material from the ,google ,print project47 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,evolution ,,together ,,with ,a ,,preliminary ,,essay ,,on ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,basis ,,of ,,science4 ,,two ,,papers ,read before ,,the ,,wisconsin ,,academy ,,of ,,sciences1 ,,arts1 ,,and ,,letters at the ,annual ,meetings of ,february1 #ahgc and ,february1 #ahgd4 ,,by ,,stephen ,h4 ,,carpenter1 ,,ll4 ,d41 ,professor of ,logic1 etc41 in the ,university of ,wisconsin1 and ,president of the ,department of ,speculative ,philosophy in the ,wisconsin ,academy of ,sciences1 ,arts1 and ,letters4 ,,reprinted ,,from ,,the ,,academy',s ,,transactions4 ,,madison1 ,,wis43 ,,atwood ,,culver1 ,,printers ,,and ,,stereotypers4 #ahgd4 ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,basis ,,of ,,science4 ,all knowledge is essentially one4 ,the object-matter upon which intellect exerts itself1 does not affect the subjective act of knowing4 ,physics1 when stripped of that which is merely contingent1 becomes metaphysics4 ,physical science deals with object-matter1 and discusses the signs by which nature communicates her message--that is1 phenomena4 ,metaphysical science has to do with the subject-mind1 and discusses the meaning of the message4 ,the one converts ,god's hieroglyphics into easily-intelligible language2 the other translates this language into ,idea4 ,if this be true1 there must be a unity of method in all science1 however great the diversity of the object-matter investigated4 ,this method is subjectively determined1 that is1 by the constitution of the mind1 and not by the particular form of matter upon which intellectual energy may be exerted4 ,if there is an essential unity in all knowledge1 it is because there is a corresponding unity of method in all mental activity4 ,it is only when we look upon what is to be known1 that truth separates into sciences2 but particular truths become particular sciences only under assumed relations to the whole of which they form a part4 ,objectively considered1 science is classified knowledge2 subjectively viewed1 it is the laws or principles according to which knowledge is classified4 ,every actor implies an act--every thinker a thought4 ,we may therefore universally make this dual classification1 according as we view the mental operation involved1 or the attributes of objects which form the subject of thought4 ,the possibility of science is conditioned upon the possibility of classification4 ,mere knowledge is not science1 as the world ought to have learned by costly experience4 ,even classified knowledge may not be science2 it becomes science not through previous classification1 but in the act of being classified1 and therefore only as the principle of classification is apprehended--that is1 only as the particular application of the law of generalization is distinctly recognized4 ,a man may know a book and know nothing more2 he knows the science only when he is capable of making the book for himself4 ,mere knowledge thus differs from science in that the one is held only by the apprehensive powers of the mind1 while the other passes beyond these into the reflective or ratiocinative4 ,pure science1 then1 must be wholly abstract4 ,the forms and substances of ,nature with which the scientific student deals1 are only the discrete figures of the young mathematician1 to be thrown aside with advancing knowledge4 ,matter is only the staff on which the mind leans1 while too feeble to go alone4 ,it is not the finely chiseled statue that renders a man a sculptor2 it is the conception which is therein embodied4 ,a day-laborer may have cut the stone1 but only the artist could conceive the idea4 ,so in science1 we care but little for the particular results at which we arrive1 compared with the laws1 according to which the results have been attained4 ,but conceptions cannot be communicated without being rendered objective4 ,the ideal of the artist is locked up in his own mind1 until on canvas1 in marble1 or by means of some other physical symbol1 he communicates his high imaginings4 ,matter1 then1 according to the present constitution of things is the condition of intellectual communication4 ,law cannot be studied as abstract law2 it can be studied only while acting1 and that which exhibits this activity must be matter--something which will always and uniformly obey4 ,there can be no conception of force except as acting1 and the sole medium of such activity is matter4 ,thus again1 matter is the condition of all communication from nature to man4 ,science is thus1 in a measure1 determined by the conditions of its discovery and communication4 ,but we must distinguish between an invariable condition and that which is thus conditioned4 ,matter is not science2 it is only the condition of its discovery and communication4 ,air is not hearing2 it is the condition of hearing4 ,we do not study matter for the sake of the matter when we study science1 but for the sake of the law communicated to us in these changes of matter1 and ,law is a metaphysical1 not a physical idea4 ,reason1 not sense1 apprehends it4 ,law is1 so to speak1 formulated in the physical1 but it is not material4 ,matter is only the vehicle of science1 as language is the vehicle of thought4 ,it is plain1 then1 that just as in mathematics we have a division into pure and mixed1 according as we deal with matter in the abstract or in the concrete1 so we may in any science make a corresponding division1 according as we confine our attention to the laws revealed by matter or to the matter revealing the laws3 in other words2 just as we give attention to the ideas of the message1 or to the language in which it is communicated4 ,the language must first be learned1 but the words used to communicate the message may be separately understood1 and yet the meaning of the message wholly missed4 ,knowing only the one makes a charlatan2 knowing the other makes a savan4 ,the sciences based upon this objective study of ,nature are denominated ,natural ,sciences2 and because they lisp the first syllables of ,nature's message to man1 they should be his primary teachers4 ,it is by their aid that the universal message of ,god to man must be read4 ,they form1 as it were1 a public highway leading from ,nature to ,god4 ,but the difficulty is that observing men become so absorbed in admiring some splendid piece of ,divine engineering that they stop to gaze and wonder1 until losing sight of everything above and beyond1 they refuse to advance1 fondly imagining that they have reached the end of the journey4 ,the science based upon this subjective study of ,nature is called metaphysics4 ,logic has been defined as ,the ,science of ,thought2 it should be termed ,the ,science of ,thinking4 ,it is not a dead body which we are studying by dissection1 but a living1 vital ,force1 which we study by observing its activities4 ,we find here the same error which we find elsewhere--a stopping with the material symbol1 and an ignoring of the intellectual force which clothed itself with the symbol4 ,astronomy is not the science of circles and spheres1 ellipses and ellipsoids1 but of the ,force whose sensible utterances are given in these curves4 ,we might as well call ,painting the science of pictures1 or ,sculpture the science of statues4 ,so ,language1 the medium of thought1 is only a symbol1 less material indeed than pictures and statues1 but still physical4 ,what we want in ,the ,science of ,thinking is not the knowledge of symbols1 but the knowledge of that which is symbolized4 ,the chemist does not care for the compounds he finds in his retort2 he seeks after the truth which these compounds formulate4 ,metaphysics and ,physics evidently agree in this2 that both are seeking to frame an articulate utterance of the ,idea given in the diverse manifestations of ,force--the ,idea which includes all ,potencies1 the summing up of all phenomena into that final generalization which includes the intellectual as well as the material1 until at last we reach the essential unity of all ,truth4 ,science1 then1 is classification1 or the discovery of the principles of classification1 rather than an arbitrary acquaintance with things classified4 ,every science1 however1 must have an objective expression--that is1 must be formulated4 ,in this1 both metaphysical and physical science agree2 the only difference in this respect is1 that in ,physics1 ,nature gives us in the first place the material interpretation of the idea--that is1 the basis of classification--which we have only to translate into idea3 while in metaphysics1 we first have the idea to which we must furnish the objective utterance4 ,we see here the precise difference between what is called the logical and the natural method--the one being usually called the reverse of the other4 ,the difference is not so much a difference in intellectual procedure as in objective expression4 ,for instance3 ,the botanist has before him the whole range of vegetable forms4 ,he notes resemblances and differences1 and groups plants into species and genera1 but his work is not ended when these are named and known1 and their qualities discovered4 ,he is seeking amidst these multifarious forms for the law of vegetable growth and reproduction4 ,every organ of the plant is the symbol of an idea1 and these ideas form the science of ,botany4 ,these ,ideas are metaphysical--that is intellectual1 and only their sensible manifestation is physical4 ,the symbols of these ,ideas1 being given in ,nature1 must be learned from observation before they can be used intelligently1 just as words must be learned before one can speak a language4 ,mastery of the means of expression is as essential to the communication of ideas an is the possession of the ideas themselves4 ,the botanist observes an individual plant1 and notes its characteristics4 ,he observes others which possess some of these characteristics whilst others are wanting4 ,he forms a class-type from these agreeing attributes1 and gives this new collocation of characteristics a name4 ,nature never presents this class-type absolutely2 it is found nowhere but in intellect4 ,what has the botanist done but to retranslate the communication of ,nature into ,idea1 and then to express this idea by less complicated and less physical symbols8 ,man's province in this case is simply to interpret the hieroglyphics of ,nature into a more readily comprehended language--to express that simply which nature has expressed confusedly4 ,the scientist restricts himself to the interpretation of a single class of symbols1 as the ,botanist to plants1 the ,zoologist to animals1 but the end sought in each case is the same--that is1 to change all these physical utterances of ,nature into ,idea1 and to secure for this ,idea a method of expression involving the least possible materiality of symbol--that is1 to change individual facts and phenomena into general principles1 which1 because abstract1 are unchangeable4 ,when this has been done1 the work of the ,naturalist ceases1 but the work of ,man1 the ,thinker is not done2 it is only just begun4 ,by assuming the ultimate expressions of the various natural sciences as individual and not as typical1 we can treat the truths reached by them precisely as the ,botanist treated plants1 and1 rejecting points of of difference1 may find in them all some central idea4 ,this is the province of the metaphysician4 ,he seeks the law of ,idea1 he determines the law of ,thinking1 just as all other laws are determined1 from a study of the symbols formulating its expression in ,nature4 ,when this law has been distinctly enunciated1 and freed from all intermixture with the contingent1 then the work of the metaphysician ceases1 the summum genus has been reached4 ,the truths communicated in the symbols of ,nature1 have been correlated and enunciated1 and finally translated from the dialect of man the physical into the language of man the intellectual4 ,physical science determines the separate words of this message of ,god1 the letters of which are scattered throughout ,nature4 ,metaphysics combines these words into propositions which enunciate a distinct truth4 ,there is therefore neither conflict nor variation between the method of ,logic and the method of ,nature4 ,the movement of both is in the same direction2 the only difference is in the point of starting4 ,and another truth no less important1 which follows from the foregoing discussion1 is that the method of ,nature is fundamental to the method of ,logic4 ,physics should precede metaphysics1 but not exclude it2 both are essential to every true science1 and physics1 which stops with physics1 leads man by dazzling promises into some ,utopian desert only to leave him there to die of hunger4 ,and it is no less true that metaphysics1 without this basis in experimental science1 is illusory and untrustworthy1 wherever the original data are necessarily empirical4 ,two conditions are thus necessary to all science3 a body of knowable truth capable of being systematized2 and an intelligence capable of apprehending and systematizing it4 ,one of these conditions is physical and one is metaphysical2 and all true science must be the resultant of ,law and ,idea1 the ,objective and the ,subjective1 the twin forces of ,nature and ,man4 ,if either of these conditions be wanting1 there can be no true science1 for science can neither be evolved from the depths of the personal consciousness1 nor can the scattered letters of scientific truth1 as given in nature1 arrange themselves into the words of a significant message4 ,knowledge must be classified before it is science1 and that which classifies can only be intellect--discovering and enunciating this classification according to the laws of mental action4 ,as prominence is given to one or other of these two conditions we have the division into ,logical and ,natural1 but the fundamental principle of classification is the same in both--it being simply the law of intellectual action--just as the law which governs the action of the levers of a loom will determine the pattern of the woven fabric4 ,there can1 therefore1 be no conflict between the methods of ,logic and those of ,nature4 ,the determining element in all classification1 whether of the phenomena of ,mind or of the grosser phenomena of ,matter is uniformly and always the same--the law of intellectual action4 ,science then resolves itself into a determination of this ,law of mental activity1 so that in an ultimate analysis1 all science is metaphysical1 just as all science primarily is physical4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 ,law can be studied only in its objective manifestations4 ,the ,law of ,thinking can be educed only from expressed ,thought1 but the ,law is not objective thought1 any more than the idea of the sculptor is marble1 or the conception of the painter is paint4 ,the simplest expression of thought is not the syllogism but the logical proposition4 ,now1 it is plain that if the proposition is the formulation--the material representative of thought--if we study it as we study other natural symbols1 we will find in it the fundamental ,law of ,thinking1 and ultimately the fundamental ,law of all ,science3 just as1 if it were possible to reduce all elementary substances to one1 the chemist would be able to find in that one a condensed expression of chemical science4 ,what then is a proposition8 ,simply stated1 it is the assertion of relation between two terms2 or more abstractly1 it is the reference of an individual to its species--the assertion of a classification4 ,we find here the same duality which we noticed above4 ,if we give prominence to the individual notion1 we consider the proposition in extension2 if we turn our attention to the specific notion we consider the proposition in intention3 in the one case referring to the individuals composing the class1 in the other to the attributes composing the class-type4 ,the first corresponds to induction1 the second to deduction4 ,when we study individuals we study physics2 when we study the attributes composing the class-type1 we study metaphysics4 ,the ,law of ,thinking as educed from a study of the proposition is the law of classification4 ,the proposition1 considered affirmatively1 asserts explicitly agreement between certain attributes of two terms2 that is1 it asserts a classification4 ,the aim of science is to reach this proposition1 to discover and assert the principle of classification--in other words1 to formulate metaphysically what nature has presented physically4 ,we must find1 then1 the first or fundamental law of thinking in this integration or classification4 ,this fundamental law may be subdivided into two species1 according to the two terms of the proposition2 of which the first may be stated thus3 ,every possible object of thought is to a certain extent identical with every other2 and as the proposition implicitly states disagreement1 the second may be stated thus3 ,every possible object of thought is to a certain extent diverse from every other4 ,the first gives the positive 7subjective7 condition of the proposition1 the second the negative 7objective7 condition3 both together constitute the conditions of thinking4 ,the proposition is thus the assertion of the same in the different4 ,the proposition also asserts1 implicitly1 the tertium quid1 or the basis of classification--the class-type1 to which both terms are referred--that is1 the proposition secondarily asserts an analysis4 ,according to the first condition we have the inductive process2 according to the second we have the deductive process4 ,a complete movement of idea from its purely physical symbolization to its metaphysical interpretation1 must involve both these processes4 ,the mind possesses the power of analysis2 it can watch its own operations and retrace its steps1 until it arrives at the original data of consciousness2 but analysis cannot comprise the whole of the logical process4 ,before there can be analysis there must be something to be analyzed2 before steps can be retraced1 they must be taken4 ,we must not confound a condition with a ,law--the one is a conception antecedent to all action1 a genus to which the particular activity may be referred2 the other is coincident with action4 ,the one is the medium of the other4 ,we may illustrate this idea by science itself1 which is reached only by an analysis of ,art4 ,matter is the condition of the expression of an idea2 hence to all but the artist1 ,art must precede ,science1 but this cannot be in the case of the artist2 in his mind the ,idea is first conceived1 and there it is given expression in the forms of ,art4 ,here1 as uniformly in ,nature1 the whole absolutely precedes the part--the universal exists before the particular--,god before man4 ,truth absolute thus exists before truth conditioned4 ,science before ,art4 ,remove conditions and the conditioned becomes the absolute2 art and science coincide4 ,but truth which is assumed to be out of all relations1 cannot be comprehended by man1 and practically is not4 ,even the universal propositions of deduction express universality under conditions--that is universality of relation2 just as infinity in mathematics means that which passes measurement1 while in fact between infinity and measurement there is no relation1 and the infinite is thus incomprehensible as an object of thought1 although by no means unrecognizable as a necessary condition antecedent to all intellectual action4 ,it is of vital importance that we note this distinction1 because reasoning1 i4 e4 classification1 is possible only so long as we deal with what is admitted to be under relation3 if we assume a term to be out of all relation1 it ceases to be an object of thought--it can neither be classified nor unclassified2 it is beyond reason4 ,mathematics can proceed with its investigations only so long as it treats all quantities as measurable2 it must wholly cease its calculations if an infinite term be introduced4 ,to claim that analysis represents the complete normal action of the intellect in reasoning1 is ultimately to claim that the initial point of thinking is the summum genus of thought--,god4 ,now ,god is undoubtedly the initial point of absolute thought1 but he is not the beginning of human thought4 ,intellectually speaking1 ,god is the final generalization2 every movement possible to him must be one of analysis--a differentiation of ,himself1 so to speak1 by negatives4 ,thus the course of absolute ,thought1 beginning with ,god1 must be first towards a complete differentiation into ultimate individualization2 and lastly a complete integration again of individuals into an infinite whole4 ,this dual action completes the circle of intellectual activity4 ,we have dropped attribute after attribute until we have reached the last possible analysis2 but we do not stop here1 but by the assumption of attributes we again reach the highest possible synthesis4 ,this must be the method of the divine activity1 successive differentiation and integration1 the closing in of a mighty circle of infinity1 embracing all the finite1 but never losing the essential characteristic of the infinite4 ,now1 if this also represent the exact movement of the finite mind in action--that is1 in reasoning1 man must be ,god4 ,man is finite4 ,even his infinite is only the immeasurable--not that which is without the category of measure4 ,he cannot begin where the ,infinite begins1 at the highest possible generalization1--but he must begin with the finite4 ,if what we have shown above be true1 man must begin with the individual1 and the first mental act of the positive character of thinking1 is the reference of this individual notion to a class4 ,now the class-notion is the same as the individual notion1 less certain attributes as individual attributes1 but gathered into a larger whole4 ,this process is plainly integration2 we are rejecting from the new conception whatever prevents enlarging the class4 ,each higher generalization involves all the attributes of the lower1 not individually1 but specifically or generically4 ,in the final generalization1 extension and intension coalesce4 ,just as we reach the individual by differentiating a universal through successive negations1 we reach the universal again1 by integration1 by successively denying the negations through which we just now differentiated4 ,the movement of the finite mind in reasoning is thus from the individual through the universal to the individual again4 ,science thus parts into two great branches--one seeking to establish principles by what we have called integration1 and the other the elucidation of facts by a priori reasoning instead of observation4 ,that is1 the aim of true science is to free man from the restrictions of the finite1 and to place him in possession of the infinite--the closing in of a lesser circle of infinite truth1 yet never losing hold upon the finite4 ,in accordance with this view we see science pursuing its integrations until it has identified as composing an essential unity all the various manifestations of force4 ,this is the finite becoming the infinite1 for unity is1 in so far1 infinity--,god is one1 a unity1 not a unit4 ,but we also see science going beyond this point1 and by a new series of differentiations reaching truths new to experience1 if indeed not impossible to experience4 ,between these two limits all knowledge is forever moving4 ,it can never rest4 ,the tide of thought sweeps onward towards the infinite--,god following it to its final absorption into the ,i ,am1 simple being1--while finite man1 because of his finiteness1 can only reach those universals which are infinite only to human thought4 ,like men on a journey we leave the train when we have reached our journey's end1 but the train passes on out of sight in the distance1 sending back1 now and then1 tokens of its progress1 as it thunders over a bridge1 or whistles shrill as it nears some further stopping place1 until at last all is still1 not because the train has stopped1 but because we can follow it no further with our senses4 ,even after science has reached the utmost limit possible to it1 it is not satisfied to rest there1 but starts at once upon its return trip1 to bring to notice undiscovered facts hidden in these mighty generalizations4 ,thus the pendulum of intellectual activity unceasingly vibrates between the infinite and the finite1 never resting1 because ,idea and ,matter1 the force of ,man and the force of ,nature can never be completely identified4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,evolution4 ,the intellectual processes of a rational being must proceed according to some law4 ,they cannot succeed each other at hap-hazard4 ,the notion of rationality is conditioned upon this regular procedure2 if this be wanting1 the essential character of rational action is wanting4 ,but to say that rational processes are determined by law1 and conditioned upon a regular procedure1 is simply to assert that the steps in ratiocination are so related to each other that the relation of each to every other may be determined by the application of the law--the difference between any two steps being analogous to the difference between any other two4 ,the astronomer determines the orbit of a planet from three observations1 because he thereby determines the law of variation between these points2 from which he assumes that this law will be constant1 presenting a series of terms each differentiated according the series of differences already determined4 ,applying the same principle to mental phenomena1 we may determine the law of intellectual action4 ,thoughts are discriminated by the presence or absence of certain attributes4 ,at one extreme we find the summum genus1 comprising the fewest possible attributes distinguishing an idea2 at the other extreme we find the individual1 comprising any number of attributes4 ,between these two extremes we find a regular series of intermediate terms4 ,the movement of an idea from the general to the individual is like the motion of a planet through one-half of its orbit2 while the return movement from the individual to the general1 corresponds to the motion of the planet over the remaining half of its orbit4 ,the same law governs both movements and unites the two halves of the orbit into a single whole2 and a series of observations taken at equal distances1 will1 by the uniformity of differences presented1 reveal the operation of the same law in this dual manifestation4 ,upon examining the processes of deduction and induction1 we find in each the same series of terms1 differing only in the fact that they are in inverse order1 and this correspondence reveals the operation of one and the same law4 ,an inductive series is only a deductive series read backward4 ,any two terms in a series whether inductive or deductive1 differ only in the degree of generality1 and differ similarly from a third term1 so that two being known the third can be therefrom determined4 ,in a deductive series the terms differ by a constant increase in the number of individualizing attributes--a concept being expanded into a deductive series by such regular additions4 ,having two terms we can proceed to the third--that is1 from two propositions expressing this relation1 we can proceed to a conclusion4 ,in an inductive series the terms differ by a constant diminution in the number of individualizing attributes--an individual term being expanded into an inductive series1 by successively dropping the attributes which compose the individual term1 until we reach the required degree of generalization4 ,thought must proceed in one of these two directions4 ,the object-matter of thought being composed wholly of attributes can differ only in the presence or absence of certain attributes4 ,a combination1 then1 of these two movements must complete the intellectual orbit4 ,the direction of the movement of the mind will be determined by the end proposed4 ,when we possess the knowledge of phenomena and wish to discover law--that is1 when we seek information--we proceed by induction1 from the individual to the general4 ,when possessed of knowledge1 we wish to discover its applications1 when knowing the law1 we wish to determine the phenomena necessarily resulting therefrom1 we proceed by deduction--from the general to the individual4 ,complete knowledge1 then1 consists in the highest possible generalization1 and the expansion of this term into a series1 ending only with the last possible individualization4 ,the aim of physical science is to determine that half of the intellectual orbit which lies between the individual and the general--the aim of metaphysical science is to trace the other half which lies between the general and the individual4 ,when we seek to know what is1 we proceed by induction--the method of the phenomenal4 ,when1 knowing what is1 we proceed to determine what hence must be1 we proceed by deduction--the method of the ,necessary4 ,thus ,science1 at first seeking principles1 proceeds by induction to establish them2 but after these fundamental principles have been established1 it proceeds deductively to determine what must result from them1 without waiting to discover these truths by observation4 ,knowledge is thus complete just in proportion to the extension of its scope through generalization4 ,the higher the generalization1 the more inclusive will it be1 and the summum genus1 or the final generalization1 will be the highest attainable reach of knowledge4 ,when man can make no further generalization1 his knowledge will be1 in so far1 absolute and complete1 and all that remains possible to him will be the practical application of what he already knows4 ,perfect knowledge is nothing but perfect generalization4 ,the ,supreme ,intelligence being hypothetically possessed of all knowledge1 that is1 having discriminated the absolute summum genus1 can proceed no further in this direction2 his intellectual activity must be exerted in a descending series1 or from the general towards the individual1 and this process must be1 as we have seen above1 by a determinate series of steps1 fixed by the operation of a definite law1 which law proceeds by the successive addition of attributes to the general4 ,complete knowledge1 being complete generalization1 the lines of all science will necessarily converge1 as they approach this generalization1 until all sciences coalesce in one science1 and all truth is reduced to a single expression in the utterance of the final conception4 ,in accordance with the laws of thinking1 this general term is reached by successive omissions of particularizing attributes1 until at last we reach ,being--the absolute summum genus1 wholly free from individual attributes1 and thereby embracing everything possible to thought1 whether material or immaterial4 ,but this summum genus must be predicable of this whole4 ,matter and mind may thus be reduced to a single category1 and the physical and the intellectual finally coalesce in this last generalization4 ,materialism and idealism thus differ merely in the degree of generalization reached--or rather they both agree in avoiding the final generalization which identifies both matter and mind4 ,materialism must always deal with the individual1 for matter can appear under no other form4 ,idealism must always rest upon the general1 for thought1 to be thought1 must state a generalization4 ,each1 however1 finds its explanation in the other1 and both are harmonized by the application of the law of intellectual action above given4 ,matter and ,mind are complementary1 not incompatible4 ,they differ with each other1 but they agree in being similarly related to a third term4 ,matter is objective2 it is thought taking form1 becoming individual1 manifesting itself in space4 ,mind is subjective4 ,the one appeals to the senses2 the other is known only to the consciousness4 ,science reaches its full development only when it includes both physical and intellectual phenomena within its scope4 ,every step which it takes carries it further from the purely physical1 and brings it nearer the purely intellectual--that is the development of physical science is from the individual towards the general1 and it reaches its end1 its completion1 only when the last distinction1 that of subjective and objective1 has disappeared in the last possible generalization4 ,when the objective has been identified with the subjective1 the distinction between ,mind and ,matter has been obliterated1 and we have reached the ,supreme ,intelligence--the ,i ,am of ,scripture--simple ,being4 ,matter is the formal expression of thought1 or the necessary condition of such expression1 and in this condition is found the link that connects the subjective and objective manifestations of being4 ,subjectivity is ideality1 as objectivity is materiality4 ,the consciousness can take cognizance only of what is within itself1 and therefore without every other4 ,consciousness is therefore wholly personal4 ,to communicate an idea it must be placed within the consciousness of another4 ,to reach this result it must cease to be personal1 must pass out of the subjective consciousness into objective form1 so as to be placed in the same relation to the speaker and the hearer4 ,thought1 out of the consciousness of the thinker1 is objective to him1 and to render thought objective is to give it material form4 ,thought to be communicated1 must pass out of the consciousness of the thinker into a material representation4 ,the assumption of material form individualizes the idea4 ,the artist's mind may be filled with splendid conceptions1 but no one but he can look within his consciousness and see them4 ,before others can have any knowledge of his thoughts1 he must give them form1 or embody them in statues or paintings4 ,the soul of the musician may be thrilled by the harmonies that his imagination creates1 but no other soul can join him in this ecstasy until he has given form to his conceptions4 ,so the thinker must embody his thoughts in language before he can communicate them to another4 ,matter1 then1 is the vehicle by which thought is communicated1 and1 so far as we are concerned1 the necessary condition of such communication1 so that the conception of thought apart from the thinker involves the intervention of material forms1 and it is by the interpretation of these symbolical forms that we discover the idea4 ,now1 let us suppose a ,supreme ,intelligence4 ,the intellectual processes of such a ,being1 to be conceived as rational by us1 must be identical with ours1 or at least analogous to ours4 ,the possession of infinite attributes may in fact free him from the control of any law1 but it is impossible for us to conceive an intelligence acting otherwise than in accordance with law4 ,so that if the ,supreme ,intelligence is to communicate with man1 it must be in obedience to the laws which control our mental activities4 ,the ,divine thought must1 then1 like human conceptions1 be communicated by means of physical symbols4 ,the ,supreme ,intelligence1 being the final generalization1 must possess all knowledge1 and the only intelligent action possible to him from our point of view1 is from this absolute generalization towards the concrete and individual4 ,the absolute general is purely subjective1 which1 to become cognizable1 must be rendered objective4 ,this can be secured to us only through the intervention of material forms4 ,from this point of view1 matter is only the symbol of thought--thought apart from the thinker4 ,the first result of the divine activity in self-manifestation would be the analysis of being into subjective and objective--that is the discrimination of mind and matter1 which terms are severally the final generalizations of the two fundamental divisions of science4 ,matter1 then1 mere formless1 chaotic matter1 would be the first result of creative activity4 ,following the development of this idea in its continually increasing individuality1 as new attributes are severally added1 matter assumes determinate form and becomes related in systems1 as the various so-called elementary substances are discriminated1 until finally all truth1 capable of being revealed by inorganic matter1 is presented to us4 ,add the idea of organism and we have the two great divisions of phenomena--material and vital4 ,the higher the generalization1 the fewer will be the attributes composing the concept1 and thus the simpler will be the form symbolizing its expression4 ,as in the case of matter1 the first result of the divine activity was more matter1 undiscriminated by any further attribute2 so here1 we have1 as the first organic creation1 a concrete expression of the highest possible generalization comprising the fewest possible attributes--that is1 forms of life involving the fewest individual characteristics4 ,to matter add the simplest organic attribute--that is1 the one lying nearest the genus--and we have mere organized matter1 the simple cell1 the foundation of all life1 no matter how great its future complexity1 equally the origin of animal and vegetable growth1 which are as yet entirely undiscriminated4 ,this would be the first appearance of life4#a ,differentiating again by the addition of a new attribute1 and organic being is subdivided into the two species1 vegetable and animal4 ,beginning with these typical forms1 adding single attributes in a continuous series1 we at last reach the highest types of animals and plants4 ,finally1 add rationality to the animal1 and we reach man1 the highest and therefore the most complex type of life1 and who1 so far as we are concerned1 must be the end of creation4 ,we cannot conceive of any higher creation1 because we cannot add an attribute to those we already possess1 any more than we can conceive of an additional sense by which to cognize such new attribute4 ,this process has been determined from the very outset by those intellectual laws which we cannot disobey1 and which we cannot conceive disobeyed by an intelligent creator4 ,if the law of intellectual action require this process from the simple to the complex1 the concrete representation of the steps of this process must indicate the operation of this law1 and must also proceed from the simple and rudimentary to the complex and highly developed4 ,an intelligent ,creator in revealing his thought must follow the method which our minds must follow in interpreting this revelation4 ,when we know and seek to communicate our knowledge1 we proceed from the general to the specific4#b ,the ,creator assumed to be infinite in knowledge would therefore follow this process instead of the method peculiar to investigation4 ,the law of intellectual action determines this method1 and the conditions of intellectual communication determine the representation of this method in the material expression of the ideas communicated4 ,considering the operation of this law under these conditions1 we find that the thought communicating only1 as nearly as may be1 the generic idea1 will be distinguished from it by the addition of but a single attribute as the generic by itself is incapable of being represented in concrete form1 the expression of this thought in form will present us matter distinguished from matter in general by but a single attribute4 ,the least possible individualizing attribute added to the highest possible generalization gives us the simplest expression of an idea1 and the form or the organism symbolizing this thought will be the simplest form and the simplest organism possible4 ,for instance3 in organic life the highest generalization barely individualized will give us the simple cell2 and no matter what degree of complexity we subsequently reach by the addition of an almost infinite number of attributes1 we nevertheless begin in every case with the same starting point4 ,each higher type is reached by adding to a lower4 ,the higher thus embraces all that can be found in the lower1 and something besides4 ,this method is invariable1 and can never be departed from4 ,the genus must always be predicable of every individual component of every species contained under it4 ,translating this law into the forms of material expression1 and it requires each higher species to physically include all lower species1 and to differ from them only by addition4 ,man1 the highest type1 must thus include all the attributes of the cell as physically expressed1 and without them he would not be man4 ,the differences between no two terms in a series can be total4 ,if the successive steps in a train of thought must be related1 so that no two notions will be wholly distinct from each other1 these notions will constitute a series1 each term of which will1 in a measure1 determine the next1 so soon as the law of the series is discovered2 and if this train of thought be objectively presented1 it will afford a corresponding series of physical terms1 each one of which will in like manner determine the next4 ,but thought is impossible unless by a train of ideas so related4 ,its physical expression will therefore be equally impossible except by a series of physical terms similarly related1 each one of which in some manner determines the next4 ,there must then be a perfect continuity in the line that reaches from the simplest form of matter through all grades of organic life up to man1 the highest expression of the divine idea4 ,there can be no break in the chain of thought1 because the law of the logical process forbids it3 there can be no break in the series of material symbols for the conditions of concrete expression equally forbid it4 ,a symbol is nothing except as it represents that which is to be symbolized4 ,so the symbols form a physical series1 because the thoughts symbolized form a logical series4 ,if the creator has fully revealed his thought1 it must be by a series of physical terms arranged in such a manner as to indicate the logical series of ideas symbolized4 ,every form of matter is a symbol of thought1 and challenges interpretation4 ,every change in form corresponds to an antecedent change in idea1 and must be intended to reveal it4 ,as thought1 then1 begins its evolution with the general and proceeds to the individual by a series of terms each of which is similarly related to both extremes1 we must find the material enunciation of this process assuming the form of a series of terms1 beginning with mere nebulous matter1 grading into organic life1 and organic life presenting us with a similar series beginning with the mere cell and ending with man4 ,so rigid and invariable must this serial arrangement be that if a term in either series be wanting1 we are authorized to hypothetically interpolate it4 ,nature never makes a leap1 says the scientific investigator1 as he studies the material symbols of thought4 ,thought never makes a leap1 says the metaphysician1 as he studies the necessary laws of rational action3 and both have uttered the same truth4 ,we prove a proposition by determining the steps by which it was educed from a more generic statement4 ,science must proceed in the same manner1 for science only discovers the track of mind--it does not make the track1 it only follows it4 ,if then we find the chain of evolution broken at any point1 science must either stop there1 or assume the wanting term in the series4 ,we have the right to interpolate these missing terms1 for we must assume that the thoughts of ,god communicated to us in material forms constitute a continuous revelation1 beginning with ,himself1 the final generalization1 and ending with man the highest individualization4 ,these limits are fixed--the one by the nature of ,god1 and the other by the nature of man4 ,between these two extremes we must find a series of intermediate terms4 ,any other conception of their relation than that of a determinate series is impossible and irrational2 and a series1 so far as it means anything1 means evolution of some sort4 ,finding the relation between these terms--distinguishing the same which reproduces itself1 and the different which introduces a new term--that is1 determining the law of apparent evolution--is the problem presented to science4 ,the astronomer found ,bode's law to all appearance violated by the omission of a planet between ,mars and ,jupiter4 ,he could see no reason for the law1 but if the planets had been placed by an intelligent ,creator1 some order of arrangement must be discoverable according to which their position was determined4 ,the ,creator being intelligent1 it is impossible to conceive them placed fortuitously4 ,there must then be a link between ,mars and ,jupiter1 because the law once established cannot be broken4 ,the same law may be observed in the arrangement of leaves around the axis of a plant4 ,if intelligence arranged them they must be arranged in some order1 for intelligence never performs the least act without a purpose4 ,each leaf or pair of leaves is not a mere duplication of the previous leaf or pair of leaves4 ,the relation which subsists between any two sets in the series expresses the idea of the ,creator1 and this must be constant4 ,completing the series as indicated by different plants1 we may assume that if any term is apparently wanting1 it is only because it has not been discovered4 ,in neither of these cases would it be asserted that any physical evolution had taken place--the terms form a series of which each term is equally determined by the operation of a fixed law2 and yet it is an operation precisely analogous to that which in the case of animals presents every appearance of a real evolution4 ,take1 for instance1 a series of animals1 presenting at one period of time the simplest and most rudimentary forms1 and at another the most complex and highly organized2 we cannot do otherwise than conceive these two extremes as related by intermediate terms1 through the operation of some law which holds good throughout the series4 ,the relation subsisting between any two1 must be the same as that subsisting between any other two similarly situated1 or a departure from that relation which is itself governed by a definite law discoverable from a comparison of two sets of terms4 ,the application of this law is so universal and so rigid that we need not hesitate to interpolate a missing term1 and confidently assert that it either does exist or has existed4 ,to deny this principle is to deny the necessity of continuity in reasoning4 ,this continuity of thought is represented in matter by the persistence of generic forms under specific differences4 ,but just as the specific is the generic with certain additions1 so the individual is this same generic with still further additions2 and these additions1 whether considered solely in space1 as given in the symbols of physical science1 or in time as in the conceptions of intellectual science1 must be determined by the same unvarying law4 ,the persistence of the same form furnishes us the means of identifying this relation1 while the differences reveal to us the successive steps by which the generic was differentiated into the individual4 ,if the creative thought has been expressed by the forms of matter1 the laws of thought must be thus expressed in the relative forms of matter4 ,anything less than this1 while it might interpret isolated ideas1 would not communicate the method of the creative process1 and science is nothing but the discovery of this method4 ,if the terms of the logical process must be arranged in a series1 the physical symbols rendering this logical process cognizable1 must be arranged in a similar series1 for science becomes impossible when the logical process becomes undiscoverable4 ,the differences between the terms in this series must be cognizable4 ,two terms which are indistinguishable are practically identical2 and two terms which are not identical vary by a difference which is cognizable by itself apart from either term4 ,the steps in the logical evolution of the final term4 ,being must be separable to be cognizable1 and the material forms interpreting these steps to the senses must also be distinguishable4 ,a species differs from the genus by the addition of at least one attribute4 ,now1 if the species is distinguishable from the genus1 the attribute which differentiates it1 must be separately cognizable--so also the individual differs from the species by the addition of attributes1 which must in like manner be separately cognizable1 or the species will never be conceived independently of the individuals4 ,a thought cannot proceed by insensible steps1 nor can its material expression vary otherwise than by determinate and distinguishable differences4 ,the distinction of species is thus a logical necessity4 ,the addition of distinct attributes to the genus gives origin to distinct species2 variation in attributes not affecting their substantial identity gives rise to varieties4 ,one species1 then1 cannot become another1 except by the assumption of a new specific attribute1 so that one species passes into another precisely as the genus passes into the species1 and that is just as1 and not otherwise1 than one thought passes into another4 ,the fundamental law of the logical process is that we pass from the generic towards the individual2 from the simple to the complex4 ,induction can proceed only by assuming a genus at the outset--that is1 by assuming certain attributes in the individual to be generic4 ,translate this law into material forms1 and we have each higher--that is more complex--species evolved from the lower by the addition of some new characteristic4 ,this new attribute cannot be added by the functional activity of the lower organism2 that can only reproduce itself4 ,a thought does not change merely through repeated expression4 ,we pass to the conclusion of a syllogism1 not from each term1 but from a comparison of the premises--and this requires an intellectual operation entirely distinct from a mere apprehension of the terms4 ,it is one thing to comprehend the premises2 it is quite another to deduce a conclusion from them4 ,it may necessarily follow1 but it requires a separate act of the mind to reach it4 ,premises will not of themselves reach a conclusion4 ,reading this same truth in the forms of matter1 we may say that species will not pass into higher species without the intervention of a force distinct from either4 ,the impulse which adds a new attribute must be intellectually separable from all those pre-existing1 and its material representation must be physically distinct from pre-existing forms4 ,this complete separability precludes the possibility of mere physical genesis4 ,the added attribute is presented by a new form of matter1 revealing the presence of a new thought--a new effect1 requiring the agency of a new cause4 ,in accordance with the usual economy of nature1 who never duplicates her forces1 change will be made only so far as may be necessary to communicate the additional idea4 ,organisms representing previous thoughts will be added to1 in order to express the expansion of the thought1 instead of a creation de novo in each instance4 ,thus an identical cellular structure will be found in all organic beings1 from the lowest to the highest1 each higher type carrying forward the idea and its physical expression found in the lower4 ,the differences between no two terms in the series can be total1 nor can any two terms be identical1 as each higher species will embrace all the attributes of the lower1 differing only by the addition of others4 ,this is simply the physical expression of the logical truth that whatever can be predicated of the genus can be predicated of every individual contained under it4 ,as the individual is only the expansion of the genus1 so higher physical types must also be similar expansions of lower4 ,here1 then1 is evolution1 or development3 primarily an evolution of the generic into the individual1 the continued differentiation of a generic idea through successive individualizations1 each adding to the previous group of attributes1 thus rendering the idea increasingly complex2 and1 secondly1 an apparent physical evolution or development1 interpreting this logical process by a series of physical forms so related as to reveal the relation existing between the thoughts thus interpreted4 ,in the physical representation of the ideas so related1 there must be an apparent physical evolution--that is1 the process of evolution logically must1 like the ideas thus evolved1 have a physical expression1 and the successive steps in this logical evolution must be revealed by material forms bearing an analogous relation1 and thereby expressing the logical process4 ,matter is nothing1 so far as we are now concerned1 but the condition necessary to the objective expression of thought4 ,every phase of matter is simply an objective formulation of a corresponding phase of thought4 ,every addition to form implies an antecedent increase of thought1 as there can be no formal expression until there is something to be expressed4 ,there can1 then1 be no such thing as mere material evolution1 for whatever is material is only symbolical4 ,matter being thus wholly inert1 the origin of the impulse towards greater complexity must be sought for outside of that which undergoes the change4 ,the movement by which one species becomes a higher is not an elaboration1 an extension or a differentiation of existing attributes1 but involves the positive addition of a new attribute1 different and distinct from any or all previously existing4 ,one species cannot pass into another by an innate impulse1 for a species is an entity composed of a determinate number of attributes1 and all attributes potentially present must be considered as actually present4 ,we cannot say that the child is a different species from the man1 and that one passes into the other by a process of evolution1 because all the essential attributes of the man are potentially present in the child4 ,if the polyp1 by the action of innate forces1 operating through a series of ages1 however extended1 can1 without any impulse from without1 develop itself into a man1 then the polyp is as much a man as a boy is1 differing only in the time required for development3 and the data for the final deduction of the highest types of creation must be furnished in the most elementary forms of life4 ,the force manifesting itself in organic life is readily distinguishable from the organism by which it is manifested4 ,life and organization are not synonyms2 one is the condition of the other1 but a condition is not a cause4 ,we can consider force apart from organism1 and this possible separation in thought proves that the same form may not represent both1 but that life can absolutely exist apart from organs which serve to give it a physical manifestation4#c ,physical life being conditioned upon organization1 whenever the organism varies1 the vital force thus manifested must also vary1 such variation being necessarily antecedent to its manifestation4 ,the organism varies1 because it must1 in order to express the added thought4 ,change in organism1 therefore1 is not induced by simple organic action1 because the organs and the force acting through them can be distinguished4 ,assuming that matter is the objective or formal representation of thought1 there can be no change in the material expression without a corresponding change in the antecedent conception4 ,there can1 then1 be physical evolution1 only as there is antecedent logical evolution1 and then only because of this logical evolution and not because of the operation of an innate organic force4 ,force1 whatever may be its genesis1 is only the exertion of power1 not the increase of it4 ,exertion limits the view to the force immediately in operation4 ,we may replace one manifestation by another1 but the quantity is neither increased nor diminished by this change4 ,change in form implies the operation of force3 and apart from such manifestation in matter1 it escapes the tests of science1 and passes into the purely metaphysical notion of cause4 ,and unless the operation of force be constant1 or1 if different forces are blended1 variable according to some determinate law1 the action of which is constant and discoverable1 so that the different units of force are separately measurable1 the force thus irregular in its action can never be placed in any scientific category4 ,evolution1 then1 cannot proceed from any innate organic impulse1 unless the force that tends to exact reproduction1 and the force that induces a change be equally and separately cognizable4 ,change must proceed according to some law which accounts for the change1 and distinguishes between the normal exertion of power and that exertion which causes a deviation4 ,science1 to be science1 must explain apparent exceptions as fully as the regular operation of forces1 and that which causes the irregularity must be as distinctly cognizably by itself as the force which acts regularly4 ,anything less than this is not science4 ,the discovery of ,neptune was the result of the application of this principle2 it was a successful attempt to discriminate the force which caused variation from the force which operated regularly4 ,each species represents the operation of certain vital forces1 and one cannot physically pass into another except by the increase of this force1 or at least by a change in the manner of its manifestation2 and this increase in amount or this change in direction must separately be accounted for4 ,nor does it matter1 for the purposes of this discussion1 as to the genesis of this added increment1 further than to show that its origin must be exterior to the organism by which its presence is manifested2 for vital energy acting through an organism is a unit1 and cannot1 even in thought1 be separated into distinguishable portions4 ,change in the direction of vital energy indicates that the original impulse has been modified in its action by encountering another force1 for nothing but force can change the direction of force4 ,it does not fall within the range of this paper to determine the nature of this exterior force which is thus distinguishable from that acting through the vital organization1 and therefore capable of separate objective representation4 ,metaphysically we may say that force is resolvable into will1 but will being purely personal is incapable of material representation1 and thus cannot enter into the determinations of physical science1 which does not seek to discover the origin of force1 but deals solely with its presence4 ,as the logician must assume his premises1 and1 as a logician1 cannot question their truth1 so the physicist must assume a force in operation1 and1 as a physicist1 cannot examine its genesis4 ,the physical or the metaphysical method of inquiry is valid only so long as restricted to physical or metaphysical processes3 a mixture of the two methods will give results satisfactory neither to science nor to philosophy4 ,as logic furnishes no criterion by which to test the absolute truth of propositions1 but deals wholly with conclusions drawn from given premises1 so science furnishes no data by which to determine the absolute genesis of force1 but restricts its enquiries to the phenomena resulting from a force given4 ,for the student of physical science cause and effect is only the transference of a given and determined force from one material form to another4 ,if this idea is to be traced further1 it must be studied outside the limits of physics4 ,this study belongs to metaphysics4 ,now1 if physical science does not deal with the origin of the initial force1 but assumes at the outset its presence1 no more does it fall within its province to examine into the origin of the increments which give to physical forms that variety which renders science possible4 ,science deals with results1 not antecedents2 and after having determined results1 it is not authorized to affirm that one species has produced another by evolution1 or has produced it at all4 ,if there are agreements between different organisms by which they are brought into relation1 there are also differences by which they are discriminated1 and these differences imply increments of force2 and to assert that one organism has evolved another is to determine not merely the presence of this new increment1 but also to determine its origin4 ,scientific investigation deals with phenomena which give evidence to the senses of a transference of force from one form or from one manifestation to another4 ,transference is not increase--an effect can be no more than the evolution of what was potentially present in the cause2 it cannot add to it4 ,the origin of the force must be investigated according to intellectual laws4 ,it has been argued that a ,supreme ,intelligence in manifesting his thought will1 according to the necessary laws of rational activity1 pass from the universal and general to the particular and individual1 or from concepts involving few attributes to those involving these and others2 and that these steps in the rational process must be represented in a corresponding physical series2 and that the communication of thought is conditioned upon this physical representation4 ,if the logical series comprises one thousand terms1 each related to the preceding according to logical law the physical series must comprise one thousand terms1 each physically related in such a manner as to reveal this law4 ,as the highest generalization comprises the fewest attributes1 the concrete expression of this idea will present the simplest possible physical form and the least complexity of organization1 and thus will present the lowest types of life2 and as the individual comprises the greatest number of attributes1 its concrete expression will present the greatest complexity1 and consequently the highest type of life4 ,we have seen that the logical process begins with the general and ends with the individual2 its material expression must therefore begin with the lowest orders and end with the highest4 ,but the individual cannot be immediately derived from the general without the intervention of intermediate generalizations4 ,no more in the concrete expression of this deduction can we pass from the lowest types to the highest without the intervention of an intermediate series4 ,these intermediate terms are not capable of independent interpretation2 they find their full explanation only in the extremes of the series--,god and ,man4 ,if1 then1 in the intellectual process from the abstract and universal towards the concrete and individual1 we find a constant evolution of idea1 each advance being an addition to the previous conception1 each new term in the series embracing all the attributes of the preceding1 and differing only by addition2 and if thought is possible only on this condition2 it necessarily follows that the material representation of this thought must present physical forms similarly related1 so that1 leaving out of view the intellectual genesis of this relation1 the observer might conclude that these forms compose a series evolved from a primordial cell in accordance with an organic law4 ,but such we find to be the universal law of intellectual procedure3 this apparent development or evolution must1 therefore1 be the condition of the communication of such intellectual process1 and the physical terms are brought into this relation by the fact that they symbolize the logical process4 ,if the material symbols of thought were unrelated physically1 the thoughts thus expressed would also be unrelated and independent4 ,but such a supposition readers ,science impossible1 for its one aim is to find the same in the different4 ,if there be no same1 there can be no science3 if there be no different1 there can be no science4 ,thought proceeds by adding the different to the same in an endless series1 and this addition of the different to the same expressed in concrete forms is what is called evolution4 ,if no evolution were apparent in ,nature1 there could be no ,science2 for those steps which to the naturalist indicate evolution1 being only the physical expression--the formulation--of the logical process1 afford the means by which the student reaches the highest generalization4 ,if these steps be wanting1 he cannot proceed4 ,admitting then to its fullest extent the fact that1 judged from a purely physical point of view1 all organic forms seem to have been derived each from its immediate predecessor1 by a mere functional impulse2 and admitting that science is possible upon no other condition2 we claim that these material forms are brought into such relation by intellectual evolution1 and not by physical genesis2 they represent an evolution of ,thought and not an evolution of ,matter4 ,we know from consciousness that this process of evolution is the method of our thinking4 ,we know also that the divine thought can be rendered intelligible to us upon no other hypothesis than that which supposes it to be governed by the laws which control human thought4 ,translating the physical symbols which we see about us1 and which present this appearance of evolution1 we infer that this is the method according to which the divine mind proceeded4 ,science will not materially err in its physical results1 if it adopt the hypothesis of physical evolution1 but it must confine its attention to physics2 it is only as we attempt higher generalizations that the insufficiency of the hypothesis becomes manifest in its failure to satisfy the conditions of the problem as presented to philosophy4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,this1 of course1 does not absolutely determine the order of organic creation2 as in the case of the syllogism the conclusion or either premise may be the proposition first enunciated1 the order of expression being determined by circumstances4 #b ,compare the demonstrations of ,geometry4 #c ,as in the case of man after the death of the body4