,note3  for this online edition ,i have 
moved the ,table of ,contents to the    
beginning of the text and slightly      
modified it to conform with the online  
format4 ,i have also made one spelling  
change3 ominiscient intelligence to     
omniscient intelligence4    ,,the       
,,sense ,,of ,,beauty  ,,being ,,the    
,,outlines ,,of ,,aesthetic ,,theory  by
  ,,george ,,santayana   ,,charles      
,,scribner',s ,,sons ,,new ,,york       
,,chicago ,,boston   ,,copyright1 #ahif1
 ,,by ,,charles ,,scribner',s ,,sons    
,printed in the ,united ,states of      
,america   ,,contents  ,preface         
,introduction  ,the ,methods of         
,aesthetics                             
#a-ac  ,part ,i4  ,the ,nature of       
,beauty  #a4 ,the philosophy of beauty  
is a theory of values                   
#ad  #b4 ,preference is ultimately      
irrational                              
#ah  #c4 ,contrast between moral and    
aesthetic values                        
#bh  #d4 ,work and play                 

#be  #e4 ,all values are in one sense   
aesthetic                               
#bh  #f4 ,aesthetic consecration of     
general principles                      
#ca  #g4 ,contrast of aesthetic and     
physical pleasures                      
#ce  #h4 ,the differentia of aesthetic  
pleasure not its disinterestedness   #cg
  #i4 ,the differentia of aesthetic     
pleasure not its universality        #dj
  #aj4 ,the differential of aesthetic   
pleasure3 its objectification     #dd   
#aa4 ,the definition of beauty          
#di  ,part ,,ii4  ,the ,materials of    
,beauty  #ab4 ,all human functions may  
contribute to the sense of beauty       
#ec  #ac4 ,the influence of the passion 
of love                            #ef  
#ad4 ,social instincts and their        
aesthetic influence                  #fb
  #ae4 ,the lower senses                
#fe  #af4 ,sound                        
#fh  #ag4 ,colour                       
#gb  #ah4 ,materials surveyed           
#gf  ,part ,,iii4  ,form  #ai4 ,there is

 a beauty of form                       
#hb  #bj4 ,physiology of the perception 
of form                            #he  
#ba4 ,values of geometrical figures     
#hh  #bb4 ,symmetry                     
#ia  #bc4 ,form the unity of a manifold 
#ie  #bd4 ,multiplicity in uniformity   
#ig  #be4 ,example of the stars         
#ajj  #bf4 ,defects of pure multiplicity
                                   #ajf 
#bg4 ,aesthetics of democracy           
#aaj  #bh4 ,values of types and values  
of examples                         #aab
  #bi4 ,origin of types                 
#aaf  #cj4 ,the average modified in the 
direction of pleasure              #aba 
#ca4 ,are all things beautiful8         
#abf  #cb4 ,effects of indeterminate    
form                                    
#aca  #cc4 ,example of landscape        
#acc  #cd4 ,extensions to objects       
usually not regarded aesthetically      
#ach  #ce4 ,further dangers of          
indeterminateness                       
#adb  #cf4 ,the illusion of infinite    

perfection                              
#adf  #cg4 ,organized nature the source 
of apperceptive forms              #aeb 
#ch4 ,utility the principle of          
organization in nature                  
#aee  #ci4 ,the relation of utility to  
beauty                              #aeg
  #dj4 ,utility the principle of        
organization in the arts                
#afj  #da4 ,form and adventitious       
ornament                                
#afc  #db4 ,syntactical form            
#afg  #db4 ,literary form4 ,the plot    
#aga  #dd4 ,character as an aesthetic   
form                                    
#agd  #de4 ,ideal characters            
#agf  #df4 ,the religious imagination   
#ahj  #dg4 ,preference is ultimately    
irrational                              
#ahe  ,part ,,iv4  ,expression  #dh4    
,expression defined                     
#aib  #di4 ,the associative process     
#aih  #ej4 ,kinds of value in the second
 term                              #bja 
#ea4 ,aesthetic value in the second term

                             #bje  #eb4 
,practical value in the same            
#bjh  #ec4 ,cost as an element of effect
                                   #baa 
#ed4 ,the expression of economy and     
fitness                          #bad   
#ee4 ,the authority of morals over      
aesthetics                        #bah  
#ef4 ,negative values in the second term
                             #bba  #eg4 
,influence of the first term in the     
pleasing expression of evil #bbf  #eh4  
,mixture of other expressions1 including
 that of truth          #bbh  #ei4 ,the 
liberation of self                      
#bcc  #fj4 ,the sublime independent of  
the expression of evil              #bci
  #fa4 ,the comic                       
#bde  #fb4 ,wit                         
#bej  #fc4 ,humour                      
#bec  #fd4 ,the grotesque               
#bef  #fe4 ,the possibility of finite   
perfection                              
#beh  #ff4 ,the stability of the ideal  
#bfc   #fg4 ,conclusion                 

#bff-bgj ,footnotes ,index              
#bga-bge    ,,preface  ,this little work
 contains the chief ideas gathered      
together for a course of lectures on the
 theory and history of aesthetics given 
at ,harvard ,college from #ahib to      
#ahie4 ,the only originality ,i can     
claim is that which may result from the 
attempt to put together the scattered   
commonplaces of criticism into a system1
 under the inspiration of a naturalistic
 psychology4 ,i have studied sincerity  
rather than novelty1 and if any subject1
 as for instance the excellence of      
tragedy1 is presented in a new light1   
the change consists only in the stricter
 application to a complex subject of the
 principles acknowledged to obtain in   
our simple judgments4 ,my effort        
throughout has been to recall those     
fundamental aesthetic feelings the      
orderly extension of which yields sanity
 of judgment and distinction of taste4  
,the influences under which the book has
 been written are rather too general and

 pervasive to admit of specification2   
yet the student of philosophy will not  
fail to perceive how much ,i owe to     
writers1 both living and dead1 to whom  
no honour could be added by my          
acknowledgments4 ,i have usually omitted
 any reference to them in foot-notes or 
in the text1 in order that the air of   
controversy might be avoided1 and the   
reader might be enabled to compare what 
is said more directly with the reality  
of his own experience4            ,g4   
,s4      ,september1 #aijf4             
,,introduction  ,the sense of beauty has
 a more important place in life than    
aesthetic theory has ever taken in      
philosophy4 ,the plastic arts1 with     
poetry and music1 are the most          
conspicuous monuments of this human     
interest1 because they appeal only to   
contemplation1 and yet have attracted to
 their service1 in all civilized ages1  
an amount of effort1 genius1 and honour1
 little inferior to that given to       
industry1 war1 or religion4 ,the fine   

arts1 however1 where aesthetic feeling  
appears almost pure1 are by no means the
 only sphere in which men show their    
susceptibility to beauty4 ,in all       
products of human industry we notice the
 keenness with which the eye is         
attracted to the mere appearance of     
things3 great sacrifices of time and    
labour are made to it in the most vulgar
 manufactures2 nor does man select his  
dwelling1 his clothes1 or his companions
 without reference to their effect on   
his aesthetic senses4 ,of late we have  
even learned that the forms of many     
animals are due to the survival by      
sexual selection of the colours and     
forms most attractive to the eye4 ,there
 must therefore be in our nature a very 
radical and wide-spread tendency to     
observe beauty1 and to value it4 ,no    
account of the principles of the mind   
can be at all adequate that passes over 
so conspicuous a faculty4  ,that        
aesthetic theory has received so little 
attention from the world is not due to  

the unimportance of the subject of which
 it treats1 but rather to lack of an    
adequate motive for speculating upon it1
 and to the small success of the        
occasional efforts to deal with it4     
,absolute curiosity1 and love of        
comprehension for its own sake1 are not 
passions we have much leisure to        
indulge3 they require not only freedom  
from affairs but1 what is more rare1    
freedom from prepossessions and from the
 hatred of all ideas that do not make   
for the habitual goal of our thought4   
,now1 what has chiefly maintained such  
speculation as the world has seen has   
been either theological passion or      
practical use4 ,all we find1 for        
example1 written about beauty may be    
divided into two groups3 that group of  
writings in which philosophers have     
interpreted aesthetic facts in the light
 of their metaphysical principles1 and  
made of their theory of taste a         
corollary or footnote to their systems2 
and that group in which artists and     

critics have ventured into philosophic  
ground1 by generalizing somewhat the    
maxims of the craft or the comments of  
the sensitive observer4 ,a treatment of 
the subject at once direct and theoretic
 has been very rare3 the problems of    
nature and morals have attracted the    
reasoners1 and the description and      
creation of beauty have absorbed the    
artists2 between the two reflection upon
 aesthetic experience has remained      
abortive or incoherent4  ,a circumstance
 that has also contributed to the       
absence or to the failure of aesthetic  
speculation is the subjectivity of the  
phenomenon with which it deals4 ,man has
 a prejudice against himself3 anything  
which is a product of his mind seems to 
him to be unreal or comparatively       
insignificant4 ,we are satisfied only   
when we fancy ourselves surrounded by   
objects and laws independent of our     
nature4 ,the ancients long speculated   
about the constitution of the universe  
before they became aware of that mind   

which is the instrument of all          
speculation4 ,the moderns1 also1 even   
within the field of psychology1 have    
studied first the function of perception
 and the theory of knowledge1 by which  
we seem to be informed about external   
things2 they have in comparison         
neglected the exclusively subjective and
 human department of imagination and    
emotion4 ,we have still to recognize in 
practice the truth that from these      
despised feelings of ours the great     
world of perception derives all its     
value1 if not also its existence4       
,things are interesting because we care 
about them1 and important because we    
need them4 ,had our perceptions no      
connexion with our pleasures1 we should 
soon close our eyes on this world2 if   
our intelligence were of no service to  
our passions1 we should come to doubt1  
in the lazy freedom of reverie1 whether 
two and two make four4  ,yet so strong  
is the popular sense of the unworthiness
 and insignificance of things purely    

emotional1 that those who have taken    
moral problems to heart and felt their  
dignity have often been led into        
attempts to discover some external right
 and beauty of which1 our moral and     
aesthetic feelings should be perceptions
 or discoveries1 just as our            
intellectual activity is1 in men's      
opinion1 a perception or discovery of   
external fact4 ,these philosophers seem 
to feel that unless moral and aesthetic 
judgments are expressions of objective  
truth1 and not merely expressions of    
human nature1 they stand condemned of   
hopeless triviality4 ,a judgment is not 
trivial1 however1 because it rests on   
human feelings2 on the contrary1        
triviality consists in abstraction from 
human interests2 only those judgments   
and opinions are truly insignificant    
which wander beyond the reach of        
verification1 and have no function in   
the ordering and enriching of life4     
,both ethics and aesthetics have        
suffered much from the prejudice against

 the subjective4 ,they have not suffered
 more because both have a subject-matter
 which is partly objective4 ,ethics     
deals with conduct as much as with      
emotion1 and therefore considers the    
causes of events and their consequences 
as well as our judgments of their value4
 ,esthetics also is apt to include the  
history and philosophy of art1 and to   
add much descriptive and critical matter
 to the theory of our susceptibility to 
beauty4 ,a certain confusion is thereby 
introduced into these inquiries1 but at 
the same time the discussion is         
enlivened by excursions into            
neighbouring provinces1 perhaps more    
interesting to the general reader4  ,we 
may1 however1 distinguish three distinct
 elements of ethics and aesthetics1 and 
three different ways of approaching the 
subject4 ,the first is the exercise of  
the moral or aesthetic faculty itself1  
the actual pronouncing of judgment and  
giving of praise1 blame1 and precept4   
,this is not a matter of science but of 

character1 enthusiasm1 niceness of      
perception1 and fineness of emotion4 ,it
 is aesthetic or moral activity1 while  
ethics and aesthetics1 as sciences1 are 
intellectual activities1 having that    
aesthetic or moral activity for their   
subject-matter4  ,the second method     
consists in the historical explanation  
of conduct or of art as a part of       
anthropology1 and seeks to discover the 
conditions of various types of          
character1 forms of polity1 conceptions 
of justice1 and schools of criticism and
 of art4 ,of this nature is a great deal
 of what has been written on aesthetics4
 ,the philosophy of art has often proved
 a more tempting subject than the       
psychology of taste1 especially to minds
 which were not so much fascinated by   
beauty itself as by the curious problem 
of the artistic instinct in man and of  
the diversity of its manifestations in  
history4  ,the third method in ethics   
and aesthetics is psychological1 as the 
other two are respectively didactic and 

historical4 ,it deals with moral and    
aesthetic judgments as phenomena of mind
 and products of mental evolution4 ,the 
problem here is to understand the origin
 and conditions of these feelings and   
their relation to the rest of our       
economy4 ,such an inquiry1 if pursued   
successfully1 would yield an            
understanding of the reason why we think
 anything right or beautiful1 wrong or  
ugly1 it would thus reveal the roots of 
conscience and taste in human nature and
 enable us to distinguish transitory    
preferences and ideals1 which rest on   
peculiar conditions1 from those which1  
springing from those elements of mind   
which all men share1 are comparatively  
permanent and universal4  ,to this      
inquiry1 as far as it concerns          
aesthetics1 the following pages are     
devoted4 ,no attempt will be made either
 to impose particular appreciations or  
to trace the history of art and         
criticism4 ,the discussion will be      
limited to the nature and elements of   

our aesthetic judgments4 ,it is a       
theoretical inquiry and has no directly 
hortatory quality4 ,yet insight into the
 basis of our preferences1 if it could  
be gained1 would not fail to have a good
 and purifying influence upon them4 ,it 
would show us the futility of a         
dogmatism that would impose upon another
 man judgments and emotions for which   
the needed soil is lacking in his       
constitution and experience2 and at the 
same time it would relieve us of any    
undue diffidence or excessive tolerance 
towards aberrations of taste1 when we   
know what are the broader grounds of    
preference and the habits that make for 
greater and more diversified aesthetic  
enjoyment4  ,therefore1 although nothing
 has commonly been less attractive than 
treatises on beauty or less a guide to  
taste than disquisitions upon it1 we may
 yet hope for some not merely           
theoretical gain from these studies4    
,they have remained so often without    
practical influence because they have   

been pursued under unfavourable         
conditions4 ,the writers have generally 
been audacious metaphysicians and       
somewhat incompetent critics2 they have 
represented general and obscure         
principles1 suggested by other parts of 
their philosophy1 as the conditions of  
artistic excellence and the essence of  
beauty4 ,but if the inquiry is kept     
close to the facts of feeling1 we may   
hope that the resulting theory may have 
a clarifying effect on the experience on
 which it is based4 ,that is1 after all1
 the use of theory4 ,if when a theory is
 bad it narrows our capacity for        
observation and makes all appreciation  
vicarious and formal1 when it is good it
 reacts favourably upon our powers1     
guides the attention to what is really  
capable of affording entertainment1 and 
increases1 by force of new analogies1   
the range of our interests4 ,speculation
 is an evil if it imposes a foreign     
organization on our mental life2 it is a
 good if it only brings to light1 and   

makes more perfect by training1 the     
organization already inherent in it4    
,we shall therefore study human         
sensibility itself and our actual       
feelings about beauty1 and we shall look
 for no deeper1 unconscious causes of   
our aesthetic consciousness4 ,such value
 as belongs to metaphysical derivations 
of the nature of the beautiful1 comes to
 them not because they explain our      
primary feelings1 which they cannot do1 
but because they express1 and in fact   
constitute1 some of our later           
appreciations4 ,there is no explanation1
 for instance1 in calling beauty an     
adumbration of divine attributes4 ,such 
a relation1 if it were actual1 would not
 help us at all to understand why the   
symbols of divinity pleased4 ,but in    
certain moments of contemplation1 when  
much emotional experience lies behind   
us1 and we have reached very general    
ideas both of nature and of life1 our   
delight in any particular object may    
consist in nothing but the thought that 

this object is a manifestation of       
universal principles4 ,the blue sky may 
come to please chiefly because it seems 
the image of a serene conscience1 or of 
the eternal youth and purity of nature  
after a thousand partial corruptions4   
,but this expressiveness of the sky is  
due to certain qualities of the         
sensation1 which bind it to all things  
happy and pure1 and1 in a mind in which 
the essence of purity and happiness is  
embodied in an idea of ,god1 bind it    
also to that idea4  ,so it may happen   
that the most arbitrary and unreal      
theories1 which must be rejected as     
general explanations of aesthetic life1 
may be reinstated as particular moments 
of it4 ,those intuitions which we call  
,platonic are seldom scientific1 they   
seldom explain the phenomena or hit upon
 the actual law of things1 but they are 
often the highest expression of that    
activity which they fail to make        
comprehensible4 ,the adoring lover      
cannot understand the natural history of

 love2 for he is all in all at the last 
and supreme stage of its development4   
,hence the world has always been puzzled
 in its judgment of the ,platonists2    
their theories are so extravagant1 yet  
their wisdom seems so great4 ,platonism 
is a very refined and beautiful         
expression of our natural instincts1 it 
embodies conscience and utters our      
inmost hopes4 ,platonic philosophers    
have therefore a natural authority1 as  
standing on heights to which the vulgar 
cannot attain1 but to which they        
naturally and half-consciously aspire4  
,when a man tells you that beauty is the
 manifestation of ,god to the senses1   
you wish you might understand him1 you  
grope for a deep truth in his obscurity1
 you honour him for his elevation of    
mind1 and your respect may even induce  
you to assent to what he says as to an  
intelligible proposition4 ,your thought 
may in consequence be dominated ever    
after by a verbal dogma1 around which   
all your sympathies and antipathies will

 quickly gather1 and the less you have  
penetrated the original sense of your   
creed1 the more absolutely will you     
believe it4 ,you will have followed     
,mephistopheles' advice3 --       ,im   
ganzen haltet euch an ,worte1      ,so  
geht euch durch die sichere ,pforte     
,zum ,tempel der ,gewissheit ein4  ,yet 
reflection might have shown you that the
 word of the master held no objective   
account of the nature and origin of     
beauty1 but was the vague expression of 
his highly complex emotions4  ,it is one
 of the attributes of ,god1 one of the  
perfections which we contemplate in our 
idea of him1 that there is no duality or
 opposition between his will and his    
vision1 between the impulses of his     
nature and the events of his life4 ,this
 is what we commonly designate as       
omnipotence and creation4  ,now1 in the 
contemplation of beauty1 our faculties  
of perception have the same perfection3 
it is indeed from the experience of     
beauty and happiness1 from the          

occasional harmony between our nature   
and our environment1 that we draw our   
conception of the divine life4 ,there   
is1 then1 a real propriety in calling   
beauty a manifestation of ,god to the   
senses1 since1 in the region of sense1  
the perception of beauty exemplifies    
that adequacy and perfection which in   
general we objectify in an idea of ,god4
  ,but the minds that dwell in the      
atmosphere of these analogies are hardly
 those that will care to ask what are   
the conditions and the varieties of this
 perfection of function1 in other words1
 how it comes about that we perceive    
beauty at all1 or have any inkling of   
divinity4 ,only the other philosophers1 
those that wallow in ,epicurus' sty1    
know anything about the latter question4
 ,but it is easier to be impressed than 
to be instructed1 and the public is very
 ready to believe that where there is   
noble language not without obscurity    
there must be profound knowledge4 ,we   
should distinguish1 however1 the two    

distinct demands in the case4 ,one is   
for comprehension2 we look for the      
theory of a human function which must   
cover all possible cases of its         
exercise1 whether noble or base4 ,this  
the ,platonists utterly fail to give us4
 ,the other demand is for inspiration2  
we wish to be nourished by the maxims   
and confessions of an exalted mind1 in  
whom the aesthetic function is          
pre-eminent4 ,by responding to this     
demand the same thinkers may win our    
admiration4  ,to feel beauty is a better
 thing than to understand how we come to
 feel it4 ,to have imagination and      
taste1 to love the best1 to be carried  
by the contemplation of nature to a     
vivid faith in the ideal1 all this is   
more1 a great deal more1 than any       
science can hope to be4 ,the poets and  
philosophers who express this aesthetic 
experience and stimulate the same       
function in us by their example1 do a   
greater service to mankind and deserve  
higher honour than the discoverers of   

historical truth4 ,reflection is indeed 
a part of life1 but the last part4 ,its 
specific value consists in the          
satisfaction of curiosity1 in the       
smoothing out and explanation of things3
 but the greatest pleasure which we     
actually get from reflection is borrowed
 from the experience on which we        
reflect4 ,we do not often indulge in    
retrospect for the sake of a scientific 
knowledge of human life1 but rather to  
revive the memories of what once was    
dear4 ,and ,i should have little hope of
 interesting the reader in the present  
analyses1 did ,i not rely on the        
attractions of a subject associated with
 so many of his pleasures4  ,but the    
recognition of the superiority of       
aesthetics in experience to aesthetics  
in theory ought not to make us accept as
 an explanation of aesthetic feeling    
what is in truth only an expression of  
it4 ,when ,plato tells us of the eternal
 ideas in conformity to which all       
excellence consists1 he is making       

himself the spokesman of the moral      
consciousness4 ,our conscience and taste
 establish these ideals2 to make a      
judgment is virtually to establish an   
ideal1 and all ideals are absolute and  
eternal for the judgment that involves  
them1 because in finding and declaring a
 thing good or beautiful1 our sentence  
is categorical1 and the standard evoked 
by our judgment is for that case        
intrinsic and ultimate4 ,but at the next
 moment1 when the mind is on another    
footing1 a new ideal is evoked1 no less 
absolute for the present judgment than  
the old ideal was for the previous one4 
,if we are then expressing our feeling  
and confessing what happens to us when  
we judge1 we shall be quite right in    
saying that we have always an absolute  
ideal before us1 and that value lies in 
conformity with that ideal4 ,so1 also1  
if we try to define that ideal1 we shall
 hardly be able to say of it anything   
less noble and more definite than that  
it is the embodiment of an infinite     

good4 ,for it is that incommunicable and
 illusive excellence that haunts every  
beautiful thing1 and            like a  
star      ,beacons from the abode where 
the eternal are4  ,for the expression of
 this experience we should go to the    
poets1 to the more inspired critics1 and
 best of all to the immortal parables of
 ,plato4 ,but if what we desire is to   
increase our knowledge rather than to   
cultivate our sensibility1 we should do 
well to close all those delightful      
books2 for we shall not find any        
instruction there upon the questions    
which most press upon us2 namely1 how an
 ideal is formed in the mind1 how a     
given object is compared with it1 what  
is the common element in all beautiful  
things1 and what the substance of the   
absolute ideal in which all ideals tend 
to be lost2 and1 finally1 how we come to
 be sensitive to beauty at all1 or to   
value it4 ,these questions must be      
capable of answers1 if any science of   
human nature is really possible4 -- ,so 

far1 then1 are we from ignoring the     
insight of the ,platonists1 that we hope
 to explain it1 and in a sense to       
justify it1 by showing that it is the   
natural and sometimes the supreme       
expression of the common principles of  
our nature4   ,,part ,i  ,,the ,,nature 
,,of ,,beauty  ,the philosophy of beauty
 is a theory of values4   #a4  ,it would
 be easy to find a definition of beauty 
that should give in a few words a       
telling paraphrase of the word4 ,we know
 on excellent authority that beauty is  
truth1 that it is the expression of the 
ideal1 the symbol of divine perfection1 
and the sensible manifestation of the   
good4 ,a litany of these titles of      
honour might easily be compiled1 and    
repeated in praise of our divinity4     
,such phrases stimulate thought and give
 us a momentary pleasure1 but they      
hardly bring any permanent              
enlightenment4 ,a definition that should
 really define must be nothing less than
 the exposition of the origin1 place1   

and elements of beauty as an object of  
human experience4 ,we must learn from   
it1 as far as possible1 why1 when1 and  
how beauty appears1 what conditions an  
object must fulfil to be beautiful1 what
 elements of our nature make us sensible
 of beauty1 and what the relation is    
between the constitution of the object  
and the excitement of our               
susceptibility4 ,nothing less will      
really define beauty or make us         
understand what aesthetic appreciation  
is4 ,the definition of beauty in this   
sense will be the task of this whole    
book1 a task that can be only very      
imperfectly accomplished within its     
limits4  ,the historical titles of our  
subject may give us a hint towards the  
beginning of such a definition4 ,many   
writers of the last century called the  
philosophy of beauty ,criticism1 and the
 word is still retained as the title for
 the reasoned appreciation of works of  
art4 ,we could hardly speak1 however1 of
 delight in nature as criticism4 ,a     

sunset is not criticised2 it is felt and
 enjoyed4 ,the word criticism1 used on  
such an occasion1 would emphasize too   
much the element of deliberate judgment 
and of comparison with standards4       
,beauty1 although often so described1 is
 seldom so perceived1 and all the       
greatest excellences of nature and art  
are so far from being approved of by a  
rule that they themselves furnish the   
standard and ideal by which critics     
measure inferior effects4  ,this age of 
science and of nomenclature has         
accordingly adopted a more learned word1
 ,aesthetics1 that is1 the theory of    
perception or of susceptibility4 ,if    
criticism is too narrow a word1 pointing
 exclusively to our more artificial     
judgments1 aesthetics seems to be too   
broad and to include within its sphere  
all pleasures and pains1 if not all     
perceptions whatsoever4 ,kant used it1  
as we know1 for his theory of time and  
space as forms of all perception2 and it
 has at times been narrowed into an     

equivalent for the philosophy of art4   
,if we combine1 however1 the            
etymological meaning of criticism with  
that of aesthetics1 we shall unite two  
essential qualities of the theory of    
beauty4 ,criticism implies judgment1 and
 aesthetics perception4 ,to get the     
common ground1 that of perceptions which
 are critical1 or judgments which are   
perceptions1 we must widen our notion of
 deliberate criticism so as to include  
those judgments of value which are      
instinctive and immediate1 that is1 to  
include pleasures and pains2 and at the 
same time we must narrow our notion of  
aesthetics so as to exclude all         
perceptions which are not appreciations1
 which do not find a value in their     
objects4 ,we thus reach the sphere of   
critical or appreciative perception1    
which is1 roughly speaking1 what we mean
 to deal with4 ,and retaining the word  
aesthetics1 which is now current1 we may
 therefore say that aesthetics is       
concerned with the perception of values4

 ,the meaning and conditions of value   
is1 then1 what we must first consider4  
,since the days of ,descartes it has    
been a conception familiar to           
philosophers that every visible event in
 nature might be explained by previous  
visible events1 and that all the        
motions1 for instance1 of the tongue in 
speech1 or of the hand in painting1     
might have merely physical causes4 ,if  
consciousness is thus accessory to life 
and not essential to it1 the race of man
 might have existed upon the earth and  
acquired all the arts necessary for its 
subsistence without possessing a single 
sensation1 idea1 or emotion4 ,natural   
selection might have secured the        
survival of those automata which made   
useful reactions upon their environment4
 ,an instinct of self-preservation would
 have been developed1 dangers would have
 been shunned without being feared1 and 
injuries revenged without being felt4   
,in such a world there might have come  
to be the most perfect organization4    

,there would have been what we should   
call the expression of the deepest      
interests and the apparent pursuit of   
conceived goods4 ,for there would have  
been spontaneous and ingrained          
tendencies to avoid certain             
contingencies and to produce others2 all
 the dumb show and evidence of thinking 
would have been patent to the observer4 
,yet there would surely have been no    
thinking1 no expectation1 and no        
conscious achievement in the whole      
process4  ,the onlooker might have      
feigned ends and objects of forethought1
 as we do in the case of the water that 
seeks its own level1 or in that of the  
vacuum which nature abhors4 ,but the    
particles of matter would have remained 
unconscious of their collocation1 and   
all nature would have been insensible of
 their changing arrangement4 ,we only1  
the possible spectators of that process1
 by virtue of our own interests and     
habits1 could see any progress or       
culmination in it4 ,we should see       

culmination where the result attained   
satisfied our practical or aesthetic    
demands1 and progress wherever such a   
satisfaction was approached4 ,but apart 
from ourselves1 and our human bias1 we  
can see in such a mechanical world no   
element of value whatever4 ,in removing 
consciousness1 we have removed the      
possibility of worth4  ,but it is not   
only in the absence of all consciousness
 that value would be removed from the   
world2 by a less violent abstraction    
from the totality of human experience1  
we might conceive beings of a purely    
intellectual cast1 minds in which the   
transformations of nature were mirrored 
without any emotion4 ,every event would 
then be noted1 its relations would be   
observed1 its recurrence might even be  
expected2 but all this would happen     
without a shadow of desire1 of pleasure1
 or of regret4 ,no event would be       
repulsive1 no situation terrible4 ,we   
might1 in a word1 have a world of idea  
without a world of will4 ,in this case1 

as completely as if consciousness were  
absent altogether1 all value and        
excellence would be gone4 ,so that for  
the existence of good in any form it is 
not merely consciousness but emotional  
consciousness that is needed4           
,observation will not do1 appreciation  
is required4  ,preference is ultimately 
irrational4   #b4 ,we may therefore at  
once assert this axiom1 important for   
all moral philosophy and fatal to       
certain stubborn incoherences of        
thought1 that there is no value apart   
from some appreciation of it1 and no    
good apart from some preference of it   
before its absence or its opposite4 ,in 
appreciation1 in preference1 lies the   
root and essence of all excellence4 ,or1
 as ,spinoza clearly expresses it1 we   
desire nothing because it is good1 but  
it is good only because we desire it4   
,it is true that in the absence of an   
instinctive reaction we can still apply 
these epithets by an appeal to usage4   
,we may agree that an action is bad1 or 

a building good1 because we recognize in
 them a character which we have learned 
to designate by that adjective2 but     
unless there is in us some trace of     
passionate reprobation or of sensible   
delight1 there is no moral or aesthetic 
judgment4 ,it is all a question of      
propriety of speech1 and of the empty   
titles of things4 ,the verbal and       
mechanical proposition1 that passes for 
judgment of worth1 is the great cloak of
 ineptitude in these matters4           
,insensibility is very quick in the     
conventional use of words4 ,if we       
appealed more often to actual feeling1  
our judgments would be more diverse1 but
 they would be more legitimate and      
instructive4 ,verbal judgments are often
 useful instruments of thought1 but it  
is not by them that worth can ultimately
 be determined4  ,values spring from the
 immediate and inexplicable reaction of 
vital impulse1 and from the irrational  
part of our nature4 ,the rational part  
is by its essence relative2 it leads us 

from data to conclusions1 or from parts 
to wholes2 it never furnishes the data  
with which it works4 ,if any preference 
or precept were declared to be ultimate 
and primitive1 it would thereby be      
declared to be irrational1 since        
mediation1 inference1 and synthesis are 
the essence of rationality4 ,the ideal  
of rationality is itself as arbitrary1  
as much dependent on the needs of a     
finite organization1 as any other ideal4
 ,only as ultimately securing           
tranquillity of mind1 which the         
philosopher instinctively pursues1 has  
it for him any necessity4 ,in spite of  
the verbal propriety of saying that     
reason demands rationality1 what really 
demands rationality1 what makes it a    
good and indispensable thing and gives  
it all its authority1 is not its own    
nature1 but our need of it both in safe 
and economical action and in the        
pleasures of comprehension4  ,it is     
evident that beauty is a species of     
value1 and what we have said of value in

 general applies to this particular     
kind4 ,a first approach to a definition 
of beauty has therefore been made by the
 exclusion of all intellectual          
judgments1 all judgments of matter of   
fact or of relation4 ,to substitute     
judgments of fact for judgments of      
value1 is a sign of a pedantic and      
borrowed criticism4 ,if we approach a   
work of art or nature scientifically1   
for the sake of its historical          
connexions or proper classification1 we 
do not approach it aesthetically4 ,the  
discovery of its date or of its author  
may be otherwise interesting2 it only   
remotely affects our aesthetic          
appreciation by adding to the direct    
effect certain associations4 ,if the    
direct effect were absent1 and the      
object in itself uninteresting1 the     
circumstances would be immaterial4      
,molire's ,misanthrope says to the court
 poet who commends his sonnet as written
 in a quarter of an hour1       ,voyons1
 monsieur1 le temps ne fait rien        

l'affaire1  and so we might say to the  
critic that sinks into the              
archaeologist1 show us the work1 and let
 the date alone4  ,in an opposite       
direction the same substitution of facts
 for values makes its appearance1       
whenever the reproduction of fact is    
made the sole standard of artistic      
excellence4 ,many half-trained observers
 condemn the work of some nave or       
fanciful masters with a sneer1 because1 
as they truly say1 it is out of drawing4
 ,the implication is that to be         
correctly copied from a model is the    
prerequisite of all beauty4 ,correctness
 is1 indeed1 an element of effect and   
one which1 in respect to familiar       
objects1 is almost indispensable1       
because its absence would cause a       
disappointment and dissatisfaction      
incompatible with enjoyment4 ,we learn  
to value truth more and more as our love
 and knowledge of nature increase4 ,but 
fidelity is a merit only because it is  
in this way a factor in our pleasure4   

,it stands on a level with all other    
ingredients of effect4 ,when a man      
raises it to a solitary pre-eminence and
 becomes incapable of appreciating      
anything else1 he betrays the decay of  
aesthetic capacity4 ,the scientific     
habit in him inhibits the artistic4     
,that facts have a value of their own1  
at once complicates and explains this   
question4 ,we are naturally pleased by  
every perception1 and recognition and   
surprise are particularly acute         
sensations4 ,when we see a striking     
truth in any imitation1 we are therefore
 delighted1 and this kind of pleasure is
 very legitimate1 and enters into the   
best effects of all the representative  
arts4 ,truth and realism are therefore  
aesthetically good1 but they are not    
all-sufficient1 since the representation
 of everything is not equally pleasing  
and effective4 ,the fact that           
resemblance is a source of satisfaction 
justifies the critic in demanding it1   
while the aesthetic insufficiency of    

such veracity shows the different value 
of truth in science and in art4 ,science
 is the response to the demand for      
information1 and in it we ask for the   
whole truth and nothing but the truth4  
,art is the response to the demand for  
entertainment1 for the stimulation of   
our senses and imagination1 and truth   
enters into it only as it subserves     
these ends4  ,even the scientific value 
of truth is not1 however1 ultimate or   
absolute4 ,it rests partly on practical1
 partly on aesthetic interests4 ,as our 
ideas are gradually brought into        
conformity with the facts by the painful
 process of selection1 -- for intuition 
runs equally into truth and into error1 
and can settle nothing if not controlled
 by experience1 -- we gain vastly in our
 command over our environment4 ,this is 
the fundamental value of natural        
science1 and the fruit it is yielding in
 our day4 ,we have no better vision of  
nature and life than some of our        
predecessors1 but we have greater       

material resources4 ,to know the truth  
about the composition and history of    
things is good for this reason4 ,it is  
also good because of the enlarged       
horizon it gives us1 because the        
spectacle of nature is a marvellous and 
fascinating one1 full of a serious      
sadness and large peace1 which gives us 
back our birthright as children of the  
planet and naturalizes us upon the      
earth4 ,this is the poetic value of the 
scientific ,weltanschauung4 ,from these 
two benefits1 the practical and the     
imaginative1 all the value of truth is  
derived4  ,aesthetic and moral judgments
 are accordingly to be classed together 
in contrast to judgments intellectual2  
they are both judgments of value1 while 
intellectual judgments are judgments of 
fact4 ,if the latter have any value1 it 
is only derivative1 and our whole       
intellectual life has its only          
justification in its connexion with our 
pleasures and pains4  ,contrast between 
moral and aesthetic values4   #c4 ,the  

relation between aesthetic and moral    
judgments1 between the spheres of the   
beautiful and the good1 is close1 but   
the distinction between them is         
important4 ,one factor of this          
distinction is that while aesthetic     
judgments are mainly positive1 that is1 
perceptions of good1 moral judgments are
 mainly and fundamentally negative1 or  
perceptions of evil4 ,another factor of 
the distinction is that whereas1 in the 
perception of beauty1 our judgment is   
necessarily intrinsic and based on the  
character of the immediate experience1  
and never consciously on the idea of an 
eventual utility in the object1         
judgments about moral worth1 on the     
contrary1 are always based1 when they   
are positive1 upon the consciousness of 
benefits probably involved4 ,both these 
distinctions need some elucidation4     
,hedonistic ethics have always had to   
struggle against the moral sense of     
mankind4 ,earnest minds1 that feel the  
weight and dignity of life1 rebel       

against the assertion that the aim of   
right conduct is enjoyment4 ,pleasure   
usually appears to them as a temptation1
 and they sometimes go so far as to make
 avoidance of it a virtue4 ,the truth is
 that morality is not mainly concerned  
with the attainment of pleasure2 it is  
rather concerned1 in all its deeper and 
more authoritative maxims1 with the     
prevention of suffering4 ,there is      
something artificial in the deliberate  
pursuit of pleasure2 there is something 
absurd in the obligation to enjoy       
oneself4 ,we feel no duty in that       
direction2 we take to enjoyment         
naturally enough after the work of life 
is done1 and the freedom and spontaneity
 of our pleasures is what is most       
essential to them4  ,the sad business of
 life is rather to escape certain       
dreadful evils to which our nature      
exposes us1 -- death1 hunger1 disease1  
weariness1 isolation1 and contempt4 ,by 
the awful authority of these things1    
which stand like spectres behind every  

moral injunction1 conscience in reality 
speaks1 and a mind which they have duly 
impressed cannot but feel1 by contrast1 
the hopeless triviality of the search   
for pleasure4 ,it cannot but feel that a
 life abandoned to amusement and to     
changing impulses must run unawares into
 fatal dangers4 ,the moment1 however1   
that society emerges from the early     
pressure of the environment and is      
tolerably secure against primary evils1 
morality grows lax4 ,the forms that life
 will farther assume are not to be      
imposed by moral authority1 but are     
determined by the genius of the race1   
the opportunities of the moment1 and the
 tastes and resources of individual     
minds4 ,the reign of duty gives place to
 the reign of freedom1 and the law and  
the covenant to the dispensation of     
grace4  ,the appreciation of beauty and 
its embodiment in the arts are          
activities which belong to our holiday  
life1 when we are redeemed for the      
moment from the shadow of evil and the  

slavery to fear1 and are following the  
bent of our nature where it chooses to  
lead us4 ,the values1 then1 with which  
we here deal are positive2 they were    
negative in the sphere of morality4 ,the
 ugly is hardly an exception1 because it
 is not the cause of any real pain4 ,in 
itself it is rather a source of         
amusement4 ,if its suggestions are      
vitally repulsive1 its presence becomes 
a real evil towards which we assume a   
practical and moral attitude4 ,and1     
correspondingly1 the pleasant is never1 
as we hare seen1 the object of a truly  
moral injunction4  ,work and play4   #d4
 ,we have here1 then1 an important      
element of the distinction between      
aesthetic and moral values4 ,it is the  
same that has been pointed to in the    
famous contrast between work and play4  
,these terms may be used in different   
senses and their importance in moral    
classification differs with the meaning 
attached to them4 ,we may call          
everything play which is useless        

activity1 exercise that springs from the
 physiological impulse to discharge the 
energy which the exigencies of life have
 not called out4 ,work will then be all 
action that is necessary or useful for  
life4 ,evidently if work and play are   
thus objectively distinguished as useful
 and useless action1 work is a          
eulogistic term and play a disparaging  
one4 ,it would be better for us that all
 our energy should be turned to account1
 that none of it should be wasted in    
aimless motion4 ,play1 in this sense1 is
 a sign of imperfect adaptation4 ,it is 
proper to childhood1 when the body and  
mind are not yet fit to cope with the   
environment1 but it is unseemly in      
manhood and pitiable in old age1 because
 it marks an atrophy of human nature1   
and a failure to take hold of the       
opportunities of life4  ,play is thus   
essentially frivolous4 ,some persons1   
understanding the term in this sense1   
have felt an aversion1 which every      
liberal mind will share1 to classing    

social pleasures1 art1 and religion     
under the head of play1 and by that     
epithet condemning them1 as a certain   
school seems to do1 to gradual          
extinction as the race approaches       
maturity4 ,but if all the useless       
ornaments of our life are to be cut off 
in the process of adaptation1 evolution 
would impoverish instead of enriching   
our nature4 ,perhaps that is the        
tendency of evolution1 and our barbarous
 ancestors amid their toils and wars1   
with their flaming passions and         
mythologies1 lived better lives than are
 reserved to our well-adapted           
descendants4  ,we may be allowed to     
hope1 however1 that some imagination may
 survive parasitically even in the most 
serviceable brain4 ,whatever course     
history may take1 -- and we are not here
 concerned with prophecy1 -- the        
question of what is desirable is not    
affected4 ,to condemn spontaneous and   
delightful occupations because they are 
useless for self-preservation shows an  

uncritical prizing of life irrespective 
of its content4 ,for such a system the  
worthiest function of the universe      
should be to establish perpetual motion4
 ,uselessness is a fatal accusation to  
bring against any act which is done for 
its presumed utility1 but those which   
are done for their own sake are their   
own justification4  ,at the same time   
there is an undeniable propriety in     
calling all the liberal and imaginative 
activities of man play1 because they are
 spontaneous1 and not carried on under  
pressure of external necessity or       
danger4 ,their utility for              
self-preservation may be very indirect  
and accidental1 but they are not        
worthless for that reason4 ,on the      
contrary1 we may measure the degree of  
happiness and civilization which any    
race has attained by the proportion of  
its energy which is devoted to free and 
generous pursuits1 to the adornment of  
life and the culture of the imagination4
 ,for it is in the spontaneous play of  

his faculties that man finds himself and
 his happiness4 ,slavery is the most    
degrading condition of which he is      
capable1 and he is as often a slave to  
the niggardness of the earth and the    
inclemency of heaven1 as to a master or 
an institution4 ,he is a slave when all 
his energy is spent in avoiding         
suffering and death1 when all his action
 is imposed from without1 and no breath 
or strength is left him for free        
enjoyment4  ,work and play here take on 
a different meaning1 and become         
equivalent to servitude and freedom4    
,the change consists in the subjective  
point of view from which the distinction
 is now made4 ,we no longer mean by work
 all that is done usefully1 but only    
what is done unwillingly and by the spur
 of necessity4 ,by play we are          
designating1 no longer what is done     
fruitlessly1 but whatever is done       
spontaneously and for its own sake1     
whether it have or not an ulterior      
utility4 ,play1 in this sense1 may be   

our most useful occupation4 ,so far     
would a gradual adaptation to the       
environment be from making this play    
obsolete1 that it would tend to abolish 
work1 and to make play universal4 ,for  
with the elimination of all the         
conflicts and errors of instinct1 the   
race would do spontaneously whatever    
conduced to its welfare and we should   
live safely and prosperously without    
external stimulus or restraint4  ,all   
values are in one sense aesthetic4   #e4
 ,in this second and subjective sense1  
then1 work is the disparaging term and  
play the eulogistic one4 ,all who feel  
the dignity and importance of the things
 of the imagination1 need not hesitate  
to adopt the classification which       
designates them as play4 ,we point out  
thereby1 not that they have no value1   
but that their value is intrinsic1 that 
in them is one of the sources of all    
worth4 ,evidently all values must be    
ultimately intrinsic4 ,the useful is    
good because of the excellence of its   

consequences2 but these must somewhere  
cease to be merely useful in their turn1
 or only excellent as means2 somewhere  
we must reach the good that is good in  
itself and for its own sake1 else the   
whole process is futile1 and the utility
 of our first object illusory4 ,we here 
reach the second factor in our          
distinction1 between aesthetic and moral
 values1 which regards their immediacy4 
,if we attempt to remove from life all  
its evils1 as the popular imagination   
has done at times1 we shall find little 
but aesthetic pleasures remaining to    
constitute unalloyed happiness4 ,the    
satisfaction of the passions and the    
appetites1 in which we chiefly place    
earthly happiness1 themselves take on an
 aesthetic tinge when we remove ideally 
the possibility of loss or variation4   
,what could the ,olympians honour in one
 another or the seraphim worship in ,god
 except the embodiment of eternal       
attributes1 of essences which1 like     
beauty1 make us happy only in           

contemplation8 ,the glory of heaven     
could not be otherwise symbolized than  
by light and music4 ,even the knowledge 
of truth1 which the most sober          
theologians made the essence of the     
beatific vision1 is an aesthetic        
delight2 for when the truth has no      
further practical utility1 it becomes a 
landscape4 ,the delight of it is        
imaginative and the value of it         
aesthetic4  ,this reduction of all      
values to immediate appreciations1 to   
sensuous or vital activities1 is so     
inevitable that it has struck even the  
minds most courageously rationalistic4  
,only for them1 instead of leading to   
the liberation of aesthetic goods from  
practical entanglements and their       
establishment as the only pure and      
positive values in life1 this analysis  
has led rather to the denial of all pure
 and positive goods altogether4 ,such   
thinkers naturally assume that moral    
values are intrinsic and supreme2 and   
since these moral values would not arise

 but for the existence or imminence of  
physical evils1 they embrace the paradox
 that without evil no good whatever is  
conceivable4  ,the harsh requirements of
 apologetics have no doubt helped them  
to this position1 from which one breath 
of spring or the sight of one           
well-begotten creature should be enough 
to dislodge them4 ,their ethical temper 
and the fetters of their imagination    
forbid them to reconsider their original
 assumption and to conceive that        
morality is a means and not an end2 that
 it is the price of human               
non-adaptation1 and the consequence of  
the original sin of unfitness4 ,it is   
the compression of human conduct within 
the narrow limits of the safe and       
possible4 ,remove danger1 remove pain1  
remove the occasion of pity1 and the    
need of morality is gone4 ,to say thou  
shalt not would then be an impertinence4
  ,but this elimination of precept would
 not be a cessation of life4 ,the senses
 would still be open1 the instincts     

would still operate1 and lead all       
creatures to the haunts and occupations 
that befitted them4 ,the variety of     
nature and the infinity of art1 with the
 companionship of our fellows1 would    
fill the leisure of that ideal          
existence4 ,these are the elements of   
our positive happiness1 the things      
which1 amid a thousand vexations and    
vanities1 make the clear profit of      
living4  ,aesthetic consecration of     
general principles4   #f4 ,not only are 
the various satisfactions which morals  
are meant to secure aesthetic in the    
last analysis1 but when the conscience  
is formed1 and right principles acquire 
an immediate authority1 our attitude to 
these principles becomes aesthetic also4
 ,honour1 truthfulness1 and cleanliness 
are obvious examples4 ,when the absence 
of these virtues causes an instinctive  
disgust1 as it does in well-bred people1
 the reaction is essentially aesthetic1 
because it is not based on reflection   
and benevolence1 but on constitutional  

sensitiveness4 ,this aesthetic          
sensitiveness is1 however1 properly     
enough called moral1 because it is the  
effect of conscientious training and is 
more powerful for good in society than  
laborious virtue1 because it is much    
more constant and catching4 ,it is      
,kalokagathia1 the aesthetic demand for 
the morally good1 and perhaps the finest
 flower of human nature4  ,but this     
tendency of representative principles to
 become independent powers and acquire  
intrinsic value is sometimes            
mischievous4 ,it is the foundation of   
the conflicts between sentiment and     
justice1 between intuitive and          
utilitarian morals4 ,every human reform 
is the reassertion of the primary       
interests of man against the authority  
of general principles which have ceased 
to represent those interests fairly1 but
 which still obtain the idolatrous      
veneration of mankind4 ,nor are chivalry
 and religion alone liable to fall into 
this moral superstition4 ,it arises     

wherever an abstract good is substituted
 for its concrete equivalent4 ,the      
miser's fallacy is the typical case1 and
 something very like it is the ethical  
principle of half our respectable       
population4 ,to the exercise of certain 
useful habits men come to sacrifice the 
advantage which was the original basis  
and justification of those habits4      
,minute knowledge is pursued at the     
expense of largeness of mind1 and riches
 at the expense of comfort and freedom4 
,this error is all the more specious    
when the derived aim has in itself some 
aesthetic charm1 such as belongs to the 
,stoic idea of playing one's part in a  
vast drama of things1 irrespective of   
any advantage thereby accruing to any   
one2 somewhat as the miser's passion is 
rendered a little normal when his eye is
 fascinated not merely by the figures of
 a bank account1 but by the glitter of  
the yellow gold4 ,and the vanity of     
playing a tragic part and the glory of  
conscious self-sacrifice have the same  

immediate fascination4 ,many irrational 
maxims thus acquire a kind of nobility4 
,an object is chosen as the highest good
 which has not only a certain           
representative value1 but also an       
intrinsic one1 -- which is not merely a 
method for the realization of other     
values1 but a value in its own          
realization4  ,obedience to ,god is for 
the ,christian1 as conformity to the    
laws of nature or reason is for the     
,stoic1 an attitude which has a certain 
emotional and passionate worth1 apart   
from its original justification by      
maxims of utility4 ,this emotional and  
passionate force is the essence of      
fanaticism1 it makes imperatives        
categorical1 and gives them absolute    
sway over the conscience in spite of    
their one-sidedness and their injustice 
to the manifold demands of human nature4
  ,obedience to ,god or reason can      
originally recommend itself to a man    
only as the surest and ultimately least 
painful way of balancing his aims and   

synthesizing his desires4 ,so necessary 
is this sanction even to the most       
impetuous natures1 that no martyr would 
go to the stake if he did not believe   
that the powers of nature1 in the day of
 judgment1 would be on his side4 ,but   
the human mind is a turbulent           
commonwealth1 and the laws that make for
 the greatest good cannot be established
 in it without some partial sacrifice1  
without the suppression of many         
particular impulses4 ,hence the voice of
 reason or the command of ,god1 which   
makes for the maximum ultimate          
satisfaction1 finds itself opposed by   
sundry scattered and refractory forces1 
which are henceforth denominated bad4   
,the unreflective conscience1 forgetting
 the vicarious source of its own        
excellence1 then assumes a solemn and   
incomprehensible immediacy1 as if its   
decrees were absolute and intrinsically 
authoritative1 not of to-day or         
yesterday1 and no one could tell whence 
they had arisen4 ,instinct can all the  

more easily produce this mystification  
when it calls forth an imaginative      
activity full of interest and eager     
passion4 ,this effect is conspicuous in 
the absolutist conscience1 both         
devotional and rationalistic1 as also in
 the passion of love4 ,for in all these 
a certain individuality1 definiteness1  
and exclusiveness is given to the       
pursued object which is very favourable 
to zeal1 and the heat of passion melts  
together the various processes of       
volition into the consciousness of one  
adorable influence4  ,however deceptive 
these complications may prove to men of 
action and eloquence1 they ought not to 
impose on the critic of human nature4   
,evidently what value general goods do  
not derive from the particular          
satisfactions they stand for1 they      
possess in themselves as ideas pleasing 
and powerful over the imagination4 ,this
 intrinsic advantage of certain         
principles and methods is none the less 
real for being in a sense aesthetic4    

,only a sordid utilitarianism that      
subtracts the imagination from human    
nature1 or at least slurs over its      
immense contribution to our happiness1  
could fail to give these principles the 
preference over others practically as   
good4  ,if it could be shown1 for       
instance1 that monarchy was as apt1 in a
 given case1 to secure the public       
well-being as some other form of        
government1 monarchy should be          
preferred1 and would undoubtedly be     
established1 on account of its          
imaginative and dramatic superiority4   
,but if1 blinded by this somewhat       
ethereal advantage1 a party sacrificed  
to it important public interests1 the   
injustice would be manifest4 ,in a      
doubtful case1 a nation decides1 not    
without painful conflicts1 how much it  
will sacrifice to its sentimental needs4
 ,the important point is to remember    
that the representative or practical    
value of a principle is one thing1 and  
its intrinsic or aesthetic value is     

another1 and that the latter can be     
justly counted only as an item in its   
favour to be weighed2 against possible  
external disadvantages4 ,whenever this  
comparison and balancing of ultimate    
benefits of every kind is angrily       
dismissed in favour of some absolute    
principle1 laid down in contempt of     
human misery and happiness1 we have a   
personal and fantastic system of ethics1
 without practical sanctions4 ,it is an 
evidence that the superstitious         
imagination has invaded the sober and   
practical domain of morals4  ,aesthetic 
and physical pleasure4   #g4 ,we have   
now separated with some care            
intellectual and moral judgments from   
the sphere of our subject1 and found    
that we are to deal only with           
perceptions of value1 and with these    
only when they are positive and         
immediate4 ,but even with these         
distinctions the most remarkable        
characteristic of the sense of beauty   
remains undefined4 ,all pleasures are   

intrinsic and positive values1 but all  
pleasures are not perceptions of beauty4
 ,pleasure is indeed the essence of that
 perception1 but there is evidently in  
this particular pleasure a complication 
which is not present in others and which
 is the basis of the distinction made by
 consciousness and language between it  
and the rest4 ,it will be instructive to
 notice the degrees of this difference4 
,the bodily pleasures are those least   
resembling perceptions of beauty4 ,by   
bodily pleasures we mean1 of course1    
more than pleasures with a bodily seat2 
for that class would include them all1  
as well as all forms and elements of    
consciousness4 ,aesthetic pleasures have
 physical conditions1 they depend on the
 activity of the eye and the ear1 of the
 memory and the other ideational        
functions of the brain4 ,but we do not  
connect those pleasures with their seats
 except in physiological studies2 the   
ideas with which aesthetic pleasures are
 associated are not the ideas of their  

bodily causes4 ,the pleasures we call   
physical1 and regard as low1 on the     
contrary1 are those which call our      
attention to some part of our own body1 
and which make no object so conspicuous 
to us as the organ in which they arise4 
,there is here1 then1 a very marked     
distinction between physical and        
aesthetic pleasure2 the organs of the   
latter must be transparent1 they must   
not intercept our attention1 but carry  
it directly to some external object4    
,the greater dignity and range of       
aesthetic pleasure is thus made very    
intelligible4 ,the soul is glad1 as it  
were1 to forget its connexion with the  
body and to fancy that it can travel    
over the world with the liberty with    
which it changes the objects of its     
thought4 ,the mind passes from ,china to
 ,peru without any conscious change in  
the local tensions of the body4 ,this   
illusion of disembodiment is very       
exhilarating1 while immersion in the    
flesh and confinement to some organ     

gives a tone of grossness and           
selfishness to our consciousness4 ,the  
generally meaner associations of        
physical pleasures also help to explain 
their comparative crudity4  ,the        
differetia of aesthetic pleasure not its
 disinterestedness4   #h4 ,the          
distinction between pleasure and the    
sense of beauty has sometimes been said 
to consist in the unselfishness of      
aesthetic satisfaction4 ,in other       
pleasures1 it is said1 we gratify our   
senses and passions2 in the             
contemplation of beauty we are raised   
above ourselves1 the passions are       
silenced and we are happy in the        
recognition of a good that we do not    
seek to possess4 ,the painter does not  
look at a spring of water with the eyes 
of a thirsty man1 nor at a beautiful    
woman with those of a satyr4 ,the       
difference lies1 it is urged1 in the    
impersonality of the enjoyment4 ,but    
this distinction is one of intensity and
 delicacy1 not of nature1 and it seems  

satisfactory only to the least aesthetic
 minds4#a  ,in the second place1 the    
supposed disinterestedness of aesthetic 
delights is not truly fundamental4      
,appreciation of a picture is not       
identical with the desire to buy it1 but
 it is1 or ought to be1 closely related 
and preliminary to that desire4 ,the    
beauties of nature and of the plastic   
arts are not consumed by being enjoyed2 
they retain all the efficacy to impress 
a second beholder4 ,but this            
circumstance is accidental1 and those   
aesthetic objects which depend upon     
change and are exhausted in time1 as are
 all performances1 are things the       
enjoyment of which is an object of      
rivalry and is coveted as much as any   
other pleasure4 ,and even plastic       
beauties can often not be enjoyed except
 by a few1 on account of the necessity  
of travel or other difficulties of      
access1 and then this aesthetic         
enjoyment is as selfishly pursued as the
 rest4  ,the truth which the theory is  

trying to state seems rather to be that 
when we seek aesthetic pleasures we have
 no further pleasure in mind2 that we do
 not mix up the satisfactions of vanity 
and proprietorship with the delight of  
contemplation4 ,this is true1 but it is 
true at bottom of all pursuits and      
enjoyments4 ,every real pleasure is in  
one sense disinterested4 ,it is not     
sought with ulterior motives1 and what  
fills the mind is no calculation1 but   
the image of an object or event1        
suffused with emotion4 ,a sophisticated 
consciousness may often take the idea of
 self as the touchstone of its          
inclinations2 but this self1 for the    
gratification and aggrandizement of     
which a man may live1 is itself only a  
complex of aims and memories1 which once
 had their direct objects1 in which he  
had taken a spontaneous and unselfish   
interest4 ,the gratifications which1    
merged together1 make the selfishness   
are each of them ingenuous1 and no more 
selfish than the most altruistic1       

impersonal emotion4 ,the content of     
selfishness is a mass of unselfishness4 
,there is no reference to the nominal   
essence called oneself either in one's  
appetites or in one's natural           
affections2 yet a man absorbed in his   
meat and drink1 in his houses and lands1
 in his children and dogs1 is called    
selfish because these interests1        
although natural and instinctive in him1
 are not shared by others4 ,the         
unselfish man is he whose nature has a  
more universal direction1 whose         
interests are more widely diffused4     
,but as impersonal thoughts are such    
only in their object1 not in their      
subject or agents1 since1 all thoughts  
are the thoughts of somebody3 so also   
unselfish interests have to be          
somebody's interests4 ,if we were not   
interested in beauty1 if it were of no  
concern to our happiness whether things 
were beautiful or ugly1 we should       
manifest not the maximum1 but the total 
absence of aesthetic faculty4 ,the      

disinterestedness of this pleasure is1  
therefore1 that of all primitive and    
intuitive satisfactions1 which are in no
 way conditioned by a reference to an   
artificial general concept1 like that of
 the self1 all the potency of which must
 itself be derived from the independent 
energy of its component elements4 ,i    
care about myself because myself is a   
name for the things ,i have at heart4   
,to set up the verbal figment of        
personality and make it an object of    
concern apart from the interests which  
were its content and substance1 turns   
the moralist into a pedant1 and ethics  
into a superstition4 ,the self which is 
the object of amour propre is an idol of
 the tribe1 and needs to be             
disintegrated into the primitive        
objective interests that underlie it    
before the cultus of it can be justified
 by reason4  ,the differentia of        
aesthetic pleasure not its universality4
   #i4 ,the supposed disinterestedness  
of our love of beauty passes into       

another characteristic of it often      
regarded as essential1 -- its           
universality4 ,the pleasures of the     
senses have1 it is said1 no dogmatism in
 them2 that anything gives me pleasure  
involves no assertion about its capacity
 to give pleasure to another4 ,but when 
,i judge a thing to be beautiful1 my    
judgment means that the thing is        
beautiful in itself1 or 7what is the    
same thing more critically expressed7   
that it should seem so to everybody4    
,the claim to universality is1 according
 to this doctrine1 the essence of the   
aesthetic2 what makes the perception of 
beauty a judgment rather than a         
sensation4 ,all aesthetic precepts would
 be impossible1 and all criticism       
arbitrary and subjective1 unless we     
admit a paradoxical universality in our 
judgment1 the philosophical implications
 of which we may then go on to develope4
 ,but we are fortunately not required to
 enter the labyrinth into which this    
method leads2 there is a much simpler   

and clearer way of studying such        
questions1 which is to challenge and    
analyze the assertion before us and seek
 its basis in human nature4 ,before this
 is done1 we should run the risk of     
expanding a natural misconception or    
inaccuracy of thought into an inveterate
 and pernicious prejudice by making it  
the centre of an elaborate construction4
  ,that the claim of universality is    
such a natural inaccuracy will not be   
hard to show4 ,there is notoriously no  
great agreement upon aesthetic matters2 
and such agreement as there is1 is based
 upon similarity of origin1 nature1 and 
circumstance among men1 a similarity    
which1 where it exists1 tends to bring  
about identity in all judgments and     
feelings4 ,it is unmeaning to say that  
what is beautiful to one man ought to be
 beautiful to another4 ,if their senses 
are the same1 their associations and    
dispositions similar1 then the same     
thing will certainly be beautiful to    
both4 ,if their natures are different1  

the form which to one will be entrancing
 will be to another even invisible1     
because his classifications and         
discriminations in perception will be   
different1 and he may see a hideous     
detached fragment or a shapeless        
aggregate of things1 in what to another 
is a perfect whole -- so entirely are   
the unities of function and use4 ,it is 
absurd to say that what is invisible to 
a given being ought to seem beautiful to
 him4 ,evidently this obligation of     
recognizing the same qualities is       
conditioned by the possession of the    
same faculties4 ,but no two men have    
exactly the same faculties1 nor can     
things have for any two exactly the same
 values4  ,what is loosely expressed by 
saying that any one ought to see this or
 that beauty is that he would see it if 
his disposition1 training1 or attention 
were what our ideal demands for him2 and
 our ideal of what any one should be has
 complex but discoverable sources4 ,we  
take1 for instance1 a certain pleasure  

in having our own judgments supported by
 those of others2 we are intolerant1 if 
not of the existence of a nature        
different from our own1 at least of its 
expression in words and judgments4 ,we  
are confirmed or made happy in our      
doubtful opinions by seeing them        
accepted universally4 ,we are unable to 
find the basis of our taste in our own  
experience and therefore refuse to look 
for it there4 ,if we were sure of our   
ground1 we should be willing to         
acquiesce in the naturally different    
feelings and ways of others1 as a man   
who is conscious of speaking his        
language with the accent of the capital 
confesses its arbitrariness with gayety1
 and is pleased and interested in the   
variations of it he observes in         
provincials2 but the provincial is      
always zealous to show that he has      
reason and ancient authority to justify 
his oddities4 ,so people who have no    
sensations1 and do not know why they    
judge1 are always trying to show that   

they judge by universal reason4  ,thus  
the frailty and superficiality of our   
own judgments cannot brook              
contradiction4 ,we abhor another man's  
doubt when we cannot tell him why we    
ourselves believe4 ,our ideal of other  
men tends therefore to include the      
agreement of their judgments with our   
own2 and although we might acknowledge  
the fatuity of this demand in regard to 
natures very different from the human1  
we may be unreasonable enough to require
 that all races should admire the same  
style of architecture1 and all ages the 
same poets4  ,the great actual unity of 
human taste within the range of         
conventional history helps the          
pretension4 ,but in principle it is     
untenable4 ,nothing has less to do with 
the real merit of a work of imagination 
than the capacity of all men to         
appreciate it2 the true test is the     
degree and kind of satisfaction it can  
give to him who appreciates it most4    
,the symphony would lose nothing if half

 mankind had always been deaf1 as       
nine-tenths of them actually are to the 
intricacies of its harmonies2 but it    
would have lost much if no ,beethoven   
had existed4 ,and more3 incapacity to   
appreciate certain types of beauty may  
be the condition sine qua non for the   
appreciation of another kind2 the       
greatest capacity both for enjoyment and
 creation is highly specialized and     
exclusive1 and hence the greatest ages  
of art have often been strangely        
intolerant4  ,the invectives of one     
school against another1 perverse as they
 are philosophically1 are artistically  
often signs of health1 because they     
indicate a vital appreciation of certain
 kinds of beauty1 a love of them that   
has grown into a jealous passion4 ,the  
architects that have pieced out the     
imperfections of ancient buildings with 
their own thoughts1 like ,charles ,v4   
when he raised his massive palace beside
 the ,alhambra1 may be condemned from a 
certain point of view4 ,they marred much

 by their interference2 but they showed 
a splendid confidence in their own      
intuitions1 a proud assertion of their  
own taste1 which is the greatest        
evidence of aesthetic sincerity4 ,on the
 contrary1 our own gropings1            
eclecticism1 and archaeology are the    
symptoms of impotence4 ,if we were less 
learned and less just1 we might be more 
efficient4 ,if our appreciation were    
less general1 it might be more real1 and
 if we trained our imagination into     
exclusiveness1 it might attain to       
character4  ,the differentia of         
aesthetic pleasure3 its objectification4
   #aj4 ,there is1 however1 something   
more in the claim to universality in    
aesthetic judgments than the desire to  
generalize our own opinions4 ,there is  
the expression of a curious but         
well-known psychological phenomenon1    
viz41 the transformation of an element  
of sensation into the quality of a      
thing4 ,if we say that other men should 
see the beauties we see1 it is because  

we think those beauties are in the      
object1 like its colour1 proportion1 or 
size4 ,our judgment appears to us merely
 the perception and discovery of an     
external existence1 of the real         
excellence that is without4 ,but this   
notion is radically absurd and          
contradictory4 ,beauty1 as we have seen1
 is a value2 it cannot be conceived as  
an independent existence which affects  
our senses and which we consequently    
perceive4 ,it exists in perception1 and 
cannot exist otherwise4 ,a beautynot    
perceived is a pleasure not felt1 and a 
contradiction4 ,but modern philosophy   
has taught us to say the same thing of  
every element of the perceived world2   
all are sensations2 and their grouping  
into objects imagined to be permanent   
and external is the work of certain     
habits of our intelligence4 ,we should  
be incapable of surveying or retaining  
the diffused experiences of life1 unless
 we organized and classified them1 and  
out of the chaos of impressions framed  

the world of conventional and           
recognizable objects4  ,how this is done
 is explained by the current theories of
 perception4 ,external objects usually  
affect various senses at once1 the      
impressions of which are thereby        
associated4 ,repeated experiences of one
 object are also associated on account  
of their similarity2 hence a double     
tendency to merge and unify into a      
single percept1 to which a name is      
attached1 the group of those memories   
and reactions which in fact had one     
external thing for their cause4 ,but    
this percept1 once formed1 is clearly   
different from those particular         
experiences out of which it grew4 ,it is
 permanent1 they are variable4 ,they are
 but partial views and glimpses of it4  
,the constituted notion therefore comes 
to be the reality1 and the materials of 
it merely the appearance4 ,the          
distinction between substance and       
quality1 reality and appearance1 matter 
and mind1 has no other origin4  ,the    

objects thus conceived and distinguished
 from our ideas of them1 are at first   
compacted of all the impressions1       
feelings1 and memories1 which offer     
themselves for association and fall     
within the vortex of the amalgamating   
imagination4 ,every sensation we get    
from a thing is originally treated as   
one of its qualities4 ,experiment1      
however1 and the practical need of a    
simpler conception of the structure of  
objects lead us gradually to reduce the 
qualities of the object to a minimum1   
and to regard most perceptions as an    
effect of those few qualities upon us4  
,these few primary qualities1 like      
extension which we persist in treating  
as independently real and as the quality
 of a substance1 are those which suffice
 to explain the order of our            
experiences4 ,all the rest1 like colour1
 are relegated to the subjective sphere1
 as merely effects upon our minds1 and  
apparent or secondary qualities of the  
object4  ,but this distinction has only 

a practical justification4 ,convenience 
and economy of thought alone determine  
what combination of our sensations we   
shall continue to objectify and treat as
 the cause of the rest4 ,the right and  
tendency to be objective is equal in    
all1 since they are all prior to the    
artifice of thought by which we separate
 the concept from its materials1 the    
thing from our experiences4  ,the       
qualities which we now conceive to      
belong to real objects are for the moat 
part images of sight and touch4 ,one of 
the first classes of effects to be      
treated as secondary were naturally     
pleasures and pains1 since it could     
commonly conduce very little to         
intelligent and successful action to    
conceive our pleasures and pains as     
resident in objects4 ,but emotions are  
essentially capable of objectification1 
as well as impressions of sense2 and one
 may well believe that a primitive and  
inexperienced consciousness would rather
 people the world with ghosts of its own

 terrors and passions than with         
projections of those luminous and       
mathematical concepts which as yet it   
could hardly have formed4  ,this        
animistic and mythological habit of     
thought still holds its own at the      
confines of knowledge1 where mechanical 
explanations are not found4 ,in         
ourselves1 where nearness makes         
observation difficult1 in the intricate 
chaos of animal and human life1 we still
 appeal to the efficacy of will and     
ideas1 as also in the remote night of   
cosmic and religious problems4 ,but in  
all the intermediate realm of vulgar    
day1 where mechanical science has made  
progress1 the inclusion of emotional or 
passionate elements in the concept of   
the reality would be now an             
extravagance4 ,here our idea of things  
is composed exclusively of perceptual   
elements1 of the ideas of form and of   
motion4  ,the beauty of objects1        
however1 forms an exception to this     
rule4 ,beauty is an emotional element1 a

 pleasure of ours1 which nevertheless we
 regard as a quality of things4 ,but we 
are now prepared to understand the      
nature of this exception4 ,it is the    
survival of a tendency originally       
universal to make every effect of a     
thing upon us a constituent of its      
conceived nature4 ,the scientific idea  
of a thing is a great abstraction from  
the mass of perceptions and reactions   
which that thing produces the aesthetic 
idea is less abstract1 since it retains 
the emotional reaction1 the pleasure of 
the perception1 as an integral part of  
the conceived thing4  ,nor is it hard to
 find the ground of this survival in the
 sense of beauty of an objectification  
of feeling elsewhere extinct4 ,most of  
the pleasures which objects cause are   
easily distinguished and separated from 
the perception of the object3 the object
 has to be applied to a particular      
organ1 like the palate1 or swallowed    
like wine1 or used and operated upon in 
some way before the pleasure arises4    

,the cohesion is therefore slight       
between the pleasure and the other      
associated elements of sense2 the       
pleasure is separated in time from the  
perception1 or it is localized in a     
different organ1 and consequently is at 
once recognized as an effect and not as 
a quality of the object4 ,but when the  
process of perception itself is         
pleasant1 as it may easily be1 when the 
intellectual operation1 by which the    
elements of sense are associated and    
projected1 and the concept of the form  
and substance of the thing produced1 is 
naturally delightful1 then we have a    
pleasure intimately bound up in the     
thing1 inseparable from its character   
and constitution1 the seat of which in  
us is the same as the seat of the       
perception4 ,we naturally fail1 under   
these circumstances1 to separate the    
pleasure from the other objectified     
feelings4 ,it becomes1 like them1 a     
quality of the object1 which we         
distinguish from pleasures not so       

incorporated in the perception of       
things1 by giving it the name of beauty4
  ,the definition of beauty4   #aa4 ,we 
have now reached our definition of      
beauty1 which1 in the terms of our      
successive analysis and narrowing of the
 conception1 is value positive1         
intrinsic1 and objectified4 ,or1 in less
 technical language1 ,beauty is pleasure
 regarded as the quality of a thing4    
,this definition is intended to sum up a
 variety of distinctions and            
identifications which should perhaps be 
here more explicitly set down4 ,beauty  
is a value1 that is1 it is not a        
perception of a matter of fact or of a  
relation3 it is an emotion1 an affection
 of our volitional and appreciative     
nature4 ,an object cannot be beautiful  
if it can give pleasure to nobody3 a    
beauty to which all men were forever    
indifferent is a contradiction in terms4
  ,in the second place this value is    
positive1 it is the sense of the        
presence of something good1 or 7in the  

case of ugliness7 of its absence4 ,it is
 never the perception of a positive     
evil1 it is never a negative value4     
,that we are endowed with the sense of  
beauty is a pure gain which brings no   
evil with it4 ,when the ugly ceases to  
be amusing or merely uninteresting and  
becomes disgusting1 it becomes indeed a 
positive evil3 but a moral and          
practical1 not an aesthetic one4 ,in    
aesthetics that saying is true -- often 
so disingenuous in ethics -- that evil  
is nothing but the absence of good3 for 
even the tedium and vulgarity of an     
existence without beauty is not itself  
ugly so much as lamentable and          
degrading4 ,the absence of aesthetic    
goods is a moral evil3 the aesthetic    
evil is merely relative1 and means less 
of aesthetic good than was expected at  
the place and time4 ,no form in itself  
gives pain1 although some forms give    
pain by causing a shock of surprise even
 when they are really beautiful3 as if a
 mother found a fine bull pup in her    

child's cradle1 when her pain would not 
be aesthetic in its nature4  ,further1  
this pleasure must not be in the        
consequence of the utility of the object
 or event1 but in its immediate         
perception2 in other words1 beauty is an
 ultimate good1 something that gives    
satisfaction to a natural function1 to  
some fundamental need or capacity of our
 minds4 ,beauty is therefore a positive 
value that is intrinsic2 it is a        
pleasure4 ,these two circumstances      
sufficiently separate the sphere of     
aesthetics from that of ethics4 ,moral  
values are generally negative1 and      
always remote4 ,morality has to do with 
the avoidance of evil and the pursuit of
 good3 aesthetics only with enjoyment4  
,finally1 the pleasures of sense are    
distinguished from the perception of    
beauty1 as sensation in general is      
distinguished from perception2 by the   
objectification of the elements and     
their appearance as qualities rather of 
things than of consciousness4 ,the      

passage from sensation to perception is 
gradual1 and the path may be sometimes  
retraced3 so it is with beauty and the  
pleasures of sensation4 ,there is no    
sharp line between them1 but it depends 
upon the degree of objectivity my       
feeling has attained at the moment      
whether ,i say ,it pleases me1 or ,it is
 beautiful4 ,if ,i am self-conscious and
 critical1 ,i shall probably use1 one   
phrase2 if ,i am impulsive and          
susceptible1 the other4 ,the more       
remote1 interwoven1 and inextricable the
 pleasure is1 the more objective it will
 appear2 and the union of two pleasures 
often makes one beauty4 ,in             
,shakespeare's ,l,i,vth sonnet are these
 words3       ,o how much more doth     
beauty beauteous seem      ,by that     
sweet ornament which truth doth give6   
,the rose looks fair1 but fairer we it  
deem      ,for that sweet odour which   
doth in it live4      ,the canker-blooms
 have full as deep a dye      ,as the   
perfumed tincture of the roses1         

,hang on such thorns1 and play as       
wantonly      ,when summer's breath     
their masked buds discloses4      ,but1 
for their beauty only is their show1    
,they live unwooed and unrespected fade2
      ,die to themselves4 ,sweet roses  
do not so3      ,of their sweet deaths  
are sweetest odours made4  ,one added   
ornament1 we see1 turns the deep dye1   
which was but show and mere sensation   
before1 into an element of beauty and   
reality1 and as truth is here the       
co-operation of perceptions1 so beauty  
is the co-operation of pleasures4 ,if   
colour1 form1 and motion are hardly     
beautiful without the sweetness of the  
odour1 how much more necessary would    
they be for the sweetness itself to     
become a beauty6 ,if we had the perfume 
in a flask1 no one would think of       
calling it beautiful3 it would give us  
too detached and controllable a         
sensation4 ,there would be no object in 
which it could be easily incorporated4  
,but let it float from the garden1 and  

it will add another sensuous charm to   
objects simultaneously recognized1 and  
help to make them beautiful4 ,thus      
beauty is constituted by the            
objectification of pleasure4 ,it is     
pleasure objectified4   ,,part ,,ii     
,,the ,,materials ,,of ,,beauty  ,all   
human functions may contribute to the   
sense of beauty4   #ab4 ,our task will  
now be to pass in review the various    
elements of our consciousness1 and see  
what each contributes to the beauty of  
the world4 ,we shall find that they do  
so whenever they are inextricably       
associated with the objectifying        
activity of the understanding4 ,whenever
 the golden thread of pleasure enters   
that web of things which our            
intelligence is always busily spinning1 
it lends to the visible world that      
mysterious and subtle charm which we    
call beauty4  ,there is no function of  
our nature which cannot contribute      
something to this effect1 but one       
function differs very much from another 

in the amount and directness of its     
contribution4 ,the pleasures of the eye 
and ear1 of the imagination and memory1 
are the most easily objectified and     
merged in ideas2 but it would betray    
inexcusable haste and slight            
appreciation of the principle involved1 
if we called them the only materials of 
beauty4 ,our effort will rather be to   
discover its other sources1 which have  
been more generally ignored1 and point  
out their importance4 ,for the five     
senses and the three powers of the soul1
 which play so large a part in          
traditional psychology1 are by no means 
the only sources or factors of          
consciousness2 they are more or less    
external divisions of its content1 and  
not even exhaustive of that4 ,the nature
 and changes of our life have deeper    
roots1 and are controlled by less       
obvious processes4  ,the human body is a
 machine that holds together by virtue  
of certain vital functions1 on the      
cessation of which it is dissolved4     

,some of these1 like the circulation of 
the blood1 the growth and decay of the  
tissues1 are at first sight unconscious4
 ,yet any important disturbance of these
 fundamental processes at once produces 
great and painful changes in            
consciousness4 ,slight alterations are  
not without their conscious echo3 and   
the whole temper and tone of our mind1  
the strength of our passions1 the grip  
and concatenation of our habits1 our    
power of attention1 and the liveliness  
of our fancy and affections are due to  
the influence of these vital forces4    
,they do not1 perhaps1 constitute the   
whole basis of any one idea or emotion3 
but they are the conditions of the      
existence and character of all4         
,particularly important are they for the
 value of our experience4 ,they         
constitute health1 without which no     
pleasure can be pure4 ,they determine   
our impulses in leisure1 and furnish    
that surplus energy which we spend in   
play1 in art1 and in speculation4 ,the  

attraction of these pursuits1 and the   
very existence of an aesthetic sphere1  
is due to the efficiency and perfection 
of our vital processes4 ,the pleasures  
which they involve are not exclusively  
bound to any particular object1 and     
therefore do not account for the        
relative beauty of things4 ,they are    
loose and unlocalized1 having no special
 organ1 or one which is internal and    
hidden within the body4 ,they therefore 
remain undiscriminated in consciousness1
 and can serve to add interest to any   
object1 or to cast a general glamour    
over the world1 very favourable to its  
interest and beauty4  ,the aesthetic    
value of vital functions differs        
according to their physiological        
concomitants3 those that are favourable 
to ideation are of course more apt to   
extend something of their intimate      
warmth to the pleasures of              
contemplation1 and thus to intensify the
 sense of beauty and the interest of    
thought4 ,those1 on the other hand1 that

 for physiological reasons tend to      
inhibit ideation1 and to drown the      
attention in dumb and unrepresentable   
feelings1 are less favourable to        
aesthetic activity4 ,the double effect  
of drowsiness and reverie will          
illustrate this difference4 ,the        
heaviness of sleep seems to fall first  
on the outer senses1 and of course makes
 them incapable of acute impressions2   
but if it goes no further1 it leaves the
 imagination all the freer1 and by      
heightening the colours of the fancy1   
often suggests and reveals beautiful    
images4 ,there is a kind of poetry and  
invention that comes only in such       
moments4 ,in them many lovely melodies  
must first have been heard1 and centaurs
 and angels originally imagined4  ,if1  
however1 the lethargy is more complete1 
or if the cause of it is such that the  
imagination is retarded while the senses
 remain awake1 -- as is the case with an
 over-fed or over-exercised body1 -- we 
have a state of aesthetic insensibility4

 ,the exhilaration which comes with pure
 and refreshing air has a marked        
influence on our appreciations4 ,to it  
is largely due the beauty of the        
morning1 and the entirely different     
charm it has from the evening4 ,the     
opposite state of all the functions here
 adds an opposite emotion to externally 
similar scenes1 making both infinitely  
but differently beautiful4  ,it would be
 curious and probably surprising to     
discover how much the pleasure of       
breathing has to do with our highest and
 most transcendental ideals4 ,it is not 
merely a metaphor that makes us couple  
airiness with exquisiteness and         
breathlessness with awe2 it is the      
actual recurrence of a sensation in the 
throat and lungs that gives those       
impressions an immediate power1 prior to
 all reflection upon their significance4
 ,it is1 therefore1 to this vital       
sensation of deep or arrested           
respiration that the impressiveness of  
those objects is immediately due4  ,the 

influence of the passion of love4   #ac4
 ,half-way between vital and social     
functions1 lies the sexual instinct4 ,if
 nature had solved the problem of       
reproduction without the differentiation
 of sex1 our emotional life would have  
been radically different4 ,so profound  
and1 especially in woman1 so pervasive  
an influence does this function exert1  
that we should betray an entirely unreal
 view of human nature if we did not     
inquire into the relations of sex with  
our aesthetic susceptibility4 ,we must  
not expect1 however1 any great          
difference between man and woman in the 
scope or objects of aesthetic interest3 
what is important in emotional life is  
not which sex an animal has1 but that it
 has sex at all4 ,for if we consider the
 difficult problem which nature had to  
solve in sexual reproduction1 and the   
nice adjustment of instinct which it    
demands1 we shall see that the reactions
 and susceptibilities which must be     
implanted in the individual are for the 

most part identical in both sexes1 as   
the sexual organization is itself       
fundamentally similar in both4 ,indeed1 
individuals of various species and the  
whole animal kingdom have the same      
sexual disposition1 although1 of course1
 the particular object destined to call 
forth the complete sexual reaction1     
differs with every species1 and with    
each sex4  ,if we were dealing with the 
philosophy of love1 and not with that of
 beauty1 our problem would be to find   
out by what machinery this fundamental  
susceptibility1 common to all animals of
 both sexes1 is gradually directed to   
more and more definite objects3 first1  
to one species and one sex1 and         
ultimately to one individual4 ,it is not
 enough that sexual organs should be    
differentiated3 the connexion must be   
established between them and the outer  
senses1 so that the animal may recognize
 and pursue the proper object4  ,the    
case of lifelong fidelity to one mate --
 perhaps even to an unsatisfied and     

hopeless love -- is the maximum of      
differentiation1 which even overleaps   
the utility which gave it a foothold in 
nature1 and defeats its own object4 ,for
 the differentiation of the instinct in 
respect to sex1 age1 and species is     
obviously necessary to its success as a 
device for reproduction4 ,while this    
differentiation is not complete1 -- and 
it often is not1 -- there is a great    
deal of groping and waste2 and the force
 and constancy of the instinct must make
 up for its lack of precision4 ,a great 
deal of vital energy is thus absorbed by
 this ill-adjusted function4 ,the most  
economical arrangement which can be     
conceived1 would be one by which only   
the one female best fitted to bear      
offspring to a male should arouse his   
desire1 and only so many times as it was
 well she should grow pregnant1 thus    
leaving his energy and attention free at
 all other times to exercise the other  
faculties of his nature4  ,if this ideal
 had been reached1 the instinct1 like   

all those perfectly adjusted1 would tend
 to become unconscious2 and we should   
miss those secondary effects with which 
we are exclusively concerned in         
aesthetics4 ,for it is precisely from   
the waste1 from the radiation of the    
sexual passion1 that ,i beauty borrows  
warmth4 ,as a harp1 made to vibrate to  
the fingers1 gives some music to every  
wind1 so the nature of man1 necessarily 
susceptible to woman1 becomes           
simultaneously sensitive to other       
influences1 and capable of tenderness   
toward every object4 ,the capacity to   
love gives our contemplation that glow  
without which it might often fail to    
manifest beauty2 and the whole          
sentimental side of our aesthetic       
sensibility -- without which it would be
 perceptive and mathematical rather than
 aesthetic -- is due to our sexual      
organization remotely stirred4  ,the    
attraction of sex could not become      
efficient unless the senses were first  
attracted4 ,the eye must be fascinated  

and the ear charmed by the object which 
nature intends should be pursued4 ,both 
sexes for this reason develope secondary
 sexual characteristics2 and the sexual 
emotions are simultaneously extended to 
various secondary objects4 ,the colour1 
the grace1 the form1 which become the   
stimuli of sexual passion1 and the      
guides of sexual selection1 acquire1    
before they can fulfil that office1 a   
certain intrinsic charm4 ,this charm is 
not only present for reasons which1 in  
an admissible sense1 we may call        
teleological1 on account1 that is1 of   
its past utility in reproduction1 but   
its intensity and power are due to the  
simultaneous stirring of profound sexual
 impulses4 ,not1 of course1 that any    
specifically sexual ideas are connected 
with these feelings3 such ideas are     
absent in a modest and inexperienced    
mind even in the obviously sexual       
passions of love and jealousy4  ,these  
secondary objects of interest1 which are
 some of the most conspicuous elements  

of beauty1 are to be called sexual for  
these two reasons3 because the          
contingencies of the sexual function    
hare helped to establish them in our    
race1 and because they owe their        
fascination in a great measure to the   
participation of our sexual life in the 
reaction which they cause4  ,if any one 
were desirous to produce a being with a 
great susceptibility to beauty1 he could
 not invent an instrument better        
designed for that object than sex4      
,individuals that need not unite for the
 birth and rearing of each generation1  
might retain a savage independence4 ,for
 them it would not be necessary that any
 vision should fascinate1 or that any   
languor should soften1 the prying       
cruelty of the eye4 ,but sex endows the 
individual with a dumb and powerful     
instinct1 which carries his body and    
soul continually towards another2 makes 
it one of the dearest employments of his
 life to select and pursue a companion1 
and joins to possession the keenest     

pleasure1 to rivalry the fiercest rage1 
and to solitude an eternal melancholy4  
,what more could be needed to suffuse   
the world with the deepest meaning and  
beauty8 ,the attention is fixed upon a  
well-defined object1 and all the effects
 it produces in the mind are easily     
regarded as powers or qualities of that 
object4 ,but these effects are here     
powerful and profound4 ,the soul is     
stirred to its depths4 ,its hidden      
treasures are brought to the surface of 
consciousness4 ,the imagination and the 
heart awake for the first time4 ,all    
these new values crystallize about the  
objects then offered to the mind4 ,if   
the fancy is occupied by the image of a 
single person1 whose qualities have had 
the power of precipitating this         
revolution1 all the values gather about 
that one image4 ,the object becomes     
perfect1 and we are said to be in       
love4#b ,if the stimulus does not appear
 as a definite image1 the values evoked 
are dispersed over the world1 and we are

 said to have become lovers of nature1  
and to have discovered the beauty and   
meaning of things4  ,to a certain extent
 this kind of interest will centre in   
the proper object of sexual passion1 and
 in the special characteristics of the  
opposite sex2 and we find accordingly   
that woman is the most lovely object to 
man1 and man1 if female modesty would   
confess it1 the most interesting to     
woman4 ,but the effects of so           
fundamental and primitive a reaction are
 much more general4 ,sex is not the only
 object of sexual passion4 ,when love   
lacks its specific object1 when it does 
not yet understand itself1 or has been  
sacrificed to some other interest1 we   
see the stifled fire bursting out in    
various directions4 ,one is religious   
devotion1 another is zealous            
philanthropy1 a third is the fondling of
 pet animals1 but not the least         
fortunate is the love of nature1 and of 
art2 for nature also is often a second  
mistress that consoles us for the loss  

of a first4 ,passion then overflows and 
visibly floods those neighbouring       
regions which it had always secretly    
watered4 ,for the same nervous          
organization which sex involves1 with   
its necessarily wide branchings and     
associations in the brain1 must be      
partially stimulated by other objects   
than its specific or ultimate one       
especially in man1 who1 unlike some of  
the lower animals1 has not his instincts
 clearly distinct and intermittent1 but 
always partially active1 and never      
active in isolation4 ,we may say1 then1 
that for man all nature is a secondary  
object of sexual passion1 and that to   
this fact the beauty of nature is       
largely due4  ,social instincts and     
their aesthetic influence4   #ad4 ,the  
function of reproduction carries with it
 not only direct modifications of the   
body and mind1 but a whole set of social
 institutions1 for the existence of     
which social instincts and habits are   
necessary in man4 ,these social         

feelings1 the parental1 the patriotic1  
or the merely gregarious1 are not of    
much direct value for aesthetics1       
although1 as is seen in the case of     
fashions1 they are important in         
determining the duration and prevalence 
of a taste once formed4  ,indirectly    
they are of vast importance and play a  
great rle in arts like poetry1 where the
 effect depends on what is signified    
more than on what is offered to sense4  
,any appeal to a human interest rebounds
 in favour of a work of art in which it 
is successfully made4 ,that interest1   
unaesthetic in itself1 helps to fix the 
attention and to furnish subject-matter 
and momentum to arts and modes of       
appreciation which are aesthetic4 ,thus 
comprehension of the passion of love is 
necessary to the appreciation of        
numberless songs1 plays1 and novels1 and
 not a few works of musical and plastic 
art4  ,the treatment of these matters   
must be postponed until we are prepared 
to deal with expression -- the most     

complex element of effect4 ,it will     
suffice here to point out why social and
 gregarious impulses1 in the            
satisfaction of which happiness mainly  
resides1 are those in which beauty finds
 least support4 ,this may help us to    
understand better the relations between 
aesthetics and hedonics1 and the nature 
of that objectification in which we have
 placed the difference between beauty   
and pleasure4  ,so long as happiness is 
conceived as a poet might conceive it1  
namely1 in its immediately sensuous and 
emotional factors1 so long as we live in
 the moment and make our happiness      
consist in the simplest things1 -- in   
breathing1 seeing1 hearing1 loving1 and 
sleeping1 -- our happiness has the same 
substance1 the same elements1 as our    
aesthetic delight1 for it is aesthetic  
delight that makes our happiness4 ,yet  
poets and artists1 with their immediate 
and aesthetic joys1 are not thought to  
be happy men2 they themselves are apt to
 be loud in their lamentations1 and to  

regard themselves as eminently and      
tragically unhappy4 ,this arises from   
the intensity and inconstancy of their  
emotions1 from their improvidence1 and  
from the eccentricity of their social   
habits4 ,while among them the sensuous  
and vital functions have the upper hand1
 the gregarious and social instincts are
 subordinated and often deranged2 and   
their unhappiness consists in the sense 
of their unfitness to live in the world 
into which they are born4  ,but man is  
pre-eminently a political animal1 and   
social needs are almost as fundamental  
in him as vital functions1 and often    
more conscious4 ,friendship1 wealth1    
reputation1 power1 and influence1 when  
added to family life1 constitute surely 
the main elements of happiness4 ,now    
these are only very partially composed  
of definite images of objects4 ,the     
desire for them1 the consciousness of   
their absence or possession1 comes upon 
us only when we reflect1 when we are    
planning1 considering the future1       

gathering the words of others1          
rehearsing their scorn or admiration for
 ourselves1 conceiving possible         
situations in which our virtue1 our fame
 or power would become conspicuous1     
comparing our lot with that of others1  
and going through other discursive      
processes of thought4 ,apprehension1    
doubt1 isolation1 are things which come 
upon us keenly when we reflect upon our 
lives2 they cannot easily become        
qualities of any object4 ,if by chance  
they can1 they acquire a great aesthetic
 value4 ,for instance1 home1 which in   
its social sense is a concept of        
happiness1 when it becomes materialized 
in a cottage and a garden becomes an    
aesthetic concept1 becomes a beautiful  
thing4 ,the happiness is objectified1   
and the object beautified4  ,social     
objects1 however1 are seldom thus       
aesthetic1 because they are not thus    
definitely imaginable4 ,they are diffuse
 and abstract1 and verbal rather than   
sensuous in their materials4 ,therefore 

the great emotions that go with them are
 not immediately transmutable into      
beauty4 ,if artists and poets are       
unhappy1 it is after all because        
happiness does not interest them4 ,they 
cannot seriously pursue it1 because its 
components are not components of beauty1
 and being in love with beauty1 they    
neglect and despise those unaesthetic   
social virtues in the operation of which
 happiness is found4 ,on the other hand 
those who pursue happiness conceived    
merely in the abstract and conventional 
terms1 as money1 success1 or            
respectability1 often miss that real and
 fundamental part of happiness which    
flows from the senses and imagination4  
,this element is what aesthetics        
supplies to life2 for beauty also can be
 a cause and a factor of happiness4 ,yet
 the happiness of loving beauty is      
either too sensuous to be stable1 or    
else too ultimate1 too sacramental1 to  
be accounted happiness by the worldly   
mind4  ,the lower senses4   #ae4 ,the   

senses of touch1 taste1 and smell1      
although capable no doubt of a great    
development1 have not served in man for 
the purposes of intelligence so much as 
those of sight and hearing4 ,it is      
natural that as they remain normally in 
the background of consciousness1 and    
furnish the least part of our           
objectified ideas1 the pleasures        
connected with them should remain also  
detached1 and unused for the purpose of 
appreciation of nature4 ,they have been 
called the unaesthetic1 as well as the  
lower1 senses2 but the propriety of     
these epithets1 which is undeniable1 is 
due not to any intrinsic sensuality or  
baseness of these senses1 but to the    
function which they happen to have in   
our experience4 ,smell and taste1 like  
hearing1 have the great disadvantage of 
not being intrinsically spatial3 they   
are therefore not fitted to serve for   
the representation of nature1 which     
allows herself to be accurately         
conceived only in spatial terms4#c ,they

 have not reached1 moreover1 the same   
organization as sounds1 and therefore   
cannot furnish any play of subjective   
sensation comparable to music in        
interest4  ,the objectification of      
musical forms is due to their fixity and
 complexity3 like words1 they are       
thought of as existing in a social      
medium1 and can be beautiful without    
being spatial4 ,but tastes have never   
been so accurately or universally       
classified and distinguished2 the       
instrument of sensation does not allow  
such nice and stable discriminations as 
does the ear4 ,the art of combining     
dishes and wines1 although one which    
everybody practises with more or less   
skill and attention1 deals with a       
material far too unrepresentable to be  
called beautiful4 ,the art remains in   
the sphere of the pleasant1 and is      
consequently regarded as servile1 rather
 than fine4  ,artists in life1 if that  
expression may be used for those who    
have beautified social and domestic     

existence1 have appealed continually to 
these lower senses4 ,a fragrant garden1 
and savoury meats1 incense1 and         
perfumes1 soft stuffs1 and delicious    
colours1 form our ideal of oriental     
luxuries1 an ideal which appeals too    
much to human nature ever to lose its   
charm4 ,yet our northern poets have     
seldom attempted to arouse these images 
in their sensuous intensity1 without    
relieving them by some imaginative      
touch4 ,in ,keats1 for example1 we find 
the following lines3 --       ,and still
 she slept in azure-lidded sleep1       
,in blanched linen1 smooth and          
lavendered1      ,while he from forth   
the closet brought a heap      ,of      
candied apple1 quince1 and plum1 and    
gourd1      ,with jellies soother than  
the creamy curd1      ,and lucent syrops
 tinct with cinnamon2      ,manna and   
dates in argosy transferred      ,from  
,fez2 and spiced dainties1 every one    
,from silken ,samarcand to cedared      
,lebanon4  ,even the most sensuous of   

,english poets1 in whom the love of     
beauty is supreme1 cannot keep long to  
the primal elements of beauty2 the      
higher flight is inevitable for him4    
,and how much does not the appeal to    
things in argosy transferred from ,fez1 
reinforced with the reference to        
,samarcand and especially to the        
authorized beauties of the cedars of    
,lebanon1 which even the ,puritan may   
sing without a blush1 add to our        
wavering satisfaction and reconcile our 
conscience to this unchristian          
indulgence of sense6  ,but the time may 
be near when such scruples will be less 
common1 and our poetry1 with our other  
arts1 will dwell nearer to the          
fountain-head of all inspiration4 ,for  
if nothing not once in sense is to be   
found in the intellect1 much less is    
such a thing to be found in the         
imagination4 ,if the cedars of ,lebanon 
did not spread a grateful shade1 or the 
winds rustle through the maze of their  
branches1 if ,lebanon had never been    

beautiful to sense1 it would not now be 
a fit or poetic subject of allusion4    
,and the word ,fez would be without     
imaginative value if no traveller had   
ever felt the intoxication of the torrid
 sun1 the languors of oriental luxury1  
or1 like the ,british soldier1 cried    
amid the dreary moralities of his native
 land3 --       ,take me somewhere east 
of ,suez           ,where the best is   
like the worst1      ,where there ain't 
no ten commandments           ,and a man
 may raise a thirst4  ,nor would        
,samarcand be anything but for the      
mystery of the desert and the           
picturesqueness of caravans1 nor would  
an argosy be poetic if the sea had no   
voices and no foam1 the winds and oars  
no resistance1 and the rudder and taut  
sheets no pull4 ,from these real        
sensations imagination draws its life1  
and suggestion its power4 ,the sweep of 
the fancy is itself also agreeable2 but 
the superiority of the distant over the 
present is only due to the mass and     

variety of the pleasures that can be    
suggested1 compared with the poverty of 
those that can at any time be felt4     
,sound4   #af4 ,sound shares with the   
lower senses the disadvantage of having 
no intrinsic spatial character2 it1     
therefore1 forms no part of the properly
 abstracted external world1 and the     
pleasures of the ear cannot become1 in  
the literal sense1 qualities of things4 
,but there is in sounds such an         
exquisite and continuous gradation in   
pitch1 and such a measurable relation in
 length1 that an object almost as       
complex and describable as the visible  
one can be built out of them4 ,what     
gives spatial forms their value in      
description of the environment is the   
ease with which discriminations and     
comparisons can be made in spatial      
objects3 they are measurable1 while     
unspatial sensations commonly are not4  
,but sounds are also measurable in their
 own category3 they have comparable     
pitches and durations1 and definite and 

recognizable combinations of those      
sensuous elements are as truly objects  
as chairs and tables4 ,not that a       
musical composition exists in any       
mystical way1 as a portion of the music 
of the spheres1 which no one is hearing2
 but that1 for a critical philosophy1   
visible objects are also nothing but    
possibilities of sensation4 ,the real   
world is merely the shadow of that      
assurance of eventual experience which  
accompanies sanity4 ,this objectivity   
can accrue to any mental figment that   
has enough cohesion1 content1 and       
individuality to be describable and     
recognizable1 and these qualities belong
 no less to audible than to spatial     
ideas4  ,there is1 accordingly1 some    
justification in ,schopenhauer's        
speculative assertion that music repeats
 the entire world of sense1 and is a    
parallel method of expression of the    
underlying substance1 or will4 ,the     
world of sound is certainly capable of  
infinite variety and1 were our sense    

developed1 of infinite extensions2 and  
it has as much as the world of matter   
the power to interest us and to stir our
 emotions4 ,it was therefore potentially
 as full of meaning4 ,but it has proved 
the less serviceable and constant       
apparition2 and1 therefore1 music1 which
 builds with its materials1 while the   
purest and most impressive of the arts1 
is the least human and instructive of   
them4  ,the pleasantness of sounds has a
 simple physical basis4 ,all sensations 
are pleasant only between certain limits
 of intensity2 but the ear can          
discriminate easily between noises1 that
 in themselves are uninteresting1 if not
 annoying1 and notes1 which have an     
unmistakable charm4 ,a sound is a note  
if the pulsations of the air by which it
 is produced recur at regular intervals4
 ,if there is no regular recurrence of  
waves1 it is a noise4 ,the rapidity of  
these regular beats determines the pitch
 of tones4 ,that quality or timbre by   
which one sound is distinguished from   

another of the same pitch and intensity 
is due to the different complications of
 waves in the air2 the ability to       
discriminate the various waves in the   
vibrating air is1 therefore1 the        
condition of our finding music in it2   
for every wave has its period1 and what 
we call a noise is a complication of    
notes too complex for our organs or our 
attention to decipher4  ,we find here1  
at the very threshold of our subject1 a 
clear instance of a conflict of         
principles which appears everywhere in  
aesthetics1 and is the source and       
explanation of many conflicts of taste4 
,since a note is heard when a set of    
regular vibrations can be discriminated 
in the chaos of sound1 it appears that  
the perception and value of this        
artistic element depends on abstraction1
 on the omission from the field of      
attention1 of all the elements which do 
not conform to a simple law4 ,this may  
be called the principle of purity4 ,but 
if it were1 the only principle at work1 

there would be no music more beautiful  
than the tone of a tuning-fork4 ,such   
sounds1 although delightful perhaps to a
 child1 are soon tedious4 ,the principle
 of purity must make some compromise    
with another principle1 which we may    
call that of interest4 ,the object must 
have enough variety and expression to   
hold our attention for a while1 and to  
stir our nature widely4  ,as we are more
 acutely sensitive to results or to     
processes1 we find the most agreeable   
effect nearer to one or to the other of 
these extremes of a tedious beauty or of
 an unbeautiful expressiveness4 ,but    
these principles1 as is clear1 are not  
coordinate4 ,the child who enjoys his   
rattle or his trumpet has aesthetic     
enjoyment1 of however rude a kind2 but  
the master of technique who should give 
a performance wholly without sensuous   
charm would be a gymnast and not a      
musician1 and the author whose novels   
and poems should be merely expressive1  
and interesting only by their meaning   

and moral1 would be a writer of history 
or philosophy1 but not an artist4 ,the  
principle of purity is therefore        
essential to aesthetic effect1 but the  
principle of interest is subsidiary1 and
 if appealed to alone would fail to     
produce beauty4  ,the distinction1      
however1 is not absolute3 for the simple
 sensation is itself interesting1 and   
the complication1 if it is appreciable  
by sense and does not require discursive
 thought to grasp it1 is itself         
beautiful4 ,there may be a work of art  
in which the sensuous materials are not 
pleasing1 as a discourse without        
euphony1 if the structure and expression
 give delight2 and there may be an      
interesting object without perceived    
structure1 like musical notes1 or the   
blue sky4 ,perfection would1 of course1 
lie in the union of elements all        
intrinsically beautiful1 in forms also  
intrinsically so2 but where this is     
impossible1 different natures prefer to 
sacrifice one or the other advantage4   

,colour4   #ag4 ,in the eye we have an  
organ so differentiated that it is      
sensitive to a much more subtle         
influence than even that of air waves4  
,there seems to be1 in the interstellar 
spaces1 some pervasive fluid1 for the   
light of the remotest star is rapidly   
conveyed to us1 and we can hardly       
understand how this radiation of light1 
which takes place beyond our atmosphere1
 could be realized without some medium4 
,this hypothetical medium we call the   
ether4 ,it is capable of very rapid     
vibrations1 which are propagated in all 
directions1 like the waves of sound1    
only much more quickly4 ,many common    
observations1 such as the apparent      
interval between lightning and thunder1 
make us aware of the quicker motion of  
light4 ,now1 since nature was filled    
with this responsive fluid1 which       
propagated to all distances vibrations  
originating at any point1 and moreover  
as these vibrations1 when intercepted by
 a solid body1 were reflected wholly or 

in part1 it obviously became very       
advantageous to every animal to develope
 an organ sensitive to these vibrations 
-- sensitive1 that is1 to light4 ,for   
this would give the mind instantaneous  
impressions dependent upon the presence 
and nature of distant objects4  ,to this
 circumstance we must attribute the     
primacy of sight in our perception1 a   
primacy that makes light the natural    
symbol of knowledge4 ,when the time came
 for our intelligence to take the great 
metaphysical leap1 and conceive its     
content as permanent and independent1   
or1 in other words1 to imagine things1  
the idea of these things had to be      
constructed out of the materials already
 present to the mind4 ,but the fittest  
material for such construction was that 
furnished by the eye1 since it is the   
eye that brings us into widest relations
 with our actual environment1 and gives 
us the quickest warning of approaching  
impressions4 ,sight has a prophetic     
function4 ,we are less interested in it 

for itself than for the suggestion it   
brings of what may follow after4 ,sight 
is a method of presenting psychically   
what is practically absent2 and as the  
essence of the thing is its existence in
 our absence1 the thing is spontaneously
 conceived in terms of sight4  ,sight   
is1 therefore1 perception par           
excellence1 since we become most easily 
aware of objects through visual agency  
and in visual terms4 ,now1 as the values
 of perception are those we call        
aesthetic1 and there could be no beauty 
if there was no conception of           
independent objects1 we may expect to   
find beauty derived mainly from the     
pleasures of sight4 ,and1 in fact1 form1
 which is almost a synonym of beauty1 is
 for us usually something visible3 it is
 a synthesis of the seen4 ,but prior to 
the effect of form1 which arises in the 
constructive imagination1 comes the     
effect of colour2 this is purely        
sensuous1 and no better intrinsically   
than the effects of any other sense3 but

 being more involved in the perception  
of objects than are the rest1 it becomes
 more readily an element of beauty4     
,the values of colours differ           
appreciably and have analogy to the     
differing values of other sensations4   
,as sweet or pungent smells1 as high and
 low notes1 or major and minor chords1  
differ from each other by virtue of     
their different stimulation of the      
senses1 so also red differs from green1 
and green from violet4 ,there is a      
nervous process for each1 and           
consequently a specific value4 ,this    
emotional quality has affinity to the   
emotional quality of other sensations2  
we need not be surprised that the high  
rate of vibration which yields a sharp  
note to the ear should involve somewhat 
the same feeling that is produced by the
 high rate of vibration which1 to the   
eye1 yields a violet colour4 ,these     
affinities escape many minds2 but it is 
conceivable that the sense of them      
should be improved by accident or       

training4 ,there are certain effects of 
colour which give all men pleasure1 and 
others which jar1 almost like a musical 
discord4 ,a more general development of 
this sensibility would make possible a  
new abstract art1 an art that should    
deal with colours as music does with    
sound4  ,we have not studied these      
effects1 however1 with enough attention1
 we have not allowed them to penetrate  
enough into the soul1 to think them very
 significant4 ,the stimulation of       
fireworks1 or of kaleidoscopic effects1 
seems to us trivial4 ,but everything    
which has a varied content has a        
potentiality of form and also of        
meaning4 ,the form will be enjoyed as   
soon as attention accustoms us to       
discriminate and recognize its          
variations2 and meaning will accrue to  
it1 when the various emotional values of
 these forms ally the new object to all 
other experiences which involve similar 
emotions1 and thus give it a sympathetic
 environment in the mind4 ,the colours  

of the sunset have a brilliancy that    
attracts attention1 and a softness and  
illusiveness that enchant the eye2 while
 the many associations of the evening   
and of heaven gather about this kindred 
charm and deepen it4 ,thus the most     
sensuous of beauties can be full of     
sentimental suggestion4 ,in stained     
glass1 also1 we have an example of      
masses of colour made to exert their    
powerful direct influence1 to intensify 
an emotion eventually to be attached to 
very ideal objects2 what is in itself a 
gorgeous and unmeaning ornament1 by its 
absolute impressiveness becomes a vivid 
symbol of those other ultimates which   
have a similar power over the soul4     
,materials surveyed4   #ah4 ,we have now
 gone over those organs of perception   
that give us the materials out of which 
we construct objects1 and mentioned the 
most conspicuous pleasures which1 as    
they arise from those organs1 are easily
 merged in the ideas furnished by the   
same4 ,we have also noticed that these  

ideas1 conspicuous as they are in our   
developed and operating consciousness1  
are not so much factors in our thought1 
independent contributors to it1 as they 
are discriminations and excisions in its
 content1 which1 after they are all     
made1 leave still a background of vital 
feeling4 ,for the outer senses are but a
 portion of our sensorium1 and the ideas
 of each1 or of all together1 but a     
portion of our consciousness4  ,the     
pleasures which accompany ideation we   
have also found to be unitary and vital2
 only just as for practical purposes it 
is necessary to abstract and            
discriminate the contribution of one    
sense from that of another1 and thus to 
become aware of particular and definable
 impressions1 so it is natural that the 
diffused emotional tone of the body     
should also be divided1 and a certain   
modicum of pleasure or pain should be   
attributed to each idea4 ,our pleasures 
are thus described as the pleasures of  
touch1 taste1 smell1 hearing1 and sight1

 and may become elements of beauty at   
the same time as the ideas to1 which    
they are attached become elements of    
objects4 ,there is1 however1 a remainder
 of emotion as there is a remainder of  
sensation2 and the importance of this   
remainder -- of the continuum in which  
lie all particular pleasures and pains  
-- was insisted upon in the beginning4  
,the beauty of the world1 indeed1 cannot
 be attributed wholly or mainly to      
pleasures thus attached to abstracted   
sensations4 ,it is only the beauty of   
the materials of things which is drawn  
from the pleasures of sensation4 ,by far
 the most important effects are not     
attributable to these materials1 but to 
their arrangement and their ideal       
relations4 ,we have yet to study those  
processes of our mind by which this     
arrangement and these relations are     
conceived2 and the pleasures which we   
can attach to these processes may then  
be added to the pleasures attached to   
sense as further and more subtle        

elements of beauty4  ,but before passing
 to the consideration of this more      
intricate subject1 we may note that     
however subordinate the beauty may be   
which a garment1 a building1 or a poem  
derives from its sensuous material1 yet 
the presence of this sensuous material  
is indispensable4 ,form cannot be the   
form of nothing4 ,if1 then1 in finding  
or creating beauty1 we ignore the       
materials of things1 and attend only to 
their form1 we miss an ever-present     
opportunity to heighten our effects4    
,for whatever delight the form may      
bring1 the material might have given    
delight already1 and so much would have 
been gained towards the value of the    
total result4  ,sensuous beauty is not  
the greatest or most important element  
of effect1 but it is the most primitive 
and fundamental1 and the most universal4
 ,there is no effect of form which an   
effect of material could not enhance1   
and this effect of material1 underlying 
that of form1 raises the latter to a    

higher power and gives the beauty of the
 object a certain poignancy1            
thoroughness1 and infinity which it     
otherwise would have lacked4 ,the       
,parthenon not in marble1 the king's    
crown not of gold1 and the stars not of 
fire1 would be feeble and prosaic       
things4 ,the greater hold which material
 beauty has upon the senses1 stimulates 
us here1 where the form is also sublime1
 and lifts and intensifies our emotions4
 ,we need this stimulus if our          
perceptions are to reach the highest    
pitch of strength and acuteness4        
,nothing can be ravishing that is not   
beautiful pervasively4  ,and another    
point4 ,the wider diffusion of sensuous 
beauty makes it as it were the poor     
man's good4 ,fewer factors are needed to
 produce it and less training to        
appreciate it4 ,the senses are          
indispensable instruments of labour1    
developed by the necessities of life2   
but their perfect development produces a
 harmony between the inward structure   

and instinct of the organ and the       
outward opportunities for its use2 and  
this harmony is the source of continual 
pleasures4 ,in the sphere of sense1     
therefore1 a certain cultivation is     
inevitable in man2 often greater1       
indeed1 among rude peoples1 perhaps     
among animals1 than among those whose   
attention takes a wider sweep and whose 
ideas are more abstract4 ,without       
requiring1 therefore1 that a man should 
rise above his station1 or develope     
capacities which his opportunities will 
seldom employ1 we may yet endow his life
 with aesthetic interest1 if we allow   
him the enjoyment of sensuous beauty4   
,this enriches him without adding to his
 labour1 and flatters him without       
alienating him from his world4  ,taste1 
when it is spontaneous1 always begins   
with the senses4 ,children and savages1 
as we are so often told1 delight in     
bright and variegated colours2 the      
simplest people appreciate the neatness 
of muslin curtains1 shining varnish1 and

 burnished pots4 ,a rustic garden is a  
shallow patchwork of the liveliest      
flowers1 without that reserve and repose
 which is given by spaces and masses4   
,noise and vivacity is all that childish
 music contains1 and primitive songs add
 little more of form than what is       
required to compose a few monotonous    
cadences4  ,these limitations are not to
 be regretted2 they are a proof of      
sincerity4  ,such simplicity is not the 
absence of taste1 but the beginning of  
it4  ,a people with genuine aesthetic   
perceptions creates traditional forms   
and expresses the simple pathos of its  
life1 in unchanging but significant     
themes1 repeated by generation after    
generation4 ,when sincerity is lost1 and
 a snobbish ambition is substituted bad 
taste comes in4 ,the essence of it is a 
substitution of non-aesthetic for       
aesthetic values4 ,to love glass beads  
because they are beautiful is barbarous1
 perhaps1 but not vulgar2 to love jewels
 only because they are dear is vulgar1  

and to betray the motive by placing them
 ineffectively is an offence against    
taste4 ,the test is always the same3    
,does the thing itself actually please8 
,if it does1 your taste is real2 it may 
be different from that of others1 but is
 equally justified and grounded in human
 nature4 ,if it does not1 your whole    
judgment is spurious1 and you are       
guilty1 not of heresy1 which in         
aesthetics is orthodoxy itself1 but of  
hypocrisy1 which is a                   
self-excommunication from its sphere4   
,now1 a great sign of this hypocrisy is 
insensibility to sensuous beauty4 ,when 
people show themselves indifferent to   
primary and fundamental effects1 when   
they are incapable of finding pictures  
except in frames or beauties except in  
the great masters1 we may justly suspect
 that they are parrots1 and that their  
verbal and historical knowledge covers a
 natural lack of aesthetic sense4       
,where1 on the contrary1 insensibility  
to higher forms of beauty does not      

exclude a natural love of the lower1 we 
have every reason to be encouraged2     
there is a true and healthy taste1 which
 only needs experience to refine it4 ,if
 a man demands light1 sound1 and        
splendour1 he proves that he has the    
aesthetic equilibrium2 that appearances 
as such interest him1 and that he can   
pause in perception to enjoy4 ,we have  
but to vary his observation1 to enlarge 
his thought1 to multiply his            
discriminations -- all of which         
education can do -- and the same        
aesthetic habit will reveal to him every
 shade of the fit and fair4 ,or if it   
should not1 and the man1 although       
sensuously gifted1 proved to be         
imaginatively dull1 at least he would   
not have failed to catch an intimate and
 wide-spread element of effect4 ,the    
beauty of material is thus the          
groundwork of all higher beauty1 both in
 the object1 whose form and meaning have
 to be lodged in something sensible1 and
 in the mind1 where sensuous ideas1     

being the first to emerge1 are the first
 that can arouse delight4   ,,part ,,iii
  ,,form  ,there is a beauty of form4   
#ai4 ,the most remarkable and           
characteristic problem of aesthetics is 
that of beauty of form4 ,where there is 
a sensuous delight1 like that of colour1
 and the impression of the object is in 
its elements agreeable1 we have to look 
no farther for an explanation of the    
charm we feel4 ,where there is          
expression1 and an object indifferent to
 the senses is associated with other    
ideas which are interesting1 the        
problem1 although complex and varied1 is
 in principle comparatively plain4 ,but 
there is an intermediate effect which is
 more mysterious1 and more specifically 
an effect of beauty4 ,it is found where 
sensible elements1 by themselves        
indifferent1 are so united as to please 
in combination4 ,there is something     
unexpected in this phenomenon1 so much  
so that those who cannot conceive its   
explanation often reassure themselves by

 denying its existence4 ,to reduce      
beauty of form1 however1 to beauty of   
elements would not be easy1 because the 
creation and variation of effect1 by    
changing the relation of the simplest   
lines1 offers too easy an experiment in 
refutation4 ,and it would1 moreover1    
follow to the comfort of the vulgar that
 all marble houses are equally          
beautiful4  ,to attribute beauty of form
 to expression is more plausible4 ,if ,i
 take the meaningless short lines in the
 figure and arrange them in the given   
ways1 intended to represent the human   
face1 there appear at once notably      
different aesthetic values4             
,illustration of long and short lines   
,illustration of lines arranged into    
three facial profiles  ,two of the forms
 are differently grotesque and one      
approximately beautiful4 ,now these     
effects are due to the expression of the
 lines2 not only because they make one  
think of fair or ugly faces1 but        
because1 it may be said1 these faces    

would in reality be fair or ugly        
according to their expression1 according
 to the vital and moral associations of 
the different types4  ,nevertheless1    
beauty of form cannot be reduced to     
expression without denying the existence
 of immediate aesthetic values          
altogether1 and reducing them all to    
suggestions of moral good4 ,for if the  
object expressed by the form1 and from  
which the form derives its value1 had   
itself beauty of form1 we should not    
advance2 we must come somewhere to the  
point where the expression is of        
something else than beauty2 and this    
something else would of course be some  
practical or moral good4 ,moralists are 
fond of such an interpretation1 and it  
is a very interesting one4 ,it puts     
beauty in the same relation to morals in
 which morals stand to pleasure and     
pain2 both would be intuitions1         
qualitatively new1 but with the same    
materials2 they would be new            
perspectives of the same object4  ,but  

this theory is actually inadmissible4   
,innumerable aesthetic effects1 indeed  
all specific and unmixed ones1 are      
direct transmutations of pleasures and  
pains2 they express nothing extrinsic to
 themselves1 much less moral            
excellences4 ,the detached lines of our 
figure signify nothing1 but they are not
 absolutely uninteresting2 the straight 
line is the simplest and not the least  
beautiful of forms4 ,to say that it owes
 its interest to the thought of the     
economy of travelling over the shortest 
road1 or of other practical advantages1 
would betray a feeble hold on           
psychological reality4 ,the impression  
of a straight line differs in a certain 
almost emotional way from that of a     
curve1 as those of various curves do    
from one another4 ,the quality of the   
sensation is different1 like that of    
various colours or sounds4 ,to attribute
 the character of these forms to        
association would be like explaining    
sea-sickness as the fear of shipwreck4  

,there is a distinct quality and value1 
often a singular beauty1 in these simple
 lines that is intrinsic in the         
perception of their form4  ,it would be 
pedantic1 perhaps1 anywhere but in a    
treatise on aesthetics1 to deny to this 
quality the name of expression2 we might
 commonly say that the circle has one   
expression and the oval another4 ,but   
what does the circle express except     
circularity1 or the oval except the     
nature of the ellipse8 ,such expression 
expresses nothing2 it is really         
impression4 ,there may be analogy       
between it and other impressions2 we may
 admit that odours1 colours1 and sounds 
correspond1 and may mutually suggest one
 another2 but this analogy is a         
superadded charm felt by very sensitive 
natures1 and does not constitute the    
original value of the sensations4 ,the  
common emotional tinge is rather what   
enables them to suggest one another1 and
 what makes them comparable4 ,their     
expression1 such as it is1 is therefore 

due to the accident that both feelings  
have a kindred quality2 and this quality
 has its effectiveness for sense        
independently of the perception of its  
recurrence in a different sphere4 ,we   
shall accordingly take care to reserve  
the term expression for the suggestion  
of some other and assignable object1    
from which the expressive thing borrows 
an interest2 and we shall speak of the  
intrinsic quality of forms as their     
emotional tinge or specific value4      
,physiology of the perception of form4  
#bj4 ,the charm of a line evidently     
consists in the relation of its parts2  
in order to understand this interest in 
spatial relations1 we must inquire how  
they are perceived4#d ,if the eye had   
its sensitive surface1 the retina1      
exposed directly to the light1 we could 
never have a perception of form any more
 than in the nose or ear1 which also    
perceive the object through media4 ,when
 the perception is not through a medium1
 but direct1 as in the case of the skin1

 we might get a notion of form1 because 
each point of the object would excite a 
single point in the skin1 and as the    
sensations in different parts of the    
skin differ in quality1 a manifold of   
sense1 in which discrimination of parts 
would be involved1 could be presented to
 the mind4 ,but when the perception is  
through a medium1 a difficulty arises4  
,any point1 a1 in the object will send a
 ray to every point1 a'1 b'1 c'1 of the 
sensitive surface2 every point of the   
retina will therefore be similarly      
affected1 since each will receive rays  
from every part of the object4          
,illustration of light rays  ,if all the
 rays from one point of the object1 a1  
are to be concentrated on a             
corresponding point of the retina1 a    
which would then become the exclusive   
representative of a1 we must have one or
 more refracting surfaces interposed1 to
 gather the rays together4 ,the presence
 of the lens1 with its various coatings1
 has made representation of point by    

point possible for the eye4 ,the absence
 of such an instrument makes the same   
sort of representation impossible to    
other senses1 such as the nose1 which   
does not smell in one place the effluvia
 of one part of the environment and in  
another place the effluvia of another1  
but smells indiscriminately the         
combination of all4 ,eyes without lenses
 like those possessed by some animals1  
undoubtedly give only a consciousness of
 diffused light1 without the possibility
 of boundaries or divisions in the field
 of view4 ,the abstraction of colour    
from form is therefore by no means an   
artificial one1 since1 by a             
simplification of the organ of sense1   
one may be perceived without the other4 
,but even if the lens enables the eye to
 receive a distributed image of the     
object1 the manifold which consciousness
 would perceive would not be necessarily
 a manifold of parts juxtaposed in      
space4 ,bach point of the retina might  
send to the brain a detached impression2

 these might be comparable1 but not     
necessarily in their spatial position4  
,the ear sends to the brain such a      
manifold of impressions 7since the ear  
also has an apparatus by which various  
external differences in rapidity of     
vibrations are distributed into         
different parts of the organ74 ,but this
 discriminated manifold is a manifold of
 pitches1 not of positions4 ,how does it
 happen that the manifold conveyed by   
the optic nerve appears in consciousness
 as spatial1 and that the relation      
between its elements is seen as a       
relation of position8  ,an answer to    
this question has been suggested by     
various psychologists4 ,the eye1 by an  
instinctive movement1 turns so as to    
bring every impression upon that point  
of the retina1 near its centre1 which   
has the acutest sensibility4 ,a series  
of muscular sensations therefore always 
follows upon the conspicuous excitement 
of any outlying point4 ,the object1 as  
the eye brings it to the centre of      

vision1 excites a series of points upon 
the retina2 and the local sign1 or      
peculiar quality of sensation1 proper to
 each of these spots1 is associated with
 that series of muscular feelings       
involved in turning the eyes4 ,these    
feelings henceforth revive together2 it 
is enough that a point in the periphery 
of the retina should receive a ray1 for 
the mind to feel1 together with that    
impression1 the suggestion of a motion1 
and of the line of points that lies     
between the excited point and the centre
 of vision4 ,a network of associations  
is thus formed1 whereby the sensation of
 each retinal point is connected with   
all the others in a manner which is that
 of points in a plane4 ,every visible   
point becomes thus a point in a field1  
and has a felt radiation of lines of    
possible motion about it4 ,our notion of
 visual space has this origin1 since the
 manifold of retinal impressions is     
distributed in a manner which serves as 
the type and exemplar of what we mean by

 a surface4  ,values of geometrical     
figures4   #ba4 ,the reader will perhaps
 pardon these details and the strain    
they put on his attention1 when he      
perceives how much they help us to      
understand the value of forms4 ,the     
sense1 then1 of the position of any     
point consists in the tensions in the   
eye1 that not only tends to bring that  
point to the centre of vision1 but feels
 the suggestion of all the other points 
which are related to the given one in   
the web of visual experience4 ,the      
definition of space as the possibility  
of motion is therefore an accurate and  
significant one1 since the most direct  
and native perception of space we can   
have is the awakening of many tendencies
 to move our organs4  ,for example1 if a
 circle is presented1 the eye will fall 
upon its centre1 as to the centre of    
gravity1 as it were1 of the balanced    
attractions of all the points2 and there
 will be1 in that position1 an          
indifference and sameness of sensation1 

in whatever direction some accident     
moves the eye1 that accounts very well  
for the emotional quality of the circle4
 ,it is a form which1 although beautiful
 in its purity and simplicity1 and      
wonderful in its continuity1 lacks any  
stimulating quality1 and is often ugly  
in the arts1 especially when found in   
vertical surfaces where it is not always
 seen in perspective4 ,for horizontal   
surfaces it is better because it is     
there always an ellipse to vision1 and  
the ellipse has a less dull and         
stupefying effect4 ,the eye can move    
easily1 organize and subordinate its    
parts1 and its relations to the         
environment are not similar in all      
directions4 ,small circles1 like        
buttons1 are not in the same danger of  
becoming ugly1 because the eye considers
 them as points1 and they diversify and 
help to divide surfaces1 without        
appearing as surfaces themselves4  ,the 
straight line offers a curious object   
for analysis4 ,it is not for the eye a  

very easy form to grasp4 ,we bend it or 
we leave it4 ,unless it passes through  
the centre of vision1 it is obviously a 
tangent to the points which have        
analogous relations to that centre4 ,the
 local signs or tensions of the points  
in such a tangent vary in an unseizable 
progression2 there is violence in       
keeping to it1 and the effect is forced4
 ,this makes the dry and stiff quality  
of any long straight line1 which the    
skilful ,greeks avoided by the curves of
 their columns and entablatures1 and the
 less economical barbarians by a        
profusion of interruptions and          
ornaments4  ,the straight line1 when    
made the direct object of attention1 is1
 of course1 followed by the eye and not 
seen by the outlying parts of the retina
 in one eccentric position4 ,the same   
explanation is good for this more common
 case1 since the consciousness that the 
eye travels in a straight line consists 
in the surviving sense of the previous  
position1 and in the manner in which the

 tensions of these various positions    
overlap4 ,if the tensions change from   
moment to moment entirely1 we have a    
broken1 a fragmentary effect1 as that of
 zigzag1 where all is dropping and      
picking up again of associated motions2 
in the straight line1 much prolonged1 we
 have a gradual and inexorable rending  
of these tendencies to associated       
movements4  ,in the curves we call      
flowing and graceful1 we have1 on the   
contrary1 a more natural and rhythmical 
set of movements in the optic muscles2  
and certain points in the various       
gyrations make rhymes and assonances1 as
 it were1 to the eye that reaches them4 
,we find ourselves at every turn        
reawakening1 with a variation1 the sense
 of the previous position4 ,it is easy  
to understand by analogy with the       
superficially observed conditions of    
pleasure1 that such rhythms and         
harmonies should be delightful4 ,the    
deeper question of the physical basis of
 pleasure we have not intended to       

discuss4 ,suffice it that measure1 in   
quantity1 in intensity1 and in time1    
must involve that physiological process1
 whatever it may be1 the consciousness  
of which is pleasure4  ,symmetry4   #bb4
 ,an important exemplification of these 
physiological principles is found in the
 charm of symmetry4 ,when for any reason
 the eye is to be habitually directed to
 a single point1 as to the opening of a 
gate or window1 to an altar1 a throne1 a
 stage1 or a fireplace1 there will be   
violence and distraction caused by the  
tendency to look aside in the recurring 
necessity of looking forward1 if the    
object is not so arranged that the      
tensions of eye are balanced1 and the   
centre of gravity of vision lies in the 
point which one is obliged to keep in   
sight4 ,in all such objects we therefore
 require bilateral symmetry4 ,the       
necessity of vertical symmetry is not   
felt because the eyes and head do not so
 readily survey objects from top to     
bottom as from side to side4 ,the       

inequality of the upper and lower parts 
does not generate the same tendency to  
motion1 the same restlessness1 as does  
the inequality of the right and left    
sides of an object in front of us4 ,the 
comfort and economy that comes from     
muscular balance in the eye1 is         
therefore in some cases the source of   
the value of symmetry4#e  ,in other     
cases symmetry appeals to us through the
 charm of recognition and rhythm4 ,when 
the eye runs over a facade1 and finds   
the objects that attract it at equal    
intervals1 an expectation1 like the     
anticipation of an inevitable note or   
requisite word1 arises in the mind1 and 
its non-satisfaction involves a shock4  
,this shock1 if caused by the emphatic  
emergence of an interesting object1     
gives the effect of the picturesque2 but
 when it comes with no compensation1 it 
gives us the feeling of ugliness and    
imperfection -- the defect which        
symmetry avoids4 ,this kind of symmetry 
is accordingly in itself a negative     

merit1 but often the condition of the   
greatest of all merits1 -- the permanent
 power to please4 ,it contributes to    
that completeness which delights without
 stimulating1 and to which our jaded    
senses return gladly1 after all sorts of
 extravagances1 as to a kind of domestic
 peace4 ,the inwardness and solidity of 
this quiet beauty comes from the        
intrinsic character of the pleasure     
which makes it up4 ,it is no            
adventitious charm2 but the eye in its  
continual passage over the object finds 
always the same response1 the same      
adequacy2 and the very process of       
perception is made delightful by the    
object's fitness to be perceived4 ,the  
parts1 thus coalescing1 form a single   
object1 the unity and simplicity of     
which are based upon the rhythm and     
correspondence of its elements4         
,symmetry is here what metaphysicians   
call a principle of individuation4 ,by  
the emphasis which it lays upon the     
recurring elements1 it cuts up the field

 into determinate units2 all that lies  
between the beats is one interval1 one  
individual4 ,if there were no recurrent 
impressions1 no corresponding points1   
the field of perception would remain a  
fluid continuum1 without defined and    
recognizable divisions4 ,the outlines of
 most things are symmetrical because we 
choose what symmetrical lines we find to
 be the boundaries of objects4 ,their   
symmetry is the condition of their      
unity1 and their unity of their         
individuality and separate existence4   
,experience1 to be sure1 can teach us to
 regard unsymmetrical objects as wholes1
 because their elements move and change 
together in nature2 but this is a       
principle of individuation1 a           
posteriori1 founded on the association  
of recognized elements4 ,these elements1
 to be recognized and seen to go        
together and form one thing1 must first 
be somehow discriminated2 and the       
symmetry1 either of their parts1 or of  
their position as wholes1 may enable us 

to fix their boundaries and to observe  
their number4 ,the category of unity1   
which we are so constantly imposing upon
 nature and its parts1 has symmetry1    
then1 for one of its instruments1 for   
one of its bases of application4  ,if   
symmetry1 then1 is a principle of       
individuation and helps us to           
distinguish objects1 we cannot wonder   
that it helps us to enjoy the           
perception4 ,for our intelligence loves 
to perceive2 water is not more grateful 
to a parched throat than a principle of 
comprehension to a confused             
understanding4 ,symmetry clarifies1 and 
we all know that light is sweet4 ,at the
 same time1 we can see why there are    
limits to the value of symmetry4 ,in    
objects1 for instance1 that are too     
small or too diffused for composition1  
symmetry has no value4 ,in an avenue    
symmetry is stately and impressive1 but 
in a large park1 or in the plan of a    
city1 or the side wall of a gallery it  
produces monotony in the various views  

rather than unity in any one of them4   
,greek temples1 never being very large1 
were symmetrical on all their facades2  
,gothic churches were generally designed
 to be symmetrical only in the west     
front1 and in the transepts1 while the  
side elevation as a whole was eccentric4
 ,this was probably an accident1 due to 
the demands of the interior arrangement2
 but it was a fortunate one1 as we may  
see by contrasting its effect with that 
of our stations1 exhibition buildings1  
and other vast structures1 where        
symmetry is generally introduced even in
 the most extensive facades which1 being
 too much prolonged for their height1   
cannot be treated as units4 ,the eye is 
not able to take them in at a glance1   
and does not get the effect of repose   
from the balance of the extremes1 while 
the mechanical sameness of the sections1
 surveyed in succession1 makes the      
impression of an unmeaning poverty of   
resource4  ,symmetry thus loses its     
value when it cannot1 on account of the 

size of the object1 contribute to the   
unity of our perception4 ,the synthesis 
which it facilitates must be            
instantaneous4 ,if the comprehension by 
which we unify our object is discursive1
 as1 for instance1 in conceiving the    
arrangement and numbering of the streets
 of ,new ,york1 or the plan of the      
,escurial1 the advantage of symmetry is 
an intellectual one2 we can better      
imagine the relations of the parts1 and 
draw a map of the whole in the fancy2   
but there is no advantage to direct     
perception1 and therefore no added      
beauty4 ,symmetry is superfluous in     
those objects4 ,similarly animal and    
vegetable forms gain nothing by being   
symmetrically displayed1 if the sense of
 their life and motion is to be given4  
,when1 however1 these forms are used for
 mere decoration1 not for the expression
 of their own vitality1 then symmetry is
 again required to accentuate their     
unity and organization4 ,this justifies 
the habit of conventionalizing natural  

forms1 and the tendency of some kinds of
 hieratic art1 like the ,byzantine or   
,egyptian1 to affect a rigid symmetry of
 posture4 ,we can thereby increase the  
unity and force of the image without    
suggesting that individual life and     
mobility1 which would interfere with the
 religious function of the object1 as   
the symbol and embodiment of an         
impersonal faith4  ,form the unity of a 
manifold4   #bc4 ,symmetry is evidently 
a kind of unity in variety1 where a     
whole is determined by the rhythmic     
repetition of similars4 ,we have seen   
that it has a value where it is an aid  
to unification4 ,unity would thus appear
 to be the virtue of forms2 but a       
moment's reflection will show us that   
unity cannot be absolute and be a form2 
a form is an aggregation1 it must have  
elements1 and the manner in which the   
elements are combined constitutes the   
character of the form4 ,a perfectly     
simple perception1 in which there was no
 consciousness of the distinction and   

relation of parts1 would not be a       
perception of form2 it would be a       
sensation4 ,physiologically these       
sensations may be aggregates and their  
values1 as in the case of musical tones1
 may differ according to the manner in  
which certain elements1 beats1          
vibrations1 nervous processes1 or what  
not1 are combined2 but for consciousness
 the result is simple1 and the value is 
the pleasantness of a datum and not of a
 process4 ,form1 therefore1 does not    
appeal to the unattentive2 they get from
 objects only a vague sensation which   
may in them awaken extrinsic            
associations2 they do not stop to survey
 the parts or to appreciate their       
relation1 and consequently are          
insensible to the various charms of     
various unifications2 they can find in  
objects only the value of material or of
 function1 not that of form4  ,beauty of
 form1 however1 is what specifically    
appeals to an aesthetic nature2 it is   
equally removed from the crudity of     

formless stimulation and from the       
emotional looseness of reverie and      
discursive thought4 ,the indulgence in  
sentiment and suggestion1 of which our  
time is fond1 to the sacrifice of formal
 beauty1 marks an absence of cultivation
 as real1 if not as confessed1 as that  
of the barbarian who revels in gorgeous 
confusion4  ,the synthesis1 then1 which 
constitutes form is an activity of the  
mind2 the unity arises consciously1 and 
is an insight into the relation of      
sensible elements separately perceived4 
,it differs from sensation in the       
consciousness of the synthesis1 and from
 expression in the homogeneity of the   
elements1 and in their common presence  
to sense4  ,the variety of forms depends
 upon the character of the elements and 
on the variety of possible methods of   
unification4 ,the elements may be all   
alike1 and their only diversity be      
numerical4 ,their unity will then be    
merely the sense of their uniformity4#f 
,or they may differ in kind1 but so as  

to compel the mind to no particular     
order in their unification4 ,or they may
 finally be so constituted that they    
suggest inevitably the scheme of their  
unity2 in this case there is            
organization in the object1 and the     
synthesis of its parts is one and       
pre-determinate4 ,we shall discuss these
 various forms in succession1 pointing  
out the effects proper to each4         
,multiplicity in uniformity4   #bd4 ,the
 radical and typical case of the first  
kind of unity in variety is found in the
 perception of extension itself4 ,this  
perception1 if we look to its origin1   
may turn out to be primitive2 no doubt  
the feeling of crude extensity is an    
original sensation2 every inference1    
association1 and distinction is a thing 
that looms up suddenly before the mind1 
and the nature and actuality of which is
 a datum of what -- to indicate its     
irresistible immediacy and              
indescribability -- we may well call    
sense4 ,forms are seen1 and if we think 

of the origin of the perception1 we may 
well call this vision a sensation4 ,the 
distinction between a sensation of form1
 however1 and one which is formless1    
regards the content and character1 not  
the genesis of the perception4 ,a       
distinction and association1 or an      
inference1 is a direct experience1 a    
sensible fact2 but it is the experience 
of a process1 of a motion between two   
terms1 and a consciousness of their     
coexistence and distinction2 it is a    
feeling of relation4 ,now the sense of  
space is a feeling of this kind2 the    
essence of it is the realization of a   
variety of directions and of possible   
motions1 by which the relation of point 
to point is vaguely but inevitably      
given4 ,the perception of extension is  
therefore a perception of form1 although
 of the most rudimentary kind4 ,it is   
merely ,auseinandersein1 and we might   
call it the materia prima of form1 were 
it not capable of existing without      
further determination4 ,for we can have 

the sense of space without the sense of 
boundaries2 indeed1 this intuition is   
what tempts us to declare space         
infinite4 ,space would have to consist  
of a finite number of juxtaposed blocks1
 if our experience of extension carried 
with it essentially the realization of  
limits4  ,the aesthetic effect of       
extensiveness is also entirely different
 from that of particular shapes4 ,some  
things appeal to us by their surfaces1  
others by the lines that limit those    
surfaces4 ,and this effect of surface is
 not necessarily an effect of material  
or colour2 the evenness1 monotony1 and  
vastness of a great curtain of colour   
produce an effect which is that of the  
extreme of uniformity in the extreme of 
multiplicity2 the eye wanders over a    
fluid infinity of unrecognizable        
positions1 and the sense of their       
numberlessness and continuity is        
precisely the source of the emotion of  
extent4 ,the emotion is primary and has 
undoubtedly a physiological ground1     

while the idea of size is secondary and 
involves associations and inferences4 ,a
 small photograph of ,st4 ,peter's gives
 the idea of size2 as does a distant    
view of the same object4 ,but this is of
 course dependent on our realization of 
the distance1 or of the scale of the    
representation4 ,the value of size      
becomes immediate only when we are at   
close quarters with the object2 then the
 surfaces really subtend a large angle  
in the field of vision1 and the sense of
 vastness establishes its standard1     
which can afterwards be applied to other
 objects by analogy and contrast4 ,there
 is also1 to be sure1 a moral and       
practical import in the known size of   
objects1 which1 by association1         
determines their dignity2 but the pure  
sense of extension1 based upon the      
attack of the object upon the           
apperceptive resources of the eye1 is   
the truly aesthetic value which it      
concerns us to point out here1 as the   
most rudimentary example of form4       

,although the effect of extension is not
 that of material1 the two are best seen
 in conjunction4 ,material must appear  
in some form2 but when its beauty is to 
be made prominent1 it is well that this 
form should attract attention as little 
as possible to itself4 ,now1 of all     
forms1 absolute uniformity in extension 
is the simplest and most allied to the  
material2 it gives the latter only just 
enough form to make it real and         
perceptible4 ,very rich and beautiful   
materials therefore do well to assume   
this form4 ,you will spoil the beauty   
you have by superimposing another2 as if
 you make a statue of gold1 or flute a  
jasper column1 or bedeck a velvet cloak4
 ,the beauty of stuffs appears when they
 are plain4 ,even stone gives its       
specific quality best in great unbroken 
spaces of wall2 the simplicity of the   
form emphasizes the substance4 ,and     
again1 the effect of extensity is never 
long satisfactory unless it is          
superinduced upon some material beauty2 

the dignity of great hangings would     
suffer if they were not of damask1 but  
of cotton1 and the vast smoothness of   
the sky would grow oppressive if it were
 not of so tender a blue4  ,example of  
the stars4   #be4 ,another beauty of the
 sky -- the stars -- offers so striking 
and fascinating an illustration of the  
effect of multiplicity in uniformity1   
that ,i am tempted to analyze it at some
 length4 ,to most people1 ,i fancy1 the 
stars are beautiful2 but if you asked   
why1 they would be at a loss to reply1  
until they remembered what they had     
heard about astronomy1 and the great    
size and distance and possible          
habitation of those orbs4 ,the vague and
 illusive ideas thus aroused fall in so 
well with the dumb emotion we were      
already feeling1 that we attribute this 
emotion to those ideas1 and persuade    
ourselves that the power of the starry  
heavens lies in the suggestion of       
astronomical facts4  ,the idea of the   
insignificance of our earth and of the  

incomprehensible multiplicity of worlds 
is indeed immensely impressive2 it may  
even be intensely disagreeable4 ,there  
is something baffling about infinity2 in
 its presence the sense of finite       
humility can never wholly banish the    
rebellious suspicion that we are being  
deluded4 ,our mathematical imagination  
is put on the rack by an attempted      
conception that has all the anguish of a
 nightmare and probably1 could we but   
awake1 all its laughable absurdity4 ,but
 the obsession of this dream is an      
intellectual puzzle1 not an aesthetic   
delight4 ,it is not essential to our    
admiration4 ,before the days of ,kepler 
the heavens declared the glory of ,god2 
and we needed no calculation of stellar 
distances1 no fancies about a plurality 
of worlds1 no image of infinite spaces1 
to make the stars sublime4  ,had we been
 taught to believe that the stars       
governed our fortunes1 and were we      
reminded of fate whenever we looked at  
them1 we should similarly tend to       

imagine that this belief was the source 
of their sublimity2 and1 if the         
superstition were dispelled1 we should  
think the interest gone from the        
apparition4 ,but experience would soon  
undeceive us1 and prove to us that the  
sensuous character of the object was    
sublime in itself4 ,indeed1 on account  
of that intrinsic sublimity the sky can 
be fitly chosen as a symbol for a       
sublime conception2 the common quality  
in both makes each suggest the other4   
,for that reason1 too1 the parable of   
the natal stars governing our lives is  
such a natural one to express our       
subjection to circumstances1 and can be 
transformed by the stupidity of         
disciples into a literal tenet4 ,in the 
same way1 the kinship of the emotion    
produced by the stars with the emotion  
proper to certain religious moments     
makes the stars seem a religious object4
 ,they become1 like impressive music1 a 
stimulus to worship4 ,but fortunately   
there are experiences which remain      

untouched by theory1 and which maintain 
the mutual intelligence of men through  
the estrangements wrought by            
intellectual and religious systems4     
,when the superstructures crumble1 the  
common foundation of human sentience and
 imagination is exposed beneath4  ,the  
intellectual suggestion of the infinity 
of nature can1 moreover1 be awakened by 
other experiences which are by no means 
sublime4 ,a heap of sand will involve   
infinity as surely as a universe of suns
 and planets4 ,any object is infinitely 
divisible and1 when we press the        
thought1 can contain as many worlds with
 as many winged monsters and ideal      
republics as can the satellites of      
,sirius4 ,but the infinitesimal does not
 move us aesthetically2 it can only     
awaken an amused curiosity4 ,the        
difference cannot lie in the import of  
the idea1 which is objectively the same 
in both cases4 ,it lies in the different
 immediate effect of the crude images   
which give us the type and meaning of   

each2 the crude image that underlies the
 idea of the infinitesimal is the dot1  
the poorest and most uninteresting of   
impressions2 while the crude image that 
underlies the idea of infinity is space1
 multiplicity in uniformity1 and this1  
as we have seen1 has a powerful effect  
on account of the breadth1 volume1 and  
omnipresence of the stimulation4 ,every 
point in the retina is evenly excited1  
and the local signs of all are          
simultaneously felt4 ,this equable      
tension1 this balance and elasticity in 
the very absence of fixity1 give the    
vague but powerful feeling that we wish 
to describe4 ,did not the infinite1 by  
this initial assault upon our senses1   
awe us and overwhelm us1 as solemn music
 might1 the idea of it would be abstract
 and moral like that of the             
infinitesimal1 and nothing but an       
amusing curiosity4  ,nothing is         
objectively impressive2 things are      
impressive only when they succeed in    
touching the sensibility of the         

observer1 by finding the avenues to his 
brain and heart4 ,the idea that the     
universe is a multitude of minute       
spheres circling1 like specks of dust1  
in a dark and boundless void1 might     
leave us cold and indifferent1 if not   
bored and depressed1 were it not that we
 identify this hypothetical scheme with 
the visible splendour1 the poignant     
intensity1 and the baffling number of   
the stars4 ,so far is the object from   
giving value to the impression1 that it 
is here1 as it must always ultimately   
be1 the impression that gives value to  
the object4 ,for all worth leads us back
 to actual feeling somewhere1 or else   
evaporates into nothing -- into a word  
and a superstition4  ,now1 the starry   
heavens are very happily designed to    
intensify the sensations on which their 
beauties must rest4 ,in the first place1
 the continuum of space is broken into  
points1 numerous enough to give the     
utmost idea of multiplicity and yet so  
distinct and vivid that it is impossible

 not to remain aware of their           
individuality4 ,the variety of local    
signs1 without becoming organized into  
forms1 remains prominent and            
irreducible4 ,this makes the object     
infinitely more exciting than a plane   
surface would be4 ,in the second place1 
the sensuous contrast of the dark       
background1 -- blacker the clearer the  
night and the more stars we can see1 -- 
with the palpitating fire of the stars  
themselves1 could not be exceeded by any
 possible device4 ,this material beauty 
adds incalculably1 as we have already   
pointed out1 to the inwardness and      
sublimity of the effect4 ,to realize the
 great importance of these two elements1
 we need but to conceive their absence1 
and observe the change in the dignity of
 the result4  ,fancy a map of the       
heavens and every star plotted upon it1 
even those invisible to the naked eye3  
why would this object1 as full of       
scientific suggestion surely as the     
reality1 leave us so comparatively cold8

 ,quite indifferent it might not leave  
us1 for ,i have myself watched stellar  
photographs with almost inexhaustible   
wonder4 ,the sense of multiplicity is   
naturally in no way diminished by the   
representation2 but the poignancy of the
 sensation1 the life of the light1 are  
gone2 and with the dulled impression the
 keenness of the emotion disappears4 ,or
 imagine the stars1 undiminished in     
number1 without losing any of their     
astronomical significance and divine    
immutability1 marshalled in geometrical 
patterns2 say in a ,latin cross1 with   
the words ,in hoc signo vinces in a     
scroll around them4 ,the beauty of the  
illumination would be perhaps increased1
 and its import1 practical1 religious1  
and cosmic1 would surely be a little    
plainer2 but where would be the         
sublimity of the spectacle8             
,irretrievably lost3 and lost because   
the form of the object would no longer  
tantalize us with its sheer             
multiplicity1 and with the consequent   

overpowering sense of suspense and awe4 
,in a word1 the infinity which moves us 
is the sense of multiplicity in         
uniformity4 ,accordingly things which   
have enough multiplicity1 as the lights 
of a city seen across water1 have an    
effect similar to that of the stars1 if 
less intense2 whereas a star1 if alone1 
because the multiplicity is lacking1    
makes a wholly different impression4    
,the single star is tender1 beautiful1  
and mild2 we can compare it to the      
humblest and sweetest of things3        
,a violet by a mossy stone      ,half   
hidden from the eye1      ,fair as a    
star when only one      ,is shining in  
the sky4  ,it is1 not only in fact but  
in nature1 an attendant on the moon1    
associated with the moon1 if we may be  
so prosaic here1 not only by contiguity 
but also by similarity4       ,fairer   
than ,phoebe's sapphire-regioned star   
,or vesper1 amorous glow-worm of the    
sky4  ,the same poet can say elsewhere  
of a passionate lover3            ,he   

arose      ,ethereal1 flushed1 and like 
a throbbing star1      ,amid the        
sapphire heaven's deep repose4  ,how    
opposite is all this from the cold      
glitter1 the cruel and mysterious       
sublimity of the stars when they are    
many6 ,with these we have no ,sapphic   
associations2 they make us think rather 
of ,kant who could hit on nothing else  
to compare with his categorical         
imperative1 perhaps because he found in 
both the same baffling                  
incomprehensibility and the same fierce 
actuality4 ,such ultimate feelings are  
sensations of physical tension4         
,defects of pure multiplicity4   #bf4   
,this long analysis will be a sufficient
 illustration of the power of           
multiplicity in uniformity2 we may now  
proceed to point out the limitations    
inherent in this form4 ,the most obvious
 one is that of monotony2 a file of     
soldiers or an iron railing is          
impressive in its way1 but cannot long  
entertain us1 nor hold us with that     

depth of developing interest1 with which
 we might study a crowd or a forest of  
trees4  ,the tendency of monotony is    
double1 and in two directions deadens   
our pleasure4 ,when the repeated        
impressions are acute1 and cannot be    
forgotten in their endless repetition1  
their monotony becomes painful4 ,the    
constant appeal to the same sense1 the  
constant requirement of the same        
reaction1 tires the system1 and we long 
for change as for a relief4 ,if the     
repeated stimulations are not very      
acute1 we soon become unconscious of    
them2 like the ticking of the clock1    
they become merely a factor in our      
bodily one1 a cause1 as the case may be1
 of a diffused pleasure or unrest2 but  
they cease to present a distinguishable 
object4  ,the pleasures1 therefore1     
which a kindly but monotonous           
environment produces1 often fail to make
 it beautiful1 for the simple reason    
that the environment is not perceived4  
,likewise the hideousness of things to  

which we are accustomed -- the blemishes
 of the landscape1 the ugliness of our  
clothes or of our walls -- do not       
oppress us1 not so much because we do   
not see the ugliness as because we      
overlook the things4 ,the beauties or   
defects of monotonous objects are easily
 lost1 because the objects are          
themselves intermittent in              
consciousness4 ,but it is of some       
practical importance to remark that this
 indifference of monotonous values is   
more apparent than real4 ,the particular
 object ceases to be of consequence2 but
 the congruity of its structure and     
quality with our faculties of perception
 remains1 and its presence in our       
environment is still a constant source  
of vague irritation and friction1 or of 
subtle and pervasive delight4 ,and this 
value1 although not associated with the 
image of the monotonous object1 lies    
there in our mind1 like all the vital   
and systemic feelings1 ready to enhance 
the beauty of any object that arouses   

our attention1 and meantime adding to   
the health and freedom of our life --   
making whatever we do a little easier   
and pleasanter for us4 ,a grateful      
environment is a substitute for         
happiness4 ,it can quicken us from      
without as a fixed hope and affection1  
or the consciousness of a right life1   
can quicken us from within4 ,to humanize
 our surroundings is1 therefore1 a task 
which should interest the physicians    
both of soul and body4  ,but the        
monotony of multiplicity is not merely  
intrinsic in the form2 what is perhaps  
even of greater consequence in the arts 
is the fact that its capacity for       
association is restricted4 ,what is in  
itself uniform cannot have a great      
diversity of relations4 ,hence the      
dryness1 the crisp definiteness and     
hardness1 of those products of art which
 contain an endless repetition of the   
same elements4 ,their affinities are    
necessarily few2 they are not fit for   
many uses1 nor capable of expressing    

many ideas4 ,the heroic couplet1 now too
 much derided1 is a form of this kind4  
,its compactness and inevitableness make
 it excellent for an epigram and        
adequate it for a satire1 but its       
perpetual snap and unvarying rhythm are 
thin for an epic1 and impossible for a  
song4 ,the ,greek colonnade1 a form in  
many ways analogous1 has similar        
limitations4 ,beautiful with a finished 
and restrained beauty1 which our taste  
is hardly refined enough to appreciate1 
it is incapable of development4 ,the    
experiments of ,roman architecture      
sufficiently show it2 the glory of which
 is their ,roman frame rather than their
 ,hellenic ornament4  ,when the ,greeks 
themselves had to face the problem of   
larger and more complex buildings1 in   
the service of a supernatural and       
hierarchical system1 they transformed   
their architecture into what we call    
,byzantine1 and ,st4 ,sophia took the   
place of the ,parthenon4 ,here a vast   
vault was introduced1 the colonnade     

disappeared1 the architrave was rounded 
into an arch from column to column1 the 
capitals of these were changed from     
concave to convex1 and a thousand other 
changes in structure and ornament       
introduced flexibility and variety4     
,architecture could in this way1        
precisely because more vague and        
barbarous1 better adapt itself to the   
conditions of the new epoch4 ,perfect   
taste is itself a limitation1 not       
because it intentionally excludes any   
excellence1 but because it impedes the  
wandering of the arts into those bypaths
 of caprice and grotesqueness in which1 
although at the sacrifice of formal     
beauty1 interesting partial effects     
might still be discovered4 ,and this    
objection applies with double force to  
the first crystallizations of taste1    
when tradition has carried us but a     
little way in the right direction4 ,the 
authorized effects are then very simple1
 and if we allow no others1 our art     
becomes wholly inadequate to the        

functions ultimately imposed upon it4   
,primitive arts might furnish examples1 
but the state of ,english poetry at the 
time of ,queen ,anne is a sufficient    
illustration of this possibility4 ,the  
,french classicism1 of which1 the       
,english school was an echo1 was more   
vital and human1 because it embodied a  
more native taste and a wider training4 
,aesthetics of democracy4   #bg4 ,it    
would be an error to suppose that       
aesthetic principles apply only to our  
judgments of works of art or of those   
natural objects which we attend to      
chiefly on account of their beauty4     
,every idea which is formed in the human
 mind1 every activity and emotion1 has  
some relation1 direct or indirect1 to   
pain and pleasure4 ,if1 as is the case  
in all the more important instances1    
these fluid activities and emotions     
precipitate1 as it were1 in their       
evanescence certain psychical solids    
called ideas of things1 then the        
concomitant pleasures are incorporated  

more or less in those concrete ideas and
 the things acquire an aesthetic        
colouring4 ,and although this aesthetic 
colouring may be the last quality we    
notice in objects of practical interest1
 its influence upon us is none the less 
real1 and often accounts for a great    
deal in our moral and practical         
attitude4  ,in the leading political and
 moral idea of our time1 in the idea of 
democracy1 ,i think there is a strong   
aesthetic ingredient1 and the power of  
the idea of democracy over the          
imagination is an illustration of that  
effect of multiplicity in uniformity    
which we have been studying4 ,of course1
 nothing could be more absurd than to   
suggest that the ,french ,revolution1   
with its immense implications1 had an   
aesthetic preference for its basis2 it  
sprang1 as we know1 from the hatred of  
oppression1 the rivalry of classes1 and 
the aspiration after a freer social and 
strictly moral organization4 ,but when  
these moral forces were suggesting and  

partly realizing the democratic idea1   
this idea was necessarily vividly       
present to men's thoughts2 the picture  
of human life which it presented was    
becoming familiar1 and was being made   
the sanction and goal of constant       
endeavour4 ,nothing so much enhances a  
good as to make sacrifices for it4 ,the 
consequence was that democracy1 prized  
at first as a means to happiness and as 
an instrument of good government1 was   
acquiring an intrinsic value2 it was    
beginning to seem good in itself1 in    
fact1 the only intrinsically right and  
perfect arrangement4 ,a utilitarian     
scheme was receiving an aesthetic       
consecration4 ,that which was happening 
to democracy had happened before to the 
feudal and royalist systems2 they too   
had come to be prized in themselves1 for
 the pleasure men took in thinking of   
society organized in such an ancient1   
and thereby to their fancy1 appropriate 
and beautiful manner4 ,the practical    
value of the arrangement1 on which1 of  

course1 it is entirely dependent for its
 origin and authority1 was forgotten1   
and men were ready to sacrifice their   
welfare to their sense of propriety2    
that is1 they allowed an aesthetic good 
to outweigh a practical one4 ,that seems
 now a superstition1 although1 indeed1 a
 very natural and even noble one4       
,equally natural and noble1 but no less 
superstitious1 is our own belief in the 
divine right of democracy4 ,its         
essential right is something purely     
aesthetic4  ,such aesthetic love of     
uniformity1 however1 is usually         
disguised under some moral label3 we    
call it the lore of justice1 perhaps    
because we have not considered that the 
value of justice also1 in so far as it  
is not derivative and utilitarian1 must 
be intrinsic1 or1 what is practically   
the same thing1 aesthetic4 ,but         
occasionally the beauties of democracy  
are presented to us undisguised4 ,the   
writings of ,walt ,whitman are a notable
 example4 ,never1 perhaps1 has the charm

 of uniformity in multiplicity been felt
 so completely and so exclusively4      
,everywhere it greets us with a         
passionate preference2 not flowers but  
leaves of grass1 not music but          
drum-taps1 not composition but          
aggregation1 not the hero but the       
average man1 not the crisis but the     
vulgarest moment2 and by this resolute  
marshalling of nullities1 by this effort
 to show us everything as a momentary   
pulsation of a liquid and structureless 
whole1 he profoundly stirs the          
imagination4 ,we may wish to dislike    
this power1 but1 ,i think1 we must      
inwardly admire it4 ,for whatever       
practical dangers we may see in this    
terrible levelling1 our aesthetic       
faculty can condemn no actual effect2   
its privilege is to be pleased by       
opposites1 and to be capable of finding 
chaos sublime without ceasing to make   
nature beautiful4  ,values of types and 
values of examples4   #bh4 ,it is time  
we should return to the consideration of

 abstract forms4 ,nearest in nature to  
the example of uniformity in            
multiplicity1 we found those objects1   
like a reversible pattern1 that having  
some variety of parts invite us to      
survey them in different orders1 and so 
bring into play in a marked manner the  
faculty of apperception4  ,there is in  
the senses1 as we have seen1 a certain  
form of stimulation1 a certain measure  
and rhythm of waves with which the      
aesthetic value of the sensation is     
connected4 ,so when1 in the perception  
of the object1 a notable contribution is
 made by memory and mental habit1 the   
value of the perception will be due1 not
 only to the pleasantness of the        
external stimulus1 but also to the      
pleasantness of the apperceptive        
reaction2 and the latter source of value
 will be more important in proportion as
 the object perceived is more dependent1
 for the form and meaning it presents1  
upon our past experience and imaginative
 trend1 and less on the structure of the

 external object4  ,our apperception of 
form varies not only with our           
constitution1 age1 and health1 as does  
the appreciation of sensuous values1 but
 also with our education and genius4    
,the more indeterminate the object1 the 
greater share must subjective forces    
have in determining our perception2 for1
 of course1 every perception is in      
itself perfectly specific1 and can be   
called indefinite only in reference to  
an abstract ideal which it is expected  
to approach4 ,every cloud has just the  
outline it has1 although we may call it 
vague1 because we cannot classify its   
form under any geometrical or animal    
species2 it would be first definitely a 
whale1 and then would become indefinite 
until we saw our way to calling it a    
camel4 ,but while in the intermediate   
stage1 the cloud would be a form in the 
perception of which there would be      
little apperceptive activity little     
reaction from the store of our          
experience1 little sense of form2 its   

value would be in its colour and        
transparency1 and in the suggestion of  
lightness and of complex but gentle     
movement4  ,but the moment we said ,yes1
 very like a whale1 a new kind of value 
would appear2 the cloud could now be    
beautiful or ugly1 not as a cloud       
merely1 but as a whale4 ,we do not speak
 now of the associations of the idea1 as
 with the sea1 or fishermen's yarns2    
that is an extrinsic matter of          
expression4 ,we speak simply of the     
intrinsic value of the form of the      
whale1 of its lines1 its movement1 its  
proportion4 ,this is a more or less     
individual set of images which are      
revived in the act of recognition2 this 
revival constitutes the recognition1 and
 the beauty of the form is the pleasure 
of that revival4 ,a certain musical     
phrase1 as it were1 is played in the    
brain2 the awakening of that echo is the
 act of apperception and the harmony of 
the present stimulation with the form of
 that phrase2 the power of this         

particular object to develope and       
intensify that generic phrase in the    
direction of pleasure1 is the test of   
the formal beauty of this example4 ,for 
these cerebral phrases have a certain   
rhythm2 this rhythm can1 by the         
influence of the stimulus that now      
reawakens it1 be marred or enriched1 be 
made more or less marked and delicate2  
and as this conflict or reinforcement   
comes1 the object is ugly or beautiful  
in form4  ,such an aesthetic value is   
thus dependent on two things4 ,the first
 is the acquired character of the       
apperceptive form evoked2 it may be a   
cadenza or a trill1 a major or a minor  
chord1 a rose or a violet1 a goddess or 
a dairy-maid2 and as one or another of  
these is recognized1 an aesthetic       
dignity and tone is given to the object4
 ,but it will be noticed that in such   
mere recognition very little pleasure is
 found1 or1 what is the same thing1     
different aesthetic types in the        
abstract have little difference in      

intrinsic beauty4 ,the great difference 
lies in their affinities4 ,what will    
decide us to like or not to like the    
type of our apperception will be not so 
much what this type is1 as its fitness  
to the context of our mind4 ,it is like 
a word in a poem1 more effective by its 
fitness than by its intrinsic beauty1   
although that is requisite too4 ,we can 
be shocked at an incongruity of natures 
more than we can be pleased by the      
intrinsic beauty of each nature apart1  
so long1 that is1 as they remain        
abstract natures1 objects recognized    
without being studied4 ,the aesthetic   
dignity of the form1 then1 tells us the 
kind of beauty we are to expect1 affects
 us by its welcome or unwelcome promise1
 but hardly gives us a positive pleasure
 in the beauty itself4  ,now this is the
 first thing in the value of a form1 the
 value of the type as such2 the second  
and more important element is the       
relation of the particular impression to
 the form under which it is apperceived4

 ,this determines the value of the      
object as an example of its class4      
,after our mind is pitched to the key   
and rhythm of a certain idea1 say of a  
queen1 it remains for the impression to 
fulfil1 aggrandize1 or enrich this form 
by a sympathetic embodiment of it4 ,then
 we have a queen that is truly royal4   
,but if instead there is disappointment1
 if this particular queen is an ugly    
one1 although perhaps she might have    
pleased as a witch1 this is because the 
apperceptive form and the impression    
give a cerebral discord4 ,the object is 
unideal1 that is1 the novel1 external   
element is inharmonious with the revived
 and internal element by suggesting     
which the object has been apperceived4  
,origin of types4   #bi4 ,a most        
important thing1 therefore1 in the      
perception of form is the formation of  
types in our mind1 with reference to    
which examples are to be judged4 ,i say 
the formation of them1 for we can hardly
 consider the theory that they are      

eternal as a possible one in psychology4
 ,the ,platonic doctrine on that point  
is a striking illustration of an        
equivocation we mentioned in the        
beginning2#g namely1 that the import of 
an experience is regarded as a          
manifestation of its cause -- the       
product of a faculty substituted for the
 description of its function4 ,eternal  
types are the instrument of aesthetic   
life1 not its foundation4 ,take the     
aesthetic attitude1 and you have for the
 moment an eternal idea2 an idea1 ,i    
mean1 that you treat as an absolute     
standard1 just as when you take the     
perceptive attitude you have an external
 object which you treat as an absolute  
existence4 ,but the aesthetic1 like the 
perceptive faculty1 can be made an      
object of study in turn1 and its theory 
can be sought2 and then the eternal     
idea1 like the external object1 is seen 
to be a product of human nature1 a      
symbol of experience1 and an instrument 
of thought4  ,the question whether there

 are not1 in external nature or in the  
mind of ,god1 objects and eternal types1
 is indeed not settled1 it is not even  
touched by this inquiry2 but it is      
indirectly shown to be futile1 because  
such transcendent realities1 if they    
exist1 can have nothing to do with our  
ideas of them4 ,the ,platonic idea of a 
tree may exist2 how should ,i deny it8  
,how should ,i deny that ,i might some  
day find myself outside the sky gazing  
at it1 and feeling that ,i1 with my     
mental vision1 am beholding the         
plenitude of arboreal beauty1 perceived 
in this world only as a vague essence   
haunting the multiplicity of finite     
trees8 ,but what can that have to do    
with my actual sense of what a tree     
should be8 ,shall we take the ,platonic 
myth literally1 and say the idea is a   
memory of the tree ,i have already seen 
in heaven8 ,how else establish any      
relation between that eternal object and
 the type in my mind8 ,but why1 in that 
case1 this infinite variability of ideal

 trees8 ,was the ,tree ,beautiful an    
oak1 or a cedar1 an ,english or an      
,american elm8 ,my actual types are     
finite and mutually exclusive2 that     
heavenly type must be one and infinite4 
,the problem is hopeless4  ,very simple1
 on the other hand1 is the explanation  
of the existence of that type as a      
residuum of experience4 ,our idea of an 
individual thing is a compound and      
residuum of our several experiences of  
it2 and in the same manner our idea of a
 class is a compound and residuum of our
 ideas of the particulars that compose  
it4 ,particular impressions have1 by    
virtue of their intrinsic similarity or 
of the identity of their relations1 a   
tendency to be merged and identified1 so
 that many individual perceptions leave 
but a single blurred memory that stands 
for them all1 because it combines their 
several associations4 ,similarly1 when  
various objects have many common        
characteristics1 the mind is incapable  
of keeping them apart4 ,it cannot hold  

clearly so great a multitude of         
distinctions and relations as would be  
involved in naming and conceiving       
separately each grain of sand1 or drop  
of water1 each fly or horse or man that 
we have ever seen4 ,the mass of our     
experience has therefore to be          
classified1 if it is to be available at 
all4 ,instead of a distinct image to    
represent each of our original          
impressions1 we have a general resultant
 -- a composite photograph -- of those  
impressions4  ,this resultant image is  
the idea of the class4 ,it often has    
very few1 if any1 of the sensible       
properties of the particulars that      
underlie it1 often an artificial symbol 
-- the sound of a word -- is the only   
element1 present to all the instances1  
which the generic image clearly         
contains4 ,for1 of course1 the reason   
why a name can represent a class of     
objects is that the name is the most    
conspicuous element of identity in the  
various experiences of objects in that  

class4 ,we have seen many horses1 but if
 we are not lovers of the animal1 nor   
particularly keen observers1 very likely
 we retain no clear image of all that   
mass of impressions except the          
reverberation of the sound horse1 which 
really or mentally has accompanied all  
those impressions4 ,this sound1         
therefore1 is the content of our general
 idea1 and to it cling all the          
associations which constitute our sense 
of what the word means4 ,but a person   
with a memory predominantly visual would
 probably add to this remembered sound a
 more or less detailed image of the     
animal2 some particular horse in some   
particular attitude might possibly be   
recalled1 but more probably some        
imaginative construction1 some dream    
image1 would accompany the sound4 ,an   
image which reproduced no particular    
horse exactly1 but which was a          
spontaneous fiction of the fancy1 would 
serve1 by virtue of its felt relations1 
the same purpose as the sound itself4   

,such a spontaneous image would be1 of  
course1 variable4 ,in fact1 no image    
can1 strictly speaking1 ever recur4 ,but
 these percepts1 as they are called1    
springing up in the mind like flowers   
from the buried seeds of past           
experience1 would inherit all the powers
 of suggestion which are required by any
 instrument of classification4  ,these  
powers of suggestion have probably a    
cerebral basis4 ,the new percept -- the 
generic idea -- repeats to a great      
extent1 both in nature and localization1
 the excitement constituting the various
 original impressions2 as the percept   
reproduces more or less of these it will
 be a more or less full and impartial   
representative of them4 ,not all the    
suggestions of a word or image are      
equally ripe4 ,a generic idea or type   
usually presents to us a very inadequate
 and biassed view of the field it means 
to cover4 ,as we reflect and seek to    
correct this inadequacy1 the percept    
changes on our hands4 ,the very         

consciousness that other individuals and
 other qualities fall under our concept1
 changes this concept1 as a             
psychological presence1 and alters its  
distinctness and extent4 ,when ,i       
remember1 to use a classical example1   
that the triangle is not isosceles1 nor 
scalene1 nor rectangular1 but each and  
all of those1 ,i reduce my percept to   
the word and its definition1 with       
perhaps a sense of the general motion of
 the hand and eye by which we trace a   
three-cornered figure4  ,since the      
production of a general idea is thus a  
matter of subjective bias1 we cannot    
expect that a type should be the exact  
average of the examples from which it is
 drawn4 ,in a rough way1 it is the      
average2 a fact that in itself is the   
strongest of arguments against the      
independence or priority of the general 
idea4 ,the beautiful horse1 the         
beautiful speech1 the beautiful face1 is
 always a medium between the extremes   
which our experience has offered4 ,it is

 enough that a given characteristic     
should be generally present in our      
experience1 for it to become an         
indispensable element of the ideal4     
,there is nothing in itself beautiful or
 necessary in the shape of the human    
ear1 or in the presence of nails on the 
fingers and toes2 but the ideal of man1 
which the preposterous conceit of our   
judgment makes us set up as divine and  
eternal1 requires these precise details2
 without them the human form would be   
repulsively ugly4  ,it often happens    
that the accidents of experience make us
 in this way introduce into the ideal1  
elements which1 if they could be        
excluded without disgusting us1 would   
make possible satisfactions greater than
 those we can now enjoy4 ,thus the taste
 formed by one school of art may condemn
 the greater beauties created by        
another4 ,in morals we have the same    
phenomenon4 ,a barbarous ideal of life  
requires tasks and dangers incompatible 
with happiness2 a rude and oppressed    

conscience is incapable of regarding as 
good a state which excludes its own     
acrid satisfactions4 ,so1 too1 a        
fanatical imagination cannot regard ,god
 as just unless he is represented as    
infinitely cruel4 ,the purpose of       
education is1 of course1 to free us from
 these prejudices1 and to develope our  
ideals in the direction of the greatest 
possible good4 ,evidently the ideal has 
been formed by the habit of perception2 
it is1 in a rough way1 that average form
 which we expect and most readily       
apperceive4 ,the propriety and necessity
 of it is entirely relative to our      
experience and faculty of apperception4 
,the shock of surprise1 the incongruity 
with the formed percept1 is the essence 
and measure of ugliness4  ,the average  
modified in the direction of pleasure4  
#cj4 ,nevertheless we do not form       
aesthetic ideals any more than other    
general types1 entirely without bias4   
,we have already observed that a percept
 seldom gives an impartial compound of  

the objects of which it is the generic  
image4 ,this partiality is due to a     
variety of circumstances4 ,one is the   
unequal accuracy of our observation4 ,if
 some interest directs our attention to 
a particular quality of objects1 that   
quality will be prominent in our        
percept2 it may even be the only content
 clearly given in our general idea2 and 
any object1 however similar in other    
respects to those of the given class1   
will at once be distinguished as        
belonging to a different species if it  
lacks that characteristic on which our  
attention is particularly fixed4 ,our   
percepts are thus habitually biassed in 
the direction of practical interest1 if 
practical interest does not indeed      
entirely govern their formation4 ,in the
 same manner1 our aesthetic ideals are  
biassed in the direction of aesthetic   
interest4 ,not all parts of an object   
are equally congruous with our          
perceptive faculty2 not all elements are
 noted with the same pleasure4 ,those1  

therefore1 which are agreeable are      
chiefly dwelt upon by the lover of      
beauty1 and his percept will give an    
average of things with a great emphasis 
laid on that part of them which is      
beautiful4 ,the ideal will thus deviate 
from the average in the direction of the
 observer's pleasure4  ,for this reason 
the world is so much more beautiful to a
 poet or an artist than to an ordinary  
man4 ,each object1 as his aesthetic     
sense is developed1 is perhaps less     
beautiful than to the uncritical eye2   
his taste becomes difficult1 and only   
the very best gives him unalloyed       
satisfaction4 ,but while each work of   
nature and art is thus apparently       
blighted by his greater demands and     
keener susceptibility1 the world itself1
 and the various natures it contains1   
are to him unspeakably beautiful4 ,the  
more blemishes he can see in men1 the   
more excellence he sees in man1 and the 
more bitterly he laments the fate of    
each particular soul1 the more reverence

 and love he has for the soul in its    
ideal essence4 ,criticism and           
idealization involve each other4 ,the   
habit of looking for beauty in          
everything makes us notice the          
shortcomings of things2 our sense1      
hungry for complete satisfaction1 misses
 the perfection it demands4 ,but this   
demand for perfection becomes at the    
same time the nucleus of our            
observation2 from every side a quick    
affinity draws what is beautiful        
together and stores it in the mind1     
giving body there to the blind yearnings
 of our nature4 ,many imperfect things  
crystallize into a single perfection4   
,the mind is thus peopled by general    
ideas in which beauty is the chief      
quality2 and these ideas are at the same
 time the types of things4 ,the type is 
still a natural resultant of particular 
impressions2 but the formation of it has
 been guided by a deep subjective bias  
in favour of what has delighted the eye4
  ,this theory can be easily tested by  

asking whether1 in the case where the   
ideal differs from the average form of  
objects1 this variation is not due to   
the intrinsic pleasantness or           
impressiveness of the quality           
exaggerated4 ,for instance1 in the human
 form1 the ideal differs immensely from 
the average4 ,in many respects the      
extreme or something near it is the most
 beautiful4 ,xenophon describes the     
women of ,armenia as kalai kai megalai1 
and we should still speak of one as fair
 and tall and of another as fair but    
little4 ,size is therefore1 even where  
least requisite1 a thing in which the   
ideal exceeds the average4 ,and the     
reason -- apart from associations of    
strength -- is that unusual size makes  
things conspicuous4 ,the first          
prerequisite of effect is impression1   
and size helps that2 therefore in the   
aesthetic ideal the average will be     
modified by being enlarged1 because that
 is a change in the direction of our    
pleasure1 and size will be an element of

 beauty4#h  ,similarly the eyes1 in     
themselves beautiful1 will be enlarged  
also2 and generally whatever makes by   
its sensuous quality1 by its abstract   
form1 or by its expression1 a particular
 appeal to our attention and            
contribution to our delight1 will count 
for more in the ideal type than its     
frequency would warrant4 ,the generic   
image has been constructed under the    
influence of a selective attention1 bent
 upon aesthetic worth4  ,to praise any  
object for approaching the ideal of its 
kind is therefore only a roundabout way 
of specifying its intrinsic merit and   
expressing its direct effect on our     
sensibility4 ,if in referring to the    
ideal we were not thus analyzing the    
real1 the ideal would be an irrelevant  
and unmeaning thing4 ,we know what the  
ideal is because we observe what pleases
 us in the reality4 ,if we allow the    
general notion to tyrannize at all over 
the particular impression and to blind  
us to new and unclassified beauties     

which the latter may contain1 we are    
simply substituting words for feelings1 
and making a verbal classification pass 
for an aesthetic judgment4 ,then the    
sense of beauty is gone to seed4 ,ideals
 have their uses1 but their authority is
 wholly representative4 ,they stand for 
specific satisfactions1 or else they    
stand for nothing at all4  ,in fact1 the
 whole machinery of our intelligence1   
our general ideas and laws1 fixed and   
external objects1 principles1 persons1  
and gods1 are so many symbolic1         
algebraic expressions4 ,they stand for  
experience2 experience which we are     
incapable of retaining and surveying in 
its multitudinous immediacy4 ,we should 
flounder hopelessly1 like the animals1  
did we not keep ourselves afloat and    
direct our course by these intellectual 
devices4 ,theory helps us to bear our   
ignorance of fact4  ,the same thing     
happens1 in a way1 in other fields4 ,our
 armies are devices necessitated by our 
weakness2 our property an encumbrance   

required by our need4 ,if our situation 
were not precarious1 these great engines
 of death and life would not be         
invented4 ,and our intelligence is such 
another weapon against fate4 ,we need   
not lament the fact1 since1 after all1  
to build these various structures is1 up
 to a certain point1 the natural        
function of human nature4 ,the trouble  
is not that the products are always     
subjective1 but that they are sometimes 
unfit and torment the spirit which they 
exercise4 ,the pathetic part of our     
situation appears only when we so attach
 ourselves to those necessary but       
imperfect fictions1 as to reject the    
facts from which they spring and of     
which they seek to be prophetic4 ,we are
 then guilty of that substitution of    
means for ends1 which is called idolatry
 in religion1 absurdity in logic1 and   
folly in morals4 ,in aesthetics the     
thing has no name1 but is nevertheless  
very common2 for it is found whenever we
 speak of what ought to please1 rather  

than of what actually pleases4  ,are all
 things beautiful8   #ca4 ,these        
principles lead to an intelligible      
answer to a question which is not       
uninteresting in itself and crucial in a
 system of aesthetics4 ,are all things  
beautiful8 ,are all types equally       
beautiful when we abstract from our     
practical prejudices8 ,if the reader has
 given his assent to the foregoing      
propositions1 he will easily see that1  
in one sense1 we must declare that no   
object is essentially ugly4 ,if         
impressions are painful1 they are       
objectified with difficulty2 the        
perception of a thing is therefore1     
under normal circumstances1 when the    
senses are not fatigued1 rather         
agreeable than disagreeable4 ,and when  
the frequent perception of a class of   
objects has given rise to an            
apperceptive norm1 and we have an ideal 
of the species1 the recognition and     
exemplification of that norm will give  
pleasure1 in proportion to the degree of

 interest and accuracy with which we    
have made our observations4 ,the        
naturalist accordingly sees beauties to 
which the academic artist is blind1 and 
each new environment must open to us1 if
 we allow it to educate our perception1 
a new wealth of beautiful forms4  ,but  
we are not for this reason obliged to   
assert that all gradations of beauty and
 dignity are a matter of personal and   
accidental bias4 ,the mystics who       
declare that to ,god there is no        
distinction in the value of things1 and 
that only our human prejudice makes us  
prefer a rose to an oyster1 or a lion to
 a monkey1 have1 of course1 a reason for
 what they say4 ,if we could strip      
ourselves of our human nature1 we should
 undoubtedly find ourselves incapable of
 making these distinctions1 as well as  
of thinking1 perceiving1 or willing in  
any way which is now possible to us4    
,but how things would appear to us if we
 were not human is1 to a man1 a question
 of no importance4 ,even1 the mystic to 

whom the definite constitution of his   
own mind is so hateful1 can only        
paralyze without transcending his       
faculties4 ,a passionate negation1 the  
motive of which1 although morbid1 is in 
spite of itself perfectly human1 absorbs
 all his energies1 and his ultimate     
triumph is to attain the absoluteness of
 indifference4  ,what is true of        
mysticism in general1 is true also of   
its manifestation in aesthetics4 ,if we 
could so transform our taste as to find 
beauty everywhere1 because1 perhaps1 the
 ultimate nature of things is as truly  
exemplified in one thing as in another1 
we should1 in fact1 have abolished taste
 altogether4 ,for the ascending series  
of aesthetic satisfactions we should    
have substituted a monotonous judgment  
of identity4 ,if things are beautiful   
not by virtue of their differences but  
by virtue of an identical something     
which they equally contain1 then there  
could be no discrimination in beauty4   
,like substance1 beauty would be        

everywhere one and the same1 and any    
tendency to prefer one thing to another 
would be a proof of finitude and        
illusion4 ,when we try to make our      
judgments absolute1 what we do is to    
surrender our natural standards and     
categories1 and slip into another genus1
 until we lose ourselves in the         
satisfying vagueness of mere being4     
,relativity to our partial nature is    
therefore essential to all our definite 
thoughts1 judgments1 and feelings4 ,and 
when once the human bias is admitted as 
a legitimate1 because for us a          
necessary1 basis of preference1 the     
whole wealth of nature is at once       
organized by that standard into a       
hierarchy of values4 ,everything is     
beautiful because everything is capable 
in some degree of interesting and       
charming our attention2 but things      
differ immensely in this capacity to    
please us in the contemplation of them1 
and therefore they differ immensely in  
beauty4 ,could our nature be fixed and  

determined once for all in every        
particular1 the scale of aesthetic      
values would become certain4 ,we should 
not dispute about tastes1 no longer     
because a common principle of preference
 could not be discovered1 but rather    
because any disagreement would then be  
impossible4  ,as a matter of fact1      
however1 human nature is a vague        
abstraction2 that which is common to all
 men is the least part of their natural 
endowment4 ,aesthetic capacity is       
accordingly very unevenly distributed2  
and the world of beauty is much vaster  
and more complex to one man than to     
another4 ,so long1 indeed1 as the       
distinction is merely one of            
development1 so that we recognize in the
 greatest connoisseur only the          
refinement of the judgments of the      
rudest peasant1 our aesthetic principle 
has not changed2 we might say that1 in  
so far1 we had a common standard more or
 less widely applied4 ,we might say so1 
because that standard would be an       

implication of a common nature more or  
less fully developed4  ,but men do not  
differ only in the degree of their      
susceptibility1 they differ also in its 
direction4 ,human nature branches into  
opposed and incompatible characters4    
,and taste follows this bifurcation4 ,we
 cannot1 except whimsically1 say that a 
taste for music is higher or lower than 
a taste for sculpture4 ,a man might be a
 musician and a sculptor by turns2 that 
would only involve a perfectly          
conceivable enlargement in human genius4
 ,but the union thus effected would be  
an accumulation of gifts in the         
observer1 not a combination of beauties 
in the object4 ,the excellence of       
sculpture and that of music would remain
 entirely independent and heterogeneous4
 ,such divergences are like those of the
 outer senses to which these arts       
appeal4 ,sound and colour have analogies
 only in their lowest depth1 as         
vibrations and excitement2 as they grow 
specific and objective1 they diverge2   

and although the same consciousness     
perceives them1 it perceives them as    
unrelated and uncombinable objects4     
,the ideal enlargement of human         
capacity1 therefore1 has no tendency to 
constitute a single standard of beauty4 
,these standards remain the expression  
of diverse habits of sense and          
imagination4 ,the man who combines the  
greatest range with the greatest        
endowment in each particular1 will1 of  
course1 be the critic most generally    
respected4 ,he will express the feelings
 of the greater number of men4 ,the     
advantage of scope in criticism lies not
 in the improvement of our sense in each
 particular field2 here the artist will 
detect the amateur's shortcomings4 ,but 
no man is a specialist with his whole   
soul4 ,some latent capacity he has for  
other perceptions2 and it is for the    
awakening of these1 and their           
marshalling before him1 that the student
 of each kind of beauty turns to the    
lover of them all4  ,the temptation1    

therefore1 to say that all things are   
really equally beautiful arises from an 
imperfect analysis1 by which the        
operations of the aesthetic             
consciousness are only partially        
disintegrated4 ,the dependence of the   
degrees of beauty upon our nature is    
perceived1 while the dependence of its  
essence upon our nature is still        
ignored4 ,all things are not equally    
beautiful because the subjective bias   
that discriminates between them is the  
cause of their being beautiful at all4  
,the principle of personal preference is
 the same as that of human taste2 real  
and objective beauty1 in contrast to a  
vagary of individuals1 means only an    
affinity to a more prevalent and lasting
 susceptibility1 a response toa more    
general and fundamental demand4 ,and the
 keener discrimination1 by which the    
distance between beautiful and ugly     
things is increased1 far from being a   
loss of aesthetic insight1 is a         
development of that faculty by the      

exercise of which beauty comes into the 
world4  ,effects of indeterminate       
organization4   #cb4 ,it is the free    
exercise of the activity of apperception
 that gives so peculiar an interest to  
indeterminate objects1 to the vague1 the
 incoherent1 the suggestive1 the        
variously interpretable4 ,the more this 
effect is appealed to1 the greater      
wealth of thought is presumed in the    
observer1 and the less mastery is       
displayed by the artist4 ,a poor and    
literal mind cannot enjoy the           
opportunity for reverie and construction
 given by the stimulus of indeterminate 
objects2 it lacks the requisite         
resources4 ,it is nonplussed and        
annoyed1 and turns away to simpler and  
more transparent things with a feeling  
of helplessness often turning into      
contempt4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the  
artist who is not artist enough1 who has
 too many irrepressible talents and too 
little technical skill1 is sure to float
 in the region of the indeterminate4 ,he

 sketches and never paints2 he hints and
 never expresses2 he stimulates and     
never informs4 ,this is the method of   
the individuals and of the nations that 
have more genius than art4  ,the        
consciousness that accompanies this     
characteristic is the sense of          
profundity1 of mighty significance4 ,and
 this feeling is not necessarily an     
illusion4 ,the nature of our materials  
-- be they words1 colours1 or plastic   
matter -- imposes a limit and bias upon 
our expression4 ,the reality of         
experience can never be quite rendered  
through these media4 ,the greatest      
mastery of technique will therefore come
 short of perfect adequacy and          
exhaustiveness2 there must always remain
 a penumbra and fringe of suggestion if 
the most explicit representation is to  
communicate a truth4 ,when there is real
 profundity1 -- when the living core of 
things is most firmly grasped1 -- there 
will accordingly be a felt inadequacy of
 expression1 and an appeal to the       

observer to piece out our imperfections 
with his thoughts4 ,but this should come
 only after the resources of a patient  
and well-learned art have been          
exhausted2 else what is felt as depth is
 really confusion and incompetence4 ,the
 simplest thing becomes unutterable1 if 
we have forgotten how to speak4 ,and a  
habitual indulgence in the inarticulate 
is a sure sign of the philosopher who   
has not learned to think1 the poet who  
has not learned to write1 the painter   
who has not learned to paint1 and the   
impression that has not learned to      
express itself -- all of which are      
compatible with an immensity of genius  
in the inexpressible soul4  ,our age is 
given to this sort of self-indulgence1  
and on both the grounds mentioned4 ,our 
public1 without being really trained1 --
 for we appeal to too large a public to 
require training in it1 -- is well      
informed and eagerly responsive to      
everything2 it is ready to work pretty  
hard1 and do its share towards its own  

profit and entertainment4 ,it becomes a 
point of pride with it to understand and
 appreciate everything4 ,and our art1 in
 its turn1 does not overlook this       
opportunity4 ,it becomes disorganized1  
sporadic1 whimsical1 and experimental4  
,the crudity we are too distracted to   
refine1 we accept as originality1 and   
the vagueness we are too pretentious to 
make accurate1 we pass off as sublimity4
 ,this is the secret of making great    
works on novel principles1 and of       
writing hard books easily4  ,example of 
landscape4   #cc4 ,an extraordinary     
taste for landscape compensates us for  
this ignorance of what is best and most 
finished in the arts4 ,the natural      
landscape is an indeterminate object2 it
 almost always contains enough diversity
 to allow the eye a great liberty in    
selecting1 emphasizing1 and grouping its
 elements1 and it is furthermore rich in
 suggestion and in vague emotional      
stimulus4 ,a landscape to be seen has to
 be composed1 and to be loved has to be 

moralized4 ,that is the reason why rude 
or vulgar people are indifferent to     
their natural surroundings4 ,it does not
 occur to them that the work-a-day world
 is capable of aesthetic contemplation4 
,only on holidays1 when they add to     
themselves and their belongings some    
unusual ornament1 do they stop to watch 
the effect4 ,the far more beautiful     
daily aspects of their environment      
escape them altogether4 ,when1 however1 
we learn to apperceive2 when we grow    
fond of tracing lines and developing    
vistas2 when1 above all1 the subtler    
influences of places on our mental tone 
are transmuted into an expressiveness in
 those places1 and they are furthermore 
poetized by our day-dreams1 and turned  
by our instant fancy into so many hints 
of a fairyland of happy living and vague
 adventure1 -- then we feel that the    
landscape is beautiful4 ,the forest1 the
 fields1 all wild or rural scenes1 are  
then full of companionship and          
entertainment4  ,this is a beauty       

dependent on reverie1 fancy1 and        
objectified emotion4 ,the promiscuous   
natural landscape cannot be enjoyed in  
any other way4 ,it has no real unity1   
and therefore requires to have some form
 or other supplied by the fancy2 which  
can be the more readily done1 in that   
the possible forms are many1 and the    
constant changes in the object offer    
varying suggestions to the eye4 ,in     
fact1 psychologically speaking1 there is
 no such thing as a landscape2 what we  
call such is an infinity of different   
scraps and glimpses given in succession4
 ,even a painted landscape1 although it 
tends to select and emphasize some parts
 of the field1 is composed by adding    
together a multitude of views4 ,when    
this painting is observed in its turn1  
it is surveyed as a real landscape would
 be1 and apperceived partially and      
piecemeal2 although1 of course1 it      
offers much less wealth of material than
 its living original1 and is therefore  
vastly inferior4  ,only the extreme of  

what is called impressionism tries to   
give upon canvas one absolute momentary 
view2 the result is that when the       
beholder has himself actually been      
struck by that aspect1 the picture has  
an extraordinary force and emotional    
value -- like the vivid power of        
recalling the past possessed by smells4 
,but1 on the other hand1 such a work is 
empty and trivial in the extreme2 it is 
the photograph of a detached impression1
 not followed1 as it would be in nature1
 by many variations of itself4 ,an      
object so unusual is often              
unrecognizable1 if the vision thus      
unnaturally isolated has never happened 
to come vividly into our own experience4
 ,the opposite school -- what might be  
called discursive landscape painting -- 
collects so many glimpses and gives so  
fully the sum of our positive           
observations of a particular scene1 that
 its work is sure to be perfectly       
intelligible and plain4 ,if it seems    
unreal and uninteresting1 that is       

because it is formless1 like the        
collective object it represents1 while  
it lacks that sensuous intensity and    
movement which might have made the      
reality stimulating4  ,the landscape    
contains1 of course1 innumerable things 
which have determinate forms2 but if the
 attention is directed specifically to  
them1 we have no longer what1 by a      
curious limitation of the word1 is      
called the love of nature4 ,not very    
long ago it was usual for painters of   
landscapes to introduce figures1        
buildings1 or ruins to add some human   
association to the beauty of the place4 
,or1 if wildness and desolation were to 
be pictured1 at least one weary wayfarer
 must be seen sitting upon a broken     
column4 ,he might wear a toga and then  
be ,marius among the ruins of ,carthage4
 ,the landscape without figures would   
have seemed meaningless2 the spectator  
would have sat in suspense awaiting     
something1 as at the theatre when the   
curtain rises on an empty stage4 ,the   

indeterminateness of the suggestions of 
an unhumanized scene was then felt as a 
defect2 now we feel it rather as an     
exaltation4 ,we need to be free2 our    
emotion suffices us2 we do not ask for a
 description of the object which        
interests us as a part of ourselves4 ,we
 should blush to say so simple and      
obvious a thing as that to us the       
mountains are a feeling2 nor should we  
think of apologizing for our romanticism
 as ,byron did3       ,i love not man   
the less but nature more      ,from     
these our interviews1 in which ,i steal1
      ,from all ,i may be1 or have been 
before1      ,to mingle with the        
universe1 and feel      ,what ,i can    
ne'er express4  ,this ability to rest in
 nature unadorned and to find           
entertainment in her aspects1 is1 of    
course1 a great gain4 ,aesthetic        
education consists in training ourselves
 to see the maximum of beauty4 ,to see  
it in the physical world1 which must    
continually be about us1 is a great     

progress toward that marriage of the    
imagination with the reality which is   
the goal of contemplation4  ,while we   
gain this mastery of the formless1      
however1 we should not lose the more    
necessary capacity of seeing form in    
those things which happen to have it4   
,in respect to most of those things     
which are determinate as well as        
natural1 we are usually in that state of
 aesthetic unconsciousness which the    
peasant is in in respect to the         
landscape4 ,we treat human life and its 
environment with the same utilitarian   
eye with which he regards the field and 
mountain4 ,that is beautiful which is   
expressive of convenience and wealth2   
the rest is indifferent4 ,if we mean by 
love of nature aesthetic delight in the 
world in which we casually live 7and    
what can be more natural than man and   
all his arts871 we may say that the     
absolute love of nature hardly exists   
among us4 ,what we love is the          
stimulation of our own personal emotions

 and dreams2 and landscape appeals to   
us1 as music does to those who have no  
sense for musical form4  ,there would   
seem to be no truth in the saying that  
the ancients loved nature less than we4 
,they loved landscape less -- less1 at  
least1 in proportion to their love of   
the definite things it contained4 ,the  
vague and changing effects of the       
atmosphere1 the masses of mountains1 the
 infinite and living complexity of      
forests1 did not fascinate them4 ,they  
had not that preponderant taste for the 
indeterminate that makes the landscape a
 favourite subject of contemplation4    
,but love of nature1 and comprehension  
of her1 they had in a most eminent      
degree2 in fact1 they actually made     
explicit that objectification of our own
 soul in her1 which for the romantic    
poet remains a mere vague and shifting  
suggestion4 ,what are the celestial     
gods1 the nymphs1 the fauns1 the dryads1
 but the definite apperceptions of that 
haunting spirit which we think we see in

 the sky1 the mountains1 and the woods8 
,we may think that our vague intuition  
grasps the truth of what their childish 
imagination turned into a fable4 ,but   
our belief1 if it is one1 is just as    
fabulous1 just as much a projection of  
human nature into material things2 and  
if we renounce all positive conception  
of quasi-mental principles in nature1   
and reduce our moralizing of her to a   
poetic expression of our own sensations1
 then can we say that our verbal and    
illusive images are comparable as       
representations of the life of nature to
 the precision1 variety1 humour1 and    
beauty of the ,greek mythology8         
,extensions to objects usually not      
regarded authentically4   #cd4 ,it may  
not be superfluous to mention here      
certain analogous fields where the human
 mind gives a series of unstable forms  
to objects in themselves                
indeterminate4#i ,history1 philosophy1  
natural as well as moral1 and religion  
are evidently such fields4 ,all theory  

is a subjective form given to an        
indeterminate material4 ,the material is
 experience2 and although each part of  
experience is1 of course1 perfectly     
definite in itself1 and just that       
experience which it is1 yet the         
recollection and relating together of   
the successive experiences is a function
 of the theoretical faculty4 ,the       
systematic relations of things in time  
and space1 and their dependence upon one
 another1 are the work of our           
imagination4 ,theory can therefore never
 have the kind of truth which belongs to
 experience2 as ,hobbes has it1 no      
discourse whatsoever can end in absolute
 knowledge of fact4  ,it is conceivable 
that two different theories should be   
equally true in respect to the same     
facts4 ,all that is required is that    
they should be equally complete schemes 
for the relation and prediction of the  
realities they deal with4 ,the choice   
between them would be an arbitrary one1 
determined by personal bias1 for the    

object being indeterminate1 its elements
 can be apperceived as forming all kinds
 of unities4 ,a theory is a form of     
apperception1 and in applying it to the 
facts1 although our first concern is    
naturally the adequacy of our instrument
 of comprehension1 we are also          
influenced1 more than we think1 by the  
ease and pleasure with which we think in
 its terms1 that is1 by its beauty4     
,the case of two alternative theories of
 nature1 both exhaustive and adequate1  
may seem somewhat imaginary4 ,the human 
mind is1 indeed1 not rich and           
indeterminate enough to drive1 as the   
saying is1 many horses abreast2 it      
wishes to have one general scheme of    
conception only1 under which it strives 
to bring everything4 ,yet the           
philosophers1 who are the scouts of     
common sense1 have come in sight of this
 possibility of a variety of methods of 
dealing with the same facts4 ,as at the 
basis of evolution generally there are  
many variations1 only some of which     

remain fixed1 so at the origin of       
conception there are many schemes2 these
 are simultaneously developed1 and at   
most stages of thought divide the       
intelligence among themselves4 ,so much 
is thought of on one principle -- say   
mechanically -- and so much on another  
-- say teleologically4 ,in those minds  
only that have a speculative turn1 that 
is1 in whom the desire for unity of     
comprehension outruns practical         
exigencies1 does the conflict become    
intolerable4 ,in them one or another of 
these theories tends to swallow all     
experience1 but is commonly incapable of
 doing so4  ,the final victory of a     
single philosophy is not yet won1       
because none as yet has proved adequate 
to all experience4 ,if ever unity should
 be attained1 our unanimity would not   
indicate that1 as the popular fancy     
conceives it1 the truth had been        
discovered2 it would only indicate that 
the human mind had found a definitive   
way of classifying its experience4 ,very

 likely1 if man still retained his      
inveterate habit of hypostatizing his   
ideas1 that definitive scheme would be  
regarded as a representation of the     
objective relations of things2 but no   
proof that it was so would ever be      
found1 nor even any hint that there were
 external objects1 not to speak of      
relations between them4 ,as the objects 
are hypostatized percepts1 so the       
relations are hypostatized processes of 
the human understanding4  ,to have      
reached a final philosophy would be only
 to have formulated the typical and     
satisfying form of human apperception2  
the view would remain a theory1 an      
instrument of comprehension and survey  
fitted to the human eye2 it would be for
 ever utterly heterogeneous from fact1  
utterly unrepresentative of any of those
 experiences which it would artificially
 connect and weave into a pattern4      
,mythology and theology are the most    
striking illustrations of this human    
method of incorporating much diffuse    

experience into graphic and picturesque 
ideas2 but steady reflection will hardly
 allow us to see anything else in the   
theories of science and philosophy4     
,these1 too1 are creatures of our       
intelligence1 and have their only being 
in the movement of our thought1 as they 
have their only justification in their  
fitness to our experience4  ,long before
 we can attain1 however1 the ideal      
unification of experience under one     
theory1 the various fields of thought   
demand provisional surveys2 we are      
obliged to reflect on life in a variety 
of detached and unrelated acts1 since   
neither can the whole material of life  
be ever given while we still live1 nor  
can that which is given be impartially  
retained in the human memory4 ,when     
omniscience was denied us1 we were      
endowed with versatility4 ,the          
picturesqueness of human thought may    
console us for its imperfection4        
,history1 for instance1 which passes for
 the account of facts1 is in reality a  

collection of apperceptions of an       
indeterminate material2 for even the    
material of history is not fact1 but    
consists of memories and words subject  
to ever-varying interpretation4 ,no     
historian can be without bias1 because  
the bias defines the history4 ,the      
memory in the first place is selective2 
official and other records are          
selective1 and often intentionally      
partial4 ,monuments and ruins remain by 
chance4 ,and when the historian has set 
himself to study these few relics of the
 past1 the work of his own intelligence 
begins4 ,he must have some guiding      
interest4 ,a history is not an          
indiscriminate register of every known  
event2 a file of newspapers is not an   
inspiration of ,clio4 ,a history is a   
view of the fortunes of some institution
 or person2 it traces the development of
 some interest4 ,this interest furnishes
 the standard by which the facts are    
selected1 and their importance gauged4  
,then1 after the facts are thus chosen1 

marshalled1 and emphasized1 comes the   
indication of causes and relations2 and 
in this part of his work the historian  
plunges avowedly into speculation1 and  
becomes a philosophical poet4           
,everything will then depend on his     
genius1 on his principles1 on his       
passions1 -- in a word1 on his          
apperceptive forms4 ,and the value of   
history is similar to that of poetry1   
and varies with the beauty1 power1 and  
adequacy of the form in which the       
indeterminate material of human life is 
presented4  ,further dangers of         
indeterminateness4   #ce4 ,the fondness 
of a race or epoch for any kind of      
effect is a natural expression of       
temperament and circumstances1 and      
cannot be blamed or easily corrected4   
,at the same time we may stop to        
consider some of the disadvantages of a 
taste for the indeterminate4 ,we shall  
be registering a truth and at the same  
time1 perhaps1 giving some encouragement
 to that rebellion which we may inwardly

 feel against this too prevalent manner4
 ,the indeterminate is by its nature    
ambiguous2 it is therefore obscure and  
uncertain in its effect1 and if used1 as
 in many arts it often is1 to convey a  
meaning1 must fail to do so             
unequivocally4 ,where a meaning is not  
to be conveyed1 as in landscape1        
architecture1 or music1 the illusiveness
 of the form is not so objectionable3   
although in all these objects the       
tendency to observe forms and to demand 
them is a sign of increasing            
appreciation4 ,the ignorant fail to see 
the forms of music1 architecture1 and   
landscape1 and therefore are insensible 
to relative rank and technical values in
 these spheres2 they regard the objects 
only as so many stimuli to emotion1 as  
soothing or enlivening influences4 ,but 
the sensuous and associative values of  
these things -- especially of music --  
are so great1 that even without an      
appreciation of form considerable beauty
 may be found in them4  ,in literature1 

however1 where the sensuous value of the
 words is comparatively small1          
indeterminateness of form is fatal to   
beauty1 and1 if extreme1 even to        
expressiveness4 ,for meaning is conveyed
 by the form and order of words1 not by 
the words themselves1 and no precision  
of meaning can be reached without       
precision of style4 ,therefore no       
respectable writer is voluntarily       
obscure in the structure of his phrases 
-- that is an abuse reserved for the    
clowns of literary fashion4 ,but a book 
is a larger sentence1 and if it is      
formless it fails to mean anything1 for 
the same reason that an unformed        
collection of words means nothing4 ,the 
chapters and verses may have said       
something1 as loose words may have a    
known sense and a tone2 but the book    
will have brought no message4  ,in fact1
 the absence of form in composition has 
two stages3 that in which1 as in the    
works of ,emerson1 significant fragments
 are collected1 and no system1 no total 

thought1 constructed out of them2 and   
secondly1 that in which1 as in the      
writings of the ,symbolists of our time1
 all the significance is kept back in   
the individual words1 or even in the    
syllables that compose them4 ,this      
mosaic of word-values has1 indeed1 a    
possibility of effect1 for the absence  
of form does not destroy materials1 but1
 as we have observed1 rather allows the 
attention to remain fixed upon them2 and
 for this reason absence of sense is a  
means of accentuating beauty of sound   
and verbal suggestion4 ,but this example
 shows how the tendency to neglect      
structure in literature is a tendency to
 surrender the use of language as an    
instrument of thought ,the descent is   
easy from ambiguity to meaninglessness4 
,the indeterminate in form is also      
indeterminate in value4 ,it needs       
completion by the mind of the observer  
and as this completion differs1 the     
value of the result must vary4 ,an      
indeterminate object is therefore       

beautiful to him who can make it so1 and
 ugly to him who cannot4 ,it appeals to 
a few and to them diversely4 ,in fact1  
the observer's own mind is the          
storehouse from which the beautiful form
 has to be drawn4 ,if the form is not   
there1 it cannot be applied to the      
half-finished object2 it is like asking 
a man without skill to complete another 
man's composition4 ,the indeterminate   
object therefore requires an active and 
well-equipped mind1 and is otherwise    
without value4  ,it is furthermore      
unprofitable even to the mind which     
takes it up2 it stimulates that mind to 
action1 but it presents it with no new  
object4 ,we can respond only with those 
forms of apperception which we already  
are accustomed to4 ,a formless object   
cannot inform the mind1 cannot mould it 
to a new habit4 ,that happens only when 
the data1 by their clear determination1 
compel the eye and imagination to follow
 new paths and see new relations4 ,then 
we are introduced to a new beauty1 and  

enriched to that extent4 ,but the       
indeterminate1 like music to the        
sentimental1 is a vague stimulus4 ,it   
calls forth at random such ideas and    
memories as may lie to hand1 stirring   
the mind1 but leaving it undisciplined  
and unacquainted with any new object4   
,this stirring1 like that of the pool of
 ,bethesda1 may indeed have its virtue4 
,a creative mind1 already rich in       
experience and observation1 may1 under  
the influence of such a stimulus1 dart  
into a new thought1 and give birth to   
that with which it is already pregnant2 
but the fertilizing seed came from      
elsewhere1 from study and admiration of 
those definite forms which nature       
contains1 or which art1 in imitation of 
nature1 has conceived and brought to    
perfection4  ,illusion of infinite      
perfection4   #cf4 ,the great advantage1
 then1 of indeterminate organization is 
that it cultivates that spontaneity1    
intelligence1 and imagination without   
which many important objects would      

remain unintelligible1 and because      
unintelligible1 uninteresting4 ,the     
beauty of landscape1 the forms of       
religion and science1 the types of human
 nature itself1 are due to this         
apperceptive gift4 ,without it we should
 have a chaos2 but its patient and      
ever-fresh activity carves out of the   
fluid material a great variety of forms4
 ,an object which stimulates us to this 
activity1 therefore1 seems often to be  
more sublime and beautiful than one     
which presents to us a single unchanging
 form1 however perfect4 ,there seems to 
be a life and infinity in the           
incomplete1 which the determinate       
excludes by its own completeness and    
petrifaction4 ,and yet the effort in    
this very activity is to reach          
determination2 we can only see beauty in
 so far as we introduce form4 ,the      
instability of the form can be no       
advantage to a work of art2 the         
determinate keeps constantly what the   
indeterminate reaches only in those     

moments in which the observer's         
imagination is especially propitious4   
,if we feel a certain disappointment in 
the monotonous limits of a definite form
 and its eternal1 unsympathizing        
message1 might we not feel much more the
 melancholy transiency of those glimpses
 of beauty which elude us in the        
indeterminate8 ,might not the torment   
and uncertainty of this contemplation1  
with the self-consciousness it probably 
involves1 more easily tire us than the  
quiet companionship of a constant       
object8 ,may we not prefer the          
unchangeable to the irrecoverable8  ,we 
may2 and the preference is one which we 
should all more clearly feel1 were it   
not for an illusion1 proper to the      
romantic temperament1 which lends a     
mysterious charm to things which are    
indefinite and indefinable4 ,it is the  
suggestion of infinite perfection4 ,in  
reality1 perfection is a synonym of     
finitude4 ,neither in nature nor in the 
fancy can anything be perfect except by 

realizing a definite type1 which        
excludes all variation1 and contrasts   
sharply with every other possibility of 
being4 ,there is no perfection apart    
from a form of apperception or type2 and
 there are as many kinds of perfection  
as there are types or forms of          
apperception latent in the mind4  ,now  
these various perfections are mutually  
exclusive4 ,only in a kind of aesthetic 
orgy -- in the madness of an intoxicated
 imagination -- can we confuse them4 ,as
 the ,roman emperor wished that the     
,roman people had but a single neck1 to 
murder them at one blow1 so we may      
sometimes wish that all beauties had but
 one form1 that we might behold them    
together4 ,but in the nature of things  
beauties are incompatible4 ,the spring  
cannot coexist with the autumn1 nor day 
with night2 what is beautiful in a child
 is hideous in a man1 and vice versa2   
every age1 every country1 each sex1 has 
a peculiar beauty1 finite and           
incommunicable2 the better it is        

attained the more completely it excludes
 every other4 ,the same is evidently    
true of schools of art1 of styles and   
languages1 and of every effect          
whatsoever4 ,it exists by its finitude  
and is great in proportion to its       
determination4  ,but there is a loose   
and somewhat helpless state of mind in  
which while we are incapable of         
realizing any particular thought or     
vision in its perfect clearness and     
absolute beauty1 we nevertheless feel   
its haunting presence in the background 
of consciousness4 ,and one reason why   
the idea cannot emerge from that        
obscurity is that it is not alone in the
 brain2 a thousand other ideals1 a      
thousand other plastic tendencies of    
thought1 simmer there in confusion2 and 
if any definite image is presented in   
response to that vague agitation of our 
soul1 we feel its inadequacy to our need
 in spite of1 or perhaps on account of1 
its own particular perfection4 ,we then 
say that the classic does not satisfy   

us1 and that the ,grecian cloys us with 
his perfectness4 ,we are not capable of 
that concentrated and serious attention 
to one thing at a time which would      
enable us to sink into its being1 and   
enjoy the intrinsic harmonies of its    
form1 and the bliss of its immanent     
particular heaven2 we flounder in the   
vague1 but at the same time we are full 
of yearnings1 of half-thoughts and      
semi-visions1 and the upward tendency   
and exaltation of our mood is emphatic  
and overpowering in proportion to our   
incapacity to think1 speak1 or imagine4 
,the sum of our incoherences has1       
however1 an imposing volume and even1   
perhaps1 a vague1 general direction4 ,we
 feel ourselves laden with an infinite  
burden2 and what delights us most and   
seems to us to come nearest to the ideal
 is not what embodies any one possible  
form1 but that which1 by embodying none1
 suggests many1 and stirs the mass of   
our inarticulate imagination with a     
pervasive thrill4 ,each thing1 without  

being a beauty in itself1 by stimulating
 our indeterminate emotion1 seems to be 
a hint and expression of infinite       
beauty4 ,that infinite perfection which 
cannot be realized1 because it is       
self-contradictory1 may be thus         
suggested1 and on account of this       
suggestion an indeterminate effect may  
be regarded as higher1 more significant1
 and more beautiful than any determinate
 one4  ,the illusion1 however1 is       
obvious4 ,the infinite perfection       
suggested is an absurdity4 ,what exists 
is a vague emotion1 the objects of      
which1 if they could emerge from the    
chaos of a confused imagination1 would  
turn out to be a multitude of           
differently beautiful determinate       
things4 ,this emotion of infinite       
perfection is the materia prima -- rudis
 indigestaque moles -- out of which     
attention1 inspiration1 and art can     
bring forth an infinity of particular   
perfections4 ,every aesthetic success1  
whether in contemplation or production1 

is the birth of one of these            
possibilities with which the sense of   
infinite perfection is pregnant4 ,a work
 of art or an act of observation which  
remains indeterminate is1 therefore1 a  
failure1 however much it may stir our   
emotion4 ,it is a failure for two       
reasons4 ,in the first place this       
emotion is seldom wholly pleasant2 it is
 disquieting and perplexing2 it brings a
 desire rather than a satisfaction4 ,and
 in the second place1 the emotion1 not  
being embodied1 fails to constitute the 
beauty of anything2 and what we have is 
merely a sentiment1 a consciousness that
 values are or might be there1 but a    
failure to extricate those values1 or to
 make them explicit and recognizable in 
an appropriate object4  ,these gropings 
after beauty have their worth as signs  
of aesthetic vitality and intimations of
 future possible accomplishment2 but in 
themselves they are abortive1 and mark  
the impotence of the imagination4       
,sentimentalism in the observer and     

romanticism in the artist are examples  
of this aesthetic incapacity4 ,whenever 
beauty is really seen and loved1 it has 
a definite embodiment3 the eye has      
precision1 the work has style1 and the  
object has perfection4 ,the kind of     
perfection may indeed be new2 and if the
 discovery of new perfections is to be  
called romanticism1 then romanticism is 
the beginning of all aesthetic life4    
,but if by romanticism we mean          
indulgence in confused suggestion and in
 the exhibition of turgid force1 then   
there is evidently need of education1 of
 attentive labour1 to disentangle the   
beauties so vaguely felt1 and give each 
its adequate embodiment4 ,the breadth of
 our inspiration need not be lost in    
this process of clarification1 for there
 is no limit to the number and variety  
of forms which the world may be made to 
wear2 only1 if it is to be appreciated  
as beautiful and not merely felt as     
unutterable1 it must be seen as a       
kingdom of forms4 ,thus the works of    

,shakespeare give us a great variety1   
with a frequent marvellous precision of 
characterization1 and the forms of his  
art are definite although its scope is  
great4  ,but by a curious anomaly1 we   
are often expected to see the greatest  
expressiveness in what remains          
indeterminate1 and in reality expresses 
nothing4 ,as we have already observed1  
the sense of profundity and significance
 is a very detachable emotion2 it can   
accompany a confused jumble of          
promptings quite as easily as it can a  
thorough comprehension of reality4 ,the 
illusion of infinite perfection is      
peculiarly apt to produce this          
sensation4 ,that illusion arises by the 
simultaneous awakening of many incipient
 thoughts and dim ideas2 it stirs the   
depths of the mind as a wind stirs the  
thickets of a forest2 and the unusual   
consciousness of the life and longing of
 the soul1 brought by that gust of      
feeling1 makes us recognize in the      
object a singular power1 a mysterious   

meaning4  ,but the feeling of           
significance signifies little4 ,all we  
have in this case is a potentiality of  
imagination2 and only when this         
potentiality begins to be realized in   
definite ideas1 does a real meaning1 or 
any object which that meaning can mean1 
arise in the mind4 ,the highest         
aesthetic good is not that vague        
potentiality1 nor that contradictory1   
infinite perfection so strongly desired2
 it is the greatest number and variety  
of finite perfections4 ,to learn to see 
in nature and to enshrine in the arts   
the typical forms of things2 to study   
and recognize their variations2 to      
domesticate the imagination in the      
world1 so that everywhere beauty can be 
seen1 and a hint found for artistic     
creation1 -- that is the goal of        
contemplation4 ,progress lies in the    
direction of discrimination and         
precision1 not in that of formless      
emotion and reverie4  ,organized nature 
the source of apperceptive forms2       

example of sculpture4   #cg4 ,the form  
of the material world is in one sense   
always perfectly definite1 since the    
particles that compose it are at each   
moment in a given relative position2 but
 a world that had no other form than    
that of such a constellation of atoms   
would remain chaotic to our perception1 
because we should not be able to survey 
it as a whole1 or to keep our attention 
suspended evenly over its innumerable   
parts4 ,according to evolutionary       
theory1 mechanical necessity has1       
however1 brought about a distribution   
and aggregation of elements such as1 for
 our purposes1 constitutes individual   
things4 ,certain systems of atoms move  
together as units2 and these organisms  
reproduce themselves and recur so often 
in our environment1 that our senses     
become accustomed to view their parts   
together4 ,their form becomes a natural 
and recognizable one4 ,an order and     
sequence is established in our          
imagination by virtue of the order and  

sequence in which the corresponding     
impressions have come to our senses4 ,we
 can remember1 reproduce1 and in        
reproducing vary1 by kaleidoscopic      
tricks of the fancy1 the forms in which 
our perceptions have come4  ,the        
mechanical organization of external     
nature is thus the source of            
apperceptive forms in the mind4 ,did not
 sensation1 by a constant repetition of 
certain sequences1 and a recurring      
exactitude of mathematical relations1   
keep our fancy clear and fresh1 we      
should fall into an imaginative         
lethargy4 ,idealization would degenerate
 into indistinctness1 and1 by the       
dulling of our memory1 we should dream a
 world daily more poor and vague4  ,this
 process is periodically observable in  
the history of the arts4 ,the way in    
which the human figure1 for instance1 is
 depicted1 is an indication of the way  
in which it is apperceived4 ,the arts   
give back only so much of nature as the 
human eye has been able to master4 ,the 

most primitive stage of drawing and     
sculpture presents man with his arms and
 legs1 his ten fingers and ten toes1    
branching out into mid-air2 the         
apperception of the body has been       
evidently practical and successive1 and 
the artist sets down what he knows      
rather than any of the particular       
perceptions that conveyed that          
knowledge4 ,those perceptions are merged
 and lost in the haste to reach the     
practically useful concept of the       
object4 ,by a nave expression of the    
same principle1 we find in some         
,assyrian drawings the eye seen from the
 front introduced into a face seen in   
profile1 each element being represented 
in that form in which it was most easily
 observed and remembered4 ,the          
development of ,greek sculpture         
furnishes a good example of the gradual 
penetration of nature into the mind1 of 
the slowly enriched apperception of the 
object4 ,the quasi-,egyptian stiffness  
melts away1 first from the bodies of the

 minor figures1 afterwards of those of  
the gods1 and finally the face is       
varied1 and the hieratic smile almost   
disappears4#aj  ,but this progress has a
 near limit2 once the most beautiful and
 inclusive apperception reached1 once   
the best form caught at its best moment1
 the artist seems to have nothing more  
to do4 ,to reproduce the imperfections  
of individuals seems wrong1 when beauty1
 after all1 is the thing desired4 ,and  
the ideal1 as caught by the master's    
inspiration1 is more beautiful than     
anything his pupils can find for        
themselves in nature4 ,from its summit1 
the art therefore declines in one of two
 directions4 ,it either becomes         
academic1 forsakes the study of nature1 
and degenerates into empty convention1  
or else it becomes ignoble1 forsakes    
beauty1 and sinks into a tasteless and  
unimaginative technique4 ,the latter was
 the course of sculpture in ancient     
times1 the former1 with moments of      
reawakening1 has been its dreadful fate 

among the moderns4  ,this reawakening   
has come whenever there has been a      
return to nature1 for a new form of     
apperception and a new ideal4 ,of this  
return there is continual need in all   
the arts2 without it our apperceptions  
grow thin and worn1 and subject to the  
sway of tradition and fashion4 ,we      
continue to judge about beauty1 but we  
give up looking for it4 ,the remedy is  
to go back to the reality1 to study it  
patiently1 to allow new aspects of it to
 work upon the mind1 sink into it1 and  
beget there an imaginative offspring    
after their own kind4 ,then a new art   
can appear1 which1 having the same      
origin in admiration for nature which   
the old art had1 may hope to attain the 
same excellence in a new direction4  ,in
 fact1 one of the dangers to which a    
modern artist is exposed is the         
seduction of his predecessors4 ,the     
gropings of our muse1 the distracted    
experiments of our architecture1 often  
arise from the attraction of some       

historical school2 we cannot work out   
our own style because we are hampered by
 the beauties of so many others4 ,the   
result is an eclecticism1 which1 in     
spite of its great historical and       
psychological interest1 is without      
aesthetic unity or permanent power to   
please4 ,thus the study of many schools 
of art may become an obstacle to        
proficiency in any4  ,utility the       
principle of organization in nature4    
#ch4 ,utility 7or1 as it is now called1 
adaptation1 and natural selection7      
organizes the material world into       
definite species and individuals4 ,only 
certain aggregations of matter are in   
equilibrium with the prevailing forces  
of the environment4 ,gravity1 for       
instance1 is in itself a chaotic force2 
it pulls all particles indiscriminately 
together without reference to the wholes
 into which the human eye may have      
grouped them4 ,but the result is not    
chaos1 because matter arranged in some  
ways is welded together by the very     

tendency which disintegrates it when    
arranged in other forms4 ,these forms1  
selected by their congruity with        
gravity1 are therefore fixed in nature1 
and become types4 ,thus the weight of   
the stones keeps the pyramid standing3  
here a certain shape has become a       
guarantee of permanence in the presence 
of a force in itself mechanical and     
undiscriminating4 ,it is the utility of 
the pyramidal form -- its fitness to    
stand -- that has made it a type in     
building4 ,the ,egyptians merely        
repeated a process that they might have 
observed going on of itself in nature1  
who builds a pyramid in every hill1 not 
indeed because she wishes to1 or because
 pyramids are in any way an object of   
her action1 but because she has no force
 which can easily dislodge matter that  
finds itself in that shape4  ,such an   
accidental stability of structure is1 in
 this moving world1 a sufficient        
principle of permanence and             
individuality4 ,the same mechanical     

principles1 in more complex             
applications1 insure the persistence of 
animal forms and prevent any permanent  
deviation from them4 ,what is called the
 principle of self-preservation1 and the
 final causes and substantial forms of  
the ,aristotelian philosophy1 are       
descriptions of the result of this      
operation4 ,the tendency of everything  
to maintain and propagate its nature is 
simply the inertia of a stable          
juxtaposition of elements1 which are not
 enough disturbed by ordinary accidents 
to lose their equilibrium2 while the    
incidence of a too great disturbance    
causes that disruption we call death1 or
 that variation of type1 which1 on      
account of its incapacity to establish  
itself permanently1 we call abnormal4   
,nature thus organizes herself into     
recognizable species2 and the aesthetic 
eye1 studying her forms1 tends1 as we   
have already shown1 to bring the type   
within even narrower limits than do the 
external exigencies of life4  ,the      

relation of utility to beauty4   #ci4   
,this natural harmony between utility   
and beauty1 when its origin is not      
understood1 is of course the subject of 
much perplexed and perplexing theory4   
,sometimes we are told that utility is  
itself the essence of beauty1 that is1  
that our consciousness of the practical 
advantages of certain forms is the      
ground of our aesthetic admiration of   
them4 ,the horse's legs are said to be  
beautiful because they are fit to run1  
the eye because it is made to see1 the  
house because it is convenient to live  
in4 ,an amusing application -- which    
might pass for a reductio ad absurdum1  
-- of this dense theory is put by       
,xenophon into the mouth of ,socrates4  
,comparing himself with a youth present 
at the same banquet1 who was about to   
receive the prize of beauty1 ,socrates  
declares himself more beautiful and more
 worthy of the crown4 ,for utility makes
 beauty1 and eyes bulging out from the  
head like his are the most advantageous 

for seeing2 nostrils wide and open to   
the air1 like his1 most appropriate for 
smell2 and a mouth large and voluminous1
 like his1 best fitted for both eating  
and kissing4#aa  ,now since these things
 are1 in fact1 hideous1 the theory that 
shows they ought to be beautiful1 is    
vain and ridiculous4 ,but that theory   
contains this truth3 that had the       
utility of ,socratic features been so   
great that men of all other type must   
have perished1 ,socrates would have been
 beautiful4 ,he would have represented  
the human type4 ,the eye would have been
 then accustomed to that form1 the      
imagination would have taken it as the  
basis of its refinements1 and           
accentuated its naturally effective     
points4 ,the beautiful does not depend  
on the useful2 it is constituted by the 
imagination in ignorance and contempt of
 practical advantage2 but it is not     
independent of the necessary1 for the   
necessary must also be the habitual and 
consequently the basis of the type1 and 

of all its imaginative variations4      
,there are1 moreover1 at a late and     
derivative stage in our aesthetic       
judgment1 certain cases in which the    
knowledge of fitness and utility enters 
into our sense of beauty4 ,but it does  
so very indirectly1 rather by convincing
 us that we should tolerate what        
practical conditions have imposed on an 
artist1 by arousing admiration of his   
ingenuity1 or by suggesting the         
interesting things themselves with which
 the object is known to be connected4   
,thus a cottage-chimney1 stout and tall1
 with the smoke floating from it1       
pleases because we fancy it to mean a   
hearth1 a rustic meal1 and a comfortable
 family4 ,but that is all extraneous    
association4 ,the most ordinary way in  
which utility affects us is negatively2 
if we know a thing to be useless and    
fictitious1 the uncomfortable haunting  
sense of waste and trickery prevents all
 enjoyment1 and therefore banishes      
beauty4 ,but this is also an            

adventitious complication4 ,the         
intrinsic value of a form is in no way  
affected by it4  ,opposed to this       
utilitarian theory stands the           
metaphysical one that would make the    
beauty or intrinsic rightness of things 
the source of their efficiency and of   
their power to survive4 ,taken          
literally1 as it is generally meant1    
this idea must1 from our point of view1 
appear preposterous4 ,beauty and        
rightness are relative to our judgment  
and emotion2 they in no sense exist in  
nature or preside over her4 ,she        
everywhere appears to move by mechanical
 law4 ,the types of things exist by     
what1 in relation to our approbation1 is
 mere chance1 and it is our faculties   
that must adapt themselves to our       
environment and not our environment to  
our faculties4 ,such is the naturalistic
 point of view which we have adopted4   
,to say1 however1 that beauty is in some
 sense the ground of practical fitness1 
need not seem to us wholly unmeaning4   

,the fault of the ,platonists who say   
things of this sort is seldom that of   
emptiness4 ,they have an intuition2 they
 have sometimes a strong sense of the   
facts of consciousness4 ,but they turn  
their discoveries into so many          
revelations1 and the veil of the        
infinite and absolute soon covers their 
little light of specific truth4         
,sometimes1 after patient digging1 the  
student comes upon the treasure of some 
simple fact1 some common experience1    
beneath all their mystery and unction4  
,and so it may be in this case4 ,if we  
make allowances for the tendency to     
express experience in allegory and myth1
 we shall see that the idea of beauty   
and rationality presiding over nature   
and guiding her1 as it were1 for their  
own greater glory1 is a projection and a
 writing large of a psychological       
principle4  ,the mind that perceives    
nature is the same that understands and 
enjoys her2 indeed1 these three         
functions are really elements of one    

process4 ,there is therefore in the mere
 perceptibility of a thing a certain    
prophecy of its beauty2 if it were not  
on the road to beauty1 if it had no     
approach to fitness to our faculties of 
perception1 the object would remain     
eternally unperceived4 ,the sense1      
therefore1 that the whole world is made 
to be food for the soul2 that beauty is 
not only its own1 but all things' excuse
 for being2 that universal aspiration   
towards perfection is the key and secret
 of the world1 -- that sense is the     
poetical reverberation of a             
psychological fact -- of the fact that  
our mind is an organism tending to      
unity1 to unconsciousness of what is    
refractory to its action1 and to        
assimilation and sympathetic            
transformation of what is kept within   
its sphere4 ,the idea that nature could 
be governed by an aspiration towards    
beauty is1 therefore1 to be rejected as 
a confusion1 but at the same time we    
must confess that this confusion is     

founded on a consciousness of the       
subjective relation between the         
perceptibility1 rationality1 and beauty 
of things4  ,utility the principle of   
organization in the arts4   #dj4 ,this  
subjective relation is1 however1        
exceedingly loose4 ,most things that are
 perceivable are not perceived so       
distinctly as to be intelligible1 nor so
 delightfully as to be beautiful4 ,if   
our eye had infinite penetration1 or our
 imagination infinite elasticity1 this  
would not be the case2 to see would then
 be to understand and to enjoy4 ,as it  
is1 the degree of determination needed  
for perception is much less than that   
needed for comprehension or ideality4   
,hence there is room for hypothesis and 
for art4 ,as hypothesis organizes       
experiences imaginatively in ways in    
which observation has not been able to  
do1 so art organizes objects in ways to 
which nature1 perhaps1 has never        
condescended4  ,the chief thing which   
the imitative arts add to nature is     

permanence1 the lack of which is the    
saddest defect of many natural beauties4
 ,the forces which determine natural    
forms1 therefore1 determine also the    
forms of the imitative arts4 ,but the   
non-imitative arts supply organisms     
different in kind from those which      
nature affords4 ,if we seek the         
principle by which these objects are    
organized1 we shall generally find that 
it is likewise utility4 ,architecture1  
for instance1 has all its forms         
suggested by practical demands4 ,use    
requires our buildings to assume certain
 determinate forms2 the mechanical      
properties of our materials1 the        
exigency of shelter1 light1             
accessibility1 economy1 and convenience1
 dictate the arrangements of our        
buildings4  ,houses and temples have an 
evolution like that of animals and      
plants4 ,various forms arise by         
mechanical necessity1 like the cave1 or 
the shelter of overhanging boughs4      
,these are perpetuated by a selection in

 which the needs and pleasures of man   
are the environment to which the        
structure must be adapted4 ,determinate 
forms thus establish themselves1 and the
 eye becomes accustomed to them4 ,the   
line of use1 by habit of apperception1  
becomes the line of beauty4 ,a striking 
example may be found in the pediment of 
the ,greek temple and the gable of the  
northern house4 ,the exigencies of      
climate determine these forms           
differently1 but the eye in each case   
accepts what utility imposes4 ,we admire
 height in one and breadth in the other1
 and we soon find the steep pediment    
heavy and the low gable awkward and     
mean4  ,it would be an error1 however1  
to conclude that habit alone establishes
 the right proportion in these various  
types of building4 ,we have the same    
intrinsic elements to consider as in    
natural forms4 ,that is1 besides the    
unity of type and correspondence of     
parts which custom establishes1 there   
are certain appeals to more fundamental 

susceptibilities of the human eye and   
imagination4 ,there is1 for instance1   
the value of abstract form1 determined  
by the pleasantness and harmony of      
implicated retinal or muscular tensions4
 ,different structures contain or       
suggest more or less of this kind of    
beauty1 and in that proportion may be   
called intrinsically better or worse4   
,thus artificial forms may be arranged  
in a hierarchy like natural ones1 by    
reference to the absolute values of     
their contours and masses4 ,herein lies 
the superiority of a ,greek to a        
,chinese vase1 or of ,gothic to         
,saracenic construction4 ,thus although 
every useful form is capable of         
proportion and beauty1 when once its    
type is established1 we cannot say that 
this beauty is always potentially equal2
 and an iron bridge1 for instance1      
although it certainly possesses and     
daily acquires aesthetic interest1 will 
probably never1 on the average1 equal a 
bridge of stone4  ,form and adventitious

 ornament4   #da4 ,beauty of form is the
 last to be found or admired in         
artificial as in natural objects4 ,time 
is needed to establish it1 and training 
and nicety of perception to enjoy it4   
,motion or colour is what first         
interests a child in toys1 as in        
animals2 and the barbarian artist       
decorates long before he designs4 ,the  
cave and wigwam are daubed with paint1  
or hung with trophies1 before any       
pleasure is taken in their shape2 and   
the appeal to the detached senses1 and  
to associations of wealth and luxury1   
precedes by far the appeal to the       
perceptive harmonies of form4 ,in music 
we observe the same gradation2 first1 we
 appreciate its sensuous and sentimental
 value2 only with education can we enjoy
 its form4 ,the plastic arts begin1     
therefore1 with adventitious ornament   
and with symbolism4 ,the aesthetic      
pleasure is in the richness of the      
material1 the profusion of the ornament1
 the significance of the shape -- in    

everything1 rather than in the shape    
itself4  ,we have accordingly1 in works 
of art two independent sources of       
effect4 ,the first is the useful form1  
which generates the type1 and ultimately
 the beauty of form1 when the type has  
been idealized by emphasizing its       
intrinsically pleasing traits4 ,the     
second is the beauty of ornament1 which 
comes from the excitement of the senses1
 or of the imagination1 by colour1 or by
 profusion or delicacy of detail4       
,historically1 the latter is first      
developed1 and applied to a form as yet 
merely useful4 ,but the very presence of
 ornament attracts contemplation2 the   
attention lavished on the object helps  
to fix its form in the mind1 and to make
 us discriminate the less from the more 
graceful4 ,the two kinds of beauty are  
then felt1 and1 yielding to that        
tendency to unity which the mind always 
betrays1 we begin to subordinate and    
organize these two excellences4 ,the    
ornament is distributed so as to        

emphasize the aesthetic essence of the  
form2 to idealize it even more1 by      
adding adventitious interests           
harmoniously to the intrinsic interest  
of the lines of structure4  ,there is   
here a great field1 of course1 for      
variety of combination and compromise4  
,some artists are fascinated by the     
decoration1 and think of the structure  
merely as the background on which it can
 be most advantageously displayed4      
,others1 of more austere taste1 allow   
ornament only to emphasize the main     
lines of the design1 or to conceal such 
inharmonious elements as nature or      
utility may prevent them from           
eliminating4#ab ,we may thus oscillate  
between decorative and structural       
motives1 and only in one point1 for each
 style1 can we find the ideal           
equilibrium1 in which the greatest      
strength and lucidity is combined with  
the greatest splendour4  ,a less subtle1
 but still very effective1 combination  
is that hit upon by many oriental and   

,gothic architects1 and found1 also1 by 
accident perhaps1 in many buildings of  
the plateresque style2 the ornament and 
structure are both presented with       
extreme emphasis1 but locally divided2 a
 vast rough wall1 for instance1         
represents the one1 and a profusion of  
mad ornament huddled around a central   
door or window represents the other4    
,gothic architecture offers us in the   
pinnacle and flying buttress a striking 
example of the adoption of a mechanical 
feature1 and its transformation into an 
element of beauty4 ,nothing could at    
first sight be more hopeless than the   
external half-arch propping the side of 
a pier1 or the chimney-like weight of   
stones pressing it down from above2 but 
a courageous acceptance of these        
necessities1 and a submissive study of  
their form1 revealed a new and strange  
effect3 the bewildering and stimulating 
intricacy of masses suspended in        
mid-air2 the profusion of line1 variety 
of surface1 and picturesqueness of light

 and shade4 ,it needed but a little     
applied ornament judiciously            
distributed2 a moulding in the arches2 a
 florid canopy and statue amid the      
buttresses2 a few grinning monsters     
leaning out of unexpected nooks2 a leafy
 budding of the topmost pinnacles2 a    
piercing here and there of some little  
gallery1 parapet1 or turret into        
lacework against the sky -- and the     
building became a poem1 an inexhaustible
 emotion4 ,add some passing cloud       
casting its moving shadow over the pile1
 add the circling of birds about the    
towers1 and you have an unforgettable   
type of beauty2 not perhaps the noblest1
 sanest1 or most enduring1 but one for  
the existence of which the imagination  
is richer1 and the world more           
interesting4  ,in this manner we accept 
the forms imposed upon us by utility1   
and train ourselves to apperceive their 
potential beauty4 ,familiarity breeds   
contempt only when it breeds            
inattention4 ,when the mind is absorbed 

and dominated by its perceptions1 it    
incorporates into them more and more of 
its own functional values1 and makes    
them ultimately beautiful and           
expressive4 ,thus no language can be    
ugly to those who speak it well1 no     
religion unmeaning to those who have    
learned to pour their life into its     
moulds4  ,of course these forms vary in 
intrinsic excellence2 they are by their 
specific character more or less fit and 
facile for the average mind4 ,but the   
man and the age are rare who can choose 
their own path2 we have generally only a
 choice between going ahead in the      
direction already chosen1 or halting and
 blocking the path for others4 ,the only
 kind of reform usually possible is     
reform from within2 a more intimate     
study and more intelligent use of the   
traditional forms4 ,disaster follows    
rebellion against tradition or against  
utility1 which are the basis and root of
 our taste and progress4 ,but1 within   
the given school1 and as exponents of   

its spirit1 we can adapt and perfect our
 works1 if haply we are better inspired 
than our predecessors4 ,for the better  
we know a given thing1 and the more we  
perceive its strong and weak points1 the
 more capable we are of idealizing it4  
,form in words4   #db4 ,the main effect 
of language consists in its meaning1 in 
the ideas which it expresses4 ,but no   
expression is possible without a        
presentation1 and this presentation must
 have a form4 ,this form of the         
instrument of expression is itself an   
element of effect1 although in practical
 life we may overlook it in our haste to
 attend to the meaning it conveys4 ,it  
is1 moreover1 a condition of the kind of
 expression possible1 and often         
determines the manner in which the      
object suggested shall be apperceived4  
,no word has the exact value of any     
other in the same or in another         
language4#ac ,but the intrinsic effect  
of language does not stop there4 ,the   
single word is but a stage in the series

 of formations which constitute         
language1 and which preserve for men the
 fruit of their experience1 distilled   
and concentrated into a symbol4  ,this  
formation begins with the elementary    
sounds themselves1 which have to be     
discriminated and combined to make      
recognizable symbols4 ,the evolution of 
these symbols goes on spontaneously1    
suggested by our tendency to utter all  
manner of sounds1 and preserved by the  
ease with which the ear discriminates   
these sounds when made4 ,speech would be
 an absolute and unrelated art1 like    
music1 were it not controlled by        
utility4 ,the sounds have indeed no     
resemblance to the objects they         
symbolize2 but before the system of     
sounds can represent the system of      
objects1 there has to be a              
correspondence in the groupings of both4
 ,the structure of language1 unlike that
 of music1 thus becomes a mirror of the 
structure of the world as presented to  
the intelligence4  ,grammar1            

philosophically studied1 is akin to the 
deepest metaphysics1 because in         
revealing the constitution of speech1 it
 reveals the constitution of thought1   
and the hierarchy of those categories by
 which we conceive the world4 ,it is by 
virtue of this parallel development that
 language has its function of expressing
 experience with exactness1 and the poet
 -- to whom language is an instrument of
 art -- has to employ it also with a    
constant reference to meaning and       
veracity2 that is1 he must be a master  
of experience before he can become a    
true master of words4 ,nevertheless1    
language is primarily a sort of music1  
and the beautiful effects which it      
produces are due to its own structure1  
giving1 as it crystallizes in a new     
fashion1 an unforeseen form to          
experience4  ,poets may be divided into 
two classes3 the musicians and the      
psychologists4 ,the first are masters of
 significant language as harmony2 they  
know what notes to sound together and in

 succession2 they can produce1 by the   
marshalling of sounds and images1 by the
 fugue of passion and the snap of wit1 a
 thousand brilliant effects out of old  
materials4 ,the ,ciceronian orator1 the 
epigrammatic1 lyric1 and elegiac poets1 
give examples of this art4 ,the         
psychologists1 on the other hand1 gain  
their effect not by the intrinsic       
mastery of language1 but by the closer  
adaptation of it to things4 ,the        
dramatic poets naturally furnish an     
illustration4  ,but however transparent 
we may wish to make our language1       
however little we may call for its      
intrinsic effects1 and direct our       
attention exclusively to its            
expressiveness1 we cannot avoid the     
limitations of our particular medium4   
,the character of the tongue a man      
speaks1 and the degree of his skill in  
speaking it1 must always count          
enormously in the aesthetic value of his
 compositions2 no skill in observation1 
no depth of thought or feeling1 but is  

spoiled by a bad style and enhanced by a
 good one4 ,the diversities of tongues  
and their irreducible aesthetic values1 
begins with the very sound of the       
letters1 with the mode of utterance1 and
 the characteristic inflections of the  
voice2 notice1 for instance1 the effect 
of the ,french of these lines of ,alfred
 de ,musset1       ,jamais deux yeux    
plus doux n'ont du ciel le plus pur     
,sond la profondeur et rflchi l'azur4   
and compare with its flute-like and     
treble quality the breadth1 depth1 and  
volume of the ,german in this inimitable
 stanza of ,goethe's3       ,ueber alien
 ,gipfeln      ,ist ,ruh1      ,in allen
 ,wipfeln      ,sprest du      ,kaum    
einen ,hauch2      ,die ,vgelein        
schweigen im ,walde4      ,warte nur1   
balde      ,ruhest du auch4  ,even if   
the same tune could be played on both   
these vocal instruments1 the difference 
in their timbre would make the value of 
the melody entirely distinct in each    
case4  ,syntactical form4   #dc4 ,the   

known impossibility of adequate         
translation appears here at the basis of
 language4 ,the other diversities are   
superadded upon this diversity of sound4
 ,the syntax is the next source of      
effect4 ,what could be better than      
,homer1 or what worse than almost any   
translation of him8 ,and this holds even
 of languages so closely allied as the  
,indo-,european1 which1 after all1 have 
certain correspondences of syntax and   
inflection4 ,if there could be a        
language with other parts of speech than
 ours1 -- a language without nouns1 for 
instance1 -- how would that grasp of    
experience1 that picture of the world1  
which all our literature contains1 be   
reproduced in it8 ,whatever beauties    
that language might be susceptible of1  
none of the effects produced on us1 ,i  
will not say by poets1 but even by      
nature itself1 could be expressed in it4
  ,nor is such a language inconceivable4
 ,instead of summarizing all our        
experiences of a thing by one word1 its 

name1 we should have to recall by       
appropriate adjectives the various      
sensations we had received from it2 the 
objects we think of would be            
disintegrated1 or1 rather1 would never  
have been unified4 ,for sun1 they would 
say high1 yellow1 dazzling1 round1      
slowly moving1 and the enumeration of   
these qualities 7as we call them71      
without any suggestion of a unity at    
their source1 might give a more vivid1  
and profound1 if more cumbrous1         
representation of the facts4 ,but how   
could the machinery of such an          
imagination be capable of repeating the 
effects of ours1 when the objects to us 
most obvious and real would be to those 
minds utterly indescribable8  ,the same 
diversity appears in the languages we   
ordinarily know1 only in a lesser       
degree4 ,the presence or absence of     
case-endings in nouns and adjectives1   
their difference of gender1 the richness
 of inflections in the verbs1 the       
frequency of particles and conjunctions1

 -- all these characteristics make one  
language differ from another entirely in
 genius and capacity of expression4     
,greek is probably the best of all      
languages in melody1 richness1          
elasticity1 and simplicity2 so much so1 
that in spite of its complex            
inflections1 when once a vocabulary is  
acquired1 it is more easy and natural   
for a modern than his ancestral ,latin  
itself4 ,latin is the stiffer tongue2 it
 is by nature at once laconic and       
grandiloquent1 and the exceptional      
condensation and transposition of which 
it is capable make its effects entirely 
foreign to a modern1 scarcely inflected1
 tongue4 ,take1 for instance1 these     
lines of ,horace3            me tabula  
sacer      votiva paries indicat uvida  
suspendisse potenti      vestimenta     
maris deo1  or these of ,lucretius3     
,jauaque caput quassans grandis suspirat
 arator      ,crebrius incassum magnum  
cecidisse laborem4  ,what conglomerate  
plebeian speech of our time could utter 

the stately grandeur of these ,lucretian
 words1 every one of which is noble1 and
 wears the toga8  ,as a substitute for  
the inimitable interpenetration of the  
words in the ,horatian strophe1 we might
 have the external links of rhyme2 and  
it seems1 in fact1 to be a justification
 of rhyme1 that besides contributing    
something to melody and to the          
distribution of parts1 it gives an      
artificial relationship to the phrases  
between which it obtains1 which1 but for
 it1 would run away from one another in 
a rapid and irrevocable flux4 ,in such a
 form as the sonnet1 for instance1 we   
have1 by dint of assonance1 a real unity
 forced upon the thought2 for a sonnet  
in which the thought is not distributed 
appropriately to the structure of the   
verse1 has no excuse for being a sonnet4
 ,by virtue of this interrelation of    
parts1 the sonnet1 the non plus ultra of
 rhyme1 is the most classic of modern   
poetical forms3 much more classic in    
spirit than blank verse1 which lacks    

almost entirely the power of            
synthesizing the phrase1 and making the 
unexpected seem the inevitable4  ,this  
beauty given to the ancients by the     
syntax of their language1 the moderns   
can only attain by the combination of   
their rhymes4 ,it is a bad substitute   
perhaps1 but better than the total      
absence of form1 favoured by the atomic 
character of our words1 and the flat    
juxtaposition of our clauses4 ,the art  
which was capable of making a gem of    
every prose sentence1 -- the art which1 
carried1 perhaps1 to1 a pitch at which  
it became too conscious1 made the       
phrases of ,tacitus a series of cameos1 
-- that art is inapplicable to our      
looser medium2 we cannot give clay the  
finish and nicety of marble4 ,our poetry
 and speech in general1 therefore1 start
 out upon a lower level2 the same effort
 will not1 with this instrument1 attain 
the same beauty4 ,if equal beauty is    
ever attained1 it comes from the wealth 
of suggestion1 or the refinement of     

sentiment4 ,the art of words remains    
hopelessly inferior4 ,and what best     
proves this1 is that when1 as in our    
time1 a reawakening of the love of      
beauty has prompted a refinement of our 
poetical language1 we pass so soon into 
extravagance1 obscurity1 and            
affectation4 ,our modern languages are  
not susceptible of great formal beauty4 
,literary form4 ,the plot4   #dd4 ,the  
forms of composition in verse and prose 
which are practised in each language are
 further organizations of words1 and    
have formal values4 ,the most exacting  
of these forms and that which has been  
carried to the greatest perfection is   
the drama2 but it belongs to rhetoric   
and poetics to investigate the nature of
 these effects1 and we have here        
sufficiently indicated the principle    
which underlies them4 ,the plot1 which  
,aristotle makes1 and very justly1 the  
most important element in the effect of 
a drama1 is the formal element of the   
drama as such3 the ethos and sentiments 

are the expression1 and the             
versification1 music1 and stage settings
 are the materials4 ,it is in harmony   
with the romantic tendency of modern    
times that modern dramatists --         
,shakespeare as well as ,molire1        
,calderon1 and the rest -- excel in     
ethos rather than in plot2 for it is the
 evident characteristic of modern genius
 to study and enjoy expression1 -- the  
suggestion of the not-given1 -- rather  
than form1 the harmony of the given4    
,ethos is interesting mainly for the    
personal observations which it          
summarizes and reveals1 or for the      
appeal to one's own actual or           
imaginative experience2 it is           
portrait-painting1 and enshrines        
something we love independently of the  
charm which at this moment and in this  
place it exercises over us4 ,it appeals 
to our affections2 it does not form     
them4 ,but the plot is the synthesis of 
actions1 and is a reproduction of those 
experiences from which our notion of men

 and things is originally derived2 for  
character can never be observed in the  
world except as manifested in action4   
,indeed1 it would be more fundamentally 
accurate to say that a character is a   
symbol and mental abbreviation for a    
peculiar set of acts1 than to say that  
acts are a manifestation of character4  
,for the acts are the data1 and the     
character the inferred principle1 and a 
principle1 in spite of its name1 is     
never more than a description a         
posteriori1 and a summary of what is    
subsumed under it4 ,the plot1 moreover1 
is what gives individuality to the play1
 and exercises invention2 it is1 as     
,aristotle again says1 the most         
difficult portion of dramatic art1 and  
that for which practice and training are
 most indispensable4 ,and this plot1    
giving by its nature a certain picture  
of human experience1 involves and       
suggests the ethos of its actors4  ,what
 the great characterizes1 like          
,shakespeare1 do1 is simply to elaborate

 and develope 7perhaps far beyond the   
necessities of the plot7 the suggestion 
of human individuality which that plot  
contains4 ,it is as if1 having drawn    
from daily observation some knowledge of
 the tempers of our friends1 we         
represented them saying and doing all   
manner of ultra-characteristic things1  
and in an occasional soliloquy laying   
bare1 even more clearly than by any     
possible action1 that character which   
their observed behaviour had led us to  
impute to them4 ,this is an ingenious   
and fascinating invention1 and delights 
us with the clear discovery of a hidden 
personality2 but the serious and equable
 development of a plot has a more stable
 worth in its greater similarity to     
life1 which allows us to see other men's
 minds through the medium of events1 and
 not events through the medium of other 
men's minds4  ,character as an aesthetic
 form4   #de4 ,we have just come upon   
one of the unities most coveted in our  
literature1 and most valued by us when  

attained1 -- the portrait1 the          
individuality1 the character4 ,the      
construction of a plot we call          
invention1 but that of a character we   
dignify with the name of creation4 ,it  
may therefore not be amiss1 in finishing
 our discussion of form1 to devote a few
 pages to the psychology of             
character-drawing4 ,how does the unity  
we call a character arise1 how is it    
described1 and what is the basis of its 
effect8  ,we may set it down at once as 
evident that we have here a case of the 
type3 the similarities of various       
persons are amalgamated1 their          
differences cancelled1 and in the       
resulting percept those traits          
emphasized which have particularly      
pleased or interested us4 ,this1 in the 
abstract1 may serve for a description of
 the origin of an idea of character     
quite as well as of an idea of physical 
form4 ,but the different nature of the  
material -- the fact that a character is
 not a presentation to sense1 but a     

rationalistic synthesis of successive   
acts and feelings1 not combinable into  
any image -- makes such a description   
much more unsatisfying in this case than
 in that of material forms4 ,we cannot  
understand exactly how these summations 
and cancellings take place when we are  
not dealing with a visible object4 ,and 
we may even feel that there is a        
wholeness and inwardness about the      
development of certain ideal characters1
 that makes such a treatment of them    
fundamentally false and artificial4 ,the
 subjective element1 the spontaneous    
expression of our own passion and will1 
here counts for so much1 that the       
creation of an ideal character becomes a
 new and peculiar problem4  ,there is1  
however1 a way of conceiving and        
delineating character which still bears 
a close resemblance to the process by   
which the imagination produces the type 
of any physical species4 ,we may gather1
 for instance1 about the nucleus of a   
word1 designating some human condition  

or occupation1 a number of detached     
observations4 ,we may keep a note-book  
in our memory1 or even in our pocket1   
with studious observations of the       
language1 manners1 dress1 gesture1 and  
history of the people we meet1          
classifying our statistics under such   
heads as innkeepers1 soldiers1          
housemaids1 governesses1 adventuresses1 
,germans1 ,frenchmen1 ,italians1        
,americans1 actors1 priests1 and        
professors4 ,and then1 when occasion    
offers1 to describe1 or to put into a   
book or a play1 any one of these types1 
all we have to do is to look over our   
notes1 to select according to the needs 
of the moment1 and if we are skilful in 
reproduction1 to obtain by that means a 
life-like image of the sort of person we
 wish to represent4  ,this process1     
which novelists and playwrights may go  
through deliberately1 we all carry on   
involuntarily4 ,at every moment         
experience is leaving in our minds some 
trait1 some expression1 some image1     

which will remain there attached to the 
name of a person1 a class1 or a         
nationality4 ,our likes and dislikes1   
our summary judgments on whole          
categories of men1 are nothing but the  
distinct survival of some such          
impression4 ,these traits have vivacity4
 ,if the picture they draw is one-sided 
and inadequate1 the sensation they      
recall may be vivid1 and suggestive of  
many other aspects of the thing4 ,thus  
the epithets in ,homer1 although they   
are often far from describing the       
essence of the object -- glankopis      
,athena enkeides ,achaioi -- seem to    
recall a sensation1 and to give vitality
 to the narrative4 ,by bringing you1    
through one sense1 into the presence of 
the object1 they give you that same hint
 of further discovery1 that same        
expectation of experience1 which we have
 at the sight of whatever we call real4 
,the graphic power of this method of    
observation and aggregation of          
characteristic traits is thus seen to be

 great4 ,but it is not by this method   
that the most famous or most living     
characters have been conceived4 ,this   
method gives the average1 or at most the
 salient1 points of the type1 but the   
great characters of poetry -- a ,hamlet1
 a ,don ,quixote1 an ,achilles -- are no
 averages1 they are not even a          
collection of salient traits common to  
certain classes of men4 ,they seem to be
 persons2 that is1 their actions and    
words seem to spring from the inward    
nature of an individual soul4 ,goethe is
 reported to have said that he conceived
 the character of his ,gretchen entirely
 without observation of originals4 ,and1
 indeed1 he would probably not have     
found any4 ,his creation rather is the  
original to which we may occasionally   
think we see some likeness in real      
maidens4 ,it is the fiction here that is
 the standard of naturalness4 ,and on   
this1 as on so many occasions1 we may   
repeat the saying that poetry is truer  
than history4 ,perhaps no actual maid   

ever spoke and acted so naturally as    
this imaginary one4  ,if we think there 
is any paradox in these assertions1 we  
should reflect that the standard of     
naturalness1 individuality1 and truth is
 in us4 ,a real person seems to us to   
have character and consistency when his 
behaviour is such as to impress a       
definite and simple image upon our mind4
 ,in themselves1 if we could count all  
their undiscovered springs of action1   
all men have character and consistency  
alike3 all are equally fit to be types4 
,but their characters are not equally   
intelligible to us1 their behaviour is  
not equally deducible1 and their motives
 not equally appreciable4 ,those who    
appeal most to us1 either in themselves 
or by the emphasis they borrow from     
their similarity to other individuals1  
are those we remember and regard as the 
centres around which variations         
oscillate4 ,these men are natural3 all  
others are more or less eccentric4      
,ideal characters4   #df4 ,the standard 

of naturalness being thus subjective1   
and determined by the laws of our       
imagination1 we can understand why a    
spontaneous creation of the mind can be 
more striking and living than any       
reality1 or any abstraction from        
realities4 ,the artist can invent a form
 which1 by its adaptation to the        
imagination1 lodges there1 and becomes a
 point of reference for all             
observations1 and a standard of         
naturalness and beauty4 ,a type may be  
introduced to the mind suddenly1 by the 
chance presentation of a form that by   
its intrinsic impressiveness and        
imaginative coherence1 acquires that    
pre-eminence which custom1 or the mutual
 reinforcement of converging            
experiences1 ordinarily gives to        
empirical percepts4  ,this method of    
originating types is what we ordinarily 
describe as artistic creation4 ,the name
 indicates the suddenness1 originality1 
and individuality of the conception thus
 attained4 ,what we call idealization is

 often a case of it4 ,in idealization   
proper1 however1 what happens is the    
elimination of individual               
eccentricities2 the result is abstract1 
and consequently meagre4 ,this          
meagreness is often felt to be a greater
 disadvantage than the accidental and   
picturesque imperfection of real        
individuals1 and the artist therefore   
turns to the brute fact1 and studies and
 reproduces that with indiscriminate    
attention1 rather than lose strength and
 individuality in the presentation of an
 insipid type4 ,he seems forced to a    
choice between an abstract beauty and an
 unlovely example4  ,but the great and  
masterful presentations of the ideal are
 somehow neither the one nor the other4 
,they present ideal beauty with just    
that definiteness with which nature     
herself sometimes presents it4 ,when we 
come in a crowd upon an incomparably    
beautiful face1 we know it immediately  
as an embodiment of the ideal2 while it 
contains the type1 -- for if it did not 

we should find it monstrous and         
grotesque1 -- it clothes that type in a 
peculiar splendour of form1 colour1 and 
expression4 ,it has an individuality4   
,and just so the imaginary figures of   
poetry and plastic art may have an      
individuality given them by the happy   
affinities of their elements in the     
imagination4 ,they are not              
idealizations1 they are spontaneous     
variations1 which can arise in the mind 
quite as easily as in the world4 ,they  
spring up in       ,the wreathd trellis 
of a working brain2      4 4 4 ,with all
 the gardener fancy e'er could feign    
,who1 breeding flowers1 will never breed
 the same4  ,imagination1 in a word1    
generates as well as abstracts2 it      
observes1 combines1 and cancels2 but it 
also dreams4 ,spontaneous syntheses     
arise in it which are not mathematical  
averages of the images it receives from 
sense2 they are effects of diffused     
excitements left in the brain by        
sensations4 ,these excitements vary     

constantly in their various renewals1   
and occasionally take such a form that  
the soul is surprised by the inward     
vision of an unexampled beauty4 ,if this
 inward vision is clear and steady1 we  
have an aesthetic inspiration1 a        
vocation to create2 and if we can also  
command the technique of an appropriate 
art1 we shall hasten to embody that     
inspiration1 and realize an ideal4 ,this
 ideal will be gradually recognized as  
supremely beautiful for the same reason 
that the object1 had it been presented  
in the real world1 would have been      
recognized as supremely beautiful2      
because while embodying a known type of 
form1 -- being1 that is1 a proper man1  
animal1 or vegetable1 -- it possessed in
 an extraordinary degree those direct   
charms which most subjugate our         
attention4  ,imaginary forms then differ
 in dignity and beauty not according to 
their closeness to fact or type in      
nature1 but according to the ease with  
which the normal imagination reproduces 

the synthesis they contain4 ,to add     
wings to a man has always been a natural
 fancy2 because man can easily imagine  
himself to fly1 and the idea is         
delightful to him4 ,the winged man is   
therefore a form generally recognized as
 beautiful2 although it can happen1 as  
it did to ,michael ,angelo1 that our    
appreciation of the actual form of the  
human body should be too keen and       
overmastering to allow us to relish even
 so charming and imaginative an         
extravagance4 ,the centaur is another   
beautiful monster4 ,the imagination can 
easily follow the synthesis of the dream
 in which horse and man melted into one1
 and first gave the glorious suggestion 
of their united vitality4  ,the same    
condition determines the worth of       
imaginary personalities4 ,from the gods 
to the characters of comedy1 all are1 in
 proportion to their beauty1 natural and
 exhilarating expressions of possible   
human activity4 ,we sometimes remould   
visible forms into imaginary creatures2 

but our originality in this respect is  
meagre compared with the profusion of   
images of action which arise in us1 both
 asleep and awake2 we constantly dream  
of new situations1 extravagant          
adventures1 and exaggerated passions4   
,even our soberer thoughts are very much
 given to following the possible        
fortunes of some enterprise1 and        
foretasting the satisfactions of love   
and ambition4 ,the mind is therefore    
particularly sensitive to pictures of   
action and character2 we are easily     
induced to follow the fortunes of any   
hero1 and share his sentiments4  ,our   
will1 as ,descartes said in a different 
context1 is infinite1 while our         
intelligence is finite2 we follow       
experience pretty closely in our ideas  
of things1 and even the furniture of    
fairyland bears a sad resemblance to    
that of earth2 but there is no limit to 
the elasticity of our passion2 and we   
love to fancy ourselves kings and       
beggars1 saints and villains1 young and 

old1 happy and unhappy4 ,there seems to 
be a boundless capacity of development  
in each of us1 which the circumstances  
of life determine to a narrow channel2  
and we like to revenge ourselves in our 
reveries for this imputed limitation1 by
 classifying ourselves with all that we 
are not1 but might so easily have been4 
,we are full of sympathy for every      
manifestation of life1 however unusual2 
and even the conception of infinite     
knowledge and happiness -- than which   
nothing could be more removed from our  
condition or more unrealizable to our   
fancy -- remains eternally interesting  
to us4  ,the poet1 therefore1 who wishes
 to delineate a character need not keep 
a note-book4 ,there is a quicker road to
 the heart -- if he has the gift to find
 it4 ,probably his readers will not     
themselves have kept note-books1 and his
 elaborate observations will only be    
effective when he describes something   
which they also happen to have noticed4 
,the typical characters describable by  

the empirical method are therefore few3 
the miser1 the lover1 the old nurse1 the
 ingnue1 and the other types of         
traditional comedy4 ,any greater        
specification would appeal only to a    
small audience for a short time1 because
 the characteristics depicted would no  
longer exist to be recognized4 ,but     
whatever experience a poet's hearers may
 have had1 they are men4 ,they will have
 certain imaginative capacities to      
conceive and admire those forms of      
character and action which1 although    
never actually found1 are felt by each  
man to express what he himself might and
 would have been1 had circumstances been
 more favourable4  ,the poet has only to
 study himself1 and the art of          
expressing his own ideals1 to find that 
he has expressed those of other people4 
,he has but to enact in himself the part
 of each of his personages1 and if he   
possesses that pliability and that      
definiteness of imagination which       
together make genius1 he may express for

 his fellows those inward tendencies    
which in them have remained painfully   
dumb4 ,he will be hailed as master of   
the human soul4 ,he may know nothing of 
men1 he may have almost no experience2  
but his creations will pass for models  
of naturalness1 and for types of        
humanity4 ,their names will be in every 
one's mouth1 and the lives of many      
generations will be enriched by the     
vision1 one might almost say by the     
friendship1 of these imaginary beings4  
,they have individuality without having 
reality1 because individuality is a     
thing acquired in the mind by the       
congeries of its impressions4 ,they have
 power1 also1 because that depends on   
the appropriateness of a stimulus to    
touch the springs of reaction in the    
soul4 ,and they of course have beauty1  
because in them is embodied the greatest
 of our imaginative delights1 -- that of
 giving body to our latent capacities1  
and of wandering1 without the strain and
 contradiction of actual existence1 into

 all forms of possible being4  ,the     
religious imagination4   #dg4 ,the      
greatest of these creations hare not    
been the work of any one man4 ,they have
 been the slow product of the pious and 
poetic imagination4 ,starting from some 
personification of nature or some memory
 of a great man1 the popular and        
priestly tradition has refined and      
developed the ideal2 it has made it an  
expression of men's aspiration and a    
counterpart of their need4 ,the devotion
 of each tribe1 shrine1 and psalmist has
 added some attribute to the god or some
 parable to his legend2 and thus1 around
 the kernel of some original divine     
function1 the imagination of a people   
has gathered every possible expression  
of it1 creating a complete and beautiful
 personality1 with its history1 its     
character1 and its gifts4 ,no poet has  
ever equalled the perfection or         
significance of these religious         
creations4 ,the greatest characters of  
fiction are uninteresting and unreal    

compared with the conceptions of the    
gods2 so much so that men have believed 
that their gods have objective reality4 
,the forms men see in dreams might have 
been a reason for believing in vague and
 disquieting ghosts2 but the belief in  
individual and well-defined divinities1 
with which the visions of the dreams    
might be identified1 is obviously due to
 the intrinsic coherence and            
impressiveness of the conception of     
those deities4 ,the visions would never 
have suggested the legend and attributes
 of the god2 but when the figure of the 
god was once imaginatively conceived1   
and his name and aspect fixed in the    
imagination1 it would be easy to        
recognize him in any hallucination1 or  
to interpret any event as due to his    
power4 ,these manifestations1 which     
constitute the evidence of his actual   
existence1 can be regarded as           
manifestations of him1 rather than of a 
vague1 unknown power1 only when the     
imagination already possesses a vivid   

picture of him1 and of his appropriate  
functions4 ,this picture is the work of 
a spontaneous fancy4  ,no doubt1 when   
the belief is once specified1 and the   
special and intelligible god is         
distinguished in the night and horror of
 the all-pervading natural power1 the   
belief in his reality helps to          
concentrate our attention on his nature1
 and thus to develope and enrich our    
idea4 ,the belief in the reality of an  
ideal personality brings about its      
further idealization4 ,had it ever      
occurred to any ,greek seer to attribute
 events to the influence of ,achilles1  
or to offer sacrifices to him in the    
heat of the enthusiasm kindled by the   
thought of his beauty and virtue1 the   
legend of ,achilles1 now become a god1  
would have grown and deepened2 it would 
have been moralized like the legend of  
,hercules1 or naturalized like that of  
,persephone1 and what is now but a      
poetic character of extraordinary force 
and sublimity would have become the     

adored patron of generation after       
generation1 and a manifestation of the  
divine man4  ,achilles would then have  
been as significant and unforgettable a 
figure as ,apollo or his sister1 as     
,zeus1 ,athena1 and the other greater   
gods4 ,if ever1 while that phase of     
religion lasted1 his character had been 
obscured and his features dimmed1 he    
would have been recreated by every new  
votary3 poets would never have tired of 
singing his praises1 or sculptors of    
rendering his form4 ,when1 after the    
hero had been the centre and subject of 
so much imaginative labour1 the belief  
in his reality lapsed1 to be transferred
 to some other conception of cosmic     
power1 he would have remained an ideal  
of poetry and art1 and a formative      
influence of all cultivated minds4 ,this
 he is still1 like all the great        
creations of avowed fiction1 but he     
would have been immensely more so1 had  
belief in his reality kept the creative 
imagination continuously intent upon his

 nature4  ,the reader can hardly fail to
 see that all this applies with equal   
force to the ,christian conception of   
the sacred personalities4 ,christ1 the  
,virgin ,mary1 and the saints may have  
been exactly what our imagination       
pictures them to be2 that is entirely   
possible2 nor can ,i see that it is     
impossible that the conceptions of other
 religions might themselves have actual 
counterparts somewhere in the universe4 
,that is a question of faith and        
empirical evidence with which we are not
 here concerned4 ,but however           
descriptive of truth our conceptions may
 be1 they have evidently grown up in our
 minds by an inward process of          
development4 ,the materials of history  
and tradition have been melted and      
recast by the devout imagination into   
those figures in the presence of which  
our piety lives4  ,that is the reason   
why the reconstructed logical gods of   
the metaphysicians are always an offence
 and a mockery to the religious         

consciousness4 ,there is here1 too1 a   
bare possibility that some one of these 
absolutes may be a representation of the
 truth2 but the method by which this    
representation is acquired is violent   
and artificial2 while the traditional   
conception of ,god is the spontaneous   
embodiment of passionate contemplation  
and long experience4  ,as the ,god of   
religion differs from that of           
metaphysics1 so does the ,christ of     
tradition differ from that of our       
critical historians4 ,even if we took   
the literal narrative of the ,gospels   
and accepted it as all we could know of 
,christ1 without allowing ourselves any 
imaginative interpretation of the       
central figure1 we should get an ideal  
of him1 ,i will not say very different  
from that of ,st4 ,francis or ,st4      
,theresa1 but even from that of the     
,english1 prayer-book4 ,the ,christ men 
have loved and adored is an ideal of    
their own hearts1 the construction of an
 ever-present personality1 living and   

intimately understood1 out of the       
fragments of story and doctrine         
connected with a name4 ,this subjective 
image has inspired all the prayers1 all 
the conversions1 all the penances1      
charities1 and sacrifices1 as well as   
half the art of the ,christian world4   
,the ,virgin ,mary1 whose legend is so  
meagre1 but whose power over the        
,catholic imagination is so great1 is an
 even clearer illustration of this      
inward building up of an ideal form4    
,everything is here spontaneous         
sympathetic expansion of two given      
events3 the incarnation and the         
crucifixion4 ,the figure of the ,virgin1
 found in these mighty scenes1 is       
gradually clarified and developed1 until
 we come to the thought on the one hand 
of her freedom from original sin1 and on
 the other to that of her universal     
maternity4 ,we thus attain the          
conception of one of the noblest of     
conceivable rles and of one of the most 
beautiful of characters4 ,it is a pity  

that a foolish iconoclasm should so long
 have deprived the ,protestant mind of  
the contemplation of this ideal4        
,perhaps it is a sign of the average    
imaginative dulness or fatigue of       
certain races and epochs that they so   
readily abandon these supreme creations4
 ,for1 if we are hopeful1 why should we 
not believe that the best we can fancy  
is also the truest2 and if we are       
distrustful in general of our prophetic 
gifts1 why should we cling only to the  
most mean and formless of our illusions8
 ,from the beginning to the end of our  
perceptive and imaginative activity1 we 
are synthesizing the material of        
experience into unities the independent 
reality of which is beyond proof1 nay1  
beyond the possibility of a shadow of   
evidence4 ,and yet the life of          
intelligence1 like the joy of           
contemplation1 lies entirely in the     
formation and inter-relation of these   
unities4 ,this activity yields us all   
the objects with which we can deal1 and 

endows them with the finer and more     
intimate part of their beauty4 ,the most
 perfect of these forms1 judged by its  
affinity to our powers and its stability
 in the presence of our experience1 is  
the one with which we should be content2
 no other kind of veracity could add to 
its value4  ,the greatest feats of      
synthesis which the human mind has yet  
accomplished will1 indeed1 be probably  
surpassed and all ideals yet formed be  
superseded1 because they were not based 
upon enough experience1 or did not fit  
that experience with adequate precision4
 ,it is also possible that changes in   
the character of the facts1 or in the   
powers of intelligence1 should          
necessitate a continual reconstruction  
of our world4 ,but unless human nature  
suffers an inconceivable change1 the    
chief intellectual and aesthetic value  
of our ideas will always come from the  
creative action of the imagination4     
,,part ,,iv  ,,expression  ,expression  
defined4   #dh4 ,we have found in the   

beauty of material and form the         
objectification of certain pleasures    
connected with the process of direct    
perception1 with the formation1 in the  
one case of a sensation1 or quality1 in 
the other of a synthesis of sensations  
or qualities4 ,but the human            
consciousness is not a perfectly clear  
mirror1 with distinct boundaries and    
clear-cut images1 determinate in number 
and exhaustively perceived4 ,our ideas  
half emerge for a moment from the dim   
continuum of vital feeling and diffused 
sense1 and are hardly fixed before they 
are changed and transformed1 by the     
shifting of attention and the perception
 of new relations1 into ideas of really 
different objects4 ,this fluidity of the
 mind would make reflection impossible1 
did we not fix in words and other       
symbols certain abstract contents2 we   
thus become capable of recognizing in   
one perception the repetition of        
another1 and of recognizing in certain  
recurrences of impressions a persistent 

object4 ,this discrimination and        
classification of the contents of       
consciousness is the work of perception 
and understanding1 and the pleasures    
that accompany these activities make the
 beauty of the sensible world4  ,but our
 hold upon our thoughts extends even    
further4 ,we not only construct visible 
unities and recognizable types1 but     
remain aware of their affinities to what
 is not at the time perceived2 that is1 
we find in them a certain tendency and  
quality1 not original to them1 a meaning
 and a tone1 which upon investigation we
 shall see to have been the proper      
characteristics of other objects and    
feelings1 associated with them once in  
our experience4 ,the hushed             
reverberations of these associated      
feelings continue in the brain1 and by  
modifying our present reaction1 colour  
the image upon which our attention is   
fixed4 ,the quality thus acquired by    
objects through association is what we  
call their expression4 ,whereas in form 

or material there is one object with its
 emotional effect1 in expression there  
are two1 and the emotional effect       
belongs to the character of the second  
or suggested one4 ,expression may thus  
make beautiful by suggestion things in  
themselves indifferent1 or it may come  
to heighten the beauty which they       
already possess4  ,expression is not    
always distinguishable in consciousness 
from the value of material or form1     
because we do not always have a         
distinguishable memory of the related   
idea which the expressiveness implies4  
,when we have such a memory1 as at the  
sight of some once frequented garden1 we
 clearly and spontaneously attribute our
 emotion to the memory and not to the   
present fact which it beautifies4 ,the  
revival of a pleasure and its embodiment
 in a present object which in itself    
might have been indifferent1 is here    
patent and acknowledged4  ,the          
distinctness of the analysis may indeed 
be so great as to prevent the synthesis2

 we may so entirely pass to the         
suggested object1 that our pleasure will
 be embodied in the memory of that1     
while the suggestive sensation will be  
overlooked1 and the expressiveness of   
the present object will fail to make it 
beautiful4 ,thus the mementos of a lost 
friend do not become beautiful by virtue
 of the sentimental associations which  
may make them precious4 ,the value is   
confined to the images of the memory2   
they are too clear to let any of that   
value escape and diffuse itself over the
 rest of our consciousness1 and beautify
 the objects which we actually behold4  
,we say explicitly3 ,i value this trifle
 for its associations4 ,and so long as  
this division continues1 the worth of   
the thing is not for us aesthetic4  ,but
 a little dimming of our memory will    
often make it so4 ,let the images of the
 past fade1 let them remain simply as a 
halo and suggestion of happiness hanging
 about a scene2 then this scene1 however
 empty and uninteresting in itself1 will

 have a deep and intimate charm2 we     
shall be pleased by its very vulgarity4 
,we shall not confess so readily that we
 value the place for its associations2  
we shall rather say3 ,i am fond of this 
landscape2 it has for me an ineffable   
attraction4 ,the treasures of the memory
 have been melted and dissolved1 and are
 now gilding the object that supplants  
them2 they are giving this object       
expression4  ,expression then differs   
from material or formal value only as   
habit differs from instinct -- in its   
origin4 ,physiologically1 they are both 
pleasurable radiations of a given       
stimulus2 mentally1 they are both values
 incorporated in an object4 ,but an     
observer1 looking at the mind           
historically1 sees in the one case the  
survival of an experience1 in the other 
the reaction of an innate disposition4  
,this experience1 moreover1 is generally
 rememberable1 and then the extrinsic   
source of the charm which expression    
gives becomes evident even to the       

consciousness in which it arises4 ,a    
word1 for instance1 is often beautiful  
simply by virtue of its meaning and     
associations2 but sometimes this        
expressive beauty is added to a musical 
quality in the world itself4  ,in all   
expression we may thus distinguish two  
terms3 the first is the object actually 
presented1 the word1 the image1 the     
expressive thing2 the second is the     
object suggested1 the further thought1  
emotion1 or image evoked1 the thing     
expressed4  ,these lie together in the  
mind1 and their union constitutes       
expression4 ,if the value lies wholly in
 the first term1 we have no beauty of   
expression4 ,the decorative inscriptions
 in ,saracenic monuments can have no    
beauty of expression for one who does   
not read ,arabic2 their charm is wholly 
one of material and form4 ,or if they   
have any expression1 it is by virtue of 
such thoughts as they might suggest1 as1
 for instance1 of the piety and oriental
 sententiousness of the builders and of 

the aloofness from us of all their      
world4 ,and even these suggestions1     
being a wandering of our fancy rather   
than a study of the object1 would fail  
to arouse a pleasure which would be     
incorporated in the present image4 ,the 
scroll would remain without expression1 
although its presence might have        
suggested to us interesting visions of  
other things4 ,the two terms would be   
too independent1 and the intrinsic      
values of each would remain distinct    
from that of the other4 ,there would be 
no visible expressiveness1 although     
there might have been discursive        
suggestions4  ,indeed1 if expression    
were constituted by the external        
relation of object with object1         
everything would be expressive equally1 
indeterminately1 and universally4 ,the  
flower in the crannied wall would       
express the same thing as the bust of   
,caesar or the ,critique of ,pure       
,reason4 ,what constitutes the          
individual expressiveness of these      

things is the circle of thoughts allied 
to each in a given mind2 my words1 for  
instance1 express the thoughts which    
they actually arouse in the reader2 they
 may express more to one man than to    
another1 and to me they may have        
expressed more or less than to yon4 ,my 
thoughts remain unexpressed1 if my words
 do not arouse them in you1 and very    
likely your greater wisdom will find in 
what ,i say the manifestation of a      
thousand principles of which ,i never   
dreamed4 ,expression depends upon the   
union of two terms1 one of which must be
 furnished by the imagination2 and a    
mind cannot furnish what it does not    
possess4 ,the expressiveness of         
everything accordingly increases with   
the intelligence of the observer4  ,but 
for expression to be an element of      
beauty1 it must1 of course1 fulfil      
another condition4 ,i may see the       
relations of an object1 ,i may          
understand it perfectly1 and may        
nevertheless regard it with entire      

indifference4 ,if the pleasure fails1   
the very substance and protoplasm of    
beauty is wanting4 ,nor1 as we have     
seen1 is even the pleasure enough2 for  
,i may receive a letter full of the most
 joyous news1 but neither the paper1 nor
 the writing1 nor the style1 need seem  
beautiful to me4 ,not until ,i confound 
the impressions1 and suffuse the symbols
 themselves with the emotions they      
arouse1 and find joy and sweetness in   
the very words ,i hear1 will the        
expressiveness constitute a beauty2 as  
when they sing1 ,gloria in excelsis     
,deo4  ,the value of the second term    
must be incorporated in the first2 for  
the beauty of expression is as inherent 
in the object as that of material or    
form1 only it accrues to that object not
 from the bare act of perception1 but   
from the association with it of further 
processes1 due to the existence of      
former impressions4 ,we may conveniently
 use the word expressiveness to mean all
 the capacity of suggestion possessed by

 a thing1 and the word expression for   
the aesthetic modification which that   
expressiveness may cause in it4         
,expressiveness is thus the power given 
by experience to any image to call up   
others in the mind2 and this            
expressiveness becomes an aesthetic     
value1 that is1 becomes expression1 when
 the value involved in the associations 
thus awakened are incorporated in the   
present object4  ,the associative       
process4   #di4 ,the purest case in     
which1 an expressive value could arise  
might seem to be that in which both     
terms were indifferent in themselves1   
and what pleased was the activity of    
relating them4 ,we have such a          
phenomenon in mathematics1 and in any   
riddle1 puzzle1 or play with symbols4   
,but such pleasures fall without the    
aesthetic field in the absence of any   
objectification2 they are pleasures of  
exercise1 and the objects involved are  
not regarded as the substances in which 
those values inhere4 ,we think of more  

or less interesting problems or         
calculations1 but it never occurs to the
 mathematician to establish a hierarchy 
of forms according to their beauty4     
,only by a metaphor could he say that 7a
  b7#b  a#b  #b;ab  b#b was a more      
beautiful formula than #b  #b  #d4 ,yet 
in proportion as such conceptions become
 definite and objective in the mind1    
they approach aesthetic values1 and the 
use of aesthetic epithets in describing 
them becomes more constant and literal4 
,the beauties of abstract music are but 
one step beyond such mathematical       
relations -- they are those relations   
presented in a sensible form1 and       
constituting an imaginable object4 ,but1
 as we see clearly in this last case1   
when the relation and not the terms     
constitute the object1 we have1 if there
 is beauty at all1 a beauty of form1 not
 of expression2 for the more            
mathematical the charm of music is the  
more form and the less expression do we 
see in it4 ,in fact1 the sense of       

relation is here the essence of the     
object itself1 and the activity of      
passing from term to term1 far from     
taking us beyond our presentation to    
something extrinsic1 constitutes that   
presentation4 ,the pleasure of this     
relational activity is therefore the    
pleasure of conceiving a determined     
form1 and nothing could be more         
thoroughly a formal beauty4  ,and we may
 here insist upon a point of fundamental
 importance2 namely1 that the process of
 association enters consciousness as    
directly1 and produces as simple a      
sensation1 as any process in any organ4 
,the pleasures and pains of cerebration1
 the delight and the fatigue of it1 are 
felt exactly like bodily impressions2   
they have the same directness1 although 
not the same localization4 ,their seat  
is not open to our daily observation1   
and therefore we leave them disembodied1
 and fancy they are peculiarly spiritual
 and intimate to the soul4 ,or we try to
 think that they flow by some logical   

necessity from the essences of objects  
simultaneously in our mind4 ,we involve 
ourselves in endless perplexities in    
trying to deduce excellence and beauty1 
unity and necessity1 from the           
describable qualities of things2 we     
repeat the rationalistic fiction of     
turning the notions which we abstract   
from the observation of facts into the  
powers that give those facts character  
and being4  ,we have1 for instance1 in  
the presence of two images a sense of   
their incongruity2 and we say that the  
character of the images causes this     
emotion2 whereas in dreams we constantly
 have the most rapid transformations and
 patent contradictions without any sense
 of incongruity at all2 because the     
brain is dozing and the necessary shock 
and mental inhibition is avoided4 ,add  
this stimulation1 and the incongruity   
returns4 ,had such a shock never been   
felt1 we should not know what           
incongruity meant2 no more than without 
eyes we should know the meaning of blue 

or yellow4  ,in saying this1 we are not 
really leaning upon physiological       
theory4 ,the appeal to our knowledge of 
the brain facilitates the conception of 
the immediacy of our feelings of        
relation2 but that immediacy would be   
apparent to a sharp introspection4 ,we  
do not need to think of the eye or skin 
to feel that light and heat are ultimate
 data2 no more do we need to think of   
cerebral excitements to see that right  
and left1 before and after1 good and    
bad1 one and two1 like and unlike1 are  
irreducible feelings4 ,the categories   
are senses without organs1 or with      
organs unknown4 ,just as the            
discrimination of our feelings of colour
 and sound might never have been        
distinct and constant1 had we not come  
upon the organs that seem to convey and 
control them2 so perhaps our            
classification of our inner sensations  
will never be settled until their       
respective organs are discovered2 for   
psychology has always been              

physiological1 without knowing it4 ,but 
this truth remains -- quite apart from  
physical conceptions1 not to speak of   
metaphysical materialism -- that        
whatever the historical conditions of   
any state of mind may be said to be1 it 
exists1 when it does exist1 immediately 
and absolutely2 each of its             
distinguishable parts might conceivably 
have been absent from it2 and its       
character1 as well as its existence1 is 
a mere datum of sense4  ,the pleasure   
that belongs to the consciousness of    
relations is therefore as immediate as  
any other2 indeed1 our emotional        
consciousness is always single1 but we  
treat it as a resultant of many and even
 of conflicting feelings because we look
 at it historically with a view to      
comprehending it1 and distribute it into
 as many factors as we find objects or  
causes to which to attribute it4 ,the   
pleasure of association is an immediate 
feeling1 which we account for by its    
relation to a feeling in the past1 or to

 cerebral structure modified by a former
 experience2 just as memory itself1     
which we explain by a reference to the  
past1 is a peculiar complication of     
present consciousness4  ,kinds of value 
in the second term4   #ej4 ,these       
reflections may make less surprising to 
us what is the most striking fact about 
the philosophy of expression2 namely1   
that the value acquired by the          
expressive thing is often of an entirely
 different kind from that which the     
thing expressed possesses4 ,the         
expression of physical pleasure1 of     
passion1 or even of pain1 may constitute
 beauty and please the beholder4 ,thus  
the value of the second term may be     
physical1 or practical1 or even         
negative2 and it may be transmuted1 as  
it passes to the first term1 into a     
value at once positive and aesthetic4   
,the transformation of practical values 
into aesthetic has often been noted1 and
 has even led to the theory that beauty 
is utility seen at arm's length2 a      

premonition of pleasure and prosperity1 
much as smell is a premonition of taste4
 ,the transformation of negative values 
into positive has naturally attracted   
even more attention1 and given rise to  
various theories of the comic1 tragic1  
and sublime4 ,for these three species of
 aesthetic good seem to please us by the
 suggestion of evil2 and the problem    
arises how a mind can be made happier by
 having suggestions of unhappiness      
stirred within it2 an unhappiness it    
cannot understand without in some degree
 sharing in it4 ,we must now turn to the
 analysis of this question4  ,the       
expressiveness of a smile is not        
discovered exactly through association  
of images4 ,the child smiles 7without   
knowing it7 when he feels pleasure2 and 
the nurse smiles back2 his own pleasure 
is associated with her conduct1 and her 
smile is therefore expressive of        
pleasure4 ,the fact of his pleasure at  
her smile is the ground of his          
instinctive belief in her pleasure in   

it4 ,for this reason the circumstances  
expressive of happiness are not those   
that are favourable to it in reality1   
but those that are congruous with it in 
idea4 ,the green of spring1 the bloom of
 youth1 the variability of childhood1   
the splendour of wealth and beauty1 all 
these are symbols of happiness1 not     
because they have been known to         
accompany it in fact1 -- for they do    
not1 any more than their opposites1 --  
but because they produce an image and   
echo of it in us aesthetically4 ,we     
believe those things to be happy which  
it makes us happy to think of or to see2
 the belief in the blessedness of the   
supreme being itself has no other       
foundation4 ,our joy in the thought of  
omniscience makes us attribute joy to   
the possession of it1 which it would in 
fact perhaps be very far from involving 
or even allowing4  ,the expressiveness  
of forms has a value as a sign of the   
life that actually inhabits those forms 
only when they resemble our own body2 it

 is then probable that similar          
conditions of body involve1 in them and 
in us1 similar emotions2 and we should  
not long continue to regard as the      
expression of pleasure an attitude that 
we know1 by experience in our own       
person1 to accompany pain4 ,children1   
indeed1 may innocently torture animals1 
not having enough sense of analogy to be
 stopped by the painful suggestions of  
their writhings2 and1 although in a     
rough way we soon correct these crying  
misinterpretations by a better          
classification of experience1 we        
nevertheless remain essentially subject 
to the same error4 ,we cannot escape it1
 because the method which involves it is
 the only one that justifies belief in  
objective consciousness at all4 ,analogy
 of bodies helps us to distribute and   
classify the life we conceive about us2 
but what leads us to conceive it is the 
direct association of our own feeling   
with images of things1 an association   
which precedes any clear representation 

of our own gestures and attitude4 ,i    
know that smiles mean pleasure before ,i
 have caught myself smiling in the      
glass2 they mean pleasure because they  
give it4  ,since these aesthetic effects
 include some of the most moving and    
profound beauties1 philosophers have not
 been slow to turn the unanalyzed       
paradox of their formation into a       
principle1 and to explain by it the     
presence and necessity of evil4 ,as in  
the tragic and the sublime1 they have   
thought1 the sufferings and dangers to  
which a hero is exposed seem to add to  
his virtue and dignity1 and to our      
sacred joy in the contemplation of him1 
so the sundry evils of life may be      
elements in the transcendent glory of   
the whole4 ,and once fired by this      
thought1 those who pretend to justify   
the ways of ,god to man have1 naturally1
 not stopped to consider whether so     
edifying a phenomenon was not a hasty   
illusion4 ,they have1 indeed1 detested  
any attempt to explain it rationally1 as

 tending to obscure one of the moral    
laws of the universe4 ,in venturing1    
therefore1 to repeat such an attempt1 we
 should not be too sanguine of success2 
for we have to encounter not only the   
intrinsic difficulties of the problem1  
but also a wide-spread and arrogant     
metaphysical prejudice4  ,for the sake  
of greater clearness we may begin by    
classifying the values that can enter   
into expression2 we shall then be better
 able to judge by what combinations of  
them various well-known effects and     
emotions are produced4 ,the intrinsic   
value of the first term can be entirely 
neglected1 since it does not contribute 
to expression4 ,it does1 however1       
contribute greatly to the beauty of the 
expressive object4 ,the first term is   
the source of stimulation1 and the      
acuteness and pleasantness of this      
determine to a great extent the         
character and sweep of the associations 
that will be aroused4 ,very often the   
pleasantness of the medium will         

counterbalance the disagreeableness of  
the import1 and expressions1 in         
themselves hideous or inappropriate1 may
 be excused for the sake of the object  
that conveys them4 ,a beautiful voice   
will redeem a vulgar song1 a beautiful  
colour and texture an unmeaning         
composition4 ,beauty in the first term  
-- beauty of sound1 rhythm1 and image --
 will make any thought whatever poetic1 
while no thought whatever can be so     
without that immediate beauty of        
presentation4#ad  ,aesthetic value in   
the second term4   #ea4 ,that the noble 
associations of any object should       
embellish that object is very           
comprehensible4 ,homer furnishes us with
 a good illustration of the constant    
employment of this effect4 ,the first   
term1 one need hardly say1 leaves with  
him little to be desired4 ,the verse is 
beautiful4 ,sounds1 images1 and         
composition conspire to stimulate and   
delight4 ,this immediate beauty is      
sometimes used to clothe things terrible

 and sad2 there is no dearth of the     
tragic in ,homer4 ,but the tendency of  
his poetry is nevertheless to fill the  
outskirts of our consciousness with the 
trooping images of things no less fair  
and noble than the verse itself4 ,the   
heroes are virtuous4 ,there is none of  
importance who is not admirable in his  
way4 ,the palaces1 the arms1 the horses1
 the sacrifices1 are always excellent4  
,the women are always stately and       
beautiful4 ,the ancestry and the history
 of every one are honourable and good4  
,the whole ,homeric world is clean1     
clear1 beautiful1 and providential1 and 
no small part of the perennial charm of 
the poet is that he thus immerses us in 
an atmosphere of beauty2 a beauty not   
concentrated and reserved for some      
extraordinary sentiment1 action1 or     
person1 but permeating the whole and    
colouring the common world of soldiers  
and sailors1 war and craft1 with a      
marvellous freshness and inward glow4   
,there is nothing in the associations of

 life in this world or in another to    
contradict or disturb our delight4 ,all 
is beautiful1 and beautiful through and 
through4  ,something of this quality    
meets us in all simple and idyllic      
compositions4 ,there is1 for instance1 a
 popular demand that stories and        
comedies should end well4 ,the hero and 
heroine must be young and handsome2     
unless they die1 -- which is another    
matter1 -- they must not in the end be  
poor4 ,the landscape in the play must be
 beautiful2 the dresses pretty2 the plot
 without serious mishap4 ,a pervasive   
presentation of pleasure must give      
warmth and ideality to the whole4 ,in   
the proprieties of social life we find  
the same principle2 we study to make our
 surroundings1 manner1 and conversation 
suggest nothing but what is pleasing4   
,we hide the ugly and disagreeable      
portion of our lives1 and do not allow  
the least hint of it to come to light   
upon festive and public occasions4      
,whenever1 in a word1 a thoroughly      

pleasing effect is found1 it is found by
 the expression1 as well as             
presentation1 of what is in itself      
pleasing -- and when this effect is to  
be produced artificially1 we attain it  
by the suppression of all expression    
that is not suggestive of something     
good4  ,if our consciousness were       
exclusively aesthetic1 this kind of     
expression would be the only one allowed
 in art or prized in nature4 ,we should 
avoid as a shock or an insipidity1 the  
suggestion of anything not intrinsically
 beautiful4 ,as there would be no values
 not aesthetic1 our pleasure could never
 be heightened by any other kind of     
interest4 ,but as contemplation is      
actually a luxury in our lives1 and     
things interest us chiefly on passionate
 and practical grounds1 the accumulation
 of values too exclusively aesthetic    
produces in our minds an effect of      
closeness and artificiality4 ,so        
selective a diet cloys1 and our palate1 
accustomed to much daily vinegar and    

salt1 is surfeited by such unmixed      
sweet4  ,instead we prefer to see       
through the medium of art -- through the
 beautiful first term of our expression 
-- the miscellaneous world which is so  
well known to us -- perhaps so dear1 and
 at any rate so inevitable1 an object4  
,we are more thankful for this          
presentation1 of the unlovely truth in a
 lovely form1 than for the like         
presentation of an abstract beauty2 what
 is lost in the purity of the pleasure  
is gained in the stimulation of our     
attention1 and in the relief of viewing 
with aesthetic detachment the same      
things that in practical life hold      
tyrannous dominion over our souls4 ,the 
beauty that is associated only with     
other beauty is therefore a sort of     
aesthetic dainty2 it leads the fancy    
through a fairyland of lovely forms1    
where we must forget the common objects 
of our interest4 ,the charm of such an  
idealization is undeniable2 but the     
other important elements of our memory  

and will cannot long be banished4       
,thoughts of labour1 ambition1 lust1    
anger1 confusion1 sorrow1 and death must
 needs mix with our contemplation and   
lend their various expressions to the   
objects with which in experience they   
are so closely allied4 ,hence the       
incorporation in the beautiful of values
 of other sorts1 and the comparative    
rareness in nature or art of expressions
 the second term of which has only      
aesthetic value4  ,practical value in   
the same4   #eb4 ,more important and    
frequent is the case of the expression  
of utility4 ,this is found whenever the 
second term is the idea of something of 
practical advantage to us1 the          
premonition of which brings             
satisfaction2 and this satisfaction     
prompts an approval of the presented    
object4 ,the tone of our consciousness  
is raised by the foretaste of a success2
 and this heightened pleasure is        
objectified in the present image1 since 
the associated image to which the       

satisfaction properly belongs often     
fails to become distinct4 ,we do not    
conceive clearly what this practical    
advantage will be2 but the vague sense  
that an advantage is there1 that        
something desirable has been done1      
accompanies the presentation1 and gives 
it expression4  ,the case that most     
resembles that of which we have been    
just speaking1 is perhaps that in which 
the second term is a piece of           
interesting information1 a theory1 or   
other intellectual datum4 ,our interest 
in facts and theories1 when not         
aesthetic1 is of course practical2 it   
consists in their connexion with our    
interests1 and in the service they can  
render us in the execution of our       
designs4 ,intellectual values are       
utilitarian in their origin but         
aesthetic in their form1 since the      
advantage of knowledge is often lost    
sight of1 and ideas are prized for their
 own sake4 ,curiosity can become a      
disinterested passion1 and yield        

intimate and immediate satisfaction like
 any other impulse4  ,when we have      
before us1 for instance1 a fine map1 in 
which the line of coast1 now rocky1 now 
sandy1 is clearly indicated1 together   
with the windings of the rivers1 the    
elevations of the land1 and the         
distribution of the population1 we have 
the simultaneous suggestion of so many  
facts1 the sense of mastery over so much
 reality1 that we gaze at it with       
delight1 and need no practical motive to
 keep us studying it1 perhaps for hours 
together4 ,a map is not naturally       
thought of as an aesthetic object2 it is
 too exclusively expressive4 ,the first 
term is passed over as a mere symbol1   
and the mind is filled either with      
imaginations of the landscape the       
country would really offer1 or with     
thoughts about its history and          
inhabitants4 ,these circumstances       
prevent the ready objectification of our
 pleasure in the map itself4 ,and yet1  
let the tints of it be a little subtle1 

let the lines be a little delicate1 and 
the masses of land and sea somewhat     
balanced1 and we really have a beautiful
 thing2 a thing the charm of which      
consists almost entirely in its meaning1
 but which nevertheless pleases us in   
the same way as a picture or a graphic  
symbol might please4 ,give the symbol a 
little intrinsic worth of form1 line1   
and colour1 and it attracts like a      
magnet all the values of the things it  
is known to symbolize4 ,it becomes      
beautiful in its expressiveness4        
,hardly different from this example is  
that of travel or of reading2 for in    
these employments we get many aesthetic 
pleasures1 the origin of which is in the
 satisfaction of curiosity and          
intelligence4 ,when we say admiringly of
 anything that it is characteristic1    
that it embodies a whole period or a    
whole man1 we are absorbed by the       
pleasant sense that it offers           
innumerable avenues of approach to      
interesting and important things4 ,the  

less we are able to specify what these  
are1 the more beautiful will the object 
be that expresses them4 ,for if we could
 specify them1 the felt value would     
disintegrate1 and distribute itself     
among the ideas of the suggested things1
 leaving the expressive object bare of  
all interest1 like the letters of a     
printed page4  ,the courtiers of ,philip
 the ,second probably did not regard his
 rooms at the ,escurial as particularly 
interesting1 but simply as small1 ugly1 
and damp4 ,the character which we find  
in them and which makes us regard them  
as eminently expressive of whatever was 
sinister in the man1 probably did not   
strike them4 ,they knew the king1 and   
had before them words1 gestures1 and    
acts enough in which to read his        
character4 ,but all these living facts  
are wanting to our experience2 and it is
 the suggestion of them in their        
unrealizable vagueness that fills the   
apartments of the monarch with such     
pungent expression4 ,it is not otherwise

 with all emphatic expressiveness --    
moonlight and castle moats1 minarets and
 cypresses1 camels filing through the   
desert -- such images get their         
character from the strong but misty     
atmosphere of sentiment and adventure   
which clings about them4 ,the profit of 
travel1 and the extraordinary charm of  
all visible relics of antiquity1        
consists in the acquisition of images in
 which to focus a mass of discursive    
knowledge1 not otherwise felt together4 
,such images are concrete symbols of    
much latent experience1 and the deep    
roots of association give them the same 
hold upon our attention which might be  
secured by a fortunate form or splendid 
material4  ,cost as an element of       
effect4   #ec4 ,there is one            
consideration which often adds much to  
the interest with which we view an      
object1 but which we might be virtuously
 inclined not to admit among aesthetic  
values4 ,i mean cost4 ,cost is practical
 value expressed in abstract terms1 and 

from the price of anything we can often 
infer what relation it has to the       
desires and efforts of mankind4 ,there  
is no reason why cost1 or the           
circumstances which are its basis1      
should not1 like other practical values1
 heighten the tone of consciousness1 and
 add to the pleasure with which we view 
an object4 ,in fact1 such is our daily  
experience2 for great as is the sensuous
 beauty of gems1 their rarity and price 
adds an expression of distinction to    
them1 which they would never have if    
they were cheap4  ,the circumstance that
 makes the appreciation of cost often   
unaesthetic is the abstractness of that 
quality4 ,the price of an object is an  
algebraic symbol1 it is a conventional  
term1 invented to facilitate our        
operations1 which remains arid and      
unmeaning if we stop with it and forget 
to translate it again at the end into   
its concrete equivalent4 ,the commercial
 mind dwells in that intermediate limbo 
of symbolized values2 the calculator's  

senses are muffled by his intellect and 
by his habit of abbreviated thinking4   
,his mental process is a reckoning that 
loses sight of its original values1 and 
is over without reaching any concrete   
image4 ,therefore the knowledge of cost1
 when expressed in terms of money1 is   
incapable of contributing to aesthetic  
effect1 but the reason is not so much   
that the suggested value is not         
aesthetic1 as that no real value is     
suggested at all4 ,no object of any kind
 is presented to the mind by the        
numerical expression4 ,if we reinterpret
 our price1 however1 and translate it   
back into the facts which constitute it1
 into the materials employed1 their     
original place and quality1 and the     
labour and art which transformed them   
into the present thing1 then we add to  
the aesthetic value of the object1 by   
the expression which we find in it1 not 
of its price in money1 but of its human 
cost4 ,we have now the consciousness of 
the real values which it represents1 and

 these values1 sympathetically present  
to the fancy1 increase our present      
interest and admiration4  ,i believe    
economists count among the elements of  
the value of an object the rarity of its
 material1 the labour of its            
manufacture1 and the distance from which
 it is brought4 ,now all these          
qualities1 if attended to in themselves1
 appeal greatly to the imagination4 ,we 
have a natural interest in what is rare 
and affects us with unusual sensations4 
,what comes from a far country carries  
our thoughts there1 and gains by the    
wealth and picturesqueness of its       
associations4 ,and that on which human  
labour has been spent1 especially if it 
was a labour of love1 and is apparent in
 the product1 has one of the deepest    
possible claims to admiration4 ,so that 
the standard of cost1 the most vulgar of
 all standards1 is such only when it    
remains empty and abstract4 ,let the    
thoughts wander back and consider the   
elements of value1 and our appreciation1

 from being verbal and commercial1      
becomes poetic and real4  ,we have in   
this one more example of the manner in  
which practical values1 when suggested  
by and incorporated in any object1      
contribute to its beauty4 ,our sense of 
what lies behind1 unlovely though that  
background may be1 gives interest and   
poignancy to that which is present2 our 
attention and wonder are engaged1 and a 
new meaning and importance is added to  
such intrinsic beauty as the            
presentation may possess4  ,the         
expression of economy and fitness4      
#ed4 ,the same principle explains the   
effect of evident cleanliness1 security1
 economy1 and comfort4 ,this ,dutch     
charm hardly needs explanation2 we are  
conscious of the domesticity and        
neatness which pleases us in it4 ,there 
are few things more utterly             
discomforting to our minds than waste3  
it is a sort of pungent extract and     
quintessence of folly4 ,the visible     
manifestation of it is therefore very   

offensive2 and that of its absence very 
reassuring4 ,the force of our approval  
of practical fitness and economy in     
things rises into an appreciation that  
is half-aesthetic1 and which becomes    
wholly so when the fit form becomes     
fixed in a type1 to the lines of which  
we are accustomed2 so that the practical
 necessity of the form is heightened and
 concentrated into the aesthetic        
propriety of it4  ,the much-praised     
expression of function and truth in     
architectural works reduces itself to   
this principle4 ,the useful contrivance 
at first appeals to our practical       
approval2 while we admire its ingenuity1
 we cannot fail to become gradually     
accustomed to its presence1 and to      
register with attentive pleasure the    
relation of its parts4 ,utility1 as we  
have pointed out in its place1 is thus  
the guiding principle in the            
determination of forms4  ,the recurring 
observation of the utility1 economy1 and
 fitness of the traditional arrangement 

in buildings or other products of art1  
re-enforces this formal expectation with
 a reflective approval4 ,we are         
accustomed1 for instance1 to sloping    
roofs2 the fact that they were necessary
 has made them familiar1 and the fact   
that they are familiar has made them    
objects of study and of artistic        
enjoyment4 ,if at any moment1 however1  
the notion of condemning them passes    
through the mind1 -- if we have visions 
of the balustrade against the sky1 -- we
 revert to our homely image with kindly 
loyalty1 when we remember the long      
months of rain and snow1 and the        
comfortless leaks to be avoided4 ,the   
thought of a glaring1 practical         
unfitness is enough to spoil our        
pleasure in any form1 however beautiful 
intrinsically1 while the sense of       
practical fitness is enough to reconcile
 us to the most awkward and rude        
contrivances4  ,this principle is1      
indeed1 not a fundamental1 but an       
auxiliary one2 the expression of utility

 modifies effect1 but does not          
constitute it4 ,there would be a kind of
 superstitious haste in the notion that 
what is convenient and economical is    
necessarily and by miracle beautiful4   
,the uses and habits of one place and   
society require works which are or may  
easily become intrinsically beautiful2  
the uses and habits of another make     
these beautiful works impossible4 ,the  
beauty has a material and formal basis  
that we have already studied2 no fitness
 of design will make a building of ten  
equal storeys as beautiful as a pavilion
 or a finely proportioned tower2 no     
utility will make a steamboat as        
beautiful as a sailing vessel4 ,but the 
forms once established1 with their      
various intrinsic characters1 the       
fitness we know to exist in them will   
lend them some added charm1 or their    
unfitness will disquiet us1 and haunt us
 like a conscientious qualm4 ,the other 
interests of our lives here mingle with 
the purely aesthetic1 to enrich or to   

embitter it4  ,if ,sybaris is so sad a  
name to the memory -- and who is without
 some ,sybaris of his own8 -- if the    
image of it is so tormenting and in the 
end so disgusting1 this is not because  
we no longer think its marbles bright1  
its fountains cool1 its athletes strong1
 or its roses fragrant2 but because1    
mingled with all these supreme beauties1
 there is the ubiquitous shade of       
,nemesis1 the sense of a vacant will and
 a suicidal inhumanity4 ,the            
intolerableness of this moral condition 
poisons the beauty which continues to be
 felt4 ,if this beauty did not exist1   
and was not still desired1 the tragedy  
would disappear and ,jehovah would be   
deprived of the worth of his victim4    
,the sternness of moral forces lies     
precisely in this1 that the sacrifices  
morality imposes upon us are real1 that 
the things it renders impossible are    
still precious4  ,we are accustomed to  
think of prudence as estranging us only 
from low and ignoble things2 we forget  

that utility and the need of system in  
our lives is a bar also to the free     
flights of the spirit4 ,the highest     
instincts tend to disorganization as    
much as the lowest1 since order and     
benefit is what practical morality      
everywhere insists upon1 while sanctity 
and genius are as rebellious as vice4   
,the constant demands of the heart and  
the belly can allow man only an         
incidental indulgence in the pleasures  
of the eye and the understanding4 ,for  
this reason1 utility keeps close watch  
over beauty1 lest in her wilfulness and 
riot she should offend against our      
practical needs and ultimate happiness4 
,and when the conscience is keen1 this  
vigilance of the practical imagination  
over the speculative ceases to appear as
 an eventual and external check4 ,the   
least suspicion of luxury1 waste1       
impurity1 or cruelty is then a signal   
for alarm and insurrection4 ,that which 
emits this sapor hoereticus becomes so  
initially horrible1 that naturally no   

beauty can ever be discovered in it2 the
 senses and imagination are in that case
 inhibited by the conscience4  ,for this
 reason1 the doctrine that beauty is    
essentially nothing but the expression  
of moral or practical good appeals to   
persons of predominant moral            
sensitiveness1 not only because they    
wish it were the truth1 but because it  
largely describes the experience of     
their own minds1 somewhat warped in this
 particular4 ,it will further be        
observed that the moralists are much    
more able to condemn than to appreciate 
the effects of the arts4 ,their taste is
 delicate without being keen1 for the   
principle on which they judge is one    
which really operates to control and    
extend aesthetic effects2 it is a source
 of expression and of certain nuances of
 satisfaction2 but it is foreign to the 
stronger and more primitive aesthetic   
values to which the same persons are    
comparatively blind4  ,the authority of 
morals over aesthetics4   #ee4 ,the     

extent to which aesthetic goods should  
be sacrificed is1 of course1 a moral    
question2 for the function of practical 
reason is to compare1 combine1 and      
harmonize all our interests1 with a view
 to attaining the greatest satisfactions
 of which our nature is capable4 ,we    
must expect1 therefore1 that virtue     
should place the same restraint upon all
 our passions -- not from superstitious 
aversion to any one need1 but from an   
equal concern for them all4 ,the        
consideration to be given to our        
aesthetic pleasures will depend upon    
their greater or less influence upon our
 happiness2 and as this influence varies
 in different ages and countries1 and   
with different individuals1 it will be  
right to let aesthetic demands count for
 more or for less in the organization of
 life4  ,we may1 indeed1 according to   
our personal sympathies1 prefer one type
 of creature to another4 ,we may love   
the martial1 or the angelic1 or the     
political temperament4 ,we may delight  

to find in others that balance of       
susceptibilities and enthusiasms which  
we feel in our own breast4 ,but no moral
 precept can require one species or     
individual to change its nature in order
 to resemble another1 since such a      
requirement can have no power or        
authority over those on whom we would   
impose it4 ,all that morality can       
require is the inward harmony of each   
life3 and if we still abhor the thought 
of a possible being who should be happy 
without love1 or knowledge1 or beauty1  
the aversion we feel is not moral but   
instinctive1 not rational but human4    
,what revolts us is not the want of     
excellence in that other creature1 but  
his want of affinity to ourselves4      
,could we survey the whole universe1 we 
might indeed assign to each species a   
moral dignity proportionate to its      
general beneficence and inward wealth2  
but such an absolute standard1 if it    
exists1 is incommunicable to us2 and we 
are reduced to judging of the excellence

 of every nature by its relation to the 
human4  ,all these matters1 however1    
belong to the sphere of ethics1 nor     
should we give them here even a passing 
notice1 but for the influence which     
moral ideas exert over aesthetic        
judgments4 ,our sense of practical      
benefit not only determines the moral   
value of beauty1 but sometimes even its 
existence as an aesthetic good4         
,especially in the right selection of   
effects1 these considerations have      
weight4 ,forms in themselves pleasing   
may become disagreeable when the        
practical interests then uppermost in   
the mind cannot1 without violence1 yield
 a place to them4 ,thus too much        
eloquence in a diplomatic document1 or  
in a familiar letter1 or in a prayer1 is
 an offence not only against practical  
sense1 but also against taste4 ,the     
occasion has tuned us to a certain key  
of sentiment1 and deprived us of the    
power to respond to other stimuli4  ,if 
things of moment are before us1 we      

cannot stop to play with symbols and    
figures of speech4 ,we cannot attend to 
them with pleasure1 and therefore they  
lose the beauty they might elsewhere    
have had4 ,they are offensive1 not in   
themselves1 -- for nothing is           
intrinsically ugly1 -- but by virtue of 
our present demand for something        
different4 ,a prison as gay as a bazaar1
 a church as dumb as a prison1 offend by
 their failure to support by their      
aesthetic quality the moral emotion     
with1 which we approach them4 ,the arts 
must study their occasions2 they must   
stand modestly aside until they can slip
 in fitly into the interstices of life4 
,this is the consequence of the         
superficial stratum on which they       
flourish2 their roots1 as we have seen1 
are not deep in the world1 and they     
appear only as unstable1 superadded     
activities1 employments of our freedom1 
after the work of life is done and the  
terror of it is allayed4 ,they must1    
therefore1 fit their forms1 like        

parasites1 to the stouter growths to    
which they cling4  ,herein lies the     
greatest difficulty and nicety of art4  
,it must not only create things         
abstractly beautiful1 but it must       
conciliate all the competitors these may
 have to the attention of the world1 and
 must know how to insinuate their charms
 among the objects of our passion4 ,but 
this subserviency and enforced humility 
of beauty is not without its virtue and 
reward4 ,if the aesthetic habit lie     
under the necessity of respecting and   
observing our passions1 it possesses the
 privilege of soothing our griefs4      
,there is no situation so terrible that 
it may not be relieved by the momentary 
pause of the mind to contemplate it     
aesthetically4  ,grief itself becomes in
 this way not wholly pain2 a sweetness  
is added to it by our reflection4 ,the  
saddest scenes may lose their bitterness
 in their beauty4 ,this ministration    
makes1 as it were1 the piety of the     
,muses1 who succour their mother1 ,life1

 and repay her for their nurture by the 
comfort of their continual presence4    
,the aesthetic world is limited in its  
scope2 it must submit to the control of 
the organizing reason1 and not trespass 
upon more useful and holy ground4 ,the  
garden must not encroach upon the       
corn-fields2 but the eye of the gardener
 may transform the corn-fields          
themselves by dint of loving observation
 into a garden of a soberer kind4 ,by   
finding grandeur in our disasters1 and  
merriment in our mishaps1 the aesthetic 
sense thus mollifies both1 and consoles 
us for the frequent impossibility of a  
serious and perfect beauty4  ,negative  
values in the second term4   #ef4 ,all  
subjects1 even the most  repellent1 when
 the circumstances of life thrust them  
before us1 can thus be observed with    
curiosity and treated with art4 ,the    
calling forth of these aesthetic        
functions softens the violence of our   
sympathetic reaction4 ,if death1 for    
instance1 did not exist and did not     

thrust itself upon our thoughts with    
painful importunity1 art would never    
have been called upon to soften and     
dignify it1 by presenting it in         
beautiful forms and surrounding it with 
consoling associations4 ,art does not   
seek out the pathetic1 the tragic1 and  
the absurd2 it is life that has imposed 
them upon our attention1 and enlisted   
art in their service1 to make the       
contemplation of them1 since it is      
inevitable1 at least as tolerable as    
possible4  ,the agreeableness of the    
presentation is thus mixed with the     
horror of the thing2 and the result is  
that while we are saddened by the truth 
we are delighted by the vehicle that    
conveys it to us4 ,the mixture of these 
emotions constitutes the peculiar       
flavour and poignancy of pathos4 ,but   
because unlovely objects and feelings   
are often so familiar as to be          
indifferent or so momentous as to be    
alone in the mind1 we are led into the  
confusion of supposing that beauty      

depends upon them for its aesthetic     
value2 whereas the truth is that only by
 the addition of positive beauties can  
these evil experiences be made agreeable
 to contemplation4  ,there is1 in       
reality1 no such paradox in the tragic1 
comic1 and sublime1 as has been         
sometimes supposed4 ,we are not pleased 
by virtue of the suggested evils1 but in
 spite of them2 and if ever the charm of
 the beautiful presentation sinks so    
low1 or the vividness of the represented
 evil rises so high1 that the balance is
 in favour of pain1 at that very moment 
the whole object becomes horrible1      
passes out of the domain of art1 and can
 be justified only by its scientific or 
moral uses4 ,as an aesthetic value it is
 destroyed2 it ceases to be a benefit2  
and the author of it1 if he were not    
made harmless by the neglect that must  
soon overtake him1 would have to be     
punished as a malefactor who adds to the
 burden of mortal life4 ,for the sad1   
the ridiculous1 the grotesque1 and the  

terrible1 unless they become aesthetic  
goods1 remain moral evils4  ,we have1   
therefore1 to study the various         
aesthetic1 intellectual1 and moral      
compensations by which the mind can be  
brought to contemplate with pleasure a  
thing which1 if experienced alone1 would
 be the cause of pain4 ,there is1 to be 
sure1 a way of avoiding this inquiry4   
,we might assert that since all moderate
 excitement is pleasant1 there is       
nothing strange in the fact that the    
representation of evil should please2   
for the experience is evil by virtue of 
the pain it gives2 but it gives pain    
only when felt with great intensity4    
,observed from afar1 it is a pleasing   
impression2 it is vivid enough to       
interest1 but not acute enough to wound4
 ,this simple explanation is possible in
 all those cases where aesthetic effect 
is gained by the inhibition of sympathy4
  ,the term evil is often a conventional
 epithet2 a conflagration may be called 
an evil1 because it usually involves    

loss and suffering2 but if1 without     
caring for a loss and suffering we do   
not share1 we are delighted by the      
blaze1 and still say that what pleases  
us is an evil1 we are using this word as
 a conventional appellation1 not as the 
mark of a felt value4 ,we are not       
pleased by an evil2 we are pleased by a 
vivid and exciting sensation1 which is a
 good1 but which has for objective cause
 an event which may indeed be an evil to
 others1 but about the consequences of  
which we are not thinking at all4 ,there
 is1 in this sense1 nothing in all      
nature1 perhaps1 which is not an evil2  
nothing which is not unfavourable to    
some interest1 and does not involve some
 infinitesimal or ultimate suffering in 
the universe of life4  ,but when we are 
ignorant or thoughtless1 this suffering 
is to us as if it did not exist4 ,the   
pleasures of drinking and walking are   
not tragic to us1 because we may be     
poisoning some bacillus or crushing some
 worm4 ,to an omniscient intelligence   

such acts may be tragic by virtue of the
 insight into their relations to        
conflicting impulses2 but unless these  
impulses are present to the same mind1  
there is no consciousness of tragedy4   
,the child that1 without understanding  
of the calamity1 should watch a         
shipwreck from the shore1 would hare a  
simple emotion of pleasure as from a    
jumping jack2 what passes for tragic    
interest is often nothing but this4 ,if 
he understood the event1 but was        
entirely without sympathy1 he would have
 the aesthetic emotion of the careless  
tyrant1 to whom the notion of suffering 
is no hindrance to the enjoyment of the 
lyre4 ,if the temper of his tyranny were
 purposely cruel1 he might add to that  
aesthetic delight the luxury of         
,schadenfreude2 but the pathos and      
horror of the sight could only appeal to
 a man who realized and shared the      
sufferings he beheld4  ,a great deal of 
brutal tragedy has been endured in the  
world because the rudeness of the       

representation1 or of the public1 or of 
both1 did not allow a really sympathetic
 reaction to arise4 ,we all smile when  
,punch beats ,judy in the puppet show4  
,the treatment and not the subject is   
what makes a tragedy4 ,a parody of      
,hamlet or of ,king ,lear would not be a
 tragedy2 and these tragedies themselves
 are not wholly such1 but by the strain 
of wit and nonsense they contain are1 as
 it were1 occasional parodies on        
themselves4 ,by treating a tragic       
subject bombastically or satirically we 
can turn it into an amusement for the   
public2 they will not feel the griefs   
which we have been careful to harden    
them against by arousing in them        
contrary emotions4 ,a work1 nominally a 
work of art1 may also appeal to         
non-aesthetic feelings by its political 
bias1 brutality1 or obscenity4 ,but if  
an effect of true pathos is sought1 the 
sympathy of the observer must be        
aroused2 we must awaken in him the      
emotion we describe4 ,the intensity of  

the impression must not be so slight    
that its painful quality is not felt2   
for it is this very sense of pain1      
mingling with the aesthetic excitement  
of the spectacle1 that gives it a tragic
 or pathetic colouring4  ,we cannot     
therefore rest in the assertion that the
 slighter degree of excitement is       
pleasant1 when a greater degree of the  
same would be disagreeable2 for that    
principle does not express the essence  
of the matter1 which is that we must be 
aware of the evil1 and conscious of it  
as such1 absorbed more or less in the   
experience of the sufferer1 and         
consequently suffering ourselves1 before
 we can experience the essence of tragic
 emotion4 ,this emotion must therefore  
be complex2 it must contain an element  
of pain overbalanced by an element of   
pleasure2 in our delight there must be a
 distinguishable touch of shrinking and 
sorrow2 for it is this conflict and     
rending of our will1 this fascination by
 what is intrinsically terrible or sad1 

that gives these turbid feelings their  
depth and pungency4  ,influence of the  
first term in the pleasing expression of
 self4   #eg4 ,a striking proof of the  
compound nature of tragic effects can be
 given by a simple experiment4 ,remove  
from any drama -- say from ,othello --  
the charm of the medium of presentation2
 reduce the tragedy to a mere account of
 the facts and of the words spoken1 such
 as our newspapers almost daily contain2
 and the tragic dignity and beauty is   
entirely lost4 ,nothing remains but a   
disheartening item of human folly1 which
 may still excite curiosity1 but which  
will rather defile than purify the mind 
that considers it4 ,a ,french poet has  
said3       ,il n'est de vulgaire       
chagrin      ,qua celui d'une me        
vulgaire4  ,the counterpart of this     
maxim is equally true4 ,there is no     
noble sorrow except in a noble mind1    
because what is noble is the reaction   
upon the sorrow1 the attitude of the man
 in its presence1 the language in which 

he clothes it1 the associations with    
which he surrounds it1 and the fine     
affections and impulses which shine     
through it4 ,only by suffusing some     
sinister experience with this moral     
light1 as a poet may do who carries that
 light within him1 can we raise         
misfortune into tragedy and make it     
better for us to remember our lives than
 to forget them4  ,there are times1     
although rare1 when men are noble in the
 very moment of passion3 when that      
passion is not unqualified1 but already 
mastered by reflection and levelled with
 truth4 ,then the experience is itself  
the tragedy1 and no poet is needed to   
make it beautiful in representation1    
since the sufferer has been an artist   
himself1 and has moulded what he has    
endured4 ,but usually these two stages  
have to be successive3 first we suffer1 
afterwards we sing4 ,an interval is     
necessary to make feeling presentable1  
and subjugate it to that form in which  
alone it is beautiful4  ,this form      

appeals to us in itself1 and without its
 aid no subject-matter could become an  
aesthetic object4 ,the more terrible the
 experience described1 the more powerful
 must the art be which is to transform  
it4 ,for this reason prose and          
literalness are more tolerable in comedy
 than in tragedy2 any violent passion1  
any overwhelming pain1 if it is not to  
make us think of a demonstration in     
pathology1 and bring back the smell of  
ether1 must be rendered in the most     
exalted style4 ,metre1 rhyme1 melody1   
the widest nights of allusion1 the      
highest reaches of fancy1 are there in  
place4 ,for these enable the mind swept 
by the deepest cosmic harmonies1 to     
endure and absorb the shrill notes which
 would be intolerable in a poorer       
setting4  ,the sensuous harmony of      
words1 and still more the effects of    
rhythm1 are indispensable at this height
 of emotion4 ,evolutionists have said   
that violent emotion naturally expresses
 itself in rhythm4 ,that is hardly an   

empirical observation1 nor can the      
expressiveness of rhythms be made       
definite enough to bear specific        
association with complex feelings4 ,but 
the suspension and rush of sound and    
movement have in themselves a strong    
effect2 we cannot undergo them without  
profound excitement2 and this1 like     
martial music1 nerves us to courage and1
 by a sort of intoxication1 bears us    
along amid scenes which might otherwise 
be sickening4 ,the vile effect of       
literal and disjointed renderings of    
suffering1 whether in writing or acting1
 proves how necessary is the musical    
quality to tragedy -- a fact ,aristotle 
long ago set forth4 ,the afflatus of    
rhythm1 even if it be the pomp of the   
,alexandrine1 sublimates the passion1   
and clarifies its mutterings into       
poetry4 ,this breadth and rationality   
are necessary to art1 which is not skill
 merely1 but skill in the service of    
beauty4  ,mixture of other expressions1 
including that of truth4   #eh4 ,to the 

value of these sensuous and formal      
elements must be added the continual    
suggestion of beautiful and happy       
things1 which no tragedy is sombre      
enough to exclude4 ,even if we do not go
 so far as to intersperse comic scenes  
and phrases into a pathetic subject1 -- 
a rude device1 since the comic passages 
themselves need that purifying which    
they are meant to effect1 -- we must at 
least relieve our theme with pleasing   
associations4 ,for this reason we have  
palaces for our scene1 rank1 beauty1 and
 virtue in our heroes1 nobility in their
 passions and in their fate1 and        
altogether a sort of glorification of   
life without which tragedy would lose   
both in depth of pathos -- since things 
so precious are destroyed -- and in     
subtlety of charm1 since things so      
precious are manifested4  ,indeed1 one  
of the chief charms that tragedies have 
is the suggestion of what they might    
have been if they had not been          
tragedies4 ,the happiness which glimmers

 through them1 the hopes1 loves1 and    
ambitions of which it is made1 these    
things fascinate us1 and win our        
sympathy2 so that we are all the more   
willing to suffer with our heroes1 even 
if we are at the same time all the more 
sensitive to their suffering4 ,too      
wicked a character or too unrelieved a  
situation revolts us for this reason4   
,we do not find enough expression of    
good to make us endure the expression of
 the evil4  ,a curious exception to this
 rule1 which1 however1 admirably        
illustrates the fundamental principle of
 it1 is where by the diversity of evils 
represented the mind is relieved from   
painful absorption in any of them4      
,there is a scene in ,king ,lear1 where 
the horror of the storm is made to brood
 over at least four miseries1 that of   
the king1 of the fool1 of ,edgar in his 
real person1 and of ,edgar in his       
assumed character4 ,the vividness of    
each of these portrayals1 with its      
different note of pathos1 keeps the mind

 detached and free1 forces it to compare
 and reflect1 and thereby to            
universalize the spectacle4 ,yet even   
here1 the beautiful effect is not       
secured without some touches of good4   
,how much is not gained by the dumb     
fidelity of the fool1 and by the sublime
 humanity of ,lear1 when he says1 ,art  
cold8 ,there is a part of me is sorry   
for thee yet4  ,yet all these           
compensations would probably be         
unavailing but for another which the    
saddest things often have1 -- the       
compensation of being true4 ,our        
practical and intellectual nature is    
deeply interested in truth4 ,what       
describes fact appeals to us for that   
reason2 it has an inalienable interest4 
,however unpleasant truth may prove1 we 
long to know it1 partly perhaps because 
experience has shown us the prudence of 
this kind of intellectual courage1 and  
chiefly because the consciousness of    
ignorance and the dread of the unknown  
is more tormenting than any possible    

discovery4 ,a primitive instinct makes  
us turn the eyes full on any object that
 appears in the dim borderland of our   
field of vision -- and this all the more
 quickly1 the more terrible that object 
threatens to be4  ,this physical thirst 
for seeing has its intellectual         
extension4 ,we covet truth1 and to      
attain it1 amid all accidents1 is a     
supreme satisfaction4 ,now this         
satisfaction the representation of evil 
can also afford4 ,whether we hear the   
account of some personal accident1 or   
listen to the symbolic representation of
 the inherent tragedy of life1 we crave 
the same knowledge2 the desire for truth
 makes us welcome eagerly whatever comes
 in its name4 ,to be sure1 the relief of
 such instruction does not of itself    
constitute an aesthetic pleasure3 the   
other conditions of beauty remain to be 
fulfilled4 ,but the satisfaction of so  
imperious an intellectual instinct      
insures our willing attention to the    
tragic object1 and strengthens the hold 

which any beauties it may possess will  
take upon us4 ,an intellectual value    
stands ready to be transmuted into an   
aesthetic one1 if once its              
discursiveness is lost1 and it is left  
hanging about the object as a vague     
sense of dignity and meaning4  ,to this 
must be added the specific pleasure of  
recognition1 one of the keenest we have1
 and the sentimental one of nursing our 
own griefs and dignifying them by       
assimilation to a less inglorious       
representation of them4 ,here we have   
truth on a small scale2 conformity in   
the fiction to incidents of our personal
 experience4 ,such correspondences are  
the basis of much popular appreciation  
of trivial and undigested works that    
appeal to some momentary phase of life  
or feeling1 and disappear with it4 ,they
 have the value of personal stimulants  
only2 they never achieve beauty4 ,like  
the souvenirs of last season's gayeties1
 or the diary of an early love1 they are
 often hideous in themselves in         

proportion as they are redolent with    
personal associations4 ,but however     
hopelessly mere history or confession   
may fail to constitute a work of art1 a 
work of art that has an historical      
warrant1 either literal or symbolical1  
gains the support of that vivid interest
 we have in facts4 ,and many tragedies  
and farces1 that to a mind without      
experience of this sublunary world might
 seem monstrous and disgusting fictions1
 may come to be forgiven and even       
perhaps preferred over all else1 when   
they are found to be a sketch from life4
  ,truth is thus the excuse which       
ugliness has for being4 ,many people1 in
 whom the pursuit of knowledge and the  
indulgence in sentiment have left no    
room for the cultivation of the         
aesthetic sense1 look in art rather for 
this expression of fact or of passion   
than for the revelation of beauty4 ,they
 accordingly produce and admire works   
without intrinsic value4 ,they employ   
the procedure of the fine arts without  

an eye to what can give pleasure in the 
effect4 ,they invoke rather the a priori
 interest which men are expected to have
 in the subject-matter1 or in the       
theories and moral implied in the       
presentation of it4 ,instead of using   
the allurements of art to inspire       
wisdom1 they require an appreciation of 
wisdom to make us endure their lack of  
art4  ,of course1 the instruments of the
 arts are public property and any one is
 free to turn them to new uses4 ,it     
would be an interesting development of  
civilization if they should now be      
employed only as methods of recording   
scientific ideas and personal           
confessions4 ,but the experiment has not
 succeeded and can hardly succeed4      
,there are other simpler1 clearer1 and  
more satisfying ways of expounding      
truth4 ,a man who is really a student of
 history or philosophy will never rest  
with the vague and partial oracles of   
poetry1 not to speak of the inarticulate
 suggestions of the plastic arts4 ,he   

will at once make for the principles    
which art cannot express1 even if it can
 embody them1 and when those principles 
are attained1 the works of art1 if they 
had no other value than that of         
suggesting them1 will lapse from his    
mind4 ,forms will give place to formulas
 as hieroglyphics have given place to   
the letters of the alphabet4  ,if1 on   
the other hand1 the primary interest is 
really in beauty1 and only the confusion
 of a moral revolution has obscured for 
a while the vision of the ideal1 then as
 the mind regains its mastery over the  
world1 and digests its new experience1  
the imagination will again be liberated1
 and create its forms by its inward     
affinities1 leaving all the weary       
burden1 archaeological1 psychological1  
and ethical1 to those whose business is 
not to delight4 ,but the sudden         
inundation of science and sentiment     
which has made the mind of the          
nineteenth century so confused1 by      
overloading us with materials and       

breaking up our habits of apperception  
and our ideals1 has led to an exclusive 
sense of the value of expressiveness1   
until this has been almost identified   
with beauty4 ,this exaggeration can best
 prove how the expression of truth may  
enter into the play of aesthetic forces1
 and give a value to representations    
which1 but for it1 would be repulsive4  
,the liberation of self4   #ei4         
,hitherto we have been considering those
 elements of a pathetic presentation    
which may mitigate our sympathetic      
emotion1 and make it on the whole       
agreeable4 ,these consist in the        
intrinsic beauties of the medium of     
presentation1 and in the concomitant    
manifestation of various goods1 notably 
of truth4 ,the mixture of these values  
is perhaps all we have in mildly        
pathetic works1 in the presence of which
 we are tolerably aware of a sort of    
balance and compensation of emotions4   
,the sorrow and the beauty1 the         
hopelessness and the consolation1 mingle

 and merge into a kind of joy which has 
its poignancy1 indeed1 but which is far 
too passive and penitential to contain  
the louder and sublimer of our tragic   
moods4 ,in these there is a wholeness1 a
 strength1 and a rapture1 which still   
demands an explanation4  ,where this    
explanation is to be found may be       
guessed from the following circumstance4
 ,the pathetic is a quality of the      
object1 at once lovable and sad1 which  
we accept and allow to flow in upon the 
soul2 but the heroic is an attitude of  
the will1 by which the voices of the    
outer world are silenced1 and a moral   
energy1 flowing from within1 is made to 
triumph over them4 ,if we fail1         
therefore1 to discover1 by analysis of  
the object1 anything which could make it
 sublime1 we must not be surprised at   
our failure4 ,we must remember that the 
object is always but a portion of our   
consciousness3 that portion which has   
enough coherence and articulation to be 
recognized as permanent and projected   

into the outer world4 ,but consciousness
 remains one1 in spite of this          
diversification of its content1 and the 
object is not really independent1 but is
 in constant relation to the rest of the
 mind1 in the midst of which it swims   
like a bubble on a dark surface of      
water4  ,the aesthetic effect of objects
 is always due to the total emotional   
value of the consciousness in which they
 exist4 ,we merely attribute this value 
to the object by a projection which is  
the ground of the apparent objectivity  
of beauty4 ,sometimes this value may be 
inherent in the process by which the    
object itself is perceived2 then we have
 sensuous and formal beauty2 sometimes  
the value may be due to the incipient   
formation of other ideas1 which the     
perception of this object evokes2 then  
we have beauty of expression4 ,but among
 the ideas with which every object has  
relation there is one vaguest1 most     
comprehensive1 and most powerful one1   
namely1 the idea of self4 ,the impulses1

 memories1 principles1 and energies     
which we designate by that word baffle  
enumeration2 indeed1 they constantly    
fade and change into one another2 and   
whether the self is anything1           
everything1 or nothing depends on the   
aspect of it which we momentarily fix1  
and especially on the definite object   
with which we contrast it4  ,now1 it is 
the essential privilege of beauty to so 
synthesize and bring to a focus the     
various impulses of the self1 so to     
suspend them to a single image1 that a  
great peace falls upon that perturbed   
kingdom4 ,in the experience of these    
momentary harmonies we have the basis of
 the enjoyment of beauty1 and of all its
 mystical meanings4 ,but there are      
always two methods of securing harmony3 
one is to unify all the given elements1 
and another is to reject and expunge all
 the elements that refuse to be unified4
 ,unity by inclusion gives us the       
beautiful2 unity by exclusion1          
opposition1 and isolation gives us the  

sublime4 ,both are pleasures3 but the   
pleasure of the one is warm1 passive1   
and pervasive2 that of the other cold1  
imperious1 and keen4 ,the one identifies
 us with the world1 the other raises us 
above it4  ,there can be no difficulty  
in understanding how the expression of  
evil in the object may be the occasion  
of this heroic reaction of the soul4 ,in
 the first place1 the evil may be felt2 
but at the same time the sense that1    
great as it may be in itself1 it cannot 
touch us1 may stimulate extraordinarily 
the consciousness of our own wholeness4 
,this is the sublimity which ,lucretius 
calls sweet in the famous lines in which
 he so justly analyzes it4 ,we are not  
pleased because another suffers an evil1
 but because1 seeing it is an evil1 we  
see at the same time our own immunity   
from it4 ,we might soften the picture a 
little1 and perhaps make the principle  
even clearer by so doing4 ,the shipwreck
 observed from the shore does not leave 
us wholly unmoved2 we suffer1 also1 and 

if possible1 would help4 ,so1 too1 the  
spectacle of the erring world must      
sadden the philosopher even in the      
,acropolis of his wisdom2 he would1 if  
it might be1 descend from his meditation
 and teach4 ,but those movements of     
sympathy are quickly inhibited by       
despair of success2 impossibility of    
action is a great condition of the      
sublime4 ,if we could count the stars1  
we should not weep before them4 ,while  
we think we can change the drama of     
history1 and of our own lives1 we are   
not awed by our destiny4 ,but when the  
evil is irreparable1 when our life is   
lived1 a strong spirit has the sublime  
resource of standing at bay and of      
surveying almost from the other world   
the vicissitudes of this4  ,the more    
intimate to himself the tragedy he is   
able to look back upon with calmness1   
the more sublime that calmness is1 and  
the more divine the ecstasy in which he 
achieves it4 ,for the more of the       
accidental vesture of life we are able  

to strip ourselves of1 the more naked   
and simple is the surviving spirit2 the 
more complete its superiority and unity1
 and1 consequently1 the more unqualified
 its joy4 ,there remains little in us1  
then1 but that intellectual essence1    
which several great philosophers have   
called eternal and identified with the  
,divinity4  ,a single illustration may  
help to fix these principles in the     
mind4 ,when ,othello has discovered his 
fatal error1 and is resolved to take his
 own life1 he stops his groaning1 and   
addresses the ambassadors of ,venice    
thus3       ,speak of me as ,i am3      
nothing extenuate1      ,nor set down   
aught in malice3 then1 must you speak   
,of one that loved1 not wisely1 but too 
well2      ,of one not easily jealous1  
but1 being wrought1      ,perplexed in  
the extreme2 of one whose hand1         
,like the base ,indian1 threw a pearl   
away      ,richer than all his tribe2 of
 one whose subdued eyes1      ,albeit   
unused to the melting mood1      ,drop  

tears as fast as the ,arabian trees     
,their medicinal gum4 ,set you down     
this3      ,and say1 besides1 that in   
,aleppo once      ,when a malignant and 
a turbaned ,turk      ,beat a ,venetian1
 and traduced the state1      ,i took by
 the throat the circumcised dog1        
,and smote him1 thus4  ,there is a kind 
of criticism that would see in all these
 allusions1 figures of speech1 and      
wandering reflections1 an unnatural     
rendering of suicide4 ,the man1 we might
 be told1 should have muttered a few    
broken phrases1 and killed himself      
without this pomp of declamation1 like  
the jealous husbands in the daily       
papers4 ,but the conventions of the     
tragic stage are more favourable to     
psychological truth than the conventions
 of real life4 ,if we may trust the     
imagination 7and in imagination lies1 as
 we have seen1 the test of propriety71  
this is what ,othello would have felt4  
,if he had not expressed it1 his        
dumbness would have been due to external

 hindrances1 not to the failure in his  
mind of just such complex and rhetorical
 thoughts as the poet has put into his  
mouth4 ,the height of passion is        
naturally complex and rhetorical4 ,love 
makes us poets1 and the approach of     
death should make us philosophers4 ,when
 a man knows that his life is over1 he  
can look back upon it from a universal  
standpoint4 ,he has nothing more to live
 for1 but if the energy of his mind     
remains unimpaired1 he will still wish  
to live1 and1 being cut off from his    
personal ambitions1 he will impute to   
himself a kind of vicarious immortality 
by identifying himself with what is     
eternal4 ,he speaks of himself as he is1
 or rather as he was4 ,he sums himself  
up1 and points to his achievement4 ,this
 ,i have been1 says he1 this ,i have    
done4  ,this comprehensive and impartial
 view1 this synthesis and               
objectification of experience1          
constitutes the liberation of the soul  
and the essence of sublimity4 ,that the 

hero attains it at the end consoles us1 
as it consoles him1 for his hideous     
misfortunes4 ,our pity and terror are   
indeed purged2 we go away knowing that1 
however tangled the net may be in which 
we feel ourselves caught1 there is      
liberation beyond1 and an ultimate      
peace4  ,the sublime independent of the 
expression of evil4   #fj4 ,so natural  
is the relation between the vivid       
conception of great evils1 and that     
self-assertion of the soul which gives  
the emotion of the sublime1 that the    
sublime is often thought to depend upon 
the terror which these conceived evils  
inspire4 ,to be sure1 that terror would 
have to be inhibited and subdued1       
otherwise we should have a passion too  
acute to be incorporated in any object2 
the sublime would not appear as an      
aesthetic quality in things1 but remain 
merely an emotional state in the        
subject4 ,but this subdued and          
objectified terror is what is commonly  
regarded as the essence of the sublime1 

and so great an authority as ,aristotle 
would seem to countenance some such     
definition4 ,the usual cause of the     
sublime is here confused1 however1 with 
the sublime itself4 ,the suggestion of  
terror makes us withdraw into ourselves3
 there with the supervening             
consciousness of safety or indifference 
comes a rebound1 and we have that       
emotion of detachment and liberation in 
which the sublime really consists4      
,thoughts and actions are properly      
sublime1 and visible things only by     
analogy and suggestion when they induce 
a certain moral emotion2 whereas beauty 
belongs properly to sensible things1 and
 can be predicated of moral facts only  
by a figure of rhetoric4 ,what we       
objectify in beauty is a sensation4     
,what we objectify in the sublime is an 
act4 ,this act is necessarily pleasant1 
for if it were not the sublime would be 
a bad quality and one we should rather  
never encounter in the world4 ,the      
glorious joy of self-assertion in the   

face of an uncontrollable world is      
indeed so deep and entire1 that it      
furnishes just that transcendent element
 of worth for which we were looking when
 we tried to understand how the         
expression of pain could sometimes      
please4 ,it can please1 not in itself1  
but because it is balanced and annulled 
by positive pleasures1 especially by    
this final and victorious one of        
detachment4 ,if the expression of evil  
seems necessary to the sublime1 it is so
 only as a condition of this moral      
reaction4  ,we are commonly too much    
engrossed in objects and too little     
centred in ourselves and our inalienable
 will1 to see the sublimity of a        
pleasing prospect4 ,we are then enticed 
and flattered1 and won over to a        
commerce with these external goods1 and 
the consummation of our happiness would 
lie in the perfect comprehension and    
enjoyment of their nature4 ,this is the 
office of art and of love2 and its      
partial fulfilment is seen in every     

perception of beauty4 ,but when we are  
checked in this sympathetic endeavour   
after unity and comprehension2 when we  
come upon a great evil or an            
irreconcilable power1 we are driven to  
seek our happiness by the shorter and   
heroic road2 then we recognize the      
hopeless foreignness of what lies before
 us1 and stiffen ourselves against it4  
,we thus for the first time reach the   
sense of our possible separation from   
our world1 and of our abstract          
stability2 and with this comes the      
sublime4  ,but although experience of   
evil is the commonest approach to this  
attitude of mind1 and we commonly become
 philosophers only after despairing of  
instinctive happiness1 yet there is     
nothing impossible in the attainment of 
detachment by other channels4 ,the      
immense is sublime as well as the       
terrible2 and mere infinity of the      
object1 like its hostile nature1 can    
have the effect of making the mind      
recoil upon itself4 ,infinity1 like     

hostility1 removes us from things1 and  
makes us conscious of our independence4 
,the simultaneous view of many things1  
innumerable attractions felt together1  
produce equilibrium and indifference1 as
 effectually as the exclusion of all4   
,if we may call the liberation of the   
self by the consciousness of evil in the
 world1 the ,stoic sublime1 we may      
assert that there is also an ,epicurean 
sublime1 which consists in liberation by
 equipoise4 ,any wide survey is sublime 
in that fashion4 ,each detail may be    
beautiful4 ,we may even be ready with a 
passionate response to its appeal4 ,we  
may think we covet every sort of        
pleasure1 and lean to every kind of     
vigorous1 impulsive life4 ,but let an   
infinite panorama be suddenly unfolded2 
the will is instantly paralyzed1 and the
 heart choked4 ,it is impossible to     
desire everything at once1 and when all 
is offered and approved1 it is          
impossible to choose everything4 ,in    
this suspense1 the mind soars into a    

kind of heaven1 benevolent but unmoved4 
,this is the attitude of all minds to   
which breadth of interest or length of  
years has brought balance and dignity4  
,the sacerdotal quality of old age comes
 from this same sympathy in             
disinterestedness4 ,old men full of     
hurry and passion appear as fools1      
because we understand that their        
experience has not left enough mark upon
 their brain to qualify with the memory 
of other goods any object that may be   
now presented4 ,we cannot venerate any  
one in whom appreciation is not divorced
 from desire4 ,and this elevation and   
detachment of the heart need not follow 
upon any great disappointment2 it is    
finest and sweetest where it is the     
gradual fruit of many affections now    
merged and mellowed into a natural      
piety4 ,indeed1 we are able to frame our
 idea of the ,deity on no other model4  
,when the pantheists try to conceive all
 the parts of nature as forming a single
 being1 which shall contain them all and

 yet have absolute unity1 they find     
themselves soon denying the existence of
 the world they are trying to deify2 for
 nature1 reduced to the unity it would  
assume in an omniscient mind1 is no     
longer nature1 but something simple and 
impossible1 the exact opposite of the   
real world4 ,such an opposition would   
constitute the liberation of the divine 
mind from nature1 and its existence as a
 self-conscious individual4 ,the effort 
after comprehensiveness of view reduces 
things to unity1 but this unity stands  
out in opposition to the manifold       
phenomena which it transcends1 and      
rejects as unreal4  ,now this           
destruction of nature1 which the        
metaphysicians since ,parmenides have so
 often repeated 7nature nevertheless    
surviving still71 is but a theoretical  
counterpart and hypostasis of what      
happens in every man's conscience when  
the comprehensiveness of his experience 
lifts him into thought1 into            
abstraction4 ,the sense of the sublime  

is essentially mystical3 it is the      
transcending of distinct perception in  
favour of a feeling of unity and volume4
 ,so in the moral sphere1 we have the   
mutual cancelling of the passions in the
 breast that includes them all1 and     
their final subsidence beneath the      
glance that comprehends them4 ,this is  
the ,epicurean approach to detachment   
and perfection2 it leads by systematic  
acceptance of instinct to the same goal 
which the stoic and the ascetic reach by
 systematic rejection of instinct4 ,it  
is thus possible to be moved to that    
self-enfranchisement which constitutes  
the sublime1 even when the object       
contains no expression of evil4  ,this  
conclusion supports that part of our    
definition of beauty which declares that
 the values beauty contains are all     
positive2 a definition which we should  
have had to change if we had found that 
the sublime depended upon the suggestion
 of evil for its effect4 ,but the       
sublime is not the ugly1 as some        

descriptions of it might lead us to     
suppose2 it is the supremely1 the       
intoxicatingly beautiful4 ,it is the    
pleasure of contemplation reaching such 
an intensity that it begins to lose its 
objectivity1 and to declare itself1 what
 it always fundamentally was1 an inward 
passion of the soul4 ,for while in the  
beautiful we find the perfection of life
 by sinking into the object1 in the     
sublime we find a purer and more        
inalienable perfection by defying the   
object altogether4 ,the surprised       
enlargement of vision1 the sudden escape
 from our ordinary interests and the    
identification of ourselves with        
something permanent and superhuman1     
something much more abstract and        
inalienable than our changing           
personality1 all this carries us away   
from the blurred objects before us1 and 
raises us into a sort of ecstasy4  ,in  
the trite examples of the sublime1 where
 we speak of the vast mass1 strength1   
and durability of objects1 or of their  

sinister aspect1 as if we were moved by 
them on account of our own danger1 we   
seem to miss the point4 ,for the        
suggestion of our own danger would      
produce a touch of fear2 it would be a  
practical passion1 or if it could by    
chance be objectified enough to become  
aesthetic1 it would merely make the     
object hateful and repulsive1 like a    
mangled corpse4 ,the object is sublime  
when we forget our danger1 when we      
escape from ourselves altogether1 and   
live as it were in the object itself1   
energizing in imitation of its movement1
 and saying1 ,be thou me1 impetuous one6
 ,this passage into the object1 to live 
its life1 is indeed a characteristic of 
all perfect contemplation4 ,but when in 
thus translating ourselves we rise and  
play a higher personage1 feeling the    
exhilaration of a life freer and wilder 
than our own1 then the experience is one
 of sublimity4 ,the emotion comes not   
from the situation we observe1 but from 
the powers we conceive2 we fail to      

sympathize with the struggling sailors  
because we sympathize too much with the 
wind and waves4 ,and this mystical      
cruelty can extend even to ourselves2 we
 can so feel the fascination of the     
cosmic forces that engulf us as to take 
a fierce joy in the thought of our own  
destruction4 ,we can identify ourselves 
with the abstractest essence of reality1
 and1 raised to that height1 despise the
 human accidents of our own nature4     
,lord1 we say1 though thou slay me1 yet 
will ,i trust in thee4 ,the sense of    
suffering disappears in the sense of    
life and the imagination overwhelms the 
understanding4  ,the comic4   #fa4      
,something analogous takes place in the 
other spheres where an aesthetic value  
seems to arise out of suggestions of    
evil1 in the comic1 namely1 and the     
grotesque4 ,but here the translation of 
our sympathies is partial1 and we are   
carried away from ourselves only to     
become smaller4 ,the larger humanity1   
which cannot be absorbed1 remains ready 

to contradict the absurdity of our      
fiction4 ,the excellence of comedy lies 
in the invitation to wander along some  
by-path of the fancy1 among scenes not  
essentially impossible1 but not to be   
actually enacted by us on account of the
 fixed circumstances of our lives4 ,if  
the picture is agreeable1 we allow      
ourselves to dream it true4 ,we forget  
its relations2 we forbid the eye to     
wander beyond the frame of the stage1 or
 the conventions of the fiction4 ,we    
indulge an illusion which deepens our   
sense of the essential pleasantness of  
things4  ,so far1 there is nothing in   
comedy that is not delightful1 except1  
perhaps1 the moment when it is over4    
,but fiction1 like all error or         
abstraction1 is necessarily unstable2   
and the awakening is not always reserved
 for the disheartening moment at the    
end4 ,everywhere1 when we are dealing   
with pretension or mistake1 we come upon
 sudden and vivid contradictions2       
changes of view1 transformations of     

apperception which are extremely        
stimulating to the imagination4 ,we have
 spoken of one of these3 when the sudden
 dissolution of our common habits of    
thought lifts us into a mystical        
contemplation1 filled with the sense of 
the sublime2 when the transformation is 
back to common sense and reality1 and   
away from some fiction1 we have a very  
different emotion4 ,we feel cheated1    
relieved1 abashed1 or amused1 in        
proportion as our sympathy attaches more
 to the point of view surrendered or to 
that attained4  ,the disintegration of  
mental forms and their redintegration is
 the life of the imagination4 ,it is a  
spiritual process of birth and death1   
nutrition and generation4 ,the strongest
 emotions accompany these changes1 and  
vary infinitely with their variations4  
,all the qualities of discourse1 wit1   
eloquence1 cogency1 absurdity1 are      
feelings incidental to this process1 and
 involved in the juxtapositions1        
tensions1 and resolutions of our ideas4 

,doubtless the last explanation of these
 things would be cerebral2 but we are as
 yet confined to verbal descriptions and
 classifications of them1 which are     
always more or less arbitrary4  ,the    
most conspicuous headings under which   
comic effects are gathered are perhaps  
incongruity and degradation4 ,but       
clearly it cannot be the logical essence
 of incongruity or degradation that     
constitutes the comic2 for then         
contradiction and deterioration would   
always amuse4 ,amusement is a much more 
directly physical thing4 ,we may be     
amused without any idea at all1 as when 
we are tickled1 or laugh in sympathy    
with others by a contagious imitation of
 their gestures4 ,we may be amused by   
the mere repetition of a thing at first 
not amusing4 ,there must therefore be   
some nervous excitement on which the    
feeling of amusement directly depends1  
although this excitement may most often 
coincide with a sudden transition to an 
incongruous or meaner image4 ,nor can we

 suppose that particular ideational     
excitement to be entirely dissimilar to 
all others2 wit is often hardly         
distinguishable from brilliancy1 as     
humour from pathos4 ,we must1 therefore1
 be satisfied with saying vaguely that  
the process of ideation involves various
 feelings of movement and relation1 --  
feelings capable of infinite gradation  
and complexity1 and ranging from        
sublimity to tedium and from pathos to  
uncontrollable merriment4  ,certain     
crude and obvious cases of the comic    
seem to consist of little more than a   
shock of surprise3 a pun is a sort of   
jack-in-the-box1 popping from nowhere   
into our plodding thoughts4 ,the        
liveliness of the interruption1 and its 
futility1 often please2 dulce est       
desipere in loco2 and yet those who must
 endure the society of inveterate jokers
 know how intolerable this sort of      
scintillation can become4 ,there is     
something inherently vulgar about it2   
perhaps because our train of thought    

cannot be very entertaining in itself   
when we are so glad to break in upon it 
with irrelevant nullities4 ,the same    
undertone of disgust mingles with other 
amusing surprises1 as when a dignified  
personage slips and falls1 or some      
disguise is thrown off1 or those things 
are mentioned and described which       
convention ignores4 ,the novelty and the
 freedom please1 yet the shock often    
outlasts the pleasure1 and we have cause
 to wish we had been stimulated by      
something which did not involve this    
degradation4 ,so1 also1 the             
impossibility in plausibility which     
tickles the fancy in ,irish bulls1 and  
in wild exaggerations1 leaves an        
uncomfortable impression1 a certain     
aftertaste of foolishness4  ,the reason 
will be apparent if we stop to analyze  
the situation4 ,we have a prosaic       
background of common sense and every-day
 reality2 upon this background an       
unexpected idea suddenly impinges4 ,but 
the thing is a futility4 ,the comic     

accident falsifies the nature before us1
 starts a wrong analogy in the mind1 a  
suggestion that cannot be carried out4  
,in a word1 we are in the presence of an
 absurdity2 and man1 being a rational   
animal1 can like absurdity no better    
than he can like hunger or cold4 ,a     
pinch of either may not be so bad1 and  
he will endure it merrily enough if you 
repay him with abundance of warm        
victuals2 so1 too1 he will play with all
 kinds of nonsense for the sake of      
laughter and good fellowship and the    
tickling of his fancy with a sort of    
caricature of thought4 ,but the qualm   
remains1 and the pleasure is never      
perfect4 ,the same exhilaration might   
have come without the falsification1    
just as repose follows more swiftly     
after pleasant than after painful       
exertions4  ,fun is a good thing1 but   
only when it spoils nothing better4 ,the
 best place for absurdity is in the     
midst of what is already absurd -- then 
we have the play of fancy without the   

sense of ineptitude4 ,things amuse us in
 the mouth of a fool that would not     
amuse us in that of a gentleman2 a fact 
which shows how little incongruity and  
degradation have to do with our pleasure
 in the comic4 ,in fact1 there is a kind
 of congruity and method even in        
fooling4 ,the incongruous and the       
degraded displease us even there1 as by 
their nature they must at all times4    
,the shock which they bring may         
sometimes be the occasion of a          
subsequent pleasure1 by attracting our  
attention1 or by stimulating passions1  
such as scorn1 or cruelty1 or           
self-satisfaction 7for there is a good  
deal of malice in our love of fun72 but 
the incongruity and degradation1 as     
such1 always remain unpleasant4 ,the    
pleasure comes from the inward          
rationality and movement of the fiction1
 not from its inconsistency with        
anything else4 ,there are a great many  
topsy-turvy worlds possible to our      
fancy1 into which we like to drop at    

times4 ,we enjoy the stimulation and the
 shaking up of our wits4 ,it is like    
getting into a new posture1 or hearing a
 new song4  ,nonsense is good only      
because common sense is so limited4 ,for
 reason1 after all1 is one convention   
picked out of a thousand4 ,we love      
expansion1 not disorder1 and when we    
attain freedom without incongruity we   
have a much greater and a much purer    
delight4 ,the excellence of wit can     
dispense with absurdity4 ,for on the    
same prosaic background of common sense1
 a novelty might have appeared that was 
not absurd1 that stimulated the         
attention quite as much as the          
ridiculous1 without so baffling the     
intelligence4 ,this purer and more      
thoroughly delightful amusement comes   
from what we call wit4  ,wit4   #fb4    
,wit also depends upon transformation   
and substitution of ideas4 ,it has been 
said to consist in quick association by 
similarity4 ,the substitution must here 
be valid1 however1 and the similarity   

real1 though unforeseen4 ,unexpected    
justness makes wit1 as sudden           
incongruity makes pleasant foolishness4 
,it is characteristic of wit to         
penetrate into hidden depths of things1 
to pick out there some telling          
circumstance or relation1 by noting     
which the whole object appears in a new 
and clearer light4 ,wit often seems     
malicious because analysis in           
discovering common traits and universal 
principles assimilates things at the    
poles of being2 it can apply to cookery 
the formulas of theology1 and find in   
the human heart a case of the fulcrum   
and lever4 ,we commonly keep the        
departments of experience distinct2 we  
think that different principles hold in 
each and that the dignity of spirit is  
inconsistent with the explanation of it 
by physical analogy1 and the meanness of
 matter unworthy of being an            
illustration of moral truths4 ,love must
 not be classed under physical cravings1
 nor faith under hypnotization4 ,when1  

therefore1 an original mind overleaps   
these boundaries1 and recasts its       
categories1 mixing up our old           
classifications1 we feel that the values
 of things are also confused4 ,but these
 depended upon a deeper relation1 upon  
their response to human needs and       
aspirations4 ,all that can be changed by
 the exercise of intelligence is our    
sense of the unity and homogeneity of   
the world4 ,we may come to hold an      
object of thought in less isolated      
respect1 and another in less hasty      
derision2 but the pleasures we derive   
from all1 or our total happiness and    
wonder1 will hardly be diminished4 ,for 
this reason the malicious or destructive
 character of intelligence must not be  
regarded as fundamental4 ,wit belittles 
one thing and dignifies another2 and its
 comparisons are as often flattering as 
ironical4  ,the same process of mind    
that we observed in wit gives rise to   
those effects we call charming1         
brilliant1 or inspired4 ,when           

,shakespeare says1       ,come and kiss 
me1 sweet and twenty1      ,youth's a   
stuff will not endure1  the fancy of the
 phrase consists in a happy             
substitution1 a merry way of saying     
something both true and tender4 ,and    
where could we find a more exquisite    
charm8 ,so1 to take a weightier example1
 when ,st4 ,augustine is made to say    
that pagan virtues were splendid vices1 
we have -- at least if we catch the full
 meaning -- a pungent assimilation of   
contrary things1 by force of a powerful 
principle2 a triumph of theory1 the     
boldness of which can only be matched by
 its consistency4 ,in fact1 a phrase    
could not be more brilliant1 or better  
condense one theology and two           
civilizations4 ,the ,latin mind is      
particularly capable of this sort of    
excellence4 ,tacitus alone could furnish
 a hundred examples4 ,it goes with the  
power of satirical and bitter eloquence1
 a sort of scornful rudeness of         
intelligence1 that makes for the core of

 a passion or of a character1 and       
affixes to it a more or less scandalous 
label4 ,for in our analytical zeal it is
 often possible to condense and abstract
 too much4 ,reality is more fluid and   
elusive than reason1 and has1 as it     
were1 more dimensions than are known    
even to the latest geometry4 ,hence the 
understanding1 when not suffused with   
some glow of sympathetic emotion or some
 touch of mysticism1 gives but a dry1   
crude image of the world4 ,the quality  
of wit inspires more admiration than    
confidence4 ,it is a merit we should    
miss little in any one we love4  ,the   
same principle1 however1 can have more  
sentimental embodiments4 ,when our      
substitutions are brought on by the     
excitement of generous emotion1 we call 
wit inspiration4 ,there is the same     
finding of new analogies1 and likening  
of disparate things2 there is the same  
transformation of our apperception4 ,but
 the brilliancy is here not only        
penetrating1 but also exalting4 ,for    

instance3       ,peace1 peace1 he is not
 dead1 he doth not sleep1           ,he 
hath awakened from the dream of life3   
',tis we that wrapped in stormy visions 
keep           ,with phantoms an        
unprofitable strife4  ,there is here    
paradox1 and paradox justified by       
reflection4 ,the poet analyzes1 and     
analyzes without reserve4 ,the dream1   
the storm1 the phantoms1 and the        
unprofitableness could easily make a    
satirical picture4 ,but the mood is     
transmuted2 the mind takes an upward    
flight1 with a sense of liberation from 
the convention it dissolves1 and of     
freer motion in the vagueness beyond4   
,the disintegration of our ideal here   
leads to mysticism1 and because of this 
effort towards transcendence1 the       
brilliancy becomes sublime4  ,humour4   
#fc4 ,a different mood can give a       
different direction to the same         
processes4 ,the sympathy by which we    
reproduce the feeling of another1 is    
always very much opposed to the         

aesthetic attitude to which the whole   
world is merely a stimulus to our       
sensibility4 ,in the tragic1 we have    
seen how the sympathetic feeling1 by    
which suffering is appreciated and      
shared1 has to be overlaid by many      
incidental aesthetic pleasures1 if the  
resulting effect is to be on the whole  
good4 ,we have also seen how the only   
way in which the ridiculous can be kept 
within the sphere of the aesthetically  
good is abstracting it from its         
relations1 and treating it as an        
independent and curious stimulus2 we    
should stop laughing and begin to be    
annoyed if we tried to make sense out of
 our absurdity4 ,the less sympathy we   
have with men the more exquisite is our 
enjoyment of their folly3 satirical     
delight is closely akin to cruelty4     
,defect and mishap stimulate our fancy1 
as blood and tortures excite in us the  
passions of the beast of prey4 ,the more
 this inhuman attitude yields to        
sympathy and reason1 the less are folly 

and error capable of amusing us4 ,it    
would therefore seem impossible that we 
should be pleased by the foibles or     
absurdities of those we love4 ,and in   
fact we never enjoy seeing our own      
persons in a satirical light1 or any one
 else for whom we really feel affection4
 ,even in farces1 the hero and heroine  
are seldom made ridiculous1 because that
 would jar upon the sympathy with which 
we are expected to regard them4         
,nevertheless1 the essence of what we   
call humour is that amusing weaknesses  
should be combined with an amicable     
humanity4 ,whether it be in the way of  
ingenuity1 or oddity1 or drollery1 the  
humorous person must have an absurd     
side1 or be placed in an absurd         
situation4 ,yet this comic aspect1 at   
which we ought to wince1 seems to endear
 the character all the more4 ,this is a 
parallel case to that of tragedy1 where 
the depth of the woe we sympathize with 
seems to add to our satisfaction4 ,and  
the explanation of the paradox is the   

same4 ,we do not enjoy the expression of
 evil1 but only the pleasant excitements
 that come with it2 namely1 the physical
 stimulus and the expression of good4   
,in tragedy1 the misfortunes help to    
give the impression of truth1 and to    
bring out the noble qualities of the    
hero1 but are in themselves depressing1 
so much so that over-sensitive people   
cannot enjoy the beauty of the          
representation4 ,so also in humour1 the 
painful suggestions are felt as such1   
and need to be overbalanced by agreeable
 elements4 ,these come from both        
directions1 from the aesthetic and the  
sympathetic reaction4 ,on the one hand  
there is the sensuous and merely        
perceptive stimulation1 the novelty1 the
 movement1 the vivacity of the          
spectacle4 ,on the other hand1 there is 
the luxury of imaginative sympathy1 the 
mental assimilation of another congenial
 experience1 the expansion into another 
life4  ,the juxtaposition of these two  
pleasures produces just that tension and

 complication in which the humorous     
consists4 ,we are satirical1 and we are 
friendly at the same time4 ,the         
consciousness of the friendship gives a 
regretful and tender touch to the       
satire1 and the sting of the satire     
makes the friendship a trifle humble and
 sad4 ,don ,quixote is mad2 he is old1  
useless1 and ridiculous1 but he is the  
soul of honour1 and in all his laughable
 adventures we follow him like the ghost
 of our better selves4 ,we enjoy his    
discomfitures too much to wish he had   
been a perfect ,amadis2 and we have     
besides a shrewd suspicion that he is   
the only kind of ,amadis there can ever 
be in this world4 ,at the same time it  
does us good to see the courage of his  
idealism1 the ingenuity of his wit1 and 
the simplicity of his goodness4 ,but how
 shall we reconcile our sympathy with   
his dream and our perception of its     
absurdity8 ,the situation is            
contradictory4 ,we are drawn to some    
different point of view1 from which the 

comedy may no longer seem so amusing4   
,as humour becomes deep and really      
different from satire1 it changes into  
pathos1 and passes out of the sphere of 
the comic altogether4 ,the mischances   
that were to amuse us as scoffers now   
grieve us as men1 and the value of the  
representation depends on the touches of
 beauty and seriousness with which it is
 adorned4  ,the grotesque4   #fd4       
,something analogous to humour can      
appear in plastic forms1 when we call it
 the grotesque4 ,this is an interesting 
effect produced by such a transformation
 of an ideal type as exaggerates one of 
its elements or combines it with other  
types4 ,the real excellence of this1    
like that of all fiction1 consists in   
re-creation2 in the formation of a thing
 which nature has not1 but might        
conceivably have offered4 ,we call these
 inventions comic and grotesque when we 
are considering their divergence from   
the natural rather than their inward    
possibility4 ,but the latter constitutes

 their real charm2 and the more we study
 and develope them1 the better we       
understand it4 ,the incongruity with the
 conventional type than disappears1 and 
what was impossible and ridiculous at   
first takes its place among recognized  
ideals4 ,the centaur and the satyr are  
no longer grotesque2 the type is        
accepted4 ,and the grotesqueness of an  
individual has essentially the same     
nature4 ,if we like the inward harmony1 
the characteristic balance of his       
features1 we are able to disengage this 
individual from the class into which we 
were trying to force him2 we can forget 
the expectation which he was going to   
disappoint4 ,the ugliness then          
disappears1 and only the reassertion of 
the old habit and demand can make us    
regard him as in any way extravagant4   
,what appears as grotesque may be       
intrinsically inferior or superior to   
the normal4 ,that is a question of its  
abstract material and form4 ,but until  
the new object impresses its form on our

 imagination1 so that we can grasp its  
unity and proportion1 it appears to us  
as a jumble and distortion of other     
forms4 ,if this confusion is absolute1  
the object is simply null2 it does not  
exist aesthetically1 except by virtue of
 materials4 ,but if the confusion is not
 absolute1 and we have an inkling of the
 unity and character in the midst of the
 strangeness of the form1 then we have  
the grotesque4 ,it is the half-formed1  
the perplexed1 and the suggestively     
monstrous4  ,the analogy to the comic is
 very close1 as we can readily conceive 
that it should be4 ,in the comic we have
 this same juxtaposition of a new and an
 old idea1 and if the new is not futile 
and really inconceivable1 it may in time
 establish itself in the mind1 and cease
 to be ludicrous4 ,good wit is novel    
truth1 as the good grotesque is novel   
beauty4 ,but there are natural          
conditions of organization1 and we must 
not mistake every mutilation for the    
creation of a new form4 ,the tendency of

 nature to establish well-marked species
 of animals shows what various          
combinations are most stable in the face
 of physical forces1 and there is a     
fitness also for survival in the mind1  
which is determined by the relation of  
any form to our fixed method of         
perception4 ,new things are therefore   
generally bad because1 as has been well 
said1 they are incapable of becoming    
old4 ,a thousand originalities are      
produced by defect of faculty1 for one  
that is produced by genius4 ,for in the 
pursuit of beauty1 as in that of truth1 
an infinite number of paths lead to     
failure1 and only one to success4  ,the 
possibility of finite perfection4   #fe4
 ,if these observations have any        
accuracy1 they confirm this important   
truth1 -- that no aesthetic value is    
really founded on the experience or the 
suggestion of evil4 ,this conclusion    
will doubtless seem the more interesting
 if we think of its possible extension  
to the field of ethics and of the       

implied vindication of the ideal of     
moral perfection as something           
essentially definable and attainable4   
,but without insisting on an analogy to 
ethics1 which might be misleading1 we   
may hasten to state the principle which 
emerges from our analysis of expression4
 ,expressiveness may be found in any one
 thing that suggests another1 or draws  
from association with that other any of 
its emotional colouring4 ,there may1    
therefore1 of course1 be an             
expressiveness of evil2 but this        
expressiveness will not have any        
aesthetic value4 ,the description or    
suggestion of suffering may have a worth
 as science or discipline1 but can never
 in itself enhance any beauty4 ,tragedy 
and comedy please in spite of this      
expressiveness and not by virtue of it2 
and except for the pleasures they give1 
they have no place among the fine arts4 
,nor have they1 in such a case1 any     
place in human life at all2 unless they 
are instruments of some practical       

purpose and serve to preach a moral1 or 
achieve a bad notoriety4 ,for ugly      
things can attract attention1 although  
they cannot keep it2 and the scandal of 
a new horror may secure a certain vulgar
 admiration which follows whatever is   
momentarily conspicuous1 and which is   
attained even by crime4 ,such           
admiration1 however1 has nothing        
aesthetic about it1 and is only made    
possible by the bluntness of our sense  
of beauty4  ,the effect of the pathetic 
and comic is therefore never pure2 since
 the expression of some evil is mixed up
 with those elements by which the whole 
appeals to us4 ,these elements we have  
seen to be the truth of the             
presentation1 which involves the        
pleasures of recognition and            
comprehension1 the beauty of the medium1
 and the concomitant expression of      
things intrinsically good4 ,to these    
sources all the aesthetic value of comic
 and tragic is due2 and the sympathetic 
emotion which arises from the spectacle 

of evil must never be allowed to        
overpower these pleasures of            
contemplation1 else the entire object   
becomes distasteful and loses its excuse
 for being4 ,too exclusive a relish for 
the comic and pathetic is accordingly a 
sign of bad taste and of comparative    
insensibility to beauty4  ,this         
situation has generally been appreciated
 in the practice of the arts1 where     
effect is perpetually studied2 but the  
greatest care has not always succeeded  
in avoiding the dangers of the pathetic1
 and history is full of failures due to 
bombast1 caricature1 and unmitigated    
horror4 ,in all these the effort to be  
expressive has transgressed the         
conditions of pleasing effect4 ,for the 
creative and imitative impulse is       
indiscriminate4 ,it does not consider   
the eventual beauty of the effect1 but  
only the blind instinct of              
self-expression4 ,hence an untrained and
 not naturally sensitive mind cannot    
distinguish or produce anything good4   

,this critical incapacity has always    
been a cause of failure and a just      
ground for ridicule2 but it remained for
 some thinkers of our time -- a time of 
little art and much undisciplined       
production -- to erect this abuse into a
 principle and declare that the essence 
of beauty is to express the artist and  
not to delight the world4 ,but the      
conditions of effect1 and the           
possibility of pleasing1 are the only   
criterion of what is capable and worthy 
of expression4 ,art exists and has value
 by its adaptation to these universal   
conditions of beauty4  ,nothing but the 
good of life enters into the texture of 
the beautiful4 ,what charms us in the   
comic1 what stirs us in the sublime and 
touches us in the pathetic1 is a glimpse
 of some good2 imperfection has value   
only as an incipient perfection4 ,could 
the labours and sufferings of life be   
reduced1 and a better harmony between   
man and nature be established1 nothing  
would be lost to the arts2 for the pure 

and ultimate value of the comic is      
discovery1 of the pathetic1 love1 of the
 sublime1 exaltation2 and these would   
still subsist4 ,indeed1 they would all  
be increased2 and it has ever been1     
accordingly1 in the happiest and most   
prosperous moments of humanity1 when the
 mind and the world were knit into a    
brief embrace1 that natural beauty has  
been best perceived1 and art has won its
 triumphs4 ,but it sometimes happens1 in
 moments less propitious1 that the soul 
is subdued to what it works in1 and     
loses its power of idealization and     
hope4 ,by a pathetic and superstitious  
self-depreciation1 we then punish       
ourselves for the imperfection of       
nature4 ,awed by the magnitude of a     
reality that we can no longer conceive  
as free from evil1 we try to assert that
 its evil also is a good2 and we poison 
the very essence of the good to make its
 extension universal4 ,we confuse the   
causal connexion of those things in     
nature which we call good or evil by an 

adventitious denomination with the      
logical opposition between good and evil
 themselves2 because one generation     
makes room for another1 we say death is 
necessary to life2 and because the      
causes of sorrow and joy are so mingled 
in this world1 we cannot conceive how1  
in a better world1 they might be        
disentangled4  ,this incapacity of the  
imagination to reconstruct the          
conditions of life and build the frame  
of things nearer to the heart's desire  
is dangerous to a steady loyalty to what
 is noble and fine4 ,we surrender       
ourselves to a kind of miscellaneous    
appreciation1 without standard or goal2 
and calling every vexatious apparition  
by the name of beauty1 we become        
incapable of discriminating its         
excellence or feeling its value4 ,we    
need to clarify our ideals1 and enliven 
our vision of perfection4 ,no atheism is
 so terrible as the absence of an       
ultimate ideal1 nor could any failure of
 power be more contrary to human nature 

than the failure of moral imagination1  
or more incompatible with healthy life4 
,for we have faculties1 and habits1 and 
impulses4 ,these are the basis of our   
demands4 ,and these demands1 although   
variable1 constitute an ever-present    
intrinsic standard of value by which we 
feel and judge4 ,the ideal is immanent  
in them2 for the ideal means that       
environment in which our faculties would
 find their freest employment1 and their
 most congenial world4 ,perfection would
 be nothing but life under those        
conditions4 ,accordingly our            
consciousness of the ideal becomes      
distinct in proportion as we advance in 
virtue and in proportion to the vigour  
and definiteness with which our         
faculties work4 ,when the vital harmony 
is complete1 when the act is pure1 faith
 in perfection passes into vision4 ,that
 man is unhappy indeed1 who in all his  
life has had no glimpse of perfection1  
who in the ecstasy of love1 or in the   
delight of contemplation1 has never been

 able to say3 ,it is attained4 ,such    
moments of inspiration are the source of
 the arts1 which have no higher function
 than to renew them4  ,a work of art is 
indeed a monument to such a moment1 the 
memorial to such a vision2 and its charm
 varies with its power of recalling us  
from the distractions of common life to 
the joy of a more natural and perfect   
activity4  ,the stability of the ideal4 
#ff4 ,the perfection thus revealed is   
relative to our nature and faculties2 if
 it were not1 it could have no value for
 us4 ,it is revealed to us in brief     
moments1 but it is not for that reason  
an unstable or fantastic thing4 ,human  
attention inevitably flickers2 we survey
 things in succession1 and our acts of  
synthesis and our realization of fact   
are only occasional4 ,this is the tenure
 of all our possessions2 we are not     
uninterruptedly conscious of ourselves1 
our physical environment1 our ruling    
passions1 or our deepest conviction4    
,what wonder1 then1 that we are not     

constantly conscious of that perfection 
which is the implicit ideal of all our  
preferences and desires8 ,we view it    
only in parts1 as passion or perception 
successively directs our attention to   
its various elements4 ,some of us never 
try to conceive it in its totality4 ,yet
 our whole life is an act of worship to 
this unknown divinity2 every heartfelt  
prayer is offered before one or another 
of its images4  ,this ideal of          
perfection varies1 indeed1 but only with
 the variations of our nature of which  
it is the counterpart and entelechy4    
,there is perhaps no more frivolous     
notion than that to which ,schopenhauer 
has given a new currency1 that a good1  
once attained1 loses all its value4 ,the
 instability of our attention1 the need 
of rest and repair in our organs1 makes 
a round of objects necessary to our     
minds2 but we turn from a beautiful     
thing1 as from a truth or a friend1 only
 to return incessantly1 and with        
increasing appreciation4 ,nor do we lose

 all the benefit of our achievements in 
the intervals between our vivid         
realizations of what we have gained4    
,the tone of the mind is permanently    
raised2 and we live with that general   
sense of steadfastness and resource     
which is perhaps the kernel of          
happiness4 ,knowledge1 affection1       
religion1 and beauty are not less       
constant influences in a man's life     
because his consciousness of them is    
intermittent4 ,even when absent1 they   
fill the chambers of the mind with a    
kind of fragrance4 ,they have a         
continual efficacy1 as well as a        
perennial worth4  ,there are1 indeed1   
other objects of desire that if attained
 leave nothing but restlessness and     
dissatisfaction behind them4 ,these are 
the objects pursued by fools4 ,that such
 objects ever attract us is a proof of  
the disorganization of our nature1 which
 drives us in contrary directions and is
 at war with itself4 ,if we had attained
 anything like steadiness of thought or 

fixity of character1 if we knew         
ourselves1 we should know also our      
inalienable satisfactions4 ,to say that 
all goods become worthless in possession
 is either a piece of superficial satire
 that intentionally denies the normal in
 order to make the abnormal seem more   
shocking1 or else it is a confession of 
frivolity1 a confession that1 as an     
idiot never learns to distinguish       
reality amid the phantasms of his brain1
 so we have never learned to distinguish
 true goods amid our extravagances of   
whim and passion4 ,that true goods exist
 is nevertheless a fact of moral        
experience4 ,a thing of beauty is a joy 
for ever2 a great affection1 a clear    
thought1 a profound and well-tried      
faith1 are eternal possessions4 ,and    
this is not merely a fact1 to be        
asserted upon the authority of those who
 know it by experience4 ,it is a        
psychological necessity4 ,while we      
retain the same senses1 we must get the 
same impressions from the same objects2 

while we keep our instincts and         
passions1 we must pursue the same goods2
 while we hare the same powers of       
imagination1 we must experience the same
 delight in their exercise4 ,age brings 
about1 of course1 variation in all these
 particulars1 and the susceptibility of 
two individuals is never exactly        
similar4 ,but the eventual decay of our 
personal energies does not destroy the  
natural value of objects1 so long as the
 same will embodies itself in other     
minds1 and human nature subsists in the 
world4 ,the sun is not now unreal       
because each one of us in succession1   
and all of us in the end1 must close our
 eyes upon it2 and yet the sun exists   
for us only because we perceive it4 ,the
 ideal has the same conditions of being1
 but has this advantage over the sun1   
that we cannot know if its light is ever
 destined to fail us4  ,there is then a 
broad foundation of identity in our     
nature1 by virtue of which we live in a 
common world1 and have an art and a     

religion in common4 ,that the ideal     
should be constant within these limits  
is as inevitable as that it should vary 
beyond them4 ,and so long as we exist   
and recognize ourselves individually as 
persons or collectively as human1 we    
must recognize also our immanent ideal1 
the realization of which would          
constitute perfection for us4 ,that     
ideal cannot be destroyed except in     
proportion as we ourselves perish4 ,an  
absolute perfection1 independent of     
human nature and its variations1 may    
interest the metaphysician2 but the     
artist and the man will be satisfied    
with a perfection that is inseparable   
from the consciousness of mankind1 since
 it is at once the natural vision of the
 imagination1 and the rational goal of  
the will4  ,conclusion4   #fg4 ,we have 
now studied the sense of beauty in what 
seem to be its fundamental              
manifestations1 and in some of the more 
striking complications which it         
undergoes4 ,in surveying so broad a     

field we stand in need of some          
classification and subdivision2 and we  
have chosen the familiar one of matter1 
form1 and expression1 as least likely to
 lead us into needless artificiality4   
,but artificiality there must always be 
in the discursive description of        
anything given in consciousness4        
,psychology attempts what is perhaps    
impossible1 namely1 the anatomy of life4
 ,mind is a fluid2 the lights and       
shadows that flicker through it have no 
real boundaries1 and no possibility of  
permanence4 ,our whole classification of
 mental facts is borrowed from the      
physical conditions or expressions of   
them4 ,the very senses are distinguished
 because of the readiness with which we 
can isolate their outer organs4 ,ideas  
can be identified only by identifying   
their objects4 ,feelings are recognized 
by their outer expression1 and when we  
try to recall an emotion1 we must do so 
by recalling the circumstances in which 
it occurred4  ,in distinguishing1 then1 

in our sense of beauty1 an appreciation 
of sensible material1 one of abstract   
form1 and another of associated values1 
we have been merely following the       
established method of psychology1 the   
only one by which it is possible to     
analyze the mind4 ,we have distinguished
 the elements of the object1 and treated
 the feeling as if it were composed of  
corresponding parts4 ,the worlds of     
nature and fancy1 which are the object  
of aesthetic feeling1 can be divided    
into parts in space and time4  ,we can  
then distinguish the material of things 
from the various forms it may           
successively assume2 we can distinguish1
 also1 the earlier and the later        
impressions made by the same object2 and
 we can ascertain the coexistence of one
 impression with another1 or with the   
memory of others4 ,but aesthetic feeling
 itself has no parts1 and this          
physiology of its causes is not a       
description of its proper nature4       
,beauty as we feel it is something      

indescribable3 what it is or what it    
means can never be said4  ,by appealing 
to experiment and memory we can show    
that this feeling varies as certain     
things vary in the objective conditions2
 that it varies with the frequency1 for 
instance1 with which a form has been    
presented1 or with the associates which 
that form has had in the past4 ,this    
will justify a description of the       
feeling as composed of the various      
contributions of these objects4 ,but the
 feeling itself knows nothing of        
composition nor contributions4 ,it is an
 affection of the soul1 a consciousness 
of joy and security1 a pang1 a dream1 a 
pure pleasure4 ,it suffuses an object   
without telling why2 nor has it any need
 to ask the question4 ,it justifies     
itself and the vision it gilds2 nor is  
there any meaning in seeking for a cause
 of it1 in this inward sense4 ,beauty   
exists for the same reason that the     
object which is beautiful exists1 or the
 world in which that object lies1 or we 

that look upon both4 ,it is an          
experience3 there is nothing more to say
 about it4 ,indeed1 if we look at things
 teleologically1 and as they ultimately 
justify themselves to the heart1 beauty 
is of all things what least calls for   
explanation4 ,for matter and space and  
time and principles of reason and of    
evolution1 all are ultimately brute1    
unaccountable data4 ,we may describe    
what actually is1 but it might have been
 otherwise1 and the mystery of its being
 is as baffling and dark as ever4  ,but 
we1 -- the minds that ask all questions 
and judge of the validity of all        
answers1 -- we are not ourselves        
independent of this world in which we   
live4 ,we sprang from it1 and our       
relations in it determine all our       
instincts and satisfactions4 ,this final
 questioning and sense of mystery is an 
unsatisfied craving which nature has her
 way of stilling4 ,now we only ask for  
reasons when we are surprised4 ,if we   
had no expectations we should have no   

surprises4 ,and what gives us           
expectation is the spontaneous direction
 of our thought1 determined by the      
structure of our brain and the effects  
of our experience4 ,if our spontaneous  
thoughts came to run in harmony with the
 course of nature1 if our expectations  
were then continually fulfilled1 the    
sense of mystery would vanish4 ,we      
should be incapable of asking why the   
world existed or had such a nature1 just
 as we are now little inclined to ask   
why anything is right1 but mightily     
disinclined to give up asking why       
anything is wrong4  ,this satisfaction  
of our reason1 due to the harmony       
between our nature and our experience1  
is partially realized already4 ,the     
sense of beauty is its realization4     
,when our senses and imagination find   
what they crave1 when the world so      
shapes itself or so moulds the mind that
 the correspondence between them is     
perfect1 then perception is pleasure1   
and existence needs no apology4 ,the    

duality which is the condition of       
conflict disappears4 ,there is no inward
 standard different from the outward    
fact with which that outward fact may be
 compared4 ,a unification of this kind  
is the goal of our intelligence and of  
our affection1 quite as much as of our  
aesthetic sense2 but we have in those   
departments fewer examples of success4  
,in the heat of speculation or of love  
there may come moments of equal         
perfection1 but they are unstable4 ,the 
reason and the heart remain deeply      
unsatisfied4 ,but the eye finds in      
nature1 and in some supreme achievements
 of art1 constant and fuller            
satisfaction4 ,for the eye is quick1 and
 seems to have been more docile to the  
education of life than the heart or the 
reason of man1 and able sooner to adapt 
itself to the reality4 ,beauty therefore
 seems to be the clearest manifestation 
of perfection1 and the best evidence of 
its possibility4 ,if perfection is1 as  
it should be1 the ultimate justification

 of being1 we may understand the ground 
of the moral dignity of beauty4 ,beauty 
is a pledge of the possible conformity  
between the soul and nature1 and        
consequently a ground of faith in the   
supremacy of the good4   ,,footnotes  #a
  ,schopenhauer1 indeed1 who makes much 
of it1 was a good critic1 but his       
psychology suffered much from the       
pessimistic generalities of his system4 
,it concerned him to show that the will 
was bad1 and1 as he felt beauty to be a 
good if not a holy thing1 he hastened to
 convince himself that it came from the 
suppression of the will4 ,but even in   
his system this suppression is only     
relative4 ,the desire of individual     
objects1 indeed1 is absent in the       
perception of beauty1 but there is still
 present that initial love of the       
general type and principles of things   
which is the first illusion of the      
absolute1 and drives it on to the fatal 
experiment of creation4 ,so that1 apart 
from ,schopenhauer's mythology1 we have 

even in him the recognition that beauty 
gives satisfaction to some dim and      
underlying demand of our nature1 just as
 particular objects give more special   
and momentary pleasures to our          
individualized wills4 ,his psychology   
was1 however1 far too vague and general 
to undertake an analysis of those       
mysterious feelings4  #b  ,cf4          
,stendhal1 ,de ,l',amour1 passim4  #c   
,this is not the place to enter into a  
discussion of the metaphysical value of 
the idea of space4 ,suffice it to point 
out that in human experience serviceable
 knowledge of our environment is to be  
had only in spatial symbols1 and1 for   
whatever reason or accident1 this is the
 language which the mind must speak if  
it is to advance in clearness and       
efficiency4  #d  ,the discussion is     
limited in this chapter to visible form1
 audible form is probably capable of a  
parallel treatment1 but requires studies
 too technical for this place4  #e  ,the
 relation to stability also makes us    

sensitive to certain kinds of symmetry2 
but this is an adventitious             
consideration with which we are not     
concerned4  #f  ,cf4 ,fechner1          
,vorschule der ,aesthetik1 ,erster      
,theil1 ,s4 #gc1 a passage by which the 
following classification of forms was   
first suggested4  #g  ,see              
,introduction1 p4 #ab4  #h  ,the        
contention of ,burke that the beautiful 
is small is due to an arbitrary         
definition4 ,by beautiful he means      
pretty and charming2 agreeable as       
opposed to impressive4 ,he only         
exaggerates the then usual opposition of
 the beautiful to the sublime4  #i      
,when we speak of things definite in    
themselves1 we of course mean things    
made definite by some human act of      
definition4 ,the senses are instruments 
that define and differentiate sensation2
 and the result of one operation is that
 definite object upon which the next    
operation is performed4 ,the memory1 for
 example1 classifies in time what the   

senses may have classified in space4 ,we
 are nowhere concerned with objects     
other than objects of human experience1 
and the epithets1 definite and          
indefinite1 refer necessarily to their  
relation to our various categories of   
perception and comprehension4  #aj  ,in 
the ,aegina marbles the wounded and     
dying warriors still wear this          
,buddha-like expression3 their bodies1  
although conventional1 show a great     
progress in observation1 compared with  
the impossible ,athena in the centre    
with her sacred feet in ,egyptian       
profile and her owl-like visage4  #aa   
,symposium of ,xenophon1 ,v4  #ab  ,it  
is a superstition to suppose that a     
refined taste would necessarily find the
 actual and useful to be the perfect2 to
 conceal structure is as legitimate as  
to emphasize it1 and for the name       
reason4 ,we emphasize in the direction  
of abstract beauty1  in the direction of
 absolute pleasure2 and we conceal or   
eliminate in the same direction4 ,the   

most exquisite ,greek taste1 for        
instance1 preferred to drape the lower  
part of the female figure1 as in the    
,venus of ,milo2 also in men to shave   
the hair of the face and body1 in order 
to maintain the purity and strength of  
the lines4 ,in the one case we conceal  
structure1 in the other we reveal it1   
modifying nature into greater sympathy  
with our faculties of perception4 ,for1 
after all1 it must be remembered that   
beauty1 or pleasure to be given to the  
eye1 is not a guiding principle in the  
world of nature or in that of the       
practical arts4 ,the beauty is in nature
 a result of the functional adaptation  
of our senses and imagination to the    
mechanical products of our environment4 
,this adaptation is never complete1 and 
there is1 accordingly1 room for the fine
 arts1 in which beauty is a result of   
the intentional adaptation of mechanical
 forms to the functions which our senses
 and imagination already have acquired4 
,this watchful subservience to our      

aesthetic demands is the essence of fine
 art4 ,nature is the basis1 but man is  
the goal4  #ac  ,not only are words     
untranslatable when the exact object has
 no name in another language1 as home or
 mon ami1 but even when the object is   
the same1 the attitude toward it1       
incorporated in one word1 cannot be     
rendered by another4 ,thus1 to my sense1
 bread is as inadequate a translation of
 the human intensity of the ,spanish pan
 as ,dios is of the awful mystery of the
 ,english ,god4 ,this latter word does  
not designate an object at all1 but a   
sentiment1 a psychosis1 not to say a    
whole chapter of religious history4     
,english is remarkable for the intensity
 and variety of the colour of its words4
 ,no language1 ,i believe1 has so many  
words specifically poetic4  #ad         
,curiously enough1 common speech here   
reverses our use of terms1 because it   
looks at the matter from the practical  
instead of from the aesthetic point of  
view1 regarding 7very unpsychologically7

 the thought as the source of the image1
 not the image as the source of the     
thought4 ,people call the words the     
expression of the thought3 whereas for  
the observer1 the hearer 7and generally 
for the speaker1 too71 the words are the
 datum and the thought is their         
expressiveness -- that which they       
suggest4   ,,index  ,achilles1 #agi1    
#ahg4 ,aesthetic feeling1 its           
importance1 #a4      speculation1 causes
 of its neglect1 #b4      theory1 its   
uses1 #f1 #g4 ,aesthetics1 ,use of the  
word1 #ae4 ,angels1 #ee1 #ahb4          
,apperception1 #if et seq4 ,arabic      
inscriptions as ornament1 #aie4         
,architecture1 ,effects of ,gothic1     
#afe1 #aff4      governed by use1 #afa1 
#afb4 ,aristotelian forms1 #aef4        
,aristotle1 #agd1 #age1 #bhh4           
,associative process1 #aih et seq4      
,augustine1 ,saint1 quoted1 #beb4       
,beauty a value1 #ad et seq4      as    
felt is indescribable1 #bfg1 #bfh4      
a justification of things1 #bfh1 #bfi4  

defined1 #di et seq4      verbal        
definitions quoted1 #ad4 ,beethoven1    
#dc4 ,breathing related to the sense of 
beauty1 #ef4 ,burke1 #abd1 note4 ,byron1
 quoted1 #acf4 ,byzantine architecture1 
#ajh1 #aji4  ,calderon1 #agd4 ,centaurs1
 #ahc1 #bef4 ,character as an aesthetic 
form1 #agf et seq4 ,characters1 ,ideal1 
#ahj et seq4 ,charles ,v4's palace at   
the ,alhambra1 #dd4 ,christ1 the various
 ideas of his nature1 #ahi4 ,circle1 its
 aesthetic quality1 #hi4 ,classicism1   
,french and ,english1 #aji4 ,colonnades1
 #ajh4 ,colour1 #gb et seq4      its    
analogy to other sensations1 #gd1 #ge4  
possibility of an abstract art of       
colour1 #ge4 ,comic1 ,the1 #bde et seq4 
,conscience1 its representative         
character1 #cc1 #cd4 ,cost as an element
 of effect1 #baa et seq4 ,couplet1 ,the1
 #ajh4 ,criticism1 ,use of the word1    
#ae4  ,definite and indefinite1 meaning 
of the terms1 #ach1 note4 ,degradation  
not what pleases in the comic1 #bdg et  
seq4 ,democracy1 aesthetics of it1 #aji 

,descartes1 #af1 #ahc4                  
,disinterestedness not the differentia  
of aesthetic pleasure1      #cg et seq4 
,don ,quixote1 #agi1 #bee4  ,economy and
 fitness1 #bad et seq4 ,emerson1 #add4  
,epicurean esthetics1 #aj1 #aa4         
sublime1 ,the1 #bda1 #bdc4 ,escurial1   
,the1 #ie1 #baj4 ,ethos1 #agd1 #age4    
,evil1 life without it aesthetic1 #bi1  
#cj4      in the second term of         
expression1 #bba et seq4                
conventional use of the word1 #bbc4     
an occasion of the sublime1 #bce et seq4
      excluded from the beautiful1 #bfj1
 #bfa4 ,evolution1 its possible tendency
 to eliminate imagination1 #bf          
,exclusiveness a sign of aesthetic      
vigour1 #dd4 ,experience superior to    
theory in aesthetics1 #aa1 #ab4         
,expression defined1 #aib et seq4       
of feeling in another1 #bjb1 #bjc4      
of practical values1 #bjh et seq4       
,expressiveness1 ,use of the word1 #aig4
  ,fechner1 #ig4 ,form1 ,there is a     
beauty of1 #hb et seq4      the unity of

 a manifold1 #ie et seq4 ,functions of  
the mind may all contribute to the sense
 of beauty1      #ec et seq4            
,geometrical figures1 #hh et seq4 ,god1 
the idea of him in tradition and in     
metaphysics1 #ahh1 #ahi4 ,gods1         
development of their ideal characters1  
#ahe et seq4 ,goethe1 #i1 #agj1 #agi4   
,grammar1 its analogy to metaphysics1   
#afi4 ,gretchen1 #agi4 ,grotesque1 ,the1
 #bef et seq4  ,hamlet1 #agi4 ,happiness
 and aesthetic interest1 #fc1 #fe4      
,health a condition of aesthetic life1  
#ed4 ,hedonism opposed by the moral     
sense1 #bc1 #bd4 ,history an imaginative
 thing1 #ada1 #adb4 ,home as a social   
and as an aesthetic idea1 #fd4 ,homer1  
#aga4      his aesthetic quality1 #bje1 
#bjf4      his epithets1 #agi4 ,horace1 
quoted1 #agb4 ,humour1 #bec et seq4     
,ideals are modified averages1 #aba et  
seq4      immanent in human nature1     
#bfb4      stable1 #bfc et seq4         
,imagination has a universal creative   
function1 #aij1 #aia4      and sense    

alternately active1 #ee1 #ef4           
,impression distinguished from          
expression1 #hd1 #he4 ,impressionism in 
painting1 #acd1 #acf4 incongruity not   
what pleases in the comic1 #bdg et seq4 
,indeterminate organizational et seq4   
,infinite beauty1 the idea impossible1  
#adh et seq4 ,inspiration1 #beb1 #bec4  
,kalokagathia1 #ca4 ,kant1 #aje4 ,keats1
 quoted1 #fg1 #aje1 #aha1 #bfd4 ,king   
,lear1 #bbi4 ,kipling1 ,r41 quoted1 #fh4
  ,landscape1 #acc et seq4      with    
figures1 #ace1 #acf4 ,liberation of     
self1 #bcc et seq4 ,love1 influence of  
the passion1 #ef et seq4 ,lowell1 ,j4   
,r41 quoted1 #adh4 ,lower senses1 #fe et
 seq4 ,lucretius1 quoted1 #agb4      on 
the sublime1 #bcf4  ,maps1 #bji1 #baj4  
,material beauty most easily            
appreciated1 #gh et seq4      its effect
 the fundamental one1 #gh4 ,materials of
 beauty surveyed1 #gf et seq4 ,methods  
in aesthetics1 #e4 ,michael ,angelo1    
#ahb4 ,miser's fallacy1 its parallel in 
morals and aesthetics1 #ca1 #cb4 ,modern

 languages inferior to the ancient1     
#agc1 #agd4 ,molire1 #agd2 quoted1 #bj4 
,monarchy1 its imaginative value1 #cd1  
#ce4 ,moral and aesthetic values1 #bc et
 seq4      the authority of morals over 
aesthetics1 #bah et seq4 ,morality and  
utility jealous of art1 #baf1 #bag4     
,multiplicity in uniformity1 #ig et seq4
      its defects1 #ajf et seq4 ,musset1
 ,alfred de1 quoted1 #agj1 #bbf4        
,mysticism in aesthetics1 #abf et seq4  
,naturalism1 the ground of its value1   
#ba4 ,nature1 its organization the      
source of apperceptive forms1      #aeb 
et seq4      the love of it among the   
ancients1 #acg1 #ach4 ,new ,york1 the   
plan of the streets1 #ie4 ,nouns1 idea  
of a language without them1 #aga4       
,objectification the differentia of     
aesthetic pleasure1 #dd et seq4         
,ornament and form1 #fc et seq4         
,othello1 #bcg4 ,ovid1 quoted1 #adi4    
,pantheism1 its contradictions1 #bdb1   
#bdc4 ,perception1 the psychological    
theory of it1 #de et seq4 ,perfection1  

illusion of infinite1 #adf et seq4      
possibility of finite1 #beh et seq4     
,physical pleasure distinguished from   
aesthetic1 #ce et seq4 ,physiology of   
the perception of form1 #he et seq4     
,picturesqueness contrasted with        
symmetry1 #ib4 ,platonic ideas useless  
in explaining types1 #aag1 #aah4        
,platonic intuitions1 their nature and  
value1 #h et seq4 ,platonists1 #aei4    
,plot1 ,the1 #agd et seq4 ,preference   
ultimately irrational1 #ah et seq4      
necessary to value1 #ag1 #ah4           
,principles consecrated aesthetically1  
#ca et seq4 ,purity1 ,the aesthetic     
principle of1 #gj et seq4  ,rationality1
 the source of its value1 #ai1 #bj4     
,religious characters1 their truth1     
#ahh4      imagination1 #ahe et seq4    
,rhyme1 #agc1 #agd4 ,romanticism1 #aej4 
,schopenhauer1 #bfc4      criticised1   
#cg1      note1 on music1 #fi4          
,scientific attitude in criticism       
opposed to the aesthetic1 #bj1 #ba4     
,sculpture1 its development1 #aec1 #aed4

 ,self not a primary object of interest1
 #ci1 #dj4 ,sensuous beauty of          
fundamental importance1 #hj1 #ha4 ,sex1 
its relation to aesthetic life1 #ef et  
seq4 ,shakespeare1 #aea1 #agd1 #age2    
quoted1 #ea1 #aad1 #bbi1 #bcg1 #bea4    
,shelley quoted1 #ab1 #bdd1 #bec4       
,sight1 its primacy in perception1 #gc1 
#gd4 ,size related to beauty1 #abc1     
#abd4 ,sky1 ,the1 its expressiveness1   
#h4 ,social interests and their         
aesthetic influence1 #fb et seq4        
,socrates1 his utilitarian aesthetics1  
#aeg4 ,sonnet1 ,the1 #agc4 ,sound1 #fh  
et seq4 ,space1 its metaphysical value1 
#ff1 note4 ,stars1 the effect analyzed1 
#ajj et seq4 ,stendhal1 #fa4 ,stoic     
,sublime1 ,the1 #bda4 ,straight lines1  
#hi1 #ij4 ,subjectivity of aesthetic    
values1 #c1d4 ,sublime1 ,the1 its       
independence of the expression of evil1 
#bci et seq4 ,sublimity1 #bcc et seq4   
,sybaris1 #baf4 ,symbolists1 #add4      
,symmetry1 #ia et seq4      a principle 
of individuation1 #ic4      limits of   

its application1 #ie4 ,syntactical form1
 #aga et seq4  ,tacitus1 #agc1 #beb4    
,terms1 the first and second terms in   
expression defined1 #aie4      influence
 of the first term in the pleasing      
expression of evil1      #bbf et seq4   
,theory a method of apperception1 #ach  
et seq4 ,tragedy mitigated by beauty of 
form and the expression of good1        
#bbh1 #bbi4      mitigated by the       
diversity of evils1 #bbi4      mixed    
with comedy1 #bbd1 #bbe1 #bbh4          
consists in treatment not in subject1   
#bbd4 ,translation necessarily          
inadequate1 #afh4 ,truth1 grounds of its
 value1 #bb1 #bc4 ,truth1 mixture of the
 expression of truth with that of evil1 
#bbh et seq4 ,types1 their origin1 #aaf 
et seq4      their value and that of    
examples1 #aab et seq4  ,ugly1 ,the1 not
 a cause of pain1 #be4 ,universality not
 the differentia of aesthetic pleasure1 
#dj et seq4 ,utility the principle of   
organization in nature1 #aee et seq4    
its relation to beauty1 #aeg et seq4    

the principle of organization in the    
arts1 #afj et seq4  ,value1 aesthetic   
value in the second term of expression1 
#bje et seq4      all in one sense      
aesthetic1 #bh et seq4      physical1   
practical1 and negative transformed into
 aesthetic1      #bja et seq4 ,venus of 
,milo1 #afe1 note4 ,virgin ,mary1 ,the1 
#ahi1 #aij4  ,whitman1 #aab4 ,wit1 #bej 
et seq4 ,words1 #afg et seq4 ,wordsworth
 quoted1 #aje4 ,work and play1 #be et   
seq4  ,xenophon quoted1 #abc4      his  
,symposium1 #aeg4