,,old-,,fashioned ,,ethics ,,and ,,common-,,sense ,,metaphysics ,with ,some of ,their ,applications by ,,william ,,thomas ,,thornton ,author of a ,treatise ',on ,labour' ,london ,macmillan and ,co4 #ahgc ,all rights reserved ',i entirely agree with you as to the ill tendency of the affected doubts of some philosophers and the fantastical conceits of others4 ,i am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking1 that ,i have quitted several of the sublime notions ,i had got in their schools for vulgar opinions4 ,and ,i give it you on my word1 that since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense1 ,i find my understanding strangely enlightened1 so that ,i can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle4'--,,berkeley',s ,,hylas ,,and ,,philonous4 ,,preface4 ,the book was all but finished1 and only the ,preface remained1 over which ,i was hesitating1 apprehensive equally of putting into it too much and too little1 when one of the most frequent 'companions of my solitude' came to my aid1 shewing me1 in fragments1 a preface already nearly written1 and needing only a little piecing to become forthwith presentable4 ,here it is4 ',in these sick days1 in a world such as ours1 richer than usual in ,truths grown obsolete1 what can the fool think but that it is all a ,den of ,lies wherein whoso will not speak and act ,lies must stand idle and despair8' ,whereby it happens that for the artist who would fain minister medicinally to the relief of folly1 'the publishing of a ,work of ,art1' designed1 like this1 to redeem ,truth from premature obsolescence1 'becomes almost a necessity4' ,for1 albeit1 'in the heart of the speaker there ought to be some kind of gospel tidings burning until it be uttered1 so that otherwise it were better for him that he altogether held his peace1' still1 than to have fire burning within1 and not to put it forth1 not many worse things are readily imaginable4 ',has the word ,duty no meaning8 ,is what we call ,duty no divine messenger and guide1 but a false1 earthly fantasm1 made up of ,desire and ,fear8' ,in that' ,logic-mill of thine' hast thou 'an earthly mechanism for the ,godlike itself1 and for grinding out ,virtue from the husks of ,pleasure8 ,i tell thee1 ,nay6 ,otherwise1 not on ,morality1 but on ,cookery1 let us build our stronghold4 ,there1 brandishing our frying-pan as censer1 let us offer up sweet incense to the ,devil1 and live at ease on the fat things he has provided for his elect1' seeing that 'with stupidity and sound digestion1 man may front much4' ,or1 'is there no ,god8 or1 at best1 an absentee ,god1 sitting idle ever since the first ,sabbath1 at the outside of ,his universe1 and seeing it go8' ,know that for man's well-being1 whatever else be needed1 ',faith is one thing needful4' ,mark1 'how1 with it1 ,martyrs1 otherwise weak1 can cheerfully endure the shame and the cross2 how1 without it1 worldlings puke up their sick existence1 by suicide1 in the midst of luxury4' ,of how much else1 'for a pure moral nature1 is not the loss of ,religious ,belief the loss8' ',all wounds1 the crush of long-continued ,destitution1 the stab of false ,friendship and of false ,love1 all wounds in the so genial heart would have healed again had not the life-warmth of ,faith been withdrawn4' ,but this once lost1 how recoverable8 how1 rather1 ever acquirable8 ',first must the dead ,letter of ,religion own itself dead1 and drop piecemeal into dust1 if the living ,spirit of ,religion1 freed from this1 its charnel house1 is to arise on us1 new born of ,heaven1 and with new healing under its wings4' ,beside these burning words of ,mr4 ,carlyle any additional words of mine would stand only as superfluous foils1 and are1 therefore1 considerately pretermitted4 ,,cadogan ,,place3 ,december #ahgb4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,,page ,i4 ,,anti-,,utilitarianism #a ,,ii4 ,,history',s ,,scientific ,,pretensions #hd ,,iii4 ,,david ,,hume ,,as ,a ,,metaphysician #aac ,,iv4 ,,huxleyism #aeh ,v4 ,,recent ,,phases ,,of ,,scientific ,,atheism #aii ,,vi4 ,,limits ,,of ,,demonstrable ,,theism #bff ,,epilogue #bih ,,old-,,fashioned ,,ethics ,,and ,,common-,,sense ,,metaphysics ,,chapter ,i4 ,,anti-,,utilitarianism4 ,i4 ,having1 by the heading of this essay1 announced that it is intended to be partly controversial1 ,i can scarcely begin better than by furnishing the reader with the means of judging whether ,i myself correctly apprehend the doctrine which ,i am about to criticise4 ,if1 then1 ,i were myself an ,utilitarian1 and1 for the sake either of vindicating my own belief1 or of making converts of other people1 had undertaken to explain what ,utilitarianism is1 ,i should set about the task somewhat in this wise3-- ,the sole use and sole object of existence is enjoyment or pleasure1 which two words will here be treated as synonymous2 happiness1 also1 though not quite identical in meaning1 being occasionally substituted for them4 ,enjoyment1 it must be observed1 is of very various kinds1 measures1 and degrees4 ,it may be sensual1 or emotional1 or imaginative1 or intellectual1 or moral4 ,it may be momentary or eternal2 intoxicating delight or sober satisfaction4 ,it may be unmixed and undisturbed1 in which case1 however short of duration or coarse in quality1 it may in strictness be called happiness2 or it may be troubled and alloyed1 although of a flavour which would be exquisite if pure1 and if there were nothing to interfere with the perception of it4 ,understood1 however1 in a sufficiently comprehensive sense1 enjoyment or pleasure may be clearly perceived to be the sole object of existence4 ,the whole value of life plainly consists of the enjoyment1 present or future1 which life affords1 or is capable of affording or securing4 ,now1 the excellence of all rules depends on their conduciveness to the object they have in view4 ,the excellence of all rules of life must1 therefore1 depend on their conduciveness to the sole object which life has in view1 viz41 enjoyment4 ,but the excellence of rules of life1 or of conduct or modes of acting1 would seem to be but another name for their morality1 and the morality of actions obviously depends on their conformity to moral rules4 ,whence1 if so much be admitted1 it necessarily follows that the test of the morality of actions is their conduciveness to enjoyment4 ,but the enjoyment thus referred to is not that of the agent alone1 for if it were1 no action whatever could possibly be immoral4 ,whatever any one does1 he does either because to do it gives him or promises him pleasure1 or because he believes that the not doing it would subject him to more pain than he will suffer from doing it4 ,besides1 one person's enjoyment may be obtained at the expense of other people's suffering1 so that an act in which the actor takes pleasure may destroy or prevent more pleasure altogether than it creates4 ,the enjoyment or happiness1 therefore1 which ,utilitarianism regards1 is not individual1 but general happiness2 not that of one or of a few1 but of the many1 nor even of the many only4 ,it is often declared to be the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 but it may with more accuracy be described as the largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all concerned4#a ,again1 an action which1 in some particular instance1 causes more pleasure than pain to those affected by it1 may yet belong to a class of actions which1 in the generality of cases1 causes more pain than pleasure1 and may thus involve a violation of a moral rule1 and1 consequently1 be itself immoral4 ,wherefore the enjoyment which ,utilitarianism adopts as its moral test is not simply the greatest sum of enjoyment for all concerned1 but that greatest sum in the greatest number of cases4 ,in its widest signification it is the greatest happiness of society at large and in the long run4 ,from these premises a decisive criterion of right and wrong may be deduced4 ,every action belonging to a class calculated to promote the permanent happiness of society is right4 ,every action belonging to a class opposed to the permanent happiness of society is wrong4 ,in the foregoing exposition ,i have1 ,i trust1 evinced a sincere desire to give ,utilitarianism its full due1 and ,i shall at least be admitted to have shown myself entirely free from most of those more vulgar misconceptions of its nature which have given its professors such just offence4 ,many of its assailants have not scrupled to stigmatise as worthy only of swine a doctrine which represents life as having no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit than pleasure4 ,to these1 however1 it has1 by the great apostle of ,utilitarianism1 been triumphantly replied that it is really they themselves who insult human nature by using language that assumes human beings to be capable of no higher pleasures than those of which swine are capable2 and that1 moreover1 if the assumption were correct1 and if the capacities of men and of swine were identical1 whatever rule of life were good enough for the latter would likewise be good enough for the former4 ,but ,i am not an assailant of this description4 ,inasmuch as there undeniably are very many and very various kinds of pleasure1 ,i of course allow ,utilitarianism credit for common sense enough to acknowledge that those kinds are most worthy of pursuit which1 from whatever cause1 possess most value--that those which are most precious are those most to be prized4 ,but whoever allows thus much will have no alternative but to concede a great deal more4 ,the most precious of pleasures is that which arises from the practice of virtue1 as may be proved conclusively in the only way of which the case admits1 viz41 by reference to the fact that1 whoever is equally acquainted with that and with other pleasures1 deliberately prefers it to all the rest1 will1 if necessary1 forego all others for its sake1 and values no others obtainable only at its expense4 ,by necessary implication it follows that1 as being more valuable than any other1 the pleasure arising from the practice of virtue must be that which ,utilitarianism recommends above all others as an object of pursuit4 ,but the pursuit of this particular pleasure and the practice of virtue are synonymous terms4 ,what1 therefore1 ,utilitarianism above all other things recommends and insists upon is the practice of virtue4 ,now1 the practice of virtue commonly involves subordination of one's own interest to that of other people2 indeed1 virtue would not be virtue in the utilitarian sense of the word unless it did involve such subordination4 ,wherefore the pleasure arising from the practice of virtue1 the pleasure which occupies the highest place on the utilitarian scale1 and that which ,utilitarianism exhorts its disciples chiefly to seek after1 is nothing else than the pleasure derived from attending to other people's pleasure instead of to our own4 ,nor is this all4 ,in order adequately to appreciate the loftiness of utilitarian teaching1 and its utter exemption from the sordidness with which it is ignorantly charged1 we must devote a few moments to examination of those distinctive peculiarities of different kinds of pleasure which entitle them to different places in our esteem4 ,all pleasures may be arranged under five heads1 and in regularly ascending series1 as follows3-- #a4 ,sensual pleasures3--,to wit1 those of eating and drinking1 and whatever others are altogether of the flesh1 fleshly4 #b4 ,emotional1 by which are to be understood agreeable moods of the mind1 such as1 irrespectively of any agreeable idea brought forward simultaneously by association1 are produced by music 7'for1' as ,milton says1 'eloquence the soul1 song charms the sense'71 by beauty of form or colour1 by genial sunshine1 by balmy or invigorating air4 #c4 ,imaginative1 or pleasures derived from the contemplation of mental pictures4 #d4 ,intellectual1 or those consequent on exercise of the reasoning powers4 #e4 ,moral1 or those which are alluded to when virtue is spoken of as being its own reward4#b ,that of these several kinds1 each of the last four is preferable to any preceding it on the list will1 it is to be hoped1 be allowed to pass as an unquestioned truth1 for to any one perverse enough to deny it1 the only answer that can be made is an appeal to observation in proof that all persons who are equally acquainted with the several kinds do exhibit the preferences indicated4 ,neither1 so far as the two kinds first-named alone are concerned1 is it possible to go much more deeply into the reasons why emotional pleasures are to be preferred to sensual1 than by pointing to the fact that all competent judges of both are observed to like the former best4 ,if all those who are endowed with equal sensitiveness of ear and of palate prefer music to feasting1 and would any day give up a dinner at ,francatelli's for the sake of hearing a rejuvenescent ,persiani as ,zerlina1 or ,patti as ,dinorah1 the one thing presumable is1 that all such persons derive more enjoyment from perfect melody than from perfect cookery1 and little else remains to be said on the subject4 ,the same ultimate fact need not1 however1 limit our inquiry as to the preferableness of imaginative or intellectual to emotional pleasures1 and of moral to any of the other three4 ,this admits of1 and demands1 a more subtle explanation1 from which we may learn1 not merely that certain preferences are shown1 but also why they are shown4 ,the preferences in question are demonstrably not due to the greater poignancy of the pleasures preferred4 ,it is simply not true that the keenest of imaginative pleasures is keener than the keenest of emotional1 and still less that the keenest of intellectual is so4 ,the very reverse is the truth4 ,the supremest delight attainable in fancy's most romantic flight is1 ,i suspect1 faint in comparison with the sort of ecstasy into which a child of freshly-strung nerves is sometimes thrown by the mere brilliance or balminess of a summer's day1 and with which even we1 dulled adults1 provided we be in the right humour1 and that all things are in a concatenation accordingly1 are now and then momentarily affected while listening to the wood-notes wild of a nightingale1 or a ,jenny ,lind1 or while gazing on star-lit sky or moon-lit sea1 or on the snowy or dolomite peaks of a mountain range fulgent with the violet and purple glories of the setting sun4 ,and yet the choicest snatches of such beatitude with which--at least1 after the fine edge of our susceptibilities has been worn away by the world's friction--we creatures of coarse human mould are ever indulged1 are but poor in comparison with the rich abundance of the same in which some more delicately-constituted organisms habitually revel4 ,if we would understand of what development emotional delight is capable1 we should watch the skylark4 ,as that 'blithe spirit' now at heaven's gate 'poureth its full heart1' and anon can ,scarce get out his notes for joy1 ,but shakes his song together as he nears ,his happy home1 the ground1 what poet but must needs confess with ,shelley1 that in his most rapturous dream1 his transport never came nigh the bird's8 ,and yet what poet would change conditions with the lark8 ,nay1 what student or philosopher would8 albeit the utmost gratification ever earned by either of these in the prosecution of his special calling--in acquiring knowledge1 in solving knotty problems1 or in scaling the heights of abstract contemplation--is probably as inferior in keenness of zest to that which the poet knows1 as the best prose is inferior in charm to the best poetry4 ,it may even be that both poet and philosopher owe1 on the whole1 more unhappiness than happiness--the one to his superior sensibility1 the other to his superior enlightenment1 and yet neither would exchange his own lesser happiness for the greater happiness of the lark4 ,why would he not8 ,it is no sufficient answer to say that in the lark's happiness there are few1 if any1 imaginative or intellectual ingredients2 that it is almost utterly unideal1 almost purely emotional1 exactly the same in kind1 and only higher in degree1 than the glee of puppies or kittens at play4 ,the question recurs as forcibly as ever1 why--seeing that enjoyment is the one thing desirable1 the only thing either valuable in itself1 or that gives value to other things--why is it that no intelligent man would accept1 in lieu of his own1 another mode of existence1 in which1 although debarred from the joys of thought and fancy1 he nevertheless has reason to believe that the share of enjoyment falling to his lot would be greater1 both in quantity and sapidity1 than it is at present8 ,the following seems to me to be the explanation of the mystery4 ,it might be too much to say that nothing can please a person who is not pleased with himself1 but it is at any rate clear that nothing can greatly please him which interferes with his self-satisfaction4 ,now imaginative and intellectual enjoyment1 each of them1 involves the exercise of a special and superior faculty1 mere consciousness of the possession of which helps to make the possessor satisfied with himself4 ,it exalts what ,mr4 ,mill aptly terms his sense of dignity1 a sense possessed in some form or other by every human being1 and one so essential to that self-satisfaction without which all pleasure would be tasteless1 that nothing which conflicts with it can be an object of serious desire4 ,in virtue of this special faculty1 the most wretched of men holds himself to be superior to the most joyous of larks4 ,to divest himself of it would be to lower himself towards the level of the bird1 and to commit such an act of self-degradation would occasion to him an amount of pain which he is not disposed to incur for the sake of any amount of pleasure obtainable at its expense4 ,it is1 then1 the fear of pain which prevents his wishing to be turned into a lark4 ,he is not ignorant that he would be happier for the metamorphosis1 but he dreads the pain that must precede the increase of happiness1 more than he desires the increase of happiness that would follow the pain4 ,the force of these considerations will be equally1 or more apparent1 on their being applied to analysis of moral pleasures4 ,that these are the most truly precious of all pleasures1 is proved by their being habitually more highly prized than any others by all who are qualified to make the comparison4 ,but why are they so prized8 ,not1 as ,i am constrained1 however reluctantly1 to admit1 on account of their greater keenness as pleasures4 ,it would be at best but well-meaning cant to pretend that the self-approval1 the sympathetic participation in other people's augmented welfare1 the grateful consciousness of having done that which is pleasing in our ,heavenly ,father's sight1 together with whatever else helps to compose the internal reward of virtue1 constitute a sum total of delight nearly as exquisite as that which may be obtained in a variety of other ways4 ,the mere circumstance of there being invariably included in a just or generous action more or less of self-denial1 self-restraint1 or self-sacrifice1 must always sober down the gratification by which virtue is rewarded1 and make it appear tame beside the delirium of gladness caused by many things with which virtue has nothing to do4 ,we will charitably suppose that the occupant of a dukedom1 who should secretly light upon conclusive proof that it was not his by right1 would at once abandon it to the legal heir1 and we need not doubt that he would subsequently be1 on the whole1 well content to have so acted1 but we cannot suppose that he would make the surrender with anything like the elation with which he entered on the estate and title4 ,if there were really no pleasure equal to that with which virtue recompenses its votaries1 the performance of a virtuous act would always make a man happier than previously2 moreover1 the greater the virtue1 the greater would be the consequent pleasure4 ,but any one may see that an act of the most exalted virtue1 far from increasing1 often utterly destroys the agent's happiness4 ,imagine an affectionate father1 some second ,brutus or second ,fitzstephen of ,galway1 constrained by overwhelming sense of duty to sentence a beloved son to death1 or a bankrupt beggaring himself and his family by honestly making over to his creditors property with which he might have safely absconded4 ,plainly1 such virtuous achievement1 far from adding to the happiness of its author1 has plunged him in an abyss of misery1 his only comfort being that in the lowest deep there is1 as we shall presently see1 a lower deep still4 ,far from being happier than he was before acting as he has done1 he would be much happier if1 being vicious instead of virtuous1 he had not felt bound so to act4 ,unquestionably1 what either upright judge or honest bankrupt has incurred--the one by becoming a saticide1 the other by making himself a beggar--is pure and simple pain1 unmitigated by one particle of positive pleasure4 ,yet it is at the same time certain that the virtue of each has in some form or other given full compensation for the pain it has occasioned1 for not only was that pain deliberately incurred in lieu of the pleasure which it has supplanted1 but restoration of the pleasure would now be refused1 if reversal of the virtuous conduct were made a condition of the restoration4 ,in what1 then1 does the compensation consist8 ,in nothing else than this1 in judge or bankrupt having been saved from pain still greater than that which he is actually suffering4 ,wretched as he is1 infinitely more wretched than he was before there was any call upon him to act as he has done1 he is less wretched than he would be if1 recognising the obligation so to act1 he had not so acted4 ,he has escaped the stings of conscience1 the sense of having wronged his neighbour and offended his ,god2 he has escaped1 in short1 self-condemnation--a torment so intolerable to those so constituted as to be susceptible of it1 that hell itself has been known to be1 in imagination at least1 preferred to it4 ,mr4 ,mill's splendid outburst that1 rather than worship a fiend that could send him to hell for refusing1 he would go to hell as he was bid1 will doubtless occur to every reader4 ,this1 however1 is all4 ,in both the supposed cases1 as in every one in which virtue consists of compliance with a painful duty1 the pleasure arising from the practice of virtue cannot in strictness be called pleasure at all4 ,at best it is but a partial negation of pain2 more properly1 indeed1 the substitution of one pain for another more acute4 ,yet this mere negation1 this ethereal inanity1 is pronounced by ,utilitarianism to be preferable to aught that can come into competition with it4 ,truly it is somewhat hard upon those who attend to such teaching1 to be reproached with their grossness of taste and likened to hogs1 for no better reason than their predilection for the lightest of all conceivable diets4 ,still harder will this seem1 when we recollect that ,utilitarians are exhorted to be virtuous1 less for their own than for other people's sakes4 ,if1 indeed1 virtue were practised by all mankind1 the utilitarian idea of the greatest possible happiness1 or1 at least1 of the greatest possible exemption from unhappiness1 would be universally realised4 ,still1 it is in order that they may afford pleasure to the community at large1 rather than that they may obtain it for themselves2 it is that they may save1 not so much themselves1 as the community1 from pain1 that individual ,utilitarians are charged to be virtuous4 ,among those pleasures1 whether positive or negative1 which it is allowable to them to seek for themselves1 the first place is assigned to the pleasure arising from the sense of giving pleasure to others4 ,thus1 not only is it the purest of pleasures that ,utilitarianism chiefly recommends for pursuit3 even that pleasure is to be pursued only from the purest and most disinterested motives4 ,all this ,i frankly acknowledge2 and ,i own1 too1 that1 far from deserving to be stigmatised as irreligious1 ,utilitarianism is literally nothing else than an amplification of one moiety of ,christianity2 that it not adopts merely1 but expands1 'the golden rule of ,jesus of ,nazareth1' exhorting us to love our neighbour1 not simply as well1 but better than ourselves2 to do for others1 not simply what we would have them do for us1 but much more than we could have the face to ask them to do2 not merely not to pursue our interests at the expense of theirs1 but to regard as our own chief interest the promotion of theirs4 ,that on account of these exhortations ,utilitarianism is godless can be supposed by those only who suppose that love to one's neighbour is contrary to the will of ,god4 ,by those who believe that works are the best signs of faith1 and that love to ,god is best evinced by doing good to man1 ,utilitarianism might rather seem to be but another name for practical religion4 ,so ,i say in all sincerity1 though not without some misgiving1 as while so speaking ,i involuntarily bethink myself of ,balaam1 son of ,beor1 who having been called forth to curse1 caught himself blessing altogether4 ,mine eyes1 too1 have been opened to the good of that which ,i was purposed to condemn1 and behold ,i have as yet done nothing but eulogise4 ,no warmest partisan of ,utilitarianism1 not ,mr4 ,mill himself1 ever spoke more highly of it than ,i have just been doing4 ,what censures1 then1 can ,i have in reserve to countervail such praises8 ,what grounds of quarrel can ,i have with a system of ethics which ,i have described as ever seeking the noblest ends from the purest motives2 whose precepts ,i own to be as elevating as its aims are exalted8 ,on reflection1 ,i am reassured by recollecting several1 which ,i proceed to bring forward one at a time1 beginning with a sin enormous enough to cover any multitude of merits4 ,my first charge against ,utilitarianism is that it is not true4 ,i do not say that there is no truth in it4 ,that ,i have found much to admire in its premises has been frankly avowed2 and in one1 at least1 of the leading deductions from those premises ,i partially concur4 ,i admit that acts utterly without utility must likewise be utterly without worth2 that conduct which subserves the enjoyment neither of oneself nor of any one else1 cannot1 except in a very restricted sense1 be termed right2 that conduct which interferes with the enjoyment both of oneself and of all others1 which injuring oneself injures others also1 and benefits no one1 cannot be otherwise than wrong2 that purely objectless asceticism which has not even self-discipline in view1 is not virtue1 but folly2 that misdirected charity which1 engendering improvidence1 creates more distress than it relieves1 is not virtue1 but criminal weakness4 ,but though admitting that there can be no virtue without utility1 ,i do not admit either that virtue must be absent unless utility preponderate1 or that if utility preponderate virtue must be present4 ,i deny that any amount of utility can of itself constitute virtue4 ,i deny that whatever adds to the general happiness must be right4 ,equally do ,i deny that whatever diminishes the general happiness or prevents its increasing must be wrong4 ,an action1 be it observed1 may be right in three different senses4 ,it may be right as being meritorious1 and deserving of commendation4 ,it may be right as being that which one is bound to do1 for the doing of which1 therefore1 one deserves no praise1 and for neglecting to do which one would justly incur blame4 ,it may be right simply as not being wrong--as being allowable--something which one has a right to do1 though to refrain from doing it might perhaps be praiseworthy4 ,there will be little difficulty in adducing examples of conduct which1 though calculated to diminish the sum total of happiness1 would be right in the first of these senses4 ,nothing can be easier than to multiply examples of such conduct that would be right in the third sense4 ,i proceed to cite cases which will answer both these purposes1 and likewise the converse one of showing that conduct calculated to increase the general happiness may nevertheless be wrong4 ,when the ,grecian chiefs1 assembled at ,aulis1 were waiting for a fair wind to convey them to ,ilium1 they were1 we are told1 warned by what was to them as a voice from heaven1 that their enterprise would make no progress unless ,agamemnon's daughter were sacrificed to ,diana4 ,in order to place the details of the story in a light as little favourable as possible to my argument1 we will deviate somewhat from the accepted version1 and will suppose that the arrested enterprise was one of even greater pith and moment than tradition ascribes to it4 ,we will suppose that upon its successful prosecution depended the national existence of ,greece2 that its failure would have involved the extermination of one-half of the people1 and the slavery of the other half4 ,we will suppose1 too1 that of all this ,iphigenia was as firmly persuaded as every one else4 ,in these circumstances1 had her countrymen a right to insist on her immolation8 ,if so1 on what was that right founded8 ,is it sufficient to say in reply that her death was essential to the national happiness1 to the extent even of being indispensable to prevent that happiness from being converted into national woe8 ,manifestly1 according to the hypothesis1 it was expedient for all concerned1 with the single exception of herself1 that she should die2 but were the others thereby entitled to take her life8 ,did the fact of its being for their advantage to do this warrant their doing it8 ,simply because it was their interest1 was it also their right8 ,right1 we must recollect1 invariably implies corresponding duty4 ,right1 it is clear1 can never be rightfully resisted4 ,if it be the right of certain persons to do a certain thing1 it must be the duty of all other persons to let that thing be done4 ,where there is no such duty1 there can be no such right4 ,wherefore1 if the 'stern1 black-bearded kings1 with wolfish eyes1' who sate 'waiting to see her die1' had a right to kill ,iphigenia1 it must have been ,iphigenia's duty to let herself be killed4 ,was this then her duty8 ',duty1' as ,i have elsewhere observed1#c 'signifies something due1 a debt1 indebtedness1 and a debt cannot have been incurred for nothing1 or without some antecedent step on the part either of debtor or creditor4' ,but it is not pretended that in any way whatever1 by any antecedent act of hers or theirs1 ,iphigenia had incurred or had been subjected to a debt to her countrymen which could be paid off only with her life4 ,it could not1 then1 be incumbent on her to let her life be taken in payment4 ,if it had been in her power to burst her bonds1 and break through the wolves in human shape that girdled her in1 she would have been guilty of no wrong by escaping4 ,but if not1 then1 however meritorious it might have been on her part to consent to die for her countrymen1 it was not her duty so to die1 nor1 consequently1 had they a right to put her to death4 ,she would have been at least negatively right in refusing to die1 while they were guilty of a very positive and a very grievous wrong in killing her1 notwithstanding that both she and they were perfectly agreed that for her to be killed would be for the incalculably greater happiness of a greater number1 exceeding the lesser number in the proportion of several hundreds of thousands to one4 ,it is true that throughout this affair every one concerned was labouring under a gross delusion--that there was no real use in putting ,iphigenia to death1 and that nothing but superstition made anybody suppose there was4 ,i do not think the case is one less to our purpose on that account1 for ,utilitarians1 like other fallible mortals1 are liable to deceive themselves4 ,they never can be quite secure of the genuineness of the utility on which they rely1 and in default of positive knowledge they will always be reduced to act1 as the ,grecian chiefs did1 according to the best of their convictions4 ,nevertheless1 for the satisfaction of those who distrust romance and insist upon reality1 we will leave fable for fact1 and take as our next illustration an incident that may any day occur4 ,imagine three shipwrecked mariners to have leapt from their sinking vessel into a cockboat scarce big enough to hold them1 and the two slimmer of the three to have presently discovered that there was little or no chance of either of them reaching land unless their over-weighted craft were lightened of their comparatively corpulent companion4 ,next1 imagine yourself in the fat sailor's place1 and then consider whether you would feel it incumbent on you to submit quietly to be drowned in order that the residuum of happiness might be greater than if either you all three went to the bottom1 or than if you alone were saved4 ,would you not1 far from recognising any such moral obligation1 hold yourself morally justified in throwing the other two overboard1 if you were strong enough1 and if need were1 to prevent their similarly ousting you8 ,but if it were not your duty to allow yourself to be cast into the sea1 the others could have no right to cast you out2 so that1 if they did cast you out1 they would clearly be doing not right but wrong4 ,and yet1 as clearly1 their wrong-doing would have conduced to the greater happiness of the greater number1 inasmuch as1 while only one life could otherwise have been saved1 it would save two1 and inasmuch as1 coeteris paribus1 two persons would necessarily derive twice as much enjoyment from continued existence as one would4 ,moreover1 their wrong-doing would be of a kind calculated always to produce similarly useful results4 ,it cannot1 ,i suppose1 be denied that a rule to the effect that whenever forfeiture of one life would save two1 one life should be sacrificed1 would--not exceptionally only1 but at large and in the long run--conduce to the saving of life1 and therefore to the conservation of happiness connected with life4 ,the foregoing cases are no doubt both of them extreme1 involving exaction of the largest possible private sacrifice for the general good2 but in all cases of the kind1 whether the exaction be small or great1 the same governing principle equally applies4 ,if you1 a foot-sore1 homeward-bound pedestrian1 on a sweltering ,july day1 were to see your next-door neighbour driving in the same direction in solitary state1 would you have a right to stop his carriage and force yourself in8 ,nay1 even though you had just before fallen down and broken your leg1 would the compassionating by-standers be justified in forcing him to take you in8 ,or1 again1 if you were outside a coach during a pelting shower1 and saw a fellow-passenger with a spare umbrella between his legs1 while an unprotected female close beside was being drenched with the rain1 would you have a right to wrest the second umbrella from him1 and hold it over her8 ,that1 very likely1 is what you would do in the circumstances1 and few would be disposed greatly to blame the indignant ebullition4 ,still1 unless you are a disciple of ,proudhon1 you will scarcely pretend that you can have a right to take possession of another's carriage or umbrella against the owner's will4 ,you can scarcely suppose that it is not for him but for you to decide what use shall be made of articles belonging not to you but to him4 ,yet there can be no doubt that the happiness of society would be vastly promoted if everyone felt himself under an irresistible obligation to assist his neighbour whenever he could do so with little or no inconvenience to himself1 or1 consequently1 if external force were always at hand to constrain anyone so to assist who was unwilling to do so of his own accord4 ,so much in proof that among things of the highest and most extensive utility there are several which it would be decidedly the reverse of right to do1 and several others which it would be perfectly right to leave undone4 ,i proceed to show that there are many other things not simply not of preponderating utility1 but calculated1 on the contrary1 to do more harm than good1 to destroy more happiness than they are capable of creating1 which1 nevertheless1 it would be not simply allowable to do1 but the doing of which would be highly meritorious1 acts possibly of the most exalted virtue4 ,let no one distrust the doctrine of development by reason of its supposed extravagance of pretension who has not duly considered to what a sublime of moral beauty the united hideousness and absurdity of ,calvinism may give birth4 ,in that ,puritan society of ,new ,england of which ,mrs4 ,beecher ,stowe has given so singularly interesting an account in her ',minister's ,wooing1' and among whose members it was an universal article of belief that the bulk of mankind are created for the express purpose of being consigned to everlasting flames1 there are said to have been not a few enthusiasts in whom a self-concentrating creed begat the very quintessence of self-devotion4 ',as a gallant soldier renounces life and personal aims in the cause of his king and country1 and holds himself ready to be drafted for a forlorn hope1 to be shot down1 or help to make a bridge of his mangled body1 over which the more fortunate shall pass to victory and glory1' so among the early descendants of the ,pilgrim ,fathers many an one 'regarded himself as devoted to the ,king ,eternal1 ready in his hands to be used to illustrate and build up an eternal commonwealth1 either by being sacrificed as a lost spirit1 or glorified as a redeemed one2 ready to throw1 not merely his mortal life1 but his immortality even1 into the forlorn hope1 to bridge1 with a never-dying soul1 the chasm over which white-robed victors should pass to a commonwealth of glory and splendour1 whose vastness should dwarf the misery of all the lost to an infinitesimal4' ,and while by many the idea of suffering everlasting pains for the glory of ,god1 and the good of being in general1 was thus contemplated with equanimity1 there were some few for whom the idea of so suffering for the good of others dearer than themselves would have been greeted with positive exultation4 ',and don't ,i care for your soul1 ,james8' exclaims ,mary ,scudder to her lover4 ',if ,i could take my hopes of heaven out of my own heart and give them to you1 ,i would4 ,dr4 ,h4 preached last ,sunday on the text1 ,i could wish myself accursed from ,christ for my brethren1 my kinsmen1 and he went on to show how we must be willing to give up even our own salvation1 if necessary1 for the good of others4 ,people said it was a hard doctrine1 but ,i could feel my way through it4 ,yes1 ,i would give my soul for yours4 ,i wish ,i could4' ,now we must on no account permit admiration of ,miss ,scudder's transcendent generosity in desiring to make this exchange blind us to the fatal effect on social happiness which1 if such exchange were possible1 the prevalence of a disposition to make it could not fail to have4 ,if ,calvinism were true instead of blasphemous1 if ,god were really the ,moloch it represents ,him1 and if1 moreover1 ,moloch were indifferent as to which of his offspring were cast into the fire1 caring only that the prescribed number of victims should be forthcoming in full tale1 nothing can be conceived more likely to prove an encouragement to evil-doers1 and a terror to them that did well1 than observation that well-doing not infrequently led to eternal misery1 and evil-doing to eternal bliss4 ,again1 if in ,china1 where criminals under sentence of death are permitted1 if they can1 by purchase or otherwise1 to procure substitutes to die in their stead1 a son were to propose to die for a parent base enough to take advantage of the offer1 could any arrangement be more plainly repugnant to the common-weal than that by which society would thus lose one of its noblest1 instead of getting rid of one of its vilest members8 ,or1 when in ,england1 a thrifty son1 by consenting to cut the entail of an estate to which he is heir-apparent1 enables a prodigal father to consume in riotous living substance which would otherwise have eventually become his1 is he not clearly taking the worse course for the public by permitting the property to be wasted1 instead of causing it to be husbanded8 ,beyond all question1 ,american ,puritan1 ,chinese or ,english devotee to filial affection1 would thus1 each in her or his degree1 have1 in the circumstances supposed1 acted in a manner opposed to the general interest1 and would therefore be condemned by ,utilitarianism as having acted immorally4 ,nor could this verdict be gainsaid if utility and morality were1 as ,utilitarianism assumes them to be1 one and the same thing4 ,clearly1 that the just should suffer for the unjust1 the innocent for the guilty1 is diametrically opposed to the welfare of society2 wherefore1 according to utilitarian principles1 by consenting so to suffer1 the just becomes unjust1 the innocent renders himself guilty4 ,but can there be a better proof that utilitarian principles are unsound than that this should be a legitimate deduction from them8 ,can there be better proof that utility and morality are not identical1 but two absolutely distinct things8 ,plainly1 there can be no meritorious or commendable immorality2 neither can there be any virtue which is not meritorious and commendable4 ,is there1 then1 no merit1 nothing commendable1 in accepting ruin or in volunteering to die temporarily1 or to perish everlastingly1 in order to save a fellow-creature from ruin1 or death1 or perdition8 ,does not such conduct1 considered independently and without reference either to its utility or its hurtfulness1 command our instantaneous and enthusiastic admiration8 ,but how1 being so admirable1 can it be immoral8 how other than virtuous8 ,what else is it1 indeed1 but the very perfection of that purest virtue which1 content to be its own reward1 deliberately cuts itself off from all other recompense8 ,without changing the immemorial meaning of the most familiar words1 there is no avoiding the obvious answers to these questions4 ,if virtue and morality1 right and wrong1 are to continue to mean anything like that which1 except by ,utilitarians1 has always been considered to be their only meaning1 it is not simply not wrong1 it is not simply right1 it is among the highest achievements of virtue and morality to sacrifice your own in order to secure another's happiness1 and the disinterestedness1 and therefore the virtue1 is surely the greater1 rather than less1 if you sacrifice more happiness of your own than you secure to another4 ,so much follows necessarily from what has been said1 and something more besides4 ,it follows further that ,utilitarianism is not less in error in declaring that actions calculated to diminish the total sum of happiness must necessarily be wrong1 cannot possibly be allowable1 still less meritorious1 than it had previously been shown to be in declaring that actions calculated to augment the sum total of happiness must necessarily be meritorious4 ,there is but one way in which ,utilitarianism can even temporarily rebut the charge of fallacy1 of which otherwise it must here stand convicted1 and that is by renouncing all claim to be a new system of ethics1 and not pretending to be more than a new system of nomenclature4 ,and even so1 it could not help contradicting1 and thereby refuting itself4 ,that nothing is right but what is of preponderating utility2 that whatever is of preponderating utility is right2 these are propositions perfectly intelligible1 indeed1 but which will be found to be tenable only on condition that the very same things may be both right and wrong4 ,the confusion1 thrice confounded1 inseparable from the substitution of such novel definitions for those which had previously been universally in vogue1 is but the smaller of two evils which must thence arise4 ,it would be bad enough that the word 'right' could not be used without raising doubt whether what people had previously understood by the 'just' or the 'generous1' or only the 'expedient' were meant2 but a still worse consequence would be that1 even if no doubt of the sort were entertained1 and if all men were agreed to take the word in none but its utilitarian sense1 the landmarks of right and wrong would thereby be well nigh obliterated4 ,due credit has already been given to ,utilitarianism for its exemplary zeal in inculcating the practice of virtue1 but its merit in that respect is more than neutralised by its equally zealous inculcation of principles1 according to which it is impossible to decide beforehand whether any particular practice will be virtuous or not4 ,this is my second charge against ,utilitarianism4 ,i maintain it to be a doctrine in most of its essentials erroneous2 but ,i maintain1 further1 that1 even if it were correct1 instead of furnishing us with an infallible criterion of right and wrong1 it would deprive us of the means of clearly distinguishing between right and wrong at all times at which the power of so distinguishing is of practical value4 ,bluntly enough1 ,i have pronounced it to be false4 ,with equal bluntness1 ,i now add that1 even if it were true1 it would1 all the same1 be practically mischievous1 and directly opposed to the very utility from which it takes its name4 ,the argument in support of this charge shall now be stated4 ,according to utilitarian ethics1 the morality of actions depends wholly and solely on their consequences4 ,on this point the language of authority is distinct1 emphatic1 unanimous1 and self-contradictory4 ',utilitarian moralists1' says the chief amongst them1 'have gone beyond all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of an action4444 ,he who saves a fellow-creature from drowning does what is morally right1 whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble4' ,upon which ,i would observe1 in passing1 that to save a fellow-creature from drowning can be deemed to be necessarily right by none but uncompromising opponents of capital punishment4 ,most others will be disposed to doubt its having been a sufficient reason for commuting the sentence of death passed upon the murderer of ,dhuleep ,sing's gamekeeper1 that1 owing to physical malformation1 hanging might perhaps have given him more than ordinary pain in the neck1 or perhaps have prolonged the pleasure which1 according to the select few qualified to speak from experience1 is attendant on that mode of strangulation4 ,neither1 without sacrificing his judgment to his feelings1 could one of these doubters1 if ,rutherford had been sentenced to be drowned instead of hanged1 have stretched out a hand to save the miscreant from the watery grave he so richly deserved4 ,that there are no actions which by reason of their beneficial consequences are always and invariably moral1 might be too much to affirm2 but ,i have no hesitation in saying that there are thousands1 the morality or immorality of which--their results remaining the same--depends absolutely on their motives4 ,thus1 if two doctors--of whom1 for distinction's sake1 we will call one ,smethurst and the other ,smith--in attendance on patients afflicted with precisely the same disease1 were by the administration of overdoses of strychnine each to kill his man1 the only difference between them being that whereas one intended and expected to kill1 the other hoped to cure--would the act of killing be equally immoral in both cases8 ,would it not in the one case be murder1 in the other mere error of judgment2 and would both be equally crimes1 or would the latter be in any degree criminal8 ,and if it had been ,smethurst instead of ,smith who committed the error of judgment--if the overdoses by which he had meant to kill had happened to cure--would his error of judgment have thereby been rendered moral1 notwithstanding that his motive was murder8 ,the same great teacher1 who so strenuously insists that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of an action1 does indeed go on to say that it has 'much to do with the worth of the agent4' ,here1 however1 ,i confess myself unable to follow him4 ,that an act may possess morality independent of the agent1 may be intelligible on the assumption that morality means simply utility1 and nothing more2 but how1 even then1 worth can be evinced by the performance of an immoral action1 is beyond my comprehension1 except upon the further assumption that there may be worth in immorality4 ,waiving1 however1 these and all other objections1 let us for the moment1 and for the sake of argument1 assume that morality and utility are really one and the same thing1 that the right or wrong of an act depends entirely on its results1 and then let us observe how utterly without rudder or compass to assist him in steering correctly will be the best-intentioned navigator of the ocean of life4 ,we can seldom1 if ever1 be quite sure what will be the result of our conduct4 ,meaning to cure1 we may only too probably kill2 meaning to kill1 we may not impossibly cure4 ,until a thing is done1 we cannot determine as to its utility2 nor1 consequently1 in an utilitarian sense1 as to the morality of doing it4 ,we must trust implicitly to our skill in calculating events1 and if that skill happen to fail us1 our conduct may become culpable4 ,with the most earnest desire to act righteously1 we can only guess beforehand whether what we propose doing will turn out to be righteous1 and can never be sure1 therefore1 that we are not going to do something wicked4 ,here ,i shall1 of course1 and very properly1 be reminded that what ,utilitarianism requires to be taken into account1 are not merely the probable consequences of some proposed act1 but the usual consequences of all acts of the same description2 so that its disciples1 instead of being left to their conjectures about the future1 may be said to have all past experience to refer to4 ,and undeniably ,utilitarianism does require this2 thereby1 however1 contradicting itself as1 ,i just now hinted1 it would presently be found doing4 ,it does indeed declare those actions only to be moral which in the long run are conducive to1 or at least not opposed to1 the general happiness2 but it also says that the morality of each particular action depends on its own particular consequences4 ,so that the docile disciple who should do something which1 though useful in the long run1 happened to be otherwise in his particular case--who1 for instance1 should save the life of a fellow-creature of whom it would have been well for the world to be rid1 would1 to his disgust and bewilderment1 find that while1 with no desire but that of acting rightly1 he had been obeying one utilitarian law1 he had nevertheless been infringing another law of the same code1 and thereby acting wrongly4 ,overlooking1 however1 this incongruity of two equally authoritative rules1 let us proceed to consider what dangerous latitude of interpretation is allowed to the followers of either of them4 ,those who believe that the merit or demerit of each separate action depends on that action's separate consequences1 need seldom be at a loss for a pretext for committing the most heinous of crimes4 ,a husband who1 hating his wife1 had his hate returned1 and loving another woman1 had his love returned1 might plausibly reason thus within himself3 ,the prescribed objects of life are the multiplication of happiness and the diminution of misery2 here are three of us1 all doomed to be miserable as long as we all three live2 but the wretchedness of two of us might be at once converted into happiness1 if the third were put out of the way4 ,by some such logical process1 ,queen ,mary and ,bothwell may have satisfied themselves of the propriety of blowing up ,darnley3 ,mr4 and ,mrs4 ,manning1 as they sate at meat with their destined victim over his ready-made grave1 may have argued themselves into self-approval of the crowning rite with which their hospitalities were to terminate3 any scampish apprentice with designs upon his master's till1 any burglar plotting an entry into a goldsmith's shop1 may become convinced of his rectitude of purpose1 and even take credit for public-spirited zeal1 in seeking to appropriate to his own use part of another's wealth1 which he may fairly suppose would be productive of more enjoyment if divided between two or more than if left in the hands of one1 and that one already perhaps the possessor of more than he knows what to do with4 ,precisely the same sophistry will not indeed suffice for those disciples who1 adopting the alternative law of the utilitarian code1 feel bound to attend to the consequences not of individual actions1 but of classes of actions4 ,the cleverest self-deceiver can scarcely bring himself to believe that1 because it might suit his personal convenience to kill or steal1 killing and stealing would not be prejudicial to society if generally practised4 ,still1 it is only necessary to have1 or to fancy one has1 public instead of private objects in view1 in order to be able to look with approbation1 from an utilitarian point of view1 on any amount of homicide or robbery4 ,it was the very same ,robespierre that1 while as yet diocesan judge at ,arras1 felt constrained to abdicate because1 'behold1 one day comes a culprit whose crime merits hanging1 and strict-minded1 strait-laced ,max's conscience will not permit the dooming of any son of ,adam to die1' who1 shortly after1 when sufficiently imbued with the utilitarian spirit1 was fully prepared to wade through floods of slaughter towards the enthronisation of his principles--one of those principles evidently being that1 if the decimation of mankind would conduce to the greater happiness of the residue1 adding more to the happiness of the nine-tenths whom it spared than it took from the tenth whom it destroyed1 the said decimation would be a duty incumbent on any one possessed of power to perpetrate it4 ,nor are principles like these appealed to only by those who have recourse to them for the vindication of their own procedure4 ,at those petits-soupers--bachelors' dinners is their modern ,english name1 noctes coenque dem their ancient classical--for which some of our ,london clubs are deservedly celebrated1 and with which the ,garrick in especial is1 in my mind1 gratefully associated--at those choice gatherings of congenial spirits1 conversation1 changing from gay to grave1 turns not unfrequently1 among other lofty topics1 on that which we are here discussing4 ,then1 even at such divine symposium1 one at least of the guests is pretty sure to take the part of devil's advocate1 and to exercise his forensic skill in showing how easily interchangeable are the names of virtue and iniquity1 crime and well-doing4 ,september massacres then find1 not their apologist1 but their eulogist4 ,noyades of ,carrier1 fusilades of ,collot d',herbois1 are cited as examples very suitable for imitation in adequate emergencies4 ,prussia's seizure1 on behalf of ,germany1 of ,schleswig and ,holstein1 on pretence of their being not ,danish1 but ,german1 and her subsequent retention of them for herself on the plea of their having always been not ,german1 but ,danish1 are applauded as acts perfectly consistent with each other and with the eternal fitness of things4 ,and all this is urged in the best possible faith4 ,of the recited enormities1 were not some1 steps to the regeneration of ,france--others1 to the unifaction of ,germany8 ,and what are myriads of lives in comparison with a regenerate--what violation of the most solemn engagements in comparison with a united1 people8 ,did not the millions of ,frenchmen who survived the ,reign of ,terror gain more than was lost by the thousands who were guillotined at ,paris1 or drowned at ,nantes1 or shot down at ,lyons8 ,is not ,germany likely to turn ,kiel to far better account than ,denmark ever did or could have done8 and will not ,german ascendency be abundant compensation for ,danish decadence8 ,how culpably misplaced1 then1 were conscientious scruples that would have impeded the march of events in such directions6 ,ends need but to be great enough to justify any means4 ,let but the good promise to exceed the evil1 and there is no evil which ought not to be done in order that good may come of it4 ,thus slightly qualified1 the ,satanic adage1 ',evil1 be thou my good1' is1 without more ado1 accepted as the utilitarian watchword4 ,and what though it be only the most thorough-paced ,utilitarians who go these extreme lengths8 ,these lengths1 extreme as they are1 are legitimate deductions from tenets held in common by the most moderate and cautious as well as by the most reckless of the sect4 ,crime in the abstract is condemned not less vehemently by the latter than by the former2 but by both equally it is condemned on account1 not of its inherent vileness1 but solely of its observed results4 ,if the results were different1 the agency to which they are due would be fitted with a different epithet4 ,if a world could be conceived to be so organised1 or1 if this world of ours could be conceived to be so changed as that the practice of killing1 stealing1 or telling lies would be conducive to the general good1 the practice in question would obtain a new name in the ,utilitarian vocabulary4 ,crime would become beneficence2 and to kill1 to steal1 or to tell lies would be not wrong1 but right4 ,these are propositions which1 without abjuring the prime articles of his creed1 the most timid ,utilitarian has no alternative but to endorse2 but how1 then1 can he shut his eyes to their obvious application8 ,how presume to rebuke those earnest philanthropists1 who1 to judge from their habitual language1 are firmly of opinion that annihilation of one half of mankind would be a small price to pay for conversion of the other moiety into citizens of a world-wide ,red ,republic2 or those admirers of ,prince ,bismarck1 who1 holding national aggrandisement to be the national summum bonum1 deem the most solemn treaties that might impede it to be obstacles which it is obligatory on a patriot to set aside8 ,will not the effects of any given cause vary with the changes in the circumstances in which the cause acts8 ,may it not easily happen that the direct effect of some private crime shall be to augment1 instead of to diminish the total happiness of all the persons affected by it8 ,and is it not1 then1 conceivable that a public crime1 provided it be of sufficient magnitude1 may more than counterpoise1 by the good it is calculated to do1 all the harm that all crimes of the same description either have done or are likely to do hereafter8 ,it is idle to reply that such a comparison between public good and evil must needs be mistaken3 that the harm1 for instance1 which violation of treaties does to mankind by sapping the foundations of international confidence1 rendering impossible international co-operation1 and bringing the very name of international morality into contempt1 is infinitely beyond any good it can do in the shape of national aggrandisement4 ,whether this be so or not is matter of opinion1 on which every one may fairly insist on forming his own1 and if that opinion be in the negative1 a utilitarian agent1 in ,prince ,bismarck's circumstances1 would be bound in duty to imitate ,prince ,bismarck's high-handed policy4 ,in all circumstances of international import1 in all cases bearing upon the general interests of society1 a ,utilitarian1 after deciding according to his lights which of the various courses open to him would best promote the general welfare1 either immediately by its direct effects1 or subsequently and indirectly by the example it would set1 would be bound in duty to adopt that course4 ,that course1 however wrong it might have appeared in all previous cases1 would now become right1 as being apparently the one most conducive to the future welfare of mankind4 ,utilitarianism's standard of morality thus turns out to be1 not any fixed and definite notion of expediency1 but one liable to change with every change in individual judgment4 ,its boasted criterion of the right or wrong of an action is the best conjecture which the agent1 with or without extrinsic advice1 is able to form of the future consequences of the action4 ,utilitarian law1 in short1 resolves itself into this--that every man shall be a law unto himself4 ,of course no ,utilitarians will acknowledge this to be their law1 not even those who shape their conduct in exact conformity to it4 ,nevertheless1 that such is the law follows necessarily from their own premises4 ,for does not ,utilitarianism sometimes--a little heedlessly1 perhaps1 but not the less positively--declare that the morality of an action depends not at all upon its motives1 but exclusively upon its consequences8 ,does it not1 when most guarded in its language1 affirm the morality of actions to depend upon their tendencies1 that is to say1 on their consequences at large1 and in the long run8 ,but there can never be perfect certainty as to consequences4 ,with regard to the future1 plausible conjecture is the utmost possible2 and by differing judgments different conjectures will needs be made4 ,so that the value of the rule of conduct furnished by ,utilitarianism to any individual depends upon the latter's ability1 supplemented by that of any counsellors whom he may consult1 to forecast events4 ,he cannot proceed correctly1 except in so far as he or they have the gift of prophecy4 ,however dull his vision may be1 he must content himself with his own blind guidance1 unless he prefer as guide some one who1 for aught he can tell1 may be as blind as himself4 ,and it is always for himself to judge whether he will follow advice3 so that in effect every ,utilitarian is his own moral law-giver2 and1 certainly1 a worse assignment of legislative functions cannot be imagined4 ,but the mischievousness of ,utilitarianism does not stop here4 ,we have seen how one of its principles destroys the landmarks between right and wrong1 between virtue and vice1 causing each to take continually the place of its opposite4 ,we have now to see how another of its principles obliterates all distinctions between different kinds of virtue1 confounding them in one indiscriminate mass1 and imparting to them a sort of general oneness not more lucid than that which1 according to ,mr4 ,curdle1 is the essence of the dramatic unities4 ,the object which it insists upon as conduct's end and aim is the general good--the greatest possible aggregate of good or happiness for all4 ,as the ,scriptures enjoin us1 whether we eat or drink1 or whatsoever we do1 to do all to the glory of ,god1 so ,utilitarianism exhorts us to do all for the welfare of mankind4 ,now1 far be it from me to caricature this soul-inspiring rule by forcing it1 under a strained construction1 to an unnatural extreme4 ,fairly examined1 it will be seen to make no extravagant demands on our self-denial4 ,as ,christianity1 even while bidding us to seek first the kingdom of ,god and his righteousness1 promises that all other things shall be added unto us1 so ,utilitarianism1 even while insisting on our seeking first to please others1 permits1 nay1 directs1 us to take as much pleasure for ourselves as we can lay hold of without depriving others1 since the aggregate of happiness which it is incumbent upon us to augment to the best of our ability would otherwise be less4 ,nay1 for the same reason1 it disapproves of our foregoing any pleasure of our own1 the full equivalent of which is not transferred to others4 ,the happiness which it requires us to attend to is that of a society of which each of us is a component member1 and no member of which can deny himself any pleasure within his reach1 and beyond the reach of others1 without diminishing the total of happiness which the whole society might enjoy4 ',as between his own happiness and that of others1' says ,mr4 ,mill1 ',utilitarianism requires an agent to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator4' ,thus qualified1 the prescribed subordination of one's own to the general good is no such extravagantly self-denying ordinance4 ,if for anything1 it might rather be reproached for its cold1 calculating equity4 ,with reference quite as much to individual as to communal happiness it is an excellent rule of conduct1 against which not a word could be said1 provided only it were left to be adopted voluntarily1 and were not authoritatively imposed4 ,unfortunately1 however1 ,utilitarianism allows no option in the matter4 ,unless we do our very utmost to promote the general weal1 at whatever sacrifice to ourselves1 it charges us with sin of omission4 ,in the words of one of the ablest among able ,editors1 'justice is the social idea in its highest1 widest1 and most binding expression4444 ,it signifies the moral principle which obliges each so to shape his conduct and relations1 his claims and his achievements1 that they harmonise with the highest good of all4'#d ,to which doctrine of ,mr4 ,morley's1 if other ,utilitarians do not subscribe1 it can only be because they are less resolutely logical4 ,mr4 ,mill1 indeed1 though dissenting in appearance on this point from ,mr4 ,morley1 agrees with him in substance4 ,even when on one occasion1 distinguishing between duty and virtue1 he says that there are innumerable acts and forbearances of human beings which1 though either causes or hindrances of good to their fellow-creatures1 lie beyond the domain of duty1 and within that of virtue or merit1 he goes on to assign as the sole reason for placing them in the domain of the latter that1 in respect to them1 it is1 on the whole1 for the general interest that people should be left free1 thereby plainly intimating that society would be equitably entitled to insist on them if it thought proper4 ,but conduct that can be equitably insisted on is clearly1 in the strictest sense1 duty2 and it would be preposterous to claim merit for doing that which it would be a breach of duty to leave undone4 ,duties do not cease to be duties because he on whom they are incumbent is not compelled under penalty to perform them1 any more than debts cease to be debts because creditors do not choose to ask for payment4 ,all consistent utilitarian teaching points inflexibly towards ,mr4 ,morley's conclusion1 according to which justice and social virtue are absolutely identical1 and according to which1 also1 whoever does not shape his 'conduct1 c41 in harmony with the highest good of all1' does less than is due from him1 while it is impossible for him to do more4 ,for whatever he propose to do must either be or not be in the prescribed harmony4 ,if it be1 he is bound to do it4 ,if not1 he is bound not to do it4 ,the very utmost he can do is no more than is incumbent upon him4 ,less than his very utmost is less than is incumbent4 ,no action of his1 therefore1 can possess any merit2 for mere fulfilment of obligations is reckoned not of grace1 but of debt4 ,having done everything1 he is still but an unprofitable servant2 he has but done that which was his duty to do4 ,where1 then1 is the boast of virtue8 ,it is excluded4 ,by what law8 ,by that of ,utilitarianism1 set forth in its full amplitude4 ,honesty and generosity1 faith1 truth1 charity1 patient endurance1 and chivalrous self-devotion1 all are mingled together under the name of justice1 and justice itself only remains just as long as it remains identical with the largest expediency4 ,at this rate we cannot possibly have any virtue to plume ourselves upon4 ,the best we can do being no more than our duly1 the only reward we can claim is exemption from the punishment we should have deserved if we had not done it4 ,whether it be that we have abstained from killing or robbing our fellow-citizens for our own advantage1 or have impoverished or half-killed ourselves in the service of the ,state1 our meed is the same4 ,loris non ureris4 ,non pasces in cruce corvos1 is what we are told4 ,we may congratulate ourselves on having escaped the cat-o'-nine-tails and the gallows4 ,well1 we have1 most of us1 so much self-sufficiency1 that to deprive us of all ground for it might be a fault on the right side4 ,but now comes a second and more awkward reflection4 ,if you will not of your own accord do your duty1 those to whom performance of the duty is owing have a right to use means to make you--foul means if fair means will not avail4 ,if1 then1 you hesitate to do your utmost for the interests of society1 society is warranted in taking measures to accelerate your movement4 ,if you are not1 or what is practically the same thing1 if a numerical majority of your fellow-citizens think you are not1 making the most beneficial use of your property2 if it be generally considered that it would be for the greater good of the greater number to divide your park and garden into peasant properties and cottage allotments1 to double the wages of the workmen in your employment1 or to subject you and the likes of you to a graduated income tax for the purpose of setting up national workshops to compete with you in your own trade2 and1 if you do not readily enter into the same views1 then the said numerical majority are not simply warranted in taking the law into their own hands and doing1 in spite of you1 what they think ought to be done with your property1 but would be culpably remiss if they neglected so to act4 ,now it is needless to dwell on the extent to which that large numerical majority of our fellow-citizens which consists of the working classes is imbued with this notion1 nor1 except to those who are similarly imbued1 can it be necessary to insist that there is no notion of which it is more indispensable to disabuse the working-class mind4 ,this1 accordingly1 ,i strove to do throughout a recent work of mine1 ',on ,labour1' particularly in the chapter which treats of the claims and rights thereof4 ,i there earnestly pleaded that there may be1 and are1 private rights independent of utility which no public needs can cancel2 that all which any man1 or set of men1 is entitled to exact from another is payment or fulfilment of what is due to him or them from that other2 that unless the poverty of the many has been caused by the few1 the many are not warranted in extorting relief of their wants from the few2 that the mere circumstance of their being without food or work does not entitle the poor to be fed or employed by the rich1 for that there is likewise a justice independent of and superior to utility1 consisting simply of respect for rights1 while injustice consists simply of violation of rights4 ,in so arguing1 ,i ran directly counter to ,utilitarianism1 provoking thereby a retaliatory assault from ,utilitarianism's tutelary champion1 who1 as readers of the ',fortnightly ,review'#e are aware1 bore down upon me with an energy no whit the less effective for being tempered with all knightly courtesy4 ,yet1 not to say it vaingloriously1 ,i am not conscious of having been shaken in the saddle1 and ,i now return to the encounter with modest assurance1 firmly believing mine to be the better cause1 and recollecting too that in a contest with ,mr4 ,mill1 let the issue be what it may1 ,i may at least comfort myself with the reflection ,minus turpe vinci quam contendisse decorum4 ,i must at the outset be permitted to remark that one or two of ,mr4 ,mill's objections to my statements are based upon misconception of their meaning4 ,i never questioned1 but1 on the contrary1 have always in the distinctest terms admitted that society is perfectly at liberty to put an end to the institution of property in land4 ,no extremest ,socialist ever went beyond me in proclaiming that the 'earth was bestowed by the ,creator1 not on any privileged class or classes1 but on all mankind and on all successive generations of men1 so that no one generation can have more than a life interest in the soil1 or be entitled to alienate the birthright of succeeding generations4'#f ,no one more fully recognises that property in land exists only on sufferance and by concession1 and that society1 which made the concession1 may at any moment take it back on giving full compensation to the concessioners4 ,again1 when asserting the inviolability of moveable1 as distinguished from landed1 property1 ,i was careful to limit the assertion to property honestly acquired4 ,i never supposed it possible to acquire by prescription 'a fee simple in an injustice4' ,only1 if in any particular instance it be suspected that property has been acquired by force1 fraud1 or robbery1 ,i contend that the onus probandi lies on him who raises the question4 ,it is for him to show1 if he can1 that a commercial fortune has1 as ,mr4 ,mill suggests1 been built up by 'jobbing contracts1 profligate loans1 or other reprehensible practices4' ,but if this cannot be shown1 the validity of the actual possessor's title must not be impugned4 ,property must be treated as of innocent acquisition and derivation until proved to be of guilty4 ,and that not merely because there could otherwise be no rights of property at all1 since it must always be impossible for any owner to demonstrate that neither he nor any one of those from whom he derives ever either overreached in a bargain or failed in a contract2 but also1 and much more1 because whether a person be or be not the rightful owner of the wealth in his possession1 no one can possibly be entitled to despoil him unless the wealth can be shown to have been ill-gotten4 ,that right must be held to be complete with which no one can show a right to interfere4 ,the gravest1 however1 of ,mr4 ,mill's criticisms is that mine is 'a doctrine priori1 claiming to command assent by its own light1 and to be evident by simple intuition4' ,this is an imputation to which ,i am so unaware of having laid myself open that ,i can account for its having been made only on the supposition that ,mr4 ,mill1 in common with most other ,utilitarians1 imagines that their only opponents are ,intuitionists1 and that it is only necessary to set aside the tenets of these in order to get their own established instead4 ,if this were really the case1 utilitarian advocacy would be a comparatively easy task4 ,intuitionism1 whether capable or not of being disproved1 is by its nature unsusceptible of decisive proof4 ,if ,i1 in support of the proposition that there is in the human mind an intuitive sense of any sort1 were to assert that ,i had such a sense while you denied that you had1 it would be impossible for me to prove you to be mistaken1 while1 unless you were mistaken as to your individual experience1 ,i should clearly be mistaken as to the generalisation which ,i had based upon mine4 ,but ,i never said a word about an intuitive sense of right and wrong4 ,how could ,i1 seeing1 as no one who chooses to look can fail to see1 that the instincts of untutored children prompt them to disregard all rights but their own1 to spit cockchafers1 rob birds' nests1 and confiscate younger children's cakes and apples8 ,all ,i say is that there may be and are rights independent of and even opposed to utility1 and these1 for reasons which shall immediately be stated1 ,i call natural rights2 but ,i do not say that they are intuitively perceived4 ,as for sense of justice or of duty1 or moral sense or faculty1 what ,i understand by that is not recognition of certain rights or duties as such1 but recognition of the obligation to respect whatever rights and to fulfil whatever duties are recognised1 according to which definition it is mere tautology to add that the sense or faculty in question originates simultaneously with the recognition of any rights or duties4 ,for inasmuch as rights invariably imply corresponding obligations--inasmuch as if a thing be rightfully claimed1 that same thing must needs be due or owing1 it is of course impossible to perceive that a thing is owing without perceiving at the same moment that it ought to be paid4 ,on this account1 and with this explanation1 ,i should not scruple to speak of the moral sense as intuitive2 but if for that reason ,i am to be called an ,intuitionist1 so equally must ,mr4 ,mill1 for he has said precisely the same thing4 ,he likewise has said that 'the moral faculty1 if not a part of our nature1 is a natural out-growth from it1 capable1 in a certain small degree1 of springing up spontaneously4' ,,ii4 ,by my avowal of a belief in ',natural ,rights1' ,i feel that ,i must have incurred in philosophic quarters a sort of civil contempt1 which ,i am very desirous of removing1 and which will1 ,i trust1 be somewhat diminished on my proceeding to explain how few and elementary are the rights that ,i propose for naturalisation4 ,they are but two in number1 and they are these3--7#a7 ,absolute right1 except in so far as the same may have been forfeited by misconduct or modified by consent1 to deal in any way one pleases1 not noxious to other people1 with one's own self or person2 7#b7 right equally absolute to dispose similarly of the produce either of one's own honest industry1 or of that of others whose rights in connection with it have been honestly acquired by oneself4 ,i call these 'rights1' because there cannot possibly anywhere exist either the right to prevent their being exercised1 or any rights with which they can clash1 and because1 therefore1 by their freest exercise1 no one can possibly be wronged1 while to interfere with their exercise would be to wrong their possessor4 ,and ,i call them 'natural1' because they are not artificially created1 and have no need of external ratification4 ,whoever thinks proper to deny this--whoever1 as all ,utilitarians do1 contends that society is entitled to interfere with the rights which ,i have called natural1 is bound to attempt to show how society became so entitled2 when for the claim he puts forward on society's behalf he will find it impossible to produce any plausible pretext1 without crediting society with possession of a right belonging to that same 'natural' class1 the existence of which he denies4 ,for1 as there can be no rights without corresponding obligations or duties1 if it be really the right of society to deal at its discretion with the persons or effects of individuals1 it must be incumbent on individuals to permit themselves and whatever is theirs to be so dealt with4 ,have1 then1 individuals incurred any such obligation8 ,no obligation1 be it remembered1 can arise1 except through some antecedent act of one or other or both of the parties concerned4 ,either a pledge of some sort must have been given or a benefit of some sort must have been received4 ,now undoubtedly there are no limits to the extent to which society and its individual members might have reciprocally pledged themselves4 ,it might have been stipulated by their articles of association that society at large should do its utmost for the welfare of each of its members1 and that each of its members should do his utmost for the welfare of society at large4 ,but it is certain1 either that no such compact ever was made1 or that1 if made1 it has always been systematically set at nought4 ,society has never made much pretence of troubling itself about the welfare of individuals1 except in certain specified particulars2 so that1 even if individuals had1 on condition of being treated with reciprocal solicitude1 accepted the obligation of attending to the welfare of society in other than the same particulars1 that conditional obligation would from the commencement have been null and void4 ,the one thing which society invariably pledges itself to do is to protect person and property1 and by implication to enforce performance of contracts2 and the two things which individual associates in turn pledge themselves to do are to abstain from molesting each other's persons and property1 and to assist society in protecting both4 ,in so abstaining and so assisting consist all those 'many acts and the still greater number of forbearances1 the perpetual practice of which by all is1' as ,mr4 ,mill says1 'universally deemed to be so necessary to the general well-being1 that people must be held to it compulsorily1 either by law or by social pressure4'#g ,under one or other of these two heads may be ranged everything that individuals owe to society in return for the mere protection which they receive from it4 ,true1 there is an universal understanding that individuals shall be subject to any laws1 whether wise or foolish1 provided only they be of equal and impartial operation1 which may be enacted by a numerical majority of the community to which the individuals belong2 and in this manner individuals may become bound by any number of miscellaneous pledges1 society acquiring simultaneously the right to hold individuals to the performance of those pledges4 ,thus1 if by the vote of an unimpeachably representative ,house of ,commons it were declared to be for the general good1 and agreed to accordingly1 that every one should be vaccinated or circumcised1 it would be incumbent on every one to submit quietly to vaccination or circumcision1 however deleterious the operation might be deemed by some4 ,or if1 improving upon a hypothetical suggestion of ,mr4 ,mill1 a parliament elected by constituencies in which the labouring-class element greatly predominated1 should prospectively forbid the accumulation by any individual of property beyond a specified amount1 then1 though the almost certain consequence would be that the prescribed limit of accumulation would not be exceeded1 still if it were exceeded1 the accumulator could not justly complain when the surplus was forfeited according to law4 ,yet even thus the obligations or duties created will correspond exactly with the pledges given2 none will be incurred except such as have been imposed by special legislation--nor even those1 unless the legislation have been impartial4 ,a law requiring people to pay poor's-rates would not suffice as a pretext for requiring them to pay education rates likewise4 ,neither if1 instead of passing the prospective law just now supposed1 a governing majority which had previously always permitted the indefinite accumulation of wealth1 were retrospectively to decree the forfeiture of all past accumulations beyond a defined amount1 would individuals be morally bound to submit to such a decree if they could contrive to evade it1 any more than sexquipedalians would be bound to lay their heads on the block in obedience to a law directing everybody six feet high to be decapitated4 ,all such partial legislation would be tyrannical1 and circumstances must be very peculiar indeed to make submission to tyranny a duty4 ,but of all conceivable legislation1 none could possibly be more partial1 or therefore more tyrannical1 than such as should give to society a general power of dealing at its pleasure with its associates1 and of arbitrarily subjecting separate classes or individuals to exceptional treatment4 ,even1 therefore1 if a law to such monstrous effect were enacted1 it could have no morally binding force4 ,it would be no one's duty to acquiesce in it4 ,i will not here stop to dispute1 though ,i am not sure that ,i could without some slight reservation admit1 that the receipt of unasked-for benefits places the recipient under precisely the same obligation to benefit his benefactor1 as if the good received by him had been conferred on express condition of his availing himself of the first opportunity to render equal good4 ,i will not stop to dispute1 for instance1 that a person saved from drowning at the risk of his own rescuer's life1 would be bound1 on occasion arising1 to risk his own life in order to save his former rescuer's4 ,for my immediate purpose1 it may suffice to remark that society has never been in the habit of showing such parental solicitude for its component members as would warrant its claiming filial devotion from them4 ,in the matter of philanthropy its practice has never been in advance of its very moderate professions4 ,it has invariably contented itself with rendering certain specific services1 never failing to exact in return fully equivalent services of each species4 ,in candour1 however1 there must be admitted to be innumerable blessings not yet adverted to1 including indeed most of those by the possession of which man is distinguished from brutes1 for which he is in so far indebted to society that1 but for the instrumentality of society1 they would never have been his4 ,unless individuals had formed themselves into communities1 civilization could have made no sensible progress3 there could have been no considerable advances1 material1 intellectual1 moral1 or sthetic4 ,not only should we have been destitute of all the comforts and luxuries that now surround us1 we should have lacked also whatever cerebral development we have attained1 together with all its concomitants and consequences2 whatever of intelligence1 or moral perceptiveness1 or artistic taste we have to boast of4 ,still1 though none of these faculties could have made much approach to maturity except under the shelter of society1 they are not gifts of society4 ,without the help of a plough1 land cannot be ploughed2 but we do not therefore credit the ploughmaker with the achievements of the ploughman4 ,neither is society to take to itself praise because its members have made good use of the protection which1 in consideration of stipulated services on their part1 it has afforded them4 ,besides1 whatever we inherit from society1 we inherit from a society of members no longer in being4 ,let the dead come to life again1 and it may then become us to examine their claims upon our gratitude1 but we need not meanwhile confound past and present generations1 nor our forefathers with our contemporaries4 ,to the mass of these latter1 at any rate1 we are none of us indebted for our brains or our aptitudes of thought and feeling1 and the circumstance of our being joint sharers with them in patrimony bequeathed by a common ancestry1 affords no very obvious reason why our share of the inheritance1 together with whatever else we possess1 should be at their absolute disposal4 ,thus it appears that in no one of the ways in which alone can originate the obligations which must always precede or accompany artificially-created rights1 has that particular obligation arisen without which it is impossible for society to obtain artificially the right of preventing individuals from doing as they will with their own4 ,no sufficient pledge has been given by one side1 no sufficient benefit conferred by the other4 ,individuals never agreed to place their all at the disposal of society2 society never rendered to individuals any services entitling it to claim such boundless gratitude4 ,one service which it invariably undertakes is that of protecting person and property4 ,this is its chief and primary duty1 the fulfilment of which is always the first object of its institution1 often the only one it acknowledges4 ,but clearly it cannot by performance of a duty acquire the right of doing the exact reverse of that duty4 ,it cannot by protecting acquire the right of molesting4 ,it cannot by preventing person and property from being meddled with1 acquire in its corporate capacity the right of itself meddling4 ,since then this right of meddling1 this right of disposing of what is exclusively some individual's own1 otherwise than the owner wishes1 has not been acquired by society artificially1 it must1 if it do actually belong to society1 have been come by naturally2 and this accordingly is what ,utilitarians really1 though perhaps unconsciously1 assume1 treating moreover this gratuitous assumption of theirs as a self-evident truth4 ,for1 as ,utilitarians themselves cannot fail on reflection to perceive1 they offer no shadow of argument in support of that 'greatest happiness principle' on which their whole system rests4 ,commencing with the undeniable postulate that happiness is the sole object of existence1 and perceiving that individual happiness alone would be a very misleading object1 they proceed to take quietly for granted that the only happiness at which life ought to aim is social happiness4 ,now1 undoubtedly social happiness is of more importance than individual happiness--the happiness of many than that of one or a few2 neither can there be any worthier object of pursuit than the greatest happiness of the greatest number4 ,all this is seen without being said1 but what is by no means so easily seen is how it can be incumbent on any one to pursue that object to his own detriment--how it can be imperative on one or on a few to sacrifice his or their happiness in order to promote that of the many4 ,plainly such self-devotion cannot be for their personal advantage1 and ,utilitarianism does not even attempt to show how it can have become their duty4 ,meritorious1 magnanimous1 heroic in the highest degree it would certainly be1 but does not that very circumstance prove conclusively that it cannot be due1 inasmuch as there is nothing meritorious in merely doing one's duty and paying one's debts8 ,but of that which is not due1 how can payment be rightfully insisted upon8 ,what the few are under no obligation to yield1 how can the many be entitled to extort1 or how can the worthiness of the latter's object excuse their doing that which they have no right to do8 ,is any object1 however worthy1 to be pursued regardless of all collateral considerations8 ,to these objections ,utilitarians have no answer to make4 ,all they can do is tacitly to take for granted the disputed duty and right4 ,that the less ought to give way to the greater1 and the few to the many1 and that the many may rightfully therefore1 if need be1 use force to compel the less or the few to give way--these are treated by them as incontestable propositions1 even as 'doctrines priori1 claiming assent by their own light1 evident by simple intuition4' ,and although thus from their own inner consciousness evolving the very first principles of their own philosophy1 the premises of their deduction that social happiness is the proper aim in life1 and that conduciveness to such happiness is the test of morality--',intuitionists1' strange to say1 is the distinctive appellation which they propose to affix to all those who hesitate to accept as ethical foundation stones the results of their intuitional evolution4 ,scarcely by a taunt so readily rebuttable will anti-,utilitarians be excited to speedier apprehension of the nature of the lien which corporate self-interest is presumed to have upon individual self-devotion4 ,not the less tenaciously may they cling to their belief in the right of every one to do as he will with whatever has come by fair means into his exclusive and complete possession4 ,neither1 ,i venture to think1 need less store be set by that right in consequence of an objection very adroitly taken to it by ,mr4 ,mill1 which1 on account both of its inherent ingenuity and of its having been addressed more immediately to myself1 it would be inexcusable in me to leave unexamined4 ,in ,mr4 ,mill's opinion1 the right in question1 even if valid1 would be valueless1 because it would be neutralised by precisely similar rights belonging to society4 ,if1 he argues1 individuals are at liberty to do as they will with their own1 so likewise must society be4 ,but 'existing social arrangements and law itself exist in virtue not only of the forbearance1 but of the active support of the labouring classes' who in every community constitute a numerical majority4 ,this working-class majority might then if they pleased withdraw their support from existing arrangements1 thereby depriving person and property of social protection2 and by merely threatening such withdrawal they could compel individuals to acquiesce in their most extravagant demands4 ',they might bind the rich to take the whole burden of taxation upon themselves4 ,they might bind them to give employment1 at liberal wages1 to a number of labourers in a direct ratio to the amount of their incomes4 ,they might enforce on them a total abolition of inheritance and bequest4' ,mr4 ,mill maintains that these things1 although exceedingly foolish1 might according to my principles1 with perfect equity be done2 nay1 if ,i understand him correctly1 that according neither to mine nor to any one else's principles can any adequate reason be assigned why they should not be done1 except that their practical results would be baneful instead of beneficial4 ,and taking this view1 he is fully warranted in asking what it can matter that according to my theory 'an employer does no wrong in making the use he does of his capital1 if the same theory would justify the employed in compelling him by law to make a different use--if the labourers would in no way infringe the definition of justice by taking the matter into their own hands and establishing by law any modification of the rights of property which in their opinion would increase the remuneration of their labour4'#h ,my reply to this and to the whole argument is the following4 ,so long as society continues to exist1 society cannot divest itself of the primary function for the discharge of which it was originally constituted4 ,society1 having come together in the first instance1 tacitly pledged to extend protection to each individual associate1 cannot1 without breach of contract1 withdraw that protection4 ,it may1 indeed1 make any impartial laws it pleases1 and attach any penalty it pleases to violation of any impartial law1 but it cannot in equity1 whatever it may in practice1 place any of its members outside the law2 neither1 most certainly1 even if its competence did extend thus far1 could it go the farther length of conferring on any one the right of doing wrong to an outlaw4 ,it may even be doubted whether1 if an outlaw were to injure any one still belonging to the society1 any but the injured person himself would be warranted in retaliating4 ,the sole reason that ,i can perceive why even he would is1 that his rights had been infringed1 and that reparation was due to him for any damage sustained by him in consequence1 while1 on the other hand1 the aggressor had forfeited those rights of his which might otherwise have forbidden the injured person from taking the reparation due4 ,but society had had none of its rights infringed4 ,by society no injury had been sustained4 ,to society1 therefore1 no reparation was due2 and society1 it seems to me1 would have no right to insist on exacting reparation not due to itself from one whom it had forcibly extruded from its communion1 and who1 therefore1 was no longer amenable to its jurisdiction4 ,society might1 indeed1 dissolve itself1 proclaiming that 'every man for himself1 and ,god for all1' should thenceforward be the rule4 ,but although it might thus leave individual rights without other defence than that of the owner1 it could not annihilate individual rights4 ,it might cancel the right to mutual protection1 but it could not1 in place of that1 create a right of mutual molestation4 ,one's own person and property would still be as much one's own as before1 and whoever outraged either would not be the less a wrong doer because society permitted his wrong doing to remain unpunished4 ,in all ethical investigations it is impossible to guard too watchfully against the smallest approach to confusion of might with right4 ,instead of being valueless1 the particular rights of which ,mr4 ,mill speaks so disparagingly1 appear to me to possess a value which can scarcely be exaggerated4 ,they are1 as may be readily perceived1 identical with the two which ,i have termed 'natural1' and of which ,i began by saying that they are exceedingly elementary1 but of which ,i have now to add that they are also all-comprehensive1 for that there are no genuine rights whatever1 however numerous or complex1 which neither are included within1 nor branch out from1 them4 ,this will be manifest on comparison of them with the items enumerated in any other catalogue of rights2 as1 for instance1 with the one drawn up by ,mr4 ,mill1 according to whom all rights may be classified as follows3--7#a7 ,legal rights2 7#b7 moral rights2 7#c7 the right of every one to that which he deserves2 7#d7 the right to fulfilment of engagements2 7#e7 right to impartiality of treatment2 7#f7 right to equality of treatment4#i ,each of these varieties will repay a brief examination4 ,under the head of 'legal' rights are commonly placed1 not those only which are conferred1 but those also which are confirmed1 by law4 ,such as law has merely confirmed1 however1 are of course not the creatures of law4 ,but it is admitted on all hands that a law may be unjust--that is to say1 it may without consent from the parties concerned1 infringe some previously existing right--and as the right so violated cannot have been created by law1 inasmuch as what law had been competent to create1 law would be equally competent to cancel--it is clear that there must be rights other than those created by law1 rights whose origin was independent of1 and anterior to1 law4 ,it is apparently to rights of this description that ,mr4 ,mill applies the name of 'moral' rights4 ,examples of them are a man's rights to personal liberty and to property in whatever belongs to him as having become his by honest means1 to both of which1 unless he had forfeited them by misconduct1 he would be equally entitled1 whether his title to them were or were not recognised by law4 ,the only genuine rights which law can create1 or consequently can have to confer1 are privileges in respect of person or property other than one's own4 ,but such legalised privileges are not necessarily rights4 ,whether they are so actually or not depends mainly on the character of the legislative authority4 ,a right to interfere with rights not based upon law cannot be conferred without the consent of the parties in whom the independent rights are vested1 given either directly by themselves or indirectly through their representatives4 ,if a legislative body be truly and thoroughly representative of the community which it controls1 then every one of its enactments1 however bad or foolish1 is virtually an engagement to which every member of the community is a party1 and any privilege arising out of it becomes to all intents and purposes a right4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the legislative authority be autocratic1 or if it represent only certain favoured sections of the community1 then none of its enactments1 however wise and good1 of which a majority of the public disapprove1 and which interfere with the rights termed by ,mr4 ,mill 'moral1' are morally binding1 except on the legislators themselves and their immediate constituents4 ,any one else may quite blamelessly break the law1 and resist any privilege thereby created1 though he must1 of course1 be prepared1 in case of detection1 to take the legal consequences of his disobedience4 ,for example1 protective duties1 however impolitic1 if imposed because a majority of the nation were of opinion that a certain branch of domestic industry had better be fostered by protection1 could not be evaded without injustice to those engaged in the protected industry1 though there would be no injustice in smuggling1 if they had been imposed in opposition to the general sense of the public by a packed ,parliament or an absolute monarch4 ,the same legal monopoly1 which in the one case could not be justly evaded1 could not in the other be justly enforced4 ,a legal privilege1 in short1 becomes a right only when a majority of those at whose expense it is to be exercised1 have formally consented either directly or indirectly to its being exercised2 and it then becomes a right solely because an engagement has been entered into1 in virtue of which1 whatever is requisite for its satisfaction has become due4 ,thus it appears that1 whatever legal rights are genuine1 and are not at the same time 'moral' rights also1 resolve themselves into specimens of the right to fulfilment of engagements1 and belong not more to the first than to the fourth of ,mr4 ,mill's categories1 to which latter1 therefore1 we may at once transfer our attention4 ,why is it1 then1 that every one has a right to fulfilment of engagements1 to have faith kept with him1 to have promises observed8 ,solely1 as it seems to me1 because whatever has been promised to any one becomes eventually his due1 and because whatever is due or owing ought to be paid4 ,a promise is nothing less than a prospective transfer of property in some thing1 or in the advantage derivable from some action1 and when the time appointed for making the transfer arrives1 whatever has been promised1 whether actually transferred or not1 becomes the complete property of1 and in the fullest sense of the word belongs to him to whom it has been promised2 so that the right to fulfilment of engagements resolves itself into the moral right of every one to have that which belongs to him1 and we have already seen that every legal right which cannot on other grounds be shown to be a moral right resolves itself into a right to fulfilment of an engagement4 ,whence it follows that there are no legal rights whatever which are not likewise moral rights1 and which might not therefore be equally rights1 even though they had never been legalised4 ,whence1 and from what has just been observed with respect to the right to fulfilment of engagements1 it further follows that of the five branches of ,mr4 ,mill's classification1 the first and fourth may without inconvenience be dispensed with1 and that the second will suffice to do duty for itself and for the other two4 ,we have next to consider a person's right to that which he deserves1 with reference to which1 and to my assertion that there is no necessary correspondence between the remuneration which a labourer ought to receive and either his merits or his needs1 ,mr4 ,mill inquires as follows3--',if justice be an affair of intuition1 if we are guided to it by the immediate and spontaneous perceptions of the moral sense1 what doctrines of justice are there on which the human race would more instantaneously and with one accord put the stamp of its recognition than these--that it is just that each should have what he deserves1 and that1 in the dispensation of good things1 those whose wants are the most urgent should have the preference8' ,but surely however just it be that each should have what he deserves1 it is so only on condition that he have it from those from whom it is due1 and do not take it from those from whom it is not due4 ,the latter1 surely1 at least as much deserve to be allowed to keep what they have already by honest means got1 as others to get what they have not yet got4 ,but if so1 then that these should be deprived of their deserts1 in order that those may get theirs1 is surely about the very last doctrine that ought to be put forward as self-evident and intuitive4 ',but1' ,mr4 ,mill proceeds to ask1 'if there be in the natural constitution of things something patently unjust1 something contrary to sentiments of justice1 which sentiments1 being intuitive1 are supposed to have been implanted in us by the same ,creator who made the order of things that they protest against--do not these sentiments impose upon us the duty of striving by all human means to repair the injustice8 ,and if1 on the contrary1 we avail ourselves of it for our own personal advantage1 do we not make ourselves participators in injustice1 allies and auxiliaries of the ,evil ,principle8'#aj ,now1 as ,i have already said1 ,i am myself no intuitionist1 but if ,i were1 ,i should not the less feel warranted in here replying that by no theory of justice1 intuitive or other1 can the passive spectator of an injustice to which he is no party be bound to assist in repairing the injustice1 simply because he has the means4 ,a creditor denied payment of his fair debts does not get what he deserves2 but upon whom1 except the defaulting debtor1 does it therefore become incumbent to repair the latter's injustice by paying his debts8 ,and if there be in the general order of mundane affairs1 as--provided ,i may attribute the existence of it1 as of all other evil1 not to ,god1 but to the devil--,i don't mind admitting there may be--something which prevents many of our fellow-creatures from getting their desserts1 something contrary1 therefore1 to our sentiments of justice whether those sentiments have been implanted in us by the ,creator or not1 ,i still maintain that those sentiments do not impose upon us the duty of striving to correct the injustice4 ,they necessarily stimulate us more or less powerfully1 according to their own intrinsic strength1 to undertake that noblest of all tasks1 but they do not render it imperative upon us4 ,whether1 if we actively avail ourselves of the injustice for our own profit--though this1 by the way1 is no more than every one of us does who takes advantage of competition among labourers to obtain labour for a less price than he perceives it to be worth--we are not making ourselves auxiliaries of the ,evil ,principle1 may be matter of opinion2 but1 at all events1 we do not even then become participators in an injustice which we did not create1 and do not uphold or help to perpetuate1 but merely accommodate ourselves to4 ,at worst1 we are but accessories to it after the fact4 ,in simply accepting the situation and striving to make the best of it for ourselves1 without trying to make it better and only abstaining from making it worse for others1 our conduct may be contemptible1 mean1 base1 disgusting1 or what you will1 only not iniquitous2 for whatever1 short of their deserts1 may1 from the cause supposed1 be received by our fellow-creatures1 although in one sense plainly due to them1 is as plainly not due from us1 and we cannot1 without palpable injustice1 as well as palpable abuse of words1 be charged with injustice for merely declining to pay debts that we do not owe4 ,the rights to impartial and to equal treatment need not detain us long4 ,there is no right to impartiality except where impartiality is due1 and it is only in a small minority of cases that impartiality is due4 ,there is nothing iniquitous in showing favour to the extent of giving one person more than his due1 provided no other person be prevented from having as much as his due4 ,the lord of the vineyard who gave unto all his labourers alike1 the same to those who had wrought for him but one hour as to those with whom he had agreed that for a penny they should bear the burden and heat of the day1 did the latter no wrong2 his eye was not the less good because theirs was evil4 ,a judge1 or an arbitrator1 or the conductor of a competitive examination1 is bound to make his award without respect of persons1 because he cannot favour one without withholding from some other what that other ought to have4 ,on every distributor of ,government patronage1 likewise1 it is morally incumbent to select for the public for whom he is trustee1 the best servants he can find4 ,an ,english ,prime ,minister has no right to make his son a ,lord of the ,treasury or of the ,admiralty1 if he know of any one better fitted for the post and willing to accept it2 and if he name any but the fittest candidate1 he fails in his duty to the community on whose behalf he acts4 ,but a private employer1 acting for himself alone1 is under no similar obligation1 and may take whom he pleases into his service1 and assign to him whatever position therein he pleases1 without affording any cause for reasonable complaint to those more capable members of his establishment whom he places under one less capable4 ,in short1 except in those rare cases in which impartiality means rendering what is due1 in which cases it is but another name for justice1 there is nothing unjust in disregarding it4 ,as for equality1 although its 'idea1' as ,mr4 ,mill says1 'often enters as a component part both into the conception and into the practice of justice1 and in the eyes of many persons constitutes its essence1'#aa ,i can think of no single case in which1 unless by reason of some special agreement1 it can possibly be due1 or in which1 consequently1 there can be any right to it4 ,even that equal protection for whatever is indisputably one's own1 the claim of all to which is commonly admitted almost as a matter of course1 is really due from those only by whom the obligation to afford it has been tacitly or formally accepted4 ,on this ground it is due from the public at large1 and from those individuals to whom the public has delegated certain of its tutelary functions1 but from no other individuals whatever4 ,no one else is bound to take1 for the protection of all other people1 whatever pains or trouble he takes for his own security--to watch1 for instance1 as vigilantly that his neighbour's house as that his own is not broken into4 ,and while the one solitary claim of any plausibility to universal equality of treatment requires to be largely qualified before it can be conceded1 there is no other claim of the kind which does not carry with it its own refutation2 there is no other which does not partake of the absurdity patent in the communistic notion that all the members of a society are entitled to share equally in the aggregate produce of the society's labour4 ,how is it possible that an equal share can be everybody's due1 if different persons may have different deserts1 and everyone's deserts be likewise his due8 ,we have now gone completely through the list of artificially created rights1 without finding one that does not derive all its validity from connection with some pre-existing right4 ,we have seen that among so-called rights none whatever are genuine by reason merely of any extrinsic sanction they may have received1 but that all real rights either are such intrinsically1 or are based upon1 or embody within them1 some right purely intrinsic4 ,we have seen that there are two rights endued with this intrinsic character--viz41 that of absolute control over one's own self or person1 and that of similar control over whatever else has by honest means come into one's exclusive possession1 or become due or owing to him exclusively2 and1 because these rights1 wherever the conditions necessary for their exercise occur1 of necessity exist1 springing up at once and full grown1 in the necessary absence of any antagonistic rights that could prevent their existing1 ,i have not scrupled to call them 'natural2' nor do ,i think that further apology can be needed for such application of the epithet4 ,to maintain1 moreover1 that these natural rights constitute the essence of all artificial rights1 was simply equivalent to saying that no so-called right can be genuine unless requiring for its satisfaction no more than already actually belongs or is due to its claimant2 while every right which does require no more must be genuine1 because there can nowhere exist the right to withdraw or to withhold from any one anything that is exclusively his4 ,these seeming truisms are indeed diametrically opposed to a theory which enters on its list of friends names no less illustrious than those of ,plato1 ,sir ,thomas ,more1 ,bentham1 and ,mill4 ,still1 whoever1 undeterred by so formidable an array of adverse authorities1 is prepared to accept the description of rights of which they form part1 will have no difficulty in framing a theory of justice perfectly conformable thereunto4 ,the justice of an action consists in its being one1 abstinence from which is due to nobody4 ,the justice of inaction--for just or unjust behaviour may be either active or passive--consists in there being nobody to whom action1 the reverse of the inaction1 is due4 ',justice1 like many other moral attributes1 may be best defined by its opposite1' and all examples of injustice have this one point in common1 that they withhold or withdraw from some person something belonging or due to him1 or in some other way infringe his rights1 and consequently wrong him4 ,conversely1 a point common to and characteristic of all just acts and omissions1 is that they neither prevent anybody from having that which is due to him1 nor in any other way infringe any one's rights1 and that they consequently do no one any wrong4 ,it is not essential to the justice of conduct that anything due be thereby rendered4 ,it suffices that nothing due be withheld4 ,all conduct is just by which nobody is wronged4 ,it is further to be noted that all just conduct is of one of three kinds--that which justice peremptorily exacts2 that which she merely permits1 and may even be said barely to tolerate2 and that which she approves of and applauds1 without1 however1 presuming to enjoin it4 ,conduct of this last sort is just in that it leaves nothing undone which justice requires1 but it is also more than just in that it does more than justice requires4 ,to speak of it as simply just1 is therefore somewhat disparaging4 ,it is just in the sense in which the less is comprehended by the greater4 ,he who faithfully fulfils an engagement that has provided for his making a reasonable return for whatever advantage he might obtain under it1 shows himself simply just in the matter1 and nothing either more or less4 ,he who1 having driven a hard bargain1 insists rigorously upon it1 giving nothing less1 and taking nothing more than had been mutually stipulated1 is likewise strictly just1 but is also shabby1 and deserves to be told so plainly4 ,he who1 besides making full return1 according to contract1 for value received1 does something more1 at some inconvenience to himself1 out of regard for another's need1 is not a whit more just than either of the other two1 but he is generous into the bargain1 and deserves thanks in proportion4 ,rising out of these considerations are two others equally meriting attention4 ,in the first place1 we may see additional cause for distrusting the testimony which etymology has been supposed to record in favour of 'an origin of justice connected with the ordinances of law4'#ab ,that 'justum is a form of jussum1 that which has been ordered3' that ',greek3 dikaion comes directly from ,greek3 dik1 a suit of law3' that 'recht1 from which came right and righteous1 is synonymous with law1' is obvious enough2 and it may not be out of place to add that in ,french the word droit has1 with almost savage irony1 been selected as the technical name1 not of law simply1 but of legal procedure with all its crookedness4#ac ,still it seems more in the ordinary course of things to explain this linguistic identification of law with justice1 by supposing conformity to justice to have been the primitive element in the formation of the notion of law1 than by supposing 'conformity to law to have been the primitive element in the formation of the notion of justice4' ,it seems more probable that certain things were commanded because they were deemed just1 than that they were deemed just because they were commanded4 ,even the ancient ,hebrews1 who 'believed their laws to be a direct emanation from the ,supreme ,being1' although1 if asked why it was wrong to kill or steal1 they might very likely have replied1 ',because theft and murder have been forbidden by ,god1' would still have acknowledged that it would be wrong to kill or steal1 even if there had been no divine prohibition of the practices4 ,and when we recollect that among 'other nations1 and in particular the ,greeks and ,romans1 who1 knowing that their laws had been made by men1 were not afraid to admit that men might make bad laws1 444 the sentiment of justice came to be attached1 not to all violations of law1 but only to violations of such laws as ought to exist1' what had previously appeared probable is converted into certainty4 ,principles of justice to which law ought to conform cannot but have been anterior to law1 and cannot have originated in law4 ,and certainty on this point grows still more certain1 assurance becomes doubly sure1 when we reflect that1 as was pointed out above1 many things are just which1 not only does not law command1 but which justice barely tolerates1 permitting them1 indeed1 to be done1 but permitting them also to be reprobated4 ,secondly1 we may perceive that in mere justice there can be nothing praiseworthy4 ,justice is nothing more than abstinence from injustice1 and no commendation can be due for not doing that the doing of which would deserve censure4 ,justice1 if entitled to be ranked among the virtues at all1 is at best only a negative virtue1 as being the reverse of a vice4 ,it is distinguished from all other moral qualities1 as being the single and solitary one1 compliance with whose behests is a duty which we owe to others4 ,of meekness1 patience1 temperance1 fortitude1 courtesy1 whatever display it may for any reason be our duty to make1 precisely that display justice requires us to make4 ,whatever of any one of these qualities justice does not exact from us1 we may1 without wronging any one1 omit4 ,we must not1 indeed1 incapacitate ourselves by tippling for our proper work1 nor offend the eyes or ears of decenter folk by reeling obstreperously through the streets2 but1 if we take the precaution of retiring during an interval of leisure to our privy chamber1 our making beasts of ourselves then and there to our heart's content1 is our own concern1 and nobody else's4 ,no doubt1 in doing this we should be doing very wrong1 but still there is no contradiction in saying that we should have perfect right to do it1 inasmuch as we should thereby be wronging no one but ourselves4 ,of another class of virtues--of all those which admit of being directly contrasted with justice1 and which may for shortness' sake be without much inaccuracy comprehended under the general designation of generosity--it may1 with literal truth1 be said that the practice of them is no part of our duty to our neighbour4 ,provided we are careful to let every one have what1 between him and us1 are his bare dues1 we may be selfish1 mean1 sordid to excess1 without infringing any one else's rights1 without the smallest dereliction of our duty to others4 ,true1 ethical writers are in the habit of speaking of 'duties of perfect and imperfect obligation1' but of these 'ill-chosen expressions1' as ,mr4 ,mill1#ad with abundant reason1 styles them1 the latter1 more particularly1 is of a slovenliness which ought to have prevented its being used by any 'philosophic jurists4' ,what some of these mean by it is stated to be 'duties in which1 though the act is obligatory1 the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice2 as in the case of charity or beneficence1 which we are indeed bound to practise1 but not towards any defined person1 or at any prescribed time4' ,but1 according to this explanation1 there are duties of which performance may not only be indefinitely postponed1 even until a morrow that may never come1 but of which performance at one time will warrant non-performance of them subsequently2 so that1 for instance1 he who has behaved charitably on past occasions1 may be uncharitable afterwards4 ',in the more precise language' of other writers1 we are told that while 'duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons1 duties of imperfect obligation are those which do not give birth to any right4' ,but1 as where there is no right nothing can be due1 it would seem from this that by duties of imperfect obligation are to be understood duties performance of which is not due4 ,i hope to be pardoned for declining to accept these illusive distinctions as the boundaries which separate justice from the other components of morality4 ,i neither understand how any obligation can be otherwise than perfect1 nor do ,i recognise any duties whatever except those of justice4 ,the main distinction between justice and all positive virtues ,i take to be that1 whereas compliance with its behests is always imperative1 compliance with theirs never is1 but is always optional and discretionary4 ,of whatsoever is1 for whatsoever reason1 due1 it is invariably justice1 and justice alone1 that demands payment or performance4 ,justice claims1 and claims peremptorily1 whatever is owing1 but never puts forward the smallest pretension to anything that is not owing4 ,but since whatever is owing plainly ought to be paid1 and since justice never claims anything but what is owing1 it is clear that there cannot be any merit in satisfying the claims of justice4 ,merit is possible only in actions which justice does not enjoin1 but to which some other virtue exhorts4 ,from the main difference here pointed out1 a minor collateral difference ramifies4 ,of whatever ought to be paid or done1 payment or performance may be righteously enforced4 ,here ,i have the satisfaction of proceeding for a few steps side by side with ,mr4 ,mill1 although only1 ,i am sorry to say1 to part company again immediately4 ',it is a part1' he says1 'of the notion of duty in every one of its forms that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it4 ,duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person as one exacts a debt4 ,unless we think it may be exacted from him1 we do not call it his duty4'#ae ,now1 since justice never asks for anything but what is due1 never makes a requisition compliance with which is not a duty1 it follows that all those persons to whom its requisitions are addressed may be rightfully compelled to comply with them1 whereas1 since what every other virtue requires is always something not due1 compliance with its requisitions is never a duty1 and cannot1 except unrighteously1 be enforced4 ,this--viz41 the rightfulness of using compulsion in aid of justice1 as contrasted with the wrongfulness of resorting to it in aid of generosity1 rather than the rightfulness of punishing breaches of the one and not of the other1 seems to me the 'real turning-point of the distinction' between the two4 ,for gross disregard of generosity1 and indeed of any other virtue1 may rightfully be punished1 justice fully sanctioning the punishment although indicating also the nature of the penalty to be inflicted in each case1 and restricting it within certain limits4 ,whoever plays the dog in the manger in a manger of his own1 or makes an exclusively selfish use of his wealth or other advantages1 refusing to do good to his neighbour at however little sacrifice on his own part it might be done1 is not thereby infringing anybody else's rights1 or thereby wronging any one else4 ,he is only exercising his own undoubted rights4 ,still he is exercising them in a manner deserving of severe reprobation1 and which witnesses of his conduct may justly punish by testifying to him the scorn1 disgust1 or indignation he has excited4 ,it is no more than just that he should have his deserts and receive the punishment which has become his due4 ,but justice1 although permitting him to be punished for acting ungenerously1 does not sanction his being compelled to make a show of acting generously4 ,if his conduct had been unjust instead of simply ungenerous1 no punishment would be adequate that did not force him to repair the evil he had done1 or to do the good he had left undone4 ,but the most flagrant breach of generosity1 neither keeping nor taking away anything to which any one has a right1 does nothing for which reparation can be due4 ,it consists simply in a man's making an exclusively selfish use of what is exclusively his1 and to make such use is one of the rights of property4 ,whoever exercises that odious right is justly punished by being shown how hateful we think him1 but we must not1 on pretence of justice1 commit the injustice of depriving him of a right which is confessedly his4 ,it is not1 then1 by being rightfully liable to punishment that unjust differs from ungenerous conduct4 ,the latter also ofttimes deserves and incurs punishment4 ,but since there can be no merit in doing that the not doing of which would merit punishment1 it may seem that1 as in justice so likewise in generosity there cannot be anything positively meritorious4 ,neither in truth would there be if conduct were entitled to be styled generous simply as being the reverse of ungenerous4 ,generosity would then1 like justice1 be a virtue in no higher sense than that of not being a vice--a negative virtue if a virtue at all4 ,but an action does not really deserve to be called generous unless what justice requires be exceeded by it in a degree more than sufficient to prevent the agent from deserving the imputation of meanness1 nor even then unless the excess have been done from a purer motive than that of the hope of praise or other reward4 ,an action is generous only in the proportion in which it involves self-sacrifice1 voluntarily undergone for the benefit of others1 without any view on the agent's part to further compensation than that derivable from the consciousness of making other people happy4 ,in such voluntary and disinterested self-sacrifice consists the merit which is one chief characteristic of generosity as of most positive virtue1 distinguishing it from justice1 in which there is never a surrender of anything which one would be warranted in keeping1 but merely a rendering of what belongs or is due to others4 ,all conduct1 not immoral1 admits1 as already more than once intimated1 of a tripartite division1 into that which may be rightfully enforced2 that of which1 though it be not due nor rightfully enforcible1 neglect deserves to be and may justly be punished by reproaches2 that which is neither due nor reasonably to be looked for1 but which involves a voluntary surrender for the good of others of some good which one might without reproach keep for oneself4 ,of this last description is the only conduct in which there is any proper or positive virtue4 ,so much and such complex argumentation may not impossibly be deemed a good deal in excess of what is requisite to establish the conclusion to which it points1 and which may be summed up in the following very simple propositions3--,that1 by a person's rights being understood the privilege of having or doing whatever no other person has a right to prevent his having or doing1 justice consists of abstinence from conduct that would interfere with that privilege2 that justice1 therefore1 is not dependent on extrinsic sanction1 but arises spontaneously from the nature of things1 and may almost indeed be said to spring necessarily from the meaning of words2 and that its sole merit is exemption from the demerit that would attach to the withholding or withdrawing from any person anything belonging or due to that person4 ,with all possible confidence1 however1 in the innate vigour of these propositions1 ,i cannot suppose that they do not require all possible adventitious strengthening to be qualified to displace the doctrine to which they are opposed4 ,i proceed1 therefore1 to test somewhat further the adequacy of the description of justice which they involve by confronting it with certain intricate problems1 in presence of which the rival utilitarian definition will be found to be hopelessly at fault4 ,there are few subjects on which casuists have differed more widely than those of the legitimacy1 and the proper measure of punishment4 ,one thinks it unjust that anybody should be punished for the sake of example to others1 or for any purpose except his own amelioration4 ,a second replies that it is only for the sake of other people's good that an offender ought to be punished2 for that1 as for his own good1 he himself should be left to decide what that is1 and he is pretty sure not to decide that it is punishment4 ,a third pronounces all punishment unjust1 seeing that a man does not make himself criminal1 but is made so by circumstances beyond his control--by his birth1 parentage1 education1 and the temptations he meets with4 ,then1 for the apportionment of punishment1 some persons think there is no principle like that of the lex talionis--an eye for an eye1 and a tooth for a tooth4 ,others that the penalty should be accurately proportioned to the immorality of the offence1 by whatever standard that immorality be measured4 ,others1 again1 that punishment should be limited to the minimum necessary to deter from crime1 quite irrespectively of the heinousness of the particular crime punished4 ,of the first three of these opinions1 ,mr4 ,mill observes that 'they are all extremely plausible1 and that so long as the question is argued as one of justice simply1 without going down to the principles that lie under justice1 and are the source of its authority1 he is unable to see how any one of the reasoners can be refuted4 ,for every one of them builds upon rules of justice confessedly true--each is triumphant so long as he is not obliged to take into consideration any other maxims of justice than those he has selected1 but that as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face1 each disputant seems to have as much to say for himself as the others4 ,no one can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another equally binding4'#af ,this view of the matter1 however1 can scarcely be regarded as satisfactory4 ,if utilitarian notions of justice cannot be carried out without trampling each other down1 they plainly should not be suffered to go at large1 but should be relegated forthwith to the limbo of oblivion4 ,but right cannot really be opposed to right2 justice cannot really be inconsistent with itself3 it never can be unjust to do what is just4 ,anti-utilitarian justice tolerates no such intestine disorder4 ,the sole ground on which she sanctions punishment is the indispensableness of punishment for the reparation of injury4 ,whoever has suffered wrong has been subjected to invasion of some right1 personal or proprietary1 and is entitled to amends for the outrage2 while the aggressor from whom the amends are due1 ought to render them because he owes them1 and because he ought1 may1 if necessary1 be compelled1 to render them4 ,by the breach of right which he has committed1 he has forfeited his own corresponding right1 which may now be equitably set aside to whatever extent may be requisite for reparation of the evil he has done1 one essential part of such reparation being adequate security against repetition of the wrong4 ,so far as may be necessary for this purpose1 punishment may equitably go1 but no further4 ,genuine justice does not permit penal laws of human enactment to take into account the abstract turpitude of crime4 ,that she reserves for divine cognisance1 recollecting that ',vengeance is mine1 ,i will repay1' saith the ,lord4 ,nor does she permit the smallest aggravation of punishment for the sake either of the offender's own mental improvement1 or to discourage others from evil doing2 neither1 on the other hand1 does she recognise any claim to abatement on the plea of an offender not having been able to help acting as he did4 ,she would not1 indeed1 punish with death or with stripes an outrage committed by a lunatic or an idiot1 partly because an outrage may be really less offensive for being committed unwittingly1 inasmuch as it does not1 at any rate1 add insult to injury1 and also because the corporal chastisement of a lunatic or an idiot could afford no reparation to the wounded feelings of a healthy mind4 ,but so far as even an idiot or a lunatic was capable of making good the evil he had done by rendering what had in consequence become due1 ,anti-utilitarianism would require him equally with an erring saint or sage to make it1 and equally1 too1 would subject him to whatever restraint might be deemed not more than sufficient to prevent his doing the same evil again4 ,and of course she does not treat an offender of ordinary intelligence with indulgence which she would not show even to a lunatic1 but exacts inexorably full reparation for what he has done1 requiring him commonly to pay in kind so far as he can1 and to make up with his person for any deficiency4 ,within the limits thus marked out she is well content that1 with the one object which alone justifies punishment1 other secondary objects with which justice has no concern1 should be combined4 ,she is well content that the same penal measures as are called for in order to compensate the injured party1 should also subserve the reform of the criminal1 and serve as general deterrents from crime4 ,but she protests against the notion that these1 or any other objects1 can ever excuse the infringement of any ordinance of justice1 or of any of even a criminal's rights which the criminal has not forfeited by crime4 ,justice1 in short1 in her penal1 as in all her other arrangements1 has but to adhere closely to the anti-utilitarian principles of rendering what is due1 and of taking nothing that is not due1 in order to steer clear of all the difficulties by which the ablest and most accomplished ,utilitarians confess themselves staggered4 ,a second greatly vexed question is1 'whether1 in a co-operative industrial association1 it is just or not that talent or skill should give a title to superior remuneration8 ,on the one side it is argued that all who do the best they can deserve equally well2 444 that superior abilities have already advantages more than enough in the admiration they excite1 the personal influence they command1 and the internal satisfaction attending them2 and that society is bound in justice rather to make compensation to the less favoured for this unmerited inequality of advantages1 than to aggravate it4 ,on the contrary side1 that society1 receiving more from the more efficient labourer1 owes him a larger return2 that a larger share of the joint result being actually his work1 not to allow his claim to it is a sort of robbery2 that if he is only to receive as much as others he can only be required to produce as much4'#ag ',between these appeals to conflicting principles of justice1' ,mr4 ,mill considers it impossible to decide4 ',justice1' he says1 'has in this case two sides to it1 which it is impossible to bring into harmony1 and the two disputants have chosen opposite sides2 the one looks to what it is just that the individual should receive1 the other to what it is just that the community should give4 ,each from his own point of view is unanswerable1 and any choice between them1 on grounds of justice1 must be perfectly arbitrary4 ,social utility alone can decide the preference4'#ah ,the form of justice depicted with this ,janus-like aspect can scarcely be the utilitarian1 since1 whoever1 on utilitarian grounds1 selects one of its sides1 must perforce1 on the same grounds1 reject the other4 ,still1 it is spoken of as genuine justice1 wherefore that there is a justice independent of utility1 would seem1 after all1 to be admitted by ,utilitarians themselves4 ,it is for them1 however1 to deal with the dilemma which their own ingenuity has thus devised4 ,my only concern with the two-headed monster they have imagined is to protest against its being mistaken for the one sole species of justice which ,anti-utilitarianism recognises1 and which never presents any such double-faced appearance4 ,in the case before us anti-utilitarian justice would decide with her accustomed ease between the two appellants4 ,what she would look to would simply be that each co-operator should have his due4 ,but how much soever she might declare an inferior workman to deserve for doing his best1 she certainly would not allow his deserts to extend to participation in the fruits of the toil of those of his fellows who had done better than he4 ,his having produced as much as he was able could not render due to him a share in the larger produce of others of superior capacity4 ,very possibly the superior workmen might agree that all should participate equally in the aggregate results of their joint labour4 ,if so1 well and good4 ,for so liberal a concession they would deserve credit1 and thanks would be due to them from those in whose favour it was made2 but this of itself would be a conclusive proof1 if any were wanting1 that the concession was an act1 not of justice1 but of generosity1 not of debt1 but of grace4 ,again1 what discordance is there not as to the most equitable repartition of taxation6 ,that all should be taxed in equal proportion to their pecuniary means2 that taxation should be a graduated percentage on income1 rising as income rose2 that all1 whether rich or poor1 should be taxed alike2 that all should pay equal capitation1 but unequal property-tax--these are some out of many divergencies of opinion1 and 'from these confusions' there is1 ,mr4 ,mill considers1 'no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian4'#ai ,but if there were really no other1 there would1 in fact1 be none at all4 ,for opinions differ scarcely less as to the utility1 than as to the justice of each specified mode of taxation4 ,there are quite as many persons who think it expedient as who think it equitable that people should be taxed either equally1 or according to any of the suggested schemes of inequality4 ,all the help that ,utilitarianism here affords is1 as usual1 to leave every one to judge for himself which plan is the most advisable1 and then to pronounce that to be the only moral plan4 ,anti-utilitarianism offers guidance of a very different sort4 ,it wastes no time in seeking for an escape from confusion1 for it allows no confusion to exist4 ,it spurns equally the idea of different persons being required to pay different prices for equal quantities of the same thing1 merely because some of them can afford to pay more1 and that of their being all required to pay the same price for different quantities1 merely because all are equally in need of the quantities they respectively obtain4 ,it recognises only an imperfect analogy between a club or a mess to which no one need subscribe unless he likes1 and a national community to whose funds every resident within its territory has no choice but to contribute2 and while quite content that members of the one should be assessed at any rates to which they have spontaneously consented1 it protests against the imposition on members of the other of burdens disproportioned to their several abilities4 ,it denies that the shilling of a man who has but one in the world is of the same value to him because it is his all1 as is to another an estate bringing him in #ajj1jjjl4 a year1 seeing that1 if the former had his pocket picked1 he might presently beg1 borrow1 or earn a second coin1 whereas if the latter were dispossessed of his estate he might live to the age of ,methusaleh without acquiring its equivalent4 ,it perceives that a rich man1 by receiving public protection for his property as well as his person1 is relieved from an expense in maintaining private watchmen1 which a poor man1 with nothing but his carcass to defend1 would have as little occasion as ability to incur2 and it concludes that more being thus in effect given to the rich1 more is due from him in return1 and more1 consequently1 may be rightfully exacted4 ,we come1 now1 to a case that may well give to both ,utilitarians and ,anti-utilitarians pause--with this difference1 however1 that whereas it brings the former to an everlasting standstill1 the latter may1 after a while1 go on complacently meditative1 at least1 if not rejoicing4 ,there are certain situations in which justice loses its authority4 ',thus1 to save a life1 it may be allowable 444 to steal or take by force the necessary food or medicine1 or kidnap and compel to officiate the only qualified medical practitioner4'#bj ,wherefore1 since to steal or to kidnap is essentially wrong1 it may sometimes be allowable to do wrong4 ,mr4 ,mill's explanation of the paradox is1 that 'there are particular cases in which some other social duty is so important as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice2 but that in such cases we usually say1 not that justice must give way to some other moral principle1 but that what is just in ordinary cases is1 by reason of that other principle1 not just in the particular case4'#ba ,i submit1 however1 that there is no real occasion to resort to any such 'useful accommodation of language1' in order to be 'saved from the necessity of admitting that there may be laudable injustice4' ,let us never shrink from looking error in the face1 for fear that1 after she has slunk away abashed1 some insoluble mystery may remain behind4 ,it is better1 at any rate1 to be puzzled than deceived4 ,there can be no doubt about theft being essentially unjust1 and no skill in the arrangement of words can convert injustice into justice1 or prevent injustice from being wrong4 ,but when1 as occasionally happens1 the only choice open to us is between two immoral courses1 it is morally incumbent on us to select the less immoral of the two4 ,the wrong we decide upon does not1 however1 itself become smaller because it prevents a larger4 ,a sworn bravo1 who had taken in advance the wages of assassination1 would sin less by breaking than by keeping faith with his employer2 but1 in either case1 would sin4 ,abstinence from murder would not absolve him from the guilt of perjury4 ,if1 unless a loaf were stolen1 a life would be lost1 ,anti-utilitarianism might pardon1 but would scarcely applaud the theft4 ,at all events it would not1 like the rival doctrine in a similar strait1 be reduced to double on itself1 declaring that wrong had become right and black white1 that the ,ethiopian had changed his skin and the leopard his spots4 ,it would still insist as positively as ever that to steal another man's bread cannot be just1 however benevolent the purpose for which it is stolen4 ,one more illustration and ,i have done4 ,whoever believes as ,i do in the indefeasible sanctity of honestly acquired moveable property1 is logically bound to hold equally sacred the rights of bequest and inheritance4 ,with whatever is exclusively your own1 you may surely do anything you please except harm2 nor need even harm be excepted if it be done to yourself alone4 ,if1 indeed1 you go the length of playing ducks and drakes with gold pieces1 or of lighting cigars with bank-notes1 you are likely enough to be stopped and placed under restraint as a lunatic1 but it is clear that this will be done solely because you are presumed not to understand what you are doing1 and not from any question as to your right to do it if you do understand1 for there are plenty of things far more objectionable in themselves1 only not implying a want of sanity1 which you will be left perfectly at liberty to do4 ,if you choose1 in imitation of ,cleopatra1 to spoil your fish-sauce by mixing powdered pearls with it1 or1 in imitation of a certain ,peruvian viceroy1 to shoe your carriage horses with silver1 no one will dream of interfering with you2 any more than of preventing courtesans and other fine ladies from befouling their nether limbs by sweeping the dusty road with flounces of ,brussels lace2 or of preventing members of the ,cobden ,club from gorging themselves annually1 at a cost of five guineas per paunch1 in honour of the prince of practical economists4 ,but property1 which1 however great the good it is capable of doing1 you are at liberty to employ solely for your own hurt1 you are1 of course1 at liberty to destroy1 thereby preventing it1 at least1 from doing any more harm4 ,the lesser right of abuse is plainly comprehended in the larger4 ,and of that which is so absolutely your own that you may1 if you please1 wantonly waste or destroy it1 you may1 of course1 transfer the ownership1 thereby conveying to another person all your rights in it1 and rendering it as unjust to interfere with the new owner's disposal of the property1 as it would previously have been to interfere with yours4 ,moreover1 since the gift is a purely voluntary act1 you may1 if you please1 without impairing its validity1 arrange that it shall begin to take effect from some future date instead of immediately2 so that1 by naming some date subsequent to your own decease1 you will be converting the gift into an equally valid bequest4 ,this1 ,i submit1 is decisive as to the iniquity of any legal limitation of testamentary power4 ,the right of bequest is comprehended within and rests upon the same basis as the right of possession1 so that1 unless it would be just to pass a law depriving all persons of any property possessed by them in excess of a given amount1 it would not be just to deprive them by law of the power of bequeathing the surplus4 ,the rights of inheritance obviously coincide precisely with those of bequest4 ,just so much as the testator parts with the legatee obtains4 ,when the bequest is unconditional1 the new owner whom it creates steps into the precise position which the previous owner has vacated4 ,often1 however1 a legacy is qualified by conditions1 and1 among others1 by this1 that the property bequeathed shall be held in trust for certain purposes4 ,now1 if these purposes be socially noxious1 society need not hesitate to set aside the will that has provided for them4 ,quite justifiably1 society might annul the testamentary endowment of a hospital for fleas and lice1 such as ,bishop ,heber1 in his ,indian tour1 found existing at ,baroach and at ,surat1 because those particular insect pests could scarcely be retained within the walls of their infirmary4 ,perhaps1 too1 society might be justified in similarly preventing the endowment of a hospital for superannuated dogs and cats2 whether it would or not depending mainly on the awkward question whether such inferior animals have any rights inconsistent with human interests4 ,be this as it may1 however1 where human interests alone are concerned1 the rights of conditional heirship present no ethical difficulty4 ,when it is for purposes socially innocuous and affecting human beings alone that property is left in trust1 it cannot be equitably diverted from those purposes without the consent of all the individuals whom the testamentary arrangements were intended to affect4 ,it matters not how whimsical or preposterous the object enjoined may be2 not even though it be a periodical dinner1 cooked after the manner of the ancients1 like the nauseous one at which ,peregrine ,pickle assisted2 or instruction in alchemy or in ,hindoo astronomy1 or in the art of walking on one's head4 ,not until there remain no persons at once entitled under the will1 and also wishing to partake of the banquet or the instruction1 can one or the other be equitably discontinued8 ,as long as there are any such persons left1 to stop1 without their consent and without adequately compensating them1 arrangements1 rights in which have been vested in them by bequest1 would be as palpable a violation of justice as to pick their pockets of sums equivalent to their several interests1 real or supposed1 in the arrangements4 ,if scrupulous adherence to the principle thus laid down would heavily shackle the activity and seriously impair the immediate usefulness of ,mr4 ,forster and his coadjutors in the ,endowed ,school ,commission1 ,i am exceedingly sorry1 but not in the least shaken in my conviction that the principle ought to be rigidly adhered to4 ,if parochial or other communities are too stupid or too selfish to consent that school endowments under their charge shall be applied to purposes of more extensive utility than the founders contemplated1 every effort should be made to persuade or to shame them into consenting1 but without their consent the thing should on no account be done4 ,on this point ,utilitarianism and ,anti-utilitarianism would1 ,i apprehend1 give identical counsel1 the former condemning as impolitic what the latter denounced as unjust4 ,the cause of national education would be ill served by any course calculated to discourage its future endowment by private testators1 and nothing would be more likely to have that effect than arbitrary interference with the endowments of former testators4 ,the courteous reader may now be temporarily released1 with fitting acknowledgment of his exemplary patience4 ,it would be cruel to detain him with a recapitulation1 without which he may readily trace for himself1 in what has gone before1 the outlines of a consistent body of anti-utilitarian ethics4 ,in these there is little new1 little that has not been anticipated by many an old-fashioned saw and antiquated apothegm--such as1 ,fiat justitia ruat clum1 ',be just before you are generous1' and1 ,i would fain add1 ',honesty is the best policy'--save that to that ,utilitarianism may fairly lay equal claim4 ,my modest ambition throughout this essay has been to vindicate some of the most momentous of primeval truths from the slights to which philosophy--not modern1 indeed1 but modernised and refurbished--is continually subjecting them1 and ,i will not deny that ,i have modest assurance enough to believe that ,i have at least partially succeeded4 ,i think ,i have shown that there are such things as abstract right and wrong1 resting not on fancied intuition1 but on a solidly rational basis1 and supporting in turn abstract justice1 whose guidance1 whoever accepts it1 will find to be as sure and as adequate as any that unassisted reason is capable of supplying4 ,anti-utilitarian justice never tries to look half-a-dozen different ways at once1 never points at the same time in opposite directions1 never issues contradictory mandates1 never halts between two opinions4 ,her votaries1 like other mortals1 may often be in doubt as to accomplished facts2 but1 provided these be clear1 their course is in general equally clear2 there seldom remains aught to embarrass them4 ,if they sincerely desire to ascertain what is due from them1 they can seldom err1 except on the right side1 and they will never dream of disputing that whatever is due from them it must be their duty to do1 without respect of consequences4 ,these they will leave to the supreme controller of events1 if they believe in one1 and will leave to take their chance1 if they do not so believe1 feeling all the more certain in the latter case that to control events cannot1 at any rate1 be within their power4 ,they never stop to calculate how much good may perhaps ensue if evil be done4 ,simple arithmetic1 apart from faith1 satisfies them that to add wrong to wrong cannot possibly augment the sum total of right4 ,the prime article of their creed is the absolute obligation of paying debts--a piece of unworldly wisdom more than ever now to ,jews a stumbling-block1 and to ,greeks foolishness1 but not the less to all1 whether ,jews or ,gentiles1 who will accept it1 a light to show through the mazes of life1 a path so plainly marked that the foolishest of wayfaring men cannot greatly err therein4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,the distinction here drawn is not merely verbal4 ,the greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean either the largest total of happiness in which the largest possible number of those concerned can participate1 or a still larger total1 which1 if some of the possible participants were excluded1 would be divisible among the remainder4 ,the largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all concerned1 means the largest sum total absolutely1 without reference to the number of participants4 ,writers on ,utilitarianism seem to have sometimes the first1 sometimes the second of these totals in view1 but more frequently the second than the first4 #b ,i do not form a separate class of pleasures of the affections1 because these seem to me not to be elementary1 but to be always compounded of two or more of the other five kinds4 #c ',on ,labour1' p4 #ace4 #d ',fortnightly ,review1' ,june1 #ahfh4 #e ,see the ,no4 for ,june1 #ahfi4 #f ',on ,labour1' p4 #ic4 #g ',fortnightly ,review' for ,june1 #ahfi1 p4 #fhc4 #h ,see ',fortnightly ,review' for ,june1 #ahfi1 pp4 #fhg-h4 #i ',utilitarianism1' by ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 pp4 #fd-h4 #aj ',fortnightly ,review' for ,june1 #ahfi1 pp4 #fhd-e4 #aa ',utilitarianism1' p4 #bfg4 #ab ',utilitarianism1' pp4 #fi1 #gj4 #ac ',les lgistes leur fournirent au besoin l'appui du droit contre le droit mme4'--,de ,tocqueville1 ',l',ancien ,rgime1' p4 #efg4 #ad ',utilitarianism1' pp4 #gb1 #gc4 #ae ',utilitarianism1' p4 #ga4 #af ',utilitarianism1' pp4 #ha1 #hb4 #ag ',utilitarianism1' pp4 #hd1 #he4 #ah ,ibid4 p4 #he4 #ai ',utilitarianism1' pp4 #hf1 #hg4 #bj ',utilitarianism1' p4 #id4 #ba ,ibid4 pp4 #id1 #ie4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,history',s ,,scientific ,,pretensions4 ,warwick4 ,there is a history in all men's lives1 ,figuring the nature of the times deceased2 ,the which observed1 a man may prophesy1 ,with a near aim1 of the main chance of things ,as yet not come to life1 which in their seeds1 ,and weak beginnings1 lie intreasured4 ,such things become the hatch and brood of time2 ,and1 by the necessary form of this1 ,king ,richard might create a perfect guess1 ,that great ,northumberland1 then false to him1 ,would1 of that seed1 grow to a greater falseness1 ,which should not find a ground to root upon1 ,unless on you4 ,king ,henry4 ,are these things1 then1 necessities8 ,king ,henry ,,iv4 ,part ,,ii4 ,act4 #c1 ,sc4 ,i4 ,when equally competent thinkers appear to take directly opposite views of a matter of purely speculative interest1 it will commonly be found that their differences arise from their using the same words in different senses1 or from their being1 by some other cause1 prevented from thoroughly apprehending each other's meaning4 ,an illustration is afforded by the controversy regarding the possibility of constructing a ,science of ,history1 which could scarcely have been so much prolonged if all who have taken part in it had begun by defining their terms1 had agreed to and adhered to the same definitions1 and had always kept steadily in view the points really in debate4 ,if the word 'science' had been used only in the restricted1 though rather inaccurate sense in which it is sometimes employed by some of the most distinguished of the disputants1 there would have been less question as to its applicability to history4 ,no one doubts that from an extensive historical survey may be drawn large general deductions on which reasonable expectations may be founded4 ,no one denies that the experience of the past may teach lessons of political wisdom for the guidance of the future4 ,if it were not so1 history would be as uninstructive as fairy lore2 its chief use would be to amuse the fancy2 and little more practical advantage could result from investigating the causes of the failure of ,james ,,ii4's designs on civil and religious liberty1 than from an inquiry into the artifices by which ,jack-the-,giant-killer contrived to escape the maw of the monsters against whom he had pitted himself4 ,what is commonly understood1 however1 by a ,science of ,history is something far beyond the idea entertained of it by such temperate reasoners as ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill and ,mr4 ,fitzjames ,stephen4 ,the science1 for the reality of which ,m4 ,comte in ,france and ,mr4 ,buckle in ,england have been the foremost champions1 would bear the same relation to political events as ,optics and ,astronomy do to the phenomena of light and of the solar and sidereal systems4 ,it would deal less with the conjectural and probable than with the predicable and positive4 ',in the moral as in the physical world1' say its leading advocates1 'are invariable rule1 inevitable sequence1 undeviating regularity1' constituting 'one vast scheme of universal order4' ',the actions of men1 and therefore of societies1 are governed by fixed eternal laws1' which 'assign to every man his place in the necessary chain of being1' and 'allow him no choice as to what that place shall be4' ,one such law is that1 'in a given state of society1 a certain number of persons must put an end to their own lives3' another1 that a certain number of persons must commit murder2 a third1 that when wages and prices are at certain points1 a certain number of marriages must annually take place1 'the number being determined not by the temper and wishes of individuals1 but by large general facts1 over which individuals can exercise no authority4' ,these are general laws2 but the special question as to who shall commit the crimes or the indiscretion enjoined by them1 'depends upon special laws1 which1 however1 in their total action must obey the large social law to which they are all subordinate4' ,a ,science of ,history would consist of a collection of 'social laws1' duly systematised and codified1 by the application of which to given states of society the historical student might predict the future course of political events1 with a confidence similar to that with which he could foretell the results of familiar chemical combinations1 or the movement of the planets4#bb ,this is the theory which a few years ago was so much discussed1 and against which1 notwithstanding the singular fascination it evidently possesses for some minds1 the moral sense of a much larger number indignantly revolts1 rightly apprehending that its establishment would be subversive of all morality4 ,for1 if the actions of men are governed by 'eternal and immutable laws1' men cannot be free agents2 and where there is not free agency there cannot be moral responsibility4 ,nor are the apprehensions entertained on this score to be allayed by the answer1 ingenious as it is1 which has been given to them#bc by one of the ablest and most judicious apologists for the new creed4 ,it is true that human actions can be said to be 'governed' only in the same metaphorical sense as that in which we speak of the laws of nature1 which do not really govern anything1 but merely describe the invariable order in which natural phenomena have been observed to occur4 ,it is true that the discovery of invariable regularity in human affairs1 supposing such a discovery to have been made1 would not prove that there was any necessity for such regularity4 ,it is conceivable that the orbs of heaven may be intelligent beings1 possessing full power to change or to arrest their own course1 and moving constantly in the same orbits merely because it pleases them to do so4 ,invariable regularity1 therefore1 would be perfectly consistent with free agency4 ,all this is perfectly just1 but it is also altogether beside the question4 ,the offence given by the writers on whose behalf the apology is set up consists not so much in their asserting that there are1 as in their insisting that there must be1 uniformity and regularity in human affairs2 or1 as ,mr4 ,buckle expresses it1 that social phenomena 'are the results of large and general causes which1 working on the aggregate of society1 must produce certain consequences1 without regard to the volition of the particular men of whom the society is composed4' ,now1 though free agency may co-exist with invariable regularity1 it obviously cannot co-exist with necessary regularity1 which1 consequently1 is incompatible likewise with moral responsibility4 ,if men are compelled by the force of circumstances1 or by any force1 to move only in one direction1 they cannot be responsible for not moving in a different direction4 ,nor is it more to the purpose to undertake a subtle analysis of the nature of causation1 and to explain that it does not1 properly speaking1 involve compulsion1 but simply means invariable antecedence4 ,let it be that a cannon-ball does not really knock down the wall against which it strikes1 and that it would be more correct to say that the ball impinges and the wall falls2 though1 seeing that the wall would not have fallen unless the ball had impinged1 the distinction is too nice for ordinary apprehension4 ,as understood1 at any rate1 by the joint headmasters of the new school1 causation does involve compulsion4 ',men's actions1' say they1 'are the product not of their volition1 but of their antecedents1' and 'result from large and general causes which must produce certain consequences4' ,neither1 if this be so1 is it of any avail to suggest that1 possibly1 the large and general causes in question may be of only temporary operation4 ',it may be that the rules1' in accordance with which the sun has hitherto risen every morning since the creation of the world1 'will hold good only for a time4' ,it may be that the springs1 whatever they are1 by which the universe is kept in motion1 may require to be periodically wound up like the works of a clock1 and that1 unless this be done1 'on some particular day out of many billions1' the sun may fail to rise1 just as the clock1 if suffered to run down1 would stop on the eighth day4 ,the conjecture would1 of course1 be not less applicable to social than to natural laws4 ,it is conceivable that the large general causes assumed to regulate human actions might lose their efficacy at the end of a certain cycle1 when mankind might either have to recommence a social revolution similar to the one just completed1 or might have to begin an entirely different revolution under entirely different laws4 ,be it so4 ,still1 if the causes1 as long as they remained in operation1 possessed a compulsory character--if1 during the continuance of the supposed cycle1 men were bound to act in a certain way in accordance with certain laws1 and irrespectively of their own volition--what would it matter that those laws were not eternal and immutable8 ,for the time being men would no more be free agents than the hands of a clock1 while the clock was wound up4 ,both would be constrained to move in a prescribed direction1 whether they would or no4 ,men in such circumstances might well be likened1 as by ,mr4 ,buckle they are likened1 to links in a chain1 but few would be prevented from joining in ,mr4 ,goldwin ,smith's eloquent protest against the comparison1 by being told that the chain perhaps was not an endless one4 ,it is clear1 then1 that the principles to which we have been adverting would1 if established1 be really subversive of morality1 inasmuch as they are incompatible with free agency1 without which there can be no responsibility4 ,the soundness of a doctrine does not1 however1 depend upon its tendencies2 and ,mr4 ,buckle was fully warranted in demanding that his views should be examined with reference1 not at all to their consequences1 but solely and exclusively to their truth4 ,they certainly ought to be so examined1 if examined at all2 but morality is so indispensable to the happiness of mankind1 that if there were reason for apprehending it to be based upon error1 there would be equal reason for avoiding an enquiry which might demonstrate the weakness of its foundations1 by bringing forward an antagonistic truth4 ,the only adequate excuse1 therefore1 for enquiring1 as ,i now proceed to do1 into the validity of ,mr4 ,buckle's theory1 is the confidence ,i feel that it will be found to contain not recondite1 newly-discovered truth1 but1 at best1 only skilfully and curiously-compounded fallacies1 which1 being dispelled1 will leave the foundations of morality as firm and unimpeachable as before4 ,in order that he might be able to prove the possibility of a ,science of ,history1 ,mr4 ,buckle asked no more than the following concessions3 ',that1 when we perform an action1 we perform it in consequence of some motive or motives2 that those motives are the results of some antecedents1 and that therefore1 if we were acquainted with the whole of the antecedents and with all the laws of their movements1 we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results4' ,now1 there is certainly nothing in these demands which may not be unhesitatingly conceded4 ,as there can be no effect without a cause1 so there can be no action without a motive3 the motive or motives of an action are the product of all the conditions and circumstances among which the agent is placed--which conditions and circumstances1 again1 must have been brought about by antecedent events4 ,the same circumstances would indeed differently affect persons of different mental constitutions and characters2 but the original constitution of a man's mind is itself the product of antecedent events1 as is also any subsequent modification of character which it may have undergone4 ,it cannot be denied1 then1 that men's motives are the results of antecedents4 ,equally undeniable is it that a knowledge of all the antecedents and of all the laws of their movements would enable us to foresee their results1 for this1 supposing the laws referred to to have any real existence1 is merely equivalent to the self-evident proposition1 that if we perceived certain causes and knew exactly how they would act1 we should know beforehand what would be their effects4 ,but what if there be no such laws8 ,what if1 on the showing of ,mr4 ,buckle himself and of his associates1 there neither are nor can be8 ,the true nature of a scientific law has never been better explained than by the writer already quoted as ,mr4 ,buckle's dexterous apologist4 ,a scientific law is not an ordinance1 but a record4 ,it simply professes to describe the order in which certain phenomena have been observed uniformly to recur4 ,it differs from a legislative enactment1 in that the one would be a law although it were never obeyed1 whereas the other would cease to be a law if one single exception to its statement could be pointed out4 ,thus the ,act of ,parliament enjoining the registration of births1 would be equally a law although no births were ever registered2 whereas the law1 that in a body moving in consequence of pressure the momentum generated is in proportion to the pressure1 would entirely forfeit its legal character if1 on any one occasion or in any circumstances1 momentum were generated in any other proportion4 ,it is essential1 then1 to the existence of a scientific law that there should be uniformity of phenomena4 ,but in human affairs uniformity is impossible4 ,no doubt1 in exactly the same circumstances exactly the same events must happen2 but exactly the same aggregation of circumstances cannot possibly be repeated4 ,such repetition is inconsistent with the very theory1 which is based on the assumption that the repetition is continually happening4 ',in the moral as well as the physical world' there are1 say the exponents of the new theory1 not only 'invariable rule' and 'inevitable sequence1' but 'irresistible growth' and 'continual advance4' ,in other words1 things can never be twice in precisely the same condition--never1 at least1 within the same cycle4 ,it has1 indeed1 been suggested that there may be in human affairs the same sort of regularity as is observed by the hands of a clock2 and that1 as the latter1 at the end of every twenty-four hours1 recommence the movement which they have just concluded1 so at the end of1 say 'every ten thousand years1' all the same events which have been happening throughout the period may begin to happen over again in the same order as before4 ,such a succession1 however1 would involve quite as much of retrogression as of progression1 and the continual advance so boastfully spoken of would be nothing else than a tendency of society to return to the condition from which it had originally emerged4 ,but1 even on this uncomfortable hypothesis1 there could be no regularity of occurrences within the same cycle2 no clue as to the future could be obtained from investigation of the past4 ,on the contrary1 the only certainty would then1 as now1 be that no combination of events which had happened once could happen again1 as long as the existing order of things continued4 ,the inference here follows necessarily from the premises4 ,if there be continual advance--if things are constantly moving forward--they cannot remain in the same state2 and if not in the same state1 they cannot produce the same effects4 ,for1 if it be obvious1 on the one hand1 that precisely the same causes must invariably produce the same results1 it is equally evident1 on the other1 that the same results cannot be reproduced except by the same causes4 ,if causes calculated to bring about certain phenomena undergo either augmentation or diminution1 there must be a corresponding change in the phenomena4 ,now1 effects cannot be identical with their causes1 and1 in the moral world1 effects once produced become in turn causes1 acting either independently or in conjunction with pre-existing causes4 ,they become in turn the antecedents spoken of by ,mr4 ,buckle1 from which spring the motives of human conduct4 ,but1 as all such antecedents must necessarily differ from all former antecedents1 they must also give rise to motives1 must be followed by actions1 and must bring about combinations of circumstances1 differing from any previously experienced4 ,thus1 in human affairs1 there can be no recurrence either of antecedents or of consequences2 and1 as a scientific law is simply a record of the uniform recurrence of consequences1 it follows that in human affairs there can be no scientific laws4 ,it will be understood that human conduct1 and the circumstances or causes which influence it1 are here spoken of in the aggregate4 ,it is not pretended that particular causes or circumstances may not continue permanently in operation1 though with an influence modified by the concomitance of fresh circumstances2 or that they may not continue to produce consequences differing from their former consequences not more than in proportion to the modification undergone by the causes4 ,still less is it pretended that certain human phenomena1 with which human motives have little or nothing to do1 may not be repeated once and again1 notwithstanding the important changes constantly going on in every human society4 ,it is not denied that marriages may continue for years together to bear much the same annual proportion to the population1 provided that during those years there be no material change in the amount of the economical obstacles which commonly interfere1 more than anything else1 with men's natural inclination to marry4 ,still less is it denied that1 in a given number of births1 the number of girls may always preserve nearly the same superiority over that of boys1 or that the proportion between red-haired and flaxen-haired children may generally be about the same1 or that the percentage of letters misdirected in a given country may vary little during long periods4 ,but1 in the first of these cases1 men do not get married1 as ,mr4 ,buckle imagined1 irrespectively of their volition4 ,if1 for several years together1 marriages continue to bear about the same proportion to population1 it is because during that period circumstances continue to present a certain amount1 and no more1 of opposition to men's connubial proclivities4 ,in the other cases1 it is not at all because the parents wish it that a girl is born instead of a boy1 or with flaxen hair instead of carrots2 neither is it from any motive or intention that letters are often misdirected1 but1 on the contrary1 from want of thought1 and from the carelessness and haste with which letter-writing1 like most other human actions1 is unfortunately too often performed4 ,but1 before assuming that this carelessness and haste bear an invariable proportion to numbers1 we should inquire whether the proportion of misdirected letters is the same in all human societies--the same1 for instance1 in ,france and ,spain as in ,england4 ,if not--if varying circumstances produce different results in this respect in different countries--it may be inferred that a variation of circumstances may produce a difference of result in the same country4 ,it will1 at any rate1 be clear that there is no 'necessary and invariable order' in which letters are misdirected4 ,in one sense1 indeed1 it may be said that the proportion of misdirected letters depends upon 'the state of society1' if by that expression be meant1 among other things1 the numerical proportion which individuals of different characters and habits bear to each other4 ,in that sense1 we may accept some far more startling propositions4 ,we may partly admit that the state of society determines the number of murders and suicides1 if by this be simply meant that the number of murders and suicides committed will depend upon the number of persons whose characters have been so moulded by circumstances as to dispose them to put an end to their own or other people's lives4 ,but ,mr4 ,buckle1 by whom the assertion was made1 was careful to explain that his meaning was the very reverse of what is here supposed4 ,speaking of suicide1 he declares it to be 'a general law that1 in a given state of society1 a certain number of persons must put an end to their own lives2' adding that 'the question as to who shall commit the crime depends upon special laws1' and that 'the individual felon only carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding circumstances4' ,in other words1 it is not the amount of crime that depends upon the number of persons prepared to commit it2 it is the number of criminals which depends upon the amount of crime that must needs be committed4 ',murder1' he elsewhere says1 'is committed with as much regularity1 and bears as uniform a relation to certain known circumstances1 as do the movements of the tides and the relations of the seasons4' ',the uniform reproduction of crime is more clearly marked1 and more capable of being predicted1 than are the physical laws connected with the disease and destruction of our bodies4 ,the offences of men are the result not so much of the vices of individual offenders1 as of the state of society into which the individuals are thrown4' ,there is here so much looseness and inconsistency of language1 that what is most offensive in it may easily bear more than one interpretation3 and the shocking dogma that1 in a given state of society1 the force of circumstances constrains the commission of a certain amount of crime1 may possibly admit of being explained away and softened down into the comparatively harmless proposition that1 where all the circumstances1 conditions or causes required for the commission of a certain amount of crime are present1 that amount of crime will certainly be committed4 ,but what is most provoking in ,mr4 ,buckle is the heedlessness or wantonness with which he is constantly insisting that the causes in question are necessarily present and uniformly acting4 ,what he calls the uniform reproduction of crime is likened by him to the uniform recurrence of the tides4 ,according to him1 it is a law that a certain number of suicides shall take place annually1 just as it is a law that there shall be high and low water twice in every twenty-four hours4 ,now a law1 as the word is here used1 means a record of invariable repetitions of phenomena4 ,has it been observed1 then1 that suicides bear1 we will not say an invariable1 but anything like a definite proportion to population8 ,mr4 ,buckle thinks it has1 and he adduces some facts in support of the opinion2 but his facts1 properly understood1 disprove instead of proving what he asserts2 and1 even if they proved it1 they would yet afford no support to his main theory4 ,in ,london1 for some years past--how many is not stated--about #bdj persons annually have made away with themselves--sometimes a few more1 sometimes a few less--the highest number having been #bff in #ahdf1 and the lowest #bac in #ahdi4 ,but1 while the number of suicides has thus been nearly stationary1 population has been anything but stationary in the metropolitan district1 but has advanced with vast and unremitting strides at an average rate of nearly #dc1jjj a year4 ,in #ahda it was #a1idh1cfi2 in #ahea1 #b1cfa1fdj2 and in #ahfa1 #b1hjc1ihi4 ,the proportion of suicide to population has consequently been by no means uniform1 but has varied exceedingly1 and on the whole has shown a constant tendency to decrease4 ,but even if it had continued uniform1 it would simply have shown that1 during a certain number of years1 the general character of ,londoners had1 in certain particulars1 undergone no material change4 ,it would not have proved that the regularity of suicide observable among ,londoners was in accordance with any general law4 ,to prove this it would have been necessary to show that the proportion had been uniform1 not only in the same but in all societies2 in ,paris as well as in ,london1 among the ,esquimaux of ,labrador1 and among the ,negroes of ,soudan4 ,for1 if the proportion were found to vary by reason of the differing circumstances of different societies1 it would plainly be seen to be at least susceptible of variation in the same society1 inasmuch as in no society do circumstances remain the same from generation to generation4 ,so equally with murders4 ,even if there were no doubt that the percentage of such crimes in ,england had long continued the same1 still that fact would prove nothing as to the uniform reproduction of crime1 if it could be shown that the percentage had ever varied anywhere else--in ,france or ,italy1 for example1 or in ,dahomey4 ,for it would be mere childishness to point to the different conditions of ,england and ,dahomey1 and to plead that no more was intended to be said than that1 with uniformity of circumstances there would also be uniformity of results4 ,so much no one1 in the least competent to discuss the subject1 would for a moment dream of disputing4 ,but in political affairs there cannot be uniformity of circumstances4 ,the aggregate of circumstances from which spring human motives cannot1 from the nature of things1 ever be repeated2 and1 though a few general causes may continue permanently in operation1 they cannot continue to produce the same identical results2 for even though they could themselves remain stationary1 it would be impossible that their operation should not be affected by the constant change going on around1 or should not partake of an otherwise universal forward movement4 ,in political affairs there cannot possibly be any recurrence of identical phenomena2 nor can there1 except within a very limited period1 be any occurrence of very similar phenomena4 ,but recurrence 7and not merely recurrence1 but complete and invariable recurrence7 is the very foundation of science4 ,without it there can be no scientific laws1 and without such laws--i4e41 without records of past recurrences--there can be no sure predictions as to the future4 ,it is only because certain motions of certain bodies have hitherto been observed to take place with invariable regularity1 that they are expected to continue to do so1 and it is upon that assumption only that we venture to predict that the sun will rise to-morrow morning1 or that an eclipse will take place next year4 ,but if no event recorded in history has ever yet been known to occur twice under precisely the same conditions1 and as a consequence of the same causes1 what ground can there be for predicting whether or when any such event will occur again8 ,what possibility is there of constructing a science of history1 when history supplies no materials for either foundation or superstructure8 ,there is nothing in this conclusion in the slightest degree opposed to the most approved doctrine of causation4 ,no effect can be without a cause4 ,no doubt1 then1 the regency of invariable causation holds good of human volitions4 ,no doubt the volitions and consequently the actions of men are the joint results of the external circumstances amid which men are placed1 and of their own characters2 which again are the results of circumstances1 natural and artificial4 ,so much must needs be admitted1 and something more besides4 ,certain causes will infallibly be succeeded by certain effects4 ,from any particular combination of circumstances1 certain determinate consequences and no others will result2 those again will give rise to consequences equally determinate1 and those in turn to others1 and so on in an infinite series4 ,it follows1 then1 from the regency of causation1 that there is a determinate course already1 as it were1 traced out1 which human events will certainly follow to the end of time2 every step of which course1 however remote1 might now be foreseen and predicted by adequate1 that is to say by infinite1 intelligence4 ,infinite intelligence would do this1 however1 not by the aid of law1 but by virtue of its own intrinsic and unassisted strength1 wherewith it would perceive how each succeeding combination of causes would operate4 ,for1 as cannot be too often repeated1 a law is merely a record of recurrences2 and in human affairs there can be no recurrences of the same aggregate either of causes or results4 ,there being then no historic laws1 there can be no ,science of ,history1 for science cannot exist without laws4 ,the historic prescience1 which is an attribute of ,infinite ,intelligence1 not being regulated by law1 or at any rate not by any law except that of causation1 is not1 technically speaking1 a science1 and even if it were1 would be utterly beyond the reach of human intellect and attainable only by ,infinite ,wisdom4 ,the admission made in the last paragraph has cleared the way for the introduction of a question1 from which the subject under discussion derives its principal interest1 and which it is indispensable therefore carefully1 though briefly1 to examine4 ,if there be certain determinate lines of conduct which men will infallibly pursue throughout all succeeding generations1 how can men be free agents8 ,how--for it is merely the old puzzle over again--how can foreknowledge be reconciled with freewill8 ,the difficulty is not to be got rid of by discrediting the reality of freewill1 and treating it as a thing for which there is no evidence4 ,when ,johnson silenced ,boswell's chatter with the words1 ',sir1 we know our will is free and there's an end on't1' he expressed a great truth in language not the less philosophically accurate on account of its colloquial curtness4 ,the consciousness possessed by an agent about to perform an act1 that he is at liberty to perform it or not1 is really conclusive evidence that the act is free4 ,for it matters not a jot whether consciousness be 'an independent faculty1' or whether--as1 ,mr4 ,buckle reminds us1 'is the opinion of some of the ablest thinkers'--it be not merely 'a state or condition of the mind4' ,if consciousness be a condition of the mind1 so also is perception2 but perception1 whatever else it be1 is also that which makes us acquainted with external phenomena1 just as consciousness is that which makes us acquainted with internal emotions4 ,the two informants1 it is true1 are not equally trustworthy4 ,perception often deceives us1 but consciousness1 never4 ,we often fancy we perceive what we do not perceive4 ,we may fancy we see a ghost1 when we are merely mocked by an optical illusion1 or we may mistake the impalpable imagery of the ,fata ,morgana for solid objects1 or the rumbling of a cart for thunder4 ,but consciousness is infallible4 ,we cannot fancy we experience an emotion which we do not experience4 ,we cannot fancy we are glad when we are not glad1 or sorry when we are not sorry1 or hopeful when in despair2 and to pretend that we can possibly be conscious of willing when we are not willing1 would be as absurd as to meet the cogito1 ergo sum of ,descartes1 with the reply that1 perhaps1 we do not really think1 but only think we think4 ,freewill1 then1 being an indisputable reality1 how can it be reconciled with foreknowledge8 ,there can be no more conclusive way of showing that the two things are capable of co-existing than to point to an example of their actual co-existence1 and such an example is afforded by the idea of ,infinite ,power4 ,omnipotence1 which by its nature implies freewill1 comprehends also ,omniscience4 ,omnipotence can do anything whatsoever which does not involve a contradiction2 but even ,omnipotence can do nothing which ,omniscience does not foresee4 ,it can1 indeed1 do whatsoever it pleases2 but ,omniscience foresees precisely what it will be pleased to do4 ,with unbounded liberty to choose any course of action1 it can yet choose no course which has not been foreseen2 but its freedom of choice is evidently not affected by the fact that the choice which it will make is known before hand4 ,neither is that of man4 ,an eager aspirant to ecclesiastical preferment is not the less at liberty to refuse a proffered mitre1 because all his acquaintances have a well founded assurance that he will accept4 ,a wayfarer1 with a yawning precipice before his eyes1 may or may not1 as he pleases1 cast himself down headlong4 ,whether he will do so or not must always have been positively foreknown to ,omniscience2 but that fact in no degree affects his power of deciding for himself4 ,if arguing on the notion that what is to be must be1 he decide on moving forward to his destruction1 then what has been foreseen is simply that he will so argue and be self-deceived1 and will consequently perish4 ,but the foreknowledge which simply perceives what direction will be taken by the will is a very different thing from an over-ruling destiny1 which should compel the will to take some special direction4 ,still it is obvious that1 in this instance also1 foreknowledge is based entirely on causation4 ,it is solely because human volitions take place as inevitable effects of antecedent causes that ,omniscience itself can be conceived as capable of foreseeing them4 ,but on such conditions1 how can human volitions really be free8 ,how can man be really at liberty to will of his good pleasure1 if what he is prompted to will depends on the influence which the circumstances that happen to surround him may exercise on the constitution and character1 which he has derived from pre-existing circumstances8 ,how can his will be free1 if that will be moulded and shaped by circumstances over which he has no control8 ,i have1 ,i am aware1 by the mode ,i have adopted of reconciling free-will with foreknowledge1 incurred the obligation of reconciling it with another co-existence of yet greater apparent incompatibility4 ,by admitting that 'human volitions take place as inevitable effects of antecedent causes1' that they must be such1 and cannot be other than such1 as antecedent causes make them1 ,i have admitted that the will1 though independent of law1 is absolutely subject to1 and must implicitly obey1 causes4 ,freewill1 then1 must be shown to be compatible not with foreknowledge only1 but with necessity also4 ,for there is no use in attempting to ignore necessity2 no use in exclaiming with ,professor ,huxley3 ',fact ,i know1 and ,law ,i know2 but what is ,necessity but an empty shadow of the mind's own throwing8'#bd ,a shadow it most certainly is not1 though it is a bugbear1 and the veriest that was ever suffered to torment a morbid imagination4 ,it is an indisputable reality1 a substantial1 but at the same time perfectly harmless1 or rather salutary reality1 whose terrors need only to be boldly confronted in order to disappear and to transform themselves into highly attractive recommendations4 ,for what1 after all1 does it imply8 ,what but that effects must follow their causes1 and causes precede their effects1 as plainly they must1 unless cause and effect be utterly unmeaning expletives4 ,of course we must on all occasions be affected by surrounding circumstances1 in modes exactly accordant with our idiosyncracies1 moral and physical4 ,of course1 too1 our volitions must exactly correspond with our contemporaneous affections4 ,when we are empty1 we must1 if in health1 feel hungry1 and desire to eat2 when full1 we must1 unless we are hogs1 be satisfied1 and prefer to ruminate4 ,most men are so organised that when tickled they must laugh2 when wronged1 must frown or sigh4 ,the sight of distress makes them pity1 and desire to see it relieved4 ,that of virtue makes them admire1 and desire to see it rewarded4 ,that of vice makes them angry1 and desire to see it punished4 ,would we have all these things reversed8 ,would it be well for us that our being starved or surfeited should make no difference in our wish to feed1 or our willingness to fast8 ,should we like the chances to be equal whether we should desire distress to be alleviated or aggravated8 ,if not1 what is the bondage under which we groan8 ,what the liberty wherewith we long to be made free8 ,our sole grievance is that1 according to actual arrangements1 there must be reasons for our wishes1 and that on those reasons our wishes must depend4 ,should we then prefer that there were no such reasons8 ,would we have our wishes to be independent of reason1 and adrift before irrational caprice8 ,probably we may1 on second thoughts1 be content to forego an enfranchisement like this2 but1 if not1 we may at least console ourselves for its indefinite postponement1 by reflecting that ,omnipotence itself is1 equally with ourselves1 subject to the sort of necessity under which we are groaning2 equally destitute of the sort of free-will to which we aspire4 ,it is manifest that1 since there cannot be omnipotence without boundless liberty1 omnipotence must possess completest freedom of will4 ,yet even the ,will of ,omnipotence is subject to the despotism of causation4 ,divine perfection cannot but be at all times affected in modes as exactly corresponding with its own excellence as human imperfection is in modes corresponding with its deficiencies1 and the movements of the ,divine ,mind cannot but correspond with the affections of the ,divine ,mind4 ,those movements are not unmeaning1 purposeless1 wayward4 ,they1 too1 have their appropriate springs1 and proceed by regular process from legitimate causes1 the chief of those causes being the infinite perfection of the ,divine ,nature4 ,divine ,power cannot then1 any more than human1 be directed by its owner's will to purposes against which its owner's nature revolts4 ,but is this inability a matter to lament over8 ,those must be greatly at a loss for a grievance who make one of its being impossible for them to will things which they have over-ruling reasons for not willing4 ,besides1 does man1 in order to believe himself free1 require more freedom than his ,maker8 ,the disciple is not above his master1 nor the servant above his lord4 ,surely it is sufficient that the disciple be as his master1 and the servant as his lord4#be ,the fact1 then1 that human conduct is subject to causation1 and may by adequate intelligence be predicted in its minutest details until the end of time1 no more proves that it is governed by invariable laws1 which act irrespectively of human volitions1 than the corresponding fact with reference to ,divine conduct impairs the freedom of the ,divine ,will4 ,there is no one living to whom such a doctrine--degrading man1 as it does1 into a helpless puppet1 robbing him of all moral responsibility and of every motive for either exertion or self-control--can be more utterly repugnant than to ,mr4 ,mill1 who nevertheless1 although dissenting from ,mr4 ,buckle's more extreme opinions1 makes use of some expressions which may be construed into a qualified approval of his general views4 ,even ,mr4 ,mill speaks of 'human volitions as depending on scientific laws1' thereby implying that the circumstances from which human motives and1 consequently1 human actions result are continually recurring with a certain regularity4 ,he speaks of 'general laws affecting communities1 which are indeed modified in their action by special causes affecting individuals1 but which1 if their effects could be observed over a field sufficiently wide and for a period sufficiently long to embrace all possible combinations of the special causes1 would be found to produce constant results4'#bf ,this proposition seems to proceed on the assumption that general causes are either of uniform operation1 or that1 if they vary in their effects1 their variations1 and also those of special causes1 occur with a certain regularity1 and constantly recur within a certain definite period4 ,but this is precisely what cannot possibly happen4 ,among the general causes referred to1 some few are continuous--those1 namely1 which are inherent in human nature2 but even these are continually modified in their action by changes continually taking place in those other general causes which constitute the existing state of society1 and which are not merely continually changing1 but are continually becoming more and more different from what they were originally4 ,so much is fully admitted by ,mr4 ,mill himself1 and indeed can be scarcely more strongly enforced than by his own words4 ',there is a progressive change1' he says1 'both in the character of the human race1 and in their outward circumstances1 so far as moulded by themselves2 in each successive age the principal phenomena of society are different from what they were in the age preceding1 and still more different from any previous age4'#bg ,it is admitted1 then1 that there can be no recurrence of social phenomena2 and it is obvious that1 the longer the period of observation1 the less possibility can there be of their recurring1 since the greater is the certainty that new causes will come into operation4 ,but1 even though it were possible that all the external circumstances which have once influenced either communities or individuals could be repeated1 the same circumstances could not a second time produce the same effects4 ,men of different characters are affected in very different ways by the same influences1 and the characters of any particular generation of men are always very different from those of every preceding generation4 ,let it be supposed1 for the sake of argument1 that the ,french of the present day could be placed in precisely the same social condition in which their fathers were towards the close of the last century2 still they would act very differently from their fathers4 ,nay1 even though they should1 with one single exception1 have inherited the dispositions of their fathers1 the difference of character in one single individual might suffice to give an entirely new turn to the course of events4 ,if every other antecedent of the first ,french ,revolution were again present1 still there might be no second revolution1 provided only that1 instead of another ,louis the ,sixteenth1 a ,leopold of ,belgium1 or a ,frederick the ,great were king4#bh ,with the last mentioned on the throne1 there would assuredly be no repetition of that vacillation of purpose which rocked the cradle and fostered the growth of popular fury till it culminated in a ,reign of ,terror4 ,since1 then1 there cannot be either a repetition of the same circumstances to act upon men1 or a reproduction of the same sort of men to be acted upon by circumstances1 human conduct can never exhibit a repetition of the same phenomena2 experience of the past can never1 in social or political affairs1 furnish a formula for predictions as to the future4 ,accordingly ,mr4 ,mill1 in common with ,mr4 ,stephen1 disclaims the idea of positive1 and pleads only for conditional1 predictions4 ,but the very term 'conditional predictions' involves a contradiction1 since it is obviously impossible to see beforehand what perhaps may never come to pass4 ,what is meant by the phrase is really nothing more than conjectures2 and conjectures1 however ingenious and reasonable1 cannot be admitted within the pale of science4 ,they cannot be accepted as fruits of a tree which has by the quality of its fruits proved its right to be entitled the ,science of ,history4 ,with the view of enhancing the value of conditional predictions1 it has been urged that they are of precisely the same description as those which we are in the habit of hazarding with respect to our familiar acquaintance4 ,there are1 it is said1 'general maxims regarding human conduct1 by the application of which to given states of fact1 predictions may be made as to what will happen2' and all that is necessary for the construction of historical science1 is the employment of these maxims on a larger scale4 ,if the premiss here be sound1 the inference may be owned to be sufficiently legitimate4 ,if there be any formula with which the actions of individuals are observed to correspond1 there is every likelihood that the same formula may1 by extension and amplification1 be adapted to the actions of communities4 ,but1 although there are plenty of maxims telling men what they ought to do1 there is not one--except that which declares that they must all die--which affords any positive information as to what they will do4 ',thou shalt not steal1' 'thou shalt not kill1' 'thou shalt not commit adultery2'--all these and many more are moral laws2 but of not one of them--the more's the pity--is the observance sufficiently regular1 to give it the smallest pretension to be styled a scientific law4 ,general propositions1 too1 there are in abundance1 representing with more or less accuracy the probable results of particular lines of conduct4 ,such are the proverbial sayings1 that ',honesty is the best policy1' that ',a rolling stone gathers no moss1' that ',the racecourse is the road to ruin4' ,but adages like these were never supposed to afford any basis for prophecy4 ,it may be that an honest man more commonly gets on in the world than a knave1 though there is also much to be said on behalf of the counter-proposition1 that ',the children of darkness are wiser in their generation than the children of light2' but1 at any rate1 there is no doubt that a man may be honest without being prosperous1 and that he is often all the poorer for his probity4 ,but1 indeed1 is there any one conceivable situation in life in which a positive rule can be laid down as to the course which men will follow8 ,can it even--to make use of an illustration which has been very effectively employed on the other side--can it even be said that a man will certainly marry a woman with whom he is deeply in love1 who returns his affection1 whom he can marry if he likes1 and whom he has the means of maintaining in a suitable manner8 ,nine times out of ten he probably will2 but in the tenth instance a ,brahmin's passion may be checked by fear of contamination with a ,pariah1 or a ,king ,cophetua's pride may prevent his wedding a beggar-maid1 or the titled owner of an entailed estate may decline to illegitimatise his offspring by espousing his deceased wife's sister1 or betrothed lovers may be parted by some such mysterious barrier as sprang up between ,talbot ,bulstrode and ,aurora ,floyd1 or an ,adam ,bede1 in spite of the example set by ,george ,eliot's hero1 may refrain from marrying ,dinah for fear of breaking his brother ,seth's heart4 ,equally vain would be the search for any rule invariably applicable to political affairs4 ,even general propositions which sound like truisms are not universally true4 ,it cannot even be said that misgovernment always produces discontent1 or that the combination of superior strength and superior strategy is always successful in war2 for examples might be cited of nations remaining patient under an iron despotism1 and perhaps also of campaigns lost by armies with every advantage of skill1 numbers1 and discipline on their side4 ,no better specimen can be given of what are popularly spoken of as historical laws than one propounded by ,mr4 ,c4 ,merivale1 whose careful study of ,roman annals has taught him to regard it as 'a condition of permanent dominion that conquerors should absorb the conquered gradually into their own body1 by extending1 as circumstances arise1 a share in their own exclusive privileges to the masses from whom they have torn their original independence4' ,the principle thus laid down is of great value1 but it must not be mistaken for an index pointing unerringly to a goal which will certainly be obtained by following its direction4 ,at least the offer of ,austrian citizenship had no perceptible effect in overcoming the exclusiveness of ,hungarian nationality2 nor in inducing ,venetia to become a willing member of a ,teutonic ,federation1 and to lend the same assistance to the ,house of ,hapsburg1 as ,gaul and ,spain did to the ,csars1 in suppressing insurrection on the banks of the ,danube4 ,history supplies many principles similar to the one evolved by ,mr4 ,merivale1 all more or less useful for the guidance of the statesman4 ,so far as they are just1 they indicate the results which would spring from the adoption of certain lines of policy1 unless something unforeseen should happen4 ,it is true that something unforeseen is almost sure to happen and to divert or impede the course which events would otherwise take2 but still1 it is most important to be able to perceive clearly the influence exerted by certain causes1 how much soever that influence may be disturbed by other causes2 since1 if it does nothing else1 it will at least prevent the disturbing causes from producing what would otherwise have been their full effect4 ,on principles which indicate only a few out of many causes in simultaneous operation1 it is evident that nothing deserving to be called predictions can be founded2 but from them1 nevertheless--inasmuch as they teach that some causes act for good and others for evil1 as far as their action extends--practical rules of government may be deduced4 ,such rules1 however1 which at best can only furnish a loose and shifting basis for doubtful conjectures1 stand without the confines of positive knowledge2 they occupy a middle-ground between science and nescience1 and constitute what1 until very lately1 was thought to be designated with sufficient distinctness as the ',philosophy of ,history4' ,by that term1 ,mr4 ,stephen in one place says1 is really meant all that he ever meant by the ,science of ,history2 and the observation1 were it not apparently inconsistent with his general reasoning1 might seem to imply that the only question between him and his opponents is whether a thing1 the existence of which is not disputed1 ought or ought not to receive a new appellation4 ,but it is otherwise1 at any rate1 with ,mr4 ,mill4 ,the language used by him on this as on all other subjects1 is too clear and precise to admit of its being supposed that he has used a new phrase without attaching to it a new signification1 or to permit the present writer to believe1 as he fain would do1 that a point of nomenclature is the only point of difference between himself and one from whom it is so difficult to differ without diffidence and self-distrust4 ,,footnotes3 #bb ,mr4 ,buckle's first chapter1 passim4 #bc ',cornhill ,magazine1' for ,june and ,july1 #ahfa4 #bd ',lay ,sermons1' p4 #aeh4 #be ,a highly esteemed literary friend1 who has done me the favour of looking over these pages in manuscript1 considers that what ,i have proved is1 not that ,omnipotence involves the co-existence of ,freewill and ,necessity1 but that ,omnipotence itself1 although capable of possessing all things1 could not possess ,freewill1 and that consequently ,freewill cannot possibly exist--that there cannot possibly be any such thing4 ,although1 for reasons stated four pages back1 not myself prepared to accept this view of the matter1 ,i should cheerfully accept it if ,i could4 ,the argument in the text proceeds upon the assumption that people mean something when they talk about ,freewill4 ,if1 however1 they have no meaning1 if the phrase be a simple sound signifying nothing1 of course all controversy regarding the possible co-existence of that nothing with ,necessity is settled at once and for ever1 while no great amount of philosophy will be requisite to induce mankind to resign themselves very placidly to the absence of that same nothing4 #bf ,mill's ',logic4' ,fifth edition4 ,vol4 ii4 p4 #ebg4 #bg ,mill's ',logic1' vol4 ii4 p4 #ejd4 #bh ',s'il se ft trouv alors 7vers #agej7 sur le trne un prince de la taille et de l'humeur du ,grand ,frdric1 je ne doute point qu'il n'et accompli dans la socit et dans le gouvernement plusieurs des plus grands changements que la ,rvolution y a faits1 non-seulement sans perdre sa couronne1 mais en augmentant beaucoup son pouvoir4'--,de ,tocqueville1 ,l',ancien ,rgime1 p4 #bgd4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,david ,,hume ,,as ,a ,,metaphysician4 ,but the mischief lieth here2 that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuit of knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things1 or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received principles1 they will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable4--,berkeley's ,hylas and ,philonous4 ,in no department of science is it possible for an enquirer to advance considerably beyond all his predecessors without serving as a light by whose aid his successors may advance somewhat beyond him4 ,this is the only apology that ,i feel disposed to offer for the freedom with which ,i am about to criticize one who1 having been1 by judges so competent as ,adam ,smith and ,professor ,huxley1 pronounced to be 'by far the greatest philosopher' and 'acutest thinker' of his own age1 would1 doubtless1 be at least on a level with the greatest philosophers of the present age if he were living now4 ,the veriest cripple that can manage to sit on horseback may contrive to crawl some few steps beyond the utmost point to which his steed has borne him1 and1 if those steps be uphill1 may1 by looking back on the course he has come1 perceive where the animal has deviated from the right road4 ,yet he does not on that account suppose that his own locomotive power is in any respect to be compared to his horse's2 neither need an annotator on ,hume1 when pointing to holes in his author's metaphysical coat1 be supposed not to be perfectly aware that it is the strength1 not of his own eyes1 but of the spectacles furnished to him by his author1 that enables him to perceive them4 ,the concentrated essence of ,hume's metaphysics is to be found in ',an ,enquiry concerning ,human ,understanding1' forming part of a volume of ,essays which ,hume published somewhat late in life1 and which he desired might 'alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles4' ,to a formal1 though necessarily rapid1 examination of the results of this ',enquiry1' the present chapter will be almost exclusively devoted4 ,often as the operation has been performed already1 there are two reasons why its repetition here may not be without utility3 for1 first1 its subject is a treatise containing the germs of much subsequent and still current speculation which1 in so far as it is merely a development of those germs1 cannot but be infected by whatever unsoundness may be inherent in them2 and1 secondly1 because the subject1 hackneyed as it may seem1 is so far from being exhausted1 that there is scarcely one among the doctrines embodied in it to which1 as ,i proceed at once to show1 fresh objection1 more or less grave1 may not be taken by a fresh investigator4 ,to begin very near indeed to the beginning1 let us take1 first1 the section of the ',enquiry' which treats of the ',origin of ,ideas4' ,all the perceptions of the mind may1 according to ,hume1 be divided into two classes1 whereof the one consists of all those 'more lively perceptions1' termed by him indifferently ,impressions or ,sensations1 which we experience when we 'hear1 or see1 or feel1 or love1 or hate1 or desire1 or will3' the other1 of those 'less lively perceptions of which we are conscious when we reflect on any of the sensations above-mentioned1' and which are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas4 ',all our ideas or more feeble perceptions1' he continues1 'are copies of our impressions or more lively ones1' the 'entire creative power of the mind amounting to no more than the faculty of compounding1 transposing1 augmenting1 or diminishing the materials afforded by the senses and experience4' ,so confident is he of the literal accuracy of this statement1 as to proceed to intimate that whenever we find in conversation or argument 'a philosophical term employed seemingly without any idea or meaning1' we have only to enquire from what impression its idea1 if it have one1 is derived1 when1 if no impression can be adduced1 we may be sure that no idea is present either4 ,the only phenomenon opposed to this rule1 which he professes himself able to think of1 is that of a person who1 of a colour--as1 for instance1 blue--with which he is familiar1 is able to conceive a shade somewhat different from any of the shades which he has actually seen2 but this instance he disregards as too singular to affect the general maxim1 to which1 as he might have added1 it is not really an exception1 any more than would be the power of a person who had never seen a mountain higher than ,snowdon or ,mont ,blanc to conceive one as high as ,chimborazo or ,mount ,everest1 for1 equally in both cases1 the ideas are copies of sensible impressions1 although of complex1 not simple1 ones--of colour and graduation in the first case1 of size and increase in the second4 ,still1 there is at least one genuine exception1 which it is the more remarkable that ,hume should have overlooked1 as it may be said to have stared him in the face from the very subject-matter he was considering4 ,our idea of idea itself1 from what sensible impression is that derived8 ,we have just been told that the difference between an idea and a sensation is that the first is a copy of the second1 a feeble copy of a lively original4 ,the idea therefore is not itself a sensation2 the copy is not itself an original4 ,neither consequently can the idea or notion which the mind proceeds to form of any of its previous ideas be derived from or be a copy of a sensation3 it cannot have entered the mind 'in the only manner by which1' according to ,hume1 'an idea can have access to the mind1 to wit1 by actual feeling and sensation4' ,let me not be misunderstood4 ,let me not be supposed to be courting collision with the ,berkleian thesis of the non-existence of abstract ideas4 ,i do not for one moment doubt that all our general or class notions of sensible objects or events are merely concrete ideas of individual objects or events--that1 for instance1 whenever we talk of man or motion in general1 we are really thinking of some particular man or motion1 which1 as possessing all properties common to all men or motions1 serves as a representative of the entire genus4 ,neither am ,i prepared to deny1 although scarcely either prepared to admit1 that even of abstract qualities all our general or class notions are equally ideas of particular specimens of those qualities2 that1 when we speak1 for instance1 of virtue or vice in general1 we are thinking of some particular exhibition of some particular kind of virtue or vice4 ,nay1 ,i am not even concerned to deny that our idea of idea in general may possibly be a copy of some particular one of our previous ideas which1 for the nonce1 serves to represent all our other previous ideas4 ,i limit myself to saying that our idea of idea in general1 whether it be or be not itself an abstraction1 is1 at all events1 not a copy of sensation4 ,i admit that it thereby differs essentially from most1 if not all1 other general ideas4 ,possibly it may be only through my having myself felt the promptings of some particular virtue or vice1 that ,i am able to form an idea of that particular virtue or vice4 ,if so1 ,i admit that my idea of that particular virtue or vice is but1 as ,hume would say1 a copy of my feeling4 ,and since1 undoubtedly1 ,i can feel myself thinking1 or perceiving1 or performing any other mental operation1 ,i am bound to admit1 further1 that my idea of any such operation may equally be described as a copy of a sensation which ,i have experienced4 ,all ,i contend for is that if1 after having formed my idea1 either of a mental operation or of anything else whatever1 ,i proceed to ask myself what sort of an entity that idea is1 the answer which ,i give myself1 or1 in other words1 the idea which ,i form of my previous idea1 being a copy of idea1 cannot be a copy of sensation4 ,so much must surely be conceded to me1 for that white1 being white1 cannot be also black is not nearly so certain as that idea and sensation1 being two distinct things1 idea of idea cannot be idea of sensation4 ,the concession1 indeed1 is likely enough to be accompanied by an exclamation of wonder that so microscopic a flaw in an elaborate exposition should be thought worth pointing out2 but ,hume himself would certainly not have so retorted4 ,of the doctrine which ,i am impugning1 viz41 that every idea is copied from some preceding sensation1 he had spoken as follows3--',those who would assert that this position is not universally true1 nor without exception1 have only one1 and that an easy1 method of refuting it1 by producing the idea which1 in their opinion1 is not derived from this source4 ,it will then be incumbent on us1 if we would maintain our doctrine1 to produce the impression or lively perception which corresponds to it4' ,he was much too candid not to have acknowledged that this challenge of his had been fairly and fully met4 ,he was not a man to refuse to own himself refuted when1 after distinctly intimating that the production of one single idea1 having no perception correspondent to it amongst those which we experience 'when we see1 or hear1 or feel1 or love1 or hate1 or will1 or desire1' would suffice for his entire refutation1 he found such an idea produced4 ,he knew too well also to what enormous errors of thought minute errors of expression may lead1 to disregard any speck of inaccuracy in any one of his definitions4 ,the apparently slight oversight committed by him on this occasion will1 indeed1 be presently seen to have sensibly contributed to lead him subsequently into a mistake of no small practical moment4 ,we come next to the ',association of ,ideas1' the influence of which almost all of ,hume's successors1 as well as himself1 seem to me to have greatly over-rated4 ,that there is a 'principle of connection between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind' is1 as he says1 sufficiently evident2 and that this principle is1 as he was apparently the first to remark1 threefold1 deriving its efficacy from resemblance1 contiguity in time or place1 and cause or effect1 may also be admitted with little qualification4 ,but ,i presume to think that he is quite incorrect in adding that1 in virtue of the aforesaid principle1 ideas 'introduce each other with a certain degree of method or regularity4' ,you are walking1 let us suppose1 through ,hyde ,park1 thinking of nothing more particular than that the morning is a pleasant one1 when you suddenly find yourself in imagination pacing the shore of the ,dead ,sea1 and1 pausing to ask yourself how you got there1 you discover1 perhaps1 that it was by the following steps4 ,remarking some landscape effect in the distance1 you were reminded of a similar one which you had remarked years before while taking a walk fifty miles off in ,sussex4 ,here resemblance operated4 ,then you recollected how during that walk you were thinking about ,mr4 ,buckle1 whose lucubrations you had been conning over before starting4 ,here entered contiguity both of time and space4 ,the name of ,buckle reminded you how that promising writer ended his travels abroad by dying of a fever which he caught while sailing over the sites of the engulphed cities of the plain4 ,here cause and effect came into action2 and1 so far1 everything accords with ,hume's theory4 ,but if you repeat the same walk to-morrow1 the same landscape effect will almost certainly suggest a train of ideas quite different from that of to-day4 ,perhaps it may begin by reminding you of landscape effects in general2 then of ,mr4 ,ruskin1 who has discoursed so eloquently on that topic1 and next of ,mr4 ,ruskin's ',stones of ,venice1' from whence it is equal chances whether your thoughts radiate1 on one side of the compass1 to stone china1 or ,stoney ,stratford1 or ,stonewall ,jackson1 or1 on the other1 to the ',venetian ,bracelet1' ,l4 ,e4 ,l4 and ,fernando ,po1 or to that effective adaptation of the ,venetian style of architecture1 the ,railway ,station at ,st4 ,pancras1 and thence to some town or other on the ,midland ,line4 ,these examples will be readily recognized as fair average specimens of those unpremeditated trains of thought with which we are all familiar4 ,is there1 then1 in the arrangement of the consecutive thoughts of which the several trains are composed1 any method or regularity common1 ,i will not say to all1 but to any two of them8 ,according to ,hume and to most of his successors in the same path of enquiry1 there ought to be4 ,thus the illustrious author of the ',analysis of the ,human ,mind' affirms1 without rebuke or protest from any one of his not less illustrious commentators1 that 'our ideas spring up or exist in the order in which the sensations existed of which they are the copies3 that of those sensations which occurred synchronically1 the ideas also spring up synchronically1 and that of the sensations which occurred successively1 the ideas rise successively4' ,and he adds1 'this is the general law of the ,association of ,ideas1' remarking1 by way of illustration1 that1 as ',i have seen the sun1 and the sky in which it is placed1 synchronically1 if ,i think of the one ,i think of the other at the same time'2 and that1 as when committing to memory a passage of words1 as1 for instance1 the ,lord's ,prayer1 we pronounce the words in successive order1 and have consequently the sensation of the words in successive order1 so when we proceed to repeat the passage1 'the ideas of the words also rise in succession1 ,our suggesting ,father1 ,father suggesting which1 which suggesting art1 and so on to the end4'#bi ,oh ,law6 ,law6 most abused of scientific terms1 what an infinity of dogmatic illegalities are committed in thy name6 ,the one thing which scientific law implies is regularity of occurrence1 but what regulation is it that is obeyed in common by a number of sequences commencing at the same point in ,hyde ,park1 yet terminating1 one in ,africa1 another in ,america1 a third in ,palestine1 and a fourth in the centre of ,england8 ,can it have been seriously said that it is impossible for us to think of the sky without thinking simultaneously of the sun which illuminates the sky8 ,is it impossible for us to think instead of the ether which constitutes it1 or peradventure even of the resemblance between its celestial azure and what ,moore calls the 'most unholy blue' of some frolicsome ,cynthia's eyes8 ,and is it not notorious that when saying the ,lord's ,prayer--a prayer which1 in spite of the injunction by which its original dictation was accompanied1 to 'avoid vain repetitions1 as the heathen do1' many ,anglican clergymen insist on repeating half-a-dozen times in a single service--is it not notorious that1 so far from the idea of one word suggesting to us the idea of the next1 no small effort of attention is requisite to enable us to have any idea at all of what we are saying8 ,it would seem that the author of the ',analysis' either could not help asking himself questions like these1 or1 without asking the questions1 could not help seeing the commonplace truths involved in the inevitable replies to them4 ,it would seem to have been semi-consciousness of the utter inability of the evidence first cited by him to justify belief in the necessarily simultaneous or successive occurrence of the ideas of simultaneously or successively experienced sensations1 which made him have recourse for help to complex ideas4 ',if1' he says1 'from a stone ,i have had synchronically the sensation of colour1 the sensation of hardness1 the sensations of shape and size1 the sensation of weight1--when the idea of one of these sensations occurs1 the ideas of all of them occur4' ,because1 then1 ,i may have ascertained by experience that a stone is white1 hard1 and round1 two feet in diameter1 and twenty pounds in weight1 am ,i really incapable1 if ,i happen to break my shin against it1 of thinking how hard it is1 without thinking also how heavy2 or1 when trying to lift it1 of thinking how heavy it is without thinking likewise of its shape and colour8 ,elsewhere the same writer speaks of 'ideas which have been so often conjoined that whenever one exists in the mind1 the others immediately exist along with it1 seem to run into one another1 to coalesce1 as it were1 and out of many to form one idea4' ,but which are the ideas whereof this can be said8 ,the writer instances those simple ideas1 colour1 hardness1 extension1 weight1 which1 he says1 make up our complex ideas of gold or iron4 ,he instances1 too1 the ideas of resistance1 muscular contractility1 direction1 extension1 place1 and motion1 of which he says our apparently simple idea1 weight1 is compounded4 ,does he mean1 then1 that we cannot entertain the idea of yellowness without entertaining at the same time all the other ideas necessary for composing the idea of gold1 and entertaining1 too1 that idea in addition to all the rest8 ,does he mean that a train of thought cannot commence with place without terminating with weight8 ,of course he means nothing of the kind1 although so he distinctly says4 ,rather1 he appears to mean the direct converse1 viz41 that we cannot have the idea of gold or of weight present to the mind1 without having present also all the simple ideas of which those complex ideas are compounded--in other words1 not that the occurrence of any one component necessarily calls up all the other components1 and forms with them the compound1 but that the appearance of the compound brings with it all its separate components4 ,but neither does this seem to be a strictly correct representation4 ,i am not sure that ,i can think of gold without thinking of yellowness1 but ,i am positive that ,i can without thinking of hardness4 ,nor is there any doubt that the youngest child knows perfectly well what it means when1 trying to lift a stone1 it calls the stone heavy1 although it might not be more difficult to make the stone itself than the child understand what is meant by muscular contractility4 ,i own that if it be here demanded of me how a compound can be present unless every one of its components be present also1 ,i may under pressure be constrained to suggest that possibly1 after all1 the very term compound or complex idea may be somewhat of a misnomer1 or at any rate that the constituents of such an idea are much fewer than is commonly supposed4 ,be it admitted that the idea1 so styled1 could not have been formed without the instrumentality of other and previously-formed ideas1 still it does not follow that the instruments of production should for ever after accompany the product4 ,the rackful of dry toast which is brought to you for breakfast could scarcely have been so neatly sliced without the help of a knife1 but the toast is not the less in bodily presence on the breakfast-table because the knife that cut it has been left behind in the kitchen4 ,neither1 although you may probably be aware that salt1 suet1 sugar1 and spice enter into the composition of a ,christmas pudding1 do you necessarily think of those separate ingredients when you think of the pudding1 any more than you would see them separately if you saw the pudding4 ,the only qualities which you apparently cannot help thinking of when you think of the pudding are its size1 shape1 and colour4 ,one word more about the assumed regularity in the succession of ideas4 ,that when you are repeating a familiar form of words or playing a familiar piece of music1 every word uttered or note struck1 by reason of connexion of some sort between itself and the word or note next in order1 enables you without the smallest mental effort to utter that word or strike that note1 is too notorious to be questioned4 ,but ,i do very earnestly question whether the connexion that thus operates is an association of ideas4 ,how can it be1 when1 as frequently happens1 you have not the smallest idea of what it is you are saying or playing8 ,have you not often1 after reverently saying grace1 like the decent paterfamilias you probably are1 occasioned a giggle round the table by saying it again a minute or two afterwards1 in utter unconsciousness that you had said it just before8 ,or1 if ,i may so far flatter myself as to fancy my reader a fair daughter of the house instead of the staid house father--has it never happened to you1 ,miss1 while executing a brilliant performance on the piano1 to have been so entirely engrossed by an animated flirtation carried on simultaneously1 that1 if at the conclusion of the piece you had been asked what you had been playing1 you could not have replied whether it was ,l ci darem la mano or ,non mi voglio maritar8 ,and is it not evident that non-existent ideas cannot have called real ideas into existence8 ,my own modest contribution towards explanation of these mysterious phenomena is as follows4 ,apart from association of ideas1 there is a separate and independent association--to wit1 association of volitions4 ,while committing to memory a form of words1 or trying a new piece of music1 every separate movement of your tongue or of your fingers is consequent on some separate volition4 ,each series of movements is consequent on a series of volitions4 ,by being repeatedly made to follow each other in the same order1 the several volitions become connected with each other1 so that whenever the mind desires to marshal them in the aforesaid order1 each one1 as it presents itself1 brings with it the next in succession1 until the whole series is completed2 while1 as each volition has consequent upon it a corresponding movement1 a series of corresponding movements simultaneously takes place4 ,the mind meanwhile is quite unconscious of the muscular movements that are going on4 ,what it is conscious of are the volitions without which no voluntary movements of the muscles could have been made1 and of which the mind must needs be conscious1 because a volition of which the mind was not conscious would be an involuntary volition1 a birth too monstrous for even metaphysics to be equal to4 ,but although necessarily conscious of these volitions1 the mind is only momentarily conscious4 ,it pays them barely an instant's attention1 and therefore instantaneously forgets them1 retaining no more trace of them than if they had never been4 ,the doctrine of ,hume's which next confronts us is his famous one concerning ,cause and ,effect4 ,he commences it by explaining that all objects of human enquiry are divisible into two kinds--#a4 ,relations of ,ideas1 like those of which geometry1 algebra1 and arithmetic treat1 and which are either intuitively certain1 or 'discoverable by the mere operation of thought1 without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe1' as1 for example1 the truths demonstrated by ,euclid1 which would be equally incontestable even 'though there were never a circle or a triangle in nature3' #b4 ,matters of ,fact1 as1 for example1 the sun's rising and setting1 or the emission of light and heat by fire1 which are never discoverable by unassisted reason1 because of no one of them would the opposite imply a contradiction or be consequently inconceivable2 and in our knowledge of any one of which we can never 'go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses1' except by means of reasons derived from experience of some fact or facts connected in some way or other with the particular matter of fact we are considering4 ,so far1 all is comparatively plain sailing1 but ,hume now propounds a difficulty which he at first presents as seemingly insurmountable1 but which ,i cannot help thinking to be mainly of his own creation1 and which he himself1 almost immediately afterwards1 suggests a mode1 though a very inadequate mode1 of overcoming4 ,his language here is not marked by his usual perspicuity1 or rather--to speak without respect of persons--it contradicts itself in most astounding fashion2 but his meaning is not the less certainly the following1 for there is no other construction which his words will bear4 ',what1' he asks1 'is the foundation of all conclusions from experience8' ,why is it that1 having found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect1 we infer that similar objects will always be attended with similar effects8 ,the proposition that a certain antecedent has always been followed by a certain consequent1 and the proposition that the same antecedent will be followed by the same consequent1 are not identical4 ,what1 then1 is the connexion between them which causes one to be inferred from the other8 ,the connexion is unhesitatingly pronounced by him to be neither intuitively perceived1 nor yet to be 'founded on any process of the understanding4' ,if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning1 he challenges you to produce that reasoning1 and taking for granted that you have none to produce1 he proceeds to indicate what principle it is which1 in his opinion1 does determine us to form the inference4 ,that principle he declares to be custom or habit1 by which alone1 he asserts1 we are1 after the constant conjunction of two objects1 determined to expect the one from the appearance of the other2 adding that all inferences from experience are effects of custom1 not of reasoning4 ,what is the correct answer to this question of ,hume's ,i shall be rash enough to endeavour to indicate a little further on2 meanwhile there can be no temerity in saying that whatever be the right answer1 ,hume's is certainly a wrong one4 ,habit plainly cannot be its own parent4 ,it enables us to repeat more easily what we have already repeatedly done1 but it cannot be the cause of our doing or being able to do anything for the first time4 ,an infant that has once burnt its fingers by touching the flame of a candle1 expects that if it touch the flame again it will burn its fingers again1 but it does not expect this because it has been in the habit of expecting it4 ,neither1 if we be here bidden to understand that the habit referred to is not any mental habit of our own1 but a habit which we have observed certain phenomena to have of following each other1 shall we thereby be brought one whit nearer the truth4 ,our infant with the burnt finger has not observed that flame is in the habit of burning4 ,it only knows that flame did burn on the one occasion on which it tried the experiment1 which experiment it consequently declines to repeat4 ,besides1 no one needs to be told that inferences1 though thus capable of being drawn from single occurrences1 are drawn with increased confidence from observation of habit4 ,we all know already that1 having always found that fire burns1 we infer that it always will burn4 ,what we want to know is1 why we draw this inference4 ,this is the question which ,hume puts1 and respecting which he gives very positively the negative reply that the inference is not drawn either intuitively1 nor yet by any process of the understanding4 ,yet that a body when not moving must needs be at rest1 is not more certainly demonstrable than that inferences cannot possibly be drawn except in one or other of these two ways4 ,is not every inference a species of belief1 and must not every belief be either innate within us1 or have been acquired artificially2 and1 as in the latter case1 it is a mental acquisition1 must it not in that case have been acquired by an operation of the mind or understanding8 ,is it not clear1 then1 that inferences must always be either intuitive or ratiocinative2 and is it not strange that ,hume should deny that they ever are so8 ,yet stranger still is it1 that even while denying them to be either one or the other1 he1 almost in the same breath1 pronounces them to be both4 ,for1 after having on one page denied that they are founded on reason1 or any process of the understanding1 he describes them on the next page as being not simply founded on1 but as being themselves 'processes of the mind1' 'processes of thought1' and immediately afterwards 'arguments1' nay1 'reasonings from experience2' and1 yet again1 after as short a pause1 these very same 'reasonings1' and 'arguments1' and 'processes of the mind and thought1' he concludes by styling 'natural instincts which no reason or process of the thought or understanding is able either to produce or to prevent'--'operations of the soul as unavoidable' when the mind is placed in certain circumstances1 as it is 'to feel the passion of love when we receive benefits1 or hatred when we meet with injuries4' ,what are we to say to a description of mental operations which are and are not 'arguments' and 'reasonings1' which are and are not 'processes of thought1' which are not 'intuitive1' and which yet are 'instincts8' ,how are we to account for such amazing inconsistencies in an exposition of one of the greatest of philosophers8 ,with all humility1 ,i submit the following as a possible solution of the enigma4 ,the one solitary ground on which ,hume denies the argumentative and ratiocinative character of what he nevertheless terms arguments and reasonings1 is the impossibility of producing the chains of argument or reasoning of which they are composed4 ,but this impossibility can at most only prove that the reasonings are elementary1 and have1 consequently1 no component parts into which they can be resolved4 ,but reasoning is not the less reasoning for being elementary1 or for being only a single link in a chain1 instead of being itself a chain composed of many links4 ,still1 being elementary1 it may occur to1 and pass through1 the mind with extreme rapidity--with not less rapidity than an intuition or instinct1 for which therefore it may easily be mistaken1 as accordingly it has actually been by ,hume4 ,but that a reasoning from experience is not really an instinct is certain1 firstly1 because intuitive or instinctive reasoning1 if not a phrase absolutely devoid of meaning1 is a contradiction in terms2 and1 secondly1 because1 if it were instinctive1 it would precede instead of following experience1 and a baby1 instead of finding out that flame burns by touching it1 would know beforehand that flame burns1 and would therefore not touch it4 ,from the species of ,belief constituted by an inference from experience1 ,hume1 by an easy transition1 passes on to ,belief in general1 which he defines to be 'nothing but a more vivid1 lively1 forcible1 firm1 steady conception of an object1 than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain1' referring1 by way of illustration1 to an animal with the head of a man and the body of a horse1 which anyone can imagine1 but no one can believe in1 and desiring us apparently to suppose that if our groom were to come and tell us that he had found a centaur feeding in the paddock beside our favourite saddle-horse1 our sole reason for believing in the horse and for not believing in the centaur would be our greater ability to conceive the one than the other4 ,that such a definition should for a moment have satisfied its author's curiosity1 is itself a psychological curiosity which must not1 however1 be suffered to detain us4 ,whoever1 not content with knowing perfectly well what belief is1 desires to have his knowledge of it set down in writing1 should read the admirable notes on the subject1 with which ,mr4 ,john ,mill and ,mr4 ,bain have enriched the last edition of ,mr4 ,james ,mill's ',analysis of the ,human ,mind4' ,most readers1 however1 will probably be disposed to avail themselves here of a rather favourite phrase of ,hume himself1 and to plead that1 'if we agree about the thing1 it is needless to dispute about terms2' and it is not unlikely that such of them as may have formed their notion of metaphysical discussions in general from the specimens given above1 may go so far as to hint a doubt whether any of the nice verbal distinctions which metaphysicians so much affect1 are really worth the trouble required to understand them4 ,nor would anyone1 perhaps1 be much the worse for acting upon this suspicion1 provided that1 in accordance with it1 he kept altogether aloof from the studies which it disparages4 ,his ideas need not be the less clear because he neither knows nor cares of what they are copies1 nor whether they are copies of anything2 nor will the order of their occurrence be at all affected in consequence of his being similarly careless1 whether that order is or is not governed by a law of association2 neither need his inferences from experience be the less sound in consequence of his never having enquired how or why they are deduced4 ,but although the most absolute ignorance and corresponding indifference about these and kindred topics may not tend in the least to disqualify him for performance of the whole duty of man1 it is not the less important that1 if he do care to know aught about them1 his knowledge should be exact1 for there is no knowing beforehand how luxuriantly the minutest germ of theoretical error may ramify in practice1 or into what substantive quagmire trust in deceitful shadows may lead4 ,these respectable aphorisms may be beneficially borne in mind during perusal of what is about to be said4 ,if the fact were really1 as ,hume supposed1 that we have no reason for our inferences from experience1 and draw them only because either we have been in the habit of drawing them1 or because we are so constituted as to be unable to help drawing them1 the reason of our drawing them plainly could not be that we perceive any necessary connection between antecedent and consequent events1 or any force or power binding these together as cause and effect4 ,accordingly1 ,hume does not scruple to affirm that 'we have no idea of connection or power at all1 and that these words are absolutely without meaning when employed either in philosophical reasoning or in common life4' ,every idea1 he argues1 referring to a rule which he somewhat hastily supposes himself to have already proved to be without exception1 must needs have been copied from some preceding sensible impression1 but neither from within nor from without can we have received an impression from which this particular idea can have been copied4 ,no keenest scrutiny of any portion of matter1 no study of its external configuration or internal structure could1 previously to experience1 enable us to conjecture that it could produce any effect whatever1 still less any particular effect3 could enable us to guess1 for instance1 that flame would burn1 or ice would chill1 if touched4 ,nor even though on once touching flame we get our fingers burnt1 are mature philosophers like us to conclude1 as if we had no more intelligence than so many babies1 that if we touch again we shall be burnt again4 ,all we have as yet learnt from the experiment is that the sensation of touching fire has once been followed by the sensation of burning1 but nothing has occurred to suggest that in the first sensation lurked any secret power of producing the second4 ,and what a single experiment does not prove1 no number of repetitions of precisely the same experiment with precisely the same results can prove4 ,even though on a lengthened course of experience we have found that in every case of our touching flame our fingers have been burnt1 we are still as far as ever from perceiving any bond of connection between the two events4 ,we do indeed believe that as flame when touched has hitherto invariably burnt1 so1 whenever touched hereafter1 it will hereafter invariably burn2 but this1 according to ,hume1 we believe simply because by long practice we have contracted such a habit of associating the idea of touched flame with burnt fingers1 that whenever we witness the one we cannot help expecting the other4 ,neither1 if1 withdrawing our eyes from the outward world1 we cast them inwardly upon the operations of our own minds1 shall we1 according to ,hume1 any the more discover what we are in search of4 ,what though we know by experience that whatever1 within certain limits1 our will appoints1 our bodily organs or mental faculties will ordinarily perform2 that our limbs will move as we wish them1 and our memory1 reason1 or imagination bring forward ideas which we desire to contemplate1 what knowledge have we here beyond that of certain volitions and certain other acts taking place in succession8 ,what smallest evidence have we of any connection between the volitions and the other acts8 ,a volition is an operation of the mind1 is it not8 and body is matter1 is it not8 ,and do you pretend to know--can you form the smallest approach to a guess--how mind is united with body1 and how it is possible therefore for the refined spiritual essence to actuate the gross material substance4 ,if you 'were empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains or to control the planets in their orbit1' would such extensive authority be one whit more inexplicable than the supposed ability of your will to raise your hand to your head or to cause your foot to make one forward step8 ,if1 nevertheless1 you fancy you understand in what manner the will has some of the bodily organs under its government1 how1 pray1 do you account for its not having all equally--the heart and liver as well as the tongue and fingers8 ,without trying1 you never would have discovered that your bowels will not1 any more than without trying you could have known that your limbs will1 ordinarily move in conformity with your wishes4 ,neither1 if one of your limbs were to be suddenly paralysed1 would you1 until you tried1 become aware that it would no longer move as you wished4 ,if there be1 then1 a power attached to the will1 it is plainly experience alone which apprises you of its existence2 whereas if you were independently conscious of it1 you would know beforehand precisely what it can and what it cannot effect1 and would1 moreover1 when you lost it1 become instantly aware of your loss4 ,again1 and above all1 does not anatomy teach us that when the mind wills the movement of any bodily member1 it 'is not the member itself which is immediately moved1 but certain intervening nerves1 muscles1 and animal spirits1 or possibly something still more minute and more unknown1' through which the motion is successively propagated until it reach the member8 ,so that when the mind wills one event1 a series of other events1 quite different and quite unthought of1 take place instead2 and it is only by their means that the will's purpose is finally achieved4 ,but how can the mind be conscious1 how can it form the remotest conception1 of a power which not only never does what the mind desires1 but never does aught of which the mind is cognisant8 ,and as we are thus utterly unable to perceive any power that the mind has over the body1 so are we equally unconscious of any power of the mind over itself4 ,we know as little of its internal nature and constitution as we do of its mode of connection with the body4 ,we know by experience that at the bidding of the will ideas are continually brought forward2 but by what means they are brought forward we are absolutely ignorant1 as we are also of the reasons of the fluctuation of mental activity1 and why mental operations are more vigorous in health than in sickness1 before breakfast than after a heavy dinner or deep carouse4 ,such1 on the issue immediately before us1 is ,hume's reasoning1 to which--though necessarily very greatly condensing it--,i shall1 ,i am sure1 be acknowledged to have conscientiously striven to do full justice1 by bringing all its points into the strongest light1 and arranging them in the most effective order4 ,still1 with its utmost strength thus displayed before us1 we are fully warranted in asserting priori that its whole utmost strength is weakness4 ,if1 by following a leader who has engaged to conduct us to a certain spot1 we find ourselves at our journey's end in a quite different place1 no appeal that the guide can make to maps or finger-posts will persuade us that he has not mistaken the way4 ,nor need our judgment be otherwise1 even though our guide be ,hume1 if1 having started with him in pursuit of truth1 we are finally landed in a patent absurdity4 ,with all due respect for logic1 we protest with ,tony ,lumpkin against being argufied out of our senses1 as we plainly should be if we allowed ourselves to be persuaded that whenever we use the words power or connection we have no idea thereto correspondent4 ,since1 then1 ,hume tells us this1 we may be quite sure that he has been deluded by some fallacy which may be detected by adequate search2 and being1 moreover1 sensible that we really have the idea our possession of which is denied by him1 we may be equally sure that the original of which the idea is a copy is similarly discoverable4 ,in sooth1 neither the one nor the other is far to seek4 ,the fallacy consists simply in confusion of the definite with the indefinite article4 ,the original of our idea of power ,hume himself indicates even while rejecting it4 ,although constrained by ,hume's demonstration to confess that we cannot even conjecture of what kind is the authority which the will exercises over the limbs1 we are not the less sensible that it does exercise an authority of some sort or other1 which they are unable to disobey4 ,we know that in ordinary circumstances our limbs will move when we wish them to move1 and will remain quiet when we wish them not to move4 ,nor this only4 ,we moreover know1 or at any rate fancy we know1 that they would not have moved unless we had wished them4 ,in examples like these of volitions followed1 as the case may be1 by premeditated motion or rest1 we have something more than the simple sequence observable in the succession of external events4 ,we do not perceive simply that1 as when fire is lighted1 heat is emitted1 so when the mind wills the body moves4 ,we perceive clearly that there must be a connection of some sort between antecedent and consequent1 without which the first certainly would not and1 we fancy1 could not have followed the first4 ,we perceive1 in short1 that the second followed because the first preceded4 ,if fire were an animated being1 capable of forming and manifesting volitions2 and if we observed that whenever it wished to emit heat1 heat was emitted2 and that whenever it wished to withhold heat1 heat was withheld2 and if we were thereupon to say that fire has the power of emitting or withholding heat at its pleasure1 our words surely would not be destitute of signification2 they would certainly possess some meaning1 and that a very obvious one4 ,and so they as certainly do when we say that the mind has power over those bodily movements which we observe to take place and to cease in constant conformity with its will4 ,i am not saying that what they mean is necessarily truth--we will come to that presently--all ,i say as yet is1 that they mean something1 and that that something1 whether it be a real or only an imaginary perception1 is perfectly fitted to be the original of that idea of 'power' connecting cause and effect1 or of 'connection' between cause and effect1 which ,hume maintains does not exist1 because there is no original from which it can have been copied4 ,it matters not that we are quite ignorant of what nature is the something from which our idea of power possessed by the mind over the body is derived1 and which1 for aught we know1 may reside1 not in the mind1 but in the body1 and may consist1 not of any strength inherent in the former1 but of loyalty and docility inherent in the latter4 ,just as the authority of a popular general over a well-disciplined army is not the less real because the soldiers1 every one of whose lives is at the general's disposal1 might1 if so inclined1 mutiny en masse1 so it can make no difference in the mind's power over the body whether the mind be intrinsically able to enforce obedience1 or the limbs be so constituted as to be unable to disobey4 ,as little does it matter that we are also ignorant of the mode in which the mind's behests are communicated to the members4 ,it is not the less certain that in some mode or other they are communicated4 ,neither does it signify more that the mind does not communicate directly with the part of the body which it desires to influence1 and acts upon that part only by means of action propagated through a series of intervening parts2 or that it is able to direct only some organs1 and not others1 or cannot direct even those1 if by some accident they have become seriously deranged4 ,a strong-armed blockhead is not the less obviously able to pump up water because the terms 'muscular contractility' and 'atmospheric pressure' are as heathen ,greek to him2 or because the pump-handle1 which alone is directly moved by him1 touches1 not the water itself1 but only the first link in a chain of mechanism connecting it with the water2 or because1 if the sucker of the pump got choked1 or the well were to dry up1 it would be vain for him to go on moving the pump-handle4 ,blockhead as he is1 nothing of all this in the least diminishes his conviction that as long as the pump continues in order and there remains water in the well1 he can oblige the water to rise by moving the pump-handle2 nor can anything analogous prevent the mind from feeling that whenever1 in ordinary circumstances1 it wills that the limbs be moved1 the limbs not only will be moved1 but cannot help being moved accordingly4 ,but it is simply impossible that1 from the exercise of volitions which it knows will be obeyed1 the mind should not receive the sensation of exercising causal power2 and having thus got the sensation1 it has nothing to do but to copy the sensation in order to get the idea of causal power4 ,ce n'est que le premier pas qui cote2 the first step being taken the others cost nothing4 ,the mind having1 by introspection of its own operations1 discovered what ,hume1 though professing to look in the same direction1 unaccountably contrived to overlook--the idea1 namely1 of causal power--proceeds to apply that idea to the connection of external phenomena4 ,not only do we1 whenever we see a horse or an ox walking of its own accord1 infer that the animal walks because it wishes to walk2 but having observed that1 when a stone is thrown into the air it invariably falls presently afterwards towards the ground2 that a magnet invariably attracts any light piece of iron placed near it2 that red-hot coals always burn2 and that water always moistens1 we infer that the second constituent of each brace of phenomena takes place because of the first1 meaning thereby that there is some strong bond connecting the two and compelling one to follow the other4 ,if called upon to justify this inference1 we may do so by reducing to absurdity its only possible alternative4 ,if there be supposed to be no connection between two phenomena constituting one of those invariable sequences which we are accustomed to denominate cause and effect1 the sequence which they constitute must needs be an unconnected sequence1 and the only reason for styling one of the phenomena a cause is1 that it is an antecedent which the other invariably follows4 ,but according to this1 as has been pointed out over and over again1 day would be the cause of night1 and night the cause of day1 and tidal flux and reflux likewise would be each other's causes2 and ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill has therefore proposed to interpolate a word1 and to define the cause of a phenomenon as 'the antecedent on which it 7the phenomenon7 is invariably and unconditionally consequent4'#cj ,i must1 however1 confess myself unable to perceive how the definition is improved by this emendation4 ,there is not1 and cannot possibly be1 such a thing as unconditionally invariable sequence1 as1 indeed1 ,mr4 ,mill himself virtually admits by expressly assuming as an indispensable condition of all causation that 'the present constitution of things endure4' ,but if1 notwithstanding the presence of this indispensable condition1 it be permissible to call any sequence unconditionally invariable1 then the sequences of night upon day and of day upon night are such sequences1 and day and night continue consequently entitled to be styled each other's causes as much under the amended as under the original definition4 ,for as long as 'the present constitution of things endures1' that is1 as long as the earth continues to revolve on its axis1 and the sun continues to shine1 and no opaque substance intervenes between earth and sun1 day and night will continue to be as invariably and unconditionally each other's antecedents as sunlight will continue to be the antecedent or concomitant of day4 ,true1 ,mr4 ,mill denies that the earth's diurnal motion is part of the present constitution of things1 because1 according to him1 'nothing can be so called which might possibly be terminated or altered by natural causes3' but1 if so1 then neither ought sunlight to be so called1 for it too quite possibly may1 nay1 in the opinion of many philosophers1 most certainly will1 be extinguished eventually by natural causes4 ,if day ought not to be called the unconditionally invariable consequent of night merely because it would cease to be so if the earth were to cease turning on its axis1 then neither ought it to be called the unconditionally invariable consequent of the unshrouded proximity of the sun1 inasmuch as it would cease to be thereupon consequent if the sun were to become burnt out4 ,if night be not1 and if sunlight be1 the cause of day1 the reason is not that sunlight always hitherto has been1 and1 on one indispensable condition1 always will be followed by day1 for so equally has hitherto been1 and on the same condition will hereafter be1 night4 ,the real reason is1 that sunlight not only always has been and will be1 but also always must be followed by day2 that unless the constitution of nature very materially change1 wherever is sunlight day must be2 whereas not only might day be1 although night had never preceded1 but unless night had preceded1 day must have been from the beginning4 ,in short1 to constitute cause1 invariability1 however unconditional1 will not suffice4 ,another quality must be added1 and that quality ,i contend to be obligatoriness4 ,a cause1 ,i maintain1 would not be a cause unless its effect not only do or will1 but must necessarily follow it4 ,in common with the great unphilosophic mass of mankind1 ,i hold that between cause and effect there is a binding power which constrains the one to follow the other4 ,if asked whence we suppose that power can have been derived1 such of us1 as conscious that we are 'no very great wits1' don't mind confessing that we 'believe in a ,god1' will not mind either suggesting that the power1 wherever not exerted by an animated creature1 may possibly be directly from ,god4 ,one thing certain is1 that inanimate matter cannot possibly possess or exercise any force or power whatever1 so that1 unless matter1 although apparently dead1 be really alive1 attraction1 cohesion1 gravitation1 and all its other so called forces1 being incompatible with dead inertness1 must needs be manifestations of some living1 and possibly divine1 power4 ,far from there being any difficulty in conceiving ,omnipresent ,deity to be exhibiting its might in every speck of universal space in every instant of never-ending time1 it is1 on the contrary1 impossible to conceive otherwise4 ,we cannot conceive one single minutest point in limitless extension to be for one moment exempt from the immediate control of a divine nature assumed to be ,diffused throughout infinity's expanse ,and co-existent with eternity4 ,here1 indeed1 we hasten to acknowledge with ,hume that 'our line is too short to fathom the immense abyss' which we have now reached4 ,but we need not1 therefore1 follow ,hume to the lengths to which his insidious mock-modesty would fain entice us4 ,we may concede to him that 'we have no idea of a ,supreme ,being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties1' but we need not imitate him by perversely shutting our eyes to the evidences of an energy inherent in our own faculties1 and thereby entitle him to insist on our joining him in denying that there is any evidence of energy in the ,supreme ,being4 ,we need not1 because constrained to admit that we know no more of the essence of divine1 than we do of human1 power1 pretend that we cannot even conceive such a thing as divine power4 ,hume's affectation of profound ignorance on the subject must have occasioned unusual amusement in a certain quarter4 ,the ,devil can seldom have had a more hearty grin at his darling sin than when witnessing this peculiar exhibition of the pride that apes humility4 ,that ,hume's ignorance was nothing but affectation is proved by his veering completely round immediately afterwards1 and in his very next chapter1 and almost in his very next page1 pronouncing it to be 'universally allowed that matter in all its operations is actuated by a necessary force1 and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect in such particular circumstances could possibly have resulted from it4' ,throughout the same chapter he argues in the same sense1 and quite forgetting how obstinately he had just before contended that there are absolutely no such things as connection or power at all1 he defies any one to 'define a cause without comprehending1 as part of the definition1 necessary connection with its effect4' ,so highly1 indeed1 does he now rate that connecting power1 whose very existence he had previously so vehemently denied1 that he professes himself unable to set any limit to its efficacy4 ,even for those who should undertake to deduce from it the impossibility of any liberty of human will1 and consequently of any human responsibility1 pleading that1 inasmuch as with a continued chain of necessary causes1 reaching from the first great cause of all to every separate volition of every single human creature1 it must needs be the ,creator of the world who is the ultimate author of all volitions1 and consequently solely accountable for every crime which man commits1 he affects1 with exceedingly ill-sitting sanctimoniousness1 to have no better answer than that such belief1 being impious1 must be absurd and cannot be true4 ,it did not suit his purpose to point out that the volitions of ,omnipotence itself1 equally with human volitions1 are necessary effects of causes--the causes in their case being the other attributes with which ,omnipotence is conjoined--and that as it is nevertheless impossible for the volitions of ,omnipotence to be otherwise than absolutely free and uncontrolled1 so there is no reason why human volitions likewise should not1 in spite of the same objection1 be as thoroughly free as our own feelings assure us they are4 ,hume's sudden conversion1 so amazing at first sight1 from flattest denial to positivest assertion of causal power1 becomes intelligible when he is seen immediately afterwards using his newly adopted creed as a fulcrum whereon to rest his argumentative lever in his assault upon ,miracles4 ,about that celebrated piece of reasoning1 startling as the avowal may sound1 there is1 to my mind1 nothing more remarkable than its celebrity1 for1 on close inspection1 it will be found to be entirely made up of 7#a7 the demonstration of a truism1 and 7#b7 the inculcation of a confessedly misleading rule4 ,not far from its commencement will be found a definition which1 if correct1 would leave nothing to dispute about4 ,a miracle1 we are told1 is 'a violation of the laws of nature1' of laws which a firm and unalterable experience has established4 ,but if so1 cadit qustio4 ,of course1 there can be no alteration of the unalterable4 ,no need1 of course1 of further words to prove that a miracle thus defined is an impossibility4 ,let us suppose1 however1 the word unalterable to have been used here by a slip of the pen instead of unaltered1 and that ,hume really meant by a miracle any alteration of what had previously appeared to be the constant course of nature4 ,even so1 we shall have him contending that no amount1 however great1 of testimony however unimpeachable1 ought to be accepted as adequate proof of such an alteration4 ,of what he urges in support of this position much may be at once dismissed as altogether irrelevant4 ,that the most honest witness may be the dupe of optical or auricular illusion1 or of a distorting or magnifying imagination2 that there is in many minds a natural predisposition to believe in the marvellous1 and that the love of astonishing often gives exaggerated expression to the exaggerations of the fancy2 that self-interest and religious zeal often furnish additional motives for mendacity1 and that testimony1 even when sincere at first1 is apt to become corrupted at every stage as it passes from hand to hand1 or is committed to paper--all this1 together with any further enumeration of circumstances calculated to invalidate testimony1 is quite beside the real question4 ,it merely proves what no one needs to have proved1 the propriety1 viz41 of weighing evidence and balancing adverse probabilities2 and even though it proved in addition that of all the so-styled miracles on record1 there is not a single one the evidence for which is sufficient1 it would still prove nothing to the purpose4 ,for ,hume is arguing against the credibility1 not of any miracles in particular1 but of all miracles in general1 those included the witnesses for which are of indisputable intelligence and undisputed veracity4 ,be the quality of the testimony what it may1 no quantity of it1 according to him1 can be sufficient4 ,this is the essence of his thesis1 the only part of it in which there is any novelty1 and in behalf of this part all that he has to say may be resolved into a sophism1 followed by a repetition of the same begging of the question1 as is involved in his afore-cited definition of a miracle4 ,in substance it runs as follows4 ,all testimony is at best but a description of the results of sensible experience--of observations of the senses--but the most faithful description must needs be a less vivid presentation of truth than the reality described4 ,a single original is better evidence than any number of copies4 ,your own personal experience is more trustworthy than any number of mere records of the experience of other people1 and where the two conflict1 the former always deserves preference4 ,now the personal experience of each one of us assures us that many sets of natural phenomena take place in perfectly invariable sequences1 in sequences so invariable as to appear to be1 and to be familiarly spoken of as1 manifestations or operations of certain inflexible laws of nature4 ,within our experience there has never been a single deviation from any such law4 ,wherefore1 though all the rest of mankind should unite in asserting that they have observed such a deviation1 we ought not to believe them4 ,even though1 for example--the example1 however1 being not ,hume's1 but my own--we were1 on leaving home some morning1 to hear on all sides that1 while we were yet in bed1 the sun was seen to rise in the west instead of the east1 and though we found the statement repeated in the ',times' and ',daily ,news1' and presently afterwards saw it posted up at the ,exchange as having been flashed by electric wire from ,new ,york and ,kurrachee1 we are not for a moment to doubt that these reiterated and mutually corroborative statements are utterly false4 ,for1 numerous and consistent as they may be1 they are but copies of the experience of other people1 while1 although we may have to oppose to them only our own single experience1 still that single experience is original1 and therefore of more worth4 ,the value1 moreover1 of any experience is1 irrespective of originality1 determined by the difference in number between the results of opposite kinds which it has discovered4 ,the smaller number is deducted from the larger1 and the balance represents the probability that the results which have most frequently occurred hitherto will continue to occur henceforward4 ,the larger the deduction thus to be made1 the smaller the probability1 and vice vers2 and when the deduction is nil1 or when there has hitherto been complete uniformity1 the probability becomes virtual certainty4 ,when two original experiences are opposed to each other1 their respective values1 ascertained in the same manner1 are compared1 and trust is reposed in one or the other accordingly4 ,now1 according to these principles1 difficult as it might be in the case supposed for any one to conceive what motive all the rest of the world could have for lying1 it would be still more difficult to believe them to be speaking truth4 ,for why do we ever believe anything that anyone says8 ,why but because we have learnt by experience that1 when people have no apparent motive for lying1 they commonly do speak the truth8 ,but the same experience which has taught us this has taught us likewise that people do now and then lie without apparent motive4 ,at best1 therefore1 there is never more than a probability that people are speaking the truth1 while in this instance1 the supposition that they might be speaking the truth would imply that there may be a truth against which there is proof amounting to certainty4 ,for what they affirm is that something has happened the very reverse of what has invariably happened before in the same circumstances4 ,is it not infinitely more likely that people should be lying as they have often done before1 than that the invariable course of nature should have undergone a variation8 ,with evidence on the one side that has never yet deceived1 with no evidence on the other save what has often proved deceptive1 how can we hesitate which to accept8 ,even though the unanimity of testimony be such as might otherwise be deemed complete proof1 it is here met by absolutely complete proof in the shape of a law of nature4 ,the greater probability overwhelms the lesser4 ,the stronger proof annihilates the weaker1 leaving none of it behind1 so that whoever still persists in believing that a law of nature has been violated1 must be content to do so without one particle of proof4 ,no quantity of testimony can furnish the smallest proof of a miracle unless the falsehood of the testimony would be a greater departure from antecedent uniformity--in other words1 would be a greater miracle--than the miracle which it attests4 ,unfortunately it is but too notorious that there is not1 and never has been1 such a thing as uniform truthfulness of testimony to depart from4 ,such1 unless most unintentionally injured by compression1 is ,hume's famous argument against miracles1 of which the author was sufficiently proud to boast openly that in it he had discovered what 'will be useful1 as long as the world endures1' as 'an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion1' but which1 as ,i nevertheless venture to repeat1 is compounded in about equal moieties of transparent sophism and baseless assumption4 ,for is it not the veriest juggle of words to insist on the necessary inferiority of copies to an original1 without adverting to the indispensable proviso that the original with which the copies are compared should be the original from which the copies have been taken8 ,may not a copy of ,leonardo ,da ,vinci's ',last ,supper' quite possibly be equal in force and vividness of expression to the original painting by ,benjamin ,west bearing the same name8 ,might it not be wise to trust rather to an ,airy1 or a ,de la ,rue1 or a ,lockyer's account of what he had observed during a solar eclipse than to your own immediate observations on the same occasion8 ,besides1 this first branch of ,hume's argument1 if sound1 would tell quite as much for1 as against1 miracles1 rendering it equally incumbent on actual witnesses to believe1 as on all but actual witnesses to disbelieve4 ,if you are always to prefer your own original experience to mere descriptions given by other people of theirs1 then should it happen to be yourself to whom the sun appeared in the west at an hour when1 according to custom1 he ought to have been in the east1 you are not to allow the protestations of any number of persons who1 happening at the time to have been looking the other way1 saw the sun in his usual place1 to persuade you that what you saw was a mock sun or an ignis fatuus4 ,rather than imagine that your own senses can have deceived you1 you are to suppose that all about you are in a league to deceive you4 ,for precisely the same reason for which you should reject even universal testimony in favour of a miracle which you have not witnessed1 you are equally to reject universal testimony in opposition to a miracle the similitude of which you have witnessed4 ,or is it possible for a question to be more distinctly begged than when1 to the question whether a miracle has occurred1 it is answered that a miracle is not a miracle unless there be uniform experience against it2 that uniformly adverse experience is direct and full proof against anything2 and that therefore there must always be full proof against miracles8 ,what is here taken for granted to be full proof is the very thing requiring to be proved4 ,if past uniformity really be a pledge for continued uniformity1 of course there can be no departure from uniformity4 ,if the whole question does not at once fall to the ground1 it is because no question has ever really arisen4 ,but what shadow of pretext is there for treating an hitherto unvaried course of events as necessarily invariable8 ,from past experience we have deduced what we are pleased to call laws of nature1 but it is morally impossible that we can seriously think1 whatever we are in the habit of saying1 that these laws are self-denying ordinances whereby nature's ,god has voluntarily abdicated part of ,his inalienable prerogative4 ,the utmost efficacy we are warranted in ascribing to them is that of lines marking certain of the courses within which ,god's providence is pleased to move4 ,but how can we pretend to know for how long a season such may continue to be the divine pleasure8 ,how do we know that the present season may not be the first of an alternating series1 and that it may not at any moment terminate1 and be succeeded by one of an opposite character8 ,what though we have some shadow of historical evidence that most physical phenomena have been going on in much the same order for some six thousand years1 is that a basis whereon to theorise with regard to the proceedings of ,him in whose sight one day is as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day8 ,might not as well some scientific member of an insect tribe of ephemera1 whom ancestral tradition1 confirmed by personal experience1 had assured that an eight-day clock had already gone on for six days1 pronounce it to be a law of the clock's nature that it should go on for ever without being again wound up8 ,would the insect philosopher's dogmatism be one whit less absurd than that of those human ephemera who so positively lay down the law about the clockwork of the universe8 ,those laws of nature to which unerring regularity and perpetuity of operation are so confidently attributed1 may they not1 perchance1 be but single clauses of much farther reaching laws1 according to whose other provisions the force of these isolated clauses may1 in novel combinations of circumstances1 be counteracted by some latent and hitherto unsuspected force8 ,or is it not1 at all events1 open to their divine promulgator to suspend their operation at his pleasure8 ,may it not conceivably have been preordained that the globe of our earth1 after revolving for a given number of ages1 in one direction1 shall then1 like a meat-jack1 or like an ,ascidian's heart1#ca reverse its order of procedure1 and commence a contrary series of revolutions8 ,or might not ,he who prescribed to the earth its rotatory movement1 will that the rotation should for some hours cease1 and that the sun should in consequence seem to stand still1 as it is recorded to have done at the command of ,joshua8 ,improbable as these suppositions may be1 who that has not been taken into counsel by his ,creator can presume to say that they may not be correct8 ,the events which they involve are not inconceivable1 and whatever is not utterly inconceivable may possibly occur1 however numerous the chances against its occurrence4 ,it is not then the fact that 'past experience1' however unvaried1 affords full proof of the future existence of any event1 or constitutes certainty against the future existence of the reverse of that event4 ,completest uniformity of experience cannot create a certainty by which any opposite probability would be completely annihilated4 ,it only creates a probability which1 however great1 is still only a probability1 and which would become a smaller probability by deduction from it of any opposite probability4 ,but mere probability1 however great1 always includes some doubt as to its own correctness1 some suspicion that its opposite may possibly be correct4 ,how much soever1 therefore1 uniform experience may vouch for the inviolability of natural laws1 it always remains possible for those laws to be violated1 and1 as miracles are nothing else but violations of natural laws1 it always remains possible for miracles to happen4 ,but since miracles are possible1 testimony to their occurrence may1 with equal possibility1 be true1 and no further refutation can1 ,i submit1 be needed for an argument which insists that all such testimony should be set aside without enquiry as self-evidently false4 ,had ,hume been content to insist that testimony in favour of miracles should never be received without extreme doubt and hesitation1 his lesson might well have passed without further objection than that of its being superfluous for any one with sense enough to profit by it4 ,nor might it have been easy to discover a flaw in his logic1 although he had gone so far as to maintain that no one of the miracles as yet on record is either adequately attested1 or would1 even if it had undoubtedly occurred1 afford sufficient evidence of any religious truth4 ,the best and only adequate evidence for any religious creed is the satisfaction which it affords to the soul's cravings and promises to the soul's aspirations2 and no rational ,christian would be at all the more disposed to turn ,mussulman1 even though it should be demonstrated to his entire conviction that ,christ did not raise ,lazarus from the dead1 and that ,mahomet did turn the hill ,safa into gold1 instead of prudently confining himself to boasting that he could have effected the transmutation if he had thought proper4 ,but for the purpose which ,hume had in view1 it was necessary to establish1 not merely the doubtfulness1 but the absolute falsehood of the miracular testimony on which1 in his opinion1 'our holy religion' rests1 in order that the character of the superstructure being inferred from that of the foundation1 both might be condemned together4 ,there is1 however1 an irreligious as well as a religious fanaticism1 and1 though it is difficult1 while looking at ,hume's portrait1 to credit the owner of that plump1 good-humoured face with feeling of any sort warm enough to be termed fanatical1 it is humiliating to note from his example into what strange inconsistency the coolest and calmest judgment may be warped by irreligious prejudice4 ,having not long before1 in order to disparage natural religion1 emphatically denied the existence of any causal connection between successive events1 he now1 in order equally to discredit the very possibility of revealed religion1 tacitly assumes that same connection1 not simply to exist1 but to be of an efficacy which no disturbing forces can impair4 ,admitting that 'the ,indian prince who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost' was wrong in his belief1 ,hume will have it that the prince nevertheless 'reasoned justly4' ,although recognising truth to be the sole worthy object of quest1 he yet enjoins rigid adherence to a rule which he is aware must inevitably lead to frequent error4 ,rather strikingly contrasted1 in respect of execution1 with ,hume's chapter on ,miracles1 comes the one next in order on a ,providence and a ,future ,state1 which1 for the skill with which the fallacy involved in it is disguised1 may be regarded as quite a masterpiece of false reasoning4 ,among its leading propositions there is but one which does not command immediate assent4 ,that we can argue but from what we know2 that of causes1 known to us only by their effects1 our estimate ought to be exactly proportioned to the effects2 that of a ,creator manifested only by ,his works1 no higher qualities1 no greater degrees of power1 intelligence1 justice1 or benevolence1 can be confidently predicated--whatever be conjectured--than are apparent in his workmanship3 all this1 on one moment's reflection1 is perceived to be indisputable4 ,needs must it be1 however reluctantly1 admitted that nothing can be more illogical than to return back to the cause1 and infer from it other effects beyond those by which alone it is known to us1 or to infer from creative attributes1 distinctly manifested1 the existence of other and not apparent attributes1 endowed with some efficacy additional to that possessed by the former4 ,but does it hence follow that faith in a superintending ,providence is so mere a matter of 'conceit and imagination1' a faith so absolutely irrational as ,hume considered it8 ,a candid examination of ,god's works will warrant us in coming to a widely different conclusion4 ,among those works is man--a being who1 in spite of the utter insignificance of his greatest performances1 is capable of forming most exalted conceptions of justice1 benevolence1 and goodness in general1 and of feeling the most eager desire to act up to his own ideal4 ,if the divine notions of goodness in its several varieties be not identical with the human1 it can only be because they are superior2 and so1 too1 of the divine love of1 and zeal for1 goodness4 ,it cannot be that the ,creator is inferior to the creature in virtues which the creature derives from ,him alone4 ,demonstrably1 therefore1 ,god is good and just in the very highest degree in which those qualities can be conceived by man4 ,demonstrably1 too1 since the universe is the work of ,his hands1 ,he must be possessed of power which1 if not necessarily unbounded1 is at least as boundless as the universe4 ,thus1 rigidly arguing from effects to causes1 and scrupulously proportioning the one to the other1 man sees imaged on the face of creation a creator1 both realising his highest conception of goodness1 and wielding measureless might4 ,is not such a being worthy to be looked up to1 and confided in1 and adored and loved as a superintending providence8 ,is not faith in such a providence not simply not irrational1 but the direct result of a strictly inductive process8 ,and would it be an irrational stretch of faith sanguinely to hope1 if not implicitly to believe1 that an union of infinite justice with measureless might may1 in some future stage of existence1 afford compensation for the apparently inequitable distribution of good and evil which1 according to all experience1 has hitherto taken place among human beings8 ,were it desirable to amplify the apology with which this paper commenced1 some additional justification of the freedom of the foregoing criticisms might be found in hints thrown out by ,hume in various parts of the treatise which we have been examining1 and particularly in its concluding chapter1 that in many of his most startling doctrines he was but half in earnest4 ,hume's temperament1 too cool for fanaticism1 had yet in it enough of a certain tepid geniality to save him from becoming a scoffer4 ,the character which he claims for himself1 and somewhat ostentatiously parades1 is that of a sceptic or general doubter--a character in which1 when rightly understood1 there is nothing to be ashamed of4 ,to take nothing on trust1 to believe nothing without proof1 to show no greater respect for authority than may consist in attentive and candid examination of its statements1 to accept only verified facts as bases for reasoning on matters of fact and existence--these are golden rules of philosophical research1 principles in which lies the secret of all real progress in any of the higher departments of science4 ,by ,hume they were adopted con amore1 and with keen appreciation1 not more of their practical utility1 than of the sport which he perceived them to be capable of yielding4 ,his serious purpose was to unmask the numberless pretences which in politics1 political economy1 metaphysics1 morals1 and theology he found universally current as gospel truths2 to expose the ambiguity and contradictions latent in popular thought1 and in the popular forms of expression which are so apt to be mistaken for thought1 and to indicate the only safe mode of investigation and the only trustworthy tests of genuine knowledge2 his favourite amusement to put time-honoured commonplaces on the rack1 and demanding their raison d'tre1 to pass on them summary sentence of extinction if they failed to account satisfactorily for their existence4 ,unfortunately1 in his keen enjoyment of the fun of the thing1 he not unfrequently overlooked the solid interests at stake4 ,like a huntsman who1 for the sake of a better run1 should outrace his quarry1 or who1 seeing that the dogs were close upon the hare1 should1 in order to prolong the chase1 start a fresh hare1 kept till then snug at his saddle-bow1 so ,hume1 in the excitement of metaphysical pursuit1 instead of stopping to gather up whatever verified affirmations came in his way1 would prefer to follow any new negation that he espied1 or1 if momentarily accepting any affirmation as established1 would proceed forthwith to affirm its direct opposite with the view of neutralising both4 ,in this1 his practice resembled that of metaphysicians in general1 who take a singular delight in setting themselves riddle after riddle1 which they either assume to be hopelessly insoluble1 or which they no sooner solve than they use the solution as the subject of another riddle involving its predecessor in redoubled perplexity4 ,now1 little harm1 and little1 perhaps1 of anything but good1 might thereby be done if the lovers of this game were content to play it by themselves1 without inviting others to join who are constitutionally unfit for such intellectual wrestling4 ,but mental exercises may to philosophers be health and invigorating sport1 and yet be death to the multitude2 and ,hume1 as an ,utilitarian1 stands self-condemned for making ordinary people uncomfortable by challenging them to disputations confessedly leading no whither1 and bewildering them with confessedly 'vain and profane babblings1 and strivings after words to no profit1 but to subverting of the hearers1 and overthrow of the faith of some4' ,and it is as poor an excuse for this wanton tampering with other people's creeds1 as it is poor amends for its mischievous consequences1 that ,hume offers when1 after watching for a while his puzzled disciples blown about by the winds of adverse doctrine that he has let loose upon them1 he proceeds to rally them on their 'whimsical condition1' which he speaks of as a mere laughing matter got up chiefly for amusement4 ,it is only an aggravation of offence that1 while1 on the one hand1 he solemnly pronounces everything to be 'a riddle1 an enigma1 an inexplicable mystery1' he1 on the other hand1 cheerily exhorts us not to suffer the 'doubts raised by philosophy to affect our actions4' ',nature1' he says1 'is always too strong for principles1 will always maintain her rights1 and prevail1 in the end1 against all reasoning whatever4' ',the great subverter of ,pyrrhonism1' he continues1 'is actual employment and the occupations of common life1' in presence of which its overstrained scruples 'vanish like smoke4' ,although real knowledge consists solely in knowing that we know nothing1 and in doubting everything1 and although sceptics may 'justly triumph' in principles which lead them to deny even the attraction of gravitation1 still they had better beware how they act on these principles1 lest by stepping unconcernedly out of window they come fatally to grief on the stones below1 and so the sect and its tenets be annihilated together4 ,so1 or to such effect1 ,hume3 but how can there be just ground for pride in speculations which1 as their own professors admit1 would1 on the first attempt to reduce them to practice1 be shattered to pieces by hard facts8 ,that cannot possibly1 even on ,hume's recommendation1 be accepted as metaphysical truth1 which flatly contradicts common sense1 nor can there be any unbecoming self-confidence in seeking1 even though ,hume pronounce the search hopeless1 for metaphysical truth1 with which common sense may be reconciled4 ,,footnotes3 #bi ,analysis of the ,phenomena of the ,human ,mind4 ,by ,james ,mill4 ,edition of #ahfi1 with ,notes by ,alexander ,bain1 ,andrew ,findlater1 ,george ,grote1 and ,john ,stuart ,mill1 vol4 i4 pp4 #gh et seq4 #cj ,mill's ',logic4' #eth ,edition4 ,vol4 i4 p4 #cgg4 #ca ',there is a class of animals called ,ascidians1 which possess a heart and a circulation1 and up to the year #ahbd no one would have dreamt of questioning the propriety of the deduction1 that these creatures have a circulation in one definite and invariable direction2 nor would any one have thought it worth while to verify the point4 ,but in that year ,m4 von ,hasselt1 happening to examine a transparent animal of this class1 found to his infinite surprise that after the heart had beat a certain number of times1 it stopped1 and then began beating the opposite way1 so as to reverse the course of the current1 which returned by-and-by to its original direction4'--,huxley's ,lay ,sermons1 p4 #ie4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,huxleyism4 ' force d'esprit tout lui parot matire4' ,in one of his interesting ',lay ,sermons1' the most interesting perhaps of the whole interesting series1 ,professor ,huxley1 taking for his theme the ',physical ,basis of ,life1' combats 'the widely-spread conception of life as a something which works through matter1 but is independent of it2' affirming1 on the contrary1 'that matter and life are inseparably connected1 and that there is one kind of matter which is common to all living beings4' ,the preacher may be safely allowed to have satisfactorily made out the second portion of this affirmation4 ,with his own singular felicity of illustration1 he shows how all vegetable and animal tissues1 without exception1 from that of the brightly coloured lichen looking so like a mere mineral incrustation on the rock that bears it1 to that of the painter who admires or the botanist who dissects it1 are1 however diverse in aspect1 essentially one in composition and structure4 ,he explains how the microscopic fungi clustering by millions within the body of a single fly1 the giant pine of ,california towering to the height of a cathedral spire1 the ,indian fig-tree covering acres with its profound shadow1 the animalcules of ocean's lowest deep1 minute enough to dance in myriads on the point of a needle1 and the ,finner whale1 hugest of beasts1 that disports its ninety feet of bone and blubber on ocean's billowy heights1 the flower that a girl wears in her hair1 and the blood that courses through her veins1 are1 each and all1 smaller or larger multiples or aggregates of one and the same structural unit1 which1 again1 is invariably resolvable into the same identical elements4 ,that unit1 he tells us1 is an atom or corpuscle composed of oxygen1 nitrogen1 hydrogen1 and carbon1 which1 and which alone1 seem to be required by nature for laying withal the foundations of vitality1 inasmuch as no substance from which any one of these ingredients is totally absent1 ever exhibits any sign of life1 while1 on the other hand1 not only are these four ingredients sufficient of themselves to form a substance capable of living1 but they actually do with very little 7when any7 foreign admixture1 form all substances whatsoever that are ever found vivified4 ,all such substances1 he informs us1 are but varieties of protoplasm1 differing indeed from each other in texture1 colour1 and general appearance1 even as a diamond differs from granite1 yet all being equally protoplasm1 just as a diamond and a block of granite are equally stones1 or as heart of oak and the outer case of a nettle's sting are equally wood4 ,the human ovum1 he gives us to understand1 is in its earliest stage but a single particle of protoplasm2 the human foetus but an aggregation of such particles1 variously modified2 the human body perfectly matured1 but a larger aggregation of such particles still further modified4 ,he proceeds to point out1 as following from these premises1 that a solution of smelling salts1 together with an infinitesimal quantity of certain other salts1 contains all the elements that enter into the composition of protoplasm1 and consequently of whatever substance the very highest animal requires for sustenance4 ,he does not1 however1 leave us to suppose that any abundance of the fluid in question would avail aught to save a hungry creature of any sort from starving1 but continues his exposition to the following effect4 ,not only is there no animal1 there is not even any vegetable organism1 to which the elements of food can serve as food1 as long as they remain elementary4 ,it is indispensable that hydrogen and oxygen should combine to form water1 nitrogen and hydrogen to form ammonia1 carbon and oxygen to form carbonic acid2 and even then1 even at a table groaning under whole hogsheads of these primitive compounds1 there is no single animal that would not find itself at a ,barmecide feast4 ,there are many plants likewise1 which in the midst of such uncongenial plenty would be equally without a drop to drink2 but there are also multitudes of others which1 without the aid of any more elaborated nutriment1 would be able to grow into a million1 nay million million fold of their original bulk4 ,provided there be in the seed or germ of any of these latter one single particle of living protoplasm to begin with1 that single particle may convert into animated protoplasm an indefinite quantity of inanimate ammonia1 carbonic acid1 and water4 ,the protoplasm thus created in the first instance1 and created1 let us suppose1 in the form of a lichen or a fungus1 is converted by decay into vegetable mould1 in which grass may take root and grow1 and which1 in that case1 will be converted into herbaceous protoplasm2 which1 being eaten by sheep or oxen1 becomes ovine or bovine protoplasm1 commonly called mutton or beef2 which1 again1 being eaten by man1 becomes human protoplasm1 and1 if eaten by a philosopher1 becomes part of a mass of protoplasm capable of investigating and of expounding in lectures or lay sermons1 the changes which itself and its several components have undergone4 ,so far we advance with willing steps like dutiful disciples along the path of knowledge indicated by our distinguished biological teacher1 who here1 however1 pulls us up short by suddenly intimating that he sees no break in the series of transubstantiations whereby precisely such oxygen1 hydrogen1 nitrogen1 and carbon as he is lecturing upon1 have become metamorphosed into him1 the lecturer1 and us1 the lectured audience1 and cannot 'understand why the language which is applicable to any one term of the series should not be used in regard to any of the others4' ,oxygen and hydrogen1 he reminds us1 are gases1 whose particles1 at and also much below #cb ,fahrenheit1 tend to rush away from each other with great force2 and this tendency we call a property of each gas4 ,let oxygen and hydrogen be mixed in certain proportions1 and an electric spark passed through them1 and they will disappear1 and a quantity of water equal in weight to the sum of their weights will appear in their place4 ,but amongst the properties of the water will be some1 the direct opposites of those of its components2 watery particles1 for example1 at any temperature not higher than #cb ,fahrenheit1 tending not to rush asunder1 but to cohere into definite geometrical shapes or to build up frosty imitations of vegetable foliage4 ,and let the water be brought into conjunction with ammonia and carbonic acid1 and the three will1 under certain conditions1 give rise to protoplasm1 which again1 if subjected to a certain succession of processes1 will rise by successive stages from protoplasm that gives no other signs of life than those of feeding and reproducing its kind1 to protoplasm endowed with the power of spontaneous motion1 and finally to protoplasm that thinks and reasons1 speculates and philosophises4 ,now why should any of the various phenomena of life exhibited by these varieties of protoplasm be supposed to be of a different class from the appearances of activity exhibited by any of the varieties of lifeless matter8 ,what reason is there why1 for instance1 thought should not be termed a property of thinking protoplasm1 just as congelation is a property of water1 and centrifugience of gas8 ,professor ,huxley protests that he is aware of no reason4 ,we call1 he says1 the several strange phenomena which are peculiar to water1 'the properties of water1 and do not hesitate to believe that in some way or other they result from the properties of the component elements of water4 ,we do not assume that something called aquosity entered into and took possession of the oxide of hydrogen as soon as it was formed1 and then guided the aqueous particles to their places in the facets of the crystal or among the leaflets of the hoar frost4 ,on the contrary1 we live in the hope and faith that1 by the advance of molecular physics1 we shall by-and-by be able to see our way as clearly from the constituents of water to the properties of water1 as we are now able to deduce the operations of a watch from the form of its parts or the manner in which they are put together4' ,why1 then1 when carbonic acid1 water1 and ammonia disappear1 and an equivalent weight of the matter of life makes its appearance in their place1 should we assume the existence in the living matter of a something which has no representative or correlative in the unliving matter that gave rise to it8 ,why imagine that into the newly formed hydro-nitrogenised oxide of carbon a something called vitality entered and took possession8 ',what better philosophical status has vitality than aquosity8' ',if scientific language is to possess a definite and constant signification1 we are1' he considers1 'logically bound to apply to protoplasm or the physical basis of life the same conceptions as those which are held to be legitimate elsewhere4' ,wherefore1 he concludes1 that 'if the phenomena exhibited by water are its properties1 so are those presented by protoplasm its properties1' and that if it be correct to describe 'the properties of water as resulting from the nature and disposition of its component molecules1' there can be no 'intelligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules4' ,here1 however1 our lay preacher candidly warns us that by the vast majority of his clerical brethren this doctrine would be denounced as rankest heresy1 and that whoever accepts it is placing his foot on the first rung of a ladder which1 in most people's estimation1 is the 'reverse of ,jacob's1 and leads to the antipodes of heaven4' ,he frankly owns that the terms of his propositions are distinctly materialistic3 nay1 that whoever commits himself to them will be temporarily landed in 'gross materialism4' ,not the less1 however1 does he1 mingling consolation with admonition1 recommend us to plunge boldly into the materialistic slough1 promising to point out a way of escape from it1 and insisting1 indeed1 that through it lies the only path to genuine spiritualistic truth4 ,in pronouncing this to be exceedingly evil counsel1 as with the most unfeigned respect for its author ,i feel bound at once to do1 it might not be necessary for me to undertake a detailed topographical survey of the path alluded to4 ,it might1 perhaps1 suffice to specify the conclusions to which the path is represented as leading1 in order to show that those conclusions cannot possibly be reached by any such route4 ,by ,professor ,huxley himself they are thus described3--,we know nothing of matter 'except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness1' nor of spirit1 except that 'it also is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause of states of consciousness4 ,in other words matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena4' ,but if matter be not a thing1 but a name1 and a name too not for a real1 but only an imaginary thing1 one perfect certainty is that matter cannot possibly be composed either wholly or in part of molecules1 and1 by necessary consequence1 that life cannot possibly be 'the product of any disposition of material molecules1' nor the phenomena of life be 'expressions of molecular changes in the matter of life4' ,of the particular ,huxleian doctrine which we are considering1 the two moieties are absolutely irreconcileable2 so that on the assumption that either moiety were true1 the truth of that moiety would be decisive against the other4 ,if matter have no real1 and only a nominal existence1 life1 which is undeniably a reality1 cannot be a property of matter4 ,if life1 being an undisputed reality1 be a property of matter1 matter must needs be a reality also1 and not merely a name4 ,any one1 however1 who1 like myself1 is thoroughly convinced that both halves of the doctrine are equally and utterly erroneous1 is precluded from employing one for the refutation of the other1 and in order to prove1 as ,i shall now attempt to do1 that life is in no sense either a product or a property of matter1 must resort for the purpose to independent reasoning4 ,i commence by defining one of the principal terms occurring in the debate4 ,when in scientific discourse we speak of anything as a property of an object1 we mean thereby not simply that it is a thing belonging to the object1 but also that it is a thing without which the object could not subsist4 ,we mean that it is one of the constituents inherent in and inseparable from the object1 whose union gives to the object its distinctive character4 ,when we call fluidity at one temperature1 solidity at another1 and vaporisation at a third1 properties of water1 we mean that matter which did not liquefy1 congeal1 and evaporate at different temperatures would not be water4 ,the habits of exhibiting these phenomena1 in conjunction with certain other habits1 make up the aquosity or wateriness of water4 ,they are parts of water's nature1 and1 in the absence of any one of them1 water would not be its own self1 and could not exist4 ,but in no such sense1 nor in any sense whatever1 is the life or vitality whereby what we are accustomed to call animated are distinguished from inanimate objects1 essential to the existence of the species of matter termed matter of life or protoplasm4 ,take from water its aquosity1 and water ceases to be water2 but you may take away vitality from protoplasm1 and yet leave protoplasm as much protoplasm as before4 ,vitality1 therefore1 evidently bears to protoplasm a quite different relation from that which aquosity bears to water4 ,protoplasm can do perfectly well without the one1 but water cannot for a moment dispense with the other4 ,protoplasm1 whether living or lifeless1 is equally itself2 but unaqueous water is unmitigated gibberish4 ,but if protoplasm1 although deprived of its vitality1 still remains protoplasm1 vitality plainly is not indispensable to protoplasm1 is not therefore a property of protoplasm4 ,and that it is not a product of protoplasm1 or a result of any particular arrangement of protoplasmic particles or molecules1 is not less easily or unanswerably demonstrable4 ,for if it were1 as long as the particular molecular arrangement remained unaltered1 life would necessarily be in attendance2 an amputated joint would1 until decomposition set in1 be as much alive as the trunk from which it had been lopped1 even as water poured from a jug into a glass is quite as much liquid as the water remaining in the jug4 ,there would be no such thing as dead meat1 which was not putrid as well as dead1 any more than water can freeze without changing from a fluid to a solid2 and there would moreover be production antecedent in origin to its own producer4 ,the force of the last at least of these objections is not to be resisted4 ,water1 ammonia1 and carbonic acid cannot1 it is admitted1 combine to form protoplasm1 unless a principle of life preside over the operation4 ,unless under those auspices the combination never takes place4 ,at present1 whenever assuming its presidential functions1 the principle of life seems to be invariably embodied in a portion of pre-existing protoplasm2 but there certainly was a time when the fact was otherwise4 ,time was1 as geology places beyond all doubt1 when our globe and its appurtenances consisted wholly of inorganic matter1 and possessed not one single animal or vegetable inhabitant4 ,in order1 then1 that any protoplasm or the substance of any organism should have been brought into existence in the first instance1 life plainly must have been already existent4 ,it must at one time have been possible for life1 without being previously embodied1 to mould and vivify inert matter2 and it must needs have been by unembodied life that inorganic matter was first organised and animated4 ,there is no possible alternative to this conclusion1 except that of supposing that death may have given birth to life--that absolutely lifeless and inert matter may have spontaneously exerted itself with all the marvellous energy requisite for its conversion into living matter1 exerting for the purpose powers which1 under the conditions of the case1 it could not have acquired without exercising before it acquired them4 ,whoever declines to swallow such absurdity has no choice but to admit that unembodied life must have been the original manufacturer of protoplasm3 but to admit this1 and yet to suppose that when now-a-days embodied life is observed to give birth to new embodied life1 the credit of the operation belongs not to the life itself but to its protoplasmic embodiment1 is much the same as to suppose that when a tailor1 dressed in clothes of his own making1 makes a second suit of clothes1 this latter is the product not of the tailor himself but of the clothes he is wearing4 ,thus1 irrespectively of whatever grounds there may be for believing that life still does1 it is incontestable that life once did1 exist apart from protoplasm2 and that protoplasm both may and continually does exist apart from what is commonly understood by life1 must be obvious to every one who is aware that protoplasm is the substance of which all plants and all animals are composed1 and has observed also that plants and animals are in the habit of dying4 ,that matter and life are inseparably connected cannot1 therefore1 it would seem1 be asserted except in total disregard of the teachings both of reason and observation1 and 'the popular conception of life as a something which works through matter but is independent of it1' would seem to be as true as it is popular4 ,if the only choice allowed to us be between 'the old notion of an ,archus governing and directing blind matter1' and the new conception of life as the product of a certain disposition of material molecules1 the absolute certainty that the latter conception is wrong1 may be fairly urged as equivalent to certainty1 equally absolute1 that the former notion is right4 ,how far soever it may be true that1 as ,professor ,huxley says1 'the progress of physical science means1 and has in all ages meant1 the extension of the province of matter and causation1' it is certainly not true that1 as he proceeds to predict1 the same province will ever be extended sufficiently to banish from the region of human thought not 'spontaneity' simply1 but likewise 'spirit4' ,in one direction at least1 limits are clearly discernible which scientific investigation need not hope to overleap4 ,how much soever we may eventually discover of the changes whereby inorganic matter becomes gradually adapted for the reception of life1 physical science can never teach us what or whence is the life that eventually takes possession of the finished receptacle4 ,possibly we at length may1 as ,professor ,huxley doubts not that we by-and-by shall1 see how it is that the properties peculiar to water have resulted from the properties peculiar to the gases whose junction constitutes water2 and similarly how the characteristic properties of protoplasm have sprung from properties in the water1 ammonia1 and carbonic acid that have united to form protoplasm2 but knowing all this1 we shall not be a hair's breadth nearer to the more recondite knowledge up to which it is expected to lead4 ,to extract the genesis of life from any data that completest acquaintance with the stages and processes of protoplasmic growth can furnish1 is a truly hopeless problem4 ,given the plan of a house1 with samples of its brick and mortar1 to find the name and nationality of the householder1 would be child's play in comparison4 ,life1 as we have seen1 is not the offspring of protoplasm1 but something which has been superinduced upon1 and may be separated from1 the protoplasm that serves as its material basis4 ,it is1 therefore1 distinct from the matter which it animates1 and1 being thus immaterial1 cannot possibly become better known by any analysis of matter4 ,of this emphatically vital question ,professor ,huxley1 as has been already intimated1 takes a diametrically opposite view4 ,he does not merely1 in sufficiently explicit terms1 deny that there is any intrinsic difference between matter and spirit1 and affirm the two to be1 in spite of appearances1 essentially identical4 ,if this were all1 ,i at any rate should not be entitled to object1 for ,i shall myself presently have occasion to use very similar language1 although attaching to it a widely different meaning from that with which it is used by ,professor ,huxley4 ,but the latter goes on to avow his belief that the human body1 like every other living body1 is a machine1 all the operations of which will sooner or later be explained on physical principles1 insomuch that we shall eventually arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness1 even as we have already arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat4 ,he considers that with the same propriety with which the amount of heat which a pound weight produces by falling through the distance of a foot1 may be called its equivalent in one sense1 may the amount of feeling which the pound produces by falling through a foot of distance on a gouty big toe1 be called its equivalent in another sense1 to wit1 that of consciousness4 ,yet he protests against these tenets being deemed materialistic1 which1 he declares1 they certainly neither are nor can be1 for that while he himself certainly holds them1 he as certainly is not himself a materialist4 ,professor ,huxley is among the last to be suspected of talking anything1 as ,monsieur ,jourdain did prose1 without knowing it4 ,he knows perfectly well that he has here been talking materialism1 but he insists that his materialism is only another form of idealism4 ,he seeks to evade the seemingly inevitable deduction from his premises by representing both matter and spirit as mere names1 and names1 too1 not for real things1 but for fanciful hypotheses which may be spoken of indifferently in materialistic or in spiritualistic terms1 thought in the one case being treated as a form of matter1 and matter in the other as a form of thought4 ,the identity of matter and spirit is1 in short1 represented by him as consisting in this3 that the existence of both is merely nominal1 or at best merely ideal4 ,ordinary folk may perhaps be somewhat slow to derive from this compromising theory all the comfort which its author deems it capable of affording4 ,most of us may1 probably1 be inclined to think that we might as well have been left to fret in the frying-pan of materialism as be cast headlong into idealistic fire1 to no better end than that of being there fused body and soul together1 and sublimated into inapprehensible nothingness4 ,our immediate concern1 however1 is not with the pleasantness of the theory1 but with its truth2 in proceeding to test which we shall probably find that there is as little warrant for idealising matter after this fashion as we have already seen that there is for materialising mind4 ,the originator of the theory about to be examined1 or rather1 perhaps1 of a somewhat different theory out of which this has been developed--not to say perverted--may1 without much inaccuracy1 be pronounced to be ,descartes4 ,he it was who1 perceiving that we are surrounded on all sides by illusions of all sorts1 that not only is there no authority or testimony implicitly to be depended on1 but that our senses likewise often play the traitor1 and that we can never be perfectly sure whether we are really seeing1 hearing1 or feeling1 or merely thinking or dreaming that we see1 hear1 or feel1 and looking anxiously around for one single point at least on which complete confidence might be placed1 discovered such a point in thought4 ,whatever else we may doubt about1 we cannot1 he justly argued1 doubt that there are thoughts4 ,if it were possible to doubt this1 our very doubt would be thought1 constituting and presenting as evidence the very existence doubted of4 ,our thoughts1 then1 are unquestionably real existences4 ,they may be delusive1 but they cannot possibly be fictitious4 ,we may perhaps hereafter have occasion to note how ,descartes1 having thus secured one firm foothold and solid resting-place1 outwent the farthest stretch of ,archimedean ambition by using it1 not as a fulcrum from whence to move the world1 but as a site for logical foundations whereon he might1 if he had persevered1 have raised the superstructure of an universe at once mental and material4#cb ,intermediately1 however1 we have to observe how two pre-eminent disciples of the ,cartesian school have perverted the fundamental proposition of their great master by treating its converse as its synonyme4 ,descartes having demonstrated that all thought is existence1 ,bishop ,berkeley and ,professor ,huxley infer that all existence is thought4 ,so says the ,professor in so many words1 and to precisely the same effect is the more diffuse language of the ,bishop1 where1 speaking of 'all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth1 of all the bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world1' he declares that their esse is percipi1 that their 'being' consists in their being 'perceived or known1' and that unless they were actually perceived by1 or existed in1 some created or uncreate mind1 they could not possibly exist at all4 ,the reasoning in support of these assertions is in substance as follows3--,we know nothing of any material object except by the sensations which it produces in our minds4 ,what we are accustomed to call the qualities of an object are nothing else but the mental sensations of various kinds which the object produces within us4 ,some of these qualities1 such as extension1 figure1 solidity1 motion1 and number1 are classed as primary2 others1 as1 for instance1 smell1 taste1 colour1 sound1 as secondary4 ,now that these latter have no existence apart from mind can readily be shown thus4 ,if ,i prick my finger with a needle1 the pain ,i suffer in consequence is surely in myself1 not in the needle1 nor anywhere else but in myself4 ,if an orange be placed on my open hand1 my sensation of touching it is in myself1 not in the orange4 ,if the orange could feel1 what it would feel would be a hand1 while what ,i am feeling is an orange4 ,nor are my sensations of pain and touch merely confined to myself2 they are also confined to a particular part of myself1 viz41 to the brain1 the seat of my consciousness1 which it is1 and not the finger or hand1 that really feels when the one is hurt1 or when anything comes in harmless contact with the other4 ,to prove this1 let the fine nervous threads1 which1 running up the whole length of the arm1 connect the skin of the finger with the spinal marrow and brain1 be cut through close to the spinal cord1 and no pain will be felt1 whatever injury be done3 while if the ends which remain in connection with the cord be pricked1 the sensation of pricking in the finger will arise just as distinctly as before4 ,or let a walking-stick be held firmly by the handle1 and its other end be touched1 and the tactile sensation will be experienced as if at the end of the stick1 where1 however1 it plainly cannot be4 ,it is the mind alone which feels1 but which1 by a peculiar faculty of localisation or extradition1 seems to remove a feeling exclusively its own1 not only to the outside of itself1 but to the outside also of the walls of its fleshly tenement4 ,and as it is with pain or touch1 so it is with every sensation with which any of the so-called secondary qualities of matter are identical4 ,if ,i look at1 or smell1 or taste a blood orange1 the sensation of colour1 or scent1 or flavour ,i receive is entirely and exclusively my own1 the orange remaining quite unconscious of its own redness1 or fragrance1 or sweetness1 and not1 indeed1 possessing in itself any real qualities of the kind4 ,for to take redness as an example2 how does the sensation of it or of any other colour arise8 ,the waves of a certain very attenuated medium1 the particles of which are vibrating with vast rapidity but with very different velocities1 strike upon an object and are thrown off in all directions4 ,of the particles which vibrate with any particular velocity1 some are gathered by the optical apparatus of the eye1 and deflected so as to impinge on the retina and on the fibres of the optic nerve therewith connected1 producing in these fibres a change which is followed by other changes in the brain1 which1 again1 by virtue of some inscrutable union between the brain and the mind1 create a feeling or consciousness of colour4 ,what the particular colour shall be1 depends either on the rate of motion in the vibrating medium or on the character of the retina2 and if1 while the former remained the same1 the other were to be altered1 or if two persons1 with differently formed retinas1 and one of the two colour-blind1 were to be looking1 what had first seemed red might now seem green1 or what seemed red to one spectator might seem green to the other4 ,but as the same object cannot itself be both red and green at the same time1 it follows that what are called its redness and greenness are not in it1 but in the spectator4 ,similarly1 the sounds which an object appears to give forth neither are nor ever were in it3 they originate in the mind of the hearer1 and have not1 and never have had any existence elsewhere4 ',if the whole body were an eye1 where1' asks ,st4 ,paul1 'were the hearing8 ,if the whole were hearing1 where were the smelling8' and ,professor ,huxley more than meets the drift of the ,apostle's questions by pronouncing it 'impossible to imagine but that if the universe contained only blind and deaf beings1 darkness and silence would reign everywhere4' ,and as with the secondary qualities of matter1 so1 on the same showing1 must it be with the primary4 ,if colour1 taste1 scent1 and the like1 exist nowhere but in the mind1 so neither do extension1 solidity1 and the like4 ,if the former could not exist unless there were intelligent minds to perceive them1 then neither could the latter4 ,for1 by extension and its cognates1 we understand simply relations which we conceive to exist between certain qualities of objects identical with certain of our own visual and tactile sensations1 or between these and our consciousness of muscular effort2 but inasmuch as all sensations and all consciousness are purely mental1 and exist nowhere but in the mind1 it follows necessarily that ideas of relation between different sensations1 or between sensations and consciousness1 must also be purely mental1 and non-existent save in the mind4 ,all the qualities of matter1 therefore1 primary as well as secondary1 are alike conceptions of the mind1 and consequently could not exist without a mind for them to be conceived by and to exist in4 ,but if the qualities did not exist1 then matter1 which cannot be conceived otherwise than as an assemblage of qualities1 could not exist either4 ,wherefore in respect of matter itself1 as well as of the qualities of matter1 esse is percipi1 essence is perception1 to be is to be perceived4 ,wherefore1 finally1 if there were no mind to perceive matter1 matter could not exist4 ,q4 ,e4 ,d4#cc ,although in the foregoing summary of an argument to which not ,berkeley and ,huxley alone1 but others of the deepest and acutest thinkers that this country has produced1 have contributed1 ,i have strenuously laboured to state all its points as convincingly as the obligations of brevity would permit1 ,i am not myself by any means convinced by it4 ,on the contrary1 although to say so may seem to imply a considerable overstock of modest assurance1 still ,i do say that whatever portion of it is sound is irrelevant1 and that whatever portion is relevant is not sound4 ,so much of it as relates to the nature of the qualities of matter1 is1 however interesting or otherwise important1 very little1 if at all1 to the purpose4 ,no doubt if ,i prick my finger with a needle1 or--to take in preference an illustration employed by ,locke--if my fingers ache in consequence of my handling snow1 it would be supremely ridiculous to talk of the pain ,i feel being in the snow2 yet not a whit more ridiculous than to call the snow itself white or cold1 if1 by so speaking1 ,i mean that anything in the slightest degree resembling my sensation of either snowy whiteness or snowy coldness resides in the snow itself4 ,and as of coldness and whiteness1 so of all the other so-styled secondary qualities4 ,if ,i smell a rose1 or listen to a piano1 the rose or the piano is quite insensible to the scent or sounds by which my sense is ravished4 ,and of primary qualities1 also1 precisely the same thing may with equal confidence be alleged4 ,a stone which ,i perceive to be large1 round1 hard1 and either rotating or motionless1 has no more perception of its own extension1 figure1 solidity1 motion1 or rest than a snowball has of its colour or temperature4 ,but all this1 though perfectly true1 has nothing to do with the question1 which is not what qualities of matter are1 but where they are1 and whether they can exist anywhere but in mind2 and this question1 ,i submit1 is distinctly begged by those who assume1 as is done throughout the reasoning under examination1 that our sensations with regard to material objects1 and the qualities of those objects1 are synonymous and convertible terms4 ,incontestably1 sensations are affections of the mind which neither have nor can have any existence outside the mind4 ,if1 then1 the qualities of objects are identical with the sensations which arise in the mind concerning those objects1 why1 of course1 the qualities likewise can exist nowhere but in the mind4 ,on narrowly scrutinising1 however1 the supposed identity1 we shall find that it involves somewhat reckless confusion of diametrical opposites4 ,when ,i look at or smell a rose1 or eat a beefsteak1 or listen to a piano1 the sensations which thereupon arise within me1 whether immediately or subsequently1 either are the results of my seeing1 smelling1 eating1 or hearing1 or they are not4 ,to say that they are not is equivalent to saying that an object need not be within reach of the perceptive faculties in order to be perceived2 that ,i may see or smell a rose1 though there be no rose to be seen or smelt2 may dine sumptuously off empty dishes1 and be raised to the seventh heaven of delight by the audible strains of a music which is not being executed4 ,fortunati nimium--only too lucky would mankind be1 did this turn out to be a correct theory1 affording as it would a solution of every social problem1 and serving as a panacea for every social evil4 ,psychology would then be the only science worth attention1 for of whatever things proficiency in that branch of study had qualified any one to form mental images1 of those same things would he simultaneously become possessor in full property4 ,whoever had succeeded in training himself to imagine vigorously might at once have1 do1 or be whatever it pleased him to imagine1 becoming ipso facto1 as the ,stoics used to say an acquirer of virtue does1 'rich1 beautiful1 a king4' ,woe betide any one1 however1 who1 as long as the cosmical constitution remains what it is1 shall attempt to put the theory into practice1 and desisting from all those animal functions1 involving intercourse with a real or imaginary external world1 which are vulgarly supposed essential to animal existence1 shall obstinately restrict himself to the sensations which he believes the mind to be1 without any such intercourse1 capable of creating for the body's sustenance and delectation4 ,the physical extinction inevitably consequent on such devotion to principle would speedily render all the devotees physically incapable of testifying in behalf of their peculiar opinion1 and1 clearing them away1 would leave no witnesses surviving but such as were signifying by deeds if not in words their hearty adherence to the popular belief4 ,practically1 then1 there may be assumed to be entire unanimity of assent to the truism that for our senses to be affected by the presence of external objects1 the objects must needs be present to affect them4 ,on all hands it is in effect admitted that in some mode or other external objects exist1 but if so1 and if the sensations resulting from operations performed by the bodily organs with external objects would not have resulted unless the objects had been present to operate or to be operated upon1 clearly there must be resident in1 or inseparably bound up with1 the objects a power or powers of producing sensation in conscious mind4 ,but the power of producing sensation1 and sensation itself1 are not one and the same thing1 but two separate and distinct things1 intrinsically distinct and locally separate4 ,the feeling1 agreeable or painful1 according to its intensity1 which heat occasions1 is not the same thing as the heat by which it is occasioned4 ,the twofold taste1 sweet to a healthy1 bitter to a distempered palate1 of one and the same aliment1 cannot be identical with the single property of the aliment whereby the taste is produced4 ,in the sense of seeming red to a spectator with normally constructed eyes1 and green to one who is colour-blind1 a ruby or a ,siberian crab is at once both red and green1 but the two colours which it causes to be perceived cannot be identical with the peculiar structure1 or whatever else it be1 whereby the ruby or ,siberian crab communicates to circumambient ether the one self-same motion that terminates in different impressions on differently constructed eyes4 ,in these and in all cases of the kind the feeling is in the mind1 the source of the feeling in matter4 ,the one is a perception1 the other a quality1 and to mistake the quality1 not merely for a perception1 but for the very perception to which the quality gives rise2 and to infer thence that the quality must likewise be in the mind1 is an instance as glaring as can well be imagined of that most heinous of logical offences1 the confounding of cause with effect4 ,by what steps ,berkeley was led1 and has since led so many after him1 into so grave an error1 he has himself acquainted us4 ,thus it is that he argues3 ,by sensible things can be meant only such as can be perceived immediately by sense3 and sensible qualities are of course sensible things4 ,but the only perceptions of sense are sensations1 and all perceptions are purely mental4 ,wherefore1 sensible qualities being1 as such1 perceptible immediately by the senses1 must be sensations1 and being sensations must be perceptions1 and being perceptions they are of course purely mental1 and existent nowhere save in the mind4 ,carefully1 however1 as ,berkeley fancied he was picking his way1 he really had tripped1 and that fatally1 at the second step4 ,he calls the qualities of objects sensible things2 but sensible they are not according to his definition1 for they are not capable of being immediately perceived by the senses4 ,it is not sense which perceives1 but reason which infers them4 ,the senses1 as ,berkeley elsewhere repeatedly and earnestly insists1 receive nothing from objects but sensations1 and these they communicate to the mind without accompanying them by the slightest hint as to whence they originally came4 ,the senses suggest nothing as to any qualities resident in or appertaining to an object corresponding with the sensations derived from the object4 ,the existence of such qualities is an inference of reason which1 taking for granted that sensations1 in common with all other occurrences1 must have causes1 and observing that certain of them commonly occur in the presence of certain objects1 and never occur in the absence of those objects1 infers that the causes of the sensations must exist in the objects4 ,to the causes thus inferred the name of qualities is given1 to distinguish them from the sensations whereof they are causes2 and the ,berkeleian transgression consists in overlooking the distinction between things so diametrically opposite4 ,by the commission of such a sin the most powerful intellect becomes inevitably committed to further enormities4 ,except by neglecting to distinguish between sight and hearing1 the effects1 and light and sound1 their respective causes1 it would surely have been impossible for ,professor ,huxley to come to the strange conclusion that if all living beings were blind and deaf1 'darkness and silence would everywhere reign4' ,had he not himself previously explained that light and sound are peculiar motions communicated to the vibrating particles of an universally diffused ether1 which motions1 on reaching the eye or ear1 produce impressions1 which1 after various modifications1 result eventually in seeing or hearing8 ,how these motions are communicated to the ether matters not4 ,only it is indispensable to note that they are not communicated by the percipient owner of the eye or ear1 so that the fact of there being no percipient present cannot possibly furnish any reason why the motions should not go on all the same4 ,but as long as they did go on there would necessarily be light and sound2 for the motions are themselves light and sound4 ,if1 on returning to his study in which1 an hour before1 he had left a candle burning and a clock ticking1 ,professor ,huxley should perceive from the appearance of candle and clock that they had gone on burning and ticking during his absence1 would he doubt that they had likewise gone on producing the motions constituting and termed light and sound1 notwithstanding that no eyes or ears had been present to see or hear8 ,but if he did not doubt this1 how could he any more doubt that1 although all sentient creatures suddenly became eyeless and earless1 the sun might go on shining1 and the wind roaring1 and the sea bellowing as before8 ,akin to the inadvertence which1 as ,i presume to think1 has led ,professor ,huxley thus to misconceive secondary qualities1 is an inattention to the differences between our ideas1 or mental pictures1 and the originals whereof those pictures are copies1 which seems to me seriously to vitiate his reasoning with regard to primary qualities4 ,with admirable perspicuity he shows#cd how it is that our notions of primary qualities are formed2 how the mind1 by localising on distinct points of the sensory surface of the body its various1 tactile sensations1 obtains the idea of extension1 or space in two dimensions1 of figure1 number1 and motion3 how the power1 combined with consciousness of the power1 of moving the hand in all directions over any substance it is in contact with1 adds the idea of geometrical solidity1 or of space in three dimensions3 how the ideas thus formed with the aid of the sense of touch are confirmed by1 and blended with1 others derived from visual sensations and muscular movements of the eye3 and1 finally1 how the idea of mechanical solidity1 or impenetrability1 arises from experience of resistance to our muscular exertions4 ,all these details1 however1 interesting as they are1 are nevertheless quite out of place4 ,what we are at present concerned with is the nature of the things themselves1 not the nature of our knowledge of them4 ,no question that this latter is purely mental4 ,if figure1 motion1 and solidity were really1 as ,professor ,huxley says1 each of them nothing but a perception of the relation of two or more sensations to one another1 no question but that1 since the mind is the sole seat of perception1 they could exist nowhere else4 ,but if all these suppositions be incorrect1 if1 as we have seen1 there be in matter and apart from mind1 potentialities of producing sensations1 it follows that1 in matter1 and outside of mind1 there must be relations between different potentialities1 and there must1 moreover1 be limits to1 and there may be changes in1 those relations4 ,wherefore1 since there is in matter a potentiality of imparting to the mind those sensations whence it derives its ideas of place and distance1 and since figure is but a 'limitation of distance1' and motion but a 'change of place1' it necessarily follows that there is in matter a potentiality of conveying to the mind those sensations whence it derives its ideas of figure and motion4 ,and a similar remark applies equally to solidity1 and to every other so-called quality of matter4 ,all of them are substantive potentialities of producing in the mind those sensations whence our ideas of themselves 7the qualities7 are derived4 ,no doubt all these qualities would be inconceivable in the absence of a mind by which they might be conceived1 but it is not necessary that1 in order to be1 they should be conceived4 ,in discussions of any abstruseness we cannot be too precise in our use of words1 and we shall inevitably be going astray here if we allow ourselves for a moment to forget that a quality and the conception of that quality are not one single thing1 but two things4 ,can it be seriously supposed that if all the conscious creatures1 of every description1 by which the universe is peopled1 were to fall temporarily into complete stupor1 the material universe would1 at the commencement of the trance1 be deprived of its extension1 solidity1 figure1 and all its other constituent properties1 recovering them again as soon as its inhabitants woke up again8 ,can it be doubted that1 on the contrary1 all potentialities resident in its material composition would pursue the even tenor of their way just as if nothing had happened2 performing1 during the temporary absence of external percipient minds1 precisely those operations which1 as soon as consciousness returned to those minds1 would be followed by the perceptions of sight1 hearing1 and touch8 ,but if so1 then plainly it is exceedingly derogatory to matter to charge it with such absolute dependence on external support that its very being consists in being perceived from without4 ,that matter cannot exist without mind ,i cheerfully admit1 or rather most earnestly affirm1 proposing presently to explain in what sense ,i make the affirmation4 ,meanwhile let it suffice to have ascertained that the mental service with which matter cannot dispense1 whatever else it be1 is at any rate not1 as the whole ,berkeleian school so positively insist1 that of mental testimony to its existence4 ,let us pause here for a moment to report progress4 ,we have seen1 on the one hand1 that unless mind and matter have been eternally coexistent1 mind must have preceded matter1 and that it is idle1 therefore1 to expect1 by any researches into matter1 to discover how mind 7or life7 originated4 ,we have seen that from a materialism which represents mind as in any sense a property or product of matter there is no possible outlet to an idealism which represents matter as owing its being to mind4 ,to see this is simply to see that the builder of a house cannot possibly have been born in the house he has himself built4 ,on the other hand1 we have seen that the idealism which represents being or existence as consisting of perception is utterly incompatible with materialism of any sort or kind1 unless1 indeed1 with a materialistic nihilism wherein would be no room for a solitary molecule1 still less for any molecular structure1 and least of all for that motion of molecular structures into which consistent materialists are logically bound to attempt to resolve all natural phenomena4 ,we have1 in short1 seen that materialism and idealism1 in the senses in which those terms are commonly used1 are utterly incapable of amalgamation1 or indeed of even being harmoniously approximated1 without being first deprived of all the characteristic traits which at present entitle them to their distinguishing appellations4 ,to which of the two belongs the larger share of blame for this implacable hostility is easily determined4 ,materialism1 in dealing with mental phenomena1 begins by setting chronology at defiance2 but between idealism and the phenomena of matter there is no such aboriginal incongruity4 ,from principles common to every form of idealism a theory is deducible which1 while frankly acknowledging the reality of matter1 may1 with perfect consistency1 maintain that reality to be mental--although mental in the sense of being1 not a perception by1 but a metamorphosis of1 mind4 ,of such a theory the outlines seem to me to have been sketched1 and the foundations partly laid1 by ,descartes1 and it cannot be otherwise than interesting to inquire in what manner and how far so consummate an artificer advanced in the work1 and where and wherefore he suddenly stopped short in it4 ,when ,descartes1 after convincing himself of the hollow pretentiousness of most human knowledge1 proceeded to dig away the accumulated drift and sand of ages in quest of any clay or rock there might be below1 the first indubitable verity he came to was thought1 about whose reality there could1 as already explained1 be no possibility of doubt1 inasmuch as any doubt concerning it1 being itself thought1 would be but an additional proof of it4 ,on the bit of firm ground thus thoroughly tested1 he proceeded to place a formula not less carefully verified1 his famous ',cogito1 ergo sum'--',i think1 therefore ,i am4' ,by many of his followers1 however1 this second verification of his is deemed to be by no means so satisfactory as it was by himself1 ,professor ,huxley more especially taking vehement1 though1 as ,i make bold to add1 somewhat gratuitous1 exception to every single word of the most celebrated of ,cartesian formul4 ,no doubt the premiss of the formula assumes the conclusion1 but it likewise includes as well as assumes it4 ,no doubt1 since ',i think' is but another way of saying ',i am thinking1' to say that ',i think' is to assume that ',i am2' nay1 the same thing is equally assumed by the mere introduction of the pronoun ',i4' ,but ,descartes was fully warranted in taking for granted the truth of his conclusion4 ,for by previously showing incontestably that thought and consciousness are real existences1 he had completely proved the premiss wherein his conclusion is included4 ,what though1 as ,professor ,huxley suggests1 'thought' may possibly 'be self-existent1' 'or a given thought the result of its antecedent thought1 or of some external power'8 ,be thought what else it may1 it must needs be1 also1 either an affection or an operation2 if not performed1 it must be felt2 there must needs be1 therefore1 something by which it is either performed or felt1 and that something cannot possibly be other than a thinking and conscious thing4 ,as surely as thought is1 so surely must there be a thinker4 ,this is1 in substance1 affirmed even by many who deny it in terms1 and ,hume1 in particular1 when saying1 as he somewhere does1 that 'all we are conscious of is a series of perceptions1' denies and affirms it at one and the same time4 ,for how can there be perception without a percipient8 or how consciousness without a conscious entity8 or how can that entity be conscious of feeling without being simultaneously conscious that it is itself which feels1 without knowing1 consequently1 that it has a self1 or without being warranted1 if it possess the gift of speech1 in declaring1 in words even more emphatic than those of ,descartes1 ',i myself am'8 ,and how1 if these questions do not admit of reply1 can ,professor ,huxley be warranted in declaring self and non-self to be mere 'hypotheses by which we account for the facts of consciousness1' and adding that of their existence we 'neither have1 nor by any possibility can have' the same 'unquestionable and immediate certainty as we have of the states of consciousness which we consider to be their effects'8 ,surely the existence of self is one of the most direct and immediate subjects of consciousness2 yet it does not depend for evidence on consciousness alone1 but is as unanswerably demonstrable as that two straight lines cannot enclose space or that parallel lines cannot meet1 or as any other mathematical negation4 ,no ratiocinative deduction can be more incontestable than that1 since ,i have thoughts1 there must be an ,i to have them4 ,whoever thus assures himself of the existence of self obtains simultaneously equal assurance of the existence of non-self2 for feeling that his conscious self is not boundless1 but is confined within limits1 he cannot doubt that beyond those limits there must be space1 and1 receiving continual sensations from without1 he perceives that there are1 in external space1 potentialities of imparting sensations4 ,thus1 ,i repeat1 ,descartes in laying down the first principles of his philosophy created an intellectual basis for the external universe4 ,unfortunately1 however1 instead of proceeding to place its proper superstructure on the foundation thus laid1 he wilfully stepped aside from what he had just pronounced the only firm ground in existence1 and undertook to raise a rival edifice on part of the formless void beyond4 ,deeply struck by the grand discoveries of his illustrious contemporaries1 ,galileo and ,harvey1 and thence discovering for himself that the phenomena of remotest worlds and also the involuntary phenomena of our own bodily frames take place in accordance with forces of uniform operation1 he leaped suddenly to the conclusion that those forces are purely mechanical4 ,the circulation of the blood1 he says1 'is as much the necessary result of the structure of the parts one can see in the heart1 and of the heat which one may feel there1 and of the nature of the blood which may be experimentally ascertained1 as is the motion of a clock the result of the force1 situation1 and figure of its wheels and of its weight4' ,nor1 in his view1 does the heart1 by virtue of its structure and composition1 merely cause the blood to circulate4 ',it also generates animal spirits1' which1 'ascending like a very subtle fluid1 or very pure and vivid flame1 into the brain as into a reservoir1 pass thence into the nerves1 where1 according as they more or less enter1 or tend to enter1 they have the power of altering the figures of the muscles into which the nerves are inserted1 and of so causing all the organs and limbs to move4' ,he puts the case thus3 ,even as the ordinary movements of a water-clock or of a mill are kept up by the ordinary flow of the water1 and even as 'in the grottoes and fountains of royal gardens1 the force wherewith the water issues from its reservoirs suffices to move various machines1 and even to make them play instruments or pronounce words according to the different disposition of the pipes which lead the water'--even so do pulsation1 respiration1 digestion1 nutrition1 and growth1 and 'other such actions as are natural and usual in the body1' result naturally from the usual course of the animal spirits4 ,moreover1 even as intruders upon the waterworks aforesaid unconsciously by their mere presence cause special movements to take place1 even as1 for example1 'if they approach a bathing ,diana1 they tread on certain planks so arranged as to make her hide among the reeds1 and1 if they attempt to follow her1 see approaching a ,neptune who threatens with his trident1 or rouse some other monster who vomits water into their faces'--even so do external objects1 by their mere presence1 act upon the organs of sense2 even so do 'the reception of light1 sounds1 odours1 flavours1 heat1 and such like qualities in the organs of the external senses1 the impression of the ideas of these in the intellect1 the imagination1 and the memory1 the internal movements of the appetites and passions1 and the external movements which follow so aptly on the presentation of objects to the senses1 or on the resuscitation of impressions by the memory1' yea1 even so do all these 'functions proceed naturally from the arrangement of the bodily organs1 neither more nor less than do the movements of a clock or other automaton from that of its weights and its wheels1 without the aid of any other vegetative or sensitive soul or any other principle of motion or of life than the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire which burns continually within the heart1 and which differs in no wise from the fire existing in inanimate bodies4'#ce ,quite fairly it may be urged that the writer of passages like these would1 if writing in modern language1 and with the aid of modern conceptions1 have expressed himself much as ,professor ,huxley does when1 declaring that the circulation of the blood and the regular movements of the respiratory1 alimentary1 and other internal organs are simply 'affairs of mechanism1 resulting from the structure and arrangement' of the bodily organs concerned1 from 'the contractility of those organs1 and from the regulation of that contractility by an automatically acting nervous apparatus2' that muscular contractility and the automatic activity or irritability of the nerves are 'purely the results of molecular mechanism2' and that 'the modes of motion which constitute the physical bases of light1 sound1 and heat are transmuted by the sensory organs into affections of nervous matter1' which affections become 'a kind of physical ideas constituting a physical memory1' and may be combined in a manner answering to association and imagination1 or may give rise to muscular contractions in those reflex actions which are the mechanical representatives of volition4' ,quite fairly may a doctrine1 capable of being thus translated1 be described as leading 'straight to materialism4' ,quite justly may its author be claimed by ,huxley as joint professor of a materialistic creed4 ,true1 ,descartes lodges within his human mechanism a chose pensante or rational soul1 whose principal seat is in the brain1 and who is treated as corresponding to a hydraulic engineer stationed in the centre of waterworks for the purpose of increasing1 slackening1 or otherwise altering their movements4 ,but this rational soul is a very needless appendage to either the ,cartesian or the ,huxleian system1 wherein1 if its post be not a literal sinecure1 there is1 at any rate1 little or nothing for it to do which might not quite as well be done without it4 ,the hydraulic engineer1 sitting in his central office1 has to wind up the whole machinery from time to time1 and to turn now this tap1 now that1 when he wishes to set this or that particular machine in motion4 ,but1 as no one need be told1 our chose pensante has nothing to do with the winding up of our digestive1 circulatory1 or respiratory apparatus2 and so far from internally arranging those other internal organs from the mere arrangement of whose parts1 according to ,descartes1 the reception1 conversion1 and retention of sensations1 and the movements1 whether internal or external1 thereupon consequent1 naturally proceed1 or from regulating the molecular mechanism1 whence1 according to ,professor ,huxley1 results the automatic nervous activity which1 in his opinion1 governs the movements of the limbs not less absolutely than those of the intestines1 it1 nine times out of ten1 neither knows nor suspects that any such organs or mechanism exist4 ,if the functions above attributed to the human frame could be shown really to belong to it1 pure1 not to say crass1 materialism1 would require no further proof4 ,those particular functions undoubtedly take place without the cognisance of that particular sensitive soul which we call ourself1 so that if no other sensitive soul take cognisance of them1 they must needs be1 not simply automatic performances1 but performances of an automaton of such marvellous powers as to be quite equal to the performance likewise of whatever human operations are vulgarly classed as mental4 ,assume1 however illogically1 that motion is a function of matter1 and from that premiss1 whether true or false1 the conclusion that thought likewise is a function of matter may be quite logically deduced4 ',that thought is as much a function of matter as motion is' must needs be conceded to ,professor ,huxley1 who1 therefore1 if he could show that motion is really such a function1 would be fully justified in adding1 that 'the distinction between spirit and matter vanishes1' that 'we lose spirit in matter4' ,undeniably1 then1 of the ,cartesian philosophy one moiety is1 as ,professor ,huxley says1 materialistic2 but from the self-contradictions inseparable from every species of materialism the ,cartesian variety is1 of course1 no more exempt than any other1 and it has besides one self-contradiction peculiar to itself4 ,a clock's pendulum vibrates1 and its hands move1 not simply by reason of the situation and figure of its weight and wheels1 but also because some intelligent person1 by winding up the clock1 has communicated an impulsive force to the weight and wheels4 ,waterworks perform all sorts of antics1 not solely because the pipes are skilfully constructed and arranged with a view to such end1 but because also an intelligent engineer has turned running water into the pipes4 ,but the only intelligent agent to whom ,descartes allows access to his corporeal machinery is one who not only has no notion how to apply a moving force except to some few portions of the machinery1 but with regard to the other portions has most likely no suspicion that they even exist4 ,but how in the absence of some other intelligence1 of some other 'vegetative or sensitive soul or principle of motion or of life1' is it possible for the inert and inanimate heart to generate animal spirits8--how is it possible for death thus to give birth to life8--or1 if the generative faculty be supposed to be the necessary result of a particular molecular structure1 how is it that when the animal spirits become from any cause extinct1 they are not immediately regenerated by the same molecular structure8 or rather1 how is it possible for animal spirits to become extinct as long as the molecular structure of which they are necessary concomitants remains unaltered8 ,in these questions the old insuperable difficulties reappear in new forms1 but on these we need not dwell4 ,apart from anti-materialistic arguments of general applicability1 there is a mode of refutation specially adapted to the ,cartesian form of materialism1 which1 besides flatly contradicting itself1 contradicts not less flatly a twin system of unimpeachable veracity4 ,truth cannot be opposed to truth3--a doctrine cannot be true1 even though propounded by ,descartes and ,huxley1 if it conflict irreconcileably with doctrines which ,descartes and ,huxley have unanswerably demonstrated4 ,now one-half of ,cartesian philosophy shows conclusively that amidst the countless infinity of human notions1 the one single and solitary certainty of independent and self-evident authority is the existence of thought1 and nothing else whatever1 therefore1 can be entitled to be regarded as absolutely certain which cannot be shown to rest mediately or immediately upon this4 ,one thing which can1 by strictest logical process1 be shown so to rest1 is the existence of a thinking self2 and another is the existence of a non-self or external universe2 but of this external universe we know scarcely anything beyond the bare fact that it exists4 ,we know that outside the thinking self there are potentialities capable of somehow or other communicating sensations to the thinking self2 but of the nature of these potentialities our senses teach us absolutely nothing1 and the few particulars that reason is able to discover1 are1 with one single though very momentous exception1 to which we are rapidly approaching1 purely negative4 ,we do know to a certain extent what qualities of objects are not4 ,we know that they are not and cannot be in the least like the sensations which we call by the same names4 ,we know that what we call the whiteness and coldness of snow or the hardness and weight of marble1 can no more resemble the feelings we receive from looking at or handling snow or marble than the mental exaltation produced within us on hearing one of ,bach's fugues is like the organ on which1 or the organist by whom1 it is played4 ,we know that of the pictures which our senses form for us not one can possibly be a correct likeness4 ,we know that what we fancy we see in matter we do not see2 that what we seem to feel we do not feel2 that the apparent structure and composition of matter cannot therefore possibly be real4 ,to this conviction we are irresistibly drawn by a chain of idealistic reasoning of which ,descartes forged the first link1 and every link of which will stand the severest strain4 ,but if this be the teaching of an idealism occupying as its base the only morsel of solid ground to be found in the mental universe1 what scrap of footing is there left for an antagonistic materialism purporting to rest on what we can see and feel of a structure and composition which1 as we have just satisfied ourselves1 we cannot see or feel at all8 ,as plainly then as one half of ,descartes' philosophy is materialistic1 so plainly1 that half1 instead of a necessary outgrowth and exact correlative of the other or idealistic moiety is1 on the contrary1 the latter's diametrical and implacable opponent4 ,as plainly1 therefore1 as the one is true1 must the other be false1 and ,cartesian idealism1 in so far as its character has been exhibited above1 has1 ,i submit1 been demonstrated to be true4 ,the greater the pity that it was not brought to maturity by its author4 ,in enumerating its first principles1 ,descartes1 as ,i must once again observe1 was forming a logical basis whereon a comprehensive and consistent conception of an external universe might forthwith have been securely deposited1 had he not unluckily1 instead of himself proceeding to build on his own foundations1 with congruous materials1 left them free for others to build upon with gold1 silver1 precious stones1 wood1 hay1 or stubble1 as chance might determine4 ,may ,i1 without presumption1 hazard a conjecture as to the sort of fabric that might have arisen1 if he had steadily prosecuted his original design8 ,at the stage which we are supposing him to have reached1 very little remained to complete the work4 ,around man1 around every individual man1 or other conscious intelligence1 as its centre1 is ranged infinitely extended space1 filled with1 or1 as it were1 composed of various kinds of matter1 every kind and every separate portion of which is endowed with special qualities capable of communicating corresponding sensations to the central intelligence4 ,so far all that can be predicated of any material object or portion of matter is that it is a collection of qualities2 but from hence we may advance boldly to the further negative discovery that it is nothing else2 that there is not and cannot be1 in addition to those qualities1 any substance in or to which the qualities inhere1 or are in any way attached4 ,the absence from matter of any such substance is evidenced by the absurdity involved in the idea of its presence4 ,suppose the substance to exist3 the qualities inherent in it must needs be as completely distinct from itself as pins are from a pincushion2 the extension and solidity of an extended1 solid substance can no more be identical with the substance than the nominative is identical with the genitive case4 ,the substance1 therefore1 although deprived of all its qualities will still retain its essence unimpaired1 will still be equally a substance1 just as a pincushion continues equally a pincushion after its last pin has been abstracted4 ,conceive1 then1 all the qualities of matter to be abstracted1 and consider what remains--a substance without qualities of any sort4 ,but a substance neither solid1 nor fluid1 nor yet gaseous2 neither coloured nor colourless2 neither singular nor plural2 without form and void1 without even extension--what is it8 not something1 but nothing2 a nonentity or non-existence4 ,the qualities of matter in being removed from the substance have therefore left nothing behind1 and1 consequently1 although carrying with them nothing but themselves1 have yet carried with them all the constituents of matter1 which is thus seen to be composed exclusively of qualities without a single particle of foreign admixture4 ,and since1 moreover1 the qualities of matter are clearly not themselves substances1 that is to say do not themselves stand under or uphold anything1 it follows that their compound1 matter1 must likewise be purely unsubstantial4 ,the edifice begun by ,descartes has now been raised high and strong enough to have its layer of negations crowned with an affirmation of pre-eminent importance4 ,the qualities of matter1 being known only by their effects1 are evidently causes3 and1 being causes1 must necessarily be either themselves forces1 or1 at the least1 manifestations of force2 and inasmuch as force involves exertion1 it cannot be inert2 and inasmuch as deadness must be incapable of exertion1 all force must be alive2 and life without substance cannot be conceived otherwise than as some species of spirit or mind4 ,such therefore must be matter4 ,matter can be nothing else than pure spirit of some kind4 ,and may we not with good reason congratulate ourselves on this result of our investigations8 ,instead of the vision we were threatened with1 of mind losing itself in matter1 our eyes are gladdened with that of the converse operation1 of the transmutation of matter into mind4 ,and on no account is this metamorphosis to be mistaken for annihilation of matter1 whose stolid grossness has vanished1 not in order to give place to empty nominalism or to a thin mist of mere mental perceptions existing only in virtue of being perceived1 but in order to reappear gloriously etherealised into living energy4 ,by the change that has taken place1 corruption has put on incorruption2 the natural body has become a quickening spirit2 death is swallowed up in victory4 ,matter reappears converted1 not into a perception of percipient mind1 but into percipient mind itself2 yet although thus presumably percipient of its own existence1 it not the less has an existence perfectly independent of perception1 either by itself or by any other intelligence4 ,under what head the mind1 or combination of living forces1 thus constituting all matter1 ought to be classed1 is a question1 which the imperfection of human faculties may as well be content to leave unanswered1 though to its being supposed to emanate directly from the mind of ,omnipresent ,deity1 one insuperable objection may be mentioned1 which should be kept steadily in view4 ,there are few of us who will not shrink with horror from a notion1 according to which man1 whenever doing as he pleases with any material object1 applying it1 as likely as not1 to some base or criminal purpose1 is disposing at his pleasure of a portion of the ,divine essence3 few who will not greatly prefer to believe that the vital principle which manifests itself in the form of a dunghill or of a poisoned dagger1 may be1 for the time1 as completely individualised and separate from all other life or mind1 as every human being perceives his own conscious mind or self to be4 ,at all events1 we have now reached a point beyond which it would be rash to rush hastily on4 ,for a while we may be well content to rest where we are4 ,that matter is nothing else but a peculiar manifestation1 or avatar1 of some species of mind1 whatever that species be1 is a proposition as demonstrably true as its converse is demonstrably false4 ,unless it be possible for death to give birth to life1 it is impossible for living mind to be the offspring of inanimate matter2 but so surely as mind is mind1 and that living force alone can act either on mind or aught else1 so surely must all matter that imparts sensation to mind1 be itself a species of living force and consequently a species of mind4 ,an unexpected conclusion this1 and widely different1 ,i confess1 from that to which ,i was myself looking forward at the outset of the discussion2 yet1 at the same time1 one of which there is the best possible proof in the impossibility of conceiving its contrary4 ,it is besides a conclusion to which not only ought ,descartes in consistency to have come1 but at which both ,locke and ,berkeley1 though advancing from opposite points of the compass1 did very nearly arrive2 nay1 which the latter did almost touch1 and must apparently have grasped1 had not his hands been already full of other things4 ,it is1 moreover1 one from which ,i do not apprehend that ,professor ,huxley himself will seriously dissent4 ,indeed1 ,i almost hope that he may object chiefly to its having been moved by me as an amendment on his original motion1 and that he may be disposed to claim it for himself as a portion of genuine ,huxleyism4 ,if so1 ,i shall readily recognise the claim so far as to admit that things very similar to many of those said by me above had already been said by ,professor ,huxley2 though1 in justice to myself1 ,i must add that their complete opposites had likewise been said by him4 ,but the office which ,i here proposed to myself was mainly that of an eclectic1 who1 going over a field which another husbandman has tilled1 separates the wheat from the tares1 and binds up the former into shapely and easily portable sheaves2 and no more satisfactory assurance can be given of my having been usefully employed in such subordinate capacity than that ,professor ,huxley1 who1 amongst all his numerous admirers1 has not one sincerer than myself1 should welcome me as a coadjutor1 instead of repelling me as an antagonist4 ,,footnotes3 #cb ,archimde1 pour tirer le globe terrestre de sa place et le transporter en un autre lieu1 ne demandait rien qu'un point qui ft ferme et immobile3 ainsi j'aurai droit de concevoir de hautes esprances si je suis assez heureux pour trouver seulement une chose qui soit certaine et indubitable4--,descartes1 ,mditation ,deuxime4 #cc ,lay ,sermons1 xiv4 ',on ,descartes' ,discourse2' also an article by ,professor ,huxley1 on ',berkeley and the ,metaphysics of ,sensation1' in ',macmillan's ,magazine' for ,june1 #ahga4 #cd ,article on ',berkeley and the ,metaphysics of ,sensation1' in ',macmillan's ,magazine' for #ahga1 pp4 #aeb et seq4 #ce ,the quotations1 of which those in the text are abridgments1 will be found in ',lay ,sermons1' xiv4 pp4 #cfd-g4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,recent ,,phases ,,of ,,scientific ,,atheism4 ',wonder is the basis of worship4 ,that progress of science which is to destroy wonder1 and in its stead substitute mensuration and numeration1 finds small favour with ,teufelsdrckh1 much as he otherwise venerates those two latter processes4'--,sartor ,resartus4 ,i4 ,by the train of thought pursued in the last chapter1 we were led to the conclusion1 not1 indeed1 that matter has no existence1 but that its nature or constitution is altogether different from what is commonly supposed4 ,the difference thus discovered does not1 however1 imply any corresponding difference with respect to the properties--sensible properties1 as they are commonly called--whereby matter affects the senses4 ,equally1 whether matter be1 in all and each of its various species1 inanimate1 inert1 passive substance1 or a combination of self-acting forces--equally whether it be the author or merely the subject of whatever activity it manifests1 that activity is equally manifested in certain sequences which are as unvarying as if they were prescribed by inexorable and irresistible laws1 and which1 indeed1 by a convenient1 though exceedingly treacherous metaphor1 are usually styled laws--laws of ,nature when spoken of collectively1 laws of attraction1 repulsion1 gravitation1 motion1 heat1 light1 and the like1 when separately referred to4 ,whithersoever we turn our eyes1 however closely we pry1 into whatever depths of infinity we peer1 we observe the most perfect harmony between structure and law1 law moulding structure and structure utilising law4 ,afar off we descry systems upon systems1 solar and sidereal1 like sand upon the sea-shore for multitude1 and every individual orb thereof rotating or revolving in strictest accordance with inflexible mathematical principles1 and evidently owing to the previous influence of those same principles its characteristic configuration4 ,near at hand we discern organic forms innumerable1 each with its own special arrangement of component parts admirably apt for the performance in ordinary circumstances of special functions1 admirably1 as circumstances change1 accommodating itself by corresponding changes for continuing the same or undertaking other and equally appropriate functions1 nor merely performing them all in despite of the restraints imposed by law1 but availing itself of those very restraints as means and aids for their performance4 ,where so much aptness is1 adaptation surely must have been3 where arrangement is so plainly conducive to ends1 the ends must surely have been foreseen1 and the arrangement effected by design and according to preconceived plan4 ,and there cannot have been design without a designer or designers3 the plan cannot but have had its author or authors3 nor could the plan have been executed without an artificer or artificers4 ,author or authors1 too1 artificer or artificers1 be the same singular or plural1 must have possessed1 individually or collectively1 not less of wisdom1 power1 and goodness than are displayed by the finished work4 ,now of each of these attributes1 the amount to which the aspect of the universe bears witness1 albeit not infinite1 inasmuch as the universe is not without imperfections1 is yet indefinite2 as plainly without measure as the universe is without bounds4 ,wherefore1 not only must the universe have had an author or authors1 an artificer or artificers1 but his or their wisdom1 power1 and goodness1 must1 whether infinite or not1 have been at least illimitable4 ,such is the argument from design1 and such1 to my thinking1 the only absolute certainties legitimately deducible from it2 and although these1 in comparison with the numerous probabilities ordinarily associated with them1 may appear somewhat meagre1 yet are they intrinsically of exceeding moment4 ,they constitute the only basis on which any rational religion1 any that appeals to the intellect as well as to the feelings1 can rest securely4 ,whoever accepts them1 by whatever other name he prefer to call himself1 is essentially a theist4 ,he only who denies or ignores them can justly be stigmatised as an atheist4 ,yet1 although an inquiry into their soundness is thus plainly second in interest to none1 it is not that in which ,i propose to engage at present1 unless indirectly4 ,my immediate concern is not with the strength of theism1 but with the weakness of atheism1 and the hollowness of the latter's dialectical pretensions4 ,what in every form of piety is most provocative of philosophic scorn1 is its forwardness of faith1 its eagerness of acquiescence2 but to this sort of reproach ,i expect to be able to show that none are more obnoxious than those very philosophers by whom it is most freely cast4 ,that nothing is more unphilosophical than uncompromising irreligion1 nothing more credulous than its credulity1 no other beliefs more monstrous than those by which it strives to fill up the void created by its own unbelief3 this is my present thesis1 and this ,i propound1 not unaware what formidable antagonists ,i am thereby challenging1 but not without something of the same confidence1 and something withal of the same ground for it1 as ,david had when1 in equal strait1 exclaiming1 ',the ,lord is on my side2 ,i will not fear2 what can man do unto me8' ,let us at the outset consider what denial of plan in the structure of the universe implies1 and note1 among other things signified1 the following4 ,the exact conformity on matter's part to ,nature's laws1 everywhere observable1 and even more striking perhaps in minute details than in grandiose generalities1 is purely accidental4 ,the laws were not enacted in order to be obeyed2 matter's various shapes were not given to or assumed by it in order that its obedience might serve any particular purpose4 ,all appearances of ingenious contrivance in the collocation of elementary particles1 or in the co-operation of elementary forces1 are mere appearances4 ,it was not designed that under the influence of the laws of motion1 chaos should resolve itself into systems1 and time divide itself into years and seasons and days and nights4 ,it is quite unintentionally that the countless varieties of mechanism appertaining to different vegetable and animal fabrics have been rendered fit for performing those special processes which1 by reason in each case of some special arrangement of parts1 they actually do perform with such marvellous precision4 ,it is a total mistake to suppose that the eye was meant for seeing1 or the ear for hearing1 or the heart for initiating and regulating the circulation of the blood1 or nervous ramifications for receiving and disseminating sensible impressions4 ,these various organs have been discovered to be useful1 and are used accordingly2 but they were not intended to be so used1 or contrived with any such view1 or1 indeed1 contrived at all4 ,the forces1 whatever they be1 and whether identical with or totally distinct from itself1 whereby matter1 on one supposition1 acts1 and1 on the other1 is acted upon1 and by whose operation the universe and all its contents have been fashioned and are sustained1 are in either case perfectly heedless and reckless forces1 operating always without the slightest reference to result4 ,language like this was much in vogue among the ,french encyclopdists of the last century4 ,by opposing it1 even ,voltaire incurred the reputation of bigotry1 and ,hume probably had to listen to a good deal of it on that memorable occasion when1 dining with ,baron ,d',holbach1 and intimating to his host his disbelief in the existence of atheists1 he was informed by way of reply that he was actually at table with seventeen members of the sect4#cf ,that in ,england1 too1 it was a good deal talked at about the same and a somewhat later period1 may be inferred from the fact that against its teaching one of ,paley's most celebrated treatises was expressly directed4 ,doctrine which was once so fashionable1 and which even now cannot be said to be obsolete1 was not1 of course1 without some show of reason to support it1 and somewhat in this wise the chief arguments in its behalf were usually marshalled3--,in order to account for actual result1 there is no need to imagine previous purpose4 ,all things that exist1 all events that occur1 must bear to each other some relations in situation and time1 which relations are not less likely to be orderly than disorderly1 or1 rather1 indeed1 are more likely to be the former than the latter4 ,for necessarily the rarer rises above the denser2 the stronger compels the weaker2 that which is pushed hardest runs fastest4 ,and even though1 among organic forms1 orderly and disorderly had been1 by the purely fortuitous concurrence of atoms1 originally produced in equal numbers1 the former would be sure in the course of ages to become the more numerous1 and that in proportion to the orderliness of their composition1 and to their consequent suitableness for the reception and maintenance of organic life1 by which they in turn would be maintained and multiplied1 while less aptly organised forms1 succumbing in the struggle for existence1 perished and vanished away4 ,thus everything arranges itself--everything1 however1 being here another name for ,nature1 which alone does or can exist1 which is all and does all2 yet1 though doing all things in general1 does whatever it does quite unintelligently1 and without the least desire of doing any one thing in particular more than another4 ,though speaking of this as a show of reasoning1 ,i would by no means be understood to consider it as merely a show4 ,on the contrary1 ,i must admit that it contains a modicum of reality sufficient1 in my opinion1 to secure the position taken up from being utterly overthrown by any direct attack not followed up by reference to a certain palpable absurdity which we shall presently perceive to be inseparably connected with the position4 ,to so much of real reasoning as we have before us1 let then all due respect be shown4 ,no doubt all existences must necessarily dispose themselves or be disposed somehow4 ,no doubt all occurrences must succeed each other somehow4 ,no doubt1 either1 that if the disposing or otherwise originating forces operated quite regardlessly of plan1 no one disposition or succession would be a whit less possible than any other--the most symmetric or evenly graduated than the most disjointed or confused4 ,now although1 since exertion is utterly inconceivable without volition1 and since volition is equally inconceivable without consciousness1 it must be impossible for any forces ever to exert themselves altogether unintentionally1 it is yet perfectly possible for their exertion to have no ulterior intention beyond that of gratifying an unprospective will4 ,this is all that one fidgetting about1 as the phrase is1 intends1 when he has no special motive for fidgetting in any particular direction more than in any other1 and similarly it may by possibility be the mere fidgettiness of ,nature that gives rise to all natural phenomena4 ,nature1 indeed1 cannot1 any more than any other force or combination of forces1 be utterly destitute of intelligence1 but its intelligence may not inconceivably be of no higher sort than that which the sensitive plant exhibits or mimics4 ,nature cannot exert itself quite unconsciously1 nor consequently quite unintentionally1 but its exertions1 though not unintended1 may possibly not be intended for any result4 ,it must be admitted1 then1 that1 so far1 no reason has appeared why the force or forces by which the universe was originally moulded1 may not1 as contended1 have been perfectly heedless and reckless2 may not1 without the least premeditation or the slightest view to any ulterior object1 have produced certain phenomena in those particular sequences to which the name of natural laws has been given2 and may not1 with the same total absence of purpose1 have adopted certain other courses of action which1 very fortunately1 though quite undesignedly1 have resulted in the production of endless varieties of mechanism1 most of them of marvellously intricate and complex structure1 and all and each of them of structure marvellously suitable for performing1 in co-operation with ,nature's laws1 functions of an utility as varied as their structure4 ,and what any forces have been equal to do once1 those same forces1 if remaining unimpaired1 must be equal to repeat times without number4 ,although1 if you found your opponent at dice invariably throwing double-sixes1 you might feel confident that his dice were loaded1 your confidence1 unless otherwise corroborated1 would not amount to entire certainty4 ,with unloaded dice there would be nothing strange in double-six being thrown once2 but1 if once1 why not twice running8 and if twice1 why not three1 four1 or a million times running1 provided that the thrower's strength held out so long8 ,no one of the separate throws1 from the first to the millionth1 would be attended with more difficulty than any other4 ,whoever made the first might with no greater effort make any one1 and therefore every one1 of the rest4 ,in the fact of his having commenced the series there would be proof of the possibility of his completing it4 ,in like manner1 if it be not inconceivable that ,nature's forces may once1 by a single unpremeditated exertion1 have bestowed on the universe its actual constitution1 it is not inconceivable that by continual repetition of similarly unpremeditated exertions1 they may have ever since maintained that constitution4 ,in this supposition there is nothing patently absurd4 ,it is perfectly legitimate to suppose that any event or combination of events1 not demonstrably impossible1 may have occurred in the absence of complete certainty that they have not occurred4 ,it may not be illegitimate1 therefore1 to suppose that all phenomena of the description termed physical1 and all repeated sequences of such phenomena1 may have occurred1 not causally1 but casually--that it may have been a fortuitous concourse of atoms which originally established the existing economy of the universe1 and an uninterrupted succession of similar fortuitous concourses that has ever since maintained that economy4 ,that supposition1 ,i repeat1 involves no absolute absurdity4 ,what however is1 if not absurd1 at any rate egregiously unscientific and most unphilosophically credulous1 is to treat the supposition as a certainty1 notwithstanding that the chances against its representing real facts are as infinity to infinitesimality2 for not less is the preponderance of improbability that the laws of nature were not intentionally prescribed1 and that the wondrously complex and wondrously useful harmony that has been established between organic structure and natural law was not designedly established4 ,in considering this point1 it will be convenient to take law first4 ,inasmuch as1 on the assumption that all phenomena of inorganic matter are effects1 purely unpremeditated1 of ,nature's capricious restlessness1 there would of course be no more reason why any one such phenomenon than any other should not at any time occur1 there would equally of course on the same assumption1 be no more reason why it should4 ,an infinity of phenomena being at all times equally possible1 the chances against any one being1 on any occasion1 preferred to all the rest1 would be infinity less one4 ,against any particular sequence of phenomena they would be as infinity less one multiplied by the number of phenomena composing the sequence1 and against one or more repetitions of the same sequence they would be the same multiple of virtual infinity multiplied by the number of repetitions4 ,against perpetual repetition1 they would1 as it were1 be virtual infinity multiplied by infinity4 ,on the assumption stated1 an apple loosened from the parent stem1 might quite possibly fall to the ground1 but quite as possibly might remain suspended in mid air1 or rise straight upwards1 or take any one of the innumerable directions intervening between zenith and nadir1 travelling too1 unless interrupted1 in the direction selected for any period1 from a single moment to endless ages4 ,experience1 however1 teaches that an apple or any other body of greater specific gravity than air1 does invariably1 when deprived of support1 fall straight downward1 such downward movement being part of one of those sequences of phenomena which are classed under the head of gravitation4 ,now1 to assert that this1 or any other1 and consequently every other1 specimen of gravitation1 cannot possibly have been unpremeditated would no doubt be unwarrantable4 ,no doubt there is one solitary1 one infinitesimal chance that the force whose action results in gravitation may1 when producing that result1 be acting with as little choice of direction as a fidgetty man makes when moving his arms or legs about for no better reason than that he will not take the trouble to keep them quiet4 ,only1 as on the supposition that the force did not select its course1 the chances against its always taking the same course would be infinity less one indefinitely multiplied1 the probability that it does select must needs be the same indefinite multiple of virtual infinity4 ,not less than this is the preponderance of probability that the invariably recurrent sequences of phenomena which we are in the habit of referring to gravitation1 are premeditated1 and that the law of gravitation has1 so to speak1 been wittingly ordained4 ,and in this respect all invariable sequences of phenomena1 otherwise termed laws of nature1 stand plainly in the same category4 ,one solitary and infinitesimal unit is the sole deduction to be made from what would otherwise be infinite certainty1 that the assumption we started with is false1 and that all invariable sequences are premeditated1 all the laws of nature enacted by a law-giver who intended what he was enacting4 ,intention1 however1 is not quite the same thing as design4 ,it is possible for action to be at once intentional and purposeless4 ,if a man1 taking regularly a constitutional walk1 is observed always to take the same road1 and to stop exactly at the same point1 there can be no reasonable doubt as to his intention to walk just so far and no farther2 but it does not follow that he has any object in walking which he supposes would not be equally served by his walking a few paces more or less4 ,similarly whatever be the certainty that the laws of nature have been intentionally established1 there is in that certainty no proof of their having been established for any purpose beyond that of gratifying some whim or humour of the lawgiver4 ,for indications of design in the universe we must look rather to organic than to inorganic nature1 rather to structure than to law4 ,we shall find applying to the former the same reasoning as to the latter1 and likewise some more besides4 ,inasmuch as1 of the innumerable combinations of which the elements or elementary forces are susceptible1 each and every one1 in the absence of any preference for one over another on the part of the volition on which the occurrence of all depends1 would have equal chances of occurring1 the chances against the occurrence at any particular time of any particular combination would be as the number1 or rather as the innumerosity1 of all the rest to one4 ,such1 in the absence of any intentional action on ,nature's part1 would be the odds against any one single occurrence of any one elemental combination4 ,against the perpetual repetition of the same combination the odds would be the same innumerosity innumerable times multiplied4 ,nevertheless there actually is everlastingly recurring1 not simply one single specimen1 but an innumerable multitude of the same elemental combinations4 ,whatever were the combinations necessary for producing all the existing organisms1 vegetable and animal1 with which our earth swarms1 the constant recurrence of those same or nearly the same combinations is indispensable both for the maintenance of the organisms during life and for the production of successors to them2 and such constant recurrence is plainly going on4 ,the chances then against its being unintended must be the aforesaid multiple of innumerosity4 ,but this is not all4 ,the multiple in question represents the chances against perpetual repetition of any set whatever of elemental combinations1 but about the actually recurrent set there is this peculiarity1 that it produces and maintains innumerable organisms or machines1 which--inasmuch as all of them are marvellously fit1 by reason of their respective specialities of structure1 for performing different obviously useful purposes--have all the appearance of having been expressly constructed for the performance of those purposes4 ,if these appearances of adaptation were fallacious1 if the apparent utility were undesigned1 the chances against the perpetual recurrence of so singularly useful1 rather than of some totally useless1 set of combinations would be a multiple of innumerosity similar to that which has clearly been shown to represent the preponderance of probability against the constant repetition of any set of combinations whatever1 whether useful or useless4 ,if1 then1 it were permissible to use so extravagant an hyperbole to indicate an idea of multitude to which it is not in the power of words to give adequate expression1 it might be said that while the chances against ,nature's habitual action being unintentional1 or the result as it were of mere fidgettiness or restlessness1 are an indefinite multiple of infinity1 the chances against its being purposeless and undesigned1 without view to end or object1 is the same multiple doubled4 ,still1 in order to give the solitary and infinitesimal chance on the other side its full due1 let us confess it to be as yet not quite conclusively demonstrated that the actual order of inorganic1 and the actual constitution of organic1 nature are results of uninterrupted repetition of one and the same purposeless volition1 and of the same purely fortuitous concourses of atoms4 ,let us admit it to be not absolutely impossible1 not utterly inconceivable1 that vegetable and animal organisms were not contrived such as they are with any view to their becoming habitations of vegetable and animal life1 but that having been accidentally discovered to be fit to be lived in1 they have been taken possession of by life and inhabited accordingly2 that1 similarly1 the wondrously complex and varied mechanisms of which most organisms are composed were not made to be used1 but are used because certain uses have been accidentally discovered for them--the eye1 for instance1 to take one example out of myriads not less remarkable1 not having been meant to be seen with1 but being employed for seeing because1 by a happy coincidence1 the particles composing it have got to be collocated in such wise that a picture of whatever is opposite to it is formed upon the retina1 and is thence by a nervous concatenation transmitted to the brain4 ,although1 if the most consummate skill1 in comparison with which that displayed in the fabrication of ,mr4 ,newall's telescope were downright clumsiness1 had striven to devise a seeing apparatus1 capable of exact self-adjustment to all degrees of light1 all gradations of distance1 all varieties of refrangibility1 it could not have adopted a contrivance more exquisitely ingenious1 or evincing more minutely accurate knowledge of the most secret laws of optics1 than the mechanism of the eye apparently betokens1 let it still be admitted to be not quite beyond the bounds of possibility1 that not skill but the blindest and densest ignorance may have presided over the whole operation4 ,but even though the modes of procedure involved in these admissions were not quite impossible or inconceivable1 belief in them would1 ,i repeat1 be palpably irrational1 and that almost to the last degree4 ,the nearest approach to a reason that can be imagined for it is the ,credo quia incredibile est to which philosophers in despair have occasionally been known to resort4 ,dudum in scholis audiveram1 says ,descartes1 nihil tam absurd dici posse quod non dicatur ab aliquo ,philosophorum4 ,in his early college days he had heard that nothing so absurd can possibly be said1 but that some philosopher or other may say it4 ,such words are too hard for me4 ,i make as yet no charges of absurdity1 contenting myself for the moment with saying that no notion can be too unscientific to be adopted by those scientific men who1 gratuitously running counter to the strongest possible presumption1 set the science of probabilities so utterly at naught as to adopt as reality an hypothesis the chances against which are but one single iota short of infinite4 ,what1 however1 is unequivocally absurd1 is a certain notion which ,i hinted would be found to be inevitably consequent on the foregoing premisses1 and whose self-evident falsity carries with it condemnation of the premisses4 ,to say that the creative agency denominated ,nature1 or by whatever other name known1 neither had any ends in view when originally adopting certain sequences of action1 and originally fabricating innumerable organisms exactly suitable for the performance1 in concert with those sequences1 of innumerable useful functions2 nor1 although ever since repeating the sequences1 and maintaining or reproducing the organisms1 has so done with any reference to the purposes which the sequences and organisms serve1 is equivalent to saying that the agency in question is not even aware that any purposes are served4 ,he who planted the eye doth not then see4 ,he who fashioned the ear doth not hear4 ,he who teacheth man knowledge doth not1 it seems1 know4 ,yet what1 according to this1 creative agency1 whether ,god or ,nature1 ,creator or ,creatress1 can not perceive1 the creature can4 ,even an ass knows that thistles are good to eat1 and that certain movements of his tongue and larynx will result in a bray2 while man not only daily discovers fresh uses for things1 but imagines that if he had had the fashioning of them1 he might have materially increased their utility2 ,king ,alfonso of ,castile1 for instance1 boasting of the valuable cosmogonical advice he could have given had he been taken into council2 and one of ,kaiser ,wilhelm's predecessors on the throne of ,prussia intimating that he1 in like case1 would have proved conclusively that pounded quartz and silex may easily be in excess in arable soil4 ,the creature1 then1 has intelligence of which the ,creator has always been destitute4 ,yet the creature can have nothing save what1 either directly or indirectly1 he derives from a creator4 ,wherefore that1 in becoming endowed with intelligence1 man must have received from the ,creator that which the ,creator had not to give1 is an article inseparable from the profession of faith of those moderate ,atheists who are content to regard man as a creature4 ,there are1 however1 others of a more uncompromising temper1 who do not hesitate to pronounce creation1 in the sense of formation of something out of nothing1 to be an incomprehensible myth2 and it cannot be denied to these that1 however difficult it be to conceive an uncreated universe existing from all eternity1 the conception of an eternally existent ,creator is not one whit easier4 ,fairly enough1 therefore1 these may proceed to argue that in the production of that compound1 man1 the share of the agency usually styled creative must have been limited to combining and arranging the elemental particles of his corporeal moiety4 ,quite fairly1 advancing still farther1 they may hazard a conjecture that it is from the union of the corporeal constituents of man that the generation of his spiritual moiety has resulted4 ,but for such generation it is plainly indispensable that the corporeal constituents should have been not inert particles but self-acting forces1 and that1 as such1 they must have been in possession of more or less intelligence1 which intelligence again either was or was not equal in amount to that of the human spirit or mind generated by them4 ,if it were not equal1 then the forces must have given to their offspring more than they had themselves got to give--which is sheer nonsense4 ,if it were equal1 then1 inasmuch as the human mind is quite clever enough to discover uses for the various parts of the human body and of other organisms1 the forces to which the human mind owes its origin must be at least equally clever4 ,the elementary forces by whose action the human and other organic bodies have been constructed1 must have been perfectly aware what they were constructing1 and what services the resulting structures would be fitted to render4 ,in other words1 they must in their constructive operations have worked towards specific ends1 according to preconceived plan and set design1 wittingly contriving various machines for various purposes4 ,the advanced ,atheists1 with whose speculations we are here especially concerned1 are thus at liberty to choose between two horns of a dilemma1 but must not hope to escape both4 ,either they stand self-refuted by assuming something to have been made out of nothing--a process which they began by pronouncing impossible--or they must imagine intelligence1 competent to devise all organisms1 to be diffused throughout the universe1 thereby showing themselves to have assumed their sectarian appellation without sufficient warrant1 and to be in reality rather ,pantheists than ,atheists4 ,a third hypothesis indeed remains for any who are content to believe that ,nature's elementary forces having1 without knowing what they were about1 constructed the human body1 the human mind1 until then a houseless wanderer1 lit upon it by chance1 and1 observing it to be a habitation suitably swept and garnished1 entered in and dwelt there4 ,upon this supposition there must be1 within the limits of our terrene sphere1 two distinct species of intelligence1 a greater and a lesser--the one competent to construct all sorts of marvellously complex and marvellously serviceable machines1 yet incompetent to understand their utility1 the other fully perceiving the utility of the machines1 yet utterly incompetent to fabricate them4 ,but there are probably few adventurers on the ocean of speculation who would not prefer total shipwreck to the shelter of such a harbour of refuge as this4 ,atheism must in fairness be acknowledged to have much mended its manners within the last two or three generations4 ,its tone and language are no longer of the rude1 scoffing sort at which ,voltaire may be readily pictured as breaking into voluble protest1 or ,hume as contemptuously opening his eyes and shrugging his shoulders4 ,though grown more civil1 however1 it cannot be complimented on having grown more rational4 ,at most may it be credited with being more elaborately irrational than of old4 ,it now no longer denies1 it only ignores4 ,it does not pronounce ,god non-existent4 ,it only insists that there is not complete proof that ,god exists2 thereupon1 however1 proceeding to argue as if ,he did not exist1 and thereby1 not simply confounding deficiency of proof on one side with sufficiency of proof on the other1 but overlooking an amount of proof that on any other subject would1 provisionally at least1 be deemed conclusive1 and perversely rejecting an hypothesis which1 whether correct1 or not1 is at least a good working hypothesis1 coinciding exactly with most of the facts1 and inconsistent with none of them1 in favour of an hypothesis which1 even in the hands of a ,huxley or a ,darwin1 cannot be made to work at all4 ,,ii4 ,to my mind there is a genuine pleasure in giving expression to admiration of any great intellectual achievement2 and it is much rather for that reason than on account of any value which ,i imagine my opinion on such a subject can possess1 that1 having had occasion to name the illustrious author of the ',origin of ,species1' ,i desire to preface my criticism on what appears to me to be a grave defect in his theory1 by intimating my hearty concurrence in its leading principles4 ,that inasmuch as1 owing to the exceeding fecundity of the generality of organic beings1 more individuals of almost every species are born than can possibly survive1 and that consequently a desperate struggle for existence must take place amongst them2 that in such a struggle the smallest grain may turn the scale1 the minutest advantage possessed by some individuals over others determine which shall live and which shall die2 that1 as the circumstances in which life is to be maintained change1 the character and structure of organisms must change also in order to be accommodated thereto1 but that the changes which consequently take place in some individuals are better suited to the altered circumstances than those which take place in other individuals2 that individual offspring1 moreover1 although always strongly resembling their parents in the majority of particulars1 always exhibit some slight differences from them2 that of these differences such as do not render the offspring less fit will almost of necessity render them more fit for coping with their rivals2 and that superior fitness1 however acquired1 is as likely as any other quality to be transmitted to succeeding generations--all these are indisputable facts1 and from these1 as premisses1 it seems to me not so much to be legitimately deducible that most existing species may have been produced 'by descent1 with modification1 through natural selection1' or 'survival of the fittest1' as necessarily to follow that they cannot have originated in any other way4 ,for all species to have been created such as they now are1 is simply inconsistent with the premisses4 ,whatever beings may at any remote epoch have been created1 there must1 according to the conditions involved1 have been amongst their descendants some better fitted1 by reason of divergence from the parent type1 for engaging in internecine strife than those1 if any such there were1 which adhered closely to that type4 ,whether1 then1 among the survivors from the first engagement in that never-ending struggle for life which must have commenced soon after the creation1 there were or were not any exact representatives of the parent type1 there must have been some exhibiting more or less of divergence from that type4 ,among the descendants of these1 again1 there must have been some who1 together with the structural or other advantages inherited from their immediate ancestors1 possessed1 moreover1 some advantages first nascent in themselves1 and who were similarly enabled thereby to prevail over their less gifted competitors1 and similarly to transmit all their advantages to a posterity1 some members of which would similarly be born with certain new advantages in addition4 ,by continual repetition of these processes1 and the consequent accumulation of divergencies from the original pattern1 however slight those divergencies might separately be1 there could not but eventually become formed breeds so distinct from each other as to be to all intents and purposes distinct species1 in whichsoever of its many vague senses the term 'species' be understood4 ,now these species1 instead of having been created1 would be the result of divergence from their created progenitor4 ,whether1 therefore1 any created species do or do not still exist1 it is certain that among existing species there are some that were not created1 but which have been gradually evolved1 and evolved1 too1 through survival of the fittest4 ,mr4 ,darwin1 then1 is fairly entitled to the praise of having placed beyond dispute that a process called by himself ',natural ,selection1' and by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer ',survival of the ,fittest1' has almost from the commencement of organic life been1 and still is1 in active operation2 that it is a cause which must needs have originated some species1 and is quite competent to have originated all that still exist2 whereas creation1 the only other suggested cause1 cannot be conceived to have done this latter unless every minutest shade of difference between offspring and parent be regarded as the effect of a separate creative act4 ,unless creation have originated every one of those divergencies the accumulation of which constitutes a species1 clearly it cannot have originated that species4 ,with some of the phenomena connected with species the theory of creation cannot be reconciled unless this novel interpretation be placed upon the word creation1 whereas there are none of the phenomena with which the evolutionary hypothesis conflicts1 and few1 if any1 which1 when restricted to its proper office of auxiliary1 it will not help to explain4 ,to what we might thus be assured of1 even if we had only general principles to guide us1 all obtainable evidence unanimously testifies4 ,geology distinctly proclaims that every portion of our globe's surface has undergone vast changes1 and that its organic inhabitants have changed simultaneously and proportionately4 ,the proof absolute1 which it furnishes1 that at a period when few1 if any1 existing species had made their appearance1 many species now extinct already existed1 is proof equally absolute that if all species extinct and extant were created1 they cannot1 at any rate1 have been created at the same time4 ,of so much at least we must be satisfied1 unless we are prepared to accept the ingenious conjecture of an orthodox divine1 that1 while our earth was being formed out of chaos1 ,satan1 to confound the faith of remote generations1 brought over bones of monsters from other worlds and embedded them in the soil of ours1 or that1 as the same idea has been otherwise expressed1 while the earth's crust was a baking the devil had a finger in the pie4 ,moreover1 on the supposition that there was a break of ages between the creations of extinct and of extant species1 as geology positively declares there must have been if both were separately created1 how passing strange is the 'grand fact that all extinct beings can be classed with all recent beings'6 ,the strangeness disappears1 however1 when both are regarded as descendants of common progenitors4 ,the wonder would then be if they could not be so classed4 ,again1 how astonishing on the creative1 how natural on the evolutionary hypothesis1 that the arrangement of bones in the hand of a man1 the wing of a bat1 the fin of a porpoise1 the leg of a horse1 should be precisely the same2 the number of vertebr in the neck of a giraffe1 and in that of an elephant the same2 the primitive germs from which a man1 a dog1 a frog1 and a lobster are gradually evolved1 to all appearance the same--the same microscopic atom of homogeneous matter1 undistinguishable by any known test from an animalcule almost at the bottom of the organic scale6 ,above all1 that the courses by which animals of all degrees of complexity are gradually developed from apparently equally simple germs should1 whenever traceable1 be found to consist of progressive ramifications1 so that every higher animal1 before arriving at maturity1 passes through several stages at the end of each of which lower animals have stopped6 ,how impossible1 or how easy1 to understand1 according as the one or the other hypothesis is adopted1 is the phenomenon of what in the one case will be treated as rudimentary1 in the other as obsolete1 organs6 ,no one need scruple to regard these as apparatus which the creature has outgrown and allowed to fall into decay through neglect2 but whatever there is in us of real nobleness of feeling revolts against the notion of their being apparatus which a divine ,creator began to build but was not able to finish4 ,and yet again1 how insultingly irreconcilable with any rational estimate of ,divine nature is the possibility of any existing type of mammals having been created1 seeing that if so1 it must have been created with false marks of nourishment from the womb of a mother that never existed6 ,these are some of the main grounds on which the ,darwinian theory rests4 ,of the abundance of detailed illustrations from which it may derive additional support no adequate idea can be formed1 except by careful perusal of its author's own writings1 and these fortunately may without much exaggeration be said to be in everybody's hands4 ,of the arguments that have been brought forward in opposition to it1 all seem to me to be susceptible of very complete answers1 and one or two of the strongest1 of answers more complete than they have yet received4 ,true1 there is no disputing the testimony borne by the paintings and sculptures of ,egyptian tombs1 and of ,ninevite palaces1 that the basement floors in ,thebes and ,memphis were infested by much the same sort of beetles as those which are such nuisances in ,london kitchens2 that ,sardanapalus1 if ever he exchanged indoor for outdoor sports1 may have hunted with dogs and horses that might pass muster at an ,english meet1 and that the ,pharaohs were served by negro slaves as like as two peas in all externals to those who in the ,united ,states have recently and prematurely been metamorphosed into free and independent electors4 ,but all this only proves that certain species which existed #d1jjj years ago are still represented by unchanged descendants4 ,it does not prove that other descendants and groups of descendants from the same species have not within the same period undergone changes sufficiently great to convert them into distinct races2 neither1 if it did prove thus much1 would it do more than afford a presumption1 and a very deceptive one1 that #d1jjj years are too short a time for the formation of a new race1 affording besides1 at the same time1 much stronger presumption that1 within the remotest limits to which ,mosaic chronology can be pushed back1 the various races of mankind1 white1 black1 and intermediately tinted1 can not possibly have descended from one pair of ancestors4 ,that domesticated animals1 when suffered to run wild1 always return to the primitive wild type--this1 instead of an argument against1 is one of the strongest arguments for the evolution theory1 from which it is indeed1 as ,mr4 ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes says1 a necessary deduction4 ,it is simply because1 as the conditions of life change1 structure must1 for adaptation's sake1 change likewise1 that wild animals are capable of being domesticated1 of being1 that is1 made to undergo modifications by being brought from the conditions of wildness to those of domesticity4 ,how1 then1 should they possibly retain those modifications1 how escape return to their previous shape and habits1 when retransferred from domesticity to wildness8 ,the question1 ,why are not new species continually produced8 may be aptly met by another4 ,how1 consistently with the theory1 is it possible they should8 ,natural ,selection is represented as acting 'solely by accumulating slight successive favourable variations1' as taking only short and slow steps4 ,by what possibility1 then1 can it suddenly produce modifications sufficiently conspicuous to mark off a new species8 ,new species may be1 and indeed are1 constantly in process of formation on all sides1 under our very eyes1 without our being aware2 for since the process requires ages for its accomplishment1 it must needs be imperceptible by the keenest observation4 ,so that even when a new species is completed1 it is not recognised as new1 so minute is the difference between the perfection to which it has attained1 and the imperfect state in which we and our fathers before us had long known it4 ',why1 however1 since1 according to the theory of ,natural ,selection1 an interminable number of intermediate forms must have existed1 linking together all the species in each group by gradations as fine as are our present varieties--why do we not see these linking forms all around us8' ,to this objection the very theory against which it is urged affords a partial and almost adequate reply1 the deficiencies of which are besides to some extent supplied by embryology and geology1 and to a farther extent accounted for by the meagreness of the geological record4 ,natural selection for survival necessarily implies extinction of all that are not selected to survive1 so that fossil remains are now the only procurable evidence that any of these latter that have long been extinct ever existed4 ,but very many organic beings are incapable of being preserved in a fossil condition1 while of those which can be so preserved 'the number of specimens in all our museums is absolutely as nothing compared with the countless generations of countless species that must have existed4' ,it should be recollected1 too1 that among still existing forms are to be included several which result from uterine transformation1 and are never found alive except in utero4 ,another objection1 notwithstanding the great stress often laid on it1 seems to me to be altogether beside the real issue4 ,it is the one derived from the invariable sterility1 real or supposed1 of hybrids4 ,a fact cited by ,mr4 ,lewes1#cg that of the fecundity of a cross called ,leporides1 bred by ,m4 ,rouy of ,angoulme1 between the hare and rabbit1 of which a thousand on an average were for many years1 and probably are still1 sent annually to market1 would seem to be decisive against the assumed sterility2 but1 however this be1 matters not the least in regard to the efficacy of ,natural ,selection1 which1 be it once again observed1 is represented as producing new species1 not suddenly by the copulation of two old and utterly distinct ones1 but very gradually and slowly1 by the accumulation of minute differences occurring in successive individuals of the same species4 ,the chief if not the only serious obstacles to acceptance of ,darwinism seem to me to be of the author's own creation4 ,now and then he appears somewhat needlessly to overstrain his principles1 as for instance when he intimates his conviction that 'all individuals of the same species1 and all the closely allied species of most genera1' will hereafter be discovered to 'have descended from one parent and to have migrated from some one birthplace4' ,this1 to my mind1 is much more unlikely than his further suggestion that 'all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype4' ,startling as this second proposition may be on first hearing1 it may not very improbably express the real fact1 provided by 'some one prototype' be signified1 not a single individual1 but several individuals of one and the same type4 ,beyond all doubt there was a time when on and about our earth all matter was as yet inorganic1 and when whatever spirit1#ch of the sort so termed in contradistinction to matter1 either permeated the earth's substance or moved about its surface1 must have been as yet unembodied4 ,mr4 ,darwin demands whether any one can 'really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's history1 elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living tissues4' ,i for one certainly am far from believing this4 ,i see no reason for believing that1 whatever other phenomenon1 at all similar1 may at any stage of the world's progress have occurred1 it has at innumerable subsequent stages been repeated2 neither do ,i consider that the phenomenon is likely to have worn the guise of a sudden flash4 ,but ,i do firmly believe1 and am quite unable to substitute any equally plausible substitute for the belief1 that when the crust of the earth had sufficiently cooled1 and when other physical conditions had become such as to admit of the manifestation of that life which we are accustomed to distinguish by attaching to it the epithet 'organic1' certain of those forces#ci which1 in my opinion1 constitute matter1 did1 either of their own accord or under superior direction--not suddenly flash1 but--slowly elaborate themselves into organic structures of some exceedingly simple type2 that in the course of ages these simple structures either developed themselves or were developed into structures rendered by slow degrees more and more complex1 until the degree of complexity attained1 being such as to fit them for being inhabited by spirit previously unembodied1 they were1 by individualised portions of such spirit1 appropriated and inhabited accordingly4 ,beyond all doubt1 at some period or other1 what had always previously been unorganised matter must have become organised4 ,of two things one1 then4 ,either this matter must1 whether under superior direction or not1 have organised itself1 or it must have been organised by some other agency4 ,mr4 ,darwin1 together with all thorough-going ,darwinians1 inclines1 ,i suspect1 to the opinion that matter organised itself2 but if so1 it cannot possibly have been inert or lifeless1 but must have been active and animate1 and capable of volition2 and on that condition1 there is no great stretch of fancy in imagining it to have spontaneously adopted the series of arrangements indicated4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we are content to admit that some external superior intelligence may have performed1 or conducted1 or presided over operations1 all room for wonder vanishes4 ,in regard to the character of the structural prototype1 that1 of course1 would depend in part on surrounding physical conditions1 and if these have ever been the same in all parts of the globe1 there is no apparent reason why any number of specimens of the prototype may not anywhere have been independently elaborated4 ,it is not possible1 however1 that1 since the earth began to revolve round the sun1 physical conditions can have been simultaneously the same in all latitudes2 while1 on the other hand1 it seems probable that1 although the same set of conditions might perhaps admit of the production of only one organic type1 there might be other sets of conditions favourable to the production of other types4 ,on the whole1 then1 it seems more probable that inorganic matter combined 7or was combined7 in the first instance in several modes1 than in one single mode1 in order to become organic4 ,but whatever may have been the organic form or forms it first took1 to assume that only a single individual of each form was independently elaborated1 and that all other individuals1 both of the same form and of all the more complex forms1 gradually evolved from that one--are descendants from the same first individual1 the same first parent--surely very gratuitously increases the difficulties of the subject4 ,especially it complicates the problem of the distribution of the same plants and animals over countries immemorially separated by gulfs apparently impassable by natural means4 ,the obstruction which ,mr4 ,darwin has created to the progress of his opinions by the exaggerated shape in which some of them have been presented is1 however1 as nothing in comparison with the injury he does to his theory by obstinately rejecting certain materials indispensable for its satisfactory completion4 ,what an admirable theory it is so far as it goes6 ,how nicely it fits into all the facts it comes in contact with1 even into those which it is1 of itself and unassisted1 incompetent to explain6 ,how elevating too and ennobling1 when rightly conceived6 for who can fail to rejoice in the view it presents of ',natural selection working solely by and for the good of each being' that it spares1 and causing 'all corporal and mental endowments to tend towards perfection'8 or who need mind suspecting himself to be descended1 through an ape1 from a triton or a hydra1 if he may compensate himself by hoping to have a distant posterity of angels8 ,how well1 moreover1 would it1 if permitted1 chime in with any rational religion1 besides being1 as already hinted1 absolutely essential to that part of the ,mosaic creed which represents all the variously coloured and variously featured races of men as springing from one single couple4 ,by what perversity then is it that ,mr4 ,darwin takes such pains1 if not to render his theory irreligious1 at least to exclude from it the assistance which religion alone can afford1 and which it so greatly needs1 that whoever1 without that assistance1 attempts to apply the theory to the complete elucidation of phenomena1 will be found inevitably committing himself to the most astounding hypotheses8 ,here ,i picture to myself a curl on the lip of some advanced ,darwinian who1 having accompanied me so far1 cannot altogether suppress his compassionate scorn at the proposed recurrence now-a-days to a mode of thought so obsolete in the treatment of scientific subjects as the theological4 ',positive biology1' he will perhaps superbly exclaim1 repeating the words of ,mr4 ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes1 'declines theological explanations altogether4' ,yes1 but positive biology is therein very unwise1 for as1 if the same reader will accompany me a little further1 ,i pledge myself to show1 it is the untheological or atheistical1 not the theistical1 mode of treatment which is here utterly out of place and flagrantly unscientific4 ,be it1 without the slightest reserve1 admitted that the formation of almost all1 and probably of quite all1 existing species is due1 and cannot be otherwise than due1 to survival of the fittest1 the superior fitness of these1 moreover1 being due to the gradual accumulation of innumerable and1 for the most part1 exceedingly slight divergencies from the parent stock4 ,but whence and why these divergencies8 ,it cannot be without a cause that even one more feather than the parent possessed appears in the offspring's wing1 or a novel tint on its coat1 or that the curve of beak or talons is not precisely the same in each4 ,what then is the cause8 ,unphilosophic people will most likely call it 'all chance1' getting sneered at for their pains1 and justly too1 as using words without meaning4 ,but are not philosophers themselves doing much the same thing1 and merely restating facts which they profess to explain1 when1 like ,mr4 ,lewes1#dj they talk of the 'specific shape' assumed by an 'organic plasma' being 'always dependent on the polarity of its molecules1' 'or due to the operation of immanent properties2' or declare that1 in the process of organic evolution1 'each stage determines its successor1' 'consensus of the whole impressing a peculiar direction on the development of parts1 and the law of ,epigenesis necessitating a serial development1' insomuch that1 'every part being the effect of a pre-existing1 and in turn the cause of a succeeding part1' the reason why1 when a crab loses its claw1 the member is reproduced1 is that the group of cells remaining at the stump 'is the necessary condition of the genesis' of precisely that new group which the reproductive process imperatively requires to follow next in order1 this second group equally the necessary condition for genesis of the one required third1 the third for the fourth1 and so on2 and that the reason why the thorns of a blackberry admit of somewhat close comparison with the hooks and spines of certain crustace1 is that portions of the integument of both plant and crawfish 'tend under similar external forces to develop' into similar forms8 ,i pass rapidly over one or two minor difficulties that here present themselves4 ,i will not stop to ask how--if reproduction of lost limbs be due to polarity of the molecules1 in other words to the direction which in the circumstances of the case the molecules are bound to take1 and if the polarity of each particular set of molecules be impressed upon them by the group formed immediately previously--how it is that the group terminating the docked stump of a limb1 which group is represented as commencing the work of reproduction1 imparts a different direction or tendency to the fresh molecules of nourishment that are supplied to it1 from that which it has been accustomed to communicate to previous molecular supplies4 ,hitherto it has used such molecules solely for the repair of its own waste2 now it employs a large portion of them to build up an entirely new fabric4 ,it seems then that molecular polarity is not a fixed but a variable property1 and1 being such1 cannot be inherent or originate in the molecular nature4 ,but ,i will not linger over this point nor yet over the fact1 absolutely unintelligible on the polar hypothesis1 that it is comparatively only few animals that are capable of reproducing severed parts4 ,although the process required1 no doubt1 is1 as ,mr4 ,lewes says1 'in all essential respects the same as that which originally produced' the parts1 the last layer of cells left at the place of excision after a human leg or arm has been cut off1 lacks the skill to repeat an operation1 which according to the hypothesis it has once before performed4 ,it cannot so determine the polarity of the molecules with which it is supplied by the arteries as to constrain them to group themselves into a new layer1 instead of merely repairing an old one4 ,a crab or a lobster1 or a polype's molecules are clever enough for this1 a man's not4 ,without pressing these objections1 but on the contrary1 conceding for the nonce and for argument's sake1 to molecular polarity1 to immanent properties1 to ,epigenetic evolution1 all the efficacy claimed for them1 ,i limit myself to inquiring what causes the various tendencies and directions which these imply4 ,tendency pre-supposes impulse2 direction control4 ,what is it that here imparts the impulse and exercises the control8 ,whatever else it be1 it must1 for reasons stated at length on a previous page1 be something possessing at least enough of intelligence to exercise volition1 and which at least intends that the movements which it originates shall take place1 whether it further intends or not the ends which eventually result from the movements4 ,to myself it seems barely conceivable that even the least marvellous of these ends should have been undesigned4 ,take1 for instance1 half a dozen infusoria of some exceedingly low type1 all individually single cells or sacs of matter perfectly transparent and destitute of any approach to structure that can be detected with a magnifying power of five thousand diameters4 ,observe how1 after feeding for a while1 and increasing proportionately in size1 one will divide itself in half1 each half becoming a separate and complete animalcule1 another line itself internally and clothe itself externally with clustered cells1 which1 by a series of differentiations1 traceable through a number of animalcular varieties1 eventually exhibit the outlines of respiratory and circulatory systems4 ,to me1 ,i repeat1 it seems all but inconceivable1 and altogether incredible1 that the intelligence which willed these cellular divisions1 multiplications1 and differentiations to take place1 did not foresee what would be their results1 and did not will them for the sake of those results4 ,and if ,i do not deem it still more incredible that there should be natural selection separating the fittest for survival by accumulating upon them slight advantages which qualify them to survive1 without there being at the same time a nature1 or other exalted intelligence1 however designated1 which selects1 and which accumulates advantages upon the objects of its selection1 in order that they may survive1 it is only because ,i consider the extremest limits of credibility to have been already passed4 ,but ,i forget4 ,on reflection ,i perceive that ,i am doing scant justice to the elasticity of philosophic belief4 ,how far this is capable of stretching on occasion1 let one or two notable ,darwinian specimens show4 ,no single piece of organic mechanism is oftener or more confidently appealed to by ,theists as rendering conclusive evidence on their side than the eye1 nor would they run much risk by allowing sentence to go for or against them according as ,mr4 ,darwin has or has not succeeded in his attempt to explain that evidence away4 ,possibly he may disclaim having made any attempt of the kind1 and ,i must admit that it is less by what he says than by what he leaves unsaid1 that he lays himself open to the charge4 ,indeed1 in almost all he says on the subject1 ,i myself cordially agree1 embracing even some of his views with less of hesitation than he seems to have felt in putting them forward4 ,he seems to me1 for instance1 to have somewhat gratuitously admitted it to be apparently 'in the highest degree absurd to suppose that the eye1 with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances1 for admitting different amounts of light1 and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration1 could have been formed by natural selection4' ,for since1 as he proceeds unanswerably to argue1 'numerous gradations1 from an imperfect and simple eye to one perfect and complex1 each grade being useful to its possessor1 can certainly be shown to exist2' since1 as certainly1 slight variations of the eye do occur1 and are inherited1 and since of these variations there cannot but be some which are useful to the animal exhibiting them under changing conditions of life1 the difficulty of believing in the formation of a perfect and complex eye by natural selection can be little else than a prejudice of the imagination4 ,he proceeds to indicate some probable stages in the assumed process4 ,some of the lowest organisms1 in which no trace of nerves can be detected1 are known to be sensible to light1 owing1 probably1 to the presence in the sarcode of which they are mainly composed1 of certain elements which1 in organisms somewhat higher in the scale1 become aggregated and developed into nerves specially endowed with the same sensibility4 ,an optic nerve thus formed1 surrounded by pigment cells1 and covered by translucent skin1 is the simplest organ that can be called an eye1 but it is an eye incapable of distinct vision1 and serving only to distinguish light from darkness4 ,in certain star-fishes1 small depressions in the layer of pigment-cells are filled with transparent gelatinous matter projecting with a convex surface like a rudimentary cornea1 and this1 it has been suggested1 may serve1 not only to form an image1 but to concentrate the luminous rays4 ,in insects1 the numerous facets in the cornea of their great compound eyes have now been ascertained to form true lenses1 the cones1 moreover1 having been discovered to include curiously modified nervous filaments4 ,it is impossible not1 in this series of changes1 to perceive the appearance of graduation1 nor ought there to be much difficulty in believing the apparent graduation to be real1 when we consider how few comparatively are the still living forms in which the changes cited have been observed1 and how far more numerous the extinct forms by which intermediate changes may have been presented4 ,if there be no extravagance in supposing that natural selection may have occasioned these early steps1 neither is there any in supposing that1 by continued progress in the same direction1 it may at length have fabricated the most perfect optical instrument possessed by any member of the articulata4 ,and1 if credited so far1 why not still further8 why not with competence to form a man's or an eagle's eye8 ,so far ,i am as completely at one with ,mr4 ,darwin in respect to the eye as in respect to any other of the subjects taken by him for illustration4 ,the fact is1 however1 that in this1 as in every similar instance1 he has completely evaded the real difficulties of the case4 ,it is not a whit more startling to be told that the most complex eye1 with all the latest improvements1 than to be told that the earliest rudiment of an optic nerve1 may have been formed by the gradual accumulation of minute differences4 ,only allow time enough for the requisite accumulation1 and neither operation is one whit more unintelligible than the other4 ,the difficulty1 equally and utterly insuperable in both cases1 is to understand how the difference can have been undesigned4 ',how a nerve comes to be sensitive to light1' says ,mr4 ,darwin1 'hardly concerns us more than how life itself originated4' ,perhaps not2 nor1 indeed1 very well could it1 for the second question of the two is surely one of almost unsurpassed concernment2 but1 at any rate1 when either of the two is asked1 nothing can be more reprehensible than1 by studiously ignoring the only alternative reply1 to leave it to be inferred that the nerve made itself1 or that life caused itself to live1 that both are in short examples of what ,mr4 ,darwin strangely calls 'variation causing alterations4'#da ,let us briefly consider a few of the results supposed to be attributable to this singular process4 ,the eye1 as every reader of course knows1 though here and there one perhaps may not be the worse for being reminded1 consists of four coats--the sclerotic1 outermost and strongest1 which constitutes the white of the eye2 the circular1 tough1 and coloured1 yet pellucid1 cornea1 in the centre of which is seen the pupil2 the choroid1 full charged with black pigment1 and lining the sclerotic2 the retina1 an expansion of the optic nerve1 lining in its turn the choroid2 of the iris1 a flat membrane1 dividing the eye into two very unequally-sized chambers2 of a lens termed the crystalline1 suspended in the posterior chamber immediately behind the iris2 and of two humours 7also virtual lenses71 whereof one1 the aqueous1 is enclosed in the anterior chamber formed by the iris and the cornea1 while the other1 the vitreous1 fills the whole of the posterior chamber save what is occupied by the crystalline lens4 ,by what nice interlacement of filaments the fibrous ring that margins the pupil1 or aperture through the iris1 regulates the admission of light1 contracting or expanding1 yet always preserving its circular form1 according as the brilliance is excessive or deficient2 how the humours or lenses are continually varying in figure and relative position so as to concentrate every pencil of light admitted on that point exactly where the retina is spread out to receive it2 how1 according as the object looked at is near at hand or far off1 certain muscles perform quite opposite services1 rendering the cornea more or less prominent1 pushing the crystalline lens forward or backward1 and thereby lengthening or shortening the axis of vision1 so that1 whether the rays enter divergently from a near object1 or parallel from a remote one1 they equally fall into focus at the same distance beyond1 and equally form on the retina a picture of the object from which they come1 perhaps compressing a landscape of five or six square leagues into a space of half an inch diameter1 and anon allowing the page of a book or a dinner-plate to occupy the entire field of vision--to these and to any kindred marvels it would be superfluous more than momentarily to refer4 ,suffice it to note how measureless the superiority1 as a mere piece of mechanism1 of an average eye to the finest of telescopes1 and how just1 nevertheless1 is the telescope-maker's claim to praise for skilful adaptation to the laws of optics1 when he has succeeded in a faint and feeble imitation of some minor part of nature's visual apparatus4 ,yet nature's original and infinitely more beautiful aptitudes we are forbidden to deem adaptations1 being required instead to regard them as self-produced1 or1 at any rate1 as having been undesigned4 ,now ,i unreservedly admit that1 among all conceivable forms1 among the most exquisitely beautiful and most usefully intricate and complex1 there is not one which may not possibly have been produced without aim or purpose by the mere restlessness of elemental forces2 the amount of probability of their having been so produced being1 however1 according to the formula already set forth in its proper place1 as one to infinity multiplied more or less frequently by itself4 ,but what adequate superlative shall we invent to express the credulity1 the credulosity run mad1 of those who1 in a matter of scientific belief1 deliberately accept such odds4 ,observe how at once extravagantly gratuitous and painfully elaborate such credulosity is2 how easily1 on the one hand1 all its ends could be served by the simple expedient of supposing a superintending intelligence2 how1 on the other1 it compels ingenuity like ,mr4 ,darwin's to entrench itself behind a phrase of utterly unmeaning gibberish4 ,if you see a man moving slowly1 with head down1 over an extensive plain1 you may fairly suspect that he does not know where he is going1 and possibly does not mean to go anywhere in particular4 ,but if you perceive that on reaching a ditch he takes a leap over1 you are quite sure that1 when leaping1 he meant to get to the other side4 ,to that extent his saltatory movement is unequivocal evidence of design4 ,it is perhaps to escape the necessity of a similar inference that ,mr4 ,darwin so frequently quotes the proverb ,natura non facit saltum2 but1 if so1 he leans on a broken reed--on a bit of proverbial philosophy as weak as the weakest of ,mr4 ,tupper's4 ,that ,nature does sometimes make a leap1 and a pretty long one1 must be obvious to any visitor to the ,museum of the ,london ,college of ,surgeons1 who has examined the two-headed and four-legged human foeti there preserved in spirits4 ,it may be said that these are leaps in the wrong direction4 ,be it so4 ,still1 whoever can leap backward can make an equal leap forward1 and most people will find the latter the easier feat of the two4 ,the power1 whatever it be1 that coupled together the ,siamese ,twins1 and gave to those respected brothers1 the late ,william and ,robert ,chambers of ,edinburgh1 twelve fingers and twelve toes apiece1 would not have gone at all more out of the way by doing1 suddenly and at once1 several of those things which ,mr4 ,darwin doubts not that it does slowly and by degrees--by single acts1 for instance1 instead of by a succession of acts1 aggregating into the semblance of an optic nerve certain elements in the sarcode of certain low organisms1 spreading out the nerve thus formed into a network or retina1 forming a number of separate pigment-cells into a homogeneous cornea1 and following up these first steps by others which1 how much soever more apparently complex1 would cost comparatively little after the earlier and simpler ones had been taken4 ,now let but the power competent to do these things be credited with sense enough to be aware of its competence1 and it may then be regarded as not unlikely to have done some of them on purpose4 ,whereupon1 the genesis of the eye ceases to be a mystery4 ,all the appearances of contrivance that have resulted from the operation find their obvious and complete explanation in the assumption of a contriver1 and all such hazy films as that of variability producing variation cease to be capable of serving as excuses for wilful blindness4 ,and why should not the power in question be so credited8 ,here is ,mr4 ,darwin's solitary reason why4 ,he doubts whether the inference implied may not be 'presumptuous4' ,he apprehends that we have no 'right to assume that the ,creator works by intellectual powers like those of a man4' ,truly1 of all suggested modes of marking respect for creative power1 that of assuming it to have worked unintelligently is the most original4 ,the hypothesis offered by ,mr4 ,darwin in explanation of the most perfect of organic structures1 is deemed by him to be equally explanatory of the most marvellous of animal instincts4 ,parenthetically1 here1 never having as yet met with a definition of instinct which ,i am able to accept as satisfactory1 ,i make bold to offer a description of my own4 ,instinct is innate knowledge how to perform any useful actions1 accompanied by a tendency or propensity to perform those actions1 but wholly unaccompanied by knowledge of any purpose which they can serve4 ,this is pure instinct1 an example whereof is afforded by the beaver1 of which animal ,i have somewhere read that one caught when newly born1 and brought up by itself in a room in its captor's house1 proceeded after a while to build up across the apartment the semblance of a dam1 composed of brushes1 rugs1 billets of wood1 and other litter4 ,pure instinct differs essentially1 not in degree only1 but in kind1 from reason1 which is not knowledge1 but an instrument for acquiring knowledge4 ,instinct1 however1 is rarely if ever found pure1 being apparently always accompanied by more or less of reason4 ,even a polype makes some show of reason by moving its cilia in one mode when it desires to suck in food1 and in another when it merely wishes to move on2 while it is scarcely possible for an unprejudiced spectator to doubt of its being by a rational deduction from experience that a dog knows that it will get kicked if it presume to snatch at the meat on its master's plate1 instead of waiting for the scraps he may be pleased to throw to it when he has done4 ,instinct by necessary implication involves habit2 habit as necessarily always more or less modifies structure2 structural modification always may be1 and often is1 inherited1 carrying with it a tendency to the habit out of which itself arose2 therefore habit and instinct are likewise heritable4 ,some instincts are originated artificially4 ,the reason why1 on the very first opportunity1 a young pointer has been known to point at game1 and a young sheep-dog to run round1 instead of at1 a flock of sheep1 is that some of their respective ancestors had been carefully trained so to point and to wheel4 ,these1 however1 are exceptions to the general rule4 ,most instincts are of what every one would call natural1 and ,mr4 ,darwin calls 'spontaneous' origin1 he explaining the meaning of the latter term to be that the slight variations from a primordial type1 the accumulation of which is considered by him to constitute actual instinct1 are 'variations produced by the same unknown causes as those which produce slight deviations of bodily structure4' ,but here ,i am once more compelled to join issue with him4 ,of the causes which he styles unknown1 ,i maintain that we know at least thus much--either they are themselves intelligent forces1 or they are forces acting under intelligent direction2 and in support of this proposition ,i need not perhaps do more than show from ,mr4 ,darwin's example what infinitely harder things must be accepted by those who decline to accept this4 ,mr4 ,darwin1 like every really truth-loving controversialist1 far from desiring to shroud1 invites special attention to any seeming weaknesses in his position2 and1 therefore1 when contending that all the faculties commonly classed as instincts1 are exclusively due to natural selection1 of course takes care to particularise the cellmaking faculty of the hive bee4 ,and here1 again1 ,i gladly bear my humble testimony to the partial success he has achieved4 ,although bound to protest against the claim set up by him1 on behalf of natural selection1 to the entire credit of producing the hive bee's most remarkable characteristic1 ,i cannot but think he has succeeded in removing all the apparent difficulties of believing that natural selection's share may have been not less important in that than in any other productive operation in which it takes part4 ,in popular estimation the hive bee is a heaven-born mathematician which1 having been set the problem how to fill a given space with waxen cells with the least loss of room and expenditure of material1 arrives by intuition and instantaneously at a solution which ,newton himself was ignorant of1 and to which1 but for his discovery of the fluxional calculus1 it would have been impossible for his follower1 ,maclaurin1 to attain4 ,and1 doubtless1 it may excusably be deemed supernatural that the insect should adopt off-hand precisely that six-sided figure1 and precisely that inclination of the angles of the same figure's pyramidal roof or floor1 which1 only by very refined and recondite investigation1 can be scientifically shown to be those best fitted for the purpose4 ,mr4 ,darwin has1 however1 adduced strong grounds for supposing the amazing architectural skill thus displayed to have been acquired1 not suddenly1 but by the same slow degrees as those which are so clearly traceable throughout organic progress in general4 ,at the lower end of a short apiary series1 he observed humble bees using their old cocoons for honey pots1 sometimes adding to them short tubes of wax1 and likewise making separate and very irregular cells entirely of wax4 ,at the higher end of the series1 he saw hive bees making double layers of cells1 each cell an hexagonal prism with the basal ends of its six sides bevelled so as to fit on to a pyramid formed of three rhombs1 and each of the three rhombs which compose the pyramidal base of a single cell on one side of the comb entering into the composition of one of the three adjoining cells on the opposite side4 ,intermediately1 he found the ,mexican melipon domestic depositing their honey in cells nearly spherical1 and of nearly equal sizes4 ',these cells1 although aggregated into a mass otherwise irregular1 are always at such a degree of nearness to each other that they would have intersected or broken into each other if the spheres had been completed4 ,but this is never permitted1 the bees building perfectly flat walls of wax between the spheres which thus tend to intersect4 ,hence1 each cell consists of an outer spherical portion1 and of two1 three1 or more1 perfectly flat surfaces1 according as the cell adjoins two1 three1 or more cells2 and when one cell rests on three others1 as from the spheres being nearly of the same size is very frequently and necessarily the case1 the three flat surfaces are united into a pyramid rudely resembling the three-sided pyramidal base of the hive bee's cell1 and necessarily enter1 like the three rhombs of the latter1 into the construction of three adjoining cells4' ,reflecting on these remarkable gradations1 it occurred to ,mr4 ,darwin that if the melipona were to make its spheres of precisely equal sizes1 and to arrange them symmetrically in double layers1 and were further so to dispose them as that the centre of each should be at the distance of radius x mathematical symbol 'square root'#b or radius #a4dadba from the centres of the six surrounding spheres in the same layer1 and at the same distance from the centres of the adjoining spheres in the other and parallel layer--then 'if planes of intersection between the several spheres on both layers were formed1 there would result a double layer of hexagonal prisms united together by pyramidal bases formed of three rhombs2 and the rhombs and the sides of the hexagonal prisms would have every angle identically the same with the best measurements that have been made of the cells of the hive bee4' ,then1 submitting this view to ,professor ,miller of ,cambridge1 he had the gratification of being assured by that distinguished geometer that it was strictly correct4 ,certainly a very happy example of an ingenious conjecture verified by a species of demonstration hardly inferior to the experimental4 ,certainly a very valuable testimony to the soundness of all the main and really essential principles of ,darwinism4 ,good cause1 certainly1 is hereby shown for believing that the cell-making faculty of the hive bee may be nothing more than the aggregate of many minute and successive improvements upon that of the melipona1 and this1 again1 than a similar aggregate of improvements on that of the humble bee2 and for believing further that hive bee and melipona may both be either descendants from the humble bee1 or joint-descendants with it from some still earlier common progenitor4 ,in order to believe this it suffices to believe that a bee which at one period made1 like the humble bee1 cells very unequally sized and irregularly rounded1 came gradually1 in the course of time1 to make them as nearly equal in size and as nearly spherical as those of the melipona2 and subsequently1 during a further lapse of time1 came to arrange them at the same distances from each other1 and in double layers like those of the humble bee4 ,to assume thus much requires no inordinate stretch of faith2 and thus much being assumed1 it is seen at once that the hive bee1 requiring for its cells only about half as much wax as the humble bee does1 and consequently only about half as much honey for the secretion of the requisite wax1 would1 in a struggle for existence1 leave the humble bee so little chance that in all probability the two species would nowhere coexist1 were it not for the special resource derived by the humble bee from possession of a trunk long enough to enter the nectaries of certain flowers1 which the shorter trunk of the hive bee is unable to tap4 ,but though there be no difficulty in assuming the improvements in question to have gradually taken place1 and to have become aggregated in the manner supposed1 there is1 to my mind1 an insuperable objection to supposing that successive generations of bees should have successively adopted the improvements without either having the sense to know what they were doing1 or being prompted by some superior intelligence that did know4 ,i will not be so superfluous as to exaggerate the difficulty4 ,passing over the earlier stages of the process1 and confining myself to one or two of the later1 ,i will content myself with showing how infinitesimally small1 when magnified to the utmost1 are the chances in favour of these having been passed through blindly4 ,i will admit it to be possible that in a society of purely meliponish habits1 there might1 in virtue of one or other of those inscrutable causes classed under the general name of spontaneous variation1 arise some two or three individuals with an innate propensity to make accurately spherical and equally sized cells2 that these individuals1 if either males or fertile females1 and not sterile neuters1 might help to generate others with the same propensity1 these again generating others1 and so on1 until the greater part or the whole of the community became possessed of the same constructive aptitude4 ,i will admit further that1 in virtue of the same inscrutable causes1 individuals1 at first few1 but gradually increasing in number1 might similarly be born with the additional tendency to make cells at the same1 and that the most appropriate1 distance from all adjoining cells2 and will freely acknowledge that the bees1 modifying their previous mode of construction1 as melipon necessarily would do under these altered circumstances1 would construct a layer of cells similar in all respects to those on one side of the hive bee's comb1 except that their bases would be flat instead of pyramidal4 ,further1 ,i admit that the bases would become pyramidal in case the bees should set about constructing double instead of single layers of cells on the same principle4 ,not a little liberality is required for these admissions4 ,for1 in the first place1 the fact of the bees having acquired the habit of making perfect and equally sized spheres would not of itself be of any obvious benefit either to individual bees or to the society at large3 in order that it should enable material and labour to be saved it would have to be accompanied by the habit of making the cells at special distances from each other4 ,and1 in the second place1 though some few individuals should present themselves with an innate tendency to choose these special distances1 whatever advantage might result therefrom1 whatever saving of material or labour1 would be shared in equally by the whole community1 the particular individuals to whom it was due benefiting by it no more than any of the rest1 and not being1 in consequence1 more likely than they to survive in any struggle for existence1 or to leave behind them offspring inheriting their special characteristics4 ,no help1 therefore1 can be derived from ,mr4 ,darwin's principles towards conjecturing why a small minority of such specially endowed bees should be gradually converted into a majority1 and should eventually constitute the whole community1 thereupon becoming in fact converted into a new species4 ,let us1 however1 liberally waive this and all similar objections1 and assume a community of hive bees to have been1 in the utterly unaccountable manner indicated by the term spontaneous variation1 developed from a meliponish stock4 ,unfortunately1 all our liberality will be found to have been thrown away without perceptibly simplifying the problem to be solved4 ,for1 whatever be among melipon the distribution of the generative capacities1 among hive bees1 at any rate1 all workers are sterile neuters1 which never have any offspring to whom to bequeath their cellmaking skill1 while the queen bee and drones1 which alone can become parents1 have no such skill to bequeath4 ,clearly the formula of 'descent with modification by natural selection1' is1 in its literal sense1 utterly inapplicable here4 ,in whatever manner the cell-making faculty might have been acquired by the first homogeneous swarm of hive bees1 it must inevitably have terminated with the generation with which it commenced1 if transmission by direct descent had been necessary for its continuance4 ,the only resource open to ,mr4 ,darwin is to suppose1 not merely 7what is1 indeed1 obviously the fact7 that queen bee after queen bee1 besides generating each in turn a progeny of workers endowed with instincts which their parents did not possess and could not therefore impart1 generated also princess bees destined in due season to generate a working progeny similarly endowed with instincts underived from their parents2 but to suppose further that all this has happened in the total absence of aim1 object1 intention1 or design4 ,now that all this should have so happened1 although not absolutely inconceivable1 nor1 therefore1 absolutely impossible1 is surely too incredible to be believed except in despair of some other hypothesis a trifle less preposterous4 ,it is surely not worth while to set the doctrine of probabilities so completely at naught1 for the sake of an explanation which avowedly leaves every difficulty unexplained1 referring them all to causes not simply unknown but unconjecturable4 ,what excuse1 then1 have philosophers1 of all people1 for doing this in preference to the simple expedient of supposing that1 although the parturient bee1 queen or other1 cannot intend that any of her progeny should be more bounteously endowed than herself1 there is an independent intelligence that does so intend8 ,to content oneself with pronouncing such preference to be eminently unscientific is tenderness of language nearly akin1 ,i fear1 to literary bathos4 ,,iii4 ,i have said that the form of unbelief to which1 on the principle of calling a spade a spade1 ,i have taken the liberty of giving the name of ,scientific ,atheism1 manifests itself now-a-days rather by ignoration than by formal denial of ,god4 ,this1 however1 is not a new feature in any atheism really worthy of being styled scientific4 ,even as ,mr4 ,darwin verbally recognises a ,creator1 although without assigning to ,him any share in creation1 even so ,kant1 when more than a century ago undertaking1 in his ',general ,natural ,history and ,theory of the ,celestial ,bodies1'#db to account for the constitution and mechanical origin of the universe on ,newtonian principles1 spoke of the elements as deriving their essential qualities from the 'eternal thought of the ,divine ,intelligence1' without1 however1 crediting the said ,intelligence with having interposed in order to carry out ,his thoughts4 ',give me matter1' he says1 'and ,i will build the world2' and without other data than diffused atoms of matter endowed with simple attractive and repulsive forces1 he proceeds to expound a complete cosmogony4 ,he pictures to himself the universe as originally an infinite expansion of minutely subdivided matter1 and supposing a single centre of attraction to be somewhere therein set up1 he endeavours to show that the result must be a prodigious central body surrounded by systems of solar and planetary worlds in all stages of development4 ',in vivid language1' says ,professor ,huxley1#dc 'he describes the great world-maelstrom widening the margin of its prodigious eddy in the slow progress of millions of ages1 gradually reclaiming more and more of the molecular waste1 and converting chaos into cosmos4' ,then1 fixing his attention more particularly on our own system1 he accounts for the relation between the masses and densities of the planets and their distances from the sun1 for the eccentricity of their orbits1 for their rotation1 for their satellites1 for the general agreement in the direction of rotation among the celestial bodies1 for ,saturn's ring1 and for the zodiacal light4 ,all this he does1 according to ,professor ,huxley1 by 'strict deduction from admitted dynamical principles1' and ,i1 well aware of my own inability to form an independent judgment on the point1 gladly take so high an authority's word for it4 ,for aught that ,i know1 ,kant's attractive and repulsive forces being admitted1 the establishment of centres of attraction1 and of circle within circle of revolutions round them1 and all his other details1 would follow naturally and of course4 ,i limit myself to asking1 ,whence these simple forces8--and when ,kant replies1 ',from the ,eternal ,thought of the ,divine ,understanding1' ,i should be the last to criticise if his answer stopped there4 ,unfortunately1 he adds that the forces were 'evolved without purpose'2 in other words1 that the ,intelligence which thought them into existence failed to think of any purpose for them4 ',matter1' he proceeds1 'is purely passive1 yet1 nevertheless1 has in its simplest state a determination towards the assumption of a more perfect constitution in the way of natural development1 whereby it breaks up rest1 stirs up nature1 gives to chaos shape4' ,for the elements whereof this passively stirring up matter is composed 'have native powers of setting each other in motion1 and are to themselves a spring of life2' and when1 having of course being previously dead1 they have given themselves life1 they forthwith begin to attract each other with a strength varying with their varying degrees of specific gravity4 ,the scattered elements of the denser sort collect by attraction all particles of less specific gravity out of their immediate neighbourhood1 and are themselves similarly collected by particles of still denser sort1 these again by others denser yet1 and so on1 until1 as results of this particular action1 several masses are formed which in like manner would converge towards and be united with the largest and densest of their number1 were it not that the counter principle of repulsion now comes into play4 ,this principle--familiarly exemplified in the elasticity of vapours1 the emanations from strong smelling substances1 and the expansion of all spirituous substances--causes the vertical movements of the converging masses to be deflected laterally1 so as ultimately to enclose the central mass within circles which1 at first intersecting each other in all directions1 are at length1 by dint of mutual collision1 made all to revolve in the same direction1 and nearly the same plane4 ,now ,i most earnestly protest against being suspected of what in me would be the intolerable impertinence of desiring to cast ridicule on these magnificent speculations1 the grandeur of which ,i thoroughly appreciate so far as my scant mathematics enable me to follow them4 ,i take exception to them only because the language in which they are couched seems to imply that operations1 of whose nature one of the most powerful of human intellects could1 at its utmost stretch1 catch only a faint hazy inkling1 may yet have been initiated and perfected without the intervention of any intellect at all4 ,this is a falsism against which my respect for philosophy and philosophers makes me only all the more indignant when ,i find any of the latter falling into it1 as those of them inevitably must who1 busying themselves1 early or late1 ,with a mighty debate1 ,a profound speculation about the creation ,and organical life1 and chaotical strife1 ,with various notions of heavenly motions1 ,and rivers and oceans1 and valleys and mountains1 ,and sources of fountains1 and meteors on high1 ,and stars in the sky1--propose by and bye1 like ,john ,hookham ,frere's ,aristophanic ,birds1 ,if we'll listen and hear1 ,to make perfectly clear how creation took place without a conscious ,creator4 ,all their fancied solutions of this hopeless puzzle have one feature in common--a family likeness which the wickedest wit finds it difficult to caricature4 ,there is a note to ,frere and ,canning's ',loves of the ,triangles' which the reader will be grateful to me for transcribing here1 the more frequently he may have laughed at it already1 laughing now all the more1 and laughing heartily at it now though he may never have before4 ,it begins by tracing the genesis or original formation of ,space to a single point1 in the same manner as the elder ,darwin had1 in his ',zoonomia1' traced the whole organized universe to his six ,filaments4 ,it represents this primeval ,point or ,pinctum saliens of the universe1 after 'evolving itself by its own energies1 to have moved forwards in a right line ad infinitum till it grew tired4' ,whereupon1 'the right line which it had generated would begin to put itself in motion in a lateral direction1 describing an area of infinite extent4 ,this area1 as soon as it became conscious of its own existence1 would begin to ascend or descend1 according as its specific weight might determine1 forming an immense solid space filled with vacuum1 and capable of containing the present existing universe4' ,thus slow progressive points protract the line1 ,as pendant spiders spin the filmy twine3 ,thus lengthened lines impetuous sweeping round1 ,spread the wide plane1 and mark its circling bound2 ,thus planes1 their substance with their motion grown1 ,form the huge cube1 the cylinder1 the cone4 ,it then proceeds as follows3-- ',,space being thus obtained1 and presenting a suitable nidus or receptacle for the generation of chaotic matter1 an immense deposit of it would gradually be accumulated2 after which the filament of fire being produced in the chaotic mass by an idiosyncrasy or self-formed habit analogous to fermentation1 explosion would take place1 suns would be shot from the central chaos1 planets from suns1 and satellites from planets4 ,in this state of things1 the filament of organization would begin to exert itself in those independent masses which1 in proportion to their bulk1 exposed the greatest surface to the action of light and heat4 ,this filament1 after an infinite series of ages1 would begin to ramify1 and its viviparous offspring would diversify their forms and habits so as to accommodate themselves to the various incunabula which nature had prepared for them4 ,upon this view of things1 it seems highly probable that the first effort of ,nature terminated in the production of vegetables1 and that these being abandoned to their own energies1 by degrees detached themselves from the surface of the earth1 and supplied themselves with wings and feet1 according as their different propensities determined them in favour of aerial or terrestrial existence4 ,others1 by an inherent disposition to society and civilisation1 and by a stronger effort of volition1 would become men4 ,these in time would restrict themselves to the use of their hind feet2 their tails would gradually rub off by sitting in their caves or huts as soon as they arrived at a domesticated state2 they would invent language and the use of fire1 with our present and hitherto imperfect system of society4 ,in the meantime1 the ,fuci and ,alg1 with the ,corallines and ,madrepores1 would transform themselves into fish1 and gradually populate all the submarine portions of the globe4'#dd ,although the writers of this delicious drollery seem to have had ,dr4 ,erasmus ,darwin only in view1 they could not1 we thus see1 parody his peculiar crotchets without hitting off not less neatly some of the corresponding extravagances of both earlier and later expounders of ,nature4 ,nature is a phrase which1 greatly to the confusion of those who so employ it1 is habitually used simultaneously in two quite opposite senses1 so as to denote at the same time both the agency in virtue of whose action the universe exists1 and likewise the universe itself which results from that action4 ,nature1 in either signification1 becomes to a great extent interpretable when the agency so designated is credited with sufficient sense to foresee and to intend the results of its own action4 ,on that condition1 although among the many unsolved problems she may continue to present there will be some evidently lying beyond the limits of human comprehension1 there will be none running counter to human reason4 ,except on that condition1 the universe is not simply uninterpretable1 it is a bewildering assemblage of irreconcilable certainties4 ,philosophy's choice lies between such patent truisms as that there can be no force but living force1 no vis but vis vivida1 no vis inerti otherwise than metaphorically1 and such blatant falsisms as that inertness and exertion may coincide1 unintelligence generate intelligence1 agency of whatsoever sort produce1 merely by its own act1 and merely out of its own essence1 other agency capable of higher action than its own4 ,philosophy1 when with these sets of alternatives before her she deliberately chooses the latter1 becomes ,scientific ,atheism1 all the varieties of which have one point in common1 resembling each other in their proneness to rush upon and embrace demonstrable impossibilities for the sake of avoiding a few things hard to be understood4 ,one variety1 however1 the ,comtist1 far exceeds all the rest in the lengths to which it is carried by this propensity4 ,,iv4 ,if1 in speaking as ,i am about to do of ,comtism1 ,i commit--heedless of ,mr4 ,lewes' solemn warning--the grave offence of speaking confidently about a writer whom ,i have never read1 ,i may at least plead in extenuation of my fault1 that1 although my knowledge of that writer be confessedly merely an echo of what others have said of him1 those others1 at any rate1 far from being his antagonists1 are two of the most ardent of his not undiscriminating admirers4 ,it is from ,mr4 ,mill#de and from ,mr4 ,lewes#df himself that ,i have derived the notions of ,comtist philosophy that suggest to me the following notes4 ,i lay no stress on certain flaws in the fundamental propositions that 'we have no knowledge of anything but phenomena1 and that our knowledge of phenomena is only relative1 not absolute2 that we know not the essence nor the real mode of production of any fact1 but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or similitude2 that the constant resemblances which link phenomena together1 and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent1 are all we know about them1 and that their causes1 whether efficient or final1 are unknown and inscrutable4' ,i will only suggest that our mere consciousness of possessing some knowledge of phenomena is itself a knowledge distinct from the knowledge which constitutes its subject--distinct1 that is1 from the knowledge of phenomena2 that if it were possible for us to be aware of only one single fact1 we should know something about that fact1 notwithstanding that there were no other facts which it could be perceived to have preceded or followed1 or to which it could be likened1 even as a polype with a stomach-ache would know something about a stomach-ache1 although ignorant that it had a stomach1 and oblivious of any former sensation1 whether painful or pleasurable2 and that if the causes of phenomena be utterly unknown1 our ignorance of them ought not to be so signified as to sound like knowledge1 as it does when resemblances are said to link1 and sequences to unite1 phenomena together1 thereby warranting the inference that one phenomenon succeeds another because the two are so linked and united4 ,these1 however1 are trifles--mere spots on the sun one might say1 were but the surface on which they appear altogether sunlike--and ,i leave them without additional remark except that1 although it may perhaps have been hypercritical to point them out1 still the language of a new philosophy1 claiming to supersede all old ones1 ought to be proof even against hypercriticism4 ,i pass on to a generalisation1 termed by ,mr4 ,mill 'the key to ,comte's other generalisations3 one on which all the others are dependent1 and which forms the back-bone1 so to speak1 of his philosophy1' insomuch that 'unless it be true he has accomplished little4' ,this is the so much vaunted discovery that all human thought passes necessarily through three stages1 beginning with the theological1 and proceeding through the metaphysical to the positive4 ,these three terms1 however1 in the novel sense in which they are used by ,comte1 stand very urgently in need of definition4 ,by the theological is to be understood that stage of the mind in which the facts of the universe are regarded as governed by single and direct volitions of a being or beings possessed of life and intelligence4 ,it is the stage in which winds are supposed to blow1 seas to rage1 trees to grow1 and mountains to tower aloft1 either because winds1 seas1 trees1 and mountains are themselves alive and so act of their own accord2 or because there is a spirit dwelling in each of them which desires that it shall so act2 or because each separate class of objects is superintended by an out-dwelling divinity1 which similarly desires2 or1 finally1 because one single divinity1 supreme over all things1 initiates and maintains all the apparently spontaneous movements of inanimate bodies4 ,in the metaphysical stage1 phenomena are ascribed not to volitions1 either sublunary or celestial1 but to realised abstractions--to properties1 qualities1 propensities1 tendencies1 forces1 regarded as real existences1 inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which they reside2 while the characteristic of the positive stage is the universal recognition that all phenomena without exception are governed by invariable laws1 with which no volitions1 natural or supernatural1 interfere4 ,these being the three stages1 the discovery of which as a series necessarily passed through by human thought in its progress towards maturity1 constitutes one of ,comte's chief glories1 ,i almost tremble at my own audacity1 shrinking from the sound myself am making1 when by inexorable sense of duty constrained to declare that the grand discovery is after all merely that of a distinction without a difference4 ,what ,comte chiefly condemned in the metaphysical mode of thought1 are the conception of mental abstractions as real entities which exert power and produce phenomena1 and the enunciation of these entities as explanations of the phenomena2 and certainly 'it is1' as ,mr4 ,mill says1 or rather was1 previously to his own ingenious solution of it1 'one of the puzzles of philosophy1 how mankind1 after inventing a set of mere names to keep together certain combinations of ideas and images1 could have so far forgotten their own act as to invest these creations of their will with objective reality1 and mistake the name of a phenomenon for its efficient cause4' ,those natural laws1 however1 on which ,positivism relies--are not they as purely mental abstractions as the essences1 virtues1 properties1 forces1 and what not1 for which it is proposed to substitute them8 ,yet since ,positivism regards these laws as 'governing' phenomena1 and having phenomena 'subject' to them1 must it not necessarily regard them likewise as realised abstractions1 as real entities8 ,plainly1 if its language be taken literally1 its professors must acknowledge that it does1 unless they prefer to stultify themselves by propounding such unmitigated nonsense as that power may be exercised1 and phenomena produced1 by non-entities4 ,but if so1 what else is ,positivism than another form of that very metaphysicism which it condemns8 and a form1 too1 peculiarly obnoxious to ,mr4 ,mill's caustic remark that 'as in religion1 so in philosophy1 men marvel at the absurdity of other people's tenets1 while exactly parallel absurdities remain in their own1 and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that words can be mistaken for things1 who is treating other words as if they were things every time he opens his mouth4' ,possibly1 however1 it may be replied that 'government by natural laws' is a phrase which ,positivists never use except metaphorically1 and by which they never mean more than certain successions of events4#dg ,very well4 ,either1 then1 they acknowledge no real government of phenomena at all1 in which case to speak of phenomena as governed by law is1 if not a purely gratuitous mystification1 as glaring an instance as can well be conceived of a 'bare enunciation of facts1 put forward as a theory or explanation of them3' or1 if they do recognise real government1 then they must suppose that1 behind those mere mental abstractions1 laws or order of ,nature1 there must be some lawgiver or other being that originally issued the laws1 or ordained the order1 and still enforces them1 or maintains it4 ,but if this be the positivist faith1 then1 that we may discover its other self1 we have only to go still further back2 as far back1 however1 as to the theological stage1 supposed to have been so early left behind1 yes1 even unto the deities or deity that the metaphysical entities had displaced4 ,positivism1 in short1 is in this dilemma3 either the mode of thought claimed by it as peculiarly its own is simply that process so justly ridiculed by ,comte himself as the 'naf reproduction of phenomena as the reason for themselves1' and by ,mr4 ,lewes as 'a restatement' 7by way of explanation7 'of the facts to be explained2' or it is at any rate nothing more than a return1 either to the metaphysical or to the theological mode of thought1 according as one or the other is adopted of the only two interpretations that can possibly be placed on its own nomenclature4 ,a new mode it certainly is not4 ,it is either no mode of thought at all1 but merely an empty form of words2 or it is at best only a new name for one or other of two old-fashioned modes1 both of which its author denounces as false from the beginning1 and now worn out and obsolete into the bargain4 ,of other features of ,comtist philosophy it would be out of place to speak here1#dh where1 indeed1 that philosophy would not have been mentioned at all but for its having been transformed by its author into a religion1 and that1 too1 an atheistical religion--the ',religion of ,humanity4' ,to myself1 as to most people1 a religion without a ,god is a contradiction in terms4 ,to constitute what is almost universally understood by religion it does not suffice that there be a 'creed or conviction claiming authority over the whole of human life3 a belief or set of beliefs deliberately adopted respecting human destiny and duty1 to which the believer inwardly acknowledges that all his actions ought to be subordinate3' nor that there be in addition 'a sentiment connected with this creed or capable of being invoked by it1 sufficiently powerful to give it1 in fact1 the authority over human conduct to which it lays claim in theory3' nor yet that there be1 moreover1 'an ideal object1 the believer's attachment and sense of duty towards which are able to control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities1 and prescribe to him a rule of life4'#di ,that such an object is fully capable of gathering round it feelings sufficiently strong to enforce the most rigid rule of life1 will certainly not be denied by me1 privileged as ,i am to count among my friends more than one whose whole life is little else than a life of devotion to an object1 'the general interest of the human race1' plainly incapable of affording them in exchange that 'eternity of personal enjoyment' to which ordinary devotees look forward as their reward1 and whose virtue ,i honour as approaching the sublime1 on account of its independence of all the props and stimulants which ordinary virtue finds indispensable4 ,but the sublimest virtue does not of itself constitute religion4 ,for1 besides the 'creed1' 'conviction1' and 'sentiment' indicated above1 there is needed some suitable object of worship to which the soul may alternately bow down in humble reverence1 and look up in fervent love--some being to whom its prayer1 praise1 and thanksgiving may be fittingly addressed4 ,this want1 recognised--as one of the few who do not recognise it admits--by nine out of every ten persons1 was distinctly recognised by ,comte1 who1 however1 attempted to supply it by pointing1 not to ,god1 but to ,man4 ,his reason for this was not a conviction that there is no ,god4 ,on the contrary1 he habitually disclaimed1 not without acrimony1 dogmatic atheism2 and once even condescended so far as to declare that 'the hypothesis of design has much greater verisimilitude than that of a blind mechanism4' ,but in the 'mature state of intelligence' at which his mind had arrived1 'conjecture founded on analogy did not seem to him a basis to rest a theory upon4' ,he preferred a religious theory without a basis1 and therefore adopted one as destitute of support as the tortoise on which stands the earth-upholding elephant of ,hindoo mythology2 selecting1 as the ',grand tre' to be worshipped1 'the entire ,human ,race1 conceived as a continuous whole1 past1 present1 and future4' ,for this great collective non-existence1 this compound of that which is1 that which has been but has ceased to be1 and that which is not yet1 he elaborated a minute ritual of devotional observances1 and would1 if he had had the chance1 have consecrated a complete sacerdotal hierarchy1 subordinated to himself as supreme pontiff4 ,having1 for fear of recognising what possibly might not be1 begun by1 wilfully and with his eyes open1 recognising what could not possibly be1 he proceeded to invest this sanctified non-existence with precisely those attributes best calculated to render it unfit to receive the admiration he prescribed for it4 ,that feeble ,humanity--the actually living portion thereof1 that is--may need and be the better for our services1 which ,divine ,omnipotence of course cannot be1 was distinctly urged by him as a reason why prayers1 or at least those outpourings of feeling which he so designated1 should be addressed to the former and not to the latter4 ,that ,humanity is in a constant state of progress1 so that both the collective mass and choice specimens of each successive generation of men must always be superior to the corresponding masses and specimens of all previous generations1 is a prime article of the ,comtist creed2 but not the less is it an imperative injunction of the ,comtist rubrick that religious homage shall be paid1 not only to the collective ',grand tre' of ,humanity1 but also to individual worthies of past ages--that superiors shall consequently fall down before1 and worship1 and take as models1 their intellectual and moral inferiors4 ,the fact of a religion made up of tenets like these having been thought out by one of the profoundest of reasoners does not prevent its being the very perfection of unreason4 ,even though on the one side there were nothing more than some doubt whether ,deity might not exist1 still with complete certainty on the other of the non-existence of ',humanity1' ,deity ought in fairness to have at least the benefit of the doubt4 ,in selection for adoration1 that which only perhaps may be1 at any rate deserves to be1 preferred to that which positively is not4 ,the excess of superstition with which ,st4 ,paul reproached the ,athenians1 for raising an altar to the ',unknown ,god1' looks like excessive circumspection1 beside the solemn dedication of temples to a chimera known not to be4 ,nay1 even ,isaiah's maker of graven images is at length outdone4 ,even he who1 having hewn down a tree1 'burneth part thereof in the fire1 with part thereof eateth flesh1 roasteth roast1 and is satisfied1 warmeth himself1 and saith1 ,aha1 ,i am warm1 ,i have seen the fire2 and with the residue maketh a god1 yea1 his graven image1 and falleth down unto it and worshippeth it1 and prayeth unto it1 and saith1 ,deliver me1 for thou art my god'--even he has at last found more than his match in irrationality4 ,for he has at least before him a visible tangible block of wood1 not the mere memory of one that has long ago rotted1 nor the dream of one that is yet to grow1 whereas that mental figment1 ,consecrated ,humanity1 is not even a real shadow1 but only a fancied one1 a shadow cast by no substance4 ,and it is to ,comtists of all people--intellectual salt of the earth as they are--that this figment is recommended for adoration--yes1 to those who1 pharisaically standing aloof from the common herd1 thank their imaginary substitute for ,god1 or whatever else it is they deem thankworthy1 that they are not blind as other men are1 and least of all as those dazed metaphysicians who actually personify their own mental abstractions4 ,no wonder that such extreme provocation should try the patience of all but the stanchest disciples4 ,no wonder that ,mr4 ,lewes himself should seem half inclined to apostrophise his quondam master in words resembling those once addressed to ,robespierre1 ',avec ton ,grand tre1 tu commences m'embter4' ,here make we one more pause4 ,this chapter's theme is1 as was betimes premised1 not the strength of theism1 but the weakness of atheism4 ,i have in it attempted to execute a design which1 according to ,boswell1 was conceived by ,lord ,hailes1 and approved by ,dr4 ,johnson1 that of writing an essay1 ,sur la crdulit des incrdules1 and ,i think ,i have succeeded so far as to show that1 if any one who can swallow atheism affects to strain at theism1 it cannot1 at any rate1 be for want of a sufficiently capacious gullet4 ,,footnotes3 #cf ,the story was thus told by ,diderot1 to ,sir ,samuel ,romilly1 when a young man3--',je vous dirai un trait de lui1 mais il vous sera un peu scandaleux peut-tre1 car vous autres ,anglais1 vous croyez un peu en ,dieu2 pour nous autres1 nous n'y croyons gures4 ,hume dna dans une grande compagnie avec le baron ,d',holbach4 ,il tait assis ct du baron2 on parla de la religion naturelle4 ,pour les athes1 disait ,hume1 je ne crois pas qu'il en existe2 je n'en ai jamais vu6 ,vous avez t un peu malheureux1 rpondit l'autre1 vous voici table avec dix-sept pour la premire fois4'--,edinburgh ,review for ,january #ahdg4 #cg ',studies in ,animal ,life1' chap4 v4 #ch ,the reader who1 having skipped some of the earlier chapters1 may find this language obscure1 is requested to turn back to the essay on ',huxleyism1' pp4 #aid-f4 #ci ,see again1 pp4 #aid-f4 #dj ',mr4 ,darwin's ,hypotheses4' ,part ,,ii4 ',fortnightly ,review' for ,june #ahfh4 #da ',origin of ,species1' p4 #bbf4 #db ,of this treatise1 no ,english or ,french translation has1 ,i believe1 been published4 ,for my own very limited acquaintance with it1 ,i am indebted to the extreme kindness of my friend1 ,professor ,croom ,robertson1 who has most obligingly favoured me with a manuscript version of the portion referred to in the text4 #dc ',lay ,sermons1' p4 #bdj4 #dd ',beauties of the ,anti-,jacobin1' #agii1 pp4 #bad-f4 #de ',auguste ,comte and ,positivism1' passim4 #df ',history of ,philosophy1' #dth edition1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #fed-gce4 #dg ,not that so restricted a meaning can1 with any propriety1 be placed on positivist definitions of law4 ,see1 for instance1 that of ,mr4 ,lewes 7',history of ,philosophy1' vol4 ii4 p4 #gja71 who defines law to be 'the invariable relation between two distinct phenomena1 according to which one depends on the other4' #dh ,some few additional random remarks1 however1 though not permissible in the text may1 perhaps1 be less inappropriate in a note4 ,my scientific deficiencies do not prevent my understanding or1 at least1 fancying ,i understand1 that ,comte's famous ',classification of the ,sciences' may be extremely serviceable as indicating in what order the sciences may most profitably be studied4 ,that a student's general progress would be swifter and surer if1 before entering on physics or chemistry1 he had already made considerable progress in algebra1 geometry1 and mechanics1 than if he commenced all five sciences simultaneously1 seems probable enough4 ,if1 however1 the classification be intended also to indicate historically the order in which the sciences have actually been studied1 ,i cannot but suspect it to be misleading4 ,certainly1 if knowledge of number was the earliest knowledge acquired by man1 those savage races which have not even yet learnt how to count beyond four1 must have been content with very few lessons in arithmetic when turning off to other branches of learning4 ,as to the measure of success that attended ,comte's scheme of creating a ,philosophy of ,general ,science1 ,i presume not to utter one syllable of my own1 preferring to cite what ,mr4 ,mill says of that 'wonderful systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences from mathematics to physiology1 which1 if he had done nothing else1 would have stamped him on all minds competent to appreciate it as one of the principal thinkers of the age4' ,in all sincerity1 ,i say that the mere conception of the enterprise1 whose vastness is so luminously expounded by ,mr4 ,lewes1 in the last edition of his ',history of ,philosophy1' seems to me to betoken superior genius4 ,i feel1 as it were1 simply awe-struck in the presence of an intellectual ambition1 that within the brief span of one human life could aspire to a mastery over all the sciences1 sufficient1 first for co-ordinating the fundamental truths and special methods1 and so obtaining the philosophy of each1 and then for co-ordinating the manifold philosophies so obtained1 and--by condensing them all into one homogeneous doctrine1 and blending them into one organic whole1 whereof each part would be seen to depend on all that preceded1 and to determine all that succeeded--transforming all science into philosophy4 ,one point however remains on which ,i shall speak with some confidence1 that1 namely1 of the inclusion among ',comte's titles to immortal fame' of the creation of a ,science of ,sociology4 ',what the law of gravitation is to astronomy1 what the elementary properties of tissues are to physiology1' that1 says ,mr4 ,lewes1 in the opinion of ,comte's disciples1 'is the law of the three stages to sociology4' ,but if1 as ,i have shown1 there are not really three but only two stages1 the so-called third stage being simply a return to either the second or the first1 the law of the three stages cannot be much of a law1 nor the science of which it is the essence much of a science4 ,mr4 ,lewes1 nevertheless1 maintains that ,m4 ,comte created ,social ,science4 ,mr4 ,mill considers that he did not create it1 but only proved its creation to be possible4 ,with all possible deference1 ,i submit that what he really did was to prove its creation to be impossible4 ,in a passage of ,mr4 ,mill's ',positivism1' quoted with approval in ,mr4 ,lewes's ',history of ,philosophy1' and presumably1 therefore1 expressing the sentiments of both writers1 ,comte is described as pronouncing inappropriate to the ,science of ,society1 the method universally admitted to be proper to all other sciences--that1 namely1 of obtaining by induction the laws of the elementary phenomena1 then1 from these laws thinking out deductively those of the complex phenomena1 and1 finally1 of verifying by specific observation the laws obtained by deduction4 ,among social phenomena1 he is described as arguing1 the elementary ones are human feelings and actions1 the laws of which are the laws of universal human nature4 ,but the human beings1 on the laws of whose nature social facts depend1 are not abstract or universal1 but historical human beings1 already shaped and made what they are1 not by the simple tendencies of universal human nature1 but by the accumulated influence of past generations of human society4 ,this being the case1 the laws of universal human nature evidently cannot serve as materials1 whence it would be possible for any powers of deduction1 starting from the bare conception of the ,being ,man1 to predict beforehand how successive generations of men would feel and act4 ,wherefore1 in order to get at social laws1 we must reverse the ordinary method1 seizing upon any generalizations which the facts of history1 empirically considered1 will supply1 and then using the universal laws of human nature for the verification of these generalizations4 ,i will not linger over the glaring inconsistency involved in the conclusion thus arrived at1 of appealing1 for the verification of empirical generalizations1 to a species of deduction confessed to be impracticable for want of the requisite materials4 ,i prefer to show that from ,comte's own premises1 as rendered by ,mr4 ,mill1 necessarily results a separate conclusion1 absolutely fatal to his sociologically creative pretensions4 ,according to him1 as we have seen1 the laws of elementary social facts1 or of human actions and feelings1 are the laws of universal human nature1 which latter can1 of course1 be no other than whatever habits of invariably1 in given circumstances1 feeling and acting in given modes1 may be common to all mankind4 ,but it is admitted that the particular generation of human beings at any time existing must1 by the accumulated influence of preceding generations1 have been rendered very different from every preceding generation3 and nothing is more certain than that two generations differing widely from each other in character1 would1 in many given circumstances1 not only not feel and act in precisely the same1 but would inevitably feel and act in widely different1 manners4 ,nor is this all4 ,the circumstances by which any generation is surrounded have been partly shaped for it by preceding generations1 partly modified by itself--so that it is not possible for any two generations ever to find themselves in the same circumstances4 ,wherefore1 as there never can be a repetition of either men or of circumstances precisely the same1 it is manifestly impossible for any habits of feeling and thinking1 in given modes in given circumstances1 to be common to any two generations of men1 still less to universal mankind4 ,in other words1 there cannot possibly be any laws of human nature3 and if no laws of human nature1 then no laws of elementary social facts2 and if no laws of elementary social facts1 then no laws of complex social facts2 and if no laws of social facts1 elementary or complex1 then no single particle of material wherewith to build up the ,science of ,society or ,sociology4 #di ',auguste ,comte and ,positivism1' pp4 #acc-d4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,limits ,,of ,,demonstrable ,,theism4 ,thought without ,reverence is barren4 ,the man who cannot wonder1 who does not habitually wonder 7and worship71 were he president of innumerable ,royal ,societies1 and carried the whole ,mcanique ,cleste and ,hegel's ,philosophy1 and the epitome of all laboratories and observatories with their results1 in his single head1 is but a pair of spectacles1 behind which there is no eye4 ,let those who have eyes look through him2 then he may be useful4--,sartor ,resartus4 ',i wouldn't mind1' said once a representative of extreme heterodoxy1 in debate with a champion of its diametrical opposite--',i wouldn't mind conceding the ,deity you contend for1 were it not for the use commonly made of him after he is conceded4' ,and no doubt that use is such as might well provoke a saint1 provided the saint were likewise a philosopher4 ,to whatever extent it be true that man was created in the image of ,god1 it is certain that in all ages and countries ,god has been created in the image of man1 invested with all human propensities1 appetites1 and passions1 and expected to demean himself on all occasions as men would do in like circumstances4 ,as popularly conceived1 so long as sensual gratification was esteemed to be the summum bonum1 he wallowed in all manner of sensual lust2 when some of his more fervent worshippers turned ascetics out of disgust with fleshly surfeit1 he became ascetism personified3 at every stage his great delight has been flattery1 and his still greater1 revenge2 in the exercise of power he has always been capricious and often wanton--ruthlessly vindictive against impugners of his honour and dignity1 unspeakably barbarous to unbelievers in his reality4 ,now1 as knowledge advanced1 unbelief in a ,god so much below the level of ordinarily virtuous men advanced equally1 quickening its pace1 too1 as the particular branch of knowledge styled 'physics' spread1 and1 spreading1 exposed the utter impossibility of many of the fables in which theological views had been expressed4 ,wherefore1 theological oracles have in every age and country been apt to confound scientific inquisitiveness with unbelief1 and to denounce physical science especially as a delusion and a snare1 and its cultivators as impostors none the less mischievous for being at the same time dupes4 ,of course1 the latter have not been slow to return the compliment4 ,hearing the truths discovered by them stigmatised as falsehoods1 they naturally enough retorted the charge of falsity against the divine authorities in whose name it was made4 ,finding war waged against them by every religion with which they were acquainted1 they naturally enough in turn declared war against all religion1 even with that form thereof which underlies every other except when sufficing to itself for superstructure as well as base4 ,natural enough this1 for humanum est errare2 but very humanly erroneous withal1 for to include ,deity itself in the same denial with pseudo-divine attributes is about as sagacious a proceeding as to refuse to recognise the sun at midday on account of his not appearing in ,phoebus's chariot and four4 ,when religion on the defensive declares herself opposed to reason1 so much the worse for religion4 ,she is thereby virtually surrendering at discretion1 since to appeal to her only other resource--revelation--is to beg the whole subject in dispute4 ,similarly1 the worse and still less excusable is it for science to declare herself irreconcileable with religion1 for she1 too1 is thereby slighting reason4 ,it is only by forsaking the single guide in whom she professes to trust1 and blindly giving herself up to angry prejudice1 that she can fail to discover the rational solidity of so much of every religion as consists of theism4 ,for this1 as we have seen1 the argument from design abundantly suffices1 although the only absolute certainty thence deducible be that the universe must have an author or authors fully equal to its original construction1 its subsequent development1 and its continued maintenance4 ,even if it be not inconceivable1 notwithstanding that the chances to the contrary be many times infinity to one1 that the mere restlessness of some utterly unintelligent force may have fabricated all material structures1 and imparted to all their movements certain orderly successions1 it is still manifestly impossible for unintelligence to have brought forth intelligence--for the speculative1 critical1 carping spirit of man to have been generated by that which has no speculation in its eyes1 nor any eyes1 to have speculation in2 impossible1 in short1 for the creature to be more richly endowed than its creator4 ,since numerous embodied intelligences actually exist1 they must have been preceded by intelligence capable of creating them and all other existing intelligences that have not eternally existed2 and it is simply impossible that creative intelligence1 whose creatures owe to it whatever intelligence they possess1 should on any occasion have exhibited a want of intelligence which they are competent to detect4 ,but although it be thus demonstrably certain that an author of the universe exists1 it does not follow that there is only one4 ,as to this no proof positive1 only probabilities1 can be adduced2 but the probabilities are of an amount all but equivalent to certainty4 ,they are forcibly urged by ,mr4 ,mill4 ,many exactly uniform occurrences1 he observes1 are more naturally referred to 'a single1 than to a number of wills precisely accordant4' ,but the classes of uniform occurrences being exceedingly numerous1 if there were a separate will for each class1 there would be equally numerous wills1 and 'unless all these wills were in complete harmony 7which would itself be the most difficult to credit of all cases of invariability1 and would require beyond anything else the ascendancy of a supreme ,deity71' it would be 'impossible that the course of phenomena under their government should be invariable4' ,every fresh appearance of resemblance extending through all nature 'affords fresh presumption that the whole is the work1 not of many1 but of the same hand1 and renders it vastly more probable that there should be one indefinitely foreseeing ,intelligence and immoveable ,will than that there should be hundreds and thousands of such4'#ej ,i will not run the risk of weakening this reasoning by expansion4 ,its obvious inference that1 there being a ,god1 there cannot be more than one1 could not be set forth more irresistibly4 ,that the wisdom of the ,creator cannot be less than the amount thereof manifested in ,his works is a self-evident proposition1 which none will be hardy enough directly to dispute4 ,there is1 however1 one critic1 of great ability and yet greater daring1 who appears to doubt whether the wisdom manifested in the universe is anything to speak of4 ,mr4 ,lewes' faculty of veneration is1 ,i suspect1 but imperfectly developed1 since 'the succession of phases which each 7animal7 embryo is forced to pass through1' is sufficient to give its action pause4 ',none of these phases1' he remarks1 'have any adaptation to the future state of the animal1 but are in positive contradiction to it1 or are simply purposeless2 many of them have no adaptation even to its embryonic state2 whereas all show stamped on them the unmistakable characters of ancestral adaptations and the progressions of organic evolution4' ',what1' he asks1 'does this fact imply8' ',there is not1' he continues1 'a single known example of an organism which is not developed out of simpler forms4 ,before it can attain the complex structure which distinguishes it1 there must be an evolution of forms which distinguish the structures of organisms lower in the series4444 ,on the hypothesis of a plan that pre-arranged the organic world' 7by no means1 however1 necessarily in types that could not change1 but rather in types adapted and calculated to change71 'nothing1' he considers1 'could be more unworthy of a supreme intelligence than this inability to construct an organism at once without making several tentative efforts1 undoing to-day what was so carefully done yesterday1 and repeating for centuries the same tentatives and the same corrections in the same succession4' ',anthropomorphists1' he says1 'talk of ,the ,great ,architect1 emphasising the name with capitals1' but 'what should we say to an architect who was unable1 or1 being able1 was obstinately unwilling1 to erect a palace except by first using his materials in the shape of a hut1 then pulling it down and rebuilding them as a cottage1 then adding storey to storey and room to room1 not with any reference to the ultimate purposes of the palace1 but wholly with reference to the way in which houses were constructed in ancient times8 ,what should we say to the architect who could not form a museum out of bricks and mortar1 but was forced to begin as if going to build a mansion1 and1 after proceeding some way in this direction1 altered his plan into a palace1 and that again into a museum8 ,would there be a chorus of applause from the ,institute of ,architects1 and favourable notices in the newspapers of this profound wisdom8'#ea ,notwithstanding the exulting tone in which these questions are put1 and which seems to imply that in their proposer's opinion they are unanswerable1 they may1 ,i think1 be very summarily disposed of4 ,whatever other comments might be made on the conduct of an architect who should build in the complex manner suggested1 surely the very last thing said would be that he did not know how to build in simpler wise4 ,his having actually built a palace would be decisive proof of his knowing how to build a palace2 and of all queer reasons for questioning his possession of that much architectural knowledge1 about the queerest would be the fact of his having built1 not a palace only1 but a hut and cottage in addition4 ,and if1 adopting a still more complicated style1 he should begin by so constructing a hut that1 if left to itself1 it would draw up brick and mortar from the earth1 and grow into a cottage1 and then go on growing and adding storey to storey till it became a palace1 this surely would be a proof not of less1 but of infinitely more1 architectural knowledge than if he had commenced and completed the palace with his own hands4 ,not unwarrantably1 perhaps1 may ,mr4 ,lewes1 reflecting that his own and every other human organism's genesis has consisted of at least three stages1 oval1 foetal1 and infantine1 wonder why he was not formed all at once1 'as ,eve was mythically affirmed to be taken from ,adam's rib1 and ,minerva from ,jupiter's head1' and why he was not brought forth full dressed in an indefinitely expansible suit of clothes4 ,not quite inexcusably1 perhaps1 might he conceive the reason to be some mere whim or humour of his ,maker1 though there might be more gratitude in conjecturing that the triple process was adopted for the purpose of assisting biological enquirers like himself in their special researches4 ,from so practised a logician1 however1 about the very last thing to have been here expected was that he should suggest creative 'ignorance and incompetence' as the only apparent alternative to denying a ,creator altogether1 as if incapacity for a comparatively easy process were a likely reason for choosing one greatly more difficult4 ,it might have occurred to ,mr4 ,lewes that1 if there were any absurdity in the choice1 the ,being who made him and bestowed on him the faculty of perceiving the absurdity1 could not have failed himself likewise to perceive it and consequently to avoid it4 ,of divine power1 the measure or measurelessness is obviously identical with that of divine wisdom4 ,both attributes must be at least co-extensive with the universe2 both consequently illimitable4 ,divine goodness1 moreover1 inasmuch as the creature's moral ideal cannot be superior to his ,creator's1 must be at least as vast as human imagination3 ,god must be at least as good as man can conceive ,him4 ,but how1 by goodness so transcending1 conjoined with immeasurable might1 can the co-existence of evil be tolerated8 ,to this last1 and perhaps greatest1 among the many great questions brought forward for renewed discussion in these pages1 ,i have long had by me an attempt at a reply1 which1 finding myself unable either to strengthen or shorten it by turning it into prose1 ,i venture to submit in its original rhythmical form4 ,a ,voice came to me as ,i sate apart1 ,pondering the burthen of life's mystery1 ,in dim perplexity1 with troubled heart4 ,with whisper weak and faint it came to me1 ,like feeble glimmer of the struggling moon ,to wildered mariner on midnight sea3 ,with whisper weak at first1 but strengthening soon1 ,like the moon's beam when filmy clouds disperse1 ,and through my scattered doubts1 with quiet tune1 ,uttering in clear1 apocalyptic verse1 ,truth1 which for comfort and monition sent1 ,e'en as the voice revealed1 do ,i rehearse4 ',what art thou8 ,whence derived8 ,with what intent ,placed where perpetual hindrances exhaust ,thy wasted strength1 in baffled effort spent8 ,where in blind maze1 with crafty windings crossed1 ,with stumbling-blocks beset1 with pitfalls strewed1 ,thou wanderest1 in endless error lost2 ,athirst beside glad rivers that elude1 ,with mocking lapse1 thy tantalized pursuit1 ,and hungering where gilded husks delude ,with bitter ashes as of ,dead ,sea fruit1 ,ashes of ,hope1 but seed of ,discontent1 ,that rears its upas growth from blighted root8 ,around1 thou hear'st ,creation eloquent1 ,hymning creative attributes1 and seest ,the starry marvels of the firmament1 ,and marvels of the nearer earth1 released ,by impulse from within1 not dimly shown1 ,nor plainlier in the greatest than the least3 ,and1 through the known discovering the unknown1 ,acknowledgest thy ,maker1 power supreme1 ,might1 and dominion1 deeming ,his alone4 ,nor ,his the lax dominion mayst thou deem ,that builds up empire1 and when built1 neglects4 ,lo6 where1 afar1 sidereal orbits gleam1 ,what first impelled1 impelling still1 directs3 ,urges and guides each solar chariot1 ,the mundane mass of every globe connects1 ,by its own energy cohering not1 ,e'en as dead leaves1 decaying languidly1 ,not from themselves derive the force to rot4 ',all-strengthening1 all-sustaining ,deity1 ,diffused throughout the infinite1 abides1 ,dwells and upholds3--then1 haply1 dwells in thee8 ,yea1 verily4 ,within thy frame resides ,what1 by its movement only mayst thou know4 ,the circling blood1 thy being's ambient tides1 ,is't thine own will that bids them ebb and flow1 ,and from their inundating flood depose ,organic germs1 whence health and vigour grow8 ,yet though such witness serve thee to disclose ,in human tenement divine abode1 ,not thine be the material creed that shows ,the spirit's birthplace in the moulded clod2 ,not thine the pantheist raving1 that because ,god dwelleth with thee1 thou thyself art ,god4 ,bethink thee--is't self-reverence that o'erawes ,thy prostrate soul1 and from thy faltering tongue1 ,subdued1 involuntary homage draws8 ,and when by harrowing pang thine heart is wrung1 ,is't for self-aid thy wandering eyes inquire1 ,heavenward1 at length1 in fervid suppliance flung8 ,and from thy native slough of sensual mire1 ,is't to the mark of thine own purity ,thy loftier aims and holier hopes aspire8 ,harshly thy fleshly fetters bear on thee1 ,in dark and dreary prison-house confined1 ,cramped and diseased with long captivity1 ,and hath divine ,intelligence designed ,that noisome dungeon for her own restraint-- ,by her own act to galling bonds consigned1-- ,self-doomed1 with wilful purpose1 to acquaint ,herself with sin and sorrow1 and pollute thereal essence with corporeal taint8 ,how doth thy helpless misery confute ,that frantic boast of vain conceit1 untaugh ,the paltriest of its plans to execute6 ,hast thou the art to add1 by taking thought1 ,one cubit to thy stature8 and hast thou1 ,or such as thou1 ,nature's whole fabric wrought8 ,not thine such vaunt--not thine to disavow ,the lustre of thy genuine origin4 ,to the ,most ,highest1 as thine author1 bow ,with rapture of exulting faith1 wherein ,devotion's cravings their desire achieve1 ,the bright ideal that they imaged1 win4 ,rejoice that thus 'tis given thee to believe1-- ,to recognise transcending majesty1 ,worthy all praise--all honour to receive3 ,rejoice in that high presence1 gratefully ,offering the vows that thy full heart dilate3 ,rejoice that thence there floweth light1 whereby ,thy emulative quest to elevate ,thitherward1 where unblemished holiness ,irradiates sovereignty1 benign as great4 ',but here thou pausest1 scrupling to confess ,a providence of aspect all benign4 ,fear not that sceptic scruple to express4 ,of truth1 ,almighty ,goodness could assign ,good only to the work of ,his own hand1 ,warmed into life by ,his own breath divine3 ,and1 where unchecked ,beneficence had planned ,a home for creatures of a fragile race1 ,evoked from nothingness at ,his command1 ,nor care1 nor want1 nor anguish should have place1 ,nor fraud betray1 nor violence oppress1 ,nor hate inflame1 nor wallowing lust debase1 ,nor aught be found1 save what conspired to bless ,the sentient clay1 wrought surely for that end1-- ,for wherefore wrought1 if not for happiness8 ',not1 as some teach1 for mastery to contend ,with fate1--in doubtful conflict to engage1-- ,struggling1 in pain and peril1 to ascend ,slowly1 through this probationary stage1 ,sore let1 but tried and chastened1 and thereby ,earning on earth a heavenly heritage4 ,was there then need that prescience should try1 ,by ordeal pitiless1 assured event1 ,disclosed beforehand to prophetic eye8 ,need was there1 by austere experiment1 ,to test the frailty and the fall foreknown ,of man1 beneath o'erwhelming burthen bent8 ,in this was tutelar prevision shown8 ,hardly may he1 in such belief confide1 ,who sees his fellow myriads left to groan ,in barren penance1 without light or guide1 ,e'en from their birth by fostering vice controlled1 ,doomed as they cross life's threshold--doomed untried4 ',as hardly1 too1 may he the dogma hold ,that fetters reason with a graduate chain ,of beings1 linked in order manifold1 ,where1 to each link1 'tis given to sustain ,a part subservient to the general weal1-- ,duly to share the mutual burthen's strain3-- ,though who from such allotment would appeal1 ,could it be truth that wisdom's masterpiece ,such aid could lack1 such feebleness conceal1 ,suing its own constituents for release ,from wrong innate1 throughout its texture wove1 ,by hard necessity1 not light caprice8 ,but to what purport could premonished ,love ,a system twined with mutual suffering weave1 ,when but a word all suffering would remove8 ,and wherefore yet delayeth the reprieve ,of ,love1 that doth not willingly afflict ,its children1 neither wantonly aggrieve8 ,can aught the gracious purpose interdict ,of ,him1 whose piercing eye1 whose boundless sway1 ,no cloud can dim1 no barrier restrict8 ,say'st thou1 ,by path inscrutable1 and way ,past finding out1 perchance1 may mercy bend ,to its own use1 whate'er its course would stay1 ,and through the labouring world high mandate send ,that all things work together unto good1 ,work1 though by means corrupt1 to righteous end8 ,beware how such conjectures must conclude4 ,can means impure ,omnipotence befit1 ,and clog the range of its solicitude8 ,can finite bonds confine the ,infinite8 ,though man1 by choice of ill1 must needs offend1 ,need ,god do ill that good may come of it8 ,must havoc's mad typhoon perforce descend8 ,may naught else serve to fan the stagnant air8 ,must captive flame earth's quaking surface rend1 ,or seek escape in lava flood8 and ere ,effete society new structure raise1 ,must dearth or pestilence the ground prepare8 ,thus is it that a parent's care purveys ,his bounty1 and1 exacting rigorously ,the price in tears1 each boon's full cost defrays8 ,thus1 with vain thrift withholding the decree1 ,that from his treasury's exhaustless store ,to all could grant unbought felicity8 ',but haply still 'tis reasoned 7and with more ,of reason's semblance were the plea maintained71 ,that higher yet would life's ambition soar1 ,not for mere scheme of happiness ordained1 ,but for advance in virtue1--for the growth ,by patient zeal and meek endurance gained3 ,that1 at the table of voluptuous sloth1 ,though banqueted on sweets without alloy1 ,unsated were a generous nature1 loth ,to feast where unearned lusciousness would cloy1 ,faint with the tedium of unbroken rest1 ,sick with the sameness of unruffled joy3 ,that for more poignant pleasure1 and of zest ,heightened and edged by healthful exercise1-- ,for scope wherein her conscious strength to test ,in keen pursuit and venturous enterprise1 ,for dear exemplars1 in whose course serene ,affection's tearful warmth might sympathise1 ,for these the yearning mind would languish1 e'en ,though with all else that wish could name endued1 ,while1 in her striving for self-discipline1 ,foiled1 and with fervid impulses imbued ,vainly1 where neither aught could valour dare ,nor aught confront and challenge fortitude3 ,and where no outward token could declare ,the hidden worth congenial heart would hail1 ,hail with each kindred chord vibrating there2d ,since virtue wakes not but when griefs assail1 ,or travail burthens1 or temptations try1 ,slumbering supine1 till roused by adverse gale1 ,in the deep sleep of moral lethargy1 ,joy's fullest cup1 by hope or doubt unstirred1 ,curdling the while to dull satiety4 ',thus haply some have reasoned1 undeterred ,by reasoning1 with equal emphasis ,but counter aim1 as readily preferred3 ,since ,heaven's perfection striveth not1 nor is ,in peril lest it lapse to apathy1 ,or lassitude invade its tranquil bliss4 ,and were it as they deem1 and righteously ,were man adjudged with his brow's sweat to eat ,bread leavened with embittering misery1 ,e'en then affliction's measure to complete1 ,amply might pain1 and want1 and death suffice1 ,and feeling's blight1 and baffled love's defeat1 ,and1 on the altar of self-sacrifice1 ,hope's withered blooms by resignation laid3 ,nor were it needed that incarnate vice1 ,in human mould1 in the same image made1 ,trampled with iron hoof his fellow man1 ,virtue's chastised development to aid4 ,for whence was ,vice derived8 ,ere life began1 ,for ,his own offspring could their ,maker trace ,their loathsome office1 and beneath his ban ,place them1 accurst 7creating to debase71 ,and doom as fuel for the flames that test ,a favoured few1 elect by partial grace8 ,elect or outcast--if alike confessed ,of the same parent1 sons--brethren who bear ,no differing lineaments1 save those imprest ,by his prevision--in their parent's care ,should not all be partakers8 ,should not all ,freely1 alike1 his nurturing guidance share8 ,are any worthier8 ',tis that warning's call ,extends to them alone--'tis that to them ,alone is given vigour1 wherewithal ,temptation's fraudful violence to stem-- ,and how shall ,he1 who needful strength denies1 ,weakness for its predestined fall condemn8 ,how1 when the creature of ,his wrath replies ,with feeble wail and inarticulate moan1 ,the sighing of that contrite heart despise8 ,what man amongst thy fellows hast thou known ,who1 if his son ask fish1 will jeeringly ,give him a serpent1 or for bread a stone8 ,if ye1 being evil1 at your children's cry ,know how to give good gifts1 should not much more ,your heavenly ,father ,his good things supply ,to them who ask ,him8 ,should ,he not restore ,a cleansed heart within them1 and renew ,an upright spirit8 not1 what they implore ,reversing1 and restraining1 lest they do ,the good they would1--constraining them withal ,to do the evil they would fain eschew8 ,how wilt thou to the same original ,whence all just thoughts and pure desires proceed1 ,impute corrupt imaginings1 whose thrall ,enslaves anew the soul but newly freed ,from their pollution8 ,can a hybrid growth ,arise spontaneous from unmingled seed8 ,are grapes upon the bramble borne1 or doth ,the fig bear olive berries8 ,canst thou show ,twin waters1 sweet and bitter1 issuing both ,from the same fountain8 ,neither should there flow ,blessing and cursing from one mouth1 nor yet ,from the same ,providence both weal and woe4 ',vile as thou art1 ofttimes in thee have met ,mercy and ,truth--and ,peace and ,righteousness ,have kissed each other2 and thine heart is set ,ofttimes to follow what is just1 redress ,where thou hast trespassed1 rendering2 ofttimes1 too1 ,forgiving other's trespass3 to distress ,thou grudgest not its sympathetic due ,of kindly deed1 or word1 or mutual tears1 ,nor in vain wholly labourest to subdue ,the hydra host whose foul miasm blears ,thy vision1 and the distant gleam obscures ,that dimly through thy prison casement peers4 ,e'en to the darkened dungeon that immures ,thy soul1 some feeble glimmer finds its way4 ,crushed beneath earthly durance1 still endures ,some lingering fire below that weight of clay1 ,some generous zeal1 some honest hardihood1 ,some faith--some charity4--,and whence are they8 ,if not of ,him whose quickening breath endued ,all things with life1--and1 when he looked upon ,what ,he had made1 beheld that all was good3 ,all good1--but chiefly man1 in whom alone ,some likeness of ,himself--some clouded light1 ,from ,his own countenance reflected1 shone4 ,doth not the sun outshine the satellite8 ,and shall not ,he who in the murkiest hour ,of sin's defilement1 streaks thy dreary night ,with beams that bid thee1 lower yet and lower ,descending1 hope1 perchance1 to rise again1-- ,say--shall not ,he in holiness as power ,transcend the creature whom ,his gifts sustain6 ,and here1 if sneering casuist blaspheme1 ,and to divided nature's sovereign1 ,ascribe1 in nature's opposite extreme ,like eminence1 and nature's ,god aver ,in evil1 even as in good1 supreme1-- ,heed not1 or ask if man's ,artificer ,with ,his own work1 in virtue matched1 can prove ,at once more holy and unholier8 ',yet since all good is fruit of love1 and love ,worketh no ill1 how still doth ill abound8 ,is't haply that with love a rival strove8 ,mark well this parable4 ,in chosen ground ,only good seed a husbandman had sown1 ,yet when the blade sprang up1 therewith he found ,tares that amid the stifled wheat had grown4 ,then knew he well1 how1 entering unawares1 ,this1 while men slept1 an enemy had done4 ,and 'tis an enemy who1 scattering tares ,amid the corn sown in ,creation's field1 ,with deadly coil the growing plant ensnares4 ,and no mean enemy1 nor one unsteeled ,for bold defiance1 nor reduced to cower ,ever in covert ambuscade concealed1 ,but at whose hest the ravening hell-hounds scour ,a wasted world1 while himself prowls to seek1 ,like roaring lion1 whom he may devour1 ,and upon whom his rancorous wrath to wreak1 ,sniffing the tainted steam of slaughter's breath1 ,and lulled by agony's despairing shriek4 ,for it is he who hath the power of death1 ,even the devil1 by whom entereth sin ,into the world1 and death engendereth3 ,yea6 by whom entereth whatsoe'er within ,warreth against the spirit1--sordid greed1 ,pride1 carnal lust1 envy to lust akin1 ,and malice1 and deceit1 whose treacheries breed ,strife between brethren1 and the faith o'erthrow ,of many1 and the duped deserters lead1 ,beneath the banner of their deadliest foe1 ,in rebel arms a ,parent to defy1 ,whom1 by ,his gifts alone1 ,his children know4 ',not less that ,parent marks with pitying eye ,the blinded rage that rivets its own chain3 ,not less to ,his own glorious liberty ,seeks1 from corruption's bondage1 to regain ,his erring children1--by device1 or lewd1 ,or threatening1 lured1 or goaded to their bane3 ,not less to overcome evil with good ,labours1 and shall therewith all things subdue ,unto ,himself--but hath not yet subdued4 ,and wherefore8 wherefore tarrieth ,he1 while through ,eden1 by daring foray oft defaced1 ,marauding fiends malignant raid pursue1 ,winging the turbid whirlwind's frantic haste1 ,pointing the levin's arrowy effluence1 ,over the mildewed harvest's hungry waste1 ,breathing the fetid breath of pestilence1 ,and crying havoc to the dogs of war1 ,let slip on unresisting innocence8 ,why suffereth ,he that thus a rival mar ,his cherished work--through devastated fields ,borne on triumphant in ensanguined car8-- ,him1 who with power to rescue1 tamely yields ,his helpless charge to persecuting hate1 ,nor ,his own offspring from the torturer shields1 ,but sits aloof1 callously obdurate1 ,while but the will is lacking to redeem1-- ,him1 how shall fitting stigma designate8 ',but 'tis not thus thy calmer doubts esteem ,the loving-kindness that with open hand ,dispenses bounty in perennial stream4 ,oft hast thou proved1 while in a foreign land ,a sojourner1 as all thy fathers were1 ,thou pacest painfully the barren sand1 ,how o'er thy path watches a ,comforter1 ,and scatters manna daily for thy food1 ,and bids the smitten rocks that barrier ,the arid track1 well out with gurgling flood1 ,and oft to shade of green oasis leads1 ,and1 from pursuer thirsting for thy blood1 ,such scanty shelter as is thine provides3 ,and though full oft that shelter fails1 and though ,its torn defence demoniac glee derides1 ,yet not for this the cheerful faith forego1 ,that memory of uncounted benefits ,and conscious instinct's still1 small tones bestow4 ,charge not thy ,god with aught that unbefits ,tenderest compassion1 nor believe that ,he ,with hardened apathetic scorn commits ,a favoured people throughout life to be ,subject to bondage4 ,doubt not of ,his will ,to rescue from that galling tyranny4 ,yet1 if in ,his despite creation still ,in thraldom groan and travail--what remains8 ,what but that strength is wanting to fulfil ,his scheme of mercy8 ,what but that ,he reigns1 ,not as sole wielder of omnipotence1 ,but1 o'er a world unconquered yet1 maintains ,encounter with opposing influence1 ,which ,he shall surely quell1 but which can stay1 ,awhile unquelled1 ,his mightier providence4 ',and doth this sadden only1 or dismay8 ,grieves it that ,he1 whose follower thou art1 ,rules not supreme with unresisted sway8 ,or that1 the progress of ,his grace to thwart1 ,satanic might the host of hell arrays8 ,and doth it not a thrill of joy impart ,that not alone need barren prayer and praise ,thine homage be1--thy choicest offering ,the formal dues prescribed obedience pays8 ,henceforth with firmer step approach thy ,king4 ,some puny succour1 thou1 in thy degree1 ,some feeble aid1 thou1 even thou1 mayst bring6 ,in the fell conflict raging ceaselessly ,around1 thou1 too1 mayst join--thou1 too1 engage ,in that dread feud1 twin with eternity1 ,which faithful angels and archangels wage ,against the powers of darkness1 to extend1 ,o'er realms retained in demon vassalage1 ,their sovereign's pure dominion1--and to blend ,all worlds beneath one righteous governance1 ,into one kingdom which shall have no end4 ',wouldst thou1 if haply so thou mayst1 advance ,that blessed consummation8 ,wouldst thou speed ,the lingering hour of ,earth's deliverance8 ,arise--the naked clothe1 the hungry feed1 ,the sick and wounded tend1--soothe the distressed4 ,if thy weak arm cannot protect1 yet plead ,with bold rebuke the cause of the oppressed1 ,kindling hot shame in ,mammon's votaries1 ,abashed1 at least1 in lucre's grovelling quest2 ,and1 in the toil-worn serf1 a glad surprise ,awakening--when1 from brute despondency1 ,taught to look up to heaven with dazzled eyes4-- ,thus mayst thou do ,god service1--thus apply ,thyself1 within thy limit1 to abate ,what wickedness thou seest1 or misery3 ,thus1 in a ,sacred ,band1 associate ,new levies1 from the adverse ranks of ,sin ,converted1--against ,sin confederate4 ,or--if by outward act to serve1 or win ,joint followers to the standard of thy ,lord1 ,thy lot forbid1--turn1 then1 thy thought within3 ,be each recess of thine own breast explored3 ,there1 o'er thy passions be thy victories won3 ,there1 be the altar of thy faith restored1 ,and thou1 a living sacrifice1 thereon ,present thyself4--,this ever mayst thou do1 ,nor1 doing this1 wilt aught have left undone4' ,here ceased the ,voice1 commissioned to renew ,truth1 which1 of old1 when ,bactrian sage began ,nature's dim maze to thread with slenderest clue1 ,its doubtful scope and dark design to scan1 ,with inward whisper1 hopeful witness bare1 ,and justified the ways of ,god to man4 ,and suddenly its warning ceased1 but ere ,it ceased1 the scales had fallen from my eyes1 ,and ,i beheld1 and shall ,i not declare ,what my uncurtained vision testifies8 ,shall coward lips the word of life suppress8 ,the oracle vouchsafed from ,heaven disguise8 ,nay1 as one crying in the wilderness1 ,where none else hearken1 to the vacant air ,and stolid mountains utters his distress1 ,e'en so will ,i too cry aloud1 ',prepare ,before ,him the ,lord's way4 ,make ,his path straight1' ,nor heed though none regard me1 nor forbear ,though all revile1 but patiently await ,till1 like light breath that panting meads exhale1 ,and scornful zephyrs lightly dissipate1 ,but which1 full surely1 down the echoing vale1 ,shall roll with sounding current1 swift and loud1 ,my slighted message likewise shall prevail1 ,entering the heart of many a mourner1 bowed ,beneath despair1 and with inspiring voice ,calling to hope to cleave her midnight cloud1 ,and bidding grief1 in hope's new dawn1 rejoice4 ,this is a creed which long since came to me after earnest inward communings1 and which1 though subsequent reflection has in some few particulars modified it1 ,i still in substance hold1 clinging to it with a grateful consciousness of ever-multiplying obligations4 ,for in it the soul has free scope for its loftiest aspirations and its widest and deepest sympathies1 strongest incentives to zeal1 surest guidance for activity1 solace in every distress1 support under every difficulty1 added cause for exultation in every success1 renewed resolution in every defeat4 ,still1 it is here offered1 not as ascertained truth1 but merely as a sample of those guesses at truth by which alone ordinary mortals need hope to promote the common cause of humanity in any of its higher bearings4 ,such guesses1 however1 when harmonising with all the conditions of their subject-matter1 may fairly claim to be provisionally regarded as truths--nay1 to be adopted as working hypotheses until superseded by new hypotheses capable of doing the same work better2 in which supercession none ought to rejoice1 nor1 if sincere truth-seekers1 will rejoice1 more cordially than the propounders of the discredited doctrines4 ,it is in this spirit and with these reservations that the articles of faith above recited are submitted for consideration4 ,how much soever they may fall short of the truth1 they are1 ,i feel1 in the absence of any nearer approach to the truth1 capable of rendering excellent service4 ,however faintly and hazily the outlines of ,deity be shown in them1 the ,deity whom they so imperfectly delineate is yet one to whom may justly be ascribed glory in the highest1 one worthy of all trust1 love1 and adoration--of an adoration1 too1 inclusive not more of praise than prayer4 ,if the divine claim to the last-named tribute be disputed1 it had better be by arguments other than those on which certain writers1 with ,mr4 ,galton for their leader and ,professor ,tyndall for their backer1 have been recently expending much misapplied ingenuity4 ,if the efficacy of prayer be1 as the foremost of these declares it to be1 'a perfectly appropriate and legitimate subject of scientific enquiry1' the enquiry ought at least to be conducted according to scientific rules4 ,on this point ,mr4 ,galton himself lays much stress1 intimating that whereas an unscientific reasoner may be expected to be 'guided by a confused recollection of crude experience1 a scientific reasoner will scrutinise each separate experience before he admits it as evidence1 and will compare all the cases he has selected on a methodical system4' ,nevertheless1 a brief examination of the experiences on which he and his principal associate rely1 may suggest some doubt as to which of the two specified classes of reasoners it is that they themselves belong4 ,the facts or fancies cited by ,mr4 ,galton in proof that praying is of no use are the following3 #a4 ',sick people who pray or are prayed for do not on the average recover more rapidly than others4' #b4 ,although 'the public prayer for the sovereign of every state1 ,protestant or ,catholic1 is and has been in the spirit of our own--,grant her in health long to live--sovereigns are literally the shortest-lived of all persons who have the advantage of affluence4' #c4 ,the 'clergy are a far more prayerful class' than either lawyers or medical men1 it being 'their profession to pray1' and 'their practice that of offering morning and evening family prayers in addition to their private devotions1' yet 'we do not find that the clergy are in any way more long-lived in consequence2' rather1 there is room for believing their class to be the 'shortest-lived of the three4' ,nay1 even missionaries1 eminently prayerful as they are themselves1 and prayed for as they are with especial earnestness by others1 'are not supernaturally endowed with health1' and 'do not live longer than other people4' #d4 ',the proportion of deaths at the time of birth is identical among the children of the praying and the non-praying classes4' #e4 ,though 'we pray in our ,liturgy that the nobility may be endowed with grace1 wisdom1 and understanding1' our 'nobility are peculiarly subject to insanity2' as are likewise1 indeed1 'very religious people of all denominations1' 'religious madness being very common indeed4' #f4 ,so far from 'religious influences' appearing to have 'clustered in any remarkable degree round the youth of those who1 whether by their talents or their social position1 have left a mark upon ,english history1' 'remarkable devotional tendencies' have been conspicuous chiefly by their absence from 'the lives either of our ,lord ,chancellors or of the leaders of our great political parties2' while1 out of our twenty-three extant dukes1 four at least1 if not five1 are descended from mistresses of ,charles ,,ii41 not a single one of them1 on the other hand1 being known to ,mr4 ,galton to be of 'eminently prayerful qualities4' #g4 ,in respect of those 'institutions1 societies1 commercial adventures1 political meetings and combinations of all sorts' with which ,england so much abounds1 and of which 'some are exclusively clerical1 some lay1 and others mixed1' ,mr4 ,galton 'for his own part never heard a favourable opinion of the value of the preponderating clerical element in their business committees4' ',the procedure of ,convocation which1 like all exclusively clerical meetings1 is opened with prayer1 has not inspired the outer world with much respect4' ,nay1 'it is a common week-day opinion of the world that praying people are not practical4' #h4 ,in those numerous instances in which an enterprise is executed by the agency of the profane on behalf not of the profane themselves but of pious clients1 'the enterprises are not observed to prosper beyond the average4' ,underwriters recognise no difference in the risks run by missionary ships and by ordinary traders1 nor do life insurance companies1 before they accept a life1 introduce into their 'confidential enquiries into the antecedents of the applicant' any 'such question as ,does he habitually use family prayers and private devotions8' ,neither are the funds of devout shareholders and depositors at all safer than those of the profane when entrusted to the custody of untrustworthy directors1 not even though the day's work of the undertaking commence1 as that of the disastrous ,royal ,british ,bank used to do1 with solemn prayer4#eb ,two or three minutes' attention to the grounds for1 and the circumstances connected with1 these statements1 may assist us in appreciating ,mr4 ,galton's notion of the difference between confusedly recollected experiences and experiences properly scrutinised and methodically selected4 ,for the statement first on the list1 some negative evidence is considered to be afforded by the absence of any 'single instance in which papers read before ,statistical ,societies have recognised the agency of prayer either in disease or in anything else4' ,the chief authority for it1 however1 is the eloquent silence of medical men 'who1 had prayers for the sick any notable effect1 would be sure to have observed it1' seeing that they are 'always on the watch for such things4' ,but are they really1 in every case of recovery from illness that comes under their notice1 so particular and so successful in their enquiries whether any1 and1 if so1 how much1 prayer has been offered on behalf of the patient1 as to be qualified to judge whether prayer has had anything to do with the cure8 ,if not1 although they may be showing their discretion by not speaking on the point1 the 'eloquence of their silence' must not be too hastily interpreted4 ,for doctors1 of all men1 should be the last to deny1 as an abstract proposition1 the efficacy of prayer in disease1 knowing1 as they do1 how great is the curative influence of prayer when addressed to themselves4 ,how1 they may naturally ask1 is it to be expected that sickness should be cured unless properly treated8 and how can it be properly treated without a doctor8 and how can a doctor be expected to attend unless he be asked8 ,upon which very natural queries others naturally follow4 ,what would be the good of the doctor's coming unless he prescribed judiciously8 and will he not more certainly prescribe judiciously if his judgment be guided by special interposition of divine grace8 and if prayer to himself has plainly been one condition of his coming1 why may not prayer to ,god have been one condition of his judgment having been rightly guided8 ,will it be pretended that ,god's proceedings are abjectly submissive to inexorable laws from which those of the doctor are exempt1 and that though the latter would certainly not have attended unless he had been asked1 the grace of ,god1 if given at all1 must have been given equally whether asked for or not8 ,statements #b and #c are founded on a memoir by ,dr4 ,guy1 purporting to show the ',mean ,age attained by males of various classes who had survived their #cjth year from #ageh to #ahdc1' and whose deaths were not caused by violence or accident4 ,according to this table1 the average age of #ig members of royal houses was only #fdjd1 while that of #a1agi members of the ,english aristocracy was #fgca1 and that of #a1fcb gentlemen commoners #gjbb2 the proportion between the total number of royal1 and that of noble and gentle1 personages who died within the period specified1 being apparently supposed to be as #ig to #bhaa1 or as #a to about #bi4 ,except upon this supposition1 ,mr4 ,galton could not with any consistency have appealed to these figures1 for he had previously announced his intention to be 'guided solely by broad averages and not to deal with isolated instances4' ,he seems1 however1 to forget this judicious rule when he comes to treat of the clergy1 of whom #ide are compared in the table with #bid lawyers and #bdd medical men4 ,here1 he says1 'the clergy as a whole show a life value of #fidi against #fhad for lawyers1 and #fgca for medical men2' but then1 he adds 'this difference is reversed' when the comparison is made between members of the three classes sufficiently distinguished to have had their lives recorded in ,chalmers' ,biographical ,dictionary or the ,annual ,register1 the value of life among clergy1 lawyers1 and medical men then appearing as #ffdb1 #ffea and #fgcd respectively4 ,whether1 of the distinguished professional men concerned in this second comparison1 the parsons were distinguished for their prayerfulness and the lawyers and doctors for their prayerlessness1 ,mr4 ,galton omits to state2 and still more serious omissions on his part are those of not mentioning in what part of our ,liturgy we are accustomed to pray that it may be granted to the ,queen1 not simply long to live1 but also to live longer than other people2 likewise in which of 'the numerous published collections of family prayers' that have undergone his scrutiny1 is to be found a petition that parsons may live longer than lawyers or doctors2 and1 yet again1 since an average1 falling short of threescore years and ten by little more than three and a half1 is so contemptuously rejected by him1 what is the precise number of years that would be accepted by him as a liberal compliance with prayer for long life8 ,while deducing his argument from clergymen1 ,mr4 ,galton makes repeated and particular reference to the clerical sub-genus1 missionaries1 treating it as the more remarkable that these should not enjoy comparative immunity from disease1 because1 as he suggests1 it would have been so easy for ,god to have made them a favoured class in respect of health3 to wit1 by the notable expedient of dissuading them from exposing themselves to any of the risks peculiarly attendant on missionary enterprise4 ',tropical fever1 for example1 is due to many subtle causes which are partly under man's control4 ,a single hour's exposure to sun1 or wet1 or fatigue1 or mental agitation will determine an attack4' ,what more simple than for ,god so to 'act on the minds of the missionaries as to disincline them to take those courses which might result in mischance1 such as the forced march1 the wetting1 the abstinence from food1 or the night exposure8' ,what more simple1 either1 it may be added1 than for ,god to save prayerful soldiers from ever being killed in battle by merely putting it into their minds to desert whenever they are ordered upon active service8 ,that 'the distribution of still-births is wholly unaffected by piety' ,mr4 ,galton has satisfied himself by finding1 'on examination of a particular period1 that the proportion of such births published in the ',record' newspaper and in the ',times' bore an identical relation to the total number of deaths4' ,he had previously1 we must suppose1 satisfied himself that advertisers in the ',times' never say their prayers4 ,for the asserted commonness of religious madness ,mr4 ,galton cites no evidence whatever1 and1 to judge from the sympathies and antipathies of which one of his avowed opinions may be supposed to be the subject and the object1 speaks probably on this point solely from hearsay4 ,very possibly1 however1 his assurance of the extraordinary prevalence of insanity among ,british noblemen may be based on personal observation1 as1 of course1 is that regarding the prayerlessness of his own ducal acquaintances4 ,birds of a feather1 proverbially1 flock together1 and the same touch of irreligion may quite possibly suffice to make certain dukes and certain commoners kin4 ,against the inefficiency1 however notorious1 of the clerical element in business committees1 ought in fairness to be set the equally notorious efficiency of ,jesuits in whatever they undertake1 the signal statecraft displayed by the ,wolseys1 the ,richelieus1 and the ,ximenes's of the days in which cardinals and archbishops were permitted to take a leading part in executive politics1 and the very respectable figure still presented by the lords spiritual1 beside the lords temporal of the ,british ,house of ,peers4 ,as for 'the common week-day opinion that praying people are not practical1' those by whom it is entertained1 of course1 mentally except praying ,quakers4 ,the fact that insurance offices do not attempt to distinguish between the prayerful and the prayerless1 but1 treating both classes as liable to the same risks1 exact from both the same premiums1 proves1 ,i submit1 nothing against the efficacy of prayer1 not even that the managers of insurance offices do not believe in it4 ,the statement that prayerful and prayerless1 when placing their money in the same dishonest keeping1 or engaging in the same bad speculations1 suffer losses1 bearing exactly the same proportion to their respective ventures1 although most probably quite true1 is also one which ,mr4 ,galton has neglected to verify by the application to it of any test1 scientific or other4 ,finally1 if the disasters of the ,royal ,british ,bank are to be ascribed to its custom of opening business with prayer1 not only ought the cackle of ,convocation to be attributed to a similar cause1 but also all the legislative botchery of the ,house of ,commons1 and the abolition of prayer before debate should be treated as the most urgently needed of those further parliamentary reforms with which the fertile brains of certain eminent statesmen are suspected to be teeming4 ,thus much by way of intimation that there would be no excessive temerity in encountering ,mr4 ,galton even on the ground of his own choosing1 were that ground really worth contending for4 ,but baseless and exorbitant as all ,mr4 ,galton's postulates are1 there is not one of them to which he might not be made heartily welcome1 for any effect its surrender could have upon the real issue1 the true nature whereof both ,mr4 ,galton and his principal coadjutor have1 with marvellous sleight of eye1 contrived completely to overlook4 ,such ,pharisees in science1 such sticklers for rigorously scientific method1 might have been expected to begin by authenticating the materials they proposed to operate upon1 and1 when professing to experiment upon pure metal1 at least to see that it was not mere dross they were casting into the crucible4 ,plainly1 however1 they despise any such nice distinctions4 ,the most earnest prayer and the emptiest ceremonial prate are both alike to them4 ,what sort of a process they imagine prayer to be may be at once perceived from the sort of trials to which they desire to subject it4 ',after much thought and examination1' the coadjutor aforesaid--a bashful ,teucer1 over whom ,professor ,tyndall has1 like a second ,ajax ,telamon1 extended1 with chivalrous haste1 the shelter of his shield--does 'not hesitate to propose that one single ward or hospital under the care of first-rate physicians or surgeons1 containing a number of patients afflicted with those diseases which have been best studied1 and of which the mortality rates are best known1 should be1 during a period of not less than three to five years1 made the object of special prayer by the whole body of the faithful1 and that1 at the end of that time1 the mortality rates should be compared with the past rates1 and also with those of other leading hospitals similarly well managed during the same period4'#ec ,in suggesting this experiment1 termed by himself 'exhaustive and complete1' its propounder imagines himself to be offering to the faithful 'an occasion of demonstrating to the faithless an imperishable record of the real power of prayer4' ,if1 however1 he were himself petitioning for the reprieve of a condemned criminal1 he would scarcely expect to succeed1 even with so tender-hearted a minister as ,mr4 ,bruce1 if he were to let out in the course of his supplications1 that he did not care whether he succeeded or not1 and was asking for the reprieve solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the head of the ,home ,office is really invested with the prerogative of mercy4 ,yet no suspicion crosses his mind that the ,searcher of ,hearts may possibly be displeased with prayers addressed to ,him by the lips of those who were1 all the while1 saying in their hearts that they did not want their prayers to be granted1 but only wanted to satisfy their curiosity to know whether they would be granted or not4 ,equally remarkable is the trustfulness of ,mr4 ,galton1 in opining that 'it would be perfectly practicable to select out of the patients at different hospitals under treatment for fractures1 or amputations1 or other common maladies1 whose course is so well understood as to admit of accurate tables being constructed for their duration and result1 two considerable groups1 the one consisting of markedly religious and piously befriended individuals1 the other of those who were remarkably cold-hearted and neglected2 and that1 then1 an honest comparison of their respective periods of treatment1 and the result1 would manifest a distinct proof of the efficacy of prayer1 if it existed to even a minute fraction of the amount that religious teachers exhort us to believe4' ,evidently1 he imagines that it would be sufficient for the hospital authorities to advertise--not of course1 in the ',times1' but in the ',record'--and that1 thereupon1 whoever1 having entered into his closet and shut the door1 had1 on behalf of any of the patients experimented upon1 prayed to the ,father who seeth in secret1 would at once come forth and proclaim openly how he had been engaged4 ,not by 'arguments' of no greater 'cogency' than that of any based upon results thus obtainable1 need either of the two experimentalists expect to persuade praying people that prayer is1 'in the natural course of events1' doomed to become 'obsolete1 just as the ,waters of ,jealousy and the ,urim and ,thummin of the ,mosaic ,law did in the times of the later ,jewish ,kings4' ,not quite so easily will they cause it to be 'abandoned to the domain of recognised superstition1' just as belief in witches and in the ,sovereign's touch as a cure for scrofula1 and 'many other items of ancient faith have already successively been4' ,both of them have1 it seems1 yet to learn that the only prayer which is believed by people of some little enlightenment to be of any avail1 is the 'fervent1 effectual prayer of a righteous man1' prayer that cometh from 'a pure heart fervently1' prayer that is made 'with the spirit and with the understanding also4' ,prayer of this sort is not to be discredited by any abundance of statistical testimony to the futility of cold lip-worship1 or by any number of fresh examples of the generally recognised fact that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light4 ,the recovery from the very jaws of death of ,king ,hezekiah1 of ,louis ,,xv4 of ,france1 while as yet undetected and bien-aim1 and of the present ,prince of ,wales1 may1 none the less probably1 have been in part due to the prayers offered up for the first by himself1 for the second1 according to ,president ,hnault and ,mr4 ,carlyle1 by all ,paris1 and1 for the third1 by the whole ,british empire1 because lessons appointed to be regularly said or sung in churches for the prolongation of the ,sovereign's life1 and said and sung by the congregations to whom they are set1 with equal regularity1 whether the ,sovereign be well or ill1 detested or beloved1 are to all appearance disregarded4 ,modern believers in prayer are well aware that1 although they ask1 they may not receive if they ask amiss1 and would accept this as fully adequate explanation of the disappointment of anyone1 who had the face to pray that he might grow as rich as the late ,mr4 ,brassey1 or be created a duke1 or appointed ,lord ,chancellor1 or supplant ,mr4 ,gladstone in the premiership1 or ,mr4 ,d',israeli in the leadership of ,her ,majesty's ,opposition4 ,moreover1 the spirit1 duly seasoned with understanding1 in which alone true prayer can be made1 is one1 not of presumptuous dictation to a ,heavenly ,father1 but of sincere and grateful recognition that ',he knoweth better than ourselves what is for our good4' ,far from praying for selfish aggrandisement1 we cannot1 if we pray aright1 pray that1 whether from ourselves or others1 the cup of affliction may pass away1 without adding1 ',nevertheless1 not as ,i will1 but as ,thou wilt4' ,the only gifts that can with propriety be prayed for unconditionally are gifts spiritual--cleansing of the thoughts of the heart1 strength to resist temptation1 strength to endure trials1 strength to perform our appointed work2 and whoever may think fit to make these the subjects of statistical inquiry1 may depend upon being assured by everyone experimentally qualified to reply1 that they are never asked for faithfully without being obtained effectually2 together with large measure1 if not of the cheerfulness1 at least of the patience1 of hope4 ,,footnotes3 #ej ',auguste ,comte and ,positivism1' pp4 #be-h4 #ea ',fortnightly ,review' for ,june #ahfh1 ',mr4 ,darwin's ,hypotheses4' #eb ',statistical ,enquiries into the ,efficacy of ,prayer1' by ,francis ,galton1 in ,fornightly ,review1' for ,august #ahgb4 #ec ',contemporary ,review1' ,july #ahgb4 ',the ,prayer for the ,sick4 ,hints towards a serious attempt to estimate its value4' ,communicated by ,prof4 ,tyndall4 ,,epilogue4 ,if with rash step1 or with presumptuous word ,i have transgressed1 or with unshrinking eye ,have sought to pierce the awful mystery ,that veils thy ,godhead1 yet forgive me1 ,lord6 ,thou knowest that ,i sought not to draw nigh ,thy ,throne1 save that my witness might record ,more truly of ,thine attributes1 whereby ,on ,earth1 e'en as in ,heaven1 might be adored ,the fulness of ,thy glory4 ,not in wrath ,his trespass wilt ,thou judge1 whom1 licence1 bred ,of zeal1 though blinded1 yet devout1 betrays1 ,nor scorn the unconscious wanderer from ,thy path1 ,nor leave me hopeless1 if indeed misled ,by thirst for truth1 more deep in error's maze4 ,,london3 ,,printed ,,by ,,spottiswoode ,,and ,,co41 ,,new-,,street ,,square ,,and ,,parliament ,,street ,,by ,,the ,,same ,,author4 ,,on ,,labour3 ,,its ,,wrongful ,,claims ,,and ,,rightful ,,dues2 ,,its ,,actual ,,present ,,and ,,possible ,,future4 ,,second ,,edition4 #hvo4 cloth1 price #ads4 ',this is a book which all true economists should welcome4' ,,economist44 ',it may be doubted whether any considerable economic work of equal merit has appeared since the first publication of ,mr4 ,mill's ,political ,economy4' ,,athen,,um4 ,,macmillan ,,co41 ,london4