,a ,manual of ,moral ,philosophy ,designed ,for ,colleges and ,high ,schools4 ,by ,andrew ,p4 ,peabody1 ,d4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,plummer ,professor of ,christian ,morals in ,harvard ,university4 ,new ,york and ,chicago3 ,a4 ,s4 ,barnes ,and ,company #ahgc ,,contents ,preface4 ,chapter #a4 ,action4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,springs ,of ,action4 ,section ,i4 ,the ,appetites4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,desires4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,affections4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,governing ,principles ,of ,action4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,right4 ,chapter ,v4 ,means ,and ,sources ,of ,knowledge ,as ,to ,right ,and ,wrong4 ,section ,i4 ,conscience4 ,section ,,ii4 ,sources ,of ,knowledge4 #a4 ,observation1 ,experience1 ,and ,tradition4 ,section ,,iii4 ,sources ,of ,knowledge4 #b4 ,law4 ,section ,,iv4 ,sources ,of ,knowledge4 #c4 ,christianity4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,rights ,and ,obligations4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,motive1 ,passion1 ,and ,habit4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,virtues1 ,and ,the ,virtues4 ,chapter ,,ix4 ,prudence2 ,or ,duties ,to ,one's ,self4 ,section ,i4 ,self-,preservation4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,attainment ,of ,knowledge4 ,section ,,iii4 ,self-,control4 ,section ,,iv4 ,moral ,self-,culture4 ,chapter ,x4 ,justice2 ,or1 ,duties ,to ,one's ,fellow-,beings4 ,section ,i4 ,duties ,to ,god4 ,section ,,ii4 ,duties ,of ,the ,family4 ,section ,,iii4 ,veracity4 ,section ,,iv4 ,honesty4 ,section ,v4 ,beneficence4 ,chapter ,,xi4 ,fortitude2 ,or ,duties ,with ,reference ,to ,unavoidable ,evils ,and ,sufferings4 ,section ,i4 ,patience4 ,section ,,ii4 ,submission4 ,section ,,iii4 ,courage4 ,chapter ,,xii4 ,order2 ,or ,duties ,as ,to ,objects ,under ,one's ,own ,control4 ,section ,i4 ,time4 ,section ,,ii4 ,place4 ,section ,,iii4 ,measure4 ,section ,,iv4 ,manners4 ,section ,v4 ,government4 ,chapter ,,xiii4 ,casuistry4 ,chapter ,,xiv4 ,ancient ,history ,of ,moral ,philosophy4 ,chapter ,,xv4 ,modern ,history ,of ,moral ,philosophy4 ,index4 ,footnotes ,,preface4 ,this book has been prepared1 particularly1 for the use of the ,freshman ,class in ,harvard ,college4 ,the author has1 at the same time1 desired to meet the need1 felt in our high schools1 of a manual of ,moral ,science fitted for the more advanced classes4 ,in the preparation of this treatise1 the author has been at no pains to avoid saying what others had said before4 ,yet the book is original1 so far as such a book can be or ought to be original4 ,the author has directly copied nothing except ,dugald ,stewart's classification of the ,desires4 ,but as his reading for several years has been principally in the department of ethics1 it is highly probable that much of what he supposes to be his own thought may have been derived from other minds4 ,of course1 there is no small part of the contents of a work of this kind1 which is the common property of writers1 and must in some form reappear in every elementary manual4 ,should this work be favorably received1 the author hopes to prepare1 for higher college-classes1 a textbook1 embracing a more detailed and thorough discussion of the questions at issue among the different schools--past and present--of ethical science4 ,chapter #a4 ,,action4 ,an act or action is a voluntary exercise of any power of body or mind4 ,the character of an action1 whether good or bad1 depends on the intention of the agent4 ,thus1 if ,i mean to do my neighbor a kindness by any particular act1 the action is kind1 and therefore good1 on my part1 even though he derive no benefit from it1 or be injured by it4 ,if ,i mean to do my neighbor an injury1 the action is unkind1 and therefore bad1 though it do him no harm1 or though it even result to his benefit4 ,if ,i mean to perform an action1 good or bad1 and am prevented from performing it by some unforeseen hindrance1 the act is as truly mine as if ,i had performed it4 ,words which have any meaning are actions4 ,so are thoughts which we purposely call up1 or retain in the mind4 ,on the other hand1 the actions which we are compelled to perform against our wishes1 and the thoughts which are forced upon our minds1 without our own consent1 are not our actions4 ,this is obviously true when our fellow-men forcibly compel us to do or to hear things which we do not wish to do or to hear4 ,it is their action solely1 and we have no more part in it than if we were brute beasts1 or inanimate objects4 ,it is1 then1 the intention that gives character to the action4 ,that we commonly do what we intend to do there can be no doubt4 ,we do not act under immediate compulsion4 ,we are1 therefore1 free agents1 or actors4 ,but are our intentions free8 ,is it in our power to will otherwise than we will8 ,when we choose to perform an act that is just or kind1 is it in our power to choose to perform an act of the opposite character8 ,in other words1 is the will free8 ,if it be not so1 then what we call our intentions are not ours1 but are to be attributed to the superior will which has given direction to our wills4 ,if ,god has so arranged the order of nature and the course of events as to force my will in certain directions1 good or evil1 then it is ,he that does the good or evil which ,i seem to do4 ,on this supposition ,god is the only agent or actor in the universe4 ,evil1 if it be wrought1 is wrought by ,him alone2 and if we cannot admit that the ,supreme ,being does evil1 the only alternative is to deny the existence of evil1 and to maintain that what we call evil bears an essential part in the production of good4 ,for instance1 if the horrible enormities imputed to ,nero were utterly bad1 the evil that was in them is chargeable1 not on ,nero1 but on ,god2 or if it be maintained that ,god cannot do evil1 then ,nero was an instrument for the advancement of human happiness and well-being4 ,what reasons have we for believing that the human will is free8 #a4 ,we have the direct evidence of consciousness4 ,we are distinctly conscious1 not only of doing as we choose1 but of exercising our free choice among different objects of desire1 between immediate and future enjoyment1 between good and evil4 ,now1 though consciousness may sometimes deceive us1 it is the strongest evidence that we can have2 we are so constituted that we cannot refuse our credence to it2 and our belief in it lies at the basis of all evidence and of all knowledge4 #b4 ,we are clearly conscious of merit or demerit1 of self-approval or self-condemnation1 in consequence of our actions4 ,if our wills were acted upon by a force beyond our control1 we might congratulate or pity ourselves1 but we could not praise or blame ourselves1 for what we had done4 #c4 ,we praise or blame others for their good or evil actions2 and in our conduct toward them we show that we believe them to have been not merely fortunate or unfortunate1 but praiseworthy or blameworthy4 ,so far as we suppose their wills to have been influenced by circumstances beyond their control1 we regard them with diminished approval or censure4 ,on the other hand1 we give the highest praise to those who have chosen the good amidst strong temptations to evil1 and bestow the severest censure on those who have done evil with virtuous surroundings and influences4 ,now our judgment of others must of necessity be derived from our own consciousness1 and if we regard and treat them as freely willing beings1 it can only be because we know that our own wills are free4 ,these arguments1 all derived from consciousness1 can be directly met only by denying the validity of consciousness as a ground of belief4 ,the opposing arguments are drawn from sources independent of consciousness4 #a4 ,the most obvious objection to the freedom of the human will is derived from the power of motives4 ,it is said1 ,we never act without a motive2 we always yield to the strongest motive2 and motives are not of our own creation or choice1 but are brought to bear upon us independently of our own action4 ,there has been1 from the creation until now1 an unbroken series of causes and effects1 and we can trace every human volition to some anterior cause or causes belonging to this inevitable series1 so that1 in order for the volition to have been other than it was1 some member of this series must have been displaced4 ,to this it may be answered3-- 7a7 ,we are capable of acting without a motive1 and we do so act in numberless instances4 ,it was a common saying among the ,schoolmen1 that an ass1 at equal distances from two equal bundles of hay1 would starve to death for lack of a motive to choose either4 ,but have we any motive whatever in the many cases in which we choose--sometimes after the vain endeavor to discover a ground of preference--between two equally valuable1 beautiful1 or appetizing objects1 between two equally pleasant routes to the same terminus1 or between two equally agreeable modes of passing a leisure day or hour8 ,yet this choice1 made without motive1 may be a fruitful cause of motives that shall have a large influence in the future4 ,thus1 on the route which one chooses without any assignable reason1 he may encounter persons or events that shall modify his whole plan of life4 ,the instances are by no means few1 in which the most decisive results have ensued upon a choice thus made entirely without motive4 7b7 ,motives of equal strength act differently on different temperaments4 ,the same motive1 when it stands alone1 with no opposing motive1 has not the same effect on different minds4 ,there is in the will of every human being a certain reluctance to action--in some greater1 in others less--corresponding to the vis inerti in inanimate substances2 and as the impulse which will move a wooden ball may not suffice to move a leaden ball1 so the motive which will start into action a quick and sensitive temperament1 may produce no effect on a person of more sluggish nature4 ,thus1 among men utterly destitute of honesty1 some are tempted by the most paltry opportunities for theft or fraud2 others1 not one whit more scrupulous1 have their cupidity aroused only by the prospect of some substantial gain4 ,so1 too1 some sincerely benevolent persons are moved to charitable actions by the slightest needs and sufferings2 others1 equally kind and generous1 have their sympathies excited only on grave occasions and by imperative claims4 ,motives1 then1 have not a determinate and calculable strength1 but a power which varies with the previous character of the person to whom they are addressed4 ,moreover1 the greater or less susceptibility to motives from without is not a difference produced by education or surroundings2 for it may be traced in children from the earliest development of character4 ,nor can it be hereditary2 for it may be found among children of the same parents1 and not infrequently between twins nurtured under precisely the same care1 instruction1 and discipline4 7c7 ,external motives are not the causes of action1 but merely its occasions or opportunities4 ,the cause of the action already exists in the character of the agent1 before the motive presents itself4 ,a purse of gold that may be stolen without detection is an irresistible motive to a thief1 or to a person who1 though not previously a thief1 is covetous and unprincipled2 but the same purse might lie in the way of an honest man every day for a month1 and it would not make him a thief4 ,if ,i recognize the presence of a motive1 ,i must perform some action1 whether exterior or internal2 but whether that action will be in accordance with the motive1 or in the opposite direction1 is determined by my previous character and habits of action4 7d7 ,the objection which we are considering assumes1 without sufficient reason1 that the phenomena of human action are closely analogous to those of motion in the material world4 ,the analogy fails in several particulars4 ,no material object can act on itself and change its own nature1 adaptations1 or uses1 without any external cause2 but the human mind can act upon itself without any external cause1 as in repentance1 serious reflection1 religious purposes and aims4 ,then again1 if two or more forces in different directions act upon a material object1 its motion is not in the direction of either1 or with the momentum derived from either1 but in a direction and with a momentum resulting from the composition of these forces2 whereas the human will1 in the presence of two or more motives1 pursues the direction and yields to the force of but one of those motives4 ,we are not1 then1 authorized to reason about the power of motives from the action of material forces4 7e7 ,were the arguments against the freedom of the will logically sound and unanswerable1 they would be of no avail against the testimony of consciousness4 ,axioms1 intuitive beliefs1 and truths of consciousness can be neither proved nor disproved by reasoning2 and the reasoning by which they seem to be disproved only evinces that they are beyond the range and reach of argument4 ,thus it may be maintained with show of reason that motion is impossible2 for an object cannot move where it is1 and cannot move where it is not1--a dilemma which does not disprove the reality of motion1 but simply indicates that the reality of motion1 being an intuitive belief1 neither needs nor admits logical proof4 #b4 ,it is urged against the freedom of the human will that it is inconsistent with ,god's foreknowledge of future events1 and thus represents the ,supreme ,being as not omniscient1 and in that particular finite and imperfect4 ,to this objection we reply3-- 7a7 ,if human freedom and the ,divine foreknowledge of human acts are mutually incompatible1 we must still retain the freedom of the will as a truth of consciousness2 for if we discredit our own consciousness1 we cannot trust even the act of the understanding by which we set it aside1 which act we know by the testimony of consciousness alone4 7b7 ,if the acts of a freely willing being cannot be foreknown1 the ignorance of them does not detract from the perfectness of the ,supreme ,being4 ,omnipotence cannot make two and two five4 ,omnipotence cannot do what is intrinsically impossible4 ,no more can ,omniscience know what is intrinsically unknowable4 7c7 ,if ,god's foreknowledge is entire1 it must include his own acts1 no less than those of men4 ,if his foreknowledge of men's acts is incompatible with their freedom1 then his foreknowledge of his own acts is incompatible with his own freedom4 ,we have1 therefore1 on the theory of necessity1 instead of a ,supreme ,will on the throne of the universe1 mere fate or destiny4 ,this is equivalent to the denial of a personal ,god4 7d7 ,it cannot be proved that ,god's foreknowledge and man's free will are incompatible with each other4 ,the most that we can say is that we do not fully see how they are to be reconciled1 which is the case with many pairs of undoubted truths that might be named4 ,but while a perfect explanation of the harmony of the ,divine foreknowledge and human freedom is beyond the scope of our faculties1 we may explain it in part1 from our own experience4 ,human foreknowledge extends very far and with a great degree of certainty1 without abridging the freedom of those to whom it relates4 ,when we can foresee outward events1 we can often foretell1 with little danger of mistake1 the courses of conduct to which they will give rise4 ,in view of the extent and accuracy of human foresight1 we cannot pronounce it impossible1 that ,he who possesses antecedent knowledge of the native constitution of every human being1 and of the shaping circumstances and influences to which each being is subjected1 may foreknow men's acts1 even though their wills be entirely free4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,springs ,,of ,,action4 ,there are certain elements of the human constitution1 in part natural1 in part acquired1 which always prompt and urge men to action1 without reference to the good or evil there may be in the action1 and without reference to its ultimate effects on the actor's well-being4 ,these are the ,appetites1 the ,desires1 and the ,affections4 ,section ,i4 ,the ,appetites4 ,the ,appetites are cravings of the body1 adapted1 and undoubtedly designed1 to secure the continued life of the individual and the preservation of the species4 ,they are common to man with the lower orders of animals1 with this difference1 that in man they may be controlled1 directed1 modified1 in part suppressed1 while in brutes they are uncontrollable1 and always tend to the same modes of gratification4 ,appetite is intermittent4 ,when gratified1 it ceases for a time1 and is renewed for the same person nearly at the same intervals1 and under similar circumstances4 ,it is1 while it lasts1 an uneasy1 even a painful sensation1 and therefore demands prompt relief1 and leads to action with a view to such relief4 ,it is also a characteristic of appetite that its indulgence is attended1 not merely by relief1 but by positive pleasure4 ,the appetites are essential to the well-being of men1 individually and collectively4 ,were it not for the pain of hunger and thirst1 and the pleasure of gratifying them1 both indolence and engrossing industry would draw off the attention of men from their bodily needs2 nourishment would be taken irregularly1 and with little reference to quality2 and one would often become aware of his neglect only too late to arrest its consequences4 ,a similar remark applies to the appetite designed to secure the preservation of the species4 ,but for this1 it may be doubted whether men would willingly take upon themselves the cares1 labors1 responsibilities1 and contingent disappointments and sorrows involved in the rearing of children4 ,in a life conformed to nature1 hunger and thirst recur only when the body actually needs the supply which they crave4 ,but stimulating food1 by the reaction that follows strong excitement of any portion of the nervous system1 may create hunger when there is no need of food1 and in like manner not only intoxicating1 but highly stimulating liquids1 may occasion an excessive1 morbid1 and injurious thirst4 ,appetite is modified by habit4 ,there is hardly any substance so offensive that it may not by use become agreeable1 then an object of desire1 and1 at length1 of intense craving4 ,the craving for repose and that for muscular action1 though not classed among the appetites1 have all their characteristics1 and serve similar ends in the economy of human life4 ,after a certain period of activity1 rest is felt as a bodily necessity1 as food is1 after long fasting2 and in like manner1 when the wearied muscles have had their due repose1 there is an irresistible tendency to their exercise1 without reference to any special employment or recreation4 ,it is by the alternation of these tendencies that the active and industrious are saved from the ruinous consequences of overtasked limbs or brain1 and that the indolent are urged to the reluctant activity without which health and life itself would be sacrificed4 ,the appetites1 being mere bodily impulses1 and being all liable to excess or misdirection1 need the control of the will1 and of the principles of action by which the will is determined and regulated4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,desires4 ,the ,desires are distinguished from the ,appetites1 first1 in their not originating from the body2 secondly1 in their not being necessarily intermittent2 and thirdly1 in their tendency to increase indefinitely1 often through the whole of life1 and to gain strength by the attainment of their specific objects4 ,if classified by their objects1 they might seem too numerous to be specified2 but they may all be embraced under the titles of the ,desire for ,knowledge1 for ,society1 for ,esteem1 for ,power1 and for ,superiority4 ,these all may be traced1 in a more or less rudimentary form1 in the inferior animals4 ,many of these animals show an active curiosity4 ,many are gregarious in their native state1 and most of the domestic animals delight in the society of their kind2 some take manifest pleasure in human society2 and the instances are by no means rare1 in which animals1 by nature mutually hostile1 become strongly attached to each other1 and render to each other the most friendly services4 ,the dog1 the horse1 and the cat evidently crave the esteem of human beings1 and show tokens of genuine grief when they incur rebuke or discern tokens of disapproval4 ,the dog maintains with watchful jealousy his own authority in his own peculiar domain2 and in the chase or on the race-ground the dog and the horse are as emulous of success as their masters4 99#a4 ,the ,desire of ,knowledge499 ,this in the human being is manifested with the earliest dawn of intelligence4 ,the infant is busy with eye and hand throughout his waking hours2 and that the desire of knowledge is innate1 and has no reference to the use that is to be made of the things known1 is manifest from the rapid growth of knowledge in the first years of life1 before the child has any distinct conception of the uses of objects1 or any conscious capacity of employing them for his own benefit4 ,it may be doubted whether in any subsequent year of life so much knowledge is acquired as during the first year4 ,the child but a year old has learned the nature of the familiar objects of the house and the street1 the faces and names of a large number of relatives1 domestics1 and acquaintances1 the regular succession of seasons and events in daily domestic life1 and the meanings of most of the words that are addressed to him or employed concerning him and the objects around him4 ,in more advanced life this desire grows by what it feeds on1 and never ceases to be active4 ,it assumes1 indeed1 different directions1 in part determining1 and in part determined by1 condition1 profession1 or employment4 ,even in the most idle and frivolous1 it is strong1 often intense1 though its objects be worthless4 ,such persons frequently are as sedulous in collecting the paltry gossip of society as the naturalist in acquiring the knowledge of new species of plants or insects1 and as ingenious in their inferences from what they see and hear as the philosopher in his inductions from the facts of science4 ,not only in infancy1 but through life1 knowledge is sought evidently for its own sake1 and not merely for its uses4 ,but a very small part of what one knows can be made of practical utility as to his own comfort or emolument4 ,many1 indeed1 voluntarily sacrifice ease1 gain1 position1 in the pursuit of science or literature4 ,fame1 if it accrues1 is not unwelcome2 but by the higher order of minds fame is not pursued as an end1 and there are many departments of knowledge in which little or no reputation is to be attained4 ,then1 too1 it is not the learner1 but the teacher1 not the profound scholar1 merely1 but the able expositor1 speaker1 or writer1 who can expect a distinguished name2 while there are many who content themselves with acquiring knowledge1 without attempting publicity4 ,nor yet can benevolence account for the love of knowledge4 ,many1 indeed1 make their attainments the property of others1 and are zealous in diffusing their own scientific views1 or in dispensing instruction in their own departments4 ,but there are also many solitary1 recluse students2 and it may be doubted whether1 if a man who is earnestly engaged in any intellectual pursuit were shut out entirely from human society1 and left alone with his books or with nature1 his diligence would be relaxed1 or his ardor abated4 99#b4 ,the ,desire of ,society499 ,this1 also1 is manifested so early as to show that it is an original1 and not an acquired principle4 ,little children dread solitude1 crave the presence of familiar faces1 and evince pleasure in the company of children of their own age4 ,a child1 reared in comparative seclusion and silence1 however tenderly1 suffers often in health1 always in mental vigor and elasticity2 while in a large family1 and in intimate association with companions of his own age1 the individual child has the fullest and most rapid development of all his powers4 ,there is1 indeed1 in the lives of many children1 a period when the presence of strangers is unwelcome2 but this state of feeling--seldom of long duration--can in most instances be traced to some sudden fright1 harsh voice1 or imagined neglect or unkindness4 ,the natural course of human life proves that man is by the necessity of his nature a social being4 ,the young of other animals are at a very early period emancipated and forsaken by their parents1 while the human child has many years of dependence1 and is hardly prepared to dispense with the shelter and kind offices of his native home1 when he is moved to create a new home of his own4 ,there is no pursuit in life in which a community of interest fails to give added zest and energy4 ,there is no possible ground of association on which societies are not formed1 and the trivial1 fictitious1 or imaginary pretences on which men thus combine1 meet1 and act in concert1 are manifest proofs of a social proclivity so strong as to create reasons for its indulgence where such reasons do not already exist4 ,even in science and in the most abstruse forms of erudition1 men of learning seek mutual countenance and encouragement1 and readily suspend their solitary research and study for the opportunity of intercommunication on the subjects and objects of their pursuit4 ,the cases in which society is voluntarily shunned or forsaken are as rare as the cases of congenital disease or deformity2 and for every such instance there may generally be assigned some grave1 if not sufficient1 cause4 ,religious asceticism has1 indeed1 induced many persons1 especially in the early ,christian ages1 to lead a solitary life2 but the cnobites have always vastly outnumbered the hermits2 monasteries 7solitary abodes7 have become convents 7assemblages72 and those who are shut out from the rest of the world find comfort in social devotion1 in the common refectory1 and in those seasons of recreation when the law of silence is suspended4 ,for prisoners solitary confinement has been found deleterious both to body and mind1 and this system1 instituted with philanthropic purpose1 and commended on grounds that seemed intimately connected with the reformation of the guilty1 is now generally repudiated as doing violence to human nature4 ,even for the insane1 society1 with judicious classification and restriction1 is an essential part of curative treatment1 and the success of asylums1 as compared with the most skilful and humane private treatment1 is due in great part to the social element4 ,it cannot be maintained that the desire of society results from fear1 and from the felt need of mutual protection2 for it exists in full at the most fearless periods of life1 and among those who are the least timid1 and is equally manifest in the strong and the weak1 in those who can proffer and in those who might crave protection4 99#c4 ,the ,desire of ,esteem499 ,it is almost superfluous to say that this is a native and indestructible element of the human constitution4 ,its first manifestations bear even date with the earliest displays of intelligence and affection4 ,to the infant1 approval is reward2 rebuke1 even by look1 is punishment4 ,the hope of esteem is the most healthful and effective stimulant in the difficult tasks of childhood and of school-life4 ,under the discipline of parents both wise and good1 it is among the most important and salutary means of moral discipline4 ,it is seldom deficient in young persons4 ,their chief danger lies in its excess2 for when it is too strongly developed1 it inclines them to seek at all hazards the approval of their associates for the time being4 ,hence the chief danger from vicious or unscrupulous associates4 ,the first steps in vice are oftener prompted1 no doubt1 by the desire for the complacent regard of one's companions than by an antecedent disposition to evil4 ,indeed1 the confession is often made1 that these steps were taken with compunction and horror1 solely from the fear of ridicule and from the desire to win the approval and favor of older transgressors4 ,on the other hand1 the desire of the esteem of good men is one of the strongest auxiliary motives to virtue2 while a yearning for the ,divine approval forms an essential part of true piety towards ,god4 99#d4 ,the ,desire of ,power499 ,this is manifested in every period of life1 and in the exercise of every faculty1 bodily1 mental1 and moral4 ,it is this which gives us pleasure in solitary exercises of physical strength1 in climbing mountains1 swimming1 lifting heavy weights1 performing difficult gymnastic feats4 ,it is this1 more than deliberate cruelty1 that induces boys to torture animals1 or to oppress and torment their weaker or more timid companions4 ,in intellectual pursuits1 the love of power leads to many exercises and efforts that have no ulterior result4 ,the mathematician will turn aside from his course of study to master a problem1 which involves no new principle1 but is merely difficult and perplexing4 ,the reading of books obscurely written1 or in languages that task the utmost power of analysis1 frequently has no other result1 and probably no other object1 than the trial of strength4 ,what can be attained only by strenuous mental labor1 is for that very reason sought1 even if it promise no utility4 ,in the affairs of practical life1 every man desires to make his influence felt4 ,with persons of the highest character1 the love of power is manifest in connection with the aim to be useful4 ,even the most modest men1 while they may spurn flattery1 are gladdened by knowing that they are acting upon the wills and shaping the characters of those around them4 ,the love of property belongs in great part under this head4 ,money is power1 preminently so at the present day4 ,property confers influence1 and puts at one's command resources that may be the means of extended and growing power alike over inanimate nature and the wills of men4 ,avarice1 or the desire of money for its own sake1 is not an original desire4 ,few or none are avaricious in very early life4 ,but money1 first sought for the power it confers1 from being a means becomes an end1 to such a degree that1 in order to possess it1 the miser will forego the very uses for which he at the outset learned to value it4 99#e4 ,the ,desire of ,superiority499 ,this is so nearly universal in all conditions of society1 and at all periods of life1 that it must be regarded as an original element of human nature4 ,without it there would be little progress4 ,in every department of life1 men stimulate one another toward a higher standard of endeavor1 attainment1 or excellence4 ,what each does1 his neighbor would fain outdo2 what each becomes1 his neighbor would fain surpass4 ,it is only by perversion that this desire tends to evil4 ,it finds its proper satisfaction1 not in crushing1 depressing1 or injuring a rival1 but barely in overtaking and excelling him2 and the higher his point of attainment1 the greater is the complacency experienced in reaching and transcending it4 ,on the race-ground1 ,i do not want to compete with a slow runner1 nor will it afford me the slightest satisfaction to win the race by tripping up my competitor2 what ,i want is to match myself with the best runner on a fair field1 and to show myself his equal or superior4 ,the object striven for is the individual's own ideal1 and those whom he successively passes on his course mark but successive stages on his progress toward that ideal4 ,thus1 in the pursuit of moral excellence1 it is only a mean and a bad man who can imagine that he gains anything by detracting from the merit of others2 but he who is sincerely contending for a high place among virtuous men1 rejoices in the signal examples of goodness of every kind which it is his privilege to emulate1 and rejoices most of all that the ideal of perfect excellence--once only actualized in human form--is so pure and lofty that it may be his life-work to approach it without reaching it4 ,emulation is not envy1 nor need it lead to envy4 ,among those who strive for superiority there need be no collision4 ,the natural desire is to be1 not to seem1 superior2 to have the consciousness1 not the mere outward semblance1 of high attainment2 and of attainment1 not by a conventional1 but by an absolute standard2 and this aim excludes none1--there may be as many first places as there are deserving candidates for them4 ,then1 too1 there is so wide a diversity of ideals1 both in degree and in kind1 there are so many different ruling aims1 and so many different routes by which these aims are pursued1 that there need be little danger of mutual interference4 ,even as regards external rewards1 so far as they depend on the bounty of nature1 the constitution of society1 or the general esteem and good will of men1 the success of one does not preclude the equal success of many2 but1 on the other hand1 the merited prosperity and honor of the individual cannot fail to be of benefit to the whole community4 ,it is only in offices contingent on election or appointment that the aspirant incurs a heavy risk of failure2 but when we consider how meanly men are often compelled to creep into office and to grovel in it1 it can hardly be supposed that a genuine desire of superiority holds a prominent place among the motives of these who are willingly dependent on patronage or on popular suffrage4 ,these desires1 according as one or another has the ascendency1 prompt to action1 without reference to the good or the evil there may be in the action2 and they therefore need the control of reason1 and of the principles which reason recognizes in the government of conduct4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,affections4 99,the ,affections are distinguished from the ,desires991 mainly in these two particulars3 first1 that the ,desires are for impersonal objects1 the ,affections1 for persons2 and secondly1 that the ,desires prompt to actions that have a direct reference to one's self2 the ,affections1 to actions that have a direct reference to others4 ,the ,affections are 99benevolent99 or 99malevolent994 #a4 ,the 99benevolent affections99 are ,love1 ,reverence1 ,gratitude1 ,kindness1 ,pity1 and ,sympathy4 99,love99 needs no definition1 and admits of none4 ,it probably never exists uncaused2 though it survives all real or imagined ground for it1 and in some cases seems rendered only the more intense by the admitted unworthiness of its object4 ,when it is not the reason for marriage1 it can hardly fail to grow from the conjugal relation between one man and one woman1 if the mutual duties belonging to that relation be held sacred4 ,it is inconceivable that a mother should not love her child1 inevitably cast upon her protection from the first moment of his being2 the father who extends a father's care over his children finds in that care a constant source of love2 and the children1 waking into conscious life under the ministries of parental benignity and kindness1 have no emotion so early1 and no early emotion so strong1 as filial love4 ,it may be doubted whether there is among the members of the same family a natural affection1 independent of relations practically recognized in domestic life4 ,it is very certain that at both extremities of the social scale family affection is liable to be impaired1 on the one hand1 by the delegation of parental duties to hirelings1 and1 on the other1 by the inability to render them constantly and efficiently4 ,we may observe also a difference in family affection1 traceable indirectly to the influence of climate4 ,out-of-door life is unfavorable to the intimate union of families2 while domestic love is manifestly the strongest in those countries where the shelter and hearth of the common home are necessary for a large portion of the year4 99,friendship99 is but another name for love between persons unconnected by domestic relations1 actual or prospective4 99,love for the ,supreme ,being991 or piety1 differs not in kind from the child's love for the parent2 but it rightfully transcends all other love1 inasmuch as the benefits received from ,god include and surpass all other benefits4 ,to awake1 then1 to a consciousness of our actual relation to ,god1 is 8to love ,him with all the heart1 and with all the understanding1 and all the soul1 and all the strength40 99,reverence99 is the sentiment inspired by advanced superiority in such traits of mind and character as we regard with complacency in ourselves1 or with esteem in our equals4 ,qualities which we do not esteem we may behold with admiration 7that is1 wonder71 but not with reverence4 ,our reverence for age is not for advanced years alone1 but for the valuable experience which they are supposed to have given1 and especially for the maturity of excellence which belongs to the old age of good men1 of which their features generally bear the impress1 and which1 in the absence of knowledge1 we are prone to ascribe to a venerable mien and aspect4 ,a foolish or wicked old man commands no reverence by his years4 ,god1 as possessing in infinite fulness all the properties which we revere in man1 must ever be the worthy object of supreme reverence4 ,gratitude1 though it can hardly be disjoined from love1 is seldom cherished for the same person in the same degree with love4 ,we love our beneficiaries more than our benefactors4 ,we love those dependent upon us more than those on whom we depend4 ,the mother's love for her child is the strongest of human affections1 and undoubtedly exceeds that even of the child for the mother to whom he owes every benefit and blessing under heaven4 ,we may be fervently grateful to persons whom we have never seen2 but there cannot be much vividness in our love for them4 ,love to ,god1 whom we have not seen1 needs to be kindled1 renewed1 and sustained by gratitude for the incessant flow of benefits from ,him1 and by the promise--contingent on character--of blessings immeasurable and everlasting4 99,kindness99 is benevolence for one's kind1--a delight in their happiness and well-being1 a readiness to perform friendly offices whenever and however they may be needed4 ,in its lower forms it is designated as good nature2 when intense and universal1 it is termed philanthropy4 ,it befits the individual man as a member of a race of kindred1 and is deemed so essential an attribute of the human character1 that he who utterly lacks it is branded as inhuman1 while its active exercise in the relief of want and suffering is emphatically termed humanity4 ,pity is the emotion occasioned by the sight or knowledge of distress or pain4 ,while without it there can be no genuine kindness1 it may exist without kindness4 ,there are persons tenderly sensitive to every form of suffering1 who yet feel only for the sufferer1 not with him1 and who would regard and treat him coldly or harshly1 if he were not a sufferer4 ,in such cases1 pity would seem to be a selfish feeling2 and there can be no doubt that some men relieve distress and poverty1 as they would remove weeds from a flower-bed1 because they are offensive to the sight4 99,sympathy99 is feeling1 not for1 but with others47#a7 ,it has for its objects successes and joys1 no less than sufferings and sorrows2 and probably is as real and intense in the case of the former as of the latter1 though its necessity is less felt and its offices are less prized in happy than in sad experiences4 ,kindness alone cannot produce sympathy4 ,in order to feel with another1 we must either have passed through similar experiences1 or must have an imagination sufficiently vivid to make them distinctly present to our thought4 ,this latter power is by no means necessary to create even the highest degree of kindness or of pity2 and among the most active and persevering in works of practical beneficence1 there are many who feel intensely for1 yet but faintly with1 the objects of their charity4 ,on the other hand1 sympathy sometimes finds its chief exercise in sensational literature1 and there are persons1 profoundly moved by fictitious representations of distress1 who yet remain inactive and indifferent as regards the real needs and sufferings around them that crave relief4 #b4 ,the 99malevolent affections99 are ,anger1 ,resentment1 ,envy1 ,revenge1 and ,hatred4 99,anger99 is the sense of indignation occasioned by real or imagined wrong4 ,when excited by actual wrong-doing1 and when contained within reasonable bounds1 it is not only innocent1 but salutary4 ,it intensifies the virtuous feeling which gives it birth2 and its due expression is among the safeguards of society against corruption and evil4 ,but when indulged without sufficient cause1 or suffered to become excessive or to outlast its occasion1 it is in itself evil1 and it may lead to any and every form of social injustice1 and of outrage against the rights of man and the law of ,god4 99,resentment99 is the feeling excited by injury done to ourselves4 ,this also is innocent and natural1 when its occasion is sufficient1 and its limits reasonable4 ,it may prevent the repetition of injury1 and the spontaneous tendency to it1 which is almost universal1 is an efficient defence against insult1 indignity1 and encroachment on the rights of individuals4 ,but1 indulged or prolonged beyond the necessity of self-defence1 it is prone to reverse the parties1 and to make the injured person himself the wrong-doer4 ,both anger and resentment are 99painful emotions991 and on this account are self-limited in a well-ordered mind4 ,he who makes happiness his aim will1 if wise1 give these disturbing forces the least possible hold upon him1 whether in intensity or in duration4 99,envy99 has been defined as the excess of emulation4 ,it seems rather to be a deficiency in the genuine principle of emulation4 ,the instinctive desire of superiority leads us1 as we have seen1 to aim at absolutely high attainments1 and to measure ourselves less by what others are1 than by our own ideal4 ,it is only those of lower aims1 who seek to supplant others on their career4 ,envy is the attempt1 not to rise or excel1 but to stand comparatively high by subverting those who hold or seek a higher position4 ,no just man voted for the banishment of ,aristides because he was always called the ,just2 but his ostracism was the decree of those who knew that they could obtain no reputation for justice till he were put out of their way4 99,revenge99 is the desire to inflict evil for evil4 ,in principle it is always wrong2 for the evil-doer1 though he may merit transient anger and resentment1 is not therefore placed beyond our benevolence1 but is rather commended to our charity as one who may be reformed and may become worthy of our esteem4 ,in practice1 revenge can scarce ever be just4 ,our self-love so exaggerates our estimate of the wrong we receive1 that we could hardly fail to retaliate by greater wrong1 and thus to provoke a renewal of the injury4 ,there are1 no doubt1 cases in which self-defence may authorize the immediate chastisement or disabling of the wrong-doer1 and in an unsettled state of society1 where there is no legal protection1 it may be the right of individuals to punish depredation or personal outrage2 but acts of this kind are to be justified on the plea of necessity1 not of revenge4 99,hatred99 is the result of either of the malevolent affections above named1 when carried to excess1 or suffered to become permanent4 ,it precludes the exercise of all the benevolent affections4 ,no man can rightfully be the object of hatred2 for there is no man who has not within him some element or possibility of good1 none who has not rights that should be respected1 none who is not entitled to pity for his sufferings1 and1 still more1 for his sins4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the affections1 benevolent and malevolent1 are common to man with lower animals4 ,love and hatred are manifested by all of them whose habits are open to our inspection2 anger1 by not a few2 gratitude1 kindness1 pity1 sympathy1 resentment1 and revenge1 by the more intelligent2 envy1 by those most completely domesticated2 reverence1 perhaps1 by the dog towards his master4 ,the affections all prompt to action1 and do not discriminate the qualities of actions4 ,hence they need the control and guidance of reason1 and can safely be indulged only in accordance with the principles which reason recognizes as supreme in the conduct of life4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,governing ,,principles ,,of ,,action4 ,the appetites1 desires1 and affections constitute the 99impelling force99 in all action4 ,were we not possessed of them1 we should not act4 ,there is no act of any kind1 good or bad1 noble or base1 mental or bodily1 of which one or another of them is not the proximate cause4 ,they are also imperative in their demands4 ,they crave immediate action1--the appetites1 in procuring or using the means of bodily gratification2 the desires1 in the increase of their objects2 the affections1 in seeking or bestowing their appropriate tokens or expressions1 whether good or evil4 ,were there no check1 the specific appetite1 desire1 or affection to which circumstances gave the ascendency for the time being1 would act in its appropriate direction1 until counteracted by another1 brought into supremacy by a new series of circumstances4 ,this is the case with brutes1 so far as we can observe their modes of action4 ,here1 in man1 reason intervenes1 and takes cognizance of the tendencies and the qualities of actions4 99,reason99 considers actions under two points of view1--interest and obligation1--expediency and right4 ,the questions which we inwardly ask concerning actions all resolve themselves into one of these1--,is the act useful or desirable for me8 or1 ,is it my right or my duty8 ,he who is wont to ask the former of these questions is called a prudent man2 he who habitually asks the latter is termed a virtuous or good man4 ,he who asks neither of them yields himself1 after the manner of the brutes1 to the promptings of appetite1 desire1 and affection1 and thus far omits to exercise the reason which distinguishes him from the brutes4 ,there can be no doubt that 99expediency and right coincide994 ,under the government of ,supreme ,benevolence1 it is impossible that what ought to be done should not conduce to the welfare of him who does it4 ,but its beneficent results may be too remote for him to trace them1 nay1 may belong to a life beyond death1 to which human cognizance does not reach2 while what ought not to be done may promise substantial benefit so far as man's foresight extends4 ,then1 too1 it is at least supposable that there may be cases1 in which1 were they solitary cases1 expediency might diverge from right1 yet in which1 because they belong to a class1 it is for the interest of society and of every individual member of society that general laws should be obeyed4 ,it is obvious also1 that there are many cases1 in which the calculation of expediency involves details too numerous and too complicated to be fully understood by a mind of ordinary discernment1 while the same mind can clearly perceive what course of conduct is in accordance with the strict rule of right4 ,still farther1 in a question of conduct in which appetite1 desire1 or affection is concerned1 we cannot take as calm and dispassionate a view of our true interest1 as we should of the interest of another person in like case4 ,the impelling force may be so strong1 that for the time being we sincerely regard it as expedient--though we know that it is not right--to yield to it4 ,for these reasons there is an 99apparent conflict between the useful and the right994 ,though a perfectly wise and dispassionate man might give precisely the same answer in every instance to the question of interest and that of duty1 men1 limited and influenced as they are1 can hardly fail in many instances to answer these questions differently4 ,the man who makes his own imagined good his ruling aim does many things which he would not defend on the ground of right2 the man who determines always to do right sometimes performs acts of reputed and conscious self-denial and self-sacrifice4 ,nor yet can more 99general99 considerations of 99expediency991 reference to the good of others1 to the greatest good of the greatest number1 serve as a guide to the right or a test of the right4 ,we have less foresight as regards others than as regards ourselves2 the details involved in the true interest of any community1 society1 or number of persons1 are necessarily more numerous and complicated than those involved in our own well-being2 and1 if not appetite or desire1 the benevolent or malevolent affections are fully as apt to warp our judgment and to misdirect our conduct in the case of others as in our own case4 ,we perceive then that 99expediency991 whether with reference to ourselves or to others1 99is not a trustworthy rule of conduct994 ,yet while it cannot hold the first place1 it occupies an important place2 for there are many cases in which the question before us is not what we ought to do1 but what it is best for us to do4 ,thus1 if there be several acts1 all equally right1 only one of which can be performed1 we are evidently entitled to perform the act which will be most pleasing or useful to ourselves4 ,if there be an end which it is our right or duty to attain1 and there be several equally innocent modes of attaining it1 the question for us is1 by which of these modes we may find the least difficulty or gain the highest enjoyment or advantage4 ,if there be several duties incumbent upon us at the same time and place1 all of which have equal intrinsic claims1 yet one of which must necessarily take precedence of the rest1 the question which shall have precedence is a question of expediency1 that by which we may do the most good being the foremost duty4 99,expediency is not a characteristic of actions499 ,an act is not in itself expedient or inexpedient1 but is made one or the other by varying circumstances alone2 while there are acts in themselves good which no possible circumstances could make bad1 and there are acts in themselves bad which no possible circumstances could make good4 ,if1 therefore1 there be a science which has for its province the intrinsic qualities of actions1 questions of expediency have no place in such a science4 99,moral ,philosophy1 or ,ethics99 7synonymous terms71 is the science which treats of human actions4 ,the term morals is often applied to external actions2 but always with reference to the intentions from which they proceed4 ,we can conceive of the treatment of actions under various aspects1 as wise or unwise1 agreeable or disagreeable1 spontaneous or deliberate2 but by the common consent of mankind1 at least of the civilized and enlightened portion of mankind1 the distinction of actions as right or wrong is regarded as of an importance so far transcending all other distinctions1 as to render them of comparatively little moment4 ,therefore ,moral ,philosophy confines itself to this single distinction1 and takes cognizance of others1 only as they modify this1 or are modified by it4 ,the questions which ,moral ,philosophy asks and answers are these3--,what constitutes the right8 ,how is it to be ascertained8 ,wherein lies the obligation to the right8 ,what are the motives to right action8 ,what specific actions1 or classes of actions are right1 and why8 ,what specific actions1 or classes of actions are wrong1 and why8 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,,right4 ,every object1 by virtue of its existence1 has its 99appropriate place1 purpose1 uses1 and relations994 ,at every moment1 each specific object is either in or out of its place1 fulfilling or not fulfilling its purpose1 subservient to or alienated from its uses1 in accordance or out of harmony with its relations1 and therefore in a state of fitness or unfitness as regards other objects4 ,every object is at every moment under the control of the intelligent will of the ,supreme ,being1 or of some finite being1 and is by that will maintained either in or out of its place1 purpose1 uses1 or relations1 and thus in a state of fitness or unfitness with regard to other objects4 ,every intelligent being1 by virtue of his existence1 bears certain definite relations to outward objects1 to his fellow-beings1 and to his ,creator4 ,at every moment1 each intelligent being is either faithful or unfaithful to these relations1 and thus in a state of fitness or unfitness as regards outward objects and other beings4 ,thus fitness or unfitness may be affirmed1 at every moment1 of every object in existence1 of the volition by which each object is controlled1 and of every intelligent being1 with regard to the exercise of his will toward or upon outward objects or his fellow-beings4 ,fitness and unfitness are the ultimate ideas that are involved in the terms right and wrong4 ,these last are metaphorical terms1--right 7,latin1 rectus71 straight1 upright1 according to rule1 and therefore fit2 wrong1 wrung1 distorted1 deflected1 twisted out of place1 contrary to rule1 and therefore unfit4 ,we are so constituted that we cannot help regarding fitness with complacency and esteem2 unfitness1 with disesteem and disapproval1 even though we ourselves create it or impersonate it4 99,fitness99 is the only standard by which we regard our own actions or the actions of others as good or evil1--by which we justify or condemn ourselves or others4 ,duty has fitness for its only aim and end4 ,to whatever object comes under our control1 its fit place1 purpose1 uses1 and relations are due2 and our perception of what is thus due constitutes our duty1 and awakens in us a sense of obligation4 ,to ourselves1 and to other beings and objects1 our fidelity to our relations has in it an intrinsic fitness2 that fitness is due to them and to ourselves2 and our perception of what is thus due constitutes our duty1 and awakens in us a sense of obligation4 99,right and wrong are not contingent on the knowledge of the moral agent499 ,unfitness1 misuse1 abuse1 is none the less intrinsically wrong1 because it is the result of ignorance4 ,it is out of harmony with the fitness of things4 ,it deprives an object of its due use4 ,it perverts to pernicious results what is salutary in its purpose4 ,it lessens for the agent his aggregate of good and of happiness1 and increases for him his aggregate of evil and of misery4 ,in this sense--far more significant than that of arbitrary infliction--the well-known maxim of jurisprudence1 8,ignorance of the law excuses no one107#b7 is a fundamental law of nature4 ,there is1 however1 an important distinction between 99absolute and relative right994 ,in action1 the absolute right is conduct in entire conformity with beings and objects as they are2 the relative right is conduct in accordance with beings and objects as1 with the best means of knowledge within our reach1 we believe them to be4 ,the ,omniscient ,being alone can have perfect knowledge of all beings and things as they are4 ,this knowledge is possessed by men in different degrees1 corresponding to their respective measures of intelligence1 sagacity1 culture1 and personal or traditional experience4 ,in the ruder conditions of society1 acts that seem to us atrociously wrong1 often proceed from honest and inevitable misapprehension1 are right in their intention1 and are therefore proper objects of moral approbation4 ,in an advanced condition of intelligence1 and especially under high religious culture1 though the realm of things unknown far exceeds that of things known1 there is a sufficiently clear understanding of the objects and relations of ordinary life to secure men against sins of ignorance1 and to leave in their wrong-doing no semblance or vestige of right4 ,the distinction between absolute and relative right enables us to 99reconcile two statements that may have seemed inconsistent99 with each other1 namely1 that 8the character of an action1 whether good or bad1 depends on the intention of the agent10 and 8that unfitness1 misuse1 abuse1 is none the less wrong because the result of ignorance40 ,both these propositions are true4 ,the same act may be in intent right and good1 and yet1 through defect of knowledge1 wrong and evil2 and it may1 in virtue of its good intent1 be attended and followed by beneficent results1 while at the same time the evil that there is in it may be attended or followed by injurious consequences4 ,we may best illustrate this double character of actions by a case so simple that we can see through it at a single glance4 ,i will suppose that ,i carry to a sick person a potion which ,i believe to be an efficient remedy1 but which1 by a mistake for which ,i am not accountable1 proves to be a deadly poison4 ,my act1 by the standard of absolute right1 is an unfitting and therefore a wrong act1 and it has its inevitable result in killing the patient4 ,but because my intention was right1 ,i have not placed myself in any wrong relation to ,god or man4 ,nay1 if ,i procured what ,i supposed to be a healing potion with care1 cost1 and trouble1 and for one whose suffering and need were his only claim upon me1 ,i have by my labor of love brought myself into an even more intimate relation1 filial and fraternal1 with ,god and man1 the result of which must be my enhanced usefulness and happiness4 ,if on the other hand ,i had meant to poison the man1 but had by mistake given him a healing potion1 my act would have been absolutely right1 because conformed to the fitness of things1 but relatively wrong1 because in its intention and purpose opposed to the fitness of things2 and as in itself fitting1 it would have done the sick man good1 while1 as in its purpose unfitting1 it would have thrown me out of the relations in which ,i ought to stand both with ,god and man4 99,mistakes as to specific acts of duty99 bear the closest possible analogy to the case of the poison given for medicine4 ,the savage1 who sincerely means to express reverence1 kindness1 loyalty1 fidelity1 may perform1 in the expression of those sentiments1 acts that are utterly unfitting1 and therefore utterly wrong2 and if so1 each of these acts produces its due consequences1 it may be1 baleful and lamentable4 ,yet because he did the best he knew in the expression of these sentiments1 he has not sunk1 but risen in his character as a moral being1--has become better and more capable of good4 99,ignorance of the right991 however1 99is innocent1 only when inevitable994 ,at the moment of action1 indeed1 what seems to me fitting is relatively right1 and were ,i to do otherwise1 even though my act were absolutely right1 it would be relatively wrong4 ,but if ,i have had and neglected the means of knowing the right1 ,i have violated the fitnesses of my own nature by not employing my cognitive powers on subjects of vital importance to my well-being4 ,in this case1 though what are called the sins of ignorance may be mistakes and not sins1 the ignorance itself has all the characteristics that attach themselves to the term sin1 and must be attended with proportionally 99harmful consequences to the offender994 ,chapter ,v4 ,,means ,,and ,,sources ,,of ,,knowledge ,,as ,,to ,,right ,,and ,,wrong4 ,section ,i4 ,conscience4 99,conscience is a means991 not a source1 99of knowledge994 ,it is analogous to sight and hearing4 ,it is the power of perceiving fitness and unfitness4 ,yet more1 it is consciousness1--a sense of our own personal relation to the fitting and the unfitting1 of our power of actualizing them in intention1 will1 and conduct4 ,it is in this last particular that man differs from the lower animals4 ,they have an instinctive perception of fitness1 and an instinctive impulse to acts befitting their nature4 ,but no brute says to himself1 8,i am acting in accordance with the fitness of things20 while man virtually says to himself1 in every act1 8,i am doing what it is fit for me to do10 or1 8,i am doing what it is unfitting for me to do40 99,conscience is a judicial faculty499 ,its decisions are based upon such knowledge as the individual has1 whether real or imagined1 and from whatever source derived4 ,it judges according to such law and evidence as are placed before it4 ,its verdict is always relatively right1 a genuine verdict 7verum dictum71 though1 by the absolute standard of right1 it may be wrong1 through defect of knowledge1--precisely as in a court of law an infallibly wise and incorruptibly just judge may pronounce an utterly erroneous or unjust decision1 if he have before him a false statement of facts1 or if the law which he is compelled to administer be unrighteous4 ,we may 99illustrate the function of conscience99 by reference to a question now agitated in our community1--the question as to the moral fitness of the moderate use of fermented liquors4 ,in civilized society1 intoxication is universally known to be opposed to the fitnesses of body and mind1 an abuse of alcoholic liquors1 and an abuse of the drinker's own personality2 and it is therefore condemned by all consciences1 by none more heartily than by those of its victims4 ,but there still remains open the question whether entire abstinence from fermented liquors be a duty1 and this is a question of fact4 ,says one party1 8,alcohol1 in every form1 and in the least quantity1 is a virulent poison1 and therefore unfit for body and mind40 ,says the other party1 8,wine1 moderately used1 is healthful1 salutary1 restorative1 and therefore fitted to body and mind40 ,change the opinion of the latter party1 their consciences would at once take the other side2 and if they retained in precept and practice their present position1 they would retain it self-condemned4 ,change the opinion of the former party1 their consciences would assume the ground which they now assail4 ,demonstrate to the whole community--as it is to be hoped physiology will do at no distant day--the precise truth in this matter1 there would remain no difference of conscientious judgment1 whatever difference of practice might still continue4 99,conscience991 like all the perceptive faculties1 99prompts to action in accordance with its perceptions994 ,in this respect it differs not in the least from sight1 hearing1 taste4 ,our natural proclivity is to direct our movements with reference to the objects within the field of our vision1 to govern our conduct by what we hear1 to take into our mouths only substances that are pleasing to the taste4 ,yet fright1 temerity1 or courage may impel us to incur dangers which we clearly see2 opiniativeness or obstinacy may make us inwardly deaf to counsels or warnings which we hear2 and motives of health may induce us to swallow the most nauseous drugs4 ,in like manner1 our inevitable tendency is to govern our conduct by the fitness of things when clearly perceived2 but intense and unrestrained appetite1 desire1 or affection may lead us to violate that fitness1 though distinctly seen and acknowledged4 99,men act in opposition to conscience only under immediate and strong temptation499 ,the great majority of the acts of bad men are conscientious1 but not therefore meritorious2 for merit consists not in doing right when there is no temptation to evil1 but in resisting temptation4 ,but1 as has been said1 it is as natural1 when there is no inducement to the contrary1 to act in accordance with the fitness of things1 as it is to act in accordance with what we see and hear4 ,it is the tendency so to act1 that alone renders human society possible1 in the absence of high moral principle4 ,in order to live1 a man must so act with reference to outward nature2 still more must he so act1 in order to possess human fellowship1 physical comfort1 transient enjoyment1 of however low a type2 and the most depraved wretch that walks the earth purchases his continued being and whatever pleasure he derives from it by a thousand acts in accordance with the fitness of things to one in which he violates that fitness4 99,conscience991 like all the perceptive faculties1 99is educated by use994 ,the watchmaker's or the botanist's eye acquires an almost microscopic keenness of vision4 ,the blind man's hearing is so trained as to supply1 in great part1 the lack of sight4 ,the epicure's taste can discriminate flavors whose differences are imperceptible to an ordinary palate4 ,in like manner1 the conscience that is constantly and carefully exercised in judging of the fit and the unfitting1 the right and the wrong1 becomes prompt1 keen1 searching1 sensitive1 comprehensive1 microscopic4 ,on the other hand1 conscience1 like the senses1 if seldom called into exercise1 becomes sluggish1 inert1 incapable of minute discrimination1 or of vigilance over the ordinary conduct of life4 ,yet it is never extinct1 and is never perverted4 ,when roused to action1 even in the most obdurate1 it resumes its judicial severity1 and records its verdict in remorseful agony4 ,conscience is commonly said to be educated by 99the increase of knowledge99 as to the relations of beings and objects1 as to the moral laws of the universe1 and as to religious verities4 ,this1 however1 is not true4 ,knowledge does not necessarily quicken the activity of conscience1 or enhance its discriminating power4 ,conscience often is intense and vivid in the most ignorant1 inactive and torpid in persons whose cognitive powers have had the most generous culture4 ,knowledge1 indeed1 brings the decisions of conscience into closer and more constant conformity with the absolute right1 but it does not render its decisions more certainly in accordance with the relative right1 that is1 with what the individual1 from his point of view1 ought to will and do4 ,it has the same effect upon conscience that accurate testimony has upon the clear-minded and uncorrupt judge1 whose mind is not made thereby the more active or discriminating1 nor his decision brought into closer accordance with the facts as they are presented to him4 ,knowledge is indeed an indispensable auxiliary to conscience2 but this cannot be affirmed exclusively of any specific department of knowledge4 ,it is true of all knowledge2 for there is no fact or law in the universe that may not in some contingency become the subject-matter or the occasion for the action of conscience4 ,nothing could seem more remote from the ordinary field of conscience than the theory of planetary motion2 yet it was this that gave ,galileo the one grand opportunity of his life for testing the supremacy of conscience1--it may be1 the sole occasion on which his conscience uttered itself strongly against his seeming interest1 and one on which obedience to conscience would have averted the only cloud that ever rested on his fame4 ,section ,,ii4 ,sources ,of ,knowledge4 #a4 ,observation1 ,experience1 ,and ,tradition4 ,except so far as there may have been direct communications from the ,supreme ,being1 all 99man's knowledge99 of persons1 objects1 and relations 99is derived991 in the last resort1 99from observation994 ,experience is merely remembered self-observation4 ,tradition1 oral and written1 is accumulated and condensed observation2 and by means of this each new generation can avail itself of the experience of preceding generations1 can thus find time to explore fresh departments of knowledge1 and so transmit its own traditions to the generations that shall follow4 ,now what we observe in objects is chiefly their properties1 or1 what is the same thing1 their fitnesses2 for a property is that which fits an object for a specific place or use4 ,what we observe in persons is their relations to other beings and objects1 with the fitnesses that belong to those relations4 ,what we experience all resolves itself into the fitness or unfitness of persons and objects to one 99another99 or to ourselves4 ,what is transmitted in history and in science is the record of fitnesses or unfitnesses that have been ascertained by observation1 or tested by experience4 ,the progress of knowledge is simply an enlarged acquaintance with the fitnesses of persons and things4 ,he knows the most1 who most fully comprehends the relations in which the beings and objects in the universe stand1 have stood1 and ought to stand toward one another4 ,moreover1 as when we see a fitness within our sphere of action1 we perceive intuitively that it is right to respect it1 wrong to violate it1 our knowledge of right and wrong is co-extensive with our knowledge of persons and things4 ,the more enlightened and cultivated a nation is1 then1 the more does it know as to right and wrong1 whatever may be its standard of practical morality4 ,for instance1 in the most savage condition1 men know1 with reference to certain articles of 99food and drink991 that they are adapted to relieve the cravings of hunger and thirst1 and they know nothing more about them4 ,they are not acquainted with the laws of health1 whether of body or of mind4 ,they therefore eat and drink whatever comes to hand1 without imagining the possibility of wrong-doing in this matter4 ,but1 with the progress of civilization1 they learn that various kinds of food and drink impair the health1 cloud the brain1 enfeeble the working power1 and therefore are unfit for human use2 and no sooner is this known1 than the distinction of right and wrong begins to be recognized1 as to what men eat and drink4 ,the more thorough is the knowledge of the human body and of the action of various substances on its organs and tissues1 the more minute and discriminating will be the perception of fitness or unfitness as to the objects that tempt the appetites1 and the keener will be the sense of right or wrong in their use4 ,for another illustration of the same principle1 we may take 99the relation between parents and children994 ,in the ruder stages of society1 and especially among a nomadic or migratory people1 there is not a sufficient knowledge of the resources of nature or the possibilities of art1 to render even healthy and vigorous life more than tolerable2 while for the infirm and feeble1 life is but a protracted burden and weariness4 ,at the same time1 there is no apprehension of the intellectual and moral worth of human life1 still less1 of the value even of its most painful experiences as a discipline of everlasting benefit4 ,in fine1 life is little more than a mere struggle for existence4 ,what wonder then1 that in some tribes filial piety has been wont to relieve superannuated parents from an existence devoid equally of joy and of hope2 and that in others parental love may have even dictated the exposure--with a view to their perishing--of feeble1 sickly1 and deformed children1 incapable of being nurtured into self-sustaining and self-depending life8 ,but increased conversance with nature and art constantly reveals new capacities of comfort and happiness in life1 and that1 not for the strong alone1 but for the feeble1 the suffering1 the helpless1 so that there are none to whom humanity knows not how to render continued life desirable4 ,at the same time1 a higher culture has made it manifest that the frailest body may be the seat of the loftiest mental activity1 moral excellence1 and spiritual aspiration1 and that in such a body there is often only a surer and more finished education for a higher state of being4 ,filial piety and parental love1 therefore1 do all in their power to prolong the flickering existence of the age-worn and decrepit1 and to cherish with tender care the life which seems born but to die4 ,there is1 then1 to the limited view of the savage1 an apparent fitness in practices which in their first aspect seem crimes against nature2 while increased knowledge develops a real and essential fitness1 in all the refinements and endearments of the most persevering and skilful love4 ,these examples1 which might be multiplied indefinitely1 show 99the dependence of conscience on knowledge991 not for relatively right decisions1 but for verdicts in accordance with the absolute right4 ,there is no subject that can be presented for the action of conscience1 on which1 upon precisely the same principles1 divergent and often opposite courses of conduct may not be dictated by more or less accurate knowledge of the subject and its relations4 ,it will be seen1 also1 that 99with the growth of knowledge1 conscience has a constantly wider scope of action994 ,the number of indifferent acts is thus diminished2 the number of positively right or wrong acts1 increased4 ,an indifferent act is one for the performance of which1 rather than its opposite1 no reason1 involving a question of right or wrong1 can be given4 ,thus1 if the performance or the omission of a specific act be equally fitted to the time1 place1 circumstances1 and persons concerned1 the act is an indifferent one2 or1 if two or more ways of accomplishing a desired end be equally fitted to time1 place1 circumstances1 and persons1 the choice between these ways is1 morally speaking1 a matter of indifference4 ,but with a knowledge both more extensive and more minute of the nature1 relations1 and fitnesses of beings and objects1 we find an increasing number of instances in which acts that seemed indifferent have a clearly perceptible fitness or unfitness1 and thus acquire a distinct moral character as right or wrong4 ,section ,,iii4 ,sources ,of ,knowledge4 #b4 ,law4 99,law is the result of the collective experience991 in part1 of particular communities1 in part1 of the human race as a whole4 ,it encourages1 protects1 or at least permits whatever acts or modes of conduct have been found or believed to be fitting1 in accordance with the nature of things and the well-being of men1 and therefore right2 it forbids and punishes such acts or modes of conduct as have been found or believed to be unfitting1 opposed to nature and to human well-being1 and therefore wrong4 ,it is far from perfect2 it is below the standard of the most advanced minds2 but it represents the average knowledge or belief of the community to which it belongs4 99,the laws99 of any particular state cannot rise far above this average2 for laws unsustained by general opinion could not be executed1 and if existing in the statute-book1 they would not have the nature and force of law1 and would remain on record simply because they had lapsed out of notice4 ,nor can they fall far below this average2 for no government can sustain itself while its legislation fails to meet the demands of the people4 ,while 99law99 thus expresses the average knowledge of belief1 it 99tends to perpetuate its own moral standard994 ,the notions of right which it embodies form a part of the general education4 ,the specific crimes1 vices1 and wrongs which the law marks out for punishment are regarded by young persons1 from their earliest years1 as worthy of the most emphatic censure and condemnation2 while those which the law leaves unpunished are looked upon as comparatively slight and venial4 ,not only so1 the degree of detestation in which a community learns to look on specific crimes and offences is not in proportion to their actual heinousness1 but to the stress of overt ignominy attached to them by legal penalties4 ,instances of this effect of law on opinion will be readily called to mind4 ,thus a common thief loses1 and can hardly regain his position in society2 while the man who by dishonest bankruptcy commits a hundred thefts in one1 can hold his place unchallenged1 even in the ,christian church1 while it is known to every one that he is living--it may be in luxury--on the money he has stolen4 ,the obvious reason is that from time immemorial simple theft has been punished with due1 when not with undue1 severity1 while the comparatively recent crime of fraudulent bankruptcy has as yet been brought very imperfectly within the grasp of penal law4 ,again1 no man of clear moral discernment can doubt that he who consciously and willingly imbrutes himself by intoxication is more blameworthy than he who sells alcoholic liquors without knowing whether they are to be used internally or externally1 moderately or immoderately1 for medicine or for luxury4 ,yet because the latter makes himself liable to fine and imprisonment1 while the former--unless he belong to the unprivileged classes--has legal protection1 instead of the disgraceful punishment he deserves1 there is a popular prejudice against the vender of strong drink1 and a strange tenderness toward the intemperate consumer4 ,yet another instance4 ,there are crimes worse than murder4 ,there are modes of moral corruption and ruin1 whose victims it were mercy to kill4 ,but while the murderer1 if he escape the gallows1 is an outcast and an object of universal abhorrence1 no social ban rests upon him whose crime has been the death of innocence and purity1 yet1 if reached at all by law1 can be compounded by the payment of money4 ,but though law is in many respects an imperfect moral teacher1 and its deficiencies are to be regretted1 its 99educational power99 is strongly felt for good1 especially in communities where the administration of justice is strict and impartial4 ,it is of no little worth that a child grows up with some fixed beliefs as to the turpitude of certain forms of evil1 especially as the positive enactments of the penal law almost always coincide with the wisest judgments of the best men in the community4 ,moreover1 law is progressive in every civilized community1 and in proportion as it approaches the standard of absolute right1 it tends to bring the moral beliefs of the people into closer conformity with the same standard4 ,it is1 then1 a partial and narrow view of law to regard it only or chiefly as the instrument of society for the detection and punishment1 or even for the direct prevention of crime4 ,its far more important function is so to train the greater part of each rising generation1 that certain forms and modes of evil-doing shall never enter into their plans or purposes4 ,the 99civil991 no less than the criminal 99law is a source of knowledge as to the right994 ,the law does not create1 but merely defines the rights appertaining to persons and property4 ,the laws of different nations are1 indeed1 widely different2 but there may be that in their respective histories which makes a difference in the actual rights of citizens1 or their civil codes may present different stages of approach toward the right4 ,thus the laws as to the conveyance and inheritance of property are in some respects unlike in ,france1 ,england1 and the ,united ,states1 and vary considerably in the several ,states of our ,union2 but there generally exist historical reasons for this variation1 and it would be found that the ends of justice are best served1 and the reasonable expectations of the people best met in each community1 by its own methods of procedure4 ,by the law of the land1 then1 we may learn civil rights and obligations1 which we have not the means of ascertaining by our own independent research4 ,it remains for us to speak of the 99factitious rights and wrongs991 supposed to be created by law4 ,of these there are many4 ,thus one mode of transacting a sale or transfer is in itself as good as another2 and it might be plausibly maintained that1 if the business be fairly and honorably conducted1 it matters not whether the legally prescribed forms--sometimes burdensome and costly--be complied with or omitted4 ,the law1 it may be said1 here creates an obligation for which there is no ground in nature or the fitness of things4 ,this we deny4 ,it is intrinsically fitting that all transactions which are liable to dispute or question should be performed in ways in which they can be attested2 and this cannot be effected except by the establishment of uniform methods4 ,he who departs from them performs not only an illegal1 but an immoral act2 and the legal provisions of the kind under discussion have an educational value in enlarging the knowledge of the individual as to the conditions and means of security1 order1 and good understanding in human society4 ,similar considerations apply to the 99crimes created by law994 ,smuggling may serve as an instance4 ,undoubtedly there are smugglers who would not steal2 and their apology is that they are but exercising the rights of ownership upon their own property4 ,but the public must have property1 else its community is dissolved2 government must be able to avail itself of that property1 else its functions are suspended4 ,men need to be taught that the rights of the state are inseparable from those of individuals1 and no less sacred1 and the laws that protect the revenue are among the most efficient means of teaching this lesson4 ,their only defect is that they attach less ignominy to frauds upon the revenue than to other modes of theft1 and thus fail to declare the whole truth1 that there is no moral difference between him who robs the public and him who robs any one of its individual members4 ,section ,,iv4 ,sources ,of ,knowledge4 #c4 ,christianity4 99,religion991 in its relation to ethics1 may be regarded both as 99a source of knowledge991 and as supplying motives for the performance of duty4 ,we are now concerned with it in the former aspect2 and it will be sufficient for our present purpose to ascertain how much 99,christianity99 adds to our knowledge of the fitnesses that underlie all questions of right and duty4 ,we by no means undervalue the beneficent ministry of natural religion in the department of ethics2 but the most sceptical admit that ,christianity includes all of natural religion1 while its disciples claim that it not only teaches natural religion with a certainty1 precision1 and authority which else were wanting1 but imparts a larger and profounder knowledge of ,god and the universe than is within the scope of man's unaided reason4 99,christianity covers the entire field of human duty991 and reveals many fitnesses1 recognized when seen1 but discovered by few or none independently of the teachings and example of its ,founder2 while it gives the emphasis and sanction of a ,divine revelation to many other fitnesses1 easily discoverable1 but liable to be overlooked and neglected4 ,in defining 99the relations of the individual human soul to ,god991 ,christianity opens to our view a department of duty paramount to all others in importance and interest4 ,his fatherly love and care1 his moral government and discipline1 his retributive providence1 define with unmistakable distinctness certain corresponding modes1 in part1 of outward action1 and in still greater part1 of action in that inward realm of thought whence the outward life receives its direction and impulse4 99,the brotherhood of the whole human race991 also1 reveals obligations which would exist on no other ground2 and for the clear and self-evidencing statement of this truth we are indebted solely to ,christianity4 ,the visible differences of race1 color1 culture1 religion1 and customs1 are in themselves dissociating influences4 ,universal charity is impossible while these differences occupy the foreground4 ,slavery was a natural and congenial institution under ,pagan auspices2 nor have we in all ancient extra-,christian literature1 unless it be in ,seneca 7in whom such sentiments may have had indirectly7#c7 a ,christian origin71 a single expression of a fellowship broad enough to embrace all diversities of condition1 much less1 of race4 ,but the ,christian1 so far as he consents to receive the obvious and undoubted import of ,christ's mission and teachings1 must regard all men as1 in nature1 in the paternal care of the ,divine ,providence1 in religious privileges1 rights1 and capacities1 on an equal footing4 ,with this view1 he cannot but perceive the fitness1 and therefore the obligation1 of many forms of social duty1 of enlarged beneficence1 of unlimited philanthropy1 which on any restricted theory of human brotherhood would be neither fitting nor reasonable4 99,the immortality of the soul991 in the next place1 casts a light at once broad and penetrating upon and into every department of duty2 for it is obvious1 without detailed statement1 that the fitnesses1 needs1 and obligations of a terrestrial being of brief duration1 and those of a being in the nursery and first stage of an endless existence1 are very wide apart1--that the latter may find it fitting1 and therefore may deem it right1 to do1 seek1 shun1 omit1 endure1 resign1 many things which to the former are very properly matters of indifference4 ,immortality was1 in a certain sense1 believed before the advent of ,christ1 but not with sufficient definiteness and assurance to occupy a prominent place in any ethical system1 or to furnish the point of view from which all things in the earthly life were to be regarded4 ,indeed1 some of the most virtuous of the ancients1 among others ,epictetus1 than whom there was no better man1 expressly denied the life after death1 and1 of course1 could have had no conception of the aspects of human and earthly affairs as seen in the light of eternity4 ,christianity makes yet another contribution to ethical knowledge in 99the person and character of its ,founder991 exhibiting in him the very fitnesses it prescribes1 showing us1 as it could not in mere precept1 the proportions and harmonies of the virtues1 and manifesting the unapproached beauty and majesty of the gentler virtues17#d7 which in pre-,christian ages were sometimes made secondary1 sometimes repudiated with contempt and derision4 ,we cannot overestimate the importance of this teaching by example4 ,the instances are very numerous1 in which the fitness of a specific mode of conduct can be tested only by experiment2 and ,jesus ,christ tried successfully several experiments in morals that had not been tried before within the memory of man1 and evinced1 in his own person and by the success of his religion1 the superior worth and efficacy of qualities which had not previously borne the name of virtues4 ,christianity still further enlarges our ethical knowledge by declaring the 99universality of moral laws994 ,there are many cases1 in which it might seem to us not only expedient1 but even right1 to set aside some principle acknowledged to be valid in the greater number of instances1 to violate justice or truth for some urgent claim of charity1 or to consent to the performance of a little evil for the accomplishment of a great good4 ,but in all such cases ,christianity interposes its peremptory precepts1 assuring us on authority which the ,christian regards as supreme and infallible1 that there are no exceptions or qualifications to any rule of right2 that the moral law1 in all its parts1 is of inalienable obligation1 and that the greatest good cannot but be the ultimate result of inflexible obedience4 ,that 99,christianity gives a fuller knowledge of the right99 than can be attained independently of its teachings1 is shown by the review of all extra-,christian ethical systems4 ,there is not one of these which does not confessedly omit essential portions of the right1 and hardly one which does not sanction dispositions and modes of conduct confessedly wrong and evil2 while even those who disclaim ,christianity as a ,divine revelation1 fail to detect like omissions and blemishes in the ethics of the ,new ,testament4 ,thus1 though there is hardly a precept of ,jesus ,christ1 the like of which cannot be found in the ethical writings of ,greece1 ,china1 ,india1 or ,persia1 the faultlessness and completeness of his teachings give them a position by themselves1 and are among the strongest internal evidences of their divinity4 ,they are also distinguished from the ethical systems of other teachers by their positiveness4 ,others say1 8,thou shalt not20 ,jesus ,christ says1 8,thou shalt40 ,they forbid and prohibit2 ,he commands4 ,they prescribe abstinence from evil2 ,he1 a constant approach to perfection4 ,buddhism is1 in our time1 often referred to as occupying a higher plane than ,christianity2 but its precepts are all negative1 its virtues are negative1 and its disciple is deemed most nearly perfect1 when in body1 mind1 and soul he has made himself utterly quiescent and inert4 ,christianity1 on the other hand1 enjoins the unresting activity of all the powers and faculties in pursuit of the highest ends4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,,rights ,,and ,,obligations4 ,of the things that are fitting and right1 there are some which1 though they may be described in general terms1 cannot be defined and limited with entire accuracy2 there are others which are 99so obvious and manifest1 or so easily ascertained991 that1 in precise form and measure1 99they may be claimed99 by those to whom they are due1 99and required99 of those from whom they are due4 ,these last are rights1 and the duties which result from them are 99obligations994 ,thus it is right that a poor man should be relieved2 and it is my duty1 so far as ,i can1 to relieve the poor4 ,but this or that individual poor man cannot claim that it is my duty rather than that of my neighbor to minister to his needs1 or that ,i am bound to give him what ,i might otherwise give to his equally needy neighbor4 ,he has no specific right to any portion of my money or goods2 ,i have no specific obligation to give him anything4 ,but if a man has lent me money1 he has a right to as much of my money or goods as will repay him with interest2 and ,i am under an obligation thus to repay him4 ,again1 it is right that in the public highway there should be1 among those who make it their thoroughfare1 mutual accommodation1 courtesy1 and kindness2 but no one man can prescribe the precise distance within which he shall not be approached1 or the precise amount of pressure which may be allowable to his abutters in a crowd4 ,nor yet can the individual citizen occupy the street in such a way as to obstruct those who make use of it4 ,he has no exclusive rights in the street2 nor are others under obligation to yield to him any peculiar privileges4 ,but he has a right to exclude whom he will from his own garden1 and to occupy it in whatever way may please him best2 and his fellow-citizens are under obligation to keep their feet from his alleys and flower-beds1 their hands from his fruit1 and to abstain from all acts that may annoy or injure him in the use and enjoyment of his garden4 99,rights99--with the corresponding obligations--might be divided into 99natural99 and 99legal994 ,but the division is nominal rather than real2 for1 in the first place1 there are no natural rights1 capable of being defined1 which are not in civilized countries under the sanction and protection of law2 secondly1 it is an open question whether some generally recognized rights--as1 for instance1 that of property--exist independently of law2 and1 thirdly1 it may be maintained1 on the other hand1 that law is powerless to create1 competent only to declare rights4 ,one chief agency of law as to rights is exercised in limiting 99natural rights994 ,considered simply in his relation to outward nature1 a man has a manifest right to whatever he can make tributary to his enjoyment or well-being4 ,but his fellow-men have the same right4 ,if1 then1 there be a restricted supply of what he and they may claim by equal right1 the alternative is1 on the one hand1 usurpation or perpetual strife1 or1 on the other1 an adjustment by which each shall yield a part of what he might claim were there no fellow-claimant1 and thus each shall have his proportion of what belongs equally to all4 ,to make this adjustment equitably is the province of law4 ,the problem which it attempts to solve is1 ,how may each individual citizen secure the fullest amount of liberty and of material well-being1 consistent with the admitted or established rights of others8 ,under republican institutions1 this problem presents itself in the simplest form1 society being in principle an equal partnership1 in which no one man can claim a larger dividend than another4 ,but where birth or condition confers certain peculiar rights1 the problem must be so modified1 that the rights conceded to the common citizens shall not interfere with these inherited or vested rights4 ,in either case1 the rights of each member of the community are bounded only by the conterminous rights of others4 ,obligations correspond to rights4 ,each member of the community is under obligation1 always to refrain from encroachment on the rights of others1 and in many cases to aid in securing or defending those rights1 he on like occasions and in similar ways having his own rights protected by others4 ,we will consider separately 99rights appertaining to the person1 to property1 and to reputation994 #a4 99,rights appertaining to the person499 ,the most essential of these is the right to life1 on which of course all else that can be enjoyed is contingent4 ,this right is invaded1 not only by direct violence1 but by whatever may impair or endanger health4 ,the corresponding obligation of the individual member of society is to refrain from all acts1 employments1 or recreations that may imperil life or health1 and of society collectively1 to furnish a police-force adequate to the protection of its members1 to forbid and punish all crimes of violence1 to enact and maintain proper sanitary regulations1 and to suppress such nuisances as may be not only annoying1 but harmful4 ,but the citizen is entitled to protection1 only so long as he refrains from acts by which he puts other lives in peril4 ,if he assault another man with a deadly weapon1 and his own life be taken in the encounter1 the slayer has violated no right1 nay1 so far as moral considerations are concerned1 he is not even the slayer2 for the man who wrongfully puts himself in a position in which another life can be protected only at the peril of his own1 if his own be forfeited1 has virtually committed suicide4 ,nor is the case materially altered1 if a man in performing an unlawful act puts himself in a position in which he may be reasonably supposed to intend violence4 ,thus1 while both law and conscience would condemn me if ,i killed a thief in broad daylight1 in order to protect my property1--if a burglar enter my house by night with no intention of violence1 and yet in the surprise and darkness of the hour ,i have reason to suppose my life and the lives of my family in danger from him1 the law regards my slaying of such a person as justifiable homicide2 and my conscience would acquit me in defending the right to life appertaining to my family and myself1 against one whose intention or willingness to commit violence was to be reasonably inferred from his own unlawful act4 ,society1 through the agency of law1 in some cases and directions limits the right of the individual citizen to life1 and this 99to the contingent benefit of each1--to the absolute benefit of all994 ,so long as men are less than perfect in character and condition1 there must of necessity be some sacrifice of life2 but this sacrifice may be reduced to its minimum by judicious legislation4 ,now1 if without such legislation the percentage of deaths would be numerically much higher than under well-framed laws1 the lives sacrificed under these laws are simply cases in which the right of the individual is made to yield to the paramount rights of the community4 ,thus1 there can be no doubt1 that contagious disease of the most malignant type could1 in many cases1 be more successfully treated at the homes of the patients than in public hospitals4 ,but if by the removal of patients to hospitals the number of cases may be greatly diminished1 and the contagion speedily arrested1 this removal is the right of the community1--yet not under circumstances of needless privation and hardship1 not without the best appliances of comfort1 care1 and skill which money can procure2 for the public can be justified in the exercise of such a right1 only by the extension of the most generous offices of humanity to those who are imperilled for the public good4 ,it is only on similar grounds that the 99death-penalty for murder99 can be justified4 ,the life of the very worst of men should be sacrificed only for the preservation of life2 for if it be unsafe to leave them at liberty1 they may be kept under restraint and duress1 without being wholly cut off from the means of enjoyment and improvement4 ,the primeval custom of the earlier nations required the nearest kinsman of the murdered man to kill the murderer with his own hand1 and in so doing to shed his blood1 which was believed to have a mysterious efficacy in expiating the crime4 ,this form of revenge was greatly checked and restricted by the institutions of ,moses2 it fell into disuse among the ,jews1 with their growth in civilization2 and was certainly included in the entire repeal of the law of retaliation by ,jesus ,christ47#e7 ,but if with the dangerous classes of men the dread of capital punishment is a dissuasive from crimes of violence1 so that the number of murders is less1 and the lives of peaceable citizens are safer1 than were murder liable to some milder penalty1 then it is the undoubted right of the public to confiscate the murderer's right to life1 and thus to sacrifice the smaller number of comparatively worthless lives for the security of the larger number of lives that may be valuable to the community4 ,or again if1 by the profligate use of the pardoning power1 the murderer sentenced to perpetual imprisonment will probably be let loose upon society unreformed1 and with passions which may lead to the repetition of his crime1 it is immeasurably more fitting that he be killed1 than that he be preserved to do farther mischief4 ,yet again1 if there be in the death-penalty for murder an educational force1--if by means of it each new generation is trained in the greater reverence for human life1 and the greater detestation and horror of the crime by which it is destroyed1--then is capital punishment to be retained as a means of preserving an incalculably greater number of lives than it sacrifices4 ,on these grounds1 though in opposition to early and strong conviction1 we are constrained to express the belief that1 in our time and country1 the capital punishment of the murderer is needed for the security of the public1 and is justified as a life-saving measure4 ,in 99enforced military service991 also1 legal authority exposes the lives of a portion of the citizens for the security of the greater number4 ,it is an unquestionable truth that1 in its moral affinities1 war is generated by evil1 is allied to numberless forms of evil1 and has a countless progeny of evil4 ,but it is equally true that war will recur at not unfrequent intervals1 so long as the moral evils from which it springs remain unreformed4 ,such are the complications of international affairs1 that the most righteous and pacific policy may not always shield a people from hostile aggressions2 while insurrection1 sedition1 and civil war may result not only from governmental oppression1 but from the most salutary measures of reform and progress4 ,in such cases1 self-defence on the part of the nation or the government assailed1 is a right and an obligation1 due even in the interest of human life1 and still more1 in behalf of interests more precious than life4 ,moreover1 even in a war of unprovoked aggression1 the aggressive nation does not forfeit the right of self-defence by the unprincipled ambition of its rulers1 and1 war once declared1 its vigorous pursuit may be the only mode of averting disaster or ruin4 ,thus war1 though always involving atrocious wrong on the part of its promoters and abettors1 becomes to the nations involved in it a necessity for which they are compelled to provide4 ,this provision may1 in some cases1 be made by voluntary enlistment2 but in most civilized countries1 it has been found necessary to fill and recruit the army by conscription1 thus forcibly endangering the lives of a portion of the citizens1 in order to avert from the soil and the homes of the people at large the worse calamities of invasion1 devastation1 and conquest4 ,so far as this is necessary1 it is undoubtedly right1 and the lives thus sacrificed are justly due to the safety and well-being of the whole people4 ,but in making this admission1 we would say1 without abatement or qualification1 that war is essentially inhuman1 barbarous1 and opposed to and by the principles and spirit of ,christianity1 and that should the world ever be thoroughly ,christianized1 the ages when war was possible1 will be looked back upon with the same horror with which we now regard cannibalism4 ,associated with the right to life1 and essential to its full enjoyment1 is the 99right to liberty994 ,this includes the right to direct one's own employments and recreations1 to divide and use his time as may seem to him good1 to go where he pleases1 to bestow his vote or his influence in public affairs as he thinks best1 and to express his own opinions orally1 in writing1 or through the press1 without hindrance or molestation4 ,these several rights belong equally to all2 but as they cannot be exercised in full without mutual interference and annoyance1 the common sense of mankind1 uttering itself through law1 permits each individual to enjoy them only so far as he can consistently with the freedom1 comfort1 and well-being of his fellow-citizens4 99,slavery99 is so nearly extirpated from ,christendom1 that it is superfluous to enter into the controversy1 which a few years ago no treatise on ,moral ,philosophy could have evaded4 ,it was defended only by patent sophistry1 and its advocates argued from the fact to the right1 inventing the latter to sustain the former4 99,personal liberty is legally and rightfully restricted99 in the case of minors1 on the ground of their 99immature99 judgment and discretion1 of their natural state of dependence on parents1 and of their usual abode under the parental roof4 ,the age of mature discretion varies very widely1 not only in different races1 but among different individuals of the same race1 as does also the period of emancipation from the controlling influence of parents1 and of an independent and self-sustaining condition in life4 ,but1 as it is impossible for government to institute special inquiries in the case of each individual1 and as1 were this possible1 there would be indefinite room for favoritism and invidious distinctions1 there is an intrinsic fitness in fixing an average age at which parental or quasi-parental tutelage shall cease1 and after which the man shall have full and sole responsibility for his own acts4 ,it is perfectly obvious that the liberty of the insane and feeble-minded ought to be restricted so far as is necessary for their own safety and for that of others4 ,there is1 also1 in most communities1 a provision by which notorious spendthrifts may be put under guardianship1 and thus restrained in what might be claimed as their rightful disposal of their own property4 ,this may be justified on the ground that1 by persistent wastefulness1 they may throw upon the public the charge of their own support and that of their families4 99,imprisonment99 is1 on the part of society1 a measure1 not of revenge1 but of self-defence4 ,the design of this mode of punishment is1 first1 to prevent the speedy repetition of the crime on the part of the person punished2 secondly1 so to work1 either upon his moral nature by confinement1 labor1 and instruction1 or at the worst1 on his fears1 by the dread of repeated and longer restraint1 that he may abstain from crime in future2 and lastly1 to deter those who might otherwise be tempted to crime from exposing themselves to its penal consequences4 ,as regards the prisoner1 he has justly forfeited the right to liberty by employing it in aggression on the rights of others4 ,as regards acts not in themselves wrong1 the freedom of the individual is rightfully restrained1 when it would interfere with the health1 comfort1 or lawful pursuits of his neighbors4 ,thus no man has the right1 either legal or moral1 to establish1 in an inhabited vicinage1 a trade or manufacture which confessedly poisons the air or the water in his neighborhood2 nor has one a moral right 7even if there are technical difficulties in the way of declaring his calling a nuisance71 to annoy his neighbors by an avocation grossly offensive or intolerably noisy4 ,it is on this ground alone that legislation with reference to the ,lord's day can be justified4 ,christians have no right to impose upon ,jews1 ,pagans1 or infidels1 entire cessation of labor1 business1 or recreation on ,sunday1 and the attempt at coercive measures of this kind can only react to the damage of the cause in which they are instituted4 ,but if the majority of the people believe it their duty to observe the first day of the week as a day of rest and devotion1 they have a right to be protected in its observance by the suppression of such kinds1 degrees1 and displays of labor and recreation as would essentially interfere with their employment of the day for its sacred uses4 #b4 99,the right to property99 is an inevitable corollary from the right to liberty2 for this implies freedom to labor at one's will1 and to what purpose can a man labor1 unless he can make the fruit of his labor his own8 ,all property1 except land1 has been created by labor4 ,except where slavery is legalized1 it is admitted that the laborer owns the value he creates4 ,if it be an article made or produced wholly by himself1 it is his to keep1 to use1 to give1 or to sell4 ,if his labor be bestowed on materials not his own1 or if he be one of a body of workmen1 he is entitled to a fair equivalent for the labor he contributes4 99,property in land991 no doubt1 originated in labor4 ,a man was deemed the proprietor of so much ground as he tilled4 ,in a sparse population there could have been no danger of mutual interference2 and in every country1 governments must have been instituted before there was a sufficiently close occupation of the soil to occasion collisions and conflicts among the occupants4 ,the governments of the early ages1 in general1 confirmed the titles founded in productive occupancy1 and treated the unoccupied land as the property of the state1 either to be held in common1 to be ceded to individual owners in reward of loyalty or services1 or to be sold on the public account4 ,it is manifest that the 99security of property is essential to civilization and progress994 ,men would labor only for the needs of the day1 if they could not retain and enjoy the fruits of their labor2 nor would they be at pains to invent or actualize industrial improvements of any kind1 if they had no permanent interest in the results of such improvements4 ,then1 too1 if there were no protection for property1 there could be no accumulation of capital1 and without capital there could be no enterprise1 no combined industries1 no expenditure in faith of a remote1 yet certain profit4 ,nor yet can the ends of a progressive civilization be answered by a community of goods and gains4 ,wherever this experiment has been tried1 it has been attended by a decline of industrial energy and capacity2 and where there has not been absolute failure1 there have been apathy1 stupidity1 and a decreasing standard of intelligence4 ,in fine1 there is in man's bodily and mental powers a certain vis inerti1 which can be efficiently aroused only by the stimulus of personal interest in the results of industry1 ingenuity1 and prudence4 ,the right of property implies 99the right of the owner1 while he lives991 to hold1 enjoy1 or dispose of his possessions in such way as may please him4 ,but his ownership necessarily ceases at death2 and what was his becomes 99rightfully the property of the public994 ,yet in all civilized countries1 it has been deemed fitting that the owner should have the liberty--with certain restrictions--of dictating the disposal of his property after his death1 and also that1 unless alienated by his will 7and in some countries his will notwithstanding71 his property should pass to his family or his nearest kindred4 ,it is believed that it would discourage industry and enfeeble enterprise were their earnings to be treated as public property on the death of the owner2 and that1 on the other hand1 men are most surely trained to and preserved in habits of diligence and thrift1 either by the power of directing the disposal of their property after death1 or by the certainty that they can thereby benefit those whom they hold in the dearest regard4 ,laws with reference to wills and to the succession of estates are not1 then1 limitations of the rights of private property1 but a directory as to what is deemed the best mode of disposing of such property as from time to time accrues to the public4 99,the law limits the right of property99 by appropriating to public uses such portions of it as are needed for the maintenance1 convenience1 and well-being of the body politic4 ,this is done1 in the first place1 by taxation1 which--in order to be just--must be equitable in its mode of assessment1 and not excessive in amount4 ,as to the modes of assessment1 it is obvious that a system which lightens the burden upon the rich1 and thus presses the more heavily on the poor 7as would be the case were a revenue raised on the necessaries of life1 while luxuries were left free71 cannot be justified4 ,on the other hand1 it may be maintained that the rate of taxation might fairly increase with the amount of property2 for a very large proportion of the machinery of government is designed for the protection of property1 and the more property an individual has1 the less capable is he of protecting his various interests by his own personal care1 and the more is he in need of well-devised and faithfully executed laws4 ,taxation excessive in amount is simply legalized theft4 ,sinecures1 supernumerary offices1 needless and costly formalities in the transaction of public business1 journeys and festivities at the public charge1 buildings designed for ostentation rather than for use1 have been so long tolerated in the municipal1 state1 and national administrations1 that they may seem inseparable from our system of government2 but they imply gross dishonesty on the part of large numbers of our public servants1 and guilty complicity in it on the part of many more4 ,under a system of direct taxation1 assessments can be more equitably made1 and their expenditure will be more carefully watched1 than in the case of indirect taxation2 while the latter method is more likely to find favor with those who hold or seek public office1 as encouraging a larger freedom of expenditure1 and supporting a larger number of needless functionaries at the public cost4 ,the law1 also1 authorizes 99the appropriation of specific portions of property to public uses991 as for streets1 roads1 aqueducts1 and public grounds1 and even in aid of private enterprises in which the community has a beneficial interest1 as of canals1 bridges1 and railways4 ,this is necessary1 and therefore right4 ,it is obvious that1 but for this1 the most essential facilities and improvements might be prevented1 or burdened with unreasonable costs1 by the obstinacy or cupidity of individuals4 ,the conditions under which such use of private property is justified are1 that the improvement proposed be for the general good1 that a fair compensation be given for the property taken1 and that as to both these points1 in case of a difference of opinion1 the ultimate appeal shall be to an impartial tribunal or arbitration4 #c4 99,the right to reputation499 ,every man has a right to the reputation he deserves1 and is under obligation to respect that right in every other man4 ,this obligation is violated1 not only by the fabrication of slander1 but equally by its repetition1 unless the person who repeats it knows it to be true1 and also by silence and seeming acquiescence in an injurious report1 if one knows or believes it to be false4 ,but has a man a right to a better reputation than he deserves8 ,certainly not1 in a moral point of view2 and if men could be generally known to be what they are1 few would fail to become what they would wish to seem4 ,yet the law admits the truth of a slanderous charge in justification of the slanderer1 only when it can be shown that the knowledge of the truth is for the public benefit4 ,there are good reasons for this attitude of the law1 without reference to any supposed rights of the justly accused party4 ,there is1 in many instances1 room for a reasonable doubt as to evil reports that seem authentic1 and in many more instances there may be extenuating circumstances which form a part of the case1 though almost never1 of the report4 ,then1 too1 the family and kindred of the person defamed may incur1 through true1 yet useless reports to his discredit1 shame1 annoyance1 and damage1 which they do not merit4 ,evil reports1 also1 even if true1 disturb the peace of the community1 and often provoke violent retaliation4 ,the wanton circulation of them1 therefore1 if a luxury to him who gives them currency1 is a luxury indulged at the expense of the public1 and he ought to be held liable for all that it may cost4 ,finally1 and above all1 the slanderer becomes a nuisance to the community1 not only by his reports of real or imagined wrong and evil1 but by the degradation of his own character1 which can hardly remain above the level of his social intercourse4 ,by the law1 defamation and libel are1 very justly1 liable both to 99criminal prosecution991 as offences against the public1 and to 99action for damages99 by civil process1 on the obvious ground that the injury of a man's character tends to impair his success in business1 his pecuniary credit1 and his comfortable enjoyment of his property4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,,motive1 ,,passion1 ,,and ,,habit4 ,the appetites1 desires1 and affections are1 as has been said1 the 99proximate motives99 of action4 ,the perception of expediency and the sense of right act1 not independently of these motives1 but upon them and through them1 checking some1 stimulating others4 ,thus they1 both1 restrain the appetites1 the former1 so far as prudence requires2 the latter1 in subserviency to the more noble elements of character4 ,the former directs the desires toward worthy1 but earthly objects2 the latter works most efficiently through the benevolent affections1 as exercised toward ,god and man4 ,exterior motives are of a secondary order1 acting not directly upon the will1 but influencing it indirectly1 through the springs of action1 or through the principles which direct and govern them4 99,the action of exterior motives99 takes place in three different ways4 #a4 ,when they are in harmony with any predominant appetite1 desire1 or affection1 they at once intensify it1 and prompt acts by which it may be gratified4 ,thus1 for instance1 a sumptuously spread table gives the epicure a keener appetite1 and invites him to its free indulgence4 ,the opportunity of a potentially lucrative1 though hazardous investment1 excites the cupidity of the man who prizes money above all things else1 and tempts him to incur the doubtful risk4 ,the presence of the object of love or hatred adds strength to the affection1 and induces expressions or acts of kindness or malevolence4 #b4 ,an exterior motive opposed to the predominant spring of action often starts that spring into vigorous and decisive activity1 and makes it thenceforth stronger and more imperative4 ,it is thus that remonstrances1 obstacles1 and interposing difficulties not infrequently render sensual passion more rabid2 while temptation1 by the acts of resistance which it elicits1 nourishes the virtue it assails4 #c4 ,an exterior motive may have a sufficient stress and cogency to call forth into energetic action some appetite1 desire1 or affection previously dormant or feeble1 thus to repress the activity of those which before held sway1 and so to produce a fundamental change in the character4 ,in this way the sudden presentation of vice1 in attractive forms1 may give paramount sway to passions which had previously shown no signs of mastery2 and1 in like manner1 a signal experience of peril1 calamity1 deliverance1 or unexpected joy may call forth the religious affections1 and invest them with enduring supremacy over a soul previously surrendered to appetite1 inferior desires1 or meaner loves4 99,an undue influence99 in the formation or change of character 99is often ascribed to exterior motives499 ,they are oftener the consequence than the cause of character4 ,men1 in general1 exercise more power over their surroundings1 than their surroundings over them4 ,a very large proportion of the circumstances which seem to have a decisive influence upon us1 are of our own choice1 and we might--had we so willed--have chosen their opposites4 ,a virtuous person seldom finds it necessary to breathe a vicious atmosphere4 ,a willingness to be tempted is commonly the antecedent condition to one's being led into temptation4 ,sympathy1 example1 and social influences are second in their power1 whether for good or for evil1 to no other class of exterior motives2 and there are few who cannot choose their own society1 and who do not choose it in accordance with their elective affinities4 ,it is true1 indeed1 that the choice of companions of doubtful virtue is often the first outward sign of vicious proclivities2 while a tenacious adherence to the society of the most worthy not infrequently precedes any very conspicuous development of personal excellence2 but in either case the choice of friends indicates the predominant springs of action1 and the direction in which the character has begun to grow4 ,so far then is man from being under the irresistible control of motives from without1 that these motives are in great part the results and the tokens of his own voluntary agency4 ,christianity justly claims preminence1 not only as a source of knowledge as to the right1 but equally as presenting the most influential and persistent motives to right conduct4 ,these motives we have in its endearing and winning manifestation of the ,divine fatherhood by ,jesus ,christ2 in his own sacrifice1 death1 and undying love for man2 in the assurance of forgiveness for past wrongs and omissions1 without which there could be little courage for future well-doing2 in the promise of ,divine aid in every right purpose and worthy endeavor2 in the certainty of a righteous retribution in the life to come2 and in institutions and observances designed and adapted to perpetuate the memory of the salient facts1 and to 99renew99 at frequent intervals the recognition of the essential truths1 which give the religion its name and character4 ,the desires and affections1 stimulated and directed by these motives1 are incapable of being perverted to evil1 while desires with lower aims and affections for inferior objects are always liable to be thus perverted4 ,these religious motives1 too1 resting on the ,infinite and the ,eternal1 are of inexhaustible power2 if felt at all1 they must of necessity be felt more strongly than all other motives2 and they cannot fail to be adequate to any stress of need1 temptation1 or trial4 99 99 99 99 99 99,passion99 implies a passive state1--a condition in which the will yields without resistance to some dominant appetite1 desire1 or affection1 under whose imperious reign reason is silenced1 considerations of expediency and of right suppressed1 and exterior counteracting motives neutralized4 ,it resembles insanity in the degree in which the actions induced by it are the results of unreasoning impulse1 and in the unreal and distorted views which it presents of persons1 objects1 and events4 ,it differs from insanity1 mainly in its being a self-induced madness1 for which1 as for drunkenness1 the sufferer is morally accountable1 and in yielding to which1 as in drunkenness1 he1 by suffering his will to pass beyond the control of reason1 makes himself responsible1 both legally and morally1 for whatever crimes or wrongs he commits in this state of mental alienation4 99,there is no appetite1 desire1 or affection which may not become a passion991 and there is no passion which does not impair the sense of right1 and interfere with the discharge of duty4 ,the appetites1 the lower desires1 the malevolent affections1 and1 not infrequently1 love1 when they become passions1 have their issues in vice and crime4 ,the nobler desires and affections when made passions1 may not lead to positive evil1 but can hardly fail to derange the fitting order of life1 and to result in the dereliction of some of its essential duties4 ,thus1 the passion for knowledge may render one indifferent to his social and religious obligations4 ,philanthropy1 when a passion1 overlooks nearer for more remote claims of duty1 and is very prone to omit self-discipline and self-culture in its zeal for world-embracing charities4 ,even the religious affections1 when they assume the character of passions1 either1 on the one hand1 are kindled into wild fanaticism1 or1 on the other1 lapse into a self-absorbed quietism1 which forgets outside duties in the luxury of devout contemplation2 and though either of these is to be immeasurably preferred to indifference1 they both are as immeasurably inferior to that piety1 equally fervent and rational1 which neglects neither man for ,god1 nor ,god for man1 and which remains mindful of all human and earthly relations1 fitnesses1 and duties1 while at the same time it retains its hold of faith1 hope1 and habitual communion1 on the higher life4 99 99 99 99 99 99,habit99 also involves the suspension of reason and motive in the performance of individual acts2 but it differs from passion in that its acts were in the beginning prompted by reason and motive4 ,indeed1 it may be plausibly maintained that in each habitual act there is a virtual remembrance--a recollection too transient to be itself remembered--of the reasoning or motive which induced the first act of the series4 ,in some cases the habitual act is performed1 as it is said1 unconsciously1 certainly with a consciousness so evanescent as to leave no trace of itself4 ,in other cases the act is performed consciously1 but as by a felt necessity1 in consequence of an uneasy sensation--analogous to hunger and thirst--which can be allayed in this way only4 ,under this last head we may class1 in the first place1 habits of criminal indulgence1 including the indulgence of morbid and depraved appetite2 secondly1 many of those morally indifferent habits1 which constitute a large portion of a regular and systematic life2 and thirdly1 habits of virtuous conduct1 of industry1 of punctuality1 of charity4 99,habit bears a most momentous part in the formation and growth of character991 whether for evil or for good4 ,it is in the easy and rapid formation of habit that lies the imminent peril of single acts of vicious indulgence4 ,the first act is performed with the determination that it shall be the last of its kind4 ,but of all examples one's own is that which he is most prone to follow1 and of all bad examples one's own is the most dangerous4 ,the precedent once established1 there is the strongest temptation to repeat it1 still with a conscious power of self-control1 and with the resolution to limit the degree and to arrest the course of indulgence1 so as to evade the ultimate disgrace and ruin to which it tends4 ,but before the pre-determined limit is reached1 the indulgence has become a habit2 its suspension is painful2 its continuance or renewal seems essential to comfortable existence2 and even in those ultimate stages when its very pleasure has lapsed into satiety1 and then into wretchedness1 its discontinuance threatens still greater wretchedness1 because the craving is even more intense when the enjoyment has ceased4 99,the beneficent agency of habit no less deserves emphatic notice499 ,its office in practical morality is analogous to that of labor-saving inventions in the various departments of industry4 ,a machine by which ten men can do the work that has been done by thirty1 disengages the twenty for new modes of productive labor1 and thus augments the products of industry and the comfort of the community4 ,a good habit is a labor-saving instrument4 ,the cultivating of any specific virtue to such a degree that it shall become an inseparable and enduring element of the character demands1 at the outset1 vigilance1 self-discipline1 and1 not infrequently1 strenuous effort4 ,but when the exercise of that virtue has become habitual1 and therefore natural1 easy1 and essential to one's conscious well-being1 it ceases to task the energies2 it no longer requires constant watchfulness2 its occasions are met spontaneously by the appropriate dispositions and acts4 ,the powers which have been employed in its culture are thus set free for the acquisition of yet other virtues1 and the formation of other good habits4 ,herein lies the secret of progressive goodness1 of an ever nearer approach to a perfect standard of character4 ,the primal virtues are first made habits of the unceasing consciousness and of the daily life1 and the moral power no longer needed for these is then employed in the cultivation of the finer traits of superior excellence1--the shaping of the delicate lines1 roundings1 and proportions1 which constitute the beauty of holiness1 the symmetry and grace of character that win not only abounding respect and confidence1 but universal admiration and love4 99,what has been said of habit1 is true not only as to outward acts1 but equally as to wonted directions and currents of thought1 study1 reflection1 and reverie499 ,it is mainly through successive stages of habit that the mind grows in its power of application1 research1 and invention4 ,it is thus that the spirit of devotion is trained to ever clearer realization of sacred truth and a more fervent love and piety4 ,it is thus that minds of good native capacity lose their apprehensive faculties and their working power2 and thus1 also1 that moral corruption often1 no doubt1 takes place before the evil desires cherished within find the opportunity of actualizing themselves in a depraved life4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,,virtues1 ,,and ,,the ,,virtues4 99,the term virtue99 is employed in various senses1 which1 though they cover a wide range1 are yet very closely allied to one another1 and to the initial conception in which they all have birth4 ,its primitive signification1 as its structure7#f7 indicates1 is manliness4 ,now what preminently distinguishes1 not so much the human race from the lower animals1 as the full-grown and strong man from the feebler members of his own race1 is the power of resolute1 strenuous1 persevering conflict and resistance4 ,it is the part of a man worthy of the name to maintain his own position1 to hold his ground against all invaders1 to show a firm front against all hostile force1 and to prefer death to conquest4 ,all this is implied in the ,greek and ,roman idea of virtue1 and is included in the ,latin virtus1 when it is used with reference to military transactions1 so that its earliest meaning was1 simply1 military prowess4 ,but with the growth of ethical philosophy1 and especially with the cultivation by the ,stoics of the sterner and hardier traits of moral excellence1 men learned that there was open to them a more perilous battle-ground1 a severer conflict1 and a more glorious victory1 than in mere physical warfare1--that there was a higher type of manliness in self-conquest1 in the resistance and subdual of appetite and passion1 in the maintenance of integrity and purity under intense temptation and amidst vicious surroundings1 than in the proudest achievements of military valour4 ,virtue thus came to mean1 not moral goodness in itself considered1 but goodness militant and triumphant47#g7 ,but 99words which have a complex signification always tend to slough off a part of their meaning992 and1 especially1 words that denote a state or property1 together with its mode of growth or of manifestation1 are prone to drop the latter1 even though it may have given them root and form4 ,thus the term virtue is often used to denote the qualities that constitute human excellence1 without direct reference to the conflict with evil1 whence it gets its name1 and in which those qualities have their surest growth and most conspicuous manifestation4 ,there is still1 however1 a tacit reference to temptation and conflict in our use of the term4 ,though we employ it to denote goodness that has stood no very severe test1 we use it only where such a test may be regarded as possible4 ,though we call a man virtuous who has been shielded from all corrupt examples and influences1 and has had no inducements to be otherwise than good1 we do not apply the epithet to the little child who cannot by any possibility have been exposed to temptation4 ,nor yet would we apply it to the perfect purity and holiness of the ,supreme ,being1 who 8cannot be tempted with evil40 ,virtue then1 in its more usual sense at the present time1 denotes 99conduct in accordance with the right991 or with the fitness of things1 on the part of one who has the power to do otherwise4 ,but in this sense there are few1 if any1 perfectly virtuous men4 ,there are1 perhaps1 none who are equally sensitive to all that the right requires1 and it is often the deficiencies of a character that give it its reputation for distinguished excellence in some one form of virtue1 the vigilance1 self-discipline1 and effort which might have sustained the character in a well-balanced mediocrity being so concentrated upon some single department of duty as to excite high admiration and extended praise4 ,there may be a deficient sensitiveness to some classes of obligations1 while yet there is no willing or conscious violation of the right1 and in such cases the character must be regarded as virtuous4 ,but if in any one department of duty a person is consciously false to his sense of right1 even though in all other respects he conforms to the right1 he cannot be deemed virtuous1 nor can there be any good ground for assurance that he may not1 with sufficient inducement1 violate the very obligations which he now holds in the most faithful regard4 ,this is what is meant by that saying of ,st4 ,james1 8,whosoever shall keep the whole law1 and yet offend in one point1 is guilty of all10--not that he who commits a single offence through inadvertency or sudden temptation1 is thus guilty2 but he who willingly and deliberately violates the right as to matters in which he is the most strongly tempted to wrong and evil1 shows an indifference to the right which will lead him to observe it only so long and so far as he finds it convenient and easy so to do4 ,here we are naturally led to inquire whether there is any essential 99connection between virtue and piety991--between the faithful discharge of the common duties of life and loving loyalty toward the ,supreme ,being4 ,on this subject extreme opinions have been held1 sceptics and unbelievers1 on the one side1 ,christians with a leaven of antinomianism on the other1 maintaining the entire independence of virtue on piety2 while ,christians of the opposite tendency have represented them1 in spite of ample evidence to the contrary1 as inseparable4 ,we shall find1 on examination1 that they are separable and independent1 yet auxiliary each to the other4 ,virtue is conduct in accordance with the right1 and we have seen that right and wrong1 as moral distinctions1 depend not on the ,divine nature1 will or law17#h7 but on the inherent1 necessary conditions of being4 ,the atheist cannot escape or disown them4 ,whatever exists--no matter how it came into being--must needs have its due place1 affinities1 adaptations1 and uses4 ,an intelligent dweller among the things that are1 cannot but know something of their fitnesses and harmonies1 and so far as he acts upon them cannot but feel the obligation to recognize their fitnesses1 and thus to create or restore their harmonies4 ,even to the atheist1 vice is a violation of fitnesses which he knows or may know4 ,it is opposed to his conscientious judgment4 ,he has with regard to it an inevitable sense of wrong4 ,we can1 therefore1 conceive of an atheist's being rigidly virtuous1 and that on principle4 ,though among the ancient ,stoics there were some eminently devout men1 there were others1 men of impregnable virtue1 whose theology was too vague and meagre to furnish either ground or nourishment for piety4 ,while1 therefore1 in the mutual and reciprocal fitnesses that pervade the universe we find demonstrative evidence of the being1 unity1 and moral perfectness of the ,creator1 we are constrained to acknowledge the possibility of these fitnesses being recognized in the conduct of life by those who do not follow them out to the great truths of theology to which they point and lead4 ,but1 on the other hand1 where there is a clear knowledge of1 or an undoubting belief in the being and providence of ,god1 and especially for persons who receive ,christianity as a revelation of the truth1 though1 as an affection1 piety is independent of virtue1 the duties of piety are an essential part of virtue4 ,if ,god is1 we stand in definable relations to ,him1 and those relations are made definite through ,christianity4 ,those relations have their fitnesses1 and we see not how he can be a thoroughly virtuous man1 who1 discerning these fitnesses with the understanding1 fails to recognize them in conduct4 ,conscience can take cognizance only of the fitnesses which the individual man knows or believes2 but it does take cognizance of all the fitnesses which he knows or believes4 ,virtue may coexist with a very low standard of emotional piety2 but it cannot coexist1 in one who believes the truths of religion1 with blasphemy1 irreverence1 or the conscious violation or neglect of religious obligations4 ,he who is willingly false to his relations with the ,supreme ,being1 needs only adequate temptation to make him false to his human relations1 and to the fitnesses of his daily life4 ,moreover1 while1 as we have said1 virtue may exist where there is but little emotional piety1 virtue can hardly fail to cherish piety4 ,loyalty of conduct deepens loyalty of spirit2 obedience nourishes love2 he who faithfully does the will of ,god can hardly fail to become worshipful and devout2 and while men are more frequently led by emotional piety to virtue1 there can be no doubt that with many the process is reversed1 and virtue leads to emotional piety4 ,then again1 we have seen that religion supplies the most efficient of all motives to a virtuous life1--motives adequate to a stress of temptation and trial which suffices to overpower and neutralize all inferior motives4 99 99 99 99 99 ,virtue is one and indivisible in its principle and essence1 yet 99in its external manifestations presenting widely different aspects991 and eliciting a corresponding diversity in specific traits of character4 ,thus1 though intrinsic fitness be equally the rule of conduct at a pleasure-party and by a pauper's bed-side1 the conduct of the virtuous man will be widely different on these two occasions2 and not only so1 but with the same purpose of fidelity to what is fitting and right1 his dispositions1 aims1 and endeavors on these two occasions will have little or nothing in common except the one pervading purpose4 ,hence virtue may under different forms assume various names1 and may thus be broken up into separate virtues4 ,these are many or few1 according as we distribute in smaller or larger groups the occasions for virtuous conduct1 or analyze with greater or less minuteness the sentiments and dispositions from which it proceeds4 99,the cardinal99799#i99799 virtues99 are the hinge-virtues1 those on which the character hinges or turns1 those1 the possession of all which1 would constitute a virtuous character1 while the absence of any one of them would justly forfeit for a man the epithet virtuous4 ,there are other less salient and essential qualities--minor virtues--the possession of which adds to the symmetry1 beauty1 and efficiency of the character1 but which one may lack1 and yet none the less deserve to be regarded as a virtuous man4 ,thus1 justice is a cardinal virtue2 gentleness1 one of the lesser rank4 ,we propose to adopt as a 99division of the virtues99 one which recognizes four cardinal virtues1 corresponding to four classes under which may be comprehended all the fitnesses of man's condition in this world1 and the duties proceeding from them respectively47#aj7 ,there are fitnesses and duties appertaining1 first1 to one's own being1 nature1 capacities1 and needs2 secondly1 to his relations to his fellow-beings2 thirdly1 to his disposition and conduct with reference to external objects and events beyond his control2 and fourthly1 to his arrangement1 disposal1 and use of objects under his control4 ,it is difficult to find names which in their common use comprehend severally all the contents of each of these four divisions2 but yet they are all comprised within the broadest significance of the terms ,prudence1 ,justice1 ,fortitude1 and ,order4 ,thus employed1 ,prudence1 or providence1 includes all the duties of self-government and self-culture2 ,justice denotes all that is due to ,god and man1 embracing piety and benevolence2 ,fortitude1 which is but a synonyme for strength1 is an appropriate general name for every mode1 whether of defiance1 resistance1 or endurance1 in which man shows himself superior to his inevitable surroundings2 and ,order is extended to all subjects in which the question of duty is a question of time1 place1 or measure4 99,we can conceive of no right feeling1 purpose1 or action1 which does not come under one of these heads499 ,it is obvious1 too1 that these are all cardinal virtues1 not one of which could be wanting or grossly deficient in a virtuous man4 ,for1 in the first place1 he who omits were it only the duties of self-culture1 and thus leaves himself ignorant of what he ought to know1 takes upon himself the full burden1 blame1 and penalty of whatever wrong he may commit in consequence of needless ignorance2 secondly1 he who is willingly unfaithful in any of his relations to ,god or man1 cannot by any possibility be worthy of approbation2 nor1 thirdly1 can he be so1 who is the slave1 not the master1 of his surroundings2 while1 fourthly1 fitnesses of time1 place1 and measure are so essential to right-doing that the violation of them renders what else were right1 wrong4 ,moreover1 99each of these four virtues991 if genuine and highly developed1 99implies the presence of all the others994 #a4 ,there is a world of wisdom in the question asked in the ,hebrew ,scriptures3 8,have all the workers of iniquity no knowledge80 ,there is in all wrong-doing either ignorance1 or temporary hallucination or blindness1 and imprudence is but ignorance or delusion carried into action4 ,did we see clearly the certain bearings and consequences of actions1 we should need no stronger dissuasive from all evil1 no more cogent motive to every form of virtue4 #b4 ,there is no conceivable duty which may not be brought under the head of justice1 either to ,god or to man2 for our duties to ourselves are due to ,god who has ordained them1 and to man whom we are the more able to benefit1 the more diligent we are in self-government and self-improvement4 #c4 ,our wrong-doing of every kind comes from our yielding to outward things instead of rising above them2 and he who truly lives above the world1 can hardly fail to do all that is right and good in it4 #d4 ,perfect order--the doing of everything in the right time1 place1 and measure--would imply the presence of all the virtues1 and would include all their work4 ,with this explanation we shall use the terms 99,prudence991 99,justice991 99,fortitude991 and 99,order99 in the titles of the four following chapters1 at the same time claiming the liberty of employing these words1 as we shall find it convenient1 in the more restricted sense which they commonly bear4 ,chapter ,,ix4 ,,prudence2 ,,or ,,duties ,,to ,,one',s ,,self4 ,can there be 99duties to one's self991 which are of absolute obligation8 ,duties are dues1 and they imply two parties1--one who owes them1 and one to whom they are due1--the debtor and the creditor4 ,but the creditor may1 at his will1 cancel the debt1 and release the debtor4 ,in selfward duties1 then1 why may ,i not1 as creditor1 release myself as debtor8 ,why may ,i not--so long as ,i violate no obligation to others--be1 at my own pleasure1 idle or industrious1 self-indulgent or abstinent1 frivolous or serious8 ,why1 if life seem burdensome to me1 may ,i not relieve myself of the trouble of living8 ,the answer is1 that to every object in the universe with which ,i am brought into relation ,i owe its fit use1 and that no being in the universe1 not even the ,omnipotent1 can absolve me from this obligation4 ,now my several powers and faculties1 with reference to my will1 are objects on which my volitions take effect1 and ,i am bound to will their fit uses1 and to abstain from thwarting or violating those uses1 on the same ground on which ,i am bound to observe and reverence the fitnesses of objects that form no part of my personality4 ,moreover1 this earthly life is1 with reference to my will1 an object on which my volitions may take effect2 ,i learn--if not by unaided reason1 from the ,christian revelation--that my life has its fit uses1 both in this world and in preparation for a higher state of being1 and that these uses are often best served by the most painful events and experiences2 and ,i thus find myself bound to take the utmost care of my life1 even when it seems the least worth caring for4 ,the 99duties due to one's self99 are self-preservation1 the attainment of knowledge1 self-control1 and moral self-culture4 ,section ,i4 ,self-,preservation4 ,the 99uses of life991 both to ourselves1 and to others through us1 suffice1 as we have said1 to render its preservation a duty1 enjoined upon us by the law of fitness4 ,this duty is violated not only by suicide--against which it is useless to reason1 for its victims in modern ,christendom are seldom of sound mind--but equally by needless and wanton exposure to peril4 ,such exposure is frequently incurred in reckless feats of strength or daring1 sometimes consummated in immediate death1 and still oftener in slower self-destruction by disease4 ,there are1 no doubt1 occasions when self-preservation must yield to a higher duty1 and humanity has made no important stage of progress without the free sacrifice of many noble lives2 but because it may be a duty to give life in the cause of truth or liberty1 it by no means follows that one has a right to throw it away for the gratification of vanity1 for a paltry wager1 or to win the fame of an accomplished athlete4 ,the duty of self-preservation includes1 of course1 99a reasonable care for health991 without which the uses of life are essentially restricted and impaired4 ,here a just mean must be sought and adhered to4 ,there is1 on the one hand1 an excessive care of the body1 which1 if it does not enfeeble the mind1 distracts it from its true work1 and makes the spiritual nature a mere slave of the material organism4 ,this solicitude is sometimes so excessive as to defeat its own purpose1 by creating imaginary diseases1 and then making them real2 and the number is by no means small of those who have become chronic invalids solely by the pains they have taken not to be so4 ,on the other hand1 there is a carelessness as to dress and diet1 to which the strongest constitution must at length yield2 and the intense consciousness of strength and vigor1 which tempts one to deem himself invulnerable1 not infrequently is the cause of life-long infirmity and disability4 ,of the cases of prolonged and enfeebling disease1 probably more are the result of avoidable than of unavoidable causes1 and if we add to these the numerous instances in which the failure of health is to be ascribed to hereditary causes which might have been avoided1 or to defective sanitary arrangements that may be laid to the charge of the public1 we have an enormous amount of serviceable life needlessly wasted for all purposes of active usefulness2 while for the precious examples of patience1 resignation1 and cheerful endurance1 the infirmities and sufferings incident to the most favorable sanitary conditions might have been amply sufficient4 ,there are1 no doubt1 such wide diversities of constitution and temperament that 99no specific rules of self-preservation can be laid down992 and as regards diet1 sleep1 and exercise1 habit may render the most unlike methods and times equally safe and beneficial4 ,but wholesome food in moderate quantity1 sleep long enough for rest and refreshment1 exercise sufficient to neutralize the torpifying influence of sedentary pursuits1 and these1 though not with slavish uniformity1 yet with a good degree of regularity1 may be regarded as essential to a sound working condition of body and mind4 ,the same may be said of the unstinted use of water1 which has happily become a necessity of high civilization1 of pure air1 the worth of which as a sanitary agent is practically ignored by the major part of our community1 and of the direct light of heaven1 the exclusion of which from dwellings from motives of economy1 while it may spare carpets and curtains1 wilts and depresses their owners4 ,these topics are inserted in a treatise on ethics1 because whatever has a bearing on health1 and thus on the capacity for usefulness selfward and manward which constitutes the whole value of this earthly life1 is of grave moral significance4 ,if the preservation of life is a duty1 then all hygienic precautions and measures are duties1 and as such they should be treated by the individual moral agent1 by parents1 guardians1 and teachers1 and by the public at large4 99,self-preservation is endangered by poverty499 ,in the lack or precariousness of the means of subsistence1 the health of the body is liable to suffer2 and even where there is not absolute want1 but a condition straitened in the present and doubtful as to the future1 the mind loses much of its working power1 and life is deprived of a large portion of its utility4 ,hence the duty of industry and economy on the part of those dependent on their own exertions4 ,it is not a man's duty to be rich1 though he who in acquiring wealth takes upon himself its due obligations and responsibilities1 is a public benefactor2 but it is every man's duty to shun poverty1 if he can1 and he who makes or keeps himself poor by his own indolence1 thriftlessness1 or prodigality1 commits a sin against his own life1 which he curtails as to its capacity of good1 and against society1 which has a beneficial interest in the fully developed life of all its members4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,attainment ,of ,knowledge4 ,inasmuch as knowledge1 real or supposed1 must needs precede every act of the will1 and as the adaptation of our actions to our purposes depends on the accuracy of our knowledge1 99it is intrinsically fitting 9999 that our cognitive powers should be thoroughly developed and trained1 and diligently employed499 ,especially is this fitting1 because--as has been already shown--it is through knowledge alone that we can bring our conduct into conformity with the absolute right1 and there is nothing within the range of our possible knowledge1 which may not become in some way connected with our agency as moral beings4 ,it is of prime importance that what we seem to know we know accurately2 and as it is through the senses that we acquire our knowledge1 not only of the outward objects with which we are daily conversant1 but of other minds than our own1 99the education of the senses99 is an obvious duty4 ,there are few so prolific sources of social evil1 injustice1 and misery1 as the falsehood of persons who mean to tell the truth1 but who see or hear only in part1 and supply the deficiencies of perception by the imagination4 ,in the acquisition of knowledge of the highest interest and importance this same hindrance is one of the most frequent obstacles4 ,the careless eye and the heedless ear waste for many minds a large portion of the time ostensibly given to serious pursuits1 and render their growth pitifully slow and scanty as compared with their means of culture4 ,the senses may1 especially in early life1 be trained to alertness and precision1 so that they shall carry to the mind true and full reports of what they see and hear2 and it is only by such training that the perceptive faculties can accomplish the whole work for which they are designed and fitted4 ,there are1 also1 interior senses1 99apprehensive powers of the mind991 which equally crave culture1 and which depend for their precision and force on careful education and diligent use4 ,mere observation1 experience1 or study1 cannot give knowledge that will be of any avail4 ,one may have a largely and variously stocked memory1 and yet be unable to employ its contents to his own advantage or to the benefit of others4 ,indeed1 there are minds that are paralyzed by being overloaded1--by taking in freight faster than they have room for it4 ,it is only materials which the mind has made its own1 incorporated into its substance1 that it can fully utilize4 ,knowledge must be acted upon by the understanding1 the reason1 the judgment1 before it can be transmuted into wisdom1 and employed either in the acquisition of new truth or in the conduct of life4 ,mental activity1 then1 is a duty2 for if we are bound to preserve life1 by parity of reason1 we are bound to improve its quality and increase its quantity1 and this cannot be done unless the intellectual powers are strengthened by diligent exercise1 as well as nourished by the facts and truths which are the raw material of wisdom4 ,the fit 99objects of knowledge99 vary indefinitely with one's condition in life4 ,things in themselves trivial or evanescent may1 under certain circumstances1 claim our careful attention and thorough cognizance4 ,we ought1 on the one hand1 to know all we can about matters concerning which we must speak or act1 and1 on the other hand1 to refrain from voluntarily speaking or acting in matters of which we are ignorant4 ,thus our social relations and our daily intercourse may render it incumbent on us to obtain for current use a large amount of accurate knowledge which is not worth our remembering4 ,then a man's profession1 stated business1 or usual occupation opens a large field of knowledge1 with which and with its allied provinces it is his manifest duty to become conversant to his utmost ability2 for the genuineness and value of his work must be in a great degree contingent on his intelligence4 ,at the same time1 every man is bound to make his profession worthy of respect2 in failing to do so1 he wrongs and injures the members of his profession collectively2 and no calling can obtain respect1 if those who pursue it show themselves uncultivated and ignorant4 ,thus far1 then1 should knowledge be extended on grounds of practical utility4 ,beyond and above this range1 there is an unlimited realm of truth1 the knowledge of which is inestimably precious for the higher culture of the mind and character4 ,in this realm1 of which only an infinitesimal portion can be conquered during an earthly lifetime1 there is no unfruitful region1--there is no department of nature1 of psychology1 or of social science1 through which the mind may not be expanded1 exalted1 energized1 led into more intimate relations with the ,supreme ,intelligence1 endowed with added power of beneficent agency4 ,while1 therefore1 knowledge of things as they are1 and of their underlying principles and laws1 so far as we are able to acquire it1 is not only a privilege beyond all price1 but an absolute duty1 there are no moral considerations which need direct or limit our choice of the themes of research or study4 ,these may properly be determined by native or acquired proclivity1 by opportunity1 or by considerations of usefulness4 ,nor1 if the love of truth be formed and cherished1 can it of be of any essential importance whether this or that portion of truth be pursued or neglected during the brief period of our life in this world2 for1 at best1 what we leave unattained must immeasurably exceed our attainments1 and there is an eternity before us for what we are compelled to omit here4 ,at the same time1 the unbounded scope and the vast diversity of things knowable and worthy to be known are adapted to stimulate self-culture1 and in that same proportion to invest human life with a higher dignity1 a larger intrinsic value1 and a more enduring influence4 ,section ,,iii4 ,self-,control4 99,a man must be either self-governed1 or under a worse government than his own499 ,god governs men1 only by teaching and helping them to govern themselves4 ,good men1 if also wise1 seek not1 even for the highest ends1 to control their fellow-men1 but1 so far as they can1 enable and encourage them to exercise a due self-control4 ,it is only unwise or bad men who usurp the government of other wills than their own4 ,but the individual will is oftener made inefficient by passion1 than by direct influence from other minds4 ,man1 in his normal state1 wills either what is expedient or what is right4 ,passion suspends1 as to its objects1 all reference to expediency and right1 even when there is the clearest knowledge of the tendencies of the acts to which it prompts4 ,thus the sensualist often knows that he is committing sure and rapid suicide1 yet cannot arrest himself on the declivity of certain ruin4 ,the man in whom avarice has become a passion is perfectly aware of the comforts and enjoyments which he is sacrificing1 yet is as little capable of procuring them as if he were a pauper4 ,anger and revenge not infrequently force men to crimes which they know will be no less fatal to themselves than to their victims4 ,now if a man will not put and keep himself under the government of conscience1 it concerns him at least to remain under the control of reason1 which1 if it do not compel him to do right1 will restrain him within the limits of expediency1 and thus will insure for him reputation1 a fair position1 and a safe course in life1 even though it fail of the highest and most enduring good4 99,self-control is easily lost991 and is often lost unconsciously4 ,the first surrender of it is prone to be final and lifelong4 ,indeed1 in many cases1 the passion destined to be dominant has nearly reached the maturity of its power previously to any outward violation of the expedient or the right4 ,where the restraining influences of education and surroundings are strong1 where important interests are at stake1 or where conscience has not been habitually silenced or tampered with1 the perilous appetite1 desire1 or affection broods long in the thought1 and is so largely indulged in reverie and anticipation1 that it becomes imperious and despotic before it assumes its wonted forms of outward manifestation4 ,hence1 the sudden infatuation and rapid ruin which we sometimes witness1--the cases in which there seems but a single step between innocence and deep depravity4 ,in truth there are many steps2 but until they become precipitous1 they are veiled from human sight4 99,self-control991 then1 in order to be effective1 99must be exercised upon the thoughts and feelings991 especially upon the imagination1 which fills so largely with its phantasms and day-dreams our else unoccupied hours4 ,let these hours be as few as possible2 and let them be filled with thoughts which we would not blush to utter1 with plans which we could actualize with the approving suffrage of all good men4 ,the inward life which would dread expression and exposure1 already puts the outward life in peril2 for passion1 thus inwardly nourished and fostered1 can hardly fail to assume sooner or later the control of the conduct and the shaping of the character4 ,let the thoughts be well governed1 and the life is emancipated from passion1 and under the control of reason and principle4 ,section ,,iv4 ,moral ,self-,culture4 ,it is evident that1 99whatever a man's aims may be1 the attainment of them depends more upon himself than upon any agency that he can employ994 ,if his aim be extended influence1 his words and acts have simply the force which his character gives them4 ,if his aim be usefulness1 his own personality measures in part the value of his gifts1 and determines entirely the worth of his services4 ,if his aim be happiness1 the more of a man he is1 the larger is his capacity of enjoyment2 for as a dog gets more enjoyment out of life than a zophyte1 and a man than a dog1 so does the fully and symmetrically developed man exceed in receptivity of happiness him whose nature is imperfectly or abnormally developed4 ,now it is through the thorough training and faithful exercise of his moral faculties and powers that man is most capable of influence1 best fitted for usefulness1 and endowed with the largest capacity for happiness4 ,history shows this4 ,the men whose lot 7if any but our own7 we would be willing to assume1 have been1 without an exception1 good men4 ,if there are in our respective circles those whose position we deem in every respect enviable1 they are men of preminent moral excellence4 ,we would not take--could we have it--the most desirable external position with a damaged character4 ,probably there are few who do not regard a virtuous character as so much to be desired1 that in yielding to temptation and falling under the yoke of vicious habits they still mean to reform and to become what they admire4 ,old men who have led profligate lives always bear visible tokens of having forfeited all the valuable purposes of life1 often confess that their whole past has been a mistake1 and not infrequently bear faithful testimony to the transcendent worth of moral goodness4 ,to remain satisfied without this is1 therefore1 a sin against one's own nature1 a sacrifice of well-being and happiness which no one has a right to make1 and which no prudent man will make4 ,self-culture in virtue implies and demands reflection on duty and on the motives to duty1 on one's own nature1 capacities and liabilities1 and on those great themes of thought1 which by their amplitude and loftiness enlarge and exalt the minds that become familiar with them4 ,the mere tongue-work or hand-99work1 of virtue slackens and becomes deteriorated1 when not sustained by profound thought and feeling4 ,moreover1 it is the mind that acts1 and it puts into its action all that it has--and no more--of moral and spiritual energy1 so that the same outward act means more or less1 is of greater or less worth1 in proportion to the depth and vigor of feeling and purpose from which it proceeds4 ,it is thus that religious devotion nourishes virtue1 and that none are so well fitted for the duties of the earthly life as those who1 in their habitual meditation1 are the most intimately conversant with the heavenly life4 ,in moral self-culture great benefit is derived from example1 whether of the living or the dead4 ,perhaps the dead are1 in this respect1 more useful than the living4 ,in witnessing the worthy deeds and beneficent agency of a person of superior excellence1 the tendency is to an over-exact imitation of specific acts and methods1 which1 precisely because they are spontaneous and fitting in his case1 will not be so in the case of his copyist2 while the biography of an eminently good man enlists our sympathy with his spirit rather than with the details of his life1 and stimulates us to embody the same spirit in widely different forms of duty and usefulness4 ,thus the school-master who in ,dr4 ,arnold's lifetime heard of his unprecedented success as an educator1 would have been tempted to go to ,rugby1 to study the system on the ground1 and then to adopt1 so far as possible1 the very plans which he there saw in successful operation1--plans which might have been fitted neither to his genius1 the traditions of his school1 nor the demands of its patrons4 ,at the same time1 the interior of ,rugby ,school was very little known1 the principles of its administration still less1 to persons other than teachers4 ,but ,arnold's biography1 revealing the foundation-principles of his character and his work1 raised up for him a host of imitators of all classes and conditions4 ,price1 who converted his immense candle-factory near ,london into a veritable ,christian seminary for mutual improvement in knowledge1 virtue1 and piety1 professed to owe his impulse to this enterprise solely to the 8,life of ,arnold10 and like instances were multiplied in very various professions throughout the ,english-speaking world4 ,in fine1 example is of service to us1 not in pointing out the precise things to be done1 but in exhibiting the beauty1 loveliness1 and majesty of moral goodness1 the possibility of exalted moral attainments1 and the varied scope for their exercise in human life4 ,even he whose example we1 as ,christians1 hold in a reverence which none other shares1 is to be imitated1 not by slavishly copying his specific acts1 which1 because they were suitable in ,juda in the first century1 are for the most part unfitting in ,america in the nineteenth century1 but by imbibing his spirit1 and then incarnating it in the forms of active duty and service appropriate to our time and land4 ,finally1 and obviously1 99the practice of virtue99 is the most efficient means of moral self-culture4 ,as the thought uttered or written becomes indelibly fixed in the mind1 so does the principle or sentiment embodied in action become more intimately and persistently an element of the moral self-consciousness4 ,chapter ,x4 ,,justice2 ,,or1 ,,duties ,,to ,,one',s ,,fellow-,,beings4 ,justice1 in the common use of the word1 refers only to such rights and dues as can be precisely defined1 enacted by law1 and enforced by legal authority4 ,yet we virtually recognize a broader meaning of the word1 whenever we place law and justice in opposition to each other1 as when we speak of an unjust law4 ,in this phrase we imply that there is a supreme and universal justice1 of whose requirements human law is but a partial and imperfect transcript4 ,this justice must embrace all rights and dues of all beings1 human and ,divine2 and it is in this sense that we may regard whatever any one being in the universe can fitly claim of another being as coming under the head of justice4 ,such1 as we have already intimated1 is the sense in which we have used the term in the caption of a chapter which will embrace piety and benevolence no less than integrity and veracity4 ,section ,i4 ,duties ,to ,god4 ,while we cannot command our affections1 we can so 99govern and direct our thoughts99 as to excite the affections which we desire to cherish2 and if certain affections must inevitably result from certain trains or habits of thought1 those affections may be regarded as virtually subject to the will1 and1 if right1 as duties4 ,it is in this sense that gratitude and love to ,god are duties4 ,we cannot contemplate the tokens of his love in the outward universe1 the unnumbered objects which have no other possible use than to be enjoyed1 the benignity of his perpetual providence1 the endowments and capacities of our own being1 the immortality of our natural aspiration and our ,christian faith and hope1 the forgiveness and redemption that come to us through ,jesus ,christ1 and the immeasurable blessings of his mission and gospel1 without fervent gratitude to our infinite ,benefactor4 ,nor can we think of him as the ,archetype and ,source of all those traits of spiritual beauty and excellence which1 in man1 call forth our reverence1 admiration1 and affection1 without loving in ,him perfect goodness1 purity1 and mercy4 ,these attributes might1 indeed1 of themselves fail to present the ,supreme ,being to our conceptions as a cognizable personality1 were it not that the personal element is so clearly manifest in the visible universe and in ,god's constant providence4 ,but there are numerous objects1 phenomena1 and events in nature and providence which have--so to speak--a distinctive personal expression1 so that the familiar metaphors of ,god's countenance1 smile1 hand1 and voice do not transcend the literal experience of him who goes through life with the inward eye and ear always open4 ,the omnipresence of ,god makes it the dictate of natural piety to address ,him directly in 99thanksgiving and prayer991--not1 of necessity1 in words1 except as words are essential to the definiteness of thoughts1 but in such words or thoughts as constitute an expression to ,him of the sentiments of which ,he is fittingly the object4 ,as regards prayer1 indeed1 the grave doubts that exist in some minds as to its efficacy might be urged as a reason why it should not be offered2 but wrongly4 ,it is so natural1 so intrinsically fitting to ask what we desire and need of an omnipresent1 omnipotent1 all-merciful ,being1 who has taught us to call him our ,father1 that the very appropriateness of the asking is in itself a strong reason for believing that we shall not ask in vain4 ,nor can we ask in vain1 if through this communion of the human spirit with the ,divine there be an inflow of strength or of peace into the soul that prays1 even though the specific objects prayed for be not granted4 ,that these objects1 when material1 are often not granted1 we very well know2 yet we know too little of the extent of material laws1 and of the degree to which a discretionary ,providence may work1 not in contravention of1 but through those laws1 to pronounce dogmatically that the prayers of men are wholly unrecognized in the course of events4 ,as the members of the same community have very numerous blessings and needs in common1 it is obviously fitting that they should unite in 99public worship1 praise1 and prayer992 and if this be a duty of the community collectively1 participation in it must1 by parity of reason1 be the duty of its individual members4 ,public worship involves the fitness1 we may even say the necessity1 of appropriating exclusively to it certain places and times4 ,associations attach themselves to places so indelibly1 that it would be impossible to maintain the gravity and sacredness of devotional services in buildings or on spots ordinarily devoted to secular purposes1 either of business or of recreation4 ,nor could assemblies for worship be convened1 otherwise that at predetermined and stated intervals2 nor could their devotional purpose be served1 were there not stated portions of time sequestered from ordinary avocations and amusements4 ,hence the duty--on the part of all who admit the fitness of public worship--of reverence for conventionally sacred places1 and of abstinence from whatever is inconsistent with the religious uses of the day appropriated to worship47#aa7 ,it remains for us to consider 99the obligations imposed by an acknowledged revelation from ,god994 ,the position in which we are placed by such a revelation may best be illustrated by reference to what takes place in every human family4 ,a judicious father's commands1 precepts1 or counsels to his son are of two kinds4 ,in the first place1 he lays emphatic stress on duties which the son knows or might know from his own sense of the fitting and the right1 such as honesty1 veracity1 temperance4 ,these duties will not be in reality any more incumbent on the son because they are urged upon him by his father2 but if he be a son worthy of the name1 he will be more profoundly impressed by their obligation1 and will find in his filial love an additional and strong motive toward their observance4 ,the father will1 in the second place1 prescribe either for his son's benefit or in his own service certain specific acts1 in themselves morally indifferent1 and these1 when thus prescribed1 are no longer indifferent1 but1 as acts of obedience to rightful authority1 they become fitting1 right1 obligatory1 and endowed with all the characteristics of acts that are in themselves virtuous4 ,now a revelation naturally would1 and the ,christian revelation does1 contain precepts and commands of both these classes4 ,it prescribes with solemn emphasis the natural virtues which are obligatory upon us on grounds of intrinsic fitness2 and though these are not thus made any the more our duty1 we have1 through the teachings and example of ,jesus ,christ1 a more vivid sense of our obligation1 a higher appreciation of the beauty of virtue1 and added motives to its cultivation derived from the love1 the justice1 and the retributive providence of ,god4 ,the ,christian revelation1 also1 contains certain directions1 not in themselves of any intrinsic obligation1 as1 for instance1 those relating to baptism and the eucharist4 ,so far as we can see1 other and very different rites might have served the same purpose with these4 ,yet it is fitting and right that these1 and not others1 should be observed1 simply because the ,divine authority which enacts them has a right to command and to be obeyed4 ,duties of this class are commonly called positive1 in contradistinction from natural obligations4 ,both classes are equally imperative on the ground of fitness2 but with this difference1 that in the latter class the fitness resides in the duties themselves1 in the former it grows out of the relation between him who gives and those who receive the command4 ,section ,,ii4 ,duties ,of ,the ,family4 99,the inviolableness and permanence of marriage99 are so absolutely essential to the stability and well-being of families1 as to be virtually a part of the law of nature4 ,the young of other species have but a very brief period of dependence2 while the human child advances very slowly toward maturity1 and for a considerable portion of his life needs1 for both body and mind1 support1 protection1 and guidance from his seniors4 ,the separation of parents by other causes than death might leave it an unsolvable question1 to which of them the custody of their children appertained2 and in whichever way they were disposed of1 their due nurture and education would be inadequately secured4 ,the children might be thrown upon the mother's care1 while the means of supporting them belonged exclusively to the father4 ,or in the father's house they might suffer for lack of a mother's personal attention and services2 while if he contracted a new matrimonial connection1 the children of the previous marriage could hardly fail of neglect1 or even of hatred and injury1 from their mother's successful rival1 especially if she had children of her own47#ab7 ,the life-tenure of the marriage-contract contributes equally to the 99happiness of the conjugal relation991 in the aggregate4 ,there are1 no doubt1 individual cases of hardship1 in which an utter and irremediable incompatibility of temper and character makes married life a burden and a weariness to both parties4 ,but the cases are much more numerous1 in which discrepancies of taste and disposition are brought by time and habit into a more comprehensive harmony1 and the husband and wife1 because unlike1 become only the more essential1 each to the other's happiness and welfare4 ,where there is sincere affection1 there is little danger that lapse of years in a permanent marriage will enfeeble it2 while1 were the contract voidable at will1 there might be after marriage1 as often before marriage1 a series of attachments of seemingly equal ardor1 each to be superseded in its turn by some new attraction4 ,where1 on the other hand1 the union is the result1 not of love1 but of mutual esteem and confidence1 aided by motives of convenience1 the very possibility of an easy divorce would render each party captious and suspicious1 so that confidence could be easily shaken1 and esteem easily impaired2 while in those who expect always to have a common home the tendency is to those habits of mutual tolerance1 accommodation1 and concession1 through which confidence and esteem ripen into sincere and lasting affection4 ,as in many respects each family must be a unit1 and as the conflict of rival powers is no less ruinous to a household than to a state1 99the family must needs have one recognized head99 or representative1 and this place is fittingly held by the husband rather than by the wife2 for by the laws and usages of all civilized nations he is held responsible--except in criminal matters--for his wife and his minor children4 ,but in the well-ordered family1 each party to the marriage-contract is supreme in his or her own department1 and in that of the other prompt in counsel1 sympathy1 and aid1 and slow in dissent1 remonstrance1 or reproof4 ,these departments are defined with perfect distinctness by considerations of intrinsic fitness1 and any attempt to interchange them can be only subversive of domestic peace and social order4 99,the parent's duties to the child99 are maintenance in his own condition in life1 care for his education and his moral and religious culture1 advice1 restraint when needed1 punishment when both deserved and needed1 pure example and wholesome influence1 aid in the formation of habits and aptitudes suited to his probable calling or estate in his adult years1 and provision for his favorable entrance on his future career4 ,some of these duties are obviously contingent on the parent's ability2 others are absolute and imperative4 ,the judicious parent will1 on the one hand1 retain his parental authority as long as he is legally responsible for his child2 but1 on the other hand1 will train him gradually to self-help and self-dependence1 and will concede to him1 as he approaches years of maturity1 such freedom of choice and action as is consistent with his permanent well-being4 99,the child's duty99 is unqualified submission to the parent's authority1 obedience to his commands1 and compliance with his wishes1 in all things not morally wrong1 and this1 not only for the years of minority1 but so long as he remains a member of his parent's family1 or dependent on him for subsistence4 ,subsequently1 it is undoubtedly his duty to consult the reasonable wishes of his parent1 to hold him in respect and reverence1 to minister assiduously to his comfort and happiness1 and1 if need be1 to sustain him in his years of decline and infirmity4 ,section ,,iii4 ,veracity4 99,the duty of veracity99 is not contingent on the rights of any second person1 but is derived from considerations of intrinsic fitness4 ,if representations of facts1 truths1 or opinions are to be made1 it is obviously fitting and right that they should be conformed to one's knowledge or belief2 and no one can make representations which he knows to be false without the consciousness of unfitness and wrong4 99,the most important interests of society depend on the confidence which men repose in one another's veracity499 ,but for this1 history would be worth no more than fiction1 and its lessons would be unheeded4 ,but for this1 judicial proceedings would be a senseless mockery of justice1 and the administration of law and equity1 the merest haphazard4 ,but for this1 the common intercourse of life would be invaded by incessant doubt and suspicion1 and its daily transactions1 aimless and tentative4 ,against this condition of things man is defended by his own nature4 ,it is more natural to tell the truth than to utter falsehood4 ,the very persons who are the least scrupulous in this matter utter the truth when they have no motive to do otherwise4 ,spontaneous falsehood betokens insanity4 99,the essence of falsehood lies in the intention to deceive991 not in the words uttered4 ,the words may bear a double sense2 and while one of the meanings may be true1 the circumstances or the manner of utterance may be such as inevitably to impose the false meaning upon the hearer4 ,a part of the truth may be told in such a way as to convey an altogether false impression4 ,a fact may be stated with the express purpose of misleading the hearer with regard to another fact4 ,looks or gestures may be framed with the intent to communicate or confirm a falsehood4 ,silent acquiescence in a known falsehood may be no less criminal than its direct utterance4 99,but has not one a right to conceal facts which another has no right to know899 ,in such a case1 concealment is undoubtedly a right2 but falsehood1 or equivocation1 or truth which will convey a false impression1 is not a right4 ,this question has not unfrequently arisen with regard to anonymous publications4 ,it might be a fair subject of inquiry1 whether anonymous writing is not in all cases objectionable1 on the ground that a sense of personal responsibility for statements given to the public would insure a more uniform regard to truth and justice1 as well as greater care in the ascertainment of facts1 and more mature deliberation in the formation of judgments and opinions4 ,but if anonymous writing be justified1 the writer is authorized to guard his secret by employing a copyist1 or by covert modes of transmission to the press1 or by avoiding such peculiarities of style as might betray him4 ,but if1 notwithstanding these precautions1 the authorship be suspected and charged upon him1 we cannot admit his right to denial1 whether expressly1 or by implication1 or even by the utterance of a misleading fact4 ,he undertook the authorship with the risk of discovery2 he had no right to give publicity to what he has need to be ashamed of2 and if there be secondary1 though grave reasons why he would prefer to remain unknown1 they cannot be sufficient to justify him in falsehood4 99,is truth to be told to an insane person991 when it might be dangerous to him or to others8 ,may not he be deceived for his benefit1 decoyed into a place of safe detention1 or deterred by falsehood from some intended act of violence8 ,those who have the guardianship of the insane are unanimous in the opinion that falsehood1 when discovered by them1 is always attended with injurious consequences1 and that it should be resorted to only when imperatively required for their immediate safety or for that of others4 ,but in such cases the severest moralist could not deny the necessity1 and therefore the right1 of falsehood4 ,but it would be falsehood in form1 and not in fact4 ,truth-telling implies two conscious parties4 ,the statement from which an insane person will draw false inferences1 and which will drive him to an act or paroxysm of madness1 is not truth to him4 ,the statement which is indispensable to his safety1 repose1 or reasonable conduct1 is virtually true to him1 inasmuch as it conveys impressions as nearly conformed to the truth as he is capable of receiving4 99,is falsehood justifiable for the safety of one's own life or that of others899 ,this is a broad question1 and comprehends a very wide diversity of cases4 ,it includes the cases1 in which the alternative is to deny one's political or religious convictions1 or to suffer death for the profession of them4 ,here1 however1 there can be no difference of opinion4 ,political freedom and religious truth have been1 in past ages1 propagated more effectively by martyrdoms1 than by any other instrumentality2 and no men have so fully merited the gratitude and reverence of their race as those who have held the truth dearer than life4 ,but the form which the question ordinarily assumes is this3 99,if by false information ,i can prevent the commission of an atrocious crime1 am ,i justified in the falsehood899 ,it ought first to be said1 that this is hardly a practical question4 ,probably it has never presented itself practically to any person under whose eye these pages will fall1 or in any instance within his knowledge4 ,nor can the familiar discussion of such extreme cases be of any possible benefit4 ,on the other hand1 he who familiarizes himself with the idea that under such a stress of circumstances what else were wrong becomes right1 will be prone to apply similar reasoning to an exigency somewhat less urgent1 and thence to any case in which great apparent good might result from a departure from strict veracity4 ,far better is it to make literal truth the unvarying law of life1 and then to rest in the assurance that1 should an extreme case present itself1 the exigency of the moment will suggest the course to be pursued4 ,yet1 in ethical strictness1 falsehood from one self-conscious person to another cannot be justified2 but we can conceive of circumstances in which it might be extenuated4 ,there are no degrees of right2 but of wrong there may be an infinite number of degrees4 ,one straight line cannot be straighter than another2 but we can conceive of a curve or a waving line that shall have but an infinitesimal divergence from a straight line4 ,so in morals1 there may be an infinitesimal wrong1--an act which cannot be pronounced right1 yet shall diverge so little from the right that conscience would contract from it no appreciable stain1 that man could not condemn it1 and that we cannot conceive of its being registered against the soul in the chancery of heaven4 ,such may be the judgment which would properly attach itself to a falsehood by which an atrocious crime was prevented4 99 99 99 99 99 99,promises99 belong under the head of veracity for a double reason1 inasmuch as they demand in their making the truthful declaration of a sincere purpose1 and in their execution an equal loyalty to the truth1 even though it involve inconvenience1 cost1 or loss4 ,the words of a promise may often bear more than one interpretation2 but it is obviously required by veracity that the promiser should fulfil his promise in the sense in which he supposed it to be understood by him to whom it was made4 ,there are 99cases in which a promise should not be kept499 ,the promise to perform an immoral act is void from the beginning4 ,it is wrong to make it1 and a double wrong to keep it4 ,the promise to perform an act1 not intrinsically immoral1 but unlawful1 should be regarded in the same light4 ,if both parties were aware1 when the promise was made1 of the unlawfulness of the act1 then neither party has the right to deem himself injured by the other4 ,if1 however1 the promiser was aware of the unlawfulness of his promise1 while the promisee supposed it lawful1 the promiser1 though not bound by his promise1 is under obligation to remunerate the promisee for his disappointment or loss4 ,if the act promised becomes unlawful between the making and the execution of the promise1 the promise is made void1 and the promisee has no ground of complaint against the promiser4 ,thus1 if a man promised to send to a correspondent goods of a certain description at a certain time1 and before that time the exportation of such goods were prohibited by law1 he would be free both from his promise and from responsibility for its non-fulfilment4 ,a promise neither immoral nor unlawful1 but made under a mistake common to both parties1 and such as--had it been known--would have prevented the promise1 is void4 ,an extorted promise to perform an immoral or unlawful act cannot be binding4 ,one has1 indeed1 no moral right to make such a promise1 though if the case be one of extreme urgency and peril1 extenuating circumstances may reduce the wrong to an infinitesimal deviation from the right2 but1 when the duress is over1 no considerations can justify the performance of what it was wrong to promise4 ,but a promise1 not in itself immoral or unlawful1 is binding1 though made under duress4 ,thus1 if a man attacked by bandits has had his life spared on condition of a pecuniary ransom1 he is bound to pay the ransom2 for at the moment of peril he thought his life worth all he promised to give for it1 and it is neither immoral nor unlawful to give money1 even to a robber4 ,in a case like this1 regard for the safety of others should1 also1 have weight2 for in a country liable to such perils1 the breach of a promise by one man might cost the community the lives of many4 99,contracts99 are mutual promises1 in which each party puts himself under specific obligations to the other4 ,they are to be interpreted on the same principles1 and to be regarded as void or voidable on the same grounds1 with promises4 99,an oath99 is an invocation of the protection and blessing of ,god1 or of his indignation and curse1 upon the person swearing1 according as his assertion is true or false1 or as his promise shall be observed or violated4 8,so help you ,god10 the form in common use in this country1 expresses the idea that underlies an oath1--so being1 of course1 the emphatic word4 ,oaths are exacted of witnesses in courts of justice in confirmation of their testimony1 and of incumbents of public offices in pledge of their fidelity4 ,they are required1 too1 in attestation of invoices1 inventories of estates1 returns of taxable property1 and various financial and statistical statements made under public authority4 ,there are1 also1 not a few persons of whom1 and occasions on which an oath of allegiance to the government of the state or nation is demanded4 99,an oath does not enhance one's obligation99 to tell the truth1 or to fulfil his promise4 ,this obligation is entire and perfect in all cases1 on the ground of intrinsic fitness1 and of the known will and command of ,god4 ,but the tendency of oaths is to establish in the minds of men two classes of assertions and promises1 one more sacred than the other4 ,he who is required under the solemn sanction of an oath merely to tell the truth or to make a promise in good faith1 arrives naturally at the conclusion that he is bound to a less rigid accuracy or fidelity in ordinary statements or promises4 ,the law of the land1 as we have seen1 bears an important part in the ethical education of the young2 and by means of the legal distinction created between assertions or promises under oath and those made without that sanction1 children and youth are trained to regard simple truth-telling and promise-keeping as of secondary obligation4 ,this effect of legal oaths is attested by the prevalence of profane swearing1 and by the frequent use of oath-like forms of asseveration1 not regarded as profane1 by persons of a more serious character4 ,except in the religious sects that abjure the use of oaths1 nine persons out of ten swear more or less1 and spontaneously confirm statements which are in the least degree strange or difficult of belief1 or promises to which they wish to give an air of sincerity and earnestness1 by the strongest oaths they dare to use4 ,this comes of a felt necessity1 which will exist as long as preminent sanctity is attached to legal oaths4 99,oaths are notoriously ineffective in insuring99 truth and fidelity4 ,so far as their educational influence is concerned1 they tend1 as we have seen1 to undermine the reverence for truth in itself considered1 which is the surest safeguard of individual veracity4 ,then too1 so far as reliance is placed upon an oath1 the attention of those concerned is directed with the less careful scrutiny to the character for veracity borne by him to whom it is administered4 ,in point of fact1 men swear falsely whenever and wherever they would be willing to utter falsehood without an oath4 ,in courts of justice1 the pains and penalties of perjury undoubtedly prevent a great deal of false swearing2 but precisely the same penalties are attached to the affirmation of persons who1 on the ground of religious scruples1 are excused from swearing1 and they certainly are none too severe for false testimony1 in whatever way it may be given4 ,notwithstanding this check1 however1 it is well known that before a corrupt or incompetent tribunal1 an unprincipled advocate never finds any difficulty in buying false testimony2 and even where justice is uprightly and skilfully administered1 it is not rare to encounter between equally credible witnesses such flagrant and irreconcilable contradictions as to leave no room for any hypothesis other than perjury on one side or both4 ,perjury in transactions with the national revenue and with municipal assessors is by no means unprecedented among persons of high general reputation4 ,false oaths of this description are1 indeed1 not infrequently preceded by some fictitious formalism1 such as an unreal and temporary transfer of property2 but this is done1 not in order to evade the guilt of perjury1 but1 in case of detection1 to open a technical escape from its legal penalty4 ,promissory oaths are of equally little worth4 ,there is not a public functionary from the ,president of the ,united ,states to the village constable1 who does not take what is meant to be a solemn oath 7though often administered with indecent levity7 to be loyal to the constitution of the country or state1 and faithful in the discharge of his official duties4 ,yet what effect has this vast amount of swearing1 if it be not to make perjury so familiar an offence as to be no longer deemed disgraceful8 ,not a bribe is taken by a member of ,congress1 not a contract surreptitiously obtained by a municipal official1 not an appointment made to the known detriment of the public on personal or party grounds1 without the commission of a crime1 in theory transcendentally heinous1 in practice constantly condoned and ignored4 ,nor can we be mistaken in regarding the sacrilege and virtual blasphemy resulting from the institution of judicial1 assertory1 and promissory oaths1 as holding no secondary place among the causes of the moral decline and corruption of which we witness so manifest tokens4 ,to one who does not carry foregone conclusions of his own to the interpretation of the ,new ,testament1 it can hardly appear otherwise than certain that the ,founder of ,christianity intended to prohibit all oaths4 ,his precept1 8,swear not at all10 occurs in a series of specifications of maxims drawn from the standard morality of his day1 under each of which he sets aside the existing ethical rule1 and substitutes for it one covering precisely the same ground1 and conformed to the intrinsic right as represented in his own spirit and life4 8,ye have heard that it hath been said1 ,an eye for an eye1 and a tooth for a tooth2 but ,i say unto you1 that ye resist not evil40 8,ye have heard that it hath been said1 ,thou shalt love thy neighbor1 and hate thine enemy2 but ,i say unto you1 ,love your enemies40 ,the analogy of these and other declarations of the same series compels us to believe that when ,jesus said1 8,ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time1 ,thou shalt not forswear thyself1 but shalt perform unto the ,lord thine oaths10 the precept which followed1 8,i say unto you1 ,swear not at all10 must have applied to the same subject-matter with the maxim which precedes it1--that ,jesus must have intended to disallow something that had been previously permitted4 ,if so1 not trivial or profane oaths alone1 but oaths made in good faith and with due solemnity must have been included in the precept1 8,swear not at all407#ac7 ,it is historically certain that the primitive ,christians thus understood the evangelic precept4 ,they not only refused the usual idolatrous forms of adjuration1 but maintained that all oaths had been forbidden by their ,divine ,lawgiver2 nor have we any proof of their having receded from this position1 until that strange fusion of church and state under ,constantine1 in which it is hard to say whether ,christianity mounted the throne of the ,csars or succumbed to their rule4 ,section ,,iv4 ,honesty4 99,honesty99 relates to transactions in which money or other property is concerned4 ,in its broadest sense1 it forbids not only the violation of the rights of individuals1 but1 equally1 acts and practices designed to gain unfair emolument at the expense of the community1 or of any class or portion of its members4 ,it enjoins not merely the paying of debts and the performance of contracts1 but rigid fidelity in every trust1 whether private or public4 ,its ground is intrinsic fitness2 and a sense of fitness will suggest its general rules1 and will always enable one to determine his duty in individual cases4 ,its whole field may be covered by two precepts1 level with the humblest understanding1 and infallible in their application4 ,the first relates to transactions between man and man1--,do that1 and only that1 which you would regard as just and right1 if it were done to you4 ,the second embraces concerns that affect numbers or classes of persons1--,do that1 and only that1 which1 were you the responsible trustee and guardian of the public good1 you would prescribe or sanction as just and right4 99,notwithstanding the undoubted increase of dishonesty99 in recent times and its disastrous frequency1 there can be no doubt that 99the majority of men are honest991 and that the transactions in which there is no deception or wrong1 largely outnumber those which are fraudulent4 ,were this not so1 there could be neither confidence nor credit1 enterprise would be paralyzed1 business would be reduced to the lowest demands of absolute necessity1 and every man would be the sole custodian of what he might make1 produce1 or in any way acquire4 ,there can1 therefore1 be no element more directly hostile to the permanence1 not to say the progress1 of material civilization and of the higher interests which depend upon it1 than fraud1 peculation1 and the violation of trust1 in pecuniary and mercantile affairs1 and with reference to public funds and measures4 ,yet there are methods1 for which to a large degree honest men are responsible1 in which dishonesty is created1 nourished1 and rewarded4 ,in political life1 if few office-holders are inaccessible to bribes1 it is not because men of impregnable integrity might not1 as in earlier times1 be found in ample numbers for all places of trust2 but because the compromises1 humiliations1 and concessions through which alone1 in many of our constituencies1 one can become the candidate of a party1 are such as an honest man either would spurn at the outset1 or could endure only by parting with his honesty4 ,so long as men will persist in electing to municipal trusts those whose sole qualification is blind loyalty and unscrupulous service to a party1 they can expect only robbery under the form of taxation2 and1 in fact1 the financial revelations that have been made in the commercial metropolis of our country are typical of what is taking place1 so far as opportunity serves1 in cities1 towns1 and villages all over the land4 ,as regards embezzlements1 forgeries1 and frauds in the management of pecuniary trusts1 there can be no doubt that the number is greatly multiplied by the morbid sympathy of the public with the criminals1 by their frequent evasion of punishment or prompt pardon after conviction1 and by the ease with which they have often recovered their social position and the means of maintaining it4 ,in addition to this complicity with fraud and wrong on the part of the public1 there are many ways in which 99dishonesty engenders991 almost necessitates 99dishonesty994 ,a branch of business1 in itself honest1 may be virtually closed against an honest man4 ,the adulterations of food1 so appallingly prevalent1 will suggest an illustration of this point4 ,there are commodities in which the mixture of cheaper ingredients cannot be detected by the purchaser1 and which in their debased form can be offered at so low a price as to drive the genuine commodities which they replace out of the market2 and thus the alternative is presented to the hitherto honest dealer to participate in the fraud1 or to quit the business4 ,the former course is1 no doubt1 taken by many who sincerely regret the seeming necessity4 99,dishonesty99 not only injures the immediate sufferer by the fraud or wrong1 but when it becomes frequent1 99is a public injury99 and calamity4 ,in one way or another it alienates from the use of every honest man a very large proportion of his earnings or income4 ,in this country1 at the present time1 we probably fall short of the truth in saying that at least a third part of every citizen's income is paid in the form of either direct or indirect taxation1 and of this amount a percentage much larger than would be readily believed is pillaged on its way into the treasury or in its disbursement4 ,then1 as regards bad debts 7so-called71 most of them fraudulently contracted or evaded1 they are not1 in general1 the loss of the immediate creditor1 nor ought they to be2 he is obliged to charge for his goods a price which will cover these debts1 and honest purchasers must thus pay the dues of the insolvent purchaser4 ,nor is this a solitary instance in which innocent persons are obliged to suffer for wrongs with which they seem to have no necessary connection4 ,there are very few exceptions to the rule1 under which1 however1 we have room but one more example4 ,it is a well known fact that many ,american railways have not only cost very much more money than was ever laid out upon them1 but are made1 by keeping the construction-account long and generously open1 to represent on the books of the respective corporations much larger sums than they cost1--especially in cases where the enterprise is lucrative and the dividends are limited by statute4 ,now in some sections of our country a transaction of this kind--essentially fraudulent1 under however respectable auspices--is a disastrous check on productive industry by the heavy freight-tariff which it imposes1--so heavy sometimes as to keep bulky commodities1 as wheat and corn1 out of the markets where1 at a fair cost for transportation1 they might find remunerative sale4 ,thus the very means devised for opening the resources of a region of country may be abused to their obstruction and hindrance4 ,in fine1 dishonesty in all its forms has a diffusive power of injury1 and1 on the mere ground of self-defence1 demands the remonstrance and antagonism of the entire community4 ,while in most departments of conduct there is a wide neutral 99ground between the right and the condemnably wrong991 there are matters of business in which there seems to be no such intermediate territory1 but in which what is fair1 honorable1 and even necessary1 is closely contiguous to dishonesty4 ,thus1 except in the simplest retail business1 all modern commerce is speculation1 and the line between legitimate and dishonest speculation is to some minds difficult of discernment4 ,yet the discrimination may be made4 ,a man has a right to all that he earns by services to the community1 and these earnings may in individual instances reach an immense sum4 ,we can easily understand how this may be1 nay1 must needs be the case with the very high salaries paid to master manufacturers4 ,such salaries would not be paid1 did not the intelligence1 skill1 and organizing capacity of these men cheapen by a still larger amount the commodities made under their direction4 ,the case is precisely similar with the merchant engaged in legitimate commerce4 ,by his knowledge of the right times and best modes of purchasing1 by his enterprise and sagacity in maintaining intercourse with and between distant markets1 and by his outlay of capital and skill as a carrier of commodities from the place of their production to the place where they are needed for use1 he cheapens the goods that pass through his hands by a greater amount than the toll he levies upon them1 which--however large--is his rightful due4 ,thus also1 when1 in anticipation of a scarcity of some one commodity1 a merchant so raises the price as essentially to diminish the sale1 99he earns his increased profits992 for an enhanced price is the only practicable check on consumption4 ,for instance1 if at the actual rate of consumption the bread-stuff on hand would be consumed a month before the new harvest could be made availing1 no statistical statement could prevent the month of famine2 but experienced grain-merchants can adjust the price of the stock in hand so as to induce precisely the amount of economy which will make that stock last till it can be replaced4 ,they will1 indeed1 obtain a large profit on their sales1 and will be accused by ignorant persons of speculating on scarcity and popular apprehension2 but it will be due wholly to their prescience that the scarcity did not become famine1 and the apprehension suffering2 and they will have merited for this service more than the largest profits that can accrue to them4 ,the same principles will apply to 99speculation in stocks991 which is in many minds identified with dishonest gain4 ,stocks are marketable commodities1 equally with sugar and salt4 ,they are liable to legitimate fluctuations in value1 their actual value being affected1 often by facts that transpire1 often by opinions that rest on assignable grounds4 ,now if a man possess skill and foresight enough to buy stocks at their lowest rates and to sell them when they will bring him a profit1 he makes a perfectly legitimate investment of his intelligence and sagacity1 and in facilitating sales for those who need to sell1 and purchases for those who wish to buy1 and thus preventing capital from lying unused1 or remaining inconvertible at need1 he earns all that his business yields him by the substantial services which he renders4 99,the legitimate business of the merchant and the broker is contingent1 as we have seen1 on fluctuations in the market991 and he who has the sagacity to foresee these fluctuations and the enterprise to prepare for them1 derives from them advantage to which he is fairly entitled4 ,but it is precisely at this point that the stress of temptation rests1 and the opportunity presents itself for dishonesty in ways of which the laws take no cognizance1 and on which public opinion is by no means severe4 ,the contingencies which sagacity can foresee1 capital and credit can often create4 ,virtual scarcity may be produced by forestalling and monopoly4 ,when there is no actual dearth1 even famine-prices may be obtained for the necessaries of life by the skilful manipulation of the grain-market4 ,so too1 in the stock-market1 bonds and shares1 instead of being bought or sold for what they are worth1 of actual owners and to real purchasers1 may be merely gambled with1--bought in large amounts in order to create a demand that shall swell their price1 or so thrown upon the market as to reduce their price below their real value1 and all this with the sole purpose of mutual contravention and discomfiture4 ,by operations of this kind1 not only is no useful end subserved1 but the financial interests and relations of the community are injuriously1 often ruinously1 deranged2 while not a few private holders of stock have their credit essentially impaired by a sudden fall of price1 or by the inflation of nominal value are led into rash speculations4 ,in the cases cited it may be seen how closely 99the right abuts upon the wrong991 so that one may over-pass the line almost unconsciously4 ,yet it is believed that a man may determine for himself on which side of the line he belongs4 ,the department of business1 or the mode of transacting business1 which cannot by any possibility be of benefit to the community1 still more1 that which in its general course is of positively injurious tendency1 is essentially dishonest1 even though there be no individual acts of fraud4 ,he really defrauds the public who lives upon the public without rendering1 or purposing to render any valuable return2 and if there be any profession or department of business to which this description applies1 it should be avoided or forsaken by every man who means to be honest4 ,among the many mooted cases in which the question of honesty is involved1 our proposed limits will permit us to consider only that of usury7#ad7 7so-called74 ,there can be no doubt that usury laws and the opinion that sustains them sprang from the false theory1 according to which money was regarded1 not as value1 but merely as the measure of value4 ,it is now understood that it owes its capacity to measure value solely to its own intrinsic value2 that its paper representatives can equal it in purchasing power only when convertible at pleasure into coin2 and that paper not immediately convertible can obtain the character of money only so far as there is promise or hope of its ultimate conversion into coin4 ,it follows that money stands on the same footing with all other values1--that its use1 therefore1 is a marketable commodity1 varying indefinitely in its fitting price1 according as money is abundant or scarce1 the loan for a long or a short period1 and the borrower of more or less certain solvency4 ,for ordinary loans the relations of supply and demand are amply competent to regulate the rate of interest1 while he who incurs an extra-hazardous risk fairly earns a correspondingly high rate of compensation4 ,there is1 therefore1 no intrinsic wrong in one's obtaining for the use of his money all that it is worth2 and while we cannot justify the violation of any laws not absolutely immoral1 dishonesty forms no part of the offence of the man who takes more than legal interest47#ae7 ,section ,v4 ,beneficence4 99,we have a distinct consciousness of the needs of human beings499 ,if we have not suffered destitution in our own persons1 we yet should deprecate it4 ,what we should dread others feel4 ,the things which we find or deem essential to our well-being1 many lack4 ,we1 it may be1 possess them or the means of procuring them1 beyond our power of personal use4 ,this larger share of material goods has come to us1 indeed1 honestly1 by the operation of laws inherent in the structure of society1 and thus1 as we believe1 by ,divine appointment4 ,at the same time we are conscious1 in a greater or less degree1 of the benevolent affections4 ,we are moved to pity by the sight or knowledge of want or suffering4 ,our sense of fitness is painfully disturbed by the existence of needs unsupplied1 of calamities unrelieved4 ,we cannot but be aware of the adaptation of such superfluity of material goods as we may possess to beneficent uses2 and it can hardly be that we shall not rest in the belief that1 in the inevitable order of society1 it is the predetermined design and purpose of abundance to supply deficiency1--of the capacity of service1 to meet the ever pressing demands for service4 ,beneficence1 then1 is a duty based on considerations of intrinsic fitness4 ,but 99beneficence must be actual991 not merely formal1 99good-doing994 ,some of the most easy and obvious modes of supply or relief are adapted to perpetuate the very evils to which they minister1 either by destroying self-respect1 by discouraging self-help1 or by granting immunity to positively vicious habits4 ,the tendency of instinctive kindness is to indiscriminate giving4 ,but there can be very few cases in which this is not harmful4 ,it sustains mendicants as a recognized class of society2 and as such they are worse than useless4 ,they necessarily lose all sense of personal dignity2 they remain ignorant or become incapable of all modes of regular industry1 and it is impossible for them to form associations that will be otherwise than degrading and corrupting4 ,of equally injurious tendency are the various modes of 99relief at the public charge994 ,they affix upon their beneficiaries the indelible brand of pauperism1 which in numerous instances becomes hereditary1 and in not a few cases has been transmitted through several generations4 ,experience has shown that recovery from a condition thus dependent is exceedingly rare1 even with the young and strong1 who1 had they been tided over the stress of need by private and judicious charity1 would shortly have resumed their place among the self-subsisting members of the community4 ,public alms1 while they are thus harmful to their recipients1 impose upon society a far heavier burden than private charity4 ,this is due in part to the permanent pauperism created by the system1 in part to the wastefulness which characterizes public expenditures of every kind4 ,by special permission of the national legislature1 the experiment was tried in ,glasgow1 under the direction of ,dr4 ,chalmers1 of substituting private munificence for relief from the public chest1 in one of the poorest territorial parishes of the city1 embracing a population of ten thousand1 and the result was the expenditure of little more than one third of what had been expended under legal authority4 ,at the same time1 the poor and suffering were so much more faithfully and kindly cared for1 that there was a constant overflow of poverty from the other districts of the city into this4 ,public charity1 when thoroughly systematized1 is liable to the still stronger objection1 that those who are able to give relief1 in ceasing to feel the necessity1 lose the will and the capacity of benevolent effort4 ,yet1 were there no public provision for the poor1 there would be cases of destitution1 disease1 disability1 and mental imbecility1 which would elude private charity1 however diligent and generous4 ,it must be remembered1 too1 that the same causes may at once enhance the demand for beneficent aid1 and cripple its resources4 ,thus1 in a conflagration1 a flood1 a dearth1 or a commercial panic1 while the stress of need among the poor is greatly intensified1 the persons on whose charity1 under ordinary circumstances1 they could place the most confident reliance1 may be among the chief sufferers4 ,thus1 also1 during the prevalence of infectious disease1 a large proportion of those who are wont to perform the offices of humanity for the suffering1 are withdrawn by their own fears1 or those of their friends1 from their wonted field of service4 ,then1 too1 there are various forms of disease and infirmity1 which demand special treatment or a permanent asylum2 and while institutions designed to meet these wants are more wisely and economically administered under private than under public auspices1 the state should never suffer them to fail or languish for lack of subsidy from private sources4 ,the most desirable condition of things undoubtedly is that--more nearly realized in ,france than in any other country in ,christendom--in which the relief of the poor and suffering in ordinary cases1 and the charge of charitable institutions to a large degree1 are left to individuals1 voluntary organizations1 and religious fraternities and sisterhoods1 while government supplements and subsidizes private charity where it is found inadequate to the need4 ,the demands upon beneficence are by no means exhausted1 when material relief and aid have been bestowed4 ,indeed1 alms are often given as a purchase of quitclaim for personal service4 ,but the manifestation and expression of sympathy may make the gift of immeasurably more worth and efficacy4 ,considerate courtesy1 delicacy1 and gentleness are essential parts of beneficence4 ,there are very few so abject that they do not feel insulted and degraded by what is coldly1 grudgingly1 superciliously1 or chidingly bestowed2 while the thoughtful tenderness which never forgets the sensibilities of those whom it relieves1 inspires comfort1 hope1 and courage1 arouses whatever capacity there may be of self-help1 and is often the means of replacing the unfortunate in the position from which they have fallen4 99,beneficence has a much broader scope than the mere relief of the poor and suffering499 ,in the daily intercourse of life there are unnumbered opportunities for kindness1 many of them slight1 yet in their aggregate1 of a magnitude that eludes all computation4 ,there is hardly a transaction1 an interview1 a casual wayside meeting1 in which it is not in the power of each person concerned to contribute in an appreciable degree to the happiness or the discomfort of those whom he thus meets1 or with whom he is brought into a relation however transient4 ,in all our movements among our fellow-men1 it is possible for us to 8go about doing good40 ,what we can thus do we are bound to do4 ,we perceive and feel that this is fitting for us as social and as mutually dependent beings4 ,we are conscious of the benefit accruing to us from little1 nameless attentions and courtesies1 often of mere look1 or manner1 or voice2 and from these experiences we infer that the possibility1 and therefore the duty of beneficence is coextensive with our whole social life4 ,the 99measure of beneficence991 prescribed for us on the most sacred authority1 8,all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you1 do ye even so to them10 needs only to be stated to be received as authentic4 ,it supplies a measure for our expectations also1 as well as for our duties4 ,we have a right to expect from others as much courtesy1 kindness1 service as1 were they in our place and we in theirs1 we should feel bound to render to them1--a rule which would often largely curtail our expectations1 and in the same proportion tone down our disappointments and imagined grievances4 ,there is another scriptural precept1 899,thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself1990 which might at first sight seem impracticable1 yet which1 as we shall see on closer examination1 represents not only a possible attainment1 but one toward which all who heartily desire and love to do good are tending4 ,there are various conditions under which1 confessedly1 human beings love others as well as themselves1 or better4 ,what else can we say of the mother's love for her child1 for whose well-being she would make any conceivable sacrifice1 nay1 were there need1 would surrender life itself8 ,have we not also sometimes witnessed1 a filial devotion equally entire and self-forgetting8 ,nor are instances wanting1 in which brothers and sisters1 or friends who had no bonds of consanguinity1 have shown by unmistakable deeds and sufferings that their love for one another was at least equal to their self-love4 ,this same love for others1 as for himself1 is manifested by the self-devoting patriot1 the practical philanthropist1 the ,christian missionary4 ,there is ample ground for it in the theory of humanity which forms a part of our accustomed religious utterance4 ,we call our fellow-men our brethren1 as children of the same ,father4 ,so far as sayings like these are sentiments1 and not mere words1 there must be in our feelings and conduct toward and for our fellow-men in general a kindness1 forbearance1 self-forgetfulness1 and self-sacrifice similar to that of which1 toward our near kindred1 we would not confess ourselves incapable4 ,here it must be borne in mind that the precepts of ,christianity represent the perfection which should be our constant aim and our only goal1 not the stage of attainment which we are conscious of having reached1 or of being able to reach with little effort4 99,the love of enemies99 is also enjoined upon us by ,jesus ,christ4 ,is this possible8 ,why not8 ,there are cases where one's nearest kindred are his worst enemies2 and we have known instances in which love has survived this rudest of all trials4 ,were the ,christian idea of universal brotherhood a profound sentiment1 it would not be quenched by enmity1 however bitter4 ,enmity toward ourselves need not affect our estimate of one's actual merit or claims4 ,if we should not think the worse of a man because he was the enemy of some one else1 why should we think the worse of him because he is our enemy8 ,he may have mistaken our character and our dispositions2 and if so1 is he more culpable for this than for any other mistake8 ,or if1 on the other hand1 he has some substantial reason for disliking us1 we should either remove the cause1 or submit to the dislike without feeling aggrieved by it4 ,at any rate we can obey the precept1 8,do good to them that hate you20 and this is the only way1 and an almost infallible way1 in which the enmity may be overcome1 and superseded by relations of mutual kindness and friendship4 ,chapter ,,xi4 ,,fortitude2 ,,or ,,duties ,,with ,,reference ,,to ,,unavoidable ,,evils ,,and ,,sufferings4 ,there are1 in almost every prolonged human experience1 99privations and sufferings to be endured1 disappointments to be submitted to1 obstacles and difficulties to be surmounted and overcome994 ,from whatever source these elements of experience proceed1 even if from blind chance1 or from fate 7which denotes the utterance or decree of arbitrary and irresponsible power71 the strong man will brace himself up to bear them2 the wise man will shape his conduct by them2 the man of lofty soul will rise above them4 ,but the temper in which they will be borne1 yielded to1 or surmounted1 must be contingent on the belief concerning them4 ,if they are regarded as actual evils1 they will probably be endured with sullenness1 or submitted to with defiance and scorn1 or surmounted with pride and self-inflation4 ,even in the writings of the later ,stoics1 which abound in edifying precepts of fortitude and courage under trial1 there is an undertone of defiance1 as if the sufferer were contending with a hostile force1 and a constant tendency to extol and almost deify the energy of soul which the good man displays in fighting with a hard destiny4 ,if1 on the other hand1 physical evils are regarded as wise and benign appointments of the ,divine love and fatherhood1 the spirit in which they are borne and struggled against is characterized by tenderness1 meekness1 humility1 trust1 and hope4 ,it is instructive in this regard to read alternately the ,stoics and ,st4 ,paul1 and to contrast their magnanimous1 but grim and stern resignation1 with the jubilant tone in which1 a hundred times over1 and with a vast variety of gladsome utterance1 he repeats the sentiment contained in those words1 8,as sorrowful1 yet always rejoicing40 ,as ours is the ,christian theory as to the 7so-called7 evils of human life1 we shall recognize it in our treatment of the several virtues comprehended under the general title of ,fortitude4 ,section ,i4 ,patience47#af7 99,patience99 is incumbent on us1 only under inevitable sufferings or hardships1 or under such as are incurred in the discharge of manifest duty1 or for the benefit of our fellow-men4 ,needless sufferings or privations we are bound to shun or to escape1 not to bear4 ,the caution and foresight by which they may be evaded hold an essential place among the duties of prudence4 ,nor does reason or religion sanction self-imposed burdens or hardships of any kind1 whether in penance for wrong-doing1 as a means of purchasing the ,divine favor1 or as a mode of spiritual discipline4 ,patience implies 99serenity1 cheerfulness1 and hopefulness991 under burdens and trials4 ,it must be distinguished from apathy1 which is a temperament1 not a virtue4 ,there are some persons whose sensibilities are so sluggish that they are incapable of keen suffering1 and of profound and lasting sorrow4 ,we can hardly call this a desirable temperament2 for its capacity of enjoyment is equally defective1 and1 as there is more happiness than misery in almost every life1 he whose susceptibility of both pain and pleasure is quick and strong is1 on the whole1 the gainer thereby4 ,the serenity of patience requires vigorous self-command4 ,it is essential1 first of all1 to control1 and as far as possible to suppress1 the outward tokens of pain and grief4 ,they1 like all modes of utterance1 deepen the feeling they express2 while a firm and self-contained bearing enhances the fortitude which it indicates4 ,control must also be exercised over the thoughts1 that they be abstracted from the painful experience1 and employed on themes that will fill and task them4 ,mental industry is the best relief that mere philosophy has for pain and sorrow2 and though it certainly is not a cure1 it never fails to be of service as a palliative4 ,even when bodily distress or infirmity renders continuous thought impossible1 the effort of recollection1 or the employment of the mind in matters too trivial for its exercise in health1 may relieve the weariness and lighten the stress of suffering4 ,nor let devices of this sort be deemed unworthy of a place even among duties2 for they are often essential means to ends of high importance4 ,they assert and maintain the rightful supremacy of the mind over the body2 they supersede that morbid brooding upon painful experiences which generates either melancholy or querulousness2 and they leave in the moral nature an unobstructed entrance to all soothing and elevating influences4 99,cheerfulness99 in the endurance of pain and hardship must result in great part from the belief4 ,if ,i regard myself as irresistibly subject to an automatic ,nature1 whose wheels may bruise or crush me at any moment1 ,i know not why or how ,i could be cheerful1 even in such precarious health or prosperity as might fall to my lot2 and there could certainly be no reassuring aspect to my adverse fortune4 ,but if ,i believe that under a fatherly ,providence there can be no suffering without its ministry of mercy1 no loss without its greater gain within my reach and endeavor1 no hardship without its reflex benefit in inward growth and energy1 then ,i can take and bear the inevitable burdens of this earthly life in the same spirit in which ,i often assume burdens not imposed upon me from without1 for the more than preponderant benefit which ,i hope to derive from them4 ,but if ,i have this faith in a benignant ,providence which will not afflict me uselessly1 ,i am under obligation not to let my faith1 if real1 remain inactive in my seasons of pain1 loss1 or grief4 ,i am bound so to ponder on my assured belief1 and on such proofs of it as may lie in my past experience1 that it shall give its hue to my condition1 its tone to my thought1 its direction to the whole current of my sentiment and feeling4 ,thus may endurance be not only calm1 but cheerful1 because pervaded by the conviction that at the heart of all that seems evil there is substantial good4 ,yet1 it cannot be denied that there are life-long burdens and griefs1--incurable illnesses1 irretrievable losses1 bereavements that will never cease to be felt1 and cannot be replaced4 ,especially in advanced years there are infirmities1 disabilities1 and privations1 which cannot by any possibility have a resultant revenue equivalent to what they take from us2 for in old age the growth of character is too slow to be worth the sacrifice which in earlier life may be more than compensated by the consciousness of spiritual enlargement and increase4 ,how shall these burdens be borne cheerfully8 ,they cannot1 unless they be also borne hopefully4 ,but if there be presented to the faith1 beyond the earthly life1 a future1 the passage into which is to be made the easier by loss and sorrow here2 if families are there to be reunited1 and void places in the affections filled again2 if worthy hopes1 seemingly disappointed1 are only postponed for a richer and happier fulfilment1--there is in that future exhaustless strength for solace and support under what must be endured here4 ,earthly trial must seem light and momentary in view of perfect and eternal happiness2 and thus the hope that lays hold on an infinite domain of being is coined into utilities for the daily needs of the tried1 suffering1 afflicted1 and age-bowed1 supplying to patience an element without which it cannot be made perfect4 ,section ,,ii4 ,submission4 ,there are events1 seemingly adverse1 which in themselves are transient1 and inflict no permanent discomfort1 but which necessitate the surrender of cherished expectations1 the change of favorite plans1 it may be1 the life-long abandonment of aims and hopes that had held the foremost place in the anticipated future4 ,here submission of some sort is a necessity4 ,but the submission may be querulous and repining2 it may be bitter and resentful2 it may be stern and rigid4 ,in the last of these types only can there be any semblance of virtue2 and this last can be virtuous1 only where inevitable events are attributed to ,fate1 and not to ,providence4 ,but if a wise and kind ,providence presides over human affairs1 its decrees are our directory4 ,the very events which hedge in1 mark out our way4 ,the tree which has its upward growth checked spreads its branches2 that which is circumscribed in its lateral expansion attains the greater height4 ,the tendrils of the vine are guided by the very obstacles placed in its way4 ,thus1 in human life1 impassable barriers in one direction prescribe aims and endeavors in a different direction4 ,the things that we cannot do determine the things that we ought to do4 ,the growth which is impeded must give place to growth of a different type1 and to us undoubtedly more wholesome1 more congenial with our capacities1 more conducive to our true well-being4 ,what seem obstacles may be supports1 giving the best possible direction to our active powers1 and so training our desires and affections as to lead to higher happiness and more substantial good than could have otherwise been attained4 99,submission991 then1 99must be grounded in faith994 ,the inevitable must be to us the appointment of ,omniscient ,love4 ,in our childhood the very regimen and discipline that were least to our taste proceeded often from the wisest counsels1 and in due time we acquiesced in them as judicious and kind1 nor would we in the retrospect have had them otherwise4 ,as little as we then knew what was best for our well-being in the nearer future1 we may now know as to what is best for us in a remote future1 whether in the present or in a higher state of being4 ,all that remains for us is acquiescence1 cheerful and hopeful1 in a ,wisdom that cannot err1 in a ,love which can will only the best of which we are capable4 99,submission99 is not merely a passive1 but equally 99an active virtue994 ,inevitable events impose imperative duties4 ,in the direction which they indicate there is work for us1 of self-culture1 of kindness1 of charity4 ,our characters can be developed1 not by yielding1 however cheerfully1 to what seem misfortunes1 but by availing ourselves of the opportunities which they present1 in place of those of which they have deprived us4 ,when the way we had first chosen is barred against us1 we are not to lie still1 but to move onward with added diligence on the way that is thus opened to us4 ,if outward success is arrested and reverted1 there is only the more reason for improving the staple of our inward being4 ,if those dearest to us have passed beyond the reach of our good offices1 there are the more remote that may be brought near1 and made ours1 by our beneficence4 ,if our earthly life is rendered desolate1 the affections1 hopes1 and aims thus unearthed may by our spiritual industry and thrift be trained heavenward4 ,all this is included in full submission to the will of the ,divine providence2 for that will is not our loss1 disappointment1 or suffering1 but our growth1 by means of it1 in quantity of mental and spiritual life1 in capacity of duty1 and in the power of usefulness4 ,section ,,iii4 ,courage4 ,patience1 as its name imports1 is a passive quality2 ,submission blends the passive and the active2 while 99,courage99 is preminently an active virtue4 ,patience resigns itself to what must be endured2 submission conforms itself to what it gladly would1 but cannot reverse2 courage resists what it cannot evade1 surmounts what it cannot remove1 and declines no conflict in which it is honorable to engage4 ,it is obvious that the occasions for these virtues are widely different4 ,patience has its place where calm and cheerful endurance is the only resource2 submission1 where there must be voluntary self-adaptation to altered circumstances2 courage1 where there is threatened evil which strenuous effort can avert1 mitigate1 or subdue4 99,courage is a virtue1 only when it is a necessity499 ,there is no merit in seeking danger1 in exciting opposition1 in courting hostility4 ,indeed1 conduct of this description more frequently proceeds from persons who know themselves cowards and fear to be thought so1 than from those who are actually possessed of courage4 ,but there are perils1 encounters1 enmities1 which cannot by any possibility be avoided1 and there are others which can be avoided only by the sacrifice of principle1 or by the surrender of opportunities for doing good1 and which1 therefore1 to a virtuous man are inevitable4 ,the 99physical courage991 commonly so called1 which is prompt and fearless in the presence of imminent danger1 or in armed conflict with enemies1 may be1 or may not be1 a virtue4 ,it may proceed from a mind too shallow and frivolous to appreciate the worth of life or the magnitude of the peril that threatens it2 it may1 as often in the case of veteran soldiers1 be the result of discipline without the aid of principle2 or it may depend wholly on intense and engrossing excitement1 so that he who would march fearlessly at the head of a forlorn hope might quail before a solitary foe4 ,but if one be1 in the face of peril1 at the same time calm and resolute1 self-collected and firm1 cautious and bold1 fully aware of all that he must encounter and unfalteringly brave in meeting it1 such courage is a high moral attainment4 ,its surest source is trust in the ,divine providence1--the fixed conviction that the inevitable cannot be otherwise than of benignant purpose and ministry1 though that purpose may be developed and that ministry effected only in a higher state of being4 ,to this faith must be added a strong sense of one's manhood1 and of his superiority by virtue of that manhood over all external surroundings and events4 ,we are conscious of a rightful supremacy over the outward world1 and deem it unworthy to succumb1 without internecine resistance1 to any force by which we may be assailed1 whether that force be a power of nature or a wrongful assault from a fellow-man4 ,it is the presence of this consciousness that wins our admiration for all genuine heroism1 and the absence of it at the moment of need that makes cowardice contemptible4 ,there is a 99moral courage99 required in pursuing our legitimate course in life1 or in discharging our manifest duty1 notwithstanding straitnesses1 hindrances1 obstacles1 to which the feeble and timid could not but yield4 ,the constituent elements of this type of courage are precisely the same that are needed in the encounter with physical peril4 ,in both cases it is equally unmanly to succumb until we have resisted to the utmost4 ,but while physical courage can at best only insure our safety1 moral courage contributes essentially to the growth of mind and character2 and the larger the opportunity for its exercise1 the greater will be the mass of mind1 the quantity of character1 the power of duty and of usefulness4 ,straitnesses develop richer resources than they bar4 ,hindrances nurture hardihood of spirit in the struggle against them1 or in the effort to neutralize them4 ,obstacles1 when surmounted1 give one a higher position than could be attained on an unobstructed path4 ,the school of difficulty is that in which we have our most efficient training for eminence1 whether of capacity or of moral excellence4 ,what are accounted inevitable evils are1 when met with courage1 only benefits and blessings1 inasmuch as they bring into full and vigorous exercise the hardier muscles and sinews of the inner man1 to measure strength with them or to rise above them4 ,courage is needed in 99the profession and maintenance of the true and the right991 when denied1 assailed1 or vilipended4 ,communities never move abreast in the progress of opinion4 ,there are always pioneer minds and consciences2 and the men who are in advance of their time must encounter obloquy at least1 often persecution1 loss1 hardship1 sometimes legal penalties and disabilities4 ,under such circumstances1 there are doubtless many more that inwardly acknowledge the unpopular truth or the contested right1 than there are who are willing to avow and defend their belief4 ,many are frightened into false utterance or deceptive silence4 ,but there must be in such minds a conscious mendacity1 fatal to their own self-respect1 and in the highest degree detrimental to their moral selfhood4 ,it demands and at the same time nurtures true greatness of soul to withstand the current of general opinion1 to defy popular prejudice1 to make one's self 8of no reputation0 in order to preserve his integrity unimpaired4 ,therefore is it that1 in the lapse of time1 the very men who have been held in the lowest esteem rise into eminence in the general regard1 sometimes while they are still living1 oftener with a succeeding generation4 ,martyrs in their day1 they receive the crown of martyrdom when the work which they commenced is consummated4 ,the history of all the great reforms which have been successive eras in the moral progress of ,christendom is full of names1 once dishonored1 now among the foremost of their race4 ,this type of courage has1 in less enlightened ages than our own1 been made illustrious by 99those who have sacrificed life rather than deny or suppress beliefs99 which they deemed of vital moment4 ,it can hardly be anticipated that the civilized world will recede so far into barbarism as to light again the death-flame of persecution2 but it may be questioned whether the chronic sacrifice of all which men most desire in life requires or manifests less of heroism than in earlier times furnished victims for the arena or the stake4 ,in the moral hierarchy the first rank is probably due to 99the courage that inspires and sustains arduous and perilous philanthropic enterprise994 ,the martyr for opinion suffers or dies rather than stain his soul with the positive guilt of falsehood2 while the philanthropist might evade toil and danger without committing any actual sin1 or making himself liable to censure or disapproval either from ,god or man4 ,in the former case1 hardship or danger is rendered inevitable by the felt necessity of self-respect2 in the latter1 by the urgency of a love for man equal or superior to the love for self4 ,as examples of this highest type of courage1 it may suffice to name ,howard1 whose labors for prison-reform were pursued at the well-known risk and the ultimate cost of his life2 ,florence ,nightingale and the noble sisterhood inaugurated by her1 who have won all the untarnished and undisputed laurels of recent wars on both sides of the ,atlantic2 and the ,christian missionaries to savage tribes and in pestilential climates1 who have often gone to their work with as clear a consciousness of deadly peril as if they had been on their way to a battle-field4 ,chapter ,,xii4 ,,order2 ,,or ,,duties ,,as ,,to ,,objects ,,under ,,one',s ,,own ,,control4 ,there are many duties that are self-defined and self-limited4 ,thus1 the ordinary acts of justice and many of the charities of daily life include in themselves the designation of time1 place1 and measure4 ,there are other duties1 of equal obligation1 which admit of wide variance as to these particulars1 but which can be most worthily and efficiently performed only when reference is had to them4 ,there are1 also1 many acts1 in themselves morally indifferent1 which acquire their moral character as right or wrong solely from one or more of these particulars4 ,thus recreations that are innocent and fitting on ,saturday1 may be inconsistent with the proprieties of ,sunday2 conversation and conduct perfectly befitting the retirement of home may be justly offensive in a place of public concourse2 or there may be great guilt in the excessive use of that which used in moderation may be blameless1 fitting1 and salutary4 ,section ,i4 ,time4 99,a life-time is none too long for a life's work499 ,hence the fitness1 and therefore the duty1 of a careful economy of time4 ,this economy can be secured only by a systematic arrangement of one's hours of labor1 relaxation1 and rest1 and the assignment to successive portions of the day1 week1 or year1 of their appropriate uses4 ,the amount of time wasted1 even by an industrious man who has no method or order in his industry1 bears a very large proportion to the time profitably employed4 ,in the needlessly frequent change of occupations1 there is at each beginning and ending a loss of the working power1 which can neither start on a new career at full speed1 nor arrest itself without previous slackening4 ,this waste is made still greater by the suspense or vacillation of purpose of those who not only have no settled plans of industry1 but often know not what to do1 or are liable1 so soon as they are occupied in one way1 to feel themselves irresistibly drawn in a different direction4 ,but in the distribution of time 99a man should be the master1 not the slave of his system994 ,the regular work and the actual duty of the moment do not always coincide4 ,due care for health1 the opportunity for earned and needed recreation1 the claims of charity1 courtesy1 and hospitality1 in fine1 the immediate urgency of any duty selfward1 manward1 or ,godward1 should always take precedence of routine-work however wisely planned4 ,obstinate adherence to system may lead to more and greater criminal omissions of duty than would be incurred1 even in the spasmodic industry which takes its impulse from the passing moment4 ,it must be remembered that timeliness is the essential element of right and obligation in many things that ought to be done1 especially in all forms of charity1 alike in great services1 and in those lesser amenities and kindnesses which contribute so largely to the charm of society and the happiness of domestic life4 ,there are many good offices which1 performed too late1 were better left undone1--courtesies which1 postponed1 are incivilities1--attentions which1 out of season1 are needless and wearisome4 99,every day1 every waking hour has its own duty991 either its special work1 or its due portion of one's normal life-work4 ,procrastination is1 therefore1 as unwise as it is immoral1 or rather1 it is immoral because it is unwise and unfitting4 ,the morrow has its own appropriate duties2 and if to-day's work be thrown into it1 the massing of two days' good work into one exceeds ordinary ability4 ,the consequence is1 either that both days' works are imperfectly performed1 or that part of what fitly belongs to the morrow is pushed farther on1 and the derangement of duty made chronic4 ,thus there are persons who are always in arrears with their engagements and occupations1--in chase1 as it were1 after duties which they never lose from sight1 and never overtake4 99,hardly less grave199 though less common1 99is the error of those who anticipate duty991 and do to-day what they ought to do to-morrow4 ,the work thus anticipated may be superseded1 or may be performed under better auspices and with fewer hindrances in its own time2 while it can hardly fail to interfere injuriously with the fit employment or due relaxation of the passing day4 ,moreover1 the habit of thus performing work before its time at once betokens and intensifies an uneasy1 self-distrusting frame of mind1 unfavorable to vigorous effort1 and still more so to the quiet enjoyment of needed rest and recreation4 ,there are those1 who are perpetually haunted by the forecast shadows1 not only of fixed1 but of contingent obligations and duties1--shadows generally larger than the substance1 and often wholly destitute of substance4 99,punctuality997#ag7 denotes the most scrupulous precision as to time1--exactness to a moment in the observance of all times that can be designated or agreed upon4 ,in matters with which we alone are concerned1 we undoubtedly have of right1 and may often very fittingly exercise1 the dispensing power4 ,thus1 in the arrangement of our own pursuits1 the clock may measure and direct our industry1 without binding us by its stroke4 ,it is often of more consequence that we finish what is almost done1 than that we change our work because the usual hour for a change has arrived4 ,but where others are concerned1 rigid punctuality is an imperative duty4 ,a fixed time for an assembly1 a meeting of a committee or board of trust1 or a business interview1 is a virtual contract into which each person concerned has entered with every other1 and the strict rules that apply to contracts of all kinds are applicable here4 ,failure in punctuality is dishonesty4 ,it involves the theft of time1 which to some men is money's worth1 to others is worth more than money4 ,it ought not to surprise us if one wantonly or habitually negligent in this matter should prove himself oblivious of other and even more imperative obligations2 for the dullness of conscience and the obscure sense of right1 indicated by the frequent breach of virtual contracts as to time1 betoken a character too feeble to maintain its integrity against any strong temptation4 ,section ,,ii4 ,place4 ,the trite maxim1 99,a place for everything1 and everything in its place991 so commends itself to the sense of fitness1 as hardly to need exposition or enforcement2 yet while no maxim is more generally admitted1 scarce any is so frequently violated in practice4 ,in duty1 the elements of time and place are intimately blended4 ,disorder in place generates derangement in time4 ,the object which is out of place can be found only by the waste of time2 and the most faithful industry loses a large part of its value when its materials are wanting where they ought to be1 and must be sought where they ought not to be4 ,apart from considerations of utility1 order is an sthetic duty4 ,it is needed to satisfy the sense of beauty4 ,its violation offends the eye1 insults the taste4 ,the sthetic nature craves and claims culture4 ,it has abundant provision made for it in external nature2 but so large a part of life must be passed within doors1 at least in a climate like ours1 that it is starved and dwarfed1 if there be not in interior arrangements some faint semblance of the symmetry and harmony of the universe4 ,to effect this needs neither abundance nor costliness of material4 ,a ,french man or woman will charm the eye at a cost which in ,england would be represented by bare and squalid poverty4 ,a ,parisian shop-window will make with a few francs' worth of goods an exhibition of artistical beauty which might challenge the most fastidious criticism4 ,these effects are produced solely by prime reference to fitness of place1--to orderly arrangement1--to a symmetry which all can understand1 and which any one might copy4 ,our very capacity of receiving gratification from this source is the measure of our duty in this regard4 ,if with the simplest materials we can give pleasure to the soul through the eye by merely assigning its fit place to every object1 order is among the plainest dictates of beneficence4 99,order is essential to domestic comfort and well-being991 and thus to all the virtues which have their earliest and surest nurture in domestic life4 ,there are homes at once affluent and joyless1 groaning with needless waste and barren of needed comfort1 in which the idea of repose seems as irrelevant as ,solomon's figure of lying down on the top of a mast1 and all from a pervading spirit of disorder4 ,in such dwellings there is no love of home4 ,the common house is a mere lodging and feeding place4 ,society is sought elsewhere1 pleasure elsewhere2 and for the young and easily impressible there is the strongest inducement to those modes of dissipation in which vice conceals its grossness behind fair exteriors and under attractive forms4 ,on the other hand1 the well-ordered house affords to its inmates the repose1 comfort1 and enjoyment which they crave and need1 and for those whose characters are in the process of formation may neutralize allurements to evil which might else be irresistible4 ,section ,,iii4 ,measure4 ,there are many objects1 as to which 99the question of duty is a question of more or less994 ,to this class belong not only food and drink1 but all forms of luxury1 indulgence1 recreation1 and amusement4 ,in all these the choice lies between excess1 abstinence1 and temperance4 ,the tendency to excess is intensely strong1 when not restrained by prudence or principle4 ,this tendency is by no means confined to the appetite for intoxicating liquors1 though modern usage has restricted to excess in this particular the term intemperance1 which properly bears a much more extended signification4 ,there is reason to believe that there is fully as much intemperance in food as in drink1 and with at least equally ruinous consequences as to capacity1 character1 health1 and life1--with this difference only1 that gluttony stupefies and stultifies1 while drunkenness maddens2 and that the glutton is merely a dead weight on the community1 while the drunkard is an active instrument of annoyance and peril4 ,there are probably fewer who sink into an absolutely beastly condition by intemperance in food than by intemperance in drink2 but of persons who do not expose themselves to open scandal1 those whose brains are muddled1 whose sensibilities are coarsened1 and whose working power is impaired by over-eating1 are more numerous than those in whom similar effects are produced by over-free indulgence in intoxicating drinks4 ,intemperance in amusements1 also1 is not uncommon1 and would undoubtedly be more prevalent than it is1 were not the inevitable necessity of labor imposed on most persons from a very early period4 ,in this matter the limit between temperance and excess is aptly fixed by the term recreation1 as applied to all the gay and festive portions of life4 ,re-creation is making over1 that is1 replacing the waste of tissue1 brain-power1 and physical and mental energy occasioned by hard work4 ,temperance permits the most generous indulgence of sport1 mirth1 and gayety that can be claimed as needful or conducive to this essential use1 but excludes all beyond this measure4 99,abstinence99 from all forms of luxury and recreation1 and from food and drink beyond the lowest demands of subsistence1 has1 under various cultures1 been regarded as a duty1 as an appropriate penance for sin1 as a means of spiritual growth1 as a token of advanced excellence4 ,this notion had its origin in the dualistic philosophy or theology of the ,east4 ,it was believed that the sovereignty of the universe was divided between the semi-omnipotent principles of good and evil1 and that the earth and the human body were created by the evil principle1--by ,satan or his analogue4 ,hence it was inferred that the evil principle could be abjured and defied1 and the good principle propitiated in no way so effectually as by renouncing the world and mortifying the body4 ,fasting1 as a religious observance1 originated in this belief4 ,it was imported from the ,east4 ,the ,hebrew fasts were not established by ,moses2 they were evidently borrowed from ,babylon1 and seem to have been regarded with no favor by the prophets4 ,the ,founder of ,christianity prescribed no fast1 nor have we any reason to believe that his immediate disciples regarded abstinence as a duty4 ,christian asceticism in all its forms is1 like the ,jewish fasts1 of ,oriental origin1 and had its first developments in close connection with those hybrids of ,christianity and ,oriental philosophy of which the dualism already mentioned forms a prominent feature4 ,with regard to all objects of appetite1 desire1 and enjoyment1 99temperance99 is evidently fitting1 and therefore a duty1 unless there be specific reasons for abstinence4 ,temperance demands and implies moral activity4 ,in the temperate man the appetites1 desires1 and tastes have their continued existence1 and need vigilant and wise control1 so that he has always work to do1 a warfare to wage2 and as conflict with the elements gives vigor to the body1 so does conflict with the body add strength continually to the moral nature4 ,the ascetic may have a hard struggle at the outset2 but his aim is to extirpate his imagined enemies in the bodily affections1 and when these are completely mortified1 or put to death1 there remains no more for him to do1 and moral idleness and lethargy ensue4 ,simon ,stylites1 who spent thirty-seven years on pillars of different heights1 had probably stupefied his moral faculties and sensibilities as effectually as he had crushed to death the appetites and cravings of the body4 ,it must not be forgotten that the body no less than the soul is of ,god's building1 and that in his purpose all the powers and capacities of the body are good in their place and uses1 and therefore to be controlled and governed1 not destroyed or suppressed4 ,the medival saint1 feeding on the offal of the streets1 was unwittingly committing sacrilege1 by degrading and imbruting an appetite for which ,god had provided decent and wholesome nutriment4 ,temperance is better than abstinence1 also1 because 99the moderate use of the objects of desire is a source of refining and elevating influences994 ,it is not without meaning that1 in common speech1 the possession or loss of the senses is made synonymous with mental sanity or derangement4 ,by the temperate gratification of the senses the mind is sustained in its freshness1 vigor1 and serenity2 while when they are perverted by excess1 impaired by age1 or deadened by disease1 in that same proportion the mental powers are distracted1 enfeebled1 or benumbed4 ,taste1 the faculty through which we become conversant with the whole realm of beauty1 and than which devotion has no more efficient auxiliary1 derives its name from what the ascetic deems the lowest animal enjoyment1 which1 however1 has its range of the very highest ministries4 ,the table is the altar of home-love and of hospitality1 and there are clustered around it unnumbered courtesies1 kindnesses1 and charities that make a large part of the charm and joy of life4 ,so far is thoughtfulness for its graceful and generous service from indicating a low type of character1 that there is hardly any surer index of refinement and elegant culture than is furnished by the family meal4 ,similar remarks apply to the entire range of pleasurable objects and experiences4 ,while there are none of them in which excess is safe1 they all1 when enjoyed in moderation1 stimulate the mental powers1 develop and train the sthetic faculty1 and multiply beneficial relations alike with nature and with society4 99,temperance991 rather than abstinence1 99is needed on grounds connected with social economy994 ,labor for the mere necessaries of life occupies hardly a tithe of human industry4 ,a nation of ascetics would be a nation of idlers4 ,it is the demand for objects of enjoyment1 taste1 luxury1 that floats ships1 dams rivers1 stimulates invention1 feeds prosperity1 and creates the wealth of nations4 ,it is only excess and extravagance that sustain and aggravate social inequalities1 wrongs1 wants1 and burdens2 while moderate1 yet generous use oils the springs and speeds the wheels of universal industry1 progress1 comfort1 and happiness4 ,but there are 99cases in which abstinence991 rather than temperance1 99is a duty994 99,past excess99 may render temperance hardly possible4 ,from the derangement consequent upon excess1 an appetite may lose the capacity of healthy exercise4 ,in such a case1 as we would amputate a diseased and useless limb1 we should suppress the appetite which we can no longer control4 ,physiological researches have shown that the excessive use of intoxicating drinks1 when long continued1 produces an organic condition1 in which the slightest indulgence is liable to excite a craving so intense as to transcend the control of the will4 99,inherited proclivities99 may1 in like manner1 render temperance so difficult as to make abstinence a duty4 ,it is conceivable that a nation or a community may1 by the prevalence of excess in past generations1 be characterized by so strong a tendency to intemperance as to render general abstinence a prerequisite to general temperance4 ,abstinence may also become a duty1 if to many around us our 99example99 in what we may enjoy innocently would be ensnaring and perilous4 ,the recreation1 harmless in itself1 which by long abuse has become a source of corruption1 it may be our duty to forego4 ,the indulgence1 safe for us1 which would be unsafe for our associates1 it may be incumbent on us to resign4 ,the food1 the drink which would make our table a snare to our guests1 we may be bound to refrain from1 though for ourselves there be in it no latent evil or lurking danger4 ,this1 however1 is a matter in which each person must determine his duty for himself alone1 and in which no one is authorized to legislate for others4 ,it may seem to a conscientious man a worthy enterprise to vindicate and rescue from its evil associations an amusement or indulgence in itself not only harmless1 but salutary2 and there may be an equally strong sense of right on both sides of a question of social morality falling under this head4 ,the joyous side of life must be maintained4 ,the young1 sanguine1 and happy will at all events have recreations1 games1 festivities1 and of these there is not a single element1 material1 or feature that has not been abused1 perverted1 or invested with associations offensive to a pure moral taste4 ,to disown and oppose them all in the name of virtue1 is to prescribe a degree of abstinence which can have the assent of those only who have outlived the capacity of enjoyment4 ,the more judicious course is to favor1 or at least to tolerate such modes of indulgence as may for the present be the least liable to abuse1 or such as may in prospect be the safest in their moral influence1 and by sanctioning these to render more emphatic and efficient the disapproval and rejection of such as are intrinsically wrong and evil4 ,section ,,iv4 ,manners4 ,the ancients had but one word for 99manners and morals994 ,it might be well if the same were the case with us1--yet with this essential difference1 that while they degraded morals to the level of manners1 a higher culture would lead us to raise manners to the level of morals4 ,the main characteristics of good manners are comprised in the three preceding ,sections4 ,they are the observance1 in one's demeanor and conduct toward others1 of the fitnesses of time and place1 and of the due and graceful mean between overwrought1 extravagant1 or fantastic manifestations of regard on the one hand1 and coldness1 superciliousness1 or indifference on the other4 ,courtesies1 like more substantial kindnesses1 are neutralized by delay1 and1 when slow1 seem forced and reluctant4 ,attentions1 which in their place are gratifying1 may1 if misplaced1 occasion only mortification and embarrassment1 as when civilities befitting interior home-life are rehearsed for the public eye and ear4 ,nor is there any department of conduct in which excess or deficiency is more painfully felt1--a redundance of compliments and assiduities tending to silence and abash the recipient1 while their undue scanting inflicts a keen sense of slight1 neglect1 and injury4 99,politeness99 must1 indeed1 in order even to appear genuine1 be the expression of sincere kindness4 ,there is no pretence so difficult to maintain as the false show of genial and benevolent feeling4 ,the mask cannot be so fitted to the face as not to betray its seams and sutures4 ,yet kindness is not of itself politeness4 ,its spontaneous expressions may be rude and awkward2 or they may take forms not readily understood and appreciated4 ,there are conventional modes of polite demeanor no less than of courteous speech4 ,these modes may have no intrinsic fitness1 yet they acquire a fitness from their long and general use2 and while the mere repetition of stereotyped formulas whether in word or deportment is justly offensive1 he who would have his politeness recognized and enjoyed must beware lest he depart too widely from the established sign-language of society4 ,there is a brusquerie often underlying hearty kindness and good fellowship1 which at the outset pains1 wounds1 and repels those brought within its sphere1 and which the most intimate friends endure and excuse rather than approve4 99,politeness is to be regarded as an indispensable duty499 ,it is believed that from its neglect or violation more discomfort ensues than from any other single cause1 and in some circles and conditions of society more than from all other causes combined4 ,there are neighborhoods and communities that are seldom disturbed by grave offences against the criminal law1 but none which can insure itself against the affronts1 enmities1 wounded sensibilities1 rankling grievances1 occasioned by incivility and rudeness4 ,moreover1 there are persons entirely free from vice1 perhaps ostentatious in the qualities which are the opposites of vices1 and not deficient in charitable labors and gifts1 who cultivate discourtesy1 are acrid or bitter in their very deeds of charity1 and carry into every society a certain porcupine selfhood1 which makes their mere presence annoying and baneful4 ,such persons1 besides the suffering they inflict on individuals1 are of unspeakable injury to their respective circles or communities1 by making their very virtues unlovely1 and piety1 if they profess it1 hateful4 ,on the other hand1 there is no truer benefactor to society--if the creation of happiness be the measure of benefit--than the genuine gentleman or gentlewoman1 who adds grace to virtue1 politeness to kindness2 who under the guidance of a sincere fellow-feeling1 studies the fitnesses of speech and manner1 in civility and courtesy endeavors to render to all their due1 and in the least details that can affect another's happiness1 does carefully and conscientiously all that the most fastidious sensibility could claim or desire4 ,section ,v4 ,government4 99,the establishment and preservation of order is the prime and essential function of government992 the prevention and punishment of crime1 its secondary1 incidental1 perhaps even temporary use4 ,in a perfect state of society1 government would still be necessary2 for it would be only by the observance of common and mutual designations of time1 place1 and measure1 that each individual member of society could enjoy the largest liberty and the fullest revenue from objects of desire1 compatible with the just claims and rights of others4 ,these benefits can1 under no conceivable condition in which finite beings can be placed1 be secured except by system1 under a central administration1 and with the submission of individual wills and judgments to constituted and established authority4 ,a bad government1 then1 is better than none2 for a bad government can exist only by doing a part of its appropriate work1 while in a state of anarchy the whole of that work is left undone and unattempted4 99,obedience to government is991 then1 fitting1 and therefore a duty1 independently of all considerations as to the wisdom1 or even the justice of its decrees or statutes4 ,if they are unwise1 they yet are rules to which the community can conform itself1 and by which its members can make their plans and govern their expectations1 while lawlessness is the negation alike of guidance for the present and of confidence in the future4 ,if they are unjust1 they yet do less wrong and to fewer persons1 than would be done by individual and sporadic attempts to evade or neutralize them4 ,nay1 unwise and inequitable laws1 to which the habits and the industrial relations of a people have adjusted themselves1 are to be preferred to vacillating legislation1 though in a generally right direction4 ,laws that affect important interests should be improved only with reference to the virtual pledges made by previous legislation1 and so as to guard the interests involved against the injurious effects of new and revolutionary measures4 ,the tariff regulations of our own country will illustrate the bearing of this principle4 ,it forms no part of our present plan to discuss the mooted questions of free trade and protection4 ,but in the confession of even extreme partisans on either side1 the capital and industry of our people could never have suffered so much from any one tariff of duties1 however injudicious1 as they suffered for a series of years from sudden changes of policy1 by which investments that had been invited by the legislation of one ,congress were made fruitless by the action of the next1 and manufactures stimulated into rapid growth by high protective duties1 were arrested and often ruined by their sudden repeal4 ,the stability of laws is obviously a higher good than their conformity to the theoretical views of the more enlightened citizens4 ,except under a despotism1 laws are virtually an expression of the opinion or will of the majority2 and laws which by any combination of favoring circumstances are enacted in advance of the general opinion1 are always liable to speedy repeal1 with a double series of the injurious consequences which can hardly fail to ensue immediately on any change4 ,but are there no 99limits to obedience998 ,undoubtedly there are4 ,a bad law is to be obeyed for the sake of order2 an immoral law is to be disobeyed for the sake of the individual conscience2 and of the moral character of a particular law1 or of action under it1 the individual conscience is the only legitimate judge4 ,where the law of the land and absolute right are at variance1 the citizen is bound1 not only to withhold obedience1 but to avow his belief1 and to give it full expression in every legitimate form and way1 by voice and pen1 by private influence and through the ballot-box4 ,but in the interest of the public order1 it is his duty to confine his opposition to legal and constitutional methods1 to refrain from factious and seditious resistance1 to avoid1 if possible1 the emergency in which disobedience would become his duty1 and in case his conscience constrains him to disobedience1 still to show his respect for the majesty of law by quietly submitting to its penalty4 ,the still recent history of our country furnishes a case in point4 ,by the ,fugitive-,slave ,law--which the ,divine providence1 indeed1 repealed without waiting for the action of ,congress--the private citizen who gave shelter1 sustenance1 or comfort to a fugitive slave2 who1 knowing his hiding-place1 omitted to divulge it1 or who1 when called upon to assist in arresting him1 refused his aid1 was made liable to a heavy fine and a long imprisonment4 ,now as to this law1 it was obviously the duty of a citizen who regarded the slave as entitled to the rights of a man1 to seek its repeal by all constitutional methods within his power4 ,it was equally his duty to refrain from all violent interference with the functionaries charged with its execution1 and to avoid1 if possible1 all collision with the government4 ,but if1 without his seeking1 a fugitive slave had been cast upon his humane offices1 the question then would have arisen whether he should obey ,god or man2 and to this question he could have had but one answer4 ,yet his obedience to ,god would have lacked its crowning grace1 if he had not meekly yielded to the penalty for his disobedience to the law of the land4 ,it was by this course that the primitive ,christians attested their loyalty at once to ,god and to 8the powers that be10 which were 8ordained of ,god40 ,they refused obedience to the civil authorities in matters in which their religious duty was compromised2 but they neither resisted nor evaded the penalty for their disobedience4 ,similar was the course of the ,quakers in ,england and ,america almost down to our own time4 ,they were quiet and useful citizens1 performing the same functions with their fellow-citizens1 so far as their consciences permitted1 and1 where conscience interposed its veto1 taking patiently the distraining of their goods1 and the imprisonment of their bodies1 until1 by their blameless lives and their meek endurance1 they won from the governments both of the mother country and of the ,united ,states1 amnesty for their conscientious scruples4 ,there may be a state of society in which it becomes 99the duty of good citizens to assume an illegal attitude1 and to perform illegal acts1 in the interest of law and order994 ,if those who are legally intrusted with executive and judicial offices are openly1 notoriously1 and persistently false to their trusts1 to such a degree as to derange and subvert the social order which it is their function to maintain1 good citizens1 if they have the power1 have undoubtedly the right to displace them1 and to institute a provisional government for the temporary emergency4 ,a case of this kind occurred a few years ago in ,san ,francisco4 ,the entire government of the city had for a series of years been under the control of ruffians and miscreants1 and force and fraud had rendered the ballot-box an ineffectual remedy4 ,no law-abiding citizen deemed his life or property safe2 gross outrages were committed with impunity2 and thieves and murderers alone had the protection of the municipal authorities4 ,despairing of legal remedy1 the best citizens of all parties organized themselves under the direction of a ,committee of ,safety1 forcibly deposed the municipal magistrates and judges1 brought well-known criminals to trial1 conviction1 and punishment1 restablished the integrity of suffrage1 and resigned their power to functionaries lawfully elected1 under whom and their successors the city has enjoyed a degree of order1 tranquillity1 and safety at least equal to that of any other great city on the continent4 99,the right of revolution99 undoubtedly is inherent in a national body politic2 but it is an extreme right1 and is to be exercised only under the most urgent necessity4 ,its conditions cannot be strictly defined1 and its exercise can1 perhaps1 be justified only by its results4 ,a constitutional government can seldom furnish occasion for violent revolutionary measures2 for every constitution has its own provisions for legal amendment1 and the public sentiment ripe for revolution can hardly fail to be strong enough to carry the amendments which it craves1 through the legal processes1 which1 if slow and cumbrous1 are immeasurably preferable to the employment of force and the evils of civil war4 ,on the other hand1 a despotic or arbitrary government may admit of abrogation only by force2 and if its administration violates private rights1 imposes unrighteous burdens and disabilities1 suppresses the development of the national resources1 and supersedes the administration of justice or the existence of equitable relations between class and class or between man and man1 the people--the rightful source and arbiter of government--has manifestly the right to assert its own authority1 and to substitute a constitution and rulers of its own choice for the sovereignty which has betrayed its trust4 ,under similar oppression1 the same right unquestionably exists in a remote colony1 or in a nation subject by conquest to a foreign power4 ,if that power refuses the rights and privileges of subjects to a people over which it exercises sovereignty1 and governs it in its own imagined interests1 with a systematic and persistent disregard to the well-being of the people thus governed1 resistance is a right1 and may become a duty4 ,in fine1 the function of government is the maintenance of just and beneficent order2 a government forfeits its rights when it is false to this function2 and the rights thus forfeited revert to the misgoverned people4 ,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,casuistry4 ,casuistry is the application of the general principles of morality to individual cases in which there is room for question as to duty4 ,the question may be as to the obligation or the rightfulness of a particular act1 as to the choice between two alternative courses1 as to the measure or limit of a recognized duty1 or as to the grounds of preference when there seems to be a conflict of duties4 ,a large proportion of these cases disappear under any just view of moral obligation4 ,most questions of conscience have their origin in deficient conscientiousness4 ,he who is determined to do the right1 the whole right1 and nothing but the right1 is seldom at a loss to know what he ought to do4 ,but when the aim is to evade all difficult duties which can be omitted without shame or the clear consciousness of wrong1 and to go as close as possible to the boundary line between good and evil without crossing it1 the questions that arise are often perplexing and complicated1 and they are such as1 in the interest of virtue1 may fittingly remain unanswered4 ,there are always those whose aim is1 not to attain any definite1 still less any indefinitely high1 standard of goodness1 but to be saved from the penal consequences of wrong-doing2 and there are even 7so-called7 religious persons1 and teachers too1 with whom this negative indemnity from punishment fills out the whole meaning of the sacred and significant term salvation4 ,it must be confessed that questions which could emanate only from such minds1 furnish a very large part of the often voluminous and unwieldy treatises on casuistry that have come down to us from earlier times1 especially of those of the ,jesuit moralists1 whose chief endeavor is to lay out a border-path just outside the confines of acknowledged wrong and evil4 ,yet there are 99cases in which the most conscientious persons may be in doubt as to the right994 ,we can here indicate only the general principles on which such cases are to be decided1 with a very few specific illustrations4 99,the question of duty is often a question991 not of principle1 but 99of fact994 ,it is the case1 the position and relations of the persons or objects concerned1 that we do not fully understand4 ,for instance1 when a new appeal is made for our charitable aid1 in labor or money1 the question is not whether it is our duty to assist in a work of real beneficence1 but whether for the proposed object1 and under the direction of those who make the appeal1 our labor or money will be lucratively invested in the service of humanity4 ,there are1 certainly1 benevolent associations and enterprises for the very noblest ends1 whose actual utility is open to the gravest doubt4 ,it is sometimes difficult even to determine a question of justice or equity1 simply because the circumstances of the case1 so far as we can understand them1 do not define the right4 ,instances of this class might be multiplied2 but they are all instances in which there is no obscurity as to our obligation or duty1 and therefore no question for moral casuistry4 ,we are1 however1 obviously bound1 by considerations of fitness1 to seek the fullest information within our power in every case in which we are compelled to act1 or see fit to act2 nor can we regard action without knowledge1 even though the motive be virtuous1 as either safe or blameless4 99,the measure or limit of duty99 is with many conscientious persons a serious question4 ,here an exact definition is hardly possible1 and a generous liberty may be given to individual taste or judgment2 yet considerations of fitness set bounds to that liberty4 ,thus direct and express self-culture is a duty incumbent on all1 yet in which diversity of inclination may render very different degrees of diligence equally fitting and right2 but all self-centred industry is fittingly limited by domestic1 social1 and civic obligations4 ,thus1 also1 direct acts of beneficence are obviously incumbent on all2 but the degree of self-sacrifice for beneficent ends need not1 nay1 ought not to be the same for every one2 and while we hold in the highest admiration those who make the entire surrender of all that they have and are to the service of mankind1 we have no reason to scant our esteem for those who are simply kind and generous1 while they at the same time labor1 spend1 or save for their own benefit4 ,indeed1 the world has fully as much need of the latter as of the former4 ,were the number of self-devoting philanthropists over-large1 a great deal of the necessary business and work of life would be left undone2 and did self-denying givers constitute a very numerous body1 the dependent and mendicant classes would be much more numerous than they are2 while the withdrawal of expenditure for personal objects would paralyze industrial enterprise1 and arrest the creation of that general wealth which contributes to the general comfort and happiness1 and the accumulation of those large fortunes which are invaluable as safety-funds and movement-funds for the whole community4 ,there are cases in which there is manifestly a 99conflict of duties994 ,this most frequently occurs between prudence and beneficence4 ,up to a certain point they coincide4 ,no prudent man will suffer himself to contract unsocial1 or selfish1 or miserly habits1 or to neglect the ordinary good offices and common charities of life4 ,but is one bound to transcend the limits of prudence1 and1 without any specific grounds of personal obligation1 to incur loss1 hardship1 or peril1 in behalf of another person8 ,one is no doubt bound to do all that he could reasonably expect from another1 were their positions reversed2 but is it his duty to do more than this8 ,in answer1 it must be admitted that he who in such a case suffers prudence to limit his beneficence has done all that duty absolutely requires2 but1 in proportion to the warmth of his benevolence and the loftiness of his spirit and character1 he will find himself constrained to transcend this limit1 and to sacrifice prudence to beneficence4 ,thus--to take an instance from a class of events by no means infrequent--if ,i see a man in danger of drowning1 it is obviously my duty to do all that ,i can do for his rescue without putting my own life in jeopardy4 ,but ,i owe him no more than this4 ,my own life is precious to me and to my family1 and ,i have a right so to regard it4 ,i shall not deserve censure or self-reproach1 if ,i decline exposing myself to imminent peril4 ,yet if ,i have the generosity and the courage which belong to a truly noble nature1 ,i shall not content myself with doing no more than this1--,i shall hazard my own safety if there is reason to hope that my efforts may have a successful issue2 and in so doing ,i shall perform an act of heroic virtue4 ,the same principle will apply to exposure1 danger1 and sacrifice of every kind1 incurred for the safety1 relief1 or benefit of others4 ,we transgress no positive law of right1 when we omit doing for others more than we could rightfully expect were we in their place4 ,prudence in such a case is our right4 ,but it is a right which it is more noble to surrender than to retain2 and the readiness with which and the degree in which we are willing to surrender it1 may be taken as a fair criterion of our moral growth and strength4 ,under the title of 99,justice991 with the broad scope which we have given to it1 there may be an apparent conflict of duties1 and there are certain obvious laws of precedence which may cover all such cases4 ,we should first say that our obligations to the ,supreme ,being have a paramount claim above all duties to inferior beings1 had we not reason to believe that ,god is in no way so truly worshipped and served as by acts of justice and mercy to his children4 ,the ,divine ,teacher has given us to understand1 not that there is no time or place too sacred for charity1 but that holy times and places have their highest consecration in the love to man which love to ,god inspires4 ,toward men1 it hardly needs to be said that justice 7in the limited and ordinary acceptation of the word7 99has the precedence of charity994 ,indeed1 were it not for the prevalence of injustice--individual1 social1 and civic--there would hardly be any scope for the active exercise of charity4 ,want comes almost wholly from wrong4 ,were justice universal1 that is1 were the rights and privileges which fitly belong to men as men1 extended to and made available by all classes and conditions of men1 there would still be great inequalities of wealth and of social condition2 but abject and squalid poverty could hardly exist4 ,in almost every individual instance1 the withholding or delay of justice tends more or less directly toward the creation of the very evils which charity relieves4 ,no amount of generosity1 then1 can palliate injustice1 or stand as a substitute for justice4 ,as regards the persons to whom we owe offices of kindness or charity1 it is obvious that 99those related to us by consanguinity or affinity have the first 9999 claim994 ,these relations have all the elements of a natural alliance for mutual defence and help2 and it is impossible that their essential duties should be faithfully discharged and their fitnesses duly observed1 without creating sympathies that in stress of need will find expression in active charity4 ,in the next rank we may fittingly place our benefactors1 if their condition be such as to demand a return for their kind offices in our behalf4 ,nearness in place may be next considered2 for the very fact that the needs of our neighbors are or may be within our cognizance1 commends them especially to our charity1 and enables us to be the more judicious and effective in their relief4 ,indeed1 in smaller communities1 where the dwellings of the rich and of the poor are interspersed1 a general recognition of the claims of neighborhood on charity would cover the field of active beneficence with an efficiency attainable in no other way1 and at a greatly diminished cost of time and substance4 ,there is yet another type of neighborhood1 consecrated to our reverent observance by the parable of the ,good ,samaritan4 ,there are from time to time cases of want and suffering brought1 without our seeking1 under our immediate regard1--cast1 as it were1 directly upon our kind offices4 ,the person thus commended to us is1 for the time1 our nearest neighbor1 nay1 our nearest kinsman1 and the very circumstances which have placed him in this relation to us1 make him fittingly the foremost object of our charity4 ,the question sometimes presents itself 99whether 9999 we shall bestow an immediate1 yet transient benefit1 or a more remote1 but permanent good994 ,if the two are incompatible1 and the former is not a matter of absolute necessity1 the latter is to be preferred4 ,thus remunerative employment is much more beneficial than alms to an able-bodied man1 and it is better that he suffer some degree of straitness till he can earn a more comfortable condition1 than that he be first made to feel the dependence of pauperism4 ,yet if his want be entire and urgent1 the delay of immediate relief is the part of cruelty4 ,on similar grounds1 beneficence which embraces a class of cases or persons is to be preferred to particular acts of kindness to individuals4 ,thus it seems harsh to refuse alms to an unknown street beggar2 but as such relief gives shelter to a vast amount of fraud1 idleness1 and vice1 it is much better that we should sustain1 by contributions proportioned to our ability1 some system by which cases of actual need1 and such only1 can be promptly and adequately cared for1 and that we then--however reluctantly--refuse our alms to applicants of doubtful merit4 ,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,ancient ,,history ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy4 ,the numerous 99ethical systems99 that have had currency in earlier or later times1 may be divided into two classes1--the one embracing those which make virtue a means2 the other1 those which make it an end4 ,according to the former1 virtue is to be practised for the good that will come of it2 according to the latter1 for its own sake1 for its intrinsic excellence4 ,these classes have obvious subdivisions4 ,the former includes both the selfish and the utilitarian theory2 while the latter embraces a wide diversity of views as to the nature1 the standard1 and the criterion of virtue1 according as it is believed to consist in conformity to the fitness of things1 in harmony with an unsophisticated taste1 in accordance with the interior moral sense1 or in obedience to the will of ,god4 ,there are1 also1 border theories1 which blend1 or rather force into juxtaposition1 the ideas that underlie the two classes respectively4 ,it is proposed1 in the present chapter1 to give an outline of 99the history of ethical philosophy in ,greece and ,rome991 or rather1 in ,greece2 for ,rome had no philosophy that was not born in ,greece4 99,socrates99 was less a moral philosopher than a preacher of virtue4 ,self-ordained as a censor and reformer1 he directed his invective and irony principally against the ,sophists1 whose chief characteristic as to philosophy seems to have been the denial of objective truth1 and thus1 of absolute and determinate right4 ,socrates1 in contrast with them1 seeks to elicit duty from the occasions for its exercise1 making his collocutors define right and obligation from the nature of things as presented to their own consciousness and reflection4 ,plato represents him1 whenever a moral question is under discussion1 as probing the very heart of the case1 and drawing thence the response as from a divine oracle4 99,plato99 held essentially the same ground1 as may be seen in his identifying the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good2 but it is impossible to trace in his writings the outlines of a definite ethical system1 whether his own1 or one derived from his great master4 ,the three 99principal schools of ethical philosophy in ,greece99 were the ,peripatetic1 the ,epicurean1 and the ,stoic4 ,the 99,peripatetics99 derived their philosophy from ,aristotle1 and their name from his habit of walking up and down under the plane-trees of the ,lyceum4 ,according to him1 virtue is conduct so conformed to human nature as to preserve all its appetites1 proclivities1 desires1 and passions1 in mutual check and limitation4 ,it consists in shunning extremes4 ,thus courage stands midway between cowardice and rashness2 temperance1 between excess and self-denial2 generosity1 between prodigality and parsimony2 meekness1 between irascibility and pusillanimity4 ,happiness is regarded as the supreme good2 but while this is not to be attained without virtue1 virtue alone will not secure it4 ,happiness requires1 in addition1 certain outward advantages1 such as health1 riches1 friends1 which therefore a good man will seek by all lawful means4 ,aristotle laid an intense stress on the cultivation of the domestic virtues1 justly representing the household as the type1 no less than the nursery1 of the state1 and the political well-being of the state as contingent on the style of character cherished and manifested in the home-life of its members4 ,there is reason to believe that 99,aristotle's personal character99 was conformed to his theory of virtue1--that he pursued the middle path1 rather than the more arduous route of moral perfection4 ,though much of his time was spent in ,athens1 he was a native of ,macedonia1 and was for several years resident at the court of ,philip as tutor to ,alexander1 with whom he retained friendly relations for the greater part of his royal pupil's life4 ,of his connection with the ,macedonian court and public affairs1 there are several stories that implicate him dishonorably with political intrigues1 and though there is not one of these that is not denied1 and not one which rests on competent historical authority1 such traditions are not apt so to cluster as to blur the fair fame of a sturdily incorruptible man1 but are much more likely to cling to the memory of a trimmer and a time-server4 99,epicurus199 from whom the ,epicurean philosophy derives its name1 was for many years a teacher of philosophy in ,athens4 ,he was a man of simple1 pure1 chaste1 and temperate habits1 in his old age bore severe and protracted sufferings1 from complicated and incurable disease1 with singular equanimity1 and had his memory posthumously blackened only by those who--like theological bigots of more recent times--inferred1 in despite of all contemporary evidence1 that he was depraved in character1 because they thought that his philosophy ought to have made him so4 ,he represented 99pleasure as the supreme good991 and its pleasure-yielding capacity as the sole criterion by which any act or habit is to be judged4 ,on this ground1 the quest of pleasure becomes the prime1 or rather the only duty4 8,do that you may enjoy10 is the fundamental maxim of morality4 ,there is no intrinsic or permanent distinction between right and wrong4 ,individual experience alone can determine the right1 which varies according to the differences of taste1 temperament1 or culture4 ,there are1 however1 some pleasures which are more than counterbalanced by the pains incurred in procuring them1 or by those occasioned by them2 and there are1 also1 pains which are the means of pleasures greater than themselves4 ,the wise man1 therefore1 will measure and govern his conduct1 not by the pleasure of the moment1 but with reference to the future and ultimate effects of acts1 habits1 and courses of conduct1 upon his happiness4 ,what are called the virtues1 as justice1 temperance1 chastity1 are in themselves no better than their opposites2 but experience has shown that they increase the aggregate of pleasure1 and diminish the aggregate of pain4 ,therefore1 and therefore alone1 they are duties4 ,the great worth of philosophy consists in its enabling men to estimate the relative duration1 and the permanent consequences1 as well as the immediate intensity1 of every form of pleasure4 ,epicurus specifies 99two kinds of pleasure991 that of rest and that of motion4 ,he prefers the former4 ,action has its reaction2 excitement is followed by depression2 effort1 by weariness2 thought for others involves the disturbance of one's own peace4 ,the gods1 according to ,epicurus1 lead an easy1 untroubled life1 leave the outward universe to take care of itself1 are wholly indifferent to human affairs1 and are made ineffably happy by the entire absence of labor1 want1 and care2 and man becomes most godlike and most happy1 therefore most virtuous1 when he floats through life1 unharming and unharmed1 idle and useless1 self-contained and self-sufficing1 simple in his tastes1 moderate in his requirements1 frugal in his habits4 ,it may be doubted 99whether ,epicurus denoted by pleasure199799#ah99799 mere physical pleasure alone994 ,it is certain that his later followers regarded the pleasures of the body as the only good2 and ,cicero says that ,epicurus himself referred all the pleasures of the intellect to the memory of past and the hope of future sensual gratification4 ,yet there is preserved an extract of a letter from ,epicurus1 in which he says that his own bodily pains in his years of decrepitude are outweighed by the pleasure derived from the memory of his philosophical labors and discoveries4 99,epicureanism numbered among its disciples991 not only 99men of approved virtue991 but not a few1 like ,pliny the ,younger1 of a more active type of virtue than ,epicurus would have deemed consistent with pleasure4 ,but in lapse of time it became the pretext and cover for the grossest sensuality2 and the associations which the unlearned reader has with the name are only strengthened by conversance with the literature to which it gave birth4 ,horace is its poet-laureate2 and he was evidently as sincere in his philosophy as he was licentious in his life4 ,there is a certain charm in good faith and honesty1 even when on the side of wrong and vice2 and it is his perfect frankness1 self-complacency1 nay1 self-praise1 in a sensuality which in plain prose would seem by turns vapid and disgusting1 that makes ,horace even perilously fascinating1 so that the guardians of the public morals may well be thankful that for the young the approach to him is warded off by the formidable barriers of grammar and dictionary4 ,while ,epicureanism thus generated1 on the one hand1 in men of the world laxity of moral principle and habit1 on the other hand1 in minds of a more contemplative cast1 it 99lapsed into atheism994 ,from otiose gods1 careless of human affairs1 the transition was natural to a belief in no gods4 ,the universe which could preserve and govern itself1 could certainly have sprung into uncaused existence2 for the tendencies which1 without a supervising power1 maintain order in nature1 continuity in change1 ever-new life evolved from incessant death1 must be inherent tendencies to combination1 harmony1 and organization1 and thus may account for the origin of the system which they sustain and renew4 ,this type of atheism has its most authentic exposition in the 8,de ,rerum ,natura0 of ,lucretius4 ,he does not1 in so many words1 deny the being of the gods1--he1 indeed1 speaks of them as leading restful lives1 withdrawn from all care of mortal affairs2 but he so scoffs at all practical recognition of them1 and so jeers at the reverence and awe professed for them by the multitude1 that we are constrained to regard them as rather the imagery of his verse than the objects of his faith4 ,he maintains the past eternity of matter1 which consists of atoms or monads of various forms4 ,these1 drifting about in space1 and impinging upon one another1 by a series of happy chances1 fell into orderly relations and close-fitting symmetries1 whence1 in succession1 and by a necessity inherent in the primitive atoms1 came organization1 life1 instinct1 love1 reason1 wisdom4 ,this poem has a peculiar value at the present day1 as closely coincident in its cosmogony with one of the most recent phases of physical philosophy1 and showing that what calls itself progress may be motion in a circle4 ,the 99,stoics991 so called from a portico7#ai7 adorned with magnificent paintings by ,polygnotus1 in which their doctrines were first taught1 owe their origin to ,zeno1 who lived to a very great age1 illustrious for self-control1 temperance1 and the severest type of virtue1 and at length1 in accordance with a favorite dogma and practice of his school1 when he found that he had before him only growing infirmity with no hope of restoration1 terminated his life by his own hand4 ,according to the ,stoic philosophy1 99virtue is the sole end of life991 and virtue is the conformity of the will and conduct to universal nature4 ,virtue alone is good2 vice alone is evil2 and whatever is neither virtue nor vice is neither good nor evil in itself1 but is to be sought or shunned1 according as it is auxiliary to virtue or conducive to vice1--if neither1 to be regarded with utter indifference4 ,virtue is indivisible4 ,it does not admit of degrees4 ,he who only approximates to virtue1 however closely1 is yet to be regarded as outside of its pale4 ,only the wise man can be virtuous4 ,he needs no precepts of duty4 ,his intuitions are always to be trusted4 ,his sense of right cannot be blinded or misled4 ,as for those who do not occupy this high philosophic ground1 though they cannot be really virtuous1 they yet may present some show and semblance of virtue1 and they may be aided in this by precepts and ethical instruction47#bj7 ,it was for the benefit of those who1 on account of their lack of true wisdom1 needed such direction1 and were at the same time so well disposed as to receive and follow it1 that treatises on practical morality were written by many of the later ,stoics1 and that in ,rome there were teachers of this school who exercised functions closely analogous to those of the ,christian preacher and pastor4 ,stoicism found 99its most congenial soil99 in the stern1 hardy integrity and patriotism of those ,romans1 whose incorruptible virtue is the one redeeming feature of the declining days of the ,republic and the effeminacy and coarse depravity of the ,empire4 ,seneca's ethical writings7#ba7 are almost ,christian1 not only in their faithful rebuke of every form of wrong1 but in their tender humanity for the poor1 the slaves1 the victims of oppression1 in their universal philanthropy1 and in their precepts of patience under suffering1 forbearance1 forgiveness1 and returning good for evil4 ,epictetus1 the deformed slave of a capricious and cruel master1 beaten and crippled in mere wantonness1 enfranchised in his latter years1 only to be driven into exile and to sound the lowest depths of poverty1 exhibited a type of heroic virtue which has hardly been equalled1 perhaps never transcended by a mere mortal2 and though looking1 as has been already said1 to annihilation as the goal of life1 he maintained a spirit so joyous1 and has left in his writings so attractive a picture of a soul serenely and supremely happy1 that he has given support and consolation to multitudes of the bravest and best disciples of the heaven-born religion1 which he can have known--if at all--only through its slanderers and persecutors4 ,marcus ,aurelius1 in a kindred spirit1 and under the even heavier burdens of a tottering empire1 domestic dissensions1 and defeat and disaster abroad1 maintained the severest simplicity and purity of life1 appropriated portions of his busiest days to devout contemplation1 meditated constantly on death1 and disciplined himself to regard with contempt alike the praise of flatterers and the contingency of posthumous fame4 ,we have1 especially in ,nero's reign1 the record of not a few men and women of like spirit and character1 whose lofty and impregnable virtue lacked only loving faith and undoubting trust in a fatherly ,providence to assimilate them to the foremost among the ,apostles and martyrs of the ,christian ,church4 99,the ,sceptical school of philosophy99 claims in this connection a brief notice4 ,though so identified in common speech with the name of a single philosopher1 that ,pyrrhonism is a synonyme for ,scepticism1 it was much older than ,pyrrho1 and greatly outnumbered his avowed followers4 ,it was held by the teachers of this school that objective truth is unattainable4 ,not only do the perceptions and conceptions of different persons vary as to every object of knowledge2 but the perceptions and conceptions of the same persons as to the same object vary at different times4 ,nay1 more1 at the same time one sense conveys impressions which another sense may negative1 and not infrequently the reflective faculty negatives all the impressions derived from the senses1 and forms a conception entirely unlike that which would have taken shape through the organs of sense4 ,the soul that seeks to know1 is thus in constant agitation4 ,but happiness consists in imperturbableness of spirit1 that is1 in suspense of judgment2 and as it is our duty to promote our own happiness1 it is our duty to live without desire or fear1 preference or abhorrence1 love or hatred1 in entire apathy1--a life of which ,mohammed's fabled coffin is the fittest symbol4 ,the 99,new ,academy991 whose philosophy was a hybrid of ,platonism and ,pyrrhonism1 while it denied the possibility of ascertaining objective truth1 yet taught that on all subjects of speculative philosophy probability is attainable1 and that1 if the subject in hand be one which admits of being acted upon1 it is the duty of the moral agent to act in accordance with probability1--to pursue the course in behalf of which the more and the better reasons can be given4 ,there are moral acts and habits which seem to be in accordance with reason and the nature of things4 ,we may be mistaken in thinking them so2 yet the probability that they are so creates a moral obligation in their favor4 ,the ,new ,academy professed a hypothetical acquiescence in the ethics of the ,peripatetic school1 maintaining1 therefore1 that the mean between two extremes is probably in accordance with right and duty1 and that virtue is probably man's highest good1 yet probably not sufficient in itself without the addition of exterior advantages4 99,cicero99 considered himself as belonging to the ,new ,academy4 ,his instincts as an advocate1 often induced by professional exigencies to deny what he had previously affirmed1 made the scepticism of this school congenial to him2 while his love of elegant ease and luxury and his lack of moral courage were in closer harmony with the practical ethics of the ,peripatetics than with the more rigid system of the ,stoics4 ,at the same time1 his pure moral taste and his sincere reverence for the right brought him into sympathy with the ,stoic school4 ,his 8,de ,officiis0 is an exposition of the ,stoic system of ethics1 though by the professed disciple of another philosophy4 ,it is as if a ,mohammedan1 without disclaiming his own religion1 should undertake an exposition of the ethics of ,christianity1 on the ground that1 though ,mohammed was a genuine prophet1 there was1 nevertheless1 a higher and purer morality in the ,new ,testament than in the ,koran4 ,chapter ,,xv4 ,,modern ,,history ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy4 99,for several centuries after the destruction of the ,western ,empire991 philosophy had hardly an existence except in its records1 and these were preserved chiefly for their parchment1 half-effaced1 covered by what took the place of literature in the 7so called7 ,dark ,ages1 and at length deciphered by such minute and wearisome toil as only medival cloisters have ever furnished4 ,for a long period1 monasteries were the only schools1 and in these the learned men of the day were1 either successively or alternately1 learners and teachers1 whence the appellation of ,schoolmen4 ,the learned men who bear this name were fond of casuistry1 and discussed imagined and often impossible cases with great pains 7their readers would have greater72 but1 so far as we know1 they have left no systematic treatises on moral philosophy1 and have transmitted no system that owes to them its distinguishing features4 ,yet we find among them a very broad division of opinion as to the ground of right4 ,the fundamental position of the ,stoics1 that virtue is conformity to nature1 and thus independent of express legislation1--not created by law1 human or divine1 but the source and origin of law1--had its champions1 strong1 but few2 while the ,augustinian theology1 then almost universal1 replaced ,epicureanism in its denial of the intrinsic and indelible moral qualities of actions4 ,the extreme ,augustinians regarded the positive command of ,god as the sole cause and ground of right1 so that the very things which are forbidden under the severest penalties would become virtuous and commendable1 if enjoined by ,divine authority4 ,william of ,ockham1 one of the most illustrious of the ,english ,schoolmen1 wrote3 8,if ,god commanded his creatures to hate himself1 the hatred of ,god would be the duty of man40 ,the 99earliest modern99 theory of morals that presented striking peculiarities was that of 99,hobbes99 7,a4 ,d4 #aehh-afgi71 who was indebted solely to the stress of his time1 alike for his system and for whatever slender following it may have had4 ,he was from childhood a staunch royalist1 was shortly after leaving the ,university the tutor of a loyal nobleman1 and1 afterward1 of ,charles ,,ii4 during the early years of his exile2 and the parliamentary and ,puritan outrages seemed to him to be aimed at all that was august and reverend1 and adapted to overturn society1 revert progress1 and crush civilization4 ,according to him1 men are by nature one another's enemies1 and can be restrained from internecine hostility only by force or fear4 ,an instinctive perception of this truth in the infancy of society gave rise to monarchical and absolute forms of government2 for only by thus centralizing and massing power1 which could be directed against any disturber of the peace1 could the individual members of society hold property or life in safety4 ,the king thus reigns by right of human necessity1 and obedience to him and to constituted authorities under him is man's whole duty1 and the sum of virtue4 ,might creates right4 ,conscience is but another name for the fear of punishment4 ,the intimate connection of religion with civil freedom in the ,english ,commonwealth no doubt went far in uprooting in ,hobbes all religious faith2 and while he did not openly attack ,christianity1 he maintained the duty of entire conformity to the monarch's religion1 whatever it might be1 which is of course tantamount to the denial of objective religious truth47#bb7 ,hobbes may fairly be regarded as 99the father of modern ethical philosophy991--not that he had children after his own likeness2 but his speculations were so revolting equally to thinking and to serious men1 as to arouse inquiry and stimulate mental activity in a department previously neglected4 ,the gauntlet thus thrown down by ,hobbes was taken up by 99,cudworth99 7,a4 ,d4 #afag-afhh71 the most learned man of his time1 whose 8,intellectual ,system of the ,universe0 is a prodigy of erudition1--a work in which his own thought is so blocked up with quotations1 authorities1 and masses of recondite lore1 that it is hardly possible to trace the windings of the river for the dbris of auriferous rocks that obstruct its flow4 ,the treatise with which we are concerned is that on 8,eternal and ,immutable ,morality40 ,in this he maintains that the right exists1 independently of all authority1 by the very nature of things1 in co-eternity with the ,supreme ,being4 ,so far is he from admitting the possibility of any dissiliency between the ,divine will and absolute right1 that he turns the tables on his opponents1 and classes among ,atheists those of his contemporaries who maintain that ,god can command what is contrary to the intrinsic right2 that ,he has no inclination to the good of his creatures2 that ,he can justly doom an innocent being to eternal torments2 or that whatever ,god wills is just because ,he wills it4 99,samuel ,clarke99 7,a4 ,d4 #afge-agbi7 followed ,cudworth in the same line of thought4 ,he was1 it is believed1 the first writer who employed the term fitness as defining the ground of the immutable and eternal right1 though the idea of fitness necessarily underlies every system or theory that assigns to virtue intrinsic validity4 99,shaftesbury99 7,a4 ,d4 #afga-agac7 represents virtue as residing1 not in the nature or relations of things1 but in the bearing of actions on the welfare or happiness of beings other than the actor4 ,benevolence constitutes virtue2 and the merit of the action and of the actor is determined by the degree in which particular affections are merged in general philanthropy1 and reference is had1 not to individual beneficiaries or benefits1 but to the whole system of things of which the actor forms a part4 ,the affections from which such acts spring commend themselves to the moral sense1 and are of necessity objects of esteem and love4 ,but the moral sense takes cognizance of the affections only1 not of the acts themselves2 and as the conventional standard of the desirable and the useful varies with race1 time1 and culture1 the acts which the affections prompt1 and which therefore are virtuous1 may be in one age or country such as the people of another century or land may repudiate with loathing4 ,las ,casas1 in introducing negro slavery into ,america1 with the fervently benevolent purpose of relieving the hardships of the feeble and overtasked aborigines1 performed1 according to this theory1 a virtuous act2 but had he once considered the question of intrinsic right or natural fitness1 a name so worthily honored would never have been associated with the foulest crime of modern civilization4 ,according to 99,adam ,smith99 7,a4 ,d4 #agbc-agij71 moral distinctions depend wholly on sympathy4 ,we approve in others what corresponds to our own tastes and habits2 we disapprove whatever is opposed to them4 ,as to our own conduct1 8we suppose ourselves10 he writes1 8the spectators of our own behavior1 and endeavor to imagine what effect it would in this light produce in us40 ,our sense of duty is derived wholly from our thus putting ourselves in the place of others1 and inquiring what they would approve in us4 ,conscience1 then1 is a collective and corporate1 not an individual faculty4 ,it is created by the prevalent opinions of the community4 ,solitary virtue there cannot be2 for without sympathy there is no self-approval4 ,by parity of reason1 the duty of the individual can never transcend the average conscience of the community4 ,this theory describes society as it is1 not as it ought to be4 ,we are1 to a sad degree1 conventional in our practice1 much more so than in our beliefs2 but it is the part of true manliness to have the conscience an interior1 not an external organ1 to form and actualize notions of right and duty for one's self1 and to stand and walk alone1 if need there be1 as there manifestly is in not a few critical moments1 and as there is not infrequently in the inward experience of every man who means to do his duty4 99,butler99 7,a4 ,d4 #afib-ageb71 in his 8,ethical ,discourses10 aims mainly and successfully to demonstrate the rightful supremacy of conscience4 ,his favorite conception is of the human being as himself a household an economy1--the various propensities1 appetites1 passions1 and affections1 the members1--,conscience1 the head1 recognized as such by all1 so that there is1 when her sovereignty is owned1 an inward repose and satisfaction2 when she is disobeyed1 a sense of discord and rebellion1 of unrest and disturbance4 ,this is sound and indisputable1 and it cannot be more clearly stated or more vividly illustrated than by ,butler2 but he manifestly regards conscience as legislator no less than judge1 and thus fails to recognize any objective standard of right4 ,it is evident that on his ground there is no criterion by which honestly erroneous moral judgments can be revised1 or by which a discrimination can be made between the results of education or involuntary prejudice1 and the right as determined by the nature of things and the standard of intrinsic fitness4 ,of all modern ethical writers since the time of ,cudworth and ,clarke1 none so much as approaches the position occupied by 99,richard ,price99 7,a4 ,d4 #agbc-agia71 a ,london dissenting divine1 a warm advocate of ,american independence1 and the intimate friend of ,john ,adams4 ,he maintained that right and wrong are inherent and necessary1 immutable and eternal characteristics1 not dependent on will or command1 but on the intrinsic nature of the act1 and determined with unerring accuracy by conscience1 whenever the nature of the case is clearly known4 8,morality10 he writes1 8is fixed on an immovable basis1 and appears not to be in any sense factitious1 or the arbitrary production of any power1 human or divine2 but equally everlasting and necessary with all truth and reason40 8,virtue is of intrinsic value and of indispensable obligation2 not the creature of will1 but necessary and immutable2 not local and temporary1 but of equal extent and antiquity with the ,divine mind2 not dependent on power1 but the guide of all power407#bc7 99,paley99 7,a4 ,d4 #agdc-ahje7 gives a definition of virtue1 remarkable for its combination of three partial theories4 ,virtue1 according to him1 is 8the doing good to mankind1 in obedience to the will of ,god1 and for the sake of everlasting happiness40 ,of this definition it may be said1 #a4 ,the doing good to mankind is indeed virtue2 but it is by no means the whole of virtue4 #b4 ,obedience to the will of ,god is our duty2 but it is so1 because his will must of necessity be in accordance with the fitting and right4 ,could we conceive of ,omnipotence commanding what is intrinsically unfit and wrong1 the virtuous man would not be the ,god-server1 but the ,prometheus suffering the implacable vengeance of an unrighteous ,deity4 #c4 ,though everlasting happiness be the result of virtue1 it is not the ground or the reason for it4 ,were our being earth-limited1 virtue would lose none of its obligation4 ,epictetus led as virtuous a life as if heaven had been open to his faith and hope4--,paley's system may be described in detail as ,shaftesbury's1 with an external washing of ,christianity2 ,shaftesbury having been what was called a free-thinker1 while ,paley was a sincere believer in the ,christian revelation1 and contributed largely and efficiently to the defence of ,christianity and the illustration of its records4 ,the chief merit of ,paley's treatise on ,moral ,philosophy is that it clearly and emphatically recognizes the ,divine authority of the moral teachings of the ,new ,testament1 though in expounding them the author too frequently dilutes them by considerations of expediency4 99,jeremy ,bentham99 7,a4 ,d4 #agdg-ahcb7 is ,paley minus ,christianity4 ,the greatest good of the greatest number is1 according to him1 the aim and criterion of virtue4 ,moral rules should be constructed with this sole end2 and this should be the pervading purpose of all legislation4 ,bentham's works are very voluminous1 and they cover1 wisely and well1 almost every department of domestic1 social1 public1 and national life4 ,the worst that can be said of his political writings is that they are in advance of the age1--literally ,utopian27#bd7 for it would be well with the country which was prepared to embody his views4 ,but1 unfortunately1 his principles have no power of self-realization4 ,they are like a watch1 perfect in all other parts1 but without the mainspring4 ,bentham contemplates the individual man as an agency1 rather than as an intellectual and moral integer4 ,he must work under yoke and harness for ends vast and remote1 beyond the appreciation of ordinary mortals2 and he must hold all partial affections and nearer aims subordinate to rules deduced by sages and legislators from considerations of general utility4 ,bentham's influence on legislation1 especially on criminal law1 has been beneficially felt on both sides of the ,atlantic4 ,in the department of pure ethics1 there are no essential points of difference between him and other writers of the utilitarian school47#be7 99 99 99 99 99 ,in 99,france99 there has been a large preponderance of sensualism1 expediency1 and selfishness in the ethical systems that have had the most extensive currency4 ,there was a great deal of elaborate ethical speculation and theory among the ,french philosophers of the last century2 but among them we cannot recall a single writer who maintained a higher ground than ,bentham1 except that ,rousseau--perhaps the most immoral of them all--who was an ,epicurean so far as he had any philosophy1 sometimes soars in sentimental rhapsodies about the intrinsic beauty and loveliness of a virtue which he knew only by name4 99,malebranche99 7,a4 ,d4 #afch-agad71 whose principal writings belong to the previous century1 represents entirely opposite views and tendencies4 ,he hardly differs from ,samuel ,clarke1 except in phraseology4 ,he resolves virtue into love of the universal order1 and conformity to it in conduct4 ,this order requires that we should prize and love all beings and objects in proportion to their relative worth1 and that we should recognize this relative worth in our rules and habits of life4 ,thus man is to be more highly valued and more assiduously served than the lower animals1 because worth more2 and ,god is to be loved infinitely more than man1 and to be always obeyed and served in preference to man1 because he is worth immeasurably more than the beings that derive their existence from him4 ,malebranche ascribes to the ,supreme ,being1 not the arbitrary exercise of power in constituting the right1 but recognition1 in his government of the world and in his revealed will1 of the order1 which is man's sole law4 8,sovereign princes10 he says1 8have no right to use their authority without reason4 ,even ,god has no such miserable right40 ,at nearly the same period commenced the ethical controversy between 99,fnlon99 7,a4 ,d4 #afea-agae7 and 99,bossuet99 7,a4 ,d4 #afbg-agjd71 as to the possibility and obligation of disinterested virtue4 ,fnlon and the ,quietists1 who sympathized with him1 maintained that the pure love of ,god1 without any self-reference1 or regard for one's own well-being either here or here-after1 is the goal and the test of human perfection1 and that nothing below this--nothing which aims or aspires at anything less than this--deserves the name of virtue4 ,bossuet defended the selfish theory of virtue1 attacked his amiable antagonist with unconscionable severity and bitterness1 and succeeded in obtaining from the court of ,rome--though against the wishes of the ,pope--the condemnation of the obnoxious tenet4 ,the ,pope remarked1 with well-turned antithesis1 that ,fnlon might have erred from excess in the love of ,god1 while ,bossuet had sinned by defect in the love of his neighbor4 ,among the recent ,french moralists1 the most distinguished names are those of 99,jouffroy99 and 99,cousin991 who--each with a terminology of his own--agree with ,malebranche in regarding right and wrong as inherent and essential characteristics of actions1 and as having their source and the ground of their validity in the nature of things4 ,the aim of ,cousin's well-known treatise on 8,the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good10 is purely ethical1 and the work is designed to identify the three members of the ,platonic triad with corresponding attributes of the ,infinite ,being1--attributes which1 virtually one1 have their counterpart and manifestation in the order of nature and the government of the universe4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in 99,germany991 the necessarian philosophers of the ,pantheistic school ignore ethics by making choice and moral action impossible4 ,man has no distinct and separate personality4 ,he is for a little while detached in appearance from the soul of the universe 7anima mundi71 but in reality no more detached from it than is a boulder or a log of drift-wood from the surface on which it rests4 ,he still remains a part of the universal soul1 the multiform1 all-embracing ,god1 who is himself not a self-conscious1 freely willing being1 but impelled by necessity in all his parts and members1 and1 no less than in all else1 in those human members through which alone he attains to some fragmentary self-consciousness4 ,according to 99,kant991 the reason intuitively discerns truths that are necessary1 absolute1 and universal4 ,the theoretical reason discerns such truths in the realm of ontology1 and in the relations and laws that underlie all subjects of physical inquiry4 ,in like manner1 the practical reason intuitively perceives the conditions and laws inherent in the objects of moral action1--that is1 as ,malebranche would have said1 the elements of universal order1 or1 in the language of ,clarke1 the fitness of things4 ,as the mind must of necessity contemplate and cognize objects of thought under the categories intuitively discerned by the theoretical reason1 so must the will be moved by the conditions and laws intuitively discerned by the practical reason4 ,this intuition is law and obligation4 ,man can obey it1 and to obey it is virtue4 ,he can disobey it1 and in so doing he does not yield to necessity1 but makes a voluntary choice of wrong and evil4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it will be perceived from the historical survey in this and the previous chapter1 that--as was said at the outset--99all ethical systems resolve themselves into the two classes of which the ,epicureans and the ,stoics furnished the pristine types199--those which make virtue an accident1 a variable1 subject to authority1 occasion1 or circumstance2 and those which endow it with an intrinsic right1 immutableness1 validity1 and supremacy4 ,on subjects of fundamental moment1 opinion is of prime importance4 ,conduct results from feeling1 and feeling from opinion4 ,we would have the youth1 from the very earliest period of his moral agency1 grounded in the belief that right and wrong are immutable1--that they have no localities1 no meridians1--that1 with a change of surroundings1 their conditions and laws vary as little as do those of planetary or stellar motion4 ,let him feel that right and wrong are not the mere dicta of human teaching1 nay1 are not created even by revelation2 but let their immutable distinction express itself to his consciousness in those sublime words which belong to it1 as personified in holy writ1 8,jehovah possessed me from the beginning of his way1 before his works of old4 ,i was set up from everlasting1 from the beginning1 or ever the earth was4 ,when ,he prepared the heavens1 ,i was there4 ,when ,he appointed the foundations of the earth1 then was ,i by ,him40 ,this conception of the ,divine and everlasting sacredness of virtue1 is a perennial fountain of strength4 ,he who has this does not imagine that he has power over the ,right1 can sway it by his choice1 or vary its standard by his action2 but it overmasters him1 and1 by subduing1 frees him1 fills and energizes his whole being1 ennobles all his powers1 exalts and hallows all his affections1 makes him a priest to ,god1 and a king among men4 ,,index4 ,abstinence1 when to be preferred to temperance1 #age ,academy1 the ,new1 #bje ,action1 defined1 #a springs of1 #aj governing principles of1 #cj ,affections1 the1 #bb ,anger1 #bf ,anonymous publications1 #abc ,appetites1 the1 #aj ,aristotle1 character of1 #aig ,beneficence1 #adc ,bentham1 ,jeremy1 #bae ,bossuet1 controversy of1 with ,fnlon1 #bag ,brotherhood1 human1 in its ethical relations1 #ef ,butler1 #bab ,capital punishment1 #ff ,casuistry1 #ahg ,children1 duties of1 #aba ,christianity1 a source of knowledge1 #ee exhibiting moral perfection in the person of its ,founder1 #fh compared1 as to its ethics1 with other religions1 #ei as a motive power1 #ha ,cicero1 philosophical relations of1 #bjf ,clarke1 ,samuel1 #baj ,conscience1 a judicial faculty1 #da educated by use1 #dd relation of knowledge to1 #de ,contracts1 #abh ,courage1 defined1 #aeh physical1 #aei moral1 #afj ,cousin1 #bah ,cudworth1 #bji ,desire1 defined1 #ab of knowledge1 #ac of society1 #ae of esteem1 #ag of power1 #ah of superiority1 #ai ,duties1 conflict of1 #aij ,duty1 limit of1 #ahi ,enemies1 love of1 possible1 #adi ,envy1 #bg ,epictetus1 character of1 #bjc ,epicureanism1 #aih ,example1 ethical value of1 #aaa ,expediency1 an insufficient rule of conduct1 #ca when to be consulted1 #cc ,extreme cases in morals1 #abe ,falsehood1 #aea ,family1 duties of the1 #aah ,fnlon1 controversy of1 with ,bossuet1 #bag ,fitness1 the ground of right1 #cf ,foreknowledge1 ,divine1 consistent with human freedom1 #h ,freedom of the will1 arguments for1 #b objections to1 #d ,government1 the essential function of1 #ahj obedience to1 how limited1 #ahb when to be opposed1 #ahd ,gratitude1 #bd ,habit1 #hd ,hatred1 #bh ,hobbes1 #bjh ,home-life1 order requisite in1 #afi ,homicide1 justifiable1 #fd ,honesty1 #acd ,horace1 the poet of ,epicureanism1 #bjj ,ignorance1 sins of1 #ci ,immortality1 ethical relations of1 #eg ,intemperance1 #agj ,jouffroy1 #bah ,justice1 #aac ,kant1 ethical system of1 #bai ,kindness1 #be ,knowledge1 attainment of1 a duty1 #ajb ,law1 the result of experience1 #ej an educational force1 #ea ,liberty1 the right to1 #fi ,love1 #bb ,lucretius1 philosophy of1 #bja ,malebranche1 #baf ,manners1 a department of morals1 #agg ,marcus ,aurelius1 character of1 #bjd ,marriage1 #abj ,measure1 duties appertaining to1 #agj ,military service1 #fh ,moral philosophy1 defined1 #cd ,motive1 #gi ,oaths1 #abi ,observation1 a source of ethical knowledge1 #df ,order1 #afd ,paley1 #bae ,pantheism1 ethics of1 #bah ,parents1 duties of1 #aba ,passion1 #hb ,patience1 #aeb ,pauperism1 #add ,peripatetics1 the1 #aic ,piety toward ,god1 #aac ,pity1 #be ,place1 duties appertaining to1 #afh ,plato1 as a teacher of ethics1 #aic ,politeness1 #agh ,positive duties1 #aag ,price1 ,richard1 #bad ,promises1 #abf ,prudence1 #ih ,punctuality1 #afg ,resentment1 #bg ,revenge1 #bh ,reverence1 #bc ,revolution1 when justifiable1 #ahe ,right1 the1 #ce absolute and relative1 #cg ,rights1 defined1 #fa how limited1 #fb personal1 #fd of property1 #gb of reputation1 #gf ,sabbath1 the1 #af ,sceptical school of philosophy1 #bjd ,schoolmen1 ethics of the1 #bjg ,self-control1 #ajf ,self-culture1 moral1 #aji ,self-preservation1 #ii ,seneca1 writings and character of1 #bjc ,shaftesbury1 #baj ,slavery1 #gj ,smith1 ,adam1 #baa ,socrates1 as a teacher of ethics1 #aie ,speculation in business1 when legitimate1 #ach when dishonest1 #adj ,spinoza1 #bji ,stoics1 philosophy of the1 #bja eminent ,roman1 #bjc ,submission1 #aee ,sympathy1 #be ,taxation1 #ge ,temperance1 #agc ,time1 duties appertaining to1 #afe ,usury1 #adb ,veracity1 #abb ,virtue1 defined1 #hh connection of1 with piety1 #ia ,virtues1 the1 #id cardinal1 #if ,worship1 public1 #aae ,zeno1 character of1 #bjb ,,footnotes #a ,compassion ought from its derivation to have the same meaning with sympathy2 but in common usage it is synonymous with pity4 #b 8,ignorantia legis neminem excusat40 #c ,the theory that ,seneca was acquainted with ,st4 ,paul1 or had any direct intercourse with ,christians in ,rome or elsewhere1 has no historical evidence1 and rests on assumptions that are contradicted by known facts4 #d ,virtutes leniores1 as ,cicero calls them4 #e ,the duty of society to inflict capital punishment on the murderer has been maintained on the ground of the ,divine command to that effect1 said to have been given to ,noah1 and thus to be binding on all his posterity4 7,genesis ix4 #e47 ,my own belief--founded on a careful examination of the ,hebrew text--is1 that the human murderer is not referred to in this precept1 but that it simply requires the slaying of the beast that should cause the death of a man1--a precaution which was liable to be neglected in a rude state of society1 and was among the special enactments of the ,mosaic law4 7,exodus xxi4 #ch47 ,if1 however1 the common interpretation be retained1 the precept requires the shedding of the murderer's blood by the brother or nearest kinsman of the murdered man1 and is not obeyed by giving up the murderer to the gallows and the public executioner4 ,moreover1 the same series of precepts prescribes an abstinence from the natural juices of animal food1 which would require an entire revolution in our shambles1 kitchens1 and tables4 ,if these precepts were ,divine commandments for men of all times1 they should be obeyed in full2 but there is the grossest inconsistency and absurdity in holding only a portion of one of them sacred1 and ignoring all the rest4 #f ,latin1 virtus1 from vir1 which denotes not1 like homo1 simply a human being1 but a man endowed with all appropriate manly attributes1 and comes from the same root with vis1 strength4 ,the ,greek synonyms of virtus1 1 is derived from 1 the god of war1 who in the heroic days of ,greece was the ideal man1 the standard of human excellence1 and whose name some lexicographers regard--as it seems to me1 somewhat fancifully--as allied through its root to 1 which bears about the same relation to that vir bears to homo4 #g ,in the languages which have inherited or adopted the ,latin virtus1 it retains its original signification1 with one striking exception1 which yet is perhaps an exception in appearance rather than in reality4 ,in the ,italian1 virtu is employed to signify taste1 and virtuoso1 which may denote a virtuous man1 oftener means a collector of objects of taste4 ,we have here an historical landmark4 ,there was a period when1 under civil despotism1 the old ,roman manhood had entirely died out on its native soil1 while ecclesiastical corruption rendered the nobler idea of ,christian manhood effete2 and then the highest type of manhood that remained was the culture of those refined sensibilities1 those ornamental arts1 and that keen sense of the beautiful1 in which ,italy as far surpassed other lands1 as it was for centuries inferior to them in physical bravery and in moral rectitude4 #h ,it is obviously on this ground alone that we can affirm moral attributes of the ,supreme ,being4 ,when we say that he is perfectly just1 pure1 holy1 beneficent1 we recognize a standard of judgment logically independent of his nature4 ,we mean that the fitness which the human conscience recognizes as its only standard of right1 is the law which he has elected for his own administration of the universe4 ,could we conceive of omnipotence not recognizing this law1 the decrees and acts of such a being would not be necessarily right4 ,omnipotence cannot make that which is fitting wrong1 or that which is unfitting right4 ,god's decrees and acts are not right because they are his1 but his because they are right4 #i ,from cardo1 a hinge4 #aj ,it is virtually ,cicero's division in the ,de ,officiis4 #aa ,the points at issue with regard to sabbatical observance hardly belong to an elementary treatise on ethics4 ,i ought not1 however1 to leave any doubt as to my own opinion4 ,i believe1 then1 the rest of the ,sabbath a necessity of man's constitution1 physical and mental1 of that of the beasts subservient to his use1 and1 in some measure1 even of the inanimate agents under his control1 while the sequestration of the day from the course of ordinary life is equally a moral and religious necessity4 ,the weekly ,sabbath ,i regard as a dictate of natural piety1 and a primeval institution1 re-enacted1 not established1 by ,moses1 and sanctioned by our ,saviour when he refers to the ,decalogue as a compend of moral duty1 as also in various other forms and ways4 ,as to modes of sabbatical observance1 the rigid abstinences and austerities once common in ,new ,england were derived from the ,mosaic ceremonial law1 and have no sanction either in the ,new ,testament or in the habits of the early ,christians4 ,i can conceive of no better rule for the ,lord's day1 than that each person so spend it as to interfere as little as possible with its fitting use by others1 and to make it as availing as he can for his own relaxation from secular cares1 and growth in wisdom and goodness4 #ab ,it was the malignity displayed toward the children of divorced wives by the women who succeeded them in the affections and homes of their husbands1 that in ,roman literature attached to the name of a stepmother 7noverca7 the most hateful associations1 which certainly have no place in modern ,christendom1 where the stepmother oftener than not assumes the maternal cares of the deceased wife as if they were natively her own4 #ac ,when ,jesus forbids swearing by heaven1 because 8it is ,god's throne10 and by the earth1 because 8it is his footstool10 the inference is obvious that1 for still stronger reasons1 all direct swearing by ,god himself is prohibited4 ,the word 1 which introduces the oaths by inferior objects specified in the text under discussion1 not infrequently corresponds to our phrase not even4 ,with this sense of 1 the passage would be rendered1 8,but ,i say unto you1 ,swear not at all1 not even by heaven10 etc4 ,i find that some writers on this subject quote in vindication of oaths on solemn occasions the instances in the ,scriptures in which ,god is said to have sworn by ,himself4 ,the reply is obvious1 that no being can swear by himself1 the essential significance of an oath being an appeal to some being or object other than one's self4 ,because ,god 8can swear by no greater10 it is certain that when this phraseology is used concerning ,him1 it is employed figuratively1 to aid the poverty of human conceptions1 and to express the certainty of his promise by the strongest terms which human language affords4 ,in like manner1 ,god is said by the sacred writers to repent of intended retribution to evil-doers1 not that infinite justice and love can change in thought1 plan1 or purpose1 but because a change of disposition and feeling is wont to precede human clemency to evil-doers4 #ad ,the odious meaning of excessive interest1 as attached to usury1 is of comparatively recent date4 ,in the earlier ,english1 as in our translation of the ,bible1 it denotes any sum given for the use of money4 #ae ,in this country usury laws are fast yielding to the growth of intelligence in monetary affairs4 ,wherever they exist in their severer forms1 they only enhance the rate of interest paid by the major portion of the class of borrowers1 as the lender must be compensated1 not only for the use of his money1 and for the risk of his creditor's inability to repay it1 but also for the additional risk of detection1 prosecution1 and forfeiture4 #af ,the reader need not be told that patience and passion are derived from different participles of the same verb4 ,patience comes from the present participle1 and fittingly denotes the spirit in which present suffering should be met2 while passion comes from the perfect or past participle1 and as fittingly denotes the condition ensuing upon any physical1 mental1 or moral affection1 induced from without1 which has been endured without protest or resistance4 #ag ,from punctum1 a point4 #ah 4 #ai 4 #bj ,the words employed by the ,stoics to indicate specific duties1 as presented to the common understanding1 recognize intrinsic fitness as the ground of right4 ,these duties are termed in ,greek1 1 that is1 be-fitting1 and in ,latin1 officia1 from ob and facio1 that which is done ob aliquid1 for some assignable reason4 #ba ,how far ,seneca's character was represented by his philosophy is1 we believe1 a fairly open question4 ,that the beginning and the close of his career were in accordance with his teachings1 is certain4 ,that as a courtier1 he was in suspicious proximity to1 if not in complicity with1 gross scandals and crimes1 is equally certain4 ,the evidence against him is weighty1 but by no means conclusive4 ,he may have lingered in the purlieus of the palace in fond memory of what ,nero had been in the promise of his youth1 and in the groundless hope of bringing him again under more humane influences4 ,this supposition is rendered the more probable by the well-known fact1 that during his whole court life1 and notwithstanding his great wealth1 ,seneca's personal habits were almost those of an anchorite4 #bb ,spinoza's ethical system was closely parallel to that of ,hobbes4 ,he denied the intrinsic difference between right and wrong2 but he regarded aristocracy as the natural order of society4 ,with him1 as with ,hobbes1 virtue consists solely in obedience to constituted authority2 and so utterly did he ignore a higher law1 that he maintained it to be the right of a state to abjure a treaty with another state1 when its terms ceased to be convenient or profitable4 #bc ,price's theory of morals is developed with singular precision and force in one of the ,baccalaureate ,addresses of the late ,president ,appleton1 of ,bowdoin ,college4 #bd 4 #be ,the reader who is conversant with the literature of ethics in ,england and ,america will miss in this chapter many names which merit a place by the side of those that have been given4 ,but within the limits proposed for this manual1 the alternative was to select a few writers among those who have largely influenced the thought of their own and succeeding times1 and to associate with each of them something that should mark his individuality2 or to make the chapter little more than a catalogue of names4 ,the former is evidently the more judicious course4 ,nothing has been said of living writers1--not because there are none who deserve an honored place among the contributors to this department of science1 but because1 were the list to be once opened1 we should hardly know where to close it4