawfully   
required4 ,neither1 of course1 is the   
requirement of service or labor1 on any 
conditions1 that are inconsistent with  
any rights that are secured to the      
people by the constitution1 sanctioned  
by the constitution as lawful4 ,slave   
laws1 then1 can obviously be held to be 
sanctioned by this clause of the        
constitution1 only by gratuitously      
assuming1 #ast1 that the constitution   
neither confers any rights1 nor imposes 
any duties1 upon the people of the      
,united ,states1 inconsistent with their
 being made slaves2 and1 #b;d1 that it  
sanctions the general principle of      
holding persons to service or labor     
arbitrarily1 without contract1 without  
compensation1 and without the charge of 
crime4 ,if this be really the kind of   
constitution that has been in force     
since #aghi1 it is somewhat wonderful   
that there are so few slaves in the     
country4 ,on the other hand1 if the     
constitution be not of this kind1 it is 

equally wonderful that we have any      
slaves at all--for the instrument offers
 no ground for saying that a colored man
 may be made a slave1 and a white man   
not4  ,again4 ,slave acts were not laws 
according to any state constitution that
 was in existence at the time the       
constitution of the ,united ,states was 
adopted4 ,and if they were not laws at  
that time1 they have not been made so   
since4  #f4 ,the constitution itself1   
7,art4 #a4 ,sec4 #b17 in fixing the     
basis of representation1 has plainly    
denied that those described in ,art4 #d1
 as persons held to service or labor1   
are slaves1--for it declares that       
persons bound to service for a term of  
years shall be included in the number of
 free persons4 ,there is no legal       
difference between being bound to       
service1 and being held to service or   
labor4 ,the addition1 in the one        
instance1 of the words1 for a term of   
years1 does not alter the case1 for it  
does not appear that1 in the other1 they

 are held to service or labor beyond a  
fixed term--and1 in the absence of      
evidence from the constitution itself1  
the presumption must be that they are   
not--because such a presumption makes it
 unnecessary to go out of the           
constitution to find the persons        
intended1 and it is also more consistent
 with the prevalent municipal1 and with 
natural law4  ,and it makes no          
difference to this result1 whether the  
word free1 in the first article1 be used
 in the political sense common at that  
day1 or as the correlative of slavery4  
,in either case1 the persons described  
as free1 could not be made slaves4  #g4 
,the words service or labor cannot be   
made to include slavery1 unless by      
reversing the legal principle1 that the 
greater includes the less1 and holding  
that the less includes the greater2 that
 the innocent includes the criminal2    
that a sanction of what is right1       
includes a sanction of what is wrong4   
,another clause relied on as a          

recognition of the constitutionality of 
slavery1 is the following1 7,art4 #a4   
,sec4 #b473     ,representatives and    
direct taxes shall be apportioned among 
the    several states1 which may be     
included within this union1 according to
    their respective numbers1 which     
shall be determined by adding to the    
whole number of free persons1 including 
those bound to service for    a term of 
years1 and excluding ,indians not taxed1
 three-fifths of all    other persons4  
,the argument claimed from this clause1 
in support of slavery1 rests entirely   
upon the word free1 and the words all   
other persons4 ,or rather it rests      
entirely upon the meaning of the word   
free1 for the application of the words  
all other persons depends upon the      
meaning given to the word free4 ,the    
slave argument assumes1 gratuitously1   
that the word free is used as the       
correlative of slavery and thence it    
infers that the words1 all other        
persons1 mean slaves4  ,it is obvious   

that the word free affords no argument  
for slavery1 unless a meaning           
correlative with slavery be arbitrarily 
given to it1 for the very purpose of    
making the constitution sanction or     
recognize slavery4 ,now it is very clear
 that no such meaning can be given to   
the word1 for such a purpose4 ,the      
ordinary meaning of a word cannot be    
thus arbitrarily changed1 for the sake  
of sanctioning a wrong4 ,a choice of    
meaning would be perfectly allowable1   
and even obligatory1 if made for the    
purpose of avoiding any such sanction2  
but it is entirely inadmissable for the 
purpose of giving it4 ,the legal rules  
of interpretation1 heretofore laid down1
 imperatively require this preference of
 the right1 over the wrong1 in all cases
 where a word is susceptible of         
different meanings4  ,the ,english law  
had for centuries used the word free as 
describing persons possessing           
citizenship1 or some other franchise or 
peculiar privilege--as distinguished    

from aliens1 and persons not possessed  
of such franchise or privilege4 ,this   
law1 and this use of the word free1 as  
has already been shown1 had been adopted
 in this country from its first         
settlement4 ,the colonial charters all1 
7probably without an exception17        
recognized it4 ,the colonial legislation
 generally1 if not universally1         
recognized it4 ,the state constitutions1
 in existence at the time the           
constitution of the ,united ,states was 
formed and adopted1 used the word in    
this sense1 and no other4 ,the ,articles
 of ,confederation--the then existing   
national compact of union--used the word
 in this sense1 and no other4 ,the sense
 is an appropriate one in itself2 the   
most appropriate to1 and consistent with
 the whole character of the             
constitution1 of any of which the word  
is susceptible4 ,in fact1 it is the only
 one that is either appropriate to1 or  
consistent with1 the other parts of the 
instrument4 ,why1 then1 is it not the   

legal meaning8 ,manifestly it is the    
legal meaning4 ,no reason whatever can  
be given against it1 except that1 if    
such be its meaning1 the constitution   
will not sanction slavery6 ,a very good 
reason--a perfectly unanswerable reason1
 in fact--in favor of this meaning2 but 
a very futile one against it4  ,it is   
evident that the word free is not used  
as the correlative of slavery1 because  
,indians not taxed are excluded from its
 application--yet they are not therefore
 slaves4  ,again4 ,the word free cannot 
be presumed to be used as the           
correlative of slavery--because slavery 
then had no legal existence4 ,the word  
must obviously be presumed to be used as
 the correlative of something that did  
legally exist1 rather than of something 
that did not legally exist4 ,if it were 
used as the correlative of something    
that did not legally exist1 the words   
all other persons would have no legal   
application4 ,until1 then1 it be shown  
that slavery had a legal existence1     

authorized either by the ,united ,states
 constitution1 or by the then existing  
state constitutions--a thing that cannot
 be shown--the word free certainly      
cannot be claimed to have been used as  
its correlative4  ,but even if slavery  
had been authorized by the state        
constitutions1 the word free1 in the    
,united ,states constitution1 could not 
have been claimed to have been used as  
its correlative1 unless it had appeared 
that the ,united ,states constitution   
had itself provided or suggested no     
correlative of the word free2 for it    
would obviously be absurd and           
inadmissible to go out of an instrument 
to find the intended correlative of one 
of its own words1 when it had itself    
suggested one4 ,this the constitution of
 the ,united ,states has done1 in the   
persons of aliens4 ,the power of        
naturalization is1 by the constitution1 
taken from the states1 and given        
exclusively to the ,united ,states4 ,the
 constitution of the ,united ,states1   

therefore1 necessarily supposes the     
existence of aliens--and thus furnishes 
the correlative sought for4 ,it         
furnishes a class both for the word     
free1 and the words all other persons to
 apply to4 ,and yet the slave argument  
contends that we must overlook these    
distinctions1 necessarily growing out of
 the laws of the ,united ,states1 and go
 out of the constitution of the ,united 
,states to find persons whom it         
describes as the free1 and all other    
persons4 ,and what makes the argument   
the more absurd is1 that by going out of
 the instrument to the then existing    
state constitutions--the only           
instruments to which we can go--we can  
find there no other persons for the     
words to apply to--no other classes     
answering to the description of the free
 persons and all other persons1--than   
the very classes suggested by the       
,united ,states constitution itself1 to 
wit1 citizens and aliens2 7for it has   
previously been shown that the then     

existing state constitutions recognized 
no such persons as slaves47  ,if we are 
obliged1 7as the slave argument claims  
we are17 to go out of the constitution  
of the ,united ,states to find the class
 whom it describes as all other persons 
than the free1 we shall1 for aught ,i   
see1 be equally obliged to go out of it 
to find those whom it describes as the  
free--for the free1 and all other       
persons than the free1 must be presumed 
to be found described somewhere in the  
same instrument4 ,if1 then1 we are      
obliged to go out of the constitution to
 find the persons described in it as the
 free and all other persons1 we are     
obliged to go out of it to ascertain who
 are the persons on whom it declares    
that the representation of the          
government shall be based1 and on whom1 
of course1 the government is founded4   
,and thus we should have the absurdity  
of a constitution that purports to      
authorize a government1 yet leaves us to
 go in search of the people who are to  

be represented in it4 ,besides1 if we   
are obliged to go out of the            
constitution1 to find the persons on    
whom the government rests1 and those    
persons are arbitrarily prescribed by   
some other instrument1 independent of   
the constitution1 this contradiction    
would follow1 viz41 that the ,united    
,states government would be a           
subordinate government--a mere appendage
 to something else--a tail to some other
 kite--or rather a tail to a large      
number of kites at once--instead of     
being1 as it declares itself to be1 the 
supreme government--its constitution and
 laws being the supreme law of the land4
  ,again4 ,it certainly cannot be       
admitted that we must go out of the     
,united ,states constitution to find the
 classes whom it describes as the free1 
and all other persons than the free1    
until it be shown that the constitution 
has told us where to go to find them4   
,in all other cases1 7without an        
exception1 ,i think17 where the         

constitution makes any of its provisions
 dependent upon the state constitutions1
 or state legislatures1 it has          
particularly described them as depending
 upon them4 ,but it gives no intimation 
that it has left it with the state      
constitutions1 or the state             
legislatures1 to prescribe whom it means
 by the terms free persons and all other
 persons1 on whom it requires its own   
representation to be based4 ,we have1   
therefore1 no more authority from the   
constitution of the ,united ,states1 for
 going to the state constitutions1 to   
find the classes described in the former
 as the free persons and all other      
persons1 than we have for going to      
,turkey or ,japan4 ,we are compelled1   
therefore1 to find them in the          
constitution of the ,united ,states     
itself1 if any answering to the         
description can possibly be found there4
  ,again4 ,if we were permitted to go to
 the state constitutions1 or to the     
state statute books1 to find who were   

the persons intended by the constitution
 of the ,united ,states2 and if1 as the 
slave argument assumes1 it was left to  
the states respectively to prescribe who
 should1 and who should not1 be free    
within the meaning of the constitution  
of the ,united ,states1 it would follow 
that the terms free and all other       
persons1 might be applied in as many    
different ways1 and to as many different
 classes of persons1 as there were      
different states in the union4 ,not only
 so1 but the application might also be  
varied at pleasure in the same state4   
,one inevitable consequence of this     
state of things would be1 that there    
could be neither a permanent1 nor a     
uniform basis of representation         
throughout the country4 ,another        
possible1 and even probable consequence 
would be1 such inextricable confusion1  
as to the persons described by the same 
terms in the different states1 that     
,congress could not apportion the       
national representation at all1 in the  

manner required by the constitution4    
,the questions of law1 arising out of   
the different uses of the word free1 by 
the different states1 might be made so  
endless and inexplicable1 that the state
 governments might entirely defeat all  
the power of the general government to  
make an apportionment4  ,if the slave   
construction be put upon this clause1   
still another difficulty1 in the way of 
making an apportionment1 would follow1  
viz41 that congress could have no legal 
knowledge of the persons composing each 
of the two different classes1 on which  
its representation must be based2 for   
there is no legal record--known to the  
laws of the ,united ,states1 or even to 
the laws of the states--of those who are
 slaves1 or those who are not4 ,the     
information obtained by the census      
takers1 7who have no legal records to go
 to17 must1 in the nature of things1 be 
of the most loose and uncertain         
character1 on such points as these4 ,any
 accurate or legal knowledge on the     

subject is1 therefore1 obviously        
impossible4 ,but if the other           
construction be adopted1 this difficulty
 is avoided--for congress then have the 
control of the whole matter1 and may    
adopt such means as may be necessary for
 ascertaining accurately the persons who
 belong to each of these different      
classes4 ,and by their naturalization   
laws they actually do provide for a     
legal record of all who are made free by
 naturalization4  ,and this             
consideration of certainty1 as to the   
individuals and numbers belonging to    
each of these two classes1 free and all 
other persons1 acquires an increased and
 irresistible force1 when it is         
considered that these different classes 
of persons constitute also different    
bases for taxation1 as well as          
representation4 ,the requirement of the 
constitution is1 that representatives   
and direct taxes shall be apportioned1  
c41 according to the number of free     
persons and all other persons4 ,in      

reference to so important a subject as  
taxation1 accurate and legal knowledge  
of the persons and numbers belonging to 
the different classes1 becomes          
indispensable4 ,yet under the slave     
construction this legal knowledge       
becomes impossible4 ,under the other    
construction it is as perfectly and     
entirely within the power of congress1  
as1 in the nature of things1 such a     
subject can be--for naturalization is a 
legal process2 and legal records1       
prescribed by congress1 may be1 and     
actually are1 preserved of all the      
persons naturalized or made free by     
their laws4  ,if we adopt that meaning  
of the word free1 which is consistent   
with freedom--that meaning which is     
consistent with natural right--the      
meaning given to it by the ,articles of 
,confederation1 by the then existing    
state constitutions1 by the colonial    
charters1 and by the ,english law ever  
since our ancestors enjoyed the name of 
freemen1 all these difficulties1        

inconsistencies1 contradictions and     
absurdities1 that must otherwise arise1 
vanish4 ,the word free then describes   
the native and naturalized citizens of  
the ,united ,states1 and the words all  
other persons describe resident aliens1 
,indians not taxed1 and possibly some   
others4 ,the representation is then     
placed upon the best1 most just1 and    
most rational basis that the words used 
can be made to describe4 ,the           
representation also becomes equal and   
uniform throughout the country4 ,the    
principle of distinction between the two
 bases1 becomes also a stable1 rational 
and intelligible one--one too           
necessarily growing out of the exercise 
of one of the powers granted to         
congress2--one1 too1 whose operation    
could have been foreseen and judged of  
by the people who adopted the           
constitution--instead of one fluctuating
 with the ever changing and arbitrary   
legislation of the various states1 whose
 mode and motives of action could not   

have been anticipated4 ,adopt this      
definition of the word free1 and the    
same legislature1 7that is1 the national
 one17 that is required by the          
constitution to apportion the           
representation according to certain     
principles1 becomes invested--as it     
evidently ought to be1 and as it        
necessarily must be1 to be              
efficient--with the power of            
determining1 by their own               
7naturalization7 laws1 who are the      
persons composing the different bases on
 which its apportionment is to be made2 
instead of being1 as they otherwise     
would be1 obliged to seek for these     
persons through all the statute books of
 all the different states of the union1 
and through all the evidences of private
 property1 under which one of these     
classes might be held4 ,adopt this      
definition of the word free1 and the    
,united ,states government becomes1 so  
far at least as its popular             
representation--which is its most       

important feature--is concerned1 an     
independent government1 subsisting by   
its own vigor1 and pervaded throughout  
by one uniform principle4 ,reject this  
definition1 and the popular national    
representation1 loses at once its       
nationality1 and becomes a mere         
dependency on the will of local         
corporations--a mere shuttlecock to be  
driven hither and thither by the        
arbitrary and conflicting legislation of
 an indefinite number of separate       
states4 ,adopt this meaning of the word 
free1 and the national government       
becomes capable of knowing its own bases
 of representation and power1 and its   
own subjects of taxation4 ,reject this  
definition1 and the government knows not
 whom it represents1 or on whom to levy 
taxes for its support4 ,adopt this      
meaning of the word free1 and some three
 millions of native born1 but now       
crushed human beings1 become1 with their
 posterity1 men and citizens4 ,adopt    
this meaning--this legal meaning--this  

only meaning that can1 in this clause1  
be legally given to the word free1 and  
our constitution becomes1 instead of a  
nefarious compact of conspirators       
against the rights of man1 a consistent 
and impartial contract of government    
between all the people of the ,united   
,states1 for securing to themselves and 
their posterity the blessings of liberty
 and justice4  ,again4 ,we cannot       
unnecessarily place upon the            
constitution a meaning directly         
destructive of the government it was    
designed to establish4 ,by giving to the
 word free the meaning universally given
 to it by our political papers of a     
similar character up to the time the    
constitution was adopted1 we give to the
 government three millions of citizens1 
ready to fight and be taxed for its     
support4 ,by giving to the word free a  
meaning correlative with slavery1 we    
locate in our midst three millions of   
enemies2 thus making a difference of six
 millions1 7one third of our whole      

number17 in the physical strength of the
 nation4 ,certainly a meaning so        
suicidal towards the government1 cannot 
be given to any part of the             
constitution1 except the language be    
irresistibly explicit2 much less can it 
be done1 7as in this case it would be17 
wantonly1 unnecessarily1 gratuitously1  
wickedly1 and in violation of all       
previous usage4  ,again4 ,if we look    
into the constitution itself for the    
meaning of the word free1 we find it to 
result from the distinction there       
recognized between citizens and aliens4 
,if we look into the contemporary state 
constitutions1 we still find the word   
free to express the political relation  
of the individual to the state1 and not 
any property relation of one individual 
to another4 ,if we look into the law of 
nature for the meaning of the word free1
 we find that by that law all mankind   
are free4 ,whether1 therefore1 we look  
to the constitution itself1 to the      
contemporary state constitutions1 or to 

the law of nature1 for the meaning of   
this word free1 the only meaning we     
shall find is one consistent with the   
personal liberty of all4 ,on the other  
hand1 if we are resolved to give the    
word a meaning correlative with slavery1
 we must go to the lawless code of the  
kidnapper to find such a meaning4 ,does 
it need any argument to prove to which  
of these different codes our judicial   
tribunals are bound to go1 to find the  
meaning of the words used in a          
constitution1 that is established       
professedly to secure liberty and       
justice8  ,once more4 ,it is altogether 
a false1 absurd1 violent1 unnatural and 
preposterous proceeding1 in construing a
 political paper1 which purports to     
establish men's relations to the state1 
and especially in construing the clause 
in it which fixes the basis of          
representation and taxation1 to give to 
the words1 which describe the persons to
 be represented and taxed1 and which    
appropriately indicate those relations  

of men to the state which make them     
proper subjects of taxation and         
representation--to give to such words a 
meaning1 which1 instead of describing   
men's relations to the state1 would     
describe merely a personal or property  
relation of one individual to another1  
which the state has nowhere else        
recognized1 and which1 if admitted to   
exist1 would absolve the persons        
described from all allegiance to the    
state1 would deny them all right to be  
represented1 and discharge them from all
 liability to be taxed4  ,but it is     
unnecessary to follow out this slave    
argument into all its ramifications4 ,it
 sets out with nothing but assumptions1 
that are gratuitous1 absurd1 improbable1
 irrelevant1 contrary to all previous   
usage1 contrary to natural right1 and   
therefore inadmissible4 ,it conducts to 
nothing but contradictions1 absurdities1
 impossibilities1 indiscriminate        
slavery1 anarchy1 and the destruction of
 the very government which the          

constitution was designed to establish4 
,the other clause relied on as a        
recognition and sanction1 both of       
slavery and the slave trade1 is the     
following3     ,the migration or        
importation of such persons as any of   
the states    now existing shall think  
proper to admit1 shall not be prohibited
 by    the congress prior to the year   
one thousand eight hundred and eight1   
but a tax or duty may be imposed on such
 importation1 not exceeding    ten      
dollars for each person4--7,art4 #a1    
,sec4 #i47  ,the slave argument1 drawn  
from this clause1 is1 that the word     
importation applies only to property1   
and that it therefore implies1 in this  
clause1 that the persons to be imported 
are necessarily to be imported as       
property--that is1 as slaves4  ,but the 
idea that the word importation applies  
only to property1 is erroneous4 ,it     
applies correctly both to persons and   
things4 ,the definition of the verb     
import is simply to bring from a foreign

 country1 or jurisdiction1 or from      
another state1 into one's own country1  
jurisdiction or state4--,when we speak  
of importing things1 it is true that we 
mentally associate with them the idea of
 property4 ,but that is simply because  
things are property1 and not because the
 word import has any control1 in that   
particular1 over the character of the   
things imported4 ,when we speak of      
importing persons1 we do not associate  
with them the idea of property1 simply  
because persons are not property4  ,we  
speak daily of the importation of       
foreigners into the country2 but no one 
infers therefrom that they are brought  
in as slaves1 but as passengers4 ,a     
vessel imports1 or brings in1 five      
hundred passengers4 ,every vessel1 or   
master of a vessel1 that brings in      
passengers1 imports them4 ,but such     
passengers are not therefore slaves4 ,a 
man imports his wife and children--but  
they are not therefore his slaves1 or   
capable of being owned or sold as his   

property4 ,a man imports a gang of      
laborers1 to clear lands1 cut canals1 or
 construct railroads2 but not therefore 
to be held as slaves4 ,an innocent      
meaning must be given to the word1 if it
 will bear one4 ,such is the legal rule4
  ,even the popular understanding of the
 word import1 when applied to persons1  
does not convey the idea of property4   
,it is only when it is applied          
distinctly to slaves1 that any such idea
 is conveyed2 and then it is the word   
slaves1 and not the word import1 that   
suggests the idea of property4 ,even    
slave traders and slave holders attach  
no such meaning to the word import1 when
 it is connected with the word persons2 
but only when it is connected with the  
word slaves4  ,in the case of ,ogden vs4
 ,saunders1 7#ab ,wheaton1 #ccb17 ,chief
 ,justice ,marshall said1 that in       
construing the constitution1 the        
intention of the instrument must        
prevail2 that this intention must be    
collected from its words2 that its words

 are to be understood in that sense in  
which they are generally used by those  
for whom the instrument was intended4   
,on this principle of construction1     
there is not the least authority for    
saying that this provision for the      
importation of persons1 authorized the  
importation of them as slaves4 ,to give 
it this meaning1 requires the same      
stretching of words towards the wrong1  
that is applied1 by the advocates of    
slavery1 to the words service or labor1 
and the words free and all other        
persons4  ,another reason1 which makes  
it necessary that this construction     
should be placed upon the word          
importation1 is1 that the clause        
contains no other word that describes   
the immigration of foreigners4 ,yet that
 the clause related to the immigration  
of foreigners generally1 and that it    
restrained congress1 7up to the year    
#ahjh17 from prohibiting the immigration
 of foreigners generally1 there can be  
no doubt4  ,the object1 and the only    

legal object1 of the clause was to      
restrain congress from so exercising    
their power of regulating commerce with 
foreign nations1 and among the several  
states1 and with the ,indian            
tribes--7which power has been decided by
 the supreme court of the ,united       
,states1 to include a power over        
navigation and the transportation of    
passengers in boats and vessels#ba7--;as
 to obstruct the introduction of new    
population into such of the states as   
were desirous of increasing their       
population in that manner4 ,the clause  
does not imply at all1 that the         
population1 which the states were thus  
to admit1 was to be a slave population4 
,the word importation1 7,i repeat17 is  
the only word in the clause1 that       
applies to persons that were to come    
into the country from foreign nations4  
,the word migration applies only to     
those who were to go out from one of our
 own states or territories into another4
 ,migration is the act of going out from

 a state or country2 and differs from   
immigration in this1 that immigration is
 the act of coming into a state or      
country4 ,it is obvious1 therefore1 that
 the migration1 which congress are here 
forbidden to prohibit1 is simply the    
going out of persons from one of our own
 states or territories into             
another--7for that is the only migration
 that could come within the jurisdiction
 of congress7--and that it has no       
reference to persons coming in from     
foreign countries to our own4  ,if1     
then1 migration1 as here used1 has      
reference only to persons going out from
 one state into another1 the word       
importation is the only one in the      
clause that is applicable to foreigners 
coming into our country4 ,this word     
importation1 then1 being the only word  
that can apply to persons coming into   
the country1 it must be considered as   
substantially synonymous with           
immigration1 and must apply equally to  
all persons1 that are imported1 or      

brought into the country as passengers4 
,and if it applies equally to all       
persons1 that are brought in as         
passengers1 it does not imply that any  
of those persons are slaves2 for no one 
will pretend that this clause ever      
authorized the state governments to     
treat as slaves all persons that were   
brought into the country as passengers4 
,and if it did not authorize them to    
treat all such passengers as slaves1 it 
did not authorize them to treat any of  
them as such2 for it makes no           
discrimination between the different    
persons that should be thus imported4   
,again4 ,the argument1 that the         
allowance of the importation of persons1
 implies the allowance of property in   
such persons1 would imply a recognition 
of the validity of the slave laws of    
other countries2 for unless slaves were 
obtained by valid purchase abroad--which
 purchase implies the existence and     
validity of foreign slave laws--the     
importer certainly could not claim to   

import his slaves as property2 but he   
would appear1 at the custom-house1 as a 
mere pirate1 claiming to have his       
captures legalized4 ,so that1 according 
to the slave argument1 the simple use of
 the word importation1 in the           
constitution1 as applied to persons1    
bound our government1 not only to the   
sanction and toleration of slavery in   
our own country1 but to the recognition 
of the validity of the slave laws of    
other countries4  ,but farther4 ,the    
allowance of the importation of slaves1 
as such1 under this clause of the       
constitution1 would imply that congress 
must take actual1 and even the most     
critical cognizance of the slave laws of
 other countries2 and that they should  
allow neither the mere word of the      
person calling himself the owner1 nor   
any thing short of the fullest and      
clearest legal proof1 according to the  
laws of those countries1 to be          
sufficient to enable him to enter his   
slaves1 as property1 at the             

custom-house2 otherwise any masters of  
vessels1 from ,england or ,france1 as   
well as from ,africa1 might1 on their   
arrival here1 claim their passengers as 
slaves4 ,did the constitution1 in this  
clause1 by simply using the word        
importation1 instead of immigration1    
intend to throw upon the national       
government--at the hazard of making it a
 party to the illegal enslavement of    
human beings--the responsibility of     
investigating and deciding upon the     
legality and credibility of all the     
evidence that might be offered by the   
piratical masters of slave ships1 to    
prove their valid purchase of1 and their
 right of property in their human       
cargoes1 according to the slave laws of 
the countries from which they should    
bring them8 ,such must have been the    
intention of the constitution1 if it    
intended1 7as it must1 if it intended   
any thing of this kind17 that the fact  
of importation under the commercial     
regulations of congress1 should be      

thereafter a sufficient authority for   
holding in slavery the persons imported4
  ,but perhaps it will be said that it  
was not the intention of the            
constitution1 that congress should take 
any responsibility at all in the matter2
 that it was merely intended that       
whoever came into the country with a    
cargo of men1 whom he called his slaves1
 should be permitted to bring them in on
 his own responsibility1 and sell them  
as slaves for life to our people2 and   
that congress were prohibited only from 
interfering1 or asking any questions as 
to how he obtained them1 or how they    
became his slaves4 ,suppose such were   
the intention of the constitution--what 
follows8 ,why1 that the national        
government1 the only government that was
 to be known to foreign nations1 the    
only government that was to be permitted
 to regulate our commerce1 or make      
treaties with foreign nations1 the      
government on whom alone was to rest the
 responsibility of war with foreign     

nations1 was bound to permit1 7until    
#ahjh17 all masters1 both of our own    
ships and of the ships of other nations1
 to turn pirates1 and make slaves of    
their passengers1 whether ,englishmen1  
,frenchmen1 or any other civilized      
people1 7for the constitution makes no  
distinction of persons on this point17  
bring them into this country1 sell them 
as slaves for life to our people1 and   
thus make our country a rendezvous and  
harbor for pirates1 involve us          
inevitably in war with every civilized  
nation in the world1 cause ourselves to 
be outlawed as a people1 and bring      
certain and swift destruction upon the  
whole nation2 and yet this government1  
that had the sole responsibility of all 
our foreign relations1 was              
constitutionally prohibited from        
interfering in the matter1 or from doing
 any thing but lifting its hands in     
prayer to ,god and these pirates1 that  
the former would so far depart1 and the 
latter so far desist from their usual   

courses1 as might be necessary to save  
us1 until #ahjh1 7after which time we   
would take the matter into our own      
hands1 and1 by prohibiting the causes of
 the danger1 save ourselves17 from the  
just vengeance1 which the rest of       
mankind were taking upon us4  ,this is  
the kind of constitution1 under which1  
7according to the slave argument17 we   
lived until #ahjh4  ,but is such the    
real character of the constitution8 ,by 
it1 did we thus really avow to the world
 that we were a nation of pirates8 that 
our territory should be a harbor for    
pirates8 that our people were           
constitutionally licensed to enslave the
 people of all other nations1 without   
discrimination1 7for the instrument     
makes no discrimination17 whom they     
could either kidnap in their own        
countries1 or capture on the high seas8 
and that we had even prohibited our only
 government that could make treaties    
with foreign nations1 from making any   
treaty1 until #ahjh1 with any particular

 nation1 to exempt the people of that   
nation from their liability to be       
enslaved by the people of our own8 ,the 
slave argument says that we did avow all
 this4 ,if we really did1 perhaps all   
that can be said of it now is1 that it  
is very fortunate for us that other     
nations did not take us at our word4    
,for if they had taken us at our word1  
we should1 before #ahjh1 have been among
 the nations that were4  ,suppose that1 
on the organization of our government1  
we had been charged by foreign nations1 
with having established a piratical     
government--how could we have rebutted  
the charge otherwise than by denying    
that the words importation of persons   
legally implied that the persons        
imported were slaves8 ,suppose that     
,european ambassadors had represented to
 president ,washington that their       
governments considered our constitution 
as licensing our people to kidnap the   
people of other nations1 without        
discrimination1 and bring them to the   

,united ,states as slaves4 ,would he not
 have denied that the legal meaning of  
the clause did any thing more than      
secure the free introduction of         
foreigners as passengers and freemen8   
,or would he--he1 the world-renowned    
champion of human rights--have indeed   
stooped to the acknowledgment that in   
truth he was the head of a nation of    
pirates1 whose constitution did         
guarantee the freedom of kidnapping men 
abroad1 and importing them as slaves8   
,and would he1 in the event of this     
acknowledgment1 have sought to avert the
 destruction1 which such an avowal would
 be likely to bring upon the nation1 by 
pleading that1 although such was the    
legal meaning of the words of our       
constitution1 we yet had an             
understanding1 7an honorable            
understanding67 among ourselves1 that we
 would not take advantage of the license
 to kidnap or make slaves of any of the 
citizens of those civilized and powerful
 nations of ,europe1 that kept ships of 

war1 and knew the use of gunpowder and  
cannon2 but only the people of poor1    
weak1 barbarous and ignorant nations1   
who were incapable of resistance and    
retaliation8  ,again4 ,even the         
allowance of the simple importation of  
slaves--7and that is the most that is   
literally provided for--and the word    
importation must be construed to the    
letter17 would not1 of itself1 give any 
authority for the continuance of the    
slavery after importation4 ,if a man    
bring either property or persons into   
this country1 he brings them in to abide
 the constitutional laws of the country2
 and not to be held according to the    
customs of the country from which they  
were brought4 ,were it not so1 the ,turk
 might import a harem of ,georgian      
slaves1 and1 at his option1 either hold 
them as his own property1 or sell them  
as slaves to our own people1 in defiance
 of any principles of freedom that      
should prevail amongst us4 ,to allow    
this kind of importation1 would be to   

allow not merely the importation of     
foreign persons1 but also of foreign    
laws to take precedence of our own4     
,finally4 ,the conclusion1 that congress
 were restrained1 by this clause1 only  
from prohibiting the immigration of a   
foreign population1 and not from        
prohibiting the importation of slaves1  
to be held as slaves after their        
importation--is the more inevitable1    
from the fact that the power given to   
congress of naturalizing foreigners1 is 
entirely unlimited--except that their   
laws must be uniform throughout the     
,united ,states4 ,they have perfect     
power to pass laws that shall naturalize
 every foreigner without distinction1   
the moment he sets foot on our soil4    
,and they had this power as perfectly   
prior to #ahjh1 as since4 ,and it is a  
power entirely inconsistent with the    
idea that they were bound to admit1 and 
forever after to acknowledge as slaves1 
all or any who might be attempted to be 
brought into the country as such4  ,one 

other provision of the constitution1    
viz3 the one that the ,united ,states   
shall protect each of the ,states       
against domestic violence--has sometimes
 been claimed as a special pledge of    
impunity and succor to that kind of     
violence1 which consists in one portion 
of the people's standing constantly upon
 the necks of another portion1 and      
robbing them of all civil privileges1   
and trampling upon all their personal   
rights4 ,the argument seems to take it  
for granted1 that the only proper way of
 protecting a republican state 7for the 
states are all to be republican17       
against domestic violence1 is to plant  
men firmly upon one another's necks1    
7about in the proportion of two upon    
one17 arm the two with whip and spur1   
and then keep an armed force standing by
 to cut down those that are ridden1 if  
they dare attempt to throw the riders4  
,when the ridden portion shall1 by this 
process1 have been so far subdued as to 
bear the burdens1 lashings and spurrings

 of the other portion without           
resistance1 then the state will have    
been secured against domestic violence1 
and the republican form of government   
will be completely successful4  ,this   
version of this provision of the        
constitution presents a fair            
illustration of those new ideas of law  
and language1 that have been invented   
for the special purpose of bringing     
slavery within the pale of the          
constitution4  ,we have thus examined   
all those clauses of the constitution1  
that have been relied on to prove that  
the instrument recognizes and sanctions 
slavery4 ,no one would have ever dreamed
 that either of these clauses alone1 or 
that all of them together1 contained so 
much as an allusion to slavery1 had it  
not been for circumstances extraneous to
 the constitution itself4 ,and what are 
these extraneous circumstances8 ,they   
are the existence and toleration1 in one
 portion of the country1 of a crime that
 embodies within itself nearly all the  

other crimes1 which it is the principal 
object of all our governments to punish 
and suppress2 a crime which we have     
therefore no more right to presume that 
the constitution of the ,united ,states 
intended to sanction1 than we have to   
presume that it intended to sanction all
 the separate crimes which slavery      
embodies1 and our governments prohibit4 
,yet we have gratuitously presumed that 
the constitution intended to sanction   
all these separate crimes1 as they are  
comprehended in the general crime of    
slavery4 ,and acting upon this          
gratuitous presumption1 we have sought1 
in the words of the constitution1 for   
some hidden meaning1 which we could     
imagine to have been understood1 by the 
initiated1 as referring to slavery2 or  
rather we have presumed its words to    
have been used as a kind of cypher1     
which1 among confederates in crime1 7as 
we presume its authors to have been17   
was meant to stand for slavery4 ,in this
 way1 and in this way only1 we pretend  

to have discovered1 in the clauses that 
have been examined1 a hidden1 yet legal 
sanction of slavery4 ,in the name of all
 that is legal1 who of us are safe1 if  
our government1 instead of searching our
 constitution to find authorities for   
maintaining justice1 are to continue to 
busy themselves in such prying and      
microscopic investigations1 after such  
disguised and enigmatical authorities   
for such wrongs as that of slavery1 and 
their pretended discoveries are to be   
adopted as law1 which they are sworn to 
carry into execution8  ,the clauses     
mentioned1 taken either separately or   
collectively1 neither assert1 imply1    
sanction1 recognize nor acknowledge any 
such thing as slavery4 ,they do not even
 speak of it4 ,they make no allusion to 
it whatever4 ,they do not suggest1 and1 
of themselves1 never would have         
suggested the idea of slavery4 ,there   
is1 in the whole instrument1 no such    
word as slave or slavery2 nor any       
language that can legally be made to    

assert or imply the existence of        
slavery4 ,there is in it nothing about  
color2 nothing from which a liability to
 slavery can be predicated of one person
 more than another2 or from which such a
 liability can be predicated of any     
person whatever4 ,the clauses1 that have
 been claimed for slavery1 are all1 in  
themselves1 honest in their language1   
honest in their legal meaning2 and they 
can be made otherwise only by such      
gratuitous assumptions against natural  
right1 and such straining of words in   
favor of the wrong1 as1 if applied to   
other clauses1 would utterly destroy    
every principle of liberty and justice1 
and allow the whole instrument to be    
perverted to every conceivable purpose  
of tyranny and crime4  ,let us now look 
at the positive provisions of the       
constitution1 in favor of liberty1 and  
see whether they are not only           
inconsistent with any legal sanction of 
slavery1 but also whether they must not1
 of themselves1 have necessarily        

extinguished slavery1 if it had had any 
constitutional existence to be          
extinguished4  ,and1 first1 the         
constitution made all the people of the 
,united ,states citizens under the      
government to be established by it2 for 
all of those1 by whose authority the    
constitution declares itself to be      
established1 must of course be presumed 
to have been made citizens under it4    
,and whether they were entitled or not  
to the right of suffrage1 they were at  
least entitled to all the personal      
liberty and protection1 which the       
constitution professes to secure to the 
people generally4  ,who1 then1          
established the constitution8  ,the     
preamble to the constitution has told us
 in the plainest possible terms1 to wit1
 that ,we1 the people of the ,united    
,states do ordain and establish this    
constitution1 c4  ,by the people of the 
,united ,states1 here mentioned1 the    
constitution intends all the people then
 permanently inhabiting the ,united     

,states4 ,if it does not intend all1 who
 were intended by the people of the     
,united ,states8--,the constitution     
itself gives no answer to such a        
question4--,it does not declare that we1
 the white people1 or we1 the free      
people1 or we1 a part of the people--but
 that we1 the people--that is1 we the   
whole people--of the ,united ,states1 do
 ordain and establish this constitution4
  ,if the whole people of the ,united   
,states were not recognized as citizens 
by the constitution1 then the           
constitution gives no information as to 
what portion of the people were to be   
citizens under it4 ,and the consequence 
would then follow that the constitution 
established a government that could not 
know its own citizens4  ,we cannot go   
out of the constitution for evidence to 
prove who were to be citizens under it4 
,we cannot go out of a written          
instrument for evidence to prove the    
parties to it1 nor to explain its       
meaning1 except the language of the     

instrument on that point be ambiguous4  
,in this case there is no ambiguity4    
,the language of the instrument is      
perfectly explicit and intelligible4    
,because the whole people of the country
 were not allowed to vote on the        
ratification of the constitution1 it    
does not follow that they were not made 
citizens under it2 for women and        
children did not vote on its adoption2  
yet they are made citizens by it1 and   
are entitled as citizens to its         
protection2 and the state governments   
cannot enslave them4 ,the national      
constitution does not limit the right of
 citizenship and protection by the right
 of suffrage1 any more than do the state
 constitutions4 ,under the most1        
probably under all the state            
constitutions1 there are persons who are
 denied the right of suffrage--but they 
are not therefore liable to be enslaved4
  ,those who did take part in the actual
 ratification of the constitution1 acted
 in behalf of1 and1 in theory1          

represented the authority of the whole  
people4 ,such is the theory in this     
country wherever suffrage is confined to
 a few2 and such is the virtual         
declaration of the constitution itself4 
,the declaration that we the people of  
the ,united ,states do ordain and       
establish this constitution1 is         
equivalent to a declaration that those  
who actually participated in its        
adoption1 acted in behalf of all others1
 as well as for themselves4  ,any       
private intentions or understandings1 on
 the part of one portion of the people1 
as to who should be citizens1 cannot be 
admitted to prove that such portion only
 were intended by the constitution1 to  
be citizens2 for the intentions of the  
other portion would be equally          
admissible to exclude the exclusives4   
,the mass of the people can claim       
citizenship under the constitution1 on  
no other ground than as being a part of 
the people of the ,united ,states2 and  
such claim necessarily admits that all  

other people of the ,united ,states are 
equally citizens4  ,that the            
designation1 ,we the people of the      
,united ,states1 included the whole     
people that properly belonged to the    
,united ,states1 is also proved by the  
fact that no exception is made in any   
other part of the instrument4  ,if the  
constitution had intended that any      
portion of the people of the ,united    
,states should be excepted from its     
benefits1 disfranchised1 outlawed1      
enslaved1 it would of course have       
designated these exceptions with such   
particularity as to make it sure that   
none but the true persons intended would
 be liable to be subjected to such      
wrongs4 ,yet1 instead of such particular
 designation of the exceptions1 we find 
no designation whatever of the kind4    
,but on the contrary1 we do find1 in the
 preamble itself1 a sweeping declaration
 to the effect that there are no such   
exceptions2 that the whole people of the
 ,united ,states are citizens1 and      

entitled to liberty1 protection1 and the
 dispensation of justice under the      
constitution4  ,if it be admitted that  
the constitution designated its own     
citizens1 then there is no escape from  
the conclusion that it designated the   
whole people of the ,united ,states as  
such4 ,on the other hand1 if it be      
denied that the constitution designated 
its own citizens1 one of these two      
conclusions must follow1 viz41 #ast1    
that it has no citizens2 or1 #b;d1 that 
it has left an unrestrained power in the
 state governments to determine who may1
 and who may not1 be citizens of the    
,united ,states government4 ,if the     
first of these conclusions be adopted1  
viz41 that the constitution has no      
citizens1 then it follows that there is 
really no ,united ,states government1   
except on paper--for there would be as  
much reason in talking of an army       
without men1 as of a government without 
citizens4 ,if the second conclusion be  
adopted1 viz41 that the state           

governments have the right of           
determining who may1 and who may not be 
citizens of the ,united ,states         
government1 then it follows that the    
state governments may at pleasure       
destroy the government of the ,united   
,states1 by enacting that none of their 
respective inhabitants shall be citizens
 of the ,united ,states4  ,this latter  
is really the doctrine of some of the   
slave states--the state-rights doctrine1
 so called4 ,that doctrine holds that   
the general government is merely a      
confederacy or league of the several    
states1 as states2 not a government     
established by the people1 as people4   
,this state-rights doctrine has been    
declared unconstitutional by reiterated 
opinions of the supreme court of the    
,united ,states2#bb and1 what is of more
 consequence1 it is denied also by the  
preamble to the constitution itself1    
which declares that it is the people1   
7and not the state governments17 that   
ordain and establish it4 ,it is true    

also that the constitution was ratified 
by conventions of the people1 and not by
 the legislatures of the states4 ,yet   
because the constitution was ratified by
 conventions of the states separately1  
7as it naturally would be for           
convenience1 and as it necessarily must 
have been for the reason that none but  
the people of the respective states     
could recall any portion of the         
authority they had1 delegated to their  
state governments1 so as to grant it to 
the ,united ,states government17--yet   
because it was thus ratified1 ,i say1   
some of the slave states have claimed   
that the general government was a league
 of states1 instead of a government     
formed by the people4 ,the true reason  
why the slave states have held this     
theory1 probably is1 because it would   
give1 or appear to give1 to the states  
the right of determining who should1 and
 who should not1 be citizens of the     
,united ,states4 ,they probably saw that
 if it were admitted that the           

constitution of the ,united ,states had 
designated its own citizens1 it had     
undeniably designated the whole people  
of the then ,united ,states as such2 and
 that1 as a state could not enslave a   
citizen of the ,united ,states1 7on     
account of the supremacy of the         
constitution of the ,united ,states17 it
 would follow that there could be no    
constitutional slavery in the ,united   
,states4  ,again4 ,if the constitution  
was established by authority of all the 
people of the ,united ,states1 they were
 all legally parties to it1 and citizens
 under it4 ,and if they were parties to 
it1 and citizens under it1 it follows   
that neither they1 nor their posterity1 
nor any nor either of them1 can ever be 
legally enslaved within the territory of
 the ,united ,states2 for the           
constitution declares its object to be1 
among other things1 to secure the       
blessings of liberty to ourselves1 and  
our posterity4 ,this purpose of the     
national constitution is a law paramount

 to all state constitutions2 for it is  
declared that this constitution1 and the
 laws of the ,united ,states that shall 
be made in pursuance thereof1 and all   
treaties made1 or which shall be made   
under the authority of the ,united      
,states1 shall be the supreme law of the
 land2 and the judges in every state    
shall be bound thereby1 any thing in the
 constitution or laws of any state to   
the contrary notwithstanding4  ,no one1 
,i suppose1 doubts that if the state    
governments were to abolish slavery1 the
 slaves would then1 without further     
legislation1 become citizens of the     
,united ,states4 ,yet1 in reality1 if   
they would become citizens then1 they   
are equally citizens now--else it would 
follow that the state governments had an
 arbitrary power of making citizens of  
the ,united ,states2 or--what is equally
 absurd--it would follow that           
disabilities1 arbitrarily imposed by the
 state governments1 upon native         
inhabitants of the country1 were1 of    

themselves1 sufficient to deprive such  
inhabitants of their citizenship1 which 
would otherwise have been conferred upon
 them by the constitution of the ,united
 ,states4 ,to suppose that the state    
governments are thus able1 arbitrarily1 
to keep in abeyance1 or arbitrarily to  
withhold from any of the inhabitants of 
the country1 any of the benefits or     
rights which the national constitution  
intended to confer upon them1 would be  
to suppose that the state constitutions 
were paramount to the national one4 ,the
 conclusion1 therefore1 is inevitable1  
that the state governments have no power
 to withhold the rights of citizenship  
from any who are otherwise competent to 
become citizens4 ,and as all the native 
born inhabitants of the country are at  
least competent to become citizens of   
the ,united ,states1 7if they are not   
already such17 the state governments    
have no power1 by slave laws or any     
other1 to withhold the rights of        
citizenship from them4  ,but however    

clear it may be1 that the constitution1 
in reality1 made citizens of all the    
people of the ,united ,states1 yet it is
 not necessary to maintain that point1  
in order to prove that the constitution 
gave no guaranty or sanction to         
slavery--for if it had not already given
 citizenship to all1 it nevertheless    
gave to the government of the ,united   
,states unlimited power of offering     
citizenship to all4 ,the power given to 
the government of passing naturalization
 laws1 is entirely unrestricted1 except 
that the laws must be uniform throughout
 the country4 ,and the government have  
undoubted power to offer naturalization 
and citizenship to every person in the  
country1 whether foreigner or native1   
who is not already a citizen4 ,to       
suppose that we have in the country     
three millions of native born           
inhabitants1 not citizens1 and whom the 
national government has no power to make
 citizens1 when its power of            
naturalization is entirely unrestricted1

 is a palpable contradiction4  ,but     
further4 ,the constitution of the       
,united ,states must be made consistent 
with itself throughout2 and if any of   
its parts are irreconcilable with each  
other1 those parts that are inconsistent
 with liberty1 justice and right1 must  
be thrown out for inconsistency4        
,besides the provisions already         
mentioned1 there are numerous others1 in
 the constitution of the ,united        
,states1 that are entirely and          
irreconcilably inconsistent with the    
idea that there either was1 or could be1
 any constitutional slavery in this     
country4  ,among these provisions are   
the following3  ,first4 ,congress have  
power to lay a capitation or poll tax   
upon the people of the country4 ,upon   
whom shall this tax be levied8 and who  
must be held responsible for its        
payment8 ,suppose a poll tax were laid  
upon a man1 whom the state laws should  
pretend to call a slave4 ,are the       
,united ,states under the necessity of  

investigating1 or taking any notice of  
the fact of slavery1 either for the     
purpose of excusing the man himself from
 the tax1 or of throwing it upon the    
person claiming to be his owner8 ,must  
the government of the ,united ,states   
find a man's pretended owner1 or only   
the man himself1 before they can tax    
him8 ,clearly the ,united ,states are   
not bound to tax any one but the        
individual himself1 or to hold any other
 person responsible for the tax4 ,any   
other principle would enable the state  
governments to defeat any tax of this   
kind levied by the ,united ,states4 ,yet
 a man's liability to be held personally
 responsible for the payment of a tax1  
levied upon himself by the government of
 the ,united ,states1 is inconsistent   
with the idea that the government is    
bound to recognize him as not having the
 ownership of his own person4           
,second4 ,the congress shall have power 
to regulate commerce with    foreign    
nations1 and among the several states1  

and with the ,indian    tribes4  ,this  
power is held1 by the supreme court of  
the ,united ,states1 to be an exclusive 
one in the general government2 and it   
obviously must be so1 to be             
effectual--for if the states could also 
interfere to regulate it1 the states    
could at pleasure defeat the regulations
 of congress4  ,congress1 then1 having  
the exclusive power of regulating this  
commerce1 they only 7if any body7 can   
say who may1 and who may not1 carry it  
on2 and probably even they have no power
 to discriminate arbitrarily between    
individuals4--,but1 in no event1 have   
the state governments any right to say  
who may1 or who may not1 carry on       
commerce with foreign nations1 or among 
the several states1 or with the ,indian 
tribes4 ,every individual--naturally    
competent to make contracts--whom the   
state laws declare to be a slave1       
probably has1 and certainly may have1   
under the regulations of congress1 as   
perfect a right to carry on commerce    

with foreign nations1 and among the     
several states1 and with the ,indian    
tribes1 as any other citizen of the     
,united ,states can have--any thing in  
the constitution or laws of any state to
 the contrary notwithstanding4 ,yet this
 right of carrying on commerce is a     
right entirely inconsistent with the    
idea of a man's being a slave4  ,again4 
,it is a principle of law that the right
 of traffic is a natural right1 and that
 all commerce 7that is intrinsically    
innocent7 is therefore lawful1 except   
what is prohibited by positive          
legislation4 ,traffic with the slaves1  
either by people of foreign nations1 or 
by people belonging to other states than
 the slaves1 has never 7so far as ,i    
know7 been prohibited by congress1 which
 is the only government1 7if any17 that 
has power to prohibit it4 ,traffic with 
the slaves is therefore as lawful at    
this moment1 under the constitution of  
the ,united ,states1 as is traffic with 
their masters2 and this fact is entirely

 inconsistent with the idea that their  
bondage is constitutional4     ,third4  
,the congress shall have power to       
establish post offices and    post      
roads4  ,who1 but congress1 have any    
right to say who may send1 or receive   
letters by the ,united ,states posts8   
,certainly no one4 ,they have undoubted 
authority to permit any one to send and 
receive letters by their posts--any     
thing in the constitutions or laws of   
the states to the contrary              
notwithstanding4 ,yet the right to send 
and receive letters by post1 is a right 
inconsistent with the idea of a man's   
being a slave4     ,fourth4 ,the        
congress shall have power to promote the
 progress of    science and useful arts1
 by securing for limited times to       
authors and    inventors the exclusive  
right to their respective writings and  
discoveries4  ,suppose a man1 whom a    
state may pretend to call a slave1      
should make an invention or             
discovery--congress have undoubted power

 to secure to such individual himself1  
by patent1 the exclusive--7mark the     
word7--the exclusive right to his       
invention or discovery4 ,but does not   
this exclusive right in the inventor    
himself1 exclude the right of any man1  
who1 under a state law1 may claim to be 
the owner of the inventor8 ,certainly it
 does4 ,yet the slave code says that    
whatever is a slave's is his owner's4   
,this power1 then1 on the part of       
congress1 to secure to an individual the
 exclusive right to his inventions and  
discoveries1 is a power inconsistent    
with the idea that that individual      
himself1 and all he may possess1 are the
 property of another4     ,fifth4 ,the  
congress shall have power to declare    
war1 grant letters    of marque and     
reprisal1 and make rules concerning     
captures on land    and water2 also to  
raise and support armies2 and to provide
 and    maintain a navy4  ,have not     
congress authority1 under these powers1 
to enlist soldiers and sailors1 by      

contract with themselves1 and to pay    
them their wages1 grant them pensions1  
and secure their wages and pensions to  
their own use1 without asking the       
permission either of the state          
governments1 or of any individuals whom 
the state governments may see fit to    
recognize as the owners of such soldiers
 and sailors8 ,certainly they have1 in  
defiance of all state laws and          
constitutions whatsoever2 and they have 
already asserted that principle by      
enacting that pensions1 paid by the     
,united ,states to their soldiers1 shall
 not be liable to be taken for debt1    
under the laws of the states4 ,have they
 not authority also to grant letters of 
marque and reprisal1 and to secure the  
prizes1 to a ship's crew of blacks1 as  
well as of whites8 ,to those whom the   
,state governments call slaves1 as well 
as to those whom the state governments  
call free8--,have not congress authority
 to make contracts1 for the defence of  
the nation1 with any and all the        

inhabitants of the nation1 who may be   
willing to perform the service8 ,or are 
they obliged first to ask and obtain the
 consent of those private individuals   
who may pretend to own the inhabitants  
of this nation8 ,undoubtedly congress   
have the power to contract with whom    
they please1 and to secure wages and    
pensions to such individuals1 in        
contempt of all state authority4 ,yet   
this power is inconsistent with the idea
 that the constitution recognizes or    
sanctions the legality of slavery4      
,sixth4 ,the congress shall have power  
to provide for the    organizing1 arming
 and disciplining the militia1 and for  
governing such part of them as may be   
employed in the service of the          
,united ,states1 reserving to the states
 respectively the appointment    of the 
officers1 and the authority of training 
the militia1 according    to the        
discipline prescribed by congress4 ,also
 to provide for    calling forth the    
militia to execute the laws of the      

,union1 suppress    insurrections1 and  
repel invasions4  ,have not congress1   
under these powers1 as undoubted        
authority to enroll in the militia1 and 
arm those whom the states call slaves1  
and authorize them always to keep their 
arms by them1 even when not on duty1    
7that they may at all times be ready to 
be called forth to execute the laws of  
the ,union1 suppress insurrections1 and 
repel invasions17 as they have thus to  
enroll and arm those whom the states    
call free8 ,can the state governments   
determine who may1 and who may not      
compose the militia of the ,united      
,states8  ,look1 too1 at this power1 in 
connection with the second amendment to 
the constitution2 which is in these     
words3     ,a well regulated militia    
being necessary to the security of a    
free    state1 the right of the people  
to keep and bear arms shall not be      
infringed4  ,these provisions obviously 
recognize the natural right of all men  
to keep and bear arms for their personal

 defence2 and prohibit both congress and
 the state governments from infringing  
the right of the people--that is1 of any
 of the people--to do so2 and more      
especially of any whom congress have    
power to include in their militia4 ,this
 right of a man to keep and bear arms1  
is a right palpably inconsistent with   
the idea of his being a slave4 ,yet the 
right is secured as effectually to those
 whom the states presume to call slaves1
 as to any whom the states condescend to
 acknowledge free4  ,under this         
provision any man has a right either to 
give or sell arms to those persons whom 
the states call slaves2 and there is no 
constitutional power1 in either the     
national or state governments1 that can 
punish him for so doing2 or that can    
take those arms from the slaves2 or that
 can make it criminal for the slaves to 
use them1 if1 from the inefficiency of  
the laws1 it should become necessary for
 them to do so1 in defence of their own 
lives or liberties2 for this            

constitutional right to keep arms       
implies the constitutional right to use 
them1 if need be1 for the defence of    
one's liberty or life4  ,seventh4 ,the  
constitution of the ,united ,states     
declares that no state shall pass any   
law impairing the obligation of         
contracts4  ,the obligation of          
contracts1 here spoken of1 is1 of       
necessity1 the natural obligation2 for  
that is the only real or true obligation
 that any contracts can have4 ,it is    
also the only obligation1 which courts  
recognize in any case1 except where     
legislatures arbitrarily interfere to   
impair it4 ,but the prohibition of the  
constitution is upon the states' passing
 any law whatever that shall impair the 
natural obligation of men's contracts4  
,yet1 if slave laws were constitutional1
 they would effectually impair the      
obligation of all contracts entered into
 by those who are made slaves2 for the  
slave laws must necessarily hold that   
all a slave's contracts are void4  ,this

 prohibition upon the states to pass any
 law impairing the natural obligation of
 men's contracts1 implies that all men  
have a constitutional right to enter    
into all contracts that have a natural  
obligation4 ,it therefore secures the   
constitutional right of all men to enter
 into such contracts1 and to have them  
respected by the state governments4 ,yet
 this constitutional right of all men to
 enter into all contracts that have a   
natural obligation1 and to have those   
contracts recognized by law as valid1 is
 a right plainly inconsistent with the  
idea that men can constitutionally be   
made slaves4  ,this provision therefore 
absolutely prohibits the passage of     
slave laws1 because laws that make men  
slaves must necessarily impair the      
obligation of all their contracts4      
,eighth4 ,persons1 whom some of the     
state governments recognize as slaves1  
are made eligible1 by the constitution  
of the ,united ,states1 to the office of
 president of the ,united ,states4 ,the 

constitutional provision on this subject
 is this3     ,no person1 except a      
natural born citizen1 or a citizen of   
the ,united    ,states at the time of   
the adoption of this constitution1 shall
 be    eligible to the office of        
president2 neither shall any person be  
eligible to that office1 who shall not  
have attained the age of    thirty-five 
years1 and been fourteen years a        
resident of the ,united    ,states4     
,according to this provision1 all       
persons1#bc who have resided within the 
,united ,states fourteen years1 have    
attained the age of thirty-five years1  
and are either natural born citizens1 or
 were citizens of the ,united ,states at
 the time of the adoption of the        
constitution1 are eligible to the office
 of president4 ,no other qualifications 
than these being required by the        
constitution1 no others can be legally  
demanded4 ,the only question1 then1 that
 can arise1 is as to the word citizen4  
,who are the persons that come within   

this definition1 as here used8 ,the     
clause itself divides them into two     
classes1 to wit1 the natural born1 and  
those who were citizens of the ,united  
,states at the time of the adoption of  
the constitution4 ,in regard to this    
latter class1 it has before been shown1 
from the preamble to the constitution1  
that all who were people of the ,united 
,states1 7that is1 permanent            
inhabitants17 at the time the           
constitution was adopted1 were made     
citizens by it4 ,and this clause1       
describing those eligible to the office 
of president1 implies the same thing4   
,this is evident2 for it speaks of those
 who were citizens of the ,united       
,states at the time of the adoption of  
the constitution4 ,now there clearly    
could have been no citizens of the      
,united ,states1 at the time of the     
adoption of the constitution1 unless    
they were made so by the constitution   
itself2 for there were no citizens of   
the ,united ,states before the adoption 

of the constitution4 ,the ,confederation
 had no citizens4 ,it was a mere league 
between the state governments4 ,the     
separate states belonging to the        
confederacy had each their own citizens 
respectively4 ,but the confederation    
itself1 as such1 had no citizens4 ,there
 were1 therefore1 no citizens of the    
,united ,states1 7but only citizens of  
the respective states17 before the      
adoption of the constitution4--,yet this
 clause asserts that immediately on the 
adoption1 or at the time of the adoption
 of this constitution1 there were       
citizens of the ,united ,states4 ,those1
 then1 who were citizens of the ,united 
,states at the time of the adoption of  
the constitution1 were necessarily      
those1 and only those1 who had been made
 so by the adoption of the constitution2
 because they could have become citizens
 at that precise time in no other way4  
,if1 then1 any persons were made        
citizens by the adoption of the         
constitution1 who were the individuals  

that were thus made citizens8 ,they were
 the people of the ,united ,states1 of  
course--as the preamble to the          
constitution virtually asserts4 ,and if 
the people of the ,united ,states were  
made citizens by the adoption of the    
constitution1 then all the people of the
 ,united ,states were necessarily made  
citizens by it--for no discrimination is
 made by the constitution between       
different individuals1 people of the    
,united ,states--and there is therefore 
no means of determining who were made   
citizens by the adoption of the         
constitution1 unless all the people of  
the ,united ,states were so made4 ,any  
person1 then1 who was one of the people 
of the ,united ,states at the time of   
the adoption of this constitution1 and  
who is thirty-five years old1 and has   
resided fourteen years within the       
,united ,states1 is eligible to the     
office of president of the ,united      
,states4 ,and if every such person be   
eligible1 under the constitution1 to the

 office of president of the ,united     
,states1 the constitution certainly does
 not recognize them as slaves4  ,the    
other class of citizens1 mentioned as   
being eligible to the office of         
president1 consists of the natural born 
citizens4 ,here is an implied assertion 
that natural birth in the country gives 
the right of citizenship4 ,and if it    
gives it to one1 it necessarily gives it
 to all--for no discrimination is made2 
and if all persons1 born in the country1
 are not entitled to citizenship1 the   
constitution has given us no test by    
which to determine who of them are      
entitled to it4  ,every person1 then1   
born in the country1 and that shall have
 attained the age of thirty-five years1 
and been fourteen years a resident      
within the ,united ,states1 is eligible 
to the office of president4 ,and if     
eligible to that office1 the            
constitution certainly does not         
recognize him as a slave4  ,persons1 who
 are citizens of the ,united ,states1   

according to the foregoing definitions1 
are also eligible to the offices of     
representative and senator of the       
,united ,states2 and therefore cannot be
 slaves4     ,ninth4 ,the constitution  
declares that the trial of all crimes1  
except in cases of impeachment1 shall be
 by jury4--,also that    ,treason       
against the ,united ,states shall       
consist only in levying war    against  
them1 or in adhering to their enemies1  
giving them aid and    comfort4  ,it is 
obvious that slaves1 if we had any1     
might levy war against the ,united      
,states1 and might also adhere to their 
enemies1 giving them aid and comfort4   
,it may1 however1 be doubted whether    
they could commit the crime of          
treason--for treason implies a breach of
 fidelity1 trust or allegiance1 where   
fidelity1 trust or allegiance is due4   
,and it is very clear that slaves could 
owe allegiance1 trust or fidelity1      
neither to the ,united ,states1 nor to  
the state governments2 for allegiance is

 due to a government only from those who
 are protected by it4 ,slaves could owe 
to our governments nothing but          
resistance and destruction4 ,if         
therefore they were to levy war against 
the ,united ,states1 they might not     
perhaps be liable to the technical      
charge of treason2 although there would1
 in reality1 be as much treason in their
 act1 as there would of any other       
crime--for there would1 in truth1 be    
neither legal nor moral crime of any    
kind in it4 ,still1 the government would
 be compelled1 in order to protect      
itself against them1 to charge them with
 some crime or other--treason1 murder1  
or something else4 ,and this charge1    
whatever it might be1 would have to be  
tried by a jury4 ,and what 7in criminal 
cases17 is the trial by jury8 ,it is a  
trial1 both of the law and the fact1 by 
the peers1 or equals1 of the person     
tried4 ,who are the peers of a slave8   
,none1 evidently1 but slaves4 ,if1 then1
 the constitution recognizes any such   

class of persons1 in this country1 as   
slaves1 it would follow that for any    
crime committed by them against the     
,united ,states1 they must be tried1    
both on the law and the facts1 by a jury
 of slaves4 ,the result of such trials  
we can readily imagine4  ,does this look
 as if the constitution guarantied1 or  
even recognized the legality of slavery8
     ,tenth4 ,the constitution declares 
that ,the privilege of the writ of      
habeas corpus shall not be suspended1   
unless when1 in cases of    rebellion or
 invasion1 the public safety may require
 it4  ,the privilege of this writ1      
wherever it is allowed1 is of itself    
sufficient to make slavery impossible   
and illegal4 ,the object and prerogative
 of this writ are to secure to all      
persons their natural right to personal 
liberty1 against all restraint except   
from the government2 and even against   
restraints by the government itself1    
unless they are imposed in conformity   
with established general laws1 and upon 

the charge of some legal offence or     
liability4 ,it accordingly liberates all
 who are held in custody against their  
will1 7whether by individuals or the    
government17 unless they are held on    
some formal writ or process1 authorized 
by law1 issued by the government1       
according to established principles1 and
 charging the person held by it with    
some legal offence or liability4 ,the   
principle of the writ seems to be1 that 
no one shall be restrained of his       
natural liberty1 unless these three     
things conspire2 #ast1 that the         
restraint be imposed by special command 
of the government2 #b;d1 that there be a
 general law authorizing restraints for 
specific causes2 and1 #c;d1 that the    
government1 previously to issuing       
process for restraining any particular  
individual1 shall itself1 by its proper 
authorities1 take express cognizance of1
 and inquire cautiously into the facts  
of each case1 and ascertain1 by         
reasonable evidence1 that the individual

 has brought himself within the         
liabilities of the general law4 ,all    
these things the writ of habeas corpus  
secures to be done1 before it will      
suffer a man to be restrained of his    
liberty2 for the writ is a mandate to   
the person holding another in custody1  
commanding him to bring his prisoner    
before the court1 and show the authority
 by which it holds him4 ,unless he then 
exhibit a legal precept1 warrant or     
writ1 issued by1 and bearing the seal of
 the government1 specifying a legal     
ground for restraining the prisoner1 and
 authorizing or requiring him to hold   
him in custody1 he will be ordered to   
let him go free4 ,hence all the keepers 
of prisons1 in order to hold their      
prisoners against the authority of this 
writ1 are required1 in the case of each 
prisoner1 to have a written precept or  
order1 bearing the seal of the          
government1 and issued by the proper    
authority1 particularly describing the  
prisoner by name or otherwise1 and      

setting forth the legal grounds of his  
imprisonment1 and requiring the keeper  
of the prison to hold him in his        
custody4  ,now the master does not hold 
his slave in custody by virtue of any   
formal or legal writ or process1 either 
authorized by law1 or issued by the     
government1 or that charges the slave   
with any legal offence or liability4 ,a 
slave is incapable of incurring any     
legal liability1 or obligation to his   
master4 ,and the government could1 with 
no more consistency1 grant a writ or    
process to the master1 to enable him to 
hold his slave1 than it could to enable 
him to hold his horse4 ,it simply       
recognizes his right of property in his 
slave1 and then leaves him at liberty to
 hold him by brute force1 if he can1 as 
he holds his ox1 or his horse--and not  
otherwise4 ,if the slave escape1 or     
refuse to labor1 the slave code no more 
authorizes the government to issue legal
 process against the slave1 to authorize
 the master to catch him1 or compel him 

to labor1 than it does against a horse  
for the same purpose4--,the slave is    
held simply as property1 by individual  
force1 without legal process4 ,but the  
writ of habeas corpus acknowledges no   
such principle as the right of property 
in man4 ,if it did1 it would be         
perfectly impotent in all cases         
whatsoever2 because it is a principle of
 law1 in regard to property1 that simple
 possession is prima facie evidence of  
ownership2 and therefore any man1 who   
was holding another in custody1 could   
defeat the writ by pleading that he     
owned his prisoner1 and by giving1 as   
proof of ownership1 the simple fact that
 he was in possession of him4 ,if1      
therefore1 the writ of habeas corpus did
 not1 of itself1 involve a denial of the
 right of property in man1 the fact     
stated in it1 that one man was holding  
another in custody1 would be prima facie
 evidence that he owned him1 and had a  
right to hold him2 and the writ would   
therefore carry an absurdity in its     

face4  ,the writ of habeas corpus1 then1
 necessarily denies the right of        
property in man4 ,and the constitution1 
by declaring1 without any discrimination
 of persons1 that the privilege of this 
writ shall not be suspended1--that is1  
shall not be denied to any human        
being--has declared that1 under the     
constitution1 there can be no right of  
property in man4  ,this writ was        
unquestionably intended as a great      
constitutional guaranty of personal     
liberty4 ,but unless it denies the right
 of property in man1 it in reality      
affords no protection to any of us      
against being made slaves4 ,if it does  
deny the right of property in man1 the  
slave is entitled to the privilege of   
the writ2 for he is held in custody by  
his master1 simply on the ground of     
property4  ,mr4 ,christian1 one of      
,blackstone's editors1 says that it is  
this writ that makes slavery impossible 
in ,england4 ,it was on this writ1 that 
,somerset was liberated4 ,the writ1 in  

fact1 asserts1 as a great constitutional
 principle1 the natural right of        
personal liberty4 ,and the privilege of 
the writ is not confined to citizens1   
but extends to all human beings4#bd ,and
 it is probably the only absolute       
guaranty1 that our national constitution
 gives to foreigners and aliens1 that   
they shall not1 on their arrival here1  
be enslaved by those of our state       
governments that exhibit such           
propensities for enslaving their        
fellow-men4 ,for this purpose1 it is a  
perfect guaranty to people who come here
 from any part of the world4 ,and if it 
be such a guaranty to foreigners and    
aliens1 is it no guaranty to those born 
under the constitution8 ,especially when
 the constitution makes no              
discrimination of persons8              
,eleventh4 ,the ,united ,states shall   
guaranty to every state in this    union
 a republican form of government1 and   
shall protect each of    them against   
invasion2 and1 on application of the    

legislature1 or of    the executive1    
7when the legislature cannot be         
convened17 against    domestic violence4
  ,mark the strength and explicitness of
 the first clause of this section1 to   
wit1 ,the ,united ,states shall         
guarantee to every state in this union a
 republican form of government4 ,mark   
also especially that this guaranty is   
one of liberty1 and not of slavery4  ,we
 have all of us heretofore been         
compelled to hear1 from individuals of  
slaveholding principles1 many arrogant  
and bombastic assertions1 touching the  
constitutional guaranties given to      
slavery2 and persons1 who are in the    
habit of taking their constitutional law
 from other men's mouths1 instead of    
looking at the constitution for         
themselves1 have probably been led to   
imagine that the constitution had really
 given such guaranties in some explicit 
and tangible form4 ,we have1            
nevertheless1 seen that all those       
pretended guaranties are at most nothing

 but certain vague hints1 insinuations1 
ciphers and innuendoes1 that are        
imagined to be covered up under language
 which legally means nothing of the     
kind4 ,but1 in the clause now cited1 we 
do have an explicit and peremptory      
guaranty1 depending upon no             
implications1 inferences or conjectures1
 and couched in no uncertain or         
ambiguous terms4 ,and what is this      
guaranty8 ,is it a guaranty of slavery8 
,no4 ,it is a guaranty of something     
flatly incompatible with slavery3 a     
guaranty of a republican form of        
government to every state in this union4
  ,and what is a republican form of     
government8 ,it is where the government 
is a commonwealth--the property of the  
public1 of the mass of the people1 or of
 the entire people4 ,it is where the    
government is made up of1 and controlled
 by the combined will and power of the  
public1 or the mass of the people--and  
where1 of natural consequence1 it will  
have1 for its object1 the protection of 

the rights of all4 ,it is indispensable 
to a republican form of government1 that
 the public1 the mass of the people1 if 
not the entire people1 participate in   
the grant of powers to the government1  
and in the protection afforded by the   
government4 ,it is impossible1          
therefore1 that a government1 under     
which any considerable number of the    
people1 7if indeed any number of the    
people17 are disfranchised and enslaved1
 can be a republic4 ,a slave government 
is an oligarchy2 and one too of the most
 arbitrary and criminal character4      
,strange that men1 who have eyes capable
 of discovering in the constitution so  
many covert1 implied and insinuated     
guaranties of crime and slavery1 should 
be blind to the legal import of so open1
 explicit and peremptory a guaranty of  
freedom1 equality and right4  ,even if  
there had really been1 in the           
constitution1 two such contradictory    
guaranties1 as one of liberty or        
republicanism in every state of the     

,union1 and another of slavery in every 
state where one portion of the people   
might succeed in enslaving the rest1 one
 of these guaranties must have given way
 to the other--for1 being plainly       
inconsistent with each other1 they could
 not have stood together4 ,and it might 
safely have been left either to legal or
 to moral rules to determine which of   
the two should prevail--whether a       
provision to perpetuate slavery should  
triumph over a guaranty of freedom4     
,but it is constantly asserted1 in      
substance1 that there is no propriety in
 the general government's interfering in
 the local governments of the states4   
,those who make this assertion appear to
 regard a state as a single individual1 
capable of managing his own affairs1 and
 of course unwilling to tolerate the    
intermeddling of others4 ,but a state is
 not an individual4 ,it is made up of   
large numbers of individuals1 each and  
all of whom1 amid the intestine         
mutations and strifes to which states   

are subject1 are liable1 at some time or
 other1 to be trampled upon by the      
strongest party1 and may therefore      
reasonably choose to secure1 in advance1
 some external protection against such  
emergencies1 by making reciprocal       
contracts with other people similarly   
exposed in the neighboring states4 ,such
 contracts for mutual succor and        
protection1 are perfectly fit and proper
 for any people who are so situated as  
to be able to contribute to each other's
 security4 ,they are as fit and proper  
as any other political contracts        
whatever2 and are founded on precisely  
the same principle of combination for   
mutual defence--for what are any of our 
political contracts and forms of        
government1 but contracts between man   
and man for mutual protection against   
those who may conspire to injure either 
or all of them8 ,but these contracts1   
fit and proper between all men1 are     
peculiarly appropriate to those1 who1   
while they are members of various local 

and subordinate associations1 are1 at   
the same time1 united for specific      
purposes1 under one general government4 
,such a mutual contract1 between the    
people of all the states1 is contained  
in this clause of the constitution4 ,and
 it gives to them all an additional     
guaranty for their liberties4  ,those   
who object to this guaranty1 however1   
choose to overlook all these            
considerations1 and then appear to      
imagine that their notions of propriety 
on this point1 can effectually expunge  
the guaranty itself from the            
constitution4 ,in indulging this fancy1 
however1 they undoubtedly overrate the  
legal1 and perhaps also the moral effect
 of such superlative fastidiousness2 for
 even if there were no propriety in the 
interference of the general government  
to maintain a republican form of        
government in the states1 still1 the    
unequivocal pledge to that effect1 given
 in the constitution1 would nevertheless
 remain an irresistible rebutter to the 

allegation that the constitution        
intended to guaranty its opposite1      
slavery1 an oligarchy1 or a despotism4  
,it would1 therefore1 entirely forbid   
all those inferences and implications1  
drawn by slaveholders1 from those other 
phrases1 which they quote as guaranties 
of slavery4#be  ,but the propriety1 and 
not only the propriety1 but the         
necessity of this guaranty1 may be      
maintained on still other grounds4  ,one
 of these grounds is1 that it would be  
impossible1 consistently with the other 
provisions of the constitution1 that the
 general government itself could be     
republican1 unless the state governments
 were republican also4 ,for example4    
,the constitution provides1 in regard to
 the choice of congressional            
representatives1 that the electors in   
each state shall have the qualifications
 requisite for electors of the most     
numerous branch of the state            
legislature4 ,it was indispensable to   
the internal quiet of each state1 that  

the same body of electors1 who should   
participate in the suffrage of the state
 governments1 should participate also in
 the suffrage of the national one--and  
vice versa1 that those who should       
participate in the national suffrage1   
should also participate in that of the  
state4 ,if the general and state        
constitutions had each a different body 
of electors within each state1 it would 
obviously give rise at once to          
implacable and irreconcilable feuds1    
that would result in the overthrow of   
one or the other of the governments     
within the state4 ,harmony or inveterate
 conflict was the only alternative4 ,as 
conflict would necessarily result in the
 destruction of one of the governments1 
harmony was the only mode by which both 
could be preserved4 ,and this harmony   
could be secured only by giving to the  
same body of electors1 suffrage in both 
the governments4  ,if1 then1 it was     
indispensable to the existence and      
authority of both governments1 within   

the territory of each state1 that the   
same body1 and only the same body of    
electors1 that were represented in one  
of the governments1 should be           
represented in the other1 it was clearly
 indispensable1 in order that the       
national one should be republican1 that 
the state governments should be         
republican also4 ,hence the interest    
which the nation at large have in the   
republicanism of each of the state      
governments4  ,it being necessary that  
the suffrage under the national         
government1 within each state1 should be
 the same as for the state government1  
it is apparent that unless the several  
state governments were all formed on one
 general plan1 or unless the electors of
 all the states were united in the      
acknowledgement of some general         
controlling principle1 applicable to    
both governments1 it would be impossible
 that they could unite in the           
maintenance of a general government that
 should act in harmony with the state   

governments2 because the same body of   
electors1 that should support a despotic
 government in the state1 could not     
consistently or cordially unite1 or even
 unite at all1 in the support of a      
republican government for the nation4   
,if one portion of the state governments
 should be republican1 like ,vermont1   
where suffrage is open to all--and      
another portion should be oligarchies1  
like ,south ,carolina1 and the other    
slave states--another portion limited   
monarchies1 like ,england--another      
portion ecclesiastical1 like that of the
 ,pope of ,rome1 or that of the ancient 
,jews--and another portion absolute     
despotisms1 like that of ,nicholas1 in  
,russia1 or that of ,francia1 in        
,paraguay1--and the same body1 and only 
the same body1 of electors1 that        
sustained each of these governments at  
home1 should be represented in the      
national government1 each state would   
send into the national legislature the  
representatives of its own peculiar     

system of government2 and the national  
legislature1 instead of being composed  
of the representatives of any one       
theory1 or principle of government1     
would be made up of the representatives 
of all the various theories of          
government that prevailed in the        
different states--from the extreme of   
democracy to the extreme of despotism4  
,and each of these various              
representatives would be obliged to     
carry his local principles into the     
national legislature1 else he could not 
retain the confidence of his peculiar   
constituents4 ,the consequence would be1
 that the national legislature would    
present the spectacle of a perfect      
,babel of discordant tongues1 elements1 
passions1 interests and purposes1       
instead of an assembly united for the   
accomplishment of any agreed or distinct
 object4  ,without some distinct and    
agreed object as a bond of union1 it    
would obviously be impracticable for any
 general union of the whole people to   

subsist2 and that bond of union1        
whatever it be1 must also harmonize with
 the principles of each of the state    
governments1 else there would be a      
collision between the general and state 
governments4  ,now the great bond of    
union1 agreed upon in the general       
government1 was the rights of           
man--expressed in the national          
constitution by the terms liberty and   
justice4 ,what other bond could have    
been agreed upon8 ,on what other        
principle of government could they all  
have united8 ,could they have united to 
sustain the divine right of kings8 ,the 
feudal privileges of nobles8 ,or the    
supremacy of the ,christian1 ,mahometan1
 or any other church8 ,no4 ,they all    
denied the divine right of kings1 and   
the feudal rights of nobles2 and they   
were of all creeds in religion4 ,but    
they were agreed that all men had       
certain natural1 inherent1 essential and
 inalienable rights1 among which were   
life1 liberty and the pursuit of        

happiness2 and that the preservation of 
these rights was the legitimate purpose 
of governments among men4 ,they had     
avowed this principle before the world1 
had fought for it1 and successfully     
defended it1 against the mightiest power
 in the world4 ,they had filled the     
world with its glory2 and it1 in turn1  
had filled the world with theirs4 ,it   
had also gathered1 and was then         
gathering1 choice spirits1 and large    
numbers of the oppressed from other     
nations unto them4 ,and this            
principle--in which were involved the   
safety1 interests and rights of each and
 every one of the people1 who were to   
unite for the formation of the          
government--now furnished a bond of     
union1 that was at once sufficient1     
legitimate1 consistent1 honorable1 of   
universal application1 and having more  
general power over the hearts and heads 
of all of them1 than any other that     
could be found to hold them together4   
,it comported with their theory of the  

true objects of government4 ,this       
principle1 therefore1 they adopted as   
the corner-stone of their national      
government2 and1 as a matter of         
necessity1 all other things1 on which   
this new government was in any degree to
 depend1 or which was to depend in any  
degree upon this government1 were then  
made to conform to this principle4      
,hence the propriety of the power given 
to the general government1 of           
guaranteeing to every state in the      
,union a republican form of government4 
,had not this power been given to the   
general government1 the majorities in   
each state might have converted the     
state governments into oligarchies1     
aristocracies1 monarchies or despotisms1
 that should not only have trampled upon
 the minorities1 and defeated their     
enjoyment of the national constitution1 
but also introduced such factions and   
feuds into the national governments1 as 
would have distracted its councils1 and 
prostrated its power4  ,but there were  

also motives of a pecuniary and social1 
as well as political nature1 that made  
it proper that the nation should        
guarantee to the states a republican    
form of government4  ,commerce was to be
 established between the people of the  
different states4 ,the commerce of a    
free people is many times more valuable 
than that of slaves4 ,freemen produce   
and consume vastly more than slaves4    
,they have therefore more to buy and    
more to sell4 ,hence the free states    
have a direct pecuniary interest in the 
civil freedom of all the other states4  
,commerce between free and slave states 
is not reciprocal or equal4 ,who can    
measure the increase that would have    
been made to the industry and prosperity
 of the free states1 if all the slaves  
in the country had been freemen1 with   
all the wants and energies of freemen8  
,and their masters had had all the      
thrift1 industry1 frugality and         
enterprise of men who depend upon their 
own labor1 instead of the labor of      

slaves1 for their prosperity8 ,great    
,britain thought it policy to carry on a
 seven years' war against us principally
 to secure to herself the control and   
benefits of the commerce of three       
millions of people and their posterity4 
,but we now have nearly or quite the    
same number of slaves within our        
borders1 and yet we think that commerce 
with them and their posterity is a      
matter with which we have no concern2   
that there is no propriety in that      
provision of the national constitution1 
which requires that the general         
government--which we have invested with 
the exclusive control of all commerce   
among the several states--should secure 
to these three millions the right of    
traffic with their fellow men1 and to   
their fellow men the right of traffic   
with them1 against the impertinent      
usurpations and tyranny of subordinate  
governments1 that have no constitutional
 right to interfere in the matter4      
,again4 ,the slave states1 in proportion

 to their population1 contribute nothing
 like an equal or equitable share to the
 aggregate of national wealth4 ,it would
 probably be within the truth to say    
that1 in proportion to numbers1 the     
people of the free states have          
contributed ten times as much to the    
national wealth as the people of the    
slave states4 ,even for such wealth as  
the culture of their great staple1      
cotton1 has added to the nation1 the    
south are indebted principally1 if not  
entirely1 to the inventive genius of a  
single northern man4#bf ,the agriculture
 of the slave states is carried on with 
rude and clumsy implements2 by listless1
 spiritless and thriftless laborers2 and
 in a manner speedily to wear out the   
natural fertility of the soil1 which    
fertility slave cultivation seldom or   
never replaces4 ,the mechanic arts are  
comparatively dead among them4          
,invention is utterly dormant4 ,it is   
doubtful whether either a slave or a    
slave holder has ever invented a single 

important article of labor-saving       
machinery since the foundation of the   
government4 ,and they have hardly had   
the skill or enterprise to apply any of 
those invented by others4 ,who can      
estimate the loss of wealth to the      
nation from these causes alone8 ,yet we 
of the free states give to the south a  
share in the incalculable wealth        
produced by our inventions and          
labor-saving machinery1 our steam       
engines1 and cotton gins1 and           
manufacturing machinery of all sorts1   
and yet say at the same time that we    
have no interest1 and that there is no  
propriety in the constitutional guaranty
 of that personal freedom to the people 
of the south1 which would enable them to
 return us some equivalent in kind4     
,for the want1 too1 of an enforcement of
 this guaranty of a republican form of  
government to each of the states1 the   
population of the country1 by the       
immigration of foreigners1 has no doubt 
been greatly hindered4 ,multitudes      

almost innumerable1 who would have come 
here1 either from a love of liberty1 or 
to better their conditions1 and given   
the country the benefit of their        
talents1 industry and wealth1 have no   
doubt been dissuaded or deterred by the 
hideous tyranny that rides triumphant in
 one half of the nation1 and extends its
 pestiferous and detested influence over
 the other half4  ,socially1 also1 we   
have an interest in the freedom of all  
the states4 ,we have an interest in free
 personal intercourse with all the      
people living under a common government 
with ourselves4 ,we wish to be free to  
discuss1 with any and all of them1 all  
the principles of liberty and all the   
interests of humanity4 ,we wish1 when we
 meet a fellow man1 to be at liberty to 
speak freely with him of his and our    
condition2 to be at liberty to do him a 
service2 to advise with him as to the   
means of improving his condition2 and1  
if need be1 to ask a kindness at his    
hands4 ,but all these things are        

incompatible with slavery4 ,is this such
 an union as we bargained for8 ,was it  
nominated in the bond1 that we should be
 cut off from these the common rights of
 human nature8 ,if so1 point to the line
 and letter1 where it is so written4    
,neither of them are to be found4 ,but  
the contrary is expressly guarantied    
against the power of both the           
governments1 state and national2 for the
 national government is prohibited from 
passing any law abridging the freedom of
 speech and the press1 and the state    
governments are prohibited from         
maintaining any other than a republican 
form of government1 which of course     
implies the same freedom4  ,the nation  
at large have still another interest in 
the republicanism of each of the states2
 an interest1 too1 that is indicated in 
the same section in which this          
republicanism is guarantied4 ,this      
interest results from the fact that the 
nation are pledged to protect each of   
the states against domestic violence4   

,was there no account taken--in         
reference either to the cost or the     
principle of this undertaking--as to    
what might be the character of the state
 governments1 which we are thus pledged 
to defend against the risings of the    
people8 ,did we covenant1 in this       
clause1 to wage war against the rights  
of man8 ,did we pledge ourselves that   
those1 however few1 who might ever      
succeed in getting the government of a  
state into their hands1 should          
thenceforth be recognized as the        
legitimate power of the state1 and be   
entitled to the whole force of the      
general government to aid them in       
subjecting the remainder of the people  
to the degradation and injustice of     
slavery8 ,or did the nation undertake   
only to guarantee the preservation of a 
republican form of government against   
the violence of those who might prove   
its enemies8 ,the reason of the thing1  
and the connexion1 in which the two     
provisions stand in the constitution1   

give the answer4  ,we have yet another  
interest still1 and that no trivial one1
 in the republicanism of the state      
governments2 an interest indicated1 too1
 like the one last mentioned1 in the    
very section in which this republicanism
 is assured4 ,it relates to the defence 
against invasion4 ,the general          
government is pledged to defend each of 
the states against invasion4 ,is it a   
thing of no moment1 whether we have     
given such a pledge to free or to slave 
states8 ,is there no difference in the  
cost and hazard of defending one or the 
other8 ,is it of no consequence to the  
expense of life and money1 involved in  
this undertaking1 whether the people of 
the state invaded shall be united1 as   
freemen naturally will be1 as one man   
against the enemy8 ,or whether1 as in   
slave states1 half of them shall be     
burning to join the enemy1 with the     
purpose of satisfying with blood the    
long account of wrong that shall have   
accrued against their oppressors8 ,did  

,massachusetts--who during the war of   
the revolution furnished more men for   
the common defence1 than all the six    
southern states together--did she1      
immediately on the close of that war1   
pledge herself1 as the slave holders    
would have it1 that she would lavish her
 life in like manner again1 for the     
defence of those whose wickedness and   
tyranny in peace should necessarily     
multiply their enemies and make them    
defenceless in war8 ,if so1 on what     
principle1 or for what equivalent1 did  
she do it8 ,did she not rather take care
 that the guaranty for a republican     
government should be inserted in the    
same paragraph with that for protection 
against invasion1 in order that both the
 principle and the extent of the        
liability she incurred1 might distinctly
 appear8  ,the nation at large1 then1 as
 a political community under the        
constitution1 have both interests and   
rights1 and both of the most vital      
character1 in the republicanism of each 

of the state governments4 ,the guaranty 
given by the national constitution1     
securing such a government to each of   
the states1 is therefore neither        
officious nor impertinent4 ,on the      
contrary1 this guaranty was a sine qua  
non to any national contract of union2  
and the enforcement of it is equally    
indispensable1 if not to the continuance
 of the union at all1 certainly to its  
continuance on any terms that are either
 safe1 honorable or equitable for the   
north4  ,this guaranty1 then1 is not    
idle verbiage4 ,it is full of meaning4  
,and that meaning is not only fatal to  
slavery itself1 but it is fatal also to 
all those pretences1 constructions1     
surmises and implications1 by which it  
is claimed that the national            
constitution sanctions1 legalizes1 or   
even tolerates slavery4  ,footnote #ah3 
,this language of the ,supreme ,court   
contains an admission of the truth of   
the charge just made against judges1    
viz3 that rather than lose their        

offices1 they will violate what they    
know to be law1 in subserviency to the  
legislatures on whom they depend2 for it
 admits1 #ast1 that the preservation of 
men's rights is the vital principle of  
law1 and1 #b;d1 that courts1 7and the   
,supreme ,court of the ,united ,states  
in particular17 will trample upon that  
principle at the bidding of the         
legislature1 when the mandate comes in  
the shape of a statute of such          
irresistible clearness1 that its meaning
 cannot be evaded4  ,footnote #ai3 ,laws
 are construed strictly to save a       
right4--,whitney et al4 vs4 ,emmett et  
al41 #a ,baldwin1 ,c4,c4,r4 #caf4  ,no  
law will make a construction do wrong2  
and there are some things which the law 
favors1 and some it dislikes2 it        
favoreth those things that come from the
 order of nature4--,jacob's ,law        
,dictionary1 title ,law4  ,footnote #bj3
 ,in the convention that framed the     
constitution1 when this clause was under
 discussion1 servants were spoken of as 

a distinct class from slaves4 ,for      
instance1 ,mr4 ,butler and ,mr4 ,pickney
 moved to require 'fugitive slaves and  
servants to be delivered up like        
criminals4' ,mr4 ,sherman objected to   
delivering up either slaves or servants4
 ,he said he saw no more propriety in   
the public seizing and surrendering a   
slave or servant1 than a                
horse4--,madison ,papers1 p4 #addg-h4   
,the language finally adopted shows that
 they at last agreed to deliver up      
servants1 but not slaves--for as the    
word servant does not mean slave1 the   
word service does not mean slavery4     
,these remarks in the convention are    
quoted1 not because the intentions of   
the convention are of the least legal   
consequence whatever2 but to rebut the  
silly arguments of those who pretend    
that the convention1 and not the people1
 adopted the constitution--and that the 
convention did not understand the legal 
difference between the word servant and 
slave1 and therefore used the word      

service1 in this clause1 as meaning     
slavery4  ,footnote #ba3 ,gibbons vs4   
,ogden4--7#i ,wheaton1 #a47  ,footnote  
#bb3 ,the government 7of the ,u4,s47    
proceeds directly from the people2 is   
'ordained and established' in the name  
of the people4--,m',culloch vs4         
,maryland1 #d ,wheaton1 #djc4  ,the     
government of the ,union is emphatically
 and truly1 a government of the people2 
and in form and in substance it emanates
 from them4 ,its powers are granted by  
them1 and are to be exercised directly  
on them1 and for their benefit4--,same1 
pages #djd1 #dje4  ,the constitution of 
the ,united ,states was ordained and    
established1 not by the ,united ,states 
in their sovereign capacities1 but      
emphatically1 as the preamble of the    
constitution declares1 by 'the people of
 the ,united ,states4'--,martin vs4     
,hunter's lessee1 #a ,wheaton1 #cbd4    
,footnote #bc3 ,that is1 male persons4  
,the constitution1 whenever it uses the 
pronoun1 in speaking of the president1  

uniformly uses the masculine            
gender--from which it may be inferred   
that male persons only were intended to 
be made eligible to the office4         
,footnote #bd3 ,somerset was not a      
citizen of ,england1 or entitled1 as    
such1 to the protection of the ,english 
law4 ,the privilege of the writ of      
habeas corpus was granted to him on the 
ground simply of his being a man4       
,footnote #be3 ,from whom come these    
objections to the propriety of the      
general government's interfering to     
maintain republicanism in the states8   
,do they not come from those who have   
ever hitherto claimed that the general  
government was bound to interfere to put
 down republicanism8 ,and that those who
 were republicans at the north1 might   
with perfect propriety and consistency1 
pledge their assistance to the despots  
of the south1 to sustain the worst1 the 
meanest and most atrocious of tyrannies8
 ,yes1 from the very same4 ,to interfere
 to assist one half of the people of a  

state in the cowardly1 cruel and        
fiendish work of crushing the other half
 into the earth1 corresponds precisely  
with their chivalrous notions of        
propriety2 but it is insufferable       
officiousness for them to form any      
political compacts that will require    
them to interfere to protect the weak   
against the tyranny of the strong1 or to
 maintain justice1 liberty1 peace and   
freedom4  ,footnote #bf3 ,eli ,whitney4 
,,chapter ,,ix4  ,,the ,,intentions ,,of
 ,,the ,,convention4   ,the intentions  
of the framers of the constitution1 7if 
we could have1 as we cannot1 any legal  
knowledge of them1 except from the words
 of the constitution17 have nothing to  
do with fixing the legal meaning of the 
constitution4 ,that convention were not 
delegated to adopt or establish a       
constitution2 but only to consult1      
devise and recommend4 ,the instrument1  
when it came from their hands1 was a    
mere proposal1 having no legal force or 
authority4 ,it finally derived all its  

validity and obligation1 as a frame of  
government1 from its adoption by the    
people at large4#bg ,of course the      
intentions of the people at large are   
the only ones1 that are of any          
importance to be regarded in determining
 the legal meaning of the instrument4   
,and their intentions are to be gathered
 entirely from the words1 which they    
adopted to express them4 ,and their     
intentions must be presumed to be just  
what1 and only what the words of the    
instrument legally express4 ,in adopting
 the constitution1 the people acted as  
legislators1 in the highest sense in    
which that word can be applied to human 
lawgivers4 ,they were establishing a law
 that was to govern both themselves and 
their government4 ,and their intentions1
 like those of other legislators1 are to
 be gathered from the words of their    
enactments4 ,such is the dictate of both
 law and common sense4#bh ,the          
instrument had been reported by their   
committee1 the convention4 ,but the     

people did not ask this committee what  
was the legal meaning of the instrument 
reported4 ,they adopted it1 judging for 
themselves of its legal meaning1 as any 
other legislative body would have done4 
,the people at large had not even an    
opportunity of consultation with the    
members of the convention1 to ascertain 
their opinions4 ,and even if they had   
consulted them1 they would not have been
 bound at all by their opinions4 ,but   
being unable to consult them1 they were 
compelled to adopt or reject the        
instrument1 on their own judgment of its
 meaning1 without any reference to the  
opinions of the convention4 ,the        
instrument1 therefore1 is now to be     
regarded as expressing the intentions of
 the people at large2 and not the       
intentions of the convention1 if the    
convention had any intentions differing 
from the meaning which the law gives to 
the words of the instrument4  ,but why  
do the partizans of slavery resort to   
the debates of the convention for       

evidence that the constitution sanctions
 slavery8 ,plainly for no other reason  
than because the words of the instrument
 do not sanction it4 ,but can the       
intentions of that convention1 attested 
only by a mere skeleton of its debates1 
and not by any impress upon the         
instrument itself1 add any thing to the 
words1 or to the legal meaning of the   
words of the constitution8 ,plainly not4
 ,their intentions are of no more       
consequence1 in a legal point of view1  
than the intentions of any other equal  
number of the then voters of the        
country4 ,besides1 as members of the    
convention1 they were not even parties  
to the instrument2 and no evidence of   
their intentions1 at that time1 is      
applicable to the case4 ,they became    
parties to it only by joining with the  
rest of the people in its subsequent    
adoption2 and they themselves1 equally  
with the rest of the people1 must then  
be presumed to have adopted its legal   
meaning1 and that alone--notwithstanding

 any thing they may have previously     
said4 ,what absurdity then is it to set 
up the opinions expressed in the        
convention1 and by a few only of its    
members1 in opposition to the opinions  
expressed by the whole people of the    
country1 in the constitution itself4    
,but notwithstanding the opinions       
expressed in the convention by some of  
the members1 we are bound1 as a matter  
of law1 to presume that the convention  
itself1 in the aggregate1 had no        
intention of sanctioning slavery--and   
why8 ,because1 after all their debates1 
they agreed upon an instrument that did 
not sanction it4 ,this was confessedly  
the result in which all their debates   
terminated4 ,this instrument is also the
 only authentic evidence of their       
intentions4 ,it is subsequent in its    
date to all the other evidence4 ,it     
comes to us1 also1 as none of the other 
evidence does1 signed with their own    
hands4 ,and is this to be set aside1 and
 the constitution itself to be impeached

 and destroyed1 and free government     
overturned1 on the authority of a few   
meagre snatches of argument1 intent or  
opinion1 uttered by a few only of the   
members2 jotted down by one of them1    
7,mr4 ,madison17 merely for his own     
convenience1 or from the suggestions of 
his own mind2 and only reported to us   
fifty years afterwards by a posthumous  
publication of his papers8 ,if any thing
 could excite the utter contempt of the 
people of this nation for the miserable 
subterfuges1 to which the advocates of  
slavery resort1 it would seem that their
 offering such evidence as this in      
support of their cause1 must do it4 ,and
 yet these1 and such as these mere      
fragments of evidence1 all utterly      
inadmissible and worthless in their     
kind1 for any legal purpose1 constitute 
the warp and the woof1 the very sine qua
 non of the whole argument for slavery4 
,did ,mr4 ,madison1 when he took his    
oath of office1 as president of the     
,united ,states1 swear to support these 

scraps of debate1 which he had filed    
away among his private papers8--,or did 
he swear to support that written        
instrument1 which the people of the     
country had agreed to1 and which was    
known to them1 and to all the world1 as 
the constitution of the ,united         
,states4#bi  ,but even if the           
unexpressed intentions1 which these     
notes of debate ascribe to certain      
members1 had been participated in by the
 whole convention1 we should have had no
 right to hold the people of the country
 at large responsible for them4 ,this   
convention sat with closed doors1 and it
 was not until near fifty years after   
the people had adopted the constitution 
itself1 that these private intentions of
 the framers authentically transpired4  
,and even now all the evidence disclosed
 implicates1 directly and absolutely1   
but few of the members--not even all    
from the slaveholding states4 ,the      
intentions of all the rest1 we have a   
right to presume1 concurred with their  

votes and the words of the instrument2  
and they had therefore no occasion to   
express contrary ones in debate4  ,but  
suppose that all the members of the     
convention had participated in these    
intentions--what then8 ,any forty or    
fifty men1 like those who framed the    
constitution1 may now secretly concoct  
another1 that is honest in its terms1   
and yet in secret conclave confess to   
each other the criminal objects they    
intend to accomplish by it1 if its      
honest character should enable them to  
secure for it the adoption of the       
people4--,but if the people should adopt
 such constitution1 would they thereby  
adopt any of the criminal and secret    
purposes of its authors8 ,or if the     
guilty confessions of these conspirators
 should be revealed fifty years         
afterwards1 would judicial tribunals    
look to them as giving the government   
any authority for violating the legal   
meaning of the words of such            
constitution1 and for so construing them

 as to subserve the criminal and        
shameless purposes of its originators8  
,the members of the convention1 as such1
 were the mere scriveners of the        
constitution2 and their individual      
purposes1 opinions or expressions1 then 
uttered in secret cabal1 though now     
revealed1 can no more be evidence of the
 intentions of the people who adopted   
the constitution1 than the secret       
opinions or expressions of the          
scriveners of any other contract can be 
offered to prove the intentions of the  
true parties to such contract4 ,as      
framers of the constitution1 the members
 of the convention gave to it no        
validity1 meaning1 or legal force4 ,they
 simply drafted it1 and offered it1 such
 as it legally might be1 to the people  
for their adoption or rejection4 ,the   
people1 therefore1 in adopting it1 had  
no reference whatever to the opinions of
 the convention4 ,they had no authentic 
evidence of what those opinions were4   
,they looked simply at the instrument4  

,and they adopted even its legal meaning
 by a bare majority4 ,if the instrument 
had contained any tangible sanction of  
slavery1 the people would sooner have   
had it burned by the hands of the common
 hangman1 than they would have adopted  
it1 and thus sold themselves as pimps to
 slavery1 covered as they were with the 
scars they had received in fighting the 
battles of freedom4 ,and the members of 
the convention knew that such was the   
feeling of a large portion of the       
people2 and for that reason1 if for no  
other1 they dared insert in the         
instrument no legal sanction of slavery4
 ,they chose rather to trust to their   
craft and influence to corrupt the      
government1 7of which they themselves   
expected to be important members17 after
 the constitution should have been      
adopted1 rather than ask the necessary  
authority directly from the people4 ,and
 the success they have had in corrupting
 the government1 proves that they judged
 rightly in presuming that the          

government would be more flexible than  
the people4  ,for other reasons1 too1   
the people should not be charged with   
designing to sanction any of the secret 
intentions of the convention4 ,when the 
states sent delegates to the convention1
 no avowal was made of any intention to 
give any national sanction to slavery4  
,the articles of confederation had given
 none2 the then existing state          
constitutions gave none2 and it could   
not have been reasonably anticipated by 
the people that any would have been     
either asked for or granted in the new  
constitution4 ,if such a purpose had    
been avowed by those who were at the    
bottom of the movement1 the convention  
would doubtless never have been held4   
,the avowed objects of the convention   
were of a totally different character4  
,commercial1 industrial and defensive   
motives were the prominent ones avowed4 
,when1 then1 the constitution came from 
the hands of such a convention1         
unstained with any legal or tangible    

sanction of slavery1 were the           
people--who1 from the nature of the     
case1 could not assemble to draft one   
for themselves--bound either to discard 
it1 or hold themselves responsible for  
all the secret intentions of those who  
had drafted it8 ,had they no power to   
adopt its legal meaning1 and that alone6
 ,unquestionably they had the power2    
and1 as matter of law1 as well as fact1 
it is equally unquestionable that they  
exercised it4 ,nothing else than the    
constitution1 as a legal instrument1 was
 offered to them for their adoption4    
,nothing else was legally before them   
that they could adopt4 ,nothing else1   
therefore1 did they adopt4  ,this       
alleged design1 on the part of the      
convention1 to sanction slavery1 is     
obviously of no consequence whatever1   
unless it can be transferred to the     
people who adopted the constitution4    
,has any such transfer ever been shown8 
,nothing of the kind4 ,it may have been 
known among politicians2 and may have   

found its way into some of the state    
conventions4 ,but there probably is not 
a little of evidence in existence1 that 
it was generally known among the mass of
 the people4 ,and1 in the nature of     
things1 it was nearly impossible that it
 should have been known by them4 ,the   
national convention had sat with closed 
doors4 ,nothing was known of their      
discussions1 except what was personally 
reported by the members4 ,even the      
discussions in the state conventions    
could not have been known to the people 
at large2 certainly not until after the 
constitution had been ratified by those 
conventions4 ,the ratification of the   
instrument1 by those conventions1       
followed close on the heels of their    
discussions4--,the population meanwhile 
was thinly scattered over the country4  
,the public papers were few1 and small1 
and far between4 ,they could not even   
make such reports of the discussions of 
public bodies1 as newspapers now do4    
,the consequence must have been that the

 people at large knew nothing of the    
intentions of the framers of the        
constitution1 but from its words1 until 
after it was adopted4 ,nevertheless1 it 
is to be constantly borne in mind1 that 
even if the people had been fully       
cognizant of those intentions1 they     
would not therefore have adopted them1  
or become at all responsible for them1  
so long as the intentions themselves    
were not incorporated in the instrument4
 ,many selfish1 ambitious and criminal  
purposes1 not expressed in the          
constitution1 were undoubtedly intended 
to be accomplished by one and another of
 the thousands of unprincipled          
politicians1 that would naturally swarm 
around the birth-place1 and assist at   
the nativity of a new and splendid      
government4 ,but the people are not     
therefore responsible for those         
purposes2 nor are those purposes1       
therefore1 a part of the constitution2  
nor is its language to be construed with
 any view to aid their accomplishment4  

,but even if the people intended to     
sanction slavery by adopting the        
intentions of the convention1 it is     
obvious that they1 like the convention1 
intended to use no language that should 
legally convey that meaning1 or that    
should necessarily convict them of that 
intention in the eyes of the            
world4--,they1 at least1 had enough of  
virtuous shame to induce them to conceal
 this intention under the cover of      
language1 whose legal meaning would     
enable them always to aver1     ,thou   
canst not say ,i did it4  ,the          
intention1 therefore1 that the judiciary
 should construe certain language into  
an authority for slavery1 when such is  
not the legal meaning of the language   
itself1 cannot be ascribed to the       
people1 except upon the supposition that
 the people presumed their judicial     
tribunals would have so much less of    
shame than they themselves1 as to       
volunteer to carry out these their      
secret wishes1 by going beyond the words

 of the constitution they should be     
sworn to support1 and violating all     
legal rules of construction1 and all the
 free principles of the instrument4 ,it 
is true that the judiciary1 7whether the
 people intended it or not17 have proved
 themselves to be thus much1 at least1  
more shameless than the people1 or the  
convention4 ,yet that is not what ought 
to have been expected of judicial       
tribunals4 ,and whether such were really
 the intention of the convention1 or the
 people1 is1 at least a matter of       
conjecture and history1 and not of law1 
nor of any evidence cognizable by any   
judicial tribunal4  ,why should we      
search at all for the intentions1 either
 of the convention1 or of the people1   
beyond the words which both the         
convention and the people have agreed   
upon to express them8 ,what is the      
object of written constitutions1 and    
written statutes1 and written contracts8
 ,is it not that the meaning of those   
who make them may be known with the most

 absolute precision of which language is
 capable8 ,is it not to get rid of all  
the fraud1 and uncertainty1 and         
disagreements of oral testimony8 ,where 
would be our constitution1 if1 instead  
of its being a written instrument1 it   
had been merely agreed upon orally by   
the members of the convention8 ,and by  
them only orally reported to the people8
 ,and only this oral report of it had   
been adopted by the people8 ,and all our
 evidence of what it really was1 had    
rested upon reports of what ,mr4 ,a1 and
 ,mr4 ,b1 members of the convention1 had
 been heard to say8 ,or upon ,mr4       
,madison's notes of the debates of the  
convention8 ,or upon the oral reports   
made by the several members to their    
respective constituents1 or to the      
respective state conventions8 ,or upon  
flying reports of the opinions which a  
few individuals1 out of the whole body  
of the people1 had formed of it when    
they adopted it8 ,no two of the members 
of the convention would probably have   

agreed in their representations of what 
the constitution really was4 ,no two of 
the people would have agreed in their   
understanding of the constitution when  
they adopted it4 ,and the consequence   
would have been that we should really   
have had no constitution at all4 ,yet   
there is as much ground1 both in reason 
and in law1 for thus throwing aside the 
whole of the written instrument1 and    
trusting entirely to these other sources
 for evidence of what any part of the   
constitution really is1 as there is for 
throwing aside those particular portions
 of the written instrument1 which bear  
on slavery1 and attempting to supply    
their place from such evidence as these 
other sources may chance to furnish4    
,and yet1 to throw aside the written    
instrument1 so far as its provisions are
 prohibitory of slavery1 and make a new 
constitution on that point1 out of other
 testimony1 is the only means1          
confessedly the only means1 by which    
slavery can be made constitutional4     

,and what is the object of resorting to 
these flying reports for evidence1 on   
which to change the meaning of the      
constitution8 ,is it to change the      
instrument from a dishonest to an honest
 one8 from an unjust to a just one8 ,no4
 ,but directly the reverse--and solely  
that dishonesty and injustice may be    
carried into effect4 ,a purpose1 for    
which no evidence of any kind whatever  
could be admitted in a court of justice4
  ,again4 ,if the principle be admitted1
 that the meaning of the constitution   
can be changed1 on proof being made that
 the scriveners or framers of it had    
secret and knavish intentions1 which do 
not appear on the face of the           
instrument1 then perfect license is     
given to the scriveners of constitutions
 to contrive any secret scheme of       
villainy they may please1 and impose it 
upon the people as a system of          
government1 under cover of a written    
instrument that is so plainly honest and
 just in its terms1 that the people     

readily agree to it4 ,is such a         
principle to be admitted in a country   
where the people claim the prerogative  
of establishing their own government1   
and deny the right of any body to impose
 a government upon them1 either by      
force1 or fraud1 or against their will8 
,finally4 ,the constitution is a        
contract2 a written contract1 consisting
 of a certain number of precise words1  
to which1 and to which only1 all the    
parties to it have1 in theory1 agreed4  
,manifestly neither this contract1 nor  
the meaning of its words1 can be        
changed1 without the consent of all the 
parties to it4 ,nor can it be changed on
 a representation1 to be made by any    
number of them less than the whole1 that
 they intended any thing different from 
what they have said4 ,to change it1 on  
the representation of a part1 without   
the consent of the rest1 would be a     
breach of contract as to all the rest4  
,and to change its legal meaning1       
without their consent1 would be as much 

a breach of the contract as to change   
its words4 ,if there were a single      
honest man in the nation1 who assented1 
in good faith1 to the honest and legal  
meaning of the constitution1 it would be
 unjust and unlawful to change the      
meaning of the instrument so as to      
sanction slavery1 even though every     
other man in the nation should testify  
that1 in agreeing to the constitution1  
he intended that slavery should be      
sanctioned4 ,if there were not a single 
honest man in the nation1 who adopted   
the constitution in good faith1 and with
 the intent that its legal meaning      
should be carried into effect1 its legal
 meaning would nevertheless remain the  
same2 for no judicial tribunal could    
lawfully allow the parties to it to come
 into court and allege their dishonest  
intentions1 and claim that they be      
substituted for the legal meaning of the
 words of the instrument4  ,footnote    
#bg3 ,the ,supreme ,court say1 ,the     
instrument1 when it came from their     

hands1 7that is1 the hands of the       
convention17 was a mere proposal1       
without obligation or pretension to it4 
,the people were at perfect liberty to  
accept or reject it2 and their act was  
final4--,m',cullock vs4 ,maryland1--#d  
,wheaton #djc-d4  ,footnote #bh3 ,the   
,supreme ,court of the ,united ,states  
say3  ,the intention of the instrument  
must prevail3 this intention must be    
collected from its words4--,ogden vs4   
,saunders1--#ab ,wheaton1 #ccb4  ,the   
intention of the legislature is to be   
searched for in the words which the     
legislature has employed to convey      
it4--,schr4 ,paulina's ,cargo vs4       
,united ,states1--#g ,cranch1 #fj4      
,footnote #bi3 ,elliot's ,debates1 so   
often referred to1 are1 if possible1 a  
more miserable authority than ,mr4      
,madison's notes4 ,he seems to have     
picked up the most of them from the     
newspapers of the day1 in which they    
were reported by nobody now probably    
knows whom4 ,in his preface to his first

 volume1 containing the debates in the  
,massachusetts and ,new ,york           
conventions1 he says3  ,in the          
compilation of this volume1 care has    
been taken to search into contemporary  
publications1 in order to make the work 
as perfect as possible2 still1 however1 
the editor is sensible1 from the daily  
experience of newspaper reports1 of the 
present time1 that the sentiments they  
contain may1 in some instances1 have    
been inaccurately taken down1 and in    
others1 probably too faintly sketched1  
fully to gratify the inquisitive        
politician4 ,he also speaks of them as  
rescued from the ephemeral prints of    
that day1 and now1 for the first time1  
presented in a uniform and durable form4
  ,in the preface to his second volume1 
which is devoted to the ,virginia       
convention1 he says the debates were    
reported by an able stenographer1 ,david
 ,robertson2 and then quotes the        
following from ,mr4 ,wirt1 in a note to 
the life of ,patrick ,henry3  ,from the 

skill and ability of the reporter1 there
 can be no doubt that the substance of  
the debates1 as well as their general   
course1 are accurately preserved4  ,in  
his preface to the third volume1        
embracing the ,north ,carolina and      
,pennsylvania conventions1 he says3     
,the first of the two ,north ,carolina  
conventions is contained in this volume2
 the second convention1 it is believed1 
was neither systematically reported nor 
printed4 ,the debates in the            
,pennsylvania convention1 that have been
 preserved1 it appears1 are on one side 
only2 a search into the contemporary    
publications of the day1 has been       
unsuccessful to furnish us with the     
other side of the question4  ,in his    
preface to the fourth volume1 he says3  
,in compiling the opinions1 on          
constitutional questions1 delivered in  
congress1 by some of the most           
enlightened senators and                
representatives1 the files of the ,new  
,york and ,philadelphia newspapers1 from

 #aghi to #ahjj1 had to be relied on2   
from the latter period to the present1  
the ,national ,intelligencer is the     
authority consulted for the desired     
information4  ,it is from such stuff as 
this1 collected and published           
thirty-five and forty years after the   
constitution was adopted--stuff very    
suitable for constitutional dreams to be
 made of--that our courts and people now
 make their constitutional law1 in      
preference to adopting the law of the   
constitution itself4 ,in this way they  
manufacture law strong enough to bind   
three millions of men in slavery4       
,,chapter ,x4  ,,the ,,practice ,,of    
,,the ,,government4   ,the practice of  
the government1 under the constitution1 
has not altered the legal meaning of the
 instrument4 ,it means now what it did  
before it was ratified1 when it was     
first offered to the people for their   
adoption or rejection4 ,one of the      
advantages of a written constitution is1
 that it enables the people to see what 

its character is before they adopt it2  
and another is1 that it enables them to 
see1 after they have adopted it1 whether
 the government adheres to it1 or       
departs from it4 ,both these advantages1
 each of which is indispensable to      
liberty1 would be entirely forfeited1 if
 the legal meaning of a written         
constitution were one thing when the    
instrument was offered to the people for
 their adoption1 and could then be made 
another thing by the government after   
the people had adopted it4  ,it is of no
 consequence1 therefore1 what meaning   
the government have placed upon the     
instrument2 but only what meaning they  
were bound to place upon it from the    
beginning4  ,the only question1 then1 to
 be decided1 is1 what was the meaning of
 the constitution1 as a legal           
instrument1 when it was first drawn up1 
and presented to the people1 and before 
it was adopted by them8  ,to this       
question there certainly can be but one 
answer4--,there is not room for a doubt 

or an argument1 on that point1 in favor 
of slavery4 ,the instrument itself is   
palpably a free one throughout1 in its  
language1 its principles1 and all its   
provisions4 ,as a legal instrument1     
there is no trace of slavery in it4 ,it 
not only does not sanction slavery1 but 
it does not even recognize its          
existence4 ,more than this1 it is       
palpably and wholly incompatible with   
slavery4 ,it is also the supreme law of 
the land1 in contempt of any state      
constitution or law that should attempt 
to establish slavery4  ,such was the    
character of the constitution when it   
was offered to the people1 and before it
 was adopted4 ,and if such was its      
character then1 such is its character   
still4 ,it cannot have been changed by  
all the errors and perversions1         
intentional or unintentional1 of which  
the government may have since been      
guilty4     ,,chapter ,,xi4  ,,the      
,,understanding ,,of ,,the ,,people4    
,although the inquiry may be of no legal

 importance1 it may nevertheless be one 
pertinent to the subject1 whether it be 
matter of history even--to say nothing  
of legal proof--that the people of the  
country did really understand or believe
 that the constitution sanctioned       
slavery8 ,those who make the assertion1 
are bound to prove it4 ,the presumption 
is against them4 ,where is their        
contrary history8  ,they will say that a
 part of the people were actually       
slaveholders1 and that it is            
unreasonable to suppose they would have 
agreed to the constitution1 if they had 
understood it to be a free one4  ,the   
answer to this argument is1 that the    
actual slaveholders were few in number  
compared with the whole people2         
comprising probably not more than       
one-eighth or one-sixth of the voters1  
and one-fortieth or one-thirtieth of the
 whole population4 ,they were so few as 
to be manifestly incapable of           
maintaining any separate political      
organization2 or even of holding their  

slave property1 except under the        
sufferance1 toleration and protection of
 the non-slaveholders4 ,they were       
compelled1 therefore1 to agree to any   
political organization1 which the       
non-slaveholders should determine on4   
,this was at that time the case even in 
the strongest of the slaveholding states
 themselves4 ,in all of them1 without   
exception1 the slaveholders were either 
obliged to live1 or from choice did     
live1 under free constitutions4 ,they1  
of course1 held their slave property in 
defiance of their constitutions4 ,they  
were enabled to do this through the     
corrupting influence of their wealth and
 union4 ,controlling a large proportion 
of the wealth of their states1 their    
social and political influence was      
entirely disproportionate to their      
numbers4 ,they could act in concert4    
,they could purchase talent by honors1  
offices and money4 ,being always united1
 while the non-slaveholders were        
divided1 they could turn the scale in   

elections1 and fill most of the offices 
with slaveholders4 ,many of the         
non-slaveholders doubtless were poor1   
dependent and subservient1 7as large    
portions of the non-slaveholders are now
 in the slaveholding states17 and lent  
themselves to the support of slavery    
almost from necessity4 ,by these1 and   
probably by many other influences that  
we cannot now understand1 they were     
enabled to maintain their hold upon     
their slave property in defiance of     
their constitutions4 ,it is even        
possible that the slaveholders          
themselves did not choose to have the   
subject of slavery mentioned in their   
constitutions2 that they were so fully  
conscious of their power to corrupt and 
control their governments1 that they did
 not regard any constitutional provision
 necessary for their security2 and that 
out of mere shame at the criminality of 
the thing1 and its inconsistency with   
all the principles the country had been 
fighting for and proclaiming1 they did  

not wish it to be named4  ,but whatever 
may have been the cause of the fact1 the
 fact itself is conspicuous1 that from  
some cause or other1 either with the    
consent of the slaveholders1 or in      
defiance of their power1 the            
constitutions of every one of the       
thirteen states were at that time free  
ones4  ,now is it not idle and useless  
to pretend1 when even the strongest     
slaveholding states had free            
constitutions--when not one of the      
separate states1 acting for itself1     
would have any but a free               
constitution--that the whole thirteen1  
when acting in unison1 should concur in 
establishing a slaveholding one8 ,the   
idea is preposterous4 ,the single fact  
that all the state constitutions were at
 that time free ones1 scatters for ever 
the pretence that the majority of the   
people of all the states either intended
 to establish1 or could have been       
induced to establish1 any other than a  
free one for the nation4 ,of course it  

scatters also the pretence that they    
believed or understood that they were   
establishing any but a free one4  ,there
 very probably may have been a general  
belief among the people1 that slavery   
would for a while live on1 on           
sufferance2 that the government1 until  
the nation should have become attached  
to the constitution1 and cemented and   
consolidated by the habit of union1     
would be too weak1 and too easily       
corrupted by the innumerable and        
powerful appliances of slaveholders1 to 
wrestle with and strangle slavery4 ,but 
to suppose that the nation at large did 
not look upon the constitution as       
designed to destroy slavery1 whenever   
its principles should be carried into   
full effect1 is obviously to suppose an 
intellectual impossibility2 for the     
instrument was plain1 and the people had
 common sense2 and those two facts      
cannot stand together consistently with 
the idea that there was any general1 or 
even any considerable misunderstanding  

of its meaning4     ,,chapter ,,xii4    
,,the ,,state ,,constitutions ,,of      
#ahde4   ,of all the existing state     
constitutions1 7excepting that of       
,florida1 which ,i have not seen17 not  
one of them contains provisions that are
 sufficient1 7or that would be          
sufficient if not restrained by the     
constitution of the ,united ,states17 to
 authorize the slavery that exists in   
the states4 ,the material deficiency in 
all of them is1 that they neither       
designate1 nor give the legislatures any
 authority to designate the persons1 who
 may be made slaves4 ,without such a    
provision1 all their other provisions in
 regard to slaves are nugatory1 simply  
because their application is legally    
unknown4 ,they would apply as well to   
whites as to blacks1 and would as much  
authorize the enslavement of whites as  
of blacks4  ,we have before seen that   
none of the state constitutions1 that   
were in existence in #aghi1 recognized  
slavery at all4 ,since that time1 four  

of the old thirteen states1 viz41       
,maryland1 ,north ,carolina1 ,south     
,carolina and ,georgia1 have altered    
their constitutions so as to make them  
recognize slavery2 yet not so as to     
provide for any legal designation of the
 persons to be made slaves4  ,the       
constitution of ,south ,carolina has a  
provision that implies that some of the 
slaves1 at least1 are negroes2 but not  
that all slaves are negroes1 nor that   
all negroes are slaves4 ,the provision1 
therefore1 amounts to nothing for the   
purposes of a constitutional designation
 of the persons who may be made slaves4 
,the constitutions of ,tennessee and    
,louisiana make no direct mention of    
slaves2 and have no provisions in favor 
of slavery1 unless the general one for  
continuing existing laws in force1 be   
such a one4 ,but both have specific     
provisions inconsistent with slavery4   
,both purport to be established by the  
people2 both have provisions for the    
writ of habeas corpus4 ,indeed1 the     

constitutions of most of the slave      
states have provisions for this writ1   
which1 as has been before shown1 denies 
the right of property in man4 ,that of  
,tennessee declares also that all courts
 shall be open1 and every man1 for an   
injury done him in his lands1 goods1    
person or reputation1 shall have remedy 
by due course of law1 and right and     
justice administered without sale1      
denial or delay4 ,tennessee also was    
formerly a part of ,north ,carolina2 was
 set off from her while the constitution
 of ,north ,carolina was a free one4 ,of
 course there has never been any legal  
slavery in ,tennessee4  ,the            
constitutions of the states of          
,kentucky1 ,missouri1 ,arkansas1        
,mississippi1 and ,alabama1 all have    
provisions about slaves2 yet none of    
them tell us who may be slaves4 ,some of
 them indeed provide for the admission  
into their state of such persons as are 
slaves under the laws1 7which of course 
means only the constitutional laws17 of 

other states4 ,but when we go to those  
other states1 we find that their        
constitutions have made no designation  
of the persons who may be made slaves2  
and therefore we are as far from finding
 the actual persons of the slaves as we 
were before4  ,the principal provision1 
in the several state constitutions1     
recognizing slavery1 is1 in substance1  
this1 that the legislature shall have no
 power to emancipate slaves without the 
consent of their owners1 or without     
making compensation4 ,but this provision
 is of no avail to legalize slavery1 for
 slavery must be constitutionally       
established1 before there can be any    
legal slaves to be emancipated2 and it  
cannot be established without describing
 the persons who may be made slaves4    
,kentucky was originally a part of      
,virginia1 and derived her slaves from  
,virginia4 ,as the constitution of      
,virginia was always a free one1 it gave
 no authority for slavery in that part  
of the state which is now ,kentucky4 ,of

 course ,kentucky never had any legal   
slavery4  ,slavery was positively       
prohibited in all the states included in
 the ,louisiana purchase1 by the third  
article of the treaty of cession--which 
is in these words3--     ,art4 #c4 ,the 
inhabitants 7that is1 all the           
inhabitants17 of the    ceded territory 
shall be incorporated in the union of   
the ,united    ,states1 and admitted as 
soon as possible1 according to the      
principles of the federal constitution1 
to the enjoyment of all the    rights1  
advantages1 and immunities of citizens  
of the ,united    ,states2 and1 in the  
mean time1 they shall be maintained and 
protected    in the free enjoyment of   
their liberty1 property1 and the        
religion    which they profess4  ,the   
cession of ,florida to the ,united      
,states was made on the same terms4 ,the
 words of the treaty1 on this point1 are
 as follows3--     ,art4 #f4 ,the       
inhabitants of the territories1 which   
his ,catholic    majesty cedes to the   

,united ,states by this treaty1 shall be
    incorporated in the ,union of the   
,united ,states1 as soon as may be      
consistent with the principles of the   
federal constitution1 and    admitted to
 the enjoyment of all the privileges1   
rights and    immunities of the citizens
 of the ,united ,states4  ,to allow any 
of the inhabitants1 included in those   
treaties1 to be held as slaves1 or      
denied the rights of citizenship under  
the ,united ,states' constitution1 is a 
plain breach of the treaties4  ,the     
constitutions of some of the slave      
states have provisions like this1 viz41 
that all laws previously in force1 shall
 remain in force until repealed1 unless 
repugnant to this constitution4 ,but ,i 
think there is no instance1 in which the
 slave acts1 then on their statute      
books1 could be perpetuated by this     
provision--and for two reasons2 #ast4   
,these slave acts were previously       
unconstitutional1 and therefore were    
not1 legally speaking1 laws in force4#cj

 #b;d4 ,every constitution1 ,i think1   
that has this provision1 has one or more
 other provisions that are repugnant to 
the slave acts4  ,footnote #cj3 ,this   
principle would apply1 as we have before
 seen1 where the change was from the    
colonial to a state government4 ,it     
would also apply to all cases where the 
change took place1 under the            
constitution of the ,united ,states1    
from a territorial to a state           
government4 ,it needs no argument to    
prove that all our territorial statutes1
 that have purported to authorize       
slavery1 were unconstitutional4         
,,chapter ,,xiii4  ,,the ,,children ,,of
 ,,slaves ,,are ,,born ,,free4   ,the   
idea that the children of slaves are    
necessarily born slaves1 or that they   
necessarily follow that natural law of  
property1 which gives the natural       
increase of property to the owner of the
 original stock1 is an erroneous one4   
,it is a principle of natural law in    
regard to property1 that a calf belongs 

to the owner of the cow that bore it2   
fruit to the owner of the tree or vine  
on which it grew2 and so on4 ,but the   
principle of natural law1 which makes a 
calf belong to the owner of the cow1    
does not make the child of a slave      
belong to the owner of the slave--and   
why8 ,simply because both cow and calf  
are naturally subjects of property2     
while neither men nor children are      
naturally subjects of property4 ,the law
 of nature gives no aid to any thing    
inconsistent with itself4 ,it therefore 
gives no aid to the transmission of     
property in man--while it does give aid 
to the transmission of property in other
 animals and in things4  ,brute animals 
and things being naturally subjects of  
property1 there are obvious reasons why 
the natural increase should belong to   
the owner of the original stock4 ,but   
men1 not being naturally subjects of    
property1 the law of nature will not    
transmit any right of property acquired 
in violation of her own authority4 ,the 

law of nature denies all rights not     
derived from herself4 ,of course she    
cannot perpetuate or transmit such      
rights--if rights they can be called4   
,one important reason why a calf belongs
 to the owner of the cow that bore it1  
is1 that there is no principle of       
natural law that can be opposed to that 
ownership4 ,for the calf is naturally a 
subject of property1 and if it were not 
given to the owner of the cow1 it would 
be lawful for any other person to assume
 the ownership4 ,no wrong would be done 
to the animal by so doing4 ,but as man  
is not naturally a subject of property1 
and as each separate individual is1 on  
principles of natural law1 entitled to  
the control of his own person1 it is as 
much a wrong1 and as much a violation of
 natural law1 to make a slave of the    
child of a slave1 as to make a slave of 
any other person4 ,the natural rights of
 the child to the control of his own    
person1 rise up1 from the moment of his 
birth1 in opposition to the transmission

 to him of any ownership1 which1 in     
violation of natural law1 has been      
asserted to the parent4  ,natural law   
may be overborne by arbitrary           
institutions2 but she will never aid1 or
 perpetuate them4 ,for her to do so1    
would be to resist1 and even deny her   
own authority4 ,it would present the    
case of a principle warring against and 
overcoming itself4 ,instead of this1 she
 asserts her own authority on the first 
opportunity4 ,the moment the arbitrary  
law expires by its own limitation1      
natural law resumes her reign4 ,if1     
therefore1 the government declare ,a to 
be a slave1 natural law may be          
practically overborne by this arbitrary 
authority2 but she will not herself     
perpetuate it beyond the person of      
,a--for that would be acting in         
contradiction to herself4--,she will    
therefore suffer this arbitrary         
authority to expend itself on the person
 of ,a1 according to the letter of the  
arbitrary law2 but she will assert her  

own authority in favor of the child of  
,a1 to whom the letter of the law       
enslaving ,a1 does not apply4  ,slavery 
is a wrong to each individual enslaved2 
and not merely to the first of a series4
 ,natural law1 therefore1 as much       
forbids the enslaving of the child1 as  
if the wrong of enslaving the parent had
 never been perpetrated4  ,slavery1     
then1 is an arbitrary institution       
throughout4 ,it depends1 from first to  
last1 upon the letter of the arbitrary  
law4 ,natural law gives it no aid1 no   
extension1 no new application1 under any
 circumstances whatever4 ,unless1       
therefore1 the letter of the arbitrary  
law explicitly authorize the enslavement
 of the child1 the child is born free1  
though the parent were a slave4  ,if the
 views that have already been taken of  
our written constitutions1 be correct1  
no parent has ever yet been legally     
enslaved in this country2 and of course 
no child4 ,if1 however1 any one thinks  
he can place his finger upon any        

constitutional law1 that has enslaved a 
parent1 let him follow that law1 and see
 whether it also expressly authorized   
the enslavement of the child4 ,if it did
 not1 then the child would be free4  ,it
 is no new principle that the child of a
 slave would be born free1 but for an   
express law to the contrary4 ,some of   
the slave codes admit the principle--for
 they have special provisions that the  
child shall follow the condition of the 
mother2 thus virtually admitting that1  
but for such a provision1 the child     
would be free1 though the mother were a 
slave4  ,under the constitutions of the 
states and the ,united ,states1 it      
requires as explicit and plenary        
constitutional authority1 to make slaves
 of the children of slaves1 as it would 
to make slaves of any body else4 ,is    
there1 in any of the constitutions of   
this country1 any general authority     
given to the governments1 to make slaves
 of whom they please8 ,no one will      
pretend it4 ,is there1 then1 any        

particular authority for making slaves  
of the children of those1 who have      
previously been held in slavery8 ,if    
there be1 let the advocates of slavery  
point it out4 ,if there be no such      
authority1 all their statutes declaring 
that the children of slaves shall follow
 the condition of their mothers1 are    
void2 and those children are free by    
force of the law of nature4  ,this law  
of nature1 that all men are born free1  
was recognized by this country in the   
,declaration of ,independence4--,but it 
was no new principle then4 ,justinian   
says1 ,captivity and servitude are both 
contrary to the law of nature2 for by   
that law all men are born free4 ,but the
 principle was not new with ,justinian2 
it exists in the nature of man1 and is  
as old as man--and the race of man      
generally has acknowledged it4 ,the     
exceptions have been special2 the rule  
general4  ,the constitution of the      
,united ,states recognizes the principle
 that all men are born free2 for it     

recognizes the principle that natural   
birth in the country gives              
citizenship#ca--which of course implies 
freedom4 ,and no exception is made to   
the rule4 ,of course all born in the    
country since the adoption of the       
constitution of the ,united ,states1    
have been born free1 whether there were1
 or were not any legal slaves in the    
country before that time4  ,even the    
provisions1 in the several state        
constitutions1 that the legislatures    
shall not emancipate slaves1 would1 if  
allowed their full effect1 unrestrained 
by the constitution of the ,united      
,states1 hold in slavery only those who 
were then slaves2 it would do nothing   
towards enslaving their children1 and   
would give the legislatures no authority
 to enslave them4  ,it is clear1        
therefore1 that1 on this principle      
alone1 slavery would now be extinct in  
this country1 unless there should be an 
exception of a few aged persons4        
,footnote #ca3 ,art4 #b1 ,sec4 #a1      

,clause #e1 ,no person1 except a natural
 born citizen199 99 99 99 shall be      
eligible to the office of ,president4