,,the ,,evidence ,,in ,,the ,,case ,a ,discussion of the ,moral ,responsibility for the ,war of #aiad1 as ,disclosed by the ,diplomatic ,records of ,england1 ,germany1 ,russia1 ,france1 ,austria1 ,italy and ,belgium4 ,,by ,,james ,m4 ,,beck1 ,,ll4,d4 ,late ,assistant ,attorney-,general of the ,u4 ,s4 ,author of ,the ,war and ,humanity4 ,with an ,introduction by ,,hon4 ,,joseph ,h4 ,,choate ,late ,u4 ,s4 ,ambassador to ,great ,britain ,did these bones cost no more the breeding but to play at loggats with 'em8 ,mine ache to think on 't4 ,,hamlet--,act ,v41 ,sc4 #a4 ,revised ,edition1 with ,additional ,material ,,new ,,york ,,grosset ,,dunlap ,,publishers ,published by ,arrangement with ,g4 ,p4 ,putnam's ,sons ,,copyright1 #aiad1 ,,by ,,james ,m4 ,,beck ,,copyright1 #aiae1 ,,by ,,james ,m4 ,,beck 7,for ,revised ,edition7 ,thirteenth ,impression ,,by ,,james ,m4 ,,beck ,the ,evidence in the ,case4 ,the ,war and ,humanity4 ,this edition is issued under arrangement with the publishers1 ,g4 ,p4 ,,putnam',s ,,sons1 ,,new ,,york ,,and ,,london ,,to ,,albert1 ,,of ,,belgium ,,every ,,inch ,a ,,king ,justum1 et tenacem propositi virum ,non civium ardor prava jubentium1 ,non vultus instantis tyranni1 ,mente quatit solida1 neque ,auster ,dux inquieti turbidus ,adri1 ,nec fulminantis magna manus ,jovis4 ,si fractus illabatur orbis1 ,impavidum ferient ruin4 ,,horace4 ,publishers' ,note ,the volume ,the ,evidence in the ,case is based upon an article by the ,hon4 ,james ,m4 ,beck1 which came into print in the ,new ,york ,times of ,october #beth4 ,the article in question made so deep an impression with thinking citizens on both sides of the ,atlantic that it has been translated into a number of ,european languages1 and some #djj1jjj copies have been sold in ,england alone4 ,in making this acknowledgment1 which is due for the courtesy of ,the ,times in permitting an article prepared for its columns to be utilized as the basis for the book1 it is in order for the publishers to explain to the readers that the material in the article has itself been rewritten and amplified1 while the book contains1 in addition to this original paper1 a number of further chapters comprising together more than six times the material of the first article4 ,the present book is an independent work1 and is deserving of consideration on the part of all citizens who are interested in securing authoritative information on the issues of the great ,european contest4 ,new ,york1 ,december #ab1 #aiad ,,introduction ,,by ,,the ,,hon4 ,,joseph ,h4 ,,choate1 ,,former ,,american ,,ambassador ,,to ,,great ,,britain#a ,footnote #a3 ,reprinted1 by permission1 from the ,n4 ,y4 ,times4 ,for five months now all people who read at all have been reading about the horrible war that is devastating ,europe and shedding the best blood of the people of five great nations4 ,in fact1 they have had no time to read anything else1 and everything that is published about it is seized upon with great avidity4 ,no wonder1 then1 that ,mr4 ,james ,m4 ,beck's book1 ,the ,evidence in the ,case1 published by ,g4 ,p4 ,putnam's ,sons1 which has grown out of the article by him contributed to the ,new ,york ,times ,sunday ,magazine1 has been warmly welcomed both here and in ,england as a valuable addition to the literature of the day4 ,an able and clear-headed lawyer and advocate1 he presents the matter in the unique form of a legal argument1 based upon an analysis of the diplomatic records submitted by ,england1 ,germany1 ,russia1 ,france1 and ,belgium1 as ,a ,case in the ,supreme ,court of ,civilization1 and the conclusions to be deduced as to the moral responsibility for the war4 ,the whole argument is founded upon the idea that there is such a thing as a public conscience of the world1 which must and will necessarily pass final judgment upon the conduct of the parties concerned in this infernal struggle4 ,many times in the course of the book he refers emphatically to that decent respect to the opinions of mankind to which ,jefferson appealed in our ,declaration of ,independence as the final arbiter upon our conduct in throwing off the ,british yoke and declaring our right to be an independent nation4 ,that this public opinion of the world is the final tribunal upon all great international contests is illustrated by the fact that all mankind1 including ,great ,britain herself1 has long ago adjudged that our great ,declaration was not only just1 but necessary for the progress of mankind4 ,it is evident from his brief preface that ,mr4 ,beck is a sincere admirer of historic ,germany1 and on the eve of the war he was at ,weimar1 after a brief visit to a little village near ,erfurt1 where one of his ancestors was born1 who had migrated at an early date to ,pennsylvania1 a ,commonwealth whose founder had made a treaty with the ,indians which1 so far from being treated as a mere scrap of paper1 was never broken4 ,like many ,americans1 ,mr4 ,beck is of mixed ancestry1 being in part ,english and in part ,swiss-,german4 ,he has therefore viewed the great question objectively1 and without any racial prejudice4 ,a careful study of the diplomatic correspondence that preceded the outbreak of the war had convinced ,mr4 ,beck that ,germany was chiefly responsible for it1 and he proceeds con amore to demonstrate the truth of this conviction by the most earnest and forceful presentation of the case4 ,forensic lawyers in the cases they present are about half the time on the wrong side1 or what proves by the final judgment to have been the wrong side1 but it is always easy to tell from the manner of presentation whether they themselves are thoroughly convinced of the justice of the side which they advocate4 ,it is evident that ,mr4 ,beck did not undertake to convince the ,supreme ,court of ,civilization until he was himself thoroughly persuaded of the justice of his cause1 that the invasion of ,belgium by ,germany was not only a gross breach of existing treaties1 but was in violation of settled international law1 and a crime against humanity never to be forgotten1 a crime which converted that peaceful and prosperous country into a human slaughterhouse1 reeking with the blood of four great nations4 ,how any intelligent lawyer could have come to any other conclusion it is not easy to imagine1 since ,germany confessed its crime while in the very act of committing it1 for on the very day that the ,german troops crossed the ,belgian frontier and hostilities began1 the ,imperial ,chancellor at the great session of the ,reichstag on ,august #dth declared1 to use his own words3 ,necessity knows no law4 ,our troops have occupied ,luxemburg1 and have possibly already entered on ,belgian soil4 ,that is a breach of international law4444 ,we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the ,governments of ,luxemburg and ,belgium1 and the injustice--,i speak openly--the injustice we thereby commit1 we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained4 ,anybody who is threatened as we are threatened and is fighting for his highest possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his way through4 ,thank ,god1 their military aims have not yet been attained1 and from present appearances are not likely to be1 but1 as ,mr4 ,beck believes1 ,germany will still be held by the judgment of mankind to make good the damage done4 ,in reviewing the diplomatic correspondence published by ,germany that preceded the outbreak of the war1 ,mr4 ,beck lays great stress1 and we think justly1 upon the obvious suppression of evidence by ,germany1 in omitting substantially all the important correspondence on vital points that passed between ,germany and ,austria1 and the suppression of important evidence in judicial proceedings always carries irresistible weight against the party guilty of it4 ,while ,england and ,france and ,russia were pressing ,germany to influence and control ,austria in the interests of peace1 not a word is disclosed of what1 if anything1 the ,german ,foreign ,office said to ,austria toward that end4 ,to quote ,mr4 ,beck's own words3 ,among the twenty-seven communications appended to the ,german ,white ,paper1 it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which passed from the ,foreign ,office of ,berlin to that of ,vienna1 and only two which passed from the ,german ,ambassador in ,vienna to the ,german ,chancellor1 and the purpose of this suppression is even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of ,austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the scrutiny of a candid world4 ,notwithstanding the disavowal given by the ,german ,ambassador at ,petrograd to the ,russian ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs1 that the ,german ,government had no knowledge of the text of the ,austrian note before it was handed in1 and did not exercise any influence on its contents1 ,mr4 ,beck establishes clearly by the admissions of the ,german ,foreign ,office itself that it was consulted by ,austria previous to the ultimatum1 and that it not only approved of its course1 but literally gave to ,austria carte blanche to proceed4 ,and the ,german ,ambassador to the ,united ,states formally admitted in an article in ,the ,independent of ,september #g1 #aiad1 that ,germany had approved in advance the ,austrian ultimatum to ,servia4 ,this brutal ultimatum by a great nation of fifty millions of people1 making impossible demands against a little one of four millions which had itself just emerged from two conflicts and was still suffering from exhaustion--an ultimatum which set all the nations of ,europe in agitation--is proved to have been jointly concocted by the two members of the ,triple ,alliance1 ,germany and ,austria4 ,but the third member of that ,alliance1 ,italy1 found it to be an act of aggression on their part which brought on the war1 and that the terms of the ,triple ,alliance1 therefore1 did not bind her to take any part4 ,the peace parleys which passed between the several nations involved are carefully reviewed by ,mr4 ,beck1 who concludes1 as we think justly1 that up to the #bhth of ,july1 when the ,german ,imperial ,chancellor sent for the ,english ,ambassador and announced the refusal of his ,government to accept the conference of the ,powers proposed by ,sir ,edward ,grey1 every proposal to preserve peace had come from the ,triple ,entente1 and that every such proposal had met with an uncompromising negative from ,austria1 and either that or obstructive quibbles from ,germany4 ,at this point1 the sudden return of the ,kaiser to ,berlin from his annual holiday in ,norway1 which his own ,foreign ,office regretted as a step taken on his ,majesty's own initiative and which they feared might cause speculation and excitement1 and his personal intervention from that time until his troops invaded ,luxemburg and he made his abrupt demand upon the ,belgian ,government for permission to cross its territory are reviewed with great force and effect by ,mr4 ,beck1 with the conclusion on his part that the ,kaiser1 who by a timely word to ,austria might have prevented all the terrible trouble that followed1 was the supremely guilty party1 and that such will be the verdict of history4 ,mr4 ,beck's review of the case of ,belgium is extremely interesting1 and his conclusion that ,england1 ,france1 ,russia1 and ,belgium can await with confidence the world's final verdict that their quarrel was just1 rests safely upon the plea of ,guilty by ,germany1 a conclusion which seems to have been already plainly declared by most of the civilized nations of the world4 ,we think that ,mr4 ,beck's opinion that ,england and ,france were taken unawares and were wholly unprepared for war is a little too strongly expressed4 ,france1 certainly1 had been making ready for war with ,germany ever since the great conflict of #ahgj had resulted in her loss of ,alsace and ,lorraine1 and had had a fixed and unalterable determination to get them back when she could1 although it is evident that she did not expect her opportunity to come just when and as it did4 ,that ,great ,britain had no present expectation of immediate war with ,germany is clearly obvious4 ,that she had long been apprehending the danger of it in the indefinite future is very clear1 but that ,sir ,edward ,grey and the ,government and the people that he represented did all that they possibly could to prevent the war seems to be clearly established4 ,mr4 ,beck's book is so extremely interesting from beginning to end that it is difficult when once begun to lay it down and break off the reading1 and we shall not be surprised to hear1 not only that it has had an immense sale in ,england and ,america1 but that its translation into the languages of the other nations of ,europe has been demanded4 ,,joseph ,h4 ,,choate4 ,,new ,,york1 ,january #aj1 #aiae4 ,,foreword ,on the eve of the ,great ,war ,i sat one evening in the reading room of the ,hotel ,erbprinz in classic ,weimar4 ,i had spent ten happy days in ,thuringia1 and had visited with deep interest a little village near ,erfurt1 where one of my forbears was born4 ,i had seen ,jena1 from whose historic university this paternal ancestor had gone as a missionary to ,north ,america in the middle of the eighteenth century4 ,this simple-minded ,german pietist had cherished the apparent delusion that even the uncivilized ,indians of the ,american wilderness might be taught--the ,bernhardis and ,treitschkes to the contrary notwithstanding--that to increase the political power of a nation by the deliberate and highly systematized destruction of its neighbors was not the truest political ideal1 even of an ,indian tribe4 ,this missionary had gone most fittingly to the ,commonwealth of ,pennsylvania1 where its enlightened founder had already given a demonstration of the truth that a treaty of peace1 even though not formally expressed in a scrap of paper1 might be kept by white men and so-called savages with scrupulous fidelity for at least three quarters of a century1 for even the cynical ,voltaire said in sincerest admiration that the compact between ,william ,penn and the ,indians was the only treaty which was never reduced to parchment1 nor ratified by an oath and yet was never broken4 ,when ,penn1 the great apostle of peace1 died in ,england1 a disappointed1 ruined1 and heart-broken man1 and the news reached the ,indians in their wigwams along the banks of the ,delaware1 they had for him1 whom they called the white ,truth ,teller so deep a sense of gratitude that they sent to his widow a sympathetic gift of valuable skins1 in memory of the man of unbroken friendship and inviolate treaties4 ,these reflections in a time of broken friendships and violated treaties are not calculated to fill the man of the twentieth century with any justifiable pride4 ,my mind1 however1 as ,i spent the quiet evening in the historic inn of ,thackeray's ,pumpernickel1 did not revert to these far distant associations but was full of other thoughts suggested by the most interesting section of ,germany1 through which it had been my privilege to pass4 ,i had visited ,eisenach and reverentially stood within the room where the great master of music1 ,john ,sebastian ,bach1 had first seen the light of day1 and as ,i saw the walls that he loved and which are forever hallowed because they once sheltered this divine genius1 the question occurred to me whether he may not have done more for ,germany with his immortal harmonies1 which are the foundation of all modern music1 than all the ,treitschkes1 and ,bernhardis1 with their gospel of racial hatred1 pseudo-patriotism1 and imperial aggrandizement4 ,i had climbed the slopes of the ,wartburg and from ,luther's room had gazed with delight upon the lovely ,thuringian forests4 ,quite apart from any ecclesiastical considerations that room seemed to suggest historic ,germany in its best estate4 ,it recalled that scene of undying interest at the ,diet of ,worms1 when the peaceful adherence to an ideal was shown to be mightier than the power of the greatest empire since the fall of ,rome4 ,the monk of ,wittenburg1 standing alone in the presence of the great ,emperor1 ,charles the ,fifth1 and the representatives of the most powerful religious organization that the world has ever known1 with his simple1 ,hier stehe ich2 ich kann nicht anders1 represented the truest soul and highest ideal of the nobler ,germany4 ,these and other glorious memories1 suggested by ,eisenach1 ,frankfort1 ,erfurt1 ,weimar1 ,jena1 and ,leipzig1 made this pilgrimage of intense interest1 and almost the only discord was the sight of the ,leipzig ,voelkerschlacht ,denkmal1 probably the largest1 and certainly the ugliest monument in all the world4 ,it has but one justification1 in that it commemorates war1 and no monument ever more fully symbolized by its own colossal crudity the moral ugliness of that most ghastly phenomenon of human life4 ,let us pray that in the event of final victory ,prussia will not commission the architects of the ,leipzig monument1 or the imperial designer of the ,siges-,alle to rebuild that ,gothic masterpiece1 the ,rheims ,cathedral4 ,that day in ,leipzig an ,alsatian cartoonist1 ,hansi1 had been sentenced to one year's imprisonment for a harmless cartoon in a book for children1 in which the most supersensitive should have found occasion for nothing1 except a passing smile4 ,on the library table of the ,erbprinz1 ,i found a large book1 which proved to be a ,bismarck memorial volume4 ,it contained hundreds of pictures glorifying and almost deifying the ,iron ,chancellor4 ,one particularly arrested my attention4 ,it was the familiar picture of the negotiations for peace between ,bismarck and ,jules ,favre in the terrible winter of #ahga4 ,the ,french statesman has sunk into a chair in abject despair1 struck speechless by the demands of the conqueror4 ,bismarck stands triumphant and his proud bearing and arrogant manner fail to suggest any such magnanimous courtesy as that with which ,grant accepted the sword of ,lee at ,appomattox4 ,the picture breathed the very spirit of v victis4 ,had a ,french artist painted this picture1 ,i could understand it1 for it would serve effectively to stimulate undying hatred in the ,french heart4 ,it seemed strange that a ,german artist should treat a subject1 calling for a spirit of most delicate courtesy1 in a manner which represented ,prussian militarism in its most arrogant form4 ,this unworthy picture reminded me of a later scene in the ,reichstag1 in which the ,iron ,chancellor1 after reviewing with complacency the profitable results of ,germany's deliberately provoked wars against ,denmark1 ,austria1 and ,france1 added the pious ejaculation3 ,wir ,deutsche frchten ,gott sonst nichts in der ,welt4 7,we ,germans fear ,god but nothing else in the world47 ,it is not necessary to impeach the sincerity of this pious glorification of the successful results of land grabbing4 ,the mind in moments of exaltation plays strange tricks with the soul4 ,bismarck may have dissembled on occasion but he was never a hypocrite4 ,it is the spirit which inspired this boastful and arrogant speech1 which has so powerfully stimulated ,prussian ,junkerism1 to which ,i wish to refer4 ,had an ,american uttered these words we would have treated the boast as a vulgar exhibition of provincial spread-eagleism1 such as characterized certain classes in this country before the ,civil ,war1 and which ,charles ,dickens somewhat over-caricatured in ,martin ,chuzzlewit1 but in the mouth of ,bismarck1 with his cynical indifference to moral considerations in questions of statecraft1 this piece of rhetorical spread double-eagleism1 manifests the spirit of the ,prussian military caste since its too easy triumph over ,france in #ahgj-ahga1 a triumph1 which may yet prove the greatest calamity that ever befell ,germany1 not only in the seeds of hatred which it sowed1 of which there is now a harvest of blood past precedent1 but also in the development of an arrogant pride which has profoundly affected to its prejudice the noble ,germany of ,luther1 ,bach1 ,beethoven1 ,goethe1 ,schiller1 ,kant1 ,humboldt1 and ,lessing4 ,to say that ,germany fears nothing save ,god is contradicted by its whole diplomatic history of the last half century4 ,in this it is not peculiar4 ,the curse of modern statecraft is the largely unreasoning fear which all nations have of their neighbors4 ,england has feared ,germany only less than ,germany has feared ,england and this nervous apprehension has bred jealousy1 hatred1 suspicion1 until to-day all civilized nations are reaping a harvest horrible beyond expression4 ,the whole history of ,germany since #ahgj has shown a constant1 and at times an unreasoning fear1 first of ,france1 then of the ,slav1 and latterly and in its most acute form1 of ,england4 ,i do not mean that ,germany has been or is now animated by any spirit of craven cowardice4 ,there has not been in recorded history a braver nation1 and the dauntless courage with which1 even at this hour1 thousands of ,germans are going with patriotic songs on their lips to their graves as to their beds1 is worthy of all admiration4 ,the whole statecraft of ,germany for over forty years has been inspired by an exaggerated apprehension of the intentions of its great neighbors4 ,this fear followed swiftly upon the triumph of #ahga1 for ,germany early showed its apprehension that ,france might recover its military strength4 ,when that fallen but indomitable foe again struggled to its feet in #ahge1 the ,prussian military caste planned to give the stricken gladiator the coup de grce and was only prevented by the intervention of ,england and ,russia4 ,later this acute and neurotic apprehension took the form of a hatred and fear of ,russia1 and this notwithstanding the fact that the ,kaiser had in the ,russo-,japanese ,war exalted the ,czar as the champion of ,christianity and the representative of the white race in the ,far ,east4 ,when the psychology of the present conflict is considered by future historians1 this neuropathic feature of ,germany's foreign policy will be regarded as a contributing element of first importance4 ,latterly the ,furor ,teutonicus was especially directed against ,england1 and although it was obvious to the dispassionate observer in neutral countries that no nation was making less preparations or was in point of fact so illy prepared for a conflict as ,england1 nevertheless ,germany1 with a completeness of preparation such as the world has never witnessed1 was constantly indulging in a very hysteria of fear at the imaginary designs of ,england upon ,germany's standing as a world power4 ,luther's famous saying1 already quoted1 and ,bismarck's blustering speech to the ,reichstag measure the difference between the ,germany of the ,reformation and the ,prussia of to-day4 ,i refuse to believe that this ,bismarckian attitude is that of the ,german people4 ,if a censored press permitted them to know the real truth with respect to the present crisis1 that people1 still sound in heart and steadfast in soul1 would repudiate a policy of duplicity1 cunning1 and arrogance1 which has precipitated their great nation into an abyss of disaster4 ,the normal ,german is an admirable citizen1 quiet1 peaceable1 thrifty1 industrious1 faithful1 efficient1 and affectionate to the verge of sentimentality4 ,he1 and not the ,junker1 has made ,germany the most efficient political ,state in the world4 ,if to his genius for organization could be added the individualism of the ,american1 the resultant product would be incomparable4 ,a combination of the ,german fortiter in re with the ,american suaviter in modo would make the most efficient republic in the world4 ,the ,germany of ,luther1 that still survives and will survive when ,junkerism is a dismal memory of the past1 believes that the supreme wisdom1 the paramount vitality1 is an abiding honesty1 the doing of right1 because right is right1 in scorn of consequence4 ,that the ,german people have rallied with enthusiastic unanimity to the flag in this great crisis1 ,i do not question4 ,this is1 in part1 due to the fact that the truth has never yet been disclosed to them1 and is not likely to be until the war is over4 ,they have been taught that in a time of profound peace ,england1 ,france1 and ,russia deliberately initiated a war of aggression to destroy the commercial power of ,germany4 ,the documents hereinafter analyzed will show how utterly baseless this fiction is4 ,even if the truth were known1 no one can blame the ,german1 who now rallies to his flag with such superhuman devotion1 for whether the cause of his country is just or unjust1 its prestige1 and perhaps its very existence1 is at stake1 and there should be for the rank and file of the ,german people only a feeling of profound pity and deep admiration4 ,edmund ,burke once said1 ,we must pardon something to the spirit of liberty4 ,we can paraphrase it and say in this crisis1 ,we must pardon something to the spirit of patriotism4 ,the whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the best traditions of the ,teutonic race4 ,thor did not wield his thunder hammer with greater effect than these descendants of the race of ,wotan4 ,if the ethical question depended upon relative bravery1 who could decide between the ,german1 faithful unto death2 the ,english soldier1 standing like a stone wall against fearful odds1 the ,french or ,russian not less brave or resolute1 and the ,belgian1 now as in ,csar's time the bravest of all the tribes of ,gaul4 ,no consideration1 either of sympathy1 admiration1 or pity1 can in any manner affect the determination of the great ethical question as to the moral responsibility for the present crime against civilization4 ,that must be determined by the facts as they have been developed1 and the nations and individuals who are responsible for this world-wide catastrophe must be held to a strict accountability4 ,the truth of history inexorably demands this4 ,to determine where this moral responsibility lies is the purpose of these pages4 ,in determining this question ,posterity will distinguish between the military caste1 headed by the ,kaiser and the ,crown ,prince1 which precipitated this great calamity1 and the ,german people4 ,the very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the failure to disclose to the ,german nation the diplomatic communications hereinafter quoted1 strongly suggest that this detestable war is not merely a crime against civilization1 but also against the deceived and misled ,german people4 ,they have a vision and are essentially progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics1 while the ideals of their military caste are those of the dark ages4 ,one day the ,german people will know the full truth and then there will be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble nation into this unfathomable gulf of suffering4 ,though the mills of ,god grind slowly1 ,yet they grind exceeding small1 ,though with patience ,he stands waiting1 ,with exactness grinds ,he all4 ,or to put this ancient ,greek proverb in its ,german form3 ,gottes ,mhle geht langsam aber die mahlt fein4 ,,james ,m4 ,,beck4 ,,new ,,york1 ,november #cj1 #aiad4 ,the ,witnesses ,,england ,,his ,,majesty1 ,,king ,,george ,v4 ,,mr4 ,,asquith ,premier4 ,,mr4 ,,beaumont ,councilor of ,embassy at ,constantinople4 ,,sir ,f4 ,,bertie ,ambassador at ,paris4 ,,sir ,g4 ,,buchanan ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg4 ,,sir ,m4 ,,de ,,bunsen ,ambassador at ,vienna4 ,,sir ,e4 ,,goschen ,ambassador at ,berlin4 ,,sir ,,edward ,,grey ,foreign ,secretary4 ,,sir ,a4 ,,johnstone ,minister at ,luxemburg4 ,,sir ,,arthur ,,nicholson ,under ,secretary for ,foreign ,affairs4 ,,sir ,r4 ,,rodd ,ambassador to ,italy4 ,,sir ,h4 ,,rumbold ,councilor of ,embassy at ,berlin4 ,,sir ,f4 ,,villiers ,minister to ,belgium4 ,,germany ,,his ,,majesty1 ,,emperor ,,william ,,ii4 ,,herr ,,von ,,below 7,,saleske#b7 ,minister to ,belgium4 ,,dr4 ,,von ,,bethmann-,,hollweg ,chancellor4 ,,herr ,,von ,,buch ,minister at ,luxemburg4 ,,herr ,,von ,,heeringen ,minister of ,war4 ,,herr ,,von ,,jagow ,secretary of ,state4 ,,prince ,,lichnowsky ,ambassador at ,london4 ,,herr ,,von ,,mueller ,minister at ,the ,hague4 ,,count ,,pourtales ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg4 ,,baron ,,von ,,schoen ,ambassador at ,paris4 ,,herr ,,von ,,zimmermann ,under ,secretary of ,state4 ,,herr ,,von ,,tschirschky ,ambassador at ,vienna4 ,footnote #b3 ,herr von ,below ,saleske is referred to in despatches as ,herr von ,below4 ,,france ,,president ,,raymond ,,poincar ,m4 ,,viviani ,premier of ,france4 ,m4 ,,berthelot ,of the ,french ,ministry for ,foreign ,affairs4 ,m4 ,,paul ,,cambon ,ambassador to ,england4 ,m4 ,,klobukowski ,minister to ,belgium4 ,m4 ,,de ,,margerie ,of the ,french ,diplomatic ,service4 ,m4 ,,jules ,,cambon ,ambassador to ,germany4 ,,russia ,,his ,,majesty1 ,,emperor ,,nicholas ,,ii4 ,m4 ,,sazonof ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs4 ,,count ,,benckendorff ,ambassador at ,london4 ,m4 ,,bronewsky ,charg d',affaires at ,berlin4 ,m4 ,,de ,,etter ,councilor of ,embassy at ,london4 ,m4 ,,isvolsky ,ambassador to ,france4 ,,prince ,,kudachef ,councilor of ,embassy at ,vienna4 ,m4 ,,salviati ,consul ,general at ,fiume4 ,m4 ,,schebeko ,ambassador to ,austria4 ,m4 ,,sevastopoulo ,charg d',affaires at ,paris4 ,m4 ,,strandtman ,charg d',affaires at ,belgrade4 ,m4 ,,suchomlinof ,minister for ,war4 ,m4 ,,de ,,swerbeew ,ambassador to ,germany4 ,,belgium ,,his ,,majesty1 ,,king ,,albert ,m4 ,,davignon ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs4 ,,baron ,,von ,,der ,,elst ,secretary ,general to ,ministry of ,foreign ,affairs4 ,,count ,,errembault ,,de ,,dudzeele ,minister at ,vienna4 ,,baron ,,fallon ,minister at ,the ,hague4 ,,baron ,,grenier ,minister at ,madrid4 ,,baron ,,guillaume ,minister at ,paris4 ,,count ,,de ,,lalaing ,minister at ,london4 ,,servia ,,his ,,majesty1 ,,king ,,peter ,m4 ,,pachitch ,premier and ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs4 ,m4 ,,boschkovitch ,minister at ,london4 ,,dr4 ,,patchou ,minister of ,finance4 ,,austria ,,his ,,majesty1 ,,emperor ,,francis ,,joseph ,,count ,,berchtold ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs4 ,,count ,,clary ,,und ,,aldringen ,minister at ,brussels4 ,,baron ,,giesl ,,von ,,gieslingen ,minister at ,belgrade4 ,,baron ,,macchio ,councilor of ,austrian ,ministry of ,foreign ,affairs4 ,,count ,,mensdorff ,ambassador to ,england4 ,,count ,,sz,p,,ry ,ambassador to ,russia4 ,,italy ,,his ,,majesty1 ,,king ,,victor ,,emmanuel ,,iii4 ,,marquis ,,di ,,san ,,giuliano ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs4 ,,contents ,,page ,,introduction v ,,foreword xv ,,the ,,witnesses xxvii ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,supreme ,,court ,,of ,,civilization ,existence of the ,court--,the conscience of mankind--,the philosophy of ,bernhardi--,the recrudescence of ,machiavelliism--,treitschke and ,bernhardi's doctrine--,recent utterances of the ,kaiser1 ,crown ,prince1 and representative officials--,george ,bernard ,shaw's defense--,concrete illustration of ,bernhardiism #a ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,record ,,in ,,the ,,case ,the issues stated--,proximate and underlying causes--,a war of diplomats--,the masses not parties to the war--,the official defenses--,the ,english ,white ,paper--,the ,german ,white ,paper--,the ,russian ,orange ,paper--,the ,belgian ,gray ,paper--,austria and ,italy still silent--,obligation of these nations to disclose facts #ah ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,suppressed ,,evidence ,no apparent suppression by ,england1 ,russia1 and ,belgium--,suppression by ,germany of vital documents--,suppression by ,austria of entire record--,significance of such suppression #bg ,,chapter ,,iv ,,germany',s ,,responsibility ,,for ,,the ,,austrian ,,ultimatum ,silence which preceded ultimatum--,europe's ignorance of impending developments--,duty to civilization--,germany's prior knowledge of ultimatum--,its disclaimer to ,russia1 ,france1 and ,england of any responsibility--,contradictory admission in its official defense--,further confirmation in ,germany's simultaneous threat to the ,powers--,further confirmation in its confidential notice to ,states of ,germany to prepare for eventualities #ca ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,austrian ,,ultimatum ,,to ,,servia ,extreme brutality of ultimatum--,limited time given to ,servia and ,europe for consideration--,ultimatum and ,servia's reply contrasted in parallel columns--,relative size of two nations--,germany's intimations to ,servia--,brutality of ultimatum shown by analogy--,disclaimer of intention to take territory valueless #dg ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,peace ,,parleys ,possibility of peace not embarrassed by popular clamor--,difficulties of peaceful solution not insuperable--,policy of ,germany and ,austria--,russia's and ,england's request for time--,germany's refusal to coperate--,germany's and ,austria's excuses for refusal to give extension of time--,berchtold's absence from ,vienna--,austria's alleged disclaimer of territorial expansion--,sazonof's conference with ,english and ,french ,ambassadors--,their conciliatory counsel to ,servia--,servia's pacific reply to ultimatum--,austria1 without considering ,servian reply1 declares war--,england proposes suspension of hostilities for peace parleys--,germany refuses--,its specious reasons--,germany's untenable position as to localization of conflict--,england's proposal for a conference--,germany's refusal--,austria declines all intervention1 refusing to discuss ,servian note--,germany supports her with a quibble as to name of conference--,russia proposes further discussion on basis of ,servian note--,russia then again proposes ,european conference--,austria and ,germany decline #fa ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,attitude ,,of ,,france ,the ,french ,yellow ,book--,its editors and contents--,m4 ,jules ,cambon--,the weakness of ,german diplomacy--,cambon's experience and merits--,interview between the ,german ,kaiser and the ,king of ,belgium--,the ,kaiser's change of attitude--,the influence of the ,moroccan crisis--,the condition of the ,german people in #aiac--,the suppression of news in ,austria--,attitude of the military party--,servia's warning to ,austria--,germany's knowledge of the ,austrian ultimatum before its issuance--,italy's ignorance of the ,austrian ultimatum--,significance of the fact--,germany's reasons for concealing its intentions from ,italy--,the policy of secrecy--,prince ,lichnowsky's anxiety--,cambon's interview with von ,jagow--,the methods of deception--,sazonof's frank offer--,germany's attempt to influence ,france--,cambon's dramatic interview with von ,jagow--,his plea ,in the name of humanity--,the different attitudes of the two groups of powers #ajb ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,intervention ,,of ,,the ,,kaiser ,the ,kaiser's return to ,berlin--,his inconsistent record and complex personality--,german ,foreign ,office deprecates his return--,its many blunders--,the ,kaiser takes the helm--,he telegraphs the ,czar--,the ,czar's reply--,the ,kaiser's second telegram--,his untenable position--,the ,czar's explanation of military preparations and pledge that no provocative action would be taken by ,russia--,king ,george's telegram proposing temporary occupation by ,austria of ,belgrade pending further peace negotiations--,the ,kaiser's reply--,the ,kaiser's telegram to the ,czar demanding ,russian discontinuance of military preparations--,his insistence upon unilateral conditions--,germany's preparations for war--,its offer to ,england to insure its neutrality--,england's reply--,russia's offer to stop conditionally military preparations--,england requests ,germany to suggest any peace formula--,austria expresses willingness to discuss with ,russia ,servian note--,motives of ,austria for this reversal of policy--,the ,kaiser sends ultimatum to ,russia--,the ,czar's last appeal--,the ,kaiser's reply--,russia's inability to recall mobilization--,england's last efforts for peace--,germany declares war--,the ,czar's telegram to ,king ,george #ach ,,chapter ,,ix ,,the ,,case ,,of ,,belgium ,the verdict of history not affected by result of war--,belgium at outbreak of war--,the ,treaty of #ahci--;,its affirmation by ,bismarck--,france's action in #ahga--,reaffirmation by ,germany of ,belgian neutrality in #aiaa-aiad--,the ,hague ,peace ,conference of #aijg--;,england asks ,germany's and ,france's intentions with respect to ,belgium's neutrality--,france replies--,germany's refusal to reply--,germany's second offer to ,england--,germany's ultimatum to ,belgium--,belgium's reply--,france's offer of five army corps--,belgium refuses aid--,germany's declaration of war against ,belgium--,the ,german ,chancellor's explanation in the ,reichstag--,the ,belgian ,king appeals to ,england--,england's ultimatum to ,germany--,the scrap of paper incident--,england declares war against ,germany--,the apologies for ,germany's action discussed--,belgium's rights independent of ,treaty of #ahci or ,the ,hague ,convention--,germany's allegation that ,france had violated ,belgium's neutrality an afterthought--,von ,mach's plea for the suspension of judgment--,the ,brussels documents discussed--,the negotiations between ,england and ,belgium--,the ,german ,chancellor's belated explanation of the scrap of paper phrase--,invasion of ,belgium a recrudescence of ,machiavelliism--,the great blunder of ,germany's diplomats and soldiers #aif ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,judgment ,,of ,,the ,,world ,the completeness of the evidence--,the force of public opinion--,the judgment of neutral ,states--,the ,united ,states as a moral arbiter--,a summary of the probable verdict of history #bdf ,,epilogue #beb ,the ,evidence in the ,case ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,supreme ,,court ,,of ,,civilization ,let us suppose that in this year of dis-,grace1 #aiad1 there had existed1 as let us pray will one day exist1 a ,supreme ,court of ,civilization1 before which the sovereign nations could litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous arbitrament of arms and that each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of ,christianity or shall we say commonplace1 everyday morality1 to have its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon1 but by the eternal criterion of justice4 ,what would be the judgment of that august tribunal8 ,it may be suggested that the question is academic1 as no such ,supreme ,court exists or is likely to exist within the life of any living man4 ,casuists of the ,bernhardi school of moral philosophy will further suggest that to discuss the ethical merits of the war is to start with a false premise that such a thing as international morality exists1 and that when once the conventionalities of civilization are laid aside the leading nations commence and make war in a manner that differs only in degree and not in kind from the methods of ,frederick the ,great and ,napoleon1 and that these in turn only differed in degree from those of ,alaric and ,attila4 ,according to this theory1 the only law of nations is that ascribed by the poet to ,rob ,roy3 ,the good old rule ,sufficeth them1 the simple plan ,that they should take who have the power1 ,and they should keep who can4 ,does the ,twentieth ,century only differ from its predecessors in having a thin veneering of hypocrisy1 or has there developed in the progress of civilization an international morality1 by which1 even though imperfectly1 the moral conduct of nations is judged8 ,the answer can be an unqualified affirmative4 ,with the age of the printing press1 the steamship1 the railroad1 and the telegraph there has developed a conscience of mankind4 ,when the founders of the ,american ,republic severed the tie which bound them to ,great ,britain1 they stated that a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation4 ,the ,declaration assumed that there was a rule of right and wrong that regulated the intercourse of nations as well as individuals2 it believed that there was a great human conscience1 which rises higher than the selfish interests and prejudices of nations and races1 and which approves justice and condemns injustice4 ,it felt that this approval is more to be desired than national advantage4 ,it constituted mankind a judge between contending nations and lest its judgment should temporarily err it established posterity as a court of last resort4 ,it placed the tie of humanity above that of nationality4 ,it proclaimed the solidarity of mankind4 ,in the years that have intervened since this noble ,declaration1 the world has so far progressed towards an enlightened sense of justice that a decent respect to the opinions of mankind has proved an efficient power in regulating peacefully and justly the intercourse of nations4 ,each nation does at least in some measure fear to-day the disapproval of civilization4 ,the time gives this proof in the eager desire of ,germany to-day--despite its policy of blood and iron--to gain the sympathetic approval of the ,american people1 not with the remotest hope of any practical coperation but to avoid that state of moral isolation1 in which the land of ,luther now finds itself4 ,the ,supreme ,court of ,civilization does exist4 ,it consists of cosmopolitan men in every country1 who put aside racial and national prejudices and determine the right and wrong of every issue between nations by that slowly forming system of international morality which is the conscience of mankind4 ,to a certain class of ,german statesmen and philosophers this ,court of ,public ,opinion is a visionary abstraction4 ,a group of distinguished ,german soldiers1 professors1 statesmen1 and even doctors of divinity1 pretending to speak in behalf of the ,german nation1 have consciously or unconsciously attempted to revive in the twentieth century the cynical political morality of the sixteenth4 ,as ,symonds1 the historian of the ,renaissance1 says in his ,age of the ,despots1 ,machiavelli was the first in modern times to formulate a theory of government in which the interests of the ruler are alone regarded1 which assumes a separation between statecraft and morality1 which recognizes force and fraud among the legitimate means of attaining high political ends1 which makes success alone the test of conduct and which presupposes the corruption1 baseness1 and venality of mankind at large4 ,even the age of ,cesare ,borgia revolted against this philosophy and the name of ,machiavelli became a byword4 ,am ,i a ,machiavel8 says the host in ,the ,merry ,wives of ,windsor1 and the implication of this question indirectly manifests the revolt of the seventeenth century against the sinister philosophy of the great ,florentine4 ,nothing can be more amazing than that not only leading militarists of ,germany but many of its foremost philosophers and teachers have become so intoxicated with the dream of ,pan-,germanism that in the utmost sincerity they have espoused and with a certain pride proclaimed the vicious principles of ,machiavelli in all their moral nudity4 ,there is an emotional and mystical element in the advanced ,german thinker1 which makes him capable of accepting in full sincerity intellectual and moral absurdities of which the more robust common sense of other nations would be incapable4 ,the advanced ,german doctrinaire is the wisest fool in ,christendom4 ,the depth of his learning is generally in the inverse ratio to the shallowness of his common sense4 ,nothing better demonstrates this than the present negation by advanced and doubtless sincere ,german thinkers of the very foundations of public morality and indeed of civilization4 ,they have been led with ,nietzsche to revile the ,beatitudes and exalt the supremacy of cruelty over mercy4 ,indeed ,treitschke in his lectures on ,politik1 which have become the gospel of ,junkerdom1 avowedly based his gospel of force upon the teaching of ,machiavelli1 for he points out that it was ,machiavelli who first clearly saw that the ,state is power 7der ,staat ist ,macht74 ,therefore to care for this power is the highest moral duty of the ,state and of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable2 it is the sin against the holy spirit of politics4 ,he therefore holds that the ,state as the ultimate good cannot bind its will for the future over against other ,states1 and that international treaties are therefore only obligatory for such time as the ,state may find to be convenient4 ,to enforce the will of the nation contrary to its own solemn promises and to increase its might1 war is the appointed means4 ,both ,treitschke and ,moltke conceived it as an ordinance set by ,god and one of the two highest functions of the ,state4 ,the doctrine is carried to the blasphemous conclusion that war is an ordinance of a just and merciful ,god2 that1 to quote ,bernhardi1 it is a biological necessity and that the living ,god will see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity4 ,therefore might is at once the supreme right and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war1 which gives a biologically just decision4 ,this means that the #db centimeter howitzer is more moral than a gun of smaller caliber and that the justice of ,god depends upon the superiority of ,krupp to other ordnance manufacturers4 ,treitschke tells us1 and the statement is quoted by ,bernhardi with approval1 that the end all and be all of a state is power1 and he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle with politics4 ,to this ,bernhardi adds that the ,state's highest moral duty is to increase its power and in so doing the ,state is the sole judge of the morality of its own action4 ,it is in fact above morality or1 in other words whatever is necessary is moral4 ,again we learn that the ,state must not allow any conventional sympathies to distract it from its object and that conditions may arise which are more powerful than the most honorable intentions4 ,all efforts directed towards the abolition of war are denominated as not only foolish but absolutely immoral4 ,to indicate that in this prosecution of war for the increase of dominion1 chivalry would be a weakness and magnanimity a crime1 we are finally told that the ,state is a law unto itself and that weak nations have not the same right to live as powerful and vigorous nations4 ,even as to weak nations1 we are further advised that the powerful and vigorous nation--which alone apparently has the right to live--must not wait for some act of aggression or legitimate casus belli1 but that it is justified in deliberately provoking a war1 and that the happiest results have always followed such deliberately provoked wars1 for the prospects of success are the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be selected to suit the political and military situation4 ,as the weak nations have no moral right to live it becomes important to remember that in the economy of ,prussian ,junkerdom there is only one strong race--his own4 ,wir sind die ,weltrasse4 ,the ultimate goal is the super-nation1 and the premise upon which the whole policy is based is that ,germany is predestined to be that super-nation4 ,bernhardi believes--and his belief is but the reflex of the oft-repeated boast of the ,kaiser--that history presents no other possibility4 ,for us there are two alternatives and no third--world power or ruin 7,weltmacht oder ,niedergang74 ,to assimilate ,germany to ancient ,rome the ,kaiser on occasion reminds himself of ,csar and affects to reign1 not by the will of the people1 but by divine right4 ,no living monarch has said or done more to revive this medival fetich4 ,to his soldiers he has recently said3 ,you think each day of your ,emperor4 ,do not forget ,god4 ,what magnanimity6 ,at the outbreak of the present war he again illustrated his spirit of fanatical absolutism1 which at times inspires him1 by saying to his army3 ,remember that the ,german people are the chosen of ,god4 ,on me1 as ,german ,emperor1 the spirit of ,god has descended4 ,i am ,his weapon2 ,his sword2 ,his ,vicegerent4 ,woe to the disobedient6 ,death to cowards and unbelievers6 ,the modern world has had nothing like this since ,mahomet and1 accepted literally1 it claims for the ,kaiser the divine attributes attributed to the ,csars4 ,even the ,csars1 in baser and more primitive times1 found posing as a divine superman somewhat difficult and disconcerting4 ,shakespeare subtly suggests this when he makes his ,csar talk like a god and act with the vacillation of a child4 ,when the war was precipitated as the natural result of such abhorrent teachings1 the world at large knew little either of ,treitschke or ,bernhardi4 ,thoughtful men of other nations did know that the successful political immoralities of ,frederick the ,great had profoundly affected the policies of the ,prussian ,court to this day4 ,the ,german poet1 ,freiligrath1 once said that ,germany is ,hamlet1 but no analogy is less justified4 ,there is nothing in the supersensitive1 introspective1 and amiable dreamer of ,elsinore to suggest the ,prussia of to-day1 which ,bebel has called ,siegesbetrunken4 7,victory-drunk47 ,since the beginning of the present war1 the world has become familiar with these abhorrent teachings and as a result of a general revolt against this recrudescence of ,borgiaism attempts have been made by the apologists for ,prussia1 especially in the ,united ,states1 to suggest that neither ,treitschke nor ,bernhardi fairly reflect the political philosophy of official ,germany4 ,treitschke's influence as an historian and lecturer could not well be denied but attempts have been made to impress ,america that ,bernhardi has no standing to speak for his country and that the importance of his teachings should therefore be minimized4 ,apart from the wide popularity of ,bernhardi's writings in ,germany1 the ,german ,government has never repudiated ,bernhardi's conclusions or disclaimed responsibility therefor4 ,while possibly not an officially authorized spokesman1 yet he is as truly a representative thinker in the ,german military system as ,admiral ,mahan was in the ,navy of the ,united ,states4 ,of the acceptance by ,prussia of ,bernhardi's teachings there is one irrefutable proof4 ,it is ,belgium4 ,the destruction of that unoffending country is the full harvest of this twentieth-century ,machiavelliism4 ,a few recent utterances from a representative physician1 a prominent journalist1 and a distinguished retired officer of the ,german ,army may be quoted as showing how completely infatuated a certain class of ,german thinkers has become with the gospel of force for the purpose of attaining world power4 ,thus a ,dr4 ,fuchs1 in a book on the subject of preparedness for war1 says3 ,therefore the ,german claim of the day must be3 ,the family to the front4 ,the ,state has to follow at first in the school1 then in foreign politics4 ,education to hate4 ,education to the estimation of hatred4 ,organization of hatred4 ,education to the desire for hatred4 ,let us abolish unripe and false shame before brutality and fanaticism4 ,we must not hesitate to announce3 ,to us is given faith1 hope1 and hatred1 but hatred is the greatest among them4 ,maximilian ,harden1 one of the most influential ,german journalists1 says3 ,let us drop our miserable attempts to excuse ,germany's action4 ,not against our will and as a nation taken by surprise did we hurl ourselves into this gigantic venture4 ,we willed it4 ,we had to will it4 ,we do not stand before the judgment seat of ,europe4 ,we acknowledge no such jurisdiction4 ,our might shall create a new law in ,europe4 ,it is ,germany that strikes4 ,when she has conquered new domains for her genius then the priesthoods of all the gods will praise the ,god of ,war4 ,still more striking and morally repellent was the very recent statement by ,major-,general von ,disfurth1 in an article contributed by him to the ,hamburger ,nachrichten1 which so completely illustrates ,bernhardiism in its last extreme of avowed brutality that it justifies quotation in extenso4 ,no object whatever is served by taking any notice of the accusations of barbarity leveled against ,germany by our foreign critics4 ,frankly1 we are and must be barbarians1 if by these we understand those who wage war relentlessly and to the uttermost degree4444 ,we owe no explanations to any one4 ,there is nothing for us to justify and nothing to explain away4 ,every act of whatever nature committed by our troops for the purpose of discouraging1 defeating1 and destroying our enemies is a brave act and a good deed1 and is fully justified4444 ,germany stands as the supreme arbiter of her own methods1 which in the time of war must be dictated to the world4444 ,they call us barbarians4 ,what of it8 ,we scorn them and their abuse4 ,for my part ,i hope that in this war we have merited the title of barbarians4 ,let neutral peoples and our enemies cease their empty chatter1 which may well be compared to the twitter of birds4 ,let them cease their talk of the ,cathedral at ,rheims and of all the churches and all the castles in ,france which have shared its fate4 ,these things do not interest us4 ,our troops must achieve victory4 ,what else matters8 ,these hysterical vaporings of advanced ,junkers no more make a case against the ,german people than the tailors of ,tooley ,street had authority to speak for ,england1 but they do represent the spirit of the ruling caste1 to which unhappily the ,german people have committed their destiny4 ,it would not be difficult to quote both the ,kaiser and the ,crown ,prince1 who on more than one occasion have manifested their enthusiastic adherence to the gospel of brute force4 ,the world is not likely to forget the ,crown ,prince's congratulations to the brutal military martinet of the ,zabern incident1 and still less the shameful fact that when the ,kaiser sent his punitive expedition to ,china1 he who once stood within sight of the ,mount of ,olives and preached a sermon breathing the spirit of ,christian humility1 said to his soldiers3 ,when you encounter the enemy you will defeat him4 ,no quarter shall be given1 no prisoners shall be taken4 ,let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy4 ,just as the ,huns a thousand years ago under the leadership of ,etzel 7,attila71 gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition1 so may the name of ,germany become known in such a manner in ,china that no ,chinaman will ever again even dare to look askance at a ,german4 ,and this campaign of extermination--worthy of a savage ,indian chief--was planned for the most pacific and unaggressive race1 the ,chinese1 for it is sadly true that the one nation which has more than any other been inspired for two thousand years by the spirit of peace on earth is the hermit nation1 into which until the nineteenth century the light of ,christianity never shone4 ,in a recent article1 ,george ,bernard ,shaw1 the ,voltaire of the twentieth century1 with the intellectual brilliancy and moral shallowness of the great cynic1 attempts to justify ,bernhardiism by resort to the unconvincing et tu quoque argument4 ,he contends that ,england also has had its ,bernhardis1 and refers to a few books which he affects to think bear out his argument4 ,that these books show that there have been advocates of militarism in ,england is undoubtedly true4 ,the present war illustrates that there was need of such literature1 for a nation which faced so great a trial as the present1 with a standing army that was pitiful in comparison with that of ,germany and without any involuntary service law1 certainly had need of some literary stimulus to self-preparation4 ,no one quarrels with ,bernhardi in his discussions of the problems of war as such4 ,it is only when the soldier ceases to be a strategist and becomes a moralist that the average man with conventional ideas of morality revolts against ,bernhardiism4 ,the books to which ,mr4 ,shaw refers can be searched in vain for any passages parallel to those which have been quoted from ,treitschke1 ,bernhardi1 and other ,german writers4 ,the brilliant but erratic ,george ,bernard ,shaw cannot find in all ,english literature any such ,machiavelliisms as those of ,treitschke and ,bernhardi4 ,shaw's whole defense of ,germany1 betrays his characteristic desire to be clever and audacious without regard to nice considerations of truth4 ,much as we may admire his intellectual badinage under other circumstances1 it may be questioned whether in this supreme tragedy of the world it was fitting for ,shaw to daub himself anew with his familiar vermilion and play the intellectual clown4 ,it was either courage of an extraordinary but unenviable character or else crass stupidity that led ,bernhardi to submit to the civilization of the present day such a debasing gospel1 for if his brain had not been hopelessly obfuscated by his ,pan-,germanic imperialism1 he would have seen that not only would this philosophy do his country infinitely more harm than a whole park of artillery but would inevitably carry his memory down to a wondering posterity1 like ,machiavelli1 detestable but1 unlike ,machiavelli1 ridiculous4 ,machiavelli gave to his ,prince a literary finish that placed his treatise among the classics1 while ,bernhardi has gained recognition chiefly because his book is a moral anachronism4 ,one concrete illustration from ,bernhardi clearly shows that the sentences above quoted are truly representative of his philosophy1 and not unfair excerpts4 ,in explaining that it is the duty of every nation to increase its power and territory without regard for the rights of others1 he alludes to the fact that ,england committed the unpardonable blunder from her point of view of not supporting the ,southern ,states in the ,american ,war of ,secession1 and thus forever severing in twain the ,american ,republic4 ,in this striking illustration of applied ,bernhardiism1 there is no suggestion as to the moral side of such intervention4 ,nothing is said with respect to the moral question of slavery1 or of the obligations of ,england to a friendly ,power4 ,nothing as to how the best hopes of humanity would have been shattered if the ,american ,republic--that pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by night to struggling humanity--had been brought to cureless ruin4 ,all these considerations are completely disregarded1 and all ,bernhardi can see in the situation1 as it presented itself to ,england in #ahfa1 was its opportunity1 by a cowardly stab in the back1 to remove forever from its path a great and growing nation4 ,poor ,bernhardi6 ,he thought to serve his royal master4 ,he has simply damned him4 ,as ,machiavelli1 as the eulogist of the ,medicis1 simply emphasized their moral nudity1 so ,bernhardi has shown the world the inner significance of this crude revival of ,csarism4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,record ,,in ,,the ,,case ,all morally sane men in this twentieth century are agreed that war abstractly is an evil thing1--perhaps the greatest of all indecencies1--and that while it may be one of the offenses which must come1 woe to that man 7or nation7 by whom the offense cometh6 ,they are of one mind in regarding this present war as a great crime--perhaps the greatest crime--against civilization1 and the only questions which invite discussion are3 ,which of the two contending groups of ,powers is morally responsible8 ,was ,austria justified in declaring war against ,servia8 ,was ,germany justified in declaring war against ,russia and ,france8 ,was ,germany justified in declaring war against ,belgium8 ,was ,england justified in declaring war against ,germany8 ,primarily and perhaps exclusively these ethical questions turn upon the issues developed by the communications which passed between the various chancelleries of ,europe in the last week of ,july1 for it is the amazing feature of this greatest of wars that it was precipitated by the ruling classes and1 assuming that all the diplomats sincerely desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the ,austrian ultimatum 7which is by no means clear7 the war is the result of ineffective diplomacy4 ,i quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war and the anterior or underlying causes4 ,the fundamental cause of the ,franco-,german ,war of #ahgj was not the incident at ,ems nor even the question of the ,spanish succession4 ,these were but the precipitating pretexts or1 as a lawyer would express it1 the proximate causes4 ,the underlying cause was unquestionably the rivalry between ,prussia and ,france for political supremacy in ,europe4 ,behind the ,austrian ultimatum to ,servia were also great questions of ,state policy1 not easily determinable upon any tangible ethical principle1 and which involved the hegemony of ,europe4 ,germany's domination of ,europe had been established when by the rattling of its saber it compelled ,russia in #aijh to permit ,austria to disturb the then existing status in the ,balkans by the forcible annexation of ,bosnia and ,herzegovina1 and behind the ,austrian-,servian question of #aiad1 arising out of the murder of the ,crown ,prince of ,austria at ,serajevo1 was the determination of ,germany and ,austria to reassert that dominant position by compelling ,russia to submit to a further humiliation of a ,slav ,state4 ,the present problem is to inquire how far ,germany and her ally selected a just pretext to test this question of mastery4 ,the pretext was the work of diplomatists4 ,it was not the case of a nation rising upon some great cause which appealed to popular imagination4 ,the acts of the statesmen in that last fateful week of ,july1 #aiad1 were not the mere echo of the popular will4 ,the issues were framed by the statesmen and diplomats of ,europe and whatever efforts were made to preserve the peace and whatever obstructive tactics were interposed were not the acts of any of the nations now in arms but those of a small coterie of men who1 in the secrecy of their respective cabinets1 made their moves and countermoves upon the chessboard of nations4 ,the future of ,europe in that last week of ,july was in the hands of a small group of men1 numbering not over fifty1 and what they did was never known to their respective nations in any detail until after the fell ,rubicon had been crossed and a world war had been precipitated4 ,if all of these men had sincerely desired to work for peace1 there would not have been any war4 ,so swiftly did events move that the masses of the people had time neither to think nor to act4 ,the suddenness of the crisis marks it as a species of mid-summer madness1 a very witches' sabbath of diplomatic demagoguery4 ,in a peaceful summer1 when the nations now struggling to exterminate each other were fraternizing in the holiday centers of ,europe1 an issue was suddenly precipitated1 made the subject of communications between the various chancelleries1 and almost in the twinkling of an eye ,europe found itself wrapped in a universal flame4 ,the appalling toll of death suggests the inquiry of ,hamlet3 ,did these bones cost no more the breeding1 but to play at loggats with 'em8 and if the diplomatic loggats of #aiad were ineffectively played1 some one must accept the responsibility for such failure4 ,this sense of responsibility against the dread ,day of ,accounting has resulted in a disposition beyond past experience to justify the quarrel by placing before the world the diplomatic record4 ,the ,english ,government commenced shortly after the outbreak of hostilities by publishing the so-called ,white ,paper1 consisting of a statement by the ,british ,government and #afj diplomatic documents as an appendix4 ,this was preceded by ,sir ,edward ,grey's masterly speech in ,parliament4 ,that speech and all his actions in this fateful crisis may rank him in future history with the younger ,pitt4 ,on ,august #dth1 the ,german ,chancellor for the first time explained to the representatives of his nation assembled in the ,reichstag the causes of the war1 then already commenced1 and there was distributed among the members a statement of the ,german ,foreign ,office1 accompanied by #bg ,exhibits in the form of diplomatic communications1 which have been erroneously called the ,german ,white ,paper and which sets forth ,germany's defense to the world4 ,shortly thereafter ,russia1 casting aside all the traditional secrecy of ,muscovite diplomacy1 submitted to a candid world its acts and deeds in the form of the so-called ,russian ,orange ,paper1 with #gi appended documents1 and this was followed later by the publication by ,belgium of the so-called ,belgian ,gray ,paper4 ,late in ,november ,france published its ,yellow ,book1 the most comprehensive of these diplomatic records4 ,of the two groups of powers1 therefore1 only ,austria and ,italy have failed to disclose their diplomatic correspondence to the scrutiny of the world4 ,the former1 as the originator of the controversy1 should give as a matter of decent respect to the opinions of mankind its justification1 if any1 for what it did4 ,so far1 it has only given its ultimatum to ,servia and ,servia's reply4 ,italy1 as a nation that has elected to remain neutral1 is not under the same moral obligation to disclose the secrets of its ,foreign ,office1 and while it remains on friendly terms with all the ,powers it probably feels some delicacy in disclosing confidential communications1 but as the whole world is vitally interested in determining the justice of the quarrel and as it is wholly probable that the archives of the ,italian ,foreign ,office would throw an illuminating searchlight upon the moral issues involved1 ,italy1 in a spirit of loyalty to civilization1 should without further delay disclose the documentary evidence in its possession4 ,while it is to be regretted that the full diplomatic record is not made up1 yet as we have the most substantial part of the record in the communications which passed in those fateful days between ,berlin1 ,st4 ,petersburg1 ,paris1 and ,london1 there is sufficient before the court to justify a judgment1 especially as there is reason to believe that the documents as yet withheld would only confirm the conclusions which the record already given to the world irresistibly suggests4 ,thus we can reasonably assume that the ,italian documentary evidence would fairly justify the conclusion that the war was on the part of ,germany and ,austria a war of aggression1 for ,italy1 by its refusal to act with its associates of the ,triple ,alliance1 has in the most significant manner thus adjudged it4 ,under the terms of the ,triple ,alliance1 ,italy had obligated itself to support ,germany and ,austria in any purely defensive war1 and if therefore the communications1 which undoubtedly passed between ,vienna and ,berlin on the one hand1 and ,rome on the other1 justified the conclusion that ,germany and ,austria had been assailed by ,russia1 ,england1 and ,france or either of them1 then we must assume that ,italy would have respected its obligation1 especially as it would thus relieve ,italy from any possible charge of treachery to two allies1 whose support and protection it had enjoyed from the time that the ,triple ,alliance was first made4 ,when ,italy decided that it was under no obligation to support its allies1 it effectually affirmed the fact that they had commenced a war of aggression1 and until the contrary is shown1 we must therefore assume that the archives of the ,foreign ,office at ,rome would merely confirm the conclusions hereinafter set forth as to the moral responsibility for the war4 ,similarly upon considerations that are familiar to all who have had any experience in the judicial investigation of truth1 it must be assumed that if ,austria had in its secret archives any documentary evidence that would justify it in its pretension that it had been unjustly assailed by one or more of the ,powers with which it is now at war1 it would have published such documents to the world in its own exculpation4 ,the moral responsibility for this war is too great for any nation to accept it unnecessarily4 ,least of all could ,austria--which on the face of the record commenced the controversy by its ultimatum to ,servia--leave anything undone to acquit itself at the bar of public opinion of any responsibility for the great crime that is now drenching ,europe with blood4 ,the time is past when any nation can ignore the opinions of mankind or needlessly outrage its conscience4 ,germany has recognized this in publishing its defense and exhibiting a part of its documentary proof1 and if its ally1 ,austria1 continues to withhold from the knowledge of the world the documents in its possession1 there can be but one conclusion as to its guilt4 ,upon the record thus made up in the ,supreme ,court of ,civilization1 that tribunal need no more hesitate to proceed to judgment than would an ordinary court hesitate to enter a decree because one of the litigants has deliberately suppressed documents known to be in its possession4 ,it does not lie in the mouth of such a litigant to ask the court to suspend judgment or withhold its sentence until the full record is made up1 when the incompleteness of that record is due to its own deliberate suppression of vital documentary proofs4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,suppressed ,,evidence ,the official defenses of ,england1 ,russia1 ,france1 and ,belgium do not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit any essential diplomatic document in their possession4 ,they have respectively made certain contentions as to the proposals that they made to maintain the peace of the world1 and in every instance have supported these contentions by putting into evidence the letters and communications in which such proposals were expressed4 ,when the ,german ,white ,paper is examined it discloses on its very face the suppression of documents of vital importance4 ,the fact that communications passed between ,berlin and ,vienna1 the text of which has never been disclosed1 is not a matter of conjecture4 ,germany asserts as part of its defense that it faithfully exercised its mediatory influence on ,austria1 but not only is such influence not disclosed by any practical results1 such as we would expect in view of her dominating relations with ,austria1 but the text of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of ,berlin and ,vienna4 ,germany has carefully selected a part of her diplomatic records for publication but withheld others4 ,austria has withheld all4 ,thus in the official apology for ,germany it is stated that1 in spite of the refusal of ,austria to accept the proposition of ,sir ,edward ,grey to treat the ,servian reply as a basis for further conversations1 we ,germany continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised ,vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the ,monarchy4#c ,footnote #c3 ,german ,white ,paper4 ,this would be more convincing if the ,german ,foreign ,office had added the text of the advice which it thus gave ,vienna4 ,a like significant omission will be found when the same official defense states that on ,july #bith the ,german ,government advised ,austria to begin the conversations with ,mr4 ,sazonof4 ,but here again the text is not found among the documents which the ,german ,foreign ,office has given to the world4 ,the communications1 which passed between that office and its ambassadors in ,st4 ,petersburg1 ,paris1 and ,london1 are given in extenso1 but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the ,german ,white ,paper it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which passed from the ,foreign ,office of ,berlin to that of ,vienna and only two which passed from the ,german ,ambassador in ,vienna to the ,german ,chancellor4 ,while the ,kaiser has favored the world with his messages to the ,czar and ,king ,george1 he has wholly failed to give us any message that he sent in those critical days to the ,austrian ,emperor or the ,king of ,italy4 ,we shall have occasion to refer hereafter to the frequent failure to produce documents1 the existence of which is admitted by the exhibits which ,germany appended to its ,white ,paper4 ,this cannot be an accident4 ,the ,german ,foreign ,office has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to ,vienna1 although professing to give the purport of a few of them4 ,the purpose of this suppression is even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of ,austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the scrutiny of a candid world4 ,until ,germany and ,austria are willing to put the most important documents in their possession in evidence1 they must not be surprised that the ,world1 remembering ,bismarck's garbling of the ,ems dispatch1 which precipitated the ,franco-,prussian ,war1 will be incredulous as to the sincerity of their pacific protestations4 ,,addendum ,the ,austrian ,red ,book1 published more than six months after the declaration of war1 simply emphasizes the policy of suppression of vital documents1 which we have already discussed4 ,of its #fi documentary exhibits1 there is not one which passed directly between the ,cabinets of ,berlin and ,vienna4 ,the text of the communications1 in which ,germany claims to have exercised a mediatory and conciliatory influence with its ally1 is still withheld4 ,not a single document is produced which was sent between ,july the #fth and ,july the #bast1 the period when the great coup was secretly planned by ,berlin and ,vienna4 ,in the ,red ,book we find eight communications from ,count ,berchtold to the ,austrian ,ambassador at ,berlin and four replies from that official1 but not a letter or telegram passing between ,berchtold and von ,bethmann-,hollweg or between the ,german and ,austrian ,kaisers4 ,the ,austrian ,red ,book gives additional evidence that at the eleventh hour1 and shortly before ,germany issued its ultimatum to ,russia1 ,austria did finally agree to discuss the ,servian question with ,russia2 but the information1 which ,germany presumably gave to its ally of its intention to send the ultimatum to ,russia1 is carefully withheld4 ,notwithstanding this suppression of vital documents1 the diplomatic papers of ,germany and ,austria1 now partially given to the world1 disclose an unmistakable purpose1 amounting to an open confession1 that they intended to force their will upon ,europe1 even though this course involved the most stupendous war in the history of mankind4 ,march #a1 #aiae4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,germany',s ,,responsibility ,,for ,,the ,,austrian ,,ultimatum ,on ,june #bh1 #aiad1 the ,austrian ,crown ,prince was murdered at ,serajevo4 ,for nearly a month thereafter there was no public statement by ,austria of its intentions1 with the exception of a few semi-inspired dispatches to the effect that it would act with the greatest moderation and self-restraint4 ,a careful examination made of the files of two leading ,american newspapers1 each having a separate news service1 from ,june #bh1 #aiad1 to ,july #bc1 #aiad1 has failed to disclose a single dispatch from ,vienna which gave any intimation as to the drastic action which ,austria was about to take4 ,the ,french ,premier1 ,viviani1 in his speech to the ,french ,senate1 and ,house of ,deputies1 on ,august #d1 #aiad1 after referring to the fact that ,france1 ,russia1 and ,great ,britain had coperated in advising ,servia to make any reasonable concession to ,austria1 added3 ,this advice was all the more valuable in view of the fact that ,austria-,hungary's demands had been inadequately foreshadowed to the governments of the ,triple ,entente1 to whom during the three preceding weeks the ,austro-,hungarian ,government had repeatedly given assurance that its demands would be extremely moderate4 ,the movements of the leading statesmen and rulers of the ,triple ,entente clearly show that they1 as well as the rest of the world1 had been lulled into false security either by the silence of ,austria1 or1 as ,viviani avers1 by its deliberate suggestion that its treatment of the ,serajevo incident would be conciliatory1 pacific1 and moderate4 ,thus1 on ,july #bjth1 the ,russian ,ambassador1 obviously anticipating no crisis1 left ,vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence4 ,the ,president of the ,french ,republic and its ,premier were far distant from ,paris4 ,pachitch1 the ,servian ,premier1 was absent from ,belgrade1 when the ultimatum was issued4 ,the testimony of the ,british ,ambassador to ,vienna is to the same effect4 ,he reports to ,sir ,edward ,grey3 ,the delivery at ,belgrade on the #bc;d of ,july of the note to ,servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the ,ballplatz4 ,he proceeds to say that with the exception of the ,german ,ambassador at ,vienna 7note the significance of the exception7 not a single member of the ,diplomatic ,corps knew anything of the ,austrian ultimatum and that the ,french ,ambassador1 when he visited the ,austrian ,foreign ,office on ,july #bc;d 7the day of its issuance71 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been issued1 but was given the impression that its tone would be moderate4 ,even the ,italian ,ambassador was not taken into ,count ,berchtold's confidence4#d ,footnote #d3 ,dispatch from ,sir ,m4 de ,bunsen to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 dated ,september #a1 #aiad4 ,the ,servian ,government had formally disclaimed any responsibility for the assassination and had pledged itself to punish any ,servian citizen implicated therein4 ,no word came from ,vienna excepting the semi-official intimations as to its moderate and conciliatory course1 and after the funeral of the ,archduke1 the world1 then enjoying its summer holiday1 had almost forgotten the ,serajevo incident4 ,the whole tragic occurrence simply survived in the sympathy which all felt with ,austria in its new trouble1 and especially with its aged monarch1 who1 like ,king ,lear1 was as full of grief as age1 wretched in both4 ,never was it even hinted that ,germany and ,austria were about to apply in a time of peace a match to the powder magazine of ,europe4 ,can it be questioned that loyalty to the highest interests of civilization required that ,germany and ,austria1 when they determined to make the murder of the ,archduke by an irresponsible assassin the pretext for bringing up for final decision the long-standing troubles between ,austria and ,servia1 should have given all the ,european nations some intimation of their intention1 so that their confrres in the family of nations could coperate to adjust this trouble1 as they had adjusted far more difficult questions after the close of the ,balko-,turkish ,war8 ,whatever the issue of the present conflict1 it will always be to the lasting discredit of ,germany and ,austria that they were false to this great duty1 and that they precipitated the greatest of all wars in a manner so underhanded as to suggest a trap4 ,they knew1 as no one else knew1 in those quiet mid-summer days of ,july1 that civilization was about to be suddenly and most cruelly torpedoed4 ,the submarine was ,germany and the torpedo1 ,austria1 and the work was most effectually done4 ,this ignorance of the leading ,european statesmen 7other than those of ,germany and ,austria7 as to what was impending is strikingly shown by the first letter in the ,english ,white ,paper from ,sir ,edward ,grey to ,sir ,h4 ,rumbold1 dated ,july #bj1 #aiad4 ,when this letter was written it is altogether probable that ,austria's arrogant and unreasonable ultimatum had already been framed and approved in ,vienna and ,berlin1 and yet ,sir ,edward ,grey1 the ,foreign ,minister of a great and friendly country1 had so little knowledge of ,austria's policy that he asked the ,german ,ambassador to-day 7,july #bjth7 if he had any news of what was going on in ,vienna4 ,he replied that he had not1 but ,austria was certainly going to take some step4 ,sir ,edward ,grey adds that he told the ,german ,ambassador that he had learned that ,count ,berchtold1 the ,austrian ,foreign ,minister1 in speaking to the ,italian ,ambassador in ,vienna1 had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave1 but had said that it should be cleared up4 ,the ,german ,minister then replied that it would be desirable if ,russia could act as a mediator with regard to ,servia1 so that the first suggestion of ,russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the ,german ,ambassador in ,london4 ,sir ,edward ,grey then adds that he told the ,german ,ambassador that he assumed that the ,austrian ,government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against ,servia1 founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial1 and the ,german ,ambassador assented to this assumption4#e ,footnote #e3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #a4 ,either the ,german ,ambassador was then deceiving ,sir ,edward ,grey1 or the submarine torpedo was being prepared with such secrecy that even the ,german ,ambassador in ,england did not know what was then in progress4 ,the interesting and important question here suggests itself whether ,germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the ,austrian ultimatum4 ,if it did1 it was guilty of duplicity1 for the ,german ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg gave to the ,russian ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs an express assurance that the ,german ,government had no knowledge of the text of the ,austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its contents4 ,it is a mistake to attribute to ,germany a threatening attitude4#f ,footnote #f3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #ah4 ,this statement is inherently improbable4 ,austria was the weaker of the two allies1 and it was ,germany's saber that it was rattling in the face of ,europe4 ,obviously ,austria could not have proceeded to extreme measures1 which it was recognized from the first would antagonize ,russia1 unless it had the support of ,germany1 and there is a probability1 amounting to a moral certainty1 that it would not have committed itself and ,germany to the possibility of a ,european war without first consulting ,germany4 ,moreover1 we have the testimony of ,sir ,m4 de ,bunsen1 the ,english ,ambassador in ,vienna1 who advised ,sir ,edward ,grey that he had private information that the ,german ,ambassador 7at ,vienna7 knew the text of the ,austrian ultimatum to ,servia before it was dispatched1 and telegraphed it to the ,german ,emperor1 and that the ,german ,ambassador himself indorses every line of it4#g ,as he does not disclose the source of his private information1 this testimony would not by itself be convincing1 but when we examine ,germany's official defense in the ,german ,white ,paper1 we find that the ,german ,foreign ,office admits that it was consulted by ,austria previous to the ultimatum and not only approved of ,austria's course but literally gave that country a carte blanche to proceed4 ,footnote #g3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #ie4 ,this point seems so important in determining the sincerity of ,germany's attitude and pacific protestations that we quote in extenso4 ,after referring to the previous friction between ,austria and ,servia1 the ,german ,white ,paper says3 ,in view of these circumstances ,austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the ,monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action4 ,the ,austro-,hungarian ,government advised us of its view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter4 ,we were able to assure our ,ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in ,servia directed against the existence of the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy would receive our approval4 ,we were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of ,austria-,hungary against ,servia would bring ,russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ,ally4 ,sir ,m4 de ,bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact that the ,british ,ambassador at ,berlin in his letter of ,july #bb;d1 to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 states that on the preceding night 7,july #bast7 he had met the ,german ,secretary of ,state for ,foreign ,affairs1 and an allusion was made to a possible action by ,austria4 ,his ,excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on ,austria's part would have been made ere this4 ,he insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement between ,servia and ,austria alone1 and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries4 ,he#h adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country should approach ,austria in the matter1 he had ,footnote #h3 von ,jagow4 on several occasions1 in conversation with the ,servian ,minister1 emphasized the extreme importance that ,austro-,servian relations should be put on a proper footing4#i ,footnote #i3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #b4 ,here we have the first statement of ,germany's position in the matter1 a position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable1 but to which it tenaciously adhered to the very end1 and which did much to precipitate the war4 ,forgetful of the solidarity of ,european civilization1 and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse continuing through many centuries a united ,european ,state exists1 even though its organization be as yet inchoate1 he took the ground that ,austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against ,servia without interference from any other ,power1 even though1 as was inevitable1 the humiliation of ,servia would destroy the status of the ,balkan ,states and threaten the ,european balance of power4 ,the inconsistency between ,germany's claim that it could give ,austria a carte blanche to proceed against ,servia and agree to support its action with the sword of ,germany1 and the other contention that neither ,russia nor any ,european ,state had any right to interfere on behalf of ,servia is obvious4 ,it was the greatest blunder of ,germany's many blunders in this ,tragedy of ,errors4 ,no space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this ,austrian ultimatum to ,servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands4 ,it would be difficult to recall a more offensive document1 and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which it gave either ,servia or ,europe4 ,servia had forty-eight hours to answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty1 and virtually admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed4 ,the other ,european nations had little more than a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of ,europe before that peace was fatally compromised4#aj ,footnote #aj3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #e2 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #c4 ,further confirmation that the ,german ,foreign ,office did have advance knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the fact that on the day the ultimatum was issued the ,chancellor of the ,german ,empire instructed its ,ambassadors in ,paris1 ,london1 and ,st4 ,petersburg to advise the ,english1 ,french1 and ,russian governments that the acts as well as the demands of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government cannot but be looked upon as justified4#aa ,footnote #aa3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,annex #a ,b4 ,how could ,germany thus indorse the demands if it did not know the substance of the ultimatum8 ,is it probable that ,germany would have given in a matter of the gravest importance a blanket endorsement of ,austria's demands1 unless the ,german ,government had first been fully advised as to their nature8 ,the hour when these instructions were sent is not given1 so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at ,belgrade at #f ,p4,m4 ,nevertheless1 as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of ,europe until the following day1 as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows1 it seems improbable that the ,german ,foreign ,office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other ,powers on ,july the #bc;d unless it had full knowledge not only of ,austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also of the substance thereof4 ,while it may be that ,germany1 while indorsing in blank the policy of ,austria1 purposely refrained from examining the text of the communication1 so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for ,austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of this iniquitous conspiracy against the peace of ,europe1--yet the more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of ,austria's ultimatum at ,belgrade and ,germany's warning to the ,powers was the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose4 ,no court or jury1 reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life1 would question this conclusion4 ,the communication from the ,german ,foreign ,office last referred to anticipates that ,servia will refuse to comply with these demands--why1 if they were justified8--and ,germany suggests to ,france1 ,england1 and ,russia that if1 as a result of such noncompliance1 ,austria has recourse to military measures1 that the choice of means must be left to it4 ,the ,german ,ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one1 the settlement of which devolves solely upon ,austria-,hungary and ,servia1 and one which the ,powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned1 and the instruction added that ,germany strongly desired that the dispute be localized1 since any intervention of another ,power1 on account of the various alliance obligations1 would bring consequences impossible to measure4 ,this is one of the most significant documents in the whole correspondence4 ,if the ,german ,foreign ,office were as ignorant as its ,ambassador at ,london affected to be of the ,austrian policy and ultimatum1 and if ,germany were not then instigating and supporting ,austria in its perilous course1 why should the ,german ,chancellor have served this threatening notice upon ,england1 ,france1 and ,russia1 that ,austria must be left free to make war upon ,servia1 and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would bring consequences impossible to measure8#ab ,footnote #ab3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,annex #a ,b4 ,a still more important piece of evidence is the carefully prepared confidential communication1 which the ,imperial ,chancellor sent to the ,federated ,governments of ,germany shortly after the ,servian reply was given4 ,in this confidential communication1 which was nothing less than a call to arms to the entire ,german ,empire1 and which probably intended to convey the intimation that without formal mobilization the constituent states of ,germany should begin to prepare for eventualities1 von ,bethmann-,hollweg recognized the possibility that ,russia might feel it a duty to take the part of ,servia in her dispute with ,austria-,hungary4 ,why1 again1 if ,austria's case was so clearly justified8 ,the ,imperial ,chancellor added that if ,russia feels constrained to take sides with ,servia in this conflict1 she certainly has a right to do it1 but added that if ,russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy1 and that ,russia would therefore alone bear the responsibility if a ,european war arises from the ,austro-,servian question1 which all the rest of the great ,european ,powers wish to localize4 ,in this significant confidential communication the ,german ,chancellor declares the strong interest which ,germany had in the punishment of ,servia by ,austria4 ,he says1 our closest interests therefore summon us to the side of ,austria-,hungary1 and he adds that if contrary to hope1 the trouble should spread1 owing to the intervention of ,russia1 then1 true to our duty as an ,ally1 we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the ,german ,empire4#ac ,footnote #ac3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,annex #b4 ,it staggers ordinary credulity to believe that this portentous warning to the constituents of the ,german ,empire to prepare for the ,day should not have been written with advance knowledge of the ,austrian ultimatum1 which had only been issued on ,july #bc;d and only reached the other capitals of ,europe on ,july #bdth4 ,the subsequent nave disclaimer by the ,german ,foreign ,office of any expectation that ,austria's attack upon ,servia could possibly have any interest to other ,european ,powers is hardly consistent with its assertion that ,germany's closest interests were involved in the question1 or the portentous warnings to the ,states of the ,empire to prepare for eventualities4 ,the ,german ,ambassador to the ,united ,states who attempted early in the controversy and with disastrous results1 to allay the rising storm of indignation in that country1 formally admitted in an article in the ,independent of ,september #g1 #aiad1 that ,germany did approve in advance the ,austrian ultimatum to ,servia4 ,why then was ,germany guilty of duplicity in disclaiming1 concurrently with its issuance1 any such responsibility8 ,the answer is obvious4 ,this was necessary to support its contention that the quarrel between ,austria and ,servia was purely local4 ,,note4--,in ,chapter ,,vii it will appear from the ,french ,yellow ,book that the ,prime ,minister of ,bavaria had knowledge of the ,austrian ultimatum before its delivery in ,belgrade4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,ultimatum ,,to ,,servia ,to convince any reasonable man that this ,austrian ultimatum to ,servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands1 and that the reply of ,servia was as complete an acquiescence as ,servia could make without a fatal compromise of its sovereignty and self-respect1 it is only necessary to print in parallel columns the demands of ,austria and the reply of ,servia4 ,,austria',s ,,ultimatum ,,to ,,servia ,to achieve this end the ,imperial and ,royal ,government sees itself compelled to demand from the ,royal ,servian ,government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the ,monarchy2 in other words1 the whole series of tendencies1 the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the ,monarchy territories belonging to it1 and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda4 ,in order to give a formal character to this undertaking the ,royal ,servian ,government shall publish on the front page of its ',official ,journal' of the #bfth ,july1 the following declaration3 ',the ,royal ,government of ,servia condemns the propaganda directed against ,austria-,hungary--i4e41 the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy territories belonging to it1 and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequence of these criminal proceedings4 ',the ,royal ,government regrets that ,servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda1 and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the ,royal ,government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the #cast ,march1 #aiji4 ',the ,royal ,government1 which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of ,austria-,hungary1 considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries1 and the whole population of the kingdom1 that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations1 which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress4' ,this declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the ,royal ,army as an order of the day by ,his ,majesty the ,king and shall be published in the ',official ,bulletin' of the ,army4 ',the ,royal ,servian ,government further undertakes3 #a4 ,to suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity2 #b4 ,to dissolve immediately the society styled ,narodna ,odbrana1 to confiscate all its means of propaganda1 and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in ,servia which engage in propaganda against the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy4 ,the ,royal ,government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form2 #c4 ,to eliminate without delay from public instruction in ,servia1 both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction1 everything that serves1 or might serve1 to foment the propaganda against ,austria-,hungary3 #d4 ,to remove from the military service1 and from the administration in general1 all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy whose names and deeds the ,austro-,hungarian ,government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the ,royal ,government2 #e4 ,to accept the collaboration in ,servia of representatives of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the ,monarchy2 #f4 ,to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the #bhth ,june who are on ,servian territory4 ,delegates of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government will take part in the investigation relating thereto2 #g4 ,to proceed without delay to the arrest of ,major ,voija ,tankositch and of the individual named ,milan ,ciganovitch1 a ,servian ,state employ1 who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at ,serajevo2 #h4 ,to prevent by effective measures the coperation of the ,servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier1 to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at ,schabatz and ,loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the ,serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier2 #i4 ,to furnish the ,imperial and ,royal ,government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high ,servian officials1 both in ,servia and abroad1 who1 notwithstanding their official position1 did not hesitate after the crime of the #bhth ,june to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the ,austro-,hungarian ,government2 and finally1 #aj4 ,to notify the ,imperial and ,royal ,government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads4 ,the ,austro-,hungarian ,government expects the reply of the ,royal ,government at the latest by six o'clock on ,saturday evening1 the #beth ,july4 ,the ,royal ,servian ,government is of the opinion that it is mutually advantageous not to hinder the settlement of this question1 and therefore1 in case the ,austro-,hungarian ,government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer1 it is ready as always to accept a peaceful solution1 either by referring the decision of this question to the international tribunal at ,the ,hague1 or by leaving it to the great ,powers who coperated in the preparation of the explanation given by the ,servian ,government on the #agth-#cast ,march1 #aiji4 ,,the ,,servian ,,reply ,the ,royal ,government has received the notification of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government of the #ajth inst41 and is convinced that its answer will remove every misunderstanding that threatens to disturb the pleasant neighborly relations between the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy and the ,servian ,kingdom4 ,the ,royal ,government is certain that in dealing with the great neighboring monarchy these protests have under no pretexts been renewed which formerly were made both in the ,skupshtina and in explanations and negotiations of responsible representatives of the ,state1 and which1 through the declaration of the ,servian ,government of ,march #ah1 #aiji1 were settled2 furthermore1 that since that time none of the various successive ,governments of the kingdom1 nor any of its officers1 has made an attempt to change the political and legal conditions set up in ,bosnia and ,herzegovina4 ,the ,royal ,government is certain that the ,austro-,hungarian ,government has made no representations of any kind along this line except in the case of a textbook concerning which the ,austro-,hungarian ,government received an entirely satisfactory reply4 ,servia1 during the ,balkan crisis1 gave evidence in numerous cases of her pacific and temperate policies1 and it will be thanks to ,servia alone and the sacrifices that she alone made in the interest of ,european peace if that peace continue4 ,the ,royal ,government cannot be held responsible for utterances of a private character such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies1 utterances which are quite ordinary in almost all countries1 and which are not generally under ,state control1 especially since the ,royal ,government1 in the solution of a great number of questions that came up between ,servia and ,austria-,hungary1 showed much consideration as a result of which most of these questions were settled in the best interests of the progress of the two neighboring countries4 ,the ,royal ,government was therefore painfully surprised to hear the contention that ,servian subjects had taken part in the preparations for the murder committed in ,serajevo4 ,it had hoped to be invited to coperate in the investigations following this crime1 and was prepared1 in order to prove the entire correctness of its acts1 to proceed against all persons concerning whom it had received information4 ,in conformity with the wish of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government1 the ,royal ,government is prepared to turn over to the court1 regardless of station or rank1 any ,servian subject concerning whose participation in the crime at ,serajevo proofs may be given to it4 ,the ,government pledges itself especially to publish on the first page of the official organ of ,july #bfth the following declaration3 ',the ,royal ,servian ,government condemns every propaganda that may be directed against ,austria-,hungary2 that is to say1 all efforts designed ultimately to sever territory from the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy1 and it regrets sincerely the sad consequences of these criminal machinations4' ,the ,royal ,government regrets that1 in accordance with advices from the ,austro-,hungarian ,government1 certain ,servian officers and functionaries are taking an active part in the present propaganda1 and that they have thereby jeopardized the pleasant neighborly relations to the maintenance of which the ,royal ,government was formally pledged by the declaration of ,march #ca1 #aiji4 ,the ,government 7what follows here is similar to the text demanded74 ,the ,royal ,government further pledges itself3 #a4 ,to introduce a provision in the press law on the occasion of the next regular session of the ,skupshtina1 according to which instigations to hatred and contempt of the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy1 as well as any publication directed in general against the territorial integrity of ,austria-,hungary1 shall be punished severely4 ,the ,government pledges itself1 on the occasion of the coming revision of the ,constitution1 to add to ,article ,,xxii4 a clause permitting the confiscation of publications1 the confiscation of which1 under the present ,article ,,xxii4 of the ,constitution1 would be impossible4 #b4 ,the ,government possesses no proof--and the ,note of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government provides it with none--that the ',narodna ,odbrana' ,society and other similar associations have up to the present committed any criminal acts through any of their members4 ,nevertheless1 the ,royal ,government will accept the demand of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government and dissolve the ,narodna ,odbrana ,society1 as well as all societies that may work against ,austria-,hungary4 #c4 ,the ,royal ,servian ,government agrees to eliminate forthwith from public education in ,servia everything that might help the propaganda against ,austria-,hungary1 provided that the ,austro-,hungarian ,government gives it actual proof of this propaganda4 #d4 ,the ,royal ,government is also ready to discharge from military and civil service such officers--provided it is proved against them by legal investigation--who have implicated themselves in acts directed against the territorial integrity of the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy2 the ,government expects that1 for the purpose of instituting proceedings1 the ,austro-,hungarian ,government will impart the names of these officers and employs and the acts of which they are accused4 #e4 ,the ,royal ,servian ,government must confess that it is not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government to the effect that the ,royal ,servian ,government bind itself to allow the coperation within its territory of representatives of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government1 but it nevertheless declares itself willing to permit such coperation as might be in conformity with international law and criminal procedure1 as well as with friendly neighborly relations4 #f4 ,the ,royal ,government naturally holds itself bound to institute an investigation against all such persons as were concerned in the plot of ,june #aeth-#bhth1 or are supposed to have been concerned in it1 and are on ,servian soil4 ,as to the coperation of special delegates of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government in this investigation1 the ,servian ,government cannot accept such coperation1 since this would be a violation of the laws and criminal procedure4 ,however1 in individual cases1 information as to the progress of the investigation might be given to the ,austro-,hungarian delegates4 #g4 ,on the very evening on which your ,note arrived the ,royal ,government caused the arrest of ,major ,voislar ,tankosic4 ,but1 regarding ,milan ,ciganovic1 who is a subject of the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy1 and who was employed until ,june #aeth 7as candidate7 in the ,department of ,railroads it has not been possible to arrest this man up till now1 for which reason a warrant has been issued against him4 ,the ,austro-,hungarian ,government is requested1 in order that the investigation may be made as soon as possible1 to make known in the specified form what grounds of suspicion exist1 and the proofs of guilt collected at the investigation in ,serajevo4 #h4 ,the ,servian ,government will increase the severity and scope of its measures against the smuggling of arms and explosives4 ,it goes without saying that it will at once start an investigation and mete out severe punishment to the frontier officials of the ,sabac-,loznica line who failed in their duty and allowed those responsible for the crime to cross the frontier4 #i4 ,the ,royal ,government is willing to give explanations of the statements made in interviews by its officials in ,servia and foreign countries after the crime1 and which1 according to the ,austro-,hungarian ,government1 were anti-,austrian1 as soon as the said ,government indicates where these statements were made1 and provides proofs that such statements were actually made by the said officials4 ,the ,royal ,government will itself take steps to collect the necessary proofs and means of transmission for this purpose4 #aj4 ,the ,royal ,government will1 in so far as this has not already occurred in this ,note1 inform the ,austro-,hungarian ,government of the taking of the measures concerning the foregoing matters1 as soon as such measures have been ordered and carried out4 ,it increases the ineffaceable discredit of this brutal ultimatum when we consider the relative size of the two nations4 ,austria has a population of over #ej1jjj1jjj and ,servia about #d1jjj1jjj4 ,moreover1 ,servia had just emerged from two terrible conflicts1 from which it was still bleeding to exhaustion4 ,austria's ultimatum was that of a ,goliath to ,david1 and1 up to the hour that this book goes to press1 the result has not been different from that famous conflict4 ,germany itself had already given to ,servia an intimation of its intended fate4 ,it had anticipated the ,austrian ultimatum by some pointed suggestions to ,servia on its own account1 for in the letter already quoted from ,sir ,m4 de ,bunsen to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 we learn that the ,german ,secretary of ,state told the ,british ,ambassador before the ultimatum was issued that he on several occasions1 in conversation with the ,servian ,minister1 emphasized the extreme importance that ,austro-,servian relations should be put on a proper footing4#ad ,footnote #ad3 ,in ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #b4 ,this pointed intimation from ,germany1 thus preceding the formal ultimatum from ,austria1 naturally gave ,servia a quick appreciation that within the short space allowed by the ultimatum1 it must either acquiesce in grossly unreasonable demands or perish as an independent nation4 ,to appreciate fully the brutality of this ultimatum let us imagine a precise analogy4 ,the relations of ,france and ,germany--leaving aside the important difference of relative size--are not unlike the relations that existed between ,servia and ,austria4 ,in #aijh1 ,austria had forcibly annexed ,bosnia and ,herzegovina1 both of them ,slav countries1 and when ,servia had emerged from the ,balko-,turkish ,war with signal credit to itself1 it was again ,austria that had intervened and deprived it of the fruit of its victories by denying it access to the sea4 ,similarly1 by the ,treaty of ,frankfort1 ,germany had forcibly annexed ,alsace and ,lorraine from ,france4 ,as there existed in ,servia voluntary organizations of men1 which ceaselessly agitated for the recovery of ,bosnia and ,herzegovina1 so in ,france similar patriotic organizations have for the last forty years continuously agitated for a war which would lead to the ultimate recovery of ,alsace and ,lorraine4 ,the statue of ,strassburg in the ,place de la ,concorde has been covered with the emblems of mourning from the time that ,bismarck wrung from ,jules ,favre the cession of the ,rhine territory4 ,if ,austria's grievance against ,servia were just1 ,germany has an equal and similar grievance against ,france4 ,under these circumstances let us suppose that on the occasion of the visit of the ,german ,crown ,prince to ,strassburg1 that an ,alsatian citizen of ,german nationality1 having strong ,french sympathies1 had assassinated the ,crown ,prince1 and that ,france had formally disclaimed any complicity in the assassination and expressed its sympathy and regret4 ,mutatis mutandis1 let us suppose that ,germany had thereupon issued to ,france the same ultimatum that ,austria issued to ,servia1 requiring ,france to acknowledge moral responsibility for a crime1 which it steadily disavowed4 ,the ultimatum to ,france in that event would have included a peremptory demand that the government of ,france1 a proud and self-respecting country1 should publish in the ,official ,journal1 and communicate as an order of the day to the army of ,france1 a statement that the ,french ,government formally denounced all attempts to recover ,alsace and ,lorraine2 that it regretted the participation of ,french officers in the murder of the ,german ,crown ,prince2 that it engaged to suppress in the ,press of ,france any expressions of hatred or contempt for ,germany2 that it would dissolve all patriotic societies that have for their object the recovery of the lost provinces2 that it would eliminate from the public schools of ,france all instruction which served to foment feeling against ,germany2 that it would remove from its army all officers who had joined in the agitation against ,germany2 that it would accept in the courts of ,france the participation of ,german officials in determining who were guilty1 either of the ,strassburg murder or of the propaganda for the recovery of ,alsace and ,lorraine2 that it would further proceed to arrest and punish certain ,french officers1 whom the ,german ,government charged with participating in the offensive propaganda1 and that it would furnish the ,german ,government with full explanations and information in reference to its execution of these peremptory demands4 ,let us suppose that such an ultimatum having been sent1 that ,france had been given forty-eight hours to comply with conditions which were obviously fatal to its self-respect and forever destructive of its prestige as a great ,power4 ,can it be questioned what the reply of ,france or the judgment of the world would be in such a quarrel8 ,every fair-minded man would say without hesitation that such an ultimatum would be an unprecedented outrage upon the fine proprieties of civilized life4 ,the only difference between the two cases is the fact that in the case of ,germany and ,france the power issuing the ultimatum would be less than double the size of that nation which it sought to coerce1 while in the case of ,austria and ,servia1 the aggressor was twelve times as powerful as the power whose moral prestige and political independence it sought to destroy4 ,in view of the nature of these demands1 the assurance which ,austria subsequently gave ,russia1 that she would do nothing to lessen the territory of ,servia1 goes for nothing4 ,from the standpoint of ,servia1 it would have been far better to lose a part of its territory and keep its independence and self-respect as to the remainder1 than to retain all its existing land area1 and by submitting to the ultimatum become virtually a vassal state of ,austria4 ,certainly if ,servia had acquiesced fully in ,austria's demands without any qualification or reservation 7as for the sake of peace it almost did71 then ,austria would have enjoyed a moral protectorate over all of ,servia's territory1 and its ultimate fate might have been that of ,bosnia and ,herzegovina1 which ,austria first governed as a protectorate1 and later forcibly annexed4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,peace ,,parleys ,the issuance of the ,austrian ultimatum precipitated a grave crisis4 ,it did not1 however1 present any insoluble problem4 ,peace could and should have been preserved4 ,its preservation is always possible when nations1 which may be involved in a controversy1 are inspired by a reasonably pacific purpose4 ,only when the masses of the people are inflamed with a passionate desire for war1 and in a time of popular hysteria responsible statesmen are helplessly borne along the turgid flow of events as bubbles are carried by the swift current of a swollen river1 is peace a visionary dream4 ,it is the peculiarity of the present crisis that no such popular hysteria existed4 ,no popular demand for war developed until after it was virtually precipitated4 ,even then large classes of workingmen1 both in ,germany and ,france1 protested4 ,the peoples of the various countries had scant knowledge of the issues which had been raised by their diplomats and had little1 if any1 interest in the ,servian trouble4 ,the chief exception to this was in ,austria1 where unquestionably popular feeling had been powerfully excited by the murder of the ,archduke and where there had been1 especially in ,vienna1 popular manifestations in favor of war4 ,in ,russia also there was not unnaturally a strong undercurrent of popular sympathy for ,servia4 ,the writer was in the ,engadine at the time referred to1 and cosmopolitan ,st4 ,moritz1 although a little place1 was1 in its heterogeneous population1 ,europe in microcosmic form4 ,there the average man continued to enjoy his mid-summer holiday and refused to believe that so great a catastrophe was imminent until the last two fateful days in ,july4 ,the citizens of all nations continued to fraternize1 and were one in amazement that a war could be precipitated on causes in which the average man took so slight an interest4 ,unembarrassed by any popular clamor1 this war could have been prevented1 and the important question presents itself to the ,supreme ,court of ,civilization as to the moral responsibility for the failure of the negotiations4 ,which of the two groups of powers sincerely worked for peace and which obstructed those efforts8 ,in reaching its conclusion our imaginary ,court would pay little attention to mere professions of a desire for peace4 ,a nation1 like an individual1 can covertly stab the peace of another while saying1 ,art thou in health1 my brother8 and even the peace of civilization can be betrayed by a ,judas-kiss4 ,professions of peace belong to the cant of diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations4 ,no war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending that his nation wished nothing but peace1 and invoking divine aid for its murderous policy4 ,to paraphrase the words of ,lady ,teazle on a noted occasion1 when ,sir ,joseph ,surface talked much of honor1 it might be as well in such instances to leave the name of ,god out of the question4 ,the writer will so far anticipate the conclusions1 which he thinks these records indisputably show1 as to suggest the respective attitudes of the different groups of diplomats and statesmen as revealed by these papers4 ,if the reader will realize fully the policy which from the first animated ,germany and ,austria1 then the documents hereinafter quoted will acquire new significance4 ,germany and ,austria had determined to impose their will upon ,servia1 even though it involved a ,european war4 ,from the outset they clearly recognized such a possibility and were willing to accept the responsibility4 ,the object to be gained was something more than a neutralization of the pro-,slav propaganda4 ,it was to subject ,servia to such severe punitive measures that thereafter her independence of will and moral sovereignty would be largely impaired1 if not altogether destroyed4 ,to do this it was not enough to have ,servia take measures to prevent pro-,slav agitation within her borders4 ,austria neither wanted nor expected the acceptance of her impossible ultimatum4 ,it planned to submit such an ultimatum as ,servia could not possibly accept and1 to make this result doubly sure1 it was thought desirable to give not only ,servia but ,europe the minimum time to take any preventive measures4 ,giving to ,servia only forty-eight hours within which to reach a decision and to ,europe barely twenty-four hours to protect the peace of the world1 it was thought that ,servia would do one of two things1 either of which would be of incalculable importance to ,germany and ,austria4 ,if ,servia accepted the ultimatum for lack of time to consider it1 then its self-respect was hopelessly compromised and its independence largely destroyed4 ,thenceforth she would be1 at least morally1 a mere vassal of ,austria4 ,if1 however1 ,servia declined to accept the ultimatum1 then war would immediately begin and ,servia would be1 as was thought1 speedily subjected to punitive measures of such a drastic character that the same result would be attained4 ,from the commencement1 both ,germany and ,austria recognized the possibility that ,russia might intervene to protect ,servia4 ,to prevent this it was important that ,russia and her allies of the ,triple ,entente should be given as little time as possible to consider their action1 and it was thought that this would probably lead to ,russia's acquiescence in the punishment of ,servia and1 if so1 ,france and ,england1 having no direct interest in ,servia1 would also undoubtedly acquiesce4 ,if1 however1 slow-moving ,russia1 instead of acquiescing1 as she did in #aijh in the case of ,bosnia and ,herzegovina1 should take up the gauntlet which ,germany and ,austria had thrown down1 then it was all important to ,germany and ,austria that ,russia should seem to be the aggressor4 ,for this there were two substantial reasons3 the one was ,italy and the other was ,england4 ,germany and ,austria desired the coperation of ,italy and could not claim it as of right under the terms of the ,triple ,alliance1 unless they were attacked4 ,upon the other hand1 if ,england believed that ,russia and ,france had declared war upon ,germany and ,austria1 there was little probability of her intervention4 ,for these reasons it was important that ,germany and ,austria should impress both ,england and ,italy that their purposes were sincerely pacific and that on the other hand they should so clearly provoke ,russia and ,france that those nations would declare war4 ,if the reader will keep this ,janus-faced policy steadily in mind1 he will understand the apparent inconsistencies in the diplomatic representations of the ,german ,foreign ,office4 ,he will understand why ,germany and ,austria1 while at times flouting ,russia in the most flagrant manner and refusing her the common courtesies of diplomatic intercourse1 were at the same time giving to ,england the most emphatic assurance of pacific intentions4 ,with this preliminary statement1 let the record speak for itself4 ,we have seen that the first great1 and as events proved1 fatal obstacle to peace which ,germany interposed was practically contemporaneous with the issuance of the ultimatum4 ,germany did not wait for any efforts at conciliation4 ,on the contrary1 it attempted to bar effectually all such efforts by serving notice upon ,france1 ,england1 and ,russia almost simultaneously with the issuance of the ,austrian ultimatum1 that the acts as well as the demands of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government cannot but be looked upon as justified2 and the communication concluded3 ,we strongly desire that the dispute be localized1 since any intervention of any ,power on account of the various alliance obligations would bring consequences impossible to measure4#ae ,footnote #ae3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,annex1 #a ,b4 ,this had only one meaning4 ,austria was to be left to discipline ,servia at will1 or there would be war4 ,germany did not even wait for any suggestion of intervention1 whether conciliatory or otherwise1 but sought to interpose to any plan of peace1 short of complete submission1 an insuperable barrier by this threat of war4 ,with this pointed threat to ,europe1 the next move was that of ,russia1 and it may be remarked that throughout the entire negotiations ,russian diplomacy was more than equal to that of ,germany4 ,russia contented itself in the first instance by stating on the morning of ,july #bdth1 that ,russia could not remain indifferent to the ,austro-,servian conflict4 ,this attitude could not surprise any one1 for ,russia's interest in the ,balkans was well known and its legitimate concern in the future of any ,slav state was1 as ,sir ,edward ,grey had said in ,parliament in ,march1 #aiac1 a commonplace in ,european diplomacy in the past4 ,with this simple statement of its legitimate interest in a matter affecting the balance of power in ,europe1 ,russia1 instead of issuing an ultimatum or declaring war1 as ,germany and ,austria may have hoped1 joined with ,england in asking for a reasonable extension of time for all the ,powers to concert for the preservation of peace4 ,on ,july #bdth1 the very day that the ,austrian ultimatum had reached ,st4 ,petersburg1 the ,russian ,foreign ,minister transmitted to the ,austrian ,government through its ,charg in ,vienna the following communication3 ,the communication of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government to the ,powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum to ,belgrade leaves to the ,powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have arisen4 ,to prevent the incalculable consequences1 equally disastrous for all the ,powers1 which can follow the method of action of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government1 it seems indispensable to us that above all the delay given to ,servia to reply should be extended4 ,austria-,hungary1 declaring herself disposed to inform the ,powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the ,imperial and ,royal ,government bases its accusations1 should at least give them also the time to take note of them 7de s'en rendre compte74 ,in this case1 if the ,powers should convince themselves of the well-groundedness of certain of the ,austrian demands they would find themselves in a position to send to the ,servian ,government consequential advice4 ,a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum would deprive of all value the step taken by the ,austro-,hungarian ,government in regard to the ,powers and would be in contradiction with the very bases of international relations4#af ,footnote #af3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #d4 ,could any court question the justice of this contention8 ,the peace of the world was at stake4 ,time only was asked to see what could be done to preserve that peace and satisfy ,austria's grievances to the uttermost4 ,germany had only to intimate to ,austria that a decent respect to the opinions of mankind1 as well as common courtesy to great and friendly nations1 required that sufficient time be given not only to ,servia1 but to the other nations1 to concert for the common good1 especially as the period was one of mid-summer dullness1 and many of the leading rulers and statesmen were absent from their respective capitals4 ,if ,germany made any communication to ,austria in the interests of peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world4 ,a word from ,berlin to ,vienna would have given the additional time which1 with sincerely pacific intentions1 might have resulted in the preservation of peace4 ,germany1 so far as the record discloses1 never spoke that word4 ,england had already anticipated the request of ,russia that a reasonable time should be given to all interested parties4 ,when the ,austrian ,minister in ,london handed the ultimatum to ,sir ,edward ,grey on ,july the #bdth1 the following conversation took place1 which speaks for itself3 ,in the ensuing conversation with his ,excellency ,i 7,sir ,edward ,grey7 remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit1 and such a short one at that1 had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings4 ,the murder of the ,archduke and some of the circumstances respecting ,servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with ,austria1 as was but natural1 but at the same time ,i had never before seen one ,state address to another independent ,state a document of so formidable a character4 ,count ,mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if ,servia had held out a hand after the murder of the ,archduke4 ,servia had1 however1 shown no sign of sympathy or help1 though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder2 a time limit1 said his ,excellency1 was essential1 owing to the procrastination on ,servia's part4 ,i said that if ,servia had procrastinated in replying a time limit could have been introduced later2 but1 as things now stood1 the terms of the ,servian reply had been dictated by ,austria1 who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation4 ,unfortunately both ,russia and ,england's requests for time were refused1 on the plea that they had reached the ,austrian ,foreign ,minister too late1 although it has never yet been explained why1 even if ,count ,berchtold were unable to take up the requests before the expiration of the ultimatum1 the matter might not have been reopened for a few days by a corresponding extension of the time limit4 ,in the absence of some explanation1 which as yet remains to be made1 the absence of the ,austrian ,premier from ,vienna at the time intervening between the issuance of the ultimatum and the expiration of the time limit seems like an extraordinarily petty piece of diplomatic finesse4 ,he had without any warning to the great ,powers of ,europe1 launched a thunderbolt1 and if there ever was a time when a pacific foreign minister should have been at his post and open to suggestions of peace1 it was in those two critical days4 ,and yet1 after issuing the ultimatum1 he immediately takes himself beyond reach of personal parleys by going to ,ischl1 and this was taken by the ,german ,foreign ,office as a convenient excuse for an anticipated failure to extend this courtesy to ,russia and ,england4 ,upon this we have the testimony of the ,english ,ambassador at ,berlin1 who in his report to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 dated ,july #beth1 says3 ,the ,german ,secretary of ,state for ,foreign ,affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at ten o'clock this morning from ,german ,ambassador at ,london1 he immediately instructed ,german ,ambassador at ,vienna to pass on to the ,austrian ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs your suggestion1 for an extension of time limit1 and to speak to his ,excellency about it4 ,unfortunately it appeared from the press that ,count ,berchtold is at ,ischl1 and ,secretary of ,state thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended4 ,secretary of ,state said that he did not know what ,austria-,hungary had ready on the spot1 but he admitted quite freely that ,austro-,hungarian ,government wished to give the ,servians a lesson1 and that they meant to take military action4 ,he also admitted that ,servian ,government could not swallow certain of the ,austro-,hungarian demands4444 ,a like excuse is found in a conversation with the ,russian ,charg at ,berlin1 in which ,bethmann-,hollweg expressed the fear that in consequence of the absence of ,berchtold at ,ischl1 and seeing the lack of time1 his 7,bethmann-,hollweg's telegrams suggesting delay7 will remain without result4#ag ,footnote #ag3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #ad4 ,these conversations are most illuminating4 ,they refer to instructions to the ,german ,ambassador in ,vienna1 which are not found in the ,german ,white ,paper1 although they would have thrown a searchlight upon the sincerity with which ,germany passed on the most important request of ,england and ,russia for a little time to save the peace of ,europe1 and it strongly suggests the possibility that ,count ,berchtold's most inopportune absence in ,ischl was to be the excuse for the gross discourtesy of refusing to give any extension of time4 ,kudachef1 the ,russian ,charg at ,vienna1 did not content himself with submitting the request to the ,acting ,foreign ,minister 7,baron ,macchio7 but to deprive ,austria of the flimsy excuse of ,berchtold's absence at ,ischl1 the ,russian ,charg went over the head of the ,austrian ,acting ,foreign ,minister and telegraphed the request for time to ,count ,berchtold at ,ischl4 ,let the record tell for itself how this most reasonable request was made and refused4 ,the ,russian ,charg sent on ,july #beth the two following telegrams to the ,russian ,foreign ,minister3 ,count ,berchtold is at ,ischl4 ,seeing the impossibility of arriving there in time1 ,i have telegraphed him our proposal to extend the delay of the ultimatum1 and ,i have repeated it verbally to ,baron ,macchio4 ,this latter promised me to communicate it in time to the ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs1 but added that he could predict with assurance a categorical refusal4#ah ,footnote #ah3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #aa4 ,sequel to my telegram of to-day4 ,have just received from ,macchio the negative reply of the ,austro-,hungarian ,government to our proposal to prolong the delay of the note4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #ab4 ,it is evident from the ,russian ,orange ,paper that that country had no illusions as to the possibility of a peaceful outcome4 ,germany has contended that on ,july the #bdth1 before ,count ,berchtold made his inopportune visit to ,ischl1 he sent for the ,russian ,charg at ,vienna and assured him that the punitive measures which ,austria had determined to take against ,servia at all costs would not involve any territorial acquisitions4 ,of this interview the chief evidence comes indirectly from two sources1 which are not entirely in accord4 ,in a telegram from the ,german ,ambassador at ,vienna to the ,german ,chancellor1 dated ,july #bdth1 it is said3 ,count ,berchtold to-day summoned the ,russian ,charg d',affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of ,austria regarding ,servia4 ,after going over the historical developments of the last few years1 he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy did not wish to appear against ,servia in the rle of a conqueror4 ,he said that ,austria-,hungary would demand no territory1 that the step was merely a definitive measure against ,servian machinations2 that ,austria-,hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly behavior of ,servia toward the monarchy2 that he had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the ,balkans4 ,the ,charg d',affaires1 who as yet had no instructions from ,st4 ,petersburg1 took the explanations of the ,minister ad referendum adding that he would immediately transmit them to ,sazonof4#bj ,footnote #bj3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #c4 ,in a report of the same interview from the ,english ,ambassador at ,vienna to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 it is said3 ,russian ,charg d',affaires was received this morning by ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs1 and said to him1 as his own personal view1 that ,austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood1 and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms4 ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs replied that ,austrian ,minister was under instructions to leave ,belgrade unless ,austrian demands were accepted integrally by #d ,p4,m4 to-morrow4 ,his ,excellency added that ,dual ,monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake2 and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country4 ,he did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any power4#ba ,footnote #ba3 ,english ,white ,papers1 ,no4 #g4 ,it will be noted that in the report of the ,english ,ambassador there is no suggestion of any disclaimer of an intention to take ,servian territory4 ,in the ,russian ,orange ,paper1 we find no report from its representative at ,vienna of any such interview and ,austria has never produced any document or memorandum either of such an interview or of such a concession to ,russia4 ,it is probable that such a concession was made1 as ,germany contends1 and if so1 ,russian diplomacy was far too keen to be led upon a false trail by this empty promise and as the evidences multiplied that ,austria would not consider either an extension of time or any modification of its terms and that ,germany was acting in complete accord and coperated with her ,ally1 the probability of war was unmistakable4 ,sazonof at once sent for the ,english and ,french ,ambassadors1 and the substance of the conference is embodied in the telegram from the ,british ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 dated ,july #bdth1 which throws a strong light upon the double effort of ,russia and ,france to preserve the peace and also as an obvious necessity to prepare for the more probable issue of war3 ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs said that ,austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral2 she would never have taken such action unless ,germany had first been consulted2 some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance4 ,he hoped that his ,majesty's ,government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with ,russia and ,france4 ,the ,french ,ambassador gave me to understand that ,france would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with ,russia1 if necessity arose1 besides supporting ,russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations4 ,i said that ,i would telegraph a full report to you of what their ,excellencies had just said to me4 ,i could not1 of course1 speak in the name of his ,majesty's ,government1 but personally ,i saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his ,majesty's ,government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support ,russia and ,france by force of arms4 ,direct ,british interests in ,servia were nil1 and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by ,british public opinion4 ,to this ,m4 ,sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general ,european question was involved1 the ,servian question being but a part of the former1 and that ,great ,britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue4 ,in reply to these remarks ,i observed that ,i gathered from what he said that his ,excellency was suggesting that ,great ,britain should join in making a communication to ,austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of ,servia could not be tolerated4 ,but1 supposing ,austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against ,servia in spite of our representations1 was it the intention of the ,russian ,government forthwith to declare war on ,austria8 ,m4 ,sazonof said that he himself thought that ,russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out2 but a council of ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question4 ,a further council would be held1 probably to-morrow1 at which the ,emperor would preside1 when a decision would be come to4444 ,had ,england then followed the sagacious suggestion of ,sazonof1 would war have been averted8 ,possibly1 perhaps probably4 ,germany's principal fear was the intervention of ,england4 ,in view of its supremacy on the seas this was natural4 ,it was ,england's intimation in the ,moroccan crisis of #aiaa1 made in ,lloyd ,george's ,mansion ,house speech1 which at that time induced ,germany to reverse the engines4 ,might not the same intimation in #aiad have had a like effect upon the mad counsels of ,potsdam8 ,the answer can only be a matter of conjecture4 ,it depends largely upon how deep-seated the purpose of ,germany may have been to provoke a ,european war at a time when ,russia1 ,france1 or ,england were not fully prepared4 ,it does not follow that if ,sazonof was right1 ,sir ,edward ,grey was necessarily wrong in declining to align ,england definitely with ,russia and ,france at that stage4 ,he was the servant of a democratic nation and could not ignore the public opinion of his country as freely as the ,russian ,foreign ,minister4 ,to take such a course1 it would have been necessary for ,grey to submit the matter to ,parliament1 and while with a large liberal majority his policy might have been endorsed1 yet it would have been after such an acrimonious discussion and such vehement protests that ,england would have stood before the world as a house divided against itself4 ,both ,sazonof and ,sir ,edward ,grey from their respective standpoints were right4 ,neither made a single false step in the great controversy4 ,as a result of this interview1 ,russia1 ,england1 and ,france1 after the request for time had been abruptly refused1 next proceeded in the interests of peace to persuade ,servia to make as conciliatory a reply to the impossible ultimatum as was possible without a fatal compromise of her political independence4 ,while the lack of time prevented ,france and ,russia from making any formal communication to ,servia on the question1 yet ,sazonof had a conference with the ,servian ,minister and discussed the wisdom of avoiding an attack on ,belgrade by having the ,servian forces withdrawn to the interior and then appealing to the ,powers1 and ,russia thereupon made the broad and magnanimous suggestion that if ,servia should appeal to the ,powers1 ,russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of ,england1 ,france1 ,germany1 and ,italy4 ,this interview1 as reported by the ,british ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 dated ,july #beth1 is as follows3 ,i saw the ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs this morning1 and communicated to his ,excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to ,paris1 and this afternoon1 ,i discussed with him the communication which the ,french ,ambassador suggested should be made to the ,servian ,government1 as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to ,belgrade4444 ,the ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs said that ,servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty1 but that no independent ,state could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward4 ,the ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs thought1 from a conversation which he had with the ,servian ,minister yesterday1 that in the event of the ,austrians attacking ,servia1 the ,servian ,government would abandon ,belgrade and withdraw their forces into the interior1 while they would at the same time appeal to the ,powers to help them4 ,his ,excellency was in favor of their making this appeal4 ,he would like to see the question placed on an international footing1 as the obligations taken by ,servia in #aijh1 to which reference is made in the ,austrian ultimatum1 were given not to ,austria1 but to the ,powers4 ,if ,servia should appeal to the ,powers1 ,russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of ,england1 ,france1 ,germany1 and ,italy4 ,it was possible1 in his opinion1 that ,servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration4 ,pursuant to this policy of conciliation ,sir ,edward ,grey in direct communication with the ,servian ,minister at ,london1 ,mr4 ,crackenthorpe1 the ,british ,ambassador at ,belgrade1 in direct communication with the ,servian ,foreign ,ministry1 and ,sazonof in interviews with the ,servian ,minister at ,st4 ,petersburg1 all brought direct influence upon ,servia to make a conciliatory reply4 ,thus ,sir ,edward ,grey instructed ,crackenthorpe3 ,servia ought to promise that if it is proved that ,servian officials1 however subordinate they may be1 were accomplices in the murder of the ,archduke at ,serajevo1 she will give ,austria the fullest satisfaction4 ,she certainly ought to express concern and regret4 ,for the rest1 ,servian ,government must reply to ,austrian demands as they consider best in ,servian interests4 ,it is impossible to say whether military action by ,austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands1 but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows4444 ,i have urged upon the ,german ,ambassador that ,austria should not precipitate military action4#bb ,footnote #bb3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #ab4 ,in response to these suggestions1 ,mr4 ,crackenthorpe communicated ,sir ,edward ,grey's pacific suggestions to the ,servian ,minister and received the following reply1 as reported in ,crackenthorpe's report to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 dated ,july #beth4 ,the ,council of ,ministers is now drawing up their reply to the ,austrian note4 ,i am informed by the ,under ,secretary of ,state for ,foreign ,affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the ,austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible4444 ,the ,servian ,government consider that1 unless the ,austrian ,government want war at any cost1 they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the ,servian reply4#bc ,footnote #bc3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #ba4 ,these pacific suggestions to ,servia met with complete success1 and as a result that country on ,july #beth1 and before the expiration of the ultimatum1 made a reply to ,austria which astonished the world with its spirit of conciliation and for a short time gave rise to optimistic hopes of peace4 ,at some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign ,state1 it accepted substantially the demands of ,austria1 with a few minor reservations1 which it expressed its willingness to refer either to arbitration at ,the ,hague ,tribunal or to a conference of the ,powers4#bd ,footnote #bd3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #ci4 ,neither ,germany nor ,austria seriously contended that the reply was not on its face a substantial acquiescence in the extreme ,austrian demands4 ,they contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances1 calling the concessions shams4 ,unless ,austria1 in asking assurances from ,servia1 were content to accept them as made in good faith and allow their sincerity to be determined by future deeds1 why should the ultimatum1 calling for such assurances1 have been made8 ,if ,germany and ,austria had accepted ,servia's reply as sufficient1 and ,servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises in the utmost good faith1 there would have been little sympathy for ,servia1 and no general war4 ,russia and ,england pledged their influence to compel ,servia1 if necessary1 to meet fully any reasonable demand of ,austria4 ,the principal outstanding question1 which ,servia agreed to arbitrate or leave to the ,powers1 was the participation of ,austrian officials in the ,servian courts4 ,this did not present a difficult problem4 ,austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily attained by having the ,powers appoint a commission of neutral jurists to make such investigation4 ,in any event1 ,austria could have accepted the very substantial concessions of ,servia and without prejudice to its rights proceeded to ,the ,hague ,tribunal or to a concert of the ,powers as to the few and comparatively simple open points4 ,when one recalls the infinite treasure of property and life1 which would thus have been saved the world1 had ,germany and ,austria accepted this reasonable and pacific course1 one can only exclaim1 ,but oh1 the pity of it6 ,it is significant that while the entire official ,german press gave ample space to the ,austrian ultimatum and rejoiced in ,austria's energetic attitude1 it withheld from the ,german people any adequate information as to the conciliatory nature of the ,servian reply1 for the ,russian ,charg at ,berlin telegraphed to ,sazonof3 ,the ,wolff ,bureau has not published the text of the ,servian response which was communicated to it4 ,up to this moment this note has not appeared in extenso in any of local journals1 which according to all the evidence do not wish to give it a place in their columns1 understanding the calming effect which this publication would produce upon the ,german readers4#be ,footnote #be3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #df4 ,instead of getting the truth1 the ,berlin populace proceeded to make riotous demonstrations against the ,russian and ,servian ,embassies4 ,the time limit on the ultimatum expired on ,july the #beth at six o'clock in the evening4 ,there is no more significant and at the same time discreditable feature of an infinitely discreditable chapter in history than that the ,austrian ,government1 without giving the ,servian answer the consideration even of a single hour1 immediately severed all diplomatic intercourse with ,belgrade and at #f4cj ,p4,m4 the ,minister of ,austria informed the ,servian ,government by note that1 not having received within the delay fixed a satisfactory response1 he is leaving ,belgrade with the whole personnel of the legation4 ,on the same night ,austria ordered the mobilization of a considerable part of its army4 ,notwithstanding these rebuffs1 ,england1 ,france1 and ,russia continued to labor for peace1 and made further pacific suggestions1 all of which fell upon deaf ears4 ,on ,july #beth1 ,sir ,edward ,grey proposed that the four ,powers 7,england1 ,france1 ,italy1 and ,germany7 should unite in asking the ,austrian and ,russian ,governments not to cross the frontier and to give time for the four ,powers1 acting at ,vienna and ,st4 ,petersburg1 to try and arrange matters4 ,if ,germany will adopt this view ,i feel strongly that ,france and ourselves should act upon it4 ,italy would no doubt gladly coperate4#bf ,footnote #bf3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,nos4 #bd and #be4 ,to this reasonable request the ,german ,chancellor replied3 ,the distinction made by ,sir ,edward ,grey between the ,austro-,servian and ,austro-,russian conflict is quite correct4 ,we wish as little as ,england to mix in the first1 and1 first and last1 we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the ,powers from intervention in it4 ,it is therefore our earnest hope that ,russia will refrain from any active intervention1 conscious of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the situation4 ,if an ,austro-,russian dispute should arise1 we are ready1 with the reservation of our known duties as ,allies1 to coperate with the other great ,powers in mediation between ,russia and ,austria4#bg ,footnote #bg3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,exhibit #ac4 ,this distinction is hard to grasp4 ,it attempts to measure the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee4 ,russia's current difference with ,austria concerned the attempt of the latter to crush ,servia without interference4 ,russia claimed such right of intervention4 ,germany would not interfere in the former matter1 but would abstractly but not concretely mediate between ,russia and ,austria in the latter4 ,mediate about what8 ,to refuse to mediate over the ,servian question was to refuse to mediate at all4 ,for all practical purposes the two things were indistinguishable4 ,all that ,germany did on ,july #beth1 so far as the record discloses1 was to pass on ,england's and ,russia's requests for more time1 but subsequent events indicate that it was passed on without any endorsement1 for is it credible that ,austria would have ignored its ally's request for more time if it had ever been made8 ,here again we note with disappointment the absence from the record of ,germany's message to ,austria1 passing on the reasonable request for an extension of time4 ,the result indicates that the request received1 if any endorsement1 the faint praise which is said to damn4 ,was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext8 ,a little time1 a few days1 even a few hours1 might have sufficed to preserve the world from present horrors1 but no time could be granted4 ,a snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats4 ,the peace of the world was to be torpedoed by submarine diplomacy4 ,the ,austrian ,government could wait nearly three months to try the assassin1 who admittedly slew the ,austrian ,archduke1 but could not wait even a few hours before condemning ,servia to political death4 ,it could not grant ,russia any time to consider a matter gravely affecting its interests1 even if the peace of ,europe and the happiness of the world depended on it4 ,it would be difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a friendly ,power1 for ,austria was not at war with ,russia4 ,defeated in their effort to get an extension of time1 ,england1 ,france1 and ,russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily arresting military proceedings until further efforts toward conciliation could be made4 ,sir ,edward ,grey proposed to ,germany1 ,france1 ,russia1 and ,italy that they should unite in asking ,austria and ,servia not to cross the frontier until we had had time to try and arrange matters between them1 but the ,german ,ambassador read ,sir ,edward ,grey a telegram that he had received from the ,german ,foreign ,office saying that his ,government had not known beforehand1 and had had no more than other ,powers to do with the stiff terms of the ,austrian note to ,servia1 but that once she had launched that note1 ,austria could not draw back4 ,prince ,lichnowsky said1 however1 that if what ,i contemplated was mediation between ,austria and ,russia1 ,austria might be able with dignity to accept it4 ,he expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion4 ,it will be noted that ,germany thus gave to ,england1 as it had already given to ,russia and ,france in the most unequivocal terms1 a disclaimer of any responsibility for the ,austrian ultimatum1 but we have already seen that when the ,german ,foreign ,office prepared its statement for the ,german nation1 which was circulated in the ,reichstag on ,august #dth1 ,germany confessed the insincerity of these assurances by admitting that before the ultimatum was issued the ,austrian ,government had advised the ,german ,foreign ,office of its intentions and asked its opinion and that we were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take 444 would receive our approval4 ,here again it is to be noted that the telegram1 which the ,german ,foreign ,office sent to ,prince ,lichnowsky1 and which that diplomat simply read to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 is not set forth in the exhibits to the ,german ,white ,paper4 ,as we have seen1 ,germany never1 so far as the record discloses1 sought in any way to influence ,austria to make this or any concession until after the ,kaiser's return from ,norway and then only if we accept the assurances of its ,foreign ,office which are not supported by official documents4 ,its attitude was shown by the declaration of its ,ambassador at ,paris to the ,french ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs1 which1 while again disclaiming that ,germany had countenanced the ,austrian ultimatum1 yet added that ,germany approved its point of view1 and that certainly1 the arrow once sent1 ,germany could not allow herself to be guided except by her duty as ally4#bh ,footnote #bh3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #ai4 ,this seemed to be the fatal error of ,germany1 that its duties to civilization were so slight that it should support its ally1 ,austria1 whether the latter were right or wrong4 ,such was its policy1 and it carried it out with fatal consistency4 ,to support its ally in actual war without respect to the justice of the quarrel may be defensible1 but to support it in a time of peace in an iniquitous demand and a policy of gross discourtesy to friendly ,states offends every sense of international morality4 ,on the following day ,russia proposed to ,austria that they should enter into an exchange of private views1 with the object of an alteration in common of some clauses of the ,austrian ultimatum4 ,to this ,austria never even replied4 ,the ,russian ,minister communicated this suggestion to the ,german ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs and expressed the hope that he would find it possible to advise ,vienna to meet our proposal1 but this did not accord with ,german policy1 for on that day the ,german ,ambassador in ,paris called upon the ,french ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs1 and submitted the following formal declaration3 ,austria has declared to ,russia that she does not seek territorial acquisitions1 and that she does not threaten the integrity of ,servia4 ,her only object is to insure her own tranquillity4 ,consequently it rests with ,russia to avoid war4 ,germany feels herself at one with ,france in her keen desire to preserve the peace1 and strongly hopes that ,france will use her influence at ,st4 ,petersburg in the direction of moderation4 ,the ,french ,minister observed that ,germany could on her side take similar steps at ,vienna1 especially in view of the conciliatory spirit which ,servia had shown4 ,the ,ambassador answered that that was not possible1 in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the ,austro-,servian conflict4 ,thereupon the ,minister asked if the four ,powers--,england1 ,germany1 ,italy1 and ,france--were not able to take steps at ,st4 ,petersburg and ,vienna1 since the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict between ,russia and ,austria4 ,the ,ambassador pleaded the absence of instructions4 ,finally1 the ,minister refused to adhere to the ,german proposal4#bi ,footnote #bi3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #bh4 ,this significant interview states the consistent attitude of ,germany4 ,the burden is put upon ,france to induce its ally to desist from any intervention and thus give ,austria a free hand1 while ,germany emphatically declines to promote the same pacific object by suggesting to ,austria a more conciliatory course4 ,on the same day ,england asked ,france1 ,italy1 and ,germany to meet in ,london for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of ,europe1 and to this fruitful suggestion1 which might have saved that peace1 the ,german ,secretary of ,state1 after conferring with the ,british ,ambassador at ,berlin1 replied that the conference would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not1 in his opinion1 be called together except at the request of ,austria and ,russia4 ,he could not1 therefore1 fall in with your ,sir ,edward ,grey's suggestion1 desirous though he was to coperate for the maintenance of peace4 ,i ,sir ,e4 ,goschen said ,i was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration1 but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation4 ,he von ,jagow maintained1 however1 that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable4#cj ,footnote #cj3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #dc4 ,germany's refusal to have ,servia's case submitted to the ,powers even for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that on the same day the ,german ,ambassador at ,london quoted the ,german ,secretary of ,state as saying that there were some things in the ,austrian note that ,servia could hardly be expected to accept1 thus recognizing that ,austria's ultimatum was1 at least in part1 unjust4 ,sir ,edward ,grey then called the ,german ,ambassador's attention to the fact that if ,austria refused the conciliatory reply of ,servia and marched into that country it meant that she was determined to crush ,servia at all costs1 being reckless of the consequences that might be involved4 ,he added that the ,servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause1 and asked that the ,german ,government should urge this at ,vienna but1 as we have already seen1 the ,german ,secretary of ,state had already replied that such a conference was not practicable1 and that it would practically amount to a court of arbitration1 and could not1 in his opinion1 be called together except at the request of ,austria and ,russia4#ca ,footnote #ca3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #af4 ,that this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain4 ,germany already knew that ,austria would not ask for such a conference1 for ,austria had already refused ,russia's request for an extension of time and had actually commenced its military operations4 ,germany's attitude is again clearly indicated by the letter of the ,russian ,minister in ,germany to the ,russian ,foreign ,office in which he states that on ,july #bgth he called at the ,german ,foreign ,office and asked it1 to urge upon ,vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up this line of conciliation4 ,von ,jagow replied that he could not advise ,austria to yield4#cb ,footnote #cb3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #ch4 ,why not8 ,russia and its allies had advised ,servia to yield and ,servia had conceded nearly every claim4 ,why could not the ,german ,foreign ,office advise ,vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation1 if its desire for peace were sincere8 ,before this interview took place1 the ,french ,ambassador had called at the ,german ,foreign ,office on a similar errand and urged the ,english suggestion that action should at once be taken by ,england1 ,germany1 ,russia1 and ,france at ,st4 ,petersburg and ,vienna1 to the effect that ,austria and ,servia should abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour4 ,by this was meant that there should be1 pending further parleys1 no invasion of ,servia by ,austria and none of ,austria by ,russia4 ,to this the ,german ,foreign ,minister opposed a categorical refusal4 ,on the same day the ,russian ,ambassador at ,vienna had a long and earnest conversation with the ,austrian ,under-,secretary of ,state for ,foreign ,affairs4 ,he expressed the earnest hope that something would be done before ,servia was actually invaded4 ,baron ,macchio replied that this would now be difficult1 as a skirmish had already taken place on the ,danube1 in which the ,servians had been aggressors4 ,the ,russian ,ambassador then said that his country would do all it could to keep the ,servians quiet1 and even to fall back before an ,austrian advance in order to gain time4 ,he urged that the ,austrian ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the ,russian ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs1 who was very willing to advise ,servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent ,power4 ,the only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be submitted to the ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs4#cc ,footnote #cc3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #ef4 ,on the same day the ,german ,ambassador at ,paris called upon the ,french ,foreign ,office and strongly insisted on the exclusion of all possibility of mediation or a conference#cd2 and yet contemporaneously the ,imperial ,german ,chancellor was advising ,london that he had started the efforts towards mediation in ,vienna1 immediately in the way desired by ,sir ,edward ,grey1 and had further communicated to the ,austrian ,foreign ,minister the wish of the ,russian ,foreign ,minister for a direct talk in ,vienna4 ,footnote #cd3 ,russian ,orange ,paper1 ,no4 #cd4 ,what hypocrisy6 ,in the formal ,german defense1 the ,german ,foreign ,office1 after stating its conviction that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the ,austro-,servian conflict1 which was purely an ,austro-,hungarian affair1 claimed that ,germany had transmitted ,sir ,edward ,grey's further suggestion to ,vienna1 in which ,austro-,hungary was urged either to agree to accept the ,servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations2 but the ,austro-,hungarian ,government--playing the rle of the wicked partner of the combination--in full appreciation of our mediatory activity 7so says the ,german ,white ,paper with sardonic humor71 replied to this proposition that1 coming after the opening of hostilities1 it was too late4 ,can it be fairly questioned that if ,germany had done something more than merely transmit these wise and pacific suggestions1 ,austria would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that ,austria would have suspended its military operations if ,germany had given any intimation of such a wish8 ,on the following day1 ,july #bhth1 the door was further closed on any possibility of compromise1 when the ,austrian ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs said1 quietly1 but firmly1 that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the ,servian note2 that war would be declared to-day1 and that the well-known pacific character of the ,emperor1 as well as1 he might add1 his own1 might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and inevitable2 that this was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned4 ,to this arrogant and unreasonable contention that ,europe must accept the guarantee of the ,austrian ,foreign ,minister as to the righteousness of ,austria's quarrel1 the ,british ,ambassador suggested the larger aspect of the question1 namely1 the peace of ,europe1 and to this larger aspect1 which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause1 the ,austrian ,foreign ,minister replied that he had it also in mind1 but thought that ,russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending1 which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement1 and which could no longer be postponed4#ce ,footnote #ce3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #fb4 ,the private conversations between ,russia and ,austria having thus failed1 ,russia returned to the proposition of a ,european conference to preserve its peace4 ,its ,ambassador in ,vienna on ,july #bhth had a further conference with ,berchtold and again earnestly pleaded for peace on the basis of friendly relations not only between ,austria and ,servia but between ,austria and ,russia4 ,the conversation in the light of present developments is so significant that it bears quotation in extenso3 ,i pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it was desirable to find a solution which1 while consolidating the good relations between ,austria-,hungary and ,russia1 should give to the ,austro-,hungarian ,monarchy serious guarantees for its future relations with ,servia4 ,i called the attention of ,count ,berchtold to all the dangers to the peace of ,europe which would be brought about by an armed conflict between ,austria-,hungary and ,servia4 ,count ,berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the ,cabinet of ,st4 ,petersburg4 ,he told me that on the other hand the ,austro-,hungarian ,government1 which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against ,servia1 could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the ,austro-,hungarian note4 ,count ,berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree that the ,government1 even if it desired1 could no longer consent to it1 all the less1 he said to me1 because the very reply of ,servia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in its promises for the future4 ,on the same day1 ,july #bhth1 the ,german ,imperial ,chancellor sent for the ,english ,ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposed conference of the neutral ,powers1 on the ground that he did not think it would be effective1 because such a conference would1 in his opinion1 have the appearance of an ,areopagus consisting of two ,powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining ,powers4 ,after engaging in this narrow and insincere quibble1 and1 being reminded of ,servia's conciliatory reply1 his ,excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the ,servian note1 but that ,austria's standpoint1 and in this he agreed1 was that her quarrel with ,servia was a purely ,austrian concern1 with which ,russia had nothing to do4#cf ,footnote #cf3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #ga4 ,at this stage of the controversy it will be noted that every proposal to preserve peace had come from the ,triple ,entente and that every such proposal had met with an uncompromising negative from ,austria1 and either that or obstructive quibbles from ,germany4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,attitude ,,of ,,france ,before proceeding to record the second and final stage in the peace parleys1 in which the ,german ,kaiser became the protagonist1 it is desirable to interpolate the additional data1 which the ,french ,yellow ,book has given to the world since the preceding chapter was written and the first editions of this book were printed4 ,this can be done with little sacrifice to the chronological sequence of this narrative4 ,the evidence of the ,yellow ,book is fuller in scope and greater in detail than the other governmental publications1 and while largely cumulative in its character1 it serves to bring into a sharper light certain phases of this extraordinary controversy4 ,it has been prepared with great care by ,m4 ,jules ,cambon1 who was the ,french ,ambassador at ,berlin during the controversy1 and ,,mm4 de ,margerie and ,berthelot1 experienced and influential diplomats in the ,french ,ministry of ,foreign ,affairs4 ,it consists of #afj documents1 classified into seven chapters1 each dealing with different periods of time in the great controversy4 ,the delay in its presentation is somewhat compensated by the exceptional fullness of the data which is thus submitted to the scrutiny of a candid world4 ,the ,french ,yellow ,book confirms the impression that ,france was most fortunate in having entrusted its interests at the difficult post of ,berlin in this great crisis to so distinguished and experienced a diplomat as ,m4 ,jules ,cambon4 ,throughout the whole controversy the impartial reader is deeply impressed with the fact1 which the more candid apologists for ,germany are themselves disposed to admit1 that ,germany's chief weakness lay in its incapable diplomatic representatives4 ,an interesting subject for conjecture suggests itself as to what would have happened if ,prince ,bismarck had been at the helm at this critical juncture4 ,his guiding principles of statecraft with reference to foreign relations were to isolate the enemy1 make him the apparent aggressor1 and then crush him as effectually and speedily as possible4 ,he never would have initiated this war4 ,his nature was that of the fox as well as the lion4 ,in the years that have succeeded his dismissal1 a certain dry rot1 due to the tendency of the ,prussian ,government to distribute its diplomatic offices among highborn but incompetent ,junkers1--une petite gentilhommerie pauvre et stupide1 as ,bismarck once described them--had affected the efficiency of ,german diplomacy4 ,feebly attempting to walk in the steps of the ,iron ,chancellor1 they wittingly or unwittingly reversed ,bismarck's policy by almost isolating ,germany1 consolidating its enemies1 and then proceeding to attack them simultaneously4 ,this may have been magnificent courage1 but it was not wise statecraft4 ,the might of the ,german sabre was supposed to offset these blundering disciples of ,machiavelli4 ,russia1 ,england1 and ,france were more fortunate and of their representatives few1 if any1 shone with greater intellectual distinction or moral courage than ,m4 ,jules ,cambon4 ,this distinguished diplomat had had exceptional experience in representing his country in various capitals of the world1 and the author1 who enjoyed the honor of his acquaintance1 when he was accredited to ,washington1 already knew1 what the documents in the ,french ,yellow ,book so clearly reveal1 that ,cambon was a diplomat of great intellectual ability4 ,with acute sagacity he grasped the significance of the fateful events1 in which he was a participant4 ,to his calm and well-poised intellectuality he added a moral force1 resulting from the clear integrity of his purpose and the broad humanity of his aims4 ,on more than one occasion he spoke in the name of humanity1 and in his constant attempt to convince the ,german ,foreign ,office as to its clear duty to civilization to preserve the peace of the world1 he became the representative1 not merely of ,france1 but of civilization itself4 ,in this great diplomatic controversy1 one of the greatest in the history of the world1 the three representatives1 who stand out with the greatest intellectual and moral distinction1 are ,sazonof1 ,grey1 and ,cambon4 ,the first displayed the greatest sagacity in divining from the very outset the real purposes of ,germany and ,austria and in checkmating the diplomatic moves1 which sought to make ,russia apparently the aggressor4 ,sir ,edward ,grey's chief merit lay in his unwearying but ineffectual efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem and also in the absolute candor--so unusual in diplomacy--with which he dealt on the one hand with the efforts of ,russia and ,france to align ,england on their side at the beginning of the quarrel1 and on the other1 to continue friendly negotiations with ,germany and ,austria1 without in any respect unfairly misleading them as to ,england's possible ultimate action4 ,the ,french ,ambassador will justly receive the approval of posterity for the high courage and moral earnestness with which he pressed upon the ,german ,foreign ,office the inevitable consequences of its acts4 ,the first chapter of the ,french ,yellow ,book consists largely of communications written from ,berlin by ,m4 ,jules ,cambon in the year #aiac4 ,its most interesting document is his report from ,berlin under date ,november #bb1 #aiac1 as to a conversation between the ,kaiser and the ,king of ,belgium1 with reference to a change in the pacific attitude1 which ,cambon had previously imputed to the ,kaiser4 ,to the world at large this statement would be more convincing if the source of the information had been disclosed4 ,those who know ,m4 ,jules ,cambon1 however1 will have a reasonable confidence that when he states that he received the record of this conversation from an absolutely sure source1 more than usual credence can be given to the statement4 ,reading between the lines1 the implication is not unreasonable that the source of ,cambon's authority was ,king ,albert himself1 but this rests only on a plausible conjecture4 ,the fact that so trained an observer as the ,french ,ambassador had seen in the ,kaiser a marked change as early as #aiac is significant1 and history may justify ,cambon in his shrewd conjecture that the impatience of the soldiers1 meaning thereby the ,german ,general ,staff1 and the growing popularity of his chauvinistic son1 the ,crown ,prince1 had appreciably modified the pacific attitude of the ,kaiser1 which had served the cause of peace so well in the ,moroccan crisis4 ,cambon's recital of the incident in question1 written on ,november #bb1 #aiac1 justifies quotation in extenso4 ,i have received from an absolutely sure source a record of a conversation which is reported between the ,emperor and the ,king of the ,belgians1 in the presence of the ,chief of the ,general ,staff1 ,general von ,moltke1 a fortnight ago--a conversation which would appear greatly to have struck ,king ,albert4 ,i am in no way surprised by the impression created1 which corresponds with that made on me some time ago4 ,hostility against us is becoming more marked1 and the ,emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace4 ,the ,german ,emperor's interlocutor thought up to the present1 as did everybody1 that ,william ,,ii41 whose personal influence has been exerted in many critical circumstances in favor of the maintenance of peace1 was still in the same state of mind4 ,this time1 it appears1 he found him completely changed4 ,the ,german ,emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the bellicose tendencies of certain ,german parties4 ,william ,,ii4 has been brought to think that war with ,france is inevitable1 and that it will have to come one day or the other4 ,the ,emperor1 it need hardly be said1 believes in the crushing superiority of the ,german army and in its assured success4 ,general von ,moltke spoke in exactly the same sense as his sovereign4 ,he also declared that war was necessary and inevitable1 but he showed himself still more certain of success4 ,for1 said he to the ,king1 this time we must put an end to it 7cette fois il faut en finir71 and your ,majesty can hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which on that day will carry away the whole ,german people4 ,the ,king of the ,belgians protested that to interpret the intentions of the ,french ,government in this manner was to travesty them1 and to allow oneself to be misled as to the feelings of the ,french nation by the manifestations of a few hotheads1 or of conscienceless intriguers4 ,the ,emperor and his ,chief of ,general ,staff none the less persisted in their point of view4 ,during this conversation the ,emperor1 moreover1 appeared overwrought1 and irritable4 ,as the years begin to weigh upon ,william ,,ii4 the family traditions1 the retrograde feelings of the ,court1 and1 above all1 the impatience of the soldiers1 are gaining more ascendency over his mind4 ,perhaps he may feel ,i know not what kind of jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son1 who flatters the passions of the ,pan-,germans1 and perhaps he may find that the position of the ,empire in the world is not commensurate with its power4 ,perhaps1 also1 the reply of ,france to the last increase in the ,german army1 the object of which was to place ,germanic superiority beyond question1 may count for something in these bitternesses1 for whatever one may say it is felt here that the ,germans cannot do much more4 ,one may ask what lay behind the conversation4 ,the ,emperor and his ,chief of ,general ,staff may have intended to impress the ,king of the ,belgians1 and to lead him not to resist in case a conflict with us should arise#cg4444 ,footnote #cg3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #f4 ,this picture of the ,kaiser is interesting and significant4 ,germany's loss of prestige in the ,moroccan controversy1 due to the ,kaiser's unwillingness to precipitate a war at that time and his somewhat diminished popularity with his people1 not only accentuated the desire of his military camarilla to find another pretext for a war1 but may have modified the ,kaiser's resistance to this bellicose policy4 ,until that time he had been quite content to play the part of ,csar4 ,it may be questioned whether he had previously a real desire to be a ,csar4 ,to describe himself metaphorically as clad in shining armor and to shake the mailed fist was his constant pose4 ,and so he played his part4 ,as long as the world was content to take this imperial fustian in a ,pickwickian sense1 the imperial impresario found the same enjoyment as when he staged ,sardanapalus on the boards of the ,berlin ,theater4 ,the ,kaiser was destined to stage a greater spectacle than the burning of a ,babylonian palace4 ,his crowning achievement was to apply the torch to civilization itself4 ,prior to #aiac neither his wishes nor plans carried him further than the congenial art of imperial posing4 ,behind his natural preference for peace was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war might cost him his throne4 ,the experience of ,napoleon the ,third was quite too recent to be ignored4 ,in the ,moroccan controversy1 the unwillingness of ,france to assent to all demands and the resolute purpose of ,england to support its ally1 presented a crisis1 which could not be met with rhetorical phrases1 and the ,kaiser found himself confronted with a situation1 in which a very considerable number of thoughtful and influential ,germans favored an immediate appeal to arms1 and as to which only his word was wanted to precipitate hostilities in #aiaa4 ,the ,kaiser at that time failed to meet the expectations of those who had expected a more warlike attitude from the knight clad in shining armor1 and the expression ,william the ,peaceful was bandied about with increasing contempt by the war party in ,germany1 whose passions the ,crown ,prince--not unwilling to push his royal father prematurely from the pedestal of popularity--was assiduously fanning4 ,while the fact cannot yet be regarded as established1 the writer believes that the future may indubitably show that the ,kaiser did have full knowledge of the ,austrian ultimatum in advance of its issuance and gave his consent to the policy of that coup in the hope that it would somewhat restore his diminished prestige4 ,he probably followed this policy in the confident expectation that ,russia would yield1 as it had yielded in #aijh in the ,bosnian incident1 and when he discovered in ,norway that ,russia1 while willing to maintain peace upon any reasonable terms1 was not disposed to surrender all its legitimate interests in the ,servian question1 he1 as will be more fully narrated in the next chapter1 hurried back to ,berlin and for a time attempted to reverse the policy and bring about a peaceful adjustment4 ,unfortunately this attempt came too late4 ,his military camarilla had determined upon war4 ,preparations were then being feverishly made1 and the ,german and ,austrian chancelleries were steadily and deliberately shutting the door upon any possibility of peace4 ,to withdraw under these circumstances from an untenable position meant a substantial impairment of his already diminished prestige4 ,a ,washington would have saved the situation1 but the ,kaiser was not a ,washington4 ,another most illuminating feature of this chapter of the ,yellow ,book is a report from the ,french ,embassy in ,berlin to its ,foreign ,office on the public opinion of ,germany in the summer of #aiac1 as disclosed by the reports of the ,french consular representatives in ,germany4 ,it gives an extraordinary analysis of conditions in ,germany prior to the war1 and it describes in great fullness the many causes which were contributory to the creation of a powerful war party in ,germany4 ,as it is not in strictness a part of the diplomatic record1 it is not embodied in the text of this book1 but its value as an acute analysis of conditions in ,germany--made before the passions of the war had clouded the judgment--will repay the reader's careful consideration4 ,the second chapter of the ,french ,yellow ,book deals with the events which took place between the murder of the ,archduke and the ,austrian ultimatum and presents new and cumulative evidence of substantial value4 ,the ,french ,consul ,general at ,budapest1 in a report to his ,foreign ,office under date ,july #aa1 #aiad1 after showing that the ,hungarian ,premier1 ,count ,tisza1 had refused to disclose1 even to the ,hungarian ,chamber1 the results of the judicial inquiry into the ,serajevo murder and the decision taken by the ,austrian ,cabinet1 proceeds to show how the suppression of the news in ,austria was a part of the scheme to make the ultimatum to ,servia so abrupt and speedy that no course would be open to ,servia and ,europe other than an immediate and unconditional surrender4 ,everything is for peace in the newspapers1 but the mass of the public believes in war and fears it4444 ,the ,government1 whether it be seriously desirous of peace1 or whether it be preparing a coup1 is now doing everything it can to allay this anxiety4 ,that is why the tone of the ,government newspapers has been lowered first1 by one note and then by two1 until now it has become almost optimistic4 ,but the ,government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the alarm4 ,their optimism to order is really without an echo4 ,the nervousness of the ,bourse1 a barometer one cannot neglect1 is a sure proof of that4 ,stocks1 without exception1 have fallen to improbably low prices4 ,the ,hungarian four per cent4 was yesterday quoted at #gi4ie1 a price which has never been quoted since the first issue4#ch ,footnote #ch3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #aa4 ,simultaneously a very different note was sounded by the organ of the military party in ,vienna4 ,the ,militrische ,rundschau1 a few days before the ultimatum to ,servia1 said3 ,the moment is still favorable for us4 ,if we do not decide upon war1 the war we shall have to make in two or three years at the latest will be begun in circumstances much less propitious2 now the initiative belongs to us4 ,russia is not ready1 the moral factors are for us1 might as well as right4 ,since some day we shall have to accept the struggle1 let us provoke it at once4#ci ,footnote #ci3 ,ibid41 ,no4 #ab4 ,before the ,austrian ultimatum was issued there had been some preliminary informal negotiations between ,austria and ,servia and the latter had expressed its willingness to give to ,austria the most ample reparation provided that she did not demand judiciary coperation1 and the ,servian ,minister at ,berlin warned the ,german ,government that it would be dangerous to endeavor by this inquiry 7i4e41 by the participation of ,austrian officials in the courts of ,servia7 to damage the prestige of ,servia4#dj ,footnote #dj3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #ae4 ,it thus appears that ,austria and ,germany had warning in advance of the issuance of the ultimatum that if this humiliating demand were included it would meet with refusal4 ,their intention to precipitate this war or impose their will upon ,europe may therefore be measured by the fact that1 with full knowledge that that particular demand would not be accepted1 it was made a leading feature of the ultimatum1 and finally became the principal outstanding difference after ,servia had accepted substantially all the other demands of ,austria4 ,this was reported by ,cambon to his ,foreign ,office two days before the ultimatum was issued and at that time ,germany was fully advised as to the one demand1 which ,servia could not in justice to its sovereignty accept4 ,in the same letter1 ,cambon advises his ,foreign ,office that ,germany had already issued the preliminary warning of mobilization1 which places ,germany in a sort of garde--vous during periods of tension4#da ,footnote #da3 ,ibid41 ,no4 #ae4 ,a further corroboration of ,germany's knowledge of the ,austrian ultimatum before its issuance is found in a report of the ,french ,minister at ,munich to the ,french ,foreign ,office1 written on the day when the ,austrian ultimatum was issued1 and a full day before it reached any capital except ,berlin and ,belgrade4 ,he writes3 ,the ,bavarian ,press appears to believe that a peaceful solution of the ,austro-,servian incident is not only possible but even probable4 ,official circles1 on the contrary1 for some time past1 have displayed with more or less sincerity positive pessimism4 ,the ,prime ,minister notably said to me to-day that the ,austrian note1 of which he had cognizance1 was in his opinion drawn up in terms acceptable to ,servia1 but that the present situation appeared to him none the less to be very grave4#db ,footnote #db3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #ba4 ,as it is unlikely that the ,austrian ,government would have dealt directly with the ,bavarian ,government without similar communications to the ,german ,foreign ,office1 it follows as a strong probability that the ,german ,foreign ,office and probably each of the constituent ,states of ,germany knew on ,july the #bc;d that ,austria intended to demand that which ,servia had previously indicated its unalterable determination to refuse4 ,under these circumstances the repeated and insistent assurances that the ,german ,foreign ,office gave to ,england1 ,france1 and ,russia that it had no knowledge of the text of the ,austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its contents#dc presents a policy of deception unworthy of a great nation or of the twentieth century4 ,footnote #dc3 ,ante1 p4 #cf4 ,it regarded this policy of submarine diplomacy as necessary1 not only to throw the other nations off their guard while ,germany was arming1 but also to support its contention that the quarrel between ,servia and ,austria was a local quarrel4 ,if it appeared that ,germany had instigated ,austria in its course1 it could not have supported its first contention that the quarrel was a local one and it could not reasonably dispute the right of ,russia to intervene4 ,for this purpose the fable was invented4 ,it deceived no one4 ,the ,french ,yellow ,book discloses another even more amazing feature of this policy of deception1 for it shows on the authority of the ,italian ,foreign ,minister that ,germany and ,austria did not even take their own ally into their confidence4 ,the significance of this fact cannot be overestimated4 ,nothing in the whole record more clearly demonstrates the purpose of the ,german and ,austrian diplomats to set a trap for the rest of ,europe4 ,under the terms of the ,triple ,alliance it was the duty of each member to submit to its associates all matters which might involve the possibility of joint coperation4 ,even if this had not been written in the very terms of the ,alliance1 it would follow as a necessary implication1 for when each member obligated itself to coperate with its allies in any attack upon either of them1 but not in any aggressive war1 it necessarily followed that each ally had the right to the fullest information as to any controversy which might involve such action1 so that it might determine whether it fell within the terms of the obligation4 ,neither the ,german nor the ,austrian ,foreign ,office have ever submitted any documentary proof that they discharged this obligation to their ally and it may be added they have never pretended that they did so4 ,if further proof were needed1 we find in the ,french ,yellow ,book a report from the ,french ,minister at ,rome to his ,foreign ,office1 under date ,july the #bgth1 reporting a conversation between the ,french ,minister and the ,italian ,foreign ,minister1 the ,marquis di ,san ,giuliano1 on that day1 in which the latter spoke of the contents of the ,austrian note1 and assured me that he had had no previous knowledge of them whatever4 ,he was well aware that the note was to be vigorous and energetic in character1 but he had no idea that it could take such a form4 ,i asked him if it was true1 as is stated in certain newspapers1 that in this connection he had expressed in ,vienna approval of ,austrian action1 and had given the assurance that ,italy would fulfill her duties as an ally towards ,austria4 ,he replied1 ,in no way have we been consulted2 we have been told nothing whatever4 ,we have therefore had no reason to make any communication of this nature in ,vienna4#dd ,footnote #dd3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #gb4 ,the reason for this secrecy is not far to seek4 ,almost a year before the ,archduke's death1 ,austria had sounded ,italy as to its willingness to acquiesce or participate in a war by ,austria against ,servia1 and ,italy had refused4 ,for this reason and also because an ,austrian war against ,servia was not to the interests of ,italy1 ,austria and ,germany both recognized1 without even consulting their ally1 that they could not count upon its coperation in such a war4 ,to submit their proposed action to ,italy was to invite a deliberate expression of disapproval1 and this would make it more difficult for them to demand its coperation1 if they could carry out their policy of so flouting ,russia as to compel it to initiate an aggressive war1 as they clearly hoped to do4 ,there was1 however1 another and very practical reason for this failure to consult their ally4 ,we have seen that the whole policy of the ,austrian ultimatum was founded upon secrecy4 ,the plan was to give to ,europe no possible intimation of the intended action until it was accomplished and then to give to ,europe only twenty-four hours within which to deliberate or act4 ,if as a matter of courtesy ,austria and ,germany submitted to their ally their proposed course of action1 ,italy1 being wholly opposed to any such unprovoked attack upon ,servia1 might find a way1 either by open and public protest or by dropping a confidential intimation1 to advise the other countries as to what was in preparation4 ,this would defeat the principal purpose of ,germany and ,austria1 to force a quick decision and to prepare for eventualities before any other country could make ready4 ,germany and ,austria therefore wholly ignored their ally and pursued their stealthy policy to its discreditable end4 ,when their diplomatic communications are disclosed in full1 this feature of their policy may disclose some significant admissions4 ,we have already seen 7ante1 p4 #ce7 that when on ,july the #bjth1 three days before the ,austrian ultimatum was issued1 ,sir ,edward ,grey asked ,prince ,lichnowsky1 the ,german ,ambassador in ,london1 as to what news he had from ,vienna with reference to the intentions of his country1 ,prince ,lichnowsky affected to be ignorant4 ,but it appears from a letter1 which ,m4 ,paul ,cambon#de wrote to his ,foreign ,office on ,july the #bdth1 #aiad1 that ,prince ,lichnowsky had returned to ,london from ,berlin about a month before and had displayed pessimistic views as to the relations between ,st4 ,petersburg and ,berlin4 ,cambon adds that the ,english ,foreign ,office and his other diplomatic colleagues had all been struck by the anxious appearance of ,prince ,lichnowsky since his return from ,berlin4#df ,footnote #de3 ,the ,french ,ambassador at ,london4 ,footnote #df3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #cb4 ,so designedly was the ,austrian ultimatum withheld from the chancelleries of ,europe1 other than ,vienna and ,berlin1 that on the day following its issuance at ,belgrade1 the only information which ,m4 ,jules ,cambon had of its issuance were the extracts in the press1 and he thereupon saw the ,german ,secretary of ,state and asked him whether such an ultimatum had been sent4 ,herr von ,jagow replied affirmatively1 adding that the note was energetic1 and that he approved it1 the ,servian ,government having long since exhausted ,austrian patience4 ,he considers1 moreover1 that for ,austria the question is one of a domestic nature1 and he hopes that it will be localized4 ,i then said to him that1 not having received any instructions1 ,i only wished to have with him an entirely personal exchange of views4 ,i then asked him if the ,berlin ,cabinet had really been in complete ignorance of the ,austrian claims before they were communicated to ,belgrade1 and as he replied that this was so1 ,i expressed my surprise that he should thus undertake to support pretensions1 the limit and nature of which he ignored4 ,it is only1 said ,herr von ,jagow1 interrupting me1 because we are talking personally between ourselves that ,i allow you to say that to me4 ,certainly1 ,i replied1 but if ,peter ,i4 humiliates himself ,servia will probably be given over to internal troubles4 ,that will open the door to fresh possibilities1 and do you know where ,vienna will lead you8 ,i added that the language of the ,german ,press was not that of a people who were indifferent and foreign to the affair1 but told of active support4 ,finally1 ,i remarked that the shortness of the time given to ,servia in which to yield would make a bad impression upon ,europe4 ,herr von ,jagow replied that he expected un peu d'motion1 on the part of ,servia's friends1 but that he counted upon their giving ,servia good advice4 ,i do not doubt1 ,i then said1 that ,russia will make an effort in ,belgrade to bring the ,cabinet to make what concessions are acceptable1 but if you ask something of one1 why not ask it of the other8 ,and if it be expected that advice will be given in ,belgrade1 is it not legitimate to expect that on the other hand advice will also be tendered to ,vienna8 ,the ,secretary of ,state allowed himself to say that that would depend on circumstances1 but1 recovering himself immediately1 declared that the matter must be localized4 ,he asked me if really ,i considered the situation serious4 ,assuredly1 ,i replied1 for1 if what is going on has been pondered over1 ,i do not understand why people have cut their bridges behind them4#dg ,footnote #dg3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #cj4 ,the ,yellow ,book throws further light upon the extraordinarily petty finesse1 with which the chancelleries of ,berlin and ,vienna attempted to take a snap judgment upon the rest of ,europe4 ,we learn from ,exhibit ,no4 #ee that ,count ,berchtold had given to the ,russian ,ambassador at ,vienna1 prior to the issuance of the ultimatum1 an express assurance that the claims against ,servia would be thoroughly acceptable1 and that upon this assurance ,count ,schebeko had left ,vienna on a leave of absence4 ,during his absence and at a time when the ,president of the ,french ,republic1 the ,french ,premier1 and its ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs were far distant from ,paris and on the high seas1 the ultimatum was issued1 and1 as we have seen1 ,count ,berchtold immediately betook himself to ,ischl and remained there until the expiration of the brief time limit in the ultimatum4 ,the same policy was pursued with reference to other ,ambassadors1 for when ,france instructed its representative in ,vienna to call the attention of the ,austrian ,government to the anxiety aroused in ,europe1 ,baron ,macchio stated to our ,ambassador that the tone of the ,austrian note and the demands formulated by it permitted one to count upon a pacific dnouement4#dh ,footnote #dh3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #bj4 ,in the same communication1 in which this information is embodied1 we gain the important information that in the ,vienna ,diplomatic ,corps the ,german ,ambassador recommends violent resolutions whilst declaring ostensibly that the ,imperial ,chancellery is not wholly in agreement with him on this point4 ,pursuant to the same ostrich policy1 the ,german ,secretary of ,state1 as we have previously seen 7ante1 pp4 #ga-ge71 gave to both the ,french and ,english ,ambassadors the absence of ,count ,berchtold at ,ischl as an excuse for the failure of ,germany to get any extension of the time limit1 and not only did he assure them repeatedly and in the most unequivocal way that the ,german ,foreign ,office had no knowledge of1 or responsibility for1 the ,austrian ultimatum1 but when on ,july the #beth the ,russian ,charg requested a personal appointment with von ,jagow in order to present his country's request for such an extension1 the ,german ,secretary of ,state only gave him an appointment at the end of the afternoon1 that is to say1 at the moment when the ultimatum will expire1 and in view of this illusory appointment the ,russian ,charg 7,m4 ,bronewsky7 sent1 with all speed1 a written note to the ,secretary of ,state1 in which he pointed out that the delay of the communication made by ,austria to the ,powers rendered the effect of the communication illusory1 since it did not give the ,powers time to become acquainted with the facts alleged before the expiry of the ultimatum4 ,he insisted very urgently on the necessity of extending it1 if one had not in view the creation of a great crisis4#di ,footnote #di3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #db4 ,thus in ,berlin and ,vienna by concerted action the representatives of ,england1 ,france1 and ,russia were evaded until the time limit for ,servia had expired4 ,contrast with this petty finesse the spirit with which ,sazonof attempted to reach an agreement with the ,austrian ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg on ,july #bfth1 as set forth in the report of the ,french ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg1 under that date4 ,he says3 ,the ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution4 ,i shall show myself ready to negotiate up to the last instant1 he said to me4 ,it is in this spirit that he has asked ,count ,szpry#ej to come and see him for a frank and loyal explanation4 ,in his presence ,m4 ,sazonof discussed the ,austro-,hungarian ultimatum1 article by article1 showing clearly the insulting character of the different clauses4 ,the intention which inspired this document1 he said1 is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory against the agitation of ,servian anarchists1 but the step to which you have had recourse is not defensible4 ,he concluded1 ,take back your ultimatum1 modify its form1 and ,i will guarantee the result4#ea ,footnote #ej3 ,the ,austrian ,ambassador4 ,footnote #ea3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #ed4 ,upon one phase of ,germany's foreign policy in this crisis the ,french ,yellow ,book naturally throws more light than the other publications4 ,i refer to the attempt of ,germany to coerce ,france into a position of neutrality1 or possibly to secure from it some definition of its attitude1 which would compromise its relations with ,russia4 ,the ,yellow ,book charges that the ,german ,ambassador1 under the pretext of securing an authorized statement to the press to allay public excitement1 thus attempted to compromise ,france4 ,the documents go far to suggest this possibility but are not wholly convincing4 ,the ,german ,ambassador on ,july the #bdth1 the very day that the ultimatum reached the chancelleries of ,europe1 and on the day when von ,jagow untruthfully claimed that it had first reached ,berlin1 called upon the ,french ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs and read to him a formal note1 of which he was unwilling to leave a copy1 although he characterized it as a note of importance4 ,it may be here noted that on more than one occasion in this diplomatic crisis the ,german representatives were unwilling to leave a copy of the diplomatic messages which they orally communicated4 ,in his memorandum the ,french ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs says3 ,the ,german ,ambassador especially directed my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before he read it4 ,he indicated that in them lay the chief point4 ,i took note of the actual text1 which is as follows3 ,the ,german ,government considers that the present question is a matter to be settled exclusively between ,austria-,hungary and ,servia1 and that the ,powers have the greatest interest in restricting it to the two interested parties4 ,the ,german ,government ardently desires the localization of the conflict1 since by the natural play of alliances any intervention by another ,power would have incalculable consequences4 ,i remarked to the ,german ,ambassador that just as it appeared to be legitimate to call for the punishment of all those concerned in the crime of ,serajevo1 on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted1 having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of ,servia2 the ,servian ,government1 even if it was willing to submit to them1 would risk being carried away by a revolution4 ,i also pointed out to ,herr von ,schoen#eb that his note only took into account two hypotheses3 that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of ,servia4 ,the third hypothesis 7which would leave the door open for an arrangement7 should also be taken into consideration2 that of ,servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-,austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity4 ,footnote #eb3 ,the ,german ,ambassador4 ,i added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by ,austria could be admitted1 the means of obtaining it could be examined2 if ,servia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that ,austria would refuse to take part in the conversation4 ,perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third party ,powers1 who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in ,servia1 to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of ,germany to localize the dispute4 ,herr von ,schoen recognized the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible4 ,when ,i asked him if we should give to the ,austrian note the character of a simple mise en demeure1 which permitted a discussion1 or an ultimatum1 he answered that personally he had no views4#ec ,footnote #ec3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #bh4 ,on the following day the ,german ,ambassador again called at the ,french ,foreign ,office and protested against an article1 which had appeared in a ,paris newspaper and which had characterized his communication of the preceding day as the ,german menace4 ,the ,german ,ambassador again gave an unequivocal assurance that there was no agreement between ,austria and ,germany over the ,austrian note1 of which the ,german ,government was ignorant1 although the ,german ,government had subsequently approved it on receiving communication of it at the same time as the other ,powers4#ed ,footnote #ed3 ,ibid41 ,no4 #cf4 ,the hardihood of this statement1 in view of the fact that on the preceding day1 simultaneously with the service of the ultimatum1 the threatening demand had been delivered by ,germany to the leading ,european chancelleries that the quarrel between ,austria and ,servia must be localized1 is apparent4 ,baron von ,schoen1 the ,german ,ambassador1 then denied that his suggestion of incalculable consequences1 if the dispute were not localized1 was a menace4 ,this statement1 repeated by ,german diplomats in other capitals1 approaches the ludicrous4 ,the first military power of ,europe formally advises other nations that unless they waive their legitimate claims and interests1 incalculable consequences will follow1 and it is gravely suggested that this is not a menace4 ,on the following day ,baron von ,schoen made two visits at the ,french ,foreign ,office and assured the acting ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs that ,germany was on the side of ,france in the ardent desire for the maintenance of peace1 and she earnestly hoped that ,france would use her influence in a soothing manner in ,st4 ,petersburg4 ,i replied to this suggestion that ,russia was moderate1 that she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation1 and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a peaceful solution of the struggle4 ,it therefore appeared to me that in counterpart ,germany should act in ,vienna1 where the efficacy of her action was sure1 with a view to avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of ,servia4 ,the ,ambassador having pointed out to me that that was irreconcilable with the position adopted by ,germany1 that the question only concerned ,austria and ,servia1 ,i said to him that mediation in ,vienna and ,st4 ,petersburg might be made by the four ,powers who were less directly interested in the matter4 ,baron von ,schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of instructions on this point1 and ,i told him that in these circumstances ,i did not feel able to act in ,st4 ,petersburg alone4 ,our conversation concluded with the renewed assurance by the ,ambassador as to the peaceful intentions of ,germany1 who1 he declared1 was with ,france on this point4#ee ,footnote #ee3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #ef4 ,the incident now followed1 which suggested to the ,french ,foreign office a subtle attempt of ,germany to compromise the relations of ,france with ,russia by imputing disloyalty to the former4 ,on his second visit a few hours later1 ,baron von ,schoen desired the ,french ,foreign ,office to give to the public a statement with reference to the preceding interview1 and suggested the following1 which he dictated to the ,french official3 ,the ,german ,ambassador and the ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs had a further interview in the course of the afternoon1 during which they examined1 in the most friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity1 the means which might be employed for the maintenance of general peace4 ,the ,acting ,political ,director at once replied3 ,then1 in your mind1 everything is settled1 and you give us the assurance that ,austria accepts the ,servian note1 or will be willing to converse with the ,powers with regard to it8 ,the ,ambassador appeared to be taken aback1 and made a vigorous denial4 ,it was therefore pointed out to him that if nothing had changed in the negative attitude of ,germany1 the terms of the suggested note to the ,press were excessive1 and likely to give ,french opinion a false feeling of security by creating illusions as to the actual situation1 the dangers of which were but too evident4#ef ,footnote #ef3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #eg4 ,it is not surprising that the ,french ,foreign ,office looked askance at these ,german suggestions of pacific solidarity with ,france1 which contrasted so strangely with ,germany's refusal to work for peace and its sinister menaces to other countries4 ,france's suspicion that ,baron von ,schoen was thus attempting to compromise its loyalty in the eyes of ,russia cannot be said to be without some foundation1 although it is as reasonable to assume that these professions of the ,german ,ambassador were only an incident to the general plan of lulling ,france and its allies into a false sense of security4 ,here again the full truth can only be ascertained when ,germany is willing to submit to the scrutiny of the world the records of its ,foreign ,office4 ,on ,july #bfth1 ,m4 ,jules ,cambon had an interview with the ,german ,secretary of ,state and earnestly supported ,sir ,edward ,grey's suggestion that a conference be called in which ,england1 ,france1 ,germany1 and ,italy should participate for the preservation of peace4 ,this interview is at once so dramatic1 and almost prophetic1 that it justifies quotation in extenso3 ,to ,cambon's proposition1 von ,jagow replied1 as he did to the ,british ,ambassador1 that he could not accept a proposal to charge the ,italian1 ,french1 and ,german ,ambassadors with the task of seeking1 with ,sir ,edward ,grey1 a means of solving the present difficulties1 for that would be to establish a regular conference to deal with the affairs of ,austria and ,russia4 ,i replied to ,herr von ,jagow that ,i regretted his response1 but that the great object1 which ,sir ,edward ,grey had in view1 was above a question of form1 and what was important was the association of ,england and ,france with ,germany and ,italy in laboring for peace2 that this association could show itself in common action in ,st4 ,petersburg and ,vienna2 that he had frequently expressed to me his regret at seeing the two groups of alliances always opposed to each other in ,europe1 and that here he had an opportunity of proving that there was a ,european spirit1 by showing four ,powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a struggle4 ,herr von ,jagow evaded the matter by saying that ,germany had her engagements with ,austria4 ,i pointed out that the relations of ,germany with ,vienna were no more close than those of ,france with ,russia1 and that it was he himself who raised the question of the two opposed groups of alliances4 ,the ,secretary of ,state then said that he did not refuse to act with a view to avoiding an ,austro-,russian conflict1 but that he could not intervene in the ,austro-,servian conflict4 ,one is the consequence of the other1 ,i said1 and it would be well to prevent the creation of any new state of affairs calculated to bring about the intervention of ,russia4 ,as the ,secretary of ,state persisted in saying that he was obliged to observe his engagements with regard to ,austria1 ,i asked him if he had pledged himself to follow ,austria everywhere blindfold1 and if he had made himself acquainted with the ,servian reply to ,austria1 which had been handed to him that morning by the ,servian ,charg d',affaires4 ,i have not yet had time1 he said4 ,i regret it1 ,i replied4 ,you will see that except on points of detail ,servia has yielded completely4 ,it would seem1 however1 that since ,austria has obtained the satisfaction1 which your support procured her1 you might to-day advise her to be content1 or to examine with ,servia the terms of the ,servian reply4 ,as ,herr von ,jagow did not answer me clearly1 ,i asked him if ,germany wanted war4 ,he protested energetically1 saying that he knew that that was my idea but that it was completely incorrect4 ,you must then1 ,i replied1 act in consequence4 ,when you read the ,servian reply1 weigh the terms with your conscience1 ,i beg you in the name of humanity1 and do not personally assume a portion of the responsibility for the catastrophe1 whose preparation you are allowing4 ,herr von ,jagow protested again1 adding that he was ready to join ,england and ,france in any common effort1 but that some form must be found for this intervention which he could accept and that the ,cabinets should agree among themselves upon the matter4 ,moreover1 he added1 direct conversations between ,vienna and ,st4 ,petersburg are begun and are proceeding4 ,i expect much good of them1 and ,i have hope4#eg ,footnote #eg3 ,french ,yellow ,book1 ,no4 #gd4 ,in his solemn injunction to von ,jagow in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in his conscience1 ,cambon struck a loftier note than any of the diplomatic disputants4 ,macaulay has said that the ,french mind has always been the interpreter between national ideas and those of universal mankind1 and at least since the ,french ,revolution the tribute has been deserved4 ,he1 who carefully and dispassionately reads the diplomatic correspondence which preceded the war1 must be impressed with the different point of view of the two groups of disputants4 ,both the written and oral communications of the ,german and ,austrian representatives failed to suggest at any time a note other than one of selfish nationalism4 ,we search in vain for the most distant recognition of the fact that the world at large had any legitimate interest in the controversy4 ,the insistent note1 which ,austria sounded1 was that its interests required its punitive action against ,servia1 even though the peace of the world were thereby sacrificed1 and that of ,germany repeated with equal insistence that its closest interests summoned it to the side of ,austria4 ,in marked contrast to this spirit of national selfishness is the repeated admonition of ,sir ,edward ,grey that the whole question should be considered in its larger aspects1 thereby meaning the peace and welfare of ,europe2 while the ,czar1 with evident sincerity1 suggested to the ,kaiser that with the aid of ,god it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood1 and proposed a reference of the question to the ,hague4 ,similarly the appeal of ,jules ,cambon to von ,jagow1 in the name of humanity was more than the ordinary exchange of diplomatic views4 ,von ,jagow's conception of his duty is shown by the fact that he had taken a position involving incalculable consequences without even reading the ,servian reply4 ,cambon approved himself a worthy yoke fellow in equity with ,sir ,edward ,grey1 and no loftier tone was sounded by any participant in this great controversy1 unless we except ,goschen's solemn statement to von ,bethmann-,hollweg in the equally dramatic interview1 which succeeded the rupture of relations between ,england and ,germany1 when ,goschen stated that it was so to speak a matter of life and death for the honor of ,great ,britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend ,belgium's neutrality if attacked1 and added1 that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn promises4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,intervention ,,of ,,the ,,kaiser ,the ,kaiser now appears upon the scene with a fatal result to the peace of ,europe4 ,one fact in this controversy is too clear for dispute4 ,when peace proposals were still under consideration and some slight progress had been made by the eleventh-hour consent of ,austria on ,july #ca to discuss with ,russia the merits of the ,servian question1 the ,kaiser--like ,brennus with his v victis--threw his sword into the trembling scales and definitely turned the balance against the peace of the world4 ,was it a reluctant ,csar who thus crossed the ,rubicon1 at whose fateful margin he had stood at other crises of his peaceful reign without destroying that peace8 ,our information is still too meager to justify a satisfactory answer at this time4 ,not only are the premises in dispute1 but the inferences from admitted premises are too conflicting4 ,at the time the ,austrian ,archduke was murdered the ,kaiser was in ,berlin1 and he at once showed an intense interest in the event and in all that it portended4 ,it was officially announced that he planned to attend the funeral in ,vienna1 but later the world was advised that he had suffered a chill1 which would prevent such attendance4 ,perhaps it was a diplomatic chill4 ,he then left for ,norway1 where he remained in the enjoyment of his annual holiday until the evening of ,july #bfth1 when he suddenly returned to his ,capitol4 ,evidently his return was unexpected1 for we learn from a telegram from ,sir ,h4 ,rumbold to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 dated ,july #bfth1 that1 the ,emperor returned suddenly to-night and the ,german ,under-,secretary of ,state for ,foreign ,affairs says that the ,foreign ,office regrets this step which was taken on ,his ,majesty's own initiative4 ,they fear that ,his ,majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement4 ,as the refusal of ,austria to accept the ,servian reply and its severance of all diplomatic relations with that country had already thrown the entire world into a state of feverish anxiety1 it is difficult to understand why the ,german ,foreign ,office should have felt that the very natural return of the ,kaiser to his ,capitol at one of the greatest crises in the history of his country and of the world should be regarded as giving rise to speculation and excitement1 especially as the ,president of the ,french ,republic was hastening back to ,paris4 ,the ,under-,secretary of ,state's deprecation of the ,kaiser's return suggests the possibility that the ,german ,foreign ,office1 which had already made substantial progress in precipitating the crisis1 did not wish the ,kaiser's return for fear that he might again exert1 as in the ,moroccan crisis1 his great influence in the interests of peace4 ,it felt that it had the matter well in hand1 but never before did a foreign office blunder so flagrantly and with such disastrous results4 ,from beginning to end every anticipation that the ,german ,chancellor had was falsified by events4 ,this discreditable and blundering chapter of ,german diplomacy is enough to make the bones of the sagacious ,bismarck turn in his grave4 ,as appears from ,sir ,m4 de ,bunsen's dispatch to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 dated ,july #bfth1 it was the confident belief of the ,german diplomats that ,russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of ,servia1 and that ,france too was not at all in a position for facing the war4#eh ,footnote #eh3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #cb4 ,when the full history of this imbroglio is written1 it will probably be found that the extensive labor troubles in ,st4 ,petersburg1 the military unpreparedness of ,russia and ,france1 and the political schism in ,england1 then verging to civil war1 had deeply impressed both ,vienna and ,berlin that the dual alliance could impose its will upon ,europe with reference to ,servia without any serious risk of a ,european war4 ,while for these reasons ,germany and ,austria may not have regarded such a war or the intervention of ,england therein as probable1 yet the dual alliance recognized from the outset such a possibility4 ,the uncertainty as to the ,kaiser's attitude with respect to such a war may therefore explain the regret1 with which the ,german ,foreign ,office witnessed his sudden and uninvited return4 ,on his return the diplomatic negotiations1 which had commenced with an allegro con brio1 for a time changed under the baton of the ,imperial ,conductor into a more peaceful andante1 until the ,kaiser made one of his characteristically sudden changes of purpose and precipitated the war by an arrogant ultimatum to ,russia1 which that country could not possibly accept without a fatal sacrifice of its self-respect and prestige as a nation4 ,if it be true--and the future may demonstrate it--that this war was planned by ,germany at least as far back as the ,moroccan crisis1 then the ,kaiser's responsibility for the commencement of the quarrel cannot be doubted4 ,it is inconceivable that the ,german ,foreign ,office could pursue for three years the policy of precipitating a ,european war without the knowledge and consent of the ,over ,war ,lord4 ,when full data are accessible as to the importations by ,germany in advance of the war1 as to its withdrawal of foreign credits and placing of foreign loans1 its sales of stocks by influential investors1 and its importations on the eve of the war of horses and foodstuffs1 a strong circumstantial case may be developed of a deliberate purpose to retrieve the ,moroccan fiasco by an audacious coup which would determine the mastery of ,europe4 ,the levy in #aiac of an extraordinary tax upon capital1 which virtually confiscated the earnings of the ,german people for military purposes1 adds much support to this contention4 ,according to ,giolitti1 the former ,italian ,premier1 ,austria sounded ,italy in ,august1 #aiac1 as to its willingness to participate in a war against ,servia4#ei ,footnote #ei3 ,giolitti ,speech1 ,italian ,chamber1 ,dec4 #e1 #aiad4 ,the inferences to be drawn from the ,kaiser's personality are somewhat conflicting4 ,like all self-centered and highly neurotic personalities1 his nature is essentially a dual one4 ,this does not mean that he is in any sense a hypocrite1 for one of the engaging features of his attractive personality has been the candor and sincerity which have marked nearly all his public acts4 ,he has shown himself to be a man of opposite moods1 and conflicting purposes1 having almost as many public poses as he has costumes1 and a strong desire to play as many varied rles as possible on the stage of the world4 ,like ,bottom in the ,midsummer ,night's ,dream1 he would play all parts from the roaring lion to the shrinking ,thisbe4 ,the ruler who sent a sympathetic message to ,kruger as an insult to ,england is he who shortly thereafter gratuitously submitted to ,queen ,victoria military plans for the subjugation of the ,boers4 ,the ruler1 who sent the ,panther to ,agadir1 later restrained his country from declaring war against ,england1 when ,lloyd ,george threw down the gauntlet in his ,mansion ,house speech in the ,moroccan crisis4 ,as preacher1 the ,kaiser exalted within sight of the ,mount of ,olives the precepts of ,christian humility1 and yet advised his soldiers1 on their departure to ,china1 to take no prisoners and give no quarter4 ,the most affable and democratic monarch on occasion will in another mood assume the outworn toggery of medival absolutism4 ,a democratic business monarch1 and as such the advance agent of ,german prosperity1 he yet shocks the common sense and awakens the ridicule of the world by posing as a combination of ,csar and ,mahomet4 ,the avowed champion of ,christianity1 who has preached with the fervor of ,peter the ,hermit against the ,yellow ,race1 he has nevertheless1 since this war began1 instigated the ,sultan of ,turkey to proclaim in the ,moslem world a holy war against his ,christian enemies4 ,pacific and bellicose by turns the monarch1 who throughout his whole reign has hitherto kept the peace of the world1 has yet on slight pretext given utterance to the most warlike and incendiary statements4 ,how is it possible to draw any inference from such a personality1 of whom it could be said1 as ,sydney ,smith once said of ,lord ,john ,russell1 that there is nothing he would not undertake4 ,i believe he would perform an operation for stone1 build ,st4 ,peter's1 assume 7with or without ten minutes' notice7 the command of the ,channel ,fleet1 and no one would discover from his manner that the patient had died1 that ,st4 ,peter's had tumbled down1 and that the ,channel ,fleet had been knocked to atoms4 ,we should therefore dismiss all inferences suggested by his complex personality and should judge him by what he did from the time that he suddenly arrived in ,berlin on ,july #bfth1 until the issuance by his direct order of the fatal ultimatum to ,russia4 ,before proceeding to analyze the very interesting and dramatic correspondence1 which passed between the rulers of ,germany1 ,england1 and ,russia--doubly interesting because of the family relationship and the unusual personal and cousinly intimacy of these dispatches--it is well to inquire what the ,kaiser could have done that would have immediately avoided the crisis and saved the situation4 ,so far as the published record goes1 he did not send a single telegram in the interests of peace to his illustrious ally1 the ,emperor ,francis ,joseph4 ,let us suppose that he had sent the following3 ,i have just returned to ,berlin and find ,europe on the verge of war4 ,i sympathize entirely with you and your country in its demands upon ,servia4 ,i agree with you that the ,servian reply is not satisfactory4 ,in accordance with the obligations of our alliance1 ,i shall in any event support with the full power of the ,german sword the cause of ,austria4 ,servia has by its reply admitted its responsibility for the murder of the ,archduke and has unreservedly accepted certain of your demands1 and as to others has agreed to submit them either to ,the ,hague ,tribunal for arbitration1 or to a concert of ,powers4 ,you will decide whether ,austria is satisfied to accept either of these suggestions1 but as ,england1 ,france1 and ,russia have asked that time be granted to consider a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the difficulty1 and as the questions reserved by ,servia can be used as the basis for further discussion without prejudice to the rights of ,austria1 and as it is to the interest of every country and the entire world that its peace should not be broken unnecessarily1 ,i shall be gratified if you can agree that a reasonable time shall be granted as a matter of courtesy to ,russia1 ,england1 and ,france1 in order that it may be determined upon due consideration whether it is not possible to preserve peace without sacrificing in any respect the legitimate demands of ,austria1 which have my full sympathy and support4 ,,wilhelm4 ,would the ,austrian ,emperor1 himself a noble-minded and peace-loving monarch1 have refused this reasonable request8 ,a little time1 a little patience and some forbearance for the rights of other ,states and the youth of ,europe need not have perished4 ,again1 the pity of it4 ,in its place the following correspondence took place between the ,kaiser on the one hand and the ,czar and ,king ,george on the other4 ,it is so dramatic that it justifies quotation in extenso4 ,on the night of ,july #bhth1 the ,kaiser sent the following dispatch to the ,czar3 ,i have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of ,austria-,hungary against ,servia4 ,the unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in ,servia has led to the revolting crime of which ,archduke ,franz ,ferdinand has become a victim4 ,the spirit which made the ,servians murder their own ,king and his consort still dominates that country4 ,doubtless ,you will agree with me that both of us1 ,you as well as ,i1 and all other sovereigns1 have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment4 ,on the other hand ,i by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by ,you and ,your ,government to stem the tide of public opinion4 ,in view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties1 ,i shall use my entire influence to induce ,austria-,hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with ,russia4 ,i hope confidently that ,you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise4#fj ,footnote #fj3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #bj4 ,the ,capitals to the pronouns follow the original correspondence4 ,this telegram rings true1 and fairly suggests a pacific attitude on the part of the ,kaiser when he first took the helm on his return from ,norway4 ,its weakness lies in the fact that the record1 as presented by the ,german ,government1 does not disclose any communication which he sent to his ,austrian ally in the interests of peace4 ,we have the frequent assurances of the ,kaiser to the ,czar that he was exerting all his influence to induce his ally to come to a satisfactory understanding with ,russia1 but neither over the signature of the ,kaiser nor over that of his ,foreign ,minister does the record show a single communication addressed to ,vienna in the interests of peace4 ,the ,czar did not fail to appreciate this1 and his reply to the ,kaiser rings quite as true and suggests the crux of the whole problem4 ,it reads3 ,i am glad that ,you are back in ,germany4 ,in this serious moment ,i ask ,you earnestly to help me4 ,an ignominious war has been declared against a weak country1 and in ,russia the indignation1 which ,i fully share1 is tremendous4 ,i fear that very soon ,i shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that ,i shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war4 ,to prevent such a calamity as a ,european war would be1 ,i urge ,you in the name of our old friendship to do all in ,your power to restrain ,your ally from going too far4#fa ,footnote #fa3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #ba4 ,who can deny the force of the sentence thus italicized8 ,it was ,austria which was the provocative factor4 ,it was then bombarding ,belgrade and endeavoring to cross the ,danube into ,servia4 ,it had declared war1 and brusquely refused even to discuss the question with ,russia4 ,it was mobilizing its army1 and making every effort to make a speedy subjugation of ,servia4 ,if peace was to be preserved1 the pressure must begin with ,austria4 ,if any question remained for peace parleys1 the status quo must be preserved4 ,russia could not permit ,austria to destroy ,servia first and then discuss its justice4 ,thereupon the ,kaiser telegraphed the ,czar as follows3 ,i have received ,your telegram and ,i share ,your desire for the conservation of peace4 ,however ,i cannot--as ,i told ,you in my first telegram--consider the action of ,austria-,hungary as an ignominious war4 ,austria-,hungary knows from experience that the promises of ,servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable4 ,according to my opinion the action of ,austria-,hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of ,servia are effectively translated into deeds4 ,in this opinion ,i am strengthened by the explanation of the ,austrian ,cabinet that ,austria-,hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of ,servia4 ,i am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for ,russia to remain a spectator in the ,austro-,servian war without drawing ,europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen4 ,i believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between ,your ,government and ,vienna1 an understanding which--as ,i have already telegraphed ,you--my ,government endeavors to aid with all possible effort4 ,naturally military measures by ,russia1 which might be construed as a menace by ,austria-,hungary1 would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which--upon ,your appeal to my friendship and aid--,i willingly accepted4#fb ,footnote #fb3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #bb4 ,see note1 post41 p4 #ahi4 ,the ,kaiser's fatal error lies in the concluding paragraph of this telegram1 in claiming that ,russia should not take any military measures pending the ,kaiser's mediation1 although ,austria should be left free not merely to make such preparations against ,russia1 but to pursue its aggressive war then already commenced against ,servia4 ,if the belligerents were expected to desist from military preparations1 should not the obligation be reciprocal8 ,later that night the ,kaiser again telegraphed the ,czar3 ,my ,ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of ,your ,government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization2 ,i have told ,you the same in my last telegram4 ,austria-,hungary has mobilized only against ,servia1 and only a part of her army4 ,if ,russia1 as seems to be the case according to ,your advice and that of ,your ,government1 mobilizes against ,austria-,hungary1 the part of the mediator1 with which ,you have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which ,i have accepted upon ,your express desire1 is threatened if not made impossible4 ,the entire weight of decision now rests upon ,your shoulders4 ,you have to bear the responsibility for war or peace4#fc ,footnote #fc3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #bc4 ,to which the ,czar replied as follows3 ,i thank ,you from my heart for ,your quick reply4 ,i am sending to-night ,tatisheff 7,russian honorary aide to the ,kaiser7 with instructions4 ,the military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago1 and for the reason of defense against the preparations of ,austria4 ,i hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner ,your position as mediator which ,i appraise very highly4 ,we need ,your strong pressure upon ,austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us4#fd ,footnote #fd3 ,german ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #bc ,a4 ,later the ,czar again telegraphed the ,kaiser3 ,i thank ,you cordially for ,your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably4 ,it is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the ,austrian mobilization4 ,it is far from us to want war4 ,as long as the negotiations between ,austria and ,servia continue1 my troops will undertake no provocative action4 ,i give ,you my solemn word thereon4 ,i confide with all my faith in the grace of ,god1 and ,i hope for the success of ,your mediation in ,vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of ,europe4 ,what more could the ,kaiser reasonably ask8 ,here was an assurance from the ruler of a great nation1 and his royal cousin1 that on his solemn word no provocative action would be taken by ,russia as long as the negotiations between ,austria and ,servia continue and this notwithstanding the fact that ,austria had flouted and ignored ,russia1 had declared war against ,servia and was then endeavoring to subjugate it quickly by bombarding its capital and invading its territory with superior forces4 ,it is true that the ,czar did not order demobilization1 and apart from his unquestioned right to prepare for eventualities in the event of the failure of the peace parleys1 the ,kaiser himself recognized in a later telegram that in the case of ,germany when mobilization had once been started it could not be immediately arrested4 ,simultaneously ,king ,george had telegraphed the ,kaiser through ,prince ,henry as follows3 ,thanks for ,your telegram2 so pleased to hear of ,william's efforts to concert with ,nicky to maintain peace4 ,indeed ,i am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a ,european war should be averted4 ,my ,government is doing its utmost suggesting to ,russia and ,france to suspend further military preparations if ,austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of ,belgrade and neighboring ,servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands2 other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparations4 ,trust ,william will use his great influence to induce ,austria to accept this proposal1 thus proving that ,germany and ,england are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe4 ,pray assure ,william ,i am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of ,europe4#fe ,footnote #fe3 ,second ,german ,white ,paper4 ,the fairness of this proposal can hardly be disputed4 ,it conceded to ,austria the right to occupy the capital of ,servia and hold it as a hostage for a satisfactory adjustment of her demands and even to continue her military preparations1 while all other nations1 including ,russia1 were to suspend their military preparations4 ,as the ,kaiser precipitated the war because ,russia would not cease its preparations for eventualities1 ,king ,george's proposal1 upon which neither the ,kaiser nor his government ever acted1 fully met his demands4 ,to this the ,kaiser replied on ,july #cast3 ,many thanks for kind telegram4 ,your proposals coincide with ,my ideas and with the statements ,i got this night from ,vienna which ,i have had forwarded to ,london4 ,i just received news from ,chancellor that official notification has just reached him that this night ,nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet4 ,he has not even awaited the results of the mediation ,i am working at1 and left ,me without any news4 ,i am off for ,berlin to take measures for ensuring safety of ,my eastern frontiers where strong ,russian troops are already posted4#ff ,footnote #ff3 ,second ,german ,white ,paper4 ,on its face this reply seems not unreasonable1 but it must not be forgotten that ,austria continued not only to bombard ,belgrade but to mobilize its armies against ,russia as well as ,servia4 ,russia agreed to stop all military preparations1 if ,austria would consent to discuss the ,servian question with a view to peace4 ,austria until the eleventh hour--when it was too late--refused even to discuss the ,servian question and never offered either to demobilize or to cease its attack upon ,servia4 ,germany upheld her in this unwarrantable course4 ,while in principle the ,kaiser agreed with the ,king as to the method of adjustment1 there is nothing in the record to indicate that the ,kaiser ever made any suggestion to his ally that it should stop its operations against ,servia after capturing ,belgrade1 and await the adjustment of the questions through diplomatic channels4 ,thereupon ,king ,george sent a brief telegram1 stating that he had sent an urgent telegram to the ,czar urging this course4 ,later on ,july #cast the ,kaiser sent the following telegram to the ,czar3 ,upon ,your appeal to my friendship and ,your request for my aid ,i have engaged in mediation between ,your ,government and the ,government of ,austria-,hungary4 ,while this action was taking place1 ,your troops were being mobilized against my ally1 ,austria-,hungary1 whereby1 as ,i have already communicated to ,you1 my mediation has become almost illusory4 ,in spite of this1 ,i have continued it1 and now ,i receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier4 ,the responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defense4 ,i have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world4 ,it is not ,i who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world4 ,it rests in ,your hand to avert it4 ,no one threatens the honor and peace of ,russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation4 ,the friendship for ,you and ,your country1 bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his death-bed1 has always been sacred to me1 and ,i have stood faithfully by ,russia while it was in serious affliction1 especially during its last war4 ,the peace of ,europe can still be preserved by ,you if ,russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace ,germany and ,austria-,hungary4 ,in this fair-spoken message we unhappily find no suggestion that ,austria would stop its mobilization1 or its military operations against ,servia4 ,the untenable position of the ,kaiser1 to which he adhered with fatal consistency to the end1 was that ,austria should be given the full right to mobilize against ,russia as well as ,servia1 and that his ally should even be permitted to press its aggressive operations against ,servia by taking possession of its capital and holding it as a ransom4 ,in the meantime ,russia should not make any military preparations1 either to move effectually against ,austria in the event of the failure of negotiations1 or even to defend itself4 ,the ,kaiser's suggestion did not even carry with it the implication that ,germany would stop the military preparations that it was then carrying on in feverish haste1 so that the contention of the ,kaiser1 however plausibly it was veiled in his telegram1 was that ,germany and ,austria should have full freedom to prepare for war against ,russia1 while ,russia was to tie its hands and await the outcome of further parleys1 with ,austrian cannon bombarding ,belgrade4 ,in this correspondence the ,kaiser displayed his recognized ability as a writer and speaker1 for in this rapid-fire exchange of telegrams the ,kaiser was easily the better controversialist4 ,he assumed the rle of a disinterested party1 who1 at the request of a litigant1 agrees to become an impartial mediator4 ,he was neither4 ,the ,czar had not asked him to be a mediator1 although in the later telegrams the ,russian monarch accepted that term4 ,the ,czar in his first telegram had asked the ,kaiser as a party to the quarrel to restrain your ally from going too far4 ,the ,kaiser1 having adroitly accepted a very different rle1 promptly shifts the responsibility upon the ,czar of embarrassing the so-called mediation4 ,this enabled him to assume the attitude of injured innocence and very skillfully he played that part4 ,this at least is clear that in this correspondence the ,kaiser was either guilty of insincerity or he betrayed a fatal incapacity to grasp the essentials of the quarrel4 ,i prefer the latter construction of his conduct4 ,against the bellicose efforts of his ,foreign ,office and his ,general ,staff1 ,i believe that for dynastic reasons he strove for a time to adjust the difficulty1 but his egomania and his life-long habit of personal absolutism blinded him to the fact that he was taking an untenable1 indeed an impossible1 position1 in contending that ,russia should effectually tie its hands while ,germany and ,austria should be left free to prepare for eventualities4 ,had there been a breathing spell and the ,kaiser had had more time for reflection1 possibly the unreasonableness of his contention would have suggested itself1 but he found on his sudden return from ,norway that his country1 through the fatuous folly of its military party1 was almost irrevocably committed to war4 ,probably he did not dare to reverse openly and formally its policy4 ,his popularity had already suffered in the ,moroccan crisis4 ,this consideration and the histrionic side to his complex personality betrayed him into his untenable and fatal position4 ,the ,kaiser has hitherto been regarded as a man of exceptional ability4 ,time and the issue of this war will tell4 ,the verdict of history may be to the contrary4 ,the world for a time may easily confuse restless energy and habitual meddling with real ability1 but its final verdict will go far deeper4 ,since the ,kaiser dropped his sagacious pilot1 ,germany's real position in the world has steadily weakened4 ,then it was the first power in ,europe with its rivals disunited4 ,the ,kaiser has united his enemies with hoops of steel1 driven ,russia and ,england into a close alliance1 forced ,italy out of the ,triple ,alliance1 and as the only compensation for these disastrous results1 he has gained the doubtful coperation of moribund ,turkey1 of which he is likely to say before many months are over3 ,who shall deliver me from the body of this death8 ,in the meantime1 ,germany was not idle in its preparations for eventualities4 ,the ,kaiser and his counsellors were already definitely planning for the war1 and were taking steps to alienate ,england from her ,allies and secure her neutrality4 ,to insure this1 the ,german ,chancellor1 having visited the ,kaiser at ,potsdam1 sent for the ,british ,ambassador1 and made the following significant offer3 #fg;,i was asked to call upon the ,chancellor to-night4 ,his ,excellency had just returned from ,potsdam4 ,footnote #fg3 ,sir ,e4 ,goschen4 ,he said that should ,austria be attacked by ,russia a ,european conflagration might1 he feared1 become inevitable1 owing to ,germany's obligations as ,austria's ally1 in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace4 ,he then proceeded to make the following strong bid for ,british neutrality4 ,he said that it was clear1 so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed ,british policy1 that ,great ,britain would never stand by and allow ,france to be crushed in any conflict there might be4 ,that1 however1 was not the object at which ,germany aimed4 ,provided that neutrality of ,great ,britain were certain1 every assurance would be given to the ,british ,government that the ,imperial ,government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of ,france1 should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue4 ,i questioned his ,excellency about the ,french colonies1 and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect4 ,as regards ,holland1 however1 his ,excellency said that1 so long as ,germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the ,netherlands1 ,germany was ready to give his ,majesty's ,government an assurance that she would do likewise4 ,it depended upon the action of ,france what operations ,germany might be forced to enter upon in ,belgium1 but when the war was over ,belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against ,germany4 ,his ,excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been ,chancellor the object of his policy had been1 as you were aware1 to bring about an understanding with ,england2 he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired4 ,he had in mind a general neutrality agreement between ,england and ,germany1 though it was1 of course1 at the present moment too early to discuss details1 and an assurance of ,british neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce1 would enable him to look forward to a realization of his desire4 ,in reply to his ,excellency's inquiry how ,i thought his request would appeal to you1 ,i said that ,i did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that ,i was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty4#fh ,footnote #fh3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #he4 ,while the ,german ,foreign ,office was thus endeavoring to keep ,england neutral1 its army was on the move against ,france4 ,this does not rest upon vague allegation1 but upon the detailed specifications in a communication from the ,french ,foreign ,office1 which the ,french ,ambassador in ,london submitted to ,sir ,edward ,grey on ,july #cast4 ,its significance is apparent when it is remembered that simultaneously the ,kaiser was invoking the ,czar to demobilize his armies1 and cease military preparations4 ,the ,german army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday 7,friday74 ,german patrols twice penetrated on to our territory4 ,our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance of #aj kilometers from the frontier4 ,the local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army1 but the ,government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the ,british ,government that in no case will ,france be the aggressor4 ,the whole #afth ,corps from ,metz1 reinforced by a part of the #hth from ,treves and ,cologne1 is occupying the frontier at ,metz on the ,luxemburg side4 ,the #aeth ,army ,corps from ,strassburg has closed up on the frontier4 ,the inhabitants of ,alsace-,lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier4 ,reservists have been called back to ,germany by tens of thousands4 ,this is the last stage before mobilization1 whereas we have not called out a single reservist4 ,as you see1 ,germany has done it4 ,i would add that all my information goes to show that the ,german preparations began on ,saturday1 the very day on which the ,austrian note was handed in4#fi ,footnote #fi3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #aje ,austrian obviously means ,servian4 ,in reply to the suggestion of the ,german ,chancellor as to the neutrality of ,england1 ,sir ,edward ,grey advised the ,english ,ambassador on ,july #cjth1 as follows3 ,his ,majesty's ,government cannot for a moment entertain the ,chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms4 ,what he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while ,french colonies are taken and ,france is beaten so long as ,germany does not take ,french territory as distinct from the colonies4 ,from the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable1 for ,france1 without further territory in ,europe being taken from her1 could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great ,power1 and become subordinate to ,german policy4 ,altogether apart from that1 it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with ,germany at the expense of ,france1 a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover4 ,the ,chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of ,belgium4 ,we could not entertain that bargain either4 ,having said so much1 it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between ,england and ,germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now4 ,we must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the ,chancellor contemplates4 ,you should speak to the ,chancellor in the above sense1 and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between ,england and ,germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of ,europe2 if we succeed in this object1 the mutual relations of ,germany and ,england will1 ,i believe1 be ipso facto improved and strengthened4 ,for that object ,his ,majesty's ,government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill4 ,and ,i will say this3 ,if the peace of ,europe can be preserved1 and the present crisis safely passed1 my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement1 to which ,germany could be a party1 by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by ,france1 ,russia1 and ourselves1 jointly or separately4 ,this letter will give ,sir ,edward ,grey lasting glory in the history of civilization4 ,its chivalrous fairness to ,france needs no comment1 but its most significant feature is the concluding portion1 in which the ,english ,foreign ,minister suggested to ,germany that if peace could be preserved1 ,england stood ready to join with ,germany in an alliance which would have insured all the great ,european nations against any aggressive war on the part of either of them4 ,it was1 in fact1 the ,united ,states of ,europe in embryo4 ,it was the one solution possible for these long-continued ,european wars--essentially civil wars--namely an alliance by the six great ,powers1--a merger of the ,triple ,alliance and the ,triple ,entente1--whereby any aggressive act on the part of any one of them would be prevented by the others4 ,what an infinite pity that the imprudent act of the ,kaiser1 and the mad folly of his advisers probably made a fair trial of this most hopeful plan for the unification of ,europe an impossibility for another century6 ,in order that ,germany should have no excuse whatever to declare war on account of ,russia's preparations1 the ,russian ,foreign ,minister saw the ,german ,ambassador in ,st4 ,petersburg on ,july #cjth1 and then offered on behalf of ,russia to stop all military preparations1 provided that ,austria would simply recognize as an abstract principle that the ,servian question had assumed the character of a question of ,european interest4 ,as this proposal fully met the demands of the ,kaiser with respect to the cessation by ,russia of military preparations1 the conversation as reported by the ,english ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg to ,sir ,edward ,grey on ,july #cjth deserves quotation in extenso3 ,french ,ambassador and ,i visited ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs this morning4 ,his ,excellency said that ,german ,ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that ,german ,government were willing to guarantee that ,servian integrity would be respected by ,austria4 ,to this he had replied that this might be so1 but nevertheless ,servia would become an ,austrian vassal1 just as1 in similar circumstances1 ,bokhara had become a ,russian vassal4 ,there would be a revolution in ,russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs4 ,m4 ,sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of ,russian ,government1 that ,germany was making military and naval preparations against ,russia--more particularly in the direction of the ,gulf of ,finland4 ,german ,ambassador had a second interview with ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs at #b ,a4,m41 when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable4 ,he appealed to ,m4 ,sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to ,german ,government as a last hope4 ,m4 ,sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to ,german ,ambassador a formula in ,french1 of which the following is a translation3 ,if ,austria1 recognizing that her conflict with ,servia has assumed character of question of ,european interest1 declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of ,servia1 ,russia engages to stop all military preparations4 ,later in the day1 at the suggestion of ,sir ,edward ,grey1 the ,russian ,foreign ,minister still further modified in the interests of peace the proposition upon which ,russia was willing to cease all military preparations4 ,if ,austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon ,servian territory1 and if1 recognizing that the ,austro-,servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of ,european interest1 she admits that the great ,powers examine the reparation which ,servia could accord to the ,government of ,austria-,hungary without injury to her rights as a sovereign ,state and to her independence--,russia undertakes to maintain her expectant attitude4 ,it will be noted that this formula implied that ,servia owed some reparation to ,austria1 and it did not bind ,austria to accept the judgment of the ,powers as to the character of such reparation4 ,it simply conceded to the ,powers the opportunity to examine--not the original controversy between ,austria and ,servia--but what reparation could be made without a compromise of sovereignty and independence4 ,austria did not bind itself to do anything except to stay the advance of her army into ,servia1 while ,russia agreed to desist from further preparations or mobilization4 ,could the offer have been more liberal8 ,in face of this assurance1 how can the ,kaiser or ,germany reasonably contend that it was the mobilization of the ,russian army which precipitated the war4 ,in the meantime ,sir ,edward ,grey was working tirelessly to suggest some peace formula1 upon which the ,powers could agree4 ,his suggestions for a conference of the four leading ,powers of ,europe1 other than ,russia and ,austria1 had been negatived by ,germany on the frivolous pretext that such a conference was too formal a method1 quite ignoring the fact that its very formality would have necessarily given a cooling time to the would-be belligerents4 ,thereupon ,sir ,edward ,grey urged that1 the ,german ,government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four ,powers could be used together to prevent war between ,austria and ,russia4 ,france agreed4 ,italy agreed4 ,the whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that ,germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable4 ,in fact1 mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that ,germany thought possible if only ,germany would press the button in the interests of peace4#gj ,footnote #gj3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #hd4 ,later in the day ,sir ,edward again repeated his suggestion to the ,german ,ambassador in ,london and urged that ,germany should1 propose some method by which the four ,powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of ,europe4 ,i pointed out1 however1 that the ,russian ,government1 while desirous of mediation1 regarded it as a condition that the military operations against ,servia should be suspended1 as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters and give ,austria time to crush ,servia4 ,it was of course too late for all military operations against ,servia to be suspended4 ,in a short time1 ,i supposed1 the ,austrian forces would be in ,belgrade1 and in occupation of some ,servian territory4 ,but even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence1 if ,austria1 while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from ,servia1 stated that she would not advance further1 pending an effort of the ,powers to mediate between her and ,russia4 ,the only reply that ,england received to this reiterated request that ,germany take the lead in suggesting some acceptable peace formula was set forth in a dispatch from ,sir ,e4 ,goschen from ,berlin to ,sir ,edward ,grey3 ,i was informed last night that they 7the ,german ,foreign ,office7 had not had time to send an answer yet4 ,to-day1 in reply to an inquiry from the ,french ,ambassador as to whether the ,imperial ,government had proposed any course of action1 the ,german ,secretary of ,state said that he felt that time would be saved by communicating with ,vienna direct1 and that he had asked the ,austro-,hungarian ,government what would satisfy them4 ,no answer had1 however1 yet been returned4 ,the ,chancellor told me last night that he was pressing the button as hard as he could1 and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at ,vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise4#ga ,footnote #ga3 ,see ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #hd4 ,the ,court of ,public ,opinion unfortunately is not favored in the ,german ,white ,paper with the text of its communication on this subject to ,vienna1 nor is it given any specifications as to the manner in which the ,german ,chancellor pressed the button4 ,what the world knows without documentary proof is that ,austria continued its military preparations and operations and that ,russia then ordered a general mobilization4 ,the only assurance which ,russia received from ,austria as a result of the alleged pressing of the button is set forth in the following dispatch from the ,russian ,ambassador at ,vienna to ,sazonof1 dated ,july #cast3 ,in spite of the general mobilization ,i continue to exchange views with ,count ,berchtold and his collaborators4 ,all insist on the absence of aggressive intentions on the part of ,austria against ,russia and of ambitions of conquest in regard to ,servia1 but all equally insist on the necessity for ,austria of pursuing to the very end the action begun and of giving to ,servia a serious lesson which would constitute a certain guarantee for the future4 ,this was in effect a flat refusal of all mediatory or otherwise pacific suggestions1 for the right of ,austria to crush ,servia by giving it a serious lesson--what such a lesson is let ,louvain1 ,lige1 and ,rheims witness6--was the crux of the whole question4 ,concurrently ,sir ,edward ,goschen telegraphed to ,sir ,edward ,grey that ,germany had declared that day the ,kriegsgefahr and that the ,german ,chancellor had expressed the opinion that all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis was at an end4 ,the ,british ,ambassador then asked the ,chancellor1-- whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at ,vienna to do something in the general interests to reassure ,russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis4 ,he replied that last night he had begged ,austria to reply to your last proposal1 and that he had received a reply to the effect that ,austrian ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs would take the wishes of the ,emperor this morning in the matter4#gb ,footnote #gb3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #aab4 ,here again the world is not favored with the text of the message1 in which the ,chancellor begged ,austria to reply1 nor with that of the ,austrian ,foreign ,minister's reply4 ,while these events were happening in ,berlin and ,london1 the ,russian ,ambassador in ,vienna advised ,sazonof that ,austria has determined not to yield to the intervention of the powers and that she is moving troops against ,russia as well as ,servia4#gc ,footnote #gc3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #aac4 ,russia thereupon1 on ,july #ca1 ordered a general mobilization of her army4 ,concurrently with these interviews1 the ,english ,ambassador in ,vienna had a conversation with the ,austrian ,under-,secretary of ,state and called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the ,albanian frontier at the ,london ,conference of ,ambassadors the ,russian ,government had stood behind ,servia1 and that a compromise between the views of ,russia and ,austria-,hungary resulted with accepted frontier line4 ,although he#gd spoke in a conciliatory tone1 and did not regard the situation as desperate1 ,i could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case4 ,count ,forgach is going this afternoon to see the ,russian ,ambassador1 whom ,i have informed of the above conversation4#ge ,footnote #gd3 ,the ,austrian ,under-,secretary of ,state4 ,footnote #ge3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #aah4 ,notwithstanding all these discouragements and rebuffs1 ,sir ,edward ,grey1 that unwearying friend of peace1 still continued to make a last attempt to preserve peace by instructing the ,british ,ambassador in ,berlin to sound the ,german ,foreign ,office1 as he would sound the ,russian ,foreign ,office1 whether it would be possible for the four disinterested ,powers to offer to ,austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on ,servia1 provided that they did not impair ,servian sovereignty and the integrity of ,servian territory4 ,as your ,excellency is aware1 ,austria has already declared her willingness to respect them4 ,russia might be informed by the four ,powers that they would undertake to prevent ,austrian demands from going the length of impairing ,servian sovereignty and integrity4 ,all ,powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations4 ,he further instructed ,sir ,edward ,goschen to advise the ,german ,foreign ,office that he1 ,sir ,edward ,grey1 had that morning proposed to the ,german ,ambassador in ,london1 that if ,germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward1 which made it clear that ,germany and ,austria were striving to preserve ,european peace1 and that ,russia and ,france would be unreasonable if they rejected it1 ,i would support it at ,st4 ,petersburg and ,paris1 and go the length of saying that1 if ,russia and ,france would not accept it1 his ,majesty's ,government would have nothing more to do with the consequences2 that1 otherwise1 ,i told the ,german ,ambassador that if ,france became involved we should be drawn in4#gf ,footnote #gf3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #aaa4 ,what1 then1 was the position when the last fatal step was taken8 ,the ,czar had pledged his personal honor that no provocative action should be taken by ,russia1 while peace parleys were in progress1 and the ,russian ,foreign ,minister had agreed to cease all military preparations1 provided that ,austria would recognize that the question of ,servia had become one of ,european interest1 and that its sovereignty would be respected4 ,on ,july #cast1 ,austria for the first time in the negotiations agreed to discuss with the ,russian ,government the merits of the ,servian note4 ,until this eleventh hour ,austria had consistently contended that her difficulty with ,servia was her own question1 in which ,russia had no right to intervene1 and which it would not under any circumstances even discuss with ,russia4 ,for this reason it had refused any time for discussion1 abruptly declared war against ,servia1 commenced its military operations1 and repeatedly declined to discuss even the few questions left open in the ,servian reply as a basis for further peace parleys4 ,as recently as ,july #cjth1 the ,austrian ,government had declined or refused any direct exchange of views with the ,russian ,government4 ,but late on ,july #cast1 a so-called conversation took place at ,vienna between ,count ,berchtold and the ,russian ,ambassador1 and as a result1 the ,austrian ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg was instructed to converse with the ,russian ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs4 ,this important concession of ,austria was conveyed to ,sazonof by the ,austrian ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg1 who expressed the readiness of his ,government to discuss the substance of the ,austrian ultimatum to ,servia4 ,m4 ,sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in ,london with the participation of the ,great ,powers4 ,m4 ,sazonof hoped that the ,british ,government would assume the direction of these discussions4 ,the whole of ,europe would be thankful to them4 ,it would be very important that ,austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on ,servian territory4#gg ,footnote #gg3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #acc4 ,it is important to note that ,austria's change of heart preceded by some hours the ,kaiser's ultimatum to ,russia4 ,the former took place some time during the day on ,july #cast4 ,the latter was sent to ,st4 ,petersburg on the midnight of that day4 ,it must also be noted that while ,austria thus agreed at the eleventh hour to discuss the substance of the ultimatum1 it did not offer to suspend military preparations or operations and this obviously deprived the concession of its chief value4#gh ,footnote #gh3 ,see ,addendum1 p4 #aia-b4 ,the cause and purpose of ,austria's partial reversal of its policy at present writing can be only a matter of conjecture4 ,when ,austria publishes its correspondence with ,germany1 we may know the truth4 ,two theories are equally plausible3 ,austria may have taken alarm at the steadfast purpose of ,russia to champion the cause of ,servia with the sword4 ,if so1 its qualified reversal of its bellicose attitude may have induced the war party at ,berlin to precipitate the war by the ultimatum to ,russia4 ,in that event1 ,germany's mad policy of war at any cost is even more iniquitous4#gi ,footnote #gi3 ,see ,addendum1 p4 #aij1 et seq4 ,the supposition is equally plausible that ,austria had been advised from ,berlin that that night ,germany would end all efforts to preserve the peace of ,europe by an ultimatum to ,russia1 which would make war inevitable4 ,the case of ,germany and ,austria at the bar of the world would be made morally stronger if1 at the outbreak of hostilities1 the attitude of ,austria had become more conciliatory4 ,this would make more plausible their contention that the mobilization of ,russia and not ,austria's flat rejection of all peace overtures had precipitated the conflict4 ,this much is certain that the ,kaiser1 with full knowledge that ,austria had consented to renew its conferences with ,russia1 and that a ray of light had broken through the lowering war clouds1 either on his own initiative or yielding to the importunities of his military camarilla1 directed the issuance of the ultimatum to ,russia and thus blasted the last hope of peace4 ,on midnight of ,july #cast1 the ,german ,chancellor sent the following telegram to the ,german ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg3 ,in spite of still pending mediatory negotiations1 and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization1 ,russia has mobilized her entire army and navy2 in other words1 mobilized against us also4 ,by these ,russian measures we have been obliged1 for the safeguarding of the ,empire1 to announce that danger of war threatens us1 which does not yet mean mobilization4 ,mobilization1 however1 must follow unless ,russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and ,austria-,hungary and gives us definite assurance thereof4 ,kindly communicate this at once to ,m4 ,sazonof and wire hour of its communication to him4 ,at midnight the fateful message was delivered4 ,as ,sazonof reports the interview3 ,at midnight the ,ambassador of ,germany declared to me1 by order of his ,government1 that if within twelve hours1 that is at midday of ,saturday1 we did not commence demobilization1 not only in regard to ,germany but also in regard to ,austria1 the ,german ,government would be forced to give the order of mobilization4 ,to my question if this was war the ,ambassador replied in the negative1 but added that we were very near it4 ,it will be noted by the italicized portion that ,germany did not restrict its demand that ,russia cease its preparations against ,germany1 but it should also desist from any preparations to defend itself or assert its rights against ,austria1 although ,austria had made no offer to suspend either its preparations for war or recall its general mobilization order4 ,the twelve hours elapsed and ,russia1 standing upon its dignity as a sovereign nation of equal standing with ,germany1 declined to answer this unreasonable and most arrogant demand1 which under the circumstances was equivalent to a declaration of war4 ,simultaneously a like telegram was sent to the ,ambassador at ,paris1 requiring the ,french ,government to state in eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral in the event of a ,russian-,german war4 ,the reasons given for this double ultimatum are as disingenuous as the whole course of ,german diplomacy in this matter4 ,the statement that ,germany had pursued any mediatory negotiations was as untrue as its statement that it had taken no measures for mobilization4 ,equally disingenuous was the statement with respect to the ,kriegsgefahr 7state of martial law71 for when that was declared on ,july #cast1 the railroad1 telegraph1 and other similar public utilities were immediately taken over by ,germany and the movement of troops to the frontier began4 ,after the fateful ultimatum had thus been given by ,germany to ,russia1 the ,british ,ambassador1 pursuant to the instructions of his home office1 saw the ,german ,secretary of ,state on ,july #cast1 and urged him most earnestly to accept your ,sir ,edward ,grey's proposal and make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe of a ,european war4 ,he von ,jagow expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal1 and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace but said it was impossible for the ,imperial ,government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from ,russia to their communication of to-day2 this communication1 which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum1 being that1 unless ,russia could inform the ,imperial ,government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against ,germany and ,austria1 ,germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once4 ,i asked his ,excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for ,russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in the south as well4 ,he replied that it was in order to prevent ,russia from saying that all her mobilization was only directed against ,austria4#hj ,footnote #hj3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #aba4 ,the ,german ,secretary of ,state also stated to ,sir ,e4 ,goschen that both the ,emperor ,william and the ,german ,foreign ,office had even up till last night been urging ,austria to show willingness to continue discussions1 and telegraphic and telephonic communications from ,vienna had been of a promising nature1 but ,russia's mobilization had spoiled everything4 ,here again it must be noted that the telegraphic communications from ,vienna have not yet been published by the ,austrian ,government1 nor by the ,german ,foreign ,office in its official defense4 ,sir ,edward ,grey's last attempt to preserve peace was on ,august #ast1 when he telegraphed to ,sir ,e4 ,goschen3 ,i still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war4 ,the ,russian ,government has communicated to me the readiness of ,austria to discuss with ,russia and the readiness of ,austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which ,russia originally suggested4 ,things ought not to be hopeless so long as ,austria and ,russia are ready to converse1 and ,i hope that the ,german ,government may be able to make use of the ,russian communications referred to above in order to avoid tension4 ,his ,majesty's ,government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters4#ha ,footnote #ha3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #aca4 ,at that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to ,russia had already expired1 but the ,british ,ambassador saw the ,german ,secretary of ,state on ,august #ast1 and1 after submitting to him the substance of ,sir ,edward ,grey's telegram last quoted1 spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between ,austria and ,russia1 and that ,germany was only drawn in as ,austria's ally4 ,if1 therefore1 ,austria and ,russia were1 as was evident1 ready to discuss matters and ,germany did not desire war on her own account1 it seemed to me only logical that ,germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement4 ,secretary of ,state for ,foreign ,affairs said that ,austria's readiness to discuss was the result of ,german influence at ,vienna1 and1 had not ,russia mobilized against ,germany1 all would have been well4 ,but ,russia1 by abstaining from answering ,germany's demand that she should demobilize1 had caused ,germany to mobilize also4 ,russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war1 and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war4 ,this was not the case with ,germany4 ,she had the speed and ,russia had the numbers1 and the safety of the ,german ,empire forbade that ,germany should allow ,russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions 4 ,the situation now was that1 though the ,imperial ,government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time1 ,russia had sent no answer4 ,germany had1 therefore1 ordered mobilization1 and the ,german representative at ,st4 ,petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the ,russian ,government that the ,imperial ,government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war4#hb ,footnote #hb3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #ach4 ,it will thus be seen that although ,germany was urged to the very last to await the result of the conferences1 which had just commenced with some slight promise of success between ,austria and ,russia1 it nevertheless elected to declare war against ,russia and thus blast beyond possible recall any possibility of peace4 ,its justification for this course1 as stated in the interview with the ,german ,secretary of ,state last quoted1 was that it did not propose to forego its advantage of speed as against the advantage of ,russia's numerical superiority4 ,for this there might be some justification1 if ,russia had shown an unyielding and bellicose attitude1 but apart from the fact that ,russia had consistently worked in the interests of peace1 ,germany had the express assurance of the ,czar that no provocative action would be taken while peace conferences continued4 ,to disregard these assurances and thus destroy the pacific efforts of other nations1 in order not to lose a tactical advantage1 was the clearest disloyalty to civilization4 ,in any aspect1 ,germany could have fully kept its advantage of speed by inducing its ally to suspend its aggressive operations against ,servia1 for in that event ,russia had expressly obligated itself to suspend all military preparations4 ,as the final document in this shameful chapter of diplomacy1 there need only be added the telegram1 sent by the ,german ,chancellor to his ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg on ,august #a1 #aiad1 in which war was declared by ,germany against ,russia on the ground that while ,germany and ,austria should be left free to pursue their aggressive military preparations1 ,russia should1 on the peremptory demand of another nation1 cease the mobilization of its armies even for self-defense4 ,it reads3 ,the ,imperial ,government has endeavored from the opening of the crisis to lead it to a pacific solution4 ,in accordance with a desire which had been expressed to him by ,his ,majesty the ,emperor of ,russia1 ,his ,majesty the ,emperor of ,germany in accord with ,england had applied himself to filling a mediatory rle with the ,cabinets of ,vienna and ,st4 ,petersburg1 when ,russia1 without awaiting the result of this1 proceeded to the complete mobilization of her forces on land and sea4 ,as a consequence of this threatening measure1 motived by no military presage on the part of ,germany1 the ,german ,empire found itself in face of a grave and imminent danger4 ,if the ,imperial ,government had failed to safeguard herself against this peril it would have compromised the safety and the very existence of ,germany4 ,consequently the ,german ,government saw itself forced to address to the ,government of ,his ,majesty the ,emperor of all the ,russias1 an insistence on the cessation of the said military acts4 ,russia1 having refused to accede to 7not having thought it should reply to71 this demand1 and having manifested by this refusal 7this attitude7 that its action was directed against ,germany1 ,i have the honor to make known to your ,excellency the following3 ,his ,majesty the ,emperor1 ,my ,august ,sovereign1 in the name of the ,empire1 taking up the challenge1 considers himself in a state of war with ,russia4 ,the feverish haste with which this fatal step was taken1 is shown by the fact that the ,german ,ambassador could not even wait to state whether ,russia had refused to answer or answered negatively4 ,this war--thus begun in such mad haste--is likely to be repented of at leisure4 ,a few hours before this rash and most iniquitous declaration was made the ,czar made his last appeal for peace4 ,with equal solemnity and pathos he telegraphed the ,kaiser3 ,i have received your telegram4 ,i comprehend that you are forced to mobilize1 but ,i should like to have from you the same guaranty which ,i have given you1 viz41 that these measures do not mean war1 and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts4 ,with the aid of ,god it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood4 ,i expect with full confidence your urgent reply4 ,this touching and magnanimous message does infinite credit to the ,czar4 ,had the ,kaiser been as pacific1 had he been inspired by the same enlightened spirit in the interests of peace1 had he been as truly mindful of the ,god of nations1 whom the ,czar thus invoked1 it would have been possible to prevent the shedding of blood1 which has now swept away after only three months of war the very flower of the youth of ,europe4 ,to this the ,kaiser replied3 ,i thank ,you for ,your telegram4 ,i have shown yesterday to ,your ,government the way through which alone war may yet be averted4 ,although ,i asked for a reply by to-day noon1 no telegram from my ,ambassador has reached me with the reply of ,your ,government4 ,i therefore have been forced to mobilize my army4 ,an immediate1 clear and unmistakable reply of ,your ,government is the sole way to avoid endless misery4 ,until ,i receive this reply ,i am unable1 to my great grief1 to enter upon the subject of ,your telegram4 ,i must ask most earnestly that ,you1 without delay1 order ,your troops to commit1 under no circumstances1 the slightest violation of our frontiers4 ,in this is no spirit of compromise2 only the repeated insistence of the unreasonable and in its consequences iniquitous demand that ,russia should by demobilizing make itself naked to its enemies1 while ,germany and ,austria1 without making any real concession in the direction of peace1 should be permitted to arm both for offense and defense4 ,there were practical reasons which made the ,kaiser's demand unreasonable4 ,mobilization is a highly developed and complicated piece of governmental machinery1 and even where transportation facilities are of the best1 as in ,germany and ,france1 the mobilization ordinarily takes about two weeks to complete4 ,in ,russia1 with limited means of transportation1 it was impossible to recall immediately a mobilization order that had gone forward to the remotest corners of the great ,empire4 ,the record shows that the ,kaiser himself recognized this fact1 for in a telegram which he sent on ,august #ast to ,king ,george1 with respect to the possible neutralization of ,england1 the ,kaiser said3 ,i just received the communication from ,your ,government offering ,french neutrality under the guarantee of ,great ,britain4 ,added to this offer was the inquiry whether under these conditions ,germany would refrain from attacking ,france4 ,on technical grounds ,my mobilization1 which had already been proclaimed this afternoon1 must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared2 this cannot be countermanded because1 ,i am sorry1 ,your telegram came so late4 ,but if ,france offers ,me neutrality which must be guaranteed by the ,british fleet and army1 ,i shall of course refrain from attacking ,france and employ ,my troops elsewhere4 ,i hope that ,france will not become nervous4 ,the troops on ,my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into ,france4#hc ,footnote #hc3 ,no such offer had been made4 ,the ,kaiser's error was due to a misunderstanding1 which had arisen quite honestly between ,sir ,edward ,grey and the ,german ,ambassador in ,london4 ,king ,george promptly corrected this misapprehension of the ,kaiser4 ,see also ,addendum1 p4 #aib4 ,if it were impossible for the ,kaiser1 with all the exceptional facilities of the ,german ,empire1 to arrest his mobilization for technical reasons1 it was infinitely more difficult for the ,czar to arrest immediately his military preparations4 ,the demand of ,germany was not that ,russia should simply cancel the mobilization order4 ,it was that ,russia should cease within twelve hours all warlike measures1 and it demanded a physical impossibility4 ,in any event1 mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression1 but simply preparation1 as the ,czar had so clearly pointed out to the ,kaiser in the telegram already quoted4 ,it is the right of a sovereign ,state and by no code of ethics a casus belli4 ,germany's demand that ,russia should not arm to defend itself1 when its prestige as a great ,european power was at stake and when ,austria was pushing her aggressive preparations1 treated ,russia as an inferior1 almost a vassal1 ,state4 ,its rejection must have been recognized by the ,kaiser and his advisers as inevitable1 and1 on the theory that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts1 it must be assumed that the ,kaiser in this mad demand at that time desired and intended war1 however pacific his purposes may have been when he first took the helm4 ,such will be his awful responsibility to the last syllable of recorded time4 ,how well prepared ,germany was1 the sequel developed only too surely4 ,on the following day--,august #b;d--its troops invaded ,luxemburg and an abrupt demand was made upon ,belgium for permission to cross its territory4 ,upon the declaration of war1 the ,czar telegraphed to ,king ,george of ,england as follows3 ,in this solemn hour1 ,i wish to assure you once more ,i have done all in my power to avert war4 ,such will be the verdict of history4 ,,addendum ,i ,,the ,,suppressed ,,telegram ,,from ,,the ,,czar ,it is a curious and suggestive fact that the ,german ,foreign ,office in publishing the correspondence between the ,kaiser and the ,czar omitted one of the most important telegrams4 ,the ,russian ,government on ,january #ca1 #aiae1 therefore1 made public the following telegram which the ,czar sent to the ,kaiser on ,july #bi1 #aiad3 ,thanks for your conciliatory and friendly telegram4 ,inasmuch as the official message presented to-day by your ,ambassador to my ,minister was conveyed in a very different tone1 ,i beg you to explain this divergency4 ,it would be right to give over the ,austro-,servian problem to ,the ,hague ,conference4 ,i trust in your wisdom and friendship4 ,the ,german ,foreign ,office has since explained that they regarded this telegram as too unimportant for publication4 ,comment is unnecessary4 ,it thus appears that the ,czar at the beginning of his correspondence with the ,kaiser suggested that the whole dispute be submitted to ,the ,hague ,tribunal for adjustment4 ,servia had already made the same suggestion4 ,as the world owes the first ,hague ,convention to the ,czar's initiative1 it can justly be said to his lasting credit that he at least was loyal to the pacific ideal of that great convention of the nations4 ,,ii ,,the ,,austrian ,,offer ,,of ,,july #ca1 #aiad ,the author has noted 7ante1 p4 #age7 that as the belated offer of ,austria on ,july the #cast to discuss with ,russia the substance of the ,austrian ultimatum to ,servia did not offer to suspend military preparations or operations1 the concession was more nominal than real4 ,the ,austrian ,red ,book converts this inference into a certainty1 and makes clear that ,austria's pretended change of policy was only diplomatic finesse1 as it contained no substantial modification of its uncompromising attitude4 ,russia had proposed on ,july the #cjth 7ante1 p4 #aff7 that if ,austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon ,servian territory and further agreed that the question of the reparation which ,servia could accord to the ,government of ,austria-,hungary could be examined by the ,great ,powers1 ,russia would suspend her military preparations4 ,as the underlying question was whether ,austria should be permitted to subjugate ,servia without interference1 it was vital that that subjugation should not proceed pending an examination by all interested powers into its justice and ultimate ends4 ,sir ,edward ,grey had previously requested ,germany on ,july the #bhth to use its influence with the ,austrian ,government to the effect that the latter either consider the reply from ,belgrade satisfactory or else accept it as a basis for discussion between the ,cabinets4 ,the ,german ,foreign ,office then instructed the ,german ,ambassador at ,vienna to submit the ,british proposal to the ,vienna ,cabinet for its consideration 7,austrian ,red ,book1 ,no4 #dc74 ,as a result of this suggestion1 ,count ,berchtold on ,july the #bith 7,austrian ,red ,book1 ,no4 #dd7 again shut the door upon any compromise by the contention that ,austria no longer is in a position to meet the ,servian reply in the spirit of the ,british suggestions1 since at the time when the ,german request was presented here1 a state of war already existed between the ,dual ,monarchy and ,servia1 and thus the ,servian reply had been superseded by events4 ,the only counter-suggestion which ,austria then made was as follows3 ,should the ,british ,cabinet be prepared to exert its influence upon the ,russian ,government for the maintenance of peace among the ,great ,powers1 and for a localization of the war1 which had been forced upon us by the ,servian agitation of many years' standing1 such efforts would meet with the ,imperial and ,royal ,government's appreciation4 7,austrian ,red ,book1 ,no4 #dd47 ,on ,july #cast the ,german ,ambassador at ,vienna1 acting on instructions 7which instructions are again not disclosed in the ,german ,white ,book7 informed ,count ,berchtold of a conversation between ,sir ,edward ,grey and ,prince ,lichnowsky1 in the course of which the ,british ,secretary of ,state declared to the ,german ,ambassador that ,russia felt unable to treat directly with ,austria-,hungary and therefore requested ,great ,britain to resume her mediation and that as a condition of this mediation1 however1 the ,russian ,government stipulates the suspension of hostilities in the meanwhile4 7,austrian ,red ,book1 ,no4 #ea47 ,thereupon ,count ,berchtold made the eleventh hour offer in question by instructing the ,austrian ,ambassador at ,st4 ,petersburg to express our readiness to consider ,sir ,edward ,grey's proposition to mediate between us and ,servia despite the changes brought about in the situation by ,russia's mobilization4 ,our acceptance1 however1 is subject to the condition that our military action against ,servia shall nevertheless proceed and that the ,british ,cabinet shall induce the ,russian ,government to stop the mobilization directed against us4 ,it is understood that in this case we would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures in ,galicia1 which had been forced upon us by ,russia's mobilization4 7,austrian ,red ,book1 ,no4 #ea47 ,this suggestion was fatally objectionable in that it required ,russia to suspend its preparations to defend its interests while permitting ,austria to proceed with the subjugation of ,servia4 ,as the bone of contention was this subjugation of ,servia1 this belated and ostensibly conciliatory proposal of ,austria amounted to an absurdity4 ,in that classic of nonsense1 ,alice in ,wonderland1 the unreasonable and violent ,queen announced in the trial of the ,knave the similar procedure of sentence first1 verdict afterwards1 and ,austria's final proposal was essentially a like folly1 for1 stripped of diplomatic pretense1 it amounted to this1 that ,austria1 while tying ,russia's hands1 should proceed not merely to sentence but even to execute ,servia and subsequently discuss the justice of its action when it had become irremediable4 ,the possible theory which we suggested 7ante1 p4 #age71 that ,austria at the eleventh hour may have experienced a change of heart and had adopted a more conciliatory course1 is apparently untenable4 ,,iii ,,the ,,invasion ,,of ,,france ,,on ,,august #a,,st ,it has been ,germany's contention that not only did the mobilization of ,russia cause the war1 but that its eastern and western frontiers were violated by ,russian and ,french soldiers at a time when ,germany's intentions were sincerely pacific4 ,at #g ,p4,m4 on ,july the #cast1 ,germany had given ,france until #a ,p4,m4 of the following day to declare whether it would remain neutral in the event of a ,russian-,german war1 and at that hour ,viviani advised the ,german ,ambassador that ,france would do that which her interests dictated4 7,german ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #bg47 ,notwithstanding ,france's virtual refusal to meet the demand of ,germany1 the latter did not declare war on ,france on that day1 and this is the more significant as it immediately declared war on ,russia4 ,the ,german ,ambassador remained in ,paris until ,august the #c;d1 and only then demanded his passports when his position in the ,french ,capitol had become untenable4 ,in the meantime ,germany was awaiting some act of aggression on the part of ,france1 that would enable it under the terms of the ,triple ,alliance to demand as of right the coperation of ,italy1 while ,france1 determined for this and other reasons not to be the aggressor1 had withdrawn its troops ten kilometers from the frontier and refused to take any offensive step either before or after the expiration of the ultimatum4 ,the confidential telegram of the ,kaiser to ,king ,george suggests the possibility that on ,august the #ast1 about the time that the eighteen-hour ultimatum had expired1 ,germany was ready and intended to commence an immediate invasion of ,france1 for on that day the ,kaiser telegraphs to ,king ,george3 ,i hope that ,france will not become nervous4 ,the troops on my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into ,france4 7,ante1 p4 #ahg47 ,the exact hour when the ,kaiser sent the ,king this message is conjectural4 ,we know from the ,german ,white ,paper that at #aa ,a4,m4 on that day ,sir ,edward ,grey inquired of ,prince ,lichnowsky over the telephone whether ,germany was in a position to declare that we would not attack ,france in a war between ,germany and ,russia in case ,france should remain neutral4 ,this message prompted the ,kaiser's telegram to ,king ,george4 ,how soon thereafter the ,kaiser sent his telegram we do not know1 but as the impossibility of ,france's neutrality was recognized in ,berlin on receipt of ,lichnowsky's telegram by #e ,p4,m4 on that day1 it is altogether probable that the ,kaiser's telegram was sent between those hours4 ,if the telegram in question is now analyzed and the fair natural import is given to the ,kaiser's language1 it would seem that the invasion of ,france1 either before or in any event simultaneously with the expiration of the eighteen-hour ultimatum1 had been determined upon by the ,kaiser and his military staff1 for the ,kaiser's intimation that he has stopped by telegraph and telephone his army from crossing into ,france fairly implies that previous orders had been given to commence such invasion and that these orders had been hurriedly recalled in the most expeditious way1 upon the supposed intimation of ,sir ,edward ,grey that ,england might guarantee the neutrality of ,france4 ,under these circumstances1 with the ,german ,ambassador still at ,paris and ostensibly preserving friendly relations1 it is evident that the invasion was either to precede or to follow immediately upon the severance of diplomatic relations4 ,this in itself may not be indefensible under international law1 but it throws a searchlight upon the contention of ,germany that its intentions were pacific and that it had been surprised by a sudden and treacherous attack on the part of ,russia1 ,france1 and ,england4 ,the difficulty1 however1 is to reconcile this apparent intention of the ,kaiser's military staff to invade ,france on ,august the #ast and the action of his ,foreign ,office in failing to make any declaration of war against ,france and in retaining its ,ambassador at ,paris and permitting the ,french ,ambassador to remain at ,berlin4 ,the diplomatic records abundantly show that this latter policy of the ,german ,foreign ,office was followed in the hope that ,france would become the aggressor1 but its inconsistency with the policy of the ,war ,office implied in the ,kaiser's telegram is obvious4 ,possibly the ,kaiser's soldiers and diplomats were not working in complete harmony4 ,it may be true that the many blunders of ,german diplomats were in part due to the reckless impetuosity of the ,war ,office and it is possible that some of von ,bethmann-,hollweg's and von ,jagow's diplomatic blunders are more properly attributable to the ,kaiser and ,moltke4 ,it is also possible that the natural inference from the ,kaiser's language above quoted is misleading and that the telegram to ,king ,george did not mean to imply that any orders for an invasion had been cancelled but simply that the army leaders on the ,western frontier had been cautioned not to cross the frontier until further orders4 ,another possible theory is that the ,kaiser for political reasons may have exaggerated the extent of his concession1 and magnified the urgency of the situation to induce prompt and favorable action by ,great ,britain4 ,but the readiness of ,germany to strike a quick and fatal blow at ,paris cannot be gainsaid and strangely contrasts with the injured innocence protestations that it was treacherously surprised by an unexpected attack4 ,always with ,prussia1 the readiness is all4 ,,iv ,,the ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,word ,,england ,in making these scattered addenda1 ,i take this occasion to make the amende honorable to some of my readers1 who since the first editions of this book appeared have taken exception to my use of the word ,england and ,english1 where obviously ,great ,britain and ,british were meant4 ,these critics are technically correct1 but ,i hope that they will acquit me of any intention of ignoring any part of the ,british ,empire in using a term1 which by common and immemorial usage has been applied throughout the world as synonymous with the great ,empire4 ,i should deeply regret it1 if any other intention were imputed to me1 for in the magnificent struggle which ,great ,britain has made for the highest ideals of civilization and the basic rights of humanity1 no one now or hereafter can ever ignore the heroic part which has been played by ,scotland1 ,ireland1 ,canada1 and the over-sea dominions ,may ,i not plead that the word ,england1 has to common intent a broader as well as a more restricted meaning and that when the poet1 the historian or--as in my case--the student uses the word ,england in reference to a world-wide controversy1 no one is likely to misapprehend his meaning4 ,such use is certainly as common and as generally understood as that of the word ,american as applied to a ,citizen of the ,united ,states1 although in both cases the characterization is not strictly accurate4 ,to my critics in ,scotland and ,ireland who have made this criticism of my book1 ,i can only say3 ,let my disclaiming from a purposed evil ,free me so far in your most generous thoughts1 ,that ,i have shot mine arrow o'er the house1 ,and hurt my brother4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,the ,,case ,,of ,,belgium ,the callous disregard by ,germany of the rights of ,belgium is one of the most shocking exhibitions of political iniquity in the history of the world4 ,that it has had its parallel in other and less civilized ages may be freely admitted1 but until ,german scientists1 philosophers1 educators1 and even doctors of divinity attempted to justify this wanton outrage1 it had been hoped that mankind had made some progress since the times of ,wallenstein and ,tilly4 ,the verdict of ,civilization in this respect will be little affected by the ultimate result of the war1 for even if ,germany should emerge from this titanic conflict as victor1 and become1 as it would then undoubtedly become1 the first power in the world1 it would none the less be a figure for the time of scorn to point his slow unmoving finger at4 ,to the eulogists of ,alexander the ,great1 ,seneca was wont to say1 ,yes1 but he murdered ,callisthenes1 and to the eulogists of victorious ,germany1 if indeed it shall prove victorious1 the wise and just of all future ages will say1 ,yes1 but it devastated ,belgium4 ,the fact that many distinguished and undoubtedly sincere partisans of ,germany have attempted to justify this atrocious rape1 suggests a problem of psychology rather than of logic or ethics4 ,it strongly illustrates a too familiar phenomenon that great intellectual and moral astigmatism is generally incident to any passionate crisis in human history4 ,it shows how pitifully unstable the human intellect is when a great man like ,dr4 ,haeckel1 a scholar and historian like ,dr4 von ,mach1 or a doctor of divinity like ,dr4 ,dryander1 can be so warped with the passions of the hour as to ignore the clearest considerations of political morality4 ,at the outbreak of the present war ,belgium had taken no part whatever in the controversy and was apparently on friendly relations with all the ,powers4 ,it had no interest whatever in the ,servian question4 ,a thrifty1 prosperous people1 inhabiting the most densely populated country of ,europe1 and resting secure in the solemn promises1 not merely of ,germany1 but of the leading ,european nations that its neutrality should be respected1 it calmly pursued the even tenor of its way1 and was as unmindful of the disaster1 which was so suddenly to befall it1 as the people of ,pompeii were on the morning of the great eruption when they thronged the theatre in the pursuit of pleasure and disregarded the ominous curling of the smoke from the crater of ,vesuvius4 ,on ,april #ai1 #ahci1 ,belgium and ,holland signed a treaty which provided that ,belgium forms an independent state of perpetual neutrality4 ,to insure that neutrality1 ,prussia1 ,france1 ,great ,britain1 ,austria1 and ,russia on the same date signed a treaty1 by which it was provided that these nations jointly became the guarantors of such perpetual neutrality4 ,in his recent article on the war1 ,george ,bernard ,shaw1 who is inimitable as a farceur but not quite convincing as a jurist1 says3 ,as all treaties are valid only rebus sic stantibus1 and the state of things which existed at the date of the ,treaty of ,london 7#ahci7 had changed so much since then 444 that in #ahgj ,gladstone could not depend on it1 and resorted to a special temporary treaty not now in force1 the technical validity of the #ahci treaty is extremely doubtful4 ,unfortunately for this contention1 the ,treaty of #ahgj1 to which ,mr4 ,shaw refers1 provided for its own expiration after twelve months and then added3 ,and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of ,belgium will1 so far as the high contracting parties are respectively concerned1 continue to rest as heretofore on the #ast ,article of the ,quintuple ,treaty of the #aith of ,april1 #ahci4 ,much has been made by ,mr4 ,shaw and others of an excerpt from a speech of ,mr4 ,gladstone in #ahgj4 ,in that speech1 ,mr4 ,gladstone1 as an abstract proposition1 declined to accept the broad statement that under all circumstances the obligations of a treaty might continue1 but there is nothing to justify the belief that ,mr4 ,gladstone in any respect questioned either the value or the validity of the ,treaty of #ahci with respect to ,belgium4 ,those who invoke the authority of ,gladstone should remember that he also said3 ,we have an interest in the independence of ,belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee4 ,it is found in the answer to the question whether1 under the circumstances of the case1 this country1 endowed as it is with influence and power1 would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history1 and thus become participators in the sin4 ,these words of the great statesman read as a prophecy4 ,while these treaties were simply declaratory of the rights1 which ,belgium independently enjoyed as a sovereign nation1 yet this solemn guarantee of the great ,powers of ,europe was so effective that even in #ahgj1 when ,france and ,germany were locked in vital conflict1 and the question arose whether ,prussia would disregard her treaty obligation1 the ,iron ,chancellor1 who ordinarily did not permit moral considerations to warp his political policies1 wrote to the ,belgian minister in ,berlin on ,july #bb1 #ahgj3 ,in confirmation of my verbal assurance1 ,i have the honor to give in writing a declaration1 which1 in view of the treaties in force1 is quite superfluous1 that the ,confederation of the ,north and its allies 7,germany7 will respect the neutrality of ,belgium on the understanding of course that it is respected by the other belligerent4 ,at that time1 ,belgium had so fine a sense of honor1 that although it was not inconsistent with the principles of international law1 yet in order to discharge her obligations of neutrality in the spirit as well as the letter1 she restricted the clear legal right of her people to supply arms and ammunition to the combatants1 thus construing the treaty to her own disadvantage4 ,it can be added to the credit of both ,france and ,prussia that in their great struggle of #ahgj-ga1 each scrupulously respected that neutrality1 and ,france carried out her obligations to such an extreme that although ,napoleon and his army could have at one time escaped from ,sedan into ,belgium1 and renewed the attack and possibly--although not probably--saved ,france1 if they had seen fit to violate that neutrality1 rather than break the word of ,france the ,emperor ,napoleon and his army consented to the crowning humiliation of ,sedan4 ,in the year #aiaa1 in the course of a discussion in ,belgium in respect to the fortifications at ,flushing1 certain ,dutch newspapers asserted that in the event of a ,franco-,german war1 the neutrality of ,belgium would be violated by ,germany4 ,it was then suggested that if a declaration were made to the contrary in the ,reichstag1 that such a declaration1 would be calculated to appease public opinion and to calm its suspicions4 ,this situation was communicated to the present ,german ,chancellor1 von ,bethmann-,hollweg1 who instructed the ,german ,ambassador at ,brussels to assure the ,belgian ,foreign ,minister1 that he was most appreciative of the sentiment which had inspired our ,belgium's action4 ,he declared that ,germany had no intention of violating our neutrality1 but he considered that by making a declaration publicly1 ,germany would weaken her military preparation with respect to ,france1 and being reassured in the northern quarter would direct her forces to the eastern quarter4#hd ,footnote #hd3 ,belgian ,gray ,book1 enclosure ,no4 #ab4 ,germany's recognition of the continuing obligation of this treaty was also shown when the question of ,belgium's neutrality was suggested at a debate in the ,reichstag on ,april #bi1 #aiac4 ,in the course of that debate a member of the ,social ,democratic ,party said3 ,in ,belgium the approach of a ,franco-,german war is viewed with apprehension1 because it is feared that ,germany will not respect ,belgian neutrality4#he ,footnote #he3 ,idem4 ,herr von ,jagow1 ,secretary of ,state for ,foreign ,affairs1 replied3 ,the neutrality of ,belgium is determined by international conventions1 and ,germany is resolved to respect these conventions4 ,this declaration did not satisfy another member of the ,social ,democratic ,party4 ,herr von ,jagow observed that he had nothing to add to the clear statement which he had uttered with reference to the relations between ,germany and ,belgium4 ,in reply to further interrogations from a member of the ,social ,democratic ,party1 ,herr von ,heeringen1 ,minister of ,war1 stated3 ,belgium does not play any part in the justification of the ,german scheme of military reorganization2 the scheme is justified by the position of matters in the ,east4 ,germany will not lose sight of the fact that ,belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties4 ,a member of the same party1 having again referred to ,belgium1 ,herr von ,jagow again pointed out that his declaration regarding ,belgium was sufficiently clear4#hf ,footnote #hf3 ,belgian ,gray ,book1 ,no4 #ab4 ,on ,july #ca1 #aiad1 the ,belgian ,foreign ,minister1 in a conversation with ,herr von ,below1 the ,german ,minister at ,brussels1 asked him whether he knew of the assurance which1 as above stated1 had been given by von ,bethmann-,hollweg through the ,german ,ambassador at ,brussels to the ,government at ,belgium in #aiaa1 and ,herr von ,below replied that he did1 and added1 that he was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that time had not changed4 ,thus on ,july #ca1 #aiad1 ,germany1 through its accredited representative at ,brussels1 repeated the assurances contained in the treaty of #ahci1 as reaffirmed in #ahgj1 and again reaffirmed in #aiaa and #aiac4 ,germany's moral obligation had an additional express confirmation4 ,the second ,international ,peace ,conference was held at ,the ,hague in #aijg4 ,there were present the representatives of forty-four nations1 thus making as near an approach to the poet's dream of the federation of the world and the parliament of man as has yet been possible in the slow progress of mankind4 ,that convention agreed upon a certain declaration of principles1 and among the signatures appended to the document was the representative of ,his ,majesty1 the ,german ,emperor4 ,they agreed upon certain principles of international morality1 most of them simply declaratory of the uncodified international law then existing1 and these were subsequently ratified by formal treaties of the respective governments1 including ,germany1 which were deposited in the archives of ,the ,hague4 ,while this treaty as an express covenant was not binding1 unless all belligerents signed it1 yet1 it recognized an existing moral obligation4 ,the ,hague ,peace ,conference proceeded to define the rights of neutral powers1 and in so doing simply reaffirmed the existing international law4 ,the pertinent parts of this great compact1 with reference to the sanctity of neutral territory1 are as follows3 ,,convention ,v ,,chapter ,i4--,,the ,,rights ,,and ,,duties ,,of ,,neutral ,,powers ,,article ,i4 ,the territory of neutral ,powers is inviolable4 ,,article ,,ii4 ,belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral ,power4 ,,article ,x4 ,the fact of a neutral ,power resisting1 even by force1 attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act4 ,notwithstanding these assurances1 it had been from time to time intimated by ,german military writers1 and notably by ,bernhardi1 that ,germany would1 in the event of a future war1 make a quick and possibly a fatal blow at the heart of ,france by invading ,belgium upon the first declaration of hostilities1 and it was probably these intimations that led the ,belgian ,government on ,july #bd1 #aiad1 to consider3 ,whether in the existing circumstances1 it would not be proper to address to the ,powers1 who had guaranteed ,belgium's independence and its neutrality1 a communication for the purpose of confirming to them its resolution to carry out the international duties which are imposed upon it by treaties in the event of war breaking out on the ,belgian frontiers4 ,confiding in the good faith of ,france and ,germany1 the ,belgian ,government concluded that any such declaration was premature4 ,on ,august #b1 #aiad1 the war having already broken out1 the ,belgian ,foreign ,minister took occasion to tell the ,german ,ambassador that ,france had reaffirmed its intention to respect the neutrality of ,belgium1 and ,herr von ,below1 the ,german ,ambassador1 after thanking ,davignon for his information1 added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us any official communication1 but we were aware of his personal opinion respecting the security with which we had the right to regard our eastern neighbors4 ,i ,davignon replied at once that all we knew of the intentions of the latter1 intentions set forth in many former interviews1 did not allow us to doubt their ,germany's perfectly correct attitude toward ,belgium4 ,it thus appears that as late as ,august #b1 #aiad1 ,germany had not given to ,belgium any intimation as to its intention1 and1 what is more important1 it had not either on that day or previously made any charge that ,belgium had in any way violated its obligations of neutrality1 or that ,france had committed any overt act in violation thereof4 ,on ,july #ca1 #aiad1 ,england1 not unreasonably apprehensive as to the sincerity of ,germany's oft-repeated protestations of good faith1 directed the ,english ,ambassadors at ,paris and ,berlin to ask the respective governments of those countries whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of ,belgium1 provided it is violated by no other ,power4 ,this question was communicated by ,sir ,edward ,grey to the ,belgian ,government1 with the addition that he 7,sir ,edward ,grey7 asked that the ,belgian ,government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality which ,i desire1 and expect other ,powers to uphold and observe4 ,pursuant to these instructions1 the ,english ,ambassador to ,paris1 on the night of ,july #ca1 #aiad1 called upon ,viviani1 the ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs1 and on the same night received a reply which is reported by ,sir ,f4 ,bertie to ,sir ,edward ,grey1 as follows3 ,french ,government is resolved to respect the neutrality of ,belgium1 and it would be only in the event of some other ,power violating that neutrality that ,france might find herself under the necessity1 in order to assure defense of her own security1 to act otherwise4 ,this assurance has been given several times4 ,the ,president of the ,republic spoke of it to the ,king of the ,belgians1 and the ,french ,minister to ,brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the ,belgian ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs to-day4#hg ,footnote #hg3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #abe4 ,confirming this1 the ,french ,minister at ,brussels1 on ,august #ast1 made to the ,belgian ,foreign ,minister the following declaration3 ,i am authorized to declare that in the event of an international conflict1 the government of the ,republic will1 as it has always declared1 respect the neutrality of ,belgium4 ,in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another ,power1 the ,french ,government1 in order to insure its own defense1 might be led to modify its attitude4#hh ,footnote #hh3 ,belgian ,gray ,paper1 ,no4 #ae4 ,on ,july #ca1 #aiad1 the ,english ,ambassador at ,berlin saw the ,german ,secretary of ,state1 and submitted ,sir ,edward ,grey's pointed interrogation1 and the only reply that was given was that he must consult the ,emperor and the ,chancellor before he could possibly answer1 and the ,german ,secretary of ,state very significantly added that for strategic reasons it was very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all4 ,goschen also submitted the matter to the ,german ,chancellor1 who also evaded the question by stating that ,germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you the ,english ,ambassador by the ,french ,government4 ,that these were mere evasions the events on the following day demonstrated4 ,on ,august #ast1 ,sir ,edward ,grey saw the ,german ,ambassador in ,london1 and the following significant conversation took place3 ,i told the ,german ,ambassador to-day that the reply of the ,german ,government with regard to the neutrality of ,belgium was a matter of very great regret1 because the neutrality of ,belgium affected feeling in this country4 ,if ,germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by ,france it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here4 ,on the other hand1 if there were a violation of the neutrality of ,belgium by one combatant1 while the other respected it1 it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country4 ,i said that we had been discussing this question at a ,cabinet meeting1 and as ,i was authorized to tell him this ,i gave him a memorandum of it4 ,he asked me whether1 if ,germany gave a promise not to violate ,belgian neutrality1 we would engage to remain neutral4 ,i replied that ,i could not say that2 our hands were still free1 and we were considering what our attitude should be4 ,all ,i could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here1 and that the neutrality of ,belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here4 ,i did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone4#hi ,footnote #hi3 ,english ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #abc4 ,on the following day1 ,august #b;d1 the ,german ,minister at ,brussels handed to the ,belgian ,foreign ,office the following highly confidential document4 ,after stating that the ,german ,government has received reliable information1 according to which the ,french forces intend to march on the ,meuse1 by way of ,givet and ,namur1 and after suggesting a fear that ,belgium1 in spite of its best will1 will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed ,french march without aid1 the document adds3 ,it is an imperative duty for the preservation of ,germany to forestall this attack of the enemy4 ,the ,german ,government would feel keen regret if ,belgium should regard as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the enemies of ,germany oblige her on her part to violate ,belgian territory4#ij ,footnote #ij3 ,belgian ,gray ,book1 ,no4 #bj4 ,some hours later1 at #a4cj ,a4,m4 on ,august #c;d1 the ,german ,minister aroused the ,belgian ,secretary ,general for the ,minister of ,foreign ,affairs from his slumbers and1 asked to see ,baron von der ,elst4 ,he told him that he was instructed by his ,government to inform us that ,french dirigibles had thrown bombs1 and that a patrol of ,french cavalry1 violating international law1 seeing that war was not declared1 had crossed the frontier4 ,the ,secretary ,general asked ,herr von ,below where these events had taken place2 in ,germany1 he was answered4 ,baron von der ,elst observed that in that case he could not understand the object of his communication4 ,herr von ,below said that these acts1 contrary to international law1 were of a nature to make one expect that other acts contrary to international law would be perpetrated by ,france4#ia ,footnote #ia3 ,belgian ,gray ,paper1 ,no4 #ba4 ,as to these last communications1 it should be noted that the ,german ,government1 neither then nor at any subsequent time1 ever disclosed to the world the reliable information1 which it claimed to have of the intentions of the ,french ,government1 and the event shows beyond a possibility of contradiction that at that time ,france was unprepared to make any invasion of ,belgium or even to defend its own north-eastern frontier4 ,it should further be noted that the alleged aggressive acts of ,france1 which were made the excuse for the invasion of ,belgium1 according to the statement of the ,german ,ambassador himself1 did not take place in ,belgium but in ,germany4 ,on ,august #c;d1 at #g o'clock in the morning1 ,belgium served upon the ,german ,ambassador at ,brussels the following reply to the ,german ultimatum1 which1 after quoting the substance of the ,german demand1 continued3 ,this note caused profound and painful surprise to the ,king's ,government4 ,the intentions which it attributed to ,france are in contradiction with the express declarations which were made to us on the #ast ,august in the name of the ,government of the ,republic4 ,moreover1 if1 contrary to our expectation1 a violation of ,belgian neutrality were to be committed by ,france1 ,belgium would fulfill all her international duties1 and her army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader4 ,the treaties of #ahci1 confirmed by the treaties of #ahgj1 establish the independence and the neutrality of ,belgium under the guarantee of the ,powers1 and particularly of the ,government of ,his ,majesty the ,king of ,prussia4 ,belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations2 she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality2 she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it respected4 ,the attempt against her independence1 with which the ,german ,government threatens her1 would constitute a flagrant violation of international law4 ,no strategic interest justifies the violation of that law4 ,the ,belgian ,government would1 by accepting the propositions which are notified to her1 sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties toward ,europe4 ,conscious of the part ,belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world1 she refuses to believe that her independence can be preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neutrality4 ,if this hope were disappointed the ,belgian ,government has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights4 ,in the records of diplomacy there are few nobler documents than this4 ,belgium then knew that she was facing possible annihilation4 ,every material interest suggested acquiescence in the peremptory demands of her powerful neighbor4 ,in the belief that then so generally prevailed1 but which recent events have somewhat modified1 the success of ,germany seemed probable1 and if so1 ,belgium1 by facilitating the triumph of ,germany1 would be in a position to participate in the spoils of the victory4 ,if ,belgium had regarded her honor as lightly as ,germany and felt that the matter of self-preservation would excuse any moral dereliction1 she would have imitated the example of ,luxemburg1 also invaded1 and permitted free passage to the ,german army without essential loss of her material prosperity1 but with a fatal sacrifice to her national honor4 ,even under these conditions ,belgium evidently entertained a hope that ,germany at the last moment would not1 in view of its promises and the protest of ,belgium1 commit this foul outrage4 ,the military attach of the ,french ,government1 being apprised of ,germany's virtual declaration of war1 offered the support of five ,french army corps to the ,belgian ,government1 and in reply ,belgium1 still jealously regardful of her obligation of neutrality1 replied3 ,we are sincerely grateful to the ,french ,government for offering eventual support4 ,in the actual circumstances1 however1 we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the ,powers4 ,the ,belgian ,government will decide later on the action which they think it necessary to take4 ,as in ,csar's time1 the ,belg1 of all the tribes of ,gaul1 are in truth the bravest4 ,later in the evening1 the ,king of ,belgium met his ,ministers1 and the offer of ,france was communicated to them1 and again the ,belgian ,government1 still reposing some confidence in the ,punic faith of ,prussia1 decided not to appeal to the guaranteeing ,powers1 or to avail itself of the offers of ,france4 ,on the following morning at #f o'clock the ,german ,minister handed this formal declaration of war to the ,belgian ,government3 ,i have been instructed1 and have the honor to inform your ,excellency1 that in consequence of the ,government of ,his ,majesty the ,king having declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the ,imperial ,government1 the latter will1 deeply to their regret1 be compelled to carry out--if necessary by force of arms--the measures of security which have been set forth as indispensable in view of the ,french menaces4 ,here again1 no active violation of ,belgium's neutrality by ,france is alleged1 only ,french menaces4 ,the conjecture is plausible that in the case of the ,prussian ,general ,staff1 it was their own hard dealings which thus taught them to suspect the thoughts of others4 ,on that day the ,german troops crossed the ,belgian frontier and hostilities began4 ,on the same day1 at the great session of the ,reichstag1 when the ,imperial ,chancellor attempted to justify to the world the hostile acts of ,germany1 and especially the invasion of ,belgium1 the pretended defense was thus bluntly stated by the ,german ,premier3 ,we are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law4 ,our troops have occupied ,luxemburg and perhaps are already on ,belgian soil4 ,gentlemen1 that is contrary to the dictates of international law4 ,it is true that the ,french ,government has declared at ,brussels that ,france is willing to respect the neutrality of ,belgium1 so long as her opponent respects it4 ,we knew1 however1 that ,france stood ready for invasion4 ,france could wait1 but we could not wait4 ,a ,french movement upon our flank upon the lower ,rhine might have been disastrous4 ,so we were compelled to override the just protest of the ,luxemburg and ,belgian ,governments4 ,the wrong--,i speak openly--that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached4 ,anybody who is threatened1 as we are threatened1 and is fighting for his highest possessions1 can only have one thought--how he is to hack his way through4 ,it will be noted that on this occasion1 when above all other occasions it was not only the duty1 but to the highest interests of ,germany1 to give to the world any substantial reason for violating the neutrality of ,belgium1 the defense of ,germany is rested upon the ground of self-interest1--euphemistically called necessity1--and upon none other4 ,while von ,bethmann-,hollweg's statement does state that ,france held herself in readiness to invade ,belgium1 there was no intimation that ,france had done so1 or had any immediate intention of doing so4 ,on the contrary1 it was added1 ,france could wait1 we 7,germany7 could not4 ,if ,belgium had forfeited its rights by undue favors to ,france or ,england1 why did the ,chancellor characterize its protest as just8 ,how ,germany fulfilled the promise of its ,chancellor1 to make good the admitted wrong which it did ,belgium1 subsequent events have shown4 ,it may be questioned whether1 since the ,thirty ,years' ,war1 any country has been subjected to such general devastating horrors4 ,so little effort has been taken by the conqueror to lessen the inevitable suffering1 that fines have been levied upon this impoverished people1 which would be oppressive even in a period of prosperity4 ,it is announced from ,holland1 as this book goes to press1 that ,germany has imposed upon this war-desolated country a fine of #g1jjj1jjj per month and an especial fine of #ge1jjj1jjj1 for its violation of neutrality4 ,were this episode not a tragedy1 the sardonic humor1 which caused the ,german ,general ,staff to impose this monstrous fine upon ,belgium for its violation of neutrality1 would have the tragi-comical aspects of ,bedlam4 ,it recalls the fable of the wolf who complained that the lamb was muddying the stream and when the lamb politely called the wolf's attention to the fact that it stood lower down on the river side than the wolf1 the latter announced its intention to devour the lamb in any event4 ,such is probably the intention of ,prussia4 ,if it prevail ,belgium as an independent ,state will cease to exist and it will be mourned as ,poland is4 ,like ,poland1 it may have a resurrection4 ,the war having thus commenced between ,germany and ,belgium1 the brave ruler of the latter country--every inch a ,king--addressed to the ,king of ,england the following appeal3 ,remembering the numerous proofs of your ,majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor1 and the friendly attitude of ,england in #ahgj and the proof of friendship you have just given us again1 ,i make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your ,majesty's ,government to safeguard the integrity of ,belgium4#ib ,footnote #ib3 ,belgian ,gray ,paper1 ,no4 #be4 ,in reply to that appeal1 which no chivalrous nation could have disregarded1 ,sir ,edward ,grey immediately1 on ,august #dth1 advised the ,british ,ambassador in ,berlin as follows3 ,we hear that ,germany has addressed a note to ,belgian ,minister for ,foreign ,affairs stating that ,german ,government will be compelled to carry out1 if necessary by force of arms1 the measures considered indispensable4 ,we are also informed that ,belgian territory has been violated at ,gemmenich4 ,in these circumstances1 and in view of the fact that ,germany declined to give the same assurance respecting ,belgium as ,france gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at ,berlin and ,paris1 we must repeat that request1 and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by #ab o'clock to-night4 ,if not1 you are instructed to ask for your passports1 and to say that his ,majesty's ,government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of ,belgium and the observance of a treaty to which ,germany is as much a party as ourselves4#ic ,footnote #ic3 ,english ,white ,paper4 ,no4 #aei4 ,thereupon ,sir ,edward ,goschen1 the ,british ,ambassador in ,berlin1 called upon the ,secretary of ,state and stated in the name of ,his ,majesty's ,government that unless the ,imperial ,government could give the assurance by #ab o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the ,belgian frontier and stop their advance1 ,i had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the ,imperial ,government that ,his ,majesty's ,government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of ,belgium and the observance of a treaty to which ,germany was as much a party as themselves4 ,herr von ,jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day1 namely1 that the safety of the ,empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the ,imperial troops should advance through ,belgium4 ,i gave his ,excellency a written summary of your telegram and1 pointing out that you had mentioned #ab o'clock as the time when ,his ,majesty's ,government would expect an answer1 asked him whether1 in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue1 it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered4 ,he replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more1 his answer must be the same4 ,i said that in that case ,i should have to demand my passports4 ,this interview took place at about #g o'clock4444 ,i then said that ,i should like to go and see the ,chancellor1 as it might be1 perhaps1 the last time ,i should have an opportunity of seeing him4 ,he begged me to do so4 ,i found the ,chancellor very agitated4 ,his ,excellency at once began a harangue1 which lasted for about twenty minutes4 ,he said that the step taken by ,his ,majesty's ,government was terrible to a degree2 just for a word--neutrality1 a word which in war time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper ,great ,britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her4 ,all his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step1 and the policy to which1 as ,i knew1 he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards4 ,what we had done was unthinkable2 it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants4 ,he held ,great ,britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen4 ,i protested strongly against that statement1 and said that1 in the same way as he and ,herr von ,jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to ,germany to advance through ,belgium and violate the latter's neutrality1 so ,i would wish him to understand that it was1 so to speak1 a matter of life and death for the honor of ,great ,britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend ,belgium's neutrality if attacked4 ,that solemn compact simply had to be kept1 or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by ,great ,britain in the future8 ,the ,chancellor said1 ,but at what price will that compact have been kept4 ,has the ,british ,government thought of that8 ,i hinted to his ,excellency as plainly as ,i could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements1 but his ,excellency was so excited1 so evidently overcome by the news of our action1 and so little disposed to hear reason1 that ,i refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument4444#id ,footnote #id3 ,british ,white ,paper1 ,no4 #afj4 ,here again it is most significant1 in view of the subsequent clumsily framed defense by ,german apologists1 to note that the ,german ,secretary of ,state1 ,herr von ,jagow1 and his superior1 the ,german ,chancellor1 did not pretend to suggest that the invasion of ,belgium was due to any overt act of ,france4 ,with even greater frankness von ,jagow stated the real purpose1 which was1 to advance into ,france by the quickest and easiest way1 and to avoid the more ,southern route1 which1 in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses1 would have entailed great loss of time4 ,the damning conclusion as to the guilt of ,germany1 which irresistibly follows from these admitted facts1 is sought to be overborne by a pamphlet entitled ,the ,truth about ,germany1 and subscribed to by a number of distinguished ,germans1 who are in turn vouched for in ,america by ,professor ,john ,w4 ,burgess of ,columbia ,college4 ,he tells us that they are the salt of the earth1 and among the greatest thinkers1 moralists1 and philanthropists of the age4 ,to overbear the doubter with the weight of such authority we are told that this defense has the support of the great theologian1 ,harnack1 the sound and accomplished political scientist and economist1 von ,schmoller1 the distinguished philologian1 von ,wilamowitz1 the well-known historian1 ,lamprecht1 the profound statesman1 von ,posadowsky1 the brilliant diplomatist1 von ,blow1 the great financier1 von ,gwinner1 the great promoter of trade and commerce1 ,ballin1 the great inventor1 ,siemens1 the brilliant preacher of the ,gospel1 ,dryander1 and the indispensable ,director in the ,ministry of ,education1 ,schmidt4 7,the adjectives are those of ,professor ,burgess47 ,the average ,american1 as indeed the average citizen of any country1 when his natural passions are not unduly aroused1 is apt to take a very prosaic and dispassionate view of such matters1 and when he has reached his conclusion based upon everyday1 commonplace morality1 he is not apt to be shaken even by an imposing array of names1 fortified by an enthusiastic excess of grandiloquent adjectives4 ,the aristocracy of brains has no monopoly of truth1 which is often best grasped by the democracy of common sense4 ,the defense of these notable representatives of ,german thought seems to be based upon the wholly unsupported assertion that ,england and ,france were resolved not to respect the neutrality of ,belgium4 ,they say3 ,it would have been a crime against the ,german people if the ,german ,general ,staff had not anticipated this intention4 ,the inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual1 whose very existence is at stake1 the moral liberty to resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times of peril4 ,as ,belgium would1 nevertheless1 not acquiesce in a friendly neutrality1 which would permit the unobstructed passage of ,german troops through small portions of her territory1 although her integrity was guaranteed1 the ,german ,general ,staff was obliged to force the passage in order to avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most unfavorable ground4 ,in other words1 it seemed preferable to the ,german ,general ,staff that it should fight in ,france rather than in ,germany1 and for this reason ,belgium must be ruined4 ,notwithstanding this and similar propositions1 which are so abhorrent in their political immorality1 it is yet gravely suggested by ,dr4 ,dernberg and others that ,bernhardi's philosophy does not reflect the true thought of the ,prussian ruling classes4 ,here are representative theologians1 economists1 historians1 statesmen1 diplomatists1 financiers1 inventors1 and educators1 who1 in invoking the support of the educated classes in the ,united ,states1 deliberately subscribe to a proposition at which even ,machiavelli might have gagged4 ,we are further told that the ,german troops1 with their iron discipline will respect the personal property and liberty of the individual in ,belgium just as they did in ,france in #ahgj1 and these scientists1 philosophers1 and doctors of divinity add that ,belgium would have been wise1 if it had permitted the passage of the ,german troops1 for the ,belgian people would have fared well from the business point of view1 for the army would have proved a good customer and paid well4 ,to this defense we are led in the last analysis1 that ,belgium should have preferred cash to her honor1 just as the ,german ,general ,staff preferred dishonor to the sacrifice of an immediate military advantage4 ,the possibilities of moral casuistry have been severely tested in the attempt of these apologists for ,germany to defend the forcible invasion of ,belgium4 ,the ethical question has been made quite unnecessarily to pivot upon the express contractual obligations of ,england1 ,germany1 and ,france with respect to the neutrality of ,belgium4 ,the indictment of ,germany has been placed upon the sound but too narrow ground that by the ,treaty of #ahci1 and ,the ,hague ,convention of #aijg1 ,germany had obligated itself by a solemn pledge to respect the neutrality both of ,luxemburg and ,belgium4 ,if1 however1 there had been no ,hague ,convention and no ,treaty of #ahci1 and if ,germany1 ,england1 and ,france had never entered into reciprocal obligations in the event of war to respect ,belgium's neutrality1 nevertheless upon the broadest considerations of international law the invasion without its consent would be without any justification whatever4 ,it is a fundamental axiom of international law that each nation is the sole and exclusive judge of the conditions under which it will permit an alien to cross its frontiers4 ,its territory is sacrosanct4 ,no nation may invade the territory of another without its consent4 ,to do so by compulsion is an act of war4 ,each nation's land is its castle of asylum and defense4 ,this fundamental right of ,belgium should not be confused or obscured by balancing the subordinate equities between ,france1 ,germany1 and ,england with respect to their formal treaty obligations4 ,belgium's case has thus been weakened in the forum of public opinion by too insistent reference to the special treaties4 ,the right of ,belgium and of its citizens as individuals1 to be secure in their possessions rests upon the sure foundation of inalienable right and is guarded by the immutable principle of moral law1 ,thou shalt not steal4 ,it was well said by ,alexander ,hamilton3 ,the sacred rights of man are not to be searched for in old parchments and musty records2 they are written as with a sunbeam in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of ,divinity itself and can never be erased by mortal power4 ,this truth can be illustrated by an imaginary instance4 ,let us suppose that the armies of the ,kaiser had made the progress which they so confidently anticipated1 and had not simply captured ,paris1 but had also invaded ,england1 and that1 in an attempt to crush the ,british ,empire1 the ,german ,general ,staff planned an invasion of ,canada4 ,let us further suppose that ,germany thereupon served upon the ,united ,states such an arrogant demand as it made upon ,belgium1 requiring the ,united ,states to permit it to land an army in ,new ,york1 with the accompanying assurance that neither its territory nor independence would be injured1 and that ,germany would generously reimburse it for any damage4 ,let us further suppose--and it is not a very fanciful supposition--that the ,united ,states would reply to the ,german demand that under no circumstances should a ,german force be landed in ,new ,york or its territory be used as a base of hostile operations against ,canada4 ,to carry out the analogy in all its details1 let us then suppose that the ,german fleet should land an army in the city of ,new ,york1 arrest its ,mayor1 and check the first attempt of its outraged inhabitants to defend the city by demolishing the ,cathedral1 the ,metropolitan ,art ,gallery1 the ,city ,hall and other structures1 and shooting down remorselessly large numbers of citizens1 because a few non-combatants had not accepted the invasion with due humility4 ,although ,germany had not entered into any treaty to respect the territory of the ,united ,states1 no one would seriously contend that ,germany would be justified in such an invasion4 ,the alleged invalidation of the treaty of #ahci being thus unimportant1 ,dr4 ,dernberg and ,professor von ,mach fall back upon the only remaining defense1 that ,france had already violated the neutrality of ,belgium with the latter's consent4 ,of this there is no evidence whatever4 ,we have1 on the contrary1 the express assurance1 which ,france gave on the eve of the ,german invasion both to ,belgium and ,england1 that it would not violate the rights of ,belgium1 and in addition we have the significant fact that when ,belgium was invaded1 and it was vitally necessary that the ,french ,army should go with all possible speed to its relief and thus stop the invasion and save ,france itself from invasion1 it was ten days before ,france could send any adequate support4 ,unhappily it was then too late4 ,if it were true that ,france intended to invade ,belgium1 then of all the blunders that the ,german ,foreign ,office has made1 the greatest was that it did not permit ,france to carry out this step1 for it would have palliated the action of ,germany in meeting such violation by a similar invasion1 and it would thus have been an immeasurable gain for ,germany and a greater injury to ,france4 ,germany's greatest weakness to-day is its moral isolation4 ,it stands condemned by the judgment of the civilized world4 ,no physical power it can exercise can compensate for this loss of moral power4 ,even success will be too dearly bought at such a price4 ,there are things which succeed better than success4 ,truth is one of them4 ,under the plea of necessity1 which means ,germany's desire to minimize its losses of life1 ,germany has turned ,belgium into a shambles1 trampled a peaceful nation under foot and almost crushed its soul beneath the iron tread of its mighty armies4 ,almost wounded unto death1 and for a time prostrate under the heel of the conqueror1 the honor of ,belgium shines unsullied by any selfish interests1 personal dishonor1 or lack of courage4 ,it is claimed that there were officers of the ,french ,army in ,lige and ,namur before the war broke out4 ,neither names nor dates have been given1 and the allegation might be fairly dismissed because of the very vagueness of the charge4 ,but even if it were true1 international law does not forbid the officers of one nation serving with the armies of another4 ,german officers have for many years been thus employed in ,turkey and engaged in training and developing the ,turkish ,army1 but no one has ever contended that the employment by that country of ,german military officers was a violation of neutrality1 or gave rise to a casus belli4 ,it is wholly probable that there were some ,german officers in ,belgium before the war commenced1 and if not1 there were certainly hundreds of spies1 of whose pernicious activities the ,belgian people were to learn later to their infinite sorrow1 but because ,germany employed an elaborate system of espionage in ,belgium1 it could not justify ,france in invading its territory without its permission4 ,to a lawyer1 who has had experience in the judicial ascertainment of truth1 there is one consideration that justifies him in disposing of all these vague allegations with respect to ,french activities in ,belgium on the eve of the war1 and that is that ,germany has not only failed to give any testimony in support of the charges1 but it never suggested this defense until the judgment of the civilized world had branded it with an ineffaceable stain4 ,professor von ,mach1 a former educator of ,harvard ,university and an apologist for ,germany1 feels this poverty of evidence and has rather navely suggested an adjournment of the case4 ,he says3 ,did ,french officers remain in ,lige or in any other ,belgian fortress after hostilities had begun1 and did ,france plan to go through ,belgium8 ,germany has officially made both claims4 ,the first can easily be substantiated by ,the ,supreme ,court of ,civilization by an investigation of the prisoners of war taken in ,belgium4 ,until an impartial investigation becomes possible no further proof than the claim made by the ,german ,government can be produced4 ,as the ,french officers taken in ,belgium are presumably in ,german detention camps1 it would seem that ,germany should first substantiate its defense by names1 dates1 and places1 although even then the mere capture of ,french officers in ,belgium after the invasion had begun does not necessarily indicate that they were in ,belgium before the invasion4 ,dr4 von ,mach adds in the reply1 which he made in the ,new ,york ,times to an article contributed by the writer to that journal3 ,it is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are which ,germany possesses1 and which for military reasons it has not yet been able to divulge4444 ,this is an important question1 and the answer must be left to ,the ,supreme ,court of ,civilization4 ,the weight of the evidence would seem to point to a justification of ,germany4 ,yet no friend of ,germany can find fault with those who would wish to defer a verdict until such time when ,germany can present her complete proof to the world1 and this may be when the war is over4 ,this nave suggestion1 that the vital question of fact should be postponed1 and in the meantime judgment should be entered for ,germany1 is refreshing in its novelty4 ,its only parallel was the contention of the celebrated ,dr4 ,cook1 who contended that the world should accept his claim as to the discovery of the ,north ,pole and await the proofs later4 ,professor von ,mach1 in his book1 ,what ,germany ,wants1 further explains this dilatory defense and amplifies it in a manner that is certainly unusual in an historian4 ,he recognizes that the speech of the ,german ,chancellor in the ,reichstag on ,august #dth1 in which von ,bethmann-,hollweg admitted that the action of ,germany in invading ,belgium was wrong and only justified it on the ground of self-preservation1 was a virtual plea of guilty by ,prussia of the crime1 of which it stands indicted at the bar of the civilized world4 ,germany's scholarly apologist1 as amicus curi1 then suggests that in criminal procedure1 when a defendant pleads guilty1 the ,court often refuses to accept his plea1 enters a plea of not guilty for him1 and assigns counsel to defend the case4 ,he therefore suggests that the ,chancellor's plea of guilty should be disregarded and the ,court should assign counsel4 ,one difficulty with the analogy is that courts do not ordinarily refuse to accept a plea of guilty4 ,on the contrary1 they accept it almost invariably1 for why try the guilt of a man when he himself in the most formal way acknowledges it8 ,the only instance in which a court does show such consideration to a prisoner is when the defendant is both poor and ignorant4 ,then1 and only then1 with a fine regard for human right1 is the procedure suggested by ,prof4 von ,mach followed4 ,to this humiliating position1 ,professor von ,mach as amicus curi consigns his great nation4 ,for myself1 as one who admires ,germany and believes it to be much greater and truer than its ruling caste or its over-zealous apologists1 ,i refuse to accept the justification of such an absurd and degrading analogy4 ,the blunt acknowledgment of the ,german ,chancellor in the ,reichstag1 already quoted1 is infinitely preferable to the disingenuous defenses of ,germany's ardent but sophistical apologists4 ,fully recognizing the import of his words1 von ,bethmann-,hollweg1 addressing the representatives of the ,german nation1 put aside with admirable candor all these sophistical artifices and rested the defense of ,germany upon the single contention that ,germany was beset by powerful enemies and that it was a matter of necessity for her to perpetrate this wrong and in this manner to hack her way through4 ,this defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance4 ,it is a plea of ,guilty at the bar of the world4 ,it has one merit4 ,it does not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy4 ,after the civilized world had condemned the invasion of ,belgium with an unprecedented approach to unanimity1 the ,german ,chancellor rather tardily discovered that public opinion was still a vital force in the world and that the strategic results of the occupation of ,belgium had not compensated for the moral injury4 ,for this reason he framed five months after this crime against civilization a belated defense1 which proved so unconvincing that the ,bernhardi plea of military necessity is clearly preferable1 as at least having the merit of candor4 ,after proclaiming to the world that the ,german ,foreign ,office had discovered in ,brussels certain secret documents1 which disclosed the fact that the neutrality of ,belgium at the time of the invasion was a sham and after the civilized world had refused to accept this bald and unsupported assertion1 as it had also refused to accept the spurious evidence of a well-known ,arctic explorer1 the ,german ,foreign ,office in ,december1 #aiad published its alleged proofs4 ,the first purported to be a report of the ,chief of the ,belgian ,general ,staff to the ,minister of ,war and reported his conversations in #aijf with a military attach of the ,british ,legation in ,brussels4 ,the second purported to be a report of similar conversations in #aiab between the same officials4 ,in an authorized statement1 published on ,january #bg1 #aiae1 ,sir ,edward ,grey states that there is no record of either of these negotiations in the ,english ,foreign ,office or the ,war ,office2 but this fact is not in itself conclusive and as there is no evidence that the documents were forged1 their genuineness should be assumed in the absence of some more specific denial4 ,the documents1 however1 do not appreciably advance the cause of ,germany1 for they disclose on their face that the conversations were not binding on the ,governments of ,england or ,belgium but were simply an informal exchange of view between the officials1 and what is far more to the purpose1 the whole of the first conversation of ,april #aj1 #aijf1 was expressly based upon the statement that the entry of the ,english into ,belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by ,germany4 ,the second document also shows that the ,belgian ,chief of ,staff expressly stated that any invasion of ,belgium by ,england1 made to repel a prior ,german invasion1 could not take place without the express consent of ,belgium1 to be given when the occasion arose1 and it is further evident that the statement of the ,english military attach--clearly a subordinate official to define the foreign policy of a great ,empire--expressly predicated his assumption1 that ,england might disembark troops in ,belgium1 upon the statement that its object would be to repel a ,german invasion of ,belgian territory4 ,if it be asked why ,england and ,belgium were thus in #aijf and #aiab considering the contingency of a ,german invasion of ,belgium and the method of effectually repelling it1 the reply is obvious that such invasion1 in the event of a war between ,germany and ,france1 was a commonplace of ,german military strategists4 ,of this purpose they made little1 if any1 concealment4 ,the construction by ,germany of numerous strategic railway lines on the ,belgian frontier1 which were out of proportion to the economic necessity of the territory1 gave to ,europe some indication of ,germany's purpose and there could have been little doubt as to such intention1 if ,germany had not1 through its ,foreign ,office1 given1 as previously shown1 repeated and continuous assurances to ,belgium that such was not its intention4 ,the ,german ,chancellor--whose stupendous blunders of speech and action in this crisis will be the marvel of posterity--has further attempted to correct his record by two equally disingenuous defenses4 ,speaking to the ,reichstag on ,december #b1 #aiad1 he said3 ,when on the #dth of ,august ,i referred to the wrong which we were doing in marching through ,belgium1 it was not yet known for certain whether the ,brussels ,government in the hour of need would not decide after all to spare the country and to retire to ,antwerp under protest4 ,you remember that1 after the occupation of ,lige1 at the request of our army leaders ,i repeated the offer to the ,belgian ,government4 ,for military reasons it was absolutely imperative that at the time1 about the #dth of ,august1 the possibility for such a development should be kept open4 ,even then the guilt of the ,belgian ,government was apparent from many a sign1 although ,i had not yet any positive documentary proofs at my disposal4 ,this is much too vague to excuse a great crime4 ,the guilt of ,belgium is said to be apparent from many a sign1 but what these signs are the ,chancellor still fails to state4 ,he admits that they were not documentary in character4 ,if the guilt of ,belgium had been so apparent to the ,chancellor on ,august the #dth1 when he made his confession of wrong doing in the ,reichstag1 then it is incredible that he would have made such an admission4 ,as to the overt acts of ,france1 all that the ,chancellor said in his speech of ,december #b was that ,france's plan of campaign was known to us and that it compelled us for reasons of self-preservation to march through ,belgium4 ,but it is again significant that1 speaking nearly five months after his first public utterance on the subject and with a full knowledge that the world had visited its destructive condemnation upon ,germany for its wanton attack upon ,belgium1 the ,chancellor can still give no specific allegation of any overt act by ,france which justified the invasion4 ,all that is suggested is a supposed plan of campaign4 ,following this unconvincing and plainly disingenuous speech1 the ,chancellor proceeded in an authorized newspaper interview on ,january #be1 #aiae to state that his now famous--or infamous--remark about the scrap of paper had been misunderstood4 ,after stating that he felt a painful surprise to learn that my phrase1 'a scrap of paper1' should have caused such an unfavorable impression on the ,united ,states1 he proceeds to explain that in his now historic interview with the ,british ,ambassador1 he 7von ,bethmann-,hollweg7 had spoken of the treaty not as a scrap of paper for ,germany1 but as an instrument which had become obsolete through ,belgium's forfeiture of its neutrality and that ,great ,britain had quite other reasons for entering into the war1 compared with which the neutrality treaty appeared to have only the value of a scrap of paper4 ,let the reader here pause to note the twofold character of this defense4 ,it suggests that ,germany's guaranty of ,belgium's neutrality had become for ,germany a scrap of paper because of ,belgium's alleged forfeiture of its rights as a neutral nation1 although at the time referred to the ,german ,chancellor had not only asked the permission of ,belgium to cross its territory but immediately before his interview with the ,british ,ambassador he had publicly testified in his speech in the ,reichstag to the justice of ,belgium's protest4 ,the other and inconsistent suggestion is that1 without respect to ,belgium's rights under the treaty of #ahci1 the violation of its territory by ,germany was not the cause of ,england's intervention2 but obviously this hardly explains the ,german ,chancellor's contemptuous reference to the long standing and oft repeated guaranty of ,belgium's neutrality as merely a scrap of paper4 ,having thus somewhat vaguely suggested a twofold defense1 the ,chancellor1 without impeaching the accuracy of ,goschen's report of the interview1 then proceeded to state that the conversation in question took place immediately after his speech in the ,reichstag1 in which1 as stated1 he had admitted the justice of ,belgium's protest against the violation of its territory1 and he adds that1 when ,i spoke1 ,i already had certain indications but no absolute proof upon which to base a public accusation that ,belgium long before had abandoned its neutrality in its relations with ,england4 ,nevertheless ,i took ,germany's responsibilities toward the neutral ,states so seriously that ,i spoke frankly of the wrong committed by ,germany4 ,if the ,german ,chancellor is truthful in his statement that on ,august the #dth1 when he spoke in the ,reichstag and an hour later had his conversation with ,goschen1 he had certain indications that ,belgium had forfeited its rights as an independent nation by hostile acts1 then the ,german ,chancellor took such a serious view of ,germany's responsibilities that1 without any necessity or justification1 he indicted his country at the bar of the whole world of a flagrant wrong4 ,if he could not at that time justify the act of the ,german ,general ,staff1 he should at least have been silent1 but1 according to his incredible statement1 although he had these certain indications and thus knew that ,germany1 in invading ,belgium1 was simply attacking an already hostile country1 he deliberately explains1 not only to his nation but to the whole world1 that such invasion was a wrong and had no justification in international law4 ,how can any reasonable man1 whose eyes are not blinded with the passions of the hour1 accept this explanation8 ,it is even more remarkable that immediately following the session of the ,reichstag1 when he had his interview with ,goschen1 the ,german ,chancellor never suggested in his own defense or that of his country1 that he had certain indications1 which justified the action that day taken1 although he then knew that1 unless he could justify it1 ,england would immediately join the already powerful foes of ,germany4 ,the reader need only reread ,goschen's report of that interview 7ante1 p4 #bad7 to know how disingenuous this belated explanation is4 ,with the whole world ringing with the infamous phrase1 the ,german ,chancellor1 after five months of reflection1 can only make this pitiful defense4 ,its acceptance subjects even the most credulous to a severe strain4 ,it exhausts the limit of gullibility4 ,the defense wholly ignores the fact that the ,chancellor had previously sought to bribe ,england to condone in advance the invasion of ,belgium by ,germany1 and that ,germany had also coerced ,luxemburg into a passive acquiescence in a similar invasion1 and there is as yet no pretense that ,luxemburg had failed in its obligation of neutrality4 ,should the judgment of the civilized world turn from the terrible fate of ,belgium and consider the wrong that was done to ,luxemburg1 then the ,german ,chancellor may1 unless better advised1 frame further maladroit excuses with reference to that country4 ,all these explanations1 as senseless as they are false1 and savoring more of the tone of a criminal court then that of an imperial chancellery1 should shock those who admire historic ,germany4 ,they are unworthy of so great a nation4 ,bismarck would never have stooped to such pitiful and transparent deception4 ,the blunt candor of ,maximilian ,harden1 which we have already quoted on page #ab1 is infinitely preferable and the position of ,germany at the bar of the civilized world will improve1 when its maladroit ,chancellor has the courage and the candor to say1 as ,harden did1 that all this was done because ,germany regarded it as for its vital interests and because we willed it4 ,unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism2 unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and the conscience of the cannon2 unless mankind1 after uncounted centuries1 has made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave dweller1 then this answer of ,germany cannot satisfy the decent respect to the opinions of mankind4 ,it is the negation of all that civilization stands for4 ,belgium has been crucified in the face of the world4 ,its innocence of any offense1 until it was attacked1 is too clear for argument4 ,its voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will plead like angels1 trumpet-tongued1 against the deep damnation of its taking off4 ,it may be questioned whether1 since the fall of ,poland1 ,civilization has been stirred to more profound pity and intense indignation than by this wanton outrage4 ,pity1 radiating to the utmost corners of the world by the sightless couriers of the air1 ,shall blow the horrid deed in every eye ,that tears shall drown the wind4 ,was it also1 as with ,macbeth1 a case of ,vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself ,and falls on the other8 ,time will tell4 ,had ,germany not invaded ,belgium1 it is an even chance that ,england would not have intervened1 at least at the beginning of the war4 ,germany could have detached a relatively small part of its army to defend its highly fortified ,western frontier1 and leaving ,france to waste its strength on frontal attacks on that almost impregnable line of defense1 ,germany with the bulk of its army and that of ,austria could have made a swift drive at ,russia4 ,is it not possible that that course would have yielded better results than the fiasco1 which followed the fruitless drive at ,paris8 ,if ,germany succeeds1 it will claim that nothing succeeds like success1 and to the disciples of ,treitschke and ,bernhardi this will be a sufficing answer4 ,if it fail1 posterity will be at a loss to determine which blundered the worst1 the ,german ,foreign ,office or its ,general ,staff1 its diplomats or its generals4 ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,judgment ,,of ,,the ,,world ,the record has now been laid before the reader in all its essential details4 ,the witnesses for the different countries have taken the stand and we have their respective contentions in their own words4 ,czar1 ,emperor1 and ,king1 as well as ,prime ,minister1 ,chancellor1 and ,ambassador1 have testified as to the fateful events1 which preceded the outbreak of the war1 with a fullness of detail1 to which history presents few parallels4 ,the evidence which ,germany and ,austria have suppressed does not prevent the determination of the issue4 ,it is a great tribute to the force of public opinion and a clear recognition that the conscience of mankind does exist as something more than a visionary abstraction1 that the secrets of diplomacy have been laid bare by most of the contending nations1 and that there is an earnest desire on the part of all of them to justify their conduct respectively at the bar of the civilized world4 ,even more impressive to the sincere friends of peace is the significant fact that concurrently with the most amazing display of physical force that the world has ever known has come a direct appeal by the belligerent nations to the neutral ,states1 and especially to the ,united ,states1 not for practical coperation in the hostilities but for moral sympathy4 ,all past wars are insignificant in dimensions in comparison with this4 ,the standing army of the ,roman ,empire1 according to the estimate of ,gibbon1 did not exceed #djj1jjj1 and guarded that mighty ,empire from the ,euphrates to the ,thames4 ,the grand army of ,napoleon1 which was supposed to mark the maximum of human effort in the art of war and with which he crossed a century ago the ,niemen1 did not exceed #gjj1jjj4 ,to-day at least fifteen millions of men are engaged in a titanic struggle1 with implements of destruction1 to which all past devices in the science of destruction are insignificant4 ,apparently1 therefore1 the ideals of the pacificist are little better than a rainbow1 a rainbow of promise1 perhaps1 but still a rainbow1 formed by the rays of ,god's justice shining through the tears of human pity4 ,but when1 in contrast to this amazing display of physical power1 there is contrasted an equally unprecedented desire on the part of the contending nations to justify their case at the bar of public opinion and to gain the moral sympathy of the neutral ,states1 then it is seen that the decent respect to the opinions of mankind is still a mighty factor in human affairs1 and the question as to the judgment of the world1 upon the moral issues raised by this great controversy1 becomes not merely of academic but of great practical interest4 ,what that judgment will be it is not difficult to determine1 for the evidence in the case can admit of but one conclusion4 ,it may be1 as ,mr4 ,george ,bernard ,shaw says1 that in the contending nations1 the ears are too greatly deafened by the roar of the cannon and the eyes too blinded by the smoke of battle1 to reach a dispassionate conclusion4 ,but in the neutral ,states of the world1 and especially in that greatest of all the neutral ,powers1 the ,united ,states of ,america1 a judgment has been pronounced that is unmistakable4 ,the great ,republic is more free than any other nation to reach a just conclusion without fear1 favor1 or affection4 ,without alliances with any ,power and with no practical interest in the ,european balance of power1 itself composed of men of all the contending nations1 it can1 above every other people1 proceed to judgment1 with malice toward none and with charity for all4 ,it is a tribute to its unique position among the nations of the world that from the beginning of the war each of the contending ,powers has invoked its judgment4 ,the ,kaiser1 the ,president of the ,french ,republic1 and the ,king of ,belgium have each in an especial way sought its moral support1 while to the other nations the question of the attitude of the ,united ,states has been one of practical and recognized importance4 ,if the ,united ,states is thus a moral arbiter in the greatest war of history1 its judgment is now1 and may hereafter increasingly become1 a potential factor of great significance4 ,the nature of that judgment is already apparent to all men4 ,the people of the ,united ,states1 numbering nearly one hundred millions1 have reached1 with an amazing approach to unanimity1 certain clear and definite conclusions4 ,these conclusions maybe summarized as follows3 #a4 ,that ,germany and ,austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted to impose their will upon ,europe in a matter affecting the balance of power4 ,whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a ,european war to determine the hegemony of ,europe is not satisfactorily established1 although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility4 ,they made war almost inevitable by 7a7 issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that ,austria may have had1 and 7b7 in giving to ,servia and ,europe insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations4 #b4 ,that ,germany had at all times the power to induce ,austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course1 but at no time effectively exerted its influence4 ,on the contrary1 it certainly abetted1 and possibly instigated1 ,austria in its unreasonable course4 #c4 ,that ,england1 ,france1 ,italy1 and ,russia throughout the diplomatic controversy sincerely worked for peace1 and in this spirit not only overlooked the original misconduct of ,austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace4 #d4 ,that ,austria1 having mobilized its army1 ,russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces4 ,such act of mobilization is the right of any sovereign ,state1 and as long as the ,russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action1 no other nation had any just right to complain1 each having the same right to make similar preparations4 #e4 ,that ,germany1 in abruptly declaring war against ,russia for failure to demobilize1 when the other ,powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress1 precipitated the war4 #f4 ,that the invasion of ,belgium by ,germany was without any provocation and in violation of ,belgium's inherent rights as a sovereign ,state4 ,the sanctity of its territory does not depend exclusively upon the ,treaty of #ahci or ,the ,hague ,convention1 but upon fundamental and axiomatic principles of international law4 ,these treaties were simply declaratory of ,belgium's rights as a sovereign nation and simply reaffirmed by a special covenant the duty of ,germany and the other ,powers to respect the neutrality of ,belgium4 #g4 ,england was justified in its declaration of war upon ,germany1 not only because of its direct interests in the neutrality of ,belgium1 but also because of the ethical duty of the strong nations to protect the weak upon adequate occasion from indefensible wrong4 ,apart from this general ethical justification1 ,england was1 under the ,treaty of #ahci1 under an especial obligation to defend the neutrality of ,belgium1 and had it failed to respect that obligation it would have broken its solemn covenant4 ,if they are thrice armed who have their quarrel just1 then ,england1 ,france1 ,russia1 and ,belgium can await with confidence1 not merely the immediate issue of the titanic conflict1 but also the equally important judgment of history4 ,,epilogue ,on the evening of ,july #ca1 #aiad1 the author reached ,basle4 ,the rapid progress of events1 narrated in this volume1 suggested the wisdom of continuing the journey to ,paris that night1 but as ,i wanted to see the tomb of ,erasmus in the ,basle ,cathedral ,i determined to break my long journey from ,st4 ,moritz4 ,it seemed a fitting time to make a pilgrimage to the last resting-place of the great humanist philosopher of ,rotterdam and ,louvain1 for in that prodigious upheaval of the sixteenth century1 which has passed into history as the ,reformation1 ,erasmus was the one noble spirit who looked with a tolerant and philosophical mind upon both parties to the great controversy4 ,he suffered the fate of the conservative in a radical time1 and as the great storm convulsed ,europe the author of the ,praise of ,folly probably said on more than one occasion3 ,a plague o' both your houses4 ,nearly four centuries have passed since he joined the silent majority1 between whom is no quarreling1 and the desolated ,louvain1 which he loved1 is to-day in its ruins a standing witness that immeasurable folly still rules the darkened counsels of men4 ,as ,i reached ,basle and saw the spires of the ,cathedral rising above the ,rhine1 it seemed to me that the great convulsion1 which was then rocking all ,europe with seismic violence1 was the greatest since that of the ,french ,revolution and might have as lasting results as the great schism of the sixteenth century4 ,i was not fated to see the tomb1 for when ,i reached my hotel the facilities of civilization had broken down so abruptly that if ,i did not wish to be interned in ,switzerland ,i must leave early on the following morning for ,paris4 ,transportation had almost entirely collapsed1 communication was difficult1 and credit itself was so strained that mine host of the ,three ,kings was disposed to look askance even at gold4 ,our journey took us to ,france by way of ,delle4 ,twenty-four hours after we passed that frontier town1 ,german soldiers entered and blew out the brains of a ,french custom-house officer1 thus the first victim in the greatest war that the world has ever known4 ,as we journeyed from ,basle to ,paris on that last day of ,july the fair fields of ,france never looked more beautiful4 ,in the gleaming summer sun they made a new field of the cloth of gold1 and the hayricks looked like the aureate tents of a mighty army4 ,it was harvest time1 but already the laborers had deserted their fields which1 although white unto the harvest1 seemed bereft of the tillers4 ,some had left the bounty of nature to join in the harvest of death4 ,from the high pasture lands of the ,alps the herdsmen at the ringing of the village church bells had left their herds and before night had fallen were on their way to the front4 ,at ,belfort the station was crowded with ,french troops and an elderly ,french couple came into our compartment4 ,the eyes of the wife were red with weeping1 while the man sank into his seat and with his head upon his breast gazed moodily into vacancy4 ,they had just parted with their son1 who had joined the colors4 ,i stood for a time with this ,french gentleman in the corridor of the train1 but as he could not speak ,english or ,german and ,i could not speak ,french1 it was impossible for us to communicate the intense and tragical thoughts that were passing through our minds4 ,suddenly he pointed to the smiling harvest fields1 by which we passed so swiftly1 and said ,perdu6 perdu6 ,this word of tragical import could have been applied to all civilization as well4 ,the night of our arrival in ,paris ,i fully expected to see a half a million ,frenchmen parading the streets and enthusiastically cheering for war and crying1 as in #ahgj1 ,berlin6 ,i was to witness an extraordinary transformation of a great nation4 ,an unusual silence brooded over the city4 ,a few hundred people paraded the chief avenues1 crying down with war61 while a separate crowd of equal size sang the national hymn4 ,with these exceptions there was no cheering or enthusiasm1 such as ,i would have expected from my preconceived idea of ,french excitability4 ,men spoke in undertones1 with a quiet but subdued intensity of feeling rather than with frenzied enthusiasm4 ,with a devotion that was extraordinary and a pathetically brave submission to a possible fate1 they seemed to be sternly resolved to die to the last man1 if necessary1 in defense of their noble nation4 ,although ,i subsequently saw in the thrilling days of mobilization many thousands of soldiers pass through the railroad stations on their way to the front1 ,i never heard the rumble of a drum or saw the waving of regimental colors4 ,no sacrifice seemed to be too great1 whether it was asked of man1 woman1 or child4 ,the spirit of materialism for the time being vanished4 ,the newspapers shrunk to a single sheet and all commercial advertisements disappeared4 ,theaters1 art galleries1 museums1 libraries1 closed their doors4 ,upon some streets nearly every shop was closed1 with the simple but eloquent placard ,gone to join the colors4 ,the ,french people neither exulted1 boasted1 nor complained4 ,the only querulous element was a small minority of the large body of ,american tourists1 so suddenly caught in a terrific storm of human passions1 who seemed to feel that this ,red ,sea of blood should part until they could walk dry-shod to the shore of safety4 ,in ,germany similar scenes were enacted and a like spirit of courage and self-sacrifice was shown4 ,it is a reflection upon civilization that two nations1 each so brave1 heroic1 and self-sacrificing1 should1 without their consent and by the miserable and iniquitous folly of scheming statesmen and diplomats1 be plunged into a war1 of which no man can see the end and which has already swept away the flower of their manhood4 ,one great lesson of this conflict may be that no aggressive war ought to be initiated unless the policy of that war is first submitted to the masses of the people1 upon whom the burdens in the last analysis fall and who must pay the dreadful penalty with their treasure and their lives4 ,if the policy of this war had been submitted by a referendum to the ,austrian and ,german peoples with a full statement of the facts of the ,servian controversy1 would they not have rejected a form of arbitrament1 which creates but does not settle questions1 convinces no one1 and only sows the seeds of greater hatred for future and richer harvests of death8 ,if the be-ribboned diplomats and decorated generals of the ,general ,staffs at ,berlin and ,vienna had been without power to precipitate this war1 unless they themselves were willing to occupy the trenches on the firing line1 this war might never have been4 99 99 99 99 99 ,nearly five months have passed since that summer day1 when ,i passed through smiling harvest fields from the mountains to the ,seine4 ,the trenches1 in which innumerable brave men are writing with their blood the records of their statesmen's follies1 are filled with snow4 ,the blackest ,christmas ,eve within the memory of living man has come and gone1 perhaps the blackest1 since in the stillness of the night there fell upon the wondering ears of the shepherds the gracious refrain of ,peace on earth1 good will among men4 ,on that night devout ,german soldiers sang in their trenches in ,flanders and along the ,vistula the hymn of ,christmas ,eve1 ,stille ,nacht1 heilige ,nacht4 ,was this unconscious mockery1 an expression of invincible faith1 or a reversion from habit to the gentler associations of childhood8 ,the spirit of ,christmas was not wholly dead1 for it is narrated that these brave men in ,english and ,german trenches on this saddest of ,christmas ,eves declared for a few hours of their own volition a ,christmas truce4 ,some say that ever 'gainst that season comes ,wherein our ,saviour's birth is celebrated ,the bird of dawning singeth all night long1 ,and then1 they say1 no spirit dare stir abroad1 ,the nights are wholesome1 then no planets strike1 ,so hallowed and so gracious is the time4 ,there is not between the men in one trench and those in another1 each seeking the speediest opportunity to kill the other1 any personal quarrel4 ,on occasion they even fraternize1 only to resume the work of mutual extermination4 ,they would not have quarreled1 if the ,berchtolds1 the von ,bethmann-,hollwegs1 and the von ,jagows had had sufficient loyalty to civilization to submit any possible grievance1 which either had1 to the judgment of ,europe4 ,a spectacle more ghastly than this far-flung battle line has never been witnessed since the world began1 for these soldiers in gray or khaki are not savages but are beings of an advanced civilization4 ,their fighting can have in method none of the old-time chivalry1 such as was witnessed at ,fontenoy when the ,french commander courteously invited his ,english rival to fire first4 ,the present is a chemical1 mechanical war1 than which no circle in ,dante's ,inferno is more horribly repellent4 ,when was better justified the terrible but beautiful imagery in ,milton's poem of ,the ,nativity1 when he says of ,nature3 ,only with speeches fair ,she woos the gentle air ,to hide her guilty front with innocent snow1 ,and on her naked shame ,pollute with sinful blame ,the saintly veil of maiden white to throw2 ,confounded that her ,maker's eyes ,should look so near upon her foul deformities4 ,the snow cannot hide the horrors of the present conflict4 ,even night1 in other wars more merciful1 no longer throws its sable mantle of mercy over the dying and the dead4 ,by the use of powerful searchlights the work of destruction continues4 ,as though the surface of the earth were no longer sufficient for this malignant exercise of the genius of man1 the heavens above and the waters under the earth have become at length the battlefields of the nations4 ,even from the infinite azure falls 4444 a ghastly dew ,from the nations' airy navies1 grappling in the central blue4 ,can all history afford a parallel in malignity to the submarine1 which1 having sunk one vessel with all its human lives1 calmly awaits1 with its periscope projecting above the water like the malignant eye of a devil fish1 the arrival of rescuing ships to sink them also8 ,was the gracious refrain of ,peace on earth1 good will among men1 merely a mockery of man's hope1 making of his civilization a mere mirage8 ,will ,csar's spirit ranging for revenge ,with ,ate from his side come hot from ,hell-- forever crucify afresh and put to an open shame the gentle ,galilean8 ,the angelic song of ,bethlehem was neither the statement of a fact nor even a prophecy4 ,in its true translation it was the statement of a profound moral truth1 upon which in the last analysis the pacification of humanity must depend4 ,the great promise was ,peace on earth to men of good will4 ,peace to the pacific1 that was the great message4 ,for all others the great ,teacher had but one prediction and that was the distress of nations1 444 men's hearts failing them for fear4 ,until civilization can grasp the truth that there can be no peace until there is among all nations a spirit of conciliation and a common desire of justice1 the cause of peace can be little more than a beautiful dream4 ,hague conventions1 international tribunals1 and agreements to arbitrate1 while minimizing the causes of war and affording the machinery for the pacific adjustment of justiciable questions1 will yet prove altogether ineffectual1 irrespective of the size of the parchment1 the imposing character of the seals1 or the length of the red tape1 unless the nations which execute them have sufficient loyalty to civilization to ask only that which seems just and to submit any disputable question to the pacific adjustment of an impartial tribunal4 ,i appreciate that some questions are not justiciable and cannot be arbitrated4 ,the historic movements of races1 like those of glaciers1 cannot be stopped by mortal hands1 and yet even these slow-moving masses of ice are stayed by an ,invisible ,hand and melt at length into gentle and fructifying streams4 ,to create the universal state and to develop a spirit of paramount loyalty to it affords the only solution of this seemingly insoluble problem4 ,history affords no more striking illustration of this fact than the present war4 ,each of the contending nations was pledged to peace4 ,all of the greater ones were signatories to the ,hague ,convention1 but as the chain can never be stronger than its weakest link1 the pacific efforts of ,england1 ,france1 and ,russia to adjust a purely justiciable question by negotiation and mediation wholly failed because ,austria and ,germany had determined to test the mastery of ,europe by an appeal to the sword4 ,the fundamental cause of the conflict was their lack of loyalty to civilization1 due to a misguided and perverted spirit of excessive nationalism4 ,until with the slow-moving progress of mankind the greater unit of the ,universal ,state can be created1 it should be the common and equal concern of all nations1 not merely to defeat this primitive appeal to brute force but to make impossible the recurrence of such an iniquitous reversion to barbarism4 ,to do this1 while any nation unjustly appeals to force1 force is unhappily necessary1 but there would be few occasions to repel force by force if there were sufficient solidarity in mankind to make it the common concern of the civilized world to suppress promptly and effectually any disturber of its peace4 ,if the present wanton attack upon the very foundations of civilization had been regarded as the common concern of all nations1 it would never have taken place and might never occur again4 ,to prevent such recurrence1 thoughtful men of all nations should coperate1 so that when the present titanic struggle is over1 an earnest and universal effort can be made to create such a compact between the civilized nations as will insure coperative effort when any nation attempts to apply the torch of war to the stately edifice of civilization4 ,may not this great war prove the supreme travail of humanity1 whereof this nobler era will be born8 ,it should be the especial duty of the ,united ,states to lead in this onward movement4 ,it has been in no small measure the liberator of mankind4 ,let it now be its pacificator6 ,can it do so in any better spirit than that voiced by one of the noblest of its ,presidents at the close of another gigantic conflict1 of which he was to be the last and greatest martyr1 when he said3 ,with malice toward none1 with charity for all1 with firmness in the right as ,god gives us to see the right1 let us strive to finish the work we are in2 to bind up the nation's wounds2 to care for him who shall have borne the battle1 and for his widow and orphan2 and to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace4 ,,index ,a ,albert1 ,king of the ,belgians1 conversation of1 with ,kaiser1 #ajg ff42 appeal of1 to ,england1 #bah ,attila1 ,kaiser's reference to1 quoted1 #ad ,austria1 given carte blanche1 x2 refuses peace proposals1 xi2 underlying causes of her ultimatum to ,servia1 #ai ff42 annexes ,bosnia and ,herzegovina1 #bj2 keeps secret diplomatic correspondence1 #bc2 ,crown ,prince of1 assassinated1 #bj1 #ca2 silence of1 proves guilt1 #be1 #bf2 refuses ,england's propositions1 #bh2 ,germany's communications to1 withheld from public1 #bh1 #bi2 ,red ,book of1 analyzed1 #cj2 attitude of1 false1 #cd2 ignorance of ultimatum of1 among diplomatic corps1 #cc2 insists situation will be cleared up1 #ce2 of necessity supported by ,germany before ultimatum1 #cf1 #cg2 would not have sent ultimatum without ,germany's backing1 #cf ff42 ultimatum of1 examined and characterized1 #dj1 #da2 ultimatum of1 to ,servia quoted in full1 #dg et seq42 population of1 #ee2 ,austria-,servian relations1 #ef2 promises to respect ,servian territory1 #ei1 #fj2 effect of ultimatum of1 #fa2 attitude of1 towards ,servia's reply1 #hc1 #hd2 most discreditable action of1 #hf2 mobilizes1 #hf2 not urged by ,germany to consider peace proposals1 #hh2 does not reply to ,russian proposal1 #ia2 claims ,servia to be aggressor in first skirmish1 #if2 refuses discussion of ,servian note1 #ih2 again refuses ,russia's pleas for peace1 #ii1 #ajj2 suppression of news in1 #aac2 offered reparation by ,servia1 #aad2 knew that ,servia would refuse demand of judiciary coperation1 #aae2 sounds ,italy regarding war on ,servia1 #aai2 ultimatum designedly withheld from powers1 #aba2 petty finesse of1 #abc2 ultimatum issued when foreign diplomats were out of the way1 #abc1 #abd2 avoids foreign diplomats1 #abe2 believes its interests require punishment of ,servia1 #acf2 national selfishness1 #acf2 bombards ,belgrade1 #adi2 insists upon pursuing action against ,servia1 #agj2 at last agrees to discuss ,servian note with ,russia1 #agc2 causes of partial reversal of policy1 #age ff42 offer of ,july #ca1 #aiad1 #aij et seq42 offer to discuss ultimatum merely nominal1 #aij2 refuses ,russia's stipulation concerning mediation1 #aia2 counter suggestions of1 to ,british ,government1 #aia2 proposal of1 absurd1 #aib2 signs neutrality of ,belgium treaty1 #aih2 suppression of evidence by1 useless1 #bdf2 conclusions concerning actions of1 #bdi et seq42 see ,berchtold1 ,szpry1 ,triple ,alliance ,b ,balkans1 existing status of1 upset1 #bj ,balko-,turkish ,war1 #cd ,ballin1 #bbc ,beck1 ,james ,m41 ancestry of1 vii ,belgium1 invasion of1 a crime1 vii2 ,german demand on1 xi2 the proof of ,germany's belief in von ,bernhardi1 #aa2 publishes ,gray ,paper1 #bc2 ,germany's disregard of rights of1 #aif ff42 took no part in preliminary war controversy1 #aig2 held no interest in ,servian question1 #aig2 treaty of neutrality signed1 #aih2 restricts sale of munitions of war in #ahgj1 #bjj2 ,bismarck's letter to1 #bjj2 feared invasion by ,germany1 #bja2 ,germany professes intention of respecting neutrality of1 #bja ff42 government fears ,german invasion1 #bje1 #bjf2 requests further assurance of ,germany's intentions to respect neutrality1 #bjf2 reassured by ,france1 #bjh2 advised by ,germany of intended invasion1 #baj2 reply of1 to ,german ultimatum1 #bab2 hopes that ,germany would respect neutrality1 #bac1 #bad2 offered military support by ,france1 #bad2 refuses ,french aid1 #bad2 fined by ,germany1 #bag1 #bah2 compared to ,poland1 #bah2 appeal of1 to ,england1 #bah2 effect of ,german invasion1 #bbi1 #bcj2 ,french officers in1 #bcj2 ,german officers and spies in1 #bcj2 ,germany claims neutrality of1 a sham1 #bce2 anticipating ,german invasion1 #bcf ff42 ,german railroads on frontier of1 #bcg2 guilt of1 #bch2 conclusions concerning actions of1 #bdi et seq42 see ,albert1 ,davignon1 ,von der ,elst ,berchtold1 ,count1 removes himself beyond reach of personal parleys1 #gj1 #ga2 conversation of1 with ,russian ,ambassador1 #ii1 #ajj2 assures ,russia that claim against ,servia would be acceptable1 #abc2 contends that ,british suggestions for peace came too late1 #aij2 offer of1 concerning mediation1 #aia2 see ,austria ,bernhardi1 doctrines of1 xvii2 opinions of1 on war quoted1 #g ff42 influence of1 #aj1 #aa2 indictment of1 #ae1 #af2 failure of1 #ag2 opinion of1 concerning ,england's attitude to ,america during ,civil ,war1 #ag1 #bje ,berthelot1 ,m41 prepares ,yellow ,book1 #ajb ,bertie1 ,sir ,f41 #bjg ,bethmann-,hollweg1 ,dr4 von1 quoted1 viii2 message of1 to ,federated ,governments of ,germany quoted1 #dd1 #de2 blunders of1 #aid2 declares ,germany will respect ,belgian neutrality1 #bjb2 attempts to justify ,germany's actions toward ,belgium1 #bae1 #baf2 scrap of paper speech quoted1 #bbj1 #bba2 speech of1 concerning invasion of ,belgium1 #bch2 discusses scrap of paper remark1 #bci ff42 see ,germany ,bismarck1 and militarism1 xix ff42 attitude of1 during peace negotiations1 xix2 and spread eagleism1 xix1 xx2 respects neutrality of ,belgium1 #bjj2 #ajc ,bosnia annexed by ,austria1 #bj ,brussels1 secret documents in1 #bce ,bunsen1 ,sir ,m4 de1 report of1 to ,sir ,edward ,grey regarding ignorance of ,diplomatic ,corps concerning ,austria's ultimatum1 #cb1 #cc2 quoted regarding ,germany's knowledge of ,austrian ultimatum1 #cg ,burgess1 ,prof4 ,john ,w41 supports ,germany1 #bbb ,c ,cambon1 ,jules1 prepares ,yellow ,book1 #ajb2 an estimate of his abilities1 #ajd1 #aje2 advises ,france of ,germany's early mobilization1 #abj2 interviews von ,jagow on ,austrian ultimatum1 #aba ff42 urges peace conference1 #acc2 see ,france ,cook1 ,dr41 ,germany compared to1 #bcb ,crackenthorpe1 ,mr41 ,british ,ambassador at ,belgrade1 instructions to1 #hb ff4 ,crown ,prince of ,germany1 the1 an adherent of brute force1 #ac ,czar1 the champion of ,christianity1 xxii2 despatch to1 from ,kaiser regarding murder of ,archduke1 #adg2 reply of1 to ,kaiser1 #adh2 reply to third message of ,kaiser1 #aea2 last message of1 to ,kaiser1 #ahd1 #ahe2 telegram of1 to ,king ,george1 #ahi2 telegram of1 to ,kaiser1 suppressed by ,german ,foreign ,office1 #ahi2 not guilty1 #ahi ,d ,davignon1 ,m41 conversation of1 with von ,below quoted1 #bjf ,decent respect to the opinions of mankind1 vi ,declaration of ,independence cited1 #c ,dernberg1 ,dr41 #bbd2 claims ,france violated ,belgian neutrality1 #bbh ,disfurth1 ,major-,general von1 on ,germany's war policy1 quoted1 #ab1 #ac ,dryander1 ,dr41 #aig1 #bbc ,e ,england1 anticipation of war in1 xii2 fear of1 for ,germany1 xxi2 has also had its ,bernhardis1 #ae2 ,bernhardi's opinion of attitude during ,civil ,war1 #ag2 publishes ,white ,paper1 #bb2 testimony of ,british ,ambassador at ,vienna cited1 #cb1 #cc2 probability of intervention of1 #ff2 requests time1 #gj1 #ga2 assured of ,french and ,russian alliance1 #gg2 refuses to align definitely with ,russia and ,france1 #gi2 suggests peace conference in ,london1 #ic2 assures ,germany of her desire for peace1 #aec2 requested to act as mediator1 #aia2 reason for use of word instead of ,great ,britain1 #aie2 signs neutrality of ,belgium treaty1 #aih2 inquires as to ,german and ,french intentions toward ,belgium1 #bjg2 requests ,belgium to maintain her neutrality1 #bjg2 questions ,germany as to intentions concerning ,belgium1 #bjh2 ultimatum of1 to ,germany1 #bah2 reply of1 to ,belgian appeal1 #bai2 anticipating ,german invasion of ,belgium1 #bcf ff42 entered war because of invasion of ,belgium1 #bde2 conclusions concerning actions of1 #bdi et seq42 see ,bertie1 ,bunsen1 ,george1 ,king1 ,goschen1 ,grey1 ,triple ,entente ,f ,france1 preparation in1 for war1 xii2 fear of ,germany for1 xxi2 publishes ,yellow ,book1 #bc2 ,french ,premier quoted on ,austrian ,servian troubles1 #ca1 #cb2 relations of1 with ,germany1 #ef2 assures ,russia and ,england of her support1 #gg2 refuses ,germany's request to influence ,russia1 #ib2 urges ,germany to join ,powers in preventing invasion of ,servia1 #ie2 assured that ,germany wishes peace1 #aca2 suspicion of1 toward ,germany1 #acb2 supports ,england's request for conference1 #acc2 declaration of war on1 delayed1 #aib2 ultimatum to1 #aib2 invasion of1 #aib et seq4 reason of1 for not assuming aggressive1 #aic2 invasion of1 to follow immediately or to precede severance of diplomatic relations1 #aid2 signs neutrality of ,belgium treaty1 #aih2 respects ,belgium neutrality1 #bjj2 reaffirms intention of respecting ,belgian neutrality1 #bjf2 reply of1 to ,england's query regarding ,belgian neutrality1 #bjg2 declares to ,belgium intention of respecting neutrality1 #bjh2 cited by ,germany as cause for violation of ,belgian neutrality1 #baj1 #baa2 offers military support to ,belgium1 #bad2 overt acts of1 #bch1 #bci2 first death in war1 #bec2 attitude of people in1 #bed ff42 see ,berthelot1 ,cambon1 ,triple ,entente1 ,viviani ,franco-,german ,war1 cause of1 #ai ,frederick the ,great1 #b2 effect of1 on ,germany to-day1 #aj ,fuchs1 ,dr41 on hatred1 quoted1 #aa2 on preparedness for war1 quoted1 #aa ,furor ,teutonicus directed against ,england1 xxii ,g ,george1 ,king of ,england1 message of1 to ,kaiser1 #aec2 telegram of1 to ,czar1 #aee2 message to1 from ,kaiser regarding neutrality of ,france1 #ahg ,germany1 confesses its crime1 viii2 suppression of evidence by1 ix2 gives ,austria carte blanche1 x2 refuses to accept peace proposals1 xi2 invades ,luxemburg1 xi2 fears ,god but nothing else1 xix ff42 attitude of1 toward rest of world1 xix et seq42 foreign policy of1 xxii2 real attitude of people1 xxiii2 ,german people misled1 xxvi2 endeavors to gain approval of ,america1 #d2 espouses visions of ,machiavelli1 #e ff42 attitude of1 toward war1 #f ff42 avowed attitude of1 towards world1 #f et seq42 doctrine of1 #aa et seq42 war policies of1 shown by quotations1 #aa et seq42 spirit of the ruling classes1 #ac2 domination of ,europe established1 #ai1 #bj2 attitude of1 on the ,balkans1 #ai et seq42 publishes ,white ,paper1 #bb2 suppression of facts by1 #bg2 communications of1 to ,austria withheld from ,white ,paper1 #bh1 #bi2 advance knowledge of ,austria's ultimatum1 #cb et seq42 only power to know of ,austria's ultimatum1 #cc2 attitude of1 false1 #cd2 ,ambassador to ,england suggests ,russia as mediator with regard to ,servia1 #ce2 ,ambassador to ,england denies knowledge of ,austria's actions1 #ce2 disclaims knowledge of ,austria's ultimatum1 #cf2 guilty of duplicity regarding ,austria's ultimatum1 #cf2 unquestionably had previous knowledge of ,austria's ultimatum1 #cg2 sincerity of attitude examined1 #ch ff42 pacific protestations of1 insincere1 #ch2 first statement of ,germany's position regarding ,austro-,servian problem1 #ci ff42 greatest diplomatic blunder1 #ci1 #dj2 further proof of her knowledge of ,austrian ultimatum1 #da2 supports ,austria1 #da2 anticipates ,servia's refusal1 #db2 instructions to ,ambassador1 #dc2 ,ambassador to ,u4 ,s4 admits advance knowledge of ,austrian ultimatum1 #df2 takes steps to allay indignation of ,u4 ,s41 #df2 warnings of1 to ,servia1 #ef2 relations of1 with ,france1 #ef2 reason for actions of1 #fe ff42 fails to move for peace1 #fi1 #gj2 excuses for not granting time extension1 #ga ff42 refuses ,russia's request for time extension1 #gc ff42 fear of1 for ,england's1 #gi2 principal fear of1 #gi2 attitude of1 toward ,servia's reply1 #hc1 #hd2 withholds from people adequate information on ,servia's reply1 #he2 reply to ,england's further requests for time1 #hg2 disclaims any responsibility for ,austrian ultimatum1 #hi1 #ij2 willing to have ,england mediate between ,austria and ,russia1 #hi2 states that ,austria cannot draw back in ,servian matter1 #hi2 fatal policy of1 #ia2 declares ,russia responsible for war1 #ib2 requests ,france to influence ,russia1 #ib2 refuses to attend peace conference in ,london1 #ic2 refuses ,russia's request to urge conciliation in ,austria1 #ie2 refuses ,france's request to prevent invasion of ,servia1 #if2 insists on exclusion of all possibility of mediation1 #ig2 claims efforts for mediation came too late1 #ih2 excuse of1 for not assenting to peace conference1 #ajj1 #aja2 incapable diplomats of1 #ajc2 attitude of people toward ,kaiser1 #aji ff42 knew that ,servia would refuse demand of judiciary coperation1 #aae2 further proof of ,germany's advance knowledge of ,austria's ultimatum1 #aaf2 petty finesse of1 #abc2 excuse of1 for not getting extension of time1 #abd2 avoids foreign diplomats1 #abe2 diplomats reluctant to leave copies of notes1 #abg ff42 ,ambassador to ,france denies agreement with ,austria over note to ,servia1 #abi2 assures ,france that she is for peace1 #acj2 refuses ,france's request for peace conference1 #acc2 closest interests of1 #acf2 national selfishness1 #acf2 believes ,russia will keep out1 #adj2 believes ,france in no position for war1 #adj2 belief of1 regarding war preparedness and action of other nations1 #adj1 #ada2 ultimatum to ,russia1 #ada2 preparedness for war1 #adb2 assured of no provocative action on part of ,russia1 #aeb2 offer of1 to ,england1 #aei ff42 advances upon ,france1 #afa2 ,french report of army movements1 #afa1 #afb2 evades ,england's request for peace suggestion1 #afi2 declaration of war by1 quoted1 #ahc1 #ahd2 proof of preparedness of1 #ahh1 #ahi2 declares war on ,russia1 #aib2 ultimatum of1 to ,france1 #aib2 delays declaration of war upon ,france1 #aib2 awaits ,french act of aggression1 #aib2 ,ambassador leaves ,paris1 #aib2 ready for invasion of ,france1 #aic2 pacific intentions of1 false1 #aic1 #aid2 inconsistency in policies of1 #aid2 diplomats and army not in harmony1 #aid2 disregard of1 for rights of ,belgium1 #aif2 respected neutrality of ,belgium in #ahgj1 #bjj2 professes intention of respecting ,belgian neutrality1 #bja ff42 recognizes obligations of neutrality treaty1 #bjb2 ,foreign ,office suppresses telegram of ,czar1 #ahi2 places responsibility for war upon ,russia1 #aib2 evades ,england's question concerning ,belgian neutrality1 #bjh2 insists she is forced to invade ,belgium1 #baj2 declares ,france will invade ,belgium1 #baj2 excuses of1 for invasion of ,belgium1 #baj ff42 declares war upon ,belgium1 #bae2 invades ,belgium1 #bae2 invasion of ,belgium considered and analyzed1 #bag ff42 imposes fines upon ,belgium1 #bag ff42 reply of1 to ,english ultimatum1 #bbj2 declares necessity forces invasion of ,belgium1 #bbj2 defense of1 for invasion of ,belgium1 #bbd2 moral isolation of1 #bbi2 compared to ,dr4 ,cook1 #bcb2 plea of guilty1 #bcc ff42 claims discovery of secret documents in ,brussels1 #bce2 strategic railroads of1 #bcg2 campaign which should have been followed1 #bde2 suppression of evidence by1 useless1 #bdf2 conclusions concerning actions of1 #bdi et seq42 attitude of people in1 #bef2 see ,kaiser1 ,lichnowsky1 ,prussia1 ,triple ,alliance1 von ,below1 ,bethmann-,hollweg1 von ,heeringen1 von ,jagow1 von ,schoen ,gladstone1 did not rely on neutrality of ,belgium treaty1 #aih2 speech of1 concerning ,belgium1 quoted1 #aii2 speech of1 cited by ,shaw1 #aii ,goschen1 ,sir ,e41 on ,germany's position in ,austro-,servian trouble1 quoted1 #ci2 report of1 regarding ,england's request for time1 #gb2 conversation of1 with von ,jagow preceding ,england's declaration of war1 #bbj ff42 instructions to1 ,august #dth1 #bai ,gray ,paper 7,belgium71 ,belgium publishes1 #bc2 quoted1 #bjb1 #bjh1 #baj1 #baa1 #bah ,great ,britain1 see ,england ,grey1 ,sir ,edward1 compared to ,pitt1 #bb2 conversation of1 with ,german ,ambassador regarding ,austro-,servian trouble1 #ce ff42 advised that ,germany had knowledge of ,austrian ultimatum1 #cg2 report to1 from ,british ,ambassador at ,berlin1 ,july #bb;d1 #ch1 #ci1 #bh2 did not anticipate ,austrian ultimatum2 deceived by ,germany1 #cf2 conversation of1 with ,austrian ,minister1 quoted1 #gj1 #ga2 restrictions binding actions of1 #gi1 #hj2 instructions of1 to ,british ,ambassador at ,belgrade1 #hb2 further plea for time1 #hf2 further proposals of1 for peace1 #hi2 suggests peace conference of ,powers in ,london1 #ic2 chief merit of1 #aje2 report of1 by ,france1 of ,german army movements1 #afa1 #afb2 replies to ,germany on neutrality of ,england1 #afb2 that ,germany suggest means of preventing ,austro-,servian war1 #afg2 continues his efforts for peace1 #agb1 #agc2 last attempt of1 to preserve peace1 #ahj1 #aha2 conversation of1 cited by ,germany1 #aia2 inquiry of1 concerning results of ,england's neutrality1 #aic2 conversations of1 with ,german ,ambassador concerning ,belgian neutrality1 #bji2 instructions to ,british ,ambassador at ,berlin1 ,august #dth1 #bai2 refutes statement concerning secret documents1 #bcf2 see ,bunsen2 ,england2 ,george1 ,king2 ,goschen ,h ,haeckel1 ,ernst1 #aig ,hague ,tribunal1 due to ,czar's initiative1 #ahi2 ,russia desires ,austro-,servian problem referred to1 #ahi2 actions taken by1 in #aijg1 #bjd ff42 #bbf2 #bea ,hamburger ,nachrichten1 quoted1 #ab1 #ac ,hamilton1 ,alexander1 quoted1 #bbg ,harden1 ,maximilian1 on ,germany's war policies1 quoted1 #ab2 #bdc ,harnack1 #bbb ,herzegovina annexed by ,austria1 #bj ,i ,italy1 not bound by ,triple ,alliance1 x2 attitude of1 #bc ff42 as affected by ,triple ,alliance1 #bd2 attitude of1 #bd1 #be2 ,german messages to1 suppressed1 #bi2 told that situation would be cleared up1 #ce2 coperation of1 dependent upon ,russia's actions1 #fe2 not advised of intended actions of ,germany and ,austria1 #aag2 previously sounded by ,austria1 #aai2 ,germany schemes to acquire support of1 #aia1 #aib2 see ,san ,giuliano ,j ,jefferson1 ,thomas1 quoted1 vi ,junkerdom1 see ,prussia ,k ,kaiser1 returns to ,berlin from ,norway1 xi2 extols the ,czar1 xxii2 spirit of absolutism of1 #i2 divine right of1 #i2 quoted1 #i2 fanatic absolutism of1 #i2 an adherent of brute force1 #ac2 ,china speech of1 quoted1 #ad2 ,hun speech1 quoted1 #ad2 ,cambon #aiac report concerning1 #ajg2 position of1 #aji et seq42 attitude and actions of1 in early part of trouble1 #ach et seq42 ultimatum of1 to ,russia1 #ada2 responsibility of1 for war1 #ada1 #adb2 character of1 #adb ff42 does not act in interests of peace1 #ade ff42 despatch of1 to ,czar regarding murder of ,archduke1 quoted1 #adg2 second message to ,czar1 #adi2 fatal error of1 #aej2 third message to ,czar1 #aea2 reply of1 to ,king ,george1 #aed2 message of1 to ,czar regarding ,russia's mobilization1 #aee2 estimate and discussion of actions of1 #aeg2 preparing for war1 #aei2 taking steps to alienate ,england from ,allies1 #aei ff42 issues ultimatum to ,russia1 #agf2 reply of1 to last message of ,czar1 #ahe1 #ahf2 message of1 to ,england regarding neutrality of ,france1 #ahg2 awful responsibility of1 #ahh2 telegram of1 to ,king ,george1 quoted1 #aic2 reason of1 for telegram to ,king ,george1 #aic2 telegram of1 analyzed1 #aic2 blunders of1 #aid2 see ,germany ,kudachef1 ,prince1 action of1 regarding time extension1 #gc ,l ,lamprecht1 #bbc ,lichnowsky1 ,prince1 affects ignorance1 #aba2 conversation with1 cited1 #aia2 query to1 regarding results of ,england's neutrality1 #aic2 conversation of1 with ,sir ,edward ,grey concerning ,belgian neutrality1 #bji2 #hi1 #ij2 see ,germany ,lige1 ,french officers at1 #bcj ,luxemburg1 invaded1 xi2 wrong done to1 #bdc ,m ,machiavelli1 vicious principles of1 #d2 ,bernhardi compared to1 #af ,mahan1 ,admiral1 #aa ,margerie1 ,m4 de1 prepares ,yellow ,book1 #ajb ,militrische ,rundschau1 quoted1 #aad ,moltke1 von1 opinion of1 cited1 #f1 #g ,morocco controversy1 #aji ff4 ,n ,namur1 ,french officers at1 #bcj ,napoleon ,,iii41 honor of1 #bja ,newspapers1 ,american1 lack of ,austrian dispatches to1 before war1 #ca ,nietzsche1 #f ,o ,orange ,paper 7,russia71 ,russia publishes1 #bb2 quoted regarding ,germany's knowledge of ,austrian ultimatum1 #cf2 quoted1 #cf1 #fh1 #fi1 #gc1 #gd1 #he1 #ia1 #ib1 #ie1 #ig ,p ,pachitch1 ,servian ,premier1 absent from ,belgrade1 #cb ,penn1 ,william1 treaty of1 compared to the scrap of paper1 xvi ,poland1 compared to ,belgium1 #bah ,prussia1 ,prussian ,junkerdom1 #h ff42 signs neutrality of ,belgium1 treaty1 #aih ,r ,red ,book1 analyzed1 #cj2 discloses true ,austrian policy1 #aij2 quoted1 #aij1 #aia ,reichstag1 debate in1 quoted1 #bja1 #bjb1 #bdj1 #bda ,rumbold1 ,sir ,h41 letter to1 quoted in ,white ,paper1 #ce ,russia1 intimidated by ,germany1 #bj2 forced to submit in ,balkans1 #bj2 publishes ,orange ,paper1 #bb2 suggested by ,germany as mediator between ,austria and ,servia1 #ce2 assured of ,germany's ignorance of ,austrian ultimatum1 #cf2 assured that ,austria will not seize ,servian territory1 #ei1 #fj2 possibility of intervention of1 #fe2 attitude of1 #fg ff42 message of1 to ,austria1 quoted1 #fh1 #fi2 request for time refused1 #ga2 assured that ,austria contemplates no acquisition of ,servian territory1 #gd1 #ge2 confers with ,france and ,england1 #gg2 suggestions of1 to avoid conflict1 #gg1 #gh2 willing to leave ,austro-,servian trouble in hands of the ,powers1 #hj1 #ha12 proposal of1 to ,austria1 #ia2 requests ,germany to urge conciliation with ,austria1 #ie2 proposes its services in keeping ,servia quiet1 #if2 again proposes peace conference1 #ii2 assured that ,austria's claims would be acceptable1 #abc2 charge put off until too late1 #abe2 ultimatum of ,germany to1 #ada12 assures ,germany of no provocative action upon her part1 #aeb2 offers to stop all military preparations1 #afd ff2 orders general mobilization1 #aga2 refuses to reply to ,germany's ultimatum1 #agh2 suggests referring ,austro-,servian problem to ,hague1 #ahi2 not guilty1 #ahi2 offer of1 to suspend military preparations1 #aij2 cannot treat direct with ,austria1 #aia2 requests ,england to act as mediator1 #aia2 stipulates suspension of hostilities during mediation1 #aia2 signs neutrality of ,belgium treaty1 #aih2 see ,czar1 ,kudachef1 ,sazonof2 see also ,triple ,entente ,russo-,japanese war1 xxii ,s ,san ,giuliano1 ,marquis di1 ,italian ,foreign ,minister1 quoted1 #aai ,sazonof1 suggestion of1 to avoid conflict1 #gg1 #gh2 good work of1 #aje2 message of1 to ,austria regarding ultimatum1 #abf1 #bh ,schmidt1 #bbc ,scrap of ,paper1 vi2 xvi2 ,bethmann-,hollweg's remark1 quoted1 #bbj1 #bba2 discusses his remark1 #bci ff42 defense for1 use of phrase1 #bci ff42 ,secret ,documents1 contents of supposed1 #bce ff4 ,sedan1 battle of1 result of ,belgium neutrality1 #bja ,serajevo1 murder of ,crown ,prince of ,austria at1 #bj1 #ca ,servia1 ultimatum to1 #ai2 advised by ,france1 ,russia1 and ,great ,britain1 #ca2 formally disclaims responsibility for murder of ,archduke1 #cc2 probable effect of humiliation of1 #dj2 refusal of ,austrian demands anticipated1 #db2 reply to ,austrian ultimatum quoted in full1 #dg et seq42 population of1 #ee2 warned by ,germany1 #ef2 ,austro-,servian relations1 #ef2 result of acquiescence to ,austria1 #fj2 requested by ,triple ,entente to make conciliatory reply1 #hj2 reply of1 in accord with requests of ,triple ,entente1 #hc2 offers ,austria ample reparation1 #aad2 subjugation of1 the bone of contention1 #aib ,shaw1 ,george ,bernard1 opinions of1 cited1 #ad1 #ae2 defense of ,germany1 #ad ff42 quoted regarding neutrality of ,belgium treaty1 #aih2 quoted1 #bdh ,siemens1 #bbc ,slav1 the1 fear of ,germany for1 xxi ,symonds1 ,john ,addington1 quoted1 #d1 #e ,szpry1 ,count1 #abf ,t ,tisza1 ,count1 refuses to disclose results of judicial inquiry into murder of ,archduke1 #aac ,treitschke1 doctrines of1 xvii2 ,politik1 cited1 #f2 doctrines of1 based on ,machiavelli1 #f2 influence of1 #aj ,treaty of #ahgj1 #aih ff4 ,treaty of #ahci1 #aih ff42 #bbe2 #bea ,triple ,alliance1 x2 as affecting ,italy1 #bd2 terms of1 #bd2 #aib2 see ,austria1 ,germany1 ,italy ,triple ,entente1 proposes peace1 xi2 lulled into false security1 #cb ff42 movements and reports of leading statesmen of1 just previous to declaration of war1 #cb ff42 ignorant of ,austria's ultimatum1 #cc1 #fe2 still labors for peace1 #hf2 see also1 ,france1 ,great ,britain1 ,russia ,turkey1 ,german officers in1 #bcj ,u ,united ,states1 supposititious invasion of1 by ,germany1 #bbe ff42 position of1 #bdh ff4 ,v ,viviani1 ,premier1 quoted regarding ,austro-,servian trouble1 #ca1 #cb2 reply of1 to ,germany1 #aib2 reply of1 to ,england's query regarding ,belgian neutrality1 #bjg2 see ,france ,voltaire1 quoted1 xvi ,von ,below1 declares ,germany will respect ,belgian neutrality1 #bjc2 #bjf2 see ,germany ,von ,blow1 #bbc ,von der ,elst1 ,baron1 #baj1 #baa2 see ,belgium ,von ,gwinner1 #bbc ,von ,heeringen1 declares ,belgian neutrality will be respected1 #bjc2 see ,germany ,von ,jagow1 ,herr1 conversation of1 cited1 #ch1 #ci2 representations of1 on ,germany's position in ,austro-,servian matter1 #ci2 refuses to attend peace conference in ,london1 #ic2 on ,austrian ultimatum1 quoted1 #id2 conversations of1 with ,cambon1 #abb ff42 refuses peace conference1 #acc2 blunders of1 #aid2 declares ,germany will respect ,belgian neutrality1 #bjb2 conversations with ,sir ,edward ,goschen preceding ,england's declaration of war1 #bai ff42 states real purpose of ,germany's invasion of ,belgium1 #bbb2 see ,germany ,von ,mach1 claims ,france violated ,belgian neutrality1 #bbh2 on ,french officers in ,belgium1 quoted1 #bca1 #bcb2 ,what ,germany ,wants1 #bcc2 arguments of1 in defense of ,germany1 #bcc ff42 #aig ,von ,moltke1 ,general1 blunders of1 #aid ,von ,posadowsky1 #bbc ,von ,schmoller1 #bbc ,von ,schoen1 ,baron1 assures ,france that ,germany is for peace1 #acj2 makes public statement through ,french ,foreign ,office1 #aca ff4 ,von ,wilamowitz1 #bbc ,w ,what ,germany ,wants1 cited1 #bcc ,white ,paper 7,english71 published1 #bb2 analyzed1 #bg ff42 quoted1 #cd ff42 #cf2 #cg2 #ch2 #ci2 #da2 #ef2 #gf2 #hb1 #hc2 #hf2 #ic2 #id2 #ig2 #ii2 #aei ff42 #afg1 #afh1 #afi2 #bjg1 #bjh2 #bji2 #bai et seq42 see ,england ,white ,paper 7,german71 published1 #bb2 suppression of facts in1 #bg ff42 suppresses instructions to ,ambassador1 #aia2 quoted1 #bh2 #ch2 #da2 #dc1 #dd2 #de2 #fg2 #ge2 #hg2 #adg2 #adi ff42 ix2 #aib2 #aic2 see ,germany ,y ,yellow ,book 7,france71 published1 #bc2 additional data in1 #ajb ff42 contents of first chapter of1 #ajf ff42 throws light on petty finesse of ,germany and ,austria1 #abc2 cited1 #df2 quoted1 #ajg ff42 second chapter of1 #aac et seq42 quoted1 #aac1 #aad1 #aae2 #aaf1 #aag2 #abb1 #abc2 #abe2 #abi2 #acc ff42 see ,france ,z ,zabern incident1 the1 attitude of ,crown ,prince toward1 #ad ,,myrtle ,,reed',s ,,novels ,may be had wherever books are sold4 ,ask for ,grosset ,dunlap's list ,,lavender ,,and ,,old ,,lace4 ,a charming story of a quaint corner of ,new ,england where bygone romance finds a modern parallel4 ,the story centers round the coming of love to the young people on the staff of a newspaper--and it is one of the prettiest1 sweetest and quaintest of old fashioned love stories1 444 a rare book1 exquisite in spirit and conception1 full of delicate fancy1 of tenderness1 of delightful humor and spontaneity4 ,a ,,spinner ,,in ,,the ,,sun4 ,miss ,myrtle ,reed may always be depended upon to write a story in which poetry1 charm1 tenderness and humor are combined into a clever and entertaining book4 ,her characters are delightful and she always displays a quaint humor of expression and a quiet feeling of pathos which give a touch of active realism to all her writings4 ,in ,a ,spinner in the ,sun she tells an old-fashioned love story1 of a veiled lady who lives in solitude and whose features her neighbors have never seen4 ,there is a mystery at the heart of the book that throws over it the glamour of romance4 ,,the ,,master',s ,,violin4 ,a love story in a musical atmosphere4 ,a picturesque1 old ,german virtuoso is the reverent possessor of a genuine ,cremona4 ,he consents to take for his pupil a handsome youth who proves to have an aptitude for technique1 but not the soul of an artist4 ,the youth has led the happy1 careless life of a modern1 well-to-do young ,american and he cannot1 with his meagre past1 express the love1 the passion and the tragedies of life and all its happy phases as can the master who has lived life in all its fulness4 ,but a girl comes into his life--a beautiful bit of human driftwood that his aunt had taken into her heart and home1 and through his passionate love for her1 he learns the lessons that life has to give--and his soul awakes4 ,founded on a fact that all artists realize4 ,ask for a compete free list of ,g4 ,d4 ,popular ,copyrighted ,fiction ,,grosset ,,dunlap1 #ebf ,,west #bfth ,,st41 ,,new ,,york ,,zane ,,grey',s ,,novels ,may be had wherever books are sold4 ,ask for ,grosset ,dunlap's list ,,the ,,light ,,of ,,western ,,stars4 ,colored frontispiece by ,w4 ,herbert ,dunton4 ,most of the action of this story takes place near the turbulent ,mexican border of the present day4 ,a ,new ,york society girl buys a ranch which becomes the center of frontier warfare4 ,her loyal cowboys defend her property from bandits1 and her superintendent rescues her when she is captured by them4 ,a surprising climax brings the story to a delightful close4 ,,desert ,,gold4 ,illustrated by ,douglas ,duer4 ,another fascinating story of the ,mexican border4 ,two men1 lost in the desert1 discover gold when1 overcome by weakness1 they can go no farther4 ,the rest of the story describes the recent uprising along the border1 and ends with the finding of the gold which the two prospectors had willed to the girl who is the story's heroine4 ,,riders ,,of ,,the ,,purple ,,sage4 ,illustrated by ,douglas ,duer4 ,a picturesque romance of ,utah of some forty years ago when ,mormon authority ruled4 ,in the persecution of ,jane ,withersteen1 a rich ranch owner1 we are permitted to see the methods employed by the invisible hand of the ,mormon ,church to break her will4 ,,the ,,last ,,of ,,the ,,plainsmen4 ,illustrated with photograph reproductions4 ,this is the record of a trip which the author took with ,buffalo ,jones1 known as the preserver of the ,american bison1 across the ,arizona desert and of a hunt in that wonderful country of yellow crags1 deep canons and giant pines4 ,it is a fascinating story4 ,,the ,,heritage ,,of ,,the ,,desert4 ,jacket in color4 ,frontispiece4 ,this big human drama is played in the ,painted ,desert4 ,a lovely girl1 who has been reared among ,mormons1 learns to love a young ,new ,englander4 ,the ,mormon religion1 however1 demands that the girl shall become the second wife of one of the ,mormons-- ,well1 that's the problem of this sensational1 big selling story4 ,,betty ,,zane4 ,illustrated by ,louis ,f4 ,grant4 ,this story tells of the bravery and heroism of ,betty1 the beautiful young sister of old ,colonel ,zane1 one of the bravest pioneers4 ,life along the frontier1 attacks by ,indians1 ,betty's heroic defense of the beleaguered garrison at ,wheeling1 the burning of the ,fort1 and ,betty's final race for life1 make up this never-to-be-forgotten story4 ,,grosset ,,dunlap1 ,,publishers1 ,,new ,,york ,,john ,,fox1 ,,jr',s4 ,,stories ,,of ,,the ,,kentucky ,,mountains ,may be had wherever books are sold4 ,ask for ,grosset and ,dunlap's list4 ,,the ,,trail ,,of ,,the ,,lonesome ,,pine4 ,illustrated by ,f4 ,c4 ,yohn4 ,the lonesome pine from which the story takes its name was a tall tree that stood in solitary splendor on a mountain top4 ,the fame of the pine lured a young engineer through ,kentucky to catch the trail1 and when he finally climbed to its shelter he found not only the pine but the foot-prints of a girl4 ,and the girl proved to be lovely1 piquant1 and the trail of these girlish foot-prints led the young engineer a madder chase than the trail of the lonesome pine4 ,,the ,,little ,,shepherd ,,of ,,kingdom ,,come4 ,illustrated by ,f4 ,c4 ,yohn4 ,this is a story of ,kentucky1 in a settlement known as ,kingdom ,come4 ,it is a life rude1 semi-barbarous2 but natural and honest1 from which often springs the flower of civilization4 ,chad1 the little shepherd did not know who he was nor whence he came--he had just wandered from door to door since early childhood1 seeking shelter with kindly mountaineers who gladly fathered and mothered this waif about whom there was such a mystery--a charming waif1 by the way1 who could play the banjo better than anyone else in the mountains4 ,a ,,knight ,,of ,,the ,,cumberland4 ,illustrated by ,f4 ,c4 ,yohn4 ,the scenes are laid along the waters of the ,cumberland1 the lair of moonshiner and feudsman4 ,the knight is a moonshiner's son1 and the heroine a beautiful girl perversely christened ,the ,blight4 ,two impetuous young ,southerners fall under the spell of ,the ,blight's charms and she learns what a large part jealousy and pistols have in the love making of the mountaineers4 ,included in this volume is ,hell fer-,sartain and other stories1 some of ,mr4 ,fox's most entertaining ,cumberland valley narratives4 ,ask for complete list of ,g4 ,d4 ,popular ,copyrighted ,fiction ,,grosset ,,dunlap1 #ebf ,,west #bf,,th ,,st41 ,,new ,,york ,,jack ,,london',s ,,novels ,may be had wherever books are sold4 ,ask for ,grosset ,dunlap's list4 ,,john ,,barleycorn4 ,illustrated by ,h4 ,t4 ,dunn4 ,this remarkable book is a record of the author's own amazing experiences ,this big1 brawny world rover1 who has been acquainted with alcohol from boyhood1 comes out boldly against ,john ,barleycorn4 ,it is a string of exciting adventures1 yet it forcefully conveys an unforgettable idea and makes a typical ,jack ,london book4 ,,the ,,valley ,,of ,,the ,,moon4 ,frontispiece by ,george ,harper4 ,the story opens in the city slums where ,billy ,roberts1 teamster and ex prize fighter1 and ,saxon ,brown1 laundry worker1 meet and love and marry4 ,they tramp from one end of ,california to the other1 and in the ,valley of the ,moon find the farm paradise that is to be their salvation4 ,,burning ,,daylight4 ,four illustrations4 ,the story of an adventurer who went to ,alaska and laid the foundations of his fortune before the gold hunters arrived4 ,bringing his fortunes to the ,states he is cheated out of it by a crowd of money kings1 and recovers it only at the muzzle of his gun4 ,he then starts out as a merciless exploiter on his own account4 ,finally he takes to drinking and becomes a picture of degeneration4 ,about this time he falls in love with his stenographer and wins her heart but not her hand and then--but read the story6 ,a ,,son ,,of ,,the ,,sun4 ,illustrated by ,a4 ,o4 ,fischer and ,c4 ,w4 ,ashley4 ,david ,grief was once a light haired1 blue eyed youth who came from ,england to the ,south ,seas in search of adventure4 ,tanned like a native and as lithe as a tiger1 he became a real son of the sun4 ,the life appealed to him and he remained and became very wealthy4 ,,the ,,call ,,of ,,the ,,wild4 ,illustrations by ,philip ,r4 ,goodwin and ,charles ,livingston ,bull4 ,decorations by ,charles ,e4 ,hooper4 ,a book of dog adventures as exciting as any man's exploits could be4 ,here is excitement to stir the blood and here is picturesque color to transport the reader to primitive scenes4 ,,the ,,sea ,,wolf4 ,illustrated by ,w4 ,j4 ,aylward4 ,told by a man whom ,fate suddenly swings from his fastidious life into the power of the brutal captain of a sealing schooner4 ,a novel of adventure warmed by a beautiful love episode that every reader will hail with delight4 ,,white ,,fang4 ,illustrated by ,charles ,livingston ,bull4 ,white ,fang is part dog1 part wolf and all brute1 living in the frozen north2 he gradually comes under the spell of man's companionship1 and surrenders all at the last in a fight with a bull dog4 ,thereafter he is man's loving slave4 ,,grosset ,,dunlap1 ,,publishers1 ,,new ,,york ,,transcriber',s ,,notes3 #a4 ,changes have been made to correct obvious typesetters' errors2 otherwise1 every effort has been made to remain true to the author's words and intent4 #b4 ,on some pages in this book1 titles were underlined2 this has been indicated by the equals sign 77 before and after the title4