,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,conditioned ,reprinted1 with ,additions1 from ,the ,contemporary ,review4 ,comprising some ,remarks on ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy and on ,mr4 ,j4,s4 ,mill's ,examination of that ,philosophy ,,by ,h4,l4 ,,mansel1 ,b4,d4 ,,waynflete ,,professor ,,of ,,moral ,,and ,,metaphysical ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,oxford ,,alexander ,,strahan1 ,,publisher ,,london ,,and ,,new ,,york #ahff ,,muir ,,and ,,paterson1 ,,printers1 ,,edinburgh4 ,,preface ,the circumstance that the following remarks were originally published as an anonymous article in a ,review1 will best explain the style in which they are written4 ,absence from ,england prevented me from becoming acquainted with ,mr4 ,mill's ,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy till some time after its publication2 and when ,i was requested to undertake the task of reviewing it1 ,i was still ignorant of its contents4 ,on proceeding to fulfil my engagement1 ,i soon discovered1 not only that the character of the book was very different from what the author's reputation had led me to expect1 but also that my task would be one1 not merely of criticism1 but1 in some degree1 of self-defence4 ,the remarks on myself1 coming from a writer of ,mr4 ,mill's ability and reputation1 were such as ,i could not pass over without notice2 while1 at the same time1 ,i felt that my principal duty in this instance was the defence of one who was no longer living to defend himself4 ,under these circumstances1 the best course appeared to be1 to devote the greater portion of my article to an exposition and vindication of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's teaching2 and1 in the additional remarks which it was necessary to make on the more personal part of the controversy1 to speak of myself in the third person1 as ,i should have spoken of any other writer4 ,the form thus adopted has been retained in the present republication1 though the article now appears with the name of its author4 ,my original intention of writing a review of the entire book was necessarily abandoned as soon as ,i became acquainted with its contents4 ,to have done justice to the whole subject1 or to ,mr4 ,mill's treatment of it1 would have required a volume nearly as large as his own4 ,i therefore determined to confine myself to the ,philosophy of the ,conditioned1 both as the most original and important portion of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's teaching1 and as that which occupies the first place in ,mr4 ,mill's ,examination4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,conditioned4 ,the reader of ,plato's ,republic will readily recall to mind that wonderful passage at the end of the sixth book1 in which the philosopher1 under the image of geometrical lines1 exhibits the various relations of the intelligible to the sensible world2 especially his lofty aspirations with regard to that second segment of the intelligible world1 which reason of itself grasps by the power of dialectic1 employing hypotheses1 not as principles1 but as veritable hypotheses1 that is to say1 as steps and starting-points1 in order that it may ascend as far as the unconditioned 7,greek3 mechri tou anypothetou71 to the first principle of the universe1 and having grasped this1 may then lay hold of the principles next adjacent to it1 and so go down to the end1 using no sensible aids whatever1 but employing abstract forms throughout1 and terminating in forms4 ,this quotation is important for our present purpose in two ways4 ,in the first place1 it may serve1 at the outset of our remarks1 to propitiate those plain-spoken ,english critics who look upon new terms in philosophy with the same suspicion with which ,jack ,cade regarded a noun and a verb1 and such abominable words as no ,christian ear can endure to hear1 by showing that the head and front of our offending1 the ,unconditioned1 is no modern invention of ,teutonic barbarism1 but sanctioned even by the ,attic elegance of a ,plato4 ,and in the second place1 it contains almost a history in miniature of the highest speculations of philosophy1 both in earlier and in later times1 and points out1 with a clearness and precision the more valuable because uninfluenced by recent controversies1 the exact field on which the philosophies of the ,conditioned and the ,unconditioned come into collision1 and the nature of the problem which they both approach from opposite sides4 ,what is the meaning of this problem1 the solution of which ,plato proposes as the highest aim of philosophy--to ascend to the unconditioned1 and thence to deduce the universe of conditioned existence8 ,the problem has assumed different forms at different times3 at present we must content ourselves with stating it in that in which it will most naturally suggest itself to a student of modern philosophy1 and in which it has the most direct bearing on the subject of the present article4 ,all consciousness must in the first instance present itself as a relation between two constituent parts1 the person who is conscious1 and the thing1 whatever it may be1 of which he is conscious4 ,this contrast has been indicated1 directly or indirectly1 by various names--mind and matter2 person and thing2 subject and object2 or1 lastly1 in the distinction1 most convenient for philosophy1 however uncouth in sound1 between self and not self--the ego and the non-ego4 ,in order to be conscious at all1 ,i must be conscious of something3 consciousness thus presents itself as the product of two factors1 ,i and something4 ,the problem of the unconditioned is1 briefly stated1 to reduce these two factors to one4 ,for it is manifest that1 so long as they remain two1 we have no unconditioned1 but a pair of conditioned existences4 ,if the something of which ,i am conscious is a separate reality1 having qualities and modes of action of its own1 and thereby determining1 or contributing to determine1 the form which my consciousness of it shall take1 my consciousness is thereby conditioned1 or partly dependent on something beyond itself4 ,it is no matter1 in this respect1 whether the influence is direct or indirect--whether1 for instance1 ,i see a material tree1 or only the mental image of a tree4 ,if the nature of the thing in any degree determines the character of the image--if the visible form of a tree is different from that of a house because the tree itself is different from the house1 my consciousness is1 however remotely1 influenced by something different from itself1 the ego by the non-ego4 ,and on the other hand1 if ,i1 who am conscious1 am a real being1 distinct from the things of which ,i am conscious--if the conscious mind has a constitution and laws of its own by which it acts1 and if the mode of its consciousness is in any degree determined by those laws1 the non-ego is so far conditioned by the ego2 the thing which ,i see is not seen absolutely and per se1 but in a form partly dependent upon the laws of my vision4 ,the first step towards the reduction of these two factors to one may obviously be made in three different ways4 ,either the ego may be represented as a mode of the non-ego1 or the non-ego of the ego1 or both of a tertium quid1 distinct from either4 ,in other words3 it may be maintained1 first1 that matter is the only real existence2 mind and all the phenomena of consciousness being really the result solely of material laws2 the brain1 for example1 secreting thought as the liver secretes bile2 and the distinct personal existence of which ,i am apparently conscious being only the result of some such secretion4 ,this is ,materialism1 which has then to address itself to the further problem1 to reduce the various phenomena of matter to some one absolutely first principle on which everything else depends4 ,or it may be maintained1 secondly1 that mind is the only real existence2 the intercourse which we apparently have with a material world being really the result solely of the laws of our mental constitution4 ,this is ,idealism1 which again has next to attempt to reduce the various phenomena to some one immaterial principle4 ,or it may be maintained1 thirdly1 that real existence is to be sought neither in mind as mind nor in matter as matter2 that both classes of phenomena are but qualities or modes of operation of something distinct from both1 and on which both alike are dependent4 ,hence arises a third form of philosophy1 which1 for want of a better name1 we will call ,indifferentism1 as being a system in which the characteristic differences of mind and matter are supposed to disappear1 being merged in something higher than both4 ,in using the two former of these terms1 we are not speaking of ,materialism and ,idealism as they have always actually manifested themselves1 but only of the distinguishing principle of these systems when pushed to its extreme result4 ,it is quite possible to be a materialist or an idealist with respect to the immediate phenomena of consciousness1 without attempting a philosophy of the ,unconditioned at all4 ,but it is also possible1 and in itself natural1 when such a philosophy is attempted1 to attempt it by means of the same method which has approved itself in relation to subordinate inquiries2 to make the relation between the human mind and its objects the type and image of that between the universe and its first principle4 ,and such attempts have actually been made1 both on the side of ,materialism and on that of ,idealism2 and probably would be made oftener1 did not counteracting causes frequently hinder the logical development of speculative principles4 ,in modern times1 and under ,christian influences1 these several systems are almost necessarily identified with inquiries concerning the existence and nature of ,god4 ,the influence of ,christianity has been indirectly felt1 even in speculations prosecuted in apparent independence of it2 and the admission of an absolute first principle of all things distinct from ,god1 or the acknowledgment of a ,god separate from or derived from the first principle of all things1 is an absurdity which1 since the prevalence of ,christianity1 has become almost impossible1 even to antichristian systems of thought4 ,in earlier times1 indeed1 this union of philosophy with theology was by no means so imperative4 ,a philosophy like that of ,greece1 which inherited its speculations from a poetical theogony1 would see no difficulty in attributing to the god or gods of its religious belief a secondary and derived existence1 dependent on some higher and more original principle1 and in separating that principle itself from all immediate connection with religion4 ,it was possible to assume1 with the ,ionian1 a material substance1 or1 with the ,eleatic1 an indifferent abstraction1 as the first principle of things1 without holding that principle to be ,god1 or1 as the only alternative1 denying the existence of a ,god2 and thus1 as ,aristotle,a has observed1 theologians endeavoured to evade the consequences of their abstract principles1 by attributing to the chief good a later and derived existence1 as the poets supposed the supreme ,god to be of younger birth than night and chaos and sea and sky4 ,but to a ,christian philosophy1 or to a philosophy in any way influenced by ,christianity1 this method of evasion is no longer possible4 ,if all conditioned existence is dependent on some one first and unconditioned principle1 either that principle must be identified with ,god1 or our philosophical speculations must fall into open and avowed atheism4 ,a ,metaph41 xiv4 #d4 ,but at this point the philosophical inquiry comes in contact with another line of thought1 suggested by a different class of the facts of consciousness4 ,as a religious and moral being1 man is conscious of a relation of a personal character1 distinct from any suggested by the phenomena of the material world1--a relation to a supreme ,personal ,being1 the object of his religious worship1 and the source and judge of his moral obligations and conduct4 ,to adopt the name of ,god in an abstract speculation merely as a conventional denomination for the highest link in the chain of thought1 and to believe in ,him for the practical purposes of worship and obedience1 are two very different things2 and for the latter1 though not for the former1 the conception of ,god as a ,person is indispensable4 ,were man a being of pure intellect1 the problem of the ,unconditioned would be divested of its chief difficulty2 but he is also a being of religious and moral faculties1 and these also have a claim to be satisfied by any valid solution of the problem4 ,hence the question assumes another and a more complex form4 ,how is the one absolute existence1 to which philosophy aspires1 to be identified with the personal ,god demanded by our religious feelings8 ,shall we boldly assume that the problem is already solved1 and that the personal ,god is the very ,unconditioned of which we were in search8 ,this is to beg the question1 not to answer it4 ,our conception of a personal being1 derived as it is from the immediate consciousness of our own personality1 seems1 on examination1 to involve conditions incompatible with the desired assumption4 ,personal agency1 similar to our own1 seems to point to something very different from an absolutely first link in a chain of phenomena4 ,our actions1 if not determined1 are at least influenced by motives2 and the motive is a prior link in the chain1 and a condition of the action4 ,our actions1 moreover1 take place in time2 and time1 as we conceive it1 cannot be regarded as an absolute blank1 but as a condition in which phenomena take place as past1 present1 and future4 ,every act taking place in time implies something antecedent to itself2 and this something1 be it what it may1 hinders us from regarding the subsequent act as absolute and unconditioned4 ,nay1 even time itself1 apart from the phenomena which it implies1 has the same character4 ,if an act cannot take place except in time1 time is the condition of its taking place4 ,to conceive the unconditioned1 as the first link in a chain of conditioned consequences1 it seems necessary that we should conceive something out of time1 yet followed by time2 standing at the beginning of all duration and succession1 having no antecedent1 but followed by a series of consequents4 ,philosophical theologians have been conscious of this difficulty1 almost from the earliest date at which philosophy and ,christian theology came in contact with each other4 ,from a number of testimonies of similar import1 we select one or two of the most striking4 ,of the ,divine ,nature1 ,gregory ,nyssen says3 ,it is neither in place nor in time1 but before these and above these in an unspeakable manner1 contemplated itself by itself1 through faith alone2 neither measured by ages1 nor moving along with times4,b ,in the changes of things1 says ,augustine1 you will find a past and a future2 in ,god you will find a present where past and future cannot be4,c ,eternity1 says ,aquinas1 has no succession1 but exists all together4,d ,among divines of the ,church of ,england1 we quote two names only1 but those of the highest3--,the duration of eternity1 says ,bishop ,pearson1 is completely indivisible and all at once2 so that it is ever present1 and excludes the other differences of time1 past and future4,e ,and ,barrow enumerates among natural modes of being and operation far above our reach1 ,god's eternity without succession1 coupling it with ,his prescience without necessitation of events4,f ,but it is needless to multiply authorities for a doctrine so familiar to every student of theology4 ,b ,c4 ,eunom41 i41 p4 #ih1 ,ed4 ,gretser4 ,c ,in ,joann4 ,evang41 tract4 xxxvii4 #aj4 ,d ,summa1 pars4 i41 qu4 x41 art4 #a4 ,e ,minor ,theol4 ,works1 vol4 i41 p4 #aje4 ,f ,sermon on the ,unsearchableness of ,god's ,judgments4 ,thus1 then1 our two lines of thought have led us to conclusions which1 at first sight1 appear to be contradictory of each other4 ,to be conceived as unconditioned1 ,god must be conceived as exempt from action in time3 to be conceived as a person1 if ,his personality resembles ours1 ,he must be conceived as acting in time4 ,can these two conclusions be reconciled with each other2 and if not1 which of them is to be abandoned8 ,the true answer to this question is1 we believe1 to be found in a distinction which some recent critics regard with very little favour1--the distinction between ,reason and ,faith2 between the power of conceiving and that of believing4 ,we cannot1 in our present state of knowledge1 reconcile these two conclusions2 yet we are not required to abandon either4 ,we cannot conceive the manner in which the unconditioned and the personal are united in the ,divine ,nature2 yet we may believe that1 in some manner unknown to us1 they are so united4 ,to conceive the union of two attributes in one object of thought1 ,i must be able to conceive them as united in some particular manner3 when this cannot be done1 ,i may nevertheless believe that the union is possible1 though ,i am unable to conceive how it is possible4 ,the problem is thus represented as one of those ,divine mysteries1 the character of which is clearly and well described in the language of ,leibnitz3--,il en est de mme des autres mystres1 o les esprits modrs trouveront toujours une explication suffisante pour croire1 et jamais autant qu'il en faut pour comprendre4 ,il nous suffit d'un certain ce que c'est 7,greek3 ti esti7 mais le comment 7,greek3 ps7 nous passe1 et ne nous est point ncessaire4,g ,g ,thodice1 ,discours de la ,conformit de la ,foi avec la ,raison1 #ef4 ,leibnitz1 it will be observed1 uses the expression pour comprendre1 for which1 in the preceding remarks1 we have substituted to conceive4 ,the change has been made intentionally1 on account of an ambiguity in the former word4 ,sometimes it is used1 as ,leibnitz here uses it1 to denote an apprehension of the manner in which certain attributes can coexist in an object4 ,but sometimes 7to say nothing of other senses7 it is used to signify a complete knowledge of an object in all its properties and their consequences1 such as it may be questioned whether we have of any object whatever4 ,this ambiguity1 which has been the source of much confusion and much captious criticism1 is well pointed out by ,norris in his ,reason and ,faith 7written in reply to ,toland71 p4 #aah1 ,ed4 #afig3 ,when we say that above reason is when we do not comprehend or perceive the truth of a thing1 this must not be meant of not comprehending the truth in its whole latitude and extent1 so that as many truths should be said to be above reason as we cannot thus thoroughly comprehend and pursue throughout all their consequences and relations to other truths 7for then almost everything would be above reason71 but only of not comprehending the union or connection of those immediate ideas of which the proposition supposed to be above reason consists4 ,comprehension1 as thus explained1 answers exactly to the ordinary logical use of the term conception1 to denote the combination of two or more attributes in an unity of representation4 ,in the same sense1 ,m4 ,peisse1 in the preface to his translation of ,hamilton's ,fragments1 p4 #ih1 says1--,comprendre1 c'est voir un terme en rapport avec un autre2 c'est voir comme un ce qui est donn comme multiple4 ,this is exactly the sense in which ,hamilton himself uses the word conception4 7,see ,reid's ,works1 p4 #cgg47 ,but this distinction involves a further consequence4 ,if the mysteries of the ,divine ,nature are not apprehended by reason as existing in a particular manner 7in which case they would be mysteries no longer71 but are accepted by faith as existing in some manner unknown to us1 it follows that we do not know ,god as ,he is in ,his absolute nature1 but only as ,he is imperfectly represented by those qualities in ,his creatures which are analogous to1 but not identical with1 ,his own4 ,if1 for example1 we had a knowledge of the ,divine ,personality as it is in itself1 we should know it as existing in a certain manner compatible with unconditioned action2 and this knowledge of the manner would at once transform our conviction from an act of faith to a conception of reason4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the only personality of which we have a positive knowledge is our own1 and if our own personality can only be conceived as conditioned in time1 it follows that the ,divine ,personality1 in so far as it is exempt from conditions1 does not resemble the only personality which we directly know1 and is not adequately represented by it4 ,this necessitates a confession1 which1 like the distinction which gives rise to it1 has been vehemently condemned by modern critics1 but which has been concurred in with singular unanimity by earlier divines of various ages and countries1--the confession that the knowledge which man in this life can have of ,god is not a knowledge of the ,divine ,nature as it is in itself1 but only of that nature as imperfectly represented through analogous qualities in the creature4 ,were it not that this doctrine has been frequently denounced of late as an heretical novelty1 we should hardly have thought it necessary to cite authorities in proof of its antiquity and catholicity4 ,as it is1 we will venture to produce a few only out of many1 selecting not always the most important1 but those which can be best exhibited verbatim in a short extract4 ,,chrysostom4--,de ,incompr4 ,dei ,natura1 ,hom4 i4 #c3 ,that ,god is everywhere1 ,i know2 and that ,he is wholly everywhere1 ,i know2 but the how1 ,i know not3 that ,he is without beginning1 ungenerated and eternal1 ,i know2 but the how1 ,i know not4 ,,basil4--,ep4 ccxxxiv43 ,that ,god is1 ,i know2 but what is ,his essence ,i hold to be above reason4 ,how then am ,i saved8 ,by faith2 and faith is competent to know that ,god is1 not what ,he is4 ,,gregory ,,nazianzen4--,orat4 xxxiv43 ,a theologian among the ,greeks ,plato has said in his philosophy1 that to conceive ,god is difficult1 to express ,him is impossible4 444 ,but ,i say that it is impossible to express ,him1 and more impossible to conceive ,him4 ,compare ,patrick1 ,works1 vol4 iii41 p4 #ci4 ,,cyril ,,of ,,jerusalem4--,catech4 vi4 #b3 ,we declare not what ,god is1 but candidly confess that we know not accurately concerning ,him4 ,for in those things which concern ,god1 it is great knowledge to confess our ignorance4 ,,augustine4--,enarr4 in ,psalm1 lxxxv4 #h3 ,god is ineffable2 we more easily say what ,he is not than what ,he is4 ,serm1 cccxli43 ,i call ,god just1 because in human words ,i find nothing better2 for ,he is beyond justice4444 ,what then is worthily said of ,god8 ,some one1 perhaps1 may reply and say1 that ,he is just4 ,but another1 with better understanding1 may say that even this word is surpassed by ,his excellence1 and that even this is said of ,him unworthily1 though it be said fittingly according to human capacity4 ,,cyril ,,of ,,alexandria4--,in ,joann4 ,evang41 #a4 ii41 c4 #e3 ,for those things which are spoken concerning it the ,divine ,nature are not spoken as they are in very truth1 but as the tongue of man can interpret1 and as man can hear2 for he who sees in an enigma also speaks in an enigma4 ,,damascenus4--,de ,fide ,orthod41 i4 #d3 ,that ,god is1 is manifest2 but what ,he is in ,his essence and nature is utterly incomprehensible and unknown4 ,,aquinas4--,summa1 pars4 i41 qu4 xiii41 art4 #a3 ,we cannot so name ,god that the name which denotes ,him shall express the ,divine ,essence as it is1 in the same way as the name man expresses in its signification the essence of man as it is4 ,ibid41 art4 #e3 ,when the name wise is said of a man1 it in a manner describes and comprehends the thing signified3 not so1 however1 when it is said of ,god2 but it leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended and exceeding the signification of the name4 ,whence it is evident that this name wise is not said in the same manner of ,god and of man4 ,the same is the case with other names2 whence no name can be predicated univocally of ,god and of creatures2 yet they are not predicated merely equivocally4444 ,we must say1 then1 that such names are said of ,god and of creatures according to analogy1 that is1 proportion4 ,,hooker4--,ecc4 ,pol41 ,i41 ii4 #b4--;,dangerous it were for the feeble brain of man to wade far into the doings of the ,most ,high2 whom although to know be life1 and joy to make mention of ,his name1 yet our soundest knowledge is to know that we know ,him not as indeed ,he is1 neither can know ,him4 ,,usher4--,body of ,divinity1 p4 #de1 ,ed4 #afde3 ,neither is it the wisdom of ,god communicated to any creature1 neither can be2 for it is unconceivable1 as the very essence of ,god ,himself is unconceivable1 and unspeakable as it is4 ,,leighton4--,theol4 ,lect4 ,,xxi41 ,works1 vol4 iv41 p4 #cbg1 ,ed4 #ahcj3 ,though in the schools they distinguish the ,divine attributes or excellences1 and that by no means improperly1 into communicable and incommunicable2 yet we ought so to guard this distinction1 as always to remember that those which are called communicable1 when applied to ,god1 are not only to be understood in a manner incommunicable and quite peculiar to ,himself1 but also1 that in ,him they are in reality infinitely different in the original1 aliud omnino1 immensum aliud from those virtues1 or rather1 in a matter where the disparity of the subjects is so very great1 those shadows of virtues that go under the same name1 either in men or angels4 ,,pearson4--,minor ,theol4 ,works1 vol4 i41 p4 #ac3 ,god in ,himself is an absolute being1 without any relation to creatures1 for ,he was from eternity without any creature1 and could1 had ,he willed1 be to eternity without creature4 ,but ,god cannot naturally be known by us otherwise than by relation to creatures1 as1 for example1 under the aspect of dominion1 or of cause1 or in some other relation4,h ,,beveridge4--,on the ,thirty-nine ,articles1 p4 #af1 ,ed4 #ahdf3 ,but seeing the properties of ,god do not so much denote what ,god is1 as what we apprehend ,him to be in ,himself2 when the properties of ,god are predicated one of another1 one thing in ,god is not predicated of another1 but our apprehensions of the same thing are predicated one of another4 ,,leslie4--,method with the ,deists1 p4 #fc1 ,ed4 #agde3 ,what we call faculties in the soul1 we call ,persons in the ,godhead2 because there are personal actions attributed to each of them4444 ,and we have no other word whereby to express it2 we speak it after the manner of men2 nor could we understand if we heard any of those unspeakable words which express the ,divine ,nature in its proper essence2 therefore we must make allowances1 and great ones1 when we apply words of our nature to the ,infinite and ,eternal ,being4 ,ibid41 p4 #fd3 ,by the word ,person1 when applied to ,god 7for want of a proper word whereby to express it71 we must mean something infinitely different from personality among men4 ,h ,bishop ,pearson's language is yet more explicit in another passage of the same work1 which we give in the original ,latin3--,non dantur pro hoc statu nomina qu ,deum significant quidditative4 ,patet2 quia nomina sunt conceptuum4 ,non autem dantur in hoc statu conceptus quidditativi de ,deo4--7,p4 #acf47 ,the system of theology represented by these extracts may1 as we think1 be fairly summed up as follows3 ,we believe that ,god in ,his own nature is absolute and unconditioned2 but we can only positively conceive ,him by means of relations and conditions suggested by created things4 ,we believe that ,his own nature is simple and uniform1 admitting of no distinction between various attributes1 nor between any attribute and its subject2 but we can conceive ,him only by means of various attributes1 distinct from the subject and from each other4,i ,we believe that in verum1 aut bonum esse1 aut omnino ipsum esse4 ,his own nature ,he is exempt from all relations of time2 but we can conceive ,him only by means of ideas and terms which imply temporal relations1 a past1 a present1 and a future4,j ,our thought1 then1 must not be taken as the measure and limit of our belief3 we think by means of relations and conditions derived from created things2 we believe in an ,absolute ,being1 in whose nature these conditions and relations1 in some manner unknown to us1 disappear in a simple and indivisible unity4 ,i ,this will be found most distinctly stated in the context of the extract from ,beveridge1 and in the citations from ,st4 ,augustine given in his notes2 to which may be added the following from ,de ,trinitate1 vi4 #g3--;,deus vero multipliciter quidem dicitur magnus1 bonus1 sapiens1 beatus1 verus1 et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur2 sed eadem magnitudo ejus est qu sapientia1 non enim mole magnus est1 sed virtute2 et eadem bonitas qu sapientia et magnitudo1 et eadem veritas qu illa omnia3 et non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum1 aut sapientem1 aut verum1 aut bonum esse1 aut omnino ipsum esse4 ,j ,compare the remarkable words of ,bishop ,beveridge1 l4c41 ,and therefore1 though ,i cannot apprehend ,his mercy to ,abel in the beginning of the world1 and ,his mercy to me now1 but as two distinct expressions of ,his mercy1 yet as they are in ,god1 they are but one and the same act1--as they are in ,god1 ,i say1 who is not measured by time1 as our apprehensions of ,him are1 but is ,himself eternity2 a centre without a circumference1 eternity without time4 ,the most important feature of this philosophical theology1 and the one which exhibits most clearly the practical difference between reason and faith1 is that1 in dealing with theoretical difficulties1 it does not appeal to our knowledge1 but to our ignorance3 it does not profess to offer a definite solution2 it only tells us that we might find one if we knew all4 ,it does not profess1 for example1 to solve the apparent contradiction between ,god's foreknowledge and man's free will2 it does not say1 ,this is the way in which ,god foreknows1 and in this way ,his foreknowledge is reconcileable with human freedom2 it only says1 ,the contradiction is apparent1 but need not be real4 ,freedom is incompatible with ,god's foreknowledge1 only on the supposition that ,god's foreknowledge is like man's3 if we knew exactly how the one differs from the other1 we might be able to see that what is incompatible with the one is not so with the other4 ,we cannot solve the difficulty1 but we can believe that there is a solution4 ,it is this open acknowledgment of our ignorance of the highest things which makes this system of philosophy distasteful to many minds3 it is the absence of any similar acknowledgment which forms the attraction and the seductiveness of ,pantheism in one way1 and of ,positivism in another4 ,the pantheist is not troubled with the difficulty of reconciling the philosophy of the absolute with belief in a personal ,god2 for belief in a personal ,god is no part of his creed4 ,like the ,christian1 he may profess to acknowledge a first principle1 one1 and simple1 and indivisible1 and unconditioned2 but he has no need to give to this principle the name of ,god1 or to invest it with such attributes as are necessary to satisfy man's religious wants4 ,his ,god 7so far as he acknowledges one at all7 is not the first principle and cause of all things1 but the aggregate of the whole--an universal substance underlying the world of phenomena1 or an universal process1 carried on in and by the changes of things4 ,hence1 as ,aristotle said of the ,eleatics1 that1 by asserting all things to be one1 they annihilated causation1 which is the production of one thing from another1 so it may be said of the various schools of ,pantheism1 that1 by maintaining all things to be ,god1 they evade rather than solve the great problem of philosophy1 that of the relation between ,god and ,his creatures4 ,the positivist1 on the other hand1 escapes the difficulty by an opposite course4 ,he declines all inquiry into reality and causation1 and maintains that the only office of philosophy is to observe and register the invariable relations of succession and similitude in phenomena4 ,he does not necessarily deny the existence of ,god2 but his personal belief1 be it what it may1 is a matter of utter indifference to his system4 ,religion and philosophy may perhaps go on side by side2 but their provinces are wholly distinct1 and therefore there is no need to attempt a reconciliation between them4 ,god1 as a first cause1 lives like an ,epicurean deity in undisturbed ease1 apart from the world of phenomena1 of which alone philosophy can take cognisance3 philosophy1 as the science of phenomena1 contents itself with observing the actual state of things1 without troubling itself to inquire how that state of things came into existence4 ,hence1 neither ,pantheism nor ,positivism is troubled to explain the relation of the ,one to the ,many2 for the former acknowledges only the ,one1 and the latter acknowledges only the ,many4 ,it is between these two systems1 both seductive from their apparent simplicity1 and both simple only by mutilation1 that the ,philosophy of the ,conditioned1 of which ,sir ,william ,hamilton is the representative1 endeavours to steer a middle course1 at the risk of sharing the fate of most mediators in a quarrel1--being repudiated and denounced by both combatants1 because it declares them to be both in the wrong4 ,against ,pantheism1 which is the natural development of the principle of ,indifferentism1 it enters a solemn protest1 by asserting that the ,absolute must be accepted in philosophy1 not as a problem to be solved by reason1 but as a reality to be believed in1 though above reason2 and that the pseudo-absolute1 which ,pantheism professes to exhibit in a positive conception1 is shown1 by the very fact of its being so conceived1 not to be the true ,absolute4 ,against ,positivism1 which is virtually ,materialism1 it protests no less strongly1 maintaining that the philosophy which professes to explain the whole of nature by the aid of material laws alone1 proceeds upon an assumption which does not merely dispense with ,god as a scientific hypothesis1 but logically involves consequences which lead to a denial of ,his very existence4 ,between both extremes1 it holds an intermediate position1 neither aspiring1 with ,pantheism1 to solve the problems of the ,absolute1 nor neglecting them1 with ,positivism1 as altogether remote from the field of philosophical inquiry2 but maintaining that such problems must necessarily arise1 and must necessarily be taken into account in every adequate survey of human nature and human thought1 and that philosophy1 if it cannot solve them1 is bound to show why they are insoluble4 ,let us hear ,hamilton's own words in relation to both the systems which he opposes4 ,against ,pantheism1 and the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned in general1 he says3-- ,the ,conditioned is the mean between two extremes1--two inconditionates1 exclusive of each other1 neither of which can be conceived as possible1,k but of which1 on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle1 one must be admitted as necessary4 ,on this opinion1 therefore1 our faculties are shown to be weak1 but not deceitful4 ,the mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions1 subversive of each other1 as equally possible2 but only as unable to understand as possible either of the two extremes2 one of which1 however1 on the ground of their mutual repugnance1 it is compelled to recognise as true4 ,we are thus taught the salutary lesson1 that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence2 and are warned from recognising the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith4 ,and by a wonderful revelation1 we are thus1 in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite1 inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality4--,discussions1 p4 #ae4 ,k ,it must be remembered that1 to conceive a thing as possible1 we must conceive the manner in which it is possible1 but that we may believe in the fact without being able to conceive the manner4 ,had ,hamilton distinctly expressed this1 he might have avoided some very groundless criticisms1 with which he has been assailed for maintaining a distinction between the provinces of conception and belief4 ,against ,materialism1 and virtually against ,positivism in general1 he says3-- ,if in man1 intelligence be a free power1--in so far as its liberty extends1 intelligence must be independent of necessity and matter2 and a power independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of an immaterial subject--that is1 a spirit4 ,if1 then1 the original independence of intelligence on matter in the human constitution--in other words1 if the spirituality of mind in man be supposed a datum of observation1 in this datum is also given both the condition and the proof of a ,god4 ,for we have only to infer1 what analogy entitles us to do1 that intelligence holds the same relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us1 and the first positive condition of a ,deity is established1 in the establishment of the absolute priority of a free creative intelligence4 ,on the other hand1 let us suppose the result of our study of man to be1 that intelligence is only a product of matter1 only a reflex of organization1 such a doctrine would not only not afford no basis on which to rest any argument for a ,god1 but1 on the contrary1 would positively warrant the atheist in denying ,his existence4 ,for if1 as the materialist maintains1 the only intelligence of which we have any experience be a consequent of matter1--on this hypothesis1 he not only cannot assume this order to be reversed in the relations of an intelligence beyond his observation1 but1 if he argue logically1 he must positively conclude that1 as in man1 so in the universe1 the phenomena of intelligence or design are only in their last analysis the products of a brute necessity4 ,psychological ,materialism1 if carried out fully and fairly to its conclusions1 thus inevitably results in theological ,atheism2 as it has been well expressed by ,dr4 ,henry ,more1 ,nullus in microcosmo spiritus1 nullus in macrocosmo ,deus4 ,i do not1 of course1 mean to assert that all materialists deny or actually disbelieve a ,god4 ,for1 in very many cases1 this would be at once an unmerited compliment to their reasoning1 and an unmerited reproach to their faith4--,lectures1 vol4 i1 p4 #ca4,l ,l ,this part of ,hamilton's teaching is altogether repudiated by a recent writer1 who1 strangely enough1 professes to be his disciple1 while rejecting all that is really characteristic of his philosophy4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 in his work on ,first ,principles1 endeavours to press ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton into the service of ,pantheism and ,positivism together1 by adopting the negative portion only of his philosophy--in which1 in common with many other writers1 he declares the absolute to be inconceivable by the mere intellect1--and rejecting the positive portions1 in which he most emphatically maintains that the belief in a personal ,god is imperatively demanded by the facts of our moral and emotional consciousness4 ,mr4 ,spencer regards religion as nothing more than a consciousness of natural facts as being in their ultimate genesis unaccountable--a theory which is simply a combination of the positivist doctrine1 that we know only the relations of phenomena1 with the pantheist assumption of the name of ,god to denote the substance or power which lies beyond phenomena4 ,no theory can be more opposed to the philosophy of the conditioned than this4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's fundamental principle is1 that consciousness must be accepted entire1 and that the moral and religious feelings1 which are the primary source of our belief in a personal ,god1 are in no way invalidated by the merely negative inferences which have deluded men into the assumption of an impersonal absolute2 the latter not being legitimate deductions from consciousness rightly interpreted4 ,mr4 ,spencer1 on the other hand1 takes these negative inferences as the only basis of religion1 and abandons ,hamilton's great principle of the distinction between knowledge and belief1 by quietly dropping out of his system the facts of consciousness which make such a distinction necessary4 ,his whole system is1 in fact1 a pertinent illustration of ,hamilton's remark1 that the phenomena of matter and of mind1 he might add1 treated by materialistic methods1 taken by themselves 7you will observe the qualification1 taken by themselves71 so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a ,god1 would1 on the contrary1 ground even an argument to his negation4 ,mr4 ,spencer1 like ,mr4 ,mill1 denies the freedom of the will2 and this1 according to ,hamilton1 leads by logical consequence to ,atheism4 ,in the few places in which ,hamilton speaks directly as a theologian1 his language is in agreement with the general voice of ,catholic theology down to the end of the seventeenth century1 some specimens of which have been given on a previous page4 ,thus he says 7,discussions1 p4 #ae73 ,true1 therefore1 are the declarations of a pious philosophy1--',a ,god understood would be no ,god at all2' ',to think that ,god is1 as we can think ,him to be1 is blasphemy4' ,the ,divinity1 in a certain sense1 is revealed2 in a certain sense is concealed3 ,he is at once known and unknown4 ,but the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar ,greek3 ,agnst ,the--',to the unknown and unknowable ,god4' ,a little later 7p4 #bj7 he says3 ,we should not recoil to the opposite extreme2 and though man be not identical with the ,deity1 still is he 'created in the image of ,god4' ,it is1 indeed1 only through an analogy of the human with the ,divine nature1 that we are percipient and recipient of ,divinity4 ,in the first of these passages we have an echo of the language of ,basil1 the two ,cyrils1 and ,john ,damascene1 and of our own ,hooker and ,usher2 while in the second we find the counter truth1 intimated by ,augustine and other ,fathers1,m and clearly stated by ,aquinas1 and which in the last century was elaborately expounded in the ,divine ,analogy of ,bishop ,browne1--namely1 that though we know not ,god in ,his own nature1 yet are we not wholly ignorant of ,him1 but may attain to an imperfect knowledge of ,him through the analogy between human things and ,divine4 ,m ,as e4g41 by ,tertullian 7,adv4 ,marc41 l4 ii41 c4 #af73 ,et hc ergo imago censenda est ,dei in homine1 quod eosdem motos et sensus habeat humanus animus quos et ,deus1 licet non tales quales ,deus3 pro substantia enim1 et status eorum et exitus distant4 ,and by ,gregory ,nazianzen1 ,orat4 xxxvii43 ,greek3 nomasamen gar hs hmin ephikton ek tn hmetern ta tou ,theou ,and by ,hilary1 ,de ,trin41 i4 #ai3 ,comparatio enim terrenorum ad ,deum nulla est2 sed infirmitas nostr intelligenti cogit species quasdam ex inferioribus1 tanquam superiorum indices qurere2 ut rerum familiarium consuetudine admovente1 ex sensus nostri conscientia ad insoliti sensus opinionem educeremur4 ,as regards theological results1 therefore1 there is nothing novel or peculiar in ,hamilton's teaching2 nor was he one who would have regarded novelty in theology as a recommendation4 ,the peculiarity of his system1 by which his reputation as a philosopher must ultimately stand or fall1 is the manner in which he endeavoured to connect these theological conclusions with psychological principles2 and thus to vindicate on philosophical grounds the position which ,catholic divines had been compelled to take in the interests of dogmatic truth4 ,that the absolute nature of ,god1 as a supertemporal and yet personal ,being1 must be believed in as a fact1 though inaccessible to reason as regards the manner of its possibility1 is a position admitted1 almost without exception1 by divines who acknowledge the mystery of a personal ,absolute--still more by those who acknowledge the yet deeper mystery of a ,trinity in ,unity4 ,we believe and know1 says ,bishop ,sanderson of the mysteries of the ,christian faith1 and that with fulness of assurance1 that all these things are so as they are revealed in the ,holy ,scriptures1 because the mouth of ,god1 who is ,truth itself1 and cannot lie1 hath spoken them2 and our own reason upon this ground teacheth us to submit ourselves and it to the obedience of faith1 for the ,greek3 to hoti1 that so it is4 ,but then1 for the ,greek3 to ps1 ,nicodemus his question1 ,how can these things be8 it is no more possible for our weak understandings to comprehend that1 than it is for the eyes of bats or owls to look steadfastly upon the body of the sun1 when he shineth forth in his greatest strength4,n ,this distinction ,hamilton endeavoured to extend from the domain of ,christian theology to that of philosophical speculation in general2 to show that the unconditioned1 as it is suggested in philosophy1 no less than as it connects itself with revealed religion1 is an object of belief1 not of positive conception2 and1 consequently1 that men cannot escape from mystery by rejecting revelation4 ,above all1 he says1 ,i am confirmed in my belief by the harmony between the doctrines of this philosophy1 and those of revealed truth4444 ,for this philosophy is professedly a scientific demonstration of the impossibility of that 'wisdom in high matters' which the ,apostle prohibits us even to attempt2 and it proposes1 from the limitation of the human powers1 from our impotence to comprehend what1 however1 we must admit1 to show articulately why the 'secret things of ,god1' cannot but be to man 'past finding out4',o ,faith in the inconceivable must thus become the ultimate refuge1 even of the pantheist and the atheist1 no less than of the ,christian2 the difference being1 that while the last takes his stand on a faith which is in agreement alike with the authority of ,scripture and the needs of human nature1 the two former are driven to one which is equally opposed to both1 as well as to the pretensions of their own philosophy4 ,n ,works1 vol4 i41 p1 #bcc4 ,o ,discussions1 p4 #fbe4 ,deny the ,trinity2 deny the ,personality of ,god3 there yet remains that which no man can deny as the law of his own consciousness--,time4 ,conditioned existence is existence in time3 to attain to a philosophy of the unconditioned1 we must rise to the conception of existence out of time4 ,the attempt may be made in two ways1 and in two only4 ,either we may endeavour to conceive an absolutely first moment of time1 beyond which is an existence having no duration and no succession2 or we may endeavour to conceive time as an unlimited duration1 containing an infinite series of successive antecedents and consequents1 each conditioned in itself1 but forming altogether an unconditioned whole4 ,in other words1 we may endeavour1 with the ,eleatics1 to conceive pure existence apart and distinct from all phenomenal change2 or we may endeavour1 with ,heraclitus1 to conceive the universe as a system of incessant changes1 immutable only in the law of its own mutability2 for these two systems may be regarded as the type of all subsequent attempts4 ,both1 however1 alike aim at an object which is beyond positive conception1 and which can be accepted only as something to be believed in spite of its inconceivability4 ,to conceive an existence beyond the first moment of time1 and to connect that existence as cause with the subsequent temporal succession of effects1 we must conceive time itself as non-existent and then commencing to exist4 ,but when we make the effort to conceive time as non-existent1 we find it impossible to do so4 ,time1 as the universal condition of human consciousness1 clings round the very conception which strives to destroy it1 clings round the language in which we speak of an existence before time4 ,nor are we more successful when we attempt to conceive an infinite regress of time1 and an infinite series of dependent existences in time4 ,to say nothing of the direct contradiction involved in the notion of an unconditioned whole1--a something completed1--composed of infinite parts--of parts never completed1--even if we abandon the ,whole1 and with it the ,unconditioned1 and attempt merely to conceive an infinite succession of conditioned existences--conditioned1 absurdly enough1 by nothing beyond themselves1--we find1 that in order to do so1 we must add moment to moment for ever--a process which would require an eternity for its accomplishment4,p ,moreover1 the chain of dependent existences in this infinite succession is not1 like a mathematical series1 composed of abstract and homogeneous units2 it is made up of divers phenomena1 of a regressive line of causes1 each distinct from the other4 ,wherever1 therefore1 ,i stop in my addition1 ,i do not positively conceive the terms which lie beyond4 ,i apprehend them only as a series of unknown somethings1 of which ,i may believe that they are1 but am unable to say what they are4 ,p ,see ,discussions1 p4 #bi4 ,of course by this is not meant that no duration can be conceived except in a duration equally long--that a thousand years1 e4g41 can only be conceived in a thousand years4 ,a thousand years may be conceived as one unit3 infinity cannot2 for an unit is something complete1 and therefore limited4 ,what is meant is1 that any period of time1 however long1 is conceived as capable of further increase1 and therefore as not infinite4 ,an infinite duration can have no time before or after it2 and thus cannot resemble any portion of finite time1 however great4 ,when we dream of conceiving an infinite regress of time1 says ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 we only deceive ourselves by substituting the indefinite for the infinite1 than which no two notions can be more opposed4 ,this caution has not been attended to by some later critics4 ,thus1 ,dr4 ,whewell 7,philosophy of ,discovery1 p4 #cbd7 says3 ,the definition of an infinite number is not that it contains all possible unities2 but this--that the progress of numeration1 being begun according to a certain law1 goes on without limit4 ,this is precisely ,descartes' definition1 not of the infinite1 but of the indefinite4 ,principia1 i4 #bf3 ,nos autem illa omnia1 in quibus sub aliqua consideratione nullum finem poterimus invenire1 non quidem affirmabimus esse infinita1 sed ut indefinita spectabimus4 ,an indefinite time is that which is capable of perpetual addition3 an infinite time is one so great as to admit of no addition4 ,surely no two notions can be more opposed4 ,the cardinal point1 then1 of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's philosophy1 expressly announced as such by himself1 is the absolute necessity1 under any system of philosophy whatever1 of acknowledging the existence of a sphere of belief beyond the limits of the sphere of thought4 ,the main scope of my speculation1,q he says1 is to show articulately that we must believe1 as actual1 much that we are unable 7positively7 to conceive as even possible4 ,it is1 of course1 beyond the range of such a speculation1 by itself1 to enter on an examination of the positive evidences in support of one form of belief rather than another4 ,so far as it aims only at exhibiting an universal law of the human mind1 it is of course compatible with all special forms of belief which do not contradict that law2 and none1 whatever their pretensions1 can really contradict it4 ,hence the service which such a philosophy can render to the ,christian religion must necessarily1 from the nature of the case1 be of an indirect and negative character4 ,it prepares the way for a fair examination of the proper evidences of ,christianity1 by showing that there is no ground for any priori prejudice against revelation1 as appealing1 for the acceptance of its highest truths1 to faith rather than to reason2 for that this appeal is common to all religions and to all philosophies1 and cannot therefore be urged against one more than another4 ,so far as certain difficulties are inherent in the constitution of the human mind itself1 they must necessarily occupy the same position with respect to all religions alike4 ,to exhibit the nature of these difficulties is a service to true religion2 but it is the service of the pioneer1 not of the builder2 it does not prove the religion to be true2 it only clears the ground for the production of the special evidences4 ,q ,letter to ,mr4 ,calderwood4 ,see ,lectures1 vol4 ii1 p4 #ecd4 ,where those evidences are to be found1 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton has not failed to tell us4 ,if mere intellectual speculations on the nature and origin of the material universe form a common ground in which the theist1 the pantheist1 and even the atheist1 may alike expatiate1 the moral and religious feelings of man--those facts of consciousness which have their direct source in the sense of personality and free will--plead with overwhelming evidence in behalf of a personal ,god1 and of man's relation to ,him1 as a person to a person4 ,we have seen1 in a previous quotation1 ,hamilton's emphatic declaration that psychological materialism1 if carried out fully and fairly to its conclusions1 inevitably results in theological atheism4 ,in the same spirit he tells us that it is only as man is a free intelligence1 a moral power1 that he is created after the image of ,god2,r that with the proof of the moral nature of man1 stands or falls the proof of the existence of a ,deity2 that the possibility of morality depends on the possibility of liberty2 that if man be not a free agent1 he is not the author of his actions1 and has therefore no responsibility1 no moral personality at all2,s and1 finally1 that he who disbelieves the moral agency of man1 must1 in consistency with that opinion1 disbelieve ,christianity4,t ,we have thus1 in the positive and negative sides of this philosophy1 both a reasonable ground of belief and a warning against presumption4 ,by our immediate consciousness of a moral and personal nature1 we are led to the belief in a moral and personal ,god3 by our ignorance of the unconditioned1 we are led to the further belief1 that behind that moral and personal manifestation of ,god there lies concealed a mystery--the mystery of the ,absolute and the ,infinite2 that our intellectual and moral qualities1 though indicating the nearest approach to the ,divine ,perfections which we are capable of conceiving1 yet indicate them as analogous1 not as identical2 that we may naturally expect to find points where this analogy will fail us1 where the function of the ,infinite ,moral ,governor will be distinct from that of the finite moral servant2 and where1 consequently1 we shall be liable to error in judging by human rules of the ways of ,god1 whether manifested in nature or in revelation4 ,such is the true lesson to be learnt from a philosophy which tells us of a ,god who is in a certain sense revealed1 in a certain sense concealed--at once known and unknown4 ,r ,lectures1 vol4 i41 p4 #cj4 ,s ,lectures1 vol4 i1 p4 #cc4 ,t ,ibid41 p4 #db4 ,it is not surprising that this philosophy1 when compared with that of a critic like ,mr4 ,mill1 should stand out in clear and sharp antagonism4 ,mr4 ,mill is one of the most distinguished representatives of that school of ,materialism which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton denounces as virtual ,atheism4 ,we do not mean that he consciously adopts the grosser tenets of the materialists4 ,we are not aware that he has ever positively denied the existence of a soul distinct from the body1 or maintained that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile4 ,but he is the advocate of a philosophical method which makes the belief in the existence of an immaterial principle superfluous and incongruous2 he not only acknowledges no such distinction between the phenomena of mind and those of matter as to require the hypothesis of a free intelligence to account for it2 he not only regards the ascertained laws of coexistence and succession in material phenomena as the type and rule according to which all phenomena whatever--those of internal consciousness no less than of external observation--are to be tested2 but he even expressly denies the existence of that free will which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton regards as the indispensable condition of all morality and all religion4,u ,thus1 instead of recognising in the facts of intelligence an order of existence diametrically in contrast to that displayed to us in the facts of the material universe1,v he regards both classes of facts as of the same kind1 and explicable by the same laws2 he abolishes the primary contrast of consciousness between the ego and the non-ego--the person and the thing2 he reduces man to a thing1 instead of a person1--to one among the many phenomena of the universe1 determined by the same laws of invariable antecedence and consequence1 included under the same formul of empirical generalization4 ,he thus makes man the slave1 and not the master of nature2 passively carried along in the current of successive phenomena2 unable1 by any act of free will1 to arrest a single wave in its course1 or to divert it from its ordained direction4 ,u ,that this is the real battle-ground between the two philosophers is virtually admitted by ,mr4 ,mill himself at the end of his criticism4 ,he says3--,the whole philosophy of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton seems to have had its character determined by the requirements of the doctrine of ,free-will2 and to that doctrine he clung1 because he had persuaded himself that it afforded the only premises from which human reason could deduce the doctrines of natural religion4 ,i believe that in this persuasion he was thoroughly his own dupe1 and that his speculations have weakened the philosophical foundation of religion fully as much as they have confirmed it4--,p4 #edi4 ,mr4 ,mill's whole philosophy1 on the other hand1 is determined by the requirements of the doctrine of ,necessity2 and to that doctrine he intrepidly adheres1 in utter defiance of consciousness1 and sometimes of his own consistency4 ,which of the two philosophers is really his own dupe1 ,mr4 ,mill in believing that morality and religion can exist without free will--that a necessary agent can be responsible for his acts--or ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton in maintaining the contrary1 is a question which the former has by no means satisfactorily settled in his own favour4 ,v ,hamilton1 ,lectures1 vol4 i1 p4 #bi4 ,this diametrical antagonism between the two philosophers is not limited to their first principles1 but extends1 as might naturally be expected1 to every subordinate science of which the immediate object is mental1 and not material4 ,logic1 instead of being1 as ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton regards it1 an priori science of the necessary laws of thought1 is with ,mr4 ,mill a science of observation1 investigating those operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of evidence4,w ,the axioms of ,mathematics1 which the former philosopher regards1 with ,kant1 as necessary thoughts1 based on the priori intuitions of space and time1 the latter,x declares to be experimental truths2 generalizations from observation4 ,psychology1 which with ,hamilton is especially the philosophy of man as a free and personal agent1 is with ,mill the science of the uniformities of succession2 the laws1 whether ultimate or derivative1 according to which one mental state succeeds another4,y ,and finally1 in the place of ,ethics1 as the science of the priori laws of man's moral obligations1 we are presented1 in ,mr4 ,mill's system1 with ,ethology1 the science which determines the kind of character produced1 in conformity to the general laws of mind1 by any set of circumstances1 physical and moral4,z ,w ,mill's ,logic4 ,introduction1 #g4 ,x ,ibid41 book ii4 #e1 #d4 ,y ,mill's ,logic1 book vi4 #d1 #c4 ,z ,ibid41 book vi4 #e1 #d4 ,the contrast between the two philosophers being thus thoroughgoing1 it was natural to expect beforehand that an ,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 by ,mr4 ,mill1 would contain a sharp and vigorous assault on the principal doctrines of that philosophy4 ,and this expectation has been amply fulfilled4 ,but there was also reason to expect1 from the ability and critical power displayed in ,mr4 ,mill's previous writings1 that his assault1 whether successful or not in overthrowing his enemy1 would at least be guided by a clear knowledge of that enemy's position and purposes2 that his dissent would be accompanied by an intelligent apprehension1 and an accurate statement1 of the doctrines dissented from4 ,in this expectation1 we regret to say1 we have been disappointed4 ,not only is ,mr4 ,mill's attack on ,hamilton's philosophy1 with the exception of some minor details1 unsuccessful2 but we are compelled to add1 that with regard to the three fundamental doctrines of that philosophy--the ,relativity of ,knowledge1 the ,incognisability of the ,absolute and ,infinite1 and the distinction between ,reason and ,faith--,mr4 ,mill has1 throughout his criticism1 altogether missed the meaning of the theories he is attempting to assail4 ,this is a serious charge to bring against a writer of such eminence as ,mr4 ,mill1 and one which should not be advanced without ample proof4 ,first1 then1 of the ,relativity of ,knowledge4 ,the assertion that all our knowledge is relative1--in other words1 that we know things only under such conditions as the laws of our cognitive faculties impose upon us1--is a statement which looks at first sight like a truism1 but which really contains an answer to a very important question1--,have we reason to believe that the laws of our cognitive faculties impose any conditions at all8--that the mind in any way reacts on the objects affecting it1 so as to produce a result different from that which would be produced were it merely a passive recipient8 ,the mind of man1 says ,bacon1 is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass1 wherein the beams of things shall reflect according to their true incidence2 nay1 it is rather like an enchanted glass1 full of superstition and imposture1 if it be not delivered and reduced4 ,can what ,bacon says of the fallacies of the mind be also said of its proper cognitions8 ,does the mind1 by its own action1 in any way distort the appearance of the things presented to it2 and if so1 how far does the distortion extend1 and in what manner is it to be rectified8 ,to trace the course of this inquiry1 from the day when ,plato compared the objects perceived by the senses to the shadows thrown by fire on the wall of a cave1 to the day when ,kant declared that we know only phenomena1 not things in themselves1 would be to write the history of philosophy4 ,we can only at present call attention to one movement in that history1 which1 was1 in effect1 a revolution in philosophy4 ,the older philosophers in general distinguished between the senses and the intellect1 regarding the former as deceptive and concerned with phenomena alone1 the latter as trustworthy and conversant with the realities of things4 ,hence arose the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world--between things as perceived by sense and things as apprehended by intellect--between ,phenomenology and ,ontology4 ,kant rejected this distinction1 holding that the intellect1 as well as the sense1 imposes its own forms on the things presented to it1 and is therefore cognisant only of phenomena1 not of things in themselves4 ,the logical result of this position would be the abolition of ontology as a science of things in themselves1 and1 fortiori1 of that highest branch of ontology which aims at a knowledge of the ,absolute,,aa ,greek3 kat' exochn1 of the unconditioned first principle of all things4 ,if the mind1 in every act of thought1 imposes its own forms on its objects1 to think is to condition1 and the unconditioned is the unthinkable4 ,such was the logical result of ,kant's principles1 but not the actual result4 ,for ,kant1 by distinguishing between the ,understanding and the ,reason1 and giving to the latter an indirect yet positive cognition of the ,unconditioned as a regulative principle of thought1 prepared the way for the systems of ,schelling and ,hegel1 in which this indirect cognition is converted into a direct one1 by investing the reason1 thus distinguished as the special faculty of the unconditioned1 with a power of intuition emancipated from the conditions of space and time1 and even of subject and object1 or a power of thought emancipated from the laws of identity and contradiction4 ,,aa ,the term absolute1 in the sense of free from relation1 may be used in two applications2--#ast1 ,to denote the nature of a thing as it is in itself1 as distinguished from its appearance to us4 ,here it is used only in a subordinate sense1 as meaning out of relation to human knowledge4 #bndly1 ,to denote the nature of a thing as independent of all other things1 as having no relation to any other thing as the condition of its existence4 ,here it is used in its highest sense1 as meaning out of relation to anything else4 ,the theory of ,hamilton is a modification of that of ,kant1 intended to obviate these consequences1 and to relieve the ,kantian doctrine itself from the inconsistency which gave rise to them4 ,so long as the reason is regarded as a separate faculty from the understanding1 and things in themselves as ideas of the reason1 so long the apparent contradictions1 which encumber the attempt to conceive the unconditioned1 must be regarded as inherent in the constitution of the reason itself1 and as the result of its legitimate exercise on its proper objects4 ,this sceptical conclusion ,hamilton endeavoured to avoid by rejecting the distinction between the understanding and the reason as separate faculties1 regarding the one as the legitimate and positive1 the other as the illegitimate and negative1 exercise of one and the same faculty4 ,he thus announces1 in opposition to ,kant1 the fundamental doctrine of the ,conditioned1 as the distinction between intelligence within its legitimate sphere of operation1 impeccable1 and intelligence beyond that sphere1 affording 7by abuse7 the occasions of error4,,ab ,hamilton1 like ,kant1 maintained that all our cognitions are compounded of two elements1 one contributed by the object known1 and the other by the mind knowing4 ,but the very conception of a relation implies the existence of things to be related2 and the knowledge of an object1 as in relation to our mind1 necessarily implies its existence out of that relation4 ,but as so existing1 it is unknown3 we believe that it is2 we know not what it is4 ,how far it resembles1 or how far it does not resemble1 the object apprehended by us1 we cannot say1 for we have no means of comparing the two together4 ,,ab ,discussions1 p4 #fcc4 ,instead2 therefore1 of saying with ,kant1 that reason is subject to an inevitable delusion1 by which1 it mistakes the regulative principles of its own thoughts for the representations of real things1 ,hamilton would say that the reason1 while compelled to believe in the existence of these real things1 is not legitimately entitled to make any positive representation of them as of such or such a nature2 and that the contradictions into which it falls when attempting to do so are due to an illegitimate attempt to transcend the proper boundaries of positive thought4 ,this theory does not1 in itself1 contain any statement of the mode in which we perceive the material world1 whether directly by presentation1 or indirectly by representative images2 and perhaps it might1 without any great violence1 be adapted to more than one of the current hypotheses on this point4 ,but that to which it most easily adjusts itself is that maintained by ,hamilton himself under the name of ,natural ,realism4 ,to speak of perception as a relation between mind and matter1 naturally implies the presence of both correlatives2 though each may be modified by its contact with the other4 ,the acid may act on the alkali1 and the alkali on the acid1 in forming the neutral salt2 but each of the ingredients is as truly present as the other1 though each enters into the compound in a modified form4 ,and this is equally the case in perception1 even if we suppose various media to intervene between the ultimate object and the perceiving mind1--such1 e4g41 as the rays of light and the sensitive organism in vision1--so long as these media are material1 like the ultimate object itself4 ,whether the object1 properly so called1 in vision1 be the rays of light in contact with the organ1 or the body emitting or reflecting those rays1 is indifferent to the present question1 so long as a material object of some kind or other is supposed to be perceived1 and not merely an inmaterial representation of such an object4 ,to speak of our perceptions as mere modifications of mind produced by an unknown cause1 would be like maintaining that the acid is modified by the influence of the alkali without entering into combination with it4 ,such a view might perhaps be tolerated1 in connection with the theory of relativity1 by an indulgent interpretation of language1 but it is certainly not that which the language of the theory most naturally suggests4 ,all this ,mr4 ,mill entirely misapprehends4 ,he quotes a passage from ,hamilton's ,lectures1 in which the above theory of ,relativity is clearly stated as the mean between the extremes of ,idealism and ,materialism1 and then proceeds to comment as follows3-- ,the proposition1 that our cognitions of objects are only in part dependent on the objects themselves1 and in part on elements superadded by our organs or our minds1 is not identical1 nor prima facie absurd4 ,it cannot1 however1 warrant the assertion that all our knowledge1 but only that the part so added1 is relative4 ,if our author had gone as far as ,kant1 and had said that all which constitutes knowledge is put in by the mind itself1 he would have really held1 in one of its forms1 the doctrine of the relativity of our knowledge4 ,but what he does say1 far from implying that the whole of our knowledge is relative1 distinctly imports that all of it which1 is real and authentic is the reverse4 ,if any part of what we fancy that we perceive in the objects themselves1 originates in the perceiving organs or in the cognising mind1 thus much is purely relative2 but since1 by supposition1 it does not all so originate1 the part that does not is as much absolute as if it were not liable to be mixed up with1 these delusive subjective impressions4--7,p4 #cj47 ,mr4 ,mill1 therefore1 supposes that wholly relative must mean wholly mental2 in other words1 that to say that a thing is wholly due to a relation between mind and matter is equivalent to saying that it is wholly due to mind alone4 ,on the contrary1 we maintain that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's language is far more accurate than ,mr4 ,mill's1 and that the above theory can with perfect correctness be described as one of total relativity2 and this from two points of view4 ,first1 as opposed to the theory of partial relativity generally held by the pre-,kantian philosophers1 according to which our sensitive cognitions are relative1 our intellectual ones absolute4 ,secondly1 as asserting that the object of perception1 though composed of elements partly material1 partly mental1 yet exhibits both alike in a form modified by their relation to each other4 ,the composition is not a mere mechanical juxtaposition1 in which each part1 though acting on the other1 retains its own characteristics unchanged4 ,it may be rather likened to a chemical fusion1 in which both elements are present1 but each of them is affected by the composition4 ,the material part1 therefore1 is not as much absolute as if it were not liable to be mixed up with subjective impressions4 ,but we must hear the continuation of ,mr4 ,mill's criticism3-- ,the admixture of the relative element not only does not take away the absolute character of the remainder1 but does not even 7if our author is right7 prevent us from recognising it4 ,the confusion1 according to him1 is not inextricable4 ,it is for us to 'analyse and distinguish what elements' in an 'act of knowledge' are contributed by the object1 and what by our organs1 or by the mind4 ,we may neglect to do this1 and as far as the mind's share is concerned1 we can only do it by the help of philosophy2 but it is a task to which1 in his opinion1 philosophy is equal4 ,by thus stripping off such of the elements in our apparent cognitions of things as are but cognitions of something in us1 and consequently relative1 we may succeed in uncovering the pure nucleus1 the direct intuitions of things in themselves2 as we correct the observed positions of the heavenly bodies by allowing for the error due to the refracting influence of the atmospheric medium1 an influence which does not alter the facts1 but only our perception of them4 ,surely ,mr4 ,mill here demands much more of philosophy than ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton deems it capable of accomplishing4 ,why may not ,hamilton1 like ,kant1 distinguish between the permanent and necessary1 and the variable and contingent--in other words1 between the subjective and the objective elements of consciousness1 without therefore obtaining a direct intuition of things in themselves8 ,why may he not distinguish between space and time as the forms of our sensitive cognitions1 and the things perceived in space and time1 which constitute the matter of the same cognitions1 without thereby having an intuition1 on the one hand1 of pure space and time with nothing in them1 or on the other1 of things in themselves out of space and time8 ,if certain elements are always present in perception1 while certain others change with every act1 ,i may surely infer that the one is due to the permanent subject1 the other to the variable object1 without thereby knowing what each would be if it could be discerned apart from the other4 ,a direct intuition of things in themselves1 according to ,kant and ,hamilton1 is an intuition of things out of space and time4 ,does ,mr4 ,mill suppose that any natural ,realist professes to have such an intuition8 ,the same error of supposing that a doctrine of relativity is necessarily a doctrine of ,idealism1 that matter known only in relation to us can mean nothing more than matter known only through the mental impressions of which it is the unknown cause1,,ac runs through the whole of ,mr4 ,mill's argument against this portion of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's teaching4 ,that argument1 though repeated in various forms1 may be briefly summed up in one thesis2 namely1 that the doctrine that our knowledge of matter is wholly relative is incompatible with the distinction1 which ,hamilton expressly makes1 between the primary and secondary qualities of body4 ,,ac ,the assumption that these two expressions are or ought to be synonymous is tacitly made by ,mr4 ,mill at the opening of this chapter4 ,he opens it with a passage from the ,discussions1 in which ,hamilton says that the existence of things in themselves is only indirectly revealed to us through certain qualities related to our faculties of knowledge2 and then proceeds to show that the author did not hold the doctrine which these phrases seem to convey in the only substantial meaning capable of being attached to them2 namely1 that we know nothing of objects except their existence1 and the impressions produced by them upon the human mind4 ,having thus quietly assumed that things in themselves are identical with objects1 and relations with impressions on the human mind1 ,mr4 ,mill bases his whole criticism on this tacit petitio principii4 ,he is not aware that though ,reid sometimes uses the term relative in this inaccurate sense1 ,hamilton expressly points out the inaccuracy and explains the proper sense4--7,see ,reid's ,works1 pp4 #cac1 #cbb47 ,the most curious circumstance about this criticism is1 that1 if not directly borrowed from1 it has at least been carefully anticipated by1 ,hamilton himself4 ,of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities1 as acknowledged by ,descartes and ,locke1 whose theory of external perception is identical with that which ,mr4 ,mill would force on ,hamilton himself1 ,hamilton says3 ,on the general doctrine1 however1 of these philosophers1 both classes of qualities1 as known1 are confessedly only states of our own minds2 and while we have no right from a subjective affection to infer the existence1 far less the corresponding character of the existence1 of any objective reality1 it is evident that their doctrine1 if fairly evolved1 would result in a dogmatic or in a sceptical negation of the primary no less than of the secondary qualities of body1 as more than appearances in and for us4,,ad ,it is astonishing that ,mr4 ,mill1 who pounces eagerly on every imaginable instance of ,hamilton's inconsistency1 should have neglected to notice this1 which1 if his criticism be true1 is the most glaring inconsistency of all4 ,,ad ,reid's ,works1 p4 #hdj4 ,but ,hamilton continues3 ,it is therefore manifest that the fundamental position of a consistent theory of dualistic realism is--that our cognitions of ,extension and its modes are not wholly ideal--that although ,space be a native1 necessary1 priori form of imagination1 and so far1 therefore1 a mere subjective state1 that there is1 at the same time1 competent to us1 in an immediate perception of external things1 the consciousness of a really existent1 of a really objective1 extended world4 ,here we have enunciated in one breath1 first the subjectivity of space1 which is the logical basis of the relative theory of perception2 and secondly1 the objectivity of the extended world1 which is the logical basis of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities4 ,it is manifest1 therefore1 that ,hamilton had not1 as ,mr4 ,mill supposes1 ceased to hold the one theory when he adopted the other4,,ae ,,ae ,see ,examination1 p4 #bh4 ,the key to all this is not difficult to find4 ,it is simply that objective existence does not mean existence per se2 and that a phenomenon does not mean a mere mode of mind4 ,objective existence is existence as an object1 in perception1 and therefore in relation2 and a phenomenon may be material1 as well as mental4 ,the thing per se may be only the unknown cause of what we directly know2 but what we directly know is something more than our own sensations4 ,in other words1 the phenomenal effect is material as well as the cause1 and is1 indeed1 that from which our primary conceptions of matter are derived4 ,matter does not cease to be matter when modified by its contact with mind1 as iron does not cease to be iron when smelted and forged4 ,a horseshoe is something very different from a piece of iron ore2 and a man may be acquainted with the former without ever having seen the latter1 or knowing what it is like4 ,but would ,mr4 ,mill therefore say that the horseshoe is merely a subjective affection of the skill of the smith--that it is not iron modified by the workman1 but the workman or his art impressed by iron8 ,if1 indeed1 ,hamilton had said with ,locke1 that the primary qualities are in the bodies themselves1 whether we perceive them or no1,,af he would have laid himself open to ,mr4 ,mill's criticism4 ,but he expressly rejects this statement1 and contrasts it with the more cautions language of ,descartes1 ut sunt1 vel saltem esse possunt4,,ag ,the secondary qualities are mere affections of consciousness1 which1 cannot be conceived as existing except in a conscious subject4 ,the primary qualities are qualities of body1 as perceived in relation to the percipient mind1 i4e41 of the phenomenal body perceived as in space4 ,how far they exist in the real body out of relation to us1 ,hamilton does not attempt to decide4,,ah ,they are inseparable from our conception of body1 which1 is derived exclusively from the phenomenon2 they may or may not be separable from the thing as it is in itself4 ,,af ,essay1 ii #h1 #bc4 ,,ag ,reid's ,works1 p4 #hci4 ,,ah ,we have been content to argue this question1 as ,mr4 ,mill himself argues it1 on the supposition that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton held that we are directly percipient of primary qualities in external bodies4 ,strictly speaking1 however1 ,hamilton held that the primary qualities are immediately perceived only in our organism as extended1 and inferred to exist in extra-organic bodies4 ,the external world is immediately apprehended only in its secundo-primary character1 as resisting our locomotive energy4 ,but as the organism1 in this theory1 is a material non-ego equally with the rest of matter1 and as to press this distinction would only affect the verbal accuracy1 not the substantial justice1 of ,mr4 ,mill's criticisms1 we have preferred to meet him on the ground he has himself chosen4 ,the same error1 of supposing that presentationism is identical with noumenalism1 and phenomenalism with representationism1 runs through the whole of ,mr4 ,stirling's recent criticism of ,hamilton's theory of perception4 ,it is curious1 however1 that the very passage 7,lectures1 i41 p4 #adf7 which ,mr4 ,mill cites as proving that ,hamilton1 in spite of his professed phenomenalism1 was an unconscious noumenalist1 is employed by ,mr4 ,stirling to prove that1 in spite of his professed presentationism1 he was an unconscious representationist4 ,the two critics tilt at ,hamilton from opposite quarters3 he has only to stand aside and let them run against each other4 ,under this explanation1 it is manifest that the doctrine1 that matter as a subject or substratum of attributes is unknown and unknowable1 is totally different from that of cosmothetic idealism1 with which ,mr ,mill confounds it2,,ai and that a philosopher may without inconsistency accept the former and reject the latter4 ,the former1 while it holds the material substance to be unknown1 does not deny that some of the attributes of matter are perceived immediately as material1 though1 it may be1 modified by contact with mind4 ,the latter maintains that the attributes1 as well as the substance1 are not perceived immediately as material1 but mediately through the intervention of immaterial representatives4 ,it is also manifest that1 in answer to ,mr4 ,mill's question1 which of ,hamilton's two cardinal doctrines1 ,relativity or ,natural ,realism1 is to be taken in a non-natural sense1,,aj we must say1 neither4 ,the two doctrines are quite compatible with each other1 and neither requires a non-natural interpretation to reconcile it to its companion4 ,,ai ,examination1 p4 #bc4 ,,aj ,examination1 p4 #bj4 ,the doctrine of relativity derives its chief practical value from its connection with the next great doctrine of ,hamilton's philosophy1 the incognisability of the ,absolute and the ,infinite4 ,for this doctrine brings ,ontology into contact with ,theology2 and it is only in relation to theology that ontology acquires a practical importance4 ,with respect to the other two ideas of the pure reason1 as ,kant calls them1 the human soul and the world1 the question1 whether we know them as realities or as phenomena1 may assist us in dealing with certain metaphysical difficulties1 but need not affect our practical conduct4 ,for we have an immediate intuition of the attributes of mind and matter1 at least as phenomenal objects1 and by these intuitions may be tested the accuracy of the conceptions derived from them1 sufficiently for all practical purposes4 ,a man will equally avoid walking over a precipice1 and is logically as consistent in avoiding it1 whether he regard the precipice as a real thing1 or as a mere phenomenon4 ,but in the province of theology this is not the case4 ,we have no immediate intuition of the ,divine attributes1 even as phenomena2 we only infer their existence and nature from certain similar attributes of which we are immediately conscious in ourselves4 ,and hence arises the question1 ,how far does the similarity extend1 and to what extent is the accuracy of our conceptions guaranteed by the intuition1 not of the object to be conceived1 but of something more or less nearly resembling it8 ,but this is not all4 ,our knowledge of ,god1 originally derived from personal consciousness1 receives accession from two other sources--from the external world1 as ,his work2 and from revelation1 as ,his word2 and the conclusions derived from each have to be compared together4 ,should any discrepancy arise between them1 are we at once warranted in rejecting one class of conclusions in favour of the other two1 or two in favour of the third8 or are we at liberty to say that our knowledge in respect of all alike is of such an imperfect and indirect character that we are warranted in believing that some reconciliation may exist1 though our ignorance prevents us from discovering what it is8 ,here at least is a practical question of the very highest importance4 ,in the early part of our previous remarks1 we have endeavoured to show how this question has been answered by orthodox theologians of various ages1 and how ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's philosophy supports that answer4 ,we have now to consider ,mr ,mill's chapter of criticisms4 ,it is always unfortunate to make a stumble on the threshold2 and ,mr4 ,mill's opening paragraph makes two4 ,the name of ,god1 he says1 is veiled under two extremely abstract phrases1 'the ,infinite and the ,absolute4'444 ,but it is one of the most unquestionable of all logical maxims1 that the meaning of the abstract must be sought in the concrete1 and not conversely4,,ak--,now1 in the first place1 the ,infinite and the ,absolute1 even in the sense in which they are both predicable of ,god1 are no more names of ,god than the creature and the finite are names of man4 ,they are the names of certain attributes1 which further inquiry may1 perhaps1 show to belong to ,god and to no other being1 but which do not in their signification express this1 and do not constitute our primary idea of ,god1 which is that of a ,person4 ,men may believe in an absolute and infinite1 without in any proper sense believing in ,god2 and thousands upon thousands of pious men have prayed to a personal ,god1 who have never heard of the absolute and the infinite1 and who would not understand the expressions if they heard them4 ,but1 in the second place1 the absolute and the infinite1 in ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's sense of the terms1 cannot both be names of ,god1 for the simple reason that they are contradictory of each other1 and are proposed as alternatives which cannot both be accepted as predicates of the same subject4 ,for ,hamilton1 whatever ,mr4 ,mill may do1 did not fall into the absurdity of maintaining that ,god in some of ,his attributes is absolute without being infinite1 and in others is infinite without being absolute4,,al ,,ak ,examination1 p4 #cb4 ,,al ,see ,examination1 p4 #ce4 ,but we have not yet done with this single paragraph4 ,after thus making two errors in his exposition of his opponent's doctrine1 ,mr4 ,mill immediately proceeds to a third1 in his criticism of it4 ,by following his most unquestionable of all logical maxims1 and substituting the name of ,god in the place of the ,infinite and the ,absolute1 he exactly reverses ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's argument1 and makes his own attempted refutation of it a glaring ignoratio elenchi4 ,one of the purposes of ,hamilton's argument is to show that we have no positive conception of an ,infinite ,being2 that when we attempt to form such a conception1 we do but produce a distorted representation of the finite2 and hence1 that our so-called conception of the infinite is not the true infinite4 ,hence it is not to be wondered at--nay1 it is a natural consequence of this doctrine1--that our positive conception of ,god as a ,person cannot be included under this pseudo-concept of the ,infinite4 ,whereas ,mr4 ,mill1 by laying down the maxim that the meaning of the abstract must be sought in the concrete1 quietly assumes that this pseudo-infinite is a proper predicate of ,god1 to be tested by its applicability to the subject1 and that what ,hamilton says of this infinite cannot be true unless it is also true of ,god4 ,of this refutation1 ,hamilton1 were he living1 might truly say1 as he said of a former criticism on another part of his writings1--,this elaborate parade of argument is literally answered in two words--,quis dubitavit8 ,but if the substitution of ,god for the ,infinite be thus a perversion of ,hamilton's argument1 what shall we say to a similar substitution in the case of the ,absolute8 ,hamilton distinctly tells us that there is one sense of the term absolute in which it is contradictory of the infinite1 and therefore is not predicable of ,god at all4 ,mr4 ,mill admits that ,hamilton1 throughout the greater part of his arguments1 employs the term in this sense2 and he then actually proceeds to test these arguments by substituting the concrete1 ,god1 for the abstract1 ,absolute2 i4e41 by substituting ,god for something which ,hamilton defines as contradictory to the nature of ,god4 ,can the force of confusion go further8 ,is it possible for perverse criticism more utterly1 we do not say to misrepresent1 but literally to invert an author's meaning8 ,the source of all these errors1 and of a great many more1 is simply this4 ,mr4 ,mill is aware1 from ,hamilton's express assertion1 that the word absolute may be used in two distinct and even contradictory senses2 but he is wholly unable to see what those senses are1 or when ,hamilton is using the term in the one sense1 and when in the other4 ,let us endeavour to clear up some of this confusion4 ,hamilton's article on the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned is a criticism1 partly of ,schelling1 partly of ,cousin2 and ,schelling and ,cousin only attempted in a new form1 under the influence of the ,kantian philosophy1 to solve the problem with which philosophy in all ages has attempted to grapple1--the problem of the ,unconditioned4 ,the unconditioned is a term which1 while retaining the same general meaning1 admits of various applications1 particular or universal4 ,it may be the unconditioned as regards some special relation1 or the unconditioned as regards all relations whatever4 ,thus there may be the unconditioned in ,psychology--the human soul considered as a substance2 the unconditioned in ,cosmology--the world considered as a single whole2 the unconditioned in ,theology--,god in ,his own nature1 as distinguished from ,his manifestations to us2 or1 finally1 the unconditioned par excellence--the unconditioned in ,ontology--the being on which all other being depends4 ,it is of course possible to identify any one of the three first with the last4 ,it is possible to adopt a system of ,egoism1 and to maintain that all phenomena are modes of my mind1 and that the substance of my mind is the only real existence4 ,it is possible to adopt a system of ,materialism1 and to maintain that all phenomena are modes of matter1 and that the material substance of the world is the only real existence4 ,or it is possible to adopt a system of ,pantheism1 and to maintain that all phenomena are modes of the ,divine existence1 and that ,god is the only reality4 ,but the several notions are in themselves distinct1 though one may ultimately be predicated of another4 ,the general notion of the ,unconditioned is the same in all these cases1 and all must finally culminate in the last1 the ,unconditioned par excellence4 ,the general notion is that of the ,one as distinguished from the ,many1 the substance from its accidents1 the permanent reality from its variable modifications4 ,thought1 will1 sensation1 are modes of my existence4 ,what is the ,i that is one and the same in all8 ,extension1 figure1 resistance1 are attributes of matter4 ,what is the one substance to which these attributes belong8 ,but the generalisation cannot stop here4 ,if matter differs from mind1 the non-ego from the ego1 as one thing from another1 there must be some special point of difference1 which1 is the condition of the existence of each in this or that particular manner4 ,unconditioned existence1 therefore1 in the highest sense of the term1 cannot be the existence of this as distinguished from that2 it must be existence per se1 the ground and principle of all conditioned or special existence4 ,this is the ,unconditioned1 properly so called3 the unconditioned in ,schelling's sense1 as the indifference of subject and object3 and it is against this that ,hamilton's arguments are directed4 ,the question is this4 ,is this ,unconditioned a mere abstraction1 the product of our own minds2 or can it be conceived as having a real existence per se1 and1 as such1 can it be identified with ,god as the source of all existence8 ,hamilton maintains that it is a mere abstraction1 and cannot be so identified2 that1 far from being a name of ,god1 it is a name of nothing at all4 ,by abstraction1 he says1 we annihilate the object1 and by abstraction we annihilate the subject of consciousness4 ,but what remains8 ,nothing4 ,when we attempt to conceive it as a reality1 we hypostatise the zero4,,am ,,am ,discussions1 p4 #ba4 ,in order to conceive the ,unconditioned existing as a thing1 we must conceive it as existing out of relation to everything else4 ,for if nothing beyond itself is necessary as a condition of its existence1 it can exist separate from everything else2 and its pure existence as the unconditioned is so separate4 ,it must therefore be conceivable as the sole existence1 having no plurality beyond itself2 and as simple1 having no plurality within itself4 ,for if we cannot conceive it as existing apart from other things1 we cannot conceive it as independent of them2 and if we conceive it as a compound of parts1 we have further to ask as before1 what is the principle of unity which binds these parts into one whole8 ,if there is such a principle1 this is the true unconditioned2 if there is no such principle1 there is no unconditioned2 for that which cannot exist except as a compound is dependent for its existence on that of its several constituents4 ,the unconditioned must therefore be conceived as one1 as simple1 and as universal4 ,is such a conception possible1 whether in ordinary consciousness1 as ,cousin says1 or in an extraordinary intuition1 as ,schelling says8 ,let us try the former4 ,consciousness is subject to the law of ,time4 ,a phenomenon is presented to us in time1 as dependent on some previous phenomenon or thing4 ,i wish to pursue the chain in thought till ,i arrive at something independent4 ,if ,i could reach in thought a beginning of time1 and discover some first fact with nothing preceding it1 ,i should conceive time as absolute--as completed1--and the unconditioned as the first thing in time1 and therefore as completed also1 for it may be considered by itself1 apart from what depends upon it4 ,or if time be considered as having no beginning1 thought would still be able to represent to itself that infinity1 could it follow out the series of antecedents for ever4 ,but is either of these alternatives possible to thought8 ,if not1 we must confess that the unconditioned is inconceivable by ordinary consciousness2 and we must found philosophy1 with ,schelling1 on the annihilation of consciousness4 ,but though ,hamilton himself distinguishes between the unconditioned and the absolute1 using the former term generally1 for that which is out of all relation1 and the latter specially1 for that which is out of all relation as complete and finished1 his opponent ,cousin uses the latter term in a wider sense1 as synonymous with the former1 and the infinite as coextensive with both4 ,this1 however1 does not affect the validity of ,hamilton's argument4 ,for if it can be shown that the absolute and the infinite 7in ,hamilton's sense7 are both inconceivable1 the unconditioned 7or absolute in ,cousin's sense71 which must be conceived as one or the other1 is inconceivable also4 ,or1 conversely1 if it can be shown that the unconditioned1 the unrelated in general1 is inconceivable1 it follows that the absolute and the infinite1 as both involving the unrelated1 are inconceivable also4 ,we may now proceed with ,mr4 ,mill's criticism4 ,he says3-- ,absolute1 in the sense in which1 it stands related to ,infinite1 means 7conformably to its etymology7 that which is finished or completed4 ,there are some things of which the utmost ideal amount is a limited quantity1 though a quantity never actually reached4444 ,we may speak of absolutely1 but not of infinitely1 pure water4 ,the purity of water is not a fact of which1 whatever degree we suppose attained1 there remains a greater beyond4 ,it has an absolute limit3 it is capable of being finished or complete1 in thought1 if not in reality4--7,p4 #cd47 ,this criticism is either incorrect or nihil ad rem4 ,if meant as a statement of ,hamilton's use of the term1 it is incorrect3 absolute1 in ,hamilton's philosophy1 does not mean simply completed1 but out of relation as completed2 i4e41 self-existent in its completeness1 and not implying the existence of anything else4 ,if meant in any other sense than ,hamilton's1 it is irrelevant4 ,can ,mr4 ,mill really have believed that ,schelling thought it necessary to invent an intellectual intuition out of time and out of consciousness1 in order to contemplate an ideal limited quantity1 such as the complete purity of water8 ,mr4 ,mill continues3-- ,though the idea of ,absolute is thus contrasted with that of ,infinite1 the one is equally fitted with the other to be predicated of ,god2 but not in respect of the same attributes4 ,there is no incorrectness of speech in the phrase ,infinite ,power3 because the notion it expresses is that of a ,being who has the power of doing all things which we know or can conceive1 and more4 ,but in speaking of knowledge1 ,absolute is the proper word1 and not ,infinite4 ,the highest degree of knowledge that can be spoken of with a meaning1 only amounts to knowing all that there is to be known3 when that point is reached1 knowledge has attained its utmost limit4 ,so of goodness or justice3 they cannot be more than perfect4 ,there are not infinite degrees of right4 ,the will is either entirely right1 or wrong in different degrees4--7,p4 #ce47 ,surely1 whatever ,divine power can do1 ,divine knowledge can know as possible to be done4 ,the one1 therefore1 must be as infinite as the other4 ,and what of ,divine goodness8 ,an angel or a glorified saint is absolutely good in ,mr4 ,mill's sense of the term4 ,his will is entirely right4 ,does ,mr4 ,mill mean to say that there is no difference1 even in degree1 between the goodness of ,god and that of one of ,his creatures8 ,but1 even supposing his statement to be true1 how is it relevant to the matter under discussion8 ,can ,mr4 ,mill possibly be ignorant that all these attributes are relations2 that the ,absolute in ,hamilton's sense1 the unconditionally limited1 is not predicable of ,god at all2 and that when divines and philosophers speak of the absolute nature of ,god1 they mean a nature in which there is no distinction of attributes at all8 ,mr4 ,mill then proceeds to give a summary of ,hamilton's arguments against ,cousin1 preparatory to refuting them4 ,in the course of this summary he says3-- ,let me ask1 en passant1 where is the necessity for supposing that1 if the ,absolute1 or1 to speak plainly1 if ,god1 is only known to us in the character of a cause1 he must therefore 'exist merely as a cause1' and be merely 'a mean towards an end8' ,it is surely possible to maintain that the ,deity is known to us only as he who feeds the ravens1 without supposing that the ,divine ,intelligence exists solely in order that the ravens may be fed4,,an--7,p4 #db47 ,,an ,in a note to this passage1 ,mr4 ,mill makes some sarcastic comments on an argument of ,hamilton's against ,cousin's theory that ,god is necessarily determined to create4 ,on this hypothesis1 says ,hamilton1 ,god1 as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation1 is determined to pass either from the better to the worse1 or from the worse to the better4 ,mr4 ,mill calls this argument a curiosity of dialectics1 and answers1 ,perfect wisdom would have begun to will the new state at the precise moment when it began to be better than the old4 ,hamilton is not speaking of states of things1 but of states of the ,divine nature1 as creative or not creative2 and ,mr4 ,mill's argument1 to refute ,hamilton1 must suppose a time when the new nature of ,god begins to be better than the old6 ,mr4 ,mill would perhaps have spoken of ,hamilton's argument with more respect had he known that it is taken from ,plato4 ,on this we would remark1 en passant1 that this is precisely ,hamilton's own doctrine1 that the sphere of our belief is more extensive than that of our knowledge4 ,the purport of ,hamilton's argument is to show that the ,absolute1 as conceived by ,cousin1 is not a true ,absolute 7,infinito-,absolute71 and therefore does not represent the real nature of ,god4 ,his argument is this3 ,cousin's ,absolute exists merely as a cause3 ,god does not exist merely as a cause3 therefore ,cousin's ,absolute is not ,god4 ,mr4 ,mill actually mistakes the position which ,hamilton is opposing for that which he is maintaining4 ,such an error does not lead us to expect much from his subsequent refutation4 ,his first criticism is a curious specimen of his reading in philosophy4 ,he says3-- ,when the ,true or the ,beautiful are spoken of1 the phrase is meant to include all things whatever that are true1 or all things whatever that are beautiful4 ,if this rule is good for other abstractions1 it is good for the ,absolute4 ,the word is devoid of meaning unless in reference to predicates of some sort4444 ,if we are told1 therefore1 that there is some ,being who is1 or which is1 the ,absolute1--not something absolute1 but the ,absolute itself1--the proposition can be understood in no other sense than that the supposed ,being possesses in absolute completeness all predicates2 is absolutely good and absolutely bad2 absolutely wise and absolutely stupid2 and so forth4,,ao--7,p4 #dc47 ,,ao ,in support of this position1 ,mr4 ,mill cites ,hegel--,what kind of an absolute ,being is that which does not contain in itself all that is actual1 even evil included8 ,we are not concerned to defend ,hegel's position2 but he was not quite so absurd as to mean what ,mr4 ,mill supposes him to have meant4 ,does not ,mr4 ,mill know that it was one of ,hegel's fundamental positions1 that the ,divine nature cannot be expressed by a plurality of predicates8 ,plato expressly distinguishes between the beautiful and things that are beautiful1 as the ,one in contrast to the ,many--the ,real in contrast to the ,apparent4,,ap ,it is1 of course1 quite possible that ,plato may be wrong1 and ,mr4 ,mill right2 but the mere fact of their antagonism is sufficient to show that the meaning of the phrase need not be what ,mr4 ,mill supposes it must be4 ,in fact1 the ,absolute in philosophy always has meant the ,one as distinguished from the ,many1 not the ,one as including the ,many4 ,but1 as applied to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 ,mr4 ,mill's remarks on the ,absolute1 and his subsequent remarks on the ,infinite1 not only misrepresent ,hamilton's position1 but exactly reverse it4 ,hamilton maintains that the terms absolute and infinite are perfectly intelligible as abstractions1 as much so as relative and finite2 for correlatives suggest each other1 and the knowledge of contradictories is one2 but he denies that a concrete thing or object can be positively conceived as absolute or infinite4 ,mr4 ,mill represents him as only proving that the unmeaning abstractions are unknowable1--abstractions which ,hamilton does not assert to be unmeaning2 and which he regards as knowable in the only sense in which such abstractions can be known1 viz41 by understanding the meaning of their names4,,aq ,,ap ,republic1 book v41 p4 #dgi4 ,,aq ,this confusion between conceiving a concrete thing and knowing the meaning of abstract terms is as old as ,toland's ,christianity not ,mysterious1 and1 indeed1 has its germ1 though not its development1 in the teaching of his assumed master1 ,locke4 ,locke taught that all our knowledge is founded on simple ideas1 and that a complex idea is merely an accumulation of simple ones4 ,hence ,toland maintained that no object could be mysterious or inconceivable if the terms in which its several attributes are expressed have ideas corresponding to them4 ,but1 in point of fact1 no simple idea can be conceived as an object by itself1 though the word by which it is signified has a perfectly intelligible meaning4 ,i cannot1 e4g41 conceive whiteness by itself1 though ,i can conceive a white wall1 i4e41 whiteness in combination with other attributes in a concrete object4 ,to conceive attributes as coexisting1 however1 we must conceive them as coexisting in a certain manner2 for an object of conception is not a mere heap of ideas1 but an organized whole1 whose constituent ideas exist in a particular combination with and relation to each other4 ,to conceive1 therefore1 we must not only be able to apprehend each idea separately in the abstract1 but also the manner in which they may possibly exist in combination with each other4 ,something infinite1 says ,mr4 ,mill1 is a conception which1 like most of our complex ideas1 contains a negative element1 but which contains positive elements also4 ,infinite space1 for instance2 is there nothing positive in that8 ,the negative part of this conception is the absence of bounds4 ,the positive are1 the idea of space1 and of space greater than any finite space4--7,p4 #de47 ,this definition of infinite space is exactly that which ,descartes gives us of indefinite extension1--,ita quia non possumus imaginari extensionem tam magnam1 quin intelligamus adhuc majorem esse posse1 dicemus magnitudinem rerum possibilium esse indefinitam4,,ar ,so too1 ,cudworth1--,there appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive infinity of space2 we being certain of no more than this1 that be the world or any figurative body never so great1 it is not impossible but that it might be still greater and greater without end4 ,which indefinite increasableness of body and space seems to be mistaken for a positive infinity thereof4,,as ,and ,locke1 a philosopher for whom ,mr4 ,mill will probably have more respect than for ,descartes or ,cudworth1 writes more plainly3 ,to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite1 is to suppose the mind already passed over1 and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space1 which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it1--which carries in it a plain contradiction4,,at ,mr4 ,mill thus unwittingly illustrates1 in his own person1 the truth of ,hamilton's remark1 ,if we dream of effecting this conceiving the infinite in time or space1 we only deceive ourselves by substituting the indefinite for the infinite1 than which no two notions can be more opposed4 ,in fact1 ,mr4 ,mill does not seem to be aware that what the mathematician calls infinite1 the metaphysician calls indefinite1 and that arguments drawn from the mathematical use of the term infinite are wholly irrelevant to the metaphysical4 ,how1 indeed1 could it be otherwise8 ,can any man suppose that1 when the ,divine attributes are spoken of as infinite1 it is meant that they are indefinitely increasable8,,au ,,ar ,principia1 i41 #bf4 ,,as ,intellectual ,system1 ed4 ,harrison1 vol4 iii41 p4 #aca4 ,,at ,essay1 ii41 #ag1 #g4 ,,au ,one of the ablest mathematicians1 and the most persevering ,hamiltono-mastix of the day1 maintains the applicability of the metaphysical notion of infinity to mathematical magnitudes2 but with an assumption which unintentionally vindicates ,hamilton's position more fully than could have been done by a professed disciple4 ,i shall assume1 says ,professor ,de ,morgan1 in a paper recently printed among the ,transactions of the ,cambridge ,philosophical ,society1 the notion of infinity and of its reciprocal infinitesimal3 that a line can be conceived infinite1 and therefore having points at an infinite distance4 ,image apart1 which we cannot have1 it seems to me clear that a line of infinite length1 without points at an infinite distance1 is a contradiction4 ,now it is easy to show1 by mere reasoning1 without any image1 that this assumption is equally a contradiction4 ,for if space is finite1 every line in space must be finite also2 and if space is infinite1 every point in space must have infinite space beyond it in every direction1 and therefore cannot be at the greatest possible distance from another point4 ,or thus3 ,any two points in space are the extremities of the line connecting them2 but an infinite line has no extremities2 therefore no two points in space can be connected together by an infinite line4 ,in fact1 it is the concrete reality1 the something infinite1 and not the mere abstraction of infinity1 which is only conceivable as a negation4 ,every something that has ever been intuitively present to my consciousness is a something finite4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i speak of a something infinite1 ,i mean a something existing in a different manner from all the somethings of which ,i have had experience in intuition4 ,thus it is apprehended1 not positively1 but negatively--not directly by what it is1 but indirectly by what it is not4 ,a negative idea is not negative because it is expressed by a negative term1 but because it has never been realised in intuition4 ,if infinity1 as applied to space1 means the same thing as being greater than any finite space1 both conceptions are equally positive or equally negative4 ,if it does not mean the same thing1 then1 in conceiving a space greater than any finite space1 we do not conceive an infinite space4 ,mr4 ,mill's next string of criticisms may be very briefly dismissed4 ,first1 ,hamilton does not1 as ,mr4 ,mill asserts1 say that the ,unconditioned is inconceivable1 because it includes both the ,infinite and the ,absolute1 and these are contradictory of one another4 ,his argument is a common disjunctive syllogism4 ,the unconditioned1 if conceivable at all1 must be conceived either as the absolute or as the infinite2 neither of these is possible2 therefore the unconditioned is not conceivable at all4 ,nor1 secondly1 is ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton guilty of the strange confusion of ideas which ,mr4 ,mill ascribes to him1 when he says that the ,absolute1 as being absolutely ,one1 cannot be known under the conditions of plurality and difference4 ,the absolute1 as such1 must be out of all relation1 and consequently cannot be conceived in the relation of plurality4 ,the plurality required1 says ,mr4 ,mill1 is not within the thing itself1 but is made up between itself and other things4 ,it is1 in fact1 both2 but even granting ,mr4 ,mill's assumption1 what is a plurality between a thing and other things but a relation between them8 ,there is undoubtedly a strange confusion of ideas in this paragraph2 but the confusion is not on the part of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,again1 continues ,mr4 ,mill1 even if we concede that a thing cannot be known at all unless known as plural1 does it follow that it cannot be known as plural because it is also ,one8 ,since when have the ,one and the ,many been incompatible things1 instead of different aspects of the same thing8444 ,if there is any meaning in the words1 must not ,absolute ,unity be ,absolute ,plurality likewise8 ,mr4 ,mill's since when8 may be answered in the words of ,plato3--,greek3 ,ouden emoige atopon dokei heinai ei hen hapanta apophainei tis t metechein tou henos kai tauta tauta polla t plthous au metechein2 all' ei ho estin hen1 auto touto polla apodeixei1 kai au ta polla d hen1 touto d thaumasomai4,,av ,here we are expressly told that absolute unity cannot be absolute plurality4 ,mr4 ,mill may say that ,plato is wrong2 but he will hardly go so far as to say that there is no meaning in his words4 ,in point of fact1 however1 it is ,mr4 ,mill who is in error1 and not ,plato4 ,in different relations1 no doubt1 the same concrete object may be regarded as one or as many4 ,the same measure is one foot or twelve inches2 the same sum is one shilling or twelve pence2 but it no more follows that absolute unity must be absolute plurality likewise1 than it follows from the above instances that one is equal to twelve4 ,and1 thirdly1 when ,mr4 ,mill accuses ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton of departing from his own meaning of the term absolute1 in maintaining that the ,absolute cannot be a ,cause1 he only shows that he does not himself know what ,hamilton's meaning is4 ,if ,absolute1 he says1 means finished1 perfected1 completed1 may there not be a finished1 perfected1 and completed ,cause8 ,hamilton's ,absolute is that which is out of relation1 as finished1 perfect1 complete2 and a ,cause1 as such1 is both in relation and incomplete4 ,it is in relation to its effect2 and it is incomplete without its effect4 ,finally1 when ,mr4 ,mill charges ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton with maintaining that extension and figure are of the essence of matter1 and perceived as such by intuition1 we must briefly reply that ,hamilton does no such thing4 ,he is not speaking of the essence of matter per se1 but only of matter as apprehended in relation to us4 ,,av ,parmenides1 p4 #abi4 ,mr4 ,mill concludes this chapter with an attempt to discover the meaning of ,hamilton's assertion1 to think is to condition4 ,we have already explained what ,hamilton meant by this expression2 and we recur to the subject now1 only to show the easy manner in which ,mr4 ,mill manages to miss the point of an argument with the clue lying straight before him4 ,did any1 he says 7of those who say that the ,absolute is thinkable71 profess to think it in any other manner than by distinguishing it from other things8 ,now this is the very thing which1 according to ,hamilton1 ,schelling actually did4 ,mr4 ,mill does not attempt to show that ,hamilton is wrong in his interpretation of ,schelling1 nor1 if he is right1 what were the reasons which led ,schelling to so paradoxical a position3 he simply assumes that no man could hold ,schelling's view1 and there is an end of it4,,aw ,hamilton's purpose is to reassert in substance the doctrine which ,kant maintained1 and which ,schelling denied2 and the natural way to ascertain his meaning would be by reference to these two philosophers4 ,but this is not the method of ,mr4 ,mill1 here or elsewhere4 ,he generally endeavours to ascertain ,hamilton's meaning by ranging the wide field of possibilities4 ,he tells us what a phrase means in certain authors of whom ,hamilton is not thinking1 or in reference to certain matters which ,hamilton is not discussing2 but he hardly ever attempts to trace the history of ,hamilton's own view1 or the train of thought by which it suggested itself to his mind4 ,and the result of this is1 that ,mr4 ,mill's interpretations are generally in the potential mood4 ,he wastes a good deal of conjecture in discovering what ,hamilton might have meant1 when a little attention in the right quarter would have shown what he did mean4 ,,aw ,mr4 ,mill does not expressly name ,schelling in this sentence3 but he does so shortly afterwards2 and his remark is of the same character with the previous one4 ,even ,schelling1 he says1 was not so gratuitously absurd as to deny that the ,absolute must be known according to the capacities of that which knows it--though he was forced to invent a special capacity for the purpose4 ,but if this capacity is an invention of ,schelling's1 and if he was forced to invent it1 ,hamilton's point is proved4 ,to think1 according to all the real operations of thought which consciousness makes known to us1 is to condition4 ,and the faculty of the unconditioned is an invention of ,schelling's1 not known to consciousness4 ,in other words3 all our real faculties bear witness to the truth of ,hamilton's statement2 and the only way of controverting it is to invent an imaginary faculty for the purpose4 ,the third feature of ,hamilton's philosophy which we charged ,mr4 ,mill with misunderstanding1 is the distinction between ,knowledge and ,belief4 ,in the early part of this article1 we endeavoured to explain the true nature of this distinction2 we have now only a very limited space to notice ,mr4 ,mill's criticisms on it4 ,hamilton1 he says1 admitted a second source of intellectual conviction called ,belief4 ,now ,belief is not a source of any conviction1 but the conviction itself4 ,no man would say that he is convinced of the truth of a proposition because he believes it2 his belief in its truth is the same thing as his conviction of its truth4 ,belief1 then1 is not a source of conviction1 but a conviction having sources of its own4 ,the question is1 have we legitimate sources of conviction1 distinct from those which constitute ,knowledge properly so called8 ,now here it should be remembered that the distinction is not one invented by ,hamilton to meet the exigencies of his own system4 ,he enumerates as many as twenty-two authors1 of the most various schools of philosophy1 who all acknowledged it before him4 ,such a concurrence is no slight argument in favour of the reality of the distinction4 ,we do not say that these writers1 or ,hamilton himself1 have always expressed this distinction in the best language1 or applied it in the best manner2 but we say that it is a true distinction1 and that it is valid for the principal purpose to which ,hamilton applied it4 ,we do not agree with all the details of ,hamilton's application4 ,we do not agree with him1 though he is supported by very eminent authorities1 in classifying our conviction of axiomatic principles as belief1 and not as knowledge4,,ax ,but this question does not directly bear on ,mr4 ,mill's criticism4 ,the point of that criticism is1 that ,hamilton1 by admitting a belief in the infinite and unrelated1 nullifies his own doctrine1 that all knowledge is of the finite and relative4 ,let us see4 ,,ax ,hamilton's distinction is in principle the same as that which we have given in our previous remarks 7pp4 #ah1 #ai74 ,he says1 ,a conviction is incomprehensible when there is merely given to us in consciousness--,that its object is 7,greek3 hoti esti71 and when we are unable to comprehend through a higher notion or belief ,why or ,how it is 7,greek3 dioti esti74--7,reid's ,works1 p4 #ged47 ,we would distinguish between why and how1 between ,greek3 dioti1 and ,greek3 ps4 ,we can give no reason why two straight lines cannot enclose a space2 but we can comprehend how they cannot4 ,we have only to form the corresponding image1 to see the manner in which the two attributes coexist in one object4 ,but when ,i say that ,i believe in the existence of a spiritual being who sees without eyes1 ,i cannot conceive the manner in which seeing coexists with the absence of the bodily organ of sight4 ,we believe that the true distinction between knowledge and belief may ultimately be referred to the presence or absence of the corresponding intuition2 but to show this in the various instances would require a longer dissertation than our present limits will allow4 ,we may believe that a thing is1 without being able to conceive how it is4 ,i believe that ,god is a person1 and also that ,he is infinite2 though ,i cannot conceive how the attributes of personality and infinity exist together4 ,all my knowledge of personality is derived from my consciousness of my own finite personality4 ,i therefore believe in the coexistence of attributes in ,god1 in some manner different from that in which they coexist in me as limiting each other3 and thus ,i believe in the fact1 though ,i am unable to conceive the manner4 ,so1 again1 ,kant brings certain counter arguments1 to prove1 on the one side1 that the world has a beginning in time1 and1 on the other side1 that it has not a beginning4 ,now suppose ,i am unable to refute either of these courses of argument1 am ,i therefore compelled to have no belief at all8 ,may ,i not say1 ,i believe1 in spite of ,kant1 that the world has a beginning in time1 though ,i am unable to conceive how it can have so begun8 ,what is this1 again1 but a belief in an absolute reality beyond the sphere of my relative knowledge8 ,i am not now considering1 says ,mr4 ,mill1 what it is that1 in our author's opinion1 we are bound to believe concerning the unknowable4 ,why1 this was the very thing he ought to have considered1 before pronouncing the position to be untenable1 or to be irreconcilable with something else4 ,meanwhile1 it is instructive to observe that ,mr4 ,mill himself believes1 or requires his readers to believe1 something concerning the unknown4 ,he does not know1 or at any rate he does not tell his readers1 what ,hamilton requires them to believe concerning the unknowable2 but he himself believes1 and requires them to believe1 that this unknown something is incompatible with the doctrine that knowledge is relative4 ,we cannot regard this as a very satisfactory mode of refuting ,hamilton's thesis4,,ay ,,ay ,in a subsequent chapter 7p4 #abj71 ,mr4 ,mill endeavours to overthrow this distinction between ,knowledge and ,belief1 by means of ,hamilton's own theory of ,consciousness4 ,hamilton maintains that we cannot be conscious of a mental operation without being conscious of its object4 ,on this ,mr4 ,mill retorts that if1 as ,hamilton admits1 we are conscious of a belief in the ,infinite and the ,absolute1 we must be conscious of the ,infinite and the ,absolute themselves2 and such consciousness is ,knowledge4 ,the fallacy of this retort is transparent4 ,the immediate object of ,belief is a proposition which ,i hold to be true1 not a thing apprehended in an act of conception4 ,i believe in an infinite ,god2 i4e41 ,i believe that ,god is infinite3 ,i believe that the attributes which ,i ascribe to ,god exist in ,him in an infinite degree4 ,now1 to believe this proposition1 ,i must1 of course1 be conscious of its meaning2 but ,i am not therefore conscious of the ,infinite ,god as an object of conception2 for this would require further an apprehension of the manner in which these infinite attributes coexist so as to form one object4 ,the whole argument of this eighth chapter is confused1 owing to ,mr4 ,mill not having distinguished between those passages in which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton is merely using an argumentum ad hominem in relation to ,reid1 and those in which he is reasoning from general principles4 ,but if ,mr4 ,mill is unjust towards the distinction between ,knowledge and ,belief1 as held by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 he makes ample amends to the injured theory in the next chapter1 by enlarging the province of credibility far beyond any extent which ,hamilton would have dreamed of claiming for it4 ,conceivability or inconceivability1 he tells us1 are usually dependent on association2 and it is quite possible that1 under other associations1 we might be able to conceive1 and therefore to believe1 anything short of the direct contradiction that the same thing is and is not4 ,it is not in itself incredible1 that a square may at the same time be round1 that two straight lines may enclose a space1 or even that two and two may make five4,,az ,but whatever concessions ,mr4 ,mill may make on this point1 he is at least fully determined that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton shall derive no benefit from them2 for he forthwith proceeds to charge ,sir ,william with confusing three distinct senses of the term conception--a confusion which exists solely in his own imagination1,,ba--and to assert that the ,philosophy of the ,conditioned is entirely founded on a mistake1 inasmuch as infinite space on the one hand1 and1 on the other1 both an absolute minimum and an infinite divisibility of space1 are perfectly conceivable4 ,with regard to the former of these two assertions1 ,mr4 ,mill's whole argument is vitiated1 as we have already shown1 by his confusion between infinite and indefinite2 but it is worth while to quote one of his special instances in this chapter1 as a specimen of the kind of reasoning which an eminent writer on logic can sometimes employ4 ,in reference to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's assertion1 that infinite space would require infinite time to conceive it1 he says1 ,let us try the doctrine upon a complex whole1 short of infinite1 such as the number #fie1ghh4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton would not1 ,i suppose1 have maintained that this number is inconceivable4 ,how long did he think it would take to go over every separate unit of this whole1 so as to obtain a perfect knowledge of the exact sum1 as different from all other sums1 either greater or less8 ,,az ,in reference to this last paradox1 ,mr4 ,mill quotes from ,essays by a ,barrister3 ,there is a world in which1 whenever two pairs of things are either placed in proximity or are contemplated together1 a fifth thing is immediately created and brought within the contemplation of the mind engaged in putting two and two together4444 ,in such a world surely two and two would make five4 ,that is1 the result to the mind of contemplating two twos would be to count five4 ,the answer to this reasoning has been already given by ,archdeacon ,lee in his ,essay on ,miracles4 ,the five in this case is not the sum of two and two1 but of two and two plus the new creature1 i4e41 of two and two plus one4 ,,ba ,the sense in which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton himself uses the word conception is explained in a note to ,reid's ,works1 p4 #cgg--namely1 the combination of two or more attributes in a unity of representation4 ,the second sense which ,mr4 ,mill imagines is simply a mistake of his own4 ,when ,hamilton speaks of being unable to conceive as possible1 he does not mean1 as ,mr4 ,mill supposes1 physically possible under the law of gravitation or some other law of matter1 but mentally possible as a representation or image2 and thus the supposed second sense is identical with the first4 ,the third sense may also be reduced to the first2 for to conceive two attributes as combined in one representation is to form a notion subordinate to those of each attribute separately4 ,we do not say that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton has been uniformly accurate in his application of the test of conceivability2 but we say that his inaccuracies1 such as they are1 do not affect the theory of the conditioned1 and that in all the long extracts which ,mr4 ,mill quotes1 with footnotes1 indicating first sense1 second sense1 third sense1 the author's meaning may be more accurately explained in the first sense only4 ,it is marvellous that it should not have occurred to ,mr4 ,mill1 while he was writing this passage1 ,how comes this large number to be a 'whole' at all2 and how comes it that 'this whole1' with all its units1 can be written down by means of six digits8 ,simply because of a conventional arrangement1 by which a single digit1 according to its position1 can express1 by one mark1 tens1 hundreds1 thousands1 c41 of units2 and thus can exhaust the sum by dealing with its items in large masses4 ,but how can such a process exhaust the infinite8 ,we should like to know how long ,mr4 ,mill thinks it would take to work out the following problem3--,if two figures can represent ten1 three a hundred1 four a thousand1 five ten thousand1 c41 find the number of figures required to represent infinity4,,bb ,,bb ,precisely the same misconception of ,hamilton's position occurs in ,professor ,de ,morgan's paper in the ,cambridge ,transactions1 to which we have previously referred4 ,he speaks 7p4 #ac7 of the notion1 which runs through many writers1 from ,descartes to ,hamilton1 that the mind must be big enough to hold all it can conceive4 ,this notion is certainly not maintained by ,hamilton1 nor yet by ,descartes in the paragraph quoted by ,mr4 ,de ,morgan2 nor1 as far as we are aware1 in any other part of his works4 ,infinite divisibility stands or falls with infinite extension4 ,in both cases ,mr4 ,mill confounds infinity with indefiniteness4 ,but with regard to an absolute minimum of space1 ,mr4 ,mill's argument requires a separate notice4 ,it is not denied1 he says1 that there is a portion of extension which to the naked eye appears an indivisible point2 it has been called by philosophers the minimum visibile4 ,this minimum we can indefinitely magnify by means of optical instruments1 making visible the still smaller parts which compose it4 ,in each successive experiment there is still a minimum visibile1 anything less than which cannot be discovered with that instrument1 but can with one of a higher power4 ,suppose1 now1 that as we increase the magnifying power of our instruments1 and before we have reached the limit of possible increase1 we arrive at a stage at which that which seemed the smallest visible space under a given microscope1 does not appear larger under one which1 by its mechanical construction1 is adapted to magnify more1 but still remains apparently indivisible4 ,i say1 that if this happened1 we should believe in a minimum of extension2 or if some priori metaphysical prejudice prevented us from believing it1 we should at least be enabled to conceive it4--7,p4 #hd47 ,the natural conclusion of most men under such circumstances would be1 that there was some fault in the microscope4 ,but even if this conclusion were rejected1 we presume ,mr4 ,mill would allow that1 under the supposed circumstances1 the exact magnitude of the minimum of extension would be calculable4 ,we have only to measure the minimum visibile1 and know what is the magnifying power of our microscope1 to determine the exact dimensions4 ,suppose1 then1 that we assign to it some definite magnitude--say the ten billionth part of an inch1--should we then conclude that it is impossible to conceive the twenty billionth part of an inch8--in other words1 that we have arrived at a definite magnitude which has no conceivable half8 ,surely this is a somewhat rash concession to be made by a writer who has just told us that numbers may be conceived up to infinity2 and therefore1 of course1 down to infinitesimality4 ,mr4 ,mill concludes this chapter with an assertion which1 even by itself1 is sufficient to show how very little he has attended to or understood the philosophy which he is attempting to criticise4 ,the law of ,excluded ,middle1 he says1 as well as that of ,contradiction1 is common to all phenomena4 ,but it is a doctrine of our author that these laws are true1 and cannot but be known to be true1 of ,noumena likewise4 ,it is not merely ,space as cognisable by our senses1 but ,space as it is in itself1 which he affirms must be either of unlimited or of limited extent 7p4 #hf74 ,at this sentence we fairly stand aghast4 ,space as it is in itself6 the ,noumenon ,space6 ,has ,mr4 ,mill been all this while examining ,sir ,william ,hamilton's philosophy1 in utter ignorance that the object of that philosophy is the ,conditioned in ,time and ,space2 that he accepts ,kant's analysis of time and space as formal necessities of thought1 but pronounces no opinion whatever as to whether time and space can exist as ,noumena or not8 ,it is the phenomenal space1 space as cognisable by our senses1 which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton says must be either limited or unlimited3 concerning the ,noumenon ,space1 he does not hazard an opinion whether such a thing exists or not4 ,he says1 indeed 7and this is probably what has misled ,mr4 ,mill71 that the laws of ,identity1 ,contradiction1 and ,excluded ,middle1 are laws of things as well as laws of thought2,,bc but he says nothing about these laws as predicating infinite or finite extension4 ,on the contrary1 he expressly classifies ,space under the law of ,relativity1 the violation of which indicates what may exist1 but what we are unable to conceive as existing4 ,briefly1 the law of ,excluded ,middle 7to take this instance alone7 is a law of things only in its abstract form1 ,everything must be ,a or not ,a 7extended1 if you please1 or not extended72 but in its subordinate form1 ,everything extended must be extended infinitely or finitely1 it is only applicable1 and only intended by ,hamilton to be applied1 to those phenomena which are already given as extended in some degree4 ,,bc ,discussions1 p4 #fjc4 ,we have now examined the first six chapters of ,mr4 ,mill's book1 containing his remarks on that portion of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's philosophy which he justly regards as comprising the most important of the doctrines which specially belong to ,hamilton himself4 ,the next chapter is an episode1 in which ,mr4 ,mill turns aside from ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton to criticise ,mr4 ,mansel's ,bampton ,lectures4 ,as our limits do not permit us to carry on the argument at present through the remainder of ,mr4 ,mill's remarks on ,hamilton himself1 we shall conclude our notice with a few words on this chapter1 as closing the properly metaphysical portion of ,mr4 ,mill's book1 and as affording ample proof that1 in this department of philosophy at least1 ,mr4 ,mill's powers of misapprehension do not cease when ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton is no longer their object4 ,mr4 ,mill's method of criticism makes it generally necessary to commence with a statement of the criticised theory as it really is1 before proceeding to his exposition of it as it is not4 ,the present instance offers no exception to this rule4 ,mr4 ,mansel's argument may be briefly stated as follows4 ,the primary and essential conception of ,god1 imperatively demanded by our moral and religious consciousness1 is that of a person4 ,but personality implies intellectual and moral attributes2 and the only direct and immediate knowledge which we have of such attributes is derived from the testimony of self-consciousness1 bearing witness to their existence in a certain manner in ourselves4 ,but when we endeavour to transfer the conception of personality1 thus obtained1 to the domain of theology1 we meet with certain difficulties1 which1 while they are not sufficient to hinder us from believing in the ,divine ,personality as a fact1 yet hinder us from conceiving the manner of its existence1 and prevent us from exhibiting our belief as a philosophical conclusion1 proved by irrefragable reasoning and secured against all objections4 ,these difficulties are occasioned1 on the one hand1 by the so-called ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned1 which in all ages has shown a tendency towards ,pantheism1 and which1 in one of its latest and most finished manifestations1 announces itself as the exhibition of ,god as ,he is in ,his eternal nature before creation2 and1 on the other hand1 by the limitations and conditions to which our own personality is subject1 and which1 as we have pointed out in the earlier part of this article1 have1 from the very beginning of ,christian theology1 prevented theologians from accepting the limited personality of man as an exact image and counterpart of the unlimited personality of ,god4 ,these difficulties ,mr4 ,mansel endeavours to meet in two ways4 ,on the one side1 he maintains1 in common with ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 that the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned1 by reason of its own incongruities and self-contradictions1 has no claim to be accepted as a competent witness in the matter2 and on the other side1 he maintains1 in common with many theologians before him1 that human personality cannot be assumed as an exact copy of the ,divine1 but only as that which is most nearly analogous to it among finite things4 ,but these two positions1 if admitted1 involve a corresponding practical conclusion as regards the criterion of religious truth or falsehood4 ,were we capable1 either1 on the one hand1 of a clear conception of the ,unconditioned1 or1 on the other1 of a direct intuition of the ,divine ,attributes as objects of consciousness1 we might be able to construct1 deductively or inductively1 an exact science of ,theology4 ,as it is1 we are compelled to reason by analogy2 and analogy furnishes only probabilities1 varying1 it may be1 from slight presumptions up to moral certainties1 but whose weight1 in any given case1 can only be determined by comparison with other evidences4 ,there are three distinct sources from which we may form a judgment about the ways of ,god--first1 from our own moral and intellectual consciousness1 by which we judge priori of what ,god ought to do in a given case1 by determining what we should think it wise or right for ourselves to do in a similar case2 secondly1 from the constitution and course of nature1 from which we may learn by experience what ,god's providence in certain cases actually is2 and thirdly1 from revelation1 attested by its proper evidences4 ,where these three agree in their testimony 7as in the great majority of cases they do7 we have the moral certainty which results from the harmony of all accessible evidences3 where they appear to differ1 we have no right at once to conclude that the second or the third must give way to the first1 and not vice vers2 because we have no right to assume that the first alone is infallible4 ,in the author's own words3 ,the lesson to be learnt from an examination of the ,limits of ,religious ,thought is not that man's judgments are worthless in relation to ,divine things1 but that they are fallible3 and the probability of error in any particular case can never be fairly estimated without giving their full weight to all collateral considerations4 ,we are indeed bound to believe that a ,revelation given by ,god can never contain anything that is really unwise or unrighteous2 but we are not always capable of estimating exactly the wisdom or righteousness of particular doctrines or precepts4 ,and we are bound to bear in mind that exactly in proportion to the strength of the remaining evidence for the ,divine origin of a religion1 is the probability that we may be mistaken in supposing this or that portion of its contents to be unworthy of ,god4 ,taken in conjunction1 the two arguments may confirm or correct each other3 taken singly and absolutely1 each may vitiate the result which should follow from their joint application4,,bd ,,bd ,bampton ,lectures1 p4 #aef1 #dth edition4 ,in criticising the first part of this argument--that which is directed against the deductive philosophy of the ,unconditioned--,mr4 ,mill manifests the same want of acquaintance with its meanings1 and with the previous history of the question2 which he had before exhibited in his attack on ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,he begins by finding fault with the definition of the ,absolute1 which ,mr4 ,mansel 7herein departing1 and purposely departing1 from ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's use of the term7 defines as that which exists in and by itself1 having no necessary relation to any other ,being4 ,on this1 ,mr4 ,mill remarks3 ,the first words of his definition would serve for the description of a ,noumenon2 but ,mr4 ,mansel's ,absolute is only meant to denote one ,being1 identified with ,god1 and ,god is not the only ,noumenon4 ,the description of a ,noumenon6 ,this is almost equal to the discovery of a ,noumenon ,space4 ,does ,mr4 ,mill really suppose that all noumena are self-existent8 ,a noumenon 7in the sense in which we suppose ,mr4 ,mill to understand the term1 for it has different meanings in different philosophies7 implies an existence out of relation to the human mind4,,be ,but is this the same as being out of all relation whatever1 as existing in and by itself8 ,does ,mr4 ,mill mean to say that a creature1 whether perceived by us or not1 has no relation to its ,creator8 ,but ,mr4 ,mill1 as we have seen before1 is not much at home when he gets among noumena4 ,we must proceed to his criticism of the second part of the definition1--having no necessary relation to any other being4 ,of these words he says1 that they admit of two constructions4 ,the words in their natural sense only mean1 capable of existing out of relation to anything else4 ,the argument requires that they should mean incapable of existing in relation with anything else4 ,and why is this non-natural sense to be forced upon very plain words8 ,because1 says ,mr4 ,mill1-- ,,be ,strictly speaking1 the term noumenon1 as meaning that which can be apprehended only by the intellect1 implies a relation to the intellect apprehending it2 and in this sense ,greek3 to nooumenon is opposed by ,plato to ,greek3 to hormenon--the object of intellect to the object of sight4 ,but as the intellect was supposed to take cognisance of things as they are1 in opposition to the sensitive perception of things as they appear1 the term noumenon became synonymous with thing in itself 7,greek3 to hon kath' hauto74 ,and this meaning is retained in the ,kantian philosophy1 in which the noumenon is identical with the ,ding an sich4 ,but as ,kant denied to the human intellect any immediate intuition of things as they are 7though such an intuition may be possible to a superhuman intellect71 hence the term noumenon in the ,kantian philosophy is opposed to all of which the human intellect can take positive cognisance4 ,hamilton1 in this respect1 agrees with ,kant4 ,but neither ,kant nor ,hamilton1 in opposing the thing in itself to the phenomenon1 meant to imply that the former is necessarily self-existent1 and therefore uncreated4 ,in what manner is a possible existence out of all relation1 incompatible with the notion of a cause8 ,have not causes a possible existence apart from their effects8 ,would the sun1 for example1 not exist if there were no earth or planets for it to illuminate8 ,mr4 ,mansel seems to think that what is capable of existing out of relation1 cannot possibly be conceived or known in relation4 ,but this is not so4444 ,freed from this confusion of ideas1 ,mr4 ,mansel's argument resolves itself into this1--,the same ,being cannot be thought by us both as ,cause and as ,absolute1 because a ,cause as such is not ,absolute1 and ,absolute1 as such1 is not a ,cause2 which is exactly as if he had said that ,newton cannot be thought by us both as an ,englishman and as a mathematician1 because an ,englishman1 as such1 is not a mathematician1 nor a mathematician1 as such1 an ,englishman4--7,p4 #ib47 ,the confusion of ideas is entirely of ,mr4 ,mill's own making1 and is owing to his having mutilated the argument before criticising it4 ,the argument in its original form consists of two parts2 the first intended to show that the ,absolute is not conceived as such in being conceived as a ,cause2 the second to show that the ,absolute cannot be conceived under different aspects at different times--first as ,absolute1 and then as ,cause4 ,it was the impossibility of this latter alternative which drove ,cousin to the hypothesis of a necessary causation from all eternity4 ,mr4 ,mill entirely omits the latter part of the argument1 and treats the former part as if it were the whole4 ,the part criticised by ,mr4 ,mill is intended to prove exactly what it does prove1 and no more2 namely1 that a cause as such is not the absolute1 and that to know a cause as such is not to know the absolute4 ,we presume ,mr4 ,mill himself will admit that to know ,newton as a mathematician is not to know him as an ,englishman4 ,whether he can be known separately as both1 and whether the ,absolute in this respect is a parallel case1 depends on another consideration1 which ,mr4 ,mill has not noticed4 ,the continuation of ,mr4 ,mill's criticism is equally confused4 ,he says3-- ,the whole of ,mr4 ,mansel's argument for the inconceivability of the ,infinite and of the ,absolute is one long ignoratio elenchi4 ,it has been pointed out in a former chapter that the words ,absolute and ,infinite have no real meaning1 unless we understand by them that which is absolute or infinite in some given attribute2 as space is called infinite1 meaning that it is infinite in extension2 and as ,god is termed infinite1 in the sense of possessing infinite power1 and absolute in the sense of absolute goodness or knowledge4 ,it has also been shown that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's arguments for the unknowableness of the ,unconditioned do not prove that we cannot know an object which is absolute or infinite in some specific attribute1 but only that we cannot know an abstraction called ',the ,absolute' or ',the ,infinite1' which is supposed to have all attributes at once4--7,p4 #ic47 ,the fallacy of this criticism1 as regards ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 has been already pointed out3 as regards ,mr4 ,mansel1 it is still more glaring1 inasmuch as that writer expressly states that he uses the term absolute in a different sense from that which ,mr4 ,mill attributes to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,when ,mr4 ,mill charges ,mr4 ,mansel with undertaking to prove the impossibility of conceiving a ,being absolutely just or absolutely wise,,bf 7i4e41 as he supposes1 perfectly just or wise71 he actually forgets that he has just been criticising ,mr4 ,hansel's definition of the ,absolute1 as something having a possible existence out of all relation4 ,will ,mr4 ,mill have the kindness to tell us what he means by goodness and knowledge out of all relation2 i4e41 a goodness and knowledge related to no object on which they can be exercised2 a goodness which is good to nothing1 a knowledge which knows nothing8 ,mr4 ,mill had better be cautious in talking about ignoratio elenchi4 ,,bf ,examination1 p4 #ie4 ,from the ,absolute1 ,mr4 ,mill proceeds to the ,infinite2 and here he commits the same mistake as before1 treating a portion of an argument as if it were the whole1 and citing a portion intended to prove one point as if it were intended to prove another4 ,he cites a passage from ,mr4 ,mansel1 in which it is said that the ,infinite1 if it is to be conceived at all1 must be conceived as potentially everything and actually nothing2 for if there is anything in general which it cannot become1 it is thereby limited2 and if there is anything in particular which it actually is1 it is thereby excluded from being any other thing4 ,but1 again1 it must also be conceived as actually everything and potentially nothing2 for an unrealised potentiality is likewise a limitation4 ,if the ,infinite can be that which it is not1 it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete1 and capable of a higher perfection4 ,if it is actually everything1 it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else1 and discerned as an object of consciousness4 ,on this passage ,mr4 ,mill remarks1 ,can a writer be serious who bids us conjure up a conception of something which possesses infinitely all conflicting attributes1 and because we cannot do this without contradiction1 would have us believe that there is a contradiction in the idea of infinite goodness or infinite wisdom8 ,the answer to this criticism is very simple4 ,the argument is not employed for the purpose which ,mr4 ,mill supposes4 ,it is employed to show that the metaphysical notion of the absolute-infinite1 as the sum1 potential or actual1 of all possible existence1 is inconceivable under the laws of human consciousness2 and thus that the absolutely first existence1 related to nothing and limited by nothing1 the ens realissimum of the older philosophers1 the pure being of the ,hegelians1 cannot be attained as a starting-point from which to deduce all relative and derived existence4 ,how far the empirical conception of certain mental attributes1 such as goodness or wisdom1 derived in the first instance from our own personal consciousness1 can be positively conceived as extended to infinity1 is considered in a separate argument1 which ,mr4 ,mill does not notice4 ,mr4 ,mill continues1 ,instead of 'the ,infinite1' substitute 'an infinitely good ,being' i4e41 substitute what is not intended1 and ,mr4 ,mansel's argument reads thus3--',if there is anything which an infinitely good ,being cannot become--if he cannot become bad--that is a limitation1 and the goodness cannot be infinite4 ,if there is anything which an infinitely good ,being actually is 7namely1 good71 he is excluded from being any other thing1 as being wise or powerful4' ,to the first part of this objection we reply by simply asking1 ,is becoming bad a 'higher perfection8' ,to the second part we reply by ,mr4 ,mill's favourite mode of reasoning--a parallel case4 ,a writer asserts that a creature which is a horse is thereby excluded from being a dog2 and that1 in so far as it has the nature of a horse1 it has not the nature of a dog4 ,what6 exclaims ,mr4 ,mill1 is it not the nature of a dog to have four legs8 and does the man mean to say that a horse has not four legs8 ,we venture respectfully to ask ,mr4 ,mill whether he supposes that being wise is being a thing1 and being good is being another thing8 ,but1 seriously1 it is much to be wished that when a writer like ,mr4 ,mill undertakes to discuss philosophical questions1 he should acquire some slight acquaintance with the history of the questions discussed4 ,had this been done by our critic in the present case1 it might possibly have occurred to him to doubt whether a doctrine supported by philosophers of such different schools of thought as ,spinoza1 ,malebranche1 ,wolf1 ,kant1 ,schelling1 could be quite such a piece of transparent nonsense as he supposes it to be4 ,all these writers are cited in ,mr4 ,mansel's note1 as maintaining the theory that the ,absolute is the ens realissimum1 or sum of all existence2 and their names might have saved ,mr4 ,mill from the absurdity of supposing that by this expression was meant something absolutely good and absolutely bad2 absolutely wise and absolutely stupid2 and so forth4 ,the real meaning of the expression has been already sufficiently explained in our earlier remarks4 ,the problem of the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned1 as sketched by ,plato and generally adopted by subsequent philosophers1 is1 as we have seen1 to ascend up to the first principle of all things1 and thence to deduce1 as from their cause1 all dependent and derived existences4 ,the ,unconditioned1 as the one first principle1 must necessarily contain in itself1 potentially or actually1 all that is derived from it1 and thus must comprehend1 in embryo or in development1 the sum of all existence4 ,to reconcile this conclusion with the phenomenal existence of evil and imperfection1 is the difficulty with which philosophy has had to struggle ever since philosophy began4 ,the ,manichean1 by referring evil to an independent cause1 denies the existence of an absolute first principle at all2 the ,leibnitzian1 with his hypothesis of the best possible world1 virtually sets bounds to the ,divine omnipotence3 the ,pantheist identifies ,god with all actual existence1 and either denies the real existence of evil at all1 or merges the distinction between evil and good in some higher indifference4 ,all these conclusions may be alike untenable1 but all alike testify to the existence of the problem1 and to the vast though unsuccessful efforts which man's reason has made to solve it4 ,the reader may now1 perhaps1 understand the reason of an assertion which ,mr4 ,mill regards as supremely absurd1--namely1 that we must believe in the existence of an absolute and infinite ,being1 though unable to conceive the nature of such a ,being4 ,to believe in such a ,being1 is simply to believe that ,god made the world3 to declare the nature of such a ,being inconceivable1 is simply to say that we do not know how the world was made4 ,if we believe that ,god made the world1 we must believe that there was a time when the world was not1 and when ,god alone existed1 out of relation to any other being4 ,but the mode of that sole existence we are unable to conceive1 nor in what manner the first act took place by which the absolute and self-existent gave existence to the relative and dependent4 ,the contradictions1 says ,mr4 ,mill1 which ,mr4 ,mansel asserts to be involved in the notions1 do not follow from an imperfect mode of apprehending the ,infinite and the ,absolute1 but lie in the definitions of them1 in the meaning of the words themselves4 ,they do no such thing3 the meaning of the words is perfectly intelligible1 and is exactly what is expressed by their definitions3 the contradictions arise from the attempt to combine the attributes expressed by the words in one representation with others1 so as to form a positive object of consciousness4 ,where is the incongruity of saying1 ,i believe that a being exists possessing certain attributes1 though ,i am unable in my present state of knowledge to conceive the manner of that existence8 ,mr4 ,mill1 at all events1 is the last man in the world who has any right to complain of such a distinction--,mr4 ,mill1 who considers it not incredible that in some part of the universe two straight lines may enclose a space1 or two and two make five2 though he is compelled to allow that under our present laws of thought1 or1 if he pleases1 of association1 we are unable to conceive how these things can be4 ,it is wearisome work to wade through this mass of misconceptions2 yet we must entreat the reader's patience a little longer1 while we say a few words in conclusion on perhaps the greatest misconception of all--though that is bold language to use with regard to ,mr4 ,mill's metaphysics1--at any rate1 the one which he expresses in the most vehement language4 ,mr4 ,mansel1 as we have said1 asserts1 as many others have asserted before him1 that the relation between the communicable attributes of ,god and the corresponding attributes of man is one not of identity1 but of analogy2 that is to say1 that the ,divine attributes have the same relation to the ,divine nature that the human attributes have to human nature4 ,thus1 for example1 there is a ,divine justice and there is a human justice2 but ,god is just as the ,creator and ,governor of the world1 having unlimited authority over all ,his creatures and unlimited jurisdiction over all their acts2 and man is just in certain special relations1 as having authority over some persons and some acts only1 so far as is required for the needs of human society4 ,so1 again1 there is a ,divine mercy and there is a human mercy2 but ,god is merciful in such a manner as is fitting compatibly with the righteous government of the universe2 and man is merciful in a certain limited range1 the exercise of the attribute being guided by considerations affecting the welfare of society or of individuals4 ,or to take a more general case3 ,man has in himself a rule of right and wrong1 implying subjection to the authority of a superior 7for conscience has authority only as reflecting the law of ,god72 while ,god has in ,himself a rule of right and wrong1 implying no higher authority1 and determined absolutely by ,his own nature4 ,the case is the same when we look at moral attributes1 not externally1 in their active manifestations1 but internally1 in their psychological constitution4 ,if we do not attribute to ,god the same complex mental constitution of reason1 passion1 and will1 the same relation to motives and inducements1 the same deliberation and choice of alternatives1 the same temporal succession of facts in consciousness1 which we ascribe to man1--it will follow that those psychological relations between reason1 will1 and desire1 which are implied in the conception of human action1 cannot represent the ,divine excellences in themselves1 but can only illustrate them by analogies from finite things4 ,and if man is liable to error in judging of the conduct of his fellow-men1 in proportion as he is unable to place himself in their position1 or to realise to himself their modes of thought and principles of action--if the child1 for instance1 is liable to error in judging the actions of the man1--or the savage of the civilised man1--surely there is far more room for error in men's judgment of the ways of ,god1 in proportion as the difference between ,god and man is greater than the difference between a man and a child4 ,this doctrine elicits from ,mr4 ,mill the following extraordinary outburst of rhetoric3-- ,if1 instead of the glad tidings that there exists a ,being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive1 exist in a degree inconceivable to us1 ,i am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite1 but what they are we cannot learn1 nor what are the principles of his government1 except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving' does not sanction them2 convince me of it1 and ,i will bear my fate as ,i may4 ,but when ,i am told that ,i must believe this1 and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality1 ,i say in plain terms that ,i will not4 ,whatever power such a being may have over me1 there is one thing which he shall not do3 he shall not compel me to worship him4 ,i will call no being good1 who is not what ,i mean when ,i apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures2 and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him1 to hell ,i will go4--7,p4 #ajc47 ,we will not pause to comment on the temper and taste of this declamation2 we will simply ask whether ,mr4 ,mill really supposes the word good to lose all community of meaning1 when it is applied1 as it constantly is1 to different persons among our fellow-creatures1 with express reference to their different duties and different qualifications for performing them8 ,the duties of a father are not the same as those of a son2 is the word therefore wholly equivocal when we speak of one person as a good father1 and another as a good son8 ,nay1 when we speak generally of a man as good1 has not the epithet a tacit reference to human nature and human duties8 and yet is there no community of meaning when the same epithet is applied to other ,creatures8 ,greek3 ,h aret pros to ergon to oikeion--the goodness of any being whatever has relation to the nature and office of that being4 ,we may therefore test ,mr4 ,mill's declamation by a parallel case4 ,a wise and experienced father addresses a young and inexperienced son3 ,my son1 he says1 there may be some of my actions which do not seem to you to be wise or good1 or such as you would do in my place4 ,remember1 however1 that your duties are different from mine2 that your knowledge of my duties is very imperfect2 and that there may be things which you cannot now see to be wise and good1 but which you may hereafter discover to be so4 ,father1 says the son1 your principles of action are not the same as mine2 the highest morality which ,i can conceive at present does not sanction them2 and as for believing that you are good in anything of which ,i do not plainly see the goodness1--,we will not repeat ,mr4 ,mill's alternative2 we will only ask whether it is not just possible that there may be as much difference between man and ,god as there is between a child and his father8 ,this declamation is followed by a sneer1 which is worth quoting1 not on its own account1 but as an evidence of the generosity with which ,mr4 ,mill deals with the supposed motives of his antagonists1 and of the accuracy of his acquaintance with the subject discussed4 ,he says3-- ,it is worthy of remark1 that the doubt whether words applied to ,god have their human signification1 is only felt when the words relate to his moral attributes2 it is never heard of with regard to his power4 ,we are never told that ,god's omnipotence must not be supposed to mean an infinite degree of the power we know in man and nature1 and that perhaps it does not mean that he is able to kill us1 or consign us to eternal flames4 ,the ,divine ,power is always interpreted in a completely human signification2 but the ,divine ,goodness and ,justice must be understood to be such only in an unintelligible sense4 ,is it unfair to surmise that this is because those who speak in the name of ,god1 have need of the human conception of his power1 since an idea which can overawe and enforce obedience must address itself to real feelings2 but are content that his goodness should be conceived only as something inconceivable1 because they are so often required to teach doctrines respecting him which conflict irreconcilably with all goodness that we can conceive8--7,p4 #ajd47 ,on the latter part of this paragraph we will not attempt to comment4 ,but as regards the former part1 we meet ,mr4 ,mill's confident assertion with a direct denial1 and take the opportunity of informing him that the conception of infinite ,power has suggested the same difficulties2 and has been discussed by philosophers and theologians in the same manner1 as those of infinite ,wisdom and infinite ,goodness4 ,has ,mr4 ,mill never heard of such questions as1 ,whether ,omnipotence can reverse the past8--,whether ,god can do that which ,he does not will to do8--,whether ,god's perfect foreknowledge is compatible with his own perfect liberty8--,whether ,god could have made a better world than the existing one8 ,nay1 has not our critic1 in this very chapter1 been arguing against ,mr4 ,mansel on the question1 whether the ,absolute can be conceived as a ,cause acting in time3 and what is this but a form of the question1 whether power1 when predicated of ,god is exactly the same thing as power when predicated of man8 ,or why has it been said that creation ex nihilo--an absolutely first act of causation1 is inconceivable by us1 but from the impossibility of finding in human power an exact type of ,divine power8 ,to attribute discreditable motives to an opponent1 even to account for unquestionable facts1 is usually considered as an abuse of criticism4 ,what shall we say when the facts are fictitious as well as the motives8 ,with regard to ,mr4 ,mansel1 the only person who is included by name in this accusation1 it is worthy of remark1 that the earliest mention of the obnoxious theory in his writings occurs in connection with a difficulty relating solely to the conception of infinite power1 and not at all to the moral attributes of ,god4,,bg ,,bg ,see ,prolegomena ,logica1 p4 #gg 7#bnd ed41 p4 #he47 ,mr4 ,mill concludes this chapter with another instance of that ignoratio elenchi which has been so abundantly manifested throughout his previous criticisms4 ,his opponent1 he allows1 would and does admit that the qualities as conceived by us bear some likeness to the justice and goodness which belong to ,god1 since man was made in ,god's image4 ,but he considers that this semi-concession destroys the whole fabric of ,mr4 ,mansel's argument4 ,the ,divine goodness1 he says1 which is said to be a different thing from human goodness1 but of which the human conception of goodness is some imperfect reflexion or resemblance1 does it agree with what men call goodness in the essence of the quality--in what constitutes it goodness8 ,if it does1 the ',rationalists' are right2 it is not illicit to reason from the one to the other4 ,if not1 the divine attribute1 whatever else it may be1 is not goodness1 and ought not to be called by the name4 ,now the question really at issue is not whether the ,rationalist argument is licit or illicit1 but whether1 in its lawful use1 it is to be regarded as infallible or fallible4 ,we have already quoted a portion of ,mr4 ,mansel's language on this point2 we will now quote two more passages1 which1 without any comment1 will sufficiently show how utterly ,mr4 ,mill has mistaken the purport of the argument which he has undertaken to examine4 ,we do not certainly know the exact nature and operation of the moral attributes of ,god3 we can but infer and conjecture from what we know of the moral attributes of man3 and the analogy between the ,finite and the ,infinite can never be so perfect as to preclude all possibility of error in the process4 ,but the possibility becomes almost a certainty1 when any one human faculty is elevated by itself into an authoritative criterion of religious truth1 without regard to those collateral evidences by which its decisions may be modified and corrected4,,bh444 ,beyond question1 every doubt which our reason may suggest in matters of religion is entitled to its due place in the examination of the evidences of religion2 if we will treat it as a part only1 and not the whole2 if we will not insist on a positive solution of that which1 it may be1 is given us for another purpose than to be solved4 ,it is reasonable to believe that1 in matters of belief as well as of practice1 ,god has not thought fit to annihilate the free will of man1 but has permitted speculative difficulties to exist as the trial and the discipline of sharp and subtle intellects1 as ,he has permitted moral temptations to form the trial and the discipline of strong and eager passions4444 ,we do not doubt that the conditions of our moral trial tend towards good1 and not towards evil2 that human nature1 even in its fallen state1 bears traces of the image of its ,maker1 and is fitted to be an instrument in ,his moral government4 ,and we believe this1 notwithstanding the existence of passions and appetites which1 isolated and uncontrolled1 appear to lead in an opposite direction4 ,is it then more reasonable to deny that a system of revealed religion1 whose unquestionable tendency as a whole is to promote the glory of ,god and the welfare of mankind1 can have proceeded from the same ,author1 merely because we may be unable to detect the same character in some of its minuter features1 viewed apart from the system to which they belong8,,bi ,,bh ,bampton ,lectures1 p4 #aeg1 ,fourth ,edition4 ,,bi ,bampton ,lectures1 p4 #aff1 ,fourth ,edition4 ,surely this is very different from denouncing all reasoning from human goodness to ,divine as illicit4 ,to take a parallel case4 ,the manufacture of gunpowder is a dangerous process1 and1 if carried on without due precautions1 is very likely to lead to disastrous consequences4 ,surely it is one thing to point out what precautions are necessary1 and what evils are to be apprehended from the neglect of them1 and another to forbid the manufacture altogether4 ,mr4 ,mill does not seem to see the difference4 ,we have now considered in detail all that part of ,mr4 ,mill's book which is devoted to the examination of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's chief and most characteristic doctrines--those which constitute the ,philosophy of the ,conditioned4 ,the remainder of the work1 which deals chiefly with subordinate questions of psychology and logic1 contains much from which we widely dissent1 but which we cannot at present submit to a special examination4 ,nor is it necessary1 so far as ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's reputation is concerned1 that we should do so4 ,if the ,philosophy of the ,conditioned is really nothing better than the mass of crudities and blunders which ,mr4 ,mill supposes it to be1 the warmest admirers of ,hamilton will do little in his behalf1 even should they succeed in vindicating some of the minor details of his teaching4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it can be shown1 as we have attempted to show1 that ,mr4 ,mill is utterly incapable of dealing with ,hamilton's philosophy in its higher branches1 his readers may be left to judge for themselves whether he is implicitly to be trusted as regards the lower4 ,in point of fact1 they will do ,mr4 ,mill no injustice1 if they regard the above specimens as samples of his entire criticism4 ,we gladly except1 as of a far higher order1 those chapters in which he is content with stating his own views2 but in the perpetual baiting of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 which occupies the greater part of the volume1 we recognise1 in general1 the same captiousness and the same incompetence which we have so often had occasion to point out in the course of our previous remarks4 ,it is1 we confess1 an unpleasant and an invidious task1 to pick to pieces1 bit by bit1 the work of an author of high reputation4 ,but ,mr4 ,mill has chosen to put the question on this issue1 and he has left those who dissent from him no alternative but to follow his example4 ,he has tasked all the resources of minute criticism to destroy piece-meal the reputation of one who has hitherto borne an honoured name in philosophy3 he has no right to complain if the same measure is meted to himself3-- ,neque enim lex quior ulla ,quam necis artifices arte perire sua4 ,but it is not so much the justice as the necessity of the case which we would plead as our excuse4 ,mr4 ,mill's method of criticism has reduced the question to a very narrow compass4 ,either ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 instead of being a great philosopher1 is the veriest blunderer that ever put pen to paper1 or the blunders are ,mr4 ,mill's own4 ,to those who accept the first of these alternatives it must always remain a marvel how ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton could ever have acquired that reputation which compels even his critic to admit that he alone1 of our metaphysicians of this and the preceding generation1 has acquired1 merely as such1 an ,european celebrity2 how he could have been designated by his illustrious opponent1 ,cousin1 as the greatest critic of our age1 or described by the learned ,brandis as almost unparalleled in the profound knowledge of ancient and modern philosophy4 ,the marvel may perhaps disappear1 should it be the case1 as we believe it to be1 that the second alternative is the true one4 ,but even in this case1 it should be borne in mind that the blow will by no means fall on ,mr4 ,mill with the same weight with which he designed it to fall on the object of his criticism4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton had devoted his whole life to the study of metaphysics2 he was probably more deeply read in that study than any of his contemporaries2 and if all his reading could produce nothing better than the confusion and self-contradiction which ,mr4 ,mill imputes to him1 the result would be pitiable indeed4 ,mr4 ,mill1 on the other hand1 we strongly suspect1 despises metaphysics too much to be at the pains of studying them at all1 and seems to think that a critic is duly equipped for his task with that amount of knowledge which1 like ,dogberry's reading and writing1 comes by nature4 ,his work has a superficial cleverness which1 together with the author's previous reputation1 will insure it a certain kind of popularity2 but we venture to predict that its estimation by its readers will be in the inverse ratio to their knowledge of the subject4 ,but ,mr4 ,mill's general reputation rests on grounds quite distinct from his performances in metaphysics2 and though we could hardly name one of his writings from whose main principles we do not dissent1 there is hardly one which is not better fitted to sustain his character as a thinker than this last1 in which the fatal charms of the goddess ,necessity seem to have betrayed her champion into an unusual excess of polemical zeal1 coupled1 it must be added1 with an unusual deficiency of philosophical knowledge4 ,,postscript4 ,it was not till after the preceding pages had been sent to press that ,i became acquainted with a little work recently published under the title of ,the ,battle of the two ,philosophies1 by an ,inquirer4 ,the author appears to have been a personal pupil of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's1 as well as a diligent student of his writings4 ,at all events1 he has inquired to some purpose1 and obtained a far more intelligent knowledge of ,hamilton's system than is exhibited by the majority of recent critics4 ,it is gratifying to find many of my remarks confirmed by the concurrent testimony of so competent a witness4 ,the following would have been noticed in their proper places had ,i been sooner acquainted with them4 ,of the popular confusion between the infinite and the indefinite1 noticed above1 pp4 #ej1 #aab1 ,an ,inquirer observes3-- ,if we could realise in thought infinite space1 that conception would be a perfectly definite one2 but the notion that is here offered us in its place1 though it may be real1 is certainly not definite2 it is merely the conception of an indefinite extension4444 ,in truth1 when we strive to think of infinite space1 the nearest approach we can make to it is this notion of an indefinite space1 which ,mr4 ,mill has substituted for it4 ,but these two conceptions are not only verbally1 they are really wholly distinct4 ,an indefinite space is a space of the extent of which we think vaguely1 without knowing or without thinking where its boundaries are4 ,infinite space has certainly1 and quite distinctly1 no boundaries anywhere4--7,pp4 #ah-bj47 ,on ,mr4 ,mill's strange distinction between the ,divine ,attributes1 as some infinite and others absolute1 the author's remarks are substantially in agreement with what has been said above on pp4 #aje-f4 ,mr4 ,mill argues that all the attributes of ,god cannot be infinite2 but that some1 as power1 may be infinite2 and some1 as goodness and knowledge1 must be absolute1 because neither can knowledge be more than complete1 nor goodness more than perfect4 ,when we know all there is to be known1 he says1 knowledge has attained its utmost limit4 ,but this is merely begging the whole question4 ,if there be an ,infinite ,being1 ,he cannot know all there is to be known unless ,he know ,himself2 and adequately to know what is infinite is to have infinite knowledge4 ,the same thing would be true if there could be a ,being whose power and duration only were infinite4 ',the will1' he adds1 'is either entirely right1 or wrong in different degrees3 downwards there are as many gradations as we choose to distinguish2 but upwards there is an ideal limit4 ,goodness can be imagined complete1--such that there can be no greater goodness beyond it1'444 ,but a ,being of infinite power and finite goodness would not be perfectly good1 because ,his power would not be wholly1 but only in part directed by ,his goodness4 ,nay1 as that which is finite bears no proportion whatever to what is infinite3 as1 however great it be absolutely1 it is still infinitely less than infinity1 such a ,being would be partly good and yet infinitely evil1 which is absurd in reason and impossible in fact4--7,pp4 #bd1 #be47 ,the following estimate of ,mr4 ,mill's merits as a metaphysician coincides with that which1 contrary to my expectation1 ,i found forced upon myself after a careful examination of his book4--7,see above1 ,pp4 #fb1 #ahb47 ,we cannot but think that ,mr4 ,mill in this1 his first work in pure metaphysics1 has disappointed just expectation4 ,in leaving the fields of practical philosophy1 he seems to have left his genius behind him4 ,even the peculiar 'cunning of his right hand'--even his unexcelled logical power avails him little1 so continually does he fail to see distinctly the conception with which he is fencing4444 ,as long as he is applying given principles to the solution of practical questions2 as long as he has to do with the process of an argument1 he proves himself a most able instructor and guide4 ,but when he has to grapple with a metaphysical problem1 it almost invariably arrives that the central1 the metaphysical difficulty1 escapes him4--7,pp4 #gh-hj47 ,,muir ,,and ,,paterson1 ,,printers1 ,,edinburgh4