---------------------------------------- ------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note3 ,all ,greek words have been transliterated into ,english1 and are contained within brackets4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------- ,,the ,,cult ,,of ,,incompetence ,,first ,,edition ,november1 #aiaa4 ,,second ,,edition ,july1 #aiab4 ,,the ,,cult ,,of ,,incompetence ,by ,,emile ,,faguet ,of the ,french ,academy ,,translated ,,from ,,the ,,french ,,by ,,beatrice ,,barstow ,,with ,,an ,,introduction ,,by ,,thomas ,,mackay ,,new ,,york3 ,e4 ,p4 ,,dutton ,,company #aiab ,,contents4 ,,page ,,introduction #a ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,forms ,,of ,,government #ab ,,ii4 ,,confusion ,,of ,,functions #cg ,,iii4 ,,the ,,refuges ,,of ,,efficiency #ei ,,iv4 ,,the ,,competent ,,legislator #ff ,v4 ,,laws ,,under ,,democracy #hb ,,vi4 ,,the ,,incompetence ,,of ,,government #ib ,,vii4 ,,judicial ,,incompetence #if ,,viii4 ,,examples ,,of ,,incompetence #abc ,,ix4 ,,manners #aef ,x4 ,,professional ,,customs #afb ,,xi4 ,,attempted ,,remedies #agb ,,xii4 ,,the ,,dream #baf ,,index #bcg ,,the ,,cult ,,of ,,incompetence4 ,,introduction4 ,though it may not have been possible in the following pages to reproduce the elegant and incisive style of a master of ,french prose1 not even the inadequacies of a translation can obscure the force of his argument4 ,the only introduction1 therefore1 that seems possible must take the form of a request to the reader to study ,m4 ,faguet's criticism of modern democracy with the daily paper in his hand4 ,he will then see1 taking chapter by chapter1 how in some aspects the phenomena of ,english democracy are identical with those described in the text1 and how in others our ,english worship of incompetence1 moral and technical1 differs considerably from that which prevails in ,france4 ,it might have been possible1 as a part of the scheme of this volume1 to note on each page1 by way of illustration1 instances from contemporary ,english practice1 but an adequate execution of this plan would have overloaded the text1 or even required an additional volume4 ,such a volume1 impartially worked out with instances drawn from the programme of all political parties1 would be an interesting commentary on current political controversy1 and it is to be hoped that ,m4 ,faguet's suggestive pages will inspire some competent hand to undertake the task4 ,if ,m4 ,faguet had chosen to refer to ,england1 he might1 perhaps1 have cited the constitution of this country1 as it existed some seventy years ago1 as an example of a demophil aristocracy1 raised to power by an aristocracy-respecting democracy4 ,it is not perhaps wise in political controversy to compromise our liberty of action in respect of the problems of the present time1 by too deferential a reference to a golden age which probably1 like ,lycurgus in the text1 p4 #gc1 never existed at all1 but it has been often stated1 and undoubtedly with a certain amount of truth1 that the years between #ahcb and #ahff were the only period in ,english history during which philosophical principles were allowed an important1 we cannot say a paramount1 authority over ,english legislation4 ,the characteristic features of the period were a determination to abolish the privileges of the few1 which1 however1 involved no desire to embark on the impossible and inequitable task of creating privileges for the many2 a deliberate attempt to extirpate the servile dependence of the old poor law1 and a definite abandonment of the plan of distributing economic advantages by eleemosynary state action4 ,this policy was based on the conviction that personal liberty and freedom of private enterprise were the adequate1 constructive influences of a progressive civilisation4 ,too much importance has perhaps been attached to the relatively unimportant question of the freedom of international trade1 for this was only part of a general policy of emancipation which had a much more far-reaching scope4 ,rightly understood the political philosophy of that time1 put forward by the competent statesmen who were then trusted by the democracy1 proclaimed the principle of liberty and freedom of exchange as the true solvents of the economic problems of the day4 ,this policy remained in force during the ministry of ,sir ,r4 ,peel and lasted right down to the time of the great budgets of ,mr4 ,gladstone4 ,if we might venture1 therefore1 to add another to the definitions of ,montesquieu1 we might say that the principle animating a liberal constitutional government was liberty1 and that this involved a definite plan for enlarging the sphere of liberty as the organising principle of civil society4 ,to what then are we to impute the decadence from this type into which parliamentary government seems now to have fallen8 ,can we attribute this to neglect or to exaggeration of its animating principle1 as suggested in the formula of ,montesquieu8 ,it is a question which the reader may find leisure to investigate2 we confine ourselves to marking what seem to be some of the stages of decay4 ,when the forces of destructive radicalism had done their legitimate work1 it seemed a time for rest and patience1 for administration rather than for fresh legislation and for a pause during which the principles of liberty and free exchange might have been left to organise the equitable distribution of the inevitably increasing wealth of the country4 ,the patience and the conviction which were needed to allow of such a development1 rightly or wrongly1 were not forthcoming1 and politicians and parties have not been wanting to give effect to remedies hastily suggested to and adopted by the people4 ,political leaders soon came to realise that recent enfranchisements had added a new electorate for whom philosophical principles had no charm4 ,at a later date also1 ,mr4 ,gladstone1 yielding to a powerful and not over-scrupulous political agitation1 suddenly determined to attempt a great constitutional change in the relations between the ,united ,kingdom and ,ireland4 ,whether the transference of the misgovernment of ,ireland from ,london to ,dublin would have had results as disastrous or as beneficial as disputants have asserted1 may be matter for doubt1 but the manner in which the proposal was made certainly had one unfortunate consequence4 ,mr4 ,gladstone's action struck a blow at the independence and self-respect1 or as ,m4 ,faguet terms it1 the moral competence of our parliamentary representation from which it has never recovered4 ,men were called on to abandon1 in the course of a few hours1 opinions which they had professed for a lifetime and this not as the result of conviction but on the pressure of party discipline4 ,political feeling ran high4 ,the ,caucus was called into more active operation4 ,political parties began to invent programmes to capture the groundlings4 ,the conservative party1 relinquishing its useful function of critic1 revived the old policy of eleemosynary doles1 and1 in an unlucky moment for its future1 has encumbered itself with an advocacy of the policy of protection4 ,for strangely enough the democracy1 the bestower of power1 though developing symptoms of fiscal tyranny and a hatred of liberty in other directions clings tenaciously to freedom of international trade--for the present at least--and it would seem that the electioneering caucus has1 in this instance1 failed to understand its own business4 ,the doles of the new ,state-charity were to be given to meet contributions from the beneficiaries1 but as the class which for one reason or another is ever in a destitute condition1 could not or would not contribute1 the only way in which the benevolent purpose of the agitation could be carried out was by bestowing the dole gratuitously4 ,the flood gates1 therefore1 had to be opened wider1 and we have been and still are exposed to a rush of philanthropic legislation which is gradually transferring all the responsibilities of life from the individual to the state4 ,free trade for the moment remains1 and it is supposed to be strongly entrenched in the convictions of the liberal party4 ,its position1 however1 is obviously very precarious in view of the demands made by the militant trade unions4 ,these1 in their various spheres1 claim a monopoly of employment for their members1 to the exclusion of those who do not belong to their associations4 ,logic has something1 perhaps not much1 to do with political action1 and it is almost inconceivable that a party can go on for long holding these two contradictory opinions4 ,which of them will be abandoned1 the future only can tell4 ,the result of all this is a growing disinclination on the part of the people to limit their responsibilities to their means of discharging them1 the creation of a proletariate which in search of maintenance drifts along the line of least resistance1 dependence on the government dole4 ,in the end too it must bring about the impoverishment of the state1 which is ever being called on to undertake new burdens2 for the individual1 thus released from obligation to discharge1 is still left free to create responsibilities1 for which it is now the business of the ,state to make provision4 ,under such a system the ability to pay as well as the number of the solvent citizens must continuously decline4 ,the proper reply to this legislation which we describe as predatory in the sense that we describe the benevolent habits of ,robin ,hood as predatory1 cannot be made by the official opposition which was itself the first to step on the down grade1 and which only waits the chances of party warfare to take its turn in providing panem et circenses at the charge of the public exchequer4 ,in this way1 progress is brought to a standstill by the chronic unwillingness of the rate- and tax-payers to find the money4 ,a truer policy1 based on the voluntary action of citizens and capable of indefinite and continuous expansion1 finds no support among politicians1 for all political parties seem to be held in the grip of the moral and technical incompetence which ,m4 ,faguet has so wittily described4 ,the only reply to a government bent on such courses is that which above has been imputed--perhaps without sufficient justification--to the governments of the period #ahcb-ahff2 and that reply democracy1 as at present advised1 will allow no political party to make4 ,there does not appear1 therefore1 to be much difference between the situation here and in ,france1 and it is very interesting to notice how in various details there is a very close parallelism between events in this country and those which ,m4 ,faguet has described4 ,the position of our ,lord ,chancellor1 who has been bitterly attacked by his own party1 in respect of his appointment of magistrates1 is very similar to that of ,m4 ,barthou1 quoted on p4 #aah4 ,our judicial system has hitherto been considered free from political partisanship1 but very recently and for the first time a minister in his place in parliament1 has rightly or wrongly seen fit to call in question the impartiality of our judicial bench1 and the suspicion1 if1 as appears to be the case1 it is widely entertained by persons heated in political strife1 will probably lead to appointments calculated to ensure reprisals4 ,astute politicians do not commit themselves to an attack on a venerated institution1 till they think they know that that institution is becoming unpopular with the followers who direct their policy4 ,criminal verdicts also1 especially on the eve of an election1 are now made liable to revision by ministers scouring the gaols of the country in search of picturesque malefactors whom1 with an accompaniment of much philanthropic speech1 they proceed to set at liberty4 ,even the first principles of equity1 as ordinarily understood1 seem to have lost their authority1 when weighed in the balance against the vote of the majority4 ,very recently the members of an honourable and useful profession represented to a minister that his extension of a scheme of more or less gratuitous relief to a class which hitherto had been able and willing to pay its way1 was likely to deprive them of their livelihood4 ,his reply1 inter alia1 contained the argument that the class in question was very numerous and had many votes1 and that he doubted whether any one would venture to propose its exclusion except perhaps a member for a university2 as a matter of fact some such proposal had been made by one of the university members whose constituents were affected by the proposal4 ,the minister further declared that he did not think that such an amendment could obtain a seconder4 ,the argument seems to impute to our national representatives a cynical disregard of equity1 and a blind worship of numbers1 which if true1 is an instance of moral incompetence quite as remarkable as anything contained in ,m4 ,faguet's narrative4 ,if readers of this volume will take the trouble to annotate their copies with a record of the relevant incidents which meet them every day of their lives1 they cannot fail to acknowledge how terribly inevitable is the rise of incompetence to political power4 ,the tragedy is all the more dreadful1 when we recognise1 as we all must1 the high character and ability of the statesmen and politicians who lie under the thrall of this compelling necessity4 ,this systematic corruption of the best threatens to assume the proportions of a national disaster4 ,it is the system1 not the actors in it1 which ,m4 ,faguet analyses and invites us to deplore4 ,t4 ,,mackay4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,forms ,,of ,,government4 ,the question has often been asked1 what is the animating principle of different forms of government1 for each1 it is assumed1 has its own principle4 ,in other words1 what is the general idea which inspires each political system8 ,montesquieu1 for instance1 proved that the principle of monarchy is honour1 the principle of despotism fear1 the principle of a republic virtue or patriotism1 and he added with much justice that governments decline and fall as often by carrying their principle to excess1 as by neglecting it altogether4 ,and this1 though a paradox1 is true4 ,at first sight it may not be obvious how a despotism can fall by inspiring too much fear1 or a constitutional monarchy by developing too highly the sentiment of honour1 or a republic by having too much virtue4 ,it is nevertheless true4 ,to make too common a use of fear is to destroy its efficacy4 ,as ,edgar ,quinet happily puts it3 ,if we want to make use of fear we must be certain that we can use it always4 ,we cannot have too much honour1 but when we can appeal to this sentiment only and when distinctions1 decorations1 orders1 ribbons--in a word honours--are multiplied1 inasmuch as we cannot increase such things indefinitely1 those who have none become as discontented as those who1 having some1 want more4 ,finally we cannot1 of course1 have too much virtue1 and naturally here governments will fall not by exaggerating but by abandoning their guiding principle4 ,yet is it not sometimes true that by demanding from citizens too great a devotion to their country1 we end by exhausting human powers of endurance and sacrifice8 ,this is what happened in the case of ,napoleon1 who1 perhaps unwittingly1 required too much from ,france1 for the building up of a ',greater ,france4' ,but that1 some one will object1 was not a republic6 ,from the point of view of the sacrifices required from the citizen1 it was a republic1 similar to the ,roman ,republic and to the ,french ,republic of #agib4 ,all the talk was 'for the glory of our country1' 'heroism1 heroism1 nothing but heroism'6 ,if too much is required of it1 civic virtue can be exhausted4 ,it is1 then1 very true that governments perish just as much from an excess as from a neglect of their appropriate principle4 ,montesquieu without doubt borrowed his general idea from ,aristotle1 who remarks not without humour1 ,those1 who think that they have discovered the basis of good government1 are apt to push the consequences of their new found principle too far4 ,they do not remember that disproportion in such matters is fatal4 ,they forget that a nose which varies slightly from the ideal line of beauty appropriate for noses1 tending slightly towards becoming a hook or a snub1 may still be of fair shape and not disagreeable to the eye1 but if the excess be very great1 all symmetry is lost1 and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all4 ,this law of proportion holds good with regard to every form of government4 99 99 99 99 99 ,starting from these general ideas1 ,i have often wondered what principle democrats have adopted for the form of government which they favour1 and it has not required a great effort on my part to arrive at the conclusion that the principle in question is the worship and cultivation1 or1 briefly 'the cult' of incompetence or inefficiency4 ,let us examine any well-managed and successful business firm or factory4 ,every employee does the work he knows and does best1 the skilled workman1 the accountant1 the manager and the secretary1 each in his place4 ,no one would dream of making the accountant change places with a commercial traveller or a mechanic4 ,look too at the animal world4 ,the higher we go in the scale of organic existence1 the greater the division of labour1 the more marked the specialisation of physiological function4 ,one organ thinks1 another acts1 one digests1 another breathes4 ,now is there such a thing as an animal with only one organ1 or rather is there any animal1 consisting of only one organ1 which breathes and thinks and digests all at the same time8 ,yes1 there is4 ,it is called the amoeba1 and the amoeba is the very lowest thing in the animal world1 very inferior even to a vegetable4 ,in the same way1 without doubt1 in a well constituted society1 each organ has its definite function1 that is to say1 administration is carried on by those who have learnt how to administer1 legislation and the amendment of laws by those who have learnt how to legislate1 justice by those who have studied jurisprudence1 and the functions of a country postman are not given to a paralytic4 ,society should model itself on nature1 whose plan is specialisation4 ,for1 as ,aristotle says1 she is not niggardly1 like the ,delphian smiths whose knives have to serve for many purposes1 she makes each thing for a single purpose1 and the best instrument is that which serves one and not many uses4 ,elsewhere he says1 ,at ,carthage it is thought an honour to hold many offices1 but a man only does one thing well4 ,the legislator should see to this1 and prevent the same man from being set to make shoes and play the flute4 ,a well-constituted society1 we may sum up1 is one where every function is not confided to every one1 where the crowd itself1 the whole body social1 is not told3 ,it is your business to govern1 to administer1 to make the laws1 c4 ,a society1 where things are so arranged1 is an amoebic society4 ,that society1 therefore1 stands highest in the scale1 where the division of labour is greatest1 where specialisation is most definite1 and where the distribution of functions according to efficiency is most thoroughly carried out4 99 99 99 99 99 ,now democracies1 far from sharing this view1 are inclined to take the opposite view4 ,at ,athens there was a great tribunal composed of men learned in1 and competent to interpret1 the law4 ,the people could not tolerate such an institution1 so laboured to destroy it and to usurp its functions4 ,the crowd reasoned thus4 ,we can interpret and carry out laws1 because we make them4 ,the conclusion was right1 but the minor premise was disputable4 ,the retort can be made3 ,true1 you can interpret and carry out laws because you make them1 but perhaps you have no business to be making laws4 ,be that as it may1 the ,athenian people not only interpreted and applied its own laws1 but it insisted on being paid for so doing4 ,the result was that the poorest citizens sat judging all day long1 as all others were unwilling to sacrifice their whole time for a payment of six drachmas4 ,this plebeian tribunal continued for many years4 ,its most celebrated feat was the judgment which condemned ,socrates to death4 ,this was perhaps matter for regret1 but the great principle1 the sovereignty of incompetence1 was vindicated4 ,modern democracies seem to have adopted the same principle1 in form they are essentially amoebic4 ,a democracy1 well-known to us all1 has been evolved in the following manner4 ,it began with this idea2 king and people1 democratic royalty1 royal democracy4 ,the people makes1 the king carries out1 the law2 the people legislates1 the king governs1 retaining1 however1 a certain control over the law1 for he can suspend the carrying out of a new law when he considers that it tends to obstruct the function of government4 ,here then was a sort of specialisation of functions4 ,the same person1 or collective body of persons1 did not both legislate and govern4 ,this did not last long4 ,the king was suppressed4 ,democracy remained1 but a certain amount of respect for efficiency remained too4 ,the people1 the masses1 did not1 every single man of them1 claim the right to govern and to legislate directly4 ,it did not even claim the right to nominate the legislature directly4 ,it adopted indirect election1 a deux degres1 that is1 it nominated electors who in turn nominated the legislature4 ,it thus left two aristocracies above itself1 the first electors and the elected legislature4 ,this was still far removed from democracy on the ,athenian model which did everything itself4 ,this does not mean that much attention was paid to efficiency4 ,the electors were not chosen because they were particularly fitted to elect a legislature1 nor was the legislature itself elected with any reference to its legislative capacity4 ,still there was a certain pretence of a desire for efficiency1 a double pseudo-efficiency4 ,the crowd1 or rather the constitution1 assumed that legislators elected by the delegates of the crowd were more competent to make laws than the crowd itself4 ,this somewhat curious form of efficiency ,i have called competence par collation1 efficiency or competence conferred by this form of selection4 ,there is absolutely nothing to show that so-and-so has the slightest legislative or juridical faculty1 so ,i confer on him a certificate of efficiency by the confidence ,i repose in him when nominating him for the office1 or rather ,i show my confidence in the electors and they confer a certificate of efficiency on those whom they nominate for the legislature4 ,this1 of course1 is devoid of all common sense1 but appearances1 and even something more1 are in its favour4 ,it is not common sense for it involves something being made out of nothing1 inefficiency producing efficiency and zero extracting 'one' out of itself4 ,this form of selection1 though it does not appeal to me under any circumstances1 is legitimate enough when it is exercised by a competent body4 ,a university can confer a degree upon a distinguished man because it can judge whether his degreeless condition is due to accident or not4 ,it would1 however1 be highly ridiculous and paradoxical if the general public were to confer mathematical degrees4 ,a degree of efficiency conferred by an inefficient body is contrary to common sense4 ,there is1 however1 some plausibility and indeed a little more than plausibility in favour of this plan4 ,degrees in literature and in dramatic art are conferred1 given by 'collation1' by incompetent people1 that is by the public4 ,we can say to the public3 ,you know nothing of literary and dramatic art4 ,it will retort3 ,true1 ,i know nothing1 but certain things move me and ,i confer the degree on those who evoke my emotions4 ,in this it is not altogether wrong4 ,in the same way the degree of doctor of political science is conferred by the people on those who stir its emotions and who express most forcibly its own passions4 ,these doctors of political science are the empassioned representatives of its own passions4 --,in other words1 the worst legislators6-- ,yes1 very nearly so1 but not quite4 ,it is very useful that we should have an exponent of popular passion at the crest of the social wave1 to tell us not indeed what the crowd is thinking1 for the crowd never thinks1 but what the crowd is feeling1 in order that we may not cross it too violently or obey it too obsequiously4 ,an engineer would call it the science of the strength of materials4 ,a medium assures me that he had a conversation with ,louis ,,xiv1 who said to him3 ,universal suffrage is an excellent thing in a monarchy4 ,it is a source of information4 ,when it recommends a certain course of action it shows us that this is a thing which we must not do4 ,if ,i could have consulted it over the ,revocation of the ,edict of ,nantes1 it would have given me a clear mandate for that ,revocation and ,i should have known what to do1 and that ,edict would not have been revoked4 ,i acted as ,i did1 because ,i was advised by ministers whom ,i considered experienced statesmen4 ,had ,i been aware of the state of public opinion ,i should have known that ,france was tired of wars and new palaces and extravagance4 ,but this was not an expression of passion and prejudice1 but a cry of suffering4 ,as far as passion and prejudice are concerned we must go right in the teeth of public opinion1 and universal suffrage will tell you what that is4 ,on the other hand we must pay heed1 serious heed to every cry of pain1 and here too universal suffrage will come to our aid4 ,universal suffrage is necessary to a monarchy as a source of information4 ,this1 ,i am told1 is ,louis ,,xiv's present opinion on the subject4 ,as far as legislation therefore is concerned1 the attempt to secure competence by 'collation' is an absurdity4 ,yet it is an inverted sort of competence useful for indicating the state of a nation's temper4 ,from this it follows that this system is as mischievous in a republic as it would be wholesome in a monarchy4 ,it is not therefore altogether bad4 ,the democracy which we have in view1 after having been governed by the representatives of its representatives for ten years1 submitted for the next fifteen years to the rule of one representative and took no particular advantage therefrom4 ,then for thirty years it adopted a scheme which aimed at a certain measure of efficiency4 ,it assumed that the electors of the legislature ought not to be nominated1 but marked out by their social position1 that is their fortune4 ,those who possessed so many drachmas were to be electors4 ,what sort of a basis for efficiency is this8 ,it is a basis but certainly a somewhat narrow one4 ,it is a basis1 first1 because a man who owns a certain fortune has a greater interest than others in a sound management of public business1 and self-interest opens and quickens the eye2 and again a man who has money and does not lose it cannot be altogether a fool4 ,on the other hand it is a narrow basis1 because the possession of money is of itself no guarantee of political ability1 and the system leads to the very questionable proposition that every rich man is a competent social reformer4 ,it is1 however1 a sort of competence1 but a competence very precariously established and on a very narrow basis4 ,this system disappeared and our democracy1 after a short interregnum1 repeated its previous experiment and submitted for eighteen years to the rule of one delegate with no great cause to congratulate itself on the result4 ,it then adopted democracy in a form almost pure and simple4 ,i say almost1 for the democratic system pure and simple involves the direct government of the people without any intervening representatives1 by means of a continuous plebiscite4 ,our democracy then set up and still maintains a democratic system almost pure and simple1 that is to say1 it established government of the nation by delegates whom it itself elected and by these delegates strictly and exclusively4 ,this time we have reached an apotheosis of incompetence that is well nigh absolute4 ,this1 our present system1 purports to be the rule of efficiency chosen by the arbitrary form of selection which has been described4 ,just as the bishop in the story1 addressing a haunch of venison1 exclaimed3 ,i baptise thee carp1 so the people says to its representatives3 ,i baptise you masters of law1 ,i baptise you statesmen1 ,i baptise you social reformers4 ,we shall see later on that this baptism goes very much further than this4 ,if the people were capable of judging of the legal and psychological knowledge possessed by those who present themselves for election1 this form of selection need not be prohibitive of efficiency and might even be satisfactory2 but in the first place1 the electors are not capable of judging1 and secondly1 even if they were1 nothing would be gained4 ,nothing would be gained1 because the people never places itself at this point of view4 ,emphatically never6 ,it looks at the qualifications of the candidate not from a scientific but from a moral point of view4 --,well that surely is something1 and1 in a way1 a guarantee of efficiency4 ,the legislators are not capable of making laws1 it is true2 but at least they are honest men4 ,this guarantee of moral efficiency1 some critic will say1 gives me much satisfaction4 ,please be careful1 ,i reply1 we should never think of giving the management of a railway station to the most honest man1 but to an honest man who1 besides1 understood thoroughly railway administration4 ,so we must put into our laws not only honest intentions1 but just principles of law1 politics1 and society4 ,secondly1 if the candidates are considered from the point of view of their moral worth it is in a peculiar fashion4 ,high morality is imputed to those who share the dominant passions of the people and who express themselves thereon more violently than others4 ,ah6 these are our honest men1 it cries1 and ,i do not say that the men of its choice are dishonest1 ,i only say that by this criterion they are not infallibly marked out even as honest4 --,still1 some one replies1 they are probably disinterested1 for they follow popular prejudices1 and not their own particular1 individual wishes4 ,yes1 that is just what the masses believe1 while they forget that there is nothing easier than to simulate popular passion in order to win popular confidence and become a political personage4 ,if disinterestedness is really so essential to the people1 only those should be elected who oppose the popular will and who show thereby that they do not want to be elected4 ,or better still only those who do not stand for election should be elected1 since not to stand is the undeniable sign of disinterestedness4 ,but this is never done4 ,that which should always be done is never done4 --,but1 some one will say1 your public bodies which recruit their numbers by co-optation1 ,academies and learned societies1 do not elect their members in this way4-- ,quite so1 and they are right4 ,such bodies do not want their members to be disinterested but scientific4 ,they have no reason to prefer an unwilling member to one who is eager to be elected4 ,their point of view is entirely different4 ,the people1 which pretends to set store by high moral character1 should exclude from power those who are ambitious of power1 or at least those who covet it with a keenness that suggests other than disinterested motives4 ,these considerations show us what the crowd understands by the moral worth of a man4 ,the moral worth of a man consists1 as far as the crowd is concerned1 in his entertaining or pretending to entertain the same sentiments as itself1 and it is just for this reason that the representatives of the multitude are excellent as documents for information1 but detestable1 or at least1 useless1 and therefore detestable1 as legislators4 ,montesquieu1 who is seldom wrong1 errs in my opinion when he says1 ,the people is well-fitted to choose its own magistrates4 ,he1 it is true1 did not live under a democracy4 ,for consider1 how could the people be fitted to choose its own magistrates and legislators1 when ,montesquieu himself1 this time with ample justification1 lays down as one of his principles that morals should correct climate1 and that law should correct morals1 and the people1 as we know1 only thinks of choosing as its delegates men who share1 in every particular1 its own manner of thinking8 ,climate can be partially resisted by the people2 but if the law should correct morals1 legislators should be chosen who have taken up an attitude of reaction against current morality4 ,it would be very curious if such a choice were ever made1 and not only is it never made but the contrary invariably happens4 ,to sum it all up1 it is intellectual incompetence1 nay moral incompetence which is sought instinctively in the people's choice4 99 99 99 99 99 ,if possible1 it is more than this4 ,the people favours incompetence1 not only because it is no judge of intellectual competence and because it looks on moral competence from a wrong point of view1 but because it desires before everything1 as indeed is very natural1 that its representatives should resemble itself4 ,this it does for two reasons4 ,first1 as a matter of sentiment1 the people desires1 as we have seen1 that its representatives should share its feelings and prejudices4 ,these representatives can share its prejudices and yet not absolutely resemble it in morals1 habits1 manners and appearance2 but naturally the people never feels so certain that a man shares its prejudices and is not merely pretending to do so1 as when the man resembles it feature by feature4 ,it is a sign and a guarantee4 ,the people is instinctively impelled therefore to elect men of the same habits1 manners and even education as itself1 or shall we say of an education slightly superior1 the education of a man who can talk1 but only superior in a very slight degree4 ,in addition to this sentimental reason1 there is another1 which is extremely important1 for it goes to the very root of the democratic idea4 ,what is the people's one desire1 when once it has been stung by the democratic tarantula8 ,it is that all men should be equal1 and in consequence that all inequalities natural as well as artificial should disappear4 ,it will not have artificial inequalities1 nobility of birth1 royal favours1 inherited wealth1 and so it is ready to abolish nobility1 royalty1 and inheritance4 ,nor does it like natural inequalities1 that is to say a man more intelligent1 more active1 more courageous1 more skilful than his neighbours4 ,it cannot destroy these inequalities1 for they are natural1 but it can neutralise them1 strike them with impotence by excluding them from the employments under its control4 ,democracy is thus led quite naturally1 irresistibly one may say1 to exclude the competent precisely because they are competent1 or if the phrase pleases better and as the popular advocate would put it1 not because they are competent but because they are unequal1 or1 as he would probably go on to say1 if he wished to excuse such action1 not because they are unequal1 but because being unequal they are suspected of being opponents of equality4 ,so it all comes to the same thing4 ,this it is that made ,aristotle say that where merit is despised1 there is democracy4 ,he does not say so in so many words1 but he wrote3 ,where merit is not esteemed before everything else1 it is not possible to have a firmly established aristocracy1 and that amounts to saying that where merit is not esteemed1 we enter at once on a democratic regime and never escape from it4 ,the chance1 then1 of efficiency coming to the front in this state of affairs is indeed deplorable4 ,first and last1 democracy--and it is natural enough--wishes to do everything itself1 it is the enemy of all specialisation of functions1 particularly it wishes to govern1 without delegates or intermediaries4 ,its ideal is direct government as it existed at ,athens1 its ideal is democracy1 in the terminology of ,rousseau1 who applied the word to direct government and to direct government only4 ,forced by historical events and perhaps by necessity to govern by delegates1 how could democracy still contrive to govern directly or nearly so1 although continuing to govern through delegates8 ,its first alternative is1 perhaps1 to impose on its delegates an imperative mandate4 ,delegates under this condition become mere agents of the people4 ,they attend the legislative assembly to register the will of the people just as they receive it1 and the people in reality governs directly4 ,this is what is meant by the imperative mandate4 ,democracy has often considered it1 but never with persistence4 ,herein it shows good sense4 ,it has a shrewd suspicion that the imperative mandate is never more than a snare and a delusion4 ,representatives of the people meet and discuss1 the interests of party become defined4 ,henceforward they are the prey of the goddess ,opportunity1 the ,greek ,kairos4 ,then it happens one day that to vote according to their mandate would be very unfavourable to the interest of their party4 ,they are therefore obliged to be faithless to their party by reason of their fidelity to their mandate1 or disobedient to their mandate by reason of their obedience to their party2 and in any case to have betrayed their mandate with this very praiseworthy and excellent intention is a thing for which they can take credit or at least obtain excuse with the electors--and on such a matter it will be very difficult to refute them4 ,the imperative mandate is therefore a very clumsy instrument for work of a very delicate character4 ,the democracy1 instinctively1 knows this very well1 and sets no great store by the imperative mandate4 ,what other alternative is there for it8 ,something very much finer1 the substance instead of the shadow4 ,it can elect men who resemble it closely1 who follow its sentiments closely1 who are in fact so nearly identical with itself that they may be trusted to do surely1 instinctively1 almost mechanically that which it would itself do1 if it were itself an immense legislative assembly4 ,they would vote1 without doubt1 according to circumstances1 but also as their electors would vote if they were governing directly4 ,in this way democracy preserves its legislative power4 ,it makes the law1 and this is the only way it can make it4 ,democracy1 therefore1 has the greatest inducement to elect representatives who are representative1 who1 in the first place1 resemble it as closely as possible1 who1 in the second place1 have no individuality of their own1 who finally1 having no fortune of their own1 have no sort of independence4 ,we deplore that democracy surrenders itself to politicians1 but from its own point of view1 a point of view which it cannot avoid taking up1 it is absolutely right4 ,what is a politician8 ,he is a man who1 in respect of his personal opinions1 is a nullity1 in respect of education1 a mediocrity1 he shares the general sentiments and passions of the crowd1 his sole occupation is politics1 and if that career were closed to him1 he would die of starvation4 ,he is precisely the thing of which the democracy has need4 ,he will never be led away by his education to develop ideas of his own2 and having no ideas of his own1 he will not allow them to enter into conflict with his prejudices4 ,his prejudices will be1 at first by a feeble sort of conviction1 afterwards by reason of his own interest1 identical with those of the crowd2 and lastly1 his poverty and the impossibility of his getting a living outside of politics make it certain that he will never break out of the narrow circle where his political employers have confined him2 his imperative mandate is the material necessity which obliges him to obey2 his imperative mandate is his inability to quarrel with his bread and butter4 ,democracy obviously has need of politicians1 has need of nothing else but politicians1 and has need indeed that there shall be in politics nothing else but politicians4 ,its enemy1 or rather the man whom democracy dreads because he means to govern and does not intend to allow the mob to govern through him1 is the man who succeeds in getting elected for some constituency or other1 either by the influence of his wealth or by the prestige of his talent and notoriety4 ,such a man is not dependent on democracy4 ,if a legislative assembly were entirely or by a majority composed of rich men1 men of superior intelligence1 men who had an interest in attending to the trades or professions in which they had succeeded rather than in playing at politics1 they would vote according to their own ideas1 and then--what would happen8 ,why then democracy would be simply suppressed4 ,it would no longer legislate and govern2 there would be1 to speak exactly1 an aristocracy1 not very permanently established perhaps1 but still an aristocracy which would eliminate the influence of the people from public affairs4 ,clearly it is almost impossible for the democracy1 if it means to survive1 to encourage efficiency1 nay it is almost impossible for it to refrain from attempting to destroy efficiency4 ,thus1 we may sum up1 only those are elected as the representatives of the people1 who are its exact counterparts and constant dependents4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,confusion ,,of ,,functions4 ,and what is the result of all this8 ,the result1 which is very logical1 very just from the democratic point of view1 and precisely that which the democracy desires and cannot do otherwise than desire1 is that the national representatives do exactly what the people would wish them to do1 and what the people would do itself if it undertook to govern directly itself4 ,the representative government wishes to do everything itself1 just as the people would like to do1 if it were itself exercising the functions of government directly1 just as it did in olden times on the ,pnyx at ,athens4 ,montesquieu realised this fully1 though naturally he had no experience of how the theory worked under a representative and parliamentary system4 ,the principle of it all is at bottom the same1 and only the change of a single phrase is needed to make the following quotation strictly applicable4 ,the principle of democracy1 he says1 is perverted not only when it loses the spirit of equality1 but still more when it carries the spirit of equality to an extreme1 and when every one wishes to be the equal of those whom he chooses to govern him4 ,for then the people1 not being able to tolerate the authority which it has created1 wishes to do everything itself1 to deliberate for the ,senate1 to act for the magistrates1 and to usurp the functions of the judges4 ,the people wishes to exclude the magistrates from their functions1 and the magistrates naturally are no longer respected4 ,the deliberations of the ,senate are allowed to have no weight1 and senators naturally fall into contempt4 ,let us translate the foregoing passage into the language of to-day4 ,under democratic parliamentary government the representatives of the people are determined to do everything themselves4 ,they must be equal to those whom they choose for their rulers4 ,they cannot tolerate the authority which they have entrusted to the ,government4 ,they must themselves govern in the place of the ,government1 administer in the place of the executive staff1 substitute their own authority for that of all the bench of judges1 perform the duties of magistrates1 and1 in a word1 throw off all regard and respect for persons and things4 ,this is the true inwardness of the popular spirit1 the will of the people which wishes to do everything itself1 or what is the same thing1 through its representatives1 its faithful and servile creatures4 ,from this point onwards efficiency is hunted and exterminated in every direction2 just as it was excluded in the election of representatives1 so the representatives laboriously and continuously exclude it from every sort of office and employment under the public service4 ,the ,government1 to begin our analysis of functional confusion at the top1 ought to be watched and advised by the national representatives1 but it ought to be independent of the national representatives1 at least it ought not to be inextricably mixed up with them1 in other words the national representatives ought not to govern4 ,under democracy this is precisely what they want to do4 ,they elect the ,government1 a privilege which need not be denied them2 but1 not being able to tolerate the authority which they have created1 as soon as they have set it up1 they put pressure on it and insist on governing continuously in its place4 ,the assembly of national representatives is not a body which makes laws1 but a body which1 by a never ending string of questions and interruptions1 dictates from day to day to the ,government what it ought to do1 that is to say1 it is a body which governs4 ,the country is governed1 literally1 by the ,chamber of ,deputies4 ,this is absolutely necessary if1 as the true spirit of the system requires1 the people is to be governed by no one but itself1 if there is to be no will at work other than the will of the people1 emanating from itself and bringing back a sort of harvest of executive acts4 ,again1 ,i repeat1 this is absolutely necessary1 in order that there shall be nothing1 not even originating with the people1 which1 for a single moment and within the most narrowly defined limits1 shall exercise the functions of sovereignty over the sovereign people4 ,this is all very well1 but government is an art and we assume that there is a science of government1 and here we have the people governed by persons who have neither science nor art1 and who are chosen precisely because they have not these qualifications and on the guarantee that they have none of them6 ,again1 in a democracy of this kind1 if there exist1 as a result of tradition or of some necessity arising out of foreign relations1 an authority1 independent for a certain term of years of the legislative assembly1 which has no accounts to render to it and which cannot be questioned or constitutionally overthrown1 that authority is so strange1 and1 if the phrase may pass1 so monstrous an anomaly1 that it dares not exercise its power1 and dreads the scandal which it would raise by acting on its rights1 and seems as it were paralysed with terror at the very thought of its own existence4 ,and its attitude is right2 for if it exercised its powers1 or even lent itself to any appearance of so doing1 there at once would be an act of will which was not an act of the popular will1 a theory altogether contrary to the spirit of this system4 ,for in this system the chief of the state can only be the nominal chief of the state4 ,a will of his own would be an abuse of power1 an idea of his own would be an encroachment1 and a word of his own would be an act of high treason4 ,it follows that1 if the constitution has formally conferred these powers1 the constitution on these points is a dead letter1 because it contravenes an unwritten constitution of higher authority1 viz41 the inner inspiration of the political institution4 ,one of these honorary chiefs of the state has said3 ,during all my term as president1 ,i was constitutionally silent4 ,this is not correct1 for the constitution gave him leave to speak and even to act4 ,at bottom it was true1 for the constitution1 in allowing him to act and speak1 was acting unconstitutionally4 ,in speaking he would have been constitutional1 in holding his tongue he was institutional4 ,he had been in fact institutionally silent4 ,he disobeyed the letter of the constitution1 but he had admirably extracted its meaning from it1 and understood and respected its spirit4 ,under democracy1 then1 the national representatives govern as directly and as really as possible1 dictating a policy to the executive and neutralising the supreme chief of the executive to whom it is not able to dictate4 ,the national representatives are not content with governing1 they wish to administer4 ,now consider how it would be if the permanent officials of finance1 justice and police1 etc41 depended solely on their parliamentary chiefs1 who are ministers only because they are the creatures of the popular assembly1 liable to instant and frequent dismissal2 surely then1 these officials1 more permanent than their chiefs1 would form an aristocracy1 and would administer the state independently of the popular will and according to their own ideas4 ,this1 of course1 must not be allowed to happen4 ,there must not be any will but the people's will1 no other power1 however limited1 but its own4 ,this causes a dilemma which is sufficiently remarkable4 ,here we seem to have contrary results from the same cause4 ,since the popular assembly governs ministers1 and frequently dismisses them1 they are not able to govern their subordinates as did ,colbert and ,louvois1 and these subordinates accordingly are very independent2 so it comes about that the greater the authority which the popular assembly wields over ministers1 the more it is likely to lose in its control over the subordinates of ministers1 and in destroying one rival power it creates another4 ,the dilemma1 however1 is avoided easily enough4 ,no public official is appointed without receiving its visa1 and it contrives even to elect the administrative officials4 ,in the first place1 the national representatives1 in their corporate capacity1 and in the central offices of government1 watch most attentively the appointment of the permanent staff1 and further each single member of the representative government in his province1 in his department1 in his arrondissement picks and chooses the candidates and really appoints the permanent staff4 ,this is1 of course1 necessary1 if the national will is to be paramount here as well as elsewhere1 and if the people is to secure servants of its own type1 if it is to choose its own magistrates1 as ,montesquieu said4 ,the people1 then1 chooses its servants through the intervention of its representatives2 and consider1 to return to our point1 how absolutely necessary it is for it to secure representatives who are intellectually the exact image and imitation of itself4 ,everything dovetails neatly together4 ,here then we have the people interfering influentially in the appointment of the civil service4 ,it continues to do everything itself4 ,complaints are raised on all sides of this confusion of politics with the business of administration1 and indeed we hear continually that politics pervade everything4 ,but what is the reason of this8 ,it is the principle of the national sovereignty asserting itself4 ,politics1 political power1 means the will of the majority of the nation1 and is it not fitting that the will of the majority should make itself felt--indeed need we be surprised that it insists on making itself felt--in the details of public business1 as administered by the permanent staff1 as well as elsewhere8 ,the ideal of democracy is that the people should elect its own rulers1 or1 if this is not its ideal1 it is its idea1 and this is what it does under a parliamentary democracy through the intervention of its representatives4 ,this is all very well1 but efficiency has been dealt another blow4 ,for how is a candidate to recommend himself for an office to which appointment is made by the people and its representatives8 ,by his merit8 ,his chiefs and his fellow civil servants might be good judges of that2 but the people or its representatives are much less capable of judging4 ,the people is admirably fitted to choose those to whom it has to entrust some part of its authority2 so ,montesquieu2 we must now examine this saying a little more closely4 ,what reasons does the philosopher give8 ,the people can only be guided by things of which it cannot be ignorant1 and which fall1 so to speak1 within its own observation4 ,it knows very well that a man has experience in war1 and that he has had such and such successes2 it is therefore quite capable of electing a general4 ,it knows that a judge is industrious1 that many of those who are litigants in his court go away satisfied1 and that he has never been convicted of bribery1 and this is enough to warrant it in appointing to any judicial office4 ,it has been impressed by the magnificence or riches of some citizen1 and this fits it for appointing an aedile4 ,all these things are matters of fact about which the man in the street has better knowledge than the king in his palace4 ,this passage1 ,i confess1 does not appear to be convincing4 ,why should not a king in his palace know of the riches of a financier1 the reputation of a judge or the success of a colonel just as well as the man in the street8 ,there is no difficulty in getting information about such things4 ,the people knows that such an one was always a good judge and such another always an excellent officer4 ,therefore it is qualified to appoint a general or a high-court judge or other officer of the law4 ,so be it1 but for the selection of a young judge or a young and untried officer what special source of information has the people8 ,i cannot find that it has any4 ,in this very argument1 ,montesquieu limits the competence of the people to the election of the great chiefs1 and of the most exalted magistrates1 and indeed further confines the popular prerogative in this matter to assigning an office and career to one who has already given proof of his capacity4 ,but for putting the competent man for the first time in the place where he is wanted1 how has the people any special instinct or information8 ,montesquieu shows that the people can recognise ability when it has been proved1 but he says nothing to show that it recognises readily nascent1 unproved talent4 ,the argument of ,montesquieu is not here conclusive4 ,he has been led astray1 it seems to me1 by his desire to present his argument antithetically 7using the term in its logical sense74 ,what he really wished to prove was not so much the truth of the proposition that he was then advancing1 but the falsity of quite another proposition4 ,the question for him1 the question which he had in his mind1 was as follows3 ,is the people capable of governing the state1 of taking measures beforehand1 and of understanding and solving the difficulties of home and foreign affairs8 ,by no means4 ,then is it fit to elect its own magistrates8 ,well1 it might do that4 ,thus he had been led away by this antithesis so far as to say3 ,able to govern8--,certainly not6 ,able to elect its own magistrates8 ,admirably6 ,the explanation of the whole paragraph which ,i have just quoted lies in the conclusion1 which runs as follows3 ,all these things are matters of fact about which the man in the street has better knowledge than the king in his palace4 ,but can the people pursue a policy and know how to avail itself of the places1 occasions1 and times when action will be profitable8 ,no6 certainly not4 ,the truth is that the people is a little better fitted to choose a magistrate than to undertake a policy for the gradual humbling of the ,house of ,austria4 ,but not very much so1 as it is only a little more difficult to humble the ,house of ,austria1 than it is to discover the man who is able to do it4 ,the masses are particularly incapable of making initial appointments and of giving promotion in the early stages of a career to those who deserve it4 ,yet in a democracy this is what they are constantly doing4 ,again1 by what means has the candidate for civil service employment1 who is favoured by the people and its representatives1 earned their approval8 ,by his merit1 of which the people and its representatives are very bad judges8 ,no6 ,by what then8 ,by his conformity to the general views of the people2 that is1 by the subserviency of his political opinions4 ,the political opinions of a candidate for civil service employment are the only things which mark him out to the popular choice because they are the only subjects on which the people is a good judge4 ,yes1 but the subserviency of his political opinions may be combined with real merit4 ,true1 but this is a mere matter of chance4 ,the people is not1 perhaps1 in this particular matter consciously hostile to efficiency1 rather it is indifferent1 or ignores the qualification altogether4 ,indeed1 there is no great compliment paid to efficiency in such transactions4 ,here is what inevitably happens4 ,the candidate for a permanent appointment who is not conscious of possessing any particular merit is not slow to realise that it is by his political opinions that he will succeed1 and he naturally professes those which are wanted4 ,the candidate who is conscious of merit1 very often knowing very well what less meritorious competitors are about1 and not wishing to be beaten1 also professes the same useful opinions4 ,there we have that infection of evil1 which ,m4 ,renouvier has explained so admirably in his ,science de la ,morale4 ,first1 then1 we see how most of the candidates chosen by the mandatories of the people are incapable2 others who are chosen in spite of their capacity are men of indifferent character2 and character1 we must admit1 in all or nearly all public careers is a necessary part of efficiency4 ,there remains a small number of meritorious persons who have never identified themselves with current political opinions1 and who have slipped into public employment1 thanks to some brief moment of inattention on the part of the politicians4 ,these intruders sometimes get on by the mere force of circumstances1 but they never reach the highest posts which are always reserved1 as indeed is proper and fitting1 for those in whom the people has put its trust4 ,this is how the people administers as well as governs through the intervention of the representative system1 dictating to ministers the policy and the details of government4 --,i realise1 some one here will object1 that administrators are nominated by the people1 but ,i do not see how the affairs of the country are actually administered by the people4-- ,well1 ,i will tell you4 ,in the first place1 by nominating officials it is already far on the road to controlling them1 for it infuses into the body of the permanent civil service the spirit of the people to the exclusion of every other source of inspiration1 and effectually prevents the civil service from becoming an aristocracy as otherwise it has always a tendency to do4 ,next1 the people does not confine itself to electing its administrators1 it watches and spies on them1 keeps them in leading strings1 and just as the popular representatives dictate to ministers the details of government1 so also they dictate to administrators the details of administration4 ,a prefet1 a procureur-general1 an engineer-in-chief under democratic rule is a much harassed man4 ,he has to play his own hand against his ministerial chief and the deputies of his district4 ,he ought to obey the minister1 but he has also to obey the deputies of the district which he administers4 ,in this connection curious points arise and situations not a little complicated4 ,the prefet owes obedience to the deputies and to the minister1 and the minister obeys the deputies1 and it might therefore have been supposed that there was only one will1 the will which the prefet obeyed4 ,but what the minister has to obey is the general will of the popular representatives1 and it is this will that he transmits for the allegiance of the prefet2 but then the prefet finds himself colliding against the individual wills of the deputies of his district4 ,the result is what we may call conflicts of obedience which have extraordinary interest for the psychologist1 but which are less agreeable for the prefet1 the engineer-in-chief1 or the procureur-general4 ,we note then1 in the first place1 how everything concurs to make the representative of the popular will as incompetent as he is omnipotent4 ,incompetent he undoubtedly is1 as we have already seen1 to start with1 and if he were not so already1 he would certainly become so by reason of the trade or rather of the miscellaneous assortment of trades which are thrust upon him4 ,the surest way of making a man incompetent is to make him ,jack-of-all-trades1 for then he will be master of none4 ,in the next place1 the representative of the popular will and spirit1 besides his trade of legislator1 has to cross-examine ministers and to dictate to them the details of their duty1 that is to say1 he has to busy himself in all home and foreign politics4 ,he has also to administer1 by choosing and watching administrators and by controlling and inspiring their actions4 ,without saying anything of the small individual services which it is his interest to render to his constituents and which his constituents are by no means backward in demanding1 he looks on himself as responsible for the conduct of things in general4 ,he becomes a sort of universal foreman1 not a man1 but a man-orchestra1 a busybody1 so busy that he can apply himself to nothing4 ,he cannot study1 or think1 or investigate1 or1 to speak accurately1 acquire any sense at all4 ,if he be efficient in some particular subject1 when he enters on his public career1 he becomes hopelessly inefficient in all subjects after a few years of public life1 and then1 void of all individuality1 he remains nothing but a public man1 that is1 a man representing the popular will and never thinking1 or able to think1 of anything but how to make that will prevail4 ,and1 to press the point again1 this is all that is wanted of him2 for can you conceive a representative of the popular will1 who had somehow preserved a measure of competence in financial or judicial administration1 who would prefer1 before other candidates1 not a political partisan but a man of merit1 knowledge and aptitude1 and who would even approve in an administrator not acts of political partiality but acts that are just and in conformity with the interests of the state8 ,why6 ,such a man would be a detestable servant in the eyes of democracy4 ,yes1 and ,i have known such a man4 ,he was not wanting in intelligence or wit and he was honest4 ,a lawyer1 he was naturally interested in politics4 ,for local reasons he had failed to be elected as deputy or as senator4 ,tired of fighting1 he obtained a judicial appointment by the influence of his political friends4 ,he became president of court4 ,a case was brought before him where the accused1 a person not perhaps of altogether blameless life1 was clearly not guilty of any indictable offence4 ,the accused1 however1 a former prefet1 appointed by a government now become very unpopular1 and known as a reactionary and an aristocrat1 was pursued by the animosity of the whole democratic population of the town and province4 ,the president1 in the face of openly expressed hostility in court1 acquitted him4 ,in the evening the president remarked1 not without a touch of humour3 ,there1 that serves them right for not making me a senator6 ,in other words3 ,if they had accepted me as a politician1 they would have made me a fool1 or at least paralysed my efficiency4 ,but they would not have it2 so here ,i am1 a man who knows the law and applies it4 ,so much the worse for them6 ,by making a man a slave ,zeus took from him half his soul4 ,so ,homer4 ,by making a man a politician1 ,demos takes from him his whole soul1 and in omitting to make him a politician1 it is foolish enough to leave him his soul4 ,this is why ,demos hates a permanent civil service4 ,an irremovable magistrate or functionary is a man whom the constitution sets free from the grip of the populace4 ,an irremovable official is a man enfranchised1 a free man4 ,demos does not love free men4 ,this will explain why in every nation where it is paramount1 democracy suspends from time to time the irremovable independent official element wherever it is found4 ,the object is nominally to clarify and filter the personnel of the official world2 but really it is intended to teach the officials whom it spares1 that their permanence is only very relative and that1 like every one else1 they have to reckon with the sovereignty of the people which will turn and rend them if they venture to be too independent4 ,according to the constitution of #ahgc there were irremovable senators in ,france4 ,in the interest of good government1 this was perhaps a sound arrangement4 ,the irremovable senators1 in the scheme of the constitution1 were intended to be1 and in fact were1 political and administrative veterans from whose knowledge1 efficiency and experience their colleagues were to profit4 ,the plan1 from this point of view1 might have worked well if the irremovable senators had not been elected by their colleagues but had become so by right2 for example every former ,president of the ,republic1 every former president of the ,cour de ,cassation1 every former president of the ,court of ,appeal1 every admiral1 every archbishop might ex officio have been raised to the rank of senator for life4 ,from the democratic point of view1 however1 it was regarded as a positive outrage that there should exist a representative of the people who had not to render account to the people1 a representative of the people who had nothing to fear from the accidents of re-election1 no risk of failing to secure re-election1 in other words that a man should be elected for his supposed efficiency1 in no sense representing the people but himself alone4 ,permanent senators were abolished4 ,obviously they constituted a political aristocracy1 founded on the pretence of services rendered1 and the ,senate which elected them also fell under the taint of aristocratic leanings since at that time it recruited its members by co-optation4 ,this of course could not be tolerated4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,refuges ,,of ,,efficiency4 ,will efficiency then1 you may well ask1 when driven out of all public employment1 find refuge somewhere8 ,certainly it will4 ,in private employments and in employments paid by public companies4 ,barristers1 solicitors1 doctors1 business men1 manufacturers and authors are not paid by the state1 nor are engineers1 mechanics1 railway employees2 and so far from their efficiency being a bar to their employment1 it is their most valuable asset4 ,when a man consults his lawyer or his medical adviser he obviously has no interest in their politics1 and when a railway company chooses an engineer1 it enquires into his qualifications and ability and is quite indifferent as to whether his political views coincide with the general mentality of the people4 ,it is for this reason1 or at least partly for this reason1 that democracy tries to nationalise all employment1 as a step in the direction of the nationalisation of everything4 ,for instance it can partly nationalise the medical profession by establishing appointments for doctors1 at relief offices1 schools1 and lycees4 ,it can also partly nationalise the legal profession by appointing state-paid professors of law4 ,already the ,state has considerable control over this class of person1 for most of them have relations in government employment1 whom they do not wish to bring into bad odour by seeming hostile to the opinions of the majority4 ,the ,state1 however1 wants to hold them in still tighter control by seizing every opportunity of nationalising and socialising them more completely4 ,the ,state wants also to destroy all large associations1 and to absorb their activities4 ,the state purchase of a railway1 for instance1 is1 in the first place1 a means of exploiting the company2 for there is always a hope that the ,state will be able to filch something out of the transaction2 but its chief recommendation lies in the fact that it suppresses a whole army of the company's officials and employees1 who were under no obligation to please the ,government1 and who had no other interest but to do their work properly4 ,the ,state will thus transform this free population into government employees1 whose primary duty is to be docile and subservient4 ,under the extreme form and under the complete form of this regime1 that is to say under socialism1 everyone will be a government official4 ,consequently1 say the ,socialist theorists1 all the alleged drawbacks above mentioned will disappear4 ,the ,state1 the democracy1 the dominant party1 whatever you choose to call it1 will no longer be obliged to select its servants1 as you say it does1 by reason of their subservience and their incompetence1 because every citizen will be an official4 ,thus too will disappear that dual social system1 under which half the population lives on the ,state1 while the other half is independent1 and prides itself on its superiority in character1 in intelligence and in efficiency4 ,socialism solves the problem4 ,i do not agree4 ,under socialism1 the electoral system1 and1 therefore1 the party system will still exist4 ,the citizens will choose the legislators1 the legislators will choose the ,government1 and the ,government will choose the directors of labour and the distributors of the means of subsistence4 ,parties1 that is1 combinations of interests1 will still exist1 and each party will want to capture the legislature in order to secure the election1 from its own number1 of the directors of labour and the distributors of the means of subsistence4 ,these directors and distributors will be the new aristocrats of socialism1 and they will be expected to arrange soft jobs and ampler rations for the members of their own group or party4 ,except that wealth and the last vestiges of liberty have been suppressed1 nothing has been changed1 and all the objections above mentioned still hold4 ,there is no solution here4 ,if it were a solution1 then the socialist government could not long remain elective4 ,it would have to reign by divine right1 like the ,jesuits in ,paraguay4 ,it would have to be a despotism1 not only in its policy but in its origin1 in fact a monarchy4 ,no intelligent king has any inducement to choose incompetent men as his officials4 ,his interest would lead him to do exactly the opposite4 ,you will say that an intelligent king is a very rare1 even an abnormal thing4 ,i readily agree4 ,except in a very few instances1 which history records with amazement1 a king has exactly the same reasons as the people for selecting as his favourites men who will not eclipse nor contradict him1 and who consequently seldom turn out to be the best of citizens either in respect of intelligence or character4 ,elective socialism and despotic socialism have the same faults as democracy as we understand the term4 ,besides1 in truth1 the drift of democracy towards socialism is nothing but a reversion to despotism4 ,if socialism were established1 it would begin by being elective1 and as every elective system lives and breathes and has its being in the party system1 the dominant party would elect the legislature1 consequently it would constitute the ,government and would extort from that ,government1 simply because it has the power to extort it1 every conceivable form of privilege4 ,exploitation of the country by the majority would result1 as in every country where elective government prevails4 ,a socialist government therefore is primarily an oligarchy of directors of labour and distributors of subsistence4 ,it is a very close oligarchy1 for those beneath it are quite defenceless1 levelled down to an equality of poverty and misery4 ,it is a form of government very difficult to replace1 for it holds in its hands the threads of such an intricate organisation that it must be protected against crude attempts to change it1 and so it tends to be a permanent oligarchy4 ,it would therefore concentrate very quickly round a leader1 or at any rate1 relegate to the second rank the national representatives and the electorate4 ,such a course of events would be very similar to what occurred under the ,first ,empire in ,france1 when the military caste eclipsed and domineered over everything4 ,it became continuously necessary to the ,state1 and though that necessity passed away1 it was soon recalled4 ,the caste then closed its ranks round the leader who gave it unity1 and the strength of unity4 99 99 99 99 99 ,so under socialism1 more slowly and perhaps after the lapse of a generation1 the directors of labour and the distributors of food1 peaceful ,janissaries of the new order1 would form themselves into a caste1 very close1 very coherent1 and 7unlike legislators for whom an executive council can always be substituted71 quite indispensable1 and would close their ranks round a chief who would give them unity and the strength of unity4 ,before we knew socialism1 we used to say that democracy tended naturally to despotism4 ,the situation seems somewhat changed1 and we might now say that it tends to socialism3 really nothing has changed4 ,for in tending towards socialism it is towards despotism that it tends4 ,socialism is not conscious of this1 for it imagines that it is journeying towards equality1 but out of these utopias of equality it is ever despotism that emerges4 ,but this is a digression which refers to the future2 let us return to the matter in hand4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,,competent ,,legislator4 ,democracy1 in its modern form1 encroaches first upon the executive and then upon the administrative authorities1 and reduces them to subjection by means of its delegates1 the legislators1 whom it chooses in its own image1 that is to say1 because they are incompetent and governed by passion1 just as in the words of ,montesquieu1 though he perhaps contradicts himself a little3 ,the people is moved only by its passions4 ,what ought then the character of the legislator to be8 ,the very opposite1 it seems to me1 of the democratic legislator1 for he ought to be well informed and entirely devoid of prejudice4 ,he ought to be well informed1 but his information should not consist only of book learning1 although an extensive legal knowledge is of the greatest use1 as it will prevent him from doing1 as so often happens1 the exact opposite of what he intends to do4 ,he should also understand intimately the temperament and character of the people for whom he legislates4 ,for a nation should only be given the laws and commandments that it can tolerate1 as ,solon said3 ,i have given them the best laws that they could endure1 and the ,god of ,israel said to the ,jews3 ,i have given you precepts which are not good1 that is to say1 they have only the goodness which your wickedness will tolerate4 ,this is the sponge1 says ,montesquieu1 which wipes out all the difficulties that can be raised against the laws of ,moses4 ,the legislator1 then1 ought to understand the temperament and genius of the people because he has to frame its laws4 ,as the ,germans say1 he ought to be an expert on the psychology of races4 ,further1 he ought to understand the temperament1 peculiarities and character of the people1 without sharing its temperament himself4 ,for where the passions and inclinations are concerned1 experience is not knowledge4 ,on the contrary1 experience prevents us from really knowing2 and indeed one of the conditions of knowledge is absence of an experience which may be another word for bias4 ,the ideal legislator1 or indeed any legislator worthy of the name1 ought to understand the general tendencies of his people1 but he ought to be able to view them from a position of detachment and to be able to control them1 because it is his business partly to satisfy and partly to combat these tendencies4 ,he has partly to satisfy them1 or at least1 to consider them1 because a law which outraged the national temperament would be like ,roland's mare1 which had every conceivable good quality with this one serious defect1 that she was dead1 and born dead4 ,suppose the ,romans had been given an international law decreeing respect for conquered peoples1 it would have been a dead letter1 and by a sort of contagion it would have led to the neglect of other laws4 ,suppose the ,french were given a liberal law1 a law prescribing respect for the individual rights of the man and the citizen4 ,liberty1 the object of such a law1 is for the ,french1 as ,baron ,joannes has remarked3 ,the right of each man to do what he likes and to prevent other men from doing what they like4 ,in ,france such a law would never obtain any but a very grudging allegiance1 and it would certainly lead to the neglect of other laws4 ,the legislator ought therefore to understand the natural idiosyncrasies of his people in order to know how far he dare venture to oppose them4 ,partly he must combat them1 because law should be to a nation1 or otherwise it is merely a police regulation1 what the moral law is to an individual4 ,law should be a restraint imposed continuously in the hope of future improvements4 ,it should be a curb on dangerous passions and injurious desires4 ,it should aid the warfare of enlightened selfishness against the selfishness of which all are ashamed4 ,that is what ,montesquieu meant when he said that morals should correct climate1 and laws should correct morals4 ,the law1 therefore1 to a certain extent should correct national tendencies1 it should be loved a little because it is felt to be just1 feared a little because it is severe1 hated a little because it is to a certain degree out of sympathy with the prevalent temper of the day1 and respected because it is felt to be necessary4 ,this is the law that the legislator has to frame1 and therefore he ought to have expert knowledge of the genius of the people for whom he legislates4 ,he must understand both those tendencies which will resist and those which will welcome him4 ,he must know how far he can go unopposed and how much he can venture without forfeiting his authority4 ,this is the principal and essential qualification for the legislator4 ,the second1 as we said before1 is that he must be impartial4 ,the very essence of the legislator is that he should have moderation1 that virtue on which ,cicero set so high a value1 which is so rare1 if we look to its real meaning1 the perfect balance of soul and mind4 ,it seems to me1 said ,montesquieu3 and ,i have written this book solely to prove it1 that the spirit of moderation is essential in a legislator1 for political1 as well as moral right1 lies between two extremes4 ,nothing is more difficult for a man than to control his passions1 or more difficult for a legislator than to control the passions of the people of whom he forms a part1 to say nothing of his own4 ,aristotle1 says ,montesquieu1 wanted to gratify1 first1 his jealousy of ,plato and then his love for ,alexander4 ,plato was horrified at the tyranny of the ,athenians4 ,machiavel was full of his idol1 the ,duke of ,valentinois4 ,thomas ,more1 who was wont to speak of what he had read rather than of what he had thought1 wanted to govern every state upon the model of a ,greek city4 ,harrington could think of nothing but an ,english republic1 while hosts of writers thought confusion must reign wherever there was no monarchy4 ,laws are always in contact with the passions and prejudices of the legislator1 whether these are his alone1 or common to him and to his people4 ,sometimes they pass through and merely take colour from the prejudice of the day1 sometimes they succumb to it and make it part of themselves4 ,this is just the opposite of what should be4 ,the legislator should be to the people what conscience is to the heart of the individual4 ,he should understand its besetting passions in all their bearings and not be deceived by subterfuge or hypocrisy4 ,sometimes he must attack them boldly1 sometimes play off one against another1 or favour one at the expense of another which is less influential1 now yielding ground1 now recovering it1 but he must ever be skilful and impartial and never be intimidated1 diverted from his purpose1 nor deceived by his natural enemies4 ,he should be1 so to speak1 more conscientious than conscience itself1 because he must never forget that he has to obey to-morrow the law which he makes to-day--semel jussit semper paruit4 ,he must1 therefore1 be absolutely disinterested1 a thing most difficult for him1 but for which conscience requires no effort4 ,not only must he be without passion1 but he must have trained himself to be impervious to passion1 which is much more4 ,we must conceive of him as a conscience that has risen from the ashes of passion4 ,as ,rousseau said1 to discover the perfect ruler for human society we must find a superior intelligence who has seen all the passions of man but has experienced none of them1 who has had no sort of relations with our nature but who knows it to the core1 whose happiness is not dependent on us1 but who wishes to promote our welfare1 in a word1 one who aims at a distant renown1 in a remote future1 and who is content to labour in one age and to enjoy in another4 ,this is why the ingenious ,greeks imagined certain legislators going into exile to some remote and unknown retreat1 as soon as they had made the people adopt and swear obedience to their laws until their return4 ,it may have been to bind the citizens by this oath1 but is it not equally probable that they wished to escape from the laws which they themselves had made8 ,possibly they felt that they could make them all the stricter with the prospect of being able to evade obedience of them by flight4 ,proudhon said3 ,i dream of a republic so liberal that in it ,i shall be guillotined as a reactionary4 ,lycurgus was perhaps like ,proudhon1 in that he founded so severe a republic that he knew he could not live under it and resolved to leave it as soon as it was established4 ,solon and ,sylla remained in the states to which they had given laws2 we must therefore place them higher than ,lycurgus who has perhaps this excuse for himself that in all probability he never existed at all4 ,but the legend remains to show that the legislator should be so superior to his own passions and to the passions of his people1 that1 as legislator1 he should make laws before which1 as a man1 he should stand in awe4 ,this moderation1 in the sense in which we use the term1 has sometimes led the legislator to suggest or insinuate laws rather than impose them4 ,this is not always possible1 but it is so occasionally4 ,montesquieu tells us the following of ,st4 ,louis3 ,seeing the manifold abuses of justice in his time he endeavoured to make them unpopular4 ,he made many regulations for the courts in his own domain1 and in those of his barons1 and he was so successful1 that only a short time after his death his methods were adopted in the courts by many of his nobles4 ,thus this prince attained his object1 although his regulations were not promulgated as a general law for the whole kingdom1 but merely as an example which any one might follow in his own interest4 ,he got rid of an evil by making patent the better way4 ,when men saw in his courts and in those of his nobles more reasonable and natural forms of procedure1 more conformable to religion and morality1 more favourable to public tranquillity and to the security of persons and property1 they adopted the substance and abandoned the shadow4 ,to suggest where you cannot compel1 to guide where you cannot demand1 that is the supreme form of skill4 ,montesquieu adds with some optimism though no doubt the idea is encouraging3 ,reason has a natural empire1 we resist it1 but it triumphs over our resistance2 we persist in error for a time but we always have to return to it4 ,the instance above quoted is very remote1 and can hardly be applied to anything in our day4 ,but consider1 for instance1 the law of ,sunday observance which has been revived from the ecclesiastical law4 ,it was a mistake to include it in the ,code because it was antagonistic to many ,french customs1 and1 in many ways1 to the national temperament4 ,the result is what might have been expected1 namely1 that it has only been carried out in rare instances1 and with an infinity of trouble4 ,it might have been made the subject of an edict without being included in the ,code4 ,the ,state might have given a holiday on ,sunday to all its officials1 employees and workmen4 ,it might have been made quite clear simply by a circular from the ,minister of ,justice that a workman would not be punished for breach of contract by refusing to work on a ,sunday4 ,the law of a weekly day of rest would then have existed1 without being formally promulgated1 and would have been limited precisely where it should be1 by agreement between masters and men who would submit to working on ,sundays when they saw that it was necessary and inevitable4 ,moreover this law would be strong enough to modify without destroying the ancient customs of the people4 ,here is another instance which occurs within the law laid down by the ,code1 where the legislator makes use of a method of suggestion and recommendation4 ,early in the nineteenth century the legislator considered that it was seemly for a husband who surprised his wife in adultery to kill both her and her accomplice4 ,the sentiment is perhaps questionable1 but at all events1 it was current4 ,was it given legal sanction8 ,no1 not precisely4 ,it is inserted in the law in the form of an insinuation1 a discreet recommendation and affectionate encouragement4 ,the legislator wrote these words3 ,in flagrante delicto murder is excusable4 ,i am not approving the sentiment1 but only this manner of indicating rather than enforcing the law and what is thought to be a wholesome practice1 and in other instances ,i should think it excellent4 ,finally1 one of the essential qualities of the legislator is to show discretion in changing existing laws1 and for this purpose he should be immune from the passions of men or at all events complete master of those which beset him4 ,for law has no real authority unless it is ancient4 ,where a law is merely a custom which has become law1 it is invested with considerable authority from the first1 because it gains strength by the antiquity of the original custom4 ,when on the other hand a law is not an old custom but runs counter to custom1 then1 before it can have any authority1 it must grow old and become a custom itself4 ,in both cases it is on its antiquity that the law must depend for its strength4 ,the law is like a tree1 at first it is a tender sapling1 then it grows up1 its bark hardens1 and its roots go deep into the ground and cling to the rock4 ,we ought to consider carefully before we venture to replace the forest tree by the young sapling4 ,most legislators1 said ,usbek to ,rhedi1,a have been men of limited abilities1 owing their position to a stroke of fortune1 and consulting nothing but their own whims and prejudices4 ,they have often abolished established laws quite unnecessarily1 and plunged nations into the chaos that is inseparable from change4 ,it is true that1 owing to some odd chance arising out of the nature rather than out of the intelligence of mankind1 it is sometimes necessary to alter laws1 but the case is very rare and when it does arise it should be handled with a reverent touch4 ,when it is a question of changing the law1 much ceremony should be observed1 and many precautions taken1 in order that the people may be naturally persuaded that laws are sacred things1 and that many formalities must precede any attempt to alter them4 ,in this passage1 as so often elsewhere1 ,montesquieu is quite ,aristotelian1 for ,aristotle wrote3 ,it is evident that at times certain laws must be changed1 but this requires great circumspection for1 when there is little to be gained thereby1 inasmuch as it is dangerous that citizens should be accustomed to find it easy to change the law1 it is better to leave a few errors in our magisterial and legislative arrangements than to accustom the people to constant change4 ,the disadvantage of having constant changes in the law is greater than any risk that we run of contracting a habit of disobedience to the law4 ,for the law assuredly will be disobeyed1 if we regard it as ephemeral1 unstable1 and always on the point of being changed4 ,some knowledge of the laws of the most important nations1 a profound knowledge of the temperament1 character1 sentiments1 passions1 opinions1 prejudices and customs of the nation to which he belongs1 moderation of heart and mind1 judgment1 impartiality1 coolness1 nay even a measure of stolidity1 these are the attributes of the ideal legislator4 ,rather they are the necessary qualifications of every man who purposes to frame a good law2 they are1 indeed1 the elementary attributes of a legislator4 ,we have seen that it is the very opposite quality that democracy likes and expects of its legislators4 ,it selects incompetent and almost invariably ignorant men1 ,i have explained why2 and its nominees are of a double distilled incompetence in that their passions would certainly neutralise their efficiency if they possessed any4 ,further we have to observe this curious fact4 ,so entirely does democracy choose its legislators1 because they are dominated by passion1 and not in spite of the fact1 chooses them indeed precisely for the reasons for which it ought to reject them1 that any moderate1 clear-headed1 practical man who wants to be elected and make use of his powers1 has to start by dissembling his moderation1 and by making a noisy display of factious violence4 ,if he wants to be nominated to a post where it will be his business to defend and guarantee public security1 he has to begin by advocating civil war3 to become a peacemaker he must first pose as a rebel4 ,every popular favourite passes through these two phases1 and has to complete one stage before he starts on the next4 ,is it not better1 you will ask1 that a man's whole career should be spent in defence of law and order rather than the latter part of it8 ,not at all1 because you cannot exercise any influence as a friend of law and order unless you have begun as an anarchist4 ,these changes of opinion occur so frequently that they merely raise a smile4 ,they have1 however1 this drawback1 that the friend of law and order1 with a seditious past1 never has an undisputed authority1 and he spends half his time explaining the reasons for his defection1 and this is a sore let and hindrance to his subsequent career4 ,the people always elects men swayed by real or simulated passion4 ,these will either always remain in a state of frenzied excitement1 and they are the great majority1 or they will become moderate men1 largely disqualified and handicapped1 as we have above shown1 for their new career4 ,the vast majority of these sentimentalists rush into politics instead of studying them with deliberation1 judgment and wisdom4 ,the canons of good government as above set out are entirely subverted4 ,the law does not control and restrain the passions of the populace4 ,legislation becomes little more than an expression of their frenzy1 a series of party measures levelled by one faction against the other4 ,the introduction of a bill is a challenge2 the passing of an act is a victory2 definitions which at once damn the legislator1 and convict the system4 ,a ,characters in ,montesquieu's ,lettres ,persanes4 ,letter cxxix4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,laws ,,under ,,democracy4 ,the truth of my contention is proved by the fact that nowadays all our laws are emergency laws1 a thing that no law should ever be4 ,montesquieu advised people to be very chary and to think twice before they destroyed old laws or pulled down an old house to run up a tent1 but his advice is completely ignored4 ,new laws are made for every change in the weather1 for every little daily incident in politics4 ,we are getting used to this hand-to-mouth legislation4 ,like the barbarian warrior1 of whom ,demosthenes tells us1 who always protected that portion of his person which had just received a blow1 holding his shield up to his shoulder1 when his shoulder had been struck1 down again to his thigh when the blow fell there1 the dominant faction only makes laws to protect itself against an adversary who is1 or is thought to be1 already in the field1 or it introduces a hurried1 ill-digested reform under the pressure of an alleged scandal4 ,if an aspirant to the tyranny1 as they used to say in ,athens1 is nominated deputy in too many constituencies1 instantly a law is passed prohibiting multiple candidatures4 ,for the same reason1 for fear of the same man1 scrutin de liste is hurriedly replaced by scrutin d'arrondissement4,b ,if an accused woman is supposed to have been ill-treated at her examination1 taken too abruptly before the interrogatory of the president1 or if the counts are ineptly set out by the public prosecutor1 instantly the whole of the criminal procedure is radically reformed4 ,it is the same everywhere4 ,the legislative workshops turn out only the latest novelties of the season4 ,or perhaps a newspaper would be a still better simile4 ,first there is the 'interpellation1',c once at least every day2 that corresponds to the leading article4 ,then there are questions for ministers on this1 that and the other trivial occurrence2 that is the serial or short story4 ,then there is a bill brought in about something that happened the night before1 that is the special article4 ,then some deputy assaults his neighbour1 this is the general news column4 ,you could not have a more faithful representation of the country4 ,everything that happens in the morning is dealt with in the evening as it might be in the village pot-house4 ,the legislative chamber is an exaggerated reflection of the gossiping public4 ,now it ought not to be a copy of the country1 it ought to be its soul and brain4 ,but when a national representative assembly represents only the passions of the populace it cannot be otherwise than what it is4 ,in other words modern democracy is not governed by laws but by decrees1 for emergency laws are no better than decrees4 ,a law is an ancient heritage1 consecrated by long usage1 which men obey without stopping to think whether it be law or custom4 ,it forms part of a coherent1 harmonious and logical whole4 ,a law improvised for an emergency is merely a decree4 ,this is one of the things that ,aristotle saw better than any one4 ,he comments frequently upon the essential and fundamental distinction between the two1 and explains how it is as dangerous to misunderstand as to ignore it4 ,i quote the passage in which he brings this out most forcibly3 ,a fifth form of democracy is that in which not the law but the multitude has the supreme power1 and supersedes the law by its decrees4 ,this is a state of affairs brought about by the demagogues4 ,for in democracies which are subject to the law1 the best citizens hold the first place and there are no demagogues2 but where the laws are not supreme1 there demagogues spring up4 ,for the people becomes a monarch and is many in one2 and the many have the power in their hands1 not as individuals but collectively4444 ,and the people1 who is now a monarch1 and no longer under the control of law1 seeks to exercise monarchical sway1 and grows into a despot2 the flatterer is held in honour2 this sort of democracy being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy4 ,the spirit of both is the same1 and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens4 ,the decrees of the ,demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant1 and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other4 ,both have great power--the flatterer with the tyrant1 the demagogue with democracies of the kind which we are describing4 ,the demagogues make the decrees of the people override the laws1 and refer all things to the popular assembly4 ,and therefore they grow great1 because the people has all things in its hands and they hold in their hands the votes of the people1 who is too ready to listen to them4 ,such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all2 for where the laws have no authority there is no constitution4 ,the law ought to be supreme over all4 ,so that if democracy be a real form of government1 the sort of constitution in which all things are regulated by decrees is clearly not a democracy in the true sense of the word1 for decrees relate only to particulars4 ,this distinction between true law1 that is to say1 venerable law1 framed to endure1 part of a co-ordinate scheme of legislation1 and an emergency law which is merely a decree like the wishes of a tyrant1 constitutes the whole difference1 if we could realise it1 between the sociologists of antiquity and those of to-day4 ,by the term ,law1 the ancient and the modern sociologists mean two different things and this is the reason for so many misunderstandings4 ,when he speaks of law1 the modern sociologist means the expression of the general will at such and such a date1 #aiaj for instance4 ,the ancient sociologist would consider that the expression of the general will in the second year of the #gcrd ,olympiad was not law at all1 but a decree4 ,a law to him would be a paragraph of the legislation of ,solon1 ,lycurgus or ,charondas4 ,whenever in a ,greek or ,roman political treatise we meet the expression--a ,state governed by laws1 the only way to translate it is--a ,state governed by a very ancient and immutable legislation4 ,this gives the true meaning to the famous personification of laws in the ,phaedo1 which would be quite meaningless if the ,greeks had understood what we do by the term4 ,are laws the expression of the general will of the people8 ,if so why should ,socrates have respected them1 he who despised the people to the day he was condemned8 ,it would be absurd4 ,these laws which ,socrates respected were not the decrees of the people contemporary with ,socrates2 they were the ancient gods of the city1 which had protected it from the earliest days4 ,these laws may err in that they seemed to sanction the verdict that condemned ,socrates to death1 but they were honourable1 venerable and inviolate1 because they had been the guardians of the city for centuries1 and guardians of ,socrates himself until the day when they were misapplied against him4 ,a constitution1 therefore1 to adopt ,aristotle's terminology1 is a ,state which obeys laws1 that is to say1 laws framed by its ancestors4 ,it is1 then1 an aristocracy1 for it is even more aristocratic to obey our ancestors themselves by obeying the thoughts which they embedded in legislation1 five centuries ago1 than to obey the inheritors of their tradition1 the aristocrats of to-day4 ,for aristocrats of to-day belong only partly to tradition1 in that they live in the present4 ,whereas a fifteenth century law belongs to the fifteenth century and to no other period4 ,to obey law as understood by the ancient sociologists1 did not mean obeying ,scipio who has just passed us on the ,via ,sacra4 ,it meant to obey his grandfather's great grandfather6 ,all this is ultra-aristocratic4 ,precisely6 ,law is an aristocratic thing2 only the emergency law1 the decree1 is democratic4 ,for this reason ,montesquieu always speaks of a monarchy as being limited1 and1 at the same time1 maintained by its law4 ,what did this mean in his day1 when there was no expression of the general will to limit monarchy1 and when royalty possessed legislative power1 and could at will make and remake laws8 ,it could only mean one thing1 namely1 that ,montesquieu's conception of law was the same as that of the ancient sociologists1--law far older than his time1 fundamental laws as he calls them1 of the ancient monarchy1 which still bind and ought so to bind the monarch1 whose rule without them would be despotism or anarchy4 ,law is essentially aristocratic4 ,it ordains that rulers should govern the people1 and that the dead should govern the rulers4 ,the very essence of aristocracy is the rule of those who have lived over those who live1 for the benefit of those who shall live hereafter4 ,aristocracy1 properly so called1 is an aristocracy in the flesh4 ,law is a spiritual aristocracy4 ,aristocracy1 as represented by the aristocrats of to-day1 only represents the dead by tradition1 inheritance1 education1 physiological heredity of temperament and characteristics4 ,law does not represent the dead1 it is the dead themselves1 it is their very thought perpetuated in immutable script4 ,a nation is aristocratic both in form and spirit which preserves its old aristocracy and maintains its vitality by careful infusions of new blood4 ,still more is that nation aristocratic which maintains its old legislation inviolate1 adding to it1 reverently and discreetly1 new laws which combine something of the modern spirit with the spirit of the old4 ,homines novi1 novae res4 ,homo novus means the man without ancestors who is worthy to be added to the ranks of the nobly born4 ,novae res are things without antecedents1 nay revolution itself4 ,novae res should only be introduced partially gradually1 insensibly and progressively into ancient things1 as new men into the community of the old nobility4 ,law is more aristocratic than aristocracy itself1 hence democracy is the natural enemy of laws and can only tolerate decrees4 ,our examination of modern democracy has brought us to the following conclusions4 ,the representation of the country is reserved for the incompetent and also for those biassed by passion1 who are doubly incompetent4 ,the representatives of the people want to do everything themselves4 ,they do everything badly and infect the government and the administration with their passion and incompetence4 ,b ,see ,france1 by ,j4 ,e4 ,c4 ,bodley1 #ahii1 pp4 #ccd1 #cce4 ,under ,scrutin de liste the department is the electoral unit1 each having its complement of deputies allotted to it in proportion to its population1 and each elector having as many votes as there are seats ascribed to his department1 without1 however1 the power to cumulate4 ,scrutin d'arrondissement is election by single-member constituencies4 ,the arrondissement is the electoral unit4 ,c ,this is a question put to a minister by a deputy4 ,the effect 444 is somewhat similar to a motion to adjourn the house in the ,english ,parliament4 ,bodley1 p4 #dde4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,incompetence ,,of ,,government4 ,this is not all4 ,the law of incompetence spreads still further1 either by some process of logical necessity or by a sort of contagion4 ,it has often been made the subject of merriment1 for1 like all tragedy1 when we regard it with good humour the matter has its comic side1 that it is very rare for any high office to be given to a man who is competent for the post4 ,generally the ,minister of ,education is a lawyer2 the ,minister of ,commerce1 an author2 the ,war ,minister1 a doctor2 the ,minister for the ,navy1 a journalist4 ,beaumarchais' epigram ,the post required a mathematician--it was given to a dancing master6 strikes the keynote much more of a democracy than of an absolute monarchy4 ,the matter is so generally recognised that it has a sort of retroactive effect upon the historical ideas of the masses4 ,three ,frenchmen out of every four are convinced that ,carnot was a civilian1 and the statement has often appeared in print4 ,why8 because it is inconceivable that under a democracy the ,war ,minister could possibly be a soldier1 or1 that the members of the ,convention could possibly have given the ,war ,office to a soldier4 ,this appeared too paradoxical to be true4 ,at first sight this extraordinary method of making incompetent men into ministers seems merely a joke1 merely the subtle and entertaining vagaries of the goddess ,incompetence4 ,partly it is so but not entirely4 ,the man whose business it is to appoint ministers has to divide the choicest plums of office among the various groups of the majority which supports him4 ,as all of these groups do not contain specialists1 the highest offices are disposed of on political grounds1 and not on grounds of professional aptitude4 ,i have shown what the result is2 the only ministerial appointment which is made in a rational manner is that which the ,president of the ,council reserves for himself1 and even in this case in order to conciliate some important political personage he very often gives it up and takes some post for which he is not so well suited4 ,see what follows3 each department is directed by an incompetent man1 who1 if he be conscientious1 sets himself to learn the work in which he ought to be a fully trained expert1 or1 if he be not conscientious1 and be pressed for time1 as he always is1 he directs his department according to his general political theories and not according to practical common sense--a double distillation of incompetence4 ,we know the kind of speech a new ,minister of ,agriculture makes to his staff4 ,he harangues them on the principles of the revolution of #aghi4 ,moreover1 in a highly centralised country1 the minister does everything in his own department4 ,he has to do everything under the pressure1 it is true1 of the national representatives2 but still his is the supreme authority4 ,it is easy to see what sort of decisions he will make4 ,they are often very little supported by law1 and sometimes are even contrary to law1 and then they remain a dead letter from the first4 ,ministerial circulars often have a remarkable character for illegality4 ,in that case they fall and are forgotten1 but not always before they have introduced a vast amount of trouble throughout the entire administration4 ,as to appointments1 they are made1 as ,i have said1 by political influence1 and even when they are flagrantly improper and corrupt1 there is no chance of their being corrected by the competence of a minister1 who1 holding enlightened views on the business and subordinates of his office1 is able to put his foot down and say ,no6 this will not do1 we must draw the line somewhere4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,judicial ,,incompetence4 ,here we find incompetence spreading its influence by the logical necessity of the case4 ,there are other quarters in which it grows by a sort of contagion4 ,have you ever noticed that the ancien regime1 in spite of grievous shortcomings1 by a sort of historical tradition1 maintained a certain respect for efficiency in its different forms8 ,for instance in matters of jurisdiction1 there were seignorial1 ecclesiastical and military courts4 ,these were not founded as the result of argument and profound consideration1 but by the natural course of events1 by history itself1 and they were maintained and approved by a monarchy which was verging on despotism4 ,seignorial jurisdiction1 without much rational justification1 was none the less of considerable utility2 it bound1 or was capable of binding1 the noble to his land1 it prevented him from losing sight of his vassals1 and his vassals from losing sight of him1 and was in fact a conservative force in the aristocratic constitution of the kingdom4 ,i submit that if this jurisdiction had been properly defined1 limited and modified1 which was never done1 it would have been consonant with the law of competence4 ,there are various local matters which come quite properly within the province of the noble1 who in those days took the place of the magistrate4 ,all that was wanted was that such matters should have been defined with precision and that in every case appeal should have been allowed4 ,ecclesiastical jurisdiction was perfectly reasonable1 as offences committed by ecclesiastics have a special character of which ecclesiastics alone can judge4 ,this seems strange to modern ideas1 although nowadays there are commercial courts and conciliation boards1 because litigation between men of business1 between workmen and women workers1 and between employers and employed1 can only be decided by men who have technical knowledge of the subject in dispute4 ,appeal1 moreover1 to a higher court is always allowed4 ,finally1 in the old days there used to be military jurisdiction for precisely the same reason4 ,all these exceptional jurisdictions are objects of the liveliest apprehension to democracy1 because they infringe the rule of uniformity1 which is the image and often the caricature of equality1 and also because they are a stronghold of efficiency4 ,democracy of course demolished aristocratic courts together with the aristocracy itself1 and ecclesiastical courts together with the ,church when it ceased to be an estate of the realm4 ,any special jurisdictions which still remain are looked upon as instruments of aristocracy2 courts-martial are held in abhorrence because they have ideas of their own in respect of military honour and duty1 and military offences4 ,therein lies their efficiency1 a thing absolutely necessary1 if we are to maintain military spirit and discipline in a strong army4 ,the private soldier or officer1 who is only judged and punished as a civilian1 will not be well judged nor adequately punished1 considering the special duties and services which are required of the army4 ,this is a question of moral as well as technical efficiency and to this the democracy pays no heed1 because it is convinced that no special efficiency is necessary and that common sense is all that is required4 ,common sense1 however1 is like wit2 it is useful in every walk of life1 but is not sufficient in any one of them4 ,this is just what democracy cannot or will not understand4 ,it makes just as great a mistake in its civil and criminal jurisdiction1 though it has1 up to now1 so far departed from its principles as to appoint qualified jurists to civil judgeships4 ,no one denies that this body of men is efficient4 ,those who act as judges know their law4 ,there is1 however1 as ,i have often had occasion to point out1 a moral as well as a technical efficiency1 and in limiting the independence that is essential to moral efficiency1 democracy neutralises the technical efficiency of its servants4 ,let me explain my meaning further4 ,formerly the magistracy was a recognised and autonomous branch of the public service1 and as a result1 save as it was affected by revolution and in normal times by the fear of revolution1 enjoyed an absolute independence4 ,this gave1 or rather preserved intact1 its moral efficiency4 ,for moral efficiency consists in an ability to act according to the dictates of conscience1 and is equivalent to a sort of moral independence4 ,now1 the magistrates form a department of the administration and are a body of officials4 ,the ,state appoints1 promotes or refuses to promote and pays them4 ,in short the ,state has them at its mercy1 just as military officers are controlled by the ,war ,office1 or tax-collectors by the ,treasury4 ,hence they are deprived of their independence and moral efficiency1 for they are always tempted to give judgment as the ,government would wish4 ,there is1 it is true1 a guarantee for their independence in the permanence of their appointments1 but this only applies to those who have reached the summit of their profession1 or are on the point of retiring1 or have no further interest in promotion4 ,the young magistrate who wants to get on1 a perfectly legitimate ambition1 is by no means independent1 for if he does not give satisfaction1 he may enjoy a peculiar kind of permanence1 the permanence of standing still at the starting point4 ,the only independent judges1 to whom justice is the sole interest1 are either those who have served for forty years or the ,president of the ,cour de ,cassation4 ,i may add also the man of independent means who is indifferent to promotion and content to spend all his time at the place of his first appointment4 ,he is exactly like the magistrates in old days1 but he and his kind get rarer every year4 ,at best1 moreover1 this permanence1 of which so much is thought1 is an illusory guarantee1 for it is often suspended by one ,government or another1 and the magistrates are constantly at the mercy of political crises4 ,their moral efficiency is indeed sorely tried4 ,i affirm1 therefore1 that this diminution of moral efficiency affects technical efficiency1 because magistrates dare not insist on technical exactitude when cases arise between the ,state and individuals1 or between those who are protected by ,government and those who are not4 ,though cases in which the ,state is a party do not occur very often1 those in which friends of the ,government are involved are of daily occurrence in a country where ,government is a faction waging incessant warfare against all other factions4 ,it has been said with much reason that parliamentary government on a basis of universal suffrage is legalised and continuous civil war4 ,it is usually a bloodless civil war1 but its weapons are insults1 provocations1 calumnies1 personalities1 libel actions4 ,these go on from one year's end to the other4 ,in a country where such a state of affairs is prevalent1 the magistracy ought to be absolutely independent in order to be impartial4 ,yet it is precisely in a country like this that the magistracy1 not being independent and autonomous1 is obliged to avoid offending the party in office which1 moreover1 is extremely exacting1 for it lives in constant fear that it may be turned out of power4 --,is there nothing to be done8 ,would you advocate a return to the practice of purchasing judicial appointments8-- ,in the first place1 this would not be anything so very terrible1 and secondly1 it might be quite possible to secure all the advantages of purchase without its actual practice4 ,i can show you that it is not so very terrible1 for the case is parallel with that of the exceptional jurisdictions1 the mention of which filled you with horror till you remembered the commercial courts and the councils of experts1 all excellent institutions4 ,we are appalled at the idea of a magistrate purchasing his office1 and yet we employ advocates and solicitors and other legal officials and trust them with our most precious interests1 yet they have1 many of them1 either bought or inherited their practice4 ,under a system of purchase1 we should be judged by lawyers of whom we required more extensive legal knowledge than is at present required of the profession4 ,we should be judged in fact by solicitors and advocates of a superior order4 ,there is nothing very alarming about that4 ,montesquieu was in favour of a system of purchase4 ,voltaire opposed it strongly4 ,they were both right and were indeed agreed on general principles4 ,montesquieu says3 ,venality1--the purchase system1--is a good thing under a monarchical form of government1 because work which would not be done from mere civic virtue is then undertaken as a family business4 ,each man's duty is laid down for him1 and the orders of the ,state are given greater permanence4 ,suidas says very aptly of ,anastasius that he turned the ,empire into an aristocracy by selling magisterial offices4 ,voltaire replies3 ,is it as a matter of civic virtue that in ,england a judge of the ,king's ,bench accepts his appointment8 7,it is either a matter of civic virtue or of profit and interest1 and if it is not profit1 it certainly must require considerable civic virtue47 ,what6 can we not find men in ,france willing to judge if we bestow their appointments upon them gratuitously8 7,we certainly can3 but they might be too grateful67 ,can the work of administering justice1 disposing of the lives and fortunes of men1 become a family business8 7,well1 the business of bearing arms and disposing of men's lives and fortunes in civil war was in #agfj a family business4 ,so too the business of being king1 and you do not protest against that67 ,it is a pity that ,montesquieu should dishonour his work by such paradoxes1 but we must forgive him2 his uncle purchased a provincial magistrate's office and left it to him4 ,human nature comes in everywhere4 ,none of us is without weaknesses4 ,montesquieu thinks aristocratic bodies are good things4 ,voltaire is in favour of absolute power4 ,montesquieu would like the judicature to be a family office1 that is to say hereditary like the profession of a soldier2 this would make the judicial profession permanent like other professions4 ,he demonstrates1 as does ,suidas1 that the purchase system creates an aristocracy4 ,voltaire1 like ,napoleon ,i41 would make his soldiers1 his priests1 and his judges1 king's men4 ,they should all belong to the king1 body and soul4 ,montesquieu had a greater antagonist than ,voltaire in ,plato4 ,plato wrote in his ,republic1 referring to all judicial offices3 ,it is as if on board ship a man were made a pilot for his wealth4 ,can it be that such a rule is bad in every other calling1 and good only in respect of the governing of a republic8 ,montesquieu answers ,plato 7and in anticipation ,voltaire7 very wittily3 ,plato is speaking of a virtuous republic and ,i of a mere monarchy4 ,under a monarchy if offices were not sold by rule1 the poverty and greed of courtiers would sell them all the same1 and chance after all will give a better result than the choice of a prince4 ,to sum up1 ,montesquieu wants the magistracy to be partly hereditary1 and partly recruited from the wealthy classes1 an independent1 aristocratic body analogous to the army or the clergy1 administering justice with that technical efficiency which university standards can guarantee1 and with the moral efficiency which is founded on independence1 dignity1 public spirit and impartiality4 ,i said above that venality1 or the system of purchase1 was not necessary to obtain these results4 ,the principle is this1 that the magistracy must be independent1 and to be independent it must have a proprietary right in its duties4 ,this can only be obtained if it hold its office by inheritance or purchase as was done under the ancien regime2 or1 if it were somehow contrived that magistrates should not be chosen by the ,government4 ,the purchase or inheritance plan is not popular1 then the only alternative is that the magistrates should be chosen by some body other than the ,government4 ,by whom then8 ,the people8 ,then the judges would be dependent upon the people and the electors4 --,that would be better1 or less bad4-- ,not at all4 ,if the judges were chosen by the electors1 they would be even less impartial than if they were elected by the ,government4 ,the judge then would think of nothing but of being re-elected4 ,he would always give judgment in favour of the party which had elected him4 ,would you care to be judged before a court composed of the deputies of your department8 ,certainly not1 if you belong to the weaker party4 ,yes1 if you belong to the majority1 but then only if you are certain that your adversary belongs to the minority1 or1 if he belong to your own party1 that he is a less influential elector than yourself4 ,to sum up1 there is no guarantee of impartiality if the judges are elected4 ,further1 if the system of electing judges by those liable to their jurisdiction were adopted1 there would be an extensive and1 ,i might add1 a most entertaining variety of justice4 ,judges1 who were elected by a blue or republican majority1 and who were anxious for re-election1 would always deliver judgment in favour of the blues4 ,the same thing would happen in the white or royalists districts4 ,justice has her epochs1 ,pascal said ironically1 and in this case justice would have her districts4 ,it would not be the same in the ,alpes-,maritimes as in the ,cotes-du-,nord4 ,the ,court of ,appeal1 if it attempted to be impartial1 would spend its time sending cases back from a blue district to be revised in a white1 and the decisions delivered in a white country to be revised in a blue4 ,there would be judicial and legal anarchy4 --,if the bench is not to be inherited1 nor bought1 nor chosen by the ,government1 nor elected by the people1 by whom is it to be nominated8-- ,by itself2 ,i see no other solution4 ,for instance ,i can suggest one good method1 though there may be several4 ,all the doctors of law in ,france could choose the judges of appeal and the judges of appeal could choose and promote all the judges4 ,this is an aristocratic-democratic scheme on a very broad basis4 ,or else the judges alone might choose the judges of appeal1 and the judges of appeal might appoint and promote the judges4 ,that is an oligarchical method4 ,or again1 here is a plan for passing from the system that is1 to that which ought to be4 ,for the first time the doctors of law might choose the ,cour de ,cassation1 and it could choose the judges4 ,afterwards the judges could fill the vacancies in the ,cour de ,cassation1 which would nominate and promote the judges4 ,the ,government would still go on1 and continue to nominate the persons eligible to serve as magistrates4 ,under all these systems the judges would form an autonomous1 self-creative body1 dependent upon and responsible to themselves alone1 and by reason of their absolute independence1 strictly impartial4 --,but they would form a caste6-- ,they would form a caste4 ,i am sorry for it1 but it is the case4 ,you will never be well judged until you have a judicial caste1 which is neither the ,government1 nor the world at large4 ,for the ,government cannot judge properly when it is both judge and party to the suit4 ,further1 if it be litigious2 it will never be out of court4 ,again1 the world at large cannot judge properly1 because1 in practice1 the world at large means the majority1 and the majority is a party1 and by definition a party can hardly be impartial4 ,but democracy does not want to be judged by a caste4 ,in the first place because it abhors castes1 and secondly because it does not care about impartial justice4 ,do not exclaim at the paradox4 ,democracy does want to be judged impartially in little every-day cases1 but in all important cases in which a political question is involved and in which one of the majority is opposed to one of the minority1 the verdict then has to be for the stronger side4 ,it says to the judicial bench what a simple-minded deputy said to the ,president of the ,chamber3 ,it is your duty to protect the majority4 ,this is why democracy clings to its official magistracy1 which contains some good elements though its members cannot always be impartial4 ,they were condemned by the mouth of one of their highest dignitaries who answered when questioned about some illegal proceeding3 ,there are reasons of high ,state policy1 thus throwing both the law and the judges at the feet of the ,government4 ,on another occasion1 with the very best intentions1 in order to put an end to an interminable affair1 they turned and twisted the law and set a bad example2 for by not applying the law correctly1 they laid themselves open to endless and justifiable attacks upon their decision2 they did not procure the longed-for settlement1 and1 instead1 left the matter open to interminable dispute4 ,they have knowledge1 good sense and intelligence1 but as their want of independence1 in other words their moral inefficiency1 neutralises their technical efficiency1 they do not and cannot possess authority4 ,democracy will inevitably go further along the road towards its ideal1 which is direct government4 ,it will want to elect the judges4 ,already it chooses them remotely in the third degree2 for it chooses the deputies who choose the ,government1 which chooses the judges2 and to some extent1 in the second degree1 for it chooses the deputies who bring pressure to bear upon the nomination of the judges and interfere with their promotion and their decisions4 ,this also is remote4 ,and1 as by this constitution1 or1 rather by this practice1 recognition is given to the principle that it is the people who really appoints the judges through its intermediaries1 democracy1 always logical and matter of fact1 would like to see the principle applied without concealment1 and the people making the appointments directly4 ,then endless questions will arise about the best way of voting and electing4 ,if unipersonal ballot is adopted1 the canton will nominate its juge de paix1 the district its tribunal1 the region its ,court1 and the whole country the ,court of ,appeal4 ,in this arrangement there will be the double drawback mentioned above2 that is1 varying interpretations of justice according to districts1 and no impartiality4 ,if1 on the other hand1 scrutin de liste is adopted1 the whole country will choose all the magistrates and they will belong to the majority4 ,in this case there would be uniformity of justice but no impartiality4 ,any intermediate system would combine the disadvantage of both plans4 ,for instance1 if nominations are made in each division1 all the magistrates in ,brittany will be white partisans1 while in ,provence they will be blue partisans4 ,in both cases they will be biassed1 and such diversity as there is will be merely a diversity of partiality and bias4 ,we are talking of the future1 though not perhaps of a very distant one4 ,let us deal with the present4 ,the jury is still with us4 ,now the jury combines absolute moral competence with absolute technical incompetence4 ,democracy must always have incompetence in one form or another4 ,a jury is independent of everybody1 both of the ,government and of the people1 and in the best possible way1 because it is the agent of the people without being elected4 ,it does not seek re-election and is rather vexed than otherwise at being summoned to perform a disagreeable duty4 ,on the other hand it always vacillates between two emotions1 between pity and self-preservation1 between feelings of humanity and the necessity for social protection2 it is equally sensitive to the eloquence of the defending advocate1 and the summing up of the prosecutor1 and as these two influences balance each other it is in a perfect moral condition for delivering an equitable verdict4 ,for this reason the jury is of ancient origin1 and has always been an institution in the land4 ,at ,athens the tribunal of the ,heliasts formed a kind of jury1 too numerous indeed and more like a public meeting1 but still a sort of jury4 ,at ,rome1 a better regulated republic1 there were certain citizens chosen by the praetor who settled questions of fact1 that is to say1 decided whether an act had or had not been committed1 whether a sum of money had or had not been paid2 and the question of law was reserved for the centumvirs4 ,in ,england the jury still exists and has existed for centuries4 ,these various peoples have considered very properly that juries are excellently adapted for forming equitable decisions1 since they possess a greater moral competence for this particular function1 than is to be found elsewhere4 ,this is true2 but on the other hand a jury has no intelligence4 ,in ,november #aiji1 a jury in the ,cote d',or before whom a murderer was being tried1 declared 7#a7 that this man did not strike the blows1 7#b7 that the blows which he struck resulted in death4 ,thereupon the man was acquitted1 although his violence1 which never took place1 had a murderous result4 ,in the ,steinheil case in the same month and year1 the jury's verdict involved 7#a7 that no one had been assassinated in the ,steinheils' house1 and 7#b7 that ,mme ,steinheil was not the daughter of ,mme ,japy4 ,if a verdict were a judgment this would have put an end to all attempts to discover the assassins of ,m4 ,steinheil and ,mme ,japy1 and on the other hand there would have been terrible social complications4 ,but the verdict of a jury is not a judgment4 ,why8 ,because the legislator foresaw the alarming absurdity of verdicts4 ,it is presumed in law that all juries' verdicts are absurd1 and experience proves that this is often the case4 ,juries' verdicts always seem to have been decided by lot like those of the famous judge in ,rabelais1 and it is proverbial at the law courts that it is impossible to foresee the issue of any case that comes before a jury4 ,it looks as if the jury reasoned thus3 ,i am a chance judge1 and it is only right that my judgment should be dictated by chance4 ,voltaire was in favour of the jury system1 principally because he had such a very low opinion of the magistrates of his day1 whom he used to compare to ,busiris4 ,but1 with his usual inconsequence1 he takes no pains to conceal the fact that the populations of ,abbeville and its neighbourhood were unanimously exasperated against ,la ,barre and ,d',etalonde1 and the people of ,toulouse against ,calas1 and all of them would have been condemned by juries summoned from those districts as surely as they were by the magisterial ,busiris4 ,the jury system is nothing but a refined example of the cult of incompetence4 ,society1 having to defend itself against thieves and murderers1 lays the duty of defending it on some of its citizens1 and arms them with the weapon of the law4 ,unfortunately it chooses for the purpose citizens who do not know how to use the weapon4 ,it then fondly imagines that it is adequately protected4 ,the jury is like an unskilled gladiator entangled in the meshes of his own net4 ,i need hardly say that democracy with its usual pertinacity is now trying to reduce the jury a step lower1 and draw it from the lower instead of the lower middle classes4 ,i see no harm in this myself1 for in the matter of law the ignorance and inexperience of the lower middle class and the ignorance of the working class are much the same4 ,i have only mentioned it to show the tendency of democracy towards what is presumably greater incompetence4 ,now comes the turn of the juges de paix4 ,at present we still have juges de paix4 ,here we have a most interesting example of the way democracy strives after incompetence in matters judicial4 ,owing to the expense entailed by an appeal the jurisdiction of a juge de paix is very often final4 ,he ought to be an instructed person with some knowledge of law and jurisprudence4 ,he is therefore usually chosen from men who have a degree in law or from lawyers' clerks who have a certificate of ability4 ,to be quite honest this is but a feeble guarantee4 ,by the law of ,july #abth1 #aije1 the ,french ,senate1 anxious to find men of still grosser incompetence1 decided that juges de paix might be nominated from those1 who1 not having the required degree or certificate1 had occupied the posts of mayor1 deputy-mayor or councillor for ten years4 ,the object of this decision was the very honest and legitimate one of giving senators and deputies the opportunity of rewarding the electoral services of the village mayors and their assistants4 ,and remember senators especially are nominated by these officials4 ,further it was an opportunity not to be missed for applying our principle--and our principle is this3 we ask1 where is absolute incompetence to be found1 for to him who can lay indisputable claim to it we must confide authority4 ,now mayors and their assistants answer this description exactly4 ,they must be able to sign their names1 but they are not obliged to know how to read1 and eighty per cent4 of them are totally illiterate4 ,their work is done for them very usually by the local schoolmaster4 ,the ,senate1 therefore1 was quite sure of finding among them men absolutely incompetent for the post of juge de paix1 and it has found what it wanted4 ,incompetence so colossal deserved an appointment1 and an appointment has been given to it4 ,the magistrature and the powers that be1 seem to have been somewhat disturbed by certain consequences of this highly democratic institution4 ,m4 ,barthou1 the ,minister of ,justice1 complained bitterly of the work which this new institution caused him4 ,he made the following speech in the ,chamber of ,deputies3 ,we are here to tell each other the truth1 and1 with all the due moderation and prudence that is fitting1 ,i feel it my duty to warn the chamber against the results of the law of #aije4 ,at the present moment ,i am besieged with applications for the post of juge de paix4 ,i need hardly mention that there are some #i1jjj of them in my office1 because a certain number are not eligible for consideration1 but there are in round numbers #e1ejj applications which are recommended and examined4 7,what he means to say is1 that these are examined because they have been recommended1 for1 as is only right1 those that are not backed by some political personage are not looked at47 ,as the average annual number of vacancies is a hundred and eighty1 you will readily see what a quandary ,i am in4 ,some of these applications are made with the most extraordinary persistency1 ,i might even call it ferocity1 and these invariably come from men who have held the office of mayor or deputy-mayor for ten years1 often in the most insignificant places4 ,the ,minister of ,justice then read a report made on the subject by a procureur-general4 ,in this department there are forty-seven juges de paix1 twenty of whom1 as ,i learn from an enquiry1 were mayors at the time of their appointment4 ,it is not to be wondered at that the number of provincial magnates who aspire to the post is on the increase1 for it seems to be generally recognised in this department that elective office irrespective of all professional aptitude is the normal means of access to a paid appointment1 more especially to that of juge de paix4 ,once they are appointed1 the mayors combine both their municipal and judicial duties1 and their interests lie far more in the commune which they administer than in the district in which they dispense justice and which1 without permission1 they should never leave4 ,sometimes these district magistrates will go to any length to obtain moral support from the politicians of the neighbourhood4 ,they extort this as a sort of blackmail given in exchange for the electoral influence which they can bring to bear in their municipal capacity4 ,they attach far less importance to being quashed by the bench1 than to the eventual support of the deputy4 ,those who come into their courts are the unfortunate victims of these compromising arrangements which are giving the ,republican system a bad name4 ,i think the ,minister of ,justice and his procureur-general have very little ground for these lamentations4 ,after all the minister only complains of having #i1jjj applications for office4 ,it would surely be quite easy for him1 in compliance with the generally recognised principle1 to choose those whose incompetence seems to be most thorough1 or those who are most influentially supported1 according to the prevailing custom4 ,as for the procureur-general's sarcasms1 which he thinks so witty1 they are quite delightfully diverting and ingenuous4 ,it seems to be generally recognised that elective office1 irrespective of all professional aptitude1 is the normal means of access to a paid appointment4 ,what else does he expect8 ,it is eminently democratic that the marked absence of professional capacity should single a man out for employment4 ,that is the very spirit of democracy4 ,he surely does not think that a man is an elector by reason of his legislative and administrative capacity8 ,it is likewise essentially democratic that elective office should lead to paid appointments1 for the democratic theory is that all office1 paid and unpaid1 should be elective4 ,why1 this procureur-general must be an aristocrat6 ,as for the mutual services rendered by the justice1 as mayor1 to the deputy1 and by the deputy to the justice1 this is democracy pure and simple4 ,the deputies distribute favours that they may be returned to power2 the influential electors put all their interest1 both personal and official1 at the service of the deputies in order to obtain those favours4 ,they are hand in glove with each other1 and form a solid union of interests4 ,what more does the procureur-general want8 ,does he want a different system8 ,if he wants another system1 whatever else it may be1 it will not be democracy1 or at least it will not be a democratic democracy4 ,nor have ,i any idea what he means when he says the ,republican system will get a bad name4 ,the good name of the ,republic depends upon its putting into practice every democratic principle2 and democratic principles have certainly never been more precisely realised than in the preceding example1 which ,i have had great pleasure in rescuing from oblivion and presenting to the notice of sociologists4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,examples ,,of ,,incompetence4 ,i have already compared this1 our desire to worship incompetence1 to an infectious disease4 ,it has attacked the ,state at the very core1 in its constitution1 and it is not surprising that it is spreading rapidly to the customs and to the morals of the country4 ,the stage1 we know1 is an imitation of life4 ,life also1 to perhaps an even greater extent1 is an imitation of the stage4 ,similarly laws spring from morals1 and morals spring from law4 ,men are governed by many things1 said ,montesquieu1 by climate1 religion1 laws1 precept1 example1 morals and manners1 which act and react upon each other and all combine to form a general temperament4 ,morals1 more often than not1 determine the nature of our laws1 particularly in a democracy1 which is deplorable1 but ,montesquieu was right in saying3 ,morals take their colour from laws1 and manners from morals1 for laws certainly help to form morals1 manners and even national character4 ,for instance in ,rome under the ,empire the code of morals was to some extent the result of arbitrary power1 as to-day the moral character of the ,english is to some extent due to the laws and constitution of their country4 ,we know that by his laws ,peter the ,great changed if not the character at least the manners and customs of his people4 ,custom is the offspring of law1 and morals are the offspring of custom4 ,national character is not really changed1 for character1 ,i believe1 is a thing incapable of change1 but it appears to be changed1 and it certainly undergoes some modifications2 one set of tendencies is checked1 while others are encouraged4 ,the law abolishing the right of primogeniture has obviously affected national morals1 though it has not otherwise altered national character4 ,for a peculiar mental attitude is evolved by the constant domination of an elder brother1 whose birthright gives him precedence and authority second only to that of the father4 ,in countries where the right of unrestricted testamentary bequests is still maintained1 family morals are very different from those which obtain where the child is considered a joint proprietor of the patrimony4 ,since the passing of the law permitting divorce1 a sad but necessary evil1 there have been far more applications for divorce than there ever were for separation4 ,can this be accounted for solely by the fact that formerly it seemed hardly worth while to take steps to obtain the qualified freedom of separation8 ,i think not4 ,for when a yoke is unbearable1 efforts to relax it would naturally be quite as strenuous and as unremitting as efforts to get rid of it altogether4 ,the truth is1 ,i think1 that when both civil and ecclesiastical law agreed in prohibiting divorce1 people held a different view of marriage2 it was looked upon as something sacred1 as a tie that it was shameful to break1 and that could not be broken except as a last resource and then almost under pain of death4 ,the law permitting divorce was what our forefathers would have called a legal indiscretion4 ,it has abolished the feeling of shame4 ,except where there is strong religious feeling1 there is now no scruple nor shame in seeking divorce4 ,the old order has passed away2 modesty has been superseded by a desire for liberty1 or for another union4 ,this change has been brought about by a law which was the result of a new moral code2 but the law itself has helped to enlarge and expand the code4 ,thus democracy extends that love of incompetence which is its most imperious characteristic4 ,greek philosophers used to delight in imagining what morals1 especially domestic morals1 would be like under a democracy4 ,they all vied with ,aristophanes4 ,one of ,xenophon's characters says3 ,i am pleased with myself1 because ,i am poor4 ,when ,i was rich ,i had to pay court to my calumniators1 who knew full well that they could harm me more than ,i could them4 ,then the ,republic was always imposing fresh taxes and ,i could not escape4 ,now that ,i am poor1 ,i am invested with authority2 no one threatens me4 ,i threaten others4 ,i am free to come and go as ,i choose4 ,the rich rise at my approach and give me place4 ,i was a slave1 now ,i am a king2 ,i used to pay tribute1 now the ,state feeds me4 ,i no longer fear misfortunes1 and ,i hope to acquire wealth4 ,plato too is quietly humorous at democracy's expense4 ,this form of government certainly seems the most beautiful of all1 and the great variety of types has an excellent effect4 ,at first sight does it not appear a privilege most delightful and convenient that we cannot be forced to accept any public office however eligible we may be1 that we need not submit to authority and that every one of us can become a judge or magistrate as our fancy dictates8 ,is there not something delightful in the benevolence shown to criminals8 ,have you ever noticed how1 in such a ,state as this1 men condemned to death or exile remain in the country and walk abroad with the demeanour of heroes8 ,see with what condescension and tolerance democrats despise the maxims which we have been brought up from childhood to revere and associate with the welfare of the ,republic4 ,we believe that unless a man is born virtuous1 he will never acquire virtue1 unless he has always lived in an environment of honesty and probity and given it his earnest attention4 ,see with what contempt democrats trample these doctrines under foot and never stop to ask what training a man has had for public office4 ,on the contrary1 anyone who merely professes zeal in the public interests is welcomed with open arms4 ,it is instantly assumed that he is quite disinterested4 ,these are only a few of the many advantages of democracy4 ,it is a pleasant form of government in which equality reigns among unequal as well as among equal things4 ,moreover1 when a democratic ,state1 athirst for liberty1 is controlled by unprincipled cupbearers1 who give it to drink of the pure wine of liberty and allow it to drink till it is drunken1 then if its rulers do not show themselves complaisant and allow it to drink its fill1 they are accused and overthrown under the pretext that they are traitors aspiring to an oligarchy2 for the people prides itself on and loves the equality that confuses and will not distinguish between those who should rule and those who should obey4 ,is it any wonder that the spirit of licence1 insubordination1 and anarchy should invade everything1 even the institution of the family8 ,fathers learn to treat their children as equals and are half afraid of them1 while children neither fear nor respect their parents4 ,all the citizens and residents and even strangers aspire to equal rights of citizenship4 ,masters stand in awe of their disciples and treat them with the greatest consideration and are jeered at for their pains4 ,young men want to be on the same terms as their elders and betters1 and old men ape the manners of the young1 for fear of being thought morose and dictatorial4 ,observe too to what lengths of liberty and equality the relations between the sexes are carried4 ,you would hardly believe how much freer domestic animals are there than elsewhere4 ,it is proverbial that little lap-dogs are on the same footing as their mistresses1 or as horses and asses2 they walk about with their noses in the air and get out of nobody's way4 ,aristotle1 faithless at this point to his favourite method of always contradicting ,plato1 has no particular liking1 as we have said1 for democracy4 ,he does not spare it though he does not imitate ,plato's scathing sarcasm4 ,in the first place1 ,aristotle is frankly in favour of slavery1 as was every ancient philosopher except perhaps ,seneca2 but he is more insistent on this point than anyone else1 for he looks upon slavery1 not as one of many foundations1 but as the very foundation of society4 ,he considers artisans as belonging to a higher estate but still as a class of half-slaves4 ,he asserts as an historical fact that only extreme and decadent democracies gave them rights of citizenship1 and theoretically he maintains that no sound government would give them the franchise of the city4 ,hence in ancient times1 and among some nations1 the working classes had no share in the government--a privilege which they only acquired under the extreme democracy4444 ,doubtless in ancient times and among some nations the artisan class were slaves or foreigners1 and therefore the majority of them are so now4 ,the best form of ,state will not admit them to citizenship4444 ,he admits that democracy may be considered as a form of government 7444 if democracy be a real form of government444471 and he admits too that 444 multitudes1 of which each individual is but an ordinary person1 when they meet together1 may very likely be better than the few good1 if regarded not individually but collectively4444 ,hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry2 for some understand one part1 and some another1 and among them they understand the whole4 ,observe that he is still speaking of a democracy in which slaves and artisans are not citizens4 ,doubtless too democracy is the most tolerable of perverted governments1 and ,plato has already made these distinctions1 but his point of view is not the same as mine4 ,for he lays down the principle that of all good constitutions democracy is the worst1 but the best of bad ones4 ,but still ,aristotle cannot help thinking that democracy is a sociological mistake 444 ,it must be admitted that we cannot raise to the rank of citizens all those1 even the most useful1 who are necessary to the existence of the ,state4 ,democracy has this drawback that it cannot constitutionally retain within itself and encourage eminent men4 ,in a democracy if there be some one person or more than one1 although not enough to make up the whole complement of a ,state1 whose virtue is so pre-eminent that the virtues or the capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs1 he or they can be no longer regarded as part of a ,state2 for justice will not be done to the superior1 if he is reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in virtue and in political capacity4 ,such an one may truly be deemed a ,god among men4 ,hence we see that legislation is necessarily concerned only with those who are equal in birth and in power2 and that for men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law--they are themselves a law4 ,anyone would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them3 they would probably retort what1 in the fable of ,antisthenes1 the lions said to the hares--'where are your claws8'--when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and claiming equality for all4 ,and for this reason democratic ,states have instituted ostracism2 equality is above all things their aim1 and therefore they ostracise and banish from the city for a time those who seem to predominate too much through their wealth1 or the number of their friends1 or through any other political influence4 ,mythology tells us that the ,argonauts left ,heracles behind for a similar reason2 the ship ,argo would not take him because she feared that he would have been too much for the rest of the crew4 ,thrasybulus1 the tyrant of ,miletus1 asked ,periander1 the tyrant of ,corinth1 one of the seven sages of ,greece1 for advice on the art of government4 ,periander made no reply but proceeded to bring a field of corn to a level by cutting off the tallest ears4 ,this is a policy not only expedient for tyrants or in practice confined to them1 but equally necessary in oligarchies and democracies4 ,ostracism is a measure of the same kind1 which acts by disabling and banishing the most prominent citizens4 ,this is what we may call a constitutional necessity for the democracy4 ,to be quite honest1 it is not always obliged to cut off the ears of corn4 ,it has a simpler method4 ,it can systematically prevent any man who betrays any superiority whatsoever1 either of birth1 fortune1 virtue or talent1 from obtaining any authority or social responsibility4 ,it can send to ,coventry4 ,i have often pointed out that under the first democracy ,louis ,,xvi was guillotined for having wished to leave the country1 while under the third democracy his great-nephews were exiled for wishing to remain in it4 ,ostracism is1 in these instances1 still feeling its way1 and its action is contradictory because it has not made up its mind4 ,this will continue till it has been reduced to a science1 when it will contrive to level1 by one method or another1 every individual eminence1 great and small1 that dares to vary by the merest fraction from the regulation standards4 ,this is ostracism1 and ostracism1 so to speak1 is a physiological organ of democracy4 ,democracy by using it mutilates the nation1 without it democracy would mutilate itself4 ,aristotle often tries to solve the problem of the eminent man4 ,good men1 he says1 differ from any individual of the many1 as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful1 and works of art from realities1 because in them the scattered elements are combined4444 ,whether this principle can apply to every democracy and to all bodies of men is not clear4444 ,but there may be bodies of men about whom our statement is nevertheless true4 ,and if so1 the difficulty which has been already raised--viz41 what power should be assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens--is solved4 ,there is still a danger in allowing them to share the great offices of ,state1 for their folly will lead them into error and their dishonesty into crime4 ,but there is a danger also in not letting them share1 for a ,state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies4 ,the only way of escape is to assign to them some deliberative and judicial functions4444 ,but each individual left to himself1 forms an imperfect judgment4 ,it is not only the eminent man that is the thorn in the flesh of democracies1 but every form of superiority1 whether individual or collective1 which exists outside the ,state and the ,government4 ,if we recollect that ,aristotle coupled extreme democracy with tyranny1 it will be interesting to recall his summary of the ancient prescriptions for the preservation of a tyranny4444 ,the tyrant should lop off those who are too high2 he must put to death men of spirit3 he must not allow common meals1 clubs1 education and the like2 he must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among his subjects2 he must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion1 and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another 7for acquaintance begets mutual confidence74 ,aristotle's conclusions are subjectively aristocratic3 ,in the perfect ,state there would be great doubts about the use of ostracism1 not when applied to excess in strength1 wealth1 popularity or the like1 but when used against some one who is pre-eminent in virtue4 ,what is to be done with him8 ,mankind will not say that such an one is to be expelled and exiled2 on the other hand he ought not to be a subject1 that would be as if men should claim to rule over ,zeus on the principle of rotation of office4 ,the only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a rule1 according to what seems to be the order of nature1 and that men like him should be kings in their ,state for life4 ,but when he speaks objectively1 ,aristotle comes to another conclusion1 which we shall have occasion to mention later on4 ,among moderns1 ,rousseau declared that he was not a democrat1 and he was right1 because by democracy he meant the ,athenian system of direct government1 of which he did not for an instant approve4 ,in the ,social ,contract he has drawn up a most detailed scheme1 which1 in spite of some contradictions and obscure passages1 is an exact description of democracy as we understand the word2 but still we cannot tell if he is actually a democrat1 because we do not know what he means by citizens1 whether he means everybody or only one class1 though that a numerous one4 ,rousseau has written more fully than anyone else1 not so much of the influence of democracy on morals1 as of the coincidence between democracy and good morals4 ,equality1 frugality and simplicity can all be found1 according to ,rousseau1 in ,states where there is neither royalty nor aristocracy nor plutocracy4 ,as ,i understand it1 his meaning is that the same virtue which makes certain nations love equality1 frugality and simplicity is also productive of a form of government which excludes aristocracy1 plutocracy and royalty4 ,if you have simplicity1 frugality and equality1 you will probably live in a republic that is democratic or virtually democratic4 ,this is1 ,i think1 the clearest and most impartial summary that we can make of ,rousseau's doctrine1 which1 though set forth in rigid formulae1 is still extremely vague4 ,in this he is a far more faithful follower of ,montesquieu than he will allow4 ,all that ,i have quoted is to be found literally in ,montesquieu's chapters on democracy4 ,even his famous saying1 the ruling principle of democracy is virtue1 means1 when he uses it in one sense1 no more than that it is the synthesis of these three perfections1 equality1 simplicity and frugality4 ,for ,montesquieu sometimes uses virtue in a narrow1 and sometimes in a broad sense1 sometimes in the sense of political and civic virtue or patriotism1 sometimes in the sense of virtue properly speaking 7simplicity1 frugality1 thrift1 equality74 ,in this latter case he and ,rousseau are absolutely agreed4 ,montesquieu only considers democracy in decadence1 as his custom is in respect of other forms of government1 and though he does not actually cite ,plato1 he really gives the substance of what we have already quoted4 ,when the people wishes to do the work of the magistrates1 the dignity of the office disappears and when the deliberations of the ,senate carry no weight1 neither senators nor old men are treated with respect4 ,when old men do not receive respect1 fathers cannot expect it from their children1 husbands from their wives1 nor masters from their men4 ,at length everyone will learn to rejoice in this untrammelled liberty1 and will grow as weary of commanding as of obeying4 ,women1 children and slaves will submit to no authority4 ,there will be an end of morals1 no more love of order1 no more virtue4 ,now as to this transition1 this passage from the public morals of a democracy to the private1 domestic1 personal morals which exist under that form of government1 have you observed what is the common root of our failings both public and private8 ,the common root of both is misunderstanding1 forgetfulness and contempt of competence4 ,if pupils despise their masters1 young men despise old men1 if wives do not respect their husbands and the unenfranchised do not respect the citizens1 if the condemned do not stand in awe of their judges1 nor sons in awe of their parents1 the principle of efficiency has vanished4 ,pupils no longer admit the scientific superiority of their teachers1 young men have no regard for the experience of the old1 women will not recognise the supremacy of their husbands in practical matters1 the unenfranchised have no sense of the superiority of the citizens from the point of view of national tradition1 the condemned do not feel the moral supremacy of their judges1 and sons do not realise the scientific1 practical1 civic and moral superiority of their fathers4 ,indeed1 why should they8 ,how could we expect these feelings to be of anything but the most transient description since the ,state itself is organised on a basis of contempt for competence1 or of what is even worse1 a reverence for incompetence1 and an insatiable craving for the guidance and government of the incompetent8 ,thus public morals have a great influence on private morals2 and gradually into family and social life there comes that laxity in the daily relations of the citizens which ,plato has wittily termed1 equality between things that are equal and those that are not4 ,the first innovation which democracy brings into family life is the equality of the sexes1 and this is followed by woman's disrespect for man4 ,this idea1 be it admitted1 is substantially correct1 it only ceases to be true when it is viewed relatively to the varying competences of the two sexes4 ,woman is man's equal in cerebral capacity1 and in civilised societies1 where intellect is the only thing that matters1 the woman is the equal of the man4 ,she should be admitted to the same employments as men in society1 and under the same conditions of capacity and education1 but in family life the same rules should apply as in every other enterprise2 7#a7 division of labour according to the competence of each2 7#b7 recognition of a leader according to the competence of each4 ,this is the law which women are constantly led to misunderstand in a democracy4 ,they will not admit the principle of the division of labour either in the world at large or in the domestic circle4 ,they try to encroach upon men's work1 which perhaps they might do very successfully1 if they were obliged to do it and had nothing else at all to do2 but which they really spoil by undertaking when they have other obvious duties to perform4 ,they will not admit that men should be at the head of affairs2 they aspire to be not only partners but managing directors4 ,this implies a contemptuous rejection of that form of social competence which comes from the acceptance of convention or contract4 ,no doubt a woman would be just as good a tax-collector as her husband1 but since they have entered into partnership1 the one to administer the collection of taxes1 the other to look after the house1 it is just as bad for the one whose business it is to keep house to begin collecting taxes1 as it is for the tax-collector to interfere with the housekeeping4 ,it is necessary to respect the efficiency that arises out of the observance of convention and contract4 ,this1 with practice and experience1 will quickly become a very real and a very valuable efficiency1 but if thwarted from outside will lead to friction1 insecurity and disorganisation4 ,it is particularly by their contempt1 which they are at no pains to disguise1 for the competence that comes from contract and later from habit1 by their refusal to recognise the position of the head of the family1 that women every day and in every minute particular are training their children to despise their father4 ,democracy seems bent on bringing up its children to despise their parents4 ,no other construction can be put upon the facts1 however good and innocent the motives4 ,just sum up the facts4 ,in the first place democracy denies that the living can be guided by the dead2 it is one of its fundamental axioms that no generation should be tied and bound by its predecessor4 ,what inference can children be expected to draw from this except that they owe no obedience to their father and mother8 ,children have naturally only too great a tendency to look down on their parents4 ,they are proud of their physical superiority2 they know that their star is rising while that of their parents is setting4 ,they are imbued with the universal prejudice of modern humanity that progress is constant and that therefore whatever is of yesterday is ex hypothesi inferior to that which is of to-day4 ,they are driven also1 as ,i am constrained to believe1 by a sort of ,nemesis inspired by fear lest human science and power should hurry forward too fast if the children were content to pick up the burden of life where their parents left it1 and simply followed their fathers and did not insist on effacing all that their fathers had done and beginning again--with the result that the edifice never rises far above its foundations1 and that children for this and other reasons have a natural inclination to treat their parents as ,cassandras4 ,then1 as it were to clench the argument1 democracy is ready with its teaching that each generation is independent of the other1 and that the dead have no lesson to impart to the living4 ,in the second place1 democracy1 applying the principle still further and proclaiming the doctrine that the ,state is master of all1 withdraws the child from the family1 as often and as completely as it can4 ,democracy1 said ,socrates1 in one of his humorous dialogues1 is a mountebank1 a kidnapper of children4 ,it snatches the child from its family while he is playing1 takes him far away1 allows him no more to see his family1 teaches him many strange languages1 drills him till his joints are supple1 paints his face and dresses him in ridiculous clothes1 and imparts to him all the mysteries of the acrobat's trade until he is sufficiently dexterous to appear in public and amuse the company by his tricks4 ,at all events democracy is determined to take the child away from his family1 to give him the education which it has chosen and not that which the parents have chosen1 and to teach him that he must not believe what his parents teach him4 ,it denies the competence of parents to rear their children and puts forward its own competence1 asserting that it is only its own that has any value4 ,this is one of the principal causes of the divisions between fathers and children in a democracy4 ,you may retort that democracy does not always succeed in its efforts to separate children from their parents1 because there is nothing to prevent the children extending the contempt1 which for such excellent reasons they have been taught to entertain for their parents1 to their ,state-appointed teachers4 ,this is a most pertinent observation1 for the general maxims of democracy are just as likely to make pupils despise their masters as to make sons despise their fathers4 ,the master1 too1 represents in the eyes of his pupil that past which has no connection with the present and which by the law of progress is very inferior to the present4 ,this is true2 but the end of all is that between the school which counteracts the influence of the parents and the home which counteracts the influence of the school1 the child becomes a personage who is never educated at all4 ,he is in like case with a child who in the family itself receives lessons1 and what is more important1 example1 from a mother who is religious and from a father who is an atheist4 ,he is not educated1 he has had no sort of education4 ,the only real education1 that is to say1 the only transmission to the children of the ideas of their parents consists of an education at home which is reinforced by the instruction of masters chosen by the parents in accordance with their own views4 ,this is precisely the form of education to which democracy refuses to be reconciled4 99 99 99 99 99 ,there is a still more cogent reason why old men are neither respected nor honoured in a democracy4 ,here is yet another efficiency formally denied and formally set aside4 ,an interesting treatise might be written on the rise and fall of old men4 ,civilization has not been kind to them4 ,in primitive times1 as among savage races to-day1 old men were kings4 ,gerontocracy1 that is1 government by the aged1 is the most ancient form of government4 ,it is easy to understand why this should be4 ,in primitive ages1 all knowledge was experience and the old men possessed all the historical1 social and political experience of the ,state4 ,they were held in great honour and listened to with the profoundest respect and veneration1 in fact with an almost superstitious reverence4 ,nietzsche was thinking of those days when he said3 ,respect for the aged is the symbol of aristocracy1 and when he added3 ,respect for the aged is respect for tradition1 he was thinking of the reason for this assumption4 ,that the dead should rule the living was accepted instinctively1 and it was their nearness to death which evoked honour for the aged4 ,at a later stage the old man shared in the civil government with monarchy1 aristocracy or oligarchy1 and retained an almost complete control of judicial affairs4 ,his moral and technical efficiency were still appreciated4 ,his moral efficiency to his contemporaries consisted in the fact that his passions were deadened and his judgment as disinterested as was humanly possible4 ,even his obstinacy is rather an advantage than otherwise4 ,he is not liable to whims and fancies and sudden gusts of temper or to external influence4 ,his technical efficiency is considerable1 because he has seen and remembered much and his mind has unconsciously drawn up a reference book of cases4 ,as history repeats itself with very slight alterations1 every fresh case which arises is already well known to him2 it does not take him by surprise and he has a solution at hand which only requires very slight modification4 ,all this1 however1 is very ancient history4 ,that which undermined the authority of old men was the book4 ,books contain all science1 equity1 jurisprudence and history better1 it must be confessed1 than the memories of old men4 ,one fine day the young men said3 ,the old men were our books2 now that we have books we have no further need for old men4 ,this was a mistake2 the knowledge which is accumulated in books can never be anything but the handmaiden of living science1 the science which is being constantly remodelled and corrected by living thought4 ,a book is a wise man paralysed2 the wise man is a book which still thinks and writes4 ,these ideas did not hold2 the book superseded the old man1 and the old man no longer was a library to the nation4 ,later still1 for various reasons1 the old men drifted from a position of respect to one of ridicule4 ,undoubtedly they lend themselves to this2 they are obstinate1 foolish1 prosy1 boring1 crotchety and unpleasant to look upon4 ,comic writers poked fun at these failings which are only too self-evident and showered ridicule upon them4 ,then as the majority of audiences is composed of young men1 first of all because there are more young men than old1 and secondly because old men do not often go to the theatre1 authors of comic plays were certain of raising a laugh by turning old men into ridicule1 or rather by exposing only their ridiculous characteristics4 ,at ,athens and at ,rome and probably elsewhere1 the old man was one of the principal grotesque characters4 ,these things1 as ,rousseau pointed out1 have a great effect upon morals4 ,once the old man became a recognised traditional stage-butt1 his social authority had come to an end4 ,in the de ,senectute it is obvious that ,cicero is running counter to the stream in seeking to restore to favour a character about whom the public is indifferent and for whom all he can do is to plead extenuating circumstances4 ,it is a remarkable fact that even in mediaeval epics1 ,charlemagne himself1 the emperor of the flowing beard1 often plays a comic part4 ,the epic is invaded by the atmosphere of the fable4 ,during the ,renaissance1 the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 the old man is generally1 though not invariably1 held up to ridicule4 ,moliere takes his lead from ,aristophanes and ,plautus rather than from ,terence and is the scourge of old age as well as the scourge of the ridiculous2 he pursues the old as a hound his prey and never leaves them in peace either in his poetry or his prose4 ,we must do this much justice to ,rousseau that both he and his child1 the ,revolution1 tried to restore the old man to his former glory2 he makes honourable mention of him in his writings1 and she gives him important posts in public ceremonies and national fetes4 ,therein were received the ancient memories of ,lacedaemon and of early ,rome1 combined with a form of reaction against the days of ,louis ,,xiv and ,louis ,,xv4 ,but with the triumph of democracy the old man was finally banished to the limbo of discredited things4 ,montesquieu's advice was quite forgotten 7see the context ,laws1 v1 #h74 ,he said that in a democracy nothing kept the standard of morals so high as that young men should venerate the old4 ,both profit by it1 the young because they respect the old1 and the old because they are confirmed in their respect for themselves 7for the respect of the young is an assistance to the self-respect of the aged74 ,democracy has forgotten this advice1 because it no longer believes in tradition and believes too much in progress4 ,old men are the natural upholders of tradition1 and we must confess that an enthusiastic faith in the value of what we call progress is not commonly their failing4 ,for this very reason their influence would be a most wholesome corrective to the system1 or rather to the attitude of mind1 which despises the past and sees in every change a step in the path of progress4 ,but democracy will not allow that it needs a corrective1 and the old man1 to it1 is only an enemy4 ,the old man upholds tradition and has no enthusiasm for progress1 but beyond this he appeals for respect1 first for himself1 then for religion1 for glory1 for his country and for the history of his nation4 ,democracy is indifferent to the sentiment of respect1 or rather it lives in constant fear that the sentiment may be applied elsewhere4 ,then what does democracy want for itself8 ,not respect1 but adoration1 passion1 devotion4 ,we all like to see our own sentiments as to ourselves repeated in the minds of others4 ,the crowd never respects1 it loves1 it yields to passion1 enthusiasm1 fanaticism4 ,it never respects even that which it loves4 ,it is quite natural that the masses should not care for old men4 ,the masses are young4 ,how aptly does ,horace's description of the young man apply to the people6 ,imberbis juvenis1 tandem custode remoto ,gaudet equis1 canibusque et aprici gramine campi2 ,cereus in vitium flecti1 monitoribus asper1 ,utilium tardus provisor1 prodigus aeris1 ,sublimis1 cupidusque et amata relinquere pernix4 ,once free from the control of his tutors1 the young man thinks of nothing but horses1 dogs and the ,campus ,martius1 impressionable as wax to every temptation1 impatient of correction1 unthrifty1 extravagant1 presumptuous and light of love4 ,at all events respect has no meaning for the crowd1 and when it rules1 we cannot from its example learn the lessons of respect4 ,democracy has no love for the old2 and it is interesting to note that the word gerontocracy to which the ancients attached the most honourable meaning is now only a term of ridicule1 and is applied only to a government which1 because it is in the hands of old men1 is therefore grotesque4 99 99 99 99 99 ,this disappearance of respect1 noted as we have seen by ,plato1 ,aristotle and ,montesquieu as a morbid system1 is1 regard it how we will1 a fact of the gravest import4 ,kant has asked the question1 what must we obey8 ,what criterion is there to tell us what to obey8 ,what is there within us which commands respect1 which does not ask for love or fear1 but for respect alone8 ,he has given us the answer4 ,the feeling of respect is the only thing that we can trust1 and that will never fail us4 ,in society the only feelings we obey are those which win our respect1 and the men to whom we listen1 and whom we honour1 are those who inspire respect4 ,this is the only criterion which enables us to gauge correctly the men and things to whom we owe1 if not absolute obedience1 at least attention and deference4 ,old men are the nation's conscience1 and it is a conscience at times severe1 morose1 tiresome1 obstinate1 over-scrupulous1 dictatorial1 and it repeats for ever the same old saws2 in other words a conscience2 but conscience it is4 ,the comparison might be carried further with results that would be advantageous as well as curious4 ,we degrade and finally vitiate our conscience if we do not respect its behests4 ,conscience then itself becomes small and timid and humble1 shamefaced1 and at length a mere whisper4 ,absolutely silent it can never be made4 ,it becomes sophisticated1 it begins to employ the language of passion1 not of the vilest passions of our nature1 but still the voice of passion2 it ceases to use the categoric imperative and tries to be persuasive4 ,it no longer raises the finger of command1 but it seeks to cajole with caressing hand4 ,then it falls still lower1 it affects indifference and scepticism and it puts on the air of the trifler in order to insinuate a word of wisdom into the seductive talk that is heard around it1 and it holds language somewhat as follows3 ,probably everything has its good points and there is something to be said for both vice and virtue1 crime and honesty1 sin and innocence1 rudeness and politeness1 licence and purity4 ,these are all simply different forms of an activity which cannot be wholly wrong in any of its manifestations2 and it is precisely because every one of these has its value that there may be nothing to lose in being honest1 nay1 perhaps something to gain4 ,nevertheless1 a nation that does not respect its old men changes their nature and despoils them of their beauty and integrity4 ,how true is ,montesquieu's saying that the respect paid them by the young helps old men to respect themselves6 ,old men who are not respected take no interest in their natural duties2 they cease to advise1 or else they only venture to advise indirectly1 as though they were apologising for their wisdom1 or they affect a laxity of morals to enable them to insinuate a surreptitious dose of worldly wisdom2--and worst of all in view of the insignificant part assigned to them in society1 old men will nowadays decline to be old4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,manners4 ,if the worship of incompetence reverberates with a jarring note through our domestic morals1 it has an effect hardly less harmful on the social relations of men in the wider theatre of public life4 ,we often ask why politeness is out of date1 and everyone replies with a smile3 ,this is democratic4 ,so it is1 but why should it be8 ,montesquieu remarks that to cast off the conventions of civility is to seek a method for putting our faults at their ease4 ,he adds the rather subtle distinction that politeness flatters the vices of others1 and civility prevents us from displaying our own4 ,it is a barrier raised by men to prevent them from corrupting each other4 ,that which flatters vice can hardly be called politeness1 but is rather adulation4 ,civility and politeness are only slightly different in degree2 civility is cold and very respectful1 politeness has a suggestion of flattery4 ,it graciously draws into evidence the good qualities of our neighbour1 not his failings1 much less his vices4 ,there is no doubt that civility and politeness are a delicate means of showing respect to our fellow-men1 and of communicating a wish to be respected in turn4 ,these things then are barriers1 but barriers from which we derive support1 which separate and strengthen us1 but which1 though holding us apart1 do not keep us estranged from our neighbours4 ,it is also very true that if we release ourselves from these rules1 whether they are civility or politeness1 we set our faults at liberty4 ,the basis of civility and politeness is respect for others and respect for ourselves4 ,as ,abbe ,barthelemy has very justly remarked3 ,in the first class of citizens is to be found a spirit of decorum which makes it evident that men respect themselves1 and a spirit of politeness which makes it evident that they also respect others4 ,this is what ,pascal meant by saying that respect is our own inconvenience1 and he explains it thus1 that to stand when our neighbour is seated1 to remove our hat when he is covered1 though trifling acts of courtesy1 are tokens of the efforts we would willingly make on his behalf if an opportunity of being really serviceable to him presented itself4 ,politeness is a mark of respect and a promise of devotion4 ,all this is anti-democratic1 because democracy does not recognise any superiority1 and therefore has no sympathy with respect and personal devotion4 ,respect to others involves a recognition from us that we are of less importance than they1 and politeness to an equal requires from us a courteous affectation that we consider him as our superior4 ,this is entirely contrary to the democratic ideal1 which asserts that there is no superiority anywhere4 ,as for pretending to treat your equal as though he were your superior1 that involves a double hypocrisy1 because it requires a reciprocal hypocrisy on the part of your neighbour4 ,you praise his wit1 only in order that he may return the compliment4 ,without1 however1 insisting on this point1 democracy will argue that politeness is to be deprecated1 because it not only recognises but actually creates superiority4 ,it treats an equal as a superior1 as though there were not enough discrepancies already without inventing any more4 ,it seems to imply that if inequality did not exist1 it would be necessary to invent it4 ,it is tantamount to proclaiming that there cannot be too much aristocracy4 ,that is an opinion which democracy cannot endure4 ,considered as a promise of future devotion1 politeness is equally anti-democratic4 ,the citizen owes no devotion to any person1 he owes it only to the community4 ,it is no small matter to style yourself your most humble servant2 it means that you single out one man from among many others and promise to serve him2 it means that you acknowledge in him some natural or social superiority1 and according to democracy there are no superiorities1 social or natural1 and if there were such a thing as natural superiority1 nature has no business to allow it4 ,this is tantamount to proclaiming a form of vassalage--a thing which is not to be tolerated4 ,as to the absence of politeness considered as a means of giving free play to one's feelings1 we recognise that in one sense this also is essentially democratic4 ,the democrat is not proud of or pleased with his faults2 not at all2 only ex hypothesi he does not believe in their existence4 ,a failing is an inferiority of one man in relation to another2 the word itself implies it2 it means that something is lacking1 that one man has a thing which another has not4 ,but all men are equal1 therefore1 argues the democrat1 ,i have no failing2 therefore ,i need not try to conceal and control my alleged failings1 as they are at worst merely mannerisms1 and are possibly virtues4 ,the democrat1 in fact1 like young men1 like most women1 and like all human beings who have begun to think but do not think very profoundly1 knows his failings and assumes that they are virtues4 ,this is very natural1 for our faults are the most conspicuous parts of our character1 and when we are still at the self-satisfied stage it is our faults that we cherish and admire4 ,consequently1 politeness1 in that it consists in concealing our faults1 is intolerable to a man who is impatient to display qualities that to him appear commendable and worthy4 ,the usual reason why we do not correct our faults is that we mistake them for qualities1 and think that any practice which requires their concealment must be quite absurdly tyrannical4 ,the democrat is therefore profoundly convinced of two things2 first1 that all men are equal and that there is no such thing as inferiority or failing1 and secondly1 that what men call faults are really natural characteristics of great interest4 ,he believes that faults are popular prejudices invented by intriguers1 priests1 nobles and rulers1 for their own base purposes to inspire the poor with humility4 ,he looks upon this sense of inferiority as a curb on the people's power1 all the more potent that it works from within and has a paralysing effect on its energy4 ,he is persuaded that1 from this point of view1 politeness is an aristocratic instrument of tyranny4 ,this explains why1 when the wave of democracy swept over ,france1 it brought with it a perfect frenzy of rudeness1 all the more curious in a nation remarkable for courtesy4 ,it was an affirmation that1 appearances notwithstanding1 neither superiorities nor excellences of human character had any real existence4 ,rudeness is democratic4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,professional ,,customs4 ,the contempt for efficiency is carried far even in the liberal professions and in professional customs4 ,we all know the story1 perhaps a mythical one1 of the judge who said to an earnest young barrister who was conscientiously elaborating a question of law3 ,now1 ,mr4 ,so and ,so1 we are not here to discuss questions of law but to settle this business4 ,he did not say this by way of jest2 he wished to say3 ,the courts no longer deliver judgment on the merits of a case according to law1 but according to equity and common sense4 ,the intricacies of the law are left to professors1 so please when conducting a case do not behave like a professor of law4 ,this theory1 which even in this mild form would have horrified the ancients1 is very prevalent nowadays in legal circles4 ,it has crept in as an infiltration1 as one might call it1 from the democratic system4 ,a magistrate1 nowadays1 whatever remnant of the ancient feeling of caste he may have retained1 certainly does not consider himself bound by the letter of the law1 or by jurisprudence1 the written tradition2 when he is anything more than a subordinate with no other idea of duty than subservience to the ,government1 he is a democratic magistrate1 a ,heliast of ,athens2 he delivers judgment according to the dictates of his individual conscience2 he does not consider himself as a member of a learned body1 bound to apply the decisions of that body1 but as an independent exponent of the truth4 ,an eccentric1 but in truth very significant1 example of the new attitude of mind is to be found in the judge1 who formally attributed to himself the right to make law and who in his judgments made references1 not to existing laws1 but to such vague generalities as appealed to him1 or to doctrines which he prophesied would later on be embodied in the law4 ,his ,code was the ,code of the future4 ,the mere existence of such a man is of no particular importance1 but the fact that many people1 even those partially enlightened1 took him seriously1 that he was popular1 and that a considerable faction thought him a good judge1 is most significant4 ,there is another much commoner sign of the times4 ,the worst form of incompetence is perhaps that which allows a man to be competent without realising it1 and1 in criminal cases at least1 this seems to be the normal attitude of the majority of our magistrates4 ,we should read on this point a very curious pamphlet called ,le ,pli ,professionnel 7#aiji71 by ,marcel ,lestranger1 a provincial magistrate4 ,it is very pertinent to our subject4 ,it shows plainly that the magistracy nowadays1 both the qualified stipendiaries and the bench of magistrates1 has lost all confidence in itself and is terrified of public opinion as represented by newspapers1 associations1 political clubs and the man in the street2 the magistrate knows too1 or thinks he knows1 that promotion depends1 not on a reputation for severity as it used to do1 but on a reputation for indulgence4 ,he is confronted in the execution of his duty by forces which are always in coalition against him2 the public1 almost always favourable to the accused1 the press1 both local and ,parisian1 the so-called science of judicial medicine1 which is almost always disposed to consider the accused as persons not responsible for their actions4 ,he lives1 too1 in constant terror of being mixed up in a miscarriage of justice1 for miscarriage of justice is now a sort of craze1 and with a considerable section of the public every conviction is a miscarriage of justice4 ,and so the magistrate of first instance never dares to sum up severely1 and the stipendiary never dares press his interrogations with firmness4 ,there are exceptions of course2 but these exceptions1 by the astonishment which they excite1 and by the reaction to which they give rise1 show sufficiently1 indeed conclusively1 that they are abnormal1 outside the new order of things1 outside the new habits of the people4 ,more often than not the subordinate magistrate1 whose business it is to commit the prisoner for trial1 acts with timidity and reserve1 apologetically attenuating the crime2 he leaves loopholes of escape1 appeals in audible asides for indulgence1 dwells on the uncertainty of evidence4 ,he demands indeed the prisoner's head but lives in terror lest he obtain it4 ,the fact is what both he and the stipendiary desire is that the affair should be settled by an acquittal1 for an affair settled by an acquittal is an affair buried4 ,stone-dead has no fellow2 it is consigned to oblivion4 ,it can never be made the sort of affair which someone is sure to declare is a miscarriage of justice1 or which someone1 animated by private and political spite or merely for the sake of a jest1 can make into a ghost to haunt for ten or even fifteen years the unfortunate magistrate who had to deal with it4 ,m4 ,lestranger tells a story which1 from all the information ,i can glean and from what ,i can remember hearing at the time1 is absolutely true and a perfect illustration of thousands of similar cases4 ,a poacher1 aged nineteen1 first outraged and then strangled in the woods a peasant woman1 the mother of a family4 ,on this occasion there could be no question of a miscarriage of justice or even of any suggestion of such a thing1 because the prisoner pleaded guilty4 ,that is a great point4 ,in ,france every conviction that is not based upon the prisoner's confession is a miscarriage of justice2 but when the prisoner pleads guilty there can be no incriminations of this sort1 although there might be1 for false confessions are not unknown1 but nothing of the sort is ever put forward1 and the case seemed to be quite straightforward4 ,but the magistrates were terrified that the prisoner would be condemned to death4 ,the crime was horrible1 particularly in the eyes of a village jury1 whose wives and daughters were often obliged to work some distance from the village4 ,moreover1 there was a tiresome man1 the widower of the victim1 thirsting for vengeance1 who sang the praises of his wife and brought his weeping son into court while he gave his evidence4 ,the president and the public prosecutor were in despair4 ,i have done all ,i can1 said the president to the public prosecutor4 ,i have made the most of his youth4 ,i have repeated 'only nineteen years of age4' ,i have indeed done all ,i can4 ,i have done all ,i can1 said the public prosecutor to the president4 ,i have not said a word about the punishment4 ,i merely accused4 ,i could not plead for the defence4 ,i have done my best4 ,at the close of the hearing the chief constable was very reassuring to these gentlemen4 ,he is under twenty and he looked so respectable at the enquiry4 ,it is quite impossible that he should be condemned to death in this quiet village4 ,you will see1 he will not be sentenced to capital punishment4 ,he was not4 ,the jury brought in a verdict of guilty with extenuating circumstances4 ,the magistrates recovered their tranquillity4 ,m4 ,lestranger's facts are supported by figures4 ,those who commit crimes which excite pity1 such as infanticide and abortion1 are less and less likely to be prosecuted1 and if they are1 they are frequently let off1 however flagrant the offence4 ,the average number of acquittals during the last twelve years is twenty-six per cent4 ,a magistrate nowadays is a ,st4 ,francis of ,assize4 ,either the magistrate does not believe in his own efficiency1 or he sacrifices it to his peace of mind1 and he cares more for his own peace of mind than for the public safety4 ,the magistracy will soon be no more than a facade1 still imposing but not at all alarming4 ,there is already a very serious symptom of how little confidence the crowd has in the wholesome severities of justice2 the criminal caught in the act is often lynched or almost lynched1 because it is well known that if he is not punished immediately1 he is very likely to escape punishment altogether4 --,yet this same crowd1 in the form of a jury1 is often1 almost always1 very indulgent4--,true1 and that is because between the crime and the assizes there is often an interval of six months4 ,at the date of the crime it is the misfortune of the victim that excites the crowd1 at the date of the assize it is the misfortune of the accused4 ,be this as it may1 the practice of lynching amounts to a formal accusation that both magistrates and juries are over indulgent4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the clergy even1 who are more tenacious of tradition than any other order in the ,state1 are gradually becoming democratic to this extent1 that though by profession teachers of dogmas and mysteries1 they now teach only morality4 ,in this way they try to get into closer touch with the poor1 and so have a greater hold upon them4 ,evidently they are not altogether to blame4 ,only1 when they cease to teach dogma and interpret mysteries1 they cease to be a learned body or to have the prestige of a learned body4 ,on the other hand they sink to the level of any other philosophy1 which teaches and explains morality1 and illustrates it by sacred examples just as well as any priesthood4 ,the result is that the people say to themselves ,what need have we of priests8 ,moral philosophers are good enough for us4 ,this ,americanism is not very dangerous1 in fact it does not matter1 in ,america1 where there are very few lay moral philosophers2 but it is a very great danger in ,france1 ,italy and ,belgium where their name is legion4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in every profession1 to sum it all up1 the root of the evil is this1 that we believe that mere dexterity and cunning are incomparably superior to knowledge and that cleverness is infinitely more valuable than sound learning4 ,those who follow professions believe this1 and the lay public that employs the professions is not dismayed by this attitude of the professional class2 and so things tend to that equality of charlatanry to which democracy instinctively tends4 ,democracy does not respect efficiency1 but it soon will have no opportunity to respect it2 for efficiency is being destroyed and before long will have disappeared altogether4 ,there will soon be no difference between the judge and the suitor1 between the layman and the priest1 the sick man and the physician4 ,the contempt which is felt for efficiency destroys it little by little1 and efficiency1 accepting the situation1 outruns the contempt that is felt for it4 ,the end will be that we shall all be only too much of one opinion4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,attempted ,,remedies4 ,we have sought very conscientiously1 and democrats themselves have sought very conscientiously1 to find remedies for this constitutional disease of democracy4 ,we have preserved certain bodies1 relatively aristocratic1 as refuges1 we would fain believe1 of efficiency4 ,we have preserved for instance a ,senate1 elected by universal suffrage1 not directly1 but in the second degree4 ,we have preserved also a ,parliament 7a ,senate and a ,chamber of ,deputies71 a floating aristocracy which is continually being renewed4 ,this is1 however1 in a sense an aristocracy inasmuch as it stands between us and a direct and immediate government of the people by the people4 ,these remedies are by no means to be despised1 but we recognise that they are very feeble1 for the reason that democracy always eludes them4 ,by the care it takes to exclude efficiency1 it has made the ,chamber of ,deputies 7with some few exceptions7 a body resembling itself with absolute fidelity both in respect of the superficial character of its knowledge and the violence of its prejudices2 with the result in my opinion that the crowd might just as well govern directly and1 without the intervention of representatives1 by means of the plebiscite4 ,the same thing applies to the ,senate1 though perhaps in a more direct fashion4 ,the ,senate is chosen by the delegates of universal suffrage4 ,these delegates1 however1 are not chosen by a general universal suffrage where each department would choose four or five hundred delegates1 but by the town councillors of each commune or parish4 ,in these communes1 especially in the rural communes1 the municipal councillors who are by far the most numerous and1 with regard to elections1 the most influential1 are more or less completely dependent on the prefets4 ,the result is that the ,senate is1 practically1 chosen by the prefets1 that is1 by the ,government1 as used to be the case under the ,first and ,second ,empire4 ,the maker of the constitution made this arrangement for the benefit of his own party1 for he upheld authority2 and he wanted the ,central ,government to control the elections of the ,senate4 ,it has not turned out as he intended4 ,vos non vobis1 others have profited by his device1 as the following considerations will show4 ,it is well known that in ,france a deputy belonging to the opposition1 though sure of his constituents1 and certain to be re-elected indefinitely1 who for private reasons wishes to be a senator1 is obliged to be civil to the ,government in power1 to abate his opposition1 and to make himself pleasant1 if he wishes to avoid failure in his new ambition4 ,it is very inconvenient to have a strong and active opposition in the ,senate4 ,it comes back again to this1 that we have a ,senate not far removed from one elected by universal suffrage4 ,universal suffrage elects the ,chamber of ,deputies1 the ,chamber elects the ,government1 and the ,government elects the ,senate4 ,the ,senate is therefore an extremely feeble anti-democratic remedy1 and if it were intended as a check on democracy1 it has not been a striking success4 ,if we really wish to have an upper chamber as competent as possible1 independent of the central authority1 and relatively independent of universal suffrage1 we must establish a chamber elected by the great constituent bodies of the nation1 and also in my opinion1 by universal suffrage1 but with modifications somewhat as follows4 ,the whole nation1 divided for practical purposes into five or six large districts1 should elect five or six thousand delegates who in turn should elect three hundred senators4 ,there would then be no pressure from ,government nor any manufacture by the crowd of a representation fashioned in its own image1 and we should have a really select body composed of as much competence as could be got in the country4 ,it is1 however1 exactly the opposite of this that is done1 and the ,french ,senate is an extremely feeble1 anti-democratic remedy4 ,it represents the rural democracy1 arbitrarily guided and governed by the democratic ,government4 99 99 99 99 99 ,another remedy which has been given an equally conscientious trial is the system of competitive examination1 which is supposed to be a guarantee for the ability of those who seek admission into government service4 ,the object of these examinations1 which are extremely detailed and complicated1 is to test the ability of the candidate in every particular1 to give employment to merit and to exclude favouritism4 --,you call that an anti-democratic remedy6 ,it is as democratic as well can be6-- ,nay1 pardon6 ,it would be anti-monarchical if we lived under a monarchy1 anti-aristocratic if we lived under an aristocracy1 and it is anti-democratic because our lot is cast in a democracy4 ,competition for public offices is a sort of co-optation4 ,in fact it is co-optation pure and simple4 ,when ,i suggested that the magistracy should be chosen by the magistrates1 that is1 the ,cour de ,cassation by the magistrates and the magistrates in turn by the ,cour de ,cassation1 ,i was of course accused of being paradoxical1 as is always the case1 when one suggests something contrary to the usual custom4 ,i was1 however1 only carrying a little further the principle which is already applied to officials4 ,in a certain sense and to a large extent officials recruit their numbers by co-optation4 ,it is true1 they do not actually choose the officials1 but they eliminate the candidates whom they do not wish to have4 ,examination is ostracism of the inefficient4 ,the ,government1 of course1 has to decide who may be candidates1 but its selection for employment is limited to those of whom other officials 7the officials who conduct the examination7 can approve4 ,it is in fact co-optation4 ,the committee of examiners which admits a candidate to ,st4 ,cyr appoints an officer4 ,the committee which admits a candidate to the ,ecole ,polytechnique appoints an officer or an engineer4 ,a committee also which refuses a candidate at either of these places is encroaching on the ,national ,sovereignty1 because it is forbidding the ,national ,sovereignty to make of this young man an officer or an engineer4 ,this is co-optation4 ,this is a guarantee of efficiency4 ,here a wall is raised against incompetence1 and against the jobbery under which incompetence would profit4 ,it is hardly necessary for me to add that this co-optation is limited to a very narrow field of operation4 ,it is confined in fact to the threshold of a man's career4 ,once the candidate has been consecrated official1 by a board of examining officials1 he belongs1 both as regards advancement1 promotion and the reverse1 to the central authority alone1 except in certain cases4 ,the co-optation of officials is merely a co-optation by elimination4 ,the elimination is made once and for all1 and the non-eliminated 7i4e41 the successful candidate7 steps at once into the toils of the ,government1 that is1 into the toils of popular electioneering and party politics1 when all the abuses which ,i have enumerated can and do arise4 ,to be fair ,i had of course to point out that we had tried to invent some slight barriers against the omnipotence of incompetence1 which prevent it being absolutely supreme4 ,unfortunately these prophylactic measures are very badly organised1 and1 far from being capable of amendment1 ought to be completely revolutionised4 ,the examination system in our country is founded on a misconception1 ,i mean on the confusion between knowledge and competence4 ,we search conscientiously for competence or efficiency1 and we believe that we have found it when we find knowledge1 but that is an error4 ,an examination requires from a candidate that he shall know1 and competition demands that he shall know more than the others1 but that is almost all that examination and competition require of him4 ,therefrom results one of the most painful open sores of our civilisation1--preparation for examinations4 ,preparation for examination is responsible for intellectual indigestion1 for minds overloaded with useless information1 and for a system of cramming1 which at once takes the heart out of men1 perhaps with good ability1 just at the age when their mental activity is most keen2 which1 further1 as the result of this surfeit1 disgusts for the rest of his life and renders impotent for all intellectual effort1 the unfortunate patient who has been condemned to undergo this treatment for five1 eight1 and sometimes ten years of his youth4 ,i am satisfied1 if ,i may be allowed to speak of myself in order to support my argument by an instance well known to me1 that1 if ,i have been able to work from the age of twenty-five to that of sixty-three1 it is because ,i have never succeeded except very moderately1 and ,i am proud of it1 in competitive examinations4 ,being of a curious turn of mind ,i have been interested in the subject set in the syllabus1 but in other matters also1 and the syllabus has been neglected4 ,i sometimes passed1 more often ,i failed1 with the result that at twenty-six ,i was behind my contemporaries1 but ,i was not overworked1 broken down1 and utterly sick of all intellectual effort4 ,i admit that some of my contemporaries who never failed in an examination1 and who passed them all with great brilliance1 have worked as hard as ,i have up to sixty1 but they are extremely few4 ,the curious thing is that the results1 not perhaps disastrous1 but obviously very unsatisfactory1 of this examination system do not lead us to abandon it 7that perhaps would be an extreme measure71 but make us aggravate and complicate it4 ,legal and medical examinations are much stiffer than they used to be1 and they require a greater physical effort1 but without requiring or obtaining any greater intellectual value4 ,in truth1 one might say1 examination is nothing more than a test of good health1 and it is a very searching test1 for it often succeeds in destroying it4 ,here is an example which ,i know well4 ,it is necessary1 if a man desire to gain distinction as a professor of secondary education1 that he should be a bachelor1 a licentiate1 an agrege or a doctor4 ,this is a qualification that counts1 and it means ten examinations or competitions1 two for the first half of the bachelor's degree1 two for the second1 two for the licentiate1 two for agrege1 two for the doctor's degree4 ,this1 moreover1 does not appear to be enough4 ,between the second part of the bachelor's degree and the licentiate's degree there is normally an interval of two years2 between the licentiate and the agregation two years1 and between the agregation and the doctor's degree there is generally three or four years4 ,you perceive the danger6 ,between the licence and the agregation1 to go no further at present1 the future professor has two whole years to himself4 ,that is to say1 that during the first of these two years he will work alone4 ,he can work freely1 he can study in what direction he pleases1 without thinking of an examination at the end of twelve months2 he has escaped for the moment from the servitude of the syllabus4 ,the prospect makes us shudder with apprehension4 ,it is sadly to be feared that the young man may take a rest and draw breath1 or worse still he may be carried into some extraneous study by his personal aptitudes or tastes4 ,the personality of the candidate has here an opening1 a moment at which it has a possibility of asserting itself4 ,that must be stopped at all costs4 ,the authorities1 therefore1 have put in an intermediate examination between the licence and the agregation4 ,the examination1 it is true1 is on a subject chosen by the candidate himself2 so much it is only fair to admit4 ,the subject chosen1 however1 must be submitted to the professors4 ,their advice and indeed assistance must be invited4 ,the result1 if not the object1 of this examination is to prevent the candidate1 during this perilous year of liberty1 from developing original ideas of his own and acting on them4 ,one examination every year for ten years--that is the ideal of the modern professor for the future professors who are in course of being trained4 ,between the second part of the bachelor's degree and the licentiate1 as there is there an interval of two years1 they will presently perceive that there ought to be an examination at the end of the first year1 and we shall have certificates of study in intermediate1 secondary1 higher subjects4 ,between the agregation and the doctorat1 there are four years1 and naturally we shall want three examinations just to see how the future professor is getting on with his theses1 to encumber him with assistance and to prevent him doing them alone2 first examination called the ,bibliography of the ,theses for the ,doctorat1 second examination called the ,methodology of the ,doctorat1 third examination called the ,preparation for the ,sustaining of the ,thesis1 and then the examination for the doctor's degree itself4 ,in this way the desired object is attained4 ,between the ages of seventeen and twenty-seven or thirty the examinee will have had to undergo sixteen examinations4 ,he will never have worked alone4 ,he will always have worked1 for periods of twelve months1 on a syllabus1 for an examination1 with a view of pleasing such and such professors1 modelling himself on their views1 their conceptions1 their general ideas1 their eccentricities1 aided by them1 influenced by them1 never knowing1 and feeling he ought not to know1 not wishing to know1 and running a great risk if he did know1 and forming habits for his whole life so that he may never know what he thinks himself1 what he imagines himself1 what he seeks and would like to seek of his own motion1 or what he ought himself to try to be4 ,he will take up all this after he is thirty4 ,not a vestige of personality or original thought till the moment when it is too late for it to appear1 that is the maxim6 ,whence comes this frenzy1 this examino mania8 ,when one comes to think of it1 it seems to be a simple case of ,dandino-mania4 ,dandin says with great determination ,i mean to go and judge4 ,the professor of a certain age means to go and examine4 ,he no longer loves to profess1 he loves to be always examining4 ,this is very natural4 ,professing1 he is judged2 examining1 he judges4 ,the one is always much pleasanter than the other4 ,for a professor1 to sweat in harness1 to feel oneself being examined1 that is1 criticised1 discussed1 held up to judgment1 and chaffed by an audience of students and amateurs1 ceases at a certain age to be altogether pleasant2 on the other hand to examine1 to sit on the throne with all the majesty of a judge1 to have only to criticise and not to produce1 to intervene only when the victim stumbles1 and to let him know that he has made a slip1 to hold the student for the whole year under the salutary terror of an approaching examination1 to remind him that he may need help and must by no means displease his professor--all this is very agreeable and makes up for many of the worries of the teaching profession4 ,the examination mania proceeds partly from the terror of being oneself examined1 and partly from the pleasure of examining others4 ,all this is true1 but there is more than this4 ,the precocious development of early talent and originality is the thing which strangely terrifies these examination-maniacs4 ,they have a horror of the man who teaches himself4 ,they have a horror of any one who ventures to think for himself and to enquire for himself at twenty-five years of age4 ,they want1 like an old hen1 to mother the young mind as long as possible4 ,they will not let it find its own feet1 till very late1 and till1 as the scoffer might well say1 its limbs are absolutely atrophied4 ,i do not say that they are wrong4 ,the man who has taught himself is apt to be a vain1 conceited fellow who takes pleasure in thinking for himself1 and has an absolute delight in despising the thoughts of others4 ,it is1 however1 no less the fact1 that it is among these self-taught men that we find those vigorous spirits who venture boldly beyond the domain of human science and extend its frontier4 ,the question then is which is best1 to favour all these troublesome self-taught people in the hope of finding some good ones among them1 or by crossing and worrying them to run the risk of destroying the good as well as the bad4 ,i am myself strongly in favour of the first of these alternatives4 ,it is better to let all go their own way1 even though pretenders to originality come to grief1 a thing that matters very little4 ,minds that are truly original will develop themselves and find room for the expansion of all their powers4 ,but here1--take note how the democratic spirit comes in everywhere--the question of numbers is raised4 ,ten times more numerous1 ,i am told1 are the pretenders to originality whom we save from themselves by discipline than the true geniuses whose wings we clip4 ,i reply that1 in matters intellectual1 questions of figures do not count4 ,an original spirit strangled is a loss which is not compensated by the rescue of ten fools from worse excesses of folly4 ,an original spirit left free to be himself is worth more than ten fools whose folly is partially restrained4 ,nietzsche has well said3 ,modern education consists in smothering the exceptional in favour of the normal4 ,it consists in directing the mind away from the exceptional into the channel of the average4 ,this ought not to be4 ,i do not say that education should do the opposite of all this4 ,oh no1 far from that4 ,it is not the business of education to look for exceptional genius1 or to help in its creation4 ,exceptional genius is born of itself and it has no need of such assistance4 ,but even less is it the business of education to regard the exceptional with terror1 and to take every means possible1 even the most barbarous and most detailed1 to prevent it as long as possible from coming to the light4 ,education ought to draw all that it can out of mediocrity1 and to respect originality as much as it can4 ,it ought never to attempt to turn mediocrity into originality1 nor to reduce originality to the level of mediocrity4 ,and how can all this be done8 ,by an intervention that is always discreet1 and sometimes by non-intervention4 ,at the present moment its policy is equally distant from non-intervention and from an intervention that is discreet4 ,it is in this way that the very institution which we have invented to safeguard efficiency contributes not a little to the triumph of its opposite4 ,these victims of examination are competent in respect of knowledge1 instruction and technical proficiency4 ,they are incompetent in respect of intellectual value1 often1 though perhaps not so often as formerly1 in respect of moral value4 ,as far as their intellectual value is concerned1 they have very frequently no mental initiative4 ,it has been cramped1 hidden away1 and trampled down4 ,if it ever existed1 it exists now no longer4 ,they are all their days merely instruments4 ,they have been taught many things1 especially intellectual obedience4 ,they continue to obey intellectually1 their brain acts like well made and well lubricated machinery4 ,the difference between the novel and the play1 said ,brunetiere1 is that in the play the characters act1 in the novel they are acted4 ,i do not know if this be true1 but of the functionary we might say as often as not1 he does not think1 he is thought4 ,the official also is incompetent1 though less and less often1 in respect of moral worth4 ,by the exercise of intellectual obedience1 he has been trained to moral obedience also and he is little disposed to assert his independence4 ,observe how everything tends to this end4 ,this method of co-opting officials by means of elimination1 as ,i have said1 operates only1 as ,i have also shown1 at the outset of the official's career4 ,from this moment onwards the functionary must depend on the ,government only1 his whole preparation during ten years of education has been calculated to ensure his absolute dependence on his official directors4 ,so far good1 perhaps a little too good4 ,it would have been well if the education of the functionary had left him1 together with a little originality of mind1 a little originality of character as well4 99 99 99 99 99 ,we have sought1 very conscientiously also1 and1 ,i may even say1 with an admirable enthusiasm1 yet another remedy for the faults of democracy1 another remedy for its incompetence4 ,it is said3 ,the crowd is incompetent1 so be it1 it is necessary to enlighten it4 ,primary education1 spread broadcast1 is the solution of every difficulty1 and provides an answer to every question4 ,from this argument aristocrats have derived some little amusement4 ,how is this8 they exclaimed1 what is the meaning of this paradox8 ,you are democrats and that means that you attribute political excellence1 'political virtue1' as we used to say1 to the crowd1 that is to ignorance4 ,why then do you wish to enlighten the crowd1 that is to destroy the very virtue which1 on your own showing1 is the cause of its superiority8 ,the democrats reply that the crowd1 even as it is1 is already very preferable to aristocracy1 and that it will be still more so when it has received instruction4 ,they resolve the apparent contradiction by the argument a fortiori4 ,at all events1 the democrats set to work most vigorously on the education of the people4 ,the result is that the people is much better educated than formerly1 and ,i am one of those who regard this result as excellent2 but the further result is1 that the people is saturated with false ideas1 and this is less comforting4 ,ancient republics had their demagogues1 their orators1 who inflamed the evil qualities of the people1 by bestowing on them high-sounding names and by flattery4 ,the great democracy of modern times has its demagogues4 ,these are its elementary school teachers4 ,they come of the people1 are proud to belong to it1 for which of course no one can blame them1 they distrust everything that is not the people1 they are all the more of the people because among the people they are intellectually in the first rank while elsewhere they are of secondary importance2 and what men love is not the group of which they form a part1 but the group of which they are the chief4 ,they are1 therefore1 profoundly democratic4 ,so far nothing could be better4 ,but it is a narrow form of democratic sentiment which they hold1 for they are only half-educated1 or rather 7for who is completely educated or even well educated871 because they have only received a rudimentary education4 ,rudimentary education may perhaps make us capable of having one idea1 it certainly renders us incapable of having two4 ,the man of rudimentary education is always the man of one single idea and of one fixed idea4 ,he has few doubts4 ,now the wise man doubts often1 the ignorant man seldom1 the fool never4 ,the man of one idea is more or less impermeable to any process of reasoning that is foreign to this idea4 ,an ,indian author has said3 ,you can convince the wise2 you can convince1 with more difficulty1 the ignorant2 the half-educated1 never4 ,now no one ever convinces the elementary schoolmaster4 ,he is confirmed in his convictions by defending1 and still more by discussing them4 ,he is the slave of his opinion4 ,he does not possess it always quite clearly1 but it possesses him4 ,he loves it with all his soul1 as a priest his religion1 because it is the truth1 because it is beautiful1 because it has been persecuted1 and because it means the salvation of the world4 ,he would enjoy its triumph but he yearns still more to be a martyr in its cause4 ,he is a convinced democrat and a sentimental democrat4 ,his conviction forms a solid basis for his sentiment1 and his sentiment kindles to a white heat his conviction4 ,his conviction makes him turn a deaf ear to every objection1 his sentiment inspires him with hatred for his adversary4 ,for him the man who is not a democrat is wrong1 and further1 to him an object of hatred4 ,in his eyes the distance between himself and the aristocrat is as the distance between truth and error1 nay between good and evil1 between honour and dishonour4 ,the schoolmaster is the fanatic vassal of democracy4 ,then1 as he is a man of one idea1 he is single-minded1 narrowly logical1 and logical to the utmost extreme4 ,he goes straight forward where his argument leads4 ,an idea which admits neither qualification nor question can go far in a very short space of time4 ,and the schoolmaster drives all his democratic principles to their natural and logical conclusion4 ,he develops these principles and all that they imply by the sheer force of what he calls his reasoning reason1 and it appears to him to be not only natural but salutary to seek their realisation4 ,everything of which the principle is good is good itself1 and no one but ,montesquieu could ever believe that an institution could be ruined by the excess of the principle in which its merit consists4 ,the schoolmaster1 therefore1 deduces their logical consequences from the two great democratic principles1 the sovereignty of the nation1 and equality2 he deduces them rigorously1 and arrives at the following conclusions4 ,the people alone is sovereign4 ,therefore1 though there can be individual liberty and liberty of association1 there ought to be only such individual liberty and liberty of association as the people permits4 ,liberty cannot be and ought not to be anything more than a thing tolerated by the sovereign people4 ,the individual may think1 speak1 write1 and act as he pleases1 but only so far as the people will allow him2 for if he can do these things with absolute freedom1 or even with limitations which are not imposed by the people1 he becomes the sovereign power1 or the power which fixed the limits of his freedom becomes the sovereign1 and the sovereignty of the people disappears4 ,this brings us back to the simple definition that liberty is the right to do what we please within the limits of the law4 ,and who makes the law8 ,the people4 ,liberty is then the right to do everything which the people permits us to do4 ,nothing more2 if we attempt to go beyond this1 the sovereignty of the individual begins1 and the sovereignty of the people disappears4 --,but to have liberty to do only what the people permits1 this is to be free as we were under ,louis ,,xiv4--and that is not to be free at all6 ,so be it4 ,there will indeed be no liberty unless the law permit it4 ,surely you do not wish to be free in opposition to the law8 --,the law may be tyrannical4 ,it is tyrannical if it is unjust4-- ,the law has the right to be unjust4 ,otherwise the sovereignty of the people would be limited and this must not be4 --,fundamental and constitutional laws might be devised to limit this sovereignty of the people in order to guarantee such and such of the liberties for the individual4-- ,and the people would then be tied6 ,the sovereignty of the people would be suppressed6 ,no1 the people cannot be tied4 ,the sovereignty of the people is fundamental and must be left intact4 --,then there will be no individual liberty8-- ,only such a measure as the people will tolerate4 --,then there will be no liberty of association8 ,still less2 for an association is in itself a limitation of the sovereignty of the nation4 ,it has its own laws1 which from a democratic point of view is an absurd and monstrous incongruity4 ,the right of association limits the national sovereignty1 just as would a free town or sanctuary of refuge4 ,it limits the nation1 and pulls it up short in face of its closed doors4 ,it is a ,state within a ,state2 where there is association1 there arises at once a source of organisation other than the great organism of the popular will4 ,it is like an animal which lives some sort of independent life within another animal larger than itself and which1 living on that other animal1 is still independent of it4 ,in fact there can be only one association1 the association of the nation1 otherwise the sovereignty of the nation is limited1 that is1 destroyed4 ,no liberty of association can then exist4 ,associations of course will exist which the people will tolerate1 but their right of existence is always revocable and they are always liable to be dissolved and destroyed4 ,otherwise the national sovereignty would be held to abdicate and it can never abdicate4 --,ah6 but there is one association1 at least1 which to some extent is sacred1 and which the sovereignty of the people is bound to respect4 ,i mean the family4 ,the father is the head of the family1 he educates his children and brings them up as he thinks best1 till they come to man's estate4-- ,nay1 that will not pass6 ,for here again we have a limitation of the sovereignty of the nation4 ,the child does not belong to his father4 ,if this were so1 at the threshold of each home the sovereignty of the people would be arrested1 which means that it would cease to exist anywhere4 ,the child1 like the man1 belongs to the people4 ,he belongs to it1 in the sense that he must not be a member of an association which might dare to think differently from the people1 or perhaps even harbour ideas in contradiction to the thought of the people4 ,it would indeed be dangerous to leave our future citizens for twenty years outside the national thought1 which is the same thing as being outside the community4 ,imagine five or six bees brought up apart1 outside the laws1 regulations1 and constitution of the hive2 imagine further that of these groups of bees there were several hundreds in the hive4 ,the result would be the destruction of the hive4 ,it is above all things in the family that the sovereignty of the people ought to prevail4 ,it ought above all things to refuse to recognise the association of the family1 and to wage war against it wherever it finds it4 ,it should leave to parents the right of embracing their children1 but nothing more4 ,the right to educate them in ideas perhaps contrary to those of their parents belongs to the people1 which1 here as well as elsewhere1 perhaps even more than elsewhere for the interests at stake are more important1 must be absolutely sovereign4 ,this1 then1 is what the schoolmaster1 with a relentless logic which appears to me to be irresistible1 deduces from the principle of the national sovereignty4 ,from the principle of equality he deduces another point4 ,all men are equal by nature and before the law4 ,that is to say1 if there were justice1 all men ought to have been equal by nature1 and further1 if there is to be justice1 all men ought to be equal before the law4 ,very obviously1 however1 all men are not equal before the law1 and they are not equal by nature4 ,very well then1 we must make them so4 ,they are not equal before the law4 ,they appear to be so1 but they are not4 ,the rich man1 even supposing that the magistrates are perfectly and strictly honest1 by reason of the fact that he can remunerate the best solicitors1 advocates1 and witnesses1 by reason further of the fact that he intimidates by his influence all those who could appear against him1 is not in every respect the equal of the poor man before the law4 ,even less does this equality exist in the presence of that union of constituted social forces which we call society4 ,in this respect the rich man will be the influential man2 the man well connected1 the man on whom no one depends1 but whom no one likes to cross or to contradict4 ,there is1 between the rich and the poor man1 however equal we may pretend them to be before the law1 the difference between the man who gives orders and the man who is obliged to obey4 ,real equality1 in society1 in presence of society and even in presence of the law1 only exists where there is neither rich nor poor4 ,but there will always be rich and poor1 as long as the institution of inheritance remains4 ,abolish inheritance therefore6 ,but1 even with inheritance abolished1 there will still be rich and poor4 ,the man who can make his fortune rapidly will be a strong man relatively to the man who can not make a fortune1 and1 ,i would have you note it1 even when we have abolished inheritance1 the son of the strong man1 during the life of his father1 will be strong himself1 so that even if we abolish inheritance1 a privilege1 namely1 the privilege of birth will still exist and equality will not exist4 ,there is only one state of affairs under which equality is possible1 that is when no one possesses and no one can acquire anything4 ,the only social policy so devised that no one can possess and no one can acquire anything is the policy of a community of goods1 that is ,communism or ,collectivism4 ,collectivism is nothing very wonderful4 ,collectivism is equality2 and equality is collectivism1 otherwise our equality will be nothing but a phantom and an hypocrisy4 ,every one who is a convinced and sincere egalitarian1 and who takes the trouble to think1 is forced to be a collectivist4 ,bonald asked very wittily3 ,do you know what is a deist8 ,it is a man who has not lived long enough to be an atheist4 ,we in our turn ask3 ,do you know what is an anti-collectivist democrat8 ,it is a man who has not lived long enough to be a collectivist1 or who1 having lived long enough1 has never taken the trouble to think1 and to perceive what are the necessary consequences of his own principles4 ,but surely collectivism is a chimaera1 an utopia1 a thing impossible4 ,certainly it is impossible in the sense that in the country which adopts it the source of all initiative will be destroyed4 ,no man will make an effort to improve his position1 since it must never be improved4 ,the whole country will become one of those stagnant pools to which one of our ministers lately referred4 ,everyone having become an official1 everyone will realise the ideal of the official which the ,goncourts have very neatly described4 ,the good official1 they say1 is the man who combines laziness with extreme accuracy4 ,it is a definitive definition4 ,the country that reformed itself in this way would be conquered at the end of ten years by some neighbouring people more or less ambitious4 ,that admits of no question2 but what does it prove8 ,that collectivism is only impossible because it is only possible if established in every country at once4 ,very well1 and in order to establish it in every country at once1 only one thing is needful1 namely1 that there shall no longer be distinct and separate countries and no longer any nationalities4 ,it surely will not answer to establish collectivism before the abolition of nationalities1 since1 once established1 it will serve no purpose except to bring into prominent relief the vast superiority of countries which have not adopted collectivism4 ,we must1 therefore1 take our problems in order and abolish nationalities before we can establish collectivism4 ,now if nations organise themselves against nature 7the nature that1 the schoolmaster assumes1 makes all men equal71 if instinctively they organise themselves in a hierarchy which is aristocratic1 if they have their leaders and their subordinates1 their stronger and their weaker members1 it is because this arrangement is necessary in a camp1 and each nation feels that it is a camp4 ,if each feels that it is a camp1 it is simply because there are other nations round it1 because it feels and knows that there are others round it4 ,when there are no longer other nations1 each nation will organise itself no longer against nature1 but naturally1 that is to say on egalitarian principles4 ,nature perhaps strictly speaking is not egalitarian1 but it tends towards equality in the sense that it produces many more1 indeed infinitely more1 mediocrities than superior intelligences4 ,thus equality demands the abolition of inheritance1 and the equality of possessions4 ,equality of possessions necessitates collectivism1 and collectivism requires the abolition of nationalities4 ,we are egalitarians1 then collectivists1 and by logical consequence anti-patriots4 ,so argue the great majority of school teachers1 with an absolute logic1 in my opinion1 irrefutable1 with the logic which takes no account of facts1 and which only takes account of its own principle and of itself4 ,so they will all argue to-morrow1 if they continue1 as it is probable they will continue1 to be very excellent dialecticians4 ,will they go back to the premises and say1 that if the sovereignty of the people and equality lead logically and imperatively to these conclusions1 it is perhaps because the sovereignty of the people and equality are false ideas1 and because these conclusions prove them to be false8 ,this is a course not likely to be taken1 for the sovereignty of the people and the principle of equality are something more than general ideas1 they are sentiments4 ,they are sentiments which have become ideas1 as is the case doubtless with all general ideas1 and they are sentiments of great strength4 ,the sovereignty of the people is the truth for him who believes in it1 because it ought to be true1 because it is a thing as full of majesty for him as was ,caesar in all his pomp for the ancient ,roman1 or ,louis ,,xiv4 in all his glory for the man of the seventeenth century4 ,equality is truth for him who believes1 because it ought to be true1 because it is justice1 and because it would be infamous if justice and truth were not one4 ,for the democrat1 the world has ever been rising gradually1 since its creation1 towards the sovereignty of the people and the doctrine of equality2 the latter contains the former1 the former is destined to found the latter and has this mission for its purpose in life2 together they constitute civilisation1 and if they are not attained1 there is a relapse into barbarism4 ,they are dogmas of faith4 ,a dogma is an overmastering sentiment which has found expression in a formula4 ,from these two dogmas everything that can be deduced without breach of logic is truth which it is our right and duty to proclaim4 ,we must add that the schoolmaster is urged in this same direction by sentiments of a less general character1 which nevertheless have an influence of their own4 ,he is placed in his commune in direct opposition to the priest1 the only person very often who is1 like himself1 in that place a man of some little education4 ,hence rivalry and a struggle for influence4 ,now the priest1 by a series of historical incidents1 is a more or less warm partisan sometimes of monarchy but almost always of aristocracy4 ,he is a member of a body that once was an estate of the realm1 and he is persuaded that his corporation is still an estate of the realm1 notwithstanding all that has happened4 ,if the existing order is regulated by the concordat1 the existing order recognises his corporation as a body legitimatised by the ,state1 since it treats it on the same terms as the magistracy and the army4 ,if the existing order is one based on the separation of ,state and ,church1 his corporation appears to him still more to be an estate of the realm1 because being forced into an attitude of solid organisation1 and recognising no limitations of frontier1 it becomes a collective personage which1 not without peril1 but also not without a certain measure of success1 has often ventured to cross swords with the ,state itself4 ,as the priest then belongs to an order endowed with an historic authority which is nevertheless distinct from1 and in no wise a delegation from1 the authority of the people1 the priest cannot fail more or less definitely and consciously to adopt an attitude of mind favourable to aristocracy4 ,the school teacher1 his rival1 is thrown then all the more inevitably towards the adoption of democratic principles1 and he embraces them with a fervour into which enters jealousy quite as much as conviction4 ,they mean more to him than even to an eighteenth century philosopher1 because he has a much greater personal interest in believing them1 the interest of personal dislike and animosity2 for it is his belief that everything taught by the priest is the pure invention of ingenious oppressors who wish to enslave the people in order to consolidate their own tyranny2 and that is his reason for professing philosophical ideas resuscitated from the teaching of ,diderot1 and ,holbach4 ,for the school teacher it is almost inconceivable that the priest should be anything but a rascal4 ,atheism is aristocratic1 said ,robespierre1 thinking of ,rousseau4 ,atheism is democratic1 say our present-day school teachers4 ,whence comes this difference of opinion8 ,first because it was fashionable among the great lords of the eighteenth century to be libertines and free-thinkers1 but among the people the belief in ,god was unanimous4 ,secondly1 because the priests of our day1 for the reasons which ,i have given and from remembrance of the persecutions suffered by their ,church at the date of the first triumphs of democracy1 have remained aristocrats or have become so even more firmly than they ever were before4 ,atheism then has become democratic as a weapon against the deists who are generally aristocrats4 ,besides1 atheism fits in very well1 whatever ,robespierre may have thought1 with the general sentiments of the baser demagogy4 ,to be restrained by nothing1 to be limited by nothing1 that is the dominant idea of the people1 or rather it is the dominant idea of the democrat for the people1 that it should be restrained by nothing and limited by nothing in its sovereign power4 ,now ,god is a limit1 ,god is a restraint4 ,and just as the democrat will not admit of a secular constitution which the people could not destroy and which would prevent him from making bad laws2 just as the democrat will not submit--if we may adopt the terminology of ,aristotle--to being governed by laws1 to be governed that is by an ancient body of law which would check the people and obstruct it in its daily fabrication of decrees2 so just in the same spirit the democrat does not admit of a ,god ,who has issued ,his commandments1 ,who has issued ,his body of laws1 anterior and superior to all the laws and all the decrees of men1 and ,who sets ,his limit on the legislative eccentricities of the people1 on its capricious omnipotence1 in a word1 on the sovereignty of the people4 ,after ,sedan1 ,bismarck was asked3 ,now that ,napoleon has fallen1 on whom do you make war8 ,he replied3 ,on ,louis ,,xiv4 ,so the democrat questioned on his atheism could reply3 ,i am warring against ,moses4 ,this is the origin of the atheism of democrats and schoolmasters4 ,this is the origin of the formula3 ,neither ,god nor ,master1 which for the anarchist requires no correction nor supplement1 which for the democrat has only to be modified3 ,neither ,god nor ,master1 save the ,people4 ,at the end of one of his great political speeches in #ahdi or #ahej1 ,victor ,hugo said3 ,in the future there will only be two powers2 the ,people and ,god4 ,the modern democrat has persuaded himself that if there be a ,god1 the sovereignty of the people is infringed1 if he believe in ,him4 ,lastly1 the school teacher is confirmed in his democratic sentiments1 in all his democratic sentiments1 by the political position which has been made for him in ,france4 ,it is a strange thing1 a disconcerting anomaly1 that the ,governments of the nineteenth century 7especially1 we must do it this justice1 the present ,government71 have very handsomely respected the liberty of professors of higher education1 and of secondary education1 and have not in the very slightest degree respected the liberty of the teachers of elementary education4 ,the professor of higher education1 especially since #ahgj1 can teach exactly what he pleases1 except immorality and contempt of our country and its laws4 ,he can even discuss our laws1 provided always that he maintains the principle that1 such as they are1 they ought to be obeyed till they are repealed4 ,his liberty as to his opinions political1 social and religious is complete4 ,it is only occasionally constrained by the disorderly demonstrations of his students4 ,the professor of secondary education enjoys a liberty almost equally wide4 ,he is subject1 but only in an extremely liberal fashion1 to a programme or syllabus of studies4 ,as to the spirit in which he conducts his work he is practically never molested4 ,he is given a free hand4 ,nor has it ever occurred to any ,government to ask a professor of higher and secondary education how he votes at political elections1 still less to require him to canvass in favour of the candidates agreeable to the ,government4 ,when1 however1 we pass to elementary education we see everything is changed4 ,the elementary teacher is not appointed by his natural chief1 the recteur or ,minister of ,public ,education1 he is appointed by the prefet1 that is by the ,minister of the ,interior1 the political head of the ,government4 ,in other words1 this is the same process as the appointment of officials by the people1 described a few pages back1 but with one intermediary the less4 ,it is pre-eminently the ,minister of the ,interior who represents the political will of the nation at any given date4 ,and it is the ,minister of the ,interior who through his prefets appoints the elementary school teacher4 ,it is then the political will of the nation which chooses the school teachers4 ,it would be impossible to convey to them more clearly 7which is only fair1 for people should be made to understand their duties7 that they are chosen for considerations of politics and that they ought to consider themselves as political agents4 ,and indeed they are nothing else1 or perhaps we should say they are something else but above all they are politicians4 ,the schoolteachers depend on the prefets and the prefets depend much on the deputies1 yet it is not the deputies who appoint them1 but it is they who can remove them1 who can get them promoted or disgraced1 who by constant removals can reduce them to destitution4 ,surely1 every candid person will exclaim1 given the difficult and scandalous situation in which they are put by the hand which appoints them1 they ought at least to have the guarantee and assurance1 very relative and ineffectual though it be1 of irremovability4 ,but they have not got it4 ,the professors of higher education who do not require it have got it1 the professors of secondary education have it to all intents and purposes4 ,the elementary school teacher has it not4 ,he is1 therefore1 delivered over to the politicians who make of him an electioneering agent1 who reckon him as such1 and who would never pardon him if he failed them4 ,the result is that the majority of school teachers are demagogues because they like it1 and with magnificent enthusiasm and passion4 ,the minority who have no turn for demagogy are demagogues though they do not like it1 and because they are forced by necessity4 ,even those who have no disposition that way become demagogues in the end1 for that is the way of the world4 ,in the heat of the melee1 said ,augier1 there are no mercenaries4 ,our school teachers1 thrown1 sometimes against their will1 into the battle1 forced at least to appear to be fighting1 receive knocks and when they have received them1 they become attached to the cause on whose behalf they have suffered4 ,we always end by having the opinions which are attributed to us1 and being taken for a demagogue the moment he arrives at his village1 the young school teacher1 not daring to say anything to the contrary1 and being very ill received by all other parties1 naturally becomes a demagogue with some show of conviction the very next year4 99 99 99 99 99 ,so the democracy receives no instruction that does not confirm and strengthen it in its errors4 ,for its good some one ought to teach it not to believe itself omnipotent1 to have scruples as to its omnipotence1 and to believe that this omnipotence should have defined limits2 it is taught without reserve the dogma of the unlimited sovereignty of the people4 ,for its good it should believe that equality is so contrary to nature that we have no right to torture nature in order to establish real equality among men1 and that the people which has established such a state of things1 which is quite possible1 must succumb to the fate of those who try to live exactly in opposition to the laws of nature4 ,instead1 it is taught1 and it is true enough1 that equality is not possible1 if it is not complete1 if it is not thorough1 that it ought to be applied to differences of fortune1 social position1 intelligence1 perhaps even to our stature and personal appearance1 and that no effort should be spared to bring all things to one absolute level4 ,for its good1 since it is natural enough that it should dislike heavy taxation1 sentiments of patriotism should be reinforced2 it is taught on the contrary that military service is a painful legacy left by a hateful and barbarous past1 and that it ought to disappear very soon before the warming rays of a peaceful civilisation4 ,in a word1 to use again the language of ,aristotle1 the pure wine of democracy is poured out to the people as it was by the demagogues to the ,athenians2 and from the quarter whence a remedy might have been expected there come only incitements to deeper intoxication4 ,aristotle has made yet another wise and profound observation on the question of equality3 ,we must establish equality1 he said1 in the passions rather than in the fortunes of men4 ,and he adds3 ,and this equality can only be the fruit of education derived from the influence of good laws4 ,that is indeed the point4 ,education should have but one object2 to reduce the passions to equality1 or rather to equanimity1 and to a certain equilibrium of mind4 ,the education given to modern democracy does not lead to this1 but leads in the opposite direction4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,the ,,dream4 ,what remedies can we apply to this modern disease1 the worship of intellectual and moral incompetence8 ,what is1 as ,m4 ,fouillee puts it1 the best way of avoiding the hidden rocks which threaten democracies8 ,it is hard to say1 for we have to do with an evil which can only be cured by itself1 with an evil which is more than content with itself4 ,m4 ,fouillee 7in the ,revue des ,deux ,mondes of ,november1 #aiji7 proposes an aristocratic ,upper ,chamber1 that is to say1 one that would represent all the competence of the country1 inasmuch as it would be appointed by everything which is based on some particular form of excellence1 the magistracy1 the army1 the university1 the chambers of commerce1 and so on4 ,nothing could be better2 but the consent of the democracy would be necessary1 and it is precisely these incorporations of efficiency that the democracy cannot abide1 looking on them1 not without reason1 as being in a sense aristocracies4 ,he proposes also an energetic intervention on the part of the ,state to restore public morality1 action for the suppression of alcoholism1 gambling and pornography4 ,beyond the fact that his argument savours of reaction1 for it recalls to us the programme of moral order of #ahgc1 we must remark1 as indeed ,m4 ,fouillee himself acknowledges1 that the democratic ,state can hardly afford to kill the thing which enables it to live1 to destroy its principal source of revenue4 ,democracy1 as its most authoritative representatives have admitted1 is not a cheap form of government4 ,it has always been instituted with the hope1 and partly with the expressed design1 of being an economical government1 and it has always been ruinous1 because it requires a much larger number of partisans than other forms of government1 and a smaller number of malcontents than other forms of government1 and these partisans have to be remunerated in one fashion or another and the malcontents have to be silenced and bought in one way or another4 ,democracy1 whether ancient or modern1 lives always in terror of tyrants who are always imminent or thought by it to be imminent4 ,against this possible tyrant who would govern with an energetic minority1 the democracy requires an immense majority which it has to bind to it by the grant of many favours2 it has also to detach from this tyrant the malcontents who would be his supporters if it did not disarm them by a still more lavish distribution of favours4 ,democracy requires therefore plenty of money4 ,it will find this by despoiling the wealthy as much as possible2 but this is a very limited source of revenue1 for the wealthy are not a numerous class4 ,it will find it more easily1 more abundantly also1 by exploiting the vices of all1 for all is a very numerous group4 ,hence the complaisance shown to drinking shops1 which1 as ,m4 ,fouillee remarks1 it would be more dangerous for the ,government to close than to close the churches4 ,as the needs of the ,government increase1 as ,m4 ,fouillee predicts1 without much doubt it will claim a monopoly in houses of ill-fame and in the publication of indecent literature2 enterprises in which there would be money4 ,and after all1 tolerating such things for the profit of certain traders and annexing them to be worked for the profit of the ,state1 is surely much the same thing from a moral point of view4 ,and the financial operation would be much more beneficent in the second case than in the first4 ,m4 ,fouillee also argues that reform must come from above and not from below1 and that the movement for regeneration can come from above and not from below4 ,i ask nothing better1 but ,i ask also how is it going to be done8 ,inasmuch as everything depends upon the people1 who1 what1 can influence the people except the people itself8 ,everything depends on the people1 by what then can it be moved except by a force that is innate4 ,we are here confronted--we are talking to a philosopher and can make use of scientific terms--with a ,kinetes akinetos with a motive force which causes but does not receive motives4 ,a principle has disappeared1 a prejudice if you like to call it so1 the prejudice in favour of competence4 ,we no longer think that the man who understands how to do a thing ought to be doing that thing1 or ought to be chosen to do it4 ,hence1 not only is everything mismanaged1 but it seems impossible by any device to handle the matter effectually4 ,we see no solution4 ,nietzsche really has a horror of democracy2 only like all energetic pessimists1 who are not mere triflers1 he used to say from time to time3 ,there are pessimists who are resigned and cowardly4 ,we do not wish to be like them4 ,when he would not take this view he persuaded himself to look at democracy through rose-coloured spectacles4 ,at times1 looking at the matter from an aesthetic point of view1 he used to say3 ,intercourse with the people is as indispensable and refreshing as the contemplation of vigorous and healthy vegetation1 and although this is in flagrant contradiction to all he has elsewhere said of the bestial flock and the inhabitants of the swamp1 the thought has a certain amount of sense in it4 ,it signifies that instinct is a force1 and that every force must be interesting to study2 and further that1 as such1 it contains an active virtue1 a principle of life1 a nucleus of growth4 ,this1 though vaguely expressed1 is very possible4 ,after all the crowd is only powerful by reason of numbers1 and because it has been decided that numbers shall decide4 ,it is an expedient2 but an expedient cannot impart force to a thing that had it not before4 ,motive power1 initiative1 belongs to the man who has a plan1 who makes his combination to achieve it1 who perseveres and is patient and does not relinquish pursuit4 ,if he is eliminated and reduced to impotence or to a minimum of usefulness1 one does not see how the crowd1 without him1 can obtain its power of initiation4 ,further explanation is needed4 ,at another time1 ,nietzsche asks whether we ought not to respect the right1 which after all belongs to the multitude1 to direct itself according to an ideal--there are of course many ideals--and according to the ideal which is its own4 ,ought we to refuse to the masses the right to search out truth for themselves1 the right to believe that they have found it when they come upon a faith that seems to them vital1 a faith that is to them as their very life8 ,the masses are the foundation on which all humanity rests1 the basis of all culture4 ,deprived of them1 what would become of the masters8 ,it is to their interest that the masses should be happy4 ,let us be patient2 let us grant to our insurgent slaves1 our masters for the moment1 the enjoyment of illusions which seem favourable to them4 ,so ,nietzsche argues1 but more often1 for he returns on various occasions to this idea1 led thereto by his customary aristocratic leanings1 he speaks of democracy as of a form of decadence1 as a necessary prelude to an aristocracy of the future4 ,a high civilisation can only be built upon a wide expanse of territory1 upon a healthy and firmly consolidated mediocrity4 ,so he wrote in #ahhg4 ,ten years earlier he held that slavery had been the necessary condition of the high civilisation of ,greece and ,rome4 ,the only end1 therefore1 which at present1 provisionally of course but still for a long time to come1 we have to expect1 must be the decadence of mankind--general decadence to a level mediocrity1 for it is necessary to have a wide foundation on which a race of strong men can be reared4 ,the decadence of the ,european is the great process which we cannot hinder1 which we ought rather to accelerate4 ,it is the active cause at work which gives us hope of seeing the rise of a stronger race1 a race which will possess in abundance those same qualities which are lacking to the degenerate vanishing species1 strength of will1 responsibility1 self-reliance1 the power of concentration4444 ,but how1 out of this mediocrity of the crowd1 a mediocrity which1 as ,nietzsche says1 is always increasing1 by what process natural or artificial can a new and superior race be created8 ,nietzsche seems to be recalling the theory1 very disrespectful and very devoid of filial piety1 by which ,renan sought to explain his own genius4 ,a long line of obscure ancestors1 he says1 has economised for me a store of intellectual energy1 and he jots down in his note book certain suggestions1 a little immature but still emitting a ray of light4 ,it is absurd1 he says1 to imagine that this victory or survival of values 7that is low values1 values1 that is1 that seem to be mediocrity7 can be antibiological3 we must look for an explanation in the fact that they are probably of some vital importance to the maintenance of the type 'man' in the event of its being threatened by a preponderance of the feeble-minded and degenerate4 ,perhaps if things went otherwise1 man would now be an extinct animal4 ,the elevation of type is dangerous for the preservation of the species4 ,why8 ,strong races are wasteful1 we find ourselves here confronted with a problem of economy4 ,we perceive1 in this train of reasoning1 some inkling of what ,nietzsche is trying to formulate as his solution of the difficulty4 ,what is needed must be a natural process1 a vis medicatrix naturae4 ,in the process of declining and falling1 races practise a sort of thrift2 they save and they economise4 ,then1 if we may suppose that the quantity of energy of intellectual and moral power1 i4e41 of human values at the disposal of the race is constant1 the races that so act are creating in themselves a reserve which one day will irresistibly take shape in a chosen class4 ,they are creating in their own bosom an elite which will one day emerge1 they have conceived all unconsciously an aristocracy which will one day be born to be their ruler4 ,we always find in ,nietzsche the theory of ,schopenhauer1 the theory of the great deceiver who leads the human race by the nose and who makes it do and1 as if it liked it1 that which it would never do if it knew where it was being led4 ,it is very possible2 still it remains that economy carried to an extreme1 though it can lead to a reserve of force1 may also lead1 and perhaps much more surely1 to a condition of anaemia2 the annihilation of one set of competent people in order to prepare the way for races of competent people in the future1 ,i do not know if this is a game inspired by the great deceiver1 but it is a game which to me appears dangerous4 ,we ought to be sure 7and who is sure87 that the great deceiver does not abandon those who abandon themselves4 ,i have often said1 without thinking of any metaphysical mythology1 thinking indeed of the ambitious people whom we meet everywhere1 and thinking only of giving them some good advice3 ,the best way to get there is to come down4 ,nothing could be more philosophical1 ,nietzsche would reply2 it is even more true of peoples than of individuals3 the best way for peoples to become one day great is to begin by growing smaller4 ,i rather doubt it4 ,there is no really solid reason to support the theory that feebleness cultivated with perseverance results in strength4 ,neither ,greece nor ,rome supply examples1 nor did the democratic republic of ,athens nor the democratic ,caesarism of ,rome ever succeed in giving birth to an aristocracy of competence by a prolonged economy of values4 --,they did not have the time4-- ,ah yes1 there is always that to be said4 ,it would perhaps be better to try to put the brake on democracy than to encourage this process of degeneration on the chance of a favourable resurrection4 ,at least this is the course which presents itself most naturally to our mind1 and which seems most consonant with duty4 ,when ,i say put the brake on democracy1 it must be understood that ,i mean that it should put the brake on itself1 for nothing else can stop it1 when once it has made up its mind4 ,it must be persuaded or left alone1 and even persuasion is a rash experiment1 for it dislikes being persuaded of anything but of its own omnipotence4 ,it must be persuaded or left alone1 for every other method would be still more useless4 ,it must be reminded that forms of government perish from the abandonment and also from the exaggeration of the principle from which their merit is derived1 though this is a very superannuated maxim2 that they perish by an abandonment of their principle because that principle is the historical reason of their coming into existence1 and they perish by carrying their principle to excess1 because there is no such thing as a principle that is absolutely good and sufficient in itself for regulating the complexity of the social machine4 ,what do we understand by the principle of a government8 ,it is not that which makes it be such and such a thing1 but that which makes it act in a particular way1 as ,montesquieu has remarked2 that is1 the human passions which supply the motive forces of life4 ,it is clear then that the passion for sovereignty1 for equality1 for incompetence1 is not sufficient to give to a government a life which is at once complete and strong4 ,it is necessary to give to competence its part1 or rather it is necessary to give competence one part1 for ,i do not wish to argue that there is any question of right involved1 ,i only affirm that it is a social necessity4 ,it is necessary that competence1 technical1 intellectual1 moral competence should be assigned its part to play1 even though the sovereignty of the people should be limited and the principle of equality be somewhat abridged thereby4 ,a democratic element is essentially necessary to a people1 an aristocratic element also is essentially necessary to a people4 ,a democratic element is essentially necessary to a people in order that the people should not feel itself to be a mere onlooker1 but should realise that it is a part and an important part of the body social1 and that the words ,you are the nation1 defend it1 have a meaning4 ,otherwise the argument of the anti-patriot demagogues would be just4 ,what is the good of fighting for one set of masters against another set1 since it will make no difference1 only a change of masters8 ,a democratic element is required in the government of a people1 because it is very dangerous that the people should be an enigma4 ,it is necessary to know what it thinks1 what it feels1 what it suffers1 what it desires1 what it fears1 and what it hopes1 and as this can only be learnt from the people itself1 it is necessary that it should have a voice which can make itself heard4 ,this should be done in one way or another1 either by a ,chamber of its own which should be endowed with great authority1 or by the presence in a single chamber of a considerable number of representatives of the people1 or by plebiscites constitutionally instituted as necessary for the revision of the constitution and for laws of universal interest1 or by the liberty of the press and the liberty of association and public meeting4 ,this would not perhaps be enough1 but it would be almost enough4 ,it is necessary that the people should be able to make known its wants1 and to influence the decisions of the ,government1 in a word its voice should be heard and considered4 ,an aristocratic element is also necessary in a nation and in the government of a nation so that all that admits of precision shall not be smothered by that which is confused2 so that what is exact shall not be obscured by what is vague1 and so that its firm resolves shall not be shaken by vacillating and incoherent caprice4 ,sometimes history itself makes an aristocracy--a fortunate circumstance for a nation6 ,this forms a caste more or less exclusive1 it has traditions1 traditions more conservative of the laws than the laws themselves1 and it embodies in itself all that there is of life1 and energy and growth in the soul of a people4 ,sometimes history has failed to give us an aristocracy or that which history has made has disappeared4 ,it is then that the people ought to draw one out of itself1 it is then its duty to appropriate and preserve the high qualities to be found in men who have rendered service to the ,state or whose ancestors have rendered service to the ,state1 who have special qualifications for each particular office and a moral efficiency for every form of public service4 ,these qualities constitute the acquired aptitude of an aristocracy for taking a part in the government2 these qualities constitute its adaptation to its social environment1 and to its special function in our social machinery and organisation4 ,one might say that it is by these qualities that it enters into and becomes part of the organism of which it is the material4 ,as ,john ,stuart ,mill has justly remarked1 there cannot be an expert1 well-managed democracy if democracy will not allow the expert to do the work which he alone can do4 ,what is wanted then and will always be wanted1 even under socialism where1 as ,i pointed out1 there will still be an aristocracy though a more numerous one1 is a blending of democracy and aristocracy2 and here1 though he wrote a long time ago1 we shall find ,aristotle is always right for he studied in a scientific spirit some hundred and fifty different constitutions4 ,he is an aristocrat1 without concealment1 as we have seen1 but his final conclusions1 whether he is speaking of ,lacedaemon1 which he did not like1 or of ,carthage1 or in general terms1 have always been in favour of mixed constitutions as ever the best4 ,there is1 he says1 a manner of combining democracy and aristocracy--which consists in so arranging matters that both the distinguished citizens and the masses have what they want4 ,the right of every man to aspire to magisterial appointments is a democratic principle1 but the admission of distinguished citizens only is an aristocratic principle4 ,this blending of democracy and aristocracy makes a good constitution1 but the union must not be one of mere juxtaposition which would serve only to put hostile elements within striking distance4 ,i said a blending but the blending must be a real fusion4 ,our need is that in the management of public business aristocracy and democracy should be combined4 ,how8 ,well for many years ,i have been saying it and ,i hope ,i may live for many years longer to say it again4 ,a healthy nation is one in which the aristocracy is demophil1 that is a lover of the people1 and where the people is aristocratic in its leanings4 ,every people where the aristocracy is aristocratic and where the democracy is democratic is a people destined to perish promptly1 because it does not understand what a people is1 it has not got beyond the stage of knowing what is a class and perhaps not even as far as that4 ,montesquieu praises highly the ,athenians and the ,romans for the following reason4 ,at ,rome1 although the people had the right of elevating plebeians to office1 it could never bring itself to elect them2 and although at ,athens1 it could by the law of ,aristides1 choose magistrates from all classes1 it never happened according to ,xenophon1 that the lower people demanded the election of rulers who could injure its safety and its glory4 ,the two instances are identical2 only1 as far as ,athens is concerned1 it signifies nothing1 for at ,athens everything was decided by plebiscite and in consequence the real rulers of ,athens were the orators1 in whom the people trusted1 who enforced their decisions and really governed the city4 ,at ,rome the fact is of great importance for it was the elected magistrates who governed4 ,republican ,rome was indeed a country aristocratically governed which had1 however1 a democratic element in its constitution1 and this democratic element1 up to the time of the civil wars1 was itself profoundly aristocratic1 just as the aristocracy which was always open to an accession of members from the plebs was profoundly demophil4 ,the institution of patron and client1 even in the state of degeneracy which overtook it1 is a phenomenon which ,i believe is well-nigh unique4 ,it shows to what extent two classes felt the social necessity1 the patriotic necessity of mutual support and of a recognition of an identity of interest4 ,a nation whose people is aristocratic and whose aristocracy is demophil is a healthy nation4 ,rome succeeded in the world because for five hundred years she enjoyed this social health4 ,an aristocratic people and a people-loving aristocracy4 ,i had long believed the formula was of my own invention4 ,i have just discovered1 and ,i am in no way surprised1 that ,aristotle was before me4 ,he quotes the oath which oligarchs take in certain cities4 ,i swear to be always the enemy of the people and never to counsel any thing that ,i do not know to be injurious to them4 ,this1 he continues1 is the very opposite of what they ought to do or to pretend to do 444 ,it is a political fault which is often committed in oligarchies as well as in democracies1 and where the multitude has control of the laws1 the demagogues make this mistake4 ,in their combat against the rich1 they always divide the ,state into two opposing parties4 ,in a democracy1 on the contrary1 the ,government should profess to speak for the rich1 and in oligarchies it should profess to speak in favour of the people4 ,it is a ,machiavelian counsel4 ,aristotle seems convinced that democrats can only profess to speak for the rich and that all we can expect from oligarchs is an appearance of speaking in favour of the people4 ,nevertheless he recognises clearly that for the peace and well-being of the commonwealth such should be their attitude4 ,there is something more profound than this4 ,aristocrats ought not only to appear but to be verily favourable to the demos1 if they understand the interests of aristocracy itself1 for aristocracy requires a base4 ,democrats also ought not only to appear but to be aristocratic if they understand the interests of democracy which requires a guide4 ,this reciprocity of good offices1 this reciprocity of devotion1 and this combination of effort are as necessary in modern as they were in ancient republics4 ,it is1 and we must coin a word to express it1 a social synergy that is wanted4 ,a union of all the vitalizing elements is as necessary in society as in the family4 ,every family that is divided must perish1 every kingdom that is divided must perish4 ,i have said little of royalty which only indirectly concerns my subject4 ,if we have seen instances of the institution of royalty firmly established1 it is where the sentiment of royalty1 appealing at once both to the aristocracy and to the people1 has realised that synergy of the whole community of which we speak2 it is where both1 being united in devotion to one object1 are led to be devoted to each other by reason of this convergence of their wills4 ,eadem velle1 eadem nolle amicitia est4 ,there is no need of royalty for this4 ,royalty is our country itself personified in one man4 ,in the identification of country and kingdom1 we can and must arrive at this same union of the separate vitalities of the nation1 at this same community and convergence of will4 ,the humble must love their country in loving the great and the great must love their country in loving the humble2 and so all classes must be at one in their hopes and in their fears4 ,amicitia sit6 ,,index4 ,abbeville1 #aae ,abolition of ,inheritance1 #bjj1 #bjc ,academies1 #bg ,america1 #agj ,amoeba1 #ae et seq4 ,antisthenes1 #acb ,aristides1 law of1 #bcb ,aristocracy1 #cf1 #ij1 #acg1 #aei ---- aptitude for government1 #bcj ---- constitution which obeys laws1 #hh ---- demophil1 #b1 #bcb1 #bcc ---- education under1 #aij ---- and examination system1 #agf ---- fusion with democracy1 #bca-bcc ---- impossible without merit1 #ca ---- old men under1 #adg ---- of ,parliament1 #agb ---- permanent senators form1 #eh ---- and religion1 #bje1 #bjg ---- result of indirect election1 #ai ----- and special jurisdictions1 #ih ,aristophanes1 #abf1 #aej ,aristotle1 #ad1 #af1 #ca1 #gj1 #gh1 #he1 #hh1 #abi1 #aca1 #acd-acf1 #aec1 #bjh1 #bae1 #bca1 #bcd1 #bce ,arrondissement1 #dd ---- scrutin d'1 #hc ,atheism1 #bjg1 #bjh ,athens1 #ag1 #ca1 #cg1 #hc1 #aac1 #adi1 #afc1 #bbf1 #bcb ,augier1 #bac ,austria1 #di ,barthelemy1 ,abbe1 #aeg ,barthou1 ,m41 #i1 #aah ,belgium1 #agj ,bismarck1 #bji ,bonald1 #bja ,brunetiere1 #ahh ,busiris1 #aae ,calas1 #aae ,carnot1 #ic ,carthage1 #af1 #bca ,caucus1 #f ,chamber of ,deputies1 #dd1 #aah1 #agb-agd ,charlemagne1 #adi ,charondas1 #hg ,church1 the1 #ih1 #bjf ,cicero1 #gj ---- de ,senectute1 #adi ,civility1 #aef et seq4 ,civil ,service1 the1 appointments to1 #de-ea ---- examinations for1 #agf et seq4 ,clergy1 the1 #afi ,code1 the1 #ge1 #gf1 #afc ,colbert1 #dc ,collectivism1 #bjj-bjc ,communism1 #bjj ,competence par collation1 #ai1 #bb ,competitive examination1 #age et seq4 ,conciliation ,boards1 #ig ,concordat1 #bjf ,constitution of #ahgc1 #eg ---- mixed1 #bca ,co-optation1 #agf ,cour de ,cassation1 #eg1 #aja1 #ajh1 #agf ,court of ,appeal1 #eg1 #ajg ,courts1 ecclesiastical1 #ih ---- martial1 #ih ,criminal procedure1 #hc ---- jurisdiction1 #ii ,dandin1 #ahd ,dandino-mania1 #ahd ,decadence1 #bbb1 #bbc ,decrees1 #hd1 #ia1 #bjh1 #bji ,demagogues1 #he1 #aia1 #bac ,democracy1 ,aristotle on1 #abi-acf ---- ,athenian1 #ag ---- children under1 #adb-adf ---- and direct government1 #cg et seq4 ,democracy1 encouragement of incompetence under1 #cj1 #ib1 #abf ---- ,english1 #agj ---- evolution of a modern1 #ah et seq4 ---- fusion with aristocracy1 #bca-bce ---- governed by decrees1 #cd1 #ia ---- and imperative mandate1 #cb ---- lack of respect under1 #aeh-afa ---- legislation under1 #ff1 #gi-ha ---- magistrature1 #aaj-abb ---- ,montesquieu on1 #acg-aci ---- morality under1 #aci ---- ,nietzsche on1 #bbj-bbf ---- old men under1 #adf-aec ---- ,plato on1 #abg-abi ---- and politicians1 #cd1 #cf ---- position of women under1 #adj-adb ---- principle of1 #ad1 #ae ---- and private enterprise1 #ei-fa ---- and reform1 #baf-bai ---- ,rousseau on1 #acf1 #acg ---- and schoolmasters1 #aia-bae ---- and socialism1 #fa-fe ---- and special jurisdictions1 #ih1 #ii ,demos1 #ef1 #hf ,demosthenes1 #hb ,deputy1 #ee1 #agd ---- mayors1 #aai ,despotism1 principle of1 #ab ---- tendency of democracy towards1 #fb1 #fe1 #if ,d',etalonde1 #aae ,diderot1 #bjg ,division of labour1 #ae ---- ---- in domestic life1 #ada ,divorce1 #abe ,germans1 #fg ,gerontocracy1 #adf1 #aec ,gladstone1 ,mr41 #c1 #e ,goncourt1 #bja ,greece1 #bbb1 #bbf ,greeks1 #ga1 #gc1 #hg ,greek philosophers1 #abf ,holbach1 #bjg ,homer1 #ef ,horace1 #aeb ,hugo1 ,victor1 #bji ,ideal legislator1 the1 #gi ,imperative mandate1 #cb1 #cc ,indirect election1 #ai ,inequalities1 artificial and natural1 #cj ,interpellation1 #hc ,italy1 #agj ,japy1 ,mme41 #aad ,jesuits in ,paraguay1 #fb ,joannes1 ,baron1 #fh ,judges1 appointment of1 #df1 #ajj-aab ---- interpretation of the law1 #afc ,juge de paix1 #aaa1 #aaf et seq4 ,jurisdiction1 criminal1 #ii ---- ecclesiastical1 #ig ---- military1 #ig ---- seignorial1 #ig ,jury1 the #aab-aae1 #afh1 #afi ,kant1 #aec ,la ,barre1 #aae ,lacedaemon1 #aej1 #bca ,law1 abolishing primogeniture1 #abd ---- abuse of1 #aaj ---- of competence1 #ig ---- and decrees1 #hd-ia ---- degree in1 #aaf ---- doctors of1 #ajh ---- ecclesiastical1 #abe ---- emergency1 #hb-hi ---- fundamental1 #hi ---- governs men1 #aba ---- of ,july #abth1 #aije1 #aag ---- made by the ideal legislator1 #fg-gd ---- made by the people1 #ag1 #ah1 #be1 #dj1 #aid-aif1 #bcd ---- must be ancient and unchanged1 #gg-gi ---- not the same for rich and poor1 #aii ---- permitting divorce1 #abe ---- of proportion1 #ad ---- questions of1 #aac1 #afb ---- of ,sunday observance1 #ge1 #gf ---- and tradition1 #bcj ,legal profession1 the1 #fj ,legislation1 ancient1 #hg ---- ,english1 #b1 #d ---- party1 #ha-hb ---- philanthropic1 #f ---- predatory1 #h ---- requires special knowledge1 #ah1 #fg ,legislator1 essential qualifications for1 #ff-ha ---- ,greek1 #gc ,lestranger1 ,m4 ,marcel1 #afd1 #aff ,liberty of association1 #aid1 #aif ,louis ,,xiv1 #ba1 #bb1 #aej1 #aie1 #bjd1 #bji ---- ,,xv1 #aej ---- ,,xvi1 #acc ,louvois1 #dc ,lycurgus1 #b1 #gc1 #hg ,lynching1 #afh1 #afi ,machiavel1 #ga ,machiavelian counsel1 #bcd ,magistracy1 hereditary system advocated for1 #aje1 #afc1 #afh ,magistrates1 election of1 #dh1 #ajj-aab ---- incompetence of1 #afd-afh ---- subservience to government1 #afc ,mayors1 #aag ,medical examinations1 #ahj ---- profession1 #fj ,mill1 ,john ,stuart1 #bcj ,minister of ,agriculture1 #id ---- of ,commerce1 #ib ---- of ,education1 #ib1 #baa ,minister of ,interior1 #baa ---- of ,justice1 #gf1 #aah-abj ---- of ,navy1 #ib ---- of ,war1 #ib1 #ic ,miscarriage of justice1 #afe ,monarchy1 old men under1 #adg ---- principle of1 #ab1 #fb1 #if ,montesquieu1 #d1 #ab1 #ad1 #bh1 #cg1 #dd-dg1 #ff-gj1 #gd-hi1 #ajc-aje1 #abc1 #acg1 #ach1 #aej-aef1 #aic1 #bbg1 #bcb ,moral effect of law1 #abe ---- order1 #bag ,morals1 high standard of1 #aej ---- laxity of1 #aee ---- private1 #aci1 #adj ---- public1 #abc1 #abd1 #aci ,more1 ,thomas1 #ga ,moses1 #fg1 #bji ,napoleon1 #ac1 #aje1 #bji ,nationalisation1 #fj ,nietzsche1 #adg1 #ahg1 #bbj-bbe ,oligarchy1 #fc1 #abh1 #adg ,olympiad1 #hg ,ostracism1 #acc ,paraguay1 #fb ,parental authority1 #adc ,parliament1 #agb ,party system under ,socialism1 #fa ,pascal1 #ajg1 #aeg ,patriotism1 #ab1 #bad ,peel1 ,sir ,r41 #c ,periander1 #acb ,peter the ,great1 #abd ,phaedo1 personification of laws in1 #hg ,plato1 #ga1 #aje1 #abf-abi1 #ach1 #adj1 #aec ,plautus1 #aej ,plebiscite1 #bd1 #agc ,pli ,professionnel1 ,le1 #afd ,pnyx1 the1 #cg ,politeness1 #aef et seq4 ,politician1 definition of1 #cd ---- democracy's need of1 #ce1 #ea ---- as schoolmaster1 #bab ,prefet1 #fb-ee1 #agc1 #bab ,president of the ,chamber1 #aaj ---- of the ,council1 #ic ---- of the ,republic1 #db1 #eg ,primogeniture1 #abd ,procureur-general1 #eb1 #ec1 #aai-abb ,proudhon1 #gc ,public officials1 appointment of1 #dc-ea ---- under ,socialism1 #bja ,purchase system1 the1 #ajc ,quinet1 ,edgar1 #ac ,rabelais1 #aae ,republic1 #ab1 #ac1 #gc ,renaissance1 #adi ,renan1 #bbc ,renouvier1 #ej ,revocation of the ,edict of ,nantes1 #bb ,rhedi1 #gh ,robespierre1 #bjg1 #bjh ,roman ,republic1 #ac1 #aac1 #bjd1 #bcc ,romans1 the1 #fh1 #hg1 #bcb ,rome1 #abd1 #adi1 #bbb1 #bbf1 #bcb-bcd ,rousseau1 #cb1 #gb1 #acf-ach1 #adi1 #aej1 #bjg1 #bjh ,royalty1 #acg1 #bhf ---- democratic1 #ah ,st4 ,cyr1 #agg ,st4 ,louis1 #gd ,schopenhauer1 #bbd ,scrutin de liste1 #hc1 #aab1 and note ---- d'arrondissement1 #hc ,senate1 #ch1 #eh1 #aag1 #aah1 #agb-age ,senators1 #ee1 #agb-age ---- irremovable1 #eg ,seneca1 #abi ,socialism1 #fa-fe1 #bca ,socrates1 #ah1 #hh ---- on democracy1 #add ,solon1 #fg1 #gc ,sovereignty of the ,people1 #dj1 #de1 #ef1 #agg1 #aid-aih1 #bjd-bji1 #bad ,specialisation of functions1 #ae-ah1 #ca ,special jurisdictions1 #ig1 #ih ,state control of children1 #add ---- ---- of magistrates1 #ajj1aja ---- ---- of private enterprise1 #fj-fa ---- danger of eminent man to1 #aca-acg ---- intervention to restore public morality1 #bag-bai ,state policy1 #aaj ---- services rendered to1 #bcj ---- within a ,state1 #aif ,steinheil case1 #aad ,suidas1 #ajc1 #aje ,sunday observance1 #ge ,sylla1 #gc ,synergy1 #bce1 #bcf ,terence1 #aej ,thrasybulus1 #acb ,toulouse1 #aae ,tyranny1 #ace ,universal suffrage1 #ba1 #agc-age ,university degrees1 #bj1 #aha-ahc ,upper chamber1 suggestions for strong1 #agd ,usbek1 #gh ,virtue1 civic1 #ad1 #ajc1 #ajd ---- the principle of a republic1 #ab1 #ac ,voltaire1 #ajc-aje1 #aaf ,women1 their position in a democracy1 #adj-adc ,xenophon1 #abf1 #bcc ,young man1 ,horace's description of1 #aeb ,printed by ,sherratt ,hughes1 ,london and ,manchester4