,,china1 ,,japan ,,and ,,the ,u4 ,s4 ,a4
                          ,present-day  
,conditions                             
in the ,far ,east                       
and ,their ,bearing on                  
the ,washington                         
,conference                             
by                                      
,,john ,,dewey                          
,professor of ,philosophy at            
,columbia ,university                   
,new ,republic ,pamphlet ,no4 #a        
,published by the                       
,,republic ,,publishing ,,co41 ,,inc4   
#dba ,west ,twenty-first ,street        
,new ,york ,city                        
#aiba                                   
,copyright #aiba                        
,,republic ,,publishing ,,co4 ,,inc4    
,introductory ,note   ,the articles     
following are reprinted as they were    
written in spite of the fact that any   
picture of contemporary events is       
modified by subsequent increase of      
knowledge and by later events4 ,in the  

main1 however1 the writer would still   
stand by what was said at the time4 ,a  
few foot notes have been inserted where 
the text is likely to give rise to      
misapprehensions4 ,the date of writing  
has been retained as a guide to the     
reader4     ,i  ,on ,two ,sides of the  
,eastern ,seas   ,it is three days' easy
 journey from ,japan to ,china4 ,it is  
doubtful whether anywhere in the world  
another journey of the same length      
brings with it such a complete change of
 political temper and belief4 ,certainly
 it is greater than the alteration      
perceived in journeying directly from   
,san ,francisco to ,shanghai4 ,the      
difference is not one in customs and    
modes of life2 that goes without saying4
 ,it concerns the ideas1 beliefs and    
alleged information current about one   
and the same fact3 the status of ,japan 
in the international world and          
especially its attitude toward ,china4  
,one finds everywhere in ,japan a       
feeling of uncertainty1 hesitation1 even

 of weakness4 ,there is a subtle nervous
 tension in the atmosphere as of a      
country on the verge of change but not  
knowing where the change will take it4  
,liberalism is in the air1 but genuine  
liberals are encompassed with all sorts 
of difficulties especially in combining 
their liberalism with the devotion to   
theocratic robes which the imperialist  
militarists who rule ,japan have so     
skilfully thrown about the ,throne and  
the ,government4 ,but what one senses in
 ,china from the first moment is the    
feeling of the all-pervading power of   
,japan which is working as surely as    
fate to its unhesitating conclusion--the
 domination of ,chinese politics and    
industry by ,japan with a view to its   
final absorption4 ,it is not my object  
to analyze the realities of the         
situation or to inquire whether the     
universal feeling in ,china is a        
collective hallucination or is grounded 
in fact4 ,the phenomenon is worthy of   
record on its own account4 ,even if it  

be merely psychological1 it is a fact   
which must be reckoned with in both its 
,chinese and its ,japanese aspects4 ,in 
the first place1 as to the differences  
in psychological atmosphere4 ,everybody 
who knows anything about ,japan knows   
that it is the land of reserves and     
reticences4 ,the half-informed ,american
 will tell you that this is put on for  
the misleading of foreigners4 ,the      
informed know that it is an attitude    
shown to foreigners only because it is  
deeply engrained in the moral and social
 tradition of ,japan2 and that1 if      
anything1 the ,japanese are more likely 
to be communicative--about many things  
at least--to a sympathetic foreigner1   
than to one another4 ,the habit of      
reserve is so deeply embedded in all the
 etiquette1 convention and daily        
ceremony of living1 as well as in the   
ideals of strength of character1 that   
only the ,japanese who have subjected   
themselves to foreign influences escape 
it--and many of them revert4 ,to put it 

mildly1 the ,japanese are not a         
loquacious people2 they have the gift of
 doing rather than of gab4  ,when       
accordingly a ,japanese statesman or    
visiting diplomatist engages in         
unusually prolonged and frank discourse 
setting forth the aims and procedures of
 ,japan1 the student of politics who has
 been long in the ,east at once becomes 
alert1 not to say suspicious4 ,a recent 
illustration is so extreme that it will 
doubtless seem fantastic beyond belief4 
,but the student at home will have to   
take these seeming fantasies seriously  
if he wishes to appreciate the present  
atmosphere of ,china4 ,cables have      
brought fragmentary reports of some     
addresses of ,baron ,goto in ,america4  
,doubtless in the ,american atmosphere  
these have the effect of reassuring     
,america as to any improper ambitions on
 the part of ,japan4 ,in ,china1 they   
were taken as announcements that ,japan 
has about completed its plans for the   
absorption of ,china1 and that the      

lucubration preliminary to operations of
 swallowing are about to begin4 ,the    
reader is forgiven in advance any       
scepticism he feels about both the fact 
itself and the correctness of my report 
of the belief in the alleged fact4 ,his 
scepticism will not surpass what ,i     
should feel in his place4 ,but the      
suspicion aroused by such statements as 
this and the recent interview of        
,foreign ,minister ,uchida and ,baron   
,ishii must be noted as evidences of the
 universal belief in ,china that ,japan 
has one mode of diplomacy for the ,east 
and another for the ,west1 and that what
 is said in the ,west must be read in   
reverse in the ,east4  ,china1 whatever 
else it is1 is not the land of          
privacies4 ,it is a proverb that nothing
 long remains secret in ,china4 ,the    
,chinese talk more easily than they     
act--especially in politics4 ,they are  
adepts in revealing their own           
shortcomings4 ,they dissect their own   
weaknesses and failures with the most   

extraordinary reasonableness4 ,one of   
the defects upon which they dwell is the
 love of finding substitutes for        
positive action1 of avoiding entering   
upon a course of action which might be  
irrevocable4 ,one almost wonders whether
 their power of self-criticism is not   
itself another of these substitutes4 ,at
 all events1 they are frank to the point
 of loquacity4 ,between the opposite    
camps there are always communications   
flowing4 ,among official enemies there  
are sworn friends4 ,in a land of        
perpetual compromise1 etiquette as well 
as necessity demands that the ways for  
later accommodations be kept open4      
,consequently things which are spoken of
 only under the breath in ,japan are    
shouted from the housetops in ,china4   
,it would hardly be good taste in ,japan
 to allude to the report that           
influential ,chinese ministers are in   
constant receipt of ,japanese funds and 
these corrupt officials are the agencies
 by which political and economic        

concessions were wrung from ,china while
 ,europe and ,america were busy with the
 war4 ,but in ,china nobody even takes  
the trouble to deny it or even to       
discuss it4 ,what is psychologically    
most impressive is the fact that it is  
merely taken for granted4 ,when it is   
spoken of1 it is as one mentions the    
heat on an unusually hot day4  ,in      
speaking of the feeling of weakness     
current in ,japan about ,japan itself1  
one must refer to the economic situation
 because of its obvious connection with 
the international situation4 ,in the    
first place1 there is the strong        
impression that ,japan is over-extended4
 ,even in normal times1 ,japan relies   
more upon production for foreign markets
 than is regarded in most countries as  
safe policy4 ,and there is the belief   
that ,japan must do so1 because only by 
large foreign sellings--large in        
comparison with the purchasing power of 
a people still having a low standard of 
life--can it purchase the raw           

materials--and even food--it has to     
have4 ,but during the war1 the          
dependence of manufacturing and trade at
 home upon the foreign market was       
greatly increased4 ,the domestic        
increase of wealth1 though very great1  
is still too much in the hands of the   
few to affect seriously the internal    
demand for goods4 ,item one1 which      
awakens sympathy for ,japan as being in 
a somewhat precarious situation4        
,another item concerns the labor        
situation4 ,japan seems to feel itself  
in a dilemma4 ,if she passes even       
reasonably decent factory laws 7or      
rather attempts their enforcement7 and  
regulates child and women's labor1 she  
will lose that advantage of cheap labor 
which she now counts on to offset her   
many disadvantages4 ,on the other hand1 
strikes1 labor difficulties1 agitation  
for unions1 etc41 are constantly        
increasing1 and the tension in the      
atmosphere is unmistakable4 ,the rice   
riots are not often spoken of1 but their

 memory persists1 and the fact that they
 came very near to assuming a directly  
political aspect4 ,is there a race      
between fulfillment of the aspirations  
of the military clans who still hold the
 reins1 and the growth of genuinely     
democratic forces which will forever    
terminate those aspirations8 ,certainly 
the defeat of ,germany gave a blow to   
bureaucratic militarism in ,japan which 
in time will go far4 ,will it have the  
time required to take effect on foreign 
policy8 ,the hope that it will is a     
large factor in stimulating liberal     
sympathy for a ,japan which is beginning
 to undergo the throes of transition4   
,as for the direct international        
situation of ,japan1 the feeling in     
,japan is that of the threatening danger
 of isolation4 ,germany is gone2 ,russia
 is gone4 ,while those facts simplify   
matters for ,japan somewhat1 there is   
also the belief that in taking away     
potential allies1 they have weakened    
,japan in the general game of balance   

and counter-balance of power4           
,particularly does the removal of       
imperialistic ,russia relieve the threat
 on ,india which was such a factor in   
the willingness of ,great ,britain to   
make the offensive-defensive alliance4  
,the revelation of the militaristic     
possibilities of ,america is another    
serious factor4 ,certainly the new      
triple entente cordiale of ,japan1      
,italy and ,france is no adequate       
substitute for a realignment of         
international forces in which a common  
understanding between ,great ,britain   
and ,america is a dominant factor4 ,this
 factor explains1 if it does not excuse1
 some of the querulousness and studied  
discourtesies with which the ,japanese  
press for some months treated ,president
 ,wilson1 the ,united ,states in general
 and its relation to the ,league of     
,nations in particular1 while it also   
throws light on the ardor with which the
 opportune question of racial           
discrimination was discussed4 7,the     

,chinese have an unfailing refuge in a  
sense of humor4 ,it was interesting to  
note the delight with which they        
received the utterance of the ,japanese 
,foreign ,minister1 after ,japanese     
success at ,paris1 that his attention   
had recently been called to various     
press attacks on ,america which he much 
deprecated74 ,in any case there is no   
mistaking the air of tension and nervous
 overstrain which now attends all       
discussion of ,japanese foreign         
relations4 ,in all directions1 there are
 characteristic signs of hesitation1    
shaking of old beliefs and movement     
along new lines4 ,japan seems to be much
 in the same mood as that which it      
experienced in the early eighties       
before1 toward the close of that decade1
 it crystallized its institutions       
through acceptance of the ,german       
constitution1 militarism1 educational   
system1 and diplomatic methods4 ,so     
that1 once more1 the observer gets the  
impression that substantially all of    

,japan's energy1 abundant as that is1   
must be devoted to her urgent problems  
of readjustment4  ,come to ,china1 and  
the difference is incredible4 ,it almost
 seems as if one were living in a dream2
 or as if some new ,alice had ventured  
behind an international looking-glass   
wherein everything is reversed4 ,that we
 in ,america should have little idea of 
the state of things and the frame of    
mind in ,china is not                   
astonishing--especially in view of the  
censorship and the distraction of       
attention of the last few years4 ,but   
that ,japan and ,china should be so     
geographically near1 and yet every fact 
that concerns them appear in precisely  
opposite perspective1 is an experience  
of a life time4 ,japanese liberalism8   
,yes1 it is heard of1 but only in       
connection with one form which the      
longing for the miraculous deus ex      
machina takes4 ,perhaps a revolution in 
,japan may intervene to save ,china from
 the fate which now hangs over her4 ,but

 there is no suggestion that anything   
less than a complete revolution will    
alter or even retard the course which is
 attributed to ,japanese diplomacy      
working hand in hand with ,japanese     
business interests and militarism4 ,the 
collapse of ,russia and ,germany8 ,these
 things only mean that ,japan has in a  
few years fallen complete heir to       
,russian hopes1 achievements and        
possessions in ,manchuria and ,outer    
,mongolia1 and has had opportunities in 
,siberia thrown into her hands which she
 could hardly have hoped for in her most
 optimistic moments4 ,and now ,japan    
has1 with the blessing of the great     
,powers at ,paris1 become also the heir 
of ,german concessions1 intrigues and   
ambitions1 with added concessions1 wrung
 7or bought7 from incompetent and       
corrupt officials by secret agreements  
when the world was busy with war4 ,if   
all the great ,powers are so afraid of  
,japan that they give way to her every  
wish1 what is ,china that she can escape

 the doom prepared for her8 ,that is the
 cry of helplessness going up all over  
,china4 ,and ,japanese propagandists    
take advantage of the situation1        
pointing to the action of the ,peace    
,conference as proof that the ,allies   
care nothing for ,china1 and that ,china
 must throw herself into the arms of    
,japan if she is to have any protection 
at all4 ,in short1 ,japan stands ready  
as she stood ready in ,korea to         
guarantee the integrity and independence
 of ,china4 ,and the fear that the      
latter must1 in spite of her animosity  
toward ,japan1 accept this fate in order
 to escape something worse swims in the 
sinister air4 ,it is the exact          
counterpart of the feeling current among
 the liberals in ,japan that ,japan has 
alienated ,china permanently when a     
considerate and slower course might have
 united the two countries4 ,if the      
economic straits of ,japan are alluded  
to1 it is only as a reason why ,japan   
has hurried her diplomatic coercion1 her

 corrupt and secret bargainings with    
,chinese traitors and her industrial    
invasion4 ,while the western world      
supposes that the military and the      
industrial party in ,japan have opposite
 ideas as to best methods of securing   
,japanese supremacy in the ,east1 it is 
the universal opinion in ,china that    
they two are working in complete        
understanding with one another1 and the 
differences that sometimes occur between
 the ,foreign ,office in ,tokyo and the 
,ministry of ,war 7which is             
extra-constitutional in its status7 are 
staged for effect4  ,these are some of  
the aspects of the most complete        
transformation scene that it has ever   
been the lot of the writer to           
experience4 ,may it turn out to be only 
an extraordinary psychological          
experience6 ,but in the interests of    
truth it must be recorded that every    
resident of ,china1 ,chinese or         
,american1 with whom ,i have talked in  
the last four weeks has volunteered the 

belief that all the seeds of a future   
great war are now deeply implanted in   
,china4 ,to avert such a calamity they  
look to the ,league of ,nations or to   
some other force outside the immediate  
scene4 ,unfortunately the press of      
,japan treats every attempt to discuss  
the state of opinion in ,china or the   
state of facts as evidence that         
,america1 having tasted blood in the    
war1 now has its eyes on ,asia with the 
expectation later on of getting its     
hands on ,asia4 ,consequently ,america  
is interested in trying to foster       
ill-will between ,china and ,japan4 ,if 
the pro-,american ,japanese do not      
enlighten their fellow-countrymen as to 
the facts1 then ,america ought to return
 some of the propaganda that visits its 
shores4 ,but every ,american who goes to
 ,japan ought also to visit ,china--if  
only to complete his education4  ,may1  
#aiai4     ,,ii  ,shantung1 ,as ,seen   
,from ,within   #a4  ,american          
apologists for that part of the ,peace  

,treaty which relates to ,china have the
 advantage of the illusions of distance4
 ,most of the arguments seem strange to 
anyone who lives in ,china even for a   
few months4 ,he finds the ,japanese on  
the spot using the old saying about     
territory consecrated by treasure spent 
and blood shed4 ,he reads in ,japanese  
papers and hears from moderately liberal
 ,japanese that ,japan must protect     
,china1 as well as ,japan1 against      
herself1 against her own weak or corrupt
 government1 by keeping control of      
,shantung to prevent ,china from again  
alienating that territory to some other 
power4  ,the history of ,european       
aggression in ,china gives this argument
 great force among the ,japanese1 who   
for the most part know nothing more     
about what actually goes on in ,china   
than they used to know about ,korean    
conditions4 ,these considerations1      
together with the immense expectations  
raised among the ,japanese during the   
war concerning their coming domination  

of the ,far ,east and the unswerving    
demand of excited public opinion in     
,japan during the ,versailles           
,conference for the settlement that     
actually resulted1 give an ironic turn  
to the statement so often made that     
,japan may be trusted to carry out her  
promises4 ,yes1 one is often tempted to 
say1 that is precisely what ,china      
fears1 that ,japan will carry out her   
promises1 for then ,china is doomed4 ,to
 one who knows the history of foreign   
aggression in ,china1 especially the    
technique of conquest by railway and    
finance1 the irony of promising to keep 
economic rights while returning         
sovereignty lies so on the surface that 
it is hardly irony4 ,china might as well
 be offered ,kant's ,critique of ,pure  
,reason on a silver platter as be       
offered sovereignty under such          
conditions4 ,the latter is equally      
metaphysical4  ,a visit to ,shantung and
 a short residence in its capital city1 
,tsinan1 made the conclusions1 which so 

far as ,i know every foreigner in ,china
 has arrived at1 a living thing4 ,it    
gave a vivid picture of the many and    
intimate ways in which economic and     
political rights are inextricably       
entangled together4 ,it made one realize
 afresh that only a ,president who kept 
himself innocent of any knowledge of    
secret treaties during the war1 could be
 naive enough to believe that the       
promise to return complete sovereignty  
retaining only economic rights is a     
satisfactory solution4 ,it threw fresh  
light upon the contention that at most  
and at worst ,japan had only taken over 
,german rights1 and that since we had   
acquiesced in the latter's arrogations  
we had no call to make a fuss about     
,japan4 ,it revealed the hollowness of  
the claim that pro-,chinese propaganda  
had wilfully misled ,americans into     
confusing the few hundred square miles  
around the port of ,tsing-tao with the  
,province of ,shantung with its thirty  
millions of ,chinese population4  ,as   

for the comparison of ,germany and      
,japan one might suppose that the       
objects for which ,america nominally    
entered the war had made1 in any case1 a
 difference4 ,but aside from this       
consideration1 the ,germans exclusively 
employed ,chinese in the railway shops  
and for all the minor positions on the  
railway itself4 ,the railway guards 7the
 difference between police and soldiers 
is nominal in ,china7 were all ,chinese1
 the ,germans merely training them4 ,as 
soon as ,japan invaded ,shantung and    
took over the railway1 ,chinese workmen 
and ,chinese military guards were at    
once dismissed and ,japanese imported to
 take their places4 ,tsinan-fu1 the     
inland terminus of the ex-,german       
railway1 is over two hundred miles from 
,tsing-tao4 ,when the ,japanese took    
over the ,german railway business       
office1 they at once built barracks1 and
 today there are several hundred        
soldiers still there--where ,germany    
kept none4 ,since the armistice even1   

,japan has erected a powerful military  
wireless within the grounds of the      
garrison1 against of course the         
unavailing protest of ,chinese          
authorities4 ,no foreigner can be found 
who will state that ,germany used her   
ownership of port and railway to        
discriminate against other nations4 ,no 
,chinese can be found who will claim    
that this ownership was used to force   
the ,chinese out of business1 or to     
extend ,german economic rights beyond   
those definitely assigned her by treaty4
 ,common sense should also teach even   
the highest paid propagandist in        
,america that there is1 from the        
standpoint of ,china1 an immense        
distinction between a national menace   
located half way around the globe1 and  
one within two days' sail over an inland
 sea absolutely controlled by a foreign 
navy1 especially as the remote nation   
has no other foothold and the nearby one
 already dominates additional territory 
of enormous strategic and economic      

value--namely1 ,manchuria4  ,these facts
 bear upon the shadowy distinction      
between the ,tsing-tao and the ,shantung
 claim1 as well as upon the solid       
distinction between ,german and         
,japanese occupancy4 ,if there still    
seemed to be a thin wall between        
,japanese possession of the port of     
,tsing-tao and usurpation of ,shantung1 
it was enough to stop off the train in  
,tsinan-fu to see the wall crumble4 ,for
 the ,japanese wireless and the barracks
 of the army of occupation are the first
 things that greet your eyes4 ,within a 
few hundred feet of the railway that    
connects ,shanghai1 via the important   
center of ,tientsin1 with the capital1  
,peking1 you see ,japanese soldiers on  
the nominally ,chinese street1 guarding 
their barracks4 ,then you learn that if 
you travel upon the ex-,german railway  
towards ,tsing-tao1 you are ordered to  
show your passport as if you were       
entering a foreign country4 ,and as you 
travel along the road 7remembering that 

you are over two hundred miles from     
,tsing-tao7 you find ,japanese soldiers 
at every station1 and several garrisons 
and barracks at important towns on the  
line4 ,then you realize that at the     
shortest possible notice1 ,japan could  
cut all communications between southern 
,china 7together with the rich ,yangste 
region7 and the capital1 and with the   
aid of the ,southern ,manchurian        
,railway at the north of the capital1   
hold the entire coast and descend at its
 good pleasure upon ,peking4  ,you are  
then prepared to learn from             
eye-witnesses that when ,japan made its 
,twenty-one ,demands upon ,china1       
machine guns were actually in position  
at strategic points throughout          
,shantung1 with trenches dug and        
sandbags placed4 ,you know that the     
,japanese liberal spoke the truth1 who  
told you1 after a visit to ,china and   
his return to protest against the action
 of his government1 that the ,japanese  
already had such a military hold upon   

,china that they could control the      
country within a week1 after a minimum  
of fighting1 if war should arise4 ,you  
also realize the efficiency of official 
control of information and domestic     
propaganda as you recall that he also   
told you that these things were true at 
the time of his visit1 under the        
,terauchi cabinet1 but had been         
completely reversed by the present ,hara
 ministry4 ,for ,i have yet to find a   
single foreigner or ,chinese who is     
conscious of any difference of policy1  
save as the end of the war has forced   
the necessity of caution1 since other   
nations can now look ,china-wards as    
they could not during the war4  ,an     
,american can get an idea of the        
realities of the present situation if he
 imagines a foreign garrison and        
military wireless in ,wilmington1 with a
 railway from that point to a fortified 
sea-port controlled by the foreign      
power1 at which the foreign nation can  
land1 without resistance1 troops as fast

 as they can be transported1 and with   
bases of supply1 munitions1 food1       
uniforms1 etc41 already located at      
,wilmington1 at the sea-port and several
 places along the line4 ,reverse the    
directions from south to north1 and     
,wilmington will stand for ,tsinan-fu1  
,shanghai for ,new ,york1 ,nanking for  
,philadelphia with ,peking standing for 
the seat of government at ,washington1  
and ,tientsin for ,baltimore4 ,suppose  
in addition that the ,pennsylvania road 
is the sole means of communication      
between ,washington and the chief       
commercial and industrial centers1 and  
you have the framework of the ,shantung 
picture as it presents itself daily to  
the inhabitants of ,china4 ,upon second 
thought1 however1 the parallel is not   
quite accurate4 ,you have to add that   
the same foreign nation controls also   
all coast communications from1 say1     
,raleigh southwards1 with railway lines 
both to the nearby coast and to ,new    
,orleans4 ,for 7still reversing         

directions7 this corresponds to the     
position of ,imperial ,japan in         
,manchuria with its railways to ,dairen 
and through ,korea to a port twelve     
hours sail from a great military center 
in ,japan proper4 ,these are not remote 
possibilities nor vague                 
prognostications4 ,they are accomplished
 facts4  ,yet the facts give only the   
framework of the picture4 ,what is      
actually going on within ,shantung8 ,one
 of the demands of the postponed group  
of the ,twenty-one ,demands was that    
,japan should supply military and police
 advisers to ,china4 ,they are not so   
much postponed but that ,japan enforced 
specific concessions from ,china during 
the war by diplomatic threats to        
reintroduce their discussion1 or so     
postponed that ,japanese advisers are   
not already installed in the police     
headquarters of the city of ,tsinan1 the
 capital city of ,shantung of three     
hundred thousand population where the   
,provincial ,assembly meets and all the 

,provincial officials reside4 ,within   
recent months the ,japanese consul has  
taken a company of armed soldiers with  
him when he visited the ,provincial     
,governor to make certain demands upon  
him1 the visit being punctuated by an   
ostentatious surrounding of the         
,governor's yamen by these troops4      
,within the past few weeks1 two hundred 
cavalry came to ,tsinan and remained    
there while ,japanese officials demanded
 of the ,governor drastic measures to   
suppress the boycott1 while it was      
threatened to send ,japanese troops to  
police the foreign settlement if the    
demand was not heeded4  ,a former consul
 was indiscreet enough to put into      
writing that if the ,chinese ,governor  
did not stop the boycott and the        
students' movement by force if need be1 
he would take matters into his own      
hands4 ,the chief tangible charge he    
brought against the ,chinese as a basis 
of his demand for protection was that   
,chinese store-keepers actually refused 

to accept ,japanese money in payment for
 goods1 not ordinary ,japanese money at 
that1 but the military notes with which1
 so as to save drain upon the bullion   
reserves1 the army of occupation is     
paid4 ,and all this1 be it remembered1  
is more than two hundred miles from     
,tsing-tao and from eight to twelve     
months after the armistice4 ,today's    
paper reports a visit of ,japanese to   
the ,governor to inform him that unless 
he should prevent a private theatrical  
performance from being given in ,tsinan 
by the students1 they would send their  
own forces into the settlement to       
protect themselves4 ,and the utmost they
 might need protection from1 was that   
the students were to give some plays    
designed to foster the boycott6         
,japanese troops overran the ,province  
before they made any serious attempt to 
capture ,tsing-tao4 ,it is only a slight
 exaggeration to say that they took the 
,chinese ,tsinan before they took the   
,german ,tsing-tao4 ,propaganda in      

,america has justified this act on the  
ground that a ,german railway to the    
rear of ,japanese forces would have been
 a menace4 ,as there were no troops but 
only legal and diplomatic papers with   
which to attack the ,japanese1 it is a  
fair inference that the menace was      
located in ,versailles rather than in   
,shantung1 and concerned the danger of  
,chinese control of their own territory4
 ,chinese have been arrested by         
,japanese gendarmes in ,tsinan and      
subjected to a torturing third degree of
 the kind that ,korea has made          
sickeningly familiar4 ,the ,japanese    
claim that the injuries were received   
while the men were resisting arrest4    
,considering that there was no more     
legal ground for arrest than there would
 be if ,japanese police arrested        
,americans in ,new ,york1 almost anybody
 but the pacifist ,chinese certainly    
would have resisted4 ,but official      
hospital reports testify to bayonet     
wounds and the marks of flogging4 ,in   

the interior where the ,japanese had    
been disconcerted by the student        
propaganda they raided a ,high ,school1 
seized a school boy at random1 and took 
him to a distant point and kept him     
locked up several days4 ,when the       
,japanese consul at ,tsinan was visited 
by ,chinese officials in protest against
 these illegal arrests1 the consul      
disclaimed all jurisdiction4 ,the       
matter1 he said1 was wholly in the hands
 of the military authorities in         
,tsing-tao4 ,his disclaimer was         
emphasized by the fact that some of the 
kidnapped ,chinese were taken to        
,tsing-tao for trial4  ,the matter of   
economic rights in relation to political
 domination will be discussed later in  
this article4 ,it is no pleasure for one
 with many warm friends in ,japan1 who  
has a great admiration for the ,japanese
 people as distinct from the ruling     
military and bureaucratic class1 to     
report such facts as have been stated4  
,one might almost say1 one might        

positively say from the standpoint of   
,japan itself1 that the worst thing that
 can be charged against the policy of   
,japan in ,china for the last six years 
is its immeasurable stupidity4 ,no      
nation has ever misjudged the national  
psychology of another people as ,japan  
has that of ,china4 ,the alienation of  
,china is widespread1 deep1 bitter4     
,even the most pessimistic of the       
,chinese who think that ,china is to    
undergo a complete economic and         
political domination by ,japan do not   
think it can last1 even without outside 
intervention1 more than half a century4 
,today1 at the beginning of a new year1 
7#aibj7 the boycott is much more        
complete and efficient than in the most 
tense days of last summer4              
,unfortunately1 the ,japanese policy    
seems to be under a truly ,greek fate   
which drives it on4 ,concessions that   
would have produced a revulsion of      
feeling in favor of ,japan a year ago   
will now merely salve the surface of the

 wound4 ,what would have been welcomed  
even eight months ago would now be      
received with contempt4 ,there is but   
one way in which ,japan can now restore 
herself4 ,it is nothing less than       
complete withdrawal from ,shantung1 with
 possibly a strictly commercial         
concession at ,tsing-tao and a real1 not
 a ,manchurian1 ,open ,door4  ,according
 to the ,japanese-owned newspapers      
published in ,tsinan1 the ,japanese     
military commander in ,tsing-tao        
recently made a speech to visiting      
journalists from ,tokyo in which he     
said3 ,the suspicions of ,china cannot  
now be allayed merely by repeating that 
we have no territorial ambitions in     
,china4 ,we must attain complete        
economic domination of the ,far ,east4  
,but if ,chino-,japanese relations do   
not improve1 some third party will reap 
the benefit4 ,japanese residing in      
,china incur the hatred of the ,chinese4
 ,for they regard themselves as the     
proud citizens of a conquering country4 

,when the ,japanese go into partnership 
with the ,chinese they manage in the    
greater number of cases to have the     
profits accrue to themselves4 ,if       
friendship between ,china and ,japan is 
to depend wholly upon the government it 
will come to nothing4 ,diplomatists1    
soldiers1 merchants1 journalists should 
repent the past4 ,the change must be    
complete4 ,but it will not be complete  
until the ,japanese withdraw from       
,shantung leaving their nationals there 
upon the footing of other foreigners in 
,china4   #b4  ,in discussing the return
 to ,china by ,japan of a metaphysical  
sovereignty while economic rights are   
retained1 ,i shall not repeat the       
details of ,german treaty rights as to  
the railway and the mines4 ,the reader  
is assumed to be familiar with those    
facts4 ,the ,german seizure was         
outrageous4 ,it was a flagrant case of  
,might making ,right4 ,as von ,buelow   
cynically but frankly told the          
,reichstag1 while ,germany did not      

intend to partition ,china1 she also did
 not intend to be the passenger left    
behind in the station when the train    
started4 ,germany had the excuse of     
prior ,european aggressions1 and in turn
 her usurpation was the precedent for   
further foreign rape4 ,if judgments are 
made on a comparative basis1 ,japan is  
entitled to all of the white-washing    
that can be derived from the            
provocations of ,european imperialistic 
powers1 including those countries that  
in domestic policy are democratic4 ,and 
every fairminded person will recognize  
that1 leaving ,china out of the         
reckoning1 ,japan's proximity to ,china 
gives her aggressions the color of      
self-defence in a way that cannot be    
urged in behalf of any ,european power4 
,it is possible to look at ,european    
aggressions in1 say1 ,africa as         
incidents of a colonization movement4   
,but no foreign policy in ,asia can     
shelter itself behind any colonization  
plea4 ,for continental ,asia is1 for    

practical purposes1 ,india and ,china1  
representing two of the oldest          
civilizations of the globe and          
presenting two of its densest           
populations4 ,if there is any such thing
 in truth as a philosophy of history    
with its own inner and inevitable logic1
 one may well shudder to think of what  
the closing acts of the drama of the    
intercourse of the ,west and ,east are  
to be4 ,in any case1 and with whatever  
comfort may be derived from the fact    
that the ,american continents have not  
taken part in the aggression and hence  
may act as a mediator to avert the final
 tragedy1 residence in ,china forces    
upon one the realization that ,asia is1 
after all1 a large figure in the future 
reckoning of history4 ,asia is really   
here after all4 ,it is not simply a     
symbol in western algebraic balances of 
trade4 ,and in the future1 so to speak1 
it is going to be even more here1 with  
its awakened national consciousness of  
about half the population of the whole  

globe4  ,let the agreements of ,france  
and ,great ,britain made with ,japan    
during the war stand for the measure of 
western consciousness of the reality of 
only a small part of ,asia1 a           
consciousness generated by the          
patriotism of ,japan backed by its      
powerful army and navy4 ,the same       
agreement measures western              
unconsciousness of the reality of that  
part of ,asia which lies within the     
confines of ,china4 ,an even better     
measure of western unconsciousness may  
be found perhaps in such a trifling     
incident as this3--,an ,english friend  
long resident in ,shantung told me of   
writing indignantly home concerning the 
,british part in the ,shantung          
settlement4 ,the reply came1            
complacently stating that ,japanese     
ships did so much in the war that the   
,allies could not properly refuse to    
recognize ,japan's claims4 ,the secret  
agreements themselves hardly speak as   
eloquently for the absence of ,china    

from the average western consciousness4 
,in saying that ,china and ,asia are to 
be enormously significant figures in    
future reckonings1 the spectre of a     
military ,yellow ,peril is not meant nor
 even the more credible spectre of an   
industrial ,yellow ,peril4 ,but ,asia   
has come to consciousness1 and her      
consciousness of herself will soon be   
such a massive and persistent thing that
 it will force itself upon the reluctant
 consciousness of the west1 and lie     
heavily upon its conscience4 ,and for   
this fact1 ,china and the western world 
are indebted to ,japan4  ,these remarks 
are more relevant to a consideration of 
the relationship of economic and        
political rights in ,shantung than they 
perhaps seem4 ,for a moment's reflection
 will call to mind that all political   
foreign aggression in ,china has been   
carried out for commercial and financial
 ends1 and usually upon some economic   
pretext4 ,as to the immediate part      
played by ,japan in bringing about a    

consciousness which will from the       
present time completely change the      
relations of the western powers to      
,china1 let one little story testify4   
,some representatives of an ,english    
missionary board were making a tour of  
inspection through ,china4 ,they went   
into an interior town in ,shantung4     
,they were received with extraordinary  
cordiality by the entire population4    
,some time afterwards some of their     
accompanying friends returned to the    
village and were received with equally  
surprising coldness4 ,it came out upon  
inquiry that the inhabitants had first  
been moved by the rumor that these      
people were sent by the ,british        
government to secure the removal of the 
,japanese4 ,later they were moved by    
indignation that they had been          
disappointed4  ,it takes no forcing to  
see a symbol in this incident4 ,part of 
it stands for the almost incredible     
ignorance which has rendered ,china so  
impotent nationally speaking4 ,the other

 part of it stands for the new spirit   
which has been aroused even among the   
common people in remote districts4      
,those who fear1 or who pretend to fear1
 a new ,boxer movement1 or a definite   
general anti-foreign movement1 are1 ,i  
think1 mistaken4 ,the new consciousness 
goes much deeper4 ,foreign policies that
 fail to take it into account and that  
think that relations with ,china can be 
conducted upon the old basis will find  
this new consciousness obtruding in the 
most unexpected and perplexing ways4    
,one might fairly say1 still speaking   
comparatively1 that it is part of the   
bad luck of ,japan that her proximity to
 ,china1 and the opportunity the war    
gave her to outdo the aggressions of    
,european powers1 have made her the     
first victim of this disconcerting      
change4 ,whatever the motives of the    
,american ,senators in completely       
disassociating the ,united ,states from 
the peace settlement as regards ,china1 
their action is a permanent asset to    

,china1 not only in respect to ,japan   
but with respect to all ,chinese foreign
 relations4 ,just before our visit to   
,tsinan1 the ,shantung ,provincial      
,assembly had passed a resolution of    
thanks to the ,american ,senate4 ,more  
significant is the fact that they passed
 another resolution to be cabled to the 
,english ,parliament1 calling attention 
to the action of the ,american ,senate  
and inviting similar action4 ,china in  
general and ,shantung in particular     
feels the reinforcement of an external  
approval4 ,with this duplication1 its   
national consciousness has as it were   
solidified4 ,japan is simply the first  
object to be affected4  ,the concrete   
working out of economic rights in       
,shantung will be illustrated by a      
single case which will have to stand as 
typical4 ,po-shan is an interior mining 
village4 ,the mines were not part of the
 ,german booty2 they were ,chinese      
owned4 ,the ,germans1 whatever their    
ulterior aims1 had made no attempt at   

dispossessing the ,chinese4 ,the mines1 
however1 are at the end of a branch line
 of the new ,japanese owned             
railway--owned by the government1 not by
 a private corporation1 and guarded by  
,japanese soldiers4 ,of the forty mines1
 the ,japanese have worked their way1 in
 only four years1 into all but four4    
,different methods are used4 ,the       
simplest is1 of course1 discrimination  
in the use of the railway for shipping4 
,downright refusal to furnish cars while
 competitors who accepted ,japanese     
partners got them1 is one method4       
,another more elaborate method is to    
send but one car when a large number is 
asked for1 and then when it is too late 
to use cars1 send the whole number asked
 for or even more1 and then charge a    
large sum for demurrage in spite of the 
fact the mine no longer wants them or   
has cancelled the order4 ,redress there 
is none4  ,tsinan has no special foreign
 concessions4 ,it is1 however1 a treaty 
port where nationals of all friendly    

powers can do business4 ,but ,po-shan is
 not even a treaty port4 ,legally       
speaking no foreigners can lease land or
 carry on any business there4 ,yet the  
,japanese have forced a settlement as   
large in area as the entire foreign     
settlement in the much larger town of   
,tsinan4 ,a ,chinese refused to lease   
land where the ,japanese wished to      
relocate their railway station4 ,nothing
 happened to him directly4 ,but         
merchants could not get shipping space1 
or receive goods by rail4 ,some of them 
were beaten up by thugs4 ,after a time1 
they used their influence with their    
compatriot to lease his land4           
,immediately the persecutions ceased4   
,not all the land has been secured by   
threats or coercion2 some has been      
leased directly by ,chinese moved by    
high prices1 in spite of the absence of 
any legal sanction4 ,in addition1 the   
,japanese have obtained control of the  
electric light works and some pottery   
factories1 etc4  ,now even admitting    

that this is typical of the methods by  
which the ,japanese plant themselves1 a 
natural ,american reaction would be to  
say that1 after all1 the country is     
built up industrially by these          
enterprises1 and that though the rights 
of some individuals may have been       
violated1 there is nothing to make a    
national1 much less an international    
fuss about4 ,more or less unconsciously 
we translate foreign incidents into     
terms of our own experience and         
environment1 and thus miss the entire   
point4 ,since ,america was largely      
developed by foreign capital to our own 
economic benefit and without political  
encroachments1 we lazily suppose some   
such separation of the economic and     
political to be possible in ,china4 ,but
 it must be remembered that ,china is   
not an open country4 ,foreigners can    
lease land1 carry on business1 and      
manufacture only in accord with express 
treaty agreements4 ,there are no such   
agreements in the cases typified by the 

,po-shan incident4 ,we may profoundly   
disagree with the closed economic policy
 of ,china1 or we may believe that under
 existing circumstances it represents   
the part of prudence for her4 ,that     
makes no difference4 ,given the frequent
 occurrence of such economic invasions1 
with the backing of soldiers of the     
,imperial ,army1 with the overt aid of  
the ,imperial ,railway1 and with the    
refusal of ,imperial officials to       
intervene1 there is clear evidence of   
the attitude and intention of the       
,japanese government in ,shantung4      
,because the population of ,shantung is 
directly confronted with an immense     
amount of just such evidence1 it cannot 
take seriously the professions of vague 
diplomatic utterances4 ,what foreign    
nation is going to intervene to enforce 
,chinese rights in such a case as       
,po-shan8 ,which one is going           
effectively to call the attention of    
,japan to such evidences of its failure 
to carry out its promise8 ,yet the      

accumulation of precisely such seemingly
 petty incidents1 and not any single    
dramatic great wrong1 will secure       
,japan's economic and political         
domination of ,shantung4 ,it is for this
 reason that foreigners resident in     
,shantung1 no matter in what part1 say  
that they see no sign whatever that     
,japan is going to get out2 that1 on the
 contrary1 everything points to a       
determination to consolidate her        
position4 ,how long ago was the         
,portsmouth treaty signed1 and what were
 its nominal pledges about evacuation of
 ,manchurian territory8  ,not a month   
will pass without something happening   
which will give a pretext for delay1 and
 for making the surrender of ,shantung  
conditional upon this1 that and the     
other thing4 ,meantime the penetration  
of ,shantung by means of railway        
discrimination1 railway military guards1
 continual nibblings here and there1    
will be going on4 ,it would make the    
chapter too long to speak of the part   

played by manipulation of finance in    
achieving this process of attrition of  
sovereignty4 ,two incidents must        
suffice4 ,during the war1 ,japanese     
traders with the connivance of their    
government gathered up immense amounts  
of copper cash from ,shantung and       
shipped it to ,japan against the        
protests of the ,chinese government4    
,what does sovereignty amount to when a 
country cannot control even its own     
currency system8 ,in ,manchuria the     
,japanese have forced the introduction  
of several hundred million dollars of   
paper currency1 nominally1 of course1   
based on a gold reserve4 ,these notes   
are redeemable1 however1 only in ,japan 
proper4 ,and there is a law in ,japan   
forbidding the exportation of gold4 ,and
 there you are4  ,japan itself has      
recently afforded an object lesson in   
the actual connection of economic and   
political rights in ,china4 ,it is so   
beautifully complete a demonstration    
that it was surely unconscious4 ,within 

the last two weeks1 ,mr4 ,obata1 the    
,japanese minister in ,peking1 has      
waited upon the government with a       
memorandum saying that the ,foochow     
incident was the culminating result of  
the boycott2 that if the boycott        
continues1 a series of such incidents is
 to be apprehended1 saying that the     
situation has become intolerable for    
,japan1 and disavowing all              
responsibility for further consequences 
unless the government makes a serious   
effort to stop the boycott4 ,japan then 
immediately makes certain specific      
demands4 ,china must stop the           
circulation of handbills1 the holding of
 meetings to urge the boycott1 the      
destruction of ,japanese goods that have
 become ,chinese property--none have    
been destroyed that are ,japanese owned4
 ,volumes could not say more as to the  
real conception of ,japan of the        
connection between the economic and the 
political relations of the two          
countries4 ,surely the pale ghost of    

,sovereignty smiled ironically as he    
read this official note4 ,president     
,wilson after having made in the case of
 ,shantung a sharp and complete         
separation of economic and political    
rights1 also said that a nation         
boycotted is within sight of surrender4 
,disassociation of words from acts has  
gone so far in his case that he will    
hardly be able to see the meaning of    
,mr4 ,obata's communication4 ,the       
,american sense of humor and fair-play  
may however be counted upon to get its  
point4  ,january1 #aibj4     ,,iii      
,hinterlands in ,china   ,one of the two
 ,presidents of ,china--it is           
unnecessary to specify which--recently  
stated that a renewal of the            
,anglo-,japanese alliance meant a       
partition of ,china4 ,in this division1 
,japan would take the north and ,great  
,britain the south4 ,probably the remark
 was not meant to be taken literally in 
the sense of formal conquest or         
annexation1 but rather symbolically with

 reference to the tendency of policies  
and events4 ,even so1 the statement will
 appear exaggerated or wild to persons  
outside of ,china1 who either believe   
that the ,open ,door policy is now      
irrevocably established or that ,japan  
is the only foreign ,power which ,china 
has to fear4 ,but a recent visit to the 
south revealed that in that section1    
especially in ,canton1 the ,british     
occupy much the same position of        
suspicion and dread which is held by the
 ,japanese in the north4  ,upon the     
negative side1 the ,japanese menace is  
negligible in the province of ,kwantung1
 in which ,canton is situated4 ,there   
are said to be more ,americans in       
,canton than ,japanese1 and the         
,american colony is not extensive4 ,upon
 the positive side the history of the   
,cassell collieries contract is         
instructive4 ,it illustrates the cause  
of the popular attitude toward the      
,british1 and quite possibly explains   
the bitterness in the remark quoted4    

,the contract is noteworthy from        
whatever standpoint it is viewed1       
whether that of time1 of the conditions 
it contains or of the circumstances     
which accompany it4  ,premising that the
 contract delivers to a ,british company
 a monopoly of the rich coal deposits of
 the province for a period of ninety    
years and--quite incidentally of        
course--the right to use all means of   
transportation1 water or rail1 wharves  
and ports now in existence1 and also to 
construct1 manage1 superintend and work 
other roads1 railways waterways as may  
be deemed advisable--which reads like a 
monopoly of all further transportation  
facilities of the province--first take  
up the time of the making of the        
contract4 ,it was drawn in ,april1 #aibj
 and confirmed a few months later4 ,it  
was made1 of course1 with the           
authorities of the ,kwantung province1  
subject to confirmation at ,peking4     
,during this period1 ,kwantung province 
was governed by military carpet-baggers 

from the neighboring province of        
,kwangsei1 which was practically alone  
of the southern provinces allied with   
the northern government1 then under the 
control of the ,anfu party4 ,it was     
matter of common knowledge that the     
people of ,canton and of the province   
were bitterly hostile to this outside   
control and submitted to it only because
 of military coercion4 ,civil strife for
 the expulsion of the outsiders was     
already going on1 continually gaining   
headway1 and a few months later the     
,kwangsei troops were defeated and      
expelled from the province by the forces
 of ,general ,chen1 now the civil       
governor of ,kwantung1 who received a   
triumphal ovation upon his entrance into
 ,canton4 ,at this time the present     
native government was established1 a    
change which made possible the return of
 ,sun ,yat ,sen and his followers from  
their exile in ,shanghai4 ,it is        
evident1 then1 that the collieries      
contract giving away the natural        

resources of the people of the province1
 was knowingly made by a ,british       
company with a government which no more 
represented the people of the province  
than the military government of ,germany
 represented the people of ,belgium     
during the war4  ,as to the terms of the
 contract1 the statement that it gave   
the ,british company a monopoly of all  
the coal mines in the province1 was not 
literally accurate4 ,verbally1          
twenty-two districts are enumerated4    
,but these are the districts along the  
lines of the only railways in the       
province and the only ones soon to be   
built1 including the as yet uncompleted 
,hankow-,canton railway4 ,possibly this 
fact accounts for the anxiety of the    
,british partners in the ,consortium    
that the completion of this line be the 
first undertaking financed by the       
,consortium4 ,the document also includes
 what is perhaps a novelty in legal     
documents having such a momentous       
economic importance1 namely1 the words  

etc4 after the districts enumerated by  
name4  ,for this concession1 the        
,british syndicate agreed to pay the    
provincial government the sum of        
#a1jjj1jjj 7silver of course74 ,this    
million dollars is to bear six per cent 
interest to the company1 and capital and
 interest are to be paid back to the    
company by the provincial government out
 of the dividends 7if any7 it is to     
receive4 ,the nature of these dividends 
is set forth in an article which should 
receive the careful attention of        
promoters elsewhere as a model of the   
possibilities of exploiting contracts4  
,the ten million capital is divided     
equally into ,a shares and ,b shares4   
,the ,a shares go unreservedly to the   
directors of the company1 and three     
millions of the ,b shares are to be     
allotted by the directors of the company
 at their discretion4 ,the other two    
million are again divided into equal    
portions1 one portion representing the  
sum advanced by the company to the      

province and to be paid back as just    
specified1 while the other              
million--one-tenth of the               
capitalization--is to be a trust fund   
the dividends of which are to go for the
 benefit of the poor people of the      
province and for an educational fund for
 the province4 ,but before any dividends
 are paid upon the ,b shares1 eight per 
cent dividends are to be paid upon the  
,a shares and a dollar a ton royalty    
upon all coal mined4 ,those having any  
familiarity with the coal business with 
its usual royalty of about ten cents a  
ton can easily calculate the splendid   
prospects of the poor people and the    
schools1 prospects which represent the  
total return to the provinces of a      
concession of untold worth4 ,the        
contract also guarantees to the company 
the assistance of the provincial        
government in expropriating the owners  
of all coal mines which have been       
granted to other companies but not yet  
worked4 ,these technical details make   

dry reading1 but they throw light upon  
the spirit with which the ,british      
company undertook its predatory         
negotiations with a government renounced
 by the people it professed to govern4  
,in comparison with the relatively crude
 methods of ,japan in ,shantung1 they   
show the advantages of wide business    
experience4  ,as for the circumstances  
and context which give added menace to  
the contract1 the following facts are   
significant4 ,hong ,kong1 a ,british    
crown colony1 lies directly opposite the
 river upon which ,canton is situated4  
,it is the port of export and import for
 the vast districts served by the mines 
and railways of the province4 ,it is    
unnecessary to point out the hold upon  
all economic development which is given 
through a monopolistic control of coal4 
,it is hardly too much to say that the  
enforcement of the contract would enable
 ,british interests in ,hong ,kong to   
control the entire industrial           
development of the most flourishing of  

the provinces of ,china4 ,it would be a 
comparatively easy and inexpensive      
matter to provide the main land with a  
first class modern harbor and port near 
,canton4 ,but such a port would tend to 
reduce the assets of ,hong ,kong to the 
possession of the most beautiful scenery
 in the world4 ,there is already fear   
that a new harbor will be built4 ,many  
persons think that the concession of    
building such railways etc41 as are     
deemed advisable for the purpose of the 
business of the company and to improve  
those now existing is the object of the 
contract1 even more than the coal       
monopoly4 ,for the ,british already own 
a considerable part of the mainland1    
including part of the railway connecting
 the littoral with ,canton4 ,by building
 a cross-cut from the ,british owned    
portion of this railway to the          
,hankow-,canton line1 the latter would  
become virtually the ,hankow-,hong ,kong
 line1 and ,canton would be a           
way-station4 ,with the advantages thus  

secured1 the project for building a new 
port could be indefinitely blocked4     
,during the period in which the contract
 was being secured1 a congress of       
,british ,chambers of ,commerce was held
 in ,shanghai4 ,resolutions were passed 
in favor of abolishing henceforth the   
whole principle of special nationalistic
 concessions1 and of cooperating with   
the ,chinese for the upbuilding of      
,china4 ,at the close of the meeting the
 ,chairman announced that a new era for 
,china had finally dawned4 ,all of the  
,british newspapers in ,china lauded the
 wise action of the ,chambers4 ,at the  
same time1 ,mr4 ,lamont was in ,peking1 
and was setting forth that the object of
 the ,consortium was the abolition of   
further concessions1 and the uniting of 
the financial resources of the banks in 
the ,consortium for the economic        
development of ,china itself4 ,by an    
ironical coincidence1 the ,hong         
,kong-,shanghai ,bank1 which is the     
financial power behind the contract and 

the new company1 is the leading ,british
 partner in the ,consortium4 ,it is     
difficult to see how the ,british can   
henceforth accuse the ,japanese of bad  
faith if any of the banking interests of
 that country should enter upon         
independent negotiations with any       
government in ,china4  ,by the time the 
scene of action was transferred to      
,peking in order to secure the          
confirmation of the central government1 
the ,anfu regime was no more1 and as yet
 no confirmation has been secured4 ,the 
new government at ,canton has declined  
to recognize the contract as having any 
validity4 ,an official of the ,hong     
,kong government has told an official of
 the ,canton government that the ,hong  
,kong government stands behind the      
enforcement of the contract1 and that   
,kwantung province is a ,british        
,hinterland4 ,within the last few weeks 
the ,governor of ,hong ,kong and a      
leading ,chinese banker of ,hong ,kong  
who is a ,british subject have visited  

,peking4 ,rumors were rife in the south 
as to the object of the visit4 ,british 
sources published the report that one   
object was to return ,weihaiwei to      
,china--in case ,peking agreed to turn  
over more of the ,kwantung mainland to  
,hong ,kong as a quid pro quo4 ,chinese 
opinion in the south was that one main  
object was to secure the ,peking        
confirmation of the ,cassell contract1  
in which case #ijj1jjj more would be    
forthcoming1 #ajj1jjj having been paid  
down when the contract was signed with  
the provincial government4 ,peking does 
not recognize the present ,canton       
government but regards it as an outlaw4 
,the crowd that signed the contract is  
still in control of the neighboring     
province of ,kwangsei and they are      
relied upon by the north to effect the  
military subjugation of the seceded     
province4 ,fighting has already1 indeed1
 begun1 but the ,kwangsei militarists   
are badly in need of money2 if ,peking  
ratifies the contract1 a large part of  

the funds will be paid over to them--all
 that isn't lost by the wayside to the  
northern militarists4#a ,meantime       
,british news agencies keep up a        
constant circulation of reports tending 
to discredit the ,kwantung government1  
although all impartial observers on the 
spot regard it as altogether the most   
promising one in ,china4      #a ,since 
the text was written1 the newspapers    
have stated         that the ,peking    
,government has officially refused to   
validate the agreement4  ,these         
considerations not only throw light on  
some of the difficulties of the         
functioning of the ,consortium1 but they
 give an indispensable background for   
judging the actual effect of the renewal
 of the ,anglo-,japanese alliance4 ,by  
force of circumstances each government1 
even against its own wish1 will be      
compelled to wink at the predatory      
policies of the other2 and the tendency 
will be to create a division of spheres 
of influence between the north and south

 in order to avoid more direct          
conflicts4 ,the ,english liberals who   
stand for the renewal of the alliance on
 the ground that it will enable ,england
 to exercise a check on ,japanese       
policies1 are more naive than was ,mr4  
,wilson with his belief in the          
separation of the economic and political
 control of ,shantung4  ,it cannot be   
too often repeated that the real point  
of friction between the ,united ,states 
and ,japan is not in ,california but in 
,china4 ,it is silly--unless it is      
calculated--for ,english authorities to 
keep repeating that under no            
circumstances does the alliance mean    
that ,great ,britain would support      
,japan in a war with the ,united        
,states4 ,the day the alliance is       
renewed1 the hands of the militarists in
 ,japan will be strengthened and the    
hands of the liberals--already weak     
enough--be still further weakened4 ,in  
consequence1 all the sources of friction
 in ,china between the ,united ,states  

and ,japan will be intensified4 ,i do   
not believe in the predicted war4 ,but  
should it come1 the first act of        
,japan--so everyone in ,china           
believes--will be to seize the ports of 
northern ,china and its railways in     
order to make sure of an uninterrupted  
supply of food and raw materials4 ,the  
act would be justified as necessary to  
national existence4 ,great ,britain in  
alliance with ,japan would be in no     
position to protest in anything but the 
most perfunctory way4 ,the guarantee of 
such abstinence would be for ,japan the 
next best thing to open naval and       
financial support4 ,without the         
guarantee they would not dare the       
seizure of ,chinese ports4 ,in recent   
years diplomatists have shown themselves
 capable of unlimited stupidity4 ,but it
 is not possible that the men in the    
,british ,foreign ,office are not aware 
of these elementary facts4 ,if they     
renew the alliance they knowingly take  
the responsibility for the consequences4

  ,may #bd1 #aiba4     ,,iv  ,a         
,political ,upheaval in ,china   ,even  
in ,america we have heard of one        
,chinese revolution1 that which thrust  
the ,manchu dynasty from the throne4    
,the visitor in ,china gets used to     
casual references to the second         
revolution1 that which frustrated ,yuan 
,shi ,kai's aspirations to be emperor1  
and the third1 the defeat in #aiag of   
the abortive attempt to put the ,manchu 
boy emperor back into power4 ,and within
 the last few weeks the 7,september     
#aibj7 fourth upheaval has taken place4 
,it may not be dignified by the name of 
the fourth revolution1 for the head of  
the state has not been changed by it4   
,but as a manifestation of the forces   
that shape ,chinese political events1   
for evil and for good1 perhaps this last
 disturbance surpasses the last two     
revolutions in significance4  ,chinese  
politics in detail are highly           
complicated1 a mess of personalities and
 factions whose oscillations no one can 

follow who does not know a multitude of 
personal1 family and provincial         
histories4 ,but occasionally something  
happens which simplifies the tangle4    
,definite outlines frame themselves out 
of the swirling criss-cross of strife1  
intrigue and ambition4 ,so1 at present1 
the complete collapse of the ,anfu      
clique which owned the central          
government for two years marks the end  
of that union of internal militarism and
 ,japanese foreign influence which was1 
for ,china1 the most marked fruit of the
 war4 ,when ,china entered the war a    
,war ,participation army was formed4 ,it
 never participated2 probably it was    
never meant to4 ,but its formation threw
 power wholly into the hands of the     
military clique1 as against the civilian
 constitutionalists4 ,and in return for 
concessions1 secret agreements relating 
to ,manchuria1 ,shantung1 new railways1 
etc41 ,japan supplied money1 munitions1 
instructors for the army and a          
benevolent supervision of foreign and   

domestic politics4 ,the war came to an  
unexpected and untimely end1 but by this
 time the offspring of the marriage of  
the militarism of ,yuan ,shi ,kai and   
,japanese money and influence was a     
lusty youth4 ,bolshevism was induced to 
take the place of ,germany as a menace  
requiring the keeping up of the army1   
and loans and teachers4 ,mongolia was   
persuaded to cut her strenuous ties with
 ,russia1 to renounce her independence  
and come again under ,chinese           
sovereignty4  ,the army and its         
,japanese support and instruction was1  
accordingly1 continued4 ,in place of the
 ,war ,participation army appeared the  
,frontier ,defense army4 ,marshal ,tuan1
 the head of the military party1        
remained the nominal political power    
behind the presidential chair1 and      
,general ,hsu 7commonly known as little 
,hsu1 in distinction from old ,hsu1 the 
president7 was the energetic manager of 
the ,mongolian adventure which1 by a    
happy coincidence1 required a bank1 land

 development companies and railway      
schemes1 as well as an army4 ,about this
 military centre as a nucleus gathered  
the vultures who fed on the carrion4    
,this flock took the name of the ,anfu  
,club4 ,it did not control the entire   
cabinet1 but to it belonged the         
,minister of ,justice1 who manipulated  
the police and the courts1 persecuted   
the students1 suppressed liberal        
journals and imprisoned inconvenient    
critics4 ,and the ,club owned the       
ministers of finance and communications1
 the two cabinet places that dispense   
revenues1 give out jobs and make loans4 
,it also regulated the distribution of  
intelligence by mail and telegraph4 ,the
 reign of corruption and despotic       
inefficiency1 tempered only by the      
student revolt1 set in4 ,in two years   
the ,anfu ,club got away with two       
hundred millions of public funds        
directly1 to say nothing of what was    
wasted by incompetency and upon the     
army4 ,the ,allies had set out to get   

,china into the war4 ,they succeeded in 
getting ,japan into control of ,peking  
and getting ,china1 politically         
speaking1 into a seemingly hopeless     
state of corruption and confusion4  ,the
 militaristic or ,pei-,yang party was1  
however1 divided into two factions1 each
 called after a province4 ,the ,anwhei  
party gathered about little ,hsu and was
 almost identical with the ,anfus4 ,the 
,chili faction had been obliged1 so far 
as ,peking was concerned1 to content    
itself with such leavings as the ,anfu  
,club tossed to it4 ,apparently it was  
hopelessly weaker than its rival1       
although ,tuan1 who was personally      
honest and above financial scandal1 was 
supported by both factions and was the  
head of both4 ,about three months ago   
there were a few signs that1 while the  
,anfu ,club had been entrenching itself 
in ,peking1 the rival faction had been  
quietly establishing itself in the      
provinces4 ,a league of ,eight ,tuchuns 
7military governors of the provinces7   

came to the assistance of the president 
against some unusually strong pressure  
from the ,anfu ,club4 ,in spite of the  
fact that the military governor of the  
three ,manchurian provinces1 ,chang ,tso
 ,lin1 popularly known as the ,emperor  
of ,manchuria1 lined up with this       
league1 practically nobody expected     
anything except some manoeuvering to get
 a larger share of the spoils4  ,but    
late in ,june the president invited     
,chang ,tso ,lin to ,peking4 ,the latter
 saw ,tuan1 told him that he was        
surrounded by evil advisers1 demanded   
that he cut loose from little ,hsu and  
the ,anfu ,club1 and declared open war  
upon little ,hsu--the two had long and  
notoriously been bitter enemies4 ,even  
then people had great difficulty in     
believing that anything would happen    
except another ,chinese compromise4 ,the
 president was known to be sympathetic  
upon the whole with the ,chili faction1 
but the president1 if not a typical     
,chinese1 is at least typical of a      

certain kind of ,chinese mandarin1      
non-resistant1 compromising1            
conciliating1 procrastinating1 covering 
up1 evading issues1 face-saving4 ,but   
finally something happened4 ,a mandate  
was issued dismissing little ,hsu from  
office1 military and civil1 dissolving  
the frontier defense corps as such1 and 
bringing it under the control of the    
,ministry of ,war 7usually armies in    
,china belong to some general or        
,tuchun1 not to the country74 ,for      
almost forty-eight hours it was thought 
that ,tuan had consented to sacrifice   
little ,hsu and that the latter would   
submit at least temporarily4 ,then with 
equally sensational abruptness ,tuan    
brought pressure to bear on the         
president4 ,the latter was appointed    
head of a national defense army1 and    
rewards were issued for the heads of the
 chiefs of the ,chili faction1 nothing1 
however1 being said about ,chang ,tso   
,lin1 who had meanwhile returned to     
,mukden and who still professed         

allegiance to ,tuan4 ,troops were       
mobilized2 there was a rush of officials
 and of the wealthy to the concessions  
of ,tientsin and to the hotels of the   
legation quarter4  ,this sketch is not  
meant as history1 but simply as an      
indication of the forces at work4 ,hence
 it is enough to say that two weeks     
after ,tuan and little ,hsu had         
intimidated the president and proclaimed
 themselves the saviors of the          
,republic1 they were in hiding1 their   
enemies of the ,chili party were in     
complete control of ,peking1 and rewards
 from fifty thousand dollars down were  
offered for the arrest of little ,hsu1  
the ex-ministers of justice1 finance and
 communications1 and other leaders of   
the ,anfu ,club4 ,the political turnover
 was as complete as it was sensational4 
,the seemingly impregnable masters of   
,china were impotent fugitives4 ,the    
carefully built up ,anfu ,club1 with its
 military1 financial and foreign        
support1 had crumbled and fallen4 ,no   

country at any time has ever seen a     
political upheaval more sudden and more 
thoroughgoing4 ,it was not so much a    
defeat as a dissolution like that of    
death1 a total disappearance1 an        
evaporation4  ,corruption had worked    
inward1 as it has a way of doing4       
,japanese-bought munitions would not    
explode2 quartermasters vanished with   
the funds with which stores were to be  
bought2 troops went without anything to 
eat for two or three days2 large        
numbers1 including the larger part of   
one division1 went over to the enemy en 
masse2 those who did not desert had no  
heart for fighting and ran away or      
surrendered on the slightest            
provocation1 saying they were willing to
 fight for their country but saw no     
reason why they should fight for a      
faction1 especially a faction that had  
been selling the country to a foreign   
nation4 ,in the manner of the defeat of 
the ,anfu clique at the height of its   
supremacy1 rather than in the mere fact 

of its defeat1 lies the credit side of  
the ,chinese political balance sheet4   
,it is a striking exhibition of the     
oldest and best faith of the            
,chinese--the power of moral            
considerations4 ,public opinion1 even   
that of the coolie on the street1 was   
wholly against the ,anfu party4 ,it went
 down not so much because of the        
strength of the other side as because of
 its own rottenness4  ,so far the       
results are to all appearances negative4
 ,the most marked is the disappearance  
of ,japanese prestige4 ,as one of the   
leading men in the ,war ,office said3   
,for over a year now the people have    
been strongly opposed to the ,japanese  
government on account of ,shantung4 ,but
 now even the generals do not care for  
,japan any more4 ,it is hardly logical  
to take the easy collapse of the        
,japanese-supported ,anfu party as a    
proof of the weakness of ,japan1 but    
prestige is always a matter of feeling  
rather than of logic4 ,many who were    

intimidated to the point of hypnotism by
 the idea of the irresistible power of  
,japan are now freely laughing at the   
inefficiency of ,japanese leadership4   
,it would not be safe to predict that   
,japan will not come back as a force to 
be reckoned with in the internal as well
 as external politics of ,china1 but it 
is safe to say that never again will    
,japan figure as superman to ,china4    
,and such a negation is after all a     
positive result4  ,and so in its way is 
the overthrow of the ,anwhei faction of 
the militarist party4 ,the ,chinese     
liberals do not feel very optimistic    
about the immediate outcome4 ,they have 
mostly given up the idea that the       
country can be reformed by political    
means4 ,they are sceptical about the    
possibility of reforming even politics  
until a new generation comes on the     
scene4 ,they are now putting their faith
 in education and in social changes     
which will take some years to consummate
 themselves visibly4 ,the self-styled   

southern republican constitutional party
 has not shown itself in much better    
light than the northern militarist      
party4 ,in fact1 its old leader ,sun    
,yat ,sen now cuts one of the most      
ridiculous figures in ,china1 as shortly
 before this upheaval he had definitely 
aligned himself with ,tuan and little   
,hsu4#b      #b ,this was written of    
course several months before ,sun ,yat  
,sen was reinstated in control of       
,canton by the successful         revolt
 of his local adherents against the     
southern         militarists who had    
usurped power and driven out ,sun ,yat  
,sen         and his followers4 ,but up 
to the time when ,i left ,china1 in     
,july of this year1 it was true that the
 liberals of northern         and       
central ,china who were bitterly opposed
 to the ,peking         ,government1 did
 not look to the ,southern ,government  
with         much hope4 ,the common     
attitude was a plague upon both of      
your houses and a desire for a new      

start4 ,the conflict         between    
,north and ,south looms much larger in  
the ,united         ,states than it did 
in ,china4  ,this does not mean1        
however1 that democratic opinion thinks 
nothing has been gained4 ,the           
demonstration of the inherent weakness  
of corrupt militarism will itself       
prevent the development of any          
militarism as complete as that of the   
,anfus4 ,as one ,chinese gentleman said 
to me3 ,when ,yuan ,shi ,kai was        
overthrown1 the tiger killed the lion4  
,now a snake has killed the tiger4 ,no  
matter how vicious the snake may become1
 some smaller animal will be able to    
kill him1 and his life will be shorter  
than that of either lion or tiger4 ,in  
short1 each successive upheaval brings  
nearer the day when civilian supremacy  
will be established4 ,this result will  
be achieved partly because of the       
repeated demonstrations of the          
uncongeniality of military despotism to 
the ,chinese spirit1 and partly because 

with every passing year education will  
have done its work4 ,suppressed liberal 
papers are coming to life1 while over   
twenty ,anfu subsidized newspapers and  
two subsidized news agencies have gone  
out of being4 ,the soldiers1 including  
many officers in the ,anwhei army1      
clearly show the effects of student     
propaganda4 ,and it is worth while to   
note down the name of one of the leaders
 on the victorious side1 the only one   
whose troops did any particular         
fighting1 and that against great odds in
 numbers4 ,the name is ,wu ,pei ,fu4 ,he
 at least has not fought for the ,chili 
faction against the ,anwhei faction4 ,he
 has proclaimed from the first that he  
was fighting to rid the country of      
military control of civil government1   
and against traitors who would sell     
their country to foreigners4 ,he has    
come out strongly for a new popular     
assembly1 to form a new constitution and
 to unite the country4 ,and although    
,chang ,tso ,lin has remarked that ,wu  

,pei ,fu as a military subordinate could
 not be expected to intervene in        
politics1 he has not as yet found it    
convenient to oppose the demand for a   
popular assembly4 ,meanwhile the        
liberals are organizing their forces1   
hardly expecting to win a victory1 but  
resolved1 win or lose1 to take advantage
 of the opportunity to carry further the
 education of the ,chinese people in the
 meaning of democracy4  ,august1 #aibj4 
,v  ,divided ,china   #a4  ,in ,january 
#aibj the ,peking government issued an  
edict proclaiming the unification of    
,china4 ,on ,may #eth ,sun ,yat ,sen was
 formally inaugurated in ,canton as     
president of all ,china4 ,thus ,china   
has within six months been twice        
unified1 once from the northern         
standpoint and once from the southern4  
,each act of unification is in fact a   
symbol of the division of ,china1 a     
division expressing differences of      
language1 temperament1 history1 and     
political policy as well as of          

geography1 persons and factions4 ,this  
division has been one of the outstanding
 facts of ,chinese history since the    
overthrow of the ,manchus ten years ago 
and it has manifested itself in         
intermittent civil war4 ,yet there are  
two other statements which are equally  
true1 although they flatly contradict   
each other and the one just made4 ,one  
statement is that so far as the people  
of ,china are concerned there is no real
 division on geographical lines1 but    
only the common division occurring      
everywhere between conservatives and    
progressives4 ,the other is that instead
 of two divisions in ,china1 there are  
at least five1 two parties in both the  
north and south1 and another in the     
central or ,yangtse region1#c each one  
of the five splitting up again more or  
less on factional and provincial lines4 
,and so far as the future is concerned1 
probably this last statement is the most
 significant of the three4 ,that all    
three statements are true is what makes 

,chinese politics so difficult to       
understand even in their larger         
features4      #c ,since the writing of 
this and the former chapter there       
are some signs that ,wu ,pei ,fu wants  
to set up in control of         the     
middle districts4  ,by the good fortune 
of circumstances we were in ,canton when
 the inauguration occurred4 ,peking and 
,canton are a long way apart in more    
than distance4 ,there is little exchange
 of actual news between the two places2 
what filters through into either city   
and gets published consists mostly of   
rumors tending to discredit the other   
city4 ,in ,canton1 the monarchy is      
constantly being restored in ,peking2   
and in ,peking1 ,canton is ,bolshevized 
at least once a week1 while every other 
week open war breaks out between the    
adherents of ,sun ,yat ,sen1 and        
,general ,chen ,kwang ,ming1 the civil  
governor of the province4 ,there is     
nothing to give the impression--even in 
circles which accept the ,peking        

government only as an evil              
necessity--that the pretensions of ,sun 
,yat ,sen represent anything more than  
the desires of a small and discredited  
group to get some slight power for      
themselves at the expense of national   
unity4 ,even in ,fukien1 the province   
next north of ,kwantung1 one found      
little but gossip whose effect was to   
minimize the importance of the southern 
government4 ,in foreign circles in the  
north as well as in liberal ,chinese    
circles upon the whole1 the feeling is  
general that bad as the de facto ,peking
 government may be1 it represents the   
cause of national unity1 while the      
southern government represents a        
perpetuation of that division of ,china 
which makes her weak and which offers   
the standing invitation to foreign      
intrigue and aggression4 ,only          
occasionally during the last few months 
has some returned traveller timidly     
advanced the opinion that we had the    
wrong dope on the south1 and that they  

were really trying to do something down 
there4  ,consequently there was little  
preparation on my part for the spectacle
 afforded in ,canton during the week of 
,may #eth4 ,this was the only           
demonstration ,i have seen in ,china    
during the last two years which gave any
 evidence of being a spontaneous popular
 movement4 ,new ,yorkers are accustomed 
to crowds1 processions1 street          
decorations and accompanying enthusiasm4
 ,i doubt if ,new ,york has ever seen a 
demonstration which surpassed that of   
,canton in size1 noise1 color or        
spontaneity--in spite of tropical rains4
 ,the country people flocked in in such 
masses1 that1 being unable to find      
accommodation even in the river boats1  
they kept up a parade all night4 ,guilds
 and localities which were not able to  
get a place in the regular procession   
organized minor ones on their own       
account on the day before and after the 
official demonstration4 ,making all     
possible allowance for the intensity of 

,cantonese local loyalty and the fact   
that they might be celebrating a        
,cantonese affair rather than a         
principle1 the scene was sufficiently   
impressive to revise one's preconceived 
ideas and to make one try to find out   
what it is that gives the southern      
movement its vitality4  ,a demonstration
 may be popular and still be superficial
 in significance4 ,however one found    
foreigners on the ground--at least      
,americans--saying that in the last few 
months the men in power in ,canton were 
the only officials in ,china who were   
actually doing something for the people 
instead of filling their own pockets and
 magnifying their personal power4 ,even 
the northern newspapers had not entirely
 omitted reference to the suppression of
 licensed gambling4 ,on the spot one    
learned that this suppression was not   
only genuine and thorough1 but that it  
meant a renunciation of an annual       
revenue of nearly ten million dollars on
 the part of a government whose chief   

difficulty is financial1 and            
where--apart from motives of personal   
squeeze--it would have been easy to     
argue that at least temporarily the end 
justified the means in retaining this   
source of revenue4 ,english papers      
throughout ,china have given much praise
 to the government of ,hong ,kong       
because it has cut down its opium       
revenue from eight to four millions     
annually with the plan for ultimate     
extinction4 ,yet ,hong ,kong is         
prosperous1 it has not been touched by  
civil war1 and it only needs revenue for
 ordinary civil purposes1 not as a means
 of maintaining its existence in a      
crisis4  ,under the circumstances1 the  
action of the southern government was   
hardly less than heroic4 ,this          
renunciation is the most sensational act
 of the ,canton government1 but one soon
 learns that it is the accompaniment of 
a considerable number of constructive   
administrative undertakings4 ,among the 
most notable are attempts to reform the 

local magistracies throughout the       
province1 the establishment of municipal
 government in ,canton--something new in
 ,china where local officials are all   
centrally appointed and                 
controlled--based upon the ,american    
,commission plan1 and directed by       
graduates of schools of political       
science in the ,united ,states2 plans   
for introducing local self-government   
throughout the province2 a scheme for   
introduction of universal primary       
education in ,canton to be completed in 
three steps4  ,these reforms are        
provincial and local4 ,they are part of 
a general movement against              
centralization and toward local autonomy
 which is gaining headway all over      
,china1 a protest against the           
appointment of officials from ,peking   
and the management of local affairs in  
the interests of factions--and          
pocketbooks--whose chief interest in    
local affairs is what can be extracted  
in the way of profit4 ,for the only     

analogue of provincial government in    
,china at the present time is the carpet
 bag government of the south in the days
 following our civil war4 ,these things 
explain the restiveness of the country1 
including central as well as southern   
provinces1 under ,peking domination4    
,but they do not explain the setting up 
of a new national1 or federal           
government1 with the election of ,mr4   
,sun ,yat ,sen as its president4 ,to    
understand this event it is necessary to
 go back into history4  ,in ,june1      
#aiag1 the parliament in ,peking was    
about to adopt a constitution4 ,the     
parliament was controlled by leaders of 
the old revolutionary party who had been
 at loggerheads with ,yuan and with the 
executive generally4 ,the latter accused
 them of being obstructionists1 wasting 
time in discussing and theorizing when  
the country needed action4 ,japan had   
changed her tactics regarding the       
participation of ,china in the war1 and 
having got her position established     

through the ,twenty-one ,demands1 saw a 
way of controlling ,chinese arsenals and
 virtually amalgamating the ,chinese    
armies with her own through supervising 
,china's entrance into the war4 ,the    
,british and ,french were pressing      
desperately for the same end4           
,parliament was slow to act1 and ,tang  
,shao ,yi1 ,sun ,yat ,sen and other     
southern leaders were averse1 since they
 regarded the war as none of ,china's   
business and were upon the whole more   
anti-,british than anti-,german--a fact 
which partly accounts for the share of  
,british journals in the present press  
propaganda against the ,canton          
government4 ,but what brought matters to
 a head was the fact that the           
constitution which was about to be      
adopted eliminated the military         
governors or tuchuns of the provinces1  
and restored the supremacy of civil     
authority which had been destroyed by   
,yuan ,shi ,kai1 in addition to         
introducing a policy of                 

decentralization4 ,coached by members of
 the so-called progressive party which  
claimed to be constitutionalist and     
which had a factionalist interest in    
overthrowing the revolutionaries who    
controlled the legislative branch if not
 the executive1 the military governors  
demanded that the president suspend     
parliament and dismiss the legislators4 
,this demand was more than passively    
supported by all the ,allied diplomats  
in ,peking with the honorable exception 
of the ,american legation4 ,the         
president weakly yielded and issued an  
edict dispelling parliament1 virtually  
admitting in the document the illegality
 of his action4 ,less than a month      
afterwards he was a refugee in the      
,dutch legation on account of the farce 
of monarchical restoration staged by    
,chang ,shun--who at the present time is
 again coming to the front in the north 
as adjutant to the plans of ,chang ,tso 
,lin1 the present strong man of ,china4 
,later1 elections were held and a new   

parliament elected4 ,this parliament has
 been functioning as the legislature of 
,china at ,peking and elected the       
president1 ,hsu ,shi ,chang1 the head of
 the government recognized by the       
foreign ,powers--in short it is the     
,chinese government from an             
international standpoint1 the ,peking   
government from a domestic standpoint4  
,the revolutionary members of the old   
parliament never recognized the legality
 of their dispersal1 and consequently   
refused to admit the legal status of the
 new parliament1 called by them the     
bogus parliament1 and of the president  
elected by it1 especially as the new    
legislative body was not elected        
according to the rules laid down by the 
constitution4 ,under the lead of some of
 the old members1 the old parliament1   
called by its opponents the defunct     
parliament1 has led an intermittent     
existence ever since4 ,claiming to be   
the sole authentic constitutional body  
of ,china1 it finally elected ,dr4 ,sun 

president of ,china and thus prepared   
the act of the fifth of ,may1 already   
reported4  ,such is the technical and   
formal background of the present        
southern government4 ,its attack upon   
the legality of the ,peking government  
is doubtless technically justified4 ,but
 for various reasons its own positive   
status is open to equally grave doubts4 
,the terms bogus and defunct1 so freely 
cast at each other1 both seem to an     
outsider to be justified4 ,it is less   
necessary to go into the reasons which  
appear to invalidate the position of the
 southern parliament because of the     
belated character of its final action4  
,a protest which waits four years to    
assert itself in positive action is     
confronted not with legal technicalities
 but with accomplished facts4 ,in my    
opinion1 legality for legality1 the     
southern government has a bare shade the
 better of the technical argument4 ,but 
in the face of a government which has   
foreign recognition and which has       

maintained itself after a fashion for   
four years1 a legal shadow is a         
precarious political basis4 ,it is wiser
 to regard the southern government as a 
revolutionary government1 which in      
addition to the prestige of continuing  
the revolutionary movement of ten years 
ago has also a considerable sentimental 
asset as a protest of constitutionalism 
against the military usurpations of the 
,peking government4  ,it is an open     
secret that the southern movement has   
not received the undivided support of   
all the forces present in ,canton which 
are opposed to the northern government4 
,tang ,shao ,yi1 for example1 was       
notable for his absence at the time of  
the inauguration1 having found it       
convenient to visit the graves of his   
ancestors at that time4 ,the provincial 
governor1 ,general ,chen ,kwang ,ming1  
was in favor of confining efforts to the
 establishment of provincial autonomy   
and the encouragement of similar        
movements in other provinces1 looking   

forward to an eventual federal1 or      
confederated1 government of at least all
 the provinces south of the ,yangtse4   
,many of his generals wanted to postpone
 action until ,kwantung province had    
made a military alliance with the       
generals in the other southwestern      
provinces1 so as to be able to resist   
the north should the latter undertake a 
military expedition4 ,others thought the
 technical legal argument for the new   
move was being overworked1 and while    
having no objections to an out and out  
revolutionary movement against ,peking1 
thought that the time for it had not yet
 come4 ,they are counting on ,chang ,tso
 ,lin's attempting a monarchical        
restoration and think that the popular  
revulsion against that move would create
 the opportune time for such a movement 
as has now been prematurely undertaken4 
,however in spite of reports of open    
strife freely circulated by ,british and
 ,peking government newspapers1 most of 
the opposition elements are now loyally 

suppressing their opposition and        
supporting the government of ,sun ,yat  
,sen4 ,a compromise has been arranged by
 which the federal government will      
confine its attention to foreign        
affairs1 leaving provincial matters     
wholly in the hands of ,governor ,chen  
and his adherents4 ,there is still room 
for friction however1 especially as to  
the control of revenues1 since at       
present there are hardly enough funds   
for one administration1 let alone two4  
#b4  ,the members of the new southern   
government are strikingly different in  
type from those one meets elsewhere     
whether in ,peking or the provincial    
capitals4 ,the latter men are literally 
mediaeval when they are not late ,roman 
,empire1 though most of them have       
learned a little modern patter to hand  
out to foreigners4 ,the former are      
educated men1 not only in the school    
sense and in the sense that they have   
had some special training for their     
jobs1 but in the sense that they think  

the ideas and speak the language current
 among progressive folk all over the    
world4 ,they welcome inquiry and talk   
freely of their plans1 hopes and fears4 
,i had the opportunity of meeting all   
the men who are most influential in both
 the local and federal governments2     
these conversations did not take the    
form of interviews for publication1 but 
,i learned that there are at least three
 angles from which the total situation  
is viewed4  ,governor ,chen has had no  
foreign education and speaks no         
,english4 ,he is distinctively ,chinese 
in his training and outlook4 ,he is a   
man of force1 capable of drastic        
methods1 straightforward intellectually 
and physically1 of unquestioned         
integrity and of almost ,spartan life in
 a country where official position is   
largely prized for the luxuries it makes
 possible4 ,for example1 practically    
alone among ,chinese provincial         
officials of the first rank he has no   
concubines4 ,not only this1 but he      

proposed to the provincial assembly a   
measure to disenfranchise all persons   
who have concubines4 7,the measure      
failed because it is said its passage   
would have deprived the majority of the 
assemblymen of their votes47 ,he is by  
all odds the most impressive of all the 
officials whom ,i have met in ,china4   
,if ,i were to select a man likely to   
become a national figure of the first   
order in the future1 it would be1       
unhesitatingly1 ,governor ,chen4 ,he can
 give and also command loyalty--a fact  
which in itself makes him almost unique4
  ,his views in gist are as follows3    
,the problem of problems in ,china is   
that of real unification4 ,industry and 
education are held back because of lack 
of stability of government1 and the     
better elements in society seclude      
themselves from all public effort4 ,the 
question is how this unification is to  
be obtained4 ,in the past it has been   
tried by force used by strong           
individuals4 ,yuan ,shi ,kai tried and  

failed2 ,feng ,kuo ,chang tried and     
failed2 ,tuan ,chi ,jui tried and       
failed4 ,that method must be            
surrendered4 ,china can be unified only 
by the people themselves1 employing not 
force but the methods of normal         
political evolution4 ,the only way to   
engage the people in the task is to     
decentralize the government4 ,futile    
efforts at centralization must be       
abandoned4 ,peking and ,canton alike    
must allow the provinces the maximum of 
autonomy2 the provincial capitals must  
give as much authority as possible to   
the districts1 and the districts to the 
communities4 ,officials must be chosen  
by and from the local districts and     
everything must be done to encourage    
local initiative4 ,governor ,chen's     
chief ambition is to introduce this     
system into ,kwantung province4 ,he     
believes that other provinces will      
follow as soon as the method has been   
demonstrated1 and that national unity   
will then be a pyramid built out of the 

local blocks4  ,with extreme            
self-government in administrative       
matters1 ,governor ,chen will endeavor  
to enforce a policy of centralized      
economic control4 ,he says in effect    
that the west has developed economic    
anarchy along with political control1   
with the result of capitalistic         
domination and class struggle4 ,he      
wishes to avert this consequence in     
,china by having government control from
 the first of all basic raw materials   
and all basic industries1 mines1        
transportation1 factories for cement1   
steel1 etc4 ,in this way the provincial 
authorities hope to secure an equable   
industrial development of the province1 
while at the same time procuring ample  
revenues without resorting to heavy     
taxation4 ,since almost all the other   
governors in ,china are using their     
power1 in combination with the          
exploiting capitalists native and       
foreign1 to monopolize the natural      
resources of their provinces for private

 profit1 it is not surprising that      
,governor ,chen's views are felt to be a
 menace to privilege and that he is     
advertised all over ,china as a devout  
,bolshevist4 ,his views have special    
point in view of ,british efforts to get
 an economic stranglehold upon the      
province--efforts which are dealt with  
in a prior chapter4  ,another type of   
views lays chief stress upon the        
internal political condition of ,china4 
,its adherents say in effect3 ,why make 
such a fuss about having two governments
 for ,china1 when1 in point of fact1    
,china is torn into dozens of           
governments8 ,in the north1 war is sure 
to break out sooner or later between    
,chang ,tso ,lin and his rivals4 ,each  
military governor is afraid of his      
division generals4 ,the brigade generals
 intrigue against the division leaders1 
and even colonels are doing all they can
 to further their personal power4 ,the  
,peking government is a stuffed sham1   
taking orders from the military         

governors of the provinces1 living only 
on account of jealousies among these    
generals1 and by the grace of foreign   
diplomatic support4 ,it is actually     
bankrupt1 and this actual state will    
soon be formally recognized4 ,the thing 
for us to do is to go ahead1 maintain in
 good faith the work of the revolution1 
give this province the best possible    
civil administration2 then in the       
inevitable approaching debacle1 the     
southern government will be ready to    
serve as the nucleus of a genuine       
reconstruction4 ,meantime we want1 if   
not the formal recognition of foreign   
governments1 at least their benevolent  
neutrality4  ,dr4 ,sun still embodies in
 himself the spirit of the revolution of
 #aiaa4 ,so far as that was not         
anti-,manchu it was in essence          
nationalistic1 and only accidentally    
republican4 ,the day after the          
inauguration of ,dr4 ,sun1 a memorial   
was dedicated to the seventy-two patriot
 heroes who fell in an abortive attempt 

in ,canton to throw off the ,manchu     
yoke1 some six months before the        
successful revolt4 ,the monument is the 
most instructive single lesson which ,i 
have seen in the political history of   
the revolution4 ,it is composed of      
seventy-two granite blocks4 ,upon each  
is engraved3 ,given by the ,chinese     
,national ,league of ,jersey ,city1 or  
,melbourne1 or ,mexico1 or ,liverpool1  
or ,singapore1 etc4 ,chinese nationalism
 is a product of ,chinese migration to  
foreign countries2 ,chinese nationalism 
on foreign shores financed the          
revolution1 and largely furnished its   
leaders and provided its organization4  
,sun ,yat ,sen was the incarnation of   
this nationalism1 which was more        
concerned with freeing ,china--and      
,asia--from all foreign domination than 
with particular political problems4 ,and
 in spite of the movement of events     
since that day1 he remains essentially  
at that stage1 being closer in spirit to
 the nationalists of the ,european      

irredentist type than to the spirit of  
contemporary young ,china4 ,a convinced 
republican1 he nevertheless measures    
events and men in the concrete by what  
he thinks they will do to promote the   
independence of ,china from foreign     
control1 rather than by what they will  
do to promote a truly democratic        
government4 ,this is the sole           
explanation that can be given for his   
unfortunate coquetting a year ago with  
the leaders of the now fallen ,anfu     
,club4 ,he allowed himself to be        
deceived into thinking that they were   
ready to turn against the ,japanese if  
he would give them his support2 and his 
nationalist imagination was inflamed by 
the grandiose schemes of little ,hsu for
 the ,chinese subjugation of ,mongolia4 
,more openly than others1 ,dr4 ,sun     
admits and justifies the new southern   
government as representing a division of
 ,china4 ,if1 he insists1 it had not    
been for the secession of the south in  
#aiag1 ,japan would now be in virtually 

complete control of all ,china4 ,a      
unified ,china would have meant a ,china
 ready to be swallowed whole by ,japan4 
,the secession localized ,japanese      
aggressions1 made it evident that the   
south would fight rather than be        
devoured1 and gave a breathing spell in 
which public opinion in the north       
rallied against the ,twenty-one ,demands
 and against the military pact with     
,japan4 ,thus it saved the independence 
of ,china4 ,but1 while it checked       
,japan1 it did not checkmate her4 ,she  
still expects with the assistance of    
,chang ,tso ,lin to make northern ,china
 her vassal4 ,the support which foreign 
governments in general and the ,united  
,states in particular are giving ,peking
 is merely playing into the hands of the
 ,japanese4 ,the independent south      
affords the only obstacle which causes  
,japan to pause in her plan of making   
northern ,china in effect a ,japanese   
province4 ,a more than usually authentic
 rumor says that upon the occasion of   

the visit of the ,japanese consul       
general to the new president 7no other  
foreign official has made an official   
visit71 the former offered from his     
government the official recognition of  
,dr4 ,sun as president of all ,china1 if
 the latter would recognize the         
,twenty-one ,demands as an accomplished 
fact4 ,from the ,japanese standpoint the
 offer was a safe one1 as this          
acceptance of ,japanese claims is the   
one thing impossible to the new         
government4 ,but meantime the offer     
naturally confirms the nationalists of  
,dr4 ,sun's type in their belief that   
the southern split is the key to        
maintaining the political independence  
of ,china2 or1 as ,dr4 ,sun puts it1    
that a divided ,china is for the time   
being the only means to an ultimately   
independent ,china4  ,these views are   
not given as stating the whole truth of 
the situation4 ,they are ex parte4 ,but 
they are given as setting forth in good 
faith the conceptions of the leaders of 

the southern movement and as requiring  
serious attention if the situation of   
,china1 domestic and international1 is  
to be understood4 ,upon my own account1 
and not simply as expressing the views  
of others1 ,i have reached a conclusion 
quite foreign to my thought before ,i   
visited the south4 ,while it is not     
possible to attach too much importance  
to the unity of ,china as a part of the 
foreign policy of the ,united ,states1  
it is possible to attach altogether too 
much importance to the ,peking          
government as a symbol of that unity4   
,to borrow and adapt the words of one   
southern leader1 while the ,united      
,states can hardly be expected to do    
other than recognize the ,peking as the 
de facto government1 there is no need to
 coddle that government and give it     
face4 ,such a course maintains a nominal
 and formal unity while in fact         
encouraging the military and corrupt    
forces that keep ,china divided and     
which make for foreign aggression4  ,in 

my opinion as the outcome of two years' 
observation of the ,chinese situation1  
the real interests of both ,china and   
the ,united ,states would be served if1 
in the first place1 the ,united ,states 
should take the lead in securing from   
the diplomatic body in ,peking the      
serving of express notice upon the      
,peking government that in no case would
 a restoration of the monarchy be       
recognized by the ,powers4 ,this may    
seem in ,america like an unwarranted    
intervention in the domestic affairs of 
a foreign country4 ,but in fact such    
intervention is already a fact4 ,the    
present government endures only in      
virtue of the support of foreign        
,powers4 ,the notice would put an end to
 one kind of intrigue1 one kind of rumor
 and suspicion1 which is holding        
industry and education back and which is
 keeping ,china in a state of unrest and
 instability4 ,it would establish a     
period of comparative quiet in which    
whatever constructive forces exist may  

come to the front4 ,the second measure  
would be more extreme4 ,the diplomacy of
 the ,united ,states should take the    
lead in making it clear that unless the 
promises about the disbanding of the    
army1 and the introduction of general   
retrenchment are honestly and           
immediately carried out1 the ,powers    
will pursue a harsh rather than a       
benevolent policy toward the ,peking    
government1 insisting upon immediate    
payment of interest and loans as they   
fall due and holding up the government  
to the strictest meeting of all its     
obligations4 ,the notification to be    
effective might well include a virtual  
threat of withdrawal of recognition in  
case the government does not seriously  
try to put its profuse promises into    
execution4 ,it should also include a    
definite discouragement of any          
expenditures designed for military      
conquest of the south4  ,diplomatic     
recognition of the southern government  
is out of the question at present4 ,it  

is not out of the question to put on the
 financial screws so that the southern  
government will be allowed space and    
time to demonstrate what it can do by   
peaceful means to give one or more      
provinces a decent1 honest and          
progressive civil administration4 ,it is
 unnecessary to enumerate the obstacles 
in the way of carrying out such a       
policy4 ,but in my judgment it is the   
only policy by which the ,great ,powers 
will not become accomplices in          
perpetuating the weakness and division  
of ,china4 ,it is the most              
straightforward way of meeting whatever 
plans of aggression ,japan may          
entertain4  ,may1 #aiba4     ,,vi       
,federalism in ,china   ,the newcomer in
 ,china in observing and judging events 
usually makes the mistake of attaching  
too much significance to current        
happenings4 ,occurrences take place     
which in the western world would portend
 important changes--and nothing         
important results4 ,it is not easy to   

loosen the habit of years2 and so the   
visitor assumes that an event which is  
striking to the point of sensationalism 
must surely be part of a train of events
 having a definite trend2 some deep-laid
 plan must be behind it4 ,it takes a    
degree of intellectual patience added to
 time and experience to make one realize
 that even when there is a rhythm in    
events the tempo is so retarded that one
 must wait a long time to judge what is 
really going on4 ,most political events 
are like daily changes in the weather1  
fluctuations back and forth which may   
seriously affect individuals but which  
taken one by one tell little about the  
movement of the seasons4 ,even the      
occurrences which are due to human      
intention are usually sporadic and      
casual1 and the observer errs by reading
 into them too much plot1 too           
comprehensive a scheme1 too farsighted a
 plan4 ,the aim behind the event is     
likely to be only some immediate        
advantage1 some direct increase of      

power1 the overthrow of a rival1 the    
grasping at greater wealth by an        
isolated act1 without any consecutive or
 systematic looking ahead4  ,foreigners 
are not the only ones who have erred1   
however1 in judging the ,chinese        
political situation of the last few     
years4 ,beginning two years ago1 one    
heard experienced ,chinese with         
political affiliations saying that it   
was impossible for things to go on as   
they were for more than three months    
longer4 ,some decisive change must      
occur4 ,yet outwardly the situation has 
remained much the same not only for     
three months but for two years1 the     
exception being the overthrow of the    
,anfu faction a year ago4 ,and this     
occurrence hardly marked a definite turn
 in events1 as it was1 to a considerable
 extent1 only a shifting of power from  
the hands of one set of tuchuns to      
another set4 ,nevertheless at the risk  
of becoming a victim of the fallacy     
which ,i have been setting forth1 ,i    

will hazard the remark that the last few
 months have revealed a definite and    
enduring trend--that through the diurnal
 fluctuations of the strife for personal
 power and wealth a seasonal political  
change in society is now showing itself4
 ,certain lines of cleavage seem to show
 themselves1 so that through the welter 
of striking1 picturesque1 sensational   
but meaningless events1 a definite      
pattern is revealed4  ,this pattern is  
indicated by the title of this          
chapter--a movement toward the          
development of a federal form of        
government4 ,in calling the movement one
 toward federalism1 there is1 however1  
more of a jump into the remote future   
than circumstances justify4 ,it would be
 more accurate1 as well as more modest1 
to say that there is a well defined and 
seemingly permanent trend toward        
provincial autonomy and local           
self-government accompanied by a hope   
and a vague plan that in the future the 
more or less independent units will     

recombine into the ,united or ,federated
 ,states of ,china4 ,some who look far  
into the future anticipate three stages2
 the first being the completion of the  
present secessionist movement2 the      
second the formation of northern and    
southern confederations respectively2   
the third a reunion into a single state4
  ,to go into the detailed evidence for 
the existence of a definite and lasting 
movement of this sort would presume too 
much on the reader's knowledge of       
,chinese geography and his acquaintance 
with specific recent events4 ,i shall   
confine myself to quite general features
 of the situation4 ,the first feature is
 the new phase which has been assumed by
 the long historic antagonism of the    
north and the south4 ,roughly speaking1 
the revolution which established the    
republic and overthrew the ,manchus     
represented a victory for the south4    
,but the transformation during the last 
five years of the nominal republic into 
a corrupt oligarchy of satraps or       

military governors or feudal lords has  
represented a victory for the north4 ,it
 is a significant fact1 symbolically at 
least1 that the most powerful remaining 
tuchun or military governor in          
,china--in some respects the only       
powerful one who has survived the       
vicissitudes of the last few            
years--namely ,chang ,tso ,lin1 is the  
uncrowned king of the three ,manchurian 
provinces4 ,the so-called civil war of  
the north and south is not1 however1 to 
be understood as a conflict of          
republicanism located in the south and  
militarism in the north4 ,such a notion 
is directly contrary to facts4 ,the     
civil war till six or eight months ago  
was mainly a conflict of military       
governors and factions1 part of that    
struggle for personal power and wealth  
which has been going on all over ,china4
  ,but recently events have taken a     
different course4 ,in four of the       
southern provinces1 tuchuns who seemed  
all powerful have toppled over1 and the 

provinces have proclaimed or tacitly    
assumed their independence of both the  
,peking and the former military ,canton 
governments--the province in which      
,canton situated being one of the four4 
,i happened to be in ,hunan1 the first  
of the southerly provinces to get       
comparative independence1 last fall1 not
 long after the overthrow of the vicious
 despot who had ruled the province with 
the aid of northern troops4 ,for a week 
a series of meetings were held in       
,changsha1 the capital of the province4 
,the burden of every speech was ,hunan  
for the ,hunanese4 ,the slogan embodies 
the spirit of two powers each aiming at 
becoming the central authority2 it is a 
conflict of the principle of provincial 
autonomy1 represented by the politically
 more mature south1 with that of        
militaristic centralization1 represented
 by ,peking4  ,as ,i write1 in early    
,september 7#aiba71 the immediate issue 
is obscured by the fight which ,wu ,pei 
,fu is waging with the ,hunanese who    

with nominal independence are in aim and
 interest allied with the south4 ,if1 as
 is likely1 ,wu ,pei ,fu wins1 he may   
take one of two courses4 ,he may use his
 added power to turn against ,chang ,tso
 ,lin and the northern militarists which
 will bring him into virtual alliance   
with the southerners and establish him  
as the antagonist of the federal        
principle4 ,this is the course which his
 earlier record would call for4 ,or he  
may yield to the usual official lust for
 power and money and try once more the  
,yuan ,shi ,kai policy of military      
centralization with himself as head1    
after trying out conclusions with ,chang
 ,tso ,lin as his rival4 ,this is the   
course which the past record of military
 leaders indicates4 ,but even if ,wu    
,pei ,fu follows precedent and goes bad1
 he will only hasten his own final end4 
,this is not prophecy4 ,it is only a    
statement of what has uniformly happened
 in ,china just at the moment a military
 leader seemed to have complete power in

 his grasp4 ,in other words1 a victory  
for ,wu ,pei ,fu may either accelerate  
or may retard the development of        
provincial autonomy according to the    
course he pursues4 ,it cannot           
permanently prevent or deflect it4  ,the
 basic factor that makes one sure that  
this trend toward local autonomy is a   
reality and not merely one of those     
meaningless shiftings of power which    
confuse the observer1 is that it is in  
accord with ,chinese temperament1       
tradition and circumstance4 ,feudalism  
is past and gone two thousand years ago1
 and at no period since has ,china      
possessed a working centralized         
government4 ,the absolute empires which 
have come and gone in the last two      
millenniums existed by virtue of        
non-interference and a religious aura4  
,the latter can never be restored2 and  
every episode of the republic           
demonstrates that ,china with its vast  
and diversified territories1 its        
population of between three hundred and 

fifty and four hundred million1 its     
multitude of languages and lack of      
communications1 its enormous local      
attachments sanctified by the family    
system and ancestral worship1 cannot be 
managed from a single and remote centre4
 ,china rests upon a network of local   
and voluntary associations cemented by  
custom4 ,this fact has given it its     
unparallelled stability and its power to
 progress even under the disturbed      
political conditions of the past ten    
years4 ,i sometimes think that          
,americans with their own traditional   
contempt for politics and their         
spontaneous reliance upon self-help and 
local organization are the ones who are 
naturally fitted to understand ,china's 
course4 ,the ,japanese with their       
ingrained reliance upon the state have  
continually misjudged and misacted4 ,the
 ,british understand better than we do  
the significance of local               
self-government2 but they are misled by 
their reverence for politics so that    

they cannot readily find or see         
government when it does not take        
political form4  ,it is not too much to 
say that one great cause for the        
overthrow of the ,manchus was the fact  
that because of the pressure of         
international relations they attempted  
to force1 especially in fiscal matters1 
a centralization upon the provinces     
wholly foreign to the spirit of the     
people4 ,this created hostility where   
before there had been indifference4     
,china may possibly not emerge from her 
troubles a unified nation1 any more than
 a much smaller and less populous       
,europe emerged from the break-up of the
 ,holy ,roman ,empire1 a single state4  
,indeed one often wonders1 not that     
,china is divided1 but that she is not  
much more broken up than she is4 ,but   
one thing is certain4 ,whatever progress
 ,china finally succeeds in making will 
come from a variety of local centres1   
not from ,peking or ,canton4 ,it will be
 effected by means of associations and  

organizations which even though they    
assume a political form are not         
primarily political in nature4          
,criticisms are passed1 especially by   
foreigners1 upon the present trend of   
events4 ,the criticisms are more than   
plausible4 ,it is evident that the      
present weakness of ,china is due to her
 divided condition4 ,hence it is natural
 to argue that the present movement     
being one of secession and general      
disintegration will increase the        
weakness of the country4 ,it is also    
evident that many of ,china's troubles  
are due to the absence of any efficient 
administrative system2 it is reasonable 
to argue that ,china cannot get even    
railways and universal education without
 a strong and stable central government4
 ,there is no doubt about the facts4 ,it
 is not surprising that many friends of 
,china deeply deplore the present       
tendency while some regard it as the    
final accomplishment of the long        
predicted breakup of ,china4 ,but       

remedies for ,china's ills based upon   
ignoring history1 psychology and actual 
conditions are so utopian that it is not
 worth while to argue whether or not    
they are theoretically desirable4 ,the  
remedy of ,china's troubles by a strong1
 centralized government is on a par with
 curing disease by the expulsion of a   
devil4 ,the evil of sectionalism is     
real1 but since it is real it cannot be 
dealt with by trying a method which     
implies its non-existence4 ,if the devil
 is really there1 he will not be        
exorcized by a formula4 ,if the trouble 
is internal1 not due to an external     
demon1 the disease can be cured only by 
using the factors of health and vigor   
which the patient already possesses4    
,and in ,china while these factors of   
recuperation and growth are numerous1   
they all exist in connection with local 
organizations and voluntary             
associations4 ,the increasing volume of 
the cry that the tuchuns must go comes  
from the provincial and local interests 

which have been insulted and violated by
 a nominally centralized but actually   
chaotic situation4 ,after this negative 
work is completed1 the constructive     
rebuilding of ,china can proceed only by
 utilizing local interests and          
abilities4 ,in ,china the movement will 
be the opposite of that which occurred  
in ,japan4 ,it will be from the         
periphery to the centre4  ,another      
objection to the present tendency has   
force especially from the foreign       
standpoint4 ,as already stated1 the     
efforts of the ,manchu dynasty in its   
latter days to enhance central power    
were due to international pressure4     
,foreign nations treated ,peking as if  
it were a capital like ,london1 ,paris  
or ,berlin1 and in its efforts to meet  
foreign demands it had to try to become 
such a centre4 ,the result was disaster4
 ,but foreign nations still want to have
 a single centre which may be held      
responsible4 ,and subconsciously1 if not
 consciously1 this desire is responsible

 for much of the objection of foreign   
nationals to the local autonomy         
movement4 ,they well know that it is    
going to take a long time to realize the
 ideal of federation1 and meantime where
 and what is to be the agency           
responsible for diplomatic relations1   
the enforcing of indemnities and the    
securing of concessions8  ,in one       
respect the secessionist tendency is    
dangerous to ,china herself as well as  
inconvenient to the powers4 ,it will    
readily stimulate the desire and ability
 of foreign nations to interfere in     
,china's domestic affairs4 ,there will  
be many centres at which to carry on    
intrigues and from which to get         
concessions instead of one or two4      
,there is also danger that one foreign  
nation may line up with one group of    
provinces1 and another foreign nation   
with another group1 so that             
international friction will increase4   
,even now some ,japanese sources and    
even such an independent liberal paper  

as ,robert ,young's ,japan ,chronicle   
are starting or reporting the rumor that
 the ,cantonese experiment is supported 
by subsidies supplied by ,american      
capitalists in the hope of economic     
concessions4 ,the rumor was invented for
 a sinister purpose4 ,but it illustrates
 the sort of situation that may come    
into existence if there are several     
political centres in ,china and one     
foreign nation backs one and another    
nation1 another4  ,the danger is real   
enough4 ,but it cannot be dealt with by 
attempting the impossible--namely       
checking the movement toward local      
autonomy1 even though disintegration may
 temporarily accompany it4 ,the danger  
only emphasizes the fundamental fact of 
the whole ,chinese situation2 that its  
essence is time4 ,the evils and troubles
 of ,china are real enough1 and there is
 no blinking the fact that they are     
largely of her own making1 due to       
corruption1 inefficiency and absence of 
popular education4 ,but no one who knows

 the common people doubts that they will
 win through if they are given time4    
,and in the concrete this means that    
they be left politically alone to work  
out their own destiny4 ,there will      
doubtless be proposals at the ,pacific  
,conference to place ,china under some  
kind of international tutelage4 ,this   
chapter and the events connected with   
the tendency which it reports will be   
cited as showing this need4 ,some of the
 schemes will spring from motives that  
are hostile to ,china4 ,some will be    
benevolently conceived in a desire to   
save ,china from herself and shorten her
 period of chaos and confusion4 ,but the
 hope of the world's peace1 as well as  
of ,china's freedom1 lies in adhering to
 a policy of ,hands ,off4 ,give ,china a
 chance4 ,give her time4 ,the danger    
lies in being in a hurry1 in impatience1
 possibly in the desire of ,america to  
show that we are a power in             
international affairs and that we too   
have a positive foreign policy4 ,and a  

benevolent policy of supporting ,china  
from without1 instead of promoting her  
aspirations from within1 may in the end 
do ,china about as much harm as a policy
 conceived in malevolence4  ,july1      
#aiba4     ,,vii  ,a ,parting of the    
,ways for ,america   #a  ,the realities 
of ,american policy in ,china and toward
 ,china are going to be more seriously  
tested in the future than they ever have
 been in the past4 ,japanese papers have
 been full of protests against any      
attempt by the ,pacific ,conference to  
place ,japan on trial4 ,would that      
,american journals were full of warnings
 that ,america is on trial at the       
,conference as to the sincerity and     
intelligent goodwill behind her amiable 
professions4 ,the world will not stop   
with the ,pacific ,conference2 the      
latter1 however important1 will not     
arrest future developments1 and the     
,united ,states will continue to be on  
trial till she has established by her   
acts a permanent and definite attitude4 

,for the realities of the situation     
cannot be exhausted in any formula or in
 any set of diplomatic agreements1 even 
if the ,conference confounds the fears  
of pessimists and results in a          
harmonious union of the powers in       
support of ,china's legitimate          
aspirations for free political and      
economic growth4  ,the ,conference1     
however1 stands as a symbol of the      
larger situation2 and its decisions or  
lack of them will be a considerable     
factor in the determination of          
subsequent events4 ,sometimes one is    
obliged to fall back on a trite phrase4 
,we are genuinely at a parting of the   
ways4 ,even if we should follow in our  
old path1 there would none the less be a
 parting of the ways1 for we cannot     
consistently tread the old path unless  
we are animated by a much more conscious
 purpose and a more general and         
intelligent knowledge of affairs than   
have controlled our activities in the   
past4  ,the ideas expressed by an       

,english correspondent about the fear   
that ,america is soon to be an active   
source of danger in the ,far ,east are  
not confined to persons on foreign      
shores4 ,the prevailing attitude in some
 circles of ,american opinion is that   
called by ,president ,hibben cynical    
pessimism4 ,all professed radicals and  
many liberals believe that if our course
 has been better in the past it has been
 due to geographical accidents combined 
with indifference and with our          
undeveloped economic status4            
,consequently they believe that since we
 have now become what is called a       
world-power and a nation which exports  
instead of importing capital1 our course
 will soon be as bad as that of any of  
the rest of them4 ,in some quarters this
 opinion is clearly an emotional        
reaction following the disillusionments 
of ,versailles4 ,in others1 it is due to
 adherence to a formula3 nothing in     
international affairs can come out of   
capitalism and ,america is emphatically 

a capitalistic country4 ,whether or not 
these feelings are correct1 they are not
 discussable2 neither an emotion nor an 
absolute formula is subject to analysis4
  ,but there are specific elements in   
the situation which give grounds for    
apprehension as to the future4 ,these   
specific elements are capable of        
detection and analysis4 ,an adequate    
realization of their nature will be a   
large factor in preventing cynical      
apprehensions from becoming actual4     
,this chapter is an attempt at a        
preliminary listing1 inadequate1 of     
course1 as any preliminary examination  
must be4 ,while an a priori argument    
based on a fatalistic formula as to how 
a capitalistic nation must conduct      
itself does not appeal to me1 there are 
nevertheless concrete facts which are   
suggested by that formula4 ,part of our 
comparatively better course in ,china in
 the past is due to the fact that we    
have not had the continuous and close   
alliance between the ,state ,department 

and big banking interests which is found
 in the case of foreign powers4 ,no     
honest well-informed history of         
developments in ,china could be written 
in which the ,russian ,asiatic ,bank1   
the ,foreign ,bank of ,belgium1 the     
,french ,indo-,china ,bank and ,banque  
,industrielle1 the ,yokohama ,specie    
,bank1 the ,hongkong-,shanghai ,bank1   
etc41 did not figure prominently4 ,these
 banks work in the closest harmony1 not 
only with railway and construction      
syndicates and big manufacturing        
interests at home1 but also with their  
respective foreign offices4 ,it is      
hardly too much to say that legations   
and banks have been in most important   
matters the right and left hands of the 
same body4 ,american business interests 
have complained an the past that the    
,american government does not give to   
,american traders abroad the same       
support that the nationals of other     
states receive4 ,in the past these      
complaints have centred largely about   

actual wrongs suffered or believed to   
have been suffered by ,american business
 undertakings carried on in a foreign   
country4 ,with the present expansion of 
capital and of commerce1 the same       
complaints and demands are going to be  
made not with reference to grievances   
suffered1 but with reference to         
furthering1 to pushing ,american        
commercial interests in connection with 
large banking groups4 ,it would take a  
credulous person to deny the influence  
of big business in domestic politics4   
,as we become more interested in        
commerce and banking enterprises what   
assurance have we that the alliance will
 not be transferred to international    
politics8  ,it should be noted that the 
policy of the open door as affirmed by  
the great powers--and as frequently     
violated by them--even if it be         
henceforth observed in good faith1 does 
not adequately protect us from this     
danger4 ,the open door policy is not    
primarily a policy about ,china herself 

but rather about the policies of foreign
 powers toward one another with respect 
to ,china4 ,it demands equality of      
economic opportunity for different      
nations4 ,were it enforced1 it would    
prevent the granting of monopolies to   
any one nation3 there is nothing in it  
to render impossible a conjoint         
exploitation of ,china by foreign       
powers1 an organized monopoly in which  
each nation has its due share with      
respect to others4 ,such an organization
 might conceivably reduce friction among
 the great powers1 and thereby reduce   
the danger of future wars--as long as   
,china herself is impotent to go to war4
 ,the agreement might conceivably for a 
considerable time be of benefit to      
,china herself4 ,but it is clear that   
for the ,united ,states to become a     
partner in any such arrangement would   
involve a reversal of our historic      
policy in the ,far ,east4 ,it might be  
technically consistent with the open    
door policy1 but it would be a violation

 of the larger sense in which the       
,american people has understood and     
praised that ideal4 ,he is blind who    
does not see that there are forces      
making for such a reversal4 ,and since  
we are all more or less blind1 an       
opening of our eyes to the danger is one
 of the conditions of its not being     
realized4  ,one of the forces which is  
operative is indicated by the phrase    
that an international agreement on an   
economic and financial basis might be of
 value to ,china herself4 ,the mere     
suggestion that such a thing is possible
 is abhorrent to many1 especially to    
radicals4 ,there seems to be something  
sinister in it4 ,so it is worth         
explaining how and why it might be so4  
,in the first place1 it would obviously 
terminate the particularistic grabbing  
for leased territory1 concessions and   
spheres of influence which has so       
damaged ,china4 ,at the present time1   
the point of this remark lies in its    
implied reference to ,japan1 as at one  

time it might have applied to ,russia4  
,fear of ,japan's aims in ,china is not 
confined to ,china2 the fear is         
widespread4 ,an international economic  
arrangement may therefore be plausibly  
presented as the easiest and most direct
 method of relieving ,china of the      
,japanese menace4 ,for ,japan to stay   
out would be to give herself away2 if   
she came in1 it would subject ,japanese 
activities to constant scrutiny and     
control4 ,there is no doubt that part of
 the fear of ,japan regarding the       
,pacific ,conference is due to a belief 
that some such arrangement is           
contemplated4 ,the case is easily       
capable of such presentation as to make 
it appeal to ,americans who are really  
friendly to ,china and who haven't the  
remotest interest in her economic       
exploitation4  ,the arrangement would1  
for example1 automatically eliminate the
 ,lansing-,ishii agreement with its     
embarrassing ambiguous recognition of   
,japan's special interests in ,china4   

,the other factor is domestic4 ,the     
distraction and civil wars of ,china are
 commonplaces4 ,so is the power         
exercised by the military governors and 
generals4 ,the greater one's knowledge1 
the more one perceives how intimately   
the former evil is dependent upon the   
latter4 ,the financial plight of the    
,chinese government1 its continual      
foreign borrowings which threaten       
bankruptcy in the near future1 depend   
upon militaristic domination and wild   
expenditure for unproductive purposes   
and squeeze4 ,without this expense1     
,china would have no great difficulty   
henceforth in maintaining a balance in  
her budget4 ,the retardation of public  
education whose advancement--especially 
in elementary schools--is ,china's      
greatest single need is due to the same 
cause4 ,so is the growth in official    
corruption which is rapidly extending   
into business and private life4  ,in    
fact1 every one of the obstacles to the 
progress of ,china is connected with the

 rule of military factions and their    
struggles with one another for complete 
mastery4 ,an economic international     
agreement among the great powers can be 
made which would surely reduce and      
possibly eliminate the greatest evils of
 militarism4 ,many liberal ,chinese say 
in private that they would be willing to
 have a temporary international         
receivership for government finance1    
provided they could be assured of its   
nature and the exact date and conditions
 of its termination--a proviso which    
they are sensible enough to recognize   
would be extremely difficult of         
attainment4 ,american leadership in     
forming and executing any such scheme   
would1 they feel1 afford the best       
reassurance as to its nature and terms4 
,under such circumstances a plausible   
case can be made out for proposals      
which1 under the guise of traditional   
,american friendship for ,china1 would  
in fact commit us to a reversal of our  
historic policy4  ,there are radicals   

abroad and at home who think that our   
entrance into a ,consortium already     
proves that we have entered upon the    
road of reversal and who naturally see  
in the ,pacific ,conference the next    
logical step4 ,i have previously stated 
my own belief that our ,state           
,department proposed the ,consortium    
primarily for political ends1 as a means
 of checking the policy pursued by      
,japan of making unproductive loans to  
,china in return for which she was      
getting an immediate grip on ,china's   
natural resources and preparing the way 
for direct administrative and financial 
control when the day of reckoning and   
foreclosure should finally come4 ,i also
 said that the ,consortium was between  
two stools1 the financial and the       
political and that up to the present its
 chief value had been negative and      
preventive1 and that jealousy or lack of
 interest by ,japan and ,great ,britain 
in any constructive policy on the part  
of the ,consortium was likely to        

maintain the same condition4 ,i have    
seen no reason thus far to change my    
mind on this point1 nor in regard to the
 further belief that probably the       
interests of ,china in the end will be  
best served by the continuation of this 
deterrent function4 ,but the question is
 bound to arise3 why continue the       
,consortium if it isn't doing anything8 
,the pressure of foreign powers         
interested in the exploitation of ,china
 and of impatient ,american economic    
interests may combine to put an end to  
the present rather otiose existence led 
by the ,consortium4 ,the two stools     
between which the past action of the    
,american government has managed to     
swing the ,consortium may be united to  
form a single solid bench4  ,at the risk
 of being charged with credulous        
gullibility1 or something worse1 ,i add 
that up to the present time the         
,american phase of the ,consortium      
hasn't shown perceptible signs of       
becoming a club exercised by ,american  

finance over ,china's economic integrity
 and independence4 ,i believe the       
repeated statements of the ,american    
representative that he himself and the  
interests he represents would be glad if
 ,china proved her ability to finance   
her own public utilities without        
resorting to foreign loans4 ,this belief
 is confirmed by the first public       
utterance of the new ,american minister 
to ,china who in his reference to the   
,consortium laid emphasis upon its      
deterrent function and upon the         
stimulation it has given to ,chinese    
bankers to finance public utilities4    
,and it is the merest justice to ,mr4   
,stevens1 the ,american representative1 
to say that he represents the           
conservative investment type of banker1 
not the promotion type1 and that thus   
far his great concern has been the      
problem of protecting the buyer of such 
securities as are passed on by the banks
 to the ultimate investor--so much so   
that he has aroused criticism from      

,american business interests impatient  
for speedy action4 ,but there is a      
larger phase of the ,consortium         
concerning which ,i think apprehensions 
may reasonably be entertained4          
,suppose1 if merely by way of           
hypothesis1 that the ,american          
government is genuinely interested in   
,china and in making the policy of the  
open door and ,chinese territorial and  
administrative integrity a reality1 not 
merely a name1 and suppose that it is   
interested in doing so from an ,american
 self-interest sufficiently enlightened 
to perceive that the political and      
economic advancement of the ,united     
,states is best furthered by a policy   
which is identical with ,china's ability
 to develop herself freely and          
independently3 what then would be the   
wise ,american course8 ,in short1 it    
would be to view our existing ,european 
interests and issues 7due to the war7   
and our ,far ,eastern interests and     
issues as parts of one and the same     

problem4 ,if we are actuated by the     
motive hypothetically imputed to our    
government and we fail in its           
realization1 the chief reason will be   
that we regard the ,european question   
and the ,asiatic problem as two         
different questions1 or because we      
identify them from the wrong end4  ,our 
present financial interest in ,europe is
 enormous4 ,it involves not merely      
foreign governmental loans but a        
multitude of private advances and       
commitments4 ,these financial           
entanglements affect not merely our     
industry and commerce but our politics4 
,they involve much more immediately     
pressing concerns than to our ,asiatic  
relations1 and they involve billions    
where the latter involve millions4 ,the 
danger under such conditions that our   
,asiatic relations will be sacrificed to
 our ,european is hardly fanciful4  ,to 
make this abstract statement concrete1  
the firm of bankers1 ,j4 ,p4 ,morgan    
,co41 which is most heavily involved in 

,european indebtedness to the ,united   
,states1 is the firm which is the       
leading spirit in the ,consortium for   
,china4 ,it seems almost inevitable that
 the ,asiatic problem should look like  
small potatoes in comparison with the   
,european one1 especially as our own    
industrial recuperation is so closely   
connected with ,european relations1     
while the ,far ,east cuts a negligible  
figure4 ,to my mind the real danger to  
set out upon selfish exploitation of    
,china3 intelligent self-interest1      
tradition and the fact that our chief   
asset in ,china is our past freedom from
 a predatory course1 dictate a course of
 cooperation with ,china4 ,the danger is
 that ,china will be subordinated and   
sacrificed because of primary           
preoccupation with the high finance and 
politics of ,europe1 that she will be   
lost in the shuffle4  ,the ,european    
aspect of the problem can be made more  
concrete by reference to ,great ,britain
 in particular4 ,that country suffers   

from the embarrassment of the ,japanese 
alliance4 ,she has already made it      
sufficiently clear that she would like  
to draw ,america into the alliance1     
making it tripartite1 since that would  
be the easiest way of maintaining good  
relations with both ,japan and the      
,united ,states4 ,there is no likelihood
 that any such step will be consummated4
 ,but ,british diplomacy is experienced 
and astute4 ,and by force of            
circumstances our high finance has      
contracted a sort of economic alliance  
with ,great ,britain4 ,there is no wish 
to claim superior virtue for ,america or
 to appeal to the strong current of     
anti-,british sentiment4 ,but the       
,british foreign office exists and      
operates apart from the tradition of    
liberalism which has mainly actuated    
,english domestic politics4 ,it stands  
peculiarly for the ,empire side of the  
,british ,empire1 no matter what party  
is in the saddle in domestic affairs4   
,every resource will be employed to     

bring about a settlement at the ,pacific
 ,conference which1 even though it      
includes some degree of compromise on   
the part of ,great ,britain1 will bend  
the ,asiatic policy of the ,united      
,states to the ,british traditions in   
the ,far ,east1 instead of committing   
,great ,britain to combining with the   
,united ,states in making a reality of  
the integrity of ,china to which both   
countries are nominally committed4 ,it  
does not seem an extreme statement to   
say that the immediate issues of the    
,conference depend upon the way in which
 our financial commitments in ,europe   
are treated1 either as reasons for our  
making concessions to ,european policy  
or on the other hand as a means of      
securing an adherence of the ,european  
powers to the traditional ,american     
policy4  ,a publicist in ,china who is  
of ,british origin and a sincere friend 
of ,china remarked in private           
conversation that if the ,united ,states
 could not secure the adherence of      

,great ,britain to her ,asiatic policy  
by persuasion 7he was deploring the     
,japanese alliance7 she might do so by  
buying it--through remission of her     
national debt to us4 ,it is not         
necessary to resort to the measure so   
baldly suggested4 ,but the remark at    
least suggests that our involvement in  
,european1 especially ,british1 finance 
and politics may be treated in either of
 two ways for either of two results4    
#b  ,that the ,chinese people generally 
speaking has a less antagonistic feeling
 toward the ,united ,states than towards
 other powers seems to me an undoubted  
fact4 ,the feeling has been disturbed at
 divers times by the treatment of the   
,chinese upon the ,pacific coast1 by the
 exclusion act1 by the turning over of  
our interest in the building of the     
,peking-,canton 7or ,hankow7 railway to 
a ,european group1 by the               
,lansing-,ishii agreement1 and finally  
by the part played by ,president ,wilson
 in the ,versailles decision regarding  

,shantung4 ,those disturbances in the   
main1 however1 have made them dubious as
 to our skill1 energy and intelligence  
rather than as to our good-will4        
,americans1 taken individually and      
collectively1 are to the ,chinese--at   
least such was my impression--a rather  
simple folk1 taking the word in its good
 and its deprecatory sense4 ,in noting  
the ,chinese reaction to the proposed   
,pacific ,conference1 it was interesting
 to see the combination of an almost    
unlimited hope that the ,united ,states 
was to lead in protecting them from     
further aggressions and in rectifying   
existing evils1 with a lack of          
confidence1 a fear that the ,united     
,states would have something put over on
 it4  ,friendly feeling is of course    
mainly based upon a negative fact1 the  
fact that the ,united ,states has taken 
no part in leasing territories1         
establishing spheres and setting up     
extra-national post-offices4 ,on the    
positive side stands the contribution   

made by ,americans to education1        
especially medical1 and that of girls   
and women1 and to philanthropy and      
relief4 ,politically1 there are the     
early service of ,burlinghame1 the open 
door policy of ,john ,hay 7though       
failure to maintain it in fact while    
securing signatures to it on paper is a 
considerable part of the ,chinese belief
 in our defective energy7 and the part  
played by the ,united ,states in        
moderating the terms of the settlement  
of the ,boxer outbreak1 in addition to a
 considerable number of minor helpful   
acts4 ,china also remembers that we were
 the only nation to take exception to   
the treaties embodying the ,twenty-one  
,demands4 ,while our exception was      
chiefly made on the basis of our own    
interests which these treaties might    
injuriously affect1 a sentiment exists  
that the protest was a pledge of        
assistance to ,china when the time      
should be opportune for raising the     
whole question4 ,and without doubt the  

reservation made on ,may #af1 #aiae1 by 
our ,state ,department is a strong card 
at the forthcoming ,conference if the   
,department wishes to play it4  ,from an
 ,american standpoint1 the open door    
principle represents one of the only two
 established principles of ,american    
diplomacy1 the other being1 of course1  
the ,monroe ,doctrine4 ,in connection   
with sentimental or idealistic          
associations which have clustered about 
it1 it constitutes us in some vague     
fashion in both the ,chinese and        
,american public opinion a sort of      
guardian or at least spokesman of the   
interests of ,china in relation to      
foreign powers4 ,although1 as was       
pointed out in a former chapter1 the    
open door policy directly concerns other
 nations in their relation to ,china    
rather than ,china herself1 yet the     
violation of the policy by other powers 
has been so frequent and so much to the 
detriment of ,china1 that ,american     
interest1 prestige and moral sentiment  

are now implicated in such an           
enforcement of it as will redound to the
 advantage of ,china4  ,citizens of     
other countries are often irritated by a
 suggestion of such a relationship      
between the ,united ,states and ,china4 
,it presents itself as a proclamation of
 superior national virtue under cover of
 which the ,united ,states aims to      
establish its influence in ,china at the
 expense of other countries4 ,the       
irritation is exasperated by the fact   
that the situation as it stands is an   
undoubted economic and political asset  
of the ,united ,states in ,china4 ,we   
may concede without argument any        
contention that the situation is not due
 to any superior virtue but rather to   
contingencies of history and            
geography--in which respect it is not   
unlike many things that pass for virtues
 with individuals4 ,the contention may  
be admitted without controversy because 
it is not pertinent to the main issue4  
,the question is not so much how the    

state of affairs came about as what it  
now is1 how it is to be treated and what
 consequences are in flow from it4 ,it  
is a fact that up to the present an     
intelligent self-interest of ,america   
has coincided with the interests of a   
stable1 independent and progressive     
,china4 ,it is also a fact that         
,american traditions and sentiments have
 gathered about this consideration so   
that now there is widespread conviction 
in the ,american people of moral        
obligations of assistance and friendly  
protection owed by us to ,china4 ,at    
present1 no policy can be entered upon  
that does not bear the semblance of     
fairness and goodwill4 ,we have at least
 so much protection against the dangers 
discussed in the prior chapter4  ,among 
,americans in ,china and presumably at  
home there is a strong feeling that we  
should adopt for the future stronger and
 more positive policies than we have    
maintained in the past4 ,this feeling   
seems to me fraught with dangers unless 

we make very clear to ourselves in just 
what respects we are to continue and    
make good in a more positive manner our 
traditional policy4 ,to some extent our 
past policy has been one of drifting4   
,radical change in this respect may go  
further than appears upon the surface in
 altering other fundamental aspects of  
our policy4 ,what is condemned as       
drifting is in effect largely the same  
thing that is also praised as           
non-interference4 ,a detailed settled   
policy1 no matter how constructive it   
may appear to be1 can hardly help       
involving us in the domestic policies of
 ,china1 an affair of factions and a    
game which the ,chinese understand and  
play much better than any foreigners4   
,such an involvement would at once      
lessen a present large asset in ,china1 
aloofness from internal intrigues and   
struggles4  ,the specific protests of   
,chinese in this country--mainly        
,cantonese--against the ,consortium seem
 to me mainly based on misapprehension4 

,but their general attitude of          
opposition nevertheless conveys an      
important lesson4 ,it is based on a     
belief that the effect of the           
,consortium will be to give the ,peking 
government a factitious advantage in the
 internal conflict which is waging in   
,china1 so that to all intents and      
purposes it will mark a taking of sides 
on our part4 ,it is well remembered that
 the effect of the reorganization loan  
of the prior ,consortium--in which the  
,united ,states was not a partner--was  
to give ,yuan ,shi ,kai the funds which 
seated him and the militarist faction   
after him1 firmly in the governmental   
saddle4 ,viewing the matter from a      
larger point of view than that of       
,canton vs4 ,peking1 the most           
fundamental objection ,i heard brought  
by ,chinese against the ,consortium was 
in effect as follows3 ,the republican   
revolution in ,china has still to be    
wrought out2 the beginning of ten years 
ago has been arrested4 ,it remains to   

fight it out4 ,the inevitable effect of 
increased foreign financial and economic
 interest in ,china1 even admitting that
 its industrial effect was advantageous 
to ,china1 would be to create an        
interest in stabilizing ,china          
politically1 which in effect would mean 
to sanctify the status quo1 and prevent 
the development of a revolution which   
cannot be accomplished without internal 
disorders that would affect foreign     
investments unfavorably4 ,these         
considerations are not mentioned for the
 sake of throwing light on the          
,consortium3 they are cited as an       
illustration of the probability that a  
too positive and constructive           
development of our tradition of goodwill
 to ,china would involve us in an       
interference with ,chinese domestic     
affairs injurious to ,china's welfare1  
to that free and independent development
 in which we profess such interest4     
,but how1 it will be asked1 are we to   
protect ,china from foreign             

depredations1 particularly those of     
,japan1 how are we to change our nominal
 goodwill into a reality1 if we do not  
enter much more positive and detailed   
policies8 ,if there was in existence at 
the present time any such thing as a    
diplomacy of peoples as distinct from a 
diplomacy of governments1 the question  
would mean something quite different    
from what it now means4 ,as things now  
stand the people should profoundly      
distrust the politicians' love for      
,china4 ,it is too frequently the       
reverse side of fear and incipient      
hatred of ,japan1 colored perhaps by    
anti-,british feeling4  ,there should be
 no disguising of the situation4 ,the   
aggressive activities of other nations  
in ,china1 centering but not exhausted  
at this time in ,japan1 are not merely  
sources of trouble to ,china but they   
are potential causes of trouble in our  
own international relationships4 ,we are
 committed by our tradition and by the  
present actualities of the situation to 

attempting something positive for ,china
 as respects her international status1  
to live up to our responsibility is a   
most difficult and delicate matter4 ,we 
have on the one side to avoid getting   
entangled in quasi-imperialistic        
,european policies in ,asia1 whether    
under the guise of altruism1 of putting 
ourselves in a position where we can    
exercise a more effective supervision of
 their behavior1 or by means of economic
 expansion4 ,on the other side1 we have 
to avoid drifting into that kind of     
covert or avowed antagonism to ,european
 and ,japanese imperialism which will   
only increase friction1 encourage a     
combination especially of ,great        
,britain and ,japan---or of ,france and 
,japan--against us1 and bring war       
appreciably nearer4  ,we need to bear in
 mind that ,china will not be saved from
 outside herself4 ,even if by a         
successful war we should relieve ,china 
from ,japanese encroachments1 from all  
encroachments1 ,china would not of      

necessity be brought nearer her         
legitimate goal of orderly and          
prosperous internal development4 ,apart 
from the question of how far war can now
 settle any fundamental issues without  
begetting others as dangerous1 ,china of
 all countries is the one where         
settlement by force1 especially by      
outside force1 is least applicable1 and 
most likely to be enormously            
disserviceable4 ,china is used to taking
 time to deal with her problems3 she can
 neither understand not profit by       
impatient methods of the western world  
which are profoundly alien to her       
genius4 ,moreover a civilization which  
is on a continental scale1 which is so  
old that the rest of us are parvenus in 
comparison1 which is thick and closely  
woven1 cannot be hurried in its         
development without disaster4           
,transformation from within is its sole 
way out1 and we can best help ,china by 
trying to see to it that she gets the   
time she needs in order to effect this  

transformation1 whether or not we like  
the particular form it assumes at any   
particular time4  ,a successful war in  
behalf of ,china would leave untouched  
her problems of education1 of factional 
and sectional forces1 of political      
immaturity showing itself in present    
incapacity for organization4 ,it would  
affect her industrial growth            
undoubtedly1 but in all human           
probability for the worse1 increasing   
the likelihood that she would enter upon
 an industrialization which would repeat
 the worst evils of western industrial  
life1 without the immunities1           
resistances and remedial measures which 
the ,west has evolved4 ,the imagination 
cannot conceive a worse crime than      
fastening western industrialism upon    
,china before she has developed within  
herself the meaning of coping with the  
forces which it would release4 ,the     
danger is great enough as it is4 ,war   
waged in ,china's behalf by western     
powers and western methods would make   

the danger practically irresistible4 ,in
 addition we should gain a permanent    
interest in ,china which is likely to be
 of the most dangerous character to     
ourselves4 ,if we were not committed by 
it to future imperialism1 we should be  
luckier than we have any right to hope  
to be4 ,these things are said against a 
mental protest to admitting even by     
implication the prospect of war with    
,japan1 but it seems necessary to say   
them4  ,these remarks are negative and  
vague as to our future course4 ,they    
imply a confession of lack of such      
wisdom as would enable me to make       
positive definite proposals4 ,but at    
least ,i have confidence in the wisdom  
and goodwill of the ,american and other 
peoples to deal with the problem1 if    
they are only called into action4 ,and  
the first condition of calling wisdom   
and goodwill into effective existence is
 to recognize the seriousness of the    
problem and the utter futility of trying
 to force its solution by impatient and 

hurried methods4 ,pro-,japanese         
apologetics is dangerous2 it obscures   
the realities of the situation4 ,an     
irritated anti-,japanism that would     
hasten the solution of the ,chinese     
problem merely by attacking ,japan is   
equally fatal to discovering and        
applying a proper method4  ,more        
specifically and also more generically1 
proper publicity is the greatest need4  
,if1 as ,secretary ,hughes has          
intimated1 a settlement of the problems 
of the ,pacific is made a condition of  
arriving at an agreement regarding      
reduction and limitation of armaments1  
it is likely that the ,conference might 
better never be held4 ,in eagerness to  
do something which will pass as a       
settlement1 either ,china's--and        
,siberia's--interests will be sacrificed
 in some unfair compromise1 or          
irritation and friction will be         
increased--and in the end so will       
armaments4 ,in any literal sense1 it is 
ridiculous to suppose that the problems 

of the ,pacific can be settled in a few 
weeks1 or months--or years4 ,yet the    
discussion of the problems1 in          
separation from the question of         
armament1 may be of great use4 ,for it  
may further that publicity which is a   
pre-condition of any genuine settlement4
 ,this involves the public in diplomacy4
 ,but it also involves a wider          
publicity1 one which will enlighten the 
world about the facts of ,asia1 internal
 and international4  ,scepticism about  
,foreign ,offices1 as they are at       
present conducted1 is justified4 ,but   
scepticism about the power of public    
opinion1 if it can be aroused and       
instructed1 to reshape ,foreign ,office 
policies means hopelessness about the   
future of the world4 ,let everything    
possible be done to reduce armament1 if 
only to secure a naval holiday on the   
part of the three great naval powers1   
and if only for the sake of lessening   
taxation4 ,let the ,conference on       
,problems devote itself to discussing   

and making known as fully and widely as 
possible the element and scope of those 
problems1 and the fears--or should one  
call them hopes8--of the cynics will be 
frustrated4 ,it is not so important that
 a decision in the ,american sense of   
the ,yap question be finally and forever
 arrived at1 as it is that the need of  
,china and the ,orient in general for   
freer and fuller communications with the
 rest of the world be made clear--and so
 on1 down or up the list of agenda4 ,the
 commercial open door is needed4 ,but   
the need is greater that the door be    
opened to light1 to knowledge and       
understanding4 ,if these forces will not
 create a public opinion which will in  
time secure a lasting and just          
settlement of other problems1 there is  
no recourse save despair of             
civilization4 ,liberals can do something
 better than predicting failure and     
impugning motives4 ,they can work for   
the opened door of open diplomacy1 of   
continuous and intelligent inquiry1 of  

discussion free from propaganda4 ,to    
shirk this responsibility on the alleged
 ground that economic imperialism and   
organized greed will surely bring the   
,conference to failure is supine and    
snobbish4 ,it is one of the factors that
 may lead the ,united ,states to take   
the wrong course in the parting of the  
ways4  ,october1 #aiba4