,a ,,theodicy2 ,,or ,,vindication ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,glory1 ,,as ,,manifested ,,in ,,the ,,constitution ,,and ,,government ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,world4 ,,by ,,albert ,,taylor ,,bledsoe1 ,,professor ,,of ,,mathematics ,,and ,,astronomy ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,mississippi4 ,,new ,,york3 ,,published ,,by ,,carlton ,,phillips4 #bjj ,,mulberry ,,street4 #ahed4 ,,contents ,introduction4 ,of ,the ,possibility ,of ,a ,theodicy4 ,section ,i4 ,the failure of ,plato and other ancient philosophers to construct a ,theodicy1 not a ground of despair4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the failure of ,leibnitz not a ground of despair4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the system of the moral universe not purposely involved in obscurity to teach us a lesson of humility4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the littleness of the human mind a ground of hope4 ,section ,v4 ,the construction of a ,theodicy1 not an attempt to solve mysteries1 but to dissipate absurdities4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the spirit in which the following work has been prosecuted1 and the relation of the author to other systems4 ,part ,i4 ,the ,existence ,of ,moral ,evil1 ,or ,sin1 ,consistent ,with ,the ,holiness ,of ,god4 ,chapter ,i4 ,the ,scheme ,of ,necessity ,denies ,that ,man ,is ,responsible ,for ,the ,existence ,of ,sin4 ,section ,i4 ,the attempts of ,calvin and ,luther to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the responsibility of man4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the manner in which ,hobbes1 ,collins1 and others1 endeavour to reconcile necessity with free and accountable agency4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the sentiments of ,descartes1 ,spinoza1 and ,malebranche1 concerning the relation between liberty and necessity4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the views of ,locke1 ,tucker1 ,hartley1 ,priestley1 ,helvetius1 and ,diderot1 with respect to the relation between liberty and necessity4 ,section ,v4 ,the manner in which ,leibnitz endeavours to reconcile liberty and necessity4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the attempt of ,edwards to establish free and accountable agency on the basis of necessity--,the views of the younger ,edwards1 ,day1 ,chalmers1 ,dick1 ,d',aubigne1 ,hill1 ,shaw1 and ,m',cosh1 concerning the agreement of liberty and necessity4 ,section ,,vii4 ,the sentiments of ,hume1 ,brown1 ,comte1 and ,mill1 in relation to the antagonism between liberty and necessity4 ,section ,,viii4 ,the views of ,kant and ,sir ,william ,hamilton in relation to the antagonism between liberty and necessity4 ,section ,,ix4 ,the notion of ,lord ,kames and ,sir ,james ,mackintosh on the same subject4 ,section ,x4 ,the conclusion of ,mhler1 ,tholuck1 and others1 that all speculation on such a subject must be vain and fruitless4 ,section ,,xi4 ,the true conclusion from the foregoing review of opinions and arguments4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,scheme ,of ,necessity ,makes ,god ,the ,author ,of ,sin4 ,section ,i4 ,the attempts of ,calvin and other reformers to show that the system of necessity does not make ,god the author of sin4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the attempt of ,leibnitz to show that the scheme of necessity does not make ,god the author of sin4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the maxims adopted and employed by ,edwards to show that the scheme of necessity does not make ,god the author of sin4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the attempts of ,dr4 ,emmons and ,dr4 ,chalmers to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the purity of ,god4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,scheme ,of ,necessity ,denies ,the ,reality ,of ,moral ,distinctions4 ,section ,i4 ,the views of ,spinoza in relation to the reality of moral distinctions4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the attempt of ,edwards to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the reality of moral distinctions4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of the proposition that ,the essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will1 lies not in their cause1 but in their nature4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the reality of moral distinctions1 not because we confound natural and moral necessity1 but because it is really inconsistent therewith4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,moral ,world ,not ,constituted ,according ,to ,the ,scheme ,of ,necessity4 ,section ,i4 ,the scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the scheme of necessity is directed against a false issue4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the scheme of necessity is supported by false logic4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the scheme of necessity is fortified by false conceptions4 ,section ,v4 ,the scheme of necessity is recommended by false analogies4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false phraseology4 ,section ,,vii4 ,the scheme of necessity originates in a false method1 and terminates in a false religion4 ,chapter ,v4 ,the ,relation ,between ,the ,human ,will ,and ,the ,divine ,agency4 ,section ,i4 ,general view of the relation between the divine and the human power4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,pelagian platform1 or view of the relation between the divine and the human power4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,augustinian ,platform1 or view of the relation between the divine agency and the human4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the views of those who1 in later times1 have symbolized with ,augustine4 ,section ,v4 ,the danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of the divine sovereignty4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,the ,existence ,of ,moral ,evil1 ,or ,sin1 ,reconciled ,with ,the ,holiness ,of ,god4 ,section ,i4 ,the hypothesis of the soul's preexistence4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the hypothesis of the ,manicheans4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the hypothesis of optimism4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the argument of the atheist--,the reply of ,leibnitz and other theists--,the insufficiency of this reply4 ,section ,v4 ,the sophism of the atheist exploded1 and a perfect agreement shown to subsist between the existence of sin and the holiness of ,god4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the true and only foundation of optimism4 ,section ,,vii4 ,the glory of ,god seen in the creation of a world1 which he foresaw would fall under the dominion of sin4 ,section ,,viii4 ,the little1 captious spirit of ,voltaire1 and other atheizing minute philosophers4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,objections ,considered4 ,section ,i4 ,it may be objected that the foregoing scheme is new theology4 ,section ,,ii4 ,it may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit the omnipotence of ,god4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the foregoing scheme1 it may be said1 presents a gloomy view of the universe4 ,section ,,iv4 ,it may be alleged1 that in refusing to subject the volitions of men to the power and control of ,god1 we undermine the sentiments of humility and submission4 ,section ,v4 ,the foregoing treatise may be deemed inconsistent with gratitude to ,god4 ,section ,,vi4 ,it may be contended1 that it is unfair to urge the preceding difficulties against the scheme of necessity2 inasmuch as the same1 or as great1 difficulties attach to the system of those by whom they are urged4 ,part ,,ii4 ,the ,existence ,of ,natural ,evil1 ,or ,suffering1 ,consistent ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,chapter ,i4 ,god ,desires ,and ,seeks ,the ,salvation of ,all ,men4 ,section ,i4 ,the reason why theologians have concluded that ,god designs the salvation of only a part of mankind4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the attempt of ,howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a portion of mankind with the sincerity of ,god in his endeavours to save them4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the views of ,luther and ,calvin respecting the sincerity of ,god in his endeavours to save those who will finally perish4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,natural ,evil1 ,or ,suffering1 ,and ,especially ,the ,suffering ,of ,infants ,reconciled ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,section ,i4 ,all suffering not a punishment for sin4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the imputation of sin not consistent with human1 much less with the divine goodness4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the true ends1 or final causes1 of natural evil4 ,section ,v4 ,the importance of harmonizing reason and revelation4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,sufferings ,of ,christ ,reconciled ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,section ,i4 ,the sufferings of ,christ not unnecessary4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the sufferings of ,christ a bright manifestation of the goodness of ,god4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the objections of ,dr4 ,channing1 and other ,unitarians1 against the doctrine of the atonement4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,eternal ,punishment ,of ,the ,wicked ,reconciled ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,section ,i4 ,the false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity of future punishment has been placed4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the unsound principles from which1 if true1 the fallacy of the eternity of future punishments may be clearly inferred4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the eternity of future punishments an expression of the divine goodness4 ,chapter ,v4 ,the ,dispensation ,of ,the ,divine ,favours ,reconciled ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,section ,i4 ,the unequal distribution of favours1 which obtains in the economy of natural providence1 consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,scripture doctrine of election consistent with the impartiality of the divine goodness4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with the impartiality and glory of the divine goodness4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the true ground and reason of election to eternal life shows it to be consistent with the infinite goodness of ,god4 ,conclusion4 ,a ,summary ,view ,of ,the ,principles ,and ,advantages ,of ,the ,foregoing ,system4 ,chapter ,i4 ,summary ,of ,the ,first ,part ,of ,the ,foregoing ,system4 ,section ,i4 ,the scheme of necessity denies that man is the responsible author of sin4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the scheme of necessity makes ,god the author of sin4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity4 ,section ,v4 ,the relation between the human agency and the divine4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite purity of ,god4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,summary ,of ,the ,second ,part ,of ,the ,foregoing ,system4 ,section ,i4 ,god desires the salvation of all men4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the sufferings of the innocent1 and especially of infants1 consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the sufferings of ,christ consistent with the divine goodness4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the eternity of future punishment consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,section ,v4 ,the true doctrine of election and predestination consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the question submitted4 ,footnotes ,introduction4 ,,of ,,the ,,possibility ,,of ,a ,,theodicy4 ,how1 under the government of an infinitely perfect ,being1 evil could have proceeded from a creature of his own1 has ever been regarded as the great difficulty pertaining to the intellectual system of the universe4 ,it has never ceased to puzzle and perplex the human mind4 ,indeed1 so great and so obstinate has it seemed1 that it is usually supposed to lie beyond the reach of the human faculties4 ,we shall1 however1 examine the grounds of this opinion1 before we exchange the bright illusions of hope1 if such indeed they be1 for the gloomy forebodings of despair4 ,section ,i4 ,the failure of ,plato and other ancient philosophers to construct a ,theodicy1 not a ground of despair4 ,the supposed want of success attending the labours of the past1 is1 no doubt1 the principal reason which has induced so many to abandon the problem of evil in despair1 and even to accuse of presumption every speculation designed to shed light upon so great a mystery4 ,but this reason1 however specious and imposing at first view1 will lose much of its apparent force upon a closer examination4 ,in every age the same reasoning has been employed to repress the efforts of the human mind to overcome the difficulties by which it has been surrounded2 yet1 in spite of such discouragements1 the most stupendous difficulties have gradually yielded to the progressive developments and revelations of time4 ,it was the opinion of ,socrates1 for example1 that the problem of the natural world was unavoidably concealed from mortals1 and that it was a sort of presumptuous impiety1 displeasing to the gods1 for men to pry into it4 ,if ,newton himself had lived in that age1 it is probable that he would have entertained the same opinion4 ,it is certain that the problem in question would then have been as far beyond the reach of his powers1 as beyond those of the most ordinary individual4 ,the ignorance of the earth's dimensions1 the manifold errors respecting the laws of motion1 and the defective state of the mathematical sciences1 which then prevailed1 would have rendered utterly impotent the efforts of a thousand ,newtons to grapple with such a problem4 ,the time was neither ripe for the solution of that problem1 nor for the appearance of a ,newton4 ,it was only after science had1 during a period of two thousand years1 multiplied her resources and gathered up her energies1 that she was prepared for a flight to the summit of the world1 whence she might behold and reveal the wonderful art wherewith it hath been constructed by the ,almighty ,architect4 ,because ,socrates could not conceive of any possible means of solving the great problem of the material world1 it did not follow1 as the event has shown1 that it was forever beyond the reach and dominion of man4 ,we should not then listen too implicitly to the teachers of despair1 nor too rashly set limits to the triumphs of the human power4 ,if we may believe 8the master of wisdom10 they are not the true friends of science1 nor of the world's progress4 8,by far the greatest obstacle10 says ,bacon1 8to the advancement of the sciences1 is to be found in men's despair and idea of impossibility40 ,even in the minds of those who cultivate a particular branch of knowledge1 there is often an internal secret despair of finding the truth1 which so far paralyzes their efforts as to prevent them from seeking it with that deep earnestness1 without which it is seldom found4 ,the history of optics furnishes a most impressive illustration of the justness of this remark4 ,previous to the time of ,newton1 no one seemed to entertain a real hope that this branch of knowledge would ever assume the form and clearness of scientific truth4 ,the laws and properties of so ethereal a substance as light1 appeared to elude the grasp of the human intellect2 and hence1 no one evinced the boldness to grapple directly with them4 ,the whole region of optics was involved in mists1 and those who gave their attention to this department of knowledge1 abandoned themselves1 for the most part1 to vague generalities and loose conjectures4 ,in the conflict of manifold opinions1 and the great variety of hypotheses which seemed to promise nothing but endless disputes1 the highest idea of the science of optics that prevailed1 was that of something in relation to light which might be plausibly advanced and confidently maintained4 ,it was reserved for ,newton to produce a revolution in the mode of treating this branch of knowledge1 as well as that of physical astronomy4 ,not despairing of the truth1 he sternly put away 8innumerable fancies flitting on all sides around him10 and by searching observation and experiment1 brought his mind directly into contact with things themselves1 and held it steadily to them1 until the clear light of truth dawned4 ,the consequence was1 that the dreams of philosophy1 falsely so called1 gave place to the clear realities of nature4 ,it was to the unconquerable hope1 no less than to the profound humility of ,newton1 that the world is indebted for his most splendid discoveries1 as well as for that perfect model of the true spirit of philosophy1 which combined the infinite caution of a ,butler with the unbounded boldness of a ,leibnitz4 ,the lowliest humility1 free from the least shadow of despair1 united with the loftiest hope1 without the least mixture of presumption1 both proceeding from an invincible love of truth1 are the elements which constituted the secret of that patient and all-enduring thought which conducted the mind of ,newton from the obscurities and dreams enveloping the world below into the bright and shining region of eternal truths above4 ,in our humble opinion1 ,newton has done more for the great cause of knowledge1 by the mighty impulse of hope he has given to the powers of the human mind1 than by all the sublime discoveries he has made4 ,for1 as ,maclaurin says3 8,the variety of opinions and perpetual disputes among philosophers has induced not a few of late1 as well as in former times1 to think that it was vain labour to endeavour to acquire certainty in natural knowledge1 and to ascribe this to some unavoidable defect in the principles of the science4 ,but it has appeared sufficiently1 from the discoveries of those who have consulted nature1 and not their own imaginations1 and particularly from what we learn from ,sir ,isaac ,newton1 that the fault has lain in philosophers themselves1 and not in philosophy40 ,we are persuaded the day will come1 when it will be seen that the despair of scepticism has been misplaced1 not only with regard to natural knowledge1 but also in relation to the great problems of the intellectual and moral world4 ,it is true1 that ,plato failed to solve these problems2 but his failure may be easily accounted for1 without in the least degree shaking the foundations of our hope4 ,the learned ,ritter has said1 that ,plato felt the necessity imposed upon him1 by his system1 to reconcile the existence of evil with the perfections of ,god2 but yet1 as often as he approached this dark subject1 his views became vague1 fluctuating1 and unsatisfactory4 ,how little insight he had into it on any scientific or clearly defined principle1 is obvious from the fact1 that he took shelter from its difficulties in the wild hypothesis of the prexistence of souls4 ,but the impotency of ,plato's attempts to solve these difficulties1 may be explained without the least disparagement to his genius1 or without leading us to hope for light only from the world's possession of better minds4 ,in the first place1 such was the state of mental science when ,plato lived1 that it would have been impossible for any one to reconcile the existence of evil with the perfections of ,god4 ,it has been truly said1 that 8,an attention to the internal operations of the human mind1 with a view to analyze its principles1 is one of the distinctions of modern times4 ,among the ancients scarcely anything of the sort was known40--,robert ,hall4 ,yet without a correct analysis of the powers of the human mind1 and of the relations they sustain to each other1 as well as to external objects and influences1 it is impossible to shed one ray of light on the relation subsisting between the existence of moral evil and the divine glory4 ,the theory of motion is 8the key to nature40 ,it was with this key that ,newton1 the great high-priest of nature1 entered into her profoundest recesses1 and laid open her most sublime secrets to the admiration of mankind4 ,in like manner1 the true theory of action is the key to the intellectual world1 by which its difficulties are to be laid open and its enigmas solved4 ,not possessing this key1 it was as impossible for ,plato1 or for any other philosopher1 to penetrate the mystery of sin's existence1 as it would have been1 without a knowledge of the laws of motion1 to comprehend the stupendous problem of the material universe4 ,secondly1 the ancient philosophers laboured under the insuperable disadvantage1 that the sublime disclosures of revelation had not been made known to the world4 ,hence the materials were wanting out of which to construct a ,theodicy1 or vindication of the perfections of ,god4 ,for if we could see only so much of this world's drama as is made known by the light of nature1 it would not be possible to reconcile it with the character of its great ,author4 ,no one was more sensible of this defect of knowledge than ,plato himself2 and its continuance was1 in his view1 inconsistent with the goodness of the divine ,being4 ,hence his well-known prediction1 that a teacher would be sent from ,god to clear up the darkness of man's present destiny1 and to withdraw the veil from its future glory4 ,the facts of revelation cannot1 of course1 be logically assumed as verities1 in an argument with the atheist2 but still1 as we shall hereafter see1 they may1 in connexion with other truths1 be made to serve a most important and legitimate function in exploding his sophisms and objections4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the failure of ,leibnitz not a ground of despair4 ,it is alleged1 that since ,leibnitz exhausted the resources of his vast erudition1 and exerted the powers of his mighty intellect without success1 to solve the problem in question1 it is in vain for any one else to attempt its solution4 ,leibnitz1 himself1 was too much of a philosopher to approve of such a judgment in relation to any human being4 ,he could never have wished1 or expected to see 8the empire of man1 which is founded in the sciences10 permanently confined to the boundaries of a single mind1 however exalted its powers1 or comprehensive its attainments4 ,he finely rebuked the false humility and the disguised arrogance of ,descartes1 in affirming that the sovereignty of ,god and the freedom of man could never be reconciled4 8,if ,descartes10 says he1 8had confessed such an inability for himself alone1 this might have savoured of humility2 but it is otherwise1 when1 because he could not find the means of solving this difficulty1 he declares it an impossibility for all ages and for all minds40 ,we have1 at least1 the authority and example of ,leibnitz1 in favour of the propriety of cultivating this department of knowledge1 with a view to shed light on the great problem of the intellectual world4 ,his failure1 if rightly considered1 is not a ground for despondency4 ,he approached the problem in question in a wrong spirit4 ,the pride of conquering difficulties is the unfortunate disposition with which he undertook to solve it4 ,his well-known boast1 that with him all difficult things are easy1 and all easy things difficult1 is a proof that his spirit was not perfectly adapted to carry him forward in a contest with the dark enigmas of the universe4 ,indeed1 if we consider what ,leibnitz has actually done1 we shall perceive1 that notwithstanding his wonderful powers1 he has rendered many easy things difficult1 as well as many difficult things easy4 ,the best way to conquer difficulties is1 if we may judge from his example1 not to attack them directly1 and with the pride of a conqueror1 but simply to seek after the truth4 ,if we make a conquest of all the truth1 this will make a conquest of all the difficulties within our reach4 ,it is wonderful with what ease a difficulty1 which may have resisted the direct siege of centuries1 will sometimes fall before a single inquirer after truth1 who had not dreamed of aiming at its solution1 until this seemed1 as if by accident1 to offer itself to his mind4 ,if we pursue difficulties1 they will be apt to fly from us and elude our grasp2 whereas1 if we give up our minds to an honest and earnest search after truth1 they will come in with their own solutions4 ,the truth is1 that the difficulty in question has been increased rather than diminished by the speculations of ,leibnitz4 ,this has resulted from a premature and extreme devotion to system--a source of miscarriage and failure common to ,leibnitz1 and to most others who have devoted their attention to the origin of evil4 ,on the one hand1 exaggerated views concerning the divine agency1 or equally extravagant notions on the other1 respecting the agency of man1 have frequently converted a seeming into a real contradiction4 ,in general1 the work of ,god has been conceived in such a relation to the powers of man1 as to make the latter entirely disappear2 or else the power of man has been represented as occupying so exalted and independent a position1 as to exclude the ,almighty from his rightful dominion over the moral world4 ,thus1 the ,supreme ,being has generally been shut out from the affairs and government of the world by one side1 and his energy rendered so all-pervading by the other1 as really to make him the author of evil4 ,in this way1 the difficulties concerning the origin and existence of evil have been greatly augmented by the very speculations designed to solve them4 ,for if ,god takes little or no concern in the affairs and destiny of the moral world1 this clearly seems to render him responsible for the evil which he might easily have prevented2 and1 on the other hand1 if he pervades the moral world with his power in such a manner as to bring all things to pass1 this as clearly seems to implicate him in the turpitude of sin4 ,after having converted the seeming discrepancy between the divine power and human agency into a real contradiction1 it is too late to endeavour to reconcile them4 ,yet such has been the case with most of the giant intellects that have laboured to reconcile the sovereignty of ,god and the moral agency of man4 ,it will hereafter be clearly seen1 we trust1 that it is not possible for any one1 holding the scheme of a ,calvin1 or a ,leibnitz1 or a ,descartes1 or an ,edwards1 to show an agreement between the power of ,god and the freedom of man2 since according to these systems there is an eternal opposition and conflict between them4 ,it is no ground of despair1 then1 that the mighty minds of the past have failed to solve the problem in question1 if the cause of their failure may be traced to the errors of their own systems1 and not to the inherent difficulties of the subject4 ,those who have endeavoured to solve the problem in question have1 for the most part1 been necessitated to fail in consequence of having adopted a wrong method4 ,instead of beginning with observation1 and carefully dissecting the world which ,god has made1 so as to rise1 by a clear analysis of things1 to the general principles on which they have been actually framed and put together1 they have set out from the lofty region of universal abstractions1 and proceeded to reconstruct the world for themselves4 ,instead of beginning with the actual1 as best befits the feebleness of the human intellect1 and working their way up into the great system of things1 they have taken their position at once in the high and boundless realm of the ideal1 and thence endeavoured to deduce the nature of the laws and phenomena of the real world4 ,this is the course pursued by ,plato1 ,leibnitz1 ,hobbes1 ,descartes1 ,edwards1 and1 indeed1 most of those great thinkers who have endeavoured to shed light on the problem in question4 ,hence each has necessarily become 8a sublime architect of words10 whose grand and imposing system of shadows and abstractions has but a slight foundation in the real constitution and laws of the spiritual world4 ,their writings furnish the most striking illustration of the profound aphorism of ,bacon1 that 8the usual method of discovery and proof1 by first establishing the most general propositions1 then applying and proving the intermediate axioms according to these1 is the parent of error and the calamity of every science40 ,he who would frame a real model of the world in the understanding1 such as it is found to be1 not such as man's reason has distorted1 must pursue the opposite course4 ,surely it cannot be deemed unreasonable1 that this course should be most diligently applied to the study of the intellectual world2 especially as it has wrought such wonders in the province of natural knowledge1 and that too1 after so many ages had1 according to the former method1 laboured upon it comparatively in vain4 ,because the human mind has not been able to bridge over the impassable gulf between the ideal and the concrete1 so as to effect a passage from the former to the latter1 it certainly does not follow1 that it should forever despair of so far penetrating the apparent obscurity and confusion of real things1 as to see that nothing which ,god has created is inconsistent with the eternal1 immutable glory of the ideal3 or1 in other words1 because the real world and the ideal cannot be shown to be connected by a logical dependency1 it does not follow1 that the actual creation and providence of ,god1 that all his works and ways cannot be made to appear consistent with the idea of an absolutely perfect being and of the eternal laws according to which his power acts3 that is to say1 because the high a priori method1 which so magisterially proceeds to pronounce what must be1 has failed to solve the problem of the moral world1 it does not follow1 that the inductive method1 or that which cautiously begins with an examination of what is1 may not finally rise to the sublime contemplation of what ought to be2 and1 in the light of ,god's own creation1 behold the magnificent model of the actual universe perfectly conformed to the transcendent and unutterable glory of the ideal4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the system of the moral universe not purposely involved in obscurity to teach us a lesson of humility4 ,but the assertion is frequently made1 that the moral government of the world is purposely left in obscurity and apparent confusion1 in order to teach man a lesson of humility and submission1 by showing him how weak and narrow is the human mind4 ,we have not1 however1 been able to find any sufficient reason or foundation for such an opinion4 ,as every atom in the universe presents mysteries which baffle the most subtle research and the most profound investigation of the human intellect1 we cannot see how any reflecting mind can possibly find an additional lesson of humility in the fact1 that the system of the universe itself is involved in clouds and darkness4 ,would it not be strange1 indeed1 if the mind1 whose grasp is not sufficient for the mysteries of a single atom1 should be really humbled by the conviction that it is too weak and limited to fathom the wonders of the universe8 ,does the insignificance of an egg-shell appear from the fact that it cannot contain the ocean8 ,the truth is1 that the more clearly the majesty and glory of the divine perfections are displayed in the constitution and government of the world1 the more clearly shall we see the greatness of ,god and the littleness of man4 ,no true knowledge can ever impress the human mind with a conceit of its own greatness4 ,the farther its light expands1 the greater must become the visible sphere of the surrounding darkness2 and its highest attainment in real knowledge must inevitably terminate in a profound sense of the vast1 unlimited extent of its own ignorance4 ,hence1 we need entertain no fear1 that man's humility will ever be endangered by too great attainments in science4 ,presumption is1 indeed1 the natural offspring of ignorance1 and not of knowledge4 ,socrates1 as we have already seen1 endeavoured to inculcate a lesson of humility1 by reminding his contemporaries how far the theory of the material heavens was beyond the reach of their faculties4 ,and to enforce this lesson1 he assured them that it was displeasing to the gods for men to attempt to pry into the wonderful art wherewith they had constructed the universe4 ,in like manner1 the poet1 at a much later period1 puts the following sentiment into the mouth of an angel3-- 8,to ask or search1 ,i blame thee not2 for heaven ,is as the book of ,god before thee set1 ,wherein to read his wondrous works1 and learn ,his seasons1 hours1 or days1 or months1 or years3 ,this to attain1 whether heaven move or earth1 ,imports not if thou reckon right2 the rest ,from man or angel the great ,architect ,did wisely to conceal1 and not divulge ,his secrets1 to be scann'd by them who ought ,rather admire2 or1 if they list to try ,conjecture1 he his fabric of the heavens ,hath left to their disputes1 perhaps to move ,his laughter at their quaint opinions wide ,hereafter40 ,all this may be very well1 no doubt1 for him by whom it was uttered1 and for those who may have received it as an everlasting oracle of truth4 ,but the true lesson of humility was taught by ,newton1 when he solved the problem of the world1 and revealed the wonderful art displayed therein by the ,supreme ,architect4 ,never before1 in the history of the human race1 was so impressive a conviction made of the almost absolute nothingness of man1 when measured on the inconceivably magnificent scale of the universe4 ,no one1 it is well known1 felt this conviction more deeply than ,newton himself4 8,i have been but as a child10 said he1 8playing on the sea-shore2 now finding some pebble rather more polished1 and now some shell rather more agreeably variegated than another1 while the immense ocean of truth extended itself unexplored before me40 ,it is1 indeed1 strangely to forget our littleness1 as well as the limits which this necessarily sets to the progress of the understanding1 to imagine that the ,almighty has to conceal anything with a view to remind us of the weakness of our powers4 ,indeed1 everything around us1 and everything within us1 brings home the conviction of the littleness of man4 ,there is not a page of the history of human thought on which this lesson is not deeply engraved4 ,still we do not despair4 ,we find a ground of hope in the very littleness as well as in the greatness of the human powers4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the littleness of the human mind a ground of hope4 ,we would yield to no one in a profound veneration for the great intellects of the past4 ,but let us not be dazzled and blinded by the splendour of their achievements4 ,let us look at it closely1 and see how wonderful it is--this thing called the human mind4 ,the more ,i think of it1 the more it fills me with amazement4 ,i scarcely know which amazes me the more1 its littleness or its grandeur4 ,now ,i see it1 with all its high powers and glorious faculties1 labouring under the ambiguity of a word1 apparently in hopeless eclipse for centuries4 ,shall ,i therefore despise it8 ,before ,i have time to do so1 the power and the light which is thus shut out from the world by so pitiful a cause1 is revealed in all its glory4 ,i see this same intelligence forcing its way through a thousand hostile appearances1 resisting innumerable obstacles pressing on all sides around it1 overcoming deep illusions1 and inveterate opinions1 almost as firmly seated as the very laws of nature themselves4 ,i see it rising above all these1 and planting itself in the radiant seat of truth4 ,it embraces the plan1 it surveys the work of the ,supreme ,architect of all things4 ,it follows the infinite reason1 and recognises the almighty power1 in their sublimest manifestations4 ,i rejoice in the glory of its triumphs1 and am ready to pronounce its empire boundless4 ,but1 alas6 ,i see it again baffled and confounded by the wonders and mysteries of a single atom6 ,i see this same thing1 or rather its mightiest representatives1 with a ,newton or a ,leibnitz at their head1 in full pursuit of a shadow1 and wasting their wonderful energies in beating the air4 ,they have measured the world1 and stretched their line upon the chambers of the great deep4 ,they have weighed the sun1 moon1 and stars1 and marked out their orbits4 ,they have determined the laws according to which all worlds and all atoms move--according to which the very spheres sing together4 ,and yet1 when they came to measure 8the force of a moving body10 they toil for a century at the task1 and finally rest in the amazing conclusion1 that 8the very same thing may have two measures widely different from each other60 ,alas6 that the same mind1 that the same god-like intelligence1 which has measured worlds and systems1 should thus have wasted its stupendous energies in striving to measure a metaphor6 ,when ,i think of its grandeur and its triumphs1 ,i bow with reverence before its power1 and am ready to despair of ever seeing it go farther than it has already gone2 but when ,i think of its littleness and its failures1 ,i take courage again1 and determine to toil on as a living atom among living atoms4 ,the glory of its triumphs does not discourage me1 because ,i also see its littleness2 nor can its littleness extinguish in me the light of hope1 because ,i also see the glory of its triumphs4 ,and surely this is right2 for the intellect of man1 so conspicuously combining the attributes of the angel and of the worm1 is not to be despised without infinite danger1 nor followed without infinite caution4 ,such1 indeed1 is the weakness and fallibility of the human mind1 even in its brightest forms1 that we cannot for a moment imagine1 that the inherent difficulties of the dark enigma of the world are insuperable1 because they have not been clearly and fully solved by a ,leibnitz or an ,edwards4 ,on the contrary1 we are perfectly persuaded that in the end the wonder will be1 not that such a question should have been attempted after so many illustrious failures1 but that any such failure should have been made4 ,this will appear the more probable1 if we consider the precise nature of the problem to be solved1 and not lose ourselves in dark and unintelligible notions4 ,it is not to do some great thing--it is simply to refute the sophism of the atheist4 ,if ,god were both willing and able to prevent sin1 which is the only supposition consistent with the idea of ,god1 says the atheist1 he would certainly have prevented it1 and sin would never have made its appearance in the world4 ,but sin has made its appearance in the world2 and hence1 ,god must have been either unable or unwilling to prevent it4 ,now1 if we take either term of this alternative1 we must adopt a conclusion which is at war with the idea of a ,god4 ,such is the argument of the atheist2 and sad indeed must be the condition of the ,christian world if it be forever unable to meet and refute such a sophism4 ,yet1 it is the error involved in this sophism which obscures our intellectual vision1 and causes so perplexing a darkness to spread itself over the moral order and beauty of the world4 ,hence1 in grappling with the supposed great difficulty in question1 we do not undertake to remove a veil from the universe--we simply undertake to remove a sophism from our own minds4 ,though we have so spoken in accommodation with the views of others1 the problem of the moral world is not1 in reality1 high and difficult in itself1 like the great problem of the material universe4 ,we repeat1 it is simply to refute and explode the sophism of the atheist4 ,let this be blown away1 and the darkness which seems to overhang the moral government of the world will disappear like the mists of the morning4 ,if such be the nature of the problem in question1 and such it will be found to be1 it is certainly a mistake to suppose that 8it must be entangled with perplexities while we see but in part407#a7 ,it is only while we see amiss1 and not while we see in part1 that this problem must wear the appearance of a dark enigma4 ,it is clear1 that our knowledge is1 and ever must be1 exceedingly limited on all sides2 and if we must understand the whole of the case1 if we must comprehend the entire extent of the divine government for the universe and for eternity1 before we can remove the difficulty in question1 we must necessarily despair of success4 ,but we cannot see any sufficient ground to support this oft-repeated assertion4 ,because the field of our vision is so exceedingly limited1 we do not see why it should be forever traversed by apparent inconsistencies and contradictions4 ,in relation to the material universe1 our space is but a point1 and our time but a moment2 and yet1 as that inconceivably grand system is now understood by us1 there is nothing in it which seems to conflict with the dictates of reason1 or with the infinite perfections of ,god4 ,on the contrary1 the revelations of modern science have given an emphasis and a sublimity to the language of inspiration1 that 8the heavens declare the glory of the ,lord10 which had1 for ages1 been concealed from the loftiest conception of the astronomer4 ,nor did it require a knowledge of the whole material universe to remove the difficulties1 or to blast the objections which atheists had1 in all preceding ages1 raised against the perfections of its divine ,author4 ,such objections1 as is well known1 were raised before astronomy1 as a science1 had an existence4 ,lucretius1 for example1 though he deemed the sun1 moon1 and stars1 no larger than they appear to the eye1 and supposed them to revolve around the earth1 undertook to point out and declaim against the miserable defects which he saw1 or fancied he saw1 in the system of the material world4 ,that is to say1 he undertook to criticise and find fault with the great volume of nature1 before he had even learned its alphabet4 ,the objections of ,lucretius1 which appeared so formidable in his day1 as well as many others that have since been raised on equally plausible grounds1 have passed away before the progress of science1 and now seem like the silly prattle of children1 or the insane babble of madmen4 ,but although such difficulties have been swept away1 and our field of vision cleared of all that is painful and perplexing1 nay1 brightened with all that is grand and beautiful1 we seem to be farther than ever from comprehending the whole of the case--from grasping the amazing extent and glory of the material globe4 ,and why may not this ultimately be the case also in relation to the moral universe8 ,why should every attempt to clear up its difficulties1 and blow away the objections of atheism to its order and beauty1 be supposed to originate in presumption and to terminate in impiety8 ,are we so much the less interested in knowing the ways of ,god in regard to the constitution and government of the moral world than of the material1 that he should purposely conceal the former from us1 while he has permitted the latter to be laid open so as to ravish our minds8 ,we can believe no such thing2 and we are not willing to admit that there is any part of the creation of ,god in which omniscience alone can cope with the atheist4 ,section ,v4 ,the construction of a ,theodicy1 not an attempt to solve mysteries1 but to dissipate absurdities4 ,as we have merely undertaken to refute the atheist1 and vindicate the glory of the divine perfections1 so it would be a grievous mistake to suppose1 that we are about to pry into the holy mysteries of religion4 ,no sound mind is ever perplexed by the contemplation of mysteries4 ,indeed1 they are a source of positive satisfaction and delight4 ,if nothing were dark1--if all around us1 and above us1 were clearly seen1--the truth itself would soon appear stale and mean4 ,everything truly great must transcend the powers of the human mind2 and hence1 if nothing were mysterious1 there would be nothing worthy of our veneration and worship4 ,it is mystery1 indeed1 which lends such unspeakable grandeur and variety to the scenery of the moral world4 ,without it1 all would be clear1 it is true1 but nothing grand4 ,there would be lights1 but no shadows4 ,and around the very lights themselves1 there would be nothing soothing and sublime1 in which the soul might rest and the imagination revel4 ,hence it is no part of our object to pry into mystery1 but to get rid of absurdity4 ,and in our humble opinion1 this would long since have been done1 and the difficulty in question solved1 had not the friends of truth incautiously given the most powerful protection to the sophism and absurdity of the atheist1 by throwing around it the sacred garb of mystery4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the spirit in which the following work has been prosecuted1 and the relation of the author to other systems4 ,in conclusion1 we offer a few remarks in relation to the manner and spirit in which the following work has been undertaken and prosecuted4 ,in the first place1 the writer may truly say1 that he did not enter on the apparently dark problem of the moral world with the least hope that he should be able to throw any light upon it1 nor with any other set purpose and design4 ,he simply revolved the subject in mind1 because he was by nature prone to such meditations4 ,so far from having aimed at things usually esteemed so high and difficult with a feeling of presumptuous confidence1 he has1 indeed1 suffered most from that spirit of despondency1 that despair of scepticism1 against which1 in the foregoing pages1 he has appeared so anxious to caution others4 ,it has been patient reflection1 and the reading of excellent authors1 together with an earnest desire to know the truth1 which has delivered him from the power of that spirit1 and conducted him to what now so clearly seems 8the bright and shining light of truth40 ,it was1 in fact1 while engaged in meditation on the powers and susceptibilities of the human mind1 as well as on the relations they sustain to each and to other things1 and not in any direct attempt to elucidate the origin of evil1 that the first clear light appeared to dawn on this great difficulty3 and in no other way1 he humbly conceives1 can the true philosophy of the spiritual world ever be comprehended4 ,for1 as the laws of matter had first to be studied and traced out in relation to bodies on the earth1 before they could be extended to the heavens1 and made to explain its wonderful mechanism2 so must the laws and phenomena of the human mind be correctly analyzed and clearly defined1 in order to obtain an insight into the intellectual system of the universe4 ,and just in proportion as the clouds and darkness hanging over the phenomena of our own minds are made to disappear1 will the intellectual system of the world which ,god 8has set in our hearts10 become more distinct and beautiful in its proportions4 ,for it is the mass of real contradictions and obscurities1 existing in the little world within1 which distorts to our view the great world without1 and causes the work and ways of ,god to appear so full of disorders4 ,hence1 in proportion as these real contradictions and obscurities are removed1 will the mind become a truer microcosm1 or more faithful mirror1 in which the image of the universe will unfold itself1 free from the apparent disorders and confusion which seem to render it unworthy of its great ,author and ,ruler4 ,secondly1 the relation which the writer sustains to other systems1 has been1 it appears to himself1 most favourable to a successful prosecution of the following speculations4 ,whether at the outset of his inquiries1 he was the more of an ,arminian or of a ,calvinist1 he is unable to say2 but if his crude and imperfectly developed sentiments had then been made known1 it is probable he would have been ranked with the ,arminians4 ,be this as it may1 it is certain that he was never so much of an ,arminian1 or of anything else1 as to imagine that ,calvinism admitted of nothing great and good4 ,on the contrary1 he has ever believed that the ,calvinists were at least equal to any other body of men in piety1 which is certainly the highest and noblest of all qualities4 ,and besides1 it was a constant delight to him to read the great master-pieces of reasoning which ,calvinism had furnished for the instruction and admiration of mankind4 ,by this means he came to believe that the scheme of the ,arminians could not be maintained1 and his faith in it was gradually undermined4 ,but although he thus submitted his mind to the dominion of ,calvinism1 as advocated by ,edwards1 and earnestly espoused it with some exceptions2 he never felt that profound1 internal satisfaction of the truth of the system1 after which his rational nature continually longed1 and which it struggled to realize4 ,he certainly expected to find this satisfaction in ,calvinism1 if anywhere4 ,long1 therefore1 did he pass over every portion of ,calvinism1 in order to discover1 if possible1 how its foundations might be rendered more clear and convincing1 and all its parts harmonized among themselves as well as with the great undeniable facts of man's nature and destiny4 ,while engaged in these inquiries1 he has been more than once led to see what appeared to be a flaw in ,calvinism itself2 but without at first perceiving all its consequences4 ,by reflection on these apparent defects2 nay1 by protracted and earnest meditation on them1 his suspicions have been confirmed and his opinions changed4 ,if what now so clearly appears to be the truth is so or not1 it is certain that it has not been embraced out of a spirit of opposition to ,calvinism1 or to any other system of religious faith whatever4 ,its light1 whether real or imaginary1 has dawned upon his mind while seeking after truth amid the foundations of ,calvinism itself2 and this light has been augmented more by reading the works of ,calvinists themselves1 than those of their opponents4 ,these things are here set down1 not because the writer thinks they should have any weight or influence to bias the judgment of the reader1 but because he wishes it to be understood that he entertains the most profound veneration for the great and good men whose works seem to stand in the way of the following design to vindicate the glory of ,god1 and which1 therefore1 he will not scruple to assail in so far as this may be necessary to his purpose4 ,it is1 indeed1 a matter of deep and inexpressible regret1 that in our conflicts with the powers of darkness1 we should1 however undesignedly1 be weakened and opposed by ,christian divines and philosophers4 ,but so it seems to be1 and we dare not cease to resist them4 ,and if1 in the following attempt to vindicate the glory of ,god1 it shall become necessary to call in question the infallibility of the great founders of human systems1 this1 it is to be hoped1 will not be deemed an unpardonable offence4 ,thus has the writer endeavoured to work his way through the mingled lights and obscurity of human systems into a bright and beautiful vision of the great harmonious system of the world itself4 ,it is certainly either a sublime truth1 or else a glorious illusion1 which thus enables him to rise above the apparent disorders and perturbations of the world1 as constituted and governed by the ,almighty1 and behold the real order and harmony therein established4 ,the ideal creations of the poet and the philosopher sink into perfect insignificance beside the actual creation of ,god4 ,where clouds and darkness once appeared the most impenetrable1 there scenes of indescribable magnificence and beauty are now beheld with inexpressible delight2 the stupendous cloud of evil no longer hangs overhead1 but rolls beneath us1 while the eternal ,reason from above permeates its gloom1 and irradiates its depths4 ,we now behold the reason1 and absolutely rejoice in the contemplation1 of that which once seemed like a dark blot on the world's design4 ,in using this language1 we do not wish to be understood as laying claim to the discovery of any great truth1 or any new principle4 ,yet we do trust1 that we have attained to a clear and precise statement of old truths4 ,and these truths1 thus clearly defined1 we trust that we have seized with a firm grasp1 and carried as lights through the dark places of theology1 so as to expel thence the errors and delusions by which its glory has been obscured4 ,moreover1 if we have not succeeded1 nor even attempted to succeed1 in solving any mysteries1 properly so called1 yet may we have removed certain apparent contradictions1 which have been usually deemed insuperable to the human mind4 ,but even if the reader should be satisfied beforehand1 that no additional light will herein be thrown on the problem of the moral world1 yet would we remind him1 that it does not necessarily follow that the ensuing discourse is wholly unworthy of his attention3 for the materials1 though old1 may be presented in new combinations1 and much may be omitted which has disfigured and obscured the beauty of most other systems4 ,although no new fountains of light may be opened1 yet may the vision of the soul be so purged of certain films of error as to enable it to reflect the glory of the spiritual universe1 just as a single dew-drop is seen to mirror forth the magnificent cope of heaven with all its multitude of stars4 ,we have sought the truth1 and how far we have found it1 no one should proceed to determine without having first read and examined4 ,we have sought it1 not in ,calvinism alone1 nor in ,arminianism alone1 nor in any other creed or system of man's devising4 ,in every direction have we diligently sought it1 as our feeble abilities would permit2 and yet1 we hope1 it will be found that the body of truth which we now have to offer is not a mere hasty patchwork of superficial eclecticism1 but a living and organic whole4 ,by this test we could wish to be tried2 for1 as ,bacon hath well said1 8,it is the harmony of any philosophy in itself that giveth it light and credence40 ,and in the application of this test1 we could also wish1 that the reader would so far forget his sectarian predilections1 if he have any1 as to permit his mind to be inspired by the immortal words of ,milton1 which we shall here adopt as a fitting conclusion of these our present remarks3-- 8,truth1 indeed1 came once into the world with her divine ,master1 and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on2 but when he ascended1 and his apostles after him were laid asleep1 then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers1 who1 as that story goes of the ,egyptian ,typhon1 with his conspirators1 how they dealt with the good ,osiris1 took the virgin1 ,truth1 hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces1 and scattered them to the four winds4 ,from that time ever since the sad friends of ,truth1 such as durst appear1 imitating the careful search that ,isis made for the mangled body of ,osiris1 went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them4 ,we have not yet found them all1 nor ever shall do1 till her ,master's second coming2 he shall bring together every joint and member1 and shall mould them into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection4 ,suffer not these licensing prohibitions to stand at every place of opportunity1 forbidding and disturbing them that continue seeking1 that continue to do our obsequies to the torn body of our martyred saint4 ,we boast our light2 but if we look not wisely on the sun itself1 it smites us into darkness4 ,who can discern those planets that are oft combust1 and those stars of brightest magnitude1 that rise and set with the sun1 until the opposite motion of their orbs bring them to such a place in the firmament1 where they may be seen morning or evening8 ,the light which we have gained was given us1 not to be ever staring on1 but by it to discover onward things more remote from our knowledge4 ,it is not the unfrocking of a priest1 the unmitring of a bishop1 and the removing him from off the ,presbyterian shoulders1 that will make us a happy nation2 no1 if other things as great in the ,church1 and in the rule of life1 both economical and political1 be not looked into and reformed1 we have looked so long upon the blaze that ,zuinglius and ,calvin have beaconed up to us1 that we are stark blind4 ,there be who perpetually complain of schisms and sects1 and make it such a calamity that any man dissents from their maxims4 ,it is their own pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing1 who neither will hear with meekness1 nor can convince1 yet all must be suppressed which is not found in their ,syntagma4 ,they are the troublers1 they are the dividers of unity1 who neglect and permit not others to unite those dissevered pieces which are yet wanting to the body of truth4 ,to be still searching what we know not1 by what we know1 still closing up truth to truth as we find it1 7for all her body is homogeneal and proportional17 this is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic1 and makes up the best harmony in a ,church2 not the forced and outward union of cold1 and neutral1 and inwardly-divided minds40 ,part ,i4 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,moral ,,evil1 ,,or ,,sin1 ,,consistent ,,with ,,the ,,holiness ,,of ,,god4 ,what ,time this ,world's great ,workmaister did cast1 ,to make all things such as we now behold1 ,it seems that he before his eyes had plast ,a goodly patterne1 to whose perfect mould ,he fashion'd them as comely as he could1 ,that now so fair and seemly they appear1 ,as naught may be amended anywhere4 ,that wondrous patterne1 wheresoe'er it be1 ,whether in earth laid up in secret store1 ,or else in heav'n1 that no man may it see ,with sinful eyes1 for feare it to deflore1 ,is perfect ,beautie4--,,spenser4 ,chapter ,i4 ,the ,scheme ,of ,necessity ,denies ,that ,man ,is ,responsible ,for ,the ,existence ,of ,sin4 ,ye1 who live1 ,do so each cause refer to ,heaven above1 ,e'en as its motion1 of necessity1 ,drew with it all that moves4 ,if this were so1 ,free choice in you were none2 nor justice would ,there should be joy for virtue1 woe for ill4--,,dante4 ,the doctrine of necessity has been1 in all ages of the world1 the great stronghold of atheism4 ,it is the mighty instrument with which the unbeliever seeks to strip man of all accountability1 and to destroy our faith and confidence in ,god1 by tracing up the existence of all moral evil to his agency4 8,the opinion of necessity10 says ,bishop ,butler1 8seems to be the very basis in which infidelity grounds itself40 ,it will not be denied that this opinion seems1 at first view1 to be inconsistent with the free agency and accountability of man1 and that it appears to impair our idea of ,god by staining it with impurity4 ,hence it has been used1 by the profligate and profane1 to excuse men for their crimes4 ,it is against this use of the doctrine that we intend to direct the force of our argument4 ,but here the question arises3 ,can we refute the argument against the accountability of man1 without attacking the doctrine on which it is founded8 ,if we can meet this argument at all1 it must be either by showing that no such consequence flows from the scheme of necessity1 or by showing that the scheme itself is false4 ,we cannot meet the sceptic1 who seeks to excuse his sins1 and to cast dishonour on ,god1 and expose his sophistry1 unless we can show that his premises are unsound1 or that his conclusions are false4 ,we must do the one or the other of these two things2 or1 whatever we may think of his moral sensibility1 we must acknowledge the superiority of his reason and logic4 ,after long and patient meditation on the subject1 we have been forced to the conclusion1 that the only way to repel the argument of the sceptic1 and cause the intrinsic lustre of man's free-agency to appear1 is to unravel and refute the doctrine of necessity4 ,if we could preserve the scheme of necessity1 and at the same time avoid the consequences in question1 we may fairly conclude that the means of doing so have been found by some of the illustrious advocates of that scheme4 ,how1 then1 do they vindicate their own system8 ,how do they repel the frightful consequences which infidelity deduces from it8 ,this is the first question to be considered2 and the discussion of it will occupy the remainder of the present chapter4 ,section ,i4 ,the attempts of ,calvin and ,luther to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the responsibility of man4 ,nothing can be more unjust than to bring1 as has often been done1 the unqualified charge of fatalism against the great ,protestant reformers4 ,the manner in which this odious epithet is frequently used1 applying it without discrimination to the brightest ornaments and to the darkest specimens of humanity1 is calculated to engender far more heat than light4 ,indeed1 under this very ambiguous term1 three distinct schemes of doctrine1 widely different from each other1 are set forth2 schemes which every candid inquirer after truth should be careful to distinguish4 ,the first is that scheme of fatalism which rests on the fundamental idea that there is nothing in the universe besides matter and local motion4 ,this doctrine1 of course1 denies the spirituality of the ,divine ,being1 as well as of all created souls1 and strikes a fatal blow at the immutability of moral distinctions4 ,it is unnecessary to say1 that in such a sense of the word1 neither ,calvin nor ,luther can be justly accused of fatalism2 as it is well known that both of them maintained the spirituality of ,god1 as well as the reality of moral distinctions prior to all human laws4 ,the second scheme of fatalism rises above the first in point of dignity and purity of character4 ,it proceeds on the idea that all things in heaven and earth are bound together by 8an implexed series and concatenation of causes30 it admits the existence of ,god1 it is true1 but yet it regards him as merely the greatest and brightest link in the adamantine universal chain of necessity4 ,according to this scheme1 as well as to the former1 the very idea of moral liberty is inconceivable and impossible4 ,this portentous scheme was perfectly understood and expressly repudiated by ,calvin4 ,in reference to this doctrine1 which was maintained by the ancient ,stoics1 he says3 8,that dogma is falsely and maliciously charged upon us4 ,for we do not1 with the ,stoics1 imagine a necessity arising from a perpetual concatenation and intricate series of causes contained in nature2 but we make ,god the ,arbiter and ,governor of all things1 who1 in his own wisdom1 has1 from all eternity1 decreed what he would do1 and now by his own power executes what he decreed40 ,here we behold the nature of the third scheme1 which has been included under the term fatalism4 ,it recognises ,god as the great central and all-controlling power of the universe4 ,it does not deny the possibility of liberty2 for it recognises its actual existence in the ,divine ,being4 8,if the divine will10 says ,calvin1 8has any cause1 then there must be something antecedent1 on which it depends2 which it is impious to suppose40 ,according to ,calvin1 it is the uncaused divine will which makes the 8necessity of all things40 ,he frequently sets forth the doctrine1 that1 from all eternity1 ,god decreed whatever should come to pass1 not excepting1 but expressly including1 the deliberations and 8volitions of men10 and by his own power now executes his decree4 ,as we do not wish to use opprobrious names1 we shall characterize these three several schemes of doctrine by the appellations given to them by their advocates4 ,the first we shall call1 8materialistic fatalism20 the second1 8,stoical fatalism20 and the third we shall designate by the term1 8necessity40 ,widely as these schemes may differ in other respects1 they have one feature in common3 they all seem to bear with equal stringency on the human will1 and deprive it of that freedom which is now conceded to be indispensable to render men accountable for their actions4 ,if our volitions be produced by a series of causes1 according to the ,stoical notion of fate1 or by the omnipotence of ,god1 they would seem to be equally necessitated and devoid of freedom4 ,hence1 in attacking one of these schemes at this point1 we really attack them all4 ,we shall first consider the question1 then1 ,how does ,calvin attempt to reconcile his doctrine with the accountability of man8 ,how does he show1 for example1 that the first man was guilty and justly punishable for a transgression in which he succumbed to the divine omnipotence8 ,if a man is really laid under a necessity of sinning1 it would certainly seem impossible to conceive that he is responsible for his sins4 ,nay1 it would not only seem impossible to conceive this1 but it would also appear very easy to understand1 that he could not be responsible for them4 ,in order to remove this difficulty1 and repel the attack of his opponents1 ,calvin makes a distinction between 8co-action and necessity40 8,now1 when ,i assert10 says he1 8that the will1 being deprived of its liberty1 is necessarily drawn or led into evil1 ,i should wonder if any one considered it as a harsh expression1 since it has nothing in it absurd1 nor is it unsanctioned by the custom of good men4 ,it offends those who know not how to distinguish between necessity and compulsion407#b7 ,let us see1 then1 what is this distinction between necessity and compulsion1 or co-action1 7as ,calvin sometimes calls it17 which is to take off all appearance of harshness from his views4 ,we are not to imagine that this is a distinction without a difference2 for1 in truth1 there is no distinction in philosophy which may be more easily made1 or more clearly apprehended4 ,it is this3 ,suppose a man wills a particular thing1 or external action1 and it is prevented from happening by any outward restraint2 or suppose he is unwilling to do a thing1 and he is constrained to do it against his will2 he is said to labour under compulsion or co-action4 ,of course he is not accountable for the failure of the consequence of his will in the one case1 nor for the consequence of the force imposed on his body in the other4 ,this kind of necessity is called co-action by ,calvin and ,luther2 it is usually denominated 8natural necessity0 by ,edwards and his followers2 though it is also frequently termed compulsion1 or co-action1 by them4 ,this natural necessity1 or co-action1 it is admitted on all hands1 destroys accountability for external conduct1 wherever it obtains4 ,indeed1 if a man is compelled to do a thing against his will1 this is not1 properly speaking1 his act at all2 nor is it an omission of his1 if he wills to do a thing1 and is necessarily prevented from doing it by external restraint4 ,but it should be observed that natural necessity1 or co-action1 reaches no deeper than the external conduct2 and can excuse for nothing else4 ,as it does not influence the will itself1 so it cannot excuse for acts of the will4 ,indeed1 it presupposes the existence of a volition1 or act of the will1 whose natural consequences it counteracts and overcomes4 ,hence1 if the question were--,is a man accountable for his external actions1 that is1 for the motions of his body1 we might speak of natural necessity1 or co-action1 with propriety2 but not so when the question relates to internal acts of the will4 ,all reference to natural necessity1 or co-action1 in relation to such a question1 is wholly irrelevant4 ,no one doubts1 and no one denies1 that the motions of the body are controlled by the volitions of the mind1 or by some external force4 ,the advocates for the inherent activity and freedom of the mind1 do not place them in the external sphere of matter1 in the passive and necessitated movements of body3 they seek not the living among the dead4 ,but to do justice to these illustrious men1 they did not attempt1 as many of their followers have done1 to pass off this freedom from external co-action for the freedom of the will4 ,indeed1 neither of them contended for the freedom of the will at all1 nor deemed such freedom requisite to render men accountable for their actions4 ,this is an element which has been wrought into their system by the subsequent progress of human knowledge4 ,luther1 it is well known1 so far from maintaining the freedom of the mind1 wrote a work on the 8,bondage of the ,human ,will10 in reply to ,erasmus4 8,i admit10 says he1 8that man's will is free in a certain sense2 not because it is now in the same state it was in paradise1 but because it was made free originally1 and may1 through ,god's grace1 become so again407#c7 ,and ,calvin1 in his ,institutes1 has written a chapter to show that 8man1 in his present state1 is despoiled of freedom of will1 and subjected to a miserable slavery40 ,he 8was endowed with free will10 says ,calvin1 8by which1 if he had chosen1 he might have obtained eternal life407#d7 ,thus1 according to both ,luther and ,calvin1 man was by the fall despoiled of the freedom of the will4 ,though they allow a freedom from co-action1 they repudiate the idea of calling this a freedom of the will4 8,lombard at length pronounces10 says ,calvin1 8that we are not therefore possessed of free-will1 because we have an equal power to do or to think either good or evil1 but only because we are free from constraint4 ,and this liberty is not diminished1 although we are corrupt1 and slaves of sin1 and capable of doing nothing but sin4 ,then man will be said to possess free-will in this sense1 not that he has an equally free election of good and evil1 but because he does evil voluntarily1 and not by constraint4 ,that indeed1 is true2 but what end could it answer to deck out a thing so diminutive with a title so superb807#e7 ,truly1 if ,lombard merely meant by the freedom of the will1 for which he contended1 a freedom from external restraint1 or co-action1 ,calvin might well contemptuously exclaim1 8,egregious liberty607#f7 ,it was reserved for a later period in the history of the ,church to deck out this diminutive thing with the superb title of the freedom of the will1 and to pass it off for the highest and most glorious liberty of which the human mind can form any conception4 ,hobbes1 it will be hereafter seen1 was the first who1 either designedly or undesignedly1 palmed off this imposture upon the world4 ,it is a remarkable fact1 in the history of the human mind1 that the most powerful and imposing arguments used by the early reformers to disprove the freedom of the will have been as confidently employed by their most celebrated followers to establish that very freedom on a solid basis4 ,it is well known1 for example1 that ,edwards1 and many other great men1 have employed the doctrine of the foreknowledge of ,god to prove philosophical necessity1 without which they conclude there can be no rational foundation for the freedom of the will4 ,yet1 in former times1 this very doctrine was regarded as the most formidable instrument with which to overthrow and demolish that very freedom4 ,thus ,luther calls the foreknowledge of ,god a thunderbolt to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms4 ,and who can forbear to agree with ,luther so far as to say1 that if the foreknowledge of ,god proves anything in opposition to the freedom of the will1 it proves that it is under the most absolute and uncontrollable necessity8 ,it clearly seems1 that if it proves anything in favour of necessity1 it proves everything for which the most absolute necessitarian can contend4 ,accordingly1 a distinguished ,calvinistic divine has said1 that if our volitions be foreseen1 we can no more avoid them 8than we can pluck the sun out of the heavens407#g7 ,but though the reformers were thus1 in some respects1 more true to their fundamental principle than their followers have been1 we are not to suppose that they are free from all inconsistencies and self-contradiction4 ,thus1 if 8foreknowledge is a thunderbolt0 to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms1 it destroyed free-will in man before the fall as well as after4 ,hence the thunderbolt of ,luther falls upon his own doctrine1 that man possessed free-will in his primitive state1 with as much force as it can upon the doctrine of his opponents4 ,he is evidently caught in the toils he so confidently prepared for his adversary4 ,and how many of the followers of the great reformer adopt his doctrine1 and wield his thunderbolts1 without perceiving how destructively they recoil on themselves6 ,though they ascribe free-will to man as one of the elements of his pristine glory1 yet they employ against it in his present condition arguments which1 if good for anything1 would despoil1 not only man1 but the whole universe of created intelligences--nay1 the great ,uncreated ,intelligence himself--of every vestige and shadow of such a power4 ,it is a wonderful inconsistency in ,luther1 that he should so often and so dogmatically assert that the doctrine of free-will falls prostrate before the prescience of ,god1 and at the same time maintain the freedom of the divine will4 ,if foreknowledge is incompatible with the existence of free-will1 it is clear that the will of ,god is not free2 since it is on all sides conceded that all his volitions are perfectly foreseen by him4 ,yet in the face of this conclusion1 which so clearly and so irresistibly follows from ,luther's position1 he asserts the freedom of the divine will1 as if he were perfectly unconscious of the self-contradiction in which he is involved4 8,it now then follows10 says he1 8that free-will is plainly a divine term1 and can be applicable to none but the ,divine ,majesty only407#h7 444 ,he even says1 ,if free-will 8be ascribed unto men1 it is not more properly ascribed1 than the divinity of ,god himself would be ascribed unto them2 which would be the greatest of all sacrilege4 ,wherefore1 it becomes theologians to refrain from the use of this term altogether1 whenever they wish to speak of human ability1 and to leave it to be applied to ,god only407#i7 ,and we may add1 if they would apply it to ,god1 it becomes them to refrain from all such arguments as would show even such an application of it to be absurd4 ,in like manner1 ,calvin admits that the human soul possessed a free-will in its primitive state1 but has been despoiled of it by the fall1 and is now in bondage to a 8miserable slavery40 ,but if the necessity which arises from the power of sin over the will be inconsistent with its freedom1 how are we to reconcile the freedom of the first man with the power exercised by the ,almighty over the wills of all created beings8 ,so true it is1 that the most systematic thinker1 who begins by denying the truth1 will be sure to end by contradicting himself4 ,in one respect1 as we have seen1 ,calvin differs from his followers at the present day2 the denial of free-will he regards as perfectly reconcilable with the idea of accountability4 ,although our volitions are absolutely necessary to us1 although they may be produced in us by the most uncontrollable power in the universe1 yet are we accountable for them1 because they are our volitions4 ,the bare fact that we will such and such a thing1 without regard to how we come by the volition1 is sufficient to render us accountable for it4 ,we must be free from an external co-action1 he admits1 to render us accountable for our external actions2 but not from an internal necessity1 to render us accountable for our internal volitions4 ,but this does not seem to be a satisfactory reply to the difficulty in question4 ,we ask1 ,how a man can be accountable for his acts1 for his volitions1 if they are caused in him by an infinite power8 and we are told1 ,because they are his acts4 ,this eternal repetition of the fact in which all sides are agreed1 can throw no light on the point about which we dispute4 ,we still ask1 ,how can a man be responsible for an act1 or volition1 which is necessitated to arise in his mind by ,omnipotence8 ,if any one should reply1 with ,dr4 ,dick1 that we do not know how he can be accountable for such an act1 yet we should never deny a thing because we cannot see how it is2 this would not be a satisfactory answer4 ,for1 though it is certainly the last weakness of the human mind to deny a thing1 because we cannot see how it is2 yet there is a great difference between not being able to see how a thing is1 and being clearly able to see that it cannot be anyhow at all1--between being unable to see how two things agree together1 and being able to see that two ideas are utterly repugnant to each other4 ,hence we mean to ask1 that if a man's act be necessitated in him by an infinite1 omnipotent power1 over which he had1 and could have1 no possible control1 can we not see that he cannot be accountable for it8 ,we have no difficulty whatever in believing a mystery2 but when we are required to embrace what so plainly seems to be an absurdity1 we confess that our reason is either weak enough1 or strong enough1 to pause and reluctate4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the manner in which ,hobbes1 ,collins1 and others1 endeavour to reconcile necessity with free and accountable agency4 ,the celebrated philosopher of ,malmsbury viewed all things as bound together in the relation of cause and effect2 and he was1 beyond doubt1 one of the most acute thinkers that ever advocated the doctrine of necessity4 ,from some of the sentiments expressed towards the conclusion of 8,the ,leviathan10 which have1 not without reason1 subjected him to the charge of atheism1 we may doubt his entire sincerity when he pretends to advocate the doctrine of necessity out of a zeal for the ,divine ,sovereignty and the dogma of ,predestination4 ,if he hoped by this avowal of his design to propitiate any class of theologians1 he must have been greatly disappointed2 for his speculations were universally condemned by the ,christian world as atheistical in their tendency4 ,this charge has been fixed upon him1 in spite of his solemn protestations against its injustice1 and his earnest endeavours to reconcile his scheme of necessity with the free-agency and accountability of man4 8,i conceive10 says ,hobbes1 8that nothing taketh beginning from itself1 but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself4 ,and that therefore1 when first a man hath an appetite or will to something1 to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will1 the cause of his will is not the will itself1 but something else not in his own disposing2 so that it is out of controversy1 that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause1 and by this which is said1 the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not1 it followeth1 that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes1 and therefore are necessitated40 ,this is clear and explicit4 ,there is no controversy1 he truly says1 that voluntary actions1 that is1 external actions proceeding from the will1 are necessitated by the will4 ,and as according to his postulate1 the will or volition is also caused by other things of which it has no disposal1 so they are also necessitated4 ,in other words1 external voluntary actions are necessarily caused by volitions1 and volitions are necessarily caused by something else other than the will2 and consequently the chain is complete between the cause of volition and its effects4 ,how1 then1 is man a free-agent8 and how is he accountable for his actions8 ,hobbes has not left these questions unanswered2 and it is a mistake to suppose1 as is too often done1 that his argument in favour of necessity evinces a design to sap the foundations of human responsibility4 ,he answers these questions precisely as they were answered by ,luther and ,calvin more than a hundred years before his time4 ,in order to solve this great difficulty1 and establish an agreement between necessity and liberty1 he insists on the distinction between co-action and necessity4 ,sir ,james ,mackintosh says1 that 8in his treatise de ,servo ,arbitrio against ,erasmus1 ,luther states the distinction between co-action and necessity as familiar a hundred and fifty years before it was proposed by ,hobbes1 or condemned in the ,jansenists407#aj7 ,according to his definition of liberty1 it is merely a freedom from co-action1 or external compulsion4 8,i conceive liberty10 says he1 8to be rightly defined in this manner3 ,liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical qualities of the agent3 as for example1 the water is said to descend freely1 or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river1 because there is no impediment that way2 but not across1 because the banks are impediments2 and though the water cannot ascend1 yet men never say it wants liberty to ascend1 but the faculty or power1 because the impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsical40 ,according to this definition1 though a man's volitions were thrown out1 not by himself1 but by some irresistible power working within his mind1 say the power of the ,almighty1 yet he would be free1 provided there were no impediments to prevent the external effects of his volitions4 ,this is the liberty which water1 impelled by the power of gravity1 possesses in descending the channel of a river4 ,it is the liberty of the winds and waves of the sea1 which1 by a sort of metaphor1 is supposed to reign over the dominions of a mechanical and materialistic fate4 ,it is the most idle of all idle things to speak of such a liberty1 or rather1 to use the word in such a sense1 when the controversy relates to the freedom of the mind itself4 ,what has such a thing to do with the origin of human volitions1 or the nature of moral agency8 ,is there no difference between the motion of the body and the action of mind8 ,or is there nothing in the universe of ,god but mere body and local motion8 ,if there is not1 then1 indeed1 we neither have nor can conceive any higher liberty than that which the philosopher is pleased to allow us to possess2 but if there be mind1 then there may be things in heaven and earth which are not dreamed of in his philosophy4 ,the definition which ,collins1 the disciple of ,hobbes1 has given of liberty1 is the same as that of his master4 8,i contend10 says he1 8for liberty1 as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills or pleases40 ,the doing here refers to the external action1 which1 properly speaking1 is not an act at all1 but merely a change of state in the body4 ,the body merely suffers a change of place and position1 in obedience to the act of the will2 it does not act1 nor can it act1 because it is passive in its nature4 ,to do as one wills1 in this sense1 is a freedom of the body from co-action2 it is not a freedom of the will from internal necessity4 ,collins says this is 8a valuable liberty10 and he says truly2 for if one were thrown into prison1 he could not go wherever he might please1 or do as he might will4 ,but the imprisonment of the body does not prevent a man from being a free-agent4 ,he also tells us truly1 that 8many philosophers and theologians1 both ancient and modern1 have given definitions of liberty that are consistent with fate and necessity40 ,but then1 their definitions1 like his own1 had no reference to the acts of the mind1 but to the motions of the body2 and it is a grand irrelevancy1 we repeat1 to speak of such a thing1 when the question relates1 not to the freedom of the body1 but the freedom of the mind4 ,calvin truly says1 that to call this external freedom from co-action or natural necessity a freedom of the will1 is to decorate a most diminutive thing with a superb title2 but the philosopher of ,malmsbury1 and his ingenious disciple1 seem disposed to confer the high-sounding title and empty name on us1 in order to reconcile us to the servitude and chains in which they have been pleased to bind us4 ,this idea of liberty1 common to ,hobbes and ,collins1 which ,mackintosh says was familiar to ,luther and ,calvin at least a hundred and thirty years before1 is in reality of much earlier origin4 ,it was maintained by the ancient ,stoics1 by whom it is as clearly set forth as by ,hobbes himself4 ,the well-known illustration of the ,stoic ,chrysippus1 so often mentioned by ,leibnitz and others1 is a proof of the correctness of this remark3 8,suppose ,i push against a heavy body10 says he3 8if it be square1 it will not move2 if it be cylindrical1 it will4 ,what the difference of form is to the stone1 the difference of disposition is to the mind40 ,thus his notion of freedom was derived from matter1 and supposed to consist in the absence of friction6 ,the idea of liberty thus deduced from that which is purely and perfectly passive1 from an absolutely necessitated state of body1 was easily reconciled by him with his doctrine of fate4 ,is it not strange that ,mr4 ,hazlitt1 after adopting this definition of liberty1 should have supposed that he allowed a real freedom to the will8 8,i prefer exceedingly10 says he1 8to the modern instances of a couple of billiard-balls1 or a pair of scales1 the illustration of ,chrysippus40 ,we cannot very well see1 how the instance of a cylinder is so great an improvement on that of a billiard-ball2 especially as a sphere1 and not a cylinder1 is free to move in all directions4 ,the truth is1 we must quit the region of dead1 inert1 passive matter1 if we would form an idea of the true meaning of the term liberty1 as applied to the activity of living agents4 ,mr4 ,hazlitt evidently loses himself amid the ambiguities of language1 when he says1 that 8,i so far agree with ,hobbes and differ from ,locke1 in thinking that liberty1 in the most extended and abstracted sense1 is applicable to material as well as voluntary agents40 ,still this very acute writer makes a few feeble and ineffectual efforts to raise our notion of the liberty of moral agents above that given by the illustration of ,chrysippus in ,cicero4 8,my notion of a free agent1 ,i confess10 says he1 8is not that represented by ,mr4 ,hobbes1 namely1 one that when all things necessary to produce the effect are present1 can nevertheless not produce it2 but ,i believe a free-agent of whatever kind is one which1 where all things necessary to produce the effect are present1 can produce it2 its own operation not being hindered by anything else4 ,the body is said to be free when it has the power to obey the direction of the will2 so the will may be said to be free when it has the power to obey the dictates of the understanding407#aa7 ,thus the liberty of the will is made to consist not in the denial that its volitions are produced1 but in the absence of impediments which might hinder its operations from taking effect4 ,this idea of liberty1 it is evident1 is perfectly consistent with the materialistic fatalism of ,hobbes1 which is so much admired by ,mr4 ,hazlitt4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the sentiments of ,descartes1 ,spinoza1 and ,malebranche1 concerning the relation between liberty and necessity4 ,no one was ever more deeply implicated in the scheme of necessity than ,descartes4 8,mere philosophy10 says he1 8is enough to make us know that there cannot enter the least thought into the mind of man1 but ,god must will and have willed from all eternity that it should enter there40 ,his argument in proof of this position is short and intelligible4 8,god10 says he1 8could not be absolutely perfect if there could happen anything in this world which did not spring entirely from him40 ,hence it follows1 that it is inconsistent with the absolute perfections of ,god to suppose that a being created by him could put forth a volition which does not spring entirely from him1 and not even in part from the creature4 ,yet ,descartes is a warm believer in the doctrine of free-will4 ,on the ground of reason1 he believes in an absolute predestination of all things2 and yet he concludes from experience that man is free4 ,if we ask how these things can hang together1 he replies1 that we cannot tell2 that a solution of this difficulty lies beyond the reach of the human faculties4 ,now1 it is evident1 that reason cannot 8make us know0 one thing1 and experience teach another1 quite contrary to it2 for no two truths can ever contradict each other4 ,those who adopt this mode of viewing the subject1 generally remind us of the feebleness of human reason1 and of the necessary limits to all human speculation4 ,though1 as disciples of ,butler1 we are deeply impressed with these truths1 yet1 as disciples of ,bacon1 we do not intend to despair until we can discover some good and sufficient reason for so doing4 ,it seems to us1 that the reply of ,leibnitz to ,descartes1 already alluded to1 is not without reason4 8,it might have been an evidence of humility in ,descartes10 says he1 8if he had confessed his own inability to solve the difficulty in question2 but not satisfied with confessing for himself1 he does so for all intelligences and for all times40 ,but1 after all1 ,descartes has really endeavoured to solve the problem which he declared insoluble2 that is1 to reconcile the infinite perfections of ,god with the free-agency of man4 ,he struggles to break loose from this dark mystery2 but1 like the charmed bird1 he struggles and flutters in vain1 and finally yields to its magical influence4 ,in his solution1 this great luminary of science1 like others before him1 seems to suffer a sad eclipse4 8,before ,god sent us into the world10 says he1 8he knew exactly what all the inclinations of our wills would be2 it is he that has implanted them in us2 it is he also that has disposed all things1 so that such or such objects should present themselves to us at such or such times1 by means of which he has known that our free-will would determine us to such or such actions1 he has willed that it should be so2 but he has not willed to constrain us thereto40 ,this is found in a letter to the ,princess ,elizabeth1 for whose benefit he endeavoured to reconcile the liberty of man with the perfections of ,god4 ,it brings us back to the old distinction between necessity and co-action4 ,god brings our volitions to pass2 he wills them2 they 8spring entirely from him20 but we are nevertheless free1 because he constrains not our external actions1 or compels us to do anything contrary to our wills6 ,we cannot suppose1 however1 that this solution of the problem made a very clear or deep impression on the mind of ,descartes himself1 or he would not1 on other occasions1 have pronounced every attempt at the solution of it vain and hopeless4 ,in his attempt to reconcile the free-agency of man with the divine perfections1 ,descartes deceives himself by a false analogy4 ,thus he supposes that a monarch 8who has forbidden duelling1 and who1 certainly knowing that two gentlemen will fight1 if they should meet1 employs infallible means to bring them together4 ,they meet1 they fight each other3 their disobedience of the laws is an effect of their free-will2 they are punishable40 8,what a king can do in such a case10 he adds1 8,god who has an infinite power and prescience1 infallibly does in relation to all the actions of men40 ,but the king1 in the supposed case1 does not act on the minds of the duellists2 their disposition to disobey the laws does not proceed from him2 whereas1 according to the theory of ,descartes1 nothing enters into the mind of man which does not spring entirely from ,god4 ,if we suppose a king1 who has direct access to the mind of his subject1 like ,god1 and who employs his power to excite therein a murderous intent or any other particular disposition to disobey the law1 we shall have a more apposite representation of the divine agency according to the theory of ,descartes4 ,has anything ever been ascribed to the agency of ,satan himself which could more clearly render him an accomplice in the sins of men8 ,from the bosom of ,cartesianism two systems arose1 one in principle1 but widely different in their developments and ultimate results4 ,we allude to the celebrated schemes of ,spinoza and ,malebranche4 ,both set out with the same exaggerated view of the sublime truth that ,god is all in all2 and each gave a diverse development to this fundamental position1 to this central idea1 according as the logical faculty predominated over the moral1 or the moral faculty over the logical4 ,father ,malebranche1 by a happy inconsistency1 preserved the great moral interests of the world against the invasion of a remorseless logic4 ,spinoza1 on the contrary1 could follow out his first principle almost to its last consequence1 even to the entire extinction of the moral light of the universe1 and the enthronement of blind power1 with as little concern1 with as profound composure1 as if he were merely discussing a theorem in the mathematics4 8,all things10 says he1 8determined to such and such actions1 are determined by ,god2 and1 if ,god determines not a thing to act1 it cannot determine itself407#ab7 ,from this proposition he drew the inference1 that things which are produced by ,god1 could not have existed in any other manner1 nor in any other order47#ac7 ,thus1 by the divine power1 all things in heaven and earth are bound together in the iron circle of necessity4 ,it required no great logical foresight to perceive that this doctrine shut all real liberty out of the created universe2 but it did require no little moral firmness1 or very great moral insensibility1 to declare such a consequence with the unflinching audacity which marks its enunciation by ,spinoza4 ,he repeatedly declares1 in various modes of expression1 that 8the soul is a spiritual automaton10 and possesses no such liberty as is usually ascribed to it4 ,all is necessary1 and the very notion of a free-will is a vulgar prejudice4 8,all ,i have to say10 he coolly remarks1 8to those who believe that they can speak or keep silence--in one word1 can act--by virtue of a free decision of the soul1 is1 that they dream with their eyes open407#ad7 ,though he thus boldly denies all free-will1 according to the common notion of mankind2 yet1 no less than ,hobbes and ,collins1 he allows that the soul possesses 8a sort of liberty40 8,it is free10 says he1 in the act of affirming that 8two and two are equal to four20 thus finding the freedom of the soul which he is pleased to allow the world to possess in the most perfect type of necessity it is possible to conceive4 ,but ,spinoza does not employ this idea of liberty1 nor any other1 to show that man is a responsible being4 ,this is not at all strange2 the wonder is1 that after having demonstrated that 8the prejudice of men concerning good and evil1 merit and demerit1 praise and blame1 order and confusion1 beauty and deformity10 are nothing but dreams1 he should have felt bound to defend the position1 that we may be justly punished for our offences by the ,supreme ,ruler of the world4 ,his defence of this doctrine we shall lay before the reader without a word of comment4 8,will you say10 he replies to ,oldenburg1 8that ,god cannot be angry with the wicked1 or that all men are worthy of beatitude8 ,in regard to the first point1 ,i perfectly agree that ,god cannot be angry at anything which happens according to his decree1 but ,i deny that it results that all men ought to be happy2 for men can be excusable1 and at the same time be deprived of beatification1 and made to suffer a thousand ways4 ,a horse is excusable for being a horse1 and not a man2 but that prevents not that he ought to be a horse1 and not a man4 ,he who is rendered mad by the bite of a dog1 is surely excusable1 and yet we ought to constrain him4 ,in like manner1 the man who cannot govern his passions1 nor restrain them by the fear of the laws1 though excusable on account of the infirmity of his nature1 can nevertheless not enjoy peace1 nor the knowledge and the love of ,god2 and it is necessary that he should perish407#ae7 ,it was as difficult for ,father ,malebranche to restrain his indignation at the system of ,spinoza1 as it was for him to expose its fallacy1 after having admitted its great fundamental principle4 ,this is well illustrated by the facts stated by ,m4 ,saisset3 8,when ,mairan10 says he1 8still young1 and having a strong passion for the study of the #8,ethique1' requested ,malebranche to guide him in that perilous route2 we know with what urgency1 bordering on importunity1 he pressed the illustrious father to show him the weak point of ,spinozism1 the precise place where the rigour of the reasoning failed1 the paralogism contained in the demonstration4 ,malebranche eluded the question1 and could not assign the paralogism1 after which ,mairan so earnestly sought3 #8,it is not that the paralogism is in such or such places of the ,ethique1 it is everywhere4' 07#af7 ,in this impatient judgment1 ,father ,malebranche uttered more truth than he could very well perceive2 the paralogism is truly everywhere1 because this whole edifice of words1 8this frightful chimera10 is really assumed in the arbitrary definition of the term substance4 ,we might say with equal truth1 that the fallacy of ,malebranche's scheme is also everywhere2 for although it stops short of the consequences so sternly deduced by ,spinoza1 it sets out from the same distorted view of the sovereignty and dominion of ,god1 from which those consequences necessarily flow4 ,spinoza1 who had but few followers during his lifetime1 has been almost idolized by the most celebrated savants of modern ,germany4 ,whether this will ultimately add to the glory of ,spinoza1 or detract from that of his admirers1 we shall leave the reader and posterity to determine4 ,in the mean time1 we shall content ourselves with a statement of the fact1 in the language of ,m4 ,saisset3 8,everything10 says he1 8appears extraordinary in ,spinoza2 his person1 his style1 his philosophy2 but that which is more strange still1 is the destiny of that philosophy among men4 ,badly known1 despised by the most illustrious of his contemporaries1 ,spinoza died in obscurity1 and remained buried during a century4 ,all at once his name reappeared with an extraordinary eclat2 his works were read with passion2 a new world was discovered in them1 with a horizon unknown to our fathers2 and the god of ,spinoza1 which the seventeenth century had broken as an idol1 became the god of ,lessing1 of ,goethe1 of ,novalis40 8,the solitary thinker whom ,malebranche called a wretch1 ,schleiermacher reveres and invokes as equal to a saint4 ,that #8systematic atheist1' on whom ,bayle lavished outrage1 has been for modern ,germany the most religious of men4 #8,god-intoxicated1' as ,novalis said1 #8he has seen the world through a thick cloud1 and man has been to his troubled eyes only a fugitive mode of ,being in itself4' ,in that system1 in fine1 so shocking and so monstrous1 that #8hideous chimera1' ,jacobi sees the last word of philosophy1 ,schelling the presentiment of the true philosophy40 ,section ,,iv4 ,the views of ,locke1 ,tucker1 ,hartley1 ,priestley1 ,helvetius1 and ,diderot1 with respect to the relation between liberty and necessity4 ,locke1 it is well known1 adopted the notions of free-agency given by ,hobbes4 8,in this10 says he1 8consists freedom1 viz41 in our being able to act or not to act1 according as we shall choose or will407#ag7 ,and this notion of liberty1 consisting in a freedom from external co-action1 has received an impetus and currency from the influence of ,locke which it would not otherwise have obtained4 ,neither ,calvin nor ,luther1 as we have seen1 pretended to hold it up as the freedom of the will4 ,this was reserved for ,hobbes and his immortal follower1 ,john ,locke1 who has1 in his turn1 been copied by a host of illustrious disciples who would have recoiled from the more articulate and consistent development of this doctrine by the philosopher of ,malmsbury4 ,it is only because ,locke has enveloped it in a cloud of inconsistencies that it has been able to secure the veneration of the great and good4 ,it is remarkable1 that although ,locke adopted the definition of free-will given by ,hobbes1 and which the latter so easily reconciled with the omnipotence and omniscience of ,god2 yet he expressly declares that he had found it impossible to reconcile those attributes in the ,divine ,being with the free-agency of man4 ,surely no such difficulty could have existed1 if his definition of free-agency1 or free-will1 be correct2 for although omnipotence itself might produce our volitions1 we might still be free to act1 to move in accordance with our volitions4 ,but the truth is1 there was something more in ,locke's thoughts and feelings1 in the inmost working of his nature1 with respect to moral liberty1 than there was in his definition4 ,the inconsistency and fluctuation of his views on this all-important subject are fully reflected in his chapter on power4 ,both in ,great ,britain and ,france1 the most illustrious successors of ,locke soon delivered themselves from his inconsistencies and self-contradictions4 ,hartley was not in all respects a follower of ,locke1 it is true1 though he admitted his definition of free-agency4 8,it appears to me10 says ,hartley1 8that all the most complex ideas arise from sensation1 and that reflection is not a distinct source1 as ,mr4 ,locke makes it40 ,by this mutilation of the philosophy of ,locke1 it was reduced back to that dead level of materialism in which ,hobbes had left it1 and from which the former had scarcely endeavoured to raise it4 ,hence arose the rigid scheme of necessity1 for which ,hartley is so zealous an advocate4 ,in reading his treatise on the 8,mechanism of the ,human ,mind10 we are irresistibly compelled to feel the conviction that the only circumstance which prevents the movements of the soul from being subjected to mathematical calculation1 and made a branch of dynamics1 is the want of a measure of the force of motives4 ,if this want were supplied1 then the philosophy of the mind might be1 according to his view of its nature and operations1 converted into a portion of mechanics4 ,yet this excellent man did not imagine for a moment that he upheld a scheme which is at war with the great moral interests of the world4 ,he supposes it is no matter how we come by our volitions1 provided our bodies be left free to obey the impulses of the will2 this is amply sufficient to render us accountable for our actions1 and to vindicate the moral government of ,god4 ,thus did he fall asleep with a specious1 but most superficial dream of liberty1 which has no more to do with the real question concerning the moral agency of man than if it related to the winds of heaven or to the waves of the sea4 ,accordingly this is the view of liberty which he repeatedly holds up as all-sufficient to secure the great moral interest of the human race4 ,his great disciple1 ,dr4 ,priestley1 pursues precisely the same course4 8,if a man10 says he1 8be wholly a material being1 and the power of thinking the result of a certain organization of the brain1 does it not follow that all his functions must be regulated by the laws of mechanism1 and that of consequence his actions proceed from an irresistible necessity80 ,and again1 he observes1 8the doctrine of necessity is the immediate result of the materiality of man1 for mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism407#ah7 ,priestley1 however1 allows us to possess free-will as defined by ,hobbes1 ,locke1 and ,hartley4 ,helvetius himself could easily admit such a liberty into his unmitigated scheme of necessity1 but he did not commit the blunder of ,locke and ,hartley1 in supposing that it bore on the great question concerning the freedom of the mind4 8,it is true10 he says1 8we can form a tolerably distinct idea of the word liberty1 understood in its common sense4 ,a man is free who is neither loaded with irons nor confined in prison1 nor intimidated like the slave with the dread of chastisement3 in this sense the liberty of man consists in the free exercise of his power2 ,i say1 of his power1 because it would be ridiculous to mistake for a want of liberty the incapacity we are under to pierce the clouds like the eagle1 to live under the water like the whale1 or to become king1 emperor1 or pope4 ,we have so far a sufficiently clear idea of the word4 ,but this is no longer the case when we come to apply liberty to the will4 ,what must this liberty then mean8 ,we can only understand by it a free power of willing or not willing a thing3 but this power would imply that there may be a will without motives1 and consequently an effect without a cause4 ,a philosophical treatise on the liberty of the will would be a treatise of effects without a cause407#ai7 ,in like manner1 ,diderot had the sagacity to perceive that the idea of liberty1 as defined by ,locke1 did not at all come into conflict with his portentous scheme of irreligion1 which had grounded itself on the doctrine of necessity4 ,having pronounced the term liberty1 as applied to the will1 to be a word without meaning1 he proceeds to justify the infliction of punishment on the same grounds on which it is vindicated by ,hobbes and ,spinoza4 8,but if there is no liberty10 says he1 8there is no action that merits either praise or blame1 neither vice nor virtue1 nothing that ought to be either rewarded or punished4 ,what then is the distinction among men8 ,the doing of good and the doing of evil6 ,the doer of ill is one who must be destroyed1 not punished4 ,the doer of good is lucky1 not virtuous4 ,but though neither the doer of good nor of ill be free1 man is1 nevertheless1 a being to be modified2 it is for this reason the doer of ill should be destroyed upon the scaffold4 ,from thence the good effects of education1 of pleasure1 of grief1 of grandeur1 of poverty1 c42 from thence a philosophy full of pity1 strongly attached to the good1 nor more angry with the wicked than with the whirlwind which fills one's eyes with dust40 444 8,adopt these principles if you think them good1 or show me that they are bad4 ,if you adopt them1 they will reconcile you too with others and with yourself3 you will neither be pleased nor angry with yourself for being what you are4 ,reproach others for nothing1 and repent of nothing1 this is the first step to wisdom4 ,besides this all is prejudice and false philosophy40 ,though these consequences irresistibly flow from the doctrine of necessity1 yet the injury resulting from them would be far less if they were maintained only by such men as ,helvetius and ,diderot4 ,it is when such errors receive the sanction of ,christian philosophers1 like ,hartley and ,leibnitz1 and are recommended to the human mind by a pious zeal for the glory of ,god1 that they are apt to obtain a frightful currency and become far more desolating in their effects4 8,the doctrine of necessity10 says ,hartley1 8has a tendency to abate all resentment against men3 since all they do against us is by the appointment of ,god1 it is rebellion against him to be offended with them40 ,section ,v4 ,the manner in which ,leibnitz endeavours to reconcile liberty and necessity4 ,leibnitz censures the language of ,descartes1 in which he ascribes all the thoughts and volitions of men to ,god1 and complains that he thereby shuts out free-agency from the world4 ,it becomes a very curious question1 then1 how ,leibnitz himself1 who was so deeply implicated in the scheme of necessity1 has been able to save the great interests of morality4 ,he does not1 for a moment1 call in question 8the great demonstration from cause and effect0 in favour of necessity4 ,it is well known that he has more than once compared the human mind to a balance1 in which reasons and inclinations take the place of weights2 he supposes it to be just as impossible for the mind to depart from the direction given to it by 8the determining cause10 as it is for a balance to turn in opposition to the influence of the greatest weight4 ,nor is he pleased with ,descartes's appeal to consciousness to prove the doctrine of liberty4 ,in reply to this appeal1 he says3 8,the chain of causes connected one with another reaches very far4 ,wherefore the reason alleged by ,descartes1 in order to prove the independence of our free actions1 by a pretended vigorous internal feeling1 has no force47#bj7 ,we cannot1 strictly speaking1 feel our independence2 and we do not always perceive the causes1 frequently imperceptible1 on which our resolution depends4 ,it is as if a needle touched with the loadstone were sensible of and pleased with its turning toward the north4 ,for it would believe that it turned itself1 independently of any other cause1 not perceiving the insensible motions of the magnetic matter407#ba7 ,thus1 he seems to represent the doctrine of liberty as a mere dream and delusion of the mind1 and the iron scheme of necessity as a stern reality4 ,is it in the power of ,leibnitz1 then1 any more than it was in that of ,descartes1 to reconcile such a scheme with the free-agency and accountability of man8 ,let us hear him and determine4 ,leibnitz repudiates the notion of liberty given by ,hobbes and ,locke4 ,in his 8,nouveaux ,essais sur ,l',entendement ,humain10 a work in which he combats many of the doctrines of ,locke1 the insignificance of his idea of the freedom of the will is most clearly and triumphantly exposed4 ,philalethe1 or the representative of ,locke1 says3 8,liberty is the power that a man has to do or not to do an action according to his will40 ,theophile1 or the representative of ,leibnitz1 replies3 8,if men understood only that by liberty1 when they ask whether the will is free1 their question would be truly absurd40 ,and again3 8,the question ought not to be asked10 says ,philalethe1 8if the will is free3 that is to speak in a very improper manner3 but if man is free4 ,this granted1 ,i say that1 when any one can1 by the direction or choice of his mind1 prefer the existence of one action to the non-existence of that action and to the contrary1 that is to say1 when he can make it exist or not exist1 according to his will1 then he is free4 ,and we can scarcely see how it could be possible to conceive a being more free than one who is capable of doing what he wills40 ,theophile rejoins3 8,when we reason concerning the liberty of the will1 we do not demand if the man can do what he wills1 but if he has a sufficient independence in the will itself2 we do not ask if he has free limbs or elbow-room1 but if the mind is free1 and in what that freedom consists407#bb7 ,having thus exploded the delusive notion of liberty which ,locke had borrowed from ,hobbes1 ,leibnitz proceeds to take what seems to be higher ground4 ,he expressly declares1 that in order to constitute man an accountable agent1 he must be free1 not only from constraint1 but also from necessity4 ,in the adoption of this language1 ,leibnitz seems to speak with the advocates of free-agency2 but does he think with them8 ,the sound is pleasant to the ear2 but what sense is it intended to convey to the mind8 ,leibnitz shall be his own interpreter4 8,all events have their necessary causes10 says ,hobbes4 8,bad10 replies ,leibnitz3 8they have their determining causes1 by which we can assign a reason for them2 but they have not necessary causes40 ,now does this signify that an event1 that a volition1 is not absolutely and indissolubly connected with its 8determining cause80 ,is this the grand idea from which the light of liberty is to beam on a darkened and enslaved world8 ,by no means4 ,we must indulge no fond hopes or idle dreams of the kind4 ,volition is free from necessity1 adds ,leibnitz2 because 8the contrary could happen without implying a contradiction40 ,this is the signification which he attaches to his own language2 and it is the only meaning of which it is susceptible in accordance with his system4 ,thus1 ,leibnitz saw and clearly exposed the futility of speaking about a freedom from co-action or restraint1 when the question is1 not whether the body is untrammelled1 but whether the mind itself is free in the act of willing4 ,but he did not see1 it seems1 that it is equally irrelevant to speak of a freedom from a mathematical necessity in such a connexion2 although this1 as plainly as the other sense of the word1 has no conceivable bearing on the point in dispute4 ,if a volition were produced by the omnipotence of ,god1 irresistibly acting on the human mind1 still it would not be necessary1 in the sense of ,leibnitz1 since it might and would have been different if ,god had so willed it2 the contrary volition implying no contradiction4 ,is it not evident1 that to suppose the mind may thus be bound to act1 and yet be free because the contrary act implies no contradiction1 is merely to dream of liberty1 and to mistake a shadow for a substance8 ,as the opposite of a volition implies no contradiction1 says ,leibnitz1 so it is free from an absolute necessity2 that is to say1 it might have been different1 nay1 it must have been different1 from what it is1 provided its determining cause had been different4 ,the same thing may be said of the motions of matter4 ,we may say that they are also free1 because the opposite motions imply no contradiction2 and we only have to vary the force in order to vary the motion4 ,hence1 freedom in this sense of the word is perfectly consistent with the absolute and uncontrolled dominion of causes over the will2 for what can be more completely necessitated than the motions of the body8 ,the demand of his own nature1 which so strongly impelled ,leibnitz to seek and cling to the freedom of the mind1 as the basis of moral and accountable agency1 could not rest satisfied with so unsubstantial a shadow4 ,after all1 he has felt constrained to have recourse to the hypothesis of a prestablished harmony in order to restore1 if possible1 the liberty which his scheme of necessity had banished from the universe4 ,it is no part of our intention to examine this obsolete fiction2 we merely wish to show how essential ,leibnitz regarded it to a solution of the difficulty under consideration4 8,i come now10 says he1 8to show how the action of the will depends on causes2 that there is nothing so agreeable to human nature as this dependence of our actions1 and that otherwise we should fall into an absurd and insupportable fatality2 that is to say1 into the ,mohammedan fate1 which is the worst of all1 because it does away with foresight and good counsel4 ,however1 it is well to explain how this dependency of our voluntary actions does not prevent that there may be at the bottom of things a marvellous spontaneity in us1 which in a certain sense renders the mind1 in its resolutions1 independent of the physical influence of all other creatures4 ,this spontaneity1 but little known hitherto1 which raises our empire over our actions as much as it is possible1 is a consequence of the system of prestablished harmony40 ,thus1 in order to satisfy himself that our actions are really free and independent of the physical influence of other creatures1 he has recourse to a fiction in which few persons ever concurred with him1 and which is now universally regarded as one of the vagaries and dreams of philosophy4 ,if we are to be saved from an insupportable fate only by such means1 our condition must indeed be one of forlorn hopelessness4 ,before we take leave of ,leibnitz1 there is one view of the difficulty in question which we wish to notice1 not because it is peculiar to him1 but because it is very clearly stated and confidently relied on by him4 ,it is common to most of the advocates of necessity1 and it is exceedingly imposing in its appearance and effect4 8,men of all times10 says he1 8have been troubled by a sophism1 which the ancients called the #8raison paresseuse1' because it induces them to do nothing1 or at least to concern themselves about nothing1 and to follow only the present inclination to pleasure4 ,for1 say they1 if the future is necessary1 that which is to happen will happen whatever ,i may do4 ,but the future1 say they1 is necessary1 either because the ,divinity foresees all things1 and even prestablishes them in governing the universe2 or because all things necessarily come to pass by a concatenation of causes407#bc7 ,leibnitz illustrated the fallacy of this reasoning in the following manner3 8,by the same reason 7if it is valid7 ,i could say--,if it is written in the archives of fate1 that poison will kill me at present1 or do me harm1 this will happen1 though ,i should not take it2 and if that is not written1 it will not happen1 though ,i should take it2 and1 consequently1 ,i can follow my inclination to take whatever is agreeable with impunity1 however pernicious it may be2 which involves a manifest absurdity4444 ,this objection staggers them a little1 but they always come back to their reasoning1 turned in different points of view1 until we cause them to comprehend in what the defect of their sophism consists4 ,it is this1 that it is false that the event will happen whatever we may do2 it will happen1 because we do that which leads to it2 and if the event is written1 the cause which will make it happen is also written4 ,thus the connexion 7liaison7 of effects and their causes1 so far from establishing the doctrine of a necessity prejudicial to practice1 serves to destroy it407#bd7 ,the same reply is found more than once in the course of the same great work2 and it is employed by all necessitarians in defence of their system4 ,but it is not a satisfactory answer4 ,it overlooks the real difficulty in the case1 and seeks to remove an imaginary one4 ,the question is1 not whether a necessary connexion between our volitions and their effects is a discouragement to practice1 but whether a necessary connexion between our volitions and their causes is so4 ,it is very true1 that no man would be accountable for his external actions or their consequences1 if there were no fixed relation between these and his volitions4 ,if1 when a man willed one thing1 another should happen to follow which he did not will1 of course he would not be responsible for it4 ,and if there were no certain or fixed connexion between his external actions and their consequences1 either as they affected himself or others1 he certainly would not be responsible for those consequences4 ,this connexion between causes and effects1 this connexion between volitions and their consequences1 is indispensable to our accountability for such consequences4 ,but for such a connexion1 nothing could be more idle and ridiculous than to endeavour to do anything2 for we might will one thing1 and another would take place4 ,but must the same necessary connexion exist between the causes of our volitions and the volitions themselves1 before we can be accountable for these volitions1 for these effects8 ,this is the question4 ,leibnitz has lost sight of it1 and deceived himself by a false application of his doctrine4 ,the doctrine of necessity1 when applied to volitions and their effects1 is indispensable to build up man's accountability for his external conduct and its consequences4 ,but the same doctrine1 when applied to establish a fixed and unalterable relation between the causes of volition and volition itself1 really demolishes all responsibility for volition1 and consequently for its external results4 ,leibnitz undertook to show that a necessary connexion between volition and its causes does not destroy man's accountability for his volitions2 and he has shown1 what no one ever doubted1 that a necessary connexion between volition and its effects does not destroy accountability for those effects6 ,strange as this confusion of things is1 it is made by the most celebrated advocates of the doctrine of necessity2 which shows1 we think1 that the doctrine hardly admits of a solid defence4 ,thus ,edwards1 for example1 insists that the doctrine of necessity is so far from rendering our endeavours vain and useless1 that it is an indispensable condition or prerequisite to their success4 ,in illustration of this point1 he says3 8,let us suppose a real and sure connexion between a man having his eyes open in the clear daylight1 with good organs of sight1 and seeing2 so that seeing is connected with opening his eyes1 and not seeing with his not opening his eyes2 and also the like connexion between such a man attempting to open his eyes and his actually doing it3 the supposed established connexion between these antecedents and consequents1 let the connexion be never so sure and necessary1 certainly does not prove that it is in vain for a man in such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes1 in order to seeing2 his aiming at that event1 and the use of the means1 being the effect of his will1 does not break the connexion1 or hinder the success40 8,so that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connexion and consequence3 on the contrary1 it is truly forcible against the ,arminian doctrine of contingence and self-determination1 which is inconsistent with such a connexion4 ,if there be no connexion between those events wherein virtue and vice consist1 and anything antecedent2 then there is no connexion between these events and any means or endeavours used in order to them3 and if so1 then those means must be in vain4 ,the less there is of connexion between foregoing things and following ones1 so much the less there is between means and end1 endeavours and success2 and in the same proportion are means and endeavours ineffectual and in vain40 ,in like manner1 ,dr4 ,chalmers1 in his defence of the doctrine of necessity1 has in all his illustrations confounded the connexion between a volition and its antecedent1 with the relation between a volition and its consequent4 ,to select one such illustration from many1 it would be idle1 says he1 for a man to labour and toil after wealth1 if there were no fixed connexion between such exertion and the accumulation of riches4 ,we reply to all such illustrations1--,it is true1 there must be a fixed connexion between our endeavours or voluntary exertions and their consequences1 in order to render such endeavours or exertions of any avail1 or to render us accountable for such consequences4 ,but it should be forever borne in mind1 that the question is not whether a fixed connexion obtains between our volitions and their sequents1 but whether a necessary connexion exists between our volitions and their antecedents4 ,the question is1 not whether the will be a power which is often followed by necessitated effects2 but whether there be a power behind the will by which its volitions are necessitated4 ,and this being the question1 what does it signify to tell us1 that the will is a producing power8 ,we deny that volitions and their antecedents are necessarily connected2 and our opponents refute us by showing that volitions and their sequents are thus connected6 ,we deny that ,a and ,b are necessarily connected2 and this position is overthrown and demolished by showing that ,b and ,c are thus connected6 ,is it not truly wonderful that such men as a ,leibnitz1 an ,edwards1 and a ,chalmers1 should1 in their zeal to maintain a favourite dogma1 commit so great an oversight1 and so grievously deceive themselves8 ,section ,,vi4 ,the attempt of ,edwards to establish free and accountable agency on the basis of necessity--,the views of the younger ,edwards1 ,day1 ,chalmers1 ,dick1 ,d',aubigne1 ,hill1 ,shaw1 and ,m',cosh1 concerning the agreement of liberty and necessity4 ,the great metaphysician of ,new-,england insists1 that his scheme1 and his scheme alone1 is consistent with the free-agency and accountability of man4 ,but how does he show this8 ,does he endeavour to shake the stern argument by which all things seem bound together in the relation of cause and effect8 ,does he even intimate a doubt with respect to the perfect coherency and validity of this argument8 ,does he once enter a protest against the doctrine of the ,stoics1 or of the materialistic fatalists1 according to which all things in heaven and earth are involved in an 8implex series of causes80 ,he does not4 ,on the contrary1 he has stated and enforced the great argument from cause and effect1 in the strongest possible terms4 ,he contends that volition is caused1 not by the will nor the mind1 but by the strongest motive4 ,this is the cause of volition1 and it is impossible for the effect to be loose from its cause4 ,it is an inherent contradiction1 a glaring absurdity1 to say that motive is the cause of volition1 and yet admit that volition may1 or may not1 follow motive4 ,this is to say1 indeed1 that motive is the cause1 and yet that it is not the cause1 of volition2 which is a contradiction in terms47#be7 ,so far from saying anything1 then1 to extricate the volitions of men from the adamantine circle of necessity1 he has exerted his prodigious energies to fasten them therein4 ,hence the question arises1 ,has he left any room for the introduction of that freedom of the mind1 which it is the great object of his inquiry to establish upon its true foundations8 ,the liberty for which he contends1 is1 after all his labours1 precisely that advocated by ,hobbes and ,collins1 and no other4 ,it is a freedom from co-action1 and not from necessity4 ,but he is entitled to speak for himself1 and we shall permit him so to do3 8,the plain and obvious meaning of the word freedom and liberty10 says he1 8in common speech1 is the power1 opportunity1 or advantage1 that any one has1 to do as he pleases4 ,or1 in other words1 his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills4 ,and the contrary to liberty1 whatever name we call it by1 is a person being hindered1 or unable to conduct as he will1 or being necessitated to do otherwise40 ,here1 it will be seen1 that liberty1 according to this notion of it1 has no relation to the manner in which the will arises1 or comes into existence2 if one's external conduct can only follow his will1 he is free4 8,there are two things10 says he1 8contrary to what is called liberty in common speech4 ,one is constraint1 otherwise called force1 compulsion1 and co-action2 which is a person being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will4 ,the other is restraint2 which is1 his being hindered1 and not having power to do according to his will4 ,but that which has no will cannot be the subject of these things40 ,this definition1 it is plain1 presupposes the existence of a volition2 and liberty consists in the absence of co-action4 ,it has no relation to the question as to how we come by our volitions1 whether they are put forth by the mind itself without being necessitated1 or whether they are necessarily produced in us4 ,it leaves this great fundamental question untouched4 ,on this subject his language is perfectly explicit4 ,there is nothing in ,kames1 nor ,collins1 nor ,crombie1 nor ,hobbes1 nor any other writer1 more perfectly unequivocal4 8,but one thing more10 says he1 8,i would observe concerning what is vulgarly called liberty1 namely1 that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will1 or according to his choice1 is all that is meant by it1 without taking into the meaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice1 or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition1 or internal habit and bias2 whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition1 or whether it happened without a cause2 whether it were necessarily connected with something foregoing1 or not connected4 ,let the person come by his choice any how1 yet1 if he is able1 and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will1 the man is perfectly free according to the primary and common notion of freedom40 ,now this is all the definition of liberty with which his 8,inquiry0 furnishes us2 and this1 he says1 is 8sufficient to show what is meant by liberty1 according to the common notion of mankind1 and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word40 ,it is easy to see1 that there is no difficulty in reconciling liberty1 in such a sense1 with the most absolute scheme of necessity or fatalism the world has ever seen4 ,let a man come by his volition ,,any ,,how2 let it be produced in him by the direct and almighty power of ,god himself2 yet1 8he is perfectly free10 provided there is no external co-action to prevent his volition from producing its natural effects6 ,president ,day is not pleased with the definition contained in the 8,inquiry20 and in this particular we think he has discovered a superior sagacity to ,edwards4 ,but his extreme anxiety to save the credit of his author has betrayed him1 it seems to us1 into an apology which will not bear a close examination4 8,on the subject of liberty or freedom10 says he1 8which occupies a portion of the fifth section of ,edwards's first book1 he has been less particular than was to be expected1 considering that this is the great object of inquiry in his work4 ,his explanation of what he regards as the proper meaning of the term is applicable to the liberty of outward action1 to what is called by philosophers external liberty40 8,this is very well as far as it goes4 ,but the professed object of his book1 according to the title-page1 is an inquiry concerning the freedom of the will1 not the freedom of the external conduct4 ,we naturally look for his meaning of this internal liberty4 ,what he has said1 in this section1 respecting freedom of the will1 has rather the appearance of evading such a definition of it as might be considered his own407#bf7 ,now1 is it possible that ,president ,edwards has instituted an inquiry into the freedom of the will1 and written a great book in defence of it1 and yet has evaded giving his own definition of it8 ,if so1 then he may have demolished the views of others on this subject1 but he has certainly not established his own in their stead2 and hence1 for aught we know1 he really did not believe in the freedom of the will at all2 and1 for all his work shows1 there may be no such freedom4 ,for how is it possible for any man to establish his views of the freedom of the will1 if he is not at sufficient pains to explain his meaning of the terms1 and forbears even to give his own definition of them8 ,but the truth is1 the author of the 8,inquiry0 has placed it beyond all controversy1 that he has been guilty of no such omission or evasion4 ,he has left no room to doubt that the definition of liberty1 which he says is in conformity 8with the common notion of mankind10 is his own4 ,he always uses this definition when he undertakes to repel objections against his scheme of necessity4 8,it is evident10 he says1 8that such a providential disposing and determining of men's moral actions1 though it infers a moral necessity of those actions1 yet it does not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind1 the only liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary to moral agency1 which1 ,,as ,,has ,,been ,,demonstrated1 is not inconsistent with such necessity407#bg7 ,he defines liberty in the very words of ,collins and ,hobbes1 to mean the power or opportunity any one has 8to do as he pleases20 or1 in other words1 to do 8as he wills407#bh7 ,this definition1 he says1 is according to the primary and common notion of mankind2 and now he declares1 that 8this is the only liberty common sense teaches is necessary to moral agency40 ,it is very strange that any one should have read the great work of ,president ,edwards without perceiving that this is the sense in which he always uses the term when he undertakes to repel the attacks of his adversaries4 ,to select only one instance out of many1 he says1 8,if the ,stoics held such a fate as is repugnant to any liberty1 consisting in our doing as we please1 ,i utterly deny such a fate4 ,if they held any such fate as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty1 activity1 moral agency1 virtue1 and vice1 ,i disclaim any such thing1 and think ,i have demonstrated the scheme ,i maintain is no such scheme407#bi7 ,thus he always has recourse to this definition of liberty1 consisting in the power or opportunity any one has 8to do as he pleases10 or1 in other words1 8as he wills10 whenever he attempts to reconcile his doctrine with the moral agency and accountability of man1 or to vindicate it against the attacks of his opponents4 ,we must suppose then1 that ,edwards has given his own definition of liberty in the ,inquiry1 or we must conclude that he defended his system by the use of an idea of liberty which he did not believe to be correct2 that when he alleged that he 8had demonstrated0 his doctrine to be consistent with free-agency1 he only meant with a false and atheistical notion of free-agency4 ,we are not surprised that ,president ,day does not like this definition of liberty2 but we are somewhat surprised1 we confess1 that such an idea of liberty should be so unhesitatingly adopted from ,edwards1 and so confidently set forth as the highest conceivable notion thereof1 by ,dr4 ,chalmers4 ,he does not seem to entertain the shadow of a doubt1 either that the definition of liberty contained in the ,inquiry is that of ,edwards himself1 or that which is fully founded in truth4 ,he freely concedes1 that 8we can do as we please10 and supposes that the reader may be startled to hear that this is 8cordially admitted by the necessitarians themselves60 ,but this concession he easily reconciles with the tenet of necessity4 8,to say that you can do as you please10 says he1 8is just to affirm one of those sequences which take place in the phenomena of mind--a sequence whereof a volition is the antecedent1 and the performance of that volition is the consequent4 ,it is a sequence which no advocate of the philosophical necessity is ever heard to deny4 ,let the volition ever be formed1 and if it point to some execution which lies within the limits we have just adverted to1 the execution of it will follow407#cj7 ,thus1 his notion of liberty makes it consist in the absence of external impediments1 which might break the connexion of a volition and its consequent1 and not in the freedom of the will itself from the absolute dominion of causes4 ,such an idea of free-will1 it must be confessed1 is very well adopted by one who intends to maintain 8a rigid and absolute predestination0 of all events4 ,the manner in which ,edwards attempts to reconcile the free-agency and accountability of man with the great argument from the law of causation1 or with his doctrine of necessity1 is1 as we have seen1 precisely the same as that adopted by ,hobbes4 ,there is not a shade of difference between them4 ,it is1 indeed1 easy to demonstrate that liberty1 according to this definition of it1 is not inconsistent with necessity2 and it is just as easy to demonstrate1 that it is not inconsistent with any scheme of fate that has ever been heard of among men4 ,the will may be absolutely necessitated in all its acts1 and yet the body may be free from external co-action or natural necessity6 ,but though there is this close agreement between ,hobbes and ,edwards1 there are some points of divergency between ,edwards and ,calvin4 ,the former comes forward as the advocate of free-will1 the latter expressly denies that we have a free-will4 ,calvin admits that we may be free from co-action or compulsion2 but to call this freedom of the will1 is1 he considers1 to decorate a most 8diminutive thing with a superb title40 ,and though this is all the freedom ,edwards allows us to possess1 yet he does not hesitate to declare that his doctrine is perfectly consistent with 8the highest degree of liberty that ever could be thought of1 or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of man to conceive40 ,the only liberty we possess1 according to all the authors referred to1 is a freedom of the body and not of the mind4 ,though the younger ,edwards is a strenuous advocate of his father's doctrine1 he has sometimes1 without intending to do so1 let fall a heavy blow upon it4 ,he finds1 for instance1 the following language in the writings of ,dr4 ,west1 8he might have omitted doing the thing if he would10 and he is perplexed to ascertain its meaning4 8,to say that if a man had chosen not to go to a debauch1 7for that is the case put by ,dr4 ,west17 he would1 indeed1 have chosen not to go to it1 is too great trifling to be ascribed to ,dr4 ,west40 8,yet to say10 he continues1 8that the man could have avoided the external action of going1 c41 if he would1 would be equally trifling2 for the question before us is concerning the liberty of the will or mind1 and not the body40 ,the italics are his own4 ,it seems1 then1 that in the opinion of the younger ,edwards it is very great trifling to speak of the power to do an external action in the present controversy1 because it relates to the will or mind1 and not to the body4 ,we believe this remark to be perfectly just1 and although it was aimed at the antagonist of ,president ,edwards1 it falls with crushing weight on the doctrine of ,president ,edwards himself4 ,is it not wonderful that so just a reflection did not occur to the younger ,edwards1 in relation to the definition of liberty contained in the great work he had undertaken to defend8 ,we have now seen how some of the early reformers1 and some of the great thinkers in after-times1 have endeavoured to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the free-agency and accountability of man4 ,before quitting this subject1 however1 we wish to adduce a remarkable passage from one of the most correct reasoners1 as well as one of the most impressive writers that in modern times have advocated the doctrines of ,calvinism4 8,here we come to a question10 says he1 8which has engaged the attention1 and exercised the ingenuity1 and perplexed the wits of men in every age4 ,if ,god has foreordained whatever comes to pass1 the whole series of events is necessary1 and human liberty is taken away4 ,men are passive instruments in the hands of their ,maker2 they can do nothing but what they are secretly and irresistibly impelled to do2 they are not1 therefore1 responsible for their actions2 and ,god is the author of sin40 ,after sweeping away some attempts to solve this difficulty1 he adds3 8,it is a more intelligible method to explain the subject by the doctrine which makes liberty consist in the power of acting according to the prevailing inclination1 or the motive which appears strongest to the mind4 ,those actions are free which are the effects of volition4 ,in whatever manner the state of mind which gave rise to volition has been produced1 the liberty of the agent is neither greater nor less4 ,it is his will alone which is to be considered1 and not the means by which it has been determined4 ,if ,god foreordained certain actions1 and placed men in such circumstances that the actions would certainly take place agreeably to the laws of the mind1 men are nevertheless moral agents1 because they act voluntarily and are responsible for the actions which consent has made their own4 ,liberty does not consist in the power of acting or not acting1 but in acting from choice4 ,the choice is determined by something in the mind itself1 or by something external influencing the mind2 but whatever is the cause1 the choice makes the action free1 and the agent accountable4 ,if this definition of liberty be admitted1 you will perceive that it is possible to reconcile the freedom of the will with absolute decrees2 but we have not got rid of every difficulty40 ,now this definition of liberty1 it is obvious1 is precisely the same as that given by ,president ,edwards1 and nothing could be more perfectly adapted to effect a reconciliation between the freedom of the will and the doctrine of absolute decrees4 ,how perfectly it shapes the freedom of man to fit the doctrine of predestination6 ,it is a fine piece of workmanship1 it is true2 but as the learned and candid author remarks1 we must not imagine that we have 8got rid of every difficulty40 ,for1 8by this theory10 he continues1 8human actions appear to be as necessary as the motions of matter according to the laws of gravitation and attraction2 and man seems to be a machine1 conscious of his movements1 and consenting to them1 but impelled by something different from himself407#ca7 ,such is the candid confession of this devoted ,calvinist4 ,we have now seen the nature of that freedom of the will which the immortal ,edwards has exerted all his powers to recommend to the ,christian world6 8,egregious liberty60 exclaimed ,calvin4 8,it merely allows us elbow-room10 says ,leibnitz4 8,it seems1 after all1 to leave us mere machines10 says ,dick4 8,it is trifling to speak of such a thing10 says the younger ,edwards1 in relation to the will4 8,why1 surely1 this cannot be what the great ,president ,edwards meant by the freedom of the will10 says ,dr4 ,day4 ,he certainly must have evaded his own idea on that point4 ,is it not evident1 that the house of the necessitarian is divided against itself8 ,necessitarians not only refute each other1 but in most cases each one contradicts himself4 ,thus the younger ,edwards says1 it is absurd to speak of a power to act according to our choice1 when the question relates1 not to the freedom of the body1 but to the freedom of the mind itself4 ,he happens to see the absurdity of this mode of speaking when he finds it in his adversary1 ,dr4 ,west2 and yet it is precisely his own definition of freedom4 8,but if by liberty10 says he1 8be meant a power of willing and choosing1 an exemption from co-action and natural necessity1 and power1 opportunity1 and advantage1 to execute our own choice2 in this sense we hold liberty407#cb7 ,thus he returns to the absurd idea of free-will as consisting in 8elbow-room10 which merely allows our choice or volition to pass into effect4 ,dr4 ,dick is guilty of the same inconsistency4 ,though he admits1 as we have seen1 that this definition of liberty does not get rid of every difficulty1 but seems to leave us mere 8machines20 yet he has recourse to it1 in order to reconcile the ,calvinistic view of divine grace with the free-agency of man4 8,the great objection10 says he1 8against the invincibility of divine grace1 is1 that it is subversive of the liberty of the will407#cc7 ,but1 he replies1 8,true liberty consists in doing what we do with knowledge and from choice40 ,yet as if unconscious that their greatest champions were thus routed and overthrown by each other1 we see hundreds of minor necessitarians still fighting on with the same weapons1 perfectly unmindful of the disorder and confusion which reigns around them in their own ranks4 ,thus1 for example1 ,d',aubign says1 8,it were easy to demonstrate that the doctrine of the reformers did not take away from man the liberty of a moral agent1 and reduce him to a passive machine40 ,now1 how does the historian so easily demonstrate that the doctrine of necessity1 as held by the reformers1 does not deny the liberty of a moral agent8 ,why1 by simply producing the old effete notion of the liberty of the will1 as consisting in freedom from co-action2 as if it had never been1 and never could be1 called in question4 8,every action performed without external restraint10 says he1 8and in pursuance of the determination of the soul itself1 is a free action407#cd7 ,this demonstration1 it is needless to repeat1 would save any scheme of fatalism from reproach1 as well as the doctrine of the reformers4 ,the scheme of the ,calvinists is defended in the same manner in ,hill's ,divinity3 8,the liberty of a moral agent10 says he1 8consists in the power of acting according to his choice2 and those actions are free1 which are performed without any external compulsion or restraint1 in consequence of the determination of his own mind40 8,according to the ,calvinists10 says ,mr4 ,shaw1 in his ,exposition of the ,confession of ,faith1 8the liberty of a moral agent consists in the power of acting according to his choice2 and those actions are free which are performed without any external compulsion or restraint1 in consequence of the determination of his own mind407#ce7 ,such1 if we may believe these learned ,calvinists1 is the idea of the freedom of the will which belongs to their system4 ,if this be so1 then it must be conceded that the ,calvinistic definition of the freedom of the will is perfectly consistent with the most absolute scheme of fatality which ever entered into the heart of man to conceive4 ,the views of ,m',cosh respecting the freedom of the will1 seem1 at first sight1 widely different from those of other ,calvinists and necessitarians4 ,the freedom and independence of the will is certainly pushed as far by him as it is carried by ,cousin1 ,coleridge1 ,clarke1 or any of its advocates in modern times4 8,true necessitarians10 says he1 8should learn in what way to hold and defend their doctrine4 ,let them disencumber themselves of all that doubtful argument1 derived from man being supposed to be swayed by the most powerful motive407#cf7 ,again3 8,the truth is10 says he1 8it is not motive1 properly speaking1 that determines the working of the will2 but it is the will that imparts the strength to the motive4 ,as ,coleridge says1 #8,it is the man that makes the motive1 and not the motive the man4' 07#cg7 ,according to this ,calvinistic divine1 the will is not determined by the strongest motive2 on the contrary1 it is self-active and self-determined4 8,mind is a self-acting substance10 says he2 8and hence its activity and independence40 ,in open defiance of all ,calvinistic and necessitarian philosophy1 he even adopts the self-determining power of the will4 8,nor have necessitarians10 says he1 8even of the highest order1 been sufficiently careful to guard the language employed by them4 ,afraid of making admissions to their opponents1 we believe that none of them have fully developed the phenomena of human spontaneity4 ,even ,edwards ridicules the idea of the faculty or power of will1 or the soul in the use of that power determining its own volitions4 ,now1 we hold it to be an incontrovertible fact1 and one of great importance1 that the true determining cause of every given volition is not any mere anterior incitement1 but the very soul itself1 by its inherent power of will407#ch7 ,surely1 the author of such a passage cannot be accused of being afraid to make concessions to his opponents4 ,but this is not all4 ,if possible1 he rises still higher in his views of the lofty1 not to say god-like1 independence of the human will4 8,we rejoice10 says he1 8to recognise such a being in man4 ,we trust that we are cherishing no presumptuous feeling1 when we believe him to be free1 as his ,maker is free4 ,we believe him1 morally speaking1 to be as independent of external control as his ,creator must ever be--as that ,creator was when1 in a past eternity1 there was no external existence to control him407#ci7 ,yet1 strange as it may seem1 ,mr4 ,m',cosh trembles at the idea of 8removing the creature from under the control of ,god20 and hence1 he insists as strenuously as any other necessitarian1 that the mind1 and all its volitions1 are subjected to the dominion of causes4 8,we are led by an intuition of our nature10 says he1 8to a belief in the invariable connexion between cause and effect2 and we see numerous proofs of this law of cause and effect reigning in the human mind as it does in the external world1 and reigning in the will as it does in every other department of the mind407#dj7 ,again3 8,it is by an intuition of our nature that we believe this thought or feeling could not have been produced without a cause2 and that this same cause will again and forever produce the same effects4 ,and this intuitive principle leads us to expect the reign of causation1 not only among the thoughts and feelings generally1 but among the wishes and volitions of the soul407#da7 ,now here is the question1 ,how can the soul be self-active1 self-determined1 and yet all its thoughts1 and feelings1 and volitions1 have producing causes8 ,how can it be free and independent in its acts1 and yet under the dominion of efficient causes8 ,how can the law of causation reign in all the states of the mind1 as it reigns over all the movements of matter1 and yet leave it as free as was the ,creator when nothing beside himself existed8 ,in other words1 ,how is such a scheme of necessity to be reconciled with such a scheme of liberty8 ,the author replies1 ,we are not bound to answer such a question7#db7--nor are we4 ,as we understand it1 the very idea of liberty1 as above set forth by the author1 is a direct negative of his doctrine of necessity4 ,but although he has taken so much pains to dissent from his necessitarian brethren1 and to advocate the ,arminian notion of free-will1 ,mr4 ,m',cosh1 nevertheless1 falls back upon the old ,calvinistic definition of liberty1 as consisting in a freedom from external co-action1 in order to find a basis for human responsibility4 ,it may seem strange1 that after all his labour in laying the foundation1 he should not build upon it2 but it is strictly true4 8,if any man asserts10 says he1 8that in order to responsibility1 the will must be free--that is1 free from physical restraint2 free to act as he pleases--we at once and heartily agree with him2 and we maintain that in this sense the will is free1 as free as it is possible for any man to conceive it to be40 ,and again3 8,if actions do not proceed from the will1 but from something else1 from mere physical or external restraint1 then the agent is not responsible for them4 ,but if the deeds proceed from the will1 then it at once attaches a responsibility to them4 ,place before the mind a murder committed by a party through pure physical compulsion brought to bear on the arm that inflicts the blow1 and the conscience says1 here no guilt is attachable4 ,but let the same murder be done with the thorough consent of the will1 the conscience stops not to inquire whether this consent has been caused or no407#dc7 ,thus1 after all his dissent from ,edwards1 he returns precisely to ,edwards's definition of the freedom of the will as the ground of human responsibility2 after all his strictures upon 8necessitarians of the first order10 he falls back upon precisely that notion of free-will which was so long ago condemned by ,calvin1 and exploded by ,leibnitz1 and which relates1 as we have so often seen1 not to acts of the will at all1 but only to the external movements of the body4 ,section ,,vii4 ,the sentiments of ,hume1 ,brown1 ,comte1 and ,mill1 in relation to the antagonism between liberty and necessity4 ,mr4 ,hume has disposed of the question concerning liberty and necessity1 by the application of his celebrated theory of cause and effect4 ,according to this theory1 the idea of power1 of efficacy1 is a mere chimera1 which has no corresponding reality in nature1 and should be ranked among the exploded prejudices of the human mind4 8,one event follows another10 says he2 8but we never can observe any tie between them4 ,they seem conjoined1 but never connected407#dd7 ,we shall not stop to examine this hypothesis1 which has been so often refuted4 ,we shall merely remark in passing1 that it owes its existence to a false method of philosophizing4 ,its author set out with the doctrine of ,locke1 that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection2 and because he could not trace the idea of power to either of these sources1 he denied its existence4 ,hence we may apply to him1 with peculiar force1 the judicious and valuable criticism which ,m4 ,cousin has bestowed upon the method of ,locke4 ,though ,mr4 ,hume undertakes1 as his title-page declares1 to introduce the inductive method into the science of human nature1 he departed from that method at the very first step4 ,instead of beginning1 as he should have done1 by ascertaining the ideas actually in our minds1 and noting their characteristics1 and proceeding to trace them up to their sources1 he pursued the diametrically opposite course4 ,he first determined and fixed the origin of all our ideas2 and every idea which was not seen to arise from this prestablished origin1 he declared to be a mere chimera4 ,he thus caused nature to bend to hypotheses2 instead of anatomizing and studying the world of mind according to the inductive method1 he pursued the high a priori road1 and reconstructed it to suit his prestablished origin of human knowledge4 ,this was not to study and interpret the work of ,god 8in the profound humiliation of the human soul207#de7 but to re-write the volume of nature1 and omit those parts which did not accord with the views and wishes of the philosopher4 ,in the pithy language of ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 he 8did not anatomize1 but truncate40 ,if this doctrine be true1 it is idle to talk about free-agency1 for there is no such thing as agency in the world4 ,it is true1 there is a thing which we call volition1 or an act of the mind2 but this does not produce the external change by which it is followed4 ,the two events co-exist1 but there is no connecting tie between them4 8,they are conjoined1 but not connected40 ,in short1 according to this scheme1 all things are equally free1 and all equally necessary4 ,in other words1 there is neither freedom nor necessity in the usual acceptation of the terms2 and the whole controversy concerning them1 which has agitated the learned for so many ages1 dwindles down into a mere empty and noisy logomachy4 ,indeed1 this is the conclusion to which ,mr4 ,hume himself comes2 expressly maintaining that the controversy in question has been a dispute about words4 ,we are not to suppose from this1 however1 that he forbears to give a definition of liberty4 ,his idea of free-agency is precisely that of ,hobbes1 and so many others before him4 8,by liberty10 says he1 8we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determination of the will3 that is1 if we choose to remain at rest1 we may2 if we choose to move1 we also may407#df7 ,such he declares is all that can possibly be meant by the term liberty2 and hence it follows that any other idea of it is a mere dream4 ,the coolness of this assumption is admirable2 but it is fully equalled by the conclusion which follows4 ,if we will observe these two circumstances1 says he1 and thereby render our definition intelligible1 ,mr4 ,hume is perfectly persuaded 8that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it40 ,if ,mr4 ,hume had closely looked into the great productions of his own school1 he would have seen the utter improbability1 that necessitarians themselves would ever concur in such a notion of liberty47#dg7 ,if ,mr4 ,hume's scheme were correct1 it would seem that nothing could be stable or fixed2 mind would be destitute of energy to move within its own sphere1 or to bind matter in its orbit4 ,all things would seem to be in a loose1 disconnected1 and fluctuating state4 ,but this is not the view which he had of the matter4 ,though he denied that there is any connecting link among events1 yet he insisted that the connexion subsisting among them is fixed and unalterable4 8,let any one define a cause10 says he1 8without comprehending1 as part of the definition1 a necessary connexion with its effect2 and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by the definition1 and ,i shall readily give up the whole controversy407#dh7 ,this is the philosopher who has so often told us1 that events are 8conjoined1 not connected40 ,the motives of volition given1 for example1 and the volition invariably and inevitably follows4 ,how then1 may we ask1 can a man be accountable for his volitions1 over which he has no power1 and in which he exerts no power8 ,this question has not escaped the attention of ,mr4 ,hume4 ,let us see his answer4 ,he admits that liberty 8is essential to morality407#di7 ,for 8as actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they are indications of the internal character1 passions1 and affections1 it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame1 when they proceed1 not from these principles1 but are derived altogether from external violence40 ,it is true1 as we have seen1 that if our external actions1 the motions of the body1 proceed not from our volitions1 but from external violence1 we are not responsible for them4 ,this is conceded on all sides1 and has nothing to do with the question4 ,but suppose our external actions are inevitably connected with our volitions1 and our volitions as inevitably connected with their causes1 how can we be responsible for either the one or the other8 ,this is the question which ,mr4 ,hume has evaded and not fairly met4 ,mr4 ,hume's notion about cause and effect has been greatly extended by its distinguished advocate1 ,dr4 ,thomas ,brown2 whose acuteness1 eloquence1 and elevation of character1 have given it a circulation which it could never have received from the influence of its author4 ,almost as often as divines have occasion to use this notion1 they call it the doctrine of ,dr4 ,brown1 and omit to notice its true atheistical paternity and origin4 ,the defenders of this doctrine are directly opposed1 in regard to a fundamental point1 to all other necessitarians4 ,though they deny the existence of all power and efficacy1 they still hold that human volitions are necessary2 while other necessitarians ground their doctrine on the fact1 that volitions are produced by the most powerful1 the most efficacious motives4 ,they are not only at war with other necessitarians1 they are also at war with themselves4 ,let us see if this may not be clearly shown4 ,according to the scheme in question1 the mind does not act upon the body1 nor the body upon the mind2 for there is no power1 and consequently no action of power1 in the universe4 ,now1 it is known that it was the doctrine of ,leibnitz1 that two substances so wholly unlike as mind and matter could not act upon each other2 and hence he concluded that the phenomena of the internal and external worlds were merely 8conjoined1 not connected40 ,the soul and body run together--to use his own illustration--like two independent watches1 without either exerting any influence upon the movements of the other4 ,thus arose his celebrated1 but now obsolete fiction1 of a prestablished harmony4 ,now1 if the doctrine of ,hume and ,brown be true1 this sort of harmony subsists1 not only in relation to mind and body1 but in relation to all things in existence4 ,mind never acts upon body1 nor mind upon mind4 ,hence1 this doctrine is but a generalization of the prestablished harmony of ,leibnitz1 with the exception that ,mr4 ,hume did not contend that this wonderful harmony was established by the ,divine ,being4 ,is it not wonderful that so acute a metaphysician as ,dr4 ,brown should not have perceived the inseparable affinity between his doctrine and that of ,leibnitz8 ,is it not wonderful that1 instead of perceiving this affinity1 he should have poured ridicule and contempt upon the doctrine of which his own was but a generalization8 ,mr4 ,mill1 another able and strenuous advocate of ,mr4 ,hume's theory of causation1 has likewise ranked the prestablished harmony of ,leibnitz1 as well as the system of occasional causes peculiar to ,malebranche1 among the fallacies of the human mind4 ,thus they are at war with themselves1 as well as with their great coadjutors in the cause of necessity4 ,m4 ,comte1 preminently distinguished in every branch of science1 has taken the same one-sided view of nature as that which is exhibited in the theory under consideration2 but he does not permit himself to be encumbered by the inconsistencies observable in his great predecessors4 ,on the contrary1 he boldly carries out his doctrine to its legitimate consequences1 denying the existence of a ,god1 the free-agency of man1 and the reality of moral distinctions4 ,mr4 ,mill also refuses to avail himself of the notion of liberty entertained by ,hobbes and ,hume1 in order to lay a foundation for human responsibility4 ,he sees that it really cannot be made to answer such a purpose4 ,he also sees1 that the doctrine of necessity1 as usually maintained1 is liable to the objections urged against it1 that 8it tends to degrade the moral nature of man1 and to paralyze our desire of excellence407#ej7 ,in making this concession to the advocates of liberty1 he speaks from his own 8personal experience40 ,the only way to escape these pernicious consequences1 he says1 is to keep constantly before the mind a clear and unclouded view of the true theory of causation1 which will prevent us from supposing1 as most necessitarians do1 that there is a real connecting link or influence between motives and volitions1 or any other events4 ,so strong is the prejudice 7as he calls it7 in favour of such connection1 that even those who adopt ,mr4 ,hume's theory1 are not habitually influenced by it1 but frequently relapse into the old error which conflicts with the free-agency and accountability of man1 and hence an advantage which their opponents have had over them4 ,these remarks are undoubtedly just4 ,there is not a single writer1 from ,mr4 ,hume himself1 down to the present day1 who has been able either to speak or to reason in conformity with his theory1 however warmly he may have embraced it4 ,mr4 ,mill himself has not been more fortunate in this respect than many of his distinguished predecessors4 ,it is an exceedingly difficult thing1 by the force of speculation1 to silence the voice of nature within us4 ,if it were necessary we might easily show1 that if we abstract 8the common prejudice10 in regard to causation1 it will be as impossible to read ,mr4 ,mill's work on logic1 as to read ,mr4 ,hume's writings themselves1 without perceiving that many of its passages have been stripped of all logical coherency of thought4 ,the defect which he so clearly sees in the writings of other advocates of necessity1 not excepting those who embrace his own paradox in relation to cause and effect1 we can easily perceive in his own4 ,the doctrine of causation1 under consideration1 annihilates one of the clearest and most fundamental distinctions ever made in philosophy2 the distinction between action and passion1 between mind and matter4 ,matter is passive1 mind is active4 ,the very first law of motion laid down in the ,principia1 a work so much admired by ,m4 ,comte and ,mr4 ,mill1 is based on the idea that matter is wholly inert1 and destitute of power either to move itself1 or to check itself when moved by anything ab extra4 ,this will not be denied4 ,but is mind equally passive8 ,is there nothing in existence which rises above this passivity of the material world8 ,if there is not1 and such is the evident conclusion of the doctrine in question1 then all things flow on in one boundless ocean of passivity1 while there is no ,first ,mover1 no ,self-active ,agent in the universe4 ,indeed1 ,mr4 ,mill has expressly declared1 that the distinction between agent and patient is illusory47#ea7 ,if this be true1 we are persuaded that ,m4 ,comte has been more successful in delivering the world from the being of a ,god1 than ,mr4 ,mill has been in relieving it from the difficulties attending the scheme of necessity4 ,section ,,viii4 ,the views of ,kant and ,sir ,william ,hamilton in relation to the antagonism between liberty and necessity4 8,to clear up this seeming antagonism between the mechanism of nature and freedom in one and the self-same given action1 we must refer10 says ,kant1 8to what was advanced in the critique of pure reason1 or what1 at least1 is a corollary from it1 viz41 that the necessity of nature which may not consort with the freedom of the subject1 attaches simply to a thing standing under the relations of time1 i4 e41 to the modifications of the acting subject as phenomena1 and that1 therefore1 so far 7i4 e41 as phenomena7 the determinators of each act lie in the foregoing elapsed time1 and are quite beyond his power1 7part of which are the actions man has already performed1 and the phenomenal character he has given himself in his own eyes17 yet1 e contra1 the self-same subject1 being self-conscious of itself as a thing in itself1 considers its existence as somewhat detached from the conditions of time1 and itself1 so far forth1 as only determinable by laws given it by its own reason407#eb7 ,kant has said1 that this 8intricate problem1 at whose solution centuries have laboured10 is not to be solved by 8a jargon of words40 ,if so1 may we not doubt whether he has taken the best method to solve it8 ,his solution shows one thing at least1 viz41 that he was not satisfied with any of the solutions of his predecessors1 for his is wholly unlike them4 ,kant saw that the question of liberty and necessity related to the will itself1 and not to the consequences of the will's volitions4 ,hence he was compelled to reject those weak evasions of the difficulty of reconciling them1 and to grapple directly with the difficulty itself4 ,let us see if this was not too much for him4 ,let us see if he has been able to maintain the doctrine of necessity1 holding it as a 8demonstrated truth10 and at the same time give the idea of liberty a tenable position in his system4 ,if we would clear up the seeming antagonism between the mechanism of nature and freedom in regard to the same volition1 says he1 we must remember1 that the volition itself1 as standing under the conditions of time1 is to be considered as subject to the law of mechanism3 yet the mind which puts forth the volition1 being conscious that it is a thing somewhat detached from the conditions of time1 is free from the law of mechanism1 and determinable by the laws of its own reason4 ,that is to say1 the volitions of mind falling under the law of cause and effect1 like all other events which appear in time1 are necessary2 while the mind itself1 which exists not exactly in time1 is free4 ,we shall state only two objections to this view4 ,in the first place1 it seems to distinguish the mind from its act1 not modally1 i4 e41 as a thing from its mode1 but numerically1 i4 e41 as one thing from another thing4 ,but who can do this8 ,who regards an act of the mind1 a volition1 as anything but the mind itself as existing in a state of willing8 ,in the second place1 it requires us to conceive1 that the act of the mind is necessitated1 while the mind itself is free in the act thus necessitated4 ,but who can do this8 ,on the contrary1 who can fail to see in this precisely the same seeming antagonism which ,kant undertook to remove8 ,to tell us1 that volition is necessitated because it exists in time1 but the mind is free because it does not exist in time1 is1 one would think1 a very odd way to dispel the darkness which hangs over the grand problem of life4 ,it is to solve one difficulty merely by adding other difficulties to it4 ,hence1 the world will never be much wiser1 we are inclined to suspect1 with respect to the seeming antagonism between liberty and necessity1 in consequence of the speculations of the philosopher of ,knigsberg1 especially since his great admirer1 ,mr4 ,coleridge1 forgot to fulfil his promise to write the history of a man who existed in 8neither time nor space1 but a-one side40 ,though ,kant made the attempt in his ,metaphysics of ,ethics to overcome the speculative difficulty in question1 it is evident that he is not satisfied with his own solution of it1 since he has repeatedly declared1 that the practical reason furnishes the only ground on which it can be surmounted4 8,this view of ,kant10 says ,knapp1 8implying that freedom1 while it is a postulate of our practical reason1 7i4 e41 necessary to be assumed in order to moral action17 is yet inconsistent with our theoretical reason1 7i4 e41 incapable of demonstration1 and contrary to the conclusions to which the reflecting mind arrives17 is now very generally rejected407#ec7 ,in regard to this point1 there seems to be a perfect coincidence between the philosophy of ,kant and that of ,sir ,william ,hamilton4 8,in thought10 says the latter1 8we never escape determination and necessity407#ed7 ,if the scheme of necessity never fails to force itself upon our thought1 how are we then to get rid of it1 so as to lay a foundation for morality and accountability8 ,this question1 the author declares1 is too much for the speculative reason of man2 and being utterly baffled in that direction1 we can only appeal to the fact of consciousness1 in order to establish the doctrine of liberty4 8,the philosophy which ,i profess10 says he1 8annihilates the theoretical problem--,how is the scheme of liberty1 or the scheme of necessity1 to be rendered comprehensible8--by showing that both schemes are equally inconceivable2 but it establishes liberty practically as a fact1 by showing that it is either itself an immediate datum1 or is involved in an immediate datum of consciousness407#ee7 ,we shall hereafter see1 why the scheme of necessity always riveted the chain of conviction on the thought of ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 and compelled him to have recourse to an appeal to consciousness in order to escape its delusive power4 ,section ,,ix4 ,the notion of ,lord ,kames and ,sir ,james ,mackintosh on the same subject4 ,lord ,kames boldly cut the knot which philosophy had failed to unravel for him4 ,supposing the doctrine of necessity to be settled on a clear and firm basis1 he resolved our feelings of liberty into 8a deceitful sense0 which he imagined the ,almighty had conferred on man for wise and good purposes4 ,he concluded that if men could see the truth1 in regard to the scheme of necessity1 without any illusion or mistake1 they would relax their exertions in all directions1 and passively submit to the all-controlling influences by which they are surrounded4 ,but ,god1 he supposed1 out of compassion for us1 concealed the truth from our eyes1 in order that we might be induced to take care of ourselves1 by the pleasant dream that we really have the power to do so4 ,we shall not stop to pull this scheme to pieces4 ,we shall only remark1 that it is a pity the philosopher undertook to counteract the benevolent design of the ,deity1 and to expose the cheat and delusion by which he intended to govern the world for its benefit4 ,but the author himself1 it is but just to add1 had the good sense and candour to renounce his own scheme2 and hence we need dwell no longer upon it4 ,it remains at the present day only as a striking example of the frightful contortions of the human mind1 in its herculean efforts to escape from the dark labyrinth of fate into the clear and open light of nature4 ,sir ,james ,mackintosh1 though familiar with the speculations of preceding philosophers1 was satisfied with none of their solutions of the great problem under consideration1 and consequently he has invented one of his own4 ,this solution is founded on his theory of the moral sentiments1 which is peculiar to himself4 ,this theory is employed to show how it is1 that although we may come by our volitions according to the scheme of necessity1 yet we do not perceive the causes by which they are necessarily produced1 and consequently imagine that we are free4 ,thus1 the 8feeling of liberty10 as he calls it1 is resolved into an illusory judgment1 and the scheme of necessity is exhibited in all its adamantine strength4 8,it seems impossible10 says he1 8for reason to consider occurrences otherwise than as bound together by the connexion of cause and effect2 and in this circumstance consists the strength of the necessitarian system407#ef7 ,we shall offer only one remark on this extraordinary hypothesis4 ,if the theory of ,sir ,james were true1 it could only show1 that although our volitions are necessarily caused1 we do not perceive the causes by which they are produced4 ,but this fact has never been denied3 it has always been conceded1 that we ascertain the existence of efficient causes1 excepting the acts of our minds1 only by means of the effects they produce4 ,both ,leibnitz and ,edwards long ago availed themselves of this undisputed fact1 in order to account for the belief which men entertain in regard to their internal freedom4 8,thus10 says ,edwards1 8,i find myself possessed of my volitions before ,i can see the effectual power and efficacy of any cause to produce them1 for the power and efficacy of the cause are not seen but by the effect1 and this1 for aught ,i know1 may make some imagine that volition has no cause40 ,we shall see hereafter that this is a very false account of the genesis of the common belief1 that we possess an internal freedom from necessity2 but it is founded on the truth which no one pretends to deny1 that external efficient causes can only be seen by their effects1 and not by any direct perception of the mind4 ,it was altogether a work of supererogation1 then1 for ,sir ,james ,mackintosh to bring forth his theory of moral sentiments to establish the possibility of a thing which preceding philosophers had admitted to be a fact4 ,it requires no elaborate theory to convince us that a thing might exist without our perceiving it1 when it is conceded on all sides1 that even if it did exist1 we have no power by which to perceive it4 ,with this single remark1 we shall dismiss a scheme which resolves our conviction of internal liberty into a mere illusion1 and which1 however pure may have been the intentions of the author1 really saps the foundation of moral obligation1 and destroys the nature of virtue4 ,section ,x4 ,the conclusion of ,mhler1 ,tholuck1 and others1 that all speculation on such a subject must be vain and fruitless4 ,considering the vast wilderness of speculation which exists on the subject under consideration1 it is not at all surprising that many should turn away from every speculative view of it with disgust1 and endeavour to dissuade others from such pursuits4 ,accordingly ,mhler has declared1 that 8so often as1 without regard to revelation1 the relation of the human spirit to ,god hath been more deeply investigated1 men have found themselves forced 444 to the adoption of pantheism1 and1 with it1 the most arrogant deification of man407#eg7 ,and ,tholuck spreads out the reasoning from effect to cause1 by which all things are referred to ,god1 and ,god himself only made the greatest and brightest link in the chain2 and assuming this to be an unanswerable argument1 he holds it up as a dissuasive from all such speculations4 ,he believes that reason necessarily conducts the mind to fatalism4 ,we cannot concur with these celebrated writers1 and we would deduce a far different conclusion from the speculations of necessitarians4 ,this sort of scepticism or despair is more common in ,germany than it is in this country2 for there1 speculation pursuing no certain or determinate method1 has shown itself in all its wild and desolating excesses4 ,but it is sophistry1 and not reason1 that leads the human mind astray2 and we believe that reason1 in all cases1 is competent to detect and expose the impositions of sophistry4 ,we do not believe that one guide which the ,almighty has given us1 can1 by the legitimate exercise of it1 lead us to a different result from that of another guide4 ,we are persuaded that if reason seems to force us into any system which is contradicted by the testimony of our moral nature1 or by the truths of revelation1 this is unsound speculation3 it is founded either on false premises1 or else springs from false conclusions1 which reason itself may correct1 either by pointing out the fallacy of the premises1 or the logical incoherency of the argument4 ,we do not then intend to abandon speculation1 but to plant it1 if we can1 on a better foundation1 and build it up according to a better method4 ,section ,,xi4 ,the true conclusion from the foregoing review of opinions and arguments4 ,all the mighty logicians we have yet named have yielded to 8the demonstration0 in favour of necessity1 but we do not know that one of them has ever directed the energies of his mind to pry into its validity4 ,they have all pursued the method so emphatically condemned by ,bacon1 and the result has verified his prediction4 8,the usual method10 says he1 8of discovery and proof by first establishing the most general propositions1 then applying and proving the intermediate axioms according to these1 is the parent of error and the calamity of every science407#eh7 ,they have set out with the universal law of causality or the principle of the sufficient reason1 and thence have proceeded to ascertain and determine the actual nature and processes of things4 ,we may despair of ever being able to determine a single fact1 or a single process of nature1 by reasoning from truisms2 we must begin in the opposite direction and learn 8to dissect nature10 if we would behold her secrets and comprehend her mysteries4 ,by pursuing this method it will be seen1 and clearly seen1 that 8the great demonstration0 which has led so many philosophers in chains1 is1 after all1 a sophism4 ,we have witnessed their attempts to reconcile the great fact of man's free-agency with this boasted demonstration of necessity4 ,but how interminable is the confusion among them8 ,if a few of them concur in one solution1 this is condemned by others1 and not unfrequently by the very authors of the solution itself4 ,we entertain too great a respect for their abilities not to believe1 that if there had been any means of reconciling these things together1 they would long since have discovered them1 and come to an agreement among themselves1 as well as made the truth known to the satisfaction of mankind4 ,but as it is1 their speculations are destitute of harmony--are filled with discordant elements4 ,instead of the clear and steady light of truth1 illuminating the great problem of existence1 we are bewildered by the glare of a thousand paradoxes2 instead of the sweet voice of harmony1 reaching and calling forth a response from the depths of the human soul1 the ear is stunned and confounded with a frightful roar of confused sounds4 ,we shall not attempt to hold the scheme of necessity1 and reconcile it with the fact of man's free-agency4 ,we shall not undertake a task1 in the prosecution of which a ,descartes1 a ,leibnitz1 a ,locke1 and an ,edwards1 not to mention a hundred others1 have laboured in vain4 ,but we do not intend to abandon speculation4 ,on the contrary1 we intend to show1 so clearly and so unequivocally that every eye may see it1 that the great boasted demonstration in favour of necessity is a prodigious sophism4 ,we intend to do this2 because until the mental vision be purged of the film of this dark error1 it can never clearly behold the intrinsic majesty and glory of ,god's creation1 nor the divine beauty of the plan according to which it is governed4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,scheme ,of ,necessity ,makes ,god ,the ,author ,of ,sin4 ,i told ye then he should prevail1 and speed ,on his bad errand2 man should be seduced1 ,and flatter'd out of all1 believing lies ,against his ,maker2 no decree of mine ,concurring to necessitate his fall1 ,or touch'd with slightest moment of impulse ,his free-will1 to her own inclining left ,in even scale4--,,milton4 ,the scheme of necessity1 as we have already said1 presents two phases in relation to the existence of moral evil2 one relating to the agency of man1 and the other to the agency of ,god4 ,in the preceding chapter1 we examined the attempts of the most learned and skilful advocates of this scheme to reconcile it with the free-agency and accountability of man4 ,we have seen how ineffectual have been all their endeavours to show that their doctrine does not destroy the responsibility of man for his sins4 ,it is the design of the present chapter to consider the doctrine of necessity under its other aspect1 and to demonstrate that it makes ,god the author of sin4 ,if this can be shown1 it may justly lead us to suspect that the scheme contains within its bosom some dark fallacy1 which should be dragged from its hiding-place into the open light of day1 and exposed to the abhorrence and detestation of mankind4 ,in discussing this branch of our subject1 we shall pursue the course adopted in relation to the first2 for if the doctrine of necessity does not make ,god the author of sin1 we may conclude that this has been shown by some one of its most profound and enlightened advocates4 ,if the attempts of a ,calvin1 and an ,edwards1 and a ,leibnitz1 to maintain such a doctrine1 and yet vindicate the purity of ,god may be shown to be signal failures1 we may well doubt whether there is a real agreement between these tenets as maintained by them4 ,nay1 if in order to vindicate their system from so great a reproach1 they have been compelled to adopt positions which are clearly inconsistent with the divine holiness1 and thus to increase rather than to diminish the reproach2 surely their system itself should be more than suspected of error4 ,we shall proceed1 then1 with this view1 to examine their speculations in regard to the agency of ,god in its connexion with the origin and existence of moral evil4 ,section ,i4 ,the attempts of ,calvin and other reformers to show that the system of necessity does not make ,god the author of sin4 ,most of the advocates of divine providence have endeavoured to soften their views1 so as to bring them into a conformity with the common sentiments of mankind1 by supposing that ,god merely permits1 without producing the sinful volitions of men4 ,but ,calvin rejects this distinction with the most positive disdain4 8,a question of still greater difficulty arises10 says he1 8from other passages1 where ,god is said to incline or draw ,satan himself and all the reprobate4 ,for the carnal understanding scarcely comprehends how he1 acting by their means1 and even in operations common to himself and them1 is free from any fault1 and yet righteously condemns those whose ministry he uses4 ,hence was invented the distinction between doing and permitting2 because to many persons this has appeared an inexplicable difficulty1 that ,satan and all the impious are subject to the power and government of ,god1 so that he directs their malice to whatever end he pleases1 and uses their crimes for the execution of his judgments4 ,the modesty of those who are alarmed by absurdity1 might perhaps be excusable1 if they did not attempt to vindicate the divine justice from all accusation by a pretence utterly destitute of any foundation in truth407#ei7 ,here the distinction between ,god's permitting and doing in relation to the sins of men1 is declared by ,calvin to be utterly without foundation in truth1 and purely chimerical4 ,so1 in various other places1 he treats this distinction as 8too weak to be supported40 8,the will of ,god10 says he1 8is the supreme and first cause of things20 and he quotes ,augustine with approbation to the effect1 that 8,he does not remain an idle spectator1 determining to permit anything2 there is an intervention of an actual volition1 if ,i may be allowed the expression1 which otherwise could never be considered a cause407#fj7 ,according to ,calvin1 then1 nothing ever happens in the universe1 not even the sinful volitions of men1 which is not caused by ,god1 even by 8the intervention of an actual volition0 of the supreme will4 ,it is evident that ,calvin scorns to have any recourse to a permissive will in ,god1 in order to soften down the stupendous difficulties under which his system seems to labour4 ,on the contrary1 he sometimes betrays a little impatience with those who had endeavoured to mitigate the more rugged features of what he conceived to be the truth4 8,the fathers10 says he1 8are sometimes too scrupulous on this subject1 and afraid of a simple confession of the truth407#fa7 ,he entertains no such fears4 ,he is even bold and rigid enough in his consistency to say1 8that ,god often actuates the reprobate by the interposition of ,satan1 but in such a manner that ,satan himself acts his part by the divine impulse407#fb7 ,and again1 he declares that by means of ,satan1 8,god excites the will and strengthens the efforts0 of the reprobate47#fc7 ,indeed1 his great work1 whenever it touches upon this awful subject1 renders it perfectly clear that ,calvin despises all weak evasions in the advocacy of his stern doctrine4 ,it has been truly said1 that ,calvin never thinks of 8deducing the fall of man from the abuse of human freedom40 ,so far is he from this1 indeed1 that he seems to lose his patience with those who trace the origin of moral evil to such a source4 8,they say it is nowhere declared in express terms10 says ,calvin1 8that ,god decreed ,adam should perish by his defection2 as though the same ,god1 whom the ,scriptures represent as doing whatever he pleases1 created the noblest of his creatures without any determinate end4 ,they maintain1 that he was possessed of free choice1 that he might be the author of his own fate1 but that ,god decreed nothing more than to treat him according to his desert4 ,if so weak a scheme as this be received1 what will become of ,god's omnipotence1 by which he governs all things according to his secret counsel1 independently of every person or thing besides407#fd7 ,the fall of man1 says ,calvin1 was decreed from all eternity1 and it was brought to pass by the omnipotence of ,god4 ,to suppose that ,adam was the author of his own fate and fall1 is to deny the omnipotence of ,god1 and to rob him of his sovereignty4 ,now1 if to say that ,god created man1 and then left his sin to proceed wholly from himself1 be to rob ,god of his omnipotence1 and to affirm that he made man for no determinate end1 the same consequences would follow from the position that ,god created ,satan1 and then left his sin and rebellion to proceed wholly from himself4 ,but1 strange as it may seem1 the very thing which ,calvin so vehemently denies in regard to man1 he asserts in relation to ,satan2 and he even feels called upon to make this assertion in order to vindicate the divine purity against the calumny of being implicated in the sin of ,satan6 8,but since the devil was created by ,god10 says he1 8we must remark1 that this wickedness which we attribute to his nature is not from creation1 but from corruption4 ,for whatever evil quality he has1 he has acquired by his defection and fall4 ,and of this ,scripture apprizes us2 but1 believing him to have come from ,god1 just as he now is1 we shall ascribe to ,god himself that which is in direct opposition to him4 ,for this reason1 ,christ declares1 that ,satan1 #8when he speaketh a lie1 speaketh of his own2' and adds the reason1 #8because he abode not in the truth4' ,when he says that he abode not in the truth1 he certainly implied that he had once been in it2 and when he calls him the father of a lie1 he precludes his imputing to ,god the depravity of his nature1 which originated wholly from himself4 ,though these things are delivered in a brief and rather obscure manner1 yet they are abundantly sufficient to vindicate the majesty of ,god from every calumny407#fe7 ,thus1 in order to show that ,god is not the author of sin1 ,calvin assumes the very positions in regard to the rebellion of ,satan which his opponents have always felt constrained to adopt in regard to the transgression of man4 ,what then1 on ,calvin's own principles1 becomes of the omnipotence of ,god8 ,does this extend merely to man and not to ,satan8 ,is it not evident that ,calvin's scheme in regard to the sin of the first man1 is here most emphatically condemned out of his own mouth8 ,does he not here endorse the very consequence which his adversaries have been accustomed to deduce from his scheme of predestination1 namely1 that it makes ,god the author of sin8 ,this scheme of doctrine1 it must be confessed1 is not without its difficulties4 ,it clothes man1 as he came from the hand of his ,maker1 with the glorious attributes of freedom2 but to what end8 ,is this attribute employed to account for the introduction of sin into the world8 ,is it employed to show that man1 and not ,god1 is the author of moral evil8 ,it is sad to reflect that it is not4 ,the fall of man is referred to the direct 8omnipotence of ,god40 ,the feeble creature yields to the decree and power of the ,almighty1 who1 because he does so1 kindles into the most fearful wrath and dooms him and all his posterity to temporal1 spiritual1 and eternal death4 ,such is the doctrine which is advanced1 in order to secure the omnipotence of ,god1 and to exalt his sovereignty4 ,but is it not a great leading feature of deism itself1 that it exalts the power of ,god at the expense of his infinite moral perfections8 ,so we have understood the matter2 and hence1 it seems to us1 that ,christian divines should be more guarded in handling the attribute of omnipotence4 8,the rigid theologians10 says ,leibnitz1 8have held the greatness of ,god in higher estimation than his goodness1 the latitudinarians have done the contrary2 true orthodoxy has these two perfections equally at heart4 ,the error which abases the greatness of ,god should be called anthropomorphism1 and despotism that which divests him of his goodness407#ff7 ,if ,calvin's doctrine be true1 ,god is not the author of sin1 inasmuch as he made man pure and upright2 but yet1 by the same power which created him1 has he plunged him into sin and misery4 ,now1 if the creation of man with a sinful nature be inconsistent with the infinite purity of ,god1 will it not be difficult to reconcile with that purity the production of sin in man1 after his creation1 by an act of the divine omnipotence8 ,if we ask1 ,how can ,god be just in causing man to sin1 and then punishing him for it8 ,calvin replies1 ,that all his dealings with us 8are guided by equity407#fg7 ,we know1 indeed1 that all his ways are guided by the most absolute and perfect justice2 and this is the very circumstance which creates the difficulty4 ,the more clearly we perceive1 and the more vividly we realize1 the perfection of the divine equity1 the more heavily does the difficulty press upon our minds4 ,this assurance brings us no relief2 we still demand1 if ,god be just1 as in truth he is1 how can he deal with us after such a manner8 ,the answer we obtain is1 that ,god is just4 ,and if this does not satisfy us1 we are reminded that 8it is impossible ever wholly to prevent the petulance and murmurs of impiety407#fh7 ,we seek for light1 and1 instead of light1 we are turned off with reproaches for the want of piety4 ,we have not that faith1 we humbly confess1 which 8from its exaltation looks down on these mists with contempt207#fi7 but we have a reason1 it may be 8a carnal understanding10 which longs to be enlarged and enlightened by faith4 ,hence1 it cannot but murmur when1 instead of being enlarged and enlightened by faith1 it is utterly overwhelmed and confounded by it4 ,and these murmurings of reason1 which we can no more prevent than we could stop the heavings of the mighty ocean from its depths1 are met and sought to be quelled with the rebuke1 8,who art thou1 ,o man1 that repliest against ,god80 ,we reply not against ,god1 but against man's interpretation of ,god's word2 and who art thou1 ,o man1 that puttest thyself in the place of ,god8 8,men10 saith ,bacon1 8are ever ready to usurp the style1 #8,non ego1 sed ,dominus2' and not only so1 but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas1 to the terror of those who have not sufficiently learned out of ,solomon1 that the #8causeless curse shall not come4' 0 ,in relation to the subject under consideration1 the amiable and philosophic mind of ,melanchthon seems to have been more consistent1 at one time1 than that of most of the reformers4 8,he laid down10 says ,d',aubign1 8a sort of fatalism1 which might lead his readers to think of ,god as the author of evil1 and which consequently has no foundation in ,scripture3 #8since whatever happens1' said he1 #8happens by necessity1 agreeably to divine foreknowledge1 it is plain our will hath no liberty whatever4' 0 ,it is certainly a very mild expression to say1 that the doctrine of ,melanchthon might lead his readers to think of ,god as the author of evil4 ,this is a consequence which the logical mind of ,melanchthon did not fail to draw from his own scheme of necessity4 ,in his commentary on the ,epistle to the ,romans1 in the edition of #aebe1 he asserted 8that ,god wrought all things1 evil as well as good2 that he was the author of ,david's adultery1 and the treason of ,judas1 as well as of ,paul's conversion40 ,this doctrine was maintained by ,melanchthon on practical as well as on speculative grounds4 ,it is useful1 says he1 in its tendency to subdue human arrogance2 it represses the wisdom and cunning of human reason4 ,we have generally observed1 that whenever a learned divine denounces the arrogancy of reason1 and insists on an humble submission to his own doctrines1 that he has some absurdity which he wishes us to embrace2 he feels a sort of internal consciousness that human reason is arrayed against him1 and hence he abuses and vilifies it4 ,but reason is not to be kept in due subordination by any such means4 ,if sovereigns would maintain a legitimate authority over their subjects1 they should bind them with wise and wholesome laws1 and not with arbitrary and despotic enactments1 which are so well calculated to engender hatred and rebellion4 ,in like manner1 the best possible way to tame the refractory reason of man1 and hold it in subjection1 is to bind it with the silken cords of divine truth1 and not fetter it with the harsh and galling absurdities of man's invention4 ,melanchthon himself furnished a striking illustration of the justness of this remark2 for although1 like other reformers1 he taught the doctrine of a divine fatality of all events1 in order to humble the pride of the human intellect1 his own reason afterward rebelled against it4 ,he not only recanted the monstrous doctrine which made ,god the author of sin1 but he openly combatted it4 ,in the writings of ,beza and ,zwingle there are passages1 in relation to the origin of evil1 more offensive1 if possible1 than any we have adduced from ,calvin and ,melanchthon4 ,the mode in which the reformers defended their common doctrine was1 with some few exceptions1 the same in substance4 ,they have said nothing which can serve to dispel1 or even materially lessen1 the stupendous cloud of difficulties which their scheme spreads over the moral government of ,god4 ,considering the condition of the ,church1 the state of human knowledge1 and1 in short1 all the circumstances of the times in which the reformers lived and acted1 it is not very surprising that they should have fallen into such errors4 ,the corruptions of human nature1 manifesting themselves in the ,romish ,church1 had so extravagantly exalted the powers of man1 and especially of the priesthood1 and so greatly depressed or obscured the sovereignty of ,god1 that the reformers1 in fighting against those abuses1 were naturally forced into the opposite extreme4 ,it is not at all wonderful1 we say1 that a reaction1 which shook the very foundations of the earth1 should have carried the authors of it beyond the bounds of moderation and truth4 ,they would have been more than human if they had not fallen into some such errors as these which we have ascribed to them4 ,but the great misfortune is1 that these errors should have been stereotyped and fixed in the symbolical books of the ,protestant ,churches1 and made to descend from the reformers to their children's children1 as though they were of the very essence of the faith once delivered to the saints4 ,this is the misfortune1 the lamentable evil1 which has furnished the ,romish ,church with its most powerful weapons of attack27#gj7 which has fortified the strongholds of atheism and infidelity2 and which has1 beyond all question1 fearfully retarded the great and glorious cause of true religion4 ,if we would examine the most elaborate efforts to defend these doctrines1 or rather the great central dogma of necessity from which they all radiate1 we must descend to later times2 we must turn our attention to the immortal writings of a ,leibnitz and an ,edwards4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the attempt of ,leibnitz to show that the scheme of necessity does not make ,god the author of sin4 ,this philosopher employed all the resources of a sublime genius1 and all the stores of a vast erudition1 in order to maintain the scheme of necessity1 and at the same time vindicate the purity of the ,divine ,being4 ,that subtle and adroit sceptic1 ,m4 ,bayle1 had drawn out all the consequences of the doctrine of necessity in opposition to the free-agency of man1 and to the holiness of ,god4 ,leibnitz wrote his great 8,essais de ,thodice10 for the purpose of refuting these conclusions of ,bayle1 as well as those of all other sceptics1 and of reconciling his system with the divine attributes4 ,in the preface to his work he says1 8,we show that evil has another source than the will of ,god2 and that we have reason to say of moral evil1 that ,god only permits it1 and that he does not will it4 ,but what is more important1 we show that ,god can not only permit sin1 but even concur therein1 and contribute to it1 without prejudice to his holiness2 although1 absolutely speaking1 he might have prevented it40 ,such is the task which ,leibnitz has undertaken to perform2 let us see how he has accomplished it4 8,the ancients10 says he1 8attributed the cause of evil to matter2 but where shall we1 who derive all things from ,god1 find the source of evil807#ga7 ,he has more than once answered this question1 by saying that the source of evil is to be found in the ideas of the divine mind4 8,chrysippus10 says he1 8has reason to allege that vice comes from the original constitution of some spirits4 ,it is objected to him that ,god has formed them2 and he can only reply1 that the imperfection of matter does not permit him to do better4 ,this reply is good for nothing2 for matter itself is indifferent to all forms1 and besides ,god has made it4 ,evil comes rather from forms themselves1 but abstract2 that is to say1 from ideas that ,god has not produced by an act of his will1 no more than he has produced number and figures2 and no more1 in one word1 than all those possible essences which we regard as eternal and necessary2 for they find themselves in the ideal region of possibles2 that is to say1 in the divine understanding4 ,god is then not the author of those essences1 in so far as they are only possibilities2 but there is nothing actual1 but what he discerned and called into existence2 and he has permitted evil1 because it is enveloped in the best plan which is found in the region of possibles2 that plan the supreme wisdom could not fail to choose4 ,it is this notion which at once satisfies the wisdom1 the power1 and the goodness of ,god1 and yet leaves room for the entrance of evil407#gb7 ,in reading the lofty speculations of ,leibnitz1 we have been often led to wonder how one1 whose genius was so great1 could have permitted himself to rest in conceptions which appear so vague and indistinct4 ,in the above passage we have both light and obscurity2 and we find it difficult to determine which predominates over the other4 ,we are clearly told that ,god is not the author of evil1 because this proceeds from abstract forms which were from all eternity enveloped in his understanding1 and not from any operation of his will4 ,but how does evil proceed from abstract forms2 from the ideal region of the possible8 ,leibnitz does not mean that evil proceeds from abstract ideas1 before they are embodied in the creation of real moral agents4 ,why then did ,god create beings which he knew from all eternity would commit sin8 and why1 having created them1 did he contribute to their sins by a divine concourse8 ,this is coming down from the ideal region of the possible1 into the world of real difficulties4 ,according to the philosophy of ,leibnitz1 ,god created every intelligent being in the universe with a perfect knowledge of its whole destiny2 and there is1 moreover1 a concourse of the divine will with all their volitions4 ,now1 here we are in the very midst of the concrete world1 and here is a difficulty which cannot be avoided by a flight into the ideal region of the possible4 ,how can there be a concourse of the divine will with the human will in one and the same sinful volition1 without a stain upon the immaculate purity of ,god8 ,how can the ,father of ,lights1 by an operation of his will1 contribute to our sinful volitions1 without prejudice to his holiness8 ,this is the problem which ,leibnitz has promised to solve2 and we shall1 with all patience1 listen to his solution4 ,the solution of this problem1 says he1 is effected by means of the 8privative nature of evil40 ,we shall state this part of his system in his own words3 8,as to the physical concourse10 says he1 8it is here that it is necessary to consider that truth which has made so much noise in the schools1 since ,st4 ,augustine has shown its importance1 that evil is a privation1 whereas the action of ,god produces only the positive4 ,this reply passes for a defective one1 and even for something chimerical in the minds of many men2 but here is an example sufficiently analogous1 which may undeceive them40 8,the celebrated ,kepler1 and after him ,m4 ,descartes1 have spoken of the natural inertia of bodies1 and that we can consider it as a perfect image1 and even as a pattern of the original limitation of creatures1 in order to make us see that privation is the formal cause of the imperfections and inconveniences which are found in substance as well as in actions4 ,suppose that the current of a river carries along with it many vessels which have different cargoes1 some of wood1 and others of stone2 some more1 and some less4 ,it will happen that the vessels which are more heavily laden will move more slowly than the others1 provided there is nothing to aid their progress4444 ,let us compare the force which the current exercises over the vessels and what it communicates to them1 with the action of ,god1 who produces and preserves whatever is positive in the creature1 and imparts to them perfection1 being1 and force2 let us compare1 ,i say1 the inertia of matter with the natural imperfection of creatures1 and the slowness of the more heavily laden vessel with the defect which is found in the qualities and in the actions of the creature1 and we shall perceive that there is nothing so just as this comparison4 ,the current is the cause of the movement of the vessel1 but not of its retardation2 ,god is the cause of the perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature1 but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the defect in its actions4 ,thus the ,platonists1 ,st4 ,augustine1 and the schoolmen1 have reason to say that ,god is the material cause of evil1 which consists in what is positive1 and not the formal cause of it1 which consists in privation1 as we can say that the current is the material cause of the retardation1 without being its formal cause2 that is to say1 is the cause of the swiftness of the vessel1 without being the cause of the bounds of that swiftness4 ,god is as little the cause of sin1 as the current of the river is the cause of the retardation of the vessel407#gc7 ,or as ,leibnitz elsewhere says1 ,god is the author of all that is positive in our volitions1 and the pravity of them arises from the necessary imperfection of the creature4 ,we have many objections to this mode of explaining the origin of moral evil1 some few of which we shall proceed to state4 #a4 ,it is a hopeless attempt to illustrate the processes of the mind by the analogies of matter4 ,all such illustrations are better adapted to darken and confound the subject1 than to throw light upon it4 ,if we would know anything about the nature of moral evil1 or its origin1 we must study the subject in the light of consciousness1 and in the light of consciousness alone4 ,dugald ,stewart has conferred on ,descartes the proud distinction of having been the first philosopher to teach the true method according to which the science of mind should be studied4 8,he laid it down as a first principle10 says ,stewart1 8that nothing comprehensible by the imagination can be at all subservient to the knowledge of mind2 and that the sensible images involved in all our common forms of speaking concerning its operations1 are to be guarded against with the most anxious care1 as tending to confound in our apprehensions1 two classes of phenomena1 which it is of the last importance to distinguish accurately from each other407#gd7 #b4 ,the privative nature of evil1 as it is called1 is purely a figment of the brain2 it is an invention of the schoolmen1 which has no corresponding reality in nature4 ,when ,adam put forth his hand to pluck the forbidden fruit1 and ate it1 he committed a sinful act4 ,but why was it sinful8 ,because he knew it was wrong2 because his act was a voluntary and known transgression of the command of ,god4 ,now1 if ,god had caused all that was positive in this sinful act1 that is1 if he had caused ,adam to will to put forth his hand and eat the fruit1 it is plain that he would have been the cause of his transgression4 ,nothing can be more chimerical1 it seems to us1 than this distinction between being the author of the substance of an act1 and the author of its pravity4 ,if ,adam had obeyed1 that is1 if he had refused to eat the forbidden fruit1 such an act would not have been more positive than the actual series of volitions by which he transgressed4 #c4 ,if what we call sin1 arises from the necessary imperfection of the creature1 as the slowness of a vessel in descending a stream arises from its cargo1 how can he be to blame for it2 or1 in other words1 how can it be moral evil at all8 ,and1 #d4 ,leibnitz has certainly committed a very great oversight in this attempt to account for the origin of evil4 ,he explains it1 by saying that it arises from the necessary imperfection of the creature which limits its receptivity2 but does he mean that ,god cannot communicate holiness to the creature8 ,does he mean that ,god endeavours to communicate holiness1 and fails in consequence of the necessary imperfection of the creature8 ,if so1 what becomes of the doctrine which he everywhere advances1 that ,god can very easily cause virtue or holiness to exist if he should choose to do so8 ,if ,god can very easily cause this to exist1 as ,leibnitz contends he can1 notwithstanding the necessary imperfection of the creature1 why has he not done so8 ,is it not evident1 that the philosophy of ,leibnitz merely plays over the surface of this great difficulty1 and decks it out with the ornaments of fancy1 instead of reaching down to the bottom of it1 and casting the illuminations of his genius into its depths8 ,section ,,iii4 ,the maxims adopted and employed by ,edwards to show that the scheme of necessity does not make ,god the author of sin4 8,this remarkable man10 says ,sir ,james ,mackintosh1 8the metaphysician of ,america1 was formed among the ,calvinists of ,new-,england1 when their stern doctrine retained its vigorous authority4 ,his power of subtle argument1 perhaps unmatched1 certainly unsurpassed among men1 was joined1 as in some of the ancient mystics1 with a character which raised his piety to fervour40 ,it is in his great work on the will1 as well as in some of his miscellaneous observations1 that ,edwards has put forth the powers of his mind1 in order to show that the scheme of necessity does not obscure the lustre of the divine perfections4 ,with the exception of the ,essais de ,thodice of ,leibnitz1 it is perhaps the greatest effort the human mind has ever made to get rid of the seeming antagonism between the scheme of necessity and the holiness of ,god4 ,according to the system of ,edwards1 as well as that of his opponents1 sin would not have been committed unless it were permitted by ,god4 ,but in the scheme of ,edwards1 the agency of ,god bears a more intimate relation to the origin and existence of sin than is implied by a bare permission of it4 8,god10 says he1 disposes 8the state of events in such a manner1 for wise1 holy1 and most excellent ends and purposes1 that sin1 if it be permitted or not hindered1 will most certainly and infallibly follow407#ge7 ,and this occurrence of sin1 in consequence of his disposing and ordering events1 enters into his design4 ,for ,edwards truly says1 that 8,if ,god disposes all events1 so that the infallible existence of the events is decided by his providence1 then1 doubtless1 he thus orders and decides things knowingly and on design4 ,god does not do what he does1 nor order what he orders1 accidentally and unawares1 either without or beside his intention40 ,thus1 we are told1 that ,god so arranges and disposes the events of his providence as to bring sin to pass1 and that he does so designedly4 ,this broad proposition is laid down1 not merely with reference to sin in general1 but to certain great sins in particular4 8,so that10 says ,edwards1 8what these murderers of ,christ did1 is spoken of as what ,god brought to pass or ordered1 and that by which he fulfilled his own word40 ,according to ,edwards1 then1 the events of ,god's providence are arranged with a view to bring all the sinful deeds of men 8certainly and infallibly0 to pass1 as well as their holy acts4 ,now1 here the question arises1 ,is this doctrine consistent with the character of ,god8 ,is it not repugnant to his infinite holiness8 ,we affirm that it is2 ,edwards declares that it is not4 ,let us see1 then1 if his position does not involve him in insuperable difficulties1 and in irreconcilable contradictions4 ,edwards supposes that some one may object3 8,all that these things amount to is1 that ,god may do evil that good may come2 which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men1 and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the perfections of ,god40 ,this is a fair and honest statement of the objection2 now let us hear the reply4 8,i answer10 says ,edwards1 8that for ,god to dispose and permit evil in the manner that has been spoken of1 is not to do evil that good may come2 for it is not to do evil at all40 ,it is not to do evil at all1 says he1 for the ,supreme ,ruler of the world to arrange events around one of his creatures in such a manner that they will certainly and infallibly induce him to commit sin4 ,why is not this to do evil8 ,at first view1 it certainly looks very much like doing evil2 and it is not at once distinguishable from the temptations ascribed to ,satanic agency4 ,why is it not to do evil1 then1 when it is done by the ,almighty8 ,it is not to do evil1 says ,edwards1 because when ,god brings sin certainly and infallibly to pass1 he does so 8for wise and holy purposes40 ,this is his answer3 8,in order to a thing's being morally evil1 there must be one of these two things belonging to it3 either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own nature1 or it must have a bad tendency1 or it must be done for an evil end4 ,but neither of these things can be attributed to ,god's ordering and permitting such events as the immoral acts of creatures for good ends407#gf7 ,let us examine this logic4 ,we are gravely told1 that ,god designedly brings the sinful acts of men to pass by the use of most certain and infallible means2 but this is not to do evil1 because he has a good end in view4 ,his intention is right2 he brings sin to pass for 8wise and holy purposes40 ,let us come a little closer to this doctrine1 and see what it is4 ,it will not be denied1 that if any being should bring sin to pass without any end at all1 except to secure its existence1 this would be a sinful agency4 ,if any being should1 knowingly and designedly1 bring sin to pass in another1 without any 8wise and holy purposes10 all mankind will agree in pronouncing the deed to be morally wrong4 ,but precisely the same deed is not wrong in ,god1 says ,edwards1 because in his case it proceeds from 8a wise and holy purpose10 and he has 8a good end in view40 ,that is to say1 the means1 in themselves considered1 are morally wrong2 but being employed for a wise and holy purpose1 for the attainment of a good end1 they are sanctified6 ,this is precisely the doctrine1 that the end sanctifies the means4 ,is it not wonderful1 that any system should be so dark and despotic in its power as to induce the mind of an ,edwards1 ordinarily so amazing for its acuteness and so exalted in its piety1 to vindicate the character of ,god upon such grounds8 ,the defence of ,edwards is neither more nor less than a play on the term evil4 ,when it is said1 that 8we may do evil that good may come20 the meaning of the maxim is1 that the means in such a case and under such circumstances ceases to be evil4 ,the maxim teaches that 8we may do evil10 that it is lawful to do evil1 with a view to the grand and glorious end to be attained by it4 ,or1 in other words1 that it is right to do what would otherwise be morally evil1 in order to accomplish a good end4 ,if ,edwards had considered the other form of the same odious maxim1 namely1 that 8the end sanctifies the means10 he would have found it impossible to evade the force of its application to his doctrine4 ,he could not have escaped from the difficulty of his position by a play upon the word evil4 ,he would have seen that he had undertaken to justify the conduct of the ,father of ,lights1 by supposing it to be governed by the most corrupt maxim of the most corrupt system of casuistry the world has ever seen4 ,what ,god does1 says ,edwards1 is not evil at all2 because his purpose is holy1 because his object is good1 his intention is right4 ,in like manner1 the maxim says1 that when the end is good and holy1 8it sanctifies the means40 ,the means may be impure in themselves considered1 but they are rendered pure by the cause in which they are employed4 ,this doctrine has been immortalized by ,pascal1 in his 8,provincial ,letters20 and we cannot better dismiss the subject than with an extract from the 8,provincial ,letters40 8,i showed you10 says the jesuitical father1 8how servants might1 with a safe conscience1 manage certain troublesome messages2 did you not observe that it is simply taking off their intention from the sin itself1 and fixing it on the advantage to be gained407#gg7 ,on this principle1 stealing1 and lying1 and murder1 may all be vindicated4 8,caramuel1 our illustrious defender10 says the ,jesuit1 8in his ,fundamental ,theology10 444 enters into the examination of many new questions resulting from this principle1 7of directing the intention17 as1 for example1 whether the ,jesuits may kill the ,jansenists8 8,alas1 father60 exclaimed ,pascal1 8this is a most surprising point in theology6 ,i hold the ,jansenists already no better than dead men by the doctrine of ,father ,launy40 8,aha1 sir1 you are caught2 for ,caramuel deduces the very opposite conclusion from the same principles40 8,how so80 said ,pascal4 8,observe his words1 n4 #aadf and #aadg1 p4 #edg and #edh4 ,the ,jansenists call the ,jesuits ,pelagians2 may they be killed for so doing8 ,no--for this plain reason1 that the ,jansenists are no more able to obscure the glory of our society1 than an owl can hide the sun2 in fact1 they promote it1 though certainly against their intention--occidi non possunt1 quia nocere non potuerunt40 8,alas1 father10 says ,pascal1 8and does the existence of the ,jansenists depend solely upon their capacity of injuring your reputation8 ,if that be the case1 ,i am afraid they are not in a very good predicament2 for if the slightest probability should arise of their doing you any hurt1 they may be despatched at once4 ,you can perform the deed logically and in form2 for it is only to direct your intention right1 and you insure a quiet conscience4 ,what a blessedness for those who can endure injuries to know this charming doctrine6 ,but1 on the other hand1 how miserable is the condition of the offending party6 ,really1 father1 it would be better to have to do with people totally devoid of all religion1 than with those who have received instructions so far only as to this point1 relative to directing the intention4 ,i am afraid the intention of the murderer is no consolation to the wounded person4 ,he can have no perception of this secret direction--poor man6 he is conscious only of the blow he receives2 and ,i am not certain whether he would not be less indignant to be cruelly massacred by people in a violent transport of rage1 than to be devoutly killed for conscience' sake40 ,now1 we submit it to the candid reader1 whether the reasoning here ascribed to the ,jesuit by ,pascal1 is not exactly parallel with that on which ,edwards justifies the procedure of the ,almighty8 ,if ,god may choose sin and bring it to pass1 without contracting the least impurity1 because his intention is directed aright1 to a wise and good end1 may we not be permitted to imitate his example8 ,and again1 if ,god thus employs the creature as an instrument to accomplish his wise and holy purposes1 why should he pour out the vials of his wrath upon him for having yielded to the dispensations of his almighty power8 ,in order to save his doctrine from reproach1 ,edwards has invented a distinction1 which next demands our attention4 8,there is no inconsistence10 says he1 8in supposing that ,god may hate a thing as it is in itself1 and considered simply as evil1 and yet that it may be his will it should come to pass1 considering all consequences4 ,i believe there is no person of good understanding who will venture to say1 he is certain that it is impossible it should be best1 taking in the whole compass and extent of existence1 and all consequences in the endless series of events1 that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world4 ,and if so1 it will certainly follow1 that an infinitely wise ,being1 who always chooses what is best1 must choose that there should be such a thing4 ,and if so1 then such a choice is not evil1 but a wise and holy choice4 ,and if so1 then that ,providence which is agreeable to such a choice1 is a wise and holy ,providence4 ,men do will sin as sin1 and so are the authors and actors of it2 they love it as sin1 and for evil ends and purposes4 ,god does not will sin as sin1 or for the sake of anything evil2 though it be his pleasure so to order things that1 he permitting1 sin will come to pass1 for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence4 ,his willing to order things so that evil should come to pass for the sake of the contrary good1 is no argument that he does not hate evil as evil2 and if so1 then it is no reason why he may not reasonably forbid evil as evil1 and punish it as such407#gh7 ,here we are plainly told1 that although ,god hates sin as sin1 yet1 all things considered1 he prefers that it should come to pass1 and even helps it into existence4 ,but man loves and commits evil as such1 and is therefore justly punishable for it4 ,there are several serious objections to this extraordinary distinction4 ,it is not true that men love and commit sin as sin4 ,sin is committed1 not for its own sake1 but for the pleasure which attends it4 ,if sin did not gratify the appetites1 or the passions1 or the desires of men1 it would not be committed at all2 there would be no temptation to it1 and it would be seen as it is in its own loathsome nature4 ,indeed1 to speak with philosophical accuracy1 sin is never a direct object of our affections or choice2 we simply desire certain things1 as ,adam did the forbidden fruit1 and we seek our gratification in them contrary to the will of ,god4 ,this constitutes our sin4 ,the direct object of our choice is1 not disobedience1 not sin1 but the forbidden thing1 the prohibited gratification4 ,we do not love and choose the disobedience1 but the thing which leads us to disobey4 ,this is so very plain and simple a matter1 that we cannot but wonder that honest men should have lost sight of it in a mist of words1 and built up their theories in the dark4 ,secondly1 the above position1 into which ,edwards has been forced by the exigencies of his doctrine concerning evil1 is directly at war with the great fundamental principle on which his whole system rests1 namely1 that the will is always determined by the greatest apparent good4 ,for how is it possible that men should commit sin as sin1 and for its own sake1 if they never do anything except what is the most agreeable to them8 ,how is it possible that they pursue moral evil merely as moral evil1 and yet pursue it as the greatest apparent good8 ,if it should be said that men love sin merely as sin1 and therefore it pleases them to choose it for its own sake1 this reply would be without foundation4 ,for1 as we have already seen1 there is no such principle in human nature as the love of sin as such1 or for its own sake2 and consequently sin can never delight or please the human mind as it is in itself4 ,and1 besides1 it is self-contradictory2 for the question is1 ,how can a man commit sin for its own sake on account of the pleasure it affords him8 ,it would be an attempt to explain an hypothesis which denies the very fact to be explained by it4 ,in the third place1 if the philosophy of ,edwards be true1 no good reason can be assigned why men should restrain themselves from the commission of sin3 for1 all things considered1 ,god prefers the sin which actually exists1 and infallibly brings it to pass4 ,he prefers it on account of the great good he intends to educe from it4 ,why then should we not also prefer its existence8 ,god is sovereign2 he will permit no more sin than he can and will render subservient to the highest good of the universe2 and so much as is for the highest good he will bring into existence4 ,why1 then1 should we give ourselves any concern about the matter8 ,why should we fear that there may be too much sin in the world1 or why should we blame other men for their crimes and offences8 ,the inference which we have just mentioned as necessarily flowing from the doctrine of ,edwards1 has actually been drawn by some of the most illustrious advocates of that doctrine4 ,thus says ,hartley1 as we have already seen1 8since all men do against us is by the appointment of ,god1 it is rebellion against him to be offended with them40 ,this is so clearly the logical inference from the doctrine in question1 that it is truly wonderful how any one can possibly fail to perceive it4 ,we are told by ,leibnitz and ,edwards1 that we should not presume to act on the principle of permitting sin in others1 or of bringing it to pass1 on account of the good that we may educe from it2 because such an affair is too high for us4 ,but1 surely1 we need have no weak fears on this ground2 for although it may be too high for us1 they do not pretend that it is too high for ,god4 ,he will allow no more sin to make its appearance in the world1 say they1 than he will cause to redound to the good of the universe4 ,he prefers it for that reason1 and why should we not respond1 amen6 to his preference8 ,why should we give ourselves any concern about sin8 ,may we not follow our own inclinations1 leaving sin to take its course1 and rest quietly in ,providence8 ,to this question it will be replied1 as ,calvin and ,edwards repeatedly reply1 that the revealed1 and not the secret1 will of ,god is the rule of our duty4 ,we do not object to this doctrine2 we acknowledge its perfect propriety and correctness3 but it is no reply to the consequence we have deduced from the philosophy of ,edwards4 ,it only shows that his philosophy leads to a conclusion which is in direct opposition to revelation4 ,so far from objecting that any should turn from the philosophy of ,edwards to revelation1 in order to find reasons why evil should not be committed by us1 we sincerely regret that such a departure from a false philosophy1 and return to a true religion1 is not more permanent and universal4 ,the doctrine of ,edwards on this subject destroys the harmony of the divine attributes4 ,it represents ,god as having two wills2 or1 to speak more correctly1 it represents him as having published a holy law for the government of his creatures1 which he does not1 in all cases1 wish them to obey4 ,on the contrary1 he prefers that some of them should violate his holy law2 and not only so1 but he adopts certain and infallible means to lead them to violate and trample it under foot4 ,it is admitted by ,edwards1 that in this sense ,god really possesses two wills2 but he still denies that this shows any inconsistency in the nature of ,god4 ,edwards says1 that the will of ,god does not oppose sin in the same sense in which it prefers sin1 and that1 therefore1 there is no inconsistency in the case4 ,but let us not deceive ourselves by words4 ,is it true1 that sin is opposed by what is called the revealed will of ,god1 by his command2 and yet that it is1 all things considered1 chosen by his secret and working will8 ,he commands one thing1 and yet works to bring another to pass6 ,he prohibits all sin1 under the awful penalty of eternal death1 and yet secretly arranges and plans things in such a manner as to secure the commission of it6 ,we have already seen one of these defences4 ,god 8hates sin as it is in itself20 and hence he prohibits it by his command4 8,yet it may be his will it should come to pass1 considering all its consequences20 and hence his secret will is bent on bringing it into existence4 ,there is no inconsistency here1 says ,edwards1 because the divine will relates to two different objects2 namely1 to 8sin considered simply as sin10 and to 8sin considered in all its consequences40 ,we do not care whether the two propositions contradict each other or not2 it is abundantly evident1 as we have seen1 that it makes ,god choose that which he hates1 even sin itself1 as the means of good4 ,it makes the end sanctify the means1 even in the eye of the holy ,god4 ,this doctrine we utterly reject and infinitely abhor4 ,we had rather have 8our sight1 hearing1 and motive power1 and what not besides1 disputed1 and even torn away from us1 than suffer ourselves to be disputed into a belief10 that the holy ,god can choose moral evil as a means of good4 ,we had rather believe all the fables in the ,talmud and the ,koran1 than that the ever-blessed ,god should1 by his providence and his power1 plunge his feeble creatures into sin1 and then punish them with everlasting torments for their transgression4 ,we know of nothing in the ,pantheism of ,spinoza1 or in the atheism of ,hobbes1 more revolting than this hideous dogma4 ,the great metaphysician of ,new-,england has made a still further attempt to vindicate the dogma in question4 8,the ,arminians10 says he1 8ridicule the distinction between the secret and revealed will of ,god1 or1 more properly expressed1 the distinction between the decree and law of ,god2 because we say he may decree one thing and command another4 ,and so1 they argue1 we hold a contrariety in ,god1 as if one will of his contradicted another4 ,however1 if they will call this a contradiction of wills1 we know that there is such a thing2 so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it4 ,we and they know it was ,god's secret will1 that ,abraham should not sacrifice his son ,isaac2 but yet his command was1 that he should do it407#gi7 ,such is the instance produced by this acute divine1 to show that the secret will of ,god may prefer the very thing which is condemned by his revealed will or law2 and on the strength of it1 he is bold to say1 8,we know it1 so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it40 ,we have often seen this passage of ,scripture produced by infidels1 to show that the ,old ,testament contains unworthy representations of ,god4 ,if ,edwards had undertaken to refute the infidel ground in relation to this passage1 he might have done so with very great ease3 but then he would at the same time have refuted himself4 ,the ,scriptural account of ,god's commanding ,abraham to offer up his son ,isaac1 was long ago employed by the famous infidel ,hobbes to show that there are two wills in ,god4 ,this argument of ,hobbes has been refuted by ,leibnitz4 8,hobbes contends10 says ,leibnitz1 8that ,god wills not always what he commands1 as when he commands ,abraham to sacrifice his son20 and he replies1 that 8,god1 in commanding ,abraham to sacrifice his son1 willed the obedience1 and not the action1 which he prevented after having the obedience2 for that was not an action which merited in itself to be willed3 but such is not the case with those actions which he positively wills1 and which are indeed worthy of being the objects of his will2 such as piety1 charity1 and every virtuous action which ,god commands1 and such as the avoidance of sin1 more repugnant to the divine perfections than any other thing4 ,it is incomparably better1 therefore1 to explain the will of ,god1 as we have done it in this work407#hj7 ,it is evident that ,leibnitz did not relish the idea of two wills in ,god2 and perhaps few pious minds would do so1 if it were presented to them by an atheist4 ,but there was too close an affinity between the philosophy of ,leibnitz and that of ,hobbes1 to permit the former to furnish the most satisfactory refutation of the argument of the latter4 ,this command to ,abraham does not show that there ever was any such contrariety between the revealed and the decretal wills of ,god1 as is contended for by ,hobbes and ,edwards4 ,god intended1 as we are told1 to prove the faith of ,abraham1 in order that it might shine forth and become a bright example to all succeeding ages4 ,for this purpose he commanded him to take his only son1 whom he loved1 and go into the land of ,moriah1 and there offer him up as a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains4 ,abraham obeyed without a murmur4 ,after several days travelling and preparation1 ,abraham has reached the appointed place1 and is ready for the sacrifice4 ,his son ,isaac is bound1 and laid upon the altar2 the father stretches forth his hand to take the knife and slay him4 ,but a voice is heard1 saying1 8,lay not thine hand on the lad2 neither do thou anything unto him40 ,now1 the conduct of ,abraham on this memorable occasion1 is one of the most remarkable exhibitions of confidence in the wisdom and goodness of ,god1 which the history of the world has furnished4 ,it deserves to be held up to the admiration of mankind1 and to be celebrated in all ages of the world4 ,we sincerely pity the man1 who is so taken up with superficial appearances1 or who is so destitute of sympathy with the moral greatness and beauty of soul manifested in this simple narrative1 that he can approach it in a little1 captious1 sneering spirit1 rather than in an attitude of profound admiration4 ,but our business1 at present1 is not so much with the laughing sceptic as with the grave divine4 ,what evidence1 then1 does this story furnish that the secret will of ,god had anything to do with the simple but sublime transaction which it records8 ,god commanded ,abraham to repair to the land of ,moriah with his son ,isaac2 but are we informed that his secret will was opposed to the patriarch's going thither1 or that it opposed any obstacle to his obedience8 ,are we told that ,god so arranged the events of his providence as to render the disobedience of ,abraham1 in any one particular1 certain and infallible8 ,we cannot find the shadow of any such information in the sacred story4 ,and is there the least intimation1 that when ,abraham was commanded to stay the uplifted knife1 the secret will of ,god was in favour of its being plunged into the bosom of his son8 ,clearly there is not4 ,where1 then1 is the discrepancy between the revealed and the secret wills of ,god in this case1 which we are required to see8 ,where is this discrepancy so plainly manifested1 that we absolutely know its existence1 so that it is the height of absurdity to dispute against it8 ,if there is any contrariety at all in this case1 it is between the revealed will of ,god in commanding ,abraham to offer up his son1 and his subsequently revealed will to desist from the sacrifice4 ,it does not present even a seeming inconsistency between his secret will and his command1 but between two portions of his revealed will4 ,this seeming inconsistency between the command of ,god and his countermand1 in relation to the same external action1 has been fully removed by ,leibnitz2 and if it had not been1 it is just as incumbent on the abettors of ,edwards's scheme to explain it1 as it is upon his opponents4 ,if ,god had commanded ,abraham to do a thing1 and yet exerted his secret will to make him violate the injunction1 this would have been a case in point3 but there is no such case to be found in the word of ,god4 ,it may not be improper1 in this connexion1 to quote the following judicious admonition of ,howe3 8,take heed10 says he1 8that we do not oppose the secret and revealed will of ,god to one another1 or allow ourselves so much as to imagine an opposition or contrariety between them4 ,and that ground being once firmly laid and stuck to1 as it is impossible that there can be a will against a will in ,god1 or that he can be divided from himself1 or against himself1 or that he should reveal anything to us as his will that is not his will1 7it being a thing inconsistent with his nature1 and impossible to him to lie17 that being1 ,i say1 firmly laid1 7as nothing can be firmer or surer than that17 then measure all your conceptions of the secret will of ,god by his revealed will1 about which you may be sure4 ,but never measure your conceptions of his revealed by his secret will2 that is1 by what you may imagine concerning that4 ,for you can but imagine while it is secret1 and so far as it is unrevealed407#ha7 8,it properly belongs10 says ,edwards1 8to the supreme absolute ,governor of the universe1 to order all important events within his dominions by wisdom2 but the events in the moral world are of the most important kind1 such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures1 and the consequences4 ,these events will be ordered by something4 ,they will either be disposed by wisdom1 or they will be disposed by chance2 that is1 they will be disposed by blind and undesigning causes1 if that were possible1 and could be called a disposal4 ,is it not better that the good and evil which happen in ,god's world should be ordered1 regulated1 bounded1 and determined by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise being1 than to leave these things to fall out by chance1 and to be determined by those causes which have no understanding and aim8444 ,it is in its own nature fit1 that wisdom1 and not chance1 should order these things407#hb7 ,in our opinion1 if there be no other alternative1 it is better that sin should be left to chance1 than ascribed to the high and holy ,one4 ,but why must sin be ordered and determined by the supreme ,ruler of the world1 or else be left to chance8 ,has the great metaphysician forgotten1 that there may be such things as men and angels in the universe2 or does he mean1 with ,spinoza1 to blot out all created agents1 and all subordinate agency1 from existence8 ,if not1 then certainly ,god may refuse to be the author of sin1 without leaving it to blind chance1 which is incapable of such a thing4 ,he may leave it1 as we conceive he has done1 to the determination of finite created intelligences4 ,if sin is to come into the world1 as come it evidently does1 it is infinitely better1 we say1 that it should be left to proceed from the creature1 and not be made to emanate from ,god himself1 the fountain of light1 and the great object of all adoration4 ,it is infinitely better that the high and holy ,one should do nothing either by his wisdom or by his decree1 by his providence or his power1 to help this hideous thing to raise its head amid the inconceivable splendours of his dominion4 ,such speculations as those of ,edwards and ,leibnitz1 in our opinion1 only reflect dishonour and disgrace upon the cause they are intended to subserve4 ,it is better1 ten thousand times better1 simply to plant ourselves upon the moral nature of man1 and the irreversible dictates of common sense1 and annihilate the speculations of the atheist1 than to endeavour to parry them off by such invented quibbles and sophisms4 ,they give point1 and pungency1 and power to the shafts of the sceptic4 ,if we meet him on the common ground of necessity1 he will snap all such quibbles like threads of tow1 and overwhelm us with the floods of irony and scorn4 ,for1 in the memorable words of ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 8,it can easily be proved by those who are able and not afraid to reason1 that the doctrine of necessity is subversive of religion1 natural and revealed40 ,to perceive this1 it requires neither a ,bayle1 nor a ,hobbes1 nor a ,hume2 it only requires a man who is neither unable nor afraid to reason4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the attempts of ,dr4 ,emmons and ,dr4 ,chalmers to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the purity of ,god4 ,as we have dwelt so long on the speculations of ,president ,edwards concerning the objections in question1 we need add but a few remarks in relation to the views of the above-mentioned authors on the same subject4 ,the sentiments of ,dr4 ,emmons on the relation between the divine agency and the sinful actions of men1 are even more clearly defined and boldly expressed than those of ,president ,edwards4 ,the disciple is more open and decided than the master4 8,since mind cannot act10 says he1 8any more than matter can move1 without a divine agency1 it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will1 to act1 or not to act1 independently of a divine influence4 ,there must be1 therefore1 the exercise of a divine agency in every human action1 without which it is impossible to conceive that ,god should govern moral agents1 and make mankind act in perfect conformity to his designs407#hc7 8,he is now exercising his powerful and irresistible agency upon the heart of every one of the human race1 and producing either holy or unholy exercises in it407#hd7 8,it is often thought and said1 that nothing more was necessary on ,god's part1 in order to fit ,pharaoh for destruction1 than barely to leave him to himself4 ,but ,god knew that no external means and motives would be sufficient of themselves to form his moral character4 ,he determined therefore to operate on his heart itself1 and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in view of certain external motives4 ,when ,moses called upon him to let the people go1 ,god stood by him1 and moved him to refuse4 ,when the people departed from his kingdom1 ,god stood by him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge4 ,and what ,god did on such particular occasions1 he did at all times407#he7 ,it is useless to multiply extracts to the same effect4 ,could language be more explicit1 or more revolting to the moral sentiments of mankind8 ,if ,god is alike the author of all our volitions1 sinful as well as holy1 one wonders by what sort of legerdemain the authors of the doctrine have contrived to ascribe all the glory and all the praise of our holy actions to ,god1 and at the same time all the shame and condemnation of our evil actions to ourselves4 ,in relation to the holy actions of men1 all the praise is due to ,god1 say they1 because they were produced by his power4 ,why is not the moral turpitude of their evil actions1 then1 also ascribed to ,god1 inasmuch as he is said to produce them by his irresistible and almighty agency8 ,we are accountable for our evil acts1 say ,dr4 ,emmons and ,calvin1 because they are voluntary4 ,are not our moral acts1 our virtuous acts1 also voluntary8 ,certainly they are2 this is not denied2 and yet we are not allowed to impute the moral quality of the acts to the agent in such cases4 ,this whole school of metaphysicians1 indeed1 from ,calvin down to ,emmons1 can make ,god the author of our evil acts1 by an exertion of his omnipotence1 and yet assert that because they are voluntary we are justly blameworthy and punishable for them2 but though our virtuous acts are also voluntary1 they still insist the praiseworthiness of them is to be ascribed exclusively to ,him by whom they were produced4 ,the plain truth is1 that as the scheme originated in a particular set purpose and design1 so it is one-sided in its views1 arbitrary in its distinctions1 and full of self-contradictions4 ,the simple fact seems to be1 that if any effect be produced in our minds by the power of ,god1 it is a passive impression1 and is very absurdly called a voluntary state of the will4 ,and even if such an impression could be a voluntary state1 or a volition1 properly so called1 we should not be responsible for it1 because it is produced by the omnipotence of ,god4 ,this1 we doubt not1 is in perfect accordance with the universal consciousness and voice of mankind1 and cannot be resisted by the sophistical evasions of particular men1 how great soever may be their genius1 or exalted their piety4 ,we shall1 in conclusion1 add one more great name to the list of those who1 from their zeal for the glory of the divine omnipotence1 have really and clearly made ,god the author of sin4 ,the denial of his scheme of 8a rigid and absolute predestination10 as he calls it1 ,dr4 ,chalmers deems equivalent to the assertion1 that 8things grow up from the dark womb of non-entity1 which omnipotence did not summon into being1 and which omniscience could not foretell40 ,and again1 8,at this rate1 events would come forth uncaused from the womb of non-entity1 to which omnipotence did not give birth1 and which omniscience could not foresee407#hf7 ,now all this is spoken1 be it remembered1 in relation to the volitions or acts of men4 ,but if there are no such events1 except such as omnipotence gives birth to1 or summons into being1 how clear and how irresistible is the conclusion that ,god is the author of the sinful acts of the creature8 ,it were better1 we say1 ten thousand times better1 that sin1 that monstrous birth of night and darkness1 should grow up out of the womb of nonentity1 if such were the only alternative1 than that it should proceed from the bosom of ,god4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,scheme ,of ,necessity ,denies ,the ,reality ,of ,moral ,distinctions4 ,our voluntary service ,he requires1 ,not our necessitated2 such with him ,finds no acceptance1 nor can find2 for how ,can hearts1 not free1 be tried whether they serve ,willing or no1 who will but what they must ,by destiny1 and can no other choose8--,,milton4 ,in the preceding chapters we have taken it for granted that there is such a thing as moral good and evil1 and endeavoured to show1 that if the scheme of necessity be true1 man is absolved from guilt1 and ,god is the author of sin4 ,but1 in point of fact1 if the scheme of necessity be true1 there is no such thing as moral good or evil in this lower world2 all distinction between virtue and vice1 moral good and evil1 is a mere dream1 and we really live in a non-moral world4 ,this has been shown by many of the advocates of necessity4 ,section ,i4 ,the views of ,spinoza in relation to the reality of moral distinctions4 ,it is shown by ,spinoza1 that all moral distinctions vanish before the iron scheme of necessity4 ,they are swept away as the dreams of vulgar prejudice by the force of ,spinoza's logic2 yet little praise is due1 we think1 on that account1 to the superiority of his acumen4 ,the wonder is1 not that ,spinoza should have drawn such an inference1 but that any one should fail to draw it4 ,for if our volitions are necessitated by causes over which we have no control1 it seems to follow1 as clear as noonday1 that they cannot be the objects of praise or blame--cannot be our virtue or vice4 ,so far is it indeed from requiring any logical acuteness to perceive such an inference1 that it demands1 as we shall see1 the very greatest ingenuity to keep from perceiving it4 ,hence1 in our humble opinion1 the praise which has been lavished on the logic of ,spinoza is not deserved4 ,his superior consistency only shows one of two things--either that he possessed a stronger reasoning faculty than his great master1 ,descartes1 or a weaker moral sense4 ,in our opinion1 it shows the latter4 ,if his moral sentiments had been vigorous and active1 they would have induced him1 no doubt1 either to invent sophistical evasions of such an inference1 or to reject the doctrine from which it flows4 ,if a ,descartes1 a ,leibnitz1 or an ,edwards1 for example1 had seen the consequences of the scheme of necessity as clearly as they were seen by ,spinoza1 his moral nature would have recoiled from it with such force as to dash the premises to atoms4 ,if any praise1 then1 be due to ,spinoza for such triumphs of the reasoning power1 it should be given1 not to the superiority of his logic1 but to the apathy of his moral sentiments4 ,for our part1 greatly as we admire sound reasoning and consistency in speculation1 we had rather be guilty of ten thousand acts of logical inconsistency1 such as those of ,edwards1 or ,leibnitz1 or ,descartes1 than to be capable of resting in the conclusion to which the logic of ,spinoza conducted him--that every moral distinction is a vulgar prejudice1 and that the existence of moral goodness is a dream47#hg7 ,section ,,ii4 ,the attempt of ,edwards to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the reality of moral distinctions4 ,it would not be difficult to see1 perhaps1 that a necessary holiness1 or a necessary sin1 is a contradiction in terms1 if we would only allow reason to speak for itself1 instead of extorting testimony from it by subjecting it to the torture of a false logic4 ,for what proposition can more clearly carry its own evidence along with it1 than that whatever is necessary to us1 that whatever we cannot possibly avoid1 is neither our virtue nor our fault8 ,what can be more unquestionable1 than that we can be neither to praise nor to blame1 neither justly rewardable nor punishable for anything over whose existence we have no power or control8 ,yet this question1 apparently so plain and simple in itself1 has been enveloped in clouds of metaphysical subtilty1 and obscured by huge masses of scholastic jargon4 ,if1 on this subject1 we have wandered in the dim twilight of uncertain speculation1 instead of walking in the clear open day1 this has been1 it seems to us1 because we have neglected the wise admonition of ,barrow1 that logic1 however admirable in its place1 was not designed as an instrument 8to put out the sight of our eyes40 ,it shall be our first object1 then1 to pull down and destroy 8the invented quibbles and sophisms0 which have so long darkened and confounded the light of reason and conscience in relation to the nature of moral good and evil1 to dispel the clouds which have been so industriously thrown around this subject1 in order that the bright and shining light of nature may1 free and unobstructed1 find its way into our minds and hearts4 ,we say1 then1 that there never can be virtue or vice in the breast of a moral agent1 prior to his own actings and doings4 ,on the contrary1 it is insisted by ,edwards1 that true virtue or holiness was planted in the bosom of the first man by the act of creation4 8,in a moral agent10 says he1 8subject to moral obligations1 it is the same thing to be perfectly innocent1 as to be perfectly righteous4 ,it must be the same1 because there can no more be any medium between sin and righteousness1 or between being right and being wrong1 in a moral sense1 than there can be a medium between straight and crooked in a natural407#hh7 ,this is applied to the first man as he came from the hand of the ,creator1 and is designed to show that he was created with true holiness or virtue in his heart4 ,according to this doctrine1 man was made upright1 not merely in the sense that he was free from the least bias to evil1 or that he possessed all the powers requisite to moral agency1 but in the sense that true virtue or moral goodness was planted in his nature by the act of creation4 ,if this be so1 the doctrine of a necessary holiness must be admitted2 for surely nothing can be more necessary to us1 nothing can take place in which we have less to do1 than the act by which we are created4 ,this then is the question which we intend to examine3 whether that which is concreated with a moral agent1 can be his virtue or his vice8 ,whether1 in other words1 the dispositions or qualities which ,adam derived from the hand of ,god1 partook of the nature of true virtue or otherwise8 ,edwards assumes the affirmative4 ,to establish his position1 he relies upon two arguments1 which we shall proceed to examine4 ,the first argument is designed to show1 that unless true virtue1 or moral goodness1 had been planted in the nature of man by the finger of ,god1 it could never have found its way into the world4 ,to give this argument in his own words1 he says3 8,it is agreeable to the sense of men in all nations and ages1 not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous1 but that the good choice itself1 from whence that effect proceeds1 is so2 yea1 also1 the antecedent good disposition1 temper1 or affection of mind1 from whence proceeds that good choice1 is virtuous4 ,this is the general notion--not that principles derive their goodness from actions1 but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed2 so that the act of choosing what is good is no further virtuous1 than it proceeds from a good principle1 or virtuous disposition of mind2 which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice2 and that1 therefore1 it is not necessary there should first be thought1 reflection1 and choice1 before there can be any virtuous disposition4 ,if the choice be first1 before the existence of a good disposition of heart1 what is the character of that choice8 ,there can1 according to our natural notions1 be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle1 but from mere self-love1 ambition1 or some animal appetites2 therefore1 a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice1 as a tree may be before its fruit1 and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it407#hi7 ,thus1 he argues1 if there must be choice before a good disposition1 or virtue1 according to our doctrine1 then virtue could not arise at all1 or find its way into the world4 ,for all men concede1 says he1 that every virtuous choice1 or act1 must proceed from a virtuous disposition2 and if this must also proceed from a virtuous act1 it is plain there could be no such thing as virtue or moral goodness at all4 ,the scheme which teaches that the act must precede the principle1 and the principle the act1 reduces the very existence of virtue to a plain impossibility4 ,he shows virtue to be possible1 and escapes the difficulty1 by referring it to the creative energy of the ,divine ,being1 by which the principle of virtue1 he contends1 was planted in the mind of the first man4 ,this argument is plausible2 but it will not bear a close examination4 ,it might be made to give way1 in various directions1 before an analysis of the principle on which it is constructed2 but we intend to demolish it by easier and more striking arguments4 ,if we had nothing better to oppose to it1 we might indeed neutralize its effect by a counter-argument of ,edwards himself1 which we find in his celebrated work on the will4 ,he there says1 that the virtuousness of every virtuous act or choice depends upon its own nature1 and not upon its origin or cause4 ,if we must refer every virtuous act1 says he1 to something in us that is virtuous as its antecedent1 we must likewise refer that antecedent to some other virtuous origin or cause2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,thus we should be compelled to trace virtue back from step to step1 until we had quite driven it out of the world1 and excluded it from the universality of things47#ij7 ,now this argument seems just as plausible as that which we have produced from the same author1 in his work on ,original ,sin4 ,let us lay them together1 and contemplate the joint result4 ,according to one1 the character of every virtuous act depends upon the virtuousness of the principle or disposition whence it proceeds2 according to the other1 it depends upon its own nature1 and not at all upon anything in its origin1 or cause1 or antecedent4 ,according to one1 we must trace every virtuous act to a virtuous principle1 and the virtuous principle itself to the necessitating act of ,god2 according to the other1 we must look no higher to determine the character of an act than its own nature2 and if we proceed to its origin or cause to determine its character1 we shall find no stopping-place4 ,we shall not trace it up to ,god1 as before1 but we shall banish all virtue quite out of the world1 and exclude it from the universality of things4 ,according to one argument1 there can be no virtue in the world1 unless it be caused to exist1 in the first place1 by the necessitating1 creative act of the ,almighty2 and according to the other1 the virtuousness of every virtuous act depends upon its own nature1 and is wholly independent of the question respecting its origin or cause4 ,the solution of these inconsistencies and contradictions1 we shall leave to the followers and admirers of ,president ,edwards47#ia7 ,but we have something better1 we trust1 to oppose to ,president ,edwards than his own arguments4 ,if his logic be good for anything1 it will prove that ,god is the author of sin as well as of virtue4 ,for it is as much the common notion of mankind that every sinful act must proceed from a sinful disposition or principle1 as it is that every virtuous act must proceed from a virtuous disposition or principle2 and hence1 according to the logic of ,edwards1 a sinful disposition or principle must have preceded the first sinful act2 that an antecedent sinful disposition or principle could not have been introduced by the act of the creature1 and consequently it must have been planted in the bosom of the first man by the act of the ,creator4 ,this argument1 we say1 just as clearly shows that sin is impossible1 or that it must have been concreated with man1 as it shows the same thing in relation to virtue4 ,if we maintain his argument1 then1 we must either deny the possibility of moral evil or make ,god the author of it4 ,after having laid down principles from which the impossibility of moral evil may be demonstrated1 it was too late for ,edwards to undertake to account for the origin of sin4 ,according to his philosophy1 it can have no existence2 and hence we are not to look into that philosophy for any very clear account of how it took its rise in the world4 ,indeed1 this point is hurried over by ,edwards in a most hasty and superficial manner1 in which he seems conscious of no little embarrassment4 ,in his great work on the will he devotes one page and a half to this subject2 and the greater part of this small space is filled up with the retort upon the ,arminians1 that their scheme is encumbered with as great difficulties as his own6 ,he lets the truth drop in one place1 however1 that 8the abiding principle and habit of sin0 was 8first introduced by an evil act of the creature407#ib7 ,is it possible8 ,how could there be an evil act which did not proceed from an antecedent evil principle or disposition8 ,what becomes of the great common notion of mankind1 on which his demonstration is erected8 ,but we must allow the author to contradict himself1 since he has now come around to the truth1 that an evil act of the creature may and must have preceded the existence of moral evil in the world4 ,if an intelligent creature1 however1 as it came from the hand of ,god1 can introduce a 8principle of sin by a sinful act10 why should it be thought impossible for such a creature to introduce a principle of virtue by a virtuous act8 ,the truth is1 that a virtuous act does not require an antecedent virtuous disposition or principle to account for its existence2 nor does a vicious act require an antecedent vicious principle to account for its existence4 ,in relation to the rise of good and evil in the world1 the philosophy of ,edwards is radically defective2 and no one can discuss that subject on the principles of his philosophy without finding himself involved in contradictions and absurdities4 ,if his psychology had not been false1 he might have seen a clear and steady light where he has only beheld difficulties and confusion4 ,as we have already seen1 and as we shall still more fully see1 ,edwards confounds the power by which we act with the susceptibility through which we feel3 the will with the emotive part of our nature4 ,every one knows that we may feel without acting2 and yet feeling and acting1 suffering and doing1 are expressly and repeatedly identified in his writings4 ,having merged the will in sensibility1 he regarded virtue and vice as phenomena of the latter1 and as evolved from its bosom by the operation of necessitating causes4 ,hence his views in relation to the nature of moral good and evil1 as well as in relation to their origin1 became unavoidably dark and confused4 ,if we only bear in mind the distinction between the will and the sensibility1 we may easily see how either holiness or sin might have taken its rise in the bosom of the first man1 without supposing that either a holy or a sinful principle was planted there by the hand of the ,creator4 ,if we will only carry the light of this distinction along with us1 it will be no more difficult to account for the rise of the first sin in the bosom of a spotless creature of ,god1 than to account for any other volition of the human mind4 ,the first man1 by means of his intelligence1 could contemplate the perfection of his ,creator1 and1 doing so1 he could not but feel an emotion of admiration and delight4 ,but this feeling was not his virtue4 ,it was the natural and the necessary result of the organization which ,god had given him4 ,he was also so constituted1 that certain earthly objects were agreeable to him1 and excited his natural appetites and desires4 ,these appetites and desires were not sinful1 nor was the sensibility from whose bosom they were evolved3 they were the spontaneous workings of the nature which ,god had bestowed upon him4 ,but his will was free4 ,he could turn his mind to ,god1 or he could turn it to earth4 ,he did the latter1 and there was no harm in this4 ,but he listened to the voice of the tempter2 he fixed his mind on the forbidden fruit2 he saw it was pleasant to the eye2 he imagined it was good for food1 and greatly to be desired to make one wise4 ,neither the possession of the intellect by which he perceived the beauty of the fruit1 nor of the sensibility in which it excited so many pleasurable emotions1 was the sin of ,adam4 ,they were given to him by the ,author of every good and perfect gift4 ,his will was free4 ,it was not necessitated to act by his desires4 ,but yet1 in direct opposition to the known will of ,god1 he put forth an act of his own free mind1 his own unnecessitated will1 and plucked the forbidden fruit to gratify his desires4 ,this was his sin--this voluntary transgression of the known will of ,god4 ,on the other hand1 if he had resisted the temptation1 and instead of voluntarily gratifying his appetite and desire1 had preserved his allegiance to ,god by acting in conformity with his will1 this would have been his virtue4 ,he would have acted in conformity with the rule of duty1 and thereby gratified a feeling of love to ,god1 instead of the lower feelings of his nature4 ,thus1 by observing the distinction between the will and the sensitive part of our nature1 we may easily see how either holiness or sin might have arisen in the bosom of the first man1 though he had neither a holy nor a sinful principle planted in his nature by the hand of the ,creator4 ,we may easily see that he had all the powers requisite to moral agency1 and that he was really capable of either a holy or a sinful act1 without any antecedent principle of holiness or sin in his nature4 ,we have now said enough1 we think1 to show the fallacy of ,edwards's first great argument in favour of a necessary holiness4 ,we have seen1 that we need not suppose the existence of a virtuous principle in the first man1 in order to account for his first virtuous act1 or to render virtue possible4 ,we might point out many other errors and inconsistencies in which that argument is involved2 but to avoid1 as far as possible1 becoming prolix and tiresome1 we shall proceed to consider his second argument in favour of a necessary or concreated holiness4 ,his second argument is this3 8,human nature must have been created with some dispositions--a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable1 and to be averse to others as odious and disagreeable2 otherwise it must be without any such thing as inclination or will2 perfectly indifferent1 without preference1 without choice1 or aversion1 towards anything as agreeable or disagreeable4 ,but if it had any concreated dispositions at all1 they must be either right or wrong1 either agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things4 ,if man had at first the highest relish of things excellent and beautiful1 a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those things which were most worthy of it1 then his dispositions were morally right and amiable1 and never can be excellent in a higher sense4 ,but if he had a disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy1 then his dispositions were vicious4 ,and it is evident there can be no medium between these40 ,it is thus that ,edwards seeks and finds virtue in the emotion1 and not in the voluntary element of man's nature4 ,the natural concreated disposition of ,adam1 he supposes1 was morally right in the highest sense of the word1 because he was so made as to relish and delight in the glorious perfections of the divine nature4 ,our first answer to this is1 that it is contradicted by the reason and moral judgment of mankind in general1 and1 in particular1 by the reason and moral judgment of ,edwards himself4 ,it is agreeable to the voice of human reason1 that nothing can be our virtue1 in the true sense of the word1 which was planted in us by the act of creation1 and in regard to the production of which we possessed no knowledge1 exercised no agency1 and gave no consent4 ,and if we listen to the language of ,edwards1 when the peculiarities of his system are out of the question1 we shall find that this moral judgment was as agreeable to him as it is to the rest of mankind4 ,for example3 human nature is created with a disposition to be grateful for favours2 and this disposition1 according to ,edwards1 must either be agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things1 that is1 it must be either morally right or wrong in the highest sense of the word4 ,there can be no medium between these two--it must partake of the nature of virtue or of vice4 ,now1 which of the terms of this alternative does ,edwards adopt8 ,does he pronounce this natural disposition our virtue or our vice8 ,we do not know what ,edwards would have said1 if this question had been propounded to him in connexion with the argument now under consideration2 but we do know what he has said of it in other portions of his works4 ,this natural concreated disposition is1 says he1 neither our virtue nor our vice6 8,that ingratitude1 or the want of natural affection10 says he1 8shows a high degree of depravity1 does not prove that all gratitude and natural affection possesses the nature of true virtue or saving grace407#ic7 8,we see1 in innumerable instances1 that mere nature is sufficient to excite gratitude in men1 or to affect their hearts with thankfulness to others for favours received407#id7 8,gratitude being thus a natural principle1 ingratitude is so much the more vile and heinous2 because it shows a dreadful prevalence of wickedness1 which even overbears and suppresses the better principles of human nature4 ,it is mentioned as a high degree of wickedness in many of the heathen1 that they were without natural affection4 ,rom4 ii1 #ca4 ,but that the want of gratitude1 or natural affection1 is evidence of a great degree of vice1 is no argument that all gratitude and natural affection has the nature of virtue or saving grace40 ,here1 as well as in various other places1 ,edwards speaks of gratitude and other natural affections as the better principles of our nature2 to be destitute of which he considers a horrible deformity4 ,but1 however amiable and lovely1 he denies to these natural affections1 or dispositions1 the character of virtue2 because they are merely natural or concreated dispositions4 ,they are innocent2 that is1 they are neither our virtue nor our vice1 but a medium between moral good and evil4 ,nothing can be more reasonable than this1 and nothing more inconsistent with the logic of the author4 ,such is the testimony of ,edwards himself1 when he escapes from the shadows of a dark system1 and the trammels of a false logic1 and permits his own individual mind1 in the clear open light of nature1 to work in full unison with the universal mind of man4 ,according to the author's own definition of 8true virtue10 it 8is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind that are of a moral nature1 i4 e41 such as are attended with desert of praise or blame40 ,surely1 ,adam could have deserved no praise for the qualities bestowed on him by the act of creation2 and hence1 according to the author's own definition1 they could not have been his virtue4 ,in regard to the 8new creation0 of the soul1 ,edwards contends that all the praise is due to ,god1 and no part of it to man2 because the whole work is performed by divine grace1 without human coperation4 ,now1 we admit that if the whole work of regeneration is performed by ,god1 then man is not to be praised for it2 that is to say1 it is not his virtue4 ,here again the author sets forth the true principle2 but how does it agree with his logic in relation to the first man8 ,was not his creation wholly and exclusively the work of ,god8 ,if so1 then all the praise is due to ,god1 and no part of it to man4 ,but1 according to the author's own definition1 when there is no praiseworthiness there is no virtue2 and hence1 as ,adam deserved no praise on account of what he received at his creation1 so such endowments partook not of the nature of true virtue4 ,but we have a still more fundamental objection to the argument in question4 ,it proceeds on the supposition that true virtue consists in mere feeling4 ,this view of the nature of virtue is admirably adapted to make it agree and harmonize with the scheme of necessity2 but it is not a sound view4 ,if an object is calculated to excite a certain feeling or emotion in the mind1 that feeling or emotion will necessarily arise in view of such object4 ,if the glorious perfections of the divine nature1 for example1 had been presented to the mind of ,adam1 no doubt he would have been necessarily compelled to 8love1 relish1 and delight in them40 ,but this feeling of love and delight1 thus necessarily evolved out of the bosom of his natural disposition1 however exquisite and enrapturing1 would not have been his virtue or holiness4 ,it would have been the spontaneous and irresistible development of the nature which ,god had given him4 ,we may admire it as the most beautiful unfolding of that nature1 but we cannot applaud it as the virtue or moral goodness of ,adam4 ,we look upon it merely as the excellency and glory of the divine work of creation4 ,we could regard the glory of the heavens1 or the beauty of the earth1 with a sentiment of moral approbation1 as easily as we could ascribe the character of moral goodness to the noble qualities with which the ,almighty had been pleased to adorn the nature of the first man4 ,the beautiful feeling or emotion of love is merely the blossom which precedes the formation of true virtue in the heart4 ,this consists1 not in holy feelings1 as they are called1 but in holy exercises of the will4 ,it is only when the will1 in its workings1 coalesces with a sense of right and a feeling of love to ,god1 that the blossom gives place to the fruit of virtue4 ,a virtuous act is not a spontaneous and irresistible emotion of the sensibility2 it is a voluntary exercise and going forth of the will in obedience to ,god4 ,it is a strange error which makes virtue consist in 8the spontaneous affections1 emotions1 and desires that arise in the mind in view of its appropriate objects40 ,if these necessarily arise in us1 8and do not wait for the bidding of the will107#ie7 how can they possibly be our virtue8 how can they form the objects of moral approbation in us8 ,yet is it confidently asserted1 that the denial of such a doctrine 8stands in direct and palpable opposition to the authority of ,god's word407#if7 ,the word of ,god1 we admit1 says that holiness consists in love2 but does it assert that it consists in the feeling of love merely8 or in any feeling which spontaneously and irresistibly arises in the mind8 ,if the ,scripture had been written expressly to refute such a moral heresy1 it could not have been more pointed or explicit4 ,holiness consists in love4 ,but what is the meaning of the term love1 as set forth in ,scripture8 ,we answer1 8,this is the love of ,god10 that we 8keep his commandments40 8,let us not love in word1 neither in tongue1 but in deed and in truth40 8,whosoever heareth these sayings of mine and doeth them1 ,i will liken him unto a wise man who built his house upon a rock40 8,he that hath my commandments1 and keepeth them1 he it is that loveth me40 ,here1 as well as in innumerable other places1 are we told that true love is not a mere evanescent feeling of the heart1 but an inwrought and abiding habit of the will4 ,it is not a suffering1 it is a doing4 ,the most lively emotions1 the most ecstatic feelings1 if they lead not the will to action1 can avail us nothing2 for the tree will be judged1 not by its blossoms1 but by its fruits4 ,if we see our brother in distress1 we cannot but sympathize with him1 unless our hearts have been hardened by crime4 ,the feeling of compassion will spontaneously arise in our minds1 in view of his distress2 but let us not too hastily imagine therefore that we are virtuous1 or even humane4 ,we may possess a tender feeling of compassion1 and yet the feeling may have no corresponding act4 ,the opening fountain of compassion may be shut up1 or turned aside from its natural course1 by a wrong habit of the will2 and hence1 with all our weeping tenderness of feeling1 we may be destitute of any true humanity4 ,we may be merely as sounding brass1 or a tinkling cymbal4 8,whoso hath this world's goods1 and seeth his brother have need1 and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him1 how dwelleth the love of ,god in him80 ,it is this loving in work1 and not in feeling merely1 which the word of ,god requires of us2 and when1 at the last day1 all nations1 and kindreds1 and tongues1 shall stand before the throne of heaven1 we shall be judged1 not according to the feelings we have experienced1 but according to the deeds done in the body4 ,hence1 the doctrine which makes true virtue or moral goodness consist in the spontaneous and irresistible feelings of the heart1 8stands in direct and palpable opposition to the authority of ,god's word40 ,feeling is one thing2 obedience is another4 ,this counterfeit virtue or moral goodness1 which begins and terminates in feeling1 is far more common than true virtue or holiness4 ,who can reflect1 for instance1 on the infinite goodness of ,god1 without an emotion or feeling of love8 ,that man must indeed be uncommonly hard-hearted and sullen1 who can walk out on a fine day and behold the wonderful exhibitions of divine goodness on all sides around him1 without being warmed into a feeling of admiration and love4 ,when all nature is music to the ear and beauty to the eye1 it requires nothing more than a freedom from the darker stains and clouds of guilt within1 to lead a sympathizing heart to the sunshine of external nature1 as it seems to rejoice in the smile of ,infinite ,beneficence4 ,the heart may swell with rapture as it looks abroad on a happy universe1 replenished with so many evidences of the divine goodness2 nay1 the story of a ,saviour's love1 set forth in eloquent and touching language1 may draw tears from our eyes1 and the soul may rise in gratitude to the ,author of such boundless compassion2 and yet1 after all1 we may be mere sentimentalists in religion1 whose wills and whose lives are in direct opposition to all laws1 both human and divine4 ,infidelity itself1 in such moments of deep but transitory feeling1 may exclaim with an emotion known but to few ,christian minds1 8,socrates died like a philosopher1 but ,jesus ,christ like a ,god10 and its iron nature still retain 8the unconquerable will40 ,we may now safely conclude1 we think1 that the mists raised by the philosophy and logic of ,edwards have not been able to obscure the lustre of the simple truth1 that true virtue or holiness cannot be produced in us by external necessitating causes4 ,whatsoever is thus produced in us1 we say1 cannot be our virtue1 nor can we deserve any praise for its existence4 ,this seems to be a clear dictate of the reason of man2 and it would so seem1 we have no doubt1 to all men1 but for certain devices which to some have obscured the light of nature4 ,the principal of these devices we shall now proceed to examine4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of the proposition that 8,the essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will1 lies not in their cause1 but in their nature407#ig7 ,for the sake of greater distinctness1 we shall confine our attention to a single branch of this complex proposition2 namely1 that the essence of virtuous acts of the will lies not in their cause1 but their nature4 ,our reasoning in relation to this point1 may be easily applied to the other branches of the proposition4 ,we admit1 then1 that the essence of a virtuous act lies in its nature4 ,if this means that the nature of a virtuous act lies in its nature1 or its essence lies in its essence1 it is certainly true2 and even if the author attached different ideas to the terms essence and nature1 we do not care to search out his meaning2 as we may very safely admit his proposition1 whatever may be its signification4 ,we are told by the editor1 that the whole proposition is very important on account of 8the negative part10 namely1 that 8the essence of virtue and vice lies not in their cause40 ,we are also willing to admit1 that the essence of everything lies in its own nature1 and not in its cause4 ,but why is this proposition brought forward8 ,what purpose is it designed to serve in the philosophy of the author8 ,this question is easily answered4 ,he contends that true virtue may be1 and is1 necessitated to exist by powers and causes over which we have no control4 ,if we raise our eyes to such a source of virtue1 its intrinsic lustre and beauty seem to fade from our view4 ,the author1 indeed1 endeavours to explain why it is1 that the scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the nature of true virtue4 ,the main reason is1 says he1 because we imagine that the essence of virtue and vice consists1 not in their nature1 but in their origin and cause4 ,hence this persuasion not to busy ourselves about the origin or cause of virtue and vice1 but to estimate them according to their nature4 ,we are fully persuaded4 ,if any can be found who will assert 8that the virtuousness of the dispositions or acts of the will1 consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts of the will1 but wholly in the origin or cause of them10 we must deliver them up to the tender mercies of ,president ,edwards4 ,or if any shall talk so absurdly as to say1 8that if the dispositions of the mind1 or acts of the will1 be never so good1 yet if the cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue1 there is nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it10 we have not one word to say in his defence2 nor shall we ever raise our voice in favour of any one1 who shall maintain1 that 8if the will1 in its inclinations or acts1 be never so bad1 yet1 unless it arises from something that is our vice or fault1 there is nothing vicious or blameworthy in it40 ,for we are firmly persuaded1 that if the acts of the will be good1 then they are good2 and if they be bad1 then they are bad2 whatever may have been their origin or cause4 ,we shall have no dispute about such truisms as these4 ,we insist1 indeed1 that the first virtuous act of the first man was so1 because it partook of the nature of virtue1 and not because it had a virtuous origin or cause in a preceding virtuous disposition of the mind4 ,but1 in his work on ,original ,sin1 ,edwards contends otherwise4 ,he there contends1 that no act of ,adam could have been virtuous1 unless it had proceeded from a virtuous origin or cause in the disposition of his heart2 and that this could have had no existence in the world1 unless it had proceeded from the power of the ,creator4 ,thus he looked beyond the nature of the act itself1 even to its origin and cause1 in order to show upon what its moral nature depended2 but now he insists that we should simply look at its own nature1 and not to its origin or cause1 in order to determine this point4 ,he ascends from acts of the will to their origin or cause1 in order to show that virtue can only consist with the scheme of necessity2 and yet he denies to us the privilege of ascending with him1 in order to show that the nature of virtue cannot at all consist with the scheme of necessity6 ,we admit that the virtuousness of every virtuous act lies1 not in its origin or cause1 but in itself4 ,but still we insist that a virtuous act1 as well as everything else1 may be traced to a false origin or cause that is utterly inconsistent with its very nature4 ,a horse is undoubtedly a horse1 come from whence it may2 but yet if any one should tell us that horses grow up out of the earth1 or drop down out of the clouds1 we should certainly understand him to speak of mere phantoms1 and no real horses1 or we should think him very greatly mistaken4 ,in like manner1 when we are told that virtue may be1 and is1 necessitated to exist in us by causes over which we have no control2 that we may be to praise for any gift bestowed upon us by the divine power2 we are constrained to believe that he has given a false genealogy of moral goodness1 and one that is utterly inconsistent with its nature4 ,nor can we be made to blink this truth1 which so perfectly accords1 as we have seen1 with the universal sentiment of mankind1 by being reminded that moral goodness consists1 not in its origin or cause1 but in its own nature4 ,virtue is always virtue1 we freely admit1 proceed from what quarter of the universe it may2 yet do we insist that it can no more be produced in us by an extraneous agency than it can grow up out of the earth1 or drop down out of the clouds of heaven4 ,that which is produced in us by such an agency1 be it what it may1 is not our virtue1 nor is any praise therefor due to us4 ,to mistake such effects or passive impressions for virtue1 is to mistake phantoms for things1 shadows for substances1 and dreams for realities4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the reality of moral distinctions1 not because we confound natural and moral necessity1 but because it is really inconsistent therewith4 ,let us then look at this matter1 and see if we are really so deplorably blinded by the ambiguity of a word1 that we cannot contemplate the glory of the scheme of moral necessity as it is in itself4 ,the distinction between these two things1 natural and moral necessity1 is certainly a clear and a broad one4 ,let us see1 then1 if we may not find our way along the line of this distinction1 without that darkness and confusion by which our judgment is supposed to be so sadly misled and perverted4 ,it is on all sides conceded1 that natural necessity is inconsistent with the good or ill desert of human actions4 ,if a man were commanded1 for example1 to leap over a mountain1 or to lift the earth from its centre1 he would be justly excusable for the non-performance of such things1 because they lie beyond the range of his natural power4 8,there is here a limit to our power10 as ,dr4 ,chalmers says1 8beyond which we cannot do that which we please to do2 and there are many thousand such limits407#ih7 ,this is natural necessity1 in one of its branches4 ,it circumscribes and binds our natural power4 ,it limits the external sphere beyond which the effects or consequences of our volitions cannot be projected4 ,it reaches not to the interior sphere of the will itself1 and has no more to do with its freedom than has the influence of the stars4 ,we may please to do a thing1 nay1 we may freely will it1 and yet a natural necessity may cut off and prevent the external consequence of the act4 ,again1 if by a superior force1 a man's limbs or external bodily organs should be used as instruments of good or evil1 without his concurrence or consent1 he would be excusable for the consequences of such use4 ,this is the other branch of natural necessity4 ,it is evident that it has no relation to the freedom or to the acts of the will1 but only to the external movements of the body4 ,it interferes merely with that external freedom of bodily motion1 about which we heard so much in the first chapter of this work1 and which the advocates of necessity have1 for the most part1 so industriously laboured to pass off upon the world for the liberty of the will itself4 ,as this natural necessity1 then1 trenches not upon the interior sphere of the will1 so it merely excuses for the performance or non-performance of external actions4 ,it leaves the great question with respect to man's accountability for the acts of the will itself1 from which his external actions proceed1 wholly untouched and undetermined4 ,far different is the case with respect to moral necessity4 ,this acts directly upon the will itself1 and absolutely controls all its movements4 ,within its own sphere it is conceded to be 8as absolute as natural necessity107#ii7 and 8as sure as fatalism407#ajj7 ,it absolutely and unconditionally determines the will at all times1 and in all cases4 ,yet we are told that we are accountable for all the acts thus produced in us1 because they are the acts of our own wills6 ,nothing is done against our wills1 as in the case of natural necessity2 7they should rather say1 against the external effects of our wills27 but our wills always follow1 and we are accountable therefor1 though they cannot but follow4 ,moral necessity is not irresistible1 because this implies resistance1 and our wills never resist that which makes us willing4 ,it is only invincible2 and invincible it is indeed1 since with the mighty1 sovereign power of the ,almighty it controls all the thoughts1 and feelings1 and volitions of the human mind4 ,now we see this scheme as it is in itself1 in all its nakedness1 just as it is presented to us by its own most able and enlightened defenders4 ,and seeing it thus removed from all contact with the scheme of natural necessity1 we ask1 whether agents can be justly held accountable for acts thus determined and controlled by the power of ,god1 or by those invincible causes which his omnipotence marshalleth8 ,we speak not of external acts2 and hence we lay aside the whole scheme of natural necessity4 ,we speak of the acts of the will2 and we ask1 if these be not free from the dominion of moral necessity1 from necessitating causes over which we have no control1 can we be accountable for them8 ,can we be to praise or to blame for them8 ,can they be our virtue or our vice8 ,these questions1 we think1 we may safely submit to the impartial decision of every unbiassed mind4 ,and to such minds we shall leave it to determine1 whether the scheme of moral necessity has owed its hold upon the reason of man to a dark confusion of words and things1 or whether its glory has been obscured by the misconception of its opponents8 ,in conclusion1 we shall simply lay down1 in a few brief propositions1 what we trust has now been seen in relation to the nature of virtue and vice3--#a4 ,no necessitated act of the mind can be its virtue or its vice4 #b4 ,in order that any act of the will should partake of a moral nature1 it must be free from the dominion of causes over which it has no control1 or from whose influence it cannot depart4 #c4 ,virtue and vice lie not in the passive state of the sensibility1 nor in any other necessitated states of the mind1 but in acts of the will1 and in habits formed by a repetition of such free voluntary acts4 ,whatever else may be said in relation to the nature of virtue and of vice1 and to the distinction between them1 these things appear to be clearly true2 and if so1 then the scheme of moral necessity is utterly inconsistent with their existence1 and saps the very foundation of all moral distinctions4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,moral ,world ,not ,constituted ,according ,to ,the ,scheme ,of ,necessity4 ,i made him just and right2 ,sufficient to have stood1 though free to fall4 ,such ,i created all the ethereal powers ,and spirits1 both them who stood and them who fail'd2 ,freely they stood who stood1 and fell who fell4--,,milton4 ,we have already witnessed the strange inconsistencies into which the most learned and ingenious men have fallen1 in their attempts to reconcile the doctrine of necessity with the accountability of man1 and the glory of ,god4 ,having involved themselves in that scheme1 on what has appeared to them conclusive evidence1 they have seemed to struggle in vain to force their way out into the clear and open light of nature4 ,they have seemed to torment themselves1 and to confound others1 in their gigantic efforts to extricate themselves from a dark labyrinth1 out of which there is absolutely no escape4 ,let us see1 then1 if we may not refute the pretended demonstration in favour of necessity1 and thereby restore the mind to that internal satisfaction which it so earnestly desires1 and which it so constantly seeks in a perfect unity and harmony of principle4 ,section ,i4 ,the scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology4 ,there are three great leading faculties or attributes of the human mind2 namely1 the intelligence1 the sensibility1 and the will4 ,by means of these we think1 we feel1 and we act4 ,now1 the phenomena of thinking1 feeling1 and acting1 will be found1 on examination1 to possess different characteristics2 of which we must form clear and fixed conceptions1 if we would extricate the philosophy of the will from the obscurity and confusion in which it has been so long involved4 ,let us proceed then to examine them1 to interrogate our consciousness in relation to them4 ,suppose1 for example1 that an apple is placed before me4 ,i fix my attention upon it1 and consider its form3 it is round4 ,this judgment1 or decision of the mind1 in relation to the form of the apple1 is a state of the intelligence4 ,it does not depend on any effort of mine1 whether it shall appear round to me or not3 ,i could not possibly come to any other conclusion if ,i would3 ,i could as soon think it as large as the globe as believe it to be square1 or of any other form than round4 ,hence this judgment1 this decision1 this state of the intelligence1 is necessitated4 ,the same thing is true of all the other perceptions or states of the intelligence4 ,m4 ,cousin has truly said3 8,undoubtedly different intellects1 or the same intellect at different periods of its existence1 may sometimes pass different judgments in regard to the same thing4 ,sometimes it may be deceived2 it will judge that which is false to be true1 the good to be bad1 the beautiful to be ugly1 and the reverse3 but at the moment when it judges that a proposition is true or false1 an action good or bad1 a form beautiful or ugly1 at that moment it is not in the power of the intellect to pass any other judgment than that it passes4 ,it obeys laws it did not make4 ,it yields to motives which determine it independent of the will4 ,in a word1 the phenomenon of intelligence1 comprehending1 judging1 knowing1 thinking1 whatever name be given to it1 is marked with the characteristic of necessity407#aja7 ,once more ,i fix my attention on the apple3 an agreeable sensation arises in the mind2 a desire to eat it is awakened4 ,this desire or appetite is a state of the sensibility4 ,whether ,i shall feel this appetite or desire1 does not depend upon any effort or exertion of my will4 ,the mind is clearly passive in relation to it2 the desire1 then1 is as strongly marked with the characteristic of necessity1 as are the states of the intelligence4 ,the same is true of all our feelings2 they are necessarily determined by the objects in view of the mind4 ,there is no controversy on these points2 it is universally agreed that every state of the intelligence and of the sensibility is necessarily determined by the evidence and the object in view of the mind4 ,it is not1 then1 either in the intelligence or in the sensibility that we are to look for liberty4 ,but once more ,i fix my attention on the apple3 the desire is awakened1 and ,i conclude to eat it4 ,hitherto ,i have done nothing except in fixing my attention on the apple4 ,i have experienced the judgment that it is round1 and felt the desire to eat it4 ,but now ,i conclude to eat it1 and ,i make an effort of the mind to put forth my hand to take the apple and eat it4 ,it is done4 ,now here is an entirely new phenomenon2 it is an effort1 an exertion1 an act1 a volition of the mind4 ,the name is of no importance2 the circumstances under which the phenomenon arises have called attention to it1 and the precise thing intended is seen in the light of consciousness4 ,let us look at it closely1 and mark its characteristic well1 being careful to see neither more nor less than is presented by the phenomenon itself4 ,we are conscious1 then1 of the existence of an act1 of a volition3 everybody can see what this is4 ,we must not say1 as the advocates of free-agency usually do1 that when we put forth this act or volition we are conscious of a power to do the contrary2 for this position may be refuted1 and the foundation on which we intend to raise our superstructure undermined4 ,we are merely conscious of the existence of the act itself1 and not even of the power by means of which we act2 the existence of the power is necessarily inferred from its exercise4 ,this is the only way in which we know it1 and not from the direct testimony of consciousness4 ,much less if we had refused to act1 should we have been conscious of the power to withhold it2 much less again are we conscious of the power to withhold the act1 as we do not in the case supposed exercise this power4 ,but certainly we are conscious of the act itself2 all men will concede this1 and this is all our argument really demands4 ,here then we are conscious of an act1 of an effort1 of the mind4 ,look at it closely4 ,is the mind passive in this act8 ,no2 we venture to answer for the universal intelligence of man4 ,if this act had been produced in us by a necessitating cause1 would not the mind have been passive in it8 ,in other words1 would it not have been a passive impression1 and not an act1 not an effort of the mind at all8 ,yes2 we again venture to answer for the unbiassed reason of man4 ,but it is not1 we have seen1 a passive impression2 it is an act of the mind1 and hence it is not necessitated4 ,it is not necessitated1 because it is not stamped with the characteristic of necessity4 ,the universal reason of man declares that the will has not necessarily yielded like the intelligence and the sensibility1 to motives over which it had no control4 ,it does not bear upon its face the mark of any such subjection 8to the power and action0 of a cause4 ,it is marked with the characteristic1 not of necessity1 but of liberty4 ,we would not say1 with ,dr4 ,samuel ,clarke1 that 8action and liberty are identical ideas20 but we will say1 that the idea of action necessarily implies that of liberty2 for if we duly reflect on the nature of an act we cannot conceive it as being necessitated4 ,this consideration furnishes an easy and satisfactory solution of a problem1 by which necessitarians are sadly perplexed4 ,they endeavour in various ways to account for the fact that we believe our volitions to be free1 or not necessarily caused4 ,some resolve this belief and feeling of liberty into a deceitful sense2 some imagine that we are deceived by the ambiguities of language2 and some resort to other methods of explaining the phenomenon4 8,it is true10 says ,president ,edwards1 8,i find myself possessed of my volitions before ,i can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them1 for the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect2 and this1 for aught ,i know1 may make some imagine that volition has no cause1 or that it produces itself40 ,but this is not a satisfactory account of the imagination1 as he would term it4 ,we also find ourselves possessed of our judgments and feelings before we perceive the effectual power of the cause which produces them4 ,why then do we refer these to the operation of a necessary cause1 and not our volitions8 ,if the power and efficacy of the cause is seen only by the effect in the one case1 it is only seen in the same manner in the other4 ,why then do we differ in our conclusions with respect to them8 ,why do we refer the judgment and the feeling to necessary causes1 and fail to do the same in relation to the volition8 ,the reason is obvious4 ,the mind is passive in judging and feeling1 and hence these phenomena necessarily demand the operation of causes to account for them2 but the mind is active in its volitions1 and this necessarily excludes the idea of causes to produce them4 ,the mind clearly perceives1 by due reflection1 and at all times sees dimly1 at least1 that an act or volition is different in its nature from a passive impression or a produced effect2 and hence it knows and feels that it is exempt from the power and efficacy of a producing cause in its volitions4 ,this fact of our consciousness it is not in the power of sophistry wholly to conceal1 nor in the power of human nature to evade4 ,hence we carry about with us the irresistible conviction that we are free2 that our wills are not absolutely subject to the dominion of causes over which we have no control4 ,hence we see and know that we are self-active4 ------------------------------------- ,having completed our analysis1 in as far as our present purpose demands1 we may proceed to show that the system of necessity is founded on a false psychology1--on a dark confusion of the facts of human nature4 ,it is very remarkable that all the advocates of this system1 from ,hobbes down to ,edwards1 will allow the human mind to possess only two faculties1 the understanding and the will4 ,the will and the sensibility are expressly identified by them4 ,locke distinguished between will and desire1 between the faculty of willing and the susceptibility to feeling2 but ,edwards has endeavoured to show that there is no such distinction as that for which ,locke contends4 ,we shall not arrest the progress of our remarks in order to point out the manner in which ,edwards has deceived himself by an appeal to logic rather than to consciousness1 because the threefold distinction for which we contend is now admitted by necessitarians themselves4 ,indeed1 after the clear and beautiful analysis by ,m4 ,cousin1 they could not well do otherwise than recognise this threefold distinction2 but they have done so1 we think it will be found1 without perceiving all the consequences of such an admission to their system4 ,it is an admission which1 in our opinion1 will show the scheme of necessity to be insecure in its foundation1 and disjointed in all its parts4 ,with the light of this distinction in our minds1 it will be easy to follow and expose the sophistries of the necessitarian4 ,he often declaims against the idea of liberty for which we contend1 on the ground that it would be1 not a perfection1 but a very great imperfection of our nature to possess such a freedom4 ,but in every such instance he confounds the will with one of the passive susceptibilities of the mind4 ,thus1 for example1 ,collins argues that liberty would be a great imperfection1 because 8nothing can be more irrational and absurd than to be able to refuse our assent to what is evidently true to us1 and to assent to what we see to be false40 ,now1 all this is true1 but it is not to the purpose2 for no one contends that the intelligence is free in assenting to1 or in dissenting from1 the evidence in view of the mind4 ,no rational being1 we admit1 could desire such a freedom2 could desire to be free1 for example1 from the conviction that two and two make four4 ,m4 ,lamartine1 we are aware1 expresses a very lively abhorrence of the mathematics1 because they allow not a sufficient freedom of thought--because they exercise so great a despotism over the intellect4 ,but the circumstance which this flowery poet deems an imperfection in the mathematics1 every enlightened friend of free-agency will regard as their chief excellency and glory4 ,the same error is committed by ,spinoza3 8,we can consider the soul under two points of view10 says he1 8as thought and as desire40 ,here the will is made to disappear1 and we behold only the two susceptibilities of the soul1 which are stamped with the characteristic of necessity4 ,where1 then1 will ,spinoza find the freedom of the soul8 ,certainly not in the will1 for this has been blotted out from the map of his psychology4 ,accordingly he says3 8,the free will is a chimera of the species1 flattered by our pride1 and founded upon our ignorance40 ,he must find the freedom of the soul then1 if he find it at all1 in one of its passive susceptibilities4 ,this1 as we have already seen1 is exactly what he does2 he says the soul is free in the affirmation that two and two are four6 ,thus he finds the liberty of the soul1 not in the exercises of its will1 of its active power1 but in the bosom of the intelligence1 which is absolutely necessitated in all its determinations4 ,in this particular1 as well as in most others1 ,spinoza merely reproduces the error of the ancient ,stoics4 ,it was a principle with them1 says ,ritter1 8that the will and the desire are one with thought1 and may be resolved into it407#ajb7 ,thus1 by the ancient ,stoics1 as well as by ,hobbes1 and ,spinoza1 and ,collins1 and ,edwards1 the will is merged in one of the passive elements of the mind1 and its real characteristic lost sight of4 8,by the freedom of the soul10 says ,ritter1 8the ,stoics understood simply that assent which it gives to certain ideas407#ajc7 ,thus the ancient ,stoics endeavoured to find the freedom of the soul1 where ,spinoza and so many modern necessitarians have sought to find it1 in the passive1 necessitated states of the intelligence4 ,this was indeed to impose upon themselves a mere shadow for a substance1--a dream for a reality4 8,by whatever name we call the act of the will10 says ,edwards1 8choosing1 refusing1 approving1 disapproving1 liking1 disliking1 embracing1 rejecting1 determining1 directing1 commanding1 forbidding1 inclining or being averse1 being pleased or displeased with--all may be reduced to this of choosing407#ajd7 ,thus1 in the vocabulary and according to the psychology of this great author1 the phenomena of the sensibility and those of the will are identified1 as well as the faculties themselves4 ,pleasing and willing1 liking and acting1 are all one with him4 ,his psychology admits of no distinction1 for example1 between the pleasant impression made by an apple on the sensibility1 and the act of the will by which the hand is put forth to take it4 8,the will and the affections of the soul10 says he1 8are not two faculties2 the affections are not essentially distinct from the will1 nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination1 but only in the liveliness and sensibility of exercise407#aje7 ,and again1 8,i humbly conceive that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will1 as though there were two faculties407#ajf7 ,and still more explicitly1 8all acts of the will are truly acts of the affections407#ajg7 ,is it not strange1 that one who could exhibit such wonderful discrimination when the exigences of his system demanded the exercise of such a power1 should have confounded things so clearly distinct in their natures as an act of the will and an agreeable impression made on the sensibility8 ,it is not possible for any mind1 no matter how great its powers1 to see the nature of things clearly when it comes to the contemplation of them with such a confusion of ideas4 ,even ,president ,edwards is not exempt from the common lot of humanity4 ,his doctrine is necessarily enveloped in obscurity4 ,we can turn it in no light without being struck with its inconsistencies or its futility4 ,he repeatedly says1 the will is always determined by the strongest affection1 or appetite1 or passion2 that is1 by the most agreeable state of the sensibility4 ,but if the will and the sensibility are identical1 as his language expressly makes them2 or if the states of the one are not distinguishable from the states of the other1 then to say that the will is always determined by the sensibility1 or an act of the will by the strongest affection of the sensibility1 is to say that a thing is determined by itself4 ,it is to say1 in fact1 that the will is always determined by itself2 a doctrine against which he uniformly protests4 ,nay1 more1 that an act of the will causes itself2 a position which he has repeatedly ascribed to his opponents1 and held up to the derision of mankind4 ,it is very remarkable1 that ,edwards seems to have been conscious1 at times1 that he laid himself open to the charge of such an absurdity1 when he said that the will is determined by the greatest apparent good1 or by what seems most agreeable to the mind4 ,for he says1 8,i have chosen rather to express myself thus1 that the will always is as the greatest apparent good1 or as what appears most agreeable1 than to say the will is determined by the greatest apparent good1 or by what seems most agreeable2 because an appearing most agreeable to the mind1 and the mind's preferring1 seem scarcely distinct40 ,we have taken the liberty to emphasize his words4 ,now here he tells us that the 8mind's preferring10 by which word he has explained himself to mean willing17#ajh7 is scarcely distinct from 8an appearing most agreeable to the mind40 ,here he returns to his psychology1 and identifies the most agreeable impression made on the sensibility with an act of the will4 ,he does not like to say1 that the act of the will is caused by the most agreeable sensation1 because this seems to make a thing the cause of itself4 ,in this he does wisely2 but having shaped his doctrine to suit himself more exactly1 in what form is it presented to us8 ,let us look at it in its new shape1 and see what it is4 ,the will is not determined by the greatest apparent good1 because a thing is not determined by itself2 but the will is always as the greatest apparent good6 ,thus the absurdity of saying a thing is determined by itself is avoided2 but surely1 if an appearing most agreeable to the mind is not distinct from the mind's acting1 then to say that the mind's acting is always as that which appears most agreeable to it is merely to say1 that the mind's acting is always as the mind's acting6 or1 in other words1 that a thing is always as itself6 ,thus1 his great fundamental proposition is1 in one form1 a glaring absurdity2 and in the other1 it is an insignificant truism2 and there is no escape from this dilemma except through a return to a better psychology1 to a sounder analysis of the great facts of human nature4 ,when ,edwards once reaches the truism that a thing is always as itself1 he feels perfectly secure1 and defies with unbounded confidence the utmost efforts of his opponents to dislodge him4 8,as we observed before10 says he1 8nothing is more evident than that1 when men act voluntarily1 and do what they please1 then they do what appears most agreeable to them2 and to say otherwise1 would be as much as to affirm1 that men do not choose what appears to suit them best1 or what seems most pleasing to them2 or that they do not choose what they prefer--which brings the matter to a contradiction40 ,true2 this brings the matter to a contradiction1 as he has repeatedly told us2 for choosing1 and preferring1 or willing1 are all one4 ,but if any one denies that a man does what he pleases when he does what he pleases2 or if he affirms that he pleases without pleasing1 or chooses without choosing1 or prefers without preferring1 we shall leave him to the logic of the necessitarian and the physician4 ,we have no idea that he will ever be able to refute the volumes that have been written to confound him4 ,president ,edwards clearly has the better of him2 for he puts 8the soul in a state of choice10 and yet affirms that it 8has no choice40 ,he might as well say1 indeed1 that 8a body may move while it is in a state of rest10 as to say that 8the mind may choose without choosing10 or without having a choice4 ,he is very clearly involved in an absurdity2 and if he can read the three hundred pages of the ,inquiry1 without being convinced of his error1 his case must indeed be truly hopeless4 ,edwards is far from being the only necessitarian who has fallen into the error of identifying the sensibility with the will2 thus reducing his doctrine to an unassailable truism4 ,in his famous controversy with ,clarke1 ,leibnitz has done the same thing4 8,thus10 says he1 8in truth1 the motives comprehend all the dispositions which the mind can have to act voluntarily2 for they include not only reasons1 but also the inclinations and passions1 or other preceding impressions4 ,wherefore if the mind should prefer a weak inclination to a strong one1 it would act against itself1 and otherwise than it is disposed to act40 ,now is it not wonderful1 that so profound a thinker1 and so acute a metaphysician1 as ,leibnitz1 should have supposed that he was engaged in a controversy to show that the mind never acts otherwise than it acts2 that it never acts against itself8 ,having reduced his doctrine to this truism1 he says1 this 8shows that the author's notions1 contrary to mine1 are superficial1 and appear to have no solidity in them1 when they are well considered40 ,true1 the notions of ,clarke were superficial1 and worse than superficial1 if he supposed that the mind ever acts contrary to its act1 or otherwise than it really acts4 ,but ,clarke distinguished between the disposition and the will4 ,in like manner ,thummig1 the disciple of ,leibnitz1 has the following language1 as quoted by ,sir ,william ,hamilton3 8,it is to philosophize very crudely concerning mind1 and to image everything in a corporeal manner1 to conceive that actuating reasons are something external1 which make an impression on the mind1 and to distinguish motives from the active principle itself40 ,now this language1 it seems1 is found in ,thummig's defence of the last paper of ,leibnitz 7who died before the controversy was terminated7 against the answer of ,clarke4 ,but1 surely1 if it is a great mistake1 as the author insists it is1 to distinguish motives from the active principle itself2 then to say that the active principle is determined by motives1 is to say that the active principle is determined by itself4 ,and having reached this point1 the disciple of ,leibnitz finds himself planted precisely on the position he had undertaken to overthrow1 namely1 that the will is determined by itself4 ,and again1 if it be wrong to distinguish the motive from the active principle itself1 then to say that the active principle never departs from the motive1 is to affirm that a thing is always as itself4 ,the great service which a false psychology has rendered to the cause of necessity is easily seen4 ,for having identified an act of the will with a state of the sensibility1 which is universally conceived to be necessitated1 the necessitarian is delivered from more than half his labours4 ,by merging a phenomenon or manifestation of the will in a state of the sensibility1 it seems to lose its own characteristic1 which is incompatible with the scheme of necessity1 and to assume the characteristic of feeling1 which is perfectly reconcilable with it2 nay1 which demands the scheme of necessity to account for its existence4 ,thus1 the system of necessity is based on a false psychology1 on which it has too securely stood from the earliest times down to the present day4 ,but the stream of knowledge1 ever deepening and widening in its course1 has been gradually undermining the foundations of this dark system4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the scheme of necessity is directed against a false issue4 ,as we have seen in the last section1 the argument of the necessitarian is frequently directed against a false issue2 but the point is worthy of a still more careful consideration4 ,we shall never cease to admire the logical dexterity with which the champions of necessity assail and worry their adversaries4 ,they have said1 in all ages1 that 8nothing taketh beginning from itself20 but who ever imagined or dreamed of so wild an absurdity8 ,it is conceded by all rational beings4 ,motion taketh not beginning from itself1 but from action2 action taketh not beginning from itself1 but from mind2 and mind taketh not beginning from itself1 but from ,god4 ,it is false1 however1 to conclude that because nothing taketh beginning from itself1 it is brought to pass 8by the action of some immediate agent without itself40 ,the motion of body1 as we have seen1 is produced by the action of some immediate agent without itself2 but the action of mind is produced1 or brought to pass1 by no action at all4 ,it taketh beginning from an agent1 and not from the action of an agent4 ,this distinction1 though so clearly founded in the nature of things1 is always overlooked by the logic of the necessitarian4 ,they might well adopt the language of ,bacon1 that the subtilty of nature far surpasseth that of our logic4 ,hobbes was content to rest on a simple statement of the fact1 that nothing can produce itself2 but it is not every logician who is willing to rely on the inherent strength of such a position4 ,ask a child1 ,did you make yourself8 and the child will answer1 ,no4 ,propound the same question to the roving savage1 or to the man of mere common sense1 and he will also answer1 ,no4 ,appeal to the universal reason of man1 and the same emphatic ,no1 will come up from its profoundest depths4 ,but your redoubtable logicians are not satisfied to rely on such testimony alone3 they dare not build on such a foundation unless it be first secured and rendered firm by the aid of the syllogistic process4 ,i know 8,i did not make myself10 says ,descartes1 8for if ,i had made myself1 ,i should have given myself every perfection40 ,now this argument in true syllogistic form stands thus3 ,if ,i had made myself1 ,i should have endowed myself with every perfection2 ,i am not endowed with every perfection2 therefore ,i did not make myself4 ,surely1 after so clear a process of reasoning1 no one can possibly doubt the proposition that ,descartes did not make himself6 ,in the same way we might prove that he did not make his own logic3 for if he had made his logic1 he would have endowed it with every possible perfection2 but it is not endowed with every possible perfection1 and therefore he did not make it4 ,but ,president ,edwards has excelled ,descartes1 and every other adept in the syllogistic art1 except ,aristotle in his physics1 in his ability to render the light of perfect day clearer by a few masterly strokes of logic4 ,he has furnished the reason why some persons imagine that volition has no cause of its existence1 or 8that it produces itself40 ,now1 by the way1 would it not have been as well if he had first made sure of the fact1 before he undertook to explain it8 ,but to proceed3 let us see how he has proved that volition does not produce itself2 that it does not arise out of nothing and bring itself into existence4 ,he does this in true logical form1 and according to the most approved methods of demonstration4 ,he first establishes the general position1 that no existence or event whatever can give rise to its own being17#aji7 and he then shows that this is true of volition in particular47#aaj7 ,and having reached the position1 that volition does not arise out of nothing1 but must 8have some antecedent0 to introduce it into being2 he next proceeds to prove that there is a necessary connexion between volition and the antecedents on which it depends for existence4 ,this completes the chain of logic1 and the process is held up by his followers to the admiration of the world as a perfect demonstration4 ,let us look at it a little more closely1 and examine the nature and mechanism of its parts4 ,if the huge frame of the earth1 with all its teeming population and productions1 could rise up out of nothing1 he argues1 and bring itself into being without any cause of its existence1 then we could not prove the being of a ,god4 ,all this is very true4 ,for1 as he truly alleges1 if one world could thus make itself1 so also might another and another1 even unto millions of millions4 ,the universe might make itself1 or come into existence without any cause thereof1 and hence we could never know that there is a ,god4 ,but surely1 if any man imagined that even one world could create itself1 it is scarcely worth while to reason with him4 ,it is not at all likely that he would be frightened from his position by such a reductio ad absurdum4 ,we should almost as soon suspect a sane man of denying the existence of ,god himself1 as of doubting the proposition that 8nothing taketh beginning from itself40 ,having settled it to his entire satisfaction1 by this and other arguments1 that no effect whatever can produce itself1 he then proceeds to show that this proposition is true of volitions as well as of all other events or occurrences4 8,if any should imagine10 says he1 8there is something in the sort of event that renders it possible to come into existence without a cause1 and should say that the free acts of the will are existences of an exceeding different nature from other things1 by reason of which they may come into existence without previous ground or reason of it1 though other things cannot2 if they make this objection in good earnest1 it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves2 for it would be giving some account of the existence of a thing1 when1 at the same time1 they would maintain there is no ground of its existence407#aaa7 ,true1 if any man should suppose that a volition rises up in the world 8without any ground or reason of its existence10 and afterward endeavour to assign a ground or reason of it1 he would certainly be strangely inconsistent with himself2 but we should deem his last position1 that there must be a ground or reason of its existence1 to be some evidence of his coming to himself1 rather than of his having forgotten himself4 ,but to proceed with the argument4 8,therefore ,i would observe10 says he1 8that the particular nature of existence1 be it never so diverse from others1 can lay no foundation for that thing coming into existence without a cause2 because1 to suppose this1 would be to suppose the particular nature of existence to be a thing prior to existence1 without a cause or reason of existence4 ,but that which in any respect makes way for a thing coming into being1 or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence1 must be prior to existence4 ,the distinguished nature of the effect1 which is something belonging to the effect1 cannot have influence backward to act before it is4 ,the peculiar nature of that thing called volition1 can do nothing1 can have no influence1 while it is not4 ,and afterward it is too late for its influence2 for then the thing has made sure of its existence already without its help407#aab7 ,after all this reasoning1 and more to the same effect1 we are perfectly satisfied that volition1 no matter what its nature may be1 cannot produce itself2 and that it must have some ground or reason of its existence1 some antecedent without which it could not come into being4 ,we shall not do justice to this branch of our subject1 if we leave it without laying before the reader one or two more specimens of logic from the celebrated ,inquiry of ,president ,edwards4 ,he is opposing 8the hypothesis10 he tells us1 8of acts of the will coming to pass without a cause40 ,now1 according to his definition of the term cause1 as laid down at the beginning of the section under consideration1 it signifies any antecedent on which a thing depends1 in whole or in part1 for its existence1 or which constitutes the reason why it is1 rather than not47#aac7 ,his doctrine is1 then1 that nothing ever comes to pass without some 8ground or reason of its existence10 without some antecedent which is necessary to account for its coming into being4 ,and those who deny it are bound to maintain the strange thesis1 that something may come into existence without any antecedent to account for it2 that it may rise from nothing and bring itself into existence4 ,it is against this thesis that his logic is directed4 8,if it were so10 says he1 8that things only of one kind1 viz41 acts of the will1 seemed to come to pass of themselves2 and it were an event that was continual1 and that happened in a course whenever were found subjects capable of such events2 this very thing would demonstrate there was some cause of them1 which made such a difference between this event and others4 ,for contingency is blind1 and does not pick and choose a particular sort of events4 ,nothing has no choice4 ,this no-cause1 which causes no existence1 cannot cause the existence which comes to pass to be of one particular sort only1 distinguished from all others4 ,thus1 that only one sort of matter drops out of heaven1 even water2 and that this comes so often1 so constantly and plentifully1 all over the world1 in all ages1 shows that there is some cause or reason of the falling of water out of the heavens1 and that something besides mere contingence had a hand in the matter407#aad7 ,we do not intend to comment on this passage2 we merely wish to advert to the fact1 that it is a laboured and logical effort to demolish the hypothesis that acts of the will do not bring themselves into existence1 and to show that there must be some antecedent to account for their coming into being4 ,we shall only add1 8it is true that nothing has no choice20 but who ever pretended to believe that nothing puts forth volitions8 that there is no mind1 no motive1 no ground or reason of volition8 ,is it not wonderful that the great metaphysician of ,new-,england should thus worry himself and exhaust his powers in grappling with shadows and combatting dreams1 which no sane man ever seriously entertained for a moment8 8,if we should suppose non-entity to be about to bring forth10 he continues1 8and things were coming into existence without any cause or antecedent on which the existence1 or kind or manner of existence depends1 or which could at all determine whether the things should be stones or stems1 or beasts or angels1 or human bodies or souls1 or only some new motion or figure in natural bodies1 or some new sensation in animals1 or new idea in the human understanding1 or new volition in the will1 or anything else of all the infinite number of possibles1--then it certainly would not be expected1 although many millions of millions of things were coming into existence in this manner all over the face of the earth1 that they should all be only of one particular kind1 and that it should be thus in all ages1 and that this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass when there is room for them1 or a subject capable of them1 and that constantly whenever there is occasion407#aae7 ,now all these words are put together to prove that non-entity cannot bring forth effects1 at least such effects as we see in the world2 for if non-entity brought them forth1 that is1 to come to the point in dispute1 if non-entity brought forth our volitions1 they would not be always of one particular sort of effects4 ,but they are of one particular sort1 and hence there must be some antecedent to account for this uniformity in their nature1 and they could not have been brought forth by nonentity6 ,surely if anything can equal the fatuity of the hypothesis that nonentity can bring forth1 or that a thing can produce itself1 it is a serious attempt to refute it4 ,how often1 while poring over the works of necessitarians1 are we lost in amazement at the logical mania which seems to have seized them1 and which1 in its impetuous efforts to settle and determine everything by reasoning1 leaves reason itself neither time nor opportunity to contemplate the nature of things themselves1 or listen to its own most authoritative and irreversible mandates4 ,but lest we should be suspected of doing this great metaphysician injustice1 we must point out the means by which he has so grossly deceived himself4 ,according to his definition of motive1 as the younger ,edwards truly says1 it includes every cause and condition of volition4 ,if anything is merely a condition1 without which a volition could not come to pass1 though it exerts no influence1 it is called a cause of that volition1 and placed in the definition of motive4 ,and if anything exerts a positive influence to produce volition1 this is also a cause of it1 and is included in the same definition4 ,in short1 this definition embraces every conceivable antecedent on which volition in any manner1 either in whole or in part1 either negatively or positively1 depends4 ,thus the most heterogeneous materials are crowded together under one and the same term1--the most different ideas under one and the same definition4 ,is it possible to conceive of a better method of obscuring a subject than such a course8 ,when ,edwards merely means a condition1 why does he not say so8 and when he means a producing cause1 why does he not use the right word to express his meaning8 ,if he had carried on the various processes of his reasoning with some one clear and distinct idea before his mind1 we might have expected great things from him2 but he has not chosen to do so4 ,it is with the term cause that he operates1 against the ambiguities of which he has not guarded himself or his reader4 8,having thus explained what ,i mean by cause10 says he1 8,i assert that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause40 ,we have seen his reasoning on this point4 ,he labours through page after page to establish his very ambiguous proposition1 in a sense in which nobody ever denied it2 unless some one has affirmed that a thing may come into being without any ground or reason of its existence1--may arise out of nothing and help itself into existence4 ,having sufficiently established his fundamental proposition in this sense1 he proceeds to show that every effect and volition in particular1 is necessarily connected with its cause4 8,it must be remembered10 says he1 8that it has been already shown1 that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause or a reason207#aaf7 and he then proceeds to show1 that 8the acts of the will must be connected with their cause40 ,in this part of his argument1 he employs his ambiguous proposition in a different sense from that in which he established it4 ,in the establishment of it he only insists that there must be some antecedent sufficient to account for every event2 and in the application of it he contends1 that the antecedent or cause must produce the event4 ,these ideas are perfectly distinct4 ,there could be no act of the mind unless there were a mind to act1 and unless there were a motive in view of which it acts2 but it does not follow that the mind is compelled to act by motive4 ,but let us see how he comes to this conclusion4 8,for an event10 says he1 8to have a cause and ground of its existence1 and yet not be connected with its cause1 is an inconsistency4 ,for if the event be not connected with its cause1 it is not dependent on the cause3 its existence is1 as it were1 loose from its influence1 and may attend it or may not407#aag7 8,dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect407#aah7 ,again1 8to suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their existence1 that yet are not necessarily connected with their cause1 is to suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause4 ,thus1 if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause1 with its influence and influential circumstances1 then1 as ,i observed before1 it is a thing possible and supposable that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence under the same circumstances1 and yet the effect not follow407#aai7 ,he has much other similar reasoning to show that it is absurd and contradictory to say that motive is the cause of volition1 and yet admit that volition may be loose from the influence of motive1 or that 8the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect407#abj7 ,in all this he uses the term in its most narrow and restricted sense4 ,it is no longer a mere antecedent or antecedents1 which are sufficient to account for the existence of the phenomena of volition2 it is an efficient cause which produces volitions4 ,thus he establishes his ambiguous proposition in one sense1 and builds on it in another4 ,he explains the term cause to signify any antecedent1 in order1 he tells us1 to prevent objection to his doctrine1 when he alleges that nothing ever comes to pass without some cause of its existence2 and yet1 when he applies this fundamental proposition to the construction of his scheme1 he returns to the restricted sense of the word1 in which it signifies1 8that which has a positive efficacy or influence to produce a thing40 ,it is thus that the great scheme of ,president ,edwards is made up of mere words1 having no intrinsic coherency of parts1 and appearing consistent throughout1 only because its disjointed fragments seem to be united1 and its huge chasms concealed by means of the ambiguities of language4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the scheme of necessity is supported by false logic4 ,one reason why the advocates of necessity deceive themselves1 as well as others1 is1 that there is great want of precision and distinctness in their views and definitions4 ,we are told by them that the will is always determined by the strongest motive2 that this is invariably the cause of volition4 ,but what is meant by the term cause8 ,we have final causes1 instrumental causes1 occasional causes1 predisposing causes1 efficient causes1 and many others4 ,now1 in which of these senses is the word used1 when we are informed that motive is the cause of volition8 ,on this point we are not enlightened4 ,neither ,leibnitz nor ,edwards is sufficiently explicit4 ,the proposition1 as left by them1 is vague and obscure4 ,leibnitz inclined to the use of the word reason1 because he carried on a controversy with ,bayle and ,hobbes1 who were atheists2 though he frequently speaks of a chain of causes which embrace human volitions47#aba7 ,while ,edwards1 who opposed the ,arminians1 generally employs the more rigid term cause2 though he1 too1 frequently represents motive as 8the ground and reason0 of volition4 ,the one softens his language1 in places1 as he contends with those who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the ,christian world by an advocacy of the doctrine of necessity in connexion with atheistical sentiments4 ,the other appears to prefer the stronger expression1 as he puts forth his power against antagonists whose views of liberty were deemed subversive of the tenets of ,calvinism4 ,but the law of causality1 as stated by ,edwards1 and the principle of the sufficient reason1 as defined and employed by ,leibnitz1 are perfectly identical4 ,when we are told that motive is the cause of volition1 it is evident we cannot determine whether to deny or to assent to the proposition1 unless we know in what sense the term cause is used4 ,we might discuss this perplexed question forever1 by the use of such vague and indefinite propositions1 without progressing a single step toward the end of the controversy4 ,we must bring a more searching analysis to the subject1 if we hope to accomplish anything4 ,we must take the word cause or reason1 in each of its significations1 in order to discover in what particulars the contending parties agree1 and in what particulars they disagree1 in order to see how far each party is right1 and how far it is wrong4 ,this is the only course that promises the least prospect of a satisfactory result4 ,if we mean by the cause of volition1 that which wills or exerts the volition1 there is no controversy2 for in this sense the advocates of necessity admit that the mind is the cause of volition4 ,thus says ,edwards3 8,the acts of my will are my own2 i4 e41 they are acts of my will407#abb7 ,it is universally conceded that it is the mind which wills1 and nothing else in the place of it2 and hence1 in this sense of the word1 there is no question but that the mind is the cause of volition4 ,but the advocates of necessity cannot be understood in this sense2 for they deny that the mind is the cause of volition1 and insist that it is caused by motive4 ,the term cause is very often used to designate the condition of a thing1 or that without which it could not happen or come to pass4 ,thus we are told by ,edwards1 that he sometimes uses 8the word cause to signify any antecedent0 of an event1 8whether it has any influence or not10 in the production of such event47#abc7 ,if this be the meaning1 when it is said that motive is the cause of volition1 the truth of the proposition is conceded by the advocates of free-agency4 ,in speaking of arguments and motives1 ,dr4 ,samuel ,clarke says3 8,occasions indeed there may be1 and are1 upon which that substance in man1 wherever the self-moving principle resides1 freely exerts its active power407#abd7 ,herein1 then1 there is a perfect agreement between the contending parties4 ,the fact that the mind requires certain conditions or occasions1 on which to exercise its active power1 does not at all interfere with its freedom2 and hence the advocates of free-agency have readily admitted that motives are the occasional causes of volition4 ,we must look out for some other meaning of the term1 then1 if we would clearly and distinctly fix our minds on the point in controversy4 ,we say that an antecedent is the cause of its consequent1 when the latter is produced by the action of the former4 ,for example1 a motion of the body is said to be caused by the mind2 because it is produced by an act of the mind4 ,this seems to be what is meant by an 8efficient cause40 ,it is1 no doubt1 the most proper sense of the word2 and around this it is that the controversy still rages1 and has for centuries raged4 ,the advocates of necessity contend1 not only that volition is the effect of motive1 but also that 8to be an effect implies passiveness1 or the being subject to the power and action of its cause407#abe7 ,such precisely is the doctrine of ,edwards1 and ,collins1 and ,hobbes4 ,in this sense of the word it is denied that motive is the cause of volition1 and it is affirmed that mind is the cause thereof4 ,thus1 says ,dr4 ,samuel ,clarke1 in his reply to ,collins1 8',tis the self-moving principle1 and not at all the reason or motive1 which is the physical or efficient cause of action20 by which we understand him to mean volition1 as that is the thing in dispute4 ,now1 when the advocates of free-agency insist that motive is not the efficient cause of volition1 and that mind is the efficient cause thereof1 we suppose them to employ the expression1 efficient cause1 in one and the same sense in both branches of the proposition4 ,this is the only fair way of viewing their language2 and if they wished to be understood in any other manner1 they should have taken the pains to explain themselves1 and not permit us to be misled by an ambiguity4 ,here the precise point in dispute is clearly presented2 and let us hear the contending parties1 before we proceed to decide between them4 ,you are in error1 says the necessitarian to his opponents1 in denying that motive1 and in affirming that mind1 is the efficient cause of volition4 ,for if an act of the mind1 or a volition1 is caused by the mind1 it must be produced by a preceding act of the mind1 and this act must be produced by another preceding act of the mind1 and so on ad infinitum2 which reduces the matter to a plain impossibility4 ,now1 if the necessitarian has not been deceived by an unwarrantable ambiguity on the part of his adversary1 he has clearly reduced his doctrine to the absurdity of an infinite series of acts3 that is to say1 if the advocate of free-agency does not depart from the ordinary meaning of words1 when he affirms that mind is the efficient cause of volition2 and if he does not use these terms 8efficient cause10 in different senses in the same sentence1 then we feel bound to say that he is fairly caught in the toils of his adversary4 ,but we are not yet in condition to pass a final judgment between the parties4 ,the necessitarian contends that 8volition1 or an act of the mind1 is the effect of motive1 and that it is subject to the power and action of its cause407#abf7 ,the advocate of free-will replies1 ,if we must suppose an action of motive on the mind to account for its act1 we must likewise suppose another action to account for the action of motive2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,thus the necessitarian seems to be fairly caught in his own toils1 and entrapped by his own definition and arguments4 ,our decision 7for the correctness of which we appeal to the calm and impartial judgment of the reader7 is as follows3 ,if the term cause be understood in the first or the second sense above mentioned1 there is no disagreement between the contending parties2 and if it be understood in the third sense1 then both parties are in error4 ,if1 in order to account for an act of the mind1 we suppose it is caused by an action of motive1 we are involved in the absurdity of an infinite series of actions2 and on the other hand1 if we suppose it is caused by a preceding act of the mind itself1 we are forced into the same absurdity4 ,hence1 we conclude1 that an act of the mind1 or a volition1 is not produced by the action of either mind or motive1 but takes its rise in the world without any such efficient cause of its existence4 ,each party has refuted his adversary1 and in the enjoyment of his triumph he seems not to have duly reflected on the destruction of his own position4 ,both are in the right1 and both are in the wrong2 but1 as we shall hereafter see1 not equally so4 ,if we adopt the argument of both sides1 in so far as it is true1 we shall come to the conclusion that action must take its rise somewhere in the universe without being caused by preceding action4 ,and if so1 where shall we look for its origin8 in that which by nature is endowed with active power1 or in that which is purely and altogether passive8 ,we lay it down1 then1 as an established and fundamental position1 that the mind acts or puts forth its volitions without being efficiently caused to do so--without being impelled by its own prior action1 or by the prior action of anything else4 ,the conditions or occasions of volition being supplied1 the mind itself acts in view thereof1 without being subject to the power or action of any cause whatever4 ,all rational beings must1 as we have seen1 either admit this exemption of the mind in willing from the power and action of any cause1 or else lose themselves in the labyrinth of an infinite series of causes4 ,it is this exemption which constitutes the freedom of the human soul4 ,we are now prepared to see1 in a clear light1 the sophistical nature of the pretended demonstration of the scheme of necessity4 8,it is impossible to consider occurrences10 says ,sir ,james ,mackintosh1 otherwise than as bound together in 8the relation of cause and effect40 ,now this relation1 if we interpret it according to the nature of things1 and not according to the sound of words1 is not one1 but two4 ,the motions of the body are caused by the mind1 that is1 they are produced by the action of the mind2 this constitutes one relation3 but acts of the mind are caused1 that is1 they are produced by the action of nothing2 and this is a quite different relation4 ,in other words1 the motions of body are produced by preceding action1 and the acts of the mind are not produced by preceding action4 ,hence1 the first are necessitated1 and the last are free3 the first come under 8the relation of cause and effect10 and the last come under a very different relation4 ,the relation of cause and effect connects the most remote consequences of volition with volition itself2 but when we reach volition there a new relation arises3 it is the relation which subsists between an agent and its act4 ,we may trace changes in the external world up to the volitions or acts of mind1 and perceive no diversity in the chain of dependencies2 but precisely at this point the chain of cause and effect ceases1 and agency begins4 ,the surrounding circumstances may be conditions1 may be occasional causes1 may be predisposing causes1 but they are not1 and cannot be1 producing or efficient causes4 ,here1 then1 the iron chain terminates1 and freedom commences4 ,in the ambiguity which fails to distinguish between 8the relation of cause and effect10 and the relation which volition bears to its antecedents1 8consists the strength of the necessitarian system40 ,let this distinction be clearly made and firmly borne in mind1 and the great boasted adamantine scheme of necessity will resolve itself into an empty1 ineffectual sound4 ,hence1 if we would place the doctrine of liberty upon solid grounds1 it becomes necessary to modify the categories of ,m4 ,cousin4 ,all things1 says he1 fall under the one or the other of the two following relations3 the relation between subject and attribute1 or the relation between cause and effect4 ,this last category1 we think1 should be subdivided1 so as to give two relations2 one between cause and effect1 properly so called1 and the other between agent and action4 ,until this be done1 it will be impossible to extricate the phenomena of the will from the mechanism of cause and effect4 ,we think we might here leave the stupendous sophism of the necessitarian2 but as it has exerted so wonderful an influence over the human mind1 and obscured1 for ages1 the glory of the moral government of ,god1 we may well be permitted to pursue it further1 and to continue the pursuit so long as a fragment or a shadow of it remains to be demolished4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the scheme of necessity is fortified by false conceptions4 ,one of the notions to which the cause of necessity owes much of its strength1 is a false conception of liberty1 as consisting in 8a power over the determinations of the will40 ,hence it is said that this power over the will can do nothing1 can cause no determination except by acting to produce it4 ,but according to this notion of liberty1 this causative act cannot be free unless it be also caused by a preceding act2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,such is one of the favourite arguments of the necessitarian4 ,but in truth the freedom of the mind does not consist in its possessing a power over the determinations of its own will1 for the true notion of freedom is a negative idea1 and consists in the absence of every power over the determinations of the will4 ,the mind is free because it possesses a power of acting1 over which there is no controlling power1 either within or without itself4 ,it must be admitted1 it seems to us1 that the advocates of free-agency have too often sanctioned this false conception of liberty1 and thereby strengthened the cause of their opponents4 ,cudworth1 ,clark1 ,stuart1 ,coleridge1 and ,reid1 all speak of this supposed power of the mind over the determinations of the will1 as that which constitutes its freedom4 ,thus says ,reid1 for example3 8,by the liberty of a moral agent1 ,i understand a power over the determinations of his own will40 ,now1 it is not at all strange that this language should be conceived by necessitarians in such a manner as to involve the doctrine of liberty in the absurd consequence of an infinite series of acts1 since it is so understood by some of the most enlightened advocates of free-agency themselves4 8,a power over the determinations of our will10 says ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 8supposes an act of the will that our will should determine so and so2 for we can only exert power through a rational determination or volition4 ,this definition of liberty is right4 ,but the question upon question remains1 7and this ad infinitum7--have we a power 7a will7 over such anterior will8 and until this question be definitively answered1 which it never can1 we must be unable to conceive the possibility of the fact of liberty4 ,but1 though inconceivable1 this fact is not therefore false40 ,true1 we are unable to conceive the possibility of the fact of liberty1 if this must be conceived as consisting in a power over the determinations of the will2 but1 in our humble opinion1 this definition of liberty is not right4 ,it seems more correct to say1 that the freedom of the will consists in the absence of a power over its determinations1 than in the presence of such a power4 ,there is another false conception which has given great apparent force to the cause of necessity4 ,it is supposed that the states of the will1 the volitions1 are often necessitated by the necessitated states of the sensibility4 ,in other words1 it is supposed that the appetites1 passions1 and desires1 often act upon the will1 and produce its volitions4 ,but this seems to be a very great mistake1 which has arisen from viewing the subtle operations of the mind through the medium of those mechanical forms of thought that have been derived from the contemplation of the phenomena of the material world4 ,in truth1 the feelings do not act at all1 and consequently they cannot act upon the will4 ,it is absurd1 as ,locke and ,edwards well say1 to ascribe power1 which belongs to the agent himself1 to the properties of an agent4 ,hence1 it is absurd to suppose that our feelings1 appetites1 desires1 and passions1 are endowed with power1 and can act4 ,they are not agents--they are merely the properties of an agent4 ,it is the mind itself which acts1 and not its passions4 ,these are but passive impressions made upon the sensibility2 and hence1 8it is to philosophize very crudely concerning mind1 and to image everything in a corporeal manner10 to conceive that they act upon the will and control its determinations1 just as the motions of body are caused and controlled by the action of mind47#abg7 ,this conception1 however1 is not peculiar to the necessitarian4 ,it has been most unfortunately sanctioned by the greatest advocates of free-agency4 ,thus says ,dr4 ,reid1 in relation to the appetites and passions3 8,such motives are not addressed to the rational powers4 ,their influence is immediately upon the will40 8,when a man is acted upon by contrary motives of this kind1 he finds it easy to yield to the strongest4 ,they are like two forces pushing him in contrary directions4 ,to yield to the strongest he needs only be passive40 ,if this be so1 how can ,dr4 ,reid maintain1 as he does1 that 8the determination was made by the man1 and not by the motive80 ,to this assertion ,sir ,william ,hamilton replies3 8,but was the man determined by no motive to that determination8 ,was his specific volition to this or to that without a cause8 ,on the supposition that the sum of the influences 7motives1 dispositions1 tendencies7 to volition ,a is equal to #ab1 and the sum of counter volition ,b1 equal to #h--;can we conceive that the determination of volition ,a should not be necessary8 ,we can only conceive the volition ,b to be determined by supposing that the man creates 7calls from nonexistence into existence7 a certain supplement of influences4 ,but this creation as actual1 or in itself1 is inconceivable2 and even to conceive the possibility of this inconceivable act1 we must suppose some cause by which the man is determined to exert it4 ,we thus in thought1 never escape determination and necessity4 ,it will be observed that ,i do not consider this inability to notion any disproof of the fact of free-will40 ,it is true1 that if we suppose1 according to the doctrine of ,sir ,william and ,dr4 ,reid1 that two counter influences act upon the will1 the one being as #ab and the other as #h1 then the first must necessarily prevail4 ,but if this supposition be correct1 we are not only unable to conceive the fact of liberty1 we are also able to conceive that it cannot be a fact at all4 ,there is a great difference1 we have been accustomed to believe1 between being unable to conceive how a thing is1 and being able to conceive that it cannot be anyhow at all3 the first would leave it a mere mystery1--the last would show it to be an absurdity4 ,in the one case1 the thing would be above reason1 and in the other1 contrary to reason4 ,now1 to which of these categories does the fact of liberty1 as left by ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 belong8 ,is it a mystery1 or is it an absurdity8 ,is it an inconceivable fact1 or is it a conceived impossibility8 ,it seems to us that it is the latter2 and that if we will only take the pains to view the phenomena of mind as they exist in consciousness1 and not through the medium of material analogies1 we shall be able to untie the knot which ,sir ,william ,hamilton has found it necessary to cut4 ,the doctrine of liberty1 if properly viewed1 is perfectly conceivable4 ,we can certainly conceive that the omnipotence of ,god can put forth an act without being impelled thereto by a power back of his own2 and to suppose otherwise1 is to suppose a power greater than ,god's1 and upon which the exercise of his omnipotence depends4 ,by parity of reason1 we should be compelled to suppose another power still back of that1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,this is not only absurd1 but1 as ,calvin truly says1 it is impious4 ,here1 then1 we have upon the throne of the universe a clear and unequivocal instance of a self-active power1--a power whose goings forth are not impelled by any power without itself4 ,it goes forth1 it is true1 in the light of the ,eternal ,reason1 and in pursuit of the ends of the ,eternal ,goodness2 but yet in itself it possesses an infinite fulness1 being self-sustained1 self-active1 and wholly independent of all other powers and influences whatsoever4 ,now1 if such a ,being should create at all1 it is not difficult to conceive that he would create subordinate agents1 bearing his own image in this1 namely1 the possession of a self-active power4 ,it is not difficult to conceive that he should produce spiritual beings like himself1 who can act without being necessitated to act1 like the inanimate portions of creation1 as well as those of an inferior nature4 ,nor is it more difficult to conceive that man1 in point of fact1 possesses such a limited self-active power1 than it is to conceive that ,god possesses an infinite self-active power4 ,indeed we must and do conceive this1 or else we should have no type or representative in this lower part of the world1 by and through which to rise to a contemplation of its universal ,lord and ,sovereign4 ,we should have a temple without a symbol1 and a universe without a ,god4 ,but ,god has not thus left himself without witness2 for he has raised man above the dust of the earth in this1 that he is endowed with a self-active power1 from whence1 as from an humble platform1 he may rise to the sublime contemplation of the ,universal ,mover of the heavens and the earth4 ,but for this ray of light1 shed abroad in our hearts by the creative energy of ,god1 the nature of the divine power itself would be unknown to us1 and its eternal1 immutable glories shrouded in impenetrable darkness4 ,the idea of an omnipotent power1 moving in and of itself in obedience to the dictates of infinite wisdom and goodness1 would be forever merged and lost in the dark scheme of an implexed series and concatenation of causes1 binding all things fast1 ,god himself not excepted1 in the iron bonds of fate4 ,if liberty be a fact1 as ,sir ,william ,hamilton contends it is1 then no such objections can be urged against it as those in which he supposes it to be involved4 ,we are aware of what may be said in favour of such a mode of viewing subjects of this kind1 as well as of the nature of the principles from which it takes its rise4 ,but we cannot consider those principles altogether sound4 ,they appear to be too sceptical1 with respect to the powers of the human mind1 and the destiny of human knowledge4 ,the sentiment of ,leibnitz seems to rest upon a more solid foundation4 8,it is necessary to come10 says he1 8to the grand question which ,m4 ,bayle has recently brought upon the carpet1 to wit1 whether a truth1 and especially a truth of faith1 can be subject to unanswerable objections4 ,that excellent author seems boldly to maintain the affirmative of this question3 he cites grave theologians on his side1 and even those of ,rome1 who appear to say what he pretends2 and he adduces philosophers who have believed that there are even philosophical truths1 the defenders of which cannot reply to objections made against them40 8,for my part10 says ,leibnitz1 8,i avow that ,i cannot be of the sentiment of those who maintain that a truth can be liable to invincible objections2 for what is an objection but an argument of which the conclusion contradicts our thesis8 and is not an invincible argument a demonstration80 8,it is always necessary to yield to demonstrations1 whether they are proposed for our adoption1 or advanced in the form of objections4 ,and it is unjust and useless to wish to weaken the proofs of adversaries1 under the pretext that they are only objections2 since the adversary has the same right1 and can reverse the denominations1 by honouring his arguments with the name of proofs1 and lowering yours by the disparaging name of objections407#abh7 ,there is another false conception1 by which the necessitarian fortifies himself in his opposition to the freedom of the will4 ,as he identifies the sensibility and the will1 so when the indifference of the latter is spoken of1 the language is understood to mean that the mind is indifferent1 and destitute of all feeling or emotion4 ,but this is to view the doctrine of liberty1 not as it is held by its advocates1 but as it is seen through the medium of a false psychology4 ,we might adduce a hundred examples of the truth of this remark1 but one or two must suffice4 ,thus1 ,collins supposes that the doctrine of liberty implies1 that the mind is 8indifferent to good and evil20 8indifferent to what causes pleasure or pain20 8indifferent to all objects1 and swayed by no motives40 ,gross as this misrepresentation of the doctrine of free-agency is1 it is frequently made by its opponents4 ,it occurs repeatedly in the writings of ,president ,edwards and ,president ,day47#abi7 ,the freedom of the will1 indeed1 no more implies an indifference of the sensibility than the power of a bird to fly implies the existence of a vacuum4 ,section ,v4 ,the scheme of necessity is recommended by false analogies4 ,it is insisted that there is no difficulty in conceiving of a caused action or volition2 but this position is illustrated by false and deceptive analogies4 ,thus says an advocate of necessity3 8,the term passive is sometimes employed to express the relation of an effect to its cause4 ,in this sense1 it is so far from being inconsistent with activity1 that activity may be the very effect which is produced4 ,a cannonshot is said to be passive1 with respect to the charge of powder which impels it4 ,but is there no activity given to the ball8 ,is not the whirlwind active when it tears up the forest807#acj7 ,not at all1 in any sense pertaining to the present controversy4 ,the tremendous power1 whatever it may be1 which sets the whirlwind in motion1 is active2 the wind itself is perfectly passive4 ,the air is acted on1 and it merely suffers a change of place4 ,if it tears up the forest1 this is not because it exercises an active power1 but because it is body coming into contact with body1 and both cannot occupy the same space at one and the same time4 ,it tears up the forest1 not as an agent1 but as an instrument4 ,the same is true of the cannonball4 ,this does not act2 it merely moves4 ,it does not put forth a volition1 or an exercise of power2 it merely suffers a change of place4 ,in one word1 there is no sort of resemblance between an act of mind and the motion of body4 ,this has no active power1 and cannot be made to act3 it is passive1 however1 and may be made to move4 ,if the question were1 ,can a body be made to move8 these illustrations would be in point2 but as it relates to the possibility of causing the mind to put forth a volition1 they are clearly irrelevant4 ,and if they were really apposite1 they would only show that the mind may be caused to act like a cannonball1 a whirlwind1 a clock1 or any other piece of machinery4 ,this is the only kind of action they serve to prove may be caused2 and such action1 as it is called1 has far more to do with machinery than with human agency4 ,president ,edwards also has recourse to false analogies4 ,to select only one instance3 8,it is no more a contradiction10 says he1 8to suppose that action may be the effect of some other cause besides the agent1 or being that acts1 than to suppose that life may be the effect of some other cause besides the being that lives407#aca7 ,now1 as we are wholly passive in the reception of life1 so it may be wholly conferred upon us by the power and agency of ,god4 ,the very reason why we suppose an act cannot be caused is1 that it is a voluntary exercise of our own minds2 whereas1 if it were caused1 it would be a necessitated passive impression4 ,how can it show the fallacy of this position1 to refer to the case of a caused life1 in regard to which1 by universal consent1 we do not and cannot act at all8 ,the younger ,edwards asserts1 that 8to say that an agent that is acted upon cannot act1 is as groundless as to say that a body acted upon cannot move40 ,again3 8,my actions are mine2 but in what sense can they be properly called mine1 if ,i be not the efficient cause of them8--,answer3 my thoughts and all my perceptions and feelings are mine2 yet it will not be pretended that ,i am the efficient cause of them407#acb7 ,but in regard to all our thoughts and feelings1 we are1 as we have seen1 altogether passive2 and these are ours1 because they are necessarily produced in us4 ,is it only in this sense that our acts are ours8 ,are they ours only because they are necessarily caused to exist in our minds8 ,if so1 then indeed we understand these writers2 but if they are not merely passive impressions1 why resort to states of the intelligence and the sensibility1 which are conceded to be passive1 in order to illustrate the reasonableness of their scheme1 and to expose the unreasonableness of the opposite doctrine8 ,we admit that every passive impression is caused2 but the question is1 ,can the mind be caused to act8 ,as we lay all the stress on the nature of an act1 as seen in the light of consciousness1 what does it signify to tell us that another thing1 which possesses no such nature1 may be efficiently caused8 ,all such illustrations overlook the essential difference between action and passion1 between doing and suffering4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false phraseology4 ,the false psychology1 of which we have spoken1 has been greatly strengthened and confirmed in its influences by the phraseology connected with it4 ,as ,mr4 ,locke distinguished between will and desire1 partially at least1 so he likewise distinguished a preference of the mind from a volition4 ,but ,president ,edwards is not satisfied with this distinction4 8,the instance he mentions10 says ,edwards1 8does not prove there is anything else in willing but merely preferring407#acc7 ,this may be very true2 but is there nothing in willing1 in acting1 but merely preferring8 ,this last term1 however it may be applied1 seems better adapted to express a state of the intelligence1 than an act of the will4 ,two objects are placed before the mind3 one affects the sensibility in a more agreeable manner than the other1 and therefore the intelligence pronounces that one is more to be desired than the other4 ,this seems to be precisely what is meant by the use of the term preference4 ,one prefers an orange to an apple1 for instance1 because the orange affects his sensibility more agreeably than the apple2 and the intelligence perceiving this state of the sensibility1 declares in favour of the orange4 ,this decision of the judgment is what is usually meant by the use of the term preference1 or choice4 ,to prefer1 is merely to judge1 in view of desire1 which of two objects is more agreeable4 ,but judging and desiring are1 as we have seen1 both necessitated states of the mind4 ,why1 then1 apply the term preference1 or choice1 to acts of the will8 ,why apply a term1 which seems to express merely a state of the intelligence1 which all concede is necessitated1 to an act of the will8 ,is it not evident1 that by such a use of language the cause of necessity gains great apparent strength8 ,there is another way in which the language of the necessitarian deceives4 ,the language he employs often represents the facts of nature1 but not facts as they would be1 if his system were true4 ,hence1 when this system is attacked1 its advocates repel the attack by the use of words which truly represent nature1 but not their errors4 ,this gives great plausibility to their apologies4 ,thus1 when it is objected that the scheme of necessity 8makes men no more than mere machines10 they are always ready to reply1 8that notwithstanding this doctrine1 man is entirely1 perfectly1 and unspeakably different from a machine40 ,but how8 ,is it because his volitions1 as they are called1 are not necessarily determined by causes8 ,no4 ,is it because his will may be loose from the influence of motives8 ,no4 ,is it because he may follow the strongest motive1 or may not follow it8 ,no4 ,nothing of the kind is hinted4 ,how does the man1 then1 differ so entirely from a machine8 ,why1 8in that he has reason and understanding1 with a faculty of will1 and so is capable of volition and choice40 ,true1 a machine has no reason or understanding2 but suppose it had1 would it be a person8 ,by no means4 ,we have seen that the understanding1 or the intelligence1 is necessarily determined2 all its states are necessitated as completely as the movements of a machine4 ,this constitutes an essential likeness1 and it is what is always meant1 when it is said that necessity makes men mere machines4 ,but it seems that man also has 8a faculty of will1 and so is capable of volition or choice407#acd7 ,yes1 he can act4 ,now this language means something according to the system of nature2 but what does it mean according to the system of necessity8 ,it merely means that the human mind is susceptible of being necessitated to undergo a change by the 8power and action of a cause10 which the advocates of that system are pleased to call an act4 ,they never hint that we are not machines1 because we have any power by which we are exempt from the most absolute dominion of causes4 ,they never hint that we are not machines1 because our volitions1 or acts1 are not as necessarily produced in us1 as the motions of a clock are produced in it4 ,now1 if this scheme were true1 there would be no such things as acts or volitions in us3 all the phenomena of our minds would be passive impressions1 like our judgments and feelings4 ,when they speak of the will1 then1 which is capable of volitions1 or acts1 they deceive by using the language of nature1 and not of their false scheme4 ,section ,,vii4 ,the scheme of necessity originates in a false method1 and terminates in a false religion4 ,this system1 as we have seen1 has been built up1 not by an analysis of the phenomena of the human mind1 but by means of universal abstractions and truisms4 ,it takes its rise1 not from the facts of nature1 but from the conceptions of the intellect4 ,in other words1 instead of anatomizing the world which ,god has made so as to exhibit the actual plan according to which it has been constituted1 it sets out from certain identical propositions1 such as that every effect must have a cause1 and proceeds to inform us how the world must have been constituted4 ,this 8usual method of discovery and proof10 as ,bacon says1 8by first establishing the most general propositions1 then applying and proving the intermediate axioms according to these1 is the parent of error and the calamity of every science40 ,nowhere1 it is believed1 can a more striking illustration of the truth of these pregnant words be found1 than in the method adopted by necessitarians4 ,they begin with the universal proposition1 that every effect must have a cause1 as a self-evident truth1 and then proceed1 not to examine and discover how the world is made1 but to demonstrate how it must have been constructed4 ,this is not to 8interpret10 it is to 8anticipate0 nature4 ,by this high a priori method the freedom of the human mind is demonstrated1 as we have seen1 to be an impossibility1 and the accountability of man a dream4 ,man is not responsible for sin1 or rather1 there is no such thing as moral good and evil in the lower world2 since ,god1 the only efficient fountain of all things and events1 is the sole responsible author of all evil as well as of all good4 ,such1 as we have seen1 are the inevitable logical consequences of this boasted scheme of necessity4 ,but we have clearly shown1 we trust1 that the grand demonstration of the necessitarian is a sophism1 whose apparent force is owing to a variety of causes3--,first1 it seeks out1 and lays its foundation in1 a false psychology2 identifying the feelings1 or affections1 and the will4 ,secondly1 by viewing the opposite scheme through the medium of this false psychology1 it reduces its main position to the pitiful absurdity that a thing may produce itself1 or arise out of nothing1 and bring itself into existence2 and then demolishes this absurdity by logic6 ,thirdly1 it reduces itself to the truism1 that a thing is always as it is2 and being entrenched in this stronghold1 it gathers around itself all the common sense and all the reason of mankind1 as well it may1 and looks down with sovereign contempt on the feeble attacks of its adversaries4 ,fourthly1 it fortifies itself by a multitude of false conceptions1 arising from a hasty application of its universal truism1 and not from a severe inspection and analysis of things4 ,fifthly1 it decorates itself in false analogies1 and thereby assumes the imposing appearance of truth4 ,sixthly1 it clothes itself in deceptive and ambiguous phraseology1 by which it speaks the language of truth to the ear1 but not to the sense4 ,and1 seventhly1 it takes its rise in a false method1 and terminates in a false religion4 ,these are some of the hidden mysteries of the scheme of necessity2 which having been detected and exposed1 we do not hesitate to pronounce it a grand imposition on the reason of mankind4 ,as such1 we set aside this stupendous sophism1 whose dark shadow has so long rested on the beauty of the world1 obscuring the intrinsic majesty and glory of the infinite goodness therein displayed4 ,we put away and repudiate this vast assemblage of errors1 which has so sadly perplexed our mental vision1 and so frightfully distorted the real proportions of the world1 as to lead philosophers1 such as ,kant and others1 to pronounce a ,theodicy impossible4 ,we put them aside utterly1 in order that we may proceed to vindicate the glory of ,god1 as manifested in the constitution and government of the moral world4 ,chapter ,v4 ,the ,relation ,between ,the ,human ,will ,and ,the ,divine ,agency4 ,thou art the source and centre of all minds1 ,their only point of rest1 eternal ,word6 ,from ,thee departing1 they are lost and rove ,at random1 without honour1 hope1 or peace4 ,from ,thee is all that soothes the life of man1-- ,his high endeavour and his glad success1 ,his strength to suffer and his will to serve4--,,cowper4 ,and ,god proclaim'd from heaven1 and by an oath ,confirm'd1 that each should answer for himself2 ,and as his own peculiar work should be ,done by his proper self1 should live or die4--,,pollok4 ,the evils of haste and precipitancy in the formation of opinions are1 perhaps1 nowhere more deplorably exhibited1 than in regard to the relation between human and divine agency4 ,indeed1 so many rash judgments have been put forth on this important subject1 that the very act of approaching it has come to be invested1 in the minds of many persons1 with the character of rashness and presumption4 ,hence the frequent warnings to turn our attention from it1 as a subject lying beyond the range of all sober speculation1 and as unsuited to the investigation of our finite minds4 ,if this be a wise conclusion1 it would be well to leave it to support itself1 instead of attempting to bolster it up with the reasons frequently given for it4 ,section ,i4 ,general view of the relation between the divine and the human power4 ,it is frequently said1 for example1 that it is impossible to reconcile the agency of ,god with that of man2 because we do not know how the divine power operates upon the human mind4 ,but1 if we examine the subject closely1 we shall find that the manner in which the ,spirit of ,god operates1 is not what we want to know1 in order to remove the great difficulty in question4 ,if such knowledge were possessed in the greatest possible perfection1 we have no reason to believe that our insight into the relation between the human and the divine power would be at all improved4 ,for aught we can see1 our notions on this point would remain as dim and feeble as if we possessed no such knowledge4 ,if we could ascertain1 however1 precisely what is done by the power of man1 then we should see whether there be any real inconsistency or conflict between them or not4 ,this is the point on which we need to be enlightened1 in order to clear up the difficulty in question2 and on this point the most satisfactory light may be attained4 ,if we must wait to understand the modus operandi of the divine ,spirit1 before we can dispel the clouds and darkness which his influence casts over the free-agency of man1 then must we indeed defer this great mystery to another state of being1 and perhaps forever4 ,those who have looked in this direction for light1 may well deplore our inability to see it4 ,but let us look in the right direction3 let us consider1 not the modus operandi of the divine power1 but the effects produced by it1 and then1 perhaps1 we may behold the beautiful harmony subsisting between the agency of ,god and the freedom of man4 ,the reason why the views of most persons concerning this relation are so vague and indistinct is1 that they do not possess a sufficiently clear and perfect analysis of the human mind4 ,the powers and susceptibilities of the mind1 as well as the laws which govern its phenomena1 seem blended together in their minds in one confused mass2 and hence the relations they bear to each other1 and to the divine agency1 are as dim and fluctuating as an ill-remembered dream4 ,in this confusion of laws and phenomena1 of powers and susceptibilities1 of facts and fancies1 it is no wonder that so many crude conceptions and vague hypotheses have sprung up and prevailed concerning the great difficulty under consideration4 ,in the dim twilight of mental science1 which has shown all things distorted and nothing in its true proportions1 it is no wonder that the beautiful order and perspective of the moral world should have been concealed from our eyes4 ,it was to have been expected1 that every attempt to delineate this order1 would1 under such circumstances1 prove premature1 and aggravate rather than lessen the apparent disorders prevailing in the spiritual world4 ,accordingly1 such attempts generally terminate1 either in the denial of the free-agency of man1 or of the sovereignty of ,god2 and those who have maintained both of these tenets in reality1 as well as in name1 have usually refused to allow themselves to be troubled by the apparent contradictions in which they are involved4 ,while they recognise the two spheres of the human and of the divine agency1 they have left them so shadowy and indistinct1 and so distorted from their real proportions1 that they have inevitably seemed to clash with each other4 ,hence1 to describe these two spheres with clearness and precision1 and to determine the precise point at which they come into contact without intersecting each other1 is still a desideratum in the science of theology4 ,we shall endeavour to define the human power and the divine sovereignty1 and to exhibit the harmony subsisting between them1 in such a manner as to supply1 in some small degree at least1 this great desideratum which has so long been the reproach of the most sublime of all the sciences4 ,but this is not to be done by planting ourselves upon any one particular platform1 and dogmatizing from thence1 as if that particular point of view necessarily presented us with every possible phase of the truth4 ,there has been1 indeed1 so much of this one-sided1 exclusive1 and dogmatizing spirit manifested in relation to the subject in question1 as to give a great appearance of truth to the assertion of an ingenious writer1 that inasmuch as different minds contemplate the divine and human agency from different points of view1 the predominant or leading idea presented to them can never be the same2 and hence they can never agree in the same representation of the complex whole4 ,the one1 says he1 8necessarily gives a greater prominence to the divine agency1 and the other to the scope and influence of the human will1 and consequently they pronounce different judgments2 just as a man who views a spherical surface from the inside will forever affirm it to be concave1 while he who contemplates it from the outside will as obstinately assert that it is convex40 ,but although this has been the usual method of treating the subject in question1 such weakness and dogmatizing is self-imposed1 and not an inevitable condition of the human mind4 ,we may learn wisdom from the errors of the past1 no less than from its most triumphant and glorious discoveries4 ,in the discussion of this subject1 it is true that opposite parties have confined themselves to first appearances too much1 and rested on one-sided views4 ,but are we necessarily tied down to such inadequate conceptions8 ,the causes which separate men in opinion1 and the obstacles which keep them asunder1 are indeed powerful2 but we hope they do not form an eternal barrier between the wise and good4 ,in regard to doctrines so fundamental and so vital as the divine sovereignty and human freedom1 it is to be hoped that all good men will some day unite1 and perfectly harmonize with each other4 ,as we are rational beings1 so we are not tied down to that appearance of things which is presented to one particular point of view4 ,if this were the case1 the science of astronomy would never have had an existence4 ,even the phenomena of that noble science are almost inconceivably different from those presented to the mind of man at his particular point of view4 ,from the small shining objects which are brought to our knowledge by the sense of sight1 the reason rises to the true dimensions of those tremendous worlds4 ,and after the human mind has thus furnished itself with the facts of the solar system1 it has proceeded but a small way toward a knowledge of the system itself4 ,it has also to deduce the laws of the material world from its first appearances1 and1 armed with these1 it must transport itself from the earth to the true centre of the system1 from which its wonderful order and beauty may be contemplated1 and revealed to the world4 ,then these innumerable twinkling points of light1 which sparkle in the heavens like so many atoms1 become to the eye of reason the stupendous suns and centres of other worlds and systems4 ,if we should judge from first appearances1 indeed1 if we could not emancipate ourselves from phenomena as they are exhibited to us from one particular point of view1 then should we never escape the conclusion1 that the earth is the fixed centre of the universe1 around which its countless myriads of worlds perform their eternal revolutions4 ,but1 fortunately1 we are subject to no such miserable bondage4 ,the mind of man has already raised itself from the planet to which his body is confined1 and1 planting itself on the true centre of the system1 has beheld the sublime scheme planned by the infinite reason1 and executed by the almighty power of the ,divine ,architect4 ,surely the mind which can do1 and has done1 all this1 has the capacity to understand1 place it where you will1 that although the inside of a sphere is concave1 the outside may be convex2 as well as some other things which may perhaps have been placed beyond its power1 without due consideration4 ,but in every attempt to emancipate ourselves from first appearances1 and to reach a knowledge of the truth1 8not as reflected under a single angle10 but as seen in all its fulness and beauty1 it is indispensable to contemplate it on all sides1 and to mark the precise boundaries of all its phases4 ,hence we shall not plant ourselves on the fact of man's power alone1 and1 viewing the subject exclusively from thence1 enlarge the sphere of human agency to such an extent as to shut the divine agency quite out of the intellectual and moral world4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 shall we permit ourselves to become so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the majesty of ,god1 to dwell so warmly on his infinite sovereignty and the littleness of man1 as to cause the sphere of human power to dwindle down to a mere point1 and entirely disappear4 ,we shall endeavour to find the true medium between these two extreme opinions4 ,that such a medium exists somewhere1 will not be denied by many persons4 ,the only question will be1 as to where and how the line should be drawn to strike out this medium4 ,in most systems of theology1 this line is not drawn at all1 but left completely in the dark4 ,we are shown some things on both sides of this line1 but we are not shown the line itself4 ,we are made to see1 for example1 the fact of human existence as something distinct from ,god1 that we may not err with ,spinoza1 in reducing man to a mere fugitive mode of the ,divine ,being1 to a mere shadow and a dream4 ,and on the other side1 we are made to contemplate the omnipotence of ,god1 that we may not call in question his sovereignty and dominion over the moral world4 ,but between these two positions1 on which the light of truth has thus been made to fall1 there is a tract of dark and unexplored territory1 a terra incognita1 which remains to be completely surveyed and delineated1 before we can see the beauty of the whole scene4 ,in the attempt to map out this region1 to define the precise boundary of that imperium in imperio1 of which ,spinoza and others entertained so great a horror1 we should endeavour to follow the wise maxim of ,bacon1 8to despise nothing1 and to admire nothing40 ,in other words1 we should endeavour to 8prove all things1 and to hold fast that which is good10 without yielding a blind veneration to received dogmas1 or a blind admiration to the seductive charms of novelty4 ,hence1 we shall first stand on the same platform with ,pelagius1 and endeavour to view the subject with his eyes2 to see all that he saw1 as well as to correct the errors of his observation4 ,and having done this1 we shall then transport ourselves to the platform of ,augustine1 and contemplate the subject from his point of view1 so as to possess ourselves of his great truths1 and also to correct the errors of his observation4 ,having finished these processes1 it will not be found difficult to combine the truths of these two conflicting schemes in a complete and harmonious system1 which shall exhibit both the human and the divine elements of religion in their true proportions and just relations to each other4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,pelagian platform1 or view of the relation between the divine and the human power4 ,the doctrine of ,pelagius was developed from his own personal experience1 and moulded1 in a great measure1 by his opposition to the scheme of ,augustine4 ,according to the historian1 ,neander1 as well as to the testimony of ,augustine himself1 the life of ,pelagius was1 from beginning to end1 one 8earnest moral effort40 ,as his character was gradually formed by his own continued and unremitted exertions1 without any sudden or violent revolution in his views or feelings1 so the great fact of human agency presented itself to his individual consciousness with unclouded lustre4 ,this fact was the great central position from which his whole scheme developed itself4 ,and1 as the history of his opinion shows1 he was led to give a still greater predominance to this fact1 in consequence of his opposition to the system of ,augustine1 by which it seemed to him to be subverted1 and the interests of morality threatened4 ,the great fact of free-will1 of whose existence he was so well assured by his own consciousness1 was so imperfectly interpreted by him1 that he was led to exclude other great facts from his system1 which might have been perfectly harmonized with his central position4 ,thus1 as ,neander well says1 he denied the operation of the divine power in the renovation of the soul17#ace7 because he could not reconcile its influence with the free-agency of man4 ,this was the weak point in the philosophy of ,pelagius1 as it has been in the system of thousands who have lived since his time4 ,to reject the one of two facts1 both of which rest upon clear and unequivocal evidence1 is an error which has been condemned by ,butler and ,burlamaqui1 as well as by many other celebrated philosophers4 ,but this error1 so far as we know1 has been by no one more finely reproved than by ,professor ,hodge1 of ,princeton4 8,if the evidence of the constant revolution of the earth round its axis10 says he1 8were presented to a man1 it would certainly be unreasonable in him to deny the fact1 merely because he could not reconcile it with the stability of everything on the earth's surface4 ,or if he saw two rays of light made to produce darkness1 must he resist the evidence of his senses1 because he knows that two candles give more light than one8 ,men do not act thus irrationally in physical investigations4 ,they let each fact stand upon its own evidence4 ,they strive to reconcile them1 and are happy when they succeed4 ,but they do not get rid of difficulties by denying facts4 8,if in the department of physical knowledge we are obliged to act upon the principle of receiving every fact upon its own evidence1 even when unable to reconcile one with another1 it is not wonderful that this necessity should be imposed upon us in those departments of knowledge which are less within the limits of our powers4 ,it is certainly irrational for a man to reject all the evidence of the spirituality of the soul1 because he cannot reconcile this doctrine with the fact that a disease of the body disorders the mind4 ,must ,i do violence to my nature in denying the proof of design afforded by the human body1 because ,i cannot account for the occasional occurrence of deformities of structure8 ,must ,i harden my heart against all the evidence of the benevolence of ,god1 which streams upon me in a flood of light from all his works1 because ,i may not know how to reconcile that benevolence with the existence of evil8 ,must ,i deny my free-agency1 the most intimate of all convictions1 because ,i cannot see the consistency between the freeness of an act and the frequency of its occurrence8 ,may ,i deny that ,i am a moral being1 the very glory of my nature1 because ,i cannot change my character at will807#acf7 ,if this judicious sentiment had been observed by speculatists1 it had been well for philosophy1 and still better for religion4 ,the heresy of ,pelagius1 and the countless forms of kindred errors1 would not have infested human thought4 ,but this sentiment1 however just in itself1 or however elegantly expressed1 should not be permitted to inspire our minds with a feeling of despair4 ,it should teach us caution1 but not despondency2 it should extinguish presumption1 but not hope4 ,for if 8we strive to reconcile the facts0 of the natural world1 8and are happy when we succeed10 how much more solicitous should we be to succeed in such an attempt to shut up and seal the very fountains of religious error8 ,nothing is more wonderful to my mind1 than that ,pelagius should have such followers as ,reimarus and ,lessing1 not to mention hundreds of others1 who deny the possibility of a divine influence1 because it seems to them to conflict with the intellectual and moral nature of man47#acg7 ,to assert1 as these philosophers do1 that the power of ,god cannot act upon the human mind without infringing upon its freedom1 betrays1 as we venture to affirm1 a profound and astonishing ignorance of the whole doctrine of free-agency4 ,it proceeds on the amazing supposition that the will is the only power of the human mind1 and that volitions are the only phenomena ever manifested therein2 so that ,god cannot act upon it at all1 unless it be to produce volitions4 ,but is it true1 that ,god must do all things within us1 or he can do nothing8 that if he produce a change in our mental state1 then he must produce all conceivable changes therein8 ,in order to refute so rash a conclusion1 and explode the wild supposition on which it is based1 it will be necessary to recur to the threefold distinction of the intelligence1 the sensibility1 and the will1 already referred to4 ,in the perception of truth1 as we have seen1 the intelligence is perfectly passive4 ,every state of the intelligence is as completely necessitated as is the affirmation that two and two are equal to four4 ,the decisions of the intelligence1 then1 are not free acts2 indeed1 they are not acts at all1 in the proper sense of the word4 ,they are passive states of the intellect4 ,they are usually called acts1 it is true2 and this use of language is1 no doubt1 one of the causes which has given rise to so many errors and delusions in regard to moral and accountable agency4 ,with every decision or state of the intelligence1 with every perception of truth by it1 there is intimately associated1 it is true1 an act of the mind1 a state of the will1 a volition1 by which the attention is directed to the subject under consideration2 and it is this intimate association in which the two states or mental phenomena seem blended into one1 which has led so many to regard the passive susceptibility1 called the intelligence1 as an active power1 and its states as free acts of the mind4 ,a more correct analysis1 a finer discrimination of the real facts of consciousness1 must prevail on this subject1 before light can be let in upon the philosophy of free and accountable agency4 ,the dividing knife must be struck between the two phenomena in question1 between an active state of the will and the passive states of the intelligence1 and the obstinate association be severed in our imagination1 before the truth can be seen otherwise than through distorting films of error4 ,as every state of the intelligence is necessitated1 so ,god may act upon this department of our mental frame without infringing upon the nature of man in the slightest possible degree4 ,as the law of necessity is the law of the intelligence1 so ,god may absolutely necessitate its states1 by the presentation of truth1 or by his direct and irresistible agency in connexion with the truth1 without doing violence to the laws of our intellectual and moral nature4 ,nay1 in so acting1 he proceeds in perfect conformity with those laws4 ,hence1 no matter how deep a human soul may be sunk in ignorance and stupidity1 ,god may flash the light of truth into it1 in perfect accordance with the laws of its nature4 ,and1 as has been well said1 8,the first effect of the divine power in the new1 as in the old creation1 is light40 ,this is not all4 ,every state of the sensibility is a passive impression1 a necessitated phenomenon of the human mind4 ,no matter what fact1 or what truth1 may be present to the mind1 either by its own voluntary attention or by the agency of ,god1 or by the coperation of both1 the impression it makes upon the sensibility is beyond the control of the will1 except by refusing to give the attention of the mind to it4 ,hence1 although truth may be vividly impressed upon the intelligence1 although the glories of heaven and the terrors of hell may be made to shine into it1 yet the sensibility may remain unaffected by them4 ,it may be dead4 ,hence1 ,god may act upon this1 may cause it to melt with sorrow or to glow with love1 without doing violence to any law of our moral nature4 ,there is no difficulty1 then1 in conceiving that the second effect of the divine power in the new creation is 8a new heart40 ,having done all this1 he may well call on us to 8work out our salvation with fear and trembling1 for ,god worketh in us to will and to do of his own good pleasure40 ,we have seen that the state of the will1 that a volition is not necessitated by the intelligence or by the sensibility2 and1 hence1 it may 8obey the heavenly vision10 or it may 8resist and do despite to the ,spirit of grace40 ,if it obey1 then the vivifying light and genial shower have not fallen upon the soul in vain4 ,the free-will coalesces with the renovated intelligence and sensibility1 and the man 8has root in himself40 ,the blossom gradually yields to the fruit1 and the germ of true holiness is formed in the soul4 ,this consists in the voluntary exercise of the mind1 in obedience to the knowledge and the love of ,god1 and in the permanent habit formed by the repetition of such exercises4 ,hence1 in the great theandric work of regeneration1 we see the part which is performed by ,god1 and the part which proceeds from man4 ,this shows an absolute dependence of the soul upon the agency of ,god4 ,for without knowledge the mind can no more perform its duty than the eye can see without light2 and without a feeling of love to ,god1 it is as impossible for it to render a spiritual obedience1 as it would be for a bird to fly in a vacuum4 ,yet this dependence1 absolute as it is1 does not impair the free-agency of man4 ,for divine grace supplies1 and must supply1 the indispensable conditions of holiness2 but it does not produce holiness itself4 ,it does not produce holiness itself1 because1 as we have seen1 a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms4 ,is it not evident1 then1 that those who assert the impossibility of a divine influence1 on the ground that it would destroy the free-agency of man1 have proceeded on a wonderful confusion of the phenomena of the human mind8 ,is it not evident that they have confounded those states of the intelligence and the sensibility1 which are marked over with the characteristics of necessity1 with those states of the will which inevitably suggest the ideas of freedom and accountability8 ,but1 strange as it may seem1 the philosophers who thus shut the influence of the ,divine ,being out of the spiritual world1 because they cannot reconcile it with the moral agency of man1 do not always deny the influence of created beings over the mind4 ,on the contrary1 it is no uncommon thing to see philosophers and theologians1 who begin by denying the influence of the ,divine ,spirit upon the human mind1 in order to save the freedom of the latter1 end by subjecting it to the most absolute dominion of facts2 and circumstances1 and motives4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,augustinian ,platform1 or view of the relation between the divine agency and the human4 ,the doctrine of ,augustine1 like that of ,pelagius1 was developed from the individual experience and consciousness of its author4 ,the difference between them was1 that the sensible experience of the one furnished him with only the human element of religion1 which was unduly magnified by him2 while the divine element was the great prominent fact in the consciousness of the other1 who accordingly rendered it too exclusive in the formation of his views4 ,the one elevated the human element of religion at the expense of the divine2 the other permitted the majesty of the divine to overshadow the human1 and cause it to disappear4 ,the causes which induced ,augustine to take this sublime but one-sided view of religion may be easily understood4 ,in the early part of his life1 he abandoned himself to vicious excesses2 being hurried away1 to use a metaphor1 by the violence of his appetites and passions4 ,his conscience1 no doubt1 often reproved him for such a course of life1 and gave rise to many resolutions of amendment4 ,but experience taught him that he could not transform and mould his own character at pleasure4 ,he lacked those views of truth1 and those feelings of reverence and love to ,god1 without which true obedience is impossible4 ,hence he struggled in vain4 ,he felt his own impotency4 ,he still yielded to the importunities of appetite and passion4 ,of a sudden1 however1 he finds his views of divine things changed1 and his religious sensibilities awakened4 ,he knows this marvellous transformation is not effected by himself4 ,he ascribes it1 and he truly ascribes it1 to the power of ,god2 by which he has been brought from a region of darkness to light4 ,old things had passed away1 and all things become new4 ,but now observe the precise manner in which the error of ,augustine takes its rise in his mind4 ,he1 too1 as well as ,pelagius1 confounds the passive susceptibility of the heart with a voluntary state of the will4 ,the intelligence and the sensibility are the only elements in his psychology2 the states of them1 which are necessitated1 constitute all the phenomena of the human mind4 ,holiness1 according to him1 consists in a feeling of love to ,god4 ,he knows this is derived from the divine agency2 and hence he concludes1 that the whole work of conversion is due to ,god1 and no part of it is performed by himself4 ,i know1 says he1 that ,i did not make myself love ,god1 by which he means a feeling of love2 and this he takes to be true holiness1 which has been wrought in his heart by the power of ,god4 8,love is the fulfilling of the law2 but love to ,god is not shed abroad in our hearts by the law1 but by the ,holy ,ghost40 ,he is sure the whole work is from ,god1 because he is sure that the intelligence and the sensibility are the whole of man4 ,how many excellent persons are there1 who1 taking their stand upon the same platform of a false psychology1 proceed to dogmatize with ,augustine as confidently as if the only possible ground of difference from them was a want of the religious experience of the ,christian consciousness1 by which they have been so eminently blessed4 ,we deny not the reality of their ,christian experience2 but we do doubt the accuracy of their interpretation of it4 ,thus1 the complex fact of consciousness1 consisting in a state of the sensibility and a state of the will1 was viewed from opposite points by ,pelagius and ,augustine4 ,the voluntary phase of it was seen by ,pelagius1 and hence he became an exclusive and one-sided advocate of free-agency2 the passive side was beheld by ,augustine1 and hence he became a one-sided and exclusive advocate of divine grace4 ,if we would possess the truth1 and the whole truth1 we must view it on all sides1 and give a better interpretation of the natural consciousness of the one1 as well as the supernatural consciousness of the other1 than they themselves were enabled to give4 ,then shall we not instinctively turn to one-sided views of revelation4 ,then shall we not always repeat with ,pelagius1 8,work out your own salvation with fear and trembling10 nor always exclaim with ,augustine1 that 8,god worketh in us to will and to do of his good pleasure20 but we shall with equal freedom and readiness approach and appropriate both branches of the truth4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the views of those who1 in later times1 have symbolized with ,augustine4 ,those divines who have adopted1 in the main1 the same leading views with ,augustine1 have generally admitted the fact of free-agency2 but1 because they could not reconcile it with their leading tenet1 they have1 as we have seen1 explained it away4 ,the only freedom which they allow to man1 pertains1 as we have shown1 not to the will at all1 but only to the external sphere of the body4 ,they have maintained the great fact in words1 but rejected it in substance4 ,though they have seen the absurdity of rejecting one fact because they could not reconcile it with another1 yet their internal struggle after a unity and harmony of principle has induced them to deny1 in reality1 what they have seemed to themselves to preserve and maintain4 ,we have seen1 in the first chapter of this work1 in what manner this has been done by them2 it now remains to take a view of the subject1 in connexion with the point under consideration4 ,the man who confounds the sensibility with the will should1 indeed1 have no difficulty in reconciling the divine agency with the human4 ,if the state of the mind in willing is purely passive1 like a state of the mind in feeling2 then to say that it is produced by the power of ,god1 would create no difficulty whatever4 ,hence1 the great difficulty of reconciling the human with the divine agency1 which has puzzled and perplexed so many1 should not exist for one who identifies the will with the sensibility2 and it would exist for no one holding this psychology1 if there were not more in the operations of his nature than in the developments of his system4 ,perhaps no one ever more completely lost sight of the true characteristic of the manifestations of the will1 by thrusting them behind the phenomena of the sensibility1 than ,president ,edwards2 and hence the difficulty in question seemed to have no existence for him4 ,so far from troubling himself about the line which separates the human agency from the divine1 he calmly and quietly speaks as if such a line had no existence4 ,according to his view1 the divine agency encircles all1 and man is merely the subject of its influence4 ,it is true1 he uses the terms active and actions1 as applicable to man and his exertions2 but yet he regards his very acts1 his volitions1 as being produced by ,god4 8,in efficacious grace10 says he1 8,god does all1 and we do all4 ,god produces all1 and we act all4 ,for that is what he produces2 namely1 our own acts40 ,now ,i think ,edwards could not have used such language1 if he had attached any other idea to the term act1 than what really belongs to it when it is applied1 as it often is1 to the passive states of the intelligence and the sensibility4 ,an act of the intellect1 or an act of the affections1 may be produced by the power of ,god2 but not an act of the will4 ,for1 as the ,princeton ,review well says1 8a necessary volition is an absurdity1 a thing inconceivable40 ,it is scarcely necessary to add1 that in causing all real human agency to disappear before the divine sovereignty1 ,edwards merely reproduced the opinion of ,calvin2 which he endeavoured to establish1 not by a fierce1 unreasoning dogmatism1 but upon the principles of reason and philosophy4 8,the apostle10 says ,calvin1 8ascribes everything to the ,lord's mercy1 and leaves nothing to our wills or exertions407#ach7 ,he even contends1 that to 8suppose man to be a coperator with ,god1 so that the validity of election depends on his consent10 is to make the 8will of man superior to the counsel of ,god207#aci7 as if there were no possible medium between nothing and omnipotence4 ,section ,v4 ,the danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of the divine sovereignty4 ,there is no danger1 it is true1 that we shall ever form too exalted conceptions of the divine majesty4 ,all notions must fall infinitely below the sublime reality4 ,but we may proceed in the wrong direction1 by making it our immediate aim and object to exalt the sovereignty of ,god4 ,an object so vast and overwhelming as the divine omnipotence1 cannot fail to transport the imagination1 and to fill the soul with wonder4 ,hence1 in our passionate1 but always feeble1 endeavours to grasp so wonderful an object1 our vision may be disturbed by our emotions1 and the glory of ,god badly reflected in our minds4 ,our utmost exertions may thus end1 not in exalted1 but in distorted views of the divine sovereignty4 ,is it not better1 then1 for feeble creatures like ourselves1 to aim simply to acquire a knowledge of the truth1 which1 we may depend upon it1 will not fail to exhibit the divine sovereignty in its most beautiful lights8 ,if such be our object1 we shall find1 we think1 that ,god is the author of our spiritual views in religion1 as well as those genuine feelings of reverence and love1 without which obedience is impossible2 and that man himself is the author of the volitions by which his obedience is consummated4 ,this shows the precise point at which the divine agency ceases1 and human agency begins2 the precise point at which the sphere of human power comes into contact with the sphere of omnipotence1 without intersecting it and without being annihilated by it4 ,it shows at once the absolute dependence of man upon ,god1 without a denial of his free and accountable agency2 and it asserts the latter1 without excluding the ,divine ,being from the affairs of the moral world4 ,it renders unto ,csar the things which are ,csar's1 and unto ,god the things which are ,god's4 ,at the same time that it combines and harmonizes these truths1 it shows the errors of the opposite extremes1 and places the doctrines of human and divine agency upon a solid and enduring basis1 by preventing each from excluding the other4 ,in all our inquiries1 truth1 and truth alone1 should be our grand object4 ,all by-ends and contracted purposes1 all party schemes and sectarian zeal1 will be almost sure to defeat their own objects1 by seeking them with too direct and exclusive an aim4 ,these1 even when noble and praiseworthy1 must be sought and reached1 if reached at all1 by seeking and finding the truth4 ,thus1 for instance1 would we exalt the sovereignty of ,god1 then must we not directly seek to exalt that sovereignty1 but put away from us all the forced contrivances and factitious lights which have been invented for that purpose4 ,it is the light of truth alone1 sought for its own sake1 and therefore clearly seen1 that can reveal the sublime proportions1 and the intrinsic moral loveliness1 of this awful attribute of the ,divine ,being4 ,on the other hand1 would we vindicate the freedom of man1 and break into atoms the iron law of necessity1 which is supposed to bind him to the dust1 then again must we seek the truth without reference to this particular aim or object4 ,we must study the great advocates of that law with as great earnestness and fairness as its adversaries4 ,for it is by the light of truth alone1 that the real position man occupies in the moral world1 or the orbit his power moves in1 can be clearly seen1 free from the manifold illusions of error2 and until it be thus seen1 the liberty of the human mind can never be successfully and triumphantly vindicated4 ,if we would understand these things1 then1 we must struggle to rise above the foggy atmosphere and the refracted lights of prejudice1 into the bright region of eternal truth4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,the ,existence ,of ,moral ,evil1 ,or ,sin1 ,reconciled ,with ,the ,holiness ,of ,god4 ,one doubt remains1 ,that wrings me sorely1 if ,i solve it not4 ,the world1 indeed1 is even so forlorn ,of all good1 as thou speakest it1 and so swarms ,with every evil4 ,yet1 beseech thee1 point ,the cause out to me1 that myself may see ,and unto others show it3 for in heaven ,one places it1 and one on earth below4--,,dante4 ,theology teaches that ,god is a being of infinite perfections4 ,hence1 it is concluded1 that if he had so chosen1 he might have secured the world against the possibility of evil2 and this naturally gives rise to the inquiry1 why he did not thus secure it8 ,why he did not preserve the moral universe1 as he had created it1 free from the least impress or overshadowing of evil8 ,why he permitted the beauty of the world to become disfigured1 as it has been1 by the dark invasion and ravages of sin8 ,this great question has1 in all ages1 agitated and disturbed the human mind1 and been a prolific source of atheistic doubts and scepticism4 ,it has been1 indeed1 a dark and perplexing enigma to the eye of faith itself4 ,to solve this great difficulty1 or at least to mitigate the stupendous darkness in which it seems enveloped1 various theories have been employed4 ,the most celebrated of these are the following3 #a4 ,the hypothesis of the soul's prexistence2 #b4 ,the hypothesis of the ,manicheans2 and1 #c4 ,the hypothesis of optimism4 ,it may not be improper to bestow a few brief remarks on these different schemes4 ,section ,i4 ,the hypothesis of the soul's prexistence4 ,this was a favourite opinion with many of the ancient philosophers4 ,in the ,phdon of ,plato1 ,socrates is introduced as maintaining it2 and he ascribes it to ,orpheus as its original author4 ,leibnitz supposes that it was invented for the purpose of explaining the origin of evil27#adj7 but the truth seems to be1 that it arose from the difficulty of conceiving how the soul could be created out of nothing1 or out of a substance so different from itself as matter4 ,the hypothesis in question was also maintained by many great philosophers1 because they imagined that if the past eternity of the soul were denied1 this would shake the philosophical proof of its future eternity47#ada7 ,there can be no doubt1 however1 that after the idea of the soul's prexistence had been conceived and entertained1 it was very generally employed to account for the origin of evil4 ,but it must be conceded that this hypothesis merely draws a veil over the great difficulty it was designed to solve4 ,the difficulty arises1 not from the circumstance that evil exists in the present state of our being1 but from the fact that it is found to exist anywhere1 or in any state1 under the moral administration of a perfect ,god4 ,it is as difficult to conceive why such a being should have permitted the soul to sin in a former state of existence1 even if such a state were an established reality1 as it is to account for its rise in the present world4 ,to remove the difficulty out of sight1 by transferring the origin of evil beyond the sphere of visible things1 is a poor substitute for a solid and satisfactory solution of it4 ,the great problem of the moral world is not to be illuminated by any such fictions of the imagination2 and we had better let it alone altogether1 if we have nothing more rational and solid to advance4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the hypothesis of the ,manicheans4 ,though this doctrine is ascribed to ,manes1 after whom it is called1 it is of a far more early origin4 ,it was taught1 says ,plutarch1 by the ,persian ,magi1 whose views are exhibited by him in his celebrated treatise of ,isis and ,osiris4 8,zoroaster10 says he1 8thought that there are two gods1 contrary to each other in their operations--a good and an evil principle4 ,to the former he gave the name of ,oromazes1 and to the latter that of ,arimanius4 ,the one resembles light and truth1 the other darkness and ignorance40 ,we do not allude to this theory for the purpose of combatting it2 we suppose it would scarcely find a respectable advocate at the present day4 ,this1 like many other inventions of the great intellects of antiquity1 has entirely disappeared before the simple but sublime doctrines of the religion of ,jesus4 ,m4 ,bayle1 it is true1 has exhausted the resources of his genius1 as well as the rich stores of his learning1 in order to adorn the doctrine of ,manes1 and to render it more plausible1 if possible1 than any other which has been employed to explain the origin and existence of evil4 ,but this was not because he sincerely believed it to be founded in truth4 ,he merely wished to show its superiority to other schemes1 in order that by demolishing it he might the more effectually inspire the minds of men with a dark feeling of universal scepticism4 ,it was decorated by him1 not as a system of truth1 but as a sacrifice to be offered up on the altar of atheism4 ,true to the instincts of his philosophy1 he sought on this subject1 as well as on all others1 to extinguish the light of science1 and manifest the wonders of his power1 by hanging round the wretched habitation of man the gloom of eternal despair4 ,though this doctrine is now obsolete in the civilized world1 it was employed by a large portion of the ancient philosophers to account for the origin of evil4 ,this theory does not1 it is true1 relieve the difficulty it was designed to solve2 but it shows that there was a difficulty to be solved1 which would not have been the case if evil could have been ascribed to the ,supreme ,god as its author4 ,if those philosophers could have regarded him as a ,being of partial goodness1 they would have found no difficulty in explaining the origin and existence of evil2 they would simply have attributed the good and the evil in the world to the good and the evil supposed to pertain to his nature4 ,but they could not do this1 inasmuch as the human mind no sooner forms an idea of ,god1 than it regards him as a being of unlimited and unmixed goodness4 ,it has shown a disposition1 in all ages1 to adopt the most wild and untenable hypotheses1 rather than entertain the imagination that evil could proceed from the ,father of ,lights4 ,the doctrine of ,manes1 then1 as well as the other hypotheses employed to explain the origin of evil1 demonstrates how deep is the conviction of the human mind that ,god is light1 and in him there is no darkness at all4 ,in searching after the fountain of evil1 it turns from the great source of life and light1 and embraces the wildest extravagancies1 rather than indulge a dark suspicion respecting the goodness of its ,maker4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the hypothesis of optimism4 8,the fundamental principle of the optimist is10 says ,dugald ,stewart1 8that all events are ordered for the best2 and that evils which we suffer are parts of a great system conducted by almighty power under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness40 ,leibnitz1 who is unquestionably one of the greatest philosophers the world has produced1 has exerted all his powers to adorn and recommend the scheme of optimism4 ,we have1 in a former chapter1 considered the system of ,leibnitz2 but we have not denied its fundamental principle1 which is so well expressed in the above language of ,mr4 ,stewart4 ,if he had confined himself to that principle1 without undertaking to explain how it is that ,god orders all things for the best1 his doctrine would have been free from objections1 except for a want of clearness and precision4 ,dr4 ,chalmers has said that the scheme of optimism1 as left by ,leibnitz1 is merely an hypothesis4 ,he insists1 however1 that even as an hypothesis1 it may be made to serve a highly important purpose in theology4 8,if it be not an offensive weapon10 says he1 8with which we may beat down and demolish the strongholds of the sceptic1 it is1 at least1 an armour of defence1 with which we may cause all his shafts to fall harmless at our feet40 ,this remark of ,dr4 ,chalmers seems to be well founded4 ,the objection of the sceptic1 as we have seen1 proceeds on the supposition that if a ,being of infinite perfections had so chosen1 he might have made a better universe than that which actually exists4 ,but we have as good reasons to make suppositions as the sceptic4 ,let us suppose1 then1 that notwithstanding the evil which reigns in the world1 the universe is the best possible universe that even infinite wisdom1 and power1 and goodness1 could have called into existence4 ,let us suppose that this would be clearly seen by us1 if we only knew the whole of the case2 if we could only view the present condition of man in all its connexions and relations to ,god's infinite plans for the universe and for eternity4 ,in other words1 let us suppose1 that if we were only omniscient1 our difficulty would vanish1 and where we now see a cloud over the divine perfections1 we should behold bright manifestations of them4 ,this is a mere supposition1 it is true1 but it should be remembered that the objection in question is based on a mere supposition4 ,when it is asked1 why ,god permitted evil if he had both the power and the will to prevent it8 it is assumed that the prevention of evil is better1 on the whole1 than the permission of it1 and consequently more worthy of the infinite wisdom and goodness ascribed to ,god4 ,but as this is a mere supposition1 which has never been proved by the sceptic1 we do not see why it may not be sufficiently answered by a mere supposition4 ,this is an important idea4 ,in many a good old writer1 it exists in the dark germ2 in ,dr4 ,chalmers it appears in the expanded blossom4 ,its value may be shown1 and its beauty illustrated1 by a reference to the affairs of human life2 for many of the most important concerns of society are settled and determined by the application of this principle4 ,if a man were on trial for his life1 for example1 and certain facts tending to establish his guilt were in evidence against him1 no enlightened tribunal would pronounce him guilty1 provided any hypothesis could be framed1 or any supposition made1 by which the facts in evidence could be reconciled with his innocence4 8,evidence10 says a distinguished legal writer1 8is always insufficient1 where1 assuming all to be proved which the evidence tends to prove1 some other hypothesis may still be true2 for it is the actual exclusion of any other hypothesis which invests mere circumstances with the force of proof407#adb7 ,this is a settled principle of law4 ,if any supposition can be made1 then1 which would reconcile the facts in evidence with a man's innocence1 the law directs that he shall be acquitted4 ,any other rule of decision would be manifestly unjust1 and inconsistent with the dictates of a sound policy4 ,this principle is applicable1 whether the accused bear a good or a bad moral character4 ,as1 according to the hypothesis1 he might be innocent2 so no tribunal on earth could fairly determine that he was guilty4 ,the hardship of such a conclusion would be still more apparent in regard to the conduct of a man whose general character is well known to be good4 ,in such a case1 especially1 should the facts be of such a nature as to exclude every favourable hypothesis1 before either truth or justice would listen to an unfavourable decision and judgment4 ,such is the rule which human wisdom has established1 in order to arrive at truth1 or at least to avoid error1 in relation to the acts and intentions of men4 ,hence1 is it not reasonable1 we ask1 that we should keep within the same sacred bounds1 when we come to form an estimate of the ways of ,god8 ,no one can fairly doubt that the world is replete with the evidences of his goodness4 ,if he had so chosen1 he might have made every breath a sigh1 every sensation a pang1 and every utterance of man's spirit a groan2 but how differently has he constituted the world within us1 and the glorious world around us6 ,instead of swelling every sound with discord1 and clothing every object with deformity1 he has made all nature music to the ear and beauty to the eye4 ,the full tide of his universal goodness flows within us1 and around us on all sides4 ,in its eternal rounds1 it touches and blesses all things living with its power4 ,we live1 and move1 and have our very being in the goodness of ,god4 ,surely1 then1 we should most joyfully cling to an hypothesis which is favourable to the character of such a ,being4 ,hence1 we infinitely prefer the warm and generous theory of the optimist1 which regards the actual universe as the best possible1 to the dark and cold hypothesis of the sceptic1 which calls in question the boundless perfections of ,god4 ,in the foregoing remarks1 we have concurred with ,dr4 ,chalmers in viewing the doctrine of ,bayle as a mere unsupported hypothesis2 but have we any right to do so8 ,it has not been proved1 it is true2 but there are some things which require no proof4 ,is not the doctrine of ,bayle a thing of this kind8 ,it certainly seems evident that if ,god hates sin above all things1 and could easily prevent it1 he would not permit it to appear in his dominions4 ,this view of the subject recommends itself powerfully to the human mind1 which has1 in all ages1 been worried and perplexed by it4 ,it seems to carry its own evidence along with it2 to shake the mind with doubt1 and over-spread it with darkness4 ,hence1 we should either expose its fallacy or else fairly acknowledge its power4 ,on the other hand1 the theory of ,leibnitz1 or rather the great fundamental idea of his theory1 is more than a mere hypothesis4 ,it rests on the conviction of the human mind that ,god is infinitely perfect1 and seems to flow from it as a necessary consequence4 ,for how natural1 how irresistible the conclusion1 that if ,god be absolutely perfect1 then the world made by him must be perfect also6 ,but while these two hypotheses seem to be sound1 it is clear that both cannot be so3 there is a real conflict between them1 and the one or the other must be made to give way before our knowledge can assume a clearly harmonious and satisfactory form4 ,the effects of the hypothesis of the sceptic may be neutralized by opposing to it the hypothesis of the theist4 ,but we are not satisfied to stop at this point4 ,we intend1 not merely to neutralize1 but to explode1 the theory of the sceptic4 ,we intend to wrest from it the element of its strength1 and grind it to atoms4 ,we intend to lay our finger precisely upon the fallacy which lies so deeply concealed in its bosom1 and from which it derives all its apparent force and conclusiveness4 ,we shall drag this false principle from its place of concealment into the open light of day1 and thereby expose the utter futility1 the inherent absurdity1 of the whole atheistical hypothesis1 to which it has so long imparted its deceptive power4 ,if ,leibnitz did not detect this false principle1 and thereby overthrow the theory of ,bayle1 it was because he held this principle in common with him4 ,we must eliminate this error1 common to the scheme of the atheist and to that of the theist1 if we would organize the truths which both contain1 and present them together in one harmonious and symmetrical system2 into a system which will enable us1 not merely to stand upon the defensive1 and parry off the attacks of the sceptic1 but to enter upon his own territory1 and demolish his strongholds2 not merely to oppose his argument by a counter-argument1 but to explode his sophism1 and exhibit the cause of ,god in cloudless splendour4 ,this false principle1 this concealed fallacy1 of which the atheist has been so long allowed to avail himself1 has been the source of many unsuspected errors1 and many lamentable evils4 ,it has not only given power and efficacy to the weapons of the sceptic1 but to the eye of faith itself has it cast clouds and darkness over the transcendent glory of the moral government of ,god4 ,it has prevented a ,leibnitz from refuting the sophism of a ,bayle1 and induced a ,kant to declare a theodicy impossible4 ,it has1 indeed1 as we shall see1 crept into and corrupted the whole mass of religious knowledge2 converting the radiant and clearly-defined body of truth into a dark1 heterogeneous compound of conflicting elements4 ,hence we shall utterly demolish it1 that neither a fragment nor a shadow of it may remain to darken and delude the minds of men4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the argument of the atheist--,the reply of ,leibnitz and other theists--,the insufficiency of this reply4 ,sin exists4 ,this is the astounding fact of which the atheist avails himself4 ,he has never ceased to contend1 that as ,god has permitted sin to exist1 he was either unable or unwilling to prevent it4 ,god might easily have prevented sin1 says he1 if he had chosen to do so2 but he has not chosen to do so1 and therefore his love of virtue is not infinite1 his holiness is not unlimited4 ,now1 we deny this conclusion1 and assert the infinite holiness of ,god4 ,this assertion may be true1 says ,voltaire1 and hence ,god would have prevented all sin1 if his power had not been limited4 ,the only conceivable way1 says he1 to reconcile the existence of sin with the purity of ,god1 is 8to deny his omnipotence40 ,we insist1 on the contrary1 that the power of ,god is absolutely without bounds or limits4 ,though sin exists1 we still maintain1 in opposition to every form of atheism1 that this fact implies no limitation of any of the perfections of ,god4 ,before proceeding to establish this position1 we shall consider the usual reply of the theist to the great argument of the atheist4 8,the greatest love which a ruler can show for virtue10 says ,bayle1 8is to cause it1 if he can1 to be always practised without any mixture of vice4 ,if it is easy for him to procure this advantage to his subjects1 and he nevertheless permits vice to raise its head in his dominions1 intending to punish it after having tolerated it for a long time1 his affection for virtue is not the greatest of which we can conceive2 it is then not infinite40 ,this has been the great standing argument of atheism in all ages of the world4 ,this argument1 as held by the atheists of antiquity1 is presented by ,cudworth in the following words3 8,the supposed ,deity and ,maker of the world was either willing to abolish all evils1 but not able2 or he was able but not willing2 or else1 lastly1 he was both able and willing4 ,this latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a ,god4 ,now that the supposed ,creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all evils1 is plain1 because then there would have been no evils at all left4 ,wherefore1 since there is such a deluge of evils overflowing all1 it must needs be that either he was willing1 and not able to remove them1 and then he was impotent2 or else he was able and not willing1 and then he was envious2 or1 lastly1 he was neither able nor willing1 and then he was both impotent and envious40 ,this argument is1 in substance1 the same as that presented by ,bayle1 and relied upon by atheists in all subsequent times4 ,to the argument of ,bayle1 the following reply is given by ,leibnitz3 8,when we detach things that are connected together1--the parts from the whole1 the human race from the universe1 the attributes of ,god from each other1 his power from his wisdom1--we are permitted to say that ,god can cause virtue to be in the world without any mixture of vice1 and even that he many easily cause it to be so407#adc7 ,but he does not cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice1 says ,leibnitz1 because the good of the whole universe requires the permission of moral evil4 ,how the good of the universe requires the permission of evil1 he has not shown us2 but he repeatedly asserts this to be the fact1 and insists that if ,god were to prevent all evil1 this would work a greater harm to the whole than the permission of some evil4 ,now1 is this a sufficient and satisfactory reply to the argument of the atheist8 ,it certainly seems to possess weight1 and is entitled to serious consideration4 ,bayle contends1 that as evil exists1 the ,creator and ,governor of the world cannot be absolutely perfect4 ,he should have concluded with me1 ,leibnitz truly says1 that as ,god is absolutely perfect1 the existence of evil is necessary to the perfection of the universe1 or is an unavoidable part of the best world that could have been created4 ,it is thus that he neutralizes1 without demolishing1 the argument of the atheist1 and each person is left to be more deeply affected by the argument of ,leibnitz1 or by that of ,bayle1 as his faith in the unlimited goodness of ,god is strong or weak4 ,if the theist1 by such means1 should gain a complete victory1 this would be due to the faith of the vanquished1 rather than to the superiority of the logic by which he is subdued4 ,to this argument of ,leibnitz we may then well apply his own remarks upon another celebrated philosopher4 ,descartes met the argument of the necessitarian1 not by exposing its fallacy1 but by repelling the conclusion of it on extraneous grounds4 8,this was to cut the ,gordian knot10 says ,leibnitz1 who was himself a necessitarian1 8and to reply to the conclusion of one argument1 not by resolving it1 but by opposing to it a contrary argument2 which is not conformed to the laws of philosophical controversy40 ,the reply of ,leibnitz to ,bayle is clearly open to the same objection4 ,it does not analyze the sophism of the sceptic1 or resolve it into its elements1 and point out its error2 it merely opposes its conclusion by the presentation of a contrary argument4 ,hence it is not likely to produce very great effect2 for1 as ,leibnitz himself says1 in relation to this mode of attacking sceptics1 8,it may arrest them a little1 but they will always return to their reasoning1 presented in different forms1 until we cause them to comprehend wherein the defect of their sophism consists40 ,leibnitz has1 then1 according to his own canons of criticism1 merely cut the ,gordian knot of atheism1 which he should have unravelled4 ,he has merely arrested the champions of scepticism 8a little10 whom he should have overthrown and demolished4 ,his reply is not only incomplete1 in that it does not expose the sophistry of the atheist2 it is also unsound4 ,it carries in its bosom the elements of its own destruction4 ,it is self-contradictory1 and consequently untenable4 ,it admits that it is easy for ,god to cause virtue to exist1 and yet contends that1 in certain cases1 he fails to do so1 because the highest good of the universe requires the existence of moral evil4 ,but how is this possible8 ,it will be conceded that the good of the individual would be promoted1 if ,god should cause him to be perfectly holy and happy4 ,this would be for the good of each and every individual moral agent in the universe4 ,how1 then1 is it possible for such an exercise of the divine power to be for the good of all the parts1 and yet not for the good of the whole8 ,so far from being able to see how these things can hang together1 it seems evident that they are utterly repugnant to each other4 ,the highest good of the universe1 we are told1 requires the permission of evil4 ,what good8 ,is it the holiness of moral agents8 ,this1 it is said1 can be produced by the agency of ,god1 without the introduction of evil1 and produced1 too1 in the greatest conceivable degree of perfection4 ,why should evil be permitted1 then1 in order to attain an end1 which it is conceded can be perfectly attained without it8 ,is there any higher end than the perfect moral purity of the universe1 which ,god seeks to accomplish by the permission of sin8 ,it certainly is not the happiness of the moral universe2 for this can also be secured1 in the highest possible degree1 by the agency of the ,divine ,being1 without the permission of moral evil4 ,what good is there1 then1 beside the perfect holiness and happiness of the universe1 to the production of which the existence of moral evil is necessary8 ,there seems to be no such good in reality4 ,it appears to be a dream of the imagination1 a splendid fiction1 which has been recommended to the human mind by its horror of the cheerless gloom of scepticism4 ,section ,v4 ,the sophism of the atheist exploded1 and a perfect agreement shown to subsist between the existence of sin and the holiness of ,god4 ,supposing ,god to possess perfect holiness1 he would certainly prevent all moral evil1 says the atheist1 unless his power were limited4 ,this inference is drawn from a false premiss2 namely1 that if ,god is omnipotent1 he could easily prevent moral evil1 and cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice4 ,this assumption has been incautiously conceded to the atheist by his opponent1 and hence his argument has not been clearly and fully refuted4 ,to refute this argument with perfect clearness1 it is necessary to show two things3 first1 that it is no limitation of the divine omnipotence to say that it cannot work contradictions2 and secondly1 that if ,god should cause virtue to exist in the heart of a moral agent1 he would work a contradiction4 ,we shall endeavour to evince these two things1 in order to refute the grand sophism of the sceptic1 and lay a solid foundation for a genuine scheme of optimism1 against which no valid objection can be urged4 ,in the first place1 then1 it is not a limitation of the divine omnipotence to say1 that it cannot work contradictions4 ,there will be little difficulty in establishing this point4 ,indeed1 it will be readily conceded2 and if we offer a few remarks upon it1 it is only that we may leave nothing dark and obscure behind us1 even to those whose minds are not accustomed to such speculations4 ,as contradictions are impossible in themselves1 so to say that ,god could perform them1 would not be to magnify his power1 but to expose our own absurdity4 ,when we affirm1 that omnipotence cannot cause a thing to be and not to be at one and the same time1 or cannot make two and two equal to five1 we do not set limits to it2 we simply declare that such things are not the objects of power4 ,a circle cannot be made to possess the properties of a square1 nor a square the properties of a circle4 ,infinite power cannot confer the properties of the one of these figures upon the other1 not because it is less than infinite power1 but because it is not within the nature1 or province1 or dominion of power1 to perform such things1 to embody such inherent and immutable absurdities in an actual existence4 ,in regard to the doing of such things1 or rather of such absurd and inconceivable nothings1 omnipotence itself possesses no advantage over weakness4 ,power1 from its very nature and essence1 is confined to the accomplishment of such things as are possible1 or imply no contradiction4 ,hence it is beyond the reach of almighty power itself to break up and confound the immutable foundations of reason and truth4 ,god possesses no such miserable power1 no such horribly distorted attribute1 no such inconceivably monstrous imperfection and deformity of nature1 as would enable him to embody absurdities and contradictions in actual existence4 ,it is one of the chief excellencies and glories of the divine nature1 that its infinite power works within a sphere of light and love1 without the least tendency to break over the sacred bounds of eternal truth1 into the outer darkness of chaotic night6 ,the truth of this remark1 as a general proposition1 will be readily admitted4 ,in general terms1 it is universally acknowledged2 and its application is easy where the impossibility is plain1 or the contradiction glaring4 ,but there are things which really imply a contradiction1 without being suspected to do so4 ,we may well ask1 in relation to such things1 why ,god does not produce them1 without being sensible of the absurdity of the inquiry4 ,the production of virtue1 or true holiness1 in the breast of a moral agent1 is a thing of this kind47#add7 ,this conducts us to our second position2 namely1 that if ,god should cause virtue to exist in the breast of a moral agent1 he would work a contradiction4 ,in other words1 the production of virtue by any extraneous agency1 is one of those impossible conceits1 those inherent absurdities1 which lie quite beyond the sphere of light in which the divine omnipotence moves1 and has no existence except in the outer darkness of a lawless imagination1 or in the dim regions of error1 in which the true nature of moral goodness has never been seen4 ,it is absurd1 we say1 to suppose that moral agents can be governed and controlled in any other way than by moral means4 ,all physical power is here out of the question4 ,by physical power1 in connexion with wisdom and goodness1 a moral agent may be created1 and endowed with the noblest attributes4 ,by physical power1 a moral agent may be caused to glow with a feeling of love1 and armed with an uncommon energy of will2 but such effects1 though produced by the power of ,god1 are not the virtue of the moral agent in whom they are produced4 ,this consists1 not in the possession of moral powers1 but in the proper and obedient exercise of those powers47#ade7 ,if infinite wisdom1 and goodness1 and power1 should muster all the means and appliances in the universe1 and cause them to bear with united energy on a single mind1 the effect produced1 however grand and beautiful1 would not be the virtue of the agent in whom it is produced4 ,nothing can be his virtue which is produced by an extraneous agency4 ,this is a dictate of the universal reason and consciousness of mankind4 ,it needs no metaphysical refinement for its support1 and no scholastic jargon for its illustration4 ,on this broad principle1 then1 which is so clearly deduced1 not from the confined darkness of the schools1 but the open light of nature1 we intend to take our stand in opposition to the embattled ranks of atheism4 ,the argument of the atheist assumes1 as we have seen1 that a ,being of infinite power could easily prevent sin1 and cause holiness to exist4 ,it assumes that it is possible1 that it implies no contradiction1 to create an intelligent moral agent1 and place it beyond all liability to sin4 ,but this is a mistake4 ,almighty power itself1 we may say with the most profound reverence1 cannot create such a being1 and place it beyond the possibility of sinning4 ,if it could not sin1 there would be no merit1 no virtue1 in its obedience4 ,that is to say1 it would not be a moral agent at all1 but a machine merely4 ,the power to do wrong1 as well as to do right1 is included in the very idea of a moral and accountable agent1 and no such agent can possibly exist without being invested with such a power4 ,to suppose such an agent to be created1 and placed beyond all liability to sin1 is to suppose it to be what it is1 and not what it is1 at one and the same time2 it is to suppose a creature to be endowed with a power to do wrong1 and yet destitute of such a power1 which is a plain contradiction4 ,hence1 ,omnipotence cannot create such a being1 and deny to it a power to do evil1 or secure it against the possibility of sinning4 ,we may1 with the atheist1 conceive of a universe of such beings1 if we please1 and we may suppose them to be at all times prevented from sinning by the omnipotent and irresistible energy of the ,divine ,being2 and having imagined all this1 we may be infinitely better pleased with this ideal creation of our own than with that which ,god has called into actual existence around us4 ,but then we should only prefer the absurd and contradictory model of a universe engendered in our own weak brains1 to that which infinite wisdom1 and power1 and goodness have actually projected into being4 ,such a universe1 if freed from contradictions1 might be also free from evil1 nay1 from the very possibility of evil2 but only on condition that it should at the same time be free from the very possibility of good4 ,it admits into its dominions moral and accountable creatures1 capable of knowing and serving ,god1 and of drinking at the purest fountain of untreated bliss1 only by being involved in irreconcilable contradiction4 ,it may appear more delightful to the imagination1 before it comes to be narrowly inspected1 than the universe of ,god2 and the latter1 being compared with it1 may seem less worthy of the infinite perfections of its ,author2 but1 after all1 it is but a weak and crazy thing1 a contradictious and impossible conceit4 ,we may admire it1 and make it the standard by which to try the work of ,god2 but1 after all1 it is but an 8idol of the human mind10 and not 8an idea of the ,divine ,mind40 ,it is a little1 distorted image of human weakness1 and not a harmonious manifestation of divine power4 ,among all the possible models of a universe1 which lay open to the infinite mind and choice of ,god1 a thing so deformed had no place2 and when the sceptic concludes that the perfections of the ,supreme ,architect are limited1 because he did work after such a model1 he only displays the impotency of his own wisdom1 and the blindness of his own presumption4 ,hence1 the error of the atheist is obvious4 ,he does not consider that the only way to place all creatures beyond a liability to sin1 is to place them below the rank of intelligent and accountable beings4 ,he does not consider that the only way to prevent 8sin from raising its head0 is to prevent holiness from the possibility of appearing in the universe4 ,he does not consider that among all the ideal worlds present to the ,divine ,mind1 there was not one which1 if called into existence1 would have been capable of serving and glorifying its ,maker1 and yet incapable of throwing off his authority4 ,hence1 he really finds fault with the work of the ,almighty1 because he has not framed the world according to a model which is involved in the most irreconcilable contradictions4 ,in other words1 he fancies that ,god is not perfect1 because he has not embodied an absurdity in the creature4 ,if ,god1 he asks1 is perfect1 why did he not render virtue possible1 and vice impossible8 ,why did he not create moral agents1 and yet deny to them the attributes of moral agents8 ,why did he not give his creatures the power to do evil1 and yet withhold this power from them8 ,he might just as well have demanded1 why he did not create matter without dimensions1 and circles without the properties of a circle4 ,poor man6 he cannot see the wisdom and power of ,god manifested in the world1 because it is not filled with moral agents which are not moral agents1 and with glorious realities that are mere empty shadows6 ,if the above remarks be just1 then the great question1 why has ,god permitted sin1 which has exercised the ingenuity of man in all ages1 is a most idle and insignificant inquiry4 ,the only real question is1 why he created such beings as men at all2 and not why he created them1 and then permitted them to sin4 ,the first question is easily answered4 ,the second1 though often propounded1 seems to be a most unmeaning question4 ,it is unmeaning1 because it seeks to ascertain the reason why ,god has permitted a thing1 which1 in reality1 he has not permitted at all4 ,having created a world of moral agents1 that is1 a world endowed with a power to sin1 it was impossible for him to prevent sin1 so long as they retained this power1 or1 in other words1 so long as they continued to exist as moral agents4 ,a universe of such agents given1 its liability to sin is not a matter for the will of ,god to permit2 this is a necessary consequence from the nature of moral agents4 ,he could no more deny peccability to such creatures than he could deny the properties of the circle to a circle2 and if he could not prevent such a thing1 it is surely very absurd to ask why he permitted it4 ,on the supposition of such a world1 ,god did not permit sin at all2 it could not have been prevented4 ,it would be considered a very absurd inquiry1 if we should ask1 why ,god permitted two and two to be equal to four1 or why he permitted the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles4 ,but all such questions1 however idle and absurd1 are not more so than the great inquiry respecting the permission of moral evil4 ,if this does not so appear to our minds1 it is because we have not sufficiently reflected on the great truth1 that a necessary virtue is a contradiction in terms1 an inherent and utter impossibility4 ,the full possession of this truth will show us1 that the cause of theism has been encumbered with great difficulties1 because its advocates have endeavoured to explain the reason why ,god has permitted a thing1 which1 in point of fact1 he has not permitted4 ,having attempted to explain a fact which has no existence1 it is no wonder that they should have involved themselves in clouds and darkness4 ,let us cease then1 to seek the reason of that which is not1 in order that we may behold the glory of that which is4 ,we have seen that it is impossible for ,omnipotence to create moral agents1 and yet prevent them from possessing an ability to sin or transgress the law of ,god4 ,in other words1 that the ,almighty cannot give agents a power to sin1 and at the same time deny this power to them4 ,to expect such things of him1 is to expect him to work contradictions2 to expect him to cause a thing to be what it is1 and not what it is1 at one and the same time4 ,thus1 although sin exists1 we vindicate the character of ,god1 on the ground that it is an inherent impossibility to exclude all evil from a moral universe4 ,this is the high1 impregnable ground of the true ,christian theist4 ,we have already said1 that the only real question is1 not why ,god permitted evil1 but why he created beings capable of sinning4 ,such creatures are1 beyond all question1 the most noble specimens of his workmanship4 ,st4 ,augustine has beautifully said1 that the horse which has gone astray is a more noble creature than a stone which has no power to go astray4 ,in like manner1 we may say1 a moral agent that is capable of knowing1 and loving1 and serving ,god1 though its very nature implies an ability to do otherwise1 is a more glorious creature than any being destitute of such a capacity4 ,if ,god had created no such beings1 his work might have represented him 8as a house doth the builder10 but not 8as a son doth his father40 ,if he had created no such beings1 there would have been no eye in the universe1 except his own1 to admire and to love his works4 ,traces of his wisdom and goodness might have been seen here and there1 scattered over his works1 provided any eye had been lighted up with intelligence to see them2 but nowhere would his living and immortal image have been seen in the magnificent temple of the world4 ,it will be conceded1 then1 that there is no difficulty in conceiving why ,god should have preferred a universe of creatures1 beaming with the glories of his own image1 to one wholly destitute of the beauty of holiness and the light of intelligence4 ,but having preferred the noblest order of beings1 its inseparable incident1 a liability to moral evil1 could not have been excluded4 ,hence ,god is the author of all good1 and of good alone2 and evil proceeds1 not from him nor from his permission1 but from an abuse of those exalted and unshackled powers1 whose nature and whose freedom constitute the glory of the moral universe4 ,this1 then1 is the sublime purpose of ,god1 to give and continue existence to free moral agents1 and to govern them for their good as well as for his own glory4 ,this is the decree of the ,almighty1 to call forth from nothing into actual existence1 the universe which now shines around us1 and spread over it the dominion of his perfect moral law4 ,he does not cause sin4 ,he does not permit sin4 ,he sees that it will raise its hideous head1 but he does not say--so let it be4 ,no6 sin is the thing which ,god hates1 and which he is determined1 by all the means within the reach of his omnipotence1 utterly to root out and destroy4 ,the word has gone forth1 8,offences must needs come1 but woe unto the man by whom they come60 ,his omnipotence is pledged to wipe out the stain and efface the shadow of evil1 in as far as possible1 from the glory of his creation4 ,but yet1 so long as the light and glory of the moral universe is permitted to shine1 may the dark shadow of evil1 which moral agents cast upon its brightness and its beauty1 continue to exist and partially obscure its divine perfections4 ,and would it not be unworthy of the divine wisdom and goodness to remove this partial shadow1 by an utter extinction of the universal light8 ,section ,,vi4 ,the true and only foundation of optimism4 ,though few have been satisfied with the details of the system of optimism1 yet has the great fundamental conception of that system been received by the wise and good in all ages4 8,the atheist takes it for granted10 says ,cudworth1 8that whosoever asserts a ,god1 or a perfect mind1 to be the original of all things1 does therefore ipso facto suppose all things to be well made1 and as they should be4 ,and this1 doubtless1 was the sense of all the ancient theologers10 c47#adf7 ,this distinguished philosopher himself maintains1 as well as ,leibnitz1 that the intellectual world could not have been made better than it is1 even by a being of infinite power and goodness4 8,to believe a ,god10 says he1 8is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe2 it is to believe that things are as they should be1 and that the world is so well framed and governed1 as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been better407#adg7 ,but while this fundamental principle has been held by philosophers1 both ancient and modern1 it has been1 as we have seen1 connected with other doctrines1 by which it is contradicted1 and its influence impaired4 ,the concession which is universally made to the sceptic1 that if ,god is omnipotent1 he can easily cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice1 is fatal to the great principle that lies at the foundation of optimism4 ,it resolves the whole scheme1 which regards the world as the best that could possibly be made1 into a loose1 vague1 and untenable hypothesis4 ,it is true1 the good man would infinitely prefer this hypothesis to the intolerable gloom of atheism2 but yet our rational nature demands something more solid and clear on which to repose4 ,indeed1 the warmest supporters of optimism have supplied us with the lofty sentiments of a pure faith1 rather than with substantial and satisfactory views4 ,the writings of ,plato1 ,leibnitz1 ,cudworth1 and ,edwards1 all furnish illustrations of the justness of this remark4 ,but nowhere is its truth more clearly seen than in the following passage from ,plotinus3 8,god made the whole most beautiful1 entire1 complete1 and sufficient10 says he2 8all agreeing friendly with itself and its parts2 both the nobler and the meaner of them being alike congruous thereunto4 ,whosoever1 therefore1 from the parts thereof1 will blame the whole1 is an absurd and unjust censurer4 ,for we ought to consider the parts not alone by themselves1 but in reference to the whole1 whether they be harmonious and agreeable to the same2 otherwise we shall not blame the universe1 but some of its parts taken by themselves407#adh7 ,the theist1 however1 who maintains this beautiful sentiment1 is accustomed to make concessions by which its beauty is marred1 and its foundation subverted4 ,for if ,god could easily cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice1 it is demonstrable that the universe might be rendered more holy and happy than it is1 in each and every one of its parts1 and consequently in the whole4 ,but if we assume the position1 as in truth we may1 that a necessary virtue is a contradiction in terms1 then we can vindicate the infinite perfections of ,god1 by showing that sin may enter into the best possible world4 ,this great truth1 then1 that 8a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms10 which has been so often uttered and so seldom followed out to its consequences1 is the precise point from which we should contemplate the world1 if we would behold the power and goodness of ,god therein manifested4 ,this is the secret of the world by which the dark enigma of evil is to be solved4 ,this is the clew1 by which we are to be conducted from the dark labyrinth of atheistical doubt and scepticism1 into the clear and open light of divine providence4 ,this is the great central light which has been wanting to the scheme of optimism1 to convert it from a mere but magnificent hypothesis1 into a clearly manifested and glorious reality4 ,god governs everything according to the nature which he has given it4 ,indeed1 it would be as impossible to necessitate true and genuine obedience by the application of power1 as it would be to convert a stone into a moral agent by the application of motives and persuasion4 ,as sin is possible1 then1 though omnipotence be pledged to prevent its existence1 it is clear that it cannot be regarded as a limitation of the divine power4 ,this cuts off the objection of ,voltaire1 and explodes the grand sophism on which it is based4 ,god hates sin above all things1 and is more than willing to prevent it2 and he actually does so1 in so far as this is possible to infinite wisdom and power4 ,this refutes the objection of ,bayle1 and leaves his argument without the shadow of a foundation4 ,god does not choose sin1 or permit it as a means of the highest good1 as if there could be any higher good than absolute and universal holiness2 but it comes to pass1 because ,god has created a world of moral agents1 and they have transgressed his law4 ,this removes the high and holy ,god infinitely above the contamination of all evil1 above all contact with the sin of the world1 and shows an impassable gulf between the purity of the ,creator and the pravity of the creature4 ,by revealing the true connexion of sin with the moral universe1 and its relation to ,god1 it clearly shows that its existence should not raise the slightest cloud of suspicion respecting his infinite goodness and power1 and thus reconciles the fact of sin's existence with the adorable perfections of the ,governor of the world4 ,it may be said1 that although ,god could not cause holiness to prevail universally1 by the exercise of his power1 yet he might employ means and influences sufficient to prevent the occurrence of sin4 ,to this there are two satisfactory answers4 ,first1 it is a contradiction to admit that ,god cannot necessitate virtue1 because such a thing is impossible2 and yet suppose that he could1 in all cases1 secure the existence of it1 without any chance of failure4 ,it both asserts and denies at the same time1 the idea of a necessary holiness4 ,secondly1 the objection in question proceeds on the supposition1 that there are resources in the stores of infinite wisdom and goodness1 which might have been successfully employed for the good of the universe1 and which ,god has failed to employ4 ,but this is a mere gratuitous assumption4 ,it never has been1 and it never can be proved4 ,it has not even the appearance of reason in its favour4 ,let the objector show wherein the ,almighty could have done more than he has actually done to prevent sin1 and secure holiness1 without attempting violence to the nature of man1 and then his objection may have some force1 and be entitled to some consideration4 ,but if he cannot do this1 his objection rests upon a mere unsupported hypothesis4 ,it is very easy to conceive that more light might have been imparted to men1 and greater influences brought to bear on their feelings2 but it will not follow that such additional inducements to virtue would have been good for them4 ,for aught we know1 it might only have added to their awful responsibilities1 without at all conducing to their good4 ,for aught we know1 the means employed by ,god for the salvation of man from sin and misery have1 both in kind and degree1 been precisely such as to secure the maximum of good and the minimum of evil4 ,let the sceptic frame a more perfect moral law for the government of the world than that which ,god has established2 let him show where more tremendous sanctions might be found to enforce that law2 let him show how the ,almighty might have made a more efficacious display of his majesty1 and power1 and goodness1 than he has actually exhibited to us2 let him refer to more powerful influences1 consistent with the free-agency and accountability of man1 than those exerted by the ,spirit of ,god2 let him do all this1 we say1 and then he may have some right to object and find fault4 ,in one word1 let him meet the demand of the ,most ,high1 8what more could have been done to my vineyard1 that ,i have not done in it10 and show it to be without foundation1 and then there will be some appearance of reason in his objection4 ,section ,,vii4 ,the glory of ,god seen in the creation of a world1 which he foresaw would fall under the dominion of sin4 ,it may be said that we have not yet gone to the bottom of the difficulty2 that although omnipotence could not deny the capacity to commit sin to a moral agent1 yet ,god could prevent moral evil1 by refusing to create any being who he foreknew would transgress his law4 ,as ,god might have prevented the rise of evil in our world1 by refusing to create man1 why1 it may be asked1 did he not do so8 ,why did he not1 in this way1 spare the universe that spectacle of crime and suffering which has been presented in the history of our fallen race8 ,to this we answer1 that ,god did not choose to prevent sin in this way1 but to create the world exactly as he did1 though he foresaw the fall and all its consequences2 because the highest good of the universe required the creation of such a world4 ,we are now prepared to see this great truth in its true light4 ,the highest good of the universe may1 no doubt1 be promoted in various ways by the redemption of our fallen race1 of which we have no conception in our present state of darkness and ignorance4 ,but we are furnished with some faint glimpses of the true source of that admiration and wonder with which the angels of ,god are inspired1 as they contemplate the manifestation of his glory in reconciling the world to himself4 ,the felicity of the angels1 and no doubt of all created intelligences1 must be found in the enjoyment of ,god4 ,no other object is sufficiently vast to fill and satisfy the unlimited desires of the mind4 ,and as the character of ,god must necessarily constitute the chief happiness of his creatures1 so every new manifestation of the glory of that character must add to their supreme felicity4 ,now1 if there had been no such thing as sin1 the compassion of ,god would have been forever concealed from the eyes of his intelligent creatures4 ,they might have adored his purity2 but of that tender compassion which calls up the deepest and most pleasurable emotions in the soul1 they could have known absolutely nothing4 ,they might have witnessed his love to sinless beings2 but they could never have seen that love in its omnipotent yearnings over the ruined and the lost4 ,the attribute of mercy or compassion would have been forever locked up and concealed in the deep recesses of the ,divine ,mind2 and the blessing1 and honour1 and glory1 and dominion1 which shall be ascribed by the redeemed unto ,him that sitteth upon the throne1 and unto the ,lamb1 forever and ever1 would not have been heard in the universe of ,god4 ,the chord which now sends forth the sweetest music in the harmony of heaven1 filling its inhabitants with deep and rapturous emotions of sympathy and delight1 would never have been touched by the finger of ,god4 ,how far such a display of the divine character is necessary to the ends of the moral government of ,god can be known only to himself4 ,we are informed in his word1 that it is by the redemption of the world1 through ,christ1 that the ends of his moral government are secured4 ,it pleased the ,father1 saith ,st4 ,paul1 that in ,christ all fulness should dwell2 and having made peace through the blood of his cross1 by him to reconcile all things unto himself1 whether they be things in earth1 or things in heaven4 ,thus we are told that all things in heaven are reconciled unto ,god1 by the blood of the cross4 ,but it may be asked1 ,how was it possible to reconcile those beings unto ,god who had never sinned against him1 nor been estranged from him8 ,according to the original1 ,god is not exactly said to reconcile1 but to keep together1 all things1 by the mediation and work of ,christ4 ,the angels fell from heaven1 and man sinned in paradise2 but the creatures of ,god are secured from any further defection from him1 by the all-controlling display of his character1 and by the stupendous system of moral agencies and means which have been called forth in the great work of redemption4 ,in this view of the passage in question we are happy to find that we are confirmed by so enlightened a critic as ,dr4 ,macknight4 ,in relation to these words1 8,and by him to reconcile all things10 he says1 8,though ,i have translated the 1 to reconcile1 which is its ordinary meaning1 ,i am clearly of opinion that it signifies here to unite simply2 because the good angels are said1 in the latter part of the verse1 to be reconciled with ,christ1 who never were at enmity with him4 ,i therefore take the apostle's meaning to be this3 #8,it pleased the ,father1 by ,christ1 to unite all things to ,christ1 namely1 as their ,head and ,governor4' 0 7,col4 i1 #bj47 ,the same sublime truth is revealed in other portions of ,scripture1 as in the fifteenth chapter of ,first ,corinthians1 where it is said1 that it is the design of ,god to subject all things to ,christ1 and exception is made only of ,him by whom this universal subjection and dominion is established4 ,the accomplishment of such an object1 it will be admitted1 is one of unspeakable importance4 ,for no government1 however perfect and beautiful in other respects1 can be of much value unless it be so constructed as to secure its own permanency4 ,this grand object1 revelation informs us1 has been attained by the redemption of the world through ,christ4 ,but for his work1 those blessed spirits now bound together in everlasting society with ,god1 by the sacred ties of confidence and love1 might have fallen from him into the outer darkness1 as angels and archangels had fallen before them4 ,the ministers of light1 though having drunk deeply of the goodness of ,god1 and rejoiced in his smile1 were not satisfied with their condition1 and1 striving to better it1 plucked down ruin on their heads4 ,so1 man in paradise1 not content with his happy lot1 but vainly striving to raise himself to a god1 forsook his allegiance to his ,maker1 and yielded himself a willing servant to the powers of darkness4 ,but an apostle1 though born in sin1 having tasted the bitter fruits of evil1 and the sweet mercies of redeeming love1 felt such confidence in ,god1 that in whatsoever state he was1 he could therewith be content4 ,not only in heaven--not only in paradise--but in a dungeon1 loaded with irons1 and beaten with stripes1 he could rejoice and give glory to ,god4 ,this firm and unshaken allegiance in a weak and erring mortal to the throne of the ,most ,high ,god1 presents a spectacle of moral grandeur and sublimity to which the annals of eternity1 but for the existence of sin1 had presented no parallel4 ,it is by the scheme of ,christianity alone that the confidence of the creature in his ,god has been rendered too strong for the gates of hell to prevail against him4 ,but for this scheme1 the moral government of ,god might have presented scenes of mutability and change1 infinitely more appalling than the partial evil which we behold in our present state4 ,or if ,god had chosen to prevent this1 to render it absolutely impossible1 by the creation of no beings who he foreknew would rebel against him1 this might have contracted his moral empire into the most insignificant limits4 ,thus1 by the creation of the world1 ,god has prepared the way to extend the boundaries of his empire1 and to secure its foundations4 ,christ is the corner-stone of the spiritual universe1 by which all things in heaven and earth are kept from falling away from ,god1 its great centre of light and life4 ,no wonder1 then1 that when this crowning event in the moral government of the universe was about to be accomplished1 the heavenly host should have shouted1 8,glory to ,god in the highest60 ,this view of the subject of moral evil1 derived from revelation1 harmonizes all the phenomena of the moral world with the perfections of ,god1 as well as warms and expands the noblest feelings of the human heart4 ,st4 ,paul ascribes the stability of all things in heaven to the manifestation of the divine character in the redemption of our fallen race4 ,if this be the case1 then those who so confidently assert that ,god might have preserved the world in holiness1 without impairing the free-agency of man1 as easily as he keeps the angels from falling1 are very much mistaken4 ,this assertion is frequently made2 but1 as we conceive1 without authority either from reason or revelation4 ,it is said by a learned divine1 8,that ,god has actually preserved some of the angels from falling2 and that he has promised to preserve1 and will1 therefore1 certainly preserve the spirits of just men made perfect2 and that this has been1 and will be1 done without infringing at all on their moral agency4 ,of course1 he could just as easily have preserved ,adam from falling1 without infringing on his moral agency407#adi7 ,this argument is pronounced by its author to be conclusive and 8unanswerable40 ,but if ,god preserves one portion of his creatures from falling1 by the manner in which he has dealt with those who have fallen1 it does not follow that he could just as easily have kept each and every portion of them from a defection4 ,if a ruler should prevent a part of his subjects from rebellion1 by the way in which he has dealt with those who have rebelled1 does it follow that he might just as easily have secured obedience in the rebels8 ,it clearly does not2 and hence there is a radical defect in the argument of these learned divines and the school to which they belong4 ,let them show that all things in heaven are not secured in their eternal allegiance to ,god by the work of ,christ1 and then they may safely conclude1 that man might have been as certainly and infallibly secured against a defection as angels and just men made perfect4 ,if ,god binds the spiritual universe to himself1 by the display of his unbounded mercy to a fallen race1 it does not follow that he could1 by the same means1 have preserved that race itself1 and every other order of beings1 from a defection4 ,for1 on this supposition1 there would have been no fallen race to call forth his infinite compassion1 and send its binding influences over angels and the spirits of just men made perfect4 ,according to the sublime idea of revelation1 it is the transcendent glory of the cross that it exerts moral influences1 which have bound the whole intelligent creation together in one harmonious society with ,god1 its sovereign and all-glorious head4 ,for aught we know1 the stability of the spiritual universe could not possibly have been secured in any other way2 and hence1 if there had been no fall1 and no redemption1 the grand intellectual system which is now so full of confidence and joy1 might have been without a secure foundation4 ,we have seen that its foundation could not1 from the very nature of things1 have been established and fixed by mere power2 for this could not have kept a single moral agent from the possibility of sinning much less a boundless universe of such beings4 ,the ,christian believer1 then1 labours under no difficulty in regard to the existence of evil1 which should in the least oppress his mind4 ,if he should confine his attention too narrowly to the nature of evil as it is in itself1 he may1 indeed1 perplex his brain almost to distraction2 but he should take a freer and wider range1 viewing it in all its relations1 dependencies1 and ultimate results4 ,if he should consider the origin of evil exclusively1 he may only meet with impenetrable obscurity and confusion1 as he endeavours to pry into the dark enigma of the world2 but all that is painful in it will soon vanish1 if he will only view it in connexion with ,god's infinite plans for the good of the universe4 ,he will then see1 that this world1 with all its wickedness and woe1 is but a dim speck of vitality in a boundless dominion of light1 that is necessary to the glory and perfection of the whole4 ,the believer should not1 for one moment1 entertain the low view1 that the atonement confers its benefits on man alone4 ,the plan of redemption was not an after-thought1 designed to remedy an evil which the eye of omniscience had not foreseen2 it was formed in the counsels of infinite wisdom long before the foundations of the world were laid4 ,the atonement was made for man1 it is true2 but1 in a still higher sense1 man was made for the atonement4 ,all things were made for ,christ4 ,god1 whose prerogative it is to bring good out of evil1 will turn the short-lived triumph of the powers of darkness into a glorious victory1 and cause it to be a universal song of rejoicing to his great name throughout the endless ages of eternity4 ,who would complain1 then1 that he is subject to the evils of this life1 since he has been subjected in hope8 ,everything around us is a type and symbol of our high destiny4 ,all things shadow forth the glory to be revealed in us4 ,the insignificant seed that rots in the earth does not die4 ,it lives1 it germinates1 it grows1 it springs up into the stately plant1 and is crowned with beauty4 ,the worm beneath our feet1 though seemingly so dead1 is1 by the secret all-working power of ,god1 undergoing changes to fit it for a higher life4 ,in due time it puts off its form of death1 and rises1 8like a winged flower10 from the cold earth into a warm region of life and light4 ,in like manner1 the bodies we inhabit1 wonderfully and fearfully as they are made1 are destined to moulder in the grave1 and become the food of worms1 before they are raised like unto ,christ's glorified body1 clothed with power and immortality4 ,nature itself1 with all its teeming forms of beauty1 must decay1 till 8pale concluding winter comes at last1 and shuts the scene40 ,but the scene is closed1 and all its magnificence shut in1 only that it may open out again1 as it were1 into all the wonders of a new creation4 ,even so the human soul1 although it be subjected to the powers of darkness for a season1 may emerge into the light and blessedness of eternity4 ,such is the destiny of man2 and upon himself1 under ,god1 it depends whether this high destiny be fulfilled1 or his bright hopes blasted4 8,i call heaven and earth this day to witness10 saith the ,lord1 8that ,i have set before you life and death1 blessing and cursing2 therefore choose life40 ,section ,,viii4 ,the little1 captious spirit of ,voltaire1 and other atheizing minute philosophers4 ,it will be objected1 no doubt1 that in the foregoing vindication of the divine holiness1 we have taken for granted the ,christian scheme of redemption2 but it should be remembered1 that we do not propose 8to justify the ways of ,god to man0 on deistical principles4 ,we are fully persuaded1 that if ,god had merely created the world1 and remained satisfied to look down as an idle spectator upon the evils it had brought upon itself1 his character and glory would not admit of vindication2 and we should not have entered upon so chimerical an enterprise4 ,we have attempted to reconcile the government of the world1 as set forth in the system we maintain1 and in no other1 with the perfections of ,god2 and whoever objects that this cannot be done1 is bound1 we insist1 to take the system as it is in itself1 and not as it is mangled and distorted by its adversaries4 ,we freely admit1 that if the ,christian religion does not furnish the means of such a reconciliation1 then we do not possess them1 and are necessarily devoted to despair4 ,here we must notice a very great inconsistency of atheists4 ,they insist that if the world had been created by an infinitely perfect ,being1 he would not have permitted the least sin or disorder to arise in his dominions2 yet1 when they hear of any interposition on his part for the good of the world1 they pour ridicule upon the idea of such intervention as wholly unworthy of the majesty of so august a ,being4 ,so weak and wavering are their notions1 that it agrees equally well with their creed1 that it becomes an infinitely perfect ,being to do all things1 and that it becomes him to do nothing6 ,can you believe that an omnipotent ,god reigns1 says ,m4 ,voltaire1 since he beholds the frightful evils of the world without putting forth his arm to redress them8 ,can you believe1 asks the same philosopher1 that so great a being1 even if he existed1 would trouble himself about the affairs of so insignificant a creature as man8 ,such inconsistencies are hardly worthy of a philosopher1 who possesses a wisdom so sublime1 and a penetration so profound1 as to authorize him to sit in judgment on the order and harmony of the universe4 ,they are perfectly worthy1 however1 of the author of ,candidus4 ,the poison of this work consists1 not in its argument1 but in its ridicule4 ,indeed1 it is not even an attempt at argument or rational criticism4 ,the sole aim of the author seems to be to show the brilliancy of his wit1 at the expense of 8the best of all possible worlds20 and it must be confessed that he has shown it1 though it be in the worst of all possible causes4 ,instead of attempting to view the existence of evil in the light of any principle whatever1 he merely accumulates evil upon evil2 and when the mass has become sufficiently terrific1 with the jeering mockery of a small fiend1 he delights in the contemplation of the awful spectacle as a conclusive demonstration that the ,ruler of the world is unequal to the government of his creatures4 ,his book is merely an appeal to the ignorance and feelings of the reader1 and can do no mischief1 except when it may happen to find a weak head in union with a corrupt heart4 ,for what does it signify that the castle of the ,baron ,thunder-ten-trock was not the most perfect of all possible castles2 does this disprove the skill of the great ,architect of the universe8 ,or what does it signify that ,dr4 ,pangloss lost an eye2 does this extinguish a single ray of the divine omniscience1 or depose either of the great lights which ,god ordained to rule the world8 ,lastly1 what does it signify that ,m4 ,voltaire1 by a horrible abuse of his powers1 should have extinguished the light of reason in his soul2 does this disprove the goodness of that ,being by whom those powers were given for a higher and a nobler purpose8 ,a fracture in the dome of ,st4 ,paul's would1 no doubt1 present as great difficulties to an insect lost in its depths1 as the disorders of this little world presented to the captious and fault-finding spirit of ,m4 ,voltaire2 and would as completely shut out the order and design of the whole structure from its field of vision1 as the order and design of the magnificent temple of the world was excluded from the mind of this very minute philosopher4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,objections ,considered4 ,heaven seeth all1 and therefore knows the sense ,of the whole beauteous frame of ,providence4 ,his judgment of ,god's kingdom needs must fail1 ,who knows no more of it than this dark jail4--,,baxter4 ,one part1 one little part1 we dimly scan1 ,through the dark medium of life's feverish dream2 ,yet dare arraign the whole stupendous plan1 ,if but that little part incongruous seem4--,,beattie4 ,though we have taken great pains to obviate objections by the manner in which we have unfolded and presented our views1 yet we cannot but foresee that they will have to run the gauntlet of adverse criticism4 ,indeed1 we could desire nothing more sincerely than such a thing1 provided they be subjected to the test of principle1 and not of prejudice4 ,but how can such a thing be hoped for8 ,is all theological prejudice and bigotry extinct1 that an author may hope to have a perfectly fair hearing1 and impartial decision8 ,experience has taught us that we must expect to be assailed by a great variety of cavils1 and that the weakest will often produce as great an effect as the strongest upon the minds of sectarians4 ,hence1 we shall endeavour to meet all such objections as may occur to us1 provided they can be supposed to exert any influence over the mind4 ,section ,i4 ,it may be objected that the foregoing scheme is 8new theology40 ,if nothing more were intended by such an objection1 than to put the reader on his guard against the prejudice in favour of novelty1 we could not complain of it4 ,for surely every new opinion which comes into collision with received doctrines1 should be held suspected1 until it is made to undergo the scrutiny to which its importance and appearance of truth may entitle it4 ,no reasonable man should complain of such a precaution4 ,certainly1 the present writer should not complain of such treatment1 for it is precisely the treatment which he has received from himself4 ,he well remembers1 that when the great truths1 as he now conceives them to be1 first dawned upon his own mind1 how sadly they disturbed and perplexed his blind veneration for the past4 ,as he was himself1 then1 so ready to shrink from his own views as 8new theology10 he surely cannot censure any one else for so doing1 provided he will but give them a fair and impartial hearing before he proceeds to scout them from his presence4 ,it is true1 after the writer had once fairly made the discovery that 8old theology0 is not necessarily true theology1 he could proceed with the greater freedom in his inquiries4 ,he did not very particularly inquire whether this or that was old or new1 but whether it was true4 ,he felt assured1 that if he could only be so fortunate as to find the truth1 the defect of novelty would be cured by lapse of time1 and he need give himself no very great concern about it4 ,not many centuries ago1 as everybody knows1 ,galileo was condemned and imprisoned for teaching 8new theology40 ,he had the unbounded audacity to put forth the insufferable heresy1 8directly against the very word of ,god itself10 that the sun does not revolve around the earth4 ,the ,vatican thundered1 and crushed ,galileo2 but it did not shake the solar system4 ,this stood as firm in its centre1 and rolled on as calmly and as majestically in its course1 as if the ,vatican had not uttered its anathema4 ,its thunders are all hushed now4 ,nay1 it has even reversed its former decree1 and concluded to permit the orbs of light to roll on in the paths appointed for them by the mighty hand that reared this beautiful fabric of the heavens and the earth4 ,even so will it be1 in relation to all sound views pertaining to the constitution and government of the moral world2 and those who may deem them unsound1 will have to give some more solid reason than an odious epithet1 before they can resist their progress4 ,we do not pretend that they have not1 or that they cannot give1 more solid reasons for this opposition to what is called 8new theology40 ,we only mean1 that an objection1 which1 entirely overlooking the truth or the falsehood of an opinion1 appeals to prejudice by the use of an odious name1 is unworthy of a serious and candid inquirer after truth1 and therefore should be laid aside by all who aspire to such a character4 ,section ,,ii4 ,it may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit the omnipotence of ,god4 ,this objection has already been sufficiently answered2 but it may be well to notice it more distinctly and by itself1 as it is one upon which great reliance will be placed4 ,it is not denying the omnipotence of ,god1 as all agree1 to say that he cannot work contradictions2 but1 as we have seen1 a necessitated volition is a contradiction in terms4 ,hence1 it does not deny or limit the divine omnipotence1 to say1 it cannot produce or necessitate our volitions4 ,it is absurd to say1 that that is a voluntary exercise of power1 which is produced in us by the power of ,god4 ,both of these principles are conceded by those who will be among the foremost1 in all probability1 to deny the conclusion which necessarily flows from them4 ,thus1 the ,princeton ,review1 for example1 admits that ,god cannot work contradictions2 and also that 8a necessary volition is an absurdity1 a thing inconceivable40 ,but will it say1 that ,god cannot work a volition in the human mind8 that omnipotence cannot work this particular absurdity8 ,if that journal should speak on this subject at all1 we venture to predict it will be seen that it has enounced a great truth1 without perceiving its bearing upon the ,princeton school of theology4 ,if this objection has any solidity1 it lies with equal force against the scheme of ,leibnitz1 ,edwards1 and other philosophers and divines1 as well as against the doctrine of the foregoing treatise4 ,for they affirm1 that ,god chooses sin as the necessary means of the greatest good2 and that he could not exclude sin from the universe1 without causing a greater evil than its permission4 ,this sentiment is repeatedly set forth in the ,essais de ,thodice of ,leibnitz2 and it is also repeatedly avowed by ,edwards4 ,now1 here is an inherent impossibility2 namely1 the prevention of sin without producing a greater evil than its permission1 which it is assumed ,god cannot work4 ,in other words1 when it is asserted1 that he chooses sin as the necessary means of the greatest good1 it is clearly intended that he cannot secure the greatest good without choosing that sin should exist4 ,hence if the doctrine of this discourse limits the omnipotence of ,god1 no less can be said of that to which it is opposed4 ,but both schemes may be objected to on this ground1 and both be set aside as limiting the perfections of ,god4 ,indeed1 it has been objected against the scheme of ,leibnitz1 8that it seems to make something which ,i do not know how to express otherwise than by the ancient stoical fate1 antecedent and superior even to ,god himself4 ,i would therefore think it best to say1 with the current of orthodox divines1 that ,god was perfectly free in his purpose and providence1 and that there is no reason to be sought for the one or the other beyond himself407#aej7 ,we do not know what reply ,leibnitz would have made to such an objection2 but we should be at no loss for an answer1 were it urged against the fundamental principle of the preceding discourse4 ,we should say1 in the first place1 that it was a very great pity the author could not find a better way of expressing his objection1 8than by the ancient stoical fate1 antecedent and superior even to ,god himself40 ,to say that ,god cannot work contradictions1 is not to place a stoical fate1 nor any other kind of fate1 above him4 ,and if it is1 this impiety is certainly practised by 8the current of orthodox divines10 even in the author's own sense of the term2 for they all affirm that ,god cannot work contradictions4 ,if such an objection has any force against the present treatise1 it might be much better expressed than by an allusion to 8the ancient stoical fate40 ,indeed1 it is much better expressed by ,luther1 in his vindication of the doctrine of consubstantiation4 ,when it was urged against that doctrine1 that it is a mathematical impossibility for the same corporeal substance to be in a thousand different places at one and the same time1 the great reformer resisted the objection as an infringement of the divine sovereignty3 8,god is above mathematics10 he exclaimed3 8,i reject reason1 common-sense1 carnal arguments1 and mathematical proofs407#aea7 ,there is no doubt but the orthodox divines of the present day will be disposed to smile at this specimen of ,luther's pious zeal for the sovereignty of ,god2 and although they may not be willing to admit that ,god is above all reason and common-sense1 yet will they be inclined to think that1 in some respects1 ,luther was a little below them4 ,but while they smile at ,luther1 might it not be well to take care1 lest they should display a zeal of the same kind1 and equally pleasant in the estimation of posterity8 ,in affirming that omnipotence cannot work contradictions1 we are certainly very far from being sensible that we place a 8stoical fate0 above ,god1 or any other kind of fate4 ,we would not place mathematics above ,god2 much less would we place him below mathematics4 ,nor would we say anything which would seem to render him otherwise than 8perfectly free in his purpose1 or in his providence40 ,to say that he cannot make two and two equal to five1 is not1 we trust1 inconsistent with the perfection of his freedom4 ,if it would be a great imperfection in mortals1 as all orthodox divines will admit1 to be able to affirm and believe that two and two are equal to five2 then it would be a still greater imperfection in ,god1 not only to be able to affirm such a thing1 but to embody it in an actual creation4 ,in like manner1 if it would be an imperfection in us to be able to affirm so great 8an absurdity10 a thing so 8inconceivable0 as a 8necessary volition20 then it could not add much to the glory of the ,divine ,being1 to suppose him capable of producing such a monstrosity in the constitution and government of the world4 ,there is a class of theologians who reject every explication of the origin of evil1 on the ground that they limit the divine sovereignty2 and to the question why evil is permitted to exist1 they reply1 8,we cannot tell40 ,if ,god can1 as they insist he can1 easily cause holiness to shine forth with unclouded1 universal splendour1 no wonder they cannot tell why he does not do so4 ,if1 by a single glance of his eye1 he can make hell itself clear up and shine out into a heaven1 and fix the eternal glories of the moral universe upon an immovable foundation1 no wonder they can see no reason why he refuses to do so4 ,the only wonder is that they cannot see that1 on this principle1 there is no reason at all for such refusal1 and the permission of moral evil4 ,for if ,god can do all this1 and yet permits sin 8to raise its hideous head in his dominions10 then there is1 and must be1 something which he loves more than holiness1 or abhors more than sin4 ,and hence1 the reason why they cannot tell is1 in our humble opinion1 because they have already told too much1--more than they know4 ,to doubt in the right place1 is often the best cure for doubt2 and to dogmatize in the wrong place1 is often the most certain road to scepticism4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the foregoing scheme1 it may be said1 presents a gloomy view of the universe4 ,if we say that ,god cannot necessitate our volitions1 or necessarily exclude all evil from a moral system1 it will be objected1 that1 on these principles1 8we have no certainty of the continued obedience of holy1 angelic1 and redeemed spirits407#aeb7 ,this is true1 if the scheme of necessity affords the only ground of certainty in the universe4 ,but we cannot see the justness of this assumption4 ,it is agreed on all sides1 that a fixed habit of acting1 formed by repeated and long-continued acts1 is a pretty sure foundation for the certainty of action4 ,hence1 there may be some little certainty1 some little stability in the moral world1 without supposing all things therein to be necessitated4 ,perhaps there may be1 on this hypothesis1 as great certainty therein1 as is actually found to exist4 ,in the assertion so often made1 that if all our volitions are not controlled by the divine power1 but left to ourselves1 then the moral world will not be so well governed as the natural1 and disorders will be found therein2 the fact seems to be overlooked1 that there is actually disorder and confusion in the moral world4 ,if it were our object to find an hypothesis to overturn and refute the facts of the moral world1 we know of none better adapted to this purpose than the doctrine of necessity2 but if it be our aim1 not to deny1 but to explain the phenomena of the moral world1 then must we adopt some other scheme4 ,but it has been eloquently said1 that 8if ,god could not have prevented sin in the universe1 he cannot prevent believers from falling2 he cannot prevent ,gabriel and ,paul from sinking at once into devils1 and heaven from turning into a hell4 ,and were he to create new races to fill the vacant seats1 they might turn to devils as fast as he created them1 in spite of anything that he could do short of destroying their moral agency4 ,he is liable to be defeated in all his designs1 and to be as miserable as he is benevolent4 ,this is infinitely the gloomiest idea that was ever thrown upon the world4 ,it is gloomier than hell itself40 ,true1 there might be a gloomier spectacle in the universe than hell itself2 and for this very reason it is1 as we have seen1 that ,god has ordained hell itself1 that such gloomier spectacle may never appear in the universe to darken its transcendent and eternal glories4 ,it is on this principle that we reconcile the infinite goodness of ,god with the awful spectacle of a world lying in ruins1 and the still more awful spectacle of an eternal hell beyond the grave4 ,it is true1 there might be a gloomier idea than hell itself2 there might be two such ideas4 ,nay1 there might be two such things2 but yet1 so far as we know1 there is only one4 ,we beg such objectors to consider1 there are some things which1 even according to our scheme1 will not take place quite so fast as they may be pleased to imagine them4 ,it is true1 for example1 that a man1 that a rational being1 might take a copper instead of a guinea1 if both were presented for his selection2 but although we may conceive this1 it does not follow that he will actually take the copper and leave the guinea4 ,it is also true1 that a man might throw himself down from the brink of a precipice into a yawning gulf2 yet he may1 perhaps1 refuse to do so4 ,this may be merely a gloomy idea1 and may never become a gloomy fact4 ,in like manner1 as one world fell away from ,god1 so might another1 and another4 ,but yet this imagination may never be realized4 ,indeed1 the ,supreme ,ruler of all things has assured us that it will not be the case2 and in forming our views of the universe1 we feel more disposed to look at facts than at fancies4 ,we need not frighten ourselves at 8gloomy ideas40 ,there are gloomy facts enough in the universe to call forth all our fears4 ,indeed1 if we should permit our minds to be directed1 not by the reality of things1 but by the relative gloominess of ideas1 we should altogether deny the eternity of future torments1 and rejoice in the contemplation of the bright prospects of the universal holiness and happiness of created beings4 ,we believe1 however1 that when the truth is once found1 it will present the universe of ,god in a more glorious point of view1 than it can be made to display by any system of error whatever4 ,whether the foregoing scheme possesses this characteristic of truth or not1 the reader can now determine for himself4 ,he can determine whether it does not present a brighter and more lovely spectacle to contemplate ,god1 the great fountain of all being and all light1 as doing all that is possible1 in the very nature of things1 for the holiness and happiness of the universe1 and actually succeeding1 through and by the coperation of his creation1 in regard to all worlds but this2 than to view him as possessing the power to shut out all evil from the universe1 for time and for eternity1 and yet absolutely refusing to do so4 ,but let me insist upon it1 that the first and the all-important inquiry is1 8,what is truth80 ,this is the only wise course2 and it is the only safe course for the necessitarian4 ,for no system1 when presented in its true colours1 is more gloomy and appalling than his own4 ,it represents the great ,god1 who is seated upon the throne of the universe1 as controlling all the volitions of his rational creatures by the omnipotence of his will4 ,the first man succumbs to his power4 ,at this unavoidable transgression1 ,god kindles into the most fearful wrath1 and dooms both himself and his posterity to temporal and eternal misery4 ,if this be so1 then let me ask the reader1 if the fact be not infinitely 8gloomier than hell itself80 ,section ,,iv4 ,it may be alleged1 that in refusing to subject the volitions of men to the power and control of ,god1 we undermine the sentiments of humility and submission4 ,this objection is often made3 it is1 indeed1 the great practical ground on which the scheme of necessity plants itself4 ,the object is1 no doubt1 a most laudable one2 but every laudable object is not always promoted by wise means4 ,let us see1 then1 if it be wise thus to assert the doctrine of a necessitated agency1 in order to abase the pride of man1 and teach him a lesson of humility4 ,if we set out from this point of view1 it will be found exceedingly difficult1 if not impossible1 to tell when and where to stop4 ,in fact1 those who rely upon this kind of argument1 often carry it much too far2 and if we look around us1 we shall find that the only means of escaping the charge of pride1 is to swallow all the doctrines which the teachers of humility may be pleased to present to us4 ,thus1 for example1 ,spinoza would have us to believe that man is not a person at all1 but a mere fugitive mode of the ,divine ,being4 ,nothing is more ridiculous1 in his eyes1 than that so insignificant a thing as a man should aspire to the rank of a distinct1 personal existence1 and assume to himself the attribute of free-will4 8,the free-will10 says he1 8is a chimera of the same kind1 flattered by our pride1 and in reality founded upon our ignorance40 ,now it may not be very humble in us1 but still we beg leave to protest against this entire annihilation of our being4 ,even ,m4 ,comte1 who in his extreme modesty1 denies the existence of a ,god1 insists that it is nothing but the fumes of pride and self-conceit1 the intoxication of vanity1 which induces us to imagine that we are free and accountable beings4 ,no doubt he would consider us sufficiently humble and submissive1 provided we would only forswear all the light which shines within us and around us1 and swallow his atheistical dogmas4 ,but there is something more valuable in the universe1 if we mistake not1 than even a reputation for humility4 ,but no one will expect us to go so far in self-abasement and humility1 as to submit our intellects to all sorts of dogmas4 ,it will be amply sufficient1 if we only go just far enough to receive the dogmas of his particular creed4 ,thus1 for example1 if you assail the doctrine of necessity1 on which1 as we have seen1 ,calvinism erects itself1 the ,puseyite will clasp his hands1 and cry out1 8,well done60 ,but if you turn around and oppose any of his dogmas1 then what pride and presumption to set up your individual opinion against 8the decisions of the mother ,church607#aec7 ,and he will be sure to wind up his lesson of humility with that of ,st4 ,vincentius3 8,quod ubique1 quod semper1 quod ab omnibus40 ,seeing1 then1 that a reputation for humility is not the greatest good in the universe1 and that the only possibility of obtaining it1 even from one party1 is by a submission of the intellect to its creed2 would it not be as well to leave such a reputation to take care of itself1 and use all exertions to search out and find the truth8 ,tell a carnal1 unregenerate man1 it is said1 that though ,god had physical power to create him1 he has not moral power to govern him1 and you could not furnish his mind with better aliment for pride and rebellion4 ,should you1 after giving this lesson1 press upon him the claims of ,jehovah1 you might expect to be answered1 as ,moses was by the proud oppressor of ,israel3 8,who is the ,lord1 that ,i should obey his voice807#aed7 ,he must1 indeed1 be an exceedingly carnal man1 who should draw such an inference from the doctrine in question4 ,but we should not tell him that 8,god had no moral power to govern him40 ,we should tell him1 that ,god could not control all his volitions2 that he could not govern him as a machine is governed1 without destroying his free-agency2 but we should still insist that he possessed the most absolute and uncontrollable power to govern him2 that ,god can give him a perfect moral law1 and power to obey it1 with the most stupendous motives for obedience2 and then1 if he persist in his disobedience1 ,god can1 and will1 shut him up in torments forever1 that others1 seeing the awful consequences of rebellion1 may keep their allegiance to him4 ,is this to deny the power of ,god to govern his creatures8 ,but is it not wonderful that a ,calvinist should undertake to test a doctrine by the consequences which a 8proud oppressor10 or 8a carnal man10 might draw from it8 ,if we should tell such a man1 that ,god possesses the absolute power to control his volitions1 and that nothing ever happens on earth but in perfect accordance with his good will and pleasure1 might we not expect him to conclude1 that he would then leave the matter with ,god1 and give himself no trouble about it8 ,if we may judge from the practical effect of doctrines1 then the authors of the objection in question do not take the best method to inculcate the lesson of humility4 ,they take the precise course pursued by ,melanchthon1 and often with the same success4 ,this great reformer1 it is well known1 undertook to frame his doctrine so as to teach humility and submission3 with this view he went so far as to insist1 that man was so insignificant a thing1 that he could not act at all1 except in so far as he was acted upon by the ,divine ,being4 ,having reached this position1 he not only saw1 but expressly adopted the conclusion1 that ,god is the author of all the volitions of men2 that he was the author of ,david's adultery as well as of ,saul's conversion4 ,now1 it is true1 if the human mind could abase itself so low as to embrace such a doctrine1 it would give a most complete1 if not a most pleasing example of its submissiveness4 ,but it cannot very well do so4 ,for even amid the ruins of our fallen nature1 there are some fragments left1 which raise the intellect and moral nature of man above so blind and so abject a submission to the dominion of error4 ,hence it was1 that ,melanchthon himself could not long submit to his own doctrine2 and he who had undertaken to teach others humility1 became one of the most illustrious of rebels4 ,this suggests the profound aphorism of ,pascal3 8,it is dangerous to make us see too much how near man is to the brutes1 without showing him his greatness4 ,it is also dangerous to make him see his greatness without his baseness4 ,it is still more dangerous to leave him ignorant of both4 ,but it is very advantageous to represent to him both the one and the other407#aee7 ,the fact is1 that nothing can teach the human intellect a genuine submission but the light of evidence3 this1 and this alone1 can rivet upon our speculative faculty the chains of inevitable conviction1 and bind it to the truth4 ,those who teach error1 then1 may preach humility with success to the blind and the unthinking2 but wherever men may be disposed to think for themselves1 they must expect to find rebels4 ,how many at the present day have begun1 like ,melanchthon1 by the preaching of submission1 and ended by the practice of rebellion against their own doctrines4 ,it is wonderful to observe the style of criticism usually adopted by the faithful1 as one illustrious rebel after another is seen to depart from their ranks4 ,the moment he is known to doubt a single dogma of the established faith1 the awful suspicion is set afloat1 8there is no telling where he will end40 ,alas6 this is but too true2 for when a man has once discovered that what he has been taught all his life to regard and reverence as a great mystery1 is in reality an absurdity and an imposition on his reason1 there is no telling where he will end4 ,the reaction may be so great1 indeed1 as to produce an entire shipwreck of his faith4 ,but in this case1 let us not chide our poor lost brother with pride and presumption1 as if we ourselves were unstained with the same sin4 ,let us remember1 that the fault may be partly our own1 as well as his4 ,let us remember1 that the sin of not even every unwarrantable innovation1 is exclusively imputable to the innovator himself4 ,for1 as ,lord ,bacon says1 8,a froward retention of customs is a great innovator40 ,if those who1 some centuries ago1 formed the various creeds of the ,christian world1 were fallible men1 and if they permitted serious errors to creep into the great mass of religious truth contained in those creeds1 then the best way to prevent innovation is1 not to preach humility and submission1 but to bring those formularies into a conformity with the truth4 ,for1 if the 8,old ,theology0 be unsound1 the 8,new ,theology0 will have the audacity to show itself4 ,and who1 among the children of men1 will set bounds to the progress of the human mind1 either in the direction of ,god's word or his work1 and say1 ,hitherto shalt thou come1 and here shall thy proud waves be stayed8 ,who will lash the winds into submission1 or bind the raging ocean at his feet8 ,section ,v4 ,the foregoing treatise may be deemed inconsistent with gratitude to ,god4 8,such reflections10 it has been urged1 8afford as little ground for gratitude as for submission4 ,why do we feel grateful to ,god for those favours which are conferred on us by the agency of our fellow-men1 except on the principle that they are instruments in his hand1 who1 without #8offering the least violence to their wills1 or taking away the liberty or contingency of second causes1' hath most sovereign dominion over them1 to do by them1 and upon them1 whatsoever himself pleaseth8 ,on any other ground1 they would be worthy of the principal1 and ,he of the secondary praise407#aef7 ,true1 if men are 8only instruments in his hand10 we should give him all the praise2 but we should never feel grateful to our earthly friends and benefactors4 ,as we should not1 on this hypothesis1 be grateful for the greatest benefits conferred on us by our fellow-men2 so1 in the language of ,hartley1 and ,belsham1 and ,diderot1 we should never resent1 nor censure1 the greatest injuries committed by the greatest criminals4 ,but on our principles1 while we have infinite ground for gratitude to ,god1 we also have some little room for gratitude to our fellow-men4 ,section ,,vi4 ,it may be contended1 that it is unfair to urge the preceding difficulties against the scheme of necessity2 inasmuch as the same1 or as great1 difficulties attach to the system of those by whom they are urged4 ,this is the great standing objection with all the advocates of necessity4 ,indeed1 we sometimes find it conceded by the advocates of free-agency2 of which concessions the opposite party are ever ready and eager to avail themselves4 ,in the statement of this fact1 ,i do not mean to complain of a zeal which all candid minds must acknowledge to be commendable on the part of the advocates of necessity4 ,it is a fact1 however1 that the following language of ,archbishop ,whately1 in relation to the difficulty of accounting for the origin of evil1 is often quoted by them3 8,let it be remembered1 that it is not peculiar to any one theological system3 let not therefore the ,calvinist or the ,arminian urge it as an objection against their respective adversaries2 much less an objection clothed in offensive language1 which will be found to recoil on their own religious tenets1 as soon as it shall be perceived that both parties are alike unable to explain the difficulty2 let them not1 to destroy an opponent's system1 rashly kindle a fire which will soon extend to the no less combustible structure of their own40 ,no one can doubt the justice or wisdom of such a maxim2 and it would be well if it were observed by all who may be disposed to assail an adversary's scheme with objections4 ,every such person should first ask himself whether his objection might not be retorted1 or the shaft be hurled back with destructive force at the assailant4 ,but although the remark of ,archbishop ,whately is both wise and just1 it is not altogether so in its application to ,archbishop ,king1 or to other ,arminians4 ,for example1 it is conceded by ,dr4 ,reid1 that he had not found the means of reconciling the existence of moral evil with the perfections of ,god2 but is this any reason why he should not shrink with abhorrence from the doctrine of necessity which so clearly appeared to him to make ,god the direct and proper cause of moral evil8 8,we acknowledge10 says he1 8that nothing can happen under the administration of the ,deity which he does not permit4 ,the permission of natural and moral evil is a phenomenon which cannot be disputed4 ,to account for this phenomenon under the government of a ,being of infinite goodness1 has1 in all ages1 been considered as difficult to human reason1 whether we embrace the system of liberty or that of necessity40 ,but because he could not solve this difficulty1 must he therefore embrace1 or at least cease to object against every absurdity which may be propounded to him8 ,because he cannot comprehend why an infinitely good ,being should permit sin1 does it follow that he should cease to protest against making ,god the proper cause and agent of all moral evil as well as good8 ,in his opinion1 the scheme of necessity does this2 and hence he very properly remarks3 8,this view of the divine nature1 the only one consistent with the scheme of necessity1 appears to me much more shocking than the permission of evil upon the scheme of liberty4 ,it is said1 that it requires only strength of mind to embrace it3 to me it seems to require much strength of countenance to profess it40 ,in this sentiment of ,dr4 ,reid the moral sense and reason of mankind will1 ,i have no doubt1 perfectly concur4 ,for although we may not be able to clear up the stupendous difficulties pertaining to the spiritual universe1 this is no reason why we may be permitted to deepen them into absurdities1 and cause them to bear1 in the harshest and most revolting form1 upon the moral sentiments of mankind4 ,the reason why ,dr4 ,reid and others could not remove the great difficulty concerning the origin of evil is1 as we have seen1 because they proceeded on the supposition that ,god could create a moral system1 and yet necessarily exclude all sin from it4 ,this mistake1 it seems to me1 has already been sufficiently refuted1 and the existence of moral evil brought into perfect accordance and harmony with the infinite holiness of ,god4 ,but it is strenuously insisted1 in particular1 that the divine foreknowledge of all future events establishes their necessity2 and thus involves the advocates of that sublime attribute in all the difficulties against which they so loudly declaim4 ,as ,i have examined this argument in another place17#aeg7 ,i shall not dwell upon it here1 but content myself with a few additional remarks4 ,the whole strength of this argument in favour of necessity arises from the assumption1 that if ,god foresees the future volitions of men1 they must be bound together with other things according to the mechanism of cause and effect2 that is to say that ,god could not foresee the voluntary acts of men1 unless they should be necessitated by causes ultimately connected with his own will4 ,accordingly1 this bold position is usually assumed by the advocates of necessity4 ,but to say that ,god could not foreknow future events1 unless they are indissolubly connected together1 seems to be a tremendous flight for any finite mind2 and especially for those who are always reminding us of the melancholy fact of human blindness and presumption4 ,who shall set limits to the modes of knowledge possessed by an infinite1 all-comprehending mind8 ,who shall tell how ,god foresees future events8 ,who shall say it must be in this or that particular way1 or it cannot be at all8 ,let the necessitarian prove his assumption1 let him make it clear that ,god could not foreknow future events unless they are necessitated1 and he will place in the hands of the sceptic the means of demonstrating1 with absolute and uncontrollable certainty1 that ,god does not foreknow all future events at all1 that he does not foresee the free voluntary acts of the human mind4 ,for we do know1 as clearly as we can possibly know anything1 not even excepting our own existence1 or the existence of a ,god1 that we are free in our volitions1 that they are not necessitated2 and hence1 according to the assumption in question1 ,god could not foresee them4 ,if the sceptic could see what the necessitarian affirms1 he might proceed from what he knows1 by a direct and irresistible process1 to a denial of the foreknowledge of ,god1 in relation to human volitions4 ,but fortunately the assumption of the necessitarian is not true4 ,by the fundamental laws of human belief1 we know that our acts are not necessitated2 and hence1 we infer that as ,god foresees them all1 he may do so without proceeding from cause to effect1 according to the method of finite minds4 ,we thus reason from the known to the unknown2 from the clear light of facts around us up to the dark question concerning the possibility of the modes in relation to the divine prescience4 ,we would not first settle this question of possibility1 we would not say that ,god cannot foreknow except in one particular way1 and then proceed to reason from such a postulate against the clearest facts in the universe4 ,no logic1 and especially no logic based upon so obscure a foundation1 shall ever be permitted to extinguish for us the light of facts1 or convert the universal intelligence of man into a falsehood4 ,those who argue from foreknowledge in favour of necessity1 usually admit that there is neither before nor after with ,god4 ,this is emphatically the case with the ,edwardses4 ,hence1 foreknowledge infers necessity in no other sense than it is inferred by present or concomitant knowledge4 ,this is also freely conceded by ,president ,edwards4 ,in what sense1 then1 does present knowledge infer necessity8 ,let us see4 ,i know a man is now walking before me2 does this prove that he could not help walking8 that he is necessitated to walk8 ,it is plain that it infers no such thing4 ,it infers the necessary connexion1 not between the act of the man in walking and the causes impelling him thereto1 but between my knowledge of the fact and the existence of the fact itself4 ,this is a necessary connexion between two ideas1 or propositions1 and not between two events4 ,this confusion is perpetually made in the 8great demonstration0 from foreknowledge in favour of necessity4 ,it proves nothing1 except that the greatest minds may be deceived and misled by the ambiguities of language4 ,this argument1 we say1 only shows a necessary connexion between two ideas or propositions4 ,this is perfectly evident from the very words in which it is often stated by the advocates of necessity4 8,i freely allow10 says ,president ,edwards1 8that foreknowledge does not prove a thing necessary any more than after-knowledge2 but the after-knowledge1 which is certain and infallible1 proves that it is now become impossible but that the proposition known should be true40 ,now1 here we have a necessary connexion between the certain and infallible knowledge of a thing1 and the infallible certainty of its existence6 ,what has this to do with the question about the will8 ,if any man has ever undertaken to assert its freedom1 by denying the necessary connexion between two or more ideas1 propositions1 or truths1 this argument may be applied to him2 we have nothing to do with it4 ,again3 8,to suppose the future volitions of moral agents10 says ,president ,edwards1 8not to be necessary events2 or1 which is the same thing1 events which are not impossible but that they may not come to pass2 and yet to suppose that ,god certainly foreknows them1 and knows all things1 is to suppose ,god's knowledge to be inconsistent with itself4 ,for to say1 that ,god certainly1 and without all conjecture1 knows that a thing will infallibly be1 which at the same time he knows to be so contingent that it may possibly not be1 is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself2 or that one thing he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows4 ,it is the same thing as to say1 he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth40 ,now all this is true4 ,if we affirm ,god's foreknowledge to be certain and at the same time to be uncertain1 we contradict ourselves4 ,but what has this necessary connexion between the elements of the divine foreknowledge1 or between our propositions concerning them1 to do with the necessary connexion among events8 ,the question is not whether all future events will certainly come to pass2 or1 in other words1 whether all future events are future events2 for this is a truism1 which no man in his right mind can possibly deny4 ,but the question is1 whether all future events will be determined by necessitating causes1 or whether they may not be1 in part1 the free unnecessitated acts of the human mind4 ,this is the question1 and let it not be lost sight of in a cloud of logomachy4 ,if all future events are necessitated1 then all past events are necessitated4 ,but if we know anything1 we know that all present events are not necessitated1 and hence1 all future events will not be necessitated4 ,we deem it always safer to reason thus from the known to the unknown1 than to invert the process4 ,but suppose that foreknowledge proves that all human volitions are under the influence of causes1 in what sense does it leave them free8 ,does it leave them free to depart from the influence of motives8 ,by no means4 ,it would be a contradiction in terms1 according to this argument1 to say that they are certainly and infallibly foreknown1 and yet that they may possibly not come to pass4 ,hence1 if the argument proves anything1 it proves the absolute fatality of all human volitions4 ,it leaves not a fragment nor a shadow of moral liberty on earth4 ,if this argument prove anything to the purpose1 then ,luther was right in declaring that 8the foreknowledge of ,god is a thunderbolt to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms20 and ,dr4 ,dick is right in affirming1 8that it is as impossible to avoid them0 7our volitions7 8as it is to pluck the sun out of the firmament407#aeh7 ,it either proves all the most absolute necessitarian could desire1 or it proves nothing4 ,in our humble opinion it proves the latter4 ,on this point the testimony of ,dr4 ,dick himself is explicit3 8,whatever is the foundation of his foreknowledge10 says he1 8what he does foreknow will undoubtedly take place4 ,hence1 then1 the actions of men are as unalterably fixed from eternity1 as if they had been the subject of an immutable decree407#aei7 ,but to dispel this grand illusion1 it should be remembered1 that the actions of men will not come to pass because they are foreknown2 but they are foreknown because they will come to pass4 ,the free actions of men are clearly reflected back in the mirror of the divine omniscience--they are not projected forward from the engine of the divine omnipotence4 ,since the argument in question proves so much1 if it proves anything1 we need not wonder that it was employed by ,cicero and other ancient ,stoics to establish the doctrine of an absolute and unconditional fate4 8,if the will is free10 says he1 8then fate does not rule everything1 then the order of all causes is not certain1 and the order of things is no longer certain in the prescience of ,god2 if the order of things is not certain in the prescience of ,god1 then things will not take place as he foresees them2 and if things do not take place as he foresees1 there is no foreknowledge in ,god40 ,thus1 by a reductio ad absurdum1 he establishes the position that the will is not free1 but fate rules all things4 ,edwards and ,dick1 however1 would only apply this argument to human volitions4 ,but are not the volitions of the divine mind also foreknown8 ,certainly they are2 this will not be denied4 ,hence1 the very men who set out to exalt the power of ,god and abase the glory of man1 have1 by this argument1 raised a dominion1 not only over the power of man1 but also over the power of ,god himself4 ,in other words1 if this argument proves that we cannot act unless we be first acted upon1 and impelled to act1 it proves no less in relation to ,god2 and hence1 if it show the weakness and dependence of men1 it also shows the weakness and dependence of ,god4 ,so apt are men to adopt arguments which defeat their own object1 whenever they have any other object than the discovery of truth4 ,it is frequently said1 as we have seen1 that it is a contradiction to affirm that a thing is foreknown1 or will certainly come to pass1 and that it may possibly not come to pass4 ,this position is at least as old as ,aristotle4 ,but let it be borne in mind1 that if this be a contradiction1 then future events are placed1 not only beyond the power of man1 but also beyond the power of ,god itself2 for it is conceded on all hands1 that ,god cannot work contradictions4 ,this famous argument entirely overlooks the question of power4 ,it simply declares the thing to be a contradiction1 and as such1 placed above all power4 ,in other words1 if it be absurd or self-contradictory to say1 that a future event is foreknown1 and1 at the same time1 might not come to pass1 this proposition is true of the volitions of the divine no less than of the human mind2 for they are all alike foreknown4 ,that is to say1 if the argument from foreknowledge proves that the volitions of man might not have been otherwise than they are1 it proves precisely the same thing in regard to the volitions of ,god4 ,thus1 if this argument proves anything to the purpose1 it reaches the appalling position of ,spinoza1 that nothing in the universe could possibly be otherwise than it is4 ,and if this be so1 then let the ,calvinist decide whether he will join with the ,pantheist and fatalist1 or give some little quarter to the ,arminian4 ,let him decide whether he will continue to employ an argument which1 if it proves anything1 demonstrates the dependency of the divine will as well as of the human2 and instead of exalting the adorable sovereignty of ,god1 subjects him to the dominion of fate4 ,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,natural ,,evil1 ,,or ,,suffering1 ,,consistent ,,with ,,the ,,goodness ,,of ,,god4 ,the path of sorrow1 and that path alone1 ,leads to the land where sorrow is unknown4 ,but ,he1 who knew what human hearts would prove1 ,how slow to learn the dictates of his love1 ,that1 hard by nature and of stubborn will1 ,a life of ease would make them harder still1 ,in pity to the souls his grace design'd ,for rescue from the ruin of mankind1 ,call'd forth a cloud to darken all their years1 ,and said1 8,go1 spend them in the vale of tears40--,,cowper4 ,chapter ,i4 ,god ,desires ,and ,seeks ,the ,salvation of ,all ,men4 ,love is the root of creation1--,god's essence4 ,worlds without number ,lie in his bosom1 like children3 he made them for this purpose only1-- ,only to love1 and be loved again4 ,he breathed forth his ,spirit ,into the slumbering dust1 and1 upright standing1 it laid its ,hand on its heart1 and felt it was warm with a flame out of heaven4--,,tegner4 ,the attentive reader has perceived before this time1 that one of the fundamental ideas1 one of the great leading truths1 of the present discourse is1 that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms1--an inherent and utter impossibility4 ,this truth has shown us why a ,being of infinite purity does not cause virtue to prevail everywhere1 and at all times4 ,if virtue could be necessitated to exist1 there seems to be no doubt that such a ,being would cause it to shine out in all parts of his dominion1 and the blot of sin would not be seen upon the beauty of the world4 ,but although moral goodness cannot be necessitated to exist1 yet ,god has attested his abhorrence of vice and his approbation of virtue1 by the dispensation of natural good and evil1 of pleasure and pain4 ,having marked out the path of duty for us1 he has made such a distribution of natural good and evil as is adapted to keep us therein4 ,the evident design of this arrangement is1 as theologians and philosophers agree1 to prevent the commission of evil1 and secure the practice of virtue4 ,the ,supreme ,ruler of the world adopts this method to promote that moral goodness which cannot be produced by the direct omnipotency of his power4 ,hence1 it must be evident1 that although ,god desires the happiness of his rational and accountable creatures1 he does not bestow happiness upon them without regard to their moral character4 ,the great dispensation of his natural providence1 as well as the express declaration of his word1 forbids the inference that he desires the happiness of those who obstinately persist in their evil courses4 ,if we may rely upon such testimony1 he desires first the holiness of his intelligent creatures1 and next their happiness4 ,hence1 it is well said by ,bishop ,butler1 that the 8divine goodness1 with which1 if ,i mistake not1 we make very free in our speculations1 may not be a bare1 single disposition to produce happiness1 but a disposition to make the good1 the faithful1 the honest man happy407#afj7 ,he desires the holiness of all1 that all may have life4 ,this great truth is so clearly and so emphatically set forth in revelation1 and it so perfectly harmonizes with the most pleasing conceptions of the divine character1 that one is filled with amazement to reflect how many crude undigested notions there are in the minds of professing ,christians1 which are utterly inconsistent with it4 8,as ,i live1 saith the ,lord ,god1 ,i have no pleasure in the death of the wicked1 but that the wicked turn from his way1 and live4 ,turn ye1 turn ye1 for why will ye die80 ,this solemn asseveration that ,god desires not the death of the sinner1 but that he should turn from his wickedness and live1 one would suppose should satisfy every mind which reposes confidence in the divine origin of revelation4 ,and yet1 until the minds of men are purged from the films of a false philosophy and sectarian prejudice1 they seem afraid to look at the plain1 obvious meaning of this and other similar passages of ,scripture4 ,they will have it1 that ,god desires the ultimate holiness and happiness of only a portion of mankind1 and the destruction of all the rest2 that upon some he bestows his grace1 causing them to become holy and happy1 and appear forever as the monuments of his mercy2 while from some he withholds his saving grace1 that they may become the fearful objects of his indignation and wrath4 ,such a display of the divine character seems to be equally unknown to reason and to revelation4 ,section ,i4 ,the reason why theologians have concluded that ,god designs the salvation of only a part of mankind4 ,the reason why so many theologians come to so frightful a conclusion is1 that they imagine ,god could very easily cause virtue in the breast of every moral agent1 if he would4 ,hence arises in their minds the stupendous difficulty1 8,how can ,god really desire the holiness and happiness of all1 since he refuses to make all holy and happy8 ,is he really in earnest1 in pleading with sinners to turn from their wickedness1 since he might so easily turn them1 and yet will not do it8 ,is the great ,god really sincere in the offer of salvation to all1 and in the grand preparations he hath made to secure their salvation1 since he will not put forth his mighty1 irresistible hand to save them80 ,such is the great difficulty which has arisen from the imagination in question1 and confounded theology for ages1 as well as cast a dark shadow upon the ,christian world4 ,it is only by getting rid of this unfounded imagination1 this false supposition1 that this stupendous difficulty can be solved1 and the glory of the divine government clearly vindicated4 ,we have before us ,mr4 ,symington's able and plausible defence of a limited atonement1 in which he says1 that 8the event is the best interpreter of the divine intention40 ,hence he infers1 that as all are not actually saved1 it was not the design of ,god that all should be saved1 and no provision is really made for their salvation4 ,this argument is plausible4 ,it is often employed by the school of theologians to which the author belongs1 and employed with great effect4 ,but is it sound8 ,no doubt it has often been shown to be unsound indirectly2 that is1 by showing that the conclusion at which it arrives comes into conflict with the express declarations of ,scripture1 as well as with our notions of the perfections of ,god4 ,but this is not to analyze the argument itself1 and show it to be a sophism4 ,nor can this be done1 so long as the principle from which the conclusion necessarily follows be admitted4 ,if we admit1 then1 that ,god could very easily cause virtue or moral goodness to exist everywhere1 we must conclude that 8the event is the best interpreter of the divine intention20 and that the atonement and all other provisions for the salvation of men are limited in extent by the design of ,god4 ,that is to say1 if we admit the premiss assumed by ,mr4 ,symington and his school1 we cannot consistently deny their conclusion4 ,nor could we resist a great many other conclusions which are frightful in the extreme4 ,for if ,god could easily make all men holy1 as it is contended he can1 then the event is the best evidence of his real intention and design4 ,hence he really did not design the salvation of all men4 ,when he gave man a holy law1 he really did not intend that he should obey and live1 but that he should transgress and die4 ,when he created the world1 he really did not intend that all should reach the abodes of eternal bliss1 but that some should be ruined and lost forever4 ,such are some of the consequences which necessarily flow from the principle1 that holiness may be caused to exist in the breast of every moral agent4 ,this is not all4 ,we have before us another book1 which insists that since the world was created1 the law of ,god has never been violated1 because his will cannot be resisted4 ,hence1 it is seriously urged1 that if theft1 or adultery1 or murder1 be perpetrated1 it must be in accordance with the will of ,god1 and consequently no sin in his sight4 8,the whole notion of sinning against ,god10 this book says1 8is perfectly puerile40 ,now all this vile stuff proceeds on the supposition1 that 8the event is the best interpreter of the divine intention20 and it rests upon that supposition with just as great security1 as does the argument in favour of a limited atonement4 ,though we may well give such stuff to the winds1 or trample it under foot with infinite scorn1 as an outrage against the moral sentiments of mankind2 yet we cannot meet it on the arena of logic1 if we concede that holiness may be everywhere caused to exist1 and universal obedience to the divine will secured4 ,the only principle1 it clearly seems to us1 on which we can reconcile such glaring discrepancies between the express will of ,god and the event1 is1 that the event is of such a nature that it is not an object of power1 or cannot be caused to exist by the ,divine ,omnipotence4 ,for his 8secret will10 or rather his executive will1 is always in perfect harmony with his revealed will4 ,it is from an inattention to the foregoing principle1 that theologians have not been able to see and vindicate the sincerity of ,god1 in the offer of salvation to all men4 ,we have examined their efforts to remove this difficulty1 and been constrained to agree with ,dr4 ,dick1 that 8we may pronounce these attempts to reconcile the universal call of the gospel with the sincerity of ,god1 to be a faint struggle to extricate ourselves from the profundities of theology40 ,but on looking into those solutions again1 in which for some years we found a sort of rest1 we could clearly perceive why theology had struggled in vain to deliver itself from its profound embarrassments on this subject1 as well as on many others4 ,these solutions admit the very principle which necessarily creates the difficulty1 and renders a satisfactory answer impossible4 ,discard this false principle1 substitute the truth in its stead1 and the sincerity of ,god will come out from every obscurity1 and shine with unclouded splendour4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the attempt of ,howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a portion of mankind with the sincerity of ,god in his endeavours to save them4 ,to illustrate the justness of the remark just made1 we shall select that solution of the difficulty in question which has been deemed the most profound and satisfactory4 ,we mean the solution of 8the wonderful ,howe407#afa7 ,this celebrated divine clearly saw the impossibility of reconciling the sincerity of ,god with the offer of salvation to all1 on the supposition that he does anything to prevent the salvation1 or promote the ruin of those who are finally lost4 ,he rejects the scheme of necessity1 or a concurrence of the divine will1 in relation to the sinful volitions of men1 as aggravating the difficulty which he had undertaken to solve4 ,this was one great step towards a solution4 ,but it still remained to 8reconcile ,god's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels1 exhortations1 and whatsoever means he uses to prevent them40 ,let us see how he has succeeded in his attempt to accomplish this great object4 ,he admits in this very attempt1 8that the universal1 continued rectitude of all intelligent creatures had1 we may be sure1 been willed with a peremptory1 efficacious will1 if it had been best40 ,he expressly says1 that ,god might have prevented sin from raising its head in his dominions1 if he had chosen to do so4 8,nor was it less easy10 says he1 8by a mighty1 irresistible hand1 universally to expel sin1 than to prevent it40 ,now1 having made this concession1 was it possible for him to vindicate the sincerity and wisdom of ,god in the use of means to prevent sin1 which he foresaw must fail to a very great extent8 ,after having made such an admission1 or rather after having assumed such a position1 we think it may be clearly shown that the author was doomed to fail2 and that he has deceived himself by false analogies in his gigantic efforts to vindicate the character of ,god4 ,he says1 for example3 8,we will1 for discourse's sake1 suppose a prince endowed with the gift or spirit of prophecy4 ,this most will acknowledge a great perfection1 added to whatsoever other of his accomplishments4 ,and suppose this his prophetic ability to be so large as to extend to most events which fall out in his dominions4 ,is it hereby become unfit for him to govern his subjects by laws1 or any way admonish them of their duty8 ,hath this perfection so much diminished him as to depose him from his government8 ,it is not1 indeed1 to be dissembled1 that it were a difficulty to determine1 whether such foresight were1 for himself1 better or worse4 ,boundless knowledge seems only in a fit conjunction with an unbounded power4 ,but it is altogether unimaginable that it should destroy his relation to his subjects2 as what of it were left1 if it should despoil him of his legislative power and capacity of governing according to laws made by it8 ,and to bring back the matter to the ,supreme ,ruler3 let it for the present be supposed only1 that the blessed ,god hath1 belonging to his nature1 the universal prescience whereof we are discoursing2 we will surely1 upon that supposition1 acknowledge it to belong to him as a perfection4 ,and were it reasonable to affirm1 that by a perfection he is disabled from government8 or were it a good consequence1 #8,he foreknows all things--he is therefore unfit to govern the world8' 0 ,this way of representing the matter1 it must be confessed1 is exceedingly plausible and taking at first view2 but yet1 if we examine it closely1 we shall find that it does not touch the real knot of the difficulty4 ,the cases are not parallel4 ,the prince is endowed with a foreknowledge of offences1 which it is not in his power wholly to prevent4 ,hence it may be perfectly consistent with his wisdom and sincerity1 to use all the means in his power to prevent them1 though he may see they will fail in some cases1 while they will succeed in others4 ,but ,god1 according to the author1 might prevent all sin1 or exclude it all from his dominions by 8his mighty1 irresistible hand40 ,hence it may not be consistent with his wisdom and sincerity to use means which he foresees will have only partial success1 when he might so easily obtain universal and perfect success4 ,it seems evident1 then1 that this is a deceptive analogy4 ,it overlooks the root1 and grapples with the branches of the difficulty4 ,let it be seen1 that no power can cause the universal1 continued moral rectitude of intelligent creatures1 and then the two cases will be parallel2 and ,god may well use all possible means to prevent sin and cause holiness1 though some of his subjects may resist and perish4 ,let this principle1 which we have laboured to establish1 be seen1 and then may we entirely dispel the cloud which has so long seemed to hang over the wisdom and sincerity of the ,supreme ,ruler of the world4 ,we might offer strictures upon other passages of the solution under consideration2 but as the same error runs through all of them1 the reader may easily unravel its remaining obscurities and embarrassments for himself4 ,if holiness cannot be caused by a direct application of power1 it follows that there is no want of wisdom in the use of indirect means1 or of sincerity in the use of the most efficacious means the nature of the case will admit3 but if universal holiness may be caused to exist by a mere word1 then indeed it seems to be clearly inconsistent with wisdom to resort to means which must fail to secure it1 and with sincerity to utter the most solemn and vehement asseverations that it is the will of ,god to secure it2 for how obvious is the inquiry1 ,if he so earnestly desire it1 and can so easily secure it1 why does he not do it8 ,in rejecting the principle for which we contend1 ,howe has paid the usual penalty of denying the truth2 that is1 he has contradicted himself4 8,it were very unreasonable to imagine10 says he1 8that ,god cannot1 in any case1 extraordinarily oversway the inclinations and determine the will of such a creature1 in a way agreeable enough to its nature1 7though we particularly know not1 and we are not concerned to know1 or curiously to inquire in what way17 and highly reasonable to suppose that in many cases he doth40 ,here he affirms1 that our wills may be overruled and determined in perfect conformity to our natures1 in some way or other1 though we know not how4 ,why1 then1 does not ,god so overrule our wills in all cases1 and secure the existence of universal holiness8 ,because1 says he1 8it is manifest to any sober reason1 that it were very incongruous this should be the ordinary course of his conduct to mankind1 or the same persons at all times2 that is1 that the whole order of intelligent creatures should be moved only by inward impulses2 that ,god's precepts1 promises1 and comminations1 whereof their nature is capable1 should be all made impertinences1 through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them2 that the faculties1 whereby men are capable of moral government1 should be rendered to this purpose1 useless and vain2 and that they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed as mere machines that know not their own use40 ,what strange confusion and self-contradiction6 ,the wills of men may be1 and often are1 swayed by the mighty1 irresistible hand of ,god1 and in a way agreeable to their nature2 and yet this is not done in all cases1 lest men should be governed as mere machines6 ,the laws1 promises1 and threatenings of ,god1 are not to be rendered vain and useless in all cases1 but only in some cases6 ,indeed1 if we would escape such inconsistencies and self-contradictions1 we must return to the position that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms1--that no power can cause it4 ,from this position we may clearly see1 that the laws1 promises1 and comminations2 the counsels1 exhortations1 and influences of ,god1 which are employed to prevent sin1 are not a system of grand impertinences1--are not a vast and complicated machinery to accomplish what might be more perfectly1 easily1 and directly accomplished without them4 ,we may see1 that ,god really desires the holiness and happiness of all men1 although some may be finally lost2 that he is in earnest in the great work of salvation2 and when he so solemnly declares that he has no pleasure in the death of the sinner1 but would rather he should turn and live1 he means precisely what he says1 without the least equivocation or mental reservation4 ,this position it is1 then1 which shows the goodness of ,god in unclouded glory1 and reconciles his sincerity with the final result of his labours4 ,but we have not yet got rid of every shade of difficulty4 ,for it may still be asked1 why ,god uses means to save those who he foresees will be lost8 why he should labour when he foresees his labour will be in vain8 ,to this we answer1 that it does not follow his labour will be in vain1 because some may be pleased to rebel and perish4 ,this would be the case in regard to such persons1 provided his only object in what he does be to save them2 but although this is one great end and aim of his agency1 it does not follow that it is his only object4 ,for if any perish1 it is certainly desirable that it be from their own fault1 and not from the neglect of ,god to provide them with the means of salvation4 ,it is his object1 as he tells us1 to vindicate his own character1 and to stop every mouth in regard to the lost1 as well as to save the greatest possible number4 ,but this object could not be accomplished1 if some should be permitted to perish without even a possibility of salvation4 ,hence he gives to all the means1 power1 and opportunity to turn and live2 and this fact is nearly always alluded to in relation to the finally impenitent and lost4 ,thus says our ,saviour1 with tears of commiseration and pity3 8,o ,jerusalem1 ,jerusalem1 how often would ,i have gathered thy children together1 even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings1 and ye would not6 ,behold1 your house is left unto you desolate40 ,now the tears of the ,redeemer thus wept over lost souls1 and this eloquent vindication of his own and his ,father's goodness and compassion1 would be a perfect mockery1 if salvation had never been placed within their reach1 or if their obedience1 their real spiritual obedience and submission1 might have been secured4 ,but as it is1 there is not even the shadow of a ground for suspecting the sincerity of the ,redeemer1 or his being in earnest in the great work of saving souls4 ,again the impenitent are addressed in the following awful language3 8,turn ye at my reproof3 behold1 ,i will pour out my spirit upon you1 ,i will make known my words unto you4 ,because ,i have called1 and ye refused2 ,i have stretched out my hand and no man regarded2 but ye have set at naught all my counsel and would none of my reproof3 ,i also will laugh at your calamity3 ,i will mock when your fear cometh40 ,thus the proceeding of the ,almighty1 in the final rejection of the impenitent1 is placed on the ground1 that they had obstinately resisted the means employed for their salvation4 ,this seems to remove every shade of difficulty4 ,but how dark and enigmatical1 nay1 how self-contradictory1 would all such language appear1 if they might have been very easily rendered holy and happy6 ,thus1 by bearing in mind that a necessary holiness is a contradiction1 an absurd and impossible conceit1 the goodness of ,god is vindicated in regard to the lost1 and his sincerity is evinced in the offer of salvation to all4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the views of ,luther and ,calvin respecting the sincerity of ,god in his endeavours to save those who will finally perish4 ,on any other principle1 we must forever struggle in vain to accomplish so desirable and so glorious an object4 ,if we proceed on the assumption that holiness may be very easily caused by an omnipotent1 extraneous agency1 we shall never be able to vindicate the sincerity of the ,almighty1 in the many solemn declarations put forth by him that he desires the salvation of all men4 ,the only sound1 logical inference for such premises1 is that drawn by ,luther1 namely1 that when ,god exhorts the sinner1 who he foresees will remain impenitent1 to turn from his wickedness and live1 he does so merely in the way of mockery and derision2 just 8as if a father were to say to his child1 #8,come1' while he knows that he cannot come407#afb7 ,the representation which ,calvin1 starting from the same point of view1 gives of the divine character1 is not more amiable or attractive than that of ,luther4 ,he maintains that 8the most perfect harmony0 exists between these two things3 8,god's having appointed from eternity on whom he will bestow his favour and exercise his wrath1 and his proclaiming salvation indiscriminately to all407#afc7 ,but how does he maintain this position8 ,how does he show this agreement8 8,there is more apparent plausibility10 says he1 8to the objection against predestination from the declaration of ,peter1 that #8the ,lord is not willing that any should perish1 but that all should come to repentance4' ,but the second clause furnishes an immediate solution of the difficulty2 for the willingness to come to repentance must be understood in consistence with the general tenor of ,scripture407#afd7 ,now what is the general tenor of ,scripture1 which is to overrule this explicit declaration that 8,god is not willing that any should perish80 ,the reader will be surprised1 perhaps1 that it is not ,scripture at all1 but the notion that ,god might easily convert the sinner if he would4 8,conversion is certainly in the power of ,god20 he adds1 8let him be asked1 whether he wills the conversion of all1 when he promises a few individuals to give them #8a heart of flesh1' while he leaves them with #8a heart of stone4' 0 ,thus the very clearest light of the divine word is extinguished by the application of a false metaphysics4 ,god tells us that he 8is not willing that any should perish30 ,calvin tells us1 that this declaration must1 in conformity with the general tenor of ,scripture1 be so understood as to allow us to believe that he is not only willing that many should perish1 but also that their destruction is prerdained and forever fixed by an eternal and immutable decree of ,god4 ,nay1 that they are1 and were1 created for the express purpose of being devoted to death1 spiritual and eternal4 ,is this to interpret1 or to refute the divine word8 ,the view which ,calvin1 from this position1 finds himself bound to take of the divine character1 is truly horrible1 and makes one's blood run cold4 ,the call of the gospel1 he admits1 is universal--is directed to the reprobate as well as to the elect2 but to what end1 or with what design1 is it directed to the former8 8,he directs his voice to them10 if we may believe ,calvin1 8but it is that they may become more deaf2 he kindles a light1 but it is that they may be made more blind2 he publishes his doctrine1 but it is that they may be more besotted2 he applies a remedy1 but it is that they may not be healed4 ,john1 citing this prophecy1 declares that the ,jews could not believe1 because the curse of ,god was upon them4 ,nor can it be disputed1 that to such persons as ,god determines not to enlighten1 he delivers his doctrine involved in enigmatical obscurity1 that its only effect may be to increase their stupidity407#afe7 ,in conclusion1 we would add that it is this idea of a necessitated holiness which gives apparent solidity to the arguments of the ,calvinist1 and which neutralizes the attacks of their opponents4 ,to select only one instance out of a thousand3 the ,calvinist insists that if ,god had really intended the salvation of all men1 then all would have been saved2 since nothing lies beyond the reach of his omnipotence4 ,to this the ,arminian cries out with horror1 that if ,god does not desire the salvation of all1 but is willing that a portion should sin and be eternally lost1 then his goodness is limited1 and his glory obscured4 ,in perfect conformity with these views1 the one contends for a limited atonement1 insisting that it is confined either in its original design1 or in its application1 to a certain1 fixed1 definite number of mankind2 while the other maintains1 with equal earnestness1 that such is the goodness of ,god that he has sent forth his ,son to make an atonement for the sins of the whole world4 ,to design and prepare it for all1 says the ,calvinist1 and then apply it only to a few1 is not consistent with either the wisdom or goodness of ,god2 and that he does savingly apply it only to a small number of the human race is evident from the fact that only a small number are actually saved4 ,however the doctrine of a limited atonement1 or1 what is the same thing in effect1 the limited application of the atonement1 may be exclaimed against and denounced as dishonourable to ,god1 all must and do admit the fact1 that it is efficaciously applied to only a select portion of mankind2 which is to deny and to admit one and the same thing in one and the same breath4 ,now1 in this contest of arms1 it is our humble opinion that each party gets the better of the other4 ,each overthrows the other2 but neither perceives that he is himself overthrown4 ,hence1 though each demolishes the other1 neither is convinced1 and the controversy still rages4 ,nor can there ever be an end of this wrangling and jangling while the arguments of the opposite parties have their roots in a common error4 ,let the work of ,mr4 ,symington1 or any other which advocates a limited atonement1 be taken up1 its argument dissected1 and let the false principle1 that ,god could easily make all men holy if he would1 be eliminated from them1 and we venture to predict that they will lose all appearance of solidity1 and resolve themselves into thin air47#aff7 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,natural ,evil1 ,or ,suffering1 ,and ,especially ,the ,suffering ,of ,infants ,reconciled ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,sweet ,eden was the arbour of delight2 ,yet in his lovely flowers our poison blew3 ,sad ,gethsemane1 the bower of baleful night1 ,where ,christ a health of poison for us drew2 ,yet all our honey in that poison grew3 ,so we from sweetest flowers could suck our bane1 ,and ,christ1 from bitter venom1 could again ,extract life out of death1 and pleasure out of pain4--,,giles ,,fletcher4 ,if1 as we have endeavoured to show1 a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms1 then the existence of natural evil may be easily reconciled with the divine goodness1 in so far as it may be necessary to punish and prevent moral evil4 ,indeed1 the divine goodness itself demands the punishment of moral evil1 in order to restrain its prevalence1 and shut out the disorders it tends to introduce into the moral universe4 ,nor is it any impeachment of the infinite wisdom and goodness of ,god1 if the evils inflicted upon the commission of sin be sufficiently great to answer the purpose for which they are intended--that is1 to stay the frightful progress and ravages of moral evil4 ,hence it was that the sin of one man brought 8death into the world1 and all our woe40 ,thus the good providence of ,god1 no less than his word1 speaks this tremendous lesson to his intelligent creatures3 8,behold the awful spectacle of a world lying in ruins1 and tremble at the very thought of sin6 ,a thousand deaths are not so terrible as one sin60 ,section ,i4 ,all suffering not a punishment for sin4 ,we should not conclude from this1 however1 that all suffering or natural evil bears the characteristic of a punishment for moral evil4 ,this seems to be a great mistake of certain theologians1 who pay more attention to the coherency of their system than to the light of nature or of revelation4 ,thus1 says ,dr4 ,dick3 8,if our antagonists will change the meaning of words1 they cannot alter the nature of things4 ,pain and death are evils1 and when inflicted by the hand of a just ,god1 must be punishments3 for although the innocent may be harassed and destroyed by the arbitrary exercise of human power1 none but the guilty suffer under his administration4 ,to pretend that1 although death and other temporal evils have come upon us through the sin of ,adam1 yet these are not to be regarded as a punishment1 is neither more nor less than to say1--they must not be called a punishment1 because this would not agree with our system4 ,if we should concede that they are a punishment1 we should be compelled to admit that the sin of the first man is imputed to his posterity1 and that he was their federal head4 ,we deny1 therefore1 that the labours and sorrows of the present life1 the loss of such joys as are left to us at its close1 and the dreadful agonies and terrors with which death is often attended1 have the nature of a penalty4 ,in like manner1 a man may call black white1 and bitter sweet1 because it will serve his purpose2 but he would be the veriest simpleton who should believe him40 ,now1 we do not deny that the agonies and terrors of death are sometimes a punishment for sin3 this is the case in regard to all those who actually commit sin1 and sink into the grave amid the horrors of a guilty conscience4 ,but the question is1 ,do suffering and death never fall upon the innocent under the administration of ,god8 ,we affirm that they do2 and also that they may fall upon the innocent1 in perfect accordance with the infinite goodness of ,god4 ,in the first place1 we reply to the confident assertions of ,dr4 ,dick1 and of the whole school to which he belongs1 as follows3 ,to pretend that death and other temporal evils are always punishments1 is neither more nor less than to say1 8they must be called punishments1 because this would agree with our system4 ,if we should concede that they are not a punishment1 we should be compelled to admit that the sin of the first man is not imputed to his posterity1 and that he was not their federal head4 ,if our antagonists10 c4 ,surely it is not very wise to use language which may be so easily retorted4 ,secondly1 it is true1 the change of a word cannot alter the nature of things2 but it may alter1 and very materially too1 our view of the nature of things4 ,besides1 if to refuse to call suffering in certain cases a punishment1 be merely to change a word1 why should so great an outcry be made about it8 ,why may we not use that word which sounds the most pleasantly to the ear1 and sits the most easily upon the heart8 ,thirdly1 we do not arbitrarily and blindly reject the term punishment1 8because it does not agree with our system40 ,we not only reject the term1 but also the very idea and the thing for which it stands4 ,we mean to affirm1 that the innocent do sometimes suffer under the administration of ,god2 and that all suffering is not a punishment for sin4 ,the very idea of punishment1 according to ,dr4 ,dick himself1 is1 that it is suffering inflicted on account of sin in the person upon whom it is inflicted2 and hence1 wherever pain or death falls under the administration of ,god1 we must there find1 says he1 either actual or imputed sin4 ,now1 in regard to certain cases1 we deny both the name and the thing4 ,and we make this denial1 as it will be seen1 not because it agrees with our system merely1 but because it agrees with the universal voice and reason of mankind1 except where that voice has been silenced1 and that reason perverted1 by dark and blindly-dogmatizing schemes of theology4 ,fourthly1 there is a vast difference1 in reality1 between regarding some sufferings as mere calamities1 and all suffering as punishment4 ,if we regard all suffering as punishment1 then we need look no higher and no further in order to vindicate the character of ,god in the infliction of them4 ,for1 according to this view1 they are the infliction of his retributive justice1 merited by the person upon whom they fall1 and adapted to prevent sin2 and consequently here our inquiries may terminate2 just as when we see the criminal receive the penalty due to his crimes4 ,on the other hand1 if we may not view all suffering as punishment1 then must we seek for other grounds and principles on which to vindicate the goodness of ,god2 then must we look for other ends1 or final causes1 of suffering under the wise economy of divine providence4 ,and this search1 as we shall see1 will lead us to behold the moral government of the world1 not as it is darkly distorted in certain systems of theology1 but as it is in itself1 replete with light and ineffable beauty4 ,but before we undertake to show this by direct arguments1 let us pause and consider the predicament to which the greatest divines have reduced themselves1 by their advocacy of such an imputation of the sin of one man4 ,dr4 ,dick affirms1 as we have seen1 that every evil brought upon man under the good providence of ,god1 must be a punishment for sin2 and hence1 as infants do not actually sin1 they are exposed to divine wrath on account of the sin of ,adam1 which is imputed to them4 ,but is not this imputation1 which draws after itself pain and death1 also an evil8 ,how has it happened1 then1 that in the good providence of ,god1 this tremendous evil1 this frightful source of so many evils1 has been permitted to fall on the infant world8 ,must there not be some other sin imputed to justify the infliction of such an evil1 and so on ad infinitum8 ,will ,dr4 ,dick carry out his principle to this consequence8 ,will he require1 as in consistency he is bound to require1 that the tremendous evil of the imputation of sin shall not fall upon any part of ,god's creation1 except as a punishment for some antecedent guilt8 ,no1 indeed3 at the very second step his great principle1 so confidently and so dogmatically asserted1 completely breaks down under him4 ,the imposition of this evil is justified1 not by any antecedent guilt1 but by the divine constitution1 according to which ,adam is the federal head and representative of the human race4 ,thus1 after all1 ,dr4 ,dick has found some principle or ground on which to justify the infliction of evil1 beside the principle of guilt or ill-desert4 ,might there not possibly be1 then1 such a divine constitution of things1 as to bring suffering upon the offspring of ,adam in consequence of his sin1 without resorting to the dark and enigmatical fiction of the imputation of his transgression8 ,if there be a divine constitution1 as ,dr4 ,dick contends there is1 which justifies the imputation of moral evil1 with all its frightful consequences1 both temporal and eternal death1 may it not be possible1 in the nature of things1 to suppose a divine constitution to justify suffering without the imputation of sin8 ,how can the one of these things be so utterly repugnant to the divine character1 and the other so perfectly agreeable to it8 ,until this question be answered1 we may suspect the author himself of having assumed positions and made confident assertions1 8because they agree with his system40 8,we say1 then10 says ,dr4 ,dick1 8that by his sin his posterity became liable to the punishment denounced against himself4 ,they became guilty through his guilt1 which is imputed to them1 or placed to their account2 so that they are treated as if they had personally broken the covenant40 ,thus all the posterity of ,adam1 not excepting infants1 became justly obnoxious to the 8penalty of the covenant of works1--death1 temporal1 spiritual1 and eternal40 ,now1 we would suppose that this scheme of imputation is attended with at least as great a difficulty as the doctrine that the innocent do sometimes suffer under the good providence of ,god4 ,indeed1 the author does not deny that it is attended with difficulties1 which have never been answered4 ,in regard to the imputation of sin1 he says3 8,candour requires me to add1 that we are not competent fully to assign the reasons of this dispensation4 ,after the most mature consideration of the subject1 it appears mysterious that ,god should have placed our first parent in such circumstances1 that while he might insure1 he might forfeit1 his own happiness and that of millions of beings who were to spring from his loins4 ,we cannot tell why he adopted this plan with us and not with angels1 each of whom was left to stand or fall for himself407#afg7 ,now1 when it is affirmed that the innocent may suffer for wise and good purposes1 why is all this candour and modesty forgotten8 ,why is it not admitted1 8,it may be so20 8,we cannot tell80 ,why is the fact1 of which these writers so often and so eloquently remind us1 that the human intellect is a poor1 blind1 weak thing1 quite unfit to pry into mysteries1 then sunk in utter oblivion1 and a tone of confident dogmatism assumed8 ,why not act consistently with the character of the sceptic or the dogmatist1 and not put on the one or the other by turns1 according to the exigencies of a system8 ,if we ask1 why infants are exposed to death1 we are told1 that it is a punishment for ,adam's sin imputed to them4 ,we are told that this must be so2 since 8none but the guilty ever suffer under the administration of ,god10 who is not an arbitrary and cruel tyrant to cause the innocent to suffer4 ,why then1 we ask1 does he impute sin to them8 ,to this it is replied1 8,we cannot tell40 ,no wonder2 for if there must always be antecedent guilt to justify ,god in imposing evil upon his subjects1 then there can be no reason for such a dispensation for imposing the tremendous evil of the imputation of sin4 ,the advocates of it themselves have laid down a principle1 which shows it to be without a reason4 ,hence they may well say1 8,we cannot tell40 ,thus suffering is justified by the imputation of guilt2 the imputation of guilt by the divine constitution2 and the divine constitution1 by nothing6 ,if this is all that can be done1 would it not have been just as well to have begun1 as well as ended1 in the divine constitution of things8 ,but1 no6 even the most humble of men must have some explanation1 some little mitigation of their difficulties1 if it be only to place the world upon the back of an elephant1 the elephant upon the back of a tortoise1 and the tortoise upon nothing4 ,it seems to be inconceivably horrible to ,dr4 ,dick1 and others of his school1 that the innocent should ever be made to suffer under the providence of ,god2 but yet they earnestly insist that the same good providence plunges the whole human race--infants and all--into unavoidable guilt1 and then punishes them for it6 ,to say that the innocent may be made to suffer is monstrous injustice--is horrible2 but to say that they are made sinners1 and then punished1 is all right and proper6 ,to say that the innocent can suffer under the administration of ,god1 is to shock our sense of justice1 and put out the light of the divine goodness2 but it is all well if we only say that the punishment due to ,adam's sin is made1 by the same good administration1 to fall upon all his posterity in the form of moral evil1 and that then they are justly punished for this punishment6 ,alas1 that the minds of the great and the good1 born to reflect the light of the glorious gospel of ,god upon a darkened world1 should be so sadly warped1 so awfully distorted1 by the inexorable necessities of a despotic system6 ,section ,,ii4 ,the imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,this point has been already indirectly considered1 but it is worthy of a more direct and complete examination4 ,it is very remarkable that although ,dr4 ,dick admits he cannot reconcile the scheme of imputation with the character of ,god1 or remove its seeming hardships1 not to say cruelty1 he yet positively affirms that 8it is a proof of the goodness of ,god407#afh7 ,surely1 if the covenant of works1 involving the imputation of sin1 as explained by ,dr4 ,dick1 be a 8proof of the divine goodness10 it cannot but appear to be too severe4 ,but as this point1 on which he scarcely dwells at all1 is more elaborately and fully discussed by ,president ,edwards1 we shall direct our attention to him4 8,it is objected10 says ,edwards1 8that appointing ,adam to stand in this great affair as the moral head of his posterity1 and so treating them as one with him1 is injurious to them40 8,to which10 says he1 8,i answer1 it is demonstrably otherwise2 that such a constitution was so far from being injurious to ,adam's posterity any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself personally1 that it was1 in itself considered1 attended with a more eligible probability of a happy issue than the latter would have been2 and so is a constitution that truly expresses the goodness of its ,author40 ,now1 let us see how this is demonstrated4 8,there is a greater tendency to a happy issue in such an appointment10 says he1 8than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself2 especially on these accounts3 7#a47 ,that ,adam had stronger motives to watchfulness than his posterity would have had2 in that1 not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake1 but also that of all his posterity4 7#b47 ,adam was in a state of complete manhood when his trial began407#afi7 ,in the first place1 then1 the constitution for which ,edwards contends is 8an expression of the divine goodness10 because it presented stronger motives to obedience than if it had merely suspended the eternal destiny of ,adam alone upon his conduct4 ,the eternal welfare of his posterity was staked upon his obedience2 and1 having this stupendous motive before him1 he would be more likely to preserve his allegiance than if the motive had been less powerful4 ,the magnitude of the motive1 says ,edwards1 is the grand circumstance which evinces the goodness of ,god in the appointment of such a constitution4 ,if this be true1 it is very easy to see how the ,almighty might have made a vast improvement in his own constitution for the government of the world4 ,he might have made the motive still stronger1 and thereby made the appointment or covenant still better3 instead of suspending merely the eternal destiny of the human race upon the conduct of ,adam1 he might have staked the eternal fate of the universe upon it4 ,according to the argument of ,edwards1 what a vast1 what a wonderful improvement would this have been in the divine constitution for the government of the world1 and how much more conspicuously would it have displayed the goodness of its ,divine ,author6 ,again1 the scheme of ,edwards is condemned out of his own mouth4 ,if this scheme be better than another1 because its motives are stronger1 why did not ,god render it still more worthy of his goodness1 by rendering its motives still more powerful and efficacious8 ,edwards admits1 nay1 he insists1 that ,god might easily have rendered the motives of his moral government perfectly efficacious and successful4 ,he repeatedly declares that ,god could have prevented all sin1 8by giving such influences of his ,spirit as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it40 ,if the goodness of a constitution1 then1 is to be determined by the strength of its motives1 as the argument of ,edwards supposes1 then we are bound1 according to his principles1 to pronounce that for which he contends unworthy of the goodness of ,god1 as being radically unsound and defective4 ,this is emphatically the case1 as the ,governor of the world might have strengthened the motives to obedience indefinitely1 not by augmenting the danger1 but by increasing the security of his subjects2 that is to say1 not by making the penalty more terrific1 but by giving a greater disposition to obedience4 ,the same thing may be clearly seen from another point of view4 ,let us suppose1 for instance1 that ,god had established the constitution or covenant1 that if ,adam had persevered in obedience1 then all his posterity should be confirmed in holiness and happiness2 and that if he fell1 he should fall for himself alone4 ,would not such an appointment1 we ask1 have been more likely to have been attended with a happy issue than that for which ,edwards contends8 ,let us suppose again1 that after such a constitution had been established1 its ,divine ,author had really secured the obedience of ,adam2 would not this have made a 8happy issue0 perfectly certain8 ,why then was not such a constitution established8 ,it would most assuredly have been an infinitely clearer and more beautiful expression of the divine goodness than that of ,edwards4 ,hence1 the philosophy of ,edwards easily furnishes an unspeakably better constitution for the government of the world1 than that which has been established by the wisdom of ,god6 ,is it not evident1 that the advocates of such a scheme should never venture before the tribunal of reason at all8 ,is it not evident1 that their only safe policy is to insist1 as they sometimes do1 that we do not know what is consistent1 or inconsistent1 with the attributes of ,god1 in his arrangements for the government of the world8 ,is it not evident1 that their truest wisdom is to be found in habitually dwelling on the littleness1 weakness1 misery1 and darkness of the human mind1 and in rebuking its arrogance for presuming to pry into the mysteries of their system8 ,the vindication of the divine goodness by ,edwards1 is1 we think it must be conceded1 exceedingly weak4 ,all it amounts to is this1--that this scheme is an expression of the goodness of ,god1 because1 in certain respects1 it is better than a scheme which might have been established4 ,so far from showing it to be the best possible scheme1 his philosophy shows it might be greatly improved in the very respects in which its excellency is supposed to consist4 ,in other words1 he contends that ,god has displayed his goodness in the appointment of such a constitution1 on the ground that he might have made a worse2 though1 according to his own principles1 it is perfectly evident that he might have made a better6 ,is this to express1 or to deny1 the absolute1 infinite goodness of ,god8 ,is it to manifest the glory of that goodness to the eye of man1 or to shroud it in clouds and darkness8 ,edwards also says1 that 8the goodness of ,god in such a constitution with ,adam appears in this3 that if there had been no sovereign1 gracious establishment at all1 but ,god had proceeded on the basis of mere justice1 and had gone no farther than this required1 he might have demanded of ,adam and all his posterity1 that they should have performed perfect1 perpetual obedience40 ,the italics are all his own4 ,on this passage1 we have to remark1 that it is built upon unfounded assumptions4 ,it is frequently said1 we are aware1 that if it had not been for the redemption of the world by a 8sovereign1 gracious0 dispensation1 the whole race of man might have been justly exposed to the torments of hell forever4 ,but where is the proof8 ,is it found in the word of ,god8 ,this tells us what is1 what has been1 and what will be2 but it is not given to speculate upon what might be4 ,for aught we know1 if there had been no salvation through ,christ1 as a part of the actual constitution and system of the world1 then there would have been no other part of that system whatever4 ,we are not told1 and we do not know1 what it would have been consistent with the justice of ,god to do in relation to the world1 if there had been no remedy provided for its restoration4 ,perhaps it might never have been created at all4 ,the work of ,christ is the great sun and centre of the system as it is2 and if this had never been a part of the original grand design1 we do not know that the planets would have been created to wander in eternal darkness4 ,we do not know that even the justice of ,god would have created man1 and permitted him to fall1 wandering everlastingly amid the horrors of death1 without hope and without remedy4 ,we find nothing of the kind in the word of ,god2 and in our nature it meets with no response1 except a wail of unutterable horror4 ,we like not1 we confess1 those vindications of ,god's goodness1 which consist in drawing hideous1 black pictures of his justice1 and then telling us that it is not so dark as these4 ,we want not to know whether there might not be darker things in the universe than ,god's love2 we only want to know if there could be anything brighter1 or better1 or more beautiful4 ,the most astounding feature of this vindication of the divine goodness still remains to be noticed4 ,we are told that the constitution in question is good1 because it was so likely to have had a 8happy issue40 ,and when this constitution was established by the sovereign will and pleasure of ,god1 the conduct of ,adam1 it is conceded1 was perfectly foreseen by him4 ,at the very time this constitution was established1 its ,divine ,author foresaw with perfect absolute certainty what would be the issue4 ,he knew that the great federal head1 so appointed by him1 would transgress the covenant1 and bring down the curse of 8death1 temporal1 spiritual1 and eternal10 upon all his posterity4 ,o1 wonderful goodness6 to promise eternal life to the human race on a condition which he certainly foreknew would not be performed6 ,amazing grace6 to threaten eternal death to all mankind1 on a condition which he certainly foreknew would be fulfilled6 ,this cannot be evaded1 by asserting that the same difficulty attaches to the fact1 that ,god created ,adam foreseeing he would fall4 ,his foreknowledge did not necessitate the fall of ,adam4 ,it left him free as ,god had created him4 ,life and death were set before him1 and he had the power to stand1 as well as the power to fall4 ,he had no right to complain of ,god1 then1 if1 under such circumstances1 he chose to rebel1 and incur the penalty4 ,but if the scheme of ,edwards be true1 the descendants of ,adam did not have their fate in their own hands4 ,it did not depend on their own choice4 ,it was necessitated1 even prior to their existence1 by the divine constitution which had indissolubly connected their awful destiny1 their temporal and eternal ruin1 with an event already foreseen4 ,and the constitution binding such awful consequences to an event already foreseen1 is called an expression of the goodness of ,god6 ,suppose1 for example1 that a great prince should promise his subjects that on the happening of a certain event1 over which they had no control1 he would confer unspeakable favours upon them4 ,suppose also1 that at the same time he should declare to them1 that if the event should not happen1 he would load them with irons1 cast them into prison1 and inflict the greatest imaginable punishments upon them during the remainder of their lives4 ,suppose again1 that at the very time he thus made known his gracious intentions to them1 he knew perfectly well that the event on which his favour was suspended would not happen4 ,then1 according to his certain foreknowledge1 the event fails1 and the penalty of the covenant or appointment is inflicted upon his subjects3--they are cast into prison2 they are bound in chains1 and perpetually tormented with the greatest of all imaginable evils3--not because they had transgressed the appointment or sovereign constitution1 but because an event had taken place over which they had no control4 ,now1 who would call such a ruler a good prince8 ,who could conceive1 indeed1 of a more cruel or deceitful tyrant8 ,but we submit it to the candid reader1 if he be not more like the prince of predestination1 than the great ,god of heaven and earth8 ,this scheme of imputation1 so far from being an expression of infinite goodness1 were indeed an exhibition of the most frightful cruelty and injustice4 ,it would be a useful1 as well as a most curious inquiry1 to examine the various contrivances of ingenious men1 in order to bring the doctrine of imputation into harmony with the justice of ,god4 ,we shall briefly allude to only two of these wonderful inventions1--those of ,augustine and ,edwards4 ,neither of these celebrated divines supposed that a foreign sin1 properly so called1 is ever imputed to any one2 but that the sin of ,adam1 which is imputed to his descendants1 is their own sin1 as well as his47#agj7 ,but here the question arises1 ,how could they make ,adam's sin to be the sin of his descendants1 many of whom were born thousands of years after it was committed8 ,augustine1 as is well known1 maintained the startling paradox1 that all mankind were present in ,adam1 and sinned in him4 ,in this way1 he supposed that all men became partakers in the guilt of ,adam's sin1 and consequently justly liable to the penalty due to his transgression4 ,augustine was quite too good a logician not to perceive1 that if all men are responsible for ,adam's sin1 because they were in him when he transgressed1 then1 it follows1 that we are also responsible for the sins of all our ancestors1 from whom we are more immediately descended4 ,this follows from that maxim of jurisprudence1 from that dictate of common-sense1 that a rule of law is coxtensive with the reason upon which it is based4 ,hence1 as ,wiggers remarks3 8,augustine thought it not improbable that the sins of ancestors universally are imputed to their descendants407#aga7 ,this conclusion is clearly set forth in the extracts made by the translator of ,wiggers47#agb7 ,if this scheme be true1 we know indeed that we are all guilty of ,adam's sin2 but who1 or how many of the human race1 were the perpetrators of ,cain's murder beside himself1 we cannot determine4 ,indeed1 if this frightful hypothesis be well founded1 if it form a part of the moral constitution of the world1 no man can possibly tell how many thefts1 murders1 or treasons1 he may have committed in his ancestors4 ,one thing is certain1 however1 and that is1 that the man who is born later in the course of time1 will have the more sins to answer for1 and the more fearful will be the accumulation of his guilt2 as all the transgressions of all his ancestors1 from ,adam down to his immediate parents1 will be laid upon his head4 ,clearly as this consequence is involved in the fundamental principle of ,augustine's theory1 the good father could not but reel and stagger under it4 8,respecting the sins of the other parents10 says he1 8the progenitors from ,adam down to one's own immediate father1 it may not improperly be debated1 whether the child is implicated in the evil acts and multiplied original faults of all1 so that each one is the worse in proportion as he is later2 or that1 in respect to the sins of their parents1 ,god threatens posterity to the third and fourth generation1 because1 by the moderation of his compassion1 he does not further extend his anger in respect to the faults of progenitors1 lest those on whom the grace of regeneration is not conferred1 should be pressed with too heavy a burden in their own eternal damnation1 if they were compelled to contract by way of origin 7originaliter7 the sins of all their preceding parents from the commencement of the human race1 and to suffer the punishment due to them47#agc7 ,whether1 on so great a subject1 anything else can or cannot be found1 by a more diligent reading and scrutiny of the ,scriptures1 ,i dare not hastily affirm407#agd7 ,thus does the sturdy logician1 notwithstanding his almost indomitable hardihood1 seem to stand appalled before the consequences to which his principles would inevitably conduct him4 ,having followed those principles but a little way1 the scene becomes so dark with his representations of the divine justice1 that he feels constrained to retrace his steps1 and arbitrarily introduce the divine mercy1 in order to mitigate the indescribable horrors which continually thicken around him4 ,such hesitation1 such wavering and inconsistency1 is the natural result of every scheme which places the decisions of the head in violent conflict with the indestructible feelings of the heart4 ,in his attempt to reconcile the scheme of imputation with the justice of ,god1 ,edwards has met with as little success as ,augustine4 ,for this purpose1 he supposed that ,god had constituted an identity between ,adam and all his posterity1 whereby the latter became partakers of his rebellion4 8,i think it would go far toward directing us to the more clear conception and right statement of this affair10 says he1 in reference to imputation1 8were we steadily to bear this in mind1 that ,god1 in every step of his proceedings with ,adam1 in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him1 looked on his posterity as being one with him4 ,and though he dealt more immediately with ,adam1 it yet was as the head of the whole body1 and the root of the whole tree2 and in his proceedings with him1 he dealt with all the branches as if they had been then existing in their root4 ,from which it will follow1 that both guilt1 or exposedness to punishment1 and also depravity of heart1 came upon ,adam's posterity just as they came upon him1 as much as if he and they had all coxisted1 like a tree with many branches2 allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place ,adam stood in as head or root of the whole4 ,otherwise1 it is as if1 in every step of proceeding1 every alteration in the root had been attended at the same instant with the same alteration throughout the whole tree1 in each individual branch4 ,i think this will naturally follow on the supposition of their being a constituted oneness or identity of ,adam and his posterity in this affair407#age7 ,as the sap of a tree1 ,edwards has said1 spreads from the root of a tree to all its branches1 so the original sin of ,adam descends from him through the generations of men4 ,in the serious promulgation of such sentiments1 it is only forgotten that sin is not the sap of a tree1 and that the whole human race is not really one and the same person4 ,such an idea of personal identity is as utterly unintelligible as the nature of the sin and the responsibility with which it is so intimately associated4 ,surely these are the dark dreams of men1 not the bright and shining lights of eternal truth4 ,before we take leave of ,president ,edwards1 we would remark1 that he proceeds on the same supposition with ,calvin17#agf7 ,bates17#agg7 ,dwight17#agh7 ,dick1 and a host of others1 that suffering is always a punishment of sin1 and of 8sin in them who suffer407#agi7 8,the light of nature10 says ,edwards1 8or tradition from ancient revelation1 led the heathen to conceive of death as in a peculiar manner an evidence of divine vengeance4 ,thus we have an account1 that when the barbarians saw the venomous beast hang on ,paul's hand1 they said among themselves1 #8,no doubt1 this man is a murderer1 whom1 though he hath escaped the seas1 yet vengeance suffereth not to live4' 07#ahj7 ,we think that the barbarians concluded rashly3 it is certain that ,st4 ,paul was neither a murderer nor a god4 ,nor1 indeed1 if the venomous beast had taken his life1 would this have proved him to be a murderer1 any more than its falling off into the fire proved him to be a god1 according to the rash judgment of the barbarians4 ,there is a better source of philosophy1 if we mistake not1 than the rash1 hasty1 foolish judgments of barbarians4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the imputation of sin not consistent with human1 much less with the divine goodness4 ,there are few persons whose feelings will allow them to be consistent advocates of the doctrine of the imputation of ,adam's sin4 8,to many other divines10 says ,bishop ,burnet1 8this seems a harsh and inconceivable opinion3 it seems repugnant to the justice and goodness of ,god to reckon men guilty of sin which they never committed1 and to punish them in their souls eternally for that which is no act of theirs407#aha7 ,it certainly 8seems very hard10 as the author says1 8to apprehend how persons who have never sinned1 but are only unhappily descended1 should be1 in consequence of that1 under so great a misery40 ,but how to escape the pressure of this stupendous difficulty is the question4 ,there are many who cannot endure it2 or rather1 there are very few who can endure it2 but1 as ,bishop ,burnet says1 they find no difficulty in the idea of temporal punishment on account of ,adam's sin4 8,this1 they think1 is easily enough reconcilable with the notions of justice and goodness1 since this is only a temporary punishment relating to men's persons407#ahb7 ,but do they not sacrifice their logic to their feelings8 ,let us see4 ,this view of a limited imputation1 and a limited punishment1 is not confined to the ,church of ,england4 ,it prevails to a greater or less extent in all denominations4 ,but ,president ,edwards has1 we think1 unanswerably exposed the inconsistency of its advocates4 8,one of them supposes10 says he1 8that this sin1 though truly imputed to ,,infants1 so that thereby they are exposed to a proper punishment1 yet is not imputed to them in such a degree1 as that upon this account they should be liable to eternal punishment1 as ,adam himself was1 but only to temporal death1 or annihilation2 ,adam himself1 the immediate actor1 being made infinitely more guilty of it than his posterity4 ,on which ,i would observe1 that to suppose ,god imputes1 not all the guilt of ,adam1 but only some little part of it1 relieves nothing but his imagination4 ,to think of poor little infants bearing such torments for ,adam's sin1 as they sometimes do in this world1 and these torments ending in death and annihilation1 may sit easier on the imagination1 than to conceive of their suffering eternal misery for it2 but it does not at all relieve one's reason4 ,there is no rule of reason that can be supposed to lie against imputing a sin in the whole of it1 which was committed by one1 to another who did not personally commit it1 but will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in part2 for all the reasons 7if there be any7 lie against the imputation1 not the quality or degree of what is imputed4 ,if there be any rule of reason that is strong and good1 lying against a proper derivation or communication of guilt from one that acted to another that did not act1 then it lies against all that is of that nature4444 ,if these reasons are good1 all the difference is this3 that to bring a great punishment on infants for ,adam's sin1 is a great act of injustice1 and to bring a comparatively smaller punishment is a smaller act of injustice2 but not1 that this is not as truly and demonstrably an act of injustice as the other407#ahc7 ,we hold this to be a solid and unanswerable argument2 and we hold also1 that ,god can no more commit a small act of injustice than a great one4 ,hence1 in the eye of reason1 there is no medium between rejecting the whole of the imputation of ,adam's sin1 and ceasing to object against the imputation of the whole of it1 as inconsistent with the justice and goodness of ,god4 ,we may arbitrarily wipe out a portion of it in order to relieve our imagination2 but this brings no relief to the calm and passionless reason4 ,it may still the wild tumults of emotion1 but it cannot silence the voice of the intellect4 ,why not relieve both the imagination and the reason8 ,why not wipe out the whole dark film of imputation1 and permit the glad eye to open on the bright glory of ,god's infinite goodness8 ,the wonder is1 that when ,edwards had carried out his logic to such a conclusion1 he did not regard his argument as a perfect reductio ad absurdum4 ,the wonder is1 that when he had carried out his logic to the position1 that it might well consist with the justice of ,god to impute the whole of ,adam's sin to 8poor little infants10 as he calls them1 and then cause them to endure 8eternal torments for it10 his whole nature did not recoil from such a conclusion with indescribable horror4 ,for our part1 highly as we value logical consistency1 we should prefer a little incoherency in our reasoning1 a little flexibility in our logic1 rather than bear even one 8poor little infant0 on the hard1 unyielding point of it into the torments of hell forever4 ,st4 ,augustine was the great founder of the doctrine of the imputation of sin4 ,but although he did more than any other person to give this doctrine a hold upon the mind of the ,christian world1 it never had a perfect hold upon his own mind4 ,so far from being able to reconcile it with the divine goodness1 he could not reconcile it with his own goodness4 ,for this purpose1 he employed the theory that all the posterity of ,adam were1 in the most literal sense1 already in him1 and sinned in him--in his person2 and that ,adam's sin is therefore justly imputed to all his posterity47#ahd7 ,he also appeals to revelation4 8,st4 ,augustine10 as ,father ,almeyda truly says1 8and the fathers who follow him1 take the fundamental principle of their doctrine 7which affirms that infants without baptism will endure eternal pain7 from the sentence which the ,supreme ,judge is to pronounce at the last day4 ,we know that the ,lord1 dividing the human race into two portions1 will put the elect on the right hand1 and the reprobate on the left2 and he will say to those on the left1 ,depart into eternal fire4 ,st4 ,augustine then argues1 that infants will not be on the right1 because ,jesus ,christ has positively excluded all those who shall not be born again of water and of the ,holy ,spirit3 then they will be on the left2 and thus they will be comprehended in the damnation of eternal fire1 which the ,lord will pronounce against those who shall be on the left side3 for having no more than two hands1 and only two places and two sentences1 since1 then1 there are infants which ,god does not favour1 it follows that they will be comprehended in the sentence of the reprobate1 which is not only a privation of the sight of ,god1 but also the pain of fire407#ahe7 ,such is the ground1 and such the logic1 on which ,st4 ,augustine and his followers erected that portentous scheme1 that awful speculation1 which has so long cast a dark cloud over the glory of the ,christian world1 and prevented it from reflecting the bright1 cheering beams of the divine goodness4 ,but1 what6 could ,st4 ,augustine find rest in his own views1--in his own logic8 ,did he really banish all non-elect infants into the region of penal fire and everlasting woe8 ,if he adhered to the literal meaning of the words of revelation1 as he understood them1 he was certainly bound to do so2 but did he really and consistently do it8 ,did he really bind the 8poor little0 reprobate1 because it had sinned in ,adam1 in chains of adamant1 and leave it to writhe beneath the fierce inquisitorial fury of the everlasting flames8 ,did he really extract the vials of such exquisite and unprovoked wrath from the essence of infinite goodness itself8 ,no3 this was reserved for the superior logic and the sterner consistency of an iron age4 ,but since it has been extracted1 we may devoutly thank ,almighty ,god1 that it is now excluded from the hearts of men calling themselves ,christians1 and kept safely bottled up in their creeds and confessions4 ,st4 ,augustine could not endure the insufferable consequences of his own doctrine4 ,hence1 in writing to his great friend1 ,st4 ,jerome1 he said1 8in all sincerity3 when ,i come to treat of the punishment of infants1 believe that ,i find myself in great embarrassment1 and ,i absolutely know not what to reply40 ,writing against ,julian1 he adds3 8,i do not say that those who die without baptism will be punished with a torment such that it would be better for them if they had never been born40 ,and again3 8,those who1 besides original sin which they have contracted1 have not committed any other1 will be subjected to a pain the most mild of all407#ahf7 ,thus by adopting a wrong interpretation1 the principles of which were but little understood in his time1 ,st4 ,augustine banished all unbaptized infants from the kingdom of light2 but yet he could hardly find it in his heart to condemn them to the outer darkness4 ,he had too great a regard for the word of ,god1 as he understood it1 to permit non-elect infants to reign with ,christ in heaven2 and1 on the other hand1 he was too severely pressed by the generous impulses of his nature1 nay1 by the eternal dictates of truth and goodness1 to permit him to consign them really to the 8fire prepared for the devil and his angels40 ,hence1 although ,christ knew of 8but two places10 he fitted up a third1 to see them in which1 was1 as ,edwards would say1 8more agreeable to his imagination40 ,it was the sublime but unsteady genius of ,st4 ,augustine that caused this doctrine of the damnation of infants to be received into the ,christian world1 and find its way into the council of ,trent4 ,that celebrated council not only adopted the views of ,st4 ,augustine on this subject1 but also most perfectly reflected all his hesitation and inconsistency4 ,widely as its members differed on other points1 they all agreed that unbaptized infants should be excluded from the kingdom of heaven4 ,there was but little unanimity however1 as to the best method of disposing of them4 ,the ,dominicans fitted up a dark1 subterraneous cavern for them1 in which there is no fire1 at least none such as that of the infernal regions1 and in which they might be at least as happy as monks4 ,this place was called ,limbo--which1 we suppose1 is to ,purgatory1 about what the varioloid is to the smallpox4 ,the ,franciscans1 more humane in their doctrine1 determined that 8dear little infants10 though they had never felt the sanctifying influences of holy water1 should yet reside1 not in dark caverns and holes of the earth1 but in the sweet light and pure air of the upper world4 ,well done1 noble ,franciscan6 we honour thee for thy sweet fancy6 ,surely thou wert not1 like other monks1 made so altogether fierce by dark keeping1 that thou couldest not delight to see in ,god's blessed1 beautiful world1 a smiling infant6 ,others insisted1 that unbaptized infants would be condemned to become philosophers1 and turn out the authors of great discoveries4 ,this may seem a terrible damnation to some persons2 but1 for our part1 if we had been of that famous council1 it is likely we should have been in favour of this decree4 ,as the most agreeable punishment we could imagine1 we should have been for condemning them1 like the fallen angels of ,paradise ,lost1 to torment themselves with reasonings high1-- 8,of providence1 foreknowledge1 will1 and fate1 ,fix'd fate1 free-will1 foreknowledge absolute40 ,and if any of them had been found to possess no very great aptitude for such speculations1 then1 rather than they should find 8no end in wandering mazes lost10 we should have condemned them to turn poets and 8build the lofty rhyme40 ,so completely did the spirit of a blind exegesis triumph over the light of reason in the time of ,augustine1 that even ,pelagius and his followers excluded unbaptized infants from the kingdom of heaven1 because our ,saviour had declared that a man could not enter therein1 except he be born of water and of the ,spirit4 ,it is true1 they did not banish them into 8the fire prepared for the devil and his angels10 nor into ,limbo1 nor into dark holes of the earth2 on the contrary1 they admitted them to the joys of eternal life1 but not into the kingdom of heaven47#ahg7 ,thus1 the ,pelagians brought 8poor little infants0 as near to the kingdom of heaven as possible1 without doing too great violence to the universal orthodoxy of their time4 ,but as we cannot1 like the ,church of ,rome1 determine the fate of infants by a decree1 we must take some little pains to ascertain how it has been determined by the ,supreme ,ruler of the world4 ,for this purpose we shall first show1 that there is suffering in the world which is not a punishment for sin1 and then declare the great ends1 or final causes1 of all natural evil4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the true ends1 or final causes1 of natural evil4 ,we have often wondered that grave divines should declare that there could be no natural evil1 or suffering1 under the administration of ,god1 except such as is a punishment for sin in the person upon whom it is inflicted4 ,we have wondered1 that in declaring none but a tyrant could ever permit the innocent to suffer1 they have entertained no fears lest they might strengthen the cause of atheism4 ,for if it be impossible to justify the character of ,god1 except on the principle that all suffering is merited on account of sin in the object of it1 then it is easy to see1 that the atheistical argument against the goodness of ,god is unanswerable4 ,the atheist might well say3 8,do we not see and know that the whole animal creation suffers8 ,now for what sin are they punished8 ,the inferior animals1 you will admit1 are not capable of committing actual sin1 any more than infants are2 and ,adam was not their federal head and representative4 ,hence1 unless you can show for what sin they are punished1 you must admit that1 according to your own principles1 ,god is a tyrant40 ,how ,dr4 ,dick1 or ,dr4 ,dwight1 or ,president ,edwards1 or ,calvin1 would have answered such an argument1 we cannot determine4 ,for although they all assume that there can be no suffering under the good providence of ,god1 except it be a punishment for sin in the object of it1 yet1 so far as we know1 they have not made the most distant allusion to the suffering of the inferior animals4 ,indeed1 they seem to be so intently bent on maintaining the doctrine of the imputation of sin to infants1 that they pay no attention1 in the assumption of the above position1 either to the word of ,god1 or to the great volume of nature spread out before them4 ,but we find the difficulty noticed in a prize essay of three hundred pages1 on the subject of native depravity1 by ,dr4 ,woods4 ,the author assumes the same ground with ,edwards1 that all suffering must be justified on the ground of justice2 and hence he finds a real and proper sin in infants1 in order to reconcile their sufferings with the character of ,god4 ,this is the only ground1 according to ,dr4 ,woods1 on which suffering can be vindicated under the administration of a perfect ,god4 ,where1 then1 is the real and proper sin in the inferior animals to justify their sufferings8 ,this difficulty occurs to the distinguished author1 and he endeavours to meet it4 ,let us see his reply4 ,it is a reply which we have long been solicitous to see1 and we now have it from one of the most celebrated theologians of the present day4 8,some suppose10 says he1 8that infants suffer as irrational animals do1 without reference to a moral law or the principles of a moral government4 ,a strange supposition indeed1 that human beings should for a time be ranked with beings which are not human1 that is1 mere animals40 ,he is evidently shocked at such an insult offered to poor little infants4 ,he will not allow us1 for one moment1 to take the whole race of man1 8during the interesting period of infancy1 cut them off from their relation to ,adam1 degrade them from the dignity of human beings1 and put them in the rank of brute animals1--and then say1 they suffer as the brutes do4444 ,this would be the worst of all theories1--the farthest off from ,scripture and reason1 and the most revolting to all the noble sensibilities of man40 ,now1 it is really refreshing to find these allusions to 8the dignity of human beings0 in a writer of this school2 and especially in ,dr4 ,woods1 who has so often rebuked others for their pride1 when they have imagined that they were only engaged in the laudable enterprise of asserting this very dignity1 by raising men from the rank of mere machines4 ,it is so refreshing1 indeed1 to find such allusions in ,dr4 ,woods1 that we could almost forgive a little special pleading and bad logic in his attempt to vindicate the 8dignity of human beings10 which should have been an attempt to vindicate the goodness of ,god4 ,we do not place human beings and brutes in the same rank1 except in so far as both are sensitive creatures1 and consequently susceptible of pleasure and pain4 ,in this particular1 the ,creator himself has1 to a certain extent1 placed them in the same rank1 and it is useless to cry out against his appointment4 ,he will not listen to our talk about 8the dignity of human beings40 ,he will still leave us1 in so far as bodily pain and death are concerned1 in the same rank with mere animals4 ,this single point of resemblance between animals and human beings is all that our argument requires2 and the fact that animals do suffer pain and death cannot be denied1 or swept away by declamation4 ,let this fact be fairly and openly met1 and not merely evaded4 ,let it be shown how the suffering of mere animals may be reconciled with the infinite goodness of ,god1 and we will undertake to show how the suffering of guiltless 8human beings0 may be reconciled with it4 ,nay1 we will undertake to show that the suffering of infants may be reconciled with the divine goodness1 on the same1 and also on still higher1 grounds4 ,we will place their sufferings on a more solid and a more definite foundation1 than upon such vague and misty assertions as that they 8suffer with reference to a moral law40 ,we do not cut off infants from their relation to ,adam2 nor could we1 if we desired to do so1 cut them off from their relation to the animal nature which ,god has given them4 ,it may be a very humiliating thought1 it is true1 that human beings should ever eat like mere animals1 or sleep like mere animals1 or suffer like mere animals2 but yet we cannot see how any rebellion against so humiliating a thought can possibly alter the fact4 ,we do not deny1 indeed1 that a theologian may eat1 and sleep1 and suffer on higher principles than mere animals do2 but we seriously doubt if infants ever eat1 or sleep1 or suffer on any higher principles4 ,it may shock the 8noble sensibilities0 of man that dear little infants should suffer as brutes do1 especially when the term brutes is so strongly emphasized2 but how it can relieve the case to have the poor little creatures arraigned at the bar of divine justice1 and condemned to suffer as malefactors and criminals do1 is more than we can possibly comprehend4 ,to have them thus arraigned1 condemned1 and punished as criminals1 may dignify their sufferings1 and render them more worthy of the rank of human beings2 but this is a dignity to which1 we trust1 they will never aspire4 ,if we are not mistaken1 then1 the theory for which we contend is 8not the worst of all theories10 nor 8the most revolting to the noblest sensibilities of man40 ,it is a worse theory to suppose1 with ,edwards1 that they may be arraigned and banished into 8eternal misery0 for a sin they have not committed1 or the possession of a nature they could not possibly have avoided possessing4 ,it is better1 we say1 to rank the human race 8for a time10 8during the interesting period of infancy10 even with mere animals1 than to rank them with the devil and his angels4 ,but1 in truth1 we rank them with neither2 we simply leave them where ,god hath placed them1 as a connecting link between the animal and the angelic natures4 ,but we may produce many instances of suffering among human beings1 which are not a punishment for sin4 ,we might refer to the feeling of compassion1 which is always painful1 and sometimes wrings the heart with the most exquisite agony2 and yet this was not planted in our bosom as a punishment for sin1 but1 as ,bishop ,butler has shown17#ahh7 it was ordained by a ,god of mercy1 to teach us a lesson of mercy1 and lead us to mitigate the manifold miseries of man's estate4 ,we might also refer to an indignation against crime1 which1 as the same profound thinker has shown in his sermon on resentment1 was planted in our natures1 not to punish the subject of it1 but to insure the punishment of others1 that is1 of criminals2 and thereby to preserve the good order and well-being of the world4 ,this sense of wrong1 of injustice1 of outrage1 by which the soul is so often tortured1 is not designed to punish the subject of it1 but to promote the happiness and virtue of mankind4 ,we might refer to these1 and many other things of the same kind1 but it is not necessary to dwell upon particular instances2 for the principle against which we contend may be more directly refuted by an appeal to reason1 and to the very authors by whom it is advocated2 for1 although it is adopted by them1 and seems plausible at first view1 it is often lost sight of when they lose sight of their system1 and they give utterance to another principle more in accordance with the voice of nature4 ,it is evident1 that if the government of ,god requires that no suffering should be inflicted1 except as a punishment for sin1 then his perfect moral government requires that the punishment should1 in all cases1 be exactly proportioned to the demerit of those upon whom it falls4 ,for1 as ,butler truly says1 8,moral government consists in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked2 in rendering to men according to their actions1 considered as good or evil4 ,and the perfection of moral government consists in doing this1 with regard to all intelligent creatures1 in exact proportion to their personal merits and demerits407#ahi7 ,this will not be denied4 ,hence1 if suffering is distributed by ,god as a punishment for sin in all cases1 as ,calvin and his followers assert1 then it must1 on the same principle1 be distributed according to the demerit of men4 ,but is this the case8 ,does this necessary consequence of this principle agree with fact8 ,if so1 then every vile deed1 every wicked outrage1 committed by man1 should be regarded as an instrument of divine justice1 and deserved by those upon whom they fall4 ,the inquisition itself1 with all its unuttered and unutterable horrors1 should be regarded1 not merely as an exhibition of human wickedness and wrath1 but also as an engine of divine justice1 to crush the martyr on its wheels1 because he refuses to lie to his own soul and to his ,god8 ,nature itself recoils from such a conclusion4 ,not one of the writers in question would adopt it4 ,hence1 they should not advocate a principle from which it necessarily flows4 ,indeed1 they all argue the necessity of a future state of retribution1 from the unequal distribution of natural good and evil in this life4 ,but ,lord ,bolingbroke has refuted this argument by reasoning from their own principles4 ,he insists that such is the justice of ,god1 that there can be no suffering or natural evil in this life1 except such as is proportioned to the demerits of men2 and hence he rejects the argument from the apparent unequal distribution of pleasure and pain in this world in favour of the reality of a future judgment4 ,he resents the imputation that ,god could ever permit any suffering which is not deserved1 as warmly as it is resented by ,dr4 ,dick himself1 and proclaims it to be dishonourable to ,god4 ,all rewards and punishments1 says he1 are equal and just in this life2 and to say otherwise1 is to take an atheistical view of the divine character4 ,learned divines proceed on the same principle1 as we have seen1 when they contend for the imputation of sin2 but they forget and overlook it1 when they come to prove the future judgment to the infidel4 ,thus1 in their zeal to establish their own peculiar dogmas1 they place themselves and their cause in the power of the infidel4 ,but if suffering be not always inflicted1 under the administration of ,god1 as a punishment for sin1 for what other end is it inflicted8 ,we answer1 it is inflicted for these ends3 #a4 ,even when it is inflicted as a punishment for sin1 this is not the only end1 or final cause of its infliction4 ,it is also intended to deter others from the commission of evil1 and preserve the order of the world4 #b4 ,in some instances1 nay1 in very many instances1 it is intended to discipline and form the mind to virtue4 ,as ,bishop ,butler well says1 even while vindicating the moral government of the world3 8,it is not pretended but that1 in the natural course of things1 happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules1 than only the personal merit and demerit of character4 ,they may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline40 ,and in his profound chapter on a 8,state of probation1 as intended for moral discipline and improvement10 he shows that they are actually distributed for this purpose4 #c4 ,the unavoidable evils of this life1 which are not brought upon us by our faults1 are intended to serve as a foil to set off the blessedness of eternity4 ,our present light afflictions are intended1 not merely to work out for us an exceeding and eternal weight of glory1 but also to heighten our sense and enjoyment of it by a recollection of the miseries experienced in this life4 ,they are intended to form but a short and discordant prelude to an everlasting harmony4 ,if they should not prove so in fact1 the fault will be our own1 without the least impeachment of the beneficent design of the great ,author and ,ruler of the universe4 ,on these grounds1 especially on the first two1 we must justify all the natural evil in the world4 ,in regard to the second1 ,bishop ,butler says3 8,allurements to what is wrong2 difficulties in the discharge of our duties2 our not being able to act a uniform right part without some thought and care2 and the opportunities we have1 or imagine we have1 of avoiding what we dislike1 or obtaining what we desire1 by unlawful means1 when we either cannot do it at all1 or at least not so easily1 by lawful ones2 these things1 that is1 the snares and temptations of vice1 are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline to those who will preserve their integrity2 because they render being upon our guard1 resolution1 and the denial of our passions1 necessary to that end40 ,thus1 the temptations by which we are surrounded1 the allurements of those passions by which vice is rendered so bewitching1 are the appointed means of moral discipline and improvement in virtue4 ,the habit of virtue thus formed1 he truly observes1 will be firm and fixed in proportion to the amount of temptation we have gradually overcome in its formation4 8,though actions materially virtuous10 says he1 8which have no sort of difficulty1 but are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations1 may possibly be done only from those particular inclinations1 and so may not be any exercise of the principle of virtue1 i4 e41 not be virtuous actions at all2 yet1 on the contrary1 they may be an exercise of that principle1 and1 when they are1 they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue4 ,but when the exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued1 oftener repeated1 and more intense1 as it must be in circumstances of danger1 temptation1 and difficulty of any kind1 and in any degree1 this tendency is increased proportionably1 and a more confirmed habit is the consequence407#aij7 ,the greater the temptation1 then1 the more fixed will be the habit of virtue1 by which it is gradually overcome and subdued4 ,this habit may become so fixed1 by a struggle with temptations and difficulties1 as to raise the soul above the dangers to which moral agents are exposed4 8,virtuous self-government is not only right in itself1 but also improves the inward constitution or character2 and may improve it to such a degree1 that though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections to be absolutely co-incident with the moral principle1 and consequently should allow1 that such creatures as have been above supposed would forever remain defectible2 yet their danger of actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened1 and they fully fortified against what remains of it2 if that may be called danger1 against which there is an adequate effectual security407#aia7 8,these several observations10 says he1 8concerning the active principle of virtue and obedience to ,god's commands are applicable to passive submission or resignation to his will1 which is another essential part of a right character1 connected with the former1 and very much in our power to form ourselves to40 ,this1 then1 is the view which we think should be entertained with respect to the natural evils of this life3 they are intended by the infinitely wise and good ,ruler of the world to detach us from the fleeting things of time and sense1 by the gradual formation of a habit of moral goodness1 arising from a resistance against the influence of such things and firm adherence to the will of ,god1 and to form our character for a state of fixed eternal blessedness4 ,such is the beneficent design of ,god in relation to the human race itself4 ,his design in relation to the more magnificent scheme of the moral universe1 in thus planting the human race and striving to train it up to virtue and happiness1 we have already considered47#aib7 ,we say1 then1 that it is a principle of the divine government of the world to impose natural evil or suffering as a means of good4 ,it is objected against this principle1 that it is to do evil that good may come4 8,to say that ,christ was subjected to sufferings10 says ,dr4 ,dick1 8for the benevolent purpose of conferring important benefits upon mankind1 is to give the highest sanction to the principle which is so strongly reprobated in the ,scriptures1 that evil may be done that good may come40 ,the theology of ,dr4 ,dick1 and of his school1 does not sufficiently distinguish between natural and moral evil4 ,we are nowhere told in ,scripture1 that it is wrong to do natural evil1 or inflict suffering1 that good may come4 ,every good man acts upon this principle every day of his life4 ,every act of self-denial1 and every infliction of parental discipline1 are proofs of the justness of this remark4 ,the surgeon who amputates a limb1 in order to save the life of his patient1 acts upon the same principle4 ,but who ever thought of condemning such conduct8 ,who ever reminded him that he should not do evil that good may come8 ,it is plain1 that neither 8the sufferings0 of ,christ1 nor any other sufferings imposed for the real good of the world1 are liable to any such objection1 or come under the condemnation of any such maxim4 ,this objection lies1 as we have seen17#aic7 against the doctrine of ,edwards and his followers1 that moral evil1 that sin1 may be chosen as the means of good4 ,the high and holy ,god never commits1 or causes others to commit1 moral evil that good may come2 but he not only may1 but actually does1 inflict natural evil in order to promote the good of his creatures4 ,thus1 by applying the language of ,scripture to natural evil instead of to moral1 ,dr4 ,dick has just exactly inverted the order of things as they actually exist in the constitution and government of the moral world4 ,section ,v4 ,the importance of harmonizing reason and revelation4 ,for these reasons1 we refuse to justify the sufferings of infants1 on the ground that the sin of ,adam was imputed to them4 ,a sentiment so dark and appalling but ill accords with the sublime and beautiful spirit of the gospel4 ,it partakes more of the weakness and infirmity of human nature than of the divine nature of ,him who 8spake as never man spake40 ,the best account which ,plato could give of the sufferings of infants was that they had sinned in some former state of existence1 for which they are punished in this4 ,st4 ,augustine and his followers1 rejecting such a view1 and relying on the literal sense of the words of revelation1 advanced the hypothesis that infants sinned1 not in a prexistent state1 but in ,adam2 for which they are justly exposed to pain and death4 ,others again1 not being able to conceive how infants could be really and personally in ,adam many thousand years before they were born1 so as to sin with him1 adopted the hypothesis1 that if they had been in his place they would have sinned1 and are therefore justly exposed to the penalty due to his transgression2 according to which theory each soul might be made liable to the guilt of infinitely more sin than any finite being could possibly commit4 ,another age1 rising above such dark notions respecting the nature of sin and the justice of ,god1 maintained the hypothesis that ,adam's sin was imputed to all his posterity1 by which the fearful penalty due to his sin might be justly inflicted upon them4 ,according to a fifth theory1 it is clear that 8nothing under the empire of ,jehovah0 can be sin1 except a known transgression of the law2 and infants are punished1 because1 as soon as they come into the world1 they knowingly transgress the law of ,god4 ,they cannot knowingly sin1 says a sixth theory2 but still they really transgress the law of ,god by those little bubbling emotions of anger1 and so forth1 as soon as they come into existence2 and hence1 the penalty of sin is inflicted upon them4 ,such are some of the hypotheses which have been adopted by ,christian theologians to reconcile the suffering of infants with the justice and goodness of ,god4 ,the more we look into them1 the more we are amazed that the great lights of the world should have indulged in reveries so wild and so wonderful2 and the more are we convinced1 that the speculations of men on these subjects1 and the whole theological literature of the world in relation to it1 form one of the darkest chapters in the history of the human mind4 ,how unlike are such views respecting the origin and existence of natural evil to the divine simplicity and beauty of the gospel6 8,who did sin1 this man or his parents10 said the disciples to our ,saviour1 8that he was born blind80 ,they made no doubt but that the great evil of natural blindness must have been the punishment of some sin2 and merely wished to know whether it were his own sin1 committed in some former state of existence1 or the sin of his parents4 ,their minds seem to have hung in a state of vacillation between the theory of ,plato and that of imputation4 ,but our ,saviour replied3 8,neither did this man sin1 nor his parents10 that he was born blind2 but 8that the work of ,god might be made manifest in him40 ,we thank thee1 ,o blessed ,master1 for that sweet word6 ,how delightful is it1 after passing through the dark labyrinths of human folly to sit at thy feet and drink in the lessons of heavenly wisdom6 ,how pleasant to the soul--how inexpressibly cheering is it--to turn from the harsh and revolting systems of men1 and listen to the sweet accents of mercy as they fall from thy lips6 ,the great law of suffering1 then1 is that it is intended for the benefit of intelligent creatures4 ,this is the case1 even when it assumes the character of punishment2 for then it is designed to prevent moral evil4 ,such a view of natural evil1 or suffering1 does not give that horrid picture of the world which arises from the sentiment that all pain and death must be a punishment for sin4 ,this causes us to see the black scourge of retributive justice everywhere1 and the hand of fatherly correction nowhere4 ,it places us1 not in a school or state of probation1 to train us up for a better and brighter world1 but in the midst of inquisitorial fires and penal woe4 ,it teaches that all mankind became guilty by the act of one man2 and that for one deed1 millions upon millions of human beings are justly obnoxious1 not only to temporal and spiritual1 but also to eternal death4 ,we are perfectly aware of all the arguments which have been drawn from ,scripture in support of such a doctrine2 and we are also perfectly satisfied that they may be most easily and triumphantly refuted4 ,but at present we do not mean to touch this argument2 we shall reserve it for another work4 ,in the mean time1 we must be permitted to express the sentiment1 that a system of theology1 so profoundly unphilosophical1 so utterly repugnant to the moral sentiments of mankind1 can never fulfil the sublime mission of true religion on earth4 ,it may possess the principle of life within1 but it is destitute of the form of life without4 ,it may convert the individual soul1 and lead it up to heaven2 but it has not the radiant form and power of truth1 to command the admiration and conquer the intellect of the world4 ,it may elevate and purify the affections1 even while it depresses and confounds the understanding2 but it cannot transfigure the whole mind1 and change it into its own divine image4 ,nothing but the most fixed and rooted faith1 or the most blind and unquestioning submission1 can withstand the fearful blasts and dark impulses of such a system4 ,no wonder1 then1 that under a system so deplorably deficient in some of the most sublime features of ,christianity1 infidelity and ,pelagianism should so often have sprung up4 ,if we write libels on the divine government1 we must expect rebellions and insurrections4 ,this is the natural consequence of the great fundamental heresy which places reason and revelation in opposition to each other4 ,orthodoxy1 as she proudly styles herself1 may denounce such rebellions2 but she herself is partly responsible for the fatal consequences of them4 ,reason and revelation can never be dissevered1 can never be placed in violent conflict1 without a frightful injury to both1 and to the best interests of mankind4 ,reason must find its own internal power and life in revelation1 and revelation must find its own external form and beauty in reason4 ,the perfection and glory of each consists in the living union and consentaneous development of both4 ,if we teach absurdity1 it is worse than idle to enforce submission by arrogant and lordly denunciations of human pride1 or of 8carnal reason40 ,and we shall always find1 indeed1 that when a theologian or a philosopher begins by abusing and vilifying human reason1 he either has some absurdity which he wishes us to swallow1 or he wishes to be excused from believing anything in particular4 ,thus1 the dogmatism of the one and the scepticism of the other unite in trampling human reason under foot2 the one1 to erect an empire of absurdity1 and the other1 to erect an empire of darkness upon its ruins4 ,it should be the great object of all our labours to effect a reunion and harmony between revelation and reason1 whose 8inauspicious repudiations and divorces0 have so long 8disturbed everything in the great family of mankind407#aid7 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,sufferings ,of ,christ ,reconciled ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,o blessed ,well of ,love6 ,o ,flower of ,grace6 ,o glorious ,morning ,starre6 ,o ,lampe of ,light6 ,most lively ,image of thy ,father's face1 ,eternal ,king of ,glorie1 ,lord of ,might1 ,meeke ,lambe of ,god1 before all worlds behight1 ,how can we thee requite for all this good8 ,or who can prize that thy most precious blood8--,,spenser4 ,in the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to show that natural evil or suffering is not inconsistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,we were there led to see that ,god1 although he never chooses moral evil1 often imposes natural evil1 or suffering1 in order to secure the well-being of the world4 ,of this general principle1 the sufferings and death of ,christ are a particular instance2 they are not anomalous1 but a striking manifestation of a great principle which pervades the whole economy of divine providence4 ,these sufferings1 so far from being inconsistent with the goodness of ,god1 are a stupendous display of that sublime mercy which is over all his works4 ,to illustrate this position1 and clear it of sceptical cavils and objections1 is the main object of the present chapter4 ,section ,i4 ,the sufferings of ,christ not unnecessary4 ,because the necessity of ,christ's death and sufferings is not manifest at first view1 or because the utility of them is not seen1 it is concluded by some that they were wholly useless1 and consequently inconsistent with the infinite goodness ascribed to the ,ruler of the world4 ,we shall content ourselves with disposing of this objection in the words of ,bishop ,butler4 8,to object against the expediency or usefulness of particular things revealed to have been done or suffered by him10 says he1 8because we do not see how they were conducive to those ends1 is highly absurd4 ,yet nothing is more common to be met with than this absurdity4 ,but if it be acknowledged beforehand1 that we are not judges in this case1 it is evident that no objection can1 with any shadow of reason1 be urged against any particular part of ,christ's mediatorial office revealed in ,scripture1 till it can be shown positively1 not to be requisite1 or conducive1 to the ends proposed to be accomplished2 or that it is in itself unreasonable407#aie7 ,again3 8,it is indeed10 says he1 8a matter of great patience to reasonable men to find people arguing in this manner2 objecting against the credibility of such particular things revealed in ,scripture1 that they do not see the necessity or expediency of them4 ,for1 though it is highly right1 and the most pious exercise of our understanding1 to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of ,god's dispensations2 yet1 when those reasons are concealed1 to argue from our ignorance1 that such dispensations cannot be from ,god1 is infinitely absurd4 ,the presumption of this kind of objection seems almost lost in the folly of them4 ,and the folly of them is yet greater1 when they are urged1 as usually they are1 against things in ,christianity analogous1 or like to those natural dispensations of ,providence which are matters of experience4 ,let reason be kept to1 and if any part of the ,scripture account of the redemption of the world by ,christ can be shown to be really contrary to it1 let the ,scripture1 in the name of ,god1 be given up3 but let not such poor creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme1 that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts1 and call this reasoning2 and what heightens the absurdity in the present case1 parts which we are not actively concerned in407#aif7 ,this reply is amply sufficient for such an objection4 ,but although the concession is made1 for the sake of argument1 it is not true1 that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of the sufferings of ,christ4 ,for1 as the author well says3 8,what has been often alleged in justification of this doctrine1 even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemption--its tendency to vindicate the authority of ,god's laws1 and deter his creatures from sin3 this has never been answered1 and is1 ,i think1 plainly unanswerable2 though ,i am far from thinking it an account of the whole of the case407#aig7 ,it is true1 we believe1 that the position that the great work of ,christ was necessary to maintain the authority of ,god's law1 and to deter his creatures from sin1 never has been1 and never can be refuted4 ,yet nearly all of the commonly received systems of theology furnish a principle1 a false principle1 on which this position may be overthrown1 and the sufferings of ,christ shown to be unnecessary4 ,for if a necessary holiness be not a contradiction in terms1 if ,god can1 as is usually asserted1 cause holiness universally to prevail by the mere word of his power1 then the work and sufferings of ,christ are not necessary to maintain the authority of his law1 and deter his creatures from sin4 ,in other words1 the sufferings of ,christ were 8not requisite to the ends proposed to be accomplished10 because1 on such a supposition1 they might have been far more easily and completely accomplished without them4 ,those who maintain1 then1 as most theologians do1 that ,god could easily cause virtue to exist everywhere if he would1 really set forth a principle which1 if true1 would demonstrate the sufferings of ,christ to be unnecessary1 and consequently inconsistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,we must strike at this false principle1 and restore the truth that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms1 an inherent and impossible conceit1 if we would behold the sublime significancy and beauty of the stupendous sacrifice of the cross4 ,we shall then behold the necessity of that sacrifice1 and see the omnipotent yearnings of the divine love in its efforts to overcome an obstacle1 which could not be otherwise surmounted4 ,it is often said1 we are well aware1 that ,god might have saved us by a mere word2 but he chose not to do so1 preferring to give up his ,son to death in order to show his love4 ,but how can such a position be maintained8 ,if ,god could save us by a word1 how can it display his love to require such immense sufferings in order to save us8 ,if he could accomplish the salvation of all men by a mere word1 how does it show his love to make such wonderful preparations for their salvation2 and1 after all1 permit so large a portion of them to be eternally lost8 ,if we could save the life of a fellow-being by merely putting forth a hand1 would it display our love for him if we should choose to travel all around the earth1 and incur incredible hardships and sufferings in order to save him8 ,would this display our love1 we ask1 or our folly8 ,is it not evident1 then1 that the principle that virtue or holiness might be easily caused to exist everywhere1 is utterly repugnant to the glory of revelation8 ,is it not evident that it causes the transcendent glory of the cross to disappear1 and reduces the whole complicated system of means and appliances for the salvation of the world to a mere idle mockery of the miseries of man's estate8 ,does it not show the whole plan of salvation1 as conceived and executed by the infinite wisdom of ,god1 to be an awkward and bungling attempt to accomplish an end1 which might have been far more easily and perfectly accomplished8 ,and if so1 does it not become all ,christian theologians to expunge this false principle from their systems1 and eradicate it from their thoughts8 ,section ,,ii4 ,the sufferings of ,christ a bright manifestation of the goodness of ,god4 ,the reason why the love of ,god does not appear to all men in the sacrifice of his ,son is1 that it is often viewed1 not as it is in itself1 but through the distorting medium of false analogies1 or of a vague and ill-defined phraseology4 ,hence it is that the melancholy spectacle is everywhere presented of men1 of rational and immortal beings1 living and dying in a determined opposition to a doctrine which they have not taken the pains to understand1 and of whose intrinsic grandeur and glory they have not enjoyed the most remote glimpse4 ,so far from beholding the love of ,god1 which shines forth so conspicuously in the cross of ,christ1 they see in it only an act of injustice and cruelty on the part of ,god4 ,one source of this error1 we have no doubt1 is to be found in the use1 or rather in the abuse1 of the term punishment4 ,in the strict sense of the word1 it is not only unjust1 but impossible1 for ,god to punish the innocent4 ,the very idea of punishment1 according to the strict sense of the word1 implies the notion of guilt or ill-desert in the person upon whom it is inflicted4 ,it is suffering inflicted on an offender1 on account of his real or supposed personal guilt4 ,hence1 as ,god regards all things just as they are in themselves1 he cannot possibly look upon the innocent as guilty2 and consequently he cannot1 in the strict sense of the word1 inflict punishment upon them4 ,and when we speak of the punishment of ,christ1 we merely mean1 or should merely mean1 to convey the idea that he suffered1 in order to release us from the punishment due to our sins4 ,it would be well1 perhaps1 if this could always be borne in mind2 for most men are more under the influence and power of words than they are apt to see1 or willing to acknowledge4 ,the mere expression1 the punishment of the innocent1 is apt to awaken associations in the mind which are inconsistent with the dictates of justice2 but which the idea of the atonement would never have suggested1 if clearly and distinctly viewed in its own clear light1 and not through the dark medium of an ill-defined phraseology4 ,another source of the error in question is to be found in the ambiguity of the term justice4 ,it is frequently said that the atonement is a satisfaction to divine justice2 to which it is replied1 that justice requires the punishment of the very individual who offends1 and not of another person in his place4 ,let us consider this subject4 ,the term justice has two distinct significations1 which ,i shall designate by the epithets retributive and administrative4 ,by retributive justice1 ,i mean that attribute which inclines ,him to punish an offender merely on account of the intrinsic demerit and hatefulness of his offence2 and which animadverts upon the evil conduct of a moral agent1 considered as an individual1 and not as a member of the great family of intelligent beings4 ,this attribute seeks to punish sin merely because it deserves punishment1 and not because its punishment is necessary to secure the ends of government2 and1 supposing sin to exist1 it would have its object1 even if there were only one accountable creature in the universe4 ,the object of public or administrative justice is quite different4 ,it inflicts punishment1 not because it is deserved1 but in order to prevent transgression1 and to secure the general good1 by securing the ends of wise and good government4 ,in the moral government of ,god1 one of the highest objects of this kind of justice1 or1 if you please1 of this phase or manifestation of the divine justice1 is to secure in the hearts of its subjects a cordial approbation of the principles according to which they are governed4 ,this is indispensable to the very existence of moral government4 ,the dominion of force1 or of power1 may be maintained1 in many cases1 notwithstanding the aversion of those who are subject to it2 but it is impossible to govern the heart by love while it disapproves and hates the principles to which it is required to submit1 or the character of the ruler by whom those principles are enforced4 ,now1 it is very true1 that ,christ has made a satisfaction to divine justice4 ,this is frequently asserted2 but it is seldom considered1 we apprehend1 with any very great degree of distinctness1 in what sense the term justice should always be understood in this proposition4 ,it cannot properly refer to the retributive justice of ,god4 ,this requires the punishment of the offender1 and of no one else4 ,it accepts of no substitute4 ,and hence1 it is impossible to conceive that it can be satisfied1 except by the punishment of the offender himself4 ,the object of this sort of justice1 as ,i have said1 is personal guilt2 and hence1 as our ,saviour did not become personally guilty1 when he assumed our place and consented to die for us1 so it is impossible to conceive that he became liable to the infliction of the retributive justice of ,god4 ,and we suppose it is this idea1 at which the ,socinian vaguely and obscurely aims1 when he says1 that the justice of ,god requires the punishment of the transgressor alone2 and that it is absurd to suppose it can be satisfied by the substitution of the innocent in his stead4 ,he denies the whole doctrine of satisfaction1 because he sees and feels that it is not true according to one meaning of the terms in which it is expressed4 ,in truth and in deed1 the sinner is just as guilty after the atonement as he was before2 and he is just as obnoxious to the inflictions of the retributive justice of ,god4 ,he may be most justly punished2 for as the claims of retributive justice have not been satisfied1 so they may be demanded of him without being a second time exacted4 ,he really deserves the wrath of ,god on account of his sins1 although administrative justice has been satisfied2 and hence1 when he truly repents and believes1 all his sins are freely and graciously remitted4 ,no satisfaction is made to retributive justice4 ,it is the administrative justice of ,god that has been satisfied by the atonement4 ,this merely enforces the punishment of the sinner1 as ,i have said1 in order to secure the ends of good government2 and hence1 it is capable of yielding and giving place to any expedient by which those ends may be secured4 ,in other words1 it is capable of being satisfied by whatever method ,god may be pleased to adopt in order to secure the ends of good government1 and to accomplish his own glorious designs1 without the punishment of the sinner4 ,all this1 as we shall see hereafter1 has been most gloriously accomplished by the death and sufferings of ,christ4 ,god can now be just1 and yet the justifier of him that believes4 ,the great obstacles which the administrative justice of ,god interposes to the forgiveness of sin1 having been taken out of the way and nailed to the cross1 that unbounded mercy from which the provision of such a ,saviour proceeded1 can now flow down upon a lost and ruined world in all the fulness and plenitude of its pardoning and sanctifying power4 ,as a general thing1 those who undertake to vindicate the sufferings of ,christ against objections1 rest their defence on the ground that they are a satisfaction to the administrative justice of ,god4 ,this is seen1 not from their express declarations1 but from the nature of their arguments and defence2 as if they unconsciously turned to this position as to their stronghold4 ,on the other hand1 those who assail the sacrifice of ,christ1 almost invariably treat it as if it were a satisfaction to the retributive justice of ,god4 ,both sides seem to be right1 and both wrong4 ,the whole idea of satisfaction to divine justice by a substitute is not absurd1 because the idea of satisfaction to retributive justice is so2 nor is the whole justice of ,god1 or the justice of ,god in every sense of the word1 to be conceived of as satisfied by the atonement1 because his administrative justice is thus satisfied4 ,when it is thus asserted1 then1 that the justice of ,god is satisfied by the atonement2 we should be careful1 we think1 to observe in what precise sense this proposition is true1 and in what sense it is false2 in order that we may pursue the clear and shining light of truth1 neither distracted by the clamour of words nor enveloped in clouds of logomachy4 ,there is a class of theologians1 we are aware1 and a very large class1 who regard the sufferings of ,christ as a satisfaction to the retributive justice of ,god4 ,but this forms no part of the doctrine which we have undertaken to defend2 and1 indeed1 we think the defence of such a view of the atonement clearly impossible4 ,it is placed on the ground1 that the sins of the world1 or of those for whom ,christ died1 have been imputed to him2 and hence he really suffers the inflictions of the retributive justice of ,god4 ,the objections to this scheme1 which seek to remove the apparent hardships and injustice of the sufferings of the innocent1 by the fiction of the imputation of the sins of the guilty1 we shall not dwell upon here2 as we so fully considered them in the preceding chapter4 ,to our mind they are plainly unanswerable4 ,we would vindicate the sufferings of ,christ no more than those of infants1 on the ground that sin was imputed to him1 so as to render them just4 ,on the contrary1 we hold them to have been wholly undeserved2 and instead of vindicating them on the ground of stern justice1 we vindicate them on the ground of the infinite1 unbounded1 and overflowing goodness of ,god4 ,it is easy to see that such a view of the atonement does not in the least degree conflict with the justice of ,god4 ,it merely teaches1 that ,god has provided for the salvation of the world by the sufferings of ,jesus ,christ1 who was without spot or blemish4 ,surely we cannot find it in our hearts to object1 that the sufferings of ,christ for such a purpose are not consistent with the justice of ,god1 if we will only read a single page in the great volume of nature and of providence4 ,it has been said by ,bishop ,butler1 that such an objection 8concludes altogether as much against ,god's whole original constitution of nature1 and the whole daily course of divine providence1 in the government of the world1 i4 e41 against the whole scheme of theism and the whole notion of religion1 as against ,christianity4 ,for the world is a constitution1 or system1 whose parts have a mutual reference to each other2 and there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on1 called the course of nature1 to the carrying on of which ,god has appointed us1 in various ways1 to contribute4 ,and when1 in the daily course of natural providence1 it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty1 this is liable to the very same objection as the instance we are considering4 ,the infinitely greater importance of that appointment of ,christianity which is objected against1 does not hinder but that it may be1 as it plainly is1 an appointment of the very same kind with what the world affords us daily examples of4 ,nay1 if there were any force at all in the objection1 it would be stronger1 in one respect1 against natural providence1 than against ,christianity2 because1 under the former1 we are in many cases commanded1 and even necessitated1 whether we will or no1 to suffer for the faults of others1 whereas the sufferings of ,christ were voluntary40 ,now1 how very unreasonable is it in the theist1 to object against ,christianity1 that it represents ,god as having acted upon a particular principle1 i4 e41 as having appointed the innocent to suffer for the good of the guilty1 when we see that he has everywhere recognised and adopted the very same principle in the government of the world8 ,however remote this principle may appear from the conceptions of man1 it is not only found in the volume of inspiration2 it is deeply engraven by the finger of ,god himself upon every page of the volume of natural providence4 ,and to question the divine original of revelation1 because it contains such a principle or appointment1 while we admit that ,god created and governs the world1 is about as unreasonable as it would be to deny that a letter came from a particular person1 because it was clearly written in his hand-writing1 and bore evident traces of his peculiarities of style and thought4 ,let us view this general principle in a particular instance4 ,this will set it in a clear and striking light1 and seem to vindicate the constitution of the world1 as well as the doctrine of the atonement4 ,the principle of compassion has been planted in our bosom by the finger of ,god4 ,and thus the necessity is laid upon us1 by a law of our nature1 to suffer on account of the distresses which our fellow-men bring upon themselves by their own crimes and vices2 and we are impelled in various ways to undergo inconvenience and loss1 and self-denial and suffering1 in order to avert from them the consequences of their own misconduct4 ,but have we any reason to complain of this appointment of ,god8 ,certainly not3 for if we obey the indications of his will1 as seen in this part of the constitution of our nature1 by doing all in our power to relieve the distresses of our fellow-men1 we shall be infinitely more than repaid for all that we may undergo and suffer4 ,however painful may be the feeling of compassion1 we only have to obey its dictates by relieving the distressed to the utmost of our ability1 and we shall be more than repaid by the satisfaction and delight which never fail to result from such a course of life2 to say nothing of those infinite rewards which ,god has prepared for those who sincerely love and serve him4 ,just so it is in relation to the sufferings of ,christ4 ,he was led by his boundless compassion to avert from us the awful consequences of sin1 by the agony1 and the sufferings1 and the death1 which he endured upon the cross4 ,and1 according to the doctrine of atonement1 he is infinitely more than repaid for all this4 ,though he suffered in the flesh1 and was made a spectacle to men and angels1 yet he despised the shame1 seeing the joy that was set before him4 ,we do confess that we can see no insufferable hardship in all this1 nor the least shadow of injustice4 ,one thing is certain1 if injustice is exhibited here1 it is exhibited everywhere in the providence of ,god2 and if the doctrine of the atonement were stricken from the scheme of ,christianity1 the injustice which is supposed to attend it would still continue to overhang and cloud the moral government of ,god4 ,and hence1 if the deist or the ,socinian would escape from this frightful spectre of his own imagination1 he must bury himself in the most profound depths and most cheerless gloom of atheism4 ,the doctrine in question is frequently misrepresented1 and made to appear inconsistent with the justice of ,god1 by means of false analogies4 ,the ,socinian frequently speaks of it1 as if it were parallel with the proceeding of a human government that should doom the innocent to suffer in place of the guilty4 ,thus the feeling of indignation that is aroused in the human bosom at the idea of a virtuous man's being sentenced to suffer the punishment due to the criminal is sought to be directed against the doctrine of the atonement4 ,but in vain will such rhetoric be employed to excite indignation and horror against the doctrine of the cross1 in the mind of any person by whom it is at all understood4 ,the cases are not at all parallel4 ,in the first place1 no human government has a right to doom a virtuous man to bear the punishment due to the criminal2 and if he were willing to suffer in the place of the culprit1 no government on earth has a right to accept of such a substitute4 ,the life of the virtuous citizen is the gift of ,god1 and no earthly power has the authority to take it for any such purpose4 ,it would be a violation of the will of ,god for any human government to admit of such a substitution4 ,on the contrary1 ,christ had the power to lay down his life2 and he did so1 in perfect accordance with the appointment of ,god4 ,in submitting to the death of the cross1 he did not subvert1 he fulfilled the end of his earthly existence4 ,secondly1 it would overthrow the ends of public justice for any human government to permit a good man1 the ornament and blessing of society1 to die in the room of the criminal1 its scourge and plague4 ,the sufferings of the good citizen in such a case would be pure and unmitigated evil4 ,while they would deprive society of his services1 they would throw back upon it the burden of one who deserved to die4 ,they would tend to render the punishment of crime uncertain2 they would shock the moral sentiments of mankind1 and cover with odium and disgrace the government that could tolerate such a proceeding4 ,but not so in relation to the sufferings of ,christ4 ,he assumed his human nature for the express purpose of dying upon the cross4 ,he died1 not to deliver an individual and turn him loose to commit further depredations upon society1 but to effect the salvation of the world itself1 and to deliver it from all the evils under which it groans and travails in pain4 ,he died for sinners1 not that they might continue in their sins1 but in order to redeem unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works4 ,in the third and last place1 the death of a good man is the end of his existence1 the entire extinction of his being1 in so far as all human government is concerned2 whereas the death of ,christ1 in relation to the government of ,god1 was but the beginning of his exaltation and glory4 ,he endured the cross1 despising the shame1 in view of the unbounded joy that was set before him4 ,the temporal evils which he endured1 unutterably great as they were1 if viewed merely in relation to himself1 were infinitely more than counterbalanced by the eternal satisfaction and delight that resulted from them4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the objections of ,dr4 ,channing1 and other ,unitarians1 against the doctrine of the atonement4 ,it is likewise objected against the doctrine of the atonement1 that it obscures the freeness and glory of the divine mercy4 ,it is supposed to interfere with the freeness of the favour of ,god1 inasmuch as it requires a sacrifice to procure the remission of sin4 ,this point1 no less than the former1 the ,socinian endeavours to establish by means of analogies drawn from the ordinary transactions of life4 8,i know it is said10 says ,dr4 ,channing1 8that ,trinitarianism magnifies ,god's mercy1 because it teaches that he himself provided the substitute for the guilty4 ,but ,i reply1 that the work here ascribed to mercy is not the most appropriate1 nor the most fitted to manifest it and impress it on the heart4 ,this may be made apparent by familiar illustration4 ,suppose that a creditor1 through compassion to certain debtors1 should persuade a benevolent and opulent man to pay him in their stead2 would not the debtors see a greater mercy1 and feel a weightier obligation1 if they were to receive a free1 gratuitous release8 ,and will not their chief gratitude stray beyond the creditor to their benevolent substitute8 ,or suppose that a parent1 unwilling to inflict a penalty on a disobedient but feeble child1 should persuade a stronger child to bear it2 would not the offender see a more touching mercy in a free forgiveness1 springing immediately from a parent's heart1 than in this circuitous remission80 ,if there were any force in such analogies1 they would conclude quite as much against the scheme of ,dr4 ,channing as against ours4 ,for he maintains that the sinner can obtain forgiveness only by a sincere repentance of his sins4 ,he teaches that ,god requires the sinner to humble himself1 and take up his cross and follow ,christ4 ,now to return to the case of the debtor4 ,would he not see a greater kindness1 8and feel a weightier obligation10 if he were to receive a free release1 without any conditions being imposed upon him1 than if it was accompanied by any terms or conditions8 ,but the analogy is false4 ,however well it might serve some purposes1 it is misapplied by ,dr4 ,channing4 ,if a creditor is known to love money1 as most men are1 and he should nevertheless release his debtors2 this would undoubtedly be an exhibition of his kindness4 ,and we might measure the extent of his kindness by the amount of the indebtedness which he had forgiven4 ,but although the creditor1 who is the most easily moved by the necessities of his debtor1 may be the most compassionate man1 it does not follow that the governor1 who under all circumstances1 makes the most free and unrestrained use of the pardoning power1 is the best ruler4 ,the creditor has a perfect right to release his debtor2 and in so doing1 he affects the interest of no one but himself3 whereas1 by the pardon of offences against public law1 the most sacred rights of the community may be disregarded1 the protection of law may be removed1 and the general good invaded4 ,the penalty of the law does not belong to the supreme executive1 as a debt belongs to the creditor to whom it is due2 and hence it cannot always be abandoned at his pleasure4 ,it is ordained1 not merely for the ruler1 but for the benefit and protection of all who are subject to its control4 ,and hence1 although a creditor may show his mercy by releasing his necessitous debtors2 yet the ruler who undertakes to display his mercy by a free use of the pardoning power1 may only betray a weak and yielding compassion for the individual1 instead of manifesting that calm and enlightened benevolence which labours to secure the foundations of wise and good government1 and thereby to promote the order and happiness of the governed4 ,this leads me to remark1 that the hope and the theology of the ,socinian is built upon the most inadequate conceptions of the divine mercy4 ,this is not a weak and yielding thing1 as men are so fondly prone to imagine2 it is a universal and inflexible law4 ,the most perfect harmony exists among all the attributes of ,god2 and as his justice demands the punishment of the sinner1 so also doth his mercy4 ,the bosom of ,god is not1 like that of frail mortals1 torn and distracted by conflicting principles4 ,even to the maintenance of his law1 that bright transcript of his eternal justice1 his mercy is inviolably pledged4 ,heaven and earth shall sooner pass away1 than his mercy shall withdraw from the support of one jot or one tittle of it4 ,it is not only just and holy1 and therefore will be maintained with almighty power2 but it is also good1 and therefore its immutable foundations are laid in the everlasting and unchanging mercy of ,god4 ,for the universal good1 it will be inexorably enforced against the individual transgressor4 ,god is not slack concerning his promises4 ,he is free from all human weakness4 ,his mind is not limited1 like that of man1 to be more affected by partial suffering than by that universal disorder and ruin which must inevitably result from the unrequited violation of his law4 ,the mind of man is unduly affected by the present and the proximate2 but to ,god there is neither remote nor future4 ,and when1 in wisdom and in goodness1 he first established and ordained the law unto life1 he saw the end from the beginning2 and he can never sacrifice the universal good by setting aside that law in order to avoid partial evil4 ,his mercy to the whole creation makes the same demand as his justice4 ,the execution of divine justice is1 indeed1 but a manifestation of that mercy which is over all his works2 and which labours1 with omnipotent energy1 to secure the good of all1 by vindicating the majesty and glory of that law1 upon the preservation of which inviolate the good of all depends4 ,the fire that is not quenched is kindled by the boundless love of ,god no less than by his justice2 and the very fierceness of its burning is1 that it is the 8wrath of the ,lamb40 ,let us not be deceived by the vain fancies and the idle dreams which our fond wishes and narrow-minded infirmities are so apt to beget in us4 ,let us remember that the mercy of ,god is united with omniscience2 and that it is to be found only in the bosom of ,him whose empire extends to the utmost bounds of the universe1 as well as throughout the endless ages of eternity4 ,in the genuine spirit of ,socinian theology1 ,dr4 ,channing1 in his illustration1 has set before us the mercy of ,god alone2 and that1 too1 merely in relation to the sinner1 and not in relation to his law and government4 ,he entirely overlooks the fact1 that it is impossible to exhibit either the justice or the mercy of ,god in the most affecting manner1 except in union with each other4 ,it is frequently said1 we are aware1 that if ,god had pardoned the sinner without enforcing the demands of the law1 he would have displayed his mercy alone1 and not his justice2 but in fact this would have been a very equivocal display of mercy4 ,it would have shown only one of two things3 either that ,god regarded the sinner with an eye of compassion1 or that he did not regard his sin3 either that he was merciful1 or that he had no great abhorrence of sin3 either that he loved the transgressor1 or that he did not hate the transgression4 ,to illustrate this point1 let us take the case of ,zaleucus1 the king of the ,locrians4 ,he passed a certain law1 with the penalty that every transgressor of it should lose both his eyes4 ,it so happened that his own son was the first by whom it was violated4 ,now1 any one can see1 that although ,zaleucus had been a hard-hearted and unfeeling tyrant1 he might have pardoned his son1 just because he had no regard to the demands of public justice2 or1 on the other hand1 that he might have inflicted the penalty of the law upon his son to the uttermost1 not out of a supreme regard to the law1 but because he was destitute of mercy and natural affection4 ,neither by remitting the whole punishment1 nor by inflicting it with rigour1 could he have made such a display of his justice and mercy as to make a deep moral impression upon his subjects4 ,in other words1 if either of these attributes had been left out in the manifestation1 the display of the other must have been exceedingly feeble and equivocal4 ,both must be seen in union1 or neither can be seen in the fulness of its glory4 ,how1 then1 could ,zaleucus have displayed both of these attributes in the most perfect and affecting manner8 ,by doing precisely that which he is said to have done4 ,he directed that one of his own eyes should be put out1 and one of his son's4 ,whose heart is not touched by this most affecting display of the tender pity of the father1 in union with the stern justice of the law-giver8 ,his pity would not allow him to inflict the whole penalty upon his beloved son2 and his high regard for the demands of public justice would not permit him to set at naught the authority of the law3 and but for the possession and manifestation of this last trait of character1 the mighty strugglings and yearnings of the first could not have burst forth and appeared with such overwhelming power and transcendent lustre4 ,hence1 every system of redemption which1 like that of the ,socinian1 leaves out of view the administrative justice of ,god1 does not admit of any very impressive display of his goodness and his mercy4 ,all such illustrations must be imperfect1 in some respects2 but the one above given conveys a far more adequate view of the atonement than that presented by ,dr4 ,channing4 ,the application of it is easy4 ,such was the mercy of ,god1 that he could not leave his poor fallen creatures to endure the awful penalty of the law2 and such was his regard for the purity and happiness of the universe1 that he could not permit his law to be violated with impunity4 ,if his administrative justice had not stood in the way1 the offer of pardon to the sinner would have cost him merely a word4 ,and hence the length1 the breadth1 and the depth of his love could not have been manifested4 ,but he was the ,ruler of the universe1 and as such his law stood in the way4 ,he owed it to himself not to permit this to be trampled under foot with impunity1 nor its violation to be forgiven1 until he had provided some way in order to secure the high and holy ends for which it had been established4 ,hence1 as it was not possible for ,god to deny himself1 he sent forth his beloved ,son1 who had been the companion of his bosom and his blessedness from all eternity1 to take upon himself the form of a servant1 and by his teaching1 and obedience1 and sufferings1 and death1 to vindicate the majesty of the law1 and to render it honourable in the sight of the universe4 ,and it is this wonderful union of the goodness and the severity1 of the mercy and the justice of ,god1 which constitutes the grand moral tendency and glory of the cross4 ,the course pursued by the king of the ,locrians1 in relation to the crime of his son1 secured the ends of the law in a much greater degree than they could have been secured by a rigorous execution of its penalty upon the person of his son4 ,it evinced a deep and settled abhorrence of crime1 and an inflexible determination to punish it4 ,it cut off all hope from his subjects that crime would be permitted to escape with impunity4 ,and hence1 after such a manifestation of his character as a king1 he could permit his son to enjoy the unspeakable blessings of sight1 without holding out the least encouragement to the commission of crime4 ,so1 likewise1 in relation to the sufferings of ,christ4 ,these were not1 in strictness1 the penalty of the law4 ,this was eternal death2 whereas the sufferings of ,christ1 inconceivably great as they were1 were but temporal2 and there can be no proportion between sufferings which know a period1 and those which are without end4 ,hence1 as we have already said1 he did not satisfy the punitive justice of ,god4 ,but the sacrifice of ,christ answered all the purposes that could have been answered by the rigorous execution of the law2 and it answered them in an infinitely greater degree1 than if the human race had been permitted to endure it without remedy4 ,god's love to his ,son was inconceivably greater than that which any creature ever bore to himself or to any other2 and1 consequently1 by offering him up as a substitute for guilty mortals1 in order that he might save them without doing violence to his administrative justice1 he manifested the infinite energy of his determination to destroy sin4 ,no account of the indescribable odiousness and deformity of evil1 nor of the inconceivable holiness of ,god1 could have made so deep an impression of his implacable abhorrence of sin1 as is made by the cross upon which his ,son was permitted to expire amid the scorn and contempt of his enemies4 ,the human imagination has no power to conceive of a more impressive and appalling enforcement of the great lesson1 8,stand in awe1 and sin not10 than that which is presented to an astonished universe in the cross and passion of the ,son of ,god4 ,and besides1 it possesses this other unspeakable advantage1 that while it manifests an infinite abhorrence of sin1 it displays the most heart-subduing love of the sinner4 ,if ,zaleucus had exhausted the penalty of the law upon his son1 this would have had little or no tendency to reform his heart1 or to induce him to acquiesce in the justness of the law4 ,it would have been more apt to lead him to regard the king as an unfeeling father4 ,but when he was made to see1 by the manner in which the king had dispensed the law1 that he cherished the warmest feelings of affection for him1 there was no cause left for a murmur on the part of any1 but for the highest admiration on the part of all4 ,just so in relation to the sufferings and death of ,christ4 ,if ,god had exhausted the fearful penalty of the law upon poor1 suffering1 and degraded humanity1 this would have been well calculated to inspire his creatures with a servile and trembling awe of him4 ,from their limited and imperfect views of the evil of sin1 and of the reasons why it should be punished1 they would not have been prepared to acquiesce in such tremendous severity4 ,thus1 one of the great ends of ,god's moral government would have been subverted3 the affections of his creatures would have been estranged from him1 through a distrust of his goodness and a dread of his power1 instead of having been drawn to him by the sweet and sacred ties of confidence and love4 ,but how different is the case now6 ,having given for us his beloved ,son1 who is greater than all things1 while we were yet enemies1 now that we are reconciled to him1 we are most firmly persuaded that he will freely give us all things that can possibly conduce to our good4 ,surely1 after such a display of his love1 it were highly criminal in us1 to permit the least shadow of suspicion or distrust to intercept the sweet1 and cheering1 and purifying beams of his reconciled countenance4 ,whatever may be his severity against sin1 and whatever terror it may strike into the conscience of evil-doers1 we can most cordially acquiesce in its justness3 for we most clearly perceive1 that the penalty of the law was not established to gratify any private appetite for revenge1 but to uphold and secure the highest happiness of the moral universe4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,eternal ,punishment ,of ,the ,wicked ,reconciled ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,and thus1 ,transfigured1 with a meek and dreadless awe1 ,a solemn hush of spirit1 he beholds ,all things of terrible seeming3 yea1 unmoved ,views e'en the immitigable ministers1 ,that shower down vengeance on these latter days4 ,for even these on wings of healing come1 ,yea1 kindling with intenser ,deity2 ,from the celestial mercy-seat they speed1 ,and at the renovating wells of love1 ,have fill'd their vials with salutary wrath4--,,coleridge4 ,having considered the sufferings of the innocent1 it now becomes necessary to contemplate the punishment of the guilty1 in connexion with the infinite goodness of ,god4 ,this conducts us to the consideration of the most awful subject that ever engaged the attention of a rational being1--the never-ending torments of the wicked in another world4 ,though plausible arguments and objections have been urged against this doctrine1 we are perfectly satisfied they will not bear the test of a close examination4 ,they have derived all their apparent force and conclusiveness1 it seems to us1 from two distinct sources1 namely3 from the circumstance that this appalling doctrine has been too often placed1 by its advocates1 upon insecure and untenable grounds2 and from the fact1 that the supporters of this doctrine have too often maintained principles from which its fallacy may be clearly inferred4 ,in the defence of this doctrine1 then1 we shall endeavour to point out1 first1 the false grounds upon which it has been placed2 secondly1 the unsound principles from which its fallacy may be inferred2 and1 thirdly1 we shall endeavour to show the means by which it may be clearly and satisfactorily reconciled with the goodness of the ,supreme ,ruler of the world4 ,section ,i4 ,the false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity of future punishment has been placed4 ,nothing could be more untenable1 it seems to us1 than the usual argument in favour of future punishments1 which seeks to justify their eternity on the ground that every sinful act1 because it is committed against an infinite being1 is infinite1 and therefore deserves to be visited with endless torments4 ,this argument1 which seems but little better than a play on the term infinite1 is perhaps calculated to make no impression upon any mind1 which is not already fully persuaded of the truth of the doctrine in question4 ,on the other hand1 it may be so easily refuted by a multitude of considerations1 that it exposes the doctrine1 in one of its defences1 to the triumphant attacks of its adversaries4 ,we shall not exhaust the patience of the reader by dwelling upon the refutation which may be given of such an argument4 ,we shall dismiss it with a single reply1 and that we shall give in the language of ,john ,foster4 8,a common argument has been that sin is an infinite evil1 that is1 of infinite demerit1 as an offence against an infinite being2 and that1 since a finite creature cannot suffer infinitely in measure1 he must in duration4 ,but1 surely in all reason1 the limited1 and in the present instance1 diminutive nature of the criminal1 must be an essential part of the case for judgment4 ,every act must1 for one of its proportions1 be measured by the nature and condition of the agent3 and it would seem that one principle in that rule of proportion should be1 that the offending agent should be capable of being aware of the magnitude 7the amount1 if we might use such a word17 of the offence he commits1 by being capable of something like an adequate conception of the being against whom it is committed4 ,a perverse child1 committing an offence against a great monarch1 of whose dignity it had some1 but a vastly inadequate apprehension1 would not be punished in the same manner as an offender of high endowments and responsibility1 and fully aware of the dignity of the personage offended4 ,the one would justly be sharply chastised2 the other might as justly be condemned to death4 ,in the present case1 the offender does or may know that the ,being offended against is of awful majesty1 and therefore the offence is one of great aggravation1 and he will justly be punished with great severity2 but by his extremely contracted and feeble faculties1 as the lowest in the scale of strictly rational and accountable creatures in the whole creation1 he is infinitely incapable of any adequate conception of the greatness of the ,being offended against4 ,he is then1 according to the argument1 obnoxious to a punishment not in any proportion to his own nature1 but alone to that infinity of the supreme nature1 which is to him infinitely inconceivable and unknown407#aih7 ,this answer alone1 though perhaps not the best which might be made1 we deem amply sufficient4 ,indeed1 does not the position1 that a man1 a poor1 weak1 fallible creature1 deserves an infinite punishment1 an eternity of torments1 for each evil thought or word1 carry its own refutation along with it8 ,and if not1 what are we to think of that attribute of justice1 which demands an eternity to inflict the infinite pangs due to a single sin8 ,is it a quality to inspire the soul with a rational worship1 or to fill it with a horror which casteth out love8 ,another argument to show the infinite ill-desert of some men1 is drawn from the scientia media ,dei4 ,it is said1 that if ,god foresaw that if they had been placed in various other circumstances1 and surrounded by other temptations1 their dispositions and character would have induced them to commit other sins2 for which they are1 therefore1 as really responsible as if they had actually committed them4 ,if this be a correct principle1 it is easy1 we must admit1 to render each individual of the human race responsible for a greater number of sins than have ever been committed1 or than could ever have been committed by all the actual dwellers upon the face of the earth4 ,nay1 by such a process of multiplication1 it would be easy to spread the guilt of a single soul over every point of infinite space1 and every moment of eternal duration4 ,but such a principle is more than questionable4 ,to say nothing of its intrinsic deformity1 it is refuted by the consequences to which it leads4 ,we want arguments on this subject1 that will give the mind1 not horrid caricatures of the divine justice1 but such views of that sublime attribute as will inspire us with sentiments of admiration and love1 as well as with a godly fear and wholesome awe4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the unsound principles from which1 if true1 the fallacy of the eternity of future punishments may be clearly inferred4 ,it is a doctrine maintained by ,augustine1 ,calvin1 and ,luther1 as well as by many of their followers1 that1 in his fallen state1 man 8is free to evil only40 ,he can do nothing good without the aid of divine grace2 and this1 in point of fact1 is given to but a very small number of the human race2 at least1 efficacious grace is given to but few1 so that the greater part of mankind cannot acquire or possess that holiness without which no man shall see the ,lord4 ,now1 if we take our stand upon this platform of doctrine1 it will be found utterly impossible1 we think1 to defend the eternity of future punishments4 ,it was upon this platform that ,john ,foster erected his tremendous battery against the doctrine in question2 and it is believed1 that the more closely the argument is examined1 the more clearly it will be seen1 that he has either demolished the doctrine which was so obnoxious to his feelings1 or else the platform which constituted so essential a part of his own creed4 ,in our humble opinion1 8the moral argument10 as he calls it1 8pressed irresistibly upon his mind20 because it was drawn from false premises1 of whose correctness he seems not to have entertained the shadow of a doubt4 ,he clung to the conclusion1 when he should have abandoned the premises4 ,but we shall give his own words1 and permit the reader to judge for himself4 ,after having endeavoured to impress our feeble powers with 8the stupendous idea of eternity10 he adds3 8,now think of an infliction of misery protracted through such a period1 and at the end of it being only commenced1--not one smallest step nearer a conclusion1--the case just the same if that sum of figures were multiplied by itself2 and then think of man1--his nature1 his situation1 the circumstances of his brief sojourn and trial on earth4 ,far be it from us to make light of the demerit of sin1 and to remonstrate with the ,supreme ,judge against a severe chastisement1 of whatever moral nature we may regard the infliction to be4 ,but still1 what is man8 ,he comes into the world with a nature fatally corrupt1 and powerfully tending to actual evil4 ,he comes among a crowd of temptations adapted to his innate evil propensities4 ,he grows up 7incomparably the greater portion of the race7 in great ignorance1 his judgment weak1 and under numberless beguilements into error2 while his passions and appetites are strong1 his conscience unequally matched against their power1--in the majority of men1 but feebly and rudely constituted4 ,the influence of whatever good instructions he may receive1 is counteracted by a combination of opposite influences almost constantly acting on him4 ,he is essentially and inevitably unapt to be powerfully acted on by what is invisible and future4 ,in addition to all which1 there is the intervention and activity of the great tempter and destroyer4 ,in short1 his condition is such that there is no hope of him1 but from a direct1 special operation on him1 of what we denominate grace4 ,is it not so8 ,are we not convinced8 ,is it not the plain doctrine of ,scripture8 ,is there not irresistible evidence1 from a view of the actual condition of the human world1 that no man can become good in the ,christian sense1--can become fit for a holy and happy place hereafter1--but by this operation ab extra8 ,but this is arbitrary and discriminative on the part of the sovereign ,agent1 and independent of the will of man4 ,and how awfully evident is it1 that this indispensable operation takes place only on a comparatively small proportion of the collective race6 8,now this creature1 thus constituted and circumstanced1 passes a few fleeting years on earth1 a short1 sinful course1 in which he does often what1 notwithstanding his ignorance and ill-disciplined judgment and conscience1 he knows to be wrong1 and neglects what he knows to be his duty2 and1 consequently1 for a greater or less measure of guilt1 widely different in different offenders1 deserves punishment4 ,but ,,endless ,,punishment6 ,,hopeless ,,misery1 through a duration to which the enormous terms above imagined will be absolutely ,,nothing6 ,i acknowledge my inability 7,i would say it reverently7 to admit this belief1 together with a belief in the divine goodness1--the belief that #8,god is love1' that his tender mercies are over all his works4 ,goodness1 benevolence1 charity1 as ascribed in supreme perfection to him1 cannot mean a quality foreign to all human conceptions of goodness3 it must be something analogous in principle to what himself has defined and required as goodness in his moral creatures2 that1 in adoring the divine goodness1 we may not be worshipping an #8unknown ,god4' ,but1 if so1 how would all our ideas be confounded1 while contemplating him bringing1 of his own sovereign will1 a race of creatures into existence1 in such a condition that they certainly will and must--must by their nature and circumstances--go wrong1 and be miserable1 unless prevented by especial grace1 which is the privilege of only a small proportion of them1 and at the same time affixing on their delinquency a doom of which it is infinitely beyond the highest archangel's faculty to apprehend a thousandth part of the horror607#aii7 ,now1 granting the premises1 we hold this argument to be unanswerable and conclusive4 ,but is it not wonderful that it did not occur to so acute a mind as ,foster's1 that the same premises would furnish a valid argument against the justice of all punishment1 as well as against the justice of eternal punishments8 ,surely1 if the utter inability of man to do good without divine grace is any extenuation1 when such grace is not given1 it is an entire and perfect exoneration4 ,it is either this1 or it is nothing4 ,such are the inevitable inconsistencies of the best thinkers1 when the feelings of the heart are at war with the notions of the head4 ,instead of analyzing this awful subject1 and tracing it down to its fundamental principles1 upon which his reason might have reposed with a calm and immovable satisfaction1 ,foster seems to have permitted his great mind to take root in a creed of man's devising1 and then to be swayed by the gusts and counter-blasts of passion4 ,believing that man 8must go wrong10 that nature and circumstances impose this dire necessity upon him1 his benevolence could not contemplate an eternity of torments as due to such inevitable sin4 ,it was repelled by 8the infinite horror of the tenet40 ,on the other hand1 his abhorrence of evil1 and sense of justice1 shrank with equal violence from the idea that all punishment is unjust2 and hence he could say1 8,far be it from us to make light of the demerit of sin1 and to remonstrate with the ,supreme ,judge against a severe chastisement40 ,thus did his great mind1 instead of resting upon truth1 perpetually hang in a state of suspense and vacillation between the noblest feelings of his heart and the darkest errors of his creed4 ,others1 who have adopted the same creed1 have endeavoured to extricate themselves from the dilemma in which ,foster found himself1 not by denying the eternity of future punishments1 but by inventing a very nice distinction between the natural and moral inability of man4 8,he can obey the law10 say they1 8if he will20 all that 8he wants is the will40 ,all his natural faculties are complete2 only let him will aright1 and he is safe4 ,but1 after all1 the question still remains1 ,how is he to get the will1--the good will1--in order to render him acceptable to ,god8 ,does he get it from nature--is it a part of his birth-right8 ,no3 from this he derives a depraved will1 8free to evil only40 ,is it vouchsafed to him from above8 ,is it a gift from ,god8 ,alas6 to those who are lost1 and perish eternally in their sins1 the grace of ,god is never given6 ,what does it signify thus to tell them1 or to tell the world1 that they have the natural ability to obey2 that none of their natural faculties are lost2 that they still have understandings1 and affections1 and wills8 ,what can all these avail them8 ,is it not the merest mockery to assure them that they really have hearts1 and wills1 and feelings1 if they 8must go wrong10 if they must put forth the volitions for which they shall be tormented forever8 ,upon this distinction we shall not dwell1 as we have fully considered it in our 8,examination of ,edwards on the ,will40 ,we shall merely add1 that it is not an invention of modern times47#bjj7 ,it is at least as old as the age of ,augustine4 8,the ,pelagians think10 says he1 8they know some great thing1 when they say1 #8,god would not command what he knew could not be done by man4' ,who does not know this8 ,but he commands what we cannot do1 whereby we know what we ought to ask of him4 ,for it is faith which obtains by prayer what the law commands4 ,for true it is that we keep the commandments if we will1 7si volumus27 but as the will is prepared of the ,lord1 we must seek of him that we may will as much as is sufficient1 in order to our doing by volition1 7ut volendo faciamus470 ,truly1 we can keep the commandments if we will to do so2 for1 as ,augustine immediately says1 8certain it is1 that we will when we will407#bja7 ,but no man can put forth a volition in conformity with the commandments1 unless it be given him of ,god1 who 8causes us to will good207#bjb7 and this is never given to the reprobate4 ,how1 then1 can they be justly consigned to eternal torments8 ,how can they be eternally punished for that which they could not possibly avoid8 ,it is no wonder that a ,foster should have shrunk from 8the infinite horrors of such a tenet10 as seen from this point of view2 the only wonder is1 that any one can be found who can possibly endure them4 ,the same distinction1 as we have already said1 is relied upon by ,edwards in order to show that man has an ability to obey the law of ,god47#bjc7 ,thus we are gravely taught that we are able to obey the law of ,god2 because if we will to do so1 the external act will follow2 and because it is certain that if we will we do really will4 ,but how to will is the question4 ,can we put forth the requisite volitions8 ,no one doubts that if we put forth the volition which the law of ,god requires1 we then obey him1 whether the external act follow or not2 nor that if we will1 then we do really will4 ,but all this leaves the great question untouched1 ,can we put forth the requisite volitions without divine aid8 ,and after this question has been answered in the negative1 and we have been told that such aid is not given to the reprobate1 all this talk about a natural ability1 which must forever prove unavailing1 is the merest mockery that ever entered into the imagination or the metaphysics of man4 ,however the fact may be disguised by verbal niceties1 it as really places eternal life beyond the reach of the reprobate1 as is the very sun in the firmament of heaven1 and makes eternal death as inevitable to them as is the rising and the setting thereof4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the eternity of future punishments an expression of the divine goodness4 ,we have seen in the first chapter of this part of the present work1 that ,god really and sincerely intended the salvation of all men2 and that if any are lost1 it is because it is impossible in the nature of things to necessitate holiness2 and that the impenitent1 in spite of all the means employed by infinite wisdom and goodness for their salvation1 do obstinately work out their own ruin and destruction4 ,omnipotence cannot confer holiness upon them2 they do not choose to acquire it2 and hence1 they are compelled to endure the awful wages of sin4 ,to those who reject this view of the nature of holiness1 the world in which we live must forever remain an inexplicable enigma2 and that to which we are hastening must present still more terrific subjects of contemplation4 ,to their minds the eternal agonies of the lost can never be made to harmonize with the infinite perfections of ,god1 by whom the second death is appointed4 8,how self-evident the proposition10 says ,foster1 8that if the ,sovereign ,arbiter had intended the salvation of the race1 it must have been accomplished40 ,having so summarily settled this position1 that ,god did not intend the salvation of the race1 the question which admits of no answer1 ,why did he not intend it8 might well spread a mysterious darkness over the whole economy of divine providence4 ,it was that darkness1 that perplexing and confounding darkness1 by which the mighty soul of ,foster was oppressed with so many gloomy thoughts1 and filled with so many frightful imaginations4 ,for our part1 if we could believe that ,god could easily work holiness in the heart of every creature1 and that he does not do so simply because he does not intend their salvation1 we should not have attempted to vindicate his perfections4 ,we should have believed in them1 it is true2 but we should have been constrained to confess1 that they are veiled in impenetrable clouds and darkness4 ,hence1 if we had not confessed ignorance and inability for all minds and all ages1 as so many others have done1 we should1 at least1 have confessed these things for ourselves1 and supinely waited for the light of eternity to dispel the awful and perplexing enigmas of time4 ,but we hold no such doctrine2 we entertain no such sentiment4 ,we believe that ,god1 in his infinite1 overflowing goodness desires1 and from all eternity has desired1 the salvation of all men4 ,we believe that salvation is impossible to some1 because a necessary holiness is impossible1 and they do not choose to work out for themselves what cannot be worked out for them1 even by omnipotence4 ,it was the bright and cheering light which this truth seemed to cast upon the dark places of the universe1 that first inspired us with the thought and determination to produce a theodicy4 ,and it is in the light of this truth1 if we mistake not1 that the infinite love of ,god may be seen beaming from the eye of hell1 as well as from the bright regions of eternal blessedness4 ,this conclusion we shall endeavour methodically to unfold1 and to set in a clear light4 ,in the first place1 then1 to begin with our fundamental position1 the ,creator could not necessitate the holiness of the creature4 ,hence this holiness1 after all the means and the ability were given to him1 must be left to the will of the creature himself4 ,all that could be done in such a case was1 for ,god to set life and death before us1 accompanied by the greatest of all conceivable motives to pursue the one1 and to fly from the other2 and then say1 8choose ye30 and all this has ,god actually done for the salvation of all men4 ,hence1 though some should be finally lost1 his infinite goodness will be clear4 ,let us see what objections may be urged against this conclusion4 ,supposing it granted1 that a necessitated virtue is a contradiction in terms1 and that it is indispensably requisite to ordain rewards and punishments in order to prevent sin and secure holiness2 it may still be said that the penalty of eternal death is too severe for that purpose1 and is therefore inconsistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,indeed1 after such a concession1 this is the only position which can be taken in opposition to the doctrine in question4 ,let us then look at it1 and examine the assumption upon which it rests for support4 ,if such punishments be too severe1 it must be for one of these two reasons3 either because no object can justify the infliction of them1 or because the end proposed by the ,supreme ,ruler is not sufficiently great for that purpose4 ,let us suppose1 then1 in the first place1 the position to be assumed1 that no object can possibly justify the infliction of such awful punishments4 ,such would be the case1 we admit1 if such punishments were unjust--were not deserved by the person upon whom they are inflicted4 ,hence1 it becomes indispensable1 in order to vindicate the divine benevolence1 to show that eternal sufferings are deserved by those upon whom they fall4 ,otherwise they would be unjust1 and consequently unjustifiable2 as the end could never justify the means4 ,we say1 then1 that eternal sufferings are deserved by the finally impenitent1 not because every sinful act carries along with it an infinite guilt1 nor because every sinner may be imagined to have committed an infinite number of sins1 but because they will continue to sin forever4 ,it will be conceded1 that if punishment be admissible at all1 it is right and proper that so long as acts of rebellion are persisted in1 the rewards of iniquity should attend them4 ,it will be conceded1 that if the finally impenitent should continue to sin forever1 then they forever deserve to reap the rewards of sin4 ,but this is one part of the ,scripture doctrine of future punishments1 that those who endure them will never cease to sin and rebel against the authority of ,god's law4 ,foster has attempted a reply to this defence of the doctrine in question1 but without success4 8,it is usually alleged10 says he1 8that there will be an endless continuance of sinning 444 and therefore the punishment must be endless40 ,but 8the allegation10 he replies1 8is of no avail in vindication of the doctrine1 because the first consignment to this dreadful state necessitates a continuance of the criminality2 the doctrine teaching that it is of the essence1 and is an awful aggravation of the original consignment1 that it dooms the condemned to maintain the criminal spirit unchanged forever4 ,the doom to sin as well as to suffer1 and1 according to the argument1 to sin in order to suffer1 is inflicted as the punishment of the sin committed in the mortal state4 ,virtually1 therefore1 the eternal punishment is the punishment of the sins of time407#bjd7 ,even according to the principles of ,foster himself1 the argument is wholly untenable4 ,for he admits1 that such is the evil nature of man1 such the circumstances around him1 and such the influences of the great tempter1 he must inevitably go wrong2 and yet he holds that he may be justly punished for such transgressions4 ,now1 if every man who comes into the world be doomed to sin1 as this author insists he is1 and may be justly punished for sins committed in this life1 why should he be excused for the sins committed in another state1 because he is doomed to commit them8 ,but this argumentum ad hominem is merely by the way1 and has more to do with the consistency of the author1 than with the validity of his position4 ,we shall proceed to subject this to a more searching and a more1 satisfactory test4 ,his argument assumes1 that 8it is of the essence of the original consignment1 that it dooms the condemned to maintain the criminal spirit unchanged forever40 ,this is an unwarrantable assumption4 ,we nowhere learn1 and we are nowhere required to believe1 that the guilty are doomed to sin forever1 because they have voluntarily sinned in this life2 much less that they are necessitated to sin in order to suffer6 ,the doctrine of the eternity of future punishments is not necessarily encumbered with any such ridiculous appendage2 and if any one can be found to entertain so absurd a view of the doctrine1 we must leave him to vindicate the creation of his own imagination4 ,we do not suppose that the soul of the guilty will continue to sin forever1 because it will be consigned to the regions of the lost2 but we suppose it will be consigned to the regions of the lost1 because1 by its own repeated acts of transgression1 it has made sure of its eternal continuance in sinning4 ,god dooms no man to sin--neither by his power nor by his providence4 ,but it is a fact1 against which there will be no dispute1 that if a man commit a sin once1 he will be still more apt to commit the same sin again1 under the same or similar circumstances4 ,the same thing will be true of each and every succeeding repetition of the offence2 until the habit of sinning may be so completely wrought into the soul1 and so firmly fixed there1 that nothing can check it in its career of guilt4 ,neither the glories of heaven1 nor the terrors of hell1 may be sufficient to change its course4 ,no amount of influence brought to bear upon its feelings1 may be sufficient to transform its will4 8,there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour10 says ,butler1 8which being transgressed1 there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things40 ,and may we not also add1 nor in the supernatural course of things either2 and there only remains a certain fearful looking-for of judgment8 ,as this may be the case1 for aught we know1 nay1 as it seems so probable that this is the case1 no one is authorized to pronounce endless sufferings unjust1 unless he can first show that the object of them has not brought upon himself an eternal continuance in the practice of sin4 ,in other words1 unless he can first show that the sinner does not doom himself to an eternity of sinning1 he cannot reasonably complain that his ,creator and ,judge dooms him to an eternity of suffering4 ,but it may be said1 that although the sinner may deserve to suffer forever1 because he continues to sin forever2 yet it were more worthy the infinite goodness of ,god1 to release him from so awful a calamity4 ,if the sinner deserves such punishment1 it is not only just to inflict it upon him1 it is a demand of infinite goodness itself that it should be inflicted upon him1 provided a sufficiently great good may be attained by such a manifestation of justice4 ,this brings us to the consideration of our second point1 namely3 ,is the object proposed to be accomplished by the infliction of eternal misery sufficiently great to justify the infliction of so severe a penalty8 ,in other words1 ,is such a penalty disproportioned to the exigencies of the case8 ,in his attempt to show1 that the infliction of eternal misery is too severe to consist with the goodness of ,god1 ,mr4 ,foster does not at all consider the great ends1 or final causes1 of penal enactments4 ,he merely dwells upon the terrors of the punishment1 and brings these into vivid contrast with the weakness and impotency of man in his mortal state4 ,this1 it must be confessed1 is a most one-sided and partial view of so profound a subject2 much better adapted to work upon the feelings than to enlighten the judgment4 ,all that he seems to have seen in the case1 is a poor1 weak creature1 utterly unable to do any good1 subjected to eternal torments for the sins of 8a few fleeting years on earth40 ,hence it was1 that 8the moral argument10 which 8pressed so irresistibly on his mind10 came in 8the stupendous idea of eternity40 ,indeed1 according to his theology1 there could be no object sufficiently vast1 no necessity sufficiently imperious1 to justify eternal punishments4 ,the prevention of sin1 and the promotion of universal holiness1 could not form such an object or constitute such a necessity2 for1 according to his creed1 all this might have been most perfectly attained by a word4 ,hence1 he was puzzled and confounded in the contemplation of what appeared to him so much unnecessary evil4 8,i acknowledge my inability10 said he1 8to admit the belief1 7the belief in endless punishment17 together with the belief in the divine goodness--the belief that #8,god is love1' that #8his tender mercies are over all his works4' 0 ,as we have already seen from another point of view1 we must come out from his theology if we would see the harmony and agreement between these beliefs4 ,we must take our stand on the position1 that ,omnipotence cannot necessitate holiness1 and must have recourse to rewards and punishments to secure it4 ,otherwise all evil and all suffering will remain an inexplicable enigma2 all rewards and punishments awkward and clumsy contrivances to attain an end1 which might be much better attained without them4 ,on this high and impregnable ground the moral argument of ,foster loses all its irresistible force1 and 8the stupendous idea of eternity0 presses with all its weight in favour of endless punishment4 ,if temporal punishments are justified on the ground that they are necessary to meet the exigencies and uphold the interests of temporal governments1 surely eternal punishments may be justified on the same ground in relation to an eternal government4 ,the 8stupendous idea of eternity0 attaches to the whole1 as well as to the part2 and hence nothing can be gained to the cause of ,universalism by the introduction of this idea1 except in the minds of those who take only a one-sided and partial view of the subject4 ,the spectacle of punishment for a single day1 it will be admitted1 would be justified on the ground that it was necessary to support for a single day a government2 especially if that government were vast in extent and involved stupendous interests4 ,but if suffering for a single day may be justified on such a ground1 then the exigencies of such a government for two days would justify a punishment for two days2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,hence1 the doctrine of eternal punishments in common with the eternal moral government of ,god1 is not a greater anomaly than temporal punishments in relation to temporal governments4 ,if we reject the one1 we must also reject the other4 ,indeed1 when we consider not only the eternal duration1 but also the universal extent1 of the divine government1 the argument in question1 if good for anything1 presses with greater force against the little1 insignificant governments of men1 than against the moral government of ,god4 ,one reason why ,foster was 8repelled into doubt by the infinite horrors of the tenet0 is1 that he merely contemplated the sufferings of the guilty1 and saw not how those sufferings were connected with the majesty and glory of ,god's universal and eternal empire4 ,it is as if an insect should undertake to set bounds to the punishments which human beings have found necessary to meet the exigencies and uphold the interests of human society4 ,we are told by writers on jurisprudence1 that penalties should be proportioned to offences2 but1 as has been truly said1 how this proportion is to be ascertained1 or on what principles it is to be adjusted1 we are seldom informed4 ,we are usually left to vague generalities1 which convey no definite information1 and furnish no satisfactory guidance to our minds4 ,if we can ascertain the precise conditions according to which this principle should be adjusted1 even by goodness itself1 we shall then be the better able to determine whether the eternal suffering of the guilty and impenitent is not a manifestation of the love of ,god1--of that tender mercy which is over all his works4 ,it is a maxim that punishment should be sufficient to accomplish the great end for which it is imposed1 namely1 the prevention of offences4 ,otherwise1 if it failed to accomplish this object1 8it would be so much suffering in waste407#bje7 ,now1 who can say that the penalty of eternal death is not necessary to this end in the moral government of the universe1 or that it is greater than is necessary for its accomplishment8 ,who can say that a punishment for a limited period would have answered that end in a greater or more desirable degree8 ,who can say that there would have been more holiness and happiness1 with less sin and misery1 in the universe1 if the punishment of those whom nothing could reclaim had not been eternal8 ,who can say that it would be better for the universe1 on the whole1 if the punishment of sin were limited than if it were eternal8 ,until this question1 which so evidently lies beyond the range of our narrow faculties1 be answered1 it is presumption to object that eternal punishment is inconsistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,for aught the objector knows1 this very penalty is demanded by infinite goodness itself1 in order to stay the universal ravages of sin1 and preserve the glory of the moral empire of ,jehovah4 ,for aught he knows1 the very sufferings of the lost forever may be1 not only a manifestation of the justice of ,god1 but also a profound expression of that tender mercy which is over all his works4 ,for aught he knows1 this very appointment1 at which he takes so great offence1 may be one of the main pillars in the structure of the intellectual system of the universe2 without which its internal constitution would be radically defective1 and its moral government impossible4 ,in short1 for aught he knows1 his objection may arise1 not from any undue or unnecessary severity of the punishment in question1 but from his own utter incapacity to decide such a point in relation to the universal and eternal government of ,god4 ,it may be said that this is an appeal to human ignorance1 rather than a reply to the argument of the ,universalist4 ,surely1 it is good to be reminded of our ignorance1 when we undertake to base objections against the doctrines of religion upon assumptions about the truth of which we know1 and1 from the nature of the case1 must know1 absolutely nothing4 ,if the doctrine in question involved any inherent contradictions1 or were it clearly at war with the dictates of justice1 or mercy1 or truth1 there might be some reason in our opposition2 but to oppose it because we cannot see how it subserves the highest interests of the universe1 seems to be an exceedingly rash and hasty decision2 especially as we see that such a penalty must powerfully tend to restrain the wickedness of men1 as well as to preserve unfallen creatures in their obedience4 ,it is not at all strange that beings with such faculties as we possess1 limited on all sides1 and far more influenced by feeling than by reason1 should be oppressed by the stupendous idea of eternal torments4 ,it absolutely overwhelms the imagination of poor1 short-sighted creatures like ourselves4 ,but ,god1 in his plans for the universe and for eternity1 takes no counsel of human weakness2 and that which seems so terrible to our feeble intellects may1 to his all-seeing eye1 appear no more than a dark speck in a boundless realm of light4 ,surely1 if there ever was1 or ever could be1 a question which should be reduced to the simple inquiry1 8,what saith the ,scripture80 it is that respecting the future condition of the wicked4 ,it is truly amazing that a mind like ,foster's should have put this inquiry so easily aside1 and relied with so much confidence upon what he was pleased to call 8the moral argument40 ,this argument1 as we have seen1 is altogether unsound and sophistical4 ,it bases itself upon the prejudices of a creed1 and terminates in dark conjectures merely4 ,he hopes1 or rather he 8would wish to indulge the hope1 founded upon the divine attribute of infinite benevolence1 that there will be a period somewhere in the endless futurity1 when all ,god's sinning creatures will be restored by him to rectitude and happiness40 ,vain hope6 delusive wish6 ,how can they be made holy without their own consent and coperation8 ,and if they could be restored to rectitude and happiness1 how can we hope that ,god would restore them1 since he has not been pleased to preserve them in their original state of rectitude and happiness8 ,but perhaps1 says he1 there will be1 not a restoration of all ,god's sinning creatures to rectitude and happiness1 but an annihilation of their existence4 ,even this conjecture1 if true1 8would be a prodigious relief20 for 8the grand object of interest is a negation of the perpetuity of misery40 ,suppose1 then1 that the universe had been planned according to this benevolent wish of ,mr4 ,foster1 and that those who could not be reclaimed should1 after a very protracted period of suffering1 be forever annihilated2 would this promote the order and well-being of the whole creation8 ,how did ,mr4 ,foster know but that such a provision in the government of the universe would oppose so feeble a barrier to the progress of sin1 that scenes of mutability1 and change1 and ruin1 would be introduced into the empire of ,god1 from which his benevolence would shrink with infinite abhorrence8 ,how did ,mr4 ,foster know but that the ,divine ,benevolence itself would prefer a hell in one part of his dominions1 to the universal disorder1 confusion1 and moral desolation which such a provision might introduce into the government of ,god8 ,such a conjecture might1 it is true1 bring a 8prodigious relief0 to our imagination2 but the government of ,god is intended for the relief of the universe1 and not for the relief of our imagination4 ,others besides the author in question have sought relief for their minds on this subject1 by indulging in vague conjectures respecting the real design of the ,supreme ,ruler and ,judge4 ,archbishop ,tillotson1 for example1 supposes that although ,god actually threatened to punish the wicked eternally1 he does not intend1 and is not bound1 to carry this threat into execution4 ,this penalty1 he supposes1 is merely set forth as a terror to evil-doers1 in order to promote the good order and well-being of the world2 and after it has subserved this purpose1 the ,lawgiver will graciously remit a portion of the threatened penalty1 and restore all his sinning creatures to purity and bliss4 ,in reply to this extraordinary position1 we shall only say that if the ,almighty really undertook to deceive the world for its own good1 it is a pity he did not take the precaution to prevent the archbishop from detecting the cheat4 ,it is a pity1 we say1 that he did not deceive the archbishop as well as the rest of men2 and not suffer his secret to get into the possession of one who has so indiscreetly published it to the whole world4 ,nothing seems more amazing to us than the haste and precipitancy with which most men dispose of subjects so awful as that of the eternity of future punishments4 ,one would suppose that if any subject in the whole range of human thought should engage our most serious attention1 and call forth the utmost exertion of our power of investigation1 it would be the duration of punishment in a future life4 ,if that punishment be eternal1 it is certainly the most momentous question which ever engaged the attention of man1 and is to be lightly disposed of only by madmen47#bjf7 ,chapter ,v4 ,the ,dispensation ,of ,the ,divine ,favours ,reconciled ,with ,the ,goodness ,of ,god4 ,o ,god1 whose thunder shakes the sky1 ,whose eye this atom globe surveys1 ,to thee1 my only rock1 ,i fly2 ,thy mercy in thy justice praise4 ,then why1 my soul1 dost thou complain8 ,why drooping seek the dark recess8 ,shake off the melancholy chain1 ,for ,god created all to bless4--,,chatterton4 ,in the preceding part1 we considered the doctrine of predestination1 under the name of necessity1 in its relation to the origin of evil4 ,we there endeavoured to show that it denies the responsibility of man1 and makes ,god the author of sin4 ,in the present part1 it remains for us to examine the same doctrine in relation to the equality of the divine goodness4 ,if we mistake not1 the scheme of predestination1 or rather the doctrine of election1 which lies at its foundation1 is1 when rightly understood1 perfectly consistent with the impartiality and glory of the goodness of ,god4 ,on this subject we shall now proceed to unfold our views in as orderly and perspicuous a manner as possible4 ,section ,i4 ,the unequal distribution of favours1 which obtains in the economy of natural providence1 consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,it has been thought that if the goodness of ,god were unlimited and impartial1 the light and blessings of revelation would be universal4 ,but before we should attach any weight to such an objection1 we should first consider and determine two things4 ,first1 we should consider and determine how far the unequal diffusion of the light of revelation has resulted from the agency of man1 and how far from the agency of ,god4 ,for1 if this inequality in the spread of a divine blessing has sprung in any degree from the abuse which free1 subordinate agents have made of their powers1 either by active opposition1 or passive neglect1 it is in so far no more imputable to a want of goodness in the ,divine ,being than is any other evil or disorder which the creature has introduced into the world4 ,in so far1 the glory of ,god is clear1 and man alone is to blame4 ,it is incumbent upon those1 then1 who urge this objection against the goodness of ,god to show that the evil in question has not resulted from the agency of man4 ,this position1 we imagine1 the objector will not find it very easy to establish2 and yet1 until he does so1 his objection very clearly rests upon a mere unsupported hypothesis4 ,secondly1 before we can fairly rely upon the objection in question1 we should be able to show1 that the agency of ,god might have been so exerted as to spread the light of revelation further than it now extends1 without on the whole causing greater evil than good4 ,light or knowledge1 it should be remembered1 is not in itself a blessing4 ,it may be so1 or it may not2 and whether it be a blessing or a curse depends1 not upon the beneficence of the giver1 but upon the disposition and character of the recipient4 ,before we should presume to indulge the least complaint1 then1 against the goodness of divine providence1 we should be able to produce the nation1 whose character for moral goodness and virtue would1 on the whole1 and in relation to its circumstances1 have been improved by the interposition of ,god in causing the light of truth to shine in the midst of its corruptions4 ,but we are manifestly incompetent to deal with a question of such a nature4 ,its infinite complication1 as well as its stupendous magnitude1 places it entirely beyond the reach of the human mind4 ,so manifold and so multiform are the hidden causes upon which its solution depends1 that general principles cannot be brought to bear upon it2 and its infinite variety and complication of detail must forever baffle the intellect of man4 ,hence1 an objection which proceeds on the supposition that this question has been solved and determined1 is worth nothing4 ,but1 for the sake of argument1 let us suppose that the unequal diffusion of religious knowledge has proceeded directly from the agency of ,god4 ,still the objection against his goodness1 in regard to the dispensation of light1 would be no greater than in relation to all the dispensations of his favour4 ,all the gifts of ,heaven--health1 riches1 honour1 intelligence1 and whatever else comes down from above--are scattered among the children of men with the most promiscuous variety4 ,hence1 the unequal distribution of the blessings of the gospel1 or rather of its external advantages1 is so far from being inconsistent with the character of ,god1 that it is of a piece with all his other dispensations3 it is so far from standing out as an anomaly in the proceedings of the ,divine ,being1 that it falls in with the whole analogy of nature and of providence4 ,hence1 there is no resting-place between the abandonment of this objection1 and downright atheism4 ,let us see1 then1 what force there is in this objection1 when urged1 as it is by the atheist1 against the whole constitution and management of the world4 ,it proceeds on the supposition1 that if light and knowledge1 or any other natural advantage1 were bestowed upon one person1 it would be bestowed upon all others1 and upon all in precisely the same degree4 ,according to his view1 there should be no such thing as degrees in knowledge1 and consequently no such thing as self-development and progress4 ,to select only one instance out of many3 the atheist objects1 that it is not worthy of infinite wisdom and goodness to provide us with so complicated an instrument as the eye1 as a means of obtaining light and knowledge4 ,why could not this end be attained by a more simple and direct method8 ,why leave us1 for so great a portion of earthly existence1 in comparative ignorance1 to grope out our way into regions of light8 ,in the eye of reason1 there is no end to this kind of objecting2 and it only stops where the shallow conceit1 or wayward fancy1 of the objector is pleased to terminate4 ,it is very easy to ask1 ,why a ,being of infinite goodness did not confer light and knowledge upon us directly and at once1 without leaving us to acquire them by the tedious use of the complicated means provided by his natural providence4 ,but the inquiry does not stop here4 ,he might just as well ask1 ,why such a ,being was pleased to confer so small an amount of light upon us1 and leave us to acquire more for ourselves8 ,why not confer it upon us without measure and without exertion on our part8 ,the same interrogation1 it is evident1 may be applied to every other blessing1 as well as to knowledge2 and hence the objection of the atheist1 when carried out1 terminates in the great difficulty1 why ,god did not make all creatures alike1 and each equal to himself4 ,on the principle of this objection1 the insect should complain that it is not a man2 the man that he is not an angel2 and the angel that he is not a god4 ,hence1 such a principle would exclude from the system of the world everything like a diversity and subordination of parts2 and would reduce the whole universe1 as a system1 to as inconceivable a nonentity as would be a watch1 all of whose parts should be made of exactly the same materials1 and possessing precisely the same force and properties4 ,in every system1 whether of nature or of art1 there must be a variety and subordination of parts4 ,hence1 to object that each part is not perfect in itself1 without considering its relations and adaptation to the whole1 is little short of madness4 ,and what heightens the absurdity in the present case is1 that the parts which fall under observation may1 for aught we know1 possess the greatest perfection which is consistent with the highest good and beauty of the whole4 ,if ,god has endowed man with the attributes of reason and speech2 if he has scattered around him1 with a liberal hand1 the multiplied blessings of life2 if1 above all1 he has made him capable of eternal blessedness1 and of an endless progress in glory2 this should warm his heart with the most glowing gratitude1 and tune his tongue to the most exalted praise4 ,and the man1 the rational and immortal being1 whose high endowments should lead him to murmur and repine at the unequal dispensations of the divine bounty1 because ,god has created beings of a higher order than himself1 and placed them in a world where no cloud is ever seen1 and where no sigh is ever heard1 would certainly1 to say the very least1 be guilty of the most criminal ingratitude4 ,reason and conscience might well cry out1 ,shall the thing formed say to ,him who formed it1 ,why hast thou made me thus8 ,and ,god himself might well demand1 ,is thine eye evil1 because ,i am good8 ,the case is not altered1 if we suppose that the divine favour is unequally bestowed upon different individuals of the same species1 instead of the different orders of created beings4 ,the same principle of wisdom and goodness1 as ,butler remarks1 whatever it may be1 which led ,god to make a difference between men and angels1 may be the same which induces him to make a difference between one portion of the human family and another--to leave one portion for a season to the dim twilight of nature1 while upon another he pours out the light of revelation4 ,the same principle1 it may also be1 which gives rise to the endless diversity of natural gifts among the different individuals of the same community1 as well as to the different situations of the same individual1 in regard to his temporal and eternal interests1 during the various stages of his earthly existence4 ,and if this be so1 we should either cease to object against the goodness of ,god1 because the same powers and advantages are not bestowed upon all1 or we should adopt the atheistical principle1 in its fullest extent1 which has now been shown to be so full of absurdity4 ,but although we cannot see the particular reasons of such a diversity of gifts1 or how each is subservient to the good of the whole2 yet every shadow of injustice will disappear1 if we consider that ,god deals with every one1 to use the language of ,scripture1 8according to what he hath1 and not according to what he hath not40 ,his bounty overflows1 in various degrees1 upon his creatures2 but his justice equalizes all1 by requiring every one to give an account of just exactly as many talents as have been committed to his charge1 and no more4 ,in this respect1 all the dispensations of divine providence are clearly and broadly distinguished from the ,calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation4 ,according to this scheme1 the reprobate1 or those who are not objects of the divine mercy1 have not1 and never had1 the ability to obey the law of ,god2 and yet they are condemned to eternal death for their failure to obey it4 ,this is to deal with them1 not according to what they have1 but according to what they have not1 and what they could not possibly have4 ,hence1 to reason from one of these cases to the other1 from the inequality of gifts and talents ordained by ,god to a scheme of election and reprobation1 as ,calvinists uniformly do1 is to confound all our notions of just dealing1 and to convert the rightful sovereignty of ,god into frightful tyranny4 ,the perfect justice of this remark will1 we trust1 be made to appear the more clearly and fully in the course of the following section of the present work4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,scripture doctrine of election consistent with the impartiality of the divine goodness4 ,we have seen that the election of a nation to the enjoyment of certain external advantages1 or the bestowment of superior gifts upon some individuals1 is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine goodness4 ,beyond the distinctions thus indicated1 and which so clearly obtain in the natural providence of ,god1 it is believed that the ,scriptural scheme of election does not go2 and that the more rigid features of the ,calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation can be deduced from revelation only by a violent wresting and straining of the clear word of ,god4 ,let us see if this assertion may not be fully established4 ,the ninth chapter of the ,epistle to the ,romans1 it is well known1 is the portion of ,scripture upon which the advocates of that scheme have chiefly relied1 from ,augustine down to ,calvin1 and from ,calvin down to the present day4 ,but1 to any impartial mind1 we believe1 this chapter will not be found to lend the least shadow of support to any such scheme of doctrine4 ,we assume this position advisedly1 and shall proceed to give the reasons on which it is based4 ,now1 in the interpretation of any instrument of writing1 it is a universally admitted rule1 that it should be construed with reference to the subject of which it treats4 ,what1 then1 is the subject of which the apostle treats in the ninth chapter of ,romans8 ,in regard to this point there is no dispute2 and1 to avoid all appearance of controversy in relation to it1 we shall state the design of the apostle1 in this part of his discourse1 in the words of one by whom the ,calvinistic scheme of election is maintained4 8,with the eighth chapter10 says ,professor ,hodge1 in his ,commentary on the ,epistle to the ,romans1 8the discussion of the plan of salvation1 and its immediate consequences1 was brought to a close4 ,the consideration of the calling of the ,gentiles1 and the rejection of the ,jews1 commences with the ninth1 and extends to the end of the eleventh40 ,thus1 according to the author1 8the subject which the apostle had in view10 in the ninth chapter1 is 8the rejection of the ,jews1 and the calling of the ,gentiles40 ,now1 if this be his subject1 and if the discussion of the plan of salvation was brought to a close in the eighth chapter1 how can the doctrine of election and reprobation1 which lies at the very foundation of1 and gives both shape and colouring to1 the whole scheme of salvation1 as maintained by ,calvinists1 be found in the ninth chapter8 ,how has it happened that such important lights have been thrown upon the plan of salvation1 and such fundamental positions established in relation to it1 after its discussion has been brought to a close8 ,but this only by the way2 we shall hereafter see how these important lights have been extracted from the chapter in question4 ,the precise passage upon which the greatest stress is laid seems to be the following3 8,the children being not yet born1 neither having done any good or evil1 that the purpose of ,god1 according to election1 might stand1 not of works1 but of him that calleth2 it was said unto her1 ,the elder shall serve the younger4 ,as it is written1 ,jacob have ,i loved1 but ,esau have ,i hated40 ,now1 the question is1 ,does this refer to the election of ,jacob to eternal life1 and the eternal reprobation of ,esau2 or1 ,does it refer to the selection of the descendants of the former to constitute the visible people of ,god on earth8 ,this is the question2 and it is one which1 we think1 is by no means difficult of solution4 ,the apostle was in the habit of quoting only a few words of a passage of the ,old ,testament1 to which he had occasion to refer2 and in the present instance he merely cites the words of the prophecy1 8,the elder shall serve the younger40 ,but1 according to the prophecy to which he refers1 it was said to ,rebecca1 8,two nations are in thy womb1 and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels2 and the one people shall be stronger than the other people1 and the elder shall serve the younger40 ,nothing can be plainer1 we think1 than that this prophecy relates to the descendants of ,jacob and ,esau1 and not to the individuals themselves4 ,this view of the above passage1 if it needed further confirmation1 is corroborated by the fact that ,esau did not serve ,jacob1 and that this part of the prophecy is true only in relation to his descendants4 ,thus the prophecy1 when interpreted by its own express words1 as well as by the event1 shows that it related to 8two nations10 to 8two manner of people10 and not to two individuals4 ,the argument of ,st4 ,paul demands this interpretation4 ,he is not discussing the plan of salvation4 ,the question before him is not whether some are elected to eternal life on account of their works or not2 and hence1 if he had quoted a prophecy7#bjg7 from the ,old ,testament to establish that position1 he would have been guilty of a gross solecism1 a non sequitur1 as plain as could well be conceived4 ,for these reasons1 we think there can be but little doubt with respect to the true meaning of the passage in question4 ,and besides1 this construction not only brings the language of the apostle into perfect conformity with the providence which ,god is actually seen to exercise over the world1 but also reconciles it with the glory of the divine character4 ,in regard to the meaning of the terms loved and hated1 used in the prophecy under consideration1 there can be no doubt that the interpretation of ,professor ,hodge is perfectly just4 8,the meaning is10 says he1 8that ,god preferred one to the other1 or chose one instead of the other4 ,as this is the idea meant to be expressed1 it is evident that in this case the word hate means to love less1 to regard and treat with less favour4 ,thus in ,gen4 xxix1 #cc1 ,leah says1 she was hated by her husband2 while1 in the thirtieth verse1 the same idea is expressed by saying1 ,jacob #8loved ,rachel more than ,leah4' ,matt4 x1 #cg4 ,luke xiv1 #bf3 #8,if any man come to me1 and hate not his father and mother1' c4 ,john xii1 #be40 ,no one will object to this explanation4 ,but how will the language1 thus understood1 apply to the case of individual election and reprobation1 as maintained by ,calvinists8 ,we can see1 indeed1 how it applies to the descendants of ,esau1 who were in many respects placed in less advantageous circumstances than the posterity of ,jacob2 but how can ,god be said to love the elect more than the reprobate8 ,can he be said to love the reprobate at all8 ,if1 from all eternity1 they have been eternally damned for not rendering an impossible obedience1 should we call this a lesser degree of love than that which is bestowed upon the elect1 or should we call it hate8 ,it seems1 that the commentator feels some repugnance at the idea of setting apart the individual1 before he has 8done either good or evil10 as an object of hate2 but not at all at the idea of setting him apart as an object of eternal and remediless woe6 8,it is no doubt true10 says ,professor ,hodge1 8that the prediction contained in this passage has reference not only to the relative standing of ,jacob and ,esau1 as individuals1 but also to that of their descendants4 ,it may even be allowed that the latter was principally intended in the communication to ,rebecca4 ,but it is clear3 #a4 ,that this distinction between the two races presupposed and included a distinction between the individuals4 ,jacob1 made the special heir to his father ,isaac1 obtained as an individual the birthright and the blessing2 and ,esau1 as an individual1 was cut off40 ,this may all be perfectly true2 it is certainly nothing to the purpose4 ,it is true1 that ,jacob was made the special heir to his father2 but did he thereby inherit eternal life8 ,the distinction between him and ,esau was undoubtedly a personal favour2 the very fact that his descendants would be so highly blessed1 must have been a source of personal satisfaction and joy1 which his less favoured brother did not possess4 ,but was this birthright and this blessing the fixed and irreversible boon of eternal life8 ,there is not the least shadow of any such thing in the whole record4 ,the only blessings1 of a personal or individual nature1 of which the account gives us the least intimation1 either by express words or by implication1 are like those with which ,god1 in his providence1 still continues to distinguish some individuals from others4 ,they are not the gift of eternal life1 but of certain external and temporal advantages4 ,hence they throw no light upon the ,calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation4 ,to make out this scheme1 or anything in support of it1 something more must be done than to show that ,god distinguishes one nation1 or one individual1 from another1 in the distribution of his favours4 ,this is conceded on all sides2 and has nothing to do with the point in dispute4 ,it must also be shown1 that the particular favour which he brings home to one by his infinite power1 and which he withholds from another1 is neither more nor less than the salvation of the soul4 ,it must be shown1 that the mere will and pleasure of ,god makes such a distinction among the souls of men1 that while some are invincibly made the heirs of glory1 others are stamped with the seal of eternal death4 ,the inheritance of ,jacob1 and the casting off of ,esau1 were1 so far as we can see1 very different from the awful proceeding which is ascribed to ,god according to the ,calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation4 ,the same remark is applicable to other attempts to show1 that ,god's favour was bestowed upon ,jacob1 as an individual1 in preference to ,esau4 8,as to the objection10 says ,professor ,hodge1 8that ,esau never personally served ,jacob1 it is founded on the mere literal sense of the words4 ,esau did acknowledge his inferiority to ,jacob1 and was postponed to him on various occasions4 ,this is the real spirit of the passage4 ,this prophecy1 as is the case with all similar predictions1 has various stages of fulfilment4 ,the relation between the two brothers during life2 the loss of the birthright blessing and promises on the part of ,esau2 the temporary subjugation of his descendants to the ,hebrews under ,david2 their final and complete subjugation under the ,maccabees2 and especially their exclusion from the peculiar privileges of the people of ,god1 through all the periods of their history1 are included40 ,suppose all this to be true1 what relation has it to the election of some individuals to eternal life1 and the reprobation of others8 ,we shall not dwell upon other portions of the chapter in question2 for1 if the foregoing remarks be just1 it will be easy to dispose of every text which may1 at first view1 appear to support the ,calvinistic doctrine of election4 ,we shall dismiss the consideration of the ninth chapter of ,romans with an extract from ,dr4 ,macknight1 who1 although a firm believer in the ,calvinistic view of election and reprobation1 does not find any support for his doctrine in this portion of ,scripture4 8,although some passages in this chapter10 says he1 8which pious and learned men have understood of the election and reprobation of individuals1 are in the foregoing illustration interpreted of the election of nations to be the people of ,god1 and to enjoy the advantage of an external revelation1 and of their losing these honourable distinctions1 the reader must not1 on that account1 suppose the author rejects the doctrines of the decree and foreknowledge of ,god4 ,these doctrines are taught in other passages of ,scripture3 see ,rom4 viii1 #bi40 ,thus this enlightened critic candidly abandons the ninth chapter of ,romans1 and seeks support for his ,calvinistic view of the divine decrees elsewhere4 ,let us1 then1 proceed to examine the eighth chapter of ,romans1 upon which he relies4 ,the words are as follow3 8,for whom he did foreknow1 he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his ,son1 that he might be the first-born among many brethren4 ,moreover1 whom he did predestinate1 them he also called3 and whom he called1 them he also justified3 and whom he justified1 them he also glorified40 ,we need have no dispute with the ,calvinists respecting the interpretation of these words4 ,if we mistake not1 we may adopt their own construction of them1 and yet clearly show that they lend not the least support to their views of election and reprobation4 8,as to know10 says ,professor ,hodge1 8is often to approve and love1 it may express the idea of peculiar affection in the case2 or it may mean to select or determine upon40 ,these two interpretations1 as he truly says1 8do not essentially differ4 ,the one is but a modification of the other40 8,the idea1 therefore1 obviously is1 that those whom ,god peculiarly loved1 and by thus loving1 distinguished or selected from the rest of mankind2 or1 to express both ideas in one word1 those whom he elected he predestinated1 c40 ,thus1 according to this commentator1 those whom ,god elected1 he also predestinated1 called1 justified1 and1 finally1 glorified4 ,now1 suppose all this to be admitted1 let us consider whether it gives any support to the ,calvinistic creed of election4 ,it teaches that all those whom ,god elects shall be ultimately saved2 but not one word or one syllable does it say with respect to the principle or ground of his election4 ,it tells us that ,god1 in his infinite wisdom1 selects one portion of mankind as the objects of his saving mercy1--the heirs of eternal glory2 but it does not say that this selection1 this approbation1 this peculiar love1 is wholly without foundation in the character or condition of the elect4 ,it tells us that ,god has numbered the elect1 and written their names in the book of life2 but it does not tell us that1 in any case1 he has taken precisely such as he has left1 or left precisely such as he has taken4 ,the bare fact of the election is all that is here disclosed4 ,the reason1 or the ground1 or the principle1 of that election is not even alluded to2 and we are left to gather it either from other portions of ,scripture1 or from the eternal dictates of justice and mercy4 ,hence1 as this passage makes no allusion to the ground or reason of the divine election1 it does not begin to touch the controversy we have with theologians of the ,calvinistic school4 ,every link in the chain here presented is perfect1 except that which connects its first link1 the election to eternal life1 with the unconditional decree of ,god2 and that link1 the only one in controversy1 is absolutely wanting4 ,we have no occasion to break the chain2 for it is only to the imagination that it seems to be unconditionally bound to the throne of the ,omnipotent4 ,as this passage1 then1 determines nothing with respect to the ground or reason of election1 so we have as much right to affirm1 even in the presence of such language1 that ,god did really foresee a difference where he has made so great a distinction1 as the ,calvinists have to suppose that so great a distinction has been made by a mere arbitrary and capricious exercise of power4 ,that we have a better reason for this position than our opponents can produce for theirs1 we shall endeavour to show in the ensuing section4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with the impartiality and glory of the divine goodness4 ,having seen that the unequal distribution of favours1 which obtains in the wise economy of ,providence1 distinguishing nation from nation1 as well as individual from individual1 is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine goodness2 and having also seen that the ,scripture doctrine of election makes no other distinctions than those which take place in the providence of ,god1 and is equally reconcilable with the glory of his character1 we come now to consider the ,calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation4 ,we have shown on what principles the providence of ,god1 which makes so many distinctions among men1 may be vindicated2 let us now see on what principles the ,calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation seeks to justify itself4 ,if we mistake not1 this scheme of predestination is as unlike the providence of ,god in its principles as it is in the appalling distinctions which it makes among the subjects of the moral government of the world4 8,predestination10 says ,calvin1 8we call the eternal decree of ,god1 by which he has determined in himself1 what he would have to become of every individual of mankind4 ,for they are not all created with a similar destiny2 but eternal life is foreordained for some1 and eternal damnation for others4 ,every man1 therefore1 being created for one or the other of these ends1 we say1 he is predestinated either to life or to death407#bjh7 ,again3 8,in conformity1 therefore1 to the clear doctrine of ,scripture1 we assert1 that by an eternal and immutable counsel1 ,god has once for all determined1 both whom he would admit to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction407#bji7 ,the doctrine of predestination is set forth in the ,westminster ,confession of ,faith1 in the following terms3 8,by the decree of ,god1 for the manifestation of his glory1 some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life1 and others foreordained to everlasting death40 8,these men and angels1 thus predestinated and foreordained1 are particularly and unchangeably designed2 and their number is so certain and definite1 that it cannot be either increased or diminished40 8,those of mankind that are predestinated unto life1 ,god1 before the foundation of the world was laid1 according to his eternal and immutable purpose1 and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will1 hath chosen in ,christ unto everlasting glory1 out of his mere free grace and love1 without any foresight of faith or good works1 or perseverance in either of them1 or any other thing in the creature1 as conditions or causes moving him thereunto2 and all to the praise of his glorious grace40 8,as ,god hath appointed the elect unto glory1 so hath he1 by the eternal and most free purpose of his will1 foreordained all the means thereunto4 ,wherefore1 they who are elected1 being fallen in ,adam1 are redeemed by ,christ1 are effectually called unto faith in ,christ by his ,spirit working in due season2 are justified1 adopted1 sanctified1 and kept by his power through faith unto salvation4 ,neither are any other redeemed by ,christ1 effectually called1 justified1 adopted1 sanctified1 and saved1 but the elect only40 8,the rest of mankind1 ,god was pleased1 according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will1 whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth1 for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures1 to pass by1 and to ordain to dishonour and wrath for their sin1 to the praise of his glorious justice40 ,the defenders of this system assume the position1 that as 8by ,adam's sin the whole human race became a corrupt mass1 and justly subject to eternal damnation2 so that no one can blame ,god's righteous decision1 if none are saved from perdition407#baj7 ,augustine expressly says3 8,but why faith is not given to all1 need not move the faithful1 who believe that by one all came into condemnation1 doubtless the most just2 so that there would be no just complaining of ,god1 though no one should be freed40 ,and again3 8,the dominion of death has so far prevailed over men1 that the deserved punishment would drive all headlong into a second death likewise1 of which there is no end1 if the undeserved grace of ,god did not deliver them from it407#baa7 ,such is the picture of the divine justice1 which the advocates of predestination have presented1 from the time of ,augustine1 the great founder of the doctrine1 down to the present day4 ,it surely furnishes a sufficiently dark background on which to display the divine mercy to advantage4 ,we are told1 however1 that we should not judge of the proceeding of ,god1 according to our notions of justice4 ,this is certainly true1 if the divine justice is fairly represented in the scheme of predestination2 for that is clearly unlike all that is called justice among men4 ,if ,god can create countless myriads of beings1 who1 because they come into the world with a depraved nature1 and 8can do nothing but sin10 he regards with such displeasure1 as to leave them without hope and without remedy2 and not only so1 but dooms them to eternal misery on account of an unavoidable continuance in sin2 it must be confessed1 that we should not presume to apply our notions of justice to his dealings with the world4 ,they would more exactly accord with our notions of injustice1 cruelty1 and oppression1 than with any others of which we are capable of forming any conception4 ,but1 if we are not to decide according to our notions of justice1 how shall we judge1 or form any opinion respecting the equity of the divine proceeding8 ,shall we judge according to some notion which we do not possess1 or shall we not judge at all8 ,this last would seem to be the wiser course2 but it is one which the ,calvinists themselves will not permit us to adopt4 ,they tell us1 that the predestination of the greater part of mankind to eternal death is 8to the praise of ,god's glorious justice40 ,but how are we to behold this glorious manifestation of the divine justice1 if we may not view it through any medium known to us1 or contemplate it in any light which may have dawned upon our minds8 ,indeed1 although the defenders of this doctrine often declare that the predestination of so many men and angels to eternal misery1 displays the justice of ,god in all its glory2 yet their own writings furnish the most abundant and conclusive evidence1 that they themselves can see no appearance of justice in such a proceeding4 ,on various occasions they do not hesitate to tell us1 that although they cannot recognise the justice of such a proceeding1 yet they believe it to be just1 because it is the proceeding of ,god4 ,but how can that be a display of justice to us1 which1 according to all our notions1 wears the appearance of the most frightful injustice8 ,calvin himself admits1 that the justice of ,god1 which is supposed to be so brightly displayed in the predestination of so many immortal beings to endless woe1 is1 in reality1 therein involved in clouds and darkness4 ,yet he does not fail to deduce an argument in its favour from 8the very obscurity which excites such dread407#bab7 ,it seems clear1 that if the divine justice is really displayed in the punishment of the reprobate1 it would have been exhibited on a still more magnificent scale by the condemnation of the whole human race4 ,for1 according to ,calvinism1 all were equally deserving of the divine displeasure1 and the saved are distinguished from the lost only by the election of ,god4 ,hence1 this scheme shows the justice of ,god to be limited1 or not displayed on so grand and imposing a scale as it might have been2 that is to say1 it shows the justice of ,god to be less than infinite4 ,but if such be the justice of ,god1 we certainly should not complain that it has been limited by his mercy2 we should rather rejoice1 indeed1 to believe that it had been thereby entirely extinguished4 ,notwithstanding the claims of divine justice1 all were not reprobated and doomed to eternal death4 ,a certain portion of mankind are elected and saved1 8to the praise of his glorious grace40 ,now1 it is conceded by ,calvinists1 that 8all the circumstances which distinguish the elect from others are the fruit of their election407#bac7 ,this proposition is deduced by a ,calvinistic divine from the 8,westminster ,confession of ,faith40 ,it is also conceded1 that if the same grace which is given to the elect1 should be bestowed upon the reprobate1 they also would be saved47#bad7 ,why1 then1 is it not bestowed8 ,why this fearful limitation of the divine mercy8 ,can the justice of ,god be manifested only at the expense of his mercy1 and his mercy only at the expense of his justice8 ,or1 is the everlasting mercy of ,god1 that sublime attribute which constitutes the excellency and glory of his moral nature1 so limited and straitened on all sides1 that it merely selects here and there an object of its favour1 while it leaves thousands and millions1 equally within its reach1 exposed to the eternal ravages of the spoiler8 ,if so1 then are we bound to conclude1 that the mercy of ,god is not infinite2 that it is not only limited1 but also partial and arbitrary in its operation8 ,but such is not the mercy of ,god4 ,this is not a capricious fondness1 nor yet an arbitrary dictate of feeling2 it is a uniform and universal rule of goodness4 ,to select one here and there out of the mass of mankind1 while others1 precisely like them in all respects1 are left to perish1 is not mercy2 it is favouritism4 ,the tyrant may have his favourites as well as others4 ,but ,god is not a respecter of persons4 ,if he selects one1 as the object of his saving mercy1 he will select all who stand in the like condition2 otherwise1 his mercy were no more mercy1 but a certain capricious fondness of feeling1 unworthy of an earthly monarch1 and much more of the august ,head and ,ruler of the moral universe4 ,these views and feelings are not peculiar to the opponents of ,calvinism4 ,they exist in the bosom of ,calvinists themselves2 only they are so crushed beneath a system1 that they cannot find that freedom of development1 nor that fulness of utterance1 which so rightfully belongs to them1 and which is so essential to their entire healthfulness and beauty4 ,we shall give only one illustration of the justness of this remark1 although we might produce a hundred4 ,after having endeavoured to vindicate the mercy of ,god1 as displayed in the scheme of predestination1 ,dr4 ,hill candidly declares3 8,still1 however1 a cloud hangs over the subject2 and there is a difficulty in reconciling the mind to a system1 which1 after laying this foundation1 that special grace is necessary to the production of human virtue1 adopts as its distinguishing tenet this position1 that that grace is denied to many407#bae7 ,notwithstanding his most elaborate defence of predestination1 he may well say1 that 8a cloud still hangs over the subject10 and darkens the mercy of ,god4 ,some of the stereotyped attempts of ,calvinists to escape from the cloud which hangs over their doctrine are too weak to deserve a serious refutation4 ,we are often asked1 for example1 if ,god may not do what he pleases with his own8 ,most assuredly he may2 but does it please him1 according to the high supralapsarian notion of ,calvin1 to create myriads of men and angels1 to the end that they may be eternally damned8 ,does it please him1 according even to the sublapsarian scheme1 to leave the great mass of mankind in the helpless and forlorn condition in which they were born1 without assistance1 and then subject them to eternal misery1 because they would not render an obedience beyond their power8 ,truly1 the sovereign ,creator and ,ruler of the world may do what he pleases with his own2 but yet we insist1 that it is his supremest pleasure to deal with his creatures according to the eternal principles of justice and mercy4 ,his power is infinite1 we admit1 nay1 we joyfully believe2 but yet it is not a power which works according to the lawless pleasure of an unmitigated despot4 ,it moves within a sphere of light and love4 ,god's infinite wisdom and goodness superintend and surround all its workings2 otherwise its omnipotent actings would soon carry the goodly frame of the world1 together with all the blessed inhabitants thereof1 into a state of utter confusion and chaotic night2 leaving occasion for none1 save the blind idolaters of power1 to exclaim1 8,may he not do what he pleases with his own80 ,we are also told1 that 8,god is under no obligation to his creatures40 ,supposing this to be true1 7though true most certainly it is not17 yet does he not owe it to himself--does he not owe it to the eternal principles of truth and goodness--does he not owe it to the glory of his own empire over the world--to deal with his rational and immortal creatures1 otherwise than according to the dark scheme of ,calvinistic predestination8 ,nay1 is it not due to the creature himself1 that he should have some little chance or opportunity to embrace the life which ,god has set before him8 ,or1 in default of such opportunity1 is it not due to him that he should be exempt from the wages of the second death8 ,confessing the wisdom and justice of predestination1 as maintained by themselves1 to be above our comprehension1 the ,calvinists are accustomed to remind us of the littleness1 the weakness1 and the blindness of the human mind1 and how dangerous it is for beings like ourselves to pry into mysteries4 ,we are aware1 indeed1 that our faculties are limited on all sides1 and that we are exceedingly prone to assume more than belongs to us4 ,we are not sure that the human mind1 so little and so assuming1 appears to any very great advantage in its advocacy of the ,calvinistic scheme of predestination4 ,this scheme is not only found in the ninth chapter of ,romans1 by a strange misapprehension of the whole scope and design of the apostle's argument1 but1 after having based it upon this misinterpretation of the divine word1 its advocates persist in regarding all opposition to it as an opposition against ,god4 ,as often as we dispute the doctrine1 they cry out1 8,nay1 but1 ,o man1 who art thou that repliest against ,god80 ,this rebuke was well administered by ,st4 ,paul4 ,he applied it to those who1 understanding his doctrine1 did not hesitate to arraign the equity of the divine proceeding in the election of one nation in preference to another to constitute the visible ,church on earth4 ,this was not only to reply against ,god's word1 but also against the manifest arrangements and dispensations of his providence4 ,but it is not well applied by ,calvinists1 unless they possess an infallibility which authorizes them to identify their interpretation of the word of ,god with the word itself4 ,it is not well applied by them1 unless they are authorized to put themselves in the place of ,god4 ,if they have no right to do this1 we must insist upon it that it is one thing to reply against ,god1 and quite another to reply against ,calvin and his followers4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the true ground and reason of election to eternal life shows it to be consistent with the infinite goodness of ,god4 ,we agree with both ,calvinistic and ,arminian writers in the position1 that no man is elected to eternal life on account of his merits4 ,indeed1 the idea that a human being can merit anything1 much less eternal life1 of ,god1 is preposterous in the extreme4 ,all his gifts are of pure grace4 ,the creation of the soul with glorious and immortal powers was an act of pure1 unmixed favour4 ,the duty of loving and serving him1 which we are permitted to enjoy1 is an exalted privilege1 and should inspire us with gratitude1 instead of begetting the miserable conceit that our service1 even when most perfect1 could deserve anything further from ,god1 or establish any claims upon his justice4 ,this view1 which we take to be the true one1 as completely shuts out all occasion of boasting as does the scheme of election maintained by the ,calvinists4 ,it is objected1 that ,god did not elect individuals to eternal life1 because he foresaw that they would repent and believe2 since repentance and faith themselves are the fruits of election4 ,if this objection have any force1 we are persuaded that it arises from an improper wording1 or presentation1 of the truth against which it is directed4 ,we cannot suppose that ,god elected any one because he foresaw his good works1 so as to make election to depend upon them1 instead of making them to depend upon election4 ,this does not prevent an individual1 however1 from having been elected1 because ,god foresaw from all eternity that the influences attending upon his election would1 by his own voluntary coperation therewith1 be rendered effectual to his salvation4 ,this is the ground on which we believe the election of individuals to eternal life to proceed4 ,accordingly1 we suppose that ,god never selected1 or determined to save1 any one who he foresaw would not yield to the influences of his grace1 provided they should be given4 ,and we also suppose that such is the overflowing goodness of ,god1 that all were elected by him1 and had their names written in the book of life1 who he foresaw would yield to the influences of his grace1 and1 by the coperation therewith1 8make their calling and election sure40 ,this scheme appears to possess the following very great advantages3-- #a4 ,it does not give such a pervading energy to the operations of divine grace as to exclude all subordinate moral agency from the world1 and destroy the very foundation of man's accountability4 #b4 ,it does not weaken the motives to the practice of a virtuous and decent life1 by assuring the worst part of mankind that they are just as likely to be made the objects of the saving grace of ,god as any others4 ,on the contrary1 it holds out this terrible warning1 that by an obstinate continuance in evil-doing1 the wicked may place themselves beyond the effectual influences of divine grace1 and set the seal of eternal death to their own souls4 #c4 ,it shows the mercy of ,god to be infinite4 ,no one1 except those who place themselves beyond the possibility of salvation by their own evil deeds1 is ever lost4 ,hence1 the mercy of ,god1 which takes in all whose salvation is within the range of possibility1 appears in full-orbed and unclouded splendour4 ,it could not possibly appear greater1 or more beautiful1 than as it presents itself to our view in this scheme4 #d4 ,it shows the justice of ,god to be infinite4 ,this1 according to the above view1 is neither limited by1 nor does it limit1 the mercy of ,god4 ,it acts merely upon those who were not1 and never could be made1 the objects of mercy2 and it acts upon these according to the full measure of their ill-desert1 as well as according to the exigencies of the moral empire of ,god4 ,it has no limits1 except those which circumscribe and bound the objects of infinite justice4 #e4 ,it not only shows the mercy and justice of ,god to be as great as can possibly be conceived1 but it also shows the perfect harmony and agreement which subsists between these sublime attributes of the ,divine ,being4 ,it marks out and defines the orbit1 in which each revolves in all the perfection and plenitude of its glory1 without the least clashing or interference with the other4 ,in conclusion1 we would simply ask the candid and impartial reader1 ,does any dark or perplexing 8cloud still hang over the subject80 ,is 8there a difficulty in reconciling the mind to a system10 which exhibits the character of ,god1 and his government of the world1 in so pleasing and so advantageous a light8 ,does not a system1 which gives so glad and joyous a response to the demand of ,god1 8,are not my ways equal80 recommend itself to the affections of the pious mind8 ,it very clearly seems to us1 that1 strong as are the convictions of ,dr4 ,chalmers in favour of 8a rigid and absolute predestination107#baf7 his affections cannot always be restrained within the narrow confines of so dark a scheme4 ,his language1 in pleading for the universality of the gospel offer1 contains1 it seems to us1 as direct1 and pointed1 and powerful condemnation of his own scheme as can well be found in the whole range of theological literature4 8,there must be10 says he1 8a sad misunderstanding somewhere4 ,the commission put into our hands is to go and preach the gospel to every creature under heaven2 and the announcement sounded forth in the world from heaven's vault was1 ,peace on earth1 good-will to men4 ,there is no freezing limitation here1 but a largeness and munificence of mercy boundless as space1 free and open as the expanse of the firmament4 ,we hope1 therefore1 the gospel1 the real gospel1 is as unlike the views of some of its interpreters1 as creation1 in all its boundless extent and beauty1 is unlike the paltry scheme of some wretched scholastic in the middle ages4 ,the middle age of science and civilization is now terminated2 but ,christianity also had its middle age1 and this1 perhaps1 is not yet fully terminated4 ,there is still a remainder of the old spell1 even the spell of human authority1 and by which a certain cramp or confinement has been laid on the genius of ,christianity4 ,we cannot doubt that the time of its complete emancipation is coming1 when it shall break loose from the imprisonment in which it is held2 but meanwhile there is1 as it were1 a stricture upon it1 not yet wholly removed1 and in virtue of which the largeness and liberality of ,heaven's own purposes have been made to descend in partial and scanty droppings through the strainers of an artificial theology1 instead of falling1 as they ought1 in a universal shower upon the world407#bag7 ,is it possible1 that this is the language of a man who believes that ,heaven's purposes of mercy descend1 not upon all men1 but only upon the elect8 ,it is even so4 ,boundless and beautiful as the goodness of ,god is in itself2 yet1 through the strainers of his theology1 is it made to descend in partial and scanty droppings merely1 and not in one universal shower4 ,it is good-will1 not to men1 but to the elect4 ,such is the 8chilling limitation10 and such the frightful 8stricture10 on the genius of ,christianity1 from which1 in the fervour of his imagination1 the great heart of ,chalmers burst into a higher and a more genial element of light and love4 ,alas6 how sad and how sudden the descent1 when in the very next paragraph he says3 8,the names and number of the saved may have been in the view1 nay1 even in the design and destination of ,god from all eternity2 and still the distinction is carried into effect1 not by means of a gospel addressed partially and exclusively to them1 but by means of a gospel addressed generally to all4 ,a partial gospel1 in fact1 could not have achieved the conversion of the elect30 that is to say1 though it was the design and destination of ,god from all eternity to save only a small portion of those whom he might have saved2 yet he made the offer of salvation to all1 in order to save the chosen few6 ,and if he had not proclaimed this universal offer1 by which 8the largeness and munificence0 of his mercy are made to appear as 8boundless as space10 the elect could not have been saved6 ,if so1 is it the real goodness of ,god1 then1 or merely the appearance of universal goodness1 that leadeth men to repentance8 8,any charm10 says he1 8which there is in ,christianity to recall or to regenerate some1 lies in those of its overtures which are so framed as to hold out the offered friendship of ,god to all307#bah7 that is1 that although ,god intends and seeks to save only a few1 he offers the same salvation to all1 to give an efficacious charm to the scheme of redemption6 ,indeed1 if the ,calvinistic scheme of an absolute predestination be true1 then we admit that there is a charm and a glory in the magnificent delusion1 arising from ,god's offer of friendship to all1 which is not to be found in the truth4 ,but that scheme1 as we have seen1 is not true2 and also1 that the goodness of ,god is as boundless and beautiful in reality1 as it could possibly be in appearance4 ,we agree with ,dr4 ,chalmers1 that the goodness of ,god should be viewed1 not through the medium of predestination1 but as it shines forth in the light of the glorious gospel4 ,we agree with him1 that 8we ought to proceed on the obvious representations which ,scripture gives of the ,deity2 and these beheld in their own immediate light1 untinged by the dogma of predestination4 ,god waiting to be gracious--,god not willing that any should perish1 but that all should come to repentance--,god swearing by himself that he has no pleasure in the death of a sinner1 but rather that all should come unto him and live--,god beseeching men to enter into reconciliation1 and this not as elect1 but simply and generally as men and sinners2--these are the attitudes in which the ,father of the human family sets himself forth unto the world--these the terms in which he speaks to us from heaven40 ,it is precisely in this sublime attitude1 and in this transporting light1 that we rejoice to contemplate the ,father of mercies2 and this view1 it must be confessed1 is wholly 8untinged with the dogma of predestination40 ,conclusion4 ,a ,,summary ,,view ,,of ,,the ,,principles ,,and ,,advantages ,,of ,,the ,,foregoing ,,system4 ,there is a lamp within the lofty dome ,of the dim world1 whose radiance clear doth show ,its awful beauty2 and1 through the wide gloom1 ,make all its obscure mystic symbols glow ,with pleasing light1--that we may see and know ,the glorious world1 and all its wondrous scheme2 ,not as distorted in the mind below1 ,nor in philosopher's1 nor poet's dream1 ,but as it was1 and is1 high in the ,mind ,supreme4--,,anon4 ,chapter ,i4 ,summary ,of ,the ,first ,part ,of ,the ,foregoing ,system4 ,the commonly received systems of theology are1 it is confessed by their advocates1 attended with manifold inconveniences and difficulties4 ,the habit of mind by which1 notwithstanding such difficulties1 it clings to the great truths of those systems1 is worthy of all admiration1 and forms one of the best guarantees of the stability and progress of human knowledge4 ,for in every department of science the great truths which dawn upon the mind are usually attended with a cloud of difficulties1 and1 but for the habit in question1 they would soon be permitted to fade away1 and be lost in their original obscurity4 ,copernicus has1 therefore1 been justly applauded17#bai7 not only for conceiving1 but for firmly grasping the heliocentric theory of the world1 notwithstanding the many formidable objections which it had to encounter in his own mind4 ,even the sublime law of the material universe1 before it finally established itself in the mind of ,newton1 more than once fell1 in its struggles for acceptance1 beneath the apparently insuperable objections by which it was attended2 and1 after all1 the overpowering evidence which caused it to be embraced1 still left it surrounded by an immense penumbra of difficulties4 ,these1 together with the sublime truth1 he bequeathed to his successors4 ,they have retained the truth1 and removed the difficulties4 ,in like manner1 admirable though the habit of clinging to every sufficiently accredited truth may be1 yet1 whether in the physical or in the moral sciences1 the effort to disencumber the truth of the difficulties by which its progress is embarrassed should never be remitted4 ,the scientific impulse1 by which a great truth is grasped1 and established upon its own appropriate evidence1 should ever be followed by the subordinate movement1 which strives to remove every obstacle out of the way1 and cause it to secure a wider and a brighter dominion in the human mind4 ,and in proportion as any scheme1 whether in relation to natural or to divine things1 shall1 without a sacrifice or mutilation of the truth1 divest itself of the darkness which must ever accompany all one-sided and partial views1 will it possess a decided advantage and superiority over other systems4 ,since this general principle will not be denied1 let us proceed1 in conclusion1 to take a brief survey of the foregoing scheme of doctrine1 and determine1 if we can1 whether to any truth it has given any such advantage4 ,it clearly seems free from the stupendous cloud of difficulties that overhang that view of the moral universe which supposes its entire constitution and government to be in accordance with the scheme of necessity4 ,these difficulties pertain1 first1 to the responsibility of man2 secondly1 to the purity of ,god2 and1 thirdly1 to the reality of moral distinctions4 ,these three several branches of the difficulty in question have been respectively considered in the first three chapters of the first part of the present work2 and we shall now briefly recapitulate the views therein presented1 in the three following sections4 ,section ,i4 ,the scheme of necessity denies that man is the responsible author of sin4 ,if1 according to this scheme1 all things in heaven and earth1 the volitions of the human mind not excepted1 be under the dominion of necessitating causes1 then may we well ask1 ,how can man be a free and responsible agent8 ,to this inquiry the most illustrious advocates of the scheme in question have not been able to return a coherent or satisfactory reply4 ,after the search of ages1 and the joint labour of all their gigantic intellects1 they have found no position in their system on which the freedom of the human mind may be securely planted4 ,the position set up for this purpose by one is pulled down by another1 who1 in his turn1 indicates some other position only to be demolished by some other advocate of his own scheme4 ,the more we look into their writings on this subject1 the more irreconcilable seems the conflict of opinion in which they are among themselves involved4 ,the more closely we contemplate the labour of their hands1 the more clearly we perceive that all their attempts1 in opposition to the voice of heaven and earth1 to rear the great metaphysical tower of necessity1 have only ended in an utter confusion of tongues4 ,so far1 indeed1 are they from having found and presented any such view of the freedom and responsibility of man1 as shall1 by the intrinsic and overpowering lustre of its evidence1 stand some chance to disarm the enemies of ,god1 that they have not even found one in which they themselves can rest4 ,the school of the necessitarian is1 in reality1 a house divided against itself2 and that1 too1 in regard to the most vital and fundamental point of its philosophy4 ,there seems to be one exception to the truth of this general remark3 for there is one scheme or definition of liberty1 in which many1 if not most1 of the advocates of necessity have concurred2 that is1 the definition of ,hobbes4 ,as the current of a river1 says he1 is free to flow down its channel1 provided there be no obstruction in the way2 so the human will1 though compelled to act by causes over which it has no control1 is free1 provided there be no external impediment to prevent its volition from passing into effect4 ,this idea of the freedom of the will1 though much older than ,hobbes1 is primarily indebted to his influence for its prevalence in modern times2 for it descended from ,hobbes to ,locke1 from ,locke to ,edwards1 and from ,edwards to the modern school of ,calvinistic divines4 ,no matter how we come by our volitions1 says ,edwards1 yet are we perfectly free when there is no external impediment to hinder our volitions from passing into effect3 that is to say1 though our volitions be absolutely produced by the divine omnipotence itself1 or in any other way2 yet is the will free1 provided no external cause interpose to prevent its volition from moving the body4 ,according to this definition of the liberty of the will1 it is not a property of the soul at all1 but only an accidental circumstance or condition of the body4 ,in the significant language of ,leibnitz1 it is not the freedom of the mind2 it is merely 8elbow-room40 ,it consists not in an attribute1 or property1 or power of the soul1 but only in the external opportunity which its necessitated volitions may have to necessitate an effect4 ,we ask1 ,how can the mind be free8 and they tell us1 ,when the body may be so6 ,we inquire about an attribute of the spiritual principle within1 and they turn us off with an answer respecting an accident of the material principle without6 ,an ignoratio elenchi more flagrant--a mistaking of the question more palpable--it is surely not possible to conceive4 ,yet this definition of the freedom of the will1 though so superficially false1 is precisely that which has found the most general acceptance among necessitarians4 ,though vehemently condemned by ,calvin himself1 unanswerably refuted by ,leibnitz1 sneered at by ,edwards the younger1 and pronounced utterly inadequate by ,dr4 ,john ,dick2 yet1 as we have seen1 is it now held up as 8the ,calvinistic idea of the freedom of the will40 ,we do not wonder that such a definition of free-will should have been adopted by atheizing philosophers1 such as ,hume and ,hobbes1 for example2 because we cannot suppose them to have been penetrated with any very profound design to uphold the cause of human responsibility1 or to vindicate the immaculate purity of the divine glory4 ,but that it should have been accepted with such unquestioning simplicity by a large body of ,christian divines1 having the great interests of the moral world at heart1 is1 we cannot but think1 a sufficient ground for the most profound astonishment and regret2 for1 surely1 to plant the great cause of human responsibility on a foundation so slender1 on a fallacy so palpable1 on a position so utterly untenable1 is to expose it to the victorious assaults of its weakest enemy and invader4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the scheme of necessity makes ,god the author of sin4 ,the necessitarian1 in his attempts to vindicate the purity of ,god1 has not been more successful than in his endeavours to establish the freedom and accountability of man4 ,if1 according to his scheme1 the ,supreme ,ruler of the world be the primal cause of all things1 the volitions of men included2 it certainly seems exceedingly difficult to conceive1 that he is not implicated in the sin of the world4 ,and this difficulty1 so appalling at first view1 remains just as great after all that the most enlightened advocates of that scheme have advanced as it was before4 ,we have witnessed the efforts of a ,leibnitz1 an ,edwards1 and a ,chalmers1 to repel this objection to the scheme of necessity2 and if we mistake not1 we have seen how utterly ineffectual they have proved to break its force1 or resist its influence4 ,the sum and substance of that defence is1 as we have seen1 that ,god may do evil that good may come2 a defence which1 instead of vindicating the purity of the divine proceeding1 represents it as having been governed by the most corrupt maxim of the most corrupt system of casuistry the world has ever seen4 ,it darkens1 rather than illuminates1 that profound and portentous obscurity of the system of the world1 arising from the origin and existence of moral evil4 ,so far from removing the difficulty from their scheme1 they have only illustrated its force by the ineffable weakness of the means and methods which that scheme has necessitated them to employ for its destruction4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions4 ,for1 if all things in the world1 the acts of the will not excepted1 be produced by an extraneous agency1 it seems clear that it is absurd to attach praise or blame to men on account of their volitions4 ,nothing appears more self-evident than the position1 that whatever is thus produced in us can neither be our virtue nor our vice4 ,the advocates of necessity1 at least those of them who do not admit the inference in question1 invoke the aid of logic to extinguish the light of the principle on which it is based4 ,but where have they found1 or where can they find1 a principle more clear1 more simple1 or more unquestionable on which to ground their arguments8 ,where1 in the whole armory of logic1 can be found a principle more unquestionable than this1 that no man can be to praise or to blame for that which is produced in him1 by causes over which he had no control8 ,we have examined those arguments in detail1 and exhibited the principles on which they proceed4 ,those principles1 instead of being of such a nature as to subserve the purposes of valid argument1 are either insignificant truisms which prove nothing1 or else they reach the point in dispute only by means of an ambiguity of words4 ,of the first description is the celebrated maxim of ,edwards1 that the essence of virtue and vice consists in their nature1 and not in their cause4 ,by which he means1 that no matter how we come by our virtue and vice1 though they be produced in us according to the scheme of necessity1 yet are they our virtue and vice4 ,if a horse should fall from the moon1 it would be a horse3 for no matter where it comes from1 a horse is a horse2 or1 more scientifically expressed1 the essence of a horse consists in the nature of a horse1 and not in its origin or cause4 ,all this is very true4 ,but then1 we no more believe that horses fall from the moon1 than we do that virtue and vice are produced according to the scheme of necessity4 ,of the last description is that other maxim of ,edwards1 that men are adjudged virtuous or vicious on account of actions proceeding from the will1 without considering how they come by their volition4 ,true1 we may judge of external actions according as their origin is in the will or otherwise1 without considering how its volitions come to pass2 but then this is because we proceed on the tacit assumption that the will is free1 and not under the dominion of necessitating causes4 ,but the question relates1 not to external actions or movements of the body1 but to the volitions of the mind itself4 ,and this being the case1 it does make a vast difference in our estimate1 whether we consider those volitions as coming to pass freely2 or whether1 according to the scheme of necessity1 we regard them as being produced by the operation of causes over which we have no control4 ,in this case1 it is impossible for the human mind to attach praise or blame to them1 or view them as constituting either virtue or vice4 ,for nothing can be plainer than the position1 that if anything in us be produced by the mighty and irresistible operation of an extraneous agency1 it can neither be our virtue nor vice4 ,this principle is so clear1 that logic can neither add to nor detract from the intrinsic lustre of its evidence4 ,and all the cloudy sophistications of an ,edwards1 ingenious as they are1 can obscure it only to the minds of those who have not sufficient penetration to see through the nature of his arguments4 ,at this point1 then1 as well as at others1 the scheme of necessity1 instead of clearing up the old1 has introduced new difficulties into the system of the world4 ,instead of diffusing light1 it has actually extended the empire of darkness1 by investing in the clouds and mists of its own raising1 some of the brightest elements which enter into its organization4 ,by scholastic refinements and sophistical devices1 it has sought to overturn and destroy1 not the elements of error and confusion1 but some of the clearest and most indestructible intuitional convictions of the human head and heart4 ,but great as these difficulties are1 we may still be asked to embrace the scheme from which they flow1 on the ground that it is true4 ,indeed1 this is the course pursued by some of the most enlightened ,calvinistic necessitarians of the present day4 ,freely admitting that all the attempts of ,leibnitz1 of ,edwards1 and others1 to bring the scheme of necessity into an agreement with the dictates of reason1 have left its stupendous difficulties pretty much where they found them--wrapped in impenetrable gloom2 they nevertheless maintain this scheme1 and propose it to our acceptance1 on the sole and sufficient ground of its evidence4 ,if we may judge from those of their writings which we have seen1 this course of proceeding is getting to be very much the fashion among the ,calvinists of the present day2 and they have a great deal to say in praise of simply adhering to the truth1 without being over-solicitous about its difficulties1 or paying too much attention to them4 ,that man1 say they1 is in imminent danger of heresy who1 instead of receiving the truth with the simplicity of a little child1 goes about to worry himself with its difficulties4 ,he walks in dark and slippery places4 ,we agree with them in this1 and commend their wisdom3 for it presents the only chance which their system has of retaining its hold on the human mind4 ,but before accepting this scheme on the ground of its evidence1 we have deemed it prudent to look into the very interior of the scheme itself1 and weigh the evidence on which it is so confidently recommended4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity4 ,in the prosecution of this inquiry1 we have appeared to ourselves to find1 that this boasted scheme of necessity is neither more nor less than one grand tissue of sophisms4 ,we have found1 we believe1 that this huge imposition on the reason of man is a vile congregation of pestilential errors1 through which1 if the glory of ,god and his marvellous ways be contemplated1 they must appear most horribly distorted4 ,we have found that this scheme is as weak and crazy in the mechanism of its internal structure as it is frightful in its consequences4 ,instead of that closely articulated body of thought1 which we were led to expect therein1 we have found little more than a jumble of incoherences1 a semi-chaotic mass of plausible blunders4 ,we have seen and shown1 we trust1 that this grand and imposing scheme of necessity is1 in reality1 based on a false psychology1--directed against a false issue1--supported by false logic1--fortified by false conceptions1--recommended by false analogies1--and rendered plausible by a false phraseology4 ,and1 besides1 we have ascertained that it originates in a false method1 and terminates in a false religion4 ,as such1 we deem it far better adapted to represent the little1 narrow1 dark1 crooked1 and perverted world within1 than the great and all-glorious world of ,god without4 ,so have we not spared its deformities4 ,section ,v4 ,the relation between the human agency and the divine4 ,having got rid of the scheme of necessity1 which opposed so many obstacles to the prosecution of our design1 we were then prepared to investigate the great problem of evil3 but1 before entering on this subject1 we paused to consider the difficulty which1 in all ages1 the human mind has found in attempting to reconcile the influence of the ,divine ,spirit with the freedom of the will4 ,in regard to this difficulty1 it has been made to appear1 we trust1 that we need not understand how the ,spirit of ,god acts1 in order to reconcile his influence with the free-agency of man4 ,we need to know1 not how the one ,spirit acts on the other1 but only what is done by each1 in order to see a perfect agreement and harmony in their coperation4 ,the inquiry relates1 then1 to the precise thing done by each1 and not to the modus operandi4 ,having1 in opposition to the commonly received notion1 ascertained this to be the difficulty1 we have found it comparatively easy of solution4 ,for the improved psychology of the present day1 which gives so clear and steady a view of the simple facts of consciousness1 has enabled us to see what may1 and what may not1 be produced by an extraneous agency4 ,this again has enabled us to make out and define the sphere of the divine power1 as well as that of the human2 and to determine the point at which they come into contact1 without interfering with or intersecting each other4 ,the same means have also shown us1 that the opposite errors of ,pelagianism and ,augustinism have a common root in a false psychology4 ,the psychology of the past1 which identifies the passive states of the sensibility with the active states of the will1 is common to both of these schemes4 ,from this common root the two doctrines branch out in opposite directions2 the one on the side of the mind's activity1 and the other on that of its passivity4 ,each perceives only one phase of the complex whole1 and denies the reality of the other4 ,with one1 the active phase is the whole2 with the other1 the passive impression is the whole4 ,hence the one recognises the human power alone2 while the other causes this power entirely to disappear beneath the overshadowing influence of the divine4 ,now the foregoing system1 by availing itself of the psychology of the present day1 not only does not cause the one of these great facts to exclude the other1 but1 by showing their logical coherency and agreement1 it removes the temptation that the speculative reason has ever felt to do such violence to the cause of truth4 ,it embraces the half views of both schemes1 and moulds them into one great and full-orbed truth4 ,in the great theandric work of regeneration1 in particular1 it neither causes the human element to exclude the divine1 nor the divine to swallow up the human2 but preserves each in its integrity1 and both in their harmonious union and coperation4 ,the mutual inter-dependency1 and the undisturbed inter-working1 of these all-important elements of the moral world1 it aims to place on a firm basis1 and exhibit in a clear light4 ,if this object has been accomplished1 though but in part1 or by way of a first approximation only1 it will be conceded to be no small gain1 or advantage1 to the cause of truth4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite purity of ,god4 ,the relation of the foregoing treatise to the great problem of the spiritual world1 concerning the origin and existence of evil1 may be easily indicated1 and the solution it proposes distinguished from that of others4 ,this may be best done1 perhaps1 with the aid of logical forms4 ,the world1 created by an infinitely perfect ,being1 says the sceptic1 must needs be the best of all possible worlds3 but the actual world is not the best of all possible worlds3 therefore it was not created by an infinitely perfect ,being4 ,now1 in replying to this argument1 no theist denies the major premiss4 ,all have conceded1 that the idea of an infinitely perfect ,being necessarily implies the existence and preservation of the greatest possible perfection in the created universe4 ,in the two celebrated works of ,m4 ,leibnitz and ,archbishop ,king1 both put forth in reply to ,bayle1 this admission is repeatedly and distinctly made4 ,this seems to have been rightly done2 for1 in the language of ,cudworth1 8,to believe a ,god1 is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe407#bbj7 ,in this1 says ,leibnitz1 is embosomed all possible good4 ,but how is this point established8 8,we judge from the event itself10 says he2 8since ,god has made it1 it was not possible to have made a better407#bba7 ,but this is the language of faith1 and not of reason4 ,as an argument addressed to the sceptic1 it is radically unsound2 for as a medium of proof1 it employs the very thing in dispute1 namely1 that ,god is infinitely perfect4 ,hence this is a petitio principii1 a begging of the question4 ,if this were all that ,m4 ,leibnitz had to offer1 he might as well have believed1 and remained silent4 ,but this was not all4 ,he endeavours to show1 that the world is absolutely perfect1 without inferring its perfection from the assumed infinite perfection of its ,author4 ,at first view1 this does not appear to be so2 for the sin and misery which overflow this lower part of the world seem to detract from the perfection and beauty of the whole4 ,not so1 says ,leibnitz3 8there are some disorders in the parts1 which marvellously heighten the beauty of the whole2 as certain discords1 skilfully employed1 render the harmony more exquisite407#bbb7 ,considered as an argument1 this is likewise quite unsatisfactory4 ,it is1 in fact1 merely the light of the imagination1 playing over the bosom of the cloud2 not the concentrated blaze of the intelligence1 dispelling its gloom4 ,and besides1 this analogy proceeds on a false principle2 inasmuch as it supposes that ,god has himself introduced sin into the world1 with a view to its happy effects4 ,we could sooner believe1 indeed1 that the principle of evil had introduced harmony into the world in order to heighten the frightful effects of its discord1 than that the principle of all good had produced the frightful discord of the world1 in order to enhance the effects of its harmony4 ,but we shall let all such fine sayings pass4 ,perhaps they were intended as the ornaments of faith1 rather than as the radiant armour and the invincible weapons of reason4 ,though ,leibnitz frequently insists1 that 8the permission of evil tends to the good of the universe107#bbc7 he does not always seem to mean that evil would be better than holiness in its stead2 but that the permission of sin is not so great an inconvenience as would be its universal prevention4 8,we ought to say10 says he1 8that ,god permits sin1 because otherwise he would himself do a worse action 7une action pire7 than all the sin of his creatures407#bbd7 ,but what is this worse1 this more unreasonable action of which ,god would be guilty1 if he should prevent all sin8 ,one bad feature thereof would be1 according to ,leibnitz1 that it would interfere with the freedom of the will4 ,in his 8,abrg de la ,controverse10 he says3 8,we have added1 after many good authors1 that it is in conformity with the general order and good1 for ,god to leave to certain creatures an occasion for the exercise of their liberty40 ,this argument comes with a bad grace from one who has already denied the liberty of the will2 and1 indeed1 from the very form of his expression1 ,leibnitz seems to have adopted it from authority1 rather than from a perception of any support it derives from his own principles4 ,he asserts the freedom of the will1 it is true1 but he does this1 as we have seen1 only in opposition to the 8absolute necessity0 of ,hobbes and ,spinoza2 according to whom nothing in the universe could possibly have been otherwise than it is4 ,in his 8,reflexions sur le ,livre de ,hobbes10 he says1 that although the will is determined in all cases by the divine omnipotence1 yet is it free from an absolute or mathematical necessity1 8because the contrary volition might happen without implying a contradiction40 ,true1 the contrary volition might happen without implying a contradiction2 for ,god himself might cause it to exist4 ,and if1 by his almighty and irresistible power1 he should cause it to exist1 the will would still be free in ,leibnitz's sense of the word2 since its contrary might have happened4 ,hence1 according to this definition of liberty1 if ,god should1 in all cases1 determine the will to good1 it would nevertheless be free2 since the contrary determination might have been produced by his power4 ,in other words1 if such be the liberty of the will1 no operation of the ,almighty could possibly interfere therewith2 as no volition produced by him would have rendered it impossible for him to have caused the opposite volition1 if he had so chosen and exerted his omnipotence for that purpose4 ,this defence of the divine procedure1 then1 has no foundation in the scheme of ,leibnitz2 and the only thing he can say in its favour is1 that after the authority 8of many good authors10 we have added it to our own views4 ,archbishop ,king1 too1 as is well known1 assumes the ground that ,god permits sin1 on account of the greater inconvenience that would result to the world from an interference with the freedom of the will4 ,but so extravagant are his views respecting this freedom1 that the position in question is one of the weakest parts of his system4 ,the mind chooses objects1 says he1 not because they please it2 but they are agreeable and pleasant to the mind1 because it chooses them4 ,surely1 such a liberty as this1 consisting in a mere arbitrary or capricious movement of the soul1 that owns not the guidance of reason1 or wisdom1 or anything apparently good1 cannot possess so great a value that the moral good of the universe should be permitted to suffer1 rather than that it should be interfered with or restrained4 ,but these are merely argumenta ad hominem4 ,there are 8many good authors0 who1 although they maintain neither of the above views of liberty1 insist that it is better for ,god to permit sin1 than to interfere with the freedom of his creatures4 ,but is it clear1 that greater inconveniences would have arisen from such an interference1 than from the frightful reign of all the sin and misery that have afflicted the world8 ,if ,god can so easily prevent all sin1 and secure all holiness1 by restraining the liberty of his creatures1 is it clear1 that in preferring their unrestrained freedom to the highest moral good of the universe1 he makes a choice worthy of his infinite wisdom8 ,in other words1 is it not more desirable that moral evil should everywhere disappear1 and the beauty of holiness everywhere shine forth1 than that the creature should be left to abuse his liberty by the introduction of sin and death into the world8 ,besides1 it is admitted by all the authors in question1 that ,god sometimes interposes the arm of his omnipotence1 in order to the production of holiness4 ,now1 in such an exertion of his power1 he either interferes with the freedom of the creature1 or he does not4 ,if he does not interfere with that freedom1 why may he not produce holiness in other cases also1 without any such interference8 ,and if1 in some cases1 he does interfere therewith1 in order to secure the holiness of his creatures1 why should he not1 in all cases1 prefer their highest moral good to so fatal an abuse of their prerogatives8 ,is his proceeding therein merely arbitrary and capricious1 or is it governed by the best of reasons8 ,undoubtedly by the best of reasons1 say all the authors in question3 but then1 when we come to this point of the inquiry1 they always tell us1 that those reasons are profoundly concealed in the unsearchable depths of the divine wisdom2 that is to say1 they believe them to be the best1 not because they have seen and considered them1 but because they are the reasons of an infinitely perfect mind4 ,now1 all this is very well2 but it is not to the purpose4 ,it is to retire from the arena of logic1 and fall back on the very point in dispute for support4 ,it is not to argue2 it is simply to drop the weapons of our warfare1 and oppose the shield of faith to the shafts of the adversary4 ,it is also contended by ,leibnitz and ,king1 as well as many other good authors1 that there is an established order1 or system of laws1 in the government of the world2 into which so great a confusion would be introduced by the interposition of divine power to prevent all sin1 that some had better be permitted4 ,this1 which ,leibnitz so positively asserts1 is thrown out as a conjecture by ,bishop ,butler47#bbe7 ,but in the present controversy1 it is not to the point4 ,for here the question is concerning the order and government of the moral world itself4 ,and this being the question1 it is not admissible for one of the parties to say1 that the proposed plan for the government of the world is not the best1 because it would interfere with and disturb the arrangements of that which is established4 ,this is clearly to beg the question4 ,it is to assume that the established method is the best1 and therefore should not have been superseded by another2 but this is the very point in dispute4 ,the truth is1 that the theist has assailed the sceptic in his strong and impregnable point1 and left the vulnerable part of his system untouched4 ,this may be easily seen4 ,the objection of the sceptic is thus stated by ,leibnitz3 ,whoever can prevent the sin of another1 and does not1 but rather contributes to it by his concourse and by the occasions he gives rise to1 though he possesses a perfect knowledge1 is an accomplice4 ,god can prevent the sin of his intelligent creatures3 but he does it not1 though his knowledge be perfect1 and contributes to it by his concourse and the occasions to which he gives rise3 therefore he is an accomplice4 ,now ,leibnitz admits the minor1 and denies the major1 premiss of this argument4 ,he should have done the contrary4 ,for1 admitting that ,god might easily prevent sin1 and cause holiness to reign universally1 what had he left to oppose to the attacks of the sceptic but the shield of faith8 ,he might say1 indeed1 as he often does1 that ,god voluntarily permits sin1 because it is a part and parcel of the best possible universe4 ,but how easy for the sceptic to demand1 ,what good purpose does it answer8 ,can it add to the holiness or happiness of the universe8 ,cannot these high ends1 these glorious purposes of the ,divine ,being1 be as well attained by the universal rectitude and purity of his creatures1 as by any other means8 ,cannot the ,supreme ,ruler of the world1 in the resources of his infinite mind1 bring as much good out of holiness as can be brought out of sin8 ,and if so1 why permit sin in order to the good of the creation8 ,are not the perfect holiness and happiness of each and every part of the moral world better for each and every part thereof than are their contraries8 ,and if so1 are they not better for the whole8 ,by this reply1 the theist is1 in our opinion1 disarmed1 and the sceptic victorious4 ,hence we say1 that the former should have conceded the major1 and denied the minor1 premiss of the above argument2 that is1 he should have admitted1 that whoever can prevent the sin of another1 but1 instead of so doing1 contributes to it by his concourse1 is an accomplice3 and he should have denied that ,god1 being able to produce holiness in the place of sin1 both permits and contributes to the reign of the latter in his dominions4 ,the theist should have denied this1 we say1 if he would have raised the ever-blessed ,god above all contact with sin1 and placed his cause upon high and impregnable ground1 far above the attacks of the sceptic4 ,but as it is1 he has placed that cause upon false grounds1 and thereby exposed it to the successful shafts of the adversary4 ,another reason assigned by ,leibnitz7#bbf7 and ,king7#bbg7 for the permission of moral evil is1 that if ,god should interpose to prevent it1 this would be to work a constant and universal miracle4 ,but if such a thing were possible1 why should he not work such a miracle8 ,by these authors themselves it is conceded1 that the ,almighty often works a miracle for the production of moral good2 and1 this being the case1 why should he not exhibit this miracle on the most grand and magnificent scale of which it is possible to conceive8 ,in other words1 why should he not render it worthy of his infinite wisdom1 and power1 and goodness8 ,is it not by a like miracle1 by a like universal interposition of his power1 that the majestic fabric of the material globe is upheld1 and the sublime movement of all its countless orbs continually carried on8 ,and if so1 are not the order and harmony of the moral universe as worthy such an exercise of his omnipotence as are the regularity and beauty of the material8 ,we defend the ,divine ,author and ,preserver of all things on no such grounds4 ,we say that a universal holiness is not produced by the omnipresent energy of his power1 not because this would be to work a miracle1 but because it would be to work a contradiction4 ,but we are becoming weary of such replies4 ,the very question is1 ,why is there not a universal interposition of the divine power8 and the reply1 ,because this would be a universal interposition of the divine power6 ,what is all this but a grand attempt to solve the awful mystery of the world1 which ends in the assurance that ,god does not universally interpose to prevent sin1 because he does not universally interpose to prevent it8 ,or1 in fewer words1 that he does not1 because he does not8 ,since sin exists1 says the sceptic1 it follows that ,god is either unable or unwilling to prevent it4 8,able1 but unwilling10 replies the theist4 ,such is the answer which has come down to us from the earliest times2 from a ,lactantius to a ,leibnitz1 and from a ,leibnitz to a ,m',cosh4 ,no wonder that in all this time they have not been able to find the reason why ,god is unwilling to prevent sin2 since1 in truth and reality1 he is infinitely more than willing to do so4 ,but1 saying that he is willing1 shall we concede that he is unable8 ,by no means3 for such language implies that the power of ,god is limited1 and he is omnipotent4 ,we choose to impale ourselves upon neither horn of the dilemma4 ,we are content to leave ,m4 ,bayle upon the one1 and ,m4 ,voltaire upon the other1 while we bestow our company elsewhere4 ,in plain ,english1 we neither reply unwilling nor unable4 ,we do say1 however1 that although ,god is infinitely willing to secure the existence of universal holiness1 to the exclusion of all sin1 yet such a thing is not an object of power1 and therefore cannot be produced by omnipotence itself4 ,the production of holiness by the application of power is1 as we have seen1 an absurd and impossible conceit1 which may exist in the brain of man1 but which can never be embodied in the fair and orderly creation of ,god4 ,it can no more be realized by the ,divine ,omnipotence than a mathematical absurdity can be caused to be true4 ,hence1 we no longer ask why ,god permits sin4 ,this were to seek a ground and reason of that which has no existence1 except in the imagination of man4 ,god does not permit sin4 ,he chooses it not1 and he permits it not1 as an essential part of the best possible universe4 ,sin is that which his soul abhors1 and which all the perfections of his nature1 his infinite power and wisdom1 no less than his holiness1 are pledged to wipe out from the face of his creation4 ,he does not cause1 he does not tolerate sin1 on account of its happy effects1 or on account of the uses to which it may be turned4 ,the only word he has for such a thing is woe2 and the only attitude he bears toward it is one of eternal and inexorable vengeance4 ,all the schemes of men make light of sin2 but ,god is in earnest1 infinitely and immutably in earnest1 in the purpose to root out and destroy the odious thing1 that it may have no place amid the glory of his dominions4 ,as sin did not originate by his permission1 so it does not continue by his sufferance4 ,he permits it1 indeed1 in that he permits the existence of beings capable of sinning2 and he permits the existence of such beings in the very act of permitting the existence of those who are capable of knowing1 and loving1 and serving him4 ,an infinitely good ,being1 says ,m4 ,bayle1 would not have conferred on his creature the fatal power to do evil4 ,but he did not reflect that a power to do good is1 ex necessitate rei1 a power to do evil4 ,surely1 a good ,being would bestow on his creature the power to do good--the power to become like himself1 and to partake of the incommunicable blessedness of a holy will4 ,but if he would bestow this1 he would certainly confer power to do evil2 for the one is identical with the other4 ,and sin has arisen1 not from any power conferred for that purpose1 but from that which constitutes the brightest element in the sublime structure and glory of the moral world4 ,it arises1 not from any imperfection in the work of ,god1 but from that without which it would have been infinitely less than perfect4 8,all divines admit10 says ,bayle1 8that ,god can infallibly produce a good act of the will in a human soul without depriving it of the use of liberty407#bbh7 ,this is no longer admitted4 ,we call it in question4 ,we deny that such an act can be produced1 either with or without depriving the soul of liberty4 ,we deny that it can be produced at all3 for whatever ,god may produce in the human soul1 this is not1 this cannot be1 the moral goodness or virtue of the soul in which it is produced4 ,in other words1 it is not1 and it cannot be1 an object of praise or of moral approbation in him in whom it is thus caused to exist4 ,his virtue or moral goodness can exist only by reason1 and in case of an exercise of his own will4 ,it can no more be the effect of an extraneous force than two and two can be made equal to five4 ,in conclusion1 the plain truth is1 that the actual universe is not in the best of all possible conditions2 for we might conceive it to be better than it is4 ,if there were no sin and no suffering1 but everywhere a purity and bliss as great as it is possible to conceive1 this would be a vast improvement in the actual state of the universe4 ,such is the magnificent dream of the sceptic2 and1 as we have seen1 it is not without truth and justice that he thus dreams4 ,but with this dream of his1 magnificent as it is1 there is connected another which is infinitely false3 for he imagines that the sublime spectacle of a world without sin1 that the beatific vision of a universe robed in stainless splendour might have been realized by the ,divine ,omnipotence2 whereas1 this could have been realized only by the universal and continued coperation of the whole intelligent creation with the grand design of ,god4 ,on the other hand1 the theist1 by conceding the error and contesting the truth of the sceptic1 has inextricably entangled himself in the toils of the adversary4 ,the only remaining question which the sceptic has to ask is1 that since ,god might have prevented moral evil by the creation of no beings who he foresaw would sin1 why did he create such beings8 ,why did he not leave all such uncreated1 and call into existence only such as he foreknew would obey his law1 and become like himself in purity and bliss8 ,this question has been fully answered both from reason and revelation4 ,we have shown that the highest good of the universe required the creation of such beings4 ,we have shown that it is by his dealings with the sinner that the foundation of his spiritual empire is secured1 and its boundaries enlarged4 ,in particular1 we have shown1 from revelation1 that it is by the redemption of a fallen world that all unfallen worlds are preserved in their allegiance to his throne1 and kept warm in the bosom of his blessedness4 ,if the sceptic should complain that this is to meet him1 not with weapons drawn from the armory of reason1 but from that of revelation1 our reply is at hand3 he has no longer anything left to be met4 ,his argument1 which assumes that a ,being of infinite power could easily cause holiness to exist1 has been shown to be false4 ,this very assumption1 this major premiss1 which has been so long conceded to him1 has been taken out of his hands1 and demolished4 ,hence1 we do not oppose the shield of faith to his argument2 we hold it in triumph over his exploded sophism4 ,we merely recall our faith1 and exult in the divine glory which it so magnificently brings to view1 and against which his once blind and blundering reason has now no more to say4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,summary ,of ,the ,second ,part ,of ,the ,foregoing ,system4 ,having reconciled the existence of sin with the purity of ,god1 and refuted the objections against the principles on which that reconciliation is based1 we next proceeded to the second part of the work1 in which the natural evil1 or suffering1 that afflicts humanity1 is shown to be consistent with his goodness4 ,this part consists of five chapters1 of whose leading principles and position we shall now proceed to take a rapid survey in the remaining sections of the present chapter4 ,section ,i4 ,god desires the salvation of all men4 ,the fact that all men are not saved1 at first view1 seems inconsistent with the goodness of the ,divine ,being1 and the sincerity of his endeavours for their conversion4 ,we naturally ask1 that if ,god could so easily cause all men to turn and live1 why should he in vain call upon them to do so8 ,is he really sincere in the use of means for the salvation of all1 since he permits so many to hold out in their rebellion and perish8 ,in other words1 if he really and sincerely seeks the salvation of all1 why are not all saved8 ,this is confessedly one of the most perplexing and confounding difficulties which attach to the commonly received systems of theology4 ,it constitutes one of those profound obscurities from which1 it is admitted1 theology has not been able to extricate itself1 and come out into the clear light of the divine glory4 ,by many theologians this difficulty1 instead of being solved1 is most fearfully aggravated4 ,luther1 for example1 finds it so great1 that he denies the sincerity of ,god in calling upon sinners to forsake their evil ways and live2 and that1 as addressed to the finally impenitent1 his language is that of mockery and scorn4 ,and ,calvin imagines that such exhortations1 as well as the other means of grace offered to all1 are designed1 not for the real conversion of those who shall finally perish1 but to enhance their guilt1 and overwhelm them in the more fearful condemnation4 ,if it were possible to go even one step beyond such doctrines1 that step is taken by ,president ,edwards3 for he is so far from supposing that ,god really intends to lead all men into a conformity with his revealed will1 that he contends that ,god possesses another and a secret will by which1 for some good purpose1 he chooses their sin1 and infallibly brings it to pass4 ,if any mind be not appalled by such doctrines1 and chilled with horror1 surely nothing can be too monstrous for its credulity1 provided only it relate to the divine sovereignty4 ,the ,arminian with indignation rejects such views of the divine glory4 ,but does he escape the great difficulty in question8 ,if ,god forms the design1 says he1 not to save all men1 he is not infinitely good2 but yet he admits that ,god actually refuses to save some4 ,now1 what difference can it make whether ,god's intention not to save all be evidenced by a prexisting design1 or by a present reality8 ,is not everything that is done by him1 or left undone1 in pursuance of his eternal purpose and design8 ,what1 then1 in reference to the point in question1 is the difference between the ,arminian and the ,calvinist8 ,both admit that ,god could easily save all men if he would2 that is1 render all men holy and happy4 ,but the one says that he did not design to save all1 while the other affirms that he actually refuses to save some4 ,surely1 if we may assume what is conceded by both parties1 the infinite goodness of ,god is no more disproved by a scheme of salvation limited in its design1 than by a scheme of salvation limited in its execution4 ,hence1 it is admitted by many ,arminians themselves1 that their own scheme merely mitigates and softens down1 without removing1 the appalling difficulty in question4 ,there are many exceptions to this remark4 ,one of the most memorable of these is the judgment which ,robert ,hall7#bbi7 pronounces concerning the solution of this difficulty by the 8,wonderful ,howe40 ,this solution1 as we have seen1 labours under the same defect with those of its predecessors1 in that it rejects the truth that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms4 ,instead of following the guidance of this truth1 he wanders amid the obscurities of the subject1 becomes involved in numerous self-contradictions1 and is misled by the deceitful light of false analogies4 ,we shall not here reproduce his inconsistencies and self-contradictions4 ,we shall simply add1 that although he1 too1 attempts to show why it is for the best that all should not be saved1 he frequently betrays the feeble and unsatisfactory nature of the impression which his own reasons made upon his mind4 ,for the light of these reasons soon fades from his recollection2 and1 like all who have gone before him1 when he comes to contemplate the subject from another point of view1 he declares that the reasons of the thing he has endeavoured to explain1 are hid from the human mind in the profound depths of the divine wisdom4 ,if we would realize1 then1 that ,god sincerely desires the salvation of all men1 we must plant ourselves on the truth1 that holiness1 which is of the very essence of salvation1 cannot be wrought in us by an extraneous force4 ,it is under the guidance of this principle1 and of this principle alone1 that we can find our way out from the dark labyrinth of error and self-contradiction1 in which others are involved1 into the clear and beautiful light of the gospel1 that ,god 8will have all men to be saved1 and come unto a knowledge of the truth40 ,it is with the aid of this principle1 and of this alone1 that we may hear the sublime teachings of the divine wisdom1 unmingled with the discordant sounds of human folly4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the sufferings of the innocent1 and especially of infants1 consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,by the ,calvinistic school of divines it is most positively and peremptorily pronounced that the innocent can never suffer under the administration of a ,being of infinite goodness4 ,they cannot possibly allow that such a ,being would permit one of his innocent creatures to suffer2 but they can very well believe that he can permit them both to sin and to suffer4 ,is not this to strain at a gnat1 and swallow a camel8 ,having predetermined that the innocent never suffer1 they have felt the necessity of finding some sin in infants1 by which their sufferings might be shown to be deserved1 and thereby reconciled with the divine goodness4 ,this has proved a hard task4 ,from the time of ,augustine down to the present day1 it has been diligently prosecuted2 and with what success1 we have endeavoured to show4 ,the series of hypotheses to which this effort has given rise1 are1 perhaps1 as wild and wonderful as any to be found in the history of the human mind4 ,we need not again recount those dark dreams and inventions in the past history of ,calvinism4 ,perhaps the hypothesis of the present day1 by which it endeavours to vindicate the suffering of infants1 will seem scarcely less astonishing to posterity1 than those exploded fictions of the past appear to this generation4 ,according to this hypothesis1 the infant world deserves to suffer1 because the sin of ,adam1 their federal head and representative1 is imputed to them4 ,it is even contended that this constitution1 by which the guilt or innocence of the world was suspended on the conduct of the first man1 is a bright display of the divine goodness1 since it was so likely to be attended with a happy issue to the human race4 ,likely to be attended with a happy issue6 ,and did not the ,almighty foresee and know1 that if the guilt of the world were made to depend on the conduct of ,adam1 it would infallibly be attended with a fatal result8 ,we have examined1 at length1 the arguments of an ,edwards to show that such a divine scheme and constitution of things is a display or manifestation of goodness4 ,those arguments are1 perhaps1 as ingenious and plausible as it is possible for the human intellect to invent in the defence of such a cause4 ,when closely examined and searched to the bottom1 they certainly appear as puerile and weak as it is possible for the human imagination to conceive4 ,indeed1 no coherent hypothesis can be invented on this subject1 so long as the mind of the inventor fails to recognise the impossibility of excluding all sin from the moral system of the universe3 for if all sin1 then all suffering1 likewise1 may be excluded2 and we can never understand why either should be permitted2 much less can we comprehend why the innocent should be allowed to suffer4 ,but having recognised this impossibility1 we have been conducted to three grounds1 on which1 it is believed1 the sufferings of the innocent may be reconciled with the goodness of ,god4 ,first1 the sufferings of the innocent1 in so far as they are the consequences of sin1 serve to show its terrific nature1 and tend to prevent its introduction into the world4 ,if this end could have been accomplished by the divine power1 such a provision would have been unnecessary1 and all the misery of the world only so much 8suffering in waste40 ,secondly1 the sufferings of the innocent serve as a foil to set off and enhance the blessedness of eternity4 ,they are but a short and discordant prelude to an everlasting harmony4 ,thirdly1 difficulties and trials1 temptations and wants1 are indispensable to the rise of moral good in the soul of the innocent2 for if there were no temptation to wrong1 there could be no merit in obedience1 and no virtue in the world4 ,suffering is1 then1 essential to the moral discipline and improvement of mankind4 ,on the one or the other of these grounds1 it is believed that every instance in which suffering falls upon the innocent1 or falls not as a punishment of sin1 may be vindicated and reconciled with the goodness of ,god4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the sufferings of ,christ consistent with the divine goodness4 ,the usual defences of the atonement are good1 so far as they go1 but not complete4 ,the vicarious sufferings of ,christ are well vindicated on the ground1 that they are necessary to cause the majesty and honour of the divine law to be respected2 but this defence1 though sound1 has been left on an insecure foundation2 for it has been admitted that ,god1 by the word of his power1 might easily have caused his laws to be universally respected and obeyed4 ,hence1 according to this admission1 the sufferings of ,christ might have been easily dispensed with1 and were not necessary in order to maintain the honour and glory of the divine government4 ,according to this admission1 they were not necessary1 and consequently not consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,again3 by distinguishing between the administrative and the retributive justice of ,god1 and showing that the vicarious sufferings of ,christ were a satisfaction to the first1 and not to the last1 we annihilate the objections of the ,socinian4 ,by means of this view of the satisfaction rendered to the divine justice1 we think we have placed the great doctrine of the atonement in a clearer and more satisfactory light than usual4 ,we have shown that the vicarious sufferings of the ,,innocent are so far from being inconsistent with the divine justice1 that they are1 in fact1 free from the least shadow or appearance of hardship either to him or to the world4 ,nay1 that they are a bright manifestation of the divine goodness both to himself and to those for whom he suffered2 the brightest manifestation thereof1 indeed1 which the universe has ever beheld4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the eternity of future punishment consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,the genuine ,calvinist1 if he reason consecutively from some of the principles of his system1 can never escape the conclusion that all men will be saved3 for so long as he denies the ability of men to obey without the efficacious grace of ,god1 and affirms that this grace is not given to such as shall finally perish1 it must follow that their punishment is unjust1 and that their eternal punishment were an act of cruelty and oppression greater than it is possible for the imagination of man to conceive4 ,it was precisely from such premises1 as we have seen1 that ,john ,foster denied the eternal duration of future punishment4 ,his logic is good2 but even an illogical escape from such a conclusion were better than the rejection of one of the great fundamental doctrines of revealed religion4 ,by having shown his premises to be false1 we demolished the very foundation of his arguments4 ,but1 not satisfied with this1 we pursued those arguments into all their branches and ramifications1 and exposed their futility4 ,by these means we have removed the objections and solved the difficulties pertaining to this doctrine of revealed religion4 ,in one word1 we have shown that it is not inconsistent with the dictates of reason1 or with the principle of the divine goodness4 ,we have shown that the eternal punishment of the wicked is deserved1 and therefore demanded by the divine justice2 that they serve to promote the highest moral interests of the universe1 and are consequently imposed by the divine goodness itself4 ,we have shown1 that in the administration of his eternal government1 the infliction of an endless punishment is even more consistent with goodness than the use of temporal punishment in the management of a temporal government2 for the first1 besides being eternal in duration1 is unbounded in extent4 ,thus reason itself1 when disenchanted of its strong ,calvinistic prejudices and its weak ,socinian sentimentalities1 utters no other voice than that which proceeds from revelation2 and this it echoes rather than utters4 ,in plainer words1 though reason does not prove or establish the eternity of future punishment1 it has not one syllable to say against its wisdom1 its justice1 or its goodness4 ,section ,v4 ,the true doctrine of election and predestination consistent with the goodness of ,god4 ,the ,calvinists endeavour to support their scheme of election and predestination by means of analogies drawn from the unequal distribution of the divine favours1 which is observable in the natural economy and government of the world4 ,but the two cases are not parallel4 ,according to the one1 though the divine favours are unequally distributed1 no man is ever required to render an account of more than he receives4 ,whereas1 according to the other1 countless millions of human-beings are doomed to eternal misery for the non-observance of a law which they never had it in their power to obey4 ,this is to judge them1 not according to what they receive1 but according to what they receive not1 and cannot obtain4 ,it is to call them to give an account of talents never committed to their charge4 ,the difference between the two cases is1 indeed1 precisely that between the conduct of a munificent prince who bestows his favours unequally1 but without making unreasonable demands1 and the proceeding of a capricious tyrant who1 while he confers the most exalted privileges and honours on one portion of his subjects1 consigns all the rest1 not more undeserving than they1 to hopeless and remediless destruction2 and that1 too1 for the non-performance of an impossible condition4 ,is it not wonderful that two cases so widely and so glaringly different1 should have been so long and so obstinately confounded by serious inquirers after truth8 ,the ,calvinistic scheme of predestination1 it is pretended1 derives support from revelation4 ,the ninth chapter of ,romans which1 from the time of ,augustine down to the present day1 has been so confidently appealed to in its support1 has1 as we have seen1 no relation to the subject4 ,it relates1 not to the election of individuals to eternal life1 but of a nation to the enjoyment of external privileges and advantages4 ,this is so plain1 that ,dr4 ,macknight1 though an advocate of the ,calvinistic dogma of predestination1 refuses to employ that portion of ,scripture in support of his doctrine4 ,nor does the celebrated passage of the eighth chapter of the same epistle touch the point in controversy4 ,we might well call in question the ,calvinistic interpretation of that passage1 if this were necessary2 but we take it in their own sense1 and show that it lends no support to their views4 ,the ,calvinists themselves being the interpreters1 that passage teaches that ,god1 according to his eternal purpose1 chose or selected a certain portion out of the great mass of mankind as the heirs of eternal life4 ,granted1 then1 that a certain portion of the human race were thus made the objects of a peculiar favour1 and prospectively endowed with the greatest of all conceivable blessings4 ,but who were thus chosen1 or selected8 and on what principle was the election made8 ,in regard to this point1 it is not pretended by them that the passage in question utters a single syllable4 ,they themselves being the judges1 this ,scripture merely affirms that a certain portion of mankind are chosen or elected to eternal life2 while in regard to the ground1 or the reason1 of their election1 it is most perfectly and profoundly silent4 ,hence it leaves us free to assume the position1 that those persons were elected or chosen who ,god foresaw would1 by a coperation with his ,spirit1 make their calling and election sure4 ,and being thus left free1 this is precisely the position in which we choose to plant ourselves1 in order to vindicate the divine glory against the awful misrepresentations of ,calvinism3 for1 in the first place1 this view harmonizes the passage in question with other portions of the divine record1 and allows us1 without the least feeling of self-contradiction1 to embrace the sublime word1 that ,god 8will have all men to be saved20 and that if any are not made the heirs of his great salvation1 it is because his grace would have proved unavailing to them4 ,secondly1 this view not only harmonizes two classes of seemingly opposed texts of ,scripture1 but it also serves to vindicate the unbounded glory of the divine goodness4 ,it shows that the goodness of ,god is not partial in its operation2 neither taking such as it leaves1 nor leaving such as it takes2 but embracing all of the same class1 and that class consisting of all who1 by wicked works1 do not place themselves beyond the possibility of being saved4 ,unlike ,calvinism1 it presents us1 not with the spectacle of a mercy which might easily save all1 but which1 nevertheless1 contenting itself with a few only1 abandons the rest to the ravages of the never-dying worm4 ,thirdly1 at the same time that it vindicates the glory of the divine mercy1 it rectifies the frightful distortion of the divine justice1 which is exhibited in the scheme of ,calvinism4 ,according to this scheme1 all those who are not elected to eternal life are set apart as the objects on which the ,almighty intends to manifest the glory of his justice4 ,but how is this glory1 or his justice1 manifested8 ,displayed1 we are told1 by dooming its helpless objects to eternal misery for the non-performance of an impossible condition6 ,a display of justice this1 which1 to the human mind1 bears every mark of the most appalling cruelty and oppression4 ,a display of justice stamped with the most terrific features of its opposite2 so that no human mind can see the glory of the one1 for the inevitable manifestation of the other6 ,no wonder that ,calvinists themselves so often fly from the defence of such a display of the divine justice1 and hide themselves in the unsearchable clouds and darkness of the divine wisdom4 ,this being of course a display for eternity1 and not for time1 they may there await the light of another world to clear away these clouds1 and reveal to them the great mystery of such a manifestation of the divine justice4 ,but whether that light will bring to view the great mystery of the divine wisdom therein displayed1 or the great secret of human folly therein concealed1 we can hardly say remains to be seen4 ,the view we take presents a glorious display of the divine justice for time as well as for eternity4 ,fourthly1 this view not only shows the justice and the mercy of ,god1 separately considered1 in the most advantageous light1 but it exhibits the sublime harmony which subsists between them4 ,it presents not1 like ,calvinism1 a mercy limited by justice1 and a justice limited by mercy2 but it exhibits each in its absolute perfection1 and in its agreement with the other3 for1 according to this view1 the claim of mercy extends to all who may be saved1 and that of justice to those who may choose to remain incorrigibly wicked4 ,hence1 the claim of the one does not interfere with that of the other2 nor can we conceive how either could be more gloriously displayed4 ,we behold the infinite amplitude1 as well as the ineffable1 unclouded splendour of each divine perfection1 without the least disturbance or collision between them4 ,in the very act of punishment1 the tender mercy of ,god1 which is over all his works1 concurs1 and inflicts that suffering which is demanded by the good of the universe4 ,the torment of the lost1 is 8the wrath of the ,lamb40 ,the glory of the redeemed1 is the pity of the ,judge4 ,hence1 instead of that frightful conflict which the scheme of ,calvinism presents1 we behold a reconciliation and agreement among the divine attributes1 worthy the great principle of order1 and harmony1 and beauty in the universe4 ,section ,,vi4 ,the question submitted4 ,we must now take leave of the reader4 ,we have honestly endeavoured to construct a ,theodicy1 or to vindicate the divine glory as manifested in the constitution and government of the moral world4 ,we have endeavoured to reconcile the great fundamental doctrines of ,god and man with each other1 as well as with the eternal principles of truth4 ,it has likewise been our earnest aim1 to evince the harmony of the divine attributes among themselves1 as well as their agreement with the condition of the universe4 ,in one word1 we have aimed to repel the objections1 and solve the difficulties which have been permitted to obscure the glory of the ,divine ,being2 whether those difficulties and objections have seemed to proceed from the false philosophy of his enemies1 or the mistaken views and misguided zeal of his friends4 ,how far we have succeeded in this attempt1 no less arduous than laudable1 it is not for us to determine4 ,we shall1 therefore1 respectfully submit the determination of this point to the calm and impartial judgment of those who may possess both the desire and the capacity to think for themselves4 ,,the ,,end4 ,,footnotes #a ,johnson's ,works1 vol4 iv1 p4 #bhf4 #b ,institutes1 b4 ii1 c4 iii4 #c ,scott's ,luther and ,ref41 vol4 i1 pp4 #gj1 #ga4 #d ,institutes1 b4 i1 c4 xv4 #e ,ibid41 b4 ii1 c4 ii4 #f ,ibid4 #g ,dick's ,theology4 #h ,bondage of the ,will1 sec4 xxvi4 #i ,ibid4 #aj ,progress of ,ethical ,philosophy1 note ,o4 ,indeed1 this distinction appears quite as clearly in the writings of ,augustine1 as it does in those of ,luther1 or ,calvin1 or ,hobbes4 ,he repeatedly places our liberty and ability in this1 that we can 8keep the commandments if we will10 which is obviously a mere freedom from external co-action4 ,see ,part ii1 ch4 iv1 sec4 #b4 #aa ,literary ,remains1 p4 #fe4 #ab ,ethique1 premiere partie1 prop4 xxvi4 #ac ,ibid41 prop4 xxxiv4 #ad ,ethique1 ,des ,passions1 prop4 ii and ,scholium4 #ae uvres de ,spinoza1 tome ii1 #cej4 #af ,introduction to the 8uvres de ,spinoza10 by ,m4 ,saisset4 #ag ,book ii1 chapters #ba1 #bg4 #ah ,disquisitions and ,introduction1 p4 #e4 #ai ,helvetius on the ,mind1 p4 #dd4 #bj ,mr4 ,stewart says3 8,dr4 ,hartley was1 ,i believe1 one of the first 7if not the first7 who denied that our consciousness is in favour of our free-agency40--,stewart's ,works1 vol4 v1 ,appendix4 ,this is evidently a mistake4 ,in the above passage1 ,leibnitz1 with even more point than ,hartley1 denies that our consciousness is in favour of free-agency4 #ba ,essais de ,theodicee1 p4 #ii4 #bb 8,hobbes defines a free-agent10 says ,stewart1 8to be #8he that can do if he will1 and forbear if he will4' ,the same definition has been adopted by ,leibnitz1 by ,collins1 by ,gravezende1 by ,edwards1 by ,bonnet1 and by all later necessitarians40 ,the truth is1 as we have seen1 that instead of adopting1 ,leibnitz has very clearly refuted1 the definition of ,hobbes4 ,mr4 ,harris1 in his work entitled 8,the ,primeval ,man10 has also fallen into the error of ascribing this definition of liberty to ,leibnitz4 ,surely1 these very learned authors must have forgotten1 that ,leibnitz wrote a reply to ,hobbes1 in which he expressly combats his views of liberty4 #bc ,essais de ,theodicee1 pp4 #e1 #f4 #bd ,id41 p4 #h4 #be ,inquiry1 part ii1 sec4 viii4 #bf ,day's ,examination of ,edwards on the ,will1 sec4 v1 pp4 #hj1 #ha4 #bg ,inquiry1 part iv1 sec4 #i4 #bh ,ibid4 #bi ,ibid41 sec4 #g4 #cj ,institutes of ,theology1 vol4 ii1 part iii1 chap4 i4 #ca ,lectures on ,theology1 by the late ,rev4 ,john ,dick1 ,d4 ,d4 #cb ,dissertation1 p4 #da4 #cc ,dick's ,lectures1 vol4 ii1 p4 #aeg4 #cd ,history of the ,reformation1 b4 v4 #ce ,hill's ,divinity1 ch4 ix1 sec4 iii4 #cf ,the ,divine ,government1 ,physical and ,moral1 b4 iii1 ch4 i1 sec4 iii4 #cg ,id41 b4 iii1 ch4 i1 sec4 ii4 #ch ,ibid4 #ci ,the ,divine ,government1 ,physical and ,moral1 b4 iii1 ch4 i1 sec4 ii4 #dj ,ibid4 #da ,ibid4 #db ,ibid4 #dc ,the ,divine ,government1 ,physical and ,moral1 b4 iii1 ch4 i1 sec4 ii4 #dd ,hume's ,works1 ,liberty and ,necessity4 #de ,bacon4 #df ,of ,liberty and ,necessity4 #dg ,although ,mr4 ,hume gives precisely the same definition of liberty as that advanced by ,hobbes1 ,locke1 and ,edwards1 he had the sagacity to perceive that this related not to the freedom of the will1 but only of the body4 ,hence he says1 8,in short1 if motives are not under our power or direction1 which is confessedly the fact1 we can at bottom have ,,no ,,liberty40 ,we are not at all surprised1 therefore1 at the reception which ,hume gave to the great work of ,president ,edwards1 as set forth in the following statement of ,dr4 ,chalmers1 concerning the appendix to the 8,inquiry40 8,the history of this appendix10 says he1 8is curious4 ,it has only been subjoined to the later editions of his work1 and did not accompany the first impression of it4 ,several copies of this impression found their way into this country1 and created a prodigious sensation among the members of a school then in all its glory4 ,i mean the metaphysical school of our northern metropolis1 whereof ,hume1 and ,smith1 and ,lord ,kames1 and several others among the more conspicuous infidels and semi-infidels of that day1 were the most distinguished members4 ,they triumphed in the book of ,edwards1 as that which set a conclusive seal on their principles10 c4--,institutes of ,theology1 vol4 ii1 ch4 ii4 #dh ,of ,liberty and ,necessity4 #di ,ibid4 #ej ,mill's ,logic1 pp4 #ebb1 #ebc4 #ea ,mill's ,logic1 book ii1 chap4 v1 sec4 #d4 #eb ,metaphysics of ,ethics4 #ec ,knapp's ,theology1 p4 #ebj4 #ed ,reid's ,works1 note1 p4 #faa4 #ee ,id41 p4 #eii1 note4 #ef ,progress of ,ethical ,philosophy1 p4 #bge4 #eg ,mhler's ,symbolism1 p4 #aag #eh ,novum ,organum1 book i1 aph4 #fi4 #ei ,institutes1 book i1 chap4 xviii4 #fj ,institutes1 book i1 chap4 xvi4 #fa ,id41 book ii1 chap4 iv4 #fb ,id41 book i1 chap4 xviii4 #fc ,id41 book iii1 chap4 xxiii4 #fd ,id41 book iii1 chap4 xxiii1 sec4 #d1 #g4 #fe ,institutes1 book i1 chap4 xiv1 sec4 #af4 #ff ,theodice1 p4 #cfe4 #fg ,institutes1 book i1 chap4 xiv4 #fh ,institutes1 book iii1 ch4 xxiii4 #fi ,id41 book i1 ch4 xviii4 #gj ,see ,mhler's ,symbolism4 #ga ,thodice1 p4 #he4 #gb ,id41 p4 #bfd4 #gc ,thodice1 pp4 #hi1 #ij4 #gd ,progress of ,ethical ,philosophy1 p4 #aad4 #ge ,inquiry1 p4 #bdf #gf ,inquiry1 part iv1 sec4 ix4 #gg ,letter vii4 #gh ,inquiry1 part iv1 sec4 ix4 #gi ,edwards's ,works1 vol4 vii1 p4 #djf4 #hj ,thodice1 p4 #cbg4 #ha ,howe's ,works1 p4 #aadb4 #hb ,on the ,will1 part iv1 sec4 ix4 #hc ,emmons's ,works1 vol4 iv1 p4 #cgb4 #hd ,ibid41 p4 #chh4 #he ,ibid41 p4 #cbg4 #hf ,institutes of ,theology1 vol4 ii1 chap4 iii4 #hg ,emphatically as this conclusion is stated by ,spinoza1 and harshly as it is thrust by him against the moral sense of the reader1 he could not himself find a perfect rest therein4 ,nothing can impart this to the reflective and inquiring mind but truth4 ,hence1 even ,spinoza finds himself constrained to speak of the duty of love to ,god1 and so forth2 all of which1 according to his own conclusion1 is irrelative nonsense4 #hh ,original ,sin1 part ii1 chap4 i1 sec4 i4 #hi ,original ,sin1 part ii1 ch4 i1 sec4 i4 #ij ,inquiry1 part iv1 sec4 i4 #ia ,they are accustomed to boast1 that no man ever excelled ,edwards in the reductio ad absurdum4 ,but we believe no one has produced a more striking illustration of his ability in the use of this weapon1 than that which we have just adduced4 ,for if we contend1 that every act is to be judged according to its own nature1 whether it be good or evil1 he will demonstrate1 that we render virtue impossible1 and exclude it entirely from the world4 ,on the other hand1 if we shift our position1 and contend that no act is to be judged according to its own nature1 but according to the goodness or badness of its origin or cause1 he will also reduce this position1 diametrically opposite though it be to the former1 to precisely the same absurdity2 namely1 that it excludes all virtue out of the world1 and banishes it from the universality of things6 ,surely1 this reductio ad absurdum is a most formidable weapon in his hands2 since he wields it with such destructive fury against the most opposite principles1 and seems himself scarcely less exposed than others to its force4 #ib ,inquiry1 part iv1 sec4 x4 #ic ,religious ,affections1 part iii1 sec4 ii4 #id ,ibid4 #ie ,dr4 ,woods4 #if ,ibid4 #ig ,inquiry of ,president ,edwards1 part iv1 sec4 #a4 #ih ,institutes of ,theology1 part iii1 chap4 i4 #ii ,president ,edwards4 #ajj ,dr4 ,chalmers4 #aja ,psychology1 p4 #bdg4 #ajb ,history of ,ancient ,philosophy1 vol4 iii1 p4 #eee4 #ajc ,ibid4 #ajd ,president ,edwards's ,works1 vol4 ii1 p4 #af4 #aje ,id41 vol4 v1 pp4 #aj1 #aa4 #ajf ,id41 vol4 iv1 p4 #hb4 #ajg ,ibid4 #ajh ,inquiry1 p4 #ag4 #aji ,inquiry1 part i1 sec4 iii4 #aaj ,id41 part i1 sec4 iv4 #aaa ,inquiry1 pp4 #ed1 #ee4 #aab ,inquiry1 p4 #ee4 #aac ,id41 p4 #ej4 #aad ,inquiry1 p4 #ed4 #aae ,id41 p4 #ee4 #aaf ,inquiry1 p4 #gg4 #aag ,ibid4 #aah ,ibid4 #aai ,id41 p4 #gh4 #abj ,id41 p4 #gi4 #aba ,thodice4 #abb ,inquiry1 p4 #bgg4 #abc ,id41 pp4 #ej1 #ea4 #abd ,remarks upon ,collins's ,philosophical ,inquiry4 #abe ,inquiry1 p4 #aih4 #abf ,edwards's ,inquiry1 p4 #agh4 #abg ,see ,examination of ,edwards on the ,will4 #abh ,discours de la ,conformit de la ,foi avec la ,raison4 #abi ,see ,examination of ,edwards on the ,will1 sec4 ix4 #acj ,president ,day on the ,will1 p4 #afj4 #aca ,inquiry1 p4 #bjc4 #acb ,dissertation1 p4 #aha4 #acc ,inquiry of ,edwards1 p4 #bbb4 #acd ,edwards's ,inquiry1 p4 #bbb4 #ace ,a different view of the ,pelagian doctrine on this point is given by ,wiggers1 and yet we suppose that both authors are in the right4 ,the truth seems to me1 that ,pelagius1 as usually happens to those who take one-sided views of the truth1 has asserted contradictory positions4 #acf ,the way of ,life1 chap4 iii1 sec4 ii4 #acg ,knapp's ,theology1 vol4 ii1 p4 #dga4 ,note by the translator4 #ach ,institutes1 b4 iii1 ch4 xxiv4 #aci ,ibid4 #adj ,essais de ,thodice4 #ada ,cudworth's ,intellectual ,system4 #adb ,starkie on ,evidence4 #adc ,thodice4 #add ,see ,chapter ,,iii4 #ade ,compare ,chap4 ,,iii4 #adf ,intellectual ,system1 vol4 ii1 p4 #cbh4 #adg ,id41 vol4 ii1 p4 #adi4 #adh ,cudworth's ,intellectual ,system1 vol4 ii1 p4 #cch4 #adi ,dwight's ,sermons1 vol4 i1 pp4 #bed-dab4 ,dick's ,lec41 p4 #bdh4 #aej ,witherspoon1 as quoted in 8,new and ,old ,theology10 issued by the ,presbyterian ,board of ,publication4 #aea ,d',aubigne's ,history of the ,reformation1 book xiii4 #aeb ,old and ,new ,theology1 p4 #ch4 #aec ,the writer here speaks from personal experience4 #aed ,old and ,new ,theology1 p4 #dj4 #aee ,penses1 ,i4 ,partie1 art4 iv1 sec4 vii4 #aef ,old and ,new ,theology4 #aeg ,examination of ,edwards on the ,will4 #aeh ,theology1 vol4 i1 p4 #ceh4 #aei ,ibid4 #afj ,butler's ,analogy1 part i1 chap4 ii4 #afa ,robert ,hall1 a profound admirer of ,howe1 has pronounced his attempt to reconcile the sincerity of ,god with the universal offer of salvation1 to be one of his great master-pieces of thought and reasoning4 #afb ,hagenbach's ,history of ,doctrines1 vol4 ii1 p4 #bei4 #afc ,institutes1 book iii1 chap4 xxiv1 sec4 xvii4 #afd ,institutes1 book iii1 chap4 xxiv1 sec4 xvi4 #afe ,id41 sec4 xiii4 #aff ,we do not intend to investigate the subject of a limited atonement in the present work1 because it is merely a metaphysical off-shoot from the doctrine of election and reprobation1 and must stand or fall with the parent trunk4 ,the strength of this we purpose to try in a subsequent chapter4 #afg ,lectures on ,theology1 vol4 i1 p4 #deh4 #afh ,lectures on ,theology1 p4 #deh4 #afi ,edwards's ,works1 vol4 ii1 p4 #edh4 #agj ,edwards on ,original ,sin1 part iv1 chap4 iii1 p4 #edc4 #aga ,encheir41 c4 #df1 #dg4 ,see also remarks by the ,american editor and translator4 #agb ,see p4 #bhd4 #agc ,if ,god1 out of the abundance of his compassion1 imputes the sins of parents only to the third or fourth generation1 how has it happened that ,adam's transgression is imputed to all his posterity1 and punished throughout all generations8 ,is there any consistency1 or harmony1 in such views respecting the government of the world8 #agd ,wiggers's ,presentation1 note by translator1 p4 #bhe4 #age ,edwards on ,original ,sin1 part iv1 ch4 iii4 #agf ,institutes1 book ii1 ch4 i4 #agg ,divine ,attributes4 #agh ,sermon on ,original ,sin4 #agi ,original ,sin1 part i1 ch4 ii4 #ahj ,original ,sin1 part i1 ch4 ii4 #aha ,exposition of the ,thirty-nine ,articles1 article ix4 #ahb ,ibid4 #ahc ,edwards on ,original ,sin1 part iv1 ch4 iii4 #ahd ,see ,knapp's ,theology1 vol4 ii1 art4 ix1 sec4 #gf2 also ,wiggers's ,presentation of ,augustinism and ,pelagianism1 chap4 xix1 p4 #bfh4 #ahe ,harmonie de la ,raison et de la ,religion4 #ahf ,ibid41 ,almeyda4 #ahg ,wiggers's ,presentation of ,augustinism and ,pelagianism1 chap4 iv4 #ahh ,sermon on ,compassion4 #ahi ,butler's ,analogy1 part i1 chap4 iii4 #aij ,analogy1 chap4 v4 #aia ,id41 chap4 v1 p4 #agh4 #aib ,part i1 chap4 vi4 #aic ,part i1 chap4 ii4 #aid ,this language of ,bacon is applied by him to the empirical and rational faculties of the human mind4 #aie ,butler's ,analogy1 part ii1 chap4 v4 #aif ,analogy4 #aig ,ibid4 #aih ,letter on the ,duration of ,future ,punishment1 pp4 #ai1 #bj4 #aii ,letter1 c41 pp4 #ae-ah4 #bjj ,robert ,hall supposes that ,edwards must have found it in ,owen4 ,he might have found it in a hundred earlier writers4 #bja ,wiggers's ,presentation1 p4 #baj--,note by ,translator4 #bjb ,wiggers's ,presentation1 p4 #baj--,note by ,trans4 #bjc ,freedom of the ,will1 p4 #ch4 #bjd ,letter1 pp4 #ba1 #bb4 #bje ,jeremy ,bentham4 #bjf ,on one point we fully concur with ,mr4 ,foster1 7see ,letter1 p4 #bg37 8,as to religious teachers1 if this tremendous doctrine be true1 surely it ought to be almost continually proclaimed as with the blast of a trumpet1 inculcated and reiterated1 with ardent passion1 in every possible form of terrible illustration2 no remission of the alarm to thoughtless spirits40 ,but if it be so incumbent on religious teachers1 who believe this awful tenet1 thus to proclaim it to a perishing world1 is it not equally incumbent on them not to speak on such a subject at all until they have taken the utmost pains to form a correct opinion concerning it8 ,if the man who merely proclaims this doctrine in the usual quiet way of preachers1 while he sees his fellow-men perishing around1 is guilty of criminal neglect1 what shall we say of the religious teacher who1 without having devoted much time to the investigation of the subject1 exerts his powers and his influence to persuade his fellow-men that it is all a delusion1 and that the idea of endless misery is utterly inconsistent with the goodness of ,god8 ,how many feeble outcries and warnings of those who are so terribly rebuked by ,mr4 ,foster1 may be silenced and forever laid to rest by his eloquent declamation against the doctrine in question1 and how many souls may be thereby betrayed and led on to their own eternal ruin6 ,yet1 wonderful as it may seem1 ,mr4 ,foster tells us that his opinion on this awful subject has not been the result of 8a protracted inquiry40 ,in the very letter from which we have so frequently quoted1 he says3 8,i have perhaps been too content to let an opinion 7or impression7 admitted in early life dispense with protracted inquiry and various reading40 ,now1 is this the way in which a question of this kind should be decided1--a question which involves the eternal destiny of millions of human beings8 ,is it to be decided1 not by protracted inquiry1 but under the influence of an 8impression admitted in early life80 #bjg ,surely a very singular doctrine to be found in a prophecy4 #bjh ,institutes1 book iii1 ch4 xxi4 #bji ,ibid4 #baj ,wiggers1 ch4 xvi4 #baa ,wiggers's ,presentation1 ch4 xvi4 #bab ,institutes1 book iii1 ch4 xxi4 #bac ,hill's ,divinity1 p4 #ebe4 #bad ,id41 p4 #ebf4 #bae ,hill's ,divinity1 p4 #efb4 #baf ,institutes of ,theology4 #bag ,institutes of ,theology1 vol4 ii1 ch4 vii4 #bah ,institutes of ,theology1 vol4 ii1 ch4 vii4 #bai ,whewell's ,history of the ,inductive ,sciences1 vol4 i4 #bbj ,intellectual ,system1 vol4 ii1 p4 #cdi4 #bba ,thodice1 ,abrg de la ,controverse4 #bbb ,ibid4 #bbc ,abrg de la ,controverse4 #bbd ,reflexions sur le ,livre de ,hobbes4 #bbe ,analogy1 part i1 chap4 vii4 #bbf ,remarques sur ,le ,livre de ,m4 ,king1 sec4 xvi4 #bbg ,origin of ,evil1 vol4 ii1 ch4 v1 sec4 v4 #bbh ,dictionary1 ,article ,paulicians4 #bbi ,it is not exactly just to rank ,hall among the ,arminians4 ,his scheme of doctrine1 if scheme it may be called1 is1 like that of so many others1 a heterogeneous mixture of ,calvinism and ,arminianism--a mixture1 and not an organic compound1 of the conflicting elements of the two systems4