,transcribed from the #ahhg ,cassell    
,co4 edition by ,david ,price1 email    
ccx#jgdpglaf4org            ,,human     
,,nature  ,,and  ,,other ,,sermons      
,,by  ,,joseph ,,butler  ,,bishop ,,of  
,,durham4    ,,cassell  ,,company1      
,,limited3  ,,london1 ,,paris1 ,,new    
,,york  ,,melbourne4  #ahhg             
,,introduction4      ,joseph ,butler was
 born in #afib1 youngest of eight       
children of a  linendraper at ,wantage1 
in ,berkshire4  ,his father was a       
,presbyterian1 and  after education at  
the ,wantage ,free ,grammar ,school     
,joseph ,butler was sent  to be educated
 for the ,presbyterian ministry in a    
training academy at  ,gloucester1 which 
was afterwards removed to ,tewkesbury4  
,there he had a  friend and comrade1    
,secker1 who afterwards became          
,archbishop of  ,canterbury4  ,butler   
and ,secker inquired actively1 and there
 was  foreshadowing of his future in the
 fact that in #agac1 at the age of      
twenty-one1 ,butler was engaged in      

anonymous discussion with ,samuel       
,clarke  upon his book on the a priori  
demonstration of the ,divine ,existence 
and  ,attributes4    ,when the time drew
 near for call to the ministry1 ,butler1
 like his friend  ,secker1 had reasoned 
himself into accordance with the        
teaching of the  ,church of ,england4   
,butler's father did not oppose his     
strong desire to  enter the ,church1 and
 he was entered in #agad at ,oriel      
,college1 ,oxford4  ,at  college a      
strong friendship was established       
between ,butler and a fellow-  student1 
,edward ,talbot1 whose father was a     
,bishop1 formerly of ,oxford and        
,salisbury1 then of ,durham4  ,through  
,talbot's influence ,butler obtained in 
#agah the office of ,preacher in the    
,rolls ,chapel1 which he held for the   
next eight years4  ,in #agbb ,talbot    
died1 and on his death-bed urged his    
father on behalf of his friend ,butler4 
,the ,bishop accordingly presented      
,joseph ,butler to the living of        

,houghton-le-,spring4  ,but it was found
 that  costs of dilapidations were      
beyond his means at ,houghton1 and      
,butler had  a dangerous regard for     
building works4  ,he was preferred two  
years  afterwards to the living of      
,stanhope1 which then became vacant1 and
 which  yielded a substantial income4   
,butler sought nothing for himself1 his 
simplicity of character1 real worth1 and
 rare intellectual power1 secured  him  
friends1 and the love of two of         
them--,talbot first1 and afterwards     
,secker1 who made his own way in the    
,church1 and became strong enough to    
put his friend as well as himself in the
 way of worldly advancement1  secured   
for ,butler all the patronage he had1   
until the ,queen also became  his active
 friend4    ,joseph ,butler was seven   
years at ,stanhope1 quietly devoted to  
his parish  duties1 preaching1 studying1
 and writing his ,analogy of ,religion1 
,natural and ,revealed1 to the          
,constitution and ,course of ,nature4   

,in  #agbg1 while still at ,stanhope1 he
 was appointed to a stall in ,durham    
,cathedral4  ,secker1 having become     
chaplain to the ,queen1 encouraged her  
in admiration of ,butler's sermons4  ,he
 told her that the author was not  dead1
 but buried1 and secured her active     
interest in his behalf4  ,from  ,talbot1
 who had become ,lord ,chancellor1      
,secker had no difficulty in  obtaining 
for ,butler a chaplaincy which exempted 
him from the necessity  of residence at 
,stanhope4  ,butler1 in accepting it1   
stipulated for  permission to live and  
work in his parish for six months in    
every year4  ,next he was made chaplain 
to the ,king1 and ,rector of ,st4       
,james's1 upon  which he gave up        
,stanhope4  ,in #agcf ,queen ,caroline  
appointed him her  ,clerk of the        
,closet1 an office which gave ,butler   
the duty of attendance  upon her for two
 hours every evening4  ,in that year he 
published his  ,analogy1 of which the   
purpose was to meet1 on its own ground1 

the  scepticism of his day4  ,the ,queen
 died in #agcg1 and1 in accordance with 
the strong desire expressed in her last 
days1 in #agch ,butler was made a       
,bishop4  ,but his ,bishopric was       
,bristol1 worth only #cjj or #djj pounds
 a  year4  ,the ,king added the ,deanery
 of ,st4 ,paul's1 when that became      
vacant  in #agdj1 and in #agej1 towards 
the close of his life1 ,joseph ,butler  
was  translated to the ,bishopric of    
,durham4  ,he died in #ageb4    ,no man 
could be less self-seeking4  ,he owed   
his rise in the ,church wholly  to the  
intellectual power and substantial worth
 of character that  inspired strong     
friendship4  ,seeing how little he      
sought worldly  advancement for himself1
 while others were pressing and         
scrambling1  ,butler's friends used     
their opportunities of winning for him  
the  advancement he deserved4  ,he was  
happiest in doing his work1 of which a  
chief part was in his study1 where he   
employed his philosophic mind in        

strengthening the foundations of        
religious faith4  ,faith in ,god was    
attacked by men who claimed especially  
to be philosophers1 and they were  best 
met by the man who had1 beyond all other
 divines of his day--some  might not be 
afraid to add1 of any day--the          
philosophic mind4    ,h4 ,m4            
,,sermon ,i4  ,,upon ,,human ,,nature4  
,,romans xii4 #d1 #e4       ,for as we  
have many members in one body1 and all  
members have not     the same office3 so
 we1 being many1 are one body in        
,christ1     and every one members one  
of another4    ,the ,epistles in the    
,new ,testament have all of them a      
particular reference  to the condition  
and usages of the ,christian world at   
the time they were  written4  ,therefore
 as they cannot be thoroughly understood
 unless that  condition and those usages
 are known and attended to1 so1 further1
 though  they be known1 yet if they be  
discontinued or changed1 exhortations1  
precepts1 and illustrations of things1  

which refer to such circumstances  now  
ceased or altered1 cannot at this time  
be urged in that manner and  with that  
force which they were to the primitive  
,christians4  ,thus the  text now before
 us1 in its first intent and design1    
relates to the decent  management of    
those extraordinary gifts which were    
then in the ,church1  #a but which are  
now totally ceased4  ,and even as to the
 allusion that  we are one body in      
,christ1 though what the apostle here   
intends is  equally true of ,christians 
in all circumstances1 and the           
consideration of  it is plainly still an
 additional motive1 over and above moral
  considerations1 to the discharge of   
the several duties and offices of a     
,christian1 yet it is manifest this     
allusion must have appeared with much   
greater force to those who1 by the many 
difficulties they went through  for the 
sake of their religion1 were led to keep
 always in view the  relation they stood
 in to their ,saviour1 who had undergone

 the same3 to  those1 who1 from the     
idolatries of all around them1 and their
  ill-treatment1 were taught to consider
 themselves as not of the world in      
which they lived1 but as a distinct     
society of themselves2 with laws and    
ends1 and principles of life and action1
 quite contrary to those which  the     
world professed themselves at that time 
influenced by4  ,hence the  relation of 
a ,christian was by them considered as  
nearer than that of  affinity and blood2
 and they almost literally esteemed     
themselves as  members one of another4  
,it cannot1 indeed1 possibly be denied1 
that our being ,god's creatures1  and   
virtue being the natural law we are born
 under1 and the whole  constitution of  
man being plainly adapted to it1 are    
prior obligations to  piety and virtue  
than the consideration that ,god sent   
his ,son into the  world to save it1 and
 the motives which arise from the       
peculiar relation  of ,christians as    
members one of another under ,christ our

 head4  ,however1  though all this be   
allowed1 as it expressly is by the      
inspired writers1  yet it is manifest   
that ,christians at the time of the     
,revelation1 and  immediately after1    
could not but insist mostly upon        
considerations of  this latter kind4    
,these observations show the original   
particular reference to the text1  and  
the peculiar force with which the thing 
intended by the allusion in  it must    
have been felt by the primitive         
,christian world4  ,they likewise       
afford a reason for treating it at this 
time in a more general way4    ,the     
relation which the several parts or     
members of the natural body have  to    
each other and to the whole body is here
 compared to the relation  which each   
particular person in society has to     
other particular persons  and to the    
whole society2 and the latter is        
intended to be illustrated by  the      
former4  ,and if there be a likeness    
between these two relations1 the        

consequence is obvious3 that the latter 
shows us we were intended to do  good to
 others1 as the former shows us that the
 several members of the  natural body   
were intended to be instruments of good 
to each other and to  the whole body4   
,but as there is scarce any ground for a
 comparison  between society and the    
mere material body1 this without the    
mind being a  dead unactive thing1 much 
less can the comparison be carried to   
any  length4  ,and since the apostle    
speaks of the several members as having 
distinct offices1 which implies the     
mind1 it cannot be thought an  allowable
 liberty1 instead of the body and its   
members1 to substitute  the whole nature
 of man1 and all the variety of internal
 principles  which belong to it4  ,and  
then the comparison will be between the 
nature  of man as respecting self1 and  
tending to private good1 his own        
preservation and happiness2 and the     
nature of man as having respect to      
society1 and tending to promote public  

good1 the happiness of that  society4   
,these ends do indeed perfectly         
coincide2 and to aim at public  and     
private good are so far from being      
inconsistent that they mutually  promote
 each other3 yet in the following       
discourse they must be  considered as   
entirely distinct2 otherwise the nature 
of man as tending  to one1 or as tending
 to the other1 cannot be compared4      
,there can no  comparison be made1      
without considering the things compared 
as distinct  and different4    ,from    
this review and comparison of the nature
 of man as respecting self  and as      
respecting society1 it will plainly     
appear that there are as real  and the  
same kind of indications in human       
nature1 that we were made for  society  
and to do good to our fellow-creatures1 
as that we were  intended to take care  
of our own life and health and private  
good3 and  that the same objections lie 
against one of these assertions as      
against  the other4  ,for1    ,first1   

there is a natural principle of         
benevolence #b in man1 which is  in some
 degree to society what self-love is to 
the individual4  ,and  if there be in   
mankind any disposition to friendship2  
if there be any  such thing as          
compassion--for compassion is momentary 
love--if there be  any such thing as the
 paternal or filial affections2 if there
 be any  affection in human nature1 the 
object and end of which is the good of  
another1 this is itself benevolence1 or 
the love of another4  ,be it ever  so   
short1 be it in ever so low a degree1 or
 ever so unhappily confined1  it proves 
the assertion1 and points out what we   
were designed for1 as  really as though 
it were in a higher degree and more     
extensive4  ,i must1  however1 remind   
you that though benevolence and         
self-love are different1  though the    
former tends most directly to public    
good1 and the latter to  private1 yet   
they are so perfectly coincident that   
the greatest  satisfactions to ourselves

 depend upon our having benevolence in a
 due  degree2 and that self-love is one 
chief security of our right behaviour   
towards society4  ,it may be added that 
their mutual coinciding1 so that  we can
 scarce promote one without the other1  
is equally a proof that we  were made   
for both4    ,secondly1 this will       
further appear1 from observing that the 
several  passions and affections1 which 
are distinct #c both from benevolence   
and self-love1 do in general contribute 
and lead us to public good as  really as
 to private4  ,it might be thought too  
minute and particular1  and would carry 
us too great a length1 to distinguish   
between and compare  together the       
several passions or appetites distinct  
from benevolence1  whose primary use and
 intention is the security and good of  
society1 and  the passions distinct from
 self-love1 whose primary intention and 
design  is the security and good of the 
individual4 #d  ,it is enough to the    
present argument that desire of esteem  

from others1 contempt and esteem  of    
them1 love of society as distinct from  
affection to the good of it1            
indignation against successful          
vice--that these are public affections  
or  passions1 have an immediate respect 
to others1 naturally lead us to         
regulate our behaviour in such a manner 
as will be of service to our            
fellow-creatures4  ,if any or all of    
these may be considered likewise as     
private affections1 as tending to       
private good1 this does not hinder them 
from being public affections too1 or    
destroy the good influence of them  upon
 society1 and their tendency to public  
good4  ,it may be added that as  persons
 without any conviction from reason of  
the desirableness of life  would yet of 
course preserve it merely from the      
appetite of hunger1 so1  by acting      
merely from regard 7suppose7 to         
reputation1 without any  consideration  
of the good of others1 men often        
contribute to public good4  ,in both    

these instances they are plainly        
instruments in the hands of  another1 in
 the hands of ,providence1 to carry on  
ends--the preservation  of the          
individual and good of society--which   
they themselves have not in  their view 
or intention4  ,the sum is1 men have    
various appetites1  passions1 and       
particular affections1 quite distinct   
both from self-love  and from           
benevolence3 all of these have a        
tendency to promote both public  and    
private good1 and may be considered as  
respecting others and  ourselves equally
 and in common2 but some of them seem   
most immediately  to respect others1 or 
tend to public good2 others of them most
  immediately to respect self1 or tend  
to private good3 as the former are  not 
benevolence1 so the latter are not      
self-love3 neither sort are  instances  
of our love either to ourselves or      
others1 but only instances  of our      
,maker's care and love both of the      
individual and the species1 and  proofs 

that ,he intended we should be          
instruments of good to each other1  as  
well as that we should be so to         
ourselves4    ,thirdly1 there is a      
principle of reflection in men1 by which
 they  distinguish between1 approve and 
disapprove their own actions4  ,we are  
plainly constituted such sort of        
creatures as to reflect upon our own    
nature4  ,the mind can take a view of   
what passes within itself1 its          
propensions1 aversions1 passions1       
affections as respecting such objects1  
and in such degrees2 and of the several 
actions consequent thereupon4  ,in  this
 survey it approves of one1 disapproves 
of another1 and towards a  third is     
affected in neither of these ways1 but  
is quite indifferent4  ,this principle  
in man1 by which he approves or         
disapproves his heart1  temper1 and     
actions1 is conscience2 for this is the 
strict sense of the  word1 though       
sometimes it is used so as to take in   
more4  ,and that this  faculty tends to 

restrain men from doing mischief to each
 other1 and  leads them to do good1 is  
too manifest to need being insisted     
upon4  ,thus  a parent has the affection
 of love to his children3 this leads him
 to  take care of1 to educate1 to make  
due provision for them--the natural     
affection leads to this3 but the        
reflection that it is his proper        
business1 what belongs to him1 that it  
is right and commendable so to          
do--this1 added to the affection1       
becomes a much more settled principle1  
and carries him on through more labour  
and difficulties for the sake of  his   
children than he would undergo from that
 affection alone1 if he  thought it1 and
 the cause of action it led to1 either  
indifferent or  criminal4  ,this indeed 
is impossible1 to do that which is good 
and not to  approve of it2 for which    
reason they are frequently not          
considered as  distinct1 though they    
really are3 for men often approve of the
 action of  others which they will not  

imitate1 and likewise do that which they
  approve not4  ,it cannot possibly be  
denied that there is this principle  of 
reflection or conscience in human       
nature4  ,suppose a man to relieve an   
innocent person in great distress2      
suppose the same man afterwards1 in  the
 fury of anger1 to do the greatest      
mischief to a person who had given  no  
just cause of offence4  ,to aggravate   
the injury1 add the circumstances  of   
former friendship and obligation from   
the injured person2 let the man  who is 
supposed to have done these two         
different actions coolly reflect  upon  
them afterwards1 without regard to their
 consequences to himself3 to  assert    
that any common man would be affected in
 the same way towards  these different  
actions1 that he would make no          
distinction between them1  but approve  
or disapprove them equally1 is too      
glaring a falsity to need  being        
confuted4  ,there is therefore this     
principle of reflection or  conscience  

in mankind4  ,it is needless to compare 
the respect it has to  private good with
 the respect it has to public2 since it 
plainly tends as  much to the latter as 
to the former1 and is commonly thought  
to tend  chiefly to the latter4  ,this  
faculty is now mentioned merely as      
another  part in the inward frame of    
man1 pointing out to us in some degree  
what  we are intended for1 and as what  
will naturally and of course have some  
influence4  ,the particular place       
assigned to it by nature1 what authority
  it has1 and how great influence it    
ought to have1 shall be hereafter       
considered4    ,from this comparison of 
benevolence and self-love1 of our public
 and  private affections1 of the courses
 of life they lead to1 and of the       
principle of reflection or conscience as
 respecting each of them1 it is  as     
manifest that we were made for society1 
and to promote the  happiness of it1 as 
that we were intended to take care of   
our own life  and health and private    

good4    ,and from this whole review    
must be given a different draught of    
human  nature from what we are often    
presented with4  ,mankind are by nature 
so  closely united1 there is such a     
correspondence between the inward       
sensations of one man and those of      
another1 that disgrace is as much       
avoided as bodily pain1 and to be the   
object of esteem and love as much       
desired as any external goods2 and in   
many particular cases persons are       
carried on to do good to others1 as the 
end their affection tends to and  rests 
in2 and manifest that they find real    
satisfaction and enjoyment in  this     
course of behaviour4  ,there is such a  
natural principle of  attraction in man 
towards man that having trod the same   
tract of land1  having breathed in the  
same climate1 barely having been born in
 the same  artificial district or       
division1 becomes the occasion of       
contracting  acquaintances and          
familiarities many years after2 for     

anything may serve  the purpose4  ,thus 
relations merely nominal are sought and 
invented1 not  by governors1 but by the 
lowest of the people1 which are found   
sufficient  to hold mankind together in 
little fraternities and copartnerships3 
weak  ties indeed1 and what may afford  
fund enough for ridicule1 if they are   
absurdly considered as the real         
principles of that union3 but they are  
in  truth merely the occasions1 as      
anything may be of anything1 upon which 
our nature carries us on according to   
its own previous bent and bias2  which  
occasions therefore would be nothing at 
all were there not this  prior          
disposition and bias of nature4  ,men   
are so much one body that in a  peculiar
 manner they feel for each other shame1 
sudden danger1  resentment1 honour1     
prosperity1 distress2 one or another1 or
 all of  these1 from the social nature  
in general1 from benevolence1 upon the  
occasion of natural relation1           
acquaintance1 protection1 dependence2   

each  of these being distinct cements of
 society4  ,and therefore to have no    
restraint from1 no regard to1 others in 
our behaviour1 is the speculative       
absurdity of considering ourselves as   
single and independent1 as having       
nothing in our nature which has respect 
to our fellow-creatures1 reduced  to    
action and practice4  ,and this is the  
same absurdity as to suppose a  hand1 or
 any part1 to have no natural respect to
 any other1 or to the  whole body4      
,but1 allowing all this1 it may be      
asked1 ,has not man dispositions and    
principles within which lead him to do  
evil to others1 as well as to do  good8 
,whence come the many miseries else     
which men are the authors and           
instruments of to each other8  ,these   
questions1 so far as they relate to  the
 foregoing discourse1 may be answered by
 asking1 ,has not man also  dispositions
 and principles within which lead him to
 do evil to himself1  as well as good8  
,whence come the many miseries          

else--sickness1 pain1 and  death--which 
men are instruments and authors of to   
themselves8    ,it may be thought more  
easy to answer one of these questions   
than the  other1 but the answer to both 
is really the same3 that mankind have   
ungoverned passions which they will     
gratify at any rate1 as well to the     
injury of others as in contradiction to 
known private interest3 but that  as    
there is no such thing as self-hatred1  
so neither is there any such  thing as  
ill-will in one man towards another1    
emulation and resentment  being away2   
whereas there is plainly benevolence or 
good-will3 there is  no such thing as   
love of injustice1 oppression1          
treachery1 ingratitude1  but only eager 
desires after such and such external    
goods2 which1  according to a very      
ancient observation1 the most abandoned 
would choose  to obtain by innocent     
means1 if they were as easy and as      
effectual to  their end3 that even      
emulation and resentment1 by any one who

 will  consider what these passions     
really are in nature1 #e will be found  
nothing to the purpose of this          
objection2 and that the principles and  
passions in the mind of man1 which are  
distinct both from self-love and        
benevolence1 primarily and most directly
 lead to right behaviour with  regard to
 others as well as himself1 and only    
secondarily and  accidentally to what is
 evil4  ,thus1 though men1 to avoid the 
shame of  one villainy1 are sometimes   
guilty of a greater1 yet it is easy to  
see  that the original tendency of shame
 is to prevent the doing of shameful    
actions2 and its leading men to conceal 
such actions when done is only in       
consequence of their being done2 i4e41  
of the passion's not having  answered   
its first end4    ,if it be said that   
there are persons in the world who are  
in great  measure without the natural   
affections towards their                
fellow-creatures1  there are likewise   
instances of persons without the common 

natural  affections to themselves4  ,but
 the nature of man is not to be judged  
of  by either of these1 but by what     
appears in the common world1 in the bulk
  of mankind4    ,i am afraid it would  
be thought very strange1 if to confirm  
the truth of  this account of human     
nature1 and make out the justness of the
 foregoing  comparison1 it should be    
added that from what appears1 men in    
fact as  much and as often contradict   
that part of their nature which respects
  self1 and which leads them to their   
own private good and happiness1  as they
 contradict that part of it which       
respects society1 and tends  to public  
good3 that there are as few persons who 
attain the greatest  satisfaction and   
enjoyment which they might attain in the
 present world1  as who do the greatest 
good to others which they might do2 nay1
 that  there are as few who can be said 
really and in earnest to aim at one as  
at the other4  ,take a survey of        
mankind3 the world in general1 the good 

and bad1 almost without exception1      
equally are agreed that were religion   
out of the case1 the happiness of the   
present life would consist in a  manner 
wholly in riches1 honours1 sensual      
gratifications2 insomuch that  one      
scarce hears a reflection made upon     
prudence1 life1 conduct1 but upon  this 
supposition4  ,yet1 on the contrary1    
that persons in the greatest  affluence 
of fortune are no happier than such as  
have only a competency2  that the cares 
and disappointments of ambition for the 
most part far  exceed the satisfactions 
of it2 as also the miserable intervals  
of  intemperance and excess1 and the    
many untimely deaths occasioned by a    
dissolute course of life3 these things  
are all seen1 acknowledged1 by  every   
one acknowledged2 but are thought no    
objections against1 though  they        
expressly contradict1 this universal    
principle--that the happiness  of the   
present life consists in one or other of
 them4  ,whence is all this  absurdity  

and contradiction8  ,is not the middle  
way obvious8  ,can  anything be more    
manifest than that the happiness of life
 consists in  these possessed and       
enjoyed only to a certain degree2 that  
to pursue them  beyond this degree is   
always attended with more inconvenience 
than  advantage to a man's self1 and    
often with extreme misery and           
unhappiness8  ,whence1 then1 ,i say1 is 
all this absurdity and contradiction8   
,is it  really the result of            
consideration in mankind1 how they may  
become most  easy to themselves1 most   
free from care1 and enjoy the chief     
happiness  attainable in this world8    
,or is it not manifestly owing either to
 this1  that they have not cool and     
reasonable concern enough for themselves
 to  consider wherein their chief       
happiness in the present life consists2 
or  else1 if they do consider it1 that  
they will not act conformably to what   
is the result of that                   
consideration--i4e41 reasonable concern 

for  themselves1 or cool self-love1 is  
prevailed over by passions and          
appetite8  ,so that from what appears   
there is no ground to assert that  those
 principles in the nature of man1 which 
most directly lead to  promote the good 
of our fellow-creatures1 are more       
generally or in a  greater degree       
violated than those which most directly 
lead us to promote  our own private good
 and happiness4    ,the sum of the whole
 is plainly this3 ,the nature of man    
considered in his  single capacity1 and 
with respect only to the present world1 
is adapted  and leads him to attain the 
greatest happiness he can for himself in
 the  present world4  ,the nature of man
 considered in his public or social     
capacity leads him to right behaviour in
 society1 to that course of life  which 
we call virtue4  ,men follow or obey    
their nature in both these  capacities  
and respects to a certain degree1 but   
not entirely3 their  actions do not come
 up to the whole of what their nature   

leads them to in  either of these       
capacities or respects3 and they often  
violate their  nature in both2 i4e41 as 
they neglect the duties they owe to     
their  fellow-creatures1 to which their 
nature leads them1 and are injurious1 to
  which their nature is abhorrent1 so   
there is a manifest negligence in men   
of their real happiness or interest in  
the present world1 when that  interest  
is inconsistent with a present          
gratification2 for the sake of  which   
they negligently1 nay1 even knowingly1  
are the authors and  instruments of     
their own misery and ruin4  ,thus they  
are as often unjust  to themselves as to
 others1 and for the most part are      
equally so to both  by the same actions4
          ,,sermon ,,ii41 ,,iii4  ,,upon
 ,,human ,,nature4         ,,romans ii4 
#ad4       ,for when the ,gentiles1     
which have not the law1 do by nature the
     things contained in the law1 these1
 having not the law1 are a     law unto 
themselves4    ,as speculative truth    

admits of different kinds of proof1 so  
likewise  moral obligations may be shown
 by different methods4  ,if the real    
nature  of any creature leads him and is
 adapted to such and such purposes only1
  or more than to any other1 this is a  
reason to believe the ,author of that   
nature intended it for those purposes4  
,thus there is no doubt the eye  was    
intended for us to see with4  ,and the  
more complex any constitution  is1 and  
the greater variety of parts there are  
which thus tend to some  one end1 the   
stronger is the proof that such end was 
designed4  ,however1  when the inward   
frame of man is considered as any guide 
in morals1 the  utmost caution must be  
used that none make peculiarities in    
their own  temper1 or anything which is 
the effect of particular customs1 though
  observable in several1 the standard of
 what is common to the species2 and     
above all1 that the highest principle be
 not forgot or excluded1 that to  which 
belongs the adjustment and correction of

 all other inward movements  and        
affections2 which principle will of     
course have some influence1 but  which  
being in nature supreme1 as shall now be
 shown1 ought to preside  over and      
govern all the rest4  ,the difficulty of
 rightly observing the  two former      
cautions2 the appearance there is of    
some small diversity  amongst mankind   
with respect to this faculty1 with      
respect to their  natural sense of moral
 good and evil2 and the attention       
necessary to  survey with any exactness 
what passes within1 have occasioned that
 it is  not so much agreed what is the  
standard of the internal nature of man  
as  of his external form4  ,neither is  
this last exactly settled4  ,yet we     
understand one another when we speak of 
the shape of a human body3 so  likewise 
we do when we speak of the heart and    
inward principles1 how far  soever the  
standard is from being exact or         
precisely fixed4  ,there is  therefore  
ground for an attempt of showing men to 

themselves1 of showing  them what course
 of life and behaviour their real nature
 points out and  would lead them to4    
,now obligations of virtue shown1 and   
motives to the  practice of it enforced1
 from a review of the nature of man1 are
 to be  considered as an appeal to each 
particular person's heart and natural   
conscience3 as the external senses are  
appealed to for the proof of  things    
cognisable by them4  ,since1 then1 our  
inward feelings1 and the  perceptions we
 receive from our external senses1 are  
equally real1 to  argue from the former 
to life and conduct is as little liable 
to  exception as to argue from the      
latter to absolute speculative truth4   
,a  man can as little doubt whether his 
eyes were given him to see with as he   
can doubt of the truth of the science of
 optics1 deduced from ocular            
experiments4  ,and allowing the inward  
feeling1 shame1 a man can as little     
doubt whether it was given him to       
prevent his doing shameful actions as   

he can doubt whether his eyes were given
 him to guide his steps4  ,and as  to   
these inward feelings themselves1 that  
they are real1 that man has in  his     
nature passions and affections1 can no  
more be questioned than that  he has    
external senses4  ,neither can the      
former be wholly mistaken1  though to a 
certain degree liable to greater        
mistakes than the latter4    ,there can 
be no doubt but that several propensions
 or instincts1 several  principles in   
the heart of man1 carry him to society1 
and to contribute  to the happiness of  
it1 in a sense and a manner in which no 
inward  principle leads him to evil4    
,these principles1 propensions1 or      
instincts  which lead him to do good are
 approved of by a certain faculty       
within1  quite distinct from these      
propensions themselves4  ,all this hath 
been  fully made out in the foregoing   
discourse4    ,but it may be said1 ,what
 is all this1 though true1 to the       
purpose of  virtue and religion8 these  

require1 not only that we do good to    
others  when we are led this way1 by    
benevolence or reflection happening to  
be  stronger than other principles1     
passions1 or appetites1 but likewise    
that  the whole character be formed upon
 thought and reflection2 that every     
action be directed by some determinate  
rule1 some other rule than the  strength
 and prevalency of any principle or     
passion4  ,what sign is there  in our   
nature 7for the inquiry is only about   
what is to be collected from  thence7   
that this was intended by its ,author8  
,or how does so various and  fickle a   
temper as that of man appear adapted    
thereto8  ,it may indeed be  absurd and 
unnatural for men to act without any    
reflection2 nay1 without  regard to that
 particular kind of reflection which you
 call conscience1  because this does    
belong to our nature4  ,for as there    
never was a man but  who approved one   
place1 prospect1 building1 before       
another1 so it does  not appear that    

there ever was a man who would not have 
approved an  action of humanity rather  
than of cruelty2 interest and passion   
being  quite out of the case4  ,but     
interest and passion do come in1 and are
  often too strong for and prevail over 
reflection and conscience4  ,now as     
brutes have various instincts1 by which 
they are carried on to the end  the     
,author of their nature intended them   
for1 is not man in the same             
condition--with this difference only1   
that to his instincts 7i4e41  appetites 
and passion7 is added the principle of  
reflection or  conscience8  ,and as     
brutes act agreeably to their nature1 in
 following  that principle or particular
 instinct which for the present is      
strongest  in them1 does not man        
likewise act agreeably to his nature1 or
 obey the  law of his creation1 by      
following that principle1 be it passion 
or  conscience1 which for the present   
happens to be strongest in him8  ,thus  
different men are by their particular   

nature hurried on to pursue honour  or  
riches or pleasure2 there are also      
persons whose temper leads them in  an  
uncommon degree to kindness1 compassion1
 doing good to their fellow-  creatures1
 as there are others who are given to   
suspend their judgment1  to weigh and   
consider things1 and to act upon thought
 and reflection4  ,let  every one1 then1
 quietly follow his nature1 as passion1 
reflection1  appetite1 the several parts
 of it1 happen to be strongest2 but let 
not  the man of virtue take upon him to 
blame the ambitious1 the covetous1 the  
dissolute1 since these equally with him 
obey and follow their nature4  ,thus1 as
 in some cases we follow our nature in  
doing the works contained  in the law1  
so in other cases we follow nature in   
doing contrary4    ,now all this        
licentious talk entirely goes upon a    
supposition that men  follow their      
nature in the same sense1 in violating  
the known rules of  justice and honesty 
for the sake of a present gratification1

 as they do  in following those rules   
when they have no temptation to the     
contrary4  ,and if this were true1 that 
could not be so which ,st4 ,paul        
asserts1 that  men are by nature a law  
to themselves4  ,if by following nature 
were  meant only acting as we please1 it
 would indeed be ridiculous to speak of 
nature as any guide in morals2 nay1 the 
very mention of deviating from  nature  
would be absurd2 and the mention of     
following it1 when spoken by  way of    
distinction1 would absolutely have no   
meaning4  ,for did ever any  one act    
otherwise than as he pleased8  ,and yet 
the ancients speak of  deviating from   
nature as vice1 and of following nature 
so much as a  distinction1 that         
according to them the perfection of     
virtue consists  therein4  ,so that     
language itself should teach people     
another sense to  the words following   
nature than barely acting as we please4 
,let it1  however1 be observed that     
though the words human nature are to be 

explained1 yet the real question of this
 discourse is not concerning the        
meaning of words1 any other than as the 
explanation of them may be  needful to  
make out and explain the assertion1 that
 every man is  naturally a law to       
himself1 that every one may find within 
himself the  rule of right1 and         
obligations to follow it4  ,this ,st4   
,paul affirms in  the words of the text1
 and this the foregoing objection really
 denies by  seeming to allow it4  ,and  
the objection will be fully answered1   
and the  text before us explained1 by   
observing that nature is considered in  
different views1 and the word used in   
different senses2 and by showing in     
what view it is considered1 and in what 
sense the word is used1 when  intended  
to express and signify that which is the
 guide of life1 that by  which men are a
 law to themselves4  ,i say1 the        
explanation of the term  will be        
sufficient1 because from thence it will 
appear that in some  senses of the word 

nature cannot be1 but that in another   
sense it  manifestly is1 a law to us4   
,i4  ,by nature is often meant no more  
than some principle in man1 without     
regard either to the kind or degree of  
it4  ,thus the passion of anger1  and   
the affection of parents to their       
children1 would be called equally       
natural4  ,and as the same person hath  
often contrary principles1 which  at the
 same time draw contrary ways1 he may by
 the same action both  follow and       
contradict his nature in this sense of  
the word2 he may follow  one passion and
 contradict another4    ,,ii4  ,nature  
is frequently spoken of as consisting in
 those passions  which are strongest1   
and most influence the actions2 which   
being vicious  ones1 mankind is in this 
sense naturally vicious1 or vicious by  
nature4  ,thus ,st4 ,paul says of the   
,gentiles1 who were dead in trespasses  
and  sins1 and walked according to the  
spirit of disobedience1 that they  were 
by nature the children of wrath4 #f     

,they could be no otherwise  children of
 wrath by nature than they were vicious 
by nature4    ,here1 then1 are two      
different senses of the word nature1 in 
neither of  which men can at all be said
 to be a law to themselves4  ,they are  
mentioned only to be excluded1 to       
prevent their being confounded1 as the  
latter is in the objection1 with another
 sense of it1 which is now to be        
inquired after and explained4    ,,iii4 
,the apostle asserts that the ,gentiles 
do by ,,nature the things  contained in 
the law4  ,nature is indeed here put by 
way of distinction  from revelation1 but
 yet it is not a mere negative4  ,he    
intends to  express more than that by   
which they did not1 that by which they  
did1  the works of the law2 namely1 by  
nature4  ,it is plain the meaning of    
the word is not the same in this passage
 as in the former1 where it is  spoken  
of as evil2 for in this latter it is    
spoken of as good--as that by  which    
they acted1 or might have acted1        

virtuously4  ,what that is in man  by   
which he is naturally a law to himself  
is explained in the following  words3   
,which show the work of the law written 
in their hearts1 their  consciences also
 bearing witness1 and their thoughts the
 meanwhile  accusing or else excusing   
one another4  ,if there be a distinction
 to be  made between the works written  
in their hearts1 and the witness of     
conscience1 by the former must be meant 
the natural disposition to  kindness and
 compassion to do what is of good       
report1 to which this  apostle often    
refers3 that part of the nature of man1 
treated of in the  foregoing discourse1 
which with very little reflection and of
 course  leads him to society1 and by   
means of which he naturally acts a just 
and  good part in it1 unless other      
passions or interest lead him astray4   
,yet  since other passions1 and regards 
to private interest1 which lead us      
7though indirectly1 yet they lead us7   
astray1 are themselves in a degree      

equally natural1 and often most         
prevalent1 and since we have no method  
of  seeing the particular degrees in    
which one or the other is placed in us  
by nature1 it is plain the former1      
considered merely as natural1 good and  
right as they are1 can no more be a law 
to us than the latter4  ,but there  is a
 superior principle of reflection or    
conscience in every man1 which          
distinguishes between the internal      
principles of his heart1 as well as  his
 external actions2 which passes         
judgement upon himself and them1        
pronounces determinately some actions to
 be in themselves just1 right1  good1   
others to be in themselves evil1 wrong1 
unjust3 which1 without  being consulted1
 without being advised with1            
magisterially exerts itself1  and       
approves or condemns him the doer of    
them accordingly3 and which1 if  not    
forcibly stopped1 naturally and always  
of course goes on to  anticipate a      
higher and more effectual sentence1     

which shall hereafter  second and affirm
 its own4  ,but this part of the office 
of conscience is  beyond my present     
design explicitly to consider4  ,it is  
by this faculty1  natural to man1 that  
he is a moral agent1 that he is a law to
 himself1  but this faculty1 ,i say1 not
 to be considered merely as a principle 
in  his heart1 which is to have some    
influence as well as others1 but        
considered as a faculty in kind and in  
nature supreme over all others1  and    
which bears its own authority of being  
so4    ,this prerogative1 this natural  
supremacy1 of the faculty which         
surveys1 approves1 or disapproves the   
several affections of our mind and      
actions of our lives1 being that by     
which men are a law to themselves1      
their conformity or disobedience to     
which law of our nature renders their   
actions1 in the highest and most proper 
sense1 natural or unnatural1 it  is fit 
it be further explained to you2 and ,i  
hope it will be so1 if you  will attend 

to the following reflections4    ,man   
may act according to that principle or  
inclination which for the  present      
happens to be strongest1 and yet act in 
a way disproportionate  to1 and violate 
his real proper nature4  ,suppose a     
brute creature by any  bait to be       
allured into a snare1 by which he is    
destroyed4  ,he plainly  followed the   
bent of his nature1 leading him to      
gratify his appetite3  there is an      
entire correspondence between his whole 
nature and such an  action3 such action 
therefore is natural4  ,but suppose a   
man1 foreseeing  the same danger of     
certain ruin1 should rush into it for   
the sake of a  present gratification2 he
 in this instance would follow his      
strongest  desire1 as did the brute     
creature2 but there would be as manifest
 a  disproportion between the nature of 
a man and such an action as between  the
 meanest work of art and the skill of   
the greatest master in that art2  which 
disproportion arises1 not from          

considering the action singly in        
itself1 or in its consequences1 but from
 comparison of it with the  nature of   
the agent4  ,and since such an action is
 utterly  disproportionate to the nature
 of man1 it is in the strictest and most
  proper sense unnatural2 this word     
expressing that disproportion4          
,therefore1 instead of the words        
disproportionate to his nature1 the     
word unnatural may now be put2 this     
being more familiar to us3 but let  it  
be observed that it stands for the same 
thing precisely4    ,now what is it     
which renders such a rash action        
unnatural8  ,is it that he  went against
 the principle of reasonable and cool   
self-love1 considered  merely as a part 
of his nature8  ,no2 for if he had acted
 the contrary  way1 he would equally    
have gone against a principle1 or part  
of his  nature--namely1 passion or      
appetite4  ,but to deny a present       
appetite1  from foresight that the      
gratification of it would end in        

immediate ruin  or extreme misery1 is by
 no means an unnatural action3 whereas  
to  contradict or go against cool       
self-love for the sake of such          
gratification is so in the instance     
before us4  ,such an action then being  
unnatural1 and its being so not arising 
from a man's going against a  principle 
or desire barely1 nor in going against  
that principle or desire  which happens 
for the present to be strongest1 it     
necessarily follows  that there must be 
some other difference or distinction to 
be made  between these two principles1  
passion and cool self-love1 than what ,i
  have yet taken notice of4  ,and this  
difference1 not being a difference in   
strength or degree1 ,i call a difference
 in nature and in kind4  ,and  since1 in
 the instance still before us1 if       
passion prevails over self-  love the   
consequent action is unnatural1 but if  
self-love prevails over  passion the    
action is natural1 it is manifest that  
self-love is in human  nature a superior

 principle to passion4  ,this may be    
contradicted without  violating that    
nature2 but the former cannot4  ,so     
that1 if we will act  conformably to the
 economy of man's nature1 reasonable    
self-love must  govern4  ,thus1 without 
particular consideration of conscience1 
we may  have a clear conception of the  
superior nature of one inward principle 
to another1 and see that there really is
 this natural superiority1 quite        
distinct from degrees of strength and   
prevalency4    ,let us now take a view  
of the nature of man1 as consisting     
partly of  various appetites1 passions1 
affections1 and partly of the principle 
of  reflection or conscience1 leaving   
quite out all consideration of the      
different degrees of strength in which  
either of them prevails1 and it  will   
further appear that there is this       
natural superiority of one inward       
principle to another1 and that it is    
even part of the idea of reflection  or 
conscience4    ,passion or appetite     

implies a direct simple tendency towards
 such and  such objects1 without        
distinction of the means by which they  
are to be  obtained4  ,consequently it  
will often happen there will be a desire
 of  particular objects1 in cases where 
they cannot be obtained without         
manifest injury to others4  ,reflection 
or conscience comes in1 need            
disapproves the pursuit of them in these
 circumstances2 but the desire  remains4
  ,which is to be obeyed1 appetite or   
reflection8  ,cannot this  question be  
answered1 from the economy and          
constitution of human nature  merely1   
without saying which is strongest8  ,or 
need this at all come into              
consideration8  ,would not the question 
be intelligibly and fully  answered by  
saying that the principle of reflection 
or conscience being  compared with the  
various appetites1 passions1 and        
affections in men1 the  former is       
manifestly superior and chief1 without  
regard to strength8  ,and  how often    

soever the latter happens to prevail1 it
 is mere usurpation3  the former remains
 in nature and in kind its superior2 and
 every instance  of such prevalence of  
the latter is an instance of breaking in
 upon and  violation of the constitution
 of man4    ,all this is no more than   
the distinction1 which everybody is     
acquainted  with1 between mere power and
 authority3 only instead of being       
intended to express the difference      
between what is possible and what is    
lawful in civil government1 here it has 
been shown applicable to the  several   
principles in the mind of man4  ,thus   
that principle by which we  survey1 and 
either approve or disapprove our own    
heart1 temper1 and  actions1 is not only
 to be considered as what is in its turn
 to have some  influence--which may be  
said of every passion1 of the lowest    
appetites--but likewise as being        
superior1 as from its very nature       
manifestly claiming superiority over all
 others1 insomuch that you cannot  form 

a notion of this faculty1 conscience1   
without taking in judgment1  direction1 
superintendency4  ,this is a constituent
 part of the idea--that  is1 of the     
faculty itself2 and to preside and      
govern1 from the very  economy and      
constitution of man1 belongs to it4     
,had it strength1 as it  had right2 had 
it power1 as it had manifest authority1 
it would  absolutely govern the world4  
,this gives us a further view of the    
nature of man2 shows us what course  of 
life we were made for3 not only that our
 real nature leads us to be  influenced 
in some degree by reflection and        
conscience1 but likewise in  what degree
 we are to be influenced by it1 if we   
will fall in with1 and  act agreeably   
to1 the constitution of our nature3 that
 this faculty was  placed within to be  
our proper governor1 to direct and      
regulate all under  principles1         
passions1 and motives of action4  ,this 
is its right and  office3 thus sacred is
 its authority4  ,and how often soever  

men violate  and rebelliously refuse to 
submit to it1 for supposed interest     
which they  cannot otherwise obtain1 or 
for the sake of passion which they      
cannot  otherwise gratify--this makes no
 alteration as to the natural right and 
office of conscience4    ,let us now    
turn this whole matter another way1 and 
suppose there was no  such thing at all 
as this natural supremacy of            
conscience--that there was  no          
distinction to be made between one      
inward principle and another1 but  only 
that of strength--and see what would be 
the consequence4    ,consider1 then1    
what is the latitude and compass of the 
actions of man  with regard to himself1 
his fellow-creatures1 and the ,supreme  
,being8  ,what  are their bounds1       
besides that of our natural power8      
,with respect to the  two first1 they   
are plainly no other than these3 no man 
seeks misery1 as  such1 for himself2 and
 no one unprovoked does mischief to     
another for its  own sake4  ,for in     

every degree within these bounds1       
mankind knowingly1  from passion or     
wantonness1 bring ruin and misery upon  
themselves and  others4  ,and impiety   
and profaneness--,i mean what every one 
would call so  who believes the being of
 ,god--have absolutely no bounds at all4
  ,men  blaspheme the ,author of nature1
 formally and in words renounce their   
allegiance to their ,creator4  ,put an  
instance1 then1 with respect to any  one
 of these three4  ,though we should     
suppose profane swearing1 and in        
general that kind of impiety now        
mentioned1 to mean nothing1 yet it      
implies wanton disregard and irreverence
 towards an infinite ,being our         
,creator2 and is this as suitable to the
 nature of man as reverence and  dutiful
 submission of heart towards that       
,almighty ,being8  ,or suppose a  man   
guilty of parricide1 with all the       
circumstances of cruelty which such  an 
action can admit of4  ,this action is   
done in consequence of its  principle   

being for the present strongest2 and if 
there be no difference  between inward  
principles1 but only that of strength1  
the strength being  given you have the  
whole nature of the man given1 so far as
 it relates to  this matter4  ,the      
action plainly corresponds to the       
principle1 the  principle being in that 
degree of strength it was3 it therefore 
corresponds to the whole nature of the  
man4  ,upon comparing the action  and   
the whole nature1 there arises no       
disproportion1 there appears no         
unsuitableness1 between them4  ,thus the
 murder of a father and the  nature of  
man correspond to each other1 as the    
same nature and an act  of filial duty4 
,if there be no difference between      
inward principles1 but  only that of    
strength1 we can make no distinction    
between these two  actions1 considered  
as the actions of such a creature2 but  
in our coolest  hours must approve or   
disapprove them equally3 than which     
nothing can be  reduced to a greater    

absurdity4          ,,sermon ,,iii4     
,the natural supremacy of reflection or 
conscience being thus established1  we  
may from it form a distinct notion of   
what is meant by human nature  when     
virtue is said to consist in following  
it1 and vice in deviating  from it4     
,as the idea of a civil constitution    
implies in it united strength1  various 
subordinations under one direction--that
 of the supreme  authority--the         
different strength of each particular   
member of the  society not coming into  
the idea--whereas1 if you leave out the 
subordination1 the union1 and the one   
direction1 you destroy and lose  it--so 
reason1 several appetites1 passions1 and
 affections1 prevailing in  different   
degrees of strength1 is not that idea or
 notion of human  nature2 but that      
nature consists in these several        
principles  considered as having a      
natural respect to each other1 in the   
several  passions being naturally       
subordinate to the one superior         

principle of  reflection or conscience4 
,every bias1 instinct1 propension       
within1 is a  natural part of our       
nature1 but not the whole3 add to these 
the superior  faculty whose office it is
 to adjust1 manage1 and preside over    
them1 and  take in this its natural     
superiority1 and you complete the idea  
of human  nature4  ,and as in civil     
government the constitution is broken in
 upon  and violated by power and        
strength prevailing over authority2 so  
the  constitution of man is broken in   
upon and violated by the lower faculties
  or principles within prevailing over  
that which is in its nature supreme     
over them all4  ,thus1 when it is said  
by ancient writers that tortures  and   
death are not so contrary to human      
nature as injustice1 by this1 to  be    
sure1 is not meant that the aversion to 
the former in mankind is less  strong   
and prevalent than their aversion to the
 latter1 but that the  former is only   
contrary to our nature considered in a  

partial view1 and  which takes in only  
the lowest part of it1 that which we    
have in common  with the brutes2 whereas
 the latter is contrary to our nature1  
considered  in a higher sense1 as a     
system and constitution contrary to the 
whole  economy of man4 #g    ,and from  
all these things put together1 nothing  
can be more evident than  that1         
exclusive of revelation1 man cannot be  
considered as a creature  left by his   
,maker to act at random1 and live at    
large up to the extent of  his natural  
power1 as passion1 humour1 wilfulness1  
happen to carry him1  which is the      
condition brute creatures are in2 but   
that from his make1  constitution1 or   
nature1 he is in the strictest and most 
proper  sense a law to himself4  ,he    
hath the rule of right within3 what is  
wanting is only that he honestly attend 
to it4    ,the inquiries which have been
 made by men of leisure after some      
general  rule1 the conformity to or     
disagreement from which should          

denominate our  actions good or evil1   
are in many respects of great service4  
,yet let any  plain1 honest man1 before 
he engages in any course of action1 ask 
himself1 ,is this ,i am going about     
right1 or is it wrong8  ,is it good1 or 
is it evil8  ,i do not in the least     
doubt but that this question would be   
answered agreeably to truth and virtue1 
by almost any fair man in almost  any   
circumstance4  ,neither do there appear 
any cases which look like  exceptions to
 this1 but those of superstition1 and of
 partiality to  ourselves4              
,superstition may perhaps be somewhat of
 an exception2 but  partiality to       
ourselves is not1 this being itself     
dishonesty4  ,for a man  to judge that  
to be the equitable1 the moderate1 the  
right part for him  to act1 which he    
would see to be hard1 unjust1 oppressive
 in another1  this is plain vice1 and   
can proceed only from great unfairness  
of mind4    ,but allowing that mankind  
hath the rule of right within himself1  

yet it  may be asked1 ,what obligations 
are we under to attend to and follow it8
  ,i answer3 ,it has been proved that   
man by his nature is a law to himself1  
without the particular distinct         
consideration of the positive sanctions 
of that law3 the rewards and punishments
 which we feel1 and those which  from   
the light of reason we have ground to   
believe1 are annexed to it4  ,the       
question1 then1 carries its own answer  
along within it4  ,your  obligation to  
obey this law is its being the law of   
your nature4  ,that  your conscience    
approves of and attests to such a course
 of action is  itself alone an          
obligation4  ,conscience does not only  
offer itself to  show us the way we     
should walk in1 but it likewise carries 
its own  authority with it1 that it is  
our natural guide2 the guide assigned us
 by  the ,author of our nature3 it      
therefore belongs to our condition of   
being2  it is our duty to walk in that  
path1 and follow this guide1 without    

looking about to see whether we may not 
possibly forsake them with  impunity4   
,however1 let us hear what is to be said
 against obeying this law of our        
nature4  ,and the sum is no more than   
this3 ,why should we be concerned  about
 anything out of and beyond ourselves8  
,if we do find within  ourselves regards
 to others1 and restraints of we know   
not how many  different kinds1 yet these
 being embarrassments1 and hindering us 
from  going the nearest way to our own  
good1 why should we not endeavour to    
suppress and get over them8    ,thus    
people go on with words1 which when     
applied to human nature1 and the        
condition in which it is placed in this 
world1 have really no meaning4  ,for    
does not all this kind of talk go upon  
supposition1 that our  happiness in this
 world consists in somewhat quite       
distinct from regard  to others1 and    
that it is the privilege of vice to be  
without restraint  or confinement8      
,whereas1 on the contrary1 the          

enjoyments--in a manner  all the common 
enjoyments of life1 even the pleasures  
of vice--depend  upon these regards of  
one kind or another to our              
fellow-creatures4  ,throw  off all      
regards to others1 and we should be     
quite indifferent to infamy  and to     
honour2 there could be no such thing at 
all as ambition2 and  scarce any such   
thing as covetousness2 for we should    
likewise be equally  indifferent to the 
disgrace of poverty1 the several        
neglects and kinds of  contempt which   
accompany this state1 and to the        
reputation of riches1 the  regard and   
respect they usually procure4  ,neither 
is restraint by any  means peculiar to  
one course of life2 but our very nature1
 exclusive of  conscience and our       
condition1 lays us under an absolute    
necessity of it4  ,we cannot gain any   
end whatever without being confined to  
the proper  means1 which is often the   
most painful and uneasy confinement4    
,and in  numberless instances a present 

appetite cannot be gratified without    
such  apparent and immediate ruin and   
misery that the most dissolute man in   
the  world chooses to forego the        
pleasure rather than endure the pain4   
,is the meaning1 then1 to indulge those 
regards to our fellow-creatures1  and   
submit to those restraints which upon   
the whole are attended with  more       
satisfaction than uneasiness1 and get   
over only those which bring  more       
uneasiness and inconvenience than       
satisfaction8  ,doubtless this was  our 
meaning4  ,you have changed sides then4 
,keep to this2 be consistent  with      
yourselves1 and you and the men of      
virtue are in general perfectly  agreed4
  ,but let us take care and avoid       
mistakes4  ,let it not be taken  for    
granted that the temper of envy1 rage1  
resentment1 yields greater  delight than
 meekness1 forgiveness1 compassion1 and 
good-will2 especially  when it is       
acknowledged that rage1 envy1           
resentment1 are in themselves  mere     

misery2 and that satisfaction arising   
from the indulgence of them is  little  
more than relief from that misery2      
whereas the temper of  compassion and   
benevolence is itself delightful2 and   
the indulgence of  it1 by doing good1   
affords new positive delight and        
enjoyment4  ,let it  not be taken for   
granted that the satisfaction arising   
from the  reputation of riches and      
power1 however obtained1 and from the   
respect  paid to them1 is greater than  
the satisfaction arising from the       
reputation of justice1 honesty1 charity1
 and the esteem which is  universally   
acknowledged to be their due4  ,and if  
it be doubtful which of  these          
satisfactions is the greatest1 as there 
are persons who think  neither of them  
very considerable1 yet there can be no  
doubt concerning  ambition and          
covetousness1 virtue and a good mind1   
considered in  themselves1 and as       
leading to different courses of life2   
there can1 ,i  say1 be no doubt1 which  

temper and which course is attended with
 most  peace and tranquillity of mind1  
which with most perplexity1 vexation1   
and  inconvenience4  ,and both the      
virtues and vices which have been now   
mentioned1 do in a manner equally imply 
in them regards of one kind or  another 
to our fellow-creatures4  ,and with     
respect to restraint and  confinement1  
whoever will consider the restraints    
from fear and shame1  the dissimulation1
 mean arts of concealment1 servile      
compliances1 one or  other of which     
belong to almost every course of vice1  
will soon be  convinced that the man of 
virtue is by no means upon a            
disadvantage in  this respect4  ,how    
many instances are there in which men   
feel and own and  cry aloud under the   
chains of vice with which they are      
enthralled1 and  which yet they will not
 shake off6  ,how many instances1 in    
which persons  manifestly go through    
more pains and self-denial to gratify a 
vicious  passion1 than would have been  

necessary to the conquest of it6  ,to   
this  is to be added1 that when virtue  
is become habitual1 when the temper of  
it is acquired1 what was before         
confinement ceases to be so by becoming 
choice and delight4  ,whatever restraint
 and guard upon ourselves may be        
needful to unlearn any unnatural        
distortion or odd gesture1 yet in all   
propriety of speech1 natural behaviour  
must be the most easy and  unrestrained4
  ,it is manifest that1 in the common   
course of life1 there  is seldom any    
inconsistency between our duty and what 
is called  interest3 it is much seldomer
 that there is an inconsistency between 
duty  and what is really our present    
interest2 meaning by interest1 happiness
  and satisfaction4  ,self-love1 then1  
though confined to the interest of  the 
present world1 does in general perfectly
 coincide with virtue1 and  leads us to 
one and the same course of life4  ,but1 
whatever exceptions  there are to this1 
which are much fewer than they are      

commonly thought1  all shall be set     
right at the final distribution of      
things4  ,it is a  manifest absurdity to
 suppose evil prevailing finally over   
good1 under  the conduct and            
administration of a perfect mined4      
,the whole argument1 which ,i have been 
now insisting upon1 may be thus  summed 
up1 and given you in one view4  ,the    
nature of man is adapted to  some course
 of action or other4  ,upon comparing   
some actions with this  nature1 they    
appear suitable and correspondent to it3
 from comparison of  other actions with 
the same nature1 there arises to our    
view some  unsuitableness or            
disproportion4  ,the correspondence of  
actions to the  nature of the agent     
renders them natural2 their             
disproportion to it1  unnatural4  ,that 
an action is correspondent to the nature
 of the agent  does not arise from its  
being agreeable to the principle which  
happens to  be the strongest3 for it may
 be so and yet be quite disproportionate

 to  the nature of the agent4  ,the     
correspondence therefore1 or            
disproportion1  arises from somewhat    
else4  ,this can be nothing but a       
difference in  nature and kind1         
altogether distinct from strength1      
between the inward  principles4  ,some  
then are in nature and kind superior to 
others4  ,and  the correspondence arises
 from the action being conformable to   
the higher  principle2 and the          
unsuitableness from its being contrary  
to it4  ,reasonable self-love and       
conscience are the chief or superior    
principles  in the nature of man2       
because an action may be suitable to    
this nature1  though all other          
principles be violated1 but becomes     
unsuitable if either  of those are4     
,conscience and self-love1 if we        
understand our true  happiness1 always  
lead us the same way4  ,duty and        
interest are perfectly  coincident2 for 
the most part in this world1 but        
entirely and in every  instance if we   

take in the future and the whole2 this  
being implied in  the notion of a good  
and perfect administration of things4   
,thus they who  have been so wise in    
their generation as to regard only their
 own  supposed interest1 at the expense 
and to the injury of others1 shall at   
last find1 that he who has given up all 
the advantages of the present  world1   
rather than violate his conscience and  
the relations of life1 has  infinitely  
better provided for himself1 and secured
 his owns interest and  happiness4      
,,sermon ,,iv4  ,,upon ,,the            
,,government ,,of ,,the ,,tongue4       
,,james i4 #bf4       ,if any man among 
you seem to be religious1 and bridleth  
not his     tongue1 but deceiveth his   
own heart1 this man's religion is vain4 
,the translation of this text would be  
more determinate by being more  literal1
 thus3 ,if any man among you seemeth to 
be religious1 not  bridling his tongue1 
but deceiving his own heart1 this man's 
religion  is vain4  ,this determines    

that the words1 but deceiveth his own   
heart1  are not put in opposition to    
seemeth to be religious1 but to bridleth
  not his tongue4  ,the certain         
determinate meaning of the text then    
being1  that he who seemeth to be       
religious1 and bridleth not his tongue1 
but in  that particular deceiveth his   
own heart1 this man's religion is vain1 
we  may observe somewhat very forcible  
and expressive in these words of ,st4   
,james4  ,as if the apostle had said1   
,no man surely can make any pretences   
to religion1 who does not at least      
believe that he bridleth his tongue3  if
 he puts on any appearance or face of   
religion1 and yet does not govern  his  
tongue1 he must surely deceive himself  
in that particular1 and think  he does2 
and whoever is so unhappy as to deceive 
himself in this1 to  imagine he keeps   
that unruly faculty in due subjection   
when indeed he  does not1 whatever the  
other part of his life be1 his religion 
is vain2  the government of the tongue  

being a most material restraint which   
virtue  lays us under3 without it no man
 can be truly religious4    ,in treating
 upon this subject1 ,i will consider1   
,first1 what is the general vice or     
fault here referred to2 or what         
disposition in men is supposed in moral 
reflections and precepts  concerning    
bridling the tongue4    ,secondly1 when 
it may be said of any one1 that he has a
 due government  over himself in this   
respect4    ,i4  ,now1 the fault        
referred to1 and the disposition        
supposed1 in precepts  and reflections  
concerning the government of the tongue1
 is not  evil-speaking from malice1 nor 
lying or bearing false witness from     
indirect selfish designs4  ,the         
disposition to these1 and the actual    
vices  themselves1 all come under other 
subjects4  ,the tongue may be employed  
about1 and made to serve all the        
purposes of vice1 in tempting and       
deceiving1 in perjury and injustice4    
,but the thing here supposed and        

referred to1 is talkativeness3 a        
disposition to be talking1 abstracted   
from the consideration of what is to be 
said2 with very little or no  regard to1
 or thought of doing1 either good or    
harm4  ,and let not any  imagine this to
 be a slight matter1 and that it        
deserves not to have so  great weight   
laid upon it1 till he has considered    
what evil is implied in  it1 and the bad
 effects which follow from it4  ,it is  
perhaps true1 that  they who are        
addicted to this folly would choose to  
confine themselves to  trifles and      
indifferent subjects1 and so intend only
 to be guilty of  being impertinent3 but
 as they cannot go on for ever talking  
of nothing1  as common matters will not 
afford a sufficient fund for perpetual  
continued discourse1 where subjects of  
this kind are exhausted they will  go on
 to defamation1 scandal1 divulging of   
secrets1 their own secrets as  well as  
those of others--anything rather than be
 silent4  ,they are  plainly hurried on 

in the heat of their talk to say quite  
different  things from what they first  
intended1 and which they afterwards wish
  unsaid3 or improper things1 which they
 had no other end in saying1 but  only  
to afford employment to their tongue4   
,and if these people expect to  be heard
 and regarded--for there are some       
content merely with  talking--they will 
invent to engage your attention3 and1   
when they have  heard the least         
imperfect hint of an affair1 they will  
out of their own  head add the          
circumstances of time and place and     
other matters to make  out their story  
and give the appearance of probability  
to it3 not that  they have any concern  
about being believed1 otherwise than as 
a means of  being heard4  ,the thing is1
 to engage your attention2 to take you  
up  wholly for the present time3 what   
reflections will be made afterwards1 is 
in truth the least of their thoughts4   
,and further1 when persons who  indulge 
themselves in these liberties of the    

tongue are in any degree  offended with 
another--as little disgusts and         
misunderstandings will  be--they allow  
themselves to defame and revile such a  
one without any  moderation or bounds2  
though the offence is so very slight1   
that they  themselves would not do1 nor 
perhaps wish him1 an injury in any other
  way4  ,and in this case the scandal   
and revilings are chiefly owing to      
talkativeness1 and not bridling their   
tongue1 and so come under our  present  
subject4  ,the least occasion in the    
world will make the humour  break out in
 this particular way or in another4  ,it
 as like a torrent1  which must and will
 flow2 but the least thing imaginable   
will first of  all give it either this  
or another direction1 turn it into this 
or that  channel3 or like a fire--the   
nature of which1 when in a heap of      
combustible matter1 is to spread and lay
 waste all around2 but any one of  a    
thousand little accidents will occasion 
it to break out first either in  this or

 another particular part4    ,the       
subject then before us1 though it does  
run up into1 and can scarce be  treated 
as entirely distinct from all others1   
yet it needs not be so much  mixed or   
blended with them as it often is4       
,every faculty and power may  be used as
 the instrument of premeditated vice and
 wickedness1 merely as  the most proper 
and effectual means of executing such   
designs4  ,but if a  man1 from deep     
malice and desire of revenge1 should    
meditate a falsehood  with a settled    
design to ruin his neighbour's          
reputation1 and should with  great      
coolness and deliberation spread it1    
nobody would choose to say of  such a   
one that he had no government of his    
tongue4  ,a man may use the  faculty of 
speech as an instrument of false        
witness1 who yet has so  entire a       
command over that faculty as never to   
speak but from forethought  and cool    
design4  ,here the crime is injustice   
and perjury1 and1 strictly  speaking1 no

 more belongs to the present subject    
than perjury and  injustice in any other
 way4  ,but there is such a thing as a  
disposition  to be talking for its own  
sake2 from which persons often say      
anything1  good or bad1 of others1      
merely as a subject of discourse1       
according to  the particular temper they
 themselves happen to be in1 and to pass
 away  the present time4  ,there is     
likewise to be observed in persons such 
a  strong and eager desire of engaging  
attention to what they say1 that they   
will speak good or evil1 truth or       
otherwise1 merely as one or the other   
seems to be most hearkened to3 and this 
though it is sometimes joined1 is  not  
the same with the desire of being       
thought important and men of            
consequence4  ,there is in some such a  
disposition to be talking1 that an      
offence of the slightest kind1 and such 
as would not raise any other            
resentment1 yet raises1 if ,i may so    
speak1 the resentment of the            

tongue--puts it into a flame1 into the  
most ungovernable motions4  ,this       
outrage1 when the person it respects is 
present1 we distinguish in the  lower   
rank of people by a peculiar term3 and  
let it be observed1 that  though the    
decencies of behaviour are a little     
kept1 the same outrage and  virulence1  
indulged when he is absent1 is an       
offence of the same kind4  ,but1 not to 
distinguish any further in this manner1 
men race into faults  and follies which 
cannot so properly be referred to any   
one general head  as this--that they    
have not a due government over their    
tongue4    ,and this unrestrained       
volubility and wantonness of speech is  
the occasion  of numberless evils and   
vexations in life4  ,it begets          
resentment in him  who is the subject of
 it1 sows the seed of strife and        
dissension amongst  others1 and inflames
 little disgusts and offences which if  
let alone  would wear away of           
themselves3 it is often of as bad effect

 upon the good  name of others1 as deep 
envy or malice3 and to say the least of 
it in  this respect1 it destroys and    
perverts a certain equity of the utmost 
importance to society to be             
observed--namely1 that praise and       
dispraise1  a good or bad character1    
should always be bestowed according to  
desert4  ,the tongue used in such a     
licentious manner is like a sword in the
 hand  of a madman2 it is employed at   
random1 it can scarce possibly do any   
good1 and for the most part does a world
 of mischief2 and implies not  only     
great folly and a trifling spirit1 but  
great viciousness of mind1  great       
indifference to truth and falsity1 and  
to the reputation1 welfare1  and good of
 others4  ,so much reason is there for  
what ,st4 ,james says of  the tongue1   
,it is a fire1 a world of iniquity1 it  
defileth the whole  body1 setteth on    
fire the course of nature1 and is itself
 set on fire  of hell4 #h  ,this is the 
faculty or disposition which we are     

required  to keep a guard upon3 these   
are the vices and follies it runs into  
when  not kept under due restraint4     
,,ii4  ,wherein the due government of   
the tongue consists1 or when it may be  
said of any one in a moral and religious
 sense that he bridleth his  tongue1 ,i 
come now to consider4    ,the due and   
proper use of any natural faculty or    
power is to be judged of  by the end and
 design for which it was given us4  ,the
 chief purpose for  which the faculty of
 speech was given to man is plainly that
 we might  communicate our thoughts to  
each other1 in order to carry on the    
affairs  of the world2 for business1 and
 for our improvement in knowledge and   
learning4  ,but the good ,author of our 
nature designed us not only             
necessaries1 but likewise enjoyment and 
satisfaction1 in that being ,he  hath   
graciously given1 and in that condition 
of life ,he hath placed us  in4  ,there 
are secondary uses of our faculties3    
they administer to  delight1 as well as 

to necessity2 and as they are           
equally-adapted to  both1 there is no   
doubt but ,he intended them for our     
gratification as  well as for the       
support and continuance of our being4   
,the secondary use  of speech is to     
please and be entertaining to each other
 in conversation4  ,this is in every    
respect allowable and right2 it unites  
men closer in  alliances and            
friendships2 gives us a fellow-feeling  
of the prosperity  and unhappiness of   
each other2 and is in several respects  
servicable to  virtue1 and to promote   
good behaviour in the world4  ,and      
provided there  be not too much time    
spent in it1 if it were considered only 
in the way  of gratification and        
delight1 men must have strange notion of
 ,god and of  religion to think that ,he
 can be offended with it1 or that it is 
any way  inconsistent with the strictest
 virtue4  ,but the truth is1 such sort  
of  conversation1 though it has no      
particular good tendency1 yet it has a  

general good one2 it is social and      
friendly1 and tends to promote          
humanity1 good-nature1 and civility4    
,as the end and use1 so likewise the    
abuse of speech1 relates to the one  or 
other of these3 either to business or to
 conversation4  ,as to the  former3     
deceit in the management of business and
 affairs does not  properly belong to   
the subject now before us3 though one   
may just mention  that multitude1 that  
heedless number of words with which     
business is  perplexed1 where a much    
fewer would1 as it should seem1 better  
serve the  purpose2 but this must be    
left to those who understand the matter4
  ,the  government of the tongue1       
considered as a subject of itself1      
relates  chiefly to conversation2 to    
that kind of discourse which usually    
fills up  the time spent in friendly    
meetings and visits of civility4  ,and  
the  danger is1 lest persons entertain  
themselves and others at the expense of 
their wisdom and their virtue1 and to   

the injury or offence of their          
neighbour4  ,if they will observe and   
keep clear of these1 they may be as     
free and easy and unreserved as they can
 desire4    ,the cautions to be given   
for avoiding these dangers1 and to      
render  conversation innocent and       
agreeable1 fall under the following     
particulars3 silence2 talking of        
indifferent things2 and1 which makes up 
too great a part of conversation1 giving
 of characters1 speaking well or  evil  
of others4    ,the ,wise ,man observes  
that there is a time to speak1 and a    
time to keep  silence4  ,one meets with 
people in the world who seem never to   
have made  the last of these            
observations4  ,and yet these great     
talkers do not at  all speak from their 
having anything to say1 as every        
sentence shows1 but  only from their    
inclination to be talking4  ,their      
conversation is merely  an exercise of  
the tongue3 no other human faculty has  
any share in it4  ,it  is strange these 

persons can help reflecting1 that unless
 they have in  truth a superior         
capacity1 and are in an extraordinary   
manner furnished  for conversation if   
they are entertaining1 it is at their   
own expense4  ,is  it possible that it  
should never come into people's thoughts
 to suspect  whether or no it be to     
their advantage to show so very much of 
themselves8  ,o that you would          
altogether hold your peace1 and it      
should  be your wisdom4 #i  ,remember   
likewise there are persons who love     
fewer  words1 an inoffensive sort of    
people1 and who deserve some regard1    
though  of too still and composed       
tempers for you4  ,of this number was   
the ,son of  ,sirach3 for he plainly    
speaks from experience when he says1 ,as
 hills of  sand are to the steps of the 
aged1 so is one of many words to a quiet
  man4  ,but one would think it should  
be obvious to every one1 that when  they
 are in company with their superiors of 
any kind--in years1  knowledge1 and     

experience--when proper and useful      
subjects are discoursed  of1 which they 
cannot bear a part in1 that these are   
times for silence1  when they should    
learn to hear1 and be attentive1 at     
least in their turn4  ,it is indeed a   
very unhappy way these people are in2   
they in a manner cut  themselves out    
from all advantage of conversation1     
except that of being  entertained with  
their own talk3 their business in coming
 into company  not being at all to be   
informed1 to hear1 to learn1 but to     
display  themselves1 or rather to exert 
their faculty1 and talk without any     
design  at all4  ,and if we consider    
conversation as an entertainment1 as    
somewhat  to unbend the mind1 as a      
diversion from the cares1 the business1 
and the  sorrows of life1 it is of the  
very nature of it that the discourse be 
mutual4  ,this1 ,i say1 is implied in   
the very notion of what we  distinguish 
by conversation1 or being in company4   
,attention to the  continued discourse  

of one alone grows more painful1 often1 
than the  cares and business we come to 
be diverted from4  ,he1 therefore1 who  
imposes this upon us is guilty of a     
double offence--arbitrarily enjoining   
silence upon all the rest1 and likewise 
obliging them to this painful           
attention4    ,i am sensible these      
things are apt to be passed over1 as too
 little to  come into a serious         
discourse2 but in reality men are       
obliged1 even in  point of morality and 
virtue1 to observe all the decencies of 
behaviour4  ,the greatest evils in life 
have had their rise from somewhat which 
was  thought of too little importance to
 be attended to4  ,and as to the matter 
we are now upon1 it is absolutely       
necessary to be considered4  ,for if    
people will not maintain a due          
government over themselves1 in regarding
  proper times and seasons for silence1 
but will be talking1 they  certainly1   
whether they design it or not at first1 
will go on to scandal  and              

evil-speaking1 and divulging secrets4   
,if it were needful to say anything     
further to persuade men to learn this   
lesson of silence1 one might put them in
 mind how insignificant they  render    
themselves by this excessive            
talkativeness3 insomuch that1 if they   
do chance to say anything which deserves
 to be attended to and regarded1  it is 
lost in the variety and abundance which 
they utter of another sort4    ,the     
occasions of silence then are obvious1  
and one would think should be  easily   
distinguished by everybody3 namely1 when
 a man has nothing to say2  or nothing  
but what is better unsaid3 better1      
either in regard to the  particular     
persons he is present with2 or from its 
being an interruption  to conversation  
itself2 or to conversation of a more    
agreeable kind2 or  better1 lastly1 with
 regard to himself4  ,i will end this   
particular with  two reflections of the 
,wise ,man2 one of which1 in the        
strongest manner1  exposes the          

ridiculous part of this licentiousness  
of the tongue2 and the  other1 the great
 danger and viciousness of it4  ,when he
 that is a fool  walketh by the way     
side1 his wisdom faileth him1 and he    
saith to  every one that he is a fool4  
#aj  ,the other is1 ,in the multitude of
  words there wanteth not sin4 #aa      
,as to the government of the tongue in  
respect to talking upon indifferent     
subjects3 after what has been said      
concerning the due government of it in  
respect to the occasions and times for  
silence1 there is little more  necessary
 than only to caution men to be fully   
satisfied that the  subjects are indeed 
of an indifferent nature2 and not to    
spend too much  time in conversation of 
this kind4  ,but persons must be sure to
 take heed  that the subject of their   
discourse be at least of an indifferent 
nature3  that it be no way offensive to 
virtue1 religion1 or good manners3 that 
it  be not of a licentious1 dissolute   
sort1 this leaving always ill           

impressions upon the mind2 that it be no
 way injurious or vexatious to  others2 
and that too much time be not spent this
 way1 to the neglect of  those duties   
and offices of life which belong to     
their station and  condition in the     
world4  ,however1 though there is not   
any necessity that  men should aim at   
being important and weighty in every    
sentence they  speak3 yet since useful  
subjects1 at least of some kinds1 are as
  entertaining as others1 a wise man1   
even when he desires to unbend his  mind
 from business1 would choose that the   
conversation might turn upon  somewhat  
instructive4    ,the last thing is1 the 
government of the tongue as relating to 
discourse  of the affairs of others1 and
 giving of characters4  ,these are in a 
manner the same2 and one can scarce call
 it an indifferent subject1  because    
discourse upon it almost perpetually    
runs into somewhat criminal4    ,and1   
first of all1 it were very much to be   
wished that this did not take  up so    

great a part of conversation2 because it
 is indeed a subject of a  dangerous    
nature4  ,let any one consider the      
various interests1  competitions1 and   
little misunderstandings which arise    
amongst men2 and  he will soon see that 
he is not unprejudiced and impartial2   
that he is  not1 as ,i may speak1       
neutral enough to trust himself with    
talking of the  character and concerns  
of his neighbour1 in a free1 careless1  
and  unreserved manner4  ,there is      
perpetually1 and often it is not        
attended  to1 a rivalship amongst people
 of one kind or another in respect to   
wit1  beauty1 learning1 fortune1 and    
that one thing will insensibly influence
  them to speak to the disadvantage of  
others1 even where there is no  formed  
malice or ill-design4  ,since therefore 
it is so hard to enter into  this       
subject without offending1 the first    
thing to be observed is that  people    
should learn to decline it2 to get over 
that strong inclination  most have to be

 talking of the concerns and behaviour  
of their neighbour4    ,but since it is 
impossible that this subject should be  
wholly excluded  conversation2 and since
 it is necessary that the characters of 
men should  be known3 the next thing is 
that it is a matter of importance what  
is  said2 and1 therefore1 that we should
 be religiously scrupulous and exact  to
 say nothing1 either good or bad1 but   
what is true4  ,i put it thus1  because 
it is in reality of as great importance 
to the good of society1  that the       
characters of bad men should be known1  
as that the characters of  good men     
should4  ,people who are given to       
scandal and detraction may  indeed make 
an ill-use of this observation2 but     
truths1 which are of  service towards   
regulating our conduct1 are not to be   
disowned1 or even  concealed1 because a 
bad use may be made of them4  ,this     
however would be  effectually prevented 
if these two things were attended to4   
,first1 ,that1  though it is equally of 

bad consequence to society that men     
should have  either good or ill         
characters which they do not deserve2   
yet1 when you  say somewhat good of a   
man which he does not deserve1 there is 
no wrong  done him in particular2       
whereas1 when you say evil of a man     
which he does  not deserve1 here is a   
direct formal injury1 a real piece of   
injustice  done him4  ,this therefore   
makes a wide difference2 and gives us1  
in point  of virtue1 much greater       
latitude in speaking well than ill of   
others4  ,secondly1 ,a good man is      
friendly to his fellow-creatures1 and a 
lover of  mankind2 and so will1 upon    
every occasion1 and often without any1  
say all  the good he can of everybody2  
but1 so far as he is a good man1 will   
never  be disposed to speak evil of any1
 unless there be some other reason for  
it1 besides1 barely that it is true4    
,if he be charged with having given  an 
ill character1 he will scarce think it a
 sufficient justification of  himself to

 say it was a true one1 unless he can   
also give some further  account how he  
came to do so3 a just indignation       
against particular  instances of        
villainy1 where they are great and      
scandalous2 or to prevent  an innocent  
man from being deceived and betrayed1   
when he has great trust  and confidence 
in one who does not deserve it4         
,justice must be done to  every part of 
a subject when we are considering it4   
,if there be a man1  who bears a fair   
character in the world1 whom yet we know
 to be without  faith or honesty1 to be 
really an ill man2 it must be allowed in
 general  that we shall do a piece of   
service to society by letting such a    
one's  true character be known4  ,this  
is no more than what we have an instance
  of in our ,saviour himself2 #ab though
 ,he was mild and gentle beyond         
example4  ,however1 no words can express
 too strongly the caution which  should 
be used in such a case as this4    ,upon
 the whole matter3 ,if people would     

observe the obvious occasions of        
silence1 if they would subdue the       
inclination to tale-bearing1 and that   
eager desire to engage attention1 which 
is an original disease in some  minds1  
they would be in little danger of       
offending with their tongue2 and  would1
 in a moral and religious sense1 have   
due government over it4    ,i will      
conclude with some precepts and         
reflections of the ,son of ,sirach  upon
 this subject4  ,be swift to hear2 and1 
if thou hast  understanding1 answer thy 
neighbour2 if not1 lay thy hand upon thy
  mouth4  ,honour and shame is in talk4 
,a man of an ill tongue is  dangerous in
 his city1 and he that is rash in his   
talk shall be hated4  ,a wise man wilt  
hold his tongue till he see opportunity2
 but a babbler  and a fool will regard  
no time4  ,he that useth many words     
shall be  abhorred2 and he that taketh  
to himself authority therein shall be   
hated4  ,a backbiting tongue hath       
disquieted many2 strong cities hath  it 

pulled down1 and overthrown the houses  
of great men4  ,the tongue  of a man is 
his fall2 but if thou love to hear1 thou
 shall receive  understanding4          
,,sermon ,v4  ,,upon ,,compassion4      
,,rom4 xii4 #ae4       ,rejoice with    
them that do rejoice1 and weep with them
 that weep4    ,every man is to be      
considered in two capacities1 the       
private and public2  as designed to     
pursue his own interest1 and likewise to
 contribute to the  good of others4     
,whoever will consider may see that1 in 
general1 there is  no contrariety       
between these2 but that from the        
original constitution of  man1 and the  
circumstances he is placed in1 they     
perfectly coincide1 and  mutually carry 
on each other4  ,but1 among the great   
variety of affections  or principles of 
actions in our nature1 some in their    
primary intention  and design seem to   
belong to the single or private1 others 
to the public  or social capacity4  ,the
 affections required in the text are of 

the  latter sort4  ,when we rejoice in  
the prosperity of others1 and           
compassionate their distresses1 we as it
 were substitute them for  ourselves1   
their interest for our own2 and have the
 same kind of pleasure  in their        
prosperity1 and sorrow in their         
distress1 as we have from  reflection   
upon our own4  ,now there is nothing    
strange or unaccountable  in our being  
thus carried out1 and affected towards  
the interests of  others4  ,for1 if     
there be any appetite1 or any inward    
principle besides  self-love2 why may   
there not be an affection to the good of
 our fellow-  creatures1 and delight    
from that affection's being gratified1  
and  uneasiness from things going       
contrary to it8 #ac    ,of these two1   
delight in the prosperity of others1 and
 compassion for  their distresses1 the  
last is felt much more generally than   
the former4  ,though men do not         
universally rejoice with all whom they  
see rejoice1  yet1 accidental obstacles 

removed1 they naturally compassionate   
all1 in  some degree1 whom they see in  
distress2 so far as they have any real  
perception or sense of that distress3   
insomuch that words expressing this     
latter1 pity1 compassion1 frequently    
occur3 whereas we have scarce any       
single one by which the former is       
distinctly expressed4  ,congratulation  
indeed answers condolence3 but both     
these words are intended to signify     
certain forms of civility rather than   
any inward sensation or feeling4  ,this 
difference or inequality is so          
remarkable that we plainly consider     
compassion as itself an original1       
distinct1 particular affection in human 
nature2 whereas to rejoice in the good  
of others is only a consequence of  the 
general affection of love and good-will 
to them4  ,the reason and  account of   
which matter is this3 when a man has    
obtained any particular  advantage or   
felicity1 his end is gained2 and he does
 not in that  particular want the       

assistance of another3 there was        
therefore no need of  a distinct        
affection towards that felicity of      
another already obtained2  neither would
 such affection directly carry him on to
 do good to that  person3 whereas men in
 distress want assistance2 and          
compassion leads us  directly to assist 
them4  ,the object of the former is the 
present  felicity of another2 the object
 of the latter is the present misery of 
another4  ,it is easy to see that the   
latter wants a particular affection  for
 its relief1 and that the former does   
not want one because it does not  want  
assistance4  ,and upon supposition of a 
distinct affection in both  cases1 the  
one must rest in the exercise of itself1
 having nothing  further to gain2 the   
other does not rest in itself1 but      
carries us on to  assist the distressed4
    ,but1 supposing these affections    
natural to the mind1 particularly the   
last2 ,has not each man troubles enough 
of his own8 must he indulge an          

affection which appropriates to himself 
those of others8 which leads him  to    
contract the least desirable of all     
friendships1 friendships with the       
unfortunate8  ,must we invert the known 
rule of prudence1 and choose to         
associate ourselves with the distressed8
 or1 allowing that we ought1 so  far as 
it is in our power to relieve them1 yet 
is it not better to do  this from reason
 and duty8  ,does not passion and       
affection of every kind  perpetually    
mislead us8  ,nay1 is not passion and   
affection itself a  weakness1 and what a
 perfect being must be entirely free    
from8  ,perhaps  so1 but it is mankind  
,i am speaking of2 imperfect creatures1 
and who  naturally and1 from the        
condition we are placed in1 necessarily 
depend  upon each other4  ,with respect 
to such creatures1 it would be found of 
as  bad consequence to eradicate all    
natural affections as to be entirely    
governed by them4  ,this would almost   
sink us to the condition of brutes2  and

 that would leave us without a          
sufficient principle of action4  ,reason
  alone1 whatever any one may wish1 is  
not in reality a sufficient motive  of  
virtue in such a creature as man2 but   
this reason joined with those           
affections which ,god has impressed upon
 his heart1 and when these are  allowed 
scope to exercise themselves1 but under 
strict government and  direction of     
reason1 then it is we act suitably to   
our nature1 and to the  circumstances   
,god has placed us in4  ,neither is     
affection itself at all a  weakness2 nor
 does it argue defect1 any otherwise    
than as our senses and  appetites do2   
they belong to our condition of nature1 
and are what we  cannot be without4     
,god ,almighty is1 to be sure1 unmoved  
by passion or  appetite1 unchanged by   
affection2 but then it is to be added   
that ,he  neither sees nor hears nor    
perceives things by any senses like     
ours2 but  in a manner infinitely more  
perfect4  ,now1 as it is an absurdity   

almost  too gross to be mentioned1 for a
 man to endeavour to get rid of his     
senses1 because the ,supreme ,being     
discerns things more perfectly without  
them2 it is as real1 though not so      
obvious an absurdity1 to endeavour to   
eradicate the passions ,he has given us1
 because ,he is without them4  ,for1    
since our passions are as really a part 
of our constitution as our  senses2     
since the former as really belong to our
 condition of nature as  the latter2 to 
get rid of either is equally a violation
 of and breaking  in upon that nature   
and constitution ,he has given us4      
,both our senses  and our passions are a
 supply to the imperfection of our      
nature2 thus  they show that we are such
 sort of creatures as to stand in need  
of those  helps which higher orders of  
creatures do not4  ,but it is not the   
supply1  but the deficiency2 as it is   
not a remedy1 but a disease1 which is   
the  imperfection4  ,however1 our       
appetites1 passions1 senses1 no way     

imply  disease3 nor indeed do they imply
 deficiency or imperfection of any sort2
  but only this1 that the constitution  
of nature1 according to which ,god  has 
made us1 is such as to require them4    
,and it is so far from being  true1 that
 a wise man must entirely suppress      
compassion1 and all fellow-  feeling for
 others1 as a weakness2 and trust to    
reason alone to teach and  enforce upon 
him the practice of the several         
charities we owe to our  kind2 that1 on 
the contrary1 even the bare exercise of 
such affections  would itself be for the
 good and happiness of the world2 and   
the  imperfection of the higher         
principles of reason and religion in    
man1 the  little influence they have    
upon our practice1 and the strength and 
prevalency of contrary ones1 plainly    
require these affections to be a        
restraint upon these latter1 and a      
supply to the deficiencies of the       
former4    ,first1 ,the very exercise   
itself of these affections in a just and

  reasonable manner and degree would    
upon the whole increase the             
satisfactions and lessen the miseries of
 life4    ,it is the tendency and       
business of virtue and religion to      
procure1 as  much as may be1 universal  
good-will1 trust1 and friendship amongst
  mankind4  ,if this could be brought to
 obtain2 and each man enjoyed the       
happiness of others1 as every one does  
that of a friend2 and looked upon  the  
success and prosperity of his neighbour 
as every one does upon that  of his     
children and family2 it is too manifest 
to be insisted upon how  much the       
enjoyments of life would be increased4  
,there would be so much  happiness      
introduced into the world1 without any  
deduction or  inconvenience from it1 in 
proportion as the precept of rejoicing  
with  those who rejoice was universally 
obeyed4  ,our ,saviour has owned this   
good affection as belonging to our      
nature in the parable of the lost       
sheep1 and does not think it to the     

disadvantage of a perfect state to      
represent its happiness as capable of   
increase from reflection upon that  of  
others4    ,but since in such a creature
 as man1 compassion or sorrow for the   
distress of others seems so far         
necessarily connected with joy in their 
prosperity1 as that whoever rejoices in 
one must unavoidably  compassionate the 
other2 there cannot be that delight or  
satisfaction1  which appears to be so   
considerable1 without the               
inconveniences1 whatever  they are1 of  
compassion4    ,however1 without        
considering this connection1 there is no
 doubt but that  more good than evil1   
more delight than sorrow1 arises from   
compassion  itself2 there being so many 
things which balance the sorrow of it4  
,there  is first the relief which the   
distressed feel from this affection in  
others towards them4  ,there is likewise
 the additional misery which they  would
 feel from the reflection that no one   
commiserated their case4  ,it  is indeed

 true that any disposition1 prevailing  
beyond a certain degree1  becomes       
somewhat wrong2 and we have ways of     
speaking1 which1 though they  do not    
directly express that excess1 yet always
 lead our thoughts to it1  and give us  
the notion of it4  ,thus1 when mention  
is made of delight in  being pitied1    
this always conveys to our mind the     
notion of somewhat  which is really a   
weakness4  ,the manner of speaking1 ,i  
say1 implies a  certain weakness and    
feebleness of mind1 which is and ought  
to be  disapproved4  ,but men of the    
greatest fortitude would in distress    
feel  uneasiness from knowing that no   
person in the world had any sort of     
compassion or real concern for them2 and
 in some cases1 especially when  the    
temper is enfeebled by sickness1 or any 
long and great distress1  doubtless1    
would feel a kind of relief even from   
the helpless goodwill  and ineffectual  
assistances of those about them4  ,over 
against the sorrow  of compassion is    

likewise to be set a peculiar calm kind 
of satisfaction1  which accompanies it1 
unless in cases where the distress of   
another is by  some means so brought    
home to ourselves as to become in a     
manner our own2  or when from weakness  
of mind the affection rises too high1   
which ought  to be corrected4  ,this    
tranquillity1 or calm satisfaction1     
proceeds  partly from consciousness of a
 right affection and temper of mind1 and
  partly from a sense of our own freedom
 from the misery we compassionate4      
,this last may possibly appear to some  
at first sight faulty2 but it  really is
 not so4  ,it is the same with that     
positive enjoyment1 which  sudden ease  
from pain for the present affords1      
arising from a real sense  of misery1   
joined with a sense of our freedom from 
it2 which in all cases  must afford some
 degree of satisfaction4    ,to these   
things must be added the observation    
which respects both the  affections we  
are considering2 that they who have got 

over all fellow-  feeling for others    
have withal contracted a certain        
callousness of heart1  which renders    
them insensible to most other           
satisfactions but those of  the grossest
 kind4    ,secondly1 ,without the       
exercise of these affections men would  
certainly be  much more wanting in the  
offices of charity they owe to cache    
other1 and  likewise more cruel and     
injurious than they are at present4     
,the private interest of the individual 
would not be sufficiently provided  for 
by reasonable and cool self-love alone2 
therefore the appetites and  passions   
are placed within as a guard and further
 security1 without which  it would not  
be taken due care of4  ,it is manifest  
our life would be  neglected were it not
 for the calls of hunger and thirst and 
weariness2  notwithstanding that without
 them reason would assure us that the   
recruits of food and sleep are the      
necessary means of our preservation4    
,it is therefore absurd to imagine that1

 without affections1 the same  reason   
alone would be more effectual to engage 
us to perform the duties  we owe to our 
fellow-creatures4  ,one of this make    
would be as defective1  as much wanting1
 considered with respect to society1 as 
one of the former  make would be        
defective1 or wanting1 considered as an 
individual1 or in  his private capacity4
  ,is it possible any can in earnest    
think that a  public spirit1 i4e41 a    
settled reasonable principle of         
benevolence to  mankind1 is so prevalent
 and strong in the species as that we   
may venture  to throw off the under     
affections1 which are its assistants1   
carry it  forward and mark out          
particular courses for it2 family1      
friends1  neighbourhood1 the distressed1
 our country8  ,the common joys and the 
common sorrows1 which belong to these   
relations and circumstances1 are as     
plainly useful to society as the pain   
and pleasure belonging to hunger1       
thirst1 and weariness are of service to 

the individual4  ,in defect of  that    
higher principle of reason1 compassion  
is often the only way by  which the     
indigent can have access to us3 and     
therefore1 to eradicate  this1 though it
 is not indeed formally to deny them    
that assistance which  is their due2 yet
 it is to cut them off from that which  
is too frequently  their only way of    
obtaining it4  ,and as for those who    
have shut up this  door against the     
complaints of the miserable1 and        
conquered this  affection in themselves2
 even these persons will be under great 
restraints from the same affection in   
others4  ,thus a man who has himself  no
 sense of injustice1 cruelty1           
oppression1 will be kept from running   
the  utmost lengths of wickedness by    
fear of that detestation1 and even      
resentment of inhumanity1 in many       
particular instances of it1 which       
compassion for the object towards whom  
such inhumanity is exercised1  excites  
in the bulk of mankind4  ,and this is   

frequently the chief danger  and the    
chief restraint which tyrants and the   
great oppressors of the  world feel4    
,in general1 experience will show that1 
as want of natural appetite to  food    
supposes and proceeds from some bodily  
disease2 so the apathy the  ,stoics talk
 of as much supposes1 or is accompanied 
with1 somewhat amiss  in the moral      
character1 in that which is the health  
of the mind4  ,those  who formerly aimed
 at this upon the foot of philosophy    
appear to have had  better success in   
eradicating the affections of tenderness
 and compassion  than they had with the 
passions of envy1 pride1 and resentment3
 these  latter1 at best1 were but       
concealed1 and that imperfectly too4    
,how far  this observation may be       
extended to such as endeavour to        
suppress the  natural impulses of their 
affections1 in order to form themselves 
for  business and the world1 ,i shall   
not determine4  ,but there does not     
appear  any capacity or relation to be  

named1 in which men ought to be entirely
  deaf to the calls of affection1 unless
 the judicial one is to be  excepted4   
,and as to those who are commonly called
 the men of pleasure1 it is  manifest   
that the reason they set up for hardness
 of heart is to avoid  being interrupted
 in their course by the ruin and misery 
they are the  authors of2 neither are   
persons of this character always the    
most free  from the impotencies of envy 
and resentment4  ,what may men at last  
bring  themselves to1 by suppressing    
their passions and affections of one    
kind1  and leaving those of the other in
 their full strength8  ,but surely it   
might be expected that persons who make 
pleasure their study and their          
business1 if they understood what they  
profess1 would reflect1 how many  of the
 entertainments of life1 how many of    
those kind of amusements which  seem    
peculiarly to belong to men of leisure  
and education they became  insensible to
 by this acquired hardness of heart4    

,i shall close these reflections with   
barely mentioning the behaviour of  that
 divine ,person1 who was the example of 
all perfection in human  nature1 as     
represented in the ,gospels mourning1   
and even1 in a literal  sense1 weeping  
over the distresses of ,his creatures4  
,the observation already made1 that1 of 
the two affections mentioned in  the    
text1 the latter exerts itself much more
 than the former2 that1 from  the       
original constitution of human nature1  
we much more generally and  sensibly    
compassionate the distressed than       
rejoice within the prosperous1  requires
 to be particularly considered4  ,this  
observation1 therefore1  with the       
reflections which arise out of it1 and  
which it leads our  thoughts to1 shall  
be the subject of another discourse4    
,for the conclusion of this1 let me just
 take notice of the danger of over-     
great refinements2 of going beside or   
beyond the plain1 obvious1 first        
appearances of things1 upon the subject 

of morals and religion4  ,the  least    
observation will show how little the    
generality of men are capable  of       
speculations4  ,therefore morality and  
religion must be somewhat plan  and easy
 to be understood3 it must appeal to    
what we call plain common  sense1 as    
distinguished from superior capacity and
 improvement2 because  it appeals to    
mankind4  ,persons of superior capacity 
and improvement have  often fallen into 
errors which no one of mere common      
understanding could4  ,is it possible   
that one of this latter character could 
even of himself  have thought that there
 was absolutely no such thing in mankind
 as  affection to the good of others8   
suppose of parents to their children2 or
  that what he felt upon seeing a friend
 in distress was only fear for  himself2
 or1 upon supposition of the affections 
of kindness and  compassion1 that it was
 the business of wisdom and virtue to   
set him  about extirpating them as fast 
as he could8  ,and yet each of these    

manifest contradictions to nature has   
been laid down by men of  speculation as
 a discovery in moral philosophy2 which 
they1 it seems1  have found out through 
all the specious appearances to the     
contrary4  ,this  reflection may be     
extended further4  ,the extravagances of
 enthusiasm and  superstition do not at 
all lie in the road of common sense2 and
  therefore1 so far as they are original
 mistakes1 must be owing to going       
beside or beyond it4  ,now1 since       
inquiry and examination can relate only 
to things so obscure and uncertain as to
 stand in need of it1 and to  persons   
who are capable of it2 the proper advice
 to be given to plain  honest men1 to   
secure them from the extremes both of   
superstition and  irreligion1 is that of
 the ,son of ,sirach3 ,in every good    
work trust thy  own soul2 for this is   
the keeping of the commandment4 #ad     
,,sermon ,,vi4  ,,upon ,,compassion4    
,,preached ,,the ,,first ,,sunday ,,in  
,,lent4         ,rom4 xii4 #ae4         

,rejoice with then that do rejoice1 and 
weep with them that weep4    ,there is a
 much more exact correspondence between 
the natural and moral  world than we are
 apt to take notice of4  ,the inward    
frame of man does in  a peculiar manner 
answer to the external condition and    
circumstances of  life in which he is   
placed4  ,this is a particular instance 
of that  general observation of the ,son
 of ,sirach3 ,all things are double one 
against another1 and ,god hath made     
nothing imperfect4 #ae  ,the  several   
passions and affections in the heart of 
man1 compared with the  circumstances of
 life in which he is placed1 afford1 to 
such as will  attend to them1 as certain
 instances of final causes1 as any      
whatever1  which are more commonly      
alleged for such3 since those affections
 lead him  to a certain determinate     
course of action suitable to those      
circumstances2 as 7for instance7        
compassion to relieve the distressed4   
,and as all observations of final       

causes1 drawn from the principles of    
action in the heart of man1 compared    
with the condition he is placed in1     
serve all the good uses which instances 
of final causes in the material  world  
about us do2 and both these are equally 
proofs of wisdom and design  in the     
,author of nature3 so the former serve  
to further good purposes2  they show us 
what course of life we are made for1    
what is our duty1 and  in a peculiar    
manner enforce upon us the practice of  
it4    ,suppose we are capable of       
happiness and of misery in degrees      
equally  intense and extreme1 yet1 we   
are capable of the latter for a much    
longer  time1 beyond all comparison4    
,we see men in the tortures of pain for 
hours1 days1 and1 excepting the short   
suspensions of sleep1 for months        
together1 without intermission1 to which
 no enjoyments of life do1 in  degree   
and continuance1 bear any sort of       
proportion4  ,and such is our  make and 
that of the world about us that any     

thing may become the  instrument of pain
 and sorrow to us4  ,thus almost any one
 man is capable  of doing mischief to   
any other1 though he may not be capable 
of doing him  good2 and if he be capable
 of doing him some good1 he is capable  
of doing  him more evil4  ,and it is1 in
 numberless cases1 much more in our     
power to  lessen the miseries of others 
than to promote their positive          
happiness1  any otherwise than as the   
former often includes the latter2 ease  
from  misery occasioning for some time  
the greatest positive enjoyment4  ,this 
constitution of nature1 namely1 that it 
is so munch more in our power to        
occasion and likewise to lessen misery  
than to promote positive  happiness1    
plainly required a particular affection 
to hinder us from  abusing1 and to      
incline us to make a right use of the   
former powers1  i4e41 the powers both to
 occasion and to lessen misery2 over and
 above  what was necessary to induce us 
to make a right use of the latter power1

  that of promoting positive happiness4 
,the power we have over the misery  of  
our fellow-creatures1 to occasion or    
lessen it1 being a more important  trust
 than the power we have of promoting    
their positive happiness2 the  former   
requires and has a further1 an          
additional1 security and guard  against 
its being violated1 beyond and over and 
above what the latter  has4  ,the social
 nature of man1 and general goodwill to 
his species1  equally prevent him from  
doing evil1 incline him to relieve the  
distressed1 and to promote the positive 
happiness of his  fellow-creatures2 but 
compassion only restrains from the      
first1 and  carries him to the second2  
it hath nothing to do with the third4   
,the final causes1 then1 of compassion  
are to prevent and to relieve  misery4  
,as to the former3 this affection may   
plainly be a restraint upon  resentment1
 envy1 unreasonable self-love2 that is1 
upon all the  principles from which men 
do evil to one another4  ,let us        

instance only  in resentment4  ,it      
seldom happens1 in regulated societies1 
that men have  an enemy so entirely in  
their power as to be able to satiate    
their  resentment with safety4  ,but if 
we were to put this case1 it is plainly 
supposable that a person might bring his
 enemy into such a condition1 as  from  
being the object of anger and rage1 to  
become an object of  compassion1 even to
 himself1 though the most malicious man 
in the world2  and in this case         
compassion would stop him1 if he could  
stop with safety1  from pursuing his    
revenge any further4  ,but since nature 
has placed  within us more powerful     
restraints to prevent mischief1 and     
since the  final cause of compassion is 
much more to relieve misery1 let us go  
on to  the consideration of it in this  
view4    ,as this world was not intended
 to be a state of any great satisfaction
 or  high enjoyment1 so neither was it  
intended to be a mere scene of          
unhappiness and sorrow4  ,mitigations   

and reliefs are provided by the         
merciful ,author of nature for most of  
the afflictions in human life4  ,there  
is kind provision made even against our 
frailties3 as we are so  constituted    
that time abundantly abates our sorrows1
 and begets in us  that resignment of   
temper1 which ought to have been        
produced by a better  cause2 a due sense
 of the authority of ,god1 and our state
 of dependence4  ,this holds in respect 
too far the greatest part of the evils  
of life2 ,i  suppose1 in some degree1 as
 to pain and sickness4  ,now this part  
of the  constitution or make of man1    
considered as some relief to misery1 and
 not  as provision for positive         
happiness1 is1 if ,i may so speak1 an   
instance  of nature's compassion for us2
 and every natural remedy or relief to  
misery may be considered in the same    
view4    ,but since in many cases it is 
very much in our power to alleviate the 
miseries of each other2 and benevolence1
 though natural in man to man1  yet is  

in a very low degree kept down by       
interest and competitions2 and  men1 for
 the most part1 are so engaged in the   
business and pleasures of  the world1 as
 to overlook and turn away from objects 
of misery2 which are  plainly considered
 as interruptions to them in their way1 
as intruders  upon their business1 their
 gaiety1 and mirth3 compassion is an    
advocate  within us in their behalf1 to 
gain the unhappy admittance and access1 
to  make their case attended to4  ,if it
 sometimes serves a contrary purpose1   
and makes men industriously turn away   
from the miserable1 these are only      
instances of abuse and perversion3 for  
the end1 for which the affection  was   
given us1 most certainly is not to make 
us avoid1 but to make us  attend to1 the
 objects of it4  ,and if men would only 
resolve to allow  thus much to it3 let  
it bring before their view1 the view of 
their mind1  the miseries of their      
fellow-creatures2 let it gain for them  
that their  case be considered2 ,i am   

persuaded it would not fail of gaining  
more1 and  that very few real objects of
 charity would pass unrelieved4  ,pain  
and  sorrow and misery have a right to  
our assistance3 compassion puts us in   
mind of the debt1 and that we owe it to 
ourselves as well as to the  distressed4
  ,for1 to endeavour to get rid of the  
sorrow of compassion by  turning from   
the wretched1 when yet it is in our     
power to relieve them1  is as unnatural 
as to endeavour to get rid of the pain  
of hunger by  keeping from the sight of 
food4  ,that we can do one with greater 
success  than we can the other is no    
proof that one is less a violation of   
nature  than the other4  ,compassion is 
a call1 a demand of nature1 to relieve  
the  unhappy as hunger is a natural call
 for food4  ,this affection plainly     
gives the objects of it an additional   
claim to relief and mercy1 over and     
above what our fellow-creatures in      
common have to our goodwill4            
,liberality and bounty are exceedingly  

commendable2 and a particular           
distinction in such a world as this1    
where men set themselves to contract    
their heart1 and close it to all        
interests but their own4  ,it is by no  
means to be opposed to mercy1 but always
 accompanies it3 the distinction        
between them is only that the former    
leads our thoughts to a more            
promiscuous and undistinguished         
distribution of favours2 to those who   
are  not1 as well as those who are1     
necessitous2 whereas the object of      
compassion is misery4  ,but in the      
comparison1 and where there is not a    
possibility of both1 mercy is to have   
the preference3 the affection of        
compassion manifestly leads us to this  
preference4  ,thus1 to relieve the      
indigent and distressed1 to single out  
the unhappy1 from whom can be  expected 
no returns either of present            
entertainment or future service1  for   
the objects of our favours2 to esteem a 
man's being friendless as a             

recommendation2 dejection1 and          
incapacity of struggling through the    
world1 as a motive for assisting him2 in
 a word1 to consider these              
circumstances of disadvantage1 which are
 usually thought a sufficient  reason   
for neglect and overlooking a person1 as
 a motive for helping him  forward3 this
 is the course of benevolence which     
compassion marks out and  directs us to3
 this is that humanity which is so      
peculiarly becoming our  nature and     
circumstances in this world4    ,to     
these considerations1 drawn from the    
nature of man1 must be added the  reason
 of the thing itself we are             
recommending1 which accords to and      
shows the same4  ,for since it is so    
much more in our power to lessen the    
misery of our fellow-creatures than to  
promote their positive happiness2  in   
cases where there is an inconsistency1  
we shall be likely to do much  more good
 by setting ourselves to mitigate the   
former than by  endeavouring to promote 

the latter4  ,let the competition be    
between the  poor and the rich4  ,it is 
easy1 you will say1 to see which will   
have the  preference4  ,true2 but the   
question is1 which ought to have the    
preference8  ,what proportion is there  
between the happiness produced by  doing
 a favour to the indigent1 and that     
produced by doing the same  favour to   
one in easy circumstances8  ,it is      
manifest that the addition of  a very   
large estate to one who before had an   
affluence1 will in many  instances yield
 him less new enjoyment or satisfaction 
than an ordinary  charity would yield to
 a necessitous person4  ,so that it is  
not only true  that our nature1 i4e41   
the voice of ,god within us1 carries us 
to the  exercise of charity and         
benevolence in the way of compassion or 
mercy1  preferably to any other way2 but
 we also manifestly discern much more   
good done by the former2 or1 if you will
 allow me the expressions1 more  misery 
annihilated and happiness created4  ,if 

charity and benevolence1  and           
endeavouring to do good to our          
fellow-creatures1 be anything1 this     
observation deserves to be most         
seriously considered by all who have to 
bestow4  ,and it holds with great       
exactness1 when applied to the several  
degrees of greater and less indigency   
throughout the various ranks in  human  
life3 the happiness or good produced not
 being in proportion to  what is        
bestowed1 but in proportion to this     
joined with the need there  was of it4  
,it may perhaps be expected that upon   
this subject notice should be taken  of 
occasions1 circumstances1 and characters
 which seem at once to call  forth      
affections of different sorts4  ,thus   
vice may be thought the object  both of 
pity and indignation3 folly1 of pity and
 of laughter4  ,how far  this is        
strictly true1 ,i shall not inquire2 but
 only observe upon the  appearance1 how 
much more humane it is to yield and give
 scope to  affections1 which are most   

directly in favour of1 and friendly     
towards1  our fellow-creatures2 and that
 there is plainly much less danger of   
being  led wrong by these than by the   
other4    ,but1 notwithstanding all that
 has been said in recommendation of     
compassion1 that it is most amiable1    
most becoming human nature1 and most    
useful to the world2 yet it must be     
owned that every affection1 as  distinct
 from a principle of reason1 may rise   
too high1 and be beyond its  just       
proportion4  ,and by means of this one  
carried too far1 a man  throughout his  
life is subject to much more uneasiness 
than belongs to  his share2 and in      
particular instances1 it may be in such 
a degree as to  incapacitate him from   
assisting the very person who is the    
object of it4  ,but as there are some   
who upon principle set up for           
suppressing this  affection itself as   
weakness1 there is also ,i know not what
 of fashion on  this side2 and1 by some 
means or other1 the whole world almost  

is run  into the extremes of            
insensibility towards the distresses of 
their fellow-  creatures3 so that       
general rules and exhortations must     
always be on the  other side4    ,and   
now to go on to the uses we should make 
of the foregoing reflections1  the      
further ones they lead to1 and the      
general temper they have a  tendency to 
beget in us4  ,there being that distinct
 affection implanted  in the nature of  
man1 tending to lessen the miseries of  
life1 that  particular provision made   
for abating its sorrows1 more than for  
increasing its positive happiness1 as   
before explained2 this may suggest  to  
us what should be our general aim       
respecting ourselves1 in our passage    
through this world3 namely1 to endeavour
 chiefly to escape misery1 keep  free   
from uneasiness1 pain1 and sorrow1 or to
 get relief and mitigation  of them2 to 
propose to ourselves peace and          
tranquillity of mind1 rather  than      
pursue after high enjoyments4  ,this is 

what the constitution of  nature before 
explained marks out as the course we    
should follow1 and the  end we should   
aim at4  ,to make pleasure and mirth and
 jollity our  business1 and be          
constantly hurrying about after some gay
 amusement1 some  new gratification of  
sense or appetite1 to those who will    
consider the  nature of man and our     
condition in this world1 will appear the
 most  romantic scheme of life that ever
 entered into thought4  ,and yet how    
many  are there who go on in this       
course1 without learning better from the
  daily1 the hourly disappointments1    
listlessness1 and satiety which         
accompany this fashionable method of    
wasting away their days6    ,the subject
 we have been insisting upon would lead 
us into the same kind  of reflections by
 a different connection4  ,the miseries 
of life brought  home to ourselves by   
compassion1 viewed through this         
affection considered  as the sense by   
which they are perceived1 would beget in

 us that  moderation1 humility1 and     
soberness of mind which has been now    
recommended2 and which peculiarly       
belongs to a season of recollection1    
the only purpose of which is to bring us
 to a just sense of things1 to  recover 
us out of that forgetfulness of         
ourselves1 and our true state1  which it
 is manifest far the greatest part of   
men pass their whole life  in4  ,upon   
this account ,solomon says that it is   
better to go to the house  of mourning  
than to go to the house of feasting2    
i4e41 it is more to a  man's advantage  
to turn his eyes towards objects of     
distress1 to recall  sometimes to his   
remembrance the occasions of sorrow1    
than to pass all  his days in           
thoughtless mirth and gaiety4  ,and he  
represents the wise as  choosing to     
frequent the former of these places2 to 
be sure not for his  own sake1 but      
because by the sadness of the           
countenance1 the heart is  made better4 
,every one observes how temperate and   

reasonable men are  when humbled and    
brought low by afflictions in comparison
 of what they  are in high prosperity4  
,by this voluntary resort to the house  
of  mourning1 which is here recommended1
 we might learn all those useful        
instructions which calamities teach     
without undergoing them ourselves2  and 
grow wiser and better at a more easy    
rate than men commonly do4  ,the        
objects themselves1 which in that place 
of sorrow lie before our view1          
naturally give us a seriousness and     
attention1 check that wantonness  which 
is the growth of prosperity and ease1   
and head us to reflect upon  the        
deficiencies of human life itself2 that 
every man at his best estate  is        
altogether vanity4  ,this would correct 
the florid and gaudy prospects  and     
expectations which we are too apt to    
indulge1 teach us to lower our  notions 
of happiness and enjoyment1 bring them  
down to the reality of  things1 to what 
is attainable1 to what the frailty of   

our condition will  admit of1 which1 for
 any continuance1 is only tranquillity1 
ease1 and  moderate satisfactions4      
,thus we might at once become proof     
against the  temptations with which the 
whole world almost is carried away2     
since it  is plain that not only what is
 called a life of pleasure1 but also    
vicious pursuits in general1 aim at     
somewhat besides and beyond these       
moderate satisfactions4    ,and as to   
that obstinacy and wilfulness1 which    
renders men so insensible  to the       
motives of religion2 this right sense of
 ourselves and of the  world about us   
would bend the stubborn mind1 soften the
 heart1 and make  it more apt to receive
 impression2 and this is the proper     
temper in which  to call our ways to    
remembrance1 to review and set home upon
 ourselves  the miscarriages of our past
 life4  ,in such a compliant state of   
mind1  reason and conscience will have a
 fair hearing2 which is the preparation 
for1 or rather the beginning of1 that   

repentance1 the outward show of  which  
we all put on at this season4           
,lastly1 ,the various miseries of life  
which lie before us wherever we turn    
our eyes1 the frailty of this mortal    
state we are passing through1 may  put  
us in mind that the present world is not
 our home2 that we are merely  strangers
 and travellers in it1 as all our       
fathers were4  ,it is therefore  to be  
considered as a foreign country2 in     
which our poverty and wants1  and the   
insufficient supplies of them1 were     
designed to turn our views to  that     
higher and better state we are heirs to3
 a state where will be no  follies to be
 overlooked1 no miseries to be pitied1  
no wants to be  relieved2 where the     
affection we have been now treating of  
will happily  be lost1 as there will be 
no objects to exercise it upon3 for ,god
 shall  wipe away all tears from their  
eyes1 and there shall be no more death1 
neither sorrow1 nor crying2 neither     
shall there be any more pain2  for the  

former things are passed away4          
,,sermon ,,vii4  ,,upon ,,the           
,,character ,,of ,,balaam4  ,,preached  
,,the ,,second ,,sunday ,,after         
,,easter4         ,,numbers xxiii4 #aj4 
,let me die the death of the righteous1 
and let my last end be like     his4    
,these words1 taken alone1 and without  
respect to him who spoke them1 lead  our
 thoughts immediately to the different  
ends of good and bad men4  ,for  though 
the comparison is not expressed1 yet it 
is manifestly implied2 as  is also the  
preference of one of these characters to
 the other in that  last circumstance1  
death4  ,and1 since dying the death of  
the righteous or  of the wicked         
necessarily implies men's being         
righteous or wicked2  i4e41 having lived
 righteously or wickedly2 a comparison  
of them in  their lives also might come 
into consideration1 from such a single  
view  of the words themselves4  ,but my 
present design is to consider them with 
a particular reference or respect to him

 who spoke them2 which reference1  if   
you please to attend1 you will see4     
,and if what shall be offered to  your  
consideration at this time be thought a 
discourse upon the whole  history of    
this man1 rather than upon the          
particular words ,i have read1  this is 
of no consequence3 it is sufficient if  
it afford reflection of  use and service
 to ourselves4    ,but1 in order to     
avoid cavils respecting this remarkable 
relation in  ,scripture1 either that    
part of it which you have heard in the  
first  lesson for the day1 or any other2
 let me just observe that as this is not
  a place for answering them1 so they no
 way affect the following  discourse2   
since the character there given is      
plainly a real one in life1  and such as
 there are parallels to4    ,the        
occasion of ,balaam's coming out of his 
own country into the land of  ,moab1    
where he pronounced this solemn prayer  
or wish1 he himself relates  in the     
first parable or prophetic speech1 of   

which it is the conclusion4  ,in which  
is a custom referred to1 proper to be   
taken notice of3 that of  devoting      
enemies to destruction before the       
entrance upon a war with them4  ,this   
custom appears to have prevailed over a 
great part of the world2 for  we find it
 amongst the most distant nations4  ,the
 ,romans had public  officers1 to whom  
it belonged as a stated part of their   
office4  ,but  there was somewhat more  
particular in the case now before us3   
,balaam  being looked upon as an        
extraordinary person1 whose blessing or 
curse was  thought to be always         
effectual4    ,in order to engage the   
reader's attention to this passage1 the 
sacred  historian has enumerated the    
preparatory circumstances1 which are    
these4  ,balaam requires the king of    
,moab to build him seven altars1 and to 
prepare him the same number of oxen and 
of rams4  ,the sacrifice being  over1 he
 retires alone to a solitude sacred to  
these occasions1 there to  wait the     

,divine inspiration or answer1 for which
 the foregoing rites were  the          
preparation4  ,and ,god met ,balaam1 and
 put a word in his mouth2  #af upon     
receiving which1 he returns back to the 
altars1 where was the  king1 who had all
 this while attended the sacrifice1 as  
appointed2 he and  all the princes of   
,moab standing1 big with expectation of 
the ,prophet's  reply4  ,and he took up 
his parable1 and said1 ,balak the king  
of ,moab  hath brought me from ,aram1   
out of the mountains of the east1       
saying1  ,come1 curse me ,jacob1 and    
come1 defy ,israel4  ,how shall ,i      
curse1 whom ,god hath not cursed8  ,or  
how shall ,i defy1 whom the  ,lord hath 
not defied8  ,for from the top of the   
rocks ,i see him1 and  from the hills ,i
 behold him3 lo1 the people shall dwell 
alone1 and  shall not be reckoned among 
the nations4  ,who can count the dust of
  ,jacob1 and the number of the fourth  
part of ,israel8  ,let me die the  death
 of the righteous1 and let my last end  

be like his4 #ag    ,it is necessary1 as
 you will see in the progress of this   
discourse1  particularly to observe what
 he understood by righteous4  ,and he   
himself is introduced in the book of    
,micah #ah explaining it2 if by         
righteous is meant good1 as to be sure  
it is4  ,o my people1  remember now what
 ,balak king of ,moab consulted1 and    
what ,balaam the  son of ,beor answered 
him from ,shittim unto ,gilgal4  ,from  
the mention of  ,shittim it is manifest 
that it is this very story which is here
 referred  to1 though another part of   
it1 the account of which is not now     
extant2 as  there are many quotations in
 ,scripture out of books which are not  
come  down to us4  ,remember what       
,balaam answered1 that ye may know the  
righteousness of the ,lord2 i4e41 the   
righteousness which ,god will  accept4  
,balak demands1 ,wherewith shall ,i come
 before the ,lord1 and  bow myself      
before the high ,god8  ,shall ,i come   
before him with burnt-  offerings1 with 

calves of a year old8  ,will the ,lord  
be pleased with  thousands of rams1 or  
with ten thousands of rivers of oil8    
,shall ,i  give my first-born for my    
transgression1 the fruit of my body for 
the  sin of my soul8  ,balaam answers   
him1 he hath showed thee1 ,o man1  what 
is good3 and what doth the ,lord require
 of thee1 but to do  justly1 and to love
 mercy1 and to walk humbly with thy     
,god8  ,here is  a good man expressly   
characterised1 as distinct from a       
dishonest and a  superstitious man4  ,no
 words can more strongly exclude        
dishonesty and  falseness of heart than 
doing justice and loving mercy2 and both
 these1  as well as walking humbly with 
,god1 are put in opposition to those    
ceremonial methods of recommendation1   
which ,balak hoped might have served    
the turn4  ,from hence appears what he  
meant by the righteous1 whose  death he 
desires to die4    ,whether it was his  
own character shall now be inquired2 and
 in order to  determine it1 we must take

 a view of his whole behaviour upon this
  occasion4  ,when the elders of ,noah  
came to him1 though he appears to have  
been much allured with the rewards      
offered1 yet he had such regard to the  
authority of ,god as to keep the        
messengers in suspense until he had     
consulted ,his will4  ,and ,god said to 
him1 ,thou shalt not go with  them2 thou
 shalt not curse the people1 for they   
are blessed4 #ai  ,upon this he         
dismisses the ambassadors1 with an      
absolute refusal of  accompanying them  
back to their king4  ,thus far his      
regards to his duty  prevailed1 neither 
does there anything appear as yet amiss 
in his  conduct4  ,his answer being     
reported to the king of ,moab1 a more   
honourable embassy is immediately       
despatched1 and greater rewards         
proposed4  ,then the iniquity of his    
heart began to disclose itself4  ,a     
thorough honest man would without       
hesitation have repeated his former     
answer1 that he could not be guilty of  

so infamous a prostitution of the       
sacred character with which he was      
invested1 as in the name of a prophet   
to curse those whom he knew to be       
blessed4  ,but instead of this1 which   
was the only honest part in these       
circumstances that lay before him1 he   
desires the princes of ,moab to tarry   
that night with him also2 and for  the  
sake of the reward deliberates1 whether 
by some means or other he  might not be 
able to obtain leave to curse ,israel2  
to do that1 which had  been before      
revealed to him to be contrary to the   
will of ,god1 which yet  he resolves not
 to do without that permission4  ,upon  
which1 as when this  nation afterwards  
rejected ,god from reigning over them1  
,he gave them a  king in ,his anger2 in 
the same way1 as appears from other     
parts of the  narration1 ,he gives      
,balaam the permission he desired3 for  
this is the  most natural sense of the  
words4  ,arriving in the territories of 
,moab1  and being received with         

particular distinction by the king1 and 
he  repeating in person the promise of  
the rewards he had before made to him   
by his ambassadors1 he seeks1 the text  
says1 by sacrifices and  enchantments   
7what these were is not to our purpose71
 to obtain leave  of ,god to curse the  
people2 keeping still his resolution1   
not to do it  without that permission3  
which not being able to obtain1 he had  
such  regard to the command of ,god as  
to keep this resolution to the last4    
,the  supposition of his being under a  
supernatural restraint is a mere fiction
  of ,philo3 he is plainly represented  
to be under no other force or  restraint
 than the fear of ,god4  ,however1 he   
goes on persevering in that  endeavour1 
after he had declared that ,god had not 
beheld iniquity in  ,jacob1 neither had 
he seen perverseness in ,israel2 #bj    
i4e41 they  were a people of virtue and 
piety1 so far as not to have drawn down 
by  their iniquity that curse which he  
was soliciting leave to pronounce upon  

them4  ,so that the state of ,balaam's  
mind was this3 he wanted to do what  he 
knew to be very wicked1 and contrary to 
the express command of ,god2 he  had    
inward checks and restraints which he   
could not entirely get over2 he         
therefore casts about for ways to       
reconcile this wickedness with his      
duty4  ,how great a paradox soever this 
may appear1 as it is indeed a           
contradiction in terms1 it is the very  
account which the ,scripture gives  us  
of him4    ,but there is a more         
surprising piece of iniquity yet behind4
  ,not daring  in his religious         
character1 as a prophet1 to assist the  
king of ,moab1 he  considers whether    
there might not be found some other     
means of assisting  him against that    
very people1 whom he himself by the fear
 of ,god was  restrained from cursing in
 words4  ,one would not think it        
possible that  the weakness1 even of    
religious self-deceit in its utmost     
excess1 could  have so poor a           

distinction1 so fond an evasion1 to     
serve itself of4  ,but  so it was2 and  
he could think of no other method than  
to betray the  children of ,israel to   
provoke ,his wrath1 who was their only  
strength and  defence4  ,the temptation 
which he pitched upon was that          
concerning which  ,solomon afterwards   
observed1 that it had cast down many    
wounded2 yea1  many strong men had been 
slain by it3 and of which he himself was
 a sad  example1 when his wives turned  
away his heart after other gods4  ,this 
succeeded3 the people sin against ,god2 
and thus the ,prophet's counsel  brought
 on that destruction which he could by  
no means be prevailed upon  to assist   
with the religious ceremony of          
execration1 which the king of  ,moab    
thought would itself have affected it4  
,their crime and punishment  are related
 in ,deuteronomy #ba and ,numbers4 #bb  
,and from the relation  repeated in     
,numbers1 #bc it appears1 that ,balaam  
was the contriver of  the whole matter4 

,it is also ascribed to him in the      
,revelation1 #bd  where he is said to   
have taught ,balak to cast a            
stumbling-block before  the children of 
,israel4    ,this was the man1 this     
,balaam1 ,i say1 was the man1 who       
desired to die  the death of the        
righteous1 and that his last end might  
be like his2  and this was the state of 
his mind when he pronounced these words4
    ,so that the object we have now     
before us is the most astonishing in the
  world3 a very wicked man1 under a deep
 sense of ,god and religion1  persisting
 still in his wickedness1 and preferring
 the wages of  unrighteousness1 even    
when he had before him a lively view of 
death1 and  that approaching period of  
his days1 which should deprive him of   
all  those advantages for which he was  
prostituting himself2 and likewise a    
prospect1 whether certain or uncertain1 
of a future state of retribution2  all  
this joined with an explicit ardent wish
 that1 when he was to leave  this world1

 he might be in the condition of a      
righteous man4  ,good ,god6  what       
inconsistency1 what perplexity is here6 
,with what different views  of things1  
with what contradictory principles of   
action1 must such a mind  be torn and   
distracted6  ,it was not unthinking     
carelessness1 by which he  ran on       
headlong in vice and folly1 without ever
 making a stand to ask  himself what he 
was doing3 no2 he acted upon the cool   
motives of interest  and advantage4     
,neither was he totally hard and callous
 to impressions of  religion1 what we   
call abandoned2 for he absolutely denied
 to curse  ,israel4  ,when reason       
assumes her place1 when convinced of his
 duty1 when  he owns and feels1 and is  
actually under the influence of the     
divine  authority2 whilst he is carrying
 on his views to the grave1 the end of  
all temporal greatness2 under this sense
 of things1 with the better  character  
and more desirable state present--full  
before him--in his  thoughts1 in his    

wishes1 voluntarily to choose the       
worse--what fatality  is here6  ,or how 
otherwise can such a character be       
explained8  ,and yet1  strange as it may
 appear1 it is not altogether an        
uncommon one3 nay1 with  some small     
alterations1 and put a little lower1 it 
is applicable to a  very considerable   
part of the world4  ,for if the         
reasonable choice be  seen and          
acknowledged1 and yet men make the      
unreasonable one1 is not this  the same 
contradiction2 that very inconsistency1 
which appeared so  unaccountable8    ,to
 give some little opening to such       
characters and behaviour1 it is to be   
observed in general that there is no    
account to be given in the way of       
reason1 of men's so strong attachments  
to the present world3 our hopes  and    
fears and pursuits are in degrees beyond
 all proportion to the known  value of  
the things they respect4  ,this may be  
said without taking into  consideration 
religion and a future state2 and when   

these are considered1  the disproportion
 is infinitely heightened4  ,now when   
men go against  their reason1 and       
contradict a more important interest at 
a distance1 for  one nearer1 though of  
less consideration2 if this be the whole
 of the  case1 all that can be said is1 
that strong passions1 some kind of brute
  force within1 prevails over the       
principle of rationality4  ,however1 if 
this be with a clear1 full1 and distinct
 view of the truth of things1  then it  
is doing the utmost violence to         
themselves1 acting in the most  palpable
 contradiction to their very nature4    
,but if there be any such  thing in     
mankind as putting half-deceits upon    
themselves2 which there  plainly is1    
either by avoiding reflection1 or 7if   
they do reflect7 by  religious          
equivocation1 subterfuges1 and          
palliating matters to  themselves2 by   
these means conscience may be laid      
asleep1 and they may go  on in a course 
of wickedness with less disturbance4    

,all the various  turns1 doubles1 and   
intricacies in a dishonest heart cannot 
be unfolded  or laid open2 but that     
there is somewhat of that kind is       
manifest1 be it  to be called           
self-deceit1 or by any other name4      
,balaam had before his  eyes the        
authority of ,god1 absolutely forbidding
 him what he1 for the  sake of a reward1
 had the strongest inclination to3 he   
was likewise in a  state of mind sober  
enough to consider death and his last   
end3 by these  considerations he was    
restrained1 first from going to the king
 of ,moab1  and after he did go1 from   
cursing ,israel4  ,but notwithstanding  
this1  there was great wickedness in his
 heart4  ,he could not forego the       
rewards  of unrighteousness3 he         
therefore first seeks for indulgences1  
and when  these could not be obtained1  
he sins against the whole meaning1 end1 
and  design of the prohibition1 which no
 consideration in the world could       
prevail with him to go against the      

letter of4  ,and surely that impious    
counsel he gave to ,balak against the   
children of ,israel was1 considered  in 
itself1 a greater piece of wickedness   
than if he had cursed them in  words4   
,if it be inquired what his situation1  
his hopes1 and fears were1 in  respect  
to this his wish2 the answer must be1   
that consciousness of the  wickedness of
 his heart must necessarily have        
destroyed all settled hopes  of dying   
the death of the righteous3 he could    
have no calm satisfaction  in this view 
of his last end3 yet1 on the other hand1
 it is possible that  those partial     
regards to his duty1 now mentioned1     
might keep him from  perfect despair4   
,upon the whole it is manifest that     
,balaam had the most just and true      
notions of ,god and religion2 as        
appears1 partly from the original story 
itself1 and more plainly from the       
passage in ,micah2 where he explains    
religion to consist in real virtue and  
real piety1 expressly  distinguished    

from superstition1 and in terms which   
most strongly exclude  dishonesty and   
falseness of heart4  ,yet you see his   
behaviour3 he seeks  indulgences for    
plain wickedness1 which not being able  
to obtain he  glosses over that same    
wickedness1 dresses it up in a new form1
 in order  to make it pass off more     
easily with himself4  ,that is1 he      
deliberately  contrives to deceive and  
impose upon himself in a matter which he
 knew to  be of the utmost importance4  
,to bring these observations home to    
ourselves3 it is too evident that  many 
persons allow themselves in very        
unjustifiable courses who yet make      
great pretences to religion2 not to     
deceive the world1 none can be so  weak 
as to think this will pass in our age2  
but from principles1 hopes1  and fears1 
respecting ,god and a future state2 and 
go on thus with a sort  of tranquillity 
and quiet of mind4  ,this cannot be upon
 a thorough  consideration1 and full    
resolution1 that the pleasures and      

advantages  they propose are to be      
pursued at all hazards1 against reason1 
against  the law of ,god1 and though    
everlasting destruction is to be the    
consequence4  ,this would be doing too  
great violence upon themselves4  ,no1   
they are for making a composition with  
the ,almighty4  ,these of ,his  commands
 they will obey2 but as to others--why1 
they will make all the  atonements in   
their power2 the ambitious1 the         
covetous1 the dissolute  man1 each in a 
way which shall not contradict his      
respective pursuit4  ,indulgences       
before1 which was ,balaam's first       
attempt1 though he was not  so          
successful in it as to deceive himself1 
or atonements afterwards1 are  all the  
same4  ,and here1 perhaps1 come in faint
 hopes that they may1 and  half-resolves
 that they will1 one time or other1 make
 a change4    ,besides these there are  
also persons1 who1 from a more just way 
of  considering things1 see the infinite
 absurdity of this1 of substituting     

sacrifice instead of obedience2 there   
are persons far enough from             
superstition1 and not without some real 
sense of ,god and religion upon  their  
minds2 who yet are guilty of most       
unjustifiable practices1 and go  on with
 great coolness and command over        
themselves4  ,the same dishonesty  and  
unsoundness of heart discovers itself in
 these another way4  ,in all  common    
ordinary cases we see intuitively at    
first view what is our duty1  what is   
the honest part4  ,this is the ground of
 the observation1 that the  first       
thought is often the best4  ,in these   
cases doubt and deliberation  is itself 
dishonesty1 as it was in ,balaam upon   
the second message4  ,that  which is    
called considering what is our duty in a
 particular case is very  often nothing 
but endeavouring to explain it away4    
,thus those courses1  which1 if men     
would fairly attend to the dictates of  
their own  consciences1 they would see  
to be corruption1 excess1 oppression1   

uncharitableness2 these are refined     
upon--things were so and so             
circumstantiated--great difficulties are
 raised about fixing bounds and         
degrees1 and thus every moral obligation
 whatever may be evaded4  ,here is      
scope1 ,i say1 for an unfair mind to    
explain away every moral obligation  to 
itself4  ,whether men reflect again upon
 this internal management and  artifice1
 and how explicit they are with         
themselves1 is another question4  ,there
 are many operations of the mind1 many  
things pass within1 which we  never     
reflect upon again2 which a bystander1  
from having frequent  opportunities of  
observing us and our conduct1 may make  
shrewd guesses  at4    ,that great      
numbers are in this way of deceiving    
themselves is certain4  ,there is scarce
 a man in the world1 who has entirely   
got over all  regards1 hopes1 and fears1
 concerning ,god and a future state2 and
 these  apprehensions in the generality1
 bad as we are1 prevail in considerable 

degrees3 yet men will and can be wicked1
 with calmness and thought2 we  see they
 are4  ,there must therefore be some    
method of making it sit a  little easy  
upon their minds2 which1 in the         
superstitious1 is those  indulgences and
 atonements before mentioned1 and this  
self-deceit of  another kind in persons 
of another character4  ,and both these  
proceed  from a certain unfairness of   
mind1 a peculiar inward dishonesty2 the 
direct contrary to that simplicity which
 our ,saviour recommends1 under  the    
notion of becoming little children1 as a
 necessary qualification  for our       
entering into the kingdom of heaven4    
,but to conclude3 ,how much soever men  
differ in the course of life they       
prefer1 and in their ways of palliating 
and excusing their vices to  themselves2
 yet all agree in one thing1 desiring to
 die the death of the  righteous4  ,this
 is surely remarkable4  ,the observation
 may be extended  further1 and put thus3
 even without determining what that is  

which we  call guilt or innocence1 there
 is no man but would choose1 after      
having  had the pleasure or advantage of
 a vicious action1 to be free of the    
guilt of it1 to be in the state of an   
innocent man4  ,this shows at least  the
 disturbance and implicit               
dissatisfaction in vice4  ,if we inquire
 into  the grounds of it1 we shall find 
it proceeds partly from an immediate    
sense of having done evil1 and partly   
from an apprehension that this  inward  
sense shall one time or another be      
seconded by a higher judgment1  upon    
which our whole being depends4  ,now to 
suspend and drown this sense1  and these
 apprehensions1 be it by the hurry of   
business or of pleasure1  or by         
superstition1 or moral equivocations1   
this is in a manner one and  the same1  
and makes no alteration at all in the   
nature of our case4  ,things and actions
 are what they are1 and the consequences
 of them will  be what they will be3    
why1 then1 should we desire to be       

deceived8  ,as we  are reasonable       
creatures1 and have any regard to       
ourselves1 we ought to  lay these things
 plainly and honestly before our mind1  
and upon this1 act  as you please1 as   
you think most fit3 make that choice1   
and prefer that  course of life1 which  
you can justify to yourselves1 and which
 sits most  easy upon your own mind4    
,it will immediately appear that vice   
cannot be  the happiness1 but must upon 
the whole be the misery1 of such a      
creature  as man2 a moral1 an           
accountable agent4  ,superstitious      
observances1 self-  deceit though of a  
more refined sort1 will not in reality  
at all mend  matters with us4  ,and the 
result of the whole can be nothing else1
 but  that with simplicity and fairness 
we keep innocency1 and take heed  unto  
the thing that is right2 for this alone 
shall bring a man peace at  the last4   
,,sermon ,,xi4 #bd;a  ,,upon ,,the      
,,love ,,of ,,our ,,neighbour4          
,,preached ,,on ,,advent ,,sunday4      

,,romans xiii4 #i4       ,and if there  
be any other commandment1 it is briefly 
comprehended     in this saying1 namely1
 ,thou shalt love thy neighbour as      
thyself4    ,it is commonly observed    
that there is a disposition in men to   
complain of  the viciousness and        
corruption of the age in which they live
 as greater  than that of former ones2  
which is usually followed with this     
further  observation1 that mankind has  
been in that respect much the same in   
all  times4  ,now1 not to determine     
whether this last be not contradicted by
  the accounts of history2 thus much can
 scarce be doubted1 that vice and  folly
 takes different turns1 and some        
particular kinds of it are more  open   
and avowed in some ages than in others2 
and1 ,i suppose1 it may be  spoken of as
 very much the distinction of the       
present to profess a  contracted spirit1
 and greater regards to self-interest1  
than appears to  have been done         
formerly4  ,upon this account it seems  

worth while to  inquire whether private 
interest is likely to be promoted in    
proportion  to the degree in which      
self-love engrosses us1 and prevails    
over all  other principles2 or whether  
the contracted affection may not        
possibly  be so prevalent as to         
disappoint itself1 and even contradict  
its own  and private good4    ,and      
since1 further1 there is generally      
thought to be some peculiar kind  of    
contrariety between self-love and the   
love of our neighbour1 between  the     
pursuit of public and of private good2  
insomuch that when you are  recommending
 one of these1 you are supposed to be   
speaking against the  other2 and from   
hence arises a secret prejudice against1
 and frequently  open scorn of1 all talk
 of public spirit and real good-will to 
our fellow-  creatures2 it will be      
necessary to inquire what respect       
benevolence hath  to self-love1 and the 
pursuit of private interest to the      
pursuit of  public3 or whether there be 

anything of that peculiar inconsistence 
and  contrariety between them over and  
above what there is between self-love   
and other passions and particular       
affections1 and their respective        
pursuits4    ,these inquiries1 it is    
hoped1 may be favourably attended to2   
for there  shall be all possible        
concessions made to the favourite       
passion1 which  hath so much allowed to 
it1 and whose cause is so universally   
pleaded3 it  shall be treated with the  
utmost tenderness and concern for its   
interests4    ,in order to do this1 as  
well as to determine the forementioned  
questions1  it will be necessary to     
consider the nature1 the object1 and end
 of  that self-love1 as distinguished   
from other principles or affections in  
the mind1 and their respective objects4 
,every man hath a general desire of his 
own happiness2 and likewise a  variety  
of particular affections1 passions1 and 
appetites to particular  external       
objects4  ,the former proceeds from1 or 

is1 self-love2 and seems  inseparable   
from all sensible creatures1 who can    
reflect upon themselves  and their own  
interest or happiness so as to have that
 interest an object  to their minds2    
what is to be said of the latter is1    
that they proceed  from or together make
 up that particular nature1 according to
 which man  is made4  ,the object the   
former pursues is somewhat internal--our
 own  happiness1 enjoyment1             
satisfaction2 whether we have1 or have  
not1 a  distinct particular perception  
what it is1 or wherein it consists3 the 
objects of the latter are this or that  
particular external thing1 which  the   
affections tend towards1 and of which it
 hath always a particular  idea or      
perception4  ,the principle we call     
self-love never seeks anything  external
 for the sake of the thing1 but only as 
a means of happiness or  good3          
particular affections rest in the       
external things themselves4  ,one       
belongs to man as a reasonable creature 

reflecting upon his own interest  or    
happiness4  ,the other1 though quite    
distinct from reason1 are as much  a    
part of human nature4    ,that all      
particular appetites and passions are   
towards external things  themselves1    
distinct from the pleasure arising from 
them1 is  manifested from hence2 that   
there could not be this pleasure1 were  
it not  for that prior suitableness     
between the object and the passion3     
there  could be no enjoyment or delight 
from one thing more than another1 from  
eating food more than from swallowing a 
stone1 if there were not an  affection  
or appetite to one thing more than      
another4    ,every particular affection1
 even the love of our neighbour1 is as  
really  our own affection as self-love2 
and the pleasure arising from its       
gratification is as much my own pleasure
 as the pleasure self-love would  have  
from knowing ,i myself should be happy  
some time hence would be my  own        
pleasure4  ,and if1 because every       

particular affection is a man's own1    
and the pleasure arising from its       
gratification his own pleasure1 or      
pleasure to himself1 such particular    
affection must be called self-love2     
according to this way of speaking1 no   
creature whatever can possibly act  but 
merely from self-love2 and every action 
and every affection whatever  is to be  
resolved up into this one principle4    
,but then this is not the  language of  
mankind2 or if it were1 we should want  
words to express the  difference between
 the principle of an action1 proceeding 
from cool  consideration that it will be
 to my own advantage2 and an action1    
suppose  of revenge or of friendship1 by
 which a man runs upon certain ruin1 to 
do  evil or good to another4  ,it is    
manifest the principles of these actions
  are totally different1 and so want    
different words to be distinguished  by2
 all that they agree in is that they    
both proceed from1 and are done  to     
gratify1 an inclination in a man's self4

  ,but the principle or  inclination in 
one case is self-love2 in the other1    
hatred or love of  another4  ,there is  
then a distinction between the cool     
principle of self-  love1 or general    
desire of our own happiness1 as one part
 of our nature1  and one principle of   
action2 and the particular affections   
towards  particular external objects1 as
 another part of our nature1 and another
  principle of action4  ,how much soever
 therefore is to be allowed to self-    
love1 yet it cannot be allowed to be the
 whole of our inward  constitution2     
because1 you see1 there are other parts 
or principles which  come into it4      
,further1 private happiness or good is  
all which self-love can make us  desire1
 or be concerned about3 in having this  
consists its gratification3  it is an   
affection to ourselves2 a regard to our 
own interest1 happiness1  and private   
good3 and in the proportion a man hath  
this1 he is  interested1 or a lover of  
himself4  ,let this be kept in mind2    

because  there is commonly1 as ,i shall 
presently have occasion to observe1     
another  sense put upon these words4    
,on the other hand1 particular          
affections  tend towards particular     
external things3 these are their        
objects3 having  these is their end3 in 
this consists their gratification3 no   
matter  whether it be1 or be not1 upon  
the whole1 our interest or happiness4   
,an  action done from the former of     
these principles is called an interested
  action4  ,an action proceeding from   
any of the latter has its denomination  
of passionate1 ambitious1 friendly1     
revengeful1 or any other1 from the      
particular appetite or affection from   
which it proceeds4  ,thus self-love  as 
one part of human nature1 and the       
several particular principles as the    
other part1 are1 themselves1 their      
objects and ends1 stated and shown4     
,from hence it will be easy to see how  
far1 and in what ways1 each of  these   
can contribute and be subservient to the

 private good of the  individual4       
,happiness does not consist in          
self-love4  ,the desire of  happiness is
 no more the thing itself than the      
desire of riches is the  possession or  
enjoyment of them4  ,people might love  
themselves with the  most entire and    
unbounded affection1 and yet be         
extremely miserable4  ,neither can      
self-love any way help them out1 but by 
setting them on work  to get rid of the 
causes of their misery1 to gain or make 
use of those  objects which are by      
nature adapted to afford satisfaction4  
,happiness or  satisfaction consists    
only in the enjoyment of those objects  
which are by  nature suited to our      
several particular appetites1 passions1 
and  affections4  ,so that if self-love 
wholly engrosses us1 and leaves no room 
for any other principle1 there can be   
absolutely no such thing at all as      
happiness or enjoyment of any kind      
whatever2 since happiness consists in   
the gratification of particular         

passions1 which supposes the having of  
them4  ,self-love then does not         
constitute this or that to be our       
interest or good2 but1 our interest or  
good being constituted by nature  and   
supposed1 self-love only puts us upon   
obtaining and securing it4  ,therefore1 
if it be possible that self-love may    
prevail and exert itself  in a degree or
 manner which is not subservient to this
 end2 then it will  not follow that our 
interest will be promoted in proportion 
to the degree  in which that principle  
engrosses us1 and prevails over others4 
,nay1  further1 the private and         
contracted affection1 when it is not    
subservient  to this end1 private good  
may1 for anything that appears1 have a  
direct  contrary tendency and effect4   
,and if we will consider the matter1 we 
shall see that it often really has4     
,disengagement is absolutely  necessary 
to enjoyment2 and a person may have so  
steady and fixed an eye  upon his own   
interest1 whatever he places it in1 as  

may hinder him from  attending to many  
gratifications within his reach1 which  
others have  their minds free and open  
to4  ,over-fondness for a child is not  
generally thought to be for its         
advantage2 and1 if there be any guess to
  be made from appearances1 surely that 
character we call selfish is not  the   
most promising for happiness4  ,such a  
temper may plainly be1 and  exert itself
 in a degree and manner which may give  
unnecessary and  useless solicitude and 
anxiety1 in a degree and manner which   
may prevent  obtaining the means and    
materials of enjoyment1 as well as the  
making use  of them4  ,immoderate       
self-love does very ill consult its own 
interest3  and1 how much soever a       
paradox it may appear1 it is certainly  
true that  even from self-love we should
 endeavour to get over all inordinate   
regard  to and consideration of         
ourselves4  ,every one of our passions  
and  affections hath its natural stint  
and bound1 which may easily be          

exceeded2 whereas our enjoyments can    
possibly be but in a determinate        
measure and degree4  ,therefore such    
excess of the affection1 since it       
cannot procure any enjoyment1 must in   
all cases be useless2 but is  generally 
attended with inconveniences1 and often 
is downright pain and  misery4  ,this   
holds as much with regard to self-love  
as to all other  affections4  ,the      
natural degree of it1 so far as it sets 
us on work to  gain and make use of the 
materials of satisfaction1 may be to our
 real  advantage2 but beyond or besides 
this1 it is in several respects an      
inconvenience and disadvantage4  ,thus  
it appears that private interest is  so 
far from being likely to be promoted in 
proportion to the degree in  which      
self-love engrosses us1 and prevails    
over all other principles1  that the    
contracted affection may be so prevalent
 as to disappoint  itself1 and even     
contradict its own and private good4    
,but who1 except the most sordidly      

covetous1 ever thought there was any    
rivalship between the love of greatness1
 honour1 power1 or between  sensual     
appetites and self-love8  ,no1 there is 
a perfect harmony between  them4  ,it is
 by means of these particular appetites 
and affections that  self-love is       
gratified in enjoyment1 happiness1 and  
satisfaction4  ,the  competition and    
rivalship is between self-love and the  
love of our  neighbour3 that affection  
which leads us out of ourselves1 makes  
us  regardless of our own interest1 and 
substitute that of another in its       
stead4  ,whether1 then1 there be any    
peculiar competition and contrariety  in
 this case shall now be considered4     
,self-love and interestedness was stated
 to consist in or be an affection  to   
ourselves1 a regard to our own private  
good3 it is therefore distinct  from    
benevolence1 which is an affection to   
the good of our  fellow-creatures4  ,but
 that benevolence is distinct from1 that
 is1 not  the same thing with self-love1

 is no reason for its being looked upon 
with any peculiar suspicion2 because    
every principle whatever1 by means  of  
which self-love is gratified1 is        
distinct from it2 and all things  which 
are distinct from each other are equally
 so4  ,a man has an  affection or       
aversion to another3 that one of these  
tends to1 and is  gratified by1 doing   
good1 that the other tends to1 and is   
gratified by1  doing harm1 does not in  
the least alter the respect which either
 one or  the other of these inward      
feelings has to self-love4  ,we use the 
word  property so as to exclude any     
other persons having an interest in that
  of which we say a particular man has  
the property4  ,and we often use the    
word selfish so as to exclude in the    
same manner all regards to the  good of 
others4  ,but the cases are not         
parallel3 for though that  exclusion is 
really part of the idea of property2 yet
 such positive  exclusion1 or bringing  
this peculiar disregard to the good of  

others into  the idea of self-love1 is  
in reality adding to the idea1 or       
changing it  from what it was before    
stated to consist in1 namely1 in an     
affection to  ourselves4 #be  ,this     
being the whole idea of self-love1 it   
can no  otherwise exclude good-will or  
love of others1 than merely by not      
including it1 no otherwise1 than it     
excludes love of arts or reputation1  or
 of anything else4  ,neither on the     
other hand does benevolence1 any  more  
than love of arts or of reputation      
exclude self-love4  ,love of our        
neighbour1 then1 has just the same      
respect to1 is no more distant from1    
self-love1 than hatred of our neighbour1
 or than love or hatred of  anything    
else4  ,thus the principles1 from which 
men rush upon certain  ruin for the     
destruction of an enemy1 and for the    
preservation of a  friend1 have the same
 respect to the private affection1 and  
are equally  interested1 or equally     
disinterested2 and it is of no avail    

whether they  are said to be one or the 
other4  ,therefore to those who are     
shocked to  hear virtue spoken of as    
disinterested1 it may be allowed that it
 is  indeed absurd to speak thus of it2 
unless hatred1 several particular       
instances of vice1 and all the common   
affections and aversions in  mankind1   
are acknowledged to be disinterested    
too4  ,is there any less  inconsistence 
between the love of inanimate things1 or
 of creatures  merely sensitive1 and    
self-love1 than between self-love and   
the love of  our neighbour8  ,is desire 
of and delight in the happiness of      
another any  more a diminution of       
self-love than desire of and delight in 
the esteem  of another8  ,they are both 
equally desire of and delight in        
somewhat  external to ourselves2 either 
both or neither are so4  ,the object of 
self-  love is expressed in the term    
self2 and every appetite of sense1 and  
every particular affection of the heart1
 are equally interested or              

disinterested1 because the objects of   
them all are equally self or  somewhat  
else4  ,whatever ridicule therefore the 
mention of a  disinterested principle or
 action may be supposed to lie open to1 
must1  upon the matter being thus       
stated1 relate to ambition1 and every   
appetite  and particular affection as   
much as to benevolence4  ,and indeed all
 the  ridicule1 and all the grave       
perplexity1 of which this subject hath  
had  its full share1 is merely from     
words4  ,the most intelligible way of   
speaking of it seems to be this3 that   
self-love and the actions done in       
consequence of it 7for these will       
presently appear to be the same as to   
this question7 are interested2 that     
particular affections towards  external 
objects1 and the actions done in        
consequence of those affections  are not
 so4  ,but every one is at liberty to   
use words as he pleases4  ,all  that is 
here insisted upon is that ambition1    
revenge1 benevolence1 all  particular   

passions whatever1 and the actions they 
produce1 are equally  interested or     
disinterested4    ,thus it appears that 
there is no peculiar contrariety between
 self-love  and benevolence2 no greater 
competition between these than between  
any  other particular affections and    
self-love4  ,this relates to the        
affections themselves4  ,let us now see 
whether there be any peculiar           
contrariety between the respective      
courses of life which these affections  
lead to2 whether there be any greater   
competition between the pursuit of      
private and of public good1 than between
 any other particular pursuits  and that
 of private good4    ,there seems no    
other reason to suspect that there is   
any such peculiar  contrariety1 but only
 that the course of action which        
benevolence leads  to has a more direct 
tendency to promote the good of others1 
than that  course of action which love  
of reputation suppose1 or any other     
particular affection leads to4  ,but    

that any affection tends to the         
happiness of another does not hinder its
 tending to one's own happiness  too4   
,that others enjoy the benefit of the   
air and the light of the sun  does not  
hinder but that these are as much one's 
own private advantage  now as they would
 be if we had the property of them      
exclusive of all  others4  ,so a pursuit
 which tends to promote the good of     
another1 yet may  have as great tendency
 to promote private interest1 as a      
pursuit which  does not tend to the good
 of another at all1 or which is         
mischievous to  him4  ,all particular   
affections whatever1 resentment1        
benevolence1 love  of arts1 equally lead
 to a course of action for their own    
gratification2  i4e41 the gratification 
of ourselves2 and the gratification of  
each  gives delight3 so far1 then1 it is
 manifest they have all the same        
respect to private interest4  ,now take 
into consideration1 further1  concerning
 these three pursuits1 that the end of  

the first is the harm1  of the second1  
the good of another1 of the last1       
somewhat indifferent2  and is there any 
necessity that these additional         
considerations should  alter the        
respect1 which we before saw these three
 pursuits had to  private interest1 or  
render any one of them less conducive to
 it1 than  any other8  ,thus one man's  
affection is to honour as his end2 in   
order to  obtain which he thinks no     
pains too great4  ,suppose another1 with
 such a  singularity of mind1 as to have
 the same affection to public good as   
his  end1 which he endeavours with the  
same labour to obtain4  ,in case of     
success1 surely the man of benevolence  
hath as great enjoyment as the man  of  
ambition2 they both equally having the  
end their affections1 in the  same      
degree1 tended to2 but in case of       
disappointment1 the benevolent man  has 
clearly the advantage2 since            
endeavouring to do good1 considered as a
  virtuous pursuit1 is gratified by its 

own consciousness1 i4e41 is in a  degree
 its own reward4    ,and as to these    
two1 or benevolence and any other       
particular passions  whatever1          
considered in a further view1 as forming
 a general temper1  which more or less  
disposes us for enjoyment of all the    
common blessings  of life1 distinct from
 their own gratification1 is benevolence
 less the  temper of tranquillity and   
freedom than ambition or covetousness8  
,does  the benevolent man appear less   
easy with himself from his love to his  
neighbour8  ,does he less relish his    
being8  ,is there any peculiar gloom    
seated on his face8  ,is his mind less  
open to entertainment1 to any           
particular gratification8  ,nothing is  
more manifest than that being in  good  
humour1 which is benevolence whilst it  
lasts1 is itself the temper  of         
satisfaction and enjoyment4    ,suppose 
then1 a man sitting down to consider how
 he might become most  easy to himself1 
and attain the greatest pleasure he     

could1 all that  which is his real      
natural happiness4  ,this can only      
consist in the  enjoyment of those      
objects which are by nature adapted to  
our several  faculties4  ,these         
particular enjoyments make up the sum   
total of our  happiness1 and they are   
supposed to arise from riches1 honours1 
and the  gratification of sensual       
appetites4  ,be it so2 yet none profess 
themselves so completely happy in these 
enjoyments1 but that there is  room left
 in the mind for others1 if they were   
presented to them3 nay1  these1 as much 
as they engage us1 are not thought so   
high1 but that human  nature is capable 
even of greater4  ,now there have been  
persons in all  ages who have professed 
that they found satisfaction in the     
exercise of  charity1 in the love of    
their neighbour1 in endeavouring to     
promote the  happiness of all they had  
to do with1 and in the pursuit of what  
is just  and right and good as the      
general bent of their mind and end of   

their  life2 and that doing an action of
 baseness or cruelty would be as great  
violence to their self1 as much breaking
 in upon their nature1 as any  external 
force4  ,persons of this character would
 add1 if they might be  heard1 that they
 consider themselves as acting in the   
view of an ,infinite  ,being1 who is in 
a much higher sense the object of       
reverence and of love1  than all the    
world besides2 and therefore they could 
have no more  enjoyment from a wicked   
action done under ,his eye than the     
persons to  whom they are making their  
apology could if all mankind were the   
spectators of it2 and that the          
satisfaction of approving themselves to 
his unerring judgment1 to whom they thus
 refer all their actions1 is a  more    
continued settled satisfaction than any 
this world can afford2 as  also that    
they have1 no less than others1 a mind  
free and open to all the  common        
innocent gratifications of it1 such as  
they are4  ,and if we go no  further1   

does there appear any absurdity in this8
  ,will any one take upon  him to say   
that a man cannot find his account in   
this general course of  life as much as 
in the most unbounded ambition1 and the 
excesses of  pleasure8  ,or that such a 
person has not consulted so well for    
himself1  for the satisfaction and peace
 of his own mind1 as the ambitious or   
dissolute man8  ,and though the         
consideration that ,god himself will in 
the  end justify their taste1 and       
support their cause1 is not formally to 
be  insisted upon here1 yet thus much   
comes in1 that all enjoyments whatever  
are much more clear and unmixed from the
 assurance that they will end  well4    
,is it certain1 then1 that there is     
nothing in these pretensions to         
happiness8 especially when there are not
 wanting persons who have  supported    
themselves with satisfactions of this   
kind in sickness1  poverty1 disgrace1   
and in the very pangs of death2 whereas 
it is manifest  all other enjoyments    

fail in these circumstances4  ,this     
surely looks  suspicions of having      
somewhat in it4  ,self-love1 methinks1  
should be  alarmed4  ,may she not       
possibly pass over greater pleasures    
than those she  is so wholly taken up   
with8    ,the short of the matter is no 
more than this4  ,happiness consists in 
the  gratification of certain           
affections1 appetites1 passions1 with   
objects  which are by nature adapted to 
them4  ,self-love may indeed set us on  
work  to gratify these1 but happiness or
 enjoyment has no immediate connection  
with self-love1 but arises from such    
gratification alone4  ,love of our      
neighbour is one of those affections4   
,this1 considered as a virtuous         
principle1 is gratified by a            
consciousness of endeavouring to promote
  the good of others1 but considered as 
a natural affection1 its  gratification 
consists in the actual accomplishment of
 this endeavour4  ,now indulgence or    
gratification of this affection1 whether

 in that  consciousness or this         
accomplishment1 has the same respect to 
interest as  indulgence of any other    
affection2 they equally proceed from or 
do not  proceed from self-love1 they    
equally include or equally exclude this 
principle4  ,thus it appears1 that      
benevolence and the pursuit of public   
good hath at least as great respect to  
self-love and the pursuit of  private   
good as any other particular passions1  
and their respective  pursuits4         
,neither is covetousness1 whether as a  
temper or pursuit1 any exception to     
this4  ,for if by covetousness is meant 
the desire and pursuit of riches  for   
their own sake1 without any regard to1  
or consideration of1 the uses  of them1 
this hath as little to do with self-love
 as benevolence hath4  ,but by this word
 is usually meant1 not such madness and 
total distraction  of mind1 but         
immoderate affection to and pursuit of  
riches as possessions  in order to some 
further end1 namely1 satisfaction1      

interest1 or good4  ,this1 therefore1 is
 not a particular affection or          
particular pursuit1 but  it is the      
general principle of self-love1 and the 
general pursuit of our  own interest1   
for which reason the word selfish is by 
every one  appropriated to this temper  
and pursuit4  ,now as it is ridiculous  
to  assert that self-love and the love  
of our neighbour are the same1 so       
neither is it asserted that following   
these different affections hath the     
same tendency and respect to our own    
interest4  ,the comparison is not       
between self-love and the love of our   
neighbour1 between pursuit of our  own  
interest and the interest of others1 but
 between the several  particular        
affections in human nature towards      
external objects1 as one  part of the   
comparison1 and the one particular      
affection to the good of  our neighbour 
as the other part of it3 and it has been
 shown that all  these have the same    
respect to self-love and private        

interest4    ,there is indeed frequently
 an inconsistence or interfering between
 self-  love or private interest and the
 several particular appetites1 passions1
  affections1 or the pursuits they lead 
to4  ,but this competition or           
interfering is merely accidental1 and   
happens much oftener between pride1     
revenge1 sensual gratifications1 and    
private interest1 than between  private 
interest and benevolence4  ,for nothing 
is more common than to see  men give    
themselves up to a passion or an        
affection to their known  prejudice and 
ruin1 and in direct contradiction to    
manifest and real  interest1 and the    
loudest calls of self-love3 whereas the 
seeming  competitions and interfering1  
between benevolence and private         
interest1  relate much more to the      
materials or means of enjoyment than to 
enjoyment  itself4  ,there is often an  
interfering in the former when there is 
none  in the latter4  ,thus as to       
riches3 so much money as a man gives    

away1 so  much less will remain in his  
possession4  ,here is a real            
interfering4  ,but  though a man cannot 
possibly give without lessening his     
fortune1 yet  there are multitudes might
 give without lessening their own       
enjoyment1  because they may have more  
than they can turn to any real use or   
advantage to themselves4  ,thus the more
 thought and time any one employs  about
 the interests and good of others1 he   
must necessarily have less to  attend   
his own3 but he may have so ready and   
large a supply of his own  wants1 that  
such thought might be really useless to 
himself1 though of  great service and   
assistance to others4    ,the general   
mistake1 that there is some greater     
inconsistence between  endeavouring to  
promote the good of another and         
self-interest1 than  between            
self-interest and pursuing anything     
else1 seems1 as hath already  been      
hinted1 to arise from our notions of    
property1 and to be carried on  by this 

property's being supposed to be itself  
our happiness or good4  ,people are so  
very much taken up with this one        
subject1 that they seem  from it to have
 formed a general way of thinking1 which
 they apply to  other things that they  
have nothing to do with4  ,hence in a   
confused and  slight way it might well  
be taken for granted that another's     
having no  interest in an affection     
7i4e41 his good not being the object of 
it7  renders1 as one may speak1 the     
proprietor's interest in it greater2 and
  that if another had an interest in it 
this would render his less1 or  occasion
 that such affection could not be so    
friendly to self-love1 or  conducive to 
private good1 as an affection or pursuit
 which has not a  regard to the good of 
another4  ,this1 ,i say1 might be taken 
for granted1  whilst it was not attended
 to1 that the object of every particular
  affection is equally somewhat external
 to ourselves1 and whether it be  the   
good of another person1 or whether it be

 any other external thing1  makes no    
alteration with regard to its being     
one's own affection1 and the            
gratification of it one's own private   
enjoyment4  ,and so far as it is  taken 
for granted that barely having the means
 and materials of enjoyment  is what    
constitutes interest and happiness2 that
 our interest or good  consists in      
possessions themselves1 in having the   
property of riches1  houses1 lands1     
gardens1 not in the enjoyment of them2  
so far it will even  more strongly be   
taken for granted1 in the way already   
explained1 that an  affection's         
conducing to the good of another must   
even necessarily  occasion it to conduce
 less to private good1 if not to be     
positively  detrimental to it4  ,for1 if
 property and happiness are one and the 
same  thing1 as by increasing the       
property of another you lessen your own 
property1 so by promoting the happiness 
of another you must lessen your  own    
happiness4  ,but whatever occasioned the

 mistake1 ,i hope it has been  fully    
proved to be one1 as it has been proved1
 that there is no peculiar  rivalship or
 competition between self-love and      
benevolence3 that as there  may be a    
competition between these two1 so there 
many also between any  particular       
affection whatever and self-love2 that  
every particular  affection1 benevolence
 among the rest1 is subservient to      
self-love by  being the instrument of   
private enjoyment2 and that in one      
respect  benevolence contributes more to
 private interest1 i4e41 enjoyment or   
satisfaction1 than any other of the     
particular common affections1 as it  is 
in a degree its own gratification4      
,and to all these things may be added   
that religion1 from whence arises  our  
strongest obligation to benevolence1 is 
so far from disowning the  principle of 
self-love1 that it often addresses      
itself to that very  principle1 and     
always to the mind in that state when   
reason presides1 and  there can no      

access be had to the understanding1 but 
by convincing men  that the course of   
life we would persuade them to is not   
contrary to  their interest4  ,it may be
 allowed1 without any prejudice to the  
cause of  virtue and religion1 that our 
ideas of happiness and misery are of all
  our ideas the nearest and most        
important to us2 that they will1 nay1 if
  you please1 that they ought to prevail
 over those of order1 and beauty1  and  
harmony1 and proportion1 if there should
 ever be1 as it is impossible  there    
ever should be1 any inconsistence       
between them1 though these last1  too1  
as expressing the fitness of actions1   
are real as truth itself4  ,let  it be  
allowed1 though virtue or moral         
rectitude does indeed consist in        
affection to and pursuit of what is     
right and good1 as such1 yet1 that  when
 we sit down in a cool hour1 we can     
neither justify to ourselves this  or   
any other pursuit1 till we are convinced
 that it will be for our  happiness1 or 

at least not contrary to it4    ,common 
reason and humanity will have some      
influence upon mankind1  whatever       
becomes of speculations2 but1 so far as 
the interests of virtue  depend upon the
 theory of it being secured from open   
scorn1 so far its  very being in the    
world depends upon its appearing to have
 no contrariety  to private interest and
 self-love4  ,the foregoing             
observations1  therefore1 it is hoped1  
may have gained a little ground in      
favour of the  precept before us1 the   
particular explanation of which shall be
 the  subject of the next discourse4    
,i will conclude at present with        
observing the peculiar obligation which 
we are under to virtue and religion1 as 
enforced in the verses following  the   
text1 in the epistle for the day1 from  
our ,saviour's coming into the  world4  
,the night is far spent1 the day is at  
hand2 let us therefore  cast off the    
works of darkness1 and let us put on the
 armour of light1  c4  ,the meaning and 

force of which exhortation is1 that     
,christianity  lays us under new        
obligations to a good life1 as by it the
 will of ,god is  more clearly revealed1
 and as it affords additional motives to
 the  practice of it1 over and above    
those which arise out of the nature of  
virtue and vice1 ,i might add1 as our   
,saviour has set us a perfect example   
of goodness in our own nature4  ,now    
love and charity is plainly the thing   
in which ,he hath placed ,his religion2 
in which1 therefore1 as we have any     
pretence to the name of ,christians1 we 
must place ours4  ,he hath at once      
enjoined it upon us by way of command   
with peculiar force1 and by ,his        
example1 as having undertaken the work  
of our salvation out of pure love  and  
goodwill to mankind4  ,the endeavour to 
set home this example upon our  minds is
 a very proper employment of this       
season1 which is bringing on  the       
festival of ,his birth1 which as it may 
teach us many excellent  lessons of     

humility1 resignation1 and obedience to 
the will of ,god1 so  there is none it  
recommends with greater authority1      
force1 and advantage  than this love and
 charity1 since it was for us men1 and  
for our  salvation1 that ,he came down  
from heaven1 and was incarnate1 and  was
 made man1 that ,he might teach us our  
duty1 and more especially that  ,he     
might enforce the practice of it1 reform
 mankind1 and finally bring us  to that 
eternal salvation1 of which ,he is the  
,author to all those that  obey ,him4   
,,sermon ,,xii4  ,,upon ,,the ,,love    
,,of ,,our ,,neighbour4         ,,rom4  
xiii4 #i4       ,and if there be any    
other commandment1 it is briefly        
comprehended     in this saying1 namely1
 ,thou shalt love thy neighbour as      
thyself4    ,having already removed the 
prejudices against public spirit1 or the
 love  of our neighbour1 on the side of 
private interest and self-love1 ,i      
proceed to the particular explanation of
 the precept before us1 by  showing1    

,who is our neighbour3 ,in what sense we
 are required to love  him as ourselves2
 ,the influence such love would have    
upon our behaviour  in life2 and lastly1
 ,how this commandment comprehends in it
 all  others4    ,i4  ,the objects and  
due extent of this affection will be    
understood by  attending to the nature  
of it1 and to the nature and            
circumstances of  mankind in this world4
  ,the love of our neighbour is the same
 with  charity1 benevolence1 or         
goodwill3 it is an affection to the good
 and  happiness of our fellow-creatures4
  ,this implies in it a disposition to  
produce happiness1 and this is the      
simple notion of goodness1 which        
appears so amiable wherever we meet with
 it4  ,from hence it is easy to  see    
that the perfection of goodness consists
 in love to the whole  universe4  ,this 
is the perfection of ,almighty ,god4    
,but as man is so much limited in his   
capacity1 as so small a part of the     
,creation comes under his notice and    

influence1 and as we are not used to    
consider things in so general a way1 it 
is not to be thought of that the        
universe should be the object of        
benevolence to such creatures as we are4
  ,thus in that precept of our ,saviour1
 ,be ye perfect1 even as your  ,father1 
which is in heaven1 is perfect1 #bf the 
perfection of the  divine goodness is   
proposed to our imitation as it is      
promiscuous1 and  extends to the evil as
 well as the good2 not as it is         
absolutely  universal1 imitation of it  
in this respect being plainly beyond us4
  ,the  object is too vast4  ,for this  
reason moral writers also have          
substituted  a less general object for  
our benevolence1 mankind4  ,but this    
likewise is  an object too general1 and 
very much out of our view4  ,therefore  
persons  more practical have1 instead of
 mankind1 put our country1 and made the 
principle of virtue1 of human virtue1 to
 consist in the entire uniform  love of 
our country3 and this is what we call a 

public spirit1 which in  men of public  
stations is the character of a patriot4 
,but this is  speaking to the upper part
 of the world4  ,kingdoms and           
governments are  large1 and the sphere  
of action of far the greatest part of   
mankind is  much narrower than the      
government they live under3 or however1 
common men  do not consider their       
actions as affecting the whole community
 of which  they are members4  ,there    
plainly is wanting a less general and   
nearer  object of benevolence for the   
bulk of men than that of their country4 
,therefore the ,scripture1 not being a  
book of theory and speculation1 but  a  
plain rule of life for mankind1 has with
 the utmost possible propriety  put the 
principle of virtue upon the love of our
 neighbour1 which is that  part of the  
universe1 that part of mankind1 that    
part of our country1  which comes under 
our immediate notice1 acquaintance1 and 
influence1 and  with which we have to   
do4    ,this is plainly the true account

 or reason why our ,saviour places the  
principle of virtue in the love of our  
neighbour1 and the account  itself shows
 who are comprehended under that        
relation4    ,,ii4  ,let us now consider
 in what sense we are commanded to love 
our  neighbour as ourselves4    ,this   
precept1 in its first delivery by our   
,saviour1 is thus  introduced3--,thou   
shalt love the ,lord thy ,god with all  
thine heart1  with all thy soul1 and    
with all thy strength2 and thy neighbour
 as  thyself4  ,these very different    
manners of expression do not lead our   
thoughts to the same measure or degree  
of love1 common to both objects1  but to
 one peculiar to each4  ,supposing1     
then1 which is to be supposed1 a        
distinct meaning and propriety in the   
words1 as thyself2 the precept we  are  
considering will admit of any of these  
senses3 that we bear the same  kind of  
affection to our neighbour as we do to  
ourselves1 or1 that the  love we bear to
 our neighbour should have some certain 

proportion or  other to self-love3 or1  
lastly1 that it should bear the         
particular  proportion of equality1 that
 it be in the same degree4    ,first1   
,the precept may be understood as       
requiring only that we have the  same   
kind of affection to our                
fellow-creatures as to ourselves2 that1 
as every man has the principle of       
self-love1 which disposes him to avoid  
misery1 and consult his own happiness1  
so we should cultivate the  affection of
 goodwill to our neighbour1 and that it 
should influence us  to have the same   
kind of regard to him4  ,this at least  
must be commanded1  and this will not   
only prevent our being injurious to him1
 but will also  put us upon promoting   
his good4  ,there are blessings in life1
 which we  share in common with others1 
peace1 plenty1 freedom1 healthful       
seasons4  ,but real benevolence to our  
fellow-creatures would give us the      
notion of  a common interest in a       
stricter sense1 for in the degree we    

love another1  his interest1 his joys   
and sorrows1 are our own4  ,it is from  
self-love  that we form the notion of   
private good1 and consider it is our    
own3 love  of our neighbour would teach 
us thus to appropriate to ourselves his 
good  and welfare2 to consider ourselves
 as having a real share in his          
happiness4  ,thus the principle of      
benevolence would be an advocate within 
our own breasts1 to take care of the    
interests of our fellow-creatures in    
all the interfering and competitions    
which cannot but be1 from the           
imperfection of our nature1 and the     
state we are in4  ,it would likewise1   
in some measure1 lessen that            
interfering1 and hinder men from forming
 so  strong a notion of private good1   
exclusive of the good of others1 as we  
commonly do4  ,thus1 as the private     
affection makes us in a peculiar  manner
 sensible of humanity1 justice or       
injustice1 when exercised towards       
ourselves1 love of our neighbour would  

give us the same kind of  sensibility in
 his behalf4  ,this would be the        
greatest security of our  uniform       
obedience to that most equitable rule4  
,whatsoever ye would that  men should do
 unto you1 do ye even so unto them4     
,all this is indeed no more than that we
 should have a real love to our         
neighbour2 but then1 which is to be     
observed1 the words as thyself  express 
this in the most distinct manner1 and   
determine the precept to  relate to the 
affection itself4  ,the advantage which 
this principle of  benevolence has over 
other remote considerations is1 that it 
is itself  the temper of virtue1 and    
likewise that it is the chief1 nay1 the 
only  effectual security of our         
performing the several offices of       
kindness we  owe to our                 
fellow-creatures4  ,when from distant   
considerations men  resolve upon any    
thing to which they have no liking1 or  
perhaps an  averseness1 they are        
perpetually finding out evasions and    

excuses1 which  need never be wanting1  
if people look for them3 and they       
equivocate with  themselves in the      
plainest cases in the world4  ,this may 
be in respect to  single determinate    
acts of virtue1 but it comes in much    
more1 where the  obligation is to a     
general course of behaviour1 and most of
 all1 if it be  such as cannot be       
reduced to fixed determinate rules4     
,this observation  may account for the  
diversity of the expression in that     
known passage of  the prophet ,micah1 to
 do justly1 and to love mercy4  ,a man's
 heart  must be formed to humanity and  
benevolence1 he must love mercy1        
otherwise he will not act mercifully in 
any settled course of behaviour4  ,as   
consideration of the future sanctions of
 religion is our only security  of      
preserving in our duty1 in cases of     
great temptation3 so to get our  heart  
and temper formed to a love and liking  
of what is good is  absolutely necessary
 in order to our behaving rightly in the

 familiar and  daily intercourses       
amongst mankind4    ,secondly1 ,the     
precept before us may be understood to  
require that we love  our neighbour in  
some certain proportion or other1       
according as we  love ourselves4  ,and  
indeed a man's character cannot be      
determined by the  love he bears to his 
neighbour1 considered absolutely1 but   
the proportion  which this bears to     
self-love1 whether it be attended to or 
not1 is the  chief thing which forms the
 character and influences the actions4  
,for1  as the form of the body is a     
composition of various parts1 so        
likewise  our inward structure is not   
simple or uniform1 but a composition of 
various passions1 appetites1 affections1
 together with rationality1  including  
in this last both the discernment of    
what is right1 and a  disposition to    
regulate ourselves by it4  ,there is    
greater variety of  parts in what we    
call a character than there are features
 in a face1 and  the morality of that is

 no more determined by one part than the
 beauty or  deformity of this is by one 
single feature3 each is to be judged of 
by  all the parts or features1 not taken
 singly1 but together4  ,in the inward  
frame the various passions1 appetites1  
affections1 stand in different  respects
 to each other4  ,the principles in our 
mind may be contradictory1  or checks   
and allays only1 or incentives and      
assistants to each other4  ,and         
principles1 which in their nature have  
no kind of contrariety or  affinity1 may
 yet accidentally be each other's allays
 or incentives4    ,from hence it comes 
to pass1 that though we were able to    
look into the  inward contexture of the 
heart1 and see with the greatest        
exactness in  what degree any one       
principle is in a particular man1 we    
could not from  thence determine how far
 that principle would go towards forming
 the  character1 or what influence it   
would have upon the actions1 unless we  
could likewise discern what other       

principles prevailed in him1 and see    
the proportion which that one bears to  
the others4  ,thus1 though two men      
should have the affection of compassion 
in the same degree exactly1 yet  one may
 have the principle of resentment or of 
ambition so strong in him  as to prevail
 over that of compassion1 and prevent   
its having any  influence upon his      
actions1 so that he may deserve the     
character of a  hard or cruel man1      
whereas the other having compassion in  
just the same  degree only1 yet having  
resentment or ambition in a lower       
degree1 his  compassion may prevail over
 them1 so as to influence his actions1  
and to  denominate his temper           
compassionate4  ,so that1 how strange   
soever it may  appear to people who do  
not attend to the thing1 yet it is quite
 manifest  that1 when we say one man is 
more resenting or compassionate than    
another1 this does not necessarily imply
 that one has the principle of          
resentment or of compassion stronger    

than the other4  ,for if the  proportion
 which resentment or compassion bears to
 other inward  principles is greater in 
one than in the other1 this is itself   
sufficient  to denominate one more      
resenting or compassionate than the     
other4    ,further1 the whole system1 as
 ,i may speak1 of affections 7including 
rationality71 which constitute the      
heart1 as this word is used in          
,scripture and on moral subjects1 are   
each and all of them stronger in  some  
than in others4  ,now the proportion    
which the two general  affections1      
benevolence and self-love1 bear to each 
other1 according to  this interpretation
 of the text1 demonstrates men's        
character as to  virtue4  ,suppose1     
then1 one man to have the principle of  
benevolence in a  higher degree than    
another2 it will not follow from hence  
that his  general temper or character or
 actions will be more benevolent than   
the  other's4  ,for he may have         
self-love in such a degree as quite to  

prevail  over benevolence1 so that it   
may have no influence at all upon his   
action1 whereas benevolence in the other
 person1 though in a lower  degree1 may 
yet be the strongest principle in his   
heart1 and strong  enough to be the     
guide of his actions1 so as to          
denominate him a good and  virtuous man4
  ,the case is here as in scales3 it is 
not one weight  considered in itself1   
which determines whether the scale shall
 ascend or  descend1 but this depends   
upon the proportion which that one      
weight hath  to the other4    ,it being 
thus manifest that the influence which  
benevolence has upon our  actions1 and  
how far it goes towards forming our     
character1 is not  determined by the    
degree itself of this principle in our  
mind1 but by the  proportion it has to  
self-love and other principles3 a       
comparison also  being made in the text 
between self-love and the love of our   
neighbour2  these joint considerations  
afforded sufficient occasion for        

treating here  of that proportion4  ,it 
plainly is implied in the precept1      
though it  should be questioned1 whether
 it be the exact meaning of the words1  
as  thyself4    ,love of our neighbour1 
then1 must bear some proportion to      
self-love1 and  virtue1 to be sure1     
consists in the due proportion4  ,what  
this due  proportion is1 whether as a   
principle in the mind1 or as exerted in 
actions1 can be judged of only from our 
nature and condition in this  world4    
,of the degree in which affections and  
the principles of action1  considered in
 themselves1 prevail1 we have no        
measure3 let us1 then1  proceed to the  
course of behaviour1 the actions they   
produce4    ,both our nature and        
condition require that each particular  
man should  make particular provision   
for himself3 and the inquiry1 what      
proportion  benevolence should have to  
self-love1 when brought down to         
practice1 will  be1 what is a competent 
care and provision for ourselves8  ,and 

how  certain soever it be that each man 
must determine this for himself1 and    
how ridiculous soever it would be for   
any to attempt to determine it for      
another1 yet it is to be observed that  
the proportion is real1 and that a      
competent provision has a bound1 and    
that it cannot be all which we can      
possibly get and keep within our grasp1 
without legal injustice4  ,mankind      
almost universally bring in vanity1     
supplies for what is called a life of   
pleasure1 covetousness1 or imaginary    
notions of superiority over others1  to 
determine this question3 but every one  
who desires to act a proper  part in    
society would do well to consider how   
far any of them come in to  determine   
it1 in the way of moral consideration4  
,all that can be said  is1 supposing    
what1 as the world goes1 is so much to  
be supposed that it  is scarce to be    
mentioned1 that persons do not neglect  
what they really  owe to themselves2 the
 more of their care and thought and of  

their  fortune they employ in doing good
 to their fellow-creatures the nearer   
they come up to the law of perfection1  
,thou shalt love thy neighbour as       
thyself4    ,thirdly1 if the words as   
thyself were to be understood of an     
equality  of affection1 it would not be 
attended with those consequences which  
perhaps may be thought to follow from   
it4  ,suppose a person to have the  same
 settled regard to others as to himself2
 that in every deliberate  scheme or    
pursuit he took their interest into the 
account in the same  degree as his own1 
so far as an equality of affection would
 produce this3  yet he would1 in fact1  
and ought to be1 much more taken up and 
employed  about himself1 and his own    
concerns1 than about others1 and their  
interests4  ,for1 besides the one common
 affection toward himself and his       
neighbour he would have several other   
particular affections1 passions1        
appetites1 which he could not possibly  
feel in common both for himself  and    

others4  ,now these sensations          
themselves very much employ us1 and     
have perhaps as great influence as      
self-love4  ,so far indeed as           
self-love1 and cool reflection upon what
 is for our interest1 would set  us on  
work to gain a supply of our own several
 wants1 so far the love of  our         
neighbour would make us do the same for 
him3 but the degree in which  we are put
 upon seeking and making use of the     
means of gratification1 by  the feeling 
of those affections1 appetites1 and     
passions1 must  necessarily be peculiar 
to ourselves4    ,that there are        
particular passions 7suppose shame1     
resentment7 which men  seem to have1 and
 feel in common1 both for themselves and
 others1 makes  no alteration in respect
 to those passions and appetites which  
cannot  possibly be thus felt in common4
  ,from hence 7and perhaps more things  
of  the like kind might be mentioned7 it
 follows1 that though there were an     
equality of affection to both1 yet      

regards to ourselves would be more      
prevalent than attention to the concerns
 of others4    ,and from moral          
considerations it ought to be so1       
supposing still the  equality of        
affection commanded1 because we are in a
 peculiar manner1 as  ,i may speak1     
intrusted with ourselves1 and therefore 
care of our own  interests1 as well as  
of our conduct1 particularly belongs to 
us4    ,to these things must be added1  
that moral obligations can extend no    
further than to natural possibilities4  
,now we have a perception of our  own   
interests1 like consciousness of our own
 existence1 which we always  carry about
 with us1 and which1 in its             
continuation1 kind1 and degree1  seems  
impossible to be felt in respect to the 
interests of others4    ,from all these 
things it fully appears that though we  
were to love our  neighbour in the same 
degree as we love ourselves1 so far as  
this is  possible1 yet the care of      
ourselves1 of the individual1 would not 

be  neglected1 the apprehended danger of
 which seems to be the only objection   
against understanding the precept in    
this strict sense4    ,,iii4  ,the      
general temper of mind which the due    
love of our neighbour  would form us to1
 and the influence it would have upon   
our behaviour in  life1 is now to be    
considered4    ,the temper and behaviour
 of charity is explained at large in    
that known  passage of ,st4 ,paul3 #bg  
,charity suffereth long1 and is kind2   
charity envieth not1 doth not behave    
itself unseemly1 seeketh not  her own1  
thinketh no evil1 beareth all things1   
believeth all  things1 hopeth all       
things4  ,as to the meaning of the      
expressions1  seeketh not her own1      
thinketh no evil1 believeth all things2 
however those expressions may be        
explained away1 this meekness1 and in   
some degree easiness of temper1         
readiness to forego our right for the   
sake of peace1 as well as in the way of 
compassion1 freedom from  mistrust1 and 

disposition to believe well of our      
neighbour1 this general  temper1 ,i say1
 accompanies1 and is plainly the effect 
of love and  goodwill4  ,and1 though    
such is the world in which we live1 that
  experience and knowledge of it not    
only may1 but must beget1 in as  greater
 regard to ourselves1 and doubtfulness  
of the characters of  others1 than is   
natural to mankind1 yet these ought not 
to be carried  further than the nature  
and course of things make necessary4    
,it is still  true1 even in the present 
state of things1 bad as it is1 that a   
real good  man had rather be deceived   
than be suspicious2 had rather forego   
his  known right1 than run the venture  
of doing even a hard thing4  ,this is   
the general temper of that charity1 of  
which the apostle asserts1 that if  he  
had it not1 giving his body to be burned
 would avail him nothing2  and which he 
says shall never fail4    ,the happy    
influence of this temper extends to     
every different relation  and           

circumstance in human life4  ,it plainly
 renders a man better1 more to  be      
desired1 as to all the respects and     
relations we can stand in to each       
other4  ,the benevolent man is disposed 
to make use of all external  advantages 
in such a manner as shall contribute to 
the good of others1 as  well as to his  
own satisfaction4  ,his own satisfaction
 consists in this4  ,he will be easy and
 kind to his dependents1 compassionate  
to the poor and  distressed1 friendly to
 all with whom he has to do4  ,this     
includes the  good neighbour1 parent1   
master1 magistrate3 and such a behaviour
 would  plainly make dependence1        
inferiority1 and even servitude easy4   
,so that a  good or charitable man of   
superior rank in wisdom1 fortune1       
authority1 is  a common blessing to the 
place he lives in3 happiness grows under
 his  influence4  ,this good principle  
in inferiors would discover itself in   
paying respect1 gratitude1 obedience1 as
 due4  ,it were therefore1  methinks1   

one just way of trying one's own        
character to ask ourselves1 am  ,i in   
reality a better master or servant1 a   
better friend1 a better  neighbour1 than
 such and such persons1 whom1 perhaps1  
,i may think not to  deserve the        
character of virtue and religion so much
 as myself8    ,and as to the spirit of 
party1 which unhappily prevails amongst 
mankind1  whatever are the distinctions 
which serve for a supply to it1 some or 
other of which have obtained in all ages
 and countries1 one who is thus         
friendly to his kind will immediately   
make due allowances for it1 as what     
cannot but be amongst such creatures as 
men1 in such a world as this4  ,and  as 
wrath and fury and overbearing upon     
these occasions proceed1 as ,i may      
speak1 from men's feeling only on their 
own side1 so a common feeling1  for     
others as well as for ourselves1 would  
render us sensible to this  truth1 which
 it is strange can have so little       
influence1 that we  ourselves differ    

from others1 just as much as they do    
from us4  ,i put the  matter in this    
way1 because it can scarce be expected  
that the generality  of men should see  
that those things which are made the    
occasions of  dissension and fomenting  
the party-spirit are really nothing at  
all3 but  it may be expected from all   
people1 how much soever they are in     
earnest  about their respective         
peculiarities1 that humanity and common 
goodwill  to their fellow-creatures     
should moderate and restrain that       
wretched  spirit4    ,this good temper  
of charity likewise would prevent strife
 and enmity  arising from other         
occasions3 it would prevent our giving  
just cause of  offence1 and our taking  
it without cause4  ,and in cases of real
 injury1 a  good man will make all the  
allowances which are to be made1 and1   
without  any attempts of retaliation1 he
 will only consult his own and other    
men's  security for the future against  
injustice and wrong4    ,,iv4  ,i       

proceed to consider1 lastly1 what is    
affirmed of the precept now  explained1 
that it comprehends in it all others1   
i4e41 that to love our  neighbour as    
ourselves includes in it all virtues4   
,now the way in which every maxim of    
conduct1 or general speculative         
assertion1 when it is to be explained at
 large should be treated1 is1 to  show  
what are the particular truths which    
were designed to be  comprehended under 
such a general observation1 how far it  
is strictly  true1 and then the         
limitations1 restrictions1 and          
exceptions1 if there be  exceptions1    
with which it is to be understood4  ,but
 it is only the former  of these1       
namely1 how far the assertion in the    
text holds1 and the ground  of the      
pre-eminence assigned to the precept of 
it1 which in strictness  comes into our 
present consideration4    ,however1 in  
almost everything that is said1 there is
 somewhat to be  understood beyond what 
is explicitly laid down1 and which we of

 course  supply1 somewhat1 ,i mean1     
which would not be commonly called a    
restriction or limitation4  ,thus1 when 
benevolence is said to be the sum  of   
virtue1 it is not spoken of as a blind  
propension1 but a principle in          
reasonable creatures1 and so to be      
directed by their reason1 for reason    
and reflection comes into our notion of 
a moral agent4  ,and that will  lead us 
to consider distant consequences1 as    
well as the immediate  tendency of an   
action4  ,it will teach us that the care
 of some persons1  suppose children and 
families1 is particularly committed to  
our charge by  ,nature and ,providence1 
as also that there are other            
circumstances1  suppose friendship or   
former obligations1 which require that  
we do good  to some1 preferably to      
others4  ,reason1 considered merely as  
subservient  to benevolence1 as         
assisting to produce the greatest good1 
will teach us  to have particular regard
 to these relations and circumstances1  

because  it is plainly for the good of  
the world that they should be regarded4 
,and  as there are numberless cases in  
which1 notwithstanding appearances1 we  
are not competent judges1 whether a     
particular action will upon the whole   
do good or harm1 reason in the same way 
will teach us to be cautious how  we act
 in these cases of uncertainty4  ,it    
will suggest to our  consideration which
 is the safer side2 how liable we are to
 be led wrong  by passion and private   
interest2 and what regard is due to     
laws1 and the  judgment of mankind4     
,all these things must come into        
consideration1 were  it only in order to
 determine which way of acting is likely
 to produce  the greatest good4  ,thus1 
upon supposition that it were in the    
strictest  sense true1 without          
limitation1 that benevolence includes in
 it all  virtues1 yet reason must come  
in as its guide and director1 in order  
to  attain its own end1 the end of      
benevolence1 the greatest public good4  

,reason1 then1 being thus included1 let 
us now consider the truth of the        
assertion itself4    ,first1 ,it is     
manifest that nothing can be of         
consequence to mankind or  any creature 
but happiness4  ,this1 then1 is all     
which any person can1 in  strictness of 
speaking1 be said to have a right to4   
,we can therefore  owe no man anything1 
but only to farther and promote his     
happiness1  according to our abilities4 
,and therefore a disposition and        
endeavour to  do good to all with whom  
we have to do1 in the degree and manner 
which  the different relations we stand 
in to them require1 is a discharge of   
all the obligations we are under to     
them4    ,as human nature is not one    
simple uniform thing but a composition  
of  various parts1 body1 spirit1        
appetites1 particular passions1 and     
affections1 for each of which reasonable
 self-love would lead men to have  due  
regard1 and make suitable provision1 so 
society consists of various  parts to   

which we stand in different respects and
 relations1 and just  benevolence would 
as surely lead us to have due regard to 
each of these  and behave as the        
respective relations require4           
,reasonable goodwill and  right         
behaviour towards our fellow-creatures  
are in a manner the same1  only that the
 former expresseth the principle as it  
is in the mind2 the  latter1 the        
principle as it were become external1   
i4e41 exerted in  actions4    ,and so   
far as temperance1 sobriety1 and        
moderation in sensual pleasures1  and   
the contrary vices1 have any respect to 
our fellow-creatures1 any  influence    
upon their quiet1 welfare1 and          
happiness1 as they always have a  real1 
and often a near influence upon it1 so  
far it is manifest those  virtues may be
 produced by the love of our neighbour1 
and that the  contrary vices would be   
prevented by it4  ,indeed1 if men's     
regard to  themselves will not restrain 
them from excess1 it may be thought     

little  probable that their love to     
others will be sufficient3 but the      
reason is1  that their love to others is
 not1 any more than their regard to     
themselves1 just1 and in its due degree4
  ,there are1 however1 manifest         
instances of persons kept sober and     
temperate from regard to their  affairs1
 and the welfare of those who depend    
upon them4  ,and it is  obvious to every
 one that habitual excess1 a dissolute  
course of life1  implies a general      
neglect of the duties we owe towards our
 friends1 our  families1 and our        
country4    ,from hence it is manifest  
that the common virtues and the common  
vices of  mankind may be traced up to   
benevolence1 or the want of it4  ,and   
this  entitles the precept1 ,thou shalt 
love thy neighbour as thyself1 to the   
pre-eminence given to it1 and is a      
justification of the apostle's          
assertion1 that all other commandments  
are comprehended in it1 whatever        
cautions and restrictions #bh there are1

 which might require to be  considered1 
if we were to state particularly and at 
length what is virtue  and right        
behaviour in mankind4  ,but1            
,secondly1 ,it might be added1 that in a
 higher and more general way of         
consideration1 leaving out the          
particular nature of creatures1 and the 
particular circumstances in which they  
are placed1 benevolence seems in  the   
strictest sense to include in it all    
that is good and worthy1 all  that is   
good1 which we have any distinct        
particular notion of4  ,we have  no     
clear conception of any position moral  
attribute in the ,supreme ,being1  but  
what may be resolved up into goodness4  
,and1 if we consider a  reasonable      
creature or moral agent1 without regard 
to the particular  relations and        
circumstances in which he is placed1 we 
cannot conceive  anything else to come  
in towards determining whether he is to 
be ranked  in a higher or lower class of
 virtuous beings1 but the higher or     

lower  degree in which that principle1  
and what is manifestly connected with   
it1  prevail in him4    ,that which we  
more strictly call piety1 or the love of
 ,god1 and which is  an essential part  
of a right temper1 some may perhaps     
imagine no way  connected with          
benevolence3 yet surely they must be    
connected1 if there  be indeed in being 
an object infinitely good4  ,human      
nature is so  constituted that every    
good affection implies the love of      
itself1 i4e41  becomes the object of a  
new affection in the same person4       
,thus1 to be  righteous1 implies in it  
the love of righteousness2 to be        
benevolent1 the  love of benevolence2 to
 be good1 the love of goodness2 whether 
this  righteousness1 benevolence1 or    
goodness be viewed as in our own mind or
  another's1 and the love of ,god as a  
being perfectly good is the love of     
perfect goodness contemplated in a being
 or person4  ,thus morality and         
religion1 virtue and piety1 will at last

 necessarily coincide1 run up  into one 
and the same point1 and love will be in 
all senses the end of  the commandment4 
99 99 99 99 99    ,o ,almighty ,god1    
inspire us with this divine principle2  
kill in us  all the seeds of envy and   
ill-will2 and help us1 by cultivating   
within ourselves the love of our        
neighbour1 to improve in the love of    
,thee4  ,thou hast placed us in various 
kindreds1 friendships1 and  relations1  
as the school of discipline for our     
affections3 help us1  by the due        
exercise of them1 to improve to         
perfection2 till all  partial affection 
be lost in that entire universal one1   
and thou1 ,o  ,god1 shalt be all in all4
          ,,sermon ,,xiii41 ,,xiv4      
,,upon ,,the ,,love ,,of ,,god4         
,,matthew xxii4 #cg4       ,thou shalt  
love the ,lord thy ,god with all thy    
heart1 and with all     thy soul1 and   
with all thy mind4    ,everybody knows1 
you therefore need only just be put in  
mind1 that there  is such a thing as    

having so great horror of one extreme as
 to run  insensibly and of course into  
the contrary2 and that a doctrine's     
having  been a shelter for enthusiasm1  
or made to serve the purposes of        
superstition1 is no proof of the falsity
 of it3 truth or right being  somewhat  
real in itself1 and so not to be judged 
of by its liableness to  abuse1 or by   
its supposed distance from or nearness  
to error4  ,it may be  sufficient to    
have mentioned this in general1 without 
taking notice of  the particular        
extravagances which have been vented    
under the pretence or  endeavour of     
explaining the love of ,god2 or how     
manifestly we are got  into the contrary
 extreme1 under the notion of a         
reasonable religion2 so  very reasonable
 as to have nothing to do with the heart
 and affections1  if these words signify
 anything but the faculty by which we   
discern  speculative truth4    ,by the  
love of ,god ,i would understand all    
those regards1 all those  affections of 

mind which are due immediately to ,him  
from such a creature  as man1 and which 
rest in ,him as their end4  ,as this    
does not include  servile fear1 so      
neither will any other regards1 how     
reasonable soever1  which respect       
anything out of or besides the          
perfection of the ,divine  nature1 come 
into consideration here4  ,but all fear 
is not excluded1  because ,his          
displeasure is itself the natural proper
 object of fear4  ,reverence1 ambition  
of ,his love and approbation1 delight in
 the hope or  consciousness of it1 come 
likewise into this definition of the    
love of  ,god1 because ,he is the       
natural object of all those affections  
or  movements of mind as really as ,he  
is the object of the affection1 which   
is in the strictest sense called love2  
and all of them equally rest in  ,him as
 their end4  ,and they may all be       
understood to be implied in these  words
 of our ,saviour1 without putting any   
force upon them3 for ,he is  speaking of

 the love of ,god and our neighbour as  
containing the whole of  piety and      
virtue4    ,it is plain that the nature 
of man is so constituted as to feel     
certain  affections upon the sight or   
contemplation of certain objects4  ,now 
the  very notion of affection implies   
resting in its object as an end4  ,and  
the particular affection to good        
characters1 reverence and moral love of 
them1 is natural to all those who have  
any degree of real goodness in          
themselves4  ,this will be illustrated  
by the description of a perfect         
character in a creature2 and by         
considering the manner in which a good  
man in his presence would be affected   
towards such a character4  ,he would  of
 course feel the affections of love1    
reverence1 desire of his  approbation1  
delight in the hope or consciousness of 
it4  ,and surely all  this is           
applicable1 and may be brought up to    
that ,being1 who is  infinitely more    
than an adequate object of all those    

affections2 whom we  are commanded to   
love with all our heart1 with all our   
soul1 and  with all our mind4  ,and of  
these regards towards ,almighty ,god    
some are  more particularly suitable to 
and becoming so imperfect a creature as 
man1 in this mortal state we are passing
 through2 and some of them1 and  perhaps
 other exercises of the mind1 will be   
the employment and happiness  of good   
men in a state of perfection4    ,this  
is a general view of what the following 
discourse will contain4  ,and  it is    
manifest the subject is a real one3     
there is nothing in it  enthusiastical  
or unreasonable4  ,and if it be indeed  
at all a subject1 it  is one of the     
utmost importance4    ,as mankind have a
 faculty by which they discern          
speculative truth1 so we  have various  
affections towards external objects4    
,understanding and  temper1 reason and  
affection1 are as distinct ideas as     
reason and hunger1  and one would think 
could no more be confounded4  ,it is by 

reason that we  get the ideas of several
 objects of our affections2 but in these
 cases  reason and affection are no more
 the same than sight of a particular    
object1 and the pleasure or uneasiness  
consequent thereupon1 are the  same4    
,now as reason tends to and rests in the
 discernment of truth1 the  object of   
it1 so the very nature of affection     
consists in tending  towards1 and       
resting in1 its objects as an end4  ,we 
do indeed often in  common language say 
that things are loved1 desired1         
esteemed1 not for  themselves1 but for  
somewhat further1 somewhat out of and   
beyond them2  yet1 in these cases1      
whoever will attend will see that these 
things are  not in reality the objects  
of the affections1 i4e4 are not loved1  
desired1 esteemed1 but the somewhat     
further and beyond them4  ,if we have   
no affections which rest in what are    
called their objects1 then what is      
called affection1 love1 desire1 hope1 in
 human nature1 is only an  uneasiness in

 being at rest2 an unquiet disposition  
to action1 progress1  pursuit1 without  
end or meaning4  ,but if there be any   
such thing as  delight in the company of
 one person1 rather than of another2    
whether in  the way of friendship1 or   
mirth and entertainment1 it is all one1 
if it  be without respect to fortune1   
honour1 or increasing our stores of     
knowledge1 or anything beyond the       
present time2 here is an instance of an 
affection absolutely resting in its     
object as its end1 and being  gratified 
in the same way as the appetite of      
hunger is satisfied with  food4  ,yet   
nothing is more common than to hear it  
asked1 what advantage a  man hath in    
such a course1 suppose of study1        
particular friendships1 or  in any      
other2 nothing1 ,i say1 is more common  
than to hear such a question  put in a  
way which supposes no gain1 advantage1  
or interest1 but as a  means to somewhat
 further3 and if so1 then there is no   
such thing at all  as real interest1    

gain1 or advantage4  ,this is the same  
absurdity with  respect to life as an   
infinite series of effects without a    
cause is in  speculation4  ,the gain1   
advantage1 or interest consists in the  
delight  itself1 arising from such a    
faculty's having its object3 neither is 
there  any such thing as happiness or   
enjoyment but what arises from hence4   
,the  pleasures of hope and of          
reflection are not exceptions3 the      
former being  only this happiness       
anticipated2 the latter the same        
happiness enjoyed  over again after its 
time4  ,and even the general expectation
 of future  happiness can afford        
satisfaction only as it is a present    
object to the  principle of self-love4  
,it was doubtless intended that life    
should be very much a pursuit to the    
gross of mankind4  ,but this is carried 
so much further than is reasonable  that
 what gives immediate satisfaction1 i4e4
 our present interest1 is  scarce       
considered as our interest at all4  ,it 

is inventions which have  only a remote 
tendency towards enjoyment1 perhaps but 
a remote tendency  towards gaining the  
means only of enjoyment1 which are      
chiefly spoken of  as useful to the     
world4  ,and though this way of thinking
 were just with  respect to the         
imperfect state we are now in1 where we 
know so little of  satisfaction without 
satiety1 yet it must be guarded against 
when we are  considering the happiness  
of a state of perfection2 which         
happiness being  enjoyment and not hope1
 must necessarily consist in this1 that 
our  affections have their objects1 and 
rest in those objects as an end1  i4e4  
be satisfied with them4  ,this will     
further appear in the sequel of  this   
discourse4    ,of the several           
affections1 or inward sensations1 which 
particular objects  excite in man1 there
 are some1 the having of which implies  
the love of  them1 when they are        
reflected upon4 #bi  ,this cannot be    
said of all our  affections1 principles1

 and motives of action4  ,it were       
ridiculous to  assert that a man upon   
reflection hath the same kind of        
approbation of  the appetite of hunger  
or the passion of fear as he hath of    
goodwill to  his fellow-creatures4  ,to 
be a just1 a good1 a righteous man1     
plainly  carries with it a peculiar     
affection to or love of justice1        
goodness1  righteousness1 when these    
principles are the objects of           
contemplation4    ,now if a man approves
 of1 or hath an affection to1 any       
principle in and  for itself1 incidental
 things allowed for1 it will be the same
 whether he  views it in his own mind or
 in another2 in himself or in his       
neighbour4  ,this is the account of our 
approbation of1 or moral love and       
affection to  good characters2 which    
cannot but be in those who have any     
degrees of  real goodness in themselves1
 and who discern and take notice of the 
same  principle in others4    ,from     
observation of what passes within       

ourselves1 our own actions1 and  the    
behaviour of others1 the mind may carry 
on its reflections as far as  it        
pleases2 much beyond what we experience 
in ourselves1 or discern in  our fellow 
creatures4  ,it may go on and consider  
goodness as become a  uniform continued 
principle of action1 as conducted by    
reason1 and  forming a temper and       
character absolutely good and perfect1  
which is in a  higher sense excellent1  
and proportionably the object of love   
and  approbation4    ,let us then       
suppose a creature perfect according to 
his created  nature--let his form be    
human1 and his capacities no more than  
equal to  those of the chief of         
men--goodness shall be his proper       
character1 with  wisdom to direct it1   
and power within some certain determined
 sphere of  action to exert it3 but     
goodness must be the simple actuating   
principle  within him2 this being the   
moral quality which is amiable1 or the  
immediate object of love as distinct    

from other affections of  approbation4  
,here then is a finite object for our   
mind to tend towards1  to exercise      
itself upon3 a creature1 perfect        
according to his capacity1  fixed1      
steady1 equally unmoved by weak pity or 
more weak fury and  resentment2 forming 
the justest scheme of conduct2 going on 
undisturbed  in the execution of it1    
through the several methods of severity 
and  reward1 towards his end1 namely1   
the general happiness of all with whom  
he hath to do1 as in itself right and   
valuable4  ,this character1 though      
uniform in itself1 in its principle1 yet
 exerting itself in different  ways1 or 
considered in different views1 may by   
its appearing variety move  different   
affections4  ,thus1 the severity of     
justice would not affect us  in the same
 way as an act of mercy4  ,the          
adventitious qualities of wisdom  and   
power may be considered in themselves2  
and even the strength of mind  which    
this immovable goodness supposes may    

likewise be viewed as an  object of     
contemplation distinct from the goodness
 itself4  ,superior  excellence of any  
kind1 as well as superior wisdom and    
power1 is the  object of awe and        
reverence to all creatures1 whatever    
their moral  character be2 but so far as
 creatures of the lowest rank were good1
 so  far the view of this character1 as 
simply good1 must appear amiable to     
them1 be the object of1 or beget love4  
,further suppose we were conscious  that
 this superior person so far approved of
 us that we had nothing  servilely to   
fear from him2 that he was really our   
friend1 and kind and  good to us in     
particular1 as he had occasionally      
intercourse with us3 we  must be other  
creatures than we are1 or we could not  
but feel the same  kind of satisfaction 
and enjoyment 7whatever would be the    
degree of it7  from this higher         
acquaintance and friendship as we feel  
from common ones1  the intercourse being
 real and the persons equally present in

 both cases4  ,we should have a more    
ardent desire to be approved by his     
better  judgment1 and a satisfaction in 
that approbation of the same sort with  
what would be felt in respect to common 
persons1 or be wrought in us by  their  
presence4    ,let us now raise the      
character1 and suppose this creature1   
for we are  still going on with the     
supposition of a creature1 our proper   
guardian  and governor2 that we were in 
a progress of being towards somewhat    
further2 and that his scheme of         
government was too vast for our         
capacities to comprehend3 remembering   
still that he is perfectly good1  and   
our friend as well as our governor4     
,wisdom1 power1 goodness1  accidentally 
viewed anywhere1 would inspire          
reverence1 awe1 love2 and as  these     
affections would be raised in higher or 
lower degrees in proportion  as we had  
occasionally more or less intercourse   
with the creature endued  with those    
qualities1 so this further consideration

 and knowledge that he  was our proper  
guardian and governor would much more   
bring these objects  and qualities home 
to ourselves2 teach us they had a       
greater respect to  us in particular1   
that we had a higher interest in that   
wisdom and power  and goodness4  ,we    
should1 with joy1 gratitude1 reverence1 
love1 trust1  and dependence1           
appropriate the character1 as what we   
had a right in1 and  make our boast in  
such our relation to it4  ,and the      
conclusion of the  whole would be that  
we should refer ourselves implicitly to 
him1 and cast  ourselves entirely upon  
him4  ,as the whole attention of life   
should be to  obey his commands1 so the 
highest enjoyment of it must arise from 
the  contemplation of this character1   
and our relation to it1 from a          
consciousness of his favour and         
approbation1 and from the exercise of   
those affections towards him which could
 not but be raised from his  presence4  
,a ,being who hath these attributes1 who

 stands in this  relation1 and is thus  
sensibly present to the mind1 must      
necessarily be  the object of these     
affections3 there is as real a          
correspondence between  them as between 
the lowest appetite of sense and its    
object4    ,that this ,being is not a   
creature1 but the ,almighty ,god2 that  
,he is of  infinite power and wisdom and
 goodness1 does not render ,him less the
  object of reverence and love than ,he 
would be if ,he had those attributes    
only in a limited degree4  ,the ,being  
who made us1 and upon whom we  entirely 
depend1 is the object of some regards4  
,he hath given us certain  affections of
 mind1 which correspond to wisdom1      
power1 goodness1 i4e4  which are raised 
upon view of those qualities4  ,if then 
,he be really  wise1 powerful1 good1 ,he
 is the natural object of those         
affections which  ,he hath endued us    
with1 and which correspond to those     
attributes4  ,that  ,he is infinite in  
power1 perfect in wisdom and goodness1  

makes no  alteration1 but only that ,he 
is the object of those affections raised
 to  the highest pitch4  ,he is not1    
indeed1 to be discerned by any of our   
senses4  ,i go forward1 but ,he is not  
there2 and backward1 but ,i  cannot     
perceive ,him3 on the left hand where   
,he doth work1 but ,i  cannot behold    
,him3 ,he hideth ,himself on the right  
hand1 that ,i cannot  see ,him1 ,oh that
 ,i knew where ,i might find ,him6 that 
,i might come  even to ,his seat6 #cj   
,but is ,he then afar off8 does ,he not 
fill heaven  and earth with ,his        
presence8  ,the presence of our         
fellow-creatures  affects our senses1   
and our senses give us the knowledge of 
their  presence2 which hath different   
kinds of influence upon us--love1 joy1  
sorrow1 restraint1 encouragement1       
reverence4  ,however1 this influence is 
not immediately from our senses1 but    
from that knowledge4  ,thus suppose a   
person neither to see nor hear another1 
not to know by any of his senses1  but  

yet certainly to know1 that another was 
with him2 this knowledge  might1 and in 
many cases would1 have one or more of   
the effects before  mentioned4  ,it is  
therefore not only reasonable1 but also 
natural1 to be  affected with a         
presence1 though it be not the object of
 our senses2  whether it be1 or be not1 
is merely an accidental circumstance1   
which  needs not come into              
consideration3 it is the certainty that 
he is with  us1 and we with him1 which  
hath the influence4  ,we consider       
persons then  as present1 not only when 
they are within reach of our senses1 but
 also  when we are assured by any other 
means that they are within such a       
nearness2 nay1 if they are not1 we can  
recall them to our mind1 and be  moved  
towards them as present2 and must ,he1  
who is so much more  intimately with us1
 that in ,him we live and move and have 
our being1 be  thought too distant to be
 the object of our affections8  ,we own 
and feel  the force of amiable and      

worthy qualities in our fellow          
creatures2 and  can we be insensible to 
the contemplation of perfect goodness8  
,do we  reverence the shadows of        
greatness here below1 are we solicitous 
about  honour and esteem and the opinion
 of the world1 and shall we not feel the
  same with respect to ,him whose are   
wisdom and power in the original1 who   
is the ,god of judgment by whom actions 
are weighed8  ,thus love1  reverence1   
desire of esteem1 every faculty1 every  
affection1 tends  towards and is        
employed about its respective object in 
common cases3 and  must the exercise of 
them be suspended with regard to ,him   
alone who is an  object1 an infinitely  
more than adequate object1 to our most  
exalted  faculties2 ,him1 of whom1 and  
through whom1 and to whom are all       
things8    ,as we cannot remove from    
this earth1 or change our general       
business on  it1 so neither can we alter
 our real nature4  ,therefore no        
exercise of  the mind can be            

recommended1 but only the exercise of   
those faculties you  are conscious of4  
,religion does not demand new           
affections1 but only  claims the        
direction of those you already have1    
those affections you  daily feel2 though
 unhappily confined to objects not      
altogether  unsuitable but altogether   
unequal to them4  ,we only represent to 
you the  higher1 the adequate objects of
 those very faculties and affections4   
,let  the man of ambition go on still to
 consider disgrace as the greatest      
evil1 honour as his chief good4  ,but   
disgrace in whose estimation8  ,honour  
in whose judgment8  ,this is the only   
question4  ,if shame1 and delight in    
esteem1 be spoken of as real1 as any    
settled ground of pain or pleasure1     
both these must be in proportion to the 
supposed wisdom1 and worth of him  by   
whom we are contemned or esteemed4      
,must it then be thought  enthusiastical
 to speak of a sensibility of this sort 
which shall have  respect to an unerring

 judgment1 to infinite wisdom1 when we  
are assured  this unerring judgment1    
this infinite wisdom does observe upon  
our  actions8    ,it is the same with   
respect to the love of ,god in the      
strictest and most  confined sense4  ,we
 only offer and represent the highest   
object of an  affection supposed already
 in your mind4  ,some degree of goodness
 must be  previously supposed2 this     
always implies the love of itself1 an   
affection  to goodness3 the highest1 the
 adequate object of this affection1 is  
perfect goodness2 which therefore we are
 to love with all our heart1  with all  
our soul1 and with all our strength4    
,must we then1  forgetting our own      
interest1 as it were go out of          
ourselves1 and love ,god  for ,his own  
sake8  ,no more forget your own         
interest1 no more go out of  yourselves1
 than when you prefer one place1 one    
prospect1 the  conversation of one man  
to that of another4  ,does not every    
affection  necessarily imply that the   

object of it be itself loved8  ,if it be
 not it  is not the object of the       
affection4  ,you may1 and ought if you  
can1 but  it is a great mistake to think
 you can love or fear or hate anything1 
from consideration that such love or    
fear or hatred may be a means of        
obtaining good or avoiding evil4  ,but  
the question whether we ought to  love  
,god for ,his sake or for our own being 
a mere mistake in language1  the real   
question which this is mistaken for     
will1 ,i suppose1 be answered  by       
observing that the goodness of ,god     
already exercised towards us1 our       
present dependence upon ,him1 and our   
expectation of future benefits1  ought1 
and have a natural tendency1 to beget in
 us the affection of  gratitude1 and    
greater love towards ,him1 than the same
 goodness exercised  towards others2    
were it only for this reason1 that every
 affection is  moved in proportion to   
the sense we have of the object of it2  
and we  cannot but have a more lively   

sense of goodness when exercised towards
  ourselves than when exercised towards 
others4  ,i added expectation of  future
 benefits because the ground of that    
expectation is present  goodness4       
,thus ,almighty ,god is the natural     
object of the several affections1 love1 
reverence1 fear1 desire of approbation4 
,for though ,he is simply one1 yet  we  
cannot but consider ,him in partial and 
different views4  ,he is in  himself one
 uniform ,being1 and for ever the same  
without variableness or  shadow of      
turning2 but ,his infinite greatness1   
,his goodness1 ,his wisdom1  are        
different objects to our mind4  ,to     
which is to be added1 that from  the    
changes in our own characters1 together 
with ,his unchangeableness1 we  cannot  
but consider ourselves as more or less  
the objects of ,his  approbation1 and   
really be so4  ,for if ,he approves what
 is good1 ,he  cannot1 merely from the  
unchangeableness of ,his nature1 approve
 what is  evil4  ,hence must arise more 

various movements of mind1 more         
different  kinds of affections4  ,and   
this greater variety also is just and   
reasonable in such creatures as we are1 
though it respects a ,being simply  one1
 good and perfect4  ,as some of these   
actions are most particularly  suitable 
to so imperfect a creature as man in    
this mortal state we are  passing       
through1 so there may be other exercises
 of mind1 or some of  these in higher   
degrees1 our employment and happiness in
 a state of  perfection4                
,,sermon ,,xiv4      ,consider then our 
ignorance1 the imperfection of our      
nature1 our virtue1  and our condition  
in this world1 with respect to aim      
infinitely good and  just ,being1 our   
,creator and ,governor1 and you will see
 what religious  affections of mind are 
most particularly suitable to this      
mortal state we  are passing through4   
,though we are not affected with        
anything so strongly as what we discern 
with our senses1 and though our nature  

and condition require that we be  much  
taken up about sensible things1 yet our 
reason convinces us that ,god  is       
present with us1 and we see and feel the
 effects of ,his goodness3 ,he  is      
therefore the object of some regards4   
,the imperfection of our virtue1  joined
 with the consideration of ,his absolute
 rectitude or holiness1 will  scarce    
permit that perfection of love which    
entirely casts out all fear3  yet       
goodness is the object of love to all   
creatures who have any degree  of it    
themselves2 and consciousness of a real 
endeavour to approve  ourselves to ,him1
 joined with the consideration of ,his  
goodness1 as it  quite excludes servile 
dread and horror1 so it is plainly a    
reasonable  ground for hope of ,his     
favour4  ,neither fear nor hope nor love
 then are  excluded1 and one or another 
of these will prevail1 according to the 
different views we have of ,god1 and    
ought to prevail1 according to the      
changes we find in our own character4   

,there is a temper of mind made up  of1 
or which follows from all three1 fear1  
hope1 love--namely1  resignation to the 
,divine will1 which is the general      
temper belonging to  this state2 which  
ought to be the habitual frame of our   
mind and heart1  and to be exercised at 
proper seasons more distinctly1 in acts 
of  devotion4    ,resignation to the    
will of ,god is the whole of piety4  ,it
 includes in it  all that is good1 and  
is a source of the most settled quiet   
and composure  of mind4  ,there is the  
general principle of submission in our  
nature4  ,man  is not so constituted as 
to desire things1 and be uneasy in the  
want of  them1 in proportion to their   
known value3 many other considerations  
come  in to determine the degrees of    
desire2 particularly whether the        
advantage  we take a view of be within  
the sphere of our rank4  ,whoever felt  
uneasiness upon observing any of the    
advantages brute creatures have over    
us8  ,and yet it is plain they have     

several4  ,it is the same with respect  
to advantages belonging to creatures of 
a superior order4  ,thus1 though  we see
 a thing to be highly valuable1 yet that
 it does not belong to our  condition of
 being is sufficient to suspend our     
desires after it1 to make  us rest      
satisfied without such advantage4  ,now 
there is just the same  reason for quiet
 resignation in the want of everything  
equally  unattainable and out of our    
reach in particular1 though others of   
our  species be possessed of it4  ,all  
this may be applied to the whole of     
life2 to positive inconveniences as well
 as wants1 not indeed to the  sensations
 of pain and sorrow1 but to all the     
uneasinesses of reflection1  murmuring1 
and discontent4  ,thus is human nature  
formed to compliance1  yielding1        
submission of temper4  ,we find the     
principles of it within us2  and every  
one exercises it towards some objects or
 other1 i4e4 feels it  with regard to   
some persons and some circumstances4    

,now this is an  excellent foundation of
 a reasonable and religious resignation4
  ,nature  teaches and inclines as to   
take up with our lot2 the consideration 
that  the course of things is           
unalterable hath a tendency to quiet the
 mind  under it1 to beget a submission  
of temper to it4  ,but when we can add  
that this unalterable course is         
appointed and continued by infinite     
wisdom and goodness1 how absolute should
 be our submission1 how entire  our     
trust and dependence6    ,this would    
reconcile us to our condition1 prevent  
all the supernumerary  troubles arising 
from imagination1 distant fears1        
impatience--all  uneasiness1 except that
 which necessarily arises from the      
calamities  themselves we may be under4 
,how many of our cares should we by this
  means be disburdened of6  ,cares not  
properly our own1 how apt soever they   
may be to intrude upon us1 and we to    
admit them2 the anxieties of            
expectation1 solicitude about success   

and disappointment1 which in truth  are 
none of our concern4  ,how open to every
 gratification would that mind  be which
 was clear of these encumbrances6       
,our resignation to the will of ,god may
 be said to be perfect when our  will is
 lost and resolved up into ,his3 when we
 rest in ,his will as our  end1 as being
 itself most just and right and good4   
,and where is the  impossibility of such
 an affection to what is just1 and      
right1 and good1  such a loyalty of     
heart to the ,governor of the universe  
as shall prevail  over all sinister     
indirect desires of our own8  ,neither  
is this at bottom  anything more than   
faith and honesty and fairness of       
mind--in a more  enlarged sense indeed  
than those words are commonly used4     
,and as1 in  common cases1 fear and hope
 and other passions are raised in us by 
their  respective objects1 so this      
submission of heart and soul and mind1  
this  religious resignation1 would be as
 naturally produced by our having just  

conceptions of ,almighty ,god1 and a    
real sense of ,his presence with us4    
,in  how low a degree soever this temper
 usually prevails amongst men1 yet it   
is a temper right in itself3 it is what 
we owe to our ,creator3 it is           
particularly suitable to our mortal     
condition1 and what we should  endeavour
 after for our own sakes in our passage 
through such a world as  this1 where is 
nothing upon which we can rest or       
depend1 nothing but what  we are liable 
to be deceived and disappointed in4     
,thus we might  acquaint ourselves with 
,god1 and be at peace4  ,this is piety  
an  religion in the strictest sense1    
considered as a habit of mind3 an       
habitual sense of ,god's presence with  
us2 being affected towards ,him1 as     
present1 in the manner ,his superior    
nature requires from such a creature  as
 man3 this is to walk with ,god4        
,little more need be said of devotion or
 religious worship than that it is  this
 temper exerted into act4  ,the nature  

of it consists in the actual  exercise  
of those affections towards ,god which  
are supposed habitual in  good men4  ,he
 is always equally present with us3 but 
we are so much taken  up with sensible  
things that1 ,lo1 ,he goeth by us1 and  
we see ,him  not3 ,he passeth on also1  
but we perceive ,him not4 #ca  ,devotion
 is  retirement from the world ,he has  
made to ,him alone3 it is to withdraw   
from the avocations of sense1 to employ 
our attention wholly upon ,him as  upon 
an object actually present1 to yield    
ourselves up to the influence  of the   
,divine presence1 and to give full scope
 to the affections of  gratitude1 love1 
reverence1 trust1 and dependence2 of    
which infinite  power1 wisdom1 and      
goodness is the natural and only        
adequate object4  ,we  may apply to the 
whole of devotion those words of the    
,son of ,sirach1  ,when you glorify the 
,lord1 exalt ,him as much as you can2   
for even  yet will ,he far exceed3 and  
when you exalt ,him1 put forth all your 

strength1 and be not weary2 for you can 
never go far enough4 #cb  ,our most     
raised affections of every kind cannot  
but fall short and be  disproportionate 
when an infinite being is the object of 
them4  ,this is  the highest exercise   
and employment of mind that a creature  
is capable  of4  ,as this divine service
 and worship is itself absolutely due to
 ,god1  so also is it necessary in order
 to a further end1 to keep alive upon   
our  minds a sense of ,his authority1 a 
sense that in our ordinary behaviour    
amongst men we act under him as our     
,governor and ,judge4    ,thus you see  
the temper of mind respecting ,god which
 is particularly  suitable to a state of
 imperfection1 to creatures in a        
progress of being  towards somewhat     
further4    ,suppose now this something 
further attained1 that we were arrived  
at it1  what a perception will it be to 
see and know and feel that our trust was
  not vain1 our dependence not          
groundless8  ,that the issue1 event1 and

  consummation came out such as fully to
 justify and answer that  resignation8  
,if the obscure view of the divine      
perfection which we have  in this world 
ought in just consequence to beget an   
entire resignation1  what will this     
resignation be exalted into when we     
shall see face to  face1 and know as we 
are known8  ,if we cannot form any      
distinct notion  of that perfection of  
the love of ,god which casts out all    
fear1 of that  enjoyment of ,him which  
will be the happiness of good men       
hereafter1 the  consideration of our    
wants and capacities of happiness1 and  
that ,he will  be adequate supply to    
them1 must serve us instead of such     
distinct  conception of the particular  
happiness itself4    ,let us then       
suppose a man entirely disengaged from  
business and pleasure1  sitting down    
alone and at leisure1 to reflect upon   
himself and his own  condition of being4
  ,he would immediately feel that he was
 by no means  complete of himself1 but  

totally insufficient for his own        
happiness4  ,one  may venture to affirm 
that every man hath felt this1 whether  
he hath  again reflected upon it or not4
  ,it is feeling this deficiency1 that  
they  are unsatisfied with themselves1  
which makes men look out for assistance 
from abroad1 and which has given rise to
 various kinds of amusements1           
altogether needless any otherwise than  
as they serve to fill up the blank      
spaces of time1 and so hinder their     
feeling this deficiency1 and being      
uneasy with themselves4  ,now1 if these 
external things we take up with  were   
really an adequate supply to this       
deficiency of human nature1 if by  their
 means our capacities and desires were  
all satisfied and filled up1  then it   
might be truly said that we had found   
out the proper happiness of  man1 and so
 might sit down satisfied1 and be at    
rest in the enjoyment of  it4  ,but if  
it appears that the amusements which men
 usually pass their  time in are so far 

from coming up to or answering our      
notions and desires  of happiness or    
good that they are really no more than  
what they are  commonly called1 somewhat
 to pass away the time1 i4e4 somewhat   
which  serves to turn us aside from1 and
 prevent our attending to1 this our     
internal poverty and want2 if they serve
 only1 or chiefly1 to suspend  instead  
of satisfying our conceptions and       
desires of happiness2 if the  want      
remains1 and we have found out little   
more than barely the means of  making it
 less sensible2 then are we still to    
seek for somewhat to be an  adequate    
supply to it4  ,it is plain that there  
is a capacity in the  nature of man     
which neither riches nor honours nor    
sensual  gratifications1 nor anything in
 this world1 can perfectly fill up or   
satisfy3 there is a deeper and more     
essential want than any of these  things
 can be the supply of4  ,yet surely     
there is a possibility of  somewhat     
which may fill up all our capacities of 

happiness1 somewhat in  which our souls 
may find rest1 somewhat which may be to 
us that  satisfactory good we are       
inquiring after4  ,but it cannot be     
anything  which is valuable only as it  
tends to some further end4  ,those      
therefore  who have got this world so   
much into their hearts as not to be able
 to  consider happiness as consisting in
 anything but property and              
possessions--which are only valuable as 
the means to somewhat else--cannot  have
 the least glimpse of the subject before
 us1 which is the end1 not  the means2  
the thing itself1 not somewhat in order 
to it4  ,but if you can  lay aside that 
general1 confused1 undeterminate notion 
of happiness1 as  consisting in such    
possessions1 and fix in your thoughts   
that it really  can consist in nothing  
but in a faculty's having its proper    
object1 you  will clearly see that in   
the coolest way of consideration1       
without either  the heat of fanciful    
enthusiasm or the warmth of real        

devotion1 nothing  is more certain than 
that an infinite ,being may ,himself be1
 if ,he  pleases1 the supply to all the 
capacities of our nature4  ,all the     
common  enjoyments of life are from the 
faculties ,he hath endued us with and   
the  objects ,he hath made suitable to  
them4  ,he may ,himself be to us        
infinitely more than all these2 ,he may 
be to us all that we want4  ,as our     
understanding can contemplate itself1   
and our affections be exercised  upon   
themselves by reflection1 so may each be
 employed in the same manner  upon any  
other mind2 and since the ,supreme      
,mind1 the ,author and ,cause of  all   
things1 is the highest possible object  
to ,himself1 ,he may be an  adequate    
supply to all the faculties of our      
souls1 a subject to our  understanding1 
and an object to our affections4        
,consider then3 when we shall have put  
off this mortal body1 when we shall  be 
divested of sensual appetites1 and those
 possessions which are now the  means of

 gratification shall be of no avail1    
when this restless scene of  business   
and vain pleasures1 which now diverts us
 from ourselves1 shall  be all over1 we1
 our proper self1 shall still remain3 we
 shall still  continue the same         
creatures we are1 with wants to be      
supplied and  capacities of happiness4  
,we must have faculties of perception1  
though  not sensitive ones2 and pleasure
 or uneasiness from our perceptions1 as 
now we have4    ,there are certain ideas
 which we express by the words order1   
harmony1  proportion1 beauty1 the       
furthest removed from anything sensual4 
,now what  is there in those            
intellectual images1 forms1 or ideas1   
which begets that  approbation1 love1   
delight1 and even rapture1 which is seen
 in some  persons' faces upon having    
those objects present to their          
minds8--,mere  enthusiasm6--,be it what 
it will3 there are objects1 works of    
nature and  of art1 which all mankind   
have delight from quite distinct from   

their  affording gratification to       
sensual appetites1 and from quite       
another view  of them than as being for 
their interest and further advantage4   
,the  faculties from which we are       
capable of these pleasures1 and the     
pleasures  themselves1 are as natural1  
and as much to be accounted for1 as any 
sensual appetite whatever1 and the      
pleasure from its gratification4  ,words
  to be sure are wanting upon this      
subject2 to say that everything of grace
  and beauty throughout the whole of    
nature1 everything excellent and        
amiable shared in differently lower     
degrees by the whole creation1 meet  in 
the ,author and ,cause of all things1   
this is an inadequate and perhaps       
improper way of speaking of the ,divine 
nature2 but it is manifest that         
absolute rectitude1 the perfection of   
being1 must be in all senses1 and  in   
every respect1 the highest object to the
 mind4    ,in this world it is only the 
effects of wisdom and power and         

greatness  which we discern2 it is not  
impossible that hereafter the qualities 
themselves in the supreme ,being may be 
the immediate object of  contemplation4 
,what amazing wonders are opened to view
 by late  improvements6  ,what an object
 is the universe to a creature1 if there
 be  a creature who can comprehend its  
system6  ,but it must be an infinitely  
higher exercise of the understanding to 
view the scheme of it in that  mind     
which projected it before its           
foundations were laid4  ,and surely we  
have meaning to the words when we speak 
of going further1 and viewing1  not only
 this system in ,his mind1 but the      
wisdom and intelligence itself  from    
whence it proceeded4  ,the same may be  
said of power4  ,but since  wisdom and  
power are not ,god1 ,he is a wise1 a    
powerful ,being2 the divine  nature may 
therefore be a further object to the    
understanding4  ,it is  nothing to      
observe that our senses give us but an  
imperfect knowledge of  things3 effects 

themselves1 if we knew them thoroughly1 
would give us but  imperfect notions of 
wisdom and power2 much less of ,his     
being in whom  they reside4  ,i am not  
speaking of any fanciful notion of      
seeing all  things in ,god1 but only    
representing to you how much a higher   
object to  the understanding an infinite
 ,being ,himself is than the things     
which ,he  has made2 and this is no more
 than saying that the ,creator is       
superior to  the works of ,his hands4   
,this may be illustrated by a low       
example4  ,suppose a machine1 the sight 
of which would raise1 and discoveries in
 its contrivance gratify1 our           
curiosity3 the real delight in this case
 would arise from its being the  effect 
of skill and contrivance4  ,this skill  
in the mind of the artificer  would be a
 higher object1 if we had any senses or 
ways to discern it4  ,for1 observe1 the 
contemplation of that principle1        
faculty1 or power  which produced any   
effect must be a higher exercise of the 

understanding  than the contemplation of
 the effect itself4  ,the cause must be 
a higher  object to the mind than the   
effect4    ,but whoever considers       
distinctly what the delight of knowledge
 is will  see reason to be satisfied    
that it cannot be the chief good of man3
 all  this1 as it is applicable1 so it  
was mentioned with regard to the        
attribute of goodness4  ,i say goodness4
  ,our being and all our enjoyments  are
 the effects of it3 just men bear its   
resemblance2 but how little do  we know 
of the original1 of what it is in       
itself8  ,recall what was before        
observed concerning the affection to    
moral characters--which1 in how low  a  
degree soever1 yet is plainly natural to
 man1 and the most excellent  part of   
his nature4  ,suppose this improved1 as 
it may be improved1 to any  degree      
whatever1 in the spirits of just men    
made perfect2 and then  suppose that    
they had a real view of that            
righteousness which is an  everlasting  

righteousness1 of the conformity of the 
,divine will to the  law of truth in    
which the moral attributes of ,god      
consist1 of that  goodness in the       
sovereign ,mind which gave birth to the 
universe4  ,add1  what will be true of  
all good men hereafter1 a consciousness 
of having an  interest in what they are 
contemplating--suppose them able to say1
 ,this  ,god is our ,god for ever and   
ever4  ,would they be any longer to seek
 for  what was their chief happiness1   
their final good8  ,could the utmost    
stretch of their capacities look        
further8  ,would not infinite perfect   
goodness be their very end1 the last end
 and object of their affections1  beyond
 which they could neither have nor      
desire1 beyond which they could  not    
form a wish or thought8    ,consider    
wherein that presence of a friend       
consists which has often so  strong an  
effect as wholly to possess the mind1   
and entirely suspend all  other         
affections and regards1 and which itself

 affords the highest  satisfaction and  
enjoyment4  ,he is within reach of the  
senses4  ,now as  our capacities of     
perception improve we shall have1       
perhaps by some  faculty entirely new1 a
 perception of ,god's presence with us  
in a nearer  and stricter way1 since it 
is certain ,he is more intimately       
present with  us than anything else can 
be4  ,proof of the existence and        
presence of any  being is quite         
different from the immediate perception1
 the consciousness  of it4  ,what then  
will be the joy of heart which ,his     
presence and the  light of ,his         
countenance1 who is the life of the     
universe1 will inspire  good men with   
when they shall have a sensation that   
,he is the sustainer  of their being1   
that they exist in ,him2 when they shall
 feel ,his  influence to cheer and      
enliven and support their frame1 in a   
manner of  which we have now no         
conception8  ,he will be in a literal   
sense their  strength and their portion 

for ever4    ,when we speak of things so
 much above our comprehension as the    
employment  and happiness of a future   
state1 doubtless it behoves us to speak 
with  all modesty and distrust of       
ourselves4  ,but the ,scripture         
represents the  happiness of that state 
under the notions of seeing ,god1 seeing
 ,him as  ,he is1 knowing as we are     
known1 and seeing face to face4  ,these 
words are not general or undetermined1  
but express a particular  determinate   
happiness4  ,and ,i will be bold to say 
that nothing can  account for or come up
 to these expressions but only this1    
that ,god  ,himself will be an object to
 our faculties1 that ,he ,himself will  
be our  happiness as distinguished from 
the enjoyments of the present state1    
which seem to arise not immediately from
 ,him but from the objects ,he has      
adapted to give us delight4    ,to      
conclude3 ,let us suppose a person tired
 with care and sorrow and the           
repetition of vain delights which fill  

up the round of life2 sensible  that    
everything here below in its best estate
 is altogether vanity4  ,suppose him to 
feel that deficiency of human nature    
before taken notice  of1 and to be      
convinced that ,god alone was the       
adequate supply to it4  ,what could be  
more applicable to a good man in this   
state of mind1 or  better express his   
present wants and distant hopes1 his    
passage through  this world as a        
progress towards a state of perfection1 
than the  following passages in the     
devotions of the royal prophet8  ,they  
are  plainly in a higher and more proper
 sense applicable to this than they     
could be to anything else4  ,i have seen
 an end of all perfection4  ,whom  have 
,i in heaven but ,thee8  ,and there is  
none upon earth that ,i desire  in      
comparison of ,thee4  ,my flesh and may 
heart faileth3 but ,god is  the strength
 of my heart and my portion for ever4   
,like as the hart  desireth the         
water-brooks1 so longeth my soul after  

,thee1 ,o ,god4  ,my  soul is athirst   
for ,god1 yea1 even for the living ,god3
 when shall ,i  come to appear before   
,him8  ,how excellent is ,thy           
loving-kindness1 ,o  ,god6 and the      
children of men shall put their trust   
under the shadow of  ,thy wings4  ,they 
shall be satisfied with the             
plenteousness of ,thy  house3 and ,thou 
shalt give them drink of ,thy pleasures1
 as out of the  river4  ,for with ,thee 
is the well of life3 and in ,thy light  
shall we  see light4  ,blessed is the   
man whom ,thou choosest1 and receivest  
unto  ,thee3 he shall dwell in ,thy     
court1 and shall be satisfied with the  
pleasures of ,thy house1 even of ,thy   
holy temple4  ,blessed is the  people1  
,o ,lord1 that can rejoice in ,thee3    
they shall walk in the  light of ,thy   
countenance4  ,their delight shall be   
daily in ,thy name1  and in ,thy        
righteousness shall they make their     
boast4  ,for ,thou art  the glory of    
their strength3 and in ,thy             

lovingkindness they shall be  exalted4  
,as for me1 ,i will behold ,thy presence
 in righteousness3  and when ,i awake up
 after ,thy likeness1 ,i shall be       
satisfied with it4  ,thou shalt shew me 
the path of life2 in ,thy presence is   
the fulness of  joy1 and at ,thy right  
hand there is pleasure for evermore4    
,footnotes3      #a  #a ,cor4 xii    #b 
,suppose a man of learning to be writing
 a grave book upon human  nature1 and to
 show in several parts of it that he had
 an insight into  the subject he was    
considering1 amongst other things1 the  
following one  would require to be      
accounted for--the appearance of        
benevolence or good-  will in men       
towards each other in the instances of  
natural relation1 and  in others4 #b;a  
,cautions of being deceived with outward
 show1 he retires  within himself to see
 exactly what that is in the mind of man
 from whence  this appearance proceeds2 
and1 upon deep reflection1 asserts the  
principle in the mind to be only the    

love of power1 and delight in the       
exercise of it4  ,would not everybody   
think here was a mistake of one word    
for another--that the philosopher was   
contemplating and accounting for  some  
other human actions1 some other         
behaviour of man to man8  ,and  could   
any one be thoroughly satisfied that    
what is commonly called  benevolence or 
good-will was really the affection      
meant1 but only by  being made to       
understand that this learned person had 
a general  hypothesis1 to which the     
appearance of good-will could no        
otherwise be  reconciled8  ,that what   
has this appearance is often nothing but
 ambition2  that delight in superiority 
often 7suppose always7 mixes itself with
  benevolence1 only makes it more       
specious to call it ambition than       
hunger1  of the two3 but in reality that
 passion does no more account for the   
whole appearances of good-will than this
 appetite does4  ,is there not  often   
the appearance of one man's wishing that

 good to another1 which he  knows       
himself unable to procure him2 and      
rejoicing in it1 though bestowed  by a  
third person8  ,and can love of power   
any way possibly come in to  account for
 this desire or delight8  ,is there not 
often the appearance of  men's          
distinguishing between two or more      
persons1 preferring one before  another1
 to do good to1 in cases where love of  
power cannot in the least  account for  
the distinction and preference8  ,for   
this principle can no  otherwise        
distinguish between objects than as it  
is a greater instance  and exertion of  
power to do good to one rather than to  
another4  ,again1  suppose good-will in 
the mind of man to be nothing but       
delight in the  exercise of power3 men  
might indeed be restrained by distant   
and  accidental consideration2 but these
 restraints being removed1 they would   
have a disposition to1 and delight in1  
mischief as an exercise and proof  of   
power3 and this disposition and delight 

would arise from1 or be the  same       
principle in the mind1 as a disposition 
to and delight in charity4  ,thus       
cruelty1 as distinct from envy and      
resentment1 would be exactly the  same  
in the mind of man as good-will3 that   
one tends to the happiness1  the other  
to the misery1 of our fellow-creatures1 
is1 it seems1 merely an  accidental     
circumstance1 which the mind has not the
 least regard to4  ,these are the       
absurdities which even men of capacity  
run into when they  have occasion to    
belie their nature1 and will perversely 
disclaim that  image of ,god which was  
originally stamped upon it1 the traces  
of which1  however faint1 are plainly   
discernible upon the mind of man4    ,if
 any person can in earnest doubt whether
 there be such a thing as good-  will in
 one man towards another 7for the       
question is not concerning  either the  
degree or extensiveness of it1 but      
concerning the affection  itself71 let  
it be observed that whether man be thus1

 or otherwise  constituted1 what is the 
inward frame in this particular is a    
mere  question of fact of natural       
history not provable immediately by     
reason4  ,it is therefore to be judged  
of and determined in the same way other 
facts or matters of natural history     
are--by appealing to the external       
senses1 or inward perceptions           
respectively1 as the matter under       
consideration is cognisable by one or   
the other3 by arguing from  acknowledged
 facts and actions for a great number of
 actions in the same  kind1 in different
 circumstances1 and respecting different
 objects1 will  prove to a certainty    
what principles they do not1 and to the 
greatest  probability what principles   
they do1 proceed from3 and1 lastly1 by  
the  testimony of mankind4  ,now that   
there is some degree of benevolence     
amongst men may be as strongly and      
plainly proved in all these ways1 as  it
 could possibly be proved1 supposing    
there was this affection in our  nature4

  ,and should any one think fit to      
assert that resentment in the  mind of  
man was absolutely nothing but          
reasonable concern for our own  safety1 
the falsity of this1 and what is the    
real nature of that passion1  could be  
shown in no other ways than those in    
which it may be shown that  there is    
such a thing in some degree as real     
good-will in man towards  man4  ,it is  
sufficient that the seeds of it be      
implanted in our nature by  ,god4       
,there is1 it is owned1 much left for us
 to do upon our own heart  and temper2  
to cultivate1 to improve1 to call it    
forth1 to exercise it in  a steady1     
uniform manner4  ,this is our work3 this
 is virtue and religion4    #b;a        
,hobbes1 ,of ,human ,nature1 c4 ix4 #g4 
#c  ,everybody makes a distinction      
between self-love and the several       
particular passions1 appetites1 and     
affections2 and yet they are often      
confounded again4  ,that they are       
totally different1 will be seen by any  

one who will distinguish between the    
passions and appetites themselves1  and 
endeavouring after the means of their   
gratification4  ,consider the  appetite 
of hunger1 and the desire of esteem3    
these being the occasion  both of       
pleasure and pain1 the coolest          
self-love1 as well as the  appetites and
 passions themselves1 may put us upon   
making use of the  proper methods of    
obtaining that pleasure1 and avoiding   
that pain2 but  the feelings themselves1
 the pain of hunger and shame1 and the  
delight  from esteem1 are no more       
self-love than they are anything in the 
world4  ,though a man hated himself1 he 
would as much feel the pain of hunger as
  he would that of the gout2 and it is  
plainly supposable there may be         
creatures with self-love in them to the 
highest degree1 who may be quite        
insensible and indifferent 7as men in   
some cases are7 to the contempt and     
esteem of those upon whom their         
happiness does not in some further      

respects depend4  ,and as self-love and 
the several particular passions  and    
appetites are in themselves totally     
different1 so that some actions  proceed
 from one and some from the other will  
be manifest to any who will  observe the
 two following very supposable cases4   
,one man rushes upon  certain ruin for  
the gratification of a present desire3  
nobody will call  the principle of this 
action self-love4  ,suppose another man 
to go  through some laborious work upon 
promise of a great reward1 without any  
distinct knowledge what the reward will 
be3 this course of action cannot  be    
ascribed to any particular passion4     
,the former of these actions is  plainly
 to be imputed to some particular       
passion or affection2 the latter  as    
plainly to the general affection or     
principle of self-love4  ,that  there   
are some particular pursuits or actions 
concerning which we cannot  determine   
how far they are owing to one1 and how  
far to the other1  proceeds from this1  

that the two principles are frequently  
mixed  together1 and run up into each   
other4  ,this distinction is further    
explained in the ,eleventh ,sermon4     
#d  ,if any desire to see this          
distinction and comparison made in a    
particular instance1 the appetite and   
passion now mentioned may serve for     
one4  ,hunger is to be considered as a  
private appetite1 because the end  for  
which it was given us is the            
preservation of the individual4  ,desire
  of esteem is a public passion2 because
 the end for which it was given us  is  
to regulate our behaviour towards       
society4  ,the respect which this has   
to private good is as remote as the     
respect that has to public good2 and    
the appetite is no more self-love than  
the passion is benevolence4  ,the       
object and end of the former is merely  
food2 the object and end of the  latter 
is merely esteem2 but the latter can no 
more be gratified without  contributing 
to the good of society1 than the former 

can be gratified  without contributing  
to the preservation of the individual4  
#e  ,emulation is merely the desire and 
hope of equality with or  superiority   
over others with whom we compare        
ourselves4  ,there does not  appear to  
be any other grief in the natural       
passion1 but only that  want which is   
implied in desire4  ,however1 this may  
be so strong as to  be the occasion of  
great grief4  ,to desire the attainment 
of this  equality or superiority by the 
particular means of others being brought
  down to our own level1 or below it1   
is1 ,i think1 the distinct notion of    
envy4  ,from whence it is easy to see   
that the real end1 which the natural    
passion emulation1 and which the        
unlawful one envy aims at1 is exactly   
the same2 namely1 that equality or      
superiority3 and consequently1 that to  
do mischief is not the end of envy1 but 
merely the means it makes use of  to    
attain its end4  ,as to resentment1 see 
the ,eighth ,sermon4    #f  ,ephes4 ii4 

#c4    #g  ,every man in his physical   
nature is one individual single agent4  
,he  has likewise properties and        
principles1 each of which may be        
considered  separately1 and without     
regard to the respects which they have  
to each  other4  ,neither of these is   
the nature we are taking a view of4     
,but it  is the inward frame of man     
considered as a system or constitution3 
whose several parts are united1 not by a
 physical principle of  individuation1  
but by the respects they have to each   
other2 the chief of  which is the       
subjection which the appetites1         
passions1 and particular  affections    
have to the one supreme principle of    
reflection or conscience4  ,the system  
or constitution is formed by and        
consists in these respects  and this    
subjection4  ,thus the body is a system 
or constitution3 so  is a tree3 so is   
every machine4  ,consider all the       
several parts of a tree  without the    
natural reselects they have to each     

other1 and you have not  at all the idea
 of a tree2 but add these respects1 and 
this gives you the  idea4  ,this body   
may be impaired by sickness1 a tree may 
decay1 a machine  be out of order1 and  
yet the system and constitution of them 
not totally  dissolved4  ,there is      
plainly somewhat which answers to all   
this in the  moral constitution of man4 
,whoever will consider his own nature   
will see  that the several appetites1   
passions1 and particular affections have
  different respects amongst themselves4
  ,they are restraints upon1 and are  in
 a proportion to1 each other4  ,this    
proportion is just and perfect1  when   
all those under principles are perfectly
 coincident with conscience1  so far as 
their nature permits1 and in all cases  
under its absolute and  entire          
direction4  ,the least excess or defect1
 the least alteration of  the due       
proportions amongst themselves1 or of   
their coincidence with  conscience1     
though not proceeding into action1 is   

some degree of disorder  in the moral   
constitution4  ,but perfection1 though  
plainly intelligible  and unsupportable1
 was never attained by any man4  ,if the
 higher  principle of reflection        
maintains its place1 and as much as it  
can  corrects that disorder1 and hinders
 it from breaking out into action1  this
 is all that can be expected in such a  
creature as man4  ,and though  the      
appetites and passions have not their   
exact due proportion to each  other1    
though they often strive for mastery    
with judgment or reflection1  yet1 since
 the superiority of this principle to   
all others is the chief  respect which  
forms the constitution1 so far as this  
superiority is  maintained1 the         
character1 the man1 is good1 worthy1    
virtuous4    #h  ,chap4 iii41 ver4 #f4  
#i  ,job xiii4 #e4    #aj  ,eccles4 x4  
#c4    #aa  ,prov4 x4 #ai4    #ab  ,mark
 xii4 #ch1 #dj4    #ac  ,there being    
manifestly this appearance of men's     
substituting others  for themselves1 and

 being carried out and affected towards 
them as  towards themselves2 some       
persons1 who have a system which        
excludes every  affection of this sort1 
have taken a pleasant method to solve   
it2 and  tell you it is not another you 
are at all concerned about1 but your    
self only1 when you feel the affection  
called compassion1 i4e4 ,here  is a     
plain matter of fact1 which men cannot  
reconcile with the general  account they
 think fit to give of things3 they      
therefore1 instead of that  manifest    
fact1 substitute another1 which is      
reconcilable to their own  scheme4  ,for
 does not everybody by compassion mean  
an affection1 the  object of which is   
another in distress8 instead of this1   
but designing to  have it mistaken for  
this1 they speak of an affection or     
passion1 the  object of which is        
ourselves1 or danger to ourselves4      
,hobbes defines  pity1 imagination1 or  
fiction of future calamity to ourselves1
  proceeding from the sense 7he means   

sight or knowledge7 of another  man's   
calamity4  ,thus fear and compassion    
would be the same idea1 and a  fearful  
and a compassionate man the same        
character1 which every one  immediately 
sees are totally different4  ,further1  
to those who give any  scope to their   
affections1 there is no perception or   
inward feeling more  universal than     
this3 that one who has been merciful and
 compassionate  throughout the course of
 his behaviour should himself be treated
 with  kindness1 if he happens to fall  
into circumstances of distress4  ,is    
fear1  then1 or cowardice1 so great a   
recommendation to the favour of the bulk
  of mankind8  ,or is it not plain that 
mere fearlessness 7and therefore not    
the contrary7 is one of the most popular
 qualifications8  ,this shows that      
mankind are not affected towards        
compassion as fear1 but as somewhat     
totally different4    ,nothing would    
more expose such accounts as these of   
the affections which  are favourable and

 friendly to our fellow-creatures than  
to substitute  the definitions1 which   
this author1 and others who follow his  
steps1 give  of such affections1 instead
 of the words by which they are commonly
  expressed4  ,hobbes1 after having laid
 down that pity or compassion is  only  
fear for ourselves1 goes on to explain  
the reason why we pity our  friends in  
distress more than others4  ,now        
substitute the word  definition instead 
of the word pity in this place1 and the 
inquiry  will be1 why we fear our       
friends1 c41 which words 7since he      
really does  not mean why we are afraid 
of them7 make no question or sentence at
 all4  ,so that common language1 the    
words to compassionate1 to pity1 cannot 
be accommodated to his account of       
compassion4  ,the very joining of the   
words to pity our friends is a direct   
contradiction to his definition  of     
pity3 because those words1 so joined1   
necessarily express that our  friends   
are the objects of the passion2 whereas 

his definition of it  asserts that      
ourselves 7or danger to ourselves7 are  
the only objects of  it4  ,he might     
indeed have avoided this absurdity1 by  
plainly saying what  he is going to     
account for2 namely1 why the sight of   
the innocent1 or of  our friends in     
distress1 raises greater fear for       
ourselves than the sight  of other      
persons in distress4  ,but had he put   
the thing thus plainly1 the  fact itself
 would have been doubted2 that the sight
 of our friends in  distress raises in  
us greater fear for ourselves than the  
sight of others  in distress4  ,and in  
the next place it would immediately have
 occurred  to every one that the fact   
now mentioned1 which at least is        
doubtful  whether1 true or false1 was   
not the same with this fact1 which      
nobody  ever doubted1 that the sight of 
our friends in distress raises in us    
greater compassion than the sight of    
others in distress3 every one1 ,i  say1 
would have seen that these are not the  

same1 but two different  inquiries2 and1
 consequently1 that fear and compassion 
are not the same4  ,suppose a person to 
be in real danger1 and by some means or 
other to have  forgot it2 any trifling  
accident1 any sound might alarm him1    
recall the  danger to his remembrance1  
and renew his fear2 but it is almost too
  grossly ridiculous 7though it is to   
show an absurdity7 to speak of that     
sound or accident as an object of       
compassion2 and yet1 according to ,mr4  
,hobbes1 our greatest friend in distress
 is no more to us1 no more the  object  
of compassion1 or of any affection in   
our heart3 neither the one  nor the     
other raises any emotion in one mind1   
but only the thoughts of  our liableness
 to calamity1 and the fear of it2 and   
both equally do this4  ,it is fit such  
sort of accounts of human nature should 
be shown to be  what they really are1   
because there is raised upon them a     
general scheme1  which undermines the   
whole foundation of common justice and  

honesty4  ,see  ,hobbes of ,human       
,nature1 c4 #i4 section #aj4    ,there  
are often three distinct perceptions or 
inward feelings upon sight  of persons  
in distress3 real sorrow and concern for
 the misery of our  fellow-creatures2   
some degree of satisfaction from a      
consciousness of our  freedom from that 
misery2 and as the mind passes on from  
one thing to  another it is not         
unnatural from such an occasion to      
reflect upon our own  liableness to the 
same or other calamities4  ,the two last
 frequently  accompany the first1 but it
 is the first only which is properly    
compassion1 of which the distressed are 
the objects1 and which directly  carries
 us with calmness and thought to their  
assistance4  ,any one of  these1 from   
various and complicated reasons1 may in 
particular cases  prevail over the other
 two2 and there are1 ,i suppose1        
instances1 where  the bare sight of     
distress1 without our feeling any       
compassion for it1  may be the occasion 

of either or both of the two latter     
perceptions4  ,one  might add that if   
there be really any such thing as the   
fiction or  imagination of danger to    
ourselves from sight of the miseries of 
others1  which ,hobbes specks of1 and   
which he has absurdly mistaken for the  
whole  of compassion2 if there be       
anything of this sort common to mankind1
  distinct from the reflection of       
reason1 it would be a most remarkable   
instance of what was furthest from his  
thoughts--namely1 of a mutual  sympathy 
between each particular of the species1 
a fellow-feeling common  to mankind4    
,it would not indeed be an example of   
our substituting others  for ourselves1 
but it would be an example of user      
substituting ourselves  for others4     
,and as it would not be an instance of  
benevolence1 so  neither would it be any
 instance of self-love3 for this phantom
 of danger  to ourselves1 naturally     
rising to view upon sight of the        
distresses of  others1 would be no more 

an instance of love to ourselves than   
the pain  of hunger is4    #ad  ,ecclus4
 xxxii4 #bh4    #ae  ,ecclus4 xlii4 #bd4
    #af  ,ver4 #d1 #e4    #ag  ,ver4 #f4
    #ah  ,micah vi4    #ai  ,chap4 xxii4
 #ab4    #bj  ,ver4 #ba4    #ba  ,chap4 
iv4    #bb  ,chap4 xxv4    #bc  ,chap4  
xxxi4    #bd  ,chap4 ii4    #bd;a  ,in  
the ,cassell edition the sermons jump   
from sermon ,,vii to ,,xi with  no      
explanation as to where ,,viii1 ,,ix and
 ,x are4  ,i've left the numbering  as  
is in case there is a good reason for   
it4--,,dp4    #be  ,p4 #acg4    #bf     
,matt4 v4 #dh4    #bg  #a ,cor4 xiii4   
#bh  ,for instance as we are not        
competent judges1 what is upon the whole
  for the good of the world1 there may  
be other immediate ends appointed  us to
 pursue1 besides that one of doing good 
or producing happiness4  ,though the    
good of the ,creation be the only end of
 the ,author of it1 yet  he may have    
laid us under particular obligations1   
which we may discern  and feel ourselves

 under1 quite distinct from a           
perception1 that the  observance or     
violation of them it for the happiness  
or misery of our  fellow-creatures4     
,and this is in fart the ease1 for there
 are certain  dispositions of mind1 and 
certain actions1 which are in themselves
  approved or disapproved by mankind1   
abstracted from the consideration of    
their tendency to the happiness or      
misery of the world approved or         
disapproved by reflection1 by that      
principle within1 whirls is the guile   
of life1 the judge of right and wrong4  
,numberless instances of this kind      
might be mentioned4  ,there are pieces  
of treachery1 which in themselves       
appear base and detestable to every one4
  ,there are actions1 which  perhaps can
 scarce have any other general name     
given them than  indecencies1 which yet 
are odious and shocking to human nature4
  ,there is  such a thing as meanness1 a
 little mind1 which as it is quite      
distinct  from incapacity1 so it raises 

a dislike and disapprobation quite      
different from that contempt1 which men 
are too apt to have1 of mere  folly4    
,on the other hand1 what we call        
greatness of mind is the object  of     
another most of approbation1 than       
superior understanding4  ,fidelity1     
honour1 strict justice1 are themselves  
approved in the highest degree1         
abstracted from the consideration of    
their tendency4  ,now1 whether it be    
thought that each of these are connected
 with benevolence in our nature1  amid  
so may he considered as the same thing  
with it1 or whether some of  them he    
thought an inferior kind of virtues and 
vices1 somewhat like  natural beauties  
and deformities1 or lastly1 plain       
exceptions to the  general rule1 thus   
such however is certain1 that the things
 now instanced  in1 and numberless      
others1 are approved or disapproved by  
mankind in  general1 in quite another   
view than as conducive to the happiness 
or  misery of the world4    #bi  ,st4   

,austin observes1 ,amor ipse ordinate   
amandus est1 quo bene  amatur quod      
amandum sit1 ut sit in nobis virtue qua 
vivitur bene1 i4e4  ,the affection which
 we rightly have for what is lovely must
 ordinate  justly1 in due manner end    
proportion1 become the object of a new  
affection1 or be itself beloved1 in     
order to our being endued with  that    
virtue which is the principle of a good 
life4  ,civ4 ,dei1 #a4 xv4 c4  #bb4     
#cj  ,job xxii4    #ca  ,job ix4 #b4    
#cb  ,eccius4 xliii4 #ej4