---------------------------------------- -------------------- ,transcriber's ,note ,obvious typographical errors have been corrected in this text4 ,for a complete list1 please see the bottom of this document4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------- ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,spinoza ,,edited ,,by ,,joseph ,,ratner ,,tudor ,,publishing ,,company ,printed in the ,united ,states of ,america ,,preface ,selections usually need no justifications4 ,some justification1 however1 of the treatment accorded ,spinoza's ,ethics may be necessary in this place4 ,the object in taking the ,ethics as much as possible out of the geometrical form1 was not to improve upon the author's text2 it was to give the lay reader a text of ,spinoza he would find pleasanter to read and easier to understand4 ,to the practice of popularization1 ,spinoza1 one may confidently feel1 would not be averse4 ,he himself gave a short popular statement of his philosophy in the ,political ,treatise4 ,the lay reader of philosophy is chiefly1 if not wholly1 interested in grasping a philosophic point of view4 ,he is not interested in highly meticulous details1 and still less is he interested in checking up the author's statements to see if the author is consistent with himself4 ,he takes such consistency1 even if unwarrantedly1 for granted4 ,a continuous reading of the original ,ethics1 even on a single topic1 is impossible4 ,the subject-matter is coherent1 but the propositions do not hang together4 ,by omitting the formal statement of the propositions2 by omitting many of the demonstrations and almost all cross-references2 by grouping related sections of the ,ethics 7with selections from the ,letters and the ,improvement of the ,understanding7 under sectional headings1 the text has been made more continuous4 ,it is the only time1 probably1 dismembering a treatise actually made it more unified4 ,in an ,appendix1 the sources of the selections from the ,ethics are summarily indicated4 ,it would be a meaningless burden on the text to make full acknowledgments in footnotes4 ,for the same reason1 there has been almost no attempt made to show1 by means of the conventional devices1 the re-arrangements and abridgements that have been made4 ,every care has been taken not to distort in any way the meaning of the text4 ,and that is all that is important in a volume of this kind4 ,wherever possible ,spinoza's own chapter headings have been retained2 and some of the sectional headings have either been taken from1 or have been based upon expressions in the text4 ,it would have been more in keeping with contemporary form to use the title ,on ,historical ,method or ,the ,new ,history instead of ,of the ,interpretation of ,scripture2 a chapter on ,race ,superiority would sound more important than one on ,the ,vocation of the ,hebrews2 but such modernizing changes were not made because the aim has been to give the reader a text as faithful to the original as the character of this volume would allow4 ,the selections have been taken from ,elwes' translation of the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus1 ,a ,political ,treatise and the ,improvement of the ,understanding2 and from ,white's translation of the ,ethics4 ,these translations are no longer in copyright and hence it was not necessary to secure permission from the publishers to use them4 ,nonetheless1 grateful acknowledgment is their just due4 ,white1 in his translation1 uses1 not altogether without reason1 the stilted term affect instead of the natural ,english term emotion4 ,affect is closer to the ,latin and it more clearly indicates the metaphysical status of the emotions as modes or affectiones of ,substance4 ,still1 practically no one has followed ,white in his usage4 ,the reasons are not difficult to discover4 ,besides being a stilted term1 having no legitimate ,english status1 affect very often makes the text extremely obscure1 even unintelligible to one who has no antecedent knowledge of it1 because besides having also its ordinary ,english meaning1 affect is used by ,white to mean mode or modification 7affection7 as well4 ,in the circumstances1 therefore1 ,i thought it advisable to change affect to emotion and affection to modification or mode4 ,i also corrected ,white's translation of the ,definition of ,attribute by deleting the word if4 ,in spite of the need for these changes1 it was desirable to use ,white's translation because it is the most accurate and elegant extant4 ,furthermore1 in both ,white and ,elwes ,i have consistently capitalized the term ,nature1 in accordance with ,spinoza's ,latin text2 ,white and ,elwes capitalize it only desultorily4 ,i have made some slight changes in ,elwes' mid-,victorian punctuation and ,white's all-too-faithful paragraphing4 ,the ,latin paragraphs of the ,ethics are extremely long4 ,these changes are all external and as far as ,i can see thoroughly legitimate as well as justified4 ,the very slight and very occasional internal changes ,i have made--other than those already accounted for--,i have indicated by square brackets4 ,i am indebted to ,mr4 ,houston ,peterson1 of ,columbia ,university1 for suggesting to me the idea of arranging a volume of selections from ,spinoza4 ,i am alone responsible1 however1 for the actual selections and arrangements1 and for the idea of taking the ,ethics out of its geometrical form4 ,professor ,morris ,r4 ,cohen1 of the ,college of the ,city of ,new ,york1 read this volume in manuscript2 ,i am indebted to him for some valuable suggestions4 ,i am also indebted very greatly to a friend 7who prefers not to be acknowledged7 for invaluable help in getting the manuscript into shape4 ,,joseph ,,ratner4 ,october1 #aibf4 ,,contents ,,page ,,preface v ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,spinoza xi ,,introduction ,,to ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,spinoza xxvii ,,first ,,part ,,on ,,god ,,chapter ,i4 ,,of ,,superstition #c ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,interpretation ,,of ,,scripture #aa ,,iii4 ,,of ,,prophets ,,and ,,prophecy #cf ,,iv4 ,,of ,,the ,,vocation ,,of ,,the ,,hebrews #fd ,v4 ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,law #ga ,,vi4 ,,of ,,the ,,ceremonial ,,law #hh ,,vii4 ,,of ,,miracles #ajc ,,viii4 ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,nature #abb ,,second ,,part ,,on ,,man ,,ix4 ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind #aee ,x4 ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,extent ,,of ,,human ,,knowledge #agc ,,xi4 ,,determinism ,,and ,,morals #aia ,,xii4 ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,emotions #baa ,,xiii4 ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,the ,,emotions #bcf ,,third ,,part ,,on ,,man',s ,,well-,,being ,,xiv4 ,,of ,,human ,,bondage #bea ,,xv4 ,,the ,,foundations ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,life #bff ,,xvi4 ,,of ,,the ,,foundations ,,of ,a ,,state #big ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,supreme ,,authorities #cad ,,xviii4 ,,freedom ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,speech #ccc ,,xix4 ,,of ,,human ,,freedom #cde ,,xx4 ,,of ,,human ,,blessedness ,,and ,,the ,,eternity ,,of ,,the ,,mind #cfa ,,appendix #cgg ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,spinoza ,baruch de ,spinoza was born into the ,jewish community of ,amsterdam on ,november #bd1 #afcb4 ,his parents were ,jews who had fled1 along with many others1 from the vicious intolerance of the ,inquisition to the limited and hesitant freedom of ,holland4 ,at the time ,spinoza was born1 the ,jewish refugees had already established themselves to a certain extent in their new home4 ,they had won1 for example1 the important right to build a synagogue4 ,still1 they did not enjoy the complete freedom and peace of mind of an independent and securely protected people4 ,although one could be a ,jew in ,amsterdam1 one had to be a ,jew with considerable circumspection4 ,whatever might prove in any way offensive to the political authority had to be scrupulously eschewed4 ,for1 as is always the case1 minority groups which are simply tolerated have to suffer for the offenses of any of their members4 ,the ,jews of ,amsterdam thoroughly understood this4 ,they knew that any significant default on the part of one member of their community would not1 in all likelihood1 be considered by the authorities to be a default of that one person alone--a failing quite in the order of human nature2 they knew it would be considered a manifestation of an essential vice characteristic of the whole community4 ,and the whole community would have to suffer1 in consequence1 an exaggerated punishment which the individual delinquent himself may well not merit4 ,it was inevitable that the intellectual life of the ,jews of ,amsterdam should bear the marks of their inner and outer social constraints4 ,their intellectual life was cramped and ineffectual4 ,indiscriminate erudition1 not independent thought1 was all the ,jewish leaders1 connected in one way or another with the ,synagogue1 were able to achieve4 ,it was far safer to cling to the innocuous past than it was to strike out boldly into the future4 ,any independence of thought that was likely to prove socially dangerous as well as schismatic was promptly suppressed4 ,the humiliation and excommunication 7circa #afdj7 of the indecisive martyr ,uriel da ,costa when he ventured to entertain doctrines that were not orthodox1 were prompted as much by political as by religious considerations4 ,it is true1 many of the faithful were attracted by ,cabbalistic wonders and the strange hope of being saved from a bitter exile by a ,messianic ,sabbatai ,zevi4 ,but these wayward deviations1 in reality not so very far removed from orthodox tradition1 exhibited only the more clearly the fearsome inner insecurity which a strained formalism in thought and habit bravely attempted to cover4 ,in such social and intellectual atmosphere ,spinoza grew up4 ,of his early life1 practically nothing is known4 ,his parents1 we know1 were at least fairly well-to-do1 for ,spinoza received a good education4 ,and we know that he was1 when about fifteen years of age1 one of the most brilliant and promising of ,rabbi ,saul ,levi ,morteira's pupils4 ,everyone who then knew ,spinoza expected great things of him4 ,he proved himself to be a very acute rabbinical student2 at that early age already somewhat too critical1 if anything1 to suit the orthodox4 ,but all felt reasonably confident he would become a distinguished ,rabbi1 and perhaps a great commentator of the ,bible4 ,of course1 of the orthodox sort4 ,but the ,rabbis were early disillusioned4 ,spinoza soon found the learning of the ,synagogue insufficient and unsatisfactory4 ,he sought the wisdom of secular philosophy and science4 ,but in order to satisfy his intellectual desires it was necessary to study ,latin4 ,and ,latin was not taught in the ,synagogue4 ,an anonymous ,german taught ,spinoza the rudiments of the language that was to enable him to enter into the important current of modern ideas especially embodied in the philosophy of ,descartes4 ,francis ,van den ,ende gave him a thorough technical1 not literary1 mastery of it4 ,and ,van den ,ende taught ,spinoza much more besides4 ,he acquainted him with the literature of antiquity2 he gave him a sound knowledge of the contemporary fundamentals of physiology and physics2 and it was he possibly1 who introduced him to the philosophy of ,descartes and the lyrical philosophic speculation of ,bruno4 ,he did much also 7we may easily infer7 to encourage the independence of mind and the freedom in thinking ,spinoza had already manifested in no inconsiderable degree4 ,for although this ,van den ,ende was a ,catholic physician and ,latin master by profession1 he was a free thinker in spirit and reputation4 ,and if we are to believe the horrified public suspicion1 he taught a select few of his ,latin pupils the grounds of his heterodox belief4 ,as one can easily understand1 to study ,latin with ,van den ,ende was not the most innocent thing one could do4 ,certainly1 to become a favorite pupil and assistant teacher of ,van den ,ende's was1 socially1 decidedly bad4 ,but ,spinoza was not deterred by the possible social consequences of his search for knowledge and truth4 ,he took full advantage of his opportunities and did not hesitate to follow wherever his master might lead4 ,van den ,ende was also something of a political adventurer2 he finally paid the unsuccessful conspirator's price on the gallows in ,paris4 ,it is not at all unlikely that ,spinoza's hard-headed political and ethical realism was1 in significant measure1 due to his early intimacy with his variously gifted and interesting ,latin master4 ,we know that ,spinoza was at least strongly attracted1 in later life1 by the ,italian political insurgent ,masaniello1 for ,spinoza drew a portrait of himself in the ,italian's costume4 ,machiavelli's influence1 too1 upon ,spinoza was very great--an influence that would but be a continuation of ,van den ,ende's4 ,spinoza may have been indebted to ,van den ,ende for one other thing3 his only recorded romance4 ,there is some question about this indebtedness because tradition does not speak very confidently1 in some essentials1 about ,van den ,ende's daughter ,clara ,maria4 ,clara1 tradition is agreed1 was intellectually and artistically well endowed1 although she was not very good looking4 ,in her father's absence on political affairs she took his place in the school1 teaching music as well as ,latin4 ,but tradition is somewhat disconcerting when it comes to ,clara's age when ,spinoza knew her4 ,according to some chronological researches1 the fair object of ,spinoza's supposed devotion1 was only twelve years old4 ,hardly of an age to warrant ,spinoza's love1 unless he loved her as ,dante loved ,beatrice4 ,a somewhat improbable possibility4 ,the tradition that is less sparing of ,clara's age is1 however1 even more sparing of her character3 the success of ,spinoza's supposed rival--a fellow-student by name1 ,kerkrinck--is attributed to the seductive powers of a pearl necklace4 ,in spite of the fact that tradition reckons this gift to have been of decisive importance1 one does not like to believe that a girl of high intellectual and artistic ability could be so easily and fatefully overcome by a mere trinket4 ,still less does one like to believe that ,spinoza fell in love with a girl whose mind was so far removed from the joys that are eternal and spiritual4 ,but1 of course1 it is conceivable that the girl took the trinket symbolically2 or else that ,spinoza1 who had given all his time to rabbinical and philosophical studies was1 in the circumstances1 quite justifiably deceived4 ,spinoza had not yet been graduated from his student days when the ,synagogue thought him a fit object for official censure and threat4 ,it seems ,spinoza was betrayed into overt indiscretion by two fellow-students from the ,synagogue1 who asked for his opinion regarding the existence of angels1 the corporeality of ,god and the immortality of the soul4 ,spinoza's answers were not complete1 but incomplete as they were1 they yet revealed a mind that was1 to the faithful1 shockingly astray from the orthodox path4 ,spinoza was to have elaborated upon his answers at a later date but the students had heard1 apparently1 quite enough4 ,instead of returning to ,spinoza they went to the authorities of the ,synagogue4 ,the authorities were quite disposed by ,spinoza's association with ,van den ,ende and his perceptible neglect of ceremonial observances1 to believe him capable of any intellectual villainy4 ,they promptly set about to reclaim the erring soul4 ,report has it they sought two means3 they offered ,spinoza an annuity of #a1jjj florins if he would1 in all overt ways1 speech and action1 conform to the established opinions and customs of the ,synagogue2 or1 if he did not see the wisdom and profit of compliance1 they threatened to isolate him by excommunication4 ,again social politics as much as established religion demanded the action the ,synagogue took4 ,their experience with ,uriel da ,costa was still very fresh in their minds and they must have felt fairly confident that ,spinoza would be warned by the fate of his heretical predecessor if not counseled by the wisdom of the ,fathers4 ,but ,spinoza was of a firmness they did not reckon on4 ,he did not hearken to their censure nor cower at their threat4 ,the thirty days or so in which he was given to reform passed without discovering in him any change4 ,excommunication had to be pronounced4 ,when barely twenty-four years old1 ,spinoza found himself cut off from the race of ,israel with all the prescribed curses of excommunication upon his head4 ,spinoza was not present when excommunication was pronounced upon him4 ,he had left ,amsterdam to stay with some ,collegiant friends on the ,ouwerkerk road1 for1 so one tradition relates1 an attempt had been made by one of the over-righteous upon ,spinoza's life soon after he became an object of official displeasure4 ,although ,spinoza was1 throughout his life1 ready to suffer the consequences of his opinions and actions1 he at no time had the least aspiration to become a martyr4 ,when ,spinoza heard of his excommunication he sent a spirited and unyielding reply4 ,the spirit if not the words of that reply 7not yet discovered7 eventually made its way into the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus4 ,for the rest of his life1 whenever he had occasion to refer to the ,jews1 ,spinoza referred to them as he did to the ,gentiles--a race to which he did not belong4 ,and immediately1 with the perfect grace and humor of a cultured mind1 he changed his name from ,baruch to ,benedict1 quite confident one can be as blessed in ,latin as in ,hebrew4 ,the subsequent course of ,spinoza's life was almost completely untroubled1 though it was unmitigatingly austere4 ,he took up the trade of polishing lenses as a means of earning his simple bread4 ,he was somewhat influenced in his decision by the advice in the ,ethics of the ,fathers that every one should do some manual work4 ,but it was also quite the fashion at that period for learned men1 interested in science1 to polish lenses1 as a hobby of course1 not as a means of support4 ,spinoza's choice was not altogether wise in spite of its learned associations and the fact that he soon gained an enviable reputation as a young scientist4 ,the early recognition ,spinoza received from men like ,henry ,oldenburg1 the first secretary of the ,royal ,society1 from ,robert ,boyle and ,huyghens1 was hardly adequate recompense for the fine dust he ground which aggravated his inherited tuberculosis and undoubtedly considerably hastened his death4 ,spinoza's accomplishment in his chosen trade was not merely practical4 ,many looked forward1 with warranted confidence1 to the time when ,spinoza would make a distinguished contribution to the science of optics4 ,but the only strictly scientific work ,spinoza left behind 7long considered to have been lost7 was a short treatise on the rainbow4 ,all ,spinoza's intellectual energy went into service of his philosophy4 ,his earliest philosophical work 7rediscovered 7#ahfb7 in translated ,dutch manuscript7 was a ,short ,treatise on ,god1 ,man and ,his ,well-,being4 ,it is a fragmentary1 uneven work1 chiefly valuable for the insight it gives into the workings and development of ,spinoza's mind4 ,the ,ethics1 in the completed form in which we have it 7no manuscript of it is extant7 has the incredible appearance of a system of philosophy sprung full-grown from an unhesitating mind4 ,even a most cursory reading of the ,short ,treatise completely dispels this preposterous illusion4 ,the ,ethics was the product of prolonged and critical toil4 ,but just how prolonged it is difficult to say4 ,for already as early as #affe almost four-fifths of the ,ethics seems to have been written4 ,we learn as much from a letter ,spinoza wrote to one of his friends promising to send him the third part of his philosophy up to the eightieth proposition4 ,from the letter it is fairly clear that at that time the ,ethics was divided into three1 not five1 parts4 ,also1 in letters written that same year to ,william ,blyenbergh one finds expressed some of the chief conclusions published five years later in the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus4 ,and ,spinoza wrote1 at this early period1 not conjecturally or speculatively1 but as one writes who knows the firm and tested grounds of his belief4 ,why the ,ethics1 in final form1 began to circulate privately only two or three years before ,spinoza's death1 and why his work on ,the ,improvement of the ,understanding and his ,political ,treatise were left unfinished1 must remain something of an insoluble philosophico-literary mystery4 ,the only book ,spinoza published in his own lifetime above his own name was his ,principles of ,descartes' ,philosophy ,geometrically ,demonstrated with an appendix of ,cogitata ,metaphysica which he had dictated to a youth 7one ,csarius7 to whom 7he7 did not wish to teach 7his7 own opinions openly4 ,discretion1 as he had already learned and later formally stated and proved1 was not inconsonant with rational valor4 ,the only other book ,spinoza published in his lifetime--the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus--bore on its title page ,spinoza's initials only1 and the name of a fictitious ,hamburg publisher4 ,when ,spinoza heard1 some time later1 that a ,dutch translation of this work was being prepared1 he earnestly beseeched his friends to forestall its publication 7which they did7 because only its ,latin dress saved it from being officially proscribed4 ,it was then an open secret who the author was4 ,spinoza's personal rule to incur as little official displeasure as possible made him abandon his final literary project entertained in #afge4 ,when he began negotiations for the publication of the ,ethics a rumor spread that he had in press a book proving that ,god does not exist4 ,complaint was lodged with the prince and magistrates4 ,the stupid ,cartesians1 ,spinoza wrote ,oldenburg being suspected of favoring me1 endeavored to remove the aspersion by abusing every where my opinions and writings1 a course which they still pursue4 ,in the circumstances1 ,spinoza thought it wisest to delay publication till matters would change4 ,but1 apparently1 they did not change1 or change sufficiently4 ,the ,ethics was first published about a year after ,spinoza's death4 ,in spite of the consensus of adverse1 and somewhat vicious opinion1 the author of the ,tractatus did find favor in the eyes of some4 ,the ,elector ,palatine1 ,karl ,ludwig1 through his secretary ,fabritius1 offered ,spinoza the chair of philosophy at ,heidelberg 7#afgc74 ,but ,spinoza graciously declined it4 ,although a more welcome or more honorable opportunity to teach could not be conceived1 it had never been his ambition to leave his secluded station in life for one involving public obligations4 ,even in his secluded corner1 he found he had aroused more public attention and sentiment than was altogether consonant with the peace and retirement he sought4 ,besides1 he did not know how well he could fulfill the desires of the ,elector by teaching nothing that would tend to discomfit established religion4 ,spinoza had1 in his young days1 learned what extreme dangers one must expect to encounter in a righteous community become inimical4 ,in his last years1 he experienced a stern and tragic reminder4 ,two of ,spinoza's best friends1 ,cornelius and ,jan de ,witt1 who had by a change in political fortune become the enemies of the people1 were brutally murdered 7#afgb74 ,spinoza for once1 when this occurred1 lost his habitual philosophic calm4 ,he could restrain neither his tears nor his anger4 ,he had to be forcibly prevented from leaving his house to post a bill1 at the scene of the murder1 denouncing the criminal mob4 ,a somewhat similar crisis recurred shortly afterwards when ,spinoza returned from a visit to the hostile ,french camp4 ,the object of his mission is not unequivocally known4 ,some think it was to meet the ,prince of ,cond solely in his private capacity of philosopher4 ,it is certain ,spinoza was advised the ,french ,king would acknowledge a dedicated book by means of a pension--an advice ,spinoza did not act upon4 ,others think his mission was political4 ,his reputation as a distinguished man would have made him a very likely ambassador4 ,this conjecture would seem more probable1 however1 if the de ,witts1 his intimate friends1 had been still in political power1 instead of in their graves4 ,but whatever ,spinoza's mission was1 when he returned to the ,hague1 the populace branded him a ,french spy4 ,spinoza's landlord feared his house would be wrecked1 by an infuriated mob4 ,this time ,spinoza exerted the calming influence4 ,he assured ,van der ,spijck that if any attempt were made on the house he would leave it and face the mob1 even if they should deal with him as they did with the unfortunate de ,witts4 ,he was a good republican as all knew4 ,and those in high political authority knew the purpose of his journey4 ,fortunately1 popular suspicion and anger dissipated this time without a sacrifice4 ,still1 the incident showed quite clearly that though ,spinoza did not desire to be a martyr1 he was no more afraid to die than he was to live for the principles he had at heart4 ,spinoza's character1 manifested in his life1 has won the high admiration of every one not bitterly hostile to him4 ,and even his enemies maintained and justified their hatred only by inventing calumnious falsehoods about him4 ,unfounded rumors of an evil nature began to circulate during his lifetime1 and naturally increased in virulence and volume after his death4 ,at that period in human history1 it was popularly recognized that nothing good could be true1 and nothing vile could be false of an atheist--which was what ,spinoza1 of course1 was reputed to be4 ,oldenburg even1 for years unflaggingly profuse in expressions of devoted friendship and humble discipleship1 an eager and fearless advocate 7supposedly7 of the truth1 a friend who lamented the fact that the world was being denied the invaluable products of ,spinoza's unsurpassed intellect1 and who1 therefore1 constantly urged ,spinoza1 by all the advice of friendship1 to publish his work without delay1 irrespective of popular prejudice--even ,oldenburg began to conceive a far from complimentary opinion of ,spinoza after the publication of the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus6 ,so prevalent were the groundless rumors that the ,lutheran pastor1 ,colerus--the source of most of our information--felt obliged in his very quaint summary biography to defend the life and character of ,spinoza4 ,to his everlasting credit1 ,colerus did this although he himself heartily detested ,spinoza's philosophy which he understood to be abhorrently blasphemous and atheistic4 ,colerus' sources of information were the best3 he spoke to all who knew ,spinoza at the ,hague2 and he himself was intimate with the ,van der ,spijcks with whom ,spinoza had lived the last five years of his life1 and with whom ,colerus was now living--in ,spinoza's very room4 ,spinoza's courage and strength of mind are as impressively manifested in the constant daily life he lived as in the few severe crises he resolutely faced4 ,for the twenty years of his excommunication he lived in comparative retirement1 if not isolation4 ,the frugality of his life bordered on asceticism4 ,all his free time and energy ,spinoza dedicated with unusual single-hearted devotion to the disinterested development of a philosophy he knew would not be very acceptable to the general or even special philosophic reader4 ,his mode of life is all the more remarkable because it was not determined by embittered misanthropy or passionate abhorrence of the goods of the world4 ,it was dictated solely by what he understood to be1 in his circumstances1 the reasonable life for him4 ,although he was an eager correspondent1 and had many friends whom he valued above all things that are external to one's own soul1 his interest in his own work kept him from carrying on1 for any length of time1 an active social life4 ,he believed1 too1 that it is part of the wisdom of life to refresh oneself with pleasant food and drink1 with delicate perfumes and the soft beauty of growing things1 with music and the theater1 literature and painting4 ,but his own income was too slender to allow him much of these temperate riches of a rational life4 ,and always1 rather than exert himself to increase his income1 he would decrease his expenditure4 ,still1 he no doubt enjoyed the little he had4 ,he found very palatable1 most likely1 the simple food he himself prepared in later life2 and he must have gained additional satisfaction from the thought that he was1 because of his own cooking1 living more safely within his means4 ,the pipe he smoked occasionally 7let us hope7 was fragrant2 the pint of wine a month very delectable4 ,for mental recreation he read fairly widely in literature1 observed the habits of insects1 with the microscope as well as the naked eye4 ,he also sometimes drew ink or charcoal sketches of his visitors and himself4 ,a fairly plausible rumor has it that ,rembrandt was his teacher4 ,unfortunately1 all of ,spinoza's sketches were destroyed4 ,although ,spinoza wanted to be independent and self-supporting he was not irrationally zealous about it4 ,he did not accept all the financial help his friends were eager to give him1 but he did accept some4 ,one of his young friends1 ,simon de ,vries1 before his early death occurred1 wanted to bequeath all of his estate to ,spinoza4 ,but ,spinoza persuaded him not to deprive his own brother of his natural inheritance4 ,even the annual #ejj florins de ,vries finally left him1 ,spinoza would not altogether accept1 offering the plea that so much wealth would surely take his mind away from his philosophy4 ,but he would accept #cjj florins1 a sum he felt would not be burdensome or dangerous to his soul4 ,this annuity he regularly received until his death4 ,his friends the de ,witts1 pensioned him too2 the heirs to the estate contested ,spinoza's claim1 whereupon ,spinoza promptly withdrew it4 ,this high-minded action corrected their covetousness1 and from the de ,witts1 too1 he received financial help until his death4 ,spinoza's relations with the humble folk he stayed with exhibited the modesty and grace of character that endeared him to his intimate friends4 ,when he was tired working in his own room1 he would frequently come down to smoke a pipe and chat with his landlady and landlord about the simple affairs that filled their lives4 ,his speech was sweet and easy2 his manner of a gentle1 noble1 beauty4 ,except for the occasion when the de ,witts were murdered1 ,spinoza never showed himself either unduly merry or unduly sad4 ,if ever he found that his emotions were likely to escape his wise control1 he would withdraw until such danger had passed4 ,we find the same characteristics exhibited in ,spinoza's correspondence4 ,although he found some of his correspondents sometimes very trying1 he never failed to be as courteous and considerate as the circumstances would permit4 ,even when one ,lambert de ,velthuysen provoked his righteous indignation1 ,spinoza tempered his caustic reply before sending it off4 ,spinoza lived the ethics he wrote4 ,as is the ,ethics1 so is his life pervaded by a simple grandeur4 ,and as he lived1 so did he die4 ,he had not been feeling very well1 and had sent for his friend and physician ,dr4 ,ludwig ,meyer4 ,a chicken broth was ordered for ,spinoza of which he partook quite healthily4 ,no one suspected that he was this time fatally ill4 ,he came down in the morning1 and spoke for some time with his hosts4 ,but when they returned from a visit that same afternoon 7,sunday1 ,feb4 #ba1 #afgg7 they learned the sad1 surprising news that ,spinoza had gently passed away1 the only one by his bedside1 his doctor and friend4 ,spinoza sought in his lifetime neither riches1 nor sensual pleasure1 nor fame4 ,he wrote and published his books when he could and thought advisable because part of his joy consisted in extending1 as he said1 a helping hand to others1 in bringing them to see and understand things as he did4 ,if they did not see1 or obdurately refused to understand1 he did not consider it part of his task to overcome them4 ,he was animated by no missionary zeal4 ,he was content to search for the truth and to explain what he found as best he could4 ,the truth1 he devoutly believed1 would make us free4 ,but it was truth that we understood1 not truth that was forced upon us4 ,he was quite satisfied to leave in his desk the manuscript of his ,ethics4 ,people in his lifetime did not want to listen to him4 ,if ever they did after his death1 they were cordially welcome to4 ,in death as in life they would find him faithful to his ideal4 ,spinoza has often been likened to the old ,hebrew prophets4 ,he does not1 it is true1 exhort the people to follow in the path of righteousness2 it is the philosopher's task simply to show the way4 ,but the morality ,spinoza stands for is the old prophetic morality purified and made consistent with itself4 ,and ,spinoza was1 in his own time1 as the prophets were in theirs1 a heretic and a rebel1 a voice calling in the wilderness--a wilderness that was later to become the very citadel of civilization4 ,excommunicated by the ,jews and vilified by the ,gentiles during his lifetime1 ,spinoza has1 since his death1 been canonized by both alike as the most saintly and exalted of philosophers4 ,like his forerunners of old1 ,spinoza was a prophet in ,israel1 for ,mankind4 ,,introduction ,,to ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,spinoza ,i ,spinoza's philosophy has suffered not a little from the highly abstruse and technical form in which the ,ethics is written4 ,some1 who are not inured to the hardships of philosophy1 quite naturally jump to the conclusion that its formidable geometry contains only the most inscrutable of philosophic mysteries2 and a wise humility persuades them to forego the unexampled enlightenment a mastery of the difficulties would yield4 ,others1 who are devoutly wedded to what they consider the unreservedly empirical character of modern 7that is1 true7 philosophy1 avoid the ,ethics because they are convinced1 on general principles1 that only a mind hopelessly lost in the dark night of medieval speculation could conceive of philosophy in such ultra-deductive fashion4 ,reason was for so long servile to idle theology1 it is not at all surprising that a work exemplifying reason to such high degree as does the ,ethics1 should receive scant respect from intrepid empiricists4 ,it is so easy to confuse the rationalizations of reason with the nature of reason itself4 ,spinoza did not1 however1 choose the geometrical order because he thought his philosophy too profound for ordinary exposition2 nor did he choose it because he was enmeshed in medieval philosophic speculation4 ,he chose it because his fundamental philosophic aim was to establish ethics on a thoroughly tested1 scientific foundation2 and geometry1 an exemplar of all mathematical science1 most completely embodied1 at that time1 the highest scientific ideal4 ,man1 ,spinoza held1 is a part of ,nature1 and ,nature is governed by eternal and immutable laws4 ,it must be just as possible1 therefore1 to apply the mathematical method to man1 as it is to apply it to matter4 ,it must be possible to determine1 with the certitude obtainable in the exact sciences1 what things are good for man and what means he has for attaining them4 ,spinoza's belief in the self-sufficing1 lawful order of ,nature1 and the adequacy of the natural powers of our mind to understand the mysteries 7popularly so appraised7 of heaven and earth1 the singular expository style of the ,ethics emphasizes in unmistakable fashion4 ,even for our understanding of ,god's own nature1 ,divine ,revelation1 as commonly interpreted in ,spinoza's day and our own1 is wholly unnecessary4 ,we need only the revelation afforded by the natural powers of reason operative in us4 ,in geometry1 we do not blindly accept conclusions on faith1 nor do we reject them by authority4 ,we are guided in our discovery of the true and the false1 solely by the light of our natural understanding4 ,and the truths we discover are not temporary fabrications of the human mind1 but eternal truths about the nature of things4 ,perhaps no other single aspect of ,spinoza's philosophy distinguishes ,spinoza from the medievalists as thoroughly as does his use of the geometrical order of exposition2 and no other single aspect1 perhaps1 justifies as thoroughly ,spinoza's claim to rank with the moderns if not even the contemporaries4 ,the geometer's method of starting with definitions and axioms and proceeding from proposition to proposition especially appealed to ,spinoza1 apart from the fact that geometry was an ideal science1 because1 for ,spinoza1 the essence of logical method consists in starting out with ideas that are of utter simplicity4 ,then1 if the ideas are understood at all1 they can only be clearly and distinctly understood4 ,the absolutely simple we can either know or not know4 ,we cannot be confused about it4 ,and ideas which are clearly and distinctly understood are1 according to ,spinoza1 necessarily true4 ,such unambiguously simple and therefore necessarily true ideas ,spinoza believed his definitions and axioms expressed4 ,furthermore1 if we gradually build up the body of our science by means of our initial simple ideas1 justifying ourselves at every step by adequate proof1 our final result will necessarily be as firmly established and as certainly true as the elementary ideas we started with4 ,the reliability of this whole procedure more than compensates for its tediousness--a defect ,spinoza expressly recognizes4 ,unfortunately1 however1 there are other defects in the geometrical method when it is applied to philosophy1 far more serious than its tediousness1--defects1 moreover1 ,spinoza apparently did not recognize4 ,even though the geometrical method is preminently scientific1 it is hardly a form suitable for philosophy4 ,the ,euclidean geometer can take it for granted that the reader understands what a line or plane1 a solid or an angle is4 ,for formality1 a curt definition is sufficient4 ,but the philosopher's fundamental terms and ideas are precisely those in need of most careful and elaborate elucidation--something which cannot be given in a formal definition or axiom4 ,also1 in the geometrical form1 the burden of the author's attention is shifted from the clarification of the propositions to the accurate demonstration of them4 ,which1 in a philosophical treatise1 is most unfortunate4 ,for though it is undoubtedly highly desirable that the philosopher should observe the same care and precision as the scientist1 admitting nothing he cannot prove1 it is nevertheless just as well for the philosopher to take reasonable care that what he is conscientiously proving is understood4 ,that ,spinoza did not always take such care but considerably over-estimated the self-evidence of his definitions and axioms and the simplicity of many of his important propositions1 is an unhappy fact conclusively established by the increasing volume of ,spinozistic literature4 ,,ii ,however1 in spite of the difficult1 and to the literary repellent form of the ,ethics1 the catholicity of ,spinoza's influence has been extremely remarkable4 ,in time1 his influence bids fair to equal in range1 if not in gross extent1 the as yet unparalleled influence of the artist-philosopher ,plato4 ,it took about a hundred years for ,spinoza to come into something of his own4 ,for the ,ethics was condemned with the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus as an atheistic and immoral work4 ,only when the romantic philosophers of ,germany1 following the lead of ,lessing and ,jacobi1 found in ,spinoza a man who was1 as they thought1 after their own heart1 did ,spinoza's mundane fortune change4 ,as a result of their efforts1 ,spinoza ceased to be a philosopher to be execrated in public 7though furtively read in private71 and became a philosopher to be eulogized on all occasions in most rhapsodic1 if bewildering1 terms4 ,many others too1 besides professional philosophers1 began to read ,spinoza with much sympathy and unbounded admiration4 ,goethe1 ,matthew ,arnold1 ,heine1 ,george ,eliot1 ,flaubert1 ,coleridge1 and ,shelley--to mention only a few distinguished lay names--found in ,spinoza a powerful1 stimulating and1 in varying degrees1 congenial thinker4 ,to-day1 after having been one of the liberating thinkers of mankind who was read but not honored1 ,spinoza is fast becoming one of the canonized of mankind who are honored but not read4 ,the reason for ,spinoza's magnificent influence is not difficult to discover3 his philosophy deals in a grand1 illuminating way with all that is of profoundest importance in human life4 ,there is no material the universe offers for man's life but ,spinoza seeks to understand and explain its rational function and utility4 ,for ,spinoza set before himself the hard task of laying down the principles whereby men may guide themselves aright in all the affairs of life--the lowest as well as the highest4 ,his philosophy1 as a result1 is at once the most exalted and the most matter of fact4 ,there is no high sentiment or glorious ideal to which ,spinoza does not give proper attention and a proper place4 ,and yet he propounds nothing in his ethical theory that cannot be clearly seen by reason and that cannot be fully substantiated by the history of man4 ,spinoza's ethics is perfectly balanced1 eminently sane4 ,and there is1 pervading it all1 a stately sustained resolution of mind1 a royal1 often religious spirit and calm4 ,and ,spinoza's thought1 if not all of his terminology1 is refreshingly modern and contemporary4 ,we find in him1 as in contemporaries1 an utter reliance upon the powers of the human mind4 ,all dogmatism1 in the pristine connotation of unexamined adherence to the doctrines of tradition1 is absent from his thought4 ,spinoza is thoroughly critical1 for only modern philosophic arrogance1 in first full bloom in ,kant1 can justly monopolize the term critical for itself4 ,naturally1 though1 ,spinoza is unfamiliar with the whole apparatus and style of philosophic thinking which the last two centuries of excessively disputatious and remarkably inconclusive philosophy have created4 ,spinoza has his own technical philosophic style1 inherited to some extent1 but to a much larger extent transformed by him for original use4 ,but technical as his style may be1 it is simplicity itself when compared with the horrific styles which were1 until the last few decades1 alone thought adequate to express the profound and esoteric mysteries of modern philosophy4 ,the philosophic jargon of the #ahth4 and #aith4 centuries is now almost universally discarded1 and with it preternaturally recondite and ineffectual modes of thought4 ,those who have achieved at least some of the new simplicity in thought and expression are better able than any others to enter into the heart of ,spinoza's philosophy1 into the open secret of his thought4 ,for apart from the mere stylistic difficulties of the ,ethics and some detail of his metaphysical doctrine1 the few great and simple ideas which dominate his philosophy are quite easy to understand--especially if one uses the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus as an introduction to them4 ,it was an unexpressed maxim with ,spinoza that even at the risk of keeping our heads empty it is necessary we keep our minds simple and pure4 ,,iii ,the central controlling idea of ,spinoza's philosophy is that all things are necessarily determined in ,nature1 which he conceives to be an absolutely infinite unified and uniform order4 ,instead of maintaining that ,god is like man magnified to infinity1 who has absolute1 irresponsible control of a universe which is external to him--the rather rude anthropomorphic account of the ultimate nature of the universe contained in the ,bible--,spinoza maintains that ,god is identical with the universe and must be and act according to eternal and necessary laws4 ,god is ,nature1 if we understand by ,nature not merely infinite matter and infinite thought1--the two attributes of ,nature specifically known to us--but infinite other attributes the precise character of which we can never1 because of our finitude1 comprehend4 ,within this ,being--,god1 ,nature or ,substance 7the more technical1 philosophic term7--there is no dichotomy2 and there is outside of it no regulative or coercive intelligence such as the ,biblical ,god is conceived to be4 ,whatever is1 is one4 ,and it is1 in the special ,spinozistic sense1 supremely perfect because absolutely real4 ,there is1 considered in its totality1 no lack or defect in ,nature4 ,there can be1 therefore1 no cosmic purposes1 for such purposes would imply that ,nature is yet unfinished1 or unperfected1 that is1 not completely real4 ,something that cannot possibly be true of an absolutely infinite ,being4 ,spinoza's conception of an absolutely infinite universe is a vast improvement upon the pent-in1 finite medieval universe inherited from ,aristotle4 ,it exceeds by infinity1 in breadth of vision1 even our contemporary notion of an infinite physical cosmos4 ,and his conception of universal necessity is as great an advance upon the view that transformed natural occurrences into miraculous events4 ,miracles1 according to the ,bible1 most clearly exemplify ,god's omnipotence2 for omnipotence in the popular mind consists in nothing so much as in the ability to satisfy any purpose or whim no matter how transitory it is1 or how incompatible with what has been antecedently desired or done4 ,miracles may be extraordinary occurrences with reference to the order of ,nature1 but they are1 with reference to ,god1 commonplace exhibitions of ,his ,almighty power4 ,for ,spinoza1 however1 miracles1 did they actually occur1 would exhibit not ,god's power1 but ,his impotence4 ,the omnipotence of the one absolutely infinite ,being is not shown by temperamental interruptions of the course of events2 it is manifested in the immutable and necessary laws by which all things come to pass4 ,spinoza's conception of the universe1 flawlessly operating under necessary laws1 effectively disposes of miracles4 ,and to dispose of miracles is one of ,spinoza's primary concerns4 ,for as long as miracles happen1 organized knowledge and rational control--the bases of a rational life--are both impossible for man4 ,if events were not absolutely conditioned by the determinate nature of things1 instead of science1 we should have superstition1 and magic instead of scientific control4 ,when a god governs the universe according to his transitory and altogether personal whims1 or when chance1 without a god1 reigns1 man is hopelessly at the mercy of the flux of events4 ,in the conduct of his affairs memory is of no use to him1 and forethought is impossible4 ,in such cases man1 as we read in his history1 and could easily conclude from his nature1 piteously grasps for salvation at whatever happens his way4 ,all things are then loaded with ominous powers the strength of which is directly proportionate to the hope or fear that enthralls him4 ,if the universe were lawless1 the irony of man's fate would forever be what it was when he lived in abysmal ignorance3 when in bitterest need of sane guidance1 he would be most prone to trust to the feeblest and most irrational of aids4 ,on the other hand1 if things are determined by necessity1 nothing happening either miraculously or by chance1 science and a commensurate power of scientific control is possible for man4 ,no more important argument could ,spinoza conceive in favor of his doctrine4 ,,iv ,but the very doctrine which ,spinoza placed at the heart of his philosophy because of the inestimable advantages man could derive from it1 people loudly objected to on the ground that it robbed man's life of all moral and religious value4 ,determinism1 they exclaimed1 reduces man to the rank of inanimate ,nature2 without free-will man is no better than a slave1 his life doomed by an inexorable fate4 ,true enough1 nothing is more abhorrent or more deadly to the striving soul of man than to be bound in a fatalistic doctrine4 ,but the anti-determinists wildly confuse a perverted determinism of ends with a scientific determinism of means4 ,and only the former determinism is truly fatalistic4 ,this confusion is to be found equally central in ,henry ,oldenburg's inconsequential letters to ,spinoza and in ,bernard ,shaw's shamelessly silly ,preface to ,back to ,methuselah4 ,fundamental confusions remain astonishingly stable throughout the centuries4 ,spinoza1 when he maintained that all things are necessarily determined by the laws of their own being1 certainly did not mean to say that1 for example1 the toothbrush ,i shall buy to-morrow will be determined by the stellar dust of ons ago4 ,he did not wish to maintain that the infinite occurrences of the past were slowly but persistently moving to that far from divine or distant event4 ,no aboriginal astronomer royal could have predicted the pending purchase merely by exhaustively analyzing the then stellar dust4 ,for toothbrushes and their purchase are determined by the nature of human beings1 not by the nature of embryonic stars4 ,and ,spinoza's doctrine of necessity maintains that all events are determined by their proper causes1 not that everything is immediately caused by some antediluvian event4 ,and this is true even though we can start from any event in the present1 no matter how trivial1 and go back to an event causally antecedent1 and from that to another1 even until we recede into the stellar dust itself4 ,but this only amounts to saying1 what is undoubtedly true1 that neither ,i nor the toothbrush could now exist if the stellar dust1 and the whole series of intervening events1 had not existed4 ,but this is totally different from saying that the stellar dust existed that ,i might exist to-day and buy a toothbrush to-morrow1 or1 what equals the same1 that ,i and the toothbrush exist so that the stellar dust and the exceedingly long consequence of natural events should have a final purpose1 an ultimate end--even if not an ideal fulfillment4 ,now only when causality1 as in the latter case1 is perversely teleological is determinism fatalistic4 ,fatalism is the result only when the ends of activity are necessarily but arbitrarily determined4 ,but when causality is not arbitrarily teleological1 or when only the natures of things1 the instruments or means of activity are necessarily determined1 then determinism involves no fatalism at all4 ,the only truly fatalistic systems which have had an important influence in the history of mankind1 have been certain religious systems--the ,christian religion among them4 ,the energies of western men were1 for over fourteen centuries1 robbed of all vitality and meaning because ,christian theology irrevocably fixed the end of life1 and man could do nothing to alter it significantly in any respect4 ,arbitrary teleological determinism is1 in the ,christian religion1 the philosophic root of other worldliness4 ,and it was no alleviation of the state of affairs that miracles could happen in the realm of ,nature1 that is1 that ,nature was not determined1 but was undetermined1 accidental1 or free4 ,on the contrary1 it was a decided aggravation that there existed side by side with a perverse teleological determinism for the other world1 an instrumental indeterminism for this world4 ,for the latter served as effectively to put the means of man's life1 as the former did to put his end1 out of his present reach and control4 ,contrast the modern and contemporary ,christian period with the medieval and pre-medieval ,christian period4 ,what a vast difference there is6 ,with the introduction of the modern period man's energies were almost instantaneously liberated4 ,and why8 ,because of ,chancellor ,bacon's discovery of the value of empirical investigation8 ,hardly4 ,for this discovery had been made long before ,bacon4 ,but it was only after ,bacon that the discovery had a great effect because an enormous intellectual transformation had already partly taken place in the time between the first medieval discovery of the empirical method and ,bacon's proclamation of it4 ,the enormous change was that determinism had been transferred from ends to means2 and indeterminism from means to ends4 ,mathematical physics had1 as a system for explaining ,nature1 supplanted theology4 ,with scientific determinism firmly established in the realm of ,nature and arbitrary determinism thoroughly disestablished in the realm of ends1 the two-fold fatality that crushed man with its oppressive power1 automatically disappeared4 ,on the one hand1 the world ceased to be haunted by demonic powers2 it was no longer a miraculous world subject constantly to capricious perturbations4 ,it was no longer a world alien to man's nature and it therefore ceased to be sheerly brutal to him4 ,for the world is brutal only as long as we do not understand it4 ,as soon as we do1 it ceases to be brutal1 and becomes quite human1 if not humane4 ,knowledge transmutes a brute existent into a rational instrumentality4 ,and1 on the other hand1 man could now espouse any end consonant with his nature4 ,he was no longer bound and dwarfed by an alien1 superimposed end which is just as sheerly brutal to man's soul as an alien world is sheerly brutal to man's body4 ,of course1 the ends that are consonant with man's nature are determined by his nature1 so that it may seem we have not really escaped the fatality of determinism4 ,this is1 however1 only seemingly so4 ,because1 according to the teleological determinism of ,christian theology the ends were fixed independently of the natures that were to fulfill them2 just as1 according to instrumental indeterminism events were caused independently of the natures of the things that caused them4 ,otherwise there would be nothing miraculous about miracles and nothing virtuous about ,calvinism4 ,but if the ends are the ends of our natures1--that is1 if teleological determinism is not perverse and arbitrary but rational and scientific--we are1 as ,spinoza constantly points out1 free4 ,only when we are subject to alien ends or the ends of alien natures are we enslaved4 ,for freedom is not opposed to necessity or determinism2 it is only opposed to an alien necessity or alien determinism4 ,freedom consists not in absolute indetermination1 but in absolute self-determination4 ,and self-determination is the very last thing that can be called fatalistic4 ,because ,spinoza knew that freedom consists in self-determination he was saved from falling into the absurdities of ,rousseau's ,back to ,nature doctrine even though ,nature is1 for ,spinoza1 the origin of everything and its laws1 the only laws that are divine4 ,still1 the purpose and conduct of man's life1 if they are to be rational1 must be defined by man's nature not by any other nature2 if man is to be free1 he must be guided by the particular laws of his own being1 not by the laws of any other being least of all by the general laws of so totally dissimilar a being as absolutely infinite ,nature4 ,there is as much sense and rationality in exhorting us to go back to the ,realm of ,nature1 as there is in exhorting us to go on to the ,city of ,god4 ,there is1 in ,spinoza's system1 no teleological determinism 7in the perverted theological usage explained above72 but neither is there1 in ,spinoza's system1 any free-will for man4 ,and the hue and cry that is always raised when free-will is denied1 was raised against ,spinoza4 ,the clamorous moralists protest that free-will is the necessary 7sic67 foundation of all morality1 and hence of religion4 ,this is the starting point of ,bernard ,shaw's no less than of ,henry ,oldenburg's infuriated argument4 ,and1 unfortunately1 no less a thinker than ,william ,james starts from the same misguided assumption4 ,and yet nothing can be more certainly clear than that if man as a matter of fact has no free-will it is the very height of absurdity to maintain that man's morality necessarily depends upon his having free-will4 ,something man does not possess cannot be made any condition1 let alone the indispensable condition of his being able to live a moral life4 ,man's morality must be based upon his nature2 and what his nature is cannot be antecedently determined in accordance with the demands of any special moral theory4 ,moral theory must be based upon man's nature2 not man's nature upon moral theory4 ,far from free-will being a necessary foundation of morality free-will would make all morality1 of the kind we know and the free-will-ists want1 absolutely impossible4 ,the central condition of moral life is responsibility4 ,so central is it1 that it is now acknowledged as such in all the penal codes of civilized countries4 ,but if man has1 instead of a determinate nature1 free-will1 responsibility can in no way be fixed4 ,education1 too1 is necessarily impossible4 ,hence all punishment would have to be retributive4 ,moral strife1 as well as legal penalties1 would bear all the stigmata of unmitigated1 imbecilic cruelty4 ,this is not the case however if man has an absolutely determinate nature4 ,education is possible4 ,and therefore although crime loses none of its evil character1 punishment can lose all of its inhuman sting4 ,the necessary condition of human morality is responsibility not irresponsibility2 reliability not unreliability2 certainty not uncertainty2 a firm will1 not a free will4 ,free-will is necessary only in theological apologetics4 ,according to ,christian theology1 if man did not have free-will it would follow that ,god is the ,author of all the evil of the world4 ,something which is not quite in keeping with ,his perfect goodness4 ,by a queer twist of mind1 theologians therefore gave man1 and not ,god 7as they should have done7 free-will4 ,but they gave man free-will not to enable him to live virtuously1 but to enable him to sin4 ,if man were able to live virtuously as well as sinfully of his own free-will he would then be altogether independent of ,god1 which can in no way be admitted or allowed4 ,hence the bitter and heart-rending cries of orthodox1 especially evangelical ministers that if left to themselves they can only sin6 ,they can live virtuously only when they are absolutely coerced so to live by ,god6 ,their radical inability to understand or believe the self-reliant moral person grows from the very heart of their theology4 ,for free-will--the only freedom they know--is the necessary condition1 not of man's morality1 but of ,god's6 ,there is no fatalism in ,spinoza's system4 ,fatalism is the moral value of a theory of the universe4 ,that theory is fatalistic1 which makes the activities man cherishes either futile or impossible4 ,any system that puts man at the mercy of the flux of events does precisely this4 ,this is necessarily done by a system according to which the universe does not faithfully observe an immutable order1 does not obey certain fixed and eternal laws4 ,nothing is as fatal as an accident2 no universe as fatalistic as an accidental universe4 ,there is no fatalism in ,spinoza's system because there are no accidents in ,spinoza's universe4 ,all things are necessarily determined by immutable laws1 and man1 who is an integral part of the universe1 is necessarily without free-will4 ,in ,spinoza's system1 ends1 being undetermined 7as contrasted with their being determined in the theological sense explained above7 they can exercise no fatalistic power2 and means1 although determined 7in the strict scientific sense7 are similarly impotent because they are1 in the life of man1 subordinate to ends4 ,consequently1 ,spinoza was able to write upon ,human ,freedom with a truth and clarity and force excelling by far all theological1 teleological1 free-will1 idealistic philosophers from ,plato to ,josiah ,royce4 ,spinoza was able to write thus because1 not in spite of the fact that he placed at the heart of his philosophy the doctrine of necessity2 because1 not in spite of the fact that he developed the only complete system of philosophy strictly consistent with the principles of natural science or mathematical physics4 ,spinoza is1 perhaps1 the only thoroughly emancipated1 the only thoroughly modern and scientific philosopher that ever lived4 ,and he is1 much more certainly1 the only thoroughly emancipated1 the only thoroughly modern and scientific ethicist that ever lived4 ,to-day1 in view of the extensive dominion and authority of science1 the objections against ,spinoza's doctrine of necessity can hardly be as self-righteous and as loud as they were two centuries ago4 ,the principle of the uniformity of ,nature has become the established foundation of natural science4 ,and it is also acknowledged1 except in the recent ranks of superstition1 that man is a part of ,nature1 not independent of it4 ,man's connection with ,nature is1 in ,spinoza's system1 at least as intimate as it is in the latest system of natural science4 ,the original doctrine of the origin of species1 ,spinoza would have found entirely in harmony with his general philosophy1 although what he would have thought of subsequent evolutionary extravaganzas1 it is impossible to say4 ,darwinian biology made man consubstantial with the animal kingdom2 ,spinoza's metaphysics makes man's body consubstantial with the infinite attribute of extension or matter1 and his mind consubstantial with the infinite attribute of thought which is the mind of ,nature or ,god4 ,man1 as a mode of extension and thought1 is necessarily subject to the laws of these two attributes of which he is compounded4 ,the fundamental relation of man to the universe1 set forth in the ,bible1 is radically transformed4 ,man is no longer an only child of ,god1 enjoying his privileges and protection 7occasionally tempered by inexperienced punishments72 he is a mode of two attributes of substance inexorably determined by their universal1 immutable laws4 ,v ,of all the laws of the universe1 it was ,spinoza's chief object to discover the mental laws4 ,that there were such laws his metaphysics assured him2 and the existence to-day of a science of psychology substantiates his belief4 ,the most popular of recent psychologies--,freudianism--is based upon the principle that nothing whatever happens in the mental life of man1 waking or asleep1 that is not specifically determined by ascertainable causes4 ,psychoanalytic therapy would be impossible otherwise4 ,psychiatry1 too1 has conclusively demonstrated that only metaphorically is the subject matter it deals with in the region of the abnormal4 ,actually1 the insane are subject to laws of behavior which can be scientifically studied no less than the sane4 ,they are no more possessed of an evil1 designing spirit1 as our witch-burning ancestors consistently believed1 than the ordinary human being is possessed of free-will4 ,spinoza's psychology is dialectical4 ,but it is no indictment of his psychology to point out that it is4 ,it is true1 his formal definition of sorrow1 for instance1 fails supremely to touch the strings of a sympathetic heart4 ,but the philosophical psychologist is not a novelist4 ,the recent claim that literary psychology is the only valid psychology1 is as well founded as the claim would be that only a literary physics is valid4 ,mathematical physics gives us no more a picture of the actual physical universe than ,spinoza's psychology gives us a picture of the mental and emotional life of an actual human being4 ,but the failure of these sciences to give us a picture of the living world in no way invalidates their truth1 or deprives them of their utility4 ,consider1 as an example1 ,spinoza's psychological law freely expressed in the dictum that ,paul's idea of ,peter tells us more about ,paul than about ,peter4 ,this conclusion follows strictly from fundamental principles of ,spinoza's abstract1 dialectical psychology2 but its truth or its practical applicability is because of that not in the least impaired4 ,indeed1 because of its dialectical form its range of meaning is greatly increased4 ,spinoza's dictum applies to what ,william ,james called the psychologist's fallacy4 ,it also applies to what ,john ,ruskin called the pathetic fallacy4 ,again1 it applies to the fallacy ,franz ,boas exposed and which he may justly have called the anthropologist's fallacy4 ,and it applies also to what one may1 with a great deal of benefit1 dub the ethicist's fallacy4 ,for the very same constitutional weakness of man to identify confusedly his own nature with that of the object he is contemplating or studying1 is most flagrantly and painfully evident in the fields of theoretical and practical ethics4 ,the ethicist's fallacy is the source of all absolutism in theory1 and all intolerance in practice4 ,all four fallacies just enumerated come under ,spinoza's dictum as special cases come under a general law4 ,and these four are by no means the only instances of the common habit of mind4 ,from no field of human endeavor is the mischief-working fallacy ever absent4 ,we find it lodged in the judge's decision1 the propagandist's program1 the historian's record1 the philosopher's system4 ,in the field of metaphysical poetry it has recently been identified by ,santayana as normal madness4 ,in its milder forms1 the fallacy is now known by every one as the personal equation2 in its pronounced1 abnormal manifestations it is known by the psychoanalysts as transference4 ,it is a ,protean fallacy woven into the emotional texture of the human mind4 ,nothing1 for it1 is sacred enough to be inviolate4 ,for ,spinoza discovered it sanctimoniously enshrined even in the ,sacred ,scriptures4 ,as he brilliantly shows us in the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus1 the prophets' ideas about ,god tell us more about the prophets than about ,god4 ,the far-reaching significance of ,spinoza's propositions is one of their most remarkable characteristics4 ,this is due to the fact1 contemporary philological philosophers notwithstanding1 that ,spinoza defined the essence1 the generating principle1 not the accidental qualities1 of the human mind4 ,another example may not be out of place4 ,spinoza's proposition that anything may be accidentally 7in the philosophic sense of accident7 a cause of pleasure1 pain1 or desire seems to explain the essence of all the particular variations of the psychological phenomena known now by all who have been aroused to the significance of their vagrant cryptic slumbers1 as the phenomena of symbolism1 sublimation1 and fetich worship4 ,spinoza's proposition explains all the phenomena adequately because among the fundamental human emotions1 ,spinoza like ,freud--if we discount the recent attempt to go beyond the pleasure-principle--reckons only three3 desire1 pleasure and pain4 ,and with ,spinoza1 as with the ,freudians1 it sometimes seems that desire is more fundamental than the other two1 for desire expresses1 in ,spinoza's terminology1 the essence of man4 ,desire however may be stimulated by almost anything4 ,it requires the least sanity of mind1 therefore1 to prevent one from scandalously over-emphasizing one particular class of objects--of desire4 ,the striking similarity1 if not identity1 between ,spinoza's psychological doctrines and those of contemporaries1 serves to give conclusive lie to the crass contemporary contention that ,truth instinctively shuns the philosophical study1 and that she only favors the laboratory or clinic where she freely comes and frankly discloses herself to the cold1 impersonal embrace of mechanical instruments4 ,it is not altogether fortuitously that ,spinoza's psychology embraces so readily contemporary psychological conceptions4 ,spinoza made a psychological1 if not psychoanalytical1 analysis of some portions of ,scripture4 ,and ,scripture is a very rich human material4 ,besides having to explain the diverse and conflicting accounts the different ,scriptural authors gave of the nature of ,god1 ,spinoza had to account for the superstitious beliefs commonly held by men that are incorporated in the ,bible--the beliefs in omens1 devils1 angels1 miracles1 magical rites4 ,spinoza had to account for all these by means of his analysis of human nature since he would not grant the existence of supernatural beings and powers4 ,spinoza's psychology adequately performs the task4 ,his psychology demonstrates with unsurpassed thoroughness and clarity how human emotions1 when uncontrolled in any way by intelligence1 naturally attach themselves to all sorts of bizarrely irrelevant and absurd things1 and stimulate the imagination to endow these things with all the qualities and powers the disturbed hearts of ignorant men desire4 ,ignorant and frustrated man1 ,spinoza showed1 frantically dreams with his eyes open4 ,,vi ,spinoza's method in psychology is dialectical1 but his interest is practical4 ,his psychology one might almost say is a moral psychology4 ,spinoza wants to explain mental phenomena through their primary causes because a knowledge of man's nature is the radical cure for his ills4 ,the greatest obstacle man has to contend against is his emotional nature4 ,not that it is inherently degraded or sinful--the grotesque superstition some religious moralists have maintained2 but man's emotional nature masters1 more often than not1 man's rational nature1 and leads man astray4 ,when the emotions are unrestrained and undirected by knowledge and intelligence1 they violently attach themselves to anything that chances to excite them4 ,their stark immediacy vitiates man's judgment4 ,he is unable1 while under their sway1 to select and follow the course that is best1 because his mind is engulfed in the evanescent present4 ,in his hectic desire to gain the passing pleasure1 man loses his ultimate good4 ,but man's salvation1 just as much as his damnation1 is within his own control4 ,salvation or blessedness is something man can achieve by his own efforts2 it is not something he can achieve only by ,divine ,grace4 ,for it is no innate perversion of soul1 no inherent wickedness of man1 no malicious free-will that causes him to follow the lure of the ,devil rather than the light of ,god4 ,the very elements in man's nature which cause him to fall are the means by which he can make himself rise4 ,he can pit one emotion against another and the stronger will not merely win1 but will win over1 the weaker4 ,and it is in the nature of the emotions not to have only one satisfying object1 but to be able to derive satisfaction from almost any object whatsoever4 ,the most spiritual forms of human love have the same emotional foundations as the most bestial forms of human lust4 ,to learn how to become master of one's emotions1 to learn how to free oneself from their bondage1 is1 therefore1 the primary condition of sustained and rational happiness4 ,the key to virtue1 ,spinoza independently agreed with ,socrates1 is knowledge of oneself4 ,only when we understand ourselves can we control our emotions4 ,and only when we have our emotions under control are we able consistently to direct our activity towards a definite1 rational goal4 ,our activity then follows from our own nature1 and not from the nature of external things which arouse our emotions and determine their strength4 ,and1 as already noticed1 to be the necessary cause of our own activity is1 according to ,spinoza1 to be free4 ,it is impossible1 of course1 for man ever to be the sole cause of his activity4 ,to be such1 he would have to be an entirely independent being--an absolute power--something he can never be4 ,no matter how eloquently misguided enthusiasts extol the powerful merits of man's free-will it will always be true that man's emotions1 sensations and ideas change very significantly with the organic changes that occur in his body4 ,the emotions1 sensations and ideas of a child differ from those of a man1 and those of a man in maturity differ from those of a man decrepit with old age4 ,and these and similar changes are quite beyond the control of man4 ,however1 without denying man's intimate dependence upon ,nature1 it is still possible to distinguish between those activities which follow1 in an important degree1 from a man's individual nature--whatever it may happen to be at the time--and those activities which follow only from his own nature in conjunction with the nature of other things4 ,the movement of my pen on paper would be impossible without the general order of ,nature which allows such phenomena as motion1 pen and paper1 to exist4 ,nevertheless1 ,i can profitably distinguish between the movement of my pen on paper and the movement of my body through stellar space4 ,the former movement follows1 in an important sense1 from my own peculiar constitution2 the latter1 from the constitution of the stellar system4 ,likewise1 but more significantly for human welfare1 one can distinguish broadly between the activities and the passivities of the mind2 between man as an agent1 a doer--man's intellect2 and man as a patient1 a sufferer--man's passions4 ,in this creative age such distinction should be singularly easy to draw4 ,in moral terminology one can distinguish between man as free and man as enslaved4 ,since man can never be the sole cause of his activity1 he can never be wholly free4 ,the range of human power is extremely limited1 and ,spinoza is ever careful to point that out4 ,spinoza is no incurable optimist1 no ,leibnizian ,pangloss who believes this is1 for man1 the best of all possible worlds4 ,to be humanly idealistic it is by no means necessary to be super-humanly utopian4 ,but neither is ,spinoza a shallow ,schopenhauerian pessimist4 ,spinoza's realistic appraisal of man's worldly estate is entirely free from all romantic despair4 ,this world is no more the worst than it is the best of all possible worlds for man4 ,although man cannot completely alter his evil estate1 he can better it4 ,and the wisdom of philosophy consists in recognizing this fact and discovering what ways and means there are for bringing such betterment about4 ,this ,spinoza has in mind throughout the devious courses of his philosophy4 ,it is present to him when he delineates the character of ,nature or ,god1 when he outlines the nature of the mind and its emotions1 no less than when he specifically addresses himself to the task of describing the way to the highest blessedness of man4 ,indeed1 so intent is ,spinoza upon reaching his ethical goal1 and making all his doctrines contributory to it1 he purposely omits to treat of many philosophical problems because they are1 though interesting in themselves1 of too little value for the conduct of man's life4 ,his philosophical system1 as a result1 is in many respects merely sketched in massive outline4 ,,vii ,the dominant ethics of ,christian civilization has made a special point of disregarding the intimate connection that exists between human nature and rational conduct4 ,morality has been identified1 not with living a life according to a rational plan and an adequate conception of an ideal form of human existence1 but with a strained attempt to live in accordance with an inherited system of coercive social habits4 ,of this morality1 the ,puritan is the popular type4 ,only in quite recent years has some advance been made back to the sane naturalistic conception of morals which is found in the ,greeks and also in ,spinoza4 ,it is a fundamental point with ,spinoza that the ceremonial law1 as he puts it in the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus1 can at best secure man wealth and social position4 ,man's highest blessedness can be secured by the divine law of ,nature alone4 ,here ,spinoza and ,rousseau are at one4 ,it was relevant to ,spinoza's purpose to treat only of religious ceremonial law2 but his conclusions apply with equal force and relevancy to social and political ceremonial law as well4 ,spinoza's distinction between ceremonial and divine law is peculiarly significant and illuminating when applied to marriage4 ,for to-day in marriage1 if anywhere1 is it glaringly evident that the legal or religious or social ceremonial law can at best secure man or woman wealth and social position4 ,happiness or blessedness lie altogether beyond its powerful reach4 ,marriage is sanctified and made blessed not by the ceremonial law of priest or city clerk but by the divine law of love4 ,natural love1 or love free from all ceremonial coercions1 is not merely not a questionable source of marital happiness3 it is the only source4 ,the ceremonial law1 the legal or religious marriage custom1 has nothing whatsoever to do with human happiness4 ,if by free love is meant love free from all legal1 social and religious ceremonial restraints1 then free love is1 according to ,spinoza1 the only basis of rational marriage4 ,no man ever treasured the joys of the spirit more than did ,spinoza2 but he did not because of that nourish a savage antagonism against the body4 ,the very bases of his philosophy of the mind saved him from any such disastrous folly4 ,what ,havelock ,ellis says ,we know at last ,spinoza knew all the time--that it must be among our chief ethical rules to see that we build the lofty structure of human society on the sure and simple foundations of man's organism4 ,it is because ,spinoza knew this so thoroughly and remembered it so well that he devotes so much of his attention to the nature of the human mind and the human emotions in a treatise on ethics4 ,mind and body are not intrinsically alien or inimical to one another4 ,they are coperative expressions of the one reality4 ,the mind is the idea of the body and in proportion as one body is better adapted than another to do or suffer many things1 in the same proportion will the mind1 at the same time1 be better adapted to perceive many things4 ,purely psychologically1 all that we can ever discover about the regulating influence glands have upon personality can only go to corroborate1 not to improve this general position4 ,and morally1 the implications are equally far-reaching and profound4 ,the virtue of the mind is not to despise or reject but to understand and transform4 ,and it clearly must be more excellent for the mind to know both itself and the body than it is for the mind to know itself alone4 ,for natural science is the result when the mind organizes into a system what are1 in their own nature1 simply apprehensions of bodily existences2 and art is the result when the mind transfuses with an ideal quality of its own what are1 in their own nature1 simply apprehensions of bodily excellences of form or motion1 color or sound4 ,matter is1 in its nature1 no more hostile to spirit than body is alien to mind4 ,paradise is not a non-or super-physical realm2 it is a physical realm made harmonious with the ideality of the soul4 ,spirit is an appreciation1 a transmutation of matter4 ,for the lover1 the physical embrace is a spiritual revelation4 ,the fundamental metaphysical law from which ,spinoza's ethical system flows is that everything endeavors to persist in its own being4 ,this law is the metaphysical equivalent of the first law of motion in physics which is itself the equivalent of the law of identity in logic4 ,by his law ,spinoza does not mean anything which anticipates the nineteenth-century doctrine of the competitive struggle for existence4 ,on the contrary1 nothing is so clear to ,spinoza as the fact that the most efficient way of preserving one's own being is not by competitive but by coperative activity4 ,especially is this true of human beings4 ,by his own efforts a solitary man cannot1 even after he has been nursed to maturity1 maintain himself in a decent manner4 ,certainly he is unable successfully to resist his foes4 ,but with the aid of his fellows man can develop a highly complex and tolerably stable civilization1 all the excellences of which he can enjoy at the comparatively small risk of becoming a victim of its dangers4 ,social organization is the natural expression of man's fundamental endeavor to preserve himself4 ,a perfect social organization naturally expresses the highest form of human existence--individualism without anarchy and communism without oppression4 ,consistent with his primary law of being1 ,spinoza defines virtue not in terms of negations1 inhibitions1 deficiencies or restraints2 virtue he defines in terms of positive human qualities compendiously called human power4 ,virtue is power1 however1 not in the sense of the ,renaissance ideal of manliness as we glimpse it1 for instance1 in ,benvenuto ,cellini2 nor is it power in the vulgar sense of dominion which seems to be the confused ideal of some ultra-contemporaries2 virtue is power in the sense of the ,greek ideal that virtue is human excellence4 ,it was therefore very natural for ,nietzsche who consciously went back to the ,greeks to hail ,spinoza as his only philosophical forerunner1 the only philosopher who dwelt with him on the highest mountain-tops1 perilous only for those who are born for the base valleys of life4 ,and it was equally natural for ,nietzsche to fail to see the important differences between his own violent and turbid thinking and the sure and disciplined thinking of ,spinoza--on those very points upon which ,nietzsche thought they agreed4 ,perfection and imperfection are1 in ,spinoza's thought1 identical with the real and the unreal4 ,the perfect is the completed1 the perfected2 the imperfect1 the uncompleted1 the unperfected4 ,these terms have1 in their first intention1 no specifically ethical significance4 ,nature is perfect1 that is1 absolutely real or completed2 but in no intelligible sense is ,nature ethically good4 ,however1 it is possible to convert non-ethical into ethical terms4 ,we can do this by designating1 for example1 a certain type of character as the perfect type4 ,if we reach that type we are perfect or supremely good2 insofar as we fall short of it1 we are imperfect1 or bad4 ,just what constitutes human excellence is determined in each case by the specific nature and relations of the individual involved4 ,the excellence of a child is not that of a man2 and the excellence of a free man differs from that of a slave4 ,for the parent1 the perfect child is docile1 beautiful and full of promise2 for the ruler1 the perfect man is industrious1 respectful of law and order1 eager to pay taxes and go to war2 for the free man1 the perfect man is a rational being1 living a harmonious life in knowledge and love of himself1 his neighbor and ,god4 ,moreover1 within any one class the excellences vary in harmony with the variations in the individuals4 ,there is no excellence in general4 ,but because ethical standards are quite human and vary1 they do not lack1 therefore1 all validity4 ,they are within their range of applicability1 absolute1 even though they are1 in a more comprehensive universe1 relative4 ,a just appreciation of the relative nature1 but absolute value of specific ethical judgments1 is above all things vitally necessary in ethics4 ,such appreciation saves the ethicist from the pernicious fallacy of erecting personal preferences into universal laws2 and it also saves him from falling into the ethical abyss where all things are of equal value because all things are equally vain4 ,ethical tolerance is different from ethical sentimentality4 ,every one has the sovereign natural right to cherish the excellence in harmony with his character4 ,but the equality extends no further4 ,a comprehensive estimate of the powers of the mind can be made and they can be arranged in a series of increasing value4 ,no arrangement can ever be absolutely final and authoritative1 for what one free man considers the highest perfection of human life1 another will consider to be only of secondary importance4 ,still1 all free men will agree that certain powers of the mind are superior to others4 ,but superiority is not rationally endowed with legislative power over others4 ,the free man is superior to the slave1 but he has1 because of that1 no rational right to dominate him2 neither is it his office to revile or despise him2 the slave was given his nature1 he did not ask for it4 ,but if it is not the office of the free man to dominate or revile the slave still less is it the divinely appointed office of the slave to rule and revile the free man--universal democratic prejudices notwithstanding4 ,and in support of the independent1 and in case of contest1 superior right of the free man we have the very highest authority for those who do not trust themselves to be guided by reason4 ,god ,himself has pronounced upon this tremendous issue4 ,and not in mere words1 but by unmistakable deeds4 ,when ,lucifer1 the first absolute democrat or equalitarian1 the first one to maintain that no one was better than he was1 raised his impious standard1 ,god assembled all ,his faithful hosts together and hurled ,lucifer out of ,heaven into ,hell4 ,and justly so4 ,for ,lucifer had1 by his foul1 sacrilegious doctrine and action1 revealed himself to be the ,prince of ,darkness not the ,prince of ,light4 ,to our untold and everlasting misery the ,prince of ,darkness who failed to ensnare the majority of angels did succeed in ensnaring the majority of mankind4 ,so irredeemably so1 even the sweetly and tenderly lyrical ,prince of ,peace had to be sent to us bearing a ghastly sword4 ,reason is not1 according to ,spinoza1 a constitutive power in man's life2 it is a regulative principle4 ,spinoza is1 in the traditional usage of the term1 anything but a rationalist in his ethics4 ,only if rationalism consists in being unflaggingly reasonable is ,spinoza an avowed and thorough-going rationalist4 ,reason has1 for ,spinoza1 no transcendental status or power1 and it plays no dictatorial rle4 ,reason1 for him1 is essentially an organizing not a legislative power in man's life4 ,to take a phrase from ,professor ,dewey1 reason1 for ,spinoza1 is reconstructive not constitutive4 ,the power of the intellect is not some underived1 original1 independent power which can impose or1 better1 superimpose its categorical imperatives upon human conduct4 ,the power of the intellect is wholly derivative1 dependent upon the nature of the things that it understands4 ,reason gives man the power and insight to organize his life on the basis of his knowledge1 to chose an end harmonious with his nature1 what is for his best advantage--the basis of all virtue--and to select and control the means by which it can be attained4 ,for the happy governance of our lives the object we must chiefly understand is ourselves4 ,because--in ,matthew ,arnold's line--the aids to noble life are all within4 ,when we become creatures conscious of our natural endowment we cease to be blind instruments of our natures and become rational1 intelligent agents4 ,for intelligence1 in the fundamental sense of the word1 consists in knowing what we are and understanding what we can do4 ,a man who governs his life according to the dictates of reason tries1 insofar as possible1 to harmonize his conflicting interests4 ,he balances1 impartially1 future with present goods1 and he bases his decision upon the broad foundation of all his needs4 ,he does not madly satisfy or repress one passion at the expense of the rest of his nature4 ,he satisfies a maximum rather than a minimum of his desires1 evaluating them not merely by numerical strength but by quality and duration4 ,it is only stupid and pernicious confusion that makes man's moral problem consist in his discovering instead of a good relative to his nature1 an absolute good1 good for no nature at all4 ,man's real moral problem is to secure a permanent good instead of a transitory good2 a more inclusive good instead of a more restricted good2 a higher good instead of a lower good4 ,morally1 it matters nothing whether an intellectual good is absolute or whether it is only relative to man's mind and his power of comprehension4 ,but it matters everything1 morally1 whether an intellectual good is more or less permanent1 more or less inclusive1 more or less valuable than a sensory good4 ,this is the real moral problem man is faced with4 ,and this is the moral problem ,spinoza considers and solves4 ,everybody knows what is ,spinoza's solution4 ,one permanent intellectual good is1 according to him1 of more importance and value in the life of man than countless transitory sensory pleasures4 ,the object most permanent in character and greatest in value is ,nature or ,god4 ,the highest virtue of the mind1 therefore1 the highest blessedness of man1 consists in the intellectual love of ,nature or ,god4 ,thus ,spinoza passes from ethics to religion1 which in his thought almost imperceptibly blend together4 ,,viii ,the beginning and the end1 as familiar wisdom has long since propounded1 are the same4 ,the ultimate origin of man is ,god1 and the final end1 the blessed crown of life1 is to return to ,god in fullest knowledge and love4 ,the philosopher who was during his lifetime and for over a century after his death constantly execrated for being an atheist 7he occasionally still is by some hardy fools7 made ,god a more integral part of his system than did any one else in the whole history of philosophy4 ,spinoza did not do occasional reverence to ,god2 he did not1 in lightly passing1 perfunctorily bow to ,him2 ,god is the veritable beginning and end of all his thought4 ,the intellectual love of ,god does not demand as basis a knowledge of the cosmic concatenation of things4 ,omniscience alone could satisfy such a demand4 ,the intellectual love of ,nature or ,god depends solely upon a knowledge of the order of ,nature1 upon a knowledge of the infinite and eternal essence of ,god4 ,and such knowledge is within the limits of our reach4 ,we can apprehend the eternal essence of ,god because the temporality of our thought is accidental to its meaning4 ,it is the nature of reason to see things under the form of eternity4 ,and we can apprehend the infinite essence of ,god or ,nature because every particular finite thing is a determinate expression of the infinite4 ,the law of causality requires that there be an essential identity of nature between cause and effect2 otherwise it would follow that something can be produced from nothing4 ,since cause and effect belong to the same realm of existence1 to the same attribute of ,nature1 whenever we apprehend the essence of a particular thing1 we necessarily apprehend the infinite essence of that attribute of ,nature4 ,for the infinite1 with ,spinoza1 is not so much an extent as a quality of being4 ,thus from the comprehension of any particular thing1 we can pass to a comprehension of the infinite and eternal4 ,this is most commonly understood1 curiously enough1 not in religion1 but in art4 ,the ecstatic power of beauty makes the soul lose all sense of time and location4 ,and in the specific object the soul sees an infinite meaning4 ,indeed1 one can almost say that the more specific or limited the artistic object1 the more clearly is the absolute or infinite meaning portrayed and discerned4 ,a sonnet is oftener than not more expressive than a long poem2 the ,red ,badge of ,courage reveals more impressively than does the ,dynasts the absolute essential horror of war4 ,there are present1 apparently1 in the more pronounced mystical visions1 characteristics similar to those of significant esthetic apprehensions4 ,these visions are extremely rare and fleeting4 ,but then we can be at the highest peaks only seldom and for a short while4 ,but in a moment we see eternity1 and in the finite1 the infinite4 ,it is for this reason ,spinoza says the more we understand particular things the more do we understand ,god4 ,the great religious significance of ,spinoza's doctrine of the intellectual love of ,god is that it establishes religion upon knowledge and not upon ignorance4 ,the virtue of the mind is clearly and distinctly to understand1 not ignorantly to believe4 ,there is no conflict between science and religion2 religion is based upon science4 ,there is a conflict only between science and superstition4 ,mysteries1 unknown and unknowable powers1 miracles1 magical rites and prayerful incantations are instruments not of religion but of superstition which has its origin in ignorant and ignominious fear4 ,the free man does not fear and he is not consumed by fear's boundless conceit4 ,he has no apprehensive conscience which unceasingly interprets all unusual or untoward events as being deliberate signs of a god's impending wrath4 ,the free man knows that man is1 cosmically considered1 impressively insignificant4 ,human loves and hatreds1 human joys and sorrows are1 in the face of the eternal and infinite1 the littlest of little things4 ,human nature is only an infinitely small part of absolutely infinite ,nature2 human life only a very tiny expression of infinite life4 ,inordinate conceit alone could conceive ,nature to have been made designedly either for our pleasure or our discomfort4 ,the stars were not hung in the heavens so that we may steer our petty courses across the seas2 nor were the sun and moon put in their places so that we may have the day in which to waste ourselves in futile labors and the night to spend in ignorant sleep4 ,even if there were a cosmic drama--which there is not--man is too trivial to play in it a leading rle4 ,the free man knows all this2 but his heart is tempered and strong4 ,he can contemplate his place in the universe without bitterness and without fear4 ,for the free man's love1 as his worship1 flows from his knowledge of ,god4 ,,ix ,spinoza is unsparing in his criticisms of the superstitions which are in1 and which have grown up around1 the ,bible4 ,all ,spinoza's major conclusions have been embodied directly or indirectly in what is now known as the higher criticism of the ,bible1 which is the basis of the ,modernist movement4 ,it was ,spinoza who established the fact that the ,pentateuch is not1 as it is reputed to be1 the work of ,moses4 ,it was ,spinoza1 also1 who first convincingly showed that other of the ,scriptural documents were compiled by various unacknowledged scribes2 not by the authors canonized by orthodoxy1 ,jewish or ,gentile4 ,the wealth of philological and historical material at the disposal of the contemporary ,biblical investigator is incomparably richer than it was at ,spinoza's time4 ,but modern scholarship has only added more material--only extended in breadth ,spinoza's modest researches4 ,in depth1 nothing new has been achieved4 ,the principles of investigation and interpretation1 and the general results ,spinoza arrived at have not been improved upon in the least1 nor is it at all likely that they ever will4 ,spinoza founded himself upon bed-rock4 ,spinoza's aim in revealing the defectiveness of the ,bible was not theological but philosophical4 ,orthodox ,biblical conceptions had in his day1 as they still have to a certain extent in ours1 a peculiarly sanctified power1 because they were institutionalized and made the basis of an authoritative system of conduct4 ,the misbegotten doctrines therefore could not be questioned with impunity1 for a criticism of the doctrines on intellectual grounds was invariably construed as an attack upon the vested customs4 ,the misfortunes of history made dissent from palpable absurdities capital heresy4 ,social and religious bigotry burned scientific men with political ardor4 ,however1 although ,spinoza suffered in his own person from religious persecution1 he never for one moment held as did1 for example1 ,voltaire1 that the ,church is the wily and unregenerate instrument of vicious priests4 ,on the contrary1 ,spinoza was quite sure that many of the clergy were among the noblest of men1 and that the ,church was in large measure a very salutary institution for the masses who cannot learn to govern themselves by force of mind4 ,but ,spinoza was unalterably opposed to any encroachment of ,church authority upon the just liberties of men4 ,especially did he object to the ,church extending its prohibitive power over men's thinking4 ,it is the business of the ,church to inculcate obedience in the masses2 not to dictate to philosophers what is the truth4 ,the fundamental purpose of ,spinoza's attack upon the ,bible is to free philosophy from theology2 not to destroy the ,church but to disestablish it4 ,many readers of ,spinoza conclude that because ,spinoza tolerated ,church authority in matters of public morality he therefore either did not in his own thought thoroughly adhere to his principles or else he was excessively cautious1 even timid1 and did not fully or consistently express his mind4 ,no one would deny that there is some accommodation in ,spinoza's language4 ,he certainly followed the practical wisdom of the thinkers of his day4 ,even so1 however1 ,spinoza was by no means as cautious as was ,descartes4 ,anyway1 accommodation does not fully account for ,spinoza's attitude on this question2 in fact1 it does not account for any significant feature of it4 ,spinoza never believed a sound metaphysics was1 for the masses1 the indispensable basis of a good moral life4 ,the multitude1 he was firmly convinced1 are controlled by their passions and desires1 not by knowledge and reason4 ,the coercive law of the ,state and ,nature1 not philosophy1 keep them living within the bounds necessary for social order and human well-being4 ,far from it being necessary to tell the masses only the truth ,spinoza believed1 as did ,plato before him1 that it may even be necessary in order to rule the masses successfully in the ways of wisdom and virtue to deceive them to a greater or lesser extent4 ,such deception is1 as a political expediency1 morally justified1 for the rulers would be lying in the interests of virtue and truth4 ,spinoza did not suffer from the fond contemporary delusion that the salvation of mankind will come about when philosophers become like all other people4 ,he knew1 as ,plato did1 that the day of ultimate1 universal happiness will dawn rather when all other people become like philosophers4 ,in the meantime1 it is the height of moral and political folly to act as if that day had arrived or else could be ushered in by morning4 ,spinoza had nothing but contempt for facile-tongued1 feather-brained ,utopians4 ,he loved humanity too sincerely to mislead humanity or himself that way4 ,and so we find in ,spinoza's ,ethics as in his ,tractatus two systems of morals--one for the many who are called1 and one for the few who are chosen4 ,in the ,tractatus1 the religion of the many is summarily called obedience2 in the ,ethics it is more fully shown to consist of utilitarianism in the conduct of our affairs1 high-mindedness towards our fellows1 and piety towards ,nature or ,god4 ,to this is added1 as the rare religion of the few1 what is designated in both treatises alike as the intellectual love of ,nature or ,god4 ,x ,spinoza's religion is as naturalistic as his ethics4 ,by making ,god and ,nature equivalent terms ,spinoza was not merely resorting to equivocation to escape the penalty of his views4 ,the identification of ,god and ,nature fully embodies ,spinoza's doctrine that there is no supernatural realm2 and therefore if man is to have a ,god at all1 ,nature must be that ,god4 ,to contend1 as so many do1 that true religion must be based upon the existence of a supernatural realm1 no matter whether or not such a realm exists1 is as absurd as to contend that true morality must be based upon man's free-will no matter whether or not man has free-will4 ,spinoza's system has been called pantheistic4 ,but it is pantheistic only in the sense that whatever man considers ,godlike must be found in ,nature1 for no other realm exists1 and there are no gods4 ,but the question is always raised1 how is it possible to love a ,being indifferent to our human miseries and blind to our hopes8 ,how is even an intellectual love of such a ,being possible8 ,man1 as his religions show1 wants ,god to be a father1 a protector1 ,one who cherishes man's desires and cares for his wants4 ,the least anthropomorphic of religions wants ,god to be the depository of abstract human ideals4 ,but ,spinoza's ,god is not even as human as this4 ,nature does not constitute the ideal type for man4 ,religion is1 it is true1 man's search for comfort and security in an alien and hostile world4 ,the simple demand of the human heart is to be recognized and to be loved4 ,love is the magic touch that transforms all that is barren and cold into all that is rich and warm and fruitful4 ,but man is neither loved nor recognized by the immensities of the universe4 ,and in face of the illimitable stretches of time and space even the stoutest heart involuntarily quakes4 ,we cannot consider the vast power of the universe without feeling crushed and becoming despondent4 ,and ignorant man cannot see in the finite things about him the full expression of the infinite beyond4 ,he cannot derive any moral strength or comfort from the world about him because he conceives that world to be an implacable instrument of a god's uncertain1 inexplicable will4 ,he therefore cosmically projects1 in a frenzy of despair1 his crying human demand4 ,and out of the wastes of space there arises for him a personal ,god4 ,anthropomorphic religions reveal man at his weakest1 not at his best4 ,man's true grandeur is shown when he transcends by his own power of mind his insistent human desires4 ,he can then stand free before the ,almighty4 ,he may tremble1 but he is not afraid4 ,for his strength of soul is grounded not in the external world but in his own ideal4 ,if we are born under a lucky star1 and are fortunate and happy lovers of the ideal1 the ecstasy of the mystic's beatific vision is ours4 ,but even if we are born under an unlucky star1 and are misfortunate and unhappy lovers of the ideal1 we still have the ideal to which we can hold fast and save ourselves from being shattered in our despairs1 from dying in spirit1 which is far more terrible than any death in the body could possibly be4 ,we have the ideal to give us the strength1 if we are lovers of ,god1 to go to the cross with ,jesus2 or1 if we are lovers of ,virtue1 to drink the hemlock with ,socrates4 ,the intellectual love of ,god is a devotion purged of all fear1 of all vain regrets and even vainer hopes4 ,the wild and angry emotions of sorrow and pain leave the strong and noble heart of man like the tidal waves leave the scattered rocks of the shore4 ,as the rocks1 when the waves return to their depths1 smile securely in the glistening sun in the sky1 so does the brave1 free heart of man1 when the passionate deluge is spent1 smile serenely in the face of ,god4 ,the free man is born neither to weep nor to laugh but to view with calm and steadfast mind the eternal nature of things4 ,to know the eternal is the immortality we enjoy4 ,but to know the eternal we must forget about ourselves4 ,we must cease to be consumed by a cancerous anxiety to endure in time and be permanent in space4 ,in the order of ,nature our own particular lives are of no especial importance4 ,and unless we recognize this1 we are necessarily doomed to a miserable fate4 ,we must recognize that our mere selves can never give us ultimate fulfillment or blessedness of soul4 ,only by losing ourselves in ,nature or ,god can we escape the wretchedness of finitude and find the final completion and salvation of our lives4 ,this1 the free man understands4 ,he knows how insignificant he is in the order of ,nature4 ,but he also knows that if only he can lose himself in ,nature or ,god then1 in his own insignificant particularity1 the eternal and infinite order of ,nature can be displayed4 ,for in the finite is the infinite expressed1 and in the temporal1 the eternal4 ,it is this knowledge that makes man free1 that breaks the finite fetters from his soul enabling him to embrace the infinite and to possess eternity4 ,once man is reconciled to the petty worth of his own person1 he assumes some of the majestic worth of the universe4 ,and the austere sublimity of soul that inscribes on the grave of the beloved ,god is ,love1 inscribes1 when it is chastened and purified by understanding1 on the grave of all that is merely human ,nature is ,great4 ,religion is the joy and peace and strength that is all understanding4 ,,joseph ,,ratner4 ,,first ,,part ,,on ,,god ,the multitude1 ever prone to superstition1 and caring more for the shreds of antiquity than for eternal truths1 pays homage to the ,books of the ,bible1 rather than to the ,word of ,god4 ,,spinoza4 ,,chapter ,i ,,of ,,superstition#a ,men would never be superstitious1 if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules1 or if they were always favored by fortune3 but being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless1 and being often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear by the uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favors1 they are consequently1 for the most part1 very prone to credulity4 ,the human mind is readily swayed this way or that in times of doubt1 especially when hope and fear are struggling for the mastery1 though usually it is boastful1 over-confident1 and vain4 ,this as a general fact ,i suppose every one knows1 though few1 ,i believe1 know their own nature2 no one can have lived in the world without observing that most people1 when in prosperity1 are so over-brimming with wisdom 7however inexperienced they may be71 that they take every offer of advice as a personal insult1 whereas in adversity they know not where to turn1 but beg and pray for counsel from every passer-by4 ,no plan is then too futile1 too absurd1 or too fatuous for their adoption2 the most frivolous causes will raise them to hope1 or plunge them into despair--if anything happens during their fright which reminds them of some past good or ill1 they think it portends a happy or unhappy issue1 and therefore 7though it may have proved abortive a hundred times before7 style it a lucky or unlucky omen4 ,anything which excites their astonishment they believe to be a portent signifying the anger of the gods or of the ,supreme ,being1 and1 mistaking superstition for religion1 account it impious not to avert the evil with prayer and sacrifice4 ,signs and wonders of this sort they conjure up perpetually1 till one might think ,nature as mad as themselves1 they interpret her so fantastically4 ,thus it is brought prominently before us1 that superstition's chief victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal advantages2 they it is1 who 7especially when they are in danger1 and cannot help themselves7 are wont with prayers and womanish tears to implore help from ,god3 upbraiding reason as blind1 because she cannot show a sure path to the shadows they pursue1 and rejecting human wisdom as vain2 but believing the phantoms of imagination1 dreams1 and other childish absurdities1 to be the very oracles of ,heaven4 ,as though ,god has turned away from the wise1 and written ,his decrees1 not in the mind of man but in the entrails of beasts1 or left them to be proclaimed by the inspiration and instinct of fools1 madmen1 and birds4 ,such is the unreason to which terror can drive mankind6 ,superstition1 then1 is engendered1 preserved1 and fostered by fear4 ,if any one desire an example1 let him take ,alexander1 who only began superstitiously to seek guidance from seers1 when he first learned to fear fortune in the passes of ,sysis 7,curtius v4 #d72 whereas after he had conquered ,darius he consulted prophets no more1 till a second time frightened by reverses4 ,when the ,scythians were provoking a battle1 the ,bactrians had deserted1 and he himself was lying sick of his wounds1 he once more turned to superstition1 the mockery of human wisdom1 and bade ,aristander1 to whom he confided his credulity1 inquire the issue of affairs with sacrificed victims4 ,very numerous examples of a like nature might be cited1 clearly showing the fact1 that only while under the dominion of fear do men fall a prey to superstition2 that all the portents ever invested with the reverence of misguided religion are mere phantoms of dejected and fearful minds2 and lastly that prophets have most power among the people1 and are most formidable to rulers1 precisely at those times when the state is in most peril4 ,i think this is sufficiently plain to all1 and will therefore say no more on the subject4 ,the origin of superstition above given affords us a clear reason for the fact1 that it comes to all men naturally1 though some refer its rise to a dim notion of ,god1 universal to mankind1 and also tends to show1 that it is no less inconsistent and variable than other mental hallucinations and emotional impulses1 and further that it can only be maintained by hope1 hatred1 anger1 and deceit2 since it springs1 not from reason1 but solely from the more powerful phases of emotion4 ,furthermore1 we may readily understand how difficult it is to maintain in the same course men prone to every form of credulity4 ,for1 as the mass of mankind remains always at about the same pitch of misery1 it never assents long to any one remedy1 but is always best pleased by a novelty which has yet proved illusive4 ,this element of inconsistency has been the cause of many terrible wars and revolutions2 for1 as ,curtius well says 7lib4 iv4 chap4 #aj73 ,the mob has no ruler more potent than superstition1 and is easily led1 on the plea of religion1 at one moment to adore its kings as gods1 and anon to execrate and abjure them as humanity's common bane4 ,immense pains have therefore been taken to counteract this evil by investing religion1 whether true or false1 with such pomp and ceremony1 that it may rise superior to every shock1 and be always observed with studious reverence by the whole people--a system which has been brought to great perfection by the ,turks1 for they consider even controversy impious1 and so clog men's minds with dogmatic formulas1 that they leave no room for sound reason1 not even enough to doubt with4 ,but if1 in despotic statecraft1 the supreme and essential mystery be to hoodwink the subjects1 and to mask the fear1 which keeps them down1 with the specious garb of religion1 so that men may fight as bravely for slavery as for safety1 and count it not shame but highest honor to risk their blood and their lives for the vainglory of a tyrant2 yet in a free state no more mischievous expedient could be planned or attempted4 ,wholly repugnant to the general freedom are such devices as enthralling men's minds with prejudices1 forcing their judgment1 or employing any of the weapons of quasi-religious sedition2 indeed1 such seditions only spring up1 when law enters the domain of speculative thought1 and opinions are put on trial and condemned on the same footing as crimes1 while those who defend and follow them are sacrificed1 not to public safety1 but to their opponents' hatred and cruelty4 ,if deeds only could be made the grounds of criminal charges1 and words were always allowed to pass free1 such seditions would be divested of every semblance of justification1 and would be separated from mere controversies by a hard and fast line4 ,now seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a republic1 where every one's judgment is free and unshackled1 where each may worship ,god as his conscience dictates1 and where freedom is esteemed before all things dear and precious1 ,i have believed that ,i should be undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task1 in demonstrating that not only can such freedom be granted without prejudice to the public peace1 but also1 that without such freedom1 piety cannot flourish nor the public peace be secure4444 ,i have often wondered that persons who make a boast of professing the ,christian religion1 namely1 love1 joy1 peace1 temperance1 and charity to all men1 should quarrel with such rancorous animosity1 and display daily towards one another such bitter hatred1 that this1 rather than the virtues they claim1 is the readiest criterion of their faith4 ,matters have long since come to such a pass that one can only pronounce a man ,christian1 ,turk1 ,jew1 or ,heathen1 by his general appearance and attire1 by his frequenting this or that place of worship1 or employing the phraseology of a particular sect--as for manner of life1 it is in all cases the same4 ,inquiry into the cause of this anomaly leads me unhesitatingly to ascribe it to the fact1 that the ministries of the ,church are regarded by the masses merely as dignities1 her offices as posts of emolument--in short1 popular religion may be summed up as a respect for ecclesiastics4 ,the spread of this misconception inflamed every worthless fellow with an intense desire to enter holy orders1 and thus the love of diffusing ,god's religion degenerated into sordid avarice and ambition4 ,every church became a theater1 where orators1 instead of church teachers harangued1 caring not to instruct the people1 but striving to attract admiration1 to bring opponents to public scorn1 and to preach only novelties and paradoxes1 such as would tickle the ears of their congregation4 ,this state of things necessarily stirred up an amount of controversy1 envy1 and hatred1 which no lapse of time could appease2 so that we can scarcely wonder that of the old religion nothing survives but its outward forms 7even these1 in the mouth of the multitude1 seem rather adulation than adoration of the ,deity71 and that faith has become a mere compound of credulity and prejudices--aye1 prejudices too1 which degrade man from rational being to beast1 which completely stifle the power of judgment between true and false1 which seem1 in fact1 carefully fostered for the purpose of extinguishing the last spark of reason6 ,piety1 great ,god6 and religion are become a tissue of ridiculous mysteries2 men1 who flatly despise reason1 who reject and turn away from understanding as naturally corrupt1 these1 ,i say1 these of all men1 are thought1 ,oh lie most horrible6 to possess light from on ,high4 ,verily1 if they had but one spark of light from on ,high1 they would not insolently rave1 but would learn to worship ,god more wisely1 and would be as marked among their fellows for mercy as they now are for malice2 if they were concerned for their opponents' souls1 instead of for their own reputations1 they would no longer fiercely persecute1 but rather be filled with pity and compassion4 ,furthermore1 if any ,divine light were in them1 it would appear from their doctrine4 ,i grant that they are never tired of professing their wonder at the profound mysteries of ,holy ,writ2 still ,i cannot discover that they teach anything but speculation of ,platonists and ,aristotelians1 to which 7in order to save their credit of ,christianity7 they have made ,holy ,writ conform2 not content to rave with the ,greeks themselves1 they want to make the prophets rave also2 showing conclusively1 that never even in sleep have they caught a glimpse of ,scripture's ,divine nature4 ,the very vehemence of their admiration for the mysteries plainly attests1 that their belief in the ,bible is a formal assent rather than a living faith3 and the fact is made still more apparent by their laying down beforehand1 as a foundation for the study and true interpretation of ,scripture1 the principle that it is in every passage true and divine4 ,such a doctrine should be reached only after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension of the ,sacred ,books 7which would teach it much better1 for they stand in need of no human fictions71 and not be set up on the threshold1 as it were1 of inquiry4 ,as ,i pondered over the facts that the light of reason is not only despised1 but by many even execrated as a source of impiety1 that human commentaries are accepted as divine records1 and that credulity is extolled as faith2 as ,i marked the fierce controversies of philosophers raging in ,church and ,state1 the source of bitter hatred and dissension1 the ready instruments of sedition and other ills innumerable1 ,i determined to examine the ,bible afresh in a careful1 impartial1 and unfettered spirit1 making no assumptions concerning it1 and attributing to it no doctrines1 which ,i do not find clearly therein set down4444 ,,footnotes3 #a ,from the ,preface to the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,of ,,the ,,interpretation ,,of ,,scripture#b ,when people declare1 as all are ready to do1 that the ,bible is the ,word of ,god teaching men true blessedness and the way of salvation1 they evidently do not mean what they say2 for the masses take no pains at all to live according to ,scripture1 and we see most people endeavoring to hawk about their own commentaries as the word of ,god1 and giving their best efforts1 under the guise of religion1 to compelling others to think as they do3 we generally see1 ,i say1 theologians anxious to learn how to wring their inventions and sayings out of the sacred text1 and to fortify them with ,divine authority4 ,such persons never display less scruple and more zeal than when they are interpreting ,scripture or the mind of the ,holy ,ghost2 if we ever see them perturbed1 it is not that they fear to attribute some error to the ,holy ,spirit1 and to stray from the right path1 but that they are afraid to be convicted of error by others1 and thus to overthrow and bring into contempt their own authority4 ,but if men really believe what they verbally testify of ,scripture1 they would adopt quite a different plan of life3 their minds would not be agitated by so many contentions1 nor so many hatreds1 and they would cease to be excited by such a blind and rash passion for interpreting the sacred writings1 and excogitating novelties in religion4 ,on the contrary1 they would not dare to adopt1 as the teaching of ,scripture1 anything which they could not plainly deduce therefrom3 lastly1 these sacrilegious persons who have dared1 in several passages1 to interpolate the ,bible1 would have shrunk from so great a crime1 and would have stayed their sacrilegious hands4 ,ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful1 that religion is thought to consist1 not so much in respecting the writings of the ,holy ,ghost1 as in defending human commentaries1 so that religion is no longer identified with charity1 but with spreading discord and propagating insensate hatred disguised under the name of zeal for the ,lord1 and eager ardor4 ,to these evils we must add superstition1 which teaches men to despise reason and ,nature1 and only to admire and venerate that which is repugnant to both3 whence it is not wonderful that for the sake of increasing the admiration and veneration felt for ,scripture1 men strive to explain it so as to make it appear to contradict1 as far as possible1 both one and the other3 thus they dream that most profound mysteries lie hid in the ,bible1 and weary themselves out in the investigation of these absurdities1 to the neglect of what is useful4 ,every result of their diseased imagination they attribute to the ,holy ,ghost1 and strive to defend with the utmost zeal and passion2 for it is an observed fact that men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived at by reason1 but conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by the passions4 ,if we would separate ourselves from the crowd and escape from theological prejudices1 instead of rashly accepting human commentaries for ,divine documents1 we must consider the true method of interpreting ,scripture and dwell upon it at some length3 for if we remain in ignorance of this we cannot know1 certainly1 what the ,bible and the ,holy ,spirit wish to teach4 ,i may sum up the matter by saying that the method of interpreting ,scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting ,nature--in fact1 it is almost the same4 ,for as the interpretation of ,nature consists in the examination of the history of ,nature1 and therefrom deducing definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed axioms1 so ,scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of ,scripture1 and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its fundamental principles4 ,by working in this manner every one will always advance without danger of error--that is1 if they admit no principles for interpreting ,scripture1 and discussing its contents save such as they find in ,scripture itself--and will be able with equal security to discuss what surpasses our understanding1 and what is known by the natural light of reason4 ,in order to make clear that such a method is not only correct1 but is also the only one advisable1 and that it agrees with that employed in interpreting ,nature1 ,i must remark that ,scripture very often treats of matters which cannot be deduced from principles known to reason3 for it is chiefly made up of narratives and revelation3 the narratives generally contain miracles--that is1 as we shall show in a later chapter1 relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted to the opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them3 the revelations also were adapted to the opinions of the prophets and in themselves surpassed human comprehension4 ,therefore the knowledge of all these--that is1 of nearly the whole contents of ,scripture1 must be sought from ,scripture alone1 even as the knowledge of nature is sought from nature4 ,as for the moral doctrines which are also contained in the ,bible1 they may be demonstrated from received axioms1 but we cannot prove in the same manner that ,scripture intended to teach them1 this can only be learned from ,scripture itself4 ,if we would bear unprejudiced witness to the ,divine origin of ,scripture1 we must prove solely on its own authority that it teaches true moral doctrines1 for by such means alone can its ,divine origin be demonstrated3 we have shown that the certitude of the prophets depended chiefly on their having minds turned towards what is just and good1 therefore we ought to have proof of their possessing this quality before we repose faith in them4 ,from miracles ,god's divinity cannot be proved as ,i shall show1 for miracles could be wrought by false prophets4 ,wherefore the ,divine origin of ,scripture must consist solely in its teaching true virtue4 ,but we must come to our conclusion simply on ,scriptural grounds1 for if we were unable to do so we could not1 unless strongly prejudiced1 accept the ,bible and bear witness to its ,divine origin4 ,our knowledge of ,scripture must then be looked for in ,scripture only4 ,lastly1 ,scripture does not give us definitions of things any more than nature does3 therefore1 such definitions must be sought in the latter case from the diverse workings of nature2 in the former case1 from the various narratives about the given subject which occur in the ,bible4 ,the universal rule1 then1 in interpreting ,scripture is to accept nothing as an authoritative ,scriptural statement which we do not perceive very clearly when we examine it in the light of its history4 ,what ,i mean by its history1 and what should be the chief points elucidated1 ,i will now explain4 ,the history of a ,scriptural statement comprises-- ,i4 ,the nature and properties of the language in which the books of the ,bible were written1 and in which their authors were accustomed to speak4 ,we shall thus be able to investigate every expression by comparison with common conversational usages4 ,now all the writers both of the ,old ,testament and the ,new were ,hebrews3 therefore1 a knowledge of the ,hebrew language is before all things necessary1 not only for the comprehension of the ,old ,testament1 which was written in that tongue1 but also of the ,new3 for although the latter was published in other languages1 yet its characteristics are ,hebrew4 ,,ii4 ,an analysis of each book and arrangement of its contents under heads2 so that we may have at hand the various texts which treat of a given subject4 ,lastly1 a note of all the passages which are ambiguous or obscure1 or which seem mutually contradictory4 ,i call passages clear or obscure according as their meaning is inferred easily or with difficulty in relation to the context1 not according as their truth is perceived easily or the reverse by reason4 ,we are at work not on the truth of passages1 but solely on their meaning4 ,we must take especial care1 when we are in search of the meaning of a text1 not to be led away by our reason in so far as it is founded on principles of natural knowledge 7to say nothing of prejudices73 in order not to confound the meaning of a passage with its truth1 we must examine it solely by means of the signification of the words1 or by a reason acknowledging no foundation but ,scripture4 ,i will illustrate my meaning by an example4 ,the words of ,moses1 ,god is a fire and ,god is jealous1 are perfectly clear so long as we regard merely the signification of the words1 and ,i therefore reckon them among the clear passages1 though in relation to reason and truth they are most obscure3 still1 although the literal meaning is repugnant to the natural light of reason1 nevertheless1 if it cannot be clearly overruled on grounds and principles derived from its ,scriptural history1 it1 that is1 the literal meaning1 must be the one retained3 and contrariwise if these passages literally interpreted are found to clash with principles derived from ,scripture1 though such literal interpretation were in absolute harmony with reason1 they must be interpreted in a different manner1 i4e41 metaphorically4 ,if we would know whether ,moses believed ,god to be a fire or not1 we must on no account decide the question on grounds of the reasonableness or the reverse of such an opinion1 but must judge solely by the other opinions of ,moses which are on record4 ,in the present instance1 as ,moses says in several other passages that ,god has no likeness to any visible thing1 whether in heaven or in earth1 or in the water1 either all such passages must be taken metaphorically1 or else the one before us must be so explained4 ,however1 as we should depart as little as possible from the literal sense1 we must first ask whether this text1 ,god is a fire1 admits of any but the literal meaning--that is1 whether the word fire ever means anything besides ordinary natural fire4 ,if no such second meaning can be found1 the text must be taken literally1 however repugnant to reason it may be3 and all the other passages1 though in complete accordance with reason1 must be brought into harmony with it4 ,if the verbal expressions would not admit of being thus harmonized1 we should have to set them down as irreconcilable1 and suspend our judgment concerning them4 ,however1 as we find the name fire applied to anger and jealousy 7see ,job xxxi4 #ab7 we can thus easily reconcile the words of ,moses1 and legitimately conclude that the two propositions ,god is a fire1 and ,god is jealous1 are in meaning identical4 ,further1 as ,moses clearly teaches that ,god is jealous1 and nowhere states that ,god is without passions or emotions1 we must evidently infer that ,moses held this doctrine himself1 or at any rate1 that he wished to teach it1 nor must we refrain because such a belief seems contrary to reason3 for as we have shown1 we cannot wrest the meaning of texts to suit the dictates of our reason1 or our preconceived opinions4 ,the whole knowledge of the ,bible must be sought solely from itself4 ,,iii4 ,lastly1 such a history should relate the environment of all the prophetic books extant2 that is1 the life1 the conduct1 and the studies of the author of each book1 who he was1 what was the occasion1 and the epoch of his writing1 whom did he write for1 and in what language4 ,further1 it should inquire into the fate of each book3 how it was first received1 into whose hands it fell1 how many different versions there were of it1 by whose advice was it received into the ,bible1 and1 lastly1 how all the books now universally accepted as sacred1 were united into a single whole4 ,all such information should1 as ,i have said1 be contained in the history of ,scripture4 ,for1 in order to know what statements are set forth as laws1 and what as moral precepts1 it is important to be acquainted with the life1 the conduct1 and the pursuits of their author3 moreover1 it becomes easier to explain a man's writings in proportion as we have more intimate knowledge of his genius and temperament4 ,further1 that we may not confound precepts which are eternal with those which served only a temporary purpose1 or were only meant for a few1 we should know what was the occasion1 the time1 the age1 in which each book was written1 and to what nation it was addressed4 ,lastly1 we should have knowledge on the other points ,i have mentioned1 in order to be sure1 in addition to the authenticity of the work1 that it has not been tampered with by sacrilegious hands1 or whether errors can have crept in1 and1 if so1 whether they have been corrected by men sufficiently skilled and worthy of credence4 ,all these things should be known1 that we may not be led away by blind impulse to accept whatever is thrust on our notice1 instead of only that which is sure and indisputable4 ,now1 when we are in possession of this history of ,scripture1 and have finally decided that we assert nothing as prophetic doctrine which does not directly follow from such history1 or which is not clearly deducible from it1 then1 ,i say1 it will be time to gird ourselves for the task of investigating the mind of the prophets and of the ,holy ,spirit4 ,but in this further arguing1 also1 we shall require a method very like that employed in interpreting ,nature from her history4 ,as in the examination of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most universal and common to all ,nature--such1 for instance1 as motion and rest1 and their laws and rules1 which ,nature always observes1 and through which she continually works--and then we proceed to what is less universal2 so1 too1 in the history of ,scripture1 we seek first for that which is most universal1 and serves for the basis and foundation of all ,scripture1 a doctrine1 in fact1 that is commended by all the prophets as eternal and most profitable to all men4 ,for example1 that ,god is one1 and that ,he is omnipotent1 and ,he alone should be worshiped1 that ,he has a care for all men1 and that ,he especially loves those who adore ,him and love their neighbor as themselves1 etc4 ,these and similar doctrines1 ,i repeat1 ,scripture everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches1 that no one was ever in doubt of its meaning concerning them4 ,the nature of ,god1 ,his manner of regarding and providing for things1 and similar doctrines1 ,scripture nowhere teaches professedly1 and as eternal doctrine2 on the contrary1 we have shown that the prophets themselves did not agree on the subject2 therefore1 we must not lay down any doctrine as ,scriptural on such subjects1 though it may appear perfectly clear on rational grounds4 ,from a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of ,scripture1 we must then proceed to other doctrines less universal1 but which1 nevertheless1 have regard to the general conduct of life1 and flow from the universal doctrine like rivulets from a source3 such are all particular external manifestations of true virtue1 which need a given occasion for their exercise2 whatever is obscure or ambiguous on such points in ,scripture must be explained and defined by its universal doctrine2 with regard to contradictory instances1 we must observe the occasion and the time in which they were written4 ,for instance1 when ,christ says1 ,blessed are they that mourn1 for they shall be comforted1 we do not know1 from the actual passage1 what sort of mourners are meant2 as1 however1 ,christ afterwards teaches that we should have care for nothing1 save only for the kingdom of ,god and ,his righteousness1 which is commended as the highest good 7see ,matt4 vi4 #cc71 it follows that by mourners ,he only meant those who mourn for the kingdom of ,god and righteousness neglected by man3 for this would be the only cause of mourning to those who love nothing but the ,divine kingdom and justice1 and who evidently despise the gifts of fortune4 ,so1 too1 when ,christ says3 ,but if a man strike you on the right cheek1 turn to him the left also1 and the words which follow4 ,if ,he had given such a command1 as a lawgiver1 to judges1 ,he would thereby have abrogated the law of ,moses1 but this ,he expressly says ,he did not do 7,matt4 v4 #ag74 ,wherefore we must consider who was the speaker1 what was the occasion1 and to whom were the words addressed4 ,now ,christ said that ,he did not ordain laws as a legislator1 but inculcated precepts as a teacher3 inasmuch as ,he did not aim at correcting outward actions so much as the frame of mind4 ,further1 these words were spoken to men who were oppressed1 who lived in a corrupt commonwealth on the brink of ruin1 where justice was utterly neglected4 ,the very doctrine inculcated here by ,christ just before the destruction of the city was also taught by ,jeremiah before the first destruction of ,jerusalem1 that is1 in similar circumstances1 as we see from ,lamentations iii4 #be-cj4 ,now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets in times of oppression1 and was even then never laid down as a law2 and as1 on the other hand1 ,moses 7who did not write in times of oppression1 but--mark this--strove to found a well-ordered commonwealth71 while condemning envy and hatred of one's neighbor1 yet ordained that an eye should be given for an eye1 it follows most clearly from these purely ,scriptural grounds that this precept of ,christ and ,jeremiah concerning submission to injuries was only valid in places where justice is neglected1 and in a time of oppression1 but does not hold good in a well-ordered state4 ,in a well-ordered state where justice is administered every one is bound1 if he would be accounted just1 to demand penalties before the judge 7see ,lev4 v4 #a71 not for the sake of vengeance 7,lev4 xix4 #ag1 #ah71 but in order to defend justice and his country's laws1 and to prevent the wicked rejoicing in their wickedness4 ,all this is plainly in accordance with reason4 ,i might cite many other examples in the same manner1 but ,i think the foregoing are sufficient to explain my meaning and the utility of this method1 and this is all my present purpose4 ,hitherto we have only shown how to investigate those passages of ,scripture which treat of practical conduct1 and which1 therefore1 are more easily examined1 for on such subjects there was never really any controversy among the writers of the ,bible4 ,the purely speculative passages cannot be so easily traced to their real meaning3 the way becomes narrower1 for as the prophets differed in matters speculative among themselves1 and the narratives are in great measure adapted to the prejudices of each age1 we must not1 on any account1 infer the intention of one prophet from clearer passages in the writings of another2 nor must we so explain his meaning1 unless it is perfectly plain that the two prophets were at one in the matter4 ,how we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets in such cases ,i will briefly explain4 ,here1 too1 we must begin from the most universal proposition1 inquiring first from the most clear ,scriptural statements what is the nature of prophecy or revelation1 and wherein does it consist2 then we must proceed to miracles1 and so on to whatever is most general till we come to the opinions of a particular prophet1 and1 at last1 to the meaning of a particular revelation1 prophecy1 history1 or miracle4 ,we have already pointed out that great caution is necessary not to confound the mind of a prophet or historian with the mind of the ,holy ,spirit and the truth of the matter2 therefore ,i need not dwell further on the subject4 ,i would1 however1 here remark concerning the meaning of revelation1 that the present method only teaches us what the prophets really saw or heard1 not what they desired to signify or represent by symbols4 ,the latter may be guessed at but cannot be inferred with certainty from ,scriptural premises4 ,we have thus shown the plan for interpreting ,scripture1 and have1 at the same time1 demonstrated that it is the one and surest way of investigating its true meaning4 ,i am willing indeed to admit that those persons 7if any such there be7 would be more absolutely certainly right1 who have received either a trustworthy tradition or an assurance from the prophets themselves1 such as is claimed by the ,pharisees2 or who have a pontiff gifted with infallibility in the interpretation of ,scripture1 such as the ,roman ,catholics boast4 ,but as we can never be perfectly sure1 either of such a tradition or of the authority of the pontiff1 we cannot found any certain conclusion on either3 the one is denied by the oldest sect of ,christians1 the other by the oldest sect of ,jews4 ,indeed1 if we consider the series of years 7to mention no other point7 accepted by the ,pharisees from their ,rabbis1 during which time they say they have handed down the tradition from ,moses1 we shall find that it is not correct1 as ,i show elsewhere4 ,therefore such a tradition should be received with extreme suspicion2 and although1 according to our method1 we are bound to consider as uncorrupted the tradition of the ,jews1 namely1 the meaning of the ,hebrew words which we received from them1 we may accept the latter while retaining our doubts about the former4 ,no one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word in ordinary use1 though many have changed the meaning of a particular sentence4 ,such a proceeding would be most difficult2 for whoever attempted to change the meaning of a word1 would be compelled1 at the same time1 to explain all the authors who employed it1 each according to his temperament and intention1 or else1 with consummate cunning1 to falsify them4 ,further1 the masses and the learned alike preserve language1 but it is only the learned who preserve the meaning of particular sentences and books3 thus1 we may easily imagine that the learned having a very rare book in their power1 might change or corrupt the meaning of a sentence in it1 but they could not alter the signification of the words2 moreover1 if anyone wanted to change the meaning of a common word he would not be able to keep up the change among posterity1 or in common parlance or writing4 ,for these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude that it would never enter into the mind of anyone to corrupt a language1 though the intention of a writer may often have been falsified by changing his phrases or interpreting them amiss4 ,as then our method 7based on the principle that the knowledge of ,scripture must be sought from itself alone7 is the sole true one1 we must evidently renounce any knowledge which it cannot furnish for the complete understanding of ,scripture4444 ,if we read a book which contains incredible or impossible narratives1 or is written in a very obscure style1 and if we know nothing of its author1 nor of the time or occasion of its being written1 we shall vainly endeavor to gain any certain knowledge of its true meaning4 ,for being in ignorance on these points we cannot possibly know the aim or intended aim of the author2 if we are fully informed1 we so order our thoughts as not to be in any way prejudiced either in ascribing to the author or him for whom the author wrote either more or less than his meaning1 and we only take into consideration what the author may have had in his mind1 or what the time and occasion demanded4 ,i think this must be tolerably evident to all4 ,it often happens that in different books we read histories in themselves similar1 but which we judge very differently1 according to the opinions we have formed of the authors4 ,i remember once to have read in some book that a man named ,orlando ,furioso used to drive a kind of winged monster through the air1 fly over any countries he liked1 kill unaided vast numbers of men and giants1 and such like fancies1 which from the point of view of reason are obviously absurd4 ,a very similar story ,i read in ,ovid of ,perseus1 and also in the books of ,judges and ,kings of ,samson1 who alone and unarmed killed thousands of men1 and of ,elijah1 who flew through the air1 and at last went up to heaven in a chariot of fire1 with horses of fire4 ,all these stories are obviously alike1 but we judge them very differently4 ,the first only sought to amuse1 the second had a political object1 the third a religious object4 ,we gather this simply from the opinions we had previously formed of the authors4 ,thus it is evidently necessary to know something of the authors of writings which are obscure or unintelligible1 if we would interpret their meaning2 and for the same reason1 in order to choose the proper reading from among a great variety1 we ought to have information as to the versions in which the differences are found1 and as to the possibility of other readings having been discovered by persons of greater authority4444 444 ,the difficulties in this method of interpreting ,scripture from its own history1 ,i conceive to be so great that ,i do not hesitate to say that the true meaning of ,scripture is in many places inexplicable1 or at best mere subject for guess work2 but ,i must again point out1 on the other hand1 that such difficulties only arise when we endeavor to follow the meaning of a prophet in matters which cannot be perceived1 but only imagined1 not in things1 whereof the understanding can give a clear and distinct idea1 and which are conceivable through themselves3 matters which by their nature are easily perceived cannot be expressed so obscurely as to be unintelligible2 as the proverb says1 a word is enough to the wise4 ,euclid1 who only wrote of matters very simple and easily understood1 can easily be comprehended by any one in any language2 we can follow his intention perfectly1 and be certain of his true meaning1 without having a thorough knowledge of the language in which he wrote2 in fact1 a quite rudimentary acquaintance is sufficient4 ,we need make no researches concerning the life1 the pursuits1 or the habits of the author2 nor need we inquire in what language1 nor when he wrote1 nor the vicissitudes of his book1 nor its various readings1 nor how1 nor by whose advice it has been received4 ,what we here say of ,euclid might equally be said of any book which treats of things by their nature perceptible3 thus we conclude that we can easily follow the intention of ,scripture in moral questions1 from the history we possess of it1 and we can be sure of its true meaning4 ,the precepts of true piety are expressed in very ordinary language1 and are equally simple and easily understood4 ,further1 as true salvation and blessedness consist in a true assent of the soul--and we truly assent only to what we clearly understand--it is most plain that we can follow with certainty the intention of ,scripture in matters relating to salvation and necessary to blessedness2 therefore1 we need not be much troubled about what remains3 such matters1 inasmuch as we generally cannot grasp them with our reason and understanding1 are more curious than profitable4 ,i think ,i have now set forth the true method of ,scriptural interpretation1 and have sufficiently explained my own opinion thereon4 ,besides1 ,i do not doubt that every one will see that such a method only requires the aid of natural reason4 ,the nature and efficacy of the natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the known1 or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions2 and these are the very processes which our method desiderates4 ,though we must admit that it does not suffice to explain everything in the ,bible1 such imperfection does not spring from its own nature1 but from the fact that the path which it teaches us1 as the true one1 has never been tended or trodden by men1 and has thus1 by the lapse of time1 become very difficult1 and almost impassable1 as1 indeed1 ,i have shown in the difficulties ,i draw attention to4 ,there only remains to examine the opinions of those who differ from me4 ,the first which comes under our notice is1 that the light of nature has no power to interpret ,scripture1 but that a supernatural faculty is required for the task4 ,what is meant by this supernatural faculty ,i will leave to its propounders to explain4 ,personally1 ,i can only suppose that they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete uncertainty about the true meaning of ,scripture4 ,if we look at their interpretations1 they contain nothing supernatural1 at least nothing but the merest conjectures4 ,let them be placed side by side with the interpretations of those who frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond their natural ones2 we shall see that the two are just alike--both human1 both long pondered over1 both laboriously invented4 ,to say that the natural reason is insufficient for such results is plainly untrue1 firstly1 for the reasons above stated1 namely1 that the difficulty of interpreting ,scripture arises from no defect in human reason1 but simply from the carelessness 7not to say malice7 of men who neglected the history of the ,bible while there were still materials for inquiry2 secondly1 from the fact 7admitted1 ,i think1 by all7 that the supernatural faculty is a ,divine gift granted only to the faithful4 ,but the prophets and apostles did not preach to the faithful only1 but chiefly to the unfaithful and wicked4 ,such persons1 therefore1 were able to understand the intention of the prophets and apostles1 otherwise the prophets and apostles would have seemed to be preaching to little boys and infants1 not to men endowed with reason4 ,moses1 too1 would have given his laws in vain1 if they could only be comprehended by the faithful1 who need no law4 ,indeed1 those who demand supernatural faculties for comprehending the meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly lacking in natural faculties1 so that we should hardly suppose such persons the possessors of a ,divine supernatural gift4 ,the opinion of ,maimonides was widely different4 ,he asserted that each passage in ,scripture admits of various1 nay1 contrary meanings2 but that we could never be certain of any particular one till we knew that the passage1 as we interpreted it1 contained nothing contrary or repugnant to reason4 ,if the literal meaning clashes with reason1 though the passage seems in itself perfectly clear1 it must be interpreted in some metaphorical sense4 ,this doctrine he lays down very plainly in ,chap4 xxv4 part ii4 of his book ,more ,nebuchim for he says3 ,know that we shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed from eternity1 because of what ,scripture saith concerning the world's creation4 ,for the texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number than those which teach that ,god hath a body2 neither are the approaches in this matter of the world's creation closed1 or even made hard to us3 so that we should not be able to explain what is written1 as we did when we showed that ,god hath no body1 nay1 peradventure1 we could explain and make fast the doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than we did away with the doctrines that ,god hath a beatified body4 ,yet two things hinder me from doing as ,i have said1 and believing that the world is eternal4 ,as it hath been clearly shown that ,god hath not a body1 we must perforce explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth not with the demonstration1 for sure it is that they can be so explained4 ,but the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated1 therefore it is not necessary to do violence to ,scripture in support of some common opinion1 whereof we might1 at the bidding of reason1 embrace the contrary4 ,such are the words of ,maimonides1 and they are evidently sufficient to establish our point3 for if he had been convinced by reason that the world is eternal1 he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away the words of ,scripture till he made them appear to teach this doctrine4 ,he would have felt quite sure that ,scripture1 though everywhere plainly denying the eternity of the world1 really intends to teach it4 ,so that1 however clear the meaning of ,scripture may be1 he would not feel certain of having grasped it1 so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of what was written4 ,for we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity with reason1 or contrary thereto1 so long as we are uncertain of its truth1 and1 consequently1 we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning of a passage be true or false4 ,if such a theory as this were sound1 ,i would certainly grant that some faculty beyond the natural reason is required for interpreting ,scripture4 ,for nearly all things that we find in ,scripture cannot be inferred from known principles of the natural reason1 and therefore1 we should be unable to come to any conclusion about their truth1 or about the real meaning and intention of ,scripture1 but should stand in need of some further assistance4 ,further1 the truth of this theory would involve that the masses1 having generally no comprehension of1 nor leisure for1 detailed proofs1 would be reduced to receiving all their knowledge of ,scripture on the authority and testimony of philosophers1 and consequently1 would be compelled to suppose that the interpretations given by philosophers were infallible4 ,truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority1 and a new sort of priests or pontiffs1 more likely to excite men's ridicule than their veneration4 ,certainly our method demands a knowledge of ,hebrew for which the masses have no leisure2 but no such objection as the foregoing can be brought against us4 ,for the ordinary ,jews or ,gentiles1 to whom the prophets and apostles preached and wrote1 understood the language1 and consequently1 the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing them2 but they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached1 which1 according to ,maimonides1 would be necessary for an understanding of it4 ,there is nothing1 then1 in our method which renders it necessary that the masses should follow the testimony of commentators1 for ,i point to a set of unlearned people who understood the language of the prophets and apostles2 whereas ,maimonides could not point to any such who could arrive at the prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of the causes of things4 ,as to the multitude of our own time we shall show that whatsoever is necessary to salvation1 though its reasons may be unknown1 can easily be understood in any language1 because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual2 it is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce1 not in the testimony of commentators2 with regard to other questions1 the ignorant and the learned fare alike4 ,but let us return to the opinion of ,maimonides1 and examine it more closely4 ,in the first place1 he supposes that the prophets were in entire agreement one with another1 and that they were consummate philosophers and theologians2 for he would have them to have based their conclusions on the absolute truth4 ,further1 he supposes that the sense of ,scripture cannot be made plain from ,scripture itself1 for the truth of things is not made plain therein 7in that it does not prove anything1 nor teach the matters of which it speaks through their definitions and first causes71 therefore1 according to ,maimonides1 the true sense of ,scripture cannot be made plain from itself1 and must not be there sought4 ,the falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter1 for we have shown both by reason and examples that the meaning of ,scripture is only made plain through ,scripture itself1 and even in questions deducible from ordinary knowledge should be looked for from no other source4 ,lastly1 such a theory supposes that we may explain the words of ,scripture according to our preconceived opinions1 twisting them about1 and reversing or completely changing the literal sense1 however plain it may be4 ,such license is utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the succeeding chapters1 and moreover1 will be evident to every one as rash and excessive4 ,but if we grant all this license1 what can it effect after all8 ,absolutely nothing4 ,those things which cannot be demonstrated1 and which make up the greater part of ,scripture1 cannot be examined by reason1 and cannot therefore be explained or interpreted by this rule2 whereas1 on the contrary1 by following our own method1 we can explain many questions of this nature1 and discuss them on a sure basis1 as we have already shown1 by reason and example4 ,those matters which are by their nature comprehensible we can easily explain1 as has been pointed out1 simply by means of the context4 ,therefore1 the method of ,maimonides is clearly useless3 to which we may add1 that it does away with all the certainty which the masses acquire by candid reading1 or which is gained by any other persons in any other way4 ,in conclusion1 then1 we dismiss ,maimonides' theory as harmful1 useless1 and absurd4 ,as to the tradition of the ,pharisees1 we have already shown#c that it is not consistent1 while the authority of the popes of ,rome stands in need of more credible evidence2 the latter1 indeed1 ,i reject simply on this ground1 for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of ,scripture as surely as did the high priests of the ,jews1 ,i should not be deterred by the fact that there have been heretic and impious ,roman pontiffs2 for among the ,hebrew high-priests of old there were also heretics and impious men who gained the high-priesthood by improper means1 but who1 nevertheless1 had ,scriptural sanction for their supreme power of interpreting the law4 7,see ,deut4 xvii4 #aa1 #ab1 and xxxviii4 #aj1 also ,malachi ii4 #h74 ,however1 as the popes can show no such sanction1 their authority remains open to very grave doubt1 nor should any one be deceived by the example of the ,jewish high-priests and think that the ,catholic religion also stands in need of a pontiff2 he should bear in mind that the laws of ,moses being also the ordinary laws of the country1 necessarily required some public authority to insure their observance2 for1 if everyone were free to interpret the laws of his country as he pleased1 no state could stand1 but would for that very reason be dissolved at once1 and public rights would become private rights4 ,with religion the case is widely different4 ,inasmuch as it consists not so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character1 it stands outside the sphere of law and public authority4 ,simplicity and truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws1 nor by the authority of the state1 no one the whole world over can be forced or legislated into a state of blessedness2 the means required for such a consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition1 sound education1 and above all1 free use of the individual judgment4 ,therefore1 as the supreme right of free thinking1 even on religion1 is in every man's power1 and as it is inconceivable that such power could be alienated1 it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right and authority of free judgment in this behalf1 and to explain and interpret religion for himself4 ,the only reason for vesting the supreme authority in the interpretation of law1 and judgment on public affairs in the hands of the magistrates1 is that it concerns questions of public right4 ,similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion1 and in passing judgment thereon1 is lodged with the individual because it concerns questions of individual right4 ,so far1 then1 from the authority of the ,hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation of the authority of the ,roman pontiffs to interpret religion1 it would rather tend to establish individual freedom of judgment4 ,thus in this way1 also1 we have shown that our method of interpreting ,scripture is the best4 ,for as the highest power of ,scriptural interpretation belongs to every man1 the rule for such interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of reason which is common to all--not any supernatural light nor any external authority2 moreover1 such a rule ought not to be so difficult that it can only be applied by very skillful philosophers1 but should be adapted to the natural and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind4 ,and such ,i have shown our method to be1 for such difficulties as it has arise from men's carelessness1 and are no part of its nature4 ,,footnotes3 #b ,from the ,tr4 ,th4-,p41 ch4 vii1 same title4 #c ,the detailed discussion of this point has been omitted4--,,ed4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,of ,,prophets ,,and ,,prophecy#d ,i ,prophecy1 or revelation1 is sure knowledge revealed by ,god to man4 ,a prophet is one who interprets the revelations of ,god to those who are unable to attain to sure knowledge of the matters revealed1 and therefore can only apprehend them by simple faith4 ,the ,hebrew word for prophet is nabi1 i4e41 speaker or interpreter1 but in ,scripture its meaning is restricted to interpreter of ,god1 as we may learn from ,exodus vii4 #a1 where ,god says to ,moses1 ,see1 ,i have made thee a god to ,pharaoh1 and ,aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet2 implying that1 since in interpreting ,moses' words to ,pharaoh1 ,aaron acted the part of a prophet1 ,moses would be to ,pharaoh as a god1 or in the attitude of a god4444 ,now it is evident1 from the definition above given1 that prophecy really includes ordinary knowledge2 for the knowledge which we acquire by our natural faculties depends on our knowledge of ,god and ,his eternal laws2 but ordinary knowledge is common to all men as men1 and rests on foundations which all share1 whereas the multitude always strains after rarities and exceptions1 and thinks little of the gifts of nature2 so that1 when prophecy is talked of1 ordinary knowledge is not supposed to be included4 ,nevertheless it has as much right as any other to be called ,divine1 for ,god's nature1 in so far as we share therein1 and ,god's laws1 dictate it to us2 nor does it suffer from that to which we give the preminence1 except in so far as the latter transcends its limits and cannot be accounted for by natural laws taken in themselves4 ,in respect to the certainty it involves1 and the source from which it is derived1 i4e41 ,god1 ordinary knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic1 unless indeed we believe1 or rather dream1 that the prophets had human bodies but superhuman minds1 and therefore that their sensations and consciousness were entirely different from our own4 ,but1 although ordinary knowledge is ,divine1 its professors cannot be called prophets1 for they teach what the rest of mankind could perceive and apprehend1 not merely by simple faith1 but as surely and honorably as themselves4 ,seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself and partakes of the nature of ,god1 and solely from this cause is enabled to form notions explaining natural phenomena and inculcating morality1 it follows that we may rightly assert the nature of the human mind 7in so far as it is thus conceived7 to be a primary cause of ,divine revelation4 ,all that we clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us1 as ,i have just pointed out1 by the idea and nature of ,god2 not indeed through words1 but in a way far more excellent and agreeing perfectly with the nature of the mind1 as all who have enjoyed intellectual certainty will doubtless attest4 ,here1 however1 my chief purpose is to speak of matters having reference to ,scripture1 so these few words on the light of reason will suffice4 ,i will now pass on to1 and treat more fully1 the other ways and means by which ,god makes revelations to mankind1 both of that which transcends ordinary knowledge and of that within its scope2 for there is no reason why ,god should not employ other means to communicate what we know already by the power of reason4 ,our conclusions on the subject must be drawn solely from ,scripture2 for what can we affirm about matters transcending our knowledge except what is told us by the words or writings of prophets8 ,and since there are1 so far as ,i know1 no prophets now alive1 we have no alternative but to read the books of prophets departed1 taking care the while not to reason from metaphor or to ascribe anything to our authors which they do not themselves distinctly state4 ,i must further premise that the ,jews never make any mention or account of secondary1 or particular causes1 but in a spirit of religion1 piety1 and what is commonly called godliness1 refer all things directly to the ,deity4 ,for instance1 if they make money by a transaction1 they say ,god gave it to them2 if they desire anything1 they say ,god has disposed their hearts towards it2 if they think anything1 they say ,god told them4 ,hence we must not suppose that everything is prophecy or revelation which is described in ,scripture as told by ,god to any one1 but only such things as are expressly announced as prophecy or revelation1 or are plainly pointed to as such by the context4 ,a perusal of the sacred books will show us that all ,god's revelations to the prophets were made through words or appearances1 or a combination of the two4 ,these words and appearances were of two kinds2 7#a7 real when external to the mind of the prophet who heard or saw them1 7#b7 imaginary when the imagination of the prophet was in a state which led him distinctly to suppose that he heard or saw them4 ,with a real voice ,god revealed to ,moses the laws which ,he wished to be transmitted to the ,hebrews1 as we may see from ,exodus xxv4 #bb1 where ,god says1 ,and there ,i will meet with thee and ,i will commune with thee from the mercy seat which is between the ,cherubim4 ,some sort of real voice must necessarily have been employed1 for ,moses found ,god ready to commune with him at any time4 ,this is the only instance of a real voice4 444 ,some of the ,jews believe that the actual words of the ,decalogue were not spoken by ,god1 but that the ,israelites heard a noise only1 without any distinct words1 and during its continuance apprehend the ,ten ,commandments by pure intuition2 to this opinion ,i myself once inclined1 seeing that the words of the ,decalogue in ,exodus are different from the words of the ,decalogue in ,deuteronomy1 for the discrepancy seemed to imply 7since ,god only spoke once7 that the ,ten ,commandments were not intended to convey the actual words of the ,lord1 but only ,his meaning4 ,however1 unless we would do violence to ,scripture1 we must certainly admit that the ,israelites heard a real voice1 for ,scripture expressly says 7,deut4 v4 #d71 ,god spake with you face to face1 i4e41 as two men ordinarily interchange ideas through the instrumentality of their two bodies2 and therefore it seems more consonant with ,holy ,writ to suppose that ,god really did create a voice of some kind with which the ,decalogue was revealed4444 ,yet not even thus is all difficulty removed1 for it seems scarcely reasonable to affirm that a created thing1 depending on ,god in the same manner as other created things1 would be able to express or explain the nature of ,god either verbally or really by means of its individual organism3 for instance1 by declaring in the first person1 ,i am the ,lord your ,god4 ,certainly when any one says his mouth1 ,i understand1 we do not attribute the understanding to the mouth1 but to the mind of the speaker2 yet this is because the mouth is the natural organ of a man speaking1 and the hearer1 knowing what understanding is1 easily comprehends1 by a comparison with himself1 that the speaker's mind is meant2 but if we knew nothing of ,god beyond the mere name and wished to commune with ,him1 and be assured of ,his existence1 ,i fail to see how our wish would be satisfied by the declaration of a created thing 7depending on ,god neither more nor less than ourselves71 ,i am the ,lord4 ,if ,god contorted the lips of ,moses1 or1 ,i will not say ,moses1 but some beast1 till they pronounced the words1 ,i am the ,lord1 should we apprehend the ,lord's existence therefrom8 ,scripture seems clearly to point to the belief that ,god spoke ,himself1 having descended from heaven to ,mount ,sinai for the purpose--and not only that the ,israelites heard ,him speaking1 but that their chief men beheld ,him 7,ex4 xxiv474 ,further1 the laws of ,moses which might neither be added to nor curtailed1 and which was set up as a national standard of right1 nowhere prescribed the belief that ,god is without body1 or even without form or figure1 but only ordained that the ,jews should believe in ,his existence and worship ,him alone3 it forbade them to invent or fashion any likeness of the ,deity1 but this was to insure purity of service2 because1 never having seen ,god1 they could not by means of images recall the likeness of ,god1 but only the likeness of some created thing which might thus gradually take the place of ,god as the object of their adoration4 ,nevertheless1 the ,bible clearly implies that ,god has a form1 and that ,moses when he heard ,god speaking was permitted to behold it1 or at least its hinder parts4 ,doubtless some mystery lurks in this question which we will discuss more fully below4 ,for the present ,i will call attention to the passages in ,scripture indicating the means by which ,god has revealed ,his laws to man4 ,revelation may be through figures only 7as in #a ,chron4 xxii471 where ,god displays his anger to ,david by means of an angel bearing a sword1 and also in the story of ,balaam4 ,maimonides and others do indeed maintain that these and every other instance of angelic apparitions 7e4g41 to ,manoah and to ,abraham offering up ,isaac7 occurred during sleep1 for that no one with his eyes open ever could see an angel1 but this is mere nonsense4 ,the sole object of such commentators seemed to be to extort from ,scripture confirmations of ,aristotelian quibbles and their own inventions1 a proceeding which ,i regard as the acme of absurdity4 ,in figures1 not real but existing only in the prophet's imagination1 ,god revealed to ,joseph his future lordship1 and in words and figures ,he revealed to ,joshua that ,he would fight for the ,hebrews1 causing to appear an angel1 as it were the captain of the ,lord's host1 bearing a sword1 and by this means communicating verbally4 ,the forsaking of ,israel by ,providence was portrayed to ,isaiah by a vision of the ,lord1 the thrice ,holy1 sitting on a very lofty throne1 and the ,hebrews1 stained with the mire of their sins1 sunk1 as it were1 in uncleanness1 and thus as far as possible distant from ,god4 ,the wretchedness of the people at the time was thus revealed1 while future calamities were foretold in words4 ,i could cite from ,holy ,writ many similar examples1 but ,i think they are sufficiently well known already4444 ,we may be able quite to comprehend that ,god can communicate immediately with man1 for without the intervention of bodily means ,he communicates to our minds ,his essence2 still1 a man who can by pure intuition comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible from the foundations of our natural knowledge1 must necessarily possess a mind far superior to those of his fellow men1 nor do ,i believe that any have been so endowed save ,christ4 ,to ,him the ordinances of ,god leading men to salvation were revealed directly without words or visions1 so that ,god manifested ,himself to the ,apostles through the mind of ,christ as ,he formerly did to ,moses through the supernatural voice4 ,in this sense the voice of ,christ1 like the voice which ,moses heard1 may be called the voice of ,god1 and it may be said that the wisdom of ,god 7i4e41 wisdom more than human7 took upon itself in ,christ human nature1 and that ,christ was the way of salvation4 ,i must at this juncture declare that those doctrines which certain churches put forward concerning ,christ1 ,i neither affirm nor deny1 for ,i freely confess that ,i do not understand them4 ,what ,i have just stated ,i gather from ,scripture1 where ,i never read that ,god appeared to ,christ1 or spoke to ,christ1 but that ,god was revealed to the ,apostles through ,christ2 that ,christ was the ,way of ,life1 and that the old law was given through an angel1 and not immediately by ,god2 whence it follows that if ,moses spoke with ,god face to face as a man speaks with his friend 7i4e41 by means of their two bodies7 ,christ communed with ,god mind to mind4#e ,thus we may conclude that no one except ,christ received the revelations of ,god without the aid of imagination1 whether in words or vision4 ,therefore the power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect mind1 but a peculiarly vivid imagination4444 ,if the ,jews were at a loss to understand any phenomenon1 or were ignorant of its cause1 they referred it to ,god4 ,thus a storm was termed the chiding of ,god1 thunder and lightning the arrows of ,god1 for it was thought that ,god kept the winds confined in caves1 ,his treasuries2 thus differing merely in name from the ,greek wind-god ,eolus4 ,in like manner miracles were called works of ,god1 as being especially marvelous2 though in reality1 of course1 all natural events are the works of ,god1 and take place solely by ,his power4 ,the ,psalmist calls the miracles in ,egypt the works of ,god1 because the ,hebrews found in them a way of safety which they had not looked for1 and therefore especially marveled at4 ,as1 then1 unusual natural phenomena are called works of ,god1 and trees of unusual size are called trees of ,god1 we cannot wonder that very strong and tall men1 though impious robbers and whoremongers1 are in ,genesis called sons of ,god4 ,this reference of things wonderful to ,god was not peculiar to the ,jews4 ,pharaoh1 on hearing the interpretation of his dream1 exclaimed that the mind of the gods was in ,joseph4 ,nebuchadnezzar told ,daniel that he possessed the mind of the holy gods2 so also in ,latin anything well made is often said to be wrought with ,divine hands1 which is equivalent to the ,hebrew phrase1 wrought with the hand of ,god4 444 ,we find that the ,scriptural phrases1 ,the ,spirit of the ,lord was upon a prophet1 ,the ,lord breathed ,his ,spirit into men1 ,men were filled with the ,spirit of ,god1 with the ,holy ,spirit1 etc41 are quite clear to us1 and mean that the prophets were endowed with a peculiar and extraordinary power1 and devoted themselves to piety with especial constancy2 that thus they perceived the mind or the thought of ,god1 for we have shown elsewhere that ,god's spirit signifies in ,hebrew ,god's mind or thought1 and that the law which shows ,his mind and thought is called ,his ,spirit2 hence that the imagination of the prophets1 inasmuch as through it were revealed the decrees of ,god1 may equally be called the mind of ,god1 and the prophets be said to have possessed the mind of ,god4 ,on our minds also the mind of ,god and ,his eternal thoughts are impressed2 but this being the same for all men is less taken into account1 especially by the ,hebrews1 who claimed a preminence1 and despised other men and other men's knowledge4 ,also the prophets were said to possess the ,spirit of ,god because men knew not the cause of prophetic knowledge1 and in their wonder referred it with other marvels directly to the ,deity1 styling it ,divine knowledge4 ,we need no longer scruple to affirm that the prophets only perceived ,god's revelation by the aid of imagination1 that is1 by words and figures either real or imaginary4 ,we find no other means mentioned in ,scripture1 and therefore must not invent any4 ,as to the particular law of ,nature by which the communications took place1 ,i confess my ignorance4 ,i might1 indeed1 say as others do1 that they took place by the power of ,god2 but this would be mere trifling1 and no better than explaining some unique specimen by a transcendental term4 ,everything takes place by the power of ,god4 ,nature herself is the power of ,god under another name1 and our ignorance of the power of ,god is co-extensive with our ignorance of ,nature4 ,it is absolutely folly1 therefore1 to ascribe an event to the power of ,god when we know not its natural cause1 which is the power of ,god4 ,however1 we are not now inquiring into the causes of prophetic knowledge4 ,we are only attempting1 as ,i have said1 to examine the ,scriptural documents1 and to draw our conclusions from them as from ultimate natural facts2 the causes of the documents do not concern us4 ,as the prophets perceived the revelations of ,god by the aid of imagination1 they could indisputably perceive much that is beyond the boundary of the intellect1 for many more ideas can be constructed from words and figures than from the principles and notions on which the whole fabric of reasoned knowledge is reared4 ,thus we have a clue to the fact that the prophets perceived nearly everything in parables and allegories1 and clothed spiritual truths in bodily forms1 for such is the usual method of imagination4 ,we need no longer wonder that ,scripture and the prophets speak so strangely and obscurely of ,god's ,spirit or ,mind 7cf4 ,numbers xi4 #ag1 #a ,kings xxii1 #ba1 etc471 that the ,lord was seen by ,micah as sitting1 by ,daniel as an old man clothed in white1 by ,ezekiel as a fire1 that the ,holy ,spirit appeared to those with ,christ as a descending dove1 to the apostles as fiery tongues1 to ,paul on his conversion as a great light4 ,all these expressions are plainly in harmony with the current ideas of ,god and spirits4 ,inasmuch as imagination is fleeting and inconstant1 we find that the power of prophecy did not remain with a prophet for long1 nor manifest itself frequently1 but was very rare2 manifesting itself only in a few men1 and in them not often4 ,we must necessarily inquire how the prophets became assured of the truth of what they perceived by imagination1 and not by sure mental laws2 but our investigation must be confined to ,scripture1 for the subject is one on which we cannot acquire certain knowledge1 and which we cannot explain by the immediate causes4 ,,ii 444 ,as ,i have said1 the prophets were endowed with unusually vivid imaginations1 and not with unusually perfect minds4 ,this conclusion is amply sustained by ,scripture1 for we are told that ,solomon was the wisest of men1 but had no special faculty of prophecy4 ,heman1 ,calcol1 and ,dara1 though men of great talent1 were not prophets1 whereas uneducated countrymen1 nay1 even women1 such as ,hagar1 ,abraham's handmaid1 were thus gifted4 ,nor is this contrary to ordinary experience and reason4 ,men of great imaginative power are less fitted for abstract reasoning1 whereas those who excel in intellect and its use keep their imagination more restrained and controlled1 holding it in subjection1 so to speak1 lest it should usurp the place of reason4 ,thus to suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual phenomena can be gained from the prophetic books1 is an utter mistake1 which ,i shall endeavor to expose1 as ,i think philosophy1 the age1 and the question itself demand4 ,i care not for the girdings of superstition1 for superstition is the bitter enemy of all true knowledge and true morality4 ,yes2 it has come to this6 ,men who openly confess that they can form no idea of ,god1 and only know ,him through created things1 of which they know not the causes1 can unblushingly accuse philosophers of ,atheism4 ,treating the question methodically1 ,i will show that prophecies varied1 not only according to the imagination and physical temperament of the prophet1 but also according to his particular opinions2 and further that prophecy never rendered the prophet wiser than he was before4 ,but ,i will first discuss the assurance of truth which the prophets received1 for this is akin to the subject-matter of the chapter1 and will serve to elucidate somewhat our present point4 ,imagination does not1 in its own nature1 involve any certainty of truth1 such as is implied in every clear and distinct idea1 but requires some extrinsic reason to assure us of its objective reality3 hence prophecy cannot afford certainty1 and the prophets were assured of ,god's revelation by some sign1 and not by the fact of revelation1 as we may see from ,abraham1 who1 when he had heard the promise of ,god1 demanded a sign1 not because he did not believe in ,god but because he wished to be sure that it was ,god ,who made the promise4 ,the fact is still more evident in the case of ,gideon3 ,show me1 he says to ,god1 show me a sign1 that ,i may know that it is ,thou that talkest with me4 ,god also says to ,moses3 ,and let this be a sign that ,i have sent thee4 ,hezekiah1 though he had long known ,isaiah to be a prophet1 none the less demanded a sign of the cure which he predicted4 ,it is thus quite evident that the prophets always received some sign to certify them of their prophetic imaginings2 and for this reason ,moses bids the ,jews 7,deut4 xviii47 ask of the prophets a sign1 namely1 the prediction of some coming event4 ,in this respect1 prophetic knowledge is inferior to natural knowledge1 which needs no sign1 and in itself implies certitude4 ,moreover1 ,scripture warrants the statement that the certitude of the prophets was not mathematical1 but moral4 ,moses lays down the punishment of death for the prophet who preaches new gods1 even though he confirm his doctrine by signs and wonders 7,deut4 xiii472 ,for1 he says1 the ,lord also worketh signs and wonders to try ,his people4 ,and ,jesus ,christ warns ,his disciples of the same thing 7,matt4 xxiv4 #bd74 ,furthermore1 ,ezekiel 7xiv4 #i7 plainly states that ,god sometimes deceives men with false revelations2 and ,micaiah bears like witness in the case of the prophets of ,ahab4 ,although these instances go to prove that revelation is open to doubt1 it nevertheless contains1 as we have said1 a considerable element of certainty1 for ,god never deceives the good1 nor ,his chosen1 but 7according to the ancient proverb and as appears in the history of ,abigail and her speech71 ,god uses the good as instruments of goodness1 and the wicked as means to execute ,his wrath4 ,this may be seen from the cases of ,micaiah above quoted2 for although ,god had determined to deceive ,ahab1 through prophets1 ,he made use of lying prophets2 to the good prophet ,he revealed the truth1 and did not forbid his proclaiming it4 ,still the certitude of prophecy remains1 as ,i have said1 merely moral2 for no one can justify himself before ,god1 nor boast that he is an instrument for ,god's goodness4 ,scripture itself teaches and shows that ,god led away ,david to number the people1 though it bears ample witness to ,david's piety4 ,the whole question of the certitude of prophecy was based on these three considerations3-- #a4 ,that the things revealed were imagined very vividly1 affecting the prophets in the same way as things seen when awake2 #b4 ,the presence of a sign2 #c4 ,lastly and chiefly1 that the mind of the prophet was given wholly to what was right and good4 ,although ,scripture does not always make mention of a sign1 we must nevertheless suppose that a sign was always vouchsafed2 for ,scripture does not always relate every condition and circumstance 7as many have remarked71 but rather takes them for granted4 ,we may1 however1 admit that no sign was needed when the prophecy declared nothing that was not already contained in the law of ,moses1 because it was confirmed by that law4 ,for instance1 ,jeremiah's prophecy of the destruction of ,jerusalem was confirmed by the prophecies of other prophets1 and by the threats in the law1 and therefore it needed no sign2 whereas ,hananiah1 who1 contrary to all the prophets1 foretold the speedy restoration of the state1 stood in need of a sign1 or he would have been in doubt as to the truth of his prophecy1 until it was confirmed by facts4 ,the prophet which prophesieth of peace1 when the word of the prophet shall come to pass1 then shall the prophet be known that the ,lord hath truly sent him4 ,as1 then1 the certitude afforded to the prophet by signs was not mathematical 7i4e41 did not necessarily follow from the perception of the thing perceived or seen71 but only moral1 and as the signs were only given to convince the prophet1 it follows that such signs were given according to the opinions and capacity of each prophet1 so that a sign which would convince one prophet would fall far short of convincing another who was imbued with different opinions4 ,therefore the signs varied according to the individual prophet4 ,so also did the revelation vary1 as we have stated1 according to individual disposition and temperament1 and according to the opinions previously held4 ,it varied according to disposition1 in this way3 if a prophet was cheerful1 victories1 peace1 and events which make men glad1 were revealed to him2 in that he was naturally more likely to imagine such things4 ,if1 on the contrary1 he was melancholy1 wars1 massacres1 and calamities were revealed2 and so1 according as a prophet was merciful1 gentle1 quick to anger1 or severe1 he was more fitted for one kind of revelation than another4 ,it varied according to the temper of imagination in this way3 if a prophet was cultivated he perceived the mind of ,god in a cultivated way1 if he was confused he perceived it confusedly4 ,and so with revelations perceived through visions4 ,if a prophet was a countryman he saw visions of oxen1 cows1 and the like2 if he was a soldier1 he saw generals and armies2 if a courtier1 a royal throne1 and so on4 ,lastly1 prophecy varied according to the opinions held by the prophets2 for instance1 to the ,magi1 who believed in the follies of astrology1 the birth of ,christ was revealed through the vision of a star in the ,east4 ,to the augurs of ,nebuchadnezzar the destruction of ,jerusalem was revealed through entrails1 whereas the king himself inferred it from oracles and the direction of arrows which he shot into the air4 ,to prophets who believed that man acts from free choice and by his own power1 ,god was revealed as standing apart from and ignorant of future human actions4 ,all of which we will illustrate from ,scripture4444 ,the style of the prophecy also varied according to the eloquence of the individual prophet4 ,the prophecies of ,ezekiel and ,amos are not written in a cultivated style like those of ,isaiah and ,nahum1 but more rudely4 ,any ,hebrew scholar who wishes to inquire into this point more closely1 and compares chapters of the different prophets treating of the same subject1 will find that ,god has no particular style in speaking1 but1 according to the learning and capacity of the prophet1 is cultivated1 compressed1 severe1 untutored1 prolixed or obscure4444 ,every one has been strangely hasty in affirming that the prophets knew everything within the scope of human intellect2 and1 although certain passages of ,scripture plainly affirm that the prophets were in certain respects ignorant1 such persons would rather say that they do not understand the passages than admit that there was anything which the prophets did not know2 or else they try to wrest the ,scriptural words away from their evident meaning4 ,if either of these proceedings is allowable we may as well shut our ,bibles1 for vainly shall we attempt to prove anything from them if their plainest passages may be classed among obscure and impenetrable mysteries1 or if we may put any interpretation on them which we fancy4 ,for instance1 nothing is more clear in the ,bible than that ,joshua1 and perhaps also the author who wrote his history1 thought that the sun revolves round the earth1 and that the earth is fixed1 and further that the sun for a certain period remained still4 ,many1 who will not admit any movement in the heavenly bodies1 explain away the passage till it seems to mean something quite different2 others1 who have learned to philosophize more correctly1 and understand that the earth moves while the sun is still1 or at any rate does not revolve round the earth1 try with all their might to wrest this meaning from ,scripture1 though plainly nothing of the sort is intended4 ,such quibblers excite my wonder6 ,are we1 forsooth1 bound to believe that ,joshua the soldier was a learned astronomer8 or that a miracle could not be revealed to him1 or that the light of the sun could not remain longer than usual above the horizon1 without his knowing the cause8 ,to me both alternatives appear ridiculous1 and therefore ,i would rather say that ,joshua was ignorant of the true cause of the lengthened day1 and that he and the whole host with him thought that the sun moved round the earth every day1 and that on that particular occasion it stood still for a time1 thus causing the light to remain longer2 and ,i would say that they did not conjecture that1 from the amount of snow in the air 7see ,josh4 x4 #aa71 the refraction may have been greater than usual1 or that there may have been some other cause which we will not now inquire into4 ,so also the sign of the shadow going back was revealed to ,isaiah according to his understanding2 that is1 as proceeding from a going backwards of the sun2 for he1 too1 thought that the sun moves and that the earth is still2 of parhelia he perhaps never even dreamed4 ,we may arrive at this conclusion without any scruple1 for the sign could really have come to pass1 and have been predicted by ,isaiah to the king1 without the prophet being aware of the real cause4 ,with regard to the building of the ,temple by ,solomon1 if it was really dictated by ,god we must maintain the same doctrine3 namely1 that all the measurements were revealed according to the opinions and understanding of the king2 for as we are not bound to believe that ,solomon was a mathematician1 we may affirm that he was ignorant of the true ratio between the circumference and the diameter of a circle1 and that1 like the generality of workmen1 he thought that it was as three to one4 ,but if it is allowable to declare that we do not understand the passage1 in good sooth ,i know nothing in the ,bible that we can understand2 for the process of building is there narrated simply and as a mere matter of history4 ,if1 again1 it is permitted to pretend that the passage has another meaning1 and was written as it is from some reason unknown to us1 this is no less than a complete subversal of the ,bible2 for every absurd and evil invention of human perversity could thus1 without detriment to ,scriptural authority1 be defended and fostered4 ,our conclusion is in no wise impious1 for though ,solomon1 ,isaiah1 ,joshua1 etc41 were prophets1 they were none the less men1 and as such not exempt from human shortcomings4 ,according to the understanding of ,noah it was revealed to him that ,god was about to destroy the whole human race1 for ,noah thought that beyond the limits of ,palestine the world was not inhabited4 ,not only in matters of this kind1 but in others more important1 the prophets could be1 and in fact were1 ignorant2 for they taught nothing special about the ,divine attributes1 but held quite ordinary notions about ,god1 and to these notions their revelations were adapted1 as ,i will demonstrate by ample ,scriptural testimony2 from all which one may easily see that they were praised and commended1 not so much for the sublimity and eminence of their intellect as for their piety and faithfulness4 ,adam1 the first man to whom ,god was revealed1 did not know that ,he is omnipotent and omniscient2 for he hid himself from ,him1 and attempted to make excuses for his fault before ,god1 as though he had had to do with a man2 therefore to him also was ,god revealed according to his understanding--that is1 as being unaware of his situation or his sin1 for ,adam heard1 or seemed to hear1 the ,lord walking in the garden1 calling him and asking him where he was2 and then1 on seeing his shamefacedness1 asking him whether he had eaten of the forbidden fruit4 ,adam evidently only knew the ,deity as the ,creator of all things4 ,to ,cain also ,god was revealed1 according to his understanding1 as ignorant of human affairs1 nor was a higher conception of the ,deity required for repentance of his sin4 ,to ,laban the ,lord revealed ,himself as the ,god of ,abraham1 because ,laban believed that each nation had its own special divinity 7see ,gen4 xxxi4 #bi74 ,abraham also knew not that ,god is omnipresent1 and has foreknowledge of all things2 for when he heard the sentence against the inhabitants of ,sodom1 he prayed that the ,lord should not execute it till ,he had ascertained whether they all merited such punishment2 for he said 7see ,gen4 xviii4 #bd71 ,peradventure there be fifty righteous within the city1 and in accordance with this belief ,god was revealed to him2 as ,abraham imagined1 ,he spake thus3 ,i will go down now1 and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it which is come unto ,me2 and if not ,i will know4 ,further1 the ,divine testimony concerning ,abraham asserts nothing but that he was obedient1 and that he commanded his household after him that they should keep the way of the ,lord 7,gen4 xviii4 #ai72 it does not state that he held sublime conceptions of the ,deity4 ,moses1 also1 was not sufficiently aware that ,god is omniscient1 and directs human actions by ,his sole decree1 for although ,god himself says that the ,israelites should hearken to ,him1 ,moses still considered the matter doubtful and repeated1 ,but if they will not believe me1 nor hearken unto my voice4 ,to him in like manner ,god was revealed as taking no part in1 and as being ignorant of1 future human actions3 the ,lord gave him two signs and said1 ,and it shall come to pass that if they will not believe thee1 neither hearken to the voice of the first sign1 that they will believe the voice of the latter sign2 but if not1 thou shalt take of the water of the river1 etc4 ,indeed1 if any one considers without prejudice the recorded opinions of ,moses1 he will plainly see that ,moses conceived the ,deity as a ,being ,who has always existed1 does exist1 and always will exist1 and for this cause he calls ,him by the name ,jehovah1 which in ,hebrew signifies these three phases of existence3 as to ,his nature1 ,moses only taught that ,he is merciful1 gracious1 and exceeding jealous1 as appears from many passages in the ,pentateuch4 ,lastly1 he believed and taught that this ,being was so different from all other beings1 that ,he could not be expressed by the image of any visible thing2 also1 that ,he could not be looked upon1 and that not so much from inherent impossibility as from human infirmity2 further1 that by reason of ,his power ,he was without equal and unique4 ,moses admitted1 indeed1 that there were beings 7doubtless by the plan and command of the ,lord7 who acted as ,god's vicegerents--that is1 beings to whom ,god had given the right1 authority1 and power to direct nations1 and to provide and care for them2 but he taught that this ,being ,whom they were bound to obey was the highest and ,supreme ,god1 7or to use the ,hebrew phrase7 ,god of gods1 and thus in the song 7,exod4 xv4 #aa7 he exclaims1 ,who is like unto ,thee1 ,o ,lord1 among the gods8 and ,jethro says 7,exod4 xviii4 #aa71 ,now ,i know that the ,lord is greater than all gods4 ,that is to say1 ,i am at length compelled to admit to ,moses that ,jehovah is greater than all gods1 and that ,his power is unrivalled4 ,we must remain in doubt whether ,moses thought that these beings who acted as ,god's vicegerents were created by ,him1 for he has stated nothing1 so far as we know1 about their creation and origin4 ,he further taught that this ,being had brought the visible world into order from ,chaos1 and had given ,nature her germs1 and therefore that ,he possesses supreme right and power over all things2 further1 that by reason of this supreme right and power ,he had chosen for ,himself alone the ,hebrew nation and a certain strip of territory1 and had handed over to the care of other gods substituted by ,himself the rest of the nations and territories1 and that therefore ,he was called the ,god of ,israel and the ,god of ,jerusalem1 whereas the other gods were called the gods of the ,gentiles4 ,for this reason the ,jews believed that the strip of territory which ,god had chosen for ,himself1 demanded a ,divine worship quite apart and different from the worship which obtained elsewhere1 and that the ,lord would not suffer the worship of other gods adapted to other countries4 ,thus they thought that the people whom the king of ,assyria had brought into ,juda were torn in pieces by lions because they knew not the worship of the ,national ,divinity 7#b ,kings xvii4 #be74444 ,if we now examine the revelations to ,moses1 we shall find that they were accommodated to these opinions2 as he believed that the ,divine ,nature was subject to the conditions of mercy1 graciousness1 etc41 so ,god was revealed to him in accordance with his idea and under these attributes 7see ,exodus xxxiv4 #f1 #g1 and the second commandment74 ,further it is related 7,ex4 xxxiii4 #ah7 that ,moses asked of ,god that he might behold ,him1 but as ,moses 7as we have said7 had formed no mental image of ,god1 and ,god 7as ,i have shown7 only revealed ,himself to the prophets in accordance with the disposition of their imagination1 ,he did not reveal ,himself in any form4 ,this1 ,i repeat1 was because the imagination of ,moses was unsuitable1 for other prophets bear witness that they saw the ,lord2 for instance1 ,isaiah1 ,ezekiel1 ,daniel1 etc4 ,for this reason ,god answered ,moses1 ,thou canst not see ,my face2 and inasmuch as ,moses believed that ,god can be looked upon--that is1 that no contradiction of the ,divine nature is therein involved 7for otherwise he would never have preferred his request7--it is added1 ,for no one shall look on ,me and live1 thus giving a reason in accordance with ,moses' idea1 for it is not stated that a contradiction of the ,divine nature would be involved1 as was really the case1 but that the thing would not come to pass because of human infirmity4444 ,lastly1 as ,moses believed that ,god dwelt in the heavens1 ,god was revealed to him as coming down from heaven on to a mountain1 and in order to talk with the ,lord ,moses went up the mountain1 which he certainly need not have done if he could have conceived of ,god as omnipresent4 ,the ,israelites knew scarcely anything of ,god1 although ,he was revealed to them2 and this is abundantly evident from their transferring1 a few days afterwards1 the honor and worship due to ,him to a calf1 which they believed to be the god who had brought them out of ,egypt4 ,in truth1 it is hardly likely that men accustomed to the superstitions of ,egypt1 uncultivated and sunk in most abject slavery1 should have held any sound notions about the ,deity1 or that ,moses should have taught them anything beyond a rule of right living2 inculcating it not like a philosopher1 as the result of freedom1 but like a lawgiver compelling them to be moral by legal authority4 ,thus the rule of right living1 the worship and love of ,god1 was to them rather a bondage than the true liberty1 the gift and grace of the ,deity4 ,moses bid them love ,god and keep ,his law1 because they had in the past received benefits from ,him 7such as the deliverance from slavery in ,egypt71 and further terrified them with threats if they transgressed ,his commands1 holding out many promises of good if they should observe them2 thus treating them as parents treat irrational children4 ,it is1 therefore1 certain that they knew not the excellence of virtue and the true happiness4 ,jonah thought that he was fleeing from the sight of ,god1 which seems to show that he too held that ,god had entrusted the care of the nations outside ,juda to other substituted powers4 ,no one in the whole of the ,old ,testament speaks more rationally of ,god than ,solomon1 who in fact surpassed all the men of his time in natural ability4 ,yet he considered himself above the law 7esteeming it only to have been given for men without reasonable and intellectual grounds for their actions71 and made small account of the laws concerning kings1 which are mainly three3 nay1 he openly violated them 7in this he did wrong1 and acted in a manner unworthy of a philosopher1 by indulging in sensual pleasure71 and taught that all ,fortune's favors to mankind are vanity1 that humanity has no nobler gift than wisdom1 and no greater punishment than folly4 7,see ,proverbs xvi4 #bb1 #bc47 444 ,god adapted revelations to the understanding and opinions of the prophets1 and 444 in matters of theory without bearing on charity or morality1 the prophets could be1 and1 in fact1 were ignorant1 and held conflicting opinions4 ,it therefore follows that we must by no means go to the prophets for knowledge1 either of natural or of spiritual phenomena4 ,we have determined1 then1 that we are only bound to believe in the prophetic writings1 the object and substance of the revelation2 with regard to the details1 every one may believe or not1 as he likes4 ,for instance1 the revelation to ,cain only teaches us that ,god admonished him to lead the true life1 for such alone is the object and substance of the revelation1 not doctrines concerning free will and philosophy4 ,hence1 though the freedom of the will is clearly implied in the words of the admonition1 we are at liberty to hold a contrary opinion1 since the words and reasons were adapted to the understanding of ,cain4 ,so1 too1 the revelation to ,micaiah would only teach that ,god revealed to him the true issue of the battle between ,ahab and ,aram2 and this is all we are bound to believe4 ,whatever else is contained in the revelation concerning the true and the false ,spirit of ,god1 the army of heaven standing on the right hand and on the left1 and all the other details1 does not affect us at all4 ,every one may believe as much of it as his reason allows4 ,the reasonings by which the ,lord displayed ,his power to ,job 7if they really were a revelation1 and the author of the history is narrating1 and not merely1 as some suppose1 rhetorically adorning his own conceptions71 would come under the same category--that is1 they were adapted to ,job's understanding1 for the purpose of convincing him1 and are not universal1 or for the convincing of all men4 ,we can come to no different conclusion with respect to the reasonings of ,christ1 by which ,he convicted the ,pharisees of pride and ignorance1 and exhorted ,his disciples to lead the true life4 ,he adapted them to each man's opinions and principles4 ,for instance1 when ,he said to the ,pharisees 7,matt4 xii4 #bf71 ,and if ,satan cast out devils1 his house is divided against itself1 how then shall his kingdom stand8 ,he only wished to convince the ,pharisees according to their own principles1 not to teach that there are devils1 or any kingdom of devils4 ,so1 too1 when ,he said to ,his disciples 7,matt4 viii4 #aj71 ,see that ye despise not one of these little ones1 for ,i say unto you that their angels1 etc41 ,he merely desired to warn them against pride and despising any of their fellows1 not to insist on the actual reason given1 which was simply adopted in order to persuade them more easily4 ,lastly1 we should say exactly the same of the apostolic signs and reasonings1 but there is no need to go further into the subject4 ,if ,i were to enumerate all the passages of ,scripture addressed only to individuals1 or to a particular man's understanding1 and which cannot1 without great danger to philosophy1 be defended as ,divine doctrines1 ,i should go far beyond the brevity at which ,i aim4 ,let it suffice then1 to have indicated a few instances of general application1 and let the curious reader consider others by himself4 ,although the points we have just raised concerning prophets and prophecy are the only ones which have any direct bearing on the end in view1 namely1 the separation of ,philosophy from ,theology1 still1 as ,i have touched on the general question1 ,i may here inquire whether the gift of prophecy was peculiar to the ,hebrews1 or whether it was common to all nations4 ,i must then come to a conclusion about the vocation of the ,hebrews1 all of which ,i shall do in the ensuing chapter4 ,,footnotes3 #d ,from the ,tr4 ,th4-,p4 ch4 i ,of ,prophecy2 and ch4 ii of ,of ,prophets4 #e 444 ,i will tell you that ,i do not think it necessary for salvation to know ,christ according to the flesh2 but with regard to the ,eternal ,son of ,god1 that is the ,eternal ,wisdom of ,god1 which has manifested itself in all things and especially in the human mind1 and above all in ,christ ,jesus1 the case is far otherwise4 ,for without this no one can come to a state of blessedness1 inasmuch as it alone teaches what is true or false1 good or evil4 ,and1 inasmuch as this wisdom was made especially manifest through ,jesus ,christ1 as ,i have said1 ,his disciples preached it1 in so far as it was revealed to them through ,him1 and thus showed that they could rejoice in that spirit of ,christ more than the rest of mankind4 ,the doctrines added by certain churches1 such as that ,god took upon ,himself human nature1 ,i have expressly said that ,i do not understand4 ,in fact1 to speak the truth1 they seem to me no less absurd than would a statement that a circle had taken upon itself the nature of a square4 ,this ,i think will be sufficient explanation of my opinion4444 ,whether it will be satisfactory to ,christians you will know better than ,i4 ,farewell4 ,from a letter to ,henry ,oldenburg 7,nov4 #afge74 444 ,for the rest1 ,i accept ,christ's passion1 death1 and burial literally1 as you do1 but ,his resurrection ,i understand allegorically4 ,i admit1 that it is related by the ,evangelists in such detail that we cannot deny that they themselves believed ,christ's body to have risen from the dead and ascended to heaven in order to sit at the right hand of ,god1 or that they believed that ,christ might have been seen by unbelievers1 if they had happened to be at hand1 in the places where ,he appeared to ,his disciples2 but in these matters they might1 without injury to ,gospel teaching1 have been deceived1 as was the case with other prophets4444 ,but ,paul1 to whom ,christ afterwards appeared1 rejoices that he knew ,christ1 not after the flesh1 but after the spirit4 ,from a letter to ,henry ,oldenburg 7,jan4 #afgf74 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,of ,,the ,,vocation ,,of ,,the ,,hebrews#f ,every man's true happiness and blessedness consist solely in the enjoyment of what is good1 not in the pride that he alone is enjoying it1 to the exclusion of others4 ,he who thinks himself the more blessed because he is enjoying benefits which others are not1 or because he is more blessed or more fortunate than his fellows1 is ignorant of true happiness and blessedness1 and the joy which he feels is either childish or envious and malicious4 ,for instance1 a man's true happiness consists only in wisdom1 and the knowledge of the truth1 not at all in the fact that he is wiser than others1 or that others lack such knowledge3 such considerations do not increase his wisdom or true happiness4 ,whoever1 therefore1 rejoices for such reasons1 rejoices in another's misfortune1 and is1 so far1 malicious and bad1 knowing neither true happiness nor the peace of the true life4 ,when ,scripture1 therefore1 in exhorting the ,hebrews to obey the law1 says that the ,lord has chosen them for ,himself before other nations 7,deut4 x4 #ae72 that ,he is near them1 but not near others 7,deut4 iv4 #g72 that to them alone ,he has given just laws 7,deut4 iv4 #h72 and1 lastly1 that ,he has marked them out before others 7,deut4 iv4 #cb72 it speaks only according to the understanding of its hearers1 who1 as we have shown in the last chapter1 and as ,moses also testified 7,deut4 ix4 #f1 #g71 knew not true blessedness4 ,for in good sooth they would have been no less blessed if ,god had called all men equally to salvation1 nor would ,god have been less present to them for being equally present to others2 their laws would have been no less just if they had been ordained for all1 and they themselves would have been no less wise4 ,the miracles would have shown ,god's power no less by being wrought for other nations also2 lastly1 the ,hebrews would have been just as much bound to worship ,god if ,he had bestowed all these gifts equally on all men4 ,when ,god tells ,solomon 7#a ,kings iii4 #ab7 that no one shall be as wise as he in time to come1 it seems to be only a manner of expressing surpassing wisdom2 it is little to be believed that ,god would have promised ,solomon1 for his greater happiness1 that ,he would never endow any one with so much wisdom in time to come2 this would in no wise have increased ,solomon's intellect1 and the wise king would have given equal thanks to the ,lord if every one had been gifted with the same faculties4 ,still1 though we assert that ,moses1 in the passages of the ,pentateuch just cited1 spoke only according to the understanding of the ,hebrews1 we have no wish to deny that ,god ordained the ,mosaic law for them alone1 nor that ,he spoke to them alone1 nor that they witnessed marvels beyond those which happened to any other nation2 but we wish to emphasize that ,moses desired to admonish the ,hebrews in such a manner and with such reasonings as would appeal most forcibly to their childish understanding and constrain them to worship the ,deity4 ,further1 we wished to show that the ,hebrews did not surpass other nations in knowledge1 or in piety1 but evidently in some attribute different from these2 or 7to speak like the ,scriptures1 according to their understanding71 that the ,hebrews were not chosen by ,god before others for the sake of the true life and sublime ideas1 though they were often thereto admonished1 but with some other object4 ,what that object was ,i will duly show4 ,but before ,i begin1 ,i wish in a few words to explain what ,i mean by the guidance of ,god1 by the help of ,god1 external and inward1 and lastly1 what ,i understand by fortune4 ,by the help of ,god1 ,i mean the fixed and unchangeable order of nature or the chain of natural events3 for ,i have said before and shown elsewhere that the universal laws of nature1 according to which all things exist and are determined1 are only another name for the eternal decrees of ,god1 which always involve eternal truth and necessity4 ,so that to say that everything happens according to natural laws1 and to say that everything is ordained by the decree and ordinance of ,god1 is the same thing4 ,now since the power in ,nature is identical with the power of ,god1 by which alone all things happen and are determined1 it follows that whatsoever man1 as a part of ,nature1 provides himself with to aid and preserve his existence1 or whatsoever ,nature affords him without his help1 is given to him solely by the ,divine power1 acting either through human nature or through external circumstance4 ,so whatever human nature can furnish itself with by its own efforts to preserve its existence1 may be fitly called the inward aid of ,god1 whereas whatever else accrues to man's profit from outward causes may be called the external aid of ,god4 ,we can now easily understand what is meant by the election of ,god4 ,for since no one can do anything save by the predetermined order of ,nature1 that is by ,god's eternal ordinance and decree1 it follows that no one can choose a plan of life for himself1 or accomplish any work save by ,god's vocation choosing him for the work or the plan of life in question1 rather than any other4 ,lastly1 by fortune1 ,i mean the ordinance of ,god in so far as it directs human life through external and unexpected means4 ,with these preliminaries ,i return to my purpose of discovering the reason why the ,hebrews were said to be elected by ,god before other nations1 and with the demonstration ,i thus proceed4 ,all objects of legitimate desire fall1 generally speaking1 under one of these three categories3-- #a4 ,the knowledge of things through their primary causes4 #b4 ,the government of the passions1 or the acquirement of the habit of virtue4 #c4 ,secure and healthy life4 ,the means which most directly conduce towards the first two of these ends1 and which may be considered their proximate and efficient causes are contained in human nature itself1 so that their acquisition hinges only on our own power1 and on the laws of human nature4 ,it may be concluded that these gifts are not peculiar to any nation1 but have always been shared by the whole human race1 unless1 indeed1 we would indulge the dream that ,nature formerly created men of different kinds4 ,but the means which conduce to security and health are chiefly in external circumstance1 and are called the gifts of fortune because they depend chiefly on objective causes of which we are ignorant2 for a fool may be almost as liable to happiness or unhappiness as a wise man4 ,nevertheless1 human management and watchfulness can greatly assist towards living in security and warding off the injuries of our fellow men1 and even of beasts4 ,reason and experience show no more certain means of attaining this object than the formation of a society with fixed laws1 the occupation of a strip of territory1 and the concentration of all forces1 as it were1 into one body1 that is the social body4 ,now for forming and preserving a society1 no ordinary ability and care is required3 that society will be most secure1 most stable1 and least liable to reverses1 which is founded and directed by far-seeing and careful men2 while1 on the other hand1 a society constituted by men without trained skill1 depends in a great measure on fortune1 and is less constant4 ,if1 in spite of all1 such a society lasts a long time1 it is owing to some other directing influence than its own2 if it overcomes great perils and its affairs prosper1 it will perforce marvel at and adore the guiding ,spirit of ,god 7in so far1 that is1 as ,god works through hidden means1 and not through the nature and mind of man71 for everything happens to it unexpectedly and contrary to anticipation1 it may even be said and thought to be by miracle4 ,nations1 then1 are distinguished from one another in respect to the social organization and the laws under which they live and are governed2 the ,hebrew nation was not chosen by ,god in respect to its wisdom nor its tranquillity of mind1 but in respect to its social organization and the good fortune with which it obtained supremacy and kept it so many years4 ,this is abundantly clear from ,scripture4 ,even a cursory perusal will show us that the only respects in which the ,hebrews surpassed other nations1 are in their successful conduct of matters relating to government1 and in their surmounting great perils solely by ,god's external aid2 in other ways they were on a par with their fellows1 and ,god was equally gracious to all4 ,for in respect to intellect 7as we have shown in the last chapter7 they held very ordinary ideas about ,god and ,nature1 so that they cannot have been ,god's chosen in this respect2 nor were they so chosen in respect of virtue and the true life1 for here again they1 with the exception of a very few elect1 were on an equality with other nations3 therefore their choice and vocation consisted only in the temporal happiness and advantages of independent rule4 ,in fact1 we do not see that ,god promised anything beyond this to the patriarchs or their successors2 in the law no other reward is offered for obedience than the continual happiness of an independent commonwealth and other goods of this life2 while1 on the other hand1 against contumacy and the breaking of the covenant is threatened the downfall of the commonwealth and great hardships4 ,nor is this to be wondered at2 for the ends of every social organization and commonwealth are 7as appears from what we have said1 and as we will explain more at length hereafter7 security and comfort2 a commonwealth can only exist by the laws being binding on all4 ,if all the members of a state wish to disregard the law1 by that very fact they dissolve the state and destroy the commonwealth4 ,thus1 the only reward which could be promised to the ,hebrews for continued obedience to the law was security and its attendant advantages1 while no surer punishment could be threatened for disobedience1 than the ruin of the state and the evils which generally follow therefrom1 in addition to such further consequences as might accrue to the ,jews in particular from the ruin of their especial state4 ,but there is no need here to go into this point at more length4 ,i will only add that the laws of the ,old ,testament were revealed and ordained to the ,jews only1 for as ,god chose them in respect to the special constitution of their society and government1 they must1 of course1 have had special laws4 ,whether ,god ordained special laws for other nations also1 and revealed ,himself to their lawgivers prophetically1 that is1 under the attributes by which the latter were accustomed to imagine ,him1 ,i cannot sufficiently determine4 ,it is evident from ,scripture itself that other nations acquired supremacy and particular laws by the external aid of ,god4 ,if any one wishes to maintain that the ,jews 444 have been chosen by ,god for ever1 ,i will not gainsay him if he will admit that this choice1 whether temporary or eternal1 has no regard1 in so far as it is peculiar to the ,jews1 to aught but dominion and physical advantages 7for by such alone can one nation be distinguished from another71 whereas in regard to intellect and true virtue1 every nation is on a par with the rest1 and ,god has not in these respects chosen one people rather than another4 ,,footnotes3 #f ,from the ,tr4 ,th4-,p41 ch4 iii1 same title4 ,,chapter ,v ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,law#g ,the word law1 taken in the abstract means that by which an individual1 or all things1 or as many things as belong to a particular species1 act in one and the same fixed and definite manner1 which manner depends either on natural necessity or on human decree4 ,a law which depends on natural necessity is one which necessarily follows from the nature1 or from the definition of the thing in question2 a law which depends on human decree1 and which is more correctly called an ordinance1 is one which men have laid down for themselves and others in order to live more safely or conveniently1 or from some similar reason4 ,for example1 the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies1 lose as much of their own motion as they communicate to the latter is a universal law of all bodies1 and depends on natural necessity4 ,so1 too1 the law that a man in remembering one thing1 straightway remembers another either like it1 or which he had perceived simultaneously with it1 is a law which necessarily follows from the nature of man4 ,but the law that men must yield1 or be compelled to yield1 somewhat of their natural right1 and that they bind themselves to live in a certain way1 depends on human decree4 ,now1 though ,i freely admit that all things are predetermined by universal natural laws to exist and operate in a given1 fixed1 and definite manner1 ,i still assert that the laws ,i have just mentioned depend on human decree4 7#a47 ,because man1 in so far as he is a part of ,nature1 constitutes a part of the power of ,nature4 ,whatever1 therefore1 follows necessarily from the necessity of human nature 7that is1 from ,nature herself1 in so far as we conceive of her as acting through man7 follows1 even though it be necessarily1 from human power4 ,hence the sanction of such laws may very well be said to depend on man's decree1 for it principally depends on the power of the human mind2 so that the human mind in respect to its perception of things as true and false1 can readily be conceived as without such laws1 but not without necessary law as we have just defined it4 7#b47 ,i have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is well to define and explain things by their proximate causes4 ,the general consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us very little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular questions4 ,let us add that as to the actual cordination and concatenation of things1 that is how things are ordained and linked together1 we are obviously ignorant2 therefore1 it is more profitable for right living1 nay1 it is necessary for us to consider things as contingent4 ,so much about law in the abstract4 ,now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by analogy1 and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either obey or neglect1 inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain originally exceeded limits1 and therefore lays down no rule beyond human strength4 ,thus it is expedient to define law more particularly as a plan of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object4 ,however1 as the true object of legislation is only perceived by a few1 and most men are almost incapable of grasping it1 though they live under its conditions1 legislators1 with a view to exacting general obedience1 have wisely put forward another object1 very different from that which necessarily follows from the nature of law3 they promise to the observers of the law that which the masses chiefly desire1 and threaten its violators with that which they chiefly fear3 thus endeavoring to restrain the masses1 as far as may be1 like a horse with a curb2 whence it follows that the word law is chiefly applied to the modes of life enjoined on men by the sway of others2 hence those who obey the law are said to live under it and to be under compulsion4 ,in truth1 a man who renders every one their due because he fears the gallows1 acts under the sway and compulsion of others1 and cannot be called just4 ,but a man who does the same from a knowledge of the true reason for laws and their necessity1 acts from a firm purpose and of his own accord1 and is therefore properly called just4 ,this1 ,i take it1 is ,paul's meaning when he says1 that those who live under the law cannot be justified through the law1 for justice1 as commonly defined1 is the constant and perpetual will to render every man his due4 ,thus ,solomon says 7,prov4 xxi4 #ae71 ,it is a joy to the just to do judgment1 but the wicked fear4 ,law1 then1 being a plan of living which men have for a certain object laid down for themselves or others1 may1 as it seems1 be divided into human law and ,divine law4 ,by human law ,i mean a plan of living which serves only to render life and the state secure4 ,by ,divine law ,i mean that which only regards the highest good1 in other words1 the true knowledge of ,god and love4 ,i call this law ,divine because of the nature of the highest good1 which ,i will here shortly explain as clearly as ,i can4 ,inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being1 it is evident that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we desire to search for what is really profitable to us4 ,for in intellectual perfection the highest good should consist4 ,now1 since all our knowledge1 and the certainty which removes every doubt1 depend solely on the knowledge of ,god2--firstly1 because without ,god nothing can exist or be conceived2 secondly1 because so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of ,god we may remain in universal doubt--it follows that our highest good and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge of ,god4 ,further1 since without ,god nothing can exist or be conceived1 it is evident that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception of ,god as far as their essence and perfection extend1 so that we have greater and more perfect knowledge of ,god in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena3 conversely 7since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a particular property of a cause7 the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena1 the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of ,god 7which is the cause of all things74 ,so1 then1 our highest good not only depends on the knowledge of ,god1 but wholly consists therein2 and it further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in proportion to the nature and perfection of the object of his special desire2 hence the most perfect and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he who prizes above all else1 and takes especial delight in the intellectual knowledge of ,god1 the most perfect ,being4 ,hither1 then1 our highest good and our highest blessedness aim--namely1 to the knowledge and love of ,god2 therefore the means demanded by this aim of all human actions1 that is1 by ,god in so far as the idea of him is in us1 may be called the commands of ,god1 because they proceed1 as it were1 from ,god ,himself1 inasmuch as ,he exists in our minds1 and the plan of life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of ,god4 ,the nature of the means1 and the plan of life which this aim demands1 how the foundations of the best states follow its lines1 and how men's life is conducted1 are questions pertaining to general ethics4 ,here ,i only proceed to treat of the ,divine law in a particular application4 ,as the love of ,god is man's highest happiness and blessedness1 and the ultimate end and aim of all human actions1 it follows that he alone lives by the ,divine law who loves ,god not from fear of punishment1 or from love of any other object1 such as sensual pleasure1 fame1 or the like2 but solely because he has knowledge of ,god1 or is convinced that the knowledge and love of ,god is the highest good4 ,the sum and chief precept1 then1 of the ,divine law is to love ,god as the highest good1 namely1 as we have said1 not from fear of any pains and penalties or from the love of any other object in which we desire to take pleasure4 ,the idea of ,god lays down the rule that ,god is our highest good--in other words1 that the knowledge and love of ,god is the ultimate aim to which all our actions should be directed4 ,the worldling cannot understand these things1 they appear foolishness to him1 because he has too meager a knowledge of ,god1 and also because in this highest good he can discover nothing which he can handle or eat1 or which affects the fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delights1 for it consists solely in thought and the pure reason4 ,they1 on the other hand1 who know that they possess no greater gift than intellect and sound reason1 will doubtless accept what ,i have said without question4 ,we have now explained that wherein the ,divine law chiefly consists1 and what are human laws1 namely1 all those which have a different aim unless they have been ratified by revelation1 for in this respect also things are referred to ,god 7as we have shown above7 and in this sense the law of ,moses1 although it was not universal1 but entirely adapted to the disposition and particular preservation of a single people1 may yet be called a law of ,god or ,divine law1 inasmuch as we believe that it was ratified by prophetic insight4 ,if we consider the nature of natural ,divine law as we have just explained it1 we shall see ,i4 ,that it is universal or common to all men1 for we have deduced it from universal human nature4 ,,ii4 ,that it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative whatsoever1 for inasmuch as this natural ,divine law is comprehended solely by the consideration of human nature1 it is plain that we can conceive it as existing as well in ,adam as in any other man1 as well in a man living among his fellows as in a man who lives by himself4 ,the truth of a historical narrative1 however assured1 cannot give us the knowledge nor consequently the love of ,god1 for love of ,god springs from knowledge of ,him1 and knowledge of ,him should be derived from general ideas1 in themselves certain and known1 so that the truth of a historical narrative is very far from being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest good4 ,still1 though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and love of ,god1 ,i do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view to life in the world1 for the more we have observed and known of men's customs and circumstances1 which are best revealed by their actions1 the more warily we shall be able to order our lives among them1 and so far as reason dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions4 ,,iii4 ,we see that this natural ,divine law does not demand the performance of ceremonies--that is1 actions in themselves indifferent1 which are called good from the fact of their institution1 or actions symbolizing something profitable for salvation1 or 7if one prefers this definition7 actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding4 ,the natural light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself unable to supply1 but only such as it can very clearly show to be good1 or a means to our blessedness4 ,such things as are good simply because they have been commanded or instituted1 or as being symbols of something good1 are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the offspring1 as it were1 or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect4 ,there is no need for me to go into this now in more detail4 ,,iv4 ,lastly1 we see that the highest reward of the ,divine law is the law itself1 namely1 to know ,god and to love ,him of our free choice1 and with an undivided and fruitful spirit2 while its penalty is the absence of these things1 and being in bondage to the flesh--that is1 having an inconstant and wavering spirit4 ,these points being noted1 ,i must now inquire ,i4 ,whether by the natural light of reason we can conceive of ,god as a lawgiver or potentate ordaining laws for men8 ,,ii4 ,what is the teaching of ,holy ,writ concerning this natural light of reason and natural law8 ,,iii4 ,with what objects were ceremonies formerly instituted8 ,,iv4 ,lastly1 what is the good gained by knowing the sacred histories and believing them8 ,of the first two ,i will treat in this chapter1 of the remaining two in the following one4 ,our conclusion about the first is easily deduced from the nature of ,god's will1 which is only distinguished from ,his understanding in relation to our intellect--that is1 the will and the understanding of ,god are in reality one and the same1 and are only distinguished in relation to our thoughts which we form concerning ,god's understanding4 ,for instance1 if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a triangle is from eternity contained in the ,divine nature as an eternal verity1 we say that ,god possesses the idea of a triangle1 or that ,he understands the nature of a triangle2 but if afterwards we look to the fact that the nature of a triangle is thus contained in the ,divine nature1 solely by the necessity of the ,divine nature1 and not by the necessity of the nature and essence of a triangle--in fact1 that the necessity of a triangle's essence and nature1 in so far as they are conceived of as eternal verities1 depends solely on the necessity of the ,divine nature and intellect1 we then style ,god's will or decree1 that which before we styled ,his intellect4 ,wherefore we make one and the same affirmation concerning ,god when we say that ,he has from eternity decreed that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles1 as when we say that ,he has understood it4 ,hence the affirmations and the negations of ,god always involve necessity or truth2 so that1 for example1 if ,god said to ,adam that ,he did not wish him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil1 it would have involved a contradiction that ,adam should have been able to eat of it1 and would therefore have been impossible that he should have so eaten1 for the ,divine command would have involved an eternal necessity and truth4 ,but since ,scripture nevertheless narrates that ,god did give this command to ,adam1 and yet that none the less ,adam ate of the tree1 we must perforce say that ,god revealed to ,adam the evil which would surely follow if he should eat of the tree1 but did not disclose that such evil would of necessity come to pass4 ,thus it was that ,adam took the revelation to be not an eternal and necessary truth1 but a law--that is1 an ordinance followed by gain or loss1 not depending necessarily on the nature of the act performed1 but solely on the will and absolute power of some potentate1 so that the revelation in question was solely in relation to ,adam1 and solely through his lack of knowledge a law1 and ,god was1 as it were1 a lawgiver and potentate4 ,from the same cause1 namely1 from lack of knowledge1 the ,decalogue in relation to the ,hebrews was a law1 for since they knew not the existence of ,god as an eternal truth1 they must have taken as a law that which was revealed to them in the ,decalogue1 namely1 that ,god exists1 and that ,god only should be worshiped4 ,but if ,god had spoken to them without the intervention of any bodily means1 immediately they would have perceived it not as a law but as an eternal truth4 ,what we have said about the ,israelites and ,adam applies also to all the prophets who wrote laws in ,god's name--they did not adequately conceive ,god's decrees as eternal truths4 ,for instance1 we must say of ,moses that from revelation1 from the basis of what was revealed to him1 he perceived the method by which the ,israelitish nation could best be united in a particular territory1 and could form a body politic or state1 and further that he perceived the method by which that nation could best be constrained to obedience2 but he did not perceive1 nor was it revealed to him1 that this method was absolutely the best1 nor that the obedience of the people in a certain strip of territory would necessarily imply the end he had in view4 ,wherefore he perceived these things not as eternal truths1 but as precepts and ordinances1 and he ordained them as laws of ,god1 and thus it came to be that he conceived ,god as a ruler1 a legislator1 a king1 as merciful1 just1 etc41 whereas such qualities are simply attributes of human nature1 and utterly alien from the nature of the ,deity4 ,thus much we may affirm of the prophets who wrote laws in the name of ,god2 but we must not affirm it of ,christ1 for ,christ1 although ,he too seems to have written laws in the name of ,god1 must be taken to have had a clear and adequate perception1 for ,christ was not so much a prophet as the mouthpiece of ,god4 ,for ,god made revelations to mankind through ,christ as ,he had before done through angels--that is1 a created voice1 visions1 etc4 ,it would be as unreasonable to say that ,god had accommodated ,his revelations to the opinions of ,christ as that ,he had before accommodated them to the opinions of angels 7that is1 of a created voice or visions7 as matters to be revealed to the prophets1 a wholly absurd hypothesis4 ,moreover1 ,christ was sent to teach not only the ,jews but the whole human race1 and therefore it was not enough that ,his mind should be accommodated to the opinions of the ,jews alone1 but also to the opinion and fundamental teaching common to the whole human race--in other words1 to ideas universal and true4 ,inasmuch as ,god revealed ,himself to ,christ1 or to ,christ's mind immediately1 and not as to the prophets through words and symbols1 we must needs suppose that ,christ perceived truly what was revealed1 in other words1 ,he understood it1 for a matter is understood when it is perceived simply by the mind without words or symbols4 ,christ1 then1 perceived 7truly and adequately7 what was revealed1 and if ,he ever proclaimed such revelations as laws1 ,he did so because of the ignorance and obstinacy of the people1 acting in this respect the part of ,god2 inasmuch as ,he accommodated ,himself to the comprehension of the people1 and though ,he spoke somewhat more clearly than the other prophets1 yet ,he taught what was revealed obscurely1 and generally through parables1 especially when ,he was speaking to those to whom it was not yet given to understand the kingdom of heaven4 7,see ,matt4 xiii4 #aj1 etc47 ,to those to whom it was given to understand the mysteries of heaven1 ,he doubtless taught ,his doctrines as eternal truths and did not lay them down as laws1 thus freeing the minds of ,his hearers from the bondage of that law which ,he further confirmed and established4 ,paul apparently points to this more than once 7e4g41 ,rom4 vii4 #f1 and iii4 #bh71 though he never himself seems to wish to speak openly1 but1 to quote his own words 7,rom4 iii4 #e1 and vi4 #ai71 merely humanly4 ,this he expressly states when he calls ,god just1 and it was doubtless in concession to human weakness that he attributes mercy1 grace1 anger1 and similar qualities to ,god1 adapting his language to the popular mind1 or1 as he puts it 7#a ,cor4 iii4 #a1 #b71 to carnal men4 ,in ,rom4 ix4 #ah1 he teaches undisguisedly that ,god's anger and mercy depend not on the actions of men1 but on ,god's own nature or will2 further1 that no one is justified by the works of the law1 but only by faith1 which he seems to identify with the full assent of the soul2 lastly1 that no one is blessed unless he have in him the mind of ,christ 7,rom4 viii4 #i71 whereby he perceives the laws of ,god as eternal truths4 ,we conclude1 therefore1 that ,god is described as a lawgiver or prince1 and styled just1 merciful1 etc41 merely in concession to popular understanding1 and the imperfection of popular knowledge2 that in reality ,god acts and directs all things simply by the necessity of ,his nature and perfection1 and that ,his decrees and volitions are eternal truths1 and always involve necessity4 ,so much for the first point which ,i wished to explain and demonstrate4 ,passing on to the second point1 let us search the sacred pages for their teaching concerning the light of nature and this ,divine law4 ,the first doctrine we find in the history of the first man1 where it is narrated that ,god commanded ,adam not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil2 this seems to mean that ,god commanded ,adam to do and to seek after righteousness because it was good1 not because the contrary was evil3 that is1 to seek the good for its own sake1 not from fear of evil4 ,we have seen that he who acts rightly from the true knowledge and love of right1 acts with freedom and constancy1 whereas he who acts from fear of evil1 is under the constraint of evil1 and acts in bondage under external control4 ,so that this commandment of ,god to ,adam comprehends the whole ,divine natural law1 and absolutely agrees with the dictates of the light of nature2 nay1 it would be easy to explain on this basis the whole history or allegory of the first man4 ,but ,i prefer to pass over the subject in silence1 because1 in the first place1 ,i cannot be absolutely certain that my explanation would be in accordance with the intention of the sacred writer2 and1 secondly1 because many do not admit that this history is an allegory1 maintaining it to be a simple narrative of facts4 ,it will be better1 therefore1 to adduce other passages of ,scripture1 especially such as were written by him1 who speaks with all the strength of his natural understanding1 in which he surpassed all his contemporaries1 and whose sayings are accepted by the people as of equal right with those of the prophets4 ,i mean ,solomon1 whose prudence and wisdom are commended in ,scripture rather than his piety and gift of prophecy4 ,he1 in his proverbs1 calls the human intellect the well-spring of true life1 and declares that misfortune is made up of folly4 ,understanding is a well-spring of life to him that hath it2 but the instruction of fools is folly 7,prov4 xvi4 #bb74 ,life being taken to mean the true life 7as is evident from ,deut4 xxx4 #ai71 the fruit of the understanding consists only in the true life1 and its absence constitutes punishment4 ,all this absolutely agrees with what was set out in our fourth point concerning natural law4 ,moreover1 our position that it is the well-spring of life1 and that the intellect alone lays down laws for the wise1 is plainly taught by the sage1 for he says 7,prov4 xiii4 #ad73 ,the law of the wise is a fountain of life--that is1 as we gather from the preceding text1 the understanding4 ,in chap4 iii4 #ac1 he expressly teaches that the understanding renders man blessed and happy1 and gives him true peace of mind4 ,happy is the man that findeth wisdom1 and the man that getteth understanding1 for ,wisdom gives length of days1 and riches and honour2 her ways are ways of pleasantness1 and all her paths peace 7xiii4 #af1 #ag74 ,according to ,solomon1 therefore1 it is only the wise who live in peace and equanimity1 not like the wicked whose minds drift hither and thither1 and 7as ,isaiah says1 chap4 lvii4 #bj7 are like the troubled sea1 for them there is no peace4 ,lastly1 we should especially note the passage in chap4 ii4 of ,solomon's proverbs which most clearly confirms our contention3 ,if thou criest after knowledge1 and liftest up thy voice for understanding 444 then shalt thou understand the fear of the ,lord1 and find the knowledge of ,god2 for the ,lord giveth wisdom2 out of ,his mouth cometh knowledge and understanding4 ,these words clearly enunciate 7#a71 that wisdom or intellect alone teaches us to fear ,god wisely--that is1 to worship ,him truly2 7#b71 that wisdom and knowledge flow from ,god's mouth1 and that ,god bestows on us this gift2 this we have already shown in proving that our understanding and our knowledge depend on1 spring from1 and are perfected by the idea or knowledge of ,god1 and nothing else4 ,solomon goes on to say in so many words that this knowledge contains and involves the true principles of ethics and politics3 ,when wisdom entereth into thy heart1 and knowledge is pleasant to thy soul1 discretion shall preserve thee1 understanding shall keep thee1 then shalt thou understand righteousness1 and judgment1 and equity1 yea every good path4 ,all of which is in obvious agreement with natural knowledge3 for after we have come to the understanding of things1 and have tasted the excellence of knowledge1 she teaches us ethics and true virtue4 ,thus the happiness and the peace of him who cultivates his natural understanding lies1 according to ,solomon also1 not so much under the dominion of fortune 7or ,god's external aid7 as in inward personal virtue 7or ,god's internal aid71 for the latter can to a great extent be preserved by vigilance1 right action1 and thought4 ,lastly1 we must by no means pass over the passage in ,paul's ,epistle to the ,romans 7i4 #bj71 in which he says3 ,for the invisible things of ,god from the creation of the world are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made1 even ,his eternal power and ,godhead2 so that they are without excuse1 because1 when they knew ,god1 they glorified ,him not as ,god1 neither were they thankful4 ,these words clearly show that every one can by the light of nature clearly understand the goodness and the eternal divinity of ,god1 and can thence know and deduce what they should seek for and what avoid2 wherefore the ,apostle says that they are without excuse and cannot plead ignorance1 as they certainly might if it were a question of supernatural light and the incarnation1 passion1 resurrection of ,christ4 ,wherefore1 he goes on to say 7ib4 #bd71 ,god gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts2 and so on1 through the rest of the chapter1 he describes the vices of ignorance1 and sets them forth as the punishment of ignorance4 ,this obviously agrees with the verse of ,solomon1 already quoted1 ,the instruction of fools is folly1 so that it is easy to understand why ,paul says that the wicked are without excuse4 ,as every man sows so shall he reap3 out of evil1 evils necessarily spring1 unless they be wisely counteracted4 ,thus we see that ,scripture literally approves of the light of natural reason and the natural ,divine law1 and ,i have fulfilled the promises made at the beginning of this chapter4 ,,footnotes3 #g ,from the ,tr4 ,th4-,p41 ch4 iv1 same title4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,of ,,the ,,ceremonial ,,law#h ,in the foregoing chapter we have shown that the ,divine law1 which renders men truly blessed1 and teaches them the true life1 is universal to all men2 nay1 we have so intimately deduced it from human nature that it must be esteemed innate1 and1 as it were1 ingrained in the human mind4 ,but with regard to the ceremonial observances which were ordained in the ,old ,testament for the ,hebrews only1 and were so adapted to their state that they could for the most part only be observed by the society as a whole and not by each individual1 it is evident that they formed no part of the ,divine law1 and had nothing to do with blessedness and virtue1 but had reference only to the election of the ,hebrews1 that is 7as ,i have shown in ,chapter ,,iv71 to their temporal bodily happiness and the tranquillity of their kingdom1 and that therefore they were only valid while that kingdom lasted4 ,if in the ,old ,testament they are spoken of as the law of ,god1 it is only because they were founded on revelation1 or a basis of revelation4 ,still as reason1 however sound1 has little weight with ordinary theologians1 ,i will adduce the authority of ,scripture for what ,i here assert1 and will further show1 for the sake of greater clearness1 why and how these ceremonials served to establish and preserve the ,jewish kingdom4 ,isaiah teaches most plainly that the ,divine law in its strict sense signifies that universal law which consists in a true manner of life1 and does not signify ceremonial observances4 ,in chapter i41 verse #aj1 the prophet calls on his countrymen to hearken to the ,divine law as he delivers it1 and first excluding all kinds of sacrifices and all feasts1 he at length sums up the law in these few words3 ,cease to do evil1 learn to do well3 seek judgment1 relieve the oppressed4 ,not less striking testimony is given in ,psalm xl4 #g-i1 where the ,psalmist addresses ,god3 ,sacrifice and offering ,thou didst not desire2 mine ears hast ,thou opened2 burnt offering and sin-offering hast ,thou not required2 ,i delight to do ,thy will1 ,o my ,god2 yea1 ,thy law is within my heart4 ,here the ,psalmist reckons as the law of ,god only that which is inscribed in his heart1 and excludes ceremonies therefrom1 for the latter are good and inscribed on the heart only from the fact of their institution1 and not because of their intrinsic value4 ,other passages of ,scripture testify to the same truth1 but these two will suffice4 ,we may also learn from the ,bible that ceremonies are no aid to blessedness1 but only have reference to the temporal prosperity of the kingdom2 for the rewards promised for their observance are merely temporal advantages and delights1 blessedness being reserved for the universal ,divine law4 ,in all the five books commonly attributed to ,moses nothing is promised1 as ,i have said1 beyond temporal benefits1 such as honors1 fame1 victories1 riches1 enjoyments1 and health4 ,though many moral precepts besides ceremonies are contained in these five books1 they appear not as moral doctrines universal to all men1 but as commands especially adapted to the understanding and character of the ,hebrew people1 and as having reference only to the welfare of the kingdom4 ,for instance1 ,moses does not teach the ,jews as a prophet not to kill or to steal1 but gives these commandments solely as a lawgiver and judge2 he does not reason out the doctrine1 but affixes for its non-observance a penalty which may and very properly does vary in different nations4 ,so1 too1 the command not to commit adultery is given merely with reference to the welfare of the state2 for if the moral doctrine had been intended1 with reference not only to the welfare of the state1 but also to the tranquillity and blessedness of the individual1 ,moses would have condemned not merely the outward act1 but also the mental acquiescence1 as is done by ,christ1 ,who taught only universal moral precepts1 and for this cause promises a spiritual instead of a temporal reward4 ,christ1 as ,i have said1 was sent into the world1 not to preserve the state nor to lay down laws1 but solely to teach the universal moral law1 so we can easily understand that ,he wished in no wise to do away with the law of ,moses1 inasmuch as ,he introduced no new laws of ,his own--,his sole care was to teach moral doctrines1 and distinguish them from the laws of the state2 for the ,pharisees1 in their ignorance1 thought that the observance of the state law and the ,mosaic law was the sum total of morality2 whereas such laws merely had reference to the public welfare1 and aimed not so much at instructing the ,jews as at keeping them under constraint4 ,but let us return to our subject1 and cite other passages of ,scripture which set forth temporal benefits as rewards for observing the ceremonial law1 and blessedness as reward for the universal law4 ,none of the prophets puts the point more clearly than ,isaiah4 ,after condemning hypocrisy1 he commends liberty and charity towards oneself and one's neighbors1 and promises as a reward3 ,then shall thy light break forth as the morning1 and thy health shall spring forth speedily1 thy righteousness shall go before thee1 and the glory of the ,lord shall be thy reward 7chap4 lviii4 #h74 ,shortly afterwards he commends the ,sabbath1 and for a due observance of it promises3 ,then shalt thou delight thyself in the ,lord1 and ,i will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth1 and feed thee with the heritage of ,jacob thy father3 for the mouth of the ,lord has spoken it4 ,thus the prophet1 for liberty bestowed and charitable works1 promises a healthy mind in a healthy body1 and the glory of the ,lord even after death2 whereas1 for ceremonial exactitude1 he only promises security of rule1 prosperity1 and temporal happiness4 444 ,it remains to show why and how the ceremonial observances tended to preserve and confirm the ,hebrew kingdom2 and this ,i can very briefly do on grounds universally accepted4 ,the formation of society serves not only for defensive purposes1 but is also very useful1 and1 indeed1 absolutely necessary1 as rendering possible the division of labor4 ,if men did not render mutual assistance to each other1 no one would have either the skill or the time to provide for his own sustenance and preservation3 for all men are not equally apt for all work1 and no one would be capable of preparing all that he individually stood in need of4 ,strength and time1 ,i repeat1 would fail1 if every one had in person to plow1 to sow1 to reap1 to grind corn1 to cook1 to weave1 to stitch and perform the other numerous functions required to keep life going2 to say nothing of the arts and sciences which are also entirely necessary to the perfection and blessedness of human nature4 ,we see that peoples living in uncivilized barbarism lead a wretched and almost animal life1 and even they would not be able to acquire their few rude necessaries without assisting one another to a certain extent4 ,now if men were so constituted by nature that they desired nothing but what is designated by true reason1 society would obviously have no need of laws3 it would be sufficient to inculcate true moral doctrines2 and men would freely1 without hesitation1 act in accordance with their true interests4 ,but human nature is framed in a different fashion3 every one1 indeed1 seeks his own interest1 but does not do so in accordance with the dictates of sound reason1 for most men's ideas of desirability and usefulness are guided by their fleshly instincts and emotions1 which take no thought beyond the present and the immediate object4 ,therefore1 no society can exist without government1 and force1 and laws to restrain and repress men's desires and immoderate impulses4 ,still human nature will not submit to absolute repression4 ,violent governments1 as ,seneca says1 never last long2 the moderate governments endure4 ,so long as men act simply from fear they act contrary to their inclinations1 taking no thought for the advantages or necessity of their actions1 but simply endeavoring to escape punishment or loss of life4 ,they must needs rejoice in any evil which befalls their ruler1 even if it should involve themselves2 and must long for and bring about such evil by every means in their power4 ,again1 men are especially intolerant of serving and being ruled by their equals4 ,lastly1 it is exceedingly difficult to revoke liberties once granted4 ,from these considerations it follows1 firstly1 that authority should either be vested in the hands of the whole state in common1 so that every one should be bound to serve1 and yet not be in subjection to his equals2 or else1 if power be in the hands of a few1 or one man1 that one man should be something above average humanity1 or should strive to get himself accepted as such4 ,secondly1 laws should in every government be so arranged that people should be kept in bounds by the hope of some greatly desired good1 rather than by fear1 for then every one will do his duty willingly4 ,lastly1 as obedience consists in acting at the bidding of external authority1 it would have no place in a state where the government is vested in the whole people1 and where laws are made by common consent4 ,in such a society the people would remain free1 whether the laws were added to or diminished1 inasmuch as it would not be done on external authority1 but their own free consent4 ,the reverse happens when the sovereign power is vested in one man1 for all act at his bidding2 and1 therefore1 unless they had been trained from the first to depend on the words of their ruler1 the latter would find it difficult1 in case of need1 to abrogate liberties once conceded1 and impose new laws4 ,from these universal considerations1 let us pass on to the kingdom of the ,jews4 ,the ,jews when they first came out of ,egypt were not bound by any national laws1 and were therefore free to ratify any laws they liked1 or to make new ones1 and were at liberty to set up a government and occupy a territory wherever they chose4 ,however1 they were entirely unfit to frame a wise code of laws and to keep the sovereign power vested in the community2 they were all uncultivated and sunk in a wretched slavery1 therefore the sovereignty was bound to remain vested in the hands of one man who would rule the rest and keep them under constraint1 make laws and interpret them4 ,this sovereignty was easily retained by ,moses1 because he surpassed the rest in virtue and persuaded the people of the fact1 proving it by many testimonies 7see ,exod4 chap4 xiv41 last verse1 and chap4 xix41 verse #i74 ,he then1 by the ,divine virtue he possessed1 made laws and ordained them for the people1 taking the greatest care that they should be obeyed willingly and not through fear1 being specially induced to adopt this course by the obstinate nature of the ,jews1 who would not have submitted to be ruled solely by constraint2 and also by the imminence of war1 for it is always better to inspire soldiers with a thirst for glory than to terrify them with threats2 each man will then strive to distinguish himself by valor and courage1 instead of merely trying to escape punishment4 ,moses1 therefore1 by his virtue and the ,divine command1 introduced a religion so that the people might do their duty from devotion rather than fear4 ,further1 he bound them over by benefits1 and prophesied many advantages in the future2 nor were his laws very severe1 as any one may see for himself1 especially if he remarks the number of circumstances necessary in order to procure the conviction of an accused person4 ,lastly1 in order that the people which could not govern itself should be entirely dependent on its ruler1 he left nothing to the free choice of individuals 7who had hitherto been slaves72 the people could do nothing but remember the law1 and follow the ordinances laid down at the good pleasure of their ruler2 they were not allowed to plow1 to sow1 to reap1 nor even to eat2 to clothe themselves1 to shave1 to rejoice1 or1 in fact1 to do anything whatever as they liked1 but were bound to follow the directions given in the law2 and not only this1 but they were obliged to have marks on their doorposts1 on their hands1 and between their eyes to admonish them to perpetual obedience4 ,this1 then1 was the object of the ceremonial law1 that men should do nothing of their own free will1 but should always act under external authority1 and should continually confess by their actions and thoughts that they were not their own masters1 but were entirely under the control of others4 ,from all these considerations it is clearer than day that ceremonies have nothing to do with a state of blessedness1 and that those mentioned in the ,old ,testament1 i4e41 the whole ,mosaic ,law1 had reference merely to the government of the ,jews1 and merely temporal advantages4 ,as for the ,christian rites1 such as baptism1 the ,lord's ,supper1 festivals1 public prayers1 and any other observances which are1 and always have been1 common to all ,christendom1 if they were instituted by ,christ or ,his ,apostles 7which is open to doubt71 they were instituted as external signs of the universal church1 and not as having anything to do with blessedness1 or possessing any sanctity in themselves4 ,therefore1 though such ceremonies were not ordained for the sake of upholding a government1 they were ordained for the preservation of a society1 and accordingly he who lives alone is not bound by them3 nay1 those who live in a country where the ,christian religion is forbidden1 are bound to abstain from such rites1 and can none the less live in a state of blessedness4 ,we have an example of this in ,japan1 where the ,christian religion is forbidden1 and the ,dutch who live there are enjoined by their ,east ,india ,company not to practice any outward rites of religion4 ,i need not cite other examples1 though it would be easy to prove my point from the fundamental principles of the ,new ,testament1 and to adduce many confirmatory instances2 but ,i pass on the more willingly1 as ,i am anxious to proceed to my next proposition4 ,i will now1 therefore1 pass on to what ,i proposed to treat of in the second part of this chapter1 namely1 what persons are bound to believe in the narratives contained in ,scripture1 and how far they are so bound4 ,examining this question by the aid of natural reason1 ,i will proceed as follows3 ,if any one wishes to persuade his fellows for or against anything which is not self-evident1 he must deduce his contention from their admissions1 and convince them either by experience or by ratiocination2 either by appealing to facts of natural experience1 or to self-evident intellectual axioms4 ,now unless the experience be of such a kind as to be clearly and distinctly understood1 though it may convince a man1 it will not have the same effect on his mind and disperse the clouds of his doubt so completely as when the doctrine taught is deduced entirely from intellectual axioms--that is1 by the mere power of the understanding and logical order1 and this is especially the case in spiritual matters which have nothing to do with the senses4 ,but the deduction of conclusions from general truths priori1 usually requires a long chain of arguments1 and1 moreover1 very great caution1 acuteness1 and self-restraint--qualities which are not often met with2 therefore people prefer to be taught by experience rather than deduce their conclusion from a few axioms1 and set them out in logical order4 ,whence it follows1 that if any one wishes to teach a doctrine to a whole nation 7not to speak of the whole human race71 and to be understood by all men in every particular1 he will seek to support his teaching with experience1 and will endeavor to suit his reasonings and the definitions of his doctrines as far as possible to the understanding of the common people1 who form the majority of mankind1 and he will not set them forth in logical sequence nor adduce the definitions which serve to establish them4 ,otherwise he writes only for the learned--that is1 he will be understood by only a small proportion of the human race4 ,all ,scripture was written primarily for an entire people1 and secondarily for the whole human race2 therefore its contents must necessarily be adapted as far as possible to the understanding of the masses1 and proved only by examples drawn from experience4 ,we will explain ourselves more clearly4 ,the chief speculative doctrines taught in ,scripture are the existence of ,god1 or a ,being ,who made all things1 and ,who directs and sustains the world with consummate wisdom2 furthermore1 that ,god takes the greatest thought for men1 or such of them as live piously and honorably1 while ,he punishes1 with various penalties1 those who do evil1 separating them from the good4 ,all this is proved in ,scripture entirely through experience--that is1 through the narratives there related4 ,no definitions of doctrine are given1 but all the sayings and reasonings are adapted to the understanding of the masses4 ,although experience can give no clear knowledge of these things1 nor explain the nature of ,god1 nor how ,he directs and sustains all things1 it can nevertheless teach and enlighten men sufficiently to impress obedience and devotion on their minds4 ,it is not1 ,i think1 sufficiently clear what persons are bound to believe in the ,scripture narratives1 and in what degree they are so bound1 for it evidently follows from what has been said that the knowledge of and belief in them is particularly necessary to the masses whose intellect is not capable of perceiving things clearly and distinctly4 ,further1 he who denies them because he does not believe that ,god exists or takes thought for men and the world1 may be accounted impious2 but a man who is ignorant of them1 and nevertheless shows by natural reason that ,god exists1 as we have said1 and has a true plan of life1 is altogether blessed--yes1 more blessed than the common herd of believers1 because besides true opinions he possesses also a true and distinct conception4 ,lastly1 he who is ignorant of the ,scriptures and knows nothing by the light of reason1 though he may not be impious or rebellious1 is yet less than human and almost brutal1 having none of ,god's gifts4 ,we must here remark that when we say that the knowledge of the sacred narrative is particularly necessary to the masses1 we do not mean the knowledge of absolutely all the narratives in the ,bible1 but only of the principal ones1 those which1 taken by themselves1 plainly display the doctrine we have just stated1 and have most effect over men's minds4 ,if all the narratives in ,scripture were necessary for the proof of this doctrine1 and if no conclusion could be drawn without the general consideration of every one of the histories contained in the sacred writings1 truly the conclusion and demonstration of such doctrine would overtask the understanding and strength not only of the masses1 but of humanity2 who is there who could give attention to all the narratives at once1 and to all the circumstances1 and all the scraps of doctrine to be elicited from such a host of diverse histories8 ,i cannot believe that the men who have left us the ,bible as we have it were so abounding in talent that they attempted setting about such a method of demonstration1 still less can ,i suppose that we cannot understand ,scriptural doctrine till we have given heed to the quarrels of ,isaac1 the advice of ,achitophel to ,absalom1 the civil war between ,jews and ,israelites1 and other similar chronicles2 nor can ,i think that it was more difficult to teach such doctrine by means of history to the ,jews of early times1 the contemporaries of ,moses1 than it was to the contemporaries of ,esdras4 ,but more will be said on this point hereafter1 we may now only note that the masses are only bound to know those histories which can most powerfully dispose their mind to obedience and devotion4 ,however1 the masses are not sufficiently skilled to draw conclusions from what they read1 they take more delight in the actual stories1 and in the strange and unlooked-for issues of events than in the doctrines implied2 therefore1 besides reading these narratives1 they are always in need of pastors or church ministers to explain them to their feeble intelligence4 ,but not to wander from our point1 let us conclude with what has been our principal object--namely1 that the truth of narratives1 be they what they may1 has nothing to do with the ,divine law1 and serves for nothing except in respect of doctrine1 the sole element which makes one history better than another4 ,the narratives in the ,old and ,new ,testaments surpass profane history1 and differ among themselves in merit simply by reason of the salutary doctrines which they inculcate4 ,therefore1 if a man were to read the ,scripture narratives believing the whole of them1 but were to give no heed to the doctrines they contain1 and make no amendment in his life1 he might employ himself just as profitably in reading the ,koran or the poetic drama1 or ordinary chronicles1 with the attention usually given to such writings2 on the other hand1 if a man is absolutely ignorant of the ,scriptures1 and none the less has right opinions and a true plan of life1 he is absolutely blessed and truly possesses in himself the spirit of ,christ4 ,the ,jews are of a directly contrary way of thinking1 for they hold that true opinions and a true plan of life are of no service in attaining blessedness1 if their possessors have arrived at them by the light of reason only1 and not like the documents prophetically revealed to ,moses4 ,maimonides ventures openly to make this assertion3 ,every man who takes to heart the seven precepts and diligently follows them1 is counted with the pious among the nations1 and an heir of the world to come2 that is to say1 if he takes to heart and follows them because ,god ordained them in the law1 and revealed them to us by ,moses1 because they were of aforetime precepts to the sons of ,noah3 but he who follows them as lead thereto by reason1 is not counted as a dweller among the pious1 nor among the wise of the nations4 ,such are the words of ,maimonides1 to which ,r4 ,joseph1 the son of ,shem ,job1 adds in his book1 which he calls ,kebod ,elohim1 or ,god's ,glory1 that although ,aristotle 7whom he considers to have written the best ethics and to be above every one else7 has not omitted anything that concerns true ethics1 and which he has adopted in his own book1 carefully following the lines laid down1 yet this was not able to suffice for his salvation1 inasmuch as he embraced his doctrines in accordance with the dictates of reason and not as ,divine documents prophetically revealed4#i ,however1 that these are mere figments and are not supported by ,scriptural authority will1 ,i think1 be sufficiently evident to the attentive reader1 so that an examination of the theory will be sufficient for its refutation4 ,it is not my purpose here to refute the assertions of those who assert that the natural light of reason can teach nothing of any value concerning the true way of salvation4 ,people who lay no claims to reason for themselves are not able to prove by reason this their assertion2 and if they hawk about something superior to reason1 it is a mere figment1 and far below reason1 as their general method of life sufficiently shows4 ,but there is no need to dwell upon such persons4 ,i will merely add that we can only judge of a man by his works4 ,if a man abounds in the fruits of the ,spirit1 charity1 joy1 peace1 long-suffering1 kindness1 goodness1 faith1 gentleness1 chastity1 against which1 as ,paul says 7,gal4 v4 #bb71 there is no law1 such an one1 whether he be taught by reason only or by the ,scripture only1 has been in very truth taught by ,god1 and is altogether blessed4 ,thus have ,i said all that ,i undertook to say concerning ,divine law4 ,,footnotes3 #h ,from the ,tr4 ,th4-,p41 ch4 v1 same title4 #i ,the ,jews were not1 of course1 alone in holding this point of view4 ,dante consigned the ancient philosophers--including ,aristotle--and even ,vergil to ,limbo1 agreeing thus in doctrine with ,maimonides and ,r4 ,joseph1 the son of ,shem ,job4--,,ed4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,of ,,miracles#aj ,as men are accustomed to call ,divine the knowledge which transcends human understanding1 so also do they style ,divine1 or the work of ,god1 anything of which the cause is not generally known3 for the masses think that the power and providence of ,god are most clearly displayed by events that are extraordinary and contrary to the conception they have formed of ,nature1 especially if such events bring them any profit or convenience3 they think that the clearest possible proof of ,god's existence is afforded when ,nature1 as they suppose1 breaks her accustomed order1 and consequently they believe that those who explain or endeavor to understand phenomena or miracles through their natural causes are doing away with ,god and ,his providence4 ,they suppose1 forsooth1 that ,god is inactive so long as ,nature works in her accustomed order1 and vice versa1 that the power of ,nature and natural causes are idle so long as ,god is acting3 thus they imagine two powers distinct one from the other1 the power of ,god and the power of ,nature1 though the latter is in a sense determined by ,god1 or 7as most people believe now7 created by ,him4 ,what they mean by either1 and what they understand by ,god and ,nature they do not know1 except that they imagine the power of ,god to be like that of some royal potentate1 and ,nature's power to consist in force and energy4 ,the masses then style unusual phenomena miracles1 and partly from piety1 partly for the sake of opposing the students of science1 prefer to remain in ignorance of natural causes1 and only to hear of those things which they know least1 and consequently admire most4 ,in fact1 the common people can only adore ,god1 and refer all things to ,his power by removing natural causes1 and conceiving things happening out of their due course1 and only admires the power of ,god when the power of ,nature is conceived of as in subjection to it4 ,this idea seems to have taken its rise among the early ,jews who saw the ,gentiles round them worshiping visible gods1 such as the sun1 the moon1 the earth1 water1 air1 etc41 and in order to inspire the conviction that such divinities were weak and inconstant1 or changeable1 told how they themselves were under the sway of an invisible ,god1 and narrated their miracles1 trying further to show that the ,god whom they worshiped arranged the whole of nature for their sole benefit4 ,this idea was so pleasing to humanity that men go on to this day imagining miracles1 so that they may believe themselves ,god's favorites and the final cause for which ,god created and directs all things4 ,what pretensions will not people in their folly advance6 ,they have no single sound idea concerning either ,god or ,nature1 they confound ,god's decrees with human decrees1 they conceive ,nature as so limited that they believe man to be its chief part6 ,i have spent enough space in setting forth these common ideas and prejudices concerning ,nature and miracles1 but in order to afford a regular demonstration ,i will show3 #a4 ,that ,nature cannot be contravened1 but that she preserves a fixed and immutable order1 and at the same time ,i will explain what is meant by a miracle4 #b4 ,that ,god's nature and existence1 and consequently ,his providence1 cannot be known from miracles1 but that they can all be much better perceived from the fixed and immutable order of ,nature4 #c4 ,that by the decrees and volitions1 and consequently the providence of ,god1 ,scripture 7as ,i will prove by ,scriptural examples7 means nothing but ,nature's order following necessarily from her eternal laws4 #d4 ,lastly1 ,i will treat of the method of interpreting ,scriptural miracles1 and the chief points to be noted concerning the narratives of them4 ,such are the principal subjects which will be discussed in this chapter1 and which will serve1 ,i think1 not a little to further the object of this treatise4 ,our first point is easily proved from what we showed in ,chapter ,v about ,divine law--namely1 that all that ,god wishes or determines involves eternal necessity and truth1 for we demonstrated that ,god's understanding is identical with ,his will1 and that it is the same thing to say that ,god wills a thing1 as to say that ,he understands it2 hence1 as it follows necessarily from the ,divine nature and perfection that ,god understands a thing as it is1 it follows no less necessarily that ,he wills it as it is4 ,now1 as nothing is necessarily true save only by ,divine decree1 it is plain that the universal laws of ,nature are decrees of ,god following from the necessity and perfection of the ,divine nature4 ,hence1 any event happening in nature which contravened ,nature's universal laws1 would necessarily also contravene the ,divine decree1 nature1 and understanding2 or if any one asserted that ,god acts in contravention to the laws of ,nature1 he1 ipso facto1 would be compelled to assert that ,god acted against ,his own nature--an evident absurdity4 ,one might easily show from the same premises that the power and efficiency of ,nature are in themselves the ,divine power and efficiency1 and that the ,divine power is the very essence of ,god1 but this ,i gladly pass over for the present4 ,nothing1 then1 comes to pass in ,nature#aa in contravention to her universal laws1 nay1 everything agrees with them and follows from them1 for whatsoever comes to pass1 comes to pass by the will and eternal decree of ,god2 that is1 as we have just pointed out1 whatever comes to pass1 comes to pass according to laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth2 ,nature1 therefore1 always observes laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth1 although they may not all be known to us1 and therefore she keeps a fixed and immutable order4 ,nor is there any sound reason for limiting the power and efficacy of ,nature1 and asserting that her laws are fit for certain purposes1 but not for all2 for as the efficacy and power of ,nature are the very efficacy and power of ,god1 and as the laws and rules of ,nature are the decrees of ,god1 it is in every way to be believed that the power of ,nature is infinite1 and that her laws are broad enough to embrace everything conceived by the ,divine intellect4 ,the only alternative is to assert that ,god has created ,nature so weak1 and has ordained for her laws so barren1 that ,he is repeatedly compelled to come afresh to her aid if ,he wishes that she should be preserved1 and that things should happen as ,he desires3 a conclusion1 in my opinion1 very far removed from reason4 ,further1 as nothing happens in ,nature which does not follow from her laws1 and as her laws embrace everything conceived by the ,divine intellect1 and1 lastly1 as ,nature preserves a fixed and immutable order1 it most clearly follows that miracles are only intelligible as in relation to human opinions1 and merely mean events of which the natural cause cannot be explained by a reference to any ordinary occurrence1 either by us1 or at any rate by the writer and narrator of the miracle4 ,we may1 in fact1 say that a miracle is an event of which the causes cannot be explained by the natural reason through a reference to ascertained workings of ,nature2 but since miracles were wrought according to the understanding of the masses1 who are wholly ignorant of the workings of ,nature1 it is certain that the ancients took for a miracle whatever they could not explain by the method adopted by the unlearned in such cases1 namely1 an appeal to the memory1 a recalling of something similar1 which is ordinarily regarded without wonder2 for most people think they sufficiently understand a thing when they have ceased to wonder at it4 ,the ancients1 then1 and indeed most men up to the present day1 had no other criterion for a miracle2 hence we cannot doubt that many things are narrated in ,scripture as miracles of which the causes could easily be explained by reference to ascertained workings of ,nature4 ,we have hinted as much in ,chapter ,,iii1 in speaking of the sun standing still in the time of ,joshua1 and going backwards in the time of ,ahaz2 but we shall soon have more to say on the subject when we come to treat of the interpretation of miracles later on in this chapter4 ,it is now time to pass on to the second point1 and show that we cannot gain an understanding of ,god's essence1 existence1 or providence by means of miracles1 but that these truths are much better perceived through the fixed and immutable order of ,nature4 ,i thus proceed with the demonstration4 ,as ,god's existence is not self-evident1 it must necessarily be inferred from ideas so firmly and incontrovertibly true that no power can be postulated or conceived sufficient to impugn them4 ,they ought certainly so to appear to us when we infer from them ,god's existence1 if we wish to place our conclusion beyond the reach of doubt2 for if we could conceive that such ideas could be impugned by any power whatsoever1 we should doubt of their truth1 we should doubt of our conclusion1 namely1 of ,god's existence1 and should never be able to be certain of anything4 ,further1 we know that nothing either agrees with or is contrary to ,nature1 unless it agrees with or is contrary to these primary ideas2 wherefore if we would conceive that anything could be done in ,nature by any power whatsoever which would be contrary to the laws of ,nature1 it would also be contrary to our primary ideas1 and we should have either to reject it as absurd1 or else to cast doubt 7as just shown7 on our primary ideas1 and consequently on the existence of ,god1 and on everything howsoever perceived4 ,therefore miracles1 in the sense of events contrary to the laws of ,nature1 so far from demonstrating to us the existence of ,god1 would1 on the contrary1 lead us to doubt it1 where1 otherwise1 we might have been absolutely certain of it1 as knowing that ,nature follows a fixed and immutable order4 ,let us take miracle as meaning that which cannot be explained through natural causes4 ,this may be interpreted in two senses3 either as that which has natural causes1 but cannot be examined by the human intellect2 or as that which has no cause save ,god and ,god's will4 ,but as all things which come to pass through natural causes come to pass also solely through the will and power of ,god1 it comes to this3 that a miracle1 whether it has natural causes or not1 is a result which cannot be explained by its cause1 that is a phenomenon which surpasses human understanding2 but from such a phenomenon1 and certainly from a result surpassing our understanding1 we can gain no knowledge4 ,for whatsoever we understand clearly and distinctly should be plain to us either in itself or by means of something else clearly and distinctly understood2 wherefore from a miracle or a phenomenon which we cannot understand we can gain no knowledge of ,god's essence1 or existence1 or indeed anything about ,god or nature2 whereas when we know that all things are ordained and ratified by ,god1 that the operations of ,nature follow from the essence of ,god1 and that the laws of ,nature are eternal decrees and volitions of ,god1 we must perforce conclude that our knowledge of ,god and of ,god's will increases in proportion to our knowledge and clear understanding of ,nature1 as we see how she depends on her primal cause1 and how she works according to eternal law4 ,wherefore so far as our understanding goes1 those phenomena which we clearly and distinctly understand have much better right to be called works of ,god1 and to be referred to the will of ,god than those about which we are entirely ignorant1 although they appeal powerfully to the imagination1 and compel men's admiration4 ,it is only phenomena that we clearly and distinctly understand which heighten our knowledge of ,god and most clearly indicate ,his will and decrees4 ,plainly1 they are but triflers who1 when they cannot explain a thing1 run back to the will of ,god2 this is1 truly1 a ridiculous way of expressing ignorance4 ,again1 even supposing that some conclusion could be drawn from miracles1 we could not possibly infer from them the existence of ,god2 for a miracle being an event under limitations is the expression of a fixed and limited power1 therefore we could not possibly infer from an effect of this kind the existence of a cause whose power is infinite1 but at the utmost only of a cause whose power is greater than that of the said effect4 ,i say at the utmost1 for a phenomenon may be the result of many concurrent causes1 and its power may be less than the power of the sum of such causes1 but far greater than that of any one of them taken individually4 ,on the other hand1 the laws of nature1 as we have shown1 extend over infinity1 and are conceived by us as1 after a fashion1 eternal1 and ,nature works in accordance with them in a fixed and immutable order2 therefore1 such laws indicate to us in a certain degree the infinity1 the eternity and the immutability of ,god4 ,we may conclude1 then1 that we cannot gain knowledge of the existence and providence of ,god by means of miracles1 but that we can far better infer them from the fixed and immutable order of ,nature4 ,by miracle ,i here mean an event which surpasses1 or is thought to surpass1 human comprehension3 for in so far as it is supposed to destroy or interrupt the order of ,nature or her laws1 it not only can give us no knowledge of ,god1 but1 contrariwise1 takes away that which we naturally have1 and makes us doubt of ,god and everything else4 ,neither do ,i recognize any difference between an event against the laws of ,nature and an event beyond the laws of ,nature 7that is1 according to some1 an event which does not contravene ,nature1 though she is inadequate to produce or effect it71 for a miracle is wrought in1 and not beyond ,nature1 though it may be said in itself to be above ,nature1 and1 therefore1 must necessarily interrupt the order of ,nature1 which otherwise we conceive of as fixed and unchangeable1 according to ,god's decrees4 ,if therefore anything should come to pass in ,nature which does not follow from her laws1 it would also be in contravention to the order which ,god has established in ,nature forever through universal natural laws4 ,it would1 therefore1 be in contravention to ,god's nature and laws1 and1 consequently belief in it would throw doubt upon everything1 and lead to ,atheism4 ,i think ,i have now sufficiently established my second point1 so that we can again conclude that a miracle1 whether in contravention to1 or beyond1 ,nature1 is a mere absurdity2 and therefore that what is meant in ,scripture by a miracle can only be a work of ,nature1 which surpasses1 or is believed to surpass1 human comprehension4 ,before passing on to my third point1 ,i will adduce ,scriptural authority for my assertion that ,god cannot be known from miracles4 ,scripture nowhere states the doctrine openly1 but it can readily be inferred from several passages4 ,firstly1 that in which ,moses commands 7,deut4 xiii47 that a false prophet should be put to death1 even though he work miracles3 ,if there arise a prophet among you1 and giveth thee a sign or wonder1 and the sign or wonder come to pass1 saying1 ,let us go after other gods 444 thou shalt not hearken unto the voice of that prophet2 for the ,lord your ,god proveth you1 and that prophet shall be put to death4 ,from this it clearly follows that miracles could be wrought even by false prophets2 and that1 unless men are honestly endowed with the true knowledge and love of ,god1 they may be as easily led by miracles to follow false gods as to follow the true ,god2 for these words are added3 ,for the ,lord your ,god tempts you1 that ,he may know whether you love ,him with all your heart and with all your mind4 ,further1 the ,israelites1 from all their miracles1 were unable to form a sound conception of ,god1 as their experience testified3 for when they had persuaded themselves that ,moses had departed from among them they petitioned ,aaron to give them visible gods2 and the idea of ,god they had formed as the result of all their miracles was a calf6444 ,i now go on to my third point1 and show from ,scripture that the decrees and mandates of ,god1 and consequently ,his providence1 are merely the order of ,nature--that is1 when ,scripture describes an event as accomplished by ,god or ,god's will1 we must understand merely that it was in accordance with the law and order of ,nature1 not1 as most people believe1 that ,nature had for a season ceased to act1 or that her order was temporarily interrupted4 ,but ,scripture does not directly teach matters unconnected with its doctrine1 wherefore it has no care to explain things by their natural causes1 nor to expound matters merely speculative4 ,wherefore our conclusion must be gathered by inference from those ,scriptural narratives which happen to be written more at length and circumstantially than usual4 ,of these ,i will cite a few4 ,in the first book of ,samuel 7ix4 #ae1 #af71 it is related that ,god revealed to ,samuel that ,he would send ,saul to him1 yet ,god did not send ,saul to ,samuel as people are wont to send one man to another4 ,his sending was merely the ordinary course of ,nature4 ,saul was looking for the asses he had lost1 and was meditating a return home without them1 when1 at the suggestion of his servant1 he went to the ,prophet ,samuel1 to learn from him where he might find them4 ,from no part of the narrative does it appear that ,saul had any command from ,god to visit ,samuel beyond this natural motive4444 ,but perhaps some one will insist that we find many things in ,scripture which seem in nowise explicable by natural causes1 as1 for instance1 that the sins of men and their prayers can be the cause of rain and of the earth's fertility1 or that faith can heal the blind1 and so on4 ,but ,i think ,i have already made sufficient answer3 ,i have shown that ,scripture does not explain things by their secondary causes1 but only narrates them in the order and the style which has most power to move men1 and especially uneducated men1 to devotion2 and therefore it speaks inaccurately of ,god and of events1 seeing that its object is not to convince the reason1 but to attract and lay hold of the imagination4 ,if the ,bible were to describe the destruction of an empire in the style of political historians1 the masses would remain unstirred1 whereas the contrary is the case when it adopts the method of poetic description1 and refers all things immediately to ,god4 ,when1 therefore1 the ,bible says that the earth is barren because of men's sins1 or that the blind were healed by faith1 we ought to take no more notice than when it says that ,god is angry at men's sins1 that ,he is sad1 that ,he repents of the good ,he has promised and done2 or that on seeing a sign ,he remembers something ,he had promised1 and other similar expressions1 which are either thrown out poetically or related according to the opinion and prejudices of the writer4 ,we may then be absolutely certain that every event which is truly described in ,scripture necessarily happened1 like everything else1 according to natural laws2 and if anything is there set down which can be proved in set terms to contravene the order of ,nature1 or not to be deducible therefrom1 we must believe it to have been foisted into the sacred writings by irreligious hands2 for whatsoever is contrary to ,nature is also contrary to reason1 and whatsoever is contrary to reason is absurd1 and1 ipso facto1 to be rejected4 ,there remain some points concerning the interpretation of miracles to be noted1 or rather to be recapitulated1 for most of them have been already stated4 ,these ,i proceed to discuss in the fourth division of my subject1 and ,i am led to do so lest any one should1 by wrongly interpreting a miracle1 rashly suspect that he has found something in ,scripture contrary to human reason4 ,it is very rare for men to relate an event simply as it happened1 without adding any element of their own judgment4 ,when they hear or see anything new1 they are1 unless strictly on their guard1 so occupied with their own preconceived opinions that they perceive something quite different from the plain facts seen or heard1 especially if such facts surpass the comprehension of the beholder or hearer1 and1 most of all1 if he is interested in their happening in a given way4 ,thus men relate in chronicles and histories their own opinions rather than actual events1 so that one and the same event is so differently related by two men of different opinions1 that it seems like two separate occurrences2 and1 further1 it is very easy from historical chronicles to gather the personal opinions of the historian4 ,i could cite many instances in proof of this from the writings both of natural philosophers and historians1 but ,i will content myself with one only from ,scripture1 and leave the reader to judge of the rest4 ,in the time of ,joshua the ,hebrews held the ordinary opinion that the sun moves with a daily motion1 and that the earth remains at rest2 to this preconceived opinion they adapted the miracle which occurred during their battle with the five kings4 ,they did not simply relate that that day was longer than usual1 but asserted that the sun and moon stood still1 or ceased from their motion--a statement which would be of great service to them at that time in convincing and proving by experience to the ,gentiles1 who worshiped the sun1 that the sun was under the control of another deity who could compel it to change its daily course4 ,thus1 partly through religious motives1 partly through preconceived opinions1 they conceived of and related the occurrence as something quite different from what really happened4 ,thus in order to interpret the ,scriptural miracles and understand from the narration of them how they really happened1 it is necessary to know the opinions of those who first related them1 and have recorded them for us in writing1 and to distinguish such opinions from the actual impression made upon their senses1 otherwise we shall confound opinions and judgments with the actual miracle as it really occurred2 nay1 further1 we shall confound actual events with symbolical and imaginary ones4 ,for many things are narrated in ,scripture as real1 and were believed to be real1 which were in fact only symbolical and imaginary4 ,as1 for instance1 that ,god came down from heaven 7,exod4 xix4 #bh1 ,deut4 v4 #bh71 and that ,mount ,sinai smoked because ,god descended upon it surrounded with fire2 or1 again1 that ,elijah ascended into heaven in a chariot of fire1 with horses of fire2 all these things were assuredly merely symbols adapted to the opinions of those who have handed them down to us as they were represented to them1 namely1 as real4 ,all who have any education know that ,god has no right hand nor left2 that ,he is not moved nor at rest1 nor in a particular place1 but that ,he is absolutely infinite and contains in ,himself all perfections4 ,these things1 ,i repeat1 are known to whoever judges of things by the perception of pure reason1 and not according as his imagination is affected by his outward senses1--following the example of the masses who imagine a bodily ,deity1 holding a royal court with a throne on the convexity of heaven1 above the stars1 which are believed to be not very far off from the earth4 ,to these and similar opinions very many narrations in ,scripture are adapted1 and should not1 therefore1 be mistaken by philosophers for realities4 ,lastly1 in order to understand1 in the case of miracles1 what actually took place1 we ought to be familiar with ,jewish phrases and metaphors2 any one who did not make sufficient allowance for these would be continually seeing miracles in ,scripture where nothing of the kind is intended by the writer2 he would thus miss the knowledge not only of what actually happened1 but also of the mind of the writers of the sacred text4 ,for instance1 ,zachariah1 speaking of some future war1 says 7chap1 xiv41 verse #g73 ,it shall be one day which shall be known to the ,lord1 not day nor night2 but at even time it shall be light4 ,in these words he seems to predict a great miracle1 yet he only means that the battle will be doubtful the whole day1 that the issue will be known only to ,god1 but that in the evening they will gain the victory4 ,the prophets frequently used to predict victories and defeats of the nations in similar phrases4 ,thus ,isaiah1 describing the destruction of ,babylon1 says 7chap4 xiii473 ,the stars of heaven1 and the constellations thereof1 shall not give their light2 the sun shall be darkened in his going forth1 and the moon shall not cause her light to shine4 ,now ,i suppose no one imagines that at the destruction of ,babylon these phenomena actually occurred any more than that which the prophet adds1 ,for ,i will make the heavens to tremble1 and remove the earth out of her place4 ,so1 too1 ,isaiah in foretelling to the ,jews that they would return from ,babylon to ,jerusalem in safety1 and would not suffer from thirst on their journey1 says3 ,and they thirsted not when ,he led them through the deserts2 ,he caused the waters to flow out of the rocks for them2 ,he clave the rocks1 and the waters gushed out4 ,these words merely mean that the ,jews1 like other people1 found springs in the desert1 at which they quenched their thirst2 for when the ,jews returned to ,jerusalem with the consent of ,cyrus1 it is admitted that no similar miracles befell them4 ,in this way many occurrences in the ,bible are to be regarded merely as ,jewish expressions4 ,there is no need for me to go through them in detail2 but ,i will call attention generally to the fact that the ,jews employed such phrases not only rhetorically1 but also1 and indeed chiefly1 from devotional motives4 ,such is the reason for the substitution of bless ,god for curse ,god 7in #a ,kings xxi4 #aj1 and ,job ii4 #i71 and for all things being referred to ,god1 whence it appears that the ,bible seems to relate nothing but miracles1 even when speaking of the most ordinary occurrences1 as in the examples given above4 ,hence we must believe that when the ,bible says that the ,lord hardened ,pharaoh's heart1 it only means that ,pharaoh was obstinate2 when it says that ,god opened the windows of heaven1 it only means that it rained very hard1 and so on4 ,when we reflect on these peculiarities1 and also on the fact that most things are related very shortly1 with very little detail1 and almost in abridgments1 we shall see that there is hardly anything in ,scripture which can be proved contrary to natural reason1 while1 on the other hand1 many things which before seemed obscure1 will after a little consideration be understood and easily explained4 ,i think ,i have now very clearly explained all that ,i proposed to explain1 but before ,i finish this chapter ,i would call attention to the fact that ,i have adopted a different method in speaking of miracles to that which ,i employed in treating of prophecy4 ,of prophecy ,i have asserted nothing which could not be inferred from premises revealed in ,scripture1 whereas in this chapter ,i have deduced my conclusions solely from the principles ascertained by the natural light of reason4 ,i have proceeded in this way advisedly1 for prophecy1 in that it surpasses human knowledge1 is a purely theological question2 therefore1 ,i knew that ,i could not make any assertions about it1 nor learn wherein it consists1 except through deductions from premises that have been revealed2 therefore ,i was compelled to collate the history of prophecy1 and to draw therefrom certain conclusions which would teach me1 in so far as such teaching is possible1 the nature and properties of the gift4 ,but in the case of miracles1 as our inquiry is a question purely philosophical 7namely1 whether anything can happen which contravenes1 or does not follow from the laws of ,nature71 ,i was not under any such necessity3 ,i therefore thought it wiser to unravel the difficulty through premises ascertained and thoroughly known by the natural light of reason4 ,i say ,i thought it wiser1 for ,i could also easily have solved the problem merely from the doctrines and fundamental principles of ,scripture3 in order that every one may acknowledge this1 ,i will briefly show how it could be done4 ,scripture makes the general assertion in several passages that nature's course is fixed and unchangeable4 7,in ,ps4 cxlviii4 #f1 for instance1 and ,jer4 xxxi4 #ce47 ,the wise man also 7in ,eccles4 i4 #aj7 distinctly teaches that there is nothing new under the sun1 and 7in verses #aa1 #ab71 illustrating the same idea1 he adds that although something occasionally happens which seems new1 it is not really new1 but hath been already of old time1 which was before us1 whereof there is no remembrance1 neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that come after4 ,again 7in chap4 iii4 #aa71 he says1 ,god hath made everything beautiful in his time1 and immediately afterwards adds1 ,i know that whatsoever ,god doeth1 it shall be for ever2 nothing can be put to it1 nor anything taken from it4 ,now all these texts teach most distinctly that ,nature preserves a fixed and unchangeable order and that ,god in all ages known and unknown has been the same2 further1 that the laws of ,nature are so perfect that nothing can be added thereto nor taken therefrom2 and1 lastly1 that miracles only appear as something new because of man's ignorance4 ,such is the express teaching of ,scripture4 ,nowhere does ,scripture assert that anything happens which contradicts1 or cannot follow from the laws of ,nature2 and therefore we should not attribute to it such a doctrine4444 ,the conclusion1 then1 that is most plainly put before us is1 that miracles were natural occurrences1 and must therefore be so explained as to appear neither new 7in the words of ,solomon7 nor contrary to ,nature1 but1 as far as possible1 in complete agreement with ordinary events4 ,this can easily be done by any one1 now that ,i have set forth the rules drawn from ,scripture4 ,nevertheless1 though ,i maintain that ,scripture teaches this doctrine1 ,i do not assert that it teaches it as a truth necessary to salvation1 but only that the prophets were in agreement with ourselves on the point2 therefore every one is free to think on the subject as he likes1 according as he thinks it best for himself1 and most likely to conduce to the worship of ,god and to single-hearted religion4 ,,footnotes3 #aj ,from the ,tr4 ,th4-,p41 ch4 vi1 same title4 #aa ,n4,b4 ,i do not mean here by ,nature1 merely matter and its modifications1 but infinite other things besides matter4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,nature ,definitions ,i4 ,by cause of itself1 ,i understand that1 whose essence involves existence2 or that1 whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing4 ,,ii4 ,that thing is called finite in its own kind 7in suo genere7 which can be limited by another thing of the same nature4 ,for example1 a body is called finite1 because we always conceive another which is greater4 ,so a thought is limited by another thought2 but a body is not limited by a thought1 nor a thought by a body4 ,,iii4 ,by substance1 ,i understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself2 in other words1 that1 the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed4 ,,iv4 ,by attribute1 ,i understand that which the intellect perceives of substance1 as constituting its essence4 ,v4 ,by mode1 ,i understand the affections of substance1 or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived4 ,,vi4 ,by ,god1 ,i understand ,being absolutely infinite1 that is to say1 substance consisting of infinite attributes1 each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence4 ,explanation4--,i say absolutely infinite but not infinite in its own kind 7in suo genere72 for of whatever is infinite only in its own kind 7in suo genere71 we can deny infinite attributes2 but to the essence of that which is absolutely infinite pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation4 ,,vii4 ,that thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone1 and is determined to action by itself alone4 ,that thing1 on the other hand1 is called necessary1 or rather compelled1 which by another is determined to existence and action in a fixed and prescribed manner4 ,,viii4 ,by eternity1 ,i understand existence itself1 so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the definition alone of the eternal thing4 ,explanation4--,for such existence1 like the essence of the thing1 is conceived as an eternal truth4 ,it cannot therefore be explained by duration of time1 even if the duration be conceived without beginning or end4 ,axioms ,i4 ,everything which is1 is either in itself or in another4 ,,ii4 ,that which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself4 ,,iii4 ,from a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows2 and1 on the other hand1 if no determinate cause be given1 it is impossible that an effect can follow4 ,,iv4 ,the knowledge 7cognitio7 of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause4 ,v4 ,those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another cannot through one another be mutually understood1 that is to say1 the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other4 ,,vi4 ,a true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea 7cum suo ideato74 ,,vii4 ,the essence of that thing which can be conceived as not existing does not involve existence4 ,the ,essence of ,god ,god1 or substance consisting of infinite attributes1 each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence1 necessarily exists4 ,this can be proved in the following manner3 ,for the existence or non-existence of everything there must be a reason or cause4 ,for example1 if a triangle exists1 there must be a reason or cause why it exists2 and if it does not exist1 there must be a reason or cause which hinders its existence or which negates it4 ,but this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing or lie outside it4 ,for example1 the nature of the thing itself shows the reason why a square circle does not exist1 the reason being that a square circle involves a contradiction4 ,and the reason1 on the other hand1 why substance exists follows from its nature alone1 which involves existence4 ,but the reason why a circle or triangle exists or does not exist is not drawn from their nature1 but from the order of corporeal nature generally2 for from that it must follow either that a triangle necessarily exists1 or that it is impossible for it to exist4 ,but this is self-evident4 ,therefore it follows that if there be no cause nor reason which hinders a thing from existing1 it exists necessarily4 ,if therefore there be no reason nor cause which hinders ,god from existing1 or which negates ,his existence1 we must conclude absolutely that ,he necessarily exists4 ,but if there be such a reason or cause1 it must be either in the nature itself of ,god or must lie outside it1 that is to say1 in another substance of another nature4 ,for if the reason lay in a substance of the same nature1 the existence of ,god would be by this very fact admitted4 ,but substance possessing another nature could have nothing in common with ,god1 and therefore could not give ,him existence nor negate it4 ,since1 therefore1 the reason or cause which could negate the divine existence cannot be outside the divine nature1 it will necessarily1 supposing that the divine nature does not exist1 be in ,his nature itself1 which would therefore involve a contradiction4 ,but to affirm this of the ,being absolutely infinite and consummately perfect is absurd4 ,therefore neither in ,god nor outside ,god is there any cause or reason which can negate ,his existence1 and therefore ,god necessarily exists4444 ,the ,corporeality of ,god ,there are those who imagine ,god to be like a man1 composed of body and soul and subject to passions2 but it is clear enough from what has already been demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from the true knowledge of ,god4 ,but these ,i dismiss1 for all men who have in any way looked into the divine nature deny that ,god is corporeal4 ,that ,he cannot be so they conclusively prove by showing that by body we understand a certain quantity possessing length1 breadth1 and depth1 limited by some fixed form2 and that to attribute these to ,god1 a being absolutely infinite1 is the greatest absurdity4 ,but yet at the same time1 from other arguments by which they endeavor to confirm their proof1 they clearly show that they remove altogether from the divine nature substance itself corporeal or extended1 affirming that it was created by ,god4 ,by what divine power1 however1 it could have been created they are altogether ignorant1 so that it is clear they do not understand what they themselves say4444 ,b _/ _/ _/ ,a ,c ,but ,i will refute my adversaries' arguments1 which1 taken altogether1 come to this4 ,first1 that corporeal substance1 in so far as it is substance1 consists1 as they suppose1 of parts1 and therefore they deny that it can be infinite1 and consequently that it can pertain to ,god4 ,this they illustrate by many examples1 one or two of which ,i will adduce4 ,if corporeal substance1 they say1 be infinite1 let us conceive it to be divided into two parts2 each part1 therefore1 will be either finite or infinite4 ,if each part be finite1 then the infinite is composed of two finite parts1 which is absurd4 ,if each part be infinite1 there is then an infinite twice as great as another infinite1 which is also absurd4 ,again1 if infinite quantity be measured by equal parts of a foot each1 it must contain an infinite number of such parts1 and similarly if it be measured by equal parts of an inch each2 and therefore one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another infinite number4 ,lastly1 if from one point of any infinite quantity it be imagined that two lines1 ,,ab1 ,,ac1 which at first are at a certain and determinate distance from one another1 be infinitely extended1 it is plain that the distance between ,b and ,c will be continually increased1 and at length from being determinate will be indeterminable4 ,since therefore these absurdities follow1 as they think1 from supposing quantity to be infinite1 they conclude that corporeal substance must be finite1 and consequently cannot pertain to the essence of ,god4 ,a second argument is assumed from the absolute perfection of ,god4 ,for ,god1 they say1 since ,he is a being absolutely perfect1 cannot suffer2 but corporeal substance1 since it is divisible1 can suffer3 it follows1 therefore1 that it does not pertain to ,god's essence4 ,these are the arguments which ,i find in authors1 by which they endeavor to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature1 and cannot pertain to it4444 ,if any one will rightly consider the matter1 he will see that all these absurdities 7supposing that they are all absurdities1 a point which ,i will now take for granted71 from which these authors attempt to draw the conclusion that substance extended is finite1 do not by any means follow from the supposition that quantity is infinite1 but from the supposition that infinite quantity is measurable1 and that it is made up of finite parts4 ,therefore1 from the absurdities to which this leads nothing can be concluded1 excepting that infinite quantity is not measurable1 and that it cannot be composed of finite parts4 ,but this is what we maintain4 444 ,the shaft therefore which is aimed at us turns against those who cast it4 ,if1 therefore1 from these absurdities any one should attempt to conclude that substance extended must be finite1 he would1 forsooth1 be in the position of the man who supposes a circle to have the properties of a square1 and then concludes that it has no center1 such that all the lines drawn from it to the circumference are equal4 ,for corporeal substance1 which cannot be conceived except as infinite1 one and indivisible1 is conceived by those against whom ,i argue to be composed of finite parts1 and to be multiplex and divisible1 in order that they may prove it finite4 ,just in the same way others1 after they have imagined a line to consist of points1 know how to discover many arguments1 by which they show that a line cannot be divided ad infinitum2 and indeed it is not less absurd to suppose that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts than to suppose that a body is composed of surfaces1 surfaces of lines1 and that lines1 finally1 are composed of points4 ,every one who knows that clear reason is infallible ought to admit this1 and especially those who deny that a vacuum can exist4 ,for if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts could be really distinct1 why could not one part be annihilated1 the rest remaining1 as before1 connected with one another8 ,and why must all be so fitted together that there can be no vacuum8 ,for of things which are really distinct the one from the other1 one can be and remain in its own position without the other4 ,since therefore it is supposed that there is no vacuum in ,nature 7about which ,i will speak at another time71 but that all the parts must be united1 so that no vacuum can exist1 it follows that they cannot be really separated2 that is to say1 that corporeal substance1 in so far as it is substance1 cannot be divided4 ,if1 nevertheless1 any one should now ask why there is a natural tendency to consider quantity as capable of division1 ,i reply that quantity is conceived by us in two ways3 either abstractly or superficially2 that is to say1 as we imagine it1 or else as substance1 in which way it is conceived by the intellect alone4 ,if1 therefore1 we regard quantity 7as we do very often and easily7 as it exists in the imagination1 we find it to be finite1 divisible1 and composed of parts2 but if we regard it as it exists in the intellect1 and conceive it in so far as it is substance1 which is very difficult1 then1 as we have already sufficiently demonstrated1 we find it to be infinite1 one1 and indivisible4 ,this will be plain enough to all who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect1 and more especially if we remember that matter is everywhere the same1 and that1 except in so far as we regard it as affected in different ways1 parts are not distinguished in it2 that is to say1 they are distinguished with regard to mode1 but not with regard to reality4 ,for example1 we conceive water as being divided1 in so far as it is water1 and that its parts are separated from one another2 but in so far as it is corporeal substance we cannot thus conceive it1 for as such it is neither separated nor divided4 ,moreover1 water1 in so far as it is water1 is originated and destroyed2 but in so far as it is substance1 it is neither originated nor destroyed4 ,by this reasoning ,i think that ,i have also answered the second argument1 since that too is based upon the assumption that matter1 considered as substance1 is divisible and composed of parts4 ,and even if what ,i have urged were not true1 ,i do not know why matter should be unworthy of the divine nature1 since outside ,god no substance can exist from which the divine nature could suffer4 ,all things1 ,i say1 are in ,god1 and everything which takes place by the laws alone of the infinite nature of ,god1 and follows 7as ,i shall presently show7 from the necessity of ,his essence4 ,therefore in no way whatever can it be asserted that ,god suffers from anything1 or that substance extended1 even if it be supposed divisible1 is unworthy of the divine nature1 provided only it be allowed that it is eternal and infinite4444 ,whatever is1 is in ,god1 and nothing can either be or be conceived without ,god4 ,the ,properties of ,god ,i ,from the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers of things in infinite ways 7that is to say1 all things which can be conceived by the infinite intellect7 must follow4 ,this proposition must be plain to every one who considers that from the given definition of anything a number of properties necessarily following from it 7that is to say1 following from the essence of the thing itself7 are inferred by the intellect1 and just in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses a greater reality1 that is to say1 just in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves a greater reality1 will more properties be inferred4 ,but the divine nature possesses absolutely infinite attributes 7,def4 #f71 each one of which expresses infinite essence in its own kind 7in suo genere71 and therefore1 from the necessity of the divine nature1 infinite numbers of things in infinite ways 7that is to say1 all things which can be conceived by the infinite intellect7 must necessarily follow4 ,hence it follows that ,god is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under the infinite intellect4 ,it follows1 secondly1 that ,god is cause through ,himself1 and not through that which is contingent 7per accidens74 ,it follows1 thirdly1 that ,god is absolutely the first cause4 ,,ii ,we have just shown that from the necessity1 or 7which is the same thing7 from the laws only of the divine nature1 infinite numbers of things absolutely follow3 and we have demonstrated that nothing can be1 nor can be conceived1 without ,god1 but that all things are in ,god4 ,therefore1 outside ,himself1 there can be nothing by which ,he may be determined or compelled to act2 and therefore ,he acts from the laws of ,his own nature only1 and is compelled by no one4 ,hence it follows1 firstly1 that there is no cause1 either external to ,god or within ,him1 which can excite ,him to act except the perfection of ,his own nature4 ,it follows1 secondly1 that ,god alone is a free cause2 for ,god alone exists from the necessity alone of ,his own nature and acts from the necessity alone of ,his own nature4 ,therefore ,he alone is a free cause4 ,there are some who think that ,god is a free cause because ,he can1 as they think1 bring about that those things which we have said follow from ,his nature--that is to say1 those things which are in ,his power--should not be1 or should not be produced by ,him4 ,but this is simply saying that ,god could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles should be equal to two right angles1 or that from a given cause an effect should not follow1 which is absurd4 ,but ,i shall show farther on1 without the help of this proposition1 that neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature of ,god4 ,i know indeed that there are many who think themselves able to demonstrate that intellect of the highest order and freedom of will both pertain to the nature of ,god1 for they say that they know nothing more perfect which they can attribute to ,him than that which is the chief perfection in ourselves4 ,but although they conceive ,god as actually possessing the highest intellect1 they nevertheless do not believe that ,he can bring about that all those things should exist which are actually in ,his intellect1 for they think that by such a supposition they would destroy ,his power4 ,if ,he had created1 they say1 all things which are in ,his intellect1 ,he could have created nothing more1 and this1 they believe1 does not accord with ,god's omnipotence2 so then they prefer to consider ,god as indifferent to all things1 and creating nothing except that which ,he has decreed to create by a certain absolute will4 ,but ,i think that ,i have shown with sufficient clearness that from the supreme power of ,god1 or from ,his infinite nature1 infinite things in infinite ways1 that is to say1 all things1 have necessarily flowed1 or continually follow by the same necessity1 in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle1 from eternity and to eternity1 that its three angles are equal to two right angles4 ,the omnipotence of ,god has therefore been actual from eternity1 and in the same actuality will remain to eternity4 ,in this way the omnipotence of ,god1 in my opinion1 is far more firmly established4 ,my adversaries1 indeed 7if ,i may be permitted to speak plainly71 seem to deny the omnipotence of ,god1 inasmuch as they are forced to admit that ,he has in ,his mind an infinite number of things which might be created1 but which1 nevertheless1 ,he will never be able to create1 for if ,he were to create all things which ,he has in ,his mind1 ,he would1 according to them1 exhaust ,his omnipotence and make ,himself imperfect4 ,therefore1 in order to make a perfect ,god1 they are compelled to make ,him incapable of doing all those things to which ,his power extends1 and anything more absurd than this1 or more opposed to ,god's omnipotence1 ,i do not think can be imagined4 ,moreover--to say a word1 too1 here about the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to ,god--if intellect and will pertain to ,his eternal essence1 these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men generally use them1 for the intellect and will which could constitute ,his essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will1 and could resemble ours in nothing except in name4 ,there could be no further likeness than that between the celestial constellation of the ,dog and the animal which barks4 ,this ,i will demonstrate as follows3 ,if intellect pertains to the divine nature1 it cannot1 like our intellect1 follow the things which are its object 7as many suppose71 nor can it be simultaneous in its nature with them1 since ,god is prior to all things in causality2 but1 on the contrary1 the truth and formal essence of things is what it is1 because as such it exists objectively in ,god's intellect4 ,therefore the intellect of ,god1 in so far as it is conceived to constitute ,his essence1 is in truth the cause of things1 both of their essence and of their existence1--a truth which seems to have been understood by those who have maintained that ,god's intellect1 will1 and power are one and the same thing4 ,since1 therefore1 ,god's intellect is the sole cause of things1 both of their essence and of their existence 7as we have already shown71 it must necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and existence2 for an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which it has from its cause4 ,for example1 one man is the cause of the existence but not of the essence of another1 for the essence is an eternal truth2 and therefore with regard to essence the two men may exactly resemble one another1 but with regard to existence they must differ4 ,consequently if the existence of one should perish1 that of the other will not therefore perish2 but if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false1 the essence of the other would be likewise destroyed4 ,therefore a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of any effect must differ from that effect both with regard to its essence and with regard to its existence4 ,but the intellect of ,god is the cause both of the essence and existence of our intellect2 therefore the intellect of ,god1 so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence1 differs from our intellect both with regard to its essence and its existence1 nor can it coincide with our intellect in anything except the name1 which is what we essayed to prove4 ,the same demonstration may be applied to the will1 as any one may easily see for himself4 ,,iii ,all things which are1 are in ,god and must be conceived through ,him and therefore ,he is the cause of the things which are in ,himself4 ,moreover1 outside ,god there can be no substance1 that is to say 7,def4 #c71 outside ,him nothing can exist which is in itself4 ,god1 therefore1 is the immanent1 but not the transitive cause of all things4 ,the ,necessity of ,all ,things ,in nature there is nothing contingent1 but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner4444 ,that which has not been thus determined by ,god cannot determine itself to action4 ,a thing which has been determined by ,god to any action cannot render itself indeterminate4 444 ,all things have necessarily followed from the given nature of ,god and from the necessity of ,his nature have been determined to existence and action in a certain manner4 ,if therefore things could have been of another nature1 or could have been determined in another manner to action1 so that the order of nature would have been different1 the nature of ,god might then be different to that which it now is1 and hence that different nature would necessarily exist1 and there might consequently be two or more ,gods1 which is absurd4 ,therefore things could be produced by ,god in no other manner and in no other order than that in which they have been produced4 ,since ,i have thus shown1 with greater clearness1 than that of noonday light1 that in things there is absolutely nothing by virtue of which they can be called contingent1 ,i wish now to explain in a few words what is to be understood by contingent1 but1 firstly1 what is to be understood by necessary and impossible4 ,a thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its cause4 ,for the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the essence and definition of the thing itself1 or from a given efficient cause4 ,in the same way a thing is said to be impossible either because the essence of the thing itself or its definition involves a contradiction1 or because no external cause exists determinate to the production of such a thing4 ,but a thing cannot be called contingent unless with reference to a deficiency in our knowledge4 ,for if we do not know that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction1 or if we actually know that it involves no contradiction1 and nevertheless we can affirm nothing with certainty about its existence because the order of causes is concealed from us1 that thing can never appear to us either as necessary or impossible1 and therefore we call it either contingent or possible4 ,from what has gone before it clearly follows that things have been produced by ,god in the highest degree of perfection1 since they have necessarily followed from the existence of a most perfect nature4 ,nor does this doctrine accuse ,god of any imperfection1 but1 on the contrary1 ,his perfection has compelled us to affirm it4 ,indeed1 from its contrary would clearly follow1 as ,i have shown above1 that ,god is not absolutely perfect1 since1 if things had been produced in any other fashion1 another nature would have had to be assigned to ,him1 different from that which the consideration of the most perfect ,being compels us to assign to ,him4 ,i do not doubt that many will reject this opinion as ridiculous1 nor will they care to apply themselves to its consideration1 and this from no other reason than that they have been in the habit of assigning to ,god another liberty widely different from that absolute will which 7,def4 #g7 we have taught4 ,on the other hand1 ,i do not doubt1 if they were willing to study the matter and properly to consider the series of our demonstrations1 that they would altogether reject this liberty which they now assign to ,god1 not only as of no value1 but as a great obstacle to knowledge4 ,neither is there any need that ,i should here repeat those things which are said above#ab4 ,but for the sake of those who differ from me1 ,i will here show that although it be granted that will pertains to ,god's essence1 it follows nevertheless from ,his perfection that things could be created in no other mode or order by ,him4 ,this it will be easy to show if we first consider that which my opponents themselves admit1 that it depends upon the decree and will of ,god alone that each thing should be what it is1 for otherwise ,god would not be the cause of all things4 ,it is also admitted that all ,god's decrees were decreed by ,god ,himself from all eternity1 for otherwise imperfection and inconstancy would be proved against ,him4 ,but since in eternity there is no when nor before nor after1 it follows from the perfection of ,god alone that ,he neither can decree nor could ever have decreed anything else than that which ,he has decreed2 that is to say1 ,god has not existed before ,his decrees1 and can never exist without them4 ,but it is said that although it be supposed that ,god had made the nature of things different from that which it is1 or that from eternity ,he had decreed something else about ,nature and her order1 it would not thence follow that any imperfection exists in ,god4 ,but if this be said1 it must at the same time be allowed that ,god can change ,his decrees4 ,for if ,god had decreed something about ,nature and her order other than that which ,he has decreed--that is to say1 if ,he had willed and conceived something else about ,nature--,he would necessarily have had an intellect and a will different from those which ,he now has4 ,and if it be allowed to assign to ,god another intellect and another will without any change of ,his essence and of ,his perfection1 what is the reason why ,he cannot now change ,his decrees about creation and nevertheless remain equally perfect8 ,for ,his intellect and will regarding created things and their order remain the same in relationship to ,his essence and perfection in whatever manner ,his intellect and will are conceived4 ,moreover1 all the philosophers whom ,i have seen admit that there is no such thing as an intellect existing potentially in ,god1 but only an intellect existing actually4 ,but since ,his intellect and ,his will are not distinguishable from ,his essence1 as all admit1 it follows from this also that if ,god had had another intellect actually and another will1 ,his essence would have been necessarily different1 and hence1 as ,i showed at the beginning1 if things had been produced by ,god in a manner different from that in which they now exist1 ,god's intellect and will1 that is to say1 ,his essence 7as has been granted71 must have been different1 which is absurd4 ,since1 therefore1 things could have been produced by ,god in no other manner or order1 this being a truth which follows from ,his absolute perfection1 there is no sound reasoning which can persuade us to believe that ,god was unwilling to create all things which are in ,his intellect with the same perfection as that in which they exist in ,his intellect4 ,but we shall be told that there is no perfection nor imperfection in things1 but that that which is in them by reason of which they are perfect or imperfect and are said to be good or evil depends upon the will of ,god alone1 and therefore if ,god had willed ,he could have effected that that which is now perfection should have been the extreme of imperfection1 and vice versa4 ,but what else would this be than openly to affirm that ,god1 who necessarily understands what ,he wills1 is able by ,his will to understand things in a manner different from that in which ,he understands them1 which1 as ,i have just shown1 is a great absurdity8 ,i can therefore turn the argument on my opponents in this way4 ,all things depend upon the power of ,god4 ,in order that things may be differently constituted1 it would be necessary that ,god's will should be differently constituted2 but ,god's will cannot be other than it is as we have lately most clearly deduced from ,his perfection4 ,things therefore cannot be differently constituted4 ,i confess that this opinion1 which subjects all things to a certain indifferent ,god's will1 and affirms that all things depend upon ,god's good pleasure1 is at a less distance from the truth than the opinion of those who affirm that ,god does everything for the sake of the ,good4 ,for these seem to place something outside of ,god which is independent of ,him1 to which ,he looks while ,he is at work as to a model1 or at which ,he aims as if at a certain mark4 ,this is indeed nothing else than to subject ,god to fate1 the most absurd thing which can be affirmed of ,him whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things as well as of their existence4 ,therefore it is not worth while that ,i should waste time in refuting this absurdity4 ,before ,i go any farther1 ,i wish here to explain or rather to recall to recollection1 what we mean by natura naturans and what by natura naturata4 ,for1 from what has gone before1 ,i think it is plain that by natura naturans we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself1 or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence1 that is to say1 ,god in so far as ,he is considered as a free cause4 ,but by natura naturata ,i understand everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of ,god1 or of any one of ,god's attributes1 that is to say1 all the modes of ,god's attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in ,god1 and which without ,god can neither be nor can be conceived4 444 ,individual things are nothing but affections or modes of ,god's attributes1 expressing those attributes in a certain and determinate manner4 ,general ,conclusions ,i have now explained the nature of ,god and its properties4 ,i have shown that ,he necessarily exists2 that ,he is one ,god2 that from the necessity alone of ,his own nature ,he is and acts2 that ,he is1 and in what way ,he is1 the free cause of all things2 that all things are in ,him1 and so depend upon ,him that without ,him they can neither be nor can be conceived2 and1 finally1 that all things have been predetermined by ,him1 not indeed from freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure1 but from ,his absolute nature or infinite power4 ,moreover1 wherever an opportunity was afforded1 ,i have endeavored to remove prejudices which might hinder the perception of the truth of what ,i have demonstrated2 but because not a few still remain which have been and are now sufficient to prove a very great hindrance to the comprehension of the connection of things in the manner in which ,i have explained it1 ,i have thought it worth while to call them up to be examined by reason4 ,but all these prejudices which ,i here undertake to point out depend upon this solely3 that it is commonly supposed that all things in ,nature1 like men1 work to some end2 and indeed it is thought to be certain that ,god ,himself directs all things to some sure end1 for it is said that ,god has made all things for man1 and man that he may worship ,god4 ,this1 therefore1 ,i will first investigate by inquiring1 firstly1 why so many rest in this prejudice1 and why all are so naturally inclined to embrace it8 ,i shall then show its falsity1 and1 finally1 the manner in which there have arisen from it prejudices concerning good and evil1 merit and sin1 praise and blame1 order and disorder1 beauty and deformity1 and so forth4 ,this1 however1 is not the place to deduce these things from the nature of the human mind4 ,it will be sufficient if ,i here take as an axiom that which no one ought to dispute1 namely1 that man is born ignorant of the causes of things1 and that he has a desire1 of which he is conscious1 to seek that which is profitable to him4 ,from this it follows1 firstly1 that he thinks himself free because he is conscious of his wishes and appetites1 whilst at the same time he is ignorant of the causes by which he is led to wish and desire1 not dreaming what they are2 and1 secondly1 it follows that man does everything for an end1 namely1 for that which is profitable to him1 which is what he seeks4 ,hence it happens that he attempts to discover merely the final causes of that which has happened2 and when he has heard them he is satisfied1 because there is no longer any cause for further uncertainty4 ,but if he cannot hear from another what these final causes are1 nothing remains but to turn to himself and reflect upon the ends which usually determine him to the like actions1 and thus by his own mind he necessarily judges that of another4 ,moreover1 since he discovers1 both within and without himself a multitude of means which contribute not a little to the attainment of what is profitable to himself--for example1 the eyes1 which are useful for seeing1 the teeth for mastication1 plants and animals for nourishment1 the sun for giving light1 the sea for feeding fish1 etc4--it comes to pass that all natural objects are considered as means for obtaining what is profitable4 ,these too being evidently discovered and not created by man1 hence he has a cause for believing that some other person exists1 who has prepared them for man's use4 ,for having considered them as means it was impossible to believe that they had created themselves1 and so he was obliged to infer from the means which he was in the habit of providing for himself that some ruler or rulers of ,nature exist1 endowed with human liberty1 who have taken care of all things for him1 and have made all things for his use4 ,since he never heard anything about the mind of these rulers1 he was compelled to judge of it from his own1 and hence he affirmed that the gods direct everything for his advantage1 in order that he may be bound to them and hold them in the highest honor4 ,this is the reason why each man has devised for himself1 out of his own brain1 a different mode of worshiping ,god1 so that ,god might love him above others1 and direct all ,nature to the service of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice4 ,thus has this prejudice been turned into a superstition and has driven deep roots into the mind--a prejudice which was the reason why every one has so eagerly tried to discover and explain the final causes of things4 ,the attempt1 however1 to show that ,nature does nothing in vain 7that is to say1 nothing which is not profitable to man71 seems to end in showing that ,nature1 the gods1 and man are alike mad4 ,do but see1 ,i pray1 to what all this has led4 ,amidst so much in ,nature that is beneficial1 not a few things must have been observed which are injurious1 such as storms1 earthquakes1 diseases1 and it was affirmed that these things happened either because the gods were angry because of wrongs which had been inflicted on them by man1 or because of sins committed in the method of worshiping them2 and although experience daily contradicted this1 and showed by an infinity of examples that both the beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed on the pious and the impious1 the inveterate prejudices on this point have not therefore been abandoned4 ,for it was much easier for a man to place these things aside with others of the use of which he was ignorant1 and thus retain his present and inborn state of ignorance1 than to destroy the whole superstructure and think out a new one4 ,hence it was looked upon as indisputable that the judgments of the gods far surpass our comprehension2 and this opinion alone would have been sufficient to keep the human race in darkness to all eternity1 if mathematics1 which does not deal with ends1 but with the essences and properties of forms1 had not placed before us another rule of truth4 ,in addition to mathematics1 other causes also might be assigned1 which it is superfluous here to enumerate1 tending to make men reflect upon these universal prejudices1 and leading them to a true knowledge of things4 ,i have thus sufficiently explained what ,i promised in the first place to explain4 ,there will now be no need of many words to show that ,nature has set no end before herself1 and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions4 ,for ,i believe that this is sufficiently evident both from the foundations and causes of this prejudice1 as well as from all those propositions in which ,i have shown that all things are begotten by a certain eternal necessity of ,nature and in absolute perfection4 ,thus much1 nevertheless1 ,i will add1 that this doctrine concerning an end altogether overturns nature4 ,for that which is in truth the cause it considers as the effect1 and vice versa4 ,again1 that which is first in ,nature it puts last2 and1 finally1 that which is supreme and most perfect it makes the most imperfect4 ,for1 passing by the first two assertions as self-evident1 it is plain that that effect is the most perfect which is immediately produced by ,god1 and in proportion as intermediate causes are necessary for the production of a thing is it imperfect4 ,but if things which are immediately produced by ,god were made in order that ,he might obtain the end ,he had in view1 then the last things for the sake of which the first exist1 must be the most perfect of all4 ,again1 this doctrine does away with ,god's perfection4 ,for if ,god works to obtain an end1 ,he necessarily seeks something of which he stands in need4 ,and although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between the end of want and the end of assimilation 7finem indigenti et finem assimilationis71 they confess that ,god has done all things for ,his own sake1 and not for the sake of the things to be created1 because before the creation they can assign nothing excepting ,god for the sake of which ,god could do anything2 and therefore they are necessarily compelled to admit that ,god stood in need of and desired those things for which ,he determined to prepare means4 ,this is self-evident4 ,nor is it here to be overlooked that the adherents of this doctrine1 who have found a pleasure in displaying their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things1 have introduced a new species of argument1 not the reductio ad impossible1 but the reductio ad ignorantiam1 to prove their position1 which shows that it had no other method of defense left4 ,for1 by way of example1 if a stone had fallen from some roof on somebody's head and killed him1 they will demonstrate in this manner that the stone has fallen in order to kill the man4 ,for if it did not fall for that purpose by the will of ,god1 how could so many circumstances concur through chance 7and a number often simultaneously do concur78 ,you will answer1 perhaps1 that the event happened because the wind blew and the man was passing that way4 ,but1 they will urge1 why did the wind blow at that time1 and why did the man pass that way precisely at the same moment8 ,if you again reply that the wind rose then because the sea on the preceding day began to be stormy1 the weather hitherto having been calm1 and that the man had been invited by a friend1 they will urge again--because there is no end of questioning--,but why was the sea agitated8 why was the man invited at that time8 ,and so they will not cease from asking the causes of causes1 until at last you fly to the will of ,god1 the refuge for ignorance4 ,so1 also1 when they behold the structure of the human body1 they are amazed2 and because they are ignorant of the causes of such art1 they conclude that the body was made not by mechanical but by a supernatural or divine art1 and has been formed in such a way so that the one part may not injure the other4 ,hence it happens that the man who endeavors to find out the true causes of miracles1 and who desires as a wise man to understand ,nature1 and not to gape at it like a fool1 is generally considered and proclaimed to be a heretic and impious by those whom the vulgar worship as the interpreters both of ,nature and the gods4 ,for these know that if ignorance be removed1 amazed stupidity1 the sole ground on which they rely in arguing or in defending their authority1 is taken away also4 ,but these things ,i leave and pass on to that which ,i determined to do in the third place4 ,after man has persuaded himself that all things which exist are made for him1 he must in everything adjudge that to be of the greatest importance which is most useful to him1 and he must esteem that to be of surpassing worth by which he is most beneficially affected4 ,in this way he is compelled to form those notions by which he explains ,nature2 such1 for instance1 as good1 evil1 order1 confusion1 heat1 cold1 beauty1 and deformity1 etc42 and because he supposes himself to be free1 notions like those of praise and blame1 sin and merit1 have arisen4 ,these latter ,i shall hereafter explain when ,i have treated of human nature2 the former ,i will here briefly unfold4 ,it is to be observed that man has given the name good to everything which leads to health and the worship of ,god2 on the contrary1 everything which does not lead thereto he calls evil4 ,but because those who do not understand ,nature affirm nothing about things themselves1 but only imagine them1 and take the imagination to be understanding1 they therefore1 ignorant of things and their nature1 firmly believe an order to be in things2 for when things are so placed that if they are represented to us through the senses1 we can easily imagine them1 and consequently easily remember them1 we call them well arranged2 but if they are not placed so that we can imagine and remember them1 we call them badly arranged or confused4 ,moreover1 since those things are more especially pleasing to us which we can easily imagine1 men therefore prefer order to confusion1 as if order were something in ,nature apart from our own imagination2 and they say that ,god has created everything in order1 and in this manner they ignorantly attribute imagination to ,god1 unless they mean perhaps that ,god1 out of consideration for the human imagination1 has disposed things in the manner in which they can most easily be imagined4 ,no hesitation either seems to be caused by the fact that an infinite number of things are discovered which far surpass our imagination1 and very many which confound it through its weakness4 ,but enough of this4 ,the other notions which ,i have mentioned are nothing but modes in which the imagination is affected in different ways1 and nevertheless they are regarded by the ignorant as being specially attributes of things1 because1 as we have remarked1 men consider all things as made for themselves1 and call the nature of a thing good1 evil1 sound1 putrid1 or corrupt1 just as they are affected by it4 ,for example1 if the motion by which the nerves are affected by means of objects represented to the eye conduces to well-being1 the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful2 while those exciting a contrary motion are called deformed4 ,those things1 too1 which stimulate the senses through the nostrils are called sweet-smelling or stinking2 those which act through the taste are called sweet or bitter1 full-flavored or insipid2 those which act through the touch1 hard or soft1 heavy or light2 those1 lastly1 which act through the ears are said to make a noise1 sound1 or harmony1 the last having caused men to lose their senses to such a degree that they have believed that ,god even is delighted with it4 ,indeed1 philosophers may be found who have persuaded themselves that the celestial motions beget a harmony4 ,all these things sufficiently show that every one judges things by the constitution of his brain1 or rather accepts the affections of his imagination in the place of things4#ac ,it is not1 therefore1 to be wondered at1 as we may observe in passing1 that all those controversies which we see have arisen amongst men1 so that at last skepticism has been the result4 ,for although human bodies agree in many things1 they differ in more1 and therefore that which to one person is good will appear to another evil1 that which to one is well arranged to another is confused1 that which pleases one will displease another1 and so on in other cases which ,i pass by both because we cannot notice them at length here1 and because they are within the experience of every one4 ,for every one has heard the expressions3 ,so many heads1 so many ways of thinking2 ,every one is satisfied with his own way of thinking2 ,differences of brains are not less common than differences of taste2--all which maxims show that men decide upon matters according to the constitution of their brains1 and imagine rather than understand things4 ,if men understood things1 they would1 as mathematics prove1 at least be all alike convinced if they were not all alike attracted4 ,we see1 therefore1 that all those methods by which the common people are in the habit of explaining ,nature are only different sorts of imaginations1 and do not reveal the nature of anything in itself1 but only the constitution of the imagination2 and because they have names as if they were entities existing apart from the imagination1 ,i call them entities not of the reason but of the imagination4 ,all argument therefore1 urged against us based upon such notions can be easily refuted4 ,many people1 for instance1 are accustomed to argue thus3--,if all things have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of ,god1 how is it that so many imperfections have arisen in ,nature--corruption1 for instance1 of things till they stink2 deformity1 exciting disgust2 confusion1 evil1 crime1 etc48 ,but1 as ,i have just observed1 all this is easily answered4 ,for the perfection of things is to be judged by their nature and power alone2 nor are they more or less perfect because they delight or offend the human senses1 or because they are beneficial or prejudicial to human nature4 ,but to those who ask why ,god has not created all men in such a manner that they might be controlled by the dictates of reason alone1 ,i give but this answer3 ,because to ,him material was not wanting for the creation of everything1 from the highest down to the very lowest grade of perfection2 or1 to speak more properly1 because the laws of ,his nature were so ample that they sufficed for the production of everything which can be conceived by an infinite intellect1 as ,i have demonstrated4 ,these are the prejudices which ,i undertook to notice here4 ,if any others of a similar character remain1 they can easily be rectified with a little thought by any one4 ,,footnotes3 #ab ,pp4 #acb-ace4 #ac ,beauty1 my dear ,sir1 is not so much a quality of the object beheld1 as an effect in him who beholds it4 ,if our sight were longer or shorter1 or1 if our constitution were different1 what now appears beautiful to us would seem misshapen and what we now think misshapen we should regard as beautiful4 ,the most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible4 ,some things are beautiful at a distance1 but ugly near2 thus things regarded in themselves1 and in relation to ,god1 are neither ugly nor beautiful4 ,therefore1 he who says that ,god has created the world so that it might be beautiful is bound to adopt one of the two alternatives3 either that ,god created the world for the sake of men's pleasure and eyesight1 or else that ,he created men's pleasure and eyesight for the sake of the world4 ,from a letter to ,hugo ,boxel 7#afgd74 ,,second ,,part ,,on ,,man ,the more things the mind knows1 the better it understands its own powers and the order of ,nature4 ,the better it understands its own powers1 so much the more easily can it direct itself and propose rules to itself4 ,the better1 also1 it understands the order of ,nature1 the more easily can it restrain itself from what is useless4 ,,spinoza4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind ,introductory ,i pass on now to explain those things which must necessarily follow from the essence of ,god or the ,being eternal and infinite2 not indeed to explain all these things1 for we have demonstrated that an infinitude of things must follow in an infinite number of ways1--but to consider those things only which may conduct us1 as it were1 by the hand to a knowledge of the human mind and its highest happiness4 ,definitions ,i4 ,by body1 ,i understand a mode which expresses in a certain and determinate manner the essence of ,god in so far as ,he is considered as the thing extended4 ,,ii4 ,i say that to the essence of anything pertains that1 which being given1 the thing itself is necessarily posited1 and being taken away1 the thing is necessarily taken2 or1 in other words1 that1 without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived1 and which in its turn cannot be nor be conceived without the thing4 ,,iii4 ,by idea1 ,i understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing4 ,explanation4--,i use the word conception rather than perception because the name perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in its relation to the object4 ,but the word conception seems to express the action of the mind4 ,,iv4 ,by adequate idea1 ,i understand an idea which1 in so far as it is considered in itself1 without reference to the object1 has all the properties or internal signs 7denominationes intrinsecas7 of a true idea4 ,explanation4--,i say internal1 so as to exclude that which is external1 the agreement1 namely1 of the idea with its object4 ,v4 ,duration is the indefinite continuation of existence4 ,explanation4--,i call it indefinite because it cannot be determined by the nature itself of the existing thing nor by the efficient cause1 which necessarily posits the existence of the thing but does not take it away4 ,,vi4 ,by reality and perfection ,i understand the same thing4 ,,vii4 ,by individual things ,i understand things which are finite and which have a determinate existence2 and if a number of individuals so unite in one action that they are all simultaneously the cause of one effect1 ,i consider them all1 so far1 as one individual thing4 ,axioms ,i4 ,the essence of man does not involve necessary existence2 that is to say1 the existence as well as the non-existence of this or that man may or may not follow from the order of ,nature4 ,,ii4 ,man thinks4 ,,iii4 ,modes of thought1 such as love1 desire1 or the emotions of the mind1 by whatever name they may be called1 do not exist1 unless in the same individual the idea exist of a thing loved1 desired1 etc4 ,but the idea may exist although no other mode of thinking exist4 ,,iv4 ,we perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways4 ,v4 ,no individual things are felt or perceived by us excepting bodies and modes of thought4 ,the ,mind of ,god ,individual thoughts1 or this and that thought1 are modes which express the nature of ,god in a certain and determinate manner4 ,god therefore possesses an attribute1 the conception of which is involved in all individual thoughts1 and through which they are conceived4 ,thought1 therefore1 is one of the infinite attributes of ,god which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of ,god or1 in other words1 ,god is a thinking thing4 ,this proposition is plain from the fact that we can conceive an infinite thinking ,being4 ,for the more things a thinking being can think1 the more reality or perfection we conceive it to possess1 and therefore the being which can think an infinitude of things in infinite ways is necessarily infinite by his power of thinking4 ,since1 therefore1 we can conceive an infinite ,being by attending to thought alone1 thought is necessarily one of the infinite attributes of ,god4#ad ,god can think an infinitude of things in infinite ways1 or 7which is the same thing7 can form an idea of ,his essence and of all the things which necessarily follow from it4 ,but everything which is in the power of ,god is necessary4 ,therefore in ,god there necessarily exists the idea of ,his essence1 and of all things which necessarily follow from ,his essence4 ,the infinite intellect comprehends nothing but the attributes of ,god and ,his modes4 ,but ,god is one4 ,therefore the idea of ,god1 from which infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways1 can be one only4 ,the common people understand by ,god's power ,his free will and right over all existing things1 which are therefore commonly looked upon as contingent2 for they say that ,god has the power of destroying everything and reducing it to nothing4 ,they very frequently1 too1 compare ,god's power with the power of kings4 ,that there is any similarity between the two we have disproved4 ,we have shown that ,god does everything with that necessity with which ,he understands ,himself2 that is to say1 as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature that ,god understands ,himself 7a truth admitted by all71 so by the same necessity it follows that ,god does an infinitude of things in infinite ways4 ,moreover1 we have shown that the power of ,god is nothing but the active essence of ,god1 and therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive that ,god does not act as that ,he does not exist4 ,if it pleased me to go farther1 ,i could show besides that the power which the common people ascribe to ,god is not only a human power 7which shows that they look upon ,god as a man1 or as being like a man71 but that it also involves weakness4 ,but ,i do not care to talk so much upon the same subject4 ,again and again ,i ask the reader to consider and reconsider what is said upon this subject above4#ae ,for it is not possible for any one properly to understand the things which ,i wish to prove unless he takes great care not to confound the power of ,god with the human power and right of kings4 ,the ,order and ,dependence of ,ideas in ,god ,the formal ,being of ideas is a mode of thought 7as is self-evident72 that is to say1 a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of ,god in so far as ,he is a thinking thing4 ,it is a mode1 therefore1 that involves the conception of no other attribute of ,god1 and consequently is the effect of no other attribute except that of thought2 therefore the formal ,being of ideas recognizes ,god for its cause in so far only as ,he is considered as a thinking thing1 and not in so far as ,he is manifested by any other attribute2 that is to say1 the ideas both of ,god's attributes and of individual things do not recognize as their efficient cause the objects of the ideas or the things which are perceived1 but ,god ,himself in so far as ,he is a thinking thing4#af ,god's power of thinking is equal to ,his actual power of acting2 that is to say1 whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of ,god1 follows from the idea of ,god 7idea ,dei71 in the same order and in the same connection objectively in ,god4 ,the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things4 ,before we go any farther1 we must here recall to our memory what we have already demonstrated1 that everything which can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance pertains entirely to the one sole substance only1 and consequently that substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance1 which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that4 ,thus1 also1 a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways--a truth which some of the ,hebrews appear to have seen as if through a cloud1 since they say that ,god1 the intellect of ,god1 and the things which are the objects of that intellect are one and the same thing4 ,for example1 the circle existing in nature and the idea that is in ,god of an existing circle are one and the same thing1 which is manifested through different attributes2 and1 therefore1 whether we think of ,nature under the attribute of extension1 or under the attribute of thought1 or under any other attribute whatever1 we shall discover one and the same order1 or one and the same connection of causes2 that is to say1 in every case the same sequence of things4 ,nor have ,i had any other reason for saying that ,god is the cause of the idea1 for example1 of the circle in so far only as ,he is a thinking thing1 and of the circle itself in so far as ,he is an extended thing1 but this1 that the formal ,being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived through another mode of thought1 as its proximate cause1 and this again must be perceived through another1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,so that when things are considered as modes of thought1 we must explain the order of the whole of ,nature or the connection of causes by the attribute of thought alone1 and when things are considered as modes of extension1 the order of the whole of ,nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone1 and so with other attributes4 ,therefore ,god is in truth the cause of things as they are in themselves in so far as ,he consists of infinite attributes1 nor for the present can ,i explain the matter more clearly4 ,the ,origin of the ,human ,mind ,the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of ,god1 and therefore1 when we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing1 we say nothing else than that ,god has this or that idea2 not indeed in so far as ,he is infinite1 but in so far as ,he is manifested through the nature of the human mind1 or in so far as ,he forms the essence of the human mind2 and when we say that ,god has this or that idea1 not merely in so far as ,he forms the nature of the human mind1 but in so far as ,he has at the same time with the human mind the idea also of another thing1 then we say that the human mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately4 444 ,when you ask me my opinion on the question#ag raised concerning our knowledge of the means1 whereby each part of ,nature agrees with its whole1 and the manner in which it is associated with the remaining parts1 ,i presume you are asking for the reasons which induce us to believe that each part of ,nature agrees with its whole1 and is associated with the remaining parts4 ,for as to the means whereby the parts are really associated1 and each part agrees with its whole1 ,i told you in my former letter that ,i am in ignorance4 ,to answer such a question we should have to know the whole of ,nature and its several parts4 ,i will therefore endeavor to show the reason which led me to make the statement2 but ,i will promise that ,i do not attribute to ,nature either beauty or deformity1 order or confusion4 ,only in relation to our imagination can things be called beautiful or deformed1 ordered or confused4 ,by the association of parts1 then1 ,i merely mean that the laws or nature of one part adapt themselves to the laws or nature of another part1 so as to cause the least possible inconsistency4 ,as to the whole and the parts1 ,i mean that a given number of things are parts of a whole1 in so far as the nature of each of them is adapted to the nature of the rest so that they all1 as far as possible1 agree together4 ,on the other hand1 in so far as they do not agree1 each of them forms1 in our minds1 a separate idea1 and is to that extent considered as a whole1 not as a part4 ,for instance1 when the parts of lymph1 chyle1 etc41 combine1 according to the proportion of the figure and size of each1 so as to evidently unite1 and form one fluid1 the chyle1 lymph1 etc41 considered under this aspect1 are part of the blood2 but1 in so far as we consider the particles of lymph as differing in figure and size from the particles of chyle1 we shall consider each of the two as a whole1 not as a part4 ,let us imagine1 with your permission1 a little worm1 living in the blood1 able to distinguish by sight the particles of blood1 lymph1 etc41 and to reflect on the manner in which each particle1 on meeting with another particle1 either is repulsed1 or communicates a portion of its own motion4 ,this little worm would live in the blood in the same way as we live in a part of the universe1 and would consider each particle of blood1 not as a part1 but as a whole4 ,he would be unable to determine how all the parts are modified by the general nature of blood1 and are compelled by it to adapt themselves so as to stand in a fixed relation to one another4 ,for if we imagine that there are no causes external to the blood1 which could communicate fresh movements to it1 nor any space beyond the blood1 nor any bodies whereto the particles of blood could communicate their motion1 it is certain that the blood would always remain in the same state1 and its particles would undergo no modifications1 save those which may be conceived as arising from the relations of motion existing between the lymph1 the chyle1 etc4 ,the blood would then always have to be considered as a whole1 not as a part4 ,but as there exist1 as a matter of fact1 very many causes which modify1 in a given manner1 the nature of blood1 and are1 in turn1 modified thereby1 it follows that other motions and other relations arise in the blood1 springing not from the mutual relations of its parts only1 but from the mutual relations between the blood as a whole and external causes4 ,thus the blood comes to be regarded as a part1 not as a whole4 ,so much for the whole and the part4 ,all natural bodies can and ought to be considered in the same way as we have here considered the blood1 for all bodies are surrounded by others1 and are mutually determined to exist and operate in a fixed and definite proportion1 while the relations between motion and rest in the sum total of them1 that is1 in the whole universe1 remain unchanged4 ,hence it follows that each body1 in so far as it exists as modified in a particular manner1 must be considered as a part of the whole universe1 as agreeing with the whole1 and associated with the remaining parts4 ,as the nature of the universe is not limited1 like the nature of blood1 but is absolutely infinite1 its parts are by this nature of infinite power infinitely modified1 and compelled to undergo infinite variations4444 ,you see1 therefore1 how and why ,i think that the human body is a part of ,nature4 ,as regards the human mind1 ,i believe that it also is a part of ,nature2 for ,i maintain that there exists in ,nature an infinite power of thinking1 which1 in so far as it is infinite1 contains subjectively the whole of ,nature1 and its thoughts proceed in the same manner as ,nature--that is1 in the sphere of ideas4 ,further1 ,i take the human mind to be identical with this said power1 not in so far as it is infinite1 and perceives the whole of ,nature1 but in so far as it is finite1 and perceives only the human body4 ,in this manner1 ,i maintain that the human mind is part of an infinite understanding4 ,the ,nature of the ,human ,mind ,the essence of man is formed by certain modes of the attributes of ,god1 that is to say1 modes of thought1 the idea of all of them being prior by nature to the modes of thought themselves2 and if this idea exists1 other modes 7which also have an idea in nature prior to them7 must exist in the same individual likewise4 ,therefore an idea is the first thing which forms the ,being of the human mind4 ,but it is not the idea of a non-existent thing1 for then the idea itself could not be said to exist4 ,it will therefore be the idea of something actually existing4 ,neither will it be the idea of an infinite thing1 for an infinite thing must always necessarily exist1 and this is absurd4 ,therefore the first thing which forms the actual ,being of the human mind is the idea of an individual thing actually existing4 ,the knowledge of everything which happens in the object of any idea necessarily exists in ,god1 in so far as ,he is considered as modified by the idea of that object2 that is to say1 in so far as ,he forms the mind of any being4 ,the knowledge1 therefore1 necessarily exists in ,god of everything which happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind2 that is to say1 it exists in ,him in so far as ,he forms the nature of the human mind2 or1 whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind2 in other words1 an idea of that thing will necessarily exist in the human mind4 ,that is to say1 if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body1 nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind4 ,if the body were not the object of the human mind1 the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in ,god1 in so far as ,he has formed our mind1 but would be in ,him in so far as ,he has formed the mind of another thing2 that is to say1 the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind4 ,but we have ideas of the modifications of a body2 therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body1 and that1 too1 actually existing4 ,again1 if there were also any other object of the mind besides a body1 since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow1 the idea of some effort produced by this object would necessarily exist in our mind4 ,but there is no such idea4 ,therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body1 or a certain mode of extension actually existing1 and nothing else4 ,hence it follows that man is composed of mind and body1 and that the human body exists as we perceive it4 ,hence we see not only that the human mind is united to the body1 but also what is to be understood by the union of the mind and body4 ,but no one can understand it adequately or distinctly without knowing adequately beforehand the nature of our body2 for those things which we have proved hitherto are altogether general1 nor do they refer more to man than to other individuals1 all of which are animate1 although in different degrees4 ,for of everything there necessarily exists in ,god an idea of which ,he is the cause1 in the same way as the idea of the human body exists in ,him2 and therefore everything that we have said of the idea of the human body is necessarily true of the idea of any other thing4 ,we cannot1 however1 deny that ideas1 like objects themselves1 differ from one another1 and that one is more excellent and contains more reality than another1 just as the object of one idea is more excellent and contains more reality than another4 ,therefore1 in order to determine the differences between the human mind and other things and its superiority over them1 we must first know1 as we have said1 the nature of its object1 that is to say1 the nature of the human body4 ,i am not able to explain it here1 nor is such an explanation necessary for what ,i wish to demonstrate4 ,this much1 nevertheless1 ,i will say generally1 that in proportion as one body is better adapted than another to do or suffer many things1 in the same proportion will the mind at the same time be better adapted to perceive many things1 and the more the actions of a body depend upon itself alone1 and the less other bodies coperate with it in action1 the better adapted will the mind be for distinctly understanding4 ,we can thus determine the superiority of one mind to another2 we can also see the reason why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body1 together with many other things which ,i shall deduce in what follows4 ,the ,complexity of the ,human ,mind ,the idea which constitutes the formal ,being of the human mind is the idea of a body which is composed of a number of individuals composite to a high degree4 ,but an idea of each individual composing the body must necessarily exist in ,god2 therefore the idea of the human body is composed of these several ideas of the component parts4 ,the idea which constitutes the formal ,being of the human mind is not simple1 but is composed of a number of ideas4 ,all ways in which any body is affected follow at the same time from the nature of the affected body1 and from the nature of the affecting body2 therefore the idea of these modifications necessarily involves the nature of each body1 and therefore the idea of each way in which the human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human body and of the external body4 ,hence it follows1 in the first place1 that the human mind perceives the nature of many bodies together with that of its own body4 ,it follows1 secondly1 that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of external bodies4 ,imagination ,if the human body be affected in a way which involves the nature of any external body1 the human mind will contemplate that external body as actually existing or as present1 until the human body be affected by a mode which excludes the existence or presence of the external body4 ,when external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that they often strike upon the softer parts1 the fluid parts change the plane of the soft parts1 and thence it happens that the fluid parts are reflected from the new planes in a direction different from that in which they used to be reflected1 and that also afterwards when they strike against these new planes by their own spontaneous motion1 they are reflected in the same way as when they were impelled towards those planes by external bodies4 ,consequently those fluid bodies produce a modification in the human body while they keep up this reflex motion similar to that produced by the presence of an external body4 ,the mind1 therefore1 will think as before1 that is to say1 it will again contemplate the external body as present4 ,this will happen as often as the fluid parts of the human body strike against those planes by their own spontaneous motion4 ,therefore1 although the external bodies by which the human body was once affected do not exist the mind will perceive them as if they were present so often as this action is repeated in the body4 ,we see1 therefore1 how it is possible for us to contemplate things which do not exist as if they were actually present4 ,this may indeed be produced by other causes1 but ,i am satisfied with having here shown one cause through which ,i could explain it1 just as if ,i had explained it through the true cause4 ,i do not think1 however1 that ,i am far from the truth1 since no postulate which ,i have assumed contains anything which is not confirmed by an experience that we cannot mistrust1 after we have proved the existence of the human body as we perceive it4 ,we clearly see1 moreover1 what is the difference between the idea1 for example1 of ,peter1 which constitutes the essence of the mind itself of ,peter1 and the idea of ,peter himself which is in another man2 for example1 in ,paul4 ,for the former directly manifests the essence of the body of ,peter himself1 nor does it involve existence unless so long as ,peter exists2 the latter1 on the other hand1 indicates rather the constitution of the body of ,paul than the nature of ,peter2 and therefore so long as ,paul's body exists with that constitution1 so long will ,paul's mind contemplate ,peter as present1 although he does not exist4 ,but in order that we may retain the customary phraseology1 we will give to those modifications of the human body1 the ideas of which represent to us external bodies as if they were present1 the name of images of things1 although they do not actually reproduce the forms of the things4 ,when the mind contemplates bodies in this way1 we will say that it imagines4 ,here ,i wish it to be observed1 in order that ,i may begin to show what error is1 that these imaginations of the mind1 regarded by themselves1 contain no error1 and that the mind is not in error because it imagines1 but only in so far as it is considered as wanting in an idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines as present4 ,for if the mind1 when it imagines non-existent things to be present1 could at the same time know that those things did not really exist1 it would think its power of imagination to be a virtue of its nature and not a defect1 especially if this faculty of imagining depended upon its own nature alone1 that is to say1 if this faculty of the mind were free4 ,association of ,ideas and ,memory ,if the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two or more bodies1 whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them1 it will also remember the others4 ,we clearly understand by this what memory is4 ,it is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas1 involving the nature of things which are outside the human body1 a concatenation which corresponds in the mind to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body4 ,i say1 firstly1 that it is a concatenation of those ideas only which involve the nature of things which are outside the human body1 and not of those ideas which explain the nature of those things1 for there are in truth ideas of the modifications of the human body1 which involve its nature as well as the nature of external bodies4 ,i say1 in the second place1 that this concatenation takes place according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body1 that ,i may distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas which takes place according to the order of the intellect1 and enables the mind to perceive things through their first causes1 and is the same in all men4 ,hence we can clearly understand how it is that the mind from the thought of one thing at once turns to the thought of another thing which is not in any way like the first4 ,for example1 from the thought of the word pomum a ,roman immediately turned to the thought of the fruit1 which has no resemblance to the articulate sound pomum1 nor anything in common with it1 excepting this1 that the body of that man was often affected by the thing and the sound2 that is to say1 he often heard the word pomum when he saw the fruit4 ,in this manner each person will turn from one thought to another according to the manner in which the habit of each has arranged the images of things in the body4 ,the soldier1 for instance1 if he sees the footsteps of a horse in the sand1 will immediately turn from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman1 and so to the thought of war4 ,the countryman1 on the other hand1 from the thought of a horse will turn to the thought of his plow1 his field1 etc42 and thus each person will turn from one thought to this or that thought1 according to the manner in which he has been accustomed to connect and bind together the images of things in his mind4 ,,footnotes3 #ad ,similarly1 it can be demonstrated that extension is an attribute of ,god1 or ,god is an extended thing4 #ae ,chapter ,eight4 #af ,the formal ,being of things which are not modes of thought does not follow from the divine nature because of ,his prior knowledge of these things1 but1 just as ideas follow from the attribute of thought1 in the same manner and with the same necessity the objects of ideas follow and are concluded from their attributes4 #ag ,from a letter to ,henry ,oldenburg 7#affe74 ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,extent ,,of ,,human ,,knowledge ,of ,truth ,all the ideas which are in ,god always agree with those things of which they are the ideas4 ,therefore1 all ideas1 in so far as they are related to ,god1 are true4 ,a true idea#ah 7for we possess a true idea7 is something different from its correlate 7ideatum72 thus a circle is different from the idea of a circle4 ,the idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a center1 as a circle has2 nor is the idea of a body that body itself4 ,now1 as it is something different from its correlate1 it is capable of being understood through itself2 in other words1 the idea1 in so far as its actual essence 7essentia formalis7 is concerned1 may be the subject of another subjective essence4 ,and1 again1 this second subjective essence will1 regarded in itself1 be something real and capable of being understood2 and so on indefinitely4 ,for instance1 the man ,peter is something real2 the true idea of ,peter is the reality of ,peter represented subjectively1 and is in itself something real1 and quite distinct from the actual ,peter4 ,now1 as this true idea of ,peter is in itself something real1 and has its own individual existence1 it will also be capable of being understood--that is1 of being the subject of another idea which will contain by representation all that the idea of ,peter contains actually4 ,and1 again1 this idea of the idea of ,peter has its own individuality1 which may become the subject of yet another idea2 and so on indefinitely4 ,this every one may make trial of for himself1 by reflecting that he knows what ,peter is1 and also knows that he knows1 and further knows that he knows that he knows1 etc4 ,hence1 it is plain that1 in order to understand the actual ,peter1 it is not necessary first to understand the idea of ,peter1 and still less the idea of the idea of ,peter4 ,this is the same as saying that in order to know1 there is no need to know that we know1 much less to know that we know that we know4 ,this is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of a triangle4 ,but with these ideas the contrary is the case2 for in order to know that ,i know1 ,i must first know4 ,hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a thing3 in other words1 the mode in which we perceive an actual reality is certainty4 ,further1 it is also evident that for the certitude of truth no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea2 for1 as ,i have shown1 it is not necessary to know that we know that we know4444 ,he who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea1 nor can he doubt the truth of the thing4 ,for no one who has a true idea is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certitude2 to have a true idea signifying just this1 to know a thing perfectly or as well as possible4 ,no one1 in fact1 can doubt this1 unless he supposes an idea to be something dumb1 like a picture on a tablet1 instead of being a mode of thought1 that is to say1 intelligence itself4 ,moreover1 ,i ask who can know that he understands a thing unless he first of all understands that thing8 that is to say1 who can know that he is certain of anything unless he is first of all certain of that thing8 ,then1 again1 what can be clearer or more certain than a true idea as the standard of truth8 ,just as light reveals both itself and the darkness1 so truth is the standard of itself and of the false4 ,of ,falsity ,there is nothing positive in ideas which can constitute a form of falsity4 ,but falsity cannot consist in absolute privation 7for we say that minds and not bodies err and are mistaken72 nor can it consist in absolute ignorance1 for to be ignorant and to be in error are different4 ,falsehood1 therefore1 consists in the privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate knowledge of things or by inadequate and confused ideas4 ,for instance1 men are deceived because they think themselves free1 and the sole reason for thinking so is that they are conscious of their own actions1 and ignorant of the causes by which those actions are determined4 ,their idea of liberty therefore is this--that they know no cause for their own actions2 for as to saying that their actions depend upon their will1 these are words to which no idea is attached4 ,what the will is1 and in what manner it moves the body1 every one is ignorant1 for those who pretend otherwise1 and devise seats and dwelling-places of the soul1 usually excite our laughter or disgust4 ,just in the same manner1 when we look at the sun1 we imagine its distance from us to be about #bjj feet2 the error not consisting solely in the imagination1 but arising from our not knowing what the true distance is when we imagine1 and what are the causes of our imagination4 ,for although we may afterwards know that the sun is more than #fjj diameters of the earth distant from us1 we still imagine it near us1 since we imagine it to be so near1 not because we are ignorant of its true distance1 but because a modification of our body involves the essence of the sun1 in so far as our body itself is affected by it4 ,the ,origin and ,nature of ,confused ,ideas ,the ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and of the human body itself and must involve the nature not only of the human body1 but of its parts1 for the modifications are ways in which the parts of the human body1 and consequently the whole body1 are affected4 ,but an adequate knowledge of external bodies and of the parts composing the human body does not exist in ,god in so far as ,he is considered as affected by the human mind1 but in so far as ,he is affected by other ideas4 ,these ideas of modifications1 therefore1 in so far as they are related to the human mind alone1 are like conclusions without premises1 that is to say1 as is self-evident1 they are confused ideas4 ,the idea which forms the nature of the mind is demonstrated in the same way not to be clear and distinct when considered in itself4 ,so also with the idea of the human mind1 and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body1 in so far as they are related to the mind alone1 as every one may easily see4 ,all ideas are in ,god and in so far as they are related to ,god are true and adequate4 ,no ideas1 therefore1 are inadequate or confused unless in so far as they are related to the individual mind of some person4 ,all ideas1 therefore1 both adequate and inadequate1 follow by the same necessity4 ,the ,origin and ,nature of ,adequate ,ideas ,let there be something1 ,a1 which is common to all bodies1 and which is equally in the part of each body and in the whole4 ,i say that ,a can only be adequately conceived4 ,for the idea of ,a will necessarily be adequate in ,god1 both in so far as ,he has the idea of the human body and in so far as ,he has the idea of its modifications1 which involve the nature of the human body1 and partly also the nature of external bodies2 that is to say1 this idea will necessarily be adequate in ,god in so far as ,he constitutes the human mind1 or in so far as ,he has ideas which are in the human mind4 ,the mind1 therefore1 necessarily perceives ,a adequately1 both in so far as it perceives itself or its own or any external body2 nor can ,a be conceived in any other manner4 ,hence it follows that some ideas or notions exist which are common to all men1 for all bodies agree in some things1 which must be adequately1 that is to say1 clearly and distinctly1 perceived by all4 ,hence it follows also that the more things the body has in common with other bodies1 the more things will the mind be adapted to perceive4 ,those ideas are also adequate which follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it4 ,for when we say that an idea follows in the human mind from ideas which are adequate in it1 we do but say that in the divine intellect itself an idea exists of which ,god is the cause1 not in so far as ,he is infinite1 nor in so far as ,he is affected by the ideas of a multitude of individual things1 but in so far only as ,he constitutes the essence of the human mind4 ,i have thus explained the origin of those notions which are called common1 and which are the foundations of our reasoning2 but of some axioms or notions other causes exist which it would be advantageous to explain by our method1 for we should thus be able to distinguish those notions which are more useful than others1 and those which are scarcely of any use2 those which are common2 those which are clear and distinct only to those persons who do not suffer from prejudice2 and1 finally1 those which are ill-founded4 ,moreover1 it would be manifest whence these notions which are called second1 and consequently the axioms founded upon them1 have taken their origin1 and other things1 too1 would be explained which ,i have thought about at different times4 ,since1 however1 ,i have set apart this subject for another treatise1 and because ,i do not wish to create disgust with excessive prolixity1 ,i have determined to pass by these matters here4 ,but not to omit anything which is necessary for us to know1 ,i will briefly give the causes from which terms called ,transcendental1 such as ,being1 ,thing1 ,something1 have taken their origin4 ,these terms have arisen because the human body1 inasmuch as it is limited1 can form distinctly in itself a certain number only of images at once4 ,if this number be exceeded1 the images will become confused2 and if the number of images which the body is able to form distinctly be greatly exceeded1 they will all run one into another4 ,since this is so1 it is clear that in proportion to the number of images which can be formed at the same time in the body will be the number of bodies which the human mind can imagine at the same time4 ,if the images in the body1 therefore1 are all confused1 the mind will confusedly imagine all the bodies without distinguishing the one from the other1 and will include them all1 as it were1 under one attribute1 that of being or thing4 ,the same confusion may also be caused by lack of uniform force in the images and from other analogous causes1 which there is no need to discuss here1 the consideration of one cause being sufficient for the purpose we have in view4 ,for it all comes to this1 that these terms signify ideas in the highest degree confused4 ,it is in this way that those notions have arisen which are called ,universal1 such as1 ,man1 ,horse1 ,dog1 etc42 that is to say1 so many images of men1 for instance1 are formed in the human body at once1 that they exceed the power of the imagination1 not entirely1 but to such a degree that the mind has no power to imagine the determinate number of men and the small differences of each1 such as color and size1 etc4 ,it will therefore distinctly imagine that only in which all of them agree in so far as the body is affected by them1 for by that the body was chiefly affected1 that is to say1 by each individual1 and this it will express by the name man1 covering thereby an infinite number of individuals2 to imagine a determinate number of individuals being out of its power4 ,but we must observe that these notions are not formed by all persons in the same way1 but that they vary in each case according to the thing by which the body is more frequently affected1 and which the mind more easily imagines or recollects4 ,for example1 those who have more frequently looked with admiration upon the stature of men1 by the name man will understand an animal of erect stature1 while those who have been in the habit of fixing their thoughts on something else1 will form another common image of men1 describing man1 for instance1 as an animal capable of laughter1 a biped without feathers1 a rational animal1 and so on2 each person forming universal images of things according to the temperament of his own body4 ,it is not therefore to be wondered at that so many controversies have arisen amongst those philosophers who have endeavored to explain natural objects by the images of things alone4 ,the ,three ,kinds of ,knowledge ,from what has been already said1 it clearly appears that we perceive many things and form universal ideas3 #a4 ,from individual things1 represented by the senses to us in a mutilated and confused manner1 and without order to the intellect4 ,these perceptions ,i have therefore been in the habit of calling knowledge from vague experience4 #b4 ,from signs2 as1 for example1 when we hear or read certain words1 we recollect things and form certain ideas of them similar to them1 through which ideas we imagine things4 ,these two ways of looking at things ,i shall hereafter call knowledge of the first kind1 opinion or imagination4 #c4 ,from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things4 ,this ,i shall call reason and knowledge of the second kind4 ,besides these two kinds of knowledge1 there is a third1 as ,i shall hereafter show1 which we shall call intuitive science4 ,this kind of knowing advances from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of ,god to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things4 ,all this ,i will explain by one example4 ,let there be three numbers given through which it is required to discover a fourth which shall be to the third as the second is to the first4 ,a merchant does not hesitate to multiply the second and third together and divide the product by the first1 either because he has not yet forgotten the things which he heard without any demonstration from his school-master1 or because he has seen the truth of the rule with the more simple numbers1 or because from the #aith ,prop4 in the #gth book of ,euclid he understands the common property of all proportionals4 ,but with the simplest numbers there is no need of all this4 ,if the numbers #a1 #b1 #c1 for instance1 be given1 every one can see that the fourth proportional is #f much more clearly than by any demonstration1 because from the ratio in which we see by one intuition that the first stands to the second we conclude the fourth4 ,to knowledge of the first kind we have said that all those ideas belong which are inadequate and confused1 and1 therefore1 this knowledge alone is the cause of falsity4 ,moreover1 to knowledge of the second and third kind we have said that those ideas belong which are adequate1 and therefore this knowledge is necessarily true4 ,it is the knowledge of the second and third1 and not that of the first kind1 which teaches us to distinguish the true from the false4 ,for he who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of the true and the false1 that is to say1 he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge4 ,reason and ,imagination ,it is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly1 that is to say1 as they are in themselves1 that is to say1 not as contingent but as necessary4 ,hence it follows that it is through the imagination alone that we look upon things as contingent both with reference to the past and the future4 ,how this happens ,i will explain in a few words4 ,we have shown above that unless causes occur preventing the present existence of things1 the mind always imagines them present before it1 even if they do not exist4 ,again1 we have shown that if the human body has once been simultaneously affected by two external bodies1 whenever the mind afterwards imagines one it will immediately remember the other2 that is to say1 it will look upon both as present before it1 unless causes occur which prevent the present existence of the things4 ,no one doubts1 too1 that we imagine time because we imagine some bodies to move with a velocity less1 or greater than1 or equal to that of others4 ,let us therefore suppose a boy who yesterday1 for the first time1 in the morning saw ,peter1 at midday ,paul1 in the evening ,simeon1 and to-day in the morning again sees ,peter4 ,it is plain that as soon as he sees the morning light he will imagine the sun passing through the same part of the sky as on the day preceding2 that is to say1 he will imagine the whole day1 and at the same time ,peter will be connected in his imagination with the morning1 ,paul with midday1 and ,simeon with the evening4 ,in the morning1 therefore1 the existence of ,paul and ,simeon will be imagined in relation to future time1 while in the evening1 if the boy should see ,simeon1 he will refer ,peter and ,paul to the past1 since they will be connected with the past in his imagination4 ,this process will be constant in proportion to the regularity with which he sees ,peter1 ,paul1 and ,simeon in this order4 ,if it should by some means happen that on some other evening1 in the place of ,simeon1 he should see ,james1 on the following morning he will connect in his imagination with the evening at one time ,simeon and at another ,james1 but not both together4 ,for he is supposed to have seen one and then the other in the evening1 but not both together4 ,his imagination will therefore fluctuate1 and he will connect with a future evening first one and then the other2 that is to say1 he will consider neither as certain1 but both as a contingency in the future4 ,this fluctuation of the imagination will take place in the same way if the imagination is dealing with things which we contemplate in the same way with reference to past or present time1 and consequently we imagine things related to time past1 present1 or future as contingent4 ,sub ,specie ternitatis ,it is of the nature of reason to consider things as necessary and not as contingent4 ,this necessity of things it perceives truly1 that is to say1 as it is in itself4 ,but this necessity of things is the necessity itself of the eternal nature of ,god4 ,therefore it is of the nature of reason to consider things under this form of eternity4 ,moreover1 the foundations of reason are notions which explain those things which are common to all1 and these things explain the essence of no individual thing1 and must therefore be conceived without any relation to time1 but under a certain form of eternity4 ,the ,limits of ,human ,knowledge ,i ,the parts composing the human body pertain to the essence of the body itself only in so far as they communicate their motions to one another by some certain method1 and not in so far as they can be considered as individuals without relation to the human body4 ,for the parts of the human body are individuals1 composite to a high degree1 parts of which can be separated from the human body and communicate their motions to other bodies in another way1 although the nature and form of the human body itself is closely preserved4 ,therefore the idea or knowledge of each part will be in ,god in so far as ,he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing1 which individual thing is prior to the part itself in the order of ,nature4 ,the same thing may be said of each part of the individual itself composing the human body1 and therefore the knowledge of each part composing the human body exists in ,god in so far as ,he is affected by a number of ideas of things1 and not in so far as ,he has the idea of the human body only2 that is to say1 the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind2 and therefore the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body4 ,we have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body so far as the external body determines the human body in some certain manner4 ,but in so far as the external body is an individual which is not related to the human body1 its idea or knowledge is in ,god1 in so far as ,he is considered as affected by the idea of another thing1 which idea is prior by nature to the external body itself4 ,therefore the adequate knowledge of an external body is not in ,god in so far as ,he has the idea of the modification of the human body1 or1 in other words1 the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body4 ,when the human mind through the ideas of the modifications of its body contemplates external bodies1 we say that it then imagines1 nor can the mind in any other way imagine external bodies as actually existing4 ,therefore in so far as the mind imagines external bodies it does not possess an adequate knowledge of them4 ,,ii ,the idea of a modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the body itself1 or1 in other words1 does not adequately express its nature1 that is to say1 it does not correspond adequately with the nature of the human mind1 and therefore the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind1 nor involve an adequate knowledge of it4 ,from this it is evident that the human mind1 when it perceives things in the common order of ,nature1 has no adequate knowledge of itself nor of its own body1 nor of external bodies1 but only a confused and mutilated knowledge2 for the mind does not know itself unless in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body4 ,moreover1 it does not perceive its body unless through those same ideas of the modifications by means of which alone it perceives external bodies4 ,therefore in so far as it possesses these ideas it possesses an adequate knowledge neither of itself1 nor of its body1 nor of external bodies1 but merely a mutilated and confused knowledge4 ,i say expressly that the mind has no adequate knowledge of itself1 nor of its body1 nor of external bodies1 but only a confused knowledge1 as often as it perceives things in the common order of ,nature1 that is to say1 as often as it is determined to the contemplation of this or that externally--namely1 by a chance coincidence1 and not as often as it is determined internally--for the reason that it contemplates several things at once1 and is determined to understand in what they differ1 agree1 or oppose one another2 for whenever it is internally disposed in this or in any other way1 it then contemplates things clearly and distinctly4 ,,iii ,the duration of our body does not depend upon its essence1 nor upon the absolute nature of ,god1 but the body is determined to existence and action by causes which also are determined by others to existence and action in a certain and determinate manner1 whilst these1 again1 are determined by others1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,the duration1 therefore1 of our body depends upon the common order of ,nature and the constitution of things4 ,but an adequate knowledge of the way in which things are constituted1 exists in ,god in so far as ,he possesses the ideas of all things1 and not in so far as ,he possesses only the idea of the human body4 ,therefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is altogether inadequate in ,god1 in so far as ,he is only considered as constituting the nature of the human mind1 that is to say1 this knowledge in our mind is altogether inadequate4 ,each individual thing1 like the human body1 must be determined to existence and action by another individual thing in a certain and determinate manner1 and this again by another1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,but we have demonstrated in the preceding proposition1 from this common property of individual things1 that we have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our own body2 therefore the same conclusion is to be drawn about the duration of individual things1 that is to say1 that we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of it4 ,hence it follows that all individual things are contingent and corruptible1 for we can have no adequate knowledge concerning their duration and this is what is to be understood by us as their contingency and capability of corruption2 for there is no other contingency but this4 ,the ,mind's ,knowledge of ,god ,the idea of an individual thing actually existing necessarily involves both the essence and existence of the thing itself4 ,but individual things cannot be conceived without ,god1 and since ,god is their cause in so far as ,he is considered under that attribute of which they are modes1 their ideas must necessarily involve the conception of that attribute1 or1 in other words1 must involve the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,by existence is to be understood here not duration1 that is1 existence considered in the abstract1 as if it were a certain kind of quantity1 but ,i speak of the nature itself of the existence which is assigned to individual things1 because from the eternal necessity of the nature of ,god infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways4 ,i repeat1 that ,i speak of the existence itself of individual things in so far as they are in ,god4 ,for although each individual thing is determined by another individual thing to existence in a certain way1 the force nevertheless by which each thing perseveres in its existence follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of ,god4 ,the demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal1 and whether a thing be considered as a part or as a whole1 its idea1 whether it be of a part or whole1 will involve the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,therefore that which gives a knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god is common to all1 and is equally in the part and in the whole4 ,this knowledge therefore will be adequate4 ,the human mind possesses ideas by which it perceives itself and its own body1 together with external bodies1 as actually existing4 ,therefore it possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,hence we see that the infinite essence and the eternity of ,god are known to all2 and since all things are in ,god and are conceived through ,him1 it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which we can know adequately1 and that we can thus form that third sort of knowledge4 ,the reason why we do not possess a knowledge of ,god as distinct as that which we have of common notions is1 that we cannot imagine ,god as we can bodies2 and because we have attached the name ,god to the images of things which we are in the habit of seeing1 an error we can hardly avoid1 inasmuch as we are continually affected by external bodies4 ,many errors1 of a truth1 consist merely in the application of the wrong names to things4 ,for if a man says that the lines which are drawn from the center of the circle to the circumference are not equal1 he understands by the circle1 at all events for the time1 something else than mathematicians understand by it4 ,so when men make errors in calculation1 the numbers which are in their minds are not those which are upon the paper4 ,as far as their mind is concerned there is no error1 although it seems as if there were1 because we think that the numbers in their minds are those which are upon the paper4 ,if we did not think so1 we should not believe them to be in error4 ,for example1 when ,i lately heard a man complaining that his court had flown into one of his neighbor's fowls1 ,i understood what he meant1 and therefore did not imagine him to be in error4 ,this is the source from which so many controversies arise--that men either do not properly explain their own thoughts1 or do not properly interpret those of other people2 for1 in truth1 when they most contradict one another1 they either think the same things or something different1 so that those things which they suppose to be errors and absurdities in another person are not so4 ,,footnotes3 #ah ,from the ,improvement of the ,understanding1 #cc-ce4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,determinism ,,and ,,morals ,the ,mind ,is ,necessarily ,determined ,the mind is a certain and determinate mode of thought1 and therefore it cannot be the free cause of its own actions1 or have an absolute faculty of willing or not willing1 but must be determined to this or that volition by a cause which is also determined by another cause1 and this again by another1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,in the same manner it is demonstrated that in the mind there exists no absolute faculty of understanding1 desiring1 loving1 etc4 ,these and the like faculties1 therefore1 are either altogether fictitious1 or else are nothing but metaphysical or universal entities1 which we are in the habit of forming from individual cases4 ,the intellect and will1 therefore1 are related to this or that idea or volition as rockiness is related to this or that rock1 or as man is related to ,peter or ,paul4 ,the reason why men imagine themselves to be free we have already explained4 ,faculty ,psychology ,fallacious ,before1 however1 ,i advance any further1 ,i must observe that by the will ,i understand a faculty of affirming or denying1 but not a desire2 a faculty1 ,i say1 by which the mind affirms or denies that which is true or false1 and not a desire by which the mind seeks a thing or turns away from it4 ,but now that we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions which are not distinguishable from the individual notions from which they are formed1 we must now inquire whether the volitions themselves are anything more than the ideas of things4 ,we must inquire1 ,i say1 whether in the mind there exists any other affirmation or negation than that which the idea involves in so far as it is an idea4 ,for this purpose see the following1 so that thought may not fall into pictures4 ,for by ideas ,i do not understand the images which are formed at the back of the eye1 or1 if you please1 in the middle of the brain1 but rather the conceptions of thought4 ,in the mind there exists no absolute faculty of willing or not willing4 ,only individual volitions exist1 that is to say1 this and that affirmation and this and that negation4 ,let us conceive1 therefore1 any individual volition1 that is1 any mode of thought1 by which the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 ,this affirmation involves the conception or idea of the triangle1 that is to say1 without it the affirmation cannot be conceived4 ,for to say that ,a must involve the conception ,b1 is the same as saying that ,a cannot be conceived without ,b4 ,moreover1 without the idea of the triangle this affirmation cannot be1 and it can therefore neither be nor be conceived without that idea4 ,but this idea of the triangle must involve this same affirmation that its three angles are equal to two right angles4 ,therefore also1 vice versa1 this idea of the triangle without this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived4 ,therefore this affirmation pertains to the essence of the idea of the triangle1 nor is it anything else besides this4 ,whatever too we have said of this volition 7since it has been taken arbitrarily7 applies to all other volitions1 that is to say1 they are nothing but ideas4 ,the will and the intellect are nothing but the individual volitions and ideas themselves4 ,but the individual volition and idea are one and the same4 ,therefore the will and the intellect are one and the same4 ,false ,doctrines about ,error ,exposed ,i have thus removed what is commonly thought to be the cause of error4 ,it has been proved above that falsity consists solely in the privation which mutilated and confused ideas involve4 ,a false idea1 therefore1 in so far as it is false1 does not involve certitude4 ,consequently1 when we say that a man assents to what is false and does not doubt it1 we do not say that he is certain1 but merely that he does not doubt1 that is to say1 that he assents to what is false1 because there are no causes sufficient to make his imagination waver4 ,although1 therefore1 a man may be supposed to adhere to what is false1 we shall never on that account say that he is certain4 ,for by certitude we understand something positive1 and not the privation of doubt2 but by the privation of certitude we understand falsity4 ,if the preceding proposition1 however1 is to be more clearly comprehended1 a word or two must be added2 it yet remains also that ,i should answer the objections which may be brought against our doctrine1 and finally1 in order to remove all scruples1 ,i have thought it worth while to indicate some of its advantages4 ,i say some1 as the principal advantages will be better understood later4 ,i begin1 therefore1 with the first1 and ,i warn my readers carefully to distinguish between an idea or conception of the mind and the images of things formed by our imagination4 ,secondly1 it is necessary that we should distinguish between ideas and the words by which things are signified4 ,for it is because these three things1 images1 words1 and ideas1 are by many people either altogether confounded or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy and care that such ignorance exists about this doctrine of the will1 so necessary to be known both for the purposes of speculation and for the wise government of life4 ,those who think that ideas consist of images1 which are formed in us by meeting with external bodies1 persuade themselves that those ideas of things of which we can form no similar image are not ideas1 but mere fancies constructed by the free power of the will4 ,they look upon ideas1 therefore1 as dumb pictures on a tablet1 and being prepossessed with this prejudice1 they do not see that an idea1 in so far as it is an idea1 involves affirmation or negation4 ,again1 those who confound words with the idea1 or with the affirmation itself which the idea involves1 think that they can will contrary to their perception1 because they affirm or deny something in words alone contrary to their perception4 ,it will be easy for us1 however1 to divest ourselves of these prejudices if we attend to the nature of thought1 which in no way involves the conception of extension1 and by doing this we clearly see that an idea1 since it is a mode of thought1 is not an image of anything1 nor does it consist of words4 ,for the essence of words and images is formed of bodily motions alone1 which involve in no way whatever the conception of thought4 ,let thus much suffice under this head4 ,i pass on now to the objections to which ,i have already alluded4 ,freedom of the ,will ,the first is1 that it is supposed to be certain that the will extends itself more widely than the intellect1 and is therefore different from it4 ,the reason why men suppose that the will extends itself more widely than the intellect is because they say they have discovered that they do not need a larger faculty of assent--that is to say1 of affirmation--and denial than that which they now have for the purpose of assenting to an infinite number of other things which we do not perceive1 but that they do need a greater faculty for understanding them4 ,the will1 therefore1 is distinguished from the intellect1 the latter being finite1 the former infinite4 ,the second objection which can be made is that there is nothing which experience seems to teach more clearly than the possibility of suspending our judgment1 so as not to assent to the things we perceive2 and we are strengthened in this opinion because no one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives a thing1 but only in so far as he assents to it or dissents from it4 ,for example1 a man who imagines a winged horse does not therefore admit the existence of a winged horse2 that is to say1 he is not necessarily deceived1 unless he grants at the same time that a winged horse exists4 ,experience1 therefore1 seems to show nothing more plainly than that the will or faculty of assent is free1 and different from the faculty of the intellect4 ,thirdly1 it may be objected that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another2 that is to say1 it does not appear that we need a greater power for affirming a thing to be true which is true than for affirming a thing to be true which is false4 ,nevertheless1 we observe that one idea contains more reality or perfection than another1 for as some objects are nobler than others1 in the same proportion are their ideas more perfect4 ,it appears indisputable1 therefore1 that there is a difference between the will and the intellect4 ,fourthly1 it may be objected that if a man does not act from freedom of the will1 what would he do if he were in a state of equilibrium1 like the ass of ,buridanus8 ,would he not perish from hunger and thirst8 and if this be granted1 do we not seem to conceive him as a statue of a man or as an ass8 ,if ,i deny that he would thus perish1 he will consequently determine himself and possess the power of going where he likes and doing what he likes4 ,there may be other objections besides these1 but as ,i am not bound to discuss what every one may dream1 ,i shall therefore make it my business to answer as briefly as possible those only which ,i have mentioned4 ,in reply to the first objection1 ,i grant that the will extends itself more widely than the intellect1 if by the intellect we understand only clear and distinct ideas2 but ,i deny that the will extends itself more widely than the perceptions or the faculty of conception2 nor1 indeed1 do ,i see why the faculty of will should be said to be infinite any more than the faculty of feeling2 for as by the same faculty of will we can affirm an infinite number of things 7one after the other1 for we cannot affirm an infinite number of things at once71 so also by the same faculty of feeling we can feel or perceive 7one after another7 an infinite number of bodies4 ,if it be said that there are an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive1 ,i reply that such things as these we can reach by no thought1 and consequently by no faculty of will4 ,but it is said that if ,god wished us to perceive those things1 it would be necessary for ,him to give us a larger faculty of perception1 but not a larger faculty of will than ,he has already given us1 which is the same thing as saying that if ,god wished us to understand an infinite number of other beings1 it would be necessary for ,him to give us a greater intellect1 but not a more universal idea of being 7in order to embrace that infinite number of beings71 than ,he has given us4 ,for we have shown that the will is a ,universal1 or the idea by which we explain all individual volitions1 that is to say1 that which is common to them all4 ,it is not to be wondered at1 therefore1 that those who believe this common or universal idea of all the volitions to be a faculty should say that it extends itself infinitely beyond the limits of the intellect4 ,for the universal is predicated of one or of many1 or of an infinite number of individuals4 ,the second objection ,i answer by denying that we have free power of suspending judgment4 ,for when we say that a person suspends judgment1 we only say in other words that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately4 ,the suspension of the judgment1 therefore1 is in truth a perception and not free will4 ,in order that this may be clearly understood1 let us take the case of a boy who imagines a horse and perceives nothing else4 ,since this imagination involves the existence of the horse1 and the boy does not perceive anything which negates its existence1 he will necessarily contemplate it as present1 nor will he be able to doubt its existence although he may not be certain of it4 ,this is a thing which we daily experience in dreams1 nor do ,i believe that there is any one who thinks that he has the free power during dreams of suspending his judgment upon those things which he dreams1 and of causing himself not to dream those things which he dreams that he sees2 and yet in dreams it nevertheless happens that we suspend our judgment1 for we dream that we dream4 ,i grant1 it is true1 that no man is deceived in so far as he perceives2 that is to say1 ,i grant that mental images considered in themselves involve no error2 but ,i deny that a man in so far as he perceives affirms nothing4 ,for what else is it to perceive a winged horse than to affirm of the horse that it has wings8 ,for if the mind perceived nothing else but this winged horse1 it would regard it as present1 nor would it have any reason for doubting its existence1 nor any power of refusing assent to it1 unless the image of the winged horse be joined to an idea which negates its existence1 or the mind perceives that the idea of the winged horse which it has is inadequate4 ,in either of the two latter cases it will necessarily deny or doubt the existence of the horse4 ,with regard to the third objection1 what has been said will perhaps be a sufficient answer--namely1 that the will is something universal1 which is predicated of all ideas1 and that it signifies that only which is common to them all1 that is to say1 affirmation4 ,its adequate essence1 therefore1 in so far as it is thus considered in the abstract1 must be in every idea1 and in this sense only must it be the same in all2 but not in so far as it is considered as constituting the essence of an idea1 for so far1 the individual affirmations differ just as the ideas differ4 ,for example1 the affirmation which the idea of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves1 just as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle4 ,again1 ,i absolutely deny that we need a power of thinking in order to affirm that to be true which is true1 equal to that which we need in order to affirm that to be true which is false4 ,for these two affirmations1 if we look to the mind1 are related to one another as being and non-being1 for there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes a form of falsity4 ,here therefore particularly is it to be observed how easily we are deceived when we confuse universals with individuals1 and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities4 ,with regard to the fourth objection1 ,i say that ,i entirely grant that if a man were placed in such a state of equilibrium he would perish of hunger and thirst1 supposing he perceived nothing but hunger and thirst1 and the food and drink which were equidistant from him4 ,if you ask me whether such a man would not be thought an ass rather than a man1 ,i reply that ,i do not know2 nor do ,i know what ought to be thought of a man who hangs himself1 or of children1 fools1 and madmen4 ,the ,independence of ,mind and ,body ,all modes of thought have ,god for a cause in so far as ,he is a thinking thing1 and not in so far as ,he is manifested by any other attribute4 ,that which determines the mind to thought1 therefore1 is a mode of thought and not of extension1 that is to say1 it is not the body4 ,again1 the motion and rest of the body must be derived from some other body1 which has also been determined to motion or rest by another1 and1 absolutely1 whatever arises in the body must arise from ,god1 in so far as ,he is considered as affected by some mode of extension1 and not in so far as ,he is considered as affected by any mode of thought1 that is to say1 whatever arises in the body cannot arise from the mind1 which is a mode of thought4 ,therefore1 the body cannot determine the mind to thought1 neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest1 nor to anything else1 if there be anything else4 ,this proposition will be better understood from what has been said1 that is to say1 that the mind and the body are one and the same thing1 conceived at one time under the attribute of thought1 and at another under that of extension4 ,for this reason1 the order or concatenation of things is one1 whether nature be conceived under this or under that attribute1 and consequently the order of the actions and passions of our body is coincident in ,nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind4 ,although these things are so1 and no ground for doubting remains1 ,i scarcely believe1 nevertheless1 that1 without a proof derived from experience1 men will be induced calmly to weigh what has been said1 so firmly are they persuaded that1 solely at the bidding of the mind1 the body moves or rests1 and does a number of things which depend upon the will of the mind alone1 and upon the power of thought4 ,for what the body can do no one has hitherto determined1 that is to say1 experience has taught no one hitherto what the body1 without being determined by the mind1 can do and what it cannot do from the laws of ,nature alone1 in so far as ,nature is considered merely as corporeal4 ,for no one as yet has understood the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions1 not to mention the fact that many things are observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity1 and that sleep-walkers in their sleep do very many things which they dare not do when awake2 all this showing that the body itself can do many things from the laws of its own nature alone at which the mind belonging to that body is amazed4 ,again1 nobody knows by what means or by what method the mind moves the body1 nor how many degrees of motion it can communicate to the body1 nor with what speed it can move the body4 ,so that it follows that when men say that this or that action of the body springs from the mind which has commanded over the body1 they do not know what they say1 and they do nothing but confess with pretentious words that they know nothing about the cause of the action1 and see nothing in it to wonder at4 ,but they will say1 that whether they know or do not know by what means the mind moves the body1 it is nevertheless in their experience that if the mind were not fit for thinking the body would be inert4 ,they say1 again1 it is in their experience that the mind alone has power both to speak and be silent1 and to do many other things which they therefore think to be dependent on a decree of the mind4 ,but with regard to the first assertion1 ,i ask them if experience does not also teach that if the body be sluggish the mind at the same time is not fit for thinking8 ,when the body is asleep1 the mind slumbers with it1 and has not the power to think1 as it has when the body is awake4 ,again1 ,i believe that all have discovered that the mind is not always equally fitted for thinking about the same subject1 but in proportion to the fitness of the body for this or that image to be excited in it will the mind be better fitted to contemplate this or that object4 ,but my opponents will say1 that from the laws of ,nature alone1 in so far as it is considered to be corporeal merely1 it cannot be that the causes of architecture1 painting1 and things of this sort1 which are the results of human art alone1 could be deduced1 and that the human body1 unless it were determined and guided by the mind1 would not be able to build a temple4 ,i have already shown1 however1 that they do not know what the body can do1 nor what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone1 and that they find that many things are done merely by the laws of ,nature which they would never have believed to be possible without the direction of the mind1 as1 for example1 those things which sleep-walkers do in their sleep1 and at which they themselves are astonished when they wake4 ,i adduce also here the structure itself of the human body1 which so greatly surpasses in workmanship all those things which are constructed by human art1 not to mention what ,i have already proved1 that an infinitude of things follows from ,nature under whatever attribute it may be considered4 ,with regard to the second point1 ,i should say that human affairs would be much more happily conducted if it were equally in the power of men to be silent and to speak4 ,but experience shows over and over again that there is nothing which men have less power over than the tongue1 and that there is nothing which they are less able to do than to govern their appetites1 so that many persons believe that we do those things only with freedom which we seek indifferently2 as the desire for such things can easily be lessened by the recollection of another thing which we frequently call to mind2 it being impossible1 on the other hand1 to do those things with freedom which we seek with such ardor that the recollection of another thing is unable to mitigate it4 ,but if1 however1 we had not found out that we do many things which we afterwards repent1 and that when agitated by conflicting emotions we see that which is better and follow that which is worse1 nothing would hinder us from believing that we do everything with freedom4 ,thus the infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast2 the angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance2 the timid man thinks it is with free will he seeks flight2 the drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid4 ,thus the madman1 the chatterer1 the boy1 and others of the same kind1 all believe that they speak by a free command of the mind1 whilst1 in truth1 they have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak1 so that experience itself1 no less than reason1 clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be free simply because they are conscious of their own actions1 knowing nothing of the causes by which they are determined4 ,it#ai teaches1 too1 that the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves1 which differ1 therefore1 according to the different temper of the body4 ,for every man determines all things from his emotion2 those who are agitated by contrary emotions do not know what they want1 whilst those who are agitated by no emotion are easily driven hither and thither4 ,all this plainly shows that the decree of the mind1 the appetite1 and determination of the body are coincident in ,nature1 or rather that they are one and the same thing1 which1 when it is considered under the attribute of thought and manifested by that1 is called a decree1 and when it is considered under the attribute of extension and is deduced from the laws of motion and rest1 is called a determination4 ,this1 however1 will be better understood as we go on1 for there is another thing which ,i wish to be observed here--that we cannot by a mental decree do a thing unless we recollect it4 ,we cannot speak a word1 for instance1 unless we recollect it4 ,but it is not in the free power of the mind either to recollect a thing or to forget it4 ,it is believed1 therefore1 that the power of the mind extends only thus far--that from a mental decree we can speak or be silent about a thing only when we recollect it4 ,but when we dream that we speak1 we believe that we do so from a free decree of the mind2 and yet we do not speak1 or1 if we do1 it is the result of a spontaneous motion of the body4 ,we dream1 again1 that we are concealing things1 and that we do this by virtue of a decree of the mind like that by which1 when awake1 we are silent about things we know4 ,we dream1 again1 that from a decree of the mind1 we do some things which we should not dare to do when awake4 ,and ,i should like to know1 therefore1 whether there are two kinds of decrees in the mind--one belonging to dreams and the other free4 ,if this be too great nonsense1 we must necessarily grant that this decree of the mind1 which is believed to be free1 is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory1 and is nothing but the affirmation which the idea necessarily involves in so far as it is an idea4 ,these decrees of the mind1 therefore1 arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing4 ,consequently1 those who believe that they speak1 or are silent1 or do anything else from a free decree of the mind1 dream with their eyes open4 ,the ,moral ,values of ,determinism ,i ,it remains for me now to show what service to our own lives a knowledge of this doctrine is4 ,this we shall easily understand from the remarks which follow4 ,notice-- #a4 ,it is of service in so far as it teaches us that we do everything by the will of ,god alone1 and that we are partakers of the divine nature in proportion as our actions become more and more perfect and we more and more understand ,god4 ,this doctrine1 therefore1 besides giving repose in every way to the soul1 has also this advantage1 that it teaches us in what our highest happiness or blessedness consists1 namely1 in the knowledge of ,god alone1 by which we are drawn to do those things only which love and piety persuade4 ,hence we clearly see how greatly those stray from the true estimation of virtue who expect to be distinguished by ,god with the highest rewards for virtue and the noblest actions as if for the completest servitude1 just as if virtue itself and the service of ,god were not happiness itself and the highest liberty4 #b4 ,it is of service to us in so far as it teaches us how we ought to behave with regard to the things of fortune1 or those which are not in our power1 that is to say1 which do not follow from our own nature2 for it teaches us with equal mind to wait for and bear each form of fortune1 because we know that all things follow from the eternal decree of ,god1 according to that same necessity by which it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles4 #c4 ,this doctrine contributes to the welfare of our social existence1 since it teaches us to hate no one1 to despise no one1 to mock no one1 to be angry with no one1 and to envy no one4 ,it teaches every one1 moreover1 to be content with his own1 and to be helpful to his neighbor1 not from any womanish pity1 from partiality1 or superstition1 but by the guidance of reason alone1 according to the demand of time and circumstance1 as ,i shall show4 #d4 ,this doctrine contributes not a little to the advantage of common society1 in so far as it teaches us by what means citizens are to be governed and led2 not in order that they may be slaves1 but that they may freely do those things which are best4 ,,ii ,at#ba last ,i see1 what it was that you begged me not to publish4 ,however1 as it forms the chief foundation of everything in the treatise#bb which ,i intend to bring out1 ,i should like briefly to explain here1 in what sense ,i assert that a fatal necessity presides over all things and actions4 ,god ,i in no wise subject to fate3 ,i conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of ,god1 in the same way as every one conceives that it follows from ,god's nature that ,god understands ,himself4 ,this latter consequence all admit to follow necessarily from the divine nature1 yet no one conceives that ,god is under the compulsion of any fate1 but that ,he understands ,himself quite freely1 though necessarily4 ,further1 this inevitable necessity in things does away neither with divine nor human laws4 ,the principles of morality1 whether they receive from ,god ,himself the form of laws or institutions1 or whether they do not1 are still divine and salutary2 whether we receive the good1 which flows from virtue and the divine love1 as from ,god in the capacity of a judge1 or as from the necessity of the divine nature1 it will in either case be equally desirable2 on the other hand1 the evils following from wicked actions and passions are not less to be feared because they are necessary consequences4#bc ,lastly1 in our actions1 whether they be necessary or contingent1 we are led by hope and fear4 ,men are only without excuse before ,god1 because they are in ,god's power1 as clay is in the hands of the potter1 who from the same lump makes vessels1 some to honor1 some to dishonor4444 #bd ,when ,i said in my former letter that we are inexcusable1 because we are in the power of ,god1 like clay in the hands of the potter1 ,i meant to be understood in the sense that no one can bring a complaint against ,god for having given him a weak nature1 or infirm spirit4 ,a circle might as well complain to ,god for not being endowed with the properties of a sphere1 or a child who is tortured1 say1 with stone1 for not being given a healthy body1 as a man of feeble spirit1 because ,god has denied to him fortitude1 and the true knowledge and love of the ,deity1 or because he is endowed with so weak a nature that he cannot check or moderate his desires4 ,for the nature of each thing is only competent to do that which follows necessarily from its given cause4 ,that every man cannot be brave1 and that we can no more command for ourselves a healthy body than a healthy mind1 nobody can deny1 without giving the lie to experience1 as well as to reason4 ,but1 you urge1 if men sin by nature1 they are excusable2 but you do not state the conclusion you draw1 whether that ,god cannot be angry with them1 or that they are worthy of blessedness--that is1 of the knowledge and love of ,god4 ,if you say the former1 ,i fully admit that ,god cannot be angry1 and that all things are done in accordance with ,his will2 but ,i deny that all men ought1 therefore1 to be blessed--men may be excusable1 and nevertheless1 be without blessedness and afflicted in many ways4#be ,a horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man2 but1 nevertheless1 he must needs be a horse and not a man4 ,he who goes mad from the bite of a dog is excusable1 yet he is rightly suffocated4 ,lastly1 he who cannot govern his desires1 and keep them in check with the fear of the laws1 though his weakness may be excusable1 yet he cannot enjoy with contentment1 the knowledge and love of ,god1 but necessarily perishes4 ,,footnotes3 #ai 444 ,i say that a thing is free1 which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature4 ,thus also ,god understands ,himself and all things freely1 because it follows solely from the necessity of ,his nature that ,he should understand all things4 ,you see ,i do not place freedom in free decision1 but in free necessity4 ,however1 let us descend to created things1 which are all determined by external causes to exist and operate in a given determinate manner4 ,in order that this may be clearly understood1 let us conceive a very simple thing4 ,for instance1 a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a certain quantity of motion1 by virtue of which it continues to move after the impulsion given by the external cause has ceased4 ,the permanence of the stone's motion is constrained1 not necessary because it must be defined by the impulsion of an external cause4 ,what is true of the stone is true of an individual1 however complicated its nature1 or varied its functions1 inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner4 ,further conceive1 ,i beg1 that a stone1 while continuing in motion1 should be capable of thinking and knowing1 that it is endeavoring1 as far as it can1 to continue to move4 ,such a stone1 being conscious merely of its own endeavor and not at all indifferent1 would believe itself to be completely free1 and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish4 ,this is that human freedom1 which all boast that they possess1 and which consists solely in the fact1 that men are conscious of their own desire1 but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined4#bj 444 #bj ,from a letter to ,g4 ,h4 ,schaller 7#afgd74 #ba ,from a letter to ,henry ,oldenburg 7,dec41 #afge74 #bb ,the ,ethics4--,,ed4 #bc ,i received on ,saturday last your very short letter dated #aeth ,nov4 ,in it you merely indicated the points in the theological treatise which have given pain to readers1 whereas ,i had hoped to learn from it what were the opinions which militated against the practice of religious virtue4444 ,i make this chief distinction between religion and superstition2 the latter is founded on ignorance1 the former on knowledge4 ,this1 ,i take it1 is the reason why ,christians are distinguished from the rest of the world1 not by faith1 nor by charity1 nor by the other fruits of the ,holy ,spirit1 but solely by their opinions1 inasmuch as they defend their cause1 like every one else1 by miracles1 that is1 by ignorance1 which is the source of all malice4 ,thus they turn a faith1 which may be true1 into superstition4 ,from a letter to ,henry ,oldenburg 7,dec41 #afge74 #bd ,from a letter to ,henry ,oldenburg 7,feb4 #g1 #afgf74 #be ,a mouse no less than an angel1 and sorrow no less than joy depend on ,god2 yet a mouse is not a kind of angel1 neither is sorrow a kind of joy4 ,from a letter to ,wm4 ,blyenbergh 7,march #ac1 #affe74 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,introductory ,most persons who have written about the emotions and man's conduct of life seem to discuss1 not the natural things which follow the common laws of ,nature1 but things which are outside her4 ,they seem indeed to consider man in ,nature as a kingdom within a kingdom4 ,for they believe that man disturbs rather than follows her order2 that he has an absolute power over his own actions2 and that he is altogether self-determined4 ,they then proceed to attribute the cause of human weakness and changeableness1 not to the common power of ,nature1 but to some vice of human nature1 which they therefore bewail1 laugh at1 mock1 or1 as is more generally the case1 detest2 whilst he who knows how to revile most eloquently or subtilely the weakness of the mind is looked upon as divine4 ,it is true that very eminent men have not been wanting1 to whose labor and industry we confess ourselves much indebted1 who have written many excellent things about the right conduct of life1 and who have given to mortals counsels full of prudence4 ,but no one so far as ,i know has determined the nature and strength of the emotions1 and what the mind is able to do towards controlling them4 ,i remember1 indeed1 that the celebrated ,descartes1 although he believed that the mind is absolute master over its own actions1 tried nevertheless to explain by their first causes human emotions1 and at the same time to show the way by which the mind could obtain absolute power over them4 ,but in my opinion he has shown nothing but the acuteness of his great intellect1 as ,i shall make evident in the proper place1 for ,i wish to return to those who prefer to detest and scoff at human affects and actions than understand them4 ,to such as these it will doubtless seem a marvelous thing for me to endeavor to treat by a geometrical method the vices and follies of men1 and to desire by a sure method to demonstrate those things which these people cry out against as being opposed to reason1 or as being vanities1 absurdities1 and monstrosities4 ,the following is my reason for so doing4 ,nothing happens in ,nature which can be attributed to any vice of ,nature1 for she is always the same and everywhere one4 ,her virtue is the same1 and her power of acting2 that is to say1 her laws and rules1 according to which all things are and are changed from form to form1 are everywhere and always the same2 so that there must also be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever1 that is to say1 by the universal laws and rules of ,nature4 ,the emotions1 therefore1 of hatred1 anger1 envy1 considered in themselves1 follow from the same necessity and virtue of ,nature as other individual things2 they have therefore certain causes through which they are to be understood1 and certain properties which are just as worthy of being known as the properties of any other thing in the contemplation alone of which we delight4 ,i shall1 therefore1 pursue the same method in considering the nature and strength of the emotions and the power of the mind over them which ,i pursued in our previous discussion of ,god and the mind1 and ,i shall consider human actions and appetites just as if ,i were considering lines1 planes or bodies4 ,definitions ,i4--,i call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived by means of the cause4 ,i call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect cannot be understood by means of the cause alone4 ,,ii4--,i say that we act when anything is done1 either within us or without us1 of which we are the adequate cause1 that is to say 7by the preceding ,definition71 when from our nature anything follows1 either within us or without us1 which by that nature alone can be clearly and distinctly understood4 ,on the other hand1 ,i say that we suffer when anything is done within us1 or when anything follows from our nature1 of which we are not the cause excepting partially4 ,,iii4--,by emotion ,i understand the modifications of the body1 by which the power of acting of the body itself is increased1 diminished1 helped1 or hindered1 together with the ideas of these modifications4 ,if1 therefore1 we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications1 ,i understand the emotion to be an action1 otherwise it is a passion4 ,postulates #a4--,the human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished1 and also in other ways which make its power of acting neither greater nor less4 #b4--,the human body is capable of suffering many changes1 and1 nevertheless1 can retain the impressions or traces of objects1 and consequently the same images of things4 ,the ,two ,states of ,mind3 ,active and ,passive ,in every human mind some ideas are adequate1 and others mutilated and confused4 ,but the ideas which in any mind are adequate are adequate in ,god in so far as ,he forms the essence of that mind1 while those again which are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in ,god1 not in so far as ,he contains the essence of that mind only1 but in so far as ,he contains the ideas of other things at the same time in ,himself4 ,again1 from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow1 of which ,god is the adequate cause1 not in so far as ,he is infinite1 but in so far as ,he is considered as affected with the given idea4 ,but of that effect of which ,god is the cause1 in so far as ,he is affected by an idea which is adequate in any mind1 that same mind is the adequate cause4 ,our mind1 therefore1 in so far as it has adequate ideas1 necessarily at times acts4 ,again1 if there be anything which necessarily follows from an idea which is adequate in ,god1 not in so far as ,he contains within ,himself the mind of one man only1 but also1 together with this1 the ideas#bf of other things1 then the mind of that man is not the adequate cause of that thing1 but is only its partial cause1 and therefore1 in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas1 it necessarily at times suffers4 ,the ,basic ,endeavor of ,all ,things ,individual things are modes by which the attributes of ,god are expressed in a certain and determinate manner2 that is to say1 they are things which express in a certain and determinate manner the power of ,god1 by which ,he is and acts4 ,a thing1 too1 has nothing in itself through which it can be destroyed1 or which can negate its existence1#bg but1 on the contrary1 it is opposed to everything which could negate its existence4 ,therefore1 in so far as it can and is in itself1 it endeavors to persevere in its own being4 ,the ,three ,primary ,emotions ,i ,desire ,the essence of the mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas 7as we have shown71 and therefore both in so far as it has the former and in so far as it has the latter1 it endeavors to persevere in its being1 and endeavors to persevere in it for an indefinite time4 ,but since the mind1 through the ideas of the modifications of the body1 is necessarily conscious of itself1 it is therefore conscious of its effort4 ,this effort1 when it is related to the mind alone1 is called will1 but when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body1 is called appetite1 which is therefore nothing but the very essence of man1 from the nature of which necessarily follow those things which promote his preservation1 and thus he is determined to do those things4 ,hence there is no difference between appetite and desire1 unless in this particular1 that desire is generally related to men in so far as they are conscious of their appetites1 and it may therefore be defined as appetite of which we are conscious4 ,from what has been said it is plain1 therefore1 that we neither strive for1 wish1 seek1 nor desire anything because we think it to be good1 but1 on the contrary1 we adjudge a thing to be good because we strive for1 wish1 seek1 or desire it4 ,,ii ,joy and ,sorrow ,if anything increases1 diminishes1 helps1 or limits our body's power of action1 the idea of that thing increases1 diminishes1 helps1 or limits our mind's power of thought4 ,we thus see that the mind can suffer great changes1 and can pass now to a greater and now to a lesser perfection2 these passions explaining to us the emotions of joy and sorrow4 ,by joy1 therefore1 in what follows1 ,i shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection2 by sorrow1 on the other hand1 the passion by which it passes to a less perfection4 ,the emotion of joy1 related at the same time both to the mind and the body1 ,i call pleasurable excitement 7titillatio7 or cheerfulness2 that of sorrow ,i call pain or melancholy4 ,it is1 however1 to be observed that pleasurable excitement and pain are related to a man when one of his parts is affected more than the others2 cheerfulness and melancholy1 on the other hand1 when all parts are equally affected4 ,what the nature of desire is ,i have explained2 and besides these three--joy1 sorrow1 and desire--,i know of no other primary emotion1 the others springing from these4 ,definitions of the ,principal ,emotions ,i4--,desire is the essence itself of man in so far as it is conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications4 ,explanation4--,we have said above1 that desire is appetite which is self-conscious1 and that appetite is the essence itself of man in so far as it is determined to such acts as contribute to his preservation4 ,but ,i have taken care to remark that in truth ,i cannot recognize any difference between human appetite and desire4 ,for whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not1 it remains one and the same appetite1 and so1 lest ,i might appear to be guilty of tautology1 ,i have not explained desire by appetite1 but have tried to give such a definition of desire as would include all the efforts of human nature to which we give the name of appetite1 desire1 will1 or impulse4 ,for ,i might have said that desire is the essence itself of man in so far as it is considered as determined to any action2 but from this definition it would not follow that the mind could be conscious of its desire or appetite1 and therefore1 in order that ,i might include the cause of this consciousness1 it was necessary to add the words1 in so far as it is conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications4 ,for by a modification of the human essence we understand any constitution of that essence1 whether it be innate1 whether it be conceived through the attribute of thought alone or of extension alone1 or whether it be related to both4 ,by the word desire1 therefore1 ,i understand all the efforts1 impulses1 appetites1 and volitions of a man1 which vary according to his changing disposition1 and not unfrequently are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither1 and knows not whither he ought to turn4 ,,ii4 ,joy is man's passage from a less to a greater perfection4 ,,iii4 ,sorrow is man's passage from a greater to a less perfection4 ,explanation4--,i say passage1 for joy is not perfection itself4 ,if a man were born with the perfection to which he passes1 he would possess it without the emotion of joy2 a truth which will appear the more clearly from the emotion of sorrow1 which is the opposite to joy4 ,for that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection1 but not in the less perfection itself1 no one can deny1 since in so far as a man shares any perfection he cannot be sad4 ,nor can we say that sorrow consists in the privation of a greater perfection for privation is nothing4 ,but the emotion of sorrow is a reality1 and it therefore must be the reality of the passage to a lesser perfection1 or the reality by which man's power of acting is diminished or limited4 ,as for the definitions of cheerfulness1 pleasurable excitement1 melancholy1 and grief1 ,i pass these by1 because they are related rather to the body than to the mind1 and are merely different kinds of joy or of sorrow4 ,,iv4 ,astonishment is the imagination of an object in which the mind remains fixed because this particular imagination has no connection with others4 ,explanation4--,that which causes the mind from the contemplation of one thing immediately to pass to the thought of another is that the images of these things are connected one with the other1 and are so arranged that the one follows the other2 a process which cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new1 for the mind will be held in the contemplation of the same object until other causes determine it to think of other things4 ,the imagination1 therefore1 considered in itself1 of a new object is of the same character as other imaginations2 and for this reason ,i do not class astonishment among the emotions1 nor do ,i see any reason why ,i should do it1 since this abstraction of the mind arises from no positive cause by which it is abstracted from other things1 but merely from the absence of any cause by which from the contemplation of one thing the mind is determined to think other things4 ,i acknowledge1 therefore1 only three primitive or primary emotions1 those of joy1 sorrow1 and desire2 and the only reason which has induced me to speak of astonishment is1 that it has been the custom to give other names to certain emotions derived from the three primitives whenever these emotions are related to objects at which we are astonished4 ,this same reason also induces me to add the definition of contempt4 ,v4 ,contempt is the imagination of an object which so little touches the mind that the mind is moved by the presence of the object to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than those which are in it4 ,the definitions of veneration and scorn ,i pass by here1 because they give a name1 so far as ,i know1 to none of the emotions4 ,,vi4 ,love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause4 ,explanation4--,this definition explains with sufficient clearness the essence of love2 that which is given by some authors1 who define love to be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object1 expresses not the essence of love but one of its properties4 ,in as much as these authors have not seen with sufficient clearness what is the essence of love1 they could not have a distinct conception of its properties1 and consequently their definition has by everybody been thought very obscure4 ,i must observe1 however1 when ,i say that it is a property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object1 that ,i do not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the mind 7for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated above71 nor even a desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is absent1 nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present1 for love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires2 but by will ,i understand the satisfaction that the beloved object produces in the lover by its presence1 by virtue of which the joy of the lover is strengthened1 or at any rate supported4 ,,vii4 ,hatred is sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause4 ,explanation4--,what is to be observed here will easily be seen from what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition4 ,,viii4 ,inclination 7propensio7 is a joy with the accompanying idea of some object as being accidentally the cause of joy4 ,,ix4 ,aversion is sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object which is accidentally the cause of the sorrow4 ,x4 ,devotion is love towards an object which astonishes us4 ,explanation4--,astonishment arises from the novelty of the object4 ,if1 therefore1 it should happen that we often imagine the object at which we are astonished1 we shall cease to be astonished at it1 and hence we see that the emotion of devotion easily degenerates into simple love4 ,,xi4 ,derision is joy arising from the imagination that something we despise is present in an object we hate4 ,explanation4--,in so far as we despise a thing we hate do we deny its existence1 and so far do we rejoice4 ,but inasmuch as we suppose that a man hates what he ridicules1 it follows that this joy is not solid4 ,,xii4 ,hope is a joy not constant1 arising from the idea of something future or past1 about the issue of which we sometimes doubt4 ,,xiii4 ,fear is a sorrow not constant1 arising from the idea of something future or past1 about the issue of which we sometimes doubt4 ,explanation4--,from these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope1 for the person who wavers in hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything is supposed to imagine something which may exclude its existence1 and so far1 therefore1 to be sad1 and consequently while he wavers in hope1 to fear lest his wishes should not be accomplished4 ,so also the person who fears1 that is to say1 who doubts whether what he hates will not come to pass1 imagines something which excludes the existence of what he hates1 and therefore is rejoiced1 and consequently so far hopes that it will not happen4 ,,xiv4 ,confidence is joy arising from the idea of a past or future object from which cause for doubting is removed4 ,,xv4 ,despair is sorrow arising from the idea of a past or future object from which cause for doubting is removed4 ,explanation4--,confidence1 therefore1 springs from hope and despair from fear1 whenever the reason for doubting the issue is taken away2 a case which occurs either because we imagine a thing past or future to be present and contemplate it as present1 or because we imagine other things which exclude the existence of those which made us to doubt4 ,for although we can never be sure about the issue of individual objects1 it may nevertheless happen that we do not doubt it4 ,for elsewhere we have shown that it is one thing not to doubt and another to possess certitude1 and so it may happen that from the image of an object either past or future we are affected with the same emotion of joy or sorrow as that by which we should be affected from the image of an object present4 ,,xvi4 ,gladness 7gaudium7 is a joy with the accompanying idea of something past1 which1 unhoped for1 has happened4 ,,xvii4 ,remorse is sorrow with the accompanying idea of something past1 which1 unhoped for1 has happened4 ,,xviii4 ,commiseration is sorrow with the accompanying idea of evil which has happened to some one whom we imagine like ourselves4 ,explanation4--,between commiseration and compassion there seems to be no difference1 excepting perhaps that commiseration refers rather to an individual emotion and compassion to it as a habit4 ,,xix4 ,favor is love towards those who have benefited others4 ,,xx4 ,indignation is hatred towards those who have injured others4 ,explanation4--,i am aware that these names in common bear a different meaning4 ,but my object is not to explain the meaning of words but the nature of things1 and to indicate them by words whose customary meaning shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning which ,i desire to bestow upon them4 ,i consider it sufficient to have said this once for all4 ,,xxi4 ,over-estimation consists in thinking too highly of another person in consequence of our love for him4 ,,xxii4 ,contempt consists in thinking too little of another person in consequence of our hatred for him4 ,explanation4--,over-estimation and contempt are therefore respectively effects or properties of love or hatred1 and so over-estimation may be defined as love in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too much of the beloved object2 and1 on the contrary1 contempt may be defined as hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too little of the object he hates4 ,,xxiii4 ,envy is hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad at the good fortune of another person and is glad when any evil happens to him4 ,explanation4--,to envy is generally opposed compassion 7misericordia71 which may therefore be defined as follows1 notwithstanding the usual signification of the word3-- ,,xxiv4 ,compassion is love in so far as it affects a man so that he is glad at the prosperity of another person and is sad when any evil happens to him4 ,i pass now to consider other emotions which are attended by the idea of something within us as the cause4 ,,xxv4 ,self-satisfaction is the joy which is produced by contemplating ourselves and our own power of action4 ,,xxvi4 ,humility is the sorrow which is produced by contemplating our impotence or helplessness4 ,self-satisfaction is opposed to humility in so far as we understand by the former the joy which arises from contemplating our power of action1 but in so far as we understand by it joy attended with the idea of something done1 which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind1 it is opposed to repentance1 which we may thus define3-- ,,xxvii4 ,repentance is sorrow accompanied with the idea of something done which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind4 ,it is not to be wondered at that sorrow should always follow all those actions which are from custom called wicked1 and that joy should follow those which are called good4 ,but that this is chiefly the effect of education will be evident from what we have before said4 ,parents1 by reprobating what are called bad actions1 and frequently blaming their children whenever they commit them1 while they persuade them to what are called good actions1 and praise their children when they perform them1 have caused the emotions of sorrow to connect themselves with the former1 and those of joy with the latter4 ,experience proves this1 for custom and religion are not the same everywhere2 but1 on the contrary1 things which are sacred to some are profane to others1 and what are honorable with some are disgraceful with others4 ,education alone1 therefore1 will determine whether a man will repent of any deed or boast of it4 ,,xxviii4 ,pride is thinking too much of ourselves1 through self-love4 ,explanation4--,pride differs1 therefore1 from over-estimation1 inasmuch as the latter is related to an external object1 but pride to the man himself who thinks of himself too highly4 ,as over-estimation1 therefore1 is an effect or property of love1 so pride is an effect or property of self-love1 and it may therefore be defined as love of ourselves or self-satisfaction1 in so far as it affects us so that we think too highly of ourselves4 ,to this emotion a contrary does not exist1 for no one1 through hatred of himself1 thinks too little of himself2 indeed1 we may say that no one thinks too little of himself1 in so far as he imagines himself unable to do this or that thing4 ,for whatever he imagines that he cannot do1 that thing he necessarily imagines1 and by his imagination is so disposed that he is actually incapable of doing what he imagines he cannot do4 ,so long1 therefore1 as he imagines himself unable to do this or that thing1 so long is he not determined to do it1 and consequently so long it is impossible for him to do it4 ,if1 however1 we pay attention to what depends upon opinion alone1 we shall be able to conceive it possible for a man to think too little of himself1 for it may happen that while he sorrowfully contemplates his own weakness he will imagine himself despised by everybody1 although nothing could be further from their thoughts than to despise him4 ,a man may also think too little of himself if in the present he denies something of himself in relation to a future time of which he is not sure2 for example1 when he denies that he can conceive of nothing with certitude1 and that he can desire and do nothing which is not wicked and base4 ,we may also say that a man thinks too little of himself when we see that1 from an excess of fear or shame1 he does not dare to do what others who are his equals dare to do4 ,this emotion1 to which ,i will give the name of despondency1 may therefore be opposed to pride2 for as self-satisfaction springs from pride1 so despondency springs from humility1 and it may therefore be defined thus3 ,,xxix4 ,despondency is thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow4 ,explanation4--,we are1 nevertheless1 often in the habit of opposing humility to pride1 but only when we attend to their effects rather than to their nature4 ,for we are accustomed to call a man proud who boasts too much1 who talks about nothing but his own virtues and other people's vices1 who wishes to be preferred to everybody else1 and who marches along with that stateliness and pomp which belong to others whose position is far above his4 ,on the other hand1 we call a man humble who often blushes1 who confesses his own faults and talks about the virtues of others1 who yields to every one1 who walks with bended head1 and who neglects to adorn himself4 ,these emotions1 humility and despondency1 are very rare1 for human nature1 considered in itself1 struggles against them as much as it can1 and hence those who have the most credit for being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and envious4 ,,xxx4 ,self-exaltation is joy with the accompanying idea of some action we have done1 which we imagine people praise4 ,,xxxi4 ,shame is sorrow1 with the accompanying idea of some action which we imagine people blame4 ,explanation4--,a difference1 however1 is here to be observed between shame and modesty4 ,shame is sorrow which follows a deed of which we are ashamed4 ,modesty is the dread or fear of shame1 which keeps a man from committing any disgraceful act4 ,to modesty is usually opposed impudence1 which indeed is not an emotion1 as ,i shall show in the proper place2 but the names of emotions1 as ,i have already said1 are matters rather of custom than indications of the nature of the emotions4 ,i have thus discharged the task which ,i set myself of explaining the emotions of joy and sorrow4 ,i will advance now to those which ,i ascribe to desire4 ,,xxxii4 ,regret is the desire or longing to possess something1 the emotion being strengthened by the memory of the object itself1 and at the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the desired object4 ,explanation4--,whenever we recollect a thing1 as we have often said1 we are thereby necessarily disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were present before us4 ,but this disposition or effort1 while we are awake1 is generally restrained by the images of things which exclude the existence of the thing which we recollect4 ,whenever1 therefore1 we recollect a thing which affects us with any kind of joy1 we thereby endeavor to contemplate it with the same emotion of joy as if it were present1--an attempt which is1 however1 immediately restrained by the memory of that which excludes the existence of the thing4 ,regret1 therefore1 is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises from the absence of what we hate4 ,but because the name regret seems to connect this emotion with desire1 ,i therefore ascribe it to desire4 ,,xxxiii4 ,emulation is the desire which is begotten in us of a thing because we imagine that other persons have the same desire4 ,explanation4--,he who seeks flight because others seek it1 he who fears because he sees others fear1 or even he who withdraws his hand and moves his body as if his hand were burning because he sees that another person has burnt his hand1 such as these1 ,i say1 although they may indeed imitate the emotion of another1 are not said to emulate it2 not because we have recognized one cause for emulation and another for imitation1 but because it has been the custom to call that man only emulous who imitates what we think noble1 useful1 or pleasant4 ,,xxxiv4 ,thankfulness or gratitude is the desire or endeavor of love with which we strive to do good to others who1 from a similar emotion of love1 have done good to us4 ,,xxxv4 ,benevolence is the desire to do good to those whom we pity4 ,,xxxvi4 ,anger is the desire by which we are impelled1 through hatred1 to injure those whom we hate4 ,,xxxvii4 ,vengeance is the desire which1 springing from mutual hatred1 urges us to injure those who1 from a similar emotion1 have injured us4 ,,xxxviii4 ,cruelty or ferocity is the desire by which a man is impelled to injure any one whom we love or pity4 ,explanation4--,to cruelty is opposed mercy1 which is not a passion1 but a power of the mind by which a man restrains anger and vengeance4 ,,xxxix4 ,fear is the desire of avoiding the greater of two dreaded evils by the less4 ,,xl4 ,audacity is the desire by which we are impelled to do something which is accompanied with a danger which our equals fear to meet4 ,,xli4 ,a person is said to be pusillanimous whose desire is restrained by the fear of a danger which his equals dare to meet4 ,explanation4--,pusillanimity1 therefore1 is nothing but the dread of some evil which most persons do not usually fear1 and therefore ,i do not ascribe it to the emotions of desire4 ,i wished1 notwithstanding1 to explain it here1 because in so far as we attend to desire1 pusillanimity is the true opposite of the emotion of audacity4 ,,xlii4 ,consternation is affirmed of the man whose desire of avoiding evil is restrained by astonishment at the evil which he fears4 ,explanation4--,consternation is therefore a kind of pusillanimity4 ,but because consternation springs from a double fear1 it may be more aptly defined as that dread which holds a man stupefied or vacillating1 so that he cannot remove an evil4 ,i say stupefied1 in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his astonishment4 ,i say also vacillating1 in so far as we conceive the same desire to be restrained by the fear of another evil which equally tortures him1 so that he does not know which of the two evils to avoid4 ,,xliii4 ,courtesy or moderation is the desire of doing those things which please men and omitting those which displease them4 ,,xliv4 ,ambition is the immoderate desire of glory4 ,explanation4--,ambition is a desire which increases and strengthens all the emotions1 and that is the reason why it can hardly be kept under control4 ,for so long as a man is possessed by any desire1 he is necessarily at the same time possessed by this4 ,every noble man1 says ,cicero1 is led by glory1 and even the philosophers who write books about despising glory place their names on the title-page4 ,,xlv4 ,luxuriousness is the immoderate desire or love of good living4 ,,xlvi4 ,drunkenness is the immoderate desire and love of drinking4 ,,xlvii4 ,avarice is the immoderate desire and love of riches4 ,,xlviii4 ,lust is the immoderate desire and love of sexual intercourse4 ,explanation4--,this desire of sexual intercourse is usually called lust1 whether it be held within bounds or not4 ,i may add that the five last-mentioned emotions have no contraries1 for moderation is a kind of ambition1 and ,i have already observed that temperance1 sobriety1 and chastity show a power and not a passion of the mind4 ,even supposing that an avaricious1 ambitious1 or timid man refrains from an excess of eating1 drinking1 or sexual intercourse1 avarice1 ambition1 and fear are not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness1 drunkenness1 or lust4 ,for the avaricious man generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink as he can1 provided only it belong to another person4 ,the ambitious man1 too1 if he hopes he can keep it a secret1 will restrain himself in nothing1 and if he lives amongst drunkards and libertines1 will be more inclined to their vices just because he is ambitious4 ,the timid man1 too1 does what he does not will2 and although1 in order to avoid death1 he may throw his riches into the sea1 he remains avaricious2 nor does the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is sorry that he cannot gratify his desire4 ,absolutely1 therefore1 these emotions have reference not so much to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as to the appetite and love itself4 ,consequently nothing can be opposed to these emotions but nobility of soul and strength of mind1 as we shall see afterwards4 ,the definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind ,i pass over in silence1 both because they are compounded of the emotions which we have already defined1 and also because many of them have no names1--a fact which shows that1 for the purposes of life1 it is sufficient to know these combinations generally4 ,moreover1 it follows from the definitions of the emotions which we have explained that1 they all arise from desire1 joy1 or sorrow1 or rather that there are none but these three1 which pass under names varying as their relations and external signs vary4 ,if1 therefore1 we attend to these primitive emotions and to what has been said above about the nature of the mind1 we shall be able here to define the emotions in so far as they are related to the mind alone4 ,general definition of the emotions4--,emotion1 which is called animi pathema1 is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body1 or any part of it1 a greater or less power of existence than before2 and this increase of power being given1 the mind itself is determined to one particular thought rather than to another4 ,explanation4--,i say1 in the first place1 that an emotion or passion of the mind is a confused idea4 ,for we have shown that the mind suffers only in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas4 ,i say again1 by which the mind affirms of its body1 or any part of it1 a greater or less power of existence than before4 ,for all ideas which we possess of bodies indicate the actual constitution of our body rather than the nature of the external body2 but this idea1 which constitutes the form of an emotion1 must indicate or express the constitution of the body1 or of some part of it2 which constitution the body or any part of it possesses from the fact that its power of action or force of existence is increased or diminished1 helped or limited4 ,but it is to be observed1 that when ,i say a greater or less power of existence than before1 ,i do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past constitution of the body1 but that the idea which constitutes the form of emotion affirms something of the body which actually involves more or less reality than before4 ,moreover1 since the essence of the mind consists in its affirmation of the actual existence of its body1 and since we understand by perfection the essence itself of the thing1 it follows that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection when it is able to affirm of its body1 or some part of it1 something which involves a greater or less reality than before4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i have said that the mind's power of thought is increased or diminished1 ,i have wished to be understood as meaning nothing else than that the mind has formed an idea of its body1 or some part of its body1 which expresses more or less reality than it had hitherto affirmed of the body4 ,for the value of ideas and the actual power of thought are measured by the value of the object4 ,finally1 ,i added1 which being given1 the mind itself is determined to one particular thought rather than to another1 that ,i might also express the nature of desire in addition to that of joy and sorrow1 which is explained by the first part of the definition4 ,i have now1 ,i think1 explained the principal emotions and vacillations of the mind which are compounded of the three primary emotions1 desire1 joy1 and sorrow1 and have set them forth through their first causes4 ,from what has been said it is plain that we are disturbed by external causes in a number of ways1 and that1 like the waves of the sea agitated by contrary winds1 we fluctuate in our ignorance of our future and destiny4 ,i have said1 however1 that ,i have only explained the principal mental complications1 and not all which may exist4 ,for by the same method which we have pursued above it would be easy to show that love unites itself to repentance1 scorn1 shame1 etc42 but ,i think it has already been made clear to all that the emotions can be combined in so many ways1 and that so many variations can arise1 that no limits can be assigned to their number4 ,it is sufficient for my purpose to have enumerated only those which are of consequence2 the rest1 of which ,i have taken no notice1 being more curious than important4 ,there is one constantly recurring characteristic of love which ,i have yet to notice1 and that is1 that while we are enjoying the thing which we desired1 the body acquires from that fruition a new disposition by which it is otherwise determined1 and the images of other things are excited in it1 and the mind begins to imagine and to desire other things4 ,for example1 when we imagine anything which usually delights our taste1 we desire to enjoy it by eating it4 ,but whilst we enjoy it the stomach becomes full1 and the constitution of the body becomes altered4 ,if1 therefore1 the body being now otherwise disposed1 the image of the food1 in consequence of its being present1 and therefore also the effort or desire to eat it1 become more intense1 then this new disposition of the body will oppose this effort or desire1 and consequently the presence of the food which we desired will become hateful to us1 and this hatefulness is what we call loathing or disgust4 ,as for the external modifications of the body which are observed in the emotions1 such as trembling1 paleness1 sobbing1 laughter1 and the like1 ,i have neglected to notice them1 because they belong to the body alone without any relationship to the mind4 ,,footnotes3 #bf ,hence it follows that the mind is subject to passions in proportion to the number of inadequate ideas which it has1 and that it acts in proportion to the number of adequate ideas which it has4 #bg ,this proposition is self-evident1 for the definition of any given thing affirms and does not deny the existence of the thing2 that is to say1 it posits the essence of the thing and does not negate it4 ,so long1 therefore1 as we attend only to the thing itself1 and not to external causes1 we shall discover nothing in it which can destroy it4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,the ,association of the ,emotions ,if the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two bodies1 whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them1 it will immediately remember the other4 ,but the imaginations of the mind indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of external bodies1 and therefore if the body1 and consequently the mind1 has been at any time1 simultaneously affected by two emotions1 whenever it is afterwards affected by one of them1 it will also be affected by the other4 ,let the mind be supposed to be affected at the same time by two emotions1 its power of action not being increased or diminished by one1 while it is increased or diminished by the other4 ,from the preceding proposition it is plain that when the mind is afterwards affected by the first emotion through its true cause1 which 7by hypothesis7 of itself neither increases nor diminishes the mind's power of thinking1 it will at the same time be affected by the other emotion1 which does increase or diminish that power1 that is to say1 it will be affected with joy or sorrow2 and thus the thing itself will be the cause of joy or of sorrow1 not of itself1 but accidentally4 ,in the same way it can easily be shown that the same thing may accidentally be the cause of desire4 ,the fact that we have contemplated a thing with an emotion of joy or sorrow1 of which it is not the efficient cause1 is a sufficient reason for being able to love or hate it4 ,we now understand why we love or hate certain things from no cause which is known to us1 but merely from sympathy or antipathy1 as they say4 ,to this class1 too1 are to be referred those objects which affect us with joy or sorrow solely because they are somewhat like objects which usually affect us with those emotions4 ,i know indeed that the writers who first introduced the words ,sympathy and ,antipathy desired thereby to signify certain hidden qualities of things1 but nevertheless ,i believe that we shall be permitted to understand by those names qualities which are plain and well known4 ,anything may be accidentally the cause either of hope or fear4 ,things which are accidentally the causes either of hope or fear are called good or evil omens4 ,in so far as the omens are the cause of hope and fear are they the cause of joy or of sorrow1 and consequently so far do we love them or hate them1 and endeavor to use them as means to obtain those things for which we hope1 or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear4 ,our natural constitution1 too1 is such that we easily believe the things we hope for1 and believe with difficulty those we fear1 and we think too much of the former and too little of the latter4 ,thus have superstitions arisen1 by which men are everywhere disquieted4 ,i do not consider it worth while to go any further1 and to explain here all those vacillations of mind which arise from hope and fear1 since it follows from the definition alone of these emotions that hope cannot exist without fear1 nor fear without hope4 ,if we imagine a certain thing to possess something which resembles an object which usually affects the mind with joy or sorrow1 although the quality in which the thing resembles the object is not the efficient cause of these emotions1 we shall nevertheless1 by virtue of the resemblance alone1 love or hate the thing4 ,if we have been affected with joy or sorrow by any one who belongs to a class or nation different from our own1 and if our joy or sorrow is accompanied with the idea of this person as its cause1 under the common name of his class or nation1 we shall not love or hate him merely1 but the whole of the class or nation to which he belongs4 ,the ,imitation and ,reciprocation of the ,emotions ,i ,the images of things are modifications of the human body1 and the ideas of these modifications represent to us external bodies as if they were present1 that is to say1 these ideas involve both the nature of our own body and at the same time the present nature of the external body4 ,if1 therefore1 the nature of the external body be like that of our body1 then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve a modification of our body like that of the external body4 ,therefore1 if we imagine any one who is like ourselves to be affected by a modification1 this imagination will express a modification of our body like that modification1 and therefore we shall be modified with a similar modification ourselves1 because we imagine something like us to be modified with the same4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we hate a thing which is like ourselves1 we shall so far be modified by a modification contrary and not similar to that with which it is modified4 ,if we imagine that a person enjoys a thing1 that will be a sufficient reason for making us love the thing and desiring to enjoy it4 ,if we imagine that a person enjoys a thing which only one can possess1 we do all we can to prevent his possessing it4 ,his enjoyment of the thing is an obstacle to our joy1 and we endeavor to bring into existence everything which we imagine conduces to joy1 and to remove or destroy everything opposed to it1 or which we imagine conduces to sorrow4 ,we see1 therefore1 that the nature of man is generally constituted so as to pity those who are in adversity and envy those who are in prosperity1 and he envies with a hatred which is the greater in proportion as he loves what he imagines another possesses4 ,we see also that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men pity one another it also follows that they are envious and ambitious4 ,if we will consult experience1 we shall find that she teaches the same doctrine1 especially if we consider the first years of our life4 ,for we find that children1 because their body is1 as it were1 continually in equilibrium1 laugh and cry merely because they see others do the same2 whatever else they see others do they immediately wish to imitate2 everything which they think is pleasing to other people they want4 ,and the reason is1 as we have said1 that the images of things are the modifications themselves of the human body1 or the ways in which it is modified by external causes and disposed to this or that action4 ,,ii ,if we imagine that we are hated by another without having given him any cause for it1 we shall hate him in return4 ,if we imagine that we have given just cause for the hatred1 we shall then be affected with shame4 ,this1 however1 rarely happens2 we endeavor to affirm everything1 both concerning ourselves and concerning the beloved object which we imagine will affect us or the object with joy1 and1 on the contrary1 we endeavor to deny everything that will affect either it or ourselves with sorrow4 ,this reciprocity of hatred may also arise from the fact that hatred is followed by an attempt to bring evil upon him who is hated4 ,if1 therefore1 we imagine that we are hated by any one else1 we shall imagine him as the cause of some evil or sorrow1 and thus we shall be affected with sorrow or apprehension accompanied with the idea of the person who hates us as a cause2 that is to say1 we shall hate him in return1 as we have said above4 ,if we imagine that the person we love is affected with hatred towards us1 we shall be agitated at the same time both with love and hatred4 ,for in so far as we imagine that we are hated are we determined to hate him in return4 ,but 7by hypothesis7 we love him notwithstanding1 and therefore we shall be agitated both by love and hatred4 ,if we imagine that an evil has been brought upon us through the hatred of some person towards whom we have hitherto been moved by no emotion1 we shall immediately endeavor to return that evil upon him4 ,if we imagine that any one like ourselves is affected with hatred towards an object like ourselves which we love1 we shall hate him4 ,if we imagine that we are beloved by a person without having given any cause for the love we shall love him in return4 ,if we imagine that we have given just cause for love1 we shall pride ourselves upon it4 ,this frequently occurs1 and we have said that the contrary takes place when we believe that we are hated by another person4 ,this reciprocal love1 and consequently this attempt to do good to the person who loves us1 and who endeavors to do good to us1 is called thankfulness or gratitude1 and from this we can see how much readier men are to revenge themselves than to return a benefit4 ,if we imagine that we are loved by a person we hate1 we shall at the same time be agitated both by love and hatred4 ,if the hatred prevail1 we shall endeavor to bring evil upon the person by whom we are loved4 ,this emotion is called ,cruelty1 especially if it is believed that the person who loves has not given any ordinary reason for hatred4 ,the ,herd ,instinct ,if we imagine men to love or hate a thing1 we shall therefore love or hate it2 that is to say1 we shall therefore rejoice or be sad at the presence of the thing1 and therefore we shall endeavor to do everything which we imagine men#bh will look upon with joy1 and1 on the contrary1 we shall be averse to doing anything to which we imagine men are averse4 ,he who imagines that he affects others with joy or sorrow will necessarily be affected with joy or sorrow4 ,but since man is conscious of himself by means of the emotions by which he is determined to act2 therefore if a person has done anything which he imagines will affect others with joy1 he also will be affected with joy1 accompanied with an idea of himself as its cause2 that is to say1 he will look upon himself with joy4 ,if1 on the other hand1 he has done anything which he imagines will affect others with sorrow1 he will look upon himself with sorrow4 ,if we imagine that a person loves1 desires1 or hates a thing which we ourselves love1 desire1 or hate1 we shall on that account love1 desire1 or hate the thing more steadily4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we imagine that he is averse to the thing we love or loves the thing to which we are averse1 we shall then suffer vacillation of mind4 ,it follows from this proposition that every one endeavors as much as possible to make others love what he loves1 and to hate what he hates4 ,hence the poet says3 ,speremus pariter1 pariter metuamus amantes2 ,ferreus est1 si quis1 quod sinit alter1 amat4 ,this effort to make every one approve what we love or hate is in truth ambition1 and so we see that each person by nature desires that other persons should live according to his way of thinking2 but if every one does this1 then all are a hindrance to one another1 and if every one wishes to be praised or beloved by the rest1 then they all hate one another4 ,the ,varieties of ,emotion ,joy and sorrow1 and consequently the emotions which are compounded of these or derived from them1 are passions4 ,but we necessarily suffer in so far as we have inadequate ideas1 and only in so far as we have them2 that is to say1 we necessarily suffer only in so far as we imagine1 or in so far as we are affected by a modification which involves the nature of our body and that of an external body4 ,the nature1 therefore1 of each passion must necessarily be explained in such a manner1 that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed4 ,the joy1 for example1 which springs from an object ,a involves the nature of that object ,a1 and the joy which springs from ,b involves the nature of that object ,b1 and therefore these two emotions of joy are of a different nature1 because they arise from causes of a different nature4 ,in like manner the emotion of sorrow which arises from one object is of a different kind from that which arises from another cause1 and the same thing is to be understood of love1 hatred1 hope1 fear1 vacillation of mind1 etc42 so that there are necessarily just as many kinds of joy1 sorrow1 love1 hatred1 etc41 as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected4 ,but desire is the essence itself or nature of a person in so far as this nature is conceived from its given constitution as determined towards any action1 and therefore as a person is affected by external causes with this or that kind of joy1 sorrow1 love1 hatred1 etc41 that is to say1 as his nature is constituted in this or that way1 so must his desire vary and the nature of one desire differ from that of another1 just as the emotions from which each desire arises differ4 ,there are as many kinds of desires1 therefore1 as there are kinds of joy1 sorrow1 love1 etc41 and1 consequently 7as we have just shown71 as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected4 ,all emotions are related to desire1 joy1 or sorrow1 as the definitions show which we have given of those emotions4 ,but desire is the very nature or essence of a person and therefore the desire of one person differs from the desire of another as much as the nature or essence of the one differs from that of the other4 ,again1 joy and sorrow are passions by which the power of a person or his effort to persevere in his own being is increased or diminished1 helped1 or limited4 ,but by the effort to persevere in his own being1 in so far as it is related at the same time to the mind and the body1 we understand appetite and desire1 and therefore joy and sorrow are desire or appetite in so far as the latter is increased1 diminished1 helped1 or limited by external causes2 that is to say they are the nature itself of each person4 ,the joy or sorrow of one person therefore differs from the joy or sorrow of another as much as the nature or essence of one person differs from that of the other1 and consequently the emotion of one person differs from the corresponding emotion of another4 ,hence it follows that the emotions of animals which are called irrational 7for after we have learned the origin of the mind we can in no way doubt that brutes feel7 differ from human emotions as much as the nature of a brute differs from that of a man4 ,both the man and the horse1 for example1 are swayed by the lust to propagate1 but the horse is swayed by equine lust and the man by that which is human4 ,the lusts and appetites of insects1 fishes1 and birds must vary in the same way2 and so1 although each individual lives contented with its own nature and delights in it1 nevertheless the life with which it is contented and its joy are nothing but the idea or soul of that individual1 and so the joy of one differs in character from the joy of the other as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other4 ,finally1 it follows from the preceding proposition that the joy by which the drunkard is enslaved is altogether different from the joy which is the portion of the philosopher1--a thing ,i wished just to hint in passing4 ,the ,inconstancy of the ,emotions ,the human body is affected by external bodies in a number of ways4 ,two men1 therefore1 may be affected in different ways at the same time1 and therefore they can be affected by one and the same object in different ways4 ,again the human body may be affected now in this and now in that way1 and consequently it may be affected by one and the same object in different ways at different times4 ,we thus see that it is possible for one man to love a thing and for another man to hate it2 for this man to fear what this man does not fear1 and for the same man to love what before he hated1 and to dare to do what before he feared4 ,again1 since each judges according to his own emotion what is good and what is evil1 what is better and what is worse1 it follows that men may change in their judgment as they do in their emotions1 and hence it comes to pass that when we compare men1 we distinguish them solely by the difference in their emotions1 calling some brave1 others timid1 and others by other names4 ,for example1 ,i shall call a man brave who despises an evil which ,i usually fear1 and if1 besides this1 ,i consider the fact that his desire of doing evil to a person whom he hates or doing good to one whom he loves is not restrained by that fear of evil by which ,i am usually restrained1 ,i call him audacious4 ,on the other hand1 the man who fears an evil which ,i usually despise will appear timid1 and if1 besides this1 ,i consider that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil which has no power to restrain me1 ,i call him pusillanimous2 and in this way everybody will pass judgment4 ,finally1 from this nature of man and the inconstancy of his judgment1 in consequence of which he often judges things from mere emotion1 and the things which he believes contribute to his joy or his sorrow1 and which1 therefore1 he endeavors to bring to pass or remove1 are often only imaginary--to say nothing about the uncertainty of things--it is easy to see that a man may often be himself the cause of his sorrow or his joy1 or of being affected with sorrow or joy accompanied with the idea of himself as its cause1 so that we can easily understand what repentance and what self-approval are4 ,love and hatred towards any object1 for example1 towards ,peter1 are destroyed if the joy and the sorrow which they respectively involve be joined to the idea of another cause2 and they are respectively diminished in proportion as we imagine that ,peter has not been their sole cause4 ,for the same reason1 love or hatred towards an object we imagine to be free must be greater than towards an object which is under necessity4 ,an object which we imagine to be free must be perceived through itself and without others4 ,if1 therefore1 we imagine it to be the cause of joy or sorrow1 we shall for that reason alone love or hate it1 and that too with the greatest love or the greatest hatred which can spring from the given emotion4 ,but if we imagine that the object which is the cause of that emotion is necessary1 then we shall imagine it as the cause of that emotion1 not alone1 but together with other causes1 and so our love or hatred towards it will be less4 ,hence it follows that our hatred or love towards one another is greater than towards other things1 because we think we are free4 ,the ,power of ,love ,over ,hate ,if we imagine that the person we hate is affected with hatred towards us1 a new hatred is thereby produced1 the old hatred still remaining 7by hypothesis74 ,if1 on the other hand1 we imagine him to be affected with love towards us1 in so far as we imagine it shall we look upon ourselves with joy1 and endeavor to please him2 that is to say1 in so far shall we endeavor not to hate him nor to affect him with sorrow4 ,this effort will be greater or less as the emotion from which it arises is greater or less1 and1 therefore1 should it be greater than that which springs from hatred1 and by which we endeavor to affect with sorrow the object we hate1 then it will prevail and banish hatred from the mind4 ,hatred is increased through return of hatred1 but may be destroyed by love4 ,hatred which is altogether overcome by love passes into love1 and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it4 ,for if we begin to love a thing which we hated1 or upon which we were in the habit of looking with sorrow1 we shall rejoice for the very reason that we love1 and to this joy which love involves a new joy is added1 which springs from the fact that the effort to remove the sorrow which hatred involves1 is so much assisted1 there being also present before us as the cause of our joy the idea of the person whom we hated4 ,notwithstanding the truth of this proposition1 no one will try to hate a thing or will wish to be affected with sorrow in order that he may rejoice the more2 that is to say1 no one will desire to inflict loss on himself in the hope of recovering the loss1 or to become ill in the hope of getting well1 inasmuch as every one will always try to preserve his being and to remove sorrow from himself as much as possible4 ,moreover1 if it can be imagined that it is possible for us to desire to hate a person in order that we may love him afterwards the more1 we must always desire to continue the hatred4 ,for the love will be the greater as the hatred has been greater1 and therefore we shall always desire the hatred to be more and more increased4 ,upon the same principle we shall desire that our sickness may continue and increase in order that we may afterwards enjoy the greater pleasure when we get well1 and therefore we shall always desire sickness1 which is absurd4 ,,footnotes3 #bh ,both here and in what follows to whom we are moved by no emotion ,i understand by the word men1 men 7,sp474 ,,third ,,part ,,on ,,man',s ,,well-,,being ,all happiness or unhappiness solely depends upon the quality of the object to which we are attached by love4 ,love for an object eternal and infinite feeds the mind with joy alone1 a joy that is free from all sorrow4 ,,spinoza4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,of ,,human ,,bondage ,introductory ,the impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions ,i call bondage1 for a man who is under their control is not his own master1 but is mastered by fortune1 in whose power he is1 so that he is often forced to follow the worse1 although he sees the better before him4 ,i propose in this part to demonstrate why this is1 and also to show what of good and evil the emotions possess4 ,but before ,i begin ,i should like to say a few words about perfection and imperfection1 and about good and evil4 ,if a man has proposed to do a thing and has accomplished it1 he calls it perfect1 and not only he1 but every one else who has really known or has believed that he has known the mind and intention of the author of that work will call it perfect too4 ,for example1 having seen some work 7which ,i suppose to be as yet not finished71 if we know that the intention of the author of that work is to build a house1 we shall call the house imperfect2 while1 on the other hand1 we shall call it perfect as soon as we see the work has been brought to the end which the author had determined for it4 ,but if we see any work such as we have never seen before1 and if we do not know the mind of the workman1 we shall then not be able to say whether the work is perfect or imperfect4 ,this seems to have been the first signification of these words2 but afterwards men began to form universal ideas1 to think out for themselves types of houses1 buildings1 castles1 and to prefer some types of things to others2 and so it happened that each person called a thing perfect which seemed to agree with the universal idea which he had formed of that thing1 and1 on the other hand1 he called a thing imperfect which seemed to agree less with his typal conception1 although1 according to the intention of the workman1 it had been entirely completed4 ,this appears to be the only reason why the words perfect and imperfect are commonly applied to natural objects which are not made with human hands2 for men are in the habit of forming1 both of natural as well as of artificial objects1 universal ideas which they regard as types of things1 and which they think ,nature has in view1 setting them before herself as types too2 it being the common opinion that she does nothing except for the sake of some end4 ,when1 therefore1 men see something done by ,nature which does not altogether answer to that typal conception which they have of the thing1 they think that ,nature herself has failed or committed an error1 and that she has left the thing imperfect4 ,thus we see that the custom of applying the words perfect and imperfect to natural objects has arisen rather from prejudice than from true knowledge of them4 ,for we have shown that ,nature does nothing for the sake of an end1 for that eternal and infinite ,being whom we call ,god or ,nature acts by the same necessity by which ,he exists2 for we have shown that ,he acts by the same necessity of nature as that by which ,he exists4 ,the reason or cause1 therefore1 why ,god or ,nature acts and the reason why ,he exists are one and the same4 ,since1 therefore1 ,he exists for no end1 ,he acts for no end2 and since ,he has no principle or end of existence1 ,he has no principle or end of action4 ,a final cause1 as it is called1 is nothing1 therefore1 but human desire1 in so far as this is considered as the principle or primary cause of anything4 ,for example1 when we say that the having a house to live in was the final cause of this or that house1 we merely mean that a man1 because he imagined the advantages of a domestic life1 desired to build a house4 ,therefore1 having a house to live in1 in so far as it is considered as a final cause1 is merely this particular desire1 which is really an efficient cause1 and is considered as primary1 because men are usually ignorant of the causes of their desires2 for1 as ,i have often said1 we are conscious of our actions and desires1 but ignorant of the causes by which we are determined to desire anything4 ,as for the vulgar opinion that ,nature sometimes fails or commits an error1 or produces imperfect things1 ,i class it amongst those fictions mentioned above4#bi ,perfection1 therefore1 and imperfection are really only modes of thought2 that is to say1 notions which we are in the habit of forming from the comparison with one another of individuals of the same species or genus1 and this is the reason why ,i have said that by reality and perfection ,i understand the same thing2 for we are in the habit of referring all individuals in ,nature to one genus1 which is called the most general2 that is to say1 to the notion of being1 which embraces absolutely all the individual objects in ,nature4 ,in so far1 therefore1 as we refer the individual objects in ,nature to this genus1 and compare them one with another1 and discover that some possess more being or reality than others1 in so far do we call some more perfect than others2 and in so far as we assign to the latter anything which1 like limitation1 termination1 impotence1 etc41 involves negation1 shall we call them imperfect1 because they do not affect our minds so strongly as those we call perfect1 but not because anything which really belongs to them is wanting1 or because ,nature has committed an error4 ,for nothing belongs to the nature of anything excepting that which follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause1 and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily happens4 ,with regard to good and evil1 these terms indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves1 nor are they anything else than modes of thought1 or notions which we form from the comparison of one thing with another4 ,for one and the same thing may at the same time be both good and evil or indifferent4 ,music1 for example1 is good to a melancholy person1 bad to one mourning1 while to a deaf man it is neither good nor bad4 ,but although things are so1 we must retain these words4 ,for since we desire to form for ourselves an idea of man upon which we may look as a model of human nature1 it will be of service to us to retain these expressions in the sense ,i have mentioned4 ,by good1 therefore1 ,i understand in the following pages everything which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we set before us4 ,by evil1 on the contrary1 ,i understand everything which we are certain hinders us from reaching that model4 ,again1 ,i shall call men more or less perfect or imperfect in so far as they approach more or less nearly to this same model4 ,for it is to be carefully observed1 that when ,i say that an individual passes from a less to a greater perfection and vice versa1 ,i do not understand that from one essence or form he is changed into another 7for a horse1 for instance1 would be as much destroyed if it were changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect71 but rather we conceive that his power of action1 in so far as it is understood by his own nature1 is increased or diminished4 ,finally1 by perfection generally1 ,i understand1 as ,i have said1 reality2 that is to say1 the essence of any object in so far as it exists and acts in a certain manner1 no regard being paid to its duration4 ,for no individual thing can be said to be more perfect because for a longer time it has persevered in existence2 inasmuch as the duration of things cannot be determined by their essence1 the essence of things involving no fixed or determined period of existence2 any object1 whether it be more or less perfect1 always being able to persevere in existence with the same force as that with which it commenced existence4 ,all things1 therefore1 are equal in this respect4 ,definitions ,i4--,by good1 ,i understand that which we certainly know is useful to us4 ,,ii4 ,by evil1 on the contrary1 ,i understand that which we certainly know hinders us from possessing anything that is good4 ,with regard to these two definitions1 see the close of the preceding4 ,,iii4 ,i call individual things contingent in so far as we discover nothing1 whilst we attend to their essence alone1 which necessarily posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it4 ,,iv4 ,i call these individual things possible1 in so far as we are ignorant1 whilst we attend to the cause from which they must be produced1 whether these causes are determined to the production of these things4 ,v4 ,by contrary emotions1 ,i understand in the following pages those which1 although they may be of the same kind1 draw a man in different directions2 such as voluptuousness and avarice1 which are both a species of love1 and are not contrary to one another by nature1 but only by accident4 ,,vi4 ,i here call a thing past or future in so far as we have been or shall be affected by it2 for example1 in so far as we have seen a thing or are about to see it1 in so far as it has strengthened us or will strengthen us1 has injured or will injure us4 ,for in so far as we thus imagine it do we affirm its existence2 that is to say1 the body is affected by no mode which excludes the existence of the thing1 and therefore the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present4 ,but because it generally happens that those who possess much experience hesitate when they think of a thing as past or future1 and doubt greatly concerning its issue1 therefore the emotions which spring from such images of things are not so constant1 but are generally disturbed by the images of other things1 until men become more sure of the issue4 ,however1 it is to be observed that it is the same with time as it is with place2 for as beyond a certain limit we can form no distinct imagination of distance--that is to say1 as we usually imagine all objects to be equally distant from us1 and as if they were on the same plane1 if their distance from us exceeds #bjj feet1 or if their distance from the position we occupy is greater than we can distinctly imagine--so we imagine all objects to be equally distant from the present time1 and refer them as if to one moment1 if the period to which their existence belongs is separated from the present by a longer interval than we can usually imagine distinctly4 ,,vii4 ,by end for the sake of which we do anything1 ,i understand appetite4 ,,viii4 ,by virtue and power1 ,i understand the same thing2 that is to say1 virtue1 in so far as it is related to man1 is the essence itself or nature of the man in so far as it has the power of effecting certain things which can be understood through the laws of its nature alone4 ,axiom ,there is no individual thing in ,nature which is not surpassed in strength and power by some other thing2 but any individual thing being given1 another and a stronger is also given1 by which the former can be destroyed4 ,man's ,place in ,nature ,the power by which individual things and1 consequently1 man preserve their being is the actual power of ,god or ,nature1 not in so far as it is infinite1 but in so far as it can be manifested by the actual essence of man4 ,the power therefore of man1 in so far as it is manifested by his actual essence is part of the infinite power of ,god or ,nature1 that is to say1 part of ,his essence4 ,again1 if it were possible that man could suffer no changes but those which can be understood through his nature alone1 it would follow that he could not perish1 but that he would exist forever necessarily2 and this necessary existence must result from a cause whose power is either finite or infinite1 that is to say1 either from the power of man alone1 which would be able to place at a distance from himself all other changes which could take their origin from external causes1 or it must result from the infinite power of ,nature by which all individual things would be so directed that man could suffer no changes but those tending to his preservation4 ,but the first case is absurd4 ,the force by which man perseveres in existence is limited1 and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes4 ,this is evident from the ,axiom4 ,therefore if it were possible for a man to suffer no changes but those which could be understood through his own nature alone1 and consequently 7as we have shown7 that he should always necessarily exist1 this must follow from the infinite power of ,god2 and therefore from the necessity of the divine nature1 in so far as it is considered as affected by the idea of any one man1 the whole order of ,nature1 in so far as it is conceived under the attributes of thought and extension1 would have to be deduced4 ,from this it would follow that man would be infinite1 which 7by the first part of this demonstration7 is an absurdity4 ,it is impossible1 therefore1 that a man can suffer no changes but those of which he is the adequate cause4 ,hence it follows that a man is necessarily always subject to passions1 and that he follows and obeys the common order of ,nature1 accommodating himself to it as far as the nature of things requires4 ,the force and increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence are not limited by the power by which we endeavor to persevere in existence1 but by the power of an external cause compared with our own power4 ,the ,nature of ,good and ,evil ,we call a thing good which contributes to the preservation of our being1 and we call a thing evil if it is an obstacle to the preservation of our being2 that is to say1 a thing is called by us good or evil as it increases or diminishes1 helps or restrains1 our power of action4 ,in so far1 therefore1 as we perceive that any object affects us with joy or sorrow do we call it good or evil1 and therefore the knowledge of good or evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sorrow which necessarily follows from the emotion itself of joy or sorrow4 ,but this idea is united to the emotion in the same way as the mind is united to the body1 or1 in other words1 this idea is not actually distinguished from the emotion itself2 that is to say1 it is not actually distinguished from the idea of the modification of the body1 unless in conception alone4 ,this knowledge1 therefore1 of good and evil is nothing but the emotion itself of joy and sorrow in so far as we are conscious of it4 ,the ,control of the ,emotions ,an emotion1 in so far as it is related to the mind1 is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or less power of existence for its body than the body possessed before4 ,whenever1 therefore1 the mind is agitated by any emotion1 the body is at the same time affected with a modification by which its power of action is increased or diminished4 ,again1 this modification of the body receives from its own cause a power to persevere in its own being1 a power1 therefore1 which cannot be restrained nor removed unless by a bodily cause affecting the body with a modification contrary to the first1 and stronger than it4 ,thus the mind is affected by the idea of a modification stronger than the former and contrary to it2 that is to say1 it will be affected with an emotion stronger than the former and contrary to it1 and this stronger emotion will exclude the existence of the other or remove it4 ,thus an emotion cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger emotion4 ,an emotion1 in so far as it is related to the mind1 cannot be restrained nor removed unless by the idea of a bodily modification opposed to that which we suffer and stronger than it4 ,for the emotion which we suffer cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger emotion2 that is to say1 it cannot be removed unless by the idea of a bodily modification stronger than that which affects us1 and opposed to it4 ,the force and increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence are limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own power and therefore the other actions or power of a man may be so far surpassed by force of some passion or emotion1 that the emotion may obstinately cling to him4 ,an emotion is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or less power of existence for the body than it possessed before1 and therefore this idea has nothing positive which can be removed by the presence of the truth1 and consequently the true knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as it is true1 can restrain no emotion4 ,but in so far as it is an emotion will it restrain any other emotion1 provided that the latter be the weaker of the two4 ,from the true knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as this is an emotion1 necessarily arises desire1 which is greater in proportion as the emotion from which it springs is greater4 ,but this desire 7by hypothesis71 because it springs from our understanding1 something truly follows therefore in us in so far as we act1 and therefore must be understood through our essence alone1 and consequently its strength and increase must be limited by human power alone4 ,but the desires which spring from the emotions by which we are agitated are greater as the emotions themselves are greater1 and therefore their strength and increase must be limited by the power of external causes1 a power which1 if it be compared with our own1 indefinitely surpasses it4 ,the desires1 therefore1 which take their origin from such emotions as these may be much stronger than that which takes its origin from a true knowledge of good and evil1 and the former may be able to restrain and extinguish the latter4 ,desire is the very essence of man1 that is to say1 the effort by which a man strives to persevere in his being4 ,the desire1 therefore1 which springs from joy1 by that very emotion of joy is assisted or increased1 while that which springs from sorrow1 by that very emotion of sorrow is lessened or restrained1 and so the force of the desire which springs from joy must be limited by human power1 together with the power of an external cause1 while that which springs from sorrow must be limited by human power alone4 ,the latter is1 therefore1 weaker than the former4 ,how the ,strength of the ,emotions ,varies ,i ,the imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates an object as present1 an idea which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the human body rather than the nature of the external object4 ,imagination1 therefore1 is an emotion in so far as it indicates the constitution of the body4 ,but the imagination increases in intensity in proportion as we imagine nothing which excludes the present existence of the external object4 ,if1 therefore1 we imagine the cause of an emotion to be actually present with us1 that emotion will be intenser or stronger than if we imagined the cause not to be present4 ,when ,i said that we are affected by the image of an object in the future or the past with the same emotion with which we should be affected if the object we imagined were actually present1 ,i was careful to warn the reader that this was true in so far only as we attend to the image alone of the object itself1 for the image is of the same nature whether we have imagined the object or not2 but ,i have not denied that the image becomes weaker when we contemplate as present other objects which exclude the present existence of the future object4 ,the image of a past or future object1 that is to say1 of an object which we contemplate in relation to the past or future to the exclusion of the present1 other things being equal1 is weaker than the image of a present object1 and consequently the emotion towards a future or past object1 other things being equal1 is weaker then than the emotion towards a present object4 ,the desire which springs from a knowledge of good and evil can be easily extinguished or restrained1 in so far as this knowledge is connected with the future1 by the desire of things which in the present are sweet4 ,,ii ,in so far as we imagine any object to be necessary do we affirm its existence1 and1 on the other hand1 we deny its existence in so far as we imagine it to be not necessary and therefore the emotion towards an object which we imagine as necessary1 other things being equal1 is stronger than that towards an object that is possible1 contingent1 or not necessary4 ,in so far as we imagine an object as contingent1 we are not affected by the image of any other object which posits the existence of the first1 but1 on the contrary 7by hypothesis71 we imagine some things which exclude its present existence4 ,but in so far as we imagine any object in the future to be possible do we imagine some things which posit its existence1 that is to say1 things which foster hope or fear1 and therefore the emotion towards an object which we know does not exist in the present1 and which we imagine as possible1 other things being equal1 is stronger than the emotion towards a contingent object4 ,the emotion towards an object which we imagine to exist in the present is stronger than if we imagined it as future1 and is much stronger if we imagine the future to be at a great distance from the present time4 ,the emotion1 therefore1 towards an object which we imagine will not exist for a long time is so much feebler than if we imagined it as present1 and nevertheless is stronger than if we imagined it as contingent2 and therefore the emotion towards a contingent object is much feebler than if we imagined the object to be present to us4 ,in so far as we imagine an object as contingent1 we are affected with no image of any other object which posits the existence of the first4 ,on the contrary1 we imagine 7by hypothesis7 certain things which exclude its present existence4 ,but in so far as we imagine it in relationship to past time are we supposed to imagine something which brings it back to the memory or which excites its image and therefore so far causes us to contemplate it as present4 ,therefore1 the emotion towards a contingent object which we know does not exist in the present1 other things being equal1 will be weaker than the emotion towards a past object4 ,in these propositions ,i consider that ,i have explained why men are more strongly influenced by an opinion than by true reason1 and why the true knowledge of good and evil causes disturbance in the mind1 and often gives way to every kind of lust1 whence the saying of the poet1 ,video meliora proboque1 deteriora sequor4 ,the same thought appears to have been in the mind of the ,preacher when he said1 ,he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow4 ,i say these things not because ,i would be understood to conclude1 therefore1 that it is better to be ignorant than to be wise1 or that the wise man in governing his passions is nothing better than the fool1 but ,i say them because it is necessary for us to know both the strength and weakness of our nature1 so that we may determine what reason can do and what it cannot do in governing our emotions4 ,,footnotes3 #bi ,chapter ,eight ad fin4 ,,chapter ,,xv ,,the ,,foundations ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,life ,introductory ,i have briefly explained the causes of human impotence and want of stability1 and why men do not obey the dictates of reason4 ,it remains for me now to show what it is which reason prescribes to us1 which emotions agree with the rules of human reason1 and which1 on the contrary1 are opposed to these rules4 ,before1 however1 ,i begin to demonstrate these things by our full method1 ,i should like briefly to set forth here these dictates of reason1 in order that what ,i have in my mind about them may be easily comprehended by all4 ,since reason demands nothing which is opposed to ,nature1 it demands1 therefore1 that every person should love himself1 should seek his own profit--what is truly profitable to him--should desire everything that really leads man to greater perfection1 and absolutely that every one should endeavor1 as far as in him lies1 to preserve his own being4 ,this is all true as necessarily as that the whole is greater than its part4 ,again1 since virtue means nothing but acting according to the laws of our own nature1 and since no one endeavors to preserve his being except in accordance with the laws of his own nature1 it follows3 ,firstly1 ,that the foundation of virtue is that endeavor itself to preserve our own being1 and that happiness consists in this--that a man can preserve his own being4 ,secondly1 ,it follows that virtue is to be desired for its own sake1 nor is there anything more excellent or more useful to us than virtue1 for the sake of which virtue ought to be desired4 ,thirdly1 ,it follows that all persons who kill themselves are impotent in mind1 and have been thoroughly overcome by external causes opposed to their nature4 ,again1 we can never free ourselves from the need of something outside us for the preservation of our being1 and we can never live in such a manner as to have no intercourse with objects which are outside us4 ,indeed1 so far as the mind is concerned1 our intellect would be less perfect if the mind were alone1 and understood nothing but itself4 ,there are many things1 therefore1 outside us which are useful to us1 and which1 therefore1 are to be sought4 ,of all these1 none more excellent can be discovered than those which exactly agree with our nature4 ,if1 for example1 two individuals of exactly the same nature are joined together1 they make up a single individual1 doubly stronger than each alone4 ,nothing1 therefore1 is more useful to man than man4 ,men can desire1 ,i say1 nothing more excellent for the preservation of their being than that all should so agree at every point that the minds and bodies of all should form1 as it were1 one mind and one body2 that all should together endeavor as much as possible to preserve their being1 and that all should together seek the common good of all4 ,from this it follows that men who are governed by reason--that is to say1 men who1 under the guidance of reason1 seek their own profit--desire nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men1 and that1 therefore1 they are just1 faithful1 and honorable4 ,these are those dictates of reason which ,i purposed briefly to set forth before commencing their demonstration by a fuller method1 in order that1 if possible1 ,i might win the attention of those who believe that this principle--that every one is bound to seek his own profit--is the foundation of impiety1 and not of virtue and piety4 ,the ,essence of ,virtue ,i ,according to the laws of his own nature each person necessarily desires that which he considers to be good1 and avoids that which he considers to be evil4 ,the more each person strives and is able to seek his own profit1 that is to say1 to preserve his being1 the more virtue does he possess2 on the other hand1 in so far as each person neglects his own profit1 that is to say1 neglects to preserve his own being1 is he impotent4 ,no one1 therefore1 unless defeated by external causes and those which are contrary to his nature1 neglects to seek his own profit or preserve his being4 ,no one1 ,i say1 refuses food or kills himself from a necessity of his nature1 but only when forced by external causes4 ,the compulsion may be exercised in many ways4 ,a man kills himself under compulsion by another when that other turns the right hand1 with which the man had by chance laid hold of a sword1 and compels him to direct the sword against his own heart2 or the command of a tyrant may compel a man1 as it did ,seneca1 to open his own veins1 that is to say1 he may desire to avoid a greater evil by a less4 ,external and hidden causes also may so dispose his imagination and may so affect his body as to cause it to put on another nature contrary to that which it had at first1 and one whose idea cannot exist in the mind2 but a very little reflection will show that it is as impossible that a man1 from the necessity of his nature1 should endeavor not to exist1 or to be changed into some other form1 as it is that something should be begotten from nothing4 ,the endeavor after self-preservation is the essence itself of a thing4 ,if1 therefore1 any virtue could be conceived prior to this of self-preservation1 the essence itself of the thing would be conceived as prior to itself1 which 7as is self-evident7 is absurd4 ,the endeavor after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue4 ,for prior to this principle no other can be conceived1 and without it no virtue can be conceived4 ,no one endeavors to preserve his own being for the sake of another object4 ,for if a man endeavored to preserve his being for the sake of any other object1 this object would then become the primary foundation of virtue 7as is self-evident71 which is an absurdity4 ,no one can desire to be happy1 to act well and live well1 who does not at the same time desire to be1 to act1 and to live1 that is to say1 actually to exist4 ,,ii ,to act absolutely in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting according to the laws of our own proper nature4 ,but only in so far as we understand do we act4 ,therefore1 to act in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting1 living1 and preserving our being as reason directs1 and doing so from the ground of seeking our own profit4#cj ,in so far as a man is determined to action because he has inadequate ideas he suffers1 that is to say1 he does something which through his essence alone cannot be perceived1 that is to say1 which does not follow from his virtue4 ,but in so far as he is determined to any action because he understands1 he acts1 that is to say he does something which is perceived through his essence alone1 or which adequately follows from his virtue4 ,the ,highest ,virtue of ,reason ,all efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to understand1 and the mind1 in so far as it uses reason1 adjudges nothing as profitable to itself excepting that which conduces to understanding4 ,the mind1 in so far as it reasons1 desires nothing but to understand1 nor does it adjudge anything to be profitable to itself excepting what conduces to understanding4 ,but the mind possesses no certitude1 unless in so far as it possesses adequate ideas1 or in so far as it reasons4 ,we do not know1 therefore1 that anything is certainly good1 excepting that which actually conduces to understanding1 and1 on the other hand1 we do not know that anything is evil excepting that which can hinder us from understanding4 ,the highest thing which the mind can understand is ,god1 that is to say1 ,being absolutely infinite1 and without whom nothing can be nor can be conceived1 and therefore that which is chiefly profitable to the mind1 or which is the highest good of the mind1 is the knowledge of ,god4 ,again1 the mind acts only in so far as it understands and only in so far can it be absolutely said to act in conformity with virtue4 ,to understand1 therefore1 is the absolute virtue of the mind4 ,but the highest thing which the mind can understand is ,god 7as we have already demonstrated71 and therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or know ,god4 ,,the ,,moral ,,value ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,i ,general ,principles ,that which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many ways1 or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways1 is profitable to man1 and is more profitable in proportion as by its means the body becomes better fitted to be affected in many ways1 and to affect other bodies2 on the other hand1 that thing is injurious which renders the body less fitted to affect or be affected4 ,whatever is effective to preserve the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the human body bear to each other is good1 and1 on the contrary1 that is evil which causes the parts of the human body to have a different proportion of motion and rest to each other4 ,in what degree these things may injure or profit the mind will be explained below4 ,here ,i observe merely that ,i understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed as to acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to each other4 ,for ,i dare not deny that the human body1 though the circulation of the blood and the other things by means of which it is thought to live be preserved1 may1 nevertheless1 be changed into another nature altogether different from its own4 ,no reason compels me to affirm that the body never dies unless it is changed into a corpse4 ,experience1 indeed1 seems to teach the contrary4 ,it happens sometimes that a man undergoes such changes that he cannot very well be said to be the same man1 as was the case with a certain ,spanish poet of whom ,i have heard1 who was seized with an illness1 and although he recovered1 remained1 nevertheless1 so oblivious of his past life that he did not believe the tales and tragedies he had composed were his own1 and he might1 indeed1 have been taken for a grown-up child if he had also forgotten his native tongue4 ,but if this seems incredible1 what shall we say of children8 ,the man of mature years believes the nature of children to be so different from his own1 that it would be impossible to persuade him he had ever been a child1 if he did not conjecture regarding himself from what he sees of others4 ,but in order to avoid giving to the superstitious matter for new questions1 ,i prefer to go no farther in the discussion of these matters4 ,,ii ,value of ,joy and ,sorrow ,joy is an emotion by which the body's power of action is increased or assisted4 ,sorrow1 on the other hand1 is an emotion by which the body's power of action is lessened or restrained1 and therefore joy is not directly evil1 but good2 sorrow1 on the other hand1 is directly evil4 ,,iii ,the ,good ,emotions ,cheerfulness is joy1 which1 in so far as it is related to the body1 consists in this1 that all the parts of the body are equally affected1 that is to say1 the body's power of action is increased or assisted1 so that all the parts acquire the same proportion of motion and rest to each other4 ,cheerfulness1 therefore1 is always good1 and can never be excessive4 ,but melancholy is sorrow1 which1 in so far as it is related to the body consists in this1 that the body's power of action is absolutely lessened or restrained1 and melancholy1 therefore1 is always evil4 ,pleasurable excitement is joy1 which1 in so far as it is related to the body1 consists in this1 that one or some of the parts of the body are affected more than others4 ,the power of this emotion may1 therefore1 be so great as to overcome the other actions of the body4 ,it may cling obstinately to the body2 it may impede the body in such a manner as to render it less capable of being affected in many ways1 and therefore may be evil4 ,again1 pain1 which1 on the contrary1 is sorrow1 considered in itself alone cannot be good4 ,but because its power and increase is limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own power1 we can therefore conceive infinite degrees of strength of this emotion1 and infinite kinds of it1 and we can therefore conceive it to be such that it can restrain an excess of pleasurable excitement1 and so far 7by the first part of this proposition7 preventing the body from becoming less capable4 ,so far1 therefore1 will pain be good4 ,love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause4 ,pleasurable excitement1 therefore with the accompanying idea of an external cause1 is love1 and therefore love may be excessive4 ,again1 desire is greater as the emotion from which it springs is greater4 ,inasmuch1 therefore1 as an emotion may overpower the other actions of a man1 so also the desire which springs from this emotion may also overpower the other desires1 and may therefore exist in the same excess which we have shown 7in the preceding proposition7 that pleasurable excitement possesses4 ,cheerfulness1 which ,i have affirmed to be good1 is more easily imagined than observed2 for the emotions by which we are daily agitated are generally related to some part of the body which is affected more than the others1 and therefore it is that the emotions exist for the most part in excess1 and so hold the mind down to the contemplation of one object alone1 that it can think about nothing else2 and although men are subject to a number of emotions1 and therefore few are found who are always under the control of one and the same emotion1 there are not wanting those to whom one and the same emotion obstinately clings4 ,we see men sometimes so affected by one object1 that although it is not present1 they believe it to be before them2 and if this happens to a man who is not asleep1 we say that he is delirious or mad4 ,nor are those believed to be less mad who are inflamed by love1 dreaming about nothing but a mistress or harlot day and night1 for they excite our laughter4 ,but the avaricious man who thinks of nothing else but gain or money1 and the ambitious man who thinks of nothing but glory1 inasmuch as they do harm1 and are1 therefore1 thought worthy of hatred1 are not believed to be mad4 ,in truth1 however1 avarice1 lust1 etc41 are a kind of madness1 although they are not reckoned amongst diseases4 ,,iv ,the ,evil ,emotions ,the man whom we hate we endeavor to destroy1 that is to say we endeavor to do something which is evil4 ,therefore hatred can never be good4#ca ,envy1 mockery1 contempt1 anger1 revenge1 and the other affects which are related to hatred or arise from it1 are evil4 ,everything which we desire because we are affected by hatred is base and unjust in the ,state4 ,i make a great distinction between mockery 7which ,i have said is bad7 and laughter2 for laughter and merriment are nothing but joy1 and therefore1 provided they are not excessive1 are in themselves good4 ,nothing but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment4 ,for why is it more seemly to extinguish hunger and thirst than to drive away melancholy8 ,my reasons and my conclusions are these3 ,no ,god and no human being1 except an envious one1 is delighted by my impotence or my trouble1 or esteems as any virtue in us tears1 sighs1 fears1 and other things of this kind1 which are signs of mental impotence2 on the contrary1 the greater the joy with which we are affected1 the greater the perfection to which we pass thereby1 that is to say1 the more do we necessarily partake of the divine nature4 ,to make use of things1 therefore1 and to delight in them as much as possible 7provided we do not disgust ourselves with them1 which is not delighting in them71 is the part of a wise man4 ,it is the part of a wise man1 ,i say1 to refresh and invigorate himself with moderate and pleasant eating and drinking1 with sweet scents and the beauty of green plants1 with ornament1 with music1 with sports1 with the theater1 and with all things of this kind which one man can enjoy without hurting another4 ,for the human body is composed of a great number of parts of diverse nature1 which constantly need new and varied nourishment1 in order that the whole of the body may be equally fit for everything which can follow from its nature1 and consequently that the mind may be equally fit to understand many things at once4 ,this mode of living best of all agrees both with our principles and with common practice2 therefore this mode of living is the best of all1 and is to be universally commended4 ,there is no need1 therefore1 to enter more at length into the subject4 ,all emotions of hatred are evil and therefore the man who lives according to the guidance of reason will strive as much as possible to keep himself from being agitated by the emotions of hatred and1 consequently1 will strive to keep others from being subject to the same emotions4 ,but hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred1 and1 on the other hand1 can be extinguished by love1 so that hatred passes into love4 ,therefore he who lives according to the guidance of reason will strive to repay the hatred of another1 etc41 with love1 that is to say1 with generosity4 ,he who wishes to avenge injuries by hating in return does indeed live miserably4 ,but he who1 on the contrary1 strives to drive out hatred by love1 fights joyfully and confidently1 with equal ease resisting one man or a number of men1 and needing scarcely any assistance from fortune4 ,those whom he conquers yield gladly1 not from defect of strength1 but from an increase of it4 ,these truths1 however1 all follow so plainly from the definitions alone of love and the intellect1 that there is no need to demonstrate them singly4 ,v ,necessary ,evils 7i7 ,the emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without sorrow2 for fear is sorrow1 and hope cannot exist without fear4 ,therefore these emotions cannot be good of themselves1 but only in so far as they are able to restrain the excesses of joy4 ,we may here add that these emotions indicate want of knowledge and impotence of mind1 and1 for the same reason1 confidence1 despair1 gladness1 and remorse are signs of weakness of mind4 ,for although confidence and gladness are emotions of joy1 they nevertheless suppose that sorrow has preceded them1 namely1 hope or fear4 ,in proportion1 therefore1 as we endeavor to live according to the guidance of reason1 shall we strive as much as possible to depend less on hope1 to liberate ourselves from fear1 to rule fortune1 and to direct our actions by the sure counsels of reason4 ,humility is sorrow1 which springs from this1 that a man contemplates his own weakness4 ,but in so far as a man knows himself by true reason is he supposed to understand his essence1 that is to say1 his power4 ,if1 therefore1 while contemplating himself1 he perceives any impotence of his1 this is not due to his understanding himself1 but1 as we have shown1 to the fact that his power of actions is restrained4 ,but if we suppose that he forms a conception of his own impotence because he understands something to be more powerful than himself1 by the knowledge of which he limits his own power of action1 in this case we simply conceive that he understands himself distinctly1 and his power of action is increased4 ,humility or sorrow1 therefore1 which arises because a man contemplates his own impotence1 does not spring from true contemplation or reason1 and is not a virtue1 but a passion4 ,repentance is not a virtue1 that is to say1 it does not spring from reason2 on the contrary1 the man who repents of what he has done is doubly wretched or impotent4 ,for1 in the first place1 we allow ourselves to be overcome by a depraved desire1 and1 in the second place1 by sorrow4 ,inasmuch as men seldom live as reason dictates1 therefore these two emotions1 humility and repentance1 together with hope and fear1 are productive of more profit than disadvantage1 and therefore1 since men must sin1 it is better that they should sin in this way4 ,for if men impotent in mind were all equally proud1 were ashamed of nothing1 and feared nothing1 by what bonds could they be united or constrained8 ,the multitude becomes a thing to be feared if it has nothing to fear4 ,it is not to be wondered at1 therefore1 that the prophets1 thinking rather of the good of the community than of a few1 should have commended so greatly humility1 repentance and reverence4 ,indeed1 those who are subject to these emotions can be led much more easily than others1 so that1 at last1 they come to live according to the guidance of reason1 that is to say1 become free men1 and enjoy the life of the blessed4 7ii7 ,pity is sorrow1 and therefore is in itself evil4 ,the good1 however1 which issues from pity1 namely1 that we endeavor to free from misery the man we pity1 we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone2 nor can we do anything except by the dictate of reason alone1 which we are sure is good4 ,pity1 therefore1 in a man who lives according to the guidance of reason is in itself bad and unprofitable4 ,hence it follows that a man who lives according to the dictates of reason endeavors as much as possible to prevent himself from being touched by pity4 ,the man who has properly understood that everything follows from the necessity of the divine nature1 and comes to pass according to the eternal laws and rules of ,nature1 will in truth discover nothing which is worthy of hatred1 laughter1 or contempt1 nor will he pity any one1 but1 so far as human virtue is able1 he will endeavor to do well1 as we say1 and to rejoice4 ,we must add also1 that a man who is easily touched by the emotion of pity1 and is moved by the misery or tears of another1 often does something of which he afterward repents1 both because from an emotion we do nothing which we certainly know to be good1 and also because we are so easily deceived by false tears4 ,but this ,i say expressly of the man who lives according to the guidance of reason4 ,for he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to be of any service to others is properly called inhuman2 for he seems to be unlike a man4 ,,vi ,diseased ,emotions ,the primary foundation of virtue is the preservation of our being according to the guidance of reason4 ,the man1 therefore1 who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues1 and consequently is ignorant of all the virtues4 ,again1 to act in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting according to the guidance of reason1 and he who acts according to the guidance of reason must necessarily know that he acts according to the guidance of reason4 ,he1 therefore1 who is ignorant of himself1 and consequently 7as we have just shown7 altogether ignorant of all the virtues1 cannot in any way act in conformity with virtue1 that is to say1 is altogether impotent in mind4 ,therefore the greatest pride or despondency indicates the greatest impotence of mind4 ,hence follows1 with the utmost clearness1 that the proud and the desponding are above all others subject to emotions4 ,despondency1 nevertheless1 can be corrected more easily than pride1 since the former is an emotion of sorrow1 while the latter is an emotion of joy1 and is therefore stronger than the former4 ,pride is joy arising from a man's having too high an opinion of himself4 ,this opinion a proud man will endeavor1 as much as he can1 to cherish1 and therefore1 will love the presence of parasites or flatterers 7the definitions of these people are omitted1 because they are too well known71 and will shun that of the noble-minded who think of him as is right4 ,it would take too much time to enumerate here all the evils of pride1 for the proud are subject to all emotions1 but to none are they less subject than to those of love and pity4 ,it is necessary1 however1 to observe here that a man is also called proud if he thinks too little of other people1 and so1 in this sense1 pride is to be defined as joy which arises from the false opinion that we are superior to other people1 while despondency1 the contrary to this pride1 would be defined as sorrow arising from the false opinion that we are inferior to other people4 ,this being understood1 it is easy to see that the proud man is necessarily envious1 and that he hates those above all others who are the most praised on account of their virtues4 ,it follows1 too1 that his hatred of them is not easily overcome by love or kindness and that he is delighted by the presence of those only who humor his weakness1 and from a fool make him a madman4 ,although despondency is contrary to pride1 the despondent man is closely akin to the proud man4 ,for since the sorrow of the despondent man arises from his judging his own impotence by the power of virtue of others1 his sorrow will be mitigated1 that is to say1 he will rejoice1 if his imagination be occupied in contemplating the vices of others4 ,hence the proverb-- ,it is a consolation to the wretched to have bad companions in their misfortunes4 ,on the other hand1 the more the despondent man believes himself to be below other people1 the more will he sorrow2 and this is the reason why none are more prone to envy than the despondent2 and why they1 above all others1 try to observe men's actions with a view to finding fault with them rather than correcting them1 so that at last they praise nothing but despondency and glory in it2 but in such a manner1 however1 as always to seem despondent4 ,these things follow from this emotion as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles4 ,it is true1 indeed1 that ,i have said that ,i call these and the like emotions evil1 in so far as ,i attend to human profit alone2 but the laws of ,nature have regard to the common order of ,nature of which man is a part--a remark ,i desired to make in passing1 lest it should be thought that ,i talk about the vices and absurdities of men rather than attempt to demonstrate the nature and properties of things4 ,as ,i said1 ,i consider human emotions and their properties precisely as ,i consider other natural objects2 and1 indeed1 the emotions of man1 if they do not show his power1 show at least the power and workmanship of ,nature1 no less than many other things which we admire and delight to contemplate4 ,,vii ,reasonable ,emotions ,if we live according to the guidance of reason1 we shall desire for others the good which we seek for ourselves4 ,therefore if we see one person do good to another1 our endeavor to do good is assisted1 that is to say1 we shall rejoice1 and our joy 7by hypothesis7 will be accompanied with the idea of the person who does good to the other1 that is to say1 we shall favor him4 ,favor is not opposed to reason1 but agrees with it1 and may arise from it4 ,indignation1 as it is defined by us1 is necessarily evil2 but it is to be observed that when the supreme authority1 constrained by the desire of preserving peace1 punishes a citizen who injures another1 ,i do not say that it is indignant with the citizen1 since it is not excited by hatred to destroy him1 but punishes him from motives of piety4 ,self-satisfaction is the joy which arises from a man's contemplating himself and his power of action4 ,but man's true power of action or his virtue is reason itself1 which he contemplates clearly and distinctly4 ,self-satisfaction therefore arises from reason4 ,again1 man1 when he contemplates himself1 perceives nothing clearly and distinctly or adequately1 excepting those things which follow from his power of action1 that is to say1 those things which follow from his power of understanding2 and therefore from this contemplation alone the highest satisfaction which can exist arises4 ,self-satisfaction is indeed the highest thing for which we can hope1 for 7as we have shown71 no one endeavors to preserve his being for the sake of any end4 ,again1 because this self-satisfaction is more and more nourished and strengthened by praise1 and1 on the contrary more and more disturbed by blame1 therefore we are principally led by glory1 and can scarcely endure life with disgrace4 ,self-exaltation is not opposed to reason1 but may spring from it4 ,what is called vainglory is self-satisfaction1 nourished by nothing but the good opinion of the multitude1 so that when that is withdrawn1 the satisfaction1 that is to say1 the chief good which every one loves1 ceases4 ,for this reason those who glory in the good opinion of the multitude anxiously and with daily care strive1 labor1 and struggle to preserve their fame4 ,for the multitude is changeable and fickle1 so that fame1 if it be not preserved1 soon passes away4 ,as every one1 moreover1 is desirous to catch the praises of the people1 one person will readily destroy the fame of another2 and consequently1 as the object of contention is what is commonly thought to be the highest good1 a great desire arises on the part of every one to keep down his fellows by every possible means1 and he who at last comes off conqueror boasts more because he has injured another person than because he has profited himself4 ,this glory of self-satisfaction1 therefore1 is indeed vain1 for it is really no glory4 ,what is worthy of notice with regard to shame may easily be gathered from what has been said about compassion and repentance4 ,i will only add that pity1 like shame1 although it is not a virtue1 is nevertheless good1 in so far as it shows that a desire of living uprightly is present in the man who is possessed with shame1 just as pain is called good in so far as it shows that the injured part has not yet putrefied4 ,a man1 therefore1 who is ashamed of what he has done1 although he is sorrowful1 is nevertheless more perfect that the shameless man who has no desire of living uprightly4 ,these are the things which ,i undertook to establish with regard to the emotions of joy and sorrow4 ,with reference to the desires1 these are good or evil as they spring from good or evil emotions4 ,all of them1 however1 in so far as they are begotten in us of emotions which are passions1 are blind1 as may easily be inferred from what has been said1 nor would they be of any use if men could be easily persuaded to live according to the dictates of reason alone4 ,the ,life of ,virtue ,i ,all our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of our nature in such a manner that they can be understood either through it alone as their proximate cause1 or in so far as we are a part of ,nature1 which part cannot be adequately conceived through itself and without the other individuals4 ,,ii ,the desires which follow from our nature in such a manner that they can be understood through it alone1 are those which are related to the mind1 in so far as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas4 ,the remaining desires are not related to the mind1 unless in so far as it conceives things inadequately1 whose power and increase cannot be determined by human power1 but by the power of objects which are without us4 ,the first kind of desires1 therefore1 are properly called actions1 but the latter passions2 for the first always indicate our power1 and the latter1 on the contrary1 indicate our impotence and imperfect knowledge4 ,,iii ,our actions1 that is to say1 those desires which are determined by man's power or reason1 are always good2 the others may be good as well as evil4 ,,iv ,it is therefore most profitable to us in life to make perfect the intellect or reason as far as possible1 and in this one thing consists the highest happiness or blessedness of man2 for blessedness is nothing but the peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of ,god1 and to perfect the intellect is nothing but to understand ,god1 together with the attributes and actions of ,god1 which flow from the necessity of ,his nature4 ,the final aim1 therefore1 of a man who is guided by reason1 that is to say1 the chief desire by which he strives to govern all his other desires1 is that by which he is led adequately to conceive himself and all things which can be conceived by his intelligence4 ,v ,there is no rational life1 therefore1 without intelligence and things are good only in so far as they assist man to enjoy that life of the mind which is determined by intelligence4 ,those things alone1 on the other hand1 we call evil which hinder man from perfecting his reason and enjoying a rational life4 ,,vi ,but because all those things of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily good1 it follows that no evil can happen to man except from external causes1 that is to say1 except in so far as he is a part of the whole of ,nature1 whose laws human nature is compelled to obey--compelled also to accommodate himself to this whole of ,nature in almost an infinite number of ways4 ,,vii ,it is impossible that a man should not be a part of ,nature and follow her common order2 but if he be placed amongst individuals who agree with his nature1 his power of action will by that very fact be assisted and supported4 ,but if1 on the contrary1 he be placed amongst individuals who do not in the least agree with his nature1 he will scarcely be able without great change on his part to accommodate himself to them4 ,,viii ,anything that exists in ,nature which we judge to be evil or able to hinder us from existing and enjoying a rational life1 we are allowed to remove from us in that way which seems the safest2 and whatever1 on the other hand1 we judge to be good or to be profitable for the preservation of our being or the enjoyment of a rational life1 we are permitted to take for our use and use in any way we may think proper2 and absolutely1 every one is allowed by the highest right of ,nature to do that which he believes contributes to his own profit4 ,,ix ,nothing1 therefore1 can agree better with the nature of any object than other individuals of the same kind1 and so 7see ,,vii7 there is nothing more profitable to man for the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of a rational life than a man who is guided by reason4 ,again1 since there is no single thing we know which is more excellent than a man who is guided by reason1 it follows that there is nothing by which a person can better show how much skill and talent he possesses than by so educating men that at last they will live under the direct authority of reason4 ,x ,in so far as men are carried away by envy or any emotion of hatred towards one another1 so far are they contrary to one another1 and consequently so much the more are they to be feared1 as they have more power than other individuals of nature4 ,,xi ,minds1 nevertheless1 are not conquered by arms1 but by love and generosity4 ,,xii ,above all things is it profitable to men to form communities and to unite themselves to one another by bonds which may make all of them as one man2 and absolutely1 it is profitable for them to do whatever may tend to strengthen their friendships4 ,,xiii ,but to accomplish this skill and watchfulness are required2 for men are changeable 7those being very few who live according to the laws of reason71 and nevertheless generally envious and more inclined to vengeance than pity4 ,to bear with each1 therefore1 according to his disposition and to refrain from imitating his emotions requires a singular power of mind4 ,but those1 on the contrary1 who know how to revile men1 to denounce vices rather than teach virtues1 and not to strengthen men's minds but to weaken them1 are injurious both to themselves and others1 so that many of them through an excess of impatience and a false zeal for religion prefer living with brutes rather than amongst men2 just as boys or youths1 unable to endure with equanimity the rebukes of their parents1 fly to the army1 choosing the discomforts of war and the rule of a tyrant rather than the comforts of home and the admonitions of a father1 suffering all kinds of burdens to be imposed upon them in order that they may revenge themselves upon their parents4 ,,xiv ,although1 therefore1 men generally determine everything by their pleasure1 many more advantages than disadvantages arise from their common union4 ,it is better1 therefore1 to endure with equanimity the injuries inflicted by them1 and to apply our minds to those things which subserve concord and the establishment of friendship4 ,,xv ,the things which beget concord are those which are related to justice1 integrity1 and honor2 for besides that which is unjust and injurious1 men take ill also anything which is esteemed base1 or that any one should despise the received customs of the ,state4 ,but in order to win love1 those things are chiefly necessary which have reference to religion and piety4 ,,xvi ,concord1 moreover1 is often produced by fear1 but it is without good faith4 ,it is to be observed1 too1 that fear arises from impotence of mind1 and therefore is of no service to reason2 nor is pity1 although it seems to present an appearance of piety4 ,,xvii ,men also are conquered by liberality1 especially those who have not the means wherewith to procure what is necessary for the support of life4 ,but to assist every one who is needy far surpasses the strength or profit of a private person1 for the wealth of a private person is altogether insufficient to supply such wants4 ,besides1 the power of any one man is too limited for him to be able to unite every one with himself in friendship4 ,the care1 therefore1 of the poor is incumbent on the whole of society and concerns only the general profit4 ,,xviii ,in the receipt of benefits and in returning thanks1 care altogether different must be taken4 ,,xix ,the love of a harlot1 that is to say1 the lust of sexual intercourse1 which arises from mere external form1 and absolutely all love which recognizes any other cause than the freedom of the mind1 easily passes into hatred1 unless1 which is worse1 it becomes a species of delirium1 and thereby discord is cherished rather than concord4 ,,xx ,with regard to marriage1 it is plain that it is in accordance with reason1 if the desire of connection is engendered not merely by external form1 but by a love of begetting children and wisely educating them2 and if1 in addition1 the love both of the husband and wife has for its cause not external form merely1 but chiefly liberty of mind4 ,,xxi ,flattery1 too1 produces concord1 but only by means of the disgraceful crime of slavery or perfidy2 for there are none who are more taken by flattery than the proud1 who wish to be first and are not so4 ,,xxii ,there is a false appearance of piety and religion in dejection2 and although dejection is the opposite of pride1 the humble dejected man is very near akin to the proud4 ,,xxiii ,shame also contributes to concord1 but only with regard to those matters which cannot be concealed4 ,shame1 too1 inasmuch as it is a kind of sorrow1 does not belong to the service of reason4 ,,xxiv ,the remaining emotions of sorrow which have man for their object are directly opposed to justice1 integrity1 honor1 piety1 and religion2 and although indignation may seem to present an appearance of equity1 yet there is no law where it is allowed to every one to judge the deeds of another1 and to vindicate his own or another's right4 ,,xxv ,affability1 that is to say1 the desire of pleasing men1 which is determined by reason1 is related to piety4 ,but if affability arise from an emotion1 it is ambition or desire1 by which men1 generally under a false pretense of piety1 excite discords and seditions4 ,for he who desires to assist other people1 either by advice or by deed1 in order that they may together enjoy the highest good1 will strive1 above all things1 to win their love1 and not to draw them into admiration1 so that a doctrine may be named after him1 nor absolutely to give any occasion for envy4 ,in common conversation1 too1 he will avoid referring to the vices of men1 and will take care only sparingly to speak of human impotence1 while he will talk largely of human virtue or power1 and of the way by which it may be made perfect1 so that men being moved not by fear or aversion1 but solely by the emotion of joy1 may endeavor as much as they can to live under the rule of reason4 ,,xxvi ,excepting man1 we know no individual thing in ,nature in whose mind we can take pleasure1 nor any thing which we can unite with ourselves by friendship or any kind of intercourse1 and therefore regard to our own profit does not demand that we should preserve anything which exists in ,nature excepting men1 but teaches us to preserve it or destroy it in accordance with its varied uses1 or to adapt it to our own service in any way whatever4 ,,xxvii ,the profit which we derive from objects without us1 over and above the experience and knowledge which we obtain because we observe them and change them from their existing forms into others1 is chiefly the preservation of the body1 and for this reason those objects are the most profitable to us which can feed and nourish the body1 so that all its parts are able properly to perform their functions4 ,for the more capable the body is of being affected in many ways1 and affecting external bodies in many ways1 the more capable of thinking is the mind4 ,but there seem to be very few things in ,nature of this kind1 and it is consequently necessary for the requisite nourishment of the body to use many different kinds of food2 for the human body is composed of a great number of parts of different nature1 which need constant and varied food in order that the whole of the body may be equally adapted for all those things which can follow from its nature1 and consequently that the mind also may be equally adapted to conceive many things4 ,,xxviii ,the strength of one man would scarcely suffice to obtain these things if men did not mutually assist one another4 ,as money has presented us with an abstract of everything1 it has come to pass that its image above every other usually occupies the mind of the multitude1 because they can imagine hardly any kind of joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause4 ,,xxix ,this1 however1 is a vice only in those who seek money not from poverty or necessity1 but because they have learned the arts of gain1 by which they keep up a grand appearance4 ,as for the body itself1 they feed it in accordance with custom1 but sparingly1 because they believe that they lose so much of their goods as they spend upon the preservation of their body4 ,those1 however1 who know the true use of money1 and regulate the measure of wealth according to their needs1 live contented with few things4 ,,xxx ,since1 therefore1 those things are good which help the parts of the body to perform their functions1 and since joy consists in this1 that the power of man1 in so far as he is made up of mind and body1 is helped or increased1 it follows that all things which bring joy are good4 ,but inasmuch as things do not work to this end--that they may affect us with joy--nor is their power of action guided in accordance with our profit1 and finally1 since joy is generally related chiefly to some one part of the body1 it follows that generally the emotions of joy 7unless reason and watchfulness be present71 and consequently the desires which are begotten from them1 are excessive4 ,it is to be added1 that an emotion causes us to put that thing first which is sweet to us in the present1 and that we are not able to judge the future with an equal emotion of the mind4 ,,xxxi ,superstition1 on the contrary1 seems to affirm that what brings sorrow is good1 and1 on the contrary1 that what brings joy is evil4 ,but1 as we have already said1 no one1 excepting an envious man1 is delighted at my impotence or disadvantage1 for the greater the joy with which we are affected1 the greater the perfection to which we pass1 and consequently the more do we participate in the divine nature2 nor can joy ever be evil which is controlled by a true consideration for our own profit4 ,on the other hand1 the man who is led by fear1 and does what is good that he may avoid what is evil1 is not guided by reason4 ,,xxxii ,but human power is very limited1 and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes1 so that we do not possess an absolute power to adapt to our service the things which are without us4 ,nevertheless we shall bear with equanimity those things which happen to us contrary to what a consideration of our own profit demands1 if we are conscious that we have performed our duty1 that the power we have could not reach so far as to enable us to avoid those things1 and that we are a part of the whole of ,nature1 whose order we follow4 ,if we clearly and distinctly understand this1 the part of us which is determined by intelligence1 that is to say1 the better part of us1 will be entirely satisfied therewith1 and in that satisfaction will endeavor to persevere2 for1 in so far as we understand1 we cannot desire anything excepting what is necessary1 nor1 absolutely1 can we be satisfied with anything but the truth4 ,therefore in so far as we understand these things properly will the efforts of the better part of us agree with the order of the whole of ,nature4 ,,footnotes3 #cj 444 ,if it agreed better with a man's nature that he should hang himself1 could any reasons be given for his not hanging himself8 ,can such a nature possibly exist8 ,if so1 ,i maintain 7whether ,i do or do not grant free will71 that such an one1 if he sees that he can live more conveniently on the gallows than sitting at his own table1 would act most foolishly1 if he did not hang himself4 ,so any one who clearly saw that1 by committing crimes1 he would enjoy a really more perfect and better life and existence1 than he could attain by the practice of virtue1 would be foolish if he did not act on his convictions4 ,for1 with such a perverse human nature as his1 crime would become virtue4 ,from a letter to ,wm4 ,blyenbergh 7,march #ac1 #affe74 #ca ,it is to be observed that here and in the following ,i understand by hatred1 hatred towards men only4 ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,of ,,the ,,foundations ,,of ,a ,,state#cb ,by the right and ordinance of ,nature1 ,i merely mean those natural laws wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by ,nature1 so as to live and act in a given way4 ,for instance1 fishes are naturally conditioned for swimming1 and the greater for devouring the less2 therefore fishes enjoy the water1 and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural right4 ,for it is certain that ,nature1 taken in the abstract1 has sovereign right to do anything she can2 in other words1 her right is co-extensive with her power4 ,the power of ,nature is the power of ,god1 which has sovereign right over all things2 and1 inasmuch as the power of ,nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components1 it follows that every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can1 in other words1 the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned4 ,now it is the sovereign law and right of ,nature that each individual should endeavor to preserve itself as it is1 without regard to anything but itself2 therefore this sovereign law and right belongs to every individual1 namely1 to exist and act according to its natural conditions4 ,we do not here acknowledge any difference between mankind and other individual natural entities1 nor between men endowed with reason and those to whom reason is unknown2 nor between fools1 madmen1 and sane men4 ,whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it has a sovereign right to do1 inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned by ,nature1 and cannot act otherwise4 ,wherefore among men1 so long as they are considered as living under the sway of ,nature1 he who does not yet know reason1 or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue1 acts solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason4 ,that is1 as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason dictates1 or to live according to the laws of reason1 so also the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates1 or to live according to the laws of desire4 ,this is identical with the teaching of ,paul1 who acknowledges that previous to the law--that is1 so long as men are considered of as living under the sway of ,nature1 there is no sin4 ,the natural right of the individual man is thus determined1 not by sound reason1 but by desire and power4 ,all are not naturally conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason2 nay1 on the contrary1 all men are born ignorant1 and before they can learn the right way of life and acquire the habit of virtue1 the greater part of their life1 even if they have been well brought up1 has passed away4 ,nevertheless1 they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses of desire4 ,nature has given them no other guide1 and has denied them the present power of living according to sound reason2 so that they are no more bound to live by the dictates of an enlightened mind than a cat is bound to live by the laws of the nature of a lion4 ,whatsoever1 therefore1 an individual1 considered as under the sway of ,nature1 thinks useful for himself1 whether led by sound reason or impelled by the passions1 that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take for himself as he best can1 whether by force1 cunning1 entreaty1 or any other means2 consequently he may regard as an enemy any one who hinders the accomplishment of his purpose4 ,it follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of ,nature1 under which all men are born1 and under which they mostly live1 only prohibits such things as no one desires1 and no one can attain3 it does not forbid strife1 nor hatred1 nor anger1 nor deceit1 nor1 indeed1 any of the means suggested by desire4 ,this we need not wonder at1 for ,nature is not bounded by the laws of human reason1 which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation4 ,her limits are infinitely wider1 and have reference to the eternal order of ,nature1 wherein man is but a speck4 ,it is by the necessity of this alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a particular way4 ,if anything1 therefore1 in ,nature seems to us ridiculous1 absurd1 or evil1 it is because we only know in part1 and are almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of ,nature as a whole1 and also because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our human reason2 in reality that which reason considers evil is not evil in respect to the order and laws of ,nature as a whole1 but only in respect to the laws of our reason4 ,nevertheless1 no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason1 for1 as we said1 they have men's true good for their object4 ,moreover1 every one wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear1 and this would be quite impossible so long as every one did everything he liked1 and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger4 ,there is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity1 hatred1 anger and deceit1 and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can4 ,when we reflect that men without mutual help1 or the aid of reason1 must needs live most miserably1 444 we shall plainly see that men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy1 as a whole1 the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals1 and their life should be no more conditioned by the force and desire of individuals1 but by the power and will of the whole body4 ,this end they will be unable to attain if desire be their only guide1 for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different direction2 they must1 therefore1 most firmly decree and establish that they will be guided in everything by reason1 which nobody will dare openly to repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman1 and will restrain any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows1 that they will do to all as they would be done by1 and that they will defend their neighbor's rights as their own4 ,how such a compact as this should be entered into1 how ratified and established1 we will now inquire4 ,now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects anything which he judges to be good1 except with the hope of gaining a greater good1 or from the fear of a greater evil2 nor does any one endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil1 or gaining a greater good4 ,that is1 every one will1 of two goods1 choose that which he thinks the greatest2 and1 of two evils that which he thinks the least4 ,i say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least1 for it does not necessarily follow that he judges right4 ,this law is so deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal truths and axioms4 ,as a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated1 no one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things1#cc and in general no one will abide by his promises1 unless under the fear of a greater evil1 or the hope of a greater good4 ,an example will make the matter clearer4 ,suppose that a robber forces me to promise that ,i will give him my goods at his will and pleasure4 ,it is plain 7inasmuch as my natural right is1 as ,i have shown1 co-extensive with my power7 that if ,i can free myself from this robber by stratagem1 by assenting to his demands1 ,i have the natural right to do so1 and to pretend to accept his conditions4 ,or1 again1 suppose ,i have genuinely promised some one that for the space of twenty days ,i will not taste food or any nourishment2 and suppose ,i afterwards find that my promise was foolish1 and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself2 as ,i am bound by natural law and right to choose the least of two evils1 ,i have complete right to break any compact1 and act as if my promise had never been uttered4 ,i say that ,i should have perfect natural right to do so1 whether ,i was actuated by true and evident reason1 or whether ,i was actuated by mere opinion in thinking ,i had promised rashly2 whether my reasons were true or false1 ,i should be in fear of a greater evil1 which1 by the ordinance of ,nature1 ,i should strive to avoid by every means in my power4 ,we may1 therefore1 conclude that a compact is only made valid by its utility1 without which it becomes null and void4 ,it is therefore foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us forever1 unless we also endeavor that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for the violator more harm than good4 ,this consideration should have very great weight in forming a state4 ,however1 if all men could be easily led by reason alone1 and could recognize what is best and most useful for a state1 there would be no one who would not forswear deceit1 for every one would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the chief good1 namely1 the preservation of the state1 and would cherish good faith above all things as the shield and buckler of the commonwealth4 ,however1 it is far from being the case that all men can always be easily led by reason alone2 every one is drawn away by his pleasure1 while avarice1 ambition1 envy1 hatred1 and the like so engross the mind that reason has no place therein4 ,hence1 though men make promises with all the appearances of good faith1 and agree that they will keep to their engagement1 no one can absolutely rely on another man's promise unless there is something behind it4 ,every one has by ,nature a right to act deceitfully1 and to break his compacts1 unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater good1 or the fear of some greater evil4 ,however1 as we have shown that the natural right of the individual is only limited by his power1 it is clear that by transferring1 either willingly or under compulsion1 this power into the hands of another1 he in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right2 and1 further1 that the sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power1 wherewith he can compel men by force1 or restrain them by threats of the universally feared punishment of death4 ,such sovereign right he will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will2 otherwise he will totter on his throne1 and no one who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him4 ,in this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural right1 and the covenant can always be strictly kept--that is1 if each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic1 the latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things2 that is1 it will have sole and unquestioned dominion1 and every one will be bound to obey1 under pain of the severest punishment4 ,a body politic of this kind is called a ,democracy1 which may be defined as a society which wields all its power as a whole4 ,the sovereign power is not restrained by any laws1 but every one is bound to obey it in all things2 such is the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all their power of self-defense1 or in other words1 all their right4 ,for if they had wished to retain any right for themselves1 they ought to have taken precautions for its defense and preservation4 ,as they have not done so1 and indeed could not have done so without dividing and consequently ruining the state1 they placed themselves absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power2 and1 therefore1 having acted 7as we have shown7 as reason and necessity demanded1 they are obliged to fulfill the commands of the sovereign power1 however absurd these may be1 else they will be public enemies1 and will act against reason1 which urges the preservation of the state as a primary duty4 ,for reason bids us choose the lesser of two evils4 ,furthermore1 this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion and will of another1 is one which may be incurred with a light heart3 for we have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their will1 so long as they have the full power to enforce it4 ,if such power be lost their right to command is lost also1 or lapses to those who have assumed it and can keep it4 ,thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose thoroughly irrational commands1 for they are bound to consult their own interests1 and retain their power by consulting the public good and acting according to the dictates of reason1 as ,seneca says1 violenta imperia nemo continuit diu4 ,no one can long retain a tyrant's sway4 ,in a democracy1 irrational commands are still less to be feared3 for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people1 especially if it be a large one1 should agree in an irrational design3 and1 moreover1 the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational1 and to bring men as far as possible under the control of reason1 so that they may live in peace and harmony4 ,if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin4 ,such being the ends in view for the sovereign power1 the duty of subjects is1 as ,i have said1 to obey its commands1 and to recognize no right save that which it sanctions4 ,it will1 perhaps1 be thought that we are turning subjects into slaves1 for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like2 but this idea is based on a misconception1 for the true slave is he who is led away by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act accordingly3 he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire guidance of reason4 ,action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain sense1 but it does not1 therefore1 make a man a slave2 all depends on the object of the action4 ,if the object of the action be the good of the state1 and not the good of the agent1 the latter is a slave and does himself no good2 but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole people1 and not that of the ruler1 is the supreme law1 obedience to the sovereign power does not make a man a slave1 of no use to himself1 but a subject4 ,therefore1 that state is the freest whose laws are founded on sound reason1 so that every member of it may1 if he will1 be free2#cd that is1 live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason4 ,children1 though they are bound to obey all the commands of their parents1 are yet not slaves2 for the commands of parents look generally to the children's benefit4 ,we must1 therefore1 acknowledge a great difference between a slave1 a son1 and a subject2 their positions may be thus defined4 ,a slave is one who is bound to obey his master's orders1 though they are given solely in the master's interest2 a son is one who obeys his father's orders1 given in his own interest2 a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power1 given for the common interest1 wherein he is included4 ,i think ,i have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy4 ,i have especially desired to do so1 for ,i believe it to be of all forms of government the most natural1 and the most consonant with individual liberty4 ,in it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs2 he only hands it over to the majority of a society1 whereof he is a unit4 ,thus all men remain1 as they were in the state of ,nature1 equals4 ,this is the only form of government which ,i have treated of at length1 for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of freedom in a state4 ,i may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of government1 for we may gather from what has been said whence their right arises without going into its origin4 ,the possessor of sovereign power1 whether he be one1 or many1 or the whole body politic1 has the sovereign right of imposing any commands he pleases2 and he who has either voluntarily1 or under compulsion1 transferred the right to defend him to another1 has1 in so doing1 renounced his natural right and is therefore bound to obey1 in all things1 the commands of the sovereign power2 and will be bound so to do so long as the king1 or nobles1 or the people preserve the sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer4 ,i need add no more4 ,the bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed1 we shall readily be able to define private civil right1 wrong1 justice1 and injustice1 with their relations to the state2 and also to determine what constitutes an ally1 or an enemy1 or the crime of treason4 ,by private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man possesses to preserve his existence1 a liberty limited by the edicts of the sovereign power1 and preserved only by its authority4 ,for when a man has transferred to another his right of living as he likes1 which was only limited by his power1 that is1 has transferred his liberty and power of self-defense1 he is bound to live as that other dictates1 and to trust to him entirely for his defense4 ,wrong takes place when a citizen1 or subject1 is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction to the authority of the law1 or the edict of the sovereign power4 ,wrong is conceivable only in an organized community2 nor can it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign1 who has the right to do what he likes4 ,it can only arise1 therefore1 between private persons1 who are bound by law and right not to injure one another4 ,justice consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due2 injustice consists in depriving a man1 under the pretense of legality1 of what the laws1 rightly interpreted1 would allow him4 ,these last are also called equity and inequity1 because those who administer the laws are bound to show no respect of persons1 but to account all men equal1 and to defend every man's right equally1 neither envying the rich nor despising the poor4 ,the men of two states become allies1 when for the sake of avoiding war1 or for some other advantage1 they covenant to do each other no hurt1 but1 on the contrary1 to assist each other if necessity arises1 each retaining his independence4 ,such a covenant is valid so long as its basis of danger or advantage is in force3 no one enters into an engagement1 or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing good1 or the fear of some evil3 if this basis be removed the compact thereby becomes void3 this has been abundantly shown by experience4 ,for although different states make treaties not to harm one another1 they always take every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the stronger party1 and do not rely on the compact1 unless there is a sufficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it4 ,otherwise they would fear a breach of faith1 nor would there be any wrong done thereby2 for who in his proper senses1 and aware of the right of the sovereign power1 would trust in the promises of one who has the will and the power to do what he likes1 and who aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion8 ,moreover1 if we consult loyalty and religion1 we shall see that no one in possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of his dominion2 for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the engagement he made with his subjects1 by which both he and they are most solemnly bound4 ,an enemy is one who lives apart from the state1 and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or as an ally4 ,it is not hatred which makes a man an enemy1 but the rights of the state4 ,the rights of the state are the same in regard to him who does not recognize by any compact the state authority1 as they are against him who has done the state an injury4 ,it has the right to force him1 as best it can1 either to submit1 or to contract an alliance4 ,lastly1 treason can only be committed by subjects1 who by compact1 either tacit or expressed1 have transferred all their rights to the state4 ,a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has attempted1 for whatever reason1 to seize the sovereign power1 or to place it in different hands4 ,i say1 has attempted1 for if punishment were not to overtake him till he had succeeded1 it would often come too late1 the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred already4 ,i also say1 has attempted1 for whatever reasons1 to seize the sovereign power1 and ,i recognize no difference whether such an attempt should be followed by public loss or public gain4 ,whatever be his reason for acting1 the crime is treason1 and he is rightly condemned4 ,in war1 every one would admit the justice of his sentence4 ,if a man does not keep to his post1 but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his commander1 whatever may be his motive1 so long as he acts on his own motion1 even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy1 he is rightly put to death1 because he has violated his oath1 and infringed the rights of his commander4 ,that all citizens are equally bound by these rights in time of peace1 is not so generally recognized1 but the reasons for obedience are in both cases identical4 ,the state must be preserved and directed by the sole authority of the sovereign1 and such authority and right have been accorded by universal consent to him alone4 ,if1 therefore1 any one else attempts1 without his consent1 to execute any public enterprise1 even though the state might 7as we said7 reap benefit therefrom1 such person has none the less infringed the sovereign's right1 and would be rightly punished for treason4 ,in order that every scruple may be removed1 we may now answer the inquiry1 whether our former assertion that every one who has not the practice of reason1 may1 in the state of ,nature1 live by sovereign natural right1 according to the laws of his desires1 is not in direct opposition to the law and right of ,god as revealed4 ,for as all men absolutely 7whether they be less endowed with reason or more7 are equally bound by the ,divine command to love their neighbor as themselves1 it may be said that they cannot1 without wrong1 do injury to any one1 or live according to their desires4 ,this objection1 so far as the state of ,nature is concerned1 can be easily answered1 for the state of ,nature is1 both in nature and in time1 prior to religion4 ,no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to ,god1#ce nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason1 but solely by revelation confirmed by signs4 ,therefore1 previous to revelation1 no one is bound by a ,divine law and right of which he is necessarily in ignorance4 ,the state of ,nature must by no means be confounded with a state of religion1 but must be conceived as without either religion or law1 and consequently without sin or wrong4 ,this is how we have described it1 and we are confirmed by the authority of ,paul4 ,it is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of ,nature as prior to1 and lacking the ,divine revealed law and right2 but in respect of freedom also1 wherewith all men are born endowed4444 ,it may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the ,divine law as subjects2 whereas we have asserted that they retain their natural rights1 and may do whatever they like4 ,in order to clear up the whole difficulty1 which arises rather concerning the natural right than the natural state1 ,i maintain that every one is bound1 in the state of ,nature1 to live according to ,divine law1 in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of sound reason2 namely1 inasmuch as it is to his advantage1 and necessary for his salvation2 but1 if he will not so live1 he may do otherwise at his own risk4 ,he is thus bound to live according to his own laws1 not according to any one else's1 and to recognize no man as a judge1 or as a superior in religion4 ,such1 in my opinion1 is the position of a sovereign1 for he may take advice from his fellow men1 but he is not bound to recognize any as a judge1 nor any one besides himself as an arbitrator on any question of right1 unless it be a prophet sent expressly by ,god and attesting his mission by indisputable signs4 ,even then he does not recognize a man1 but ,god ,himself as his judge4 ,if a sovereign refuses to obey ,god as revealed in ,his law1 he does so at his own risk and loss1 but without violating any civil or natural right4 ,for the civil right is dependent on his own decree2 and natural right is dependent on the laws of ,nature1 which latter are not adapted to religion1 whose sole aim is the good of humanity1 but to the order of ,nature--that is1 to ,god's eternal decree unknown to us4 ,this truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer form by those who maintain that men can sin against ,god's revelation1 but not against the eternal decree by which ,he has ordained all things4444 ,,footnotes3 #cb ,from the ,tr4 ,th4-,p41 ch4 xvi1 same title4 #cc ,in the state of social life1 where general right determines what is good or evil1 stratagem is rightly distinguished as of two kinds1 good and evil4 ,but in the state of ,nature1 where every man is his own judge1 possessing the absolute right to lay down laws for himself1 to interpret them as he pleases1 or to abrogate them if he thinks it convenient1 it is not conceivable that stratagem should be evil4 #cd ,whatever be the social state a man finds himself in1 he may be free4 ,for certainly a man is free1 in so far as he is led by reason4 ,now reason 7though ,hobbes thinks otherwise7 is always on the side of peace1 which cannot be attained unless the general laws of the state be respected4 ,therefore the more a man is led by reason--in other words1 the more he is free1 the more constantly will he respect the laws of his country1 and obey the commands of the sovereign power to which he is subject4 #ce ,when ,paul says that men have in themselves no refuge1 he speaks as a man3 for in the ninth chapter of the same ,epistle he expressly teaches that ,god has mercy on whom ,he will1 and that men are without excuse1 only because they are in ,god's power like clay in the hands of a potter1 who out of the same lump makes vessels1 some for honor and some for dishonor1 not because they have been forewarned4 ,as regards the ,divine natural law whereof the chief commandment is1 as we have said1 to love ,god1 ,i have called it a law in the same sense1 as philosophers style laws those general rules of ,nature1 according to which everything happens4 ,for the love of ,god is not a state of obedience3 it is a virtue which necessarily exists in a man who knows ,god rightly4 ,obedience has regard to the will of a ruler1 not to necessity and truth4 ,now as we are ignorant of the nature of ,god's will1 and on the other hand know that everything happens solely by ,god's power1 we cannot1 except through revelation1 know whether ,god wishes in any way to be honored as a sovereign4 ,again2 we have shown that the ,divine rights appear to us in the light of rights or commands1 only so long as we are ignorant of their cause3 as soon as their cause is known1 they cease to be rights1 and we embrace them no longer as rights but as eternal truths2 in other words1 obedience passes into love of ,god1 which emanates from true knowledge as necessarily as light emanates from the sun4 ,reason then leads us to love ,god1 but cannot lead us to obey ,him2 for we cannot embrace the commands of ,god as ,divine1 while we are in ignorance of their cause1 neither can we rationally conceive ,god as a sovereign laying down laws as a sovereign4 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,of ,,supreme ,,authorities ,i ,of the ,right of ,supreme ,authorities#cf ,under every dominion the state is said to be ,civil2 but the entire body subject to a dominion is called a ,commonwealth1 and the general business of the dominion1 subject to the direction of him that holds it1 has the name of ,affairs of ,state4 ,next we call men ,citizens1 as far as they enjoy by the civil law all the advantages of the commonwealth1 and ,subjects1 as far as they are bound to obey its ordinances or laws4 ,lastly 444 of the civil state there are three kinds--democracy1 aristocracy and monarchy4 ,now1 before ,i begin to treat of each kind separately1 ,i will first deduce all the properties of the civil state in general4 ,and of these1 first of all comes to be considered the supreme right of the commonwealth1 or the right of the supreme authorities4 ,it is clear that the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else than simple natural right1 limited1 indeed1 by the power1 not of every individual1 but of the multitude1 which is guided1 as it were1 by one mind--that is1 as each individual in the state of ,nature1 so the body and mind of a dominion have as much right as they have power4 ,and thus each single citizen or subject has the less right1 the more the commonwealth exceeds him in power1 and each citizen consequently does and has nothing but what he may by the general decree of the commonwealth defend4 ,if the commonwealth grant to any man the right1 and therewith the authority 7for else it is but a gift of words7 to live after his own mind1 by that very act it abandons its own right1 and transfers the same to him1 to whom it has given such authority4 ,but if it has given this authority to two or more1 ,i mean authority to live each after his own mind1 by that very act it has divided the dominion1 and if1 lastly1 it has given this same authority to every citizen1 it has thereby destroyed itself1 and there remains no more a commonwealth1 but everything returns to the state of ,nature2 all of which is very manifest from what goes before4 ,and thus it follows1 that it can by no means be conceived1 that every citizen should by the ordinance of the commonwealth live after his own mind1 and accordingly this natural right of being one's own judge ceases in the civil state4 ,i say expressly by the ordinance of the commonwealth1 for if we weigh the matter aright1 the natural right of every man does not cease in the civil state4 ,for man1 alike in the natural and in the civil state1 acts according to the laws of his own nature1 and consults his own interest4 ,man1 ,i say1 in each state is led by fear or hope to do or leave undone this or that2 but the main difference between the two states is this1 that in the civil state all fear the same things1 and all have the same ground of security1 and manner of life2 and this certainly does not do away with the individual's faculty of judgment4 ,for he that is minded to obey all the commonwealth's orders1 whether through fear of its power or through love of quiet1 certainly consults after his own heart his own safety and interest4 ,moreover1 we cannot even conceive1 that every citizen should be allowed to interpret the commonwealth's decrees or laws4 ,for were every citizen allowed this1 he would thereby be his own judge1 because each would easily be able to give a color of right to his own deeds1 which by the last section is absurd4 ,we see1 then1 that every citizen depends not on himself1 but on the commonwealth1 all whose commands he is bound to execute1 and has no right to decide1 what is equitable or iniquitous1 just or unjust4 ,but1 on the contrary1 as the body of the dominion should1 so to speak1 be guided by one mind1 and consequently the will of the commonwealth must be taken to be the will of all2 what the state decides to be just and good must be held to be so decided by every individual4 ,and so1 however iniquitous the subject may think the commonwealth's decisions1 he is none the less bound to execute them4 ,but1 it may be objected1 is it not contrary to the dictate of reason to subject oneself wholly to the judgment of another1 and1 consequently1 is not the civil state repugnant to reason8 ,whence it would follow that the civil state is irrational1 and could only be created by men destitute of reason1 not at all by such as are led by it4 ,but since reason teaches nothing contrary to ,nature1 sound reason cannot therefore dictate that every one should remain independent1 so long as men are liable to passions1 that is1 reason pronounces against such independence4 ,besides1 reason altogether teaches to seek peace1 and peace cannot be maintained1 unless the commonwealth's general laws be kept unbroken4 ,and so1 the more a man is guided by reason1 that is1 the more he is free1 the more constantly he will keep the laws of the commonwealth1 and execute the commands of the supreme authority1 whose subject he is4 ,furthermore1 the civil state is naturally ordained to remove general fear1 and prevent general sufferings1 and therefore pursue above everything the very end1 after which every one1 who is led by reason1 strives1 but in the natural state strives vainly4 ,wherefore1 if a man1 who is led by reason1 has sometimes to do by the commonwealth's order what he knows to be repugnant to reason1 that harm is far compensated by the good1 which he derives from the existence of a civil state4 ,for it is reason's own law1 to choose the less of two evils2 and accordingly we may conclude that no one is acting against the dictate of his own reason1 so far as he does what by the law of the commonwealth is to be done4 ,and this any one will more easily grant us1 after we have explained how far the power and consequently the right of the commonwealth extends4 ,for1 first of all1 it must be considered that1 as in the state of ,nature the man who is led by reason is most powerful and most independent1 so too that commonwealth will be most powerful and most independent which is founded and guided by reason4 ,for the right of the commonwealth is determined by the power of the multitude1 which is led1 as it were1 by one mind4 ,but this unity of mind can in no wise be conceived1 unless the commonwealth pursues chiefly the very end which sound reason teaches is to the interest of all men4 ,in the second place it comes to be considered that subjects are so far dependent1 not on themselves but on the commonwealth1 as they fear its power or threats1 or as they love the civil state4 ,whence it follows1 that such things1 as no one can be induced to do by rewards or threats1 do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth4 ,for instance1 by reason of his faculty of judgment1 it is in no man's power to believe4 ,for by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to believe that the whole is not greater than its part1 or that ,god does not exist1 or that that is an infinite being1 which he sees to be finite1 or1 generally1 anything contrary to his sense or thought8 ,so1 too1 by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to love one whom he hates1 or to hate one whom he loves8 ,and to this head must likewise be referred such things as are so abhorrent to human nature1 that it regards them as actually worse than any evil1 as that a man should be witness against himself1 or torture himself1 or kill his parents1 or not strive to avoid death1 and the like1 to which no one can be induced by rewards or threats4 ,but if we still choose to say that the commonwealth has the right or authority to order such things1 we can conceive of it in no other sense than that in which one might say that a man has the right to be mad or delirious4 ,for what but a delirious fancy would such a right be1 as could bind no one8 ,and here ,i am speaking expressly of such things as cannot be subject to the right of a commonwealth and are abhorrent to human nature in general4 ,for the fact that a fool or madman can by no rewards or threats be induced to execute orders1 or that this or that person1 because he is attached to this or that religion1 judges the laws of a dominion worse than any possible evil1 in no wise makes void the laws of the commonwealth1 since by them most of the citizens are restrained4 ,and so1 as those who are without fear or hope are so far independent1 they are1 therefore1 enemies of the dominion1 and may lawfully be coerced by force4 ,thirdly1 and lastly1 it comes to be considered that those things are not so much within the commonwealth's right1 which cause indignation in the majority4 ,for it is certain1 that by the guidance of ,nature men conspire together1 either through common fear1 or with the desire to avenge some common hurt2 and as the right of the commonwealth is determined by the common power of the multitude1 it is certain that the power and right of the commonwealth are so far diminished1 as it gives occasion for many to conspire together4 ,there are certainly some subjects of fear for a commonwealth1 and as every separate citizen or in the state of ,nature every man1 so a commonwealth is the less independent1 the greater reason it has to fear4 ,so much for the right of supreme authorities over subjects4 ,now before ,i treat of the right of the said authorities as against others1 we had better resolve a question commonly mooted about religion4 ,for it may be objected to us1 ,do not the civil state1 and the obedience of subjects1 such as we have shown is required in the civil state1 do away with religion1 whereby we are bound to worship ,god8 ,but if we consider the matter1 as it really is1 we shall find nothing that can suggest a scruple4 ,for the mind1 so far as it makes use of reason1 is dependent1 not on the supreme authorities1 but on itself4 ,and so the true knowledge and the love of ,god cannot be subject to the dominion of any1 nor yet can charity towards one's neighbor4 ,and if we further reflect that the highest exercise of charity is that which aims at keeping peace and joining in unity1 we shall not doubt that he does his duty1 who helps every one1 so far as the commonwealth's laws1 that is1 so far as unity and quiet allow4 ,as for external rites1 it is certain1 that they can do no good or harm at all in respect of the true knowledge of ,god1 and the love which necessarily results from it2 and so they ought not to be held of such importance1 that it should be thought worth while on their account to disturb public peace and quiet4 ,moreover1 it is certain that ,i am not a champion of religion by the law of ,nature1 that is1 by the divine decree4 ,for ,i have no authority1 as once the disciples of ,christ had1 to cast out unclean spirits and work miracles2 which authority is yet so necessary to the propagating of religion in places where it is forbidden1 that without it one not only1 as they say1 wastes one's time#cg and trouble1 but causes besides very many inconveniences1 whereof all ages have seen most mournful examples4 ,every one therefore1 wherever he may be1 can worship ,god with true religion1 and mind his own business1 which is the duty of a private man4 ,but the care of propagating religion should be left to ,god1 or the supreme authorities1 upon whom alone falls the charge of affairs of state4 ,but ,i return to my subject4 ,after explaining the right of supreme authorities over citizens and the duty of subjects1 it remains to consider the right of such authorities against the world at large1 which is now easily intelligible from what has been said4 ,for since the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else but simple natural right1 it follows that two dominions stand towards each other in the same relation as do two men in the state of ,nature1 with this exception1 that a commonwealth can provide against being oppressed by another2 which a man in the state of ,nature cannot do1 seeing that he is overcome daily by sleep1 often by disease or mental infirmity1 and in the end by old age1 and is besides liable to other inconveniences1 from which a commonwealth can secure itself4 ,a commonwealth1 then1 is so far independent1 as it can plan and provide against oppression by another1 and so far dependent on another commonwealth1 as it fears that other's power1 or is hindered by it from executing its own wishes1 or1 lastly1 as it needs its help for its own preservation or increase4 ,for we cannot at all doubt1 that if two commonwealths are willing to offer each other mutual help1 both together are more powerful1 and therefore have more right1 than either alone4 ,but this will be more clearly intelligible if we reflect that two commonwealths are naturally enemies4 ,for men in the state of ,nature are enemies4 ,those1 then1 who stand outside a commonwealth1 and retain their natural rights1 continue enemies4 ,accordingly1 if one commonwealth wishes to make war on another and employ extreme measures to make that other dependent on itself1 it may lawfully make the attempt1 since it needs but the bare will of the commonwealth for war to be waged4 ,but concerning peace it can decide nothing1 save with the concurrence of another commonwealth's will4 ,when it follows that laws of war regard every commonwealth by itself1 but laws of peace regard not one1 but at the least two commonwealths1 which are therefore called contracting parties4 ,this contract remains so long unmoved as the motive for entering into it1 that is1 fear of hurt or hope of gain1 subsists4 ,but take away from either commonwealth this hope or fear1 and it is left independent1 and the link1 whereby the commonwealths were mutually bound1 breaks of itself4 ,and therefore every commonwealth has the right to break its contract1 whenever it chooses1 and cannot be said to act treacherously or perfidiously in breaking its word1 as soon as the motive of hope or fear is removed4 ,for every contracting party was on equal terms in this respect1 that whichever could first free itself of fear should be independent1 and make use of its independence after its own mind2 and1 besides1 no one makes a contract respecting the future1 but on the hypothesis of certain precedent circumstances4 ,but when these circumstances change1 the reason of policy applicable to the whole position changes with them2 and therefore every one of the contracting commonwealths retains the right of consulting its own interest1 and consequently endeavors1 as far as possible1 to be free from fear and thereby independent1 and to prevent another from coming out of the contract with greater power4 ,if then a commonwealth complains that it has been deceived1 it cannot properly blame the bad faith of another contracting commonwealth1 but only its own folly in having entrusted its own welfare to another party1 that was independent1 and had for its highest law the welfare of its own dominion4 ,to commonwealths1 which have contracted a treaty of peace1 it belongs to decide the questions which may be mooted about the terms or rules of peace1 whereby they have mutually bound themselves1 inasmuch as laws of peace regard not one commonwealth1 but the commonwealths which contract taken together4 ,but if they cannot agree together about the conditions1 they by that very fact return to a state of war4 ,the more commonwealths there are1 that have contracted a joint treaty of peace1 the less each of them by itself is an object of fear to the remainder1 or the less it has the authority to make war4 ,but it is so much the more bound to observe the conditions of peace2 that is1 the less independent1 and the more bound to accommodate itself to the general will of the contracting parties4 ,but the good faith1 inculcated by sound reason and religion1 is not hereby made void2 for neither reason nor ,scripture teaches one to keep one's word in every case4 ,for if ,i have promised a man1 for instance1 to keep safe a sum of money he has secretly deposited with me1 ,i am not bound to keep my word1 from the time that ,i know or believe the deposit to have been stolen1 but ,i shall act more rightly in endeavoring to restore it to its owners4 ,so likewise1 if the supreme authority has promised another to do something1 which subsequently occasion or reason shows or seems to show is contrary to the welfare of its subjects1 it is surely bound to break its word4 ,as then ,scripture only teaches us to keep our word in general1 and leaves to every individual's judgment the special cases of exception1 it teaches nothing repugnant to what we have just proved4 ,but that ,i may not have so often to break the thread of my discourse1 and to resolve hereafter similar objections1 ,i would have it known that all this demonstration of mine proceeds from the necessity of human nature1 considered in what light you will--,i mean1 from the universal effort of all men after self-preservation1 an effort inherent in all men1 whether learned or unlearned4 ,and therefore1 however one considers men are led1 whether by passion or by reason1 it will be the same thing2 for the demonstration1 as we have said1 is of universal application4 ,,ii ,of the ,functions of ,supreme ,authorities#ch ,the right of the supreme authorities is limited by their power2 the most important part of that right is1 that they are1 as it were1 the mind of the dominion1 whereby all ought to be guided2 and accordingly1 such authorities alone have the right of deciding what is good1 evil1 equitable or iniquitous1 that is1 what must be done or left undone by the subjects severally or collectively4 ,and1 accordingly1 they have the sole right of laying down laws1 and of interpreting the same1 whenever their meaning is disputed1 and of deciding whether a given case is in conformity with or violation of the laws2 and1 lastly1 of waging war1 and of drawing up and offering propositions for peace1 or of accepting such when offered4 ,as all these functions1 and also the means required to execute them1 are matters which regard the whole body of the dominion1 that is1 are affairs of state1 it follows that affairs of state depend on the direction of him only who holds supreme dominion4 ,and hence it follows that it is the right of the supreme authority alone to judge the deeds of every individual1 and demand of him an account of the same2 to punish criminals1 and decide questions of law between citizens1 or appoint jurists acquainted with the existing laws1 to administer these matters on its behalf2 and1 further1 to use and order all means to war and peace1 as to found and fortify cities1 levy soldiers1 assign military posts1 and order what it would have done1 and1 with a view to peace1 to send and give audience to ambassadors2 and1 finally1 to levy the costs of all this4 ,since1 then1 it is the right of the supreme authority alone to handle public matters1 or choose officials to do so1 it follows that that subject is a pretender to the dominion1 who1 without the supreme council's knowledge1 enters upon any public matter1 although he believe that his design will be to the best interest of the commonwealth4 ,but it is often asked1 whether the supreme authority is bound by laws1 and1 consequently1 whether it can do wrong4 ,now as the words law and wrong-doing often refer not merely to the laws of a commonwealth1 but also to the general rules which concern all natural things1 and especially to the general rules of reason1 we cannot1 without qualification1 say that the commonwealth is bound by no laws1 or can do no wrong4 ,for were the commonwealth bound by no laws or rules1 which removed1 the commonwealth were no commonwealth1 we should have to regard it not as a natural thing1 but as a chimera4 ,a commonwealth then does wrong1 when it does1 or suffers to be done1 things which may be the cause of its own ruin2 and we can say that it then does wrong1 in the sense in which philosophers or doctors say that ,nature does wrong2 and in this sense we can say1 that a commonwealth does wrong1 when it acts against the dictate of reason4 ,for a commonwealth is most independent when it acts according to the dictate of reason2 so far1 then1 as it acts against reason1 it fails itself1 or does wrong4 ,and we shall be able more easily to understand this if we reflect that when we say1 that a man can do what he will with his own1 this authority must be limited not only by the power of the agent1 but by the capacity of the object4 ,if1 for instance1 ,i say that ,i can rightfully do what ,i will with this table1 ,i do not certainly mean that ,i have the right to make it eat grass4 ,so1 too1 though we say1 that men depend not on themselves1 but on the commonwealth1 we do not mean1 that men lose their human nature and put on another2 nor yet that the commonwealth has the right to make men wish for this or that1 or 7what is just as impossible7 regard with honor things which excite ridicule or disgust4 ,but it is implied that there are certain intervening circumstances which supposed1 one likewise supposes the reverence and fear of the subjects towards the commonwealth1 and which abstracted1 one makes abstraction likewise of that fear and reverence1 and therewith of the commonwealth itself4 ,the commonwealth1 then1 to maintain its independence1 is bound to preserve the causes of fear and reverence1 otherwise it ceases to be a commonwealth4 ,for the person or persons that hold dominion can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets1 or the performances of a stage-player1 or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves1 than they can combine existence with non-existence4 ,but to proceed to slay and rob subjects1 ravish maidens1 and the like1 turns fear into indignation and the civil state into a state of enmity4 ,we see1 then1 in what sense we may say1 that a commonwealth is bound by laws and can do wrong4 ,but if by law we understand civil law1 and by wrong that which1 by civil law1 is forbidden to be done1 that is1 if these words be taken in their proper sense1 we cannot at all say that a commonwealth is bound by laws or can do wrong4 ,for the maxims and motives of fear and reverence which a commonwealth is bound to observe in its own interest1 pertain not to civil jurisprudence1 but to the law of ,nature1 since they cannot be vindicated by the civil law1 but by the law of war4 ,and a commonwealth is bound by them in no other sense than that in which in the state of ,nature a man is bound to take heed that he preserve his independence and be not his own enemy1 lest he should destroy himself2 and in this taking heed lies not the subjection1 but the liberty of human nature4 ,but civil jurisprudence depends on the mere decree of the commonwealth1 which is not bound to please any but itself1 nor to hold anything to be good or bad1 but what it judges to be such for itself4 ,and1 accordingly1 it has not merely the right to avenge itself1 or to lay down and interpret laws1 but also to abolish the same1 and to pardon any guilty person out of the fullness of its power4 ,contracts or laws1 whereby the multitude transfers its right to one council or man1 should without doubt be broken1 when it is expedient for the general welfare to do so4 ,but to decide this point1 whether1 that is1 it be expedient for the general welfare to break them or not1 is within the right of no private person1 but of him only who holds dominion2 therefore of these laws he who holds dominion remains sole interpreter4 ,moreover1 no private person can by right vindicate these laws1 and so they do not really bind him who holds dominion4 ,notwithstanding1 if they are of such a nature that they cannot be broken without at the same time weakening the commonwealth's strength1 that is1 without at the same time changing to indignation the common fear of most of the citizens1 by this very fact the commonwealth is dissolved1 and the contract comes to an end2 and therefore such contract is vindicated not by the civil law1 but by the law of war4 ,and so he who holds dominion is not bound to observe the terms of the contract by any other cause than that1 which bids a man in the state of ,nature to beware of being his own enemy1 lest he should destroy himself4 ,,iii ,of the ,best ,state of a ,dominion#ci ,we have shown that man is then most independent when he is most led by reason1 and1 in consequence1 that that commonwealth is most powerful and most independent which is founded and guided by reason4 ,but1 as the best plan of living1 so as to assure to the utmost self-preservation1 is that which is framed according to the dictate of reason1 therefore it follows that that in every kind is best done1 which a man or commonwealth does1 so far as he or it is in the highest degree independent4 ,for it is one thing to till a field by right1 and another to till it in the best way4 ,one thing1 ,i say1 to defend or preserve oneself1 and to pass judgment by right1 and another to defend or preserve oneself in the best way1 and to pass the best judgment2 and1 consequently1 it is one thing to have dominion and care of affairs of state by right1 and another to exercise dominion and direct affairs of state in the best way4 ,and so1 as we have treated of the right of every commonwealth in general1 it is time to treat of the best state of every dominion4 ,now the quality of the state of any dominion is easily perceived from the end of the civil state1 which end is nothing else but peace and security of life4 ,and therefore that dominion is the best1 where men pass their lives in unity1 and the laws are kept unbroken4 ,for it is certain1 that seditions1 wars1 and contempt or breach of the laws are not so much to be imputed to the wickedness of the subjects1 as to the bad state of a dominion4 ,for men are not born fit for citizenship1 but must be made so4 ,besides1 men's natural passions are everywhere the same2 and if wickedness more prevails1 and more offenses are committed in one commonwealth than in another1 it is certain that the former has not enough pursued the end of unity1 nor framed its laws with sufficient forethought2 and that1 therefore1 it has failed in making quite good its right as a commonwealth4 ,for a civil state1 which has not done away with the causes of seditions1 where war is a perpetual object of fear1 and where1 lastly1 the laws are often broken1 differs but little from the mere state of ,nature1 in which every one lives after his own mind at the great risk of his life4 ,but as the vices and inordinate license and contumacy of subjects must be imputed to the commonwealth1 so1 on the other hand1 their virtue and constant obedience to the laws are to be ascribed in the main to the virtue and perfect right of the commonwealth4 ,and so it is deservedly reckoned to ,hannibal as an extraordinary virtue1 that in his army there never arose a sedition4 ,of a commonwealth1 whose subjects are but hindered by terror from taking arms1 it should rather be said1 that it is free from war1 than that it has peace4 ,for peace is not mere absence of war1 but is a virtue that springs from force of character3 for obedience is the constant will to execute what1 by the general decree of the commonwealth1 ought to be done4 ,besides1 that commonwealth whose peace depends on the sluggishness of its subjects1 that are led about like sheep to learn but slavery1 may more properly be called a desert than a commonwealth4 ,when1 then1 we call that dominion best1 where men pass their lives in unity1 ,i understand a human life1 defined not by mere circulation of the blood1 and other qualities common to all animals1 but above all by reason1 the true excellence and life of the mind4 ,but be it remarked that1 by the dominion which ,i have said is established for this end1 ,i intend that which has been established by a free multitude1 not that which is acquired over a multitude by right of war4 ,for a free multitude is guided more by hope than fear2 a conquered one1 more by fear than by hope3 inasmuch as the former aims at making use of life1 the latter but at escaping death4 ,the former1 ,i say1 aims at living for its own ends1 the latter is forced to belong to the conqueror2 and so we say that this is enslaved1 but that free4 ,and1 therefore1 the end of a dominion1 which one gets by right of war1 is to be master1 and have rather slaves than subjects4 ,and although between the dominion created by a free multitude1 and that gained by right of war1 if we regard generally the right of each1 we can make no essential distinction2 yet their ends1 as we have already shown1 and further the means to the preservation of each are very different4 ,but what means a prince1 whose sole motive is lust of mastery1 should use to establish and maintain his dominion1 the most ingenious ,machiavelli has set forth at large1#dj but with what design one can hardly be sure4 ,if1 however1 he had some good design1 as one should believe of a learned man1 it seems to have been to show1 with how little foresight many attempt to remove a tyrant1 though thereby the causes which make the prince a tyrant can in no wise be removed1 but1 on the contrary1 are so much the more established1 as the prince is given more cause to fear1 which happens when the multitude has made an example of its prince1 and glories in the parricide as in a thing well done4 ,moreover1 he perhaps wished to show how cautious a free multitude should be of entrusting its welfare absolutely to one man1 who1 unless in his vanity he thinks he can please everybody1 must be in daily fear of plots1 and so is forced to look chiefly after his own interest1 and1 as for the multitude1 rather to plot against it than consult its good4 ,and ,i am the more led to this opinion concerning that most far-seeing man1 because it is known that he was favorable to liberty1 for the maintenance of which he has besides given the most wholesome advice4 ,,footnotes3 #cf ,from ,a ,political ,treatise1 ch4 iii1 same title4 #cg ,literally1 oil and trouble--a common proverbial expression in ,latin4 #ch ,from ,a ,political ,treatise1 ch4 iv1 same title4 #ci ,from ,a ,political ,treatise1 ch4 v1 same title4 #dj ,in his book called ,il ,principe1 or ,the ,prince4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,freedom ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,speech#da ,if men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues1 every king would sit safely on his throne1 and government by compulsion would cease2 for every subject would shape his life according to the intentions of his rulers1 and would esteem a thing true or false1 good or evil1 just or unjust1 in obedience to their dictates4 ,however1 444 no man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of another1 for no one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and judgment1 or be compelled so to do4 ,for this reason government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical1 and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true1 or rejected as false1 or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of ,god4 ,all these questions fall within a man's natural right1 which he cannot abdicate even with his own consent4 ,i admit that the judgment can be biased in many ways1 and to an almost incredible degree1 so that while exempt from direct external control it may be so dependent on another man's words1 that it may fitly be said to be ruled by him2 but although this influence is carried to great lengths1 it has never gone so far as to invalidate the statement that every man's understanding is his own1 and that brains are as diverse as palates4 ,moses1 not by fraud1 but by ,divine virtue1 gained such a hold over the popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman1 and believed to speak and act through the inspiration of the ,deity2 nevertheless1 even he could not escape murmurs and evil interpretations4 ,how much less then can other monarchs avoid them6 ,yet such unlimited power1 if it exists at all1 must belong to a monarch1 and least of all to a democracy1 where the whole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively4 ,this is a fact which ,i think every one can explain for himself4 ,however unlimited1 therefore1 the power of a sovereign may be1 however implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion1 it can never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect1 or being influenced by any given emotion4 ,it is true that it has the right to treat as enemies all men whose opinions do not1 on all subjects1 entirely coincide with its own2 but we are not discussing its strict rights1 but its proper course of action4 ,i grant that it has the right to rule in the most violent manner1 and to put citizens to death for very trivial causes1 but no one supposes it can do this with the approval of sound judgment4 ,nay1 inasmuch as such things cannot be done without extreme peril to itself1 we may even deny that it has the absolute power to do them1 or1 consequently1 the absolute right2 for the rights of the sovereign are limited by his power4 ,since1 therefore1 no one can abdicate his freedom of judgment and feeling2 since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of his own thoughts1 it follows that men1 thinking in diverse and contradictory fashions1 cannot1 without disastrous results1 be compelled to speak only according to the dictates of the supreme power4 ,not even the most experienced1 to say nothing of the multitude1 know how to keep silence4 ,men's common failing is to confide their plans to others1 though there be need for secrecy1 so that a government would be most harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought2 and would be moderate if such freedom were granted4 ,still we cannot deny that authority may be as much injured by words as by actions4 ,hence1 although the freedom we are discussing cannot be entirely denied to subjects1 its unlimited concession would be most baneful2 we must1 therefore1 now inquire1 how far such freedom can and ought to be conceded without danger to the peace of the state1 or the power of the rulers4 ,it follows1 plainly1 from the explanation given above1 of the foundations of a state1 that the ultimate aim of government is not to rule1 or restrain by fear1 nor to exact obedience1 but1 contrariwise1 to free every man from fear that he may live in all possible security2 in other words1 to strengthen his natural right to exist and work without injury to himself or others4 ,no1 the object of government is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets1 but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in security1 and to employ their reason unshackled2 neither showing hatred1 anger or deceit1 nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and injustice4 ,in fact1 the true aim of government is liberty4 ,now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making laws must either be vested in the body of the citizens1 or in a portion of them1 or in one man4 ,for1 although men's free judgments are very diverse1 each one thinking that he alone knows everything1 and although complete unanimity of feeling and speech is out of the question1 it is impossible to preserve peace unless individuals abdicate their right of acting entirely on their own judgment4 ,therefore1 the individual justly cedes the right of free action1 though not of free reason and judgment2 no one can act against the authorities without danger to the state1 though his feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith2 he may even speak against them1 provided that he does so from rational conviction1 not from fraud1 anger or hatred1 and provided that he does not attempt to introduce any change on his private authority4 ,for instance1 supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound reason1 and should therefore be repealed2 if he submits his opinion to the judgment of the authorities 7who alone have the right of making and repealing laws71 and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law1 he has deserved well of the state1 and has behaved as a good citizen should2 but if he accuses the authorities of injustice1 and stirs up the people against them1 or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law without their consent1 he is a mere agitator and rebel4 ,thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he believes1 without injury to the authority of his rulers1 or to the public peace2 namely1 by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as it affects action1 and by doing nothing against their laws1 though he be compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes1 and openly feels1 to be best4 ,such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and dutifulness1 nay1 it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt4 ,we have shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities1 so that no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just1 while the highest regard for duty1 as we have pointed out1 is exercised in maintaining public peace and tranquillity4 ,these could not be preserved if every man were to live as he pleased4 ,therefore it is no less than undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's laws1 for if the practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily follow4 ,hence1 so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers1 he in nowise contravenes his reason1 for in obedience to reason he transferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to theirs4 ,this doctrine we can confirm from actual custom1 for in a conference of great and small powers1 schemes are seldom carried unanimously1 yet all unite in carrying out what is decided on1 whether they voted for or against4 ,but ,i return to my proposition4 ,from the fundamental notions of a state1 we have discovered how a man may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power3 from the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be seditious4 ,evidently those which by their very nature nullify the compact by which the right of free action was ceded4 ,for instance1 a man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him1 or that promises ought not to be kept1 or that every one should live as he pleases1 or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the above-mentioned contract1 is seditious1 not so much from his actual opinions and judgment1 as from the deeds which they involve2 for he who maintains such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly1 or openly1 he made with his rulers4 ,other opinions which do not involve acts violating the contract1 such as revenge1 anger1 and the like1 are not seditious1 unless it be in some corrupt state1 where superstitious and ambitious persons1 unable to endure men of learning1 are so popular with the multitude that their word is more valued than the law4 ,however1 ,i do not deny that there are some doctrines which1 while they are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods1 are yet propounded and published with unworthy motives4444 ,reason should nevertheless remain unshackled4 ,if we hold to the principle that a man's loyalty to the state should be judged1 like his loyalty to ,god1 from his actions only--namely1 from his charity towards his neighbors2 we cannot doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical speculation no less than of religious belief4 ,i confess that from such freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise1 but what question was ever settled so wisely than no abuses could possibly spring therefrom8 ,he who seeks to regulate everything by law is more likely to arouse vices than to reform them4 ,it is best to grant what cannot be abolished1 even though it be in itself harmful4 ,how many evils spring from luxury1 envy1 avarice1 drunkenness and the like1 yet these are tolerated--vices as they are--because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments4 ,how much more1 then1 should free thought be granted1 seeing that it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed6 ,besides1 the evil results can easily be checked1 as ,i will show1 by the secular authorities1 not to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary for progress in science and the liberal arts3 for no man follows such pursuits to advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and unhampered4 ,but let it be granted that freedom may be crushed1 and men be so bound down that they do not dare to utter a whisper1 save at the bidding of their rulers2 nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of making them think according to authority1 so that the necessary consequences would be that men would daily be thinking one thing and saying another1 to the corruption of good faith1 that mainstay of government1 and to the fostering of hateful flattery and perfidy1 whence spring stratagems1 and the corruption of every good art4 ,it is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech1 for the more rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech the more obstinately are they resisted2 not indeed by the avaricious1 the flatterers1 and other numskulls1 who think supreme salvation consists in filling their stomachs and gloating over their money-bags1 but by those whom good education1 sound morality1 and virtue have rendered more free4 ,men1 as generally constituted1 are most prone to resent the branding as criminal of opinions which they believe to be true1 and the proscription as wicked of that which inspires them with piety towards ,god and man2 hence they are ready to forswear the laws and conspire against the authorities1 thinking it not shameful but honorable to stir up seditions and perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view4 ,such being the constitution of human nature1 we see that laws directed against opinions affect the generous minded rather than the wicked1 and are adapted less for coercing criminals than for irritating the upright2 so that they cannot be maintained without great peril to the state4 ,moreover1 such laws are almost always useless1 for those who hold that the opinions proscribed are sound1 cannot possibly obey the law2 whereas those who already reject them as false1 accept the law as a kind of privilege1 and make such boast of it1 that authority is powerless to repeal it1 even if such a course be subsequently desired4 444 ,and1 lastly1 how many schisms have arisen in the ,church from the attempt of the authorities to decide by law the intricacies of theological controversy6 ,if men were not allured by the hope of getting the law and the authorities on their side1 of triumphing over their adversaries in the sight of an applauding multitude1 and of acquiring honorable distinctions1 they would not strive so maliciously1 nor would such fury sway their minds4 ,this is taught not only by reason but by daily examples1 for laws of this kind prescribing what every man shall believe and forbidding any one to speak or write to the contrary1 have often been passed as sops or concessions to the anger of those who cannot tolerate men of enlightenment1 and who1 by such harsh and crooked enactments1 can easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and direct it against whom they will4 ,how much better would it be to restrain popular anger and fury1 instead of passing useless laws1 which can only be broken by those who love virtue and the liberal arts1 thus paring down the state till it is too small to harbor men of talent4 ,what greater misfortune for a state can be conceived than that honorable men should be sent like criminals into exile1 because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot disguise8 ,what1 ,i say1 can be more hurtful than that men who have committed no crime or wickedness should1 simply because they are enlightened1 be treated as enemies and put to death1 and that the scaffold1 the terror of evil-doers1 should become the arena where the highest examples of tolerance and virtue are displayed to the people with all the marks of ignominy that authority can devise8 ,he that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a criminal1 and shrinks from no punishment4 ,his mind is not wrung with remorse for any disgraceful deed4 ,he holds that death in a good cause is no punishment1 but an honor1 and that death for freedom is glory4 ,what purpose1 then1 is served by the death of such men1 what example is proclaimed8 ,the cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and the foolish1 hateful to the turbulent1 loved by the upright4 ,the only lesson we can draw from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor1 or else to imitate the victim4 ,if formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction1 and if governments are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled to yield to agitators1 it is imperative that freedom of judgment should be granted1 so that men may live together in harmony1 however diverse1 or even openly contradictory their opinions may be4 ,we cannot doubt that such is the best system of government and open to the fewest objections1 since it is the one most in harmony with human nature4 ,in a democracy 7the most natural form of government7 every one submits to the control of authority over his actions1 but not over his judgment and reason2 that is1 seeing that all cannot think alike1 the voice of the majority has the force of law1 subject to repeal if circumstances bring about a change of opinion4 ,in proportion as the power of free judgment is withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind1 and consequently the government becomes more tyrannical4 ,in order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience arises which cannot easily be checked by the exercise of the sovereign power1 and that men's actions can easily be kept in bounds1 though their opinions be at open variance1 it will be well to cite an example4 ,such an one is not very far to seek4 ,the city of ,amsterdam reaps the fruit of this freedom in its own great prosperity and in the admiration of all other people4 ,for in this most flourishing state1 and most splendid city1 men of every nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony1 and ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow-citizen1 save whether he be rich or poor1 and whether he generally acts honestly1 or the reverse4 ,his religion and sect is considered of no importance3 for it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing a cause1 and there is no sect so despised that its followers1 provided that they harm no one1 pay every man his due1 and live uprightly1 are deprived of the protection of the magisterial authority4 ,on the other hand1 when the religious controversy between ,remonstrants and ,counter-,remonstrants began to be taken up by politicians and the ,states1 it grew into a schism1 and abundantly showed that laws dealing with religion and seeking to settle its controversies are much more calculated to irritate than to reform1 and that they give rise to extreme license4 ,further1 it was seen that schisms do not originate in a love of truth1 which is a source of courtesy and gentleness1 but rather in an inordinate desire for supremacy4 ,from all these considerations it is clearer than the sun at noonday1 that the true schismatics are those who condemn other men's writings1 and seditiously stir up the quarrelsome masses against their authors1 rather than those authors themselves1 who generally write only for the learned1 and appeal solely to reason4 ,in fact1 the real disturbers of the peace are those who1 in a free state1 seek to curtail the liberty of judgment which they are unable to tyrannize over4 ,i have thus shown3--,i4 ,that it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty of saying what they think4 ,,ii4 ,that such liberty can be conceded to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign power1 and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights1 provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing any new rights into the state1 or acting in any way contrary to the existing laws4 ,,iii4 ,that every man may enjoy this liberty without detriment to the public peace1 and that no inconveniences arise therefrom which cannot easily be checked4 ,,iv4 ,that every man may enjoy it without injury to his allegiance4 ,v4 ,that laws dealing with speculative problems are entirely useless4 ,,vi4 ,lastly1 that not only may such liberty be granted without prejudice to the public peace1 to loyalty1 and to the rights of rulers1 but that it is even necessary for their preservation4 ,for when people try to take it away1 and bring to trial1 not only the acts which alone are capable of offending1 but also the opinions of mankind1 they only succeed in surrounding their victims with an appearance of martyrdom1 and raise feelings of pity and revenge rather than of terror4 ,uprightness and good faith are thus corrupted1 flatterers and traitors are encouraged1 and sectarians triumph1 inasmuch as concessions have been made to their animosity1 and they have gained the state sanction for the doctrines of which they are the interpreters4 ,hence they arrogate to themselves the state authority and rights1 and do not scruple to assert that they have been directly chosen by ,god1 and that their laws are ,divine1 whereas the laws of the state are human1 and should therefore yield obedience to the laws of ,god--in other words1 to their own laws4 ,every one must see that this is not a state of affairs conducive to public welfare4 ,wherefore1 the safest way for a state is to lay down the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise of charity and justice1 and that the rights of rulers in sacred1 no less than in secular matters1 should merely have to do with actions1 but that every man should think what he likes and say what he thinks4 ,,footnotes3 #da ,from the ,tr4 ,th4-,p41 ch4 xx1 same title4 ,,chapter ,,xix ,,of ,,human ,,freedom ,introductory ,i pass at length to the other part of ethics which concerns the method or way which leads to liberty4 ,in the following1 therefore1 ,i shall treat of the power of reason1 showing how much reason itself can control the emotions1 and then what is freedom of mind or blessedness4 ,thence we shall see how much stronger the wise man is than the ignorant4 ,in what manner and what way the intellect should be rendered perfect1 and with what art the body is to be cared for in order that it may properly perform its functions1 ,i have nothing to do with here2 for the former belongs to logic1 the latter to medicine4 ,i shall occupy myself here1 as ,i have said1 solely with the power of the mind or of reason1 first of all showing the extent and nature of the authority which it has over the emotions in restraining them and governing them2 for that we have not absolute authority over them we have already demonstrated4 ,the ,stoics indeed thought that the emotions depend absolutely on our will1 and that we are absolutely masters over them2 but they were driven1 by the contradiction of experience1 though not by their own principles1 to confess that not a little practice and study are required in order to restrain and govern the emotions4 ,this one of them attempted to illustrate1 if ,i remember rightly1 by the example of two dogs1 one of a domestic and the other of a hunting breed2 for he was able by habit to make the house dog hunt1 and the hunting dog1 on the contrary1 to desist from running after hares4 ,to the ,stoical opinion ,descartes much inclines4 ,he affirms that the soul or mind is united specially to a certain part of the brain called the pineal gland1 which the mind by the mere exercise of the will is able to move in different ways1 and by whose help the mind perceives all the movements which are excited in the body and external objects4 ,this gland1 he affirms1 is suspended in the middle of the brain in such a manner that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal spirits4 ,again1 he affirms that any variation in the manner in which the animal spirits impinge upon this gland is followed by a variation in the manner in which it is suspended in the middle of the brain1 and moreover that the number of different impressions on the gland is the same as that of the different external objects which propel the animal spirits toward it4 ,hence it comes to pass that if the gland1 by the will of the soul moving it in different directions1 be afterwards suspended in this or that way in which it had once been suspended by the spirits agitated in this or that way1 then the gland itself will propel and determine the animal spirits themselves in the same way as that in which they had before been repelled by a similar suspension of the gland4 ,moreover1 he affirmed that each volition of the mind is united in ,nature to a certain motion of the gland4 ,for example1 if a person wishes to behold a remote object1 this volition will cause the pupil of the eye to dilate1 but if he thinks merely of the dilation of the pupil1 to have that volition will profit him nothing1 because ,nature has not connected a motion of the gland which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way suitable for dilation or contraction of the pupil with the volition or dilation or contraction1 but only with the volition of beholding objects afar off or close at hand4 ,finally1 he maintained that although each motion of this gland appears to be connected by ,nature from the commencement of our life with an individual thought1 these motions can nevertheless be connected by habit with other thoughts1 a proposition which he attempts to demonstrate in his ,passions of the ,soul 7art4 #ej1 pt4 #a74 ,from this he concludes that there is no mind so feeble that it cannot1 when properly directed1 acquire absolute power over its passions2 for passions1 as defined by him1 are perceptions1 or sensations1 or emotions of the soul which are related to it specially1 and which 7,n4,b47 are produced1 preserved1 and strengthened by some motion of the spirits4 7,see the ,passions of ,soul1 art4 #bg1 pt4 #a47 ,but since it is possible to join to a certain volition any motion of the gland1 and consequently of the spirits1 and since the determination of the will depends solely on our power1 we shall be able to acquire absolute mastery over our passions provided only we determine our will by fixed and firm decisions by which we desire to direct our actions and bind with these decisions the movements of the passions we wish to have4 ,so far as ,i can gather from his own words1 this is the opinion of that distinguished man1 and ,i could scarcely have believed it possible for one so great to have put it forward if it had been less subtle4 ,i can hardly wonder enough that a philosopher who firmly resolved to make no deduction except from self-evident principles1 and to affirm nothing but what he clearly and distinctly perceived1 and who blamed all the ,schoolmen because they desired to explain obscure matters by occult qualities1 should accept a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality4 ,what does he understand1 ,i ask1 by the union of the mind and body8 ,what clear and distinct conception has he of thought intimately connected with a certain small portion of matter8 ,i wish that he had explained this union by its proximate cause4 ,but he conceived the mind to be so distinct from the body that he was able to assign no single cause of this union1 nor of the mind itself1 but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe1 that is to say1 to ,god4 ,again1 ,i should like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can give to that pineal gland1 and with how great a power the mind can hold it suspended4 ,for ,i do not understand whether this gland is acted on by the mind more slowly or more quickly than by the animal spirits1 and whether the movements of the passions1 which we have so closely bound with firm decisions1 might not be separated from them again by bodily causes1 from which it would follow that although the mind had firmly determined to meet danger1 and had joined to this decision the motion of boldness1 the sight of the danger might cause the gland to be suspended in such a manner that the mind could think of nothing but flight4 ,indeed1 since there is no relation between the will and motion1 so there is no comparison between the power or strength of the body and that of the mind1 and consequently the strength of the body can never be determined by the strength of the mind4 ,it is to be remembered also that this gland is not found to be so situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so easily and in so many ways1 and that all the nerves are not extended to the cavities of the brain4 ,lastly1 ,i omit all that ,descartes asserts concerning the will and the freedom of the will1 since ,i have shown over and over again that it is false4 ,therefore1 inasmuch as the power of the mind1 as ,i have shown above1 is determined by intelligence alone1 we shall determine by the knowledge of the mind alone the remedies against the emotions--remedies which every one1 ,i believe1 has experienced1 although there may not have been any accurate observation or distinct perception of them1 and from this knowledge of the mind alone shall we deduce everything which relates to its blessedness4 ,axioms ,i4 ,if two contrary actions be excited in the same subject1 a change must necessarily take place in both1 or in one alone1 until they cease to be contrary4 ,,ii4 ,the power of an emotion is limited by the power of its cause1 in so far as the essence of the emotion is manifested or limited by the essence of the cause itself4 ,the ,strength of the ,emotions ,the emotion towards an object which we imagine to be free is greater than towards one which is necessary1 and consequently still greater than towards one which we imagine as possible or contingent4 ,but to imagine an object as free can be nothing else than to imagine it simply1 while we know not the causes by which it was determined to action4 ,an emotion1 therefore1 towards an object which we simply imagine is1 other things being equal1 greater than towards one which we imagine as necessary1 possible1 or contingent1 and consequently greatest of all4 ,the mind understands all things to be necessary and determined by an infinite chain of causes to existence and action1 and therefore so far enables itself to suffer less from the emotions which arise from these things1 and to be less affected towards them4 ,the more this knowledge that things are necessary is applied to individual things which we imagine more distinctly and more vividly1 the greater is this power of the mind over the emotions--a fact to which experience also testifies4 ,for we see that sorrow for the loss of anything good is diminished if the person who has lost it considers that it could not by any possibility have been preserved4 ,so also we see that nobody pities an infant because it does not know how to speak1 walk1 or reason1 and lives so many years not conscious1 as it were1 of itself4 ,but if a number of human beings were born adult1 and only a few here and there were born infants1 every one would pity the infants1 because we should then consider infancy not as a thing natural and necessary1 but as a defect or fault of ,nature4 ,many other facts of a similar kind we might observe4 ,we do not contemplate an object as absent by reason of the emotion by which we imagine it1 but by reason of the fact that the body is affected with another modification1 which excludes the existence of that object4 ,the emotion1 therefore1 which is related to an object which we contemplate as absent1 is not of such a nature as to overcome the other actions and power of man1 but1 on the contrary1 is of such a nature that it can in some way be restrained by those modifications which exclude the existence of its external cause4 ,but the emotion which arises from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things1 which we always contemplate as present for nothing can exist which excludes their present existence1 and which we always imagine in the same way4 ,this emotion1 therefore1 always remains the same1 and consequently the emotions which are contrary to it1 and which are not maintained by their external cause1 must more and more accommodate themselves to it until they are no longer contrary to it4 ,so far1 therefore1 the emotion which springs from reason is the stronger4 ,a number of simultaneous causes can do more than if they were fewer1 and therefore the greater the number of the simultaneous causes by which an emotion is excited1 the greater it is4 ,an emotion is bad or injurious only in so far as it hinders the mind from thinking and therefore that emotion by which the mind is determined to the contemplation of a number of objects at the same time is less injurious than another emotion equally great which holds the mind in the contemplation of one object alone or of a few objects1 so that it cannot think of others4 ,again1 since the essence of the mind1 that is to say1 its power1 consists in thought alone1 the mind suffers less through an emotion by which it is determined to the contemplation of a number of objects at the same time than through an emotion equally great which holds it occupied in the contemplation of one object alone or of a few objects4 ,finally1 this emotion1 in so far as it is related to a number of external causes1 is therefore less towards each4 ,the ,power of the ,intellect ,over the ,emotions ,i ,general ,principles ,the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things1 and vice versa1 the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas4 ,therefore1 as the order and connection of ideas in the mind is according to the order and connection of the modifications of the body it follows vice versa1 that the order and connection of the modifications of the body is according to the order and connection in the mind of the thoughts and ideas of things4 ,if we detach an emotion of the mind from the thought of an external cause and connect it with other thoughts1 then the love or hatred towards the external cause and the fluctuations of the mind which arise from these emotions will be destroyed4 ,an emotion which is a passion is a confused idea4 ,if1 therefore1 we form a clear and distinct idea of this emotion1 the idea will not be distinguished--except by reason--from this emotion1 in so far as the emotion is related to the mind alone1 and therefore the emotion will cease to be a passion4 ,in proportion1 then1 as we know an emotion better is it more within our control1 and the less does the mind suffer from it4 ,those things which are common to all cannot be otherwise than adequately conceived and therefore there is no modification of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception4 ,hence it follows that there is no emotion of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception4 ,for an emotion is an idea of a modification of the body1 and this idea therefore must involve some clear and distinct conception4 ,since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow1 and since we understand clearly and distinctly everything which follows from an idea which is adequate in us1 it is a necessary consequence that every one has the power1 partly at least1 if not absolutely1 of understanding clearly and distinctly himself and his emotions1 and consequently of bringing it to pass that he suffers less from them4 ,we have therefore mainly to strive to acquire a clear and distinct knowledge as far as possible of each emotion1 so that the mind may be led to pass from the emotion to think those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly1 and with which it is entirely satisfied1 and to strive also that the emotion may be separated from the thought of an external cause and connected with true thoughts4 ,thus not only love1 hatred1 etc41 will be destroyed1 but also the appetites or desires to which the emotion gives rise cannot be excessive4 ,for it is above everything to be observed that the appetite by which a man is said to act is one and the same appetite as that by which he is said to suffer4 ,for example1 we have shown that human nature is so constituted that every one desires that other people should live according to his way of thinking1 a desire which in a man who is not guided by reason is a passion which is called ambition1 and is not very different from pride2 while1 on the other hand1 in a man who lives according to the dictates of reason it is an action or virtue which is called piety4 ,in the same manner1 all the appetites or desires are passions only in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas1 and are classed among the virtues whenever they are excited or begotten by adequate ideas2 for all the desires by which we are determined to any action may arise either from adequate or inadequate ideas4 ,to return1 therefore1 to the point from which we set out3 there is no remedy within our power which can be conceived more excellent for the emotions than that which consists in true knowledge of them1 since the mind possesses no other power than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas1 as we have shown above4 ,,ii ,the ,natural ,basis of ,rational ,control ,the greater the number of objects to which an image or emotion is related1 the greater is the number of causes by which it can be excited and cherished4 ,all these causes the mind contemplates simultaneously by means of the emotion 7by hypothesis71 and therefore the more constant is the emotion1 or the more frequently does it present itself1 and the more does it occupy the mind4 ,things which we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common properties of things or what are deduced from them1 and consequently are more frequently excited in us2 and therefore it is easier for us to contemplate other things together with these which we clearly and distinctly understand than with any others1 and consequently it is easier to connect things with these which we clearly and distinctly understand than with any others4 ,the greater the number of other things with which any image is connected1 the more frequently does it present itself4 ,for the greater the number of other things with which an image is connected1 the greater is the number of causes by which it may be excited4 ,there is no modification of the body of which the mind cannot form some clear and distinct conception and therefore it can cause all the modifications of the body to be related to the idea of ,god4 ,,iii ,the ,function of the ,intellectual ,order ,the emotions which are contrary to our nature1 that is to say1 which are evil1 are evil so far as they hinder the mind from understanding4 ,so long1 therefore1 as we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary to our nature1 so long the power of the mind by which it endeavors to understand things is not hindered1 and therefore so long does it possess the power of forming clear and distinct ideas1 and of deducing them the one from the other4 ,so long1 consequently1 do we possess the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the order of the intellect4 ,through this power of properly arranging and connecting the modifications of the body we can prevent ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions4 ,for a greater power is required to restrain emotions which are arranged and connected according to the order of the intellect than is required to restrain those which are uncertain and unsettled4 ,the best thing1 therefore1 we can do1 so long as we lack a perfect knowledge of our emotions1 is to conceive a right rule of life1 or sure maxims 7dogmata7 of life--to commit these latter to memory1 and constantly to apply them to the particular cases which frequently meet us in life1 so that our imagination may be widely affected by them1 and they may always be ready to hand4 ,for example1 amongst the maxims of life we have placed this1 that hatred is to be conquered by love or generosity1 and is not to be met with hatred in return4 ,but in order that we may always have this prescript of reason in readiness whenever it will be of service1 we must think over and often meditate upon the common injuries inflicted by men1 and consider how and in what way they may best be repelled by generosity2 for thus we shall connect the image of injury with the imagination of this maxim1 and it will be at hand whenever an injury is offered to us4 ,if we also continually have regard to our own true profit1 and the good which follows from mutual friendship and common fellowship1 and remember that the highest peace of mind arises from a right rule of life1 and also that man1 like other things1 acts according to the necessity of ,nature1 then the injury or the hatred which usually arises from that necessity will occupy but the least part of the imagination1 and will be easily overcome3 or supposing that the anger which generally arises from the greatest injuries is not so easily overcome1 it will nevertheless be overcome1 although not without fluctuation of mind1 in a far shorter space of time than would have been necessary if we had not possessed those maxims on which we had thus meditated beforehand4 ,concerning strength of mind1 we must reflect in the same way for the purpose of getting rid of fear1 that is to say1 we must often enumerate and imagine the common dangers of life1 and think upon the manner in which they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and courage4 ,it is to be observed1 however1 that in the ordering of our thoughts and images we must always look to those qualities which in each thing are good1 so that we may be determined to action always by an emotion of joy4 ,for example1 if a man sees that he pursues glory too eagerly1 let him think on its proper use1 for what end it is to be followed1 and by what means it can be obtained2 but let him not think upon its abuse and vanity1 and on the inconstancy of men1 and things of this sort1 about which no one thinks unless through disease of mind4 ,for with such thoughts do those who are ambitious greatly torment themselves when they despair of obtaining the honors for which they are striving2 and while they vomit forth rage1 wish to be thought wise4 ,indeed it is certain that those covet glory the most who are loudest in declaiming against its abuse and the vanity of the world4 ,nor is this a peculiarity of the ambitious1 but is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are impotent in mind2 for we see that a poor and avaricious man is never weary of speaking about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich1 thereby achieving nothing save to torment himself and show to others that he is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own poverty but also the wealth of others4 ,so also a man who has not been well deceived by his mistress thinks of nothing but the fickleness of women1 their faithlessness1 and their other oft-proclaimed failing--all of which he forgets as soon as he is taken into favor by his mistress again4 ,he1 therefore1 who desires to govern his emotions and appetites from a love of liberty alone will strive as much as he can to know virtues and their causes1 and to fill his mind with that joy which springs from a true knowledge of them4 ,least of all will he desire to contemplate the vices of men and disparage men1 or to delight in a false show of liberty4 ,he who will diligently observe these things 7and they are not difficult71 and will continue to practice them1 will assuredly in a short space of time be able for the most part to direct his actions in accordance with the command of reason4 ,,iv ,summary ,i have1 in what has preceded1 included all the remedies for the emotions1 that is to say1 everything which the mind1 considered in itself alone1 can do against them4 ,it appears therefrom that the power of the mind over the emotions consists-- #a4 ,in the knowledge itself of the emotions4 #b4 ,in the separation by the mind of the emotions from the thought of an external cause1 which we imagine confusedly4 #c4 ,in duration1 in which the emotions which are related to objects we understand surpass those related to objects conceived in a mutilated or confused manner4 #d4 ,in the multitude of causes by which the emotions which are related to the common properties of things or to ,god are nourished4 #e4 ,in the order in which the mind can arrange its emotions and connect them one with the other4 ,but that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood1 it is to be carefully observed that we call the emotions great when we compare the emotion of one man with that of another1 and see that one man is agitated more than another by the same emotion1 or when we compare the emotions of one and the same man with one another1 and discover that he is affected or moved more by one emotion than by another4 ,for the power of any emotion is limited by the power of the external cause as compared with our own power4 ,but the power of the mind is limited solely by knowledge1 whilst impotence or passion is estimated solely by privation of knowledge1 or1 in other words1 by that through which ideas are called inadequate2 and it therefore follows that that mind suffers the most whose largest part consists of inadequate ideas1 so that it is distinguished rather by what it suffers than by what it does1 while1 on the contrary1 that mind acts the most whose largest part consists of adequate ideas1 so that although it may possess as many inadequate ideas as the first1 it is nevertheless distinguished rather by those which belong to human virtue than by those which are a sign of human impotence4 ,again1 it is to be observed that our sorrows and misfortunes mainly proceed from too much love towards an object which is subject to many changes1 and which we can never possess4 ,for no one is troubled or anxious about any object he does not love1 neither do wrongs1 suspicions1 hatreds1 etc41 arise except from love towards objects of which no one can be truly the possessor4 ,from all this we easily conceive what is the power which clear and distinct knowledge1 and especially that third kind of knowledge whose foundation is the knowledge itself of ,god1 possesses over the emotions2 the power1 namely1 by which it is able1 in so far as they are passions1 if not actually to destroy them1 at least to make them constitute the smallest part of the mind4 ,moreover1 it begets a love towards an immutable and eternal object of which we are really partakers2 a love which therefore cannot be vitiated by the defects which are in common love1 but which can always become greater and greater1 occupy the largest part of the mind1 and thoroughly affect it4 ,i have now concluded all that ,i had to say relating to this present life4 ,for any one who will attend to what has been urged will easily be able to see the truth of what ,i said--that in these few words all the remedies for the emotions are comprehended4 ,it is time1 therefore1 that ,i should now pass to the consideration of those matters which appertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body4 ,,chapter ,,xx ,,of ,,human ,,blessedness ,,and ,,the ,,eternity ,,of ,,the ,,mind ,human ,blessedness3 ,the ,intellectual ,love of ,god ,i ,the third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of ,god to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things2 and the more we understand things in this manner1 the more we understand ,god2 and therefore the highest virtue of the mind1 that is to say1 the power or nature of the mind1 or the highest effort1 is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge4 ,the better the mind is adapted to understand things by the third kind of knowledge1 the more it desires to understand them by this kind of knowledge4 ,the highest virtue of the mind is to know ,god1 or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge4 ,this virtue is greater the more the mind knows things by this kind of knowledge1 and therefore he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection1 and consequently is affected with the highest joy1 which is accompanied with the idea of himself and his own virtue2 and therefore from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind4 ,the effort or the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind1 but may arise from the second kind of knowledge4 ,this proposition is self-evident4 ,for everything that we clearly and distinctly understand1 we understand either through itself or through something which is conceived through itself2 or1 in other words1 ideas which are clear and distinct in us1 or which are related to the third kind of knowledge1 cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas1 which are related to the first kind of knowledge1 but from adequate ideas1 that is to say1 from the second and third kinds of knowledge4 ,,ii ,eternity is the very essence of ,god1 in so far as that essence involves necessary existence4 ,to conceive things therefore under the form of eternity1 is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through the essence of ,god as actually existing things1 or in so far as through the essence of ,god they involve existence4 ,therefore our mind1 in so far as it conceives itself and its body under the form of eternity1 necessarily has a knowledge of ,god1 and knows that it is in ,god and is conceived through ,him4 ,we delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge1 and our delight is accompanied with the idea of ,god as its cause4 ,from the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of ,god4 ,for from this kind of knowledge arises joy attended with the idea of ,god as its cause1 that is to say1 the love of ,god1 not in so far as we imagine ,him as present1 but in so far as we understand that ,he is eternal2 and that is what ,i call the intellectual love of ,god4 ,he who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions rejoices1 and his joy is attended with the idea of ,god1 therefore he loves ,god1 and 7by the same reasoning7 loves ,him better the better he understands himself and his emotions4 ,this intellectual love necessarily follows from the nature of the mind1 in so far as it is considered1 through the nature of ,god1 as an eternal truth4 ,if there were anything1 therefore1 contrary to this love1 it would be contrary to the truth1 and consequently whatever might be able to negate this love would be able to make the true false1 which1 as is self-evident1 is absurd4 ,there exists1 therefore1 nothing in ,nature contrary to this intellectual love1 or which can negate it4 ,,iii ,this love to ,god above everything else ought to occupy the mind1 for this love is connected with all the modifications of the body1 by all of which it is cherished4 ,the idea of ,god which is in us is adequate and perfect1 and therefore in so far as we contemplate ,god do we act and consequently no sorrow can exist with the accompanying idea of ,god2 that is to say1 no one can hate ,god4 ,love to ,god cannot be turned into hatred4 ,but some may object1 that if we understand ,god to be the cause of all things1 we do for that very reason consider ,him to be the cause of sorrow4 ,but ,i reply1 that in so far as we understand the causes of sorrow1 it ceases to be a passion1 that is to say1 it ceases to be sorrow2 and therefore in so far as we understand ,god to be the cause of sorrow do we rejoice4 ,this love to ,god is the highest good which we can seek according to the dictate of reason2 is common to all men2 and we desire that all may enjoy it4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 be sullied by the emotion of envy1 nor by that of jealousy1 but1 on the contrary1 it must be the more strengthened the more people we imagine to rejoice in it4 ,it is possible to show in the same manner that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love and able to destroy it1 and so we may conclude that this love to ,god is the most constant of all the emotions1 and that1 in so far as it is related to the body1 it cannot be destroyed unless with the body itself4 ,what its nature is1 in so far as it is related to the mind alone1 we shall see hereafter4 ,,iv ,all ideas1 in so far as they are related to ,god1 are true2 that is to say1 are adequate1 and therefore1 7by the general definition of the ,emotions71 ,god is free from passions4 ,again1 ,god can neither pass to a greater nor to a less perfection1 and therefore ,he cannot be affected with any emotion of joy or sorrow4 ,he who loves ,god cannot strive that ,god should love him in return4 ,if a man were to strive after this1 he would desire that ,god1 whom he loves1 should not be ,god1 and consequently he would desire to be sad1 which is absurd4 ,v ,god is absolutely infinite1 that is to say1 the nature of ,god delights in infinite perfection accompanied with the idea of ,himself1 that is to say1 with the idea of ,himself as cause1 and this is what we have called intellectual love4 ,god loves ,himself with an infinite intellectual love4 ,the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god is the very love with which ,he loves ,himself1 not in so far as ,he is infinite1 but in so far as ,he can be manifested through the essence of the human mind1 considered under the form of eternity2 that is to say1 the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god is part of the infinite love with which ,god loves ,himself4 ,hence it follows that ,god1 in so far as ,he loves ,himself1 loves men1 and consequently that the love of ,god towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god are one and the same thing4 ,hence it follows that ,god1 in so far as ,he loves ,himself1 loves men1 and consequently that the love of the mind towards ,god are one and the same thing4 ,hence we clearly understand that our salvation1 or blessedness1 or liberty consists in a constant and eternal love towards ,god1 or in the love of ,god towards men4 ,this love or blessedness is called ,glory in the sacred writings1 and not without reason4 ,for whether it be related to ,god or to the mind1 it may properly be called repose of mind1 which is1 in truth1 not distinguished from glory4 ,for in so far as it is related to ,god1 it is joy 7granting that it is allowable to use this word71 accompanied with the idea of ,himself1 and it is the same thing when it is related to the mind4 ,again1 since the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone1 whose beginning and foundation is ,god1 it is clear to us in what manner and by what method our mind1 with regard both to essence and existence1 follows from the divine nature1 and continually depends upon ,god4 ,i thought it worth while for me to notice this here1 in order that ,i might show1 by this example1 what that knowledge of individual objects which ,i have called intuitive or of the third kind is able to do1 and how much more potent it is than the universal knowledge1 which ,i have called knowledge of the second kind4 ,for although ,i have shown generally that all things1 and consequently also the human mind1 depend upon ,god both with regard to existence and essence1 yet that demonstration1 although legitimate1 and placed beyond the possibility of a doubt1 does not1 nevertheless1 so affect our mind as a proof from the essence itself of any individual object which we say depends upon ,god4 ,the more we understand individual objects1 the more we understand ,god4 ,the ,eternity of the ,mind ,i ,the mind does not express the actual existence of its body1 nor does it conceive as actual the modifications of the body1 except while the body exists1 and consequently it conceives no body as actually existing except while its own body exists4 ,it can therefore imagine nothing1 nor can it recollect anything that is past1 except while the body exists4 ,an imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates any object as present4 ,this idea nevertheless indicates the present constitution of the human body rather than the nature of the external object4 ,an emotion1 therefore 7by the general definition of the ,emotions71 is an imagination in so far as it indicates the present constitution of the body1 and therefore the mind1 only so long as the body exists1 is subject to emotions which are related to passions4 ,hence it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal4 ,if we look at the common opinion of men1 we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their minds1 but they confound it with duration1 and attribute it to imagination or memory1 which they believe remain after death4 ,god is not only the cause of the existence of this or that human body1 but also of its essence1 which therefore must necessarily be conceived through the essence of ,god itself and by a certain eternal necessity4 ,this conception1 moreover1 must necessarily exist in ,god4 ,in ,god there necessarily exists an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity4 ,in ,god there necessarily exists a conception or idea which expresses the essence of the human body4 ,this conception or idea is therefore necessarily something which pertains to the essence of the human mind4 ,but we ascribe to the human mind no duration which can be limited by time1 unless in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body1 which is manifested through duration1 and which can be limited by time1 that is to say1 we cannot ascribe duration to the mind except while the body exists4 ,but1 nevertheless1 since this something is that which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the essence itself of ,god1 this something which pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal4 ,this idea which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity is1 as we have said1 a certain mode of thought which pertains to the essence of the mind1 and is necessarily eternal4 ,it is impossible1 nevertheless1 that we should recollect that we existed before the body1 because there are no traces of any such existence in the body1 and also because eternity cannot be defined by time1 or have any relationship to it4 ,nevertheless we feel and know by experience that we are eternal4 ,for the mind is no less sensible of those things which it conceives through intelligence than of those which it remembers1 for demonstrations are the eyes of the mind by which it sees and observes things4 ,although1 therefore1 we do not recollect that we existed before the body1 we feel that our mind1 in so far as it involves the essence of the body under the form of eternity1 is eternal1 and that this existence of the mind cannot be limited by time nor manifested through duration4 ,only in so far1 therefore1 as it involves the actual existence of the body can the mind be said to possess duration1 and its existence be limited by a fixed time1 and so far only has it the power of determining the existence of things in time1 and of conceiving them under the form of duration4 ,,ii ,in so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body does it conceive duration which can be determined in time1 and so far only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time4 ,but eternity cannot be manifested through duration1 therefore the mind so far has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity3 but because it is the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity1 and because it also pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity1 and excepting these two things nothing else pertains to the nature of the mind1 therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity does not pertain to the mind except in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the form of eternity4 ,things are conceived by us as actual in two ways2 either in so far as we conceive them to exist with relation to a fixed time and place1 or in so far as we conceive them to be contained in ,god1 and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature4 ,but those things which are conceived in this second way as true or real we conceive under the form of eternity1 and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,the mind conceives nothing under the form of eternity1 unless in so far as it conceives the essence of its body under the form of eternity1 that is to say1 unless in so far as it is eternal4 ,therefore in so far as the mind is eternal it has a knowledge of ,god1 which is necessarily adequate1 and therefore in so far as it is eternal it is fitted to know all those things which can follow from this knowledge of ,god1 that is to say1 it is fitted to know things by the third kind of knowledge of which1 in so far as the mind is eternal1 it is the adequate or formal cause4 ,as each person therefore becomes stronger in this kind of knowledge1 the more is he conscious of himself and of ,god2 that is to say1 the more perfect and the happier he is1 a truth which will still more clearly appear from what follows4 ,here1 however1 it is to be observed1 that although we are now certain that the mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity1 yet1 in order that what we wish to prove may be more easily explained and better understood1 we shall consider the mind1 as we have hitherto done1 as if it had just begun to be1 and had just begun to understand things under the form of eternity4 ,this we can do without any risk of error1 provided only we are careful to conclude nothing except from clear premises4 ,the third kind of knowledge is eternal1 and therefore the love which springs from it is necessarily eternal4 ,although this love to ,god has no beginning1 it nevertheless has all the perfections of love1 just as if it had originated4 ,nor is there here any difference1 excepting that the mind has eternally possessed these same perfections which we imagined as now accruing to it1 and has possessed them with the accompanying idea of ,god as the eternal cause4 ,and if joy consist in the passage to a greater perfection1 blessedness must indeed consist in this1 that the mind is endowed with perfection itself4 ,,iii ,the essence of the mind consists in knowledge4 ,the more things1 therefore1 the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge1 the greater is that part which abides and consequently the greater is that part which is not touched by emotions which are contrary to our nature1 that is to say1 which are evil4 ,the more things1 therefore1 the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge1 the greater is that part which remains unharmed1 and the less consequently does it suffer from the emotions4 ,we are thus enabled to understand that death is by so much the less injurious to us as the clear and distinct knowledge of the mind is greater1 and consequently as the mind loves ,god more4 ,again1 since from the third kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible peace1 it follows that it is possible for the human mind to be of such a nature that that part of it which we have shown perishes with its body1 in comparison with the part of it which remains1 is of no consequence4 ,but more fully upon this subject presently4 ,he who possesses a body fitted for doing many things is least of all agitated by those emotions which are evil1 that is to say1 by emotions which are contrary to our nature1 and therefore he possesses the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the order of the intellect1 and consequently of causing all the modifications of the body to be related to the idea of ,god2 in consequence of which he is affected with a love to ,god1 which must occupy or form the greatest part of his mind1 and therefore he possesses a mind of which the greatest part is eternal4 ,inasmuch as human bodies are fit for many things1 we cannot doubt the possibility of their possessing such a nature that they may be related to minds which have a large knowledge of themselves and of ,god1 and whose greatest or principal part is eternal1 so that they scarcely fear death4 ,to understand this more clearly1 it is to be here considered that we live in constant change1 and that according as we change for the better or the worse we are called happy or unhappy4 ,for he who passes from infancy or childhood to death is called unhappy1 and1 on the other hand1 we consider ourselves happy if we can pass through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body4 ,moreover1 he who1 like an infant or child1 possesses a body fit for very few things1 and1 almost altogether dependent on external causes1 has a mind which1 considered in itself alone1 is almost entirely unconscious of itself1 of ,god1 and of objects4 ,on the other hand1 he who possesses a body fit for many things possesses a mind which1 considered in itself alone1 is largely conscious of itself1 of ,god1 and of objects4 ,in this life1 therefore1 it is our chief endeavor to change the body of infancy1 so far as its nature permits and is conducive thereto1 into another body which is fitted for many things1 and which is related to a mind conscious as much as possible of itself1 of ,god1 and of objects2 so that everything which is related to its memory or imagination1 in comparison with the intellect is scarcely of any moment1 as ,i have already said4 ,the more perfect a thing is1 the more reality it possesses1 and consequently the more it acts and the less it suffers4 ,inversely also it may be demonstrated in the same way that the more a thing acts the more perfect it is4 ,hence it follows that that part of the mind which abides1 whether great or small1 is more perfect than the other part4 ,for the part of the mind which is eternal is the intellect1 through which alone we are said to act1 but that part which1 as we have shown1 perishes1 is the imagination itself1 through which alone we are said to suffer4 ,therefore that part which abides1 whether great or small1 is more perfect than the latter4 ,these are the things ,i proposed to prove concerning the mind1 in so far as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body1 and from these1 and other propositions1 it is evident that our mind1 in so far as it understands1 is an eternal mode of thought1 which is determined by another eternal mode of thought1 and this again by another1 and so on ad infinitum1 so that all taken together form the eternal and infinite intellect of ,god4 ,conclusion ,the primary and sole foundation of virtue or of the proper conduct of life is to seek our own profit4 ,but in order to determine what reason prescribes as profitable1 we had no regard to the eternity of the mind4 ,therefore1 although we were at that time ignorant that the mind is eternal1 we considered as of primary importance those things which we have shown are related to strength of mind and generosity2 and therefore1 even if we were now ignorant of the eternity of the mind1 we should consider those commands of reason as of primary importance4 ,the creed of the multitude seems to be different from this2 for most persons seem to believe that they are free in so far as it is allowed them to obey their lusts1 and that they give up a portion of their rights1 in so far as they are bound to live according to the commands of divine law4 ,piety1 therefore1 and religion1#db and absolutely all those things that are related to greatness of soul1 they believe to be burdens which they hope to be able to lay aside after death2 hoping also to receive some reward for their bondage1 that is to say1 for their piety and religion4 ,it is not merely this hope1 however1 but also and chiefly fear of dreadful punishments after death1 by which they are induced to live according to the commands of divine law1 that is to say1 as far as their feebleness and impotent mind will permit2 and if this hope and fear were not present to them1 but if they1 on the contrary1 believed that minds perish with the body1 and that there is no prolongation of life for miserable creatures exhausted with the burden of their piety1 they would return to ways of their own liking4 ,they would prefer to let everything be controlled by their own passions1 and to obey fortune rather than themselves4 ,this seems to me as absurd as if a man1 because he does not believe that he will be able to feed his body with good food to all eternity1 should desire to satiate himself with poisonous and deadly drugs2 or as if1 because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal1 he should therefore prefer to be mad and to live without reason--absurdities so great that they scarcely deserve to be repeated4 ,blessedness consists in love towards ,god1 which arises from the third kind of knowledge1 and this love1 therefore1 must be related to the mind in so far as it acts4 ,blessedness1 therefore1 is virtue itself4 ,again1 the more the mind delights in this divine love or blessedness1 the more it understands1 that is to say1 the greater is the power it has over its emotions and the less it suffers from emotions which are evil4 ,therefore1 it is because the mind delights in this divine love or blessedness that it possesses the power of restraining the lusts2 and because the power of man to restrain the emotions is in the intellect alone1 no one1 therefore1 delights in blessedness because he has restrained his emotions1 but1 on the contrary1 the power of restraining his lusts springs from blessedness itself4 ,i have finished everything ,i wished to explain concerning the power of the mind over the emotions and concerning its liberty4 ,from what has been said we see what is the strength of the wise man1 and how much he surpasses the ignorant who is driven forward by lust alone4 ,for the ignorant man is not only agitated by external causes in many ways1 and never enjoys true peace of soul1 but lives also ignorant1 as it were1 both of ,god and of things1 and as soon as he ceases to suffer ceases also to be4 ,on the other hand1 the wise man1 in so far as he is considered as such1 is scarcely ever moved in his mind1 but1 being conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself1 of ,god1 and of things1 never ceases to be1 and always enjoys true peace of soul4 ,if the way which1 as ,i have shown1 leads hither seem very difficult1 it can nevertheless be found4 ,it must indeed be difficult since it is so seldom discovered2 for if salvation lay ready to hand and could be discovered without great labor1 how could it be possible that it should be neglected almost by everybody8 ,but all noble things are as difficult as they are rare4 ,,footnotes3 #db ,everything which we desire and do1 of which we are the cause in so far as we possess an idea of ,god1 or in so far as we know ,god1 ,i refer to ,religion4 ,the desire of doing well which is born in us1 because we live according to the guidance of reason1 ,i call ,piety4 ,,appendix ,spinoza's ,ethics1 demonstrated in geometrical order1 consists of five parts2 from these parts the following selections have been taken3 ,part ,i4 ,of ,god ,definitions1 ,axioms1 and the ,appendix4 ,propositions3 #aa2 #ae-ah2 #bf2 #bg2 #bi2 #cc4 ,part ,,ii4 ,of the ,nature and ,origin of the ,mind ,preface1 ,definitions1 and ,axioms4 ,propositions3 #a2 #d-g2 #aa-ac2 #ae-ah2 #bd-bf2 #bh-cb2 #ce2 #cf2 #ch-di4 ,part ,,iii4 ,of the ,origin and ,nature of the ,emotions ,preface1 ,definitions1 and ,postulates2 ,definitions of the ,emotions4 ,propositions3 #a2 #b2 #d2 #f2 #i2 #aa2 #ad2 #af2 #ah2 #be2 #bg-cb2 #dj2 #da2 #dc-df2 #dh-ea2 #ef2 #eg4 ,part ,,iv4 ,of ,human ,bondage or ,of the ,strength of the ,emotions ,preface1 ,definitions1 ,axioms1 and the ,appendix4 ,propositions3 #c-i2 #aa-bg2 #ch2 #ci2 #da-dg2 #ej-ed2 #ef-eh4 ,part ,v4 ,of the ,power of the ,intellect or ,of ,human ,liberty ,preface and ,axioms4 ,propositions3 #a-bh2 #cj-db4 ,,the ,,end ---------------------------------------- ---------------------- ,transcriber's ,notes ,page vii3 affectiones sic ,page xxvi3 villified amended to vilified ,page xxvii3 chose amended to choose 7twice72 forego sic ,page xxxvi3 antedeluvian amended to antediluvian ,page lix3 goverance amended to governance ,page #a3 oursleves amended to ourselves ,page #f3 superstitition amended to superstition ,page #i3 conprehension amended to comprehension ,page #bf3 chose amended to choose ,page #bh3 interpretating amended to interpreting ,page #de3 phophet amended to prophet ,page #ea3 came amended to come ,page #fi3 patriachs amended to patriarchs ,page #hd3 refer amended to prefer ,page #ace3 appetities amended to appetites ,page #bjd3 thy amended to they and thir amended to their ,page #bbi3 ,explanations amended to ,explanation ,page #bgf3 others amended to other ,page #bhd3 mutitude amended to multitude ,page #cfb3 propositon amended to proposition ,abbreviations in footnotes and references have been standardized4 ,accents and hyphenation have generally been standardised4 ---------------------------------------- ----------------------