,the ,academic ,questions1              
,treatise ,de ,finibus4                 
and                                     
,tusculan ,disputations                 
,of                                     
,m4 ,t4 ,cicero                         
,with             ,a ,sketch of the     
,greek ,philosophers ,mentioned by      
,cicero4                                
,literally ,translated by               
,c4 ,d4 ,yonge1 ,b4,a4                  
,london3 ,george ,bell and ,sons        
,york ,street                           
,covent ,garden                         
,printed by ,william ,clowes and ,sons1 
,stamford ,street and ,charing ,cross4  
#ahge            ,,contents      ,a     
,sketch of the ,greek ,philosophers     
,mentioned by ,cicero4  ,introduction4  
,first ,book ,of ,the ,academic         
,questions4  ,second ,book ,of ,the     
,academic ,questions4  ,a ,treatise ,on 
,the ,chief ,good ,and ,evil4     ,first
 ,book ,of ,the ,treatise ,on ,the      
,chief ,good ,and ,evil4     ,second    

,book ,of ,the ,treatise ,on ,the ,chief
 ,good ,and ,evil4     ,third ,book ,of 
,the ,treatise ,on ,the ,chief ,good    
,and ,evil4     ,fourth ,book ,of ,the  
,treatise ,on ,the ,chief ,good ,and    
,evil4     ,fifth ,book ,of ,the        
,treatise ,on ,the ,chief ,good ,and    
,evil4  ,the ,tusculan ,disputations4   
,introduction4     ,book ,i4 ,on ,the   
,contempt ,of ,death4     ,book ,,ii4   
,on ,bearing ,pain4     ,book ,,iii4 ,on
 ,grief ,of ,mind4     ,book ,,iv4 ,on  
,other ,perturbations ,of ,the ,mind4   
,book ,v4 ,whether ,virtue ,alone ,be   
,sufficient ,for ,a ,happy ,life4       
,footnotes              ,a ,,sketch ,,of
 ,,the ,,greek ,,philosophers           
,,mentioned ,,by ,,cicero4      ,in the 
works translated in the present volume1 
,cicero makes such constant  references 
to the doctrines and systems of the     
ancient ,greek ,philosophers1  that it  
seems desirable to give a brief account 
of the most remarkable of  those        
mentioned by him2 not entering at length

 into the history of their  lives1 but  
indicating the principal theories which 
they maintained1 and  the main points in
 which they agreed with1 or differed    
from1 each other4    ,the earliest of   
them was ,thales1 who was born at       
,miletus1 about #fdj ,b4,c4  ,he was a  
man of great political sagacity and     
influence2 but we have to  consider him 
here as the earliest philosopher who    
appears to have been  convinced of the  
necessity of scientific proof of        
whatever was put forward  to be         
believed1 and as the originator of      
mathematics and geometry4 ,he was  also 
a great astronomer2 for we read in      
,herodotus 7i4 #gd7 that he  predicted  
the eclipse of the sun which happened in
 the reign of ,alyattes1  king of       
,lydia1 ,b4,c4 #fji4 ,he asserted that  
water is the origin of all  things2 that
 everything is produced out of it1 and  
everything is resolved  into it4 ,he    
also asserted that it is the soul which 
originates all motion1  so much so1 that

 he attributes a soul to the magnet4    
,aristotle also  represents him as      
saying that everything is full of ,gods4
 ,he does not  appear to have left any  
written treatises behind him3 we are    
uncertain  when or where he died1 but he
 is said to have lived to a great       
age--to #gh1  or1 according to some     
writers1 to #ij years of age4           
,anaximander1 a countryman of ,thales1  
was also born at ,miletus1 about #cj    
years later2 he is said to have been a  
pupil of the former1 and deserves       
especial mention as the oldest          
philosophical writer among the ,greeks4 
,he  did not devote himself to the      
mathematical studies of ,thales1 but    
rather  to speculations concerning the  
generation and origin of the world2 as  
to  which his opinions are involved in  
some obscurity4 ,he appears1 however1 to
  have considered that all things were  
formed of a sort of matter1 which he    
called  1 or ,the ,infinite2 which was  
something everlasting and  divine1      

though not invested with any spiritual  
or intelligent nature4 ,his  own works  
have not come down to us2 but1 according
 to ,aristotle1 he  considered this     
8,infinite0 as consisting of a mixture  
of simple1  unchangeable elements1 from 
which all things were produced by the   
concurrence of homogeneous particles    
already existing in it1--a process      
which he attributed to the constant     
conflict between heat and cold1 and to  
affinities of the particles3 in this he 
was opposed to the doctrine of  ,thales1
 ,anaximenes1 and ,diogenes of          
,apollonia1 who agreed in deriving all  
things from a single1 not changeable1   
principle4    ,anaximander further held 
that the earth was of a cylindrical     
form1  suspended in the middle of the   
universe1 and surrounded by water1 air1 
and  fire1 like the coats of an onion2  
but that the interior stratum of fire   
was broken up and collected into masses1
 from which originated the sun1  moon1  
and stars2 which he thought were carried

 round by the three spheres  in which   
they were respectively fixed4 ,he       
believed that the moon had a  light of  
her own1 not a borrowed light2 that she 
was nineteen times as  large as the     
earth1 and the sun twenty-eight4 ,he    
thought that all animals1  including    
man1 were originally produced in water1 
and proceeded gradually  to become land 
animals4 ,according to ,diogenes        
,laertius1 he was the  inventor of the  
gnomon1 and of geographical maps2 at all
 events1 he was  the first person who   
introduced the use of the gnomon into   
,greece4 ,he died  about #edg ,b4,c4    
,anaximenes was also a ,milesian1 and a 
contemporary of ,thales and             
,anaximander4 ,we do not exactly know   
when he was born1 or when he died2 but  
he must have lived to a very great age1 
for he was in high repute as early  as  
,b4,c4 #edd1 and he was the tutor of    
,anaxagoras1 ,b4,c4 #dhj4 ,his theory   
was1  that air was the first cause of   
all things1 and that the other elements 

of  the universe were resolvable into   
it4 ,from this infinite air1 he imagined
  that all finite things were formed by 
compression and rarefaction1  produced  
by motion1 which had existed from all   
eternity2 so that the earth  was        
generated out of condensed air1 and the 
sun and other heavenly bodies  from the 
earth4 ,he thought also that heat and   
cold were produced by  different degrees
 of density of this primal element1 air2
 that the clouds  were formed by the    
condensing of the air2 and that it was  
the air which  supported the earth1 and 
kept it in its place4 ,even the human   
soul he  believed to be1 like the body1 
formed of air4 ,he believed in the      
eternity  of matter1 and denied the     
existence of anything immaterial4       
,anaxagoras1 who1 as has been already   
stated1 was a pupil of ,anaximenes1  was
 born at ,clazomen1 in ,ionia1 about    
,b4,c4 #dii4 ,he removed to ,athens at  
the time of the ,persian war1 where he  
became intimate with ,pericles1 who     

defended him1 though unsuccessfully1    
when he was prosecuted for impiety3  he 
was fined five talents1 and banished    
from the city2 on which he retired  to  
,lampsacus1 where he died at the age of 
#gb4 ,he differed from his  predecessors
 of the ,ionic ,school1 and sought for a
 higher cause of all  things than       
matter3 this cause he considered to be 1
 intelligence1  or mind4 ,not that he   
thought this  to be the creator of the  
world1  but only that principle which   
arranged it1 and gave it motion2 for his
  idea was1 that matter had existed from
 all eternity1 but that1 before the     
arranged it1 it was all in a state of   
chaotic confusion1 and full of  an      
infinite number of homogeneous and      
heterogeneous parts2 then the           
separated the homogeneous parts from the
 heterogeneous1 and in this manner  the 
world was produced4 ,this separation1   
however1 he taught1 was made in  such a 
manner that everything contains in      
itself parts of other things1 or        

heterogeneous elements2 and is what it  
is only on account of certain           
homogeneous parts which constitute its  
predominant and real character4         
,pythagoras was earlier than            
,anaxagoras1 though this latter has been
  mentioned before him to avoid breaking
 the continuity of the ,ionic ,school4  
,his father's name was ,mnesarchus1 and 
he was born at ,samos about #egj ,b4,c41
  though some accounts make him earlier4
 ,he is said by some writers to have    
been a pupil of ,thales1 by others of   
,anaximander1 or of ,pherecydes of      
,scyros4 ,he was a man of great         
learning1 as a geometrician1            
mathematician1  astronomer1 and         
musician2 a great traveller1 having     
visited ,egypt and  ,babylon1 and1      
according to some accounts1 penetrated  
as far as ,india4    ,many of his       
peculiar tenets are believed to have    
been derived from the  ,tyrrhenian      
,pelasgians1 with whom he is said to    
have been connected4 ,his               

contemporaries at ,crotona in ,south    
,italy1 where he lived1 looked upon him 
as a man peculiarly connected with the  
gods2 and some of them even  identified 
him with the ,hyperborean ,apollo4 ,he  
himself is said to have  laid claim to  
the gifts of divination and prophecy4   
,the religious element  was clearly     
predominant in his character4 ,grote    
says of him1 8,in his  prominent        
vocation1 analogous to that of          
,epimenides1 ,orpheus1 or ,melampus1  he
 appears as the revealer of a mode of   
life calculated to raise his  disciples 
above the level of mankind1 and to      
recommend them to the favour  of the    
gods40 7,hist4 of ,greece1 iv4 p4 #ebi47
    ,on his arrival at ,crotona1 he     
formed a school1 consisting at first of 
three hundred of the richest of the     
citizens1 who bound themselves by a     
sort of vow to himself and to each      
other1 for the purpose of cultivating   
the ascetic observances which he        
enjoined1 and of studying his religious 

and philosophical theories4 ,all that   
took place in this school was kept a    
profound secret2 and there were         
gradations among the pupils themselves1 
who were not all admitted1 or at all    
events not at first1 to a full          
acquaintance with their master's        
doctrines4 ,they were also required to  
submit to a period of probation4 ,the   
statement of his forbidding his  pupils 
the use of animal food is denied by many
 of the best authorities1  and that of  
his insisting on their maintaining an   
unbroken silence for  five years1 rests 
on no sufficient authority1 and is      
incredible4 ,it is  beyond our purpose  
at present to enter into the question of
 how far the  views of ,pythagoras in   
founding his school or club of three    
hundred1  tended towards uniting in this
 body the idea of 8at once a            
philosophical  school1 a religious      
brotherhood1 and a political            
association10 all which  characters the 
,bishop of ,st4 ,david's 7,hist4 of     

,greece1 vol4 ii4 p4 #adh7  thinks were 
inseparably united in his mind2 while   
,mr4 ,grote's view of his  object       
7,hist4 of ,greece1 vol4 iv4 p4 #edd7 is
 very different4 ,in a  political riot  
at ,crotona1 a temple1 in which many of 
his disciples were  assembled1 was      
burnt1 and they perished1 and some say  
that ,pythagoras  himself was among     
them2 though according to other accounts
 he fled to  ,tarentum1 and afterwards  
to ,metapontum1 where he starved himself
 to death4  ,his tomb 7see ,cic4 de     
,fin4 v4 #b7 was shown at ,metapontum   
down to ,cicero's  time4 ,soon after his
 death his school was suppressed1 and   
did not revive1  though the             
,pythagoreans continued to exist as a   
sect1 the members of which  kept up the 
religious and scientific pursuits of    
their founder4    ,pythagoras is said to
 have been the first who assumed the    
title of  2 but there is great          
uncertainty as to the most material of  
his  philosophical and religious        

opinions4 ,it is believed that he wrote 
nothing  himself1 and that the earliest 
,pythagorean treatises were the work of 
,philolaus1 a contemporary of ,socrates4
 ,it appears1 however1 that he          
undertook to solve by reference to one  
single primary principle the  problem of
 the origin and constitution of the     
universe4 ,his predilection  for        
mathematics led him to trace the origin 
of all things to number2 for  8in       
numbers he thought that they perceived  
many analogies of things that  exist and
 are produced1 more than in fire1 earth1
 or water3 as1 for  instance1 they      
thought that a certain condition of     
numbers was justice2  another1 soul and 
intellect1 444 ,and moreover1 seeing the
 conditions and  ratios of what pertains
 to harmony to consist in numbers1 since
 other  things seemed in their entire   
nature to be formed in the likeness of  
numbers1 and in all nature numbers are  
the first1 they supposed the  elements  
of numbers to be the elements of all    

things40 7,arist4 ,met4 i4 #e47         
,music and harmony too1 played almost as
 important a part in the  ,pythagorean  
system as mathematics1 or numbers4 ,his 
idea appears to be1  that order or      
harmony of relation is the regulating   
principle of the whole  universe4 ,he   
drew out a list of ten pairs of         
antagonistic elements1 and in  the      
octave and its different harmonic       
relations1 he believed that he found    
the ground of the connexion between     
them4 ,in his system of the universe    
fire was the important element1         
occupying both the centre and the       
remotest point of it2 and being the     
vivifying principle of the whole4       
,round the central fire the heavenly    
bodies he believed to move in a  regular
 circle2 furthest off were the fixed    
stars2 and then1 in order1 the  planets1
 the moon1 the sun1 the earth1 and what 
he called 1 a sort  of other half of the
 earth1 which was a distinct body from  
it1 but moving  parallel to it4    ,the 

most distant region he called ,olympus2 
the space between the fixed  stars and  
the moon he called 2 the space between  
the moon and the  earth 4 ,he1 or at    
least his disciples1 taught that the    
earth  revolved on its axis1 7though    
,philolaus taught that its revolutions  
were  not round its axis but round the  
central fire74 ,the universe itself they
  considered as a large sphere1 and the 
intervals between the heavenly  bodies  
they thought were determined according  
to the laws and relations of  musical   
harmony4 ,and from this theory arose the
 doctrine of the ,music of  the         
,spheres2 as the heavenly bodies in     
their motion occasioned a sort of  sound
 depending on their distances and       
velocities2 and as these were           
determined by the laws of harmonic      
intervals1 the sounds1 or notes1 formed 
a regular musical scale4    ,the light  
and heat of the central fire he believed
 that we received  through the sun1     
which he considered a kind of lens3 and 

perfection1 he  conceived to exist in   
direct ratio to the distance from the   
central fire4    ,the universe1 itself1 
they looked upon as having subsisted    
from all  eternity1 controlled by an    
eternal supreme ,deity2 who established 
both  limits and infinity2 and whom they
 often speak of as the absolute 1  or   
unity4 ,he pervaded 7though he was      
distinct from7 and presided over the    
universe4 ,sometimes1 too1 he is called 
the absolute ,good1--while the  origin  
of evil is attributed not to him1 but to
 matter which prevented him  from       
conducting everything to the best end4  
,with respect to man1 the doctrine of   
,pythagoras was that known by the name  
of the ,metempsychosis1--that the soul  
after death rested a certain time  till 
it was purified1 and had acquired a     
forgetfulness of what had  previously   
happened to it2 and then reanimated some
 other body4 ,the ethics  of the        
,pythagoreans consisted more in ascetic 
practice and maxims for the  restraint  

of the passions1 than in any scientific 
theories4 ,wisdom they  considered as   
superior to virtue1 as being connected  
with the  contemplation of the upper and
 purer regions1 while virtue was        
conversant  only with the sublunary part
 of the world4 ,happiness1 they thought1
  consisted in the science of the       
perfection of the soul2 or in the       
perfect  science of numbers2 and the    
main object of all the endeavours of man
 was  to be1 to resemble the ,deity as  
far as possible4    ,alcmon of ,crotona 
was a pupil of ,pythagoras2 but that is 
all that is  known of his history4 ,he  
was a great natural philosopher2 and is 
said to  have been the first who        
introduced the practice of dissection4  
,he is said1  also1 to have been the    
first who wrote on natural philosophy4  
,aristotle1  however1 distinguishes     
between the principles of ,alcmon and   
,pythagoras1  though without explaining 
in what the difference consisted4 ,he   
asserted  the immortality of the soul1  

and said that it partook of the divine  
nature1 because1 like the heavenly      
bodies themselves1 it contained in      
itself the principle of motion4         
,xenophanes1 the founder of the ,eleatic
 school1 was a native of ,colophon2  and
 flourished probably about the time of  
,pisistratus4 ,being banished from  his 
own country1 he fled to the ,ionian     
colonies in ,sicily1 and at last        
settled in ,elea1 or ,velia4 ,his       
writings were chiefly poetical4 ,he was 
universally regarded by the ancients as 
the originator of the doctrine of  the  
oneness of the universe3 he also        
maintained1 it is said1 the unity of    
the ,deity2 and also his immortality and
 eternity2 denounced the  transference  
of him into human form2 and reproached  
,homer and ,hesiod for  attributing to  
him human weaknesses4 ,he represented   
him as endowed with  unwearied activity1
 and as the animating power of the      
universe4    ,heraclitus was an         
,ephesian1 and is said to have been a   

pupil of  ,xenophanes1 though this      
statement is much doubted2 others call  
him a pupil  of ,hippasus the           
,pythagorean4 ,he wrote a treatise on   
,nature2 declaring that  the principle  
of all things was fire1 from which he   
saw the world was  evolved by a natural 
operation2 he further said that this    
fire was the  human life and soul1 and  
therefore a rational intelligence       
guiding the  whole universe4 ,in this   
primary fire he considered that there   
was a  perpetual longing to manifest    
itself in different forms3 in its       
perfectly  pure state it is in heaven2  
but in order to gratify this longing it 
descends1 gradually losing the rapidity 
of its motion till it settles in  the   
earth4 ,the earth1 however1 is not      
immovable1 but only the slowest of  all 
moving bodies2 while the soul of man1   
though dwelling in the lowest of  all   
regions1 namely1 in the earth1 he       
considered a migrated portion of  fire  
in its pure state2 which1 in spite of   

its descent1 had lost none of  its      
original purity4 ,the summum bonum he   
considered to be a contented            
acquiescence in the decrees of the      
,deity4 ,none of his writings are       
extant2  and he does not appear to have 
had many followers4    ,diogenes of     
,apollonia1 7who must not be confounded 
with his ,stoic or  ,cynic namesake17   
was a pupil of ,anaximenes1 and wrote a 
treatise on  ,nature1 of which ,diogenes
 ,laertius gives the following account3 
8,he  maintained that air was the       
primary element of all things2 that     
there was  an infinite number of worlds 
and an infinite vacuum2 that air        
condensed  and rarefied produced the    
different members of the universe2 that 
nothing  was generated from nothing1 or 
resolved into nothing2 that the earth   
was  round1 supported in the centre1    
having received its shape from the      
whirling round it of warm vapours1 and  
its concrete nature and hardness  from  
cold40 ,he also imputed to air an       

intellectual energy1 though he did  not 
recognise any difference between mind   
and matter4    ,parmenides was a native 
of ,elea or ,velia1 and flourished about
 #dfj ,b4,c41  soon after which time he 
came to ,athens1 and became acquainted  
with  ,socrates1 who was then very      
young4 ,theophrastus and ,aristotle     
speak  doubtfully of his having been a  
pupil of ,xenophanes4 ,some authors1    
however1 reckon him as one of the       
,pythagorean school2 ,plato and         
,aristotle  speak of him as the greatest
 of the ,eleatics2 and it is said that  
his  fellow-countrymen bound their      
magistrates every year to abide by the  
laws  which he had laid down4 ,he1 like 
,xenophanes1 explained his philosophical
  tenets in a didactic poem1 in which he
 speaks of two primary forms1 one  the  
fine uniform etherial fire of flame 7 71
 the other the cold  body of night1 out 
of the intermingling of which everything
 in the world  is formed by the ,deity  
who reigns in the midst4 ,his cosmogony 

was carried  into minute detail1 of     
which we possess only a few obscure     
fragments2 he  somewhat resembled the   
,pythagoreans in believing in a         
spherical system of  the world1         
surrounded by a circle of pure light2 in
 the centre of which  was the earth2 and
 between the earth and the light was the
 circle of the  ,milky ,way1 of the     
morning and evening star1 of the sun1   
the planets1 and  the moon4 ,and the    
differences in perfection of            
organization1 he attributed  to the     
different proportions in which the      
primary principles were  intermingled4  
,the ultimate principle of the world    
was1 in his view1  necessity1 in which  
,empedocles appears to have followed    
him2 he seems to  have been the only    
philosopher who recognised with         
distinctness and  precision that the    
,existent1  1 as such1 is unconnected   
with all  separation or juxtaposition1  
as well as with all succession1 all     
relation  to space or time1 all coming  

into existence1 and all change4 ,it is1 
however1 a mistake to suppose that he   
recognised it as a ,deity4              
,democritus was born at ,abdera1 ,b4,c4 
#dfj4 ,his father ,hegesistratus had    
been so rich as to be able to entertain 
,xerxes1 when on his march against      
,greece4 ,he spent his inheritance in   
travelling into distant countries1      
visiting the greater part of ,asia1 and1
 according to some authors1  extending  
his travels as far as ,india and        
thiopia4 ,egypt he certainly was        
acquainted with4 ,he lived to beyond the
 age of #ajj years1 and is said to  have
 died ,b4,c4 #ceg4    ,he was a man of  
vast and varied learning1 and a most    
voluminous author1  though none of his  
works have come down to us2--in them he 
carried out the  theory of atoms which  
he had derived from ,leucippus2         
insisting on the  reality of a vacuum   
and of motion1 which he held was the    
eternal and  necessary consequence of   
the original variety of atoms in this   

vacuum4  ,these atoms1 according to this
 theory1 being in constant motion and   
impenetrable1 offer resistance to one   
another1 and so create a whirling       
motion which gives birth to worlds4     
,moreover1 from this arise combinations 
of distinct atoms which become real     
things and beings4 ,the first cause of  
all existence he called chance 771 in   
opposition to the  of  ,anaxagoras4 ,but
 ,democritus went further2 for he       
directed his  investigations especially 
to the discovery of causes4    ,besides 
the infinite number of atoms1 he        
likewise supposed the existence  of an  
infinite number of worlds1 each being   
kept together by a sort of  shell or    
skin4 ,he derived the four elements from
 the form1 quality1 and  proportionate  
magnitude of the atoms predominating in 
each2 and in  deriving individual things
 from atoms1 he mainly considered the   
qualities  of warm and cold2 the soul he
 considered as derived from fire atoms2 
and  he did not consider mind as        

anything peculiar1 or as a power        
distinct from  the soul or sensuous     
perception2 but he considered knowledge 
derived from  reason to be a sensuous   
perception4    ,in his ethical          
philosophy1 he considered 7as we may see
 from the de  ,finibus7 the acquisition 
of peace of mind as the end and ultimate
 object  of all our actions1 and as the 
last and best fruit of philosophical    
inquiry4 ,temperance and moderation in  
prosperity and adversity were1 in  his  
eyes1 the principal means of acquiring  
this peace of mind4 ,and he  called     
those men alone pious and beloved by the
 ,gods who hate whatever is  wrong4     
,empedocles was a ,sicilian1 who        
flourished about the time when          
,thrasydus1 the son of ,theron1 was     
expelled from ,agrigentum1 to the       
tyranny of which he had succeeded2 in   
which revolution he took an active      
part3 it is even said that the          
sovereignty of his native city was      
offered  to and declined by him4    ,he 

was a man of great genius and extensive 
learning2 it is not known whose  pupil  
he was1 nor are any of his disciples    
mentioned except ,gorgias4 ,he  was well
 versed in the tenets of the ,eleatic   
and ,pythagorean schools2 but  he did   
not adopt the fundamental principles of 
either2 though he agreed  with          
,pythagoras in his belief in the        
metempsychosis1 in the influence of     
numbers1 and in one or two other points2
 and with the ,eleatics in  disbelieving
 that anything could be generated out of
 nothing4 ,aristotle  speaks of him as  
very much resembling in his opinions    
,democritus and  ,anaxagoras4 ,he was   
the first who established the number of 
four elements1  which had been          
previously pointed out one by one1      
partly as fundamental  substances1 and  
partly as transitive changes of things  
coming into  existence4 ,he first       
suggested the idea of two opposite      
directions of the  moving power1 an     
attractive and a repelling one3 and he  

believed that  originally these two     
coexisted in a state of repose and      
inactivity4 ,he  also assumed a         
periodical change of the formation of   
the world2 or  perhaps1 like the        
philosophers of the pure ,ionic school1 
a perpetual  continuance of pure        
fundamental substances2 to which the    
parts of the  world that are tired of   
change return1 and prepare the formation
 of the  sphere for the next period of  
the world4 ,like the ,eleatics1 he      
strove to  purify the notion of the     
,deity1 saying that he1 8being a holy   
infinite  spirit1 not encumbered with   
limbs1 passes through the world with    
rapid  thoughts40 ,at the same time he  
speaks of the eternal power of          
,necessity as  an ancient decree of the 
,gods1 though it is not quite clear what
 he  understood by this term4           
,diagoras was a native of ,melos1 and a 
pupil of ,democritus1 and  flourished   
about ,b4,c4 #dce4 ,he is remarkable as 
having been regarded by all  antiquity  

as an ,atheist4 ,in his youth he had    
some reputation as a lyric  poet2 so    
that he is sometimes classed with       
,pindar1 ,simonides1 and  ,bacchylides4 
,aristophanes1 in the ,clouds1 alludes  
to him where he calls  ,socrates 8the   
,melian20 not that he was so1 but he    
means to hint that  ,socrates was an    
atheist as well as the ,melian          
,diagoras4 ,he lived at ,athens  for    
many years till ,b4,c4 #daa1 when he    
fled from a prosecution instituted      
against him for impiety1 according to   
,diodorus1 but probably for some        
offence of a political nature2 perhaps  
connected with the mutilation of  the   
,herm4    ,that he was an atheist1      
however1 appears to have been quite     
untrue4 ,like  ,socrates1 he took new   
and peculiar views respecting the ,gods 
and their  worship2 and seems to have   
ridiculed the honours paid to their     
statues1  and the common notions which  
were entertained of their actions and   
conduct4 7,see ,de ,nat4 ,deor4 iii4    

#cg47 ,he is said also to have attacked 
objects held in the greatest veneration 
at ,athens1 such as the ,eleusinian     
,mysteries1 and to have dissuaded people
 from being initiated into them4 ,he    
appears also1 in his theories on the    
divine nature1 to have substituted in   
some degree the active powers of nature 
for the activity of the ,gods4 ,in  his 
own conduct he was a man of strict      
morality and virtue4 ,he died at        
,corinth before the end of the century4 
,protagoras was a native of ,abdera2 the
 exact time of his birth is  unknown1   
but he was a little older than          
,socrates4 ,he was the first person  who
 gave himself the title of 1 and taught 
for pay4 ,he came to  ,athens early in  
life1 and gave to the settlers who left 
it for ,thurium1  ,b4,c4 #dde1 a code of
 laws1 or perhaps adapted the old laws  
of ,charondas to  their use4 ,he was a  
friend of ,pericles4 ,after some time he
 was impeached  for impiety in saying1  
,that respecting the ,gods he did not   

know whether  they existed or not2 and  
banished from ,athens 7see ,de ,nat4    
,deor4 i4 #bc74  ,he was a very prolific
 author3 his most peculiar doctrines    
excited ,plato  to write the ,thetetus  
to oppose them4    ,his fundamental     
principle was1 that everything is       
motion1 and that that is  the efficient 
cause of everything2 that nothing       
exists1 but that  everything is         
continually coming into existence4 ,he  
divided motion  7besides numerous       
subordinate divisions7 into active and  
passive2 though  he did not consider    
either of these characteristics as      
permanent4 ,from the  concurrence of two
 such motions he taught that sensations 
and perceptions  arose1 according to the
 rapidity of the motion4 ,therefore he  
said that  there is or exists for each  
individual1 only that of which he has a 
sensation or perception2 and that as    
sensation1 like its objects1 is  engaged
 in a perpetual change of motion1       
opposite assertions might exist         

according to the difference of the      
perception respecting such object4      
,moral worth he attributed to taking    
pleasure in the beautiful2 and virtue   
he referred to a certain sense of shame 
implanted in man by nature2 and to  a   
certain conscious feeling of justice1   
which secures the bonds of  connexion in
 private and political life4            
,socrates1 the son of ,sophroniscus1 a  
statuary1 and ,phnarete1 a midwife1  was
 born ,b4,c4 #dfh4 ,he lived all his    
life at ,athens1 serving indeed as a    
soldier at ,potida1 ,amphipolis1 and in 
the battle of ,delium2 but with  these  
exceptions he never left the city2 where
 he lived as a teacher of  philosophy2  
not1 however1 founding a school or      
giving lectures1 but  frequenting the   
market-place and all other places of    
public resort1  talking with every one  
who chose to address him1 and putting   
questions to  every one of every rank   
and profession1 so that ,grote calls him
 8a public  talker for instruction40 ,he

 believed himself to have a special     
religious  mission from the ,gods to    
bring his countrymen to knowledge and   
virtue4 ,he  was at last impeached      
before the legal tribunals1 on the      
ground of  8corrupting the youth of the 
city1 and not worshipping the ,gods whom
 the  city worshipped20 and disdaining  
to defend himself1 or rather making a   
justificatory defence of such a         
character as to exasperate the judges1  
he  was condemned to death1 and executed
 by having hemlock administered to  him1
 ,b4,c4 #cii4    ,from his disciples    
,plato and ,xenophon we have a very full
 account of his  habits and doctrines2  
though it has been much disputed which  
of the two is  to be considered as      
giving the most accurate description of 
his opinions4  ,as a young man he had   
been to a certain extent a pupil of     
,archelaus 7the  disciple of            
,anaxagoras71 and derived his fondness  
for the dialectic style  of argument    
from ,zeno the ,eleatic1 the favourite  

,pupil of ,parmenides4 ,he  differed1   
however1 from all preceding philosophers
 in discarding and  excluding wholly    
from his studies all the abstruse       
sciences1 and limiting  his philosophy  
to those practical points which could   
have influence on  human conduct4 8,he  
himself was always conversing about the 
affairs of  men10 is the description    
given of him by ,xenophon4 ,astronomy he
 pronounced  to be one of the divine    
mysteries which it was impossible to    
understand  and madness to investigate2 
all that man wanted was to know enough  
of the  heavenly bodies to serve as an  
index to the change of seasons and as   
guides for voyages1 etc42 and that      
knowledge might1 he said1 easily be     
obtained from pilots and watchmen4      
,geometry he reduced to its literal     
meaning of land-measuring1 useful to    
enable one to act with judgment in  the 
purchase or sale of land2 but he looked 
with great contempt on the  study of    
complicated diagrams and mathematical   

problems4 ,as to general  natural       
philosophy1 he wholly discarded it2     
asking whether those who  professed to  
apply themselves to that study knew     
human affairs so well  as to have time  
to spare for divine2 was it that they   
thought that they  could influence the  
winds1 rain1 and seasons1 or did they   
desire nothing  but the gratification of
 an idle curiosity8 ,men should         
recollect how much  the wisest of them  
who have attempted to prosecute these   
investigations  differ from one another1
 and how totally opposite and           
contradictory their  opinions are4      
,socrates1 then1 looked at all knowledge
 from the point of view of human        
practice4 ,he first1 as ,cicero says1   
7,tusc4 ,dis4 v4 #d17 8called philosophy
  down from heaven and established it in
 the cities1 introduced it even into    
private houses1 and compelled it to     
investigate life1 and manners1 and  what
 was good and evil among men40 ,he was  
the first man who turned his  thoughts  

and discussions distinctly to the       
subject of ,ethics4 ,deeply  imbued with
 sincere religious feeling1 and         
believing himself to be under  the      
peculiar guidance of the ,gods1 who at  
all times admonished him by a  divine   
warning voice when he was in danger of  
doing anything unwise1  inexpedient1 or 
improper1 he believed that the ,gods    
constantly manifested  their love of and
 care for all men in the most essential 
manner1 in  replying through oracles1   
and sending them information by         
sacrificial  signs or prodigies1 in     
cases of great difficulty2 and he had no
 doubt that  if a man were diligent in  
learning all that the ,gods permitted to
 be  learnt1 and if besides he was      
assiduous in paying pious court to them 
and  in soliciting special information  
by way of prophecy1 they would be       
gracious to him and signify their       
purposes to him4    ,such then being the
 capacity of man for wisdom and virtue1 
his object was  to impart that wisdom to

 them2 and the first step necessary1 he 
considered  to be eradicating one great 
fault which was a barrier to all        
improvement4  ,this fault he described  
as 8the conceit of knowledge without the
 reality40  ,his friend and admirer     
,chrephon had consulted the oracle at   
,delphi as to  whether any man was wiser
 than ,socrates2 to which the priestess 
replied  that no other man was wiser4   
,socrates affirms that he was greatly   
disturbed at hearing this declaration   
from so infallible an authority2  till  
after conversing with politicians1 and  
orators1 and poets1 and men of  all     
classes1 he discovered not only that    
they were destitute of wisdom1  but that
 they believed themselves to be         
possessed of it2 so that he was  wiser  
than they1 though wholly ignorant1      
inasmuch as he was conscious of  his own
 ignorance4 ,he therefore considered his
 most important duty to be  to convince 
men of their ignorance1 and to excite   
them to remedy it1 as  the indispensable

 preliminary to virtue2 for virtue he   
defined as doing a  thing well1 after   
having learnt it and practised it by the
 rational and  proper means2 and whoever
 performed his duties best1 whether he  
was a  ruler of a state or a husbandman1
 was the best and most useful man and   
the  most beloved by the ,gods4    ,and 
if his objects were new1 his method was 
no less so4 ,he was the parent  of      
dialectics and logic4 ,aristotle says1  
8,to ,socrates we may  unquestionably   
assign two novelties--inductive         
discourses1 and the  definitions of     
general terms40 ,without any predecessor
 to copy1 ,socrates  fell as it were    
instinctively into that which ,aristotle
 describes as the  double tract of the  
dialectic process1 breaking up the one  
into the many1  and recombining the many
 into the one2 though the latter or     
synthetical  process he did not often   
perform himself1 but strove to stimulate
 his  hearer's mind so as to enable him 
to do it for himself4    ,the fault of  

the ,socratic theory is well remarked by
 ,grote to be1 that  while he resolved  
all virtue into knowledge or wisdom1 and
 all vice into  ignorance or folly1 he  
omitted to notice what is not less      
essential to  virtue1 the proper        
condition of the passions1 desires1 c41 
and limited  his views too exclusively  
to the intellect2 still while laying    
down a  theory which is too narrow1 he  
escaped the erroneous consequences of it
 by  a partial inconsistency4 ,for no   
one ever insisted more emphatically on  
the  necessity of control over the      
passions and appetites1 of enforcing    
good  habits1 and on the value of that  
state of the sentiments and emotions    
which such a course tended to form4 ,he 
constantly pointed out that the  chief  
pleasures were such as inevitably arise 
from the performance of  one's duty1 and
 that as to happiness1 a very moderate  
degree of good  fortune is sufficient as
 to external things1 provided the       
internal man be  properly disciplined4  

,grote remarks further1 7and this remark
 is particularly worth remembering  in  
the reading of ,cicero's philosophical  
works17 that 8,arcesilaus and the  ,new 
,academy thought that they were         
following the example of ,socrates1 7and
  ,cicero appears to have thought so    
too17 when they reasoned against        
everything1 and laid it down as a       
system1 that against every affirmative  
position an equal force of negative     
argument could be brought as a          
counterpoise3 now this view of ,socrates
 is1 in my judgment1 not only  partial1 
but incorrect4 ,he entertained no such  
doubts of the powers of the  mind to    
attain certainty4 ,about physics he     
thought man could know nothing2  but    
respecting the topics which concern man 
and society1 this was the  field which  
the ,gods had expressly assigned1 not   
merely to human practice1  but to human 
study and knowledge2 and he thought that
 every man1 not only  might know these  
things1 but ought to know them2 that he 

could not  possibly act well unless he  
did know them2 and that it was his      
imperative  duty to learn them as he    
would learn a profession1 otherwise he  
was  nothing better than a slave1 unfit 
to be trusted as a free and accountable 
being4 ,he was possessed by the truly   
,baconian idea1 that the power of       
steady moral action depended upon1 and  
was limited by1 the rational            
comprehension of moral ends and means40 
,the system1 then1 of ,socrates was     
animated by the truest spirit of        
positive science1 and formed an         
indispensable precursor to its          
attainment4  ,and we may form some      
estimate of his worth and genius if we  
recollect1  that while the systems and  
speculations of other ancient           
philosophers  serve only as curiosities 
to make us wonder1 or as beacons to warn
 us into  what absurdities the ablest   
men may fall1 the principles and the    
system of  ,socrates and his followers1 
and of that school alone1 exercise to   

this day  an important influence on all 
human argument and speculation4         
,aristippus 7whom we will consider      
before ,plato1 that ,aristotle may      
follow ,plato more immediately7 came    
when a young man to ,athens1 for the    
express purpose of becoming acquainted  
with ,socrates1 with whom he  remained  
almost till his death4 ,he was1 however1
 very different from his  master1 being 
a person of most luxurious and sensual  
habits4 ,he was also  the first of      
,socrates' disciples who took money for 
teaching4 ,he was the  founder of the   
,cyrenaic school of philosophy1 which   
followed ,socrates in  limiting all     
philosophical inquiries to ethics2      
though under this name  they            
comprehended a more varied range of     
subjects than ,socrates did1  inasmuch  
as one of the parts into which they     
divided philosophy1 referred  to the    
feelings2 another to causes1 which is   
rather a branch of physics2  and a third
 to proofs1 which is clearly connected  

with logic4    ,he pronounced pleasure  
to be the chief good1 and pain the chief
 evil2 but  he denied that either of    
these was a mere negative inactive      
state1  considering them1 on the        
contrary1 both to be motions of the     
soul1--pain a  violent1 and pleasure a  
moderate one4    ,as to actions1 he     
asserted that they were all morally     
indifferent1 that  men should only look 
to their results1 and that law and      
custom are the  only authorities which  
make an action either good or bad4      
,whatever  conduces to pleasure1 he     
thought virtue2 in which he agreed with 
,socrates  that the mind has the        
principal share4    ,plato1 the greatest
 of all the disciples of ,socrates1 was 
the son of  ,ariston and ,perictione1   
and was born probably in the year ,b4,c4
 #dbh1 and  descended1 on the side of   
his father1 from ,codrus1 and on his    
mother's  side related to ,solon4 ,at   
the age of twenty1 he became a constant 
attendant of ,socrates1 and lived at    

,athens till his death4 ,after this     
event1 in consequence of the            
unpopularity of the very name of his    
master1  he retired to ,megara1 and     
subsequently to ,sicily4 ,he is said    
also to have  been at some part of his  
life1 after the death of ,socrates1 a   
great  traveller4 ,about twelve years   
after the death of ,socrates he returned
 to  ,athens1 and began to teach in the 
,academy1 partly by dialogue1 and       
partly1  probably1 by connected         
lectures4 ,he taught gratuitously2 and  
besides  ,speusippus1 ,xenocrates1      
,aristotle1 ,heraclides ,ponticus1 and  
others1 who  were devoted solely to     
philosophical studies1 he is said to    
have  occasionally numbered ,chabrias1  
,iphicrates1 ,timotheus1 ,phocion1      
,isocrates1  and 7by some7 ,demosthenes 
among his hearers4 ,he died at a great  
age1 ,b4,c4  #cdg4    ,his works have   
come down to us in a more complete form 
than those of any  other ancient author 
who was equally voluminous2 and from    

them we get a  clear idea of the        
principal doctrines which he inculcated 
on his  followers4    ,like ,socrates1  
he was penetrated with the idea1 that   
knowledge and wisdom  were the things   
most necessary to man1 and the greatest 
goods assigned to  him by ,god4 ,wisdom 
he looked on as the great purifier of   
the soul2 and as  any approach to wisdom
 presupposes an original communion with 
,being1  properly so called1 this       
communion also presupposes the divine   
nature1 and  consequent immortality of  
the soul1 his doctrine respecting which 
was of a  much purer and loftier        
character than the usual theology of the
 ancients4  ,believing that the world   
also had a soul1 he considered the human
 soul as  similar to it in nature1 and  
free from all liability to death1 in    
spite of  its being bound up with the   
appetites1 in consequence of its        
connexion  with the body1 and as        
preserving power and consciousness after
 its  separation from the body4 ,what he

 believed1 however1 to be its condition 
after death is far less certain1 as his 
ideas on this subject are  expressed in 
a mythical form4    ,the chief point1   
however1 to which ,plato directed his   
attention1 was  ethics1 which1          
especially in his system1 are closely   
connected with  politics4 ,he devotes   
the ,protagoras1 and several shorter    
dialogues1 to  refute the sensual and   
selfish theories of some of his         
predecessors1 in  order to adopt a more 
scientific treatment of the subject2 and
 in these  dialogues he urges that      
neither happiness nor virtue are        
attainable by the  indulgence of our    
desires1 but that men must bring these  
into proper  restraint1 if they are     
desirous of either4 ,he supposes an     
inward harmony1  the preservation of    
which is pleasure1 while its disturbance
 is pain2 and  as pleasure is always    
dependent on the activity from which it 
springs1 the  more this activity is     
elevated the purer the pleasure becomes4

    ,virtue he considered the fitness of
 the soul for the operations that are   
proper to it2 and it manifests itself by
 means of its inward harmony1  beauty1  
and health4 ,different phases of virtue 
are distinguishable so far  as the soul 
is not pure spirit1 but just as the     
spirit should rule both  the other      
elements of the soul1 so also should    
wisdom1 as the inner  development of the
 spirit1 rule the other virtues4        
,politics he considered an inseparable  
part of ethics1 and the state as the    
copy of a well-regulated individual     
life3 from the three different          
activities of the soul he deduced the   
three main elements of the state1       
likening the working class to the       
appetitive element of the soul1 both of 
which equally require to be kept under  
control2 the military order1 which      
answered1 in his idea1 to the emotive   
element1 ought to develop itself in     
thorough dependence on the reason2 and  
from that the governing order1          

answering to the rational faculty1 must 
proceed4 ,the right of passing from  a  
subordinate to a dominant position must 
depend on the individual  capacity and  
ability for raising itself4 ,but from   
the difficulties of  realizing his      
theories1 he renounces this absolute    
separation of ranks in  his book on     
,laws1 limits the power of the          
governors1 attempts to reconcile        
freedom with unity and reason1 and to   
mingle monarchy with democracy4    ,with
 respect to his theology1 he appears to 
have agreed entirely with  ,socrates4   
,aristotle was born at ,stageira1 ,b4,c4
 #chd4 ,his father1 ,nicomachus1 was    
physician to ,amyntas ,,ii41 king of    
,macedon4 ,at the age of seventeen he   
went  to ,athens1 in hopes to become a  
pupil of ,plato2 but ,plato was in      
,sicily1  and did not return for three  
years1 which time ,aristotle applied to 
severe  study1 and to cultivating the   
friendship of ,heraclides ,ponticus4    
,when  ,plato returned1 he soon         

distinguished him above all his other   
pupils4 ,he  remained at ,athens twenty 
years1 maintaining1 however1 his        
connexion with  ,macedonia2 but on the  
death of ,plato1 ,b4,c4 #cdg1 which     
happened while  ,aristotle was absent in
 ,macedonia on an embassy1 he quitted   
,athens1  thinking1 perhaps1 that       
travelling was necessary to complete his
  education4 ,after a short period1 he  
accepted an invitation from ,philip to  
superintend the education of ,alexander4
 ,he remained in ,macedonia till ,b4,c4 
#cce1 when he returned to ,athens1 where
 he found ,xenocrates had succeeded     
,speusippus as the head of the ,academy4
 ,here the ,lyceum was appropriated to  
him1 in the shady walks 77 of which he  
delivered his lectures to  a number of  
eminent scholars who flocked around him4
 ,from these walks the  name of         
,peripatetic was given to the ,school   
which he subsequently  established4     
,like several others of the ,greek      
philosophers1 he had a  select body of  

pupils1 to whom he delivered his        
esoteric doctrines2 and a  larger1 more 
promiscuous1 and less accomplished      
company1 to whom he  delivered his      
exoteric lectures on less abstruse      
subjects4 ,when he had  resided thirteen
 years at ,athens1 he found himself     
threatened with a  prosecution for      
impiety1 and fled to ,chalcis1 in ,euba1
 and died soon  after1 ,b4,c4 #cbb4     
,his learning was immense1 and his most 
voluminous writings embraced almost     
every subject conceivable2 but only a   
very small portion of them has come     
down to us4 ,cicero1 however1 alludes to
 him only as a moral philosopher1  and  
occasionally as a natural historian2 so 
that it may be sufficient here  for us  
to confine our view of him to his       
teaching on the ,practical  ,sciences2  
his ,ethics1 too1 being one of his works
 which has come down to  us entire4     
,god he considered to be the highest and
 purest energy of eternal               
intellect1--an absolute principle1--the 

highest reason1 the object of whose     
thought is himself2 expanding and       
declaring1 in a more profound manner1   
the  of ,anaxagoras4 ,with respect to   
man1 the object of all action1 he       
taught1 was happiness3 and this         
happiness he defines to be an energy of 
the soul 7or of life7 according to      
virtue1 existing by and for itself4     
,virtue1 again1 he subdivided into moral
 and intellectual1 according to the     
distinction between the reasoning       
faculty and that quality in the soul    
which obeys reason4 ,again1 moral virtue
 is the proper medium between  excess   
and deficiency1 and can only be acquired
 by practice2 intellectual  virtue can  
be taught2 and by the constant practice 
of moral virtue a man  becomes virtuous1
 but he can only practise it by a       
resolute determination  to do so4       
,virtue1 therefore1 is defined further  
as a habit accompanied by1  or arising  
out of1 deliberate choice1 and based    
upon free and conscious  action4 ,from  

these principles1 ,aristotle is led to  
take a wider view of  virtue than other 
philosophers3 he includes friendship    
under this head1 as  one of the very    
greatest virtues1 and a principal means 
for a steady  continuance in all virtue2
 and as the unrestricted exercise of    
each  species of activity directed      
towards the good1 produces a feeling of 
pleasure1 he considers pleasure as a    
very powerful means of virtue4          
,connected with ,aristotle's system of  
ethics was his system of politics1  the 
former being only a part1 as it were1 of
 the latter2 the former aiming  at the  
happiness of individuals1 the latter at 
that of communities2 so  that the latter
 is the perfection and completion of the
 former4 ,for  ,aristotle looked upon   
man as a 8political animal0--as a being1
 that is1  created by nature for the    
state1 and for living in the state2     
which1 as a  totality consisting of     
organically connected members1 is by    
nature prior  to the individual or the  

family4 ,the state he looked upon as a  
whole  consisting of mutually dependent 
and connected members1 with reference as
  well to imaginary as to actually      
existing constitutions4 ,the            
constitution  is the arrangement of the 
powers in the state--the soul of the    
state1 as it  were1--according to which 
the sovereignty is determined4 ,the laws
 are the  determining principles1       
according to which the dominant body    
governs and  restrains those who would1 
and punishes those who do1 transgress   
them4 ,he  defines three kinds of       
constitutions1 each of them having a    
corresponding  perversion3--a republic1 
arising from the principle of equality2 
this at  times degenerates into         
democracy2 monarchy1 and aristocracy1   
which arise  from principles of         
inequality1 founded on the preponderance
 of external or  internal strength and  
wealth1 and which are apt to degenerate 
into tyranny  and oligarchy4 ,the       
education of youth he considers as a    

principal concern  of the state1 in     
order that1 all the individual citizens 
being trained to  a virtuous life1      
virtue may become predominant in all the
 spheres of  political life2 and1       
accordingly1 by means of politics the   
object is  realized of which ethics are 
the groundwork1 namely1 human happiness1
  depending on a life in accordance with
 virtue4    ,heraclides ,ponticus1 as he
 is usually called1 was1 as his name    
denotes1  a native of ,pontus4 ,he      
migrated to ,athens1 where he became a  
disciple of  ,plato1 who1 while absent  
in ,sicily1 entrusted him with the care 
of his  school4    ,speusippus was the  
nephew of ,plato1 and succeeded him as  
,president of  the ,academy2 but he     
continued so but a short time1 and1     
within eight years  of the death of     
,plato1 he died at ,athens1 ,b4,c4 #cci4
 ,he refused to  recognise the ,good as 
the ultimate principle2 but1 going back 
to the  older theologians1 maintained   
that the origin of the universe was to  

be  set down indeed as a cause of the   
,good and ,perfect1 but was not the     
,good  and ,perfect itself2 for that was
 the result of generated existence or   
development1 just as plants are of the  
seeds4 ,when1 with the ,pythagoreans1   
he reckoned the ,one in the series of   
good things1 he probably thought of  it 
only in opposition to the ,manifold1 and
 wished to point out that it  is from   
the ,one that the ,good is to be        
derived4 ,he appears1 however1  7see ,de
 ,nat4 ,deor4 i4 #ac17 to have          
attributed vital activity to the        
primordial unity1 as inseparably        
belonging to it4    ,theophrastus was a 
native of ,eresus1 from whence he       
migrated to ,athens1  where he became a 
follower of ,plato1 and afterwards of   
,aristotle1 by whom1  when he quitted   
,athens for ,chalcis1 he was designated 
as his successor in  the presidency of  
the ,lyceum2 while in this position1 he 
is said to have  had two thousand       
disciples1 and among them the comic poet

 ,menander4 ,when1  ,b4,c4 #cje1 the    
philosophers were banished from ,athens1
 he also left the  city1 but returned   
the next year on the repeal of the law4 
,he lived to a  great age1 though the   
date of his birth is not certainly      
known4    ,he was a very voluminous     
writer on many subjects1 but directed   
his chief  attention to continuing the  
researches into natural history which   
had been  begun by ,aristotle4 ,as1     
however1 only a few fragments of his    
works have  come down to us1 and these  
in a very corrupt state1 we know but    
little  what peculiar views he          
entertained2 though we learn from       
,cicero 7,de ,inv4  i4 #db-ej7 that he  
departed a good deal from the doctrines 
of ,aristotle in  his principles of     
ethics1 and also in his metaphysical and
 theological  speculations2 and ,cicero 
7,de ,nat4 ,deor4 i4 #ac7 complains that
 he did not  express himself with       
precision or with consistency about the 
,deity2 and in  other places 7,acad4 i4 

#aj1 ,tusc4 ,qust4 v4 #i71 that he      
appeared unable to  comprehend a        
happiness resting merely on virtue2 so  
that he had attributed  to virtue a rank
 very inferior to its deserts4          
,xenocrates was a native of ,chalcedon1 
born probably ,b4,c4 #cif4 ,he was a    
follower of ,plato1 and accompanied him 
to ,sicily4 ,after his death1 he  betook
 himself1 with ,aristotle1 to the court 
of ,hermias1 tyrant of  ,ptarneus1 but  
soon returned to ,athens1 and became    
president of the ,academy  when         
,speusippus1 through ill health1 was    
forced to abandon that post4 ,he  died  
,b4,c4 #cad4    ,he was not a man of    
great genius1 but of unwearied industry 
and the purest  virtue and integrity4   
,none of his works have come down to us2
 but1 from  the notices of other        
writers1 we are acquainted with some of 
his peculiar  doctrines4 ,he stood at   
the head of those who1 regarding the    
universe as  imperishable and existing  
from eternity1 looked upon the chronic  

succession in the theory of ,plato as a 
form in which to denote the  relations  
of conceptual succession4 ,he asserted  
that the soul was a  self-moving        
member1--called ,unity and ,duality     
deities1 considering the  former as the 
first male existence1 ruling in heaven1 
father and ,jupiter2  the latter as the 
female1 as the mother of the ,gods1 and 
the soul of the  universe1 which reigns 
over the mutable world under heaven4 ,he
  approximated to the ,pythagoreans in  
considering ,number as the principle of 
consciousness1 and consequently of      
knowledge2 supplying1 however1 what was 
deficient in the ,pythagorean theory by 
the definition of ,plato1 that it is    
only in as far as number reconciles the 
opposition between the same and  the    
different1 and can raise itself to      
independent motion1 that it is  soul4   
,in his ethics he endeavoured to render 
the ,platonic theory more complete1  and
 to give it a more direct applicability 
to human life2 admitting1  besides the  

good and the bad1 of something which is 
neither good nor bad1  and some of these
 intermediate things1 such as health1   
beauty1 fame1 good  fortune1 he would   
not admit to be absolutely worthless and
 indifferent4 ,he  maintained1 however1 
in the most decided manner1 that virtue 
is the only  thing valuable in itself1  
and that the value of everything else is
  conditional1 7see ,cic4 de ,fin4 iv4  
#ah1 de ,leg4 i4 #ba1 ,acad4 i4 #f1     
,tusc4  ,qust4 v4 #aj-ah17 that         
happiness ought to coincide with the    
consciousness  of virtue4 ,he did not   
allow that mere intellectual scientific 
wisdom was  the only true wisdom to be  
sought after as such by men3 and in one 
point  he came nearer the precepts of   
,christianity than any of the ancients1 
when  he asserted the indispensableness 
of the morality of the thoughts to      
virtue1 and declared it to be the same  
thing1 whether a person cast  longing   
eyes on the possessions of his          
neighbour1 or attempted to possess      

himself of them by force4               
,antisthenes was older than ,plato2     
though the exact time of his birth is   
uncertain3 but he fought at the battle  
of ,tanagra1 ,b4,c4 #dbj1 though then   
very young4 ,he became a disciple of    
,gorgias1 and afterwards of ,socrates1  
at whose death he set up a school in the
 ,cynosarges1 a gymnasium for the  use  
of ,athenians born of foreign mothers1  
near the temple of ,hercules1  from     
which place of assembly his followers   
were called ,cynics4 ,he lived to  a    
great age1 though the year of his death 
is not known1 but he certainly  was     
alive after the battle of ,leuctra1     
,b4,c4 #cga4    ,in his philosophical   
system1 which was almost confined to    
ethics1 he  appears to have aimed at    
novelty rather than truth or common     
sense4 ,he  taught that in all that the 
wise man does he conforms to perfect    
virtue1  and that pleasure is so far    
from being necessary to man1 that it is 
a  positive evil4 ,he is reported also  

to have gone the length of pronouncing  
pain and infamy blessings rather than   
evils1 though when he spoke of  pleasure
 as worthless1 he probably meant that   
pleasure which arises from  the         
gratification of sensual or artificial  
desires2 for he praised that  which     
arises from the intellect1 and from     
friendship4 ,the summum bonum  he placed
 in a life according to virtue4    ,in a
 treatise in which he discussed the     
nature of the ,gods he contended  for   
the unity of the ,deity1 and asserted   
that man is unable to know him by  any  
sensible representation1 since he is    
unlike any being on earth2 and          
demonstrated the sufficiency of virtue  
for happiness1 by the doctrine that     
outward events are regulated by ,god so 
as to benefit the wise and good4        
,diogenes1 a native of ,sinope in       
,pontus1 who was born ,b4,c4 #dab1 was  
one  of his few disciples2 he came at an
 early age to ,athens1 and became       
notorious for the most frantic excesses 

of moroseness and self-denial4 ,on  a   
voyage to gina he was taken by pirates  
and sold as a slave to ,xeniades1  a    
,corinthian1 over whom he acquired great
 influence1 and was made tutor to  his  
children4 ,his system consisted merely  
in teaching men to dispense with  even  
the simplest necessaries of civilized   
life3 and he is said to have  taught    
that all minds are air1 exactly alike1  
and composed of similar  particles2 but 
that in beasts and in idiots they are   
hindered from  properly developing      
themselves by various humors and        
incapacities of their  bodies4 ,he died 
,b4,c4 #cbc1 the same year that         
,epicurus came to ,athens4    ,zeno was 
born at ,citium1 a city of ,cyprus2 but 
having been shipwrecked  near ,cyprus1  
he settled in that city1 where he       
devoted himself to severe  study for a  
great length of time1 cultivating1 it is
 said1 the  acquaintance of the         
philosophers of the ,megaric school1    
,diodorus and  ,philo1 and of the       

,academics1 ,xenocrates and ,polemo4    
,after he had completed  his studies1 he
 opened a school himself in the porch1  
adorned with the  paintings of          
,polygnotus 7 71 from which his         
followers were  called ,stoics4 ,the    
times of his birth and of his death are 
not known with  any exactness2 but he is
 said to have reached a great age4      
,in speaking of the ,stoic doctrines1 it
 is not very clear how much of them     
proceeded from ,zeno himself1 and how   
much from ,chrysippus and other  eminent
 men of the school in subsequent years4 
,in natural philosophy he  considered   
that there was a primary matter which   
was never increased or  diminished1 and 
which was the foundation of everything  
which existed3 and  which was brought   
into existence by the operative         
power1--that is1 by the  ,deity4 ,he saw
 this operative power in fire and in    
ther as the basis of  all vital         
activity1 7see ,cic4 ,acad4 i4 #aa1 ii4 
#da2 de ,nat4 ,deor4 ii4 #i1  iii4 #ad17

 and he taught that the universe comes  
into being when the  primary substance  
passing from fire through the           
intermediate stage of air  becomes      
liquefied1 and then the thick portion   
becomes earth1 the thinner  portion air1
 which is again rarefied till it becomes
 fire4 ,this fire he  conceived to be   
identical with the ,deity1 7,cic4 de    
,nat4 ,deor4 ii4 #bb17 and  to be       
endowed with consciousness and          
foresight4 ,at other times he defined   
the ,deity as that law of nature which  
ever accomplishes what is right1 and    
prevents the opposite1 and identified it
 with unconditional necessity4 ,the     
soul of man he considered as being of   
the nature of fire1 or of a warm        
breath1 7,cic4 ,tusc4 ,qust4 i4 #i2 de  
,nat4 ,deor4 iii4 #d17 and therefore as 
mortal4    ,in ethics he agreed with the
 ,cynics in recognising the             
constitutional  nature of moral         
obligations1 though he differed from    
them with respect to  things            

indifferent1 and opposed their morose   
contempt for custom1 though  he did not 
allow that the gratification of mere    
external wants1 or that  external good  
fortune1 had any intrinsic value4 ,he   
comprised everything  which could make  
life happy in virtue alone 7,cic4 ,acad4
 i4 #aj71 and called  it the only good  
which deserved to be striven after and  
praised for its  own sake 7,cic4 de     
,fin4 iii4 #f1 #h71 and taught that the 
attainment of it  must inevitably       
produce happiness4 ,but as virtue could1
 according to his  system1 only subsist 
in conjunction with the perfect dominion
 of reason1  and vice only in the       
renunciation of the authority of reason1
 he inferred  that one good action could
 not be more virtuous than another1 and 
that a  person who had one virtue had   
all1 and that he who was destitute of   
one  was destitute of all4    ,cleanthes
 was born at ,assos in the ,troas1 about
 #cjj ,b4,c42 he came to  ,athens at an 
early age1 and became the pupil of      

,zeno1 whom at his death he  succeeded  
in his school4 ,he differed from his    
master in regarding the soul  as        
immortal1 and approximated to the       
,cynics in denying that pleasure was    
agreeable to nature1 or in any respect  
good4 ,he died of voluntary  starvation 
at the age of eighty4    ,chrysippus was
 born ,b4,c4 #bhj1 at ,soli in ,cilicia4
 ,he came at an early  age to ,athens1  
and became a pupil of ,cleanthes2 and   
among the later ,stoics  he was more    
regarded than either ,zeno or           
,cleanthes4 ,he died ,b4,c4 #bjg4       
,his doctrines do not appear to have    
differed from those of ,zeno2 only      
that1 from feeling the dangerous        
influence of the ,epicurean principles1 
he  endeavoured to popularize the ,stoic
 ethics4    ,epicurus was an ,athenian  
of the ,attic demos ,gargettus1 whence  
he is  sometimes simply called the      
,gargettian4 ,he was1 however1 born at  
,samos1  ,b4,c4 #cdb1 and did not come  
to ,athens till the age of eighteen1    

when he  found ,xenocrates at the head  
of the ,academy1 and by some authors is 
said  to have become his pupil1 though  
he himself would not admit it 7,cic4 de 
,nat4 ,deor4 i4 #bf74 ,at the outbreak  
of the ,samian war he crossed over to   
,colophon1 where he collected a school4 
,it is said that the first thing  that  
excited him to the study of philosophy  
was the perusal of the works  of        
,democritus while he resided at         
,colophon4 ,from thence he went to      
,mitylene and ,lampsacus1 and ,b4,c4    
#cjf he returned to ,athens1 and finally
  established himself as a teacher of   
philosophy4 ,his own life was that of a 
man of simple1 pure1 and temperate      
habits4 ,he died of the stone1 ,b4,c4   
#bgj1  and left ,hermarchus of ,mitylene
 as his successor in the management of  
his  school4    ,none of his works have 
come down to us4 ,with regard to his    
philosophical  system1 in spite of his  
boast of being self-taught and having   
borrowed  from no one1 he clearly       

derived the chief part of his natural   
philosophy  from ,democritus1 and of his
 moral philosophy from ,aristippus and  
the  ,cyrenaics4 ,he considered human   
happiness the end of all philosophy1 and
  agreed with the ,cyrenaics that       
pleasure constituted the greatest       
happiness2 still this theory in his     
hands acquired a far loftier  character2
 for pleasure1 in his idea1 was not a   
mere momentary and  transitory          
sensation1 but something lasting and    
imperishable1 consisting  in pure mental
 enjoyments1 and in the freedom from    
pain and any other  influence which     
could disturb man's peace of mind4 ,and 
the summum bonum1  according to him1    
consisted in this peace of mind2 which  
was based upon  correct wisdom 774      
,in his natural philosophy he embraced  
the atomic theories of ,democritus  and 
,diagoras1 carrying them even further   
than they themselves had done1 to  such 
a degree that he drew upon himself the  
reproach of ,atheism4 ,he  regarded the 

,gods themselves as consisting of atoms1
 and our notions of  them as based upon 
the images 77 which are reflected from  
them1 and  so pass into our minds4 ,and 
he believed that they exercised no      
influence  whatever on the world1 or on 
the actions or fortunes of man4         
,theodorus was a native of ,cyrene1 who 
flourished about ,b4,c4 #cbj4 ,he was   
of the ,cyrenaic sect1 and the founder  
of that branch of it which was  called  
after him1 the ,theodorean2 though we   
scarcely know in what his  doctrines    
differed from those of ,aristippus1     
unless they were1 if  possible1 of a    
still more lax character4 ,he taught1   
for instance1 that  there was nothing   
really wrong or disgraceful in theft1   
adultery1 or  sacrilege2 but that they  
were branded by public opinion to       
restrain fools4  ,he is also reproved   
with utter atheism2 and ,cicero classes 
him with  ,diagoras1 as a man who       
utterly denied the existence of any     
,gods at all4    ,pyrrho was a          

contemporary of ,alexander the ,great1  
whose expedition into  ,asia he joined4 
,he appears1 as far as his philosophy   
went1 to have been an  universal        
sceptic4 ,he impeached1 however1 none of
 the chief principles of  morality1 but1
 regarding ,socrates as his model1      
directed all his  endeavours towards the
 production in his pupils of a firm     
well-regulated  moral character4        
,crantor was a native of ,soli in       
,cilicia2 we do not know when he was    
born  or when he died1 but he came to   
,athens before ,b4,c4 #cae4 ,he was the 
first  of ,plato's followers who wrote  
commentaries on the works of his master4
 ,he  died of dropsy1 and left          
,arcesilaus his heir4    ,arcesilaus1 or
 ,arcesilas1 flourished about ,b4,c4    
#bhj2 he was born at  ,pitane1 but came 
to ,athens and became the pupil of      
,theophrastus and of  ,crantor1 and     
afterwards of some of the more sceptical
 philosophers4 ,on the  death of        
,crantor he succeeded to the chair of   

the ,academy1 in the  doctrines of which
 he made so many innovations that he is 
called the  founder of the ,new         
,academy4 ,what his peculiar views were 
is1 however1 a  matter of great         
uncertainty4 ,some give him the credit  
of having restored  the doctrines of    
,plato in an uncorrupted form2 while1   
according to ,cicero1  on the other     
hand1 7,acad4 i4 #ab17 he summed up all 
his opinions in the  statement that he  
knew nothing1 not even his own          
ignorance4 ,he1 and the  ,new ,academy1 
do not1 however1 seem to have doubted   
the existence of truth  in itself1 but  
only the capacity of man for arriving at
 the knowledge of  it4    ,carneades was
 born at ,cyrene about ,b4,c4 #bac4 ,he 
went early to ,athens1  and at first    
attended the lectures of the ,stoics2   
but subsequently  attached himself to   
the ,academy1 and succeeded to the chair
 on the death  of ,hegesinus4 ,in the   
year ,b4,c4 #aee1 he came to ,rome on an
 embassy1 but so  offended ,cato by     

speaking one day in praise of justice as
 a virtue1 and  the next day1 in answer 
to all his previous arguments1 that he  
made a  motion in the senate1 that he   
should be ordered to depart from ,rome4 
,he  died ,b4,c4 #abi4    ,philo of     
,larissa1 who is often mentioned by     
,cicero1 was his own master1  having    
removed to ,rome after the conquest of  
,athens by ,mithridates1 where  he      
settled as a teacher of philosophy and  
rhetoric4 ,he would not admit  that     
there was any difference between the    
,old and ,new ,academy1 in which he     
differed from his pupil ,antiochus4 ,the
 exact time of his birth or death is    
not known2 but he was not living when   
,cicero composed his ,academics4 7ii4   
#f47    ,antiochus of ,ascalon has been 
called by some writers the founder of   
the  ,fifth ,academy2 he also was a     
teacher of ,cicero during the time he   
studied  at ,athens2 he had also a      
school at ,alexandria1 and another in   
,syria1 where  he died4 ,he studied     

under ,philo1 but was so far from       
agreeing with him  that he wrote a      
treatise on purpose to refute what he   
considered as the  scepticism of the    
,academics4 ,and undoubtedly the later  
philosophers of  that school had        
exaggerated the teaching of ,plato1 that
 the senses were  not in all cases      
trustworthy organs of perception1 so as 
to infer from it  a denial of the       
certainty of any knowledge whatever4    
,antiochus professed  that his object   
was to revive the real doctrines of     
,plato in opposition to  the modern     
scepticism of ,carneades and ,philo4 ,he
 appears to have  considered himself as 
an eclectic philosopher1 combining the  
best parts of  the doctrines of the     
,academic1 ,peripatetic1 and ,stoic     
schools4    ,diodorus of ,tyre          
flourished about ,b4,c4 #aaj4 ,he lived 
at ,athens1 where he  succeeded         
,critolaus as the head of the           
,peripatetic school4 ,cicero1  however1 
denies that he was a genuine            

,peripatetic1 and says that his         
doctrine that the summum bonum consisted
 in a combination of virtue with  the   
absence of pain was an attempt to       
reconcile the theory of the ,stoics     
with that of the ,epicureans4           
,pantius was a native of ,rhodes2 his   
exact age is not known1 but he was  a   
contemporary of ,scipio milianus1 who   
died ,b4,c4 #abi4 ,he went to ,athens   
at an early age1 where he is said to    
have been a pupil of ,diogenes of       
,babylon and ,antipater of ,tarsus1 and 
also of ,polemo ,periegetes4 ,he became 
associated with ,p4 ,scipio milianus1   
who valued him highly4 ,the latter  part
 of his life he spent at ,athens1 where 
he had succeeded ,antipater as  head of 
the ,stoic school4 ,he was the author of
 a treatise on 8,what is  ,becoming10   
which ,cicero professes to have         
imitated1 though carried rather         
further1 in his ,de ,officiis4 ,he      
softened down the harsher features of   
the  ,stoic doctrines1 approximating    

them in some degree to the opinions of  
,xenocrates1 ,plato1 and ,aristotle1 and
 made them attractive by the elegance   
of his style2 indeed1 he modified the   
principles of the school so much1  that 
some writers called him a ,platonist4   
,in natural philosophy he  abandoned the
 ,stoic doctrine of the conflagration of
 the world2  endeavoured to simplify the
 division of the faculties of the soul2 
and  doubted the reality of the science 
of divination4 ,in ethics he followed   
the method of ,aristotle2 and1 in direct
 opposition to the earlier ,stoics1     
vindicated the claim of certain         
pleasurable sensations to be regarded as
  in accordance with nature4    ,polemo 
was a pupil of ,xenocrates1 and         
succeeded him as the head of his        
school4 ,there is a story that he had   
been a very dissolute young man1 and    
that one day1 at the head of a band of  
revellers1 he burst into the school  of 
,xenocrates1 when his attention was so  
arrested by the discourse of the        

philosopher1 which happened to be on the
 subject of temperance1 that he  tore   
off his festive garland1 remained till  
the end of the lecture1 and  devoted    
himself to philosophy all the rest of   
his life4 ,he does not appear  to have  
varied at all from the doctrines of his 
master4 ,he died ,b4,c4 #bgc4           
,archytas was a native of ,tarentum3 his
 age is not quite certain1 but he  is   
believed to have been a contemporary of 
,plato1 and he is even said to  have    
saved his life by his interest with the 
tyrant ,dionysius4 ,he was a  great     
general and statesman1 as well as a     
philosopher4 ,in philosophy he  was a   
,pythagorean2 and1 like most of that    
school1 a great mathematician2  and     
applied his favourite science not only  
to music1 but also to  metaphysics4     
,aristotle is believed to have borrowed 
from him his ,system of  ,categories4   
,the limits of this volume forbid more  
than the preceding very brief sketch  of
 the chiefs of the ancient philosophy4  

,for a more detailed account the  reader
 is referred to the ,biographical       
,dictionary edited by ,dr4 ,smith1  from
 which valuable work much of this sketch
 has been derived4 ,the account  of     
,socrates has been principally derived  
from ,mr4 ,grote's admirable  history of
 ,greece3 in which attention has so     
successfully been devoted to  the       
history of philosophy and the sophists1 
that a correct idea of the  subject can 
hardly be acquired without a careful    
study of that work4    ,it was intended 
to subjoin a comparison of the systems  
of the different  sects1 but it would   
take more space than can be spared2 and 
it is moreover  unnecessary1 as1 the    
distinctive tenets of each having been  
explained1 the  reader is supplied with 
sufficient materials to institute such a
  comparison for himself4 ,he will not  
wonder that men without the guidance  of
 revelation should at times have lost   
their way in speculations beyond  the   
reach of human faculties1 but will the  

more admire that genius and  virtue     
which manifested itself in such men as  
,socrates1 ,plato1 and ,cicero1  for the
 perpetual enlightenment of the human   
race4            ,,introduction4        
,the following account of the two ,books
 of the ,academics is extracted from    
the ,dictionary of ,greek and ,roman    
,biography1 edited by ,dr4 ,w4 ,smith3--
    8,the history of this work1 before  
it finally quitted the hands of its     
author1 is exceedingly curious and      
somewhat obscure2 but must be clearly   
understood before we can explain the    
relative position of those portions  of 
it which have been transmitted to modern
 times4 ,by comparing carefully  a      
series of letters written to ,atticus1  
in the course of ,b4,c4 #de 7,ep4 ad    
,att4 xiii4 #cb27a7 #ab1 #ac1 #ad1 #af1 
#ah1 #ai1 #ba1 #bb1 #bc1 #be1 #ce1 #dd71
 we find  that ,cicero had drawn up a   
treatise upon the ,academic ,philosophy1
 in the  form of a dialogue between     
,catulus1 ,lucullus1 and ,hortensius2   

and that it  was comprised in two books1
 the first bearing the name of ,catulus1
 the  second that of ,lucullus4 ,a copy 
was sent to ,atticus2 and1 soon after it
  reached him1 two new ,introductions   
were composed1 the one in praise of     
,catulus1 the other in praise of        
,lucullus4 ,scarcely had this been done1
  when ,cicero1 from a conviction that  
,catulus1 ,lucullus1 and ,hortensius1   
although men of highly cultivated minds1
 and well acquainted with general       
literature1 were known to have been     
little conversant with the subtle       
arguments of abstruse philosophy1       
determined to withdraw them altogether1 
and accordingly substituted ,cato and   
,brutus in their place4 ,immediately    
after this change had been introduced1  
he received a communication from        
,atticus1 representing that ,varro was  
much offended by being passed over in   
the discussion of topics in which he was
 so deeply versed4 ,thereupon  ,cicero1 
catching eagerly at the idea thus       

suggested1 resolved to recast  the whole
 piece1 and quickly produced1 under the 
old title1 a new and  highly improved   
edition1 divided into four books instead
 of two1  dedicating the whole to       
,varro1 to whom was assigned the task of
 defending  the tenets of ,antiochus2   
while ,cicero himself undertook to      
support the  views of ,philo1 ,atticus  
also taking a share in the conversation4
    8,but1 although these alterations   
had been effected with extreme rapidity1
  the copy originally sent to ,atticus  
had in the meantime been repeatedly     
transcribed2 hence both editions passed 
into circulation1 and a part of  each   
has been preserved4 ,one section1       
containing twelve chapters1 is a  short 
fragment of the second or ,varronian    
edition4 ,the other1 containing         
forty-nine chapters1 is the entire      
second book of the first edition2 to    
which is prefixed the new introduction1 
together with the proper title of       
,lucullus4 ,the scene of the ,catulus   

was the villa of that statesman1 at     
,cum2 while the ,lucullus is supposed to
 have been held at the mansion of       
,hortensius1 near ,bauli4    8,the      
object proposed was to give an account  
of the rise and progress of  the        
,academic ,philosophy1 to point out the 
various modifications introduced  by    
successive professors1 and to           
demonstrate the superiority of the      
principles of the ,new ,academy1 as     
taught by ,philo1 over those of the old1
  as advocated by ,antiochus40          
,,first ,,book ,,of ,,the ,,academic    
,,questions4      ,i4 ,when a short time
 ago my friend ,atticus7#b7 was with me 
at my villa in  the district of ,cum1   
news was sent us by ,marcus7#c7 ,varro1 
that he had  arrived in ,rome the day   
before in the evening1 and that if he   
had not  found himself too tired after  
his journey he should have proceeded at 
once  to see us4 ,but when we heard     
this1 we thought that we ought not to   
suffer  anything to delay our seeing a  

man so intimately connected with us by  
an  identity of studies1 and by a very  
long standing intimacy and friendship4  
,and so we set out at once to go to see 
him2 and when we were no great  distance
 from his villa we saw him coming       
towards us2 and when we had  embraced   
him1 as the manner of friends is1 after 
some time we accompanied  him back to   
his villa4 ,and as ,i was asking a few  
questions1 and inquiring  what was the  
news at ,rome1 ,never mind those things1
 said ,atticus1 which we  can neither   
inquire about nor hear of without       
vexation1 but ask him rather  whether he
 has written anything new2 for the muse 
of ,varro has been silent  much longer  
than usual2 though ,i rather suppose he 
is suppressing for a  time what he has  
written1 than that he has been really   
idle4 ,you are quite  wrong1 said he2   
for ,i think it very foolish conduct in 
a man to write what  he wishes to have  
concealed4 ,but ,i have a great work on 
hand2 for ,i have  been a long time     

preparing a treatise which ,i have      
dedicated to my friend  here1 7he meant 
me17 which is of great importance1 and  
is being polished  up by me with a good 
deal of care4    ,i have been waiting to
 see it a long time1 ,varro1 said ,i1   
but still ,i have  not ventured to ask  
for it4 ,for ,i heard from our friend   
,libo1 with whose  zeal you are well    
acquainted1 7for ,i can never conceal   
anything of that  kind17 that you have  
not been slackening in the business1 but
 are  expending a great deal of care on 
it1 and in fact never put it out of your
  hands4 ,but it has never hitherto come
 into my mind to ask you about it2      
however now1 since ,i have begun to     
commit to a durable record those things 
which ,i learnt in your company1 and to 
illustrate in the ,latin language  that 
ancient philosophy which originated with
 ,socrates1 ,i must ask you why  it is  
that1 while you write on so many        
subjects1 you pass over this one1       
especially when you yourself are very   

eminent in it2 and when that study1  and
 indeed the whole subject1 is far       
superior in importance to all other     
studies and arts4    ,,ii4 ,you are     
asking me1 he replied1 about a matter on
 which ,i have often  deliberated and   
frequently revolved in my mind4 ,and1   
therefore1 ,i will  answer you without  
any hesitation2 still1 however1 speaking
 quite  off-hand1 because ,i have1 as ,i
 said just now1 thought over the subject
  both deeply and frequently4 ,for as ,i
 saw that philosophy had been  explained
 with great care in the ,greek language1
 ,i thought that if any of  our         
countrymen were engrossed by the study  
of it1 who were well versed in  ,greek  
literature1 they would be more likely to
 read ,greek treatises than  ,latin     
ones3 but that those men who were averse
 to ,greek science and to the  schools  
of the ,greek philosophers would not    
care the least for such  matters as     
these1 which could not be understood at 
all without some  acquaintance with     

,greek literature4 ,and1 therefore1 ,i  
did not choose to  write treatises which
 unlearned men could not understand1 and
 learned men  would not be at the       
trouble of reading4 ,and you yourself   
are aware of  this4 ,for you have learnt
 that we cannot resemble ,amafanius7#d7 
or  ,rabirius17#e7 who without any art  
discuss matters which come before the   
eyes of every one in plain ordinary     
language1 giving no accurate            
definitions1 making no divisions1       
drawing no inferences by well-directed  
questions1 and who appear to think that 
there is no such thing as any art  of   
speaking or disputing4 ,but we1 in      
obedience to the precepts of the        
logicians and of orators also1 as if    
they were positive laws1 7since our     
countrymen consider skill in each of    
these branches to be a virtue17 are     
compelled to use words although they may
 be new ones2 which learned men1  as ,i 
have said before1 will prefer taking    
from the ,greeks1 and which  unlearned  

men will not receive even from us2 so   
that all our labour may be  undertaken  
in vain4 ,but now1 if ,i approved of the
 doctrines of ,epicurus1  that is to    
say1 of ,democritus1 ,i could write of  
natural philosophy in as  plain a style 
as ,amafanius4 ,for what is the great   
difficulty when you have  put an end to 
all efficient causes1 in speaking of the
 fortuitous  concourse of corpuscules1  
for this is the name he gives to atoms4 
,you know  our system of natural        
philosophy1 which depends upon the two  
principles1  the efficient cause1 and   
the subject matter out of which the     
efficient  cause forms and produces what
 it does produce4 ,for we must have     
recourse  to geometry1 since1 if we do  
not1 in what words will any one be able 
to  enunciate the principles he wishes1 
or whom will he be able to cause to     
comprehend those assertions about life1 
and manners1 and desiring and  avoiding 
such and such things8    ,for those men 
are so simple as to think the good of a 

sheep and of a man  the same thing4     
,while you know the character and extent
 of the accuracy  which philosophers of 
our school profess4 ,again1 if you      
follow ,zeno1 it is  a hard thing to    
make any one understand what that       
genuine and simple good  is which cannot
 be separated from honesty2 while       
,epicurus asserts that he  is wholly    
unable to comprehend what the character 
of that good may be  which is           
unconnected with pleasures which affect 
the senses4 ,but if we  follow the      
doctrines of the ,old ,academy which1 as
 you know1 we prefer1  then with what   
accuracy must we apply ourselves to     
explain it2 with what  shrewdness and   
even with what obscurity must we argue  
against the ,stoics6  ,the whole1       
therefore1 of that eagerness for        
philosophy ,i claim for myself1  both   
for the purpose of strengthening my     
firmness of conduct as far as ,i  can1  
and also for the delight of my mind4    
,nor do ,i think1 as ,plato says1  that 

any more important or more valuable gift
 has been given to men by the  gods4    
,but ,i send all my friends who have any
 zeal for philosophy into  ,greece2 that
 is to say1 ,i bid them study the ,greek
 writers1 in order to  draw their       
precepts from the fountain-head1 rather 
than follow little  streams4 ,but those 
things which no one had previously      
taught1 and which  could not be learnt  
in any quarter by those who were eager  
on the subject1  ,i have laboured as far
 as ,i could 7for ,i have no great      
opinion of anything  which ,i have done 
in this line7 to explain to our         
fellow-countrymen4 ,for  this knowledge 
could not be sought for among the       
,greeks1 nor1 after the  death of our   
friend ,lucius lius17#f7 among the      
,latins either4 ,and yet in  those old  
works of ours which we composed in      
imitation of ,menippus17#g7 not         
translating him1 sprinkling a little    
mirth and sportiveness over the whole   
subject1 there are many things mingled  

which are drawn from the most  recondite
 philosophy1 and many points argued     
according to the rules of  strict logic2
 but ,i added these lighter matters in  
order to make the whole  more easy for  
people of moderate learning to          
comprehend1 if they were  invited to    
read those essays by a pleasing style1  
displayed in panegyrics1  and in the    
very prefaces of my books of            
antiquities4 ,and this was my  object in
 adopting this style1 however ,i may    
have succeeded in it4    ,,iii4 ,the    
fact1 ,i replied1 is just as you say1   
,varro4 ,for while we were  sojourners1 
as it were1 in our own city1 and        
wandering about like  strangers1 your   
books have conducted us1 as it were1    
home again1 so as to  enable us at last 
to recognise who and where we were4 ,you
 have discussed  the antiquity of our   
country1 and the variety of dates and   
chronology  relating to it4 ,you have   
explained the laws which regulate       
sacrifices and  priests2 you have       

unfolded the customs of the city both in
 war and peace2  you have described the 
various quarters and districts2 you have
 omitted  mentioning none of the names1 
or kinds1 or functions1 or causes of    
divine  or human things2 you have thrown
 a great deal of light on our poets1 and
  altogether on ,latin literature and on
 ,latin expressions2 you have yourself  
composed a poem of varied beauties1 and 
elegant in almost every point2 and  you 
have in many places touched upon        
philosophy in a manner sufficient to    
excite our curiosity1 though inadequate 
to instruct us4    ,you allege1 indeed1 
a very plausible reason for this4 ,for1 
you say1 those  who are learned men will
 prefer reading philosophical treatises 
in ,greek1  and those who are ignorant  
of ,greek will not read them even in    
,latin4  ,however1 tell me now1 do you  
really agree with your own argument8 ,i 
would  rather say1 those who are unable 
to read them in the one language will   
read them in the other2 and even those  

who can read them in ,greek will not    
despise their own language4 ,for what   
reason can be imagined why men  learned 
in ,greek literature should read the    
,latin poets1 and not read the  ,latin  
philosophers8 ,or again1 if ,ennius17#h7
 ,pacuvius1 ,accius1 and many  others   
who have given us1 ,i will not say the  
exact expressions1 but the  meaning of  
the ,greeks1 delight their readers2 how 
much more will the  philosophers delight
 them1 if1 as the poets have imitated   
schylus1  ,sophocles1 and ,euripides1   
they in like manner imitate ,plato1     
,aristotle1  and ,theophrastus8 ,i see1 
too1 that any orators among us are      
praised who  imitate ,hyperides or      
,demosthenes4    ,but ,i1 7for ,i will  
speak the plain truth17 as long as      
ambition and the  pursuit of public     
honours and the pleading of causes1 and 
not a mere  regard for the republic1 but
 even a certain degree of concern in its
  government1 entangled me in and       
hampered me with the numerous duties in 

which those occupations involved me2 ,i 
kept1 ,i say1 all these matters to      
myself1 and brushed them up1 when ,i    
could1 by reading1 to prevent their     
getting rusty4 ,but now1 having been    
stricken to the ground by a most  severe
 blow of fortune1 and being discharged  
from all concern in the  republic1 ,i   
seek a medicine for my sorrow in        
philosophy1 and consider this  study the
 most honourable pastime for my leisure4
 ,for ,i may look upon it  as most      
suitable to my age1 and most especially 
consistent with any  memorable exploits 
which ,i may have performed1 and        
inferior to no other  occupation in its 
usefulness for the purpose of educating 
my  fellow-countrymen4 ,or even if this 
be too high a view to take of it1 at    
all events ,i see nothing else which ,i 
can do4 ,my friend ,brutus1 indeed1 a   
man eminent for every kind of virtue1   
has illustrated philosophy in the       
,latin language in such a way that he   
has left ,greece nothing to wish for  on

 those subjects4 ,and he adopts the same
 opinions that you do4 ,for he was  for 
some time a pupil of ,aristus1 at       
,athens1 whose brother ,antiochus was   
your own preceptor4 ,and therefore do   
you also1 ,i entreat you1 apply         
yourself to this kind of literature4    
,,iv4 ,then he replied4 ,i will indeed  
consider of these matters1 but only in  
your company4 ,but still1 said he1 what 
is this which ,i hear about you         
yourself8 ,on what subject8 said ,i4    
,why1 that the old system is deserted by
  you1 and that you have espoused the   
principles of the new school4 ,what of  
that8 said ,i4 ,why should ,antiochus1  
my own intimate friend1 be more at      
liberty to return back again from the   
new school to the old1 than ,i myself   
to migrate to the new from the old8 ,for
 certainly everything that is most      
recent is corrected and amended in the  
highest degree2 although ,philo1 the    
master of ,antiochus1 a great man1 as   
you yourself consider him1 used to  deny

 in his books that there were two       
,academies 7and we ourselves have  heard
 him assert the same things in his      
lectures72 and he convicts those  who   
say that there are1 of palpable mistake4
 ,it is as you say1 said he1  but ,i do 
not imagine that you are ignorant of    
what ,antiochus has written  in reply to
 the arguments of ,philo4 ,certainly1   
said ,i1 ,i am not1 and ,i  should like 
to hear the whole cause of the ,old     
,academy1 from which ,i have  been so   
long absent1 recapitulated by you1 if it
 is not giving you too  much trouble2   
and let us sit down now1 if you have no 
objection4 ,that will  suit me very     
well1 said he1 for ,i am not at all     
strong4 ,but let us  consider whether   
,atticus will be pleased with that      
compliance of mine1  which ,i see that  
you yourself are desirous of4 ,indeed ,i
 shall1 said he2  for what could ,i     
prefer to being reminded of what ,i long
 ago heard from  ,antiochus1 and seeing 
at the same time whether those ideas can

 be  expressed with sufficient          
suitableness in ,latin8 ,so after this  
preface we  all sat down looking at one 
another4 ,and ,varro began as follows3--
    ,socrates appears to me1 and indeed 
it is the universal opinion1 to have    
been the first person who drew          
philosophy away from matters of an      
abstruse  character1 which had been     
shrouded in mystery by nature herself1  
and in  which all the philosophers      
before his time had been wholly         
occupied1 and  to have diverted it to   
the objects of ordinary life2 directing 
its  speculations to virtues and vices1 
and generally to whatever was good or   
bad4 ,and he thought that the heavenly  
bodies were either far out of the  reach
 of our knowledge1 or that1 even if we  
became ever so intimately  acquainted   
with them1 they had no influence on     
living well4 ,in nearly all  his        
discourses1 which have been reported in 
great variety and very fully  by those  
who were his pupils1 he argues in such a

 manner that he affirms  nothing        
himself1 but refutes the assertions of  
others4 ,he says that he  knows nothing1
 except that one fact1 that he is       
ignorant2 and that he is  superior to   
others in this particular1 that they    
believe that they do know  what they do 
not1 while he knows this one thing      
alone1 that he knows  nothing4 ,and it  
is on that account that he imagines he  
was pronounced by  ,apollo the wisest of
 all men1 because this alone is the     
whole of wisdom1  for a man not to think
 that he knows what he does not know4   
,and as he was  always saying this1 and 
persisting in the maintenance of this   
opinion1 his  discourse was entirely    
devoted to the praise of virtue1 and to 
encouraging  all men to the study of    
virtue2 as may be plainly seen in the   
books of the  disciples of ,socrates1   
and above all in those of ,plato4 ,but  
by the  influence of ,plato1 a man of   
vast and varied and eloquent genius1 a  
system  of philosophy was established   

which was one and identical1 though     
under  two names2 the system namely of  
the ,academics and ,peripatetics4 ,for  
these  two schools agreed in reality1   
and differed only in name4 ,for when    
,plato  had left ,speusippus1 his       
sister's son1 the inheritor as it were  
of his  philosophy1 and also two pupils 
most eminent for industry and genius1   
,xenocrates of ,chalcedon1 and          
,aristotle the ,stagirite2 those who    
adhered to  ,aristotle were called      
,peripatetics1 because they disputed    
while walking7#i7  in the ,lyceum4 ,and 
the others1 who according to the fashion
 of ,plato  himself were accustomed to  
hold their meetings and discussions in  
the  ,academy1 which is a second        
,gymnasium1 took their name from the    
place where  they used to meet4 ,but    
both these schools1 being impregnated   
with the  copiousness of ,plato1        
arranged a certain definite system of   
doctrine1  which was itself copious and 
luxuriant2 but abandoned the ,socratic  

plan of  doubting on every subject1 and 
of discussing everything without ever   
venturing on the assertion of a positive
 opinion4 ,and thus there arose  what   
,socrates would have been far from      
approving of1 a certain art of          
philosophy1 and methodical arrangement1 
and division of the school1 which  at   
first1 as ,i have already said1 was one 
under two names4 ,for there was  no real
 difference between the ,peripatetics   
and the old ,academy4  ,aristotle1 at   
least such is my opinion1 was superior  
in a certain  luxuriance of genius2 but 
both schools had the same source1 and   
adopted  the same division of things    
which were to be desired and avoided4   
,but what  am ,i about8 said he1        
interrupting himself2 am ,i in my senses
 while ,i am  explaining these things to
 you8 for although it may not be exactly
 a case  of the pig teaching ,minerva1  
still it is not very wise of any one to 
attempt to impart instruction to that   
goddess4    ,v4 ,i entreat you however1 

said ,atticus1 ,i entreat you to go on1 
,varro4 ,for  ,i am greatly attached to 
my own countrymen and to their works2   
and those  subjects delight me beyond   
measure when they are treated in ,latin1
 and in  such a manner as you treat     
them4 ,and what1 said ,i1 do you think  
that ,i  must feel1 who have already    
engaged to display philosophy to our    
nation8  ,let us then1 said he1 continue
 the subject1 since it is agreeable to  
you4    ,a threefold system of          
philosophising1 then1 was already       
received from  ,plato4 ,one1 on the     
subject of life and morals4 ,a second1  
on nature and  abstruse matters4 ,the   
third1 on discussion1 and on what is    
true or false2  what is right or wrong  
in a discourse2 what is consistent or   
inconsistent  in forming a decision4    
,and that first division of the subject1
 that namely of living well1 they       
sought in nature herself1 and said that 
it was necessary to obey her2 and  that 
that chief good to which everything was 

referred was not to be sought  in       
anything whatever except in nature4 ,and
 they laid it down that the  crowning   
point of all desirable things1 and the  
chief good1 was to have  received from  
nature everything which is requisite for
 the mind1 or the  body1 or for life4   
,but of the goods of the body1 they     
placed some in the  whole1 and others in
 the parts4 ,health1 strength1 and      
beauty in the whole4  ,in the parts1    
soundness of the senses1 and a certain  
excellence of the  individual parts4 ,as
 in the feet1 swiftness2 in the hands1  
strength2 in  the voice1 clearness2 in  
the tongue1 a distinct articulation of  
words4 ,the  excellences of the mind    
they considered those which were        
suitable to the  comprehension of virtue
 by the disposition4 ,and those they    
divided under  the separate heads of    
nature and morals4 ,quickness in        
learning and memory  they attributed to 
nature2 each of which was described as a
 property of  the mind and genius4      

,under the head of 8morals0 they classed
 our studies1  and1 ,i may say1 our     
habits1 which they formed1 partly by a  
continuity of  practice1 partly by      
reason4 ,and in these two things was    
contained  philosophy itself1 in which  
that which is begun and not brought to  
its  completion1 is called a sort of    
advance towards virtue2 but that which  
is  brought to completion is virtue1    
being a sort of perfection of nature and
  of all things which they place in the 
mind2 the one most excellent thing4     
,these things then are qualities of the 
mind4    ,the third division was that of
 life4 ,and they said that those things 
which  had influence in facilitating the
 practice of virtue were connected with 
this division4 ,for virtue is discerned 
in some good qualities of the mind  and 
body1 which are added not so much to    
nature as to a happy life4 ,they        
thought that a man was as it were a     
certain part of the state1 and of the   
whole human race1 and that he was       

connected with other men by a sort of   
human society4 ,and this is the way in  
which they deal with the chief and      
natural good4 ,but they think that      
everything else is connected with it1   
either in the way of increasing or of   
maintaining it2 as riches1 power1       
glory1 and influence4 ,and thus a       
threefold division of goods is inferred 
by them4    ,,vi4 ,and these are those  
three kinds which most people believe   
the  ,peripatetics speak of3 and so far 
they are not wrong2 for this division is
  the work of that school4 ,but they are
 mistaken if they think that the        
,academicians--those at least who bore  
this name at that time--are different   
from the ,peripatetics4 ,the principle1 
and the chief good asserted by both     
appeared to be the same--namely1 to     
attain those things which were in the   
first class by nature1 and which were   
intrinsically desirable2 the whole  of  
them1 if possible1 or1 at all events1   
the most important of them4 ,but  those 

are the most important which exist in   
the mind itself1 and are  conversant    
about virtue itself4 ,therefore1 all    
that ancient philosophy  perceived that 
a happy life was placed in virtue alone2
 and yet that it  was not the happiest  
life possible1 unless the good qualities
 of the body  were added to it1 and all 
the other things which have been already
  mentioned1 which are serviceable      
towards acquiring a habit of virtue4    
,from  this definition of theirs1 a     
certain principle of action in life1 and
 of  duty itself1 was discovered1 which 
consisted in the preservation of those  
things which nature might prescribe4    
,hence arose the avoidance of sloth1    
and contempt of pleasures2 from which   
proceeded the willingness to  encounter 
many and great labours and pains1 for   
the sake of what was right  and         
honourable1 and of those things which   
are conformable to the objects  of      
nature4 ,hence was generated friendship1
 and justice1 and equity2 and  these    

things were preferred to pleasure and to
 many of the advantages of  life4 ,this 
was the system of morals recommended in 
their school1 and the  method and design
 of that division which ,i have placed  
first4    ,but concerning nature 7for   
that came next71 they spoke in such a   
manner  that they divided it into two   
parts1--making one efficient1 and the   
other  lending itself1 as it were1 to   
the first1 as subject matter to be      
worked  upon4 ,for that part which was  
efficient they thought there was power2 
and  in that which was made something by
 it they thought there was some matter2 
and something of both in each4 ,for they
 considered that matter itself  could   
have no cohesion1 unless it were held   
together by some power2 and  that power 
could have none without some matter to  
work upon2 for that is  nothing which is
 not necessarily somewhere4 ,but that   
which exists from a  combination of the 
two they called at once body1 and a sort
 of quality1 as  it were4 ,for you will 

give me leave1 in speaking of subjects  
which have  not previously been in      
fashion1 to use at times words which    
have never  been heard of 7which1       
indeed1 is no more than the ,greeks     
themselves do1  who have been long in   
the habit of discussing these subjects74
    ,,vii4 ,to be sure we will1 said    
,atticus4 ,moreover1 you may even use   
,greek  words when you wish1 if by      
chance you should be at a loss for      
,latin ones4  ,you are very kind2 but ,i
 will endeavour to express myself in    
,latin1 except  in the case of such     
words as these--philosophia1 rhetorica1 
physica1  or dialectica1 which1 like    
many others1 fashion already sanctions1 
as if  they were ,latin4 ,i therefore   
have called those things qualitates     
7qualities71 which the ,greeks call --a 
word which1 even among the  ,greeks1 is 
not one in ordinary use1 but is confined
 to philosophers4 ,and  the same rule   
applies to many other expressions4 ,as  
for the ,dialecticians1  they have no   

terms in common use3 they use technical 
terms entirely4 ,and  the case is the   
same with nearly every art2 for men must
 either invent new  names for new       
things1 or else borrow them from other  
subjects4 ,and if the  ,greeks do this1 
who have now been engaged in such       
matters for so many  ages1 how much more
 ought this licence to be allowed to us1
 who are now  endeavouring to deal with 
these subjects for the first time8 ,but1
 said ,i1  ,o ,varro1 it appears to me  
that you will deserve well of your      
fellow-countrymen1 if you enrich them1  
not only with an abundance of new       
things1 as you have done1 but also of   
words4 ,we will venture1 then1 said  he1
 to employ new terms1 if it be          
necessary1 armed with your authority and
  sanction4    ,of these qualities1     
then1 said he1 some are principal ones1 
and others  arise out of them4 ,the     
principal ones are of one character and 
simple2 but  those which arise out of   
them are various1 and1 as it were1      

multiform4  ,therefore1 air 7we use the 
,greek word  as ,latin71 fire1 water1   
and  earth are principal ones2 and out  
of them there arise the forms of living 
creatures1 and of those things which are
 produced out of the earth4  ,therefore1
 those first are called principles and  
7to translate the ,greek  word7         
elements3 from which air and fire have  
the power of movement and  efficiency3  
the other divisions--,i mean1 water and 
the earth--have the power  of receiving1
 and1 as it were1 of suffering4 ,the    
fifth class1 from which  the stars and  
winds were formed1 ,aristotle considered
 to be a separate  essence1 and         
different from those four which ,i have 
mentioned above4    ,but they think that
 there is placed under all of these a   
certain matter  without any form1 and   
destitute of all quality 7for we may as 
well1 by  constant use1 make this word  
more usual and notorious71 from which   
all  things are sketched out and made2  
which can receive everything in its     

entirety1 and can be changed in every   
manner and in every part4 ,and also     
that it perishes1 not so as to become   
nothing1 but so as to be dissolved  with
 its component parts1 which again are   
able to be cut up and divided1  ad      
infinitum2 since there is absolutely    
nothing in the whole nature of  things  
which cannot be divided3 and those      
things which are moved1 are all  moved  
at intervals1 which intervals again are 
capable of being infinitely  divided4   
,and1 since that power which we have    
called quality is moved in  this way1   
and is agitated in every direction1 they
 think also that the  whole of matter is
 itself entirely changed1 and so that   
those things are  produced which they   
call qualities1 from which the world is 
made1 in  universal nature1 cohering    
together and connected with all its     
divisions2  and1 out of the world1 there
 is no such thing as any portion of     
matter or  any body4    ,and they say   
that the parts of the world are all the 

things which exist in  it1 and which are
 maintained by sentient nature2 in which
 perfect reason  is placed1 which is    
also everlasting3 for that there is     
nothing more  powerful which can be the 
cause of its dissolution4 ,and this     
power they  call the soul of the world1 
and also its intellect and perfect      
wisdom4 ,and  they call it ,god1 a      
providence watching over everything     
subject to its  dominion1 and1 above    
all1 over the heavenly bodies2 and1 next
 to them1  over those things on earth   
which concern men3 which also they      
sometimes  call necessity1 because      
nothing can be done in a manner         
different from  that in which it has    
been arranged by it in a destined 7if ,i
 may so say7  and inevitable            
continuation of eternal order4          
,sometimes1 too1 they call it  fortune1 
because it brings about many unforeseen 
things1 which have never  been expected 
by us1 on account of the obscurity of   
their causes1 and our  ignorance of     

them4    ,,viii4 ,the third part of     
philosophy1 which is next in order1     
being  conversant about reason and      
discussion1 was thus handled by both    
schools4  ,they said that1 although it  
originated in the senses1 still the     
power of  judging of the truth was not  
in the senses4 ,they insisted upon it   
that  intellect was the judge of things4
 ,they thought that the only thing      
deserving of belief1 because it alone   
discerned that which was always  simple 
and uniform1 and which perceived its    
real character4 ,this they call  idea1  
having already received this name from  
,plato2 and we properly  entitle it     
species4    ,but they thought that all  
the senses were dull and slow1 and that 
they did  not by any means perceive     
those things which appeared subjected to
 the  senses2 which were either so small
 as to be unable to come under the      
notice of sense1 or so moveable and     
rapid that none of them was ever one    
consistent thing1 nor even the same     

thing1 because everything was in a      
continual state of transition and       
disappearance4 ,and therefore they      
called  all this division of things one 
resting wholly on opinion4 ,but they    
thought that science had no existence   
anywhere except in the notions and      
reasonings of the mind2 on which account
 they approved of the definitions  of   
things1 and employed them on everything 
which was brought under  discussion4    
,the explanation of words also was      
approved of--that is to say1  the       
explanation of the cause why everything 
was named as it was2 and that  they     
called etymology4 ,afterwards they used 
arguments1 and1 as it were1  marks of   
things1 for the proof and conclusion of 
what they wished to have  explained2 in 
which the whole system of               
dialectics--that is to say1 of an       
oration brought to its conclusion by    
ratiocination1 was handed down4 ,and  to
 this there was added1 as a kind of     
second part1 the oratorical power of    

speaking1 which consists in developing a
 continued discourse1 composed in  a    
manner adapted to produce conviction4   
,,ix4 ,this was the first philosophy    
handed down to them by ,plato4 ,and if  
you  like ,i will explain to you those  
discussions which have originated in it4
  ,indeed1 said ,i1 we shall be glad if 
you will2 and ,i can answer for ,atticus
  as well as for myself4 ,you are quite 
right1 said he2 for the doctrine both   
of the ,peripatetics and of the old     
,academy is most admirably explained4   
,aristotle1 then1 was the first to      
undermine the doctrine of species1 which
  ,i have just now mentioned1 and which 
,plato had embraced in a wonderful      
manner2 so that he even affirmed that   
there was something divine in it4  ,but 
,theophrastus1 a man of very delightful 
eloquence1 and of such purity  of morals
 that his probity and integrity were    
notorious to all men1 broke  down more  
vigorously still the authority of the   
old school2 for he  stripped virtue of  

its beauty1 and made it powerless1 by   
denying that to  live happily depended  
solely on it4 ,for ,strato1 his pupil1  
although a man  of brilliant abilities1 
must still be excluded entirely from    
that school2  for1 having deserted that 
most indispensable part of philosophy   
which is  placed in virtue and morals1  
and having devoted himself wholly to the
  investigation of nature1 he by that   
very conduct departs as widely as       
possible from his companions4 ,but      
,speusippus and ,xenocrates1 who were   
the  earliest supporters of the system  
and authority of ,plato1--and1 after    
them1  ,polemo and ,crates1 and at the  
same time ,crantor1--being all collected
  together in the ,academy1 diligently  
maintained those doctrines which they   
had received from their predecessors4   
,zeno and ,arcesilas had been diligent  
attenders on ,polemo2 but ,zeno1 who    
preceded ,arcesilas in point of time1   
and argued with more subtilty1 and was a
 man of the greatest acuteness1         

attempted to correct the system of that 
school4 ,and1 if you like1 ,i will      
explain to you the way in which he set  
about that correction1 as ,antiochus    
used to explain it4 ,indeed1 said ,i1 ,i
 shall be very glad to hear you do  so2 
and you see that ,pomponius intimates   
the same wish4    ,x4 ,zeno1 then1 was  
not at all a man like ,theophrastus1 to 
cut through the  sinews of virtue2 but1 
on the other hand1 he was one who placed
 everything  which could have any effect
 in producing a happy life in virtue    
alone1 and  who reckoned nothing else a 
good at all1 and who called that        
honourable  which was single in its     
nature1 and the sole and only good4 ,but
 as for all  other things1 although they
 were neither good nor bad1 he divided  
them1  calling some according to1 and   
others contrary to nature4 ,there were  
others which he looked upon as placed   
between these two classes1 and which  he
 called intermediate4 ,those which were 
according to nature1 he taught  his     

disciples1 deserved to be taken1 and to 
be considered worthy of a  certain      
esteem4 ,to those which were contrary to
 nature1 he assigned a  contrary        
character2 and those of the intermediate
 class he left as  neutrals1 and        
attributed to them no importance        
whatever4 ,but of those  which he said  
ought to be taken1 he considered some   
worthy of a higher  estimation and      
others of a less4 ,those which were     
worthy of a higher  esteem1 he called   
preferred2 those which were only worthy 
of a lower  degree1 he called rejected4 
,and as he had altered all these things1
 not  so much in fact as in name1 so too
 he defined some actions as             
intermediate1 lying between good deeds  
and sins1 between duty and a  violation 
of duty2--classing things done rightly  
as good actions1 and  things done       
wrongly 7that is to say1 sins7 as bad   
actions4 ,and several  duties1 whether  
discharged or neglected1 he considered  
of an intermediate  character1 as ,i    

have already said4 ,and whereas his     
predecessors had not  placed every      
virtue in reason1 but had said that some
 virtues were  perfected by nature1 or  
by habit1 he placed them all in reason2 
and while  they thought that those kinds
 of virtues which ,i have mentioned     
above  could be separated1 he asserted  
that that could not be done in any      
manner1  and affirmed that not only the 
practice of virtue 7which was the       
doctrine  of his predecessors71 but the 
very disposition to it1 was             
intrinsically  beautiful2 and that      
virtue could not possibly be present to 
any one  without his continually        
practising it4    ,and while they did   
not entirely remove all perturbation of 
mind from man1  7for they admitted that 
man did by nature grieve1 and desire1   
and fear1  and become elated by joy17   
but only contracted it1 and reduced it  
to  narrow bounds2 he maintained that   
the wise man was wholly free from all   
these diseases as they might be called4 

,and as the ancients said that  those   
perturbations were natural1 and devoid  
of reason1 and placed desire  in one    
part of the mind and reason in another1 
he did not agree with them  either2 for 
he thought that all perturbations were  
voluntary1 and were  admitted by the    
judgment of the opinion1 and that a     
certain unrestrained  intemperance was  
the mother of all of them4 ,and this is 
nearly what he  laid down about morals4 
,,xi4 ,but about natures he held these  
opinions4 ,in the first place1 he did   
not connect this fifth nature1 out of   
which his predecessors thought that     
sense and intellect were produced1 with 
those four principles of things4  ,for  
he laid it down that fire is that nature
 which produces everything1  and        
intellect1 and sense4 ,but he differed  
from them again1 inasmuch as he  thought
 it absolutely impossible for anything  
to be produced from that  nature which  
was destitute of body2 which was the    
character attributed by  ,xenocrates and

 his predecessors to the mind1 and he   
would not allow that  that which        
produced anything1 or which was produced
 by anything1 could  possibly be        
anything except body4    ,but he made a 
great many alterations in that third    
part of his philosophy1  in which1 first
 of all1 he said some new things of the 
senses themselves3  which he considered 
to be united by some impulse as it were1
 acting upon  them from without1 which  
he called 1 and which we may term       
perception4 ,and let us recollect this  
word1 for we shall have frequent        
occasion to employ it in the remainder  
of our discourse2 but to these  things  
which are perceived1 and as it were     
accepted by the senses1 he adds  the    
assent of the mind1 which he considers  
to be placed in ourselves and           
voluntary4 ,he did not give credit to   
everything which is perceived1 but  only
 to those which contain some especial   
character of those things which  are    
seen2 but he pronounced what was seen1  

when it was discerned on  account of its
 own power1 comprehensible--will you    
allow me this word8  ,certainly1 said   
,atticus1 for how else are you to       
express 8 ,but  after it had been       
received and approved1 then he called it
  comprehension1 resembling those things
 which are taken up  7prehenduntur7 in  
the hand2 from which verb also he       
derived this noun1  though no one else  
had ever used this verb with reference  
to such matters2  and he also used many 
new words1 for he was speaking of new   
things4 ,but  that which was            
comprehended by sense he called felt    
7sensum17 and if  it was so comprehended
 that it could not be eradicated by     
reason1 he  called it knowledge2        
otherwise he called it ignorance3 from  
which also was  engendered opinion1     
which was weak1 and compatible with what
 was false or  unknown4 ,but between    
knowledge and ignorance he placed that  
comprehension  which ,i have spoken of1 
and reckoned it neither among what was  

right or  what was wrong1 but said that 
it alone deserved to be trusted4    ,and
 from this he attributed credit also to 
the senses1 because1 as ,i have  said   
above1 comprehension made by the senses 
appeared to him to be true  and         
trustworthy4 ,not because it            
comprehended all that existed in a      
thing1  but because it left out nothing 
which could affect it1 and because      
nature  had given it to us to be as it  
were a rule of knowledge1 and a         
principle  from which subsequently all  
notions of things might be impressed on 
our  minds1 from which not only         
principles1 but some broader paths to   
the  discovery of reason are found out4 
,but error1 and rashness1 and ignorance1
  and opinion1 and suspicion1 and in a  
word everything which was  inconsistent 
with a firm and consistent assent1 he   
discarded from virtue  and wisdom4 ,and 
it is in these things that nearly all   
the disagreement  between ,zeno and his 
predecessors1 and all his alteration of 

their system  consists4    ,,xii4 ,and  
when he had spoken thus--,you have1 said
 ,i1 ,o ,varro1 explained the           
principles both of the ,old ,academy and
 of the ,stoics with brevity1 but  also 
with great clearness4 ,but ,i think it  
to be true1 as ,antiochus1 a  great     
friend of mine1 used to assert1 that it 
is to be considered rather  as a        
corrected edition of the ,old ,academy1 
than as any new sect4 ,then  ,varro     
replied--,it is your part now1 who      
revolt from the principles of the       
ancients1 and who approve of the        
innovations which have been made by     
,arcesilas1 to explain what that        
division of the two schools which he    
made  was1 and why he made it2 so that  
we may see whether that revolt of his   
was  justifiable4 ,then ,i              
replied--,arcesilas1 as we understand1  
directed all his  attacks against ,zeno1
 not out of obstinacy or any desire of  
gaining the  victory1 as it appears to  
me1 but by reason of the obscurity of   

those  things which had brought         
,socrates to the confession of          
ignorance1 and even  before ,socrates1  
,democritus1 ,anaxagoras1 ,empedocles1  
and nearly all the  ancients2 who       
asserted that nothing could be          
ascertained1 or perceived1 or  known3   
that the senses of man were narrow1 his 
mind feeble1 the course of  his life    
short1 and that truth1 as ,democritus   
said1 was sunk in the deep2  that       
everything depended on opinions and     
established customs2 that nothing  was  
left to truth4 ,they said in short1 that
 everything was enveloped in  darkness2 
therefore ,arcesilas asserted that there
 was nothing which could  be known1 not 
even that very piece of knowledge which 
,socrates had left  himself4 ,thus he   
thought that everything lay hid in      
secret1 and that there  was nothing     
which could be discerned or understood2 
for which reasons it  was not right for 
any one to profess or affirm anything1  
or sanction  anything by his assent1 but

 men ought always to restrain their     
rashness  and to keep it in check so as 
to guard it against every fall4 ,for    
rashness  would be very remarkable when 
anything unknown or false was approved  
of2  and nothing could be more          
discreditable than for a man's assent   
and  approbation to precede his         
knowledge and perception of a fact4 ,and
 he used  to act consistently with these
 principles1 so as to pass most of his  
days  in arguing against every one's    
opinion1 in order that when equally     
important reasons were found for both   
sides of the same question1 the         
judgment might more naturally be        
suspended1 and prevented from giving    
assent to either4    ,this they call the
 ,new ,academy1 which however appears to
 me to be the old  one1 if1 at least1 we
 reckon ,plato as one of that ,old      
,academy4 ,for in his  books nothing is 
affirmed positively1 and many arguments 
are allowed on  both sides of a         
question2 everything is investigated1   

and nothing positive  affirmed4 ,still  
let the school whose principles ,i have 
explained1 be  called the ,old ,academy1
 and this other the ,new2 which1 having 
continued to  the time of ,carneades1   
who was the fourth in succession after  
,arcesilas1  continued in the same      
principles and system as ,arcesilas4    
,but ,carneades1  being a man ignorant  
of no part of philosophy1 and1 as ,i    
have learnt from  those who had been his
 pupils1 and particularly from ,zeno the
 ,epicurean1  who1 though he greatly    
differed from him in opinion1 still     
admired him  above all other men1 was   
also a person of incredible abilities444
    ,the rest of this ,book is lost4    
,,second ,,book ,,of ,,the ,,academic   
,,questions4      ,i4 ,lucius ,lucullus 
was a man of great genius1 and very much
 devoted to the  study of the most      
important arts2 every branch of liberal 
learning worthy  of a man of high birth1
 was thoroughly understood by him2 but  
at the time  when he might have made the

 greatest figure in the forum1 he was   
wholly  removed from all participation  
in the business of the city4 ,for while 
he  was very young1 he1 uniting with his
 brother1 a man of equal sense of duty  
and diligence with himself1 followed up 
the quarrel7#aj7 bequeathed to him  by  
his father to his own exceeding credit2 
afterwards having gone as  qustor into  
,asia1 he there governed the province   
for many years with  great reputation4  
,subsequently he was made dile in his   
absence1 and  immediately after that he 
was elected prtor2 for his services had 
been  rewarded by an express law        
authorizing his election at a period    
earlier  than usual4 ,after that he was 
sent into ,africa2 from thence he       
proceeded  to the consulship1 the duties
 of which he discharged in such a       
manner1  that every one admired his     
diligence1 and recognised his genius4   
,afterwards he was sent by the ,senate  
to conduct the war against              
,mithridates1 and there he not only     

surpassed the universal expectation     
which every one had formed of his       
valour1 but even the glory of his       
predecessors4 ,and that was the more    
admirable in him1 because great skill   
as a general was not very much looked   
for in one who had spent his youth  in  
the occupations of the forum1 and the   
duration of his qustorship in  peace in 
,asia1 while ,murena was carrying on the
 war in ,pontus4 ,but the  incredible   
greatness of his genius did not require 
the aid of experience1  which can never 
be taught by precepts4 ,therefore1      
having devoted the whole  time occupied 
in his march and his voyage1 partly to  
making inquiries of  those who were     
skilful in such matters1 and partly in  
reading the accounts  of great          
achievements1 he arrived in ,asia a     
perfect general1 though he had  left    
,rome entirely ignorant of military     
affairs4 ,for he had an almost  divine  
memory for facts1 though ,hortensius had
 a better one for words4 ,but  as in    

performing great deeds1 facts are of    
more consequence than words1  this      
memory of his was the more serviceable  
of the two2 and they say1 that  the same
 quality was conspicuous in             
,themistocles1 whom we consider beyond  
all comparison the first man in ,greece4
 ,and a story is told of him1 that1     
when some one promised to teach him the 
art of memory1 which was then  beginning
 to be cultivated1 he answered1 that he 
should much prefer  learning to forget2 
,i suppose1 because everything which he 
had either  heard or seen stuck in his  
memory4    ,lucullus having this great  
genius1 added to it that study which    
,themistocles had despised3 therefore1  
as we write down in letters what we     
wish to commit to monuments1 he1 in like
 manner1 had the facts engraved in  his 
mind4 ,therefore1 he was a general of   
such perfect skill in every kind  of    
war1 in battles1 and sieges1 and naval  
fights1 and in the whole  equipment and 
management of war1 that that king1 the  

greatest that has  ever lived since the 
time of ,alexander1 confessed1 that he  
considered him  a greater general than  
any one of whom he had ever read4 ,he   
also displayed  such great prudence in  
arranging and regulating the affairs of 
the  different cities1 and such great   
justice too1 that to this very day1     
,asia  is preserved by the careful      
maintenance of the regulations1 and by  
following as it were in the footsteps of
 ,lucullus4 ,but although it was        
greatly to the advantage of the         
republic1 still that great virtue and   
genius was kept abroad at a distance    
from the eyes both of the forum and  the
 senate-house1 for a longer time than ,i
 could have wished4 ,moreover1  when he 
had returned victorious from the war    
against ,mithridates1 owing to  the     
calumnies of his adversaries1 he did not
 celebrate his triumph till  three years
 later than he ought to have done4 ,for 
,i may almost say1 that ,i  myself when 
consul led into the city the chariot of 

that most illustrious  man1 and ,i might
 enlarge upon the great advantage that  
his counsel and  authority were to me1  
in the most critical circumstances1 if  
it were not  that to do so would compel 
me to speak of myself1 which at this    
moment is  not necessary4 ,therefore1 ,i
 will rather deprive him of the         
testimony due  to him1 than mix it up   
now with a commendation of myself4      
,,ii4 ,but as for those exploits of     
,lucullus1 which were entitled to be    
celebrated by the praises of the nation1
 they have been extolled both in  ,greek
 and ,latin writings4 ,for those outward
 exploits of his are known to  us in    
common with the multitude2 but his      
interior excellences 7if ,i may so  call
 them7 we and a few of his friends have 
learnt from himself4 ,for  ,lucullus    
used to apply himself to every kind of  
literature1 and especially  to          
philosophy1 with greater eagerness than 
those who were not acquainted  with him 
believed4 ,and he did so1 not only at   

his first entrance into  life1 but also 
when he was proqustor1 as he was for    
several years1 and  even during the time
 of war itself1 a time when men are     
usually so fully  occupied with their   
military business1 that very little     
leisure is left to  the general1 even in
 his own tent4 ,and as of all the       
philosophers of that  day1 ,antiochus1  
who had been a pupil of ,philo1 was     
thought to excel in  genius and         
learning1 he kept him about him while he
 was qustor1 and some  years afterwards 
when he was general4 ,and as he had that
 extraordinary  memory which ,i have    
mentioned already1 by hearing frequently
 of things1 he  arrived at a thorough   
acquaintance with them2 as he           
recollected everything  that he had     
heard of only once4 ,and he was         
wonderfully delighted in the  reading   
books of which he heard any one speak4  
,and ,i sometimes fear lest ,i may even 
diminish the glory of such characters   
as his1 even while wishing to enhance   

it2 for there are many people who  are  
altogether averse to ,greek literature1 
still more who have a dislike  to       
philosophy1 and men in general1 even    
though they do not positively           
disapprove of them1 still think the     
discussion of such matters not          
altogether suitable for the chiefs of   
the state4 ,but ,i1 having heard that   
,marcus ,cato learnt ,greek in his old  
age1 and learning from history that     
,pantius was above all other men the    
chosen companion of ,publius            
,africanus1 in that noble embassy which 
he was employed on before he  entered on
 the censorship1 think ,i have no need  
of any other instance to  justify his   
study of ,greek literature or of        
philosophy4    ,it remains for me to    
reply to those men who disapprove of    
such dignified  characters being mixed  
up in discussions of this sort2 as if   
the meetings  of illustrious men were   
bound to be passed in silence1 or their 
conversation to be confined to jesting1 

and all the topics to be drawn  from    
trifling subjects4 ,in truth1 if in any 
one of my writings ,i have  given       
philosophy its due praise1 then surely  
its discussion is thoroughly  worthy of 
every excellent and honourable man2 nor 
is anything else  necessary to be taken 
care of by us1 whom the ,roman people   
has placed in  our present rank1 except 
that we do not devote to our private    
pursuits1  the time which ought to be   
bestowed on the affairs of the public4  
,but if1  while we are bound to         
discharge our duties1 we still not only 
never omit  to give our assistance in   
all public meetings1 but never even     
write a  single word unconnected with   
the forum1 who then will blame our      
leisure1  because even in that moment we
 are unwilling to allow ourselves to    
grow  rusty and stupid1 but take pains  
rather to benefit as many people as     
possible8    ,and ,i think1 that not    
only is the glory of those men not      
diminished1 but  that it is even        

increased by our adding to their popular
 and notorious  praises these also which
 are less known and less spoken of4     
,some people  also deny that those men  
who are introduced in our writings as   
disputants  had any knowledge of those  
affairs which are the subjects of       
discussion4  ,but they appear to me to  
be showing their envy1 not only of the  
living but  also of the dead4    ,,iii4 
,there remains one class of critics who 
disapprove of the general  principles of
 the ,academy4 ,which we should be more 
concerned at if any one  approved of any
 school of philosophy except that which 
he himself  followed4 ,but we1 since we 
are in the habit of arguing against     
every one  who appears to himself to    
know anything1 cannot object to others  
also  dissenting from us4 ,although our 
side of the question is an easier one1  
since we wish to discover the truth     
without any dispute1 and we seek for    
that with the greatest anxiety and      
diligence4 ,for although all knowledge  

is beset with many difficulties1 and    
there is that obscurity in the things   
themselves and that infirmity in our own
 judgment1 that it is not without       
reason that the most learned and ancient
 philosophers have distrusted  their    
power of discovering what they wished2  
yet they have not been  deficient in any
 respect1 nor do we allow ourselves to  
abandon the pursuit  of truth through   
fatigue2 nor have our discussions ever  
any other object  except that of1 by    
arguing on each side1 eliciting1 and as 
it were1  squeezing out something which 
may either be the truth itself1 or may  
at  least come as near as possible to   
it4 ,nor is there any difference between
  us and those people who fancy that    
they know something1 except that they   
do not doubt at all that those doctrines
 which they uphold are the truth1  while
 we account many things as probable     
which we can adopt as our belief1  but  
can hardly positively affirm4    ,and in
 this we are more free and unfettered   

than they are1 because our  power of    
judging is unimpeached1 and because we  
are not compelled by any  necessity to  
defend theories which are laid upon as  
injunctions1 and1 if ,i  may say so1 as 
commands4 ,for in the first place1 those
 of the other  schools have been bound  
hand and foot before they were able to  
judge what  was best2 and1 secondly1    
before their age or their understanding 
had come  to maturity1 they have either 
followed the opinion of some friend1 or 
been  charmed by the eloquence of some  
one who was the first arguer whom they  
ever heard1 and so have been led to form
 a judgment on what they did not        
understand1 and now they cling to       
whatever school they were1 as it were1  
dashed against in a tempest1 like       
sailors clinging to a rock4 ,for as to  
their statement that they are wholly    
trusting to one whom they judge to  have
 been a wise man1 ,i should approve of  
that if that were a point which  they1  
while ignorant and unlearned1 were able 

to judge of1 7for to decide  who is a   
wise man appears to me most especially  
the task of one who is  himself wise47  
,but they have either formed their      
opinion as well as they  could from a   
hearing of all the circumstances1 and   
also from a knowledge  of the opinions  
of philosophers of all the other        
schools2 or else1 having  heard the     
matter mentioned once1 they have        
surrendered themselves to the  guidance 
of some one individual4 ,but1 ,i know   
not how it is1 most people  prefer being
 in error1 and defending with the utmost
 pugnacity that  opinion which they have
 taken a fancy to1 to inquiring without 
any  obstinacy what is said with the    
greatest consistency4    ,and these     
subjects were very frequently and very  
copiously discussed by us  at other     
times1 and once also in the villa of    
,hortensius1 which is at  ,bauli1 when  
,catulus1 and ,lucullus1 and ,i myself  
had arrived there the day  after we had 
been staying with ,catulus4 ,and we had 

come thither rather  early in the day1  
because we had intended1 if the wind was
 fair1 to set  sail1 ,lucullus for his  
villa near ,naples1 and ,i myself       
towards mine1 in  the district of       
,pompeii4 ,when1 therefore1 we had had a
 short conversation  on the terrace1 we 
sat down where we were4    ,,iv4 ,then  
,catulus said1--,although what we were  
inquiring into yesterday was  almost    
wholly explained in such a manner that  
nearly the whole question  appears to   
have been discussed1 still ,i long to   
hear what you promised to  tell us1     
,lucullus1 as being what you had learnt 
from ,antiochus4 ,i1 indeed1  said      
,hortensius1 did more than ,i intended1 
for the whole matter ought to  have been
 left untouched for ,lucullus1 and      
indeed1 perhaps it was3 for ,i  only    
said such things as occurred to me at   
the moment2 but ,i hope to hear         
something more recondite from ,lucullus4
    ,lucullus rejoined1 ,i am not much  
troubled1 ,hortensius1 at your          

expectation1 although there is nothing  
so unfavourable for those who wish  to  
give pleasure2 but still1 as ,i am not  
very anxious about how far ,i can  prove
 to your satisfaction the arguments     
which ,i advance1 ,i am the less        
disturbed4 ,for the arguments which ,i  
am going to repeat are not my own1  nor 
such that1 if they are incorrect1 ,i    
should not prefer being defeated  to    
gaining the victory2 but1 in truth1 as  
the case stands at present1  although   
the doctrines of my school were somewhat
 shaken in yesterday's  discussion1     
still they do seem to me to be wholly   
true4 ,i will therefore  argue as       
,antiochus used to argue2 for the       
subject is one with which ,i am  well   
acquainted4 ,for ,i used to listen to   
his lectures with a mind quite          
unengaged1 and with great pleasure1 and1
 moreover1 he frequently discussed  the 
same subject over again2 so that you    
have some grounds for expecting  more   
from me than you had from ,hortensius a 

little while ago4 ,when he had  begun in
 this manner we prepared to listen with 
great attention4    ,and he spoke       
thus3--,when ,i was at ,alexandria1 as  
proqustor1 ,antiochus was  with me1 and 
before my arrival1 ,heraclitus1 of      
,tyre1 a friend of  ,antiochus1 had     
already settled in ,alexandria1 a man   
who had been for many  years a pupil of 
,clitomachus and of ,philo1 and who had 
a great and  deserved reputation in that
 school1 which having been almost       
utterly  discarded1 is now coming again 
into fashion2 and ,i used often to hear 
,antiochus arguing with him2 but they   
both conducted their discussions with   
great gentleness4 ,and just at that time
 those two books of ,philo which  were  
yesterday mentioned by ,catulus had been
 brought to ,alexandria1 and  had for   
the first time come under the notice of 
,antiochus2 and he1 though  naturally a 
man of the mildest disposition1 7nor    
indeed was it possible  for any one to  
be more peaceable than he was17 was     

nevertheless a little  provoked4 ,i was 
surprised1 for ,i had never seen him so 
before3 but he1  appealing to the       
recollection of ,heraclitus1 began to   
inquire of him  whether he had seen     
those works of ,philo1 or whether he had
 heard the  doctrines contained in them1
 either from ,philo or from any one else
 of the  ,academic school8 ,and he said 
that he had not2 however1 he recognised 
the  style of ,philo1 nor1 indeed1 could
 there be any doubt about it2 for some  
friends of mine1 men of great learning1 
,publius and ,caius ,setilius1 and      
,tetrilius ,rogus were present1 who said
 that they heard ,philo advance such    
operations at ,rome2 and who said that  
they had written out those two books    
from his dictation4 ,then ,antiochus    
repeated what ,catulus mentioned        
yesterday1 as having been said to ,philo
 by his father1 and many other  things  
besides2 nor did he forbear even to     
publish a book against his own  master1 
which is called 8,sosus40    ,i         

therefore1 then1 as ,i was much         
interested in hearing ,heraclitus       
arguing  against ,antiochus1 and        
,antiochus against the ,academicians1   
paid great  attention to ,antiochus1 in 
order to learn the whole matter from    
him4  ,accordingly1 for many days1      
collecting together ,heraclitus and     
several  learned men1 and among them    
,aristus1 the brother of ,antiochus1 and
 also  ,ariston and ,dion1 men whom he  
considered only second to his brother in
  genius1 we devoted a great deal of    
time to that single discussion4    ,but 
we must pass over that part of it which 
was bestowed on refuting the  doctrines 
of ,philo2 for he is a less formidable  
adversary1 who altogether  denies that  
the ,academicians advance those         
arguments which were maintained         
yesterday4 ,for although he is quite    
wrong as to the fact1 still he is a     
less invincible adversary4 ,let us speak
 of ,arcesilas and ,carneades4    ,v4   
,and having said this1 he began         

again3--,you appear to me1 in the first 
place1 7and he addressed me by name17   
when you speak of the old natural       
philosophers1 to do the same thing that 
seditious citizens are in the  habit of 
doing when they bring forward some      
illustrious men of the  ancients1 who   
they say were friends of the people1 in 
the hope of being  themselves considered
 like them4 ,they go back to ,publius   
,valerius1 who was  consul the first    
year after the expulsion of the kings4  
,they enumerate all  the other men who  
have passed laws for the advantage of   
the people  concerning appeals when they
 were consuls2 and then they come down  
to  these better known men1 ,caius      
,flaminius1 who1 as tribune of the      
people1  passed an ,agrarian law some   
years before the second ,punic war1     
against the  will of the senate1 and who
 was afterwards twice elected consul2 to
 ,lucius  ,cassius and ,quintus         
,pompeius2 they are also in the habit of
 classing  ,publius ,africanus in the   

same list2 and they assert that those   
two  brothers of infinite wisdom and    
exceeding glory1 ,publius ,crassus and  
,publius ,scvola1 were the advisers of  
,tiberius ,gracchus1 in the matter of   
the laws which he proposed2 the one1    
indeed1 as we see1 openly2 the other1   
as we suspect1 in a more concealed      
manner4 ,they add also ,caius ,marius2  
and  with respect to him they speak     
truly enough3 then1 having recounted the
  names of so many illustrious men1 they
 say that they are acting up to  their  
principles4    ,in like manner1 you1    
when you are seeking to overturn a      
well-established  system of philosophy1 
in the same way as those men endeavoured
 to overturn  the republic1 bring       
forward the names of ,empedocles1       
,anaxagoras1  ,democritus1 ,parmenides1 
,xenophanes1 and even ,plato and        
,socrates4 ,but  ,saturninus1 7that ,i  
may name my own enemy rather than any   
one else17 had  nothing in him          
resembling those ancient men2 nor are   

the ungrounded  accusations of          
,arcesilas to be compared to the modesty
 of ,democritus4 ,and  yet those natural
 philosophers1 though very seldom1 when 
they have any  very great difficulty1   
make loud and violent outcries1 as if   
under the  influence of some great      
excitement1 ,empedocles1 indeed1 does so
 to such a  degree1 that he appears to  
me at times to be mad1 crying out that  
all  things are hidden1 that we feel    
nothing1 see nothing1 and cannot find   
out  the true character of anything     
whatever4 ,but for the most part all    
those  men appear to me to affirm some  
things rather too positively1 and to    
profess that they know more than they   
really do know4 ,but if they then       
hesitated while discussing new subjects1
 like children lately born1 are we  for 
that reason to think that nothing has   
been explained in so many ages  by the  
greatest genius and the most untiring   
industry8 ,may we not say  that1 after  
the establishment of some wise and      

important schools of  philosophy1 then1 
as ,tiberius ,gracchus arose in an      
excellent constitution1  for the purpose
 of throwing everything into confusion1 
so ,arcesilas rose  up to overturn the  
established philosophy1 and to shelter  
himself under  the authority of those   
men who asserted that nothing could be  
known or  perceived2 in which number we 
ought not to include ,plato or          
,socrates2 the  one because he left     
behind him a most perfect school1       
namely1 the  ,peripatetics and          
,academics1 differing in name1 but      
agreeing in all  substantial matters3   
and from whom the ,stoics themselves    
differ in words  rather than in         
opinions4 ,but ,socrates1 who always    
disparaged himself in  arguing1         
attributed more knowledge to those whom 
he wished to refute4 ,so1  as he was    
speaking differently from what he really
 thought1 he was fond of  using that    
kind of dissimulation which the ,greeks 
call 2 which  ,fannius says ,africanus  

also was in the habit of indulging in1  
and that  that ought not be considered a
 bad habit in him1 as it was a favourite
  practice of ,socrates4    ,,vi4 ,but1 
however1 we will allow1 if you like1    
that all those things were  unknown to  
the ancients3--was nothing effected     
then1 by their being  thoroughly        
investigated1 after that ,arcesilas1    
disparaging ,zeno1 7for that  is        
supposed to have been his object17 as   
discovering nothing new1 but only       
correcting previous changes of names1   
while seeking to upset his  definitions1
 had attempted to envelop the clearest  
possible matters in  darkness8 ,and his 
system1 which was at first not at all   
approved of1  although it was           
illustrated both by acute genius and by 
an admirable  wittiness of language1 was
 in the next generation adopted by no   
one but  ,lacydes2 but subsequently it  
was perfected by ,carneades1 who was the
  fourth in succession from ,arcesilas2 
for he was the pupil of ,hegesinus1  who

 had been the pupil of ,evander1 the    
disciple of ,lacydes1 and ,lacydes      
himself had been the pupil of           
,arcesilas2 but ,carneades maintained it
 for a  long time1 for he lived ninety  
years2 and those who had been his pupils
  had a very high reputation1 of whom   
,clitomachus displayed the most         
industry1 as the number of books which  
he composed testifies2 nor was  there   
less brilliancy of genius in him than   
there was of eloquence in  ,charmadas1  
or of sweetness in ,melanthius of       
,rhodes4 ,but ,metrodorus of            
,stratonice was thought to be the one   
who had the most thorough  understanding
 of ,carneades4 ,and your friend ,philo 
attended the lectures of  ,clitomachus  
for many years2 but as long as ,philo   
was alive the ,academy was  never in    
want of a head4    ,but the business    
that we now propose to ourselves1 of    
arguing against the  ,academicians1     
appears to some philosophers1 and those1
 too1 men of no  ordinary calibre1 to be

 a thing that ought not to be done at   
all2 and they  think that there is no   
sense at all in1 and no method of       
disputing with  men who approve of      
nothing2 and they blame ,antipater1 the 
,stoic1 who was  very fond of doing so1 
and say that there is no need of laying 
down exact  definitions of what         
knowledge is1 or perception1 or1 if we  
want to render  word for word1          
comprehension1 which they call 2 and    
they say that  those who wish to        
persuade men that there is anything     
which can be  comprehended and          
perceived1 are acting ignorantly2       
because there is  nothing clearer than 1
 as the ,greeks call it1 and which we   
may  call perspicuity1 or evidentness if
 you like1--coining words1 if you will  
permit us to do so1 that this fellow    
7meaning me7 may not think that he is   
the only person to whom such liberties  
are permitted4 ,still they thought  that
 no discourse could be found which      
should be more intelligible than        

evidentness itself2 and they thought    
that there was no need of defining      
things which were so clear4    ,but     
others declared that they would never be
 the first to speak in behalf  of this  
evidentness2 but they thought that a    
reply ought to be made to  those        
arguments which were advanced against   
it1 to prevent any one being  deceived  
by them4 ,there are also many men who do
 not disapprove of the  definitions of  
the evident things themselves1 and who  
think the subject  one worthy of being  
inquired into1 and the men worthy of    
being argued  with4    ,but ,philo1     
while he raises some new questions1     
because he was scarcely  able to        
withstand the things which were said    
against the obstinacy of the            
,academicians1 speaks falsely1 without  
disguise1 as he was reproached for      
doing by the elder ,catulus2 and also1  
as ,antiochus told him1 falls into  the 
very trap of which he was afraid4 ,for  
as he asserted that there was  nothing  

which could be comprehended1 7for that  
is what we conceive to be  meant by 17  
if that was1 as ,zeno defined it1 such a
 perception1  7for we have already spent
 time enough yesterday in beating out a 
word for  17 then a perception was      
extracted and produced out of that from 
which it originated1 such as could be   
produced from that from which it did    
not originate4 ,and we say that this    
matter was most excellently defined by  
,zeno2 for how can anything be          
comprehended1 so that you may feel      
absolutely sure that it has been        
perceived and known1 which is of such a 
character that it is even possible that 
it may be false8 ,now when ,philo       
upsets and denies this1 he takes away   
also all distinction between what is    
known and unknown2 from which it follows
 that nothing can be comprehended2  and 
so1 without intending it1 he is brought 
back to the point he least  intended4   
,wherefore1 all this discourse against  
the ,academy is undertaken  by us in    

order that we may retain that definition
 which ,philo wished to  overturn2 and  
unless we succeed in that1 we grant that
 nothing can be  perceived4    ,,vii4   
,let us begin then with the senses--the 
judgments of which are so clear  and    
certain1 that if an option were given to
 our nature1 and if some god  were to   
ask of it whether it is content with its
 own unimpaired and  uncorrupted senses1
 or whether it desires something better1
 ,i do not see  what more it could ask  
for4 ,nor while speaking on this topic  
need you wait  while ,i reply to the    
illustration drawn from a bent oar1 or  
the neck of a  dove2 for ,i am not a man
 to say that everything which seems is  
exactly of  that character of which it  
seems to be4 ,epicurus may deal with    
this idea1  and with many others2 but in
 my opinion there is the very greatest  
truth  in the senses1 if they are in    
sound and healthy order1 and if         
everything  is removed which could      
impede or hinder them4 ,therefore we    

often wish the  light to be changed1 or 
the situation of those things which we  
are looking  at2 and we either narrow or
 enlarge distances2 and we do many      
things until  our sight causes us to    
feel confidence in our judgment4 ,and   
the same thing  takes place with respect
 to sounds1 and smell1 and taste1 so    
that there is  not one of us who1 in    
each one of his senses1 requires a more 
acute  judgment as to each sort of      
thing4    ,but when practice and skill  
are added1 so that one's eyes are       
charmed by a  picture1 and one's ears by
 songs1 who is there who can fail to see
 what  great power there is in the      
senses8 ,how many things do painters see
 in  shadows and in projections which we
 do not see8 ,how many beauties which   
escape us in music are perceived by     
those who are practised in that kind  of
 accomplishment8 men who1 at the first  
note of the flute-player1  say1--,that  
is the ,antiope1 or the ,andromache1    
when we have not even a  suspicion of   

it4 ,there is no need for me to speak of
 the faculties of  taste or smell2      
organs in which there is a degree of    
intelligence1 however  faulty it may be4
 ,why should ,i speak of touch1 and of  
that kind of touch  which philosophers  
call the inner one1 ,i mean the touch of
 pleasure or  pain8 in which alone the  
,cyrenaics think that there is any      
judgment of the  truth1 because pleasure
 or pain are felt4 ,can any one then say
 that there  is no difference between a 
man who is in pain and a man who is in  
pleasure8 or can any one think that a   
man who entertains this opinion is  not 
flagrantly mad8    ,but such as those   
things are which we say are perceived by
 the senses1  such also are those things
 which are said to be perceived1 not by 
the  senses themselves1 but by the      
senses after a fashion2 as these        
things--that  is white1 this is sweet1  
that is tuneful1 this is fragrant1 that 
is rough4  ,we have these ideas already 
comprehended by the mind1 not by the    

senses4  ,again1 this is a house1 that  
is a dog4 ,then the rest of the series  
follows1 connecting the more important  
links2 such as these1 which  embrace1 as
 it were1 the full comprehension of     
things2--,if he is a man1 he  is a      
mortal animal partaking of reason3--from
 which class of arguments the  notions  
of things are impressed upon us1 without
 which nothing can be  understood1 nor  
inquired into1 nor discussed4 ,but if   
those notions were  false1 7for you     
seemed to me to translate  notions17 if1
 ,i say1  they were false1 or impressed1
 or perceptions of such a kind as not to
 be  able to be distinguished from false
 ones2 then ,i should like to know how  
we were to use them8 and how we were to 
see what was consistent with each  thing
 and what was inconsistent with it8     
,certainly no room at all is here  left 
for memory1 which of all qualities is   
the one that most completely  contains1 
not only philosophy1 but the whole      
practice of life1 and all the  arts4    

,for what memory can there be of what is
 false8 or what does any one  remember  
which he does not comprehend and hold in
 his mind8 ,and what art  can there be  
except that which consists not of one1  
nor of two1 but of  many perceptions of 
the mind8 and if you take these away1   
how are you to  distinguish the artist  
from the ignorant man8 ,for we must not 
say at  random that this man is an      
artist1 and deny that that man is2 but  
we must  only do so when we see that the
 one retains the things which he has    
perceived and comprehended1 and that the
 other does not4 ,and as some arts  are 
of that kind that one can only see the  
fact in one's mind1 others such  that   
one can design and effect something1 how
 can a geometrician perceive  those     
things which have no existence1 or which
 cannot be distinguished  from what is  
false8 or how can he who plays on the   
lyre complete his  rhythm1 and finish   
verses8 ,and the same will be the case  
with respect to  similar arts1 whose    

whole work consists in acting and in    
effecting  something4 ,for what is there
 that can be effected by art1 unless the
 man  who exercises the art has many    
perceptions8    ,,viii4 ,and most       
especially does the knowledge of virtues
 confirm the  assertion that many things
 can be perceived and comprehended4 ,and
 in those  things alone do we say that  
science exists2 which we consider to be 
not a  mere comprehension of things1 but
 one that is firm and unchangeable2 and 
we consider it also to be wisdom1 the   
art of living which1 by itself1  derives
 consistency from itself4 ,but if that  
consistency has no perception  or       
knowledge about it1 then ,i ask whence  
it has originated and how8 ,i ask  also1
 why that good man who has made up his  
mind to endure every kind of  torture1  
to be torn by intolerable pain1 rather  
than to betray his duty or  his faith1  
has imposed on himself such bitter      
conditions1 when he has  nothing        
comprehended1 perceived1 known1 or      

established1 to lead him to  think that 
he is bound to do so8 ,it cannot1 then1 
by any possibility be  the case that any
 one should estimate equity and good    
faith so highly as  to shrink from no   
punishment for the sake of preserving   
them1 unless he  has assented to those  
facts which cannot be false4 ,but as to 
wisdom  itself1 if it be ignorant of its
 own character1 and if it does not know 
whether it be wisdom or not1 in the     
first place1 how is it to obtain its    
name of wisdom8 ,secondly1 how will it  
venture to undertake any exploit1 or  to
 perform it with confidence1 when it has
 nothing certain to follow8 ,but  when  
it doubts what is the chief and highest 
good1 being ignorant to what  everything
 is referred1 how can it be wisdom8     
,and that also is manifest1 that it is  
necessary that there should be laid     
down in the first place a principle     
which wisdom may follow when it begins  
to act2 and that principle must be      
adapted to nature4 ,for otherwise1 the  

desire1 7for that is how ,i translate 17
 by which we are impelled to  act1 and  
by which we desire what has been seen1  
cannot be set in motion4  ,but that     
which sets anything in motion must first
 be seen and trusted1  which cannot be  
the case if that which is seen cannot be
 distinguished  from what is false4 ,but
 how can the mind be moved to desire    
anything1 if  it cannot be perceived    
whether that which is seen is adapted to
 nature or  inconsistent with it8       
,and again1 if it does not occur to a   
man's mind what his duty is1 he will    
actually never do anything1 he will     
never be excited to any action1 he  will
 never be moved4 ,but if he ever is     
about to do anything1 then it is        
necessary that that which occurs to him 
must appear to him to be true4  ,what6  
,but if those things are true1 is the   
whole of reason1 which is1 as  it were1 
the light and illumination of life1 put 
an end to8 ,and still will  you persist 
in that wrong-headedness8 ,for it is    

reason which has brought  men the       
beginning of inquiry1 which has         
perfected virtue1 after reason  herself 
had been confirmed by inquiry4 ,but     
inquiry is the desire of  knowledge2 and
 the end of inquiry is discovery4 ,but  
no one can discover  what is false2 nor 
can those things which continue         
uncertain be  discovered4 ,but when     
those things which have1 as it were1    
been under a  veil1 are laid open1 then 
they are said to be discovered2 and so  
reason  contains the beginning of       
inquiry1 and the end of perceiving and  
comprehending4 ,therefore the conclusion
 of an argument1 which in ,greek is     
called 1 is thus defined3--,reason1     
which leads one from facts  which are   
perceived1 to that which was not        
perceived4    ,,ix4 ,but if all things  
which are seen were of that sort that   
those men say  they are1 so that they   
either could possibly be false1 or that 
no  discernment could distinguish       
whether they were false or not1 then how

  could we say that any one had either  
formed any conclusion1 or discovered    
anything8 ,or what trust could be placed
 in an argument when brought to a       
conclusion8 ,and what end will          
philosophy itself have1 which is bound  
to  proceed according to reason8 ,and   
what will become of wisdom8 which ought 
not to doubt about its own character1   
nor about its decrees1 which            
philosophers call 2 none of which can be
 betrayed without  wickedness4 ,for when
 a decree is betrayed1 the law of truth 
and right is  betrayed too4 ,from which 
fault betrayals of friendships and of   
republics  often originate4 ,it cannot1 
therefore be doubted1 that no rule of   
wisdom  can possibly be false2 and it   
ought not to be enough for the wise man 
that  it is not false1 but it ought also
 to be steady1 durable1 and lasting2    
such as no arguments can shake4 ,but    
none can either be1 or appear such1     
according to the principle of those men 
who deny that those perceptions in      

which all rules originate are in any    
respect different from false ones2  and 
from this assertion arose the demand    
which was repeated by ,hortensius1  that
 you would at least allow that the fact 
that nothing can be perceived  has been 
perceived by the wise man4 ,but when    
,antipater made the same  demand1 and   
argued that it was unavoidable that the 
man who affirmed that  nothing could be 
perceived should nevertheless admit that
 this one thing  could be               
perceived1--namely1 that nothing else   
could1--,carneades resisted  him with   
great shrewdness4 ,for he said that this
 admission was so far from  being       
consistent with the doctrine asserted1  
that it was above all others            
incompatible with it3 for that a man who
 denied that there was anything  which  
could be perceived excepted nothing4    
,and so it followed of  necessity1 that 
even that very thing which was not      
excepted1 could not be  comprehended and
 perceived in any possible manner4      

,antiochus1 on this topic1 seems to     
press his antagonist more closely4 ,for 
since the ,academicians adopted that    
rule1 7for you understand that ,i am    
translating by this word what they call 
17 that nothing can be  perceived1 he   
urged that they ought not to waver in   
their rule as in other  matters1        
especially as the whole of their        
philosophy consisted in it3 for  that   
the fixing of what is true and false1   
known and unknown1 is the  supreme law  
of all philosophy4 ,and since they      
adopted this principle1 and  wished to  
teach what ought to be received by each 
individual1 and what  rejected1         
undoubtedly1 said he1 they ought to     
perceive this very thing  from which the
 whole judgment of what is true and     
false arises4 ,he urged1  in short1 that
 there were these two principal objects 
in philosophy1 the  knowledge of truth1 
and the attainment of the chief good2   
and that a man  could not be wise who   
was ignorant of either the beginning of 

knowledge1  or of the end of desire1 so 
as not to know either where to start    
from1 or  whither to seek to arrive at4 
,but that to feel in doubt on these     
points1  and not to have such confidence
 respecting them as to be unable to be  
shaken1 is utterly incompatible with    
wisdom4    ,in this manner1 therefore1  
it was more fitting to demand of them   
that they  should at least admit that   
this fact was perceived1 namely1 that   
nothing  could be perceived4 ,but       
enough1 ,i imagine1 has been said of the
  inconsistency of their whole opinion1 
if1 indeed1 you can say that a man  who 
approves of nothing has any opinion at  
all4    ,x4 ,the next point for         
discussion is one which is copious      
enough1 but  rather abstruse2 for it    
touches in some points on natural       
philosophy1 so  that ,i am afraid that  
,i may be giving the man who will reply 
to me too  much liberty and licence4    
,for what can ,i think that he will do  
about  abstruse and obscure matters1 who

 seeks to deprive us of all light8 ,but 
one might argue with great refinement   
the question1--with how much  artificial
 skill1 as it were1 nature has made1    
first of all1 every animal2  secondly1  
man most especially2--how great the     
power of the senses is2 in  what manner 
things seen first affect us2 then1 how  
the desires1 moved by  these things1    
followed2 and1 lastly1 in what manner we
 direct our senses  to the perception of
 things4 ,for the mind itself1 which is 
the source of  the senses1 and which    
itself is sense1 has a natural power1   
which it  directs towards those things  
by which it is moved4 ,therefore it     
seizes on  other things which are seen  
in such a manner as to use them at once2
  others it stores up2 and from these   
memory arises3 but all other things it  
arranges by similitudes1 from which     
notions of things are engendered2  which
 the ,greeks call1 at one time 1 and at 
another 4 ,and  when to this there is   
added reason and the conclusion of the  

argument1 and  a multitude of countless 
circumstances1 then the perception of   
all those  things is manifest1 and the  
same reason1 being made perfect by these
  steps1 arrives at wisdom4    ,as1     
therefore1 the mind of man is admirably 
calculated for the science of  things   
and the consistency of life1 it embraces
 knowledge most especially4  ,and it    
loves that 1 7which we1 as ,i have said1
 will call  comprehension1 translating  
the word literally17 for its own sake1  
7for  there is nothing more sweet than  
the light of truth17 and also because of
  its use2 on which account also it uses
 the senses1 and creates arts1 which    
are1 as it were1 second senses2 and it  
strengthens philosophy itself to  such a
 degree that it creates virtue1 to which
 single thing all life is  subordinate4 
,therefore1 those men who affirm that   
nothing can be  comprehended1 take away 
by their assertion all these instruments
 or  ornaments of life2 or rather1 ,i   
should say1 utterly overturn the whole  

of  life1 and deprive the animal itself 
of mind 7animo71 so that it is          
difficult to speak of their rashness as 
the merits of the case require4    ,nor 
can ,i sufficiently make out what their 
ideas or intentions really are4  ,for   
sometimes1 when we address them with    
this argument1--that if the  doctrines  
which we are upholding are not true1    
then everything must be  uncertain3 they
 reply1--,well1 what is that to us8 is  
that our fault8 blame  nature1 who1 as  
,democritus says1 has buried truth deep 
in the bottom of  the sea4    ,but      
others defend themselves more elegantly1
 who complain also that we  accuse them 
of calling everything uncertain2 and    
they endeavour to explain  how much     
difference there is between what is     
uncertain and what cannot be  perceived1
 and to make a distinction between them4
 ,let us1 then1 now deal  with those who
 draw this distinction1 and let us      
abandon1 as incurable and  desperate1   
those who say that everything is as     

uncertain as whether the  number of the 
stars be odd or even4 ,for they contend1
 7and ,i noticed that  you were         
especially moved by this17 that there is
 something probable1 and1  as ,i may    
say1 likely2 and that they adopt that   
likelihood as a rule in  steering their 
course of life1 and in making inquiries 
and conducting  discussions4    ,,xi4   
,but what rule can there be1 if we have 
no notion whatever of true or  false1   
because it is impossible to distinguish 
one from the other8 ,for1 if  we have   
such a notion1 then there must be a     
difference between what is  true and    
what is false1 as there is between what 
is right and what is  wrong4 ,if there  
is no difference1 then there is no rule2
 nor can a man to  whom what is true and
 what is false appear under one common  
aspect1 have  any means of judging of1  
or any mark at all by which he can know 
the  truth4 ,for when they say1 that    
they take away nothing but the idea of  
anything being able to appear in such a 

manner that it cannot possibly  appear  
false in the same manner but that they  
admit everything else1 they  are acting 
childishly4 ,for though they have taken 
away that by which  everything is judged
 of1 they deny that they take away the  
rest2 just as  if a person were to      
deprive a man of his eyes1 and then say 
that he has  not taken away from him    
those things which can be seen4 ,for    
just as those  things are known by the  
eyes1 so are the other things known by  
the  perceptions2 but by a mark         
belonging peculiarly to truth1 and not  
common  to what is true and false4      
,wherefore1 whether you bring forward a 
perception which is merely  probable1 or
 one which is at once probable and free 
from all hindrance1 as  ,carneades      
contended1 or anything else that you may
 follow1 you will still  have to return 
to that perception of which we are      
treating4 ,but in it1 if  there be but  
one common characteristic of what is    
false and true1 there  will be no       

judgment possible1 because nothing      
peculiar can be noted in one  sign      
common to two things3 but if there be no
 such community1 then ,i have  got what 
,i want2 for ,i am seeking what appears 
to me to be so true1 that  it cannot    
possibly appear false4    ,they are     
equally mistaken when1 being convicted  
and overpowered by the  force of truth1 
they wish to distinguish between what is
 evident and what  is perceived1 and    
endeavour to prove that there is        
something  evident1--being a truth      
impressed on the mind and               
intellect1--and yet that  it cannot be  
perceived and comprehended4 ,for how can
 you say distinctly  that anything is   
white1 when it may happen that that     
which is black may  appear white8 ,or   
how are we to call those things evident1
 or to say that  they are impressed     
faithfully on the mind1 when it is      
uncertain whether it  is really moved or
 only in an illusory manner8 ,and so    
there is neither  colour1 nor body1 nor 

truth1 nor argument1 nor sense1 nor     
anything certain  left us4 ,and1 owing  
to this1 it frequently happens that1    
whatever they  say1 they are asked by   
some people1--,do you1 then1 perceive   
that8 ,but they  who put this question  
to them are laughed at by them2 for they
 do not  press them hard enough so as to
 prove that no one can insist upon any  
point1 or make any positive assertion1  
without some certain and peculiar  mark 
to distinguish that thing which each    
individual says that he is  persuaded   
of4    ,what1 then1 is this probability 
of yours8 ,for if that which occurs to  
every one1 and which1 at its first look1
 as it were1 appears probable1 is       
asserted positively1 what can be more   
trifling8 ,but if your philosophers  say
 that they1 after a certain degree of   
circumspection and careful              
consideration1 adopt what they have seen
 as such1 still they will not be  able  
to escape from us4 ,first of all1       
because credit is equally taken from    

all these things which are seen1 but    
between which there is no difference2   
secondly1 when they say that it can     
happen to a wise man1 that after he  has
 done everything1 and exercised the most
 diligent circumspection1 there  may    
still be something which appears        
probable1 and which yet is very far     
removed from being true1--how can they  
then trust themselves1 even if they  7to
 use their own expression7 approach     
truth for the most part1 or even if     
they come as near to it as possible8    
,for1 in order to trust themselves1  the
 distinctive mark of truth ought to be  
thoroughly known to them2 and if  that  
be obscure or concealed1 what truth is  
there which they can seem to  themselves
 to arrive at8 ,and what can be so      
absurd a thing to say as1--,this  indeed
 is a sign of that thing1 or a proof of 
it1 and on that account ,i  follow it2  
but it is possible that that which is   
indicated may either be  false1 or may  
actually have no existence at all8      

,,xii4 ,however1 we have said enough    
about perception4 ,for if any one wishes
  to invalidate what has been said1     
truth will easily defend itself1 even if
  we are absent4    ,these things1 then1
 which have now been explained1 being   
sufficiently  understood1 we will       
proceed to say a little on the subject  
of assent and  approbation1 which the   
,greeks call 4 ,not that the subject    
itself is not an extensive one1 but     
because the foundations have been       
already laid a little while ago4 ,for   
when we were explaining what power      
there was in the senses1 this point was 
at the same time established1 that  many
 things were comprehended and perceived 
by the senses1 which is a  thing which  
cannot take place without assent4       
,secondly1 as this is the  principal    
difference between an inanimate and an  
animated being1 that the  inanimate     
being does nothing1 but the animated one
 does something 7for it  is impossible  
even to imagine what kind of animal that

 can be which does  nothing7--either    
sense must be taken from it1 or else    
assent 7which is  wholly in our own     
power7 must be given4 ,but mind is in   
some degree denied  to those beings whom
 they will not allow either to feel or  
to assent4 ,for  as it is inevitable    
that one scale of a balance must be     
depressed when a  weight is put in it1  
so the mind1 too1 must yield to what is 
evident2 for  just as it is impossible  
for any animal to forbear discerning    
what is  manifestly suited to its nature
 7the ,greeks call that 71 so it is     
equally impossible for it to withhold   
its assent to a manifest fact which  is 
brought under its notice4    ,although1 
if those principles which we have been  
maintaining are true1  there is no      
advantage whatever in discussing assent4
 ,for he who perceives  anything1       
assents immediately4 ,but these         
inferences also follow1--that  memory   
can have no existence without assent1 no
 more can notions of things  or arts4   

,and what is most important of all is1  
that1 although some things  may be in   
our power1 yet they will not be in the  
power of that man who  assents to       
nothing4 ,where1 then1 is virtue1 if    
nothing depends on  ourselves8 ,but it  
is above all things absurd that vices   
should be in the  power of the agents1  
and that no one should do wrong except  
by deliberate  consent to do so1 and yet
 that this should not be the case with  
virtue2  all the consistency and        
firmness of which depends on the things 
to which  it has assented1 and which it 
has approved4 ,and altogether it is     
necessary  that something should be     
perceived before we act1 and before we  
assent to  what is perceived2 wherefore1
 he who denies the existence of         
perception or  assent1 puts an end to   
all action in life4    ,,xiii4 ,now let 
us examine the arguments which are      
commonly advanced by this  school in    
opposition to these principles4 ,but1   
first of all1 you have it  in your power

 to become acquainted with what ,i may  
call the foundations of  their system4  
,they then1 first of all1 compound a    
sort of art of those  things which we   
call perceptions1 and define their power
 and kinds2 and at  the same time they  
explain what the character of that thing
 which can be  perceived and            
comprehended is1 in the very same words 
as the ,stoics4 ,in  the next place1    
they explain those two principles1 which
 contain1 as it  were1 the whole of this
 question2 and which appear in such a   
manner that  even others may appear in  
the same1 nor is there any difference   
between  them1 so that it is impossible 
that some of them should be perceived1  
and  that others should not be          
perceived2 but that it makes no         
difference1 not  only if they are in    
every part of the same character1 but   
even if they  cannot be distinguished4  
,and when these principles are laid     
down1 then these men comprehend the     
whole cause in the conclusion of one    

argument4 ,but this conclusion1 thus    
compounded1 runs in this way3 8,of the  
things which are seen1 some are true    
and some are false2 and what is false   
cannot be perceived1 but that which     
appears to be true is all of such a     
character that a thing of the same  sort
 may seem to be also false4 ,and as to  
those things which are perceived  being 
of such a sort that there is no         
difference between them1 it cannot      
possibly happen that some of them can be
 perceived1 and that others  cannot2    
there is1 then1 nothing seen which can  
really be perceived40    ,but of the    
axioms which they assume1 in order to   
draw the conclusions  which they desire1
 they think that two ought to be granted
 to them2 for no  one objects to them4  
,they are these3 8,that those           
perceptions which are  false1 cannot    
really be perceived20 and the second    
is--8,of those  perceptions between     
which there is no difference1 it is     
impossible that  some should be of such 

a character that they can be perceived1 
and others  of such a character that    
they cannot40    ,but their other       
propositions they defend by numerous and
 varied arguments1  and they likewise   
are two in number4 ,one is--8,of those  
things which appear1  some are true and 
others false20 the other is--8,every    
perception which  originates in the     
truth1 is of such a character as it     
might be of1 though  originating in what
 is false40 ,and these two propositions 
they do not pass  by1 but they expand in
 such a manner as to show no slight     
degree of care  and diligence4 ,for they
 divide them into parts1 and those also 
large  parts2 first of all into the     
senses1 then into those things which are
  derived from the senses1 and from     
universal custom1 the authority of which
  they wish to invalidate4 ,then they   
come to the point of laying it down     
that nothing can be perceived even by   
reason and conjecture4 ,and these       
universal propositions they cut up into 

more minute parts4 ,for as in our       
yesterday's discussion you saw that they
 acted with respect to the senses1  so  
do they also act with respect to        
everything else4 ,and in each separate  
thing which they divide into the most   
minute parts1 they wish to make out     
that all these true perceptions have    
often false ones added to them1 which   
are in no respect different from the    
true ones2 and that1 as they are of     
such a character1 nothing can be        
comprehended4    ,,xiv4 ,now all this   
subtlety ,i consider indeed thoroughly  
worthy of  philosophy1 but still wholly 
unconnected with the case which they    
advocate  who argue thus4 ,for          
definitions1 and divisions1 and a       
discourse which  employs these          
ornaments1 and also similarities and    
dissimilarities1 and  the subtle and    
fine-drawn distinctions between them1   
belong to men who are  confident that   
those arguments which they are upholding
 are true1 and  firm1 and certain2 and  

not to men who assert loudly that those 
things are  no more true than false4    
,for what would they do if1 after they  
had defined  anything1 some one were to 
ask them whether that definition could  
be  transferred to something else8 ,if  
they said it could1 then what reason    
could they give why it should be a true 
definition8 ,if they said no1--then  it 
must be confessed1 since that definition
 of what is true cannot be  transferred 
to what is false1 that that which is    
explained by that  definition can be    
perceived2 which is the last thing they 
mean4    ,the same thing may be said on 
every article of the division4 ,for if  
they  say that they see clearly the     
things about which they are arguing1 and
  they cannot be hindered by any        
similarity of appearance1 then they will
  confess that they are able to         
comprehend those things4 ,but if they   
affirm  that true perceptions cannot be 
distinguished from false ones1 how can  
they go any further8 ,for the same      

objections will be made to them which   
have been made already2 for an argument 
cannot be concluded1 unless the         
premises which are taken to deduce the  
conclusion from are so established  that
 nothing of the same kind can be false4 
,therefore1 if reason1 relying on things
 comprehended and perceived1 and        
advancing in reliance on them1          
establishes the point that nothing can  
be  comprehended1 what can be found     
which can be more inconsistent with     
itself8 ,and as the very nature of an   
accurate discourse professes that it    
will develop something which is not     
apparent1 and that1 in order the more   
easily to succeed in its object1 it will
 employ the senses and those  things    
which are evident1 what sort of         
discourse is that which is uttered  by  
those men who insist upon it that       
everything has not so much an  existence
 as a mere appearance8    ,but they are 
convicted most of all when they assume1 
as consistent with  each other1 these   

two propositions which are so utterly   
incompatible3  first of all1--,that     
there are some false perceptions2--and  
in asserting this  they declare also    
that there are some which are true3 and 
secondly1 they  add at the same         
time1--,that there is no difference     
between true perceptions  and false     
ones4 ,but you assumed the first        
proposition as if there were  some      
difference2 and so the latter           
proposition is inconsistent with the    
former1 and the former with the latter4 
,but let us proceed further1 and act so 
as in no respect to seem to be          
flattering ourselves2 and let us follow 
up what is said by them1 in such a      
manner as to allow nothing to be passed 
over4    ,in the first place1 then1 that
 evidentness which we have mentioned has
  sufficiently great power of itself to 
point out to us the things which are    
just as they are4 ,but still1 in order  
that we may remain with firmness and    
constancy in our trust in what is       

evident1 we have need of a greater      
degree of either skill or diligence1 in 
order not1 by some sort of  juggling or 
trick1 to be driven away from those     
things which are clear of  themselves4  
,for ,epicurus1 who wished to remedy    
those errors1 which seem to  perplex    
one's knowledge of the truth1 and who   
said that it was the duty of  a wise man
 to separate opinion from evident       
knowledge1 did no good at all2  for he  
did not in the least remove the errors  
of opinion itself4    ,,xv4 ,wherefore1 
as there are two causes which oppose    
what is manifest and  evident1 it is    
necessary also to provide oneself with  
an equal number of  aids4 ,for this is  
the first obstacle1 that men do not     
sufficiently exert  and fix their minds 
upon those things which are evident1 so 
as to be able  to understand how great  
the light is with which they are        
surrounded4 ,the  second is1 that some  
men1 being deluded and deceived by      
fallacious and  captious                

interrogatories1 when they cannot clear 
them up1 abandon the  truth4 ,it is     
right1 therefore1 for us to have those  
answers ready which  may be given in    
defence of the evidentness of a         
thing1--and we have already  spoken of  
them1--and to be armed1 in order to be  
able to encounter the  questions of     
those people1 and to scatter their      
captious objections to the  winds3 and  
this is what ,i propose to do next4     
,i will1 therefore1 explain their       
arguments one by one2 since even they   
themselves are in the habit of speaking 
in a sufficiently lucid manner4    ,in  
the first place1 they endeavour to show 
that many things can appear to  exist1  
which in reality have no existence2 when
 minds are moved to no  purpose by      
things which do not exist1 in the same  
manner as by things that  do4 ,for when 
you say 7say they7 that some visions are
 sent by ,god1 as  those1 for instance1 
which are seen during sleep1 and those  
also which are  revealed by oracles1 and

 auspices1 and the entrails of victims1 
7for they  say that the ,stoics1 against
 whom they are arguing1 admit all these 
things17 they ask how ,god can make     
those things probable which appear to   
be false2 and how it is that ,he cannot 
make those appear so which plainly  come
 as near as possible to truth8 ,or if   
,he can likewise make those appear      
probable1 why ,he cannot make the others
 appear so too1 which are only with     
great difficulty distinguished from     
them8 ,and if ,he can make these appear 
so1 then why ,he cannot also make those 
things appear so which are  absolutely  
different in no respect whatever8    ,in
 the next place1 since the mind is moved
 by itself1--as those things  which we  
picture to ourselves in thought1 and    
those which present  themselves to the  
sight of madmen or sleeping men         
declare1--is it not1 say  they1 probable
 that the mind is also moved in such a  
manner1 that not only  it does not      
distinguish between the perceptions1 as 

to whether they be  true or false1 but  
that there really is no difference      
between them8 ,as1  for instance1 if any
 men of their own accord trembled and   
grew pale1 on  account of some agitation
 of mind1 or because some terrible      
object came  upon them from without1    
there would be no means of              
distinguishing one  trembling and       
paleness from the other1 nor indeed     
would there be any  difference between  
the external and internal alarm which   
caused them4    ,lastly1 if no          
perceptions are probable which are      
false1 then we must seek  for other     
principles2 but if they are probable1   
then why may not one say  the same of   
such as are not easily distinguished    
from one another8 ,why not  also of such
 as have actually no difference at all  
between them8  ,especially when you     
yourselves say that the wise man when   
enraged  withholds himself from all     
assent1 because there is no distinction 
between  his perceptions which is       

visible to him4    ,,xvi4 ,now on all   
these empty perceptions ,antiochus      
brought forward a great  many arguments1
 and one whole day was occupied in the  
discussion of this  subject4 ,but ,i do 
not think that ,i ought to adopt the    
same course1 but  merely to give the    
heads of what he said4    ,and in the   
first place1 they are blameable in this1
 that they use a most  captious kind of 
interrogation4 ,and the system of adding
 or taking away1  step by step1 minute  
items from a proposition1 is a kind of  
argument very  little to be approved of 
in philosophy4 ,they call it            
sorites17#aa7 when  they make up a heap 
by adding grain after grain2 a very     
vicious and  captious style of arguing4 
,for you mount up in this way3--,if a   
vision is  brought by ,god before a man 
asleep of such a nature as to be        
probable  7probabile71 why may not one  
also be brought of such a nature as to  
be  very like truth 7verisimile78 ,if   
so1 then why may not one be brought     

which can hardly be distinguished from  
truth8 ,if so1 then why may there  not  
be one which cannot be distinguished at 
all8 ,if so1 then why may there  not be 
such that there is actually no          
difference between them8--,if you come  
to this point because ,i have granted   
you all the previous propositions1 it   
will be my fault2 but if you advance    
thither of your own accord1 it will  be 
yours4 ,for who will grant to you either
 that ,god can do everything1 or  that  
even if ,he could ,he would act in that 
manner8 ,and how do you assume  that if 
one thing may be like another1 it       
follows that it may also be  difficult  
to distinguish between them8 ,and then1 
that one cannot  distinguish between    
them at all8 ,and lastly1 that they are 
identical8 ,so  that if wolves are like 
dogs1 you will come at last to asserting
 that they  are the same animals4 ,and  
indeed there are some things not        
honourable1  which are like things that 
are honourable2 some things not good1   

like  those that are good2 some things  
proceeding on no system1 like others    
which are regulated by system4 ,why then
 do we hesitate to affirm that  there is
 no difference between all these things8
 ,do we not even see that  they are     
inconsistent8 ,for there is nothing that
 can be transferred from  its own genus 
to another4 ,but if such a conclusion   
did follow1 as that  there was no       
difference between perceptions of       
different genera1 but that  some could  
be found which were both in their own   
genus and in one which  did not belong  
to them1 how could that be possible8    
,there is then one means of getting rid 
of all unreal perceptions1 whether  they
 be formed in the ideas1 which we grant 
to be usually the case1 or  whether they
 be owing to idleness1 or to wine1 or to
 madness4 ,for we say  that clearness1  
which we ought to hold with the greatest
 tenacity1 is  absent from all visions  
of that kind4 ,for who is there who1    
when he  imagines something and pictures

 it to himself in his thoughts1 does    
not1  as soon as he has stirred up      
himself1 and recovered himself1 feel how
 much  difference there is between what 
is evident and what is unreal8 ,the case
  of dreams is the same4 ,do you think  
that ,ennius1 when he had been walking  
in his garden with ,sergius ,galba1 his 
neighbour1 said to himself1--,i have    
seemed to myself to be walking with     
,galba8 ,but when he had a dream1 he    
related it in this way1--          ,the 
poet ,homer seem'd to stand before me4  
,and again in his ,epicharmus he says-- 
,for ,i seem'd to be dreaming1 and laid 
in the tomb4      ,therefore1 as soon as
 we are awakened1 we despise those      
things which we  have seen1 and do not  
regard them as we do the things which we
 have done  in the forum4    ,,xvii4    
,but while these visions are being      
beheld1 they assume the same  appearance
 as those things which we see while     
awake4 ,there is a good deal  of real   
difference between them2 but we may pass

 over that4 ,for what we  assert is1    
that there is not the same power or     
soundness in people when  asleep that   
there is in them while waking1 either in
 intellect or in  sensation4 ,what even 
drunken men do1 they do not do with the 
same  deliberate approbation as sober   
men4 ,they doubt1 they hesitate1 they   
check  themselves at times1 and give but
 a feeble assent to what they see or    
agree too4 ,and when they have slept off
 their drunkenness1 then they           
understand how unreal their perceptions 
were4 ,and the same thing is the  case  
with madmen2 that when their madness is 
beginning1 they both feel and  say that 
something appears to them to exist that 
has no real existence4  ,and when their 
frenzy abates1 they feel and speak like 
,alcmon2--          ,but now my heart   
does not agree      ,with that which    
with my eyes ,i see4      ,but even in  
madness the wise man puts restraint upon
 himself1 so far as  not to approve of  
what is false as if it were true4 ,and  

he does so often  at other times1 if    
there is by chance any heaviness or     
slowness in his  senses1 or if those    
things which are seen by him are rather 
obscure1 or if  he is prevented from    
thoroughly examining them by the        
shortness of the  time4 ,although the   
whole of this fact1 that the wise man   
sometimes  suspends his assent1 makes   
against you4 ,for if there were no      
difference  between his perceptions1 he 
would either suspend it always or never4
    ,but from the whole character of    
this discussion we may see the worthless
  nature of the argument of those men   
who wish to throw everything into       
confusion4 ,we want judgment1 marked    
with gravity1 consistency1 firmness1    
and wisdom3 and we use the examples of  
men dreaming1 mad1 or drunk4 ,i  press  
this point1 that in all this discussion 
we are speaking with great              
inconsistency4 ,for we should not bring 
forward men sunk in wine or sleep1  or  
deprived of sense1 in such an absurd    

manner as at one time to say there  is a
 difference between the perceptions of  
men awake and sober and  sensible1 and  
those of men in a different condition1  
and at other times  that there was no   
difference at all4    ,they do not even 
perceive that by this kind of argument  
they are making  out everything to be   
uncertain1 which they do not wish to do4
 ,i call that  uncertain which the      
,greeks call 4 ,for if the fact be that 
there is  no difference between the     
appearance that a thing presents to a   
madman and  to a person in his senses1  
then who can feel quite sure of his own 
sanity8  ,and to wish to produce such an
 effect as that is a proof of no        
ordinary  madness4 ,but they follow up  
in a childish manner the likenesses of  
twins1  or of impressions of rings4 ,for
 who of us denies that there are such   
things as likenesses1 when they are     
visible in numbers of things8 ,but if   
the fact of many things being like many 
other things is sufficient to take  away

 knowledge1 why are you not content with
 that1 especially as we admit  it8 ,and 
why do you rather insist upon that      
assertion which the nature of  things   
will not suffer1 that everything is not 
in its own kind of that  character of   
which it really is8 and that there is a 
conformity without  any difference      
whatever in two or more things2 so that 
eggs are entirely  like eggs1 and bees  
like bees8 ,what then are you contending
 for8 or what  do you seek to gain by   
talking about twins8 ,for it is granted 
that they  are alike2 and you might be  
content with that4 ,but you try to make 
them  out to be actually the same1 and  
not merely alike2 and that is quite     
impossible4    ,then you have recourse  
to those natural philosophers who are so
 greatly  ridiculed in the ,academy1 but
 whom you will not even now desist from 
quoting4 ,and you tell us that          
,democritus says that there are a       
countless  number of worlds1 and that   
there are some which are not only so    

like one  another1 but so completely and
 absolutely equal in every point1 that  
there  is no difference whatever between
 them1 and that they are quite          
innumerable2 and so also are men4 ,then 
you require that1 if the world be  so   
entirely equal to another world that    
there is absolutely not the  slightest  
difference between them1 we should grant
 to you that in this  world of ours also
 there must be something exactly equal  
to something  else1 so that there is no 
difference whatever or distinction      
between them4  ,for why1 you will say1  
since there not only can be1 but        
actually are  innumerable ,quinti       
,lutatii ,catuli formed out of those    
atoms1 from which  ,democritus affirms  
that everything is produced1 in all the 
other worlds1  which are likewise       
innumerable1--why may not there be a    
second ,catulus  formed in this         
identical world of ours1 since it is of 
such a size as we  see it8    ,,xviii4  
,first of all ,i reply1 that you are    

bringing me to the arguments of         
,democritus1 with whom ,i do not agree4 
,and ,i will the more readily refute    
them1 on account of that doctrine which 
is laid down very clearly by the  more  
refined natural philosophers1 that      
everything has its own separate         
property4 ,for grant that those ancient 
,servilii who were twins were as  much  
alike as they are said to have been1 do 
you think that that would  have made    
them the same8 ,they were not           
distinguished from one another out  of  
doors1 but they were at home4 ,they were
 not distinguished from one  another by 
strangers1 but they were by their own   
family4 ,do we not see  that this is    
frequently the case1 that those people  
whom we should never  have expected to  
be able to know from one another1 we do 
by practice  distinguish so easily that 
they do not appear to be even in the    
least  alike8    ,here1 however1 you may
 struggle2 ,i will not oppose you4      
,moreover1 ,i will  grant that that very

 wise man who is the subject of all this
 discussion1  when things like one      
another come under his notice1 in which 
he has not  remarked any special        
character1 will withhold his assent1 and
 will never  agree to any perception    
which is not of such a character as a   
false  perception can never assume4 ,but
 with respect to all other things he has
 a  certain art by which he can         
distinguish what is true from what is   
false2  and with respect to those       
similitudes he must apply the test of   
experience4 ,as a mother distinguishes  
between twins by the constant  practice 
of her eyes1 so you too will distinguish
 when you have become  accustomed to it4
 ,do you not see that it has become a   
perfect proverb that  one egg is like   
another8 and yet we are told that at    
,delos 7when it was a  flourishing      
island7 there were many people who used 
to keep large numbers  of hens for the  
sake of profit2 and that they1 when they
 had looked upon  an egg1 could tell    

which hen had laid it4 ,nor does that   
fact make against  our argument2 for it 
is sufficient for us to be able to      
distinguish  between the eggs4 ,for it  
is impossible for one to assent to the  
proposition that this thing is that     
thing more1 than by admitting that      
there is actually no difference at all  
between the two4 ,for ,i have laid it   
down as a rule1 to consider all         
perceptions true which are of such a    
character as those which are false      
cannot be4 ,and from this ,i may not    
depart one finger's breadth1 as they    
say1 lest ,i should throw everything    
into confusion4 ,for not only the       
knowledge of what is true and false1 but
  their whole nature too1 will be       
destroyed if there is no difference     
between one and the other4 ,and that    
must be very absurd which you  sometimes
 are in the habit of saying1 when       
perceptions are imprinted on  the mind1 
that what you say is1 not that there is 
no difference between  the impressions1 

but only that there is none between     
certain appearances  and forms which    
they assume4 ,as if perceptions were not
 judged of by their  appearance1 which  
can deserve or obtain no credit if the  
mark by which we  are to distinguish    
truth from falsehood be taken away4     
,but that is a monstrous absurdity of   
yours1 when you say that you follow     
what is probable when you are not       
hindered by anything from doing so4 ,in 
the first place1 how can you avoid being
 hindered1 when what is false does  not 
differ from what is true8 ,secondly1    
what judgment can be formed of  what is 
true1 when what is true is              
undistinguishable from what is false8   
,from these facts there springs         
unavoidably 1 that is to say1 a         
suspension of assent3 for which         
,arcesilas is more consistent1 if at    
least  the opinions which some people   
entertain of ,carneades are correct4    
,for if  nothing can be perceived1 as   
they both agree in thinking1 then all   

assent  is taken away4 ,for what is so  
childish as to talk of approving of what
 is  not known8 ,but even yesterday we  
heard that ,carneades was in the habit1 
at  times1 of descending to say that a  
wise man would be guided by opinion1    
that is to say1 would do wrong4 ,to me1 
indeed1 it is not so certain that  there
 is anything which can be comprehended1 
a question which ,i have now  spent too 
much time in discussing1 as that a wise 
man is never guided by  opinion1 that is
 to say1 never assents to anything which
 is either false  or unknown4    ,there 
remains this other statement of theirs1 
that for the sake of  discovering the   
truth1 one ought to speak against every 
side1 and in  favour of every side4 ,i  
wish then to see what they have         
discovered4 ,we are  not in the habit1  
says he1 of showing that4 ,what then is 
the object of all  this mystery8 or why 
do you conceal your opinion as something
  discreditable8 ,in order1 says he1    
that those who hear us may be influenced

  by reason rather than led by          
authority4 ,what if they are influenced 
by  both8 would there be any harm in    
that8 ,however1 they do not conceal one 
of  their theories1 namely1 that there  
is nothing which can be conceived4 ,is  
authority no hindrance to entertaining  
this opinion8 ,it seems to me to be  a  
great one4 ,for who would ever have     
embraced so openly and undisguisedly    
such perverse and false principles1 if  
there had not been such great  richness 
of ideas and power of eloquence in      
,arcesilas1 and1 in a still  greater    
degree1 in ,carneades8    ,,xix4 ,these 
are nearly the arguments which          
,antiochus used to urge at  ,alexandria1
 and many years afterwards1 with much   
more positiveness too1 in  ,syria1 when 
he was there with me1 a little before he
 died4 ,but1 as my case  is now         
established1 ,i will not hesitate to    
warn you1 as you are my dearest  friend1
 7he was addressing me17 and one a good 
deal younger than myself4    ,will you1 

then1 after having extolled philosophy  
with such panegyrics1 and  provoked our 
friend ,hortensius1 who disagrees with  
us1 now follow that  philosophy which   
confounds what is true with what is     
false1 deprives us of  all judgment1    
strips us of the power of approval1 and 
robs us of all our  senses8 ,even the   
,cimmerians1 to whom some god1 or       
nature1 or the foulness  of the country 
that they inhabited1 had denied the     
light of the sun1 had  still some fires 
which they were permitted to avail      
themselves of as if  they were light4   
,but those men whom you approve of1     
after having enveloped  us in such      
darkness1 have not left us a single     
spark to enable us to look  around by4  
,and if we follow them1 we become bound 
with such chains that we  cannot move4  
,for when assent is taken away1 they    
take away at the same  time all motion  
of our minds1 and all our power of      
action2 which not only  cannot be done  
rightly1 but which cannot possibly be   

done at all4 ,beware1  also1 lest you   
become the only person who is not       
allowed to uphold that  opinion4 ,will  
you1 when you have explained the most   
secret matters and  brought them to     
light1 and said on your oath that you   
have discovered  them1 7which1 indeed1  
,i could swear to also1 since ,i learnt 
them from  you17--will you1 ,i say1     
assert that there is nothing which can  
be known1  comprehended1 or perceived8  
,beware1 ,i entreat you1 lest the       
authority of  those most beautiful      
actions be diminished by your own       
conduct4    ,and having said this he    
stopped4 ,but ,hortensius1 admiring all 
he said very  greatly1 7so much1 indeed1
 that all the time that ,lucullus was   
speaking he  kept lifting up his hands2 
and it was no wonder1 for ,i do not     
believe that  an argument had ever been 
conducted against the ,academy with more
  acuteness17 began to exhort me1 either
 jestingly or seriously1 7for that  was 
a point that ,i was not quite sure      

about17 to abandon my opinions4  ,then1 
said ,catulus1 if the discourse of      
,lucullus has had such influence  over  
you1--and it has been a wonderful       
exhibition of memory1 accuracy1 and     
ingenuity1--,i have nothing to say2 nor 
do ,i think it my duty to try and  deter
 you from changing opinion if you       
choose4 ,but ,i should not think it     
well for you to be influenced merely by 
his authority4 ,for he was all but      
warning you1 said he1 jestingly1 to take
 care that no worthless tribune of  the 
people1 of whom you know what a number  
there will always be1 seize  upon you1  
and ask of you in the public assembly   
how you are consistent  with yourself1  
when at one time you assert that nothing
 certain can be  discovered1 and at     
another time affirm that you yourself   
have discovered  something4 ,i entreat  
you1 do not let him terrify you4 ,but ,i
 would rather  have you disagree with   
him on the merits of the case itself4   
,but if you  give in to him1 ,i shall   

not be greatly surprised2 for ,i        
recollect that  ,antiochus himself1     
after he had entertained such opinions  
for many years1  abandoned them as soon 
as he thought it desirable4 ,when       
,catulus had said  this1 they all began 
to fix their eyes on me4    ,,xx4 ,then 
,i1 being no less agitated than ,i      
usually am when pleading  important     
causes1 began to speak something after  
this fashion3--    ,the discourse of    
,lucullus1 ,o ,catulus1 on the matter   
itself1 moved me a  good deal1 being the
 discourse of a learned and ingenious   
and quick-witted  man1 and of one who   
passes over nothing which can be said   
for his side2  but still ,i am not      
afraid but that ,i may be able to answer
 him4 ,but no  doubt such authority as  
his would have influenced me a good     
deal1 if you  had not opposed your own  
to it1 which is of equal weight4 ,i will
  endeavour1 therefore1 to reply to him 
after ,i have said a few words in       
defence of my own reputation1 as it     

were4    ,if it is by any desire of     
display1 or any zeal for contentious    
disputes1  that ,i have been chiefly led
 to rank myself as an adherent of this  
school  of philosophy1 ,i should think  
not only my folly1 but also my          
disposition  and nature deserving of    
severe censure2 for if obstinacy is     
found fault  with in the most trifling  
matters1 and if also calumny is         
repressed1  should ,i choose to contend 
with others in a quarrelsome manner     
about the  general condition and conduct
 of my whole life1 or to deceive others 
and  also my own self8 ,therefore1 if ,i
 did not think it foolish in such a     
discussion to do what1 when one is      
discussing affairs of state1 is         
sometimes done1 ,i would swear by       
,jupiter and my household gods1 that ,i 
am  inflamed with a desire of           
discovering the truth1 and that ,i do   
truly feel  what ,i say4 ,for how can ,i
 avoid wishing to discover the truth1   
when ,i  rejoice if ,i have discovered  

anything resembling the truth8 ,but     
although ,i  consider to see the truth a
 most beautiful thing1 so also do ,i    
think it a  most disgraceful one to     
approve of what is false as if it were  
true4 ,not1  indeed1 that ,i am myself a
 man who never approve of anything      
false1 who  never give assent to any    
such thing1 and am never guided by      
opinion2 but  we are speaking of a wise 
man4 ,but ,i myself am very apt to adopt
 opinions1  for ,i am not a wise man1   
and ,i direct my thoughts1 steering not 
to that  little ,cynosura1          ,the
 nightly star1 which shining not in     
vain1      ,guides the ,phnician sailor 
o'er the main1      as ,aratus          
says2--and those mariners steer in a    
more direct course because  they keep   
looking at the constellation1           
,which in its inner course and orbit    
brief      ,surely revolves2--      but 
looking rather towards ,helice1 and the 
bright north star1 that is to  say1 to  
these reasons of a more expansive kind1 

not polished away to a  point2 and      
therefore ,i roam and wander about in a 
freer course4 ,however1  the question1  
as ,i said just now1 is not about       
myself1 but about a wise  man4 ,for when
 these perceptions have made a violent  
impression on the  intellect and senses1
 ,i admit them1 and sometimes ,i even   
assent to them1  but still ,i do not    
perceive them3 for ,i do not think that 
anything can be  perceived4 ,i am not a 
wise man1 therefore ,i submit to        
perceptions and  cannot resist them3 but
 ,arcesilas1 being on this point in     
agreement with  ,zeno1 thinks that this 
is the most important part of the power 
of a wise  man1 that he can guard       
against being entangled1 and provide    
against being  deceived4 ,for there is  
nothing more incompatible with the idea 
which we  have of the gravity of a wise 
man than error1 levity1 and temerity4   
,why1  then1 need ,i speak of the       
firmness of a wise man8 whom even you   
too1  ,lucullus1 admit to be never      

guided by mere opinion4 ,and since this 
is  sanctioned by you1 7if ,i am dealing
 irregularly with you at this moment1 ,i
  will soon return to the proper order  
of your arguments17 just consider  what 
force this first conclusion has4        
,,xxi4 ,if the wise man ever assents to 
anything1 he will likewise sometimes    
form opinions3 but he never will form   
opinions3 therefore he will never       
assent to anything4 ,this conclusion was
 approved of by ,arcesilas1 for it      
confirmed both his first and second     
proposition4 ,but ,carneades sometimes  
granted that minor premiss1 that the    
wise man did at times assent3 then it   
followed that he also was at times      
guided by opinion2 which you will not   
allow2 and you are right1 as it seems to
 me3 but the first proposition1  that   
the wise man1 if he expresses assent1   
must also be guided by opinion1  is     
denied by the ,stoics and their follower
 on this point1 ,antiochus4    ,for they
 say that they can distinguish what is  

false from what is true1  and what      
cannot be perceived from what can4 ,but1
 in the first place1 even  if anything  
can be perceived1 still the very custom 
of expressing assent  appears to us to  
be perilous and unsure4 ,wherefore1 as  
it is plain that is  so faulty a        
proceeding1 to assent to anything that  
is either false or  unknown1 all assent 
must rather be removed1 lest it should  
rush on into  difficulties if it        
proceeds rashly4 ,for what is false is  
so much akin to  what is true1 and the  
things which cannot be perceived to     
those which can1  7if1 indeed1 there are
 any such1 for we shall examine that    
point  presently17 that a wise man ought
 not to trust himself in such a         
hazardous  position4    ,but if ,i      
assume that there is actually nothing   
which can be perceived1 and  if ,i also 
take what you grant me1 that a wise man 
is never guided by  opinion1 then the   
consequence will be that the wise man   
will restrain all  assent on his part2  

so that you must consider whether you   
would rather  have it so1 or let the    
wise man sometimes form opinions4 ,you  
do not  approve of either1 you will say4
 ,let us1 then1 endeavour to prove that 
nothing can be perceived2 for that is   
what the whole controversy turns  upon4 
,,xxii4 ,but first ,i must say a few    
words to ,antiochus2 who under ,philo   
learnt this very doctrine which ,i am   
now defending1 for such a length of     
time1 that it is certain that no one was
 ever longer studying it2 and who  wrote
 on these subjects with the greatest    
acuteness1 and who yet attacked  it in  
his old age with no less energy than he 
had defended it in his  youth4 ,although
 therefore he may have been a shrewd    
arguer1 as indeed he  was1 still his    
authority is diminished by his          
inconsistency4 ,for what day1  ,i should
 like to know1 will ever dawn1 which    
shall reveal to him that  distinctive   
characteristic of what is true and what 
is false1 of which for  so many years he

 denied the existence8 ,has he devised  
anything new8 ,he  says the same that   
the ,stoics say4 ,does he repent of     
having held such an  opinion8 ,why did  
he not cross over to some other school1 
and especially to  the ,stoics8 for this
 disagreement with the ,academy was     
peculiarly theirs4  ,what8 did he repent
 of ,mnesarchus or ,dardanus1 who at    
that time were the  chiefs of the       
,stoics at ,athens8 ,he never deserted  
,philo till after the  time when he     
himself began to have pupils4    ,but   
from whence was the ,old ,academy on a  
sudden recalled8 ,he appears to  have   
wished to preserve the dignity of the   
name1 after he had given up the         
reality2 which however some people said1
 that he did from a view to his  own    
glory1 and that he even hoped that those
 who followed him might be  called      
,antiochians4 ,but to me it seems1 that 
he could not stand that  concourse of   
all the philosophers4 ,in truth1 there  
are among them all1  some common        

principles on the other points2 but this
 doctrine is peculiar  to the           
,academicians1 and not one of the other 
philosophers approves of it4            
,therefore1 he quitted it2 and1 like    
those men who1 where the new shops      
stand1 cannot bear the sun1 so he1 when 
he was hot1 took refuge under the  shade
 of the ,old ,academicians1 as those men
 do under the shade of the old  shops   
near the pillar of ,mnius4 ,there was   
also an argument which he was  in the   
habit of employing1 when he used to     
maintain that nothing could be          
perceived2 namely1 asking whether       
,dionysius of ,heraclea had comprehended
  the doctrine which he had espoused for
 many years1 because he was guided  by  
that certain characteristic1 and whether
 he believed the doctrine of  his master
 ,zeno1 that whatever was honourable was
 the only good2 or1  whether he adopted 
the assertion which he defended         
subsequently1 that the  name of         
honourableness is a mere phantom1 and   

that pleasure is the chief  good3 for   
from this change of opinion on his part 
he wished to prove1 that  nothing can be
 so stamped on our minds by the truth1  
that it cannot also  be impressed on    
them in the same manner by falsehood2   
and so he took care  that others should 
derive from his own conduct the same    
argument which he  himself had derived  
from ,dionysius4    ,,xxiii4 ,but we    
will argue this point more at length    
another time2 at  present we will turn  
what has been said1 ,lucullus1 to you4  
,and in the  first place1 let us examine
 the assertion which you made at the    
beginning1  and see what sort of        
assertion it is2 namely1 that we spoke  
of the ancient  philosophers in a manner
 similar to that in which seditious men 
were in  the habit of speaking of       
illustrious men1 who were however       
friends of the  people4 ,these men do   
not indeed pursue good objects1 but     
still wish to be  considered to resemble
 good men2 but we say that we hold those

 opinions1  which you yourselves confess
 to have been entertained by the most   
illustrious philosophers4 ,anaxagoras   
said1 that snow was black3 would you    
endure me if ,i were to say the same8   
,you would not bear even for me to      
express a doubt on the subject4 ,but who
 is this man8 is he a ,sophist8 for  by 
that name were those men called1 who    
used to philosophize for the sake  of   
display or of profit4 ,the glory of the 
gravity and genius of that man  was     
great4 ,why should ,i speak of          
,democritus8 ,who is there whom we can  
compare with him for the greatness1 not 
merely of his genius1 but also of  his  
spirit8 a man who dared to begin thus3  
8,i am going to speak of  everything40  
,he excepts nothing1 so as not to       
profess a knowledge of it4  ,for indeed1
 what could there possibly be beyond    
everything8 ,who can avoid  placing this
 philosopher before ,cleanthes1 or      
,chrysippus1 or all the rest  of his    
successors8 men who1 when compared with 

him1 appear to me to be in  the fifth   
class4    ,but he does not say this1    
which we1 who do not deny that there is 
some  truth1 declare cannot be          
perceived3 he absolutely denies that    
there is any  truth4 ,he says that the  
senses are not merely dim1 but utterly  
dark2 for  that is what ,metrodorus of  
,chios1 who was one of his greatest     
admirers1  says of them1 at the         
beginning of his book on ,nature4 8,i   
deny10 says he1  8that we know whether  
we know anything or whether we know     
nothing2 ,i say  that we do not even    
know what is ignorance and knowledge2   
and that we have  no knowledge whether  
anything exists or whether nothing      
does40    ,empedocles appears to you to 
be mad2 but to me he seems to utter     
words  very worthy of the subjects of   
which he speaks4 ,does he then blind us1
 or  deprive us of our senses1 if he    
thinks that there is but little power in
  them to judge of those things which   
are brought under their notice8         

,parmenides and ,xenophanes blame1 as if
 they were angry with them1 though  in  
no very poetical verses1 the arrogance  
of those people who1 though  nothing can
 be known1 venture to say that they know
 something4 ,and you  said that         
,socrates and ,plato were distinct from 
these men4 ,why so8 ,are  there any men 
of whom we can speak more certainly8 ,i 
indeed seem to myself  to have lived    
with these men2 so many of their        
discourses have been  reported1 from    
which one cannot possibly doubt that    
,socrates thought that  nothing could be
 known4 ,he excepted one thing only1    
asserting that he did  know that he knew
 nothing2 but he made no other          
exception4 ,what shall ,i  say of       
,plato8 who certainly would never have  
followed up these doctrines  in so many 
books if he had not approved of them2   
for there was no object  in going on    
with the irony of the other1 especially 
when it was so  unceasing4    ,,xxiv4   
,do ,i not seem to you1 not1 like       

,saturninus1 to be content with  naming 
illustrious men1 but also sometimes even
 to imitate them1 though  never unless  
they are really eminent and noble8 ,and 
,i might have opposed  to you men who   
are annoying to you1 but yet disputants 
of great accuracy2  ,stilpo1 ,diodorus1 
and ,alexinus3 men who indulged in      
far-fetched and  pointed sophisms2 for  
that was the name given usually to      
fallacious  conclusions4 ,but why need  
,i enumerate them1 when ,i have         
,chrysippus1 who is  considered to be   
the great support of the portico of the 
,stoics8 ,how many  of the arguments    
against the senses1 how many against    
everything which is  approved by        
ordinary practice1 did he not refute6   
,it is true that ,i do not  think very  
much of his refutations2 but still1 let 
us grant that he did  refute them4      
,certainly he would never have collected
 so many arguments to  deceive us with  
their excessive probability1 unless he  
saw that it was not  easily possible to 

resist them4    ,what do you think of   
the ,cyrenaic ,school8 philosophers far 
from  contemptible1 who affirm that     
there is nothing which can be perceived 
externally2 and that they perceive those
 things alone which they feel by  their 
inmost touch1 such as pain1 or pleasure4
 ,and that they do not know  what colour
 anything is of1 or what sound it       
utters2 but only feel that  they        
themselves are affected in a certain    
manner4    ,we have said enough about   
authors3 although you had asked me      
whether ,i did  not think that since the
 time of those ancient philosophers1 in 
so many  ages1 the truth might have been
 discovered1 when so many men of genius 
and  diligence were looking for it8     
,what was discovered we will consider   
presently1 and you yourself shall be the
 judge4 ,but it is easily seen that     
,arcesilas did not contend with ,zeno   
for the sake of disparaging him2 but    
that he wished to discover the truth4   
,no one1 ,i say1 of preceding           

philosophers had said positively1 no one
 had even hinted that it was  possible  
for man never to form opinions3 and that
 for a wise man it was  not only        
possible1 but indispensable4 ,the       
opinion of ,arcesilas appeared  not only
 true1 but honourable and worthy of a   
wise man4    ,perhaps he asked of ,zeno 
what would happen if a wise man could   
not  possibly perceive anything1 and if 
to form mere opinion was unworthy of a  
wise man8 ,he answered1 ,i suppose1 that
 the wise man never would form mere     
opinion1 since there were things which  
admitted of being perceived4 ,what  then
 were they8 ,perceptions1 ,i suppose4   
,what sort of perceptions then8 ,in     
reply to this he gave a definition1     
,that it was such as is impressed and   
stamped upon and figured in us1         
according to and conformably to         
something  which exists4 ,afterwards the
 question was asked1 whether1 if such a 
perception was true1 it was of the same 
character as one that was false8  ,here 

,zeno saw clearly enough that there was 
no perception that could be  perceived  
at all1 if the perception derived from  
that which is1 could  possibly resemble 
that which is derived from that which is
 not4    ,arcesilas was quite right in  
admitting this4 ,an addition was made to
 the  definition2 namely1 ,that nothing 
false could be perceived2 nor anything  
true either1 if it was of such a        
character as that which was false4 ,but 
he  applied himself diligently to these 
discussions1 in order to prove that no  
perception originated in what was true  
of such a kind that there might not  be 
a similar one originating in what was   
false4 ,and this is the one  subject of 
controversy which has lasted to this    
day4 ,for the other  doctrine1 that the 
wise man would never assent to anything1
 had nothing to  do with this question4 
,for it was quite possible for a man to 
perceive  nothing1 and nevertheless to  
be guided at times by opinion2 which is 
said  to have been admitted by          

,carneades4 ,i1 indeed1 trusting rather 
to  ,clitomachus than to ,philo or      
,metrodorus1 believe that he argued this
 point  rather than that he admitted it4
    ,,xxv4 ,however1 let us say no more 
about this4 ,undoubtedly1 when opinion  
and  perception are put an end to1 the  
retention of every kind of assent must  
follow2 as1 if ,i prove that nothing can
 be perceived1 you would then grant     
that a philosopher would never assent to
 anything4 ,what is there then that  can
 be perceived1 if even the senses do not
 warn us of the truth8 ,but you1  ,o    
,lucullus1 defend them by a common      
topic2 and to prevent you from being    
able to do so it was1 that ,i yesterday1
 when it was not otherwise  necessary1  
said so much against the senses4 ,but   
you say that you are not  at all moved  
by 8the broken oar0 or 8the dove's      
neck40 ,in the first place1  ,i will ask
 why8--for in the case of the oar1 ,i   
feel that that which appears  to be the 
case1 is not really so2 and that in the 

dove's neck there appear  to be many    
colours1 but are not in reality more    
than one4 ,have we1 then1  said nothing 
more than this8 ,let all our arguments  
stand3 that man is  tearing his cause to
 pieces2 he says that his senses are    
voracious4  ,therefore you have always  
one backer who will plead the cause at  
his own  risk3 for ,epicurus brings the 
matter down to this point1 that if once 
in a  man's life one of his senses has  
decided wrongly1 none of them is ever to
  be trusted4 ,this is what he calls    
being true1 and confiding in his own    
witnesses1 and urging his proofs to     
their just conclusion2 therefore        
,timagoras the ,epicurean declares1 that
 when he had twisted his eye with  his  
hand1 he had never seen two flames      
appear out of one candle3 for that  the 
error was one of opinion1 and not one of
 his eyes2 just as if the  question were
 what the fact is1 and not what it      
appears to be4 ,however1 he  is just    
like his predecessors4 ,but as for you1 

who say that of the things  perceived by
 your senses1 some are true and some    
false1 how do you  distinguish between  
them8 ,cease1 ,i beg of you1 to employ  
common topics3 we  have plenty of them  
at home4    ,if any god were to ask you1
 while your senses are sound and        
unimpaired1  whether you desire anything
 further1 what would you answer8 ,i     
wish1  indeed1 he would ask me6 ,you    
should hear how ill he treats us3 for   
how far  are we to look in order to see 
the truth8 ,i can see the ,cuman villa  
of  ,catulus from this place1 but not   
his villa near ,pompeii2 not that there 
is  any obstacle interposed1 but my     
eyesight cannot extend so far4 ,what a  
superb view6 ,we see ,puteoli1 but we do
 not see our friend ,avianus1 though  he
 may perhaps be walking in the portico  
of ,neptune2 there was1 however1  some  
one or other who is often spoken of in  
the ,schools who could see  things that 
were a thousand and eighty furlongs off2
 and some birds can  see further still4 

,i should therefore answer your god     
boldly1 that ,i am  not at all contented
 with these eyes of mine4 ,he will tell 
me1 perhaps1  that ,i can see better    
than some fishes2 which are not seen by 
us1 and  which even now are beneath our 
eyes1 and yet they cannot look up far   
enough to see us3 therefore1 as water is
 shed around them1 so a dense air  is   
around us4 ,but we desire nothing       
better4 ,what8 do you suppose that a    
mole longs for light8--nor would he     
complain to the god that he could not   
see far1 but rather that he saw         
incorrectly4 ,do you see that ship8 ,it 
appears to us to be standing still2 but 
to those who are in that ship1  this    
villa appears to be moving4 ,seek for   
the reason why it seems so1 and  if you 
discover it ever so much1 and ,i do not 
know whether you may not be  able to1   
still you will have proved1 not that you
 have a trustworthy  witness1 but that  
he has not given false evidence without 
sufficient  reason4    ,,xxvi4 ,what    

need had ,i to speak of the ship8 for ,i
 saw that what ,i said  about the oar   
was despised by you2 perhaps you expect 
something more  serious4 ,what can be   
greater than the sun1 which the         
mathematicians affirm  to be more than  
eighteen times as large as the earth8   
,how little does it  appear to us6 ,to  
me1 indeed1 it seems about a foot in    
diameter2 but  ,epicurus thinks it      
possible that it may be even less than  
it seems1 but  not much2 nor does he    
think that it is much greater1 but that 
it is very  near the size it seems to   
be3 so that our eyes are either quite   
correct1  or1 at all events1 not very   
incorrect4 ,what becomes then of the    
exception1  8,if once44480 ,however1 let
 us leave this credulous man1 who does  
not  believe that the senses are ever   
wrong1--not even now1 when that sun1    
which  is borne along with such rapidity
 that it is impossible even to conceive 
how great its velocity is1 nevertheless 
seems to us to be standing still4       

,however1 to abridge the controversy1   
consider1 ,i pray you1 within what      
narrow bounds you are confined4 ,there  
are four principles which conduct  you  
to the conclusion that there is nothing 
which can be known1 or  perceived1 or   
comprehended2--and it is about this that
 the whole dispute  is4 ,the first      
principle is1 that some perceptions are 
false2 the second1  that such cannot be 
perceived2 the third1 that of           
perceptions between  which there is no  
difference1 it is not possible that some
 of them can be  perceived and that     
others cannot2 the fourth1 that there is
 no true  perception proceeding from the
 senses1 to which there is not some     
other  perception opposed which in no   
respect differs from it1 and which      
cannot  be perceived4 ,now of these four
 principles1 the second and third are   
admitted by every one4 ,epicurus does   
not admit the first1 but you1 with  whom
 we are now arguing1 admit that one     
too1--the whole contest is about  the   

fourth4    ,the man1 then1 who saw      
,publius ,servilius ,geminus1 if he     
thought that he  saw ,quintus1 fell into
 a perception of that kind that could   
not be  perceived2 because what was true
 was distinguished by no characteristic 
mark from what was false3 and if this   
distinctive mark were taken away1  what 
characteristic of the same kind could he
 have by which to recognise  ,caius     
,cotta1 who was twice consul with       
,geminus1 which could not possibly  be  
false8 ,you say that such a likeness as 
that is not in the nature of  things4   
,you fight the question vigorously1 but 
you are fighting a  peaceably disposed  
adversary4 ,grant1 then1 that it is not2
 at all events1  it is possible that it 
should seem to be so2 therefore it will 
deceive the  senses4 ,and if one        
likeness deceives them1 it will have    
made everything  doubtful2 for when that
 judgment is once taken away by which   
alone things  can be known1 then1 even  
if the person whom you see1 be really   

the person  whom he appears to you to   
be1 still you will not judge by that    
characteristic which you say you ought1 
being of such a character that one  of  
the same kind cannot be false4 ,if1     
therefore1 it is possible that  ,publius
 ,geminus may appear to you to be       
,quintus1 what certainty have you  that 
he may not appear to you to be ,cotta   
though he is not1 since some  things do 
appear to you to be what they are not8  
,you say that everything  has its own   
peculiar genus2 that there is nothing   
the same as something  else4 ,that is a 
stoic doctrine1 and one not very        
credible1 for they say  that there is   
not a single hair or a single grain in  
every respect like  another hair or     
grain4 ,these things could all be       
refuted1 but ,i do not  wish to be      
contentious2 for it has nothing in the  
world to do with the  question whether  
the things which are seen do not differ 
at all in any  part1 or whether they    
cannot be distinguished from another    

even though  they do differ4 ,but1      
granting that there cannot be such a    
likeness between  men1 can there not be 
such between statues8 ,tell me1 could   
not ,lysippus1  using the same brass1   
the same composition of metals1 the same
 atmosphere1  water1 and all other      
appliances1 have made a hundred         
,alexanders exactly  alike8 ,how then   
could you distinguish between them8     
,again2 if ,i1 with this  ring1 make a  
hundred impressions on the same piece of
 wax1 is it possible  that there should 
be any difference to enable you to      
distinguish one from  the other8--or1   
shall you have to seek out some ring    
engraver1 since you  have already found 
us a ,delian poulterer who could        
recognise his eggs8    ,,xxvii4 ,but you
 have recourse to art1 which you call in
 to the aid of the  senses4 ,a painter  
sees what we do not see2 and as soon as 
a flute-player  plays a note the air is 
recognised by a musician4 ,well8 ,does  
not this  argument seem to tell against 

you1 if1 without great skill1 such as   
very  few persons of our class attain   
to1 we can neither see nor hear8 ,then  
you  give an excellent description of   
the skill with which nature has         
manufactured our senses1 and intellect1 
and the whole construction of man1  in  
order to prevent my being alarmed at    
rashness of opinions4 ,can you  also1   
,lucullus1 affirm that there is any     
power united with wisdom and  prudence  
which has made1 or1 to use your own     
expression1 manufactured man8  ,what    
sort of a manufacture is that8 ,where is
 it exercised8 when8 why8 how8  ,these  
points are all handled ingeniously1 they
 are discussed even  elegantly4 ,let it 
be said even that they appear likely2   
only let them not  be affirmed          
positively4 ,but we will discuss natural
 philosophy hereafter1  and1 indeed1 we 
will do so that you1 who said a little  
while ago that ,i  should speak of it1  
may appear not to have spoken falsely4  
,however1 to come to what is clearer1 ,i

 shall now bring forward general  facts 
on which whole volumes have been filled1
 not only by those of our  own ,school1 
but also by ,chrysippus4 ,but the       
,stoics complain of him1 that1  while he
 studiously collected every argument    
which could be brought  forward against 
the senses and clearness1 and against   
all custom1 and  against reason1 when he
 came to reply to himself1 he was       
inferior to what  he had been at first2 
and therefore that1 in fact1 he put arms
 into the  hands of ,carneades4 ,those  
arguments are such as have been         
ingeniously  handled by you4 ,you said  
that the perceptions of men asleep1 or  
drunk1 or  mad1 were less vigorous than 
those of men awake1 sober1 and sane4    
,how do  you prove that8 because1 when  
,ennius had awakened1 he would not say  
that  he had seen ,homer1 but only that 
,homer had seemed to be present4 ,and   
,alcmon says--          ,my heart       
distrusts the witness of my eyes4       
,and one may say the same of men who are

 drunk4 ,as if any one denied that  when
 a man has awakened he ceases to think  
his dreams true2 and that a man  whose  
frenzy has passed away1 no longer       
conceives those things to be real  which
 appeared so to him during his madness4 
,but that is not the question3  the     
question is1 how those things appear to 
us1 at the time when they do  appear4   
,unless1 indeed1 we suppose that ,ennius
 heard the whole of that  address--     
,o piety of the soul4444      7if1      
indeed1 he did dream it71 just as he    
would have heard it if he had  been     
awake4 ,for when awake1 he was able to  
think those things phantoms--as1  in    
fact1 they were--and dreams4 ,but while 
he was asleep1 he felt as sure of  their
 reality as if he had been awake4       
,again1 ,iliona1 in that dream of  hers1
 where she hears--          ,mother1 ,i 
call on you4444      does she not       
believe that her son has spoken1 just as
 she would have  believed it if she had 
been awake8 ,on which account she adds--

          ,come now1 stand here1 remain1
 and hear my words1      ,and once again
 repeat those words to me4      ,does   
she here seem to place less trust in    
what she has seen than people do  when  
awake8    ,,xxviii4 ,why should ,i speak
 of madmen8--such as your relation      
,tuditanus was1  ,catulus4 ,does any    
man1 who may be ever so much in his     
senses1 think the  things which he sees 
as certain as he used to think those    
that appeared to  him8 ,again1 the man  
who cries out--          ,i see you now1
 ,i see you now alive1      ,ulysses1   
while such sight is still allow'd me2   
does he not twice cry out that he is    
seeing what he never sees at all8       
,again1 when ,hercules1 in ,euripides1  
shot his own sons with his arrows1      
taking them for the sons of             
,eurystheus1--when he slew his          
wife1--when he  endeavoured even to slay
 his father1--was he not worked upon by 
false  ideas1 just as he might have been
 by true ones8 ,again1 does not your own

  ,alcmon1 who says that his heart      
distrusts the witness of his eyes1 say  
in  the same place1 while inflamed by   
frenzy--          ,whence does this     
flame arise8      ,and presently        
afterwards--          ,come on2 come on2
 they hasten1 they approach2      ,they 
seek for me4      ,listen1 how he       
implores the good faith of the virgin3--
          ,o bring me aid2 ,o drive this
 pest away2      ,this fiery power which
 now doth torture me2      ,see1 they   
advance1 dark shades1 with flames       
encircled1      ,and stand around me    
with their blazing torches4      ,have  
you any doubt here that he appears to   
himself to see these things8  ,and then 
the rest of his speech3--          ,see 
how ,apollo1 fair-hair'd ,god1          
,draws in and bends his golden bow2     
,while on the left fair ,dian waves her 
torch4      ,how could he have believed 
these things any more if they had really
  existed than he did when they only    
seemed to exist8 ,for it is clear that  

at the moment his heart was not         
distrusting his eyes4 ,but all these    
instances are cited in order to prove   
that than which nothing can be more     
certain1 namely1 that between true and  
false perceptions there is no           
difference at all1 as far as the assent 
of the mind is concerned4 ,but you      
prove nothing when you merely refute    
those false perceptions of men who  are 
mad or dreaming1 by their own           
recollection4 ,for the question is not  
what sort of recollection those people  
usually have who have awakened1 or      
those who have recovered from madness1  
but what sort of perception madmen  or  
dreamers had at the moment when they    
were under the influence of their       
madness or their dream4 ,however1 we    
will say no more about the senses4      
,what is there that can be perceived by 
reason8 ,you say that ,dialectics  have 
been discovered1 and that that science  
is1 as it were1 an arbiter and  judge of
 what is true and false4 ,of what true  

and false8--and of true and  false on   
what subject8 ,will a dialectician be   
able to judge1 in geometry1  what is    
true and false1 or in literature1 or in 
music8 ,he knows nothing  about those   
things4 ,in philosophy1 then8 ,what is  
it to him how large the  sun is8 or what
 means has he which may enable him to   
judge what the chief  good is8 ,what    
then will he judge of8 ,of what         
combination or disjunction of  ideas is 
accurate1--of what is an ambiguous      
expression1--of what follows  from each 
fact1 or what is inconsistent with it8  
,if the science of  dialectics judges of
 these things1 or things like them1 it  
is judging of  itself4 ,but it professed
 more4 ,for to judge of these matters is
 not  sufficient for the resolving of   
the other numerous and important        
questions  which arise in philosophy4   
,but1 since you place so much importance
 in that  art1 ,i would have you to     
consider whether it was not invented for
 the  express purpose of being used     

against you4 ,for1 at its first opening1
 it  gives an ingenious account of the  
elements of speaking1 and of the manner 
in which one may come to an             
understanding of ambiguous expressions1 
and of  the principles of reasoning3    
then1 after a few more things1 it comes 
to  the sorites1 a very slippery and    
hazardous topic1 and a class of argument
  which you yourself pronounced to be a 
vicious one4    ,,xxix4 ,what then1 you 
will say2 are we to be blamed for that  
viciousness8  ,the nature of things has 
not given us any knowledge of ends1 so  
as to  enable us1 in any subject        
whatever1 to say how far we can go4 ,nor
 is this  the case only in respect of   
the heap of wheat1 from which the name  
is  derived1 but in no matter whatever  
where the argument is conducted by      
minute questions3 for instance1 if the  
question be whether a man is rich  or   
poor1 illustrious or obscure1--whether  
things be many or few1 great or  small1 
long or short1 broad or narrow1--we have

 no certain answer to give1  how much   
must be added or taken away to make the 
thing in question either  one or the    
other4    ,but the sorites is a vicious 
sort of argument3--crush it1 then1 if   
you can1  to prevent its being          
troublesome2 for it will be so1 if you  
do not guard  against it4 ,we have      
guarded against it1 says he4 ,for       
,chrysippus's plan is1  when he is      
interrogated step by step 7by way of    
giving an instance71  whether there are 
three1 or few1 or many1 to rest a little
 before he comes  to the 8many20 that is
 to say1 to use their own language1 4   
,rest  and welcome1 says ,carneades2 you
 may even snore1 for all ,i care4 ,but  
what  good does he do8 ,for one follows 
who will waken you from sleep1 and      
question you in the same manner3--,take 
the number1 after the mention of  which 
you were silent1 and if to that number  
,i add one1 will there be  many8 ,you   
will again go on1 as long as you think  
fit4 ,why need ,i say more8  for you    

admit this1 that you cannot in your     
answers fix the last number  which can  
be classed as 8few10 nor the first1     
which amounts to 8many40 ,and  this kind
 of uncertainty extends so widely1 that 
,i do not see any bounds  to its        
progress4    ,nothing hurts me1 says he2
 for ,i1 like a skilful driver1 will    
rein in my  horses before ,i come to the
 end1 and all the more if the ground    
which the  horses are approaching is    
precipitous4 ,and thus1 too1 says he1 ,i
 will  check myself1 and not reply any  
more to one who addresses me with       
captious  questions4 ,if you have a     
clear answer to make1 and refuse to make
 it1 you  are giving yourself airs2 if  
you have not1 even you yourself do not  
perceive it4 ,if you stop1 because the  
question is obscure1 ,i admit that it   
is so2 but you say that you do not      
proceed as far as what is obscure4 ,you 
stop1 then1 where the case is still     
clear4 ,if then all you do is to hold   
your tongue1 you gain nothing by that4  

,for what does it matter to the man  who
 wishes to catch you1 whether he        
entangles you owing to your silence or  
to your talking8 ,suppose1 for instance1
 you were to say1 without  hesitation1  
that up to the number nine1 is 8few10   
but were to pause at the  tenth2 then   
you would be refusing your assent to    
what is certain and  evident1 and yet   
you will not allow me to do the same    
with respect to  subjects which are     
obscure4    ,that art1 therefore1 does  
not help you against the sorites2       
inasmuch as it  does not teach a man1   
who is using either the increasing or   
diminishing  scale1 what is the first   
point1 or the last4 ,may ,i not say that
 that same  art1 like ,penelope undoing 
her web1 at last undoes all the         
arguments which  have gone before8 ,is  
that your fault1 or ours8 ,in truth1 it 
is the  foundation of dialectics1 that  
whatever is enunciated 7and that is what
  they call 1 which answers to our word 
effatum17 is either true or  false4     

,what1 then1 is the case8 ,are these    
true or false8 ,if you say that  you are
 speaking falsely1 and that that is     
true1 you are speaking falsely  and     
telling the truth at the same time4     
,this1 forsooth1 you say is             
inexplicable2 and that is more odious   
than our language1 when we call  things 
uncomprehended1 and not perceived4      
,,xxx4 ,however1 ,i will pass over all  
this4 ,i ask1 if those things cannot be 
explained1 and if no means of judging of
 them is discovered1 so that you  can   
answer whether they are true or false1  
then what has become of that            
definition1--8,that a proposition       
7effatum7 is something which is either  
true or false80 ,after the facts are    
assumed ,i will add1 that of them some  
are to be adopted1 others impeached1    
because they are contrary to the  first4
 ,what then do you think of this        
conclusion1--8,if you say that the sun  
shines1 and if you speak truth1         
therefore the sun does shine80 ,at all  

events you approve of the kind of       
argument1 and you say that the          
conclusion has been most correctly      
inferred4 ,therefore1 in teaching1 you  
deliver that as the first mood in which 
to draw conclusions4 ,either1           
therefore1 you will approve of every    
other conclusion in the same mood1 or   
that art of yours is good for nothing4  
,consider1 then1 whether you are        
inclined to approve of this             
conclusion2--8,if you say that you are a
 liar1  and speak the truth1 then you   
are a liar4 ,but you do say that you are
 a  liar1 and you do speak the truth1   
therefore you are a liar40 ,how can you 
avoid approving of this conclusion1 when
 you approved of the previous one  of   
the same kind8    ,these are the        
arguments of ,chrysippus1 which even he 
himself did not  refute4 ,for what could
 he do with such a conclusion as        
this1--8,if it  shines1 it shines3 but  
it does shine1 therefore it does shine80
 ,he must  give in2 for the principle of

 the connexion compels you to grant the 
last  proposition after you have once   
granted the first4 ,and in what does    
this  conclusion differ from the        
other1--8,if you lie1 you lie2 but you  
do lie1  therefore you do lie80 ,you    
assert that it is impossible for you    
either to  approve or disapprove of     
this3 if so1 how can you any more       
approve or  disapprove of the other8 ,if
 the art1 or the principle1 or the      
method1 or  the force of the one        
conclusion avails1 they exist in exactly
 the same  degree in both4    ,this1    
however1 is their last resource4 ,they  
demand that one should make an          
exception with regard to these points   
which are inexplicable4 ,i give my  vote
 for their going to some tribune of the 
people2 for they shall never  obtain    
this exception from me4 ,in truth1 when 
they cannot prevail on  ,epicurus1 who  
despises and ridicules the whole science
 of dialectics1 to  grant this          
proposition to be true1 which we may    

express thus--8,hermachus  will either  
be alive to-morrow or he will not20 when
 the dialecticians lay  it down that    
every disjunctive proposition1 such as  
8either yes or no0 is  not only true but
 necessary2 you may see how cautious he 
is1 whom they  think slow4 ,for1 says   
he1 if ,i should grant that one of the  
two  alternatives is necessary1 it will 
then be necessary either that ,hermachus
  should be alive to-morrow1 or not4    
,but there is no such necessity in the  
nature of things4 ,let the dialecticians
 then1 that is to say1 ,antiochus  and  
the ,stoics1 contend with him1 for he   
upsets the whole science of  dialectics4
    ,for if a disjunctive proposition   
made up of contraries1 7,i call those   
propositions contraries when one affirms
 and the other denies17 if1 ,i say1     
such a disjunctive can be false1 then no
 one is ever true4 ,but what  quarrel   
have they with me who am following their
 system8 ,when anything of  that kind   
happened1 ,carneades used to joke in    

this way3--8,if ,i have drawn  my       
conclusion correctly1 ,i gain the cause3
 if incorrectly1 ,diogenes shall  pay   
back a mina20 for he had learnt         
dialectics of that ,stoic1 and a mina   
was the pay of the dialecticians4    ,i1
 therefore1 follow that system which ,i 
learnt from ,antiochus2 and ,i find  no 
reason why ,i should judge 8,if it does 
shine1 it does shine0 to be true1       
because ,i have learnt that everything  
which is connected with itself is  true2
 and yet not judge 8,if you lie1 you    
lie10 to be connected with itself  in   
the same manner4 ,either1 therefore1 ,i 
must judge both this and that to  be    
true1 or1 if ,i may not judge this to be
 true1 then ,i cannot judge that  to be4
    ,,xxxi4 ,however1 to pass over all  
those prickles1 and all that tortuous   
kind  of discussion1 and to show what we
 are3--after having explained the whole 
theory of ,carneades1 all the quibbles  
of ,antiochus will necessarily fall  to 
pieces4 ,nor will ,i say anything in    

such a way as to lead any one to        
suspect that anything is invented by me4
 ,i will take what ,i say from          
,clitomachus1 who was with ,carneades   
till his old age1 a man of great        
shrewdness1 7indeed1 he was a           
,carthaginian17 and very studious and   
diligent4 ,and he has written four books
 on the subject of withholding  assent2 
but what ,i am going to say is taken out
 of the first4    ,carneades asserts    
that there are two kinds of appearances2
 and that the  first kind may be divided
 into those which can be perceived and  
those  which cannot2 and the other into 
those which are probable and those which
  are not4 ,therefore1 those which are  
pronounced to be contrary to the  senses
 and contrary to evidentness belong to  
the former division2 but that  nothing  
can be objected to those of the second  
kind4 ,wherefore his opinion  is1 that  
there is no appearance of such a        
character that perception will  follow  
it1 but many such as to draw after them 

probability4 ,indeed1 it  would be      
contrary to nature if nothing were      
probable2 and that entire  overturning  
of life1 which you were speaking of1    
,lucullus1 would ensue4  ,therefore     
there are many things which may be      
proved by the senses2 only  one must    
recollect that there is not in them     
anything of such a character  that there
 may not also be something which is     
false1 but which in no  respect differs 
from it in appearance2 and so1 whatever 
happens which is  probable in           
appearance1 if nothing offers itself    
which is contrary to that  probability1 
the wise man will use it2 and in this   
way the whole course of  life will be   
regulated4    ,and1 in truth1 that wise 
man whom you are bringing on the stage1 
is often  guided by what is probable1   
not being comprehended1 nor perceived1  
nor  assented to1 but only likely2 and  
unless a man acts on such circumstances 
there is an end to the whole system of  
life4 ,for what must happen8 ,has the   

wise man1 when he embarks on board ship1
 a positive comprehension and           
perception in his mind that he will have
 a successful voyage8 ,how can he8  ,but
 suppose he goes from this place to     
,puteoli1 thirty furlongs1 in a         
seaworthy vessel1 with a good pilot1 and
 in fine weather like this1 it  appears 
probable that he will arrive there safe4
 ,according to appearances  of this     
kind1 then1 he will make up his mind to 
act or not to act2 and he  will be more 
willing to find the snow white than     
,anaxagoras1 who not only  denied that  
fact1 but who affirmed1 because he knew 
that water1 from which  snow was        
congealed1 was of a dark colour1 that   
snow did not even look  white4 ,and he  
will be influenced by anything which    
affects him in such a  way that the     
appearance is probable1 and not         
interfered with by any  obstacle4 ,for  
such a man is not cut out of stone or   
hewn out of oak4 ,he  has a body1 he has
 a mind1 he is influenced by intellect1 

he is influenced  by his senses1 so that
 many things appear to him to be true1  
and yet not  to have conspicuous and    
peculiar characteristics by which to be 
perceived4  ,and therefore the wise man 
does not assent to them1 because it is  
possible  that something false may exist
 of the same kind as this true thing4   
,nor do  we speak against the senses    
differently from the ,stoics1 who say   
that many  things are false1 and are    
very different from the appearance which
 they  present to the senses4           
,,xxxii4 ,but if this is the case1 that 
one false idea can be entertained by    
the senses1 you will find some one in a 
moment who will deny that anything  can 
be perceived by the senses4 ,and so1    
while we are silent1 all  perception and
 comprehension is done away with by the 
two principles laid  down1 one by       
,epicurus and the other by you4 ,what is
 ,epicurus's maxim8--,if  anything that 
appears to the senses be false1 then    
nothing can be  perceived4 ,what is     

yours8--,the appearances presented to   
the senses are  false4--,what is the    
conclusion8 ,even if ,i hold my tongue1 
it speaks for  itself1 that nothing can 
be perceived4 ,i do not grant that1 says
 he1 to  ,epicurus4 ,argue then with    
him1 as he is wholly at variance with   
you1 but  leave me alone1 who certainly 
agree with you so far1 that the senses  
are  liable to error4 ,although nothing 
appears so strange to me1 as that such  
things should be said1 especially by    
,antiochus1 to whom the propositions    
which ,i have just mentioned were       
thoroughly known4 ,for although1 if he  
pleases1 any one may find fault with    
this1 namely with our denying that      
anything can be perceived2 at all events
 it is not a very serious reproof  that 
we can have to endure4 ,but as for our  
statement that some things are          
probable1 this does not seem to you to  
be sufficient4 ,grant that it is  not4  
,at least we ought to escape the        
reproaches which are incessantly        

bandied about by you1 8,can you1 then1  
see nothing8 can you hear nothing8  is  
nothing evident to you80    ,i explained
 just now1 on the testimony of          
,clitomachus1 in what manner  ,carneades
 intended those statements to be taken4 
,hear now1 how the same  things are     
stated by ,clitomachus in that book     
which he dedicated to ,caius  ,lucilius1
 the poet1 after he had written on the  
same subject to ,lucius  ,censorinus1   
the one1 ,i mean1 who was consul with   
,marcus ,manilius2 he then  used almost 
these very words2 for ,i am well        
acquainted with them1 because  the first
 idea and arrangement of those very     
matters which we are now  discussing is 
contained in that book4 ,he then uses   
the following language--    8,the       
philosophers of the ,academy are of     
opinion that there are differences      
between things of such a kind that some 
appear probable1 and others the         
contrary4 ,but that it is not a         
sufficient reason for one's saying that 

some of these can be perceived and that 
others cannot1 because many things      
which are false are probable2 but       
nothing false can be perceived and      
known4 ,therefore1 says he1 those men   
are egregiously wrong who say that  the 
,academics deny the existence of the    
senses2 for they have never said  that  
there is no such thing as colour1 or    
taste1 or sound2 the only point  they   
argue for is1 that there is not in them 
that peculiar characteristic  mark of   
truth and certainty which does not exist
 anywhere else40    ,and after having   
explained this1 he adds1 that there are 
two senses in  which the wise man may be
 said to suspend his assent3 one1 when  
it is  understood that he1 as a general 
rule1 assents to nothing2 the other1    
when  he forbears answering1 so as to   
say that he approves or disapproves of  
anything1 or1 so as to deny or affirm   
anything4 ,this being the case1 he      
approves of the one sense1 so as never  
to assent to anything2 and adheres  to  

the other1 so as to be able to answer   
yes1 or no1 following probability       
whenever it either occurs or is wanting4
 ,and that one may not be  astonished at
 one1 who in every matter withholds     
himself from expressing  his assent1    
being nevertheless agitated and excited 
to action1 he leaves  us perceptions of 
the sort by which we are excited to     
action1 and those  owing to which we    
can1 when questioned1 answer either way1
 being guided  only by appearances1 as  
long as we avoid expressing a deliberate
 assent4  ,and yet we must look upon all
 appearances of that kind as probable1  
but  only those which have no obstacles 
to counteract them4 ,if we do not induce
  you to approve of these ideas1 they   
may perhaps be false1 but they          
certainly do not deserve odium4 ,for we 
are not depriving you of any light2  but
 with reference to the things which you 
assert are perceived and  comprehended1 
we say1 that if they be only probable1  
they appear to be  true4    ,,xxxiii4   

,since1 therefore1 what is probable1 is 
thus inferred and laid  down1 and at the
 same time disencumbered of all         
difficulties1 set free and              
unrestrained1 and disentangled from all 
extraneous circumstances2 you see1      
,lucullus1 that that defence of         
perspicuity which you took in hand is   
utterly overthrown4 ,for this wise man  
of whom ,i am speaking will survey  the 
heaven and earth and sea with the same  
eyes as your wise man2 and will  feel   
with the same senses all those other    
things which fall under each  respective
 sense4 ,that sea1 which now1 as the    
west wind is rising over it1  appears   
purple to us1 will appear so too to our 
wise man1 but nevertheless  he will not 
sanction the appearance by his assent2  
because1 to us  ourselves it appeared   
just now blue1 and in the morning it    
appeared  yellow2 and now1 too1 because 
it sparkles in the sun1 it is white and 
dimpled1 and quite unlike the adjacent  
continent2 so that1 even if you  could  

give an account why it is so1 still you 
could not establish the  truth of the   
appearance that is presented to the     
eyes4    ,whence then1--for this was the
 question which you asked1--comes       
memory1 if  we perceive nothing1 since  
we cannot recollect anything which we   
have seen  unless we have comprehended  
it8 ,what8 ,did ,polynus1 who is said to
 have  been a great mathematician1 after
 he had been persuaded by ,epicurus to  
believe all geometry to be false1 forget
 all the knowledge which he had         
previously possessed8 ,but that which is
 false cannot be comprehended as  you   
yourselves assert4 ,if1 therefore1      
memory is conversant only with  things  
which have been perceived and           
comprehended1 then it retains as        
comprehended and perceived all that     
every one remembers4 ,but nothing false 
can be comprehended2 and ,scyron        
recollects all the dogmas of ,epicurus2 
therefore they are all true4 ,for all ,i
 care1 they may be2 but you also  must  

either admit that they are so1 and that 
is the last thing in your  thoughts1 or 
else you must allow me memory1 and grant
 that there is plenty  of room for it1  
even if there be no comprehension or    
perception4    ,what then is to become  
of the arts8 ,of what arts8 of those1   
which of their  own accord confess that 
they proceed on conjecture more than on 
knowledge2  or of those which only      
follow what appears to them1 and are    
destitute of  that art which you possess
 to enable them to distinguish between  
truth and  falsehood8    ,but there are 
two lights which1 more than any others1 
contain the whole  case2 for1 in the    
first place1 you deny the possibility of
 any man  invariably withholding his    
assent from everything4 ,but that is    
quite  plain2 since ,pantius1 almost the
 greatest man1 in my opinion1 of all the
  ,stoics1 says that he is in doubt as  
to that matter1 which all the ,stoics   
except him think absolutely certain1    
namely as to the truth of the  auspices 

taken by soothsayers1 and of oracles1   
and dreams1 and prophecies2  and        
forbears to express any assent          
respecting them4 ,and why1 if he may    
pursue this course concerning those     
matters1 which the men of whom he       
himself learnt considered               
unquestionable1 why may not a wise man  
do so too  in all other cases8 ,is there
 any position which a man may either    
approve  or disapprove of after it has  
been asserted1 but yet may not doubt    
about8  ,may you do so with respect to  
the sorites whenever you please1 and may
 not  he take his stand in the same     
manner in other cases1 especially when  
without expressing his assent he may be 
able to follow a probability which  is  
not embarrassed by anything8    ,the    
second point is that you declare that   
man incapable of action who  withholds  
his assent from everything4 ,for first  
of all we must see in what  assent      
consists4 ,for the ,stoics say that the 
senses themselves are  assents2 that    

desire comes after them1 and action     
after desire4 ,but that  every thing is 
at an end if we deny perception4        
,,xxxiv4 ,now on this subject many      
things have been said and written on    
both  sides1 but the whole matter may be
 summed up in a few words4 ,for although
  ,i think it a very great exploit to   
resist one's perceptions1 to withstand  
one's vague opinions1 to check one's    
propensity to give assent to            
propositions1--and though ,i quite agree
 with ,clitomachus1 when he writes  that
 ,carneades achieved a ,herculean labour
 when1 as if it had been a  savage and  
formidable monster1 he extracted assent1
 that is to say1 vague  opinion and     
rashness1 from our minds1--yet1         
supposing that part of the  defence is  
wholly omitted1 what will hinder the    
action of that man who  follows         
probability1 without any obstacle       
arising to embarrass him8 ,this  thing  
of itself1 says he1 will embarrass      
him1--that he will lay it down1  that   

even the thing he approves of cannot be 
perceived4 ,and that will  hinder you1  
also1 in sailing1 in planting1 in       
marrying a wife1 in becoming  the parent
 of children1 and in many things in     
which you follow nothing  except what is
 probable4    ,and1 nevertheless1 you   
bring up again that old and often       
repudiated  objection1 to employ it not 
as ,antipater did1 but1 as you say1 in a
 closer  manner4 ,for you tell us that  
,antipater was blamed for saying1 that  
it was  consistent in a man who affirmed
 that nothing could be comprehended1 to 
say that at least this fact of that     
impossibility could be comprehended2    
which appeared even to ,antiochus to be 
a stupid kind of assertion1 and         
contradictory to itself4 ,for that it   
cannot be said with any consistency     
that nothing can be comprehended1 if it 
is asserted at the same time that  the  
fact of the impossibility can be        
comprehended4 ,he thinks that           
,carneades ought rather to be pressed in

 this way3--,as the wise man admits  of 
no dogma except such as is comprehended1
 perceived1 and known1 he must          
therefore confess that this very dogma  
of the wise man1 8that nothing can  be  
perceived10 is perceived2 as if the wise
 man had no other maxim  whatever1 and  
as if he could pass his life without    
any4 ,but as he has  others1 which are  
probable1 but not positively perceived1 
so also has he  this one1 that nothing  
can be perceived4 ,for if he had on this
 point any  characteristic of certain   
knowledge1 he would also have it on all 
other  points2 but since he has it not1 
he employs probabilities4 ,therefore he 
is  not afraid of appearing to be       
throwing everything into confusion1 and 
making it uncertain4 ,for it is not     
admissible for a person to say that he  
is ignorant about duty1 and about many  
other things with which he is           
constantly mixed up and conversant2 as  
he might say1 if he were asked  whether 
the number of the stars is odd or even4 

,for in things uncertain1  nothing is   
probable2 but as to those matters in    
which there is  probability1 in those   
the wise man will not be at a loss what 
to do1 or  what answer to give4    ,nor 
have you1 ,o ,lucullus1 omitted that    
other objection of ,antiochus 7and1     
indeed1 it is no wonder1 for it is a    
very notorious one17 by which he used   
to say that ,philo was above all things 
perplexed4 ,for when one proposition    
was assumed1 that some appearances were 
false1 and a second one that there  was 
no difference between them and true     
ones1 he said that that school  omitted 
to take notice that the former          
proposition had been granted by  him1   
because there did appear to be some     
difference between appearances2  but    
that that was put an end to by the      
second proposition1 which asserted  that
 there was no difference between false  
and true ones2 for that no two          
assertions could be more contradictory4 
,and this objection would be  correct if

 we altogether put truth out of the     
question3 but we do not2 for  we see    
both true appearances and false ones4   
,but there is a show of  probability in 
them1 though of perception we have no   
sign whatever4    ,,xxxv4 ,and ,i seem  
to myself to be at this moment adopting 
too meagre an  argument2 for1 when there
 is a wide plain1 in which our discourse
 may rove  at liberty1 why should we    
confine it within such narrow straits1  
and drive  it into the thickets of the  
,stoics8 ,for if ,i were arguing with a 
,peripatetic1 who said 8that everything 
could be perceived which was an         
impression originating in the truth10   
and who did not employ that  additional 
clause1--8in such a way as it could not 
originate in what was  false10 ,i should
 then deal plainly with a plain man1 and
 should not be  very disputatious4 ,and 
even if1 when ,i said that nothing could
 be  comprehended1 he was to say that a 
wise man was sometimes guided by        
opinion1 ,i should not contradict him2  

especially as even ,carneades is not    
very hostile to this idea4 ,as it is1   
what can ,i do8 ,for ,i am asking what  
there is that can be comprehended2 and  
,i am answered1 not by ,aristotle1 or   
,theophrastus1 or even ,xenocrates or   
,polemo1 but by one who is of much      
later date than they1--8,a truth of such
 a nature as what is false cannot  be40 
,i find nothing of the sort4 ,therefore 
,i will1 in truth1 assent to  what is   
unknown2--that is to say1 ,i will be    
guided by opinion4 ,this ,i am  allowed 
to do both by the ,peripatetics and by  
the ,old ,academy2 but you  refuse me   
such indulgence1 and in this refusal    
,antiochus is the foremost1  who has    
great weight with me1 either because ,i 
loved the man1 as he did  me1 or because
 ,i consider him the most refined and   
acute of all the  philosophers of our   
age4    ,and1 first of all1 ,i will ask 
him how it is that he is a follower of  
that  ,academy to which he professes to 
belong8 ,for1 to pass over other points1

  who is there1 either of the ,old      
,academy or of the ,peripatetics1 who   
has  ever made these two assertions     
which are the subject of                
discussion1--either  that that alone    
could be perceived which was a truth of 
such a nature1 as  what was false could 
not be2 or that a wise man was never    
guided by  opinion8 ,certainly no one of
 them ever said so4 ,neither of these   
propositions was much maintained before 
,zeno's time4 ,but ,i consider both  of 
them true2 and ,i do not say so just to 
serve the present turn1 but it  is my   
honest opinion4    ,,xxxvi4 ,this is    
what ,i cannot bear4 ,when you forbid me
 to assent to what ,i  do not know1 and 
say such a proceeding is most           
discreditable1 and full of              
rashness1--when you1 at the same time1  
arrogate so much to yourself1 as to     
take upon yourself to explain the whole 
system of wisdom1 to unfold the  nature 
of all things1 to form men's manners1 to
 fix the limits of good and  evil1 to   

describe men's duties1 and also to      
undertake to teach a complete  rule and 
system of disputing and understanding1  
will you be able to  prevent me from    
never tripping while embracing all those
 multitudinous  branches of knowledge8  
,what1 in short1 is that school to which
 you would  conduct me1 after you have  
carried me away from this one8 ,i fear  
you will  be acting rather arrogantly if
 you say it is your own4 ,still you must
  inevitably say so4 ,nor1 indeed1 are  
you the only person who would say such  
a thing1 but every one will try and     
tempt me to his own4 ,come2 suppose ,i  
resist the ,peripatetics1 who say that  
they are closely connected with the     
orators1 and that illustrious men who   
have been instructed by them have  often
 governed the republic2--suppose that ,i
 withstand the ,epicureans1 so  many of 
whom are friends of my own1--excellent1 
united1 and affectionate  men2--what am 
,i to do with respect to ,deodotus the  
,stoic1 of whom ,i have  been a pupil   

from my youth1--who has been living with
 me so many years1--who  dwells in my   
house1--whom ,i admire and love1 and who
 despises all those  theories of        
,antiochus8 ,our principles1 you will   
say1 are the only true  ones4 ,certainly
 the only true ones1 if they are true at
 all2 for there  cannot be many true    
principles incompatible with one        
another4 ,are we then  shameless who are
 unwilling to make mistakes2 or they    
arrogant who have  persuaded themselves 
that they are the only people who know  
everything8 ,i  do not1 says he1 assert 
that ,i1 but that the wise man knows    
everything4  ,exactly so2 that he knows 
those things which are the principles of
 your  school4 ,now1 in the first place1
 what an assertion it is that wisdom    
cannot be explained by a wise man4--,but
 let us leave off speaking of           
ourselves2 let us speak of the wise man1
 about whom1 as ,i have often said      
before1 the whole of this discussion is4
    ,wisdom1 then1 is distributed by    

most people1 and indeed by us1 into     
three  parts4 ,first therefore1 if you  
please1 let us consider the researches  
that  have been made into the nature of 
things4 ,is there any one so puffed up  
with a false opinion of himself as to   
have persuaded himself that he knows    
those things8 ,i am not asking about    
those reasons which depend on           
conjecture1 which are dragged every way 
by discussions1 and which do not  admit 
any necessity of persuasion4 ,let the   
geometricians look to that1 who  profess
 not to persuade men to believe them1   
but to compel them to do so2  and who   
prove to you everything that they       
describe4 ,i am not asking these  men   
for those principles of the             
mathematicians1 which1 if they be not   
granted1 they cannot advance a single   
step2 such as that a point is a  thing  
which has no magnitude1--that an        
extremity or levelness1 as it were1  is 
a space which has no thickness1--that a 
line is length without breadth4  ,though

 ,i should grant that all these axioms  
are true1 if ,i were to add an  oath1 do
 you think a wise man would swear that  
the sun is many degrees  greater than   
the earth1 before ,archimedes had1      
before his eyes1 made out  all those    
calculations by which it is proved8 ,if 
he does1 then he will be  despising the 
sun which he considers a god4 ,but if he
 will not believe the  mathematical     
calculations which employ a sort of     
constraint in  teaching1--as you        
yourselves say1--surely he will be very 
far from believing  the arguments of    
philosophers2 or1 if he does believe any
 such1 which  school will he believe8   
,one may explain all the principles of  
natural  philosophers1 but it would take
 a long time3 ,i ask1 however1 whom he  
will  follow8 ,suppose for a moment that
 some one is now being made a wise man1 
but is not one yet1--what system and    
what school shall he select above all   
others8 ,for1 whatever one he selects1  
he will select while he is still        

unwise4 ,but grant that he is a man of  
godlike genius1 which of all the        
natural philosophers will he approve of 
above all others8 ,for he cannot        
approve of more than one4 ,i will not   
pursue an infinite number of  questions2
 only let us see whom he will approve of
 with respect to the  elements of things
 of which all things are composed2 for  
there is a great  disagreement among the
 greatest men on this subject4          
,,xxxvii4 ,first of all1 ,thales1 one of
 the seven1 to whom they say that the   
other six yielded the preeminence1 said 
that everything originated out of       
water2 but he failed to convince        
,anaximander1 his countryman and        
companion1 of this theory2 for his idea 
was that there was an infinity of       
nature from which all things were       
produced4 ,after him1 his pupil1        
,anaximenes1 said that the air was      
infinite1 but that the things which were
  generated from it were finite2 and    
that the earth1 and water1 and fire1    

were generated1 and that from them was  
produced everything else4  ,anaxagoras  
said that matter was infinite2 but that 
from it were produced  minute particles 
resembling one another2 that at first   
they were confused1  but afterwards     
brought into order by divine intellect4 
,xenophanes1 who was  a little more     
ancient still1 asserted that all things 
were only one single  being1 and that   
that being was immutable and a god1 not 
born1 but  everlasting1 of a globular   
form4 ,parmenides considered that it is 
fire  that moves the earth1 which is    
formed out of it4 ,leucippus thought    
that  there was a plenum1 and a vacuum2 
,democritus resembled him in this  idea1
 but was more copious on other matters3 
,empedocles adopts the theory  of the   
four ordinary and commonly known        
elements4 ,heraclitus refers  everything
 to fire2 ,melissus thinks that what    
exists is infinite1  immutable1 always  
has existed1 and always will4 ,plato    
thinks that the  world was made by ,god1

 so as to be eternal1 out of matter     
which collects  everything to itself4   
,the ,pythagoreans affirm that          
everything proceeds  from numbers1 and  
from the principles of mathematicians4  
,now of all these different teachers the
 wise man will1 ,i imagine1 select  some
 one to follow2 all the rest1 numerous1 
and great men as they are1  will be     
discarded by him and condemned2 but     
whichever doctrine he approves  of he   
will retain in his mind1 being          
comprehended in the same manner as      
those things which he comprehends by    
means of the senses2 nor will he feel   
any greater certainty of the fact of its
 now being day1 than1 since he is  a    
,stoic1 of this world being wise1 being 
endowed with intellect1 which has  made 
both itself and the world1 and which    
regulates1 sets in motion1 and  governs 
everything4 ,he will also be persuaded  
that the sun1 and moon1 and  all the    
stars1 and the earth1 and sea1 are gods1
 because a certain animal  intelligence 

pervades and passes through them all3   
but nevertheless that  it will happen   
some day or other that all this world   
will be burnt up with  fire4            
,,xxxviii4 ,suppose that all this is    
true3 7for you see already that ,i admit
  that something is true17 still ,i deny
 that these things are comprehended  and
 perceived4 ,for when that wise ,stoic  
of yours has repeated all that to  you1 
syllable by syllable1 ,aristotle will   
come forward pouring forth a  golden    
stream of eloquence1 and pronounce him a
 fool2 and assert that the  world has   
never had a beginning1 because there    
never existed any beginning  of so      
admirable a work from the adoption of a 
new plan3 and that the world  is so     
excellently made in every part that no  
power could be great enough  to cause   
such motion1 and such changes2 nor could
 any time whatever be  long enough to   
produce an old age capable of causing   
all this beauty to  decay and perish4   
,it will be indispensable for you to    

deny this1 and to  defend the former    
doctrine as you would your own life and 
reputation2 may  ,i not have even leave 
to entertain a doubt on the matter8 ,to 
say nothing  about the folly of people  
who assent to propositions rashly1 what 
value am  ,i to set upon a liberty which
 will not allow to me what is necessary 
for  you8 ,why did ,god1 when he was    
making everything for the sake of man1  
7for  this is your doctrine17 make such 
a multitude of water-serpents and       
vipers8 ,why did he scatter so many     
pernicious and fatal things over the    
earth8 ,you assert that all this        
universe could not have been made so    
beautifully and so ingeniously without  
some godlike wisdom2 the majesty of     
which you trace down even to the        
perfection of bees and ants2 so that it 
would seem that there must have been a  
,myrmecides7#ab7 among the gods2 the    
maker of all animated things4    ,you   
say that nothing can have any power     
without ,god4 ,exactly opposite is  the 

doctrine of ,strato of ,lampsacus1 who  
gives that ,god of his exemption  from  
all important business4 ,but as the     
priests of the gods have a  holiday1 how
 much more reasonable is it that the    
gods should have one  themselves8 ,he   
then asserts that he has no need of the 
aid of the gods to  account for the     
making of the world4 ,everything that   
exists1 he says1 was  made by ,nature3  
not agreeing with that other philosopher
 who teaches1 that  the universe is a   
concrete mass of rough and smooth1 and  
hooked and  crooked bodies1 with the    
addition of a vacuum3 this he calls a   
dream of  ,democritus1 and says that he 
is here not teaching1 but wishing2--but 
he  himself1 examining each separate    
part of the world1 teaches that whatever
  exists1 and whatever is done1 is      
caused1 or has been caused1 by natural  
weights and motions4 ,in this way he    
releases ,god from a great deal of hard 
work1 and me from fear2 for who is there
 who1 7when he thinks that he is  an    

object of divine care17 does not feel an
 awe of the divine power day  and night8
 ,and who1 whenever any misfortunes     
happen to him 7and what man  is there to
 whom none happen87 feels a dread lest  
they may have befallen  him             
deservedly--not1 indeed1 that ,i agree  
with that2 but neither do ,i with  you3 
at one time ,i think one doctrine more  
probable1 and at other times ,i  incline
 to the other4    ,,xxxix4 ,all these   
mysteries1 ,o ,lucullus1 lie concealed  
and enveloped in  darkness so thick that
 no human ingenuity has a sight         
sufficiently  piercing to penetrate into
 heaven1 and dive into the earth4 ,we do
 not  understand our own bodies3 we do  
not know what is the situation of their 
different parts1 or what power each part
 has3 therefore1 the physicians         
themselves1 whose business it was to    
understand these things1 have opened    
bodies in order to lay those parts open 
to view4 ,and yet empirics say that     
they are not the better known for that2 

because it is possible that1 by  being  
laid open and uncovered1 they may be    
changed4 ,but is it possible for  us1 in
 the same manner1 to anatomize1 and     
open1 and dissect the natures of        
things1 so as to see whether the earth  
is firmly fixed on its foundations  and 
sticks firm on its roots1 if ,i may so  
say1 or whether it hangs in the  middle 
of a vacuum8 ,xenophanes says that the  
moon is inhabited1 and that  it is a    
country of many cities and mountains4   
,these assertions seem  strange1 but the
 man who has made them could not take   
his oath that such  is the case2 nor    
could ,i take mine that it is not the   
case4 ,you also say  that1 opposite to  
us1 on the contrary side of the earth1  
there are people  who stand with their  
feet opposite to our feet1 and you call 
them  ,antipodes4 ,why are you more     
angry with me1 who do not despise these 
theories1 than with those who1 when they
 hear them1 think that you are  beside  
yourselves8    ,hiretas of ,syracuse1 as

 ,theophrastus tells us1 thinks that the
 sun1 and  moon1 and stars1 and all the 
heavenly bodies1 in short1 stand still2 
and  that nothing in the world moves    
except the earth2 and1 as that turns and
  revolves on its own axis with the     
greatest rapidity1 he thinks that       
everything is made to appear by it as if
 it were the heaven which is moved      
while the earth stands still4 ,and1     
indeed1 some people think that ,plato1  
in the ,timus1 asserts this1 only rather
 obscurely4 ,what is your opinion1      
,epicurus8 ,speak4 ,do you think that   
the sun is so small8--,do ,i8 ,do you   
yourselves think it so large8 ,but all  
of you are ridiculed by him1 and you  in
 your turn mock him4 ,socrates1 then1 is
 free from this ridicule1 and so  is    
,ariston of ,chios1 who thinks that none
 of these matters can be known4    ,but 
,i return to the mind and body4 ,is it  
sufficiently known by us what is  the   
nature of the sinews and of the veins8  
,do we comprehend what the mind         

is8--where it is8--or1 in short1 whether
 it exists at all1 or whether1 as       
,dicarchus thinks1 there is no such     
thing whatever8 ,if there is such a     
thing1 do we know whether it has three  
divisions1 as ,plato thought2 those  of 
reason1 anger1 and desire8--or whether  
it is single and uniform8 ,if it  is    
single and uniform1 do we know whether  
it is fire1 or breath1 or  blood8--or1  
as ,xenocrates says1 number without a   
body8--though1 what sort of  thing that 
is1 is not very easy to understand4 ,and
 whatever it is1 do we  know whether it 
is mortal or eternal8 ,for many         
arguments are alleged on  both sides4   
,,xl4 ,some of these theories seem      
certain to your wise man3 but ours does 
not even see what is most probable2 so  
nearly equal in weight are the  opposite
 arguments in most cases4 ,if you       
proceed more modestly1 and  reproach me1
 not because ,i do not assent to your   
reasoning1 but because ,i  do not assent
 to any1 ,i will not resist any further3

 but ,i will select  some one with whom 
,i may agree4 ,whom shall ,i            
choose8--whom8 ,democritus8  for1 as you
 know1 ,i have always been a favourer of
 noble birth4 ,i shall be  at once      
overwhelmed with the reproaches of your 
whole body4 ,can you think1  they will  
say to me1 that there is any vacuum1    
when everything is so  filled and close 
packed that whenever any body leaves its
 place and moves1  the place which it   
leaves is immediately occupied by some  
other body8 ,or  can you believe that   
there are any atoms to which whatever is
 made by  their combination is entirely 
unlike8 or that any excellent thing can 
be  made without intellect8 ,and1 since 
this admirable beauty is found in one   
world1 do you think that there are also 
innumerable other worlds1 above1  below1
 on the right hand and on the left1     
before1 and behind1 some unlike  this   
one1 and some of the same kind8 ,and1 as
 we are now at ,bauli1 and are          
beholding ,puteoli1 do you think that   

there are in other places like these  a 
countless host of men1 of the same names
 and rank1 and exploits1 and  talents1  
and appearances1 and ages1 arguing on   
the same subjects8 ,and if  at this     
moment1 or when we are asleep1 we seem  
to see anything in our  mind1 do you    
think that those images enter from      
without1 penetrating into  our minds    
through our bodies8 ,you can never adopt
 such ideas as these1 or  give your     
assent to such preposterous notions4 ,it
 is better to have no  ideas at all than
 to have such erroneous ones as these4  
,your object1 then1 is not to make me   
sanction anything by my assent4 ,if it  
were1 consider whether it would not be  
an impudent1 not to say an arrogant     
demand1 especially as these principles  
of yours do not seem to me to be  even  
probable4 ,for ,i do not believe that   
there is any such thing as  divination1 
which you assent to2 and ,i also despise
 fate1 by which you say  that everything
 is regulated4 ,i do not even believe   

that this world was  formed by divine   
wisdom2 or1 ,i should rather say1 ,i do 
not know whether it  was so formed or   
not4    ,,xli4 ,but why should you seek 
to disparage me8 ,may ,i not confess    
that ,i do  not understand what ,i      
really do not8 ,or may the ,stoics argue
 with one  other1 and may ,i not argue  
with them8 ,zeno1 and nearly all the    
rest of the  ,stoics1 consider ther as  
the ,supreme ,god1 being endued with    
reason1 by  which everything is         
governed4 ,cleanthes1 who we may call a 
,stoic1 ,majorum  ,gentium1 the pupil of
 ,zeno1 thinks that the ,sun has the    
supreme rule over  and government of    
everything4 ,we are compelled1          
therefore1 by the  dissensions of these 
wise men1 to be ignorant of our own     
ruler1 inasmuch  as we do not know      
whether we are subjects of the ,sun or  
of ther4 ,but the  great size of the    
sun1 7for this present radiance of his  
appears to be  looking at me17 warns me 
to make frequent mention of him4 ,now   

you all  speak of his magnitude as if   
you had measured it with a ten-foot     
rule1  7though ,i refuse credit to your 
measurement1 looking on you as but bad  
architects47 ,is there then any room for
 doubt1 which of us1 to speak as  gently
 as possible1 is the more modest of the 
two8 ,not1 however1 that ,i  think those
 questions of the natural philosophers  
deserving of being  utterly banished    
from our consideration2 for the         
consideration and  contemplation of     
nature is a sort of natural food1 if ,i 
may say so1 for  our minds and talents4 
,we are elevated by it1 we seem to be   
raised above  the earth1 we look down on
 human affairs2 and by fixing our       
thoughts on  high and heavenly things we
 despise the affairs of this life1 as   
small and  inconsiderable4 ,the mere    
investigation of things of the greatest 
importance1 which are at the same time  
very secret1 has a certain pleasure  in 
it4 ,and when anything meets us which   
appears likely1 our minds are  filled   

with pleasure thoroughly worthy of a    
man4 ,both your wise man and  ours1     
then1 will inquire into these things2   
but yours will do so in order  to       
assent1 to feel belief1 to express      
affirmation2 ours1 with such  feelings  
that he will fear to yield rashly to    
opinion1 and will think that  he has    
succeeded admirably if in matters of    
this kind he has found out  anything    
which is likely4    ,let us now come to 
the question of the knowledge of good   
and evil4 ,but we  must say a few words 
by way of preface4 ,it appears to me    
that they who  speak so positively about
 those questions of natural philosophy1 
do not  reflect that they are depriving 
themselves of the authority of those    
ideas  which appear more clear4 ,for    
they cannot give a clearer assent to1 or
 a  more positive approval of the fact  
that it is now daylight1 than they do1  
when the crow croaks1 to the idea that  
it is commanding or prohibiting         
something4 ,nor will they affirm that   

that statue is six feet high more       
positively after they have measured it1 
than that the sun1 which they  cannot   
measure1 is more than eighteen times as 
large as the earth4 ,from  which this   
conclusion arises3 if it cannot be      
perceived how large the sun  is1 he who 
assents to other things in the same     
manner as he does to the  magnitude of  
the sun1 does not perceive them4 ,but   
the magnitude of the sun  cannot be     
perceived4 ,he1 then1 who assents to a  
statement about it1 as if  he perceived 
it1 perceives nothing4 ,suppose they    
were to reply that it is  possible to   
perceive how large the sun is2 ,i will  
not object as long as  they admit that  
other things too can be perceived and   
comprehended in the  same manner4 ,for  
they cannot affirm that one thing can be
 comprehended  more or less than        
another1 since there is only one        
definition of the  comprehension of     
everything4    ,,xlii4 ,however1 to go  
back to what ,i had begun to say--,what 

have we in good  and bad certainly      
ascertained8 7we must1 of course1 fix   
boundaries to  which the sum of good and
 evil is to be referred27 what subject1 
in fact1  is there about which there is 
a greater disagreement between the most 
learned men8 ,i say nothing about those 
points which seem now to be  abandoned2 
or about ,herillus1 who places the chief
 good in knowledge and  science3 and    
though he had been a pupil of ,zeno1 you
 see how far he  disagrees with him1 and
 how very little he differs from ,plato4
 ,the school  of the ,megaric           
philosophers was a very celebrated one2 
and its chief1 as ,i  see it stated in  
books1 was ,xenophanes1 whom ,i         
mentioned just now4 ,after  him came    
,parmenides and ,zeno2 and from them the
 ,eleatic philosophers get  their name4 
,afterwards came ,euclid of ,megara1 a  
pupil of ,socrates1 from  whom that     
school got the name of ,megaric4 ,and   
they defined that as the  only good     
which was always one1 alike1 and        

identical4 ,they also borrowed a  great 
deal from ,plato4 ,but the ,eretrian    
philosophers1 who were so called  from  
,menedumus1 because he was a native of  
,eretria1 placed all good in the  mind1 
and in that acuteness of the mind by    
which the truth is discerned4  ,the     
,megarians say very nearly the same1    
only that they1 ,i think1 develop  their
 theory with more elegance and richness 
of illustration4 ,if we now  despise    
these men1 and think them worthless1 at 
all events we ought to  show more       
respect for ,ariston1 who1 having been a
 pupil of ,zeno1 adopted  in reality the
 principles which he had asserted in    
words2 namely1 that  there was nothing  
good except virtue1 and nothing evil    
except what was  contrary to virtue2 and
 who denied altogether the existence of 
those  influences which ,zeno contended 
for as being intermediate1 and neither  
good nor evil4 ,his idea of the chief   
good1 is being affected in neither      
direction by these circumstances2 and   

this state of mind he calls  2 but      
,pyrrho asserts that the wise man does  
not even feel them2  and that state is  
called 4    ,to say nothing1 then1 of   
all these opinions1 let us now examine  
those  others which have been long and  
vigorously maintained4 ,some have       
accounted  pleasure the chief good2 the 
chief of whom was ,aristippus1 who had  
been a  pupil of ,socrates1 and from    
whom the ,cyrenaic school spring4 ,after
 him  came ,epicurus1 whose school is   
now better known1 though he does not    
exactly agree with the ,cyrenaics about 
pleasure itself4 ,but ,callipho  thought
 that pleasure and honour combined made 
up the chief good4  ,hieronymus placed  
it in being free from all annoyance2    
,diodorus in this  state when combined  
with honour4 ,both these last men were  
,peripatetics4 ,to  live honourably1    
enjoying those things which nature makes
 most dear to  man1 was the definition  
both of the ,old ,academy1 7as we may   
learn from the  writings of ,polemo1 who

 is highly approved of by ,antiochus17  
and of  ,aristotle1 and it is the one to
 which his friends appear now to come   
nearest4 ,carneades also introduced a   
definition1 7not because he approved  of
 it himself1 but for the sake of        
opposition to the ,stoics17 that the    
chief good is to enjoy those things     
which nature has made man consider as   
most desirable4 ,but ,zeno laid it down 
that that honourableness which  arises  
from conformity to nature is the chief  
good4 ,and ,zeno was the  founder and   
chief of the ,stoic school4    ,,xliii4 
,this now is plain enough1 that all     
these chief goods which ,i have         
mentioned have a chief evil             
corresponding to them1 which is their   
exact  opposite4 ,i now put it to you1  
whom shall ,i follow8 only do not let   
any  one make me so ignorant and absurd 
a reply as1 ,any one1 provided only that
  you follow some one or other4 ,nothing
 more inconsiderate can be said3 ,i     
wish to follow the ,stoics4 ,will       

,antiochus1 7,i do not say ,aristotle1 a
 man  almost1 in my opinion1 unrivalled 
as a philosopher1 but will ,antiochus7  
give me leave8 ,and he was called an    
,academic2 but he would have been1 with 
very little alteration1 something very  
like a ,stoic4 ,the matter shall now  be
 brought to a decision4 ,for we must    
either give the wise man to the  ,stoics
 or to the ,old ,academy4 ,he cannot    
belong to both2 for the contention      
between them is not one about           
boundaries1 but about the whole         
territory4  ,for the whole system of    
life depends on the definition of the   
chief good2  and those who differ on    
that point1 differ about the whole      
system of life4  ,it is impossible1     
therefore1 that those of both these     
schools should be  wise1 since they     
differ so much from one another3 but one
 of them only can  be so4 ,if it be the 
disciple of ,polemo1 then the ,stoic is 
wrong1 who  assents to an error3 and you
 say that nothing is so incompatible    

with the  character of a wise man as    
that4 ,but if the principles of ,zeno be
 true1  then we must say the same of the
 ,old ,academics and of the             
,peripatetics2  and as ,i do not know   
which is the more wise of the two1 ,i   
give my assent  to neither4 ,what8 when 
,antiochus in some points disagrees with
 the ,stoics  whom he is so fond of1    
does he not show that these principles  
cannot be  approved of by a wise man8   
,the ,stoics assert that all offences   
are equal3 but ,antiochus energetically 
resists this doctrine4 ,at least1 let me
 consider before ,i decide which        
opinion ,i will embrace4 ,cut the matter
 short1 says he1 do at last decide  on  
something4 ,what8 ,the reasons which are
 given appear to me to be both  shrewd  
and nearly equal3 may ,i not then be on 
my guard against committing  a crime8   
for you called it a crime1 ,lucullus1 to
 violate a principle2 ,i1  therefore1   
restrain myself1 lest ,i should assent  
to what ,i do not  understand2 and this 

principle ,i have in common with you4   
,here1 however1 is a much greater       
difference4--,zeno thinks that a happy  
life  depends on virtue alone4 ,what    
says ,antiochus8 ,he admits that this is
 true  of a happy life1 but not of the  
happiest possible life4 ,the first is a 
god1 who thinks that nothing can be     
wanting to virtue2 the latter is a      
miserable man1 who thinks that there are
 many things besides virtue1 some  of   
which are dear to a man1 and some even  
necessary4 ,but ,i am afraid that  the  
former may be attributing to virtue more
 than nature can bear2  especially since
 ,theophrastus has said many things with
 eloquence and  copiousness on this     
subject2 and ,i fear that even he may   
not be quite  consistent with himself4  
,for though he admits that there are    
some evils  both of body and fortune1 he
 nevertheless thinks that a man may be  
happy  who is afflicted by them all1    
provided he is wise4 ,i am perplexed    
here2 at  one time the one opinion      

appears to me to be more probable1 and  
at another  time the other does4 ,and   
yet1 unless one or the other be true1 ,i
 think  virtue must be entirely trampled
 under foot4    ,,xliv4 ,however1 they  
differ as to this principle4 ,what then8
 ,can we  approve1 as true1 of those    
maxims on which they agree2 namely1 that
 the  mind of the wise man is never     
influenced by either desire or joy8     
,come1  suppose this opinion is a       
probable one1 is this other one so too2 
namely1  that it never feels either     
alarm or grief8 ,cannot the wise fear8  
,and if  his country be destroyed1      
cannot he grieve8 ,that seems harsh1 but
 ,zeno  thinks it inevitable2 for he    
considers nothing good except what is   
honourable4 ,but you do not think it    
true in the least1 ,antiochus4 ,for you 
admit that there are many good things   
besides honour1 and many evils  besides 
baseness2 and it is inevitable that the 
wise man must fear such  when coming1   
and grieve when they have come4 ,but ,i 

ask when it was decided  by the ,old    
,academy that they were to deny that the
 mind of the wise man  could be agitated
 or disturbed8 ,they approved of        
intermediate states1 and  asserted that 
there was a kind of natural mean in     
every agitation4 ,we have  all read the 
treatise on ,grief1 by ,crantor1 a      
disciple of the ,old ,academy4  ,it is  
not large1 but it is a golden book1 and 
one1 as ,pantius tells  ,tubero1 worth  
learning by heart4 ,and these men used  
to say that those  agitations were very 
profitably given to our minds by nature2
 fear1 in  order that we may take care2 
pity and melancholy they called the     
whetstone  of our clemency2 and anger   
itself that of our courage4 ,whether    
they were  right or wrong we may        
consider another time4 ,how it was that 
those stern  doctrines of yours forced  
their way into the ,old ,academy ,i do  
not know1  but ,i cannot bear them2 not 
because they have anything in them      
particularly disagreeable to me2 for    

many of the marvellous doctrines of  the
 ,stoics1 which men call 1 are derived  
from ,socrates4 ,but where  has         
,xenocrates or where has ,aristotle     
touched these points8 ,for you try to   
make out the ,stoics to be the same as  
these men4 ,would they ever say that    
wise men were the only kings1 the only  
rich1 the only handsome men8 that       
everything everywhere belonged to the   
wise man8 that no one was a consul1  or 
prtor1 or general1 or even1 for aught ,i
 know1 a quinquevir1 but the  wise man8 
lastly1 that he was the only citizen1   
the only free man8 and  that all who are
 destitute of wisdom are foreigners1    
exiles1 slaves1 or  madmen8 last of all1
 that the writings of ,lycurgus and     
,solon and our  ,twelve ,tables are not 
laws8 that there are even no cities or  
states except  those which are peopled  
by wise men8 ,now these maxims1 ,o      
,lucullus1 if you  agree with           
,antiochus1 your own friend1 must be    
defended by you as  zealously as the    

bulwarks of your city2 but ,i am only   
bound to uphold them  with moderation1  
just as much as ,i think fit4    ,,xlv4 
,i have read in ,clitomachus1 that when 
,carneades and ,diogenes the  ,stoic    
were standing in the capitol before the 
senate1 ,aulus ,albonus 7who  was prtor 
at the time1 in the consulship of       
,publius ,scipio and ,marcus            
,marcellus1 the same ,albonus who was   
consul1 ,lucullus1 with your own        
grandfather1 a learned man1 as his own  
history shows1 which is written in      
,greek7 said jestingly to               
,carneades--8,i do not1 ,o ,carneades1  
seem to you to  be prtor because ,i am  
not wise1 nor does this seem to be a    
city1 nor do  the inhabitants seem to be
 citizens1 for the same reason40 ,and he
  answered--8,that is the ,stoic        
doctrine40 ,aristotle or ,xenocrates1   
whom  ,antiochus wished to follow1 would
 have had no doubt that he was prtor1   
and ,rome a city1 and that it was       
inhabited by citizens4 ,but our friend  

is1  as ,i said before1 a manifest      
,stoic1 though he talks a little        
nonsense4    ,but you are all afraid for
 me1 lest ,i should descend to opinions1
 and  adopt and approve of something    
that ,i do not understand2 which you    
would  be very sorry for me to do4 ,what
 advice do you give me8 ,chrysippus     
often  testifies that there are three   
opinions only about the chief good which
  can be defended2 he cuts off and      
discards all the rest4 ,he says that    
either honour is the chief good1 or     
pleasure1 or both combined4 ,for that   
those who say that the chief good is to 
be free from all annoyance1 shun  the   
unpopular name of pleasure1 but hover   
about its neighbourhood4 ,and  those    
also do the same who combine that       
freedom from annoyance with  honour4    
,and those do not much differ from them 
who unite to honour the  chief          
advantages of nature4 ,so he leaves     
three opinions which he thinks  may be  
maintained by probable arguments4    ,be

 it so4 ,although ,i am not easily to be
 moved from the definition of  ,polemo  
and the ,peripatetics1 and ,antiochus1  
nor have ,i anything more  probable to  
bring forward4 ,still1 ,i see how       
sweetly pleasure allures our  senses4 ,i
 am inclined to agree with ,epicurus or 
,aristippus4 ,but virtue  recalls me1 or
 rather leads me back with her hand2    
says that these are the  feelings of    
cattle1 and that man is akin to the     
,deity4 ,i may take a middle  course2 so
 that1 since ,aristippus1 as if we had  
no mind1 defends nothing  but the body1 
and ,zeno espouses the cause of the mind
 alone1 as if we were  destitute of     
body1 ,i may follow ,callipho1 whose    
opinion ,carneades used to  defend with 
such zeal1 that he appeared wholly to   
approve of it2 although  ,clitomachus   
affirmed that he never could understand 
what ,carneades  approved of4 ,but if ,i
 were to choose to follow him1 would not
 truth  itself1 and all sound and proper
 reason1 oppose me8 ,will you1 when     

honour  consists in despising pleasure1 
unite honour to pleasure1 joining1 as it
  were1 a man to a beast8    ,,xlvi4    
,there is now1 then1 only one pair of   
combatants left--pleasure and  honour2  
between which ,chrysippus1 as far as ,i 
can see1 was not long in  perplexity how
 to decide4 ,if you follow the one1 many
 things are  overthrown1 especially the 
fellowship of the human race1 affection1
  friendship1 justice1 and all other    
virtues1 none of which can exist at all 
without disinterestedness3 for the      
virtue which is impelled to action by   
pleasure1 as by a sort of wages1 is not 
really virtue1 but only a  deceitful    
imitation and pretence of virtue4       
,listen1 on the contrary1 to  those men 
who say that they do not even understand
 the name of honour1  unless we call    
that honourable which is accounted      
reputable by the  multitude2 that the   
source of all good is in the body2 that 
this is the  law1 and rule1 and command 
of nature2 and that he who departs from 

it will  never have any object in life  
to follow4 ,do you think1 then1 that ,i 
am not  moved when ,i hear these and    
innumerable other statements of the same
 kind8  ,i am moved as much as you are1 
,lucullus2 and you need not think me    
less a  man than yourself4 ,the only    
difference is that you1 when you are    
agitated1  acquiesce1 assent1 and       
approve2 you consider the impression    
which you have  received true1 certain1 
comprehended1 perceived1 established1   
firm1 and  unalterable2 and you cannot  
be moved or driven from it by any means 
whatever4 ,i think that there is nothing
 of such a kind that1 if ,i assent  to  
it1 ,i shall not often be assenting to  
what is false2 since there is no        
distinct line of demarcation between    
what is true and what is false1         
especially as the science of dialectics 
has no power of judging on this         
subject4    ,i come now to the third    
part of philosophy4 ,there is an idea   
advanced by  ,protagoras1 who thinks    

that that is true to each individual    
which seems so  to him2 and a completely
 different one put forward by the       
,cyrenaics1 who  think that there is no 
such thing as certain judgment about    
anything  except the inner feelings3 and
 a third1 different from either1        
maintained  by ,epicurus1 who places all
 judgment in the senses1 and in our     
notions of  things1 and in pleasure4    
,but ,plato considered that the whole   
judgment of  truth1 and that truth      
itself1 being abstracted from opinions  
and from the  senses1 belonged to the   
province of thought and of the          
intellect4 ,does our  friend ,antiochus 
approve of any of these principles8 ,he 
does not even  approve of those who may 
be called his own ancestors in          
philosophy3 for  where does he follow   
,xenocrates1 who has written a great    
many books on the  method of speaking1  
which are highly esteemed8--or          
,aristotle himself1 than  whom there is 
no more acute or elegant writer8 ,he    

never goes one step  without            
,chrysippus4    ,,xlvii4 ,do we then1   
who are called ,academics1 misuse the   
glory of this  name8 or why are we to be
 compelled to follow those men who      
differ from  one another8 ,in this very 
thing1 which the dialecticians teach    
among the  elements of their art1 how   
one ought to judge whether an argument  
be true  or false which is connected in 
this manner1 8,if it is day1 it shines10
 how  great a contest there             
is2--,diodorus has one opinion1 ,philo  
another1  ,chrysippus a third4 ,need ,i 
say more8 ,in how many points does      
,chrysippus  himself differ from        
,cleanthes1 his own teacher8 ,again1 do 
not two of the  very princes of the     
dialecticians1 ,antipater and           
,archidemus1 men most  devoted to       
hypothesis1 disagree in numbers of      
things8 ,why then1 ,lucullus1  do you   
seek to bring me into odium1 and drag   
me1 as it were1 before the  assembly8   
,and why1 as seditious tribunes often   

do1 do you order all the  shops to be   
shut8 ,for what is your object when you 
complain that all  trades are being     
suppressed by us1 if it be not to excite
 the artisans8  ,but1 if they all come  
together from all quarters1 they will be
 easily  excited against you2 for1 first
 of all1 ,i will cite all those         
unpopular  expressions of yours when you
 called all those1 who will then be in  
the  assembly1 exiles1 and slaves1 and  
madmen3 and then ,i will come to those  
arguments which touch not the multitude1
 but you yourselves who are here        
present4 ,for ,zeno and ,antiochus both 
deny that any of you know anything4     
,how so8 you will say2 for we allege1 on
 the other hand1 that even a man        
without wisdom comprehends many things4 
,but you affirm that no one except  a   
wise man knows one single thing4 ,and   
,zeno professed to illustrate this  by a
 piece of action2 for when he stretched 
out his fingers1 and showed  the palm of
 his hand1 8,perception10 said he1 8is a

 thing like this40 ,then1  when he had a
 little closed his fingers1 8,assent is 
like this40  ,afterwards1 when he had   
completely closed his hand1 and held    
forth his  fist1 that1 he said1 was     
comprehension4 ,from which simile he    
also gave  that state a name which it   
had not before1 and called it 4 ,but    
when he brought his left hand against   
his right1 and with it took a firm  and 
tight hold of his fist1 knowledge1 he   
said1 was of that character2 and  that  
was what none but a wise man possessed4 
,but even those who are  themselves wise
 men do not venture to say so1 nor any  
one who has ever  lived and been a wise 
man4 ,according to that theory1 you1    
,catulus1 do not  know that it is       
daylight2 and you1 ,hortensius1 are     
ignorant that we are  now in your villa4
    ,now1 are these arguments less      
formidable than yours8 ,they are not1   
perhaps1 very refined2 and those others 
show more acuteness4 ,but1 just as  you 
said1 that if nothing could be          

comprehended1 all the arts were         
destroyed at once1 and would not grant  
that mere probability was a  sufficient 
foundation for art2 so ,i now reply to  
you1 that art cannot  exist without     
knowledge4 ,would ,zeuxis1 or ,phidias1 
or ,polycletus allow  that they knew    
nothing1 when they were men of such     
marvellous skill8 ,but  if any one had  
explained to them how much power        
knowledge was said to  have1 they would 
cease to be angry2 they would not even  
be offended with  us1 when they had     
learnt that we were only putting an end 
to what did not  exist anywhere2 but    
that we left them what was quite        
sufficient for them4    ,and this       
doctrine is confirmed also by the       
diligence of our ancestors1 who         
ordained1 in the first place1 that every
 one should swear 8according to  the    
opinion of his own mind20 secondly1 that
 he should be accounted guilty  8if he  
knowingly swore falsely10 because there 
was a great deal of  ignorance in life2 

thirdly1 that the man who was giving his
 evidence  should say that 8he thought10
 even in a case where he was speaking of
 what  he had actually seen himself4    
,and that when the judges were giving   
their  decision on their evidence1 they 
should say1 not that such and such a    
thing had been done1 but that such and  
such a thing appeared to them4          
,,xlviii4 ,but since the sailor is      
making signals1 and the west wind is    
showing us too1 by its murmur1 that it  
is time for us1 ,lucullus1 to set  sail1
 and since ,i have already said a great 
deal1 ,i must now conclude4 ,but        
hereafter1 when we inquire into these   
subjects1 we will discuss the great     
disagreements between the most eminent  
on the subject of the obscurity of      
nature1 and the errors of so many       
philosophers who differ from one another
  about good and evil so widely1 that1  
as more than one of their theories      
cannot be true1 it is inevitable that   
many illustrious schools must fall  to  

the ground1 rather than the theories    
about the false impressions of the  eyes
 and the other senses1 and sorites1 or  
false syllogism1--rods which the        
,stoics have made to beat themselves    
with4    ,then ,lucullus replied1 ,i am 
not at all sorry that we have had this  
discussion2 for often1 when we meet     
again1 especially in our ,tusculan      
villas1 we can examine other questions  
which seem worth investigation4         
,certainly1 said ,i2 but what does      
,catulus think8 and ,hortensius8 ,i8    
said  ,catulus4 ,i return to my father's
 opinion1 which he used to say was      
derived  from ,carneades1 and think that
 nothing can be perceived2 but still ,i 
imagine that a wise man will assent to  
what is not actually perceived--that  is
 to say1 will form opinions3 being1     
however1 aware at the same time that    
they are only opinions1 and knowing that
 there is nothing which can be          
comprehended and perceived4 ,and1       
practising that  so as to take          

probability for a guide in all things1  
,i altogether assent to that other      
doctrine1 that nothing can be perceived4
 ,i see your meaning1 said ,i2 and ,i   
do not very much object to it4 ,but what
 is your opinion1 ,hortensius8 ,he      
laughed1 and said1 ,i suspend my        
judgment4 ,i understand1 said ,i2 for   
that  is the peculiar principle of the  
,academy4    ,so1 after we had finished 
our discourse1 ,catulus remained behind1
 and we  went down to the shore to      
embark in our vessels4            ,a    
,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,chief ,,good    
,,and ,,evil4      ,introduction4       
,the following treatise was composed by 
,cicero a little before the  publication
 of his ,tusculan ,disputations4 ,it    
consists of a series of  ,dialogues1 in 
which the opinions of the different     
schools of ,greek  philosophy1          
especially the ,epicureans1 ,stoics1 and
 ,peripatetics1 on the  ,supreme ,good1 
as the proper object or end 7finis7 of  
our thoughts and  actions1 are          

investigated and compared4 ,it is       
usually reckoned one of the  most highly
 finished and valuable of his           
philosophical works2 though from  the   
abstruse nature of some of the topics   
dwelt upon1 and the subtlety of  some of
 the arguments adduced1 it is           
unquestionably the most difficult4      
,he gives an account himself of the work
 and of his design and plan in the      
following terms4 7,epist4 ad ,att4 xiii4
 #ai47 8,what ,i have lately written is 
in the manner of ,aristotle1 where the  
conversation is so managed that he      
himself has the principal part4 ,i have 
finished the five books ,de ,finibus    
,bonorum et ,malorum1 so as to give the 
,epicurean doctrine to ,lucius          
,torquatus1 the ,stoic to ,marcus ,cato1
 and the ,peripatetic to ,marcus ,cato4 
,for ,i considered that their being dead
 would preclude all jealousy40 ,he  does
 not1 however1 maintain the unity of    
scene or character throughout the  five 
books4 ,in the first book he relates a  

discussion which is represented  as     
having taken place in his villa near    
,cum1 in the presence of ,caius         
,valerius ,triarius1 between himself and
 ,lucius ,manlius ,torquatus1 who is    
spoken of as being just about to enter  
his office as prtor1 a  circumstance    
which fixes the date of this imaginary  
discussion to ,b4,c4 #ej1  a time       
agreeing with the allusion 7,b4 ii4     
#ah17 to the great power of  ,pompey4   
,in the first book he attacks the       
doctrines of the ,epicurean  school1 and
 ,torquatus defends them1 alleging that 
they had been generally  misunderstood2 
and in the second book ,cicero          
enumerates the chief  arguments with    
which the ,stoics assailed them4    ,in 
the third book the scene is laid in the 
library of ,lucullus1 where  ,cicero had
 accidentally met ,cato2 and from       
conversing on the books by  which they  
were surrounded they proceeded to       
discuss the difference  between the     
ethics of the ,stoics1 and those of the 

,old ,academy and the  ,peripatetics2   
,cicero insisting that the disagreement 
was merely verbal and  not real1 and    
that ,zeno was wrong in leaving ,plato  
and ,aristotle and  establishing a new  
school2 but ,cato asserts1 on the other 
hand1 that the  difference is a real    
one1 and that the views held by the     
,stoics of the  ,supreme ,good are of a 
much loftier and purer character than   
those which  had been previously        
entertained4 ,in the fourth book ,cicero
 gives us the  arguments with which the 
philosophers of the ,new ,academy       
assailed the  ,stoics4 ,and this        
conversation is supposed to have been   
held two years  before that in the first
 book3 for at the beginning of ,book    
,,iv4 there is a  reference to the law  
for limiting the length of the speeches 
of counsel  passed in the second        
consulship of ,pompey1 ,b4,c4 #ee1 as   
being only just  passed4    ,in the     
fifth book we are carried back to ,b4,c4
 #gi1 and the scene is laid at  ,athens1

 where ,cicero was at that time under   
,antiochus and ,demetrius4 ,he  and his 
brother ,quintus1 ,lucius ,cicero his   
cousin1 ,pomponius ,atticus1 and        
,marcus ,pupius ,piso are represented as
 meeting in the ,academia2 and ,piso1   
at the request of his companions1 lays  
open the precepts inculcated by         
,aristotle and his school on the subject
 of the ,summum ,bonum2 after which     
,cicero states the objections of the    
,stoics to the ,peripatetic system1 and 
,piso replies4 ,while giving the        
opinions of these above-named sects with
  great fairness and impartiality       
,cicero abstains throughout from        
pronouncing any judgment of his own4    
,first ,book ,of ,the ,treatise ,on ,the
 ,chief ,good ,and ,evil4      ,i4 ,i   
was not ignorant1 ,brutus1 when ,i was  
endeavouring to add to ,latin           
literature the same things which        
philosophers of the most sublime genius 
and the most profound and accurate      
learning had previously handled in the  

,greek language1 that my labours would  
be found fault with on various  grounds4
 ,for some1 and those too1 far from     
unlearned men1 are disinclined  to      
philosophy altogether2 some1 on the     
other hand1 do not blame a moderate     
degree of attention being given to it1  
but do not approve of so much study  and
 labour being devoted to it4 ,there will
 be others again1 learned in  ,greek    
literature and despising ,latin         
compositions1 who will say that they    
would rather spend their time in reading
 ,greek2 and1 lastly1 ,i suspect  that  
there will be some people who will      
insist upon it that ,i ought to  apply  
myself to other studies1 and will urge  
that1 although this style of  writing   
may be an elegant accomplishment1 it is 
still beneath my character  and dignity4
 ,and to all these objections ,i think  
,i ought to make a brief  reply2        
although1 indeed1 ,i have already given 
a sufficient answer to the  enemies of  
philosophy in that book in which        

philosophy is defended and  extolled by 
me after having been attacked and       
disparaged by  ,hortensius47#ac7 ,and as
 both you and others whom ,i considered 
competent  judges approved highly of    
that book1 ,i have undertaken a larger  
work1  fearing to appear able only to   
excite the desires of men1 but incapable
 of  retaining their attention4 ,but    
those who1 though they have a very good 
opinion of philosophy1 still think it   
should be followed in a moderate  degree
 only1 require a temperance which is    
very difficult in a thing  which1 when  
once it has the reins given it1 cannot  
be checked or  repressed2 so that ,i    
almost think those men more reasonable  
who altogether  forbid us to apply      
ourselves to philosophy at all1 than    
they who fix a  limit to things which   
are in their nature boundless1 and who  
require  mediocrity in a thing which is 
excellent exactly in proportion to its  
intensity4    ,for1 if it be possible   
that men should arrive at wisdom1 then  

it must not  only be acquired by us1 but
 even enjoyed4 ,or if this be difficult1
 still  there is no limit to the way in 
which one is to seek for truth except   
one  has found it2 and it is base to be 
wearied in seeking a thing1 when what   
we do seek for is the most honourable   
thing possible4 ,in truth1 if we are    
amused when we are writing1 who is so   
envious as to wish to deny us that      
pleasure8 ,if it is a labour to us1 who 
will fix a limit to another  person's   
industry8 ,for as the ,chremes7#ad7 of  
,terence does not speak from a          
disregard of what is due to men when he 
does not wish his new neighbour         
,to dig1 or plough1 or any toil endure3 
for he is not in this dissuading him    
from industry1 but only from such       
labour as is beneath a gentleman2 so1 on
 the other hand those men are over      
scrupulous who are offended by my       
devoting myself to a labour which is far
  from irksome to myself4    ,,ii4 ,it  
is more difficult to satisfy those men  

who allege that they despise  ,latin    
writings4 ,but1 first of all1 ,i may    
express my wonder at their not  being   
pleased with their native language in   
matters of the highest  importance1 when
 they are fond enough of reading fables 
in ,latin1  translated word for word    
from the ,greek4 ,for what man is such  
an enemy 7as  ,i may almost call it7 to 
the ,roman name1 as to despise or reject
 the ,medea  of ,ennius1 or the ,antiope
 of ,pacuvius8 and to express a dislike 
of ,latin  literature1 while at the same
 time he speaks of being pleased with   
the  plays of ,euripides8 8,what10 says 
such an one1 8shall ,i rather read the  
,synephebi of ,ccilius17#ae7 or the     
,andria of ,terence1 than either of     
these  plays in the original of         
,menander80 ,but ,i disagree with men of
 these  opinions so entirely1 that      
though ,sophocles has composed an       
,electra in the  most admirable manner  
possible1 still ,i think the indifferent
 translation  of it by ,atilius7#af7    

worth reading too1 though ,licinius     
calls him an iron  writer2 with much    
truth in my opinion2 still he is a      
writer whom it is  worth while to read4 
,for to be wholly unacquainted with our 
own poets is a  proof either of the     
laziest indolence1 or else of a very    
superfluous  fastidiousness4    ,my own 
opinion is1 that no one is sufficiently 
learned who is not well  versed in the  
works written in our own language4      
,shall we not be as  willing to read--  
,would that the pine1 the pride of      
,pelion's brow1      as the same idea   
when expressed in ,greek8 ,and is there 
any objection to  having the discussions
 which have been set out by ,plato1 on  
the subject of  living well and happily1
 arrayed in a ,latin dress8 ,and if we  
do not limit  ourselves to the office of
 translators1 but maintain those        
arguments which  have been advanced by  
people with whom we argue1 and add to   
them the  exposition of our own         
sentiments1 and clothe the whole in our 

own  language1 why then should people   
prefer the writings of the ,greeks to   
those things which are written by us in 
an elegant style1 without being         
translated from the works of ,greek     
philosophers8 ,for if they say that     
these matters have been discussed by    
those foreign writers1 then there       
surely is no necessity for their reading
 such a number of those ,greeks as  they
 do4 ,for what article of ,stoic        
doctrine has been passed over by        
,chrysippus8 ,and yet we read also      
,diogenes17#ag7 ,antipater17#ah7        
,mnesarchus17#ai7 ,pantius17#bj7 and    
many others1 and especially the works of
  my own personal friend                
,posidonius47#ba7 ,what shall we say of 
,theophrastus8  ,is it but a moderate   
pleasure which he imparts to us while he
 is handling  the topics which had been 
previously dilated on by ,aristotle8    
,what shall  we say of the ,epicureans8 
,do they pass over the subjects on which
 ,epicurus  himself and other ancient   

writers have previously written1 and    
forbear to  deliver their sentiments    
respecting them8 ,but if ,greek authors 
are read by  the ,greeks1 though        
discussing the same subjects over and   
over again1  because they deal with them
 in different manners1 why should not   
the  writings of ,roman authors be also 
read by our own countrymen8    ,,iii4   
,although if ,i were to translate ,plato
 or ,aristotle in as bold a  manner as  
our poets have translated the ,greek    
plays1 then1 ,i suppose1 ,i  should not 
deserve well at the hands of my         
fellow-countrymen1 for having  brought  
those divine geniuses within their      
reach4 ,however1 that is not  what ,i   
have hitherto done1 though ,i do not    
consider myself interdicted  from doing 
so4 ,some particular passages1 if ,i    
think it desirable1 ,i shall  translate1
 especially from those authors whom ,i  
have just named1 when  there is an      
opportunity of doing so with propriety2 
just as ,ennius often  translates       

passages from ,homer1 and ,afranius7#bb7
 from ,menander4 ,nor will  ,i1 like    
,lucilius1 make any objection to        
everybody reading my writings4 ,i       
should be glad to have that             
,persius7#bc7 for one of my readers2 and
 still  more to have ,scipio and        
,rutilius2 men whose criticism he       
professed to  fear1 saying that he wrote
 for the people of ,tarentum1 and       
,consentia1 and  ,sicily4 ,that was all 
very witty of him1 and in his usual     
style2 but still1  people at that time  
were not so learned as to give him cause
 to labour  much before he could        
encounter their judgment1 and his       
writings are of a  lightish character1  
showing indeed1 a high degree of good   
breeding1 but  only a moderate quantity 
of learning4 ,but whom can ,i fear to   
have read my  works when ,i ventured to 
address a book to you1 who are not      
inferior to  the ,greeks themselves in  
philosophical knowledge8 ,although ,i   
have this  excuse for what ,i am doing1 

that ,i have been challenged by you1 in 
that to  me most acceptable book which  
you sent me 8,on ,virtue40    ,but ,i   
imagine that some people have become    
accustomed to feel a repugnance  to     
,latin writing because they have fallen 
in with some unpolished and  inelegant  
treatises translated from bad ,greek    
into worse ,latin4 ,and with  those men 
,i agree1 provided they will not think  
it worth while to read the  ,greek books
 written on the same subject4 ,but who  
would object to read  works on important
 subjects expressed in well-selected    
diction1 with  dignity and elegance2    
unless1 indeed1 he wishes to be taken   
absolutely for  a ,greek1 as ,albucius  
was saluted at ,athens by ,scvola1 when 
he was prtor8  ,and this topic has been 
handled by that same ,lucilius with     
great elegance  and abundant wit2 where 
he represents ,scvola as saying--       
,you have preferr'd1 ,albucius1 to be   
call'd      ,a ,greek much rather than a
 ,roman citizen      ,or ,sabine1       

countryman of ,pontius1                 
,tritannius1 and the brave centurions   
,and standard-bearers of immortal fame4 
,so now at ,athens1 ,i1 the prtor1 thus 
,salute you as you wish1 whene'er ,i see
 you1      ,with ,greek address1   noble
 ,titus1      ,ye lictors1 and          
attendants 4        noble ,titus4 ,from 
this day      ,the great ,albucius was  
my enemy4      ,but surely ,scvola was  
right4 ,however1 ,i can never           
sufficiently express my  wonder whence  
this arrogant disdain of everything     
national arose among us4  ,this is not  
exactly the place for lecturing on the  
subject2 but my own  feelings are1 and  
,i have constantly urged them1 that the 
,latin language is  not only not        
deficient1 so as to deserve to be       
generally disparaged2 but  that it is   
even more copious than the ,greek4 ,for 
when have either we  ourselves1 or when 
has any good orator or noble poet1 at   
least after there  was any one for him  
to imitate1 found himself at a loss for 

any richness  or ornament of diction    
with which to set off his sentiments8   
,,iv4 ,and ,i myself 7as ,i do not think
 that ,i can be accused of having1 in my
  forensic exertions1 and labours1 and  
dangers1 deserted the post in which ,i  
was stationed by the ,roman people17 am 
bound1 forsooth1 to exert myself as     
much as ,i can to render my             
fellow-countrymen more learned by my    
labours  and studies and diligence1 and 
not so much to contend with those men   
who  prefer reading ,greek works1       
provided that they really do read them1 
and do  not only pretend to do so2 and  
to fall in also with the wishes of those
  men who are desirous either to avail  
themselves of both languages1 or who1   
as long as they have good works in their
 own1 do not care very much about       
similar ones in a foreign tongue4 ,but  
those men who would rather that ,i      
would write on other topics should be   
reasonable1 because ,i have already     
composed so many works that no one of my

 countrymen has ever published  more1   
and perhaps ,i shall write even more if 
my life is prolonged so as to  allow me 
to do so4 ,and yet1 whoever accustoms   
himself to read with care  these things 
which ,i am now writing on the subject  
of philosophy1 will  come to the        
conclusion that no works are better     
worth reading than these4  ,for what is 
there in life which deserves to be      
investigated so diligently  as every    
subject which belongs to philosophy1 and
 especially that which is  discussed in 
this treatise1 namely1 what is the end1 
the object1 the  standard to which all  
the ideas of living well and acting     
rightly are to  be referred8 ,what it is
 that nature follows as the chief of all
 desirable  things8 what she avoids as  
the principal of all evils8    ,and as  
on this subject there is great          
difference of opinion among the most    
learned men1 who can think it           
inconsistent with that dignity which    
every  one allows to belong to me1 to   

examine what is in every situation in   
life  the best and truest good8 ,shall  
the chief men of the city1 ,publius     
,scvola  and ,marcus ,manilius argue    
whether the offspring of a female slave 
ought to  be considered the gain of the 
master of the slave2 and shall ,marcus  
,brutus  express his dissent from their 
opinion1 7and this is a kind of         
discussion  giving great room for the   
display of acuteness1 and one too that  
is of  importance as regards the        
citizens17 and do we read1 and shall we 
continue  to read1 with pleasure their  
writings on this subject1 and the others
 of  the same sort1 and at the same time
 neglect these subjects1 which embrace  
the whole of human life8 ,there may1    
perhaps1 be more money affected by      
discussions on that legal point1 but    
beyond all question1 this of ours is    
the more important subject3 that1       
however1 is a point which the readers   
may be left to decide upon4 ,but we now 
think that this whole question  about   

the ends of good and evil is1 ,i may    
almost say1 thoroughly explained  in    
this treatise1 in which we have         
endeavoured to set forth as far as we   
could1 not only what our own opinion    
was1 but also everything which has  been
 advanced by each separate school of    
philosophy4    ,v4 ,to begin1 however1  
with that which is easiest1 we will     
first of all  take the doctrine of      
,epicurus1 which is well known to most  
people2 and you  shall see that it is   
laid down by us in such a way that it   
cannot be  explained more accurately    
even by the adherents of that sect      
themselves4  ,for we are desirous of    
ascertaining the truth2 not of          
convicting some  adversary4    ,but the 
opinion of ,epicurus about pleasure was 
formerly defended with  great precision 
by ,lucius ,torquatus1 a man            
accomplished in every kind of  learning2
 and ,i myself replied to him1 while    
,caius ,triarius1 a most  learned and   
worthy young man1 was present at the    

discussion4 ,for as it  happened that   
both of them had come to my villa near  
,cum to pay me a  visit1 first of all we
 conversed a little about literature1 to
 which they  were both of them greatly  
devoted2 and after a while ,torquatus   
said--,since  we have found you in some 
degree at leisure1 ,i should like much  
to hear  from you why it is that you1 ,i
 will not say hate our master           
,epicurus--as  most men do who differ   
from him in opinion--but still why you  
disagree with  him whom ,i consider as  
the only man who has discerned the real 
truth1 and  who ,i think has delivered  
the minds of men from the greatest      
errors1 and  has handed down every      
precept which can have any influence on 
making men  live well and happily4 ,but 
,i imagine that you1 like my friend     
,triarius  here1 like him the less      
because he neglected the ornaments of   
diction in  which ,plato1 and           
,aristotle1 and ,theophrastus indulged4 
,for ,i can hardly be  persuaded to     

believe that the opinions which he      
entertained do not appear  to you to be 
correct4 ,see now1 said ,i1 how far you 
are mistaken1  ,torquatus4 ,i am not    
offended with the language of that      
philosopher2 for he  expresses his      
meaning openly and speaks in plain      
language1 so that ,i can  understand    
him4 ,not1 however1 that ,i should      
object to eloquence in a  philosopher1  
if he were to think fit to employ it2   
though if he were not  possessed of it  
,i should not require it4 ,but ,i am not
 so well satisfied  with his matter1 and
 that too on many topics4 ,but there are
 as many  different opinions as there   
are men2 and therefore we may be in     
error  ourselves4 ,what is it1 said he1 
in which you are dissatisfied with him8 
,for ,i consider you a candid judge2    
provided only that you are accurately   
acquainted with what he has really said4
 ,unless1 said ,i1 you think that       
,phdrus or ,zeno have spoken falsely    
7and ,i have heard them both lecture1   

though they gave me a high opinion of   
nothing but their own diligence17  all  
the doctrines of ,epicurus are quite    
sufficiently known to me4 ,and ,i  have 
repeatedly1 in company with my friend   
,atticus1 attended the lectures  of     
those men whom ,i have named2 as he had 
a great admiration for both of  them1   
and an especial affection even for      
,phdrus4 ,and every day we used to  talk
 over what we heard1 nor was there ever 
any dispute between us as to  whether ,i
 understood the scope of their          
arguments2 but only whether ,i  approved
 of them4    ,,vi4 ,what is it1 then1   
said he1 which you do not approve of in 
them1 for ,i  am very anxious to hear8  
,in the first place1 said ,i1 he is     
utterly wrong  in natural philosophy1   
which is his principal boast4 ,he only  
makes some  additions to the doctrine of
 ,democritus1 altering very little1 and 
that in  such a way that he seems to me 
to make those points worse which he     
endeavours to correct4 ,he believes that

 atoms1 as he calls them1 that is  to   
say bodies which by reason of their     
solidity are indivisible1 are borne     
about in an interminable vacuum1        
destitute of any highest1 or lowest1 or 
middle1 or furthest1 or nearest         
boundary1 in such a manner that by their
  concourse they cohere together2 by    
which cohesion everything which exists  
and which is seen is formed4 ,and he    
thinks that motion of atoms should be   
understood never to have had a          
beginning1 but to have subsisted from   
all  eternity4    ,but in those matters 
in which ,epicurus follows ,democritus1 
he is usually  not very wrong4 ,although
 there are many assertions of each with 
which ,i  disagree1 and especially with 
this--that as in the nature of things   
there  are two points which must be     
inquired into1--one1 what the material  
out of  which everything is made1 is2   
the other1 what the power is which makes
  everything1--they discussed only the  
material1 and omitted all  consideration

 of the efficient power and cause4      
,however1 that is a fault  common to    
both of them2 but these blunders which  
,i am going to mention are  ,epicurus's 
own4    ,for he thinks that those       
indivisible and solid bodies are borne  
downwards  by their own weight in a     
straight line2 and that this is the     
natural  motion of all bodies4 ,after   
this assertion1 that shrewd man1--as it 
occurred to him1 that if everything were
 borne downwards in a straight  line1 as
 ,i have just said1 it would be quite   
impossible for one atom ever  to touch  
another1--on this account he introduced 
another purely imaginary  idea1 and said
 that the atoms diverged a little from  
the straight line1  which is the most   
impossible thing in the world4 ,and he  
asserted that it  is in this way that   
all those embraces1 and conjunctions1   
and unions of  the atoms with one       
another took place1 by which the world  
was made1 and  all the parts of the     
world1 and all that is in the world4    

,and not only is  all this idea         
perfectly childish1 but it fails in     
effecting its object4  ,for this very   
divergence is invented in a most        
capricious manner1 7for he  says that   
each atom diverges without any cause17  
though nothing can be  more             
discreditable to a natural philosopher  
than to say that anything  takes place  
without a cause2 and also1 without any  
reason1 he deprives  atoms of that      
motion which is natural to every body of
 any weight 7as he  himself lays it     
down7 which goes downwards from the     
upper regions2 and at  the same time he 
does not obtain the end for the sake of 
which he invented  all these theories4  
,for if every atom diverges equally1    
still none will ever meet with one      
another so as to cohere2 but if some    
diverge1 and others are borne  straight 
down by their natural inclination1 in   
the first place this will  be           
distributing provinces as it were among 
the atoms1 and dividing them so  that   

some are borne down straight1 and others
 obliquely2 and in the next  place1 this
 turbulent concourse of atoms1 which is 
a blunder of ,democritus  also1 will    
never be able to produce this           
beautifully ornamented world  which we  
see around us4 ,even this1 too1 is      
inconsistent with the  principles of    
natural philosophy1 to believe that     
there is such a thing as  a minimum2 a  
thing which he indeed never would have  
fancied1 if he had  been willing to     
learn geometry from his friend          
,polynus17#bd7 instead of  seeking to   
persuade him to give it up himself4     
,the sun appears to ,democritus to be of
 vast size1 as he is a man of  learning 
and of a profound knowledge of geometry4
 ,epicurus perhaps thinks  that it is   
two feet across1 for he thinks it of    
just that size which it  appears to be1 
or perhaps a little larger or smaller4  
,so what he changes  he spoils2 what he 
accepts comes entirely from             
,democritus1--the atoms1 the  vacuum1   

the appearances1 which they call 1 to   
the inroads of which  it is owing not   
only that we see1 but also that we      
think2 and all that  infiniteness1 which
 they call 1 is borrowed from           
,democritus2 and  also the innumerable  
worlds which are produced and perish    
every day4 ,and  although ,i cannot     
possibly agree myself with all those    
fancies1 still ,i  should not like to   
see ,democritus1 who is praised by every
 one else1  blamed by this man who has  
followed him alone4    ,,vii4 ,and as   
for the second part of philosophy1 which
 belongs to  investigating and          
discussing1 and which is called 1 there 
your  master as it seems to me is wholly
 unarmed and defenceless4 ,he abolishes 
definitions2 he lays down no rules for  
division and partition2 he gives no     
method for drawing conclusions or       
establishing principles2 he does not    
point out how captious objections may be
 refuted1 or ambiguous terms  explained4
 ,he places all our judgments of things 

in our senses2 and if  they are once led
 to approve of anything false as if it  
were true1 then he  thinks that there is
 an end to all our power of             
distinguishing between  truth and       
falsehood4    ,but in the third part1   
which relates to life and manners1 with 
respect to  establishing the end of our 
actions1 he utters not one single       
generous or  noble sentiment4 ,he lays  
down above all others the principle1    
that nature  has but two things as      
objects of adoption and aversion1       
namely1 pleasure  and pain3 and he      
refers all our pursuits1 and all our    
desires to avoid  anything1 to one of   
these two heads4 ,and although this is  
the doctrine of  ,aristippus1 and is    
maintained in a better manner and with  
more freedom by  the ,cyrenaics1 still  
,i think it a principle of such a kind  
that nothing  can appear more unworthy  
of a man4 ,for1 in my opinion1 nature   
has produced  and formed us for greater 
and higher purposes4 ,it is possible1   

indeed1  that ,i may be mistaken2 but my
 opinion is decided that that           
,torquatus1 who  first acquired that    
name1 did not tear the chain from off   
his enemy for  the purpose of procuring 
any corporeal pleasure to himself2 and  
that he  did not1 in his third          
consulship1 fight with the ,latins at   
the foot of  ,mount ,vesuvius for the   
sake of any personal pleasure4 ,and when
 he caused  his son to be executed1 he  
appears to have even deprived himself of
 many  pleasures1 by thus preferring the
 claims of his dignity and command to   
nature herself and the dictates of      
fatherly affection4 ,what need ,i say   
more8 ,take ,titus ,torquatus1 him ,i   
mean who was consul with ,cnus          
,octavius2  when he behaved with such   
severity towards that son whom he had   
allowed  ,decimus ,silanus to adopt as  
his own1 as to command him1 when the    
ambassadors of the ,macedonians accused 
him of having taken bribes in his       
province while he was prtor1 to plead   

his cause before his tribunal3 and1     
when he had heard the cause on both     
sides1 to pronounce that he had not in  
his command behaved after the fashion of
 his forefathers1 and to forbid  him    
ever to appear in his sight again2 does 
he seem to you to have given a  thought 
to his own pleasure8    ,however1 to say
 nothing of the dangers1 and labours1   
and even of the pain  which every       
virtuous man willingly encounters on    
behalf of his country1 or  of his       
family1 to such a degree that he not    
only does not seek for1 but  even       
disregards all pleasures1 and prefers   
even to endure any pain  whatever rather
 than to forsake any part of his duty2  
let us come to those  things which show 
this equally1 but which appear of less  
importance4 ,what  pleasure do you1 ,o  
,torquatus1 what pleasure does this     
,triarius derive from  literature1 and  
history1 and the knowledge of events1   
and the reading of  poets1 and his      
wonderful recollection of such numbers  

of verses8 ,and do  not say to me1 ,why 
all these things are a pleasure to me4  
,so1 too1 were  those noble actions to  
the ,torquati4 ,epicurus never asserts  
this in this  manner2 nor would you1 ,o 
,triarius1 nor any man who had any      
wisdom1 or who  had ever imbibed those  
principles4 ,and as to the question     
which is often  asked1 why there are so 
many ,epicureans--there are several     
reasons2 but  this is the one which is  
most seductive to the multitude1 namely1
 that  people imagine that what he      
asserts is that those things which are  
right  and honourable do of themselves  
produce joy1 that is1 pleasure4 ,those  
excellent men do not perceive that the  
whole system is overturned if that  is  
the case4 ,for if it were once granted1 
even although there were no  reference  
whatever to the body1 that these things 
were naturally and  intrinsically       
pleasant2 then virtue and knowledge     
would be intrinsically  desirable4 ,and 
this is the last thing which he would   

choose to admit4    ,these principles1  
then1 of ,epicurus1 ,i say1 ,i do not   
approve of4 ,as for  other matters1 ,i  
wish either that he himself had been a  
greater master of  learning1 7for he is1
 as you yourself cannot help seeing1 not
 sufficiently  accomplished in those    
branches of knowledge which men possess 
who are  accounted learned17 or at all  
events that he had not deterred others  
from  the study of literature3 although 
,i see that you yourself have not been  
at  all deterred from such pursuits by  
him4    ,,viii4 ,and when ,i had said   
this1 more for the purpose of exciting  
him than  of speaking myself1 ,triarius1
 smiling gently1 said1--,you1 indeed1   
have  almost entirely expelled ,epicurus
 from the number of philosophers4 ,for  
what have you left him except the       
assertion that1 whatever his language   
might he1 you understood what he meant8 
,he has in natural philosophy said      
nothing but what is borrowed from       
others1 and even then nothing which you 

approved of4 ,if he has tried to amend  
anything he has made it worse4 ,he  had 
no skill whatever in disputing4 ,when he
 laid down the rule that  pleasure was  
the chief good1 in the first place he   
was very short-sighted  in making such  
an assertion2 and secondly1 even this   
very doctrine was a  borrowed one2 for  
,aristippus had said the same thing     
before1 and better  too4 ,you added1 at 
last1 that he was also destitute of     
learning4    ,it is quite impossible1 ,o
 ,triarius1 ,i replied1 for a person not
 to state  what he disapproves of in the
 theory of a man with whom he disagrees4
 ,for  what could hinder me from being  
an ,epicurean if ,i approved of what    
,epicurus says8 especially when it would
 be an amusement to learn his           
doctrines4 ,wherefore1 a man is not to  
be blamed for reproving those who       
differ from one another2 but evil       
speaking1 contumely1 ill-temper1        
contention1 and pertinacious violence in
 disputing1 generally appear to me      

quite unworthy of philosophy4    ,i     
quite agree with you1 said ,torquatus2  
for one cannot dispute at all  without  
finding fault with your antagonist2 but 
on the other hand you  cannot dispute   
properly if you do so with ill-temper or
 with pertinacity4  ,but1 if you have no
 objection1 ,i have an answer to make to
 these  assertions of yours4 ,do you    
suppose1 said ,i1 that ,i should have   
said what  ,i have said if ,i did not   
desire to hear what you had to say too8 
,would you  like then1 says he1 that ,i 
should go through the whole theory of   
,epicurus1  or that we should limit our 
present inquiry to pleasure by itself2  
which  is what the whole of the present 
dispute relates to8 ,we will do1 said   
,i1  whichever you please4 ,that then1  
said he1 shall be my present course4 ,i 
will explain one matter only1 being the 
most important one4 ,at another  time ,i
 will discuss the question of natural   
philosophy2 and ,i will prove  to you   
the theory of the divergence of the     

atoms1 and of the magnitude of  the sun1
 and that ,democritus committed many    
errors which were found fault  with and 
corrected by ,epicurus4 ,at present1 ,i 
will confine myself to  pleasure2 not   
that ,i am saying anything new1 but     
still ,i will adduce  arguments which ,i
 feel sure that even you yourself will  
approve of4  ,undoubtedly1 said ,i1 ,i  
will not be obstinate2 and ,i will      
willingly agree  with you if you will   
only prove your assertions to my        
satisfaction4 ,i will  prove them1 said 
he1 provided only that you are as       
impartial as you  profess yourself3 but 
,i would rather employ a connected      
discourse than  keep on asking or being 
asked questions4 ,as you please1 said   
,i4    ,on this he began to speak2--    
,,ix4 ,first of all then1 said he1 ,i   
will proceed in the manner which is     
sanctioned by the founder of this       
school3 ,i will lay down what that is   
which is the subject of our inquiry1 and
 what its character is3 not that ,i     

imagine that you do not know1 but in    
order that my discourse may proceed  in 
a systematic and orderly manner4 ,we are
 inquiring1 then1 what is the           
end1--what is the extreme point of good1
 which1 in the opinion of all           
philosophers1 ought to be such that     
everything can be referred to it1 but   
that it itself can be referred to       
nothing4 ,this ,epicurus places in      
pleasure1 which he argues is the chief  
good1 and that pain is the chief  evil2 
and he proceeds to prove his assertion  
thus4 ,he says that every  animal the   
moment that it is born seeks for        
pleasure1 and rejoices in it  as the    
chief good2 and rejects pain as the     
chief evil1 and wards it off  from      
itself as far as it can2 and that it    
acts in this manner1 without  having    
been corrupted by anything1 under the   
promptings of nature herself1  who forms
 this uncorrupt and upright judgment4   
,therefore1 he affirms that  there is no
 need of argument or of discussion as to

 why pleasure is to be  sought for1 and 
pain to be avoided4 ,this he thinks a   
matter of sense1 just  as much as that  
fire is hot1 snow white1 honey sweet2   
none of which  propositions he thinks   
require to be confirmed by laboriously  
sought  reasons1 but that it is         
sufficient merely to state them4 ,for   
that there is  a difference between     
arguments and conclusions arrived at by 
ratiocination1 and ordinary observations
 and statements3--by the first1  secret 
and obscure principles are explained2 by
 the second1 matters which  are plain   
and easy are brought to decision4 ,for  
since1 if you take away  sense from a   
man1 there is nothing left to him1 it   
follows of necessity  that what is      
contrary to nature1 or what agrees with 
it1 must be left to  nature herself to  
decide4 ,now what does she perceive1 or 
what does she  determine on as her guide
 to seek or to avoid anything1 except   
pleasure  and pain8 ,but there are some 
of our school who seek to carry out this

  doctrine with more acuteness1 and who 
will not allow that it is sufficient    
that it should be decided by sense what 
is good and what is bad1 but who  assert
 that these points can be ascertained by
 intellect and reason also1  and that   
pleasure is to be sought for on its own 
account1 and that pain  also is to be   
avoided for the same reason4            
,therefore1 they say that this notion is
 implanted in our minds naturally  and  
instinctively1 as it were2 so that we   
feel that the one is to be  sought for1 
and the other to be avoided4 ,others1   
however1 7and this is my  own opinion   
too17 assert that1 as many reasons are  
alleged by many  philosophers why       
pleasure ought not to be reckoned among 
goods1 nor pain  among evils1 we ought  
not to rely too much on the goodness of 
our cause1  but that we should use      
arguments1 and discuss the point with   
precision1  and argue1 by the help of   
carefully collected reasons1 about      
pleasure and  about pain4    ,x4 ,but   

that you may come to an accurate        
perception of the source whence  all    
this error originated of those people   
who attack pleasure and extol  pain1 ,i 
will unfold the whole matter2 and ,i    
will lay before you the very  statements
 which have been made by that discoverer
 of the truth1 and  architect1 as it    
were1 of a happy life4 ,for no one      
either despises1 or  hates1 or avoids   
pleasure itself merely because it is    
pleasure1 but  because great pains      
overtake those men who do not understand
 how to pursue  pleasure in a reasonable
 manner4 ,nor is there any one who      
loves1 or  pursues1 or wishes to acquire
 pain because it is pain1 but because   
sometimes such occasions arise that a   
man attains to some great pleasure      
through labour and pain4 ,for1 to       
descend to trifles1 who of us ever      
undertakes any laborious exertion of    
body except in order to gain some       
advantage by so doing8 and who is there 
who could fairly blame a man who  should

 wish to be in that state of pleasure   
which no annoyance can  interrupt1 or   
one who shuns that pain by which no     
subsequent pleasure is  procured8 ,but  
we do accuse those men1 and think them  
entirely worthy of  the greatest hatred1
 who1 being made effeminate and         
corrupted by the  allurements of present
 pleasure1 are so blinded by passion    
that they do  not foresee what pains and
 annoyances they will hereafter be      
subject to2  and who are equally guilty 
with those who1 through weakness of     
mind1 that  is to say1 from eagerness to
 avoid labour and pain1 desert their    
duty4    ,and the distinction between   
these things is quick and easy4 ,for at 
a time  when we are free1 when the      
option of choice is in our own power1   
and when  there is nothing to prevent   
our being able to do whatever we choose1
 then  every pleasure may be enjoyed1   
and every pain repelled4 ,but on        
particular  occasions it will often     
happen1 owing either to the obligations 

of duty or  the necessities of business1
 that pleasures must be declined and    
annoyances must not be shirked4         
,therefore the wise man holds to this   
principle of choice in those matters1   
that he rejects some pleasures1 so  as1 
by the rejection1 to obtain others which
 are greater1 and encounters  some      
pains1 so as by that means to escape    
others which are more  formidable4      
,now1 as these are my sentiments1 what  
reason can ,i have for fearing that ,i  
may not be able to accommodate our      
,torquati to them--men whose examples   
you  just now quoted from memory1 with a
 kind and friendly feeling towards us8  
,however1 you have not bribed me by     
praising my ancestors1 nor made me less 
prompt in replying to you4 ,but ,i      
should like to know from you how you    
interpret their actions8 ,do you think  
that they attacked the enemy with  such 
feelings1 or that they were so severe to
 their children and to their  own blood 
as to have no thought of their own      

advantage1 or of what might  be useful  
to themselves8 ,but even wild beasts do 
not do that1 and do not  rush about and 
cause confusion in such a way that we   
cannot understand  what is the object of
 their motions4 ,and do you think that  
such  illustrious men performed such    
great actions without a reason8 ,what   
their  reason was ,i will examine       
presently2 in the meantime ,i will lay  
down this  rule1--,if there was any     
reason which instigated them to do those
 things  which are undoubtedly splendid 
exploits1 then virtue by herself was not
  the sole cause of their conduct4 ,one 
man tore a chain from off his enemy1    
and at the same time he defended himself
 from being slain2 but he  encountered  
great danger4 ,yes1 but it was before   
the eyes of the whole  army4 ,what did  
he get by that8 ,glory1 and the         
affection of his countrymen1  which are 
the surest bulwarks to enable a man to  
pass his life without  fear4 ,he put his
 son to death by the hand of the        

executioner4 ,if he did so  without any 
reason1 then ,i should be sorry to be   
descended from so inhuman  and merciless
 a man4 ,but if his object was to       
establish military  discipline and      
obedience to command1 at the price of   
his own anguish1 and  at a time of a    
most formidable war to restrain his army
 by the fear of  punishment1 then he was
 providing for the safety of his        
fellow-citizens1  which he was well     
aware embraced his own4 ,and this       
principle is one of  extensive          
application4 ,for the very point        
respecting which your whole  school1 and
 yourself most especially1 who are such 
a diligent investigator  of ancient     
instances1 are in the habit of vaunting 
yourself and using  high-flown language1
 namely1 the mention of brave and       
illustrious men1 and  the extolling of  
their actions1 as proceeding not from   
any regard to  advantage1 but from pure 
principles of honour and a love of      
glory1 is  entirely upset1 when once    

that rule in the choice of things is    
established  which ,i mentioned just    
now1--namely1 that pleasures are passed 
over for the  sake of obtaining other   
greater pleasures1 or that pains are    
encountered  with a view to escape      
greater pains4    ,,xi4 ,but1 however1  
for the present we have said enough     
about the  illustrious and glorious     
actions of celebrated men2 for there    
will be1  hereafter1 a very appropriate 
place for discussing the tendency of all
 the  virtues to procure pleasure4      
,but1 at present1 ,i will explain what  
pleasure itself is1 and what its        
character is2 so as to do away with all 
the mistakes of ignorant people1  and in
 order that it may be clearly understood
 how dignified1 and  temperate1 and     
virtuous that system is1 which is often 
accounted  voluptuous1 effeminate1 and  
delicate4 ,for we are not at present    
pursuing  that pleasure alone which     
moves nature itself by a certain        
sweetness1 and  which is perceived by   

the senses with a certain pleasurable   
feeling2 but  we consider that the      
greatest of all pleasures which is felt 
when all pain  is removed4 ,for since1  
when we are free from pain1 we rejoice  
in that very  freedom itself1 and in the
 absence of all annoyance1--but         
everything which  is a cause of our     
rejoicing is pleasure1 just as          
everything that gives us  offence is    
pain1--accordingly1 the absence of all  
pain is rightly  denominated pleasure4  
,for1 as when hunger and thirst are     
driven away by  meat and drink1 the very
 removal of the annoyance brings with it
 the  attainment of pleasure1 so1 in    
every case1 the removal of pain produces
  the succession of pleasure4 ,and      
therefore ,epicurus would not admit that
  there was any intermediate state      
between pleasure and pain2 for he       
insisted that that very state which     
seems to some people the intermediate   
one1 when a man is free from every sort 
of pain1 is not only pleasure1 but  the 

highest sort of pleasure4 ,for whoever  
feels how he is affected must           
inevitably be either in a state of      
pleasure or in a state of pain4 ,but    
,epicurus thinks that the highest       
pleasure consists in an absence of all  
pains2 so that pleasure may afterwards  
be varied1 and may be of different      
kinds1 but cannot be increased or       
amplified4    ,and even at ,athens1 as  
,i have heard my father say1 when he was
 jesting in  a good-humoured and        
facetious way upon the ,stoics1 there is
 a statue in  the ,ceramicus of         
,chrysippus1 sitting down with his hand 
stretched out2 and  this attitude of the
 hand intimates that he is amusing      
himself with this  brief question1      
8,does your hand1 while in that         
condition in which it is at  present1   
want anything80--,nothing at all4 ,but  
if pleasure were a good1  would it want 
it8 ,i suppose so4 ,pleasure1 then1 is  
not a good4 ,and my  father used to say 
that even a statue would not say this if

 it could  speak4 ,for the conclusion   
was drawn as against the ,stoics with   
sufficient  acuteness1 but it did not   
concern ,epicurus4 ,for if that were the
 only  pleasure which tickled the       
senses1 as it were1 if ,i may say so1   
and which  overflowed and penetrated    
them with a certain agreeable feeling1  
then even  a hand could not be content  
with freedom from pain without some     
pleasing  motion of pleasure4 ,but if   
the highest pleasure is1 as ,epicurus   
asserts1  to be free from pain1 then1 ,o
 ,chrysippus1 the first admission was   
correctly made to you1 that the hand1   
when it was in that condition1 was  in  
want of nothing2 but the second         
admission was not equally correct1 that 
if pleasure were a good it would wish   
for it4 ,for it would not wish for it   
for this reason1 inasmuch as whatever is
 free from pain is in pleasure4         
,,xii4 ,but that pleasure is the        
boundary of all good things may be      
easily  seen from this consideration4   

,let us imagine a person enjoying       
pleasures  great1 numerous1 and         
perpetual1 both of mind and body1 with  
no pain either  interrupting him at     
present or impending over him2 what     
condition can we  call superior to or   
more desirable than this8 ,for it is    
inevitable that  there must be in a man 
who is in this condition a firmness of  
mind which  fears neither death nor     
pain1 because death is void of all      
sensation2 and  pain1 if it is of long  
duration1 is a trifle1 while if severe  
it is  usually of brief duration2 so    
that its brevity is a consolation if it 
is  violent1 and its trifling nature if 
it is enduring4 ,and when there is      
added to these circumstances that such a
 man has no fear of the deity of  the   
gods1 and does not suffer past pleasures
 to be entirely lost1 but  delights     
himself with the continued recollection 
of them1 what can be  added to this     
which will be any improvement to it8    
,imagine1 on the other hand1 any one    

worn out with the greatest pains of     
mind and body which can possibly befal a
 man1 without any hope being held  out  
to him that they will hereafter be      
lighter1 when1 besides1 he has no       
pleasure whatever either present or     
expected2 what can be spoken of or      
imagined more miserable than this8 ,but 
if a life entirely filled with  pains is
 above all things to be avoided1 then   
certainly that is the  greatest of evils
 to live in pain4 ,and akin to this     
sentiment is the  other1 that it is the 
most extreme good to live with pleasure4
 ,for our  mind has no other point where
 it can stop as at a boundary2 and all  
fears  and distresses are referable to  
pain3 nor is there anything whatever    
besides1 which of its own intrinsic     
nature can make us anxious or grieve    
us4 ,moreover1 the beginnings of        
desiring and avoiding1 and indeed       
altogether of everything which we do1   
take their rise either in pleasure  or  
pain4 ,and as this is the case1 it is   

plain that everything which is  right   
and laudable has reference to this one  
object of living with  pleasure4 ,and   
since that is the highest1 or extreme1  
or greatest good1  which the ,greeks    
call 1 because it is referred to nothing
 else  itself1 but everything is        
referred to it1 we must confess that the
 highest  good is to live agreeably4    
,,xiii4 ,and those who place this in    
virtue alone1 and1 being caught by the  
splendour of a name1 do not understand  
what nature requires1 will be  delivered
 from the greatest blunder imaginable if
 they will listen to  ,epicurus4 ,for   
unless those excellent and beautiful    
virtues which your  school talks about  
produced pleasure1 who would think them 
either  praiseworthy or desirable8 ,for 
as we esteem the skill of physicians not
  for the sake of the art itself1 but   
from our desire for good health1--and   
as the skill of the pilot1 who has the  
knowledge how to navigate a vessel      
well1 is praised with reference to its  

utility1 and not to his ability1--so    
wisdom1 which should be considered the  
art of living1 would not be sought      
after if it effected nothing2 but at    
present it is sought after because it   
is1 as it were1 the efficient cause of  
pleasure1 which is a legitimate  object 
of desire and acquisition4 ,and now you 
understand what pleasure ,i  mean1 so   
that what ,i say may not be brought into
 odium from my using an  unpopular word4
 ,for as the chief annoyances to human  
life proceed from  ignorance of what    
things are good and what bad1 and as by 
reason of that  mistake men are often   
deprived of the greatest pleasures1 and 
tortured by  the most bitter grief of   
mind1 we have need to exercise wisdom1  
which1 by  removing groundless alarms   
and vain desires1 and by banishing the  
rashness  of all erroneous opinions1    
offers herself to us as the surest guide
 to  pleasure4 ,for it is wisdom alone  
which expels sorrow from our minds1 and 
prevents our shuddering with fear3 she  

is the instructress who enables us  to  
live in tranquillity1 by extinguishing  
in us all vehemence of desire4  ,for    
desires are insatiable1 and ruin not    
only individuals but entire  families1  
and often overturn the whole state4     
,from desires arise hatred1             
dissensions1 quarrels1 seditions1 wars4 
,nor is it only out of doors that  these
 passions vent themselves1 nor is it    
only against others that they  run with 
blind violence2 but they are often shut 
up1 as it were1 in the  mind1 and throw 
that into confusion with their          
disagreements4    ,and the consequence  
of this is1 to make life thoroughly     
wretched2 so that  the wise man is the  
only one who1 having cut away all vanity
 and error1  and removed it from him1   
can live contented within the boundaries
 of  nature1 without melancholy and     
without fear4 ,for what diversion can be
  either more useful or more adapted for
 human life than that which ,epicurus   
employed8 ,for he laid it down that     

there were three kinds of desires2 the  
first1 such as were natural and         
necessary2 the second1 such as were     
natural but not necessary2 the third1   
such as were neither natural nor        
necessary4 ,and these are all such1 that
 those which are necessary are          
satisfied without much trouble or       
expense3 even those which are natural   
and not necessary1 do not require a     
great deal1 because nature itself  makes
 the riches1 which are sufficient to    
content it1 easy of acquisition  and of 
limited quantity3 but as for vain       
desires1 it is impossible to find  any  
limit to1 or any moderation in them4    
,,xiv4 ,but if we see that the whole    
life of man is thrown into disorder by  
error and ignorance2 and that wisdom is 
the only thing which can relieve  us    
from the sway of the passions and the   
fear of danger1 and which can  teach us 
to bear the injuries of fortune itself  
with moderation1 and which  shows us all
 the ways which lead to tranquillity and

 peace2 what reason is  there that we   
should hesitate to say that wisdom is to
 be sought for the  sake of pleasure1   
and that folly is to be avoided on      
account of its  annoyances8 ,and on the 
same principle we shall say that even   
temperance is  not to be sought for its 
own sake1 but because it brings peace to
 the  mind1 and soothes and             
tranquillizes them by what ,i may call a
 kind of  concord4 ,for temperance is   
that which warns us to follow reason in 
desiring or avoiding anything4 ,nor is  
it sufficient to decide what ought  to  
be done1 and what ought not2 but we must
 adhere to what has been  decided4 ,but 
many men1 because they are enfeebled and
 subdued the moment  pleasure comes in  
sight1 and so are unable to keep and    
adhere to the  determination they have  
formed1 give themselves up to be bound  
hand and  foot by their lusts1 and do   
not foresee what will happen to them2   
and in  that way1 on account of some    
pleasure which is trivial and           

unnecessary1  and which might be        
procured in some other manner1 and which
 they could  dispense with without      
annoyance1 incur terrible diseases1 and 
injuries1  and disgrace1 and are often  
even involved in the penalties of the   
legal  tribunals of their country4      
,but these men who wish to enjoy        
pleasure in such a way that no grief    
shall  ever overtake them in            
consequence1 and who retain their       
judgment so as  never to be overcome by 
pleasure as to do what they feel ought  
not to be  done2 these men1 ,i say1     
obtain the greatest pleasure by passing 
pleasure  by4 ,they often even endure   
pain1 in order to avoid encountering    
greater  pain hereafter by their        
shunning it at present4 ,from which     
consideration  it is perceived that     
intemperance is not to be avoided for   
its own sake2  and that temperance is to
 be sought for1 not because it avoids   
pleasures1  but because it attains to   
greater ones4    ,,xv4 ,the same        

principle will be found to hold good    
with respect to courage4  ,for the      
discharge of labours and the endurance  
of pain are neither of them             
intrinsically tempting2 nor is patience1
 nor diligence1 nor watchfulness1  nor  
industry which is so much extolled1 nor 
even courage itself3 but we  cultivate  
these habits in order that we may live  
without care and fear1  and may be able1
 as far as is in our power1 to release  
our minds and  bodies from annoyance4   
,for as the whole condition of tranquil 
life is  thrown into confusion by the   
fear of death1 and as it is a miserable 
thing  to yield to pain and to bear it  
with a humble and imbecile mind2 and as 
on  account of that weakness of mind    
many men have ruined their parents1 many
  men their friends1 some their country1
 and very many indeed have utterly      
undone themselves2 so a vigorous and    
lofty mind is free from all care and    
pain1 since it despises death1 which    
only places those who encounter it in   

the same condition as that in which they
 were before they were born2 and  it is 
so prepared for pain that it recollects 
that the very greatest are  terminated  
by death1 and that slight pains have    
many intervals of rest1  and that we can
 master moderate ones1 so as to bear    
them if they are  tolerable1 and if not1
 we can depart with equanimity out of   
life1 just as  out of a theatre1 when it
 no longer pleases us4 ,by all which    
considerations it is understood that    
cowardice and idleness are not  blamed1 
and that courage and patience are not   
praised1 for their own  sakes2 but that 
the one line of conduct is rejected as  
the parent of pain1  and the other      
desired as the author of pleasure4      
,,xvi4 ,justice remains to be mentioned1
 that ,i may not omit any virtue        
whatever2 but nearly the same things may
 be said respecting that4 ,for1 as  ,i  
have already shown that wisdom1         
temperance1 and fortitude are connected 
with pleasure in such a way that they   

cannot possibly be separated or  divided
 from it1 so also we must consider that 
it is the case with  justice4 ,which not
 only never injures any one2 but on the 
contrary always  nourishes something    
which tranquillizes the mind1 partly by 
its own power  and nature1 and partly by
 the hopes that nothing will be wanting 
of those  things which a nature not     
depraved may fairly derive4    ,since   
rashness and lust and idleness always   
torture the mind1 always make  it       
anxious1 and are of a turbulent         
character1 so too1 wherever injustice   
settles in any man's mind1 it is        
turbulent from the mere fact of its     
existence and presence there2 and if it 
forms any plan1 although it  executes it
 ever so secretly1 still it never       
believes that what has been  done will  
be concealed for ever4 ,for generally1  
when wicked men do  anything1 first of  
all suspicion overtakes their actions2  
then the common  conversation and report
 of men2 then the prosecutor and the    

judge2 and  many even1 as was the case  
when you were consul1 have given        
information  against themselves4 ,but if
 any men appear to themselves to be     
sufficiently  fenced round and protected
 from the consciousness of men1 still   
they dread  the knowledge of the ,gods1 
and think that those very anxieties by  
which  their minds are eaten up night   
and day1 are inflicted upon them by the 
immortal ,gods for the sake of          
punishment4 ,and how is it possible that
  wicked actions can ever have as much  
influence towards alleviating the       
annoyances of life1 as they must have   
towards increasing them from the        
consciousness of our actions1 and also  
from the punishments inflicted by  the  
laws and the hatred of the citizens8    
,and yet1 in some people1 there is  no  
moderation in their passion for money   
and for honour and for command1  or in  
their lusts and greediness and other    
desires1 which acquisitions1  however   
wickedly made1 do not at all diminish1  

but rather inflame1 so that  it seems we
 ought rather to restrain such men than 
to think that we can  teach them better4
 ,therefore sound wisdom invites        
sensible men to justice1  equity1 and   
good faith4 ,and unjust actions are not 
advantageous even to  that man who has  
no abilities or resources2 inasmuch as  
he cannot easily  do what he endeavours 
to do1 nor obtain his objects if he does
 succeed in  his endeavours4 ,and the   
gifts of fortune and of genius are      
better suited  to liberality2 and those 
who practise this virtue gain themselves
  goodwill1 and affection1 which is the 
most powerful of all things to  enable a
 man to live with tranquillity2         
especially when he has absolutely  no   
motive at all for doing wrong4    ,for  
those desires which proceed from nature 
are easily satisfied without  any       
injustice2 but those which are vain     
ought not to be complied with4 ,for     
they desire nothing which is really     
desirable2 and there is more            

disadvantage in the mere fact of        
injustice than there is advantage in    
what  is acquired by the injustice4     
,therefore a person would not be right  
who  should pronounce even justice      
intrinsically desirable for its own     
sake2  but because it brings the        
greatest amount of what is agreeable4   
,for to be  loved and to be dear to     
others is agreeable because it makes    
life safer1  and pleasure more abundant4
 ,therefore we think dishonesty should  
be  avoided1 not only on account of     
those disadvantages which befal the     
wicked1 but even much more because it   
never permits the man in whose mind  it 
abides to breathe freely1 and never lets
 him rest4    ,but if the praise of     
those identical virtues in which the    
discourse of all  other philosophers so 
especially exults1 cannot find any end  
unless it be  directed towards pleasure1
 and if pleasure be the only thing which
 calls  and allures us to itself by its 
own nature2 then it cannot be doubtful  

that that is the highest and greatest of
 all goods1 and that to live  happily is
 nothing else except to live with       
pleasure4    ,,xvii4 ,and ,i will now   
explain in a few words the things which 
are  inseparably connected with this    
sure and solid opinion4    ,there is no 
mistake with respect to the ends        
themselves of good and evil1  that is to
 say1 with respect to pleasure and pain2
 but men err in these  points when they 
do not know what they are caused by4    
,but we admit that  the pleasures and   
pains of the mind are caused by the     
pleasures and pains  of the body4       
,therefore ,i grant what you were saying
 just now1 that if any  philosophers of 
our school think differently 7and ,i see
 that many men do  so1 but they are     
ignorant people7 they must be convicted 
of error4 ,but  although pleasure of    
mind brings us joy1 and pain causes us  
grief1 it is  still true that each of   
these feelings originates in the body1  
and is  referred to the body2 and it    

does not follow on that account that    
both the  pleasures and pains of the    
mind are not much more important than   
those of  the body4 ,for with the body  
we are unable to feel anything which is 
not  actually existent and present2 but 
with our mind we feel things past and   
things to come4 ,for although when we   
are suffering bodily pain1 we are       
equally in pain in our minds1 still a   
very great addition may be made to  that
 if we believe that any endless and     
boundless evil is impending over  us4   
,and we may transfer this assertion to  
pleasure1 so that that will be  greater 
if we have no such fear4    ,this now is
 entirely evident1 that the very        
greatest pleasure or annoyance  of the  
mind contributes more to making life    
happy or miserable than either  of these
 feelings can do if it is in the body   
for an equal length of time4  ,but we do
 not agree that1 if pleasure be taken   
away1 grief follows  immediately1 unless
 by chance it happens that pain has     

succeeded and taken  the place of       
pleasure2 but1 on the other hand1 we    
affirm that men do  rejoice at getting  
rid of pain even if no pleasure which   
can affect the  senses succeeds4 ,and   
from this it may be understood how great
 a pleasure  it is not to be in pain4   
,but as we are roused by those good     
things which  we are in expectation of1 
so we rejoice at those which we         
recollect4 ,but  foolish men are        
tortured by the recollection of past    
evils2 wise men are  delighted by the   
memory of past good things1 which are   
thus renewed by the  agreeable          
recollection4 ,but there is a feeling   
implanted in us by which we  bury       
adversity as it were in a perpetual     
oblivion1 but dwell with pleasure  and  
delight on the recollection of good     
fortune4 ,but when with eager and       
attentive minds we dwell on what is     
past1 the consequence is1 that          
melancholy ensues1 if the past has been 
unprosperous2 but joy1 if it has  been  

fortunate4    ,,xviii4 ,oh what a       
splendid1 and manifest1 and simple1 and 
plain way of  living well6 ,for as      
certainly nothing could be better for   
man than to be  free from all pain and  
annoyance1 and to enjoy the greatest    
pleasures of  both mind and body1 do you
 not see how nothing is omitted which   
can aid  life1 so as to enable men more 
easily to arrive at that chief good     
which  is their object6 ,epicurus cries 
out--the very man whom you pronounce to 
be  too devoted to pleasure--that man   
cannot live agreeably1 unless he lives  
honourably1 justly1 and wisely2 and     
that1 if he lives wisely1 honourably1   
and justly1 it is impossible that he    
should not live agreeably4 ,for a city  
in sedition cannot be happy1 nor can a  
house in which the masters are          
quarrelling4 ,so that a mind which      
disagrees and quarrels with itself1     
cannot taste any portion of clear and   
unrestrained pleasure4 ,and a man who   
is always giving in to pursuits and     

plans which are inconsistent with and   
contrary to one another1 can never know 
any quiet or tranquillity4    ,but if   
the pleasure of life is hindered by the 
graver diseases of the  body1 how much  
more must it be so by those of the mind8
 ,but the diseases  of the mind are     
boundless and vain desires of riches1 or
 glory1 or  domination1 or even of      
lustful pleasures4 ,besides these there 
are  melancholy1 annoyance1 sorrow1     
which eat up and destroy with anxiety   
the  minds of those men who do not      
understand that the mind ought not to   
grieve  about anything which is         
unconnected with some present or future 
pain of  body4 ,nor is there any fool   
who does not suffer under some one of   
these  diseases4 ,therefore there is no 
fool who is not miserable4 ,besides     
these  things there is death1 which is  
always hanging over us as his rock is   
over  ,tantalus2 and superstition1 a    
feeling which prevents any one who is   
imbued  with it from ever enjoying      

tranquillity4 ,besides1 such men as they
 do not  recollect their past good      
fortune1 do not enjoy what is present1  
but do  nothing but expect what is to   
come2 and as that cannot be certain1    
they  wear themselves out with grief and
 apprehension1 and are tormented most   
especially when they find out1 after it 
is too late1 that they have  devoted    
themselves to the pursuit of money1 or  
authority1 or power1 or  glory1 to no   
purpose4 ,for they have acquired no     
pleasures1 by the hope of  enjoying     
which it was that they were inflamed to 
undertake so many great  labours4 ,there
 are others1 of little and narrow minds1
 either always  despairing of           
everything1 or else malcontent1 envious1
 ill-tempered1  churlish1 calumnious1   
and morose2 others devoted to amatory   
pleasures1  others petulant1 others     
audacious1 wanton1 intemperate1 or idle1
 never  continuing in the same opinion2 
on which account there is never any     
interruption to the annoyances to which 

their life is exposed4    ,therefore1   
there is no fool who is happy1 and no   
wise man who is not4 ,and  we put this  
much more forcibly and truly than the   
,stoics3 for they assert  that there is 
no good whatever1 but some imaginary    
shadow which they call   1 a name showy 
rather than substantial2 and they insist
 upon it1  that virtue relying on this  
principle of honour stands in need of no
  pleasure1 and is content with its own 
resources as adequate to secure a  happy
 life4    ,,xix4 ,however1 these        
assertions may be to a certain extent   
made not only  without our objecting to 
them1 but even with our concurrence and 
agreement4 ,for in this way the wise man
 is represented by ,epicurus as  always 
happy4 ,he has limited desires2 he      
disregards death2 he has a true  opinion
 concerning the immortal ,gods without  
any fear2 he does not  hesitate1 if it  
is better for him1 to depart from life4 
,being prepared in  this manner1 and    
armed with these principles1 he is      

always in the  enjoyment of pleasure2   
nor is there any period when he does not
 feel more  pleasure than pain4 ,for he 
remembers the past with gratitude1 and  
he  enjoys the present so as to notice  
how important and how delightful the    
joys which it supplies are2 nor does he 
depend on future good1 but he  waits for
 that and enjoys the present2 and is as 
far removed as possible  from those     
vices which ,i have enumerated2 and when
 he compares the life of  fools to his  
own he feels great pleasure4 ,and pain1 
if any does attack  him1 has never such 
power that the wise man has not more to 
rejoice at  than to be grieved at4      
,but ,epicurus does admirably in saying 
that fortune has but little power  over 
the wise man1 and that the greatest and 
most important events of such  a man's  
life are managed by his own wisdom and  
prudence2 and that greater  pleasure    
cannot be derived from an eternity of   
life than such a man enjoys  from this  
life which we see to be limited4    ,but

 in your dialectics he thought that     
there was no power which could          
contribute either to enable men to live 
better1 or argue more  conveniently4 ,to
 natural philosophy he attributed a     
great deal of  importance4 ,for by the  
one science it is only the meaning of   
words and the  character of a speech1   
and the way in which arguments follow   
from or are  inconsistent with one      
another1 that can be seen2 but if the   
nature of all  things is known1 we are  
by that knowledge relieved from         
superstition1  released from the fear of
 death1 exempted from being perplexed by
 our  ignorance of things1 from which   
ignorance horrible fears often arise4   
,lastly1 we shall be improved in our    
morals when we have learnt what nature  
requires4 ,moreover1 if we have an      
accurate knowledge of things1 preserving
  that rule which has fallen from heaven
 as it were for the knowledge of all    
things1 by which all our judgments of   
things are to be regulated1 we shall    

never abandon our opinions because of   
being overcome by any one's  eloquence4 
,for unless the nature of things is     
thoroughly known1 we shall have no      
means by which we can defend the        
judgments formed by our senses4         
,moreover1  whatever we discern by our  
intellect1 all arises from the senses4  
,and if  our senses are all correct1 as 
the theory of ,epicurus affirms1 then   
something may be discerned and          
understood accurately2 but as to those  
men  who deny the power of the senses1  
and say that nothing can be known by    
them1 those very men1 if the senses are 
discarded1 will be unable to  explain   
that very point which they are arguing  
about4 ,besides1 if all  knowledge and  
science is put out of the question1 then
 there is an end  also of all settled   
principles of living and of doing       
anything4    ,thus1 by means of natural 
philosophy1 courage is desired to       
withstand the  fear of death1 and       
constancy to put aside the claims       

engendered by  superstition2 and by     
removing ignorance of all secret things1
 tranquillity  of mind is produced2 and 
by explaining the nature of desires and 
their  different kinds1 we get          
moderation3 and 7as ,i just now         
explained7 by means  of this rule of    
knowledge1 and of the judgment which is 
established and  corrected by it1 the   
power of distinguishing truth from      
falsehood is put  into man's hands4     
,,xx4 ,there remains a topic necessary  
above all others to this discussion1    
that of friendship1 namely3 which you1  
if pleasure is the chief good1  affirm  
to have no existence at all4 ,concerning
 which ,epicurus speaks thus3  ,that of 
all the things which wisdom has         
collected to enable man to live         
happily1 nothing is more important1 more
 influential1 or more delightful  than  
friendship4 ,nor did he prove this      
assertion by words only1 but still  more
 by his life1 and conduct1 and actions4 
,and how important a thing it  is1 the  

fables of the ancients abundantly       
intimate1 in which1 many and  varied as 
they are1 and traced back to the        
remotest antiquity1 scarcely  three     
pairs of friends are found1 even if you 
begin as far back as  ,theseus1 and come
 down to ,orestes4 ,but in one single   
house1 and that a  small one1 what great
 crowds of friends did ,epicurus        
collect1 and how  strong was the bond of
 affection that held them together6 ,and
 this is the  case even now among the   
,epicureans4 ,however1 let us return to 
our subject3  it is not necessary for us
 to be discussing men4    ,i see1 then1 
that the philosophers of our school have
 treated the question  of friendship in 
three ways4 ,some1 as they denied that  
those pleasures  which concerned our    
friends were to be sought with as much  
eagerness for  their own sake1 as we    
display in seeking our own1 7by pressing
 which topic  some people think that the
 stability of friendship is endangered17
  maintain that doctrine resolutely1    

and1 as ,i think1 easily explain it4    
,for1 as in the case of the virtues     
which ,i have already mentioned1 so too 
they deny that friendship can ever be   
separated from pleasure4 ,for1 as a     
life which is solitary and destitute of 
friends is full of treachery and  alarm1
 reason itself warns us to form         
friendships4 ,and when such are  formed1
 then our minds are strengthened1 and   
cannot be drawn away from the  hope of  
attaining pleasure4 ,and as hatred1     
envy1 and contempt are all  opposed to  
pleasures1 so friendships are not only  
the most faithful  favourers1 but also  
are the efficient causes of pleasures to
 one's friends  as well as to oneself2  
and men not only enjoy those pleasures  
at the  moment1 but are also roused by  
hopes of subsequent and future time4    
,and as  we cannot possibly maintain a  
lasting and continued happiness of life 
without friendship1 nor maintain        
friendship itself unless we love our    
friends and ourselves equally1 therefore

 this very effect is produced in        
friendship1 and friendship is combined  
with pleasure4    ,for we rejoice in the
 joy of our friends as much as we do in 
our own1 and  we are equally grieved at 
their sorrows4 ,wherefore the wise man  
will feel  towards his friend as he does
 towards himself1 and whatever labour he
  would encounter with a view to his own
 pleasure1 he will encounter also  for  
the sake of that of his friend4 ,and all
 that has been said of the  virtues as  
to the way in which they are invariably 
combined with pleasure1  should also be 
said of friendship4 ,for admirably does 
,epicurus say1 in  almost these exact   
words3 8,the same science has           
strengthened the mind so  that it should
 not fear any eternal or long lasting   
evil1 inasmuch as in  this very period  
of human life1 it has clearly seen that 
the surest  bulwark against evil is that
 of friendship40    ,there are1 however1
 some ,epicureans who are rather        
intimidated by the  reproaches of your  

school1 but still men of sufficient     
acuteness1 and they  are afraid lest1 if
 we think that friendship is only to be 
sought after  with a view to our own    
pleasure1 all friendships should1 as it 
were1  appear to be crippled4 ,therefore
 they admit that the first meetings1 and
  unions1 and desires to establish      
intimacy1 do arise from a desire of     
pleasure2 but1 they say1 that when      
progressive habit has engendered        
familiarity1 then such great affection  
is ripened1 that friends are loved  by  
one another for their own sake1 even    
without any idea of advantage           
intermingling with such love4 ,in truth1
 if we are in the habit of feeling      
affection for places1 and temples1 and  
cities1 and gymnasia1 and the  ,campus  
,martius1 and for dogs1 and horses1 and 
sports1 in consequence of  our habit of 
exercising ourselves1 and hunting1 and  
so on1 how much more  easily and        
reasonably may such a feeling be        
produced in us by our intimacy  with    

men6    ,but some people say that there 
is a sort of agreement entered into by  
wise  men not to love their friends less
 than themselves2 which we both imagine 
to be possible1 and indeed see to be    
often the case2 and it is evident  that 
nothing can be found having any         
influence on living agreeably1 which  is
 better suited to it than such a union4 
,from all which considerations it  may  
be inferred1 not only that the principle
 of friendship is not hindered  by our  
placing the chief good in pleasure1 but 
that without such a  principle it is    
quite impossible that any friendship    
should be  established4    ,,xxi4       
,wherefore1 if the things which ,i have 
been saying are clearer and  plainer    
than the sun itself2 if all that ,i have
 said is derived from the  fountain of  
nature2 if the whole of my discourse    
forces assent to itself  by its         
accordance with the senses1 that is to  
say1 with the most  incorruptible and   
honest of all witnesses2 if infant      

children1 and even  brute beasts1       
declare almost in words1 under the      
teaching and guidance of  nature1 that  
nothing is prosperous but pleasure1     
nothing hateful but  pain--a matter as  
to which their decision is neither      
erroneous nor  corrupt--ought we not to 
feel the greatest gratitude to that man 
who1  having heard this voice of nature1
 as ,i may call it1 has embraced it with
  such firmness and steadiness1 that he 
has led all sensible men into the  path 
of a peaceful1 tranquil1 and happy life8
 ,and as for his appearing to  you to be
 a man of but little learning1 the      
reason of that is1 that he  thought no  
learning deserving of the name except   
such as assisted in the  attainment of a
 happy life4 ,was he a man to waste his 
time in reading  poets1 as ,triarius and
 ,i do at your instigation8 men in whose
 works there  is no solid utility1 but  
only a childish sort of amusement2 or to
 devote  himself1 like ,plato1 to music1
 geometry1 arithmetic1 and astronomy8   

studies which1 starting from erroneous  
principles1 cannot possibly be  true2   
and which1 if they were true1 would     
constitute nothing to our living  more  
agreeably1 that is to say1 better4      
,should he1 then1 pursue such           
occupations as those1 and abandon the   
task of laying down principles of       
living1 laborious1 but1 at the same     
time1 useful as they are8    ,epicurus1 
then1 was not destitute of learning2 but
 those persons are  ignorant who think  
that those studies which it is          
discreditable for boys  not to have     
learnt1 are to be continued till old    
age4    ,and when he had spoken         
thus1--,i have now1 said he1 explained  
my opinions1  and have done so with the 
design of learning your judgment of     
them4 ,but  the opportunity of doing so1
 as ,i wished1 has never been offered me
 before  to-day4          ,second ,book 
,of ,the ,treatise ,on ,the ,chief ,good
 ,and ,evil4      ,i4 ,on this1 when    
both of them fixed their eyes on me1 and

 showed that they  were ready to listen 
to me3--,in the first place1 said ,i1 ,i
 intreat you not  to fancy that ,i1 like
 a professed philosopher1 am going to   
explain to you  the doctrines of some   
particular school2 a course which ,i    
have never much  approved of when       
adopted by philosophers themselves4 ,for
 when did  ,socrates1 who may fairly be 
called the parent of philosophy1 ever do
  anything of the sort8 ,that custom was
 patronized by those who at that time   
were called ,sophists1 of which number  
,georgias of ,leontium was the first    
who ventured in an assembly to demand a 
question1--that is to say1 to  desire   
any one in the company to say what he   
wished to hear discussed4 ,it  was a    
bold proceeding2 ,i should call it an   
impudent one1 if this fashion  had not  
subsequently been borrowed by our own   
philosophers4 ,but we see  that he whom 
,i have just mentioned1 and all the     
other ,sophists1 7as may be  gathered   
from ,plato17 were all turned into      

ridicule by ,socrates2 for he1  by      
questioning and interrogating them1 was 
in the habit of eliciting the  opinions 
of those with whom he was arguing1 and  
then1 if he thought it  necessary1 of   
replying to the answers which they had  
given him4 ,and as  that custom had not 
been preserved by those who came after  
him1 ,arcesilaus  re-introduced it1 and 
established the custom1 that those who  
wished to  become his pupils were not to
 ask him questions1 but themselves to   
state  their opinions2 and then1 when   
they had stated them1 he replied to what
  they had advanced2 but those who came 
to him for instruction defended  their  
own opinions as well as they could4     
,but with all the rest of the           
philosophers the man who asks the       
question  says no more2 and this        
practice prevails in the ,academy to    
this day4 ,for  when he who wishes to   
receive instruction has spoken thus1    
8,pleasure  appears to me to be the     
chief good10 they argue against this    

proposition  in an uninterrupted        
discourse2 so that it may be easily     
understood that  they who say that they 
entertain such and such an opinion1 do  
not of  necessity really entertain it1  
but wish to hear the arguments which may
 be  brought against it4 ,we follow a   
more convenient method1 for not only has
  ,torquatus explained what his opinions
 are1 but also why he entertains  them3 
but ,i myself think1 although ,i was    
exceedingly delighted with his          
uninterrupted discourse1 that still1    
when you stop at each point that        
arises1 and come to an understanding    
what each party grants1 and what he     
denies1 you draw the conclusion you     
desire from what is admitted with more  
convenience1 and come to an end of the  
discussion more readily4 ,for when a    
discourse is borne on uninterruptedly1  
like a torrent1 although it hurries     
along in its course many things of every
 kind1 you still can take hold of       
nothing1 and put your hand on nothing1  

and can find no means of  restraining   
that rapid discourse4    ,,ii4 ,but     
every discourse which is concerned in   
the investigation of any  matter1 and   
which proceeds on any system and        
principle1 ought first to  establish the
 rule 7as is done in lawsuits1 where one
 proceeds according  to set formulas71  
in order that it may be agreed between  
the parties to  the discussion1 what the
 subject of the discussion really is4   
,this rule  was approved by ,epicurus1  
as it was laid down by ,plato in his    
8,phdrus10  and he considered that it   
ought to be adopted in every            
controversy4 ,but he  did not perceive  
what was the necessary consequence of   
it1 for he asserts  that the subject    
ought not to be defined2 but if this be 
not done1 it is  sometimes impossible   
that the disputants should agree what   
the matter is  that is the subject of   
discussion1 as in this very case which  
we are  discussing now1 for we are      
inquiring into the ,end of ,good4 ,how  

can we know  what the character of this 
is1 if1 when we have used the expression
 the  ,end of ,good1 we do not compare  
with one another our ideas of what is   
meant  by the ,end1 and of what the     
,good itself is8    ,and this laying    
open of things covered up1 as it were1  
when it is once  explained what each    
thing is1 is the definition of it2 which
 you sometimes  used without being aware
 of it2 for you defined this very thing1
 whether  it is to be called the ,end1  
or the extremity1 or the limit1 to be   
that to  which everything which was done
 rightly was referred1 and which was    
itself  never referred to anything4 ,so 
far was very well said2 and1 perhaps1 if
 it  had been necessary1 you would also 
have defined the ,good itself1 and told 
us what that was2 making it to be that  
which is desirable by nature1 or  that  
which is profitable1 or that which is   
useful1 or that which is  pleasant3 and 
now1 since you have no general          
objections to giving  definitions1 and  

do it when you please1 if it is not too 
much trouble1 ,i  should be glad if you 
would define what is pleasure1 for that 
is what all  this discussion relates to4
    ,as if1 said he1 there were any one 
who is ignorant what pleasure is1 or    
who is in need of any definition to     
enable him to understand it better4     
,i should say1 ,i replied1 that ,i      
myself am such a man1 if ,i did not seem
 to  myself to have a thorough          
acquaintance with1 and an accurate idea 
and  notion of1 pleasure firmly         
implanted in my mind4 ,but1 at present1 
,i say  that ,epicurus himself does not 
know1 and that he is greatly in error on
  this subject2 and that he who mentions
 the subject so often ought to  explain 
carefully what the meaning of the words 
he uses is1 but that he  sometimes does 
not understand what the meaning of this 
word pleasure is1  that is to say1 what 
the idea is which is contained under    
this word4    ,,iii4 ,then he laughed1  
and said1--,this is a capital idea1     

indeed1 that he  who says that pleasure 
is the end of all things which are to be
 desired1  the very extreme point and   
limit of ,good1 should be ignorant of   
what it  is1 and of what is its         
character4 ,but1 ,i replied1 either     
,epicurus is  ignorant of what pleasure 
is1 or else all the rest of the world   
are4 ,how  so8 said he4    ,because all 
men feel that this is pleasure which    
moves the senses when  they receive it1 
and which has a certain agreeableness   
pervading it  throughout4 ,what then1   
said he1 is ,epicurus ignorant of that  
kind of  pleasure8 ,not always1 ,i      
replied2 for sometimes he is even too   
well  acquainted with it1 inasmuch as he
 declares that he is unable even to     
understand where it is1 or what any good
 is1 except that which is enjoyed  by   
the instrumentality of meat or drink1 or
 the pleasure of the ears1 or  sensual  
enjoyment3 is not this what he says8 ,as
 if1 said he1 ,i were  ashamed of these 
things1 or as if ,i were unable to      

explain in what sense  these things are 
said4 ,i do not doubt1 ,i replied1 that 
you can do so  easily2 nor is there any 
reason why you need be ashamed of       
arguing with a  wise man1 who is the    
only man1 as far as ,i know1 who has    
ever ventured to  profess himself a wise
 man4 ,for they do not think that       
,metrodorus himself  professed this1 but
 only that1 when he was called wise by  
,epicurus1 he was  unwilling to reject  
such an expression of his goodwill4 ,but
 the ,seven had  this name given to     
them1 not by themselves1 but by the     
universal suffrage  of all nations4     
,however1 in this place1 ,i will assume 
that ,epicurus1 by  these expressions1  
certainly meant to intimate the same    
kind of pleasure  that the rest do2 for 
all men call that pleasing motion by    
which the  senses are rendered cheerful1
  in ,greek1 and voluptas in ,latin4    
,what is it1 then1 that you ask8 ,i will
 tell you1 said ,i1 and that for the    
sake of learning rather than of finding 

fault with either you or ,epicurus4  ,i 
too1 said he1 should be more desirous to
 learn of you1 if you can impart        
anything worth learning1 than to find   
fault with you4    ,well1 then1 said ,i1
 you are aware of what ,hieronymus7#be7 
of ,rhodes says is  the chief good1 to  
which he thinks that everything ought to
 be referred8 ,i  know1 said he1 that he
 thinks that the great end is freedom   
from pain4  ,well1 what are his         
sentiments respecting pleasure8 ,he     
affirms1 he replied1  that it is not to 
be sought for its own sake2 for he      
thinks that rejoicing  is one thing1 and
 being free from pain another4 ,and     
indeed1 continued he1  he is in this    
point greatly mistaken1 for1 as ,i      
proved a little while ago1  the end of  
increasing pleasure is the removal of   
all pain4 ,i will examine1  said ,i1    
presently1 what the meaning of the      
expression1 freedom from pain1  is2 but 
unless you are very obstinate1 you must 
admit that pleasure is a  perfectly     

distinct thing from mere freedom from   
pain4 ,you will1 however1  said he1 find
 that ,i am obstinate in this2 for      
nothing can be more real  than the      
identity between the two4 ,is there1    
now1 said ,i1 any pleasure  felt by a   
thirsty man in drinking8 ,who can deny  
it8 said he4 ,is it1 asked  ,i1 the same
 pleasure that he feels after his thirst
 is extinguished8 ,it  is1 replied he1  
another kind of pleasure2 for the state 
of extinguished  thirst has in it a     
certain stability of pleasure1 but the  
pleasure of  extinguishing it is        
pleasure in motion4 ,why1 then1 said ,i1
 do you call  things so unlike one      
another by the same name8 ,do not you   
recollect1 he  rejoined1 what ,i said   
just now1--that when all pain is        
banished1 pleasure  is varied1 not      
extinguished8 ,i recollect1 said ,i2 but
 you spoke in  admirable ,latin1 indeed1
 but yet not very intelligibly2 for     
varietas is  a ,latin word1 and properly
 applicable to a difference of colour1  

but it is  applied metaphorically to    
many differences3 we apply the          
adjective1  varias1 to poems1 orations1 
manners1 and changes of fortune2 it is  
occasionally predicated also of         
pleasure1 when it is derived from many  
things unlike one another1 which cause  
pleasures which are similarly  unlike4  
,now1 if that is the variety you mean1  
,i should understand you1 as1  in fact1 
,i do understand you1 without your      
saying so3 but still1 ,i do not  see    
clearly what that variety is1 because   
you say1 that when we are free  from    
pain we are then in the enjoyment of the
 greatest pleasure2 but when  we are    
eating those things which cause a       
pleasing motion to the senses1  then    
there is a pleasure in the emotion which
 causes a variety in the  pleasure2 but 
still1 that that pleasure which arises  
from the freedom from  pain is not      
increased2--and why you call that       
pleasure ,i do not know4    ,,iv4 ,is it
 possible1 said he1 for anything to be  

more delightful than  freedom from pain8
 ,well1 said ,i1 but grant that nothing 
is preferable to  that1 7for that is not
 the point which ,i am inquiring about  
at present17  does it follow on that    
account1 that pleasure is identical with
 what ,i may  call painlessness8        
,undoubtedly it is identical with it1   
said he2 and that  painlessness is the  
greatest of pleasures which no other can
 possibly  exceed4 ,why1 then1 said ,i1 
do you hesitate1 after you have defined 
the  chief good in this manner1 to      
uphold1 and defend1 and maintain the    
proposition1 that the whole of pleasure 
consists in freedom from pain8 ,for     
what necessity for your introducing     
pleasure among the council of the       
virtues1 any more than for bringing in a
 courtezan to an assembly of  matrons8  
,the very name of pleasure is odious1   
infamous1 and a just object  of         
suspicion3 therefore1 you are all in the
 constant habit of saying that  we do   
not understand what ,epicurus means when

 he speaks of pleasure4 ,and  whenever  
such an assertion is made to me1--and ,i
 hear it advanced pretty                
often1--although ,i am usually a very   
peaceful arguer1 still ,i do on such    
occasions get a little angry4 ,am ,i to 
be told that ,i do not know what that   
is which the ,greeks call 1 and the     
,latins voluptas8 ,which language  is   
it1 then1 that ,i do not understand8    
,then1 too1 how comes it about that  ,i 
do not understand1 though every one else
 does1 who chooses to call  himself an  
,epicurean8 when the disciples of your  
school argue most  excellently1 that    
there is no need whatever for a man1 who
 wishes to  become a philosopher1 to be 
acquainted with literature4 ,therefore1 
just as  our ancestors tore ,cincinnatus
 away from his plough to make him       
,dictator1  in like manner you collect  
from among the ,greeks all those men1   
who may in  truth be respectable men    
enough1 but who are certainly not       
over-learned4    ,do they then          

understand what ,epicurus means1 and do 
,i not understand it8  ,however1 that   
you may know that ,i do understand1     
first of all ,i tell you  that voluptas 
is the same thing that he calls 4 ,and1 
indeed1 we  often have to seek for a    
,latin word equivalent to1 and exactly  
equipollent  to a ,greek one2 but here  
we had nothing to seek for3 for no word 
can be  found which will more exactly   
express in ,latin what  does in ,greek1 
than voluptas4 ,now every man in the    
world who understands ,latin1           
comprehends under this word two         
things1--joy in the mind1 and an        
agreeable  emotion of pleasantness in   
the body4 ,for when the man in          
,trabea7#bf7 calls  an excessive        
pleasure of the mind joy1 7ltitia17 he  
says much the same  as the other        
character in ,ccilius's play1 who says  
that he is joyful with  every sort of   
joy4    ,however1 there is this         
difference1 that pleasure is also spoken
 of as  affecting the mind2 which is    

wrong1 as the ,stoics think1 who define 
it  thus3 8,an elation of the mind      
without reason1 when the mind has an    
idea  that it is enjoying some great    
good40 ,but the words ltitia 7gladness71
  and gaudium 7joy71 do not properly    
apply to the body4 ,but the word        
voluptas 7pleasure7 is applied to the   
body by the usage of all people  who    
speak ,latin1 whenever that pleasantness
 is felt which moves any one of  the    
senses4 ,now transfer this pleasantness1
 if you please1 to the mind2  for the   
verb juvo 7to please7 is applied both to
 body and mind1 and the  word jucundus  
is derived from it2 provided you        
understand that between  the man who    
says1          ,i am transported with   
gladness now      ,that ,i am scarce    
myself4444      and him who says1       
,now then at length my mind's on fire1  
444      one of whom is beside himself  
with joy1 and the other is being        
tormented  with anguish1 there is this  
intermediate person1 whose language is1 

,although this our acquaintance is so   
new1      who feels neither gladness nor
 anguish4 ,and1 in the same manner1     
between  the man who is in the enjoyment
 of the pleasures of the body1 which he 
has  been wishing for1 and him who is   
being tormented with extreme anguish1   
there is a third man1 who is free alike 
from pleasure and from pain4    ,v4 ,do 
,i not1 then1 seem to you sufficiently  
to understand the meaning of  words1 or 
must ,i at this time of life be taught  
how to speak ,greek1 and  even ,latin8  
,and yet ,i would have you consider1    
whether if ,i1 who1 as ,i  think1       
understand ,greek very fairly1 do still 
not understand what ,epicurus  means1 it
 it may not be owing to some fault of   
his for speaking so as not  to be       
intelligible4 ,and this sometimes       
happens in two ways1 without any  blame2
 either if you do so on purpose1 as     
,heraclitus did1 who got the  surname of
 17#bg7 because he spoke with too much  
obscurity about  natural philosophy2 or 

when the obscurity of the subject       
itself1 not of  the language1 prevents  
what is said from being clearly         
understood1 as is  the case in the      
,timus of ,plato4 ,but ,epicurus1 as ,i 
imagine1 is both  willing1 if it is in  
his power1 to speak intelligibly1 and is
 also  speaking1 not of an obscure      
subject like the natural philosophers1  
nor of  one depending on precise rules1 
as the mathematicians are1 but he is    
discussing a plain and simple matter1   
which is a subject of common            
conversation among the common people4   
,although you do not deny that we       
understand the usual meaning of the word
 voluptas1 but only what he  means by   
it3 from which it follows1 not that we  
do not understand what is  the meaning  
of that word1 but that he follows his   
own fashion1 and  neglects our usual    
one2 for if he means the same thing that
 ,hieronymus  does1 who thinks that the 
chief good is to live without any       
annoyance1 why  does he prefer using the

 term 8pleasure0 rather than freedom    
from pain1 as  ,hieronymus does1 who is 
quite aware of the force of the words   
which he  employs8 ,but1 if he thinks   
that he ought to add1 that pleasure     
which  consists in motion1 7for this is 
the distinction he draws1 that this     
agreeable pleasure is pleasure in       
motion1 but the pleasure of him who is  
free from pain is a state of pleasure17 
then why does he appear to aim at  what 
is impossible1 namely1 to make any one  
who knows himself--that is to  say1 who 
has any proper comprehension of his own 
nature and  sensations--think freedom   
from pain1 and pleasure1 the same thing8
    ,this1 ,o ,torquatus1 is doing      
violence to one's senses2 it is wresting
 out  of our minds the understanding of 
words with which we are imbued2 for who 
can avoid seeing that these three states
 exist in the nature of things3  first1 
the state of being in pleasure2         
secondly1 that of being in pain2        
thirdly1 that of being in such a        

condition as we are at this moment1 and 
you too1 ,i imagine1 that is to say1    
neither in pleasure nor in pain2 in     
such pleasure1 ,i mean1 as a man who is 
at a banquet1 or in such pain as a  man 
who is being tortured4 ,what6 do you not
 see a vast multitude of men  who are   
neither rejoicing nor suffering1 but in 
an intermediate state  between these two
 conditions8 ,no1 indeed1 said he2 ,i   
say that all men who  are free from pain
 are in pleasure1 and in the greatest   
pleasure too4 ,do  you1 then1 say that  
the man who1 not being thirsty himself1 
mingles some  wine for another1 and the 
thirsty man who drinks it when mixed1   
are both  enjoying the same pleasure8   
,,vi4 ,then1 said he1 a truce1 if you   
please1 to all your questions2 and1     
indeed1 ,i said at the beginning that ,i
 would rather have none of them1 for  ,i
 had a provident dread of these captious
 dialectics4 ,would you rather1  then1  
said ,i1 that we should argue           
rhetorically than dialectically8 ,as if1

  said he1 a continuous discourse       
belonged solely to orators1 and not to  
philosophers also6 ,i will tell you1    
said ,i1 what ,zeno the ,stoic said2 he 
said1 as ,aristotle had said before him1
 that all speaking was divided into  two
 kinds1 and that rhetoric resembled the 
open palm1 dialectics the  closed fist1 
because orators usually spoke in a      
rather diffuse1 and  dialecticians in a 
somewhat compressed style4 ,i will      
comply1 then1 with  your desires1 and   
will speak1 if ,i can1 in an oratorical 
style1 but still  with the oratory of   
the philosophers1 and not that which we 
use in the  forum2 which is forced at   
times1 when it is speaking so as to suit
 the  multitude1 to submit to a very    
ordinary style4 ,but while ,epicurus1 ,o
  ,torquatus1 is expressing his contempt
 for dialectics1 an art which by  itself
 contains the whole science both of     
perceiving what the real subject  is in 
every question1 and also of judging what
 the character of each thing  is1 by its

 system and method of conducting the    
argument1 he goes on too  fast1 as it   
seems to me1 and does not distinguish   
with any skill at all  the different    
points which he is intent upon proving1 
as in this very  instance which we were 
just now speaking of4    ,pleasure is   
pronounced to be the chief good4 ,we    
must then open the  question1 ,what is  
pleasure8 for otherwise1 the thing which
 we are seeking  for cannot be          
explained4 ,but1 if he had explained it1
 he would not  hesitate2 for either he  
would maintain that same definition of  
pleasure  which ,aristippus did1 namely1
 that it is that feeling by which the   
senses  are agreeably and pleasantly    
moved1 which even cattle1 if they could 
speak1 would call pleasure2 or else1 if 
he chose rather to speak in his  own    
style1 than like          ,all the      
,greeks from high ,mycen1      ,all     
,minerva's ,attic youth1      and the   
rest of the ,greeks who are spoken of in
 these anapsts1 then he  would call this

 freedom from pain alone by the name of 
pleasure1 and would  despise the        
definition of ,aristippus2 or1 if he    
thought both definitions  good1 as in   
fact he does1 he would combine freedom  
from pain with  pleasure1 and would     
employ the two extremes in his own      
definition3 for  many1 and they1 too1   
great philosophers1 have combined these 
extremities  of goods1 as1 for instance1
 ,aristotle1 who united in his idea the 
practice  of virtue with the prosperity 
of an entire life4 ,callipho7#bh7 added 
pleasure to what is honourable4         
,diodorus1 in his definition1 added to  
the  same honourableness1 freedom from  
pain4 ,epicurus would have done so too1 
if he had combined the opinion which was
 held by ,hieronymus1 with the  ancient 
theory of ,aristippus4 ,for those two   
men disagree with one another1  and on  
this account they employ separate       
definitions2 and1 while they both  write
 the most beautiful ,greek1 still1      
neither does ,aristippus1 who calls     

pleasure the chief good1 ever speak of  
freedom from pain as pleasure2 nor  does
 ,hieronymus1 who lays it down that     
freedom from pain is the chief  good1   
ever use the word 8pleasure0 for that   
painlessness1 inasmuch as he  never even
 reckons pleasure at all among the      
things which are desirable4    ,,vii4   
,they are also two distinct things1 that
 you may not think that the  difference 
consists only in words and names4 ,one  
is to be without pain1  the other to be 
with pleasure4 ,but your school not only
 attempt to make  one name for these two
 things which are so exceedingly unlike1
 7for ,i  would not mind that so much17 
but you endeavour also to make one thing
 out  of the two1 which is utterly      
impossible4 ,but ,epicurus1 who admits  
both  things1 ought to use both         
expressions1 and in fact he does divide 
them in  reality1 but still he does not 
distinguish between them in words4 ,for 
though he in many places praises that   
very pleasure which we all call by  the 

same name1 he ventures to say that he   
does not even suspect that there  is any
 good whatever unconnected with that    
kind of pleasure which  ,aristippus     
means2 and he makes this statement in   
the very place where his  whole         
discourse is about the chief good4 ,but 
in another book1 in which he  utters    
opinions of the greatest weight in a    
concise form of words1 and in  which he 
is said to have delivered oracles of    
wisdom1 he writes in those  words which 
you are well acquainted with1 ,o        
,torquatus4 ,for who is there of  you   
who has not learnt the   of ,epicurus1  
that is to say1 his  fundamental maxims8
 because they are sentiments of the     
greatest gravity  intended to guide men 
to a happy life1 and enunciated with    
suitable  brevity4 ,consider1 therefore1
 whether ,i am not translating this     
maxim of  his correctly4 8,if those     
things which are the efficient causes of
  pleasures to luxurious men were to    
release them from all fear of the gods1 

and of death1 and of pain1 and to show  
them what are the proper limits to      
their desires1 we should have nothing to
 find fault with2 as men would  then be 
filled with pleasures from all quarters1
 and have on no side  anything painful  
or melancholy1 for all such things are  
evil40    ,on this ,triarius could      
restrain himself no longer4 ,i beg of   
you1  ,torquatus1 said he1 to tell me1  
is this what ,epicurus says8--because he
  appeared to me1 although he knew it   
himself1 still to wish to hear          
,torquatus admit it4 ,but he was not at 
all put out1 and said with great        
confidence1 ,indeed1 he does1 and in    
these identical words2 but you do not   
perceive what he means4 ,if1 said ,i1 he
 says one thing and means another1  then
 ,i never shall understand what he      
means1 but he speaks plainly enough  for
 me to see what he says4 ,and if what he
 says is that luxurious men are  not to 
be blamed if they are wise men1 he talks
 absurdly2 just as if he  were to say   

that parricides are not to be found     
fault with if they are not  covetous1   
and if they fear neither gods1 nor      
death1 nor pain4 ,and yet1  what is the 
object of making any exception as to the
 luxurious1 or of  supposing any people1
 who1 while living luxuriously1 would   
not be reproved  by that consummate     
philosopher1 provided only they guard   
against all other  vices4 ,still1 would 
not you1 ,epicurus1 blame luxurious men 
for the mere  fact of their living in   
such a manner as to pursue every sort of
 pleasure2  especially when1 as you say1
 the chief pleasure of all is to be free
 from  pain8 ,but yet we find some      
debauched men so far from having any    
religious  scruples1 that they will eat 
even out of the sacred vessels2 and so  
far  from fearing death that they are   
constantly repeating that passage out of
  the ,hymnis17#bi7--          ,six     
months of life for me are quite         
sufficient1      ,the seventh may be for
 the shades below1--      and bringing  

up that ,epicurean remedy for pain1 as  
if they were taking it  out of a        
medicine chest3 8,if it is bitter1 it is
 of short duration2 if it  lasts a long 
time1 it must be slight in degree40     
,there is one thing which  ,i do not    
understand1 namely1 how a man who is    
devoted to luxury can  possibly have his
 appetites under restraint4    ,,viii4  
,what then is the use of saying1 ,i     
should have nothing to reproach  them   
with if they only set bounds to their   
appetites8 ,this is the same as  saying1
 ,i should not blame debauched men if   
they were not debauched men4  ,in the   
same way one might say1 ,i should not   
blame even wicked men if they  were     
virtuous4 ,this man of strict morality  
does not think luxury of itself  a thing
 to be blamed4 ,and1 indeed1 ,o         
,torquatus1 to speak the truth1 if      
pleasure is the chief good1 he is quite 
right not to think so4 ,for ,i  should  
be sorry to picture to myself1 7as you  
are in the habit of doing17  men so     

debauched as to vomit over the table and
 be carried away from  banquets1 and    
then the next day1 while still suffering
 from indigestion1  gorge themselves    
again2 men who1 as they say1 have never 
in their lives  seen the sun set or     
rise1 and who1 having devoured their    
patrimony1 are  reduced to indigence4   
,none of us imagine that debauched men  
of that sort  live pleasantly4 ,you1    
however1 rather mean to speak of refined
 and elegant  bons vivans1 men who1 by  
the employment of the most skilful cooks
 and  bakers1 and by carefully culling  
the choicest products of fishermen1     
fowlers1 and hunters1 avoid all         
indigestion--          ,men who draw    
richer wines from foaming casks4        
,as ,lucilius says1 men who          ,so
 strain1 so cool the rosy wine with     
snow1      ,that all the flavour still  
remains uninjured--      and so on--men 
in the enjoyment of luxuries such that1 
if they are taken  away1 ,epicurus says 
that he does not know what there is that

 can be called  good4 ,let them also    
have beautiful boys to attend upon them2
 let their  clothes1 their plate1 their 
articles of ,corinthian vertu1 the      
banqueting-room itself1 all correspond1 
still ,i should never be induced to  say
 that these men so devoted to luxury    
were living either well or  happily4    
,from which it follows1 not indeed that 
pleasure is not pleasure1  but that     
pleasure is not the chief good4 ,nor was
 ,llius1 who1 when a young  man1 was a  
pupil of ,diogenes the ,stoic1 and      
afterwards of ,pantius1 called  a wise  
man because he did not understand what  
was most pleasant to the  taste1 7for it
 does not follow that the man who has a 
discerning heart  must necessarily have 
a palate destitute of discernment17 but 
because he  thought it of but small     
importance4          ,o sorrel1 how that
 man may boast himself1      ,by whom   
you're known and valued6 ,proud of you1 
,that wise man ,llius would loudly      
shout1      ,addressing all our epicures

 in order4      ,and it was well said by
 ,llius1 and he may be truly called a   
wise man1--          ,you ,publius1     
,gallonius1 you whirlpool1      ,you are
 a miserable man2 you never      ,in all
 your life have really feasted well1    
,though spending all your substance on  
those prawns1      ,and overgrown huge  
sturgeons4      ,the man who says this  
is one who1 as he attributes no         
importance to  pleasure himself1 denies 
that the man feasts well who refers     
everything to  pleasure4 ,and yet he    
does not deny that ,gallonius has at    
times feasted as  he wished3 for that   
would be speaking untruly3 he only      
denies that he has  ever feasted well4  
,with such dignity and severe principle 
does he  distinguish between pleasure   
and good4 ,and the natural inference is1
 that  all who feast well feast as they 
wish1 but that it does not follow that  
all who feast as they wish do therefore 
feast well4 ,llius always feasted  well4
 ,how so8 ,lucilius shall tell you--    

,he feasted on well season'd1 well      
arranged--      what8 ,what was the     
chief part of his supper8               
,converse of prudent men1--      ,well1 
and what else8          with cheerful   
mind4      ,for he came to a banquet    
with a tranquil mind1 desirous only of  
appeasing  the wants of nature4 ,llius  
then is quite right to deny that        
,gallonius had  ever feasted well2 he is
 quite right to call him miserable2     
especially as  he devoted the whole of  
his attention to that point4 ,and yet no
 one  affirms that he did not sup as he 
wished4 ,why then did he not feast well8
  ,because feasting well is feasting    
with propriety1 frugality1 and good     
order2 but this man was in the habit of 
feasting badly1 that is1 in a           
dissolute1 profligate1 gluttonous1      
unseemly manner4 ,llius1 then1 was not  
preferring the flavour of sorrel to     
,gallonius's sturgeon1 but merely       
treating the taste of the sturgeon with 
indifference2 which he would not  have  

done if he had placed the chief good in 
pleasure4    ,,ix4 ,we must then discard
 pleasure1 not only in order to follow  
what is  right1 but even to be able to  
talk becomingly4 ,can we then call that 
the  chief good in life1 which we see   
cannot possibly be so even in a banquet8
    ,but how is it that this philosopher
 speaks of three kinds of               
appetites1--some natural and necessary1 
some natural but not necessary1 and     
others neither natural nor necessary8   
,in the first place1 he has not made  a 
neat division2 for out of two kinds he  
has made three4 ,now this is not        
dividing1 but breaking in pieces4 ,if he
 had said that there are two kinds  of  
appetites1 natural and superfluous ones1
 and that the natural appetites  might  
be also subdivided into two kinds1      
necessary and not necessary1 he  would  
have been all right4 ,and those who have
 learnt what he despises do  usually say
 so4 ,for it is a vicious division to   
reckon a part as a genus4  ,however1 let

 us pass over this1 for he despises     
elegance in arguing2 he  speaks         
confusedly4 ,we must submit to this as  
long as his sentiments are  right4 ,i do
 not1 however1 approve1 and it is as    
much as ,i can do to  endure1 a         
philosopher speaking of the necessity of
 setting bounds to the  desires4 ,is it 
possible to set bounds to the desires8  
,i say that they must  be banished1     
eradicated by the roots4 ,for what man  
is there in whom  appetites7#cj7 dwell1 
who can deny that he may with propriety 
be called  appetitive8 ,if so1 he will  
be avaricious1 though to a limited      
extent2 and  an adulterer1 but only in  
moderation2 and he will be luxurious in 
the same  manner4 ,now what sort of a   
philosophy is that which does not bring 
with it  the destruction of depravity1  
but is content with a moderate degree of
  vice8 ,although in this division ,i am
 altogether on his side as to the       
facts1 only ,i wish he would express    
himself better4 ,let him call these     

feelings the wishes of nature2 and let  
him keep the name of desire for  other  
objects1 so as1 when speaking of        
avarice1 of intemperance1 and of  the   
greatest vices1 to be able to indict it 
as it were on a capital  charge4        
,however1 all this is said by him with a
 good deal of freedom1 and  is often    
repeated2 and ,i do not blame him1 for  
it is becoming in so great  a           
philosopher1 and one of such a great    
reputation1 to defend his own  degrees  
fearlessly4    ,but still1 from the fact
 of his often appearing to embrace that 
pleasure1  7,i mean that which all      
nations call by this name17 with a good 
deal of  eagerness1 he is at times in   
great difficulties1 so that1 if he could
 only  pass undetected1 there is nothing
 so shameful that it does not seem      
likely  that he would do it for the sake
 of pleasure4 ,and then1 when he has    
been  put to the blush1 7for the power  
of nature is very great17 he takes      
refuge  in denying that any addition can

 possibly be made to the pleasure of the
  man who is free from pain4 ,but that  
state of freedom from pain is not       
called pleasure4 ,i do not care1 says   
he1 about the name4 ,but what do you    
say about the thing being utterly       
different8--,i will find you many men1  
or  ,i may say an innumerable host1 not 
so curious nor so embarrassing as you   
are1 whom ,i can easily convince of     
whatever ,i choose4 ,why then do we     
hesitate to say that1 if to be free from
 pain is the highest degree of          
pleasure1 to be destitute of pleasure is
 the highest degree of pain8  ,because  
it is not pleasure which is the contrary
 to pain1 but the absence  of pain4     
,x4 ,but this he does not see1 that it  
is a great proof that at the very       
moment when he says that if pleasure be 
once taken away he has no idea at  all  
what remaining thing can be called good1
 7and he follows up this  assertion with
 the statement that he means such       
pleasure as is perceptible  by the      

palate and by the ears1 and adds other  
things which decency ought  to forbid   
him to mention17 he is1 like a strict   
and worthy philosopher1  aware that this
 which he calls the chief good is not   
even a thing which is  worth desiring   
for its own sake1 that he himself       
informs us that we have  no reason to   
wish for pleasure at all1 if we are free
 from pain4 ,how  inconsistent are these
 statements6 ,if he had learnt to make  
correct  divisions or definitions of his
 subject1 if he had a proper regard to  
the  usages of speaking and the common  
meaning of words1 he would never have   
fallen into such difficulties4 ,but as  
it is1 you see what it is he is  doing4 
,that which no one has ever called      
pleasure at all1 and that also  which is
 real active pleasure1 which are two    
distinct things1 he makes but  one4 ,for
 he calls them agreeable and1 as ,i may 
say1 sweet-tasted  pleasures4 ,at times 
he speaks so lightly of them that you   
might fancy you  were listening to      

,marcus ,curius4 ,at times he extols    
them so highly that he  says he cannot  
form even the slightest idea of what    
else is good--a  sentiment which        
deserves not the reproof of a           
philosopher1 but the brand  of the      
censor4 ,for vice does not confine      
itself to language1 but  penetrates also
 into the manners4 ,he does not find    
fault with luxury  provided it to be    
free from boundless desires and from    
fear4 ,while  speaking in this way he   
appears to be fishing for disciples1    
that men who  wish to become debauchees 
may become philosophers first4    ,now1 
in my opinion1 the origin of the chief  
good is to be sought in the  first      
origin of living animals4 ,as soon as an
 animal is born it rejoices  in         
pleasure1 and seeks it as a good2 it    
shuns pain as an evil4 ,and  ,epicurus  
says that excellent decisions on the    
subject of the good and the  evil are   
come to by those animals which are not  
yet depraved4 ,you1 too1  have laid down

 the same position1 and these are your  
own words4 ,how many  errors are there  
in them6 ,for by reference to which kind
 of pleasure will  a puling infant judge
 of the chief good2 pleasure in         
stability or pleasure  in               
motion8--since1 if the gods so will1 we 
are learning how to speak from          
,epicurus4 ,if it is from pleasure as a 
state1 then certainly nature desires  to
 be exempt from evil herself2 which we  
grant2 if it is from pleasure in        
motion1 which1 however1 is what you say1
 then there will be no pleasure so      
discreditable as to deserve to be passed
 over4 ,and at the same time that       
just-born animal you are speaking of    
does not begin with the highest         
pleasure2 which has been defined by you 
to consist in not being in pain4        
,however1 ,epicurus did not seek to     
derive this argument from infants1 or   
even from beasts1 which he looks upon as
 mirrors of nature as it were2 so  as to
 say that they1 under the guidance of   

nature1 seek only this pleasure  of     
being free from pain4 ,for this sort of 
pleasure cannot excite the  desires of  
the mind2 nor has this state of freedom 
from pain any impulse  by which it can  
act upon the mind4 ,therefore           
,hieronymus blunders in this  same      
thing4 ,for that pleasure only acts upon
 the mind which has the power  of       
alluring the senses4 ,therefore         
,epicurus always has recourse to this   
pleasure when wishing to prove that     
pleasure is sought for naturally2       
because that pleasure which consists in 
motion both allures infants to  itself1 
and beasts2 and this is not done by that
 pleasure which is a state  in which    
there is no other ingredient but freedom
 from pain4 ,how then can  it be proper 
to say that nature begins with one kind 
of pleasure1 and yet  to put the chief  
good in another8    ,,xi4 ,but as for   
beasts1 ,i do not consider that they can
 pronounce any  judgment at all4 ,for   
although they are not depraved1 it is   

still possible  for them to be wrong4   
,just as one stick may be bent and      
crooked by having  been made so on      
purpose1 and another may be so          
naturally2 so the nature of  beasts is  
not indeed depraved by evil education1  
but is wrong naturally4  ,nor is it     
correct to say that nature excites the  
infant to desire  pleasure1 but only to 
love itself and to desire to preserve   
itself safe  and unhurt4 ,for every     
animal the moment that it is born loves 
itself1 and  every part of itself1 and  
above all does it love its two principal
 parts1  namely its mind and body1 and  
afterwards it proceeds to love the      
separate  parts of each4 ,for there are 
in the mind and also in the body some   
parts  of especial consequence2 and as  
soon as it has got a slight perception  
of  this fact1 it then begins to make   
distinctions1 so as to desire those     
things which are by nature given to it  
as its principal goods1 and to  reject  
the contrary4 ,now it is a great        

question whether among these  primary   
natural goods1 pleasure has any place or
 not4 ,but to think that  there is      
nothing beyond pleasure1 no limbs1 no   
sensations1 no emotions of  the mind1 no
 integrity of the body1 no health1      
appears to me to be a token  of the     
greatest ignorance4 ,and on this the    
whole question of good and evil  turns4 
,now ,polemo and also ,aristotle thought
 those things which ,i  mentioned just  
now the greatest of goods4 ,and from    
this originated that  opinion of the    
,old ,academy and of the ,peripatetic   
,school1 which led them  to say that the
 greatest good was to live in accordance
 with nature--that  is to say1 to enjoy 
the chief good things which are given by
 nature1 with  the accompaniment of     
virtue4 ,callipho added nothing to      
virtue except  pleasure2 ,diodorus      
nothing except freedom from pain4 ,and  
all these men  attach the idea of the   
greatest good to some one of these      
things which ,i  have mentioned4        

,aristippus thought it was simple       
pleasure4 ,the ,stoics  defined it to be
 agreeing with nature1 which they say   
can only be living  virtuously1 living  
honourably4 ,and they interpret it      
further thus--to live  with an          
understanding of those things which     
happen naturally1 selecting  those which
 are in accordance with nature1 and     
rejecting the contrary4 ,so  there are  
three definitions1 all of which exclude 
honesty3--one1 that of  ,aristippus or  
,epicurus2 the second1 that of          
,hieronymus2 the third1 that of         
,carneades3 three in which honesty is   
admitted with some qualifying           
additions2 those1 namely1 of ,polemo1   
,callipho1 and ,diodorus3 one single    
one1 of which ,zeno is the author1 which
 is wholly referred to what is          
becoming2 that is to say1 to honesty4   
,for ,pyrrho1 ,aristo1 and ,herillus1   
have long since sunk into oblivion4 ,the
 rest have been consistent with         
themselves1 so as to make their ends    

agree with their beginnings2 so that    
,aristippus has defined it to be        
pleasure2 ,hieronymus1 freedom from     
pain2  and ,carneades1 the enjoyment of 
what are pointed out by nature as the   
principal goods4    ,,xii4 ,but when    
,epicurus had given pleasure the highest
 rank1 if he meant  the same pleasure   
that ,aristippus did he ought to have   
adopted the same  thing as the chief    
good that he did2 if he meant the same  
that ,hieronymus  did1 he would then    
have been assigning the first rank to   
,hieronymus's  pleasure1 and not to that
 of ,aristippus4    ,for1 as to what he 
says1 that it is decided by the senses  
themselves that  pleasure is a good and 
that pain is an evil1 he has attributed 
more weight  to the senses than the laws
 allow them4 ,we are the judges of      
private  actions1 but we cannot decide  
anything which does not legally come    
under  the cognisance of our tribunal2  
and1 in such a case1 it is to no purpose
  that judges are in the habit1 when    

they pronounce sentence1 of adding1 8if 
the question belongs to my              
jurisdiction20 for1 if the matter did   
not come  under their jurisdiction1 this
 additional form of words would not any 
the  more give validity to their        
decision4 ,now1 what is it that the     
senses are  judges of8 ,whether a thing 
is sweet or bitter1 soft or hard1 near  
or far  off2 whether it is standing     
still or moving2 whether it is square or
  round4 ,what sentence1 then1 will     
reason pronounce1 having first of all   
called in the aid of the knowledge of   
divine and human affairs1 which is      
properly called wisdom2 and having1     
after that1 associated to itself the    
virtues which reason points out as the  
mistresses of all things1 but which  you
 make out to be only the satellites and 
handmaidens of pleasures8 ,the          
sentence1 however1 of all these         
qualities1 will pronounce first of all1 
respecting pleasure1 that there is no   
room for it2 not only no room for  its  

being placed by itself in the rank of   
the chief good1 which is what we  are   
looking for1 but no room even for its   
being placed in connexion even  with    
what is honourable4    ,the same        
sentence will be passed upon freedom    
from pain2 ,carneades also  will be     
disregarded2 nor will any definition of 
the chief good be approved  of1 which   
has any close connexion with pleasure1  
or freedom from pain1 or  which is      
devoid of what is honourable4 ,and so it
 will leave two1 which it  will consider
 over and over again2 for it will either
 lay down the maxim1  that nothing is   
good except what is honourable1 nothing 
evil except what  is disgraceful2 that  
everything else is either of no         
consequence at all1  or1 at all events1 
of only so much1 that it is neither to  
be sought after  nor avoided1 but only  
selected or rejected2 or else1 it will  
prefer that  which it shall perceive to 
be the most richly endowed with what is 
honourable1 and enriched1 at the same   

time1 with the primary good things  of  
nature1 and with the perfection of the  
whole life2 and it will do so  all the  
more clearly1 if it comes to a right    
understanding whether the  controversy  
between them is one of facts1 or only of
 words4    ,,xiii4 ,i now1 following the
 authority of this man1 will do the same
 as he  has done2 for1 as far as ,i can1
 ,i will diminish the disputes1 and will
  regard all their simple opinions in   
which there is no association of        
virtue1 as judgments which ought to be  
utterly removed to a distance from      
philosophy4 ,first of all1 ,i will      
discard the principles of ,aristippus1  
and  of all the ,cyrenaics1--men who    
were not afraid to place the chief good 
in  that pleasure which especially      
excited the senses with its sweetness1  
disregarding that freedom from pain4    
,these men did not perceive that1 as a  
horse is born for galloping1 and an ox  
for ploughing1 and a dog for  hunting1  
so man1 also1 is born for two objects1  

as ,aristotle says1 namely1  for        
understanding and for acting as if he   
were a kind of mortal god4 ,but1  on the
 other hand1 as a slow moving and       
languid sheep is born to feed1 and  to  
take pleasure in propagating his        
species1 they fancied also that this    
divine animal was born for the same     
purposes2 than which nothing can  appear
 to me more absurd2 and all this is in  
opposition to ,aristippus1 who          
considers that pleasure not only the    
highest1 but also the only one1 which   
all the rest of us consider as only one 
of the pleasures4    ,you1 however1     
think differently2 but he1 as ,i have   
already said1 is  egregiously           
wrong1--for neither does the figure of  
the human body1 nor the  admirable      
reasoning powers of the human mind1     
intimate that man was born  for no other
 end than the mere enjoyment of         
pleasure2 nor must we listen  to        
,hieronymus1 whose chief good is the    
same which you sometimes1 or1 ,i  might 

say1 too often call so1 namely1 freedom 
from pain2 for it does not  follow1     
because pain is an evil1 that to be free
 from that evil is  sufficient for      
living well4 ,ennius speaks more        
correctly1 when he says1--          ,the
 man who feels no evil1 does      ,enjoy
 too great a good4      ,let us define a
 happy life as consisting1 not in the   
repelling of evil1  but in the          
acquisition of good2 and let us seek to 
procure it1 not by  doing nothing1      
whether one is feeling pleasure1 as     
,aristippus says1 or  feeling no pain1  
as ,hieronymus insists1 but by doing    
something1 and giving  our mind to      
thought4 ,and all these same things may 
be said against that  chief good which  
,carneades calls such2 which he1        
however1 brought forward1  not so much  
for the purpose of proving his position1
 as of contradicting  the ,stoics1 with 
whom he was at variance3 and this good  
of his is such1  that1 when added to    
virtue1 it appears likely to have some  

authority1 and  to be able to perfect a 
happy life in a most complete manner1   
and it is  this that the whole of this  
present discussion is about2 for they   
who add  to virtue pleasure1 which is   
the thing which above all others virtue 
thinks of small importance1 or freedom  
from pain1 which1 even if it be a       
freedom from evil1 is nevertheless not  
the chief good1 make use of an  addition
 which is not very easily recommended to
 men in general1 and yet ,i  do not     
understand why they do it in such a     
niggardly and restricted  manner3 for1  
as if they had to bring something to add
 to virtue1 first of  all they add      
things of the least possible value2     
afterwards they add  things one by one1 
instead of uniting everything which     
nature had approved  of as the highest  
goods1 to pleasure4 ,and as all these   
things appeared to  ,aristo and to      
,pyrrho absolutely of no consequence at 
all1 so that they  said that there was  
literally no difference whatever between

 being in a  most perfect state of      
health1 and in a most terrible condition
 of disease1  people rightly enough have
 long ago given up arguing against them2
 for1  while they insisted upon it that 
everything was comprised in virtue      
alone1  to such a degree as to deprive  
it of all power of making any selection 
of  external circumstances1 and while   
they gave it nothing from which it could
  originate1 or on which it could rely1 
they in reality destroyed virtue        
itself1 which they were professing to   
embrace4 ,but ,herillus1 who sought to  
refer everything to knowledge1 saw1     
indeed1 that there was one good1 but    
what he saw was not the greatest        
possible good1 nor such an one that life
  could be regulated by it2 therefore1  
he also has been discarded a long  time 
ago1 for1 indeed1 there has been no one 
who has argued against him  since       
,chrysippus4    ,,xiv4 ,your school1    
then1 is now the only one remaining to  
be combated2 for  the contest with the  

,academicians is an uncertain one1 for  
they affirm  nothing1 and1 as if they   
despaired of arriving at any certain    
knowledge1  wish to follow whatever is  
probable4 ,but we have more trouble with
  ,epicurus1 because he combines two    
kinds of pleasure1 and because he and   
his friends1 and many others since1 have
 been advocates of that opinion2  and   
somehow or other1 the people1 who1      
though they have the least  authority1  
have nevertheless the greatest power1   
are on his side2 and1  unless we refute 
them1 all virtue1 and all reputation1   
and all true glory1  must be abandoned4 
,and so1 having put aside the opinions  
of all the rest1  there remains a       
contest1 not between ,torquatus and me1 
but between virtue  and pleasure2 and   
this contest ,chrysippus1 a man of great
 acuteness and  great industry1 is far  
from despising2 and he thinks that the  
whole  question as to the chief good is 
at stake in this controversy3 but ,i    
think1 if ,i show the reality of what is

 honourable1 and that it is a thing  to 
be sought for by reason of its own      
intrinsic excellence1 and for its  own  
sake1 that all your arguments are at    
once overthrown2 therefore1 when  ,i    
have once established what its character
 is1 speaking briefly1 as the  time     
requires1 ,i shall approach all your    
arguments1 ,o ,torquatus1 unless my     
memory fails me4    ,we understand1     
then1 that to be honourable which is    
such that1 leaving all  advantage out of
 the question1 it can be deservedly     
praised by itself1  without thinking of 
any reward or profit derived from it4   
,and what its  character is may be      
understood1 not so much by the          
definition which ,i have  employed1     
7although that may help in some degree17
 as by the common  sentiments of all    
men1 and by the zeal and conduct of     
every virtuous man2  for such do many   
things for this sole reason1 because    
they are becoming1  because they are    
right1 because they are honourable1 even

 though they do  not perceive any       
advantage likely to result from them3   
for men differ from  beasts in many     
other things indeed1 but especially in  
this one particular1  that they have    
reason and intellect given to them by   
nature1 and a mind1  active1 vigorous1  
revolving many things at the same time  
with the greatest  rapidity1 and1 if ,i 
may so say1 sagacious to perceive the   
causes of  things1 and their            
consequences and connexions1 and to use 
metaphors1 and  to combine things which 
are unconnected1 and to connect the     
future with  the present1 and to embrace
 in its view the whole course of a      
consistent  life4 ,the same reason has  
also made man desirous of the society of
 men1  and inclined to agree with them  
by nature1 and conversation1 and custom2
  so that1 setting out with affection   
for his friends and relations1 he       
proceeds further1 and unites himself in 
a society1 first of all of his          
fellow-countrymen1 and subsequently of  

all mortals2 and as ,plato wrote to     
,archytas1 recollects that he has been  
born1 not for himself alone1 but for    
his country and his family2 so that     
there is but a small portion of  himself
 left for himself4 ,and since the same  
nature has implanted in man a  desire of
 ascertaining the truth1 which is most  
easily visible when1 being  free from   
all cares1 we wish to know what is      
taking place1 even in the  heavens2 led 
on from these beginnings we love        
everything that is true1  that is to    
say1 that is faithful1 simple1          
consistent1 and we hate what is  vain1  
false and deceitful1 such as fraud1     
perjury1 cunning and injustice4    ,the 
same reason has in itself something     
large and magnificent1 suited for       
command rather than for obedience2      
thinking all events which can befal a   
man not only endurable1 but             
insignificant2 something lofty and      
sublime1  fearing nothing1 yielding to  
no one1 always invincible4 ,and1 when   

these  three kinds of the honourable    
have been noticed1 a fourth follows1 of 
the  same beauty and suited to the other
 three1 in which order and moderation   
exist2 and when the likeness of it to   
the others is perceived in the  beauty  
and dignity of all their separate forms1
 we are transported across  to what is  
honourable in words and actions2 for1 in
 consequence of these  three virtues    
which ,i have already mentioned1 a man  
avoids rashness1 and  does not venture  
to injure any one by any wanton word or 
action1 and is  afraid either to do or  
to say anything which may appear at all 
unsuited to  the dignity of a man4      
,,xv4 ,here1 now1 ,o ,torquatus1 you    
have a picture of what is honourable    
completely filled in and finished2 and  
it is contained wholly in these  four   
virtues which you also mentioned4 ,but  
your master ,epicurus says that  he     
knows nothing whatever of it1 and does  
not understand what1 or what  sort of   
quality those people assert it to be1   

who profess to measure the  chief good  
by the standard of what is honourable4  
,for if everything is  referred to that1
 and if they say that pleasure has no   
part in it1 then he  says that they are 
talking idly1 7these are his very       
words17 and do not  understand or see   
what real meaning ought to be conveyed  
under this word  honourable2 for1 as    
custom has it1 he says that that alone  
is honourable  which is accounted       
glorious by common report2 and that1    
says he1 although  it is often more     
pleasant than some pleasures1 still is  
sought for the  sake of pleasure4 ,do   
you not see how greatly these two       
parties differ8 ,a  noble philosopher1  
by whom not only ,greece and ,italy1 but
 all the  countries of the barbarians   
are influenced1 says that he does not   
understand what honourableness is1 if it
 be not in pleasure1 unless1  perchance1
 it is that thing which is praised by   
the common conversation of  the         
populace4 ,but my opinion is1 that this 

is often even dishonourable1  and that  
real honourableness is not called so    
from the circumstance of its  being     
praised by the many1 but because it is  
such a thing that even if men  were     
unacquainted with it1 or if they said   
nothing about it1 it would  still be    
praiseworthy by reason of its own       
intrinsic beauty and  excellence4       
,and so he again1 being forced to yield 
to the power of nature1 which is  always
 irresistible1 says in another place    
what you also said a little  while      
ago1--that a man cannot live pleasantly 
unless he also lives  honourably4 ,now  
then1 what is the meaning of honourably8
 does it mean the  same as pleasantly8  
,if so1 this statement will come to     
this1 that a man  cannot live honourably
 unless he lives honourably4 ,is it     
honourably  according to public report8 
,therefore he affirms that a man cannot 
live  pleasantly without he has public  
report in his favour4 ,what can be more 
shameful than for the life of a wise man

 to depend on the conversation of       
fools8 ,what is it1 then1 that in this  
place he understands by the word        
honourable8 ,certainly nothing except   
what can be deservedly praised for  its 
own sake2 for if it be praised for the  
sake of pleasure1 then what  sort of    
praise1 ,i should like to know1 is that 
which can be sought for in  the         
shambles8 ,he is not a man1 while he    
places honourableness in such a  rank   
that he affirms it to be impossible to  
live pleasantly without it1 to  think   
that honourable which is popular1 and to
 affirm that one cannot live  pleasantly
 without popularity2 or to understand by
 the word honourable  anything except   
what is right1 and deservedly to be     
praised by itself and  for itself1 from 
a regard to its own power and influence 
and intrinsic  nature4    ,,xvi4        
,therefore1 ,torquatus1 when you said   
that ,epicurus asserted loudly  that a  
man could not live pleasantly if he did 
not also live honourably1  and wisely1  

and justly1 you appeared to me to be    
boasting yourself4 ,there  was such     
energy in your words1 on account of the 
dignity of those things  which were     
indicated by those words1 that you      
became taller1 that you rose  up1 and   
fixed your eyes upon us as if you were  
giving a solemn testimony  that         
honourableness and justice are sometimes
 praised by ,epicurus4 ,how  becoming   
was it to you to use that language1     
which is so necessary for  philosophers1
 that if they did not use it we should  
have no great need of  philosophy at    
all6 ,for it is out of love for those   
words1 which are very  seldom employed  
by ,epicurus--,i mean wisdom1 fortitude1
 justice1 and  temperance--that men of  
the most admirable powers of mind have  
betaken  themselves to the study of     
philosophy4    8,the sense of our eyes10
 says ,plato1 8is most acute in us2 but 
yet we do  not see wisdom with them4    
,what a vehement passion for itself     
would it  excite if it could be beheld  

by the eyes60 ,why so8 ,because it is so
  ingenious as to be able to devise     
pleasures in the most skilful manner4   
,why is justice extolled8 or what is it 
that has given rise to that old and     
much-worn proverb1 8,he is a man with   
whom you may play7#ca7 in the dark40    
,this1 though applied to only one thing1
 has a very extensive application2  so  
that in every case we are influenced by 
the facts1 and not by the  witness4     
,for those things which you were saying 
were very weak and powerless            
arguments1--when you urged that the     
wicked were tormented by their own      
consciences1 and also by fear of        
punishment1 which is either inflicted on
  them1 or keeps them in constant fear  
that it will be inflicted4 ,one ought   
not to imagine a man timid1 or weak in  
his mind1 nor a good man1 who1  whatever
 he has done1 keeps tormenting himself1 
and dreads everything2 but  rather let  
us fancy one1 who with great shrewdness 
refers everything to  usefulness--an    

acute1 crafty1 wary man1 able with ease 
to devise plans for  deceiving any one  
secretly1 without any witness1 or any   
one being privy to  it4 ,do you think   
that ,i am speaking of ,lucius          
,tubulus8--who1 when as prtor  he had   
been sitting as judge upon the trial of 
some assassins1 took money  to influence
 his decision so undisguisedly1 that the
 next year ,publius  ,scvola1 being     
tribune of the people1 made a motion    
before the people1  that an inquiry     
should be made into the case4 ,in       
accordance with which  decree of the    
people1 ,cnus ,cpio1 the consul1 was    
ordered by the senate  to investigate   
the affair4 ,tubulus immediately went   
into banishment1 and  did not dare to   
make any reply to the charge1 for the   
matter was  notorious4    ,,xvii4 ,we   
are not1 therefore1 inquiring about a   
man who is merely wicked1  but about one
 who mingles cunning with his           
wickedness1 7as ,quintus  ,pompeius7#cb7
 did when he repudiated the treaty of   

,numantia17 and yet who  is not afraid  
of everything1 but who has rather no    
regard for the stings  of conscience1   
which it costs him no trouble at all to 
stifle2 for a man  who is called close  
and secret is so far from informing     
against himself1  that he will even     
pretend to grieve at what is done wrong 
by another2 for  what else is the       
meaning of the word crafty 7versutus78  
,i recollect on  one occasion being     
present at a consultation held by       
,publius ,sextilius  ,rufus1 when he    
reported the case on which he asked     
advice to his friends  in this manner3  
,that he had been left heir to ,quintus 
,fadius ,gallus2 in  whose will it had  
been written that he had entreated      
,sextilius to take  care that what he   
left behind him should come to his      
daughter4 ,sextilius  denied that he had
 done so4 ,he could deny it with        
impunity1 for who was  there to convict 
him8 ,none of us believed him2 and it   
was more likely that  he should tell a  

lie whose interest it was to do so1 than
 he who had set  down in his will that  
he had made the request which he ought  
to have made4  ,he added1 moreover1 that
 having sworn to comply with the        
,voconian7#cc7 law1  he did not dare to 
violate it1 unless his friends were of a
 contrary  opinion4 ,i myself was very  
young when ,i was present on this       
occasion1 but  there were present also  
many men of the highest character1 not  
one of whom  thought that more ought to 
be given to ,fadia than could come to   
her under  the provisions of the        
,voconian law4 ,sextilius retained a    
very large  inheritance2 of which1 if he
 had followed the opinion of those men  
who  preferred what was right and       
honourable to all profit and advantage1 
he  would never have touched a single   
penny4 ,do you think that he was        
afterwards anxious and uneasy in his    
mind on that account8 ,not a bit of  it3
 on the contrary1 he was a rich man1    
owing to that inheritance1 and he       

rejoiced in his riches1 for he set a    
great value on money which was  acquired
 not only without violating the laws1   
but even by the law4 ,and  money is what
 you also think worth seeking for1 even 
with great risk1 for  it is the         
efficient cause of many and great       
pleasures4 ,as1 therefore1  every danger
 appears fit to be encountered for the  
sake of what is  becoming and           
honourable1 by those who decide that    
what is right and  honourable is to be  
sought for its own sake2 so the men of  
your school1  who measure everything by 
pleasure1 must encounter every danger in
 order  to acquire great pleasures1 if  
any great property or any important     
inheritance is at stake1 since numerous 
pleasures are procured by money4  ,and  
your master ,epicurus must1 if he wishes
 to pursue what he himself  considers   
the chief of all good things1 do the    
same that ,scipio did1 who  had a       
prospect of great glory before him if he
 could compel ,annibal to  return into  

,africa4 ,and with this view1 what great
 dangers did he  encounter6 for he      
measured the whole of his enterprise by 
the standard of  honour1 not of         
pleasure4 ,and in like manner1 your wise
 man1 being excited  by the prospect of 
some advantage1 will fight7#cd7         
courageously1 if it  should be          
necessary4 ,if his exploits are         
undiscovered1 he will rejoice2 if  he is
 taken1 he will despise every kind of   
punishment1 for he will be  thoroughly  
armed for a contempt of death1          
banishment1 and even of pain1  which you
 indeed represent as intolerable when   
you hold it out to wicked  men as a     
punishment1 but as endurable when you   
argue that a wise man has  always more  
good than evil in his fortune4          
,,xviii4 ,but picture to yourself a man 
not only cunning1 so as to be  prepared 
to act dishonestly in any circumstances 
that may arise1 but also  exceedingly   
powerful2 as1 for instance1 ,marcus     
,crassus was1 who1 however1  always     

exercised his own natural good          
disposition2 or as at this day our      
friend ,pompeius is1 to whom we ought to
 feel grateful for his virtuous         
conduct2 for1 although he is inclined to
 act justly1 he could be unjust  with   
perfect impunity4 ,but how many unjust  
actions can be committed which          
nevertheless no one could find any      
ground for attacking6 ,suppose your     
friend1 when dying1 has entreated you to
 restore his inheritance to his         
daughter1 and yet has never set it down 
in his will1 as ,fadius did1 and  has   
never mentioned to any one that he has  
done so1 what will you do8 ,you  indeed 
will restore it4 ,perhaps ,epicurus     
himself would have restored it2  just as
 ,sextus ,peducus the son of ,sextus    
did2 he who has left behind him  a son1 
our intimate friend1 a living image of  
his own virtue and honesty1  a learned  
person1 and the most virtuous and       
upright of all men2 for he1  though no  
one was aware that he had been entreated

 by ,caius ,plotius1 a  ,roman knight of
 high character and great fortune1 of   
the district of  ,nursia1 to do so1 came
 of his own accord to his widow1 and1   
though she had  no notion of the fact1  
detailed to her the commission which he 
had  received from her husband1 and made
 over the inheritance to her4 ,but ,i   
ask  you 7since you would certainly have
 acted in the same manner yourself71 do 
you not understand that the power of    
nature is all the greater1 inasmuch  as 
you yourselves1 who refer everything to 
your own advantage1 and1 as you         
yourselves say1 to pleasure1 still      
perform actions from which it is        
evident that you are guided not by      
pleasure1 but by principles of duty1    
and that your own upright nature has    
more influence over you than any        
vicious reasoning8    ,if you knew1 says
 ,carneades1 that a snake was lying hid 
in any place1 and  that some one was    
going ignorantly to sit down upon it    
whose death would  bring you some       

advantage1 you would be acting wickedly 
if you did not warn  him not to sit down
 there2 and yet you could not be        
punished1 for who  could possibly       
convict you8 ,however1 ,i am dwelling   
too long on this point2  for it is      
evident1 unless equity1 good faith and  
justice proceed from  nature1 and if all
 these things are referred to advantage1
 that a good man  cannot possibly be    
found4 ,but on this subject we have put 
a sufficient  number of arguments into  
the mouth of ,llius1 in our books on a  
,republic4    ,,xix4 ,now apply the same
 arguments to modesty1 or temperance1   
which is a  moderation of the appetites1
 in subordination to reason4 ,can we say
 that a  man pays sufficient regard to  
the dictates of modesty1 who indulges   
his  lusts in such a manner as to have  
no witnesses of his conduct8 or is there
  anything which is intrinsically       
flagitious1 even if no loss of          
reputation  ensues8 ,what do brave men  
do8 ,do they enter into an exact        

calculation of  pleasure1 and so enter  
the battle1 and shed their blood for    
their country8  or are they excited     
rather by a certain ardour and          
impetuosity of courage8  ,do you think1 
,o ,torquatus1 that that imperious      
ancestor of yours1 if he  could hear    
what we are now saying1 would rather    
listen to your sentiments  concerning   
him1 or to mine1 when ,i said that he   
had done nothing for his  own sake1 but 
everything for that of the republic2 and
 you1 on the  contrary1 affirm that he  
did nothing except with a view to his   
own  advantage8 ,but if you were to wish
 to explain yourself further1 and were  
to say openly that he did nothing except
 for the sake of pleasure1 how do  you  
think that he would bear such an        
assertion8    ,be it so4 ,let           
,torquatus1 if you will1 have acted     
solely with a view to his  own          
advantage1 for ,i would rather employ   
that expression than pleasure1          
especially when speaking of so eminent a

 man1--did his colleague too1  ,publius 
,decius1 the first man who ever was     
consul in that family1 did he1  ,i say1 
when he was devoting himself1 and       
rushing at the full speed of his  horse 
into the middle of the army of the      
,latins1 think at all of his own        
pleasures8 ,for where or when was he to 
find any1 when he knew that he  should  
perish immediately1 and when he was     
seeking that death with more  eager zeal
 than ,epicurus thinks even pleasure    
deserving to be sought with8  ,and      
unless this exploit of his had been     
deservedly extolled1 his son would  not 
have imitated it in his fourth          
consulship2 nor1 again1 would his son1  
when fighting against ,pyrrhus1 have    
fallen in battle when he was consul1    
and so offered himself up for the sake  
of the republic as a third victim  in an
 uninterrupted succession from the same 
family4 ,i will forbear giving  any more
 examples4 ,i might get a few from the  
,greeks1 such as ,leonidas1             

,epaminondas1 and three or four more    
perhaps4 ,and if ,i were to begin       
hunting up our own annals for such      
instances1 ,i should soon establish my  
point1 and compel ,pleasure to give     
herself up1 bound hand and foot1 to     
virtue4 ,but the day would be too short 
for me4 ,and as ,aulus ,varius1 who  was
 considered a rather severe judge1 was  
in the habit of saying to his           
colleague1 when1 after some witnesses   
had been produced1 others were still    
being summoned1 8,either we have had    
witnesses enough1 or ,i do not know     
what is enough20 so ,i think that ,i    
have now brought forward witnesses      
enough4    ,for1 what will you say8 ,was
 it pleasure that worked upon you1 a man
  thoroughly worthy of your ancestors1  
while still a young man1 to rob         
,publius ,sylla of the consulship8 ,and 
when you had succeeded in procuring  it 
for your father1 a most gallant man1    
what a consul did he prove1 and  what a 
citizen at all times1 and most          

especially after his consulship6  ,and1 
indeed1 it was by his advice that we    
ourselves behaved in such a  manner as  
to consult the advantage of the whole   
body of the citizens  rather than our   
own4    ,but how admirably did you seem 
to speak1 when on the one side you drew 
a  picture of a man loaded with the most
 numerous and excessive pleasures1  with
 no pain1 either present or future2 and 
on the other1 of a man  surrounded with 
the greatest torments affecting his     
whole body1 with no  pleasure1 either   
present or hoped for2 and asked who     
could be more  miserable than the one1  
or more happy than the other8 and then  
concluded1  that pain was the greatest  
evil1 and pleasure the greatest good4   
,,xx4 ,there was a man of ,lanuvium1    
called ,lucius ,thorius ,balbus1 whom   
you  cannot remember2 he lived in such a
 way that no pleasure could be imagined 
so exquisite1 that he had not a         
superfluity of it4 ,he was greedy of    
pleasure1 a critical judge of every     

species of it1 and very rich4 ,so far   
removed from all superstition1 as to    
despise the numerous sacrifices which   
take place1 and temples which exist in  
his country2 so far from fearing  death1
 that he was slain in battle fighting   
for the republic4 ,he bounded  his      
appetites1 not according to the division
 of ,epicurus1 but by his own  feelings 
of satiety4 ,he took sufficient exercise
 always to come to supper  both thirsty 
and hungry4 ,he ate such food as was at 
the same time nicest  in taste and most 
easy of digestion2 and selected such    
wine as gave him  pleasure1 and was1 at 
the same time1 free from hurtful        
qualities4 ,he had  all those other     
means and appliances which ,epicurus    
thinks so necessary1  that he says that 
if they are denied1 he cannot understand
 what is good4  ,he was free from every 
sort of pain2 and if he had felt any1 he
 would not  have borne it impatiently1  
though he would have been more inclined 
to  consult a physician than a          

philosopher4 ,he was a man of a         
beautiful  complexion1 of perfect       
health1 of the greatest influence1 in   
short1 his  whole life was one          
uninterrupted scene of every possible   
variety of  pleasures4 ,now1 you call   
this man happy4 ,your principles compel 
you to do  so4 ,but as for me1 ,i will  
not1 indeed1 venture to name the man    
whom ,i  prefer to him--,virtue herself 
shall speak for me1 and she will not    
hesitate  to rank ,marcus ,regulus      
before this happy man of yours4 ,for    
,virtue asserts  loudly that this man1  
when1 of his own accord1 under no       
compulsion1 except  that of the pledge  
which he had given to the enemy1 he had 
returned to  ,carthage1 was1 at the very
 moment when he was being tortured with 
sleeplessness and hunger1 more happy    
than ,thorius while drinking on a bed   
of roses4    ,regulus had had the       
conduct of great wars2 he had been twice
 consul2 he  had had a triumph2 and yet 
he did not think those previous exploits

 of his  so great or so glorious as that
 last misfortune which he incurred1     
because  of his own good faith and      
constancy2 a misfortune which appears   
pitiable  to us who hear of it1 but was 
actually pleasant to him who endured it4
 ,for  men are happy1 not because of    
hilarity1 or lasciviousness1 or         
laughter1 or  jesting1 the companion of 
levity1 but often even through sorrow   
endured  with firmness and constancy4   
,lucretia1 having been ravished by force
 by  the king's son1 called her         
fellow-citizens to witness1 and slew    
herself4  ,this grief of hers1 ,brutus  
being the leader and mover of the ,roman
 people1  was the cause of liberty to   
the whole state4 ,and out of regard for 
the  memory of that woman1 her husband  
and her father were made consuls7#ce7   
the  first year of the republic4 ,lucius
 ,virginius1 a man of small property and
  one of the people1 sixty years after  
the reestablishment of liberty1 slew    
his virgin daughter with his own hand1  

rather than allow her to be  surrendered
 to the lust of ,appius ,claudius1 who  
was at that time invested  with the     
supreme power4    ,,xxi4 ,now you1 ,o   
,torquatus1 must either blame all these 
actions1 or else  you must abandon the  
defence of pleasure4 ,and what a cause  
is that1 and  what a task does the man  
undertake who comes forward as the      
advocate of  pleasure1 who is unable to 
call any one illustrious man as evidence
 in her  favour or as a witness to her  
character8 ,for as we have awakened     
those men  from the records of our      
annals as witnesses1 whose whole life   
has been  consumed in glorious labours2 
men who cannot bear to hear the very    
name of  pleasure3 so on your side of   
the argument history is dumb4 ,i have   
never  heard of ,lycurgus1 or ,solon1   
,miltiades1 or ,themistocles1 or        
,epaminondas  being mentioned in the    
school of ,epicurus2 men whose names are
 constantly  in the mouth of all the    
other philosophers4 ,but now1 since we  

have begun  to deal with this part of   
the question1 our friend ,atticus1 out  
of his  treasures1 will supply us with  
the names of as many great men as may be
  sufficient for us to bring forward as 
witnesses4 ,is it not better to say a   
little of these men1 than so many       
volumes about ,themista87#cf7 ,let these
  things be confined to the ,greeks3    
although we have derived philosophy and 
all the liberal sciences from them1     
still there are things which may be     
allowable for them to do1 but not for   
us4 ,the ,stoics are at variance with   
the ,peripatetics4 ,one sect denies that
 anything is good which is not also     
honourable3 the other asserts that it   
allows great weight1 indeed1 by far  the
 most weight1 to what is honourable1 but
 still affirms that there are  in the   
body also1 and around the body1 certain 
positive goods4 ,it is an  honourable   
contest and a splendid discussion4 ,for 
the whole question is  about the dignity
 of virtue4    ,but when one is arguing 

with philosophers of your school1 one is
 forced to  hear a great deal about even
 the obscure pleasures which ,epicurus  
himself  continually mentions4 ,you     
cannot then1 ,torquatus1 believe me1 you
 cannot  uphold those principles1 if you
 examine into yourself1 and your own    
thoughts and studies4 ,you will1 ,i say1
 be ashamed of that picture which       
,cleanthes was in the habit of drawing  
with such accuracy in his  description4 
,he used to desire those who came to him
 as his pupils1 to  think of ,pleasure  
painted in a picture1 clad in beautiful 
robes1 with  royal ornaments1 and       
sitting on a throne4 ,he represented all
 the ,virtues  around her1 as her       
handmaidens1 doing nothing else1 and    
thinking nothing  else their duty1 but  
to minister to ,pleasure1 and only just 
to whisper in  her ear 7if1 indeed1 that
 could be made intelligible in a        
picture7 a  warning to be on her guard  
to do nothing imprudent1 nothing to     
offend the  minds of men1 nothing from  

which any pain could ensue4 ,we1 indeed1
 they  would say1 we ,virtues are only  
born to act as your slaves2 we have no  
other business4    ,,xxii4 ,but         
,epicurus 7for this is your great point7
 denies that any man who  does not live 
honourably can live agreeably2 as if ,i 
cared what he denies  or what he        
affirms4 ,what ,i inquire is1 what it is
 consistent for that man  to say who    
places the chief good in pleasure4 ,what
 reason do you allege  why ,thorius1 why
 ,chius1 why ,postumius1 why the master 
of all these men1  ,orata1 did not live 
most agreeably8 ,he himself1 as ,i have 
already said1  asserts that the life of 
men devoted to luxury is not deserving  
of blame1  unless they are absolute     
fools1 that is to say1 unless they      
abandon  themselves to become slaves to 
their desires or to their fears4 ,and   
when  he promises them a remedy for both
 these things1 he1 in so doing1 offers  
them a licence for luxury4 ,for if you  
take away these things1 then he says    

that he cannot find anything in the life
 of debauched men which deserves  blame4
 ,you then1 who regulate everything by  
the standard of pleasure1  cannot either
 defend or maintain virtue4 ,for he does
 not deserve to be  accounted a virtuous
 or a just man who abstains from        
injustice in order to  avoid suffering  
evil4 ,you know the line1 ,i suppose--  
,he's not a pious man whom fear         
constrains      ,to acts of piety 444 a 
man--      ,and nothing can be more     
true4 ,for a man is not just while he is
 in a state  of alarm4 ,and certainly   
when he ceases to be in fear1 he will   
not be just4  ,but he will not be afraid
 if he is able to conceal his actions1  
or if he  is able1 by means of his great
 riches and power1 to support what he   
has  done4 ,and he will certainly prefer
 being regarded as a good man1 though he
  is not one1 to being a good man and   
not being thought one4 ,and so1 beyond  
all question1 instead of genuine and    
active justice1 you give us only an     

effigy of justice1 and you teach us1 as 
it were1 to disregard our own  unvarying
 conscience1 and to go hunting after the
 fleeting vagabond  opinions of others4 
,and the same may be said of the other  
virtues also2 the foundation of all     
which you place in pleasure1 which is   
like building on water4 ,for what are   
we to say8 ,can we call that same       
,torquatus a brave man8 ,for ,i am      
delighted1 though ,i cannot1 as you say1
 bribe you2 ,i am delighted with  your  
family and with your name4 ,and1 in     
truth1 ,i have before my eyes ,aulus    
,torquatus17#cg7 a most excellent man1  
and one greatly attached to me2 and     
both of you must certainly be aware how 
great and how eminent his zeal in  my   
behalf was in those times which are well
 known to every one4 ,and that  conduct 
of his would not have been delightful to
 me1 who wish both to be1  and to be    
considered1 grateful1 if ,i did not see 
clearly that he was  friendly to me for 
my own sake1 not for his own2 unless1   

indeed1 you say1  it was for his own    
sake1 because it is for the interest of 
every one to  act rightly4 ,if you say  
that1 we have gained our point4 ,for    
what we are  aiming at1 what we are     
contending for1 is1 that duty itself is 
the reward  of duty4 ,but that master of
 yours will not admit this1 and requires
  pleasure to result from every action  
as a sort of wages4    ,however1 ,i     
return to him4 ,if it was for the sake  
of pleasure that  ,torquatus1 when      
challenged1 fought with the ,gaul on the
 ,anio1 and out of  his spoils took his 
chain and earned his surname1 or if it  
was for any  other reason but that he   
thought such exploits worthy of a man1  
then ,i do  not account him brave4 ,and1
 indeed1 if modesty1 and decency1 and   
chastity1  and1 in one word1 temperance1
 is only upheld by the fear of          
punishment or  infamy1 and not out of   
regard to their own sanctity1 then what 
lengths  will adultery and debauchery   
and lust shrink from proceeding to1 if  

there  is a hope either of escaping     
detection1 or of obtaining impunity or  
licence8    ,what shall ,i say more8    
,what is your idea1 ,o ,torquatus1 of   
this8--that you1  a man of your name1 of
 your abilities1 of your high           
reputation1 should not  dare to allege  
in a public assembly what you do1 what  
you think1 what you  contend for1 the   
standard to which you refer everything1 
the object for  the sake of which you   
wish to accomplish what you attempt1 and
 what you  think best in life4 ,for what
 can you claim to deserve1 when you have
  entered upon your magistracy1 and come
 forward to the assembly1 7for then  you
 will have to announce what principles  
you intend to observe in  administering 
the law1 and perhaps1 too1 if you think 
fit1 you will1 as is  the ancient       
custom1 say something about your        
ancestors and  yourself17--what1 ,i say1
 can you claim as your just desert1 if  
you say that  in that magistracy you    
will do everything for the sake of      

pleasure8 and  that you have never done 
anything all your life except with a    
view to  pleasure8 ,do you think1 say   
you1 that ,i am so mad as to speak in   
that way  before ignorant people8 ,well1
 say it then in the court of justice1 or
 if  you are afraid of the surrounding  
audience1 say it in the senate3 you will
  never do so4 ,why not1 except that    
such language is disgraceful8 ,do you   
then think ,triarius and me fit people  
for you to speak before in a            
disgraceful manner8    ,,xxiii4         
,however1 be it so4 ,the name of        
pleasure certainly has no dignity in    
it1 and perhaps we do not exactly       
understand what is meant by it2 for you 
are constantly saying that we do not    
understand what you mean by the word    
pleasure3 no doubt it is a very         
difficult and obscure matter4 ,when you 
speak of atoms1 and spaces between      
worlds1 things which do not exist1 and  
which cannot possibly exist1 then we    
understand you2 and cannot we           

understand what pleasure is1 a thing    
which is known to every sparrow8 ,what  
will you say if ,i compel you to confess
 that ,i not only do know what  pleasure
 is 7for it is a pleasant emotion       
affecting the senses71 but also  what   
you mean by the word8 ,for at one time  
you mean by the word the very  same     
thing which ,i have just said1 and you  
give it the description of  consisting  
in motion1 and of causing some variety3 
at another time you  speak of some other
 highest pleasure1 which is susceptible 
of no addition  whatever1 but that it is
 present when every sort of pain is     
absent1 and  you call it then a state1  
not a motion3 let that1 then1 be        
pleasure4 ,say1  in any assembly you    
please1 that you do everything with a   
view to avoid  suffering pain3 if you do
 not think that even this language is   
sufficiently dignified1 or sufficiently 
honourable1 say that you will do        
everything during your year of office1  
and during your whole life1 for the     

sake of your own advantage2 that you    
will do nothing except what is          
profitable to yourself1 nothing which is
 not prompted by a view to your  own    
interest4 ,what an uproar do you not    
suppose such a declaration would  excite
 in the assembly1 and what hope do you  
think you would have of the  consulship 
which is ready for you8 ,and can you    
follow these principles1  which1 when by
 yourself1 or in conversation with your 
dearest friends1 you  do not dare to    
profess and avow openly8 ,but you have  
those maxims  constantly in your mouth  
which the ,peripatetics and ,stoics     
profess4 ,in the  courts of justice and 
in the senate you speak of duty1 equity1
 dignity1  good faith1 uprightness1     
honourable actions1 conduct worthy of   
power1  worthy of the ,roman people2 you
 talk of encountering every imaginable  
danger in the cause of the republic--of 
dying for one's country4 ,when you      
speak in this manner we are all amazed1 
like a pack of blockheads1 and you  are 

laughing in your sleeve3 for1 among all 
those high-sounding and  admirable      
expressions1 pleasure has no place1 not 
only that pleasure which  you say       
consists in motion1 and which all men1  
whether living in cities or  in the     
country1 all men1 in short1 who speak   
,latin1 call pleasure1 but  even that   
stationary pleasure1 which no one but   
your sect calls pleasure  at all4       
,,xxiv4 ,take care lest you find        
yourselves obliged to use our language1 
though adhering to your own opinions4   
,but if you were to put on a feigned    
countenance or gait1 with the object of 
appearing more dignified1 you  would not
 then be like yourself2 and yet are you 
to use fictitious  language1 and to say 
things which you do not think1 or1 as   
you have one  dress to wear at home1 and
 another in which you appear in court1  
are you  to disguise your opinions in a 
similar manner1 so as to make a parade  
with  your countenance1 while you are   
keeping the truth hidden within8        

,consider1  ,i intreat you1 whether this
 is proper4 ,my opinion is that those   
are  genuine sentiments which are       
honourable1 which are praiseworthy1     
which are  creditable2 which a man is   
not ashamed to avow in the senate1      
before the  people1 in every company and
 every assembly1 so that he will be     
ashamed to  think what he is ashamed to 
say4    ,but what room can there be for 
friendship1 or who can be a friend to   
any  one whom he does not love for his  
own sake8 ,and what is loving1 from     
which  verb 7amo7 the very name of      
friendship 7amicitia7 is derived1 but   
wishing a certain person to enjoy the   
greatest possible good fortune1 even  if
 none of it accrues to oneself8 ,still1 
you say1 it is a good thing for  me to  
be of such a disposition4 ,perhaps it   
may be so2 but you cannot be so  if it  
is not really your disposition2 and how 
can you be so unless love  itself has   
seized hold of you8 which is not usually
 generated by any  accurate computation 

of advantage1 but is self-produced1 and 
born  spontaneously from itself4 ,but1  
you will say1 ,i am guided by prospects 
of  advantage4 ,friendship1 then1 will  
remain just as long as any advantage    
ensues from it2 and if it be a principle
 of advantage which is the  foundation  
of friendship1 the same will be its     
destruction4 ,but what will  you do1 if1
 as is often the case1 advantage takes  
the opposite side to  friendship8 ,will 
you abandon it8 what sort of friendship 
is that8 ,will you  preserve it8 how    
will that be expedient for you8 ,for you
 see what the  rules are which you lay  
down respecting friendship which is     
desirable only  for the sake of one's   
own advantage3--,i must take care that  
,i do not incur  odium if ,i cease to   
uphold my friend4 ,now1 in the first    
place1 why should  such conduct incur   
odium1 except because it is disgraceful8
 ,but1 if you  will not desert your     
friend lest you should incur any        
disadvantage from so  doing1 still you  

will wish that he was dead1 to release  
you from being  bound to a man from whom
 you get no advantage4 ,but suppose he  
not only  brings you no advantage1 but  
you even incur loss of property for his 
sake1  and have to undertake labours1   
and to encounter danger of your life2   
will  you not1 even then1 show some     
regard for yourself1 and recollect that 
every one is born for himself and for   
his own pleasures8 ,will you go bail  to
 a tyrant for your friend in a case     
which may affect your life1 as that     
,pythagorean7#ch7 did when he became    
surety to the ,tyrant of ,sicily8 or1   
when you are ,pylades1 will you affirm  
that you are ,orestes1 that you may  die
 for your friend8 or1 if you were       
,orestes1 would you contradict          
,pylades1 and give yourself up8 and1 if 
you could not succeed then1 would  you  
intreat that you might be both put to   
death together8    ,,xxv4 ,you1 indeed1 
,o ,torquatus1 would do all these       
things4 ,for ,i do not  think that there

 is anything deserving of great praise1 
which you would be  likely to shrink    
from out of fear of death or pain3 nor  
is it the question  what is consistent  
with your nature1 but with the doctrines
 of your  school--that philosophy which 
you defend1 those precepts which you    
have  learnt1 and which you profess to  
approve of1 utterly overthrow           
friendship--even though ,epicurus       
should1 as indeed he does1 extol it to  
the  skies4 ,oh1 you will say1 but he   
himself cultivated friendship4 ,as if   
any  one denied that he was a good1 and 
courteous1 and kind-hearted man2 the    
question in these discussions turns on  
his genius1 and not on his morals4      
,grant that there is such perversity in 
the levity of the ,greeks1 who  attack  
those men with evil speaking with whom  
they disagree as to the  truth of a     
proposition4 ,but1 although he may have 
been courteous in  maintaining          
friendships1 still1 if all this is true1
 7for ,i do not affirm  anything        

myself71 he was not a very acute arguer4
 ,oh1 but he convinced  many people4    
,and perhaps it was quite right that he 
should2 still1 the  testimony of the    
multitude is not of the greatest        
possible weight2 for in  every art1 or  
study1 or science1 as in virtue itself1 
whatever is most  excellent is also most
 rare4 ,and to me1 indeed1 the very fact
 of he  himself having been a good man1 
and of many ,epicureans having also been
  such1 and being to this day faithful  
in their friendships1 and consistent    
throughout their whole lives1 and men of
 dignified conduct1 regulating  their   
lives1 not by pleasure1 but by their    
duty1 appears to show that the  power of
 what is honourable is greater1 and that
 of pleasure smaller4 ,for  some men    
live in such a manner that their        
language is refuted by their  lives2 and
 as others are considered to speak      
better than they act1 so  these men seem
 to me to act better than they speak4   
,,xxvi4 ,however1 all this is nothing to

 the purpose4 ,let us just consider     
those things which have been said by you
 about friendship1 and among them  ,i   
fancied that ,i recognized one thing as 
having been said by ,epicurus  himself1 
namely1 that friendship cannot be       
separated from pleasure1 and  that it   
ought on that account to be cultivated1 
because without it men  could not live  
in safety1 and without fear1 nor even   
with any kind of  pleasantness4 ,answer 
enough has been given to this argument4 
,you also  brought forward another more 
humane one1 invented by these more      
modern  philosophers1 and never1 as far 
as ,i know1 advanced by the master      
himself1  that at first1 indeed1 a      
friend is sought out with a view to     
one's own  advantage1 but that when     
intimacy has sprung up1 then the man is 
loved for  himself1 all hope or idea of 
pleasure being put out of the question4 
,now1  although this argument is open to
 attack on many accounts1 still ,i will 
accept what they grant2 for it is enough

 for me1 though not enough for  them3   
for they admit that it is possible for  
men to act rightly at times1  without   
any expectation of1 or desire to acquire
 pleasure4    ,you also affirmed that   
some people say that wise men make a    
kind of treaty  among themselves1 that  
they shall have the same feelings       
towards their  friends that they        
entertain for themselves1 and that that 
is possible1 and  is often the case1 and
 that it has especial reference to the  
enjoyment of  pleasures4 ,if they could 
make this treaty1 they at the same time 
make that  other to love equity1        
moderation1 and all the virtues for     
their own sake1  without any            
consideration of advantage4 ,but if we  
cultivate friendships  for the sake of  
their profits1 emoluments1 and          
advantages which may be  derived from   
them1 if there is to be no affection    
which may make the  friendship desirable
 for its own sake1 on its own account1  
by its own  influences1 by itself and   

for itself1 is there any doubt at all   
that in  such a case we must prefer our 
farms and estates to our friends8 ,and  
here  you may again quote those         
panegyrics which have been uttered in   
most  eloquent language by ,epicurus    
himself1 on the subject of friendship4  
,i am  not asking what he says1 but what
 he can possibly say which shall be     
consistent with his own system and      
sentiments4    ,friendship has been     
sought for the sake of advantage2 do    
you1 then1 think  that my friend        
,triarius1 here1 will be more useful to 
you than your  granaries at ,puteol8    
,think of all the circumstances which   
you are in the  habit of recollecting2  
the protection which friends are to a   
man4 ,you have  sufficient protection in
 yourself1 sufficient in the laws1      
sufficient also  in moderate            
friendships4 ,as it is1 you cannot be   
looked upon with  contempt2 but you will
 easily avoid odium and unpopularity1   
for precepts  on that subject are given 

by ,epicurus4 ,and yet you1 by employing
 such  large revenues in purposes of    
liberality1 even without any ,pyladean  
friendship1 will admirably defend and   
protect yourself by the goodwill of     
numbers4 ,but with whom1 then1 is a man 
to share his jests1 his serious         
thoughts1 as people say1 and all his    
secrets and hidden wishes8 ,with you1   
above all men2 but if that cannot be1   
why with some tolerably intimate        
friend4 ,however1 grant that all these  
circumstances are not unreasonable2     
what comparison can there be between    
them and the utility of such large  sums
 of money8 ,you see1 then1 if you       
measure friendship by the affection     
which it engenders1 that nothing is more
 excellent2 if by the advantage  that is
 derived from it1 then you see that the 
closest intimacies are  surpassed by the
 value of a productive farm4 ,you must  
therefore love me1  myself1 and not my  
circumstances1 if we are to be real     
friends4    ,,xxvii4 ,but we are getting

 too prolix in the most self-evident    
matters2  for1 as it has been concluded 
and established that there is no room   
anywhere for either virtues or          
friendships if everything is referred to
  pleasure1 there is nothing more which 
it is of any great importance should  be
 said4 ,and yet1 that ,i may not appear 
to have passed over any topic  without a
 reply1 ,i will1 even now1 say a few    
words on the remainder of  your         
argument4    ,since1 then1 the whole sum
 of philosophy is directed to ensure    
living  happily1 and since men1 from a  
desire of this one thing1 have devoted  
themselves to this study2 but different 
people make happiness of life to        
consist in different circumstances2 you1
 for instance1 place it in  pleasure2   
and1 in the same manner you1 on the     
other hand1 make all  unhappiness to    
consist in pain3 let us consider1 in the
 first place1 what  sort of thing this  
happy life of yours is4 ,but you will   
grant this1 ,i  think1 that if there is 

really any such thing as happiness1 it  
ought to be  wholly in the power of a   
wise man to secure it2 for1 if a happy  
life can  be lost1 it cannot be happy4  
,for who can feel confident that a thing
 will  always remain firm and enduring  
in his case1 which is in reality        
fleeting  and perishable8 ,but the man  
who distrusts the permanence of his good
  things1 must necessarily fear that    
some day or other1 when he has lost     
them1 he will become miserable2 and no  
man can be happy who is in fear  about  
most important matters4 ,no one1 then1  
can be happy2 for a happy life  is      
usually called so1 not in some part     
only1 but in perpetuity of time2  and1  
in fact1 life is not said to be happy at
 all till it is completed and  finished4
 ,nor is it possible for any man to be  
sometimes happy and  sometimes          
miserable2 for he who thinks it possible
 that he may become  miserable1 is      
certainly not happy4 ,for1 when a happy 
life is once  attained1 it remains as   

long as the maker of the happy life     
herself1  namely1 wisdom2 nor does it   
wait till the last period of a man's    
existence1 as ,herodotus says that      
,crsus was warned by ,solon4    ,but1 as
 you yourself were saying1 ,epicurus    
denies that length of time has  any     
influence on making life happy1 and that
 no less pleasure can be felt  in a     
short time than would be the case if the
 pleasure were everlasting4  ,now these 
statements are most inconsistent4 ,for1 
when he places the chief  good in       
pleasure1 he denies that pleasure can be
 greater in infinite time1  than it can 
in a finite and moderate period4 ,the   
man who places all good  in virtue1 has 
it in his power to say that a happy life
 is made so by the  perfection of       
virtue2 for he consistently denies that 
time can bring any  increase to his     
chief good4 ,but he who thinks that life
 is made happy by  pleasure1 must surely
 be inconsistent with himself if he     
denies that  pleasure is increased by   

length of time3 if so1 then pain is not 
either4  ,shall we1 then1 say that all  
pain is most miserable in proportion as 
it is  most lasting1 and yet that       
duration does not make pleasure more    
desirable8  ,why1 then1 is it that      
,epicurus always speaks of ,god as happy
 and eternal8  ,for1 if you only take   
away his eternity1 ,jupiter is in no    
respect more  happy than ,epicurus2 for 
each of them is in the enjoyment of the 
chief  good1 namely1 pleasure4 ,oh1 but 
,epicurus is also liable to pain4 ,that 
does  not affect him at all2 for he says
 that if he were being burnt1 he would  
say1 8,how pleasant it is40 ,in what    
respect1 then1 is he surpassed by the   
,god1 if he is not surpassed by him     
because of his eternity8 ,for what good 
has the ,god1 except the highest degree 
of pleasure1 and that1 too1             
everlasting6 ,what1 then1 is the good of
 speaking so pompously1 if one does  not
 speak consistently8 ,happiness of life 
is placed in pleasure of body1  7,i will

 add of mind also1 if you please1 as    
long as that pleasure of the  mind is   
derived from the pleasure of the body47 
,what8 who can secure this  pleasure to 
a wise man in perpetuity8 ,for the      
circumstances by which  pleasures are   
generated are not in the power of a wise
 man2 for happiness  does not consist in
 wisdom itself1 but in those things     
which wisdom  provides for the          
production of pleasure4 ,and all these  
circumstances are  external2 and what is
 external is liable to accident4 ,and   
thus fortune is  made the mistress of   
happiness in life1--,fortune1 which1    
,epicurus says1 has  but little to do   
with a wise man4    ,,xxviii4 ,but you  
will say1 ,come1 these things are       
trifles4 ,nature by  herself enriches   
the wise man2 and1 indeed1 ,epicurus has
 taught us that  the riches of nature   
are such as can be acquired4 ,this is   
well said1 and ,i  do not object to it2 
but still these same assertions are     
inconsistent with  one another4 ,for    

,epicurus denies there is less pleasure 
derived from the  poorest food1 from the
 most despised kinds of meat and drink1 
than from  feasting on the most         
delicious dishes4 ,now if he were to    
assert that it  makes no difference as  
to the happiness of life what food a man
 ate1 ,i  would grant it1 ,i would even 
praise him for saying so2 for he would  
be  speaking the truth2 and ,i know that
 ,socrates1 who ranked pleasure as      
nothing at all1 said the same thing1    
namely1 that hunger was the best        
seasoning for meat1 and thirst for      
drink4 ,but ,i do not comprehend how a  
man who refers everything to pleasure1  
lives like ,gallonius1 and yet talks    
like that great man ,frugi ,piso2 nor1  
indeed1 do ,i believe that what he  says
 is his real opinion4 ,he has said that 
natural riches can be acquired1  because
 nature is contented with a little4     
,certainly1 unless you estimate         
pleasure at a great value4 ,no less     
pleasure1 says he1 is derived from the  

most ordinary things than from the most 
valuable4 ,now to say this1 is not  only
 not to have a heart1 but not to have   
even a palate4 ,for they who  despise   
pleasure itself1 may be allowed to say  
that they do not prefer a  sturgeon to a
 herring4 ,but the man who places his   
chief good in pleasure1  must judge of  
everything by his sensations1 not by his
 reason1 and must  pronounce those      
things best which are most pleasant4    
,however1 be it so4 ,let him acquire the
 greatest possible pleasures1 not  only 
at a cheap rate1 but1 as far as ,i am   
concerned1 for nothing at all1  if he   
can manage it4 ,let there be no less    
pleasure in eating a nasturtium1  which 
,xenophon tells us the ,persians used to
 eat1 than in those ,syracusan  banquets
 which are so severely blamed by ,plato4
 ,let1 ,i say1 the  acquisition of      
pleasure be as easy as you say it is4   
,what shall we say of  pain8 the        
torments of which are so great that1 if 
at least pain is the  greatest of evils1

 a happy life cannot possibly exist in  
company with it4  ,for ,metrodorus      
himself1 who is almost a second         
,epicurus1 describes a happy  man in    
these words4 ,when his body is in good  
order1 and when he is quite  certain    
that it it will be so for the future4   
,is it possible for any one  to be      
certain in what condition his body will 
be1 ,i do not say a year  hence1 but    
even this evening8 ,pain1 therefore1    
which is the greatest of  evils1 will   
always be dreaded even if it is not     
present4 ,for it will  always be        
possible that it may be present4 ,but   
how can any fear of the  greatest       
possible evil exist in a happy life8    
,oh1 says he1 ,epicurus has handed down 
maxims according to which we may        
disregard pain4 ,surely1 it is an       
absurdity to suppose that the greatest  
possible evil can be disregarded4       
,however1 what is the maxim8 ,the       
greatest  pain1 says he1 is short-lived4
 ,now1 first of all1 what do you call   

short-lived8 ,and1 secondly1 what do you
 call the greatest pain8 ,for what  do  
you mean8 ,cannot extreme pain last for 
many days8 ,aye1 and for many  months8  
,unless1 indeed1 you intend to assert   
that you mean such pain as  kills a man 
the moment it seizes on him4 ,who is    
afraid of that pain8 ,i  would rather   
you would lessen that pain by which ,i  
have seen that most  excellent and      
kind-hearted man1 ,cnus ,octavius1 the  
son of ,marcus  ,octavius1 my own       
intimate friend1 worn out1 and that not 
once1 or for a  short time1 but very    
often1 and for a long period at once4   
,what agonies1 ,o  ye immortal gods1 did
 that man use to bear1 when all his     
limbs seemed as  if they were on fire4  
,and yet he did not appear to be        
miserable1 7because  in truth pain was  
not the greatest of evils17 but only    
afflicted4 ,but if  he had been immersed
 in continued pleasure1 passing at the  
same time a  vicious and infamous life1 
then he would have been miserable4      

,,xxix4 ,but when you say that great    
pains last but a short time1 and that if
  they last long they are always light1 
,i do not understand the meaning of     
your assertion4 ,for ,i see that some   
pains are very great1 and also very     
durable4 ,and there is a better         
principle which may enable one to endure
  them1 which however you cannot adopt1 
who do not love what is honourable  for 
its own sake4 ,there are some precepts  
for1 and ,i may almost say laws  of1    
fortitude1 which forbid a man to behave 
effeminately in pain4  ,wherefore it    
should be accounted disgraceful1 ,i do  
not say to grieve1 7for  that is at     
times unavoidable17 but to make those   
rocks of ,lemnos  melancholy with such  
outcries as those of ,philoctetes--     
,who utters many a tearful note aloud1  
,with ceaseless groaning1 howling1 and  
complaint4      ,now let ,epicurus1 if  
he can1 put himself in the place of that
 man--          ,whose veins and        
entrails thus are racked with pain      

,and horrid agony1 while the serpent's  
bite      ,spreads its black venom      
through his shuddering frame4      ,let 
,epicurus become ,philoctetes4 ,if his  
pain is sharp it is short4 ,but in  fact
 he has been lying in his cave for ten  
years4 ,if it lasts long it is  light1  
for it grants him intervals of          
relaxation4 ,in the first place it  does
 not do so often2 and in the second     
place what sort of relaxation is  it    
when the memory of past agony is still  
fresh1 and the fear of further  agony   
coming and impending is constantly      
tormenting him4 ,let him die1 says  he4 
,perhaps that would be the best thing   
for him2 but then what becomes of  the  
argument1 that the wise man has always  
more pleasure than pain8 ,for if  that  
be the case ,i would have you think     
whether you are not recommending  him a 
crime1 when you advise him to die4 ,say 
to him rather1 that it is a  disgraceful
 thing for a man to allow his spirit to 
be crushed and broken  by pain1 that it 

is shameful to yield to it4 ,for as for 
your maxim1 if it  is violent it is     
short1 if it lasts long it is slight1   
that is mere empty  verbiage4 ,the only 
real way to mitigate pain is by the     
application of  virtue1 of magnanimity1 
of patience1 of courage4    ,,xxx4      
,listen1 that ,i may not make too wide a
 digression1 to the words of  ,epicurus 
when dying2 and take notice how         
inconsistent his conduct is with  his   
language4 8,epicurus to ,hermarchus     
greeting4 ,i write this letter10 says   
he1 8while passing a happy day1 which is
 also the last day of my life4 ,and  the
 pains of my bladder and bowels are so  
intense that nothing can be  added to   
them which can make them greater40 ,here
 is a man miserable1 if  pain is the    
greatest possible evil4 ,it cannot      
possibly be denied4 ,however1  let us   
see how he proceeds4 8,but still ,i have
 to balance this a joy in my  mind1     
which ,i derive from the recollection of
 my philosophical principles  and       

discoveries4 ,but do you1 as becomes the
 goodwill which from your youth  upwards
 you have constantly discovered for me  
and for philosophy1 protect  the        
children of ,metrodorus40 ,after reading
 this1 ,i do not consider the  death of 
,epaminondas or ,leonidas preferable to 
his4 ,one of whom defeated  the         
,lacedmonians at ,mantinea17#ci7 and    
finding that he had been rendered       
insensible by a mortal wound1 when he   
first came to himself1 asked whether    
his shield was safe8 ,when his weeping  
friends had answered him that it  was1  
he then asked whether the enemy was     
defeated8 ,and when he received to  this
 question also the answer which he      
wished1 he then ordered the spear  which
 was sticking in him to be pulled out4  
,and so1 losing quantities of  blood1 he
 died in the hour of joy and victory4   
,but ,leonidas1 the king of the         
,lacedmonians1 put himself and those    
three  hundred men1 whom he had led from
 ,sparta1 in the way of the enemy of    

,thermopyl17#dj7 when the alternative   
was a base flight1 or a glorious  death4
 ,the deaths of generals are glorious1  
but philosophers usually die  in their  
beds4 ,but still ,epicurus here mentions
 what1 when dying1 he  considered great 
credit to himself4 8,i have10 says he1  
8a joy to  counterbalance these pains40 
,i recognise in these words1 ,o         
,epicurus1 the  sentiments of a         
philosopher1 but still you forgot what  
you ought to have  said4 ,for1 in the   
first place1 if those things be true1 in
 the  recollection of which you say you 
rejoice1 that is to say1 if your        
writings and discoveries are true1 then 
you cannot rejoice4 ,for you have  no   
pleasure here which you can refer to the
 body4 ,but you have constantly         
asserted that no one ever feels joy or  
pain except with reference to his  body4
 8,i rejoice10 says he1 8in the past40  
,in what that is past8 ,if you  mean    
such past things as refer to the body1  
then ,i see that you are                

counterbalancing your agonies with your 
reason1 and not with your  recollection 
of pleasures which you have felt in the 
body4 ,but if you are  referring to your
 mind1 then your denial of there being  
any joy of the  mind which cannot be    
referred to some pleasure of the body1  
must be false4  ,why1 then1 do you      
recommend the children of ,metrodorus to
 ,hermarchus8 ,in  that admirable       
exercise of duty1 in that excellent     
display of your good  faith1 for that is
 how ,i look upon it1 what is there that
 you refer to the  body8    ,,xxxi4 ,you
 may twist yourself about in every      
direction as you please1  ,torquatus1   
but you will not find in this excellent 
letter anything written  by ,epicurus   
which is in harmony and consistent with 
the rules he laid  down4 ,and so he is  
convicted by himself1 and his writings  
are upset by his  own virtue and        
goodness4 ,for that recommendation of   
those children1 that  recollection of   
them1 and affectionate friendship for   

them1 that attention  to the most       
important duties at the last gasp1      
indicates that honesty  without any     
thought of personal advantage was innate
 in the man2 that it  did not require   
the invitation of pleasure1 or the      
allurements of  mercenary rewards4 ,for 
what greater evidence can we require    
that those  things which are honourable 
and right are desirable of themselves   
for  their own sake1 than the sight of a
 dying man so anxious in the discharge  
of such important duties8 ,but1 as ,i   
think that letter deserving of all      
commendation of which ,i have just given
 you a literal translation1  7although  
it was in no respect consistent with the
 general system of that  philosopher17  
so also ,i think that his will is       
inconsistent not only with  the dignity 
of a philosopher1 but even with his own 
sentiments4 ,for he  wrote often1 and at
 great length1 and sometimes with       
brevity and suitable  language1 in that 
book which ,i have just named1 that     

death had nothing to  do with us2 for   
that whatever was dissolved was void of 
sensation1 and  whatever was void of    
sensation had nothing whatever to do    
with us4 ,even  this might have been    
expressed better and more elegantly4    
,for when he lays  down the position    
that what has been dissolved is void of 
sensation1 that  is such an expression  
that it is not very plain what he means 
by the word  dissolved4 ,however1 ,i    
understand what he really does mean4    
,but still ,i ask  why1 when every      
sensation is extinguished by            
dissolution1 that is to say1  by death1 
and when there is nothing else whatever 
that has any connexion  with us1 he     
should still take such minute and       
diligent care to enjoin  ,amynomachus   
and ,timocrates1 his heirs1 to furnish  
every year what in the  opinion of      
,hermarchus shall be enough to keep his 
birthday in the month  ,gamelion1 with  
all proper solemnity4 ,and also1 shall  
every month1 on the  twentieth day of   

the month1 supply money enough to       
furnish a banquet for  those men who    
have studied philosophy with him1 in    
order that his memory1  and that of     
,metrodorus1 may be duly honoured4 ,now 
,i cannot deny that these  injunctions  
are in keeping with the character of a  
thoroughly accomplished  and amiable    
man2 but still ,i utterly deny that it  
is inconsistent with the  wisdom of a   
philosopher1 especially of a natural    
philosopher1 which is the  character he 
claims for himself1 to think that there 
is such a day as the  birthday of any   
one4 ,what8 ,can any day which has once 
passed recur over  again frequently4    
,most indubitably not2 or can any day   
like it recur8 ,even  that is           
impossible1 unless it may happen after  
an interval of many  thousand years1    
that there may be a return of all the   
stars at the same  moment to the point  
from which they set out4 ,there is1     
therefore1 no such  thing as anybody's  
birthday4 ,but still it is considered   

that there is4 ,as  if ,i did not know  
that4 ,but even if there be1 is it to be
 regarded after a  man's death8 ,and is 
a man to give injunctions in his will   
that it shall be  so1 after he has told 
you all1 as if with the voice of an     
oracle1 that  there is nothing which    
concerns us at all after death8 ,these  
things are  very inconsistent in a man  
who1 in his mind1 had travelled over    
innumerable worlds and boundless        
regions1 which were destitute of all    
limits and boundaries4 ,did ,democritus 
ever say such a thing as this8 ,i  will 
pass over every one else1 and call him  
only as a witness whom  ,epicurus       
himself followed to the exclusion of    
others4    ,but if a day did deserve to 
be kept1 which was it more fitting to   
observe1  the day on which a man was    
born1 or that on which he became wise8  
,a man1  you will say1 could not have   
become wise unless he had been born4    
,and1 on  the same principle1 he could  
not if his grandmother had never been   

born4  ,the whole business1 ,torquatus1 
is quite out of character for a learned 
man  to wish to have the recollection of
 his name celebrated with banquets      
after his death4 ,i say nothing of the  
way in which you keep these days1  and  
to how many jokes from witty men you    
expose yourselves4 ,there is no  need of
 quarrelling4 ,i only say that it would 
have been more becoming in  you to keep 
,epicurus's birthday1 than in him to    
leave injunctions in his  will that it  
should be kept4    ,,xxxii4 ,however1 to
 return to our subject1 7for while we   
were talking of  pain we digressed to   
that letter of his17 we may now fairly  
come to this  conclusion4 ,the man who  
is in the greatest evil1 while he is in 
it1 is not  happy4 ,but the wise man is 
always happy1 and is also occasionally  
in pain4  ,therefore1 pain is not the   
greatest evil4 ,what kind of doctrine1  
then1 is  this1 that goods which are    
past are not lost to a wise man1 but    
that he  ought not to remember past     

evils4 ,first of all1 is it in our power
 to  decide what we will remember4 ,when
 ,simonides1 or some one else1 offered  
to  ,themistocles to teach him the art  
of memory1 8,i would rather10 said he1  
8that you would teach me that of        
forgetfulness2 for ,i even now recollect
  what ,i would rather not2 but ,i      
cannot forget what ,i should like to40  
,this  was a very sensible answer4 ,but 
still the fact is that it is the act of 
a  very arbitrary philosopher to forbid 
a man to recollect4 ,it seems to me a   
command very much in the spirit of your 
ancestor1 ,manlius1 or even worse1  to  
command what it is impossible for me to 
do4 ,what will you say if the           
recollection of past evils is even      
pleasant8 ,for some proverbs are more   
true than your dogmas4 ,nor does        
,euripides speak all when he says1 ,i   
will  give it you in ,latin1 if ,i can1 
but you all know the ,greek line--      
,sweet is the memory of sorrows         
past47#da7      ,however1 let us return 

to the consideration of past goods4 ,and
 if you were  to utter such maxims as   
might be capable of consoling ,caius    
,marius1 and  enabling him when         
banished1 indigent1 and up to his neck  
in a marsh1 to  relieve his anguish by  
the recollection of his past trophies1  
,i would  listen to you1 and approve of 
all you could say4 ,nor1 indeed1 can the
  happiness of a philosopher be complete
 or continue to the end1 if all the     
admirable discoveries which he has made1
 and all his virtuous actions1 are  to  
be lost by his own forgetfulness4 ,but1 
in your case1 you assert that  the      
recollection of pleasures which have    
been felt makes life happy1 and  of such
 pleasures too1 as affect the body4 ,for
 if there are any other  pleasures1 then
 it is incorrect to say that all the    
pleasures of the mind  originate in its 
connexion with the body4    ,but if     
pleasures felt by the body1 even when   
they are past1 can give  pleasure1 then 
,i do not understand why ,aristotle     

should turn the  inscription on the tomb
 of ,sardanapalus into so much ridicule2
 in which  the king of ,assyria boasts  
that he has taken with him all his      
lascivious  pleasures4 ,for1 says       
,aristotle1 how could those things which
 even while he  was alive he could not  
feel a moment longer than while he was  
actually  enjoying them1 possibly remain
 to him after he was dead8 ,the         
pleasure1  then1 of the body is lost1   
and flies away at the first moment1 and 
oftener  leaves behind reasons for      
repenting of it than for recollecting   
it4  ,therefore1 ,africanus is happier  
when addressing his country in this     
manner--          ,cease1 ,rome1 to     
dread your foes4444      ,and in the    
rest of his admirable boast--           
,for you have trophies by my labour     
raised4      ,he is rejoicing here in   
his labours which are past4 ,but you    
would bid him  exult in past pleasures4 
,he traces back his feelings to things  
which had  never had any reference to   

his body4 ,you cling to the body to the 
exclusion of everything else4           
,,xxxiii4 ,but how can that proposition 
possibly be maintained which you  urge1 
namely1 that all the pleasures and pains
 of the mind are connected  inseparably 
with the pleasures and pains of the     
body8 ,is there1 then1  nothing which   
ever delights you1 7,i know whom ,i am  
addressing17 is there  nothing1 ,o      
,torquatus1 which ever delights you for 
its own sake8 ,i say  nothing about     
dignity1 honourableness1 the beauty of  
virtue1 which ,i have  mentioned before4
 ,i will put all these things aside as  
of less  consequence4 ,but is there     
anything when you are writing1 or       
reading a  poem1 or an oration1 when you
 are investigating the history of       
exploits or  countries1 or anything in a
 statue1 or picture1 or pleasant place2 
in  sports1 in hunting1 or in a villa of
 ,lucullus1 7for if ,i were to say of   
your own1 you would have a loophole to  
escape through1 saying that that  had   

connexion with your body17 is there any 
of all these things1 ,i say1  which you 
can refer to your body1 or do they not  
please you1 if they  please you at all1 
for their own sake8    ,you must either 
be the most obstinate of men1 if you    
persist in referring  these things1     
which ,i have just mentioned1 to the    
body1 or else you must  abandon         
,epicurus's whole theory of pleasure1 if
 you admit that they have  no connexion 
with it4    ,but as for your argument1  
that the pleasures and pains of the mind
 are  greater than those of the body1   
because the mind is a partaker of three 
times17#db7 but nothing but what is     
present is felt by the body2 how can it 
possibly be allowed that a man who      
rejoices for my sake rejoices more than 
,i do myself8 ,the pleasure of the mind 
originates in the pleasure of the  body1
 and the pleasure of the mind is greater
 than that of the body4 ,the  result1   
then1 is1 that the party who            
congratulates the other is more         

rejoiced than he whom he congratulates4 
,but while you are trying to make  out  
the wise man to be happy1 because he is 
sensible of the greatest  pleasures in  
his mind1 and1 indeed1 of pleasures     
which are in all their  parts greater   
than those which he is sensible of in   
his body1 you do not  see what really   
happens4 ,for he will also feel the     
pains of the mind to be  in every       
respect greater than those of the body4 
,and so he must  occasionally be        
miserable1 whom you endeavour to        
represent as being always  happy4 ,nor1 
indeed1 will it be possible for you ever
 to fill up the idea  of perfect and    
uninterrupted happiness while you refer 
everything to  pleasure and pain4    ,on
 which account1 ,o ,torquatus1 we must  
find out something else which is  the   
chief good of man4 ,let us grant        
pleasure to the beasts1 to whom you     
often appeal as witnesses on the subject
 of the chief good4 ,what will you  say1
 if even the beasts do many things under

 the guidance of their various  natures1
 partly out of indulgence to other      
beasts1 and at the cost of  their own   
labour1 as1 for instance1 it is very    
visible in bringing forth  and rearing  
their young1 that they have some other  
object in view besides  their own       
pleasure8 and partly1 too1 when they    
rejoice in running about  and           
travelling2 and some assemble in herds1 
in such a manner as to imitate  in some 
degree a human state4 ,in some species  
of birds we see certain  indications of 
affection1 knowledge1 and memory2 in    
many we see what even  looks like a     
regular system of action4 ,shall there1 
then1 be in beasts  some images of human
 virtues1 quite unconnected with        
pleasure1 and shall  there be no virtue 
in man except for the sake of pleasure8 
and though he  is as superior as can be 
to all the other animals1 shall we still
 affirm  that he has no peculiar        
attributes given to him by nature8      
,,xxxiv4 ,but we1 if indeed all things  

depend on pleasure1 are greatly         
surpassed by beasts1 for which the      
earth1 of her own accord1 produces      
various sorts of food1 in every kind of 
abundance1 without their taking  any    
trouble about it2 while the same        
necessaries are scarcely 7sometimes ,i  
may even use stronger language still7   
supplied to us1 when we seek them  with 
great labour4 ,nor is it possible that  
,i should ever think that the  chief    
good was the same in the case of a beast
 and a man4 ,for what can be  the use of
 having so many means and appliances for
 the carrying out of the  most excellent
 arts1--what can be the use of such an  
assemblage of most  honourable pursuits1
 of such a crowd of virtues1 if they are
 all got  together for no other end but 
pleasure8 ,as if1 when ,xerxes1 with    
such vast  fleets1 such countless troops
 of both cavalry and infantry1 had      
bridged  over the ,hellespont and dug   
through ,mount ,athos1 had walked across
 the  sea1 and sailed7#dc7 over the     

land1 if1 when he had invaded ,greece   
with  such irresistible violence1 any   
one had asked him for the cause of      
collecting so vast an army1 and waging  
so formidable a war1 and he had  replied
 that he wished to get some honey from  
,hymettus1 certainly he would  have been
 thought to have undertaken such an     
enterprise for an  insufficient cause4  
,and in like manner1 if we were to say  
that a wise man1  furnished and provided
 with numerous and important virtues and
  accomplishments1 not1 indeed1         
travelling like him over sea on foot1   
and  over mountains with his fleet1 but 
embracing the whole heaven1 all the     
earth1 and the universal sea with his   
mind1 had nothing in view but  pleasure1
 we might say that he1 too1 was taking a
 great deal of trouble  for a little    
honey4    ,believe me1 ,torquatus1 we   
were born for more lofty and noble ends2
 and you  may see this1 not only by     
considering the parts of the mind1 in   
which  there is the recollection of a   

countless number of things1 7and from   
thence proceed infinite conjectures as  
to the consequences of them1 not  very  
far differing from divination2 there is 
also in them shame1 which is  the       
regulator of desire1 and the faithful   
guardianship of justice1 so  necessary  
to human society1 and a firm enduring   
contempt for pain and  death1 shown in  
the enduring of labours and the         
encountering of dangers47  ,all these   
things1 ,i say1 are in the mind4 ,but ,i
 would have you consider  also the limbs
 and the senses1 which1 like the other  
parts of the body1  will appear to you  
to be not only the companions of the    
virtues1 but also  their slaves4 ,what  
will you say1 if many things in the body
 itself appear  to deserve to be        
preferred to pleasure8 such as strength1
 health1  activity1 beauty8 ,and if this
 is the case1 how many qualities of the 
mind  will likewise seem so8 ,for in the
 mind1 the old philosophers--those most 
learned men--thought that there was     

something heavenly and divine4 ,but if  
the chief good consisted in pleasure1 as
 you say1 then it would be natural  that
 we should wish to live day and night in
 the midst of pleasure1  without any    
interval or interruption1 while all our 
senses were1 as it  were1 steeped in and
 influenced wholly by pleasure4 ,but who
 is there1 who  is worthy of the name of
 a man1 who would like to spend even the
 whole of  one day in that kind of      
pleasure8 ,the ,cyrenaic philosophers1  
indeed1 would  not object4 ,your sect is
 more modest in this respect1 though    
their's is  perhaps the more sincere4   
,however1 let us contemplate with our   
minds1 not1 indeed1 these most          
important arts1 which are so valuable1  
that those who were ignorant of  them   
were accounted useless by our ancestors2
 but ,i ask you whether you  think that 
7,i will not say ,homer1 or             
,archilochus1 or ,pindar1 but7 ,phidias1
  or ,polycletus1 or ,zeuxis directed   
the whole of their skill to cause more  

pleasure4 ,shall1 then1 an artist       
propose to himself a higher aim1 with   
reference to the beauty of figures1 than
 a virtuous citizen with reference  to  
the nobleness of action8 ,but what other
 cause can there be for such a  blunder 
being so widely and extensively         
diffused1 except that he who  determines
 that pleasure is the chief good1       
deliberates not with that part  of his  
mind in which reason and wisdom dwell1  
but with his desires1 that  is to say1  
with the most trifling portion of his   
mind4 ,for ,i put the  question to you  
yourself1 if there are gods1 as you     
think that there are1  how have they the
 power of being happy1 when they are not
 able to feel any  pleasure in their    
bodies8 or if they are happy1 though    
destitute of that  kind of pleasure1 why
 do you refuse to recognize the         
possibility of a  similar exertion of   
intellect on the part of a wise man8    
,,xxxv4 ,read1 ,o ,torquatus1 the       
panegyrics1 not of those men who have   

been  praised by ,homer1 not the        
encomiums passed on ,cyrus1 or          
,agesilaus1 or  ,aristides1 or          
,themistocles1 or ,philip1 or           
,alexander2 but read the praises  of our
 own fellow-countrymen1 of the heroes of
 your own family4 ,you will  not find   
any one praised on the ground of having 
been a cunning contriver1  or procurer1 
of pleasure4 ,the eulogies on their     
monuments signify no such  thing2 like  
this one which is at one of our gates1  
8,in whose favour many  nations         
unanimously agree that he was the       
noblest man of the nation40 ,do  we     
think that many nations judged of       
,calatinus1 that he was the noblest  man
 of the nation1 because he was the most 
skilful in the devising of  pleasures8  
,shall we1 then1 say that there is great
 hope and an excellent  disposition in  
those young men whom we think likely to 
consult their own  advantage1 and to see
 what will be profitable to themselves8 
,do we not see  what a great confusion  

of everything would ensue8 what great   
disorder8  ,such a doctrine puts an end 
to all beneficence1 to all gratitude1   
which  are the great bonds of agreement4
 ,for if you do good to any one for your
  own sake1 that is not to be considered
 a kindness1 but only usury2 nor  does  
any gratitude appear due to the man who 
has benefited another for his  own sake4
    ,but if pleasure is the dominant    
power1 it is inevitable that all the    
virtues must be trampled under foot4    
,for there are many kinds of base       
conduct1 which1 unless honourableness is
 naturally to have the most  influence1 
must1 or at least it is not easy to     
explain why they should  not1 overcome a
 wise man2 and1 not to go hunting for   
too many instances1  it is quite clear1 
that virtue deservedly praised1 must cut
 off all the  approaches of pleasure4   
,do not1 now1 expect any more arguments 
from me4 ,look1 ,torquatus1 yourself1   
into your own mind2 turn the question   
over in all your thoughts2 examine      

yourself1 whether you would prefer to   
pass your life in the enjoyment of      
perpetual pleasure1 in that tranquillity
 which you have often felt1 free  from  
all pain1 with the addition also of that
 blessing which you often  speak of as  
an addition1 but which is1 in fact1 an  
impossible one1 the  absence of all     
fear2 or1 while deserving well of all   
nations1 and bearing  assistance and    
safety to all who are in need of it1 to 
encounter even the  distresses of       
,hercules4 ,for so our ancestors1 even  
in the case of a god1  called labours   
which were unavoidable by the most      
melancholy name1  distresses47#dd7 ,i   
would require you1 and compel you to    
answer me1 if ,i  were not afraid that  
you might say that ,hercules himself    
performed those  exploits1 which he     
performed with the greatest labour for  
the safety of  nations1 for the sake of 
pleasure4    ,and when ,i had said      
this1--,i know1 said ,torquatus1 who it 
is that ,i have to  thank for this2 and 

although ,i might be able to do         
something myself1 yet ,i  am still more 
glad to find my friends better prepared 
than ,i am4    ,i suppose you mean ,syro
 and ,philodemus1 excellent citizens and
 most  learned men4 ,you are right1 said
 he4 ,come1 then1 said ,i4 ,but it would
 be  more fair for ,triarius to give    
some opinion on this discussion of ours4
  ,indeed1 said he smiling1 it would be 
very unfair1 at least on this  subject3 
for you manage the question more gently2
 but this man attacks us  after the     
fashion of the ,stoics4 ,then ,triarius 
said1 ,hereafter ,i will  speak more    
boldly still3 for ,i shall have all     
these arguments which ,i have  just     
heard ready to my hand2 and ,i will not 
begin before ,i see you  equipped by    
those philosophers whom you mention4    
,and when this had been said1 we made an
 end both of our walk and of our        
discussion4          ,third ,book ,of   
,the ,treatise ,on ,the ,chief ,good    
,and ,evil4      ,i4 ,i think1 ,brutus1 

that ,pleasure1 if she were to speak for
 herself1 and  had not such pertinacious
 advocates1 would yield to ,virtue1 as  
having been  vanquished in the preceding
 book4 ,in truth1 she would be destitute
 of  shame if she were to resist ,virtue
 any longer1 or persist in preferring   
what is pleasant to what is honourable1 
or were to contend that a tickling      
pleasure1 as it were1 of the body1 and  
the joy arising out of it1 is of  more  
importance than dignity of mind and     
consistency4 ,so that we may  dismiss   
,pleasure1 and desire her to confine    
herself within her own  boundaries1 so  
that the strictness of our discussions  
may not be hindered  by her allurements 
and blandishments4 ,for we have now to  
inquire what that  chief good is which  
we are anxious to discover2 since       
pleasure is quite  unconnected with it1 
and since nearly the same arguments can 
be urged  against those who have        
considered freedom from pain as the     
greatest of  goods4    ,nor1 indeed1 can

 anything be admitted to be the chief   
good which is  destitute of virtue1 to  
which nothing can be superior4          
,therefore1 although  in that discourse 
which was held with ,torquatus we were  
not remiss1 still  we have now a much   
sharper contest before us with the      
,stoics4 ,for the  statements which are 
made about pleasure are not expressed   
with any great  acuteness or refinement4
 ,for they who defend it are not skilful
 in  arguing1 nor have those who take   
the opposite side a very difficult cause
  to oppose4 ,even ,epicurus himself    
says1 that one ought not even to argue  
about pleasure1 because the decision    
respecting it depends on the            
sensations1 so that it is sufficient for
 us to be warned respecting it1  and    
quite unnecessary for us to be          
instructed4 ,and on this account1 that  
previous discussion of ours was a simple
 one on both sides2 for there was       
nothing involved or intricate in the    
discourse of ,torquatus1 and my own     

language1 as it seems to me1 was very   
clear4 ,but you are not ignorant what  a
 subtle1 or ,i might rather say1 thorny 
kind of arguing it is which is  employed
 by the ,stoics4 ,and if it is so among 
the ,greeks1 much more so is  it among  
us1 who are forced even to invent words1
 and to give new names to  new things4  
,and this is what no one who is even    
moderately learned will  wonder at1 when
 he considers that in every art which is
 not in common and  ordinary use1 there 
is a great variety of new names1 as     
appellations are  forced to be given to 
everything about which each art is      
conversant4  ,therefore1 both           
dialecticians and natural philosophers  
use those words  which are not common in
 the ordinary conversation of the       
,greeks2 and  geometricians1 musicians1 
and grammarians1 all speak after a      
peculiar  fashion of their own4 ,and    
even the rhetoricians1 whose art is a   
forensic  one1 and wholly directed to   
the people1 still in giving their       

lessons use  words which are1 as it     
were1 their peculiar private property4  
,,ii4 ,and1 without dwelling on the case
 of these liberal and gentlemanly       
professions1 even artisans would not be 
capable of exercising their trades      
properly if they did not use technical  
words1 which are not understood by  us1 
though in common use among them4        
,agriculture1 also1 which is as  distant
 as can be from all polite refinement1  
still marks those matters  with which it
 is conversant by new names4 ,and much  
more is this course  allowable in a     
philosopher2 for philosophy is the art  
of life1 and a man  who is discussing   
that cannot borrow his language from the
 forum1--although  there is no school of
 philosophers which has made so many    
innovations as  the ,stoics4 ,zeno too1 
their chief1 was not so much a          
discoverer of new  things as of new     
words4 ,but if1 even in that language   
which most people  consider richer than 
our own1 ,greece has permitted the most 

learned men to  use words not in        
ordinary use about subjects which are   
equally unusual1  how much more ought   
the same licence to be granted to us1   
who are now  venturing to be the very   
first of our countrymen to touch on such
 matters8  ,and though we have often    
said1--and that1 too1 in spite of some  
complaints  not only of the ,greeks1 but
 of those men also who would prefer     
being  accounted ,greeks to being       
thought our own countrymen1--that we are
 so far  from being surpassed by the    
,greeks in the richness and copiousness 
of our  language1 that we are even      
superior to them in that particular2 we 
must  labour to establish this point1   
not only in our own national arts1 but  
in  those too which we have derived from
 them4 ,although1 since they have       
become established by habit1 we may     
fairly consider those words as our own  
which1 in accordance with ancient       
custom1 we use as ,latin words2 such as 
philosophia itself1 rhetorica1          

dialectica1 grammatica1  geometria1     
musica1--although they could1 no doubt1 
be translated into  more genuine ,latin4
    ,enough1 however1 of the names of   
things4 ,but with respect to the things 
themselves1 ,i am often afraid1 ,brutus1
 that ,i may be blamed when ,i am       
writing to you1 who have made so much   
progress1 not only in philosophy1  but  
in the most excellent kind of           
philosophy4 ,and if ,i wrote as if ,i   
were  giving you any instruction1 ,i    
should deserve to be blamed2 but such   
conceit is far from me4 ,nor do ,i send 
letters to you under the idea of  making
 you acquainted with what is thoroughly 
known to you before2 but  because ,i am 
fond of supporting myself by your name1 
and because also ,i  consider you the   
most candid critic and judge of those   
studies which both  you and ,i apply    
ourselves to in common4 ,i know1        
therefore1 that you will  pay careful   
attention to what ,i write1 as is your  
wont1 and that you will  decide on the  

dispute which took place between your   
uncle--a most  heavenly-minded and      
admirable man--and myself4    ,for when 
,i was at my villa near ,tusculum1 and  
was desirous to make use of  some books 
in the library of the young ,lucullus1  
,i went one day to his  house1 in order 
to take away 7as ,i was in the habit of 
doing7 the books  which ,i wanted4 ,and 
when ,i had arrived there1 ,i found     
,marcus ,cato1 whom ,i  did not know to 
be there1 sitting in the library1       
surrounded by a number  of the books of 
the ,stoics4 ,for he had1 as you know1 a
 boundless desire  for reading1 one     
which was quite insatiable1--so much so1
 indeed1 that he  was not afraid of the 
causeless reproaches of the common      
people1 but was  accustomed to continue 
reading even in the senate-house itself1
 while the  senate was assembling1      
without1 however1 at all relaxing in his
 attention  to the affairs of the       
republic4 ,and now1 being in the        
enjoyment of  complete leisure1 and     

being surrounded by a great abundance of
 such  treasures1 he appeared to be     
completely gorging himself with books1  
if ,i  may use such an expression about 
so respectable a subject4 ,and as it so 
happened that neither of us expected to 
see the other1 he at once rose up  on my
 entrance2 and1 after the first         
salutations which are usual at such a   
meeting1 ,what object has brought you   
here8 said he2 for ,i presume you are   
come from your own villa1 and if ,i had 
known that you had been there1 ,i       
should have come myself to see you4 ,i  
only1 said ,i1 left the city  yesterday 
after the commencement of the games1 and
 got home in the  evening4 ,but my      
object in coming here was to take some  
books away with me2  and it will be a   
pity1 ,cato1 if our friend ,lucullus    
does not some day or  other become      
acquainted with all these treasures2 for
 ,i would rather have  him take delight 
in these books than in all the rest of  
the furniture of  the villa4 ,for he is 

a youth ,i am very anxious about2       
although1 indeed1 it  is more peculiarly
 your business to take care that he     
shall be so educated  as to do credit to
 his father1 and to our friend ,cpio1   
and to you who are  such a near relation
 of his47#de7 ,but ,i myself have some  
right to feel an  interest in him2 for  
,i am influenced by my recollection of  
his  grandfather1--and you well know    
what a regard ,i had for ,cpio1 who1 in 
my  opinion1 would now be one of the    
first men of the city if he were alive2 
and ,i also have ,lucullus himself      
always before my eyes1--a man not only  
excelling in every virtue1 but connected
 with me both by friendship and a       
general resemblance of inclination and  
sentiment4 ,you do well1 said he1 to    
retain a recollection of those persons1 
both of whom recommended their  children
 to your care by their wills1 and you   
are right too to be attached  to this   
youth4 ,and as for your calling it my   
peculiar business1 ,i will not  decline 

the office1 but ,i claim you for my     
partner in the duty4 ,i will say  this  
also1 that the boy has already shown me 
many indications both of  modesty and of
 ability2 but you see how young he is as
 yet4 ,to be sure ,i  do1 said ,i2 but  
even now he ought to receive a tincture 
of those  accomplishments which1 if he  
drinks of them now while he is young1   
will  hereafter make him more ready for 
more important business4 ,and so we will
  often talk over this matter anxiously 
together1 and we will act in  concert4  
,however1 let us sit down1 says he1 if  
you please4 ,so we sat down4    ,,iii4  
,then ,cato said3 ,but now1 what books  
in the world are they that you  are     
looking for here1 when you have such a  
library at home8 ,i want1 said  ,i1 some
 of the ,aristotelian ,commentaries1    
which ,i know are here2 and ,i  came to 
carry them off1 to read when ,i have    
leisure1 which is not1 as you  know1    
very often the case with me4 ,how ,i    
wish1 said he1 that you had an          

inclination towards our ,stoic sect2 for
 certainly it is natural for you1  if it
 ever was so for any one1 to think      
nothing a good except virtue4 ,may  ,i  
not1 ,i replied1 rejoin that it would be
 natural for you1 as your opinion  in   
reality is the same as mine1 to forbear 
giving new names to things8 for  our    
principles are the same1--it is only our
 language that is at variance4  ,indeed1
 said he1 our principles are not the    
same at all2 for ,i can never  agree to 
your calling anything desirable except  
what is honourable1 and to  your        
reckoning such things among the         
goods1--and1 by so doing1  extinguishing
 honourableness1 which is1 as it were1  
the light of virtue1  and utterly       
upsetting virtue herself4 ,those are all
 very fine words1 said  ,i1 ,o ,cato2   
but do you not see that all those       
pompous expressions are  shared by you  
in common with ,pyrrho and ,aristo1 who 
think all things  equal8 ,and ,i should 
like to know what your opinion of them  

is4 ,mine8 said  he2 do you want to know
 what ,i think of them8 ,i think that   
those men whom  we have either heard of 
from our ancestors1 or seen ourselves1  
to be good1  brave1 just1 and moderate  
in the republic1--those who1 following  
nature  herself1 without any particular 
learning or system1 have done many      
praiseworthy actions1 have been educated
 by nature herself better than  they    
could have been educated by philosophy1 
if they had adopted any other           
philosophy except that which ranks      
nothing whatever among the goods except 
what is honourable1 and nothing among   
the evils except what is  disgraceful4  
,as for all other systems of philosophy1
 they differ entirely  in their estimate
 of good and evil2 but still ,i consider
 no one of them  which classes anything 
destitute of virtue among either the    
goods or the  evils1 as being of any use
 to men1 or as uttering any sentiment by
 which  we may become better2 but ,i    
think that they all tend rather to      

deprave  nature herself4 ,for if this   
point be not conceded1 that that alone  
is good  which is honourable1 it follows
 that it must be impossible to prove    
that  life is made happy by virtue4 ,and
 if that be the case1 then ,i do not see
  why any attention should be bestowed  
on philosophy2 for if a wise man can  be
 miserable1 then of a truth ,i do not   
consider that virtue1 which is          
accounted so glorious and memorable a   
thing1 of any great value4    ,,iv4 ,all
 that you have been saying1 ,cato1 ,i   
replied1 you might say if you  agreed   
with ,pyrrho or ,aristo2 for you are not
 ignorant that they consider  that      
honourableness not only the chief good1 
but also 7as you yourself  maintain7 the
 only good4 ,and if this is the case1   
the consequence which ,i  see you aim at
 follows necessarily1 that all wise men 
are always happy4 ,do  you then praise  
these men1 and do you think that we     
ought to follow their  opinion8 ,by no  
means1 said he2 for as this is a        

peculiar attribute of  virtue to make   
its selection of those things which are 
in accordance with  nature1 those who   
have made all things equal in such a    
manner as to  consider all things on    
either side perfectly indifferent1 so as
 to leave  no room for any selection1   
have utterly put an end to virtue4 ,you 
say  right1 said ,i2 but ,i ask you     
whether you1 too1 must not do the same  
thing1  when you say that there is      
nothing good which is not right and     
honourable1  and so put an end to all   
the difference between other things8    
,that would  be the case1 said he1 if ,i
 did put an end to it2 but ,i deny the  
fact--,i  leave it4 ,how so1 said ,i8   
,if virtue alone1--if that thing alone  
which you  call honourable1 right1      
praiseworthy1 and creditable1 7for it   
will be more  easily seen what is the   
character that you ascribe to it1 if it 
be pointed  out by many words tending to
 the same point17--if1 ,i say1 that is  
the sole  good1 what else will there be 

for you to follow8 ,and1 on the other   
hand1  if nothing is evil except what is
 disgraceful1 dishonourable1 unbecoming1
  wrong1 flagitious1 and base1 7to make 
this also manifest by giving it many    
names17 what else will there be which   
you can say ought to be avoided8    ,i  
will not1 said he1 reply to each point  
of your question1 as you are not1  as ,i
 suspect1 ignorant of what ,i am going  
to say1 but seeking rather to  find     
something to carp at in my brief answer3
 ,i will rather1 since we have  plenty  
of time1 explain to you1 unless you     
think it foreign to the  subject1 the   
whole opinion of ,zeno and the ,stoics  
on the matter4 ,very far  from foreign  
to the subject1 said ,i2 indeed1 your   
explanations will be of  great service  
in elucidating to me the points about   
which ,i am inquiring4  ,let us try1    
then1 said he1 although this system of  
the ,stoics has in it  something rather 
difficult and obscure2 for1 as formerly1
 when these  matters were discussed in  

the ,greek language1 the very names of  
things  appeared strange which have now 
become sanctioned by daily use1 what do 
you think will be the case when we are  
discussing them in ,latin8 ,still1  said
 ,i1 we must do so2 for if ,zeno might  
take the liberty when he had  discovered
 anything not previously common1 to fix 
on it a name that was  likewise         
unprecedented1 why may not ,cato take   
the same8 ,nor will it be  necessary for
 you to render what he has said word for
 word1 as translators  are in the habit 
of doing who have no command of language
 of their own1  whenever there is a word
 in more ordinary use which has the same
 meaning4  ,i indeed myself am in the   
habit1 if ,i cannot manage it any other 
way1 of  using many words to express    
what the ,greeks have expressed in one2 
and yet  ,i think that we ought to be   
allowed to use a ,greek word on         
occasions when  we cannot find a ,latin 
one1 and to employ such terms as        
proegmena and  apoproegmena1 just as    

freely as we say ephippia and           
acratophori1  though it may be          
sufficient to translate these two       
particular words by  preferred and      
rejected4 ,i am much obliged to you1    
said he1 for your  hint2 and ,i will in 
preference use those ,latin terms which 
you have just  mentioned2 and in other  
cases1 too1 you shall come to my        
assistance if you  see me in            
difficulties4 ,i will do so1 said ,i1   
with great goodwill2 but  fortune       
favours the bold4 ,so make the attempt1 
,i beg of you2 for what more  divine    
occupation can we have8    ,v4 ,those   
philosophers1 said he1 whose system ,i  
approve of1 consider that  as soon as an
 animal is born1 7for this is where we  
must begin17 he is  instinctively       
induced and excited to preserve himself 
and his existing  condition1 and to feel
 attachment to those things which have a
 tendency to  preserve that condition2  
and to feel an abhorrence of            
dissolution1 and of  those circumstances

 which appear to be pregnant with       
dissolution4 ,and they  prove that this 
is the case1 because1 before either     
pleasure or pain has  affected it1 even 
while it is very little1 it seeks what  
is salutary1 and  shuns the contrary3   
and this would not be the case if they  
were not fond  of their condition1 and  
afraid of dissolution2 and it would not 
be  possible for them to seek any       
particular thing if they had not some   
sense  of themselves1 and if that did   
not influence them to love themselves   
and  what belongs to them4 ,from which  
it ought to be understood that it is    
from  the animal itself that the        
principle of self-love in it is derived4
 ,but  among these natural principles of
 self-love most of the ,stoics do not   
admit that pleasure ought to be classed2
 and ,i entirely agree with them1  to   
avoid the many discreditable things     
which must ensue if nature should       
appear to have placed pleasure among    
those things which are the first        

objects of desire4 ,but it appears to be
 proof enough why we naturally love     
those things which are by nature placed 
in the first rank1 that there is  no    
one1 who1 when either alternative is    
equally in his power1 would not  prefer 
to have all the parts of his body in a  
suitable and entire  condition1 rather  
than impaired by use1 or in any         
particular distorted or  depraved4      
,but as for the knowledge of things--or 
if you do not so much approve of  this  
word cognitio1 or find it less          
intelligible1 we will call it  --that we
 think is naturally to be acquired for  
its own sake1  because it contains      
something which has1 as it were1        
embraced and seized  upon truth4 ,and   
this is perceptible even in infants2    
whom we see amused if  they have        
succeeded in finding out anything       
themselves by reason1 even  though it   
may be of no service whatever to them4  
,and moreover1 we consider  arts worth  
attending to on their own account1 both 

because there is in  them something     
worth acceptance1 and also because they 
depend upon  knowledge1 and contain in  
themselves something which proceeds on  
system  and method4 ,but ,i think that  
we are more averse to assent on false   
grounds  than to anything else which is 
contrary to nature4 ,now of the limbs1  
that  is to say1 of the parts of the    
body1 some appear to have been given to 
us  by nature because of the use which1 
they are of to us1 as1 for instance1    
the hands1 legs1 and feet1 and also     
those internal organs of the body1 of   
which ,i may leave it to the physicians 
to explain the exceeding  usefulness2   
but others with no view to utility1 but 
for ornament as it  were1 as the tail is
 given to the peacock1 plumage of many  
colours to the  dove1 breasts and a     
beard to man4 ,perhaps you will say this
 is but a dry  enumeration2 for these   
things are1 as it were1 the first       
elements of  nature1 which cannot well  
have any richness of language employed  

upon  them2 nor indeed am ,i thinking of
 displaying any2 but when one is        
speaking  of more important matters1    
then the subject itself hurries on the  
language3 and then one's discourse is at
 the same time more impressive and  more
 ornate4 ,it is as you say1 said ,i2 but
 still everything which is said  in a   
lucid manner about a good subject       
appears to me to be said well4 ,and  to 
wish to speak of subjects of that kind  
in a florid style is childish2  but to  
be able to explain them with clearness  
and perspicuity1 is a token  of a       
learned and intelligent man4    ,,vi4   
,let us then proceed1 said he1 since we 
have digressed from these first         
principles of nature1 which everything  
which follows ought to be in  harmony   
with4 ,but this is the first division of
 the subject4 ,a thing is  said to be   
estimable3 for so we may1 ,i think1 call
 that which is either  itself in        
accordance with nature1 or else which is
 the efficient cause of  something of   

such a character that it is worthy of   
being selected because  it has in it    
some weight worth appreciating1 which he
 calls 2 and1 on  the other hand1       
something not estimable1 which is the   
contrary of the  preceding4 ,the first  
principles1 therefore1 being laid down1 
that those  things which are according  
to nature are to be chosen for their own
 sakes1  and those which are contrary to
 it are in like manner to be rejected2  
the  first duty 7for that is how ,i     
translate the word 7 is1 for a man to   
preserve himself in his natural         
condition2 next to that1 to maintain    
those  things which are in accordance   
with nature1 and reject what is opposite
 to  it2 and when this principle of     
selection and rejection has been        
discovered1 then follows selection in   
accordance with duty2 and then that     
third kind1 which is perpetual1 and     
consistent to the end1 and              
corresponding to nature1 in which there 
first begins to be a proper             

understanding of what there is which can
 be truly called good4 ,for the  first  
attraction of man is to those things    
which are according to nature4  ,but as 
soon as he has received that            
intelligence1 or perhaps ,i should say1 
notion1 which they call 1 and has seen  
the order and1 if ,i may so  say1 the   
harmony in which things are to be done1 
he then estimates it at a  higher value 
than all the things which he loved at   
first2 and by this  knowledge1 and by   
reasoning1 he comes to such a conclusion
 that he decides  that the chief good of
 man1 which deserves to be praised and  
desired for  its own sake1 is placed in 
what the ,stoics call 1 and we          
agreement1 if you approve of this       
translation of the term2 as therefore it
  is in this that that good is placed to
 which all things which are done        
honourably are to be referred1 and      
honour itself1 which is reckoned among  
the goods1 although it is only produced 
subsequently1 still this alone  deserves

 to be sought for on account of its     
intrinsic power and worth2 but  of those
 things which are the principal natural 
goods there is not one  which is to be  
sought for its own sake4    ,but as     
those things which ,i have called duties
 proceed from the first  principles of  
nature1 they must necessarily be        
referred to them2 so that  it may be    
fairly said that all duties are referred
 to this end1 of  arriving at the       
principles of nature2 not1 however1 that
 this is the  highest of all goods1     
because there is no such thing as       
honourable action  in the first         
attractions of nature2 for that is what 
follows1 and arises  subsequently1 as ,i
 have said before4 ,but still it is     
according to nature1  and encourages us 
to desire itself much more than all     
those things which  have been previously
 mentioned4 ,but1 first of all1 we must 
remove a  mistake1 that no one may think
 that it follows that there are two     
supreme  goods4 ,for as1 if it were the 

purpose of any one to direct an arrow or
 a  spear straight at any object1 just  
as we have said that there is an        
especial point to be aimed at in        
goods1--the archer ought to do all in   
his  power to aim straight at the       
target1 and the other man ought also to 
do  his endeavour to hit the mark1 and  
gain the end which he has proposed to   
himself3 let this then which we call the
 chief good in life be1 as it  were1 his
 mark2 and his endeavour to hit it must 
be furthered by careful  selection1 not 
by mere desire4    ,,vii4 ,but as all   
duties proceed from the first principles
 of nature1 it  follows inevitably that 
wisdom itself must proceed from the same
 source4  ,but as it often happens1 that
 he who has been recommended to any one 
considers him to whom he has been       
recommended of more importance than him 
who recommended him2 so it is not at all
 strange that in the first  instance we 
are recommended to wisdom by the        
principles of nature1 but  that         

subsequently wisdom herself becomes     
dearer to us than the starting  place   
from which we arrive at it4 ,and as     
limbs have been given to us in  such a  
way that it is plain they have been     
given for some purpose of life2  so that
 appetite of the mind which in ,greek is
 called 1 appears to  have been given to
 us1 not for any particular kind of     
life1 but rather for  some especial     
manner of living3 and so too is system  
and perfect method4  ,for as an actor   
employs gestures1 and a dancer motions1 
not practising any  random movement1 but
 a regular systematic action2 so life   
must be passed  according to a certain  
fixed kind1 and not any promiscuous way1
 and that  certain kind we call a       
suitable and harmonious one4 ,nor do we 
think wisdom  similar to the art of     
navigation or medicine1 but rather to   
that kind of  action which ,i have      
spoken of1 and to dancing2 ,i mean1     
inasmuch as the  ultimate point1 that is
 to say1 the production of the art1 lies

 in the art  itself1 and is not sought  
for from foreign sources4 ,and yet there
 are  other points in which there is a  
difference between wisdom and those     
arts2  because in those arts those      
things which are done properly do       
nevertheless  not comprise all the parts
 of the arts of which they consist4 ,but
 the  things which we call right1 or    
rightly done1 if you will allow the     
expression1 and which they call 1       
contain in them the whole  completeness 
of virtue4 ,for wisdom is the only thing
 which is contained  wholly in itself2  
and this is not the case with the other 
arts4    ,and it is only out of         
ignorance that the object of the art of 
medicine or  navigation is compared with
 the object of wisdom2 for wisdom       
embraces  greatness of mind and justice1
 and judges all the accidents which     
befal  mankind beneath itself3 and this 
too is not the case in the other arts4  
,but no one will be able to maintain    
those very virtues of which ,i have     

just made mention1 unless he lays down a
 rule that there is nothing which  is of
 any importance1 nothing which differs  
from anything else1 except  what is     
honourable or disgraceful4    ,,viii4   
,let us see now how admirably these     
rules follow from those  principles     
which ,i have already laid down4 ,for as
 this is the ultimate  7extremum7 point1
 7for you have noticed1 ,i dare say1    
that ,i translate  what the ,greek      
philosopher calls 1 sometimes by the    
word extremum1  sometimes by ultimum1   
and sometimes by summum1 and instead of 
extremum or ultimum1 ,i may also use the
 word finis17--as1 then1 this  is the   
ultimate point1 to live in a manner     
suitable to and harmonising  with       
nature2 it follows of necessity that all
 wise men do always live  happily1      
perfectly1 and fortunately2 that they   
are hindered by nothing1  embarrassed by
 nothing2 that they are in want of      
nothing4 ,and that which  holds together
 not more that school of which ,i am    

speaking than our lives  and fortunes1  
that is to say1 the principle of        
accounting what is  honourable to be the
 sole good1 may indeed easily be        
embellished and  enlarged upon at great 
length1 with great richness of          
illustration1 with  great variety of    
carefully chosen expressions1 and with  
the most pompous  sentiments in a       
rhetorical manner2 but ,i prefer the    
brief1 acute1  conclusive arguments of  
the ,stoics4 ,now their conclusions are 
arrived at  in this manner3 8,everything
 which is good is praiseworthy2 but     
everything  which is praiseworthy is    
honourable2--therefore1 everything which
 is good  is honourable40 ,does not this
 appear properly deduced8               
,undoubtedly2--for  the result which was
 obtained from the two premises which   
were assumed1  you see was contained in 
them4 ,but of the two premises from     
which the  conclusion was inferred it is
 only the major one which can be        
contradicted--if you say that it is not 

the case1 that everything which is  good
 is praiseworthy3 for it is granted that
 whatever is praiseworthy is            
honourable4 ,but it is utterly absurd to
 say1 that there is anything good  which
 is not to be sought for2 or1 that there
 is anything which ought to  be sought  
for which is not pleasing2 or1 that if  
it is pleasing it ought  not likewise to
 be loved4 ,then it ought also to be    
approved of4 ,then it is  praiseworthy4 
,but what is praiseworthy is honourable4
 ,and so the result  is1 that whatever  
is good is also honourable4 ,in the next
 place1 ,i ask1  who can boast of a life
 which is miserable2 or avoid boasting  
of one which  is happy8--therefore men  
boast only of a life which is happy4    
,from which  the consequence follows1   
that a happy life deserves to be boasted
 of2 but  this cannot properly be       
predicated of any life which is not an  
honourable  one4 ,from this it follows1 
that a happy life must be an honourable 
one4  ,and since the man to whom it     

happens to be deservedly praised has    
some  eminent qualities tending to      
credit and glory1 so that he may rightly
 be  called happy on account of such    
important qualities2 the same thing is  
properly predicated of the life of such 
a man4 ,and so1 if a happy life is      
discerned by its honourableness1 then   
what is honourable ought to be          
considered the sole good4 ,and1 as this 
cannot possibly be denied1 what man  do 
we say can ever exist of a stable and   
firm and great mind1--whom1 in  fact1   
can we ever call brave1--unless the     
point is established1 that pain  is not 
an evil8 ,for as it is impossible that  
the man who ranks death among  evils    
should not fear it1 so in every case it 
is impossible for a man to  disregard   
what he judges to be an evil1 and to    
despise it4 ,and when this  point has   
been laid down1 and ratified by         
universal assent1 this is  assumed next1
 that the man who is of a brave and     
magnanimous spirit  despises and utterly

 disregards every accident which can    
befal a man4 ,and  as this is the case1 
the consequence is1 that there is       
nothing evil which  is not disgraceful4 
,and that man of lofty and excellent    
spirit1--that  magnanimous and truly    
brave man1 who considers all human      
accidents beneath  his notice1--the man 
,i mean whom we wish to make so1 whom at
 all events we  are looking for1--ought 
to confide in himself1 and in his own   
life both  past and to come1 and to form
 a favourable judgment of himself1      
laying  down as a principle1 that no    
evil can happen to a wise man4 ,from    
which  again the same result follows1   
that the sole good is that which is     
honourable2 and that to live happily is 
to live honourably1 that is1            
virtuously4    ,,ix4 ,not that ,i am    
ignorant that the opinions of           
philosophers have been  various1 of     
those ,i mean who have placed the chief 
good1 that which ,i call  the end1 in   
the mind4 ,and although some people have

 followed them very  incorrectly1 still 
,i prefer their theory1 not only to that
 of the three  sects who have separated 
virtue from the chief good1 while       
ranking either  pleasure1 or freedom    
from pain1 or the original gifts of     
nature among  goods1 but also to the    
other three who have thought that virtue
 would be  crippled without some        
reinforcement1 and on that account have 
each added  to it one of those other    
particulars which ,i have just          
enumerated4 ,i1  however1 as ,i said1   
prefer to all these the men1 whoever    
they may be1 who  have described the    
chief good as consisting in the mind and
 in virtue4 ,but  nevertheless1 those   
also are extremely absurd who have said 
that to live  with knowledge is the     
highest good1 and who have asserted that
 there is no  difference between things1
 and so1 that a wise man will surely be 
a happy  one1 never at any moment of his
 life preferring one thing to another3  
as  some of the ,academics are said to  

have laid it down1 that the highest good
  and the chief duty of a wise man is to
 resist appearances1 and firmly to      
withhold his assent from them4    ,now  
people often make very lengthy replies  
to each of these assertions2  yet what  
is very clear ought not to be long4 ,but
 what is more evident  than1 if there be
 no selection made1 discarding those    
things which are  contrary to nature1   
and selecting those which are according 
to nature1 all  that prudence which is  
so much sought after and extolled would 
be done  away with8 ,if1 then1 we       
discard those sentiments which ,i have  
mentioned1  and all others which        
resemble them1 it remains that the chief
 good must be  to live1 exercising a    
knowledge of those things which happen  
by nature1  selecting what is according 
to nature1 and rejecting any which are  
contrary to nature2 that is to say1 to  
live in a manner suitable and           
corresponding to nature4    ,but in     
other arts1 when anything is said to    

have been done according to  the rules  
of art1 there is something to be        
considered which is subsequent  and     
follows upon such compliance2 which they
 call 4 ,but  when we say in any matter 
that a thing has been done wisely1 that 
same  thing is from the first said also 
to have been done most properly2 for    
whatever proceeds from a wise man must  
at once be perfect in all its  parts3   
for in him is placed that quality which 
we say is to be desired4  ,for as it is 
a sin to betray one's country1 to injure
 one's parents1 to  plunder temples1    
which are all sins of commission2 so it 
is likewise a sin  to be afraid1 to     
grieve1 to be under the dominion of     
lust1 even if no  overt act follows     
these feelings4 ,but1 as these are sins1
 not in their  later periods and        
consequences1 but at once from the first
 moment2 so  those actions which proceed
 from virtue are to be considered right 
at the  first moment that they are      
undertaken1 and not only when they are  

accomplished4    ,x4 ,but it may be as  
well to give an explanation and         
definition of the word  good1 which1 has
 been so often employed in this         
discourse4 ,but the  definitions of     
those philosophers differ a good deal   
from one another1 and  yet have all     
reference to the same facts4 ,i myself  
agree with ,diogenes1  who has defined  
good to be that which in its nature is  
perfect4 ,but that  which follows1 that 
which is profitable 7for so we may      
translate his  71 he considered to be a 
motion1 or a state1 arising out of the  
nature of the perfect4 ,and as the      
notions of things arise in the mind1 if 
anything has become known either by     
practice1 or by combination1 or by      
similitude1 or by the comparison of     
reason2 then by this fourth means1      
which ,i have placed last1 the knowledge
 of good is arrived at4 ,for when1  by a
 comparison of the reason1 the mind     
ascends from those things which  are    
according to reason1 then it arrives at 

a notion of good4 ,and this  good we are
 speaking of1 we both feel to be and    
call good1 not because of  any addition 
made to it1 nor from its growth1 nor    
from comparing it with  other things1   
but because of its own proper power4    
,for as honey1 although  it is very     
sweet1 is still perceived to be sweet by
 its own peculiar kind  of taste1 and   
not by comparison with other things2 so 
this good1 which we  are now treating   
of1 is indeed to be esteemed of great   
value2 but that  valuation depends on   
kind and not on magnitude4 ,for as      
estimation1 which  is called 1 is not   
reckoned among goods1 nor1 on the other 
hand1 among  evils1 whatever you add to 
it will remain in its kind4 ,there is1  
therefore1 another kind of estimation   
proper to virtue1 which is of weight    
from its character1 and not because of  
its increasing4 ,nor1 indeed1 are  the  
perturbations of the mind1 which make   
the lives of the unwise bitter  and     
miserable1 and which the ,greeks call 1 

7,i might translate the word  itself by 
the ,latin morbi1 but it would not suit 
all the meanings of the  ,greek word2   
for who ever calls pity1 or even anger1 
a disease--morbus78  but the ,greeks do 
call such a feeling 4 ,let us then      
translate it  perturbation1 which is by 
its very name pointed out to be         
something  vicious4 ,nor are these      
perturbations1 ,i say1 excited by any   
natural force2  and they are altogether 
in kind four1 but as to their divisions 
they are  more numerous4 ,there is      
melancholy1 fear1 lust1 and that feeling
 which the  ,stoics call by the common  
name which they apply to both mind and  
body1  1 and which ,i prefer translating
 joy 7ltitia71 rather than a            
pleasurable elation of an exulting mind4
 ,but perturbations are not excited  by 
any force of nature2 and all those      
feelings are judgments and opinions     
proceeding from light-mindedness2 and1  
therefore1 the wise man will always  be 
free from them4    ,,xi4 ,but that      

everything which is honourable is to be 
sought for its own  sake1 is an opinion 
common to us with many other schools of 
philosophers4  ,for1 except the three   
sects which exclude virtue from the     
chief good1 this  opinion must be       
maintained by all philosophers1 and     
above all by us1 who  do not rank       
anything whatever among goods except    
what is honourable4 ,but  the defence of
 this opinion is very easy and simple   
indeed2 for who is  there1 or who ever  
was there1 of such violent avarice1 or  
of such  unbridled desires as not       
infinitely to prefer that anything which
 he  wishes to acquire1 even at the     
expense of any conceivable wickedness1  
should come into his power without      
crime1 7even though he had a prospect   
of perfect impunity17 than through      
crime8 and what utility1 or what        
personal advantage do we hope for1 when 
we are anxious to know whether  those   
bodies are moving whose movements are   
concealed from us1 and owing  to what   

causes they revolve through the heavens8
 ,and who is there that  lives according
 to such clownish maxims1 or who has so 
rigorously hardened  himself against the
 study of nature1 as to be averse to    
things worthy of  being understood1 and 
to be indifferent to and disregard such 
knowledge1  merely because there is no  
exact usefulness or pleasure likely to  
result  from it8 or1 who is there       
who--when he comes to know the exploits1
 and  sayings1 and wise counsels of our 
forefathers1 of the ,africani1 or of    
that  ancestor of mine whom you are     
always talking of1 and of other brave   
men1  and citizens of pre-eminent       
virtue--does not feel his mind affected 
with  pleasure8 and who that has been   
brought up in a respectable family1 and 
educated as becomes a freeman1 is not   
offended with baseness as such1  though 
it may not be likely to injure him      
personally8 ,who can keep his           
equanimity while looking on a man who1  
he thinks1 lives in an impure and       

wicked manner8 ,who does not hate       
sordid1 fickle1 unstable1 worthless men8
  ,but what shall we be able to say1 7if
 we do not lay it down that baseness  is
 to be avoided for its own sake71 is the
 reason why men do not seek  darkness   
and solitude1 and then give the rein to 
every possible infamy1  except that     
baseness of itself detects them by      
reason of its own intrinsic  foulness8  
,innumerable arguments may be brought   
forward to support this  opinion2 but it
 is needless1 for there is nothing which
 can be less a  matter of doubt than    
that what is honourable ought to be     
sought for its  own sake2 and1 in the   
same manner1 what is disgraceful ought  
to be  avoided4    ,but after that point
 is established1 which we have          
previously mentioned1  that what is     
honourable is the sole good2 it must    
unavoidably be  understood that that    
which is honourable1 is to be valued    
more highly than  those intermediate    
goods which we derive from it4 ,but when

 we say that  folly1 and rashness1 and  
injustice1 and intemperance are to be   
avoided on  account of those things     
which result from them1 we do not speak 
in such a  manner that our language is  
at all inconsistent with the position   
which  has been laid down1 that that    
alone is evil which is dishonourable4   
,because those things are not referred  
to any inconvenience of the body1  but  
to dishonourable actions1 which arise   
out of vicious propensities  7vitia74   
,for what the ,greeks call  ,i prefer   
translating by vitium  rather than by   
malitia4    ,,xii4 ,certainly2 ,cato1   
said ,i1 you are employing very         
admirable language1  and such as        
expresses clearly what you mean2 and1   
therefore1 you seem to  me to be        
teaching philosophy in ,latin1 and1 as  
it were1 to be presenting  it with the  
freedom of the city4 ,for up to this    
time she has seemed like a  stranger at 
,rome1 and has not put herself in the   
way of our conversation2  and that1 too1

 chiefly because of a certain highly    
polished thinness of  things and words4 
,for ,i am aware that there are some men
 who are able to  philosophise in any   
language1 but who still employ no       
divisions and no  definitions2 and who  
say themselves that they approve of     
those things  alone to which nature     
silently assents4 ,therefore1 they      
discuss1 without  any great degree of   
labour1 matters which are not very      
obscure4 ,and1 on  this account1 ,i am  
now prepared to listen eagerly to you1  
and to commit to  memory all the names  
which you give to those matters to which
 this  discussion refers4 ,for1 perhaps1
 ,i myself may some day have reason to  
employ them too4    ,you1 then1 appear  
to me to be perfectly right1 and to be  
acting in strict  accordance with our   
usual way of speaking1 when you lay it  
down that there  are vices the exact    
opposites of virtues2 for that which is 
blameable  7vituperabile7 for its own   
sake1 ,i think ought1 from that very    

fact1 to  be called a vice2 and perhaps 
this verb1 vitupero1 is derived from    
vitium4 ,but if you had translated  by  
malitia17#df7 then the usage  of the    
,latin language would have limited us to
 one particular vice2 but1  as it is1   
all vice is opposed to all virtue by one
 generic opposite name4    ,,xiii4 ,then
 he proceeded3--,after these things1    
therefore1 are thus laid  down1 there   
follows a great contest1 which has been 
handled by the  ,peripatetics somewhat  
too gently1 7for their method of arguing
 is not  sufficiently acute1 owing to   
their ignorance of dialectics27 but your
  ,carneades has pressed the matter with
 great vigour and effect1 displaying  in
 reference to it a most admirable skill 
in dialectics1 and the most  consummate 
eloquence2 because he has never ceased  
to contend throughout  the whole of this
 discussion1 which turns upon what is   
good and what is  bad1 that the         
controversy between the ,stoics and     
,peripatetics is not one  of things1 but

 only of names4 ,but1 to me1 nothing    
appears so evident as  that the opinions
 of these two schools differ from one   
another far more as  to facts than to   
names2 ,i mean to say1 that there is    
much greater  difference between the    
,stoics and ,peripatetics in principle  
than in  language4 ,forasmuch as the    
,peripatetics assert that everything    
which they  themselves call good1 has a 
reference to living happily2 but our    
school  does not think that a happy life
 necessarily embraces everything which  
is  worthy of any esteem4    ,but can   
anything be more certain than that1     
according to the principles of  those   
men who rank pain among the evils1 a    
wise man cannot be happy when  he is    
tormented on the rack8 ,while the       
principles of those who do not  consider
 pain among the evils1 certainly compels
 us to allow that a happy  life is      
preserved to a wise man among all       
torments4 ,in truth1 if those men       
endure pain with greater fortitude who  

suffer it in the cause of their         
country1 than those who do so for any   
slighter object2 then it is plain  that 
it is opinion1 and not nature1 which    
makes the force of pain greater  or     
less4 ,even that opinion of the         
,peripatetics is more than ,i can agree 
to1 that1 as there are three kinds of   
goods1 as they say1 each individual  is 
the happier in proportion as he is      
richer in the goods of the body or      
external goods1 so that we must be      
forced also to approve of this          
doctrine1 that that man is happier who  
has a greater quantity of those  things 
which are accounted of great value as   
affecting the body4 ,for they  think    
that a happy life is made complete by   
bodily advantages2 but there  is nothing
 which our philosophers can so little   
agree to4 ,for1 as our  opinion is that 
life is not even made in the least more 
happy by an  abundance of those goods   
which we call goods of nature1 nor more 
desirable1 nor deserving of being more  

highly valued1 then certainly a         
multitude of bodily advantages can have 
still less effect on making life  happy4
 ,in truth1 if to be wise be a desirable
 thing1 and to be well be so  too1 then 
both together must be more desirable    
than wisdom by itself2 but  it does not 
follow1 if each quality deserves to be  
esteemed1 that  therefore1 the two taken
 together deserve to be esteemed more   
highly than  wisdom does by itself4 ,for
 we who consider good health worthy of  
any  esteem1 and yet do not rank it     
among the goods1 think1 at the same     
time1  that the esteem to which it is   
entitled is by no means such as that it 
ought to be preferred to virtue4 ,but   
this is not the doctrine of the         
,peripatetics2 and they ought to tell   
us1 that that which is an honourable    
action and unaccompanied by pain1 is    
more to be desired than the same  action
 would be if it were attended with pain4
 ,we think not3 whether we  are right or
 wrong may be discussed hereafter2 but  

can there possibly be a  greater        
disagreement respecting facts and       
principles8    ,,xiv4 ,for as the light 
of a candle is obscured and put out by  
the light of  the sun2 and as a drop of 
brine is lost in the magnitude of the   
gan sea2  or an addition of a penny amid
 the riches of ,crsus2 or as one step is
 of  no account in a march from here to 
,india2 so1 if that is the chief good   
which the ,stoics affirm is so1 then1   
all the goods which depend on the  body 
must inevitably be obscured and         
overwhelmed by1 and come to nothing     
when placed by the side of the splendour
 and importance of virtue4 ,and  since  
opportunity1 7for that is how we may    
translate 17 is not  made greater by    
extending the time1 7for whatever is    
said to be opportune  has its own       
peculiar limit27 so a right action1 7for
 that is how ,i  translate 1 and a right
 deed ,i call 17--a right action1  ,i   
say1 and suitableness1 and1 in short1   
the good itself1 which depends on  the  

fact of its being in accordance with    
nature1 has no possibility of  receiving
 any addition or growth4 ,for as that   
opportunity is not made  greater by the 
extension of time1 so neither are these 
things which ,i have  mentioned4 ,and1  
on that account1 a happy life does not  
seem to the ,stoics  more desirable or  
more deserving of being sought after1 if
 it is long than  if it is short2 and   
they prove this by a simile3--,as the   
praise of a buskin  is to fit the foot  
exactly1 and as many buskins are not    
considered to fit  better than few1 and 
large ones are not thought better than  
small ones2  so1 in the case of those   
the whole good of which depends upon its
  suitableness and fitness2 many are not
 preferred to few1 nor what is  durable 
to what is short-lived4 ,nor do they    
exhibit sufficient acuteness  when they 
say1 if good health is more to be       
esteemed when it lasts long  than when  
it lasts only a short time1 then the    
longest possible enjoyment  of wisdom   

must clearly be of the greatest value4  
,they do not understand  that the       
estimate of good health is formed       
expressly with reference to its         
duration2 of virtue with reference to   
its fitness of time2 so that men who    
argue in this manner1 seem as if they   
would speak of a good death1 or a  good 
labour1 and call one which lasted long1 
better than a short one4 ,they  do not  
perceive that some things are reckoned  
of more value in proportion  to their   
brevity2 and some in proportion to their
 length4 ,therefore1 it is  quite       
consistent with what has been said1 that
 according to the principles  of those  
who think that that end of goods which  
we call the extreme or  chief good1 is  
susceptible of growth1 they may also    
think that one man can  be wiser than   
another2 and1 in like manner then1 one  
man may sin more1 or  act more rightly  
than another4 ,but such an assertion is 
not allowable to  us1 who do not think  
the end of goods susceptible of growth4 

,for as men  who have been submerged    
under the water1 cannot breathe any more
 because  they are at no great depth    
below the surface1 7though they may on  
this  account be able at times to       
emerge17 than if they were at the       
bottom1 nor  can the puppy who is nearly
 old enough to see1 as yet see any more 
than  one who is but this moment born2  
so the man who has made some progress   
towards the approach to virtue1 is no   
less in a state of misery than he  who  
has made no such advance at all4        
,,xv4 ,i am aware that all this seems   
very strange4 ,but as unquestionably the
  previous propositions are true and    
uncontrovertible1 and as these others   
are in harmony with1 and are the direct 
consequences of them2 we cannot         
question their truth also4 ,but although
 some people deny that either  virtues  
or vices are susceptible of growth1     
still they believe that each  of them is
 in some degree diffused1 and as it were
 extended4 ,but ,diogenes  thinks that  

riches have not only such power1 that   
they are1 as it were1  guides to        
pleasure and to good health1 but that   
they even contain them3  but that they  
have not the same power with regard to  
virtue1 or to the  other arts to which  
money may indeed be a guide1 but which  
it cannot  contain4 ,therefore1 if      
pleasure or if good health be among the 
goods1  riches also must be classed     
among the goods2 but if wisdom be a     
good1 it  does not follow that we are   
also to call riches a good2 nor can that
 which  is classed among the goods be   
contained by anything which is not      
placed in  the same classification4 ,and
 on that account1 because the knowledge 
and  comprehension of those things by   
which arts are produced1 excite a desire
  for them1 as riches are not among the 
goods1 therefore no art can be          
contained in riches4    ,but if we grant
 this to be true with respect to arts1  
still it is not to  follow that the same
 rule holds good with respect to virtue2

 because  virtue requires a great deal  
of meditation and practice1 and this is 
not  always the case with arts2 and also
 because virtue embraces the stability1 
firmness1 and consistency of the entire 
life2 and we do not see that the  same  
is the case with arts4    ,after this1  
we come to explain the differences      
between things4 ,and if we  were to say 
that there is none1 then all life would 
be thrown into  confusion1 as it is by  
,aristo4 ,nor could any office or work  
be found for  wisdom1 if there were     
actually no difference between one thing
 and  another1 and if there were no     
power of selection at all requisite to  
be  exerted4 ,therefore1 after it had   
been sufficiently established that that 
alone was good which was honourable1 and
 that alone evil which was  disgraceful1
 they asserted that there were some     
particulars in which those  things which
 had no influence on the misery or      
happiness of life1 differed  from one   
another1 so that some of them deserved  

to be esteemed1 some to be  despised1   
and others were indifferent4 ,but as to 
those things which  deserved to be      
esteemed1 some of them had in themselves
 sufficient reason  for being preferred 
to others1 as good health1 soundness of 
the senses1  freedom from pain1 glory1  
riches1 and similar things4 ,but others 
were not  of this kind4 ,and in like    
manner1 as to those things which were   
worthy of  no esteem at all1 some had   
cause enough in themselves why they     
should be  rejected1 such as pain1      
disease1 loss of senses1 poverty1       
ignominy1 and  things like them1 and    
some had not4 ,and thus1 from this      
distinction1 came  what ,zeno called 1  
and on the other hand what he called  1 
as though writing in so copious a       
language1 he chose to  employ new terms 
of his own invention2 a license which is
 not allowed to  us in this barren      
language of ours2 although you often    
insist that it is  richer than the      
,greek4 ,but it is not foreign to our   

present subject1 in  order that the     
meaning of the word may be more easily  
understood1 to  explain the principle on
 which ,zeno invented these terms4      
,,xvi4 ,for as1 says he1 no one in a    
king's palace says that the king is1 as 
it were1 led forward towards his dignity
 7for that is the real meaning of  the  
word 1 but the term is applied to those 
who are of some rank  whose order comes 
next to his1 so as to be second to the  
kingly dignity72  so in life too1 it is 
not those things which are in the first 
rank1 but  those which are in the second
 which are called 1 or led forward4     
,and we may translate the ,greek by     
productum 7this will be a strictly      
literal translation71 or we may call it 
and its opposite promotum and  remotum1 
or as we have said before1 we may call 1
 prpositum  or prcipuum1 and its        
opposite rejectum4 ,for when the thing  
is  understood1 we ought to be very     
ductile as to the words which we employ4
    ,but since we say that everything   

which is good holds the first rank1 it  
follows inevitably that this which we   
call prcipuum or prpositum1  must be    
neither good nor bad4 ,and therefore we 
define it as something  indifferent1    
attended with a moderate esteem4 ,for   
that which they call  1 it occurs to me 
to translate indifferens4 ,nor1 indeed1 
was it  at all possible that there      
should be nothing left intermediate1    
which was  either according to nature or
 contrary to it2 nor1 when that was     
left1  that there should be nothing     
ranked in this class which was tolerably
  estimable2 nor1 if this position were 
once established1 that there should  not
 be some things which are preferred4    
,this distinction1 then1 has been  made 
with perfect propriety1 and this simile 
is employed by them to make  the truth  
more easily seen4 ,for as1 say they1 if 
we were to suppose this  to be1 as it   
were1 the end and greatest of goods1 to 
throw a die in such a  manner that it   
should stand upright1 then the die which

 is thrown in such  a manner as to fall 
upright1 will have some particular thing
 preferred as  its end1 and vice vers4  
,and yet that preference of the die will
 have no  reference to the end of which 
,i have been speaking4 ,so those things 
which  have been preferred are referred 
indeed to the end1 but have no reference
  at all to its force or nature4        
,next comes that division1 that of goods
 some have reference to that end  7for  
so ,i express those which they call 1   
for we must here1 as we  have said      
before1 endure to express in many words1
 what we cannot express  by one so as to
 be thoroughly intelligible17 some are  
efficient causes1  and some are both    
together4 ,but of those which have      
reference to that end1  nothing is good 
except honourable actions2 of those     
which are efficient  causes1 nothing is 
good except a friend4 ,but they assert  
that wisdom is  both a referential and  
an efficient good4 ,for1 because wisdom 
is suitable  action1 it is of that      

referential character which ,i have     
mentioned2 but  inasmuch as it brings   
and causes honourable actions1 it may be
 so far  called efficient4    ,,xvii4   
,now these things which we have spoken  
of as preferred1 are preferred  some for
 their own sake1 some because they      
effect something else1 and some  for    
both reasons4 ,some are preferred for   
their own sake1 such as some  particular
 appearance or expression of            
countenance1 some particular kind  of   
gait1 or motion1 in which there are some
 things which may well be  preferred1   
and some which may be rejected4 ,others 
are said to be preferred  because they  
produce something1 as money2 and others 
for a combination of  both reasons1 as  
soundness of the senses1 or good health4
 ,but respecting  good reputation1 7for 
what they call  is more properly called1
 in  this place1 good reputation than   
glory17 ,chrysippus and ,diogenes denied
  its whole utility1 and used to say    
that one ought not even to put forth a  

finger for the sake of it1 with whom ,i 
entirely and heartily agree4 ,but  those
 who came after them1 being unable to   
withstand the arguments of  ,carneades1 
said that this good reputation1 as ,i   
call it1 was preferred for  its own     
sake1 and ought to be chosen for its own
 sake1 and that it was  natural for a   
man of good family1 who had been        
properly brought up1 to  wish to be     
praised by his parents1 his relations1  
and by good men in  general1 and that   
too for the sake of the praise itself1  
and not of any  advantage which might   
ensue from it4 ,and they say1 too1 that 
as we wish to  provide for our children1
 even for such as may be posthumous     
children1 for  their own sake1 so we    
ought also to show a regard for         
posthumous fame  after our death1 for   
its own sake1 without any thought of    
gain or  advantage4    ,but as we assert
 that what is honourable is the only    
good1 still it is  consistent with this 
assertion to discharge one's duty1      

though we do not  class duty among      
either the goods or the evils4 ,for     
there is in these  things some          
likelihood1 and that of such a nature   
that reasons can be  alleged for there  
being such2 and therefore of such a     
nature1 that  probable reasons may be   
adduced for adopting such a line of     
conduct4 ,from  which it follows that   
duty is a sort of neutral thing1 which  
is not to be  classed either among the  
goods or among the opposites of goods4  
,and since1  in those things which are  
neither ranked among the virtues nor    
among the  vices1 there is still        
something which may be of use2 that is  
not to be  destroyed4 ,for there is a   
certain action of that sort1 and that   
too of  such a character that reason    
requires one to do and perform it4 ,but 
that  which is done in obedience to     
reason we call duty2 duty1 then1 is a   
thing  of that sort1 that it must not be
 ranked either among the goods or among 
the opposites of goods4    ,,xviii4 ,and

 this also is evident1 that in these    
natural things the wise man  is not     
altogether inactive4 ,he therefore1 when
 he acts1 judges that that  is his duty2
 and because he is never deceived in    
forming his judgment1  duty must be     
classed among neutral things2 and this  
is proved also by this  conclusion of   
reason4 ,for since we see that there is 
something which we  pronounce to have   
been rightly done 7for that is duty when
 accomplished71  there must also be     
something which is rightly begun3 as1 if
 to restore  what has been justly       
deposited belongs to the class of right 
actions1 then  it must be classed among 
the duties to restore a deposit2 and the
 addition  of the word 8justly0 makes   
the duty to be rightly performed3 but   
the mere  fact of restoring is classed  
as a duty4 ,and since it is not         
doubtful1 that  in those things which we
 call intermediate or neutral1 some     
ought to be  chosen and others rejected1
 whatever is done or said in this manner

 comes  under the head of ordinary duty4
 ,and from this it is understood1 since 
all  men naturally love themselves1 that
 a fool is as sure as a wise man to     
choose what is in accordance with       
nature1 and to reject what is contrary  
to it2 and so there is one duty in      
common both to wise men and to fools2   
from which it follows that duty is      
conversant about those things which we  
call neutral4 ,but since all duties     
proceed from these things1 it is not    
without reason that it is said that all 
our thoughts are referred to these      
things1 and among them our departure    
from life1 and our remaining in life4   
,for he in whom there are many things   
which are in accordance with nature1    
his duty it is to remain in life2 but as
 to the man in whom there either  is or 
appears likely to be a preponderance of 
things contrary to nature1  that man's  
duty is to depart from life4 ,from which
 consideration it is  evident1 that it  
is sometimes the duty of a wise man to  

depart from life  when he is happy1 and 
sometimes the duty of a fool to remain  
in life  though he is miserable4 ,for   
that good and that evil1 as has been    
often  said1 comes afterwards4 ,but     
those principal natural goods1 and those
 which  hold the second rank1 and those 
things which are opposite to them1 all  
come under the decision of1 and are     
matters for the reflection of the wise  
man2 and are1 as it were1 the subject   
matter of wisdom4 ,therefore the        
question of remaining in life1 or of    
emigrating from it1 is to be measured   
by all those circumstances which ,i have
 mentioned above2 for death is not  to  
be sought for by those men who are      
retained in life by virtue1 nor by      
those who are destitute of virtue4 ,but 
it is often the duty of a wise man  to  
depart from life1 when he is thoroughly 
happy1 if it is in his power to  do so  
opportunely2 and that is living in a    
manner suitable to nature1 for  their   
maxim is1 that living happily depends   

upon opportunity4 ,therefore a  rule is 
laid down by wisdom1 that if it be      
necessary a wise man is even to  leave  
her herself4    ,wherefore1 as vice has 
not such power as to afford a justifying
 cause for  voluntary death1 it is      
evident that it is the duty even of     
fools1 and of  those too who are        
miserable1 to remain in life1 if they   
are surrounded by  a preponderance of   
those things which we call according to 
nature4 ,and  since such a man is       
equally miserable1 whether departing    
from life1 or  abiding in it1 and since 
the duration of misery is not any the   
more a  cause for fleeing from life1    
therefore it is not a causeless         
assertion1  that those men who have the 
power of enjoying the greatest number of
  natural goods1 ought to abide in life4
    ,,xix4 ,but they think it is very   
important with reference to this        
subject1  that it should be understood  
that it is the work of nature1 that     
children  are beloved by their parents2 

and that this is the first principle    
from  which we may trace the whole      
progress of the common society of the   
human  race4 ,and that this may be      
inferred1 in the first place1 from the  
figure  and members of the body1 which  
of themselves declare that a due regard 
for  everything connected with          
generation has been exhibited by nature2
 nor can  these two things possibly be  
consistent with one another1 that nature
  should desire that offspring should be
 propagated1 and yet take no care  that 
what is propagated should be loved4 ,but
 even in beasts the power of  nature may
 be discerned2 for when we see such     
labour bestowed upon the  bringing forth
 and bearing of their offspring1 we seem
 to be hearing the  voice of nature     
herself4 ,wherefore1 as it is evident   
that we are by nature  averse to pain2  
so also it is clear that we are impelled
 by nature herself  to love those whose 
existence we have caused4 ,and from this
 it arises that  there is such a        

recommendation by nature of one man to  
another1 that one  man ought never to   
appear unfriendly to another1 for the   
simple reason  that he is a man4    ,for
 as among the limbs some appear to be   
created for themselves as it  were1 as  
the eyes and ears2 others assist the    
rest of the limbs1 as the  legs and     
hands2 so there are some monstrous      
beasts born for themselves  alone3 but  
that fish which floats in an open shell 
and is called the  pinna1 and that other
 which swims out of the shell1 and1     
because it is a  guard to the other1 is 
called the pinnoteres1 and when it has  
withdrawn  within the shell again1 is   
shut up in it1 so that it appears that  
it has  given it warning to be on its   
guard2 and also ants1 and bees1 and     
storks1  do something for the sake of   
others4 ,much more is this the case with
  reference to the union of men4 ,and   
therefore we are by nature adapted for  
companionship1 for taking counsel       
together1 for forming states4 ,but they 

think that this world is regulated by   
the wisdom of the gods1 and that it  is1
 as it were1 a common city and state of 
men and gods1 and that every  individual
 of us is a part of the world4 ,from    
which that appears to follow  by nature1
 that we should prefer the general      
advantage to our own4 ,for as  the laws 
prefer the general safety to that of    
individuals1 so a good and  wise man1   
and one who obeys the laws and who is   
not ignorant of his duty  as a citizen1 
consults the general advantage rather   
than that of any  particular individual1
 or even than his own4 ,nor is a        
betrayer of his  country more to be     
blamed1 than one who deserts the general
 advantage or  the general safety on    
account of his own private advantage or 
safety4 ,from  which it also follows1   
that that man deserves to be praised who
 encounters  death voluntarily for the  
sake of the republic1 because it is     
right that  the republic should be      
dearer to us than ourselves4 ,and since 

it is said  to be a wicked thing1 and   
contrary to human nature1 for a man to  
say that  he would not care if1 after   
his own death1 a general conflagration  
of the  whole world were to happen1     
which is often uttered in a ,greek7#dg7 
verse2  so it is certainly true that we 
ought to consult the interests of those 
who are to come after us1 for the sake  
of the love which we bear them4    ,,xx4
 ,it is in this disposition of mind that
 wills1 and the recommendations  of     
dying persons1 have originated4 ,and    
because no one would like to pass  his  
life in solitude1 not even if surrounded
 with an infinite abundance of          
pleasures1 it is easily perceived that  
we are born for communion and           
fellowship with man1 and for natural    
associations4 ,but we are impelled by   
nature to wish to benefit as many       
persons as possible1 especially by      
instructing them and delivering them    
precepts of prudence4 ,therefore1 it  is
 not easy to find a man who does not    

communicate to some other what he  knows
 himself2 so prone are we not only to   
learn1 but also to teach4 ,and  as the  
principle is by nature implanted in     
bulls to fight in behalf of  their      
calves with the greatest vigour and     
earnestness1 even against lions2  so    
those who are rich or powerful1 and are 
able to do so1 are excited by  nature to
 preserve the race of mankind1 as we    
have heard by tradition was  the case   
with ,hercules and ,libera4 ,and also   
when we call ,jupiter  all-powerful and 
all-good1 and likewise when we speak of 
him as the  salutary god1 the hospitable
 god1 or as ,stator1 we mean it to be   
understood that the safety of men is    
under his protection4 ,but it is very   
inconsistent1 when we are disregarded   
and despised by one another1 to         
entreat1 that we may be dear to and     
beloved by the immortal gods4 ,as1      
therefore1 we make use of our limbs     
before we have learnt the exact         
advantage with a view to which we are   

endowed with them1 so also we are       
united and associated by nature in a    
community of fellow-citizens4 ,and if   
this were not the case1 there would be  
no room for either justice or           
benevolence4    ,and as men think that  
there are bonds of right which connect  
man with man1  so also there is no law  
which connects man with the beasts4 ,for
 well did  ,chrysippus say1 that all    
other animals have been born for the    
sake of men  and of the gods2 but that  
men and gods have been born only for the
 sake of  their own mutual communion and
 society1 so that men might be able to  
use  beasts for their own advantage     
without any violation of law or right4  
,and  since the nature of man is such   
that he has1 as it were1 a sort of right
  of citizenship connecting him with the
 whole human race1 a man who  maintains 
that right is just1 and he who departs  
from it is unjust4    ,but as1 although 
a theatre is publicly open1 still it may
 be fairly said  that the place which   

each individual has occupied belongs to 
him2 so in a  city1 or in the world1    
which is likewise common to all1 there  
is no  principle of right which hinders 
each individual from having his own     
private property4 ,but since we see that
 man has been born for the purpose  of  
defending and preserving men1 so it is  
consistent with this nature that  a wise
 man should wish to manage and regulate 
the republic2 and1 in order  to live in 
compliance with nature1 to marry a wife 
and beget children4 ,nor  do            
philosophers think virtuous love        
inconsistent with a wise man4 ,but      
others say that the principles and life 
of the ,cynics are more suited to a     
wise man2 if1 indeed1 any chance should 
befal him which might compel him  to act
 in such a manner2 while others wholly  
deny it4    ,,xxi4 ,but in order that   
the society1 and union1 and affection   
between man  and man may be completely  
preserved1 they have laid it down that  
all  benefits and injuries1 which they  

call  and 1 are  likewise common2 of    
which the former are advantageous1 and  
the latter  injurious4 ,nor have they   
been contented with calling them common1
 but they  have also asserted their     
equality4 ,but as for disadvantages and 
advantages1 7by which words ,i translate
  and 17  those they assert to be       
common1 but they deny that they are     
equal4 ,for  those things which profit  
or which injure are either good or evil2
 and  they must necessarily be equal4   
,but advantages and disadvantages are of
  that kind which we have already called
 things preferred or rejected2 and  they
 cannot be equal4 ,but advantages are   
said to be common2 but things  done     
rightly1 and sins1 are not considered   
common4 ,but they think that  friendship
 is to be cultivated because it is one  
of that class of things  which is       
profitable4 ,but although1 in           
friendship1 some people assert that  the
 interest of a man's friend is as dear  
to him as his own2 others1 on  the other

 hand1 contend that every man has a     
greater regard for his own4  ,yet these 
latter confess that it is inconsistent  
with justice1 for which  we seem to be  
born1 to take anything from another for 
the purpose of  appropriating it to     
oneself4 ,but philosophers of this      
school which ,i am  speaking of1 never  
approve of either friendship or justice 
being exercised  or sanctioned for the  
sake of its usefulness3 for they say    
that the same  principles of usefulness 
may1 at times1 undermine or overturn    
them4 ,in  truth1 neither justice nor   
friendship can have any existence at    
all1  unless they be sought for their   
own sake4 ,they contend also that all   
right1 which has any pretence to the    
name and appellation1 is so by  nature2 
and that it is inconsistent with the    
character of a wise man1 not  only to do
 any injustice to any one1 but even to  
do him any damage4 ,nor is  it right to 
make such a league with one's friends as
 to share in all their  good deeds1 or  

to become a partner in every act of     
injustice2 and they  argue1 with the    
greatest dignity and truth1 that justice
 can never be  separated from           
usefulness3 and that whatever is just   
and equitable is also  honourable2 and1 
reciprocally1 that whatever is          
honourable must be also  just and       
equitable4    ,and to those virtues     
which we have discussed1 they also add  
dialectics and  natural philosophy2 and 
they call both these sciences by the    
name of  virtues3 one1 because it has   
reason1 so as to prevent our assenting  
to any  false proposition1 or being even
 deceived by any plausible probability2 
and to enable us to maintain and defend 
what we were saying about good and      
evil4 ,for without this act they think  
that any one may be led away from  the  
truth and deceived2 accordingly1 if     
rashness and ignorance is in every  case
 vicious1 this power which removes them 
is properly named virtue4    ,,xxii4    
,the same honour is also attributed to  

natural philosophy1 and not  without    
reason1 because the man who wishes to   
live in a manner suitable to  nature1   
must begin by studying the universal    
world1 and the laws which  govern it4   
,nor can any one form a correct judgment
 of good and evil  without being        
acquainted with the whole system of     
nature1 and of the life  of the gods    
also1 and without knowing whether or not
 the nature of man  agrees with         
universal nature4 ,he must also have    
learnt the ancient rules  of those wise 
men who bid men yield to the times1 and 
obey ,god1 and know  oneself1 and shun  
every kind of excess4 ,now1 without a   
knowledge of  natural philosophy1 no man
 can see what great power these rules   
have2 and  it is as great as can be3 and
 also this is the only knowledge which  
can  teach a man how greatly nature     
assists in the cultivation of justice1  
in  the maintenance of friendship and   
the rest of the affections4 ,nor can    
piety towards the ,gods1 nor the        

gratitude which is due to them1 be      
properly understood and appreciated     
without a correct understanding of the  
laws of nature4    ,but ,i feel now that
 ,i have advanced further than ,i had   
intended1 or than  the subject before me
 required4 ,but the admirable           
arrangement of the ,stoic  doctrine1 and
 the incredible beauty of the system1   
drew me on4 ,and1 in the  name of the   
immortal gods6 can you forbear to admire
 it8 ,for what is there  in all         
nature--though nothing is better or more
 accurately adapted to its  ends than   
that--or what can be found in any work  
made by the hand1 so well  arranged1 and
 united1 and put together8 ,what is     
there which is posterior1  which does   
not agree with what has preceded it8    
,what is there which  follows1 and does 
not correspond to what has gone before8 
,what is there  which is not connected  
with something else in such a manner1   
that if you  only move one letter the   
whole will fall to pieces8 ,nor1 indeed1

 is there  anything which can be moved4 
,but what a grand and magnificent and   
consistent character is that of the     
wise man which is drawn by them6 ,for   
he1 after reason has taught him that    
that which is honourable is alone good1 
must inevitably be always happy1  and   
must have a genuine right to those names
 which are often ridiculed by  the      
ignorant4 ,for he will be more properly 
called king than ,tarquin1 who  was able
 to govern neither himself nor his      
family2 he will deserve to be  called   
the master of the people more than      
,sylla1 who was only the master  of     
three pestiferous vices1 luxury1        
avarice1 and cruelty2 he will be  called
 rich more properly than ,crassus1 who  
would never have desired to  cross the  
,euphrates without any legitimate cause 
for war1 if he had not  been in want of 
something4 ,everything will be properly 
said to belong to  that man1 who alone  
knows how to make use of everything4 ,he
 will also  rightly be called beautiful1

 for the features of the mind are more  
beautiful than those of the body3 he    
will deservedly be called the only  free
 man1 who is neither subject to the     
domination of any one1 nor  subservient 
to his own passions4 ,he will fairly be 
called invincible1 on  whose mind1 even 
though his body be bound with chains1 no
 fetters can ever  be imposed4 ,nor will
 he wait till the last period of his    
life1 so as to  have it decided whether 
he has been happy or not1 after he has  
come to the  last day of life and closed
 his eyes in death1 in the spirit of the
  warning which one of the wise men gave
 to ,crsus1 without showing much  wisdom
 in so doing4 ,for if he had ever been  
happy1 then he would have  borne his    
happy life with him1 even as far as the 
funeral pile built for  him by ,cyrus4  
,but if it be true that no one except a 
good man is happy1 and that all  good   
men are happy1 then what deserves to be 
cultivated more than  philosophy1 or    
what is more divine than virtue8        

,fourth ,book ,of ,the ,treatise ,on    
,the ,chief ,good ,and ,evil4      ,i4  
,and when he had made an end of saying  
these things1 ,i replied1 ,truly1 ,o    
,cato1 you have displayed a wonderful   
memory in explaining to us such a       
number of things1 and in laying such    
obscure things so clearly before us4    
,so that we must either give up having  
any meaning or wish contrary to what    
you have said1 or else we must take time
 to deliberate3 for it is not easy  to  
learn thoroughly the principles of a    
school which has not only had its       
foundation laid1 but which has even been
 built up with such diligence1  although
 perhaps with some errors as to its     
truth1 7which1 however1 ,i will  not as 
yet dare to affirm17 but at all events  
with such care and accuracy4  ,then1    
said he1 is that what you say1 when ,i  
have seen you1 in obedience to  this new
 law1 reply to the prosecutor on the    
same day on which he has  brought       
forward his charge1 and sum up for three

 hours2 and then do you  think that ,i  
am going to allow an adjournment in this
 cause8 which1  however1 will not be    
conducted by you better than those which
 are at times  entrusted to you4        
,wherefore1 ,i desire that you will now 
apply yourself to  this one1 especially 
as it has been handled by others1 and   
also by  yourself several times2 so that
 you cannot be at a loss for arguments  
or  language4    ,i replied1 ,i do not1 
in truth1 venture to argue              
inconsiderately against  the ,stoics1   
not because ,i agree with them in any   
great degree1 but ,i am  hindered by    
shame2 because they say so much that ,i 
hardly understand4 ,i  confess1 said he1
 that some of our arguments are obscure2
 not that we make  them so on purpose1  
but because there is some obscurity in  
the subjects  themselves4 ,why1 then1   
said ,i1 when the ,peripatetics discuss 
the same  subjects1 does not a single   
word occur which is not well understood8
 ,do  they discuss the same subjects8   

said he2 or have ,i failed to prove to  
you  that the ,stoics differ from the   
,peripatetics1 not in words only1 but in
  the whole of the subject1 and in every
 one of their opinions8 ,but1 said ,i1  
if1 ,o ,cato1 you can establish that1 ,i
 will allow you to carry me over1  body 
and soul1 to your school4 ,i did think1 
said he1 that ,i had said  enough on    
that point2 wherefore answer me on that 
head first1 if you  please2 and         
afterwards you can advance what         
arguments you please4 ,i do not  think  
it too much1 said ,i1 if ,i claim to    
answer you on that topic as ,i  myself  
please4 ,as you will1 said he2 for      
although the other way would have  been 
more common1 yet it is only fair to     
allow every one to adopt his own        
method4    ,,ii4 ,i think1 then1 said   
,i1 ,o ,cato1 that those ancient pupils 
of ,plato1  ,speusippus1 ,aristotle and 
,xenocrates1 and afterwards their       
pupils1 ,polemo  and ,theophrastus1 had 
a system laid down with sufficient      

richness and  eloquence of language2 so 
that ,zeno had no reason1 after having  
been a  pupil of ,polemo1 for deserting 
him and his predecessors who had        
established this school4 ,and in this   
school ,i should like you to observe    
what you think ought to be changed1 and 
not to wait while ,i am replying to     
everything which has been said by you4  
,for ,i think that ,i must contend  with
 the whole of their system1 against the 
whole of yours4    ,and as these men    
said that we are born with the view of  
being generally  well adapted to those  
virtues which are well known and        
conspicuous1 ,i mean  justice and       
temperance1 and others of the same kind1
 all which resemble  the other arts1 and
 differ only for the better in their    
subject matter and  way of              
handling2--and as they saw that we      
desired those very virtues in a         
somewhat magnificent and ardent spirit2 
and that we had also a certain          
instruction1 or1 ,i should rather say1  

innate desire of knowledge2 and that  we
 were born for companionship with men1  
and for society and communion  with the 
human race1 and that these qualities are
 most conspicuous in the  greatest      
geniuses2--they divided all philosophy  
into three parts2 and we  see that this 
same division was retained by ,zeno3 and
 as one of these  parts is that by which
 the manners are thought to be formed1  
,i postpone  the consideration of that  
part1 which is1 as it were1 the         
foundation of  this question4 ,for what 
is the chief good ,i will discuss       
presently2 but at  this moment ,i only  
say that that topic which ,i think we   
shall be right in  calling the civil    
one1 and which the ,greeks call 1 has   
been  treated of in a dignified and     
copious manner by the ancient           
,peripatetics  and ,academicians who1   
agreeing in parts1 differed from one    
another only in  words4    ,,iii4 ,how  
many books have these men written on the
 republic6 how many on  laws6 ,how many 

precepts in art1 and1 more than that1   
how many instances of  good speaking in 
orations have they bequeathed to us6    
,for1 in the first  place1 they said    
with the greatest degree of polish and  
fitness those very  things which were to
 be argued in a subtle manner1 laying   
down both  definitions and divisions3 as
 your friends have also done3 but you   
have  done it in a more shabby manner2  
while you see how brilliant their       
language is4 ,in the second place1 with 
what splendid language have they        
adorned that part of the subject which  
required ornate and impressive          
eloquence6 how gloriously have they     
illustrated it6 discussing justice1  and
 fortitude1 and friendship1 and the     
method of passing life1 and  philosophy1
 and the government of the state1 and   
temperance1 not like men  picking out   
thorns1 like the ,stoics1 or laying bare
 the bones1 but like  men who knew how  
to handle great subjects elegantly1 and 
lesser ones  clearly4 ,what1 therefore1 

are their consolations8 ,what are their 
exhortations8 ,what also are their      
warnings and advice written to the most 
eminent men8 ,for their practice in     
speaking was1 like the nature of the    
things themselves1 of a two-fold        
character4 ,for whatever is made a      
question of1 contains a controversy     
either as to the genus itself1 without  
reference to persons or times2 or else1 
with these additions1 a dispute as  to  
the fact1 or the right1 or the name4    
,and therefore1 they exercised          
themselves in both kinds2 and that      
discipline it was which produced that   
great copiousness of eloquence among    
them in both kinds of argumentation4    
,now ,zeno1 and those who imitated him1 
were either unable to do much in  this  
kind of argument1 or else were          
unwilling1 or at all events they did    
not do it4 ,although ,cleanthes wrote a 
treatise on the art of rhetoric1 and  so
 too did ,chrysippus1 but still in such 
a manner1 that if any one were to  wish 

to be silent1 he ought to read nothing  
else4 ,therefore you see how  they      
speak4 ,they invent new words--they     
abandon old established terms4    ,but  
what great attempts do they make8 ,they 
say that this universal world  is our   
town2 accordingly1 this excites those   
who hear such a statement4  ,you see1   
now1 how great a business you are       
undertaking2 to make a man who  lives at
 ,circeii believe that this universal   
world is merely a town for  himself to  
live in4 ,what will be the end of this8 
,shall he set fire to it8  ,he will     
rather extinguish it1 if he has received
 it on fire4 ,the next  thing said is   
that list of titles which you briefly   
enumerated1--king1  dictator1 rich man1 
the only wise man2 words poured out by  
you decorously  and roundly3 they well  
might be1 for you have learnt them from 
the  orators4 ,but how vague and        
unsubstantial are those speeches about  
the  power of virtue6 which they make   
out to be so great that it can1 by      

itself1 secure the happiness of man4    
,they prick us with narrow little bits  
of questions as with pins2 and those who
 assent to them are not at all  changed 
in their minds1 and go away the same as 
they came3 for matters  which are       
perhaps true1 and which certainly are   
important1 are not handled  as they     
ought to be1 but in a more minute and   
petty manner4    ,,iv4 ,the next thing  
is the principle of arguing1 and the    
knowledge of  nature4 ,for we will      
examine the chief good presently1 as ,i 
said before1  and apply the whole       
discussion to the explanation of it4    
,there was1 then1  in those two parts   
nothing which ,zeno wished to alter4    
,for the whole  thing1 in both its      
divisions1 is in an excellent state2 for
 what has been  omitted by the ancients 
in that kind of argument which is of    
influence in  discussion8 ,for they have
 both given many definitions1 and have  
bequeathed  to us titles for defining2  
and that important addition to          

definition1 ,i  mean the dividing of the
 subject into parts1 is both done by    
them1 and  they have also left us rules 
to enable us to do so too2 and ,i may   
say the  same of contraries2 from which 
they came to genera1 and to the forms of
  genera4 ,now1 they make those things  
which they call evident1 the beginning  
of an argument concluded by reason3 then
 they follow an orderly  arrangement2   
and the conclusion at last shows what is
 true in the separate  propositions4    
,but what a great variety of arguments1 
which lead to  conclusions according to 
reason1 do they give us1 and how        
dissimilar are  they to captious        
questions6 ,what shall we say of their  
denouncing1 as it  were1 in many places1
 that we ought neither entirely to trust
 our senses  when unsupported by reason1
 nor reason when unsupported by our     
senses2 but  that1 at the same time1 we 
ought to keep the line between the two  
clearly  marked8 ,what shall ,i say     
more8 ,were not all the precepts which  

the  dialecticians now deliver and      
teach1 originally discovered and        
established  by them8 ,and although they
 were very much elaborated by           
,chrysippus1 still  they were much less 
practised by ,zeno than by the ancients4
 ,and there were  several things in     
which he did not improve on the         
ancients2 and some which  he never      
touched at all4 ,and as there are two   
arts by which reason and  oratory are   
brought to complete perfection1 one that
 of discovering1 the  other that of     
arguing1--both the ,stoics and          
,peripatetics have handed us  down this 
latter1 but the ,peripatetics alone have
 given us rules for the  former1 while  
the ,stoics have altogether avoided it4 
,for the men of your  school never even 
suspected the places from which         
arguments might be drawn  as out of     
magazines2 but the ,peripatetics taught 
a regular system and  method4    ,and   
the consequence is1 that it is not      
necessary for one now to be always      

repeating a sort of dictated lesson on  
the same subject1 or to be afraid  to go
 beyond one's note-books3 for he who    
knows where everything is  placed1 and  
how he can arrive at it1 even if        
anything be completely  buried1 will be 
able to dig it up1 and will always have 
his wits about him  in every discussion4
 ,and although men who are endowed with 
great  abilities1 attain to a certain   
copiousness of eloquence without any    
definite principles of oratory1 still   
art is a surer guide than nature4  ,for 
it is one thing to pour out words after 
the fashion of poets1 and  another to   
distinguish on settled principles and   
rules all that you say4    ,v4 ,similar 
things may be said about the explanation
 of natural philosophy1  which both the 
,peripatetics and ,stoics apply         
themselves to2 and that not  on two     
accounts only1 as ,epicurus thinks1     
namely1 to get rid of the fears  of     
death and of religion2 but besides this1
 the knowledge of heavenly  things      

imparts some degree of modesty to those 
who see what great  moderation and what 
admirable order there is likewise among 
the gods3 it  inspires them also with   
magnanimity when they contemplate the   
arts and  works of the gods2 and        
justice1 too1 when they come to know how
 great is  the power and wisdom1 and    
what the will is also1 of the supreme   
ruler and  master of the world1 whose   
reason1 in accordance with nature1 is   
called by  philosophers the true and    
supreme law4 ,there is in the same study
 of  nature1 an insatiable kind of      
pleasure derived from the knowledge of  
things2 the only pleasure in which1 when
 all our necessary actions are          
performed1 and when we are free from    
business1 we can live honourably1 and   
as becomes free men4 ,therefore1 in the 
whole of this ratiocination on  subjects
 of the very highest importance1 the    
,stoics have for the most part  followed
 the ,peripatetics2 so far at all events
 as to admit that there are  gods1 and  

to assert that everything consists of   
one of four elements4 ,but  when an     
exceedingly difficult question was      
proposed1 namely1 whether there  did not
 seem to be a sort of fifth nature from 
which reason and  intelligence sprang2  
7in which question another was involved 
respecting  the mind1 as to what class  
that belonged to27 ,zeno said that it   
was fire2  and then he said a few more  
things--very few1 in a novel manner2 but
  concerning the most important point of
 all1 he spoke in the same way1         
asserting that the universal world1 and 
all its most important parts1 were      
regulated by the divine intellect and   
nature of the gods4 ,but as for the     
matter and richness of facts1 we shall  
find the ,stoics very poorly off1  but  
the ,peripatetics very rich4    ,what   
numbers of facts have been investigated 
and accumulated by them with  respect to
 the genus1 and birth1 and limbs1 and   
age of all kinds of  animals6 and in    
like manner with respect to those things

 which are  produced out of the earth6  
,how many causes have they developed1   
and in  what numerous cases1 why        
everything is done1 and what numerous   
demonstrations have they laid open how  
everything is done6 ,and from this      
copiousness of theirs most abundant and 
undeniable arguments are derived  for   
the explanation of the nature of        
everything4 ,therefore1 as far as ,i    
understand1 there is no necessity at all
 for any change of name4 ,for it  does  
not follow that1 though he may have     
differed from the ,peripatetics in  some
 points1 he did not arise out of them4  
,and ,i1 indeed1 consider  ,epicurus1 as
 far as his natural philosophy is       
concerned1 as only another  ,democritus3
 he alters very few of his doctrines2   
and ,i should think him so  even if he  
had changed more3 but in numerous       
instances1 and certainly on  all the    
most important points1 he coincides with
 him exactly4 ,and though  the men of   
your school do this1 they do not show   

sufficient gratitude to  the original   
discoverers4    ,,vi4 ,but enough of    
this4 ,let us now1 ,i beg1 consider the 
chief good1 which  contains all         
philosophy1 and see whether ,zeno has   
brought forward any  reason for         
dissenting from the original discoverers
 and parents of it1 as  ,i may call     
them4 ,while speaking1 then1 on this    
topic--although1 ,cato1 this  summit of 
goods1 which contains all philosophy1   
has been carefully  explained by you1   
and though you have told us what is     
considered so by the  ,stoics1 and in   
what sense it is called so--yet ,i also 
will give my  explanation1 in order that
 we may see clearly1 if we can1 what new
  doctrine has been introduced into the 
question by ,zeno4 ,for as preceding    
philosophers1 and ,polemo most          
explicitly of all1 had said that the    
chief  good was to live according to    
nature1 the ,stoics say that three      
things are  signified by these words3   
one1 that a man should live exercising a

  knowledge of those things which happen
 by nature2 and they say that this  is  
the chief good of ,zeno1 who declares1  
as has been said by you1 that it        
consists in living in a manner suitable 
to nature3 the second meaning is  much  
the same as if it were said that a man  
ought to live attending to  all1 or     
nearly all1 the natural and intermediate
 duties4 ,but this1 when  explained in  
this manner1 is different from the      
former4 ,for the former is  right1 which
 you called 1 and it happens to the wise
 man alone2  but this is only a duty    
which is begun and not perfected1 and   
this may  happen to some who are far    
from being wise3 the third is that a man
 should  live1 enjoying all things1 or  
at least all the most important things  
which  are according to nature2 but this
 does not always depend on ourselves1   
for  it is perfected both out of that   
kind of life which is bounded by virtue1
  and out of those things which are     
according to nature1 and which are not  

in our own power4    ,but this chief    
good1 which is understood in the third  
signification of the  definition1 and   
that life which is passed in conformity 
with that good1  can happen to the wise 
man alone1 because virtue is connected  
with it4 ,and  that summit of good1 as  
we see it expressed by the ,stoics      
themselves1 was  laid down by           
,xenocrates and by ,aristotle2 and so   
that first arrangement of  the          
principles of nature1 with which you    
also began1 is explained by them  in    
almost these very words4    ,,vii4 ,all 
nature desires to be a preserver of     
itself1 in order that it may  be both   
safe itself1 and that it may be         
preserved in its kind4 ,they say  that  
for this end arts have been invented to 
assist nature1 among which  that is     
accounted one of the most important     
which is the art of living so  as to    
defend what has been given by nature1   
and to acquire what is  wanting2 and1 at
 the same time1 they have divided the   

nature of man into  mind and body4 ,and1
 as they said that each of these things 
was desirable  for its own sake1 so also
 they said that the virtues of each of  
them were  desirable for their own sake4
 ,but when they extolled the mind with  
boundless praises1 and preferred it to  
the body1 they at the same time         
preferred the virtues of the mind to the
 goods of the body4    ,but1 as they    
asserted that wisdom was the guardian   
and regulator of the  entire man1 being 
the companion and assistant of nature1  
they said that  the especial office of  
wisdom was to defend the being who      
consisted of  mind and body1--to assist 
him and support him in each particular4 
,and so1  the matter being first laid   
down simply1 pursuing the rest of the   
argument  with more subtlety1 they      
thought that the goods of the body      
admitted of an  easy explanation1 but   
they inquired more accurately into those
 of the  mind4 ,and1 first of all1 they 
found out that they contained the seeds 

of  justice2 and they were the first of 
all philosophers to teach that the      
principle that those which were the     
offspring should be beloved by their    
parents1 was implanted in all animals by
 nature2 and they said1 also1 that  that
 which precedes the birth of offspring1 
in point of time1--namely1 the  marriage
 of men and women1--was a bond of union 
suggested by nature1 and  that this was 
the root from which the friendships     
between relations  sprang4 ,and1        
beginning with these first principles1  
they proceeded to  investigate the      
origin and progress of all the virtues2 
by which course a  great magnanimity was
 engendered1 enabling them easily to    
resist and  withstand fortune1 because  
the most important events were in the   
power of  the wise man2 and a life      
conducted according to the precepts of  
the  ancient philosophers was easily    
superior to all the changes and injuries
  of fortune4    ,but when these        
foundations had been laid by nature1    

certain great  increases of good were   
produced1--some arising from the        
contemplation of  more secret things1   
because there is a love of knowledge    
innate in the  mind1 in which also the  
fondness for explaining principles and  
for  discussing them originates2 and    
because man is the only animal which has
  any share of shame or modesty2 and    
because he also covets union and        
society with other men1 and takes pains 
in everything which he does or  says1   
that he may do nothing which is not     
honourable and becoming2--these         
foundations being1 as ,i have said1     
implanted in us by nature like so many  
seeds1 temperance1 and modesty1 and     
justice1 and all virtue1 was brought  to
 complete perfection4    ,,viii4 ,you   
here1 ,o ,cato1 have a sketch of the    
philosophers of whom ,i am  speaking2   
and1 now that ,i have given you this1 ,i
 wish to know what reason  there is why 
,zeno departed from their established   
system2 and which of all  their         

doctrines it was that he disapproved of8
 ,did he object to their  calling all   
nature a preserver of itself8--or to    
their saying that every  animal was     
naturally fond of itself1 so as to wish 
to be safe and  uninjured in its        
kind8--or1 as the end of all arts is to 
arrive at what  nature especially       
requires1 did he think that the same    
principle ought to  be laid down with   
respect to the art of the entire        
life8--or1 since we  consist of mind and
 body1 did he think that these and their
 excellences  ought to be chosen for    
their own sakes8--or was he displeased  
with the  preeminence which is          
attributed by the ,peripatetics to the  
virtue of the  mind8--or did he object  
to what they said about prudence1 and   
the knowledge  of things1 and the union 
of the human race1 and temperance1 and  
modesty1  and magnanimity1 and          
honourableness in general8 ,the ,stoics 
must confess  that all these things were
 excellently explained by the others1   

and that  they gave no reason to ,zeno  
for deserting their school4 ,they must  
allege  some other excuse4    ,i suppose
 they will say that the errors of the   
ancients were very great1  and that he1 
being desirous of investigating the     
truth1 could by no means  endure them4  
,for what can be more perverse--what can
 be more intolerable1  or more stupid1  
than to place good health1 and freedom  
from all pain1 and  soundness of the    
eyes and the rest of the senses1 among  
the goods1 instead  of saying that there
 is no difference at all between them   
and their  contraries8 ,for that all    
those things which the ,peripatetics    
called goods1  were only things         
preferable1 not good4 ,and also that the
 ancients had been  very foolish when   
they said that these excellences of the 
body were  desirable for their own sake3
 they were to be accepted1 but not to be
  desired4 ,and the same might be said  
of all the other circumstances of  life1
 which consists of nothing but virtue   

alone1--that that life which is  rich   
also in the other things which are      
according to nature is not more to  be  
desired on that account1 but only more  
to be accepted2 and1 though  virtue     
itself makes life so happy that a man   
cannot be happier1 still  something is  
wanting to wise men1 even when they are 
most completely  happy2 and that they   
labour to repel pain1 disease1 and      
debility4    ,,ix4 ,oh1 what a splendid 
force is there in such genius1 and what 
an  excellent reason is this for setting
 up a new school6 ,go on2 for it will   
follow1--and1 indeed1 you have most     
learnedly adopted the principle1--that  
all folly1 and all injustice1 and all   
other vices are alike1 and that all     
errors are equal2 and that those who    
have made great progress1 through       
natural philosophy and learning1 towards
 virtue1 if they have not arrived  at   
absolute perfection in it1 are          
completely miserable1 and that there is 
no difference between their life and    

that of the most worthless of men1--as  
,plato1 that greatest of men1 if he was 
not thoroughly wise1 lived no  better1  
and in no respect more happily1 than the
 most worthless of men4  ,this is1      
forsooth1 the ,stoic correction and     
improvement of the old  philosophy2 but 
it can never find any entrance into the 
city1 or the  forum1 or the             
senate-house4 ,for who could endure to  
hear a man1 who  professed to be a      
teacher of how to pass life with dignity
 and wisdom1  speaking in such a        
manner--altering the names of things2   
and though he was  in reality of the    
same opinion as every one else1 still   
giving new names  to the things to which
 he attributed just the same force that 
others did1  without proposing the least
 alteration in the ideas to be          
entertained of  them8 ,would the        
advocate of a cause1 when summing up for
 a defendant1 deny  that exile or the   
confiscation of his client's property   
was an evil8--that  these things were to

 be rejected1 though not to be fled     
from8--or would he  say that a judge    
ought not to be merciful8    ,but if he 
were speaking in the public             
assembly1--if ,hannibal had arrived at  
the gates and had driven his javelin    
into the wall1 would he deny that it    
was an evil to be taken prisoner1 to be 
sold1 to be slain1 to lose one's        
country8 ,or could the senate1 when it  
was voting a triumph to ,africanus1     
have expressed itself1--,because by his 
virtue and good fortune 444 if there    
could not properly be said to be any    
virtue or any good fortune except in  a 
wise man8 ,what sort of a philosophy1   
then1 is that which speaks in the       
ordinary manner in the forum1 but in a  
peculiar style of its own in books8     
especially when1 as they intimate       
themselves in all they say1 no          
innovations are made by them in the     
facts1--none of the things themselves   
are changed1 but they remain exactly the
 same1 though in another manner4  ,for  

what difference does it make whether you
 call riches1 and power1 and  health    
goods1 or only things preferred1 as long
 as the man who calls them  goods       
attributes no more to them than you do  
who call them things  preferred8        
,therefore1 ,pantius--a noble and       
dignified man1 worthy of the  intimacy  
which he enjoyed with ,scipio and       
,llius--when he was writing to  ,quintus
 ,tubero on the subject of bearing pain1
 never once asserted1 what  ought to    
have been his main argument1 if it could
 have been proved1 that  pain was not an
 evil2 but he explained what it was1 and
 what its character  was1 and what      
amount of disagreeableness there was in 
it1 and what was the  proper method of  
enduring it2 and 7for he1 too1 was a    
,stoic7 all that  preposterous language 
of the school appears to me to be       
condemned by these  sentiments of his4  
,x4 ,but1 however1 to come1 ,o ,cato1   
more closely to what you have been      
saying1 let us treat this question more 

narrowly1 and compare what you  have    
just said with those assertions which ,i
 prefer to yours4 ,now1 those  arguments
 which you employ in common with the    
ancients1 we may make use of  as        
admitted4 ,but let us1 if you please1   
confine our discussion to those  which  
are disputed4 ,i do please1 said he3 ,i 
am very glad to have the  question      
argued with more subtlety1 and1 as you  
call it1 more closely2 for  what you    
have hitherto advanced are mere popular 
assertions1 but from you  ,i expect     
something more elegant4 ,from me8 said  
,i4 ,however1 ,i will try2  and1 if ,i  
cannot find arguments enough1 ,i will   
not be above having  recourse to those  
which you call popular4    ,but let me  
first lay down this position1 that we   
are so recommended to  ourselves by     
nature1 and that we have this principal 
desire implanted in  us by nature1 that 
our first wish is to preserve ourselves4
 ,this is  agreed4 ,it follows1 that we 
must take notice what we are1 that so we

 may  preserve ourselves in that        
character of which we ought to be4 ,we  
are1  therefore1 men3 we consist of mind
 and body1--which are things of a       
particular description1--and we ought1  
as our first natural desire  requires1  
to love these parts of ourselves1 and   
from them to establish  this summit of  
the chief and highest good1 which1 if   
our first principles  are true1 must be 
established in such a way as to acquire 
as many as  possible of those things    
which are in accordance with nature1 and
  especially all the most important of  
them4 ,this1 then1 is the chief good    
which they aimed at4 ,i have expressed  
it more diffusely1--they call it        
briefly1 living according to nature4    
,this is what appears to them to be  the
 chief good4    ,,xi4 ,come1 now let    
them teach us1 or rather do so yourself1
 7for who is  better able87 in what way 
you proceed from these principles1 and  
prove  that to live honourably 7for that
 is the meaning of living according to  

virtue1 or in a manner suitable to      
nature7 is the chief good2 and in what  
manner1 or in what place1 you on a      
sudden get rid of the body1 and leave   
all those things which1 as they are     
according to nature1 are out of our  own
 power2 and1 lastly1 how you get rid of 
duty itself4    ,i ask1 therefore1 how  
it is that all these recommendations1   
having  proceeded from nature1 are      
suddenly abandoned by wisdom8 ,but if it
 were  not the chief good of man that we
 were inquiring into1 but only that of  
some animal1 and if he were nothing     
except mind 7for we may make such a     
supposition as that1 in order more      
easily to discover the truth71 still    
this chief good of yours would not      
belong to that mind4 ,for it would wish 
for good health1 for freedom from pain2 
it would also desire the  preservation  
of itself1 and the guardianship of these
 qualities1 and it  would appoint as its
 own end to live according to nature1   
which is1 as ,i  have said1 to have     

those things which are according to     
nature1 either all  of them1 or most of 
them1 and all the most important ones4  
,for whatever  kind of animal you make  
him out1 it is necessary1 even though he
 be  incorporeal1 as we are supposing   
him1 still that there must be in the    
mind  something like those qualities    
which exist in the body2 so that the    
chief  good cannot possibly be defined  
in any other manner but that which ,i   
have  mentioned4    ,but ,chrysippus1   
when explaining the differences between 
living creatures1  says1 that some excel
 in their bodies1 others in their minds1
 some in  both4 ,and then he argues that
 there ought to be a separate chief good
 for  each description of creature4 ,but
 as he had placed man in such a class   
that he attributed to him excellence of 
mind1 he determined that his chief  good
 was not that he appeared to excel in   
mind1 but that he appeared to be        
nothing else but mind4    ,,xii4 ,but in
 one case the chief good might rightly  

be placed in virtue  alone1 if there    
were any animal which consisted wholly  
of mind2 and that1  too1 in such a      
manner that that mind had in itself     
nothing that was  according to nature1  
as health is4 ,but it cannot even be    
imagined what  kind of thing that is1 so
 as not to be inconsistent with itself4 
,but if he  says that some things are   
obscure1 and are not visible because    
they are  very small1 we also admit     
that2 as ,epicurus says of pleasure1    
that those  pleasures which are very    
small are often obscured and            
overwhelmed4 ,but  that kind has not so 
many advantages of body1 nor any which  
last so long1  or are so great4         
,therefore1 in those in which           
obscuration follows because  of their   
littleness1 it often happens that we    
confess that it makes no  difference to 
us whether they exist at all or not2    
just as when the sun is  out1 as you    
yourself said1 it is of no consequence  
to add the light of a  candle1 or to add

 a penny to the riches of ,crsus4 ,but  
in those matters in  which so great an  
obscuration does not take place1 it may 
still be the  case1 that the matter     
which makes a difference is of no great 
consequence4  ,as if1 when a man had    
lived ten years agreeably1 an additional
 month's  life of equal pleasantness    
were given to him1 it would be good1    
because  any addition has some power to 
produce what is agreeable2 but if that  
is  not admitted1 it does not follow    
that a happiness of life is at once put 
an end to4    ,but the goods of the body
 are more like this instance which ,i   
have just  mentioned4 ,for they admit of
 additions worthy of having pains taken 
about  them2 so that on this point the  
,stoics appear to me sometimes to be    
joking1 when they say that1 if a bottle 
or a comb were given as an  addition to 
a life which is being passed with       
virtue1 a wise man would  rather choose 
that life1 because these additions were 
given to it1 but yet  that he would not 

be happier on that account4 ,now1 is not
 this simile to  be upset by ridicule   
rather than by serious discourse8 ,for  
who would not  be deservedly ridiculed1 
if he were anxious whether he had       
another bottle  or not8 ,but if any one 
relieves a person from any affection of 
the limbs1  or from the pain of any     
disease1 he will receive great          
gratitude4 ,and if  that wise man of    
yours is put on the rack of torture by a
 tyrant1 he will  not display the same  
countenance as if he had lost his       
bottle2 but1 as  entering upon a serious
 and difficult contest1 seeing that he  
will have to  fight with a capital      
enemy1 namely1 pain1 he will summon up  
all his  principles of fortitude and    
patience1 by whose assistance he will   
proceed  to face that difficult and     
important battle1 as ,i have called it4 
,we will not inquire1 then1 what is     
obscured1 or what is destroyed1 because 
it is something very small2 but what is 
of such a character as to complete  the 

whole sum of happiness4 ,one pleasure   
out of many may be obscured in  that    
life of pleasure2 but still1 however    
small an one it may be1 it is a  part of
 that life which consists wholly of     
pleasure4 ,one coin is lost of  the     
riches of ,crsus1 still it is a part of 
his riches4 ,wherefore those  things1   
too1 which we say are according to      
nature1 may be obscured in a  happy     
life1 still they must be parts of the   
happy life4    ,,xiii4 ,but if1 as we   
ought to agree1 there is a certain      
natural desire  which longs for those   
things which are according to nature1   
then1 when  taken altogether1 they must 
be considerable in amount4 ,and if this 
point  is established1 then we may be   
allowed to inquire about those things at
  our leisure1 and to investigate the   
greatness of them1 and their            
excellence1 and to examine what         
influence each has on living happily1   
and  also to consider the very          
obscurations themselves1 which1 on      

account of  their smallness1 are        
scarcely ever1 or ,i may say never1     
visible4    ,what should ,i say about   
that as to which there is no dispute8   
,for there is  no one who denies that   
that which is the standard to which     
everything is  referred resembles every 
nature1 and that is the chief thing     
which is to  be desired4 ,for every     
nature is attached to itself4 ,for what 
nature is  there which ever deserts     
itself1 or any portion of itself1 or any
 one of  its parts or faculties1 or1 in 
short1 any one of those things1 or      
motions1  or states which are in        
accordance with nature8 ,and what nature
 has ever  been forgetful of its        
original purpose and establishment8     
,there has never  been one which does   
not observe this law from first to last4
 ,how1 then1  does it happen that the   
nature of man is the only one which ever
 abandons  man1 which forgets the body1 
which places the chief good1 not in the 
whole  man1 but in a part of man8 ,and  

how1 as they themselves admit1 and as is
  agreed upon by all1 will it be        
preserved1 so that that ultimate good of
  nature1 which is the subject of our   
inquiry1 shall resemble every nature8   
,for it would resemble them1 if in other
 natures also there were some  ultimate 
point of excellence4 ,for then that     
would seem to be the chief  good of the 
,stoics4 ,why1 then1 do you hesitate to 
alter the principles of  nature8 ,for   
why do you say that every animal1 the   
moment that it is born1  is prone to    
feel love for itself1 and is occupied in
 its own preservation8  ,why do you not 
rather say that every animal is inclined
 to that which is  most excellent in    
itself1 and is occupied in the          
guardianship of that one  thing1 and    
that the other natures do nothing else  
but preserve that  quality which is the 
best in each of them8 ,but how can it be
 the best1 if  there is nothing at all  
good besides8 ,but if the other things  
are to be  desired1 why1 then1 is not   

that which is the chief of all desirable
 things  inferred from the desire of all
 those things1 or of the most numerous  
and  important of them8 as ,phidias can 
either begin a statue from the          
beginning1 and finish it1 or he can take
 one which has been begun by  another1  
and complete that4    ,now wisdom is    
like this3 for wisdom is not herself the
 parent of man1 but  she has received   
him after he has been commenced by      
nature4 ,and without  regard to her1 she
 ought to complete that work of her's1  
as an artist  would complete a statue4  
,what kind of man1 then1 is it that     
nature has  commenced8 and what is the  
office and task of wisdom8 ,what is it  
that  ought to be finished and completed
 by her8 ,if there is nothing to be made
  further in man1 except some kind of   
motion of the mind1 that is to say1     
reason1 then it follows1 that the       
ultimate object is to mould the life    
according to virtue4 ,for the perfection
 of reason is virtue4 ,if there is      

nothing but body1 then the chief goods  
must be good health1 freedom from  pain1
 beauty1 and so on4 ,the question at    
this moment is about the chief  good of 
man4    ,,xiv4 ,why do we hesitate1     
then1 to inquire as to his whole nature1
 what has  been done8 ,for as it is     
agreed by all1 that the whole duty and  
office of  wisdom is to be occupied     
about the cultivation of man1 some 7that
 you may  not think that ,i am arguing  
against none but the ,stoics7 bring     
forward  opinions in which they place   
the chief good among things of a kind   
which  are wholly out of our own power1 
just as if they were speaking of one of 
the brute beasts2 others1 on the        
contrary1 as if man had no body at all1 
so entirely exclude everything from     
their consideration except the mind1    
7and this1 too1 while the mind itself1  
in their philosophy1 is not some        
unintelligible kind of vacuum1 but      
something which exists in some          
particular species of body17 that even  

that is not content with virtue  alone1 
but requires freedom from pain4 ,so that
 both these classes do the  same thing1 
as if they neglected the left side of a 
man1 and took care  only of the right2  
or as if they 7as ,herillus did7        
attended only to the  knowledge of the  
mind itself1 and passed over all action4
 ,for it is but a  crippled system which
 all those men set up who pass over many
 things1 and  select some one in        
particular to adhere to4 ,but that is a 
perfect and full  system which those    
adopt who1 while inquiring about the    
chief good of man1  pass over in their  
inquiry no part either of his mind or   
body1 so as to  leave it unprotected4   
,but your school1 ,o ,cato1 because     
virtue holds1 as we  all admit1 the     
highest and most excellent place in man1
 and because we  think those who are    
wise men1 perfect and admirable men1    
seeks entirely to  dazzle the eyes of   
our minds with the splendour of virtue4 
,for in every  living creature there is 

some one principal and most excellent   
thing1 as1  for instance1 in horses and 
dogs2 but those must be free from pain  
and in  good health4 ,therefore1 you do 
not seem to me to pay sufficient        
attention  to what the general path and 
progress of nature is4 ,for it does not 
pursue  the same course in man that it  
does in corn1 7which1 when it has       
advanced  it from the blade to the ear1 
it leaves and considers the stubble as  
nothing17 and leave him as soon as it   
has conducted him to a state of  reason4
 ,for it is always taking something     
additional1 without ever  abandoning    
what it has previously given4           
,therefore1 it has added reason to  the 
senses2 and when it has perfected his   
reason1 it still does not  abandon the  
senses4    ,as if the culture of the    
vine1 the object of which is to cause   
the vine1  with all its parts1 to be in 
the best possible condition1 7however   
that is  what we understand it to be1   
for one may1 as you often do yourselves1

  suppose anything for the purpose of   
illustration17 if1 then1 that culture   
of the vine be in the vine itself1 it   
would1 ,i presume1 desire everything    
else which concerns the cultivation of  
the vine1 to be as it has been  before4 
,but it would prefer itself to every    
separate part of the vine1 and  it would
 feel sure that nothing in the vine was 
better than itself4 ,in  like manner    
sense1 when it has been added to nature1
 protects it indeed1  but it also       
protects itself4 ,but when reason is    
also added1 then it is  placed in a     
position of such predominant power1 that
 all those first  principles of nature  
are put under its guardianship4         
,therefore it does not  abandon the care
 of those things over which it is so    
set1 that its duty is  to regulate the  
entire life3 so that we cannot          
sufficiently marvel at  their           
inconsistency4 ,for they assert that the
 natural appetite1 which they  call 1   
and also duty1 and even virtue herself1 

are all protectors of  those things     
which are according to nature4 ,but when
 they wish to arrive  at the chief good1
 they overleap everything1 and leave us 
two tasks  instead of one--namely1 to   
choose some things and desire others1   
instead of  including both under one    
head4    ,,xv4 ,but now you say that    
virtue cannot properly be established1  
if those  things which are external to  
virtue have any influence on living     
happily4  ,but the exact contrary is the
 case4 ,for virtue cannot possibly be   
introduced1 unless everything which it  
chooses and which it neglects is  all   
referred to one general end4 ,for if we 
entirely neglect ourselves1 we  then    
fall into the vices and errors of       
,ariston1 and shall forget the          
principles which we have attributed to  
virtue itself4 ,but if we do not        
neglect those things1 and yet do not    
refer them to the chief good1 we  shall 
not be very far removed from the        
trivialities of ,herillus4 ,for we      

shall have to adopt two different plans 
of conduct in life3 for he makes  out   
that there are two chief goods          
unconnected with each other2 but if     
they were real goods1 they ought to be  
united2 but at present they are         
separated1 so that they never can be    
united4 ,but nothing can be more        
perverse than this4 ,therefore1 the fact
 is exactly contrary to your  assertion3
 for virtue cannot possibly be          
established firmly1 unless it  maintains
 those things which are the principles  
of nature as having an  influence on the
 object4 ,for we have been looking for a
 virtue which  should preserve nature1  
not for one which should abandon it4    
,but that of  yours1 as you represent   
it1 preserves only one part1 and        
abandons the  rest4    ,and1 indeed1 if 
the custom of man could speak1 this     
would be its language4  ,that its first 
beginnings were1 as it were1 beginnings 
of desire that it  might preserve itself
 in that nature in which it had been    

born4 ,for it had  not yet been         
sufficiently explained what nature      
desired above all things4  ,let it      
therefore be explained4 ,what else then 
will be understood but that  no part of 
nature is to be neglected8 ,and if there
 is nothing in it  besides reason1 then 
the chief good must be in virtue alone4 
,but if there  is also body1 then will  
that explanation of nature have caused  
us to  abandon the belief which we held 
before the explanation4 ,is it1 then1   
being in a manner suitable to nature to 
abandon nature8 ,as some  philosophers  
do1 when having begun with the senses   
they have seen  something more important
 and divine1 and then abandoned the     
senses2 so1  too1 these men1 when they  
had beheld the beauty of virtue         
developed in its  desire for particular 
things1 abandoned everything which they 
had seen for  the sake of virtue        
herself1 forgetting that the whole      
nature of desirable  things was so      
extensive that it remained from         

beginning to end2 and they  do not      
understand that they are taking away the
 very foundations of these  beautiful   
and admirable things4    ,,xvi4         
,therefore1 all those men appear to me  
to have made a blunder who have         
pronounced the chief good to be to live 
honourably4 ,but some have erred  more  
than others1--,pyrrho above all1 who1   
having fixed on virtue as the  chief    
good1 refuses to allow that there is    
anything else in the world  deserving of
 being desired2 and1 next to him1       
,aristo1 who did not1 indeed1  venture  
to leave nothing else to be desired1 but
 who introduced influence1  by which a  
wise man might be excited1 and desire   
whatever occurred to his  mind1 and     
whatever even appeared so to occur4 ,he 
was more right than  ,pyrrho1 inasmuch  
as he left man some kind of desire2 but 
worse than the  rest1 inasmuch as he    
departed wholly from nature3 but the    
,stoics1 because  they place the chief  
good in virtue alone1 resemble these    

men3 but  inasmuch as they seek for a   
principle of duty1 they are superior to 
,pyrrho2 and as they do not admit the   
desire of those objects which offer     
themselves to the imagination1 they are 
more correct than ,aristo2 but1         
inasmuch as they do not add the things  
which they admit to be adopted by       
nature1 and to be worthy of being chosen
 for their own sakes1 to the chief      
good1 they here desert nature1 and are  
in some degree not different from       
,aristo3 for he invented some strange   
kinds of occurrences2 but these men     
recognise1 indeed1 the principles of    
nature1 but still they disconnect  them 
from the perfect and chief good2 and    
when they put them forward1 so  that    
there may be some selection of things1  
they appear to follow nature2  but when 
they deny that they have any influence  
in making life happy1 they  again       
abandon nature4    ,and hitherto ,i have
 been showing how destitute ,zeno was of
 any good reason  for abandoning the    

authority of previous philosophers3 now 
let us consider  the rest of his        
arguments2 unless1 indeed1 ,o ,cato1 you
 wish to make any  reply to what ,i have
 been saying1 or unless we are getting  
tedious4  ,neither1 said he2 for ,i wish
 this side of the question to be        
completely  argued by you2 nor does your
 discourse seem to me to be at all      
tedious4 ,i  am glad to hear it1 ,i     
replied2 for what can be more desirable 
for me than  to discuss the subject of  
virtue with ,cato1 who is the most      
virtuous of  men in every point8 ,but1  
first of all1 remark that that imposing 
sentiment  of yours1 which brings a     
whole family after it1 namely1 that what
 is  honourable is the only good1 and   
that to live honourably is the chief    
good1 will be shared in common with you 
by all who define the chief good  as    
consisting in virtue alone2 and1 as to  
what you say1 that virtue cannot  be    
formed if anything except what is       
honourable is included in the  account1 

the same statement will be made by those
 whom ,i have just named4  ,but it      
appeared to me to be fairer1 advancing  
from one common beginning1  to see where
 ,zeno1 while disputing with ,polemo1   
from whom he had learnt  what the       
principles of nature were1 first took   
his stand1 and what the  original cause 
of the controversy was2 and not to stand
 on their side1 who  did not even allow 
that their own chief good was derived   
from nature1 and  to employ the same    
arguments which they did1 and to        
maintain the same  sentiments4          
,,xvii4 ,but ,i am very far from        
approving this conduct of yours1 that   
when  you have proved1 as you imagine1  
that that alone is good which is        
honourable1 then say again that it is   
necessary that beginnings should be  put
 forward which are suitable and adapted 
to nature2 by a selection from  which   
virtue might be called into existence4  
,for virtue ought not to have  been     
stated to consist in selection1 so that 

that very thing which was  itself the   
chief good1 was to acquire something    
besides itself2 for all  things which   
are to be taken1 or chosen1 or desired1 
ought to exist in the  chief good1 so   
that he who has attained that may want  
nothing more4 ,do you  not see how      
evident it is to those men whose chief  
good consists in  pleasure1 what they   
ought to do and what they ought not8 so 
that no one of  them doubts what all    
their duties ought to regard1 what they 
ought to  pursue1 or avoid4 ,let this1  
then1 be the chief good which is now    
defended  by me2 it will be evident in a
 moment what are the necessary duties   
and  actions4 ,but you1 who set before  
yourselves another end except what is   
right and honourable1 will not be able  
to find out where your principle of     
duty and action is to originate4        
,therefore you are all of you seeking   
for this1 and so are those who say  that
 they pursue whatever comes into their  
mind and occurs to them2 and  you return

 to nature4 ,but nature will fairly     
reply to you1 that it is not  true that 
the chief happiness of life is to be    
sought in another quarter1  but the     
principles of action in herself3 for    
that there is one system  only1 in which
 both the principles of action and the  
chief good too is  contained2 and that1 
as the opinion of ,aristo is exploded1  
when he says  that one thing does not   
differ from another1 and that there is  
nothing  except virtue and vice in which
 there was any difference whatever2 so1 
too1 ,zeno was in the wrong1 who        
affirmed that there was no influence in 
anything1 except virtue or vice1 of the 
very least power to assist in the       
attainment of the chief good3 and as    
that had no influence on making life    
happy1 but only in creating a desire for
 things1 he said that there was  some   
power of attraction in them3 just as if 
this desire had no reference  to the    
acquisition of the chief good4 ,but what
 can be less consistent than  what they 

say1 namely1 that when they have        
obtained the knowledge of the  chief    
good they then return to nature1 in     
order to seek in it the  principle of   
action1 that is to say1 of duty8 ,for it
 is not the principle  of action or duty
 which impels them to desire those      
things which are  according to nature2  
but desire and action are both set in   
motion by those  things4    ,,xviii4    
,now ,i come to those brief statements  
of yours which you call  conclusions2   
and first of all to that--than which1   
certainly1 nothing can  be more         
brief--that everything good is          
praiseworthy2 but everything            
praiseworthy is honourable2 therefore   
everything good is honourable4 ,oh1     
what a leaden dagger6--for who will     
grant you your first premises8 ,and if  
it should be granted to you1 then you   
have no need of the second3 for if      
everything good is praiseworthy1 so is  
everything honourable2 who1 then1  will 
grant you this1 except ,pyrrho1 ,aristo1

 and men like them8--whom you do  not   
approve of4 ,aristotle1 ,xenocrates1 and
 all that school1 will not grant  it2   
inasmuch as they call health1 strength1 
riches1 glory1 and many other  things   
good1 but not praiseworthy2 and they    
therefore do not think that  the chief  
good is contained in virtue alone1      
though still they do prefer  virtue to  
everything else4 ,what do you think that
 those men will do who  have utterly    
separated virtue from the chief good1   
,epicurus1 ,hieronymus1  and those too1 
if indeed there are any such1 who wish  
to defend the  definition of the chief  
good given by ,carneades8 ,and how will 
,callipho and  ,diodorus be able to     
grant you what you ask1 men who join to 
honourableness  something else which is 
not of the same genus8--,do you1 then1  
think it  proper1 ,cato1 after you have 
assumed premises which no one will grant
 to  you1 to derive whatever conclusion 
you please from them8 ,take this        
sorites1 than which you think nothing   

can be more faulty3 8,that which is     
good is desirable2 that which is        
desirable ought to be sought for2 that  
which ought to be sought for is         
praiseworthy10 and so on through all the
  steps4 ,but ,i will stop here1 for in 
the same manner no one will grant to    
you that whatever ought to be sought is 
therefore praiseworthy2 and that  other 
argument of theirs is far from a        
legitimate conclusion1 but a most       
stupid assertion1 8that a happy life is 
one worthy of being boasted of40  ,for  
it can never happen that a person may   
reasonably boast1 without  something    
honourable in the circumstances4 ,polemo
 will grant this to ,zeno2  and so will 
his master1 and the whole of that       
school1 and all the rest  who1          
preferring virtue by far to everything  
else1 still add something  besides to it
 in their definition of the chief good4 
,for1 if virtue be a  thing worthy of   
being boasted of1 as it is1 and if it is
 so far superior  to all other things   

that it can scarcely be expressed how   
much better it  is2 then a man may1     
possibly1 be happy if endowed with      
virtue alone1 and  destitute of         
everything else2 and yet he will never  
grant to you that  nothing whatever is  
to be classed among goods1 except       
virtue4    ,but those men whose chief   
good has no virtue in it1 will perhaps  
not grant  to you that a happy life has 
anything in it of which a man can       
rightly  boast1 although they also1 at  
times1 represent virtues as subjects for
  boasting4 ,you see1 therefore1 that   
you are either assuming propositions    
which are not admitted1 or else such as1
 even if they are granted1 will do  you 
no good4    ,,xix4 ,in truth1 in all    
these conclusions1 ,i should think this 
worthy both  of philosophy and of       
ourselves1--and that1 too1 most         
especially so when we  were inquiring   
into the chief good1--that our lives1   
and designs1 and  wishes should be      
corrected1 and not our expressions4 ,for

 who1 when he has  heard those brief and
 acute arguments of yours which1 as you 
say1 give you  so much pleasure1 can    
ever have his opinion changed by them8  
,for when men  fix their attention on   
them1 and wish to hear why pain is not  
an evil1  they tell him that to be in   
pain is a bitter1 annoying1 odious1     
unnatural  condition1 and one difficult 
to be borne2 but1 because there is in   
pain no  fraud1 or dishonesty1 or       
malice1 or fault1 or baseness1 therefore
 it is  not an evil4 ,now1 the man who  
hears this said1 even if he does not    
care to  laugh1 will still depart       
without being a bit more courageous as  
to bearing  pain than he was when he    
came4 ,but you affirm that no one can be
  courageous who thinks pain an evil4   
,why should he be more courageous if he 
thinks it--what you yourself admit it to
 be--bitter and scarcely endurable8     
,for timidity is generated by things1   
and not by words4 ,and you say1 that  if
 one letter is moved1 the whole system  

of the school will be undermined4  ,do  
,i seem1 then1 to you to be moving a    
letter1 or rather whole pages8 ,for     
although the order of things1 which is  
what you so especially extol1 may  be   
preserved among them1 and although      
everything may be well joined and       
connected together1 7for that is what   
you said17 still we ought not to  follow
 them too far1 if arguments1 having set 
out from false principles1  are         
consistent with themselves1 and do not  
wander from the end they  propose to    
themselves4    ,accordingly1 in his     
first establishment of his system1 your 
master1 ,zeno1  departed from nature2   
and as he had placed the chief good on  
that  superiority of disposition which  
we call virtue1 and had affirmed that   
there was nothing whatever good which   
was not honourable1 and that virtue     
could have no real existence if in other
 things there were things of which  one 
was better or worse than another2 having
 laid down these premises1 he  naturally

 maintained the conclusions4 ,you say   
truly2 for ,i cannot deny it4  ,but the 
conclusions which follow from his       
premises are so false that the  premises
 from which they are deduced cannot be  
true4 ,for the  dialecticians1 you know1
 teach us that if the conclusions which 
follow  from any premises are false1 the
 premises from which they follow cannot 
be  true4 ,and so that conclusion is not
 only true1 but so evident that even    
the dialecticians do not think it       
necessary that any reasons should be    
given for it--8,if that is the case1    
this is2 but this is not2 therefore     
that is not40 ,and so1 by denying your  
consequence1 your premise is            
contradicted4 ,what follows1            
then8--8,all who are not wise are       
equally  miserable2 all wise men are    
perfectly happy3 all actions done       
rightly are  equal to one another2 all  
offences are equal40 ,but1 though all   
these  propositions at first appear to  
be admirably laid down1 after a little  

consideration they are not so much      
approved of4 ,for every man's own       
senses1 and the nature of things1 and   
truth itself1 cried out1 after a        
fashion1 that they could never be       
induced to believe that there was no    
difference between those things which   
,zeno asserted to be equal4    ,,xx4    
,afterwards that little ,phnician of    
yours 7for you know that the  people of 
,citium1 your clients1 came from        
,phnicia71 a shrewd man1 as he  was not 
succeeding in his case1 since nature    
herself contradicted him1  began to     
withdraw his words2 and first of all he 
granted in favour of  those things which
 we consider good1 that they might be   
considered fit1  and useful1 and adapted
 to nature2 and he began to confess that
 it was  more advantageous for a        
wise--that is to say for a perfectly    
happy--man1 to  have those things which 
he does not venture indeed to call      
goods1 but yet  allows to be well       
adapted to nature4 ,and he denies that  

,plato1 if he were  not a wise man1     
would be in the same circumstances as   
the tyrant  ,dionysius2 for that to die 
was better for the one1 because he      
despaired of  attaining wisdom1 but to  
live was better for the other1 because  
of his  hope of doing so4 ,and he       
asserts that of offences some are       
tolerable1 and  some by no means so1    
because many men passed by some         
offences1 and there  are others which   
very few people pass by1 on account of  
the number of  duties violated4 ,again1 
he said that some men are so foolish as 
to be  utterly unable ever to arrive at 
wisdom2 but that there are others who1  
if  they had taken pains1 might have    
attained to it4 ,now1 in this he        
expressed  himself differently from any 
one else1 but he thought just the same  
as all  the rest4 ,nor did he think     
those things deserving of being valued  
less  which he himself denied to be     
goods1 than they did who considered them
 as  goods4 ,what1 then1 did he wish to 

effect by having altered these names8   
,at  least he would have taken something
 from their weight1 and would have      
valued them at rather less than the     
,peripatetics1 in order to appear to    
think in some respects differently from 
them1 and not merely to speak so4       
,what more need ,i say8 ,what do you say
 about the happy life to which          
everything is referred8 ,you affirm that
 it is not that life which is  filled   
with everything which nature requires2  
and you place it entirely in  virtue    
alone4 ,and as every controversy is     
usually either about a fact or a  name1 
both kinds of dispute arise if either   
the fact is not understood or  if a     
mistake is made as to the name2 and if  
neither of these is the case1  we must  
take care to use the most ordinary      
language possible1 and words as         
suitable as can be1--that is1 such as   
make the subject plain4 ,is it1 then1   
doubtful that if the former philosophers
 have not erred at all as to the  fact  

itself1 they certainly express          
themselves more conveniently8 ,let us1  
then1 examine their opinions1 and then  
return to the question of names4        
,,xxi4 ,they say that the desire of the 
mind is excited when anything appears   
to it to be according to nature2 and    
that all things which are according  to 
nature are worthy of some esteem2 and   
that they deserve to be esteemed  in    
proportion to the weight that there is  
in each of them3 and that of  those     
things which are according to nature1   
some have in themselves  nothing of that
 appetite of which we have already      
frequently spoken1 being  neither called
 honourable nor praiseworthy2 and some1 
again1 are  accompanied by pleasure in  
the case of every animal1 and in the    
case of  man also with reason4 ,and     
those of them which are suitable are    
honourable1  beautiful1 and             
praiseworthy2 but the others1 mentioned 
before1 are  natural1 and1 when combined
 with those which are honourable1 make  

up and  complete a perfectly happy life4
 ,but they say1 too1 that of all these  
advantages--to which those people do not
 attribute more importance who say  that
 they are goods1 than ,zeno does1 who   
denies it--by far the most  excellent is
 that which is honourable and           
praiseworthy2 but that if two           
honourable things are both set before   
one1 one accompanied with good  health  
and the other with sickness1 it is not  
doubtful to which of them  nature       
herself will conduct us3 but1           
nevertheless1 that the power of         
honourableness is so great1 and that it 
is so far better than1 and  superior to1
 everything else1 that it can never be  
moved by any  punishments or by any     
bribes from that which it has decided to
 be right2  and that everything which   
appears hard1 difficult1 or unfortunate1
 can be  dissipated by those virtues    
with which we have been adorned by      
nature2 not  because they are trivial or
 contemptible--or else where would be   

the merit  of the virtues8--but that we 
might infer from such an event1 that it 
was  not in them that the main question 
of living happily or unhappily          
depended4    ,in short1 the things which
 ,zeno has called estimable1 and worth  
choosing1  and suitable to nature1 they 
call goods2 but they call that a happy  
life  which consists of those things    
which ,i have mentioned1 or1 if not of  
all1  at least of the greatest number of
 them1 and of the most important4 ,but  
,zeno calls that the only good which has
 some peculiar beauty of its own to     
make it desirable2 and he calls that    
life alone happy which is passed with   
virtue4    ,,xxii4 ,if we are to discuss
 the reality of the case1 then there    
cannot  possibly1 ,cato1 be any         
disagreement between you and me3 for    
there is  nothing on which you and ,i   
have different opinions2 let us only    
compare  the real circumstances1 after  
changing the names4 ,nor1 indeed1 did he
 fail  to see this2 but he was delighted

 with the magnificence and splendour of 
the language3 and if he really felt what
 he said1 and what his words  intimate1 
then what would be the difference       
between him and ,pyrrho or  ,aristo8    
,but if he did not approve of them1 then
 what was his object in  differing in   
language with those men with whom he    
agreed in reality8    ,what would you do
 if these ,platonic philosophers1 and   
those1 too1 who were  their pupils1 were
 to come to life again1 and address you 
thus3--8,as1 ,o  ,marcus ,cato1 we heard
 that you were a man exceedingly devoted
 to  philosophy1 a most just citizen1 an
 excellent judge1 and a most            
conscientious witness1 we marvelled what
 the reason was why you preferred  the  
,stoics to us2 for they1 on the subject 
of good and evil things1  entertain     
those opinions which ,zeno learnt from  
,polemo2 and use those  names which1    
when they are first heard1 excite       
wonder1 but when they are  explained1   
move only ridicule4 ,but if you approved

 those doctrines so  much1 why did you  
not maintain them in their own proper   
language8 ,if  authority had influence  
with you1 how was it that you preferred 
some  stranger to all of us and to      
,plato himself8 especially while you    
were  desirous to be a chief man in the 
republic1 and might have been           
accomplished and equipped by us in a way
 to enable you to defend it to  your own
 great increase of dignity4 ,for the    
means to such an end have been          
investigated1 described1 marked down1   
and enjoined by us2 and we have  written
 detailed accounts of the government of 
all republics1 and their  descriptions1 
and constitutions1 and changes1--and    
even of the laws1 and  customs1 and     
manners of all states4 ,moreover1 how   
much eloquence1 which is  the greatest  
ornament to leading men1--in which1     
indeed1 we have heard that  you are very
 eminent1--might you have learnt1 in    
addition to that which is  natural to   
you1 from our records60 ,when they had  

said this1 what answer  could you have  
made to such men8 ,i would have         
entreated you1 said he1 who  had        
dictated their speech to them1 to speak 
likewise for me1 or else  rather to give
 me a little room to answer them myself1
 only that now ,i  prefer listening to  
you2 and yet at another time ,i should  
be likely to  reply to them at the same 
time that ,i answer you4    ,,xxiii4    
,but if you were to answer truly1 ,cato1
 you would be forced to say  this--,that
 you do not approve of those men1 men of
 great genius and great  authority as   
they are4 ,but that you have noticed    
that the things which1 by  reason of    
their antiquity they have failed to see1
 have been thoroughly  comprehended by  
the ,stoics1 and that these latter have 
discussed the same  matters with more   
acuteness1 and have also entertained    
more dignified and  courageous          
sentiments1 inasmuch as1 in the first   
place1 they deny that  good health is to
 be desired1 though they admit that it  

may be chosen2 not  because to be well  
is a good1 but because it is not to be  
utterly  disregarded1 and yet that it   
does not appear to them of more value   
that it  does to those who do not       
hesitate to call it a good4 ,and that   
you could  not endure that those        
ancients1 those bearded men 7as we are  
in the habit  of calling our own        
ancestors71 should believe that the life
 of that man  who lived honourably1 if  
he had also good health and a good      
reputation1  and was rich1 was more     
desirable1 better1 and more to be sought
 for1 than  that of him who was equally 
a good man in many respects1 like the   
,alcmon  of ,ennius--                   
,surrounded by disease1 and exile sad1  
,and cruel want4      ,those ancients1  
then1 must have been far from clever1 to
 think that life  more desirable1       
better1 and happier4 ,but the ,stoics   
think it only to be  preferred if one   
has a choice2 not because this life is  
happier1 but  because it is better      

adapted to nature2 and they think that  
all who are  not wise are equally       
miserable4 ,the ,stoics1 forsooth1      
thought this2 but it  had entirely      
escaped the perception of those         
philosophers who preceded  them1 for    
they thought that men stained with all  
sorts of parricide and  wickedness were 
not at all more miserable than those    
who1 though they  lived purely and      
uprightly1 had not yet attained complete
 wisdom4    ,and while on this topic1   
you brought forth those similes which   
they are in  the habit of employing1    
which are1 in truth1 no similes at all4 
,for who is  ignorant that1 if many men 
should choose to emerge from the deep1  
those  would be nearer breathing who    
came close to the surface1 but still    
would  not be actually able to breathe  
any more than those who are at the      
bottom8  ,therefore1 on your principles1
 it is of no avail to make progress and 
advancement in virtue1 in order to be   
less utterly miserable before you  have 

actually arrived at it1 since it is of  
no use in the case of men in  the water4
 ,and since puppies who are on the point
 of opening their eyes1  are just as    
blind as those that are but this moment 
born2 it is plain also  that ,plato1 as 
he had not yet seen wisdom1 was as blind
 in his intellect  as ,phalaris4        
,,xxiv4 ,these cases are not alike1     
,cato4 ,for in these instances1 though  
you  may have made a good deal of       
progress1 still you are in exactly the  
same  evil from which you wish to be    
free1 till you have entirely escaped4   
,for a  man does not breathe till he has
 entirely emerged1 and puppies are just 
as  blind till they have opened their   
eyes1 as if they were never going to    
open them4 ,i will give you some        
instances that really are like4 ,one    
man's  eyes are bad1 another is weak in 
his body2 these men are both gradually  
relieved by the daily application of    
remedies4 ,the one gets better every    
day1 and the other sees better4 ,now    

these men resemble all those who study  
virtue4 ,they are relieved of their     
vices2 they are relieved of their       
errors4 ,unless1 perchance1 you think   
that ,tiberius ,gracchus1 the father1   
was not happier than his son1 when the  
one laboured to establish the  republic1
 and the other to subvert it4 ,and yet  
he was not a wise man4 ,for  who taught 
him wisdom8 or when8 or where8 or whence
 did he learn it8  ,still1 because he   
consulted his twin glory and dignity1 he
 had made great  progress in virtue4    
,but ,i will compare your grandfather1  
,drusus1 with ,caius ,gracchus1 who was 
nearly his contemporary4 ,he healed the 
wounds which the other inflicted on  the
 republic4 ,but there is nothing which  
makes men so miserable as impiety  and  
wickedness4 ,grant that all those who   
are unwise are miserable1 as1 in  fact1 
they are2 still he is not equally       
miserable who consults the  interest of 
his country with him who wishes for its 
destruction4  ,therefore1 those men are 

already a great deal relieved from their
 vices  who have made any considerable  
advance towards virtue4 ,but the men of 
your  school admit that advance towards 
virtue can be made1 but yet assert that 
no relief from vices takes place in     
consequence4    ,but it is worth while  
to consider on what arguments acute men 
rely for  proving this point4 ,those    
arts1 say they1 of which the perfection 
can be  increased1 show that the        
completeness of their contraries can    
likewise be  increased4 ,but no addition
 can be made to the perfection of       
virtue4  ,therefore1 also1 vices will   
not be susceptible of any increase1 for 
they  are the contraries of virtues4    
,shall we say1 then1 that things which  
are  doubtful are made plain by things  
which are evident1 or that things which 
are evident are obscured by things that 
are doubtful8 ,but this is evident1     
that different vices are greater in     
different people4 ,this is doubtful1    
whether any addition can be made to that

 which you call the chief good4  ,but   
you1 while what you ought to do is to   
try and illustrate what is  doubtful by 
what is evident1 endeavour to get rid of
 what is evident by  what is doubtful4  
,and1 therefore1 you will find yourself 
hampered by the  same reasoning which ,i
 used just now4 ,for if it follows that 
some vices  are not greater than others1
 because no addition can be made to that
 chief  good which you describe1 since  
it is quite evident that the vices of   
all  men are not equal1 you must change 
your definition of the chief good4 ,for 
we must inevitably maintain this rule1  
that when a consequence is false1  the  
premises from which the consequence     
proceeds cannot be true4    ,,xxv4      
,what1 then1 is the cause of these      
difficulties8 ,a vain-glorious  parade  
in defining the chief good4 ,for when it
 is positively asserted that  what is   
honourable is the sole good1 all care   
for one's health1 all  attention to     
one's estate1 all regard for the        

government of the republic1  all        
regularity in transacting business1 all 
the duties of life1 in short1  are put  
an end to4 ,even that very              
honourableness1 in which alone you      
assert that everything is comprised1    
must be abandoned4 ,all which  arguments
 are carefully urged against ,ariston by
 ,chrysippus4 ,and from that            
embarrassment it is that all those      
fallaciously speaking wiles1 as ,attius 
calls them1 have arisen4 ,for because   
wisdom had no ground on which to rest   
her foot1 when all the duties were taken
 away1 7and duties were taken away  when
 all power of selection and             
discrimination was denied2 for what     
choice1 or what discrimination could    
there be when all things were so        
completely equal that there was no      
difference whatever between them87 from 
these difficulties there arose worse    
errors than even those of ,aristo4 ,for 
his arguments were at all events simple2
 those of your school are full of       

craft4    ,for suppose you were to ask  
,aristo whether these things1 freedom   
from  pain1 riches1 and good health1    
appear to him to be goods8 ,he would    
deny  it4 ,what next8 ,suppose you ask  
him whether the contraries of these     
things  are bad8 ,he would deny that    
equally4 ,suppose you were to ask ,zeno 
the same  question8 ,he would give you  
the same answer1 word for word4 ,suppose
  further1 that we1 being full of       
astonishment1 were to ask them both how 
it  will be possible for us to live1 if 
we think that it makes not the least    
difference to us whether we are well or 
sick2 whether we are free from  pain or 
tormented by it2 whether we are able or 
unable to endure cold and  hunger8 ,you 
will live1 says ,aristo1 magnificently  
and excellently1 doing  whatever seems  
good to you4 ,you will never be vexed1  
you will never desire  anything1 you    
will never fear anything4 ,what will    
,zeno say8 ,he says that  all these     
ideas are monstrous1 and that it is     

totally impossible for any  one to live 
on these principles2 but that there is  
some extravagant1 some  immense         
difference between what is honourable   
and what is base2 that  between other   
things1 indeed1 there is no difference  
at all4 ,he will also  say--7listen to  
what follows1 and do not laugh1 if you  
can help it7--all  those intermediate   
things1 between which there is no       
difference1 are  nevertheless such that 
some of them are to be chosen1 others   
rejected1 and  others utterly           
disregarded2 that is to say1 that you   
may wish for some1  wish to avoid       
others1 and be totally indifferent about
 others4 ,but you  said just now1 ,o    
,zeno1 that there was no difference     
whatever between these  things4 ,and now
 ,i say the same1 he replies2 and that  
there is no  difference whatever as     
respects virtues and vices4 ,well1 ,i   
should like to  know who did not know   
that8    ,,xxvi4 ,however1 let us hear a
 little more4 ,those things1 says he1   

which you  have mentioned1 to be well1  
to be rich1 to be free from pain1 ,i do 
not  call goods2 but ,i will call them  
in ,greek  7which you may  translate by 
the ,latin producta1 though ,i prefer   
prposita or  prcipua1 for they are more 
easily comprehended and more applicable 
terms74 ,and again1 the contraries1     
want1 sickness1 and pain1 ,i do not call
  evils1 though ,i have no objection to 
styling them 7if you wish7 things to  be
 rejected4 ,and1 therefore1 ,i do not   
say that ,i seek for them first1 but    
that ,i choose them2 not that ,i wish   
for them1 but that ,i accept them4 ,and 
so1 too1 ,i do not say that ,i flee from
 the contraries2 but that ,i1 as it     
were1 keep aloof from them4 ,what says  
,aristotle and the rest of the          
disciples of ,plato8 ,why1 that they    
call everything good which is according 
to nature2 and that whatever is contrary
 to nature they call evil4    ,do you   
not see1 then1 that your master ,zeno   
agrees with ,aristo in words1  but      

differs from him as to facts2 but that  
he agrees with ,aristotle and  those    
other philosophers as to facts1 but     
differs from them only in words8  ,why1 
then1 when we are agreed as to facts1 do
 we not prefer speaking in  the ordinary
 manner8 ,let him teach me either that  
,i shall be more prepared  to despise   
money1 if ,i reckon it only among things
 preferred1 than if ,i  count it among  
goods2 and that ,i shall have more      
fortitude to endure pain  if ,i call it 
bitter1 and difficult to bear1 and      
contrary to nature1 than  if ,i         
pronounce it an evil4 ,marcus ,piso1 my 
intimate1 also was a very witty  man1   
and used to ridicule the ,stoics for    
their language on this topic3 for  what 
was he used to say8 8,you deny that     
riches are a good1 but call them        
something to be preferred4 ,what good do
 you do by that8 do you diminish        
avarice8 ,but if we mind words1 then1 in
 the first place1 your expression1  to  
be preferred1 is longer than good40     

8,that has nothing to do with the       
matter40 8,i dare say it has not1 but   
still it is a more difficult            
expression4 ,for ,i do not know what the
 word good is derived from2 but the     
word preferred ,i suppose means that it 
is preferred to other things4 ,that     
appears to me to be important40         
,therefore1 he insisted upon it1 that   
more  consequence was attributed to     
riches by ,zeno1 who placed them among  
things  preferred1 than by ,aristotle1  
who admitted that they were a good4     
,still he  did not say that they were a 
great good1 but rather such an one as   
was to  be despised and scorned in      
comparison of what was right and        
honourable1  and never one to be greatly
 sought after4 ,and altogether1 he      
argued in  this way1 about all those    
expressions which had been altered by   
,zeno1 both  as to what he denied to be 
goods1 and as to those things to which  
he  referred the name of evil2 saying   
that the first received from him a more 

joyful title than they did from us2 and 
the latter a more gloomy one4           
,,xxvii4 ,piso1 then--a most excellent  
man1 and1 as you well know1 a great     
friend of yours--used to argue in this  
manner4 ,and now let us make an end  of 
this1 after we have just said a few     
additional words4 ,for it would take  a 
long time to reply to all your          
assertions4    ,for from the same tricks
 with words1 originate all those        
kingdoms1 and  commands1 and riches1 and
 universal dominion which you say belong
 to the  wise man4 ,you say besides1    
that he alone is handsome1 he alone is  
free1 he  alone is a citizen2 and that  
everything which is the contrary of all 
these  things belongs to the foolish    
man1 who is also insane1 as you assert  
they  call these assertions 2 we may    
call them marvellous4 ,and yet what     
marvel is there in them when you come   
nearer to them8 ,i will just examine    
the matter with you1 and see what       
meaning you affix to each word2 there   

shall be no dispute between us4 ,you say
 that all offences are equal4 ,i  will  
not speak to you now1 as ,i spoke on the
 same subject when ,i was  defending    
,lucius ,murena1 whom you prosecuted2   
then ,i was addressing an               
unphilosophical audience2 something too 
was to be directed to the  bystanders in
 court2 at present1 we must proceed more
 precisely4 ,in what  way can all       
offences be called equal8 ,because      
nothing is more honourable  than what is
 honourable2 nothing more base than what
 is base4 ,go on a  little further1 for 
there is a great dispute as to this     
point2 let us  examine those arguments1 
which are especially your own1 why all  
offences  are equal4 ,as1 says he1 in   
many lyres1 if not one of them is so    
well in  tune as to be able to preserve 
the harmony1 all are equally out of     
tune2  so because offences differ from  
what is right1 they will differ equally2
  therefore they are equal3 now here we 
are being mocked with an ambiguous      

expression4 ,for it equally happens to  
all the lyres to be out of tune1 but    
not to them all to be equally out of    
tune4 ,therefore1 that comparison does  
not help you at all4 ,for it would not  
follow if we were to say that every     
avarice is equally avarice1 that        
therefore every case of avarice was     
equal4 ,here is another simile which is 
no simile2 for as1 says he1 a pilot     
blunders equally if he wrecks a ship    
loaded with straw1 as if he wrecks  one 
loaded with gold2 so1 too1 he sins      
equally who beats his parent1 with  him 
who beats a slave unjustly4 ,this is not
 seeing that it has no  connexion with  
the art of the pilot what cargo the ship
 carries3 and  therefore that it makes  
no difference with respect to his       
steering well or  ill1 whether his      
freight is straw or gold4 ,but it can   
and ought to be  understood what the    
difference is between a parent and a    
slave2 therefore  it makes no difference
 with respect to navigation1 but a great

 deal with  respect to duty1 what the   
description of thing may be which is    
affected by  the blunder4 ,and if1 in   
navigation1 a ship has been wrecked     
through  carelessness1 the offence then 
becomes more serious if gold is lost1   
than  if it is only straw4 ,for in all  
arts we insist upon the exercise of what
  is called common prudence2 which all  
men who have the management of any      
business entrusted to them are bound to 
possess4 ,and so even in this  instance 
offences are not equal4    ,,xxviii4    
,however1 they press on1 and relax      
nothing4 ,since1 say they1 every        
offence is one of imbecility and        
inconsistency1 and since these vices are
  equally great in all fools1 it follows
 necessarily that offences are  equal3  
as if it were admitted that vices are   
equally great in all fools1  and that   
,lucius ,tubulus was a man of the same  
imbecility and inconsistency  as        
,publius ,scvola1 on whose motion he was
 condemned2 and as if there were  no    

difference at all between the things    
themselves which are the subject  of the
 offences2 so that1 in proportion as    
they are more or less  important1 the   
offences committed in respect of them   
are so too4    ,therefore1 for ,i may   
now bring this discourse to an end1 your
 ,stoics seem  to me to be most         
especially open to this charge1 that    
they fancy they can  support two        
opposite propositions4 ,for what is so  
inconsistent as for the  same person to 
say that what is honourable is the only 
good1 and also that  the desire of      
things adapted for human life proceeds  
from nature8 ,but when  they wish to    
maintain the arguments which are        
suitable for the former  propositions1  
they agree with ,aristo2 when they avoid
 that1 they in  reality are upholding   
the same doctrines as the ,peripatetics2
 they cling  to words with great        
tenacity2 and as they cannot bear to    
have them taken  from them one after    
another1 they become more fierce1 and   

rough1 and  harsher both in their       
language and manners4 ,but ,pantius1    
wishing to avoid  their moroseness and  
asperity1 would not approve of either   
the bitterness  of their sentiments1 or 
their captious way of arguing3 and so in
 one  respect he was more gentle1 and in
 the other more intelligible4 ,and he   
was  always quoting ,plato1 and         
,aristotle1 and ,xenocrates1 and        
,theophrastus1 and  ,dicarchus1 as his  
own writings show4 ,and indeed1 ,i feel 
very sure that it  would do you a great 
deal of good if you too were to study   
those authors  with care and diligence4 
,but since it is getting towards        
evening1 and ,i must return to my villa1
 we  will stop this discussion at this  
point1 but we will often return to it on
  other occasions4 ,indeed we will1 said
 he1 for what can we do better8 ,and    
indeed ,i shall require of you to give  
me a hearing while ,i refute what you   
have said2 but recollect that you       
approve of all our opinions1 charging us

  only with using words incorrectly2 but
 that we do not approve of one  single  
one of your ideas4 ,you are throwing a  
stone at me as ,i depart1 said  ,i2     
however1 we shall see4 ,and when we had 
thus spoken we separated4               
,fifth ,book ,of ,the ,treatise ,on ,the
 ,chief ,good ,and ,evil4      ,i4 ,one 
day when ,i had been hearing ,antiochus 
lecture1 as ,i was in the  habit of     
doing1 ,o ,brutus1 in company with      
,marcus ,piso1 in that gymnasium  which 
is called ,ptolemy's1 my brother        
,quintus being with me1 and ,titus      
,pomponius1 and ,lucius ,cicero1 our    
cousin on the father's side as to       
relationship1 but our own brother as to 
affection1 we determined to take  our   
afternoon's walk in the ,academy1       
principally because at that time of  day
 that place was free from any crowd4    
,accordingly1 at the appointed time  we 
all met at ,piso's house1 and from      
thence we walked half-a-dozen  furlongs 
from the ,dipylus to the ,academy1      

beguiling the road with  discourse on   
various subjects2 and when we had       
arrived at the deservedly  celebrated   
space of the ,academy1 we there found   
the solitude which we  desired4 ,then   
said ,piso--,shall ,i say that this is  
implanted in us by  nature1 or by some  
mistake1 that when we see those places  
which we have  heard that men who       
deserve to be had in recollection have  
much frequented1  we are more moved than
 when we hear even of their actual      
deeds1 or than  when we read some one of
 their writings8--just as ,i am affected
 now4 ,for  the remembrance of ,plato   
comes into my mind1 whom we understand  
to have  been the first person who was  
accustomed to dispute in this place2 and
  whose neighbouring gardens not only   
recal him vividly to my recollection1   
but seem even to place the man himself  
before my eyes4 ,here ,speusippus1  here
 ,xenocrates1 here his pupil ,polemo    
used to walk2 and the latter used  to   
sit in the very spot which is now before

 us4 ,there is our senate-house  7,i    
mean the ,curia ,hostilia17#dh7 not this
 new one1 which always seems to me      
smaller1 though in fact it is larger73  
whenever ,i have looked upon that ,i    
have always thought of ,scipio1 and     
,cato1 and ,llius1 and more especially  
of my own grandfather4 ,so great a power
 of reminding one of circumstances      
exists in the places themselves1 that it
 is not without reason that some  people
 have built up a system of memory in    
them4 ,then ,quintus said--,it is  just 
as you say1 ,piso3 for as ,i was coming 
here just now1 that district of         
,colonos drew my attention to itself1   
whose inhabitant1 ,sophocles1 was       
brought at once before my eyes3 for you 
know how ,i admire1 and how ,i  delight 
in him3 and accordingly a sort of       
appearance moved me1 an  unsubstantial  
one indeed1 but still it did move me to 
a more vivid  recollection of dipus     
coming hither1 and asking in most       
melodious verse  what all these places  

were4 ,then ,pomponius said--,i whom you
 all are always  attacking as devoted to
 ,epicurus1 am often with ,phdrus1 who  
is a  particular friend of mine1 as you 
know1 in the gardens of ,epicurus1 which
  we passed by just this moment2 but1   
according to the warning of the old     
proverb1 ,i remember the living2 still  
,i may not forget ,epicurus1 even if    
were to wish to do so1 whose likeness   
our friends have not only in  pictures1 
but even on their goblets and rings4    
,,ii4 ,on this ,i chimed in3--,our      
friend ,pomponius1 said ,i1 appears to  
be  joking1 and perhaps he has a right  
to do so2 for he has established        
himself at ,athens in such a way that he
 has almost become an ,athenian1 and    
indeed so as to seem likely to earn such
 a surname4 ,but ,i1 ,piso1 agree  with 
you that we do get into a habit of      
thinking a good deal more  earnestly and
 deeply on illustrious men in           
consequence of the warnings of  place4  
,for you know that once ,i went with you

 to ,metapontum1 and did not  turn into 
the house of my entertainer until ,i had
 seen the very place  where ,pythagoras 
passed his life1 and his house2 and at  
this present time1  although all over   
,athens there are many traces of eminent
 men in the  places themselves1 still ,i
 am greatly affected by this seat which 
is  before me4 ,for here ,charmadas     
lately sat1--a man whom ,i seem to see1 
for  his likeness is well known to me1  
and ,i can fancy that his voice is      
regretted by the very seat itself1      
deprived as it is now of such a         
brilliant genius4 ,then ,piso           
said--,since1 now1 we have all said     
something1  what does our friend ,lucius
 think8 is he glad to visit that spot   
where  ,demosthenes and schines used to 
contend together8 for every one is      
chiefly attracted by his own particular 
study4 ,and he blushed1 and             
answered--,do not ask me1 who went down 
even to the harbour of ,phalerum1  where
 they say that ,demosthenes used to     

declaim to the waves1 in order to       
accustom himself to outvoice the roaring
 of the sea4 ,i turned aside also  out  
of the road1 a little to the right1 to  
approach the tomb of ,pericles2         
although1 indeed1 such records are      
countless in this city1 for wherever we 
step we place our foot on some history4 
,then ,piso continued3--,but1 ,cicero1  
said he1 those inclinations are the     
inclinations of clever men1 if they lead
 to the imitation of great men2  but if 
they only tend to bringing up again the 
traces of ancient  recollections1 that  
is mere curiosity4 ,but we all exhort   
you1--though you  of your own accord1 as
 ,i hope1 are running that way1--to     
imitate those men  whom you wish that   
you had known4 ,although1 ,i replied1   
our friend ,piso  here does1 as you see1
 what you recommended1 still your       
exhortation is  pleasing to me4 ,then   
said he1 in a most friendly manner1 as  
was his  wont1--,let all of us1 then1   
contribute every assistance to his      

youth1  especially urging him to devote 
some of his studies to philosophy1      
either  for the sake of imitating you   
whom he loves1 or else of being able to 
do  what he is desirous to do with more 
elegance4 ,but do you1 ,o ,lucius1 said 
he1 require to be exhorted by us1 or are
 you inclined that way of your own      
accord8 ,you appear1 indeed1 to me to be
 very assiduous in your attendance  on  
,antiochus1 whose pupil you are4 ,then  
replied he1 timidly1--or1 ,i ought      
rather to say1 modestly1--,i am indeed2 
but did you not just now hear           
,charmadas's name mentioned8 ,i am      
attracted in that direction1 but        
,antiochus drags me back again2 nor is  
there any one else whose lectures it    
would be possible to attend4    ,,iii4  
,piso replied--,although1 while our     
friend here 7meaning me7 is present1    
this matter will perhaps not be quite so
 easy2 yet ,i will endeavour to  call   
you back from this ,new ,academy to that
 ancient one1 in which 7as you  used to 

hear ,antiochus say7 those men are not  
alone reckoned who are  called          
,academics1--,speusippus1 ,xenocrates1  
,polemo1 ,crantor1 and the rest2  but   
the old ,peripatetics also1 the chief of
 whom was ,aristotle1 whom1 next  to    
,plato1 ,i think ,i may fairly call the 
prince of philosophers4 ,turn  yourself1
 therefore1 ,i entreat you1 to those    
men2 for from their writings  and       
systems all liberal learning1 all       
history1 all elegance of language1  may 
be derived2 and also1 so great is the   
variety of arts of which they  were     
masters1 that no one can come properly  
armed for any business of  importance   
and credit without being tolerably      
versed in their writings4 ,it  is owing 
to them that men have turned out        
orators1 generals1 and  statesmen2 and1 
to descend to less important matters1 it
 is from this  ,academy1 as from a      
regular magazine of all the arts1 that  
mathematicians1  poets1 musicians1 aye1 
and physicians too1 have proceeded4     

,i replied--,you know well1 ,o ,piso1   
that my opinion is the same3 but still  
the mention of it by you was very       
seasonable2 for my relation ,cicero is  
anxious to hear what was the doctrine of
 that ,old ,academy which you have  been
 speaking of1 and of the ,peripatetics1 
about the chief good2 and we  think that
 you can very easily explain it to us1  
because you entertained  ,staseas the   
,neapolitan in your house for many      
years1 and because1 too1 we  are aware  
that you have been many months at       
,athens1 investigating these  very      
things1 as a pupil of ,antiochus4 ,and  
he said1 with a laugh1 ,come1           
come1--for you have very cleverly drawn 
me in to begin the discussion1--let  us 
explain it to the young man if we can2  
for this solitude gives us the          
opportunity3 but1 even if a god had told
 me so1 ,i would never have  believed   
that ,i should be disputing in the      
,academy1 like a philosopher4  ,however1
 ,i hope ,i shall not annoy the rest of 

you while complying with his  request4  
,annoy me1 said ,i1 who asked you8      
,quintus and ,pomponius also said  that 
they entertained the same wish2 so he   
began4 ,and ,i beg of you1  ,brutus1 to 
consider whether what he said appears to
 you to sufficiently  embrace the       
doctrines of ,antiochus1 which ,i know  
you1 who were a constant  attendant on  
the lectures of his brother ,aristus1   
approve of highly4 ,thus  he spoke3--   
,,iv4 ,what great elegance there is in  
the ,peripatetic system ,i have         
explained a little time ago1 as briefly 
as ,i could4 ,but the form of the       
system1 as is the case with most of the 
other schools1 is threefold3 one        
division being that of nature2 the      
second1 that of arguing2 the third1     
that of living4 ,nature has been        
investigated by them so thoroughly that 
there is no part of heaven1 or earth1 or
 sea 7to speak like a poet71 which  they
 have passed over4 ,moreover1 after     
having treated of the origin of  things1

 and of the universal world1 so as to   
prove many points not only by  probable 
arguments1 but even by the inscrutable  
demonstrations of  mathematicians1 they 
brought from the subjects which they had
 investigated  abundant materials to    
assist in attaining to the knowledge of 
secret  things4 ,aristotle investigated 
the birth1 and way of living1 and figure
 of  every animal2 ,theophrastus        
examined the causes1 and principles1 and
  natures of plants1 and of almost      
everything which is produced out of the 
earth2 by which knowledge the           
investigation of the most secret things 
is  rendered easier4 ,also1 they have   
given rules for arguing1 not only       
logically1 but oratorically2 and a      
system of speaking in both these        
manners1 on every subject1 has been laid
 down by ,aristotle1 their chief2  so   
that he did not always argue against    
everything1 as ,arcesilas did2 and  yet 
he furnished one on every subject with  
arguments to be used on both  sides of  

it4    ,but1 as the third division was  
occupied about the rules of living well1
 it  was also brought back by those same
 people1 not only to the system of      
private life1 but also to the direction 
of affairs of state4 ,for from          
,aristotle we have acquired a knowledge 
of the manners1 and customs1 and        
institutions of almost every state1 not 
of ,greece only1 but also of the        
,barbarians2 and from ,theophrastus we  
have learnt even their laws3 and each   
of them taught what sort of man a leader
 in a state ought to be1 and also  wrote
 at great length to explain what was the
 best constitution for a  state4 ,but   
,theophrastus also detailed very        
copiously what were the natural         
inclinations of affairs1 and what the   
influences of opportunities which       
required regulating as occasion might   
demand4 ,and as for living1 a quiet     
method of life appeared to them to be   
the best1 passed in the  contemplation  
and knowledge of things2 which1 inasmuch

 as it had the  greatest resemblance to 
the life of the gods1 appeared to them  
to be most  worthy of a wise man2 and on
 these subjects they held very lofty and
  dignified language4    ,v4 ,but       
respecting the chief good1 because there
 are two kinds of  books1--one addressed
 to the people1 which they used to call 
1  the other written in a more polished 
style1 which they left behind in        
commentaries1--they appear not always to
 say the same thing2 and yet in  their  
ultimate conclusion there is no variety 
in the language of the men  whom ,i have
 named1 nor is there any disagreement   
between them4 ,but1 as a  happy life is 
the object of search1 and as that is the
 only thing which  philosophy ought to  
pursue and regard1 there never appears  
to be the least  difference or doubt in 
their writings1 as to whether happiness 
is wholly  in the power of the wise man1
 or whether it can be undermined or     
taken  from him by adversity4 ,and this 
point is the especial subject of the    

book  of ,theophrastus1 on a ,happy     
,life2 in which a great deal is         
attributed to  fortune3 and if that     
theory is correct1 then wisdom cannot   
make life  happy4 ,now1 this seems to me
 rather too tender 7if ,i may say so7   
and  delicate a doctrine1 more so than  
the power and importance of virtue can  
sanction4 ,wherefore let us rather hold 
with ,aristotle1 and his son            
,nicomachus1--whose admirably written   
books on ,morals are said1 indeed1 to   
be ,aristotle's2 but ,i do not see why  
the son may not have been like his      
father2 but1 in most cases1 let us apply
 to ,theophrastus1 as long as we        
attribute a little more firmness and    
strength to virtue than he did4    ,let 
us1 then1 be content with these guides2 
for their successors are wiser  men1    
indeed1 in my opinion1 than the         
philosophers of other schools3 but      
still they degenerate so from these     
great men1 that they seem to me rather  
to have arisen from themselves than from

 them4 ,in the first place1 ,strato1    
the pupil of ,theophrastus1 called      
himself a natural philosopher3 and      
though1 in truth1 he is an eminent man  
in that line1 still most of what he     
said was novel2 and he said very little 
about morals4 ,his pupil ,lyco was  rich
 in eloquence1 but very meagre in       
matter4 ,then his pupil ,aristo was a   
neat and elegant writer1 but still he   
had not that dignity which we look  for 
in a great philosopher3 he wrote a great
 deal1 certainly1 and in a  polished    
style2 but1 somehow or other1 his       
writings do not carry any  weight4 ,i   
pass over several1 and among them that  
learned man and pleasant  writer1       
,hieronymus2 and ,i do not know why ,i  
should call him a ,peripatetic1  for he 
defined the chief good to be freedom    
from pain3 and he who  disagrees with me
 about the chief good1 disagrees with me
 about the whole  principle of          
philosophy4 ,critolaus wished to copy   
the ancients2 and1  indeed1 he comes    

nearest to them in dignity1 and his     
eloquence is  preeminent3 still he      
adheres to the ancient doctrine4        
,diodorus1 his pupil1  adds to          
honourableness freedom from pain3 he1   
too1 clings to a theory of  his own2    
and1 as he disagrees from them about the
 chief good1 he is hardly  entitled to  
be called a ,peripatetic4 ,but my friend
 ,antiochus seems to me  to pursue the  
opinions of the ancients with the       
greatest care2 and he  shows that they  
coincided with the doctrines of         
,aristotle and ,polemo4    ,,vi4 ,my    
young friend ,lucius1 therefore1 acts   
prudently when he wishes  chiefly to be 
instructed about the chief good2 for    
when this point is once  settled in     
philosophy1 everything is settled4 ,for 
in other matters1 if  anything is passed
 over1 or if we are ignorant of         
anything1 the  inconvenience thus       
produced is no greater than the         
importance the matter  is of in which   
the omission has taken place2 but if one

 is ignorant of  what is the chief good1
 one must necessarily be ignorant of the
 true  principles of life2 and from this
 ignorance such great errors ensue that 
they cannot tell to what port to betake 
themselves4 ,but when one has  acquired 
a knowledge of the chief ends1--when one
 knows what is the chief  good and the  
chief evil1--then a proper path of life1
 and a proper  regulation of all the    
duties of life1 is found out4    ,there 
is1 therefore1 an object to which       
everything may be referred2 from  which 
a system of living happily1 which is    
what every one desires1 may be          
discovered and adopted4 ,but since there
 is a great division of opinion as  to  
what that consists in1 we had better    
employ the division of ,carneades1      
which our friend ,antiochus prefers1 and
 usually adopts4 ,he therefore saw  not 
only how many different opinions of     
philosophers on the subject of the      
chief good there were1 but how many     
there could be4 ,accordingly1 he        

asserted that there was no art which    
proceeded from itself2 for1 in truth1   
that which is comprehended by an art is 
always exterior to the art4 ,there  is  
no need of prolonging this argument by  
adducing instances2 for it is  evident  
that no art is conversant about itself1 
but that the art itself is  one thing1  
and the object which is proposed to be  
attained by the art  another4 ,since1   
therefore1 prudence is the art of       
living1 just as medicine  is of health1 
or steering of navigation1 it follows   
unavoidably that that  also must have   
been established by1 and must proceed   
from1 something else4  ,but it is agreed
 among almost all people1 that that     
object with which  prudence is          
conversant1 and which it wishes to      
arrive at1 ought to be  fitted and      
suited to nature1 and to be of such a   
character as by itself to  invite and   
attract that desire of the mind which   
the ,greeks call 4 ,but  as to what it  
is which causes this excitement1 and    

which is so greatly  desired by nature  
from its first existence1 it is not     
agreed2 and1 indeed1  there is a great  
dissension on the subject among         
philosophers whenever the  chief good is
 the subject of investigation3 for the  
source of this whole  question which is 
agitated as to the chief good and evil1 
when men inquire  what is the extreme   
and highest point of either1 must be    
traced back1 and  in that will be found 
the primitive inducements of nature2 and
 when it is  found1 then the whole      
discussion about the chief good and evil
 proceeds  from it as from a spring4    
,,vii4 ,some people consider the first  
desire to be a desire of pleasure1 and  
the first thing which men seek to ward  
off to be pain3 others think that  the  
first thing wished for is freedom from  
pain1 and the first thing  shunned1     
pain2 and from these men others proceed1
 who call the first goods  natural ones2
 among which they reckon the safety and 
integrity of all  one's parts1 good     

health1 the senses unimpaired1 freedom  
from pain1  strength1 beauty1 and other 
things of the same sort1 the images of  
which  are the first things in the mind1
 like the sparks and seeds of the       
virtues4 ,and of these three1 as there  
is some one thing by which nature is    
originally moved to feel desire1 or to  
repel something1 and as it is           
impossible that there should be anything
 except these three things1 it  follows 
unavoidably that every duty1 whether of 
avoiding or of pursuing  anything1 is   
referred to some one of these things2 so
 that that prudence1  which we have     
called the art of life1 is always       
conversant about some one  of these     
three things from which it derives the  
beginning of the whole  life3 and from  
that which it has pronounced to be the  
original cause by  which nature is      
excited1 the principle of what is right 
and honourable  arises2 which can agree 
with some one of these three divisions2 
so that it  is honourable to do         

everything for the sake of pleasure1    
even if you do  not obtain it2 or else  
for the sake of avoiding pain1 though   
you may not  be able to compass that2 or
 else of getting some one of those      
things which  are according to nature4  
,and thus it comes about that there is  
as much  difference between the chief   
good and the chief evil as there is in  
their  natural principles4 ,others      
again1 starting from the same beginning1
 refer  everything either to pleasure or
 to freedom from pain1 or else to the   
attainment of those primary goods which 
are according to nature4    ,now then   
that we have detailed six opinions about
 the chief good1 these  are the chief   
advocates of the three last-mentioned   
opinions1--,aristippus1  the advocate of
 pleasure2 ,hieronymus1 of freedom from 
pain2 and ,carneades1  of the enjoyment 
of those things which we have called the
 principal things  in accordance with   
nature 7though he1 indeed1 was not the  
author of this  theory1 but only its    

advocate1 for the sake of maintaining a 
debate74 ,now1  the three former were   
such as might possibly be true1 though  
only one of  them was defended1 and that
 was vehemently maintained4 ,for no one 
says1  that to do everything for the    
sake of pleasure1 or that1 even though  
we  obtain nothing1 still the very      
design of acting so is of itself        
desirable1  and honourable1 and the only
 good2 no one ever even placed the      
avoidance  of pain 7not even if it could
 be avoided7 among things intrinsically 
desirable2 but to do everything with a  
view to obtain the things which are     
according to nature1 even though we do  
not succeed in obtaining them1 the      
,stoics do affirm to be honourable1 and 
the only thing to be desired for  its   
own sake1 and the only good4    ,,viii4 
,these1 then1 are six plain opinions    
about the chief good and the  chief     
evil1--two having no advocate1 but four 
being defended4 ,but of united  and     
twofold explanations of the chief good  

there were in all three2 nor  could     
there be more if you examine the nature 
of things thoroughly4 ,for  either      
pleasure can be added to honourableness1
 as ,callipho and ,dinomachus  thought2 
or freedom from pain1 as ,diodorus      
asserted2 or the first gifts of  nature1
 as the ancients said1 whom we call at  
the same time ,academics and            
,peripatetics4 ,but1 since everything   
cannot be said at once1 at present      
these things ought to be known1 that    
pleasure ought to be excluded2 since1   
as it will presently appear1 we have    
been born for higher purposes2 and      
nearly the same may be said of freedom  
from pain as of pleasure4 ,since  then  
we have discussed pleasure with         
,torquatus1 and honourableness 7in      
which alone every good was to consist7  
with ,cato2 in the first place1 the     
arguments which were urged against      
pleasure are nearly equally applicable  
to freedom from pain4 ,nor1 indeed1 need
 we seek for any others to reply to     

that opinion of ,carneades2 for in      
whatever manner the chief good is       
explained1 so as to be unconnected with 
honourableness1 in that system  duty1   
and virtue1 and friendship1 can have no 
place4 ,but the union of  either        
pleasure or freedom from pain with      
honourableness1 makes that very         
honourableness which it wishes to       
embrace dishonourable2 for to refer what
  you do to those things1 one of which  
asserts the man who is free from evil   
to be in the enjoyment of the chief     
good1 while the other is conversant     
with the most trifling part of our      
nature1 is rather the conduct of a man  
who would obscure the whole brilliancy  
of honourableness--,i might almost  say1
 who would pollute it4    ,the ,stoics  
remain1 who after they had borrowed     
everything from the  ,peripatetics and  
,academics1 pursued the same objects    
under different  names4 ,it is better to
 reply to them all separately4 ,but let 
us stick to  our present subject2 we can

 deal with those men at a more          
convenient  season4 ,but the 8security0 
of ,democritus1 which is as it were a   
sort of  tranquillity of the mind which 
they all 1 deserved to be separated     
from this discussion1 because that      
tranquillity of the mind is of itself a 
happy life4 ,what we are inquiring1     
however1 is not what it is1 but whence  
it is derived4 ,the opinions of ,pyrrho1
 ,aristo1 and ,herillus1 have long ago  
been exploded and discarded1 as what can
 never be applicable to this  circle of 
discussion to which we limit ourselves1 
and which had no need to  have been ever
 mentioned2 for as the whole of this    
inquiry is about the  chief1 and what ,i
 may call the highest good and evil1 it 
ought to start  from that point which we
 call suitable and adapted to nature1   
and which is  sought of itself for      
itself4 ,now this is wholly put out of  
the question by  those who deny that in 
those things in which there is nothing  
either  honourable or dishonourable1    

there is any reason why one thing should
 be  preferred to another1 and who think
 that there is actually no difference   
whatever between those things4 ,and     
,herillus1 if he thought that nothing   
was good except knowledge1 put an end to
 all reason for taking counsel1  and to 
all inquiry about duty4 ,thus1 after we 
have got rid of the opinions  of the    
rest1 as there can be no other1 this    
doctrine of the ancients must           
inevitably prevail4    ,,ix4 ,therefore1
 after the fashion of the ancients1     
which the ,stoics also  adopt1 let us   
make this beginning3--,every animal     
loves itself1 and as soon  as it is born
 labours to preserve itself1 because    
this is the first desire  given to it by
 nature1 to regulate its whole life1 to 
preserve itself1 and  to be so disposed 
as it best may in accordance with       
nature4 ,at the  beginning it has such a
 confused and uncertain kind of         
organization that  it can only just take
 care of itself1 whatever it is2 but it 

does not  understand either what it is1 
or what its powers are1 or what its     
nature  is4 ,but when it has advanced a 
little1 and begins to perceive how far  
anything touches it1 or has reference to
 it1 then it begins gradually to        
improve1 and to comprehend itself1 and  
to understand for what cause it has     
that appetite of the mind which ,i have 
spoken of2 and begins also to  desire   
those things which it feels to be suited
 to its nature1 and to keep  off the    
contrary4 ,therefore1 in the case of    
every animal1 what it wishes  is placed 
in that thing which is adapted to its   
nature4 ,and so the chief  good is to   
live according to nature1 with the best 
disposition and the  most suitable to   
nature that can be engendered4    ,but  
since every animal has his own peculiar 
nature1 it is plain that the  object of 
each must be to have his nature         
satisfied4 ,for there is no  hindrance  
to there being some things in common to 
all other animals1 and  some common both

 to men and beasts1 since the nature of 
all is common4 ,but  that highest and   
chief good and evil which we are in     
search of1 is  distributed and divided  
among the different kinds of animals1   
each having  its own peculiar good and  
evil1 adapted to that end which the     
nature of  each class of animal         
requires4 ,wherefore1 when we say that  
the chief good  to all animals is to    
live according to nature1 this must be  
understood as  if we said that they had 
all the same chief good4 ,but as it may 
truly be  said to be common to all arts 
to be conversant about some science1 and
  that there is a separate science      
belonging to each art1 so we may say    
that  it is common to all animals to    
live according to nature1 but that there
  are different natures2 so that the    
horse has by nature one chief good1 the 
ox another1 man another2 and yet in all 
there is one common end2 and that  is   
the case too1 not only in animals1 but  
also in all those things which  nature  

nourishes1 causes to grow1 and protects2
 in which we see that those  things     
which are produced out of the earth1    
somehow or other by their own  energy   
create many things for themselves which 
have influence on their  life and       
growth1 and so each in their own kind   
they arrive at the chief  good4 ,so that
 we may now embrace all such in one     
comprehensive statement2  and ,i need   
not hesitate to say1 that every nature  
is its own preserver2  and has for its  
object1 as its end and chief good1 to   
protect itself in  the best possible    
condition that its kind admits of2 so   
that it follows  inevitably that all    
things which flourish by nature have a  
similar but  still not the same end4    
,and from this it should be understood1 
that the  chief and highest good to man 
is to live according to nature which we 
may  interpret thus1--to live according 
to that nature of a man which is made   
perfect on all sides1 and is in need of 
nothing4 ,these things then we must     

explain2 and if our explanation is      
rather minute1 you will excuse it2 for  
we are bound to consider the youth of   
our hearer1 and the fact that he is  now
 perhaps listening to such a discourse  
for the first time4 ,certainly1  said   
,i2 although what you have said hitherto
 might be very properly  addressed to   
hearers of any age4    ,x4 ,since then1 
said he1 we have explained the limit of 
those things which  are to be desired1  
we must next show why the facts are as  
,i have stated  them4 ,wherefore1 let us
 set out from the position which ,i     
first laid down1  which is also in      
reality the first1 so that we may       
understand that every  animal loves     
itself4 ,and though there is no doubt of
 this1 7for it is a  principle fixed    
deep in nature itself1 and is           
comprehended by the sense of  every one1
 in such a degree that if any one wished
 to argue against it1 he  would not be  
listened to17 yet1 that ,i may not pass 
over anything1 ,i think  it as well to  

adduce some reasons why this is the     
case4 ,although1 how can  any one either
 understand or fancy that there is any  
animal which hates  itself8 ,it would be
 a contradiction of facts2 for when that
 appetite of  the mind has begun        
designedly to attract anything to itself
 which is an  hindrance to it1 because  
it is an enemy to itself1--when it does 
that for  its own sake1 it will both    
hate itself and love itself1 which is   
impossible4 ,it is unavoidable that1 if 
any one is an enemy to himself1 he  must
 think those things bad which are good1 
and1 on the other hand1 those  things   
good which are bad2 that he must avoid  
those things which he ought  to seek1   
and seek what he ought to avoid2 all    
which habits are indubitably  the       
overturning of life4 ,for even if some  
people are found who seek for  halters  
or other modes of destruction1 or1 like 
the man in ,terence1 who  determined    
8for such a length of time to do less   
injury to his son10 7as  he says        

himself17 8until he becomes miserable10 
it does not follow that  they are to be 
thought enemies to themselves4 ,but some
 are influenced by  pain1 others by     
desire2 many again are carried away by  
passion1 and while  they knowingly run  
into evils1 still fancy that they are   
consulting their  own interests most    
excellently2 and1 therefore1 they       
unhesitatingly say--          ,that is  
my way2 do you whate'er you must--      
like men who have declared war against  
themselves1 who like to be tortured  all
 day and tormented all night1 and who   
yet do not accuse themselves of  having 
omitted to consult their own interests2 
for this is a complaint  made by those  
men who are dear to and who love        
themselves4    ,wherefore1 whenever a   
man is said to be but little obliged to 
himself1 to  be a foe and enemy to      
himself1 and in short to flee from life1
 it should  be understood that there is 
some cause of that kind lying beneath   
the  surface2 so that it may be         

understood from that very instance that 
every  one is dear to himself4 ,nor is  
it sufficient that there has never been 
any  one who hated himself2 but we must 
understand also that there is no one    
who thinks that it is a matter of       
indifference to him in what condition he
  is2 for all desire of the mind will be
 put an end to if1 as in those  things  
between which there is no difference we 
are not more inclined to  either side1  
so also1 in the case of our own selves1 
we think it makes no  difference to us  
in what way we are affected4    ,,xi4   
,and this also would be a very absurd   
thing if any one were to say it1        
namely1 that a man is loved by himself  
in such a manner that that vehement     
love is referred to some other thing1   
and not to that very man who loves      
himself4 ,now when this is said in the  
case of friendship1 of duty1 or of      
virtue1 however it is said1 it is still 
intelligible what is meant by it2  but  
in regard to our own selves1 it cannot  

even be understood that we  should love 
ourselves for the sake of something     
else1 or in a word1 for  the sake of    
pleasure4 ,for it is for our sakes that 
we love pleasure1 and  not for the sake 
of pleasure that we love ourselves2     
although what can be  more evident than 
that every one is not only dear1 but    
excessively dear to  himself8 ,for who  
is there1 or at all events how few are  
there1 who when  death approaches1 does 
not find          ,his heart's blood    
chill'd with sudden fear1      ,his     
cheek grow pale8      and if it is a    
vice to dread the dissolution of nature 
so excessively1  7and the same thing on 
the same principle may be asserted of   
our aversion  to pain17 still the fact  
that nearly every one is affected in    
this manner1  is a sufficient proof that
 nature abhors destruction4 ,and though 
some men  show this dread or aversion to
 such a degree that they are deservedly 
blamed for it1 still this may show us   
that such feelings would not be so      

excessive in some people1 if a moderate 
degree of them were not implanted  in   
mankind by nature4    ,nor1 indeed1 do  
,i mean that fear of death which is     
shown by those men who1  because they   
think that they are being deprived of   
the goods of life1 or  because they fear
 some terrible events after death1 or   
who1 because they  are afraid of dying  
in pain1 therefore shun death2 for in   
the case of  children1 who can have no  
such ideas or apprehensions1 they often 
show  fear if1 when playing with them1  
we threaten to throw them down from any 
place2 and even beasts1 as ,pacuvius    
says1          ,who have no cunning1 or 
prophetic craft      ,to ward off danger
 ere it come1      shudder when the fear
 of death comes before them4 ,and1      
indeed1 who  entertains a different     
opinion of the wise man himself8 who1   
even when he  has decided that he must  
die1 still is affected by the departure 
from his  family1 and by the fact that  
he must leave the light of day4 ,and    

above all  is the power of nature       
visible in the human race1 since many   
endure  beggary to preserve life1 and   
men worn out with old age are tortured  
with  the idea of the approach of death1
 and endure such things as we see       
,philoctetes in the play suffer1 who1   
while he was kept in torture by         
intolerable pains1 nevertheless         
preserved his life by the game which he 
could kill with his arrows4             
,he1 though slow1 o'ertook the swift1   
,he stood and slew the flying--      as 
,attius says1 and made himself coverings
 for his body by plaiting the  feathers 
together4 ,i am speaking of mankind1    
and1 indeed1 generally of all  animals1 
though plants and trees have nearly the 
same nature1 whether1 as  is the opinion
 of some most learned men1 because some 
predominant and  divine cause has       
implanted this power in them1 or whether
 it is  accidental4 ,we see those things
 which the earth produces preserved in  
vigour by their bark and roots1 which   

happens to animals by the  arrangement  
of their senses1 and a certain compact  
conformation of limb4  ,and with        
reference to this subject1 although ,i  
agree with those men who  think that all
 these things are regulated by nature1  
and that if nature  neglected to        
regulate them1 the animals themselves   
could not exist1 still  ,i grant that   
those who differ on this subject may    
think what they please1  and may either 
understand that when ,i say the nature  
of man ,i mean man  7for it makes no    
difference72 for a man will be able to  
depart from  himself sooner than he can 
lose the desire of those things which   
are  advantageous to him4 ,rightly1     
therefore1 have the most learned        
philosophers sought the principle of the
 chief good in nature1 and thought  that
 that appetite for things adapted to    
nature is implanted in all men1  for    
they are kept together by that          
recommendation of nature in obedience   
to which they love themselves4    ,,xii4

 ,the next thing which we must examine  
is1 what is the nature of man1  since it
 is sufficiently evident that every one 
is dear to himself by  nature2 for that 
is the thing which we are really        
inquiring about4 ,but it  is evident    
that man consists of mind and body1 and 
that the first rank  belongs to the     
mind1 and the second to the body4 ,in   
the next place we see1  also1 that his  
body is so formed as to excel that of   
other animals1 and  that his mind is so 
constituted as to be furnished with     
senses1 and to  have excellence of      
intellect which the whole nature of man 
obeys1 in which  there is a certain     
admirable force of reason1 and          
knowledge1 and science1  and all kinds  
of virtues2 for the things which are    
parts of the body have  no authority to 
be compared with that possessed by the  
parts of the mind2  and they are more   
easily known4 ,therefore1 let us begin  
with them4    ,it is evident1 now1 how  
suitable to nature are the parts of our 

body1 and  the whole general figure1    
form1 and stature of it2 nor is there   
any doubt  what kind of face1 eyes1 ears
 and other features are peculiar to man4
 ,but  certainly it is necessary for    
them to be in good health and vigorous1 
and  to have all their natural movements
 and uses2 so that no part of them      
shall be absent1 or disordered1 or      
enfeebled2 for nature requires          
soundness4 ,for there is a certain      
action of the body which has all its    
motions and its general condition in a  
state of harmony with nature1 in  which 
if anything goes wrong through any      
distortion or depravity1 either  by any 
irregular motion or disordered          
condition1--as if1 for instance1 a      
person were to walk on his hands1 or to 
walk not forwards but  backwards1--then 
he would evidently appear to be flying  
from himself1 and  to be putting off his
 manhood1 and to hate his own nature4   
,on which  account1 also1 some ways of  
sitting down1 and some contorted and    

abrupt  movements1 such as wanton or    
effeminate men at times indulge in1 are 
contrary to nature4 ,so that even if    
that should happen through any fault  of
 the mind1 still the nature of the man  
would seem to be changed in his  body4  
,therefore1 on the contrary1 moderate   
and equal conditions1 and  affections1  
and habits of the body1 seem to be      
suitable to nature4 ,but now  the mind  
must not only exist1 but must exist in a
 peculiar manner1 so as  to have all its
 parts sound1 and to have no virtue     
wanting3 but each sense  has its own    
peculiar virtue1 so that nothing may    
hinder each sense from  performing its  
office in the quick and ready perception
 of those things  which come under the  
senses4    ,,xiii4 ,but there are many  
virtues of the mind1 and of that part of
 the mind  which is the chief1 and which
 is called the intellect2 but these     
virtues  are divided into two principal 
classes3 one1 consisting of those which 
are  implanted by nature1 and are called

 involuntary2 the other1 of those which 
depend on the will1 and are more often  
spoken of by their proper name of       
virtues2 whose great excellence is      
attributed to the mind as a subject of  
praise4 ,now in the former class are    
docility1 memory1 and others1 nearly    
all of which are called by the one name 
of ingenium1 and those who  possess them
 are called ingeniosi4 ,the other class 
consists of those  which are great and  
real virtues2 which we call voluntary1  
such as  prudence1 temperance1          
fortitude1 justice1 and others of the   
same kind4 ,and  this was what might be 
said briefly of both mind and body2 and 
this  statement supplies a sort of      
sketch of what the nature of man        
requires3--and from this it is evident1 
since we are beloved by ourselves1  and 
since we wish everything both in our    
minds and bodies to be perfect1  that   
those qualities are dear to us for their
 own sakes1 and that they are  of the   
greatest influence towards our living   

well4 ,for he to whom  self-preservation
 is proposed as an object1 must         
necessarily feel an  affection for all  
the separate parts of himself2 and a    
greater affection  in proportion as they
 are more perfect and more praiseworthy 
in their  separate kinds4 ,for that kind
 of life is desired which is full of the
  virtues of the mind and body2 and in  
that the chief good must unavoidably  be
 placed1 since it ought to be of such a 
character as to be the highest  of all  
desirable things4 ,and when we have     
ascertained that1 there ought to  be no 
doubt entertained1 that as men are dear 
to themselves for their own  sake1 and  
of their own accord1 so1 also1 the parts
 of the body and mind1  and of those    
things which are in the motion and      
condition of each1 are  cultivated with 
a deserved regard1 and are sought for   
their own sakes4 ,and  when this        
principle has been laid down1 it is easy
 to conjecture that  those parts of us  
are most desirable which have the most  

dignity2 so that  the virtue of each    
most excellent part which is sought for 
its own sake1  is also deserving of     
being principally sought after4 ,and the
 consequence  will be1 that the virtue  
of the mind is preferred to the virtue  
of the  body1 and that the voluntary    
virtues of the mind are superior to the 
involuntary2 for it is the voluntary    
ones which are properly called  virtues1
 and which are much superior to the     
others1 as being the offspring  of      
reason2 than which there is nothing more
 divine in man4 ,in truth1 the  chief   
good of all those qualities which nature
 creates and maintains1 and  which are  
either unconnected or nearly so with the
 body1 is placed in the  mind2 so that  
it appears to have been a tolerably     
acute observation which  was made       
respecting the sow1 that that animal had
 a soul given it instead  of salt to    
keep it from getting rotten4    ,,xiv4  
,but there are some beasts in which     
there is something resembling  virtue1  

such as lions1 dogs1 and horses2 in     
which we see movements not of  the body 
only1 as we do in pigs1 but to a certain
 extent we may discern  some movements  
of mind4 ,but in man the whole dominant 
power lies in the  mind2 and the        
dominant power of the mind is reason3   
and from this proceeds  virtue1 which is
 defined as the perfection of reason3   
which they think is  to be gradually    
developed day by day4 ,those things1    
too1 which the earth  produces have a   
sort of gradual growth towards          
perfection1 not very unlike  what we see
 in animals4 ,therefore we say that a   
vine lives1 and dies2 we  speak of a    
tree as young1 or old2 being in its     
prime1 or growing old4 ,and  it is      
therefore not inconsistent to speak1 as 
in the case of animals1 of  some things 
in plants1 too1 being conformable to    
nature1 and some not3 and  to say that  
there is a certain cultivation of them1 
nourishing1 and  causing them to grow1  
which is the science and art of the     

farmer1 which  prunes them1 cuts them   
in1 raises them1 trains them1 props     
them1 so that  they may be able to      
extend themselves in the direction which
 nature points  out2 in such a manner   
that the vines themselves1 if they could
 speak1  would confess that they ought  
to be managed and protected in the way  
they  are4 ,and now indeed that which   
protects it 7that ,i may continue to    
speak  chiefly of the vine7 is external 
to the vine3 for it has but very little 
power in itself to keep itself in the   
best possible condition1 unless         
cultivation is applied to it4 ,but if   
sense were added to the vine1 so that   
it could feel desire and be moved by    
itself1 what do you think it would  do8 
,would it do those things which were    
formerly done to it by the              
vine-dresser1 and of itself attend to   
itself8 ,do you not see that it would   
also have the additional care of        
preserving its senses1 and its desire   
for  all those things1 and its limbs1 if

 any were added to it8 ,and so too1 to  
all that it had before1 it will unite   
those things which have been added  to  
it since3 nor will it have the same     
object that its dresser had1 but it     
will desire to live according to that   
nature which has been subsequently      
added to it3 and so its chief good will 
resemble that which it had before1  but 
will not be identical with it2 for it   
will be no longer seeking the  good of a
 plant1 but that of an animal4 ,and     
suppose that not only the  senses are   
given it1 but also the mind of a man1   
does it not follow  inevitably that     
those former things will remain and     
require to be  protected1 and that among
 them these additions will be far more  
dear to it  than its original qualities8
 and that each portion of the mind which
 is  best is also the dearest8 and that 
its chief good must now consist in      
satisfying its nature1 since intellect  
and reason are by far the most          
excellent parts of it8 ,and so the chief

 of all the things which it has to      
desire1 and that which is derived from  
the original recommendation of  nature1 
ascends by several steps1 so as at last 
to reach the summit2  because it is made
 up of the integrity of the body1 and   
the perfect reason  of the intellect4   
,,xv4 ,as1 therefore1 the form of nature
 is such as ,i have described it1 if1   
as ,i said at the beginning1 each       
individual as soon as he is born could  
know himself1 and form a correct        
estimate of what is the power both of   
his  entire nature and of its separate  
parts1 he would see immediately what    
this was which we are in search of1     
namely1 the highest and best of all  the
 things which we desire3 nor would it be
 possible for him to make a  mistake in 
anything4 ,but now nature is from the   
very beginning concealed  in a wonderful
 manner1 nor can it be perceived nor    
comprehended4 ,but as  our age advances1
 we gradually1 or ,i should rather say  
slowly1 come to a  kind of knowledge of 

ourselves4 ,therefore1 that original    
recommendation  which is given to us by 
our nature1 is obscure and uncertain2   
and that  first appetite of the mind    
only goes the length of wishing to      
secure our  own safety and soundness4   
,but when we begin to look around us1   
and to feel  what we are1 and in what we
 differ from all the other animals1 then
 we  begin to pursue the objects for    
which we were born4 ,and we see a       
similar  thing take place in beasts1 who
 at first do not move from the place in 
which they were born2 but afterwards all
 move1 influenced by some desire  of    
their own4 ,and so we see snakes crawl1 
ducks swim1 blackbirds fly1 oxen  use   
their horns1 scorpions their stings2 and
 we see nature a guide to each  animal  
in its path of life4    ,and the case is
 similar with the human race4 ,for      
infants at their first  birth lie as if 
they were utterly devoid of mind2 but   
when a little  strength has been added  
to them1 they use both their mind and   

their  senses1 and endeavour to raise   
themselves up and to use their hands2   
and  they recognise those by whom they  
are being brought up2 and afterwards    
they are amused with those of their own 
age1 and gladly associate with  them1   
and give themselves up to play1 and are 
attracted by hearing  stories1 and are  
fond of pleasing others with their own  
superfluities2 and  take curious notice 
of what is done at home1 and begin to   
make remarks1  and to learn2 and do not 
like to be ignorant of the names of     
those whom  they see2 and in their      
sports and contests with their fellows1 
they are  delighted if they win1 and if 
they are beaten they are dejected and   
lose  their spirits4 ,and we must not   
think that any of these things happen   
without reason2 for the power of man is 
produced in such a way by nature1  that 
it seems made for a perception of all   
excellence3 and on that account         
children1 even without being taught1 are
 influenced by likeness of those        

virtues of which they have the seeds in 
themselves2 for they are the  original  
elements of nature3 and when they have  
acquired growth1 then the  whole work of
 nature is accomplished4 ,for as we have
 been born and created  so as to contain
 in ourselves the principles of doing   
something1 and of  loving somebody1 and 
of liberality1 and of gratitude2 and so 
as to have  minds adapted for knowledge1
 prudence1 and fortitude1 and averse to 
their  opposites2 it is not without     
cause that we see in children those     
sparks1  as it were1 of virtue which ,i 
have mentioned1 by which the reason of a
  philosopher ought to be kindled to    
follow that guide as if it were a god1  
and so to arrive at the knowledge of the
 object of nature4    ,for1 as ,i have  
often said already1 the power of nature 
is discerned  through a cloud while we  
are of a weak age and feeble intellect2 
but when  our mind has made progress and
 acquired strength1 then it recognises  
the  power of nature1 but still in such 

a way that it can make more progress    
still1 and that it must derive the      
beginning of that progress from itself4 
,,xvi4 ,we must therefore enter into the
 nature of things1 and see thoroughly   
what it demands2 for otherwise we cannot
 arrive at the knowledge of  ourselves4 
,and because this precept was too       
important an one to be  discerned by a  
man1 it has on that account been        
attributed to ,god4 ,the  ,pythian      
,apollo1 then1 enjoins us to know       
ourselves3 but this knowledge is  to    
know the power of our mind and body1 and
 to follow that course of life  which   
enjoys the circumstances in which it is 
placed4 ,and since that  desire of the  
mind to have all the things which ,i    
have mentioned in the  most perfect     
manner in which nature could provide    
them1 existed from the  beginning1 we   
must admit1 when we have obtained what  
we desired1 that  nature consists in    
that as its extreme point1 and that that
 is the chief  good3 which certainly    

must in every case be sought for        
spontaneously for  its own sake1 since  
it has already been proved1 that even   
all its separate  parts are to be       
desired for their own sake4 ,but if1 in 
enumerating the  advantages of the body1
 any one should think that we have      
passed over  pleasure1 that question may
 be postponed till another opportunity2 
for it  makes no difference with regard 
to the present subject of our           
discussion1  whether pleasure consists  
in those things which we have called the
 chief  things in accordance with       
nature1 or whether it does not4 ,for if1
 as ,i  indeed think1 pleasure is not   
the crowning good of nature1 it has been
  properly passed over3 but if that     
crowning good does exist in pleasure1 as
  some assert1 then the fact does not at
 all hinder this idea of ours of the    
chief good from being the right one4    
,for1 if to those things which are the  
principal goods of nature1 pleasure is  
added1 then there will have been  added 

just one advantage of the body2 but no  
change will have been made in  the      
original definition of the chief good   
which was laid down at first4    ,,xvii4
 ,and hitherto1 indeed1 reason has      
advanced with us in such a way as  to be
 wholly derived from the original       
recommendation of nature4 ,but now  we  
must pursue another kind of argument1   
namely1 that we are moved in  these     
matters of our own exceeding goodwill1  
not only because we love  ourselves1 but
 because there is both in the body and  
in the mind a  peculiar power belonging 
to each part of nature4 ,and1 7to begin 
with the  body17 do you not see that if 
there is anything in their limbs        
deformed1  or weak1 or deficient1 men   
conceal it8 and take pains1 and labour  
earnestly1 if they can possibly contrive
 it1 to prevent that defect of the  body
 from being visible1 or else to render  
it as little visible as  possible8 and  
that they submit to great pain for the  
sake of curing any  such defect8 in     

order that1 even though the actual use  
of the limb1 after  the application of  
the remedy1 be likely to be not greater1
 but even less1  still the appearance of
 the limb may be restored to the        
ordinary course of  nature4 ,in truth1  
as all men fancy that they are          
altogether desirable by  nature1 and    
that too1 not on any other account1 but 
for their own sakes1  it follows        
inevitably that each part of them should
 be desired for its own  sake1 because  
the whole body is sought for its own    
sake4 ,what more need ,i  say8 ,is there
 nothing in the motion and condition of 
the body which nature  herself decides  
ought to be noticed8 for instance1 how a
 person walks or  sits1 what the        
expression of his countenance is1 what  
his features are2 is  there nothing in  
all these things which we think worthy  
or unworthy of a  free man1 as the case 
may be8 ,do we not think many men       
deserving of  hatred1 who appear by some
 motion or condition to have despised   

the laws  and moderation of nature8 ,and
 since these things are derived from the
  body1 what is the reason why beauty   
also may not fairly be said to be a     
thing to be desired for its own sake8   
,for if we consider distortion or       
disfigurement of the body a thing to be 
avoided for its own sake1 why should we 
not also1 and perhaps still more1       
cultivate dignity of form for its own   
sake8 ,and if we avoid what is          
unseemly1 both in the condition and     
motion of the body1 why may we not on   
the other hand pursue beauty8 ,and we   
also desire health1 strength1 and       
freedom from pain1 not merely because of
 their utility1 but also for their  own 
sakes4 ,for since nature wishes to be   
made complete in all her parts1  she    
desires this condition of the body1     
which is most according to nature1  for 
its own sake3 but nature is put into    
complete confusion if the body is       
either sick1 or in pain1 or destitute of
 strength4    ,,xviii4 ,let us consider 

the parts of the mind1 the appearance of
 which is  more noble2 for in proportion
 as they are more sublime1 they give a  
more  clear indication of their nature4 
,so vehement a love1 then1 of knowledge 
and science is innate in us1 that no one
 can doubt that the nature of man  is   
drawn to them without being attracted by
 any external gain4 ,do we not  see how 
boys cannot be deterred even by stripes 
from the consideration and              
investigation of such and such things8  
how1 though they may be beaten1  they   
still pursue their inquiries1 and       
rejoice in having acquired some         
knowledge8 how they delight in telling  
others what they have learnt8 how  they 
are attracted by processions1 and games1
 and spectacles of that kind1  and will 
endure even hunger and thirst for such  
an object8 ,can ,i say no  more8 ,do we 
not see those who are fond of liberal   
studies and arts regard  neither their  
health nor their estate8 and endure     
everything because they  are charmed    

with the intrinsic beauty of knowledge  
and science8 and that  they put the     
pleasures which they derive from        
learning in the scale  against the      
greatest care and labour8 ,and ,homer   
himself appears to me to  have had some 
such feeling as this1 which he has      
developed in what he has  said about the
 songs of the ,sirens3 for they do not  
seem to have been  accustomed to attract
 those who were sailing by with the     
sweetness of  their voices1 or with any 
novelty or variety in their song1 but   
the  profession which they made of      
possessing great knowledge2 so that men 
clung to their rocks from a desire of   
learning4 ,for thus they invite         
,ulysses1 7for ,i have translated       
several passages of ,homer1 and this    
among  them7--          ,oh stay1 ,o    
pride of ,greece6 ,ulysses1 stay6       
,oh1 cease thy course1 and listen to our
 lay6      ,blest is the man ordain'd   
our voice to hear3      ,our song       
instructs the soul and charms the ear4  

,approach1 thy soul shall into raptures 
rise2      ,approach1 and learn new     
wisdom from the wise4      ,we know     
whate'er the kings of mighty name       
,achieved at ,ilium in the field of     
fame2      ,whate'er beneath the sun's  
bright journey lies--      ,oh stay1 and
 learn new wisdom from the wise47#di7   
,homer saw that the story would not be  
probable if he represented so great  a  
man as caught by mere songs2 so they    
promise him knowledge1 which it was  not
 strange that a man desirous of wisdom  
should consider dearer than his         
country4 ,and1 indeed1 to wish to know  
everything of every kind1 is natural  to
 the curious2 but1 to be attracted by   
the contemplation of greater  objects1  
to entertain a general desire for       
knowledge1 ought to be  considered a    
proof of a great man4    ,,xix4 ,what   
ardour for study do you not suppose     
there must have been in  ,archimedes1   
who was so occupied in drawing some     
mathematical figures in  the sand1 that 

he was not aware that his city was      
taken8 ,and what a mighty  genius was   
that of ,aristoxenus which1 we see1 was 
devoted to music8 ,what  fondness1 too1 
for study1 must have inspired           
,aristophanes1 to dedicate his  whole   
life to literature6 ,what shall we say  
of ,pythagoras8 ,why should ,i  speak of
 ,plato and of ,democritus1 by whom1 we 
see1 that the most distant  countries   
were travelled over1 on account of their
 desire for learning8  ,and those who   
are blind to this have never loved      
anything very worthy of  being known4   
,and here ,i may say1 that those who say
 that those studies  which ,i have      
mentioned are cultivated for the sake of
 the pleasures of the  mind1 do not     
understand that they are desirable for  
their own sakes1  because the mind is   
delighted by them1 without the          
interruption of any  ideas of utility1  
and rejoices in the mere fact of        
knowledge1 even though  it may possibly 
produce inconvenience4 ,but why need we 

seek for more  instances to prove what  
is so evident8 ,for let us examine our  
own selves1  and inquire how the motions
 of the stars1 and the contemplation of 
the  heavenly bodies1 and the knowledge 
of all those things which are hidden    
from us by the obscurity of nature1     
affect us2 and why history1 which we    
are accustomed to trace back as far as  
possible1 delights us2 in the           
investigation of which we go over again 
all that has been omitted1 and  follow  
up all that we have begun4 ,nor1 indeed1
 am ,i ignorant that there is  a use1   
and not merely pleasure1 in history4    
,what1 however1 will be said1  with     
reference to our reading with pleasure  
imaginary fables1 from which  no utility
 can possibly be derived8 ,or to our    
wishing that the names of  those who    
have performed any great exploits1 and  
their family1 and their  country1 and   
many circumstances besides1 which are   
not at all necessary1  should be known  
to us8 ,how shall we explain the fact1  

that men of the  lowest rank1 who have  
no hope of ever performing great deeds  
themselves1  artisans in short1 are fond
 of history2 and that we may see that   
those  persons also are especially fond 
of hearing and reading of great         
achievements1 who are removed from all  
hope of ever performing any1 being  worn
 out with old age8    ,it must1         
therefore1 be understood1 that the      
allurements are in the things           
themselves which are learnt and known1  
and that it is they themselves  which   
excite us to learning and to the        
acquisition of information4 ,and1       
indeed1 the old philosophers1 in their  
fictitious descriptions of the  islands 
of the blessed1 intimate the kind of    
life which the wise pass1  whom they    
imagine to be free from all care1       
requiring no cultivation or             
appointments of life as necessary1 and  
doing1 and about to do nothing else  but
 devote their whole time to inquiring   
and learning and arriving at a          

knowledge of nature4 ,but we see that   
that is not only the delight of a  happy
 life1 but also a relief from misery4   
,therefore1 many men while in  the power
 of enemies or tyrants1 many while in   
prison or in exile1 have  relieved their
 sorrow by the study of literature4 ,a  
great man of this  city1 ,demetrius     
,phalereus1 when he had been unjustly   
banished from his  country1 fled to     
,alexandria1 to king ,ptolemy2 and1 as  
he was very eminent  for his knowledge  
of this philosophy to which we are      
exhorting you1 and  had been a pupil of 
,theophrastus1 he wrote many admirable  
treatises during  the time of that      
unfortunate leisure of his1 not1 indeed1
 for any utility  to himself1 for that  
was out of his reach1 but the           
cultivation of his mind  was to him a   
sort of sustenance for his human nature4
    ,i1 indeed1 have often heard ,cnus  
,aufidius1 a man of prtorian rank1 of   
great learning1 but blind1 say that he  
was affected more by a regret for  the  

loss of light1 than of any actual       
benefit which he derived from his  eyes4
 ,lastly1 if sleep did not bring us rest
 to our bodies1 and a sort of  medicine 
after labour1 we should think it        
contrary to nature1 for it  deprives us 
of our senses1 and takes away our power 
of action4 ,therefore1  if either nature
 were in no need of rest1 or if it could
 obtain it by any  other means1 we      
should be glad1 since even now we are in
 the habit of  doing without sleep1 in a
 manner almost contrary to nature1 when 
we want  to do or to learn something4   
,,xx4 ,but there are tokens supplied by 
nature1 still clearer1 or1 ,i may say1  
entirely evident and indubitable1--more 
especially1 indeed1 in man1 but  also in
 every animal1--that the mind is always 
desirous to be doing  something1 and can
 in no condition endure perpetual rest4 
,it is easy to  see this in the earliest
 age of children2 for although ,i fear  
that ,i may  appear prolix on this      
subject1 still all the ancient          

philosophers1 and  especially those of  
our own country1 have recourse to the   
cradle for  illustrations1 because they 
think that in childhood they can most   
easily  detect the will of nature4 ,we  
see1 then1 that even infants cannot     
rest2  but1 when they have advanced a   
little1 then they are delighted with    
even  laborious sports1 so that they    
cannot be deterred from them even by    
beating3 and that desire for action     
grows with their growth4 ,therefore1 we 
should not like to have the slumber of  
,endymion given to us1 not even if  we  
expected to enjoy the most delicious    
dreams2 and if it were1 we should  think
 it like death4 ,moreover1 we see that  
even the most indolent men1 men  of a   
singular worthlessness1 are still always
 in motion both in mind and  body2 and  
when they are not hindered by some      
unavoidable circumstance1  that they    
demand a dice-box or some game of some  
kind1 or conversation2  and1 as they    
have none of the liberal delights of    

learning1 seek circles  and assemblies4 
,even beasts1 which we shut up for our  
own amusement1  though they are better  
fed than if they were free1 still do not
 willingly  endure being imprisoned1 but
 pine for the free and unrestrained     
movements  given to them by nature4     
,therefore1 in proportion as every one  
is born and  prepared for the best      
objects1 he would be unwilling to live  
at all if1  being excluded from action1 
he were able only to enjoy the most     
abundant  pleasures4    ,for men wish   
either to do something as individuals1  
or those who have  loftier souls        
undertake the affairs of the state1 and 
devote themselves to  the attainment of 
honours and commands1 or else wholly    
addict themselves  to the study of      
learning2 in which path of life they are
 so far from  getting pleasures1 that   
they even endure care1 anxiety and      
sleeplessness1  enjoying only that most 
excellent portion of man which may be   
accounted  divine in us1 ,i mean the    

acuteness of the genius and intellect1  
and they  neither seek for pleasure nor 
shun labour4 ,nor do they intermit      
either  their admiration of the         
discoveries of the ancients1 or their   
search after  new ones2 and1 as they are
 insatiable in their pursuit of such1   
they  forget everything else1 and admit 
no low or grovelling thoughts2 and such 
great power is there in those studies1  
that we see even those who have         
proposed to themselves other chief      
goods1 which they measure by advantage  
or pleasure1 still devote their lives to
 the investigation of things1 and  to   
the explanation of the mysteries of     
nature4    ,,xxi4 ,this1 then1 is       
evident1 that we were born for action4  
,but there are  several kinds of action1
 so that the lesser are thrown into the 
shade by  those more important4 ,but    
those of most consequence are1 first of 
all1 as  it appears to me1 and to those 
philosophers whose system we are at     
present  discussing1 the consideration  

and knowledge of the heavens1 and of    
those  things which are hidden and      
concealed by nature1 but into which     
reason can  still penetrate4 ,and1 next 
to them1 the management of state        
affairs1 or a  prudent1 temperate1      
courageous principle of government and  
knowledge1 and  the other virtues1 and  
such actions as are in harmony with     
those virtues1  which we1 embracing them
 all in one word1 call honourable2 to   
the  knowledge and practice of which we 
are led by nature herself1 who goes     
before us as our guide1 we having been  
already encouraged to pursue it4  ,for  
the beginnings of all things are small1 
but1 as they proceed1 they  increase in 
magnitude1 and that naturally3 for1 at  
their first birth1  there is in them a  
certain tenderness and softness1 so that
 they cannot  see or do what is best4   
,for the light of virtue and of a happy 
life1 which  are the two principal      
things to be desired1 appears rather    
later2 and much  later still in such a  

way that it can be plainly perceived of 
what  character they are4    ,for1      
admirably does ,plato say1 8,that man is
 happy to whom1 even in his old  age1 it
 is allowed to arrive at wisdom and     
correctness of judgment40  ,wherefore1  
since we have said enough of the first  
advantages of nature1 we  will now      
examine those which are more important1 
and which are later in  point of time4  
,nature1 then1 has made and fashioned   
the body of man in such a manner1  that 
it makes some parts of him perfect at   
his first birth1 and forms  others as he
 advances in age2 and1 at the same time1
 does not employ many  external or      
adventitious aids4 ,but she has filled  
up the perfection of the  mind in the   
same way as that of the body2 for she   
has adorned it with  senses suitable for
 the effecting of its purposes1 so that 
it is not in  the least1 or not much1 in
 want of any assistance for             
strengthening  itself4 ,but that which  
is most excellent and important in man  

it has  abandoned3 although it has given
 him an intellect able to receive every 
kind of virtue1 and has implanted in    
him1 even without instruction1 a  slight
 knowledge of the most important things1
 and has begun1 as it were1  to teach   
him1 and has led him on to those        
elements as ,i may call them1 of  virtue
 which existed in him4 ,but it has only 
begun virtue itself1 nothing  more4     
,therefore it belongs to us1--when ,i   
say to us1 ,i mean to our art1--to      
trace back the consequences to those    
principles which we have received1      
until we have accomplished our object1  
which is indeed of a good deal more     
consequence1 and a good deal more to be 
desired for its own sake1 than  either  
the senses1 or those parts of the body  
which we have mentioned2  which the     
excellent perfection of the mind is so  
far superior to1 that it  can scarcely  
be imagined how great the difference is4
 ,therefore1 all  honour1 all           
admiration1 all study is referred to    

virtue1 and to those  actions which are 
consistent with virtue2 and all those   
things which are  either in our minds in
 that state1 or are done in that manner1
 are called  by one common              
name--honourable4 ,and we shall         
presently see what knowledge  we have of
 all these things1 and what is meant by 
the different names1 and  what the power
 and nature of each is4    ,,xxii4 ,but 
at present we need only explain that    
these things which ,i call  honourable1 
7besides the fact of our living         
ourselves on their account17  are also  
by their own nature deserving of being  
sought for their own sake4  ,children   
show this1 in whom nature is perceived  
as in a mirror4 ,what  eagerness is     
there in them when contending together6 
how vigorous are  their contests6 how   
elated are those who win6 how ashamed   
those who are  beaten6 how unwilling are
 they to be blamed6 how eager to be     
praised6 what  labours will they not    
endure to surpass their fellows6 what a 

recollection  have they of those who are
 kind to them6 how anxious are they to  
prove  their gratitude6 and these       
qualities are most visible in the best  
dispositions2 in which all these        
honourable qualities which we appreciate
  are filled up as it were by nature4   
,but in children they are only          
sketched4    ,again1 in more mature age1
 who is so unlike a man as not to be    
moved to a  dislike of baseness and     
approval of what is honourable8 ,who is 
there who  does not loathe a libidinous 
and licentious youth8 who1 on the       
contrary1  does not love modesty and    
constancy in that age1 even though his  
own  interest is not at all concerned8  
,who does not detest ,pullus            
,numitorius1  of ,fregell1 the traitor1 
although he was of use to our own       
republic8 who  does not praise ,codrus1 
the saviour of his city1 and the        
daughters of  ,erectheus8 ,who does not 
detest the name of ,tubulus8 and love   
the dead  ,aristides8 ,do we forget how 

much we are affected at hearing or      
reading  when we are brought to the     
knowledge of anything which has been    
done in a  pious1 or friendly1 or       
magnanimous spirit8 ,why should ,i speak
 of men like  ourselves1 who have been  
born and brought up and trained to      
praise and  glory8 ,what shouts of the  
common people and of the unlettered     
crowd are  excited in the theatres when 
this sentence is uttered--          ,i  
am ,orestes3      and when1 on the other
 hand1 the other actor says--           
,no2 it is ,i1 'tis ,i who am ,orestes4 
,but when one of them is allowed to     
depart by the perplexed and bewildered  
king1 and they demand to die together1  
is this scene ever acted without  being 
accompanied by the most violent         
expressions of admiration8 ,there is  no
 one1 then1 who does not approve of and 
praise this disposition of mind2  by    
which not only no advantage is sought1  
but good faith is preserved even  at the
 expense of one's advantage4 ,and not   

only are imaginary fables1 but  true    
histories also1 and especially those of 
our country1 full of such  instances3   
for we selected our most virtuous       
citizen to receive the ,idan  sacred    
vessels2 we have sent guardians to      
kings2 our generals have devoted  their 
lives for the safety of the republic2   
our consuls have warned a king  who was 
our greatest enemy1 when he was actually
 approaching our walls1 to  beware of   
poison4 ,in our republic1 a woman has   
been found to expiate1 by a  voluntary  
death1 a violation which was inflicted  
on her by force2 and a  man to kill his 
daughter to save her from being         
ravished4 ,all which  instances1 and a  
countless host of others1 prove to the  
comprehension of  every one that those  
who performed those deeds were induced  
to do so by  the brilliancy of virtue1  
forgetful of their own advantage1 and   
that we1  when we praise those actions1 
are influenced by nothing but their     
honourable character4    ,,xxiii4 ,and  

having briefly explained these matters1 
7for ,i have not sought  to adduce the  
number of examples which ,i might have  
done1 because there  was no doubt on the
 subject17 it is shown sufficiently by  
these facts that  all the virtues1 and  
that honourableness which arises from   
these virtues1  and clings to them1 are 
worthy to be sought for their own sake4 
,but in the  whole of this              
honourableness of which we are speaking1
 there is nothing so  eminent1 nor so   
extensive in its operation1 as the union
 of man with man1  and a certain        
partnership in and communication of     
advantages1 and the  affection itself of
 the human race2 which originating in   
that first  feeling according to which  
the offspring is loved by the parent1   
and the  whole house united by the bonds
 of wedlock and descent1 creeps         
gradually  out of doors1 first of all to
 one's relations1 then to one's         
connexions1  then to one's friends and  
neighbours1 then to one's               

fellow-countrymen1 and  to the public   
friends and allies of one's country2    
then it embraces the  whole human race3 
and this disposition of mind1 giving    
every one his due1  and protecting with 
liberality and equity this union of     
human society  which ,i have spoken of1 
is called justice1 akin to which are    
piety1  kindness1 liberality1           
benevolence1 courtesy1 and all other    
qualities of  the same kind4 ,but these1
 though peculiarly belonging to justice1
 are also  common to the other virtues4 
,for as the nature of man has been      
created such that it has a sort of      
innate principle of society and         
citizenship1 which the ,greeks call  1  
whatever each virtue does will not be   
inconsistent with that  principle of    
common union1 and that human affection  
and society which ,i  have spoken of2   
and justice1 as she founds herself in   
practice on the  other virtues1 will    
also require them1 for justice cannot be
 maintained  except by a courageous and 

wise man4 ,honourableness itself1 then1 
is a  thing of the same character as all
 this conspiracy and agreement of the   
virtues which ,i have been speaking of2 
since it is either virtue itself1  or an
 action virtuously performed4 ,and a    
life acting in harmony and  consistency 
with this system1 and with virtue1 may  
fairly be thought  upright and          
honourable1 and consistent1 and natural4
 ,and this union and  combination of    
virtues is nevertheless divided by      
philosophers on some  principle of their
 own4 ,for though they are so joined and
 connected as to  be all partners with  
one another1 and to be unable to be     
separated from  one another1 yet each   
has its peculiar sphere of duty2 as1 for
 instance1  fortitude is discerned in   
labour and danger2 temperance1 in the   
disregard  of pleasures2 prudence1 in   
the choice of good and evil2 justice1 in
 giving  every one his due4 ,since1     
then1 there is in every virtue a certain
 care  which turns its eyes abroad1 as  

it were1 and which is anxious about and 
embraces others1 the conclusion is1 that
 friends1 and brothers1 and  relations1 
and connexions1 and fellow-countrymen1  
and in short everybody1  since we wish  
the society of all mankind to be one1   
are to be sought after  for their own   
sakes4 ,but still1 of all these things  
and people there is  nothing of such a  
kind that it can be accounted the chief 
good4 ,and from  this it follows1 that  
there are found to be two kinds of goods
 which are  to be sought for their own  
sake4 ,one kind which exists in those   
things in  which that chief good is     
brought to perfection3 and they are     
qualities of  either the mind or body4  
,but these things which are external1   
that is to  say1 which are in neither   
mind nor body1 such as friends1 parents1
  children1 relations1 or one's country1
 are indeed dear to me for their own    
sake1 but still are not of the same     
class as the other kind4 ,nor1 indeed1  
could any one ever arrive at the chief  

good1 if all those things which are     
external1 although desirable1 were      
contained in the chief good4    ,,xxiv4 
,how then1 you will say1 can it be true 
that everything is referred  to the     
chief good1 if friendship1 and          
relationship1 and all other external    
things are not contained in the chief   
good8 ,why1 on this  principle1--because
 we protect those things which are      
external with those  duties which arise 
from their respective kinds of virtue4  
,for the  cultivation of the regard of a
 friend or a parent1 which is the       
discharge  of a duty1 is advantageous in
 the actual fact of its being such1     
inasmuch  as to discharge a duty is a   
good action2 and good actions spring    
from  virtues2 and wise men attend to   
them1 using nature as a kind of guide4  
,but men who are not perfect1 though    
endued with admirable talents and       
dispositions1 are often excited by      
glory1 which has the form and likeness  
of honourableness4 ,but if they were to 

be thoroughly acquainted with the       
nature of that honourableness which is  
wholly complete and perfect1 that  one  
thing which is the most admirable of all
 things1 and the most  praiseworthy1    
with what joy would they be filled1 when
 they are so greatly  delighted at its  
outline and bare idea6 ,for who that is 
given up to  pleasure1 and inflamed with
 the conflagration of desire in the     
enjoyment  of those things which he has 
most eagerly wished for1 can we imagine 
to be  full of such joy as the elder    
,africanus after he had conquered       
,hannibal1  or the younger one after he 
had destroyed ,carthage8 ,what man was  
there who  was so much elated with the  
way in which all the people flocked to  
the  ,tiber on that day of festivity as 
,lucius ,paullus1 when he was leading in
  triumph king ,perses as his prisoner1 
who was conveyed down on the same       
river8    ,come now1 my friend ,lucius1 
build up in your mind the lofty         
excellence of  virtue1 and you will not 

doubt that the men who are possessed of 
it1 and  who live with a magnanimous and
 upright spirit1 are always happy2 men  
who  are aware that all the movements of
 fortune1 all the changes of affairs    
and circumstances1 must be insignificant
 and powerless if ever they come  to a  
contest with virtue4 ,for those things  
which are considered by us as  goods of 
the body1 do indeed make up a happy     
life1 but still not without  leaving it 
possible for a life to be happy without 
them4 ,for so slight and  inconsiderable
 are those additions of goods1 that as  
stars in the orbit of  the sun are not  
seen1 so neither are those qualities1   
but they are lost in  the brilliancy of 
virtue4 ,and as it is said with truth   
that the influence  of the advantages of
 the body have but little weight in     
making life happy1  so on the other hand
 it is too strong an assertion to say   
that they have  no weight at all3 for   
those who argue thus appear to me to    
forget the  principles of nature which  

they themselves have contended for4     
,we must1 therefore1 allow these things 
some influence3 provided only that  we  
understand how much we ought to allow   
them4 ,it is1 however1 the part of  a   
philosopher1 who seeks not so much for  
what is specious as for what is  true1  
neither utterly to disregard those      
things which those very boastful  men   
used to admit to be in accordance with  
nature2 and at the same time to  see    
that the power of virtue1 and the       
authority1 if ,i may say so1 of         
honourableness1 is so great that all    
those other things appear to be1 ,i     
will not say nothing1 but so trivial as 
to be little better than nothing4  ,this
 is the language natural to a man who1  
on the one hand1 does not  despise      
everything except virtue1 and who1 at   
the same time1 honours  virtue with the 
praises which it deserves4 ,this1 in    
short1 is a full and  perfect           
explanation of the chief good2 and as   
the others have attempted to  detach    

different portions from the main body of
 it1 each individual among  them has    
wished to appear to have established his
 own theory as the  victorious one4     
,,xxv4 ,the knowledge of things has been
 often extolled in a wonderful manner   
by ,aristotle and ,theophrastus for its 
own sake4 ,and ,herillus1 being  allured
 by this single fact1 maintained that   
knowledge was the chief good1  and that 
there was no other thing whatever that  
deserved to be sought for  its own sake4
 ,many things have been said by the     
ancients on the subject of  despising   
and contemning all human affairs4 ,this 
was the one principle of  ,aristo2 he   
declared that there was nothing which   
ought to be avoided or  desired except  
vice and virtue4 ,and our school has    
placed freedom from  pain among those   
things which are in accordance with     
nature4 ,hieronymus  has said that this 
is the chief good3 but ,callipho1 and   
,diodorus after  him1 one of whom was   
devoted to pleasure1 and the other to   

freedom from  pain1 could neither of    
them allow honourableness to be left    
out1 which has  been especially praised 
by our countrymen4 ,moreover1 even the  
advocates of  pleasure seek for         
subterfuges1 and are talking of virtue  
whole days  together2 and say that      
pleasure is at first only wished for2   
that  afterwards it1 through custom1    
becomes a second nature1 by which men   
are  excited to do many things without  
at all seeking pleasure4    ,the ,stoics
 remain to be mentioned4 ,they1 indeed1 
have borrowed not one  idea or another  
from us1 but have appropriated our whole
 system of  philosophy4 ,and as other   
thieves alter the marks on the things   
which they  have stolen1 so they1 in    
order to be able to use our opinions as 
their  own1 have changed the names which
 are like the private marks on things4  
,and so this school alone remains worthy
 of those men who study the liberal     
arts1 worthy of the learned1 worthy of  
eminent men1 worthy of princes1  worthy 

of kings4    ,and when he had said this1
 and then stopped to take breath for a  
while2  ,what is the matter8 said he2 do
 ,i not seem to have said enough in your
  presence for my own defence8 ,i       
replied1--,indeed1 ,o ,piso1 as has     
often been  the case before1 you have   
seemed to-day to have so thorough an    
acquaintance with all these things1     
that1 if we could always have the       
advantage of your company1 ,i should not
 think that we had much reason to  have 
recourse to the ,greeks4 ,which1 indeed1
 ,i have been the more pleased  with1   
because ,i recollect that ,staseas1 the 
,neapolitan1 your preceptor1 a  very    
illustrious ,peripatetic1 was at times  
accustomed to discuss these  points     
differently1 agreeing with those men who
 attributed a great deal of  weight to  
prosperity and adversity1 and to the    
good or evil qualities of  the body4 ,it
 is as you say1 he replied3 but these   
points are argued with  much more       
accuracy and impressiveness by my friend

 ,antiochus than they  used to be by    
,staseas4 ,although ,i do not ask what  
,i have proved to your  satisfaction1   
but what ,i have proved to the          
satisfaction of this friend of  mine1   
the young ,cicero1 a pupil whom ,i wish 
to seduce from you4    ,,xxvi4 ,then    
,lucius said1--,indeed1 ,i quite agree  
with what you have said1 and  ,i think  
my brother does too4 ,then said ,piso to
 me3 ,is it so8 ,do you pardon  the     
youth8 or would you rather that he      
should learn these things which1  when  
he has learnt thoroughly1 he will know  
nothing at all8 ,i give him  leave1 said
 ,i4 ,but do not you recollect that ,i  
am allowed to express my  approval or   
disapproval of what has been said by    
you8 ,for who can avoid  approving of   
what appears to him to be probable8 ,can
 any1 we said1 approve  of anything of  
which he has not a thorough perception1 
comprehension1 and  knowledge8 ,there   
is1 said ,i1 no great dispute between   
us1 ,piso2 for there  is no other reason

 why it appears to me that nothing can  
be perceived  except that the faculty of
 perceiving is defined in such a manner 
by the  ,stoics that they affirm that   
nothing can be perceived except what is 
so  true that it cannot possibly be     
false4 ,therefore there is a dispute    
between us and the ,stoics1 but none    
between us and the ,peripatetics4       
,however1 we may pass over this1 for it 
would open the door to a long and       
sufficiently bitter dispute4    ,it     
seemed to me that it was too hasty an   
assertion of yours that all wise  men   
were always happy4 ,i know not how such 
a sentence escaped you2 but  unless it  
is proved1 ,i fear that the assertion   
which ,theophrastus made  with respect  
to fortune1 and pain1 and bodily torture
 be true1 with which  he did not        
consider that a happy life could        
possibly be joined1 must be  true4 ,for 
it is exceedingly inconsistent that the 
same person should be  happy1 and       
afflicted with many misfortunes2 and how

 these things can be  reconciled1 ,i do 
not at all understand4 ,which assertion 
then1 said he1 is  it that you object   
to8 ,do you deny that the power of      
virtue is so great  that she can by     
herself be sufficient for happiness8 or1
 if you admit  that1 do you think it    
impossible that those persons who are   
possessed of  virtue may be happy1 even 
if they are afflicted with some evils8  
,i1  indeed1 ,i replied1 wish to        
attribute as much power as possible to  
virtue2  however1 we may discuss at     
another time how great her power is2 at 
present  the only question is1 whether  
she has so much power as this1 if       
anything  external to virtue is reckoned
 among the goods4 ,but1 said he1 if you 
grant  to the ,stoics that virtue alone1
 if it be present1 makes life happy1 you
  grant it also to the ,peripatetics2   
for those things which they do not      
venture to call evils1 but which they   
admit to be unpleasant and              
inconvenient1 and to be rejected1 and   

odious to nature we call evils1 but     
slight1 and1 indeed1 exceedingly        
trifling ones4 ,wherefore1 if that man  
can  be happy who is among disagreeable 
things which ought to be rejected1 he   
also may be so who is among slight      
evils4 ,and ,i say1 ,o ,piso1 if there  
is  any one who in causes is used to    
have a clear insight into what the real 
question is1 you are the man3 wherefore 
,i beg of you to take notice2 for1      
hitherto1 owing perhaps to my fault1 you
 do not perceive what it is that ,i  am 
seeking4 ,i am attending1 said he2 and  
,i am waiting to see what answer  you   
will make to the questions that ,i ask4 
,,xxvii4 ,i will answer1 said ,i1 that  
,i am not inquiring at present what     
virtue can effect1 but what is said     
consistently on the subject1 and why    
the assertions are at variance with one 
another4 ,how so8 said he4 ,because1    
said ,i1 when this pompous assertion is 
uttered by ,zeno1 as if he were an      
oracle1--8,virtue requires nothing      

beyond herself to enable a man to live  
happily0--why8 said he--8,because there 
is no other good except what is         
honourable40 ,i do not ask now whether  
that is true2 ,i only say that what  he 
says is admirably consistent4 ,epicurus 
will say the same thing--8that  the wise
 man is always happy20 which1 indeed1 he
 is in the habit of  spouting out       
sometimes4 ,and he says that this wise  
man1 when he is being  torn to pieces   
with the most exquisite pains1 will say1
 8,how pleasant it  is6 how ,i disregard
 it60 ,i will not argue with the man as 
to why there is  so much power in       
nature2 ,i will only urge that he does  
not understand what  he ought to say1   
after he has said that pain is the      
greatest evil4    ,now ,i will address  
the same language to you4 ,you say that 
all the goods  and evils are the same   
that those men pronounce them to be who 
have never  even seen a philosopher in a
 picture1 as the saying is--namely1     
health1  strength1 stature1 beauty1 the 

soundness of all a man's nails1 you call
  good--deformity1 disease1 weakness you
 call evils4 ,these are all externals2  
do not go on any more2 but at all events
 you will reckon these things  among the
 goods1 as the goods of the body which  
help to compose them1  namely1 friends1 
children1 relations1 riches1 honour1    
power4 ,take notice  that ,i say nothing
 against this4 ,if those are evils into 
which a wise man  can fall1 then it     
follows that to be a wise man is not    
sufficient to  secure a happy life4     
,indeed1 said he1 it is very little     
towards securing a  perfectly happy one1
 but enough for securing a tolerably    
happy one4    ,i have noticed1 said he1 
that you made this distinction a little 
while  ago1 and ,i know that our friend 
,antiochus used to speak in this manner4
  ,but what can be less approved of than
 the idea of a person being happy1  and 
yet not happy enough8 ,for when anything
 is enough1 then whatever is  added to  
that is excess3 and no one is too happy3

 and no one is happier  than a happy    
man4 ,therefore1 said he1 was not       
,quintus ,metellus1 who saw  three of   
his sons consuls1 one of whom was also  
censor and celebrated a  triumph1 and a 
fourth prtor2 and who left them all in  
safety behind him1  and who saw his     
three daughters married1 having been    
himself consul1  censor and augur1 and  
having celebrated a triumph2 was he not1
 ,i say1 in  your opinion1 7supposing   
him to have been a wise man17 happier   
than  ,regulus1 who being in the power  
of the enemy1 was put to death by       
sleeplessness and hunger1 though he may 
have been equally wise8    ,,xxviii4    
,why do you ask me that8 said ,i2 ask   
the ,stoics4 ,what answer1 then1  said  
he1 do you suppose they will make8 ,they
 will say that ,metellus was in  no     
respect more happy than ,regulus4 ,let  
us1 then1 said he1 hear what they  have 
got to say4 ,but1 said ,i1 we are       
wandering from our subject2 for ,i am   
not asking what is true1 but what each  

person ought to say4 ,i wish1  indeed1  
that they would say that one man is     
happier than another3 you  should see   
the ruin ,i would make of them4 ,for1 as
 the chief good consists  in virtue     
alone1 and in honourableness2 and as    
neither virtue1 as they  say1 nor       
honourableness is capable of growth1 and
 as that alone is good  which makes him 
who enjoys it necessarily happy1 as that
 in which alone  happiness is placed    
cannot be increased1 how is it possible 
that one  person can be happier than    
another8 ,do you not see how all these  
things  agree together8 ,and1 in truth1 
7for ,i must avow what ,i feel17 the    
mutual  dependence of all these things  
on one another is marvellous3 the last  
part  corresponds to the first1 the     
middle to each extremity1 and each      
extremity  to the other4 ,they see all  
that follows from1 or is inconsistent   
with  them4 ,in geometry1 if you grant  
the premises the conclusion follows4    
,grant  that there is nothing good      

except what is honourable1 and you must 
grant  that happiness is placed in      
virtue alone4 ,try it the other way4 ,if
 you  grant this conclusion1 you must   
grant the premises2 but this is not the 
case with the arguments of your school4 
,there are three kinds of goods4  ,the  
assertions go trippingly on3 he comes to
 the conclusion3 he sticks  fast3 he is 
in a difficulty2 for he wishes to say1  
that nothing can be  wanting to a wise  
man to complete his happiness--a very   
honourable  sentiment1 one worthy of    
,socrates1 or even of ,plato4 ,well1 ,i 
do venture to  assert that1 says he4 ,it
 is impossible1 unless you remodel your 
premises3  if poverty is an evil1 no    
beggar can be happy be he ever so wise4 
,but ,zeno  ventured to call such a man 
not only happy1 but also rich4    ,to be
 in pain is an evil2 the man who is     
fastened to a cross cannot be  happy4   
,children are a good2 childlessness is  
an evil4 ,one's country is a  good2     
exile is an evil4 ,health is a good2    

disease is an evil4 ,vigour of  body is 
a good2 feebleness is an evil4 ,clear   
sight is a good2 blindness is  an evil4 
,but1 though a man may be able to       
alleviate any single one of  these evils
 by consolation1 how will he be able to 
endure them all8 ,for1  suppose one     
person were blind1 feeble1 afflicted    
with grievous sickness1  banished1      
childless1 in indigence1 and put to the 
torture2 what will you  call him1 ,zeno8
 ,happy1 says he4 ,will you call him    
most perfectly happy8 ,to  be sure ,i   
will1 says he1 when ,i have taught him  
that happiness does not  admit of       
degrees any more than virtue1 the mere  
possession of which makes  him happy4   
,this seems to you incredible that he   
can call him perfectly  happy4 ,what is 
your own doctrine8 is that credible8    
,for if you appeal to  the people1 you  
will never convince them that a man in  
such a condition is  happy4 ,if you     
appeal to prudent men1 perhaps they will
 doubt as to one  point1 namely1 whether

 there is so much force in virtue that  
men endued  with that can be happy1 even
 in ,phalaris's bull2 but they will not 
doubt  at all that the ,stoic language  
is consistent with itself and that yours
 is  not4    ,do you then1 says he1     
approve of the book of ,theophrastus on 
a happy life8  ,we are wandering from   
our subject2 and that ,i may not be too 
tedious--if1  said ,i1 ,piso1 those     
things are evils1 ,i wholly approve of  
it4 ,do not they  then1 said he1 seem to
 you to be evils8 ,do you ask that8 said
 ,i2 whatever  answer ,i give you1 you  
will find yourself in embarrassment4    
,how so8 said  he4 ,because1 if they are
 evils1 a man who is affected with them 
cannot be  happy4 ,if they are not      
evils1 there is an end to the whole     
system of the  ,peripatetics4 ,and he   
laughing replied1 ,i see what you are   
at2 you are  afraid ,i shall carry off  
your pupil4 ,you may carry him off1 said
 ,i1 if he  likes to follow you2 for he 
will still be with me if he is with you4

    ,,xxix4 ,listen then1 said he1 ,o   
,lucius2 for1 as ,theophrastus says1 ,i 
must  direct my discourse to you1--the  
whole authority of philosophy consists  
in  making life happy2 for we are all   
inflamed with a desire of living        
happily4 ,this1 both your brother and ,i
 agree upon4 ,wherefore we must see     
whether the system of the philosophers  
can give us this4 ,it promises to do  so
 certainly3 for1 unless it made that    
promise1 why did ,plato travel over     
,egypt1 to learn numbers and knowledge  
of the heavenly mysteries from          
barbarian priests8 ,why afterwards did  
he go to ,tarentum to ,archytas2 and  to
 the other ,pythagoreans of ,locri1     
,echecrates1 ,timus1 and ,acrion2 in    
order1 after he had drained ,socrates to
 the dregs1 to add the doctrine of  the 
,pythagoreans to his1 and to learn in   
addition those things which  ,socrates  
rejected8 ,why did ,pythagoras himself  
travel over ,egypt1 and visit  the      
,persian ,magi2 why did he go on foot   

over so many countries of the           
barbarians1 and make so many voyages8   
,why did ,democritus do the same8 who1  
7whether it is true or false1 we will   
not stop to inquire17 is said to  have  
put out his own eyes2 certainly1 in     
order that his mind might be  abstracted
 from contemplation as little as        
possible2 he neglected his  patrimony1  
and left his lands uncultivated1 and    
what other object could he  have had    
except a happy life8 ,and if he placed  
that in the knowledge of  things1 still 
from that investigation of natural      
philosophy he sought to  acquire        
equanimity2 for he called the summum    
bonum 1 and very often  1 that is to    
say1 a mind free from alarm4 ,but1      
although this was  well said1 it was not
 very elegantly expressed2 for he said  
very little  about virtue1 and even what
 he did say1 he did not express very    
clearly4  ,for it was not till after his
 death that these subjects were         
discussed in  this city1 first by       

,socrates1 and from ,socrates they got  
entrance into the  ,academy4 ,nor was   
there any doubt that all hope of living 
well and also  happily was placed in    
virtue3 and when ,zeno had learnt this  
from our  school1 he began to express   
himself on the same subject in another  
manner1  as lawyers do on trials4 ,and  
now you approve of this conduct in him4 
,will  you then say that he by changing 
the names of things escaped the charge  
of  inconsistency1 and yet not allow us 
to do so too8    ,he asserts that the   
life of ,metellus was not happier than  
that of ,regulus1  but admits that it   
was preferable to it2 he says it was not
 more to be  sought after1 but still to 
be taken in preference2 and that if one 
had a  choice1 one would choose the life
 of ,metellus1 and reject that of       
,regulus4  ,what then he calls          
preferable1 and worthy to be chosen in  
preference1 ,i  call happier2 and yet ,i
 do not attribute more importance to    
that sort of  life than the ,stoics do4 

,for what difference is there between   
us1 except  that ,i call well-known     
things by well-known names1 and that    
they seek for  new terms to express the 
same ideas8 ,and so1 as there is always 
some one  in the senate who wants an    
interpreter1 we1 too1 must listen to    
them with  an interpreter4 ,i call that 
good which is in accordance with nature2
 and  whatever is contrary to nature ,i 
call evil4 ,nor do ,i alone use the     
definition2 you do also1 ,o ,chrysippus1
 in the forum and at home2 but in  the  
school you discard it4 ,what then8 ,do  
you think that men in general  ought to 
speak in one way1 and philosophers in   
another1 as to the  importance of which 
everything is8 that learned men should  
hold one  language1 and unlearned ones  
another8 ,but as learned men are agreed 
of how  much importance everything is1  
7if they were men1 they would speak in  
the  usual fashion17 why1 as long as    
they leave the facts alone1 they are    
welcome to mould the names according to 

their fancy4    ,,xxx4 ,but ,i come now 
to the charge of inconsistency1 that you
 may not  repeat that ,i am making      
digressions2 which you think exist only 
in  language1 but which ,i used to      
consider depended on the subject of     
which  one was speaking4 ,if it is      
sufficiently perceived 7and here we have
 most  excellent assistance from the    
,stoics71 that the power of virtue is so
  great1 that if everything else were   
put on the opposite side1 it would not  
be even visible1 when all things which  
they admit at least to be  advantages1  
and to deserve to be taken1 and chosen1 
and preferred1 and  which they define as
 worthy of being highly estimated2 when1
 ,i say1 ,i call  these things goods    
which have so many names given them by  
the ,stoics1 some  of which are new1 and
 invented expressly for them1 such as   
producta and  reducta1 and some of which
 are merely synonymous2 7for what       
difference  can it make whether you wish
 for a thing or choose it8 that which is

  chosen1 and on which deliberate choice
 is exercised1 appears to me to be  the 
better7 still1 when ,i have called all  
these things goods1 the question  is    
merely how great goods ,i call them2    
when ,i say they deserved to be  wished 
for1 the question is1--how eagerly8     
,but1 if ,i do not attribute more       
importance to them when ,i say that they
  deserve to be wished for1 than you do 
who say they only deserve to be  chosen1
 and if ,i do not value them more highly
 when ,i call them bona1  than you1 when
 you speak of them as producta2 then all
 these things must  inevitably be       
involved in obscurity1 and put out of   
sight1 and lost amid  the rays of virtue
 like stars in the sunbeams4 ,but that  
life in which  there is any evil cannot 
be happy4 ,then a corn-field full of    
thick and  heavy ears of corn is not a  
corn-field if you see any tares         
anywhere2 nor  is traffic gainful if1   
amid the greatest gains1 you incur the  
most  trifling loss4 ,do we ever act on 

different principles in any             
circumstances  of life2 and will you not
 judge of the whole from its greatest   
part8 or is  there any doubt that virtue
 is so much the most important thing in 
all  human affairs1 that it throws all  
the rest into the shade8    ,i will     
venture1 then1 to call the rest of the  
things which are in  accordance with    
nature1 goods1 and not to cheat them of 
their ancient  title1 rather than go and
 hunt for some new name for them2 and   
the dignity  of virtue ,i will put1 as  
it were1 in the other scale of the      
balance4  ,believe me1 that scale will  
outweigh both earth and sea2 for the    
whole  always has its name from that    
which embraces its largest part1 and is 
the  most widely diffused4 ,we say that 
one man lives merrily4 ,is there1 then1 
an end of this merry life of his if he  
is for a moment a little poor8    ,but1 
in the case of that ,marcus ,crassus1   
who1 ,lucilius says1 laughed once  in   
his life1 the fact of his having done so

 did not deliver him from being  called 
4 ,they call ,polycrates of ,samos      
happy4 ,nothing had ever  happened to   
him which he did not like1 except that  
he had thrown into the  sea a ring which
 he valued greatly2 therefore he was    
unhappy as to that  one annoyance2 but  
subsequently he was happy again when    
that same ring was  found in the belly  
of a fish4 ,but he1 if he was unwise    
7which he certainly  was1 since he was a
 tyrant71 was never happy2 if he was    
wise he was not  miserable1 even at the 
time when he was crucified by ,ortes1   
the  lieutenant of ,darius4 ,but he had 
great evils inflicted on him4 ,who      
denies  that8--but those evils were     
overcome by the greatness of his virtue4
    ,,xxxi4 ,do you not grant even this 
to the ,peripatetics1 that they may say 
that the life of all good1 that is1 of  
all wise men1 and of men adorned  with  
every virtue1 has in all its parts more 
good than evil8 ,who says  this8 ,the   
,stoics may say so4 ,by no means4 ,but  

do not those very men who  measure      
everything by pleasure and pain1 say    
loudly that the wise man has  always    
more things which he likes than         
dislikes8 ,when1 then1 these men        
attribute so much to virtue1 who confess
 that they would not even lift a  finger
 for the sake of virtue1 if it did not  
bring pleasure with it1 what  ought we  
to do1 who say that ever so             
inconsiderable an excellence of mind  is
 so superior to all the goods of the    
body1 that they are put wholly out  of  
sight by it8 ,for who is there who can  
venture to say1 that it can  happen to a
 wise man 7even if such a thing were    
possible7 to discard  virtue for ever1  
with a view of being released from all  
pain8 ,who of our  school1 who are not  
ashamed to call those things evils which
 the ,stoics  call only bitter1 would   
say that it was better to do anything   
dishonourably with pleasure than        
honourably with pain8 ,to us1 indeed1   
,dionysius of ,heraclea appears to have 

deserted the ,stoics in a shameful      
manner1 on account of the pain of his   
eyes2 as if he had learnt from ,zeno    
not to be in pain when he was in pain4  
,he had heard1 but he had not  learnt1  
that it was not an evil1 because it was 
not dishonourable1 and  because it might
 be borne by a man4 ,if he had been a   
,peripatetic he would1  ,i suppose1 have
 adhered to his opinion1 since they say 
that pain is an  evil4 ,and with respect
 to bearing its bitterness1 they give   
the same  precepts as the ,stoics2 and1 
indeed1 your friend ,arcesilas1 although
 he  was a rather pertinacious arguer1  
was still on our side2 for he was a     
pupil of ,polemo2 and when he was       
suffering under the pain of the gout1   
and  ,carneades1 a most intimate friend 
of ,epicurus1 had come to see him1 and  
was going away very melancholy1 said1   
8,stay awhile1 ,i entreat you1 friend   
,carneades2 for the pain does not reach 
here10 showing his feet and his  breast4
 ,still he would have preferred being   

out of pain4    ,,xxxii4 ,this1 then1 is
 our doctrine1 which appears to you to  
be  inconsistent1 since1 by reason of a 
certain heavenly1 divine1 and           
inexpressible excellence of virtue1 so  
great1 that wherever virtue and  great1 
desirable1 and praiseworthy exploits    
done by virtue are1 there  misery and   
grief cannot be1 but nevertheless labour
 and annoyance can be1  ,i do not       
hesitate to affirm that all wise men are
 always happy1 but still1  that it is   
possible that one man may be more happy 
than another4    ,but this is exactly   
the assertion1 ,piso1 said ,i1 which you
 are bound to  prove over and over      
again2 and if you establish it1 then you
 may take with  you not only my young   
,cicero here1 but me too4 ,then1 said   
,quintus1 it  appears to me that this   
has been sufficiently proved4 ,i am     
glad1 indeed1  that philosophy1 the     
treasures of which ,i have been used to 
value above  the possession of          
everything else 7so rich did it appear  

to me1 that ,i  could ask of it whatever
 ,i desired to know in our studies71--,i
 rejoice1  therefore1 that it has been  
found more acute than all other arts1   
for it  was in acuteness that some      
people asserted that it was deficient4  
,not a  mite more so than ours1 surely1 
said ,pomponius1 jestingly4 ,but1       
seriously1  ,i have been very much      
pleased with what you have said2 for    
what ,i did not  think could be         
expressed in ,latin has been expressed  
by you1 and that no  less clearly than  
by the ,greeks1 and in not less well    
adapted language4  ,but it is time to   
depart1 if you please2 and let us go to 
my house4    ,and when he had said this1
 as it appeared that we had discussed   
the  subject sufficiently1 we all went  
into the town to the house of           
,pomponius4            ,,the ,,tusculan 
,,disputations4          ,introduction4 
,in the year ,a4,u4,c4 #gjh1 and the    
#fb;d year of ,cicero's age1 his        
daughter1  ,tullia1 died in childbed2   

and her loss afflicted ,cicero to such a
 degree  that he abandoned all public   
business1 and1 leaving the city1 retired
 to  ,asterra1 which was a country house
 that he had near ,antium2 where1 after 
a  while1 he devoted himself to         
philosophical studies1 and1 besides     
other  works1 he published his ,treatise
 de ,finibus1 and also this ,treatise   
called  the ,tusculan ,disputations1 of 
which ,middleton gives this concise     
description3--    8,the first book      
teaches us how to contemn the terrors of
 death1 and to  look upon it as a       
blessing rather than an evil2    8,the  
second1 to support pain and affliction  
with a manly fortitude2    8,the third1 
to appease all our complaints and       
uneasinesses under the  accidents of    
life2    8,the fourth1 to moderate all  
our other passions2    8,and the fifth  
explains the sufficiency of virtue to   
make men happy40    ,it was his custom  
in the opportunities of his leisure to  
take some friends  with him into the    

country1 where1 instead of amusing      
themselves with idle  sports or feasts1 
their diversions were wholly            
speculative1 tending to  improve the    
mind and enlarge the understanding4 ,in 
this manner he now  spent five days at  
his ,tusculan villa in discussing with  
his friends the  several questions just 
mentioned4 ,for1 after employing the    
mornings in  declaiming and rhetorical  
exercises1 they used to retire in the   
afternoon  into a gallery1 called the   
,academy1 which he had built for the    
purpose of  philosophical conferences1  
where1 after the manner of the ,greeks1 
he held  a school as they called it1 and
 invited the company to call for any    
subject that they desired to hear       
explained1 which being proposed         
accordingly by some of the audience     
became immediately the argument of  that
 day's debate4 ,these five conferences  
or dialogues he collected  afterwards   
into writing in the very words and      
manner in which they really  passed2 and

 published them under the title of his  
,tusculan ,disputations1  from the name 
of the villa in which they were held4   
,book ,i4 ,on ,the ,contempt ,of ,death4
      ,i4 ,at a time when ,i had        
entirely1 or to a great degree1 released
 myself  from my labours as an advocate1
 and from my duties as a senator1 ,i had
  recourse again1 ,brutus1 principally  
by your advice1 to those studies which  
never had been out of my mind1 although 
neglected at times1 and which  after a  
long interval ,i resumed3 and now since 
the principles and rules of  all arts   
which relate to living well depend on   
the study of wisdom1 which  is called   
philosophy1 ,i have thought it an       
employment worthy of me to  illustrate  
them in the ,latin tongue3 not because  
philosophy could not be  understood in  
the ,greek language1 or by the teaching 
of ,greek masters2 but  it has always   
been my opinion1 that our countrymen    
have1 in some  instances1 made wiser    
discoveries than the ,greeks1 with      

reference to those  subjects which they 
have considered worthy of devoting their
 attention to1  and in others have      
improved upon their discoveries1 so that
 in one way or  other we surpass them on
 every point3 for1 with regard to the   
manners and  habits of private life1 and
 family and domestic affairs1 we        
certainly  manage them with more        
elegance1 and better than they did2 and 
as to our  republic1 that our ancestors 
have1 beyond all dispute1 formed on     
better  customs and laws4 ,what shall ,i
 say of our military affairs2 in which  
our  ancestors have been most eminent in
 valour1 and still more so in           
discipline8 ,as to those things which   
are attained not by study1 but  nature1 
neither ,greece1 nor any nation1 is     
comparable to us3 for what  people has  
displayed such gravity1 such steadiness1
 such greatness of  soul1 probity1      
faith--such distinguished virtue of     
every kind1 as to be  equal to our      
ancestors4 ,in learning1 indeed1 and all

 kinds of literature1  ,greece did excel
 us1 and it was easy to do so where     
there was no  competition2 for while    
amongst the ,greeks the poets were the  
most ancient  species of learned        
men1--since ,homer and ,hesiod lived    
before the foundation  of ,rome1 and    
,archilochus7#ej7 was a contemporary of 
,romulus1--we received  poetry much     
later4 ,for it was about five hundred   
and ten years after the  building of    
,rome before ,livius7#ea7 published a   
play in the consulship of  ,c4          
,claudius1 the son of ,ccus1 and ,m4    
,tuditanus1 a year before the birth  of 
,ennius1 who was older than ,plautus and
 ,nvius4    ,,ii4 ,it was1 therefore1   
late before poets were either known or  
received  amongst us2 though we find in 
,cato de ,originibus that the guests    
used1 at  their entertainments1 to sing 
the praises of famous men to the sound  
of  the flute2 but a speech of ,cato's  
shows this kind of poetry to have been  
in no great esteem1 as he censures      

,marcus ,nobilior1 for carrying poets   
with him into his province3 for that    
consul1 as we know1 carried ,ennius     
with him into tolia4 ,therefore the less
 esteem poets were in1 the less  were   
those studies pursued3 though even then 
those who did display the  greatest     
abilities that way1 were not very       
inferior to the ,greeks4 ,do we  imagine
 that if it had been considered         
commendable in ,fabius17#eb7 a man of   
the highest rank1 to paint1 we should   
not have had many ,polycleti and        
,parrbasii4 ,honour nourishes art1 and  
glory is the spur with all to  studies2 
while those studies are always neglected
 in every nation1 which  are looked upon
 disparagingly4 ,the ,greeks held skill 
in vocal and  instrumental music as a   
very important accomplishment1 and      
therefore it is  recorded of            
,epaminondas1 who1 in my opinion1 was   
the greatest man amongst  the ,greeks1  
that he played excellently on the flute2
 and ,themistocles some  years before   

was deemed ignorant because at an       
entertainment he declined  the lyre when
 it was offered to him4 ,for this reason
 musicians flourished  in ,greece2 music
 was a general study2 and whoever was   
unacquainted with  it1 was not          
considered as fully instructed in       
learning4 ,geometry was in  high esteem 
with them1 therefore none were more     
honourable than  mathematicians2 but we 
have confined this art to bare measuring
 and  calculating4    ,,iii4 ,but on the
 contrary1 we early entertained an      
esteem for the orator2  though he was   
not at first a man of learning1 but only
 quick at speaking2  in subsequent times
 he became learned2 for it is reported  
that ,galba1  ,africanus1 and ,llius1   
were men of learning2 and that even     
,cato1 who  preceded them in point of   
time1 was a studious man3 then succeeded
 the  ,lepidi1 ,carbo1 and ,gracchi1 and
 so many great orators after them1 down 
to  our own times1 that we were very    
little1 if at all1 inferior to the      

,greeks4 ,philosophy has been at a low  
ebb even to this present time1 and  has 
had no assistance from our own language1
 and so now ,i have undertaken  to raise
 and illustrate it1 in order that1 as ,i
 have been of service to my  countrymen1
 when employed on public affairs1 ,i    
may1 if possible1 be so  likewise in my 
retirement2 and in this ,i must take the
 more pains1 because  there are already 
many books in the ,latin language which 
are said to be  written inaccurately1   
having been composed by excellent men1  
only not of  sufficient learning3 for   
indeed it is possible that a man may    
think well1  and yet not be able to     
express his thoughts elegantly2 but for 
any one to  publish thoughts which he   
can neither arrange skilfully nor       
illustrate so  as to entertain his      
reader1 is an unpardonable abuse of     
letters and  retirement3 they1          
therefore1 read their books to one      
another1 and no one  ever takes them up 
but those who wish to have the same     

licence for  careless writing allowed to
 themselves4 ,wherefore1 if oratory has 
acquired  any reputation from my        
industry1 ,i shall take the more pains  
to open the  fountains of philosophy1   
from which all my eloquence has taken   
its rise4    ,,iv4 ,but1 as             
,aristotle17#ec7 a man of the greatest  
genius1 and of the most  various        
knowledge1 being excited by the glory of
 the rhetorician  ,isocrates17#ed7      
commenced teaching young men to speak1  
and joined  philosophy with eloquence3  
so it is my design not to lay aside my  
former  study of oratory1 and yet to    
employ myself at the same time in this  
greater and more fruitful art2 for ,i   
have always thought1 that to be able  to
 speak copiously and elegantly on the   
most important questions1 was the  most 
perfect philosophy4 ,and ,i have so     
diligently applied myself to this       
pursuit that ,i have already ventured to
 have a school like the ,greeks4 ,and   
lately when you left us1 having many of 

my friends about me1 ,i attempted  at my
 ,tusculan villa what ,i could do in    
that way2 for as ,i formerly used  to   
practise declaiming1 which nobody       
continued longer than myself1 so this   
is now to be the declamation of my old  
age4 ,i desired any one to propose a    
question which he wished to have        
discussed3 and then ,i argued that point
  either sitting or walking1 and so ,i  
have compiled the schol1 as the  ,greeks
 call them1 of five days1 in as many    
books4 ,we proceeded in this  manner3   
when he who had proposed the subject for
 discussion had said what  he thought   
proper1 ,i spoke against him2 for this  
is1 you know1 the old and  ,socratic    
method of arguing against another's     
opinion2 for ,socrates thought  that    
thus the truth would more easily be     
arrived at4 ,but to give you a  better  
notion of our disputations1 ,i will not 
barely send you an account  of them1 but
 represent them to you as they were     
carried on2 therefore let  the          

introduction be thus3--    ,v4 ,a4 ,to  
me death seems to be an evil4    ,m4    
,what to those who are already dead8 or 
to those who must die8    ,a4 ,to both4 
,m4 ,it is a misery then1 because an    
evil8    ,a4 ,certainly4    ,m4 ,then   
those who have already died1 and those  
who have still got to  die1 are both    
miserable8    ,a4 ,so it appears to me4 
,m4 ,then all are miserable8    ,a4     
,every one4    ,m4 ,and1 indeed1 if you 
wish to be consistent1 all that are     
already born1  or ever shall be1 are not
 only miserable1 but always will be so2 
for  should you maintain those only to  
be miserable1 you would not except any  
one living1 for all must die2 but there 
should be an end of misery in  death4   
,but seeing that the dead are miserable1
 we are born to eternal  misery1 for    
they must of consequence be miserable   
who died a hundred  thousand years ago2 
or rather1 all that have ever been born4
    ,a4 ,so1 indeed1 ,i think4    ,m4   
,tell me1 ,i beseech you1 are you afraid

 of the three-headed ,cerberus  in the  
shades below1 and the roaring waves of  
,cocytus1 and the passage  over         
,acheron1 and ,tantalus expiring with   
thirst1 while the water touches  his    
chin2 and ,sisyphus1          ,who      
sweats with arduous toil in vain        
,the steepy summit of the mount to gain8
      ,perhaps1 too1 you dread the      
inexorable judges1 ,minos and           
,rhadamanthus2  before whom neither ,l4 
,crassus1 nor ,m4 ,antonius can defend  
you2 and where1  since the cause lies   
before ,grecian judges1 you will not    
even be able to  employ ,demosthenes3   
but you must plead for yourself before a
 very great  assembly4 ,these things    
perhaps you dread1 and therefore look on
 death as  an eternal evil4    ,,vi4 ,a4
 ,do you take me to be so imbecile as to
 give credit to such  things8    ,m4    
,what8 do you not believe them8    ,a4  
,not in the least4    ,m4 ,i am sorry to
 hear that4    ,a4 ,why1 ,i beg8    ,m4 
,because ,i could have been very        

eloquent in speaking against them4      
,a4 ,and who could not on such a        
subject8 or1 what trouble is it to      
refute  these monstrous inventions of   
the poets and painters87#ee7    ,m4 ,and
 yet you have books of philosophers full
 of arguments against  these4    ,a4 ,a 
great waste of time1 truly6 for1 who is 
so weak as to be concerned  about them8 
,m4 ,if1 then1 there is no one miserable
 in the infernal regions1 there  can be 
no one there at all4    ,a4 ,i am       
altogether of that opinion4    ,m4      
,where1 then1 are those you call        
miserable8 or what place do they        
inhabit8 for1 if they exist at all1 they
 must be somewhere8    ,a4 ,i1 indeed1  
am of opinion that they are nowhere4    
,m4 ,then they have no existence at all4
    ,a4 ,even so1 and yet they are      
miserable for this very reason1 that    
they  have no existence4    ,m4 ,i had  
rather now have you afraid of ,cerberus1
 than speak thus  inaccurately4    ,a4  
,in what respect8    ,m4 ,because you   

admit him to exist whose existence you  
deny with the same  breath4 ,where now  
is your sagacity8 when you say any one  
is miserable1 you  say that he who does 
not exist1 does exist4    ,a4 ,i am not 
so absurd as to say that4    ,m4 ,what  
is it that you do say1 then8    ,a4 ,i  
say1 for instance1 that ,marcus ,crassus
 is miserable in being  deprived of such
 great riches as his by death2 that ,cn4
 ,pompey is  miserable1 in being taken  
from such glory and honour2 and in      
short1 that  all are miserable who are  
deprived of this light of life4    ,m4  
,you have returned to the same point1   
for to be miserable implies an          
existence2 but you just now denied that 
the dead had any existence2 if1  then1  
they have not1 they can be nothing2 and 
if so1 they are not even  miserable4    
,a4 ,perhaps ,i do not express what ,i  
mean1 for ,i look upon this very        
circumstance1 not to exist after having 
existed1 to be very miserable4    ,m4   
,what1 more so than not to have existed 

at all8 therefore1 those who  are not   
yet born1 are miserable because they are
 not2 and we ourselves1 if  we are to be
 miserable after death1 were miserable  
before we were born3  but ,i do not     
remember that ,i was miserable before ,i
 was born2 and ,i should  be glad to    
know1 if your memory is better1 what you
 recollect of yourself  before you were 
born4    ,,vii4 ,a4 ,you are pleasant2  
as if ,i had said that those men are    
miserable  who are not born1 and not    
that they are so who are dead4    ,m4   
,you say1 then1 that they are so8    ,a4
 ,yes1 ,i say that because they no      
longer exist after having existed1  they
 are miserable4    ,m4 ,you do not      
perceive1 that you are asserting        
contradictions2 for what  is a greater  
contradiction1 than that they should be 
not only miserable1  but should have any
 existence at all1 which does not exist8
 ,when you go  out at the ,capene gate  
and see the tombs of the ,calatini1 the 
,scipios1  ,servilii1 and ,metelli1 do  

you look on them as miserable8    ,a4   
,because you press me with a word1      
henceforward ,i will not say they  are  
miserable absolutely1 but miserable on  
this account1 because they have  no     
existence4    ,m4 ,you do not say1 then1
 8,m4 ,crassus is miserable10 but only  
8,miserable  ,m4 ,crassus40    ,a4      
,exactly so4    ,m4 ,as if it did not   
follow1 that whatever you speak of in   
that manner1  either is or is not4 ,are 
you not acquainted with the first       
principles of  logic8 for this is the   
first thing they lay down1 ,whatever is 
asserted1  7for that is the best way    
that occurs to me1 at the moment1 of    
rendering  the ,greek term1 1 if ,i can 
think of a more accurate expression     
hereafter ,i will use it17 is asserted  
as being either true or false4 ,when1   
therefore1 you say1 8,miserable ,m4     
,crassus10 you either say this1 8,m4    
,crassus is miserable10 so that some    
judgment may be made whether it is  true
 or false1 or you say nothing at all4   

,a4 ,well1 then1 ,i now own that the    
dead are not miserable1 since you have  
drawn from me a concession1 that they   
who do not exist at all1 cannot be      
miserable4 ,what then8 we that are      
alive1 are we not wretched1 seeing we   
must die8 for what is there agreeable in
 life1 when we must night and day       
reflect that1 at some time or other1 we 
must die8    ,,viii4 ,m4 ,do you not1   
then1 perceive how great is the evil    
from which you  have delivered human    
nature8    ,a4 ,by what means8    ,m4   
,because1 if to die were miserable to   
the dead1 to live would be a  kind of   
infinite and eternal misery3 now1       
however1 ,i see a goal1 and when  ,i    
have reached it1 there is nothing more  
to be feared2 but you seem to me  to    
follow the opinion of ,epicharmus17#ef7 
a man of some discernment1 and  sharp   
enough for a ,sicilian4    ,a4 ,what    
opinion8 for ,i do not recollect it4    
,m4 ,i will tell you if ,i can in       
,latin1 for you know ,i am no more used 

to  bring in ,latin sentences in a      
,greek discourse1 than ,greek in a      
,latin one4    ,a4 ,and that is right   
enough3 but what is that opinion of     
,epicharmus8    ,m4          ,i would   
not die1 but yet      ,am not concerned 
that ,i shall be dead4      ,a4 ,i now  
recollect the ,greek1 but since you have
 obliged me to grant  that the dead are 
not miserable1 proceed to convince me   
that it is not  miserable to be under a 
necessity of dying4    ,m4 ,that is easy
 enough1 but ,i have greater things in  
hand4    ,a4 ,how comes that to be so   
easy8 and what are those things of more 
consequence8    ,m4 ,thus3 because1 if  
there is no evil after death1 then even 
death  itself can be none2 for that     
which immediately succeeds that is a    
state  where you grant that there is no 
evil2 so that even to be obliged to die 
can be no evil2 for that is only the    
being obliged to arrive at a place      
where we allow that no evil is4    ,a4  
,i beg you will be more explicit on this

 point1 for these subtle  arguments     
force me sooner to admissions than to   
conviction4 ,but what are  those more   
important things about which you say    
that you are occupied8    ,m4 ,to teach 
you1 if ,i can1 that death is not only  
no evil1 but a good4    ,a4 ,i do not   
insist on that1 but should be glad to   
hear you argue it1 for  even though you 
should not prove your point1 yet you    
will prove that death  is no evil3 but  
,i will not interrupt you1 ,i would     
rather hear a continued  discourse4     
,m4 ,what1 if ,i should ask you a       
question1 would you not answer8    ,a4  
,that would look like pride2 but ,i     
would rather you should not ask but     
where necessity requires4    ,,ix4 ,m4  
,i will comply with your wishes1 and    
explain as well as ,i can1  what you    
require2 but not with any idea that1    
like the ,pythian ,apollo1  what ,i say 
must needs be certain and indisputable2 
but as a mere man1  endeavouring to     
arrive at probabilities by conjecture1  

for ,i have no  ground to proceed       
further on than probability4 ,those men 
may call their  statements indisputable 
who assert that what they say can be    
perceived by  the senses1 and who       
proclaim themselves philosophers by     
profession4    ,a4 ,do as you please1 we
 are ready to hear you4    ,m4 ,the     
first thing1 then1 is to inquire what   
death1 which seems to be so  well       
understood1 really is2 for some imagine 
death to be the departure of  the soul  
from the body2 others think that there  
is no such departure1 but  that soul and
 body perish together1 and that1 the    
soul is extinguished  with the body4 ,of
 those who think that the soul does     
depart from the body1  some believe in  
its immediate dissolution2 others fancy 
that it continues  to exist for a time2 
and others believe that it lasts for    
ever4 ,there is  great dispute even what
 the soul is1 where it is1 and whence it
 is  derived3 with some1 the heart      
itself 7cor7 seems to be the soul1 hence

 the  expressions1 excordes1 vecordes1  
concordes2 and that prudent ,nasica1    
who was twice consul1 was called        
,corculus1 i4e4 wise-heart2 and lius    
,sextus is described as ,egregie        
cordatus homo1 catus liu' ,sextus--that 
great wise-hearted man1 sage lius4      
,empedocles imagines the blood1 which   
is suffused over the heart1 to be the   
soul2 to others1 a certain part of  the 
brain seems to be the throne of the     
soul2 others neither allow the  heart   
itself1 nor any portion of the brain1 to
 be the soul2 but think  either that the
 heart is the seat and abode of the     
soul2 or else that the  brain is so4    
,some would have the soul1 or spirit1 to
 be the anima1 as  our schools generally
 agree2 and indeed the name signifies as
 much1 for we  use the expressions      
animam agere1 to live2 animam efflare1  
to expire2  animosi1 men of spirit2 bene
 animati1 men of right feeling2 exanimi 
sententia1 according to our real        
opinion--and the very word animus is    

derived from anima4 ,again1 the soul    
seems to ,zeno the ,stoic to be fire4   
,x4 ,but what ,i have said as to the    
heart1 the blood1 the brain1 air1 or    
fire being the soul1 are common         
opinions3 the others are only           
entertained  by individuals2 and indeed 
there were many amongst the ancients who
 held  singular opinions on this        
subject1 of whom the latest was         
,aristoxenus1 a  man who was both a     
musician and a philosopher2 he          
maintained a certain  straining of the  
body1 like what is called harmony in    
music1 to be the  soul2 and believed    
that1 from the figure and nature of the 
whole body1  various motions are        
excited1 as sounds are from an          
instrument4 ,he adhered  steadily to his
 system1 and yet he said something1 the 
nature of which1  whatever it was1 had  
been detailed and explained a great     
while before by  ,plato4 ,xenocrates    
denied that the soul had any figure1 or 
anything like a  body2 but said it was a

 number1 the power of which1 as         
,pythagoras had  fancied1 some ages     
before1 was the greatest in nature3 his 
master1 ,plato1  imagined a three-fold  
soul2 a dominant portion of which1 that 
is to say1  reason1 he had lodged in the
 head1 as in a tower2 and the other two 
parts1  namely1 anger and desire1 he    
made subservient to this one1 and       
allotted  them distinct abodes1 placing 
anger in the breast1 and desire under   
the  prcordia4 ,but ,dicarchus1 in that 
discourse of some learned disputants1   
held at ,corinth1 which he details to us
 in three books2 in the first book      
introduces many speakers2 and in the    
other two he introduces a certain       
,pherecrates1 an old man of ,phthia1    
who1 as he said1 was descended from     
,deucalion2 asserting1 that there is in 
fact no such thing at all as a  soul2   
but that it is a name1 without a        
meaning2 and that it is idle to use  the
 expression1 8animals10 or 8animated    
beings20 that neither men nor  beasts   

have minds or souls2 but that all that  
power1 by which we act or  perceive1 is 
equally infused into every living       
creature1 and is  inseparable from the  
body1 for if it were not1 it would be   
nothing2 nor is  there anything whatever
 really existing except body1 which is a
 single and  simple thing1 so fashioned1
 as to live and have its sensations in  
consequence of the regulations of       
nature4 ,aristotle1 a man superior to   
all  others1 both in genius and industry
 7,i always except ,plato71 after having
  embraced these four known sorts of    
principles1 from which all things       
deduce their origin1 imagines that there
 is a certain fifth nature1 from  whence
 comes the soul2 for to think1 to       
foresee1 to learn1 to teach1 to  invent 
anything1 and many other attributes of  
the same kind1 such as1 to  remember1 to
 love1 to hate1 to desire1 to fear1 to  
be pleased or  displeased2 these1 and   
others like them1 exist1 he thinks1 in  
none of  those first four kinds3 on such

 account he adds a fifth kind1 which has
 no  name1 and so by a new name he calls
 the soul 1 as if it were a  certain    
continued and perpetual motion4    ,,xi4
 ,if ,i have not forgotten anything     
unintentionally1 these are the          
principal opinions concerning the soul4 
,i have omitted ,democritus1 a very     
great man indeed1 but one who deduces   
the soul from the fortuitous  concourse 
of small1 light1 and round substances2  
for1 if you believe men  of his school1 
there is nothing which a crowd of atoms 
cannot effect4  ,which of these opinions
 is true1 some god must determine4 ,it  
is an  important question for us1 which 
has the most appearance of truth4 ,shall
  we1 then1 prefer determining between  
them1 or shall we return to our         
subject8    ,a4 ,i could wish both1 if  
possible2 but it is difficult to mix    
them2  therefore1 if without a          
discussion of them we can get rid of the
 fears of  death1 let us proceed to do  
so2 but if this is not to be done       

without  explaining the question about  
souls1 let us have that now1 and the    
other  at another time4    ,m4 ,i take  
that plan to be the best1 which ,i      
perceive you are inclined  to2 for      
reason will demonstrate that1 whichever 
of the opinions which ,i  have stated is
 true1 it must follow1 then1 that death 
cannot be an evil2  or that it must     
rather be something desirable1 for if   
either the heart1 or  the blood1 or the 
brain1 is the soul1 then certainly the  
soul1 being  corporeal1 must perish with
 the rest of the body2 if it is air1 it 
will  perhaps be dissolved2 if it is    
fire1 it will be extinguished2 if it is 
,aristoxenus's harmony1 it will be put  
out of tune4 ,what shall ,i say of      
,dicarchus1 who denies that there is any
 soul8 ,in all these opinions1  there is
 nothing to affect any one after death2 
for all feeling is lost  with life1 and 
where there is no sensation1 nothing can
 interfere to  affect us4 ,the opinions 
of others do indeed bring us hope2 if it

 is any  pleasure to you to think that  
souls1 after they leave the body1 may go
 to  heaven as to a permanent home4     
,a4 ,i have great pleasure in that      
thought1 and it is what ,i most desire2 
and even if it should not be so1 ,i     
should still be very willing to believe 
it4    ,m4 ,what occasion have you1     
then1 for my assistance8 am ,i superior 
to  ,plato in eloquence8 ,turn over     
carefully his book that treats of the   
soul1  you will have there all that you 
can want4    ,a4 ,i have1 indeed1 done  
that1 and often2 but1 ,i know not how it
 comes to  pass1 ,i agree with it whilst
 ,i am reading it1 but when ,i have laid
 down  the book1 and begin to reflect   
with myself on the immortality of the   
soul1  all that agreement vanishes4     
,m4 ,how comes that8 do you admit this1 
that souls either exist after  death1 or
 else that they also perish at the      
moment of death8    ,a4 ,i agree to     
that4 ,and if they do exist1 ,i admit   
that they are happy2  but if they       

perish1 ,i cannot suppose them to be    
unhappy1 because1 in fact1  they have no
 existence at all4 ,you drove me to that
 concession but just  now4    ,m4 ,how1 
then1 can you1 or why do you1 assert    
that you think that death  is an evil1  
when it either makes us happy1 in the   
case of the soul  continuing to exist1  
or1 at all events1 not unhappy1 in the  
case of our  becoming destitute of all  
sensation4    ,,xii4 ,a4 ,explain1      
therefore1 if it is not troublesome to  
you1 first1 if  you can1 that souls do  
exist after death2 secondly1 should you 
fail in  that1 7and it is a very        
difficult thing to establish17 that     
death is free  from all evil2 for ,i am 
not without my fears that this itself is
 an evil2  ,i do not mean the immediate 
deprivation of sense1 but the fact that 
we  shall hereafter suffer deprivation4 
,m4 ,i have the best authority in       
support of the opinion you desire to    
have established1 which ought1 and      
generally has1 great weight in all      

cases4 ,and first1 ,i have all antiquity
 on that side1 which the more near  it  
is to its origin and divine descent1 the
 more clearly1 perhaps1 on that  account
 did it discern the truth in these      
matters4 ,this very doctrine1  then1 was
 adopted by all those ancients1 whom    
,ennius calls in the ,sabine  tongue1   
,casci1 namely1 that in death there was 
a sensation1 and that1 when  men        
departed this life1 they were not so    
entirely destroyed as to perish         
absolutely4 ,and this may appear from   
many other circumstances1 and           
especially from the pontifical rites and
 funeral obsequies1 which men of  the   
greatest genius would not have been so  
solicitous about1 and would not  have   
guarded from any injury by such severe  
laws1 but from a firm  persuasion that  
death was not so entire a destruction as
 wholly to abolish  and destroy         
everything1 but rather a kind of        
transmigration1 as it were1  and change 
of life1 which was1 in the case of      

illustrious men and women1  usually a   
guide to heaven1 while in that of       
others1 it was still confined  to the   
earth1 but in such a manner as still to 
exist4 ,from this1 and the  sentiments  
of the ,romans1          ,in heaven     
,romulus with ,gods now lives2      as  
,ennius saith1 agreeing with the common 
belief2 hence1 too ,hercules is         
considered so great and propitious a god
 amongst the ,greeks1 and from them  he 
was introduced among us1 and his worship
 has extended even to the very  ocean   
itself4 ,this is how it was that        
,bacchus was deified1 the offspring  of 
,semele2 and from the same illustrious  
fame we receive ,castor and ,pollux  as 
gods1 who are reported not only to have 
helped the ,romans to victory in  their 
battles1 but to have been the messengers
 of their success4 ,what  shall we say  
of ,ino1 the daughter of ,cadmus8 is she
 not called ,leucothea  by the ,greeks1 
and ,matuta by us8 ,nay more2 is not the
 whole of heaven 7not  to dwell on      

particulars7 almost filled with the     
offspring of men8    ,should ,i attempt 
to search into antiquity1 and produce   
from thence what  the ,greek writers    
have asserted1 it would appear that even
 those who are  called their principal  
gods1 were taken from among men up into 
heaven4    ,,xiii4 ,examine the         
sepulchres of those which are shown in  
,greece2  recollect1 for you have been  
initiated1 what lessons are taught in   
the  mysteries2 then will you perceive  
how extensive this doctrine is4 ,but    
they  who were not acquainted with      
natural philosophy1 7for it did not     
begin to  be in vogue till many years   
later17 had no higher belief than what  
natural  reason could give them2 they   
were not acquainted with the principles 
and  causes of things2 they were often  
induced by certain visions1 and those   
generally in the night1 to think that   
those men1 who had departed from  this  
life1 were still alive4 ,and this may   
further be brought as an  irrefragable  

argument for us to believe that there   
are gods1--that there  never was any    
nation so barbarous1 nor any people in  
the world so savage1  as to be without  
some notion of gods3 many have wrong    
notions of the gods1  for that is the   
nature and ordinary consequence of bad  
customs1 yet all  allow that there is a 
certain divine nature and energy4 ,nor  
does this  proceed from the conversation
 of men1 or the agreement of            
philosophers2 it  is not an opinion     
established by institutions or by laws2 
but1 no doubt1  in every case the       
consent of all nations is to be looked  
on as a law of  nature4 ,who is there1  
then1 that does not lament the loss of  
his friends1  principally from imagining
 them deprived of the conveniences of   
life8 ,take  away this opinion1 and you 
remove with it all grief2 for no one is 
afflicted merely on account of a loss   
sustained by himself4 ,perhaps we may   
be sorry1 and grieve a little2 but that 
bitter lamentation1 and those  mournful 

tears1 have their origin in our         
apprehensions that he whom we  loved is 
deprived of all the advantages of life1 
and is sensible of his  loss4 ,and we   
are led to this opinion by nature1      
without any arguments or  any           
instruction4    ,,xiv4 ,but the greatest
 proof of all is1 that nature herself   
gives a silent  judgment in favour of   
the immortality of the soul1 inasmuch as
 all are  anxious1 and that to a great  
degree1 about the things which concern  
futurity2--          ,one plants what   
future ages shall enjoy1      as        
,statius saith in his ,synephebi4 ,what 
is his object in doing so1 except  that 
he is interested in posterity8 ,shall   
the industrious husbandman1  then1 plant
 trees the fruit of which he shall never
 see8 and shall not the  great man found
 laws1 institutions1 and a republic8    
,what does the  procreation of children 
imply--and our care to continue our     
names--and our  adoptions--and our      
scrupulous exactness in drawing up      

wills--and the  inscriptions on         
monuments1 and panegyrics1 but that our 
thoughts run on  futurity8 ,there is no 
doubt but a judgment may be formed of   
nature in  general1 from looking at each
 nature in its most perfect specimens2  
and  what is a more perfect specimen of 
a man1 than those are who look on       
themselves as born for the assistance1  
the protection1 and the  preservation of
 others8 ,hercules has gone to heaven2  
he never would have  gone thither1 had  
he not1 whilst amongst men1 made that   
road for himself4  ,these things are of 
old date1 and have1 besides1 the        
sanction of universal  religion4        
,,xv4 ,what will you say8 what do you   
imagine that so many and such great men 
of our republic1 who have sacrificed    
their lives for its good1 expected8  ,do
 you believe that they thought that     
their names should not continue  beyond 
their lives8 ,none ever encountered     
death for their country1 but  under a   
firm persuasion of immortality6         

,themistocles might have lived at  his  
ease2 so might ,epaminondas2 and1 not to
 look abroad and amongst the  ancients  
for instances1 so might ,i myself4 ,but1
 somehow or other1 there  clings to our 
minds a certain presage of future ages2 
and this both exists  most firmly and   
appears most clearly1 in men of the     
loftiest genius and  greatest souls4    
,take away this1 and who would be so mad
 as to spend his  life amidst toils and 
dangers8 ,i speak of those in power4    
,what are the  poet's views but to be   
ennobled after death8 ,what else is the 
object of  these lines--                
,behold old ,ennius here1 who erst      
,thy fathers' great exploits rehearsed8 
,he is challenging the reward of glory  
from those men whose ancestors he       
himself had ennobled by his poetry4 ,and
 in the same spirit he says in  another 
passage--          ,let none with tears 
my funeral grace1 for ,i      ,claim    
from my works an immortality4      ,why 
do ,i mention poets8 the very mechanics 

are desirous of fame after  death4 ,why 
did ,phidias include a likeness of      
himself in the shield of  ,minerva1 when
 he was not allowed to inscribe his name
 on it8 ,what do our  philosophers think
 on the subject8 do not they put their  
names to those  very books which they   
write on the contempt of glory8 ,if1    
then1 universal  consent is the voice of
 nature1 and if it is the general       
opinion  everywhere1 that those who have
 quitted this life are still interested 
in  something2 we also must subscribe to
 that opinion4 ,and if we think that    
men of the greatest abilities and virtue
 see most clearly into the power  of    
nature1 because they themselves are her 
most perfect work2 it is very  probable 
that1 as every great man is especially  
anxious to benefit  posterity1 there is 
something of which he himself will be   
sensible after  death4    ,,xvi4 ,but as
 we are led by nature to think there are
 gods1 and as we  discover1 by reason1  
of what description they are1 so1 by the

 consent of  all nations1 we are induced
 to believe that our souls survive2 but 
where  their habitation is1 and of what 
character they eventually are1 must be  
learned from reason4 ,the want of any   
certain reason on which to argue has    
given rise to the idea of the shades    
below1 and to those fears1 which you    
seem1 not without reason1 to despise3   
for as our bodies fall to the  ground1  
and are covered with earth 7humus71 from
 whence we derive the  expression to be 
interred 7humari71 that has occasioned  
men to imagine  that the dead continue1 
during the remainder of their existence1
 under  ground2 which opinion has drawn 
after it many errors1 which the poets   
have  increased2 for the theatre1 being 
frequented by a large crowd1 among which
  are women and children1 is wont to be 
greatly affected on hearing such        
pompous verses as these--          ,lo6 
here ,i am1 who scarce could gain this  
place1      ,through stony mountains and
 a dreary waste2      ,through cliffs1  

whose sharpen'd stones tremendous hung1 
,where dreadful darkness spread itself  
around3      and the error prevailed so 
much1 though indeed at present it seems 
to me  to be removed1 that although men 
knew that the bodies of the dead had    
been  burned1 yet they conceived such   
things to be done in the infernal       
regions  as could not be executed or    
imagined without a body2 for they could 
not  conceive how disembodied souls     
could exist2 and1 therefore1 they looked
  out for some shape or figure4 ,this   
was the origin of all that account of   
the dead in ,homer4 ,this was the idea  
that caused my friend ,appius to frame  
his ,necromancy2 and this is how there  
got about that idea of the lake of      
,avernus1 in my neighbourhood1--        
,from whence the souls of               
undistinguish'd shape1      ,clad in    
thick shade1 rush from the open gate    
,of ,acheron1 vain phantoms of the dead4
      ,and they must needs have these   
appearances speak1 which is not possible

  without a tongue1 and a palate1 and   
jaws1 and without the help of lungs  and
 sides1 and without some shape or       
figure2 for they could see nothing by   
their mind alone1 they referred all to  
their eyes4 ,to withdraw the mind  from 
sensual objects1 and abstract our       
thoughts from what we are  accustomed   
to1 is an attribute of great genius3 ,i 
am persuaded1 indeed1  that there were  
many such men in former ages3 but       
,pherecydes7#eg7 the  ,syrian is the    
first on record who said that the souls 
of men were  immortal2 and he was a     
philosopher of great antiquity in the   
reign of my  namesake ,tullus4 ,his     
disciple ,pythagoras greatly confirmed  
this opinion1  who came into ,italy in  
the reign of ,tarquin the ,proud3 and   
all that  country which is called ,great
 ,greece was occupied by his school1 and
 he  himself was held in high honour1   
and had the greatest authority3 and the 
,pythagorean sect was for many ages     
after in such great credit1 that all    

learning was believed to be confined to 
that name4    ,,xvii4 ,but ,i return to 
the ancients4 ,they scarcely ever gave  
any reason for  their opinion but what  
could be explained by numbers or        
definitions4 ,it is  reported of ,plato1
 that he came into ,italy to make       
himself acquainted with  the            
,pythagoreans2 and that when there1     
amongst others1 he made an  acquaintance
 with ,archytas7#eh7 and ,timus17#ei7   
and learned from them all  the tenets of
 the ,pythagoreans2 and that he not only
 was of the same  opinion with          
,pythagoras concerning the immortality  
of the soul1 but that  he also brought  
reasons in support of it2 which1 if you 
have nothing to  say against it1 ,i will
 pass over1 and say no more at present  
about all  this hope of immortality4    
,a4 ,what1 will you leave me when you   
have raised my expectations so high8  ,i
 had rather1 so help me ,hercules6 be   
mistaken with ,plato1 whom ,i know how  
much you esteem1 and whom ,i admire     

myself from what you say of him1 than   
be in the right with those others4      
,m4 ,i commend you2 for1 indeed1 ,i     
could myself willingly be mistaken in   
his company4 ,do we1 then1 doubt1 as we 
do in other cases1 7though ,i think     
here is very little room for doubt in   
this case1 for the mathematicians  prove
 the facts to us17 that the earth is    
placed in the midst of the  world1 being
 as it were a sort of point1 which they 
call a 1  surrounded by the whole       
heavens2 and that such is the nature of 
the four  principles1 which are the     
generating causes of all things1 that   
they have  equally divided amongst them 
the constituents of all bodies2 moreover
 that  earthy and humid bodies are      
carried at equal angles1 by their own   
weight  and ponderosity1 into the earth 
and sea2 that the other two parts       
consist  one of fire and the other of   
air8 ,as the two former are carried by  
their  gravity and weight into the      
middle region of the world2 so these1 on

 the  other hand1 ascend by right lines 
into the celestial regions2 either      
because1 owing to their intrinsic       
nature1 they are always endeavouring to 
reach the highest place1 or else because
 lighter bodies are naturally  repelled 
by heavier2 and as this is notoriously  
the case1 it must  evidently follow1    
that souls1 when once they have departed
 from the body1  whether they are       
animal1 7by which term ,i mean capable  
of breathing17 or  of the nature of     
fire1 must mount upwards3 but if the    
soul is some number1  as some people    
assert1 speaking with more subtlety than
 clearness1 or if  it is that fifth     
nature1 for which it would be more      
correct to say that we  have not given a
 name to1 than that we do not correctly 
understand  it--still it is too pure and
 perfect1 not to go to a great distance 
from  the earth4 ,something of this     
sort1 then1 we must believe the soul to 
be1  that we may not commit the folly of
 thinking that so active a principle    

lies immerged in the heart or brain2 or1
 as ,empedocles would have it1 in  the  
blood4    ,,xviii4 ,we will pass over   
,dicarchus17#fj7 with his contemporary  
and  fellow-disciple ,aristoxenus17#fa7 
both indeed men of learning4 ,one of    
them  seems never even to have been     
affected with grief1 as he could not    
perceive that he had a soul2 while the  
other is so pleased with his  musical   
compositions1 that he endeavours to show
 an analogy betwixt them  and souls4    
,now1 we may understand harmony to arise
 from the intervals of  sounds1 whose   
various compositions occasion many      
harmonies2 but ,i do not  see how a     
disposition of members1 and the figure  
of a body without a soul1  can occasion 
harmony2 he had better1 learned as he   
is1 leave these  speculations to his    
master ,aristotle1 and follow his own   
trade1 as a  musician2 good advice is   
given him in that ,greek proverb1--     
,apply your talents where you best are  
skill'd4      ,i will have nothing at   

all to do with that fortuitous concourse
 of  individual light and round bodies1 
notwithstanding ,democritus insists on  
their being warm1 and having breath1    
that is to say1 life4 ,but this soul1   
which is compounded of either of the    
four principles from which we assert    
that all things are derived1 is of      
inflamed air1 as seems particularly to  
have been the opinion of ,pantius1 and  
must necessarily mount upwards2 for  air
 and fire have no tendency downwards1   
but always ascend2 so should they  be   
dissipated1 that must be at some        
distance from the earth2 but should     
they remain1 and preserve their original
 state1 it is clearer still that  they  
must be carried heavenward2 and this    
gross and concrete air1 which is        
nearest the earth1 must be divided and  
broken by them2 for the soul is  warmer1
 or rather hotter than that air1 which  
,i just now called gross and  concrete2 
and this may be made evident from this  
consideration1--that our  bodies1 being 

compounded of the earthy class of       
principles1 grow warm by  the heat of   
the soul4    ,,xix4 ,we may add1 that   
the soul can the more easily escape from
 this air1  which ,i have often named1  
and break through it2 because nothing is
 swifter  than the soul2 no swiftness is
 comparable to the swiftness of the     
soul2  which1 should it remain uncorrupt
 and without alteration1 must           
necessarily  be carried on with such    
velocity as to penetrate and divide all 
this  atmosphere1 where clouds1 and     
rain1 and winds are formed2 which1 in   
consequence of the exhalations from the 
earth1 is moist and dark2 but1  when the
 soul has once got above this region1   
and falls in with1 and  recognises a    
nature like its own1 it then rests upon 
fires composed of a  combination of thin
 air and a moderate solar heat1 and does
 not aim at any  higher flight4 ,for    
then1 after it has attained a lightness 
and heat  resembling its own1 it moves  
no more1 but remains steady1 being      

balanced1  as it were1 between two equal
 weights4 ,that1 then1 is its natural   
seat  where it has penetrated to        
something like itself2 and where1       
wanting  nothing further1 it may be     
supported and maintained by the same    
aliment  which nourishes and maintains  
the stars4    ,now1 as we are usually   
incited to all sorts of desires by the  
stimulus of  the body1 and the more so1 
as we endeavour to rival those who are  
in  possession of what we long for1 we  
shall certainly be happy when1 being    
emancipated from that body1 we at the   
same time get rid of these desires  and 
this rivalry3 and1 that which we do at  
present1 when1 dismissing all  other    
cares1 we curiously examine and look    
into anything1 we shall then do  with   
greater freedom2 and we shall employ    
ourselves entirely in the  contemplation
 and examination of things2 because     
there is naturally in our  minds a      
certain insatiable desire to know the   
truth2 and the very region  itself where

 we shall arrive1 as it gives us a more 
intuitive and easy  knowledge of        
celestial things1 will raise our desires
 after knowledge4 ,for  it was this     
beauty of the heavens1 as seen even here
 upon earth1 which  gave birth to that  
national and hereditary philosophy1 7as 
,theophrastus  calls it17 which was thus
 excited to a desire of knowledge4 ,but 
those  persons will in a most especial  
degree enjoy this philosophy1 who1 while
  they were only inhabitants of this    
world and enveloped in darkness1 were   
still desirous of looking into these    
things with the eye of their mind4      
,,xx4 ,for1 if those men now think that 
they have attained something who have   
seen the mouth of the ,pontus1 and those
 straits which were passed by the  ship 
called ,argo1 because1          ,from   
,argos she did chosen men convey1       
,bound to fetch back the golden fleece1 
their prey2      or those who have seen 
the straits of the ocean1               
,where the swift waves divide the       

neighbouring shores      ,of ,europe1   
and of ,afric4      ,what kind of sight 
do you imagine that will be1 when the   
whole earth is  laid open to our view8  
and that1 too1 not only in its position1
 form1 and  boundaries1 nor those parts 
of it only which are habitable1 but     
those also  that lie uncultivated1      
through the extremities of heat and cold
 to which  they are exposed2 for not    
even now is it with our eyes that we    
view what  we see1 for the body itself  
has no senses2 but 7as the naturalists1 
aye1  and even the physicians assure us1
 who have opened our bodies1 and        
examined them71 there are certain       
perforated channels from the seat of the
  soul to the eyes1 ears1 and nose2 so  
that frequently1 when either  prevented 
by meditation1 or the force of some     
bodily disorder1 we neither  hear nor   
see1 though our eyes and ears are open1 
and in good condition2 so  that we may  
easily apprehend that it is the soul    
itself which sees and  hears1 and not   

those parts which are1 as it were1 but  
windows to the soul2  by means of which1
 however1 she can perceive nothing1     
unless she is on the  spot1 and exerts  
herself4 ,how shall we account for the  
fact1 that by the  same power of        
thinking we comprehend the most         
different things2 as colour1  taste1    
heat1 smell1 and sound8 which the soul  
could never know by her five            
messengers1 unless everything was       
referred to her1 and she were the sole  
judge of all4 ,and we shall certainly   
discover these things in a more clear   
and perfect degree when the soul is     
disengaged from the body1 and has       
arrived at that goal to which nature    
leads her2 for at present1              
notwithstanding nature has contrived1   
with the greatest skill1 those  channels
 which lead from the body to the soul1  
yet are they1 in some way  or other1    
stopped up with earthy and concrete     
bodies2 but when we shall be  nothing   
but soul1 then nothing will interfere to

 prevent our seeing  everything in its  
real substance1 and in its true         
character4    ,,xxi4 ,it is true1 ,i    
might expatiate1 did the subject require
 it1 on the  many and various objects   
with which the soul will be entertained 
in those  heavenly regions2 when ,i     
reflect on which1 ,i am apt to wonder at
 the  boldness of some philosophers1 who
 are so struck with admiration at the   
knowledge of nature1 as to thank1 in an 
exulting manner1 the first  inventor and
 teacher of natural philosophy1 and to  
reverence him as a ,god3  for they      
declare that they have been delivered by
 his means from the  greatest tyrants1 a
 perpetual terror1 and a fear that      
molested them by  night and day4 ,what  
is this dread--this fear8 what old woman
 is there so  weak as to fear these     
things1 which you1 forsooth1 had you not
 been  acquainted with natural          
philosophy1 would stand in awe of8      
,the hallow'd roofs of ,acheron1 the    
dread      ,of ,orcus1 the pale regions 

of the dead4      ,and does it become a 
philosopher to boast that he is not     
afraid of these  things1 and that he has
 discovered them to be false8 ,and from 
this we may  perceive how acute these   
men were by nature1 who1 if they had    
been left  without any instruction would
 have believed in these things4 ,but now
 they  have certainly made a very fine  
acquisition in learning that when the   
day  of their death arrives they will   
perish entirely2 and1 if that really is 
the case1 for ,i say nothing either way1
 what is there agreeable or  glorious in
 it8 ,not that ,i see any reason why the
 opinion of ,pythagoras  and ,plato may 
not be true3 but even although ,plato   
were to have assigned  no reason for his
 opinion 7observe how much ,i esteem the
 man71 the weight  of his authority     
would have borne me down2 but he has    
brought so many  reasons1 that he       
appears to me to have endeavoured to    
convince others1 and  certainly to have 
convinced himself4    ,,xxii4 ,but there

 are many who labour on the other side  
of the question1 and  condemn souls to  
death1 as if they were criminals        
capitally convicted2 nor  have they any 
other reason to allege why the          
immortality of the soul  appears to them
 to be incredible1 except that they are 
not able to  conceive what sort of thing
 the soul can be when disentangled from 
the  body2 just as if they could really 
form a correct idea as to what sort of  
thing it is1 even when it is in the     
body2 what its form1 and size1 and      
abode are2 so that were they able to    
have a full view of all that is now     
hidden from them in a living body1 they 
have no idea whether the soul  would be 
discernible by them1 or whether it is of
 so fine a texture that  it would escape
 their sight4 ,let those consider this1 
who say that they  are unable to form   
any idea of the soul without the body1  
and then they  will see whether they can
 form any adequate idea of what it is   
when it is  in the body4 ,for my own    

part1 when ,i reflect on the nature of  
the soul1 it  appears to me a far more  
perplexing and obscure question to      
determine what  is its character while  
it is in the body1 a place which1 as it 
were1 does  not belong to it1 than to   
imagine what it is when it leaves it1   
and has  arrived at the free ther1 which
 is1 if ,i may so say1 its proper1 its  
own  habitation4 ,for unless we are to  
say that we cannot apprehend the        
character or nature of anything which we
 have never seen1 we certainly may  be  
able to form some notion of ,god1 and of
 the divine soul when released  from the
 body4 ,dicarchus1 indeed1 and          
,aristoxenus1 because it was hard to    
understand the existence1 and substance1
 and nature of the soul1 asserted  that 
there was no such thing as a soul at    
all4 ,it is1 indeed1 the most  difficult
 thing imaginable1 to discern the soul  
by the soul4 ,and this1  doubtless1 is  
the meaning of the precept of ,apollo1  
which advises every  one to know        

himself4 ,for ,i do not apprehend the   
meaning of the god to have  been1 that  
we should understand our members1 our   
stature1 and form2 for we  are not      
merely bodies2 nor1 when ,i say these   
things to you1 am ,i  addressing myself 
to your body3 when1 therefore1 he says1 
8,know yourself10  he says this1        
8,inform yourself of the nature of your 
soul20 for the body  is but a kind of   
vessel1 or receptacle of the soul1 and  
whatever your soul  does is your own    
act4 ,to know the soul1 then1 unless it 
had been divine1  would not have been a 
precept of such excellent wisdom1 as to 
be  attributed to a god2 but even though
 the soul should not know of what       
nature itself is1 will you say that it  
does not even perceive that it  exists  
at all1 or that it has motion8 on which 
is founded that reason of  ,plato's1    
which is explained by ,socrates in the  
,phdrus1 and inserted by  me1 in my     
sixth book of the ,republic4    ,,xxiii4
 8,that which is always moved is        

eternal2 but that which gives motion  to
 something else1 and is moved itself by 
some external cause1 when that  motion  
ceases1 must necessarily cease to exist4
 ,that1 therefore1 alone1  which is     
self-moved1 because it is never forsaken
 by itself1 can never  cease to be      
moved4 ,besides1 it is the beginning and
 principle of motion to  everything     
else2 but whatever is a principle has no
 beginning1 for all  things arise from  
that principle1 and it cannot itself owe
 its rise to  anything else2 for then it
 would not be a principle did it proceed
 from  anything else4 ,but if it has no 
beginning1 it never will have any end2  
for  a principle which is once          
extinguished1 cannot itself be restored 
by  anything else1 nor can it produce   
anything else from itself2 inasmuch as  
all things must necessarily arise from  
some first cause4 ,and thus it comes    
about1 that the first principle of      
motion must arise from that thing which 
is itself moved by itself2 and that can 

neither have a beginning nor an  end of 
its existence1 for otherwise the whole  
heaven and earth would be  overset1 and 
all nature would stand still1 and not be
 able to acquire any  force1 by the     
impulse of which it might be first set  
in motion4 ,seeing1  then1 that it is   
clear1 that whatever moves itself is    
eternal1 can there  be any doubt that   
the soul is so8 ,for everything is      
inanimate which is  moved by an external
 force2 but everything which is animate 
is moved by an  interior force1 which   
also belongs to itself4 ,for this is the
 peculiar  nature and power of the soul2
 and if the soul be the only thing in   
the  whole world which has the power of 
self-motion1 then certainly it never    
had a beginning1 and therefore it is    
eternal40    ,now1 should all the lower 
order of philosophers1 7for so ,i think 
they may  be called1 who dissent from   
,plato and ,socrates and that school17  
unite  their force1 they never would be 
able to explain anything so elegantly as

  this1 nor even to understand how      
ingeniously this conclusion is drawn4   
,the  soul1 then1 perceives itself to   
have motion1 and at the same time that  
it  gets that perception1 it is sensible
 that it derives that motion from its   
own power1 and not from the agency of   
another2 and it is impossible that  it  
should ever forsake itself2 and these   
premises compel you to allow its        
eternity1 unless you have something to  
say against them4    ,a4 ,i should      
myself be very well pleased not to have 
even a thought arise  in my mind against
 them1 so much am ,i inclined to that   
opinion4    ,,xxiv4 ,m4 ,well then1 ,i  
appeal to you1 if the arguments which   
prove that  there is something divine in
 the souls of men are not equally       
strong8 but  if ,i could account for the
 origin of these divine properties1 then
 ,i might  also be able to explain how  
they might cease to exist2 for ,i think 
,i can  account for the manner in which 
the blood1 and bile1 and phlegm1 and    

bones1 and nerves1 and veins1 and all   
the limbs1 and the shape of the  whole  
body1 were put together and made2 aye1  
and even as to the soul  itself1 were   
there nothing more in it than a         
principle of life1 then the  life of a  
man might be put upon the same footing  
as that of a vine or any  other tree1   
and accounted for as caused by nature2  
for these things1 as we  say1 live4     
,besides1 if desires and aversions were 
all that belonged to the  soul1 it would
 have them only in common with the      
beasts2 but it has1 in  the first place1
 memory1 and that1 too1 so infinite1 as 
to recollect an  absolute countless     
number of circumstances1 which ,plato   
will have to be a  recollection of a    
former life2 for in that book which is  
inscribed ,menon1  ,socrates asks a     
child some questions in geometry1 with  
reference to  measuring a square2 his   
answers are such as a child would make1 
and yet  the questions are so easy1 that
 while answering them1 one by one1 he   

comes  to the same point as if he had   
learned geometry4 ,from whence ,socrates
  would infer1 that learning is nothing 
more than recollection2 and this  topic 
he explains more accurately1 in the     
discourse which he held the very  day he
 died2 for he there asserts that any one
 who seeming to be entirely  illiterate1
 is yet able to answer a question well  
that is proposed to him1  does in so    
doing manifestly show that he is not    
learning it then1 but  recollecting it  
by his memory4 ,nor is it to be         
accounted for in any other  way1 how    
children come to have notions of so many
 and such important  things1 as are     
implanted1 and as it were sealed up in  
their minds1 7which  the ,greeks call 17
 unless the soul before it entered the  
body had  been well stored with         
knowledge4 ,and as it had no existence  
at all1 7for  this is the invariable    
doctrine of ,plato1 who will not admit  
anything to  have a real existence which
 has a beginning and an end2 and who    

thinks  that that alone does really     
exist which is of such a character as   
what he  calls 1 and we species17       
therefore1 being shut up in the body1 it
  could not while in the body discover  
what it knows3 but it knew it before1   
and brought the knowledge with it1 so   
that we are no longer surprised at  its 
extensive and multifarious knowledge3   
nor does the soul clearly  discover its 
ideas at its first resort to this abode 
to which it is so  unaccustomed1 and    
which is in so disturbed a state2 but   
after having  refreshed and recollected 
itself1 it then by its memory recovers  
them2  and1 therefore1 to learn implies 
nothing more than to recollect4 ,but ,i 
am  in a particular manner surprised at 
memory2 for what is that faculty by     
which we remember8 what is its force8   
what its nature8 ,i am not inquiring    
how great a memory ,simonides7#fb7 may  
be said to have had1 or                 
,theodectes17#fc7 or that ,cineas17#fd7 
who was sent to ,rome as ambassador     

from ,pyrrhus1 or in more modern times  
,charmadas27#fe7 or very lately1        
,metrodorus17#ff7 the ,scepsian1 or our 
own contemporary ,hortensius37#fg7 ,i am
  speaking of ordinary memory1 and      
especially of those men who are employed
  in any important study or art1 the    
great capacity of whose minds it is     
hard to estimate1 such numbers of things
 do they remember4    ,,xxv4 ,should you
 ask what this leads to1 ,i think we may
 understand what  that power is1 and    
whence we have it4 ,it certainly        
proceeds neither from  the heart1 nor   
from the blood1 nor from the brain1 nor 
from atoms2 whether  it be air or fire1 
,i know not1 nor am ,i1 as those men    
are1 ashamed in  cases where ,i am      
ignorant1 to own that ,i am so4 ,if in  
any other obscure  matter ,i were able  
to assert anything positively1 then ,i  
would swear that  the soul1 be it air or
 fire1 is divine4 ,just think1 ,i       
beseech you1--can you  imagine this     
wonderful power of memory to be sown in1

 or to be a part of  the composition of 
the earth1 or of this dark and gloomy   
atmosphere8  ,though you cannot         
apprehend what it is1 yet you see what  
kind of thing it  is1 or if you do not  
quite see that1 yet you certainly see   
how great it  is4 ,what then8 shall we  
imagine that there is a kind of measure 
in the  soul1 into which1 as into a     
vessel1 all that we remember is poured8 
that  indeed is absurd2 for how shall we
 form any idea of the bottom1 or of the 
shape or fashion of such a soul as that8
 and again how are we to conceive  how  
much it is able to contain8 ,shall we   
imagine the soul to receive  impressions
 like wax1 and memory to be marks of the
 impressions made on  the soul8 ,what   
are the characters of the words1 what of
 the facts  themselves8 and what again  
is that prodigious greatness which can  
give  rise to impressions of so many    
things8 ,what1 lastly1 is that power    
which  investigates secret things1 and  
is called invention and contrivance8    

,does  that man seem to be compounded of
 this earthly1 mortal1 and perishing    
nature1 who first invented names for    
everything1 which1 if you will  believe 
,pythagoras1 is the highest pitch of    
wisdom8 or he1 who collected  the       
dispersed inhabitants of the world1 and 
united them1 in the bonds of  social    
life8 or he1 who confined the sounds of 
the voice1 which used to  seem infinite1
 to the marks of a few letters8 or he   
who first observed the  courses of the  
planets1 their progressive motions1     
their laws8 ,these were  all great men2 
but they were greater still1 who        
invented food1 and  raiment1 and houses2
 who introduced civilization amongst us1
 and armed us  against the wild beasts2 
by whom we were made sociable and       
polished1 and  so proceeded from the    
necessaries of life to its              
embellishments4 ,for we  have provided  
great entertainments for the ears1 by   
inventing and  modulating the variety   
and nature of sounds2 we have learnt to 

survey the  stars1 not only those that  
are fixed1 but also those which are     
improperly  called wandering2 and the   
man who has acquainted himself with all 
their  revolutions and motions1 is      
fairly considered to have a soul        
resembling  the soul of that ,being who 
has created those stars in the heavens3 
for  when ,archimedes described in a    
sphere the motions of the moon1 sun1 and
  five planets1 he did the very same    
thing as ,plato's ,god1 in his ,timus1  
who made the world2 causing one         
revolution to adjust motions differing  
as  much as possible in their slowness  
and velocity4 ,now1 allowing that what  
we see in the world could not be        
effected without a ,god1 ,archimedes    
could  not have imitated the same       
motions in his sphere without a divine  
soul4    ,,xxvi4 ,to me1 indeed1 it     
appears that even those studies which   
are more  common and in greater esteem  
are not without some divine energy3 so  
that ,i  do not consider that a poet can

 produce a serious and sublime poem1    
without some divine impulse working on  
his mind2 nor do ,i think that          
eloquence1 abounding with sonorous words
 and fruitful sentences1 can flow  thus1
 without something beyond mere human    
power4 ,but as to philosophy1  that is  
the parent of all the arts1 what can we 
call that but1 as ,plato  says1 a gift1 
or as ,i express it1 an invention of the
 ,gods8 ,this it was  which first taught
 us the worship of the ,gods2 and then  
led us on to  justice1 which arises from
 the human race being formed into       
society3 and  after that it imbued us   
with modesty1 and elevation of soul4    
,this it was  which dispersed darkness  
from our souls1 as it is dispelled from 
our eyes1  enabling us to see all things
 that are above or below1 the beginning1
 end1  and middle of every thing4 ,i am 
convinced entirely1 that that which     
could  effect so many and such great    
things must be a divine power4 ,for what
 is  memory of words and circumstances8 

what1 too1 is invention8 ,surely they   
are things than which nothing greater   
can be conceived in a ,god6 for ,i do   
not imagine the ,gods to be delighted   
with nectar and ambrosia1 or with       
,juventas presenting them with a cup2   
nor do ,i put any faith in ,homer1 who  
says that ,ganymede was carried away by 
the ,gods1 on account of his beauty1  in
 order to give ,jupiter his wine4 ,too  
weak reasons for doing ,laomedon  such  
injury6 ,these were mere inventions of  
,homer1 who gave his ,gods the          
imperfections of men4 ,i would rather   
that he had given men the perfections   
of the ,gods6 those perfections1 ,i     
mean1 of uninterrupted health1 wisdom1  
invention1 memory4 ,therefore the soul  
7which is1 as ,i say1 divine17 is1 as   
,euripides more boldly expresses it1 a  
,god4 ,and thus1 if the divinity be  air
 or fire1 the soul of man is the same3  
for as that celestial nature has        
nothing earthly or humid about it1 in   
like manner the soul of man is also     

free from both these qualities3 but if  
it is of that fifth kind of nature1     
first introduced by ,aristotle1 then    
both ,gods and souls are of the same4   
,,xxvii4 ,as this is my opinion1 ,i have
 explained it in these very words1 in   
my book on ,consolation47#fh7 ,the      
origin of the soul of man is not to be  
found upon earth1 for there is nothing  
in the soul of a mixed or concrete      
nature1 or that has any appearance of   
being formed or made out of the  earth2 
nothing even humid1 or airy1 or fiery3  
for what is there in natures  of that   
kind which has the power of memory1     
understanding1 or thought8  which can   
recollect the past2 foresee the future2 
and comprehend the  present8 for these  
capabilities are confined to divine     
beings2 nor can we  discover any source 
from which men could derive them1 but   
from ,god4 ,there  is therefore a       
peculiar nature and power in the soul1  
distinct from those  natures which are  
more known and familiar to us4          

,whatever1 then1 that is  which thinks1 
and which has understanding1 and        
volition1 and a principle  of life1 is  
heavenly and divine1 and on that account
 must necessarily be  eternal3 nor can  
,god himself1 who is known to us1 be    
conceived to be  anything else except a 
soul free and unembarrassed1 distinct   
from all  mortal concretion1 acquainted 
with everything1 and giving motion to   
everything1 and itself endued with      
perpetual motion4    ,,xxviii4 ,of this 
kind and nature is the intellect of man4
 ,where1 then1 is  this intellect       
seated1 and of what character is it8    
where is your own1 and  what is its     
character8 are you able to tell8 ,if ,i 
have not faculties for  knowing all that
 ,i could desire to know1 will you not  
even allow me to  make use of those     
which ,i have8 ,the soul has not        
sufficient capacity to  comprehend      
itself2 yet1 the soul1 like the eye1    
though it has no distinct  view of      
itself1 sees other things3 it does not  

see 7which is of least  consequence7 its
 own shape2 perhaps not1 though it      
possibly may2 but we  will pass that by3
 but it certainly sees that it has      
vigour1 sagacity1  memory1 motion1 and  
velocity2 these are all great1 divine1  
eternal  properties4 ,what its          
appearance is1 or where it dwells1 it is
 not  necessary even to inquire4 ,as    
when we behold1 first of all1 the beauty
 and  brilliant appearance of the       
heavens2 secondly1 the vast velocity of 
its  revolutions1 beyond power of our   
imagination to conceive2 then the       
vicissitudes of nights and days2 the    
four-fold division of the seasons1 so   
well adapted to the ripening of the     
fruits of the earth1 and the            
temperature of our bodies2 and after    
that we look up to the sun1 the         
moderator and governor of all these     
things2 and view the moon1 by the       
increase and decrease of its light1     
marking1 as it were1 and appointing  our
 holy days2 and see the five planets1   

borne on in the same circle1  divided   
into twelve parts1 preserving the same  
course with the greatest  regularity1   
but with utterly dissimilar motions     
amongst themselves2 and  the nightly    
appearance of the heaven1 adorned on all
 sides with stars2  then1 the globe of  
the earth1 raised above the sea1 and    
placed in the  centre of the universe1  
inhabited and cultivated in its two     
opposite  extremities2 one of which1 the
 place of our habitation1 is situated   
towards the north pole1 under the seven 
stars3--          ,where the cold       
northern blasts1 with horrid sound1     
,harden to ice the snowy cover'd        
ground1--      the other1 towards the   
south pole1 is unknown to us2 but is    
called by the  ,greeks 3 the other parts
 are uncultivated1 because they are     
either frozen with cold1 or burnt up    
with heat2 but where we dwell1 it  never
 fails in its season1          ,to yield
 a placid sky1 to bid the trees         
,assume the lively verdure of their     

leaves3      ,the vine to bud1 and1     
joyful in its shoots1      ,foretell the
 approaching vintage of its fruits3     
,the ripen'd corn to sing1 whilst all   
around      ,full riv'lets glide2 and   
flowers deck the ground3--      then the
 multitude of cattle1 fit part for food1
 part for tilling the  ground1 others   
for carrying us1 or for clothing us2 and
 man himself1 made  as it were on       
purpose to contemplate the heavens and  
the ,gods1 and to pay  adoration to     
them2 lastly1 the whole earth1 and wide 
extending seas1 given  to man's use4    
,when we view these1 and numberless     
other things1 can we  doubt that they   
have some being who presides over them1 
or has made them  7if1 indeed1 they have
 been made1 as is the opinion of ,plato1
 or if1 as  ,aristotle thinks1 they are 
eternal71 or who at all events is the   
regulator  of so immense a fabric and so
 great a blessing to men8 ,thus1 though 
you  see not the soul of man1 as you see
 not the ,deity1 yet1 as by the         

contemplation of his works you are led  
to acknowledge a ,god1 so you must  own 
the divine power of the soul1 from its  
remembering things1 from its  invention1
 from the quickness of its motion1 and  
from all the beauty of  virtue4 ,where1 
then1 is it seated1 you will say8       
,,xxix4 ,in my opinion it is seated in  
the head1 and ,i can bring you reasons  
for my adopting that opinion4 ,at       
present1 let the soul reside where it   
will1 you certainly have one in you4    
,should you ask what its nature is8 ,it 
has one peculiarly its own2 but         
admitting it to consist of fire1 or air1
  it does not affect the present        
question2 only observe this1 that as you
  are convinced there is a ,god1 though 
you are ignorant where he resides1  and 
what shape he is of2 in like manner you 
ought to feel assured that you  have a  
soul1 though you cannot satisfy yourself
 of the place of its  residence1 nor its
 form4 ,in our knowledge of the soul1   
unless we are  grossly ignorant of      

natural philosophy1 we cannot but be    
satisfied that it  has nothing but what 
is simple1 unmixed1 uncompounded1 and   
single2 and if  this is admitted1 then  
it cannot be separated1 nor divided1 nor
 dispersed1  nor parted1 and therefore  
it cannot perish2 for to perish implies 
a  parting asunder1 a division1 a       
disunion of those parts which1 whilst it
  subsisted1 were held together by some 
band2 and it was because he was         
influenced by these and similar reasons 
that ,socrates neither looked out  for  
anybody to plead for him when he was    
accused1 nor begged any favour  from his
 judges1 but maintained a manly freedom1
 which was the effect not  of pride1 but
 of the true greatness of his soul3 and 
on the last day of  his life1 he held a 
long discourse on this subject2 and a   
few days before1  when he might have    
been easily freed from his confinement1 
he refused to  be so1 and when he had   
almost actually hold of that deadly cup1
 he spoke  with the air of a man not    

forced to die1 but ascending into       
heaven4    ,,xxx4 ,for so indeed he     
thought himself1 and thus he            
spoke3--8,that there were  two ways1 and
 that the souls of men1 at their        
departure from the body1  took different
 roads1 for those which were polluted   
with vices1 that are  common to men1 and
 which had given themselves up entirely 
to unclean  desires1 and had become so  
blinded by them as to have habituated   
themselves to all manner of debauchery  
and profligacy1 or to have laid         
detestable schemes for the ruin of their
 country1 took a road wide of that      
which led to the assembly of the ,gods3 
but they who had preserved  themselves  
upright and chaste1 and free from the   
slightest contagion of  the body1 and   
had always kept themselves as far as    
possible at a distance  from it1 and    
whilst on earth1 had proposed to        
themselves as a model the  life of the  
,gods1 found the return to those beings 
from whom they had come  an easy one40  

,therefore he argues1 that all good and 
wise men should take  example from the  
swans1 who are considered sacred to     
,apollo1 not without  reason1 but       
particularly because they seem to have  
received the gift of  divination from   
him1 by which1 foreseeing how happy it  
is to die1 they  leave this world with  
singing and joy4 ,nor can any one doubt 
of this1  unless it happens to us who   
think with care and anxiety about the   
soul1  7as is often the case with those 
who look earnestly at the setting sun17 
to lose the sight of it entirely3 and so
 the mind's eye viewing itself1         
sometimes grows dull1 and for that      
reason we become remiss in our          
contemplation4 ,thus our reasoning is   
borne about1 harassed with doubts and   
anxieties1 not knowing how to proceed1  
but measuring back again those          
dangerous tracts which it has passed1   
like a boat tossed about on the         
boundless ocean4 ,but these reflections 
are of long standing1 and borrowed  from

 the ,greeks4 ,but ,cato left this world
 in such a manner1 as if he were        
delighted that he had found an          
opportunity of dying2 for that ,god who 
presides in us1 forbids our departure   
hence without his leave4 ,but when  ,god
 himself has given us a just cause1 as  
formerly he did to ,socrates1 and       
lately to ,cato1 and often to many      
others1--in such a case1 certainly every
  man of sense would gladly exchange    
this darkness1 for that light3 not that 
he would forcibly break from the chains 
that held him1 for that would be        
against the law2 but like a man released
 from prison by a magistrate1 or  some  
lawful authority1 so he too would walk  
away1 being released and  discharged by 
,god4 ,for the whole life of a          
philosopher is1 as the same  philosopher
 says1 a meditation on death4    ,,xxxi4
 ,for what else is it that we do1 when  
we call off our minds from  pleasure1   
that is to say1 from our attention to   
the body1 from the  managing our        

domestic estate1 which is a sort of     
handmaid and servant of  the body1 or   
from duties of a public nature1 or from 
all other serious  business whatever8   
,what else is it1 ,i say1 that we do1   
but invite the soul  to reflect on      
itself8 oblige it to converse with      
itself1 and1 as far as  possible1 break 
off its acquaintance with the body8 ,now
 to separate the  soul from the body1 is
 to learn to die1 and nothing else      
whatever4  ,wherefore take my advice2   
and let us meditate on this1 and        
separate  ourselves as far as possible  
from the body1 that is to say1 let us   
accustom ourselves to die4 ,this will be
 enjoying a life like that of  heaven   
even while we remain on earth2 and when 
we are carried thither and  released    
from these bonds1 our souls will make   
their progress with more  rapidity3 for 
the spirit which has always been        
fettered by the bonds of  the body1 even
 when it is disengaged1 advances more   
slowly1 just as those  do who have worn 

actual fetters for many years3 but when 
we have arrived  at this emancipation   
from the bonds of the body1 then indeed 
we shall  begin to live1 for this       
present life is really death1 which ,i  
could say a  good deal in lamentation   
for if ,i chose4    ,a4 ,you have       
lamented it sufficiently in your book on
 ,consolation2 and  when ,i read that1  
there is nothing which ,i desire more   
than to leave these  things3 but that   
desire is increased a great deal by what
 ,i have just  heard4    ,m4 ,the time  
will come1 and that soon1 and with equal
 certainty whether  you hang back or    
press forward2 for time flies4 ,but     
death is so far from  being an evil1 as 
it lately appeared to you1 that ,i am   
inclined to  suspect1 not that there is 
no other thing which is an evil to man1 
but  rather that there is nothing else  
which is a real good to him2 if1 at     
least1 it is true1 that we become       
thereby either ,gods ourselves1 or      
companions of the ,gods4 ,however1 this 

is not of so much consequence1 as  there
 are some of us here who will not allow 
this4 ,but ,i will not leave  off       
discussing this point till ,i have      
convinced you that death can1 upon  no  
consideration whatever1 be an evil4     
,a4 ,how can it1 after what ,i now know8
    ,m4 ,do you ask how it can8 ,there  
are crowds of arguers who contradict    
this2 and those not only ,epicureans1   
whom ,i regard very little1 but1 some   
how or other1 almost every man of       
letters2 and1 above all1 my favourite   
,dicarchus is very strenuous in opposing
 the immortality of the soul3 for  he   
has written three books1 which are      
entitled ,lesbiacs1 because the         
discourse was held at ,mitylene1 in     
which he seeks to prove that souls are  
mortal4 ,the ,stoics1 on the other hand1
 allow us as long a time for  enjoyment 
as the life of a raven2 they allow the  
soul to exist a great  while1 but are   
against its eternity4    ,,xxxii4 ,are  
you willing to hear then why1 even      

allowing this1 death cannot  be an evil8
    ,a4 ,as you please2 but no one shall
 drive me from my belief in mortality4  
,m4 ,i commend you indeed1 for that2    
though we should not be too confident   
in our belief of anything2 for we are   
frequently disturbed by some subtle     
conclusion2 we give way and change our  
opinions even in things that are  more  
evident than this2 for in this there    
certainly is some obscurity4            
,therefore1 should anything of this kind
 happen1 it is well to be on our  guard4
    ,a4 ,you are right in that1 but ,i  
will provide against any accident4      
,m4 ,have you any objection to our      
dismissing our friends the ,stoics8     
those1 ,i mean1 who allow that the souls
 exist after they have left the  body1  
but yet deny that they exist for ever4  
,a4 ,we certainly may dismiss the       
consideration of those men who admit    
that which is the most difficult point  
in the whole question1 namely1 that  a  
soul can exist independently of the     

body1 and yet refuse to grant that1     
which is not only very easy to believe1 
but which is even the natural           
consequence of the concession which they
 have made1 that if they can exist  for 
a length of time1 they most likely do so
 for ever4    ,m4 ,you take it right2   
that is the very thing3 shall we give1  
therefore1  any credit to ,pantius1 when
 he dissents from his master1 ,plato8   
whom he  everywhere calls divine1 the   
wisest1 the holiest of men1 the ,homer  
of  philosophers2 and whom he opposes in
 nothing except this single opinion of  
the soul's immortality3 for he maintains
 what nobody denies1 that  everything   
which has been generated will perish2   
and that even souls are  generated1     
which he thinks appears from their      
resemblance to those of the  men who    
begot them2 for that likeness is as     
apparent in the turn of their  minds as 
in their bodies4 ,but he brings another 
reason2 that there is  nothing which is 
sensible of pain which is not also      

liable to disease2 but  whatever is     
liable to disease must be liable to     
death2 the soul is  sensible of pain1   
therefore it is liable to perish4       
,,xxxiii4 ,these arguments may be       
refuted2 for they proceed from his not  
knowing that while discussing the       
subject of the immortality of the soul1 
he is speaking of the intellect1 which  
is free from all turbid motion2 but  not
 of those parts of the mind in which    
those disorders1 anger and lust1  have  
their seat1 and which he whom he is     
opposing1 when he argues thus1  imagines
 to be distinct and separate from the   
mind4 ,now this resemblance  is more    
remarkable in beasts1 whose souls are   
void of reason4 ,but the  likeness in   
men consists more in the configuration  
of the bodies2 and it  is of no little  
consequence in what bodies the soul is  
lodged2 for there  are many things which
 depend on the body that give an edge to
 the soul1  many which blunt it4        
,aristotle indeed1 says1 that all men of

 great genius  are melancholy2 so that  
,i should not have been displeased to   
have been  somewhat duller than ,i am4  
,he instances many1 and1 as if it were  
matter of  fact1 brings his reasons for 
it3 but if the power of those things    
that  proceed from the body be so great 
as to influence the mind1 7for they are 
the things1 whatever they are1 that     
occasion this likeness17 still that     
does not necessarily prove why a        
similitude of souls should be generated4
  ,i say nothing about cases of         
unlikeness4 ,i wish ,pantius could be   
here2 he  lived with ,africanus2 ,i     
would inquire of him which of his family
 the  nephew of ,africanus's brother was
 like8 ,possibly he may in person have  
resembled his father2 but in his        
manners1 he was so like every profligate
  abandoned man1 that it was impossible 
to be more so4 ,who did the grandson  of
 ,p4 ,crassus1 that wise1 and eloquent1 
and most distinguished man  resemble8   
,or the relations and sons of many other

 excellent men1 whose  names there is no
 occasion to mention8 ,but what are we  
doing8 ,have we  forgotten that our     
purpose was1 when we had sufficiently   
spoken on the  subject of the           
immortality of the soul1 to prove that1 
even if the soul  did perish1 there     
would be1 even then1 no evil in death8  
,a4 ,i remembered it very well2 but ,i  
had no dislike to your digressing a     
little from your original design1 whilst
 you were talking of the soul's         
immortality4    ,m4 ,i perceive you have
 sublime thoughts1 and are eager to     
mount up to  heaven4    ,,xxxiv4 ,i am  
not without hopes myself that such may  
be our fate4 ,but admit  what they      
assert2 that the soul does not continue 
to exist after death4    ,a4 ,should it 
be so1 ,i see that we are then deprived 
of the hopes of a  happier life4    ,m4 
,but what is there of evil in that      
opinion8 ,for let the soul perish as    
the body3 is there any pain1 or indeed  
any feeling at all in the body  after   

death8 ,no one1 indeed1 asserts that2   
though ,epicurus charges  ,democritus   
with saying so2 but the disciples of    
,democritus deny it4 ,no  sense1        
therefore1 remains in the soul2 for the 
soul is nowhere2 where1  then1 is the   
evil8 for there is nothing but these two
 things4 ,is it  because the mere       
separation of the soul and body cannot  
be effected  without pain8 but even     
should that be granted1 how small a pain
 must that  be6 ,yet ,i think that it is
 false2 and that it is very often       
unaccompanied  by any sensation at all1 
and sometimes even attended with        
pleasure3 but  certainly the whole must 
be very trifling1 whatever it is1 for it
 is  instantaneous4 ,what makes us      
uneasy1 or rather gives us pain1 is the 
leaving all the good things of life4    
,but just consider1 if ,i might not     
more properly say1 leaving the evils of 
life2 only there is no reason for  my   
now occupying myself in bewailing the   
life of man1 and yet ,i might1  with    

very good reason2 but what occasion is  
there1 when what ,i am  labouring to    
prove is that no one is miserable after 
death1 to make life  more miserable by  
lamenting over it8 ,i have done that in 
the book which ,i  wrote1 in order to   
comfort myself as well as ,i could4 ,if1
 then1 our  inquiry is after truth1     
death withdraws us from evil1 not from  
good4 ,this  subject is indeed so       
copiously handled by ,hegesias1 the     
,cyrenaic  philosopher1 that he is said 
to have been forbid by ,ptolemy from    
delivering his lectures in the schools1 
because some who heard him made  away   
with themselves4 ,there is too1 an      
epigram of ,callimachus17#fi7 on        
,cleombrotus of ,ambracia2 who1 without 
any misfortune having befallen him1  as 
he says1 threw himself from a wall into 
the sea1 after he had read a  boot of   
,plato's4 ,the book ,i mentioned of that
 ,hegesias1 is called  1 or 8,a ,man who
 starves himself10 in which a man is    
represented  as killing himself by      

starvation1 till he is prevented by his 
friends1 in  reply to whom he reckons up
 all the miseries of human life3 ,i     
might do the  same1 though not so fully 
as he1 who thinks it not worth any man's
 while  to live4 ,i pass over others4   
,was it even worth my while to live1    
for1 had  ,i died before ,i was deprived
 of the comforts of my own family1 and  
of the  honours which ,i received for my
 public services1 would not death have  
taken me from the evils of life1 rather 
than from its blessings8    ,,xxxv4     
,mention1 therefore1 some one1 who never
 knew distress2 who never  received any 
blow from fortune4 ,the great ,metellus 
had four distinguished  sons2 but ,priam
 had fifty1 seventeen of which were born
 to him by his  lawful wife3 ,fortune   
had the same power over both1 though she
 exercised it  but on one3 for ,metellus
 was laid on his funeral pile by a great
 company  of sons and daughters1        
grandsons1 and grandaughters2 but ,priam
 fell by the  hand of an enemy1 after   

having fled to the altar1 and having    
seen himself  deprived of all his       
numerous progeny4 ,had he died before   
the death of his  sons and the ruin of  
his kingdom1          ,with all his     
mighty wealth elate1      ,under rich   
canopies of state2      would he then   
have been taken from good or from evil8 
,it would indeed1 at  that time1 have   
appeared that he was being taken away   
from good2 yet  surely1 it would have   
turned out advantageous for him2 nor    
should we have  had these mournful      
verses1--          ,lo6 these all       
perish'd in one flaming pile2      ,the 
foe old ,priam did of life beguile1     
,and with his blood1 thy altar1 ,jove1  
defile4      ,as if anything better     
could have happened to him at that time1
 than to  lose his life in that manner2 
but yet1 if it had befallen him sooner1 
it  would have prevented all those      
consequences2 but even as it was it     
released him from any further sense of  
them4 ,the case of our friend           

,pompey7#gj7 was something better3 once1
 when he had been very ill at  ,naples1 
the ,neapolitans on his recovery put    
crowns on their heads1 as did  those of 
,puteoli2 the people flocked from the   
country to congratulate  him2--it is a  
,grecian custom1 and a foolish one2     
still it is a sign of good  fortune4    
,but the question is1 had he died1 would
 he have been taken from  good1 or from 
evil8 ,certainly from evil4 ,he would   
not have been engaged in  a war with his
 father-in-law27#ga7 he would not have  
taken up arms before  he was prepared2  
he would not have left his own house1   
nor fled from  ,italy2 he would not1    
after the loss of his army1 have fallen 
unarmed into  the hands of slaves1 and  
been put to death by them2 his children 
would not  have been destroyed2 nor     
would his whole fortune have come into  
the  possession of the conquerors4 ,did 
not he1 then1 who1 if he had died at    
that time would have died in all his    
glory1 owe all the great and terrible   

misfortunes into which he subsequently  
fell to the prolongation of his  life at
 that time8    ,,xxxvi4 ,these          
calamities are avoided by death1 for    
even though they should  never happen1  
there is a possibility that they may2   
but it never occurs to  a man1 that such
 a disaster may befal him himself4      
,every one hopes to be  as happy as     
,metellus3 as if the number of the happy
 exceeded that of the  miserable2 or as 
if there were any certainty in human    
affairs2 or again1  as if there were    
more rational foundation for hope than  
fear4 ,but should  we grant them even   
this1 that men are by death deprived of 
good things1  would it follow that the  
dead are therefore in need of the good  
things of  life1 and are miserable on   
that account8 ,certainly they must      
necessarily  say so4 ,can he who does   
not exist1 be in need of anything8 ,to  
be in need  of1 has a melancholy sound1 
because it in effect amounts to         
this1--he had1  but he has not2 he      

regrets1 he looks back upon1 he wants4  
,such are1 ,i  suppose1 the distresses  
of one who is in need of4 ,is he        
deprived of eyes8  to be blind is       
misery4 ,is he destitute of children8   
not to have them is  misery4 ,these     
considerations apply to the living1 but 
the dead are neither  in need of the    
blessings of life1 nor of life itself4  
,but when ,i am  speaking of the dead ,i
 am speaking of those who have no       
existence4 ,but  would any one say of   
us1 who do exist1 that we want horns or 
wings8  ,certainly not4 ,should it be   
asked1 why not8 the answer would be1    
that not  to have what neither custom   
nor nature has fitted you for1 would not
 imply  a want of them1 even though you 
were sensible that you had them not4    
,this  argument should be pressed over  
and over again1 after that point has    
once  been established1 which if souls  
are mortal there can be no dispute      
about--,i mean1 that the destruction of 
them by death is so entire1 as to       

remove even the least suspicion of any  
sense remaining4 ,when1 therefore1  this
 point is once well grounded and        
established1 we must correctly define   
what the term1 to want1 means2 that     
there may be no mistake in the word4    
,to want1 then1 signifies this2 to be   
without that which you would be glad  to
 have3 for inclination for a thing is   
implied in the word want2  excepting    
when we use the word in an entirely     
different sense1 as we do  when we say  
that a fever is wanting to any one4 ,for
 it admits of a  different              
interpretation1 when you are without a  
certain thing1 and are  sensible that   
you are without it1 but yet can easily  
dispense with having  it4 8,to want10   
then1 is an expression which you cannot 
apply to the dead1  nor is the mere fact
 of wanting something necessarily       
lamentable4 ,the  proper expression     
ought to be1 8that they want a good10   
and that is an  evil4    ,but a living  
man does not want a good1 unless he is  

distressed without it2  and yet1 we can 
easily understand how any man alive can 
be without a  kingdom4 ,but this cannot 
be predicated of you with any accuracy3 
it might  have been asserted of         
,tarquin1 when he was driven from his   
kingdom3 but  when such an expression is
 used respecting the dead it is         
absolutely  unintelligible4 ,for to     
want1 implies to be sensible2 but the   
dead are  insensible2 therefore the dead
 can be in no want4    ,,xxxvii4 ,but   
what occasion is there to philosophize  
here1 in a matter with  which we see    
that philosophy is but little concerned8
 ,how often have not  only our generals1
 but whole armies1 rushed on certain    
death6 but if it  had been a thing to be
 feared1 ,l4 ,brutus would never have   
fallen in fight1  to prevent the return 
of that tyrant whom he had expelled2 nor
 would  ,decius the father have been    
slain in fighting with the ,latins2 nor 
would  his son1 when engaged with the   
,etruscans1 nor his grandson with       

,pyrrhus1  have exposed themselves to   
the enemy's darts4 ,spain would never   
have seen1  in one campaign1 the        
,scipios fall fighting for their        
country2 nor would  the plains of ,cann 
have witnessed the death of ,paulus and 
,geminus2 or  ,venusia1 that of         
,marcellus3 nor would the ,latins have  
beheld the death of  ,albinus2 nor the  
,lucanians1 that of ,gracchus4 ,but are 
any of these  miserable now8 nay1 they  
were not so even at the first moment    
after they  had breathed their last3 nor
 can any one be miserable after he has  
lost  all sensation4 ,oh1 but the mere  
circumstance of being without sensation 
is  miserable4 ,it might be so if being 
without sensation were the same thing   
as wanting it2 but as it is evident     
there can be nothing of any kind in     
that which has no existence1 what can   
there be afflicting to that which  can  
neither feel want1 nor be sensible of   
anything8 ,we might be said to  have    
repeated this over too often1 only that 

here lies all that the soul  shudders   
at1 from the fear of death4 ,for whoever
 can clearly apprehend  that which is as
 manifest as the light1 that when both  
soul and body are  consumed1 and there  
is a total destruction1 then that which 
was an animal1  becomes nothing2 will   
clearly see1 that there is no difference
 between a  ,hippocentaur1 which never  
had existence1 and king ,agamemnon2 and 
that ,m4  ,camillus is no more concerned
 about this present civil war1 than ,i  
was at  the sacking of ,rome1 when he   
was living4    ,,xxxviii4 ,why1 then1   
should ,camillus be affected with the   
thoughts of these  things happening     
three hundred and fifty years after his 
time8 ,and why  should ,i be uneasy if  
,i were to expect that some nation might
 possess  itself of this city1 ten      
thousand years hence8 ,because so great 
is our  regard for our country1 as not  
to be measured by our own feeling1 but  
by  its own actual safety4    ,death1   
then1 which threatens us daily from a   

thousand accidents1 and  which1 by      
reason of the shortness of life1 can    
never be far off1 does not  deter a wise
 man from making such provision for his 
country and his  family1 as he hopes may
 last for ever2 and from regarding      
posterity1 of  which he can never have  
any real perception1 as belonging to    
himself4  ,wherefore a man may act for  
eternity1 even though he be persuaded   
that his  soul is mortal2 not1 indeed1  
from a desire of glory1 which he will be
  insensible of1 but from a principle of
 virtue1 which glory will inevitably    
attend1 though that is not his object4  
,the process1 indeed1 of nature is      
this2 that just in the same manner as   
our birth was the beginning of  things  
with us1 so death will be the end2 and  
as we were no ways concerned  with      
anything before we were born1 so neither
 shall we be after we are  dead2 and in 
this state of things where can the evil 
be8 since death has  no connexion with  
either the living or the dead2 the one  

have no existence  at all1 the other are
 not yet affected by it4 ,they who make 
the least of  death consider it as      
having a great resemblance to sleep2 as 
if any one  would choose to live ninety 
years on condition that1 at the         
expiration of  sixty1 he should sleep   
out the remainder4 ,the very swine would
 not accept  of life on those terms1    
much less ,i3 ,endymion1 indeed1 if you 
listen to  fables1 slept once on a time1
 on ,latmus1 a mountain of ,caria1 and  
for such  a length of time that ,i      
imagine he is not as yet awake4 ,do you 
think that  he is concerned at the      
,moon's being in difficulties1 though it
 was by her  that he was thrown into    
that sleep1 in order that she might kiss
 him while  sleeping2 for what should he
 be concerned for who has not even any  
sensation8 ,you look on sleep as an     
image of death1 and you take that on    
you daily2 and have you1 then1 any doubt
 that there is no sensation in  death1  
when you see there is none in sleep1    

which is its near resemblance8          
,,xxxix4 ,away1 then1 with those follies
 which are little better than the old   
women's dreams1 such as that it is      
miserable to die before our time4 ,what 
time do you mean8 ,that of nature8 ,but 
she has only lent you life1 as she      
might lend you money1 without fixing any
 certain time for its repayment4  ,have 
you any grounds of complaint1 then1 that
 she recals it at her  pleasure8 for you
 received it on these terms4 ,they that 
complain thus1  allow1 that if a young  
child dies the survivors ought to bear  
his loss  with equanimity2 that if an   
infant in the cradle dies1 they ought   
not even  to utter a complaint2 and yet 
nature has been more severe with them in
  demanding back what she gave4 ,they   
answer by saying1 that such have not    
tasted the sweets of life2 while the    
other had begun to conceive hopes of    
great happiness1 and indeed had begun to
 realize them4 ,men judge better in     
other things1 and allow a part to be    

preferable to none2 why do they not     
admit the same estimate in life8 ,though
 ,callimachus does not speak amiss  in  
saying1 that more tears had flowed from 
,priam than his son2 yet they  are      
thought happier who die after they have 
reached old age4 ,it would be  hard to  
say why2 for ,i do not apprehend that   
any one1 if a longer life  were granted 
to him1 would find it happier4 ,there is
 nothing more  agreeable to a man than  
prudence1 which old age most certainly  
bestows on  a man1 though it may strip  
him of everything else2 but what age is 
long8  or what is there at all long to a
 man8 ,does not          ,old age1      
though unregarded1 still attend      ,on
 childhood's pastimes1 as the cares of  
men8      ,but because there is nothing 
beyond old age1 we call that long2 all  
these  things are said to be long or    
short1 according to the proportion of   
time  they were given us for4 ,aristotle
 saith1 there is a kind of insect near  
the river ,hypanis1 which runs from a   

certain part of ,europe into the        
,pontus1 whose life consists but of one 
day2 those that die at the eighth  hour1
 die in full age2 those who die when the
 sun sets are very old1  especially when
 the days are at the longest4 ,compare  
our longest life with  eternity and we  
shall be found almost as short-lived as 
those little  animals4    ,,xl4 ,let us1
 then1 despise all these follies--for   
what softer name can ,i  give to such   
levities8--and let us lay the foundation
 of our happiness in  the strength and  
greatness of our minds1 in a contempt   
and disregard of  all earthly things1   
and in the practice of every virtue4    
,for at present we  are enervated by the
 softness of our imaginations1 so that1 
should we  leave this world before the  
promises of our fortune-tellers are made
 good  to us1 we should think ourselves 
deprived of some great advantages1 and  
seem disappointed and forlorn4 ,but if1 
through life1 we are in continual       
suspense1 still expecting1 still        

desiring1 and are in continual pain and 
torture1 good ,gods6 how pleasant must  
that journey be which ends in  security 
and ease6 ,how pleased am ,i with       
,theramenes6 of how exalted a soul  does
 he appear6 ,for1 although we never read
 of him without tears1 yet that         
illustrious man is not to be lamented in
 his death1 who1 when he had been       
imprisoned by the command of the thirty 
tyrants1 drank off1 at one  draught1 as 
if he had been thirsty1 the poisoned    
cup1 and threw the  remainder out of it 
with such force1 that it sounded as it  
fell2 and then1  on hearing the sound of
 the drops1 he said1 with a smile1 8,i  
drink this to  the most excellent       
,critias10 who had been his most bitter 
enemy2 for it is  customary among the   
,greeks1 at their banquets1 to name the 
person to whom  they intend to deliver  
the cup4 ,this celebrated man was       
pleasant to the  last1 even when he had 
received the poison into his bowels1 and
 truly  foretold the death of that man  

whom he named when he drank the poison1 
and  that death soon followed4 ,who that
 thinks death an evil1 could approve of 
the evenness of temper in this great man
 at the instant of dying8 ,socrates     
came1 a few years after1 to the same    
prison and the same cup1 by as great    
iniquity on the part of his judges as   
the tyrants displayed when they         
executed ,theramenes4 ,what a speech is 
that which ,plato makes him deliver     
before his judges1 after they had       
condemned him to death6    ,,xli4 8,i am
 not without hopes1 ,o judges1 that it  
is a favourable  circumstance for me    
that ,i am condemned to die2 for one of 
these two  things must necessarily      
happen1 either that death will deprive  
me entirely  of all sense1 or else1 that
 by dying ,i shall go from hence into   
some other  place2 wherefore1 if all    
sense is utterly extinguished1 and if   
death is  like that sleep which         
sometimes is so undisturbed as to be    
even without  the visions of dreams--in 

that case1 ,o ye good ,gods6 what gain  
is it to  die6 or what length of days   
can be imagined which would be          
preferable to  such a night8 ,and if the
 constant course of future time is to   
resemble  that night1 who is happier    
than ,i am8 ,but if1 on the other hand1 
what is  said be true1 namely1 that     
death is but a removal to those regions 
where  the souls of the departed dwell1 
then that state must be more happy      
still1  to have escaped from those who  
call themselves judges1 and to appear   
before such as are truly so1 ,minos1    
,rhadamanthus1 acus1 ,triptolemus1 and  
to meet with those who have lived with  
justice and probity67#gb7 ,can this     
change of abode appear otherwise than   
great to you8 ,what bounds can you  set 
to the value of conversing with         
,orpheus1 and ,musus1 and ,homer1 and   
,hesiod8 ,i would even1 were it         
possible1 willingly die often1 in order 
to  prove the certainty of what ,i speak
 of4 ,what delight must it be to meet   

with ,palamedes1 and ,ajax1 and others1 
who have been betrayed by the  iniquity 
of their judges6 ,then1 also1 should ,i 
experience the wisdom of  even that king
 of kings1 who led his vast troops to   
,troy1 and the prudence  of ,ulysses and
 ,sisyphus3 nor should ,i then be       
condemned for prosecuting my  inquiries 
on such subjects in the same way in     
which ,i have done here on  earth4 ,and 
even you1 my judges1 you1 ,i mean1 who  
have voted for my  acquittal1 do not you
 fear death1 for nothing bad can befal a
 good man1  whether he be alive or dead2
 nor are his concerns ever overlooked by
 the  ,gods1 nor in my case either has  
this befallen me by chance2 and ,i have 
nothing to charge those men with who    
accused or condemned me1 but the fact   
that they believed that they were doing 
me harm40 ,in this manner he  proceeded3
 there is no part of his speech which ,i
 admire more than his  last words3 8,but
 it is time10 says he1 8for me now to go
 hence1 that ,i may  die2 and for you1  

that you may continue to live4 ,which   
condition of the  two is the best1 the  
immortal ,gods know2 but ,i do not      
believe that any  mortal man does40     
,,xlii4 ,surely ,i would rather have had
 this man's soul1 than all the  fortunes
 of those who sat in judgment on him2   
although that very thing  which he says 
no one except the ,gods knows1 namely1  
whether life or death  is most          
preferable1 he knows himself1 for he had
 previously stated his  opinion on it2  
but he maintained to the last that      
favourite maxim of his1  of affirming   
nothing4 ,and let us1 too1 adhere to    
this rule of not thinking  anything an  
evil1 which is a general provision of   
nature3 and let us  assure ourselves1   
that if death is an evil1 it is an      
eternal evil1 for  death seems to be the
 end of a miserable life2 but if death  
is a misery1  there can be no end of    
that4 ,but why do ,i mention ,socrates1 
or ,theramenes1  men distinguished by   
the glory of virtue and wisdom8 when a  

certain  ,lacedmonian1 whose name is not
 so much as known1 held death in such   
contempt1 that1 when led to it by the   
ephori1 he bore a cheerful and  pleasant
 countenance2 and1 when he was asked by 
one of his enemies whether  he despised 
the laws of ,lycurgus8 8,on the         
contrary10 answered he1 8,i am  greatly 
obliged to him1 for he has amerced me in
 a fine which ,i can pay  without       
borrowing1 or taking up money at        
interest40 ,this was a man worthy  of   
,sparta6 and ,i am almost persuaded of  
his innocence because of the  greatness 
of his soul4 ,our own city has produced 
many such4 ,but why should  ,i name     
generals1 and other men of high rank1   
when ,cato could write1 that  legions   
have marched with alacrity to that place
 from whence they never  expected to    
return8 ,with no less greatness of soul 
fell the ,lacedmonians  at ,thermopyl1  
on whom ,simonides wrote the following  
epitaph3--          ,go1 stranger1 tell 
the ,spartans1 here we lie1      ,who to

 support their laws durst boldly        
die47#gc7      ,what was it that        
,leonidas1 their general1 said to them8 
8,march on with  courage1 my            
,lacedmonians2 to-night1 perhaps1 we    
shall sup in the regions  below40 ,this 
was a brave nation whilst the laws of   
,lycurgus were in force4  ,one of them1 
when a ,persian had said to him in      
conversation1 8,we shall  hide the sun  
from your sight by the number of our    
arrows and darts20  replied1 8,we shall 
fight then in the shade40 ,do ,i talk of
 their men8 how  great was that         
,lacedmonian woman1 who had sent her son
 to battle1 and  when she heard that he 
was slain1 said1 8,i bore him for that  
purpose1 that  you might have a man who 
durst die for his country40 ,however1 it
 is a  matter of notoriety that the     
,spartans were bold and hardy1 for the  
discipline of a republic has great      
influence4    ,,xliii4 ,what1 then1 have
 we not reason to admire ,theodorus the 
,cyrenean1 a  philosopher of no small   

distinction8 who1 when ,lysimachus      
threatened to  crucify him1 bade him    
keep those menaces for his courtiers3   
8to ,theodorus  it makes no difference  
whether he rot in the air or under      
ground40 ,by  which saying of the       
philosopher ,i am reminded to say       
something of the  custom of funerals and
 sepulture1 and of funeral ceremonies1  
which is1  indeed1 not a difficult      
subject1 especially if we recollect what
 has been  before said about            
insensibility4 ,the opinion of ,socrates
 respecting this  matter is clearly     
stated in the book which treats of his  
death2 or which  we have already said so
 much2 for when he had discussed the    
immortality of  the soul1 and when the  
time of his dying was approaching       
rapidly1 being  asked by ,criton how he 
would be buried1 8,i have taken a great 
deal of  pains1 saith he1 my friends1 to
 no purpose1 for ,i have not convinced  
our  ,criton1 that ,i shall fly from    
hence1 and leave no part of me behind3  

notwithstanding1 ,criton1 if you can    
overtake me1 wheresoever you get hold   
of me1 bury me as you please3 but       
believe me1 none of you will be able to 
catch me when ,i have flown away from   
hence40 ,that was excellently said1     
inasmuch as he allows his friend to do  
as he pleased1 and yet shows his        
indifference about anything of this     
kind4 ,diogenes was rougher1 though of  
the same opinion1 but in his character  
of a ,cynic1 he expressed himself in  a 
somewhat harsher manner2 he ordered     
himself to be thrown anywhere  without  
being buried4 ,and when his friends     
replied1 8,what1 to the birds  and      
beasts80 8,by no means10 saith he2      
8place my staff near me1 that ,i may    
drive them away40 8,how can you do      
that10 they answer1 8for you will not   
perceive them80 8,how am ,i then injured
 by being torn by those animals1 if  ,i 
have no sensation80 ,anaxagoras1 when he
 was at the point of death1 at          
,lampsacus1 and was asked by his        

friends1 whether1 if anything should    
happen to him1 he would not choose to be
 carried to ,clazomen1 his  country1    
made this excellent answer1--8,there    
is10 says he1 8no occasion for  that1   
for all places are at an equal distance 
from the infernal regions40  ,there is  
one thing to be observed with respect to
 the whole subject of  burial1 that it  
relates to the body1 whether the soul   
live or die4 ,now  with regard to the   
body1 it is clear that whether the soul 
live or die1  that has no sensation4    
,,xliv4 ,but all things are full of     
errors4 ,achilles drags ,hector1 tied to
  his chariot2 he thinks1 ,i suppose1 he
 tears his flesh1 and that ,hector      
feels the pain of it2 therefore1 he     
avenges himself on him1 as he  imagines2
 but ,hecuba bewails this as a sore     
misfortune--          ,i saw 7a dreadful
 sight67 great ,hector slain1           
,dragg'd at ,achilles' car along the    
plain4      ,what ,hector8 or how long  
will he be ,hector8 ,accius is better in

 this1 and  ,achilles1 too1 is sometimes
 reasonable--          ,i ,hector's body
 to his sire convey'd1      ,hector ,i  
sent to the infernal shade4      ,it was
 not ,hector that you dragged along1 but
 a body that had been  ,hector's4 ,here 
another starts from underground1 and    
will not suffer his  mother to sleep--  
,to thee ,i call1 my once loved parent1 
hear1      ,nor longer with thy sleep   
relieve thy care2      ,thine eye which 
pities not is closed--arise1            
,ling'ring ,i wait the unpaid obsequies4
      ,when these verses are sung with a
 slow and melancholy tune1 so as to     
affect the whole theatre with sadness1  
one can scarce help thinking those      
unhappy that are unburied--             
,ere the devouring dogs and hungry      
vultures 444      ,he is afraid he shall
 not have the use of his limbs so well  
if they are  torn to pieces1 but is     
under no such apprehensions if they are 
burned--          ,nor leave my naked   
bones1 my poor remains1      ,to        

shameful violence1 and bloody stains4   
,i do not understand what he could fear 
who could pour forth such excellent     
verses to the sound of the flute4 ,we   
must1 therefore1 adhere to this1 that   
nothing is to be regarded after we are  
dead1 though many people revenge        
themselves on their dead enemies4       
,thyestes pours forth several curses in 
some good lines of ,ennius1 praying1    
first of all1 that ,atreus may perish   
by a shipwreck1 which is certainly a    
very terrible thing1 for such a death   
is not free from very grievous          
sensations4 ,then follow these unmeaning
  expressions3--                        
,may      ,on the sharp rock his mangled
 carcase lie1      ,his entrails torn1  
to hungry birds a prey2      ,may he    
convulsive writhe his bleeding side1    
,and with his clotted gore the stones be
 dyed4      ,the rocks themselves were  
not more destitute of feeling than he   
who was  hanging to them by his side2   
though ,thyestes imagines he is wishing 

him  the greatest torture4 ,it would be 
torture indeed1 if he were sensible2 but
  as he is not1 it can be none2 then how
 very unmeaning is this6          ,let  
him1 still hovering o'er the ,stygian   
wave1      ,ne'er reach the body's      
peaceful port1 the grave4      ,you see 
under what mistaken notions all this is 
said4 ,he imagines the body  has its    
haven1 and that the dead are at rest in 
their graves4 ,pelops was  greatly to   
blame in not having informed and taught 
his son what regard was  due to         
everything4    ,,xlv4 ,but what occasion
 is there to animadvert on the opinions 
of  individuals1 when we may observe    
whole nations to fall into all sorts of 
errors8 ,the ,egyptians embalm their    
dead1 and keep them in their houses2    
the ,persians dress them over with wax1 
and then bury them1 that they may       
preserve their bodies as long as        
possible4 ,it is customary with the     
,magi1  to bury none of their order1    
unless they have been first torn by wild

  beasts4 ,in ,hyrcania1 the people     
maintain dogs for the public use1 the   
nobles have their own2 and we know that 
they have a good breed of dogs2  but    
every one1 according to his ability1    
provides himself with some1 in  order to
 be torn by them2 and they hold that to 
be the best kind of  interment4         
,chrysippus1 who is curious in all kinds
 of historical facts1  has collected    
many other things of this kind1 but some
 of them are so  offensive as not to    
admit of being related4 ,all that has   
been said of  burying1 is not worth our 
regard with respect to ourselves1 though
 it is  not to be neglected as to our   
friends1 provided we are thoroughly     
aware  that the dead are insensible2 but
 the living1 indeed1 should consider    
what  is due to custom and opinion1 only
 they should at the same time consider  
that the dead are no ways interested in 
it4 ,but death truly is then met  with  
the greatest tranquillity1 when the     
dying man can comfort himself  with his 

own praise4 ,no one dies too soon who   
has finished the course of  perfect     
virtue4 ,i myself have known many       
occasions when ,i have seemed in  danger
 of immediate death2 oh6 how ,i wish it 
had come to me1 for ,i have  gained     
nothing by the delay4 ,i had gone over  
and over again the duties of  life2     
nothing remained but to contend with    
fortune4 ,if reason1 then1  cannot      
sufficiently fortify us to enable us to 
feel a contempt for death1  at all      
events1 let our past life prove that we 
have lived long enough1 and  even longer
 than was necessary2 for notwithstanding
 the deprivation of  sense1 the dead are
 not without that good which peculiarly 
belongs to  them1 namely1 the praise and
 glory which they have acquired1 even   
though  they are not sensible of it4    
,for although there be nothing in glory 
to  make it desirable1 yet it follows   
virtue as its shadow4 ,and the genuine  
judgment of the multitude on good men1  
if ever they form any1 is more to  their

 own praise1 than of any real advantage 
to the dead2 yet ,i cannot  say1 however
 it may be received1 that ,lycurgus and 
,solon have no glory  from their laws1  
and from the political constitution     
which they  established in their        
country2 or that ,themistocles and      
,epaminondas have  not glory from their 
martial virtue4    ,,xlvi4 ,for ,neptune
 shall sooner bury ,salamis itself with 
his waters1 than  the memory of the     
trophies gained there2 and the ,botian  
,leuetra shall  perish1 sooner than the 
glory of that great battle4 ,and longer 
still shall  fame be before it deserts  
,curius1 and ,fabricius1 and ,calatinus1
 and the  two ,scipios1 and the two     
,africani1 and ,maximus1 and ,marcellus1
 and ,paulus1  and ,cato1 and ,llius1   
and numberless other heroes2 and whoever
 has caught  any resemblance of them1   
not estimating it by common fame1 but by
 the real  applause of good men1 may    
with confidence1 when the occasion      
requires1  approach death1 on which we  

are sure that even if the chief good is 
not  continued1 at least no evil is4    
,such a man would even wish to die1     
whilst  in prosperity2 for all the      
favours that could be heaped on him1    
would not  be so agreeable to him1 as   
the loss of them would be painful4 ,that
 speech  of the ,lacedmonian seems to   
have the same meaning1 who1 when        
,diagoras the  ,rhodian1 who had himself
 been a conqueror at the ,olympic games1
 saw two of  his own sons conquerors    
there on the same day1 approached the   
old man1 and  congratulating him1 said1 
8,you should die now1 ,diagoras1 for no 
greater  happiness can possibly await   
you40 ,the ,greeks look on these as     
great  things2 perhaps they think too   
highly of them1 or rather they did so   
then4  ,and so he who said this to      
,diagoras1 looking on it as something   
very  glorious1 that three men out of   
one family should have been conquerors  
there1 thought it could answer no       
purpose to him1 to continue any longer  

in life1 where he could only be exposed 
to a reverse of fortune4    ,i might    
have given you a sufficient answer1 as  
it seems to me1 on this  point1 in a few
 words1 as you had allowed the dead were
 not exposed to any  positive evil2 but 
,i have spoken at greater length on the 
subject for this  reason1 because this  
is our greatest consolation in the      
losing and  bewailing of our friends4   
,for we ought to bear with moderation   
any grief  which arises from ourselves1 
or is endured on our own account1 lest  
we  should seem to be too much          
influenced by self-love4 ,but should we 
suspect  our departed friends to be     
under those evils1 which they are       
generally  imagined to be and to be     
sensible of them1 then such a suspicion 
would  give us intolerable pain2 and    
accordingly ,i wished1 for my own sake1 
to  pluck up this opinion by the roots1 
and on that account ,i have been        
perhaps somewhat more prolix than was   
necessary4    ,,xlvii4 ,a4 ,more prolix 

than was necessary8 certainly not1 in my
 opinion4  ,for ,i was induced by the   
former part of your speech1 to wish to  
die2 but1  by the latter1 sometimes not 
to be unwilling1 and at others to be    
wholly  indifferent about it4 ,but the  
effect of your whole argument is1 that  
,i am  convinced that death ought not to
 be classed among the evils4    ,m4 ,do 
you1 then1 expect that ,i am to give you
 a regular peroration1 like  the        
rhetoricians1 or shall ,i forego that   
art8    ,a4 ,i would not have you give  
over an art which you have set off to   
such  advantage2 and you were in the    
right to do so1 for1 to speak the truth1
 it  also has set you off4 ,but what is 
that peroration8 for ,i should be glad  
to  hear it1 whatever it is4    ,m4 ,it 
is customary in the schools1 to produce 
the opinions of the  immortal gods on   
death2 nor are these opinions the fruits
 of the  imagination alone of the       
lecturers1 but they have the authority  
of  ,herodotus and many others4 ,cleobis

 and ,biton are the first they mention1 
sons of the ,argive priestess2 the story
 is a well-known one4 ,as it was        
necessary that she should be drawn in a 
chariot to a certain annual  sacrifice1 
which was solemnized at a temple some   
considerable distance  from the town1   
and the cattle that were to draw the    
chariot had not  arrived1 those two     
young men whom ,i have just mentioned1  
pulling off their  garments1 and        
anointing their bodies with oil1        
harnessed themselves to the  yoke4 ,and 
in this manner the priestess was        
conveyed to the temple2 and  when the   
chariot had arrived at the proper place1
 she is said to have  entreated the     
goddess to bestow on them1 as a reward  
for their piety1 the  greatest gift that
 a ,god could confer on man4 ,and the   
young men1 after  having feasted with   
their mother1 fell asleep2 and in the   
morning they  were found dead4          
,trophonius and ,agamedes are said to   
have put up the same  petition1 for they

 having built a temple to ,apollo at    
,delphi1 offered  supplications to the  
god1 and desired of him some            
extraordinary reward for  their care and
 labour1 particularizing nothing1 but   
asking for whatever  was best for men4  
,accordingly1 ,apollo signified to them 
that he would  bestow it on them in     
three days1 and on the third day at     
daybreak they  were found dead4 ,and so 
they say that this was a formal decision
  pronounced by that god1 to whom the   
rest of the deities have assigned the   
province of divining with an accuracy   
superior to that of all the rest4       
,,xlviii4 ,there is also a story told of
 ,silenus1 who1 when taken prisoner by  
,midas1 is said to have made him this   
present for his ransom2 namely1 that  he
 informed him7#gd7 that never to have   
been born1 was by far the greatest      
blessing that could happen to man2 and  
that the next best thing was1 to  die   
very soon2 which very opinion ,euripides
 makes use of in his  ,cresphontes1     

saying1--          ,when man is born1   
'tis fit1 with solemn show1      ,we    
speak our sense of his approaching woe1 
,with other gestures1 and a different   
eye1      ,proclaim our pleasure when   
he's bid to die47#ge7      ,there is    
something like this in ,crantor's       
,consolation2 for he says1 that         
,terinus of ,elysia1 when he was        
bitterly lamenting the loss of his son1 
came to a place of divination to be     
informed why he was visited with so     
great affliction1 and received in his   
tablet these three verses1--            
,thou fool1 to murmur at ,euthynous'    
death      ,the blooming youth to fate  
resigns his breath3      ,the fate1     
whereon your happiness depends1      ,at
 once the parent and the son            
befriends47#gf7      ,on these and      
similar authorities they affirm that the
 question has been  determined by the   
,gods4 ,nay more2 ,alcidamas1 an ancient
 rhetorician of the  very highest       
reputation1 wrote even in praise of     

death1 which he  endeavoured to         
establish by an enumeration of the evils
 of life2 and his  ,dissertation has a  
great deal of eloquence in it1 but he   
was unacquainted  with the more refined 
arguments of the philosophers4 ,by the  
orators1  indeed1 to die for our country
 is always considered not only as       
glorious1  but even as happy2 they go   
back as far as ,erechtheus17#gg7 whose  
very  daughters underwent death1 for the
 safety of their fellow-citizens3 they  
instance ,codrus1 who threw himself into
 the midst of his enemies1 dressed  like
 a common man1 that his royal robes     
might not betray him2 because the       
oracle had declared the ,athenians      
conquerors1 if their king was slain4    
,menceus7#gh7 is not overlooked by them1
 who1 in compliance with the            
injunctions of an oracle1 freely shed   
his blood for his country4 ,iphigenia   
ordered herself to be conveyed to       
,aulis1 to be sacrificed1 that her blood
  might be the cause of spilling that of

 her enemies4    ,,xlix4 ,from hence    
they proceed to instances of a fresher  
date4 ,harmodius  and ,aristogiton are  
in everybody's mouth2 the memory of     
,leonidas the  ,lacedmonian1 and        
,epaminondas the ,theban1 is as fresh as
 ever4 ,those  philosophers were not    
acquainted with the many instances in   
our country--to  give a list of whom    
would take up too much time--who1 we    
see1 considered  death desirable as long
 as it was accompanied with honour4     
,but1  notwithstanding this is the      
correct view of the case1 we must use   
much  persuasion1 speak as if we were   
endued with some higher authority1 in   
order to bring men to begin to wish to  
die1 or cease to be afraid of  death4   
,for if that last day does not occasion 
an entire extinction1 but a  change of  
abode only1 what can be more desirable8 
and if it on the other  hand destroys1  
and absolutely puts an end to us1 what  
can be preferable to  the having a deep 
sleep fall on us1 in the midst of the   

fatigues of life1  and being thus       
overtaken1 to sleep to eternity8 ,and1  
should this really be  the case1 then   
,ennius's language is more consistent   
with wisdom than  ,solon's2 for our     
,ennius says--          ,let none bestow
 upon my passing bier      ,one needless
 sigh or unavailing tear4      ,but the 
wise ,solon says--          ,let me not 
unlamented die1 but o'er my bier        
,burst forth the tender sigh1 the       
friendly tear47#gi7      ,but let us1 if
 indeed it should be our fate to know   
the time which is  appointed by the     
,gods for us to die1 prepare ourselves  
for it1 with a  cheerful and grateful   
mind1 thinking ourselves like men who   
are delivered  from a jail1 and released
 from their fetters1 for the purpose of 
going  back to our eternal habitation1  
which may be more emphatically called   
our  own2 or else to be divested of all 
sense and trouble4 ,if1 on the other    
hand1 we should have no notice given us 
of this decree1 yet let us  cultivate   

such a disposition as to look on that   
formidable hour of death  as happy for  
us1 though shocking to our friends2 and 
let us never imagine  anything to be an 
evil1 which is an appointment of the    
immortal ,gods1 or  of nature1 the      
common parent of all4 ,for it is not by 
hazard or without  design that we have  
been born and situated as we have4 ,on  
the contrary1  beyond all doubt there is
 a certain power1 which consults the    
happiness of  human nature2 and this    
would neither have produced nor provided
 for a  being1 which after having gone  
through the labours of life was to fall 
into eternal misery by death4 ,let us   
rather infer1 that we have a retreat    
and haven prepared for us1 which ,i wish
 we could crowd all sail and arrive  at2
 but though the winds should not serve1 
and we should be driven back1  yet we   
shall to a certainty arrive at that     
point eventually1 though  somewhat      
later4 ,but how can that be miserable   
for one which all must of  necessity    

undergo8 ,i have given you a peroration1
 that you might not think  ,i had       
overlooked or neglected anything4    ,a4
 ,i am persuaded you have not2 and1     
indeed1 that peroration has  confirmed  
me4    ,m4 ,i am glad it has had that   
effect2 but it is now time to consult   
our  health2 to-morrow1 and all the time
 we continue in this ,tusculan villa1   
let us consider this subject2 and       
especially those portions of it which   
may ease our pain1 alleviate our fears1 
and lessen our desires1 which is  the   
greatest advantage we can reap from the 
whole of philosophy4          ,book     
,,ii4 ,on ,bearing ,pain4      ,i4      
,neoptolemus1 in ,ennius1 indeed1 says1 
that the study of philosophy was        
expedient for him2 but that it required 
limiting to a few subjects1 for  that to
 give himself up entirely to it1 was    
what he did not approve of4  ,and for my
 part1 ,brutus1 ,i am perfectly         
persuaded that it is expedient for  me  
to philosophize2 for what can ,i do     

better1 especially as ,i have no        
regular occupation8 but ,i am not for   
limiting my philosophy to a few         
subjects1 as he does2 for philosophy is 
a matter in which it is difficult  to   
acquire a little knowledge without      
acquainting yourself with many1 or  all 
its branches1 nor can you well take a   
few subjects without selecting  them out
 of a great number2 nor can any one1 who
 has acquired the  knowledge of a few   
points1 avoid endeavouring with the same
 eagerness to  understand more4 ,but    
still1 in a busy life1 and in one mainly
 occupied  with military matters1 such  
as that of ,neoptolemus was at that     
time1 even  that limited degree of      
acquaintance with philosophy may be of  
great use1  and may yield fruit1 not    
perhaps so plentiful as a thorough      
knowledge of  the whole of philosophy1  
but yet such as in some degree may at   
times  deliver us from the dominion of  
our desires1 our sorrows1 and our fears2
  just as the effect of that discussion 

which we lately maintained in my        
,tusculan villa seemed to be1 that a    
great contempt of death was  engendered2
 which contempt is of no small efficacy 
towards delivering the  mind from fear2 
for whoever dreads what cannot be       
avoided1 can by no means  live with a   
quiet and tranquil mind4 ,but he who is 
under no fear of death1  not only       
because it is a thing absolutely        
inevitable1 but also because he  is     
persuaded that death itself hath nothing
 terrible in it1 provides  himself with 
a very great resource towards a happy   
life4 ,however1 ,i am not  ignorant1    
that many will argue strenuously against
 us2 and1 indeed1 that  is a thing which
 can never be avoided1 except by        
abstaining from writing  at all4 ,for if
 my ,orations1 which were addressed to  
the judgment and  approbation of the    
people1 7for that is a popular art1 and 
the object of  oratory is popular       
applause17 have been criticised by some 
people who are  inclined to withhold    

their praise from every thing but what  
they are  persuaded they can attain to  
themselves1 and who limit their ideas of
 good  speaking by the hopes which they 
conceive of what they themselves may    
attain to1 and who declare1 when they   
are overwhelmed with a flow of words    
and sentences1 that they prefer the     
utmost poverty of thought and           
expression to that plenty and           
copiousness2 7from which arose the      
,attic  kind of oratory1 which they who 
professed it were strangers to1 though  
they have now been some time silenced1  
and laughed out of the very courts  of  
justice27 what may ,i not expect1 when  
at present ,i cannot have the  least    
countenance from the people1 by whom ,i 
used to be upheld before8 ,for          
philosophy is satisfied with a few      
judges1 and of her own accord           
industriously avoids the multitude1 who 
are jealous of it1 and utterly          
displeased with it2 so that1 should any 
one undertake to cry down the  whole of 

it1 he would have the people on his     
side2 while1 if he should  attack that  
school which ,i particularly profess1 he
 would have great  assistance from those
 of the other philosophers4    ,,ii4    
,but ,i have answered the detractors of 
philosophy in general1 in my            
,hortensius4 ,and what ,i had to say in 
favour of the ,academics1 is1 ,i think1 
explained with sufficient accuracy in my
 four books of the ,academic  ,question4
    ,but yet ,i am so far from desiring 
that no one should write against me1    
that it is what ,i most earnestly wish2 
for philosophy would never have  been in
 such esteem in ,greece itself1 if it   
had not been for the strength  which it 
acquired from the contentions and       
disputations of the most  learned men2  
and therefore ,i recommend all men who  
have abilities to  follow my advice1 to 
snatch this art also from declining     
,greece1 and to  transport it to this   
city2 as our ancestors by their study   
and industry  have imported all their   

other arts1 which were worth having4    
,thus the  praise of oratory1 raised    
from a low degree1 is arrived at such   
perfection1 that it must now decline1   
and1 as is the nature of all things1    
verge to its dissolution in a very short
 time4 ,let philosophy then derive  its 
birth in ,latin language from this time1
 and let us lend it our  assistance1 and
 bear patiently to be contradicted and  
refuted2 and  although those men may    
dislike such treatment who are bound and
 devoted to  certain predetermined      
opinions1 and are under such obligations
 to maintain  them that they are forced1
 for the sake of consistency1 to adhere 
to them  even though they do not        
themselves wholly approve of them2 we1  
on the  other hand1 who pursue only     
probabilities1 and who cannot go beyond 
that  which seems really likely1 can    
confute others without obstinacy1 and   
are  prepared to be confuted ourselves  
without resentment4 ,besides1 if these  
studies are ever brought home to us1 we 

shall not want even ,greek  libraries1  
in which there is an infinite number of 
books1 by reason of the  multitude of   
authors among them2--for it is a common 
practice with many to  repeat the same  
things which have been written by       
others1 which serves no  purpose1 but to
 stuff their shelves3 and this will be  
our case1 too1 if  many apply themselves
 to this study4    ,,iii4 ,but let us   
excite those1 if possible1 who have had 
a liberal  education1 and are masters of
 an elegant style1 and who philosophize 
with  reason and method4    ,for there  
is a certain class of them who would    
willingly be called  philosophers1 whose
 books in our language are said to be   
numerous1 and  which ,i do not despise1 
for indeed ,i never read them3 but still
 because  the authors themselves declare
 that they write without any regularity1
 or  method1 or elegance1 or ornament1  
,i do not care to read what must be so  
void of entertainment4 ,there is no one 
in the least acquainted with            

literature1 who does not know the style 
and sentiments of that school2          
wherefore1 since they are at no pains to
 express themselves well1 ,i do not  see
 why they should be read by anybody     
except by one another3 let them  read   
them1 if they please1 who are of the    
same opinions3 for in the same  manner  
as all men read ,plato1 and the other   
,socratics1 with those who  sprung from 
them1 even those who do not agree with  
their opinions1 or are  very indifferent
 about them2 but scarcely any one except
 their own  disciples1 take ,epicurus1  
or ,metrodorus1 into their hands2 so    
they alone  read these ,latin books1 who
 think that the arguments contained in  
them are  sound4 ,but1 in my opinion1   
whatever is published1 should be        
recommended to  the reading of every man
 of learning2 and though we may not     
succeed in  this ourselves1 yet         
nevertheless we must be sensible that   
this ought to be  the aim of every      
writer4 ,and on this account ,i have    

always been pleased  with the custom of 
the ,peripatetics1 and ,academics1 of   
disputing on both  sides of the         
question2 not solely from its being the 
only method of  discovering what is     
probable on every subject1 but also     
because it affords  the greatest scope  
for practising eloquence2 a method that 
,aristotle first  made use of1 and      
afterward all the ,aristotelians2 and in
 our own memory  ,philo1 whom we have   
often heard1 appointed one time to treat
 of the  precepts of the rhetoricians1  
and another for philosophical           
discussion1 to  which custom ,i was     
brought to conform by my friends at my  
,tusculum2 and  accordingly our leisure 
time was spent in this manner4 ,and     
therefore1 as  yesterday before noon1 we
 applied ourselves to speaking2 and in  
the  afternoon went down into the       
,academy3 the discussions which were    
held  there ,i have acquainted you with1
 not in the manner of a narration1 but  
in  almost the very same words which    

were employed in the debate4    ,,iv4   
,the discourse1 then1 was introduced in 
this manner1 whilst we were  walking1   
and it was commenced by some such an    
opening as this4    ,a4 ,it is not to be
 expressed how much ,i was delighted1 or
 rather  edified1 by your discourse of  
yesterday4 ,for although ,i am conscious
 to  myself that ,i have never been too 
fond of life1 yet at times1 when ,i have
  considered that there would be an end 
to this life1 and that ,i must some     
time or other part with all its good    
things1 a certain dread and  uneasiness 
used to intrude itself on my thoughts2  
but now1 believe me1 ,i  am so freed    
from that kind of uneasiness1 that there
 is nothing that ,i  think less worth   
any regard4    ,m4 ,i am not at all     
surprised at that1 for it is the effect 
of  philosophy1 which is the medicine of
 our souls2 it banishes all groundless  
apprehensions1 frees us from desires1   
and drives away fears3 but it has  not  
the same influence over all men2 it is  

of very great influence when it  falls  
in with a disposition well adapted to   
it4 ,for not only does ,fortune1  as the
 old proverb says1 assist the bold1 but 
reason does so in a still  greater      
degree2 for it1 by certain precepts1 as 
it were1 strengthens even  courage      
itself4 ,you were born naturally great  
and soaring1 and with a  contempt for   
all things which pertain to man alone2  
therefore a discourse  against death    
took easy possession of a brave soul4   
,but do you imagine  that these same    
arguments have any force with those very
 persons who have  invented1 and        
canvassed1 and published them1 excepting
 indeed some very  few particular       
persons8 ,for how few philosophers will 
you meet with1 whose  life and manners  
are conformable to the dictates of      
reason6 who look on  their profession1  
not as a means of displaying their      
learning1 but as a  rule for their own  
practice6 who follow their own precepts1
 and comply  with1 their own decrees6   

,you may see some of such levity1 and   
such vanity1  that it would have been   
better for them to have been ignorant2  
some  covetous of money1 some others    
eager for glory1 many slaves to their   
lusts2 so that their discourses and     
their actions are most strangely at     
variance2 than which nothing in my      
opinion can be more unbecoming3 for     
just as if one who professed to teach   
grammar1 should speak with  impropriety2
 or a master of music sing out of tune2 
such conduct has the  worse appearance  
in these men1 because they blunder in   
the very particular  with which they    
profess that they are well acquainted3  
so a philosopher1  who errs in the      
conduct of his life1 is the more        
infamous1 because he is  erring in the  
very thing which he pretends to teach1  
and whilst he lays  down rules to       
regulate life by1 is irregular in his   
own life4    ,v4 ,a4 ,should this be the
 case1 is it not to be feared that you  
are  dressing up philosophy in false    

colours8 for what stronger argument can 
there be that it is of little use1 than 
that some very profound  philosophers   
live in a discreditable manner8    ,m4  
,that1 indeed1 is no argument at all1   
for as all the fields which are         
cultivated are not fruitful1 7and this  
sentiment of ,accius is false1 and      
asserted without any foundation1        
,the ground you sow on1 is of small     
avail2      ,to yield a crop good seed  
can never fail37      it is not every   
mind which has been properly cultivated 
that produces  fruit2--and to go on with
 the comparison1 as a field1 although it
 may be  naturally fruitful cannot      
produce a crop1 without dressing1 so    
neither can  the mind1 without          
education2 such is the weakness of      
either without the  other4 ,whereas     
philosophy is the culture of the mind3  
this it is which  plucks up vices by the
 roots2 prepares the mind for the       
receiving of  seeds1 commits them to it1
 or1 as ,i may say1 sows them1 in the   

hope that1  when come to maturity1 they 
may produce a plentiful harvest4 ,let us
  proceed1 then1 as we begun2 say1 if   
you please1 what shall be the subject   
of our disputation4    ,a4 ,i look on   
pain to be the greatest of all evils4   
,m4 ,what1 even greater than infamy8    
,a4 ,i dare not indeed assert that1 and 
,i blush to think ,i am so soon  driven 
from my ground4    ,m4 ,you would have  
had greater reason for blushing had you 
persevered in  it2 for what is so       
unbecoming--what can appear worse to    
you1 than disgrace1  wickedness1        
immorality8 ,to avoid which1 what pain  
is there which we ought  not 7,i will   
not say to avoid shirking1 but even7 of 
our own accord to  encounter1 and       
undergo1 and even to court8    ,a4 ,i am
 entirely of that opinion2 but          
notwithstanding that pain is not  the   
greatest evil1 yet surely it is an evil4
    ,m4 ,do you perceive1 then1 how much
 of the terror of pain you have given   
up on a small hint8    ,a4 ,i see that  

plainly2 but ,i should be glad to give  
up more of it4    ,m4 ,i will endeavour 
to make you do so1 but it is a great    
undertaking1  and ,i must have a        
disposition on your part1 which is not  
inclined to offer  any obstacles4    ,a4
 ,you shall have such3 for as ,i behaved
 yesterday1 so now ,i will follow       
reason wherever she leads4    ,,vi4 ,m4 
,first1 then1 ,i will speak of the      
weakness of many philosophers1  and     
those too of various sects2 the head of 
whom1 both in authority and  antiquity1 
was ,aristippus1 the pupil of ,socrates1
 who hesitated not to  say1 that pain   
was the greatest of all evils4 ,and     
after him ,epicurus  easily gave into   
this effeminate and enervated doctrine4 
,after him  ,hieronymus1 the ,rhodian1  
said1 that to be without pain was the   
chief good1  so great an evil did pain  
appear to him to be4 ,the rest1 with the
  exceptions of ,zeno1 ,aristo1 ,pyrrho1
 were pretty much of the same opinion   
that you were of just now1 that it was  

indeed an evil1 but that there were     
many worse4 ,when then nature herself   
and a certain generous feeling of       
virtue at once prevents you from        
persisting in the assertion that pain is
  the chief evil1 and when you were     
driven from such an opinion when        
disgrace was contrasted with pain1 shall
 philosophy1 the preceptress of  life1  
cling to this idea for so many ages8    
,what duty of life1 what praise1  what  
reputation would be of such consequence 
that a man should be desirous  of       
gaining it at the expense of submitting 
to bodily pain1 when he has  persuaded  
himself that pain is the greatest evil8 
,on the other side1 what  disgrace1 what
 ignominy1 would he not submit to1 that 
he might avoid pain1  when persuaded    
that it was the greatest of evils8      
,besides1 what person1 if  it be only   
true that pain is the greatest of evils1
 is not miserable1 not  only when he    
actually feels pain1 but also whenever  
he is aware that it  may befal him8 ,and

 who is there whom pain may not befal8  
so that it is  clear that there is      
absolutely no one who can possibly be   
happy4  ,metrodorus1 indeed1 thinks that
 man perfectly happy1 whose body is free
  from all disorders1 and who has an    
assurance that it will always continue  
so2 but who is there who can be assured 
of that8    ,,vii4 ,but ,epicurus1      
indeed1 says such things that it should 
seem that his  design was only to make  
people laugh2 for he affirms somewhere1 
that if a  wise man were to be burned1  
or put to the torture1--you expect1     
perhaps1  that he is going to say he    
would bear it1 he would support himself 
under  it with resolution6 he would not 
yield to it1 and that1 by ,hercules6    
would  he very commendable1 and worthy  
of that very ,hercules whom ,i have just
  invoked3 but even this will not       
satisfy ,epicurus1 that robust and hardy
  man6 ,no2 his wise man1 even if he    
were in ,phalaris's bull1 would say1    
,how  sweet it is6 how little do ,i     

regard it6 ,what sweet8 is it not       
sufficient1  if it is not disagreeable8 
,but those very men who deny pain to be 
an evil1  are not in the habit of saying
 that it is agreeable to any one to be  
tormented2 they rather say1 that it is  
cruel1 or hard to bear1 afflicting1     
unnatural1 but still not an evil3 while 
this man who says that it is the  only  
evil1 and the very worst of all evils1  
yet thinks that a wise man  would       
pronounce it sweet4 ,i do not require of
 you to speak of pain in the  same words
 which ,epicurus uses--a man1 as you    
know1 devoted to pleasure3 he  may make 
no difference1 if he pleases1 between   
,phalaris's bull1 and his  own bed3 but 
,i cannot allow the wise man to be so   
indifferent about pain4  ,if he bears it
 with courage1 it is sufficient2 that he
 should rejoice in  it1 ,i do not       
expect2 for pain is1 beyond all         
question1 sharp1 bitter1  against       
nature1 hard to submit to1 and to bear4 
,observe ,philoctetes3 ,we  may allow   

him to lament1 for he saw ,hercules     
himself groaning loudly  through        
extremity of pain on mount ta3 the      
arrows with which ,hercules  presented  
him1 were then no consolation to him1   
when          ,the viper's bite1        
impregnating his veins      ,with       
poison1 rack'd him with its bitter      
pains4      ,and therefore he cries out1
 desiring help1 and wishing to die1     
,oh6 that some friendly hand its aid    
would lend1      ,my body from this     
rock's vast height to send      ,into   
the briny deep6 ,i'm all on fire1       
,and by this fatal wound must soon      
expire4      ,it is hard to say that the
 man who was obliged to cry out in this 
manner1  was not oppressed with evil1   
and great evil too4    ,,viii4 ,but let 
us observe ,hercules himself1 who was   
subdued by pain at the  very time when  
he was on the point of attaining        
immortality by death4 ,what  words does 
,sophocles here put in his mouth1 in his
 ,trachini8 who1 when  ,deianira had put

 upon him a tunic dyed in the centaur's 
blood1 and it  stuck to his entrails1   
says1          ,what tortures ,i endure 
no words can tell1      ,far greater    
these1 than those which erst befel      
,from the dire terror of thy consort1   
,jove2      ,e'en stern ,eurystheus'    
dire command above2      ,this of thy   
daughter1 neus1 is the fruit1           
,beguiling me with her envenom'd suit1  
,whose close embrace doth on my entrails
 prey1      ,consuming life2 my lungs   
forbid to play2      ,the blood forsakes
 my veins1 my manly heart      ,forgets 
to beat2 enervated1 each part           
,neglects its office1 whilst my fatal   
doom      ,proceeds ignobly from the    
weaver's loom4      ,the hand of foe    
ne'er hurt me1 nor the fierce           
,giant issuing from his parent earth4   
,ne'er could the ,centaur such a blow   
enforce1      ,no barbarous foe1 nor all
 the ,grecian force2      ,this arm no  
savage people could withstand1          
,whose realms ,i traversed to reform the

 land4      ,thus1 though ,i ever bore a
 manly heart1      ,i fall a victim to a
 woman's art4        ,,ix4 ,assist1 my  
son1 if thou that name dost hear1       
,my groans preferring to thy mother's   
tear2      ,convey her here1 if1 in thy 
pious heart1      ,thy mother shares not
 an unequal part3      ,proceed1 be     
bold1 thy father's fate bemoan1         
,nations will join1 you will not weep   
alone4      ,o what a sight is this same
 briny source1      ,unknown before1    
through all my labours' course6         
,that virtue1 which could brave each    
toil but late1      ,with woman's       
weakness now bewails its fate4          
,approach1 my son2 behold thy father    
laid1      ,a wither'd carcase that     
implores thy aid2      ,let all behold2 
and thou1 imperious ,jove1      ,on me  
direct thy lightning from above3        
,now all its force the poison doth      
assume1      ,and my burnt entrails with
 its flame consume4      ,crest-fallen1 
unembraced ,i now let fall              

,listless1 those hands that lately      
conquer'd all2      ,when the ,neman    
lion own'd their force1      ,and he    
indignant fell a breathless corse3      
,the serpent slew1 of the ,lernean lake1
      ,as did the ,hydra of its force   
partake3      ,by this1 too1 fell the   
,erymanthian boar3      ,e'en ,cerberus 
did his weak strength deplore4          
,this sinewy arm did overcome with ease 
,that dragon1 guardian of the golden    
fleece4      ,my many conquests let some
 others trace2      ,it's mine to say1  
,i never knew disgrace47#hj7      ,can  
we1 then1 despise pain1 when we see     
,hercules himself giving vent to  his   
expressions of agony with such          
impatience8    ,,ix4 ,let us see what   
schylus says1 who was not only a poet1  
but a  ,pythagorean philosopher1 also1  
for that is the account which you have  
received of him2 how doth he make       
,prometheus bear the pain he suffered   
for  the ,lemnian theft1 when he        
clandestinely stole away the celestial  

fire1  and bestowed it on men1 and was  
severely punished by ,jupiter for the   
theft4 ,fastened to mount ,caucasus1 he 
speaks thus3          ,thou heav'n-born 
race of ,titans here fast bound1        
,behold thy brother6 ,as the sailors    
sound      ,with care the bottom1 and   
their ships confine      ,to some safe  
shore1 with anchor and with line3       
,so1 by ,jove's dread decree the god of 
fire      ,confines me here the victim  
of ,jove's ire4      ,with baneful art  
his dire machine he shapes2      ,from  
such a god what mortal e'er escapes8    
,when each third day shall triumph o'er 
the night1      ,then doth the vulture1 
with his talons light1      ,seize on my
 entrails2 which1 in rav'nous guise1    
,he preys on6 then with wing extended   
flies      ,aloft1 and brushes with his 
plumes the gore3      ,but when dire    
,jove my liver doth restore1      ,back 
he returns impetuous to his prey1       
,clapping his wings1 he cuts th'        
ethereal way4      ,thus do ,i nourish  

with my blood this pest1      ,confined 
my arms1 unable to contest2             
,entreating only1 that in pity ,jove    
,would take my life1 and this cursed    
plague remove4      ,but endless ages   
past1 unheard my moan1      ,sooner     
shall drops dissolve this very          
stone47#ha7      ,and therefore it      
scarcely seems possible to avoid calling
 a man who is  suffering1 miserable2 and
 if he is miserable1 then pain is an    
evil4    ,,xi4 ,a4 ,hitherto you are on 
my side2 ,i will see to that by-and-by2 
and1  in the meanwhile1 whence are those
 verses8 ,i do not remember them4    ,m4
 ,i will inform you1 for you are in the 
right to ask4 ,do you see that ,i  have 
much leisure8    ,a4 ,what then8    ,m4 
,i imagine1 when you were at ,athens1   
you attended frequently at the  schools 
of the philosophers4    ,a4 ,yes1 and   
with great pleasure4    ,m4 ,you        
observed then1 that1 though none of them
 at that time were very  eloquent1 yet  
they used to mix verses with their      

harangues4    ,a4 ,yes1 and particularly
 ,dionysius1 the ,stoic1 used to employ 
a great  many4    ,m4 ,you say right2   
but they were quoted without any        
appropriateness or  elegance4 ,but our  
friend ,philo used to give a few select 
lines and well  adapted2 and in         
imitation of him1 ever since ,i took a  
fancy to this kind  of elderly          
declamation1 ,i have been very fond of  
quoting our poets1 and  where ,i cannot 
be supplied from them1 ,i translate from
 the ,greek1 that the  ,latin language  
may not want any kind of ornament in    
this kind of  disputation4    ,but do   
you not see how much harm is done by    
poets8 ,they introduce the  bravest men 
lamenting over their misfortunes3 they  
soften our minds1 and  they are besides 
so entertaining1 that we do not only    
read them1 but get  them by heart4 ,thus
 the influence of the poets is added to 
our want of  discipline at home1 and our
 tender and delicate manner of living1  
so that  between them they have deprived

 virtue of all its vigour and energy4   
,plato  therefore was right in banishing
 them from his commonwealth1 where he   
required the best morals1 and the best  
form of government4 ,but we1 who  have  
all our learning from ,greece1 read and 
learn these works of theirs  from our   
childhood2 and look on this as a liberal
 and learned education4    ,,xii4 ,but  
why are we angry with the poets8 we may 
find some philosophers1  those masters  
of virtue1 who have taught that pain was
 the greatest of  evils4 ,but you1 young
 man1 when you said but just now that it
 appeared so  to you1 upon being asked  
by me what appeared greater than infamy1
 gave up  that opinion at a word4       
,suppose ,i ask ,epicurus the same      
question4 ,he will  answer1 that a      
trifling degree of pain is a greater    
evil than the greatest  infamy2 for that
 there is no evil in infamy itself1     
unless attended with  pain4 ,what pain  
then attends ,epicurus1 when he says    
this very thing1 that  pain is the      

greatest evil2 and yet nothing can be a 
greater disgrace to a  philosopher than 
to talk thus4 ,therefore1 you allowed   
enough when you  admitted that infamy   
appeared to you to be a greater evil    
than pain4 ,and  if you abide by this   
admission1 you will see how far pain    
should be  resisted3 and that our       
inquiry should be not so much whether   
pain be an  evil2 as how the mind may be
 fortified for resisting it4 ,the       
,stoics infer  from some petty quibbling
 arguments1 that it is no evil1 as if   
the dispute  was about a word1 and not  
about the thing itself4 ,why do you     
impose upon  me1 ,zeno8 for when you    
deny what appears very dreadful to me to
 be an  evil2 ,i am deceived1 and am at 
a loss to know why that which appears to
 me  to be a most miserable thing1      
should be no evil4 ,the answer is1 that 
nothing is an evil but what is base and 
vicious4 ,you return to your  trifling1 
for you do not remove what made me      
uneasy4 ,i know that pain is  not       

vice1--you need not inform me of that3  
but show me1 that it makes no           
difference to me whether ,i am in pain  
or not4 ,it has never anything to do1   
say you1 with a happy life1 for that    
depends upon virtue alone2 but yet  pain
 is to be avoided4 ,if ,i ask1 why8 it  
is disagreeable1 against nature1  hard  
to bear1 woful and afflicting4          
,,xiii4 ,here are many words to express 
that by so many different forms1  which 
we call by the single word1 evil4 ,you  
are defining pain1 instead of  removing 
it1 when you say1 it is disagreeable1   
unnatural1 scarcely  possible to be     
endured or borne3 nor are you wrong in  
saying so2 but the  man who vaunts      
himself in such a manner should not give
 way in his  conduct1 if it be true that
 nothing is good but what is honest1 and
  nothing evil but what is disgraceful4 
,this would be wishing1 not             
proving4--,this argument is a better    
one1 and has more truth in it1 that all 
things which nature abhors are to be    

looked upon as evil2 that those which   
she approves of1 are to be considered as
 good3 for when this is admitted1  and  
the dispute about words removed1 that   
which they with reason embrace1  and    
which we call honest1 right1 becoming1  
and sometimes include under the  general
 name of virtue1 appears so far superior
 to everything else1 that  all other    
things which are looked upon as the     
gifts of fortune1 or the  good things of
 the body1 seem trifling and            
insignificant3 and no evil  whatever1   
nor all the collective body of evils    
together1 appears to be  compared to the
 evil of infamy4 ,wherefore1 if1 as you 
granted in the  beginning1 infamy is    
worse than pain1 pain is certainly      
nothing2 for while  it appears to you   
base and unmanly to groan1 cry out1     
lament1 or faint  under pain--while you 
cherish notions of probity1 dignity1    
honour1 and  keeping your eye on them1  
refrain yourself--pain will certainly   
yield to  virtue1 and by the influence  

of imagination1 will lose its whole     
force4--,for you must either admit that 
there is no such thing as virtue1 or    
you must despise every kind of pain4    
,will you allow of such a virtue as     
prudence1 without which no virtue       
whatever can even be conceived8 ,what   
then8 will that suffer you to labour and
 take pains to no purpose8 ,will        
temperance permit you to do anything to 
excess8 ,will it be possible for        
justice to be maintained by one who     
through the force of pain discovers     
secrets1 or betrays his confederates1 or
 deserts many duties of life8 ,will  you
 act in a manner consistently with      
courage1 and its attendants1  greatness 
of soul1 resolution1 patience1 and      
contempt for all worldly  things8 ,can  
you hear yourself called a great man1   
when you lie groveling1  dejected1 and  
deploring your condition1 with a        
lamentable voice2 no one  would call you
 even a man1 while in such a condition3 
you must therefore  either abandon all  

pretensions to courage1 or else pain    
must be put out of  the question4       
,,xiv4 ,you know very well1 that even   
though part of your ,corinthian         
furniture were gone1 the remainder might
 be safe without that2 but if you  lose 
one virtue 7though virtue in reality    
cannot be lost71 still if1 ,i  say1 you 
should acknowledge that you were        
deficient in one1 you would be  stripped
 of all4 ,can you1 then1 call yourself a
 brave man1 of a great  soul1 endued    
with patience and steadiness above the  
frowns of fortune8 or  ,philoctetes8 for
 ,i choose to instance him1 rather than 
yourself1 for he  certainly was not a   
brave man1 who lay in his bed1 which was
 watered with  his tears1               
,whose groans1 bewailings1 and whose    
bitter cries1      ,with grief incessant
 rent the very skies4      ,i do not    
deny pain to be pain2 for were that the 
case1 in what would  courage consist8   
but ,i say it should be assuaged by     
patience1 if there be  such a thing as  

patience3 if there be no such thing1 why
 do we speak so in  praise of           
philosophy8 or why do we glory in its   
name8 ,does pain annoy us8  let it sting
 us to the heart3 if you are without    
defensive armour1 bare  your throat to  
it2 but if you are secured by ,vulcanian
 armour1 that is to  say by resolution1 
resist it2 should you fail to do so1    
that guardian of  your honour1 your     
courage1 will forsake and leave         
you4--,by the laws of  ,lycurgus1 and by
 those which were given to the ,cretans 
by ,jupiter1 or  which ,minos           
established under the direction of      
,jupiter1 as the poets say1  the youths 
of the state are trained by the practice
 of hunting1 running1  enduring hunger  
and thirst1 cold and heat4 ,the boys at 
,sparta are scourged  so at the altars1 
that blood follows the lash in          
abundance1 nay1  sometimes1 as ,i used  
to hear when ,i was there1 they are     
whipped even to  death2 and yet not one 
of them was ever heard to cry out1 or so

 much as  groan4 ,what then8 shall men  
not be able to bear what boys do8 and   
shall  custom have such great force1 and
 reason none at all8    ,,xv4 ,there is 
some difference betwixt labour and pain2
 they border upon one  another1 but     
still there is a certain difference     
between them4 ,labour is a  certain     
exercise of the mind or body1 in some   
employment or undertaking of  serious   
trouble and importance2 but pain is a   
sharp motion in the body1  disagreeable 
to our senses4--,both these feelings1   
the ,greeks1 whose  language is more    
copious than ours1 express by the common
 name of 2  therefore they call         
industrious men1 pains-taking1 or rather
 fond of  labour2 we1 more conveniently1
 call them laborious2 for labouring is  
one  thing and enduring pain another4   
,you see1 ,o ,greece1 your barrenness of
  words1 sometimes1 though you think you
 are always so rich in them4 ,i say1    
then1 that there is a difference betwixt
 labouring and being in pain4 ,when     

,caius ,marius had an operation         
performed for a swelling in his thigh1  
he  felt pain2 when he headed his troops
 in a very hot season1 he laboured4     
,yet these two feelings bear some       
resemblance to one another2 for the     
accustoming ourselves to labour makes   
the endurance of pain more easy to      
us4--,and it was because they were      
influenced by this reason1 that the     
founders of the ,grecian form of        
government provided that the bodies of  
their youth should be strengthened by   
labour1 which custom the ,spartans      
transferred even to their women1 who in 
other cities lived more  delicately1    
keeping within the walls of their       
houses1 but it was otherwise  with the  
,spartans4          ,the ,spartan women1
 with a manly air1      ,fatigues and   
dangers with their husbands share3      
,they in fantastic sports have no       
delight1      ,partners with them in    
exercise and fight4      ,and in these  
laborious exercises pain interferes     

sometimes2 they are  thrown down1       
receive blows1 have bad falls1 and are  
bruised1 and the  labour itself produces
 a sort of callousness to pain4         
,,xvi4 ,as to military service1 7,i     
speak of our own1 not of that of the    
,spartans1 for they used to march slowly
 to the sound of the flute1 and  scarce 
a word of command was given without an  
anapst27 you may see in the  first place
 whence the very name of an army        
7,exercitus77#hb7 is derived2  and      
secondly1 how great the labour is of an 
army on its march2 then  consider that  
they carry more than a fortnight's      
provision1 and whatever  else they may  
want3 that they carry the burthen of the
 stakes17#hc7 for as  to shield1 sword1 
or helmet1 they look on them as no more 
encumbrance than  their own limbs1 for  
they say that arms are the limbs of a   
soldier1 and  those indeed they carry so
 commodiously1 that when there is       
occasion they  throw down their burdens1
 and use their arms as readily as their 

limbs4  ,why need ,i mention the        
exercises of the legions8 and how great 
the labour  is which is undergone in the
 running1 encounters1 shouts6 ,hence it 
is1  that their minds are worked up to  
make so light of wounds in action4 ,take
  a soldier of equal bravery1 but       
undisciplined1 and he will seem a woman4
  ,why is it that there is this sensible
 difference betwixt a raw recruit and  a
 veteran soldier8 ,the age of the young 
soldiers is for the most part in  their 
favour1 but it is practice only that    
enables men to bear labour1 and  despise
 wounds4 ,moreover1 we often see1 when  
the wounded are carried off  the field1 
the raw untried soldier1 though but     
slightly wounded1 cries out  most       
shamefully2 but the more brave          
experienced veteran only inquires for   
some one to dress his wounds1 and says1 
,patroclus1 to thy aid ,i must appeal   
,ere worse ensue1 my bleeding wounds to 
heal2      ,the sons of sculapius are   
employ'd1      ,no room for me1 so many 

are annoy'd4      ,,xvii4 ,this is      
certainly ,eurypylus himself4 ,what an  
experienced man6--,whilst  his friend is
 continually enlarging on his           
misfortunes1 you may observe  that he is
 so far from weeping1 that he even      
assigns a reason why he  should bear his
 wounds with patience4          ,who at 
his enemy a stroke directs1      ,his   
sword to light upon himself expects4    
,patroclus1 ,i suppose1 will lead him   
off to his chamber to bind up his       
wounds1 at least if he be a man3 but not
 a word of that2 he only inquires  how  
the battle went4          ,say how the  
,argives bear themselves in fight8--    
,and yet no words can show the truth as 
well as those1 your deeds and  visible  
sufferings4          ,peace6 and my     
wounds bind up2      but though         
,eurypylus could bear these afflictions1
 sopus could not1          ,where       
,hector's fortune press'd our yielding  
troops2      and he explains the rest1  
though in pain2 so unbounded is military

 glory  in a brave man6 ,shall1 then1 a 
veteran soldier be able to behave in    
this  manner1 and shall a wise and      
learned man not be able8 ,surely the    
latter  might be able to bear pain      
better1 and in no small degree either3  
at  present1 how ever1 ,i am confining  
myself to what is engendered practice   
and discipline4 ,i am not yet come to   
speak of reason and philosophy4 ,you    
may often hear of old women living      
without victuals for three or four      
days3 but take away a wrestler's        
provisions but for one day1 and he will 
implore the aid of ,jupiter ,olympius1  
the very ,god for whom he exercises     
himself3 he will cry out that he cannot 
endure it4 ,great is the force of       
custom6 ,sportsmen will continue whole  
nights in the snow3 they will bear      
being almost frozen upon the mountains4 
,from practice boxers will not so  much 
as utter a groan1 however bruised by the
 cestus4 ,but what do you  think of     
those to whom a victory in the ,olympic 

games seemed almost on a  par with the  
ancient consulships of the ,roman       
people8 ,what wounds will the           
gladiators bear1 who are either         
barbarians1 or the very dregs of        
mankind6  ,how do they1 who are trained 
to it1 prefer being wounded to basely   
avoiding it6 ,how often do they prove   
that they consider nothing but the      
giving satisfaction to their masters or 
to the people6 for when covered  with   
wounds1 they send to their masters to   
learn their pleasure2 if it is  their   
will1 they are ready to lie down and    
die4 ,what gladiator1 of even  moderate 
reputation1 ever gave a sigh8 who ever  
turned pale8 who ever  disgraced himself
 either in the actual combat1 or even   
when about to die8  who that had been   
defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid 
the stroke of  death8 ,so great is the  
force of practice1 deliberation1 and    
custom6 ,shall  this1 then1 be done by  
,a ,samnite rascal1 worthy of his trade2
      and shall a man born to glory have

 so soft a part in his soul as not to be
  able to fortify it by reason and      
reflection8 ,the sight of the           
gladiators'  combats is by some looked  
on as cruel and inhuman1 and ,i do not  
know1 as  it is at present managed1 but 
it may be so2 but when the guilty       
fought1 we  might receive by our ears   
perhaps 7but certainly by our eyes we   
could not7  better training to harden us
 against pain and death4    ,,xviii4 ,i 
have now said enough about the effects  
of exercise1 custom1 and  careful       
meditation2 proceed we now to consider  
the force of reason1 unless  you have   
something to reply to what has been     
said4    ,a4 ,that ,i should interrupt  
you6 by no means2 for your discourse has
  brought me over to your opinion4 ,let 
the ,stoics1 then1 think it their       
business to determine whether pain be an
 evil or not1 while they endeavour  to  
show by some strained and trifling      
conclusions1 which are nothing to  the  
purpose1 that pain is no evil4 ,my      

opinion is1 that whatever it is1 it  is 
not so great as it appears2 and ,i say1 
that men are influenced to a  great     
extent by some false representations and
 appearance of it1 and that  all which  
is really felt is capable of being      
endured4 ,where shall ,i begin1  then8  
shall ,i superficially go over what ,i  
said before1 that my discourse  may have
 a greater scope8    ,this1 then1 is    
agreed upon by all1 and not only by     
learned men1 but also  by the unlearned1
 that it becomes the brave and          
magnanimous1 those that  have patience  
and a spirit above this world1 not to   
give way to pain4 ,nor  has there ever  
been any one who did not commend a man  
who bore it in this  manner4 ,that1     
then1 which is expected from a brave    
man1 and is commended  when it is seen1 
it must surely be base in any one to be 
afraid of at its  approach1 or not to   
bear when it comes4 ,but ,i would have  
you consider  whether1 as all the right 
affections of the soul are classed under

 the  name of virtues1 the truth is that
 this is not properly the name of them  
all1 but that they all have their name  
from that leading virtue which is       
superior to all the rest3 for the name1 
8virtue10 comes from vir1 a man1  and   
courage is the peculiar distinction of a
 man3 and this virtue has two  principal
 duties1 to despise death and pain4 ,we 
must1 then1 exert these1  if we would be
 men of virtue1 or rather1 if we would  
be men1 because  virtue 7virtus7 takes  
its very name from vir1 man4    ,,xix4  
,you may inquire1 perhaps1 how8 and such
 an inquiry is not amiss1 for           
philosophy is ready with her assistance4
 ,epicurus offers himself to you1 a  man
 far from a bad1 or1 ,i should rather   
say1 a very good man2 he advises  no    
more than he knows4 8,despise pain10    
says he4 ,who is it saith this8 ,is  it 
the same man who calls pain the greatest
 of all evils8 ,it is not1  indeed1 very
 consistent in him4 ,let us hear what he
 says3--8,if the pain is  excessive it  

must needs be short40 ,i must have that 
over again1 for ,i do  not apprehend    
what you mean exactly by 8excessive0 or 
8short40 ,that is  excessive1 than which
 nothing can be greater2 that is short1 
than which  nothing is shorter4 ,i do   
not regard the greatness of any pain    
from which1  by reason of the shortness 
of its continuance1 ,i shall be         
delivered almost  before it reaches me4 
,but1 if the pain be as great as that of
 ,philoctetes1  it will appear great    
indeed to me1 but yet not the greatest  
that ,i am  capable of bearing2 for the 
pain is confined to my foot3 but my eye 
may  pain me1 ,i may have a pain in the 
head1 or sides1 or lungs1 or in every   
part of me4 ,it is far1 then1 from being
 excessive2 therefore1 says he1  pain of
 a long continuance has more pleasure in
 it than uneasiness4 ,now ,i  cannot    
bring myself to say so great a man talks
 nonsense2 but ,i imagine he  is        
laughing at us4 ,my opinion is that the 
greatest pain 7,i say the  greatest1    

though it may be ten atoms less than    
another7 is not therefore  short1       
because acute2 ,i could name to you a   
great many good men who have  been      
tormented many years with the acutest   
pains of the gout4 ,but this  cautious  
man doth not determine the measure of   
that greatness or of  duration1 so as to
 enable us to know what he calls        
excessive1 with regard  to pain1 or     
short1 with respect to its continuance4 
,let us pass him by1  then1 as one who  
says just nothing at all2 and let us    
force him to  acknowledge1              
notwithstanding he might behave himself 
somewhat boldly under  his cholic and   
his strangury1 that no remedy against   
pain can be had from  him who looks on  
pain as the greatest of all evils4 ,we  
must apply1 then1  for relief elsewhere1
 and nowhere better 7if we seek for what
 is most  consistent with itself7 than  
to those who place the chief good in    
honesty1  and the greatest evil in      
infamy4 ,you dare not so much as groan1 

or  discover the least uneasiness in    
their company1 for virtue itself speaks 
to you through them4    ,,xx4 ,will you1
 when you may observe children at       
,lacedmon1 and young men at  ,olympia1  
and barbarians in the amphitheatre1     
receive the severest wounds1  and bear  
them without once opening their         
mouths1--will you1 ,i say1 if any  pain 
should by chance attack you1 cry out    
like a woman8 will you not  rather bear 
it with resolution and constancy8 and   
not cry1 ,it is  intolerable1 nature    
cannot bear it4 ,i hear what you        
say1--,boys bear this  because they are 
led thereto by glory3 some bear it      
through shame1 many  through fear1 and  
yet are we afraid that nature cannot    
bear what is borne  by many1 and in such
 different circumstances8 ,nature not   
only bears it1  but challenges it1 for  
there is nothing with her preferable1   
nothing which  she desires more1 than   
credit1 and reputation1 and praise1 and 
honour1 and  glory4 ,i choose here to   

describe this one thing under many      
names1 and ,i  have used many that you  
may have the clearer idea of it2 for    
what ,i mean  to say is1 that whatever  
is desirable of itself1 proceeding from 
virtue1  or placed in virtue1 and       
commendable on its own account1 7which  
,i would  rather agree to call the only 
good than deny it to be the chief good17
 is  what men should prefer above all   
things4 ,and as we declare this to be   
the  case with respect to honesty1 so we
 speak in the contrary manner of        
infamy2 nothing is so odious1 so        
detestable1 nothing so unworthy of a    
man3  and if you are thoroughly         
convinced of this 7for1 at the beginning
 of this  discourse1 you allowed that   
there appeared to you more evil in      
infamy than  in pain71 it follows that  
you ought to have the command over      
yourself1  though ,i scarcely know how  
this expression may seem an accurate    
one1 which  appears to represent man as 
made up of two natures1 so that one     

should be  in command and the other be  
subject to it4    ,,xxi4 ,yet this      
division does not proceed from          
ignorance2 for the soul  admits of a    
two-fold division1 one of which partakes
 of reason1 the other  is without it2   
when1 therefore1 we are ordered to give 
a law to ourselves1  the meaning is1    
that reason should restrain our         
rashness4 ,there is in the  soul of     
every man1 something naturally soft1    
low1 enervated in a manner1  and        
languid4 ,were there nothing besides    
this1 men would be the greatest of      
monsters2 but there is present to every 
man reason1 which presides over1  and   
gives laws to all2 which1 by improving  
itself1 and making continual  advances1 
becomes perfect virtue4 ,it behoves a   
man1 then1 to take care  that reason    
shall have the command over that part   
which is bound to  practise obedience4  
,in what manner8 you will say4 ,why1 as 
a master has  over his slave1 a general 
over his army1 a father over his son4   

,if that  part of the soul which ,i have
 called soft behaves disgracefully1 if  
it  gives itself up to lamentations and 
womanish tears1 then let it be          
restrained1 and committed to the care of
 friends and relations1 for we  often   
see those persons brought to order by   
shame1 whom no reasons can  influence4  
,therefore1 we should confine those     
feelings1 like our servants1  in safe   
custody1 and almost with chains4 ,but   
those who have more  resolution1 and yet
 are not utterly immovable1 we should   
encourage with  our exhortations1 as we 
would good soldiers1 to recollect       
themselves1 and  maintain their honour4 
,that wisest man of all ,greece1 in the 
,niptr1 does  not lament too much over  
his wounds1 or rather1 he is moderate in
 his  grief3--          ,move slow1 my  
friends1 your hasty speed refrain1      
,lest by your motion you increase my    
pain4      ,pacuvius is better in this  
than ,sophocles1 for in the one ,ulysses
 bemoans  his wounds too vehemently2 for

 the very people who carried him after  
he  was wounded1 though his grief was   
moderate1 yet1 considering the dignity  
of the man1 did not scruple to say1     
,and thou1 ,ulysses1 long to war inured1
      ,thy wounds1 though great1 too    
feebly hast endured4      ,the wise poet
 understood that custom was no          
contemptible instructor how to  bear    
pain4 ,but the same hero complains with 
more decency1 though in great  pain1--  
,assist1 support me1 never leave me so2 
,unbind my wounds1 oh6 execrable woe6   
,he begins to give way1 but instantly   
checks himself3--          ,away1       
begone1 but cover first the sore2       
,for your rude hands but make my pains  
the more4      ,do you observe how he   
constrains himself2 not that his bodily 
pains were  less1 but because he checks 
the anguish of his mind8 ,therefore1 in 
the  conclusion of the ,niptr1 he blames
 others1 even when he himself is        
dying3--          ,complaints of fortune
 may become the man1      ,none but a   

woman will thus weeping stand4      ,and
 so that soft place in his soul obeys   
his reason1 just as an abashed  soldier 
does his stern commander4    ,,xxii4    
,the man1 then1 in whom absolute wisdom 
exists 7such a man1 indeed1  we have    
never as yet seen1 but the philosophers 
have described in their  writings what  
sort of man he will be1 if he should    
exist72 such a man1 or  at least that   
perfect and absolute reason which exists
 in him1 will have  the same authority  
over the inferior part as a good parent 
has over his  dutiful children1 he will 
bring it to obey his nod1 without any   
trouble or  difficulty4 ,he will rouse  
himself1 prepare and arm himself to     
oppose pain  as he would an enemy4 ,if  
you inquire what arms he will provide   
himself  with1 they will be contention1 
encouragement1 discourse with himself2  
he  will say thus to himself1 ,take care
 that you are guilty of nothing base1   
languid1 or unmanly4 ,he will turn over 
in his mind all the different kinds  of 

honour4 ,zeno of ,elea will occur to    
him1 who suffered everything rather     
than betray his confederates in the     
design of putting an end to the         
tyranny4 ,he will reflect on            
,anaxarchus1 the pupil of ,democritus1  
who  having fallen into the hands of    
,nicocreon king of ,cyprus1 without the 
least entreaty for mercy1 or refusal1   
submitted to every kind of torture4     
,calanus the ,indian will occur to him1 
an ignorant man and a barbarian1  born  
at the foot of ,mount ,caucasus1 who    
committed himself to the flames by  his 
own free1 voluntary act4 ,but we1 if we 
have the tooth-ache1 or a pain  in the  
foot1 or if the body be any ways        
affected1 cannot bear it4 ,for our      
sentiments of pain1 as well as pleasure1
 are so trifling and effeminate1  we are
 so enervated and relaxed by luxuries1  
that we cannot bear the sting  of a bee 
without crying out4 ,but ,caius ,marius1
 a plain country-man1 but of  a manly   
soul1 when he had an operation performed

 on him1 as ,i mentioned  above1 at     
first refused to be tied down2 and he is
 the first instance of  any one's having
 had an operation performed on him      
without being tied  down4 ,why1 then1   
did others bear it afterwards8 ,why1    
from the force of  example4 ,you see1   
then1 that pain exists more in opinion  
than in nature1  and yet the same       
,marius gave a proof that there is      
something very sharp in  pain1 for he   
would not submit to have the other thigh
 cut4 ,so that he bore  his pain with   
resolution as a man2 but1 like a        
reasonable person1 he was  not willing  
to undergo any greater pain without some
 necessary reason4 ,the  whole1 then1   
consists in this1 that you should have  
command over yourself4  ,i have already 
told you what kind of command this is2  
and by considering  what is most        
consistent with patience1 fortitude1 and
 greatness of soul1 a  man not only     
restrains himself1 but somehow or other 
mitigates even pain  itself4    ,,xxiii4

 ,even as in a battle1 the dastardly and
 timorous soldier throws away  his      
shield on the first appearance of an    
enemy1 and runs as fast as he  can1 and 
on that account loses his life          
sometimes1 though he has never  received
 even one wound1 when he who stands his 
ground has nothing of the  sort happen  
to him2 so1 they who cannot bear the    
appearances of pain1  throw themselves  
away1 and give themselves up to         
affliction and dismay2  but they that   
oppose it1 often come off more than a   
match for it4 ,for the  body has a      
certain resemblance to the soul3 as     
burdens are more easily  borne the more 
the body is exerted1 while they crush us
 if we give way2 so  the soul by        
exerting itself resists the whole weight
 that would oppress  it2 but if it      
yields1 it is so pressed1 that it cannot
 support itself4 ,and  if we consider   
things truly1 the soul should exert     
itself in every  pursuit1 for that is   
the only security for its doing its     

duty4 ,but this  should be principally  
regarded in pain1 that we must not do   
anything  timidly1 or dastardly1 or     
basely1 or slavishly1 or effeminately1  
and above  all things we must dismiss   
and avoid that ,philoctetean sort of    
outcry4 ,a  man is allowed sometimes to 
groan1 but yet seldom2 but it is not    
permissible even in a woman to howl2 for
 such a noise as this is  forbidden1 by 
the twelve tables1 to be used even at   
funerals4 ,nor does a  wise or brave man
 ever groan1 unless when he exerts      
himself to give his  resolution greater 
force1 as they who run in the stadium   
make as much  noise as they can4 ,the   
wrestlers1 too1 do the same when they   
are training2  and the boxers1 when they
 aim a blow with the cestus at their    
adversary1  give a groan1 not because   
they are in pain1 or from a sinking of  
their  spirits1 but because their whole 
body is put upon the stretch by the     
throwing out of these groans1 and the   
blow comes the stronger4    ,,xxiv4     

,what6 they who would speak louder than 
ordinary1 are they satisfied  with      
working their jaws1 sides1 or tongue1 or
 stretching the common organs  of speech
 and utterance8 the whole body and every
 muscle is at full  stretch1 if ,i may  
be allowed the expression1 every nerve  
is exerted to  assist their voice4 ,i   
have actually seen the knees of ,marcus 
,antonius  touch the ground when he was 
speaking with vehemence for himself1    
with  relation to the ,varian law4 ,for 
as the engines you throw stones or darts
  with1 throw them out with the greater 
force the more they are strained and    
drawn back2 so it is in speaking1       
running1 or boxing1 the more people     
strain themselves1 the greater their    
force4 ,since1 therefore1 this  exertion
 has so much influence--if in a moment  
of pain groans help to  strengthen the  
mind1 let us use them2 but if they be   
groans of  lamentation1 if they be the  
expression of weakness or abjectness1 or
  unmanly weeping1 then ,i should       

scarcely call him a man who yielded to  
them4 ,for even supposing that such     
groaning could give any ease1 it still  
should be considered1 whether it were   
consistent with a brave and resolute    
man4 ,but1 if it does not ease our pain1
 why should we debase ourselves to  no  
purpose8 for what is more unbecoming in 
a man than to cry like a woman8  ,but   
this precept which is laid down with    
respect to pain is not confined  to it2 
we should apply this exertion of the    
soul to everything else4 ,is  anger     
inflamed8 is lust excited8 we must have 
recourse to the same  citadel1 and apply
 to the same arms2 but since it is pain 
which we are at  present discussing1 we 
will let the other subjects alone4 ,to  
bear pain1  then1 sedately and calmly1  
it is of great use to consider with all 
our  soul1 as the saying is1 how noble  
it is to do so1 for we are naturally    
desirous 7as ,i said before1 but it     
cannot be too often repeated7 and very  
much inclined to what is honourable1 of 

which1 if we discover but the  least    
glimpse1 there is nothing which we are  
not prepared to undergo and  suffer to  
attain it4 ,from this impulse of our    
minds1 this desire for  genuine glory   
and honourable conduct1 it is that such 
dangers are  supported in war1 and that 
brave men are not sensible of their     
wounds in  action1 or if they are       
sensible of them1 prefer death to the   
departing but  the least step from their
 honour4 ,the ,decii saw the shining    
swords of  their enemies when they were 
rushing into the battle4 ,but the       
honourable  character and the glory of  
the death which they were seeking1 made 
all  fear of death of little weight4 ,do
 you imagine that ,epaminondas groaned  
when he perceived that his life was     
flowing out with his blood8 ,no2 for he 
left his country triumphing over the    
,lacedmonians1 whereas he had found  it 
in subjection to them4 ,these are the   
comforts1 these are the things  that    
assuage the greatest pain4    ,,xxv4    

,you may ask1 how the case is in peace8 
what is to be done at home8  how we are 
to behave in bed8 ,you bring me back to 
the philosophers1 who  seldom go to war4
 ,among these1 ,dionysius of ,heraclea1 
a man certainly of  no resolution1      
having learned fortitude of ,zeno1      
quitted it on being in  pain2 for1 being
 tormented with a pain in his kidneys1  
in bewailing  himself he cried out1 that
 those things were false which he had   
formerly  conceived of pain4 ,and when  
his fellow-disciple1 ,cleanthes1 asked  
him why  he had changed his opinion1 he 
answered1 8,that the case of any man who
 had  applied so much time to           
philosophy1 and yet was unable to bear  
pain1 might  be a sufficient proof that 
pain is an evil4 ,that he himself had   
spent many  years at philosophy1 and yet
 could not bear pain4 ,it followed1     
therefore1  that pain was an evil40 ,it 
is reported that ,cleanthes on that     
struck his  foot on the ground1 and     
repeated a verse out of the ,epigon--   

,amphiaraus1 hear'st thou this below8   
,he meant ,zeno3 he was sorry the other 
had degenerated from him4    ,but it was
 not so with our friend ,posidonius1    
whom ,i have often seen  myself1 and ,i 
will tell you what ,pompey used to say  
of him3 that when he  came to ,rhodes1  
after his departure from ,syria1 he had 
a great desire to  hear ,posidonius1 but
 was informed that he was very ill of a 
severe fit of  the gout2 yet he had     
great inclination to pay a visit to so  
famous a  philosopher4 ,accordingly1    
when he had seen him1 and paid his      
compliments1  and had spoken with great 
respect of him1 he said he was very     
sorry that  he could not hear him       
lecture4 ,but indeed you may1 replied   
the other1 nor  will ,i suffer any      
bodily pain to occasion so great a man  
to visit me in  vain4 ,on this ,pompey  
relates that1 as he lay on his bed1 he  
disputed with  great dignity and fluency
 on this very subject--,that nothing was
 good but  what was honest2 and that in 

his paroxysms he would often say1       
8,pain1 it  is to no purpose1           
notwithstanding you are troublesome1 ,i 
will never  acknowledge you an evil40   
,and in general all celebrated and      
notorious  afflictions become endurable 
by disregarding them4    ,,xxvi4 ,do we 
not observe1 that where those exercises 
called gymnastic are  in esteem1 those  
who enter the lists never concern       
themselves about  dangers3 that where   
the praise of riding and hunting is     
highly esteemed1  they who practise     
these arts decline no pain4 ,what shall 
,i say of our own  ambitious pursuits1  
or desire of honours8 ,what fire have   
not candidates  run through to gain a   
single vote8 ,therefore ,africanus had  
always in his  hands ,xenophon1 the     
pupil of ,socrates1 being particularly  
pleased with his  saying1 that the same 
labours were not equally heavy to the   
general and to  the common man1 because 
the honour itself made the labour       
lighter to the  general4 ,but yet1 so it

 happens1 that even with the illiterate 
vulgar1 an  idea of honour is of great  
influence1 though they cannot understand
 what  it is4 ,they are led by report   
and common opinion to look on that as   
honourable1 which has the general voice4
 ,not that ,i would have you1 should    
the multitude be ever so fond of you1   
rely on their judgment1 nor approve  of 
everything which they think right2 you  
must use your own judgment4 ,if  you are
 satisfied with yourself when you have  
approved of what is right1  you will not
 only have the mastery over yourself1   
7which ,i recommend to  you just now17  
but over everybody1 and everything4 ,lay
 this down1 then1 as  a rule1 that a    
great capacity1 and lofty elevation of  
soul1 which  distinguishes itself most  
by despising and looking down with      
contempt on  pain1 is the most excellent
 of all things1 and the more so1 if it  
does not  depend on the people1 and does
 not aim at applause1 but derives its   
satisfaction from itself4 ,besides1 to  

me indeed everything seems the more     
commendable the less the people are     
courted1 and the fewer eyes there are   
to see it4 ,not that you should avoid   
the public1 for every generous action   
loves the public view2 yet no theatre   
for virtue is equal to a  consciousness 
of it4    ,,xxvii4 ,and let this be     
principally considered1 that this       
bearing of pain1  which ,i have often   
said is to be strengthened by an        
exertion of the soul1  should be the    
same in everything4 ,for you meet with  
many who1 through a  desire of victory1 
or for glory1 or to maintain their      
rights1 or their  liberty1 have boldly  
received wounds1 and borne themselves up
 under them2  and yet those very same   
persons1 by relaxing that intenseness of
 their  minds1 were unequal to bearing  
the pain of a disease4 ,for they did not
  support themselves under their former 
sufferings by reason or philosophy1  but
 by inclination and glory4 ,therefore   
some barbarians and savage people  are  

able to fight very stoutly with the     
sword1 but cannot bear sickness  like   
men3 but the ,grecians1 men of no great 
courage1 but as wise as human  nature   
will admit of1 cannot look an enemy in  
the face1 yet the same will  bear to be 
visited with sickness tolerably1 and    
with a sufficiently manly  spirit2 and  
the ,cimbrians and ,celtiberians are    
very alert in battle1 but  bemoan       
themselves in sickness2 for nothing can 
be consistent which has not  reason for 
its foundation4 ,but when you see those 
who are led by  inclination or opinion1 
not retarded by pain in their pursuits1 
nor  hindered by it from succeeding in  
them1 you may conclude1 either that pain
  is no evil1 or that1 notwithstanding  
you may choose to call an evil  whatever
 is disagreeable and contrary to nature1
 yet it is so very  trifling an evil1   
that it may so effectually be got the   
better of by  virtue as quite to        
disappear4 ,and ,i would have you think 
of this night and  day2 for this        

argument will spread itself1 and take up
 more room sometime  or other1 and not  
be confined to pain alone2 for if the   
motives to all our  actions are to avoid
 disgrace and acquire honour1 we may not
 only despise  the stings of pain1 but  
the storms of fortune1 especially if we 
have  recourse to that retreat which was
 pointed out in our yesterday's         
discussion3 for as1 if some ,god had    
advised a man who was pursued by        
pirates to throw himself overboard1     
saying1 ,there is something at hand to  
receive you2 either a dolphin will take 
you up1 as it did ,arion of  ,methymna2 
or those horses sent by ,neptune to     
,pelops 7who are said to have  carried  
chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by
 the waves7 will receive  you1 and      
convey you wherever you please2 cast    
away all fear3 so1 though  your pains be
 ever so sharp and disagreeable1 if the 
case is not such that  it is worth your 
while to endure them1 you see whither   
you may betake  yourself4 ,i think this 

will do for the present4 ,but perhaps   
you still  abide by your opinion4    ,a4
 ,not in the least1 indeed2 and ,i hope 
,i am freed by these two days'          
discourses from the fear of two things  
that ,i greatly dreaded4    ,m4         
,to-morrow then for rhetoric1 as we were
 saying2 but ,i see we must not  drop   
our philosophy4    ,a4 ,no1 indeed1 we  
will have the one in the forenoon1 and  
this at the  usual time4    ,m4 ,it     
shall be so1 and ,i will comply with    
your very laudable  inclinations4       
,book ,,iii4 ,on ,grief ,of ,mind4      
,i4 ,what reason shall ,i assign1 ,o    
,brutus1 why1 as we consist of mind and 
body1 the art of curing and preserving  
the body should be so much sought       
after1 and the invention of it1 as being
 so useful1 should be ascribed to  the  
immortal ,gods2 but the medicine of the 
mind should not have been so  much the  
object of inquiry1 whilst it was        
unknown1 nor so much attended to  and   
cultivated after its discovery1 nor so  

well received or approved of by  some1  
and accounted actually disagreeable1 and
 looked upon with an envious  eye by    
many8 ,is it because we1 by means of the
 mind1 judge of the pains  and disorders
 of the body1 but do not1 by means of   
the body1 arrive at any  perception of  
the disorders of the mind8 ,hence it    
comes that the mind only  judges of     
itself1 when that very faculty by which 
it is judged is in a bad  state4 ,had   
nature given us faculties for discerning
 and viewing herself1  and could we go  
through life by keeping our eye on      
her--our best  guide--there would be no 
reason certainly why any one should be  
in want of  philosophy or learning3 but1
 as it is1 she has furnished us only    
with some  feeble rays of light1 which  
we immediately extinguish so completely 
by  evil habits and erroneous opinions1 
that the light of nature is nowhere     
visible4 ,the seeds of virtues are      
natural to our constitutions1 and1 were 
they suffered to come to maturity1 would

 naturally conduct us to a happy  life2 
but now1 as soon as we are born and     
received into the world1 we are         
instantly familiarized with all kinds of
 depravity and perversity of  opinions2 
so that we may be said almost to suck in
 error with our nurse's  milk4 ,when we 
return to our parents1 and are put into 
the hands of tutors  and governors1 we  
are imbued with so many errors1 that    
truth gives place  to falsehood1 and    
nature herself to established opinion4  
,,ii4 ,to these we may add the poets2   
who1 on account of the appearance they  
exhibit of learning and wisdom1 are     
heard1 read1 and got by heart1 and  make
 a deep impression on our minds4 ,but   
when to these are added the  people1 who
 are as it were one great body of       
instructors1 and the  multitude1 who    
declare unanimously for what is wrong1  
then are we  altogether overwhelmed with
 bad opinions1 and revolt entirely from 
nature2  so that they seem to deprive us
 of our best guide1 who have decided    

that  there is nothing better for man1  
nothing more worthy of being desired by 
him1 nothing more excellent than honours
 and commands1 and a high  reputation   
with the people2 which indeed every     
excellent man aims at2 but  whilst he   
pursues that only true honour1 which    
nature has in view above  all other     
objects1 he finds himself busied in     
arrant trifles1 and in  pursuit of no   
conspicuous form of virtue1 but only    
some shadowy  representation of glory4  
,for glory is a real and express        
substance1 not a  mere shadow4 ,it      
consists in the united praise of good   
men1 the free voice  of those who form a
 true judgment of preeminent virtue2 it 
is1 as it were1  the very echo of       
virtue2 and being generally the         
attendant on laudable  actions1 should  
not be slighted by good men4 ,but       
popular fame1 which would  pretend to   
imitate it1 is hasty and inconsiderate1 
and generally commends  wicked and      
immoral actions1 and throws discredit   

upon the appearance and  beauty of      
honesty1 by assuming a resemblance of   
it4 ,and it is owing to  their not being
 able to discover the difference between
 them that some  men1 ignorant of real  
excellence1 and in what it consists1    
have been the  destruction of their     
country and of themselves4 ,and thus the
 best men have  erred1 not so much in   
their intentions1 as by a mistaken      
conduct4 ,what1 is  no cure to be       
attempted to be applied to those who are
 carried away by the  love of money1 or 
the lust of pleasures1 by which they are
 rendered little  short of madmen1 which
 is the case of all weak people8 or is  
it because  the disorders of the mind   
are less dangerous than those of the    
body8 or  because the body will admit of
 a cure1 while there is no medicine     
whatever  for the mind8    ,,iii4 ,but  
there are more disorders of the mind    
than of the body1 and they  are of a    
more dangerous nature2 for these very   
disorders are the more  offensive1      

because they belong to the mind1 and    
disturb it2 and the mind1  when         
disordered1 is1 as ,ennius says1 in a   
constant error2 it can neither  bear nor
 endure anything1 and is under the      
perpetual influence of desires4  ,now1  
what disorders can be worse to the body 
than these two distempers of  the mind  
7for ,i overlook others71 weakness and  
desire8 ,but how1 indeed1  can it be    
maintained that the mind cannot         
prescribe for itself1 when she  it is   
who has invented the medicines for the  
body1 when1 with regard to  bodily      
cures1 constitution and nature have a   
great share1 nor do all1 who  suffer    
themselves to be cured1 find that effect
 instantly2 but those minds  which are  
disposed to be cured1 and submit to the 
precepts of the wise1  may undoubtedly  
recover a healthy state8 ,philosophy is 
certainly the  medicine of the soul1    
whose assistance we do not seek from    
abroad1 as in  bodily disorders1 but we 
ourselves are bound to exert our utmost 

energy  and power in order to effect our
 cure4 ,but as to philosophy in general1
 ,i  have1 ,i think1 in my              
8,hortensius10 sufficiently spoken of   
the credit and  attention which it      
deserves3 since that1 indeed1 ,i have   
been continually  either disputing or   
writing on its most material branches3  
and ,i have laid  down in these books   
all the discussions which took place    
between myself  and my particular       
friends at my ,tusculan ,villa3 but as  
,i have spoken in  the two former of    
pain and death1 this book shall be      
devoted to the  account of the third day
 of our disputations4    ,we came down  
into the ,academy when the day was      
already declining towards  afternoon1   
and ,i asked one of those who were      
present to propose a subject  for us to 
discourse on2 and then the business was 
carried on in this  manner4    ,,iv4 ,a4
 ,my opinion is1 that a wise man is     
subject to grief4    ,m4 ,what1 and to  
the other perturbations of mind1 as     

fears1 lusts1 anger8  ,for these are    
pretty much like what the ,greeks call 4
 ,i might call  them diseases1 and that 
would be a literal translation1 but it  
is not  agreeable to our way of         
speaking4 ,for envy1 delight1 and       
pleasure1 are all  called by the ,greeks
 diseases1 being affections of the mind 
not in  subordination to reason3 but we1
 ,i think1 are right1 in calling the    
same  motions of a disturbed soul       
perturbations1 and in very seldom using 
the  term diseases2 though1 perhaps1 it 
appears otherwise to you4    ,a4 ,i am  
of your opinion4    ,m4 ,and do you     
think a wise man subject to these8      
,a4 ,entirely1 ,i think4    ,m4 ,then   
that boasted wisdom is but of small     
account1 if it differs so  little from  
madness8    ,a4 ,what8 does every       
commotion of the mind seem to you to be 
madness8    ,m4 ,not to me only2 but ,i 
apprehend1 though ,i have often been    
surprised  at it1 that it appeared so to
 our ancestors many ages before         

,socrates3  from whom is derived all    
that philosophy which relates to life   
and morals4    ,a4 ,how so8    ,m4      
,because the name madness7#hd7 implies a
 sickness of the mind and  disease1 that
 is to say an unsoundness1 and an       
unhealthiness of mind1  which they call 
madness4 ,but the philosophers call all 
perturbations of  the soul diseases1 and
 their opinion is that no fool is ever  
free from  these3 but all that are      
diseased are unsound2 and the minds of  
all fools  are diseased2 therefore all  
fools are mad4 ,for they held that      
soundness of  the mind depends on a     
certain tranquillity and steadiness2 and
 a mind  which was destitute of these   
qualities they called insane1 because   
soundness was inconsistent with a       
perturbed mind just as much as with a   
disordered body4    ,v4 ,nor were they  
less ingenious in calling the state of  
the soul devoid of  the light of the    
mind1 8a being out of one's mind10 8a   
being beside  oneself40 ,from whence we 

may understand1 that they who gave these
 names to  things were of the same      
opinion with ,socrates1 that all silly  
people were  unsound1 which the ,stoics 
have carefully preserved as being       
derived from  him2 for whatever mind is 
distempered1 7and as ,i just now said1  
the  philosophers call all perturbed    
motions of the mind distempers17 is no  
more sound than a body is when in a fit 
of sickness4 ,hence it is1 that  wisdom 
is the soundness of the mind1 folly a   
sort of unsoundness1 which is  insanity1
 or a being out of one's mind3 and these
 are much better  expressed by the      
,latin words than the ,greek2 which you 
will find the case  also in many other  
topics4 ,but we will discuss that point 
elsewhere3 let  us now attend to our    
present subject4 ,the very meaning of   
the word  describes the whole thing     
about which we are inquiring1 both as to
 its  substance and character4 ,for we  
must necessarily understand by 8sound10 
those whose minds are under no          

perturbation from any motion as if it   
were  a disease4 ,they who are          
differently affected we must necessarily
 call  8unsound40 ,so that nothing is   
better than what is usual in ,latin1 to 
say1  that they who are run away with by
 their lust or anger1 have quitted the  
command over themselves2 though anger   
includes lust1 for anger is defined  to 
be the lust of revenge4 ,they1 then1 who
 are said not to be masters of          
themselves1 are said to be so because   
they are not under the government of    
reason1 to which is assigned by nature  
the power over the whole soul4 ,why  the
 ,greeks should call this 1 ,i do not   
easily apprehend2 but we  define it much
 better than they1 for we distinguish   
this madness  7insania71 which1 being   
allied to folly1 is more extensive1 from
 what we  call furor1 or raving4 ,the   
,greeks indeed would do so too1 but they
 have  no one word that will express it3
 what we call furor1 they call  1 as if 
the reason were affected only by a black

 bile1 and not  disturbed as often by a 
violent rage1 or fear1 or grief4 ,thus  
we say  ,athamas1 ,alcmon1 ,ajax1 and   
,orestes1 were raving 7furere73 because 
a  person affected in this manner was   
not allowed1 by the twelve tables1 to   
have the management of his own affairs2 
therefore the words are not1 if he  is  
mad 7insanus71 but1 if he begins to be  
raving 7furiosus74 ,for they  looked    
upon madness to be an unsettled humour1 
that proceeded from not  being of sound 
mind2 yet such a person might perform   
his ordinary duties1  and discharge the 
usual and customary requirements of     
life3 but they  considered one that was 
raving as afflicted with a total        
blindness of the  mind1 which1          
notwithstanding it is allowed to be     
greater than madness1 is  nevertheless  
of such a nature1 that a wise man may be
 subject to raving  7furor71 but cannot 
possibly be afflicted by insanity       
7insania74 ,but  this is another        
question3 let us now return to our      

original subject4    ,,vi4 ,i think you 
said that it was your opinion that a    
wise man was liable  to grief4    ,a4   
,and so1 indeed1 ,i think4    ,m4 ,it is
 natural enough to think so1 for we are 
not the offspring of  flints3 but we    
have by nature something soft and tender
 in our souls1  which may be put into a 
violent motion by grief1 as by a storm2 
nor did  that ,crantor1 who was one of  
the most distinguished men that our     
,academy  has ever produced1 say this   
amiss3 8,i am by no means of their      
opinion who  talk so much in praise of  
,i know not what insensibility1 which   
neither can  exist1 nor ought to exist3 
,i would choose10 says he1 8never to be 
ill2 but  should ,i be so1 still ,i     
should choose to retain my sensation1   
whether  there was to be an amputation1 
or any other separation of anything from
 my  body4 ,for that insensibility      
cannot be but at the expense of some    
unnatural ferocity of mind1 or stupor of
 body40 ,but let us consider  whether to

 talk in this manner be not allowing    
that we are weak1 and  yielding to our  
softness4 ,notwithstanding1 let us be   
hardy enough1 not  only to lop off every
 arm of our miseries1 but even to pluck 
up every  fibre of their roots3 yet     
still something perhaps may be left     
behind1 so  deep does folly strike its  
roots3 but whatever may be left1 it will
 be no  more than is necessary4 ,but let
 us be persuaded of this1 that unless   
the  mind be in a sound state1 which    
philosophy alone can effect1 there can  
be  no end of our miseries4 ,wherefore1 
as we begun1 let us submit ourselves to 
it for a cure2 we shall be cured if we  
choose to be4 ,i shall advance          
something further4 ,i shall not treat of
 grief alone1 though that indeed is  the
 principal thing2 but1 as ,i originally 
proposed1 of every perturbation  of the 
mind1 as ,i termed it1 disorder1 as the 
,greeks call it3 and first1  with your  
leave1 ,i shall treat it in the manner  
of the ,stoics1 whose  method is to     

reduce their arguments into a very small
 space2 afterwards ,i  shall enlarge    
more in my own way4    ,,vii4 ,a man of 
courage is also full of faith2 ,i do not
 use the word  confident1 because1 owing
 to an erroneous custom of speaking1    
that word  has come to be used in a bad 
sense1 though it is derived from        
confiding1  which is commendable4 ,but  
he who is full of faith1 is certainly   
under no  fear2 for there is an         
inconsistency between faith and fear4   
,now whoever is  subject to grief is    
subject to fear2 for whatever things we 
grieve at when  present1 we dread when  
hanging over us and approaching4 ,thus  
it comes  about1 that grief is          
inconsistent with courage3 it is very   
probable1  therefore1 that whoever is   
subject to grief1 is also liable to     
fear1 and  to a broken kind of spirits  
and sinking4 ,now whenever these befal a
 man1  he is in a servile state1 and    
must own that he is overpowered3 for    
whoever  admits these feelings1 must    

admit timidity and cowardice4 ,but these
 cannot  enter into the mind of a man of
 courage2 neither therefore can grief3  
but  the man of courage is the only wise
 man2 therefore grief cannot befal the  
wise man4 ,it is besides necessary1 that
 whoever is brave1 should be a man  of  
great soul2 that whoever is a man of a  
great soul1 should be  invincible3      
whoever is invincible looks down with   
contempt on all things  here1 and       
considers them beneath him4 ,but no one 
can despise those things  on account of 
which he may be affected with grief3    
from whence it follows1  that a wise man
 is never affected with grief3 for all  
wise men are brave2  therefore a wise   
man is not subject to grief4 ,and as the
 eye1 when  disordered1 is not in a good
 condition for performing its office    
properly2  and as the other parts1 and  
the whole body itself1 when unsettled1  
cannot  perform their office and        
business2 so the mind1 when disordered1 
is but  ill-fitted to perform its duty4 

,the office of the mind is to use its   
reason well2 but the mind of a wise man 
is always in condition to make the  best
 use of his reason1 and therefore is    
never out of order4 ,but grief is  a    
disorder of the mind2 therefore a wise  
man will be always free from it4        
,,viii4 ,and from these considerations  
we may get at a very probable           
definition of the temperate man1 whom   
the ,greeks call 1 and they  call that  
virtue 1 which ,i at one time call      
temperance1 at  another time moderation1
 and sometimes even modesty2 but ,i do  
not know  whether that virtue may not be
 properly called frugality1 which has a 
more  confined meaning with the ,greeks2
 for they call frugal men 1  which      
implies only that they are useful3 but  
our name has a more extensive  meaning2 
for all abstinence1 all innocency1      
7which the ,greeks have no  ordinary    
name for1 though they might use the word
 1 for innocency  is that disposition of
 mind which would offend no one17 and   

several other  virtues1 are comprehended
 under frugality2 but1 if this quality  
were of  less importance1 and confined  
in as small a compass as some imagine1  
the  surname of ,piso7#he7 would not    
have been in so great esteem4 ,but as we
  allow him not the name of a frugal man
 7frugi71 who either quits his  post    
through fear1 which is cowardice2 or who
 reserves to his own use what  was      
privately committed to his keeping1     
which is injustice2 or who fails  in his
 military undertakings through rashness1
 which is folly2 for that  reason the   
word frugality takes in these three     
virtues of fortitude1  justice1 and     
prudence1 though it is indeed common to 
all virtues1 for they  are all connected
 and knit together4 ,let us allow1 then1
 frugality itself  to be another and    
fourth virtue2 for its peculiar property
 seems to be1 to  govern and appease all
 tendencies to too eager a desire after 
anything1 to  restrain lust1 and to     
preserve a decent steadiness in         

everything4 ,the vice  in contrast to   
this is called prodigality 7nequitia74  
,frugality1 ,i  imagine1 is derived from
 the word fruge1 the best thing which   
the earth  produces2 nequitia is derived
 7though this is perhaps rather more    
strained1 still let us try it2 we shall 
only be thought to have been  trifling  
if there is nothing in what we say7 from
 the fact of everything  being to no    
purpose 7nequicquam7 in such a man2 from
 which circumstance  he is called also  
,nihil1 nothing4 ,whoever is frugal1    
then1 or1 if it is  more agreeable to   
you1 whoever is moderate and temperate1 
such a one must  of course be           
consistent2 whoever is consistent1 must 
be quiet2 the quiet  man must be free   
from all perturbation1 therefore from   
grief likewise3 and  these are the      
properties of a wise man2 therefore a   
wise man must be free  from grief4      
,,ix4 ,so that ,dionysius of ,heraclea  
is right when1 upon this complaint of   
,achilles in ,homer--          ,well    

hast thou spoke1 but at the tyrant's    
name      ,my rage rekindles1 and my    
soul's in flame3      ',tis just        
resentment1 and becomes the brave1      
,disgraced1 dishonour'd like the vilest 
slave7#hf7--      he reasons thus3 ,is  
the hand as it should be1 when it is    
affected with a  swelling8 or is it     
possible for any other member of the    
body1 when swollen  or enlarged1 to be  
in any other than a disordered state8   
,must not the  mind1 then1 when it is   
puffed up1 or distended1 be out of      
order8 ,but the  mind of a wise man is  
always free from every kind of disorder2
 it never  swells1 never is puffed up3  
but the mind when in anger is in a      
different  state4 ,a wise man therefore 
is never angry2 for when he is angry1 he
 lusts  after something2 for whoever is 
angry naturally has a longing desire to 
give all the pain he can to the person  
who he thinks has injured him2 and      
whoever has this earnest desire must    
necessarily be much pleased with the    

accomplishment of his wishes2 hence he  
is delighted with his neighbour's       
misery2 and as a wise man is not capable
 of such feelings as these1 he is       
therefore not capable of anger4 ,but    
should a wise man be subject to grief1  
he may likewise be subject to anger2 for
 as he is free from anger1 he must      
likewise be free from grief4 ,again1    
could a wise man be subject to grief1   
he might also be liable to pity1 or even
 might be open to a disposition  towards
 envy 7invidentia72 ,i do not say to    
envy 7invidia71 for that  can only exist
 by the very act of envying3 but we may 
fairly form the word  invidentia from   
invidendo1 and so avoid the doubtful    
name invidia2  for this word is probably
 derived from in and video1 looking too 
closely into another's fortune2 as it is
 said in the ,melanippus1          ,who 
envies me the flower of my children8    
where the ,latin is invidit florem4 ,it 
may appear not good ,latin1 but it  is  
very well put by ,accius2 for as video  

governs an accusative case1 so  it is   
more correct to say invideo florem than 
flori4 ,we are debarred  from saying so 
by common usage3 the poet stood in his  
own right1 and  expressed himself with  
more freedom4    ,x4 ,therefore         
compassion and envy are consistent in   
the same man2 for  whoever is uneasy at 
any one's adversity1 is also uneasy at  
another's  prosperity3 as ,theophrastus 
while he laments the death of his       
companion  ,callisthenes1 is at the same
 time disturbed at the success of       
,alexander2  and therefore he says1 that
 ,callisthenes met with a man of the    
greatest  power and good fortune1 but   
one who did not know how to make use of 
his  good fortune4 ,and as pity is an   
uneasiness which arises from the        
misfortunes of another1 so envy is an   
uneasiness that proceeds from the  good 
success of another3 therefore whoever is
 capable of pity1 is capable  of envy4  
,but a wise man is incapable of envy1   
and consequently incapable  of pity4    

,but were a wise man used to grieve1 to 
pity also would be  familiar to him2    
therefore to grieve1 is a feeling which 
cannot affect a  wise man4 ,now1 though 
these reasonings of the ,stoics1 and    
their  conclusions1 are rather strained 
and distorted1 and ought to be expressed
  in a less stringent and narrow manner1
 yet great stress is to be laid on  the 
opinions of those men who have a        
peculiarly bold and manly turn of       
thought and sentiment4 ,for our friends 
the ,peripatetics1 notwithstanding  all 
their erudition1 gravity1 and fluency of
 language1 do not satisfy me  about the 
moderation of these disorders and       
diseases of the soul which  they insist 
upon2 for every evil1 though moderate1  
is in its nature great4  ,but our object
 is to make out that the wise man is    
free from all evil2 for  as the body is 
unsound if it is ever so slightly       
affected1 so the mind  under any        
moderate disorder loses its soundness3  
therefore the ,romans  have1 with their 

usual accuracy of expression1 called    
trouble1 and  anguish1 and vexation1 on 
account of the analogy between a        
troubled mind  and a diseased body1     
disorders4 ,the ,greeks call all        
perturbation of mind  by pretty nearly  
the same name2 for they name every      
turbid motion of the  soul 1 that is to 
say1 a distemper4 ,but we have given    
them a more  proper name2 for a disorder
 of the mind is very like a disease of  
the  body4 ,but lust does not resemble  
sickness2 neither does immoderate joy1  
which is an elated and exulting pleasure
 of the mind4 ,fear1 too1 is not  very  
like a distemper1 though it is akin to  
grief of mind1 but properly1  as is also
 the case with sickness of the body1 so 
too sickness of mind has  no name       
separated from pain4 ,and therefore ,i  
must explain the origin of  this pain1  
that is to say1 the cause that occasions
 this grief in the  mind1 as if it were 
a sickness of the body4 ,for as         
physicians think they  have found out   

the cure1 when they have discovered the 
cause of the  distemper2 so we shall    
discover the method of curing           
melancholy1 when the  cause of it is    
found out4    ,,xi4 ,the whole cause1   
then1 is in opinion2 and this           
observation applies not  to this grief  
alone1 but to every other disorder of   
the mind1 which are of  four sorts1 but 
consisting of many parts4 ,for as every 
disorder or  perturbation is a motion of
 the mind1 either devoid of reason1 or  
in  despite of reason1 or in            
disobedience to reason1 and as that     
motion is  excited by an opinion of     
either good or evil2 these four         
perturbations are  divided equally into 
two parts3 for two of them proceed from 
an opinion of  good1 one of which is an 
exulting pleasure1 that is to say1 a joy
 elated  beyond measure1 arising from an
 opinion of some present great good2 the
  other is a desire which may fairly be 
called even a lust1 and is an           
immoderate inclination after some       

conceived great good1 without any       
obedience to reason4 ,therefore these   
two kinds1 the exulting pleasure1 and   
the lust1 have their rise from an       
opinion of good1 as the other two1 fear 
and grief1 have from an opinion of evil4
 ,for fear is an opinion of some  great 
evil impending over us1 and grief is an 
opinion of some great evil  present2    
and1 indeed1 it is a freshly conceived  
opinion of an evil so  great1 that to   
grieve at it seems right3 it is of that 
kind1 that he who  is uneasy at it      
thinks he has good reason to be so4 ,now
 we should exert  our utmost efforts to 
oppose these perturbations--which are1  
as it were1 so  many furies let loose   
upon us1 and urged on by folly--if we   
are desirous to  pass this share of life
 that is allotted to us with ease and   
satisfaction4  ,but of the other        
feelings ,i shall speak elsewhere2 our  
business at present  is to drive away   
grief if we can1 for that shall be the  
object of our  present discussion1 since

 you have said that it was your opinion 
that a  wise man might be subject to    
grief1 which ,i can by no means allow   
of2 for  it is a frightful1 miserable1  
and detestable thing1 which we should   
fly  from with our utmost efforts--with 
all our sails and oars1 as ,i may say4  
,,xii4 ,that descendant of ,tantalus1   
how does he appear to you8 he who sprung
  from ,pelops1 who formerly stole      
,hippodamia from her father-in-law1 king
  nomaus1 and married her by force8 ,he 
who was descended from ,jupiter         
himself1 how broken-hearted and         
dispirited does he not seem6--          
,stand off1 my friends1 nor come within 
my shade1      ,that no pollutions your 
sound hearts pervade1      ,so foul a   
stain my body doth partake4      ,will  
you condemn yourself1 ,thyestes1 and    
deprive yourself of life1 on  account of
 the greatness of another's crime8 ,what
 do you think of that son  of ,phbus8 do
 you not look upon him as unworthy of   
his own father's light8          ,hollow

 his eyes1 his body worn away1      ,his
 furrow'd cheeks his frequent tears     
betray2      ,his beard neglected1 and  
his hoary hairs      ,rough and         
uncomb'd1 bespeak his bitter cares4     
,o foolish etes1 these are evils which  
you yourself have been the cause  of1   
and are not occasioned by any accidents 
with which chance has visited  you2 and 
you behaved as you did1 even after you  
had been inured to your  distress1 and  
after the first swelling of the mind had
 subsided6 whereas  grief consists 7as  
,i shall show7 in the notion of some    
recent evil2 but  your grief1 it is very
 plain1 proceeded from the loss of your 
kingdom1 not  of your daughter1 for you 
hated her1 and perhaps with reason1 but 
you  could not calmly bear to part with 
your kingdom4 ,but surely it is an      
impudent grief which preys upon a man   
for not being able to command those     
that are free4 ,dionysius1 it is true1  
the tyrant of ,syracuse1 when driven    
from his country taught a school at     

,corinth2 so incapable was he of living 
without some authority4 ,but what could 
be more impudent than ,tarquin8 who     
made war upon those who could not bear  
his tyranny2 and when he could not      
recover his kingdom by the aid of the   
forces of the ,veientians and the       
,latins1 is said to have betaken himself
 to ,cuma1 and to have died in that     
city1 of old age and grief6    ,,xiii4  
,do you1 then1 think that it can befal a
 wise man to be oppressed  with grief1  
that is to say1 with misery8 for1 as all
 perturbation is  misery1 grief is the  
rack itself4 ,lust is attended with     
heat1 exulting joy  with levity1 fear   
with meanness1 but grief with something 
greater than  these2 it consumes1       
torments1 afflicts1 and disgraces a man2
 it tears him1  preys upon his mind1 and
 utterly destroys him3 if we do not so  
divest  ourselves of it as to throw it  
completely off1 we cannot be free from  
misery4 ,and it is clear that there must
 be grief where anything has the        

appearance of a present sore and        
oppressing evil4 ,epicurus is of        
opinion1  that grief arises naturally   
from the imagination of any evil2 so    
that  whosoever is eye-witness of any   
great misfortune1 if he conceives that  
the  like may possibly befal himself1   
becomes sad instantly from such an idea4
  ,the ,cyrenaics think that grief is   
not engendered by every kind of evil1   
but only by unexpected1 unforeseen evil2
 and that circumstance is1 indeed1  of  
no small effect on the heightening of   
grief2 for whatsoever comes of a  sudden
 appears more formidable4 ,hence these  
lines are deservedly  commended--       
,i knew my son1 when first he drew his  
breath1      ,destined by fate to an    
untimely death2      ,and when ,i sent  
him to defend the ,greeks1      ,war was
 his business1 not your sportive freaks4
      ,,xiv4 ,therefore1 this ruminating
 beforehand upon future evils which you 
see  at a distance1 makes their approach
 more tolerable2 and on this account1   

what ,euripides makes ,theseus say1 is  
much commended4 ,you will give me  leave
 to translate them1 as is usual with    
me--          ,i treasured up what some 
learn'd sage did tell1      ,and on my  
future misery did dwell2      ,i thought
 of bitter death1 of being drove        
,far from my home by exile1 and ,i      
strove      ,with every evil to possess 
my mind1      ,that1 when they came1 ,i 
the less care might find47#hg7      ,but
 ,euripides says that of himself1 which 
,theseus said he had heard from  some   
learned man1 for the poet had been a    
pupil of ,anaxagoras1 who1 as  they     
relate1 on hearing of the death of his  
son1 said1 8,i knew that my son  was    
mortal20 which speech seems to intimate 
that such things afflict those  men who 
have not thought on them before4        
,therefore1 there is no doubt but  that 
all those things which are considered   
evils are the heavier from not  being   
foreseen4 ,though1 notwithstanding this 
is not the only circumstance  which     

occasions the greatest grief1 still1 as 
the mind1 by foreseeing and  preparing  
for it1 has great power to make all     
grief the less1 a man should  at all    
times consider all the events that may  
befal him in this life2 and  certainly  
the excellence and divine nature of     
wisdom consists in taking a  near view  
of1 and gaining a thorough acquaintance 
with1 all human affairs1  in not being  
surprised when anything happens1 and in 
thinking1 before the  event1 that there 
is nothing but what may come to pass4   
,wherefore ev'ry man1      ,when his    
affairs go on most swimmingly1          
,e'en then it most behoves to arm       
himself      ,against the coming storm3 
loss1 danger1 exile1      ,returning    
ever1 let him look to meet2      ,his   
son in fault1 wife dead1 or daughter    
sick3      ,all common accidents1 and   
may have happen'd1      ,that nothing   
shall seem new or strange4 ,but if      
,aught has fall'n out beyond his hopes1 
all that      ,let him account clear    

gain47#hh7      ,,xv4 ,therefore1 as    
,terence has so well expressed what he  
borrowed from  philosophy1 shall not we1
 from whose fountains he drew it1 say   
the same  thing in a better manner1 and 
abide by it with more steadiness8 ,hence
 came  that steady countenance1 which1  
according to ,xantippe1 her husband     
,socrates always had2 so that she said  
that she never observed any  difference 
in his looks when he went out1 and when 
he came home4 ,yet the  look of that old
 ,roman1 ,m4 ,crassus1 who1 as ,lucilius
 says1 never smiled  but once in his    
lifetime1 was not of this kind1 but     
placid and serene1 for  so we are told4 
,he1 indeed1 might well have had the    
same look at all times  who never       
changed his mind1 from which the        
countenance derives its  expression4 ,so
 that ,i am ready to borrow of the      
,cyrenaics those arms  against the      
accidents and events of life1 by means  
of which1 by long  premeditation1 they  
break the force of all approaching      

evils2 and at the  same time1 ,i think  
that those very evils themselves arise  
more from  opinion than nature1 for1 if 
they were real1 no forecast could make  
them  lighter4 ,but ,i shall speak more 
particularly on these matters after ,i  
have  first considered ,epicurus's      
opinion1 who thinks that all people must
  necessarily be uneasy who believe     
themselves to be in any evils1 let them 
be either foreseen and expected1 or     
habitual to them2 for1 with him1 evils  
are not the less by reason of their     
continuance1 nor the lighter for  having
 been foreseen2 and it is folly to      
ruminate on evils to come1 or  such as1 
perhaps1 never may come2 every evil is  
disagreeable enough when  it does come2 
but he who is constantly considering    
that some evil may  befal him1 is       
loading himself with a perpetual evil1  
and even should such  evil never light  
on him1 he voluntarily takes upon       
himself unnecessary  misery1 so that he 
is under constant uneasiness1 whether he

 actually  suffers any evil1 or only    
thinks of it4 ,but he makes the         
alleviation of  grief depend on two     
things1 a ceasing to think on evil1 and 
a turning to  the contemplation of      
pleasure4 ,for he thinks that the mind  
may possibly be  under the power of     
reason1 and follow her directions2 he   
forbids us1  therefore1 to mind trouble1
 and calls us off from sorrowful        
reflections3  he throws a mist over our 
eyes to hinder us from the contemplation
 of  misery4 ,having sounded a retreat  
from this statement1 he drives our      
thoughts on again1 and encourages them  
to view and engage the whole mind  in   
the various pleasures with which he     
thinks the life of a wise man  abounds1 
either from reflecting on the past1 or  
from the hope of what is  to come4 ,i   
have said these things in my own way1   
the ,epicureans have  theirs3 however1  
let us examine what they say2 how they  
say it is of  little consequence4       
,,xvi4 ,in the first place1 they are    

wrong in forbidding men to premeditate  
on futurity1 and blaming their wish to  
do so2 for there is nothing that  breaks
 the edge of grief and lightens it more1
 than considering1 during  one's whole  
life1 that there is nothing which it is 
impossible should  happen2 or1 than     
considering what human nature is1 on    
what conditions life  was given1 and how
 we may comply with them4 ,the effect of
 which is1 that  we are always grieving1
 but that we never do so2 for whoever   
reflects on  the nature of things1 the  
various turns of life1 and the weakness 
of human  nature1 grieves1 indeed1 at   
that reflection2 but while so grieving  
he is1  above all other times1 behaving 
as a wise man3 for he gains these two   
things by it2 one1 that while he is     
considering the state of human nature   
he is performing the especial duties of 
philosophy1 and is provided with a      
triple medicine against adversity3 in   
the first place1 because he has long    
reflected that such things might befal  

him1 and this reflection by itself      
contributes much towards lessening and  
weakening all misfortunes2 and1         
secondly1 because he is persuaded that  
we should bear all the accidents  which 
can happen to a man1 with the feelings  
and spirit of a man2 and  lastly1       
because he considers that what is       
blameable is the only evil2 but  it is  
not your fault that something has       
happened to you which it was  impossible
 for man to avoid4 ,for that withdrawing
 of our thoughts which he  recommends   
when he calls us off from contemplating 
our misfortunes1 is an  imaginary       
action2 for it is not in our power to   
dissemble or to forget  those evils     
which lie heavy on us2 they tear1 vex1  
and sting us--they burn  us up1 and     
leave no breathing-time2 and do you     
order us to forget them1  7for such     
forgetfulness is contrary to nature17   
and at the same time  deprive us of the 
only assistance which nature affords1   
the being  accustomed to them8 for that1

 though it is but a slow medicine 7,i   
mean  that which is brought by lapse of 
time71 is still a very effectual one4   
,you order me to employ my thoughts on  
something good1 and forget my           
misfortunes4 ,you would say something   
worthy a great philosopher1 if you      
thought those things good which are best
 suited to the dignity of human  nature4
    ,,xvii4 ,should ,pythagoras1        
,socrates1 or ,plato1 say to me1 ,why   
are you  dejected1 or sad8 ,why do you  
faint1 and yield to fortune1 which1     
perhaps1  may have power to harass and  
disturb you1 but should not quite unman 
you8  ,there is great power in the      
virtues2 rouse them if they chance to   
droop4  ,take fortitude for your guide1 
which will give you such spirits1 that  
you  will despise everything that can   
befal man1 and look on it as a trifle4  
,add to this temperance1 which is       
moderation1 and which was just now      
called  frugality1 which will not suffer
 you to do anything base or bad--for    

what  is worse or baser than an         
effeminate man8 ,not even justice will  
suffer you  to act in this manner1      
though she seems to have the least      
weight in this  affair2 but still1      
notwithstanding1 even she will inform   
you that you are  doubly unjust when you
 both require what does not belong to   
you1 inasmuch  as though you who have   
been born mortal1 demand to be placed in
 the  condition of the immortals1 and at
 the same time you take it much to heart
  that you are to restore what was lent 
you4 ,what answer will you make to      
prudence1 who informs you that she is a 
virtue sufficient of herself both  to   
teach you a good life1 and also to      
secure you a happy one8 ,and1 indeed1   
if she were fettered by external        
circumstances1 and dependent on others1 
and if she did not originate in herself 
and return to herself1 and also  embrace
 everything in herself1 so as to seek no
 adventitious aid from any  quarter1 ,i 
cannot imagine why she should appear    

deserving of such lofty  panegyrics1 or 
of being sought after with such         
excessive eagerness4 ,now1  ,epicurus1  
if you call me back to such goods as    
these1 ,i will obey you1 and  follow    
you1 and use you as my guide1 and even  
forget1 as you order me1 all  my        
misfortunes2 and ,i will do this the    
more readily from a persuasion that     
they are not to be ranked amongst evils 
at all4 ,but you are for bringing  my   
thoughts over to pleasure4 ,what        
pleasures8 pleasures of the body1 ,i    
imagine1 or such as are recollected or  
imagined on account of the body4 ,is    
this all8 ,do ,i explain your opinion   
rightly8 for your disciples are used  to
 deny that we understand at all what    
,epicurus means4 ,this is what he  says1
 and what that subtle fellow1 old ,zeno1
 who is one of the sharpest of  them1   
used1 when ,i was attending lectures at 
,athens1 to enforce and talk  so loudly 
of2 saying that he alone was happy who  
could enjoy present  pleasure1 and who  

was at the same time persuaded that he  
should enjoy it  without pain1 either   
during the whole or the greatest part of
 his life2 or  if1 should any pain      
interfere1 if it was very sharp1 then it
 must be  short2 should it be of longer 
continuance1 it would have more of what 
was  sweet than bitter in it2 that      
whosoever reflected on these things     
would be  happy1 especially if satisfied
 with the good things which he had      
already  enjoyed1 and if he were without
 fear of death1 or of the ,gods4        
,,xviii4 ,you have here a representation
 of a happy life according to           
,epicurus1 in the words of ,zeno1 so    
that there is no room for contradiction 
in any point4 ,what then8 ,can the      
proposing and thinking of such a life   
make ,thyestes grief the less1 or       
etes's1 of whom ,i spoke above1 or      
,telamon's1 who was driven from his     
country to penury and banishment8 in    
wonder at whom men exclaimed thus3--    
,is this the man surpassing glory       

raised8      ,is this that ,telamon so  
highly praised      ,by wondering       
,greece1 at whose sight1 like the sun1  
,all others with diminish'd lustre      
shone8      ,now1 should any one1 as the
 same author says1 find his spirits sink
 with  the loss of his fortune1 he must 
apply to those grave philosophers of    
antiquity for relief1 and not to these  
voluptuaries3 for what great  abundance 
of good do they promise8 ,suppose that  
we allow that to be  without pain is the
 chief good8 yet that is not called     
pleasure4 ,but it is  not necessary at  
present to go through the whole3 the    
question is1 to what  point are we to   
advance in order to abate our grief8    
,grant that to be in  pain is the       
greatest evil2 whosoever1 then1 has     
proceeded so far as not to  be in pain1 
is he1 therefore1 in immediate          
possession of the greatest  good8 ,why1 
,epicurus1 do we use any evasions1 and  
not allow in our own  words the same    
feeling to be pleasure1 which you are   

used to boast of with  such assurance8  
,are these your words or not8 ,this is  
what you say in that  book which        
contains all the doctrine of your       
school2 for ,i will perform1  on this   
occasion1 the office of a translator1   
lest any one should imagine  that ,i am 
inventing anything4 ,thus you speak3    
8,nor can ,i form any notion  of the    
chief good1 abstracted from those       
pleasures which are perceived by  taste1
 or from what depends on hearing music1 
or abstracted from ideas  raised by     
external objects visible to the eye1 or 
by agreeable motions1 or  from those    
other pleasures which are perceived by  
the whole man by means  of any of his   
senses2 nor can it possibly be said that
 the pleasures of  the mind are excited 
only by what is good2 for ,i have       
perceived men's  minds to be pleased    
with the hopes of enjoying those things 
which ,i  mentioned above1 and with the 
idea that it should enjoy them without  
any  interruption from pain40 ,and these

 are his exact words1 so that any one   
may understand what were the pleasures  
with which ,epicurus was acquainted4    
,then he speaks thus1 a little lower    
down3 8,i have often inquired of those  
who have been called wise men1 what     
would be the remaining good if they     
should exclude from consideration all   
these pleasures1 unless they meant  to  
give us nothing but words8 ,i could     
never learn anything from them2 and     
unless they choose that all virtue and  
wisdom should vanish and come to        
nothing1 they must say with me1 that the
 only road to happiness lies  through   
those pleasures which ,i mentioned      
above40 ,what follows is much the  same1
 and his whole book on the chief good   
everywhere abounds with the  same       
opinions4 ,will you1 then1 invite       
,telamon to this kind of life to ease   
his grief8 and should you observe any   
one of your friends under  affliction1  
would you rather prescribe him a        
sturgeon than a treatise of  ,socrates8 

or advise him to listen to the music of 
a water-organ rather  than to ,plato8 or
 lay before him the beauty and variety  
of some garden1  put a nosegay to his   
nose1 burn perfumes before him1 and bid 
him crown  himself with a garland of    
roses and woodbines8 ,should you add one
 thing  more1 you would certainly wipe  
out all his grief4    ,,xix4 ,epicurus  
must admit these arguments2 or he must  
take out of his book  what ,i just now  
said was a literal translation2 or      
rather he must destroy  his whole book1 
for it is crammed full of pleasures4 ,we
 must inquire1  then1 how we can ease   
him of his grief1 who speaks in this    
manner3--          ,my present state    
proceeds from fortune's stings2      ,by
 birth ,i boast of a descent from kings2
      ,hence may you see from what a    
noble height      ,i'm sunk by fortune  
to this abject plight4      ,what6 to   
ease his grief1 must we mix him a cup of
 sweet wine1 or something  of that kind8
 ,lo6 the same poet presents us with    

another sentiment  somewhere else3--    
,i1 ,hector1 once so great1 now claim   
your aid4      ,we should assist her1   
for she looks out for help4             
,where shall ,i now apply1 where seek   
support8      ,where hence betake me1 or
 to whom resort8      ,no means remain  
of comfort or of joy1      ,in flames my
 palace1 and in ruins ,troy2      ,each 
wall1 so late superb1 deformed nods1    
,and not an altar's left t' appease the 
gods4      ,you know what should follow1
 and particularly this3--          ,of  
father1 country1 and of friends bereft1 
,not one of all these sumptuous temples 
left2      ,which1 whilst the fortune of
 our house did stand1      ,with        
rich-wrought ceilings spoke the artist's
 hand4      ,o excellent poet6 though   
despised by those who sing the verses of
  ,euphorion4 ,he is sensible that all  
things which come on a sudden are       
harder to be borne4 ,therefore1 when he 
had set off the riches of ,priam to  the
 best advantage1 which had the          

appearance of a long continuance1 what  
does he add8--          ,lo1 these all  
perish'd in one blazing pile2      ,the 
foe old ,priam of his life beguiled1    
,and with his blood1 thy altar1 ,jove1  
defiled4      ,admirable poetry6 ,there 
is something mournful in the subject1 as
 well as  in the words and measure4 ,we 
must drive away this grief of her's3 how
 is  that to be done8 ,shall we lay her 
on a bed of down3 introduce a singer2   
shall we burn cedar1 or present her with
 some pleasant liquor1 and provide  her 
something to eat8 ,are these the good   
things which remove the most  afflicting
 grief8 for you but just now said you   
knew of no other good4 ,i  should agree 
with ,epicurus that we ought to be      
called off from grief to  contemplate   
good things1 if we could only agree upon
 what was good4    ,,xx4 ,it may be     
said1 ,what6 do you imagine ,epicurus   
really meant this1 and  that he         
maintained anything so sensual8 ,indeed 
,i do not imagine so1 for ,i  am        

sensible that he has uttered many       
excellent things and sentiments1 and    
delivered maxims of great weight4       
,therefore1 as ,i said before1 ,i am    
speaking of his acuteness1 not of his   
morals4 ,though he should hold those    
pleasures in contempt1 which he just now
 commended1 yet ,i must remember        
wherein he places the chief good4 ,for  
he was not contented with barely  saying
 this1 but he has explained what he     
meant3 he says1 that taste1 and         
embraces1 and sports1 and music1 and    
those forms which affect the eyes  with 
pleasure1 are the chief good4 ,have ,i  
invented this8 have ,i  misrepresented  
him8 ,i should be glad to be confuted2  
for what am ,i  endeavouring at1 but to 
clear up truth in every question8 ,well1
 but the  same man says1 that pleasure  
is at its height where pain ceases1 and 
that  to be free from all pain is the   
very greatest pleasure4 ,here are three 
very great mistakes in a very few words4
 ,one is1 that he contradicts  himself2 

for1 but just now1 he could not imagine 
anything good1 unless the  senses were  
in a manner tickled with some pleasure2 
but now he says that  to be free from   
pain is the highest pleasure4 ,can any  
one contradict  himself more8 ,the next 
mistake is1 that where there is         
naturally a  threefold division1 the    
first1 to be pleased2 next1 to be in    
pain2 the  last1 to be affected neither 
by pleasure nor pain3 he imagines the   
first  and the last to be the same1 and 
makes no difference betwixt pleasure and
  a cessation of pain4 ,the last mistake
 he falls into in common with some      
others2 which is this3 that as virtue is
 the most desirable thing1 and as       
philosophy has been investigated with a 
view to the attainment of it1 he  has   
separated the chief good from virtue4   
,but he commends virtue1 and that       
frequently2 and indeed ,c4 ,gracchus1   
when he had made the largest            
distributions of the public money1 and  
had exhausted the treasury1             

nevertheless spoke much of defending the
 treasury4 ,what signifies what men     
say1 when we see what they do8 ,that    
,piso1 who was surnamed ,frugal1 had    
always harangued against the law that   
was proposed for distributing the  corn1
 but when it had passed1 though a man of
 consular dignity1 he came to  receive  
the corn4 ,gracchus observed ,piso      
standing in the court1 and asked  him1  
in the hearing of the people1 how it was
 consistent for him to take  corn by a  
law he had himself opposed8 8,it was10  
said he1 8against your  distributing my 
goods to every man as you thought       
proper2 but1 as you do  so1 ,i claim my 
share40 ,did not this grave and wise man
 sufficiently show  that the public     
revenue was dissipated by the           
,sempronian law8 ,read  ,gracchus's     
speeches1 and you will pronounce him the
 advocate of the  treasury4 ,epicurus   
denies that any one can live pleasantly 
who does not  lead a life of virtue2 he 
denies that fortune has any power over a

 wise  man3 he prefers a spare diet to  
great plenty1 and maintains that a wise 
man is always happy4 ,all these things  
become a philosopher to say1 but  they  
are not consistent with pleasure4 ,but  
the reply is1 that he doth not  mean    
that pleasure3 let him mean any         
pleasure1 it must be such a one as      
makes no part of virtue4 ,but suppose we
 are mistaken as to his pleasure1  are  
we so too as to his pain8 ,i maintain   
therefore the impropriety of  language  
which that man uses when talking of     
virtue1 who would measure  every great  
evil by pain8    ,,xxi4 ,and indeed the 
,epicureans1 those best of men1 for     
there is no order  of men more innocent1
 complain1 that ,i take great pains to  
inveigh against  ,epicurus4 ,we are     
rivals1 ,i suppose1 for some honour or  
distinction4 ,i  place the chief good in
 the mind1 he in the body2 ,i in virtue1
 he in  pleasure2 and the ,epicureans   
are up in arms1 and implore the         
assistance of  their neighbours1 and    

many are ready to fly to their aid4     
,but1 as for my  part1 ,i declare that  
,i am very indifferent about the matter1
 and that ,i  consider the whole        
discussion which they are so anxious    
about at an end4  ,for what6 is the     
contention about the ,punic war8 on     
which very subject1  though ,m4 ,cato   
and ,l4 ,lentulus were of different     
opinions1 still there was  no difference
 betwixt them4 ,but these men behave    
with too much heat1  especially as the  
opinions which they would uphold are no 
very spirited  ones1 and such as they   
dare not plead for either in the senate1
 or before  the assembly of the people1 
or before the army1 or the censors3 but1
  however1 ,i will argue with them      
another time1 and with such a           
disposition  that no quarrel shall arise
 between us2 for ,i shall be ready to   
yield to  their opinions when founded on
 truth4 ,only ,i must give them this    
advice3  ,that were it ever so true1    
that a wise man regards nothing but the 

body2  or1 to express myself with more  
decency1 never does anything except what
  is expedient1 and views all things    
with exclusive reference to his own     
advantage2 as such things are not very  
commendable1 they should confine  them  
to their own breasts1 and leave off     
talking with that parade of them4       
,,xxii4 ,what remains is the opinion of 
the ,cyrenaics1 who think that men      
grieve when anything happens            
unexpectedly4 ,and that is1 indeed1 as  
,i said  before1 a great aggravation of 
a misfortune2 and ,i know that it       
appeared  so to ,chrysippus1 8,whatever 
falls out unexpected is so much the     
heavier40  ,but the whole question does 
not turn on this2 though the sudden     
approach  of an enemy sometimes         
occasions more confusion than it would  
if you had  expected him1 and a sudden  
storm at sea throws the sailors into a  
greater  fright than one which they have
 foreseen2 and it is the same in many   
other  cases4 ,but when you carefully   

consider the nature of what was         
expected1  you will find nothing more1  
than that all things which come on a    
sudden  appear greater2 and this upon   
two accounts3 first of all1 because you 
have  not time to consider how great the
 accident is2 and secondly1 because you 
are probably persuaded that you could   
have guarded against it had you         
foreseen it1 and therefore the          
misfortune1 having been seemingly       
encountered by your own fault1 makes    
your grief the greater4 ,that it is  so1
 time evinces2 which1 as it advances1   
brings with it so much  mitigation1 that
 though the same misfortunes continue1  
the grief not only  becomes the less1   
but in some cases is entirely removed4  
,many  ,carthaginians were slaves at    
,rome1 and many ,macedonians when       
,perseus their  king was taken prisoner4
 ,i saw1 too1 when ,i was a young man1  
some  ,corinthians in the ,peloponnesus4
 ,they might all have lamented with     
,andromache1--          ,all these ,i   

saw4442      but they had perhaps given 
over lamenting themselves1 for by their 
countenances1 and speech1 and other     
gestures1 you might have taken them  for
 ,argives or ,sicyonians4 ,and ,i myself
 was more concerned at the ruined  walls
 of ,corinth1 than the ,corinthians     
themselves were1 whose minds by         
frequent reflection and time had become 
callous to such sights4 ,i have  read a 
book of ,clitomachus1 which he sent to  
his fellow-citizens1 who were           
prisoners1 to comfort them after the    
destruction of ,carthage2 there is in   
it a treatise written by ,carneades1    
which1 as ,clitomachus says1 he had     
inserted into his book2 the subject was1
 8,that it appeared probable that a     
wise man would grieve at the state of   
subjection of his country10 and all  the
 arguments which ,carneades used against
 this proposition are set down  in the  
book4 ,there the philosopher applies    
such a strong medicine to a  fresh      
grief1 as would be quite unnecessary in 

one of any continuance2 nor1  if this   
very book had been sent to the captives 
some years after1 would it  have found  
any wounds to cure1 but only scars2 for 
grief1 by a gentle  progress and slow   
degrees1 wears away imperceptibly4 ,not 
that the  circumstances which gave rise 
to it are altered1 or can be1 but that  
custom teaches what reason should1 that 
those things which before seemed  to be 
of some consequence1 are of no such     
great importance after all4    ,,xxiii4 
,it may be said1 ,what occasion is there
 to apply to reason1 or to  any sort of 
consolation such as we generally make   
use of1 to mitigate the  grief of the   
afflicted8 ,for we have this argument   
always at hand1 that  nothing ought to  
appear unexpected4 ,but how will any one
 be enabled to  bear his misfortunes the
 better by knowing that it is           
unavoidable that  such things should    
happen to man8 ,saying this subtracts   
nothing from the  sum of the grief3 it  
only asserts that nothing has fallen out

 but what  might have been anticipated2 
and yet this manner of speaking has some
  little consolation in it1 though ,i   
apprehend not a great deal4 ,therefore  
those unlooked-for things have not so   
much force as to give rise to all  our  
grief2 the blow perhaps may fall the    
heavier1 but whatever happens  does not 
appear the greater on that account2 no1 
it is the fact of its  having happened  
lately1 and not of its having befallen  
us unexpectedly1  that makes it seem the
 greater4 ,there are two ways then of   
discerning the  truth1 not only of      
things that seem evil1 but of those that
 have the  appearance of good4 ,for we  
either inquire into the nature of the   
thing1 of  what description1 and        
magnitude1 and importance it is1--as    
sometimes with  regard to poverty1 the  
burden of which we may lighten when by  
our  disputations we show how few things
 nature requires1 and of what a         
trifling kind they are1--or1 without any
 subtle arguing1 we refer them to       

examples1 as here we instance a         
,socrates1 there a ,diogenes1 and then  
again  that line in ,ccilius1           
,wisdom is oft conceal'd in mean attire4
      ,for as poverty is of equal weight
 with all1 what reason can be given1 why
  what was borne by ,fabricius should be
 spoken of by any one else as           
unsupportable when it falls upon        
themselves8 ,of a piece with this is    
that  other way of comforting1 which    
consists in pointing out that nothing   
has  happened but what is common to     
human nature2 for this argument doth not
  only inform us what human nature is1  
but implies that all things are         
tolerable which others have borne and   
are bearing4    ,,xxiv4 ,is poverty the 
subject8 they tell you of many who have 
submitted to  it with patience4 ,is it  
the contempt of honours8 they acquaint  
you with  some who never enjoyed any1   
and were the happier for it2 and of     
those who  have preferred a private     
retired life to public employment1      

mentioning  their names with respect2   
they tell you of the verse7#hi7 of that 
most  powerful king1 who praises an old 
man1 and pronounces him happy1 because  
he was unknown to fame1 and seemed      
likely to arrive at the hour of death   
in obscurity and without notice4 ,thus  
too they have examples for those who    
are deprived of their children2 they who
 are under any great grief are          
comforted by instances of like          
affliction2 and thus the endurance of   
every  misfortune is rendered more easy 
by the fact of others having undergone  
the same1 and the fate of others causes 
what has happened to appear less        
important than it has been previously   
thought1 and reflection thus  discovers 
to us how much opinion had imposed on   
us4 ,and this is what that  ,telamon    
declares1 8,i1 when my son was born10   
etc42 and thus ,theseus1 8,i on  my     
future misery did dwell20 and           
,anaxagoras1 8,i knew my son was        
mortal40  ,all these men1 by frequently 

reflecting on human affairs1 had        
discovered  that they were by no means  
to be estimated by the opinion of the   
multitude2 and indeed it seems to me to 
be pretty much the same case with  those
 who consider beforehand as with those  
who derive their remedies from  time1   
excepting that a kind of reason cures   
the one1 and the other remedy  is       
provided by nature2 by which we discover
 7and this contains the whole  marrow of
 the matter7 that what was imagined to  
be the greatest evil1 is  by no means so
 great as to defeat the happiness of    
life4 ,and the effect of  this is1 that 
the blow is greater by reason of its not
 having been  foreseen1 and not1 as they
 suppose1 that when similar misfortunes 
befal  two different people1 that man   
only is affected with grief whom this   
calamity has befallen unexpectedly4 ,so 
that some persons1 under the  oppression
 of grief1 are said to have borne it    
actually worse for hearing  of this     
common condition of man1 that we are    

born under such conditions as  render it
 impossible for a man to be exempt from 
all evil4    ,,xxv4 ,for this reason    
,carneades1 as ,i see our friend        
,antiochus writes1 used  to blame       
,chrysippus for commending these verses 
of ,euripides1--          ,man1 doom'd  
to care1 to pain1 disease1 and strife1  
,walks his short journey thro' the vale 
of life3      ,watchful attends the     
cradle and the grave1      ,and passing 
generations longs to save3      ,last1  
dies himself3 yet wherefore should we   
mourn8      ,for man must to his kindred
 dust return2      ,submit to the       
destroying hand of fate1      ,as       
ripen'd ears the harvest-sickle         
wait47#ij7      ,he would not allow a   
speech of this kind to avail at all to  
the cure of  our grief1 for he said it  
was a lamentable case itself1 that we   
were  fallen into the hands of such a   
cruel fate2 and that a speech like that1
  preaching up comfort from the         
misfortunes of another1 was a comfort   

adapted only to those of a malevolent   
disposition4 ,but to me it appears  far 
otherwise2 for the necessity of bearing 
what is the common condition  of        
humanity forbids your resisting the will
 of the ,gods1 and reminds you  that you
 are a man2 which reflection greatly    
alleviates grief2 and the  enumeration  
of these examples is not produced with a
 view to please those  of a malevolent  
disposition1 but in order that any one  
in affliction may  be induced to bear   
what he observes many others have       
previously borne with  tranquillity and 
moderation4 ,for they who are falling to
 pieces1 and  cannot hold together      
through the greatness of their grief1   
should be  supported by all kinds of    
assistance4 ,from whence ,chrysippus    
thinks that  grief is called 1 as it    
were 1 that is to say1 a dissolution of 
the whole man4 ,the whole of which ,i   
think may be pulled up by the roots1  by
 explaining1 as ,i said at the          
beginning1 the cause of grief2 for it is

  nothing else but an opinion and       
judgment formed of a present acute evil4
  ,and thus any bodily pain1 let it be  
ever so grievous1 may be endurable      
where any hopes are proposed of some    
considerable good2 and we receive  such 
consolation from a virtuous and         
illustrious life1 that they who lead    
such lives are seldom attacked by grief1
 or but slightly affected by it4        
,,xxvi4 ,but as besides this opinion of 
great evil there is this other added    
also1 that we ought to lament what has  
happened1 that it is right so to  do1   
and part of our duty2 then is brought   
about that terrible disorder of  mind1  
grief4 ,and it is to this opinion that  
we owe all those various and  horrid    
kinds of lamentation1 that neglect of   
our persons1 that womanish  tearing of  
our cheeks1 that striking on our thighs1
 breasts1 and heads4  ,thus ,agamemnon1 
in ,homer and in ,accius1--             
,tears in his grief his uncomb'd        
locks27#ia7      from whence comes that 

pleasant saying of ,bion1 that the      
foolish king in  his sorrow tore away   
the hairs of his head1 imagining that   
his grief would  be alleviated by       
baldness4 ,but men do all these things  
from being  persuaded that they ought to
 do so4 ,and thus schines inveighs      
against  ,demosthenes for sacrificing   
within seven days after the death of his
  daughter4 ,but with what eloquence1   
with what fluency does he attack him6   
what sentiments does he collect6 what   
words does he hurl against him6 ,you    
may see by this that an orator may do   
anything2 but nobody would approve  of  
such licence if it were not that we have
 an idea innate in our minds1  that     
every good man ought to lament the loss 
of a relation as bitterly as  possible4 
,and it is owing to this that some men1 
when in sorrow1 betake  themselves to   
deserts1 as ,homer says of              
,bellerophon2--                         
,distracted in his mind1      ,forsook  
by heaven1 forsaking human kind1        

,wide o'er the ,alean field he chose to 
stray1      ,a long1 forlorn1           
uncomfortable way67#ib7      ,and thus  
,niobe is feigned to have been turned   
into stone1 from her never  speaking1 ,i
 suppose1 in her grief4 ,but they       
imagine ,hecuba to have been  converted 
into a bitch1 from her rage and         
bitterness of mind4 ,there are  others  
who love to converse with solitude      
itself1 when in grief1 as the  nurse in 
,ennius1--          ,fain would ,i to   
the heavens and earth relate            
,medea's ceaseless woes and cruel       
fate47#ic7      ,,xxvii4 ,now all these 
things are done in grief1 from a        
persuasion of their  truth1 and         
propriety1 and necessity2 and it is     
plain1 that those who  behave thus1 do  
so from a conviction of its being their 
duty2 for should  these mourners by     
chance drop their grief1 and either act 
or speak for a  moment in a more calm or
 cheerful manner1 they presently check  
themselves  and return to their         

lamentations again1 and blame themselves
 for having  been guilty of any         
intermissions from their grief4 ,and    
parents and masters  generally correct  
children not by words only1 but by      
blows1 if they show  any levity by      
either word or deed when the family is  
under affliction1  and1 as it were1     
oblige them to be sorrowful4 ,what8 does
 it not appear1  when you have ceased to
 mourn1 and have discovered that your   
grief has  been ineffectual1 that the   
whole of that mourning was voluntary1 on
 your  part8 ,what does that man say1 in
 ,terence1 who punishes himself1 the    
,self-tormentor8          ,i think ,i do
 my son less harm1 ,o ,chremes1      ,as
 long as ,i myself am miserable4        
,he determines to be miserable3 and can 
any one determine on anything  against  
his will8          ,i well might think  
that ,i deserved all evil4      ,he     
would think he deserved any misfortune1 
were he otherwise than  miserable6      
,therefore1 you see the evil is in      

opinion1 not in nature4 ,how  is it1    
when some things do of themselves       
prevent your grieving at them8 as  in   
,homer1 so many died and were buried    
daily1 that they had not leisure to     
grieve3 where you find these lines1--   
,the great1 the bold1 by thousands daily
 fall1      ,and endless were the grief 
to weep for all4      ,eternal sorrows  
what avails to shed8      ,greece       
honours not with solemn fasts the dead3 
,enough when death demands the brave to 
pay      ,the tribute of a melancholy   
day4      ,one chief with patience to   
the grave resign'd1      ,our care      
devolves on others left behind47#id7    
,therefore it is in our own power to lay
 aside grief upon occasion2 and is      
there any opportunity 7seeing the thing 
is in our own power7 that we  should let
 slip of getting rid of care and grief8 
,it was plain1 that the  friends of     
,cnus ,pompeius1 when they saw him      
fainting under his wounds1 at  the very 
moment of that most miserable and bitter

 sight were under great  uneasiness how 
they themselves1 surrounded by the enemy
 as they were1  should escape1 and were 
employed in nothing but encouraging the 
rowers and  aiding their escape2 but    
when they reached ,tyre1 they began to  
grieve and  lament over him4 ,therefore1
 as fear with them prevailed over grief1
 cannot  reason and true philosophy have
 the same effect with a wise man8       
,,xxviii4 ,but what is there more       
effectual to dispel grief than the      
discovery that it answers no purpose1   
and has been undergone to no  account8  
,therefore1 if we can get rid of it1 we 
need never have been  subject to it4 ,it
 must be acknowledged1 then1 that men   
take up grief  wilfully and knowingly2  
and this appears from the patience of   
those who1  after they have been        
exercised in afflictions and are better 
able to bear  whatever befals them1     
suppose themselves hardened against     
fortune2 as that  person in ,euripides--
          ,had this the first essay of  

fortune been1      ,and ,i no storms    
thro' all my life had seen1      ,wild  
as a colt ,i'd broke from reason's sway2
      ,but frequent griefs have taught  
me to obey47#ie7      ,as1 then1 the    
frequent bearing of misery makes grief  
the lighter1 we must  necessarily       
perceive that the cause and original of 
it does not lie in the  calamity itself4
 ,your principal philosophers1 or lovers
 of wisdom1 though  they have not yet   
arrived at perfect wisdom1 are not they 
sensible that  they are in the greatest 
evil8 ,for they are foolish1 and        
foolishness is  the greatest of all     
evils1 and yet they lament not4 ,how    
shall we account  for this8 ,because    
opinion is not fixed upon that kind of  
evil2 it is not  our opinion that it is 
right1 meet1 and our duty to be uneasy  
because we  are not all wise men4       
,whereas this opinion is strongly       
affixed to that  uneasiness where       
mourning is concerned1 which is the     
greatest of all  grief4 ,therefore      

,aristotle1 when he blames some ancient 
philosophers for  imagining that by     
their genius they had brought philosophy
 to the highest  perfection1 says1 they 
must be either extremely foolish or     
extremely vain2  but that he himself    
could see that great improvements had   
been made  therein in a few years1 and  
that philosophy would in a little time  
arrive  at perfection4 ,and             
,theophrastus is reported to have       
reproached nature at  his death for     
giving to stags and crows so long a     
life1 which was of no  use to them1 but 
allowing only so short a span to men1 to
 whom length of  days would have been of
 the greatest use2 for if the life of   
man could  have been lengthened1 it     
would have been able to provide itself  
with all  kinds of learning1 and with   
arts in the greatest perfection4 ,he    
lamented1  therefore1 that he was dying 
just when he had begun to discover      
these4  ,what8 does not every grave and 
distinguished philosopher acknowledge   

himself ignorant of many things1 and    
confess that there are many things      
which he must learn over and over again8
 and yet1 though these men are  sensible
 that they are standing still in the    
very midway of folly1 than  which       
nothing can be worse1 they are under no 
great affliction1 because no  opinion   
that it is their duty to lament is ever 
mingled with this  knowledge4 ,what     
shall we say of those who think it      
unbecoming in a man to  grieve8 amongst 
whom we may reckon ,q4 ,maximus1 when he
 buried his son that  had been consul1  
and ,l4 ,paulus1 who lost two sons      
within a few days of one  another4 ,of  
the same opinion was ,m4 ,cato1 who lost
 his son just after he  had been elected
 prtor1 and many others1 whose names ,i 
have collected in  my book on           
,consolation4 ,now what made these men  
so easy1 but their  persuasion that     
grief and lamentation was not becoming  
in a man8  ,therefore1 as some give     
themselves up to grief from an opinion  

that it is  right so to do1 they        
refrained themselves1 from an opinion   
that it was  discreditable2 from which  
we may infer that grief is owing more to
 opinion  than nature4    ,,xxix4 ,it   
may be said1 on the other side1 ,who is 
so mad as to grieve of his  own accord8 
,pain proceeds from nature2 which you   
must submit to1 say they1  agreeably to 
what even your own ,crantor teaches1 for
 it presses and gains  upon you         
unavoidably1 and cannot possibly be     
resisted4 ,so that the very  same       
,oileus1 in ,sophocles1 who had before  
comforted ,telamon on the death  of     
,ajax1 on hearing of the death of his   
own son is broken-hearted4 ,on this     
alteration of his mind we have these    
lines3--          ,show me the man so   
well by wisdom taught      ,that what he
 charges to another's fault1      ,when 
like affliction doth himself betide1    
,true to his own wise counsel will      
abide47#if7      ,now when they urge    
these things1 their endeavour is to     

prove that nature  is absolutely and    
wholly irresistible2 and yet the same   
people allow that  we take greater grief
 on ourselves than nature requires4     
,what madness is  it then in us to      
require the same from others8 ,but there
 are many reasons  for our taking grief 
on us4 ,the first is from the opinion of
 some evil1 on  the discovery and       
certainty of which grief comes of       
course4 ,besides1 many  people are      
persuaded that they are doing something 
very acceptable to the  dead when they  
lament bitterly over them4 ,to these may
 be added a kind of  womanish           
superstition1 in imagining that when    
they have been stricken by  the         
afflictions sent by the gods1 to        
acknowledge themselves afflicted and    
humbled by them is the readiest way of  
appeasing them4 ,but most men appear  to
 be unaware what contradictions these   
things are full of4 ,they commend  those
 who die calmly1 but they blame those   
who can bear the loss of  another with  

the same calmness1 as if it were        
possible that it should be  true1 as is 
occasionally said in love speeches1 that
 any one can love  another more than    
himself4 ,there is1 indeed1 something   
excellent in this1  and1 if you examine 
it1 something no less just than true1   
that we love  those who ought to be most
 dear to us as well as we love          
ourselves2 but to  love them more than  
ourselves is absolutely impossible2 nor 
is it  desirable in friendship that ,i  
should love my friend more than myself1 
or  that he should love me so2 for this 
would occasion much confusion in life1  
and break in upon all the duties of it4 
,,xxx4 ,but we will speak of this       
another time3 at present it is          
sufficient  not to attribute our misery 
to the loss of our friends1 nor to love 
them  more than1 if they themselves     
could be sensible of our conduct1 they  
would  approve of1 or at least not more 
than we do ourselves4 ,now as to what   
they  say1 that some are not at all     

appeased by our consolations2 and       
moreover  as to what they add1 that the 
comforters themselves acknowledge they  
are  miserable when fortune varies the  
attack and falls on them1--in both these
  cases the solution is easy3 for the   
fault here is not in nature1 but in  our
 own folly2 and much may be said against
 folly4 ,but men who do not  admit of   
consolation seem to bespeak misery for  
themselves2 and they who  cannot bear   
their misfortunes with that temper which
 they recommend to  others1 are not more
 faulty in this particular than most    
other persons2  for we see that covetous
 men find fault with others who are     
covetous2 as  do the vain-glorious with 
those who appear too wholly devoted to  
the  pursuit of glory4 ,for it is the   
peculiar characteristic of folly to     
perceive the vices of others1 but to    
forget its own4 ,but since we find  that
 grief is removed by length of time1 we 
have the greatest proof that  the       
strength of it depends not merely on    

time1 but on the daily  consideration of
 it4 ,for if the cause continues the    
same1 and the man be  the same1 how can 
there be any alteration in the grief1 if
 there is no  change in what occasioned 
the grief1 nor in him who grieves8      
,therefore it  is from daily reflecting 
that there is no real evil in the       
circumstance  for which you grieve1 and 
not from the length of time1 that you   
procure a  remedy for your grief4       
,,xxxi4 ,here some people talk of       
moderate grief2 but if such be natural1 
what occasion is there for consolation8 
for nature herself will determine  the  
measure of it2 but if it depends on and 
is caused by opinion1 the  whole opinion
 should be destroyed4 ,i think that it  
has been sufficiently  said1 that grief 
arises from an opinion of some present  
evil1 which  includes this belief1 that 
it is incumbent on us to grieve4 ,to    
this  definition ,zeno has added very   
justly1 that the opinion of this present
  evil should be recent4 ,now this word 

recent they explain thus2--those are    
not the only recent things which        
happened a little while ago1 but as long
  as there shall be any force or vigour 
or freshness in that imagined evil1  so 
long it is entitled to the name of      
recent4 ,take the case of ,artemisia1   
the wife of ,mausolus king of ,caria1   
who made that noble sepulchre at        
,halicarnassus2 whilst she lived she    
lived in grief1 and died of it1 being   
worn out by it1 for that opinion was    
always recent with her3 but you  cannot 
call that recent1 which has already     
begun to decay through time4  ,now the  
duty of a comforter is1 to remove grief 
entirely1 to quiet it1 or  draw it off  
as much as you can1 or else to keep it  
under1 and prevent its  spreading any   
further1 and to divert one's attention  
to other matters4  ,there are some who  
think with ,cleanthes1 that the only    
duty of a comforter  is to prove1 that  
what one is lamenting is by no means an 
evil4 ,others1 as  the ,peripatetics1   

prefer urging that the evil is not      
great4 ,others1 with  ,epicurus1 seek to
 divert your attention from the evil to 
good3 some think  it sufficient to show1
 that nothing has happened but what you 
had reason  to expect1 and this is the  
practice of the ,cyrenaics4 ,but        
,chrysippus  thinks that the main thing 
in comforting is1 to remove the opinion 
from  the person who is grieving1 that  
to grieve is his bounden duty4 ,there   
are  others who bring together all these
 various kinds of consolations1 for     
people are differently affected2 as ,i  
have done myself in my book on          
,consolation3 for as my own mind was    
much disordered1 ,i have attempted in   
that book to discover every method of   
cure4 ,but the proper season is as  much
 to be attended to in the cure of the   
mind1 as of the body2 as  ,prometheus in
 schylus1 on its being said to him1     
,i think1 ,prometheus1 you this tenet   
hold1      ,that all men's reason should
 their rage control2      answers1      

,yes1 when one reason properly applies2 
,ill-timed advice will make the storm   
but rise47#ig7      ,,xxxii4 ,but the   
principal medicine to be applied in     
consolation1 is to  maintain either that
 it is no evil at all1 or a very        
inconsiderable one3  the next best to   
that is1 to speak of the common         
condition of life1 having  a view1 if   
possible1 to the state of the person    
whom you comfort  particularly4 ,the    
third is1 that it is folly to wear      
oneself out with  grief which can avail 
nothing4 ,for the comfort of ,cleanthes 
is suitable  only for a wise man1 who is
 in no need of any comfort at all2 for  
could  you persuade one in grief1 that  
nothing is an evil but what is base1 you
  would not only cure him of grief1 but 
folly4 ,but the time for such  precepts 
is not well chosen4 ,besides1 ,cleanthes
 does not seem to me  sufficiently aware
 that affliction may very often proceed 
from that very  thing which he himself  
allows to be the greatest misfortune4   

,for what  shall we say8 ,when ,socrates
 had convinced ,alcibiades1 as we are   
told1 that  he had no distinctive       
qualifications as a man different from  
other people1  and that in fact there   
was no difference betwixt him1 though a 
man of the  highest rank1 and a porter2 
and when ,alcibiades became uneasy at   
this1 and  entreated ,socrates1 with    
tears in his eyes1 to make him a man of 
virtue1  and to cure him of that mean   
position2 what shall we say to this1    
,cleanthes8 ,was there no evil in what  
afflicted ,alcibiades thus8 ,what       
strange things does ,lycon say8 who1    
making light of grief1 says that it     
arises from trifles1 from things that   
affect our fortune or bodies1 not  from 
the evils of the mind4 ,what1 then--did 
not the grief of ,alcibiades  proceed   
from the defects and evils of the mind8 
,i have already said enough  of         
,epicurus's consolation4    ,,xxxiii4   
,nor is that consolation much to be     
relied on1 though it is  frequently     

practised1 and sometimes has some       
effect1 namely1 8,that you are  not     
alone in this40--,it has its effect1 as 
,i said1 but not always1 nor with  every
 person2 for some reject it1 but much   
depends on the application of  it2 for  
you ought rather to show1 not how men in
 general have been  affected with such  
evils1 but how men of sense have borne  
them4 ,as to  ,chrysippus's method1 it  
is certainly founded in truth2 but it is
 difficult  to apply it in time of      
distress4 ,it is a work of no small     
difficulty to  persuade a person in     
affliction that he grieves1 merely      
because he thinks  it right so to do4   
,certainly then1 as in pleadings we do  
not state all  cases alike1 7if ,i may  
adopt the language of lawyers for a     
moment17 but  adapt what we have to say 
to the time1 to the nature of the       
subject under  debate1 and to the       
person2 so too in alleviating grief1    
regard should be  had to what kind of   
cure the party to be comforted can admit

 of4 ,but1  somehow or other1 we have   
rambled from what you originally        
proposed4 ,for  your question was       
concerning a wise man1 with whom nothing
 can have the  appearance of evil1 that 
is not dishonourable3 or at least1      
anything else  would seem so small an   
evil1 that by his wisdom he would so    
over-match it1  as to make it wholly    
disappear2 and such a man makes no      
addition to his  grief through opinion1 
and never conceives it right to torment 
himself  above measure1 nor to wear     
himself out with grief1 which is the    
meanest  thing imaginable4 ,reason1     
however1 it seems1 has demonstrated1    
7though it  was not directly our object 
at the moment to inquire whether        
anything can  be called an evil except  
what is base17 that it is in our power  
to  discern1 that all the evil which    
there is in affliction has nothing      
natural in it1 but is contracted by our 
own voluntary judgment of it1 and  the  
error of opinion4    ,,xxxiv4 ,but the  

kind of affliction of which ,i have     
treated is that which is  the greatest2 
in order that when we have once got rid 
of that1 it may  appear a business of   
less consequence to look after remedies 
for the  others4 ,for there are certain 
things which are usually said about     
poverty2  and also certain statements   
ordinarily applied to retired and       
undistinguished life4 ,there are        
particular treatises on banishment1 on  
the  ruin of one's country1 on slavery1 
on weakness1 on blindness1 and on every 
incident that can come under the name of
 an evil4 ,the ,greeks divide these     
into different treatises and distinct   
books3 but they do it for the sake  of  
employment3 not but that all such       
discussions are full of  entertainment2 
and yet1 as physicians1 in curing the   
whole body1 attend to  even the most    
insignificant part of the body which is 
at all disordered1  so does philosophy  
act1 after it has removed grief in      
general1 7still if  any other deficiency

 exists1 should poverty bite1 should    
ignominy sting1  should banishment bring
 a dark cloud over us1 or should any of 
those  things which ,i have just        
mentioned appear17--there is for each   
its  appropriate consolation3 which you 
shall hear whenever you please4 ,but we 
must have recourse again to the same    
original principle1 that a wise man  is 
free from all sorrow1 because it is     
vain1 because it answers no  purpose1   
because it is not founded in nature1 but
 on opinion and  prejudice1 and is      
engendered by a kind of invitation to   
grieve1 when once  men have imagined    
that it is their duty to do so4 ,when   
then we have  subtracted what is        
altogether voluntary1 that mournful     
uneasiness will be  removed2 yet some   
little anxiety1 some slight pricking    
will still remain4  ,they may indeed    
call this natural1 provided they give it
 not that horrid1  solemn1 melancholy   
name of grief1 which can by no means    
consist with  wisdom4 ,but how various1 

and how bitter1 are the roots of grief6 
,whatever  they are1 ,i propose1 after  
having felled the trunk1 to destroy them
 all2  even if it should be necessary1  
by allotting a separate dissertation to 
each1 for ,i have leisure enough to do  
so1 whatever time it may take up4  ,but 
the principle of every uneasiness is the
 same1 though they may appear  under    
different names4 ,for envy is an        
uneasiness2 so are emulation1           
detraction1 anguish1 sorrow1 sadness1   
tribulation1 lamentation1 vexation1     
grief1 trouble1 affliction1 and despair4
 ,the ,stoics define all these          
different feelings1 and all those words 
which ,i have mentioned belong to       
different things1 and do not1 as they   
seem1 express the same ideas2 but  they 
are to a certain extent distinct1 as ,i 
shall make appear perhaps in  another   
place4 ,these are those fibres of the   
roots1 which1 as ,i said at  first1 must
 be traced back and cut off1 and        
destroyed1 so that not one  shall       

remain4 ,you say it is a great and      
difficult undertaking3--who denies  it8 
,but what is there of any excellency    
which has not its difficulty8--,yet     
philosophy undertakes to effect it1     
provided we admit its superintendence4  
,but enough of this3 the other books1   
whenever you please1 shall be ready  for
 you here1 or any where else4           
,book ,,iv4 ,on ,other ,perturbations   
,of ,the ,mind4      ,i4 ,i have often  
wondered1 ,brutus1 on many occasions1 at
 the ingenuity and  virtues of our      
countrymen2 but nothing has surprised me
 more than their  development in those  
studies1 which1 though they came        
somewhat late to us1  have been         
transported into this city from ,greece4
 ,for the system of  auspices1 and      
religious ceremonies1 and courts of     
justice1 and appeals to  the people1 the
 senate1 the establishment of an army of
 cavalry and  infantry1 and the whole   
military discipline1 were instituted as 
early as  the foundation of the city by 

royal authority1 partly too by laws1 not
  without the assistance of the ,gods4  
,then with what a surprising and        
incredible progress did our ancestors   
advance towards all kind of  excellence1
 when once the republic was freed from  
the regal power6 ,not  that this is a   
proper occasion to treat of the manners 
and customs of our  ancestors1 or of the
 discipline and constitution of the     
city2 for ,i have  elsewhere1           
particularly in the six books ,i wrote  
on the ,republic1 given a  sufficiently 
accurate account of them4 ,but whilst ,i
 am on this subject1  and considering   
the study of philosophy1 ,i meet with   
many reasons to  imagine that those     
studies were brought to us from abroad1 
and not merely  imported1 but preserved 
and improved2 for they had ,pythagoras1 
a man of  consummate wisdom and         
nobleness of character1 in a manner1    
before their  eyes2 who was in ,italy at
 the time that ,lucius ,brutus1 the     
illustrious  founder of your nobility1  

delivered his country from tyranny4 ,as 
the  doctrine of ,pythagoras spread     
itself on all sides1 it seems probable  
to  me1 that it reached this city2 and  
this is not only probable of itself1    
but it does really appear to have been  
the case from many remains of it4  ,for 
who can imagine that1 when it flourished
 so much in that part of ,italy  which  
was called ,magna ,grcia1 and in some of
 the largest and most  powerful cities1 
in which1 first the name of ,pythagoras1
 and then that of  those men who were   
afterwards his followers1 was in so high
 esteem2 who  can imagine1 ,i say1 that 
our people could shut their ears to what
 was said  by such learned men8         
,besides1 it is even my opinion1 that it
 was the great  esteem in which the     
,pythagoreans were held1 that gave rise 
to that opinion  amongst those who came 
after him1 that king ,numa was a        
,pythagorean4 ,for1  being acquainted   
with the doctrine and principles of     
,pythagoras1 and  having heard from     

their ancestors that this king was a    
very wise and just  man1 and not being  
able to distinguish accurately between  
times and  periods that were so remote1 
they inferred from his being so eminent 
for  his wisdom1 that he had been a     
pupil of ,pythagoras4    ,,ii4 ,so far  
we proceed on conjecture4 ,as to the    
vestiges of the  ,pythagoreans1 though  
,i might collect many1 ,i shall use but 
a few2 because  they have no connexion1 
with our present purpose4 ,for1 as it is
 reported  to have been a custom with   
them to deliver certain precepts in a   
more  abstruse manner in verse1 and to  
bring their minds from severe thought to
  a more composed state by songs and    
musical instruments2 so ,cato1 a writer 
of the very highest authority1 says in  
his ,origins1 that it was customary     
with our ancestors for the guests at    
their entertainments1 every one in  his 
turn1 to celebrate the praises and      
virtues of illustrious men in song  to  
the sound of the flute2 from whence it  

is clear that poems and songs  were then
 composed for the voice4 ,and1 indeed1  
it is also clear that  poetry was in    
fashion from the laws of the ,twelve    
,tables1 wherein it is  provided1 that  
no song should be made to the injury of 
another4 ,another  argument of the      
erudition of those times is1 that they  
played on  instruments before the       
shrines of their ,gods1 and at the      
entertainments of  their magistrates2   
but that custom was peculiar to the sect
 ,i am speaking  of4 ,to me1 indeed1    
that poem of ,appius ,ccus1 which       
,pantius commends so  much in a certain 
letter of his which is addressed to     
,quintus ,tubero1 has  all the marks of 
a ,pythagorean author4 ,we have many    
things derived from  the ,pythagoreans  
in our customs2 which ,i pass over1 that
 we may not seem  to have learned that  
elsewhere which we look upon ourselves  
as the  inventors of4 ,but to return to 
our purpose4 ,how many great poets as   
well  as orators have sprung up among   

us6 and in what a short time6 so that it
  is evident that our people could      
arrive at any learning as soon as they  
had an inclination for it4 ,but of other
 studies ,i shall speak elsewhere if    
there is occasion1 as ,i have already   
often done4    ,,iii4 ,the study of     
philosophy is certainly of long standing
 with us2 but  yet ,i do not find that  
,i can give you the names of any        
philosopher before  the age of ,llius   
and ,scipio3 in whose younger days we   
find that ,diogenes  the ,stoic1 and    
,carneades the ,academic1 were sent as  
ambassadors by the  ,athenians to our   
senate4 ,and as these had never been    
concerned in public  affairs1 and one of
 them was a ,cyrenean1 the other a      
,babylonian1 they  certainly would never
 have been forced from their studies1   
nor chosen for  that employment1 unless 
the study of philosophy had been in     
vogue with  some of the great men at    
that time2 who1 though they might employ
 their  pens on other subjects1 some on 

civil law1 others on oratory1 others on 
the history of former times1 yet        
promoted this most extensive of all     
arts1  the principle of living well1    
even more by their life than by their   
writings4 ,so that of that true and     
elegant philosophy1 7which was derived  
from ,socrates1 and is still preserved  
by the ,peripatetics1 and by the        
,stoics1 though they express themselves 
differently in their disputes with  the 
,academics17 there are few or no ,latin 
records2 whether this proceeds  from the
 importance of the thing itself1 or from
 men's being otherwise  employed1 or    
from their concluding that the capacity 
of the people was not  equal to the     
apprehension of them4 ,but1 during this 
silence1 ,c4 ,amafinius  arose and took 
upon himself to speak2 on the publishing
 of whose writings  the people were     
moved1 and enlisted themselves chiefly  
under this sect1  either because the    
doctrine was more easily understood1 or 
because they  were invited thereto by   

the pleasing thoughts of amusement1 or  
that1  because there was nothing better1
 they laid hold of what was offered     
them4  ,and after ,amafinius1 when many 
of the same sentiments had written much 
about them1 the ,pythagoreans spread    
over all ,italy3 but that these         
doctrines should be so easily understood
 and approved of by the unlearned1  is a
 great proof that they were not written 
with any great subtlety1 and  they think
 their establishment to be owing to     
this4    ,,iv4 ,but let every one defend
 his own opinion1 for every one is at   
liberty  to choose what he likes2 ,i    
shall keep to my old custom2 and being  
under no  restraint from the laws of any
 particular school1 which in philosophy 
every one must necessarily confine      
himself to1 ,i shall always inquire what
  has the most probability in every     
question1 and this system1 which ,i have
  often practised on other occasions1 ,i
 have adhered closely to in my          
,tusculan ,disputations4 ,therefore1 as 

,i have acquainted you with the         
disputations of the three former days1  
this book shall conclude the  discussion
 of the fourth day4 ,when we had come   
down into the ,academy1 as  we had done 
the former days1 the business was       
carried on thus4    ,m4 ,let any one    
say1 who pleases1 what he would wish to 
have discussed4    ,a4 ,i do not think a
 wise man can possibly be free from     
every  perturbation of mind4    ,m4 ,he 
seemed by yesterday's discourse to be   
free from grief2 unless you  agreed with
 us only to avoid taking up time4    ,a4
 ,not at all on that account1 for ,i was
 extremely satisfied with your          
discourse4    ,m4 ,you do not think1    
then1 that a wise man is subject to     
grief8    ,a4 ,no1 by no means4    ,m4  
,but if that cannot disorder the mind of
 a wise man1 nothing else can4  ,for    
what8 can such a man be disturbed by    
fear8 ,fear proceeds from the same      
things when absent1 which occasion grief
 when present4 ,take away grief  then1  

and you remove fear4    ,the two        
remaining perturbations are1 a joy elate
 above measure1 and lust2  and1 if a    
wise man is not subject to these1 his   
mind will be always at  rest4    ,a4 ,i 
am entirely of that opinion4    ,m4     
,which1 then1 shall we do8 shall ,i     
immediately crowd all my sails8 or      
shall ,i make use of my oars1 as if ,i  
were just endeavouring to get clear  of 
the harbour8    ,a4 ,what is it that you
 mean2 for ,i do not exactly comprehend 
you8    ,v4 ,m4 ,because1 ,chrysippus   
and the ,stoics1 when they discuss the  
perturbations of the mind1 make great   
part of their debate to consist in      
definitions and distinctions2 while they
 employ but few words on the  subject of
 curing the mind1 and preventing it from
 being disordered4  ,whereas the        
,peripatetics bring a great many things 
to promote the cure of  it1 but have no 
regard to their thorny partitions and   
definitions4--,my  question1 then1 was1 
whether ,i should instantly unfold the  

sails of my  eloquence1 or be content   
for a while to make less way with the   
oars of  logic8    ,a4 ,let it be so2   
for by the employment of both these     
means the subject  of our inquiry will  
be more thoroughly discussed4    ,m4 ,it
 is certainly the better way2 and should
 anything be too obscure1  you may      
examine that afterwards4    ,a4 ,i will 
do so2 but those very obscure points1   
you will1 as usual1  deliver with more  
clearness than the ,greeks4    ,m4 ,i   
will indeed endeavour to do so2 but it  
well requires great  attention1 lest1 by
 losing one word1 the whole should      
escape you4 ,what the  ,greeks call 1 we
 choose to name perturbations 7or       
disorders7 rather  than diseases2 in    
explaining which1 ,i shall follow1      
first1 that very old  description of    
,pythagoras1 and afterwards that of     
,plato2 for they both  divide the mind  
into two parts1 and make one of these   
partake of reason1  and the other they  
represent without it4 ,in that which    

partakes of reason  they place          
tranquillity1 that is to say1 a placid  
and undisturbed  constancy2 to the other
 they assign the turbid motions of anger
 and  desire1 which are contrary and    
opposite to reason4 ,let this1 then1 be 
our  principle1 the spring of all our   
reasonings4 ,but notwithstanding1 ,i    
shall  use the partitions and           
definitions of the ,stoics in describing
 these  perturbations2 who seem to me to
 have shown very great acuteness on this
  question4    ,,vi4 ,zeno's definition1
 then1 is this3 8a perturbation0 7which 
he calls a  7 8is a commotion of the    
mind repugnant to reason1 and against   
nature40 ,some of them define it even   
more briefly1 saying that a             
perturbation is a somewhat too vehement 
appetite2 but by too vehement they  mean
 an appetite that recedes further from  
the constancy of nature4 ,but  they     
would have the divisions of             
perturbations to arise from two imagined
  goods1 and from two imagined evils2   

and thus they become four3 from the     
good proceed lust and joy--joy having   
reference to some present good1 and     
lust to some future one4 ,they suppose  
fear and grief to proceed from  evils3  
fear from something future1--grief from 
something present2 for  whatever things 
are dreaded as approaching1 always      
occasion grief when  present4 ,but joy  
and lust depend on the opinion of good2 
as lust1 being  inflamed and provoked1  
is carried on eagerly towards what has  
the  appearance of good2 and joy is     
transported and exults on obtaining what
  was desired3 for we naturally pursue  
those things that have the appearance   
of good1 and avoid the contrary4        
,wherefore1 as soon as anything that has
  the appearance of good presents       
itself1 nature incites us to endeavour  
to  obtain it4 ,now1 where this strong  
desire is consistent and founded on     
prudence1 it is by the ,stoics called 1 
and the name which we give  it is       
volition2 and this they allow to none   

but their wise man1 and define  it thus3
 ,volition is a reasonable desire2 but  
whatever is incited too  violently in   
opposition to reason1 that is a lust1 or
 an unbridled desire1  which is         
discoverable in all fools4--,and1       
therefore1 when we are affected  so as  
to be placed in any good condition1 we  
are moved in two ways2 for  when the    
mind is moved in a placid and calm      
motion1 consistent with  reason1 that is
 called joy2 but when it exults with a  
vain1 wanton  exultation1 or immoderate 
joy1 then that feeling may be called    
immoderate  ecstasy or transport1 which 
they define to be an elation of the mind
  without reason4--,and as we naturally 
desire good things1 so in like manner   
we naturally seek to avoid what is evil2
 and this avoidance of which1 if        
conducted in accordance with reason1 is 
called caution2 and this the wise  man  
alone is supposed to have3 but that     
caution which is not under the  guidance
 of reason1 but is attended with a base 

and low dejection1 is  called           
fear4--,fear is1 therefore1 caution     
destitute of reason4 ,but a wise  man is
 not affected by any present evil2 while
 the grief of a fool  proceeds from     
being affected with an imaginary evil1  
by which his mind is  contracted and    
sunk1 since it is not under the dominion
 of reason4 ,this1  then1 is the first  
definition1 which makes grief to consist
 in a shrinking  of the mind1 contrary  
to the dictates of reason4 ,thus1 there 
are four  perturbations1 and but three  
calm rational emotions2 for grief has no
  exact opposite4    ,,vii4 ,but they   
insist upon it that all perturbations   
depend on opinion and  judgment2        
therefore they define them more         
strictly1 in order not only the  better 
to show how blameable they are1 but to  
discover how much they are  in our      
power4 ,grief1 then is a recent opinion 
of some present evil1 in  which it seems
 to be right that the mind should shrink
 and be dejected4  ,joy is a recent     

opinion of a present good1 in which it  
seems to be right  that the mind should 
be elated4 ,fear is an opinion of an    
impending evil1  which we apprehend will
 be intolerable4 ,lust is an opinion of 
a good to  come1 which would be of      
advantage were it already come1 and     
present with  us4 ,but however ,i have  
named the judgments and opinions of     
perturbations1  their meaning is1 not   
that merely the perturbations consist in
 them1 but  that the effects likewise of
 these perturbations do so2 as grief    
occasions  a kind of painful pricking1  
and fear engenders a recoil or sudden   
abandonment of the mind2 joy gives rise 
to a profuse mirth1 while lust is  the  
parent of an unbridled habit of         
coveting4 ,but that imagination1 which  
,i have included in all the above       
definitions1 they would have to consist 
in assenting without warrantable        
grounds4 ,now1 every perturbation has   
many  subordinate parts annexed to it of
 the same kind4 ,grief is attended with 

enviousness 7invidentia7--,i use that   
word for instruction sake1 though it  is
 not so common2 because envy 7invidia7  
takes in not only the person  who       
envies1 but the person too who is       
envied2--emulation1 detraction1 pity1   
vexation1 mourning1 sadness1            
tribulation1 sorrow1 lamentation1       
solicitude1  disquiet of mind1 pain1    
despair1 and many other similar         
feelings1 are so  too4 ,under fear are  
comprehended sloth1 shame1 terror1      
cowardice1  fainting1 confusion1        
astonishment4--,in pleasure they        
comprehend  malevolence1 that is pleased
 at another's misfortune1 delight1      
boastfulness1 and the like4 ,to lust    
they associate anger1 fury1 hatred1     
enmity1 discord1 wants1 desire1 and     
other feelings of that kind4    ,but    
they define these in this manner3       
,,viii4 ,enviousness 7invidentia71 they 
say1 is a grief arising from the        
prosperous circumstances of another1    
which are in no degree injurious to  the

 person who envies3 for where any one   
grieves at the prosperity of  another1  
by which he is injured1 such a one is   
not properly said to  envy1--as when    
,agamemnon grieves at ,hector's success2
 but where any one1  who is in no way   
hurt by the prosperity of another1 is in
 pain at his  success1 such an one      
envies indeed4 ,now the name emulation  
is taken in a  double sense1 so that the
 same word may stand for praise and     
dispraise3  for the imitation of virtue 
is called emulation--7however1 that     
sense of it  ,i shall have no occasion  
for here1 for that carries praise with  
it72--but  emulation is also a term     
applied to grief at another's enjoying  
what ,i  desired to have1 and am        
without4 ,detraction 7and ,i mean by    
that1 jealousy7  is a grief even at     
another's enjoying what ,i had a great  
inclination for4  ,pity is a grief at   
the misery of another who suffers       
wrongfully2 for no  one is moved by pity
 at the punishment of a parricide1 or of

 a betrayer of  his country4 ,vexation  
is a pressing grief4 ,mourning is a     
grief at the  bitter death of one who   
was dear to you4 ,sadness is a grief    
attended with  tears4 ,tribulation is a 
painful grief4 ,sorrow1 an excruciating 
grief4  ,lamentation1 a grief where we  
loudly bewail ourselves4 ,solicitude1 a 
pensive grief4 ,trouble1 a continued    
grief4 ,affliction1 a grief that        
harasses the body4 ,despair1 a grief    
that excludes all hope of better  things
 to come4 ,but those feelings which are 
included under fear1 they  define       
thus3--,there is sloth1 which is a dread
 of some ensuing labour3  shame and     
terror1 which affect the body2 hence    
blushing attends shame2 a  paleness1 and
 tremor1 and chattering of the teeth1   
attend terror3  cowardice1 which is an  
apprehension of some approaching evil3  
dread1 a  fear that unhinges the mind2  
whence comes that line of ,ennius1--    
,then dread discharged all wisdom from  
my mind3      fainting is the associate 

and constant attendant on dread3        
confusion1 a  fear that drives away all 
thought3 alarm1 a continued fear4       
,,ix4 ,the different species into which 
they divide pleasure come under this    
description2 so that malevolence is a   
pleasure in the misfortunes of  another1
 without any advantage to yourself3     
delight1 a pleasure that  soothes the   
mind by agreeable impressions on the    
ear4 ,what is said of the  ear1 may be  
applied to the sight1 to the touch1     
smell1 and taste4 ,all  feelings of this
 kind are a sort of melting pleasure    
that dissolves the  mind4 ,boastfulness 
is a pleasure that consists in making an
 appearance1  and setting off yourself  
with insolence4--,the subordinate       
species of lust  they define in this    
manner4 ,anger is a lust of punishing   
any one who1 as  we imagine1 has injured
 us without cause4 ,heat is anger just  
forming and  beginning to exist1 which  
the ,greeks call 4 ,hatred is a settled 
anger4 ,enmity is anger waiting for an  

opportunity of revenge4 ,discord is a   
sharper anger conceived deeply in the   
mind and heart4 ,want1 an insatiable    
lust4 ,regret is when one eagerly wishes
 to see a person who is absent4 ,now    
here they have a distinction2 so that   
with them regret is a lust conceived  on
 hearing of certain things reported of  
some one1 or of many1 which the  ,greeks
 call 1 or predicaments2 as that they   
are in possession  of riches and        
honours3 but want is a lust for those   
very honours and  riches4--,but these   
definers make intemperance the fountain 
of all these  perturbations2 which is an
 absolute revolt from the mind and right
 reason3  a state so averse to all rules
 of reason1 that the appetites of the   
mind  can by no means be governed and   
restrained4 ,as1 therefore1 temperance  
appeases these desires1 making them obey
 right reason1 and maintains the        
well-weighed judgments of the mind2 so  
intemperance1 which is in  opposition to
 this1 inflames1 confounds1 and puts    

every state of the mind  into a violent 
motion4 ,thus1 grief and fear1 and every
 other perturbation  of the mind1 have  
their rise from intemperance4    ,x4    
,just as distempers and sickness are    
bred in the body from the  corruption of
 the blood1 and the too great abundance 
of phlegm and bile2  so the mind is     
deprived of its health1 and disordered  
with sickness1 from  a confusion of     
depraved opinions1 that are in          
opposition to one another4  ,from these 
perturbations arise1 first1 diseases1   
which they call 2  and also those       
feelings which are in opposition to     
these diseases1 and  which admit certain
 faulty distastes or loathings2 then    
come sicknesses1  which are called  by  
the ,stoics2 and these two have their   
opposite aversions4 ,here the ,stoics1  
especially ,chrysippus1 give  themselves
 unnecessary trouble to show the analogy
 which the diseases of  the mind have to
 those of the body3 but1 overlooking all
 that they say as  of little            

consequence1 ,i shall treat only of the 
thing itself4 ,let us then  understand  
perturbation to imply a restlessness    
from the variety and  confusion of      
contradictory opinions2 and that when   
this heat and  disturbance of the mind  
is of any standing1 and has taken up its
  residence1 as it were1 in the veins   
and marrow1 then commence diseases and  
sickness1 and those aversions which are 
in opposition to these diseases  and    
sicknesses4    ,,xi4 ,what ,i say here  
may be distinguished in thought1 though 
they are in  fact the same2 inasmuch as 
they both have their rise from lust and 
joy4  ,for should money be the object of
 our desire1 and should we not instantly
  apply to reason1 as if it were a kind 
of ,socratic medicine to heal this      
desire1 the evil glides into our veins1 
and cleaves to our bowels1 and  from    
thence proceeds a distemper or sickness1
 which1 when it is of any  continuance1 
is incurable1 and the name of this      
disease is covetousness4  ,it is the    

same with other diseases2 as the desire 
of glory1 a passion for  women1 to which
 the ,greeks give the name of 2 and thus
 all other  diseases and sicknesses are 
generated4 ,but those feelings1 which   
are the  contrary of these1 are supposed
 to have fear for their foundation1 as a
  hatred of women1 such as is displayed 
in the ,woman-hater of ,atilius3 or  the
 hatred of the whole human species1 as  
,timon is reported to have done1  whom  
they called the ,misanthrope4 ,of the   
same kind is inhospitality2 and  all    
these diseases proceed from a certain   
dread of such things as they  hate and  
avoid4 ,but they define sickness of mind
 to be an overweening  opinion1 and that
 fixed and deeply implanted in the      
heart1 of something as  very desirable1 
which is by no means so4 ,what proceeds 
from aversion1 they  define thus3 a     
vehement idea of something to be        
avoided1 deeply implanted1  and inherent
 in our minds1 when there is no reason  
for avoiding it2 and  this kind of      

opinion is a deliberate belief that one 
understands things of  which one is     
wholly ignorant4 ,now1 sickness of the  
mind has all these  subordinate         
divisions1 avarice1 ambition1 fondness  
for women1 obstinacy1  gluttony1        
drunkenness1 covetousness1 and other    
similar vices4 ,but avarice  is a       
violent opinion about money1 as if it   
were vehemently to be desired  and      
sought after1 which opinion is deeply   
implanted and inherent in our  minds2   
and the definition of all the other     
similar feelings resembles  these4 ,but 
the definitions of aversions are of this
 sort2 inhospitality is  a vehement     
opinion1 deeply implanted and inherent  
in your mind1 that you  should avoid a  
stranger4 ,thus too the hatred of women1
 like that felt by  ,hippolytus1 is     
defined1 and the hatred of the human    
species like that  displayed by ,timon4 
,,xii4 ,but to come to the analogy of   
the state of body and mind1 which ,i    
shall sometimes make use of1 though more

 sparingly than the ,stoics3 some  men  
are more inclined to particular         
disorders than others4 ,and1 therefore1 
we say1 that some people are rheumatic1 
others dropsical1 not because they  are 
so at present1 but because they are     
often so3 some are inclined to  fear1   
others to some other perturbation4 ,thus
 in some there is a continual  anxiety1 
owing to which they are anxious2 in some
 a hastiness of temper1  which differs  
from anger1 as anxiety differs from     
anguish3 for all are not  anxious who   
are sometimes vexed2 nor are they who   
are anxious always  uneasy in that      
manner3 as there is a difference betwixt
 being drunk1 and  drunkenness2 and it  
is one thing to be a lover1 another to  
be given to  women4 ,and this           
disposition of particular people to     
particular disorders  is very common3   
for it relates to all perturbations2 it 
appears in many  vices1 though it has no
 name3 some are therefore said to be    
envious1  malevolent1 spiteful1 fearful1

 pitiful1 from a propensity to those    
perturbations1 not from their being     
always carried away by them4 ,now this  
propensity to these particular disorders
 may be called a sickness1 from  analogy
 with the body2 meaning1 that is to say1
 nothing more than a  propensity towards
 sickness4 ,but with regard to whatever 
is good1 as some  are more inclined to  
different good qualities than others1 we
 may call  this a facility or tendency3 
this tendency to evil is a proclivity or
  inclination to falling3 but where     
anything is neither good nor bad1 it may
  have the former name4    ,,xiii4 ,even
 as there may be1 with respect to the   
body1 a disease1 a  sickness1 and a     
defect2 so it is with the mind4 ,they   
call that a disease  where the whole    
body is corrupted3 they call that       
sickness1 where a  disease is attended  
with a weakness3 and that a defect1     
where the parts of  the body are not    
well compacted together2 from whence it 
follows1 that the  members are          

mis-shapen1 crooked1 and deformed4 ,so  
that these two1 a  disease and sickness1
 proceed from a violent concussion and  
perturbation  of the health of the whole
 body2 but a defect discovers itself1   
even when  the body is in perfect       
health4 ,but a disease of the mind is   
distinguishable only in thought from a  
sickness4 ,but a viciousness is a  habit
 or affection discordant and            
inconsistent with itself through life4  
,thus it happens1 that in the one case a
 disease and sickness may arise  from a 
corruption of opinions2 in the other    
case the consequence may be  inconstancy
 and inconsistency4 ,for every vice of  
the mind does not imply a  disunion of  
parts2 as is the case with those who are
 not far from being  wise men3 with them
 there is that affection which is       
inconsistent with  itself whilst it is  
foolish1 but it is not distorted1 nor   
depraved4 ,but  diseases and sicknesses 
are parts of viciousness3 but it is a   
question  whether perturbations are     

parts of the same3 for vices are        
permanent  affections3 perturbations are
 such as are restless2 so that they     
cannot be  parts of permanent ones4 ,as 
there is some analogy between the nature
 of  the body and mind in evil1 so is   
there in good3 for the distinctions of  
the body are beauty1 strength1 health1  
firmness1 quickness of motion2 the  same
 may be said of the mind4 ,the body is  
said to be in a good state1 when  all   
those things on which health depends are
 consistent3 the same may be  said of   
the mind1 when its judgments and        
opinions are not at variance with  one  
another4 ,and this union is the virtue  
of the mind3 which1 according to  some  
people1 is temperance itself2 others    
make it consist in an obedience  to the 
precepts of temperance1 and a compliance
 with them1 not allowing it  to be any  
distinct species of itself3 but be it   
one or the other1 it is to  be found    
only in a wise man4 ,but there is a     
certain soundness of mind1  which even a

 fool may have1 when the perturbation of
 his mind is removed  by the care and   
management of his physicians4 ,and1 as  
what is called  beauty arises from an   
exact proportion of the limbs1 together 
with a  certain sweetness of complexion1
 so the beauty of the mind consists in  
an  equality and constancy of opinions  
and judgments1 joined to a certain      
firmness and stability1 pursuing virtue1
 or containing within itself the  very  
essence of virtue4 ,besides1 we give the
 very same names to the  faculties of   
the mind1 as we do to the powers of the 
body1 the nerves1 and  other powers of  
action4 ,thus the velocity of the body  
is called swiftness3  a praise which we 
ascribe to the mind1 from its running   
over in its  thoughts so many things in 
so short a time4    ,,xiv4 ,herein      
indeed the mind and body are unlike3    
that though the mind when  in perfect   
health may be visited by sickness1 as   
the body may1 yet the  body may be      
disordered without our fault1 the mind  

cannot4 ,for all the  disorders and     
perturbations of the mind proceed from a
 neglect of reason2  these disorders1   
therefore1 are confined to men2 the     
beasts are not  subject to such         
perturbations1 though they act sometimes
 as if they had  reason4 ,there is a    
difference1 too1 betwixt ingenious and  
dull men2 the  ingenious1 like the      
,corinthian brass1 which is long before 
it receives  rust1 are longer before    
they fall into these perturbations1 and 
are  recovered sooner3 the case is      
different with the dull4 ,nor does the  
mind  of an ingenious man fall into     
every kind of perturbation1 for it never
  yields to any that are brutish and    
savage3 and some of their perturbations 
have at first even the appearance of    
humanity1 as mercy1 grief1 and fear4    
,but the sicknesses and diseases of the 
mind are thought to be harder to        
eradicate1 than those leading vices     
which are in opposition to virtues3  for
 vices may be removed1 though the       

diseases of the mind should continue1   
which diseases are not cured with that  
expedition with which vices are         
removed4 ,i have now acquainted you with
 the arguments which the ,stoics put    
forth with such exactness3 which they   
call logic1 from their close  arguing2  
and since my discourse has got clear of 
these rocks1 ,i will  proceed with the  
remainder of it1 provided ,i have been  
sufficiently clear  in what ,i have     
already said1 considering the obscurity 
of the subject ,i  have treated4    ,a4 
,clear enough2 but should there be      
occasion for a more exact inquiry1  ,i  
shall take another opportunity of asking
 you3 ,i expect you now to hoist  your  
sails as you just now called them1 and  
proceed on your course4    ,,xv4 ,m4    
,since ,i have spoken before of virtue  
in other places1 and shall  often have  
occasion to speak again 7for a great    
many questions that relate  to life and 
manners arise from the spring of        
virtue72 and since1 as ,i say1  virtue  

consists in a settled and uniform       
affection of mind1 making those  persons
 praiseworthy who are possessed of her2 
she herself also1  independent of       
anything else1 without regard to any    
advantage1 must be  praiseworthy2 for   
from her proceed good inclinations1     
opinions1 actions1  and the whole of    
right reason2 though virtue may be      
defined in few words  to be right reason
 itself4 ,the opposite to this is       
viciousness 7for so ,i  choose to       
translate what the ,greeks call 1 rather
 than by  perverseness2 for perverseness
 is the name of a particular vice2 but  
viciousness includes all71 from whence  
arise those perturbations1 which1  as ,i
 just now said1 are turbid and violent  
motions of the mind1 repugnant  to      
reason1 and enemies in a high degree to 
the peace of the mind1 and a  tranquil  
life3 for they introduce piercing and   
anxious cares1 and afflict  and         
debilitate the mind through fear2 they  
violently inflame our hearts  with      

exaggerated appetite2 which is in       
reality an impotence of mind1  utterly  
irreconcilable with temperance and      
moderation1 which we sometimes  call    
desire1 and sometimes lust2 and which1  
should it even attain the  object of its
 wishes1 immediately becomes so elated1 
that it loses all its  resolution1 and  
knows not what to pursue2 so that he was
 in the right who  said1 8that          
exaggerated pleasure was the very       
greatest of mistakes40  ,virtue then    
alone can effect the cure of these      
evils4    ,,xvi4 ,for what is not only  
more miserable1 but more base and       
sordid1 than a  man afflicted1 weakened1
 and oppressed with grief8 ,and little  
short of  this misery is one who dreads 
some approaching evil1 and who1 through 
faintheartedness1 is under continual    
suspense4 ,the poets1 to express the    
greatness of this evil1 imagine a stone 
to hang over the head of ,tantalus1  as 
a punishment for his wickedness1 his    
pride1 and his boasting4 ,and this  is  

the common punishment of folly2 for     
there hangs over the head of every  one 
whose mind revolts from reason some     
similar fear4 ,and as these             
perturbations of the mind1 grief and    
fear1 are of a most wasting nature2  so 
those two others1 though of a more merry
 cast1 7,i mean lust1 which is  always  
coveting something with eagerness1 and  
empty mirth1 which is an  exulting joy17
 differ very little from madness4 ,hence
 you may understand  what sort of person
 he is whom we call at one time         
moderate1 at another  modest or         
temperate1 at another constant and      
virtuous2 while sometimes we  include   
all these names in the word frugality1  
as the crown of all4 ,for if  that word 
did not include all virtues1 it would   
never have been proverbial  to say1 that
 a frugal man does everything rightly2  
but when the ,stoics  apply this saying 
to their wise man1 they seem to exalt   
him too much1 and  to speak of him with 
too much admiration4    ,,xvii4         

,whoever1 then1 through moderation and  
constancy1 is at rest in his  mind1 and 
in calm possession of himself1 so as    
neither to pine with care1  nor be      
dejected with fear1 nor to be inflamed  
with desire1 coveting  something        
greedily1 nor relaxed by extravagant    
mirth1--such a man is that  identical   
wise man whom we are inquiring for1 he  
is the happy man3 to whom  nothing in   
this life seems intolerable enough to   
depress him2 nothing  exquisite enough  
to transport him unduly4 ,for what is   
there in this life  that can appear     
great to him1 who has acquainted himself
 with eternity1  and the utmost extent  
of the universe8 ,for what is there in  
human  knowledge1 or the short span of  
this life1 that can appear great to a   
wise  man8 whose mind is always so upon 
its guard1 that nothing can befal him   
which is unforeseen1 nothing which is   
unexpected1 nothing1 in short1 which  is
 new4 ,such a man takes so exact a      
survey on all sides of him1 that he     

always knows the proper place and spot  
to live in free from all the  troubles  
and annoyances of life1 and encounters  
every accident that  fortune can bring  
upon him with a becoming calmness4      
,whoever conducts  himself in this      
manner1 will be free from grief1 and    
from every other  perturbation3 and a   
mind free from these feelings renders   
men completely  happy3 whereas a mind   
disordered and drawn off from right and 
unerring  reason1 loses at once1 not    
only its resolution1 but its            
health4--,therefore  the thoughts and   
declarations of the ,peripatetics are   
soft and effeminate1  for they say that 
the mind must necessarily be agitated1  
but at the same  time they lay down     
certain bounds beyond which that        
agitation is not to  proceed4 ,and do   
you set bounds to vice8 or is it novice 
to disobey reason8  does not reason     
sufficiently declare1 that there is no  
real good which you  should desire too  
ardently1 or the possession of which you

 should allow to  transport you3 and    
that there is no evil that should be    
able to overwhelm  you1 or the suspicion
 of which should distract you8 and that 
all these  things assume too melancholy 
or too cheerful an appearance through   
our own  error8 ,but if fools find this 
error lessened by time1 so that1 though 
the  cause remains the same1 they are   
not affected in the same manner1 after  
some time1 as they were at first2 why   
surely a wise man ought not to be       
influenced at all by it4 ,but what are  
those degrees by which we are to  limit 
it8 ,let us fix these degrees in grief1 
a difficult subject1 and one  much      
canvassed4--,fannius writes that ,p4    
,rutilius took it much to heart1  that  
his brother was refused the consulship3 
but he seems to have been too  much     
affected by this disappointment2 for it 
was the occasion of his  death3 he      
ought1 therefore1 to have borne it with 
more moderation4 ,but let  us suppose1  
that whilst he was bearing this with    

moderation1 the death of  his children  
had intervened2 here would have started 
a fresh grief1 which1  admitting it to  
be moderate in itself1 yet still must   
have been a great  addition to the      
other4 ,now to these let us add some    
acute pains of body1  the loss of his   
fortune1 blindness1 banishment2         
supposing1 then1 each  separate         
misfortune to occasion a separate       
additional grief1 the whole  would be   
too great to be supportable4    ,,xviii4
 ,the man who attempts to set bounds to 
vice1 acts like one who  should throw   
himself headlong from ,leucate1         
persuaded that he could stop  himself   
whenever he pleased4 ,now1 as that is   
impossible1 so a perturbed  and         
disordered mind cannot restrain itself1 
and stop where it pleases4  ,certainly  
whatever is bad in its increase1 is bad 
in its birth3 now grief1  and all other 
perturbations1 are doubtless baneful in 
their progress1 and  have therefore no  
small share of evil at the beginning2   

for they go on of  themselves when once 
they depart from reason1 for every      
weakness is  self-indulgent1 and        
indiscreetly launches out1 and does not 
know where to  stop4 ,so that it makes  
no difference whether you approve of    
moderate  perturbations of mind1 or of  
moderate injustice1 moderate cowardice1 
and  moderate intemperance4 ,for whoever
 prescribes bounds to vice1 admits a    
part of it1 which1 as it is odious of   
itself1 becomes the more so as it       
stands on slippery ground1 and being    
once set forward1 glides on headlong1   
and cannot by any means be stopped4     
,,xix4 ,why should ,i say more8 ,why    
should ,i add that the ,peripatetics say
  that these perturbations1 which we    
insist upon it should be extirpated1    
are not only natural1 but were given to 
men by nature for a good purpose8  ,they
 usually talk in this manner4 ,in the   
first place1 they say much in  praise of
 anger2 they call it the whetstone of   
courage1 and they say that  angry men   

exert themselves most against an enemy  
or against a bad citizen3  that those   
reasons are of little weight which are  
the motives of men who  think thus1     
as1--,it is a just war1 it becomes us to
 fight for our laws1 our  liberties1 our
 country2 they will allow no force to   
these arguments unless  our courage is  
warmed by anger4--,nor do they confine  
their argument to  warriors3 but their  
opinion is1 that no one can issue any   
rigid commands  without some bitterness 
and anger4 ,in short1 they have no      
notion of an  orator either accusing or 
even defending a client1 without he is  
spurred  on by anger4 ,and though this  
anger should not be real1 still they    
think  his words and gestures ought to  
wear the appearance of it1 so that the  
action of the orator may excite the     
anger of his hearer4 ,and they deny     
that any man has ever been seen1 who    
does not know what it is to be angry3   
and they name what we call lenity1 by   
the bad appellation of indolence3  nor  

do they commend only this lust1 7for    
anger is1 as ,i defined it above1  the  
lust of revenge17 but they maintain that
 kind of lust or desire to be  given us 
by nature for very good purposes3 saying
 that no one can execute  anything well 
but what he is in earnest about4        
,themistocles used to walk  in the      
public places in the night1 because he  
could not sleep3 and when  asked the    
reason1 his answer was1 that ,miltiades'
 trophies kept him awake4  ,who has not 
heard how ,demosthenes used to watch2   
who said that it gave him  pain1 if any 
mechanic was up in a morning at his work
 before him8 ,lastly1  they urge that   
some of the greatest philosophers would 
never have made  that progress in their 
studies1 without some ardent desire     
spurring them  on4--,we are informed    
that ,pythagoras1 ,democritus1 and      
,plato1 visited the  remotest parts of  
the world2 for they thought that they   
ought to go  whereever anything was to  
be learned4 ,now it is not conceivable  

that these  things could be effected by 
anything but by the greatest ardour of  
mind4    ,,xx4 ,they say that even      
grief1 which we have already said ought 
to be  avoided as a monstrous and fierce
 beast1 was appointed by nature1 not    
without some good purpose3 in order that
 men should lament when they had        
committed a fault1 well knowing they had
 exposed themselves to correction1      
rebuke1 and ignominy4 ,for they think   
that those who can bear ignominy and    
infamy without pain1 have acquired a    
complete impunity for all sorts of      
crimes3 for with them1 reproach is a    
stronger check than conscience4 ,from   
whence we have that scene in ,afranius1 
borrowed from common life2 for when  the
 abandoned son saith1 ,wretched that ,i 
am6 the severe father replies1          
,let him but grieve1 no matter what the 
cause4      ,and they say the other     
divisions of sorrow have their use2 that
 pity  incites us to hasten to the      
assistance of others1 and to alleviate  

the  calamities of men who have         
undeservedly fallen into them3 that even
 envy  and detraction are not without   
their use2 as when a man sees that      
another  person has attained what he    
cannot1 or observes another to be       
equally  successful with himself3 that  
he who should take away fear1 would take
  away all industry in life2 which those
 men exert in the greatest degree  who  
are afraid of the laws and of the       
magistrates1 who dread poverty1         
ignominy1 death1 and pain4 ,but while   
they argue thus1 they allow indeed of   
these feelings being retrenched1 though 
they deny that they either can1 or      
should be plucked up by the roots3 so   
that their opinion is that  mediocrity  
is best in everything4 ,when they reason
 in this manner1 what  think you8 is    
what they say worth attending to or not8
    ,a4 ,i think it is2 ,i wait1        
therefore1 to hear what you will say in 
reply  to them4    ,,xxi4 ,m4 ,perhaps  
,i may find something to say1--but ,i   

will make this  observation first3 do   
you take notice with what modesty the   
,academics  behave themselves8 for they 
speak plainly to the purpose4 ,the      
,peripatetics  are answered by the      
,stoics2 they have my leave to fight it 
out2 who think  myself no otherwise     
concerned than to inquire for what may  
seem to be most  probable4 ,our present 
business is1 then1 to see if we can meet
 with  anything in this question which  
is the probable1 for beyond such        
approximation to truth as that human    
nature cannot proceed4 ,the definition  
of a perturbation1 as ,zeno1 ,i think1  
has rightly determined it1 is thus3     
,that a perturbation is a commotion of  
the mind against nature1 in  opposition 
to right reason2 or more briefly thus1  
that a perturbation is a  somewhat too  
vehement appetite2 and when he says     
somewhat too vehement1 he  means such as
 is at a greater distance from the      
constant course of nature4  ,what can ,i
 say to these definitions8 the greater  

part of them we have from  those who    
dispute with sagacity and acuteness3    
some of them expressions1  indeed1 such 
as the 8ardours of the mind10 and 8the  
whetstones of virtue10  savouring of the
 pomp of rhetoricians4 ,as to the       
question1 if a brave man  can maintain  
his courage without becoming angry2 it  
may be questioned with  regard to the   
gladiators3 though we often observe much
 resolution even in  them2 they meet1   
converse1 they make objections and      
demands1 they agree  about terms1 so    
that they seem calm rather than angry4  
,but let us admit a  man of the name of 
,placideianus1 who was one of that      
trade1 to be in such  a mind1 as        
,lucilius relates of him1          ,if  
for his blood you thirst1 the task be   
mine2      ,his laurels at my feet he   
shall resign2      ,not but ,i know1    
before ,i reach his heart1      ,first  
on myself a wound he will impart4       
,i hate the man2 enraged ,i fight1 and  
straight      ,in action we had been1   

but that ,i wait      ,till each his    
sword had fitted to his hand1      ,my  
rage ,i scarce can keep within command4 
,,xxii4 ,but we see ,ajax in ,homer     
advancing to meet ,hector in battle     
cheerfully1 without any of this         
boisterous wrath4 ,for he had no sooner 
taken up his arms1 than the first step  
which he made inspired his  associates  
with joy1 his enemies with fear3 so that
 even ,hector1 as he is  represented by 
,homer17#ih7 trembling condemned himself
 for having  challenged him to fight4   
,yet these heroes conversed together1   
calmly and  quietly1 before they        
engaged2 nor did they show any anger or 
outrageous  behaviour during the combat4
 ,nor do ,i imagine that ,torquatus1 the
 first  who obtained this surname1 was  
in a rage when he plundered the ,gaul of
 his  collar3 or that ,marcellus'       
courage at ,clastidium was only owing to
 his  anger4 ,i could almost swear1 that
 ,africanus1 with whom we are better    
acquainted1 from our recollection of him

 being more recent1 was no ways         
inflamed by anger1 when he covered      
,alienus ,pelignus with his shield1 and 
drove his sword into the enemy's breast4
 ,there may be some doubt of ,l4        
,brutus1 whether he was not influenced  
by extraordinary hatred of the  tyrant1 
so as to attack ,aruns with more than   
usual rashness2 for ,i observe  that    
they mutually killed each other in close
 fight4 ,why1 then1 do you  call in the 
assistance of anger8 would courage1     
unless it began to get  furious1 lose   
its energy8 ,what8 do you imagine that  
,hercules1 whom the  very courage which 
you would try to represent as anger     
raised to heaven1  was angry when he    
engaged the ,erymanthian boar1 or the   
,nemean lion8 or was  ,theseus in a     
passion when he seized on the horns of  
the ,marathonian bull8  ,take care how  
you make courage to depend in the least 
on rage4 ,for anger  is altogether      
irrational1 and that is not courage     
which is void of reason4    ,,xxiii4 ,we

 ought to hold all things here in       
contempt2 death is to be looked  on with
 indifference2 pains and labours must be
 considered as easily  supportable4 ,and
 when these sentiments are established  
on judgment and  conviction1 then will  
that stout and firm courage take place3 
unless you  attribute to anger whatever 
is done with vehemence1 alacrity1 and   
spirit4  ,to me1 indeed1 that very      
,scipio7#ii7 who was chief priest1 that 
favourer of  the saying of the ,stoics1 
8that no private man could be a wise    
man10 does  not seem to be angry with   
,tiberius ,gracchus1 even when he left  
the consul  in a hesitating frame of    
mind1 and1 though a private man himself1
  commanded1 with the authority of a    
consul1 that all who meant well to the  
republic should follow him4 ,i do not   
know whether ,i have done anything in   
the republic that has the appearance of 
courage2 but if ,i have1 ,i  certainly  
did not do it in wrath4 ,doth anything  
come nearer madness than  anger8 ,and   

indeed ,ennius has well defined it as   
the beginning of madness4  ,the changing
 colour1 the alteration of our voice1   
the look of our eyes1  our manner of    
fetching our breath1 the little command 
we have over our  words and actions1 how
 little do all these things indicate a  
sound mind6  ,what can make a worse     
appearance than ,homer's ,achilles1 or  
,agamemnon1  during the quarrel4 ,and as
 to ,ajax1 anger drove him into         
downright  madness1 and was the occasion
 of his death4 ,courage1 therefore1 does
 not  want the assistance of anger2 it  
is sufficiently provided1 armed1 and    
prepared of itself4 ,we may as well say 
that drunkenness1 or madness1 are  of   
service to courage1 because those who   
are mad or drunk often do a great  many 
things with unusual vehemence4 ,ajax was
 always brave1 but still he  was most   
brave when he was in that state of      
frenzy3          ,the greatest feat that
 ,ajax e'er achieved      ,was1 when his
 single arm the ,greeks relieved4       

,quitting the field2 urged on by rising 
rage1      ,forced the declining troops 
again t'engage4      ,shall we say1     
then1 that madness has its use8         
,,xxiv4 ,examine the definitions of     
courage3 you will find it does not      
require the assistance of passion4      
,courage is1 then1 an affection of mind1
  that endures all things1 being itself 
in proper subjection to the highest  of 
all laws2 or1 it may be called a firm   
maintenance of judgment in  supporting  
or repelling everything that has a      
formidable appearance1 or a  knowledge  
of what is formidable or otherwise1 and 
maintaining invariably a  stable        
judgment of all such things1 so as to   
bear them1 or despise them2  or1 in     
fewer words according to ,chrysippus3   
7for the above definitions are          
,sphrus's1 a man of the first ability as
 a layer down of definitions1 as  the   
,stoics think3 but they are all pretty  
much alike1 they give us only  common   
notions1 some one way1 and some         

another47 ,but what is ,chrysippus's    
definition8 ,fortitude1 says he1 is the 
knowledge of all things that are        
bearable3 or an affection of the mind1  
which bears and supports everything  in 
obedience to the chief law of reason1   
without fear4 ,now1 though we  should   
attack these men in the same manner as  
,carneades used to do1 ,i fear  they are
 the only real philosophers3 for which  
of these definitions is  there which    
does not explain that obscure and       
intricate notion of courage  which every
 man conceives within himself8 ,and when
 it is thus explained1  what can a      
warrior1 a commander1 or an orator1 want
 more8 and no one can  think that they  
will be unable to behave themselves     
courageously without  anger4 ,what8 do  
not even the ,stoics1 who maintain that 
all fools are mad1  make the same       
inferences8 for1 take away              
perturbations1 especially a  hastiness  
of temper1 and they will appear to talk 
very absurdly4 ,but what  they assert is

 this3 they say that all fools are mad1 
as all dunghills  stink2 not that they  
always do so1 but stir them1 and you    
will perceive  it4 ,and in like manner1 
a warm-tempered man is not always in a  
passion2  but provoke him1 and you will 
see him run mad4 ,now1 that very warlike
  anger1 which is of such service in    
war1 what is the use of it to him when  
he is at home with his wife1 children1  
and family8 ,is there1 then1  anything  
that a disturbed mind can do better than
 one which is calm and  steady8 or can  
any one be angry without a perturbation 
of mind8 ,our  people1 then1 were in the
 right1 who1 as all vices depend on our 
manners1  and nothing is worse than a   
passionate disposition1 called angry men
 the  only morose men47#ajj7    ,,xxv4  
,anger is in no wise becoming in an     
orator1 though it is not amiss to       
affect it4 ,do you imagine that ,i am   
angry when in pleading ,i use any       
extraordinary vehemence and sharpness8  
,what8 when ,i write out my speeches    

after all is over and past1 am ,i then  
angry while writing8 or do you think    
sopus was ever angry when he acted1 or  
,accius was so when he wrote8 ,those    
men1 indeed1 act very well1 but the     
orator acts better than the player1     
provided he be really an orator2 but    
then they carry it on without  passion1 
and with a composed mind4 ,but what     
wantonness is it to commend  lust8 ,you 
produce ,themistocles and ,demosthenes2 
to these you add  ,pythagoras1          
,democritus1 and ,plato4 ,what1 do you  
then call studies lust8  ,but these     
studies of the most excellent and       
admirable things1 such as  those were   
which you bring forward on all          
occasions1 ought to be composed  and    
tranquil2 and what kind of philosophers 
are they who commend grief1  than which 
nothing is more detestable8 ,afranius   
has said much to this  purpose--        
,let him but grieve1 no matter what the 
cause4      ,but he spoke this of a     
debauched and dissolute youth2 but we   

are inquiring  into the conduct of a    
constant and wise man4 ,we may even     
allow a  centurion1 or standard-bearer1 
to be angry1 or any others1 whom1 not to
  explain too far the mysteries of the  
rhetoricians1 ,i shall not mention      
here2 for to touch the passions1 where  
reason cannot be come at1 may have  its 
use2 but my inquiry1 as ,i often repeat1
 is about a wise man4    ,,xxvi4 ,but   
even envy1 detraction1 pity1 have their 
use4 ,why should you pity  rather than  
assist1 if it is in your power to do so8
 ,is it because you  cannot be liberal  
without pity8 ,we should not take       
sorrows on ourselves  upon another's    
account2 but we ought to relieve others 
of their grief if  we can4 ,but to      
detract from another's reputation1 or to
 rival him with  that vicious emulation1
 which resembles an enmity1 of what use 
can that  conduct be8 ,now envy implies 
being uneasy at another's good because  
one  does not enjoy it oneself2 but     
detraction is the being uneasy at       

another's  good1 merely because he      
enjoys it4 ,how can it be right that you
 should  voluntarily grieve1 rather than
 take the trouble of acquiring what you 
want to have2 for it is madness in the  
highest degree to desire to be the  only
 one that has any particular happiness4 
,but who can with correctness  speak in 
praise of a mediocrity of evils8 ,can   
any one in whom there is  lust or       
desire1 be otherwise than libidinous or 
desirous8 or can a man who  is occupied 
by anger avoid being angry8 or can one  
who is exposed to any  vexation escape  
being vexed8 or if he is under the      
influence of fear1 must  he not be      
fearful8 ,do we look1 then1 on the      
libidinous1 the angry1 the  anxious1 and
 the timid man1 as persons of wisdom1 of
 excellence8 of which  ,i could speak   
very copiously and diffusely1 but ,i    
wish to be as concise as  possible4 ,and
 so ,i will merely say that wisdom is an
 acquaintance with all  divine and human
 affairs1 and a knowledge of the cause  

of everything4  ,hence it is1 that it   
imitates what is divine1 and looks upon 
all human  concerns as inferior to      
virtue4 ,did you1 then1 say that it was 
your  opinion that such a man was as    
naturally liable to perturbation as the 
sea  is exposed to winds8 ,what is there
 that can discompose such gravity and   
constancy8 ,anything sudden or          
unforeseen8 ,how can anything of this   
kind  befal one1 to whom nothing is     
sudden and unforeseen that can happen to
  man8 ,now1 as to their saying that    
redundancies should be pared off1 and   
only what is natural remain2 what1 ,i   
pray you1 can be natural1 which may  be 
too exuberant8    ,,xxvii4 ,all these   
assertions proceed from the roots of    
errors1 which must  be entirely plucked 
up and destroyed1 not pared and         
amputated4 ,but as ,i  suspect that your
 inquiry is not so much respecting the  
wise man as  concerning yourself1 7for  
you allow that he is free from all      
perturbations1 and you would willingly  

be so too yourself17 let us see  what   
remedies there are which may be applied 
by philosophy to the diseases  of the   
mind4 ,there is certainly some remedy2  
nor has nature been so unkind  to the   
human race1 as to have discovered so    
many things salutary to the  body1 and  
none which are medicinal to the mind4   
,she has even been kinder  to the mind  
than to the body2 inasmuch as you must  
seek abroad for the  assistance which   
the body requires2 while the mind has   
all that it  requires within itself4    
,but in proportion as the excellency of 
the mind is  of a higher and more divine
 nature1 the more diligence does it     
require2  and therefore reason1 when it 
is well applied1 discovers what is best1
 but  when it is neglected it becomes   
involved in many errors4 ,i shall apply1
  then1 all my discourse to you2 for    
though you pretend to be inquiring      
about the wise man1 your inquiry may    
possibly be about yourself4 ,various1   
then1 are the cures of those            

perturbations which ,i have expounded1  
for  every disorder is not to be        
appeased the same way2--one medicine    
must be  applied to the man who mourns1 
another to the pitiful1 another to the  
person who envies1 for there is this    
difference to be maintained in all  the 
four perturbations2 we are to consider  
whether our discourse had  better be    
directed to perturbations in general1   
which are a contempt of  reason1 or a   
somewhat too vehement appetite2 or      
whether it would be better  applied to  
particular descriptions1 as1 for        
instance1 to fear1 lust1 and  the rest1 
and whether it appears preferable to    
endeavour to remove that  which has     
occasioned the grief1 or rather to      
attempt wholly to eradicate  every kind 
of grief4 ,as1 should any one grieve    
that he is poor1 the  question is1 would
 you maintain poverty to be no evil1 or 
would you  contend that a man ought not 
to grieve at anything8 ,certainly this  
last is  the best course2 for should you

 not convince him with regard to        
poverty1  you must allow him to grieve2 
but if you remove grief by particular   
arguments1 such as ,i used yesterday1   
the evil of poverty is in some manner   
removed4    ,,xxviii4 ,but any          
perturbation of the mind of this sort   
may be1 as it were1  wiped away by this 
method of appeasing the mind1 if you    
succeed in showing  that there is no    
good in that which has given rise to joy
 and lust1 nor  any evil in that which  
has occasioned fear or grief4 ,but      
certainly the  most effectual cure is to
 be achieved by showing that all        
perturbations  are of themselves        
vicious1 and have nothing natural or    
necessary in them4  ,as we see grief    
itself is easily softened when we charge
 those who grieve  with weakness and an 
effeminate mind2 or when we commend the 
gravity and  constancy of those who bear
 calmly whatever befals them here1 as   
accidents  to which all men are liable2 
and1 indeed1 this is generally the      

feeling of  those who look on these as  
real evils1 but yet think they should be
 borne  with resignation4 ,one imagines 
pleasure to be a good1 another money2   
and  yet the one may be called off from 
intemperance1 the other from            
covetousness4 ,the other method and     
address1 which1 at the same time that   
it removes the false opinion1 withdraws 
the disorder1 has more subtilty in  it2 
but it seldom succeeds1 and is not      
applicable to vulgar minds1 for  there  
are some diseases which that medicine   
can by no means remove4 ,for1  should   
any one be uneasy because he is without 
virtue1 without courage1  destitute of a
 sense of duty1 or honesty2 his anxiety 
proceeds from a real  evil1 and yet we  
must apply another method of cure to    
him2 and such a one  as all the         
philosophers1 however they may differ   
about other things1 agree  in4 ,for they
 must necessarily agree in this1 that   
commotions of the mind  in opposition to
 right reason are vicious2 and that even

 admitting those  things to be evils1   
which occasion fear or grief1 and those 
to be goods  which provoke desire or    
joy1 yet that very commotion itself is  
vicious2  for we mean by the expressions
 magnanimous and brave1 one who is      
resolute1  sedate1 grave1 and superior  
to everything in this life3 but one who 
either  grieves1 or fears1 or covets1 or
 is transported with passion1 cannot    
come  under that denomination2 for these
 things are consistent only with those  
who look on the things of this world as 
things with which their minds are       
unequal to contend4    ,,xxix4          
,wherefore1 as ,i before said1 the      
philosophers have all one method of     
cure1 so that we need say nothing about 
what sort of thing that is which        
disturbs the mind1 but we must speak    
only concerning the perturbation        
itself4 ,thus1 first1 with regard to    
desire itself1 when the business is     
only to remove that the inquiry is not  
to be1 whether that thing be good  or   

evil which provokes lust1 but the lust  
itself is to be removed2 so that        
whether whatever is honest is the chief 
good1 or whether it consists in         
pleasure1 or in both these things       
together1 or in the other three kinds of
  goods1 yet should there be in any one 
too vehement an appetite for even       
virtue itself1 the whole discourse      
should be directed to the deterring him 
from that vehemence4 ,but human nature1 
when placed in a conspicuous point  of  
view1 gives us every argument for       
appeasing the mind1 and to make this    
the more distinct1 the laws and         
conditions of life should be explained  
in  our discourse4 ,therefore1 it was   
not without reason that ,socrates is    
reported1 when ,euripides was exhibiting
 his play called ,orestes1 to have      
repeated the first three verses of that 
tragedy--          ,what tragic story   
men can mournful tell1      ,whate'er   
from fate or from the gods befel1       
,that human nature can support----7#aja7

      ,but1 in order to persuade those  
to whom any misfortune has happened1    
that  they can and ought to bear it1 it 
is very useful to set before them an    
enumeration of other persons who have   
borne similar calamities4 ,indeed1  the 
method of appeasing grief was explained 
in my dispute of yesterday1  and in my  
book on ,consolation1 which ,i wrote in 
the midst of my own grief2  for ,i was  
not myself so wise a man as to be       
insensible to grief1 and ,i  used this1 
notwithstanding ,chrysippus's advice to 
the contrary1 who is  against applying a
 medicine to the agitations of the mind 
while they are  fresh2 but ,i did it1   
and committed a violence on nature1 that
 the  greatness of my grief might give  
way to the greatness of the medicine4   
,,xxx4 ,but fear borders upon grief1 of 
which ,i have already said enough2 but  
,i must say a little more on that4 ,now1
 as grief proceeds from what is         
present1 so does fear from future evil2 
so that some have said that fear  is a  

certain part of grief3 others have      
called fear the harbinger of  trouble1  
which1 as it were1 introduces the       
ensuing evil4 ,now1 the reasons  that   
make what is present supportable1 make  
what is to come very  contemptible2 for1
 with regard to both1 we should take    
care to do nothing  low or grovelling1  
soft or effeminate1 mean or abject4     
,but1  notwithstanding we should speak  
of the inconstancy1 imbecility1 and     
levity  of fear itself1 yet it is of    
very great service to speak             
contemptuously of  those very things of 
which we are afraid4 ,so that it fell   
out very well1  whether it was by       
accident or design1 that ,i disputed the
 first and second  day on death and     
pain1--the two things that are the most 
dreaded3 now1 if  what ,i then said was 
approved of1 we are in a great degree   
freed from  fear4 ,and this is          
sufficient1 as far as regards the       
opinion of evils4    ,,xxxi4 ,proceed we
 now to what are goods--that is to say1 

to joy and desire4  ,to me1 indeed1 one 
thing alone seems to embrace the        
question of all that  relates to the    
perturbations of the mind--the fact1    
namely1 that all  perturbations are in  
our own power2 that they are taken up   
upon opinion1  and are voluntary4 ,this 
error1 then1 must be got rid of2 this   
opinion must  be removed3 and1 as with  
regard to imagined evils1 we are to make
 them  more supportable1 so with respect
 to goods1 we are to lessen the violent 
effects of those things which are called
 great and joyous4 ,but one thing  is to
 be observed1 that equally relates both 
to good and evil3 that1  should it be   
difficult to persuade any one that none 
of those things which  disturb the mind 
are to be looked on as good or evil1 yet
 a different cure  is to be applied to  
different feelings2 and the malevolent  
person is to be  corrected by one way of
 reasoning1 the lover by another1 the   
anxious man  by another1 and the fearful
 by another3 and it would be easy for   

any one  who pursues the best approved  
method of reasoning1 with regard to good
 and  evil1 to maintain that no fool can
 be affected with joy1 as he never can  
have anything good4 ,but1 at present1 my
 discourse proceeds upon the common     
received notions4 ,let1 then1 honours1  
riches1 pleasures1 and the rest1 be  the
 very good things which they are        
imagined to be2 yet a too elevated and  
exulting joy on the possession of them  
is unbecoming2 just as though it  might 
be allowable to laugh1 to giggle would  
be indecent4 ,thus1 a mind  enlarged by 
joy is as blameable as a contraction of 
it by grief2 and eager  longing is a    
sign of as much levity in desiring as   
immoderate joy is in  possessing2 and1  
as those who are too dejected are said  
to be effeminate1  so they who are too  
elated with joy are properly called     
volatile2 and as  feeling envy is a part
 of grief1 and the being pleased with   
another's  misfortune is a kind of joy  
both these feelings are usually         

corrected by  showing the wildness and  
insensibility of them3 and as it becomes
 a man to  be cautious1 but it is       
unbecoming in him to be fearful2 so to  
be pleased  is proper1 but to be joyful 
improper4 ,i have1 in order that ,i     
might be the  better understood1        
distinguished pleasure from joy4 ,i have
 already said  above1 that a contraction
 of the mind can never be right1 but    
that an  elation of it may2 for the joy 
of ,hector in ,nvius is one thing1--    
',tis joy indeed to hear my praises sung
      ,by you1 who are the theme of     
honour's tongue3      but that of the   
character in ,trabea another3--8,the    
kind procuress1 allured  by my money1   
will observe my nod1 will watch my      
desires1 and study my  will4 ,if ,i but 
move the door with my little finger1    
instantly it flies  open2 and if        
,chrysis should unexpectedly discover   
me1 she will run with  joy to meet me1  
and throw herself into my arms40    ,now
 he will tell you how excellent he      

thinks this3--          ,not even       
fortune herself is so fortunate4        
,,xxxii4 ,any one who attends the least 
to the subject will be convinced how    
unbecoming this joy is4 ,and as they are
 very shameful who are immoderately     
delighted with the enjoyment of venereal
 pleasures1 so are they very  scandalous
 who lust vehemently after them4 ,and   
all that which is commonly  called love 
7and1 believe me1 ,i can find out no    
other name to call it by7  is of such a 
trivial nature that nothing1 ,i think1  
is to be compared to  it3 of which      
,ccilius says--          ,i hold the man
 of every sense bereaved1      ,who     
grants not ,love to be of ,gods the     
chief3      ,whose mighty power whate'er
 is good effects1      ,who gives to    
each his beauty and defects3            
,hence1 health and sickness2 wit and    
folly1 hence1      ,the ,god that love  
and hatred doth dispense6      ,an      
excellent corrector of life this same   
poetry1 which thinks that love1  the    

promoter of debauchery and vanity1      
should have a place in the council  of  
the ,gods6 ,i am speaking of comedy1    
which could not subsist at all  without 
our approving of these debaucheries4    
,but what said that chief of  the       
,argonauts in tragedy8--          ,my   
life ,i owe to honour less than love    
,what1 then1 are we to say of this love 
of ,medea8--what a train of miseries    
did it occasion6 and yet the same woman 
has the assurance to say to her  father1
 in another poet1 that she had a        
husband--          ,dearer by love than 
ever fathers were4      ,,xxxiii4       
,however1 we may allow the poets to     
trifle1 in whose fables we see  ,jupiter
 himself engaged in these debaucheries3 
but let us apply to the  masters of     
virtue1--the philosophers who deny love 
to be anything carnal2  and in this they
 differ from ,epicurus1 who1 ,i think1  
is not much mistaken4  ,for what is that
 lore of friendship8 ,how comes it that 
no one is in love  with a deformed young

 man1 or a handsome old one8 ,i am of   
opinion that  this love of men had its  
rise from the ,gymnastics of the        
,greeks1 where  these kinds of loves are
 admissible and permitted2 therefore    
,ennius spoke  well3--          ,the    
censure of this crime to those is due1  
,who naked bodies first exposed to view4
      ,now1 supposing them chaste1 which
 ,i think is hardly possible1 they are  
uneasy and distressed1 and the more so  
because they contain and refrain        
themselves4 ,but1 to pass over the love 
of women1 where nature has allowed  more
 liberty1 who can misunderstand the     
poets in their rape of ,ganymede1  or   
not apprehend what ,laius says1 and what
 he desires1 in ,euripides8  ,lastly1   
what have the principal poets and the   
most learned men published  of          
themselves in their poems and songs8    
,what doth ,alcus1 who was              
distinguished in his own republic for   
his bravery1 write on the love of  young
 men8 and as for ,anacreon's poetry1 it 

is wholly on love4 ,but ,ibycus  of     
,rhegium appears1 from his writings1 to 
have had this love stronger on  him than
 all the rest4    ,,xxxiv4 ,now we see  
that the loves of all these writers were
 entirely  libidinous4 ,there have      
arisen also some amongst us philosophers
 7and ,plato  is at the head of them1   
whom ,dicarchus blames not without      
reason71 who  have countenanced love4   
,the ,stoics in truth say1 not only that
 their wise  man may be a lover1 but    
they even define love itself as an      
endeavour to  originate friendship out  
of the appearance of beauty4 ,now1      
provided there  is any one in the nature
 of things without desire1 without care1
 without a  sigh1--such a one may be a  
lover2 for he is free from all lust3 but
 ,i have  nothing to say to him1 as it  
is lust of which ,i am now speaking4    
,but  should there be any love1--as     
there certainly is1--which1 is but      
little1 or  perhaps not at all1 short of
 madness1 such as his is in the         

,leucadia1--          ,should there be  
any ,god whose care ,i am3      it is   
incumbent on all the ,gods to see that  
he enjoys his amorous  pleasure4        
,wretch that ,i am6      ,nothing is    
more true1 and he says very             
appropriately--          ,what1 are you 
sane1 who at this rate lament8      ,he 
seems even to his friends to be out of  
his senses3 then how tragical he        
becomes6          ,thy aid1 divine      
,apollo1 ,i implore1      ,and thine1   
dread ruler of the wat'ry store6        
,oh6 all ye winds1 assist me6      ,he  
thinks that the whole world ought to    
apply itself to help his love3 he       
excludes ,venus alone as unkind to him4 
,thy aid1 ,o ,venus1 why should ,i      
invoke8      ,he thinks ,venus too much 
employed in her own lust1 to have regard
 to  anything else1 as if he himself had
 not said and committed these shameful  
things from lust4    ,,xxxv4 ,now the   
cure for one who is affected in this    
manner1 is to show1 how  light1 how     

contemptible1 how very trifling he is in
 what he desires2 how  he may turn his  
affections to another object1 or        
accomplish his desires by  some other   
means2 or else to persuade him that he  
may entirely disregard  it2 sometimes he
 is to be led away to objects of another
 kind1 to study1  business1 or other    
different engagements and concerns3 very
 often the cure  is effected by change  
of place1 as sick people1 that have not 
recovered  their strength1 are benefited
 by change of air4 ,some people think an
 old  love may be driven out by a new   
one1 as one nail drives out another3 but
  above all things the man thus         
afflicted should be advised what madness
  love is3 for of all the perturbations 
of the mind1 there is not one which  is 
more vehement2 for1 7without charging it
 with rapes1 debaucheries1  adultery1 or
 even incest1 the baseness of any of    
these being very  blameable2 not1 ,i    
say1 to mention these17 the very        
perturbation of the  mind in love is    

base of itself1 for1 to pass over all   
its acts of  downright madness1 what    
weakness do not those very things which 
are looked  upon as indifferent argue8  
,affronts and jealousies1 jars1         
squabbles1 wars1      ,then peace       
again4--,the man who seeks to fix       
,these restless feelings1 and to        
subjugate      ,them to some regular    
law1 is just as wise      ,as one who'd 
try to lay down rules by which      ,men
 should go mad47#ajb7      ,now is not  
this inconstancy and mutability of mind 
enough to deter any one  by its own     
deformity8 ,we are to demonstrate1 as   
was said of every  perturbation1 that   
there are no such feelings which do not 
consist  entirely of opinion and        
judgment1 and are not owing to          
ourselves4 ,for if  love were natural1  
all would be in love1 and always so1 and
 all love the  same object2 nor would   
one be deterred by shame1 another by    
reflection1  another by satiety4        
,,xxxvi4 ,anger1 too1 when it disturbs  

the mind any time1 leaves no room to    
doubt its being madness3 by the         
instigation of which1 we see such       
contention as this between brothers3    
,where was there ever impudence like    
thine8      ,who on thy malice ever     
could refine87#ajc7      ,you know what 
follows3 for abuses are thrown out by   
these brothers1 with  great bitterness1 
in every other verse3 so that you may   
easily know them  for the sons of       
,atreus1 of that ,atreus who invented a 
new punishment for  his brother3        
,i who his cruel heart to gall am bent1 
,some new1 unheard-of torment must      
invent4      ,now what were these       
inventions8 ,hear ,thyestes4            
,my impious brother fain would have me  
eat      ,my children1 and thus serves  
them up for meat4      ,to what length  
now will not anger go8 even as far as   
madness4 ,therefore we  say properly    
enough1 that angry men have given up    
their power1 that is1  they are out of  
the power of advice1 reason1 and        

understanding3 for these  ought to have 
power over the whole mind4 ,now you     
should put those out of  the way1 whom  
they endeavour to attack1 till they have
 recollected  themselves2 but what does 
recollection here imply1 but getting    
together  again the dispersed parts of  
their mind into their proper place8 or  
else  you must beg and entreat them1 if 
they have the means of revenge1 to defer
  it to another opportunity1 till their 
anger cools4 ,but the expression of     
cooling implies1 certainly1 that there  
was a heat raised in their minds in     
opposition to reason3 from which        
consideration that saying of ,archytas  
is  commended3 who being somewhat       
provoked at his steward1 8,how would ,i 
have  treated you10 said he1 8if ,i had 
not been in a passion80    ,,xxxvii4    
,where1 then1 are they who say that     
anger has its use8 ,can madness  be of  
any use8 ,but still it is natural4 ,can 
anything be natural that is  against    
reason8 or how is it1 if anger is       

natural1 that one person is more        
inclined to anger than another8 or that 
the lust of revenge should cease  before
 it has revenged itself8 or that any one
 should repent of what he  had done in a
 passion8 as we see that ,alexander the 
king did1 who could  scarcely keep his  
hands from himself1 when he had killed  
his favourite  ,clytus3 so great was his
 compunction6 ,now who1 that is         
acquainted with  these instances1 can   
doubt that this motion of the mind is   
altogether in  opinion and voluntary8   
for who can doubt that disorders of the 
mind1 such  as covetousness1 and a      
desire of glory1 arise from a great     
estimation of  those things1 by which   
the mind is disordered8 from whence we  
may  understand1 that every perturbation
 of the mind is founded in opinion4     
,and if boldness1 that is to say1 a firm
 assurance of mind1 is a kind of        
knowledge and serious opinion1 not      
hastily taken up3 then diffidence is a  
fear of an expected and impending evil3 

and if hope is an expectation of  good1 
fear must of course be an expectation of
 evil4 ,thus fear and other             
perturbations are evils4 ,therefore as  
constancy proceeds from knowledge1  so  
does perturbation from error4 ,now they 
who are said to be naturally  inclined  
to anger1 or to pity1 or to envy1 or to 
any feeling of this kind2  their minds  
are constitutionally1 as it were1 in bad
 health1 yet they are  curable1 as the  
disposition of ,socrates is said to have
 been2 for when  ,zopyrus1 who professed
 to know the character of every one from
 his person1  had heaped a great many   
vices on him in a public assembly1 he   
was laughed  at by others1 who could    
perceive no such vices in ,socrates2 but
 ,socrates  kept him in countenance1 by 
declaring that such vices were natural  
to him1  but that he had got the better 
of them by his reason4 ,therefore1 as   
any  one who has the appearance of the  
best constitution1 may yet appear to be 
naturally rather inclined to some       

particular disorder1 so different minds 
may be more particularly inclined to    
different diseases4 ,but as to those    
men who are said to be vicious1 not by  
nature1 but their own fault2 their      
vices proceed from wrong opinions of    
good and bad things1 so that one is     
more prone than another to different    
motions and perturbations4 ,but1 just   
as it is in the case of the body1 an    
inveterate disease is harder to be  got 
rid of than a sudden disorder2 and it is
 more easy to cure a fresh  tumour in   
the eyes1 than to remove a defluxion of 
any continuance4    ,,xxxviii4 ,but as  
the cause of perturbations is now       
discovered1 for all of  them arise from 
the judgment or opinion1 or volition1 ,i
 shall put an end  to this discourse4   
,but we ought to be assured1 since the  
boundaries of  good and evil are now    
discovered1 as far as they are          
discoverable by man1  that nothing can  
be desired of philosophy greater1 or    
more useful1 than  the discussions which

 we have held these four days4 ,for     
besides instilling  a contempt of death1
 and relieving pain so as to enable men 
to bear it2 we  have added the appeasing
 of grief1 than which there is no       
greater evil to  man4 ,for though every 
perturbation of mind is grievous1 and   
differs but  little from madness3 yet we
 are used to say of others1 when they   
are under  any perturbation1 as of fear1
 joy1 or desire1 that they are agitated 
and  disturbed2 but of those who give   
themselves up to grief1 that they are   
miserable1 afflicted1 wretched1 unhappy4
 ,so that it doth not seem to be by     
accident1 but with reason proposed by   
you1 that ,i should discuss grief1  and 
the other perturbations separately2 for 
there lies the spring and head  of all  
our miseries3 but the cure of grief1 and
 of other disorders1 is one  and the    
same1 in that they are all voluntary1   
and founded on opinion2 we  take them on
 ourselves because it seems right so to 
do4 ,philosophy  undertakes to eradicate

 this error1 as the root of all our     
evils3 let us  therefore surrender      
ourselves to be instructed by it1 and   
suffer ourselves  to be cured2 for      
whilst these evils have possession of   
us1 we not only  cannot be happy1 but   
cannot be right in our minds4 ,we must  
either deny  that reason can effect     
anything1 while1 on the other hand1     
nothing can be  done right without      
reason2 or else1 since philosophy       
depends on the  deductions of reason1 we
 must seek from her1 if we would be good
 or happy1  every help and assistance   
for living well and happily4            
,book ,v4 ,whether ,virtue ,alone ,be   
,sufficient ,for ,a ,happy ,life4       
,i4 ,this fifth day1 ,brutus1 shall put 
an end to our ,tusculan ,disputations3  
on which day we discussed your favourite
 subject4 ,for ,i perceive from that    
book which you wrote for me1 with the   
greatest accuracy1 as well as from  your
 frequent conversation1 that you are    
clearly of this opinion1 that  virtue is

 of itself sufficient for a happy life3 
and though it may be  difficult to prove
 this1 on account of the many various   
strokes of  fortune1 yet it is a truth  
of such a nature1 that we should        
endeavour to  facilitate the proof of   
it4 ,for among all the topics of        
philosophy1 there  is not one of more   
dignity or importance4 ,for as the first
 philosophers  must have had some       
inducement1 to neglect everything for   
the search of the  best state of life3  
surely1 the inducement must have been   
the hope of  living happily1 which      
impelled them to devote so much care and
 pains to  that study4 ,now1 if virtue  
was discovered and carried to perfection
 by  them2 and if virtue is a sufficient
 security for a happy life3 who can     
avoid thinking the work of              
philosophising excellently recommended  
by them1  and undertaken by me8 ,but if 
virtue1 as being subject to such various
 and  uncertain accidents1 were but the 
slave of fortune1 and were not of       

sufficient ability to support herself2  
,i am afraid that it would seem         
desirable rather to offer up prayers    
than to rely on our own confidence in   
virtue1 as the foundation for our hope  
of a happy life4 ,and1 indeed1 when  ,i 
reflect on those troubles1 with which ,i
 have been so severely exercised  by    
fortune1 ,i begin to distrust this      
opinion2 and sometimes even to dread    
the weakness and frailty of human       
nature1 for ,i am afraid lest1 when     
nature had given us infirm bodies1 and  
had joined to them incurable  diseases1 
and intolerable pains1 she perhaps also 
gave us minds  participating in these   
bodily pains1 and harassed also with    
troubles and  uneasinesses1 peculiarly  
their own4 ,but here ,i correct myself1 
for forming  my judgment of the power of
 virtue more from the weakness of       
others1 or of  myself perhaps1 than from
 virtue itself3 for she herself         
7provided there  is such a thing as     
virtue1 and your uncle ,brutus has      

removed all doubt of  it7 has everything
 that can befal mankind in subjection to
 her2 and by  disregarding such things1 
she is far removed from being at all    
concerned  at human accidents2 and1     
being free from every imperfection1 she 
thinks  that nothing which is external  
to herself can concern her4 ,but we1 who
  increase every approaching evil by our
 fear1 and every present one by our     
grief1 choose rather to condemn the     
nature of things1 than our own errors4  
,,ii4 ,but the amendment of this fault1 
and of all our other vices and          
offences1 is to be sought for in        
philosophy3 and as my own inclination   
and  desire led me1 from my earliest    
youth upwards1 to seek her protection2  
so1  under my present misfortunes1 ,i   
have had recourse to the same port from 
whence ,i set out1 after having been    
tossed by a violent tempest4 ,o         
,philosophy1 thou guide of life6 thou   
discoverer of virtue1 and expeller of   
vices6 what had not only ,i myself1 but 

the whole life of man been without  you8
 ,to you it is that we owe the origin of
 cities2 you it was who called  together
 the dispersed race of men into social  
life2 you united them  together1 first1 
by placing them near one another1 then  
by marriages1 and  lastly1 by the       
communication of speech and languages4  
,you have been the  inventress of laws2 
you have been our instructress in morals
 and  discipline3 to you we fly for     
refuge2 from you we implore assistance2 
and  as ,i formerly submitted to you in 
a great degree1 so now ,i surrender up  
myself entirely to you4 ,for one day    
spent well1 and agreeably to your       
precepts1 is preferable to an eternity  
of error4 ,whose assistance1 then1  can 
be of more service to me than yours1    
when you have bestowed on us            
tranquillity of life1 and removed the   
fear of death8 ,but ,philosophy is so   
far from being praised as much as she   
has deserved by mankind1 that she is    
wholly neglected by most men1 and       

actually evil spoken of by many4 ,can   
any  person speak ill of the parent of  
life1 and dare to pollute himself thus  
with parricide6 and be so impiously     
ungrateful as to accuse her1 whom he    
ought to reverence1 even were he less   
able to appreciate the advantages  which
 he might derive from her8 ,but this    
error1 ,i imagine1 and this  darkness1  
has spread itself over the minds of     
ignorant men1 from their not  being able
 to look so far back1 and from their not
 imagining that those  men by whom human
 life was first improved1 were          
philosophers3 for though  we see        
philosophy to have been of long         
standing1 yet the name must be          
acknowledged to be but modern4    ,,iii4
 ,but indeed1 who can dispute the       
antiquity of philosophy1 either in  fact
 or name8 for it acquired this excellent
 name from the ancients1 by  the        
knowledge of the origin and causes of   
everything1 both divine and  human4     
,thus those seven 1 as they were        

considered and called by the  ,greeks1  
have always been esteemed and called    
wise men by us3 and thus  ,lycurgus many
 ages before1 in whose time1 before the 
building of this  city1 ,homer is said  
to have lived1 as well as ,ulysses and  
,nestor in the  heroic ages1 are all    
handed down to us by tradition as having
 really been  what they were called1    
wise men2 nor would it have been said   
that ,atlas  supported the heavens1 or  
that ,prometheus was bound to ,caucasus1
 nor would  ,cepheus1 with his wife1 his
 son-in-law1 and his daughter1 have been
  enrolled among the constellations1 but
 that their more than human  knowledge  
of the heavenly bodies had transferred  
their names into an  erroneous fable4   
,from whence1 all who occupied          
themselves in the  contemplation of     
nature1 were both considered and called1
 wise men3 and  that name of theirs     
continued to the age of ,pythagoras1 who
 is reported to  have gone to ,phlius1  
as we find it stated by ,heraclides     

,ponticus1 a very  learned man1 and a   
pupil of ,plato1 and to have discoursed 
very learnedly  and copiously on certain
 subjects1 with ,leon1 prince of the    
,phliasii--and  when ,leon1 admiring his
 ingenuity and eloquence1 asked him what
 art he  particularly professed2 his    
answer was1 that he was acquainted with 
no  art1 but that he was a philosopher4 
,leon1 surprised at the novelty of the  
name1 inquired what he meant by the name
 of philosopher1 and in what            
philosophers differed from other men3 on
 which ,pythagoras replied1 8,that  the 
life of man seemed to him to resemble   
those games1 which were  celebrated with
 the greatest possible variety of       
sports1 and the general  concourse of   
all ,greece4 ,for as in those games     
there were some persons  whose object   
was glory1 and the honour of a crown1 to
 be attained by the  performance of     
bodily exercises3 so others were led    
thither by the gain of  buying and      
selling1 and mere views of profit3 but  

there was likewise one  class of        
persons1 and they were by far the best1 
whose aim was neither  applause nor     
profit1 but who came merely as          
spectators through curiosity1  to       
observe what was done1 and to see in    
what manner things were carried on      
there4 ,and thus1 said he1 we come from 
another life and nature unto this  one1 
just as men come out of some other city1
 to some much frequented  mart2 some    
being slaves to glory1 others to money2 
and there are some few  who1 taking no  
account of anything else1 earnestly look
 into the nature of  things3 and these  
men call themselves studious of wisdom1 
that is1  philosophers2 and as there it 
is the most reputable occupation of all 
to  be a looker-on1 without making any  
acquisition1 so in life1 the            
contemplating things1 and acquainting   
oneself with them1 greatly exceeds      
every other pursuit of life40    ,,iv4  
,nor was ,pythagoras the inventor only  
of the name1 but he enlarged also  the  

thing itself1 and1 when he came into    
,italy after this conversation at       
,phlius1 he adorned that ,greece1 which 
is called ,great ,greece1 both          
privately and publicly1 with the most   
excellent institutions and arts2 but  of
 his school and system1 ,i shall1       
perhaps1 find another opportunity to    
speak4 ,but numbers and motions1 and the
 beginning and end of all things1  were 
the subjects of the ancient philosophy  
down to ,socrates1 who was a  pupil of  
,archelaus1 who had been the disciple of
 ,anaxagoras4 ,these made  diligent     
inquiry into the magnitude of the stars1
 their distances1  courses1 and all that
 relates to the heavens4 ,but ,socrates 
was the first  who brought down         
philosophy from the heavens1 placed it  
in cities1  introduced it into families1
 and obliged it to examine into life and
  morals1 and good and evil4 ,and his   
different methods of discussing         
questions1 together with the variety of 
his topics1 and the greatness of  his   

abilities1 being immortalized by the    
memory and writings of ,plato1  gave    
rise to many sects of philosophers of   
different sentiments3 of all  which ,i  
have principally adhered to that one    
which1 in my opinion1  ,socrates himself
 followed2 and argue so as to conceal my
 own opinion1  while ,i deliver others  
from their errors1 and so discover what 
has the  greatest appearance of         
probability in every question4 ,and the 
custom  ,carneades adopted with great   
copiousness and acuteness1 and ,i myself
 have  often given in to it on many     
occasions elsewhere1 and in this manner1
 too1  ,i disputed lately1 in my        
,tusculan villa2 indeed ,i have sent you
 a book of  the four former days'       
discussions2 but the fifth day1 when we 
had seated  ourselves as before1 what we
 were to dispute on was proposed thus3--
    ,v4 ,a4 ,i do not think virtue can  
possibly be sufficient for a happy life4
    ,m4 ,but my friend ,brutus thinks   
so1 whose judgment1 with submission1 ,i 

greatly prefer to yours4    ,a4 ,i make 
no doubt of it2 but your regard for him 
is not the business  now2 the question  
is now what is the real character of    
that quality of  which ,i have declared 
my opinion4 ,i wish you to dispute on   
that4    ,m4 ,what6 do you deny that    
virtue can possibly be sufficient for a 
happy  life8    ,a4 ,it is what ,i      
entirely deny4    ,m4 ,what6 is not     
virtue sufficient to enable us to live  
as we ought1  honestly1 commendably1 or1
 in fine1 to live well8    ,a4          
,certainly sufficient4    ,m4 ,can you1 
then1 help calling any one miserable1   
who lives ill8 or will  you deny that   
any one who you allow lives well1 must  
inevitably live  happily8    ,a4 ,why   
may ,i not8 for a man may be upright in 
his life1 honest1  praiseworthy1 even in
 the midst of torments1 and therefore   
live well4  ,provided you understand    
what ,i mean by well2 for when ,i say   
well1 ,i mean  with constancy1 and      
dignity1 and wisdom1 and courage2 for a 

man may  display all these qualities on 
the rack2 but yet the rack is           
inconsistent  with a happy life4    ,m4 
,what then8 is your happy life left on  
the outside of the prison1  whilst      
constancy1 dignity1 wisdom1 and the     
other virtues1 are surrendered  up to   
the executioner1 and bear punishment and
 pain without reluctance8    ,a4 ,you   
must look out for something new1 if you 
would do any good4 ,these  things have  
very little effect on me1 not merely    
from their being common1  but           
principally because1 like certain light 
wines1 that will not bear  water1 these 
arguments of the ,stoics are pleasanter 
to taste than to  swallow4 ,as when that
 assemblage of virtues is committed to  
the rack1 it  raises so reverend a      
spectacle before our eyes1 that         
happiness seems to  hasten on towards   
them1 and not to suffer them to be      
deserted by her4 ,but  when you take    
your attention off from this picture and
 these images of the  virtues1 to the   

truth and the reality1 what remains     
without disguise is1  the question      
whether any one can be happy in torment8
 ,wherefore let us now  examine that    
point1 and not be under any             
apprehensions1 lest the virtues  should 
expostulate and complain1 that they are 
forsaken by happiness4 ,for  if prudence
 is connected with every virtue1 then   
prudence itself discovers  this1 that   
all good men are not therefore happy2   
and she recollects many  things of      
,marcus ,atilius17#ajd7 ,quintus        
,cpio17#aje7 ,marcus ,aquilius27#ajf7   
and prudence herself1 if these          
representations are more agreeable to   
you  than the things themselves1        
restrains happiness1 when it is         
endeavouring  to throw itself into      
torments1 and denies that it has any    
connexion with  pain and torture4       
,,vi4 ,m4 ,i can easily bear with your  
behaving in this manner1 though it is   
not fair in you to prescribe to me1 how 
you would have me carry on this         

discussion2 but ,i ask you if ,i have   
effected anything or nothing in the     
preceding days8    ,a4 ,yes1 something  
was done1 some little matter indeed4    
,m4 ,but if that is the case1 this      
question is settled1 and almost put an  
end to4    ,a4 ,how so8    ,m4 ,because 
turbulent motions and violent agitations
 of the mind1 when it  is raised and    
elated by a rash impulse1 getting the   
better of reason1  leave no room for a  
happy life4 ,for who that fears either  
pain or death1  the one of which is     
always present1 the other always        
impending1 can be  otherwise than       
miserable8 ,now supposing the same      
person1 which is often  the case1 to be 
afraid of poverty1 ignominy1 infamy1 or 
weakness1 or  blindness2 or lastly1     
slavery1 which doth not only befal      
individual men1  but often even the most
 powerful nations2 now can any one under
 the  apprehension of these evils be    
happy8 ,what shall we say of him who not
  only dreads these evils as impending1 

but actually feels and bears them at    
present8 ,let us unite in the same      
person1 banishment1 mourning1 the loss  
of children2 now how can any one who is 
broken down and rendered sick in  body  
and mind by such affliction be otherwise
 than very miserable indeed8  ,what     
reason again can there be1 why a man    
should not rightly enough be  called    
miserable1 whom we see inflamed and     
raging with lust1 coveting  everything  
with an insatiable desire1 and in       
proportion as he derives more  pleasure 
from anything1 thirsting the more       
violently after them8 ,and as to  a man 
vainly elated1 exulting with an empty   
joy1 and boasting of himself  without   
reason1 is not he so much the more      
miserable in proportion as he  thinks   
himself happier8 ,therefore1 as these   
men are miserable1 so on the  other hand
 those are happy1 who are alarmed by no 
fears1 wasted by no  griefs1 provoked by
 no lusts1 melted by no languid         
pleasures that arise  from vain and     

exulting joys4 ,we look on the sea as   
calm when not the least  breath of air  
disturbs its waves2 and in like manner  
the placid and quiet  state of the mind 
is discovered when unmoved by any       
perturbation4 ,now if  there be any one 
who holds the power of fortune1 and     
everything human1  everything that can  
possibly befal any man1 as supportable1 
so as to be  out of the reach of fear or
 anxiety2 and if such a man covets      
nothing1 and  is lifted up by no vain   
joy of mind1 what can prevent his being 
happy8 and  if these are the effects of 
virtue1 why cannot virtue itself make   
men  happy8    ,,vii4 ,a4 ,but the other
 of these two propositions is           
undeniable1 that they  who are under no 
apprehensions1 who are no ways uneasy1  
who covet nothing1  who are lifted up by
 no vain joy1 are happy3 and therefore  
,i grant you  that2 but as for the      
other1 that is not now in a fit state   
for discussion2  for it has been proved 
by your former arguments that a wise man

 is free  from every perturbation of    
mind4    ,m4 ,doubtless1 then1 the      
dispute is over2 for the question       
appears to  have been entirely          
exhausted4    ,a4 ,i think indeed that  
that is almost the case4    ,m4 ,but    
yet1 that is more usually the case with 
the mathematicians than  philosophers4  
,for when the geometricians teach       
anything1 if what they have  before     
taught relates to their present subject1
 they take that for granted  which has  
been already proved2 and explain only   
what they had not written  on before4   
,but the philosophers1 whatever subject 
they have in hand1 get  together        
everything that relates to it2          
notwithstanding they may have  dilated  
on it somewhere else4 ,were not that the
 case1 why should the  ,stoics say so   
much on that question1 whether virtue   
was abundantly  sufficient to a happy   
life8 when it would have been answer    
enough1 that  they had before taught1   
that nothing was good but what was      

honourable2 for  as this had been       
proved1 the consequence must be1 that   
virtue was  sufficient to a happy life3 
and each premise may be made to follow  
from  the admission of the other1 so    
that if it be admitted that virtue is   
sufficient to secure a happy life1 it   
may also be inferred that nothing is    
good except what is honourable4 ,they   
however do not proceed in this  manner2 
for they would separate books about what
 is honourable1 and what  is the chief  
good3 and when they have demonstrated   
from the one that  virtue has power     
enough to make life happy1 yet they     
treat this point  separately2 for       
everything1 and especially a subject of 
such great  consequence1 should be      
supported by arguments and exhortations 
which  belong to that alone4 ,for you   
should have a care how you imagine      
philosophy to have uttered anything more
 noble1 or that she has promised        
anything more fruitful or of greater    
consequence3 for1 good ,gods6 doth she  

not engage1 that she will render him who
 submits to her laws so  accomplished as
 to be always armed against fortune1 and
 to have every  assurance within himself
 of living well and happily2 that he    
shall1 in  short1 be for ever happy4    
,but let us see what she will perform8  
,in the  meanwhile ,i look upon it as a 
great thing1 that she has even made such
 a  promise4 ,for ,xerxes1 who was      
loaded with all the rewards and gifts of
  fortune1 not satisfied with his armies
 of horse and foot1 nor the  multitude  
of his ships1 nor his infinite treasure 
of gold1 offered a  reward to any one   
who could find out a new pleasure3 and  
yet1 when it was  discovered1 he was not
 satisfied with it1 nor can there ever  
be an end to  lust4 ,i wish we could    
engage any one by a reward1 to produce  
something the  better to establish us in
 this belief4    ,,viii4 ,a4 ,i wish    
that indeed myself2 but ,i want a little
 information4 ,for  ,i allow1 that in   
what you have stated1 the one           

proposition is the  consequence of the  
other2 that as1 if what is honourable be
 the only good1  it must follow1 that a 
happy life is the effect of virtue3 so  
that if a  happy life consists in       
virtue1 nothing can be good but virtue4 
,but your  friend ,brutus1 on the       
authority of ,aristo and ,antiochus1    
does not see  this3 for he thinks the   
case would be the same1 even if there   
were  anything good besides virtue4     
,m4 ,what then8 do you imagine that ,i  
am going to argue against ,brutus8      
,a4 ,you may do what you please3 for it 
is not for me to prescribe what  you    
shall do4    ,m4 ,how these things agree
 together shall be examined somewhere   
else3 for  ,i frequently discussed that 
point with ,antiochus1 and lately with  
,aristo1  when1 during the period of my 
command as general1 ,i was lodging with 
him  at ,athens4 ,for to me it seemed   
that no one could possibly be happy     
under  any evil3 but a wise man might be
 afflicted with evil1 if there are any  

things arising from body or fortune1    
deserving the name of evils4 ,these     
things were said1 which ,antiochus has  
inserted in his books in many  places3  
that virtue itself was sufficient to    
make life happy1 but yet not  perfectly 
happy3 and that many things derive their
 names from the  predominant portion of 
them1 though they do not include        
everything1 as  strength1 health1       
riches1 honour1 and glory3 which        
qualities are  determined by their kind1
 not their number3 thus a happy life is 
so called  from its being so in a great 
degree1 even though it should fall short
 in  some point4 ,to clear this up1 is  
not absolutely necessary at present1    
though it seems to be said without any  
great consistency3 for ,i cannot        
imagine what is wanting to one that is  
happy1 to make him happier1 for if      
anything be wanting to him he cannot be 
so much as happy2 and as to what  they  
say1 that everything is named and       
estimated from its predominant  portion1

 that may be admitted in some things4   
,but when they allow three  kinds of    
evils2 when any one is oppressed with   
every imaginable evil of  two kinds1    
being afflicted with adverse fortune1   
and having at the same  time his body   
worn out and harassed with all sorts of 
pains1 shall we say  that such a one is 
but little short of a happy life1 to say
 nothing about  the happiest possible   
life8    ,,ix4 ,this is the point which 
,theophrastus was unable to maintain3   
for after  he had once laid down the    
position1 that stripes1 torments1       
tortures1 the  ruin of one's country1   
banishment1 the loss of children1 had   
great  influence on men's living        
miserably and unhappily1 he durst not   
any longer  use any high and lofty      
expressions1 when he was so low and     
abject in his  opinion4 ,how right he   
was is not the question2 he certainly   
was  consistent4 ,therefore ,i am not   
for objecting to consequences where the 
premises are admitted4 ,but this most   

elegant and learned of all the          
philosophers1 is not taken to task very 
severely when he asserts his three      
kinds of good2 but he is attacked by    
every one for that book which he  wrote 
on a happy life1 in which book he has   
many arguments1 why one who is  tortured
 and racked cannot be happy4 ,for in    
that book he is supposed to  say1 that a
 man who is placed on the wheel1 7that  
is a kind of torture in  use among the  
,greeks17 cannot attain to a completely 
happy life4 ,he  nowhere1 indeed1 says  
so absolutely1 but what he says amounts 
to the same  thing4 ,can ,i1 then1 find 
fault with him2 after having allowed1   
that pains  of the body are evils1 that 
the ruin of a man's fortunes is an evil1
 if he  should say that every good man  
is not happy1 when all those things     
which  he reckons as evils may befal a  
good man8 ,the same ,theophrastus is    
found  fault with by all the books and  
schools of the philosophers1 for        
commending that sentence in his         

,callisthenes3          ,fortune1 not   
wisdom1 rules the life of man4          
,they say1 never did philosopher assert 
anything so languid4 ,they are  right1  
indeed1 in that3 but ,i do not apprehend
 anything could be more  consistent3 for
 if there are so many good things that  
depend on the body1  and so many foreign
 to it that depend on chance and        
fortune1 is it  inconsistent to say that
 fortune1 which governs everything1 both
 what is  foreign and what belongs to   
the body1 has greater power than        
counsel4 ,or  would we rather imitate   
,epicurus8 who is often excellent in    
many things  which he speaks1 but quite 
indifferent how consistent he may be1 or
 how  much to the purpose he is         
speaking4 ,he commends spare diet1 and  
in that he  speaks as a philosopher2 but
 it is for ,socrates or ,antisthenes to 
say so1  and not for one who confines   
all good to pleasure4 ,he denies that   
any one  can live pleasantly unless he  
lives honestly1 wisely1 and justly4     

,nothing  is more dignified than this   
assertion1 nothing more becoming a      
philosopher1 had he not measured this   
very expression of living honestly1     
justly1 and wisely1 by pleasure4 ,what  
could be better than to assert that     
fortune interferes but little with a    
wise man8 ,but does he talk thus1 who   
after he has said that pain is the      
greatest evil1 or the only evil1 might  
himself be afflicted with the sharpest  
pains all over his body1 even at  the   
time he is vaunting himself the most    
against fortune8 ,and this very  thing1 
too1 ,metrodorus has said1 but in better
 language3 8,i have  anticipated you1   
,fortune2 ,i have caught you1 and cut   
off every access1 so  that you cannot   
possibly reach me40 ,this would be      
excellent in the mouth  of ,aristo the  
,chian1 or ,zeno the ,stoic1 who held   
nothing to be an evil but  what was     
base2 but for you1 ,metrodorus1 to      
anticipate the approaches of  fortune1  
who confine all that is good to your    

bowels and marrow1--for you  to say so1 
who define the chief good by a strong   
constitution of body1 and  a well       
assured hope of its continuance1--for   
you to cut off every access of  fortune8
 ,why1 you may instantly be deprived of 
that good4 ,yet the simple  are taken   
with these propositions1 and a vast     
crowd is led away by such  sentences to 
become their followers4    ,x4 ,but it  
is the duty of one who would argue      
accurately1 to consider not  what is    
said1 but what is said consistently4 ,as
 in that very opinion which  we have    
adopted in this discussion1 namely1 that
 every good man is always  happy2 it is 
clear what ,i mean by good men3 ,i call 
those both wise and  good men1 who are  
provided and adorned with every virtue4 
,let us see1  then1 who are to be called
 happy4 ,i imagine1 indeed1 that those  
men are to  be called so1 who are       
possessed of good without any alloy of  
evil3 nor is  there any other notion    
connected with the word that expresses  

happiness1  but an absolute enjoyment of
 good without any evil4 ,virtue cannot  
attain  this1 if there is anything good 
besides itself3 for a crowd of evils    
would  present themselves1 if we were to
 allow poverty1 obscurity1 humility1    
solitude1 the loss of friends1 acute    
pains of the body1 the loss of  health1 
weakness1 blindness1 the ruin of one's  
country1 banishment1  slavery1 to be    
evils3 for a wise man may be afflicted  
by all these evils1  numerous and       
important as they are1 and many others  
also may be added2 for  they are brought
 on by chance1 which may attack a wise  
man3 but if these  things are evils1 who
 can maintain that a wise man is always 
happy1 when  all these evils may light  
on him at the same time8 ,i therefore do
 not  easily agree with my friend       
,brutus1 nor with our common masters1   
nor those  ancient ones1 ,aristotle1    
,speusippus1 ,xenocrates1 ,polemon1 who 
reckon all  that ,i have mentioned above
 as evils1 and yet they say that a wise 

man is  always happy2 nor can ,i allow  
them1 because they are charmed with this
  beautiful and illustrious title1 which
 would very well become ,pythagoras1    
,socrates1 and ,plato1 to persuade my   
mind1 that strength1 health1 beauty1    
riches1 honours1 power1 with the beauty 
of which they are ravished1 are         
contemptible1 and that all those things 
which are the opposites of these  are   
not to be regarded4 ,then might they    
declare openly1 with a loud voice1  that
 neither the attacks of fortune1 nor the
 opinion of the multitude1 nor  pain1   
nor poverty1 occasion them any          
apprehensions2 and that they have       
everything within themselves1 and that  
there is nothing whatever which  they   
consider as good but what is within     
their own power4 ,nor can ,i by any     
means allow the same person1 who falls  
into the vulgar opinion of good and     
evil1 to make use of these expressions1 
which can only become a great and       
exalted man4 ,struck with which glory1  

up starts ,epicurus1 who1 with          
submission to the ,gods1 thinks a wise  
man always happy4 ,he is much charmed   
with the dignity of this opinion1 but he
 never would have owned that1 had  he   
attended to himself3 for what is there  
more inconsistent1 than for one  who    
could say that pain was the greatest or 
the only evil1 to think also  that a    
wise man can possibly say in the midst  
of his torture1 ,how sweet is  this6 ,we
 are not1 therefore1 to form our        
judgment of philosophers from  detached 
sentences1 but from their consistency   
with themselves1 and their  ordinary    
manner of talking4    ,,xi4 ,a4 ,you    
compel me to be of your opinion2 but    
have a care that you are  not           
inconsistent yourself4    ,m4 ,in what  
respect8    ,a4 ,because ,i have lately 
read your fourth book on ,good and      
,evil3 and in  that you appeared to me1 
while disputing against ,cato1 to be    
endeavouring  to show1 which in my      
opinion means to prove1 that ,zeno and  

the  ,peripatetics differ only about    
some new words2 but if we allow that1   
what  reason can there be1 if it follows
 from the arguments of ,zeno1 that      
virtue  contains all that is necessary  
to a happy life1 that the ,peripatetics 
should not be at liberty to say the     
same8 ,for1 in my opinion1 regard       
should be had to the thing1 not to      
words4    ,m4 ,what8 you would convict  
me from my own words1 and bring against 
me  what ,i had said or written         
elsewhere4 ,you may act in that manner  
with  those who dispute by established  
rules3 we live from hand to mouth1 and  
say anything that strikes our mind with 
probability1 so that we are the  only   
people who are really at liberty4 ,but1 
since ,i just now spoke of  consistency1
 ,i do not think the inquiry in this    
place is1 if the opinion  of ,zeno and  
his pupil ,aristo be true1 that nothing 
is good but what is  honourable2 but1   
admitting that1 then1 whether the whole 
of a happy life  can be rested on virtue

 alone4 ,wherefore1 if we certainly     
grant ,brutus  this1 that a wise man is 
always happy1 how consistent he is1 is  
his own  business3 for who indeed is    
more worthy than himself of the glory of
 that  opinion8 ,still we may maintain  
that such a man is more happy than any  
one  else4    ,,xii4 ,though ,zeno the  
,cittian1 a stranger and an             
inconsiderable coiner of  words1 appears
 to have insinuated himself into the old
 philosophy2 still  the prevalence of   
this opinion is due to the authority of 
,plato1 who often  makes use of this    
expression1 8that nothing but virtue can
 be entitled to  the name of good10     
agreeably to what ,socrates says in     
,plato's ,gorgias2 for  it is there     
related that when some one asked him if 
he did not think  ,archelaus the son of 
,perdiccas1 who was then looked upon as 
a most  fortunate person1 a very happy  
man3 8,i do not know10 replied he1 8for 
,i  never conversed with him40 8,what1  
is there no other way you can know it   

by80 8,none at all40 8,you cannot1 then1
 pronounce of the great king of the     
,persians1 whether he is happy or not80 
8,how can ,i1 when ,i do not know how   
learned or how good a man he is80       
8,what6 do you imagine that a happy life
  depends on that80 8,my opinion        
entirely is1 that good men are happy1   
and  the wicked miserable40 8,is        
,archelaus1 then1 miserable80           
8,certainly1 if  unjust40 ,now does it  
not appear to you1 that he is here      
placing the whole  of a happy life in   
virtue alone8 ,but what does the same   
man say in his  funeral oration8 8,for10
 saith he1 8whoever has everything that 
relates to  a happy life so entirely    
dependent on himself as not to be       
connected with  the good or bad fortune 
of another1 and not to be affected by1  
or made in  any degree uncertain by1    
what befals another2 and whoever is such
 a one  has acquired the best rule of   
living2 he is that moderate1 that brave1
  that wise man1 who submits to the gain

 and loss of everything1 and  especially
 of his children1 and obeys that old    
precept2 for he will never  be too      
joyful or too sad1 because he depends   
entirely upon himself40    ,,xiii4 ,from
 ,plato1 therefore1 all my discourse    
shall be deduced1 as if from  some      
sacred and hallowed fountain4 ,whence   
can ,i1 then1 more properly begin  than 
from nature1 the parent of all8 ,for    
whatsoever she produces 7,i am not      
speaking only of animals1 but even of   
those things which have sprung from  the
 earth in such a manner as to rest on   
their own roots7 she designed it  to be 
perfect in its respective kind4 ,so that
 among trees and vines1 and  those lower
 plants and trees which cannot advance  
themselves high above  the earth1 some  
are evergreen1 others are stripped of   
their leaves in  winter1 and1 warmed by 
the spring season1 put them out afresh1 
and there  are none of them but what are
 so quickened by a certain interior     
motion1  and their own seeds enclosed in

 every one1 so as to yield flowers1     
fruit1  or berries1 that all may have   
every perfection that belongs to it1    
provided no violence prevents it4 ,but  
the force of nature itself may be  more 
easily discovered in animals1 as she has
 bestowed sense on them4 ,for  some     
animals she has taught to swim1 and     
designed to be inhabitants of the       
water2 others she has enabled to fly1   
and has willed that they should  enjoy  
the boundless air2 some others she has  
made to creep1 others to  walk4 ,again1 
of these very animals1 some are         
solitary1 some gregarious1  some wild1  
others tame1 some hidden and buried     
beneath the earth1 and  every one of    
these maintains the law of nature1      
confining itself to what  was bestowed  
on it1 and unable to change its manner  
of life4 ,and as every  animal has from 
nature something that distinguishes it1 
which every one  maintains and never    
quits2 so man has something far more    
excellent1 though  everything is said to

 be excellent by comparison4 ,but the   
human mind1  being derived from the     
divine reason1 can be compared with     
nothing but  with the ,deity itself1 if 
,i may be allowed the expression4 ,this1
 then1 if  it is improved1 and when its 
perception is so preserved as not to be 
blinded by errors1 becomes a perfect    
understanding1 that is to say1  absolute
 reason1 which is the very same as      
virtue4 ,and if everything is  happy    
which wants nothing1 and is complete and
 perfect in its kind1 and  that is the  
peculiar lot of virtue2 certainly all   
who are possessed of  virtue are happy4 
,and in this ,i agree with ,brutus1 and 
also with  ,aristotle1 ,xenocrates1     
,speusippus1 ,polemon4    ,,xiv4 ,to me 
such are the only men who appear        
completely happy2 for what can  he want 
to a complete happy life who relies on  
his own good qualities1 or  how can he  
be happy who does not rely on them8 ,but
 he who makes a  threefold division of  
goods must necessarily be diffident1 for

 how can he  depend on having a sound   
body1 or that his fortune shall         
continue8 but no  one can be happy      
without an immovable1 fixed1 and        
permanent good4 ,what1  then1 is this   
opinion of theirs8 ,so that ,i think    
that saying of the  ,spartan may be     
applied to them1 who1 on some merchant's
 boasting before  him1 that he had      
despatched ships to every maritime      
coast1 replied1 that a  fortune which   
depended on ropes was not very          
desirable4 ,can there be any  doubt that
 whatever may be lost1 cannot be        
properly classed in the number  of those
 things which complete a happy life8 for
 of all that constitutes a  happy life1 
nothing will admit of withering1 or     
growing old1 or wearing  out1 or        
decaying2 for whoever is apprehensive of
 any loss of these things  cannot be    
happy2 the happy man should be safe1    
well fenced1 well  fortified1 out of the
 reach of all annoyance1 not like a man 
under  trifling apprehensions1 but free 

from all such4 ,as he is not called     
innocent who but slightly offends1 but  
he who offends not at all2 so it is  he 
alone who is to be considered without   
fear who is free from all fear1  not he 
who is but in little fear4 ,for what    
else is courage but an  affection of    
mind1 that is ready to undergo perils1  
and patient in the  endurance of pain   
and labour without any alloy of fear8   
,now this certainly  could not be the   
case1 if there were anything else good  
but what depended  on honesty alone4    
,but how can any one be in possession of
 that desirable  and much-coveted       
security 7for ,i now call a freedom from
 anxiety a  security1 on which freedom a
 happy life depends7 who has1 or may    
have1 a  multitude of evils attending   
him8 ,how can he be brave and undaunted1
 and  hold everything as trifles which  
can befal a man1 for so a wise man      
should  do1 unless he be one who thinks 
that everything depends on himself8     
,could  the ,lacedmonians without this1 

when ,philip threatened to prevent all  
their attempts1 have asked him1 if he   
could prevent their killing  themselves8
 ,is it not easier1 then1 to find one   
man of such a spirit as we  are         
inquiring after1 than to meet with a    
whole city of such men8 ,now1 if  to    
this courage ,i am speaking of we add   
temperance1 that it may govern all  our 
feelings and agitations1 what can be    
wanting to complete his happiness  who  
is secured by his courage from          
uneasiness and fear2 and is prevented   
from immoderate desires and immoderate  
insolence of joy1 by temperance8 ,i     
could easily show that virtue is able to
 produce these effects1 but that ,i     
have explained on the foregoing days4   
,,xv4 ,but as the perturbations of the  
mind make life miserable1 and           
tranquillity renders it happy2 and as   
these perturbations are of two  sorts1  
grief and fear1 proceeding from imagined
 evils1 and as immoderate  joy and lust 
arise from a mistake about what is good1

 and as all these  feelings are in      
opposition to reason and counsel2 when  
you see a man at  ease1 quite free and  
disengaged from such troublesome        
commotions1 which  are so much at       
variance with one another can you       
hesitate to pronounce  such an one a    
happy man8 ,now the wise man is always  
in such a disposition1  therefore the   
wise man is always happy4 ,besides1     
every good is pleasant2  whatever is    
pleasant may he boasted and talked of2  
whatever may he boasted  of1 is         
glorious1 but whatever is glorious is   
certainly laudable1 and  whatever is    
laudable doubtless1 also1 honourable2   
whatever1 then1 is good  is honourable2 
7but the things which they reckon as    
goods1 they themselves  do not call     
honourable27 therefore what is          
honourable alone is good4 ,hence  it    
follows that a happy life is comprised  
in honesty alone4 ,such things1  then1  
are not to be called or considered      
goods1 when a man may enjoy an          

abundance of them1 and yet be most      
miserable4 ,is there any doubt but that 
a man who enjoys the best health1 and   
who has strength and beauty1 and his    
senses flourishing in their utmost      
quickness and perfection2 suppose him   
likewise1 if you please1 nimble and     
active1 nay1 give him riches1 honours1  
authority1 power1 glory2 now1 ,i say1   
should this person1 who is in           
possession of all these1 be unjust1     
intemperate1 timid1 stupid1 or an       
idiot1 could you hesitate to call such  
an one miserable8 ,what1 then1 are      
those goods1 in the possession of which 
you may be very miserable8 ,let us  see 
if a happy life is not made up of parts 
of the same nature1 as a heap  implies a
 quantity of grain of the same kind4    
,and if this be once  admitted1         
happiness must be compounded of         
different good things which  alone are  
honourable2 if there is any mixture of  
things of another sort  with these1     
nothing honourable can proceed from such

 a composition2 now1  take away honesty1
 and how can you imagine anything happy8
 ,for whatever is  good is desirable on 
that account2 whatever is desirable must
 certainly be  approved of2 whatever you
 approve of must be looked on as        
acceptable and  welcome4 ,you must      
consequently impute dignity to this2 and
 if so1 it must  necessarily be         
laudable2 therefore1 everything that is 
laudable is good4  ,hence it follows1   
that what is honourable is the only     
good4 ,and should we  not look upon it  
in this light1 there will be a great    
many things which we  must call good4   
,,xvi4 ,i forbear to mention riches1    
which1 as any one1 let him be ever so   
unworthy1 may have them1 ,i do not      
reckon amongst goods2 for what is good  
is not attainable by all4 ,i pass over  
notoriety1 and popular fame1 raised  by 
the united voice of knaves and fools4   
,even things which are absolute         
nothings may be called goods2 such as   
white teeth1 handsome eyes1 a good      

complexion1 and what was commended by   
,euryclea1 when she was washing         
,ulysses's feet1 the softness of his    
skin and the mildness of his  discourse4
 ,if you look on these as goods1 what   
greater encomiums can the  gravity of a 
philosopher be entitled to than the wild
 opinion of the  vulgar and the         
thoughtless crowd8 ,the ,stoics give the
 name of excellent  and choice to what  
the others call good3 they call them so1
 indeed2 but  they do not allow them to 
complete a happy life4 ,but these others
 think  that there is no life happy     
without them2 or1 admitting it to be    
happy1  they deny it to be the most     
happy4 ,but our opinion is1 that it is  
the most  happy2 and we prove it from   
that conclusion of ,socrates4 ,for thus 
that  author of philosophy argued3 that 
as the disposition of a man's mind is1  
so is the man3 such as the man is1 such 
will be his discourse3 his actions  will
 correspond with his discourse1 and his 
life with his actions4 ,but the         

disposition of a good man's mind is     
laudable2 the life1 therefore1 of a     
good man is laudable3 it is honourable1 
therefore1 because laudable3 the        
unavoidable conclusion from which is1   
that the life of good men is happy4     
,for1 good ,gods6 did ,i not make it    
appear1 by my former arguments1--or was 
,i  only amusing myself and killing time
 in what ,i then said1--that the mind of
  a wise man was always free from every 
hasty motion which ,i call a            
perturbation1 and that the most         
undisturbed peace always reigned in his 
breast8 ,a man1 then1 who is temperate  
and consistent1 free from fear or       
grief1 and uninfluenced by any          
immoderate joy or desire1 cannot be     
otherwise than happy3 but a wise man is 
always so1 therefore he is always       
happy4 ,moreover1 how can a good man    
avoid referring all his actions and  all
 his feelings to the one standard of    
whether or not it is laudable8 ,but  he 
does refer everything to the object of  

living happily3 it follows1  then1 that 
a happy life is laudable2 but nothing is
 laudable without  virtue3 a happy life1
 then1 is the consequence of            
virtue4--,and this is the  unavoidable  
conclusion to be drawn from these       
arguments4    ,,xvii4 ,a wicked life has
 nothing which we ought to speak of or  
glory in3  nor has that life which is   
neither happy nor miserable4 ,but there 
is a  kind of life that admits of being 
spoken of1 and gloried in1 and boasted  
of2 as ,epaminondas saith1--            
,the wings of ,sparta's pride my        
counsels clipt4      ,and ,africanus    
boasts1--          ,who1 from beyond    
,motis to the place      ,where the sun 
rises1 deeds like mine can trace8       
,if1 then1 there is such a thing as a   
happy life1 it is to be gloried in1     
spoken of1 and commended by the person  
who enjoys it3 for there is nothing     
excepting that which can be spoken of1  
or gloried in2 and when that is  once   
admitted1 you know what follows4 ,now1  

unless an honourable life is a  happy   
life1 there must of course be something 
preferable to a happy life3  for that   
which is honourable1 all men will       
certainly grant to be  preferable to    
anything else4 ,and thus there will be  
something better than  a happy life2 but
 what can be more absurd than such an   
assertion8 ,what6  when they grant vice 
to be effectual to the rendering life   
miserable1 must  they not admit that    
there is a corresponding power in virtue
 to make life  happy8 ,for contraries   
follow from contraries4 ,and here ,i    
ask1 what weight  they think there is in
 the balance of ,critolaus1 who1 having 
put the goods  of the mind into one     
scale1 and the goods of the body and    
other external  advantages into the     
other1 thought the goods of the mind    
outweighed the  others so far1 that they
 would require the whole earth and sea  
to equalise  the scale4    ,,xviii4     
,what hinders ,critolaus1 then1 or that 
gravest of philosophers1  ,xenocrates   

7who raises virtue so high1 and who     
lessens and depreciates  everything     
else71 from not only placing a happy    
life1 but the happiest  possible life1  
in virtue8 and1 indeed1 if this were not
 the case1 virtue  would be absolutely  
lost4 ,for whoever is subject to grief1 
must  necessarily be subject to fear    
too2 for fear is an uneasy apprehension 
of  future grief3 and whoever is subject
 to fear is liable to dread1 timidity1  
consternation1 cowardice4 ,therefore1   
such a person may1 some time or  other1 
be defeated1 and not think himself      
concerned with that precept of          
,atreus1--          ,and let men so     
conduct themselves in life1      ,as to 
be always strangers to defeat4      ,but
 such a man1 as ,i have said1 will be   
defeated2 and not only defeated1  but   
made a slave of4 ,but we would have     
virtue always free1 always  invincible2 
and were it not so1 there would be an   
end of virtue4 ,but if  virtue has in   
herself all that is necessary for a good

 life1 she is  certainly sufficient for 
happiness3 virtue is certainly          
sufficient1 too1  for our living with   
courage2 if with courage1 then with a   
magnanimous  spirit1 and indeed so as   
never to be under any fear1 and thus to 
be always  invincible4--,hence it       
follows1 that there can be nothing to be
 repented of1  no wants1 no lets or     
hindrances4 ,thus all things will be    
prosperous1  perfect1 and as you would  
have them2 and consequently happy3 but  
virtue is  sufficient for living with   
courage1 and therefore virtue is able by
  herself to make life happy4 ,for as   
folly1 even when possessed of what it   
desires1 never thinks it has acquired   
enough3 so wisdom is always  satisfied  
with the present1 and never repents on  
her own account4    ,,xix4 ,look but on 
the single consulship of ,llius1--and   
that1 too1 after  having been set aside 
7though when a wise and good man1 like  
him1 is  outvoted1 the people are       
disappointed of a good consul1 rather   

than he  disappointed by a vain people72
 but the point is1 would you prefer1    
were  it in your power1 to be once such 
a consul as ,llius1 or be elected four  
times1 like ,cinna8 ,i have no doubt in 
the world what answer you will make1    
and it is on that account ,i put the    
question to you4    ,i would not ask    
every one this question2 for some one   
perhaps might answer  that he would not 
only prefer four consulates to one1 but 
even one day of  ,cinna's life to whole 
ages of many famous men4 ,llius would   
have suffered  had he but touched any   
one with his finger2 but ,cinna ordered 
the head of  his colleague consul1 ,cn4 
,octavius1 to be struck off2 and put to 
death ,p4  ,crassus7#ajg7 and ,l4       
,csar17#ajh7 those excellent men1 so    
renowned both at  home and abroad2 and  
even ,m4 ,antonius17#aji7 the greatest  
orator whom ,i  ever heard2 and ,c4     
,csar1 who seems to me to have been the 
pattern of  humanity1 politeness1       
sweetness of temper1 and wit4 ,could he1

 then1 be  happy who occasioned the     
death of these men8 ,so far from it1    
that he seems  to be miserable1 not only
 for having performed these actions1 but
 also for  acting in such a manner1 that
 it was lawful for him to do it1 though 
it is  unlawful for any one to do wicked
 actions2 but this proceeds from        
inaccuracy of speech1 for we call       
whatever a man is allowed to do1        
lawful4--,was not ,marius happier1 ,i   
pray you1 when he shared the glory of   
the victory gained over the ,cimbrians  
with his colleague ,catulus 7who was    
almost another ,llius1 for ,i look upon 
the two men as very like one  another17 
than when1 conqueror in the civil war1  
he in a passion answered  the friends of
 ,catulus1 who were interceding for him1
 ,let him die8 ,and  this answer he     
gave1 not once only1 but often4 ,but in 
such a case1 he was  happier who        
submitted to that barbarous decree than 
he who issued it4 ,and  it is better to 
receive an injury than to do one2 and so

 it was better to  advance a little to  
meet that death that was making its     
approaches1 as  ,catulus did1 than1 like
 ,marius1 to sully the glory of six     
consulships1 and  disgrace his latter   
days1 by the death of such a man4       
,,xx4 ,dionysius exercised his tyranny  
over the ,syracusans thirty-eight       
years1 being but twenty-five years old  
when he seized on the government4  ,how 
beautiful and how wealthy a city did he 
oppress with slavery6 ,and yet  we have 
it from good authority1 that he was     
remarkably temperate in his  manner of  
living1 that he was very active and     
energetic in carrying on  business1 but 
naturally mischievous and unjust2 from  
which description1  every one who       
diligently inquires into truth must     
inevitably see that he  was very        
miserable4 ,neither did he attain what  
he so greatly desired1 even  when he was
 persuaded that he had unlimited power2 
for1 notwithstanding he  was of a good  
family and reputable parents 7though    

that is contested by  some authors71 and
 had a very large acquaintance of       
intimate friends and  relations1 and    
also some youths attached to him by ties
 of love after the  fashion of the      
,greeks1 he could not trust any one of  
them1 but committed  the guard of his   
person to slaves1 whom he had selected  
from rich men's  families and made free1
 and to strangers and barbarians4 ,and  
thus1 through  an unjust desire of      
governing1 he in a manner shut himself  
up in a prison4  ,besides1 he would not 
trust his throat to a barber1 but had   
his daughters  taught to shave2 so that 
these royal virgins were forced to      
descend to the  base and slavish        
employment of shaving the head and beard
 of their father4  ,nor would he trust  
even them1 when they were grown up1 with
 a razor2 but  contrived how they might 
burn off the hair of his head and beard 
with  red-hot nut-shells4 ,and as to his
 two wives1 ,aristomache his            
countrywoman1  and ,doris of ,locris1 he

 never visited them at night before     
everything had  been well searched and  
examined4 ,and as he had surrounded the 
place where  his bed was with a broad   
ditch1 and made a way over it with a    
wooden  bridge1 he drew that bridge over
 after shutting his bedchamber door4    
,and  as he did not dare to stand on the
 ordinary pulpits from which they       
usually harangued the people1 he        
generally addressed them from a high    
tower4 ,and it is said1 that when he was
 disposed to play at ball1--for he      
delighted much in it1--and had pulled   
off his clothes1 he used to give his    
sword into the keeping of a young man   
whom he was very fond of4 ,on this1  one
 of his intimates said pleasantly1 8,you
 certainly trust your life with  him20  
and as the young man happened to smile  
at this1 he ordered them both  to be    
slain1 the one for showing how he might 
be taken off1 the other for  approving  
of what had been said by smiling4 ,but  
he was so concerned at  what he had     

done1 that nothing affected him more    
during his whole life2  for he had slain
 one to whom he was extremely partial4  
,thus do weak men's  desires pull them  
different ways1 and whilst they indulge 
one1 they act  counter to another4      
,,xxi4 ,this tyrant1 however1 showed    
himself how happy he really was3 for    
once1 when ,damocles1 one of his        
flatterers1 was dilating in conversation
  on his forces1 his wealth1 the        
greatness of his power1 the plenty he   
enjoyed1 the grandeur of his royal      
palaces1 and maintaining that no one    
was ever happier1--8,have you an        
inclination10 said he1 8,damocles1 as   
this  kind of life pleases you1 to have 
a taste of it yourself1 and to make a   
trial of the good fortune that attends  
me80 ,and when he said that he  should  
like it extremely1 ,dionysius ordered   
him to be laid on a bed of  gold with   
the most beautiful covering1 embroidered
 and wrought with the  most exquisite   
work1 and he dressed out a great many   

sideboards with  silver and embossed    
gold4 ,he then ordered some youths1     
distinguished for  their handsome       
persons1 to wait at his table1 and to   
observe his nod1 in  order to serve him 
with what he wanted4 ,there were        
ointments and garlands2  perfumes were  
burned2 tables provided with the most   
exquisite meats4  ,damocles thought     
himself very happy4 ,in the midst of    
this apparatus1  ,dionysius ordered a   
bright sword to be let down from the    
ceiling1  suspended by a single         
horsehair1 so as to hang over the head  
of that happy  man4 ,after which he     
neither cast his eye on those handsome  
waiters1 nor on  the well wrought plate2
 nor touched any of the provisions3     
presently the  garlands fell to pieces4 
,at last he entreated the tyrant to give
 him leave  to go1 for that now he had  
no desire to be happy47#aaj7 ,does not  
,dionysius1  then1 seem to have declared
 there can be no happiness for one who  
is under  constant apprehensions8 ,but  

it was not now in his power to return to
  justice1 and restore his citizens     
their rights and privileges2 for1 by the
  indiscretion of youth1 he had engaged 
in so many wrong steps1 and  committed  
such extravagances1 that had he         
attempted to have returned to a  right  
way of thinking he must have endangered 
his life4    ,,xxii4 ,yet1 how desirous 
he was of friendship1 though at the same
 time he  dreaded the treachery of      
friends1 appears from the story of those
 two  ,pythagoreans3 one of these had   
been security for his friend1 who was   
condemned to die2 the other1 to release 
his security1 presented himself at  the 
time appointed for his dying3 8,i wish10
 said ,dionysius1 8you would  admit me  
as the third in your friendship40 ,what 
misery was it for him to  be deprived of
 acquaintance1 of company at his table1 
and of the freedom  of conversation2    
especially for one who was a man of     
learning1 and from  his childhood       
acquainted with liberal arts1 very fond 

of music1 and  himself a tragic         
poet1--how good a one is not to the     
purpose1 for ,i know  not how it is1 but
 in this way1 more than any other1 every
 one thinks his  own performances       
excellent4 ,i never as yet knew any poet
 7and ,i was very  intimate with        
,aquinius71 who did not appear to       
himself to be very  admirable4 ,the case
 is this2 you are pleased with your own 
works1 ,i like  mine4 ,but to return to 
,dionysius3 he debarred himself from all
 civil and  polite conversation1 and    
spent his life among fugitives1 bondmen1
 and  barbarians2 for he was persuaded  
that no one could be his friend who was 
worthy of liberty or had the least      
desire of being free4    ,,xxiii4 ,shall
 ,i not1 then1 prefer the life of ,plato
 and ,archytas1  manifestly wise and    
learned men1 to his1 than which nothing 
can possibly  be more horrid1 or        
miserable1 or detestable8    ,i will    
present you with an humble and obscure  
mathematician of the same  city1 called 

,archimedes1 who lived many years after2
 whose tomb1 overgrown  with shrubs and 
briars1 ,i in my qustorship discovered1 
when the  ,syracusans knew nothing of   
it1 and even denied that there was any  
such  thing remaining3 for ,i remembered
 some verses1 which ,i had been informed
  were engraved on his monument1 and    
these set forth that on the top of the  
tomb there was placed a sphere with a   
cylinder4 ,when ,i had carefully        
examined all the monuments 7for there   
are a great many tombs at the gate      
,achradin71 ,i observed a small column  
standing out a little above the  briars1
 with the figure of a sphere and a      
cylinder upon it2 whereupon ,i          
immediately said to the ,syracusans1 for
 there were some of their principal  men
 with me there1 that ,i imagined that   
was what ,i was inquiring for4  ,several
 men being sent in with scythes1 cleared
 the way1 and made an  opening for us4  
,when we could get at it1 and were come 
near to the front  of the pedestal1 ,i  

found the inscription1 though the latter
 parts of all  the verses were effaced  
almost half away4 ,thus one of the      
noblest cities  of ,greece1 and one     
which at one time likewise had been very
 celebrated for  learning1 had known    
nothing of the monument of its greatest 
genius1 if it  had not been discovered  
to them by a native of ,arpinum4 ,but to
 return to  the subject from which ,i   
have been digressing4 ,who is there in  
the least  degree acquainted with the   
,muses1 that is1 with liberal knowledge1
 or that  deals at all in learning1 who 
would not choose to be this             
mathematician  rather than that tyrant8 
,if we look into their methods of living
 and their  employments1 we shall find  
the mind of the one strengthened and    
improved  with tracing the deductions of
 reason1 amused with his own ingenuity1 
which is the one most delicious food of 
the mind2 the thoughts of the  other    
engaged in continual murders and        
injuries1 in constant fears by  night   

and by day4 ,now imagine a ,democritus1 
a ,pythagoras1 and an  ,anaxagoras2 what
 kingdom1 what riches would you prefer  
to their studies  and amusements8 for   
you must necessarily look for that      
excellence which we  are seeking for in 
that which is the most perfect part of  
man2 but what is  there better in man   
than a sagacious and good mind8 ,the    
enjoyment1  therefore1 of that good     
which proceeds from that sagacious mind1
 can alone  make us happy3 but virtue is
 the good of the mind2 it follows1      
therefore1  that a happy life depends on
 virtue4 ,hence proceed all things that 
are  beautiful1 honourable1 and         
excellent1 as ,i said above 7but this   
point  must1 ,i think1 be treated of    
more at large71 and they are well stored
 with  joys4 ,for1 as it is clear that a
 happy life consists in perpetual and   
unexhausted pleasures1 it follows too1  
that a happy life must arise from       
honesty4    ,,xxiv4 ,but that what ,i   
propose to demonstrate to you may not   

rest on mere  words only1 ,i must set   
before you the picture of something1 as 
it were1  living and moving in the      
world1 that may dispose us more for the 
improvement of the understanding and    
real knowledge4 ,let us1 then1 pitch    
upon some man perfectly acquainted with 
the most excellent arts2 let us  present
 him for a while to our own thoughts1   
and figure him to our own  imaginations4
 ,in the first place1 he must           
necessarily be of an  extraordinary     
capacity2 for virtue is not easily      
connected with dull  minds4 ,secondly1  
he must have a great desire of          
discovering truth1 from  whence will    
arise that threefold production of the  
mind2 one of which  depends on knowing  
things1 and explaining nature3 the other
 in defining  what we ought to desire1  
and what to avoid3 the third in judging 
of  consequences and impossibilities3 in
 which consists both subtilty in        
disputing1 and also clearness of        
judgment4 ,now with what pleasure must  

the  mind of a wise man be affected1    
which continually dwells in the midst of
  such cares and occupations as these1  
when he views the revolutions and       
motions of the whole world1 and sees    
those innumerable stars in the  heavens1
 which1 though fixed in their places1   
have yet one motion in  common with the 
whole universe1 and observes the seven  
other stars1 some  higher1 some lower1  
each maintaining their own course1 while
 their  motions1 though wandering1 have 
certain defined and appointed spaces to 
run through1 the sight of which         
doubtless urged and encouraged those    
ancient philosophers to exercise their  
investigating spirit on many other      
things4 ,hence arose an inquiry after   
the beginnings1 and1 as it were1  seeds 
from which all things were produced and 
composed2 what was the  origin of every 
kind of thing1 whether animate or       
inanimate1 articulately  speaking or    
mute2 what occasioned their beginning   
and end1 and by what  alteration and    

change one thing was converted into     
another3 whence the  earth originated1  
and by what weights it was balanced3 by 
what caverns the  seas were supplied3 by
 what gravity all things being carried  
down tend  always to the middle of the  
world1 which in any round body is the   
lowest  place4    ,,xxv4 ,a mind        
employed on such subjects1 and which    
night and day  contemplates them1       
contains in itself that precept of the  
,delphic ,god1 so  as to 8know itself10 
and to perceive its connexion with the  
divine reason1  from whence it is filled
 with an insatiable joy4 ,for           
reflections on the  power and nature of 
the ,gods raise in us a desire of       
imitating their  eternity4 ,nor does the
 mind1 that sees the necessary          
dependences and  connexions that one    
cause has with another1 think it        
possible that it  should be itself      
confined to the shortness of this life4 
,those causes1  though they proceed from
 eternity to eternity1 are governed by  

reason and  understanding4 ,and he who  
beholds them and examines them1 or      
rather he  whose view takes in all the  
parts and boundaries of things1 with    
what  tranquillity of mind does he look 
on all human affairs1 and on all that is
  nearer him6 ,hence proceeds the       
knowledge of virtue2 hence arise the    
kinds  and species of virtues2 hence are
 discovered those things which nature   
regards as the bounds and extremities of
 good and evil2 by this it is           
discovered to what all duties ought to  
be referred1 and which is the most      
eligible manner of life4 ,and when these
 and similar points have been           
investigated1 the principal consequence 
which is deduced from them1 and  that   
which is our main object in this        
discussion1 is the establishment of  the
 point--that virtue is of itself        
sufficient to a happy life4    ,the     
third qualification of our wise man is  
the next to be considered1  which goes  
through and spreads itself over every   

part of wisdom2 it is  that whereby we  
define each particular thing1           
distinguish the genus from  its species1
 connect consequences1 draw just        
conclusions1 and distinguish  truth from
 falsehood1 which is the very art and   
science of disputing2  which is not only
 of the greatest use in the examination 
of what passes in  the world1 but is    
likewise the most rational              
entertainment1 and that which  is most  
becoming to true wisdom4 ,such are its  
effects in retirement4 ,now  let our    
wise man be considered as protecting the
 republic2 what can be  more excellent  
than such a character8 ,by his prudence 
he will discover the  true interests of 
his fellow-citizens1 by his justice he  
will be prevented  from applying what   
belongs to the public to his own use2   
and in short1 he  will be ever governed 
by all the virtues which are many and   
various8 ,to  these let us add the      
advantage of his friendships2 in which  
the learned  reckon not only a natural  

harmony and agreement of sentiments     
throughout  the conduct of life1 but the
 utmost pleasure and satisfaction in    
conversing and passing our time         
constantly with one another4 ,what can  
be  wanting to such a life as this1 to  
make it more happy than it is8 ,fortune 
herself must yield to a life stored with
 such joys4 ,now if it be a  happiness  
to rejoice in such goods of the mind1   
that is to say1 in such  virtues1 and if
 all wise men enjoy thoroughly these    
pleasures1 it must  necessarily be      
granted that all such are happy4        
,,xxvi4 ,a4 ,what1 when in torments and 
on the rack8    ,m4 ,do you imagine ,i  
am speaking of him as laid on roses and 
violets8 ,is  it allowable even for     
,epicurus 7who only puts on the         
appearance of being a  philosopher1 and 
who himself assumed that name for       
himself17 to say1  7though as matters   
stand1 ,i commend him for his saying17  
that a wise man  might at all times cry 
out1 though he be burned1 tortured1 cut 

to pieces1  8,how little ,i regard it60 
,shall this be said by one who defines  
all evil  as pain1 and measures every   
good by pleasure2 who could ridicule    
whatever  we call either honourable or  
base1 and could declare of us that we   
were  employed about words1 and uttering
 mere empty sounds2 and that nothing is 
to be regarded by us1 but as it is      
perceived to be smooth or rough by the  
body8 ,what1 shall such a man as this1  
as ,i said1 whose understanding is      
little superior to the beasts1 be at    
liberty to forget himself2 and not  only
 to despise fortune1 when the whole of  
his good and evil is in the  power of   
fortune1 but to say1 that he is happy in
 the most racking  torture1 when he had 
actually declared pain to be not only   
the greatest  evil1 but the only one8   
,nor did he take any trouble to provide 
himself  with those remedies which might
 have enabled him to bear pain2 such as 
firmness of mind1 a shame of doing      
anything base1 exercise1 and the habit  

of patience1 precepts of courage1 and a 
manly hardiness3 but he says that  he   
supports himself on the single          
recollection of past pleasures1 as if   
any one1 when the weather was so hot as 
that he was scarcely able to bear  it1  
should comfort himself by recollecting  
that he was once in my country          
,arpinum1 where he was surrounded on    
every side by cooling streams3 for ,i   
do not apprehend how past pleasures can 
allay present evils4 ,but when he  says 
that a wise man is always happy1 who    
would have no right to say so if  he    
were consistent with himself1 what may  
they not do1 who allow nothing  to be   
desirable1 nothing to be looked on as   
good but what is honourable8  ,let1     
then1 the ,peripatetics and old         
,academics follow my example1 and at    
length leave off muttering to           
themselves2 and openly and with a clear 
voice let them be bold to say1 that a   
happy life may not be inconsistent  with
 the agonies of ,phalaris's bull4       

,,xxvii4 ,but to dismiss the subtleties 
of the ,stoics1 which ,i am sensible ,i 
have employed more than was necessary1  
let us admit of three kinds of  goods3  
and let them really be kinds of goods1  
provided no regard is had to  the body1 
and to external circumstances1 as       
entitled to the appellation of  good in 
any other sense than because we are     
obliged to use them3 but let  those     
other divine goods spread themselves far
 in every direction1 and  reach the very
 heavens4 ,why1 then1 may ,i not call   
him happy1 nay1 the  happiest of men1   
who has attained them8 ,shall a wise man
 be afraid of  pain8 which is1 indeed1  
the greatest enemy to our opinion4 ,for 
,i am  persuaded that we are prepared   
and fortified sufficiently1 by the      
disputations of the foregoing days1     
against our own death1 or that of our   
friends1 against grief and the other    
perturbations of the mind4 ,but pain    
seems to be the sharpest adversary of   
virtue3 that it is which menaces us     

with burning torches2 that it is which  
threatens to crush our fortitude1  and  
greatness of mind1 and patience4 ,shall 
virtue then yield to this8  ,shall the  
happy life of a wise and consistent man 
succumb to this8 ,good  ,gods6 how base 
would this be6 ,spartan boys will bear  
to have their bodies  torn by rods      
without uttering a groan4 ,i myself have
 seen at ,lacedmon1  troops of young    
men1 with incredible earnestness        
contending together with  their hands   
and feet1 with their teeth and nails1   
nay even ready to  expire1 rather than  
own themselves conquered4 ,is any       
country of barbarians  more uncivilized 
or desolate than ,india8 ,yet they have 
amongst them some  that are held for    
wise men1 who never wear any clothes all
 their life  long1 and who bear the snow
 of ,caucasus1 and the piercing cold of 
winter1  without any pain3 and who if   
they come in contact with fire endure   
being  burned without a groan4 ,the     
women too1 in ,india1 on the death of   

their  husbands have a regular contest1 
and apply to the judge to have it       
determined which of them was best       
beloved by him2 for it is customary     
there for one man to have many wives4   
,she in whose favour it is determined   
exults greatly1 and being attended by   
her relations is laid on the funeral    
pile with her husband3 the others1 who  
are postponed1 walk away very much      
dejected4 ,custom can never be superior 
to nature3 for nature is never to  be   
got the better of4 ,but our minds are   
infected by sloth and idleness1  and    
luxury1 and languor1 and indolence3 we  
have enervated them by  opinions1 and   
bad customs4 ,who is there who is       
unacquainted with the  customs of the   
,egyptians8 ,their minds being tainted  
by pernicious  opinions1 they are ready 
to bear any torture1 rather than hurt an
 ibis1 a  snake1 a cat1 a dog1 or a     
crocodile3 and should any one           
inadvertently have  hurt any of these   
animals1 he will submit to any          

punishment4 ,i am speaking  of men only4
 ,as to the beasts1 do they not bear    
cold and hunger1 running  about in      
woods1 and on mountains and deserts8    
will they not fight for  their young    
ones till they are wounded8 ,are they   
afraid of any attacks or  blows8 ,i     
mention not what the ambitious will     
suffer for honour's sake1 or  those who 
are desirous of praise on account of    
glory1 or lovers to gratify  their lust4
 ,life is full of such instances4       
,,xxviii4 ,but let us not dwell too much
 on these questions1 but rather let  us 
return to our subject4 ,i say1 and say  
again1 that happiness will submit  even 
to be tormented2 and that in pursuit of 
justice1 and temperance1 and  still more
 especially and principally fortitude1  
and greatness of soul1  and patience1 it
 will not stop short at sight of the    
executioner2 and when  all other virtues
 proceed calmly to the torture1 that one
 will never halt1  as ,i said1 on the   
outside and threshold of the prison3 for

 what can be  baser1 what can carry a   
worse appearance1 than to be left alone1
 separated  from those beautiful        
attendants8 not however that this is by 
any means  possible3 for neither can the
 virtues hold together without          
happiness1 nor  happiness without the   
virtues3 so that they will not suffer   
her to desert  them1 but will carry her 
along with them1 to whatever torments1  
to  whatever pain they are led4 ,for it 
is the peculiar quality of a wise man   
to do nothing that he may repent of1    
nothing against his inclination3 but    
always to act nobly1 with constancy1    
gravity1 and honesty3 to depend on      
nothing as certainty3 to wonder at      
nothing1 when it falls out1 as if it    
appeared strange and unexpected to him3 
to be independent of every one1  and    
abide by his own opinion4 ,for my part1 
,i cannot form an idea of  anything     
happier than this4 ,the conclusion of   
the ,stoics is indeed easy2  for since  
they are persuaded that the end of good 

is to live agreeably to  nature1 and to 
be consistent with that1--as a wise man 
should do so1 not  only because it is   
his duty1 but because it is in his      
power1 it must of  course follow1 that  
whoever has the chief good in his power1
 has his  happiness so too4 ,and thus   
the life of a wise man is always happy4 
,you  have here what ,i think may be    
confidently said of a happy life1 and as
  things now stand1 very truly also1    
unless you can advance something        
better4    ,,xxix4 ,a4 ,indeed ,i       
cannot2 but ,i should be glad to prevail
 on you1 unless  it is troublesome 7as  
you are under no confinement from       
obligations to any  particular sect1 but
 gather from all of them whatever       
strikes you most as  having the         
appearance of probability71 as you just 
now seemed to advise  the ,peripatetics 
and the ,old ,academy1 boldly to speak  
out without reserve1  8that wise men are
 always the happiest10--,i should be    
glad to hear how you  think it          

consistent for them to say so1 when you 
have said so much against  that opinion1
 and the conclusions of the ,stoics4    
,m4 ,i will make use1 then1 of that     
liberty which no one has the privilege  
of using in philosophy but those of our 
school1 whose discourses determine      
nothing1 but take in everything1 leaving
 them1 unsupported by the  authority of 
any particular person1 to be judged of  
by others1 according  to their weight4  
,and as you seem desirous of knowing how
 it is that1  notwithstanding the       
different opinions of philosophers with 
regard to the  ends of goods1 virtue has
 still sufficient security for the      
effecting of a  happy life1--which      
security1 as we are informed1 ,carneades
 used indeed to  dispute against2 but he
 disputed as against the ,stoics1 whose 
opinions he  combated with great zeal   
and vehemence1--,i however shall handle 
the  question with more temper2 for if  
the ,stoics have rightly settled the    
ends of goods1 the affair is at an end2 

for a wise man must necessarily  be     
always happy4 ,but let us examine1 if we
 can1 the particular opinions of  the   
others1 that so this excellent decision1
 if ,i may so call it1 in  favour of a  
happy life1 may be agreeable to the     
opinions and discipline of  all4        
,,xxx4 ,these then are the opinions1 as 
,i think1 that are held and defended3   
the first four are simple ones2 8that   
nothing is good but what is honest10    
according to the ,stoics3 nothing good  
but pleasure1 as ,epicurus  maintains3  
8nothing good but a freedom from pain10 
as ,hieronymus7#aaa7  asserts3 8nothing 
good but an enjoyment of the principal1 
or all1 or the  greatest goods of       
nature10 as ,carneades maintained       
against the  ,stoics3--these are simple1
 the others are mixed propositions4     
,then there  are three kinds of goods2  
the greatest being those of the mind1   
the next  best those of the body1 the   
third are external goods1 as the        
,peripatetics  call them1 and the old   

,academics differ very little from them4
  ,dinomachus7#aab7 and ,callipho7#aac7 
have coupled pleasure with honesty3 but 
,diodorus17#aad7 the ,peripatetic1 has  
joined indolence to honesty4 ,these are 
the opinions that have some footing2 for
 those of ,aristo17#aae7  ,pyrrho17#aaf7
 ,herillus17#aag7 and of some others1   
are quite out of date4 ,now  let us see 
what weight these men have in them1     
excepting the ,stoics1 whose  opinion ,i
 think ,i have sufficiently defended2   
and indeed ,i have explained  what the  
,peripatetics have to say2 excepting    
that ,theophrastus1 and those  who      
followed him1 dread and abhor pain in   
too weak a manner4 ,the others  may go  
on to exaggerate the gravity and dignity
 of virtue1 as usual2 and  then1 after  
they have extolled it to the skies1 with
 the usual  extravagance of good        
orators1 it is easy to reduce the other 
topics to  nothing by comparison1 and to
 hold them up to contempt4 ,they who    
think  that praise deserves to be sought

 after1 even at the expense of pain1 are
  not at liberty to deny those men to be
 happy1 who have obtained it4 ,though   
they may be under some evils1 yet this  
name of happy has a very wide           
application4    ,,xxxi4 ,for even as    
trading is said to be lucrative1 and    
farming  advantageous1 not because the  
one never meets with any loss1 nor the  
other  with any damage from the         
inclemency of the weather1 but because  
they  succeed in general3 so life may be
 properly called happy1 not from its    
being entirely made up of good things1  
but because it abounds with these  to a 
great and considerable degree4 ,by this 
way of reasoning1 then1 a  happy life   
may attend virtue even to the moment of 
execution2 nay1 may  descend with her   
into ,phalaris's bull1 according to     
,aristotle1 ,xenocrates1  ,speusippus1  
,polemon2 and will not be gained over by
 any allurements to  forsake her4 ,of   
the same opinion will ,calliphon and    
,diodorus be3 for they  are both of them

 such friends to virtue1 as to think    
that all things  should be discarded and
 far removed that are incompatible with 
it4 ,the  rest seem to be more hampered 
with these doctrines1 but yet they get  
clear  of them2 such as ,epicurus1      
,hieronymus1 and whoever else thinks it 
worth  while to defend the deserted     
,carneades3 for there is not one of them
 who  does not think the mind to be     
judge of those goods1 and able          
sufficiently  to instruct him how to    
despise what has the appearance only of 
good or  evil4 ,for what seems to you to
 be the case with ,epicurus1 is the case
 also  with ,hieronymus and ,carneades1 
and indeed with all the rest of them3   
for  who is there who is not            
sufficiently prepared against death and 
pain8 ,i  will begin1 with your leave1  
with him whom we call soft and          
voluptuous4  ,what6 does he seem to you 
to be afraid of death or pain1 when he  
calls the  day of his death happy2 and  
who1 when he is afflicted by the        

greatest  pains1 silences them all by   
recollecting arguments of his own       
discovering8  ,and this is not done in  
such a manner as to give room for       
imagining that  he talks thus wildly    
from some sudden impulse3 but his       
opinion of death  is1 that on the       
dissolution of the animal1 all sense is 
lost2 and what is  deprived of sense is1
 as he thinks1 what we have no concern  
at all with4  ,and as to pain too1 he   
has certain rules to follow then3 if it 
be great1  the comfort is1 that it must 
be short2 if it be of long continuance1 
then  it must be supportable4 ,what     
then8 ,do those grandiloquent gentlemen 
state  anything better than ,epicurus1  
in opposition to these two things which 
distress us the most8 ,and as to other  
things1 do not ,epicurus and the rest   
of the philosophers seem sufficiently   
prepared8 ,who is there who does not    
dread poverty8 ,and yet no true         
philosopher ever can dread it4          
,,xxxii4 ,but with how little is this   

man himself satisfied8 ,no one has said 
more on frugality4 ,for when a man is   
far removed from those things which     
occasion a desire of money1 from love1  
ambition1 or other daily  extravagance1 
why should he be fond of money1 or      
concern himself at all  about it8 ,could
 the ,scythian ,anacharsis7#aah7        
disregard money1 and shall  not our     
philosophers be able to do so8 ,we are  
informed of an epistle of  his1 in these
 words3 8,anacharsis to ,hanno1         
greeting4 ,my clothing is the  same as  
that with which the ,scythians cover    
themselves2 the hardness of my  feet    
supplies the want of shoes2 the ground  
is my bed1 hunger my sauce1 my  food    
milk1 cheese1 and flesh4 ,so you may    
come to me as to a man in want of       
nothing4 ,but as to those presents you  
take so much pleasure in1 you may       
dispose of them to your own citizens1 or
 to the immortal gods40 ,and almost  all
 philosophers1 of all schools1 excepting
 those who are warped from  right reason

 by a vicious disposition1 might have   
been of this same  opinion4 ,socrates1  
when on one occasion he saw a great     
quantity of gold  and silver carried in 
a procession1 cried out1 8,how many     
things are there  which ,i do not want60
    ,xenocrates1 when some ambassadors  
from ,alexander had brought him fifty   
talents1 which was a very large sum of  
money in those times1 especially at     
,athens1 carried the ambassadors to sup 
in the ,academy2 and placed just a      
sufficiency before them1 without any    
apparatus4 ,when they asked him1 the    
next day1 to whom he wished the money   
which they had for him to be paid3      
8,what80 said he1 8did you not perceive 
by our slight repast of yesterday1  that
 ,i had no occasion for money80 ,but    
when he perceived that they were        
somewhat dejected1 he accepted of thirty
 min1 that he might not seem to  treat  
with disrespect the king's generosity4  
,but ,diogenes took a greater  liberty1 
like a ,cynic1 when ,alexander asked him

 if he wanted anything3  8,just at      
present10 said he1 8,i wish that you    
would stand a little out of  the line   
between me and the sun10 for ,alexander 
was hindering him from  sunning himself4
 ,and indeed this very man used to      
maintain how much he  surpassed the     
,persian king1 in his manner of life and
 fortune2 for that he  himself was in   
want of nothing1 while the other never  
had enough2 and that  he had no         
inclination for those pleasures of which
 the other could never  get enough to   
satisfy himself3 and that the other     
could never obtain his4    ,,xxxiii4    
,you see1 ,i imagine1 how ,epicurus has 
divided his kinds of desires1  not very 
acutely perhaps1 but yet usefully3      
saying1 that they are 8partly  natural  
and necessary2 partly natural1 but not  
necessary2 partly neither4  ,that those 
which are necessary may be supplied     
almost for nothing2 for  that the things
 which nature requires are easily       
obtained40 ,as to the  second kind of   

desires1 his opinion is1 that any one   
may easily either  enjoy or go without  
them4 ,and with regard to the third1    
since they are  utterly frivolous1 being
 neither allied to necessity nor nature1
 he thinks  that they should be entirely
 rooted out4 ,on this topic a great many
  arguments are adduced by the          
,epicureans2 and those pleasures which  
they do  not despise in a body1 they    
disparage one by one1 and seem rather   
for  lessening the number of them3 for  
as to wanton pleasures1 on which subject
  they say a great deal1 these1 say     
they1 are easy1 common1 and within any  
one's reach2 and they think that if     
nature requires them1 they are not to   
be estimated by birth1 condition1 or    
rank1 but by shape1 age1 and person3    
and that it is by no means difficult to 
refrain from them1 should health1  duty1
 or reputation require it2 but that     
pleasures of this kind may be           
desirable1 where they are attended with 
no inconvenience1 but can never be  of  

any use4 ,and the assertions which      
,epicurus makes with respect to the     
whole of pleasure1 are such as show his 
opinion to be that pleasure is  always  
desirable1 and to be pursued merely     
because it is pleasure2 and for  the    
same reason pain is to be avoided1      
because it is pain4 ,so that a wise  man
 will always adopt such a system of     
counterbalancing as to do himself  the  
justice to avoid pleasure1 should pain  
ensue from it in too great a            
proportion2 and will submit to pain1    
provided the effects of it are to       
produce a greater pleasure3 so that all 
pleasurable things1 though the          
corporeal senses are the judges of them1
 are still to be referred to the  mind1 
on which account the body rejoices1     
whilst it perceives a present  pleasure2
 but that the mind not only perceives   
the present as well as the  body1 but   
foresees it1 while it is coming1 and    
even when it is past will  not let it   
quite slip away4 ,so that a wise man    

enjoys a continual series  of pleasures1
 uniting the expectation of future      
pleasure to the  recollection of what he
 has already tasted4 ,the like notions  
are applied  by them to high living2 and
 the magnificence and expensiveness of  
entertainments are deprecated1 because  
nature is satisfied at a small  expense4
    ,,xxxiv4 ,for who does not see this1
 that an appetite is the best sauce8    
,when  ,darius1 in his flight from the  
enemy1 had drunk some water which was   
muddy  and tainted with dead bodies1 he 
declared that he had never drunk        
anything  more pleasant2 the fact was1  
that he had never drunk before when he  
was  thirsty4 ,nor had ,ptolemy ever    
eaten when he was hungry3 for as he was 
travelling over ,egypt1 his company not 
keeping up with him1 he had some  coarse
 bread presented him in a cottage3 upon 
which he said1 8,nothing ever  seemed to
 him pleasanter than that bread40 ,they 
relate too of ,socrates1  that1 once    
when he was walking very fast till the  

evening1 on his being  asked why he did 
so1 his reply was that he was purchasing
 an appetite by  walking1 that he might 
sup the better4 ,and do we not see what 
the  ,lacedmonians provide in their     
,phiditia8 where the tyrant ,dionysius  
supped1 but told them he did not at all 
like that black broth1 which was  their 
principal dish2 on which he who dressed 
it said1 8,it was no wonder1  for it    
wanted seasoning40 ,dionysius asked what
 that seasoning was2 to  which it was   
replied1 8,fatigue in hunting1 sweating1
 a race on the banks  of ,eurotas1      
hunger1 and thirst30 for these are the  
seasonings to the  ,lacedmonian         
banquets4 ,and this may not only be     
conceived from the custom  of men1 but  
from the beasts1 who are satisfied with 
anything that is  thrown before them1   
provided it is not unnatural1 and they  
seek no  farther4 ,some entire cities1  
taught by custom1 delight in parsimony1 
as ,i  said but just now of the         
,lacedmonians4 ,xenophon has given an   

account of  the ,persian diet2 who      
never1 as he saith1 use anything but    
cresses with  their bread1 not but that1
 should nature require anything more    
agreeable1  many things might be easily 
supplied by the ground1 and plants in   
great  abundance1 and of incomparable   
sweetness4 ,add to this1 strength and   
health1 as the consequence of this      
abstemious way of living4 ,now compare  
with this1 those who sweat and belch1   
being crammed with eating1 like  fatted 
oxen3 then will you perceive that they  
who pursue pleasure most1  attain it    
least3 and that the pleasure of eating  
lies not in satiety1 but  appetite4     
,,xxxv4 ,they report of ,timotheus1 a   
famous man at ,athens1 and the head of  
the city1 that having supped with       
,plato1 and being extremely delighted   
with his entertainment1 on seeing him   
the next day1 he said1 8,your suppers   
are not only agreeable whilst ,i partake
 of them1 but the next day also40       
,besides1 the understanding is impaired 

when we are full with over-eating  and  
drinking4 ,there is an excellent epistle
 of ,plato to ,dion's relations1  in    
which there occurs as nearly as possible
 these words3 8,when ,i came  there1    
that happy life so much talked of1      
devoted to ,italian and ,syracusan      
entertainments1 was no ways agreeable to
 me2 to be crammed twice a day1  and    
never to have the night to yourself1 and
 the other things which are  the        
accompaniments of this kind of life1 by 
which a man will never be made  the     
wiser1 but will be rendered much less   
temperate2 for it must be an            
extraordinary disposition that can be   
temperate in such circumstances40  ,how1
 then1 can a life be pleasant without   
prudence and temperance8 ,hence  you    
discover the mistake of ,sardanapalus1  
the wealthiest king of the  ,assyrians1 
who ordered it to be engraved on his    
tomb1          ,i still have what in    
food ,i did exhaust1      ,but what ,i  
left1 though excellent1 is lost4        

8,what less than this10 says ,aristotle1
 8could be inscribed on the tomb1  not  
of a king but an ox80 ,he said that he  
possessed those things when  dead1      
which1 in his lifetime1 he could have no
 longer than whilst he was  enjoying    
them4 ,why1 then1 are riches desired8   
,and wherein doth poverty  prevent us   
from being happy8 ,in the want1 ,i      
imagine1 of statues1 pictures1  and     
diversions4 ,but if any one is delighted
 with these things1 have not  the poor  
people the enjoyment of them more than  
they who are the owners of  them in the 
greatest abundance8 ,for we have great  
numbers of them  displayed publicly in  
our city4 ,and whatever store of them   
private people  have1 they cannot have a
 great number1 and they but seldom see  
them1 only  when they go to their       
country seats2 and some of them must be 
stung to the  heart when they consider  
how they came by them4 ,the day would   
fail me1  should ,i be inclined to      
defend the cause of poverty3 the thing  

is  manifest1 and nature daily informs  
us how few things there are1 and how    
trifling they are1 of which she really  
stands in need4    ,,xxxvi4 ,let us     
inquire1 then1 if obscurity1 the want of
 power1 or even the  being unpopular1   
can prevent a wise man from being happy4
 ,observe if  popular favour1 and this  
glory which they are so fond of1 be not 
attended  with more uneasiness than     
pleasure4 ,our friend ,demosthenes was  
certainly  very weak in declaring       
himself pleased with the whisper of a   
woman who was  carrying water1 as is the
 custom in ,greece1 and who whispered to
 another1  8,that is he--that is        
,demosthenes40 ,what could be weaker    
than this8 and yet  what an orator he   
was6 ,but although he had learned to    
speak to others1 he  had conversed but  
little with himself4 ,we may perceive1  
therefore1 that  popular glory is not   
desirable of itself2 nor is obscurity to
 be dreaded4  8,i came to ,athens10     
saith ,democritus1 8and there was no one

 there that  knew me30 this was a       
moderate and grave man who could glory  
in his  obscurity4 ,shall musicians     
compose their tunes to their own tastes2
 and  shall a philosopher1 master of a  
much better art1 seek to ascertain1 not 
what is most true1 but what will please 
the people8 ,can anything be more       
absurd than to despise the vulgar as    
mere unpolished mechanics1 taken        
singly1 and to think them of consequence
 when collected into a body8 ,these     
wise men would contemn our ambitious    
pursuits1 and our vanities1 and would   
reject all the honours which the people 
could voluntarily offer to them3  but we
 know not how to despise them till we   
begin to repent of having  accepted     
them4 ,there is an anecdote related by  
,heraclitus the natural  philosopher1 of
 ,hermodorus the chief of the           
,ephesians1 that he said1 8that  all the
 ,ephesians ought to be punished with   
death1 for saying1 when they  had       
expelled ,hermodorus out of their city1 

that they would have no one  amongst    
them better than another2 but that if   
there were any such1 he  might go       
elsewhere to some other people40 ,is not
 this the case with the  people         
everywhere8 do they not hate every      
virtue that distinguishes  itself8      
,what6 was not ,aristides 7,i had rather
 instance in the ,greeks than           
ourselves7 banished his country for     
being eminently just8 ,what troubles1   
then1 are they free from who have no    
connexion whatever with the people6     
,what is more agreeable than a learned  
retirement8 ,i speak of that learning   
which makes us acquainted with the      
boundless extent of nature1 and the     
universe1 and which even while we remain
 in this world discovers to us  both    
heaven1 earth1 and sea4    ,,xxxvii4    
,if1 then1 honour and riches have no    
value1 what is there else to  be afraid 
of8 ,banishment1 ,i suppose2 which is   
looked on as the greatest  evil4 ,now1  
if the evil of banishment proceeds not  

from ourselves1 but from  the froward   
disposition of the people1 ,i have just 
now declared how  contemptible it is4   
,but if to leave one's country be       
miserable1 the  provinces are full of   
miserable men2 very few of the settlers 
in which  ever return to their country  
again4 ,but exiles are deprived of their
  property6 ,what1 then6 has there not  
been enough said on bearing poverty8    
,but with regard to banishment1 if we   
examine the nature of things1 not the   
ignominy of the name1 how little does it
 differ from constant travelling8  in   
which some of the most famous           
philosophers have spent their whole     
life3  as ,xenocrates1 ,crantor1        
,arcesilas1 ,lacydes1 ,aristotle1       
,theophrastus1 ,zeno1  ,cleanthes1      
,chrysippus1 ,antipater1 ,carneades1    
,pantius1 ,clitomachus1 ,philo1         
,antiochus1 ,posidonius1 and innumerable
 others2 who from their first  setting  
out never returned home again4 ,now what
 ignominy can a wise man be  affected   

with 7for it is of such a one that ,i am
 speaking7 who can be  guilty of nothing
 which deserves it2 for there is no     
occasion to comfort  one who is banished
 for his deserts4 ,lastly1 they can     
easily reconcile  themselves to every   
accident who measure all their objects  
and pursuits in  life by the standard of
 pleasure2 so that in whatever place    
that is  supplied1 there they may live  
happily4 ,thus what ,teucer said may be 
applied to every case3                  
,wherever ,i am happy1 is my country4   
,socrates1 indeed1 when he was asked    
where he belonged to1 replied1 8,the    
world20 for he looked upon himself as a 
citizen and inhabitant of the  whole    
world4 ,how was it with ,t4 ,altibutius8
 ,did he not follow his  philosophical  
studies with the greatest satisfaction  
at ,athens1 although  he was banished8  
which1 however1 would not have happened 
to him1 if he had  obeyed the laws of   
,epicurus1 and lived peaceably in the   
republic4 ,in what  was ,epicurus       

happier1 living in his own country1 than
 ,metrodorus who lived  at ,athens8 ,or 
did ,plato's happiness exceed that of   
,xenocrates1 or ,polemo1  or ,arcesilas8
 ,or is that city to be valued much1    
that banishes all her  good and wise    
men8 ,demaratus1 the father of our king 
,tarquin1 not being  able to bear the   
tyrant ,cypselus1 fled from ,corinth to 
,tarquinii1 settled  there1 and had     
children4 ,was it1 then1 an unwise act  
in him to prefer the  liberty of        
banishment to slavery at home8          
,,xxxviii4 ,besides the emotions of the 
mind1 all griefs and anxieties are      
assuaged by forgetting them1 and turning
 our thoughts to pleasure4  ,therefore1 
it was not without reason that ,epicurus
 presumed to say that a  wise man       
abounds with good things1 because he may
 always have his  pleasures3 from whence
 it follows1 as he thinks1 that that    
point is  gained1 which is the subject  
of our present inquiry1 that a wise man 
is  always happy4 ,what6 though he      

should be deprived of the senses of     
seeing  and hearing8 ,yes2 for he holds 
those things very cheap4 ,for1 in the   
first  place1 what are the pleasures of 
which we are deprived by that dreadful  
thing1 blindness8 ,for though they allow
 other pleasures to be confined to  the 
senses1 yet the things which are        
perceived by the sight do not depend    
wholly on the pleasure the eyes receive2
 as is the case when we taste1  smell1  
touch1 or hear2 for1 in respect of all  
these senses1 the organs  themselves are
 the seat of pleasure2 but it is not so 
with the eyes4 ,for  it is the mind     
which is entertained by what we see2 but
 the mind may be  entertained in many   
ways1 even though we could not see at   
all4 ,i am  speaking of a learned and a 
wise man1 with whom to think is to live4
 ,but  thinking in the case of a wise   
man does not altogether require the use 
of  his eyes in his investigations2 for 
if night does not strip him of his      
happiness1 why should blindness1 which  

resembles night1 have that effect8  ,for
 the reply of ,antipater the ,cyrenaic1 
to some women who bewailed his  being   
blind1 though it is a little too        
obscene1 is not without its             
significance4 8,what do you mean80 saith
 he2 8do you think the night can        
furnish no pleasure80 ,and we find by   
his magistracies and his actions1  that 
old ,appius7#aai7 too1 who was blind for
 many years1 was not prevented  from    
doing whatever was required of him1 with
 respect either to the  republic or his 
own affairs4 ,it is said1 that ,c4      
,drusus's house was  crowded with       
clients4 ,when they1 whose business it  
was1 could not see how  to conduct      
themselves1 they applied to a blind     
guide4    ,,xxxix4 ,when ,i was a boy1  
,cn4 ,aufidius1 a blind man1 who had    
served the  office of prtor1 not only   
gave his opinion in the senate1 and was 
ready  to assist his friends1 but wrote 
a ,greek history1 and had a considerable
  acquaintance with literature4         

,diodorus the ,stoic was blind1 and     
lived many  years at my house4 ,he1     
indeed1 which is scarcely credible1     
besides  applying himself more than     
usual to philosophy1 and playing on the 
flute1  agreeably to the custom of the  
,pythagoreans1 and having books read to 
him  night and day1 in all which he did 
not want eyes1 contrived to teach       
geometry1 which1 one would think1 could 
hardly be done without the  assistance  
of eyes1 telling his scholars how and   
where to draw every line4  ,they relate 
of ,asclepiades1 a native of ,eretria1  
and no obscure  philosopher1 when some  
one asked him what inconvenience he     
suffered from  his blindness1 that his  
reply was1 8,he was at the expense of   
another  servant40 ,so that1 as the most
 extreme poverty may be borne1 if you   
please1 as is daily the case with some  
in ,greece2 so blindness may easily  be 
borne1 provided you have the support of 
good health in other respects4          
,democritus was so blind he could not   

distinguish white from black3 but he    
knew the difference betwixt good and    
evil1 just and unjust1 honourable and   
base1 the useful and useless1 great and 
small4 ,thus one may live happily       
without distinguishing colours2 but     
without acquainting yourself with       
things1 you cannot2 and this man was of 
opinion1 that the intense  application  
of the mind was taken off by the objects
 that presented  themselves to the eye1 
and while others often could not see    
what was  before their feet1 he         
travelled through all infinity4 ,it is  
reported also  that ,homer7#abj7 was    
blind1 but we observe his painting1 as  
well as his  poetry4 ,what country1 what
 coast1 what part of ,greece1 what      
military  attacks1 what dispositions of 
battle1 what army1 what ship1 what      
motions  of men and animals can be      
mentioned which he has not described in 
such a  manner as to enable us to see   
what he could not see himself8 ,what1   
then6  can we imagine that ,homer1 or   

any other learned man1 has ever been in 
want  of pleasure and entertainment for 
his mind8 ,were it not so1 would        
,anaxagoras1 or this very ,democritus1  
have left their estates and             
patrimonies1 and given themselves up to 
the pursuit of acquiring this  divine   
pleasure8 ,it is thus that the poets who
 have represented ,tiresias  the ,augur 
as a wise man and blind1 never exhibit  
him as bewailing his  blindness4 ,and   
,homer1 too1 after he had described     
,polyphemus as a monster  and a wild    
man1 represents him talking with his    
ram1 and speaking of his  good fortune1 
inasmuch as he could go wherever he     
pleased and touch what  he would4 ,and  
so far he was right1 for that ,cyclops  
was a being of not  much more           
understanding than his ram4    ,,xl4    
,now1 as to the evil of being deaf3 ,m4 
,crassus was a little thick of  hearing2
 but it was more uneasiness to him that 
he heard himself ill  spoken of1 though1
 in my opinion1 he did not deserve it4  

,our ,epicureans  cannot understand     
,greek1 nor the ,greeks ,latin3 now1    
they are deaf  reciprocally as to each  
other's language1 and we are all truly  
deaf with  regard to those innumerable  
languages which we do not understand4   
,they do  not hear the voice of the     
harper2 but then they do not hear the   
grating of  a saw when it is setting1 or
 the grunting of a hog when his throat  
is  being cut1 nor the roaring of the   
sea when they are desirous of rest4 ,and
  if they should chance to be fond of   
singing1 they ought in the first place  
to consider that many wise men lived    
happily before music was discovered2    
besides1 they may have more pleasure in 
reading verses than in hearing  them    
sung4 ,then1 as ,i before referred the  
blind to the pleasures of  hearing1 so  
,i may the deaf to the pleasures of     
sight3 moreover1 whoever  can converse  
with himself doth not need the          
conversation of another4 ,but  suppose  
all these misfortunes to meet in one    

person3 suppose him blind and           
deaf1--let him be afflicted with the    
sharpest pains of body1 which1 in the   
first place1 generally of themselves    
make an end of him2 still1 should  they 
continue so long1 and the pain be so    
exquisite1 that we should be  unable to 
assign any reason for our being so      
afflicted1--still1 why1 good  ,gods6    
should we be under any difficulty8 ,for 
there is a retreat at hand3  death is   
that retreat--a shelter where we shall  
for ever be insensible4  ,theodoras said
 to ,lysimachus1 who threatened him with
 death1 8,it is a  great matter1 indeed1
 for you to have acquired the power of a
 ,spanish  fly60 ,when ,perses entreated
 ,paulus not to lead him in triumph1    
8,that is a  matter which you have in   
your own power10 said ,paulus4 ,i said  
many things  about death in our first   
day's disputation1 when death was the   
subject2  and not a little the next day1
 when ,i treated of pain2 which things  
if you  recollect1 there can be no      

danger of your looking upon death as    
undesirable1 or at least it will not be 
dreadful4    ,that custom which is      
common among the ,grecians at their     
banquets should1  in my opinion1 be     
observed in life3--,drink1 say they1 or 
leave the company3  and rightly enough2 
for a guest should either enjoy the     
pleasure of  drinking with others1 or   
else not stay till he meets with        
affronts from  those that are in liquor4
 ,thus1 those injuries of fortune which 
you cannot  bear1 you should flee from4 
,,xli4 ,this is the very same which is  
said by ,epicurus and ,hieronymus4 ,now1
  if those philosophers1 whose opinion  
it is that virtue has no power of       
itself1 and who say that the conduct    
which we denominate honourable and      
laudable is really nothing1 and is only 
an empty circumstance set off with  an  
unmeaning sound1 can nevertheless       
maintain that a wise man is always      
happy1 what1 think you1 may be done by  
the ,socratic and ,platonic             

philosophers4 ,some of these allow such 
superiority to the goods of the  mind1  
as quite to eclipse what concerns the   
body and all external  circumstances4   
,but others do not admit these to be    
goods2 they make  everything depend on  
the mind3 whose disputes ,carneades     
used1 as a sort of  honorary arbitrator1
 to determine4 ,for1 as what seemed     
goods to the  ,peripatetics were allowed
 to be advantages by the ,stoics1 and as
 the  ,peripatetics allowed no more to  
riches1 good health1 and other things of
  that sort1 than the ,stoics1 when     
these things were considered according  
to  their reality1 and not by mere      
names1 his opinion was that there was no
  ground for disagreeing4 ,therefore1   
let the philosophers of other schools   
see how they can establish this point   
also4 ,it is very agreeable to me  that 
they make some professions worthy of    
being uttered by the mouth of a         
philosopher1 with regard to a wise man's
 having always the means of living      

happily4    ,,xlii4 ,but as we are to   
depart in the morning1 let us remember  
these five  days' discussions2 though1  
indeed1 ,i think ,i shall commit them to
 writing3  for how can ,i better employ 
the leisure which ,i have1 of whatever  
kind it  is1 and whatever it be owing   
to8 and ,i will send these five books   
also to  my friend ,brutus1 by whom ,i  
was not only incited to write on        
philosophy1  but1 ,i may say1 provoked4 
,and by so doing1 it is not easy to say 
what  service ,i may be of to others2 at
 all events1 in my own various and acute
  afflictions1 which surround me on all 
sides1 ,i cannot find any better        
comfort for myself4    ,,the ,,end      
,,footnotes          #a ,the following  
are the most important of the passages  
referred        to3--8,since ,i entered 
upon these philosophical inquiries1     
,varro has        given me notice of a  
valuable and honourable dedication of a 
work of        his to me4444 ,in the    
mean time ,i have been preparing myself 

as he        desired to make him a      
return4                4          8,i   
may as well1 therefore1 remove from my  
,academical ,disputations        the    
present speakers1 who are distinguished 
characters indeed1 but        by no     
means philosophical1 and who discourse  
with too much subtlety1        and      
substitute ,varro in their place4 ,for  
these are the opinions of               
,antiochus1 to which he is much         
attached4 ,i can find a place for       
,catulus and ,lucullus elsewhere40--,ep4
 #ab4          8,the ,catulus and       
,lucullus ,i imagine you have had       
before2 but ,i have        made new     
introductions to these books which ,i   
wish you to have1        containing an  
eulogium upon each of these persons1 and
 there are        some other            
additions40--,ep4 #cb4          8,in    
consequence of the letter which you     
wrote to me about ,varro1 ,i        have
 taken the ,academy entirely out of the 
hands of those        distinguished     

persons1 and transferred it to our      
friend4 ,and from        two books ,i   
have made it into four4 ,these are      
longer than the others        were1     
though there are several parts left     
out4444 ,in truth1 if my                
self-love does not deceive me1 these    
books have come out in such a           
manner that there is nothing of the same
 kind like them even in                 
,greek40--,ep4 #ac4          8,i have   
transferred the whole of that           
,academical ,treatise to ,varro4        
,it had at first been divided among     
,catulus1 ,lucullus1 and                
,hortensius4 ,afterwards1 as this       
appeared unsuitable1 owing to those     
persons being1 not indeed unlearned1 but
 notoriously unversed in        such    
subjects1 as soon as ,i got home ,i     
transferred those dialogues        to   
,cato and ,brutus4 ,your letter about   
,varro has just reached me1 and         
there is no one by whom the opinions of 
,antiochus could be more        fitly   

supported40--,ep4 #af4          8,i had 
determined to include no living persons 
in my dialogues2 but        since you   
inform me that ,varro is desirous of it1
 and sets a great        value upon it1 
,i have composed this work1 and         
completed the whole        ,academical  
,discussion in four books2 ,i know not  
how well1 but with        such care that
 nothing can exceed it4 ,in these1 what 
had been        excellently collected by
 ,antiochus against the doctrine of     
incomprehensibility1 ,i have attributed 
to ,varro2 to this ,i reply in        my
 own person1 and you are the third in   
our conversation4 ,if ,i had        made
 ,cotta and ,varro disputing with one   
another1 as you suggest in        your  
last letter1 my own would have been a   
mute character4444          8,the       
,academics1 as you know1 ,i had         
discussed in the persons of             
,catulus1 ,lucullus1 and ,hortensius2   
but in truth the subject did not        
suit their characters1 being more       

logical than what they could be         
supposed ever to have dreamt of4        
,therefore1 when ,i read your letter    
to ,varro1 ,i seized on it as a sort of 
inspiration4 ,nothing could be          
more adapted to that species of         
philosophy in which he seems to take    
particular delight2 or to the support of
 such a part that ,i could        manage
 to avoid making my own sentiments      
predominant4 ,for the        opinions of
 ,antiochus are extremely persuasive1   
and are so carefully        expressed as
 to retain the acuteness of ,antiochus  
with my own        brilliancy of        
language1 if indeed ,i possess          
any40--,ep4 #ai4          ,the          
,antiochus mentioned above was a native 
of ,ascalon1 and the        founder of  
the fifth ,academy2 he had been the     
teacher of ,cicero        while he      
studied at ,athens2 and he had also a   
school in ,syria and        another in  
,alexandria4 ,cicero constantly speaks  
of him with great        regard and     

esteem4 ,the leaders of the ,academy    
since the time of        ,plato1 7and   
,cicero ranks even him among those      
philosophers who        denied the      
certainty of any kind of knowledge17 had
 gradually fallen        into a degree  
of scepticism that seemed to strike at  
the root of all        truth1           
theoretical and practical4 ,but         
,antiochus professed to revive          
the doctrines of the old ,academy1      
maintaining1 in opposition to           
,carneades and ,philo1 that the         
intellect had in itself a test by       
which it could distinguish between what 
was real and what existed        only in
 the imagination4 ,he himself appears to
 have held doctrines        very nearly 
coinciding with those of ,aristotle2    
agreeing however so        far with the 
,stoics as to insist that all emotions  
ought to be        suppressed4 ,so that 
,cicero almost inclines to class him    
among the        ,stoics2 though it     
appears that he considered himself as an

 ,eclectic        philosopher1 uniting  
the doctrines of the ,stoics and        
,academics so as        to revive the   
old ,academy4        #b ,titus          
,pomponius ,atticus was three years     
older than ,cicero1 with whom        he 
had been educated1 and with whom he     
always continued on terms of        the 
greatest intimacy2 his daughter was     
married to ,agrippa4 ,he was        of  
the ,epicurean school in philosophy4 ,he
 died ,b4,c4 #cb4        #c ,marcus     
,terentius ,varro was ten years older   
than ,cicero1 and a man of        the   
most extensive and profound learning4   
,he had held a naval        command     
against the pirates1 and against        
,mithridates1 and served as             
lieutenant to ,pompey in ,spain1 at the 
beginning of the civil war1             
adhering to his party till after the    
battle of ,pharsalia1 when he        was
 pardoned1 and taken into favour by     
,csar4 ,he was proscribed by        the 
second triumvirate1 but escaped1 and    

died ,b4,c4 #bh4 ,he was a very         
voluminous author1 and according to his 
own account composed four        hundred
 and ninety books2 but only one1 the    
three books ,de ,re        ,rustic1 have
 come down to us1 and a portion of a    
large treatise ,de        ,lingu ,latin4
          ,in philosophy he had been a  
pupil of ,antiochus1 and attached       
himself        to the ,academy with     
something of a leaning to the ,stoics4  
#d ,amafanius was one of the earliest   
,roman writers of the ,epicurean        
school4 ,he is mentioned by no one but  
,cicero4        #e ,we do not know who  
this ,rabirius was4        #f ,lucius   
lius ,prconinus ,stilo was a ,roman     
knight1 and one of the        earliest  
grammarians of ,rome4 ,cicero in the    
,brutus describes him as        a very  
learned man in both ,greek and ,roman   
literature2 and        especially in old
 ,latin works4 ,he had been a teacher of
 ,varro in        grammar1 and of       
,cicero himself in rhetoric4 ,he        

received the name of        ,stilo from 
his compositions2 and of ,prconinus     
because his father        had been a    
herald4        #g ,menippus was         
originally a slave1 a native of ,gadara 
in ,cle ,syria1        and a pupil of   
,diogenes the ,cynic4 ,he became very   
rich by usury1        afterwards he lost
 his money and committed suicide4 ,he   
wrote nothing        serious1 but his   
books were entirely full of jests4 ,we  
have some        fragments of ,varro's  
,satyr ,menippe1 which were written1 as 
we are        here told1 in imitation of
 ,menippus4        #h ,cicero ranges    
these poets here in chronological order4
          ,ennius was born at ,rudi in  
,calabria1 ,b4,c4 #bci1 of a very noble 
family4 ,he was brought to ,rome by ,m4 
,porcius ,cato at the end of the        
second ,punic war4 ,his plays were all  
translations or adaptations        from 
the ,greek2 but he also wrote a poetical
 history of ,rome called                
,annales1 in eighteen books1 and a poem 

on his friend ,scipio        ,africanus2
 some ,satires1 ,epigrams1 and one or   
two philosophical        poems4 ,only a 
few lines of his works remain to us4 ,he
 died at the        age of seventy4     
,pacuvius was a native of ,brundusium1  
and a relation1 probably a              
nephew1 of ,ennius4 ,he was born about  
,b4,c4 #bbj1 and lived to about         
the year ,b4,c4 #acj4 ,his works were   
nearly entirely tragedies               
translated from the ,greek4 ,horace1    
distinguishing between him and          
,accius1 says--          8,aufert       
,pacuvius docti famam senis2 ,accius    
alti40--,epist4 ,,ii4 i4 #ee4        #i 
,from 1 to walk4       #aj ,this ,lucius
 ,lucullus was the son of ,lucius       
,licinius ,lucullus1 who        was     
prtor ,b4,c4 #ajc1 and was appointed by 
the senate to take the        command in
 ,sicily1 where there was a formidable  
insurrection of the        slaves under 
,athenion and ,tryphon4 ,he was not     
however successful1        and was      

recalled2 and subsequently prosecuted by
 ,servilius for        bribery and      
malversation1 convicted and banished4   
,the exact time of        the birth of  
this ,lucullus his son is not known1 but
 was probably        about ,b4,c4 #aji4 
,his first appearance in public life was
 prosecuting        ,servilius1 who had 
now become an augur1 on a criminal      
charge1 7which        is what ,cicero   
alludes to here47 ,and though the trial 
terminated in        the acquittal of   
,servilius1 yet the part ,lucullus took 
in it appears        to have added      
greatly to his credit among his         
contemporaries4 ,the        special law 
in his favour mentioned a few lines     
lower down1 was        passed by ,sylla 
with whom ,lucullus was in high favour2 
so much so        that ,sylla at his    
death confided to him the charge of     
revising and        correcting his      
,commentaries4 ,cicero's statement of   
his perfect        inexperience in      
military affairs before the war against 

,mithridates        is not quite        
correct1 as he had served with          
distinction in the        ,marsic war4  
,the time of his death is not certainly 
known1 but ,cicero        speaks of him 
as dead in the ,oration concerning the  
consular        provinces1 delivered    
,b4,c4 #ef1 while he was certainly alive
 ,b4,c4 #ei1        in which year he was
 charged by ,l4 ,vettius with an        
imaginary plot        against the life  
of ,pompey4 ,his second wife was        
,servilia1        half-sister to ,cato  
,uticensis4       #aa ,from 1 a heap4   
#ab ,from  an ant4       #ac ,it is not 
even known to what work ,cicero is      
referring here4       #ad ,in the       
,heautontimorumenos4 ,act i4 ,sc4 #a4   
#ae ,ccilius ,statius was the           
predecessor of ,terence2 by birth an    
,insubrian ,gaul and a native of ,milan4
 ,he died ,b4,c4 #afe1 two years        
before the representation of the ,andria
 of ,terence4 ,he was        considered 
by the ,romans as a great master of the 

art of exciting        the feelings4    
,and ,cicero 7de ,opt4 ,gen4 ,dic4 #a47 
speaks of him as the        chief of the
 ,roman ,comic writers4 ,horace says--  
,vincere ,ccilius gravitate1 ,terentius 
arte4       #af ,marcus ,atilius1       
7though ,cicero speaks of him here as a 
tragedian17        was chiefly          
celebrated as a comic poet4 ,he was one 
of the earliest        writers of that  
class2 but nothing of his has come down 
to us4 ,in        another place ,cicero 
calls him 8duris simusscriptor40        
7,epist4 ad        ,att4 xiv4 #bj47     
#ag ,diogenes was a pupil of            
,chrysippus1 and succeeded ,zeno of     
,tarsus as        the head of the ,stoic
 school at ,athens4 ,he was one of the  
embassy        sent to ,rome by the     
,athenians1 ,b4,c4 #aee1 and is supposed
 to have        died almost immediately 
afterwards4       #ah ,antipater was a  
native of ,tarsus1 and the pupil and    
successor of        ,diogenes4 ,cicero  
speaks in very high terms of his genius4

 7,de ,off4        iii4 #ab47       #ai 
,mnesarchus was a pupil of ,pantius and 
the teacher of ,antiochus of            
,ascalon4       #bj ,pantius was a      
,rhodian1 a pupil of ,diogenes and      
,antipater1 which        last he        
succeeded as head of the ,stoic school4 
,he was a friend of ,p4        ,scipio  
milianus1 and accompanied him on his    
embassy to the kings of        ,egypt   
and ,asia in alliance with ,rome4 ,he   
died before ,b4,c4 #aaa4       #ba      
,posidonius was a native of ,apamea1 in 
,egypt1 a pupil of ,pantius1        and 
a contemporary of ,cicero4 ,he came to  
,rome ,b4,c4 #ea1 having been           
sent there as ambassador from ,rhodes in
 the time of ,marius4       #bb ,lucius 
,afranius lived about #ajj ,b4,c4 ,his  
comedies were chiefly        togat1     
depicting ,roman life2 he borrowed      
largely from ,menander1        to whom  
the ,romans compared him4 ,horace says--
          ,dicitur ,afran toga          
convenisse ,menandro4          ,cicero  

praises his language highly 7,brut4     
#de74       #bc ,caius ,lucilius was the
 earliest of the ,roman satirists1 born 
at        ,suessa ,aurunca1 ,b4,c4 #adh2
 he died at ,naples1 ,b4,c4 #ajc4 ,he   
served        under ,scipio in the      
,numantine war4 ,he was a very vehement 
and bold        satirist4 ,cicero       
alludes here to a saying of his1 which  
he mentions        more expressly 7,de  
,orat4 ii471 that he did not wish the   
ignorant to        read his works       
because they could not understand them3 
nor the        learned because they     
would be able to criticise them4        
,persium non curo legere3 ,llium        
,decimum volo4          ,this ,persius  
being a very learned man2 in comparison 
with whom        ,llius was an          
ignoramus4       #bd ,polynus1 the son  
of ,athenodorus was a native of         
,lampsacus3 he was a        friend of   
,epicurus1 and though he had previously 
obtained a high        reputation as a  
mathematician1 he was persuaded by him  

at last to        agree with him as to  
the worthlessness of geometry4       #be
 ,hieronymus was a disciple of          
,aristotle and a contemporary of        
,arcesilaus4 ,he lived down to the time 
of ,ptolemy ,philadelphus4       #bf    
,trabea was a ,roman comic poet1 who    
flourished about #acj ,b4,c4       #bg  
,dark1 obscure4       #bh ,we know      
nothing more of ,callipho than what we  
derive from this and        one or two  
other notices of him by ,cicero4        
#bi ,the ,hymnis was a comedy of        
,menander1 translated by ,ccilius4      
#cj ,it is hardly possible to translate 
this so as to give the force of         
the original4 ,cicero says1 ,if         
cupiditas is in a man he must be        
cupidus1 and we have no ,english word   
which will at all answer to        this 
adjective in this sense4       #ca ,the 
,latin is 8quicum in tenebris10--the    
proverb at full length being1           
8,dignus quicum in tenebris mices40     
,micare was a game played1 7much        

the same as that now called ,la ,mora in
 ,italy17 by extending the              
fingers and making the antagonist guess 
how many fingers were        extended by
 the two together4       #cb ,this was  
,quintus ,pompeius1 the first man who   
raised his family to        importance  
at ,rome4 ,he was consul ,b4,c4 #ada4   
,being commander in        ,spain1 he   
laid siege to ,numantia2 and having lost
 great numbers of        his troops     
through cold and disease1 he proposed to
 the ,numantines        to come to      
terms4 ,publicly he required of them an 
unconditional        surrender1 but in  
private he only demanded the restoration
 of the        prisoners and deserters1 
that they should give hostages and pay  
thirty talents4 ,the ,numantines agreed 
to this1 and paid part of the           
money1 but when ,popilius ,lnas arrived 
in ,spain as his successor1 he          
denied the treaty1 though it had been   
witnessed by his own officers4          
,the matter was referred to the senate1 

who on the evidence of        ,pompeius 
declared the treaty invalid1 and the war
 was renewed4       #cc ,the ,voconia   
lex was passed on the proposal of       
,quintus ,voconius ,saxa1        one of 
the tribunes1 ,b4,c4 #afi4 ,one of its  
provisions was1 that a        woman     
could not be left the heiress of any    
person who was rated in        the      
census at #ajj1jjj sesterces2 though she
 could take the        inheritance per  
fidei commissum4 ,but as the law applied
 only to        wills1 a daughter could 
inherit from a father dying intestate1  
whatever the amount of his property     
might be4 ,a person who was not         
census could make a woman his heir4     
,there is1 however1 a good deal         
of obscurity and uncertainty as to some 
of the provisions of this        law4   
#cd ,there appears to be some corruption
 in the text here4       #ce ,spurius   
,lucretius ,tricipitinus1 the father of 
,lucretia1 was made        consul as the
 colleague of ,valerius ,publicola1 in  

the place of        ,brutus1 who had    
been slain in battle by ,aruns1 one of  
the sons of        ,tarquin4       #cf  
,themista was a female philosopher1 wife
 of a man named ,leonteus1 or           
,leon1 and a friend and correspondent of
 ,epicurus4       #cg ,he means when he 
was banished1 and when ,torquatus joined
 in        promoting the measures for   
his recal4       #ch ,cicero alludes    
here to the story of ,damon1 who1 when  
his friend        ,pythias was condemned
 to death by ,dionysius of ,syracuse1   
pledged his        life for his return  
in time to be put to death1 if the      
tyrant would        give him leave to go
 home for the purpose of arranging his  
affairs1        and ,pythias did return 
in time4--,see ,cic4 de ,off4 iii4 #aj2 
,just4 ,div4        v4 #bb4       #ci   
,b4,c4 #cfc4       #dj ,b4,c4 #dhj4     
#da ,the ,greek line occurs in the      
,orestes1 #bjg4                 4       
,virgil has the same idea--             
,vos et ,scyllam rabiem1 penitusque     

sonantes        ,acctis scopulos1 vos et
 ,cyclopia saxa        ,experti2        
revocate animos1 moestumque timorem     
,pellite3 forsan et haec olim meminisse 
juvabit4--n4 i4 #bjj4          ,which   
,dryden translates--          ,with me  
the rocks of ,scylla have you tried1    
,th' inhuman ,cyclops and his den       
defied3        ,what greater ills       
hereafter can you bear8        ,resume  
your courage and dismiss your care2     
,an hour will come with pleasure to     
relate        ,your sorrows past as     
benefits of fate4       #db ,that is1 of
 the past1 the present1 and the future4 
#dc ,this seems to refer to the ,greek  
epigram--               1         1  4  
4          ,which may be translated--   
,him who the paths of land and sea      
disturb'd1        ,sail'd o'er the      
earth1 walk'd o'er the humbled waves1   
,three hundred spears of dauntless      
,sparta curb'd4        ,shame on you1   
land and sea1 ye willing slaves6        
#dd ,the ,latin is rumn3 perhaps it is  

in allusion to this passage        that 
,juvenal says--          ,et potiores   
,herculis rumnas credat1 svosque labores
        ,et ,venere et cnis1 et pluma   
,sardanapali4          ,sat4 x4 #cfa4   
#de ,the great ,lucullus1 father of this
 young ,lucullus1 was married to        
,servilia1 half-sister to ,cato1 and    
daughter of ,quintus ,servilius         
,cpio1 who was killed in the ,social    
war1 having been decoyed into an        
ambush by ,pompdius1 ,b4,c4 #ij4 ,the   
young ,lucullus was afterwards          
killed in the battle of ,philippi4      
#df 8,malitia1 badness of quality 444   
especially malice1 ill-will1 spite1     
malevolence1 artfulness1 cunning1       
craft40--,riddle and ,arnold1 ,lat4     
,dict4       #dg ,the ,greek proverb    
was1     4       #dh ,the ,curia        
,hostilia was built by ,tullus          
,hostilius1 and was originally          
the only place where a ,senatus         
,consultum could be passed1 though the  
senate met at times in other places4    

,but1 under ,csar1 the ,curia           
,julia1 an immense edifice1 had been    
built as the senate-house4       #di    
,pope's ,homer1 ,odys4 xii4 #bca4       
#ej ,archilochus was a native of ,paros1
 and flourished about #gad-fgf1         
,b4,c4 ,his poems were chiefly ,iambics 
of bitter satire4 ,horace speaks        
of him as the inventor of ,iambics1 and 
calls himself his pupil4                
,parios ego primus ,iambos              
,ostendi ,latio1 numeros animosque      
secutus        ,archilochi1 non res et  
agentia verba ,lycamben4                
,epist4 ,i4 xix4 #be4          ,and in  
another place he says--                 
,archilochum proprio rabies armavit     
,iambo4--,a4 ,p4 #gd4       #ea ,this   
was ,livius ,andronicus3 he is supposed 
to have been a native of                
,tarentum1 and he was made prisoner by  
the ,romans1 during their wars        in
 ,southern ,italy2 owing to which he    
became the slave of ,m4 ,livius         
,salinator4 ,he wrote both comedies and 

tragedies1 of which ,cicero             
7,brutus #ah7 speaks very               
contemptuously1 as 8,livian fabul non   
satis        dign qu iterum             
legantur10--not worth reading a second  
time4 ,he also        wrote a ,latin    
,odyssey1 and some hymns1 and died      
probably about ,b4,c4        #bba4      
#eb ,c4 ,fabius1 surnamed ,pictor1      
painted the temple of ,salus1 which the 
dictator ,c4 ,junius ,brutus ,bubulus   
dedicated ,b4,c4 #cjb4 ,the temple was  
destroyed by fire in the reign of       
,claudius4 ,the painting is highly      
praised by ,dionysius1 xvi4 #f4         
#ec ,for an account of the ancient      
,greek philosophers1 see the sketch at  
the end of the volume4       #ed        
,isocrates was born at ,athens1 ,b4,c4  
#dcf4 ,he was a pupil of ,gorgias1      
,prodicus and ,socrates4 ,he opened a   
school of rhetoric1 at ,athens1         
with great success4 ,he died by his own 
hand at the age of #ih4       #ee ,so   
,horace joins these two classes as      

inventors of all kinds of               
improbable fictions--                   
,pictoribus atque poetis                
,quidlibet audendi semper fuit qua      
potestas4--,a4 ,p4 #i4          ,which  
,roscommon translates--                 
,painters and poets have been still     
allow'd        ,their pencil and their  
fancies unconfined4       #ef           
,epicharmus was a native of ,cos1 but   
lived at ,megara1 in ,sicily1 and       
when ,megara was destroyed1 removed to  
,syracuse1 and lived at the        court
 of ,hiero1 where he became the first   
writer of comedies1 so        that      
,horace ascribes the invention of comedy
 to him1 and so does        ,theocritus4
 ,he lived to a great age4       #eg    
,pherecydes was a native of ,scyros1 one
 of the ,cyclades2 and is said        to
 have obtained his knowledge from the   
secret books of the        ,phnicians4  
,he is said also to have been a pupil of
 ,pittacus1 the        rival of ,thales1
 and the master of ,pythagoras4 ,his    

doctrine was that        there were     
three principles1 1 or ther1 1 or       
,chaos1 and        1 or ,time2 and four 
elements1 ,fire1 ,earth1 ,air1 and      
,water1        from which everything    
that exists was formed4--,vide ,smith's 
,dict4        ,gr41 and ,rom4 ,biog4    
#eh ,archytas was a native of ,tarentum1
 and is said to have saved the          
life of ,plato by his influence with the
 tyrant ,dionysius4 ,he was             
especially great as a mathematician and 
geometrician1 so that ,horace           
calls him          ,maris et terr       
numeroque carentis aren                 
,mensorem--,od4 i4 #bh4 #a4             
,plato is supposed to have learnt some  
of his views from him1 and              
,aristotle to nave borrowed from him    
every idea of the ,categories4       #ei
 ,this was not ,timus the historian1 but
 a native of ,locri1 who is        said 
also in the ,de ,finibus 7c4 #bi7 to    
have been a teacher of ,plato4          
,there is a treatise extant bearing his 

name1 which is1 however1        probably
 spurious1 and only an abridgment of    
,plato's dialogue        ,timus4        
#fj ,dicarchus was a native of ,messana1
 in ,sicily1 though he lived            
chiefly in ,greece2 he was one of the   
later disciples of ,aristotle4          
,he was a great geographer1 politician1 
historian1 and philosopher1        and  
died about ,b4,c4 #bhe4       #fa       
,aristoxenus was a native of ,tarentum1 
and also a pupil of ,aristotle4         
,we know nothing of his opinions except 
that he held the soul to be a           
harmony of the body2 a doctrine which   
had been already discussed        by    
,plato in the ,phdo1 and combated by    
,aristotle4 ,he was a great             
musician1 and the chief portions of his 
works which have come down        to us 
are fragments of some musical           
treatises4--,smith's ,dict4 ,gr4 and    
,rom4 ,biog41 to which source ,i must   
acknowledge my obligation for           
nearly the whole of these biographical  

notes4       #fb ,the ,simonides here   
meant1 is the celebrated poet of ,ceos1 
the        perfecter of ,elegiac poetry 
among the ,greeks4 ,he flourished about 
the time of the ,persian war4 ,besides  
his poetry1 he is said to have          
been the inventor of some method of     
aiding the memory4 ,he died at          
the court of ,hiero1 ,b4,c4 #dfg4       
#fc ,theodectes was a native of         
,phaselis1 in ,pamphylia1 a             
distinguished        rhetorician and    
tragic poet1 and flourished in the time 
of ,philip of        ,macedon4 ,he was a
 pupil of ,isocrates1 and lived at      
,athens1 and died        there at the   
age of #da4       #fd ,cineas was a     
,thessalian1 and 7as is said in the     
text7 came to ,rome        as ambassador
 from ,pyrrhus after the battle of      
,heraclea1 ,b4,c4 #bhj1        and his  
memory is said to have been so great    
that on the day after        his arrival
 he was able to address all the senators
 and knights by        name4 ,he        

probably died before ,pyrrhus returned  
to ,italy1 ,b4,c4 #bgf4       #fe       
,charmadas1 called also ,charmides1 was 
a fellow pupil with ,philo1 the         
,larissan of ,clitomachus1 the          
,carthaginian4 ,he is said by some      
authors to have founded a fourth        
academy4       #ff ,metrodorus was a    
minister of ,mithridates the ,great2 and
 employed by        him as supreme judge
 in ,pontus1 and afterwards as an       
ambassador4        ,cicero speaks of him
 in other places 7,de ,orat4 ii4 #hh7 as
 a man of        wonderful memory4      
#fg ,quintus ,hortensius was eight years
 older than ,cicero2 and1 till          
,cicero's fame surpassed his1 he was    
accounted the most eloquent of          
all the ,romans4 ,he was ,verres's      
counsel in the prosecution conducted    
against him by ,cicero4 ,seneca relates 
that his memory was so great        that
 he could come out of an auction and    
repeat the catalogue        backwards4  
,he died ,b4,c4 #ej4       #fh ,this    

treatise is one which has not come down 
to us1 but which had        been lately 
composed by ,cicero in order to comfort 
himself for the        loss of his      
daughter4       #fi ,the epigram is--   
1               1            1          
4          ,which may be translated1    
perhaps--          ,farewell1 ,o sun1   
,cleombrotus exclaim'd1        ,then    
plung'd from off a height beneath the   
sea2        ,stung by pain1 of no       
disgrace ashamed1        ,but mov'd by  
,plato's high philosophy4       #gj     
,this is alluded to by ,juvenal--       
,provida ,pompeio dederat ,campania     
febres        ,optandas3 sed mult urbes 
et publica vota        ,vicerunt4       
,igitur ,fortuna ipsius et ,urbis1      
,servatum victo caput abstulit4--,sat4  
x4 #bhc4       #ga ,pompey's second wife
 was ,julia1 the daughter of ,julius    
,csar2 she        died the year before  
the death of ,crassus1 in ,parthia4     
,virgil speaks        of ,csar and      
,pompey as relations1 using the same    

expression 7socer7        as ,cicero--  
,aggeribus socer ,alpinis atque arce    
,monci        ,descendens1 gener        
adversis instructus ,eois4--n4 vi4 #hcj4
       #gb ,this idea is beautifully    
expanded by ,byron3--          ,yet if1 
as holiest men have deem'd1 there be    
,a land of souls beyond that sable shore
        ,to shame the doctrine of the   
,sadducee        ,and sophist1 madly    
vain of dubious lore1        ,how sweet 
it were in concert to adore        ,with
 those who made our mortal labours      
light1        ,to hear each voice we    
fear'd to hear no more1        ,behold  
each mighty shade reveal'd to sight1    
,the ,bactrian1 ,samian sage1 and all   
who taught the right4          ,childe  
,harold1 ii4 #h4       #gc ,the epitaph 
in the original is1--                   
1    4       #gd ,this was expressed in 
the ,greek verses--               1     
2          which by some authors are    
attributed to ,homer4       #ge ,this is
 the first fragment of the              

,cresphontes4--,ed4 ,var4 vii4 p4 #eid  
1    4                         4        
#gf ,the ,greek verses are quoted by    
,plutarch--          444  1             
4       #gg ,this refers to the story   
that when ,eumolpus1 the son of         
,neptune1        whose assistance the   
,eleusinians had called in against the  
,athenians1 had been slain by the       
,athenians1 an oracle demanded the      
sacrifice of one of the daughters of    
,erechtheus1 the ,king of ,athens4      
,and when one was drawn by lot1 the     
others voluntarily accompanied          
her to death4       #gh ,menceus was son
 of ,creon1 and in the war of the       
,argives against        ,thebes1        
,teresias declared that the ,thebans    
should conquer if        ,menceus would 
sacrifice himself for his country2 and  
accordingly he        killed himself    
outside the gates of ,thebes4       #gi 
,the ,greek is1              1          
4       #hj ,soph4 ,trach4 #ajdg4       
#ha ,the lines quoted by ,cicero here1  

appear to have come from the ,latin     
play of ,prometheus by ,accius2 the     
ideas are borrowed rather than          
translated from the ,prometheus of      
schylus4       #hb ,from ,exerceo4      
#hc ,each soldier carried a stake1 to   
help form a palisade in front of        
the camp4       #hd ,insania--from in1 a
 particle of negative force in          
composition1 and        sanus1 healthy1 
sound4       #he ,the man who first     
received this surname was ,l4           
,calpurnius ,piso1 who        was       
consul1 ,b4,c4 #acc1 in the ,servile    
,war4       #hf ,the ,greek is--        
4--,il4 ix4 #fdb4          ,i have given
 ,pope's translation in the text4       
#hg ,this is from the ,theseus--        
4          1            1               
4       #hh ,ter4 ,phorm4 ,,ii4 i4 #aa4 
#hi ,this refers to the speech of       
,agamemnon in ,euripides1 in the        
,iphigenia in ,aulis--          444  1 1
                     1 1 4--v4 #ae4     
#ij ,this is a fragment from the        

,hypsipyle--                2           
1          4               2            
4       #ia      4--,il4 x4 #ae4        
#ib                 1   4--,il4 vi4     
#bja4       #ic ,this is a translation  
from ,euripides--                       
4--,med4 #eg4       #id               1 
8            1   1          1   4--,hom4
 ,il4 xix4 #bbf4       #ie ,this is one 
of the fragments of ,euripides which we 
are unable to        assign to any play 
in particular2 it occurs ,var4 ,ed4 ,tr4
 ,inc4 #afg4                            
1          1   2           1   4        
#if ,this is only a fragment preserved  
by ,stobus--                          1 
1           2                          1
             4       #ig 4              
4        4                    4         
sch4 ,prom4 v4 #cgh4       #ih ,cicero  
alludes here to ,il4 vii4 #baa1 which is
 thus translated by        ,pope--      
,his massy javelin quivering in his     
hand1        ,he stood the bulwark of   
the ,grecian band2        ,through every

 ,argive heart new transport ran1       
,all ,troy stood trembling at the mighty
 man3        ,e'en ,hector paused1 and  
with new doubt oppress'd1        ,felt  
his great heart suspended in his breast2
        ',twas vain to seek retreat1 and
 vain to fear1        ,himself had      
challenged1 and the foe drew near4      
,but ,melmoth 7,note on the ,familiar   
,letters of ,cicero1 book ii4 ,let4     
#bc7 rightly accuses ,cicero of having  
misunderstood ,homer1 who 8by no        
means represents ,hector as being thus  
totally dismayed at the        approach 
of his adversary2 and indeed it would   
have been        inconsistent with the  
general character of that hero to have  
described him under such circumstances  
of terror40                1            
1              4          ,but there is 
a great difference1 as ,dr4 ,clarke     
remarks1 between            and    1 or 
4--,the ,trojans1 says ,homer1 trembled 
at        the sight of ,ajax1 and even  
,hector himself felt some emotion in his

        breast4       #ii ,cicero means 
,scipio ,nasica1 who in the riots       
consequent on the        re-election of 
,tiberius ,gracchus to the tribunate1   
,b4,c4 #acc1 having        called in    
vain on the consul1 ,mucius ,scvola1 to 
save the republic1        attacked      
,gracchus himself1 who was slain in the 
tumult4      #ajj ,morosus is evidently 
derived from mores--8,morosus1 mos1     
stubbornness1        selfwill1          
etc40--,riddle and ,arnold1 ,lat4 ,diet4
      #aja ,in the original they run    
thus3--                1         1      
4      #ajb ,this passage is from the   
,eunuch of ,terence1 ,act i4 sc4 #a1    
#ad4      #ajc ,these verses are from   
the ,atreus of ,accius4      #ajd ,this 
was ,marcus ,atilius ,regulus1 the story
 of whose treatment by the              
,carthaginians in the first ,punic ,war 
is well known to everybody4      #aje   
,this was ,quintus ,servilius ,cpio1    
who1 ,b4,c4 #aje1 was destroyed1 with   
his army1 by the ,cimbri1--it was       

believed as a judgment for the          
covetousness which he had displayed in  
the plunder of ,tolosa4      #ajf ,this 
was ,marcus ,aquilius1 who1 in the year 
,b4,c4 #hh1 was sent against            
,mithridates as one of the consular     
legates3 and being defeated1 was        
delivered up to the king by the         
inhabitants of ,mitylene4 ,mithridates  
put him to death by pouring molten gold 
down his throat4      #ajg ,this was the
 elder brother of the triumvir ,marcus  
,crassus1 ,b4,c4 #hg4        ,he was put
 to death by ,fimbria1 who was in       
command of some of the        troops of 
,marius4      #ajh ,lucius ,csar and    
,caius ,csar were relations 7it is      
uncertain in what        degree7 of the 
great ,csar1 and were killed by ,fimbria
 on the same        occasion as         
,octavius4      #aji ,m4 ,antonius was  
the grandfather of the triumvir2 he was 
murdered the        same year1 ,b4,c4   
#hg1 by ,annius1 when ,marius and ,cinna
 took ,rome4      #aaj ,this story is   

alluded to by ,horace--                 
,districtus ensis cui super impi        
,cervice pendet non ,sicul dapes        
,dulcem elaborabunt saporem1        ,non
 avium citharve cantus        ,somnum   
reducent4--iii4 #a4 #ag4      #aaa      
,hieronymus was a ,rhodian1 and a pupil 
of ,aristotle1 flourishing        about 
#cjj ,b4,c4 ,he is frequently mentioned 
by ,cicero4      #aab ,we know very     
little of ,dinomachus4 ,some ,,mss4 have
 ,clitomachus4      #aac ,callipho was  
in all probability a pupil of ,epicurus1
 but we have no        certain          
information about him4      #aad        
,diodorus was a ,syrian1 and succeeded  
,critolaus as the head of the           
,peripatetic ,school at ,athens4        
#aae ,aristo was a native of ,ceos1 and 
a pupil of ,lycon1 who succeeded        
,stratton as the head of the            
,peripatetic ,school1 ,b4,c4 #bgj4 ,he  
afterwards himself succeeded ,lycon4    
#aaf ,pyrrho was a native of ,elis1 and 
the originator of the sceptical         

theories of some of the ancient         
philosophers4 ,he was a contemporary    
of ,alexander4      #aag ,herillus was a
 disciple of ,zeno of ,cittium1 and     
therefore a ,stoic4        ,he did not1 
however1 follow all the opinions of his 
master3 he held        that knowledge   
was the chief good4 ,some of the        
treatises of        ,cleanthes were     
written expressly to confute him4       
#aah ,anacharsis was 7,herod1 iv4 #gf7  
son of ,gnurus and brother of ,saulius1 
king of ,thrace4 ,he came to ,athens    
while ,solon was occupied in            
framing laws for his people2 and by the 
simplicity of his way of        living1 
and his acute observations on the       
manners of the ,greeks1 he              
excited such general admiration1 that he
 was reckoned by some        writers    
among the seven wise men of ,greece4    
#aai ,this was ,appius ,claudius ,ccus1 
who was censor ,b4,c4 #caj1 and who1    
according to ,livy1 was afflicted with  
blindness by the gods for               

persuading the ,potitii to instruct the 
public servants in the way of           
sacrificing to ,hercules4 ,he it was who
 made the ,via ,appia4      #abj ,the   
fact of ,homer's blindness rests on a   
passage in the ,hymn to        ,apollo1 
quoted by ,thucydides as a genuine work 
of ,homer1 and which        is thus     
spoken of by one of the most            
accomplished scholars that this         
country or this age has ever            
produced3--8,they are indeed beautiful  
verses1 and if none worse had ever been 
attributed to ,homer1 the        ,prince
 of ,poets would have had little reason 
to complain4          8,he has been     
describing the ,delian festival in      
honour of ,apollo and        ,diana1 and
 concludes this part of the poem with an
 address to the        women of that    
island1 to whom it is to be supposed    
that he had        become familiarly    
known by his frequent recitations3      
1            1                          
1                   8               1   

1     1            4          ,virgins1 
farewell1--and oh6 remember me          
,hereafter1 when some stranger from the 
sea1        ,a hapless wanderer1 may    
your isle explore1        ,and ask you1 
8,maids1 of all the bards you boast1    
,who sings the sweetest1 and delights   
you most80        ,oh6 answer all1--8,a 
blind old man1 and poor1                
,sweetest he sings1 and dwells on       
,chios' rocky shore40                   
--,coleridge's ,introduction to the     
,study of the ,greek ,classic ,poets4