,,creative ,,evolution   ,,by ,,henri   
,,bergson  ,,member ,,of ,,the          
,,institute ,,professor ,,at ,,the      
,,college ,,de ,,france   ,,authorized  
,,translation ,,by ,,arthur ,,mitchell1 
,,ph4,d4   ,,new ,,york ,,henry ,,holt  
,,and ,,company #aiaa     ,,copyright1  
#aiaa1 by  ,,henry ,,holt ,,and         
,,company   ,,camelot ,,press1 #ah-bj   
,,oak ,,street1 ,,new ,,york            
,,translator',s ,,note   ,in the writing
 of this ,english translation of        
,professor ,bergson's most important    
work1 ,i was helped by the friendly     
interest of ,professor ,william ,james1 
to whom ,i owe the illumination of much 
that was dark to me as well as the happy
 rendering of certain words and phrases 
for which an ,english equivalent was    
difficult to find4 ,his sympathetic     
appreciation of ,professor ,bergson's   
thought is well known1 and he has       
expressed his admiration for it in one  
of the chapters of ,a ,pluralistic      
,universe4 ,it was his intention1 had he

 lived to see the completion of this    
translation1 himself to introduce it to 
,english readers in a prefatory note4   
,i wish to thank my friend1 ,dr4 ,george
 ,clarke ,cox1 for many valuable        
suggestions4  ,i have endeavored to     
follow the text as closely as possible1 
and at the same time to preserve the    
living union of diction and thought4    
,professor ,bergson has himself         
carefully revised the whole work4 ,we   
both of us wish to acknowledge the great
 assistance of ,miss ,millicent ,murby4 
,she has kindly studied the translation 
phrase by phrase1 weighing each word1   
and her revision has resulted in many   
improvements4  ,but above all we must   
express our acknowledgment to ,mr4 ,h4  
,wildon ,carr1 the ,honorary ,secretary 
of the ,aristotelian ,society of        
,london1 and the writer of several      
studies of ,evolution ,creatrice4#a ,we 
asked him to be kind enough to revise   
the proofs of our work4 ,he has done    
much more than revise them3 they have   

come from his hands with his personal   
mark in many places4 ,we cannot express 
all that the present work owes to him4  
,,arthur ,,mitchell  ,,harvard          
,,university     ,,contents             
,,page  ,,introduction                  
ix   ,,chapter ,i  ,,the ,,evolution    
,,of ,,life--,,mechanism ,,and          
,,teleology  ,of duration in            
general--,unorganized bodies and        
abstract time--,organized bodies and    
real duration--,individuality and the   
process of growing old                  
#a  ,of transformism and the different  
ways of interpreting it--,radical       
mechanism and real duration3 the        
relation of biology to physics and      
chemistry--,radical finalism and real   
duration3 the relation of biology to    
philosophy                              
#bc  ,the quest of a                    
criterion--,examination of the various  
theories with regard to a particular    
example--,darwin and insensible         
variation--,de ,vries and sudden        

variation--,eimer and                   
orthogenesis--,neo-,lamarckism and the  
hereditability of acquired characters   
#ei  ,result of the inquiry--,the vital 
impetus                                 
#hg   ,,chapter ,,ii  ,,the ,,divergent 
,,directions ,,of ,,the ,,evolution ,,of
 ,,life--,,torpor1 ,,intelligence1      
,,instinct  ,general idea of the        
evolutionary                            
process--,growth--,divergent and        
complementary tendencies--,the meaning  
of progress and of adaptation           
#ih  ,the relation of the animal to the 
plant--,general tendency of animal      
life--,the development of animal life   
#aje  ,the main directions of the       
evolution of life3 torpor1 intelligence1
 instinct                               
#ace  ,the nature of the intellect      
#aea  ,the nature of instinct           
#afe  ,life and consciousness--,the     
apparent place of man in nature         
#agf   ,,chapter ,,iii  ,,on ,,the      
,,meaning ,,of ,,life--,,the ,,order    

,,of ,,nature ,,and ,,the ,,form ,,of   
,,intelligence  ,relation of the problem
 of life to the problem of              
knowledge--,the method of               
philosophy--,apparent vicious circle of 
the method proposed--,real vicious      
circle of the opposite method           
#ahf  ,simultaneous genesis of matter   
and intelligence--,geometry inherent in 
matter--,geometrical tendency of the    
intellect--,geometry and                
deduction--,geometry and                
induction--,physical laws               
#aii  ,sketch of a theory of knowledge  
based on the analysis of the idea of    
,disorder--,two opposed forms of order3 
the problem of genera and the problem of
 laws--,the idea of disorder an         
oscillation of the intellect between the
 two kinds of order                     
#bbj  ,creation and evolution--,ideal   
genesis of matter--,the origin and      
function of life--,the essential and the
 accidental in the vital process and in 
the evolutionary                        

movement--,mankind--,the life of the    
body and the life of the spirit         
#bcf   ,,chapter ,,iv  ,,the            
,,cinematographical ,,mechanism ,,of    
,,thought ,,and ,,the ,,mechanistic     
,,illusion--,a ,,glance ,,at ,,the      
,,history ,,of ,,systems--,,real        
,,becoming ,,and ,,false ,,evolutionism 
,sketch of a criticism of philosophical 
systems1 based on the analysis of the   
idea of ,immutability and of the idea of
 ,nothing--,relation of metaphysical    
problems to the idea of ,nothing--,real 
meaning of this idea                    
#bgb  ,form and ,becoming               
#bih  ,the philosophy of ,forms and its 
conception of ,becoming--,plato and     
,aristotle--,the natural trend of the   
intellect                       #cjd    
,becoming in modern science3 two views  
of ,time                           #cbi 
,the metaphysical interpretation of     
modern science3 ,descartes1 ,spinoza1   
,leibniz                                
#cde  ,the ,criticism of ,kant          

#cef  ,the evolutionism of ,spencer     
#cfc  ,,index                           
#cga     ,,introduction   ,the history  
of the evolution of life1 incomplete as 
it yet is1 already reveals to us how the
 intellect has been formed1 by an       
uninterrupted progress1 along a line    
which ascends through the vertebrate    
series up to man4 ,it shows us in the   
faculty of understanding an appendage of
 the faculty of acting1 a more and more 
precise1 more and more complex and      
supple adaptation of the consciousness  
of living beings to the conditions of   
existence that are made for them4 ,hence
 should result this consequence that our
 intellect1 in the narrow sense of the  
word1 is intended to secure the perfect 
fitting of our body to its environment1 
to represent the relations of external  
things among themselves--in short1 to   
think matter4 ,such will indeed be one  
of the conclusions of the present essay4
 ,we shall see that the human intellect 
feels at home among inanimate objects1  

more especially among solids1 where our 
action finds its fulcrum and our        
industry its tools2 that our concepts   
have been formed on the model of solids2
 that our logic is1 pre-eminently1 the  
logic of solids2 that1 consequently1 our
 intellect triumphs in geometry1 wherein
 is revealed the kinship of logical     
thought with unorganized matter1 and    
where the intellect has only to follow  
its natural movement1 after the lightest
 possible contact with experience1 in   
order to go from discovery to discovery1
 sure that experience is following      
behind it and will justify it           
invariably4  ,but from this it must also
 follow that our thought1 in its purely 
logical form1 is incapable of presenting
 the true nature of life1 the full      
meaning of the evolutionary movement4   
,created by life1 in definite           
circumstances1 to act on definite       
things1 how can it embrace life1 of     
which it is only an emanation or an     
aspect8 ,deposited by the evolutionary  

movement in the course of its way1 how  
can it be applied to the evolutionary   
movement itself8 ,as well contend that  
the part is equal to the whole1 that the
 effect can reabsorb its cause1 or that 
the pebble left on the beach displays   
the form of the wave that brought it    
there4 ,in fact1 we do indeed feel that 
not one of the categories of our        
thought--unity1 multiplicity1 mechanical
 causality1 intelligent finality1       
etc4--applies exactly to the things of  
life3 who can say where individuality   
begins and ends1 whether the living     
being is one or many1 whether it is the 
cells which associate themselves into   
the organism or the organism which      
dissociates itself into cells8 ,in vain 
we force the living into this or that   
one of our molds4 ,all the molds crack4 
,they are too narrow1 above all too     
rigid1 for what we try to put into them4
 ,our reasoning1 so sure of itself among
 things inert1 feels ill at ease on this
 new ground4 ,it would be difficult to  

cite a biological discovery due to pure 
reasoning4 ,and most often1 when        
experience has finally shown us how life
 goes to work to obtain a certain       
result1 we find its way of working is   
just that of which we should never have 
thought4  ,yet evolutionist philosophy  
does not hesitate to extend to the      
things of life the same methods of      
explanation which have succeeded in the 
case of unorganized matter4 ,it begins  
by showing us in the intellect a local  
effect of evolution1 a flame1 perhaps   
accidental1 which lights up the coming  
and going of living beings in the narrow
 passage open to their action2 and lo6  
forgetting what it has just told us1 it 
makes of this lantern glimmering in a   
tunnel a ,sun which can illuminate the  
world4 ,boldly it proceeds1 with the    
powers of conceptual thought alone1 to  
the ideal reconstruction of all things1 
even of life4 ,true1 it hurtles in its  
course against such formidable          
difficulties1 it sees its logic end in  

such strange contradictions1 that it    
very speedily renounces its first       
ambition4 ,it is no longer reality      
itself1 it says1 that it will           
reconstruct1 but only an imitation of   
the real1 or rather a symbolical image2 
the essence of things escapes us1 and   
will escape us always2 we move among    
relations2 the absolute is not in our   
province2 we are brought to a stand     
before the ,unknowable4--,but for the   
human intellect1 after too much pride1  
this is really an excess of humility4   
,if the intellectual form of the living 
being has been gradually modeled on the 
reciprocal actions and reactions of     
certain bodies and their material       
environment1 how should it not reveal to
 us something of the very essence of    
which these bodies are made8 ,action    
cannot move in the unreal4 ,a mind born 
to speculate or to dream1 ,i admit1     
might remain outside reality1 might     
deform or transform the real1 perhaps   
even create it--as we create the figures

 of men and animals that our imagination
 cuts out of the passing cloud4 ,but an 
intellect bent upon the act to be       
performed and the reaction to follow1   
feeling its object so as to get its     
mobile impression at every instant1 is  
an intellect that touches something of  
the absolute4 ,would the idea ever have 
occurred to us to doubt this absolute   
value of our knowledge if philosophy had
 not shown us what contradictions our   
speculation meets1 what dead-locks it   
ends in8 ,but these difficulties and    
contradictions all arise from trying to 
apply the usual forms of our thought to 
objects with which our industry has     
nothing to do1 and for which1 therefore1
 our molds are not made4 ,intellectual  
knowledge1 in so far as it relates to a 
certain aspect of inert matter1 ought1  
on the contrary1 to give us a faithful  
imprint of it1 having been stereotyped  
on this particular object4 ,it becomes  
relative only if it claims1 such as it  
is1 to present to us life--that is to   

say1 the maker of the stereotype-plate4 
99       99       99       99       99  
,must we then give up fathoming the     
depths of life8 ,must we keep to that   
mechanistic idea of it which the        
understanding will always give us--an   
idea necessarily artificial and         
symbolical1 since it makes the total    
activity of life shrink to the form of a
 certain human activity which is only a 
partial and local manifestation of life1
 a result or by-product of the vital    
process8 ,we should have to do so1      
indeed1 if life had employed all the    
psychical potentialities it possesses in
 producing pure understandings--that is 
to say1 in making geometricians4 ,but   
the line of evolution that ends in man  
is not the only one4 ,on other paths1   
divergent from it1 other forms of       
consciousness have been developed1 which
 have not been able to free themselves  
from external constraints or to regain  
control over themselves1 as the human   
intellect has done1 but which1 none the 

less1 also express something that is    
immanent and essential in the           
evolutionary movement4 ,suppose these   
other forms of consciousness brought    
together and amalgamated with intellect3
 would not the result be a consciousness
 as wide as life8 ,and such a           
consciousness1 turning around suddenly  
against the push of life which it feels 
behind1 would have a vision of life     
complete--would it not8--even though the
 vision were fleeting4  ,it will be said
 that1 even so1 we do not transcend our 
intellect1 for it is still with our     
intellect1 and through our intellect1   
that we see the other forms of          
consciousness4 ,and this would be right 
if we were pure intellects1 if there did
 not remain1 around our conceptual and  
logical thought1 a vague nebulosity1    
made of the very substance out of which 
has been formed the luminous nucleus    
that we call the intellect4 ,therein    
reside certain powers that are          
complementary to the understanding1     

powers of which we have only an         
indistinct feeling when we remain shut  
up in ourselves1 but which will become  
clear and distinct when they perceive   
themselves at work1 so to speak1 in the 
evolution of nature4 ,they will thus    
learn what sort of effort they must make
 to be intensified and expanded in the  
very direction of life4         99      
99       99       99       99  ,this    
amounts to saying that theory of        
knowledge and theory of life seem to us 
inseparable4 ,a theory of life that is  
not accompanied by a criticism of       
knowledge is obliged to accept1 as they 
stand1 the concepts which the           
understanding puts at its disposal3 it  
can but enclose the facts1 willing or   
not1 in pre-existing frames which it    
regards as ultimate4 ,it thus obtains a 
symbolism which is convenient1 perhaps  
even necessary to positive science1 but 
not a direct vision of its object4 ,on  
the other hand1 a theory of knowledge   
which does not replace the intellect in 

the general evolution of life will teach
 us neither how the frames of knowledge 
have been constructed nor how we can    
enlarge or go beyond them4 ,it is       
necessary that these two inquiries1     
theory of knowledge and theory of life1 
should join each other1 and1 by a       
circular process1 push each other on    
unceasingly4  ,together1 they may solve 
by a method more sure1 brought nearer to
 experience1 the great problems that    
philosophy poses4 ,for1 if they should  
succeed in their common enterprise1 they
 would show us the formation of the     
intellect1 and thereby the genesis of   
that matter of which our intellect      
traces the general configuration4 ,they 
would dig to the very root of nature and
 of mind4 ,they would substitute for the
 false evolutionism of ,spencer--which  
consists in cutting up present reality1 
already evolved1 into little bits no    
less evolved1 and then recomposing it   
with these fragments1 thus positing in  
advance everything that is to be        

explained--a true evolutionism1 in which
 reality would be followed in its       
generation and its growth4  ,but a      
philosophy of this kind will not be made
 in a day4 ,unlike the philosophical    
systems properly so called1 each of     
which was the individual work of a man  
of genius and sprang up as a whole1 to  
be taken or left1 it will only be built 
up by the collective and progressive    
effort of many thinkers1 of many        
observers also1 completing1 correcting  
and improving one another4 ,so the      
present essay does not aim at resolving 
at once the greatest problems4 ,it      
simply desires to define the method and 
to permit a glimpse1 on some essential  
points1 of the possibility of its       
application4  ,its plan is traced by the
 subject itself4 ,in the first chapter1 
we try on the evolutionary progress the 
two ready-made garments that our        
understanding puts at our disposal1     
mechanism and finality2#b we show that  
they do not fit1 neither the one nor the

 other1 but that one of them might be   
recut and resewn1 and in this new form  
fit less badly than the other4 ,in order
 to transcend the point of view of the  
understanding1 we try1 in our second    
chapter1 to reconstruct the main lines  
of evolution along which life has       
traveled by the side of that which has  
led to the human intellect4 ,the        
intellect is thus brought back to its   
generating cause1 which we then have to 
grasp in itself and follow in its       
movement4 ,it is an effort of this kind 
that we attempt--incompletely indeed--in
 our third chapter4 ,a fourth and last  
part is meant to show how our           
understanding itself1 by submitting to a
 certain discipline1 might prepare a    
philosophy which transcends it4 ,for    
that1 a glance over the history of      
systems became necessary1 together with 
an analysis of the two great illusions  
to which1 as soon as it speculates on   
reality in general1 the human           
understanding is exposed4  ,,footnotes3 

,footnote #a3 ,proceedings of the       
,aristotelian ,society1 vols4 ix4 and   
x41 and ,hibbert ,journal for ,july1    
#aiaj4  ,footnote #b3 ,the idea of      
regarding life as transcending teleology
 as well as mechanism is far from being 
a new idea4 ,notably in three articles  
by ,ch4 ,dunan on ,le problme de la vie 
7,revue philosophique1 #ahib7 it is     
profoundly treated4 ,in the development 
of this idea1 we agree with ,ch4 ,dunan 
on more than one point4 ,but the views  
we are presenting on this matter1 as on 
the questions attaching to it1 are those
 that we expressed long ago in our      
,essai sur les donnes immdiates de la   
conscience 7,paris1 #ahhi74 ,one of the 
principal objects of that essay was1 in 
fact1 to show that the psychical life is
 neither unity nor multiplicity1 that it
 transcends both the mechanical and the 
intellectual1 mechanism and finalism    
having meaning only where there is      
distinct multiplicity1 spatiality1 and  
consequently assemblage of pre-existing 

parts3 real duration signifies both     
undivided continuity and creation4 ,in  
the present work we apply these same    
ideas to life in general1 regarded1     
moreover1 itself from the psychological 
point of view4     ,,chapter ,i  ,,the  
,,evolution ,,of ,,life--,,mechanism    
,,and ,,teleology   ,the existence of   
which we are most assured and which we  
know best is unquestionably our own1 for
 of every other object we have notions  
which may be considered external and    
superficial1 whereas1 of ourselves1 our 
perception is internal and profound4    
,what1 then1 do we find8 ,in this       
privileged case1 what is the precise    
meaning of the word exist8 ,let us      
recall here briefly the conclusions of  
an earlier work4  ,i find1 first of all1
 that ,i pass from state to state4 ,i am
 warm or cold1 ,i am merry or sad1 ,i   
work or ,i do nothing1 ,i look at what  
is around me or ,i think of something   
else4 ,sensations1 feelings1 volitions1 
ideas--such are the changes into which  

my existence is divided and which color 
it in turns4 ,i change1 then1 without   
ceasing4 ,but this is not saying enough4
 ,change is far more radical than we are
 at first inclined to suppose4  ,for ,i 
speak of each of my states as if it     
formed a block and were a separate      
whole4 ,i say indeed that ,i change1 but
 the change seems to me to reside in the
 passage from one state to the next3 of 
each state1 taken separately1 ,i am apt 
to think that it remains the same during
 all the time that it prevails4         
,nevertheless1 a slight effort of       
attention would reveal to me that there 
is no feeling1 no idea1 no volition     
which is not undergoing change every    
moment3 if a mental state ceased to     
vary1 its duration would cease to flow4 
,let us take the most stable of internal
 states1 the visual perception of a     
motionless external object4 ,the object 
may remain the same1 ,i may look at it  
from the same side1 at the same angle1  
in the same light2 nevertheless the     

vision ,i now have of it differs from   
that which ,i have just had1 even if    
only because the one is an instant older
 than the other4 ,my memory is there1   
which conveys something of the past into
 the present4 ,my mental state1 as it   
advances on the road of time1 is        
continually swelling with the duration  
which it accumulates3 it goes on        
increasing--rolling upon itself1 as a   
snowball on the snow4 ,still more is    
this the case with states more deeply   
internal1 such as sensations1 feelings1 
desires1 etc41 which do not correspond1 
like a simple visual perception1 to an  
unvarying external object4 ,but it is   
expedient to disregard this             
uninterrupted change1 and to notice it  
only when it becomes sufficient to      
impress a new attitude on the body1 a   
new direction on the attention4 ,then1  
and then only1 we find that our state   
has changed4 ,the truth is that we      
change without ceasing1 and that the    
state itself is nothing but change4     

,this amounts to saying that there is no
 essential difference between passing   
from one state to another and persisting
 in the same state4 ,if the state which 
remains the same is more varied than we 
think1 on the other hand the passing    
from one state to another resembles1    
more than we imagine1 a single state    
being prolonged2 the transition is      
continuous4 ,but1 just because we close 
our eyes to the unceasing variation of  
every psychical state1 we are obliged1  
when the change has become so           
considerable as to force itself on our  
attention1 to speak as if a new state   
were placed alongside the previous one4 
,of this new state we assume that it    
remains unvarying in its turn1 and so on
 endlessly4 ,the apparent discontinuity 
of the psychical life is then due to our
 attention being fixed on it by a series
 of separate acts3 actually there is    
only a gentle slope2 but in following   
the broken line of our acts of          
attention1 we think we perceive separate

 steps4 ,true1 our psychic life is full 
of the unforeseen4 ,a thousand incidents
 arise1 which seem to be cut off from   
those which precede them1 and to be     
disconnected from those which follow4   
,discontinuous though they appear1      
however1 in point of fact they stand out
 against the continuity of a background 
on which they are designed1 and to which
 indeed they owe the intervals that     
separate them2 they are the beats of the
 drum which break forth here and there  
in the symphony4 ,our attention fixes on
 them because they interest it more1 but
 each of them is borne by the fluid mass
 of our whole psychical existence4 ,each
 is only the best illuminated point of a
 moving zone which comprises all that we
 feel or think or will--all1 in short1  
that we are at any given moment4 ,it is 
this entire zone which in reality makes 
up our state4 ,now1 states thus defined 
cannot be regarded as distinct elements4
 ,they continue each other in an endless
 flow4  ,but1 as our attention has      

distinguished and separated them        
artificially1 it is obliged next to     
reunite them by an artificial bond4 ,it 
imagines1 therefore1 a formless ego1    
indifferent and unchangeable1 on which  
it threads the psychic states which it  
has set up as independent entities4     
,instead of a flux of fleeting shades   
merging into each other1 it perceives   
distinct and1 so to speak1 solid colors1
 set side by side like the beads of a   
necklace2 it must perforce then suppose 
a thread1 also itself solid1 to hold the
 beads together4 ,but if this colorless 
substratum is perpetually colored by    
that which covers it1 it is for us1 in  
its indeterminateness1 as if it did not 
exist1 since we only perceive what is   
colored1 or1 in other words1 psychic    
states4 ,as a matter of fact1 this      
substratum has no reality2 it is merely 
a symbol intended to recall unceasingly 
to our consciousness the artificial     
character of the process by which the   
attention places clean-cut states side  

by side1 where actually there is a      
continuity which unfolds4 ,if our       
existence were composed of separate     
states with an impassive ego to unite   
them1 for us there would be no duration4
 ,for an ego which does not change does 
not endure1 and a psychic state which   
remains the same so long as it is not   
replaced by the following state does not
 endure either4 ,vain1 therefore1 is the
 attempt to range such states beside    
each other on the ego supposed to       
sustain them3 never can these solids    
strung upon a solid make up that        
duration which flows4 ,what we actually 
obtain in this way is an artificial     
imitation of the internal life1 a static
 equivalent which will lend itself      
better to the requirements of logic and 
language1 just because we have          
eliminated from it the element of real  
time4 ,but1 as regards the psychical    
life unfolding beneath the symbols which
 conceal it1 we readily perceive that   
time is just the stuff it is made of4   

,there is1 moreover1 no stuff more      
resistant nor more substantial4 ,for our
 duration is not merely one instant     
replacing another2 if it were1 there    
would never be anything but the         
present--no prolonging of the past into 
the actual1 no evolution1 no concrete   
duration4 ,duration is the continuous   
progress of the past which gnaws into   
the future and which swells as it       
advances4 ,and as the past grows without
 ceasing1 so also there is no limit to  
its preservation4 ,memory1 as we have   
tried to prove1#c is not a faculty of   
putting away recollections in a drawer1 
or of inscribing them in a register4    
,there is no register1 no drawer2 there 
is not even1 properly speaking1 a       
faculty1 for a faculty works            
intermittently1 when it will or when it 
can1 whilst the piling up of the past   
upon the past goes on without           
relaxation4 ,in reality1 the past is    
preserved by itself1 automatically4 ,in 
its entirety1 probably1 it follows us at

 every instant2 all that we have felt1  
thought and willed from our earliest    
infancy is there1 leaning over the      
present which is about to join it1      
pressing against the portals of         
consciousness that would fain leave it  
outside4 ,the cerebral mechanism is     
arranged just so as to drive back into  
the unconscious almost the whole of this
 past1 and to admit beyond the threshold
 only that which can cast light on the  
present situation or further the action 
now being prepared--in short1 only that 
which can give useful work4 ,at the     
most1 a few superfluous recollections   
may succeed in smuggling themselves     
through the half-open door4 ,these      
memories1 messengers from the           
unconscious1 remind us of what we are   
dragging behind us unawares4 ,but1 even 
though we may have no distinct idea of  
it1 we feel vaguely that our past       
remains present to us4 ,what are we1 in 
fact1 what is our character1 if not the 
condensation of the history that we have

 lived from our birth--nay1 even before 
our birth1 since we bring with us       
prenatal dispositions8 ,doubtless we    
think with only a small part of our     
past1 but it is with our entire past1   
including the original bent of our soul1
 that we desire1 will and act4 ,our     
past1 then1 as a whole1 is made manifest
 to us in its impulse2 it is felt in the
 form of tendency1 although a small part
 of it only is known in the form of     
idea4  ,from this survival of the past  
it follows that consciousness cannot go 
through the same state twice4 ,the      
circumstances may still be the same1 but
 they will act no longer on the same    
person1 since they find him at a new    
moment of his history4 ,our personality1
 which is being built up each instant   
with its accumulated experience1 changes
 without ceasing4 ,by changing1 it      
prevents any state1 although            
superficially identical with another1   
from ever repeating it in its very      
depth4 ,that is why our duration is     

irreversible4 ,we could not live over   
again a single moment1 for we should    
have to begin by effacing the memory of 
all that had followed4 ,even could we   
erase this memory from our intellect1 we
 could not from our will4  ,thus our    
personality shoots1 grows and ripens    
without ceasing4 ,each of its moments is
 something new added to what was before4
 ,we may go further3 it is not only     
something new1 but something            
unforeseeable4 ,doubtless1 my present   
state is explained by what was in me and
 by what was acting on me a moment ago4 
,in analyzing it ,i should find no other
 elements4 ,but even a superhuman       
intelligence would not have been able to
 foresee the simple indivisible form    
which gives to these purely abstract    
elements their concrete organization4   
,for to foresee consists of projecting  
into the future what has been perceived 
in the past1 or of imagining for a later
 time a new grouping1 in a new order1 of
 elements already perceived4 ,but that  

which has never been perceived1 and     
which is at the same time simple1 is    
necessarily unforeseeable4 ,now such is 
the case with each of our states1       
regarded as a moment in a history that  
is gradually unfolding3 it is simple1   
and it cannot have been already         
perceived1 since it concentrates in its 
indivisibility all that has been        
perceived and what the present is adding
 to it besides4 ,it is an original      
moment of a no less original history4   
,the finished portrait is explained by  
the features of the model1 by the nature
 of the artist1 by the colors spread out
 on the palette2 but1 even with the     
knowledge of what explains it1 no one1  
not even the artist1 could have foreseen
 exactly what the portrait would be1 for
 to predict it would have been to       
produce it before it was produced--an   
absurd hypothesis which is its own      
refutation4 ,even so with regard to the 
moments of our life1 of which we are the
 artisans4 ,each of them is a kind of   

creation4 ,and just as the talent of the
 painter is formed or deformed--in any  
case1 is modified--under the very       
influence of the works he produces1 so  
each of our states1 at the moment of its
 issue1 modifies our personality1 being 
indeed the new form that we are just    
assuming4 ,it is then right to say that 
what we do depends on what we are2 but  
it is necessary to add also that we are1
 to a certain extent1 what we do1 and   
that we are creating ourselves          
continually4 ,this creation of self by  
self is the more complete1 the more one 
reasons on what one does4 ,for reason   
does not proceed in such matters as in  
geometry1 where impersonal premisses are
 given once for all1 and an impersonal  
conclusion must perforce be drawn4      
,here1 on the contrary1 the same reasons
 may dictate to different persons1 or to
 the same person at different moments1  
acts profoundly different1 although     
equally reasonable4 ,the truth is that  
they are not quite the same reasons1    

since they are not those of the same    
person1 nor of the same moment4 ,that is
 why we cannot deal with them in the    
abstract1 from outside1 as in geometry1 
nor solve for another the problems by   
which he is faced in life4 ,each must   
solve them from within1 on his own      
account4 ,but we need not go more deeply
 into this4 ,we are seeking only the    
precise meaning that our consciousness  
gives to this word exist1 and we find   
that1 for a conscious being1 to exist is
 to change1 to change is to mature1 to  
mature is to go on creating oneself     
endlessly4 ,should the same be said of  
existence in general8         99        
99       99       99       99  ,a       
material object1 of whatever kind1      
presents opposite characters to those   
which we have just been describing4     
,either it remains as it is1 or else1 if
 it changes under the influence of an   
external force1 our idea of this change 
is that of a displacement of parts which
 themselves do not change4 ,if these    

parts took to changing1 we should split 
them up in their turn4 ,we should thus  
descend to the molecules of which the   
fragments are made1 to the atoms that   
make up the molecules1 to the corpuscles
 that generate the atoms1 to the        
imponderable within which the corpuscle 
is perhaps a mere vortex4 ,in short1 we 
should push the division or analysis as 
far as necessary4 ,but we should stop   
only before the unchangeable4  ,now1 we 
say that a composite object changes by  
the displacement of its parts4 ,but when
 a part has left its position1 there is 
nothing to prevent its return to it4 ,a 
group of elements which has gone through
 a state can therefore always find its  
way back to that state1 if not by       
itself1 at least by means of an external
 cause able to restore everything to its
 place4 ,this amounts to saying that any
 state of the group may be repeated as  
often as desired1 and consequently that 
the group does not grow old4 ,it has no 
history4  ,thus nothing is created      

therein1 neither form nor matter4 ,what 
the group will be is already present in 
what it is1 provided what it is includes
 all the points of the universe with    
which it is related4 ,a superhuman      
intellect could calculate1 for any      
moment of time1 the position of any     
point of the system in space4 ,and as   
there is nothing more in the form of the
 whole than the arrangement of its      
parts1 the future forms of the system   
are theoretically visible in its present
 configuration4  ,all our belief in     
objects1 all our operations on the      
systems that science isolates1 rest in  
fact on the idea that time does not bite
 into them4 ,we have touched on this    
question in an earlier work1 and shall  
return to it in the course of the       
present study4 ,for the moment1 we will 
confine ourselves to pointing out that  
the abstract time t attributed by       
science to a material object or to an   
isolated system consists only in a      
certain number of simultaneities or more

 generally of correspondences1 and that 
this number remains the same1 whatever  
be the nature of the intervals between  
the correspondences4 ,with these        
intervals we are never concerned when   
dealing with inert matter2 or1 if they  
are considered1 it is in order to count 
therein fresh correspondences1 between  
which again we shall not care what      
happens4 ,common sense1 which is        
occupied with detached objects1 and also
 science1 which considers isolated      
systems1 are concerned only with the    
ends of the intervals and not with the  
intervals themselves4 ,therefore the    
flow of time might assume an infinite   
rapidity1 the entire past1 present1 and 
future of material objects or of        
isolated systems might be spread out all
 at once in space1 without there being  
anything to change either in the        
formulae of the scientist or even in the
 language of common sense4 ,the number t
 would always stand for the same thing2 
it would still count the same number of 

correspondences between the states of   
the objects or systems and the points of
 the line1 ready drawn1 which would be  
then the course of time4  ,yet          
succession is an undeniable fact1 even  
in the material world4 ,though our      
reasoning on isolated systems may imply 
that their history1 past1 present1 and  
future1 might be instantaneously        
unfurled like a fan1 this history1 in   
point of fact1 unfolds itself gradually1
 as if it occupied a duration like our  
own4 ,if ,i want to mix a glass of sugar
 and water1 ,i must1 willy nilly1 wait  
until the sugar melts4 ,this little fact
 is big with meaning4 ,for here the time
 ,i have to wait is not that            
mathematical time which would apply     
equally well to the entire history of   
the material world1 even if that history
 were spread out instantaneously in     
space4 ,it coincides with my impatience1
 that is to say1 with a certain portion 
of my own duration1 which ,i cannot     
protract or contract as ,i like4 ,it is 

no longer something thought1 it is      
something lived4 ,it is no longer a     
relation1 it is an absolute4 ,what else 
can this mean than that the glass of    
water1 the sugar1 and the process of the
 sugar's melting in the water are       
abstractions1 and that the ,whole within
 which they have been cut out by my     
senses and understanding progresses1 it 
may be in the manner of a consciousness8
  ,certainly1 the operation by which    
science isolates and closes a system is 
not altogether artificial4 ,if it had no
 objective foundation1 we could not     
explain why it is clearly indicated in  
some cases and impossible in others4 ,we
 shall see that matter has a tendency to
 constitute isolable systems1 that can  
be treated geometrically4 ,in fact1 we  
shall define matter by just this        
tendency4 ,but it is only a tendency4   
,matter does not go to the end1 and the 
isolation is never complete4 ,if science
 does go to the end and isolate         
completely1 it is for convenience of    

study2 it is understood that the        
so-called isolated system remains       
subject to certain external influences4 
,science merely leaves these alone1     
either because it finds them slight     
enough to be negligible1 or because it  
intends to take them into account later 
on4 ,it is none the less true that these
 influences are so many threads which   
bind up the system to another more      
extensive1 and to this a third which    
includes both1 and so on to the system  
most objectively isolated and most      
independent of all1 the solar system    
complete4 ,but1 even here1 the isolation
 is not absolute4 ,our sun radiates heat
 and light beyond the farthest planet4  
,and1 on the other hand1 it moves in a  
certain fixed direction1 drawing with it
 the planets and their satellites4 ,the 
thread attaching it to the rest of the  
universe is doubtless very tenuous4     
,nevertheless it is along this thread   
that is transmitted down to the smallest
 particle of the world in which we live 

the duration immanent to the whole of   
the universe4  ,the universe endures4   
,the more we study the nature of time1  
the more we shall comprehend that       
duration means invention1 the creation  
of forms1 the continual elaboration of  
the absolutely new4 ,the systems marked 
off by science endure only because they 
are bound up inseparably with the rest  
of the universe4 ,it is true that in the
 universe itself two opposite movements 
are to be distinguished1 as we shall see
 later on1 descent and ascent4 ,the     
first only unwinds a roll ready         
prepared4 ,in principle1 it might be    
accomplished almost instantaneously1    
like releasing a spring4 ,but the       
ascending movement1 which corresponds to
 an inner work of ripening or creating1 
endures essentially1 and imposes its    
rhythm on the first1 which is           
inseparable from it4  ,there is no      
reason1 therefore1 why a duration1 and  
so a form of existence like our own1    
should not be attributed to the systems 

that science isolates1 provided such    
systems are reintegrated into the       
,whole4 ,but they must be so            
reintegrated4 ,the same is even more    
obviously true of the objects cut out by
 our perception4 ,the distinct outlines 
which we see in an object1 and which    
give it its individuality1 are only the 
design of a certain kind of influence   
that we might exert on a certain point  
of space3 it is the plan of our eventual
 actions that is sent back to our eyes1 
as though by a mirror1 when we see the  
surfaces and edges of things4 ,suppress 
this action1 and with it consequently   
those main directions which by          
perception are traced out for it in the 
entanglement of the real1 and the       
individuality of the body is reabsorbed 
in the universal interaction which1     
without doubt1 is reality itself4  ,now1
 we have considered material objects    
generally4 ,are there not some objects  
privileged8 ,the bodies we perceive are1
 so to speak1 cut out of the stuff of   

nature by our perception1 and the       
scissors follow1 in some way1 the       
marking of lines along which action     
might be taken4 ,but the body which is  
to perform this action1 the body which  
marks out upon matter the design of its 
eventual actions even before they are   
actual1 the body that has only to point 
its sensory organs on the flow of the   
real in order to make that flow         
crystallize into definite forms and thus
 to create all the other bodies--in     
short1 the living body--is this a body  
as others are8  ,doubtless it1 also1    
consists in a portion of extension bound
 up with the rest of extension1 an      
intimate part of the ,whole1 subject to 
the same physical and chemical laws that
 govern any and every portion of matter4
 ,but1 while the subdivision of matter  
into separate bodies is relative to our 
perception1 while the building up of    
closed-off systems of material points is
 relative to our science1 the living    
body has been separated and closed off  

by nature herself4 ,it is composed of   
unlike parts that complete each other4  
,it performs diverse functions that     
involve each other4 ,it is an           
individual1 and of no other object1 not 
even of the crystal1 can this be said1  
for a crystal has neither difference of 
parts nor diversity of functions4 ,no   
doubt1 it is hard to decide1 even in the
 organized world1 what is individual and
 what is not4 ,the difficulty is great1 
even in the animal kingdom2 with plants 
it is almost insurmountable4 ,this      
difficulty is1 moreover1 due to profound
 causes1 on which we shall dwell later4 
,we shall see that individuality admits 
of any number of degrees1 and that it is
 not fully realized anywhere1 even in   
man4 ,but that is no reason for thinking
 it is not a characteristic property of 
life4 ,the biologist who proceeds as a  
geometrician is too ready to take       
advantage here of our inability to give 
a precise and general definition of     
individuality4 ,a perfect definition    

applies only to a completed reality2    
now1 vital properties are never entirely
 realized1 though always on the way to  
become so2 they are not so much states  
as tendencies4 ,and a tendency achieves 
all that it aims at only if it is not   
thwarted by another tendency4 ,how1     
then1 could this occur in the domain of 
life1 where1 as we shall show1 the      
interaction of antagonistic tendencies  
is always implied8 ,in particular1 it   
may be said of individuality that1 while
 the tendency to individuate is         
everywhere present in the organized     
world1 it is everywhere opposed by the  
tendency towards reproduction4 ,for the 
individuality to be perfect1 it would be
 necessary that no detached part of the 
organism could live separately4 ,but    
then reproduction would be impossible4  
,for what is reproduction1 but the      
building up of a new organism with a    
detached fragment of the old8           
,individuality therefore harbors its    
enemy at home4 ,its very need of        

perpetuating itself in time condemns it 
never to be complete in space4 ,the     
biologist must take due account of both 
tendencies in every instance1 and it is 
therefore useless to ask him for a      
definition of individuality that shall  
fit all cases and work automatically4   
,but too often one reasons about the    
things of life in the same way as about 
the conditions of crude matter4 ,nowhere
 is the confusion so evident as in      
discussions about individuality4 ,we are
 shown the stumps of a ,lumbriculus1    
each regenerating its head and living   
thence-forward as an independent        
individual2 a hydra whose pieces become 
so many fresh hydras2 a sea-urchin's egg
 whose fragments develop complete       
embryos3 where then1 we are asked1 was  
the individuality of the egg1 the hydra1
 the worm8--,but1 because there are     
several individuals now1 it does not    
follow that there was not a single      
individual just before4 ,no doubt1 when 
,i have seen several drawers fall from a

 chest1 ,i have no longer the right to  
say that the article was all of one     
piece4 ,but the fact is that there can  
be nothing more in the present of the   
chest of drawers than there was in its  
past1 and if it is made up of several   
different pieces now1 it was so from the
 date of its manufacture4 ,generally    
speaking1 unorganized bodies1 which are 
what we have need of in order that we   
may act1 and on which we have modelled  
our fashion of thinking1 are regulated  
by this simple law3 the present contains
 nothing more than the past1 and what is
 found in the effect was already in the 
cause4 ,but suppose that the distinctive
 feature of the organized body is that  
it grows and changes without ceasing1 as
 indeed the most superficial observation
 testifies1 there would be nothing      
astonishing in the fact that it was one 
in the first instance1 and afterwards   
many4 ,the reproduction of unicellular  
organisms consists in just this--the    
living being divides into two halves1 of

 which each is a complete individual4   
,true1 in the more complex animals1     
nature localizes in the almost          
independent sexual cells the power of   
producing the whole anew4 ,but something
 of this power may remain diffused in   
the rest of the organism1 as the facts  
of regeneration prove1 and it is        
conceivable that in certain privileged  
cases the faculty may persist integrally
 in a latent condition and manifest     
itself on the first opportunity4 ,in    
truth1 that ,i may have the right to    
speak of individuality1 it is not       
necessary that the organism should be   
without the power to divide into        
fragments that are able to live4 ,it is 
sufficient that it should have presented
 a certain systematization of parts     
before the division1 and that the same  
systematization tend to be reproduced in
 each separate portion afterwards4 ,now1
 that is precisely what we observe in   
the organic world4 ,we may conclude1    
then1 that individuality is never       

perfect1 and that it is often difficult1
 sometimes impossible1 to tell what is  
an individual1 and what is not1 but that
 life nevertheless manifests a search   
for individuality1 as if it strove to   
constitute systems naturally isolated1  
naturally closed4         99       99   
99       99       99  ,by this is a     
living being distinguished from all that
 our perception or our science isolates 
or closes artificially4 ,it would       
therefore be wrong to compare it to an  
object4 ,should we wish to find a term  
of comparison in the inorganic world1 it
 is not to a determinate material       
object1 but much rather to the totality 
of the material universe that we ought  
to compare the living organism4 ,it is  
true that the comparison would not be   
worth much1 for a living being is       
observable1 whilst the whole of the     
universe is constructed or reconstructed
 by thought4 ,but at least our attention
 would thus have been called to the     
essential character of organization4    

,like the universe as a whole1 like each
 conscious being taken separately1 the  
organism which lives is a thing that    
endures4 ,its past1 in its entirety1 is 
prolonged into its present1 and abides  
there1 actual and acting4 ,how otherwise
 could we understand that it passes     
through distinct and well-marked phases1
 that it changes its age--in short1 that
 it has a history8 ,if ,i consider my   
body in particular1 ,i find that1 like  
my consciousness1 it matures little by  
little from infancy to old age2 like    
myself1 it grows old4 ,indeed1 maturity 
and old age are1 properly speaking1     
attributes only of my body2 it is only  
metaphorically that ,i apply the same   
names to the corresponding changes of my
 conscious self4 ,now1 if ,i pass from  
the top to the bottom of the scale of   
living beings1 from one of the most to  
one of the least differentiated1 from   
the multicellular organism of man to the
 unicellular organism of the            
,infusorian1 ,i find1 even in this      

simple cell1 the same process of growing
 old4 ,the ,infusorian is exhausted at  
the end of a certain number of          
divisions1 and though it may be         
possible1 by modifying the environment1 
to put off the moment when a            
rejuvenation by conjugation becomes     
necessary1 this cannot be indefinitely  
postponed4#d ,it is true that between   
these two extreme cases1 in which the   
organism is completely individualized1  
there might be found a multitude of     
others in which the individuality is    
less well marked1 and in which1 although
 there is doubtless an ageing somewhere1
 one cannot say exactly what it is that 
grows old4 ,once more1 there is no      
universal biological law which applies  
precisely and automatically to every    
living thing4 ,there are only directions
 in which life throws out species in    
general4 ,each particular species1 in   
the very act by which it is constituted1
 affirms its independence1 follows its  
caprice1 deviates more or less from the 

straight line1 sometimes even remounts  
the slope and seems to turn its back on 
its original direction4 ,it is easy     
enough to argue that a tree never grows 
old1 since the tips of its branches are 
always equally young1 always equally    
capable of engendering new trees by     
budding4 ,but in such an organism--which
 is1 after all1 a society rather than an
 individual--something ages1 if only the
 leaves and the interior of the trunk4  
,and each cell1 considered separately1  
evolves in a specific way4 ,wherever    
anything lives1 there is1 open          
somewhere1 a register in which time is  
being inscribed4  ,this1 it will be     
said1 is only a metaphor4--,it is of the
 very essence of mechanism1 in fact1 to 
consider as metaphorical every          
expression which attributes to time an  
effective action and a reality of its   
own4 ,in vain does immediate experience 
show us that the very basis of our      
conscious existence is memory1 that is  
to say1 the prolongation of the past    

into the present1 or1 in a word1        
duration1 acting and irreversible4 ,in  
vain does reason prove to us that the   
more we get away from the objects cut   
out and the systems isolated by common  
sense and by science and the deeper we  
dig beneath them1 the more we have to do
 with a reality which changes as a whole
 in its inmost states1 as if an         
accumulative memory of the past made it 
impossible to go back again4 ,the       
mechanistic instinct of the mind is     
stronger than reason1 stronger than     
immediate experience4 ,the metaphysician
 that we each carry unconsciously within
 us1 and the presence of which is       
explained1 as we shall see later on1 by 
the very place that man occupies amongst
 the living beings1 has its fixed       
requirements1 its ready-made            
explanations1 its irreducible           
propositions3 all unite in denying      
concrete duration4 ,change must be      
reducible to an arrangement or          
rearrangement of parts2 the             

irreversibility of time must be an      
appearance relative to our ignorance2   
the impossibility of turning back must  
be only the inability of man to put     
things in place again4 ,so growing old  
can be nothing more than the gradual    
gain or loss of certain substances1     
perhaps both together4 ,time is assumed 
to have just as much reality for a      
living being as for an hour-glass1 in   
which the top part empties while the    
lower fills1 and all goes where it was  
before when you turn the glass upside   
down4  ,true1 biologists are not agreed 
on what is gained and what is lost      
between the day of birth and the day of 
death4 ,there are those who hold to the 
continual growth in the volume of       
protoplasm from the birth of the cell   
right on to its death4#e ,more probable 
and more profound is the theory         
according to which the diminution bears 
on the quantity of nutritive substance  
contained in that inner environment in  
which the organism is being renewed1 and

 the increase on the quantity of        
unexcreted residual substances which1   
accumulating in the body1 finally crust 
it over4#f ,must we however--with an    
eminent bacteriologist--declare any     
explanation of growing old insufficient 
that does not take account of           
phagocytosis8#g ,we do not feel         
qualified to settle the question4 ,but  
the fact that the two theories agree in 
affirming the constant accumulation or  
loss of a certain kind of matter1 even  
though they have little in common as to 
what is gained and lost1 shows pretty   
well that the frame of the explanation  
has been furnished a priori4 ,we shall  
see this more and more as we proceed    
with our study3 it is not easy1 in      
thinking of time1 to escape the image of
 the hour-glass4  ,the cause of growing 
old must lie deeper4 ,we hold that there
 is unbroken continuity between the     
evolution of the embryo and that of the 
complete organism4 ,the impetus which   
causes a living being to grow larger1 to

 develop and to age1 is the same that   
has caused it to pass through the phases
 of the embryonic life4 ,the development
 of the embryo is a perpetual change of 
form4 ,any one who attempts to note all 
its successive aspects becomes lost in  
an infinity1 as is inevitable in dealing
 with a continuum4 ,life does but       
prolong this prenatal evolution4 ,the   
proof of this is that it is often       
impossible for us to say whether we are 
dealing with an organism growing old or 
with an embryo continuing to evolve2    
such is the case1 for example1 with the 
larvae of insects and crustacea4 ,on the
 other hand1 in an organism such as our 
own1 crises like puberty or the         
menopause1 in which the individual is   
completely transformed1 are quite       
comparable to changes in the course of  
larval or embryonic life--yet they are  
part and parcel of the process of our   
ageing4 ,although they occur at a       
definite age and within a time that may 
be quite short1 no one would maintain   

that they appear then ex abrupto1 from  
without1 simply because a certain age is
 reached1 just as a legal right is      
granted to us on our one-and-twentieth  
birthday4 ,it is evident that a change  
like that of puberty is in course of    
preparation at every instant from birth1
 and even before birth1 and that the    
ageing up to that crisis consists1 in   
part at least1 of this gradual          
preparation4 ,in short1 what is properly
 vital in growing old is the insensible1
 infinitely graduated1 continuance of   
the change of form4 ,now1 this change is
 undoubtedly accompanied by phenomena of
 organic destruction3 to these1 and to  
these alone1 will a mechanistic         
explanation of ageing be confined4 ,it  
will note the facts of sclerosis1 the   
gradual accumulation of residual        
substances1 the growing hypertrophy of  
the protoplasm of the cell4 ,but under  
these visible effects an inner cause    
lies hidden4 ,the evolution of the      
living being1 like that of the embryo1  

implies a continual recording of        
duration1 a persistence of the past in  
the present1 and so an appearance1 at   
least1 of organic memory4  ,the present 
state of an unorganized body depends    
exclusively on what happened at the     
previous instant2 and likewise the      
position of the material points of a    
system defined and isolated by science  
is determined by the position of these  
same points at the moment immediately   
before4 ,in other words1 the laws that  
govern unorganized matter are           
expressible1 in principle1 by           
differential equations in which time 7in
 the sense in which the mathematician   
takes this word7 would play the rle of  
independent variable4 ,is it so with the
 laws of life8 ,does the state of a     
living body find its complete           
explanation in the state immediately    
before8 ,yes1 if it is agreed a priori  
to liken the living body to other       
bodies1 and to identify it1 for the sake
 of the argument1 with the artificial   

systems on which the chemist1 physicist1
 and astronomer operate4 ,but in        
astronomy1 physics1 and chemistry the   
proposition has a perfectly definite    
meaning3 it signifies that certain      
aspects of the present1 important for   
science1 are calculable as functions of 
the immediate past4 ,nothing of the sort
 in the domain of life4 ,here           
calculation touches1 at most1 certain   
phenomena of organic destruction4       
,organic creation1 on the contrary1 the 
evolutionary phenomena which properly   
constitute life1 we cannot in any way   
subject to a mathematical treatment4 ,it
 will be said that this impotence is due
 only to our ignorance4 ,but it may     
equally well express the fact that the  
present moment of a living body does not
 find its explanation in the moment     
immediately before1 that all the past of
 the organism must be added to that     
moment1 its heredity--in fact1 the whole
 of a very long history4 ,in the second 
of these two hypotheses1 not in the     

first1 is really expressed the present  
state of the biological sciences1 as    
well as their direction4 ,as for the    
idea that the living body might be      
treated by some superhuman calculator in
 the same mathematical way as our solar 
system1 this has gradually arisen from a
 metaphysic which has taken a more      
precise form since the physical         
discoveries of ,galileo1 but which1 as  
we shall show1 was always the natural   
metaphysic of the human mind4 ,its      
apparent clearness1 our impatient desire
 to find it true1 the enthusiasm with   
which so many excellent minds accept it 
without proof--all the seductions1 in   
short1 that it exercises on our thought1
 should put us on our guard against it4 
,the attraction it has for us proves    
well enough that it gives satisfaction  
to an innate inclination4 ,but1 as will 
be seen further on1 the intellectual    
tendencies innate to-day1 which life    
must have created in the course of its  
evolution1 are not at all meant to      

supply us with an explanation of life3  
they have something else to do4  ,any   
attempt to distinguish between an       
artificial and a natural system1 between
 the dead and the living1 runs counter  
to this tendency at once4 ,thus it      
happens that we find it equally         
difficult to imagine that the organized 
has duration and that the unorganized   
has not4 ,when we say that the state of 
an artificial system depends exclusively
 on its state at the moment before1 does
 it not seem as if we were bringing time
 in1 as if the system had something to  
do with real duration8 ,and1 on the     
other hand1 though the whole of the past
 goes into the making of the living     
being's present moment1 does not organic
 memory press it into the moment        
immediately before the present1 so that 
the moment immediately before becomes   
the sole cause of the present one8--,to 
speak thus is to ignore the cardinal    
difference between concrete time1 along 
which a real system develops1 and that  

abstract time which enters into our     
speculations on artificial systems4     
,what does it mean1 to say that the     
state of an artificial system depends on
 what it was at the moment immediately  
before8 ,there is no instant immediately
 before another instant2 there could not
 be1 any more than there could be one   
mathematical point touching another4    
,the instant immediately before is1 in  
reality1 that which is connected with   
the present instant by the interval dt4 
,all that you mean to say1 therefore1 is
 that the present state of the system is
 defined by equations into which        
differential coefficients enter1 such as
 dsdt1 dvdt1 that is to say1 at bottom1 
present velocities and present          
accelerations4 ,you are therefore really
 speaking only of the present--a        
present1 it is true1 considered along   
with its tendency4 ,the systems science 
works with are1 in fact1 in an          
instantaneous present that is always    
being renewed2 such systems are never in

 that real1 concrete duration in which  
the past remains bound up with the      
present4 ,when the mathematician        
calculates the future state of a system 
at the end of a time t1 there is nothing
 to prevent him from supposing that the 
universe vanishes from this moment till 
that1 and suddenly reappears4 ,it is the
 t-th moment only that counts--and that 
will be a mere instant4 ,what will flow 
on in the interval--that is to say1 real
 time--does not count1 and cannot enter 
into the calculation4 ,if the           
mathematician says that he puts himself 
inside this interval1 he means that he  
is placing himself at a certain point1  
at a particular moment1 therefore at the
 extremity again of a certain time t'2  
with the interval up to ,t' he is not   
concerned4 ,if he divides the interval  
into infinitely small parts by          
considering the differential dt1 he     
thereby expresses merely the fact that  
he will consider accelerations and      
velocities--that is to say1 numbers     

which denote tendencies and enable him  
to calculate the state of the system at 
a given moment4 ,but he is always       
speaking of a given moment--a static    
moment1 that is--and not of flowing     
time4 ,in short1 the world the          
mathematician deals with is a world that
 dies and is reborn at every            
instant--the world which ,descartes was 
thinking of when he spoke of continued  
creation4 ,but1 in time thus conceived1 
how could evolution1 which is the very  
essence of life1 ever take place8       
,evolution implies a real persistence of
 the past in the present1 a duration    
which is1 as it were1 a hyphen1 a       
connecting link4 ,in other words1 to    
know a living being or natural system is
 to get at the very interval of         
duration1 while the knowledge of an     
artificial or mathematical system       
applies only to the extremity4          
,continuity of change1 preservation of  
the past in the present1 real           
duration--the living being seems1 then1 

to share these attributes with          
consciousness4 ,can we go further and   
say that life1 like conscious activity1 
is invention1 is unceasing creation8    
99       99       99       99       99  
,it does not enter into our plan to set 
down here the proofs of transformism4   
,we wish only to explain in a word or   
two why we shall accept it1 in the      
present work1 as a sufficiently exact   
and precise expression of the facts     
actually known4 ,the idea of            
transformism is already in germ in the  
natural classification of organized     
beings4 ,the naturalist1 in fact1 brings
 together the organisms that are like   
each other1 then divides the group into 
sub-groups within which the likeness is 
still greater1 and so on3 all through   
the operation1 the characters of the    
group appear as general themes on which 
each of the sub-groups performs its     
particular variation4 ,now1 such is just
 the relation we find1 in the animal and
 in the vegetable world between the     

generator and the generated3 on the     
canvas which the ancestor passes on1 and
 which his descendants possess in       
common1 each puts his own original      
embroidery4 ,true1 the differences      
between the descendant and the ancestor 
are slight1 and it may be asked whether 
the same living matter presents enough  
plasticity to take in turn such         
different forms as those of a fish1 a   
reptile and a bird4 ,but1 to this       
question1 observation gives a peremptory
 answer4 ,it shows that up to a certain 
period in its development the embryo of 
the bird is hardly distinguishable from 
that of the reptile1 and that the       
individual develops1 throughout the     
embryonic life in general1 a series of  
transformations comparable to those     
through which1 according to the theory  
of evolution1 one species passes into   
another4 ,a single cell1 the result of  
the combination of two cells1 male and  
female1 accomplishes this work by       
dividing4 ,every day1 before our eyes1  

the highest forms of life are springing 
from a very elementary form4            
,experience1 then1 shows that the most  
complex has been able to issue from the 
most simple by way of evolution4 ,now1  
has it arisen so1 as a matter of fact8  
,paleontology1 in spite of the          
insufficiency of its evidence1 invites  
us to believe it has2 for1 where it     
makes out the order of succession of    
species with any precision1 this order  
is just what considerations drawn from  
embryogeny and comparative anatomy would
 lead any one to suppose1 and each new  
paleontological discovery brings        
transformism a new confirmation4 ,thus1 
the proof drawn from mere observation is
 ever being strengthened1 while1 on the 
other hand1 experiment is removing the  
objections one by one4 ,the recent      
experiments of ,h4 de ,vries1 for       
instance1 by showing that important     
variations can be produced suddenly and 
transmitted regularly1 have overthrown  
some of the greatest difficulties raised

 by the theory4 ,they have enabled us   
greatly to shorten the time biological  
evolution seems to demand4 ,they also   
render us less exacting toward          
paleontology4 ,so that1 all things      
considered1 the transformist hypothesis 
looks more and more like a close        
approximation to the truth4 ,it is not  
rigorously demonstrable2 but1 failing   
the certainty of theoretical or         
experimental demonstration1 there is a  
probability which is continually        
growing1 due to evidence which1 while   
coming short of direct proof1 seems to  
point persistently in its direction3    
such is the kind of probability that the
 theory of transformism offers4  ,let us
 admit1 however1 that transformism may  
be wrong4 ,let us suppose that species  
are proved1 by inference or by          
experiment1 to have arisen by a         
discontinuous process1 of which to-day  
we have no idea4 ,would the doctrine be 
affected in so far as it has a special  
interest or importance for us8          

,classification would probably remain1  
in its broad lines4 ,the actual data of 
embryology would also remain4 ,the      
correspondence between comparative      
embryogeny and comparative anatomy would
 remain too4 ,therefore biology could   
and would continue to establish between 
living forms the same relations and the 
same kinship as transformism supposes   
to-day4 ,it would be1 it is true1 an    
ideal kinship1 and no longer a material 
affiliation4 ,but1 as the actual data of
 paleontology would also remain1 we     
should still have to admit that it is   
successively1 not simultaneously1 that  
the forms between which we find an ideal
 kinship have appeared4 ,now1 the       
evolutionist theory1 so far as it has   
any importance for philosophy1 requires 
no more4 ,it consists above all in      
establishing relations of ideal kinship1
 and in maintaining that wherever there 
is this relation of1 so to speak1       
logical affiliation between forms1 there
 is also a relation of chronological    

succession between the species in which 
these forms are materialized4 ,both     
arguments would hold in any case4 ,and  
hence1 an evolution somewhere would     
still have to be supposed1 whether in a 
creative ,thought in which the ideas of 
the different species are generated by  
each other exactly as transformism holds
 that species themselves are generated  
on the earth2 or in a plan of vital     
organization immanent in nature1 which  
gradually works itself out1 in which the
 relations of logical and chronological 
affiliation between pure forms are just 
those which transformism presents as    
relations of real affiliation between   
living individuals2 or1 finally1 in some
 unknown cause of life1 which develops  
its effects as if they generated one    
another4 ,evolution would then simply   
have been transposed1 made to pass from 
the visible to the invisible4 ,almost   
all that transformism tells us to-day   
would be preserved1 open to             
interpretation in another way4 ,will it 

not1 therefore1 be better to stick to   
the letter of transformism as almost all
 scientists profess it8 ,apart from the 
question to what extent the theory of   
evolution describes the facts and to    
what extent it symbolizes them1 there is
 nothing in it that is irreconcilable   
with the doctrines it has claimed to    
replace1 even with that of special      
creations1 to which it is usually       
opposed4 ,for this reason we think the  
language of transformism forces itself  
now upon all philosophy1 as the dogmatic
 affirmation of transformism forces     
itself upon science4  ,but then1 we must
 no longer speak of life in general as  
an abstraction1 or as a mere heading    
under which all living beings are       
inscribed4 ,at a certain moment1 in     
certain points of space1 a visible      
current has taken rise2 this current of 
life1 traversing the bodies it has      
organized one after another1 passing    
from generation to generation1 has      
become divided amongst species and      

distributed amongst individuals without 
losing anything of its force1 rather    
intensifying in proportion to its       
advance4 ,it is well known that1 on the 
theory of the continuity of the         
germ-plasm1 maintained by ,weismann1 the
 sexual elements of the generating      
organism pass on their properties       
directly to the sexual elements of the  
organism engendered4 ,in this extreme   
form1 the theory has seemed debatable1  
for it is only in exceptional cases that
 there are any signs of sexual glands at
 the time of segmentation of the        
fertilized egg4 ,but1 though the cells  
that engender the sexual elements do not
 generally appear at the beginning of   
the embryonic life1 it is none the less 
true that they are always formed out of 
those tissues of the embryo which have  
not undergone any particular functional 
differentiation1 and whose cells are    
made of unmodified protoplasm4#h ,in    
other words1 the genetic power of the   
fertilized ovum weakens1 the more it is 

spread over the growing mass of the     
tissues of the embryo2 but1 while it is 
being thus diluted1 it is concentrating 
anew something of itself on a certain   
special point1 to wit1 the cells1 from  
which the ova or spermatozoa will       
develop4 ,it might therefore be said    
that1 though the germ-plasm is not      
continuous1 there is at least continuity
 of genetic energy1 this energy being   
expended only at certain instants1 for  
just enough time to give the requisite  
impulsion to the embryonic life1 and    
being recouped as soon as possible in   
new sexual elements1 in which1 again1 it
 bides its time4 ,regarded from this    
point of view1 life is like a current   
passing from germ to germ through the   
medium of a developed organism4 ,it is  
as if the organism itself were only an  
excrescence1 a bud caused to sprout by  
the former germ endeavoring to continue 
itself in a new germ4 ,the essential    
thing is the continuous progress        
indefinitely pursued1 an invisible      

progress1 on which each visible organism
 rides during the short interval of time
 given it to live4  ,now1 the more we   
fix our attention on this continuity of 
life1 the more we see that organic      
evolution resembles the evolution of a  
consciousness1 in which the past presses
 against the present and causes the     
upspringing of a new form of            
consciousness1 incommensurable with its 
antecedents4 ,that the appearance of a  
vegetable or animal species is due to   
specific causes1 nobody will gainsay4   
,but this can only mean that if1 after  
the fact1 we could know these causes in 
detail1 we could explain by them the    
form that has been produced2 foreseeing 
the form is out of the question4#i ,it  
may perhaps be said that the form could 
be foreseen if we could know1 in all    
their details1 the conditions under     
which it will be produced4 ,but these   
conditions are built up into it and are 
part and parcel of its being2 they are  
peculiar to that phase of its history in

 which life finds itself at the moment  
of producing the form3 how could we know
 beforehand a situation that is unique  
of its kind1 that has never yet occurred
 and will never occur again8 ,of the    
future1 only that is foreseen which is  
like the past or can be made up again   
with elements like those of the past4   
,such is the case with astronomical1    
physical and chemical facts1 with all   
facts which form part of a system in    
which elements supposed to be unchanging
 are merely put together1 in which the  
only changes are changes of position1 in
 which there is no theoretical absurdity
 in imagining that things are restored  
to their place2 in which1 consequently1 
the same total phenomenon1 or at least  
the same elementary phenomena1 can be   
repeated4 ,but an original situation1   
which imparts something of its own      
originality to its elements1 that is to 
say1 to the partial views that are taken
 of it1 how can such a situation be     
pictured as given before it is actually 

produced8#aj ,all that can be said is   
that1 once produced1 it will be         
explained by the elements that analysis 
will then carve out of it4 ,now1 what is
 true of the production of a new species
 is also true of the production of a new
 individual1 and1 more generally1 of any
 moment of any living form4 ,for1 though
 the variation must reach a certain     
importance and a certain generality in  
order to give rise to a new species1 it 
is being produced every moment1         
continuously and insensibly1 in every   
living being4 ,and it is evident that   
even the sudden mutations which we now  
hear of are possible only if a process  
of incubation1 or rather of maturing1 is
 going on throughout a series of        
generations that do not seem to change4 
,in this sense it might be said of life1
 as of consciousness1 that at every     
moment it is creating something4#aa     
,but against this idea of the absolute  
originality and unforeseeability of     
forms our whole intellect rises in      

revolt4 ,the essential function of our  
intellect1 as the evolution of life has 
fashioned it1 is to be a light for our  
conduct1 to make ready for our action on
 things1 to foresee1 for a given        
situation1 the events1 favorable or     
unfavorable1 which may follow thereupon4
 ,intellect therefore instinctively     
selects in a given situation whatever is
 like something already known2 it seeks 
this out1 in order that it may apply its
 principle that like produces like4 ,in 
just this does the prevision of the     
future by common sense consist4 ,science
 carries this faculty to the highest    
possible degree of exactitude and       
precision1 but does not alter its       
essential character4 ,like ordinary     
knowledge1 in dealing with things       
science is concerned only with the      
aspect of repetition4 ,though the whole 
be original1 science will always manage 
to analyze it into elements or aspects  
which are approximately a reproduction  
of the past4 ,science can work only on  

what is supposed to repeat itself--that 
is to say1 on what is withdrawn1 by     
hypothesis1 from the action of real     
time4 ,anything that is irreducible and 
irreversible in the successive moments  
of a history eludes science4 ,to get a  
notion of this irreducibility and       
irreversibility1 we must break with     
scientific habits which are adapted to  
the fundamental requirements of thought1
 we must do violence to the mind1 go    
counter to the natural bent of the      
intellect4 ,but that is just the        
function of philosophy4  ,in vain1      
therefore1 does life evolve before our  
eyes as a continuous creation of        
unforeseeable form3 the idea always     
persists that form1 unforeseeability and
 continuity are mere appearance--the    
outward reflection of our own ignorance4
 ,what is presented to the senses as a  
continuous history would break up1 we   
are told1 into a series of successive   
states4 ,what gives you the impression  
of an original state resolves1 upon     

analysis1 into elementary facts1 each of
 which is the repetition of a fact      
already known4 ,what you call an        
unforeseeable form is only a new        
arrangement of old elements4 ,the       
elementary causes1 which in their       
totality have determined this           
arrangement1 are themselves old causes  
repeated in a new order4 ,knowledge of  
the elements and of the elementary      
causes would have made it possible to   
foretell the living form which is their 
sum and their resultant4 ,when we have  
resolved the biological aspect of       
phenomena into physico-chemical factors1
 we will leap1 if necessary1 over       
physics and chemistry themselves2 we    
will go from masses to molecules1 from  
molecules to atoms1 from atoms to       
corpuscles3 we must indeed at last come 
to something that can be treated as a   
kind of solar system1 astronomically4   
,if you deny it1 you oppose the very    
principle of scientific mechanism1 and  
you arbitrarily affirm that living      

matter is not made of the same elements 
as other matter4--,we reply that we do  
not question the fundamental identity of
 inert matter and organized matter4 ,the
 only question is whether the natural   
systems which we call living beings must
 be assimilated to the artificial       
systems that science cuts out within    
inert matter1 or whether they must not  
rather be compared to that natural      
system which is the whole of the        
universe4 ,that life is a kind of       
mechanism ,i cordially agree4 ,but is it
 the mechanism of parts artificially    
isolated within the whole of the        
universe1 or is it the mechanism of the 
real whole8 ,the real whole might well  
be1 we conceive1 an indivisible         
continuity4 ,the systems we cut out     
within it would1 properly speaking1 not 
then be parts at all2 they would be     
partial views of the whole4 ,and1 with  
these partial views put end to end1 you 
will not make even a beginning of the   
reconstruction of the whole1 any more   

than1 by multiplying photographs of an  
object in a thousand different aspects1 
you will reproduce the object itself4   
,so of life and of the physico-chemical 
phenomena to which you endeavor to      
reduce it4 ,analysis will undoubtedly   
resolve the process of organic creation 
into an ever-growing number of          
physico-chemical phenomena1 and chemists
 and physicists will have to do1 of     
course1 with nothing but these4 ,but it 
does not follow that chemistry and      
physics will ever give us the key to    
life4  ,a very small element of a curve 
is very near being a straight line4 ,and
 the smaller it is1 the nearer4 ,in the 
limit1 it may be termed a part of the   
curve or a part of the straight line1 as
 you please1 for in each of its points a
 curve coincides with its tangent4 ,so  
likewise vitality is tangent1 at any and
 every point1 to physical and chemical  
forces2 but such points are1 as a fact1 
only views taken by a mind which        
imagines stops at various moments of the

 movement that generates the curve4 ,in 
reality1 life is no more made of        
physico-chemical elements than a curve  
is composed of straight lines4  ,in a   
general way1 the most radical progress a
 science can achieve is the working of  
the completed results into a new scheme 
of the whole1 by relation to which they 
become instantaneous and motionless     
views taken at intervals along the      
continuity of a movement4 ,such1 for    
example1 is the relation of modern to   
ancient geometry4 ,the latter1 purely   
static1 worked with figures drawn once  
for all2 the former studies the varying 
of a function--that is1 the continuous  
movement by which the figure is         
described4 ,no doubt1 for greater       
strictness1 all considerations of motion
 may be eliminated from mathematical    
processes2 but the introduction of      
motion into the genesis of figures is   
nevertheless the origin of modern       
mathematics4 ,we believe that if biology
 could ever get as close to its object  

as mathematics does to its own1 it would
 become1 to the physics and chemistry of
 organized bodies1 what the mathematics 
of the moderns has proved to be in      
relation to ancient geometry4 ,the      
wholly superficial displacements of     
masses and molecules studied in physics 
and chemistry would become1 by relation 
to that inner vital movement 7which is  
transformation and not translation7 what
 the position of a moving object is to  
the movement of that object in space4   
,and1 so far as we can see1 the         
procedure by which we should then pass  
from the definition of a certain vital  
action to the system of physico-chemical
 facts which it implies would be like   
passing from the function to its        
derivative1 from the equation of the    
curve 7i4e4 the law of the continuous   
movement by which the curve is          
generated7 to the equation of the       
tangent giving its instantaneous        
direction4 ,such a science would be a   
mechanics of transformation1 of which   

our mechanics of translation would      
become a particular case1 a             
simplification1 a projection on the     
plane of pure quantity4 ,and just as an 
infinity of functions have the same     
differential1 these functions differing 
from each other by a constant1 so       
perhaps the integration of the          
physico-chemical elements of properly   
vital action might determine that action
 only in part--a part would be left to  
indetermination4 ,but such an           
integration can be no more than dreamed 
of2 we do not pretend that the dream    
will ever be realized4 ,we are only     
trying1 by carrying a certain comparison
 as far as possible1 to show up to what 
point our theory goes along with pure   
mechanism1 and where they part company4 
,imitation of the living by the         
unorganized may1 however1 go a good way4
 ,not only does chemistry make organic  
syntheses1 but we have succeeded in     
reproducing artificially the external   
appearance of certain facts of          

organization1 such as indirect          
cell-division and protoplasmic          
circulation4 ,it is well known that the 
protoplasm of the cell effects various  
movements within its envelope2 on the   
other hand1 indirect cell-division is   
the outcome of very complex operations1 
some involving the nucleus and others   
the cytoplasm4 ,these latter commence by
 the doubling of the centrosome1 a small
 spherical body alongside the nucleus4  
,the two centrosomes thus obtained draw 
apart1 attract the broken and doubled   
ends of the filament of which the       
original nucleus mainly consisted1 and  
join them to form two fresh nuclei about
 which the two new cells are constructed
 which will succeed the first4 ,now1 in 
their broad lines and in their external 
appearance1 some at least of these      
operations have been successfully       
imitated4 ,if some sugar or table salt  
is pulverized and some very old oil is  
added1 and a drop of the mixture is     
observed under the microscope1 a froth  

of alveolar structure is seen whose     
configuration is like that of           
protoplasm1 according to certain        
theories1 and in which movements take   
place which are decidedly like those of 
protoplasmic circulation4#ab ,if1 in a  
froth of the same kind1 the air is      
extracted from an alveolus1 a cone of   
attraction is seen to form1 like those  
about the centrosomes which result in   
the division of the nucleus4#ac ,even   
the external motions of a unicellular   
organism--of an amoeba1 at any rate--are
 sometimes explained mechanically4 ,the 
displacements of an amoeba in a drop of 
water would be comparable to the motion 
to and fro of a grain of dust in a      
draughty room4 ,its mass is all the time
 absorbing certain soluble matters      
contained in the surrounding water1 and 
giving back to it certain others2 these 
continual exchanges1 like those between 
two vessels separated by a porous       
partition1 would create an everchanging 
vortex around the little organism4 ,as  

for the temporary prolongations or      
pseudopodia which the amoeba seems to   
make1 they would be not so much given   
out by it as attracted from it by a kind
 of inhalation or suction of the        
surrounding medium4#ad ,in the same way 
we may perhaps come to explain the more 
complex movements which the ,infusorian 
makes with its vibratory cilia1 which1  
moreover1 are probably only fixed       
pseudopodia4  ,but scientists are far   
from agreed on the value of explanations
 and schemas of this sort4 ,chemists    
have pointed out that even in the       
organic--not to go so far as the        
organized--science has reconstructed    
hitherto nothing but waste products of  
vital activity2 the peculiarly active   
plastic substances obstinately defy     
synthesis4 ,one of the most notable     
naturalists of our time has insisted on 
the opposition of two orders of         
phenomena observed in living tissues1   
anagenesis and katagenesis4 ,the rle of 
the anagenetic energies is to raise the 

inferior energies to their own level by 
assimilating inorganic substances4 ,they
 construct the tissues4 ,on the other   
hand1 the actual functioning of life    
7excepting1 of course1 assimilation1    
growth1 and reproduction7 is of the     
katagenetic order1 exhibiting the fall1 
not the rise1 of energy4 ,it is only    
with these facts of katagenetic order   
that physico-chemistry deals--that is1  
in short1 with the dead and not with the
 living4#ae ,the other kind of facts    
certainly seem to defy physico-chemical 
analysis1 even if they are not          
anagenetic in the proper sense of the   
word4 ,as for the artificial imitation  
of the outward appearance of protoplasm1
 should a real theoretic importance be  
attached to this when the question of   
the physical framework of protoplasm is 
not yet settled8 ,we are still further  
from compounding protoplasm chemically4 
,finally1 a physico-chemical explanation
 of the motions of the amoeba1 and a    
fortiori of the behavior of the         

,infusoria1 seems impossible to many of 
those who have closely observed these   
rudimentary organisms4 ,even in these   
humblest manifestations of life they    
discover traces of an effective         
psychological activity4#af ,but         
instructive above all is the fact that  
the tendency to explain everything by   
physics and chemistry is discouraged    
rather than strengthened by deep study  
of histological phenomena4 ,such is the 
conclusion of the truly admirable book  
which the histologist ,e4,b4 ,wilson has
 devoted to the development of the cell3
 ,the study of the cell has1 on the     
whole1 seemed to widen rather than to   
narrow the enormous gap that separates  
even the lowest forms of life from the  
inorganic world4#ag  ,to sum up1 those  
who are concerned only with the         
functional activity of the living being 
are inclined to believe that physics and
 chemistry will give us the key to      
biological processes4#ah ,they have     
chiefly to do1 as a fact1 with phenomena

 that are repeated continually in the   
living being1 as in a chemical retort4  
,this explains1 in some measure1 the    
mechanistic tendencies of physiology4   
,on the contrary1 those whose attention 
is concentrated on the minute structure 
of living tissues1 on their genesis and 
evolution1 histologists and             
embryogenists on the one hand1          
naturalists on the other1 are interested
 in the retort itself1 not merely in its
 contents4 ,they find that this retort  
creates its own form through a unique   
series of acts that really constitute a 
history4 ,thus1 histologists1           
embryogenists1 and naturalists believe  
far less readily than physiologists in  
the physico-chemical character of vital 
actions4  ,the fact is1 neither one nor 
the other of these two theories1 neither
 that which affirms nor that which      
denies the possibility of chemically    
producing an elementary organism1 can   
claim the authority of experiment4 ,they
 are both unverifiable1 the former      

because science has not yet advanced a  
step toward the chemical synthesis of a 
living substance1 the second because    
there is no conceivable way of proving  
experimentally the impossibility of a   
fact4 ,but we have set forth the        
theoretical reasons which prevent us    
from likening the living being1 a system
 closed off by nature1 to the systems   
which our science isolates4 ,these      
reasons have less force1 we acknowledge1
 in the case of a rudimentary organism  
like the amoeba1 which hardly evolves at
 all4 ,but they acquire more when we    
consider a complex organism which goes  
through a regular cycle of              
transformations4 ,the more duration     
marks the living being with its imprint1
 the more obviously the organism differs
 from a mere mechanism1 over which      
duration glides without penetrating4    
,and the demonstration has most force   
when it applies to the evolution of life
 as a whole1 from its humblest origins  
to its highest forms1 inasmuch as this  

evolution constitutes1 through the unity
 and continuity of the animated matter  
which supports it1 a single indivisible 
history4 ,thus viewed1 the evolutionist 
hypothesis does not seem so closely akin
 to the mechanistic conception of life  
as it is generally supposed to be4 ,of  
this mechanistic conception we do not   
claim1 of course1 to furnish a          
mathematical and final refutation4 ,but 
the refutation which we draw from the   
consideration of real time1 and which   
is1 in our opinion1 the only refutation 
possible1 becomes the more rigorous and 
cogent the more frankly the evolutionist
 hypothesis is assumed4 ,we must dwell a
 good deal more on this point4 ,but let 
us first show more clearly the notion of
 life to which we are leading up4  ,the 
mechanistic explanations1 we said1 hold 
good for the systems that our thought   
artificially detaches from the whole4   
,but of the whole itself and of the     
systems which1 within this whole1 seem  
to take after it1 we cannot admit a     

priori that they are mechanically       
explicable1 for then time would be      
useless1 and even unreal4 ,the essence  
of mechanical explanation1 in fact1 is  
to regard the future and the past as    
calculable functions of the present1 and
 thus to claim that all is given4 ,on   
this hypothesis1 past1 present and      
future would be open at a glance to a   
superhuman intellect capable of making  
the calculation4 ,indeed1 the scientists
 who have believed in the universality  
and perfect objectivity of mechanical   
explanations have1 consciously or       
unconsciously1 acted on a hypothesis of 
this kind4 ,laplace formulated it with  
the greatest precision3 ,an intellect   
which at a given instant knew all the   
forces with which nature is animated1   
and the respective situations of the    
beings that compose nature--supposing   
the said intellect were vast enough to  
subject these data to analysis--would   
embrace in the same formula the motions 
of the greatest bodies in the universe  

and those of the slightest atom3 nothing
 would be uncertain for it1 and the     
future1 like the past1 would be present 
to its eyes4#ai ,and ,du ,bois-,reymond3
 ,we can imagine the knowledge of nature
 arrived at a point where the universal 
process of the world might be           
represented by a single mathematical    
formula1 by one immense system of       
simultaneous differential equations1    
from which could be deduced1 for each   
moment1 the position1 direction1 and    
velocity of every atom of the world4#bj 
,huxley has expressed the same idea in a
 more concrete form3 ,if the fundamental
 proposition of evolution is true1 that 
the entire world1 living and not living1
 is the result of the mutual            
interaction1 according to definite laws1
 of the forces possessed by the         
molecules of which the primitive        
nebulosity of the universe was composed1
 it is no less certain that the existing
 world lay1 potentially1 in the cosmic  
vapor1 and that a sufficient intellect  

could1 from a knowledge of the          
properties of the molecules of that     
vapor1 have predicted1 say the state of 
the ,fauna of ,great ,britain in #ahfi1 
with as much certainty as one can say   
what will happen to the vapor of the    
breath in a cold winter's day4 ,in such 
a doctrine1 time is still spoken of3 one
 pronounces the word1 but one does not  
think of the thing4 ,for time is here   
deprived of efficacy1 and if it does    
nothing1 it is nothing4 ,radical        
mechanism implies a metaphysic in which 
the totality of the real is postulated  
complete in eternity1 and in which the  
apparent duration of things expresses   
merely the infirmity of a mind that     
cannot know everything at once4 ,but    
duration is something very different    
from this for our consciousness1 that is
 to say1 for that which is most         
indisputable in our experience4 ,we     
perceive duration as a stream against   
which we cannot go4 ,it is the          
foundation of our being1 and1 as we     

feel1 the very substance of the world in
 which we live4 ,it is of no use to hold
 up before our eyes the dazzling        
prospect of a universal mathematic2 we  
cannot sacrifice experience to the      
requirements of a system4 ,that is why  
we reject radical mechanism4         99 
99       99       99       99  ,but     
radical finalism is quite as            
unacceptable1 and for the same reason4  
,the doctrine of teleology1 in its      
extreme form1 as we find it in ,leibniz 
for example1 implies that things and    
beings merely realize a programme       
previously arranged4 ,but if there is   
nothing unforeseen1 no invention or     
creation in the universe1 time is       
useless again4 ,as in the mechanistic   
hypothesis1 here again it is supposed   
that all is given4 ,finalism thus       
understood is only inverted mechanism4  
,it springs from the same postulate1    
with this sole difference1 that in the  
movement of our finite intellects along 
successive things1 whose successiveness 

is reduced to a mere appearance1 it     
holds in front of us the light with     
which it claims to guide us1 instead of 
putting it behind4 ,it substitutes the  
attraction of the future for the        
impulsion of the past4 ,but succession  
remains none the less a mere appearance1
 as indeed does movement itself4 ,in the
 doctrine of ,leibniz1 time is reduced  
to a confused perception1 relative to   
the human standpoint1 a perception which
 would vanish1 like a rising mist1 for a
 mind seated at the centre of things4   
,yet finalism is not1 like mechanism1 a 
doctrine with fixed rigid outlines4 ,it 
admits of as many inflections as we     
like4 ,the mechanistic philosophy is to 
be taken or left3 it must be left if the
 least grain of dust1 by straying from  
the path foreseen by mechanics1 should  
show the slightest trace of spontaneity4
 ,the doctrine of final causes1 on the  
contrary1 will never be definitively    
refuted4 ,if one form of it be put      
aside1 it will take another4 ,its       

principle1 which is essentially         
psychological1 is very flexible4 ,it is 
so extensible1 and thereby so           
comprehensive1 that one accepts         
something of it as soon as one rejects  
pure mechanism4 ,the theory we shall put
 forward in this book will therefore    
necessarily partake of finalism to a    
certain extent4 ,for that reason it is  
important to intimate exactly what we   
are going to take of it1 and what we    
mean to leave4  ,let us say at once that
 to thin out the ,leibnizian finalism by
 breaking it into an infinite number of 
pieces seems to us a step in the wrong  
direction4 ,this is1 however1 the       
tendency of the doctrine of finality4   
,it fully realizes that if the universe 
as a whole is the carrying out of a     
plan1 this cannot be demonstrated       
empirically1 and that even of the       
organized world alone it is hardly      
easier to prove all harmonious3 facts   
would equally well testify to the       
contrary4 ,nature sets living beings at 

discord with one another4 ,she          
everywhere presents disorder alongside  
of order1 retrogression alongside of    
progress4 ,but1 though finality cannot  
be affirmed either of the whole of      
matter or of the whole of life1 might it
 not yet be true1 says the finalist1 of 
each organism taken separately8 ,is     
there not a wonderful division of labor1
 a marvellous solidarity among the parts
 of an organism1 perfect order in       
infinite complexity8 ,does not each     
living being thus realize a plan        
immanent in its substance8--,this theory
 consists1 at bottom1 in breaking up the
 original notion of finality into bits4 
,it does not accept1 indeed it          
ridicules1 the idea of an external      
finality1 according to which living     
beings are ordered with regard to each  
other3 to suppose the grass made for the
 cow1 the lamb for the wolf--that is all
 acknowledged to be absurd4 ,but there  
is1 we are told1 an internal finality3  
each being is made for itself1 all its  

parts conspire for the greatest good of 
the whole and are intelligently         
organized in view of that end4 ,such is 
the notion of finality which has long   
been classic4 ,finalism has shrunk to   
the point of never embracing more than  
one living being at a time4 ,by making  
itself smaller1 it probably thought it  
would offer less surface for blows4     
,the truth is1 it lay open to them a    
great deal more4 ,radical as our own    
theory may appear1 finality is external 
or it is nothing at all4  ,consider the 
most complex and the most harmonious    
organism4 ,all the elements1 we are     
told1 conspire for the greatest good of 
the whole4 ,very well1 but let us not   
forget that each of these elements may  
itself be an organism in certain cases1 
and that in subordinating the existence 
of this small organism to the life of   
the great one we accept the principle of
 an external finality4 ,the idea of a   
finality that is always internal is     
therefore a self-destructive notion4 ,an

 organism is composed of tissues1 each  
of which lives for itself4 ,the cells of
 which the tissues are made have also a 
certain independence4 ,strictly         
speaking1 if the subordination of all   
the elements of the individual to the   
individual itself were complete1 we     
might contend that they are not         
organisms1 reserve the name organism for
 the individual1 and recognize only     
internal finality4 ,but every one knows 
that these elements may possess a true  
autonomy4 ,to say nothing of phagocytes1
 which push independence to the point of
 attacking the organism that nourishes  
them1 or of germinal cells1 which have  
their own life alongside the somatic    
cells--the facts of regeneration are    
enough3 here an element or a group of   
elements suddenly reveals that1 however 
limited its normal space and function1  
it can transcend them occasionally2 it  
may even1 in certain cases1 be regarded 
as the equivalent of the whole4  ,there 
lies the stumbling-block of the         

vitalistic theories4 ,we shall not      
reproach them1 as is ordinarily done1   
with replying to the question by the    
question itself3 the vital principle may
 indeed not explain much1 but it is at  
least a sort of label affixed to our    
ignorance1 so as to remind us of this   
occasionally1#ba while mechanism invites
 us to ignore that ignorance4 ,but the  
position of vitalism is rendered very   
difficult by the fact that1 in nature1  
there is neither purely internal        
finality nor absolutely distinct        
individuality4 ,the organized elements  
composing the individual have themselves
 a certain individuality1 and each will 
claim its vital principle if the        
individual pretends to have its own4    
,but1 on the other hand1 the individual 
itself is not sufficiently independent1 
not sufficiently cut off from other     
things1 for us to allow it a vital      
principle of its own4 ,an organism such 
as a higher vertebrate is the most      
individuated of all organisms2 yet1 if  

we take into account that it is only the
 development of an ovum forming part of 
the body of its mother and of a         
spermatozoon belonging to the body of   
its father1 that the egg 7i4e4 the ovum 
fertilized7 is a connecting link between
 the two progenitors since it is common 
to their two substances1 we shall       
realize that every individual organism1 
even that of a man1 is merely a bud that
 has sprouted on the combined body of   
both its parents4 ,where1 then1 does the
 vital principle of the individual begin
 or end8 ,gradually we shall be carried 
further and further back1 up to the     
individual's remotest ancestors3 we     
shall find him solidary with each of    
them1 solidary with that little mass of 
protoplasmic jelly which is probably at 
the root of the genealogical tree of    
life4 ,being1 to a certain extent1 one  
with this primitive ancestor1 he is also
 solidary with all that descends from   
the ancestor in divergent directions4   
,in this sense each individual may be   

said to remain united with the totality 
of living beings by invisible bonds4 ,so
 it is of no use to try to restrict     
finality to the individuality of the    
living being4 ,if there is finality in  
the world of life1 it includes the whole
 of life in a single indivisible        
embrace4 ,this life common to all the   
living undoubtedly presents many gaps   
and incoherences1 and again it is not so
 mathematically one that it cannot allow
 each being to become individualized to 
a certain degree4 ,but it forms a single
 whole1 none the less2 and we have to   
choose between the out-and-out negation 
of finality and the hypothesis which    
co-ordinates not only the parts of an   
organism with the organism itself1 but  
also each living being with the         
collective whole of all others4         
,finality will not go down any easier   
for being taken as a powder4 ,either the
 hypothesis of a finality immanent in   
life should be rejected as a whole1 or  
it must undergo a treatment very        

different from pulverization4         99
       99       99       99       99    
,the error of radical finalism1 as also 
that of radical mechanism1 is to extend 
too far the application of certain      
concepts that are natural to our        
intellect4 ,originally1 we think only in
 order to act4 ,our intellect has been  
cast in the mold of action4 ,speculation
 is a luxury1 while action is a         
necessity4 ,now1 in order to act1 we    
begin by proposing an end2 we make a    
plan1 then we go on to the detail of the
 mechanism which will bring it to pass4 
,this latter operation is possible only 
if we know what we can reckon on4 ,we   
must therefore have managed to extract  
resemblances from nature1 which enable  
us to anticipate the future4 ,thus we   
must1 consciously or unconsciously1 have
 made use of the law of causality4      
,moreover1 the more sharply the idea of 
efficient causality is defined in our   
mind1 the more it takes the form of a   
mechanical causality4 ,and this scheme1 

in its turn1 is the more mathematical   
according as it expresses a more        
rigorous necessity4 ,that is why we have
 only to follow the bent of our mind to 
become mathematicians4 ,but1 on the     
other hand1 this natural mathematics is 
only the rigid unconscious skeleton     
beneath our conscious supple habit of   
linking the same causes to the same     
effects2 and the usual object of this   
habit is to guide actions inspired by   
intentions1 or1 what comes to the same1 
to direct movements combined with a view
 to reproducing a pattern4 ,we are born 
artisans as we are born geometricians1  
and indeed we are geometricians only    
because we are artisans4 ,thus the human
 intellect1 inasmuch as it is fashioned 
for the needs of human action1 is an    
intellect which proceeds at the same    
time by intention and by calculation1 by
 adapting means to ends and by thinking 
out mechanisms of more and more         
geometrical form4 ,whether nature be    
conceived as an immense machine         

regulated by mathematical laws1 or as   
the realization of a plan1 these two    
ways of regarding it are only the       
consummation of two tendencies of mind  
which are complementary to each other1  
and which have their origin in the same 
vital necessities4  ,for that reason1   
radical finalism is very near radical   
mechanism on many points4 ,both         
doctrines are reluctant to see in the   
course of things generally1 or even     
simply in the development of life1 an   
unforeseeable creation of form4 ,in     
considering reality1 mechanism regards  
only the aspect of similarity or        
repetition4 ,it is therefore dominated  
by this law1 that in nature there is    
only like reproducing like4 ,the more   
the geometry in mechanism is emphasized1
 the less can mechanism admit that      
anything is ever created1 even pure     
form4 ,in so far as we are              
geometricians1 then1 we reject the      
unforeseeable4 ,we might accept it1     
assuredly1 in so far as we are artists1 

for art lives on creation and implies a 
latent belief in the spontaneity of     
nature4 ,but disinterested art is a     
luxury1 like pure speculation4 ,long    
before being artists1 we are artisans2  
and all fabrication1 however            
rudimentary1 lives on likeness and      
repetition1 like the natural geometry   
which serves as its fulcrum4            
,fabrication works on models which it   
sets out to reproduce2 and even when it 
invents1 it proceeds1 or imagines itself
 to proceed1 by a new arrangement of    
elements already known4 ,its principle  
is that we must have like to produce    
like4 ,in short1 the strict application 
of the principle of finality1 like that 
of the principle of mechanical          
causality1 leads to the conclusion that 
all is given4 ,both principles say the  
same thing in their respective          
languages1 because they respond to the  
same need4  ,that is why again they     
agree in doing away with time4 ,real    
duration is that duration which gnaws on

 things1 and leaves on them the mark of 
its tooth4 ,if everything is in time1   
everything changes inwardly1 and the    
same concrete reality never recurs4     
,repetition is therefore possible only  
in the abstract3 what is repeated is    
some aspect that our senses1 and        
especially our intellect1 have singled  
out from reality1 just because our      
action1 upon which all the effort of our
 intellect is directed1 can move only   
among repetitions4 ,thus1 concentrated  
on that which repeats1 solely           
preoccupied in welding the same to the  
same1 intellect turns away from the     
vision of time4 ,it dislikes what is    
fluid1 and solidifies everything it     
touches4 ,we do not think real time4    
,but we live it1 because life transcends
 intellect4 ,the feeling we have of our 
evolution and of the evolution of all   
things in pure duration is there1       
forming around the intellectual concept 
properly so-called an indistinct fringe 
that fades off into darkness4 ,mechanism

 and finalism agree in taking account   
only of the bright nucleus shining in   
the centre4 ,they forget that this      
nucleus has been formed out of the rest 
by condensation1 and that the whole must
 be used1 the fluid as well as and more 
than the condensed1 in order to grasp   
the inner movement of life4  ,indeed1 if
 the fringe exists1 however delicate and
 indistinct1 it should have more        
importance for philosophy than the      
bright nucleus it surrounds4 ,for it is 
its presence that enables us to affirm  
that the nucleus is a nucleus1 that pure
 intellect is a contraction1 by         
condensation1 of a more extensive power4
 ,and1 just because this vague intuition
 is of no help in directing our action  
on things1 which action takes place     
exclusively on the surface of reality1  
we may presume that it is to be         
exercised not merely on the surface1 but
 below4  ,as soon as we go out of the   
encasings in which radical mechanism and
 radical finalism confine our thought1  

reality appears as a ceaseless          
upspringing of something new1 which has 
no sooner arisen to make the present    
than it has already fallen back into the
 past2 at this exact moment it falls    
under the glance of the intellect1 whose
 eyes are ever turned to the rear4 ,this
 is already the case with our inner     
life4 ,for each of our acts we shall    
easily find antecedents of which it may 
in some sort be said to be the          
mechanical resultant4 ,and it may       
equally well be said that each action is
 the realization of an intention4 ,in   
this sense mechanism is everywhere1 and 
finality everywhere1 in the evolution of
 our conduct4 ,but if our action be one 
that involves the whole of our person   
and is truly ours1 it could not have    
been foreseen1 even though its          
antecedents explain it when once it has 
been accomplished4 ,and though it be the
 realizing of an intention1 it differs1 
as a present and new reality1 from the  
intention1 which can never aim at       

anything but recommencing or rearranging
 the past4 ,mechanism and finalism are  
therefore1 here1 only external views of 
our conduct4 ,they extract its          
intellectuality4 ,but our conduct slips 
between them and extends much further4  
,once again1 this does not mean that    
free action is capricious1 unreasonable 
action4 ,to behave according to caprice 
is to oscillate mechanically between two
 or more ready-made alternatives and at 
length to settle on one of them2 it is  
no real maturing of an internal state1  
no real evolution2 it is merely--however
 paradoxical the assertion may          
seem--bending the will to imitate the   
mechanism of the intellect4 ,a conduct  
that is truly our own1 on the contrary1 
is that of a will which does not try to 
counterfeit intellect1 and which1       
remaining itself--that is to say1       
evolving--ripens gradually into acts    
which the intellect will be able to     
resolve indefinitely into intelligible  
elements without ever reaching its goal4

 ,the free act is incommensurable with  
the idea1 and its rationality must be   
defined by this very incommensurability1
 which admits the discovery of as much  
intelligibility within it as we will4   
,such is the character of our own       
evolution2 and such also1 without doubt1
 that of the evolution of life4  ,our   
reason1 incorrigibly presumptuous1      
imagines itself possessed1 by right of  
birth or by right of conquest1 innate or
 acquired1 of all the essential elements
 of the knowledge of truth4 ,even where 
it confesses that it does not know the  
object presented to it1 it believes that
 its ignorance consists only in not     
knowing which one of its time-honored   
categories suits the new object4 ,in    
what drawer1 ready to open1 shall we put
 it8 ,in what garment1 already cut out1 
shall we clothe it8 ,is it this1 or     
that1 or the other thing8 ,and this1 and
 that1 and the other thing are always   
something already conceived1 already    
known4 ,the idea that for a new object  

we might have to create a new concept1  
perhaps a new method of thinking1 is    
deeply repugnant to us4 ,the history of 
philosophy is there1 however1 and shows 
us the eternal conflict of systems1 the 
impossibility of satisfactorily getting 
the real into the ready-made garments of
 our ready-made concepts1 the necessity 
of making to measure4 ,but1 rather than 
go to this extremity1 our reason prefers
 to announce once for all1 with a proud 
modesty1 that it has to do only with the
 relative1 and that the absolute is not 
in its province4 ,this preliminary      
declaration enables it to apply its     
habitual method of thought without any  
scruple1 and thus1 under pretense that  
it does not touch the absolute1 to make 
absolute judgments upon everything4     
,plato was the first to set up the      
theory that to know the real consists in
 finding its ,idea1 that is to say1 in  
forcing it into a pre-existing frame    
already at our disposal--as if we       
implicitly possessed universal          

knowledge4 ,but this belief is natural  
to the human intellect1 always engaged  
as it is in determining under what      
former heading it shall catalogue any   
new object2 and it may be said that1 in 
a certain sense1 we are all born        
,platonists4  ,nowhere is the inadequacy
 of this method so obvious as in        
theories of life4 ,if1 in evolving in   
the direction of the vertebrates in     
general1 of man and intellect in        
particular1 life has had to abandon by  
the way many elements incompatible with 
this particular mode of organization and
 consign them1 as we shall show1 to     
other lines of development1 it is the   
totality of these elements that we must 
find again and rejoin to the intellect  
proper1 in order to grasp the true      
nature of vital activity4 ,and we shall 
probably be aided in this by the fringe 
of vague intuition that surrounds our   
distinct--that is1                      
intellectual--representation4 ,for what 
can this useless fringe be1 if not that 

part of the evolving principle which has
 not shrunk to the peculiar form of our 
organization1 but has settled around it 
unasked for1 unwanted8 ,it is there1    
accordingly1 that we must look for hints
 to expand the intellectual form of our 
thought2 from there shall we derive the 
impetus necessary to lift us above      
ourselves4 ,to form an idea of the whole
 of life cannot consist in combining    
simple ideas that have been left behind 
in us by life itself in the course of   
its evolution4 ,how could the part be   
equivalent to the whole1 the content to 
the container1 a by-product of the vital
 operation to the operation itself8     
,such1 however1 is our illusion when we 
define the evolution of life as a       
passage from the homogeneous to the     
heterogeneous1 or by any other concept  
obtained by putting fragments of        
intellect side by side4 ,we place       
ourselves in one of the points where    
evolution comes to a head--the principal
 one1 no doubt1 but not the only one2   

and there we do not even take all we    
find1 for of the intellect we keep only 
one or two of the concepts by which it  
expresses itself2 and it is this part of
 a part that we declare representative  
of the whole1 of something indeed which 
goes beyond the concrete whole1 ,i mean 
of the evolution movement of which this 
whole is only the present stage6 ,the   
truth is1 that to represent this the    
entire intellect would not be too       
much--nay1 it would not be enough4 ,it  
would be necessary to add to it what we 
find in every other terminal point of   
evolution4 ,and these diverse and       
divergent elements must be considered as
 so many extracts which are1 or at least
 which were1 in their humblest form1    
mutually complementary4 ,only then might
 we have an inkling of the real nature  
of the evolution movement2 and even then
 we should fail to grasp it completely1 
for we should still be dealing only with
 the evolved1 which is a result1 and not
 with evolution itself1 which is the act

 by which the result is obtained4  ,such
 is the philosophy of life to which we  
are leading up4 ,it claims to transcend 
both mechanism and finalism2 but1 as we 
announced at the beginning1 it is nearer
 the second doctrine than the first4 ,it
 will not be amiss to dwell on this     
point1 and show more precisely how far  
this philosophy of life resembles       
finalism and wherein it is different4   
,like radical finalism1 although in a   
vaguer form1 our philosophy represents  
the organized world as a harmonious     
whole4 ,but this harmony is far from    
being as perfect as it has been claimed 
to be4 ,it admits of much discord1      
because each species1 each individual   
even1 retains only a certain impetus    
from the universal vital impulsion and  
tends to use this energy in its own     
interest4 ,in this consists adaptation4 
,the species and the individual thus    
think only of themselves--whence arises 
a possible conflict with other forms of 
life4 ,harmony1 therefore1 does not     

exist in fact2 it exists rather in      
principle2 ,i mean that the original    
impetus is a common impetus1 and the    
higher we ascend the stream of life the 
more do diverse tendencies appear       
complementary to each other4 ,thus the  
wind at a street-corner divides into    
diverging currents which are all one and
 the same gust4 ,harmony1 or rather     
complementarity1 is revealed only in the
 mass1 in tendencies rather than in     
states4 ,especially 7and this is the    
point on which finalism has been most   
seriously mistaken7 harmony is rather   
behind us than before4 ,it is due to an 
identity of impulsion and not to a      
common aspiration4 ,it would be futile  
to try to assign to life an end1 in the 
human sense of the word4 ,to speak of an
 end is to think of a pre-existing model
 which has only to be realized4 ,it is  
to suppose1 therefore1 that all is      
given1 and that the future can be read  
in the present4 ,it is to believe that  
life1 in its movement and in its        

entirety1 goes to work like our         
intellect1 which is only a motionless   
and fragmentary view of life1 and which 
naturally takes its stand outside of    
time4 ,life1 on the contrary1 progresses
 and endures in time4 ,of course1 when  
once the road has been traveled1 we can 
glance over it1 mark its direction1 note
 this in psychological terms and speak  
as if there had been pursuit of an end4 
,thus shall we speak ourselves4 ,but1 of
 the road which was going to be         
traveled1 the human mind could have     
nothing to say1 for the road has been   
created pari passu with the act of      
traveling over it1 being nothing but the
 direction of this act itself4 ,at every
 instant1 then1 evolution must admit of 
a psychological interpretation which is1
 from our point of view1 the best       
interpretation2 but this explanation has
 neither value nor even significance    
except retrospectively4 ,never could the
 finalistic interpretation1 such as we  
shall propose it1 be taken for an       

anticipation of the future4 ,it is a    
particular mode of viewing the past in  
the light of the present4 ,in short1 the
 classic conception of finality         
postulates at once too much and too     
little3 it is both too wide and too     
narrow4 ,in explaining life by          
intellect1 it limits too much the       
meaning of life3 intellect1 such at     
least as we find it in ourselves1 has   
been fashioned by evolution during the  
course of progress2 it is cut out of    
something larger1 or1 rather1 it is only
 the projection1 necessarily on a plane1
 of a reality that possesses both relief
 and depth4 ,it is this more            
comprehensive reality that true finalism
 ought to reconstruct1 or1 rather1 if   
possible1 embrace in one view4 ,but1 on 
the other hand1 just because it goes    
beyond intellect--the faculty of        
connecting the same with the same1 of   
perceiving and also of producing        
repetitions--this reality is undoubtedly
 creative1 i4e4 productive of effects in

 which it expands and transcends its own
 being4 ,these effects were therefore   
not given in it in advance1 and so it   
could not take them for ends1 although1 
when once produced1 they admit of a     
rational interpretation1 like that of   
the manufactured article that has       
reproduced a model4 ,in short1 the      
theory of final causes does not go far  
enough when it confines itself to       
ascribing some intelligence to nature1  
and it goes too far when it supposes a  
pre-existence of the future in the      
present in the form of idea4 ,and the   
second theory1 which sins by excess1 is 
the outcome of the first1 which sins by 
defect4 ,in place of intellect proper   
must be substituted the more            
comprehensive reality of which intellect
 is only the contraction4 ,the future   
then appears as expanding the present3  
it was not1 therefore1 contained in the 
present in the form of a represented    
end4 ,and yet1 once realized1 it will   
explain the present as much as the      

present explains it1 and even more2 it  
must be viewed as an end as much as1 and
 more than1 a result4 ,our intellect has
 a right to consider the future         
abstractly from its habitual point of   
view1 being itself an abstract view of  
the cause of its own being4  ,it is true
 that the cause may then seem beyond our
 grasp4 ,already the finalist theory of 
life eludes all precise verification4   
,what if we go beyond it in one of its  
directions8 ,here1 in fact1 after a     
necessary digression1 we are back at the
 question which we regard as essential3 
can the insufficiency of mechanism be   
proved by facts8 ,we said that if this  
demonstration is possible1 it is on     
condition of frankly accepting the      
evolutionist hypothesis4 ,we must now   
show that if mechanism is insufficient  
to account for evolution1 the way of    
proving this insufficiency is not to    
stop at the classic conception of       
finality1 still less to contract or     
attenuate it1 but1 on the contrary1 to  

go further4  ,let us indicate at once   
the principle of our demonstration4 ,we 
said of life that1 from its origin1 it  
is the continuation of one and the same 
impetus1 divided into divergent lines of
 evolution4 ,something has grown1       
something has developed by a series of  
additions which have been so many       
creations4 ,this very development has   
brought about a dissociation of         
tendencies which were unable to grow    
beyond a certain point without becoming 
mutually incompatible4 ,strictly        
speaking1 there is nothing to prevent   
our imagining that the evolution of life
 might have taken place in one single   
individual by means of a series of      
transformations spread over thousands of
 ages4 ,or1 instead of a single         
individual1 any number might be         
supposed1 succeeding each other in a    
unilinear series4 ,in both cases        
evolution would have had1 so to speak1  
one dimension only4 ,but evolution has  
actually taken place through millions of

 individuals1 on divergent lines1 each  
ending at a crossing from which new     
paths radiate1 and so on indefinitely4  
,if our hypothesis is justified1 if the 
essential causes working along these    
diverse roads are of psychological      
nature1 they must keep something in     
common in spite of the divergence of    
their effects1 as school-fellows long   
separated keep the same memories of     
boyhood4 ,roads may fork or by-ways be  
opened along which dissociated elements 
may evolve in an independent manner1 but
 nevertheless it is in virtue of the    
primitive impetus of the whole that the 
movement of the parts continues4        
,something of the whole1 therefore1 must
 abide in the parts2 and this common    
element will be evident to us in some   
way1 perhaps by the presence of         
identical organs in very different      
organisms4 ,suppose1 for an instant1    
that the mechanistic explanation is the 
true one3 evolution must then have      
occurred through a series of accidents  

added to one another1 each new accident 
being preserved by selection if it is   
advantageous to that sum of former      
advantageous accidents which the present
 form of the living being represents4   
,what likelihood is there that1 by two  
entirely different series of accidents  
being added together1 two entirely      
different evolutions will arrive at     
similar results8 ,the more two lines of 
evolution diverge1 the less probability 
is there that accidental outer          
influences or accidental inner          
variations bring about the construction 
of the same apparatus upon them1        
especially if there was no trace of this
 apparatus at the moment of divergence4 
,but such similarity of the two products
 would be natural1 on the contrary1 on a
 hypothesis like ours3 even in the      
latest channel there would be something 
of the impulsion received at the source4
 ,pure mechanism1 then1 would be        
refutable1 and finality1 in the special 
sense in which we understand it1 would  

be demonstrable in a certain aspect1 if 
it could be proved that life may        
manufacture the like apparatus1 by      
unlike means1 on divergent lines of     
evolution2 and the strength of the proof
 would be proportional both to the      
divergency between the lines of         
evolution thus chosen and to the        
complexity of the similar structures    
found in them4  ,it will be said that   
resemblance of structure is due to      
sameness of the general conditions in   
which life has evolved1 and that these  
permanent outer conditions may have     
imposed the same direction on the forces
 constructing this or that apparatus1 in
 spite of the diversity of transient    
outer influences and accidental inner   
changes4 ,we are not1 of course1 blind  
to the rle which the concept of         
adaptation plays in the science of      
to-day4 ,biologists certainly do not all
 make the same use of it4 ,some think   
the outer conditions capable of causing 
change in organisms in a direct manner1 

in a definite direction1 through        
physico-chemical alterations induced by 
them in the living substance2 such is   
the hypothesis of ,eimer1 for example4  
,others1 more faithful to the spirit of 
,darwinism1 believe the influence of    
conditions works indirectly only1       
through favoring1 in the struggle for   
life1 those representatives of a species
 which the chance of birth has best     
adapted to the environment4 ,in other   
words1 some attribute a positive        
influence to outer conditions1 and say  
that they actually give rise to         
variations1 while the others say these  
conditions have only a negative         
influence and merely eliminate          
variations4 ,but1 in both cases1 the    
outer conditions are supposed to bring  
about a precise adjustment of the       
organism to its circumstances4 ,both    
parties1 then1 will attempt to explain  
mechanically1 by adaptation to similar  
conditions1 the similarities of         
structure which we think are the        

strongest argument against mechanism4   
,so we must at once indicate in a       
general way1 before passing to the      
detail1 why explanations from adaptation
 seem to us insufficient4  ,let us first
 remark that1 of the two hypotheses just
 described1 the latter is the only one  
which is not equivocal4 ,the ,darwinian 
idea of adaptation by automatic         
elimination of the unadapted is a simple
 and clear idea4 ,but1 just because it  
attributes to the outer cause which     
controls evolution a merely negative    
influence1 it has great difficulty in   
accounting for the progressive and1 so  
to say1 rectilinear development of      
complex apparatus such as we are about  
to examine4 ,how much greater will this 
difficulty be in the case of the similar
 structure of two extremely complex     
organs on two entirely different lines  
of evolution6 ,an accidental variation1 
however minute1 implies the working of a
 great number of small physical and     
chemical causes4 ,an accumulation of    

accidental variations1 such as would be 
necessary to produce a complex          
structure1 requires therefore the       
concurrence of an almost infinite number
 of infinitesimal causes4 ,why should   
these causes1 entirely accidental1 recur
 the same1 and in the same order1 at    
different points of space and time8 ,no 
one will hold that this is the case1 and
 the ,darwinian himself will probably   
merely maintain that identical effects  
may arise from different causes1 that   
more than one road leads to the same    
spot4 ,but let us not be fooled by a    
metaphor4 ,the place reached does not   
give the form of the road that leads    
there2 while an organic structure is    
just the accumulation of those small    
differences which evolution has had to  
go through in order to achieve it4 ,the 
struggle for life and natural selection 
can be of no use to us in solving this  
part of the problem1 for we are not     
concerned here with what has perished1  
we have to do only with what has        

survived4 ,now1 we see that identical   
structures have been formed on          
independent lines of evolution by a     
gradual accumulation of effects4 ,how   
can accidental causes1 occurring in an  
accidental order1 be supposed to have   
repeatedly come to the same result1 the 
causes being infinitely numerous and the
 effect infinitely complicated8  ,the   
principle of mechanism is that the same 
causes produce the same effects4 ,this  
principle1 of course1 does not always   
imply that the same effects must have   
the same causes2 but it does involve    
this consequence in the particular case 
in which the causes remain visible in   
the effect that they produce and are    
indeed its constitutive elements4 ,that 
two walkers starting from different     
points and wandering at random should   
finally meet1 is no great wonder4 ,but  
that1 throughout their walk1 they should
 describe two identical curves exactly  
superposable on each other1 is          
altogether unlikely4 ,the improbability 

will be the greater1 the more           
complicated the routes2 and it will     
become impossibility1 if the zigzags are
 infinitely complicated4 ,now1 what is  
this complexity of zigzags as compared  
with that of an organ in which thousands
 of different cells1 each being itself a
 kind of organism1 are arranged in a    
definite order8  ,let us turn1 then1 to 
the other hypothesis1 and see how it    
would solve the problem4 ,adaptation1 it
 says1 is not merely elimination of the 
unadapted2 it is due to the positive    
influence of outer conditions that have 
molded the organism on their own form4  
,this time1 similarity of effects will  
be explained by similarity of cause4 ,we
 shall remain1 apparently1 in pure      
mechanism4 ,but if we look closely1 we  
shall see that the explanation is merely
 verbal1 that we are again the dupes of 
words1 and that the trick of the        
solution consists in taking the term    
adaptation in two entirely different    
senses at the same time4  ,if ,i pour   

into the same glass1 by turns1 water and
 wine1 the two liquids will take the    
same form1 and the sameness in form will
 be due to the sameness in adaptation of
 content to container4 ,adaptation1     
here1 really means mechanical           
adjustment4 ,the reason is that the form
 to which the matter has adapted itself 
was there1 ready-made1 and has forced   
its own shape on the matter4 ,but1 in   
the adaptation of an organism to the    
circumstances it has to live in1 where  
is the pre-existing form awaiting its   
matter8 ,the circumstances are not a    
mold into which life is inserted and    
whose form life adopts3 this is indeed  
to be fooled by a metaphor4 ,there is no
 form yet1 and the life must create a   
form for itself1 suited to the          
circumstances which are made for it4 ,it
 will have to make the best of these    
circumstances1 neutralize their         
inconveniences and utilize their        
advantages--in short1 respond to outer  
actions by building up a machine which  

has no resemblance to them4 ,such       
adapting is not repeating1 but          
replying1--an entirely different thing4 
,if there is still adaptation1 it will  
be in the sense in which one may say of 
the solution of a problem of geometry1  
for example1 that it is adapted to the  
conditions4 ,i grant indeed that        
adaptation so understood explains why   
different evolutionary processes result 
in similar forms3 the same problem1 of  
course1 calls for the same solution4    
,but it is necessary then to introduce1 
as for the solution of a problem of     
geometry1 an intelligent activity1 or at
 least a cause which behaves in the same
 way4 ,this is to bring in finality     
again1 and a finality this time more    
than ever charged with anthropomorphic  
elements4 ,in a word1 if the adaptation 
is passive1 if it is mere repetition in 
the relief of what the conditions give  
in the mold1 it will build up nothing   
that one tries to make it build2 and if 
it is active1 capable of responding by a

 calculated solution to the problem     
which is set out in the conditions1 that
 is going further than we do--too far1  
indeed1 in our opinion--in the direction
 we indicated in the beginning4 ,but the
 truth is that there is a surreptitious 
passing from one of these two meanings  
to the other1 a flight for refuge to the
 first whenever one is about to be      
caught in flagrante delicto of finalism 
by employing the second4 ,it is really  
the second which serves the usual       
practice of science1 but it is the first
 that generally provides its philosophy4
 ,in any particular case one talks as if
 the process of adaptation were an      
effort of the organism to build up a    
machine capable of turning external     
circumstances to the best possible      
account3 then one speaks of adaptation  
in general as if it were the very       
impress of circumstances1 passively     
received by an indifferent matter4  ,but
 let us come to the examples4 ,it would 
be interesting first to institute here a

 general comparison between plants and  
animals4 ,one cannot fail to be struck  
with the parallel progress which has    
been accomplished1 on both sides1 in the
 direction of sexuality4 ,not only is   
fecundation itself the same in higher   
plants and in animals1 since it         
consists1 in both1 in the union of two  
nuclei that differ in their properties  
and structure before their union and    
immediately after become equivalent to  
each other2 but the preparation of      
sexual elements goes on in both under   
like conditions3 it consists essentially
 in the reduction of the number of      
chromosomes and the rejection of a      
certain quantity of chromatic           
substance4#bb ,yet vegetables and       
animals have evolved on independent     
lines1 favored by unlike circumstances1 
opposed by unlike obstacles4 ,here are  
two great series which have gone on     
diverging4 ,on either line1 thousands   
and thousands of causes have combined to
 determine the morphological and        

functional evolution4 ,yet these        
infinitely complicated causes have been 
consummated1 in each series1 in the same
 effect4 ,and this effect1 could hardly 
be called a phenomenon of adaptation3   
where is the adaptation1 where is the   
pressure of external circumstances8     
,there is no striking utility in sexual 
generation2 it has been interpreted in  
the most diverse ways2 and some very    
acute enquirers even regard the         
sexuality of the plant1 at least1 as a  
luxury which nature might have dispensed
 with4#bc ,but we do not wish to dwell  
on facts so disputed4 ,the ambiguity of 
the term adaptation1 and the necessity  
of transcending both the point of view  
of mechanical causality and that of     
anthropomorphic finality1 will stand out
 more clearly with simpler examples4 ,at
 all times the doctrine of finality has 
laid much stress on the marvellous      
structure of the sense-organs1 in order 
to liken the work of nature to that of  
an intelligent workman4 ,now1 since     

these organs are found1 in a rudimentary
 state1 in the lower animals1 and since 
nature offers us many intermediaries    
between the pigment-spot of the simplest
 organisms and the infinitely complex   
eye of the vertebrates1 it may just as  
well be alleged that the result has been
 brought about by natural selection     
perfecting the organ automatically4 ,in 
short1 if there is a case in which it   
seems justifiable to invoke adaptation1 
it is this particular one4 ,for there   
may be discussion about the function and
 meaning of such a thing as sexual      
generation1 in so far as it is related  
to the conditions in which it occurs2   
but the relation of the eye to light is 
obvious1 and when we call this relation 
an adaptation1 we must know what we     
mean4 ,if1 then1 we can show1 in this   
privileged case1 the insufficiency of   
the principles invoked on both sides1   
our demonstration will at once have     
reached a high degree of generality4    
,let us consider the example on which   

the advocates of finality have always   
insisted3 the structure of such an organ
 as the human eye4 ,they have had no    
difficulty in showing that in this      
extremely complicated apparatus all the 
elements are marvelously co-ordinated4  
,in order that vision shall operate1    
says the author of a well-known book on 
,final ,causes1 the sclerotic membrane  
must become transparent in one point of 
its surface1 so as to enable luminous   
rays to pierce it2444 the cornea must   
correspond exactly with the opening of  
the socket2444 behind this transparent  
opening there must be refracting        
media2444 there must be a retina#bd at  
the extremity of the dark chamber2444   
perpendicular to the retina there must  
be an innumerable quantity of           
transparent cones permitting only the   
light directed in the line of their axes
 to reach the nervous membrane1#be etc4 
etc4 ,in reply1 the advocate of final   
causes has been invited to assume the   
evolutionist hypothesis4 ,everything is 

marvelous1 indeed1 if one consider an   
eye like ours1 in which thousands of    
elements are cordinated in a single     
function4 ,but take the function at its 
origin1 in the ,infusorian1 where it is 
reduced to the mere impressionability   
7almost purely chemical7 of a           
pigment-spot to light3 this function1   
possibly only an accidental fact in the 
beginning1 may have brought about a     
slight complication of the organ1 which 
again induced an improvement of the     
function4 ,it may have done this either 
directly1 through some unknown          
mechanism1 or indirectly1 merely through
 the effect of the advantages it brought
 to the living being and the hold it    
thus offered to natural selection4 ,thus
 the progressive formation of an eye as 
well contrived as ours would be         
explained by an almost infinite number  
of actions and reactions between the    
function and the organ1 without the     
intervention of other than mechanical   
causes4  ,the question is hard to       

decide1 indeed1 when put directly       
between the function and the organ1 as  
is done in the doctrine of finality1 as 
also mechanism itself does4 ,for organ  
and function are terms of different     
nature1 and each conditions the other so
 closely that it is impossible to say a 
priori whether in expressing their      
relation we should begin with the first1
 as does mechanism1 or with the second1 
as finalism requires4 ,but the          
discussion would take an entirely       
different turn1 we think1 if we began by
 comparing together two terms of the    
same nature1 an organ with an organ1    
instead of an organ with its function4  
,in this case1 it would be possible to  
proceed little by little to a solution  
more and more plausible1 and there would
 be the more chance of a successful     
issue the more resolutely we assumed the
 evolutionist hypothesis4  ,let us place
 side by side the eye of a vertebrate   
and that of a mollusc such as the common
 ,pecten4 ,we find the same essential   

parts in each1 composed of analogous    
elements4 ,the eye of the ,pecten       
presents a retina1 a cornea1 a lens of  
cellular structure like our own4 ,there 
is even that peculiar inversion of      
retinal elements which is not met with1 
in general1 in the retina of the        
invertebrates4 ,now1 the origin of      
molluscs may be a debated question1 but1
 whatever opinion we hold1 all are      
agreed that molluscs and vertebrates    
separated from their common parent-stem 
long before the appearance of an eye so 
complex as that of the ,pecten4 ,whence1
 then1 the structural analogy8  ,let us 
question on this point the two opposed  
systems of evolutionist explanation in  
turn--the hypothesis of purely          
accidental variations1 and that of a    
variation directed in a definite way    
under the influence of external         
conditions4  ,the first1 as is well     
known1 is presented to-day in two quite 
different forms4 ,darwin spoke of very  
slight variations being accumulated by  

natural selection4 ,he was not ignorant 
of the facts of sudden variation2 but he
 thought these sports1 as he called     
them1 were only monstrosities incapable 
of perpetuating themselves2 and he      
accounted for the genesis of species by 
an accumulation of insensible           
variations4#bf ,such is still the       
opinion of many naturalists4 ,it is     
tending1 however1 to give way to the    
opposite idea that a new species comes  
into being all at once by the           
simultaneous appearance of several new  
characters1 all somewhat different from 
the previous ones4 ,this latter         
hypothesis1 already proposed by various 
authors1 notably by ,bateson in a       
remarkable book1#bg has become deeply   
significant and acquired great force    
since the striking experiments of ,hugo 
de ,vries4 ,this botanist1 working on   
the ,o,enothera ,lamarckiana1 obtained  
at the end of a few generations a       
certain number of new species4 ,the     
theory he deduces from his experiments  

is of the highest interest4 ,species    
pass through alternate periods of       
stability and transformation4 ,when the 
period of mutability occurs1 unexpected 
forms spring forth in a great number of 
different directions4#bh--,we will not  
attempt to take sides between this      
hypothesis and that of insensible       
variations4 ,indeed1 perhaps both are   
partly true4 ,we wish merely to point   
out that if the variations invoked are  
accidental1 they do not1 whether small  
or great1 account for a similarity of   
structure such as we have cited4  ,let  
us assume1 to begin with1 the ,darwinian
 theory of insensible variations1 and   
suppose the occurrence of small         
differences due to chance1 and          
continually accumulating4 ,it must not  
be forgotten that all the parts of an   
organism are necessarily cordinated4    
,whether the function be the effect of  
the organ or its cause1 it matters      
little2 one point is certain--the organ 
will be of no use and will not give     

selection a hold unless it functions4   
,however the minute structure of the    
retina may develop1 and however         
complicated it may become1 such         
progress1 instead of favoring vision1   
will probably hinder it if the visual   
centres do not develop at the same time1
 as well as several parts of the visual 
organ itself4 ,if the variations are    
accidental1 how can they ever agree to  
arise in every part of the organ at the 
same time1 in such way that the organ   
will continue to perform its function8  
,darwin quite understood this2 it is one
 of the reasons why he regarded         
variation as insensible4#bi ,for a      
difference which arises accidentally at 
one point of the visual apparatus1 if it
 be very slight1 will not hinder the    
functioning of the organ2 and hence this
 first accidental variation can1 in a   
sense1 wait for complementary variations
 to accumulate and raise vision to a    
higher degree of perfection4 ,granted2  
but while the insensible variation does 

not hinder the functioning of the eye1  
neither does it help it1 so long as the 
variations that are complementary do not
 occur4 ,how1 in that case1 can the     
variation be retained by natural        
selection8 ,unwittingly one will reason 
as if the slight variation were a       
toothing stone set up by the organism   
and reserved for a later construction4  
,this hypothesis1 so little conformable 
to the ,darwinian principle1 is         
difficult enough to avoid even in the   
case of an organ which has been         
developed along one single main line of 
evolution1 e4g4 the vertebrate eye4 ,but
 it is absolutely forced upon us when we
 observe the likeness of structure of   
the vertebrate eye and that of the      
molluscs4 ,how could the same small     
variations1 incalculable in number1 have
 ever occurred in the same order on two 
independent lines of evolution1 if they 
were purely accidental8 ,and how could  
they have been preserved by selection   
and accumulated in both cases1 the same 

in the same order1 when each of them1   
taken separately1 was of no use8  ,let  
us turn1 then1 to the hypothesis of     
sudden variations1 and see whether it   
will solve the problem4 ,it certainly   
lessens the difficulty on one point1 but
 it makes it much worse on another4 ,if 
the eye of the mollusc and that of the  
vertebrate have both been raised to     
their present form by a relatively small
 number of sudden leaps1 ,i have less   
difficulty in understanding the         
resemblance of the two organs than if   
this resemblance were due to an         
incalculable number of infinitesimal    
resemblances acquired successively3 in  
both cases it is chance that operates1  
but in the second case chance is not    
required to work the miracle it would   
have to perform in the first4 ,not only 
is the number of resemblances to be     
added somewhat reduced1 but ,i can also 
understand better how each could be     
preserved and added to the others2 for  
the elementary variation is now         

considerable enough to be an advantage  
to the living being1 and so to lend     
itself to the play of selection4 ,but   
here there arises another problem1 no   
less formidable1 viz41 how do all the   
parts of the visual apparatus1 suddenly 
changed1 remain so well cordinated that 
the eye continues to exercise its       
function8 ,for the change of one part   
alone will make vision impossible1      
unless this change is absolutely        
infinitesimal4 ,the parts must then all 
change at once1 each consulting the     
others4 ,i agree that a great number of 
uncordinated variations may indeed have 
arisen in less fortunate individuals1   
that natural selection may have         
eliminated these1 and that only the     
combination fit to endure1 capable of   
preserving and improving vision1 has    
survived4 ,still1 this combination had  
to be produced4 ,and1 supposing chance  
to have granted this favor once1 can we 
admit that it repeats the self-same     
favor in the course of the history of a 

species1 so as to give rise1 every time1
 all at once1 to new complications      
marvelously regulated with reference to 
each other1 and so related to former    
complications as to go further on in the
 same direction8 ,how1 especially1 can  
we suppose that by a series of mere     
accidents these sudden variations occur1
 the same1 in the same order1--involving
 in each case a perfect harmony of      
elements more and more numerous and     
complex--along two independent lines of 
evolution8  ,the law of correlation will
 be invoked1 of course2 ,darwin himself 
appealed to it4#cj ,it will be alleged  
that a change is not localized in a     
single point of the organism1 but has   
its necessary recoil on other points4   
,the examples cited by ,darwin remain   
classic3 white cats with blue eyes are  
generally deaf2 hairless dogs have      
imperfect dentition1 etc4--,granted2 but
 let us not play now on the word        
correlation4 ,a collective whole of     
solidary changes is one thing1 a system 

of complementary changes--changes so    
cordinated as to keep up and even       
improve the functioning of an organ     
under more complicated conditions--is   
another4 ,that an anomaly of the pilous 
system should be accompanied by an      
anomaly of dentition is quite           
conceivable without our having to call  
for a special principle of explanation2 
for hair and teeth are similar          
formations1#ca and the same chemical    
change of the germ that hinders the     
formation of hair would probably        
obstruct that of teeth3 it may be for   
the same sort of reason that white cats 
with blue eyes are deaf4 ,in these      
different examples the correlative      
changes are only solidary changes 7not  
to mention the fact that they are really
 lesions1 namely1 diminutions or        
suppressions1 and not additions1 which  
makes a great difference74 ,but when we 
speak of correlative changes occurring  
suddenly in the different parts of the  
eye1 we use the word in an entirely new 

sense3 this time there is a whole set of
 changes not only simultaneous1 not only
 bound together by community of origin1 
but so cordinated that the organ keeps  
on performing the same simple function1 
and even performs it better4 ,that a    
change in the germ1 which influences the
 formation of the retina1 may affect at 
the same time also the formation of the 
cornea1 the iris1 the lens1 the visual  
centres1 etc41 ,i admit1 if necessary1  
although they are formations that differ
 much more from one another in their    
original nature than do probably hair   
and teeth4 ,but that all these          
simultaneous changes should occur in    
such a way as to improve or even merely 
maintain vision1 this is what1 in the   
hypothesis of sudden variation1 ,i      
cannot admit1 unless a mysterious       
principle is to come in1 whose duty it  
is to watch over the interest of the    
function4 ,but this would be to give up 
the idea of accidental variation4 ,in   
reality1 these two senses of the word   

correlation are often interchanged in   
the mind of the biologist1 just like the
 two senses of the word adaptation4 ,and
 the confusion is almost legitimate in  
botany1 that science in which the theory
 of the formation of species by sudden  
variation rests on the firmest          
experimental basis4 ,in vegetables1     
function is far less narrowly bound to  
form than in animals4 ,even profound    
morphological differences1 such as a    
change in the form of leaves1 have no   
appreciable influence on the exercise of
 function1 and so do not require a whole
 system of complementary changes for the
 plant to remain fit to survive4 ,but it
 is not so in the animal1 especially in 
the case of an organ like the eye1 a    
very complex structure and very delicate
 function4 ,here it is impossible to    
identify changes that are simply        
solidary with changes which are also    
complementary4 ,the two senses of the   
word correlation must be carefully      
distinguished2 it would be a downright  

paralogism to adopt one of them in the  
premisses of the reasoning1 and the     
other in the conclusion4 ,and this is   
just what is done when the principle of 
correlation is invoked in explanations  
of detail in order to account for       
complementary variations1 and then      
correlation in general is spoken of as  
if it were any group of variations      
provoked by any variation of the germ4  
,thus1 the notion of correlation is     
first used in current science as it     
might be used by an advocate of         
finality2 it is understood that this is 
only a convenient way of expressing     
oneself1 that one will correct it and   
fall back on pure mechanism when        
explaining the nature of the principles 
and turning from science to philosophy4 
,and one does then come back to pure    
mechanism1 but only by giving a new     
meaning to the word correlation--a      
meaning which would now make correlation
 inapplicable to the detail it is called
 upon to explain4  ,to sum up1 if the   

accidental variations that bring about  
evolution are insensible variations1    
some good genius must be appealed       
to--the genius of the future species--in
 order to preserve and accumulate these 
variations1 for selection will not look 
after this4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the 
accidental variations are sudden1 then1 
for the previous function to go on or   
for a new function to take its place1   
all the changes that have happened      
together must be complementary4 ,so we  
have to fall back on the good genius    
again1 this time to obtain the          
convergence of simultaneous changes1 as 
before to be assured of the continuity  
of direction of successive variations4  
,but in neither case can parallel       
development of the same complex         
structures on independent lines of      
evolution be due to a mere accumulation 
of accidental variations4 ,so we come to
 the second of the two great hypotheses 
we have to examine4 ,suppose the        
variations are due1 not to accidental   

and inner causes1 but to the direct     
influence of outer circumstances4 ,let  
us see what line we should have to take1
 on this hypothesis1 to account for the 
resemblance of eye-structure in two     
series that are independent of each     
other from the phylogenetic point of    
view4  ,though molluscs and vertebrates 
have evolved separately1 both have      
remained exposed to the influence of    
light4 ,and light is a physical cause   
bringing forth certain definite effects4
 ,acting in a continuous way1 it has    
been able to produce a continuous       
variation in a constant direction4 ,of  
course it is unlikely that the eye of   
the vertebrate and that of the mollusc  
have been built up by a series of       
variations due to simple chance4        
,admitting even that light enters into  
the case as an instrument of selection1 
in order to allow only useful variations
 to persist1 there is no possibility    
that the play of chance1 even thus      
supervised from without1 should bring   

about in both cases the same            
juxtaposition of elements cordinated in 
the same way4 ,but it would be different
 supposing that light acted directly on 
the organized matter so as to change its
 structure and somehow adapt this       
structure to its own form4 ,the         
resemblance of the two effects would    
then be explained by the identity of the
 cause4 ,the more and more complex eye  
would be something like the deeper and  
deeper imprint of light on a matter     
which1 being organized1 possesses a     
special aptitude for receiving it4  ,but
 can an organic structure be likened to 
an imprint8 ,we have already called     
attention to the ambiguity of the term  
adaptation4 ,the gradual complication of
 a form which is being better and better
 adapted to the mold of outward         
circumstances is one thing1 the         
increasingly complex structure of an    
instrument which derives more and more  
advantage from these circumstances is   
another4 ,in the former case1 the matter

 merely receives an imprint2 in the     
second1 it reacts positively1 it solves 
a problem4 ,obviously it is this second 
sense of the word adapt that is used    
when one says that the eye has become   
better and better adapted to the        
influence of light4 ,but one passes more
 or less unconsciously from this sense  
to the other1 and a purely mechanistic  
biology will strive to make the passive 
adaptation of an inert matter1 which    
submits to the influence of its         
environment1 mean the same as the active
 adaptation of an organism which derives
 from this influence an advantage it can
 appropriate4 ,it must be owned1 indeed1
 that ,nature herself appears to invite 
our mind to confuse these two kinds of  
adaptation1 for she usually begins by a 
passive adaptation where1 later on1 she 
will build up a mechanism for active    
response4 ,thus1 in the case before us1 
it is unquestionable that the first     
rudiment of the eye is found in the     
pigment-spot of the lower organisms2    

this spot may indeed have been produced 
physically1 by the mere action of light1
 and there are a great number of        
intermediaries between the simple spot  
of pigment and a complicated eye like   
that of the vertebrates4--,but1 from the
 fact that we pass from one thing to    
another by degrees1 it does not follow  
that the two things are of the same     
nature4 ,from the fact that an orator   
falls in1 at first1 with the passions of
 his audience in order to make himself  
master of them1 it will not be concluded
 that to follow is the same as to lead4 
,now1 living matter seems to have no    
other means of turning circumstances to 
good account than by adapting itself to 
them passively at the outset4 ,where it 
has to direct a movement1 it begins by  
adopting it4 ,life proceeds by          
insinuation4 ,the intermediate degrees  
between a pigment-spot and an eye are   
nothing to the point3 however numerous  
the degrees1 there will still be the    
same interval between the pigment-spot  

and the eye as between a photograph and 
a photographic apparatus4 ,certainly the
 photograph has been gradually turned   
into a photographic apparatus2 but could
 light alone1 a physical force1 ever    
have provoked this change1 and converted
 an impression left by it into a machine
 capable of using it8  ,it may be       
claimed that considerations of utility  
are out of place here2 that the eye is  
not made to see1 but that we see because
 we have eyes2 that the organ is what it
 is1 and utility is a word by which we  
designate the functional effects of the 
structure4 ,but when ,i say that the eye
 makes use of light1 ,i do not merely   
mean that the eye is capable of seeing2 
,i allude to the very precise relations 
that exist between this organ and the   
apparatus of locomotion4 ,the retina of 
vertebrates is prolonged in an optic    
nerve1 which1 again1 is continued by    
cerebral centres connected with motor   
mechanisms4 ,our eye makes use of light 
in that it enables us to utilize1 by    

movements of reaction1 the objects that 
we see to be advantageous1 and to avoid 
those which we see to be injurious4     
,now1 of course1 as light may have      
produced a pigment-spot by physical     
means1 so it can physically determine   
the movements of certain organisms2     
ciliated ,infusoria1 for instance1 react
 to light4 ,but no one would hold that  
the influence of light has physically   
caused the formation of a nervous       
system1 of a muscular system1 of an     
osseous system1 all things which are    
continuous with the apparatus of vision 
in vertebrate animals4 ,the truth is1   
when one speaks of the gradual formation
 of the eye1 and1 still more1 when one  
takes into account all that is          
inseparably connected with it1 one      
brings in something entirely different  
from the direct action of light4 ,one   
implicitly attributes to organized      
matter a certain capacity sui generis1  
the mysterious power of building up very
 complicated machines to utilize the    

simple excitation that it undergoes4    
,but this is just what is claimed to be 
unnecessary4 ,physics and chemistry are 
said to give us the key to everything4  
,eimer's great work is instructive in   
this respect4 ,it is well known what    
persevering effort this biologist has   
devoted to demonstrating that           
transformation is brought about by the  
influence of the external on the        
internal1 continuously exerted in the   
same direction1 and not1 as ,darwin     
held1 by accidental variations4 ,his    
theory rests on observations of the     
highest interest1 of which the          
starting-point was the study of the     
course followed by the color variation  
of the skin in certain lizards4 ,before 
this1 the already old experiments of    
,dorfmeister had shown that the same    
chrysalis1 according as it was submitted
 to cold or heat1 gave rise to very     
different butterflies1 which had long   
been regarded as independent species1   
,vanessa levana and ,vanessa prorsa3 an 

intermediate temperature produces an    
intermediate form4 ,we might class with 
these facts the important               
transformations observed in a little    
crustacean1 ,artemia salina1 when the   
salt of the water it lives in is        
increased or diminished4#cb ,in these   
various experiments the external agent  
seems to act as a cause of              
transformation4 ,but what does the word 
cause mean here8 ,without undertaking an
 exhaustive analysis of the idea of     
causality1 we will merely remark that   
three very different meanings of this   
term are commonly confused4 ,a cause may
 act by impelling1 releasing1 or        
unwinding4 ,the billiard-ball1 that     
strikes another1 determines its movement
 by impelling4 ,the spark that explodes 
the powder acts by releasing4 ,the      
gradual relaxing of the spring1 that    
makes the phonograph turn1 unwinds the  
melody inscribed on the cylinder3 if the
 melody which is played be the effect1  
and the relaxing of the spring the      

cause1 we must say that the cause acts  
by unwinding4 ,what distinguishes these 
three cases from each other is the      
greater or less solidarity between the  
cause and the effect4 ,in the first1 the
 quantity and quality of the effect vary
 with the quantity and quality of the   
cause4 ,in the second1 neither quality  
nor quantity of the effect varies with  
quality and quantity of the cause3 the  
effect is invariable4 ,in the third1 the
 quantity of the effect depends on the  
quantity of the cause1 but the cause    
does not influence the quality of the   
effect3 the longer the cylinder turns by
 the action of the spring1 the more of  
the melody ,i shall hear1 but the nature
 of the melody1 or of the part heard1   
does not depend on the action of the    
spring4 ,only in the first case1 really1
 does cause explain effect2 in the      
others the effect is more or less given 
in advance1 and the antecedent invoked  
is--in different degrees1 of course--its
 occasion rather than its cause4 ,now1  

in saying that the saltness of the water
 is the cause of the transformations of 
,artemia1 or that the degree of         
temperature determines the color and    
marks of the wings which a certain      
chrysalis will assume on becoming a     
butterfly1 is the word cause used in the
 first sense8 ,obviously not3 causality 
has here an intermediary sense between  
those of unwinding and releasing4 ,such1
 indeed1 seems to be ,eimer's own       
meaning when he speaks of the           
kaleidoscopic character of the          
variation1#cc or when he says that the  
variation of organized matter works in a
 definite way1 just as inorganic matter 
crystallizes in definite directions4#cd 
,and it may be granted1 perhaps1 that   
the process is a merely physical and    
chemical one in the case of the         
color-changes of the skin4 ,but if this 
sort of explanation is extended to the  
case of the gradual formation of the eye
 of the vertebrate1 for instance1 it    
must be supposed that the               

physico-chemistry of living bodies is   
such that the influence of light has    
caused the organism to construct a      
progressive series of visual apparatus1 
all extremely complex1 yet all capable  
of seeing1 and of seeing better and     
better4#ce ,what more could the most    
confirmed finalist say1 in order to mark
 out so exceptional a physico-chemistry8
 ,and will not the position of a        
mechanistic philosophy become still more
 difficult1 when it is pointed out to it
 that the egg of a mollusc cannot have  
the same chemical composition as that of
 a vertebrate1 that the organic         
substance which evolved toward the first
 of these two forms could not have been 
chemically identical with that of the   
substance which went in the other       
direction1 and that1 nevertheless1 under
 the influence of light1 the same organ 
has been constructed in the one case as 
in the other8  ,the more we reflect upon
 it1 the more we shall see that this    
production of the same effect by two    

different accumulations of an enormous  
number of small causes is contrary to   
the principles of mechanistic           
philosophy4 ,we have concentrated the   
full force of our discussion upon an    
example drawn from phylogenesis4 ,but   
ontogenesis would have furnished us with
 facts no less cogent4 ,every moment1   
right before our eyes1 nature arrives at
 identical results1 in sometimes        
neighboring species1 by entirely        
different embryogenic processes4        
,observations of heteroblastia have     
multiplied in late years1#cf and it has 
been necessary to reject the almost     
classical theory of the specificity of  
embryonic gills4 ,still keeping to our  
comparison between the eye of           
vertebrates and that of molluscs1 we may
 point out that the retina of the       
vertebrate is produced by an expansion  
in the rudimentary brain of the young   
embryo4 ,it is a regular nervous centre 
which has moved toward the periphery4   
,in the mollusc1 on the contrary1 the   

retina is derived from the ectoderm     
directly1 and not indirectly by means of
 the embryonic encephalon4 ,quite       
different1 therefore1 are the           
evolutionary processes which lead1 in   
man and in the ,pecten1 to the          
development of a like retina4 ,but1     
without going so far as to compare two  
organisms so distant from each other1 we
 might reach the same conclusion simply 
by looking at certain very curious facts
 of regeneration in one and the same    
organism4 ,if the crystalline lens of a 
,triton be removed1 it is regenerated by
 the iris4#cg ,now1 the original lens   
was built out of the ectoderm1 while the
 iris is of mesodermic origin4 ,what is 
more1 in the ,salamandra maculata1 if   
the lens be removed and the iris left1  
the regeneration of the lens takes place
 at the upper part of the iris2 but if  
this upper part of the iris itself be   
taken away1 the regeneration takes place
 in the inner or retinal layer of the   
remaining region4#ch ,thus1 parts       

differently situated1 differently       
constituted1 meant normally for         
different functions1 are capable of     
performing the same duties and even of  
manufacturing1 when necessary1 the same 
pieces of the machine4 ,here we have1   
indeed1 the same effect obtained by     
different combinations of causes4       
,whether we will or no1 we must appeal  
to some inner directing principle in    
order to account for this convergence of
 effects4 ,such convergence does not    
appear possible in the ,darwinian1 and  
especially the neo-,darwinian1 theory of
 insensible accidental variations1 nor  
in the hypothesis of sudden accidental  
variations1 nor even in the theory that 
assigns definite directions to the      
evolution of the various organs by a    
kind of mechanical composition of the   
external with the internal forces4 ,so  
we come to the only one of the present  
forms of evolution which remains for us 
to mention1 viz41 neo-,lamarckism4      
99       99       99       99       99  

,it is well known that ,lamarck         
attributed to the living being the power
 of varying by use or disuse of its     
organs1 and also of passing on the      
variation so acquired to its            
descendants4 ,a certain number of       
biologists hold a doctrine of this kind 
to-day4 ,the variation that results in a
 new species is not1 they believe1      
merely an accidental variation inherent 
in the germ itself1 nor is it governed  
by a determinism sui generis which      
develops definite characters in a       
definite direction1 apart from every    
consideration of utility4 ,it springs   
from the very effort of the living being
 to adapt itself to the circumstances of
 its existence4 ,the effort may indeed  
be only the mechanical exercise of      
certain organs1 mechanically elicited by
 the pressure of external circumstances4
 ,but it may also imply consciousness   
and will1 and it is in this sense that  
it appears to be understood by one of   
the most eminent representatives of the 

doctrine1 the ,american naturalist      
,cope4#ci ,neo-,lamarckism is therefore1
 of all the later forms of evolutionism1
 the only one capable of admitting an   
internal and psychological principle of 
development1 although it is not bound to
 do so4 ,and it is also the only        
evolutionism that seems to us to account
 for the building up of identical       
complex organs on independent lines of  
development4 ,for it is quite           
conceivable that the same effort to turn
 the same circumstances to good account 
might have the same result1 especially  
if the problem put by the circumstances 
is such as to admit of only one         
solution4 ,but the question remains1    
whether the term effort must not then be
 taken in a deeper sense1 a sense even  
more psychological than any             
neo-,lamarckian supposes4  ,for a mere  
variation of size is one thing1 and a   
change of form is another4 ,that an     
organ can be strengthened and grow by   
exercise1 nobody will deny4 ,but it is a

 long way from that to the progressive  
development of an eye like that of the  
molluscs and of the vertebrates4 ,if    
this development be ascribed to the     
influence of light1 long continued but  
passively received1 we fall back on the 
theory we have just criticized4 ,if1 on 
the other hand1 an internal activity is 
appealed to1 then it must be something  
quite different from what we usually    
call an effort1 for never has an effort 
been known to produce the slightest     
complication of an organ1 and yet an    
enormous number of complications1 all   
admirably cordinated1 have been         
necessary to pass from the pigment-spot 
of the ,infusorian to the eye of the    
vertebrate4 ,but1 even if we accept this
 notion of the evolutionary process in  
the case of animals1 how can we apply it
 to plants8 ,here1 variations of form do
 not seem to imply1 nor always to lead  
to1 functional changes2 and even if the 
cause of the variation is of a          
psychological nature1 we can hardly call

 it an effort1 unless we give a very    
unusual extension to the meaning of the 
word4 ,the truth is1 it is necessary to 
dig beneath the effort itself and look  
for a deeper cause4  ,this is especially
 necessary1 we believe1 if we wish to   
get at a cause of regular hereditary    
variations4 ,we are not going to enter  
here into the controversies over the    
transmissibility of acquired characters2
 still less do we wish to take too      
definite a side on this question1 which 
is not within our province4 ,but we     
cannot remain completely indifferent to 
it4 ,nowhere is it clearer that         
philosophers can not to-day content     
themselves with vague generalities1 but 
must follow the scientists in           
experimental detail and discuss the     
results with them4 ,if ,spencer had     
begun by putting to himself the question
 of the hereditability of acquired      
characters1 his evolutionism would no   
doubt have taken an altogether different
 form4 ,if 7as seems probable to us7 a  

habit contracted by the individual were 
transmitted to its descendants only in  
very exceptional cases1 all the         
,spencerian psychology would need       
remaking1 and a large part of ,spencer's
 philosophy would fall to pieces4 ,let  
us say1 then1 how the problem seems to  
us to present itself1 and in what       
direction an attempt might be made to   
solve it4  ,after having been affirmed  
as a dogma1 the transmissibility of     
acquired characters has been no less    
dogmatically denied1 for reasons drawn a
 priori from the supposed nature of     
germinal cells4 ,it is well known how   
,weismann was led1 by his hypothesis of 
the continuity of the germ-plasm1 to    
regard the germinal cells--ova and      
spermatozoa--as almost independent of   
the somatic cells4 ,starting from this1 
it has been claimed1 and is still       
claimed by many1 that the hereditary    
transmission of an acquired character is
 inconceivable4 ,but if1 perchance1     
experiment should show that acquired    

characters are transmissible1 it would  
prove thereby that the germ-plasm is not
 so independent of the somatic envelope 
as has been contended1 and the          
transmissibility of acquired characters 
would become ipso facto conceivable2    
which amounts to saying that            
conceivability and inconceivability have
 nothing to do with the case1 and that  
experience alone must settle the matter4
 ,but it is just here that the          
difficulty begins4 ,the acquired        
characters we are speaking of are       
generally habits or the effects of      
habit1 and at the root of most habits   
there is a natural disposition4 ,so that
 one can always ask whether it is really
 the habit acquired by the soma of the  
individual that is transmitted1 or      
whether it is not rather a natural      
aptitude1 which existed prior to the    
habit4 ,this aptitude would have        
remained inherent in the germ-plasm     
which the individual bears within him1  
as it was in the individual himself and 

consequently in the germ whence he      
sprang4 ,thus1 for instance1 there is no
 proof that the mole has become blind   
because it has formed the habit of      
living underground2 it is perhaps       
because its eyes were becoming atrophied
 that it condemned itself to a life     
underground4#dj ,if this is the case1   
the tendency to lose the power of vision
 has been transmitted from germ to germ 
without anything being acquired or lost 
by the soma of the mole itself4 ,from   
the fact that the son of a              
fencing-master has become a good fencer 
much more quickly than his father1 we   
cannot infer that the habit of the      
parent has been transmitted to the      
child2 for certain natural dispositions 
in course of growth may have passed from
 the plasma engendering the father to   
the plasma engendering the son1 may have
 grown on the way by the effect of the  
primitive impetus1 and thus assured to  
the son a greater suppleness than the   
father had1 without troubling1 so to    

speak1 about what the father did4 ,so of
 many examples drawn from the           
progressive domestication of animals3 it
 is hard to say whether it is the       
acquired habit that is transmitted or   
only a certain natural tendency--that1  
indeed1 which has caused such and such a
 particular species or certain of its   
representatives to be specially chosen  
for domestication4 ,the truth is1 when  
every doubtful case1 every fact open to 
more than one interpretation1 has been  
eliminated1 there remains hardly a      
single unquestionable example of        
acquired and transmitted peculiarities1 
beyond the famous experiments of        
,brown-,squard1 repeated and confirmed  
by other physiologists4#da ,by cutting  
the spinal cord or the sciatic nerve of 
guinea-pigs1 ,brown-,squard brought     
about an epileptic state which was      
transmitted to the descendants4 ,lesions
 of the same sciatic nerve1 of the      
restiform body1 etc41 provoked various  
troubles in the guinea-pig which its    

progeny inherited sometimes in a quite  
different form3 exophthalmia1 loss of   
toes1 etc4 ,but it is not demonstrated  
that in these different cases of        
hereditary transmission there had been a
 real influence of the soma of the      
animal on its germ-plasm4 ,weismann at  
once objected that the operations of    
,brown-,squard might have introduced    
certain special microbes into the body  
of the guinea-pig1 which had found their
 means of nutrition in the nervous      
tissues and transmitted the malady by   
penetrating into the sexual elements4#db
 ,this objection has been answered by   
,brown-,squard himself2#dc but a more   
plausible one might be raised4 ,some    
experiments of ,voisin and ,peron have  
shown that fits of epilepsy are followed
 by the elimination of a toxic body     
which1 when injected into animals1#dd is
 capable of producing convulsive        
symptoms4 ,perhaps the trophic disorders
 following the nerve lesions made by    
,brown-,squard correspond to the        

formation of precisely this             
convulsion-causing poison4 ,if so1 the  
toxin passed from the guinea-pig to its 
spermatozoon or ovum1 and caused in the 
development of the embryo a general     
disturbance1 which1 however1 had no     
visible effects except at one point or  
another of the organism when developed4 
,in that case1 what occurred would have 
been somewhat the same as in the        
experiments of ,charrin1 ,delamare1 and 
,moussu1 where guinea-pigs in gestation1
 whose liver or kidney was injured1     
transmitted the lesion to their progeny1
 simply because the injury to the       
mother's organ had given rise to        
specific cytotoxins which acted on the  
corresponding organ of the foetus4#de   
,it is true that1 in these experiments1 
as in a former observation of the same  
physiologists1#df it was the already    
formed foetus that was influenced by the
 toxins4 ,but other researches of       
,charrin have resulted in showing that  
the same effect may be produced1 by an  

analogous process1 on the spermatozoa   
and the ova4#dg ,to conclude1 then3 the 
inheritance of an acquired peculiarity  
in the experiments of ,brown-,squard can
 be explained by the effect of a toxin  
on the germ4 ,the lesion1 however well  
localized it seems1 is transmitted by   
the same process as1 for instance1 the  
taint of alcoholism4 ,but may it not be 
the same in the case of every acquired  
peculiarity that has become hereditary8 
,there is1 indeed1 one point on which   
both those who affirm and those who deny
 the transmissibility of acquired       
characters are agreed1 namely1 that     
certain influences1 such as that of     
alcohol1 can affect at the same time    
both the living being and the germ-plasm
 it contains4 ,in such case1 there is   
inheritance of a defect1 and the result 
is as if the soma of the parent had     
acted on the germ-plasm1 although in    
reality soma and plasma have simply both
 suffered the action of the same cause4 
,now1 suppose that the soma can         

influence the germ-plasm1 as those      
believe who hold that acquired          
characters are transmissible4 ,is not   
the most natural hypothesis to suppose  
that things happen in this second case  
as in the first1 and that the direct    
effect of the influence of the soma is a
 general alteration of the germ-plasm8  
,if this is the case1 it is by          
exception1 and in some sort by accident1
 that the modification of the descendant
 is the same as that of the parent4 ,it 
is like the hereditability of the       
alcoholic taint3 it passes from father  
to children1 but it may take a different
 form in each child1 and in none of them
 be like what it was in the father4 ,let
 the letter ,c represent the change in  
the plasm1 ,c being either positive or  
negative1 that is to say1 showing either
 the gain or loss of certain substances4
 ,the effect will not be an exact       
reproduction of the cause1 nor will the 
change in the germ-plasm1 provoked by a 
certain modification of a certain part  

of the soma1 determine a similar        
modification of the corresponding part  
of the new organism in process of       
formation1 unless all the other nascent 
parts of this organism enjoy a kind of  
immunity as regards ,c3 the same part   
will then undergo alteration in the new 
organism1 because it happens that the   
development of this part is alone       
subject to the new influence4 ,and1 even
 then1 the part might be altered in an  
entirely different way from that in     
which the corresponding part was altered
 in the generating organism4  ,we should
 propose1 then1 to introduce a          
distinction between the hereditability  
of deviation and that of character4 ,an 
individual which acquires a new         
character thereby deviates from the form
 it previously had1 which form the      
germs1 or oftener the half-germs1 it    
contains would have reproduced in their 
development4 ,if this modification does 
not involve the production of substances
 capable of changing the germ-plasm1 or 

does not so affect nutrition as to      
deprive the germ-plasm of certain of its
 elements1 it will have no effect on the
 offspring of the individual4 ,this is  
probably the case as a rule4 ,if1 on the
 contrary1 it has some effect1 this is  
likely to be due to a chemical change   
which it has induced in the germ-plasm4 
,this chemical change might1 by         
exception1 bring about the original     
modification again in the organism which
 the germ is about to develop1 but there
 are as many and more chances that it   
will do something else4 ,in this latter 
case1 the generated organism will       
perhaps deviate from the normal type as 
much as the generating organism1 but it 
will do so differently4 ,it will have   
inherited deviation and not character4  
,in general1 therefore1 the habits      
formed by an individual have probably no
 echo in its offspring2 and when they   
have1 the modification in the           
descendants may have no visible likeness
 to the original one4 ,such1 at least1  

is the hypothesis which seems to us most
 likely4 ,in any case1 in default of    
proof to the contrary1 and so long as   
the decisive experiments called for by  
an eminent biologist#dh have not been   
made1 we must keep to the actual results
 of observation4 ,now1 even if we take  
the most favorable view of the theory of
 the transmissibility of acquired       
characters1 and assume that the         
ostensible acquired character is not1 in
 most cases1 the more or less tardy     
development of an innate character1     
facts show us that hereditary           
transmission is the exception and not   
the rule4 ,how1 then1 shall we expect it
 to develop an organ such as the eye8   
,when we think of the enormous number of
 variations1 all in the same direction1 
that we must suppose to be accumulated  
before the passage from the pigment-spot
 of the ,infusorian to the eye of the   
mollusc and of the vertebrate is        
possible1 we do not see how heredity1 as
 we observe it1 could ever have         

determined this piling-up of            
differences1 even supposing that        
individual efforts could have produced  
each of them singly4 ,that is to say    
that neo-,lamarckism is no more able    
than any other form of evolutionism to  
solve the problem4         99       99  
99       99       99  ,in thus          
submitting the various present forms of 
evolutionism to a common test1 in       
showing that they all strike against the
 same insurmountable difficulty1 we have
 in no wise the intention of rejecting  
them altogether4 ,on the contrary1 each 
of them1 being supported by a           
considerable number of facts1 must be   
true in its way4 ,each of them must     
correspond to a certain aspect of the   
process of evolution4 ,perhaps even it  
is necessary that a theory should       
restrict itself exclusively to a        
particular point of view1 in order to   
remain scientific1 i4e4 to give a       
precise direction to researches into    
detail4 ,but the reality of which each  

of these theories takes a partial view  
must transcend them all4 ,and this      
reality is the special object of        
philosophy1 which is not constrained to 
scientific precision because it         
contemplates no practical application4  
,let us therefore indicate in a word or 
two the positive contribution that each 
of the three present forms of           
evolutionism seems to us to make toward 
the solution of the problem1 what each  
of them leaves out1 and on what point   
this threefold effort should1 in our    
opinion1 converge in order to obtain a  
more comprehensive1 although thereby of 
necessity a less definite1 idea of the  
evolutionary process4  ,the             
neo-,darwinians are probably right1 we  
believe1 when they teach that the       
essential causes of variation are the   
differences inherent in the germ borne  
by the individual1 and not the          
experiences or behavior of the          
individual in the course of his career4 
,where we fail to follow these          

biologists1 is in regarding the         
differences inherent in the germ as     
purely accidental and individual4 ,we   
cannot help believing that these        
differences are the development of an   
impulsion which passes from germ to germ
 across the individuals1 that they are  
therefore not pure accidents1 and that  
they might well appear at the same time1
 in the same form1 in all the           
representatives of the same species1 or 
at least in a certain number of them4   
,already1 in fact1 the theory of        
mutations is modifying ,darwinism       
profoundly on this point4 ,it asserts   
that at a given moment1 after a long    
period1 the entire species is beset with
 a tendency to change4 ,the tendency to 
change1 therefore1 is not accidental4   
,true1 the change itself would be       
accidental1 since the mutation works1   
according to ,de ,vries1 in different   
directions in the different             
representatives of the species4 ,but1   
first we must see if the theory is      

confirmed by many other vegetable       
species 7,de ,vries has verified it only
 by the ,o,enothera ,lamarckiana71#di   
and then there is the possibility1 as we
 shall explain further on1 that the part
 played by chance is much greater in the
 variation of plants than in that of    
animals1 because1 in the vegetable      
world1 function does not depend so      
strictly on form4 ,be that as it may1   
the neo-,darwinians are inclined to     
admit that the periods of mutation are  
determinate4 ,the direction of the      
mutation may therefore be so as well1 at
 least in animals1 and to the extent we 
shall have to indicate4  ,we thus arrive
 at a hypothesis like ,eimer's1         
according to which the variations of    
different characters continue from      
generation to generation in definite    
directions4 ,this hypothesis seems      
plausible to us1 within the limits in   
which ,eimer himself retains it4 ,of    
course1 the evolution of the organic    
world cannot be predetermined as a      

whole4 ,we claim1 on the contrary1 that 
the spontaneity of life is manifested by
 a continual creation of new forms      
succeeding others4 ,but this            
indetermination cannot be complete2 it  
must leave a certain part to            
determination4 ,an organ like the eye1  
for example1 must have been formed by   
just a continual changing in a definite 
direction4 ,indeed1 we do not see how   
otherwise to explain the likeness of    
structure of the eye in species that    
have not the same history4 ,where we    
differ from ,eimer is in his claim that 
combinations of physical and chemical   
causes are enough to secure the result4 
,we have tried to prove1 on the         
contrary1 by the example of the eye1    
that if there is orthogenesis here1 a   
psychological cause intervenes4         
,certain neo-,lamarckians do indeed     
resort to a cause of a psychological    
nature4 ,there1 to our thinking1 is one 
of the most solid positions of          
neo-,lamarckism4 ,but if this cause is  

nothing but the conscious effort of the 
individual1 it cannot operate in more   
than a restricted number of cases--at   
most in the animal world1 and not at all
 in the vegetable kingdom4 ,even in     
animals1 it will act only on points     
which are under the direct or indirect  
control of the will4 ,and even where it 
does act1 it is not clear how it could  
compass a change so profound as an      
increase of complexity3 at most this    
would be conceivable if the acquired    
characters were regularly transmitted so
 as to be added together2 but this      
transmission seems to be the exception  
rather than the rule4 ,a hereditary     
change in a definite direction1 which   
continues to accumulate and add to      
itself so as to build up a more and more
 complex machine1 must certainly be     
related to some sort of effort1 but to  
an effort of far greater depth than the 
individual effort1 far more independent 
of circumstances1 an effort common to   
most representatives of the same        

species1 inherent in the germs they bear
 rather than in their substance alone1  
an effort thereby assured of being      
passed on to their descendants4         
99       99       99       99       99  
,so we come back1 by a somewhat         
roundabout way1 to the idea we started  
from1 that of an original impetus of    
life1 passing from one generation of    
germs to the following generation of    
germs through the developed organisms   
which bridge the interval between the   
generations4 ,this impetus1 sustained   
right along the lines of evolution among
 which it gets divided1 is the          
fundamental cause of variations1 at     
least of those that are regularly passed
 on1 that accumulate and create new     
species4 ,in general1 when species have 
begun to diverge from a common stock1   
they accentuate their divergence as they
 progress in their evolution4 ,yet1 in  
certain definite points1 they may evolve
 identically2 in fact1 they must do so  
if the hypothesis of a common impetus be

 accepted4 ,this is just what we shall  
have to show now in a more precise way1 
by the same example we have chosen1 the 
formation of the eye in molluscs and    
vertebrates4 ,the idea of an original   
impetus1 moreover1 will thus be made    
clearer4  ,two points are equally       
striking in an organ like the eye3 the  
complexity of its structure and the     
simplicity of its function4 ,the eye is 
composed of distinct parts1 such as the 
sclerotic1 the cornea1 the retina1 the  
crystalline lens1 etc4 ,in each of these
 parts the detail is infinite4 ,the     
retina alone comprises three layers of  
nervous elements--multipolar cells1     
bipolar cells1 visual cells--each of    
which has its individuality and is      
undoubtedly a very complicated organism3
 so complicated1 indeed1 is the retinal 
membrane in its intimate structure1 that
 no simple description can give an      
adequate idea of it4 ,the mechanism of  
the eye is1 in short1 composed of an    
infinity of mechanisms1 all of extreme  

complexity4 ,yet vision is one simple   
fact4 ,as soon as the eye opens1 the    
visual act is effected4 ,just because   
the act is simple1 the slightest        
negligence on the part of nature in the 
building of the infinitely complex      
machine would have made vision          
impossible4 ,this contrast between the  
complexity of the organ and the unity of
 the function is what gives us pause4   
,a mechanistic theory is one which means
 to show us the gradual building-up of  
the machine under the influence of      
external circumstances intervening      
either directly by action on the tissues
 or indirectly by the selection of      
better-adapted ones4 ,but1 whatever form
 this theory may take1 supposing it     
avails at all to explain the detail of  
the parts1 it throws no light on their  
correlation4  ,then comes the doctrine  
of finality1 which says that the parts  
have been brought together on a         
preconceived plan with a view to a      
certain end4 ,in this it likens the     

labor of nature to that of the workman1 
who also proceeds by the assemblage of  
parts with a view to the realization of 
an idea or the imitation of a model4    
,mechanism1 here1 reproaches finalism   
with its anthropomorphic character1 and 
rightly4 ,but it fails to see that      
itself proceeds according to this       
method--somewhat mutilated6 ,true1 it   
has got rid of the end pursued or the   
ideal model4 ,but it also holds that    
nature has worked like a human being by 
bringing parts together1 while a mere   
glance at the development of an embryo  
shows that life goes to work in a very  
different way4 ,life does not proceed by
 the association and addition of        
elements1 but by dissociation and       
division4  ,we must get beyond both     
points of view1 both mechanism and      
finalism being1 at bottom1 only         
standpoints to which the human mind has 
been led by considering the work of man4
 ,but in what direction can we go beyond
 them8 ,we have said that in analyzing  

the structure of an organ1 we can go on 
decomposing for ever1 although the      
function of the whole is a simple thing4
 ,this contrast between the infinite    
complexity of the organ and the extreme 
simplicity of the function is what      
should open our eyes4  ,in general1 when
 the same object appears in one aspect  
and in another as infinitely complex1   
the two aspects have by no means the    
same importance1 or rather the same     
degree of reality4 ,in such cases1 the  
simplicity belongs to the object itself1
 and the infinite complexity to the     
views we take in turning around it1 to  
the symbols by which our senses or      
intellect represent it to us1 or1 more  
generally1 to elements of a different   
order1 with which we try to imitate it  
artificially1 but with which it remains 
incommensurable1 being of a different   
nature4 ,an artist of genius has painted
 a figure on his canvas4 ,we can imitate
 his picture with many-colored squares  
of mosaic4 ,and we shall reproduce the  

curves and shades of the model so much  
the better as our squares are smaller1  
more numerous and more varied in tone4  
,but an infinity of elements infinitely 
small1 presenting an infinity of shades1
 would be necessary to obtain the exact 
equivalent of the figure that the artist
 has conceived as a simple thing1 which 
he has wished to transport as a whole to
 the canvas1 and which is the more      
complete the more it strikes us as the  
projection of an indivisible intuition4 
,now1 suppose our eyes so made that they
 cannot help seeing in the work of the  
master a mosaic effect4 ,or suppose our 
intellect so made that it cannot explain
 the appearance of the figure on the    
canvas except as a work of mosaic4 ,we  
should then be able to speak simply of a
 collection of little squares1 and we   
should be under the mechanistic         
hypothesis4 ,we might add that1 beside  
the materiality of the collection1 there
 must be a plan on which the artist     
worked2 and then we should be expressing

 ourselves as finalists4 ,but in neither
 case should we have got at the real    
process1 for there are no squares       
brought together4 ,it is the picture1   
i4e4 the simple act1 projected on the   
canvas1 which1 by the mere fact of      
entering into our perception1 is        
decomposed before our eyes into         
thousands and thousands of little       
squares which present1 as recomposed1 a 
wonderful arrangement4 ,so the eye1 with
 its marvelous complexity of structure1 
may be only the simple act of vision1   
divided for us into a mosaic of cells1  
whose order seems marvelous to us       
because we have conceived the whole as  
an assemblage4  ,if ,i raise my hand    
from ,a to ,b1 this movement appears to 
me under two aspects at once4 ,felt from
 within1 it is a simple1 indivisible    
act4 ,perceived from without1 it is the 
course of a certain curve1 ,,ab4 ,in    
this curve ,i can distinguish as many   
positions as ,i please1 and the line    
itself might be defined as a certain    

mutual cordination of these positions4  
,but the positions1 infinite in number1 
and the order in which they are         
connected1 have sprung automatically    
from the indivisible act by which my    
hand has gone from ,a to ,b4 ,mechanism1
 here1 would consist in seeing only the 
positions4 ,finalism would take their   
order into account4 ,but both mechanism 
and finalism would leave on one side the
 movement1 which is reality itself4 ,in 
one sense1 the movement is more than the
 positions and than their order2 for it 
is sufficient to make it in its         
indivisible simplicity to secure that   
the infinity of the successive positions
 as also their order be given at        
once--with something else which is      
neither order nor position but which is 
essential1 the mobility4 ,but1 in       
another sense1 the movement is less than
 the series of positions and their      
connecting order2 for1 to arrange points
 in a certain order1 it is necessary    
first to conceive the order and then to 

realize it with points1 there must be   
the work of assemblage and there must be
 intelligence1 whereas the simple       
movement of the hand contains nothing of
 either4 ,it is not intelligent1 in the 
human sense of the word1 and it is not  
an assemblage1 for it is not made up of 
elements4 ,just so with the relation of 
the eye to vision4 ,there is in vision  
more than the component cells of the eye
 and their mutual cordination3 in this  
sense1 neither mechanism nor finalism go
 far enough4 ,but1 in another sense1    
mechanism and finalism both go too far1 
for they attribute to ,nature the most  
formidable of the labors of ,hercules in
 holding that she has exalted to the    
simple act of vision an infinity of     
infinitely complex elements1 whereas    
,nature has had no more trouble in      
making an eye than ,i have in lifting my
 hand4 ,nature's simple act has divided 
itself automatically into an infinity of
 elements which are then found to be    
cordinated to one idea1 just as the     

movement of my hand has dropped an      
infinity of points which are then found 
to satisfy one equation4  ,we find it   
very hard to see things in that light1  
because we cannot help conceiving       
organization as manufacturing4 ,but it  
is one thing to manufacture1 and quite  
another to organize4 ,manufacturing is  
peculiar to man4 ,it consists in        
assembling parts of matter which we have
 cut out in such manner that we can fit 
them together and obtain from them a    
common action4 ,the parts are arranged1 
so to speak1 around the action as an    
ideal centre4 ,to manufacture1          
therefore1 is to work from the periphery
 to the centre1 or1 as the philosophers 
say1 from the many to the one4          
,organization1 on the contrary1 works   
from the centre to the periphery4 ,it   
begins in a point that is almost a      
mathematical point1 and spreads around  
this point by concentric waves which go 
on enlarging4 ,the work of manufacturing
 is the more effective1 the greater the 

quantity of matter dealt with4 ,it      
proceeds by concentration and           
compression4 ,the organizing act1 on the
 contrary1 has something explosive about
 it3 it needs at the beginning the      
smallest possible place1 a minimum of   
matter1 as if the organizing forces only
 entered space reluctantly4 ,the        
spermatozoon1 which sets in motion the  
evolutionary process of the embryonic   
life1 is one of the smallest cells of   
the organism2 and it is only a small    
part of the spermatozoon which really   
takes part in the operation4  ,but these
 are only superficial differences4      
,digging beneath them1 we think1 a      
deeper difference would be found4  ,a   
manufactured thing delineates exactly   
the form of the work of manufacturing   
it4 ,i mean that the manufacturer finds 
in his product exactly what he has put  
into it4 ,if he is going to make a      
machine1 he cuts out its pieces one by  
one and then puts them together3 the    
machine1 when made1 will show both the  

pieces and their assemblage4 ,the whole 
of the result represents the whole of   
the work2 and to each part of the work  
corresponds a part of the result4  ,now 
,i recognize that positive science can  
and should proceed as if organization   
was like making a machine4 ,only so will
 it have any hold on organized bodies4  
,for its object is not to show us the   
essence of things1 but to furnish us    
with the best means of acting on them4  
,physics and chemistry are well advanced
 sciences1 and living matter lends      
itself to our action only so far as we  
can treat it by the processes of our    
physics and chemistry4 ,organization can
 therefore only be studied              
scientifically if the organized body has
 first been likened to a machine4 ,the  
cells will be the pieces of the machine1
 the organism their assemblage1 and the 
elementary labors which have organized  
the parts will be regarded as the real  
elements of the labor which has         
organized the whole4 ,this is the       

standpoint of science4 ,quite different1
 in our opinion1 is that of philosophy4 
,for us1 the whole of an organized      
machine may1 strictly speaking1         
represent the whole of the organizing   
work 7this is1 however1 only            
approximately true71 yet the parts of   
the machine do not correspond to parts  
of the work1 because the materiality of 
this machine does not represent a sum of
 means employed1 but a sum of obstacles 
avoided3 it is a negation rather than a 
positive reality4 ,so1 as we have shown 
in a former study1 vision is a power    
which should attain by right an infinity
 of things inaccessible to our eyes4    
,but such a vision would not be         
continued into action2 it might suit a  
phantom1 but not a living being4 ,the   
vision of a living being is an effective
 vision1 limited to objects on which the
 being can act3 it is a vision that is  
canalized1 and the visual apparatus     
simply symbolizes the work of           
canalizing4 ,therefore the creation of  

the visual apparatus is no more         
explained by the assembling of its      
anatomic elements than the digging of a 
canal could be explained by the heaping 
up of the earth which might have formed 
its banks4 ,a mechanistic theory would  
maintain that the earth had been brought
 cart-load by cart-load2 finalism would 
add that it had not been dumped down at 
random1 that the carters had followed a 
plan4 ,but both theories would be       
mistaken1 for the canal has been made in
 another way4  ,with greater precision1 
we may compare the process by which     
nature constructs an eye to the simple  
act by which we raise the hand4 ,but we 
supposed at first that the hand met with
 no resistance4 ,let us now imagine     
that1 instead of moving in air1 the hand
 has to pass through iron filings which 
are compressed and offer resistance to  
it in proportion as it goes forward4 ,at
 a certain moment the hand will have    
exhausted its effort1 and1 at this very 
moment1 the filings will be massed and  

cordinated in a certain definite form1  
to wit1 that of the hand that is stopped
 and of a part of the arm4 ,now1 suppose
 that the hand and arm are invisible4   
,lookers-on will seek the reason of the 
arrangement in the filings themselves   
and in forces within the mass4 ,some    
will account for the position of each   
filing by the action exerted upon it by 
the neighboring filings3 these are the  
mechanists4 ,others will prefer to think
 that a plan of the whole has presided  
over the detail of these elementary     
actions3 they are the finalists4 ,but   
the truth is that there has been merely 
one indivisible act1 that of the hand   
passing through the filings3 the        
inexhaustible detail of the movement of 
the grains1 as well as the order of     
their final arrangement1 expresses      
negatively1 in a way1 this undivided    
movement1 being the unitary form of a   
resistance1 and not a synthesis of      
positive elementary actions4 ,for this  
reason1 if the arrangement of the grains

 is termed an effect and the movement of
 the hand a cause1 it may indeed be said
 that the whole of the effect is        
explained by the whole of the cause1 but
 to parts of the cause parts of the     
effect will in no wise correspond4 ,in  
other words1 neither mechanism nor      
finalism will here be in place1 and we  
must resort to an explanation of a      
different kind4 ,now1 in the hypothesis 
we propose1 the relation of vision to   
the visual apparatus would be very      
nearly that of the hand to the iron     
filings that follow1 canalize and limit 
its motion4  ,the greater the effort of 
the hand1 the farther it will go into   
the filings4 ,but at whatever point it  
stops1 instantaneously and automatically
 the filings cordinate and find their   
equilibrium4 ,so with vision and its    
organ4 ,according as the undivided act  
constituting vision advances more or    
less1 the materiality of the organ is   
made of a more or less considerable     
number of mutually cordinated elements1 

but the order is necessarily complete   
and perfect4 ,it could not be partial1  
because1 once again1 the real process   
which gives rise to it has no parts4    
,that is what neither mechanism nor     
finalism takes into account1 and it is  
what we also fail to consider when we   
wonder at the marvelous structure of an 
instrument such as the eye4 ,at the     
bottom of our wondering is always this  
idea1 that it would have been possible  
for a part only of this cordination to  
have been realized1 that the complete   
realization is a kind of special favor4 
,this favor the finalists consider as   
dispensed to them all at once1 by the   
final cause2 the mechanists claim to    
obtain it little by little1 by the      
effect of natural selection2 but both   
see something positive in this          
cordination1 and consequently something 
fractionable in its cause1--something   
which admits of every possible degree of
 achievement4 ,in reality1 the cause1   
though more or less intense1 cannot     

produce its effect except in one piece1 
and completely finished4 ,according as  
it goes further and further in the      
direction of vision1 it gives the simple
 pigmentary masses of a lower organism1 
or the rudimentary eye of a ,serpula1 or
 the slightly differentiated eye of the 
,alciope1 or the marvelously perfected  
eye of the bird2 but all these organs1  
unequal as is their complexity1         
necessarily present an equal            
cordination4 ,for this reason1 no matter
 how distant two animal species may be  
from each other1 if the progress toward 
vision has gone equally far in both1    
there is the same visual organ in each  
case1 for the form of the organ only    
expresses the degree in which the       
exercise of the function has been       
obtained4  ,but1 in speaking of a       
progress toward vision1 are we not      
coming back to the old notion of        
finality8 ,it would be so1 undoubtedly1 
if this progress required the conscious 
or unconscious idea of an end to be     

attained4 ,but it is really effected in 
virtue of the original impetus of life2 
it is implied in this movement itself1  
and that is just why it is found in     
independent lines of evolution4 ,if now 
we are asked why and how it is implied  
therein1 we reply that life is1 more    
than anything else1 a tendency to act on
 inert matter4 ,the direction of this   
action is not predetermined2 hence the  
unforeseeable variety of forms which    
life1 in evolving1 sows along its path4 
,but this action always presents1 to    
some extent1 the character of           
contingency2 it implies at least a      
rudiment of choice4 ,now a choice       
involves the anticipatory idea of       
several possible actions4 ,possibilities
 of action must therefore be marked out 
for the living being before the action  
itself4 ,visual perception is nothing   
else3#ej the visible outlines of bodies 
are the design of our eventual action on
 them4 ,vision will be found1 therefore1
 in different degrees in the most       

diverse animals1 and it will appear in  
the same complexity of structure        
wherever it has reached the same degree 
of intensity4  ,we have dwelt on these  
resemblances of structure in general1   
and on the example of the eye in        
particular1 because we had to define our
 attitude toward mechanism on the one   
hand and finalism on the other4 ,it     
remains for us to describe it more      
precisely in itself4 ,this we shall now 
do by showing the divergent results of  
evolution not as presenting analogies1  
but as themselves mutually              
complementary4  ,,footnotes3  ,footnote 
#c3 ,matire et mmoire1 ,paris1 #ahif1   
chaps4 ii4 and iii4  ,footnote #d3      
,calkins1 ,studies on the ,life ,history
 of ,protozoa 7,archiv f4               
,entwicklungsmechanik1 vol4 xv41 #aijc1 
pp4 #aci-ahf74  ,footnote #e3 ,sedgwick 
,minot1 ,on ,certain ,phenomena of      
,growing ,old 7,proc4 ,amer4 ,assoc4 for
 the ,advancement of ,science1 #cith    
,meeting1 ,salem1 #ahia1 pp4 #bga-bhh74 

,footnote #f3 ,le ,dantec1              
,l',individualit et l'erreur            
individualiste1 ,paris1 #aije1 pp4 #hd  
ff4  ,footnote #g3 ,metchnikoff1 ,la    
,dgnrescence snile 7,anne biologique1   
iii41 #ahig1 pp4 #bdi ff474 ,cf4 by the 
same author1 ,la ,nature humaine1       
,paris1 #aijc1 pp4 #cab ff4  ,footnote  
#h3 ,roule1 ,l',embryologie gnrale1     
,paris1 #ahic1 p4 #cai4  ,footnote #i3  
,the irreversibility of the series of   
living beings has been well set forth by
 ,baldwin 7,development and ,evolution1 
,new ,york1 #aijb2 in particular p4     
#cbg74  ,footnote #aj3 ,we have dwelt on
 this point and tried to make it clear  
in the ,essai sur les donnes immdiates  
de la conscience1 pp4 #adj-aea4         
,footnote #aa3 ,in his fine work on     
,genius in ,art 7,le ,gnie dans l'art71 
,m4 ,sailles develops this twofold      
thesis1 that art is a continuation of   
nature and that life is creation4 ,we   
should willingly accept the second      
formula2 but by creation must we        

understand1 as the author does1 a       
synthesis of elements8 ,where the       
elements pre-exist1 the synthesis that  
will be made is virtually given1 being  
only one of the possible arrangements4  
,this arrangement a superhuman intellect
 could have perceived in advance among  
all the possible ones that surround it4 
,we hold1 on the contrary1 that in the  
domain of life the elements have no real
 and separate existence4 ,they are      
manifold mental views of an indivisible 
process4 ,and for that reason there is  
radical contingency in progress1        
incommensurability between what goes    
before and what follows--in short1      
duration4  ,footnote #ab3 ,btschli1     
,untersuchungen ber mikroskopische      
,schume und das ,protoplasma1 ,leipzig1 
#ahib1 ,first ,part4  ,footnote #ac3    
,rhumbler1 ,versuch einer mechanischen  
,erklrung der indirekten ,zell-und      
,kernteilung 7,roux's ,archiv1 #ahif74  
,footnote #ad3 ,berthold1 ,studien ber  
,protoplasmamechanik1 ,leipzig1 #ahhf1  

p4 #ajb4 ,cf4 the explanation proposed  
by ,le ,dantec1 ,thorie nouvelle de la  
vie1 ,paris1 #ahif1 p4 #fj4  ,footnote  
#ae3 ,cope1 ,the ,primary ,factors of   
,organic ,evolution1 ,chicago1 #ahif1   
pp4 #dge-dhd4  ,footnote #af3 ,maupas1  
,etude des infusoires cilis 7,arch4 de  
zoologie exprimentale1 #ahhc1 pp4 #dg1  
#dia1 #eah1 #edi1 in particular74 ,p4   
,vignon1 ,recherches de cytologie gnrale
 sur les pithliums1 ,paris1 #aijb1 p4   
#fee4 ,a profound study of the motions  
of the ,infusoria and a very penetrating
 criticism of the idea of tropism have  
been made recently by ,jennings         
7,contributions to the ,study of the    
,behavior of ,lower ,organisms1         
,washington1 #aijd74 ,the type of       
behavior of these lower organisms1 as   
,jennings defines it 7pp4 #bcg-beb71 is 
unquestionably of the psychological     
order4  ,footnote #ag3 ,e4,b4 ,wilson1  
,the ,cell in ,development and          
,inheritance1 ,new ,york1 #ahig1 p4     
#ccj4  ,footnote #ah3 ,dastre1 ,la ,vie 

et la mort1 p4 #dc4  ,footnote #ai3     
,laplace1 ,introduction  la thorie      
analytique des probabilits 7,o,euvres   
compltes1 vol4 vii41 ,paris1 #ahhf1 p4  
vi474  ,footnote #bj3 ,du               
,bois-,reymond1 ber die ,grenzen des    
,naturerkennens1 ,leipzig1 #ahib4       
,footnote #ba3 ,there are really two    
lines to follow in contemporary         
neo-vitalism3 on the one hand1 the      
assertion that pure mechanism is        
insufficient1 which assumes great       
authority when made by such scientists  
as ,driesch or ,reinke1 for example2    
and1 on the other hand1 the hypotheses  
which this vitalism superposes on       
mechanism 7the entelechies of ,driesch1 
and the dominants of ,reinke1 etc474 ,of
 these two parts1 the former is perhaps 
the more interesting4 ,see the admirable
 studies of ,driesch--,die ,lokalisation
 morphogenetischer ,vorgnge1 ,leipzig1  
#ahii2 ,die organischen ,regulationen1  
,leipzig1 #aija2 ,naturbegriffe und     
,natururteile1 ,leipzig1 #aijd2 ,der    

,vitalismus als ,geschichte und als     
,lehre1 ,leipzig1 #aije2 and of         
,reinke--,die ,welt als ,tat1 ,berlin1  
#ahii2 ,einleitung in die theoretische  
,biologie1 ,berlin1 #aija2 ,philosophie 
der ,botanik1 ,leipzig1 #aije4          
,footnote #bb3 ,p4 ,gurin1 ,les         
,connaissances actuelles sur la         
fcondation chez les phanrogames1 ,paris1
 #aijd1 pp4 #add-adh4 ,cf4 ,delage1     
,l',hrdit1 #bnd edition1 #aijc1 pp4 #adj
 ff4  ,footnote #bc3 ,mbius1 ,beitrge   
zur ,lehre von der ,fortpflanzung der   
,gewchse1 ,jena1 #ahig1 pp4 #bjc-bjf in 
particular4 ,cf4 ,hartog1 ,sur les      
phnomnes de reproduction 7,anne         
biologique1 #ahie1 pp4 #gjg-gji74       
,footnote #bd3 ,paul ,janet1 ,les       
,causes finales1 ,paris1 #ahgf1 p4 #hc4 
,footnote #be3 ,ibid4 p4 #hj4  ,footnote
 #bf3 ,darwin1 ,origin of ,species1     
chap4 ii4  ,footnote #bg3 ,bateson1     
,materials for the ,study of ,variation1
 ,london1 #ahid1 especially pp4 #efg ff4
 ,cf4 ,scott1 ,variations and ,mutations

 7,american ,journal of ,science1 ,nov4 
#ahid74  ,footnote #bh3 ,de ,vries1 ,die
 ,mutationstheorie1 ,leipzig1           
#aija-aijc4 ,cf41 by the same author1   
,species and ,varieties1 ,chicago1      
#aije4  ,footnote #bi3 ,darwin1 ,origin 
of ,species1 chap4 vi4  ,footnote #cj3  
,darwin1 ,origin of ,species1 chap4 i4  
,footnote #ca3 ,on this homology of hair
 and teeth1 see ,brandt1 ber 444 eine   
mutmassliche ,homologie der ,haare und  
,zahne 7,biol4 ,centralblatt1 vol4      
xviii41 #ahih1 especially pp4 #bfb ff474
  ,footnote #cb3 ,it seems1 from later  
observations1 that the transformation of
 ,artemia is a more complex phenomenon  
than was first supposed4 ,see on this   
subject ,samter and ,heymons1 ,die      
,variation bei ,artemia ,salina 7,anhang
 zu den ,abhandlungen der k4            
preussischen ,akad4 der ,wissenschaften1
 #aijb74  ,footnote #cc3 ,eimer1        
,orthogenesis der ,schmetterlinge1      
,leipzig1 #ahig1 p4 #bd4 ,cf4 ,die      
,entstehung der ,arten1 p4 #ec4         

,footnote #cd3 ,eimer1 ,die ,entstehung 
der ,arten1 ,jena1 #ahhh1 p4 #be4       
,footnote #ce3 ,ibid4 pp4 #afe ff4      
,footnote #cf3 ,salensky1 ,heteroblastie
 7,proc4 of the ,fourth ,international  
,congress of ,zoology1 ,london1 #ahii1  
pp4 #aaa-aah74 ,salensky has coined this
 word to designate the cases in which   
organs that are equivalent1 but of      
different embryological origin1 are     
formed at the same points in animals    
related to each other4  ,footnote #cg3  
,wolff1 ,die ,regeneration der          
,urodelenlinse 7,arch4 f4               
,entwicklungsmechanik1 i41 #ahie1 pp4   
#chj ff474  ,footnote #ch3 ,fischel1 ber
 die ,regeneration der ,linse 7,anat4   
,anzeiger1 xiv41 #ahih1 pp4 #cgc-chj74  
,footnote #ci3 ,cope1 ,the ,origin of   
the ,fittest1 #ahhg2 ,the ,primary      
,factors of ,organic ,evolution1 #ahif4 
,footnote #dj3 ,cunot1 ,la ,nouvelle    
,thorie transformiste 7,revue gnrale des
 sciences1 #ahid74 ,cf4 ,morgan1        
,evolution and ,adaptation1 ,london1    

#aijc1 p4 #ceg4  ,footnote #da3         
,brown-,squard1 ,nouvelles recherches   
sur l'pilepsie due  certaines lsions de 
la moelle piniere et des nerfs          
rachidiens 7,arch4 de physiologie1 vol4 
ii41 #ahff1 pp4 #baa1 #dbb1 and #dig74  
,footnote #db3 ,weismann1 ,aufstze ber  
,vererbung1 ,jena1 #ahib1 pp4 #cgf-cgh1 
and also ,vortrge ber                   
,descendenztheorie1 ,jena1 #aijb1 vol4  
ii41 p4 #gf4  ,footnote #dc3            
,brown-,squard1 ,hrdit d'une affection  
due  une cause accidentelle 7,arch4 de  
physiologie1 #ahib1 pp4 #fhf ff474      
,footnote #dd3 ,voisin and ,peron1      
,recherches sur la toxicit urinaire chez
 les pileptiques 7,arch4 de neurologie1 
vol4 xxiv41 #ahib1 and xxv41 #ahic4 ,cf4
 the work of ,voisin1 ,l'pilepsie1      
,paris1 #ahig1 pp4 #abe-acc74  ,footnote
 #de3 ,charrin1 ,delamare and ,moussu1  
,transmission exprimentale aux          
descendants de lsions dveloppes chez les
 ascendants 7,c4,r4 de l',acad4 des     
sciences1 vol4 cxxxv41 #aijb1 p4 #aia74 

,cf4 ,morgan1 ,evolution and            
,adaptation1 p4 #beg1 and ,delage1      
,l',hrdit1 #bnd edition1 p4 #chh4       
,footnote #df3 ,charrin and ,delamare1  
,hrdit cellulaire 7,c4,r4 de l',acad4   
des sciences1 vol4 cxxxiii41 #aija1 pp4 
#fi-ga74  ,footnote #dg3 ,charrin1      
,l',hrdit pathologique 7,revue gnrale   
des sciences1 #ae janvier #ahif74       
,footnote #dh3 ,giard1 ,controverses    
transformistes1 ,paris1 #aijd1 p4 #adg4 
,footnote #di3 ,some analogous facts1   
however1 have been noted1 all in the    
vegetable world4 ,see ,blaringhem1 ,la  
,notion d'espce et la thorie de la      
mutation 7,anne psychologique1 vol4     
xii41 #aijf1 pp4 #ie ff471 and ,de      
,vries1 ,species and ,varieties1 p4     
#fee4  ,footnote #ej3 ,see1 on this     
subject1 ,matire et mmoire1 chap4 i4    
,,chapter ,,ii  ,,the ,,divergent       
,,directions ,,of ,,the ,,evolution ,,of
 ,,life4 ,,torpor1 ,,intelligence1      
,,instinct   ,the evolution movement    
would be a simple one1 and we should    

soon have been able to determine its    
direction1 if life had described a      
single course1 like that of a solid ball
 shot from a cannon4 ,but it proceeds   
rather like a shell1 which suddenly     
bursts into fragments1 which fragments1 
being themselves shells1 burst in their 
turn into fragments destined to burst   
again1 and so on for a time             
incommensurably long4 ,we perceive only 
what is nearest to us1 namely1 the      
scattered movements of the pulverized   
explosions4 ,from them we have to go    
back1 stage by stage1 to the original   
movement4  ,when a shell bursts1 the    
particular way it breaks is explained   
both by the explosive force of the      
powder it contains and by the resistance
 of the metal4 ,so of the way life      
breaks into individuals and species4 ,it
 depends1 we think1 on two series of    
causes3 the resistance life meets from  
inert matter1 and the explosive         
force--due to an unstable balance of    
tendencies--which life bears within     

itself4  ,the resistance of inert matter
 was the obstacle that had first to be  
overcome4 ,life seems to have succeeded 
in this by dint of humility1 by making  
itself very small and very insinuating1 
bending to physical and chemical forces1
 consenting even to go a part of the way
 with them1 like the switch that adopts 
for a while the direction of the rail it
 is endeavoring to leave4 ,of phenomena 
in the simplest forms of life1 it is    
hard to say whether they are still      
physical and chemical or whether they   
are already vital4 ,life had to enter   
thus into the habits of inert matter1 in
 order to draw it little by little1     
magnetized1 as it were1 to another      
track4 ,the animate forms that first    
appeared were therefore of extreme      
simplicity4 ,they were probably tiny    
masses of scarcely differentiated       
protoplasm1 outwardly resembling the    
amoeba observable to-day1 but possessed 
of the tremendous internal push that was
 to raise them even to the highest forms

 of life4 ,that in virtue of this push  
the first organisms sought to grow as   
much as possible1 seems likely4 ,but    
organized matter has a limit of         
expansion that is very quickly reached2 
beyond a certain point it divides       
instead of growing4 ,ages of effort and 
prodigies of subtlety were probably     
necessary for life to get past this new 
obstacle4 ,it succeeded in inducing an  
increasing number of elements1 ready to 
divide1 to remain united4 ,by the       
division of labor it knotted between    
them an indissoluble bond4 ,the complex 
and quasi-discontinuous organism is thus
 made to function as would a continuous 
living mass which had simply grown      
bigger4  ,but the real and profound     
causes of division were those which life
 bore within its bosom4 ,for life is    
tendency1 and the essence of a tendency 
is to develop in the form of a sheaf1   
creating1 by its very growth1 divergent 
directions among which its impetus is   
divided4 ,this we observe in ourselves1 

in the evolution of that special        
tendency which we call our character4   
,each of us1 glancing back over his     
history1 will find that his             
child-personality1 though indivisible1  
united in itself divers persons1 which  
could remain blended just because they  
were in their nascent state3 this       
indecision1 so charged with promise1 is 
one of the greatest charms of childhood4
 ,but these interwoven personalities    
become incompatible in course of growth1
 and1 as each of us can live but one    
life1 a choice must perforce be made4   
,we choose in reality without ceasing2  
without ceasing1 also1 we abandon many  
things4 ,the route we pursue in time is 
strewn with the remains of all that we  
began to be1 of all that we might have  
become4 ,but nature1 which has at       
command an incalculable number of lives1
 is in no wise bound to make such       
sacrifices4 ,she preserves the different
 tendencies that have bifurcated with   
their growth4 ,she creates with them    

diverging series of species that will   
evolve separately4  ,these series may1  
moreover1 be of unequal importance4 ,the
 author who begins a novel puts into his
 hero many things which he is obliged to
 discard as he goes on4 ,perhaps he will
 take them up later in other books1 and 
make new characters with them1 who will 
seem like extracts from1 or rather like 
complements of1 the first2 but they will
 almost always appear somewhat poor and 
limited in comparison with the original 
character4 ,so with regard to the       
evolution of life4 ,the bifurcations on 
the way have been numerous1 but there   
have been many blind alleys beside the  
two or three highways2 and of these     
highways themselves1 only one1 that     
which leads through the vertebrates up  
to man1 has been wide enough to allow   
free passage to the full breath of life4
 ,we get this impression when we compare
 the societies of bees and ants1 for    
instance1 with human societies4 ,the    
former are admirably ordered and united1

 but stereotyped2 the latter are open to
 every sort of progress1 but divided1   
and incessantly at strife with          
themselves4 ,the ideal would be a       
society always in progress and always in
 equilibrium1 but this ideal is perhaps 
unrealizable3 the two characteristics   
that would fain complete each other1    
which do complete each other in their   
embryonic state1 can no longer abide    
together when they grow stronger4 ,if   
one could speak1 otherwise than         
metaphorically1 of an impulse toward    
social life1 it might be said that the  
brunt of the impulse was borne along the
 line of evolution ending at man1 and   
that the rest of it was collected on the
 road leading to the hymenoptera3 the   
societies of ants and bees would thus   
present the aspect complementary to     
ours4 ,but this would be only a manner  
of expression4 ,there has been no       
particular impulse towards social life2 
there is simply the general movement of 
life1 which on divergent lines is       

creating forms ever new4 ,if societies  
should appear on two of these lines1    
they ought to show divergence of paths  
at the same time as community of        
impetus4 ,they will thus develop two    
classes of characteristics which we     
shall find vaguely complementary of each
 other4  ,so our study of the evolution 
movement will have to unravel a certain 
number of divergent directions1 and to  
appreciate the importance of what has   
happened along each of them--in a word1 
to determine the nature of the          
dissociated tendencies and estimate     
their relative proportion4 ,combining   
these tendencies1 then1 we shall get an 
approximation1 or rather an imitation1  
of the indivisible motor principle      
whence their impetus proceeds4          
,evolution will thus prove to be        
something entirely different from a     
series of adaptations to circumstances1 
as mechanism claims2 entirely different 
also from the realization of a plan of  
the whole1 as maintained by the doctrine

 of finality4         99       99       
99       99       99  ,that adaptation  
to environment is the necessary         
condition of evolution we do not        
question for a moment4 ,it is quite     
evident that a species would disappear1 
should it fail to bend to the conditions
 of existence which are imposed on it4  
,but it is one thing to recognize that  
outer circumstances are forces evolution
 must reckon with1 another to claim that
 they are the directing causes of       
evolution4 ,this latter theory is that  
of mechanism4 ,it excludes absolutely   
the hypothesis of an original impetus1  
,i mean an internal push that has       
carried life1 by more and more complex  
forms1 to higher and higher destinies4  
,yet this impetus is evident1 and a mere
 glance at fossil species shows us that 
life need not have evolved at all1 or   
might have evolved only in very         
restricted limits1 if it had chosen the 
alternative1 much more convenient to    
itself1 of becoming anchylosed in its   

primitive forms4 ,certain ,foraminifera 
have not varied since the ,silurian     
epoch4 ,unmoved witnesses of the        
innumerable revolutions that have       
upheaved our planet1 the ,lingulae are  
to-day what they were at the remotest   
times of the paleozoic era4  ,the truth 
is that adaptation explains the         
sinuosities of the movement of          
evolution1 but not its general          
directions1 still less the movement     
itself4#ea ,the road that leads to the  
town is obliged to follow the ups and   
downs of the hills2 it adapts itself to 
the accidents of the ground2 but the    
accidents of the ground are not the     
cause of the road1 nor have they given  
it its direction4 ,at every moment they 
furnish it with what is indispensable1  
namely1 the soil on which it lies2 but  
if we consider the whole of the road1   
instead of each of its parts1 the       
accidents of the ground appear only as  
impediments or causes of delay1 for the 
road aims simply at the town and would  

fain be a straight line4 ,just so as    
regards the evolution of life and the   
circumstances through which it          
passes--with this difference1 that      
evolution does not mark out a solitary  
route1 that it takes directions without 
aiming at ends1 and that it remains     
inventive even in its adaptations4      
,but1 if the evolution of life is       
something other than a series of        
adaptations to accidental circumstances1
 so also it is not the realization of a 
plan4 ,a plan is given in advance4 ,it  
is represented1 or at least             
representable1 before its realization4  
,the complete execution of it may be put
 off to a distant future1 or even       
indefinitely2 but the idea is none the  
less formulable at the present time1 in 
terms actually given4 ,if1 on the       
contrary1 evolution is a creation       
unceasingly renewed1 it creates1 as it  
goes on1 not only the forms of life1 but
 the ideas that will enable the         
intellect to understand it1 the terms   

which will serve to express it4 ,that is
 to say that its future overflows its   
present1 and can not be sketched out    
therein in an idea4  ,there is the first
 error of finalism4 ,it involves        
another1 yet more serious4  ,if life    
realizes a plan1 it ought to manifest a 
greater harmony the further it advances1
 just as the house shows better and     
better the idea of the architect as     
stone is set upon stone4 ,if1 on the    
contrary1 the unity of life is to be    
found solely in the impetus that pushes 
it along the road of time1 the harmony  
is not in front1 but behind4 ,the unity 
is derived from a vis a tergo3 it is    
given at the start as an impulsion1 not 
placed at the end as an attraction4 ,in 
communicating itself1 the impetus splits
 up more and more4 ,life1 in proportion 
to its progress1 is scattered in        
manifestations which undoubtedly owe to 
their common origin the fact that they  
are complementary to each other in      
certain aspects1 but which are none the 

less mutually incompatible and          
antagonistic4 ,so the discord between   
species will go on increasing4 ,indeed1 
we have as yet only indicated the       
essential cause of it4 ,we have         
supposed1 for the sake of simplicity1   
that each species received the impulsion
 in order to pass it on to others1 and  
that1 in every direction in which life  
evolves1 the propagation is in a        
straight line4 ,but1 as a matter of     
fact1 there are species which are       
arrested2 there are some that           
retrogress4 ,evolution is not only a    
movement forward2 in many cases we      
observe a marking-time1 and still more  
often a deviation or turning back4 ,it  
must be so1 as we shall show further on1
 and the same causes that divide the    
evolution movement often cause life to  
be diverted from itself1 hypnotized by  
the form it has just brought forth4     
,thence results an increasing disorder4 
,no doubt there is progress1 if progress
 mean a continual advance in the general

 direction determined by a first        
impulsion2 but this progress is         
accomplished only on the two or three   
great lines of evolution on which forms 
ever more and more complex1 ever more   
and more high1 appear2 between these    
lines run a crowd of minor paths in     
which1 on the contrary1 deviations1     
arrests1 and set-backs1 are multiplied4 
,the philosopher1 who begins by laying  
down as a principle that each detail is 
connected with some general plan of the 
whole1 goes from one disappointment to  
another as soon as he comes to examine  
the facts2 and1 as he had put everything
 in the same rank1 he finds that1 as the
 result of not allowing for accident1 he
 must regard everything as accidental4  
,for accident1 then1 an allowance must  
first be made1 and a very liberal       
allowance4 ,we must recognize that all  
is not coherent in nature4 ,by so doing1
 we shall be led to ascertain the       
centres around which the incoherence    
crystallizes4 ,this crystallization     

itself will clarify the rest2 the main  
directions will appear1 in which life is
 moving whilst developing the original  
impulse4 ,true1 we shall not witness the
 detailed accomplishment of a plan4     
,nature is more and better than a plan  
in course of realization4 ,a plan is a  
term assigned to a labor3 it closes the 
future whose form it indicates4 ,before 
the evolution of life1 on the contrary1 
the portals of the future remain wide   
open4 ,it is a creation that goes on for
 ever in virtue of an initial movement4 
,this movement constitutes the unity of 
the organized world--a prolific unity1  
of an infinite richness1 superior to any
 that the intellect could dream of1 for 
the intellect is only one of its aspects
 or products4  ,but it is easier to     
define the method than to apply it4 ,the
 complete interpretation of the         
evolution movement in the past1 as we   
conceive it1 would be possible only if  
the history of the development of the   
organized world were entirely known4    

,such is far from being the case4 ,the  
genealogies proposed for the different  
species are generally questionable4     
,they vary with their authors1 with the 
theoretic views inspiring them1 and     
raise discussions to which the present  
state of science does not admit of a    
final settlement4 ,but a comparison of  
the different solutions shows that the  
controversy bears less on the main lines
 of the movement than on matters of     
detail2 and so1 by following the main   
lines as closely as possible1 we shall  
be sure of not going astray4 ,moreover1 
they alone are important to us2 for we  
do not aim1 like the naturalist1 at     
finding the order of succession of      
different species1 but only at defining 
the principal directions of their       
evolution4 ,and not all of these        
directions have the same interest for   
us3 what concerns us particularly is the
 path that leads to man4 ,we shall      
therefore not lose sight of the fact1 in
 following one direction and another1   

that our main business is to determine  
the relation of man to the animal       
kingdom1 and the place of the animal    
kingdom itself in the organized world as
 a whole4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,to begin with the second  
point1 let us say that no definite      
characteristic distinguishes the plant  
from the animal4 ,attempts to define the
 two kingdoms strictly have always come 
to naught4 ,there is not a single       
property of vegetable life that is not  
found1 in some degree1 in certain       
animals2 not a single characteristic    
feature of the animal that has not been 
seen in certain species or at certain   
moments in the vegetable world4         
,naturally1 therefore1 biologists       
enamored of clean-cut concepts have     
regarded the distinction between the two
 kingdoms as artificial4 ,they would be 
right1 if definition in this case must  
be made1 as in the mathematical and     
physical sciences1 according to certain 
statical attributes which belong to the 

object defined and are not found in any 
other4 ,very different1 in our opinion1 
is the kind of definition which befits  
the sciences of life4 ,there is no      
manifestation of life which does not    
contain1 in a rudimentary state--either 
latent or potential1--the essential     
characters of most other manifestations4
 ,the difference is in the proportions4 
,but this very difference of proportion 
will suffice to define the group1 if we 
can establish that it is not accidental1
 and that the group as it evolves1 tends
 more and more to emphasize these       
particular characters4 ,in a word1 the  
group must not be defined by the        
possession of certain characters1 but by
 its tendency to emphasize them4 ,from  
this point of view1 taking tendencies   
rather than states into account1 we find
 that vegetables and animals may be     
precisely defined and distinguished1 and
 that they correspond to two divergent  
developments of life4  ,this divergence 
is shown1 first1 in the method of       

alimentation4 ,we know that the         
vegetable derives directly from the air 
and water and soil the elements         
necessary to maintain life1 especially  
carbon and nitrogen1 which it takes in  
mineral form4 ,the animal1 on the       
contrary1 cannot assimilate these       
elements unless they have already been  
fixed for it in organic substances by   
plants1 or by animals which directly or 
indirectly owe them to plants2 so that  
ultimately the vegetable nourishes the  
animal4 ,true1 this law allows of many  
exceptions among vegetables4 ,we do not 
hesitate to class amongst vegetables the
 ,drosera1 the ,dionaea1 the            
,pinguicula1 which are insectivorous    
plants4 ,on the other hand1 the fungi1  
which occupy so considerable a place in 
the vegetable world1 feed like animals3 
whether they are ferments1 saprophytes  
or parasites1 it is to already formed   
organic substances that they owe their  
nourishment4 ,it is therefore impossible
 to draw from this difference any static

 definition such as would automatically 
settle in any particular case the       
question whether we are dealing with a  
plant or an animal4 ,but the difference 
may provide the beginning of a dynamic  
definition of the two kingdoms1 in that 
it marks the two divergent directions in
 which vegetables and animals have taken
 their course4 ,it is a remarkable fact 
that the fungi1 which nature has spread 
all over the earth in such extraordinary
 profusion1 have not been able to       
evolve4 ,organically they do not rise   
above tissues which1 in the higher      
vegetables1 are formed in the embryonic 
sac of the ovary1 and precede the       
germinative development of the new      
individual4#eb ,they might be called the
 abortive children of the vegetable     
world4 ,their different species are like
 so many blind alleys1 as if1 by        
renouncing the mode of alimentation     
customary amongst vegetables1 they had  
been brought to a standstill on the     
highway of vegetable evolution4 ,as to  

the ,drosera1 the ,dionaea1 and         
insectivorous plants in general1 they   
are fed by their roots1 like other      
plants2 they too fix1 by their green    
parts1 the carbon of the carbonic acid  
in the atmosphere4 ,their faculty of    
capturing1 absorbing and digesting      
insects must have arisen late1 in quite 
exceptional cases where the soil was too
 poor to furnish sufficient nourishment4
 ,in a general way1 then1 if we attach  
less importance to the presence of      
special characters than to their        
tendency to develop1 and if we regard as
 essential that tendency along which    
evolution has been able to continue     
indefinitely1 we may say that vegetables
 are distinguished from animals by their
 power of creating organic matter out of
 mineral elements which they draw       
directly from the air and earth and     
water4 ,but now we come to another      
difference1 deeper than this1 though not
 unconnected with it4  ,the animal1     
being unable to fix directly the carbon 

and nitrogen which are everywhere to be 
found1 has to seek for its nourishment  
vegetables which have already fixed     
these elements1 or animals which have   
taken them from the vegetable kingdom4  
,so the animal must be able to move4    
,from the amoeba1 which thrusts out its 
pseudopodia at random to seize the      
organic matter scattered in a drop of   
water1 up to the higher animals which   
have sense-organs with which to         
recognize their prey1 locomotor organs  
to go and seize it1 and a nervous system
 to cordinate their movements with their
 sensations1 animal life is             
characterized1 in its general direction1
 by mobility in space4 ,in its most     
rudimentary form1 the animal is a tiny  
mass of protoplasm enveloped at most in 
a thin albuminous pellicle which allows 
full freedom for change of shape and    
movement4 ,the vegetable cell1 on the   
contrary1 is surrounded by a membrane of
 cellulose1 which condemns it to        
immobility4 ,and1 from the bottom to the

 top of the vegetable kingdom1 there are
 the same habits growing more and more  
sedentary1 the plant having no need to  
move1 and finding around it1 in the air 
and water and soil in which it is       
placed1 the mineral elements it can     
appropriate directly4 ,it is true that  
phenomena of movement are seen in       
plants4 ,darwin has written a well-known
 work on the movements of climbing      
plants4 ,he studied also the            
contrivances of certain insectivorous   
plants1 such as the ,drosera and the    
,dionaea1 to seize their prey4 ,the     
leaf-movements of the acacia1 the       
sensitive plant1 etc41 are well known4  
,moreover1 the circulation of the       
vegetable protoplasm within its sheath  
bears witness to its relationship to the
 protoplasm of animals1 whilst in a     
large number of animal species          
7generally parasites7 phenomena of      
fixation1 analogous to those of         
vegetables1 can be observed4#ec ,here1  
again1 it would be a mistake to claim   

that fixity and mobility are the two    
characters which enable us to decide1 by
 simple inspection alone1 whether we    
have before us a plant or an animal4    
,but fixity1 in the animal1 generally   
seems like a torpor into which the      
species has fallen1 a refusal to evolve 
further in a certain direction2 it is   
closely akin to parasitism and is       
accompanied by features that recall     
those of vegetable life4 ,on the other  
hand1 the movements of vegetables have  
neither the frequency nor the variety of
 those of animals4 ,generally1 they     
involve only part of the organism and   
scarcely ever extend to the whole4 ,in  
the exceptional cases in which a vague  
spontaneity appears in vegetables1 it is
 as if we beheld the accidental         
awakening of an activity normally       
asleep4 ,in short1 although both        
mobility and fixity exist in the        
vegetable as in the animal world1 the   
balance is clearly in favor of fixity in
 the one case and of mobility in the    

other4 ,these two opposite tendencies   
are so plainly directive of the two     
evolutions that the two kingdoms might  
almost be defined by them4 ,but fixity  
and mobility1 again1 are only           
superficial signs of tendencies that are
 still deeper4  ,between mobility and   
consciousness there is an obvious       
relationship4 ,no doubt1 the            
consciousness of the higher organisms   
seems bound up with certain cerebral    
arrangements4 ,the more the nervous     
system develops1 the more numerous and  
more precise become the movements among 
which it can choose2 the clearer1 also1 
is the consciousness that accompanies   
them4 ,but neither this mobility nor    
this choice nor consequently this       
consciousness involves as a necessary   
condition the presence of a nervous     
system2 the latter has only canalized in
 definite directions1 and brought up to 
a higher degree of intensity1 a         
rudimentary and vague activity1 diffused
 throughout the mass of the organized   

substance4 ,the lower we descend in the 
animal series1 the more the nervous     
centres are simplified1 and the more1   
too1 they separate from each other1 till
 finally the nervous elements disappear1
 merged in the mass of a less           
differentiated organism4 ,but it is the 
same with all the other apparatus1 with 
all the other anatomical elements2 and  
it would be as absurd to refuse         
consciousness to an animal because it   
has no brain as to declare it incapable 
of nourishing itself because it has no  
stomach4 ,the truth is that the nervous 
system arises1 like the other systems1  
from a division of labor4 ,it does not  
create the function1 it only brings it  
to a higher degree of intensity and     
precision by giving it the double form  
of reflex and voluntary activity4 ,to   
accomplish a true reflex movement1 a    
whole mechanism is necessary1 set up in 
the spinal cord or the medulla4 ,to     
choose voluntarily between several      
definite courses of action1 cerebral    

centres are necessary1 that is1         
crossways from which paths start1       
leading to motor mechanisms of diverse  
form but equal precision4 ,but where    
nervous elements are not yet canalized1 
still less concentrated into a system1  
there is something from which1 by a kind
 of splitting1 both the reflex and the  
voluntary will arise1 something which   
has neither the mechanical precision of 
the former nor the intelligent          
hesitations of the latter1 but which1   
partaking of both it may be             
infinitesimally1 is a reaction simply   
undecided1 and therefore vaguely        
conscious4 ,this amounts to saying that 
the humblest organism is conscious in   
proportion to its power to move freely4 
,is consciousness here1 in relation to  
movement1 the effect or the cause8 ,in  
one sense it is the cause1 since it has 
to direct locomotion4 ,but in another   
sense it is the effect2 for it is the   
motor activity that maintains it1 and1  
once this activity disappears1          

consciousness dies away or rather falls 
asleep4 ,in crustaceans such as the     
rhizocephala1 which must formerly have  
shown a more differentiated structure1  
fixity and parasitism accompany the     
degeneration and almost complete        
disappearance of the nervous system4    
,since1 in such a case1 the progress of 
organization must have localized all the
 conscious activity in nervous centres1 
we may conjecture that consciousness is 
even weaker in animals of this kind than
 in organisms much less differentiated1 
which have never had nervous centres but
 have remained mobile4  ,how then could 
the plant1 which is fixed in the earth  
and finds its food on the spot1 have    
developed in the direction of conscious 
activity8 ,the membrane of cellulose1 in
 which the protoplasm wraps itself up1  
not only prevents the simplest vegetable
 organism from moving1 but screens it   
also1 in some measure1 from those outer 
stimuli which act on the sensibility of 
the animal as irritants and prevent it  

from going to sleep4#ed ,the plant is   
therefore unconscious4 ,here again1     
however1 we must beware of radical      
distinctions4 ,unconscious and conscious
 are not two labels which can be        
mechanically fastened1 the one on every 
vegetable cell1 the other on all        
animals4 ,while consciousness sleeps in 
the animal which has degenerated into a 
motionless parasite1 it probably awakens
 in the vegetable that has regained     
liberty of movement1 and awakens in just
 the degree to which the vegetable has  
reconquered this liberty4 ,nevertheless1
 consciousness and unconsciousness mark 
the directions in which the two kingdoms
 have developed1 in this sense1 that to 
find the best specimens of consciousness
 in the animal we must ascend to the    
highest representatives of the series1  
whereas1 to find probable cases of      
vegetable consciousness1 we must descend
 as low as possible in the scale of     
plants--down to the zoospores of the    
algae1 for instance1 and1 more          

generally1 to those unicellular         
organisms which may be said to hesitate 
between the vegetable form and          
animality4 ,from this standpoint1 and in
 this measure1 we should define the     
animal by sensibility and awakened      
consciousness1 the vegetable by         
consciousness asleep and by             
insensibility4  ,to sum up1 the         
vegetable manufactures organic          
substances directly with mineral        
substances2 as a rule1 this aptitude    
enables it to dispense with movement and
 so with feeling4 ,animals1 which are   
obliged to go in search of their food1  
have evolved in the direction of        
locomotor activity1 and consequently of 
a consciousness more and more distinct1 
more and more ample4         99       99
       99       99       99  ,now1 it   
seems to us most probable that the      
animal cell and the vegetable cell are  
derived from a common stock1 and that   
the first living organisms oscillated   
between the vegetable and animal form1  

participating in both at once4 ,indeed1 
we have just seen that the              
characteristic tendencies of the        
evolution of the two kingdoms1 although 
divergent1 coexist even now1 both in the
 plant and in the animal4 ,the          
proportion alone differs4 ,ordinarily1  
one of the two tendencies covers or     
crushes down the other1 but in          
exceptional circumstances the suppressed
 one starts up and regains the place it 
had lost4 ,the mobility and             
consciousness of the vegetable cell are 
not so sound asleep that they cannot    
rouse themselves when circumstances     
permit or demand it2 and1 on the other  
hand1 the evolution of the animal       
kingdom has always been retarded1 or    
stopped1 or dragged back1 by the        
tendency it has kept toward the         
vegetative life4 ,however full1 however 
overflowing the activity of an animal   
species may appear1 torpor and          
unconsciousness are always lying in wait
 for it4 ,it keeps up its rle only by   

effort1 at the price of fatigue4 ,along 
the route on which the animal has       
evolved1 there have been numberless     
shortcomings and cases of decay1        
generally associated with parasitic     
habits2 they are so many shuntings on to
 the vegetative life4 ,thus1 everything 
bears out the belief that vegetable and 
animal are descended from a common      
ancestor which united the tendencies of 
both in a rudimentary state4  ,but the  
two tendencies mutually implied in this 
rudimentary form became dissociated as  
they grew4 ,hence the world of plants   
with its fixity and insensibility1 hence
 the animals with their mobility and    
consciousness4 ,there is no need1 in    
order to explain this dividing into two1
 to bring in any mysterious force4 ,it  
is enough to point out that the living  
being leans naturally toward what is    
most convenient to it1 and that         
vegetables and animals have chosen two  
different kinds of convenience in the   
way of procuring the carbon and nitrogen

 they need4 ,vegetables continually and 
mechanically draw these elements from an
 environment that continually provides  
it4 ,animals1 by action that is         
discontinuous1 concentrated in certain  
moments1 and conscious1 go to find these
 bodies in organisms that have already  
fixed them4 ,they are two different ways
 of being industrious1 or perhaps we may
 prefer to say1 of being idle4 ,for this
 very reason we doubt whether nervous   
elements1 however rudimentary1 will ever
 be found in the plant4 ,what           
corresponds in it to the directing will 
of the animal is1 we believe1 the       
direction in which it bends the energy  
of the solar radiation when it uses it  
to break the connection of the carbon   
with the oxygen in carbonic acid4 ,what 
corresponds in it to the sensibility of 
the animal is the impressionability1    
quite of its kind1 of its chlorophyl    
light4 ,now1 a nervous system being     
pre-eminently a mechanism which serves  
as intermediary between sensations and  

volitions1 the true nervous system of   
the plant seems to be the mechanism or  
rather chemicism sui generis which      
serves as intermediary between the      
impressionability of its chlorophyl to  
light and the producing of starch3 which
 amounts to saying that the plant can   
have no nervous elements1 and that the  
same impetus that has led the animal to 
give itself nerves and nerve centres    
must have ended1 in the plant1 in the   
chlorophyllian function4#ee         99  
99       99       99       99  ,this    
first glance over the organized world   
will enable us to ascertain more        
precisely what unites the two kingdoms1 
and also what separates them4  ,suppose1
 as we suggested in the preceding       
chapter1 that at the root of life there 
is an effort to engraft on to the       
necessity of physical forces the largest
 possible amount of indetermination4    
,this effort cannot result in the       
creation of energy1 or1 if it does1 the 
quantity created does not belong to the 

order of magnitude apprehended by our   
senses and instruments of measurement1  
our experience and science4 ,all that   
the effort can do1 then1 is to make the 
best of a pre-existing energy which it  
finds at its disposal4 ,now1 it finds   
only one way of succeeding in this1     
namely1 to secure such an accumulation  
of potential energy from matter1 that it
 can get1 at any moment1 the amount of  
work it needs for its action1 simply by 
pulling a trigger4 ,the effort itself   
possesses only that power of releasing4 
,but the work of releasing1 although    
always the same and always smaller than 
any given quantity1 will be the more    
effective the heavier the weight it     
makes fall and the greater the          
height--or1 in other words1 the greater 
the sum of potential energy accumulated 
and disposable4 ,as a matter of fact1   
the principal source of energy usable on
 the surface of our planet is the sun4  
,so the problem was this3 to obtain from
 the sun that it should partially and   

provisionally suspend1 here and there1  
on the surface of the earth1 its        
continual outpour of usable energy1 and 
store a certain quantity of it1 in the  
form of unused energy1 in appropriate   
reservoirs1 whence it could be drawn at 
the desired moment1 at the desired spot1
 in the desired direction4 ,the         
substances forming the food of animals  
are just such reservoirs4 ,made of very 
complex molecules holding a considerable
 amount of chemical energy in the       
potential state1 they are like          
explosives which only need a spark to   
set free the energy stored within them4 
,now1 it is probable that life tended at
 the beginning to compass at one and the
 same time both the manufacture of the  
explosive and the explosion by which it 
is utilized4 ,in this case1 the same    
organism that had directly stored the   
energy of the solar radiation would have
 expended it in free movements in space4
 ,and for that reason we must presume   
that the first living beings sought on  

the one hand to accumulate1 without     
ceasing1 energy borrowed from the sun1  
and on the other hand to expend it1 in a
 discontinuous and explosive way1 in    
movements of locomotion4 ,even to-day1  
perhaps1 a chlorophyl-bearing           
,infusorian such as the ,euglena may    
symbolize this primordial tendency of   
life1 though in a mean form1 incapable  
of evolving4 ,is the divergent          
development of the two kingdoms related 
to what one may call the oblivion of    
each kingdom as regards one of the two  
halves of the programme8 ,or rather1    
which is more likely1 was the very      
nature of the matter1 that life found   
confronting it on our planet1 opposed to
 the possibility of the two tendencies  
evolving very far together in the same  
organism8 ,what is certain is that the  
vegetable has trended principally in the
 first direction and the animal in the  
second4 ,but if1 from the very first1 in
 making the explosive1 nature had for   
object the explosion1 then it is the    

evolution of the animal1 rather than    
that of the vegetable1 that indicates1  
on the whole1 the fundamental direction 
of life4  ,the harmony of the two       
kingdoms1 the complementary characters  
they display1 might then be due to the  
fact that they develop two tendencies   
which at first were fused in one4 ,the  
more the single original tendency grows1
 the harder it finds it to keep united  
in the same living being those two      
elements which in the rudimentary state 
implied each other4 ,hence a parting in 
two1 hence two divergent evolutions2    
hence also two series of characters     
opposed in certain points1 complementary
 in others1 but1 whether opposed or     
complementary1 always preserving an     
appearance of kinship4 ,while the animal
 evolved1 not without accidents along   
the way1 toward a freer and freer       
expenditure of discontinuous energy1 the
 plant perfected rather its system of   
accumulation without moving4 ,we shall  
not dwell on this second point4 ,suffice

 it to say that the plant must have been
 greatly benefited1 in its turn1 by a   
new division1 analogous to that between 
plants and animals4 ,while the primitive
 vegetable cell had to fix by itself    
both its carbon and its nitrogen1 it    
became able almost to give up the second
 of these two functions as soon as      
microscopic vegetables came forward     
which leaned in this direction          
exclusively1 and even specialized       
diversely in this still complicated     
business4 ,the microbes that fix the    
nitrogen of the air and those which     
convert the ammoniacal compounds into   
nitrous ones1 and these again into      
nitrates1 have1 by the same splitting up
 of a tendency primitively one1 rendered
 to the whole vegetable world the same  
kind of service as the vegetables in    
general have rendered to animals4 ,if a 
special kingdom were to be made for     
these microscopic vegetables1 it might  
be said that in the microbes of the     
soil1 the vegetables and the animals1 we

 have before us the analysis1 carried   
out by the matter that life found at its
 disposal on our planet1 of all that    
life contained1 at the outset1 in a     
state of reciprocal implication4 ,is    
this1 properly speaking1 a division of  
labor8 ,these words do not give the     
exact idea of evolution1 such as we     
conceive it4 ,wherever there is division
 of labor1 there is association and also
 convergence of effort4 ,now1 the       
evolution we are speaking of is never   
achieved by means of association1 but by
 dissociation2 it never tends toward    
convergence1 but toward divergence of   
efforts4 ,the harmony between terms that
 are mutually complementary in certain  
points is not1 in our opinion1 produced1
 in course of progress1 by a reciprocal 
adaptation2 on the contrary1 it is      
complete only at the start4 ,it arises  
from an original identity1 from the fact
 that the evolutionary process1 splaying
 out like a sheaf1 sunders1 in          
proportion to their simultaneous growth1

 terms which at first completed each    
other so well that they coalesced4      
,now1 the elements into which a tendency
 splits up are far from possessing the  
same importance1 or1 above all1 the same
 power to evolve4 ,we have just         
distinguished three different kingdoms1 
if one may so express it1 in the        
organized world4 ,while the first       
comprises only microorganisms which have
 remained in the rudimentary state1     
animals and vegetables have taken their 
flight toward very lofty fortunes4      
,such1 indeed1 is generally the case    
when a tendency divides4 ,among the     
divergent developments to which it gives
 rise1 some go on indefinitely1 others  
come more or less quickly to the end of 
their tether4 ,these latter do not issue
 directly from the primitive tendency1  
but from one of the elements into which 
it has divided2 they are residual       
developments made and left behind on the
 way by some truly elementary tendency  
which continues to evolve4 ,now1 these  

truly elementary tendencies1 we think1  
bear a mark by which they may be        
recognized4  ,this mark is like a trace1
 still visible in each1 of what was in  
the original tendency of which they     
represent the elementary directions4    
,the elements of a tendency are not like
 objects set beside each other in space 
and mutually exclusive1 but rather like 
psychic states1 each of which1 although 
it be itself to begin with1 yet partakes
 of others1 and so virtually includes in
 itself the whole personality to which  
it belongs4 ,there is no real           
manifestation of life1 we said1 that    
does not show us1 in a rudimentary or   
latent state1 the characters of other   
manifestations4 ,conversely1 when we    
meet1 on one line of evolution1 a       
recollection1 so to speak1 of what is   
developed along other lines1 we must    
conclude that we have before us         
dissociated elements of one and the same
 original tendency4 ,in this sense1     
vegetables and animals represent the two

 great divergent developments of life4  
,though the plant is distinguished from 
the animal by fixity and insensibility1 
movement and consciousness sleep in it  
as recollections which may waken4 ,but1 
beside these normally sleeping          
recollections1 there are others awake   
and active1 just those1 namely1 whose   
activity does not obstruct the          
development of the elementary tendency  
itself4 ,we may then formulate this law3
 ,when a tendency splits up in the      
course of its development1 each of the  
special tendencies which thus arise     
tries to preserve and develop everything
 in the primitive tendency that is not  
incompatible with the work for which it 
is specialized4 ,this explains precisely
 the fact we dwelt on in the preceding  
chapter1 viz41 the formation of         
identical complex mechanisms on         
independent lines of evolution4 ,certain
 deep-seated analogies between the      
animal and the vegetable have probably  
no other cause3 sexual generation is    

perhaps only a luxury for the plant1 but
 to the animal it was a necessity1 and  
the plant must have been driven to it by
 the same impetus which impelled the    
animal thereto1 a primitive1 original   
impetus1 anterior to the separation of  
the two kingdoms4 ,the same may be said 
of the tendency of the vegetable towards
 a growing complexity4 ,this tendency is
 essential to the animal kingdom1 ever  
tormented by the need of more and more  
extended and effective action4 ,but the 
vegetable1 condemned to fixity and      
insensibility1 exhibits the same        
tendency only because it received at the
 outset the same impulsion4 ,recent     
experiments show that it varies at      
random when the period of mutation      
arrives2 whereas the animal must have   
evolved1 we believe1 in much more       
definite directions4 ,but we will not   
dwell further on this original doubling 
of the modes of life4 ,let us come to   
the evolution of animals1 in which we   
are more particularly interested4  ,what

 constitutes animality1 we said1 is the 
faculty of utilizing a releasing        
mechanism for the conversion of as much 
stored-up potential energy as possible  
into explosive actions4 ,in the         
beginning the explosion is haphazard1   
and does not choose its direction4 ,thus
 the amoeba thrusts out its pseudopodic 
prolongations in all directions at once4
 ,but1 as we rise in the animal scale1  
the form of the body itself is observed 
to indicate a certain number of very    
definite directions along which the     
energy travels4 ,these directions are   
marked by so many chains of nervous     
elements4 ,now1 the nervous element has 
gradually emerged from the barely       
differentiated mass of organized tissue4
 ,it may1 therefore1 be surmised that in
 the nervous element1 as soon as it     
appears1 and also in its appendages1 the
 faculty of suddenly freeing the        
gradually stored-up energy is           
concentrated4 ,no doubt1 every living   
cell expends energy without ceasing1 in 

order to maintain its equilibrium4 ,the 
vegetable cell1 torpid from the start1  
is entirely absorbed in this work of    
maintenance alone1 as if it took for end
 what must at first have been only a    
means4 ,but1 in the animal1 all points  
to action1 that is1 to the utilization  
of energy for movements from place to   
place4 ,true1 every animal cell expends 
a good deal--often the whole--of the    
energy at its disposal in keeping itself
 alive2 but the organism as a whole     
tries to attract as much energy as      
possible to those points where the      
locomotive movements are effected4 ,so  
that where a nervous system exists1 with
 its complementary sense-organs and     
motor apparatus1 everything should      
happen as if the rest of the body had1  
as its essential function1 to prepare   
for these and pass on to them1 at the   
moment required1 that force which they  
are to liberate by a sort of explosion4 
,the part played by food amongst the    
higher animals is1 indeed1 extremely    

complex4 ,in the first place it serves  
to repair tissues1 then it provides the 
animal with the heat necessary to render
 it as independent as possible of       
changes in external temperature4 ,thus  
it preserves1 supports1 and maintains   
the organism in which the nervous system
 is set and on which the nervous        
elements have to live4 ,but these       
nervous elements would have no reason   
for existence if the organism did not   
pass to them1 and especially to the     
muscles they control1 a certain energy  
to expend2 and it may even be           
conjectured that there1 in the main1 is 
the essential and ultimate destination  
of food4 ,this does not mean that the   
greater part of the food is used in this
 work4 ,a state may have to make        
enormous expenditure to secure the      
return of taxes1 and the sum which it   
will have to dispose of1 after deducting
 the cost of collection1 will perhaps be
 very small3 that sum is1 none the less1
 the reason for the tax and for all that

 has been spent to obtain its return4   
,so it is with the energy which the     
animal demands of its food4  ,many facts
 seem to indicate that the nervous and  
muscular elements stand in this relation
 towards the rest of the organism4      
,glance first at the distribution of    
alimentary substances among the         
different elements of the living body4  
,these substances fall into two classes1
 one the quaternary or albuminoid1 the  
other the ternary1 including the        
carbohydrates and the fats4 ,the        
albuminoids are properly plastic1       
destined to repair the                  
tissues--although1 owing to the carbon  
they contain1 they are capable of       
providing energy on occasion4 ,but the  
function of supplying energy has        
devolved more particularly on the second
 class of substances3 these1 being      
deposited in the cell rather than       
forming part of its substance1 convey to
 it1 in the form of chemical potential1 
an expansive energy that may be directly

 converted into either movement or heat4
 ,in short1 the chief function of the   
albuminoids is to repair the machine1   
while the function of the other class of
 substances is to supply power4 ,it is  
natural that the albuminoids should have
 no specially allotted destination1     
since every part of the machine has to  
be maintained4 ,but not so with the     
other substances4 ,the carbohydrates are
 distributed very unequally1 and this   
inequality of distribution seems to us  
in the highest degree instructive4      
,conveyed by the arterial blood in the  
form of glucose1 these substances are   
deposited1 in the form of glycogen1 in  
the different cells forming the tissues4
 ,we know that one of the principal     
functions of the liver is to maintain at
 a constant level the quantity of       
glucose held by the blood1 by means of  
the reserves of glycogen secreted by the
 hepatic cells4 ,now1 in this           
circulation of glucose and accumulation 
of glycogen1 it is easy to see that the 

effect is as if the whole effort of the 
organism were directed towards providing
 with potential energy the elements of  
both the muscular and the nervous       
tissues4 ,the organism proceeds         
differently in the two cases1 but it    
arrives at the same result4 ,in the     
first case1 it provides the muscle-cell 
with a large reserve deposited in       
advance3 the quantity of glycogen       
contained in the muscles is1 indeed1    
enormous in comparison with what is     
found in the other tissues4 ,in the     
nervous tissue1 on the contrary1 the    
reserve is small 7the nervous elements1 
whose function is merely to liberate the
 potential energy stored in the muscle1 
never have to furnish much work at one  
time72 but the remarkable thing is that 
this reserve is restored by the blood at
 the very moment that it is expended1 so
 that the nerve is instantly recharged  
with potential energy4 ,muscular tissue 
and nervous tissue are1 therefore1 both 
privileged1 the one in that it is       

stocked with a large reserve of energy1 
the other in that it is always served at
 the instant it is in need and to the   
exact extent of its requirements4  ,more
 particularly1 it is from the           
sensori-motor system that the call for  
glycogen1 the potential energy1 comes1  
as if the rest of the organism were     
simply there in order to transmit force 
to the nervous system and to the muscles
 which the nerves control4 ,true1 when  
we think of the part played by the      
nervous system 7even the sensori-motor  
system7 as regulator of the organic     
life1 it may well be asked whether1 in  
this exchange of good offices between it
 and the rest of the body1 the nervous  
system is indeed a master that the body 
serves4 ,but we shall already incline to
 this hypothesis when we consider1 even 
in the static state only1 the           
distribution of potential energy among  
the tissues2 and we shall be entirely   
convinced of it when we reflect upon the
 conditions in which the energy is      

expended and restored4 ,for suppose the 
sensori-motor system is a system like   
the others1 of the same rank as the     
others4 ,borne by the whole of the      
organism1 it will wait until an excess  
of chemical potential is supplied to it 
before it performs any work4 ,in other  
words1 it is the production of glycogen 
which will regulate the consumption by  
the nerves and muscles4 ,on the         
contrary1 if the sensori-motor system is
 the actual master1 the duration and    
extent of its action will be            
independent1 to a certain extent at     
least1 of the reserve of glycogen that  
it holds1 and even of that contained in 
the whole of the organism4 ,it will     
perform work1 and the other tissues will
 have to arrange as they can to supply  
it with potential energy4 ,now1 this is 
precisely what does take place1 as is   
shown in particular by the experiments  
of ,morat and ,dufourt4#ef ,while the   
glycogenic function of the liver depends
 on the action of the excitory nerves   

which control it1 the action of these   
nerves is subordinated to the action of 
those which stimulate the locomotor     
muscles--in this sense1 that the muscles
 begin by expending without calculation1
 thus consuming glycogen1 impoverishing 
the blood of its glucose1 and finally   
causing the liver1 which has had to pour
 into the impoverished blood some of its
 reserve of glycogen1 to manufacture a  
fresh supply4 ,from the sensori-motor   
system1 then1 everything starts2 on that
 system everything converges2 and we may
 say1 without metaphor1 that the rest of
 the organism is at its service4        
,consider again what happens in a       
prolonged fast4 ,it is a remarkable fact
 that in animals that have died of      
hunger the brain is found to be almost  
unimpaired1 while the other organs have 
lost more or less of their weight and   
their cells have undergone profound     
changes4#eg ,it seems as though the rest
 of the body had sustained the nervous  
system to the last extremity1 treating  

itself simply as the means of which the 
nervous system is the end4  ,to sum up3 
if we agree1 in short1 to understand by 
the sensori-motor system the            
cerebro-spinal nervous system together  
with the sensorial apparatus in which it
 is prolonged and the locomotor muscles 
it controls1 we may say that a higher   
organism is essentially a sensori-motor 
system installed on systems of          
digestion1 respiration1 circulation1    
secretion1 etc41 whose function it is to
 repair1 cleanse and protect it1 to     
create an unvarying internal environment
 for it1 and above all to pass it       
potential energy to convert into        
locomotive movement4#eh ,it is true that
 the more the nervous function is       
perfected1 the more must the functions  
required to maintain it develop1 and the
 more exacting1 consequently1 they      
become for themselves4 ,as the nervous  
activity has emerged from the           
protoplasmic mass in which it was almost
 drowned1 it has had to summon around   

itself activities of all kinds for its  
support4 ,these could only be developed 
on other activities1 which again implied
 others1 and so on indefinitely4 ,thus  
it is that the complexity of functioning
 of the higher organisms goes on to     
infinity4 ,the study of one of these    
organisms therefore takes us round in a 
circle1 as if everything was a means to 
everything else4 ,but the circle has a  
centre1 none the less1 and that is the  
system of nervous elements stretching   
between the sensory organs and the motor
 apparatus4  ,we will not dwell here on 
a point we have treated at length in a  
former work4 ,let us merely recall that 
the progress of the nervous system has  
been effected both in the direction of a
 more precise adaptation of movements   
and in that of a greater latitude left  
to the living being to choose between   
them4 ,these two tendencies may appear  
antagonistic1 and indeed they are so2   
but a nervous chain1 even in its most   
rudimentary form1 successfully          

reconciles them4 ,on the one hand1 it   
marks a well-defined track between one  
point of the periphery and another1 the 
one sensory1 the other motor4 ,it has   
therefore canalized an activity which   
was originally diffused in the          
protoplasmic mass4 ,but1 on the other   
hand1 the elements that compose it are  
probably discontinuous2 at any rate1    
even supposing they anastomose1 they    
exhibit a functional discontinuity1 for 
each of them ends in a kind of          
cross-road where probably the nervous   
current may choose its course4 ,from the
 humblest ,monera to the best endowed   
insects1 and up to the most intelligent 
vertebrates1 the progress realized has  
been above all a progress of the nervous
 system1 coupled at every stage with all
 the new constructions and complications
 of mechanism that this progress        
required4 ,as we foreshadowed in the    
beginning of this work1 the rle of life 
is to insert some indetermination into  
matter4 ,indeterminate1 i4e4            

unforeseeable1 are the forms it creates 
in the course of its evolution4 ,more   
and more indeterminate also1 more and   
more free1 is the activity to which     
these forms serve as the vehicle4 ,a    
nervous system1 with neurones placed end
 to end in such wise that1 at the       
extremity of each1 manifold ways open in
 which manifold questions present       
themselves1 is a veritable reservoir of 
indetermination4 ,that the main energy  
of the vital impulse has been spent in  
creating apparatus of this kind is1 we  
believe1 what a glance over the         
organized world as a whole easily shows4
 ,but concerning the vital impulse      
itself a few explanations are necessary4
         99       99       99       99  
99  ,it must not be forgotten that the  
force which is evolving throughout the  
organized world is a limited force1     
which is always seeking to transcend    
itself and always remains inadequate to 
the work it would fain produce4 ,the    
errors and puerilities of radical       

finalism are due to the misapprehension 
of this point4 ,it has represented the  
whole of the living world as a          
construction1 and a construction        
analogous to a human work4 ,all the     
pieces have been arranged with a view to
 the best possible functioning of the   
machine4 ,each species has its reason   
for existence1 its part to play1 its    
allotted place2 and all join together1  
as it were1 in a musical concert1       
wherein the seeming discords are really 
meant to bring out a fundamental        
harmony4 ,in short1 all goes on in      
nature as in the works of human genius1 
where1 though the result may be         
trifling1 there is at least perfect     
adequacy between the object made and the
 work of making it4  ,nothing of the    
kind in the evolution of life4 ,there1  
the disproportion is striking between   
the work and the result4 ,from the      
bottom to the top of the organized world
 we do indeed find one great effort2 but
 most often this effort turns short1    

sometimes paralyzed by contrary forces1 
sometimes diverted from what it should  
do by what it does1 absorbed by the form
 it is engaged in taking1 hypnotized by 
it as by a mirror4 ,even in its most    
perfect works1 though it seems to have  
triumphed over external resistances and 
also over its own1 it is at the mercy of
 the materiality which it has had to    
assume4 ,it is what each of us may      
experience in himself4 ,our freedom1 in 
the very movements by which it is       
affirmed1 creates the growing habits    
that will stifle it if it fails to renew
 itself by a constant effort3 it is     
dogged by automatism4 ,the most living  
thought becomes frigid in the formula   
that expresses it4 ,the word turns      
against the idea4  ,the letter kills the
 spirit4 ,and our most ardent           
enthusiasm1 as soon as it is            
externalized into action1 is so         
naturally congealed into the cold       
calculation of interest or vanity1 the  
one takes so easily the shape of the    

other1 that we might confuse them       
together1 doubt our own sincerity1 deny 
goodness and love1 if we did not know   
that the dead retain for a time the     
features of the living4  ,the profound  
cause of this discordance lies in an    
irremediable difference of rhythm4 ,life
 in general is mobility itself2         
particular manifestations of life accept
 this mobility reluctantly1 and         
constantly lag behind4 ,it is always    
going ahead2 they want to mark time4    
,evolution in general would fain go on  
in a straight line2 each special        
evolution is a kind of circle4 ,like    
eddies of dust raised by the wind as it 
passes1 the living turn upon themselves1
 borne up by the great blast of life4   
,they are therefore relatively stable1  
and counterfeit immobility so well that 
we treat each of them as a thing rather 
than as a progress1 forgetting that the 
very permanence of their form is only   
the outline of a movement4 ,at times1   
however1 in a fleeting vision1 the      

invisible breath that bears them is     
materialized before our eyes4 ,we have  
this sudden illumination before certain 
forms of maternal love1 so striking1 and
 in most animals so touching1 observable
 even in the solicitude of the plant for
 its seed4 ,this love1 in which some    
have seen the great mystery of life1 may
 possibly deliver us life's secret4 ,it 
shows us each generation leaning over   
the generation that shall follow4 ,it   
allows us a glimpse of the fact that the
 living being is above all a            
thoroughfare1 and that the essence of   
life is in the movement by which life is
 transmitted4  ,this contrast between   
life in general1 and the forms in which 
it is manifested1 has everywhere the    
same character4 ,it might be said that  
life tends toward the utmost possible   
action1 but that each species prefers to
 contribute the slightest possible      
effort4 ,regarded in what constitutes   
its true essence1 namely1 as a          
transition from species to species1 life

 is a continually growing action4 ,but  
each of the species1 through which life 
passes1 aims only at its own            
convenience4 ,it goes for that which    
demands the least labor4 ,absorbed in   
the form it is about to take1 it falls  
into a partial sleep1 in which it       
ignores almost all the rest of life2 it 
fashions itself so as to take the       
greatest possible advantage of its      
immediate environment with the least    
possible trouble4 ,accordingly1 the act 
by which life goes forward to the       
creation of a new form1 and the act by  
which this form is shaped1 are two      
different and often antagonistic        
movements4 ,the first is continuous with
 the second1 but cannot continue in it  
without being drawn aside from its      
direction1 as would happen to a man     
leaping1 if1 in order to clear the      
obstacle1 he had to turn his eyes from  
it and look at himself all the while4   
,living forms are1 by their very        
definition1 forms that are able to live4

 ,in whatever way the adaptation of the 
organism to its circumstances is        
explained1 it has necessarily been      
sufficient1 since the species has       
subsisted4 ,in this sense1 each of the  
successive species that paleontology and
 zoology describes was a success carried
 off by life4 ,but we get a very        
different impression when we refer each 
species to the movement that has left it
 behind on its way1 instead of to the   
conditions into which it has been set4  
,often this movement has turned aside2  
very often1 too1 it has stopped short2  
what was to have been a thoroughfare has
 become a terminus4 ,from this new point
 of view1 failure seems the rule1       
success exceptional and always          
imperfect4 ,we shall see that1 of the   
four main directions along which animal 
life bent its course1 two have led to   
blind alleys1 and1 in the other two1 the
 effort has generally been out of       
proportion to the result4  ,documents   
are lacking to reconstruct this history 

in detail1 but we can make out its main 
lines4 ,we have already said that       
animals and vegetables must have        
separated soon from their common stock1 
the vegetable falling asleep in         
immobility1 the animal1 on the contrary1
 becoming more and more awake and       
marching on to the conquest of a nervous
 system4 ,probably the effort of the    
animal kingdom resulted in creating     
organisms still very simple1 but endowed
 with a certain freedom of action1 and1 
above all1 with a shape so undecided    
that it could lend itself to any future 
determination4 ,these animals may have  
resembled some of our worms1 but with   
this difference1 however1 that the worms
 living to-day1 to which they could be  
compared1 are but the empty and fixed   
examples of infinitely plastic forms1   
pregnant with an unlimited future1 the  
common stock of the echinoderms1        
molluscs1 arthropods1 and vertebrates4  
,one danger lay in wait for them1 one   
obstacle which might have stopped the   

soaring course of animal life4 ,there is
 one peculiarity with which we cannot   
help being struck when glancing over the
 fauna of primitive times1 namely1 the  
imprisonment of the animal in a more or 
less solid sheath1 which must have      
obstructed and often even paralyzed its 
movements4 ,the molluscs of that time   
had a shell more universally than those 
of to-day4 ,the arthropods in general   
were provided with a carapace2 most of  
them were crustaceans4 ,the more ancient
 fishes had a bony sheath of extreme    
hardness4#ei ,the explanation of this   
general fact should be sought1 we       
believe1 in a tendency of soft organisms
 to defend themselves against one       
another by making themselves1 as far as 
possible1 undevourable4 ,each species1  
in the act by which it comes into being1
 trends towards that which is most      
expedient4 ,just as among primitive     
organisms there were some that turned   
towards animal life by refusing to      
manufacture organic out of inorganic    

material and taking organic substances  
ready made from organisms that had      
turned toward the vegetative life1 so1  
among the animal species themselves1    
many contrived to live at the expense of
 other animals4 ,for an organism that is
 animal1 that is to say mobile1 can     
avail itself of its mobility to go in   
search of defenseless animals1 and feed 
on them quite as well as on vegetables4 
,so1 the more species became mobile1 the
 more they became voracious and         
dangerous to one another4 ,hence a      
sudden arrest of the entire animal world
 in its progress towards higher and     
higher mobility2 for the hard and       
calcareous skin of the echinoderm1 the  
shell of the mollusc1 the carapace of   
the crustacean and the ganoid           
breast-plate of the ancient fishes      
probably all originated in a common     
effort of the animal species to protect 
themselves against hostile species4 ,but
 this breast-plate1 behind which the    
animal took shelter1 constrained it in  

its movements and sometimes fixed it in 
one place4 ,if the vegetable renounced  
consciousness in wrapping itself in a   
cellulose membrane1 the animal that shut
 itself up in a citadel or in armor     
condemned itself to a partial slumber4  
,in this torpor the echinoderms and even
 the molluscs live to-day4 ,probably    
arthropods and vertebrates were         
threatened with it too4 ,they escaped1  
however1 and to this fortunate          
circumstance is due the expansion of the
 highest forms of life4  ,in two        
directions1 in fact1 we see the impulse 
of life to movement getting the upper   
hand again4 ,the fishes exchanged their 
ganoid breast-plate for scales4 ,long   
before that1 the insects had appeared1  
also disencumbered of the breast-plate  
that had protected their ancestors4     
,both supplemented the insufficiency of 
their protective covering by an agility 
that enabled them to escape their       
enemies1 and also to assume the         
offensive1 to choose the place and the  

moment of encounter4 ,we see a progress 
of the same kind in the evolution of    
human armaments4 ,the first impulse is  
to seek shelter2 the second1 which is   
the better1 is to become as supple as   
possible for flight and above all for   
attack--attack being the most effective 
means of defense4 ,so the heavy hoplite 
was supplanted by the legionary2 the    
knight1 clad in armor1 had to give place
 to the light free-moving infantryman2  
and in a general way1 in the evolution  
of life1 just as in the evolution of    
human societies and of individual       
destinies1 the greatest successes have  
been for those who have accepted the    
heaviest risks4  ,evidently1 then1 it   
was to the animal's interest to make    
itself more mobile4 ,as we said when    
speaking of adaptation in general1 any  
transformation of a species can be      
explained by its own particular         
interest4 ,this will give the immediate 
cause of the variation1 but often only  
the most superficial cause4 ,the        

profound cause is the impulse which     
thrust life into the world1 which made  
it divide into vegetables and animals1  
which shunted the animal on to          
suppleness of form1 and which1 at a     
certain moment1 in the animal kingdom   
threatened with torpor1 secured that1 on
 some points at least1 it should rouse  
itself up and move forward4  ,on the two
 paths along which the vertebrates and  
arthropods have separately evolved1     
development 7apart from retrogressions  
connected with parasitism or any other  
cause7 has consisted above all in the   
progress of the sensori-motor nervous   
system4 ,mobility and suppleness were   
sought for1 and also--through many      
experimental attempts1 and not without a
 tendency to excess of substance and    
brute force at the start--variety of    
movements4 ,but this quest itself took  
place in divergent directions4 ,a glance
 at the nervous system of the arthropods
 and that of the vertebrates shows us   
the difference4 ,in the arthropods1 the 

body is formed of a series more or less 
long of rings set together2 motor       
activity is thus distributed amongst a  
varying--sometimes a                    
considerable--number of appendages1 each
 of which has its special function4 ,in 
the vertebrates1 activity is            
concentrated in two pairs of members    
only1 and these organs perform functions
 which depend much less strictly on     
their form4#fj ,the independence becomes
 complete in man1 whose hand is capable 
of any kind of work4  ,that1 at least1  
is what we see4 ,but behind what is seen
 there is what may be surmised--two     
powers1 immanent in life and originally 
intermingled1 which were bound to part  
company in course of growth4  ,to define
 these powers1 we must consider1 in the 
evolution both of the arthropods and the
 vertebrates1 the species which mark the
 culminating point of each4 ,how is this
 point to be determined8 ,here again1 to
 aim at geometrical precision will lead 
us astray4 ,there is no single simple   

sign by which we can recognize that one 
species is more advanced than another on
 the same line of evolution4 ,there are 
manifold characters1 that must be       
compared and weighed in each particular 
case1 in order to ascertain to what     
extent they are essential or accidental 
and how far they must be taken into     
account4  ,it is unquestionable1 for    
example1 that success is the most       
general criterion of superiority1 the   
two terms being1 up to a certain point1 
synonymous4 ,by success must be         
understood1 so far as the living being  
is concerned1 an aptitude to develop in 
the most diverse environments1 through  
the greatest possible variety of        
obstacles1 so as to cover the widest    
possible extent of ground4 ,a species   
which claims the entire earth for its   
domain is truly a dominating and        
consequently superior species4 ,such is 
the human species1 which represents the 
culminating point of the evolution of   
the vertebrates4 ,but such also are1 in 

the series of the articulate1 the       
insects and in particular certain       
hymenoptera4 ,it has been said of the   
ants that1 as man is lord of the soil1  
they are lords of the sub-soil4  ,on the
 other hand1 a group of species that has
 appeared late may be a group of        
degenerates2 but1 for that1 some special
 cause of retrogression must have       
intervened4 ,by right1 this group should
 be superior to the group from which it 
is derived1 since it would correspond to
 a more advanced stage of evolution4    
,now man is probably the latest comer of
 the vertebrates2#fa and in the insect  
series no species is later than the     
hymenoptera1 unless it be the           
lepidoptera1 which are probably         
degenerates1 living parasitically on    
flowering plants4  ,so1 by different    
ways1 we are led to the same conclusion4
 ,the evolution of the arthropods       
reaches its culminating point in the    
insect1 and in particular in the        
hymenoptera1 as that of the vertebrates 

in man4 ,now1 since instinct is nowhere 
so developed as in the insect world1 and
 in no group of insects so marvelously  
as in the hymenoptera1 it may be said   
that the whole evolution of the animal  
kingdom1 apart from retrogressions      
towards vegetative life1 has taken place
 on two divergent paths1 one of which   
led to instinct and the other to        
intelligence4  ,vegetative torpor1      
instinct1 and intelligence--these1 then1
 are the elements that coincided in the 
vital impulsion common to plants and    
animals1 and which1 in the course of a  
development in which they were made     
manifest in the most unforeseen forms1  
have been dissociated by the very fact  
of their growth4 ,the cardinal error    
which1 from ,aristotle onwards1 has     
vitiated most of the philosophies of    
nature1 is to see in vegetative1        
instinctive and rational life1 three    
successive degrees of the development of
 one and the same tendency1 whereas they
 are three divergent directions of an   

activity that has split up as it grew4  
,the difference between them is not a   
difference of intensity1 nor1 more      
generally1 of degree1 but of kind4      
99       99       99       99       99  
,it is important to investigate this    
point4 ,we have seen in the case of     
vegetable and animal life how they are  
at once mutually complementary and      
mutually antagonistic4 ,now we must show
 that intelligence and instinct also are
 opposite and complementary4 ,but let us
 first explain why we are generally led 
to regard them as activities of which   
one is superior to the other and based  
upon it1 whereas in reality they are not
 things of the same order3 they have not
 succeeded one another1 nor can we      
assign to them different grades4  ,it is
 because intelligence and instinct1     
having originally been interpenetrating1
 retain something of their common       
origin4 ,neither is ever found in a pure
 state4 ,we said that in the plant the  
consciousness and mobility of the       

animal1 which lie dormant1 can be       
awakened2 and that the animal lives     
under the constant menace of being drawn
 aside to the vegetative life4 ,the two 
tendencies--that of the plant and that  
of the animal--were so thoroughly       
interpenetrating1 to begin with1 that   
there has never been a complete         
severance between them3 they haunt each 
other continually2 everywhere we find   
them mingled2 it is the proportion that 
differs4 ,so with intelligence and      
instinct4 ,there is no intelligence in  
which some traces of instinct are not to
 be discovered1 more especially no      
instinct that is not surrounded with a  
fringe of intelligence4 ,it is this     
fringe of intelligence that has been the
 cause of so many misunderstandings4    
,from the fact that instinct is always  
more or less intelligent1 it has been   
concluded that instinct and intelligence
 are things of the same kind1 that there
 is only a difference of complexity or  
perfection between them1 and1 above all1

 that one of the two is expressible in  
terms of the other4 ,in reality1 they   
accompany each other only because they  
are complementary1 and they are         
complementary only because they are     
different1 what is instinctive in       
instinct being opposite to what is      
intelligent in intelligence4  ,we are   
bound to dwell on this point4 ,it is one
 of the utmost importance4  ,let us say 
at the outset that the distinctions we  
are going to make will be too sharply   
drawn1 just because we wish to define in
 instinct what is instinctive1 and in   
intelligence what is intelligent1       
whereas all concrete instinct is mingled
 with intelligence1 as all real         
intelligence is penetrated by instinct4 
,moreover1 neither intelligence nor     
instinct lends itself to rigid          
definition3 they are tendencies1 and not
 things4 ,also1 it must not be forgotten
 that in the present chapter we are     
considering intelligence and instinct as
 going out of life which deposits them  

along its course4 ,now the life         
manifested by an organism is1 in our    
view1 a certain effort to obtain certain
 things from the material world4 ,no    
wonder1 therefore1 if it is the         
diversity of this effort that strikes us
 in instinct and intelligence1 and if we
 see in these two modes of psychical    
activity1 above all else1 two different 
methods of action on inert matter4 ,this
 rather narrow view of them has the     
advantage of giving us an objective     
means of distinguishing them4 ,in       
return1 however1 it gives us1 of        
intelligence in general and of instinct 
in general1 only the mean position above
 and below which both constantly        
oscillate4 ,for that reason the reader  
must expect to see in what follows only 
a diagrammatic drawing1 in which the    
respective outlines of intelligence and 
instinct are sharper than they should   
be1 and in which the shading-off which  
comes from the indecision of each and   
from their reciprocal encroachment on   

one another is neglected4 ,in a matter  
so obscure1 we cannot strive too hard   
for clearness4 ,it will always be easy  
afterwards to soften the outlines and to
 correct what is too geometrical in the 
drawing--in short1 to replace the       
rigidity of a diagram by the suppleness 
of life4         99       99       99   
99       99  ,to what date is it agreed 
to ascribe the appearance of man on the 
earth8 ,to the period when the first    
weapons1 the first tools1 were made4    
,the memorable quarrel over the         
discovery of ,boucher de ,perthes in the
 quarry of ,moulin-,quignon is not      
forgotten4 ,the question was whether    
real hatchets had been found or merely  
bits of flint accidentally broken4 ,but 
that1 supposing they were hatchets1 we  
were indeed in the presence of          
intelligence1 and more particularly of  
human intelligence1 no one doubted for  
an instant4 ,now let us open a          
collection of anecdotes on the          
intelligence of animals3 we shall see   

that besides many acts explicable by    
imitation or by the automatic           
association of images1 there are some   
that we do not hesitate to call         
intelligent3 foremost among them are    
those that bear witness to some idea of 
manufacture1 whether the animal life    
succeeds in fashioning a crude          
instrument or uses for its profit an    
object made by man4 ,the animals that   
rank immediately after man in the matter
 of intelligence1 the apes and          
elephants1 are those that can use an    
artificial instrument occasionally4     
,below1 but not very far from them1 come
 those that recognize a constructed     
object3 for example1 the fox1 which     
knows quite well that a trap is a trap4 
,no doubt1 there is intelligence        
wherever there is inference2 but        
inference1 which consists in an         
inflection of past experience in the    
direction of present experience1 is     
already a beginning of invention4       
,invention becomes complete when it is  

materialized in a manufactured          
instrument4 ,towards that achievement   
the intelligence of animals tends as    
towards an ideal4 ,and though1          
ordinarily1 it does not yet succeed in  
fashioning artificial objects and in    
making use of them1 it is preparing for 
this by the very variations which it    
performs on the instincts furnished by  
nature4 ,as regards human intelligence1 
it has not been sufficiently noted that 
mechanical invention has been from the  
first its essential feature1 that even  
to-day our social life gravitates around
 the manufacture and use of artificial  
instruments1 that the inventions which  
strew the road of progress have also    
traced its direction4 ,this we hardly   
realize1 because it takes us longer to  
change ourselves than to change our     
tools4 ,our individual and even social  
habits survive a good while the         
circumstances for which they were made1 
so that the ultimate effects of an      
invention are not observed until its    

novelty is already out of sight4 ,a     
century has elapsed since the invention 
of the steam-engine1 and we are only    
just beginning to feel the depths of the
 shock it gave us4 ,but the revolution  
it has effected in industry has         
nevertheless upset human relations      
altogether4 ,new ideas are arising1 new 
feelings are on the way to flower4 ,in  
thousands of years1 when1 seen from the 
distance1 only the broad lines of the   
present age will still be visible1 our  
wars and our revolutions will count for 
little1 even supposing they are         
remembered at all2 but the steam-engine1
 and the procession of inventions of    
every kind that accompanied it1 will    
perhaps be spoken of as we speak of the 
bronze or of the chipped stone of       
prehistoric times3 it will serve to     
define an age4#fb ,if we could rid      
ourselves of all pride1 if1 to define   
our species1 we kept strictly to what   
the historic and the prehistoric periods
 show us to be the constant             

characteristic of man and of            
intelligence1 we should say not ,homo   
sapiens1 but ,homo faber4 ,in short1    
intelligence1 considered in what seems  
to be its original feature1 is the      
faculty of manufacturing artificial     
objects1 especially tools to make tools1
 and of indefinitely varying the        
manufacture4  ,now1 does an             
unintelligent animal also possess tools 
or machines8 ,yes1 certainly1 but here  
the instrument forms a part of the body 
that uses it2 and1 corresponding to this
 instrument1 there is an instinct that  
knows how to use it4 ,true1 it cannot be
 maintained that all instincts consist  
in a natural ability to use an inborn   
mechanism4 ,such a definition would not 
apply to the instincts which ,romanes   
called secondary2 and more than one     
primary instinct would not come under   
it4 ,but this definition1 like that     
which we have provisionally given of    
intelligence1 determines at least the   
ideal limit toward which the very       

numerous forms of instinct are          
traveling4 ,indeed1 it has often been   
pointed out that most instincts are only
 the continuance1 or rather the         
consummation1 of the work of            
organization itself4 ,where does the    
activity of instinct begin8 and where   
does that of nature end8 ,we cannot     
tell4 ,in the metamorphoses of the larva
 into the nymph and into the perfect    
insect1 metamorphoses that often require
 appropriate action and a kind of       
initiative on the part of the larva1    
there is no sharp line of demarcation   
between the instinct of the animal and  
the organizing work of living matter4   
,we may say1 as we will1 either that    
instinct organizes the instruments it is
 about to use1 or that the process of   
organization is continued in the        
instinct that has to use the organ4 ,the
 most marvelous instincts of the insect 
do nothing but develop its special      
structure into movements3 indeed1 where 
social life divides the labor among     

different individuals1 and thus allots  
them different instincts1 a             
corresponding difference of structure is
 observed3 the polymorphism of ants1    
bees1 wasps and certain pseudoneuroptera
 is well known4 ,thus1 if we consider   
only those typical cases in which the   
complete triumph of intelligence and of 
instinct is seen1 we find this essential
 difference between them3 instinct      
perfected is a faculty of using and even
 of constructing organized instruments2 
intelligence perfected is the faculty of
 making and using unorganized           
instruments4  ,the advantages and       
drawbacks of these two modes of activity
 are obvious4 ,instinct finds the       
appropriate instrument at hand3 this    
instrument1 which makes and repairs     
itself1 which presents1 like all the    
works of nature1 an infinite complexity 
of detail combined with a marvelous     
simplicity of function1 does at once1   
when required1 what it is called upon to
 do1 without difficulty and with a      

perfection that is often wonderful4 ,in 
return1 it retains an almost invariable 
structure1 since a modification of it   
involves a modification of the species4 
,instinct is therefore necessarily      
specialized1 being nothing but the      
utilization of a specific instrument for
 a specific object4 ,the instrument     
constructed intelligently1 on the       
contrary1 is an imperfect instrument4   
,it costs an effort4 ,it is generally   
troublesome to handle4 ,but1 as it is   
made of unorganized matter1 it can take 
any form whatsoever1 serve any purpose1 
free the living being from every new    
difficulty that arises and bestow on it 
an unlimited number of powers4 ,whilst  
it is inferior to the natural instrument
 for the satisfaction of immediate      
wants1 its advantage over it is the     
greater1 the less urgent the need4      
,above all1 it reacts on the nature of  
the being that constructs it2 for in    
calling on him to exercise a new        
function1 it confers on him1 so to      

speak1 a richer organization1 being an  
artificial organ by which the natural   
organism is extended4 ,for every need   
that it satisfies1 it creates a new     
need2 and so1 instead of closing1 like  
instinct1 the round of action within    
which the animal tends to move          
automatically1 it lays open to activity 
an unlimited field into which it is     
driven further and further1 and made    
more and more free4 ,but this advantage 
of intelligence over instinct only      
appears at a late stage1 when           
intelligence1 having raised construction
 to a higher degree1 proceeds to        
construct constructive machinery4 ,at   
the outset1 the advantages and drawbacks
 of the artificial instrument and of the
 natural instrument balance so well that
 it is hard to foretell which of the two
 will secure to the living being the    
greater empire over nature4  ,we may    
surmise that they began by being implied
 in each other1 that the original       
psychical activity included both at     

once1 and that1 if we went far enough   
back into the past1 we should find      
instincts more nearly approaching       
intelligence than those of our insects1 
intelligence nearer to instinct than    
that of our vertebrates1 intelligence   
and instinct being1 in this elementary  
condition1 prisoners of a matter which  
they are not yet able to control4 ,if   
the force immanent in life were an      
unlimited force1 it might perhaps have  
developed instinct and intelligence     
together1 and to any extent1 in the same
 organisms4 ,but everything seems to    
indicate that this force is limited1 and
 that it soon exhausts itself in its    
very manifestation4 ,it is hard for it  
to go far in several directions at once3
 it must choose4 ,now1 it has the choice
 between two modes of acting on the     
material world3 it can either effect    
this action directly by creating an     
organized instrument to work with2 or   
else it can effect it indirectly through
 an organism which1 instead of          

possessing the required instrument      
naturally1 will itself construct it by  
fashioning inorganic matter4 ,hence     
intelligence and instinct1 which diverge
 more and more as they develop1 but     
which never entirely separate from each 
other4 ,on the one hand1 the most       
perfect instinct of the insect is       
accompanied by gleams of intelligence1  
if only in the choice of place1 time and
 materials of construction3 the bees1   
for example1 when by exception they     
build in the open air1 invent new and   
really intelligent arrangements to adapt
 themselves to such new conditions4#fc  
,but1 on the other hand1 intelligence   
has even more need of instinct than     
instinct has of intelligence2 for the   
power to give shape to crude matter     
involves already a superior degree of   
organization1 a degree to which the     
animal could not have risen1 save on the
 wings of instinct4 ,so1 while nature   
has frankly evolved in the direction of 
instinct in the arthropods1 we observe  

in almost all the vertebrates the       
striving after rather than the expansion
 of intelligence4 ,it is instinct still 
which forms the basis of their psychical
 activity2 but intelligence is there1   
and would fain supersede it4            
,intelligence does not yet succeed in   
inventing instruments2 but at least it  
tries to1 by performing as many         
variations as possible on the instinct  
which it would like to dispense with4   
,it gains complete self-possession only 
in man1 and this triumph is attested by 
the very insufficiency of the natural   
means at man's disposal for defense     
against his enemies1 against cold and   
hunger4 ,this insufficiency1 when we    
strive to fathom its significance1      
acquires the value of a prehistoric     
document2 it is the final leave-taking  
between intelligence and instinct4 ,but 
it is no less true that nature must have
 hesitated between two modes of         
psychical activity--one assured of      
immediate success1 but limited in its   

effects2 the other hazardous1 but whose 
conquests1 if it should reach           
independence1 might be extended         
indefinitely4 ,here again1 then1 the    
greatest success was achieved on the    
side of the greatest risk4 ,instinct and
 intelligence therefore represent two   
divergent solutions1 equally fitting1 of
 one and the same problem4  ,there      
ensue1 it is true1 profound differences 
of internal structure between instinct  
and intelligence4 ,we shall dwell only  
on those that concern our present study4
 ,let us say1 then1 that instinct and   
intelligence imply two radically        
different kinds of knowledge4 ,but some 
explanations are first of all necessary 
on the subject of consciousness in      
general4  ,it has been asked how far    
instinct is conscious4 ,our reply is    
that there are a vast number of         
differences and degrees1 that instinct  
is more or less conscious in certain    
cases1 unconscious in others4 ,the      
plant1 as we shall see1 has instincts2  

it is not likely that these are         
accompanied by feeling4 ,even in the    
animal there is hardly any complex      
instinct that is not unconscious in some
 part at least of its exercise4 ,but    
here we must point out a difference1 not
 often noticed1 between two kinds of    
unconsciousness1 viz41 that in which    
consciousness is absent1 and that in    
which consciousness is nullified4 ,both 
are equal to zero1 but in one case the  
zero expresses the fact that there is   
nothing1 in the other that we have two  
equal quantities of opposite sign which 
compensate and neutralize each other4   
,the unconsciousness of a falling stone 
is of the former kind3 the stone has no 
feeling of its fall4 ,is it the same    
with the unconsciousness of instinct1 in
 the extreme cases in which instinct is 
unconscious8 ,when we mechanically      
perform an habitual action1 when the    
somnambulist automatically acts his     
dream1 unconsciousness may be absolute2 
but this is merely due to the fact that 

the representation of the act is held in
 check by the performance of the act    
itself1 which resembles the idea so     
perfectly1 and fits it so exactly1 that 
consciousness is unable to find room    
between them4 ,representation is stopped
 up by action4 ,the proof of this is1   
that if the accomplishment of the act is
 arrested or thwarted by an obstacle1   
consciousness may reappear4 ,it was     
there1 but neutralized by the action    
which fulfilled and thereby filled the  
representation4 ,the obstacle creates   
nothing positive2 it simply makes a     
void1 removes a stopper4 ,this          
inadequacy of act to representation is  
precisely what we here call             
consciousness4  ,if we examine this     
point more closely1 we shall find that  
consciousness is the light that plays   
around the zone of possible actions or  
potential activity which surrounds the  
action really performed by the living   
being4 ,it signifies hesitation or      
choice4 ,where many equally possible    

actions are indicated without there     
being any real action 7as in a          
deliberation that has not come to an    
end71 consciousness is intense4 ,where  
the action performed is the only action 
possible 7as in activity of the         
somnambulistic or more generally        
automatic kind71 consciousness is       
reduced to nothing4 ,representation and 
knowledge exist none the less in the    
case if we find a whole series of       
systematized movements the last of which
 is already pre-figured in the first1   
and if1 besides1 consciousness can flash
 out of them at the shock of an         
obstacle4 ,from this point of view1 the 
consciousness of a living being may be  
defined as an arithmetical difference   
between potential and real activity4 ,it
 measures the interval between          
representation and action4  ,it may be  
inferred from this that intelligence is 
likely to point towards consciousness1  
and instinct towards unconsciousness4   
,for1 where the implement to be used is 

organized by nature1 the material       
furnished by nature1 and the result to  
be obtained willed by nature1 there is  
little left to choice2 the consciousness
 inherent in the representation is      
therefore counterbalanced1 whenever it  
tends to disengage itself1 by the       
performance of the act1 identical with  
the representation1 which forms its     
counterweight4 ,where consciousness     
appears1 it does not so much light up   
the instinct itself as the thwartings to
 which instinct is subject2 it is the   
deficit of instinct1 the distance1      
between the act and the idea1 that      
becomes consciousness so that           
consciousness1 here1 is only an         
accident4 ,essentially1 consciousness   
only emphasizes the starting-point of   
instinct1 the point at which the whole  
series of automatic movements is        
released4 ,deficit1 on the contrary1 is 
the normal state of intelligence4       
,laboring under difficulties is its very
 essence4 ,its original function being  

to construct unorganized instruments1 it
 must1 in spite of numberless           
difficulties1 choose for this work the  
place and the time1 the form and the    
matter4 ,and it can never satisfy itself
 entirely1 because every new            
satisfaction creates new needs4 ,in     
short1 while instinct and intelligence  
both involve knowledge1 this knowledge  
is rather acted and unconscious in the  
case of instinct1 thought and conscious 
in the case of intelligence4 ,but it is 
a difference rather of degree than of   
kind4 ,so long as consciousness is all  
we are concerned with1 we close our eyes
 to what is1 from the psychological     
point of view1 the cardinal difference  
between instinct and intelligence4  ,in 
order to get at this essential          
difference we must1 without stopping at 
the more or less brilliant light which  
illumines these two modes of internal   
activity1 go straight to the two        
objects1 profoundly different from each 
other1 upon which instinct and          

intelligence are directed4  ,when the   
horse-fly lays its eggs on the legs or  
shoulders of the horse1 it acts as if it
 knew that its larva has to develop in  
the horse's stomach and that the horse1 
in licking itself1 will convey the larva
 into its digestive tract4 ,when a      
paralyzing wasp stings its victim on    
just those points where the nervous     
centres lie1 so as to render it         
motionless without killing it1 it acts  
like a learned entomologist and a       
skilful surgeon rolled into one4 ,but   
what shall we say of the little beetle1 
the ,sitaris1 whose story is so often   
quoted8 ,this insect lays its eggs at   
the entrance of the underground passages
 dug by a kind of bee1 the ,anthophora4 
,its larva1 after long waiting1 springs 
upon the male ,anthophora as it goes out
 of the passage1 clings to it1 and      
remains attached until the nuptial      
flight1 when it seizes the opportunity  
to pass from the male to the female1 and
 quietly waits until it lays its eggs4  

,it then leaps on the egg1 which serves 
as a support for it in the honey1       
devours the egg in a few days1 and1     
resting on the shell1 undergoes its     
first metamorphosis4 ,organized now to  
float on the honey1 it consumes this    
provision of nourishment1 and becomes a 
nymph1 then a perfect insect4           
,everything happens as if the larva of  
the ,sitaris1 from the moment it was    
hatched1 knew that the male ,anthophora 
would first emerge from the passage2    
that the nuptial flight would give it   
the means of conveying itself to the    
female1 who would take it to a store of 
honey sufficient to feed it after its   
transformation2 that1 until this        
transformation1 it could gradually eat  
the egg of the ,anthophora1 in such a   
way that it could at the same time feed 
itself1 maintain itself at the surface  
of the honey1 and also suppress the     
rival that otherwise would have come out
 of the egg4 ,and equally all this      
happens as if the ,sitaris itself knew  

that its larva would know all these     
things4 ,the knowledge1 if knowledge    
there be1 is only implicit4 ,it is      
reflected outwardly in exact movements  
instead of being reflected inwardly in  
consciousness4 ,it is none the less true
 that the behavior of the insect        
involves1 or rather evolves1 the idea of
 definite things existing or being      
produced in definite points of space and
 time1 which the insect knows without   
having learned them4  ,now1 if we look  
at intelligence from the same point of  
view1 we find that it also knows certain
 things without having learned them4    
,but the knowledge in the two cases is  
of a very different order4 ,we must be  
careful here not to revive again the old
 philosophical dispute on the subject of
 innate ideas4 ,so we will confine      
ourselves to the point on which every   
one is agreed1 to wit1 that the young   
child understands immediately things    
that the animal will never understand1  
and that in this sense intelligence1    

like instinct1 is an inherited function1
 therefore an innate one4 ,but this     
innate intelligence1 although it is a   
faculty of knowing1 knows no object in  
particular4 ,when the new-born babe     
seeks for the first time its mother's   
breast1 so showing that it has knowledge
 7unconscious1 no doubt7 of a thing it  
has never seen1 we say1 just because the
 innate knowledge is in this case of a  
definite object1 that it belongs to     
instinct and not to intelligence4       
,intelligence does not then imply the   
innate knowledge of any object4 ,and    
yet1 if intelligence knows nothing by   
nature1 it has nothing innate4 ,what1   
then1 if it be ignorant of all things1  
can it know8 ,besides things1 there are 
relations4 ,the new-born child1 so far  
as intelligent1 knows neither definite  
objects nor a definite property of any  
object2 but when1 a little later on1 he 
will hear an epithet being applied to a 
substantive1 he will immediately        
understand what it means4 ,the relation 

of attribute to subject is therefore    
seized by him naturally1 and the same   
might be said of the general relation   
expressed by the verb1 a relation so    
immediately conceived by the mind that  
language can leave it to be understood1 
as is instanced in rudimentary languages
 which have no verb4 ,intelligence1     
therefore1 naturally makes use of       
relations of like with like1 of content 
to container1 of cause to effect1 etc41 
which are implied in every phrase in    
which there is a subject1 an attribute  
and a verb1 expressed or understood4    
,may one say that it has innate         
knowledge of each of these relations in 
particular8 ,it is for logicians to     
discover whether they are so many       
irreducible relations1 or whether they  
can be resolved into relations still    
more general4 ,but1 in whatever way we  
make the analysis of thought1 we always 
end with one or several general         
categories1 of which the mind possesses 
innate knowledge since it makes a       

natural use of them4 ,let us say1       
therefore1 that whatever1 in instinct   
and intelligence1 is innate knowledge1  
bears in the first case on things and in
 the second on relations4  ,philosophers
 distinguish between the matter of our  
knowledge and its form4 ,the matter is  
what is given by the perceptive         
faculties taken in the elementary state4
 ,the form is the totality of the       
relations set up between these materials
 in order to constitute a systematic    
knowledge4 ,can the form1 without       
matter1 be an object of knowledge8 ,yes1
 without doubt1 provided that this      
knowledge is not like a thing we possess
 so much as like a habit we have        
contracted1--a direction rather than a  
state3 it is1 if we will1 a certain     
natural bent of attention4 ,the         
schoolboy1 who knows that the master is 
going to dictate a fraction to him1     
draws a line before he knows what       
numerator and what denominator are to   
come2 he therefore has present to his   

mind the general relation between the   
two terms although he does not know     
either of them2 he knows the form       
without the matter4 ,so is it1 prior to 
experience1 with the categories into    
which our experience comes to be        
inserted4 ,let us adopt then words      
sanctioned by usage1 and give the       
distinction between intelligence and    
instinct this more precise formula3     
,intelligence1 in so far as it is       
innate1 is the knowledge of a form2     
instinct implies the knowledge of a     
matter4  ,from this second point of     
view1 which is that of knowledge instead
 of action1 the force immanent in life  
in general appears to us again as a     
limited principle1 in which originally  
two different and even divergent modes  
of knowing coexisted and intermingled4  
,the first gets at definite objects     
immediately1 in their materiality       
itself4 ,it says1 ,this is what is4 ,the
 second gets at no object in particular2
 it is only a natural power of relating 

an object to an object1 or a part to a  
part1 or an aspect to an aspect--in     
short1 of drawing conclusions when in   
possession of the premisses1 of         
proceeding from what has been learnt to 
what is still unknown4 ,it does not say1
 ,this is2 it says only that if the     
conditions are such1 such will be the   
conditioned4 ,in short1 the first kind  
of knowledge1 the instinctive1 would be 
formulated in what philosophers call    
categorical propositions1 while the     
second kind1 the intellectual1 would    
always be expressed hypothetically4 ,of 
these two faculties1 the former seems1  
at first1 much preferable to the other4 
,and it would be so1 in truth1 if it    
extended to an endless number of        
objects4 ,but1 in fact1 it applies only 
to one special object1 and indeed only  
to a restricted part of that object4 ,of
 this1 at least1 its knowledge is       
intimate and full2 not explicit1 but    
implied in the accomplished action4 ,the
 intellectual faculty1 on the contrary1 

possesses naturally only an external and
 empty knowledge2 but it has thereby the
 advantage of supplying a frame in which
 an infinity of objects may find room in
 turn4 ,it is as if the force evolving  
in living forms1 being a limited force1 
had had to choose between two kinds of  
limitation in the field of natural or   
innate knowledge1 one applying to the   
extension of knowledge1 the other to its
 intension4 ,in the first case1 the     
knowledge may be packed and full1 but it
 will then be confined to one specific  
object2 in the second1 it is no longer  
limited by its object1 but that is      
because it contains nothing1 being only 
a form without matter4 ,the two         
tendencies1 at first implied in each    
other1 had to separate in order to grow4
 ,they both went to seek their fortune  
in the world1 and turned out to be      
instinct and intelligence4  ,such1 then1
 are the two divergent modes of         
knowledge by which intelligence and     
instinct must be defined1 from the      

standpoint of knowledge rather than that
 of action4 ,but knowledge and action   
are here only two aspects of one and the
 same faculty4 ,it is easy to see1      
indeed1 that the second definition is   
only a new form of the first4  ,if      
instinct is1 above all1 the faculty of  
using an organized natural instrument1  
it must involve innate knowledge        
7potential or unconscious1 it is true71 
both of this instrument and of the      
object to which it is applied4 ,instinct
 is therefore innate knowledge of a     
thing4 ,but intelligence is the faculty 
of constructing unorganized--that is to 
say artificial--instruments4 ,if1 on its
 account1 nature gives up endowing the  
living being with the instruments that  
may serve him1 it is in order that the  
living being may be able to vary his    
construction according to circumstances4
 ,the essential function of intelligence
 is therefore to see the way out of a   
difficulty in any circumstances         
whatever1 to find what is most suitable1

 what answers best the question asked4  
,hence it bears essentially on the      
relations between a given situation and 
the means of utilizing it4 ,what is     
innate in intellect1 therefore1 is the  
tendency to establish relations1 and    
this tendency implies the natural       
knowledge of certain very general       
relations1 a kind of stuff that the     
activity of each particular intellect   
will cut up into more special relations4
 ,where activity is directed toward     
manufacture1 therefore1 knowledge       
necessarily bears on relations4 ,but    
this entirely formal knowledge of       
intelligence has an immense advantage   
over the material knowledge of instinct4
 ,a form1 just because it is empty1 may 
be filled at will with any number of    
things in turn1 even with those that are
 of no use4 ,so that a formal knowledge 
is not limited to what is practically   
useful1 although it is in view of       
practical utility that it has made its  
appearance in the world4 ,an intelligent

 being bears within himself the means to
 transcend his own nature4  ,he         
transcends himself1 however1 less than  
he wishes1 less also than he imagines   
himself to do4 ,the purely formal       
character of intelligence deprives it of
 the ballast necessary to enable it to  
settle itself on the objects that are of
 the most powerful interest to          
speculation4 ,instinct1 on the contrary1
 has the desired materiality1 but it is 
incapable of going so far in quest of   
its object2 it does not speculate4 ,here
 we reach the point that most concerns  
our present inquiry4 ,the difference    
that we shall now proceed to denote     
between instinct and intelligence is    
what the whole of this analysis was     
meant to bring out4 ,we formulate it    
thus3 ,there are things that            
intelligence alone is able to seek1 but 
which1 by itself1 it will never find4   
,these things instinct alone could find2
 but it will never seek them4  ,it is   
necessary here to consider some         

preliminary details that concern the    
mechanism of intelligence4 ,we have said
 that the function of intelligence is to
 establish relations4 ,let us determine 
more precisely the nature of these      
relations4 ,on this point we are bound  
to be either vague or arbitrary so long 
as we see in the intellect a faculty    
intended for pure speculation4 ,we are  
then reduced to taking the general      
frames of the understanding for         
something absolute1 irreducible and     
inexplicable4 ,the understanding must   
have fallen from heaven with its form1  
as each of us is born with his face4    
,this form may be defined1 of course1   
but that is all2 there is no asking why 
it is what it is rather than anything   
else4 ,thus1 it will be said that the   
function of the intellect is essentially
 unification1 that the common object of 
all its operations is to introduce a    
certain unity into the diversity of     
phenomena1 and so forth4 ,but1 in the   
first place1 unification is a vague     

term1 less clear than relation or even  
thought1 and says nothing more4 ,and1   
moreover1 it might be asked if the      
function of intelligence is not to      
divide even more than to unite4         
,finally1 if the intellect proceeds as  
it does because it wishes to unite1 and 
if it seeks unification simply because  
it has need of unifying1 the whole of   
our knowledge becomes relative to       
certain requirements of the mind that   
probably might have been entirely       
different from what they are3 for an    
intellect differently shaped1 knowledge 
would have been different4 ,intellect   
being no longer dependent on anything1  
everything becomes dependent on it2 and 
so1 having placed the understanding too 
high1 we end by putting too low the     
knowledge it gives us4 ,knowledge       
becomes relative1 as soon as the        
intellect is made a kind of             
absolute4--,we regard the human         
intellect1 on the contrary1 as relative 
to the needs of action4 ,postulate      

action1 and the very form of the        
intellect can be deduced from it4 ,this 
form is therefore neither irreducible   
nor inexplicable4 ,and1 precisely       
because it is not independent1 knowledge
 cannot be said to depend on it3        
knowledge ceases to be a product of the 
intellect and becomes1 in a certain     
sense1 part and parcel of reality4      
,philosophers will reply that action    
takes place in an ordered world1 that   
this order is itself thought1 and that  
we beg the question when we explain the 
intellect by action1 which presupposes  
it4 ,they would be right if our point of
 view in the present chapter was to be  
our final one4 ,we should then be dupes 
of an illusion like that of ,spencer1   
who believed that the intellect is      
sufficiently explained as the impression
 left on us by the general characters of
 matter3 as if the order inherent in    
matter were not intelligence itself6    
,but we reserve for the next chapter the
 question up to what point and with what

 method philosophy can attempt a real   
genesis of the intellect at the same    
time as of matter4 ,for the moment1 the 
problem that engages our attention is of
 a psychological order4 ,we are asking  
what is the portion of the material     
world to which our intellect is         
specially adapted4 ,to reply to this    
question1 there is no need to choose a  
system of philosophy3 it is enough to   
take up the point of view of common     
sense4  ,let us start1 then1 from       
action1 and lay down that the intellect 
aims1 first of all1 at constructing4    
,this fabrication is exercised          
exclusively on inert matter1 in this    
sense1 that even if it makes use of     
organized material1 it treats it as     
inert1 without troubling about the life 
which animated it4 ,and of inert matter 
itself1 fabrication deals only with the 
solid2 the rest escapes by its very     
fluidity4 ,if1 therefore1 the tendency  
of the intellect is to fabricate1 we may
 expect to find that whatever is fluid  

in the real will escape it in part1 and 
whatever is life in the living will     
escape it altogether4 ,our intelligence1
 as it leaves the hands of nature1 has  
for its chief object the unorganized    
solid4  ,when we pass in review the     
intellectual functions1 we see that the 
intellect is never quite at its ease1   
never entirely at home1 except when it  
is working upon inert matter1 more      
particularly upon solids4 ,what is the  
most general property of the material   
world8 ,it is extended3 it presents to  
us objects external to other objects1   
and1 in these objects1 parts external to
 parts4 ,no doubt1 it is useful to us1  
in view of our ulterior manipulation1 to
 regard each object as divisible into   
parts arbitrarily cut up1 each part     
being again divisible as we like1 and so
 on ad infinitum4 ,but it is above all  
necessary1 for our present manipulation1
 to regard the real object in hand1 or  
the real elements into which we have    
resolved it1 as provisionally final1 and

 to treat them as so many units4 ,to    
this possibility of decomposing matter  
as much as we please1 and in any way we 
please1 we allude when we speak of the  
continuity of material extension2 but   
this continuity1 as we see it1 is       
nothing else but our ability1 an ability
 that matter allows to us to choose the 
mode of discontinuity we shall find in  
it4 ,it is always1 in fact1 the mode of 
discontinuity once chosen that appears  
to us as the actually real one and that 
which fixes our attention1 just because 
it rules our action4 ,thus discontinuity
 is thought for itself2 it is thinkable 
in itself2 we form an idea of it by a   
positive act of our mind2 while the     
intellectual representation of          
continuity is negative1 being1 at       
bottom1 only the refusal of our mind1   
before any actually given system of     
decomposition1 to regard it as the only 
possible one4 ,of the discontinuous     
alone does the intellect form a clear   
idea4  ,on the other hand1 the objects  

we act on are certainly mobile objects1 
but the important thing for us to know  
is whither the mobile object is going   
and where it is at any moment of its    
passage4 ,in other words1 our interest  
is directed1 before all1 to its actual  
or future positions1 and not to the     
progress by which it passes from one    
position to another1 progress which is  
the movement itself4 ,in our actions1   
which are systematized movements1 what  
we fix our mind on is the end or meaning
 of the movement1 its design as a       
whole--in a word1 the immobile plan of  
its execution4 ,that which really moves 
in action interests us only so far as   
the whole can be advanced1 retarded1 or 
stopped by any incident that may happen 
on the way4 ,from mobility itself our   
intellect turns aside1 because it has   
nothing to gain in dealing with it4 ,if 
the intellect were meant for pure       
theorizing1 it would take its place     
within movement1 for movement is reality
 itself1 and immobility is always only  

apparent or relative4 ,but the intellect
 is meant for something altogether      
different4 ,unless it does violence to  
itself1 it takes the opposite course2 it
 always starts from immobility1 as if   
this were the ultimate reality3 when it 
tries to form an idea of movement1 it   
does so by constructing movement out of 
immobilities put together4 ,this        
operation1 whose illegitimacy and danger
 in the field of speculation we shall   
show later on 7it leads to dead-locks1  
and creates artificially insoluble      
philosophical problems71 is easily      
justified when we refer it to its proper
 goal4 ,intelligence1 in its natural    
state1 aims at a practically useful end4
 ,when it substitutes for movement      
immobilities put together1 it does not  
pretend to reconstitute the movement    
such as it actually is2 it merely       
replaces it with a practical equivalent4
 ,it is the philosophers who are        
mistaken when they import into the      
domain of speculation a method of       

thinking which is made for action4 ,but 
of this more anon4 ,suffice it now to   
say that to the stable and unchangeable 
our intellect is attached by virtue of  
its natural disposition4 ,of immobility 
alone does the intellect form a clear   
idea4  ,now1 fabricating consists in    
carving out the form of an object in    
matter4 ,what is the most important is  
the form to be obtained4 ,as to the     
matter1 we choose that which is most    
convenient2 but1 in order to choose it1 
that is to say1 in order to go and seek 
it among many others1 we must have      
tried1 in imagination at least1 to endow
 every kind of matter with the form of  
the object conceived4 ,in other words1  
an intelligence which aims at           
fabricating is an intelligence which    
never stops at the actual form of things
 nor regards it as final1 but1 on the   
contrary1 looks upon all matter as if it
 were carvable at will4 ,plato compares 
the good dialectician to the skilful    
cook who carves the animal without      

breaking its bones1 by following the    
articulations marked out by nature4#fd  
,an intelligence which always proceeded 
thus would really be an intelligence    
turned toward speculation4 ,but action1 
and in particular fabrication1 requires 
the opposite mental tendency3 it makes  
us consider every actual form of things1
 even the form of natural things1 as    
artificial and provisional2 it makes our
 thought efface from the object         
perceived1 even though organized and    
living1 the lines that outwardly mark   
its inward structure2 in short1 it makes
 us regard its matter as indifferent to 
its form4 ,the whole of matter is made  
to appear to our thought as an immense  
piece of cloth in which we can cut out  
what we will and sew it together again  
as we please4 ,let us note1 in passing1 
that it is this power that we affirm    
when we say that there is a space1 that 
is to say1 a homogeneous and empty      
medium1 infinite and infinitely         
divisible1 lending itself indifferently 

to any mode of decomposition whatsoever4
 ,a medium of this kind is never        
perceived2 it is only conceived4 ,what  
is perceived is extension colored1      
resistant1 divided according to the     
lines which mark out the boundaries of  
real bodies or of their real elements4  
,but when we think of our power over    
this matter1 that is to say1 of our     
faculty of decomposing and recomposing  
it as we please1 we project the whole of
 these possible decompositions and      
recompositions behind real extension in 
the form of a homogeneous space1 empty  
and indifferent1 which is supposed to   
underlie it4 ,this space is therefore1  
pre-eminently1 the plan of our possible 
action on things1 although1 indeed1     
things have a natural tendency1 as we   
shall explain further on1 to enter into 
a frame of this kind4 ,it is a view     
taken by mind4 ,the animal has probably 
no idea of it1 even when1 like us1 it   
perceives extended things4 ,it is an    
idea that symbolizes the tendency of the

 human intellect to fabrication4 ,but   
this point must not detain us now4      
,suffice it to say that the intellect is
 characterized by the unlimited power of
 decomposing according to any law and of
 recomposing into any system4  ,we have 
now enumerated a few of the essential   
features of human intelligence4 ,but we 
have hitherto considered the individual 
in isolation1 without taking account of 
social life4 ,in reality1 man is a being
 who lives in society4 ,if it be true   
that the human intellect aims at        
fabrication1 we must add that1 for that 
as well as for other purposes1 it is    
associated with other intellects4 ,now1 
it is difficult to imagine a society    
whose members do not communicate by     
signs4 ,insect societies probably have a
 language1 and this language must be    
adapted1 like that of man1 to the       
necessities of life in common4 ,by      
language community of action is made    
possible4 ,but the requirements of joint
 action are not at all the same in a    

colony of ants and in a human society4  
,in insect societies there is generally 
polymorphism1 the subdivision of labor  
is natural1 and each individual is      
riveted by its structure to the function
 it performs4 ,in any case1 these       
societies are based on instinct1 and    
consequently on certain actions or      
fabrications that are more or less      
dependent on the form of the organs4 ,so
 if the ants1 for instance1 have a      
language1 the signs which compose it    
must be very limited in number1 and each
 of them1 once the species is formed1   
must remain invariably attached to a    
certain object or a certain operation3  
the sign is adherent to the thing       
signified4 ,in human society1 on the    
contrary1 fabrication and action are of 
variable form1 and1 moreover1 each      
individual must learn his part1 because 
he is not preordained to it by his      
structure4 ,so a language is required   
which makes it possible to be always    
passing from what is known to what is   

yet to be known4 ,there must be a       
language whose signs--which cannot be   
infinite in number--are extensible to an
 infinity of things4 ,this tendency of  
the sign to transfer itself from one    
object to another is characteristic of  
human language4 ,it is observable in the
 little child as soon as he begins to   
speak4 ,immediately and naturally he    
extends the meaning of the words he     
learns1 availing himself of the most    
accidental connection or the most       
distant analogy to detach and transfer  
elsewhere the sign that had been        
associated in his hearing with a        
particular object4 ,anything can        
designate anything2 such is the latent  
principle of infantine language4 ,this  
tendency has been wrongly confused with 
the faculty of generalizing4 ,the       
animals themselves generalize2 and1     
moreover1 a sign--even an instinctive   
sign--always to some degree represents a
 genus4 ,but what characterizes the     
signs of human language is not so much  

their generality as their mobility4 ,the
 instinctive sign is adherent1 the      
intelligent sign is mobile4  ,now1 this 
mobility of words1 that makes them able 
to pass from one thing to another1 has  
enabled them to be extended from things 
to ideas4 ,certainly1 language would not
 have given the faculty of reflecting to
 an intelligence entirely externalized  
and incapable of turning homeward4 ,an  
intelligence which reflects is one that 
originally had a surplus of energy to   
spend1 over and above practically useful
 efforts4 ,it is a consciousness that   
has virtually reconquered itself4 ,but  
still the virtual has to become actual4 
,without language1 intelligence would   
probably have remained riveted to the   
material objects which it was interested
 in considering4 ,it would have lived in
 a state of somnambulism1 outside       
itself1 hypnotized on its own work4     
,language has greatly contributed to its
 liberation4 ,the word1 made to pass    
from one thing to another1 is1 in fact1 

by nature transferable and free4 ,it can
 therefore be extended1 not only from   
one perceived thing to another1 but even
 from a perceived thing to a            
recollection of that thing1 from the    
precise recollection to a more fleeting 
image1 and finally from an image        
fleeting1 though still pictured1 to the 
picturing of the act by which the image 
is pictured1 that is to say1 to the     
idea4 ,thus is revealed to the          
intelligence1 hitherto always turned    
outwards1 a whole internal world--the   
spectacle of its own workings4 ,it      
required only this opportunity1 at      
length offered by language4 ,it profits 
by the fact that the word is an external
 thing1 which the intelligence can catch
 hold of and cling to1 and at the same  
time an immaterial thing1 by means of   
which the intelligence can penetrate    
even to the inwardness of its own work4 
,its first business was indeed to make  
instruments1 but this fabrication is    
possible only by the employment of      

certain means which are not cut to the  
exact measure of their object1 but go   
beyond it and thus allow intelligence a 
supplementary--that is to say           
disinterested work4 ,from the moment    
that the intellect1 reflecting upon its 
own doings1 perceives itself as a       
creator of ideas1 as a faculty of       
representation in general1 there is no  
object of which it may not wish to have 
the idea1 even though that object be    
without direct relation to practical    
action4 ,that is why we said there are  
things that intellect alone can seek4   
,intellect alone1 indeed1 troubles      
itself about theory2 and its theory     
would fain embrace everything--not only 
inanimate matter1 over which it has a   
natural hold1 but even life and thought4
  ,by what means1 what instruments1 in  
short by what method it will approach   
these problems1 we can easily guess4    
,originally1 it was fashioned to the    
form of matter4 ,language itself1 which 
has enabled it to extend its field of   

operations1 is made to designate things1
 and nought but things3 it is only      
because the word is mobile1 because it  
flies from one thing to another1 that   
the intellect was sure to take it1      
sooner or later1 on the wing1 while it  
was not settled on anything1 and apply  
it to an object which is not a thing and
 which1 concealed till then1 awaited the
 coming of the word to pass from        
darkness to light4 ,but the word1 by    
covering up this object1 again converts 
it into a thing4 ,so intelligence1 even 
when it no longer operates upon its own 
object1 follows habits it has contracted
 in that operation3 it applies forms    
that are indeed those of unorganized    
matter4 ,it is made for this kind of    
work4 ,with this kind of work alone is  
it fully satisfied4 ,and that is what   
intelligence expresses by saying that   
thus only it arrives at distinctness and
 clearness4  ,it must1 therefore1 in    
order to think itself clearly and       
distinctly1 perceive itself under the   

form of discontinuity4 ,concepts1 in    
fact1 are outside each other1 like      
objects in space2 and they have the same
 stability as such objects1 on which    
they have been modeled4 ,taken together1
 they constitute an intelligible world1 
that resembles the world of solids in   
its essential characters1 but whose     
elements are lighter1 more diaphanous1  
easier for the intellect to deal with   
than the image of concrete things3 they 
are not1 indeed1 the perception itself  
of things1 but the representation of the
 act by which the intellect is fixed on 
them4 ,they are1 therefore1 not images1 
but symbols4 ,our logic is the complete 
set of rules that must be followed in   
using symbols4 ,as these symbols are    
derived from the consideration of       
solids1 as the rules for combining these
 symbols hardly do more than express the
 most general relations among solids1   
our logic triumphs in that science which
 takes the solidity of bodies for its   
object1 that is1 in geometry4 ,logic and

 geometry engender each other1 as we    
shall see a little further on4 ,it is   
from the extension of a certain natural 
geometry1 suggested by the most general 
and immediately perceived properties of 
solids1 that natural logic has arisen2  
then from this natural logic1 in its    
turn1 has sprung scientific geometry1   
which extends further and further the   
knowledge of the external properties of 
solids4#fe ,geometry and logic are      
strictly applicable to matter2 in it    
they are at home1 and in it they can    
proceed quite alone4 ,but1 outside this 
domain1 pure reasoning needs to be      
supervised by common sense1 which is an 
altogether different thing4  ,thus1 all 
the elementary forces of the intellect  
tend to transform matter into an        
instrument of action1 that is1 in the   
etymological sense of the word1 into an 
organ4 ,life1 not content with producing
 organisms1 would fain give them as an  
appendage inorganic matter itself1      
converted into an immense organ by the  

industry of the living being4 ,such is  
the initial task it assigns to          
intelligence4 ,that is why the intellect
 always behaves as if it were fascinated
 by the contemplation of inert matter4  
,it is life looking outward1 putting    
itself outside itself1 adopting the ways
 of unorganized nature in principle1 in 
order to direct them in fact4 ,hence its
 bewilderment when it turns to the      
living and is confronted with           
organization4 ,it does what it can1 it  
resolves the organized into the         
unorganized1 for it cannot1 without     
reversing its natural direction and     
twisting about on itself1 think true    
continuity1 real mobility1 reciprocal   
penetration--in a word1 that creative   
evolution which is life4  ,consider     
continuity4 ,the aspect of life that is 
accessible to our intellect--as indeed  
to our senses1 of which our intellect is
 the extension--is that which offers a  
hold to our action4 ,now1 to modify an  
object1 we have to perceive it as       

divisible and discontinuous4 ,from the  
point of view of positive science1 an   
incomparable progress was realized when 
the organized tissues were resolved into
 cells4 ,the study of the cell1 in its  
turn1 has shown it to be an organism    
whose complexity seems to grow1 the more
 thoroughly it is examined4 ,the more   
science advances1 the more it sees the  
number grow of heterogeneous elements   
which are placed together1 outside each 
other1 to make up a living being4 ,does 
science thus get any nearer to life8    
,does it not1 on the contrary1 find that
 what is really life in the living seems
 to recede with every step by which it  
pushes further the detail of the parts  
combined8 ,there is indeed already among
 scientists a tendency to regard the    
substance of the organism as continuous1
 and the cell as an artificial          
entity4#ff ,but1 supposing this view    
were finally to prevail1 it could only  
lead1 on deeper study1 to some other    
mode of analyzing of the living being1  

and so to a new discontinuity--although 
less removed1 perhaps1 from the real    
continuity of life4 ,the truth is that  
this continuity cannot be thought by the
 intellect while it follows its natural 
movement4 ,it implies at once the       
multiplicity of elements and the        
interpenetration of all by all1 two     
conditions that can hardly be reconciled
 in the field in which our industry1 and
 consequently our intellect1 is engaged4
  ,just as we separate in space1 we fix 
in time4 ,the intellect is not made to  
think evolution1 in the proper sense of 
the word--that is to say1 the continuity
 of a change that is pure mobility4 ,we 
shall not dwell here on this point1     
which we propose to study in a special  
chapter4 ,suffice it to say that the    
intellect represents becoming as a      
series of states1 each of which is      
homogeneous with itself and consequently
 does not change4 ,is our attention     
called to the internal change of one of 
these states8 ,at once we decompose it  

into another series of states which1    
reunited1 will be supposed to make up   
this internal modification4 ,each of    
these new states must be invariable1 or 
else their internal change1 if we are   
forced to notice it1 must be resolved   
again into a fresh series of invariable 
states1 and so on to infinity4 ,here    
again1 thinking consists in             
reconstituting1 and1 naturally1 it is   
with given elements1 and consequently   
with stable elements1 that we           
reconstitute4 ,so that1 though we may do
 our best to imitate the mobility of    
becoming by an addition that is ever    
going on1 becoming itself slips through 
our fingers just when we think we are   
holding it tight4  ,precisely because it
 is always trying to reconstitute1 and  
to reconstitute with what is given1 the 
intellect lets what is new in each      
moment of a history escape4 ,it does not
 admit the unforeseeable4 ,it rejects   
all creation4 ,that definite antecedents
 bring forth a definite consequent1     

calculable as a function of them1 is    
what satisfies our intellect4 ,that a   
definite end calls forth definite means 
to attain it1 is what we also           
understand4 ,in both cases we have to do
 with the known which is combined with  
the known1 in short1 with the old which 
is repeated4 ,our intellect is there at 
its ease2 and1 whatever be the object1  
it will abstract1 separate1 eliminate1  
so as to substitute for the object      
itself1 if necessary1 an approximate    
equivalent in which things will happen  
in this way4 ,but that each instant is a
 fresh endowment1 that the new is ever  
upspringing1 that the form just come    
into existence 7although1 when once     
produced1 it may be regarded as an      
effect determined by its causes7 could  
never have been foreseen--because the   
causes here1 unique in their kind1 are  
part of the effect1 have come into      
existence with it1 and are determined by
 it as much as they determine it--all   
this we can feel within ourselves and   

also divine1 by sympathy1 outside       
ourselves1 but we cannot think it1 in   
the strict sense of the word1 nor       
express it in terms of pure             
understanding4 ,no wonder at that3 we   
must remember what our intellect is     
meant for4 ,the causality it seeks and  
finds everywhere expresses the very     
mechanism of our industry1 in which we  
go on recomposing the same whole with   
the same parts1 repeating the same      
movements to obtain the same result4    
,the finality it understands best is the
 finality of our industry1 in which we  
work on a model given in advance1 that  
is to say1 old or composed of elements  
already known4 ,as to invention properly
 so called1 which is1 however1 the point
 of departure of industry itself1 our   
intellect does not succeed in grasping  
it in its upspringing1 that is to say1  
in its indivisibility1 nor in its       
fervor1 that is to say1 in its          
creativeness4 ,explaining it always     
consists in resolving it1 it the        

unforeseeable and new1 into elements old
 or known1 arranged in a different      
order4 ,the intellect can no more admit 
complete novelty than real becoming2    
that is to say1 here again it lets an   
essential aspect of life escape1 as if  
it were not intended to think such an   
object4  ,all our analyses bring us to  
this conclusion4 ,but it is hardly      
necessary to go into such long details  
concerning the mechanism of intellectual
 working2 it is enough to consider the  
results4 ,we see that the intellect1 so 
skilful in dealing with the inert1 is   
awkward the moment it touches the       
living4 ,whether it wants to treat the  
life of the body or the life of the     
mind1 it proceeds with the rigor1 the   
stiffness and the brutality of an       
instrument not designed for such use4   
,the history of hygiene or of pedagogy  
teaches us much in this matter4 ,when we
 think of the cardinal1 urgent and      
constant need we have to preserve our   
bodies and to raise our souls1 of the   

special facilities given to each of us1 
in this field1 to experiment continually
 on ourselves and on others1 of the     
palpable injury by which the wrongness  
of a medical or pedagogical practise is 
both made manifest and punished at once1
 we are amazed at the stupidity and     
especially at the persistence of errors4
 ,we may easily find their origin in the
 natural obstinacy with which we treat  
the living like the lifeless and think  
all reality1 however fluid1 under the   
form of the sharply defined solid4 ,we  
are at ease only in the discontinuous1  
in the immobile1 in the dead4 ,the      
intellect is characterized by a natural 
inability to comprehend life4         99
       99       99       99       99    
,instinct1 on the contrary1 is molded on
 the very form of life4 ,while          
intelligence treats everything          
mechanically1 instinct proceeds1 so to  
speak1 organically4 ,if the             
consciousness that slumbers in it should
 awake1 if it were wound up into        

knowledge instead of being wound off    
into action1 if we could ask and it     
could reply1 it would give up to us the 
most intimate secrets of life4 ,for it  
only carries out further the work by    
which life organizes matter--so that we 
cannot say1 as has often been shown1    
where organization ends and where       
instinct begins4 ,when the little chick 
is breaking its shell with a peck of its
 beak1 it is acting by instinct1 and yet
 it does but carry on the movement which
 has borne it through embryonic life4   
,inversely1 in the course of embryonic  
life itself 7especially when the embryo 
lives freely in the form of a larva71   
many of the acts accomplished must be   
referred to instinct4 ,the most         
essential of the primary instincts are  
really1 therefore1 vital processes4 ,the
 potential consciousness that           
accompanies them is generally actualized
 only at the outset of the act1 and     
leaves the rest of the process to go on 
by itself4 ,it would only have to expand

 more widely1 and then dive into its own
 depth completely1 to be one with the   
generative force of life4  ,when we see 
in a living body thousands of cells     
working together to a common end1       
dividing the task between them1 living  
each for itself at the same time as for 
the others1 preserving itself1 feeding  
itself1 reproducing itself1 responding  
to the menace of danger by appropriate  
defensive reactions1 how can we help    
thinking of so many instincts8 ,and yet 
these are the natural functions of the  
cell1 the constitutive elements of its  
vitality4 ,on the other hand1 when we   
see the bees of a hive forming a system 
so strictly organized that no individual
 can live apart from the others beyond a
 certain time1 even though furnished    
with food and shelter1 how can we help  
recognizing that the hive is really1 and
 not metaphorically1 a single organism1 
of which each bee is a cell united to   
the others by invisible bonds8 ,the     
instinct that animates the bee is       

indistinguishable1 then1 from the force 
that animates the cell1 or is only a    
prolongation of that force4 ,in extreme 
cases like this1 instinct coincides with
 the work of organization4  ,of course  
there are degrees of perfection in the  
same instinct4 ,between the humble-bee1 
and the honey-bee1 for instance1 the    
distance is great2 and we pass from one 
to the other through a great number of  
intermediaries1 which correspond to so  
many complications of the social life4  
,but the same diversity is found in the 
functioning of histological elements    
belonging to different tissues more or  
less akin4 ,in both cases there are     
manifold variations on one and the same 
theme4 ,the constancy of the theme is   
manifest1 however1 and the variations   
only fit it to the diversity of the     
circumstances4  ,now1 in both cases1 in 
the instinct of the animal and in the   
vital properties of the cell1 the same  
knowledge and the same ignorance are    
shown4 ,all goes on as if the cell knew1

 of the other cells1 what concerns      
itself2 as if the animal knew1 of the   
other animals1 what it can utilize--all 
else remaining in shade4 ,it seems as if
 life1 as soon as it has become bound up
 in a species1 is cut off from the rest 
of its own work1 save at one or two     
points that are of vital concern to the 
species just arisen4 ,is it not plain   
that life goes to work here exactly like
 consciousness1 exactly like memory8 ,we
 trail behind us1 unawares1 the whole of
 our past2 but our memory pours into the
 present only the odd recollection or   
two that in some way complete our       
present situation4 ,thus the instinctive
 knowledge which one species possesses  
of another on a certain particular point
 has its root in the very unity of life1
 which is1 to use the expression of an  
ancient philosopher1 a whole sympathetic
 to itself4 ,it is impossible to        
consider some of the special instincts  
of the animal and of the plant1         
evidently arisen in extraordinary       

circumstances1 without relating them to 
those recollections1 seemingly          
forgotten1 which spring up suddenly     
under the pressure of an urgent need4   
,no doubt many secondary instincts1 and 
also many varieties of primary instinct1
 admit of a scientific explanation4 ,yet
 it is doubtful whether science1 with   
its present methods of explanation1 will
 ever succeed in analyzing instinct     
completely4 ,the reason is that instinct
 and intelligence are two divergent     
developments of one and the same        
principle1 which in the one case remains
 within itself1 in the other steps out  
of itself and becomes absorbed in the   
utilization of inert matter4 ,this      
gradual divergence testifies to a       
radical incompatibility1 and points to  
the fact that it is impossible for      
intelligence to reabsorb instinct4 ,that
 which is instinctive in instinct cannot
 be expressed in terms of intelligence1 
nor1 consequently1 can it be analyzed4  
,a man born blind1 who had lived among  

others born blind1 could not be made to 
believe in the possibility of perceiving
 a distant object without first         
perceiving all the objects in between4  
,yet vision performs this miracle4 ,in a
 certain sense the blind man is right1  
since vision1 having its origin in the  
stimulation of the retina1 by the       
vibrations of the light1 is nothing     
else1 in fact1 but a retinal touch4     
,such is indeed the scientific          
explanation1 for the function of science
 is just to express all perceptions in  
terms of touch4 ,but we have shown      
elsewhere that the philosophical        
explanation of perception 7if it may    
still be called an explanation7 must be 
of another kind4#fg ,now instinct also  
is a knowledge at a distance4 ,it has   
the same relation to intelligence that  
vision has to touch4 ,science cannot do 
otherwise than express it in terms of   
intelligence2 but in so doing it        
constructs an imitation of instinct     
rather than penetrates within it4  ,any 

one can convince himself of this by     
studying the ingenious theories of      
evolutionist biology4 ,they may be      
reduced to two types1 which are often   
intermingled4 ,one type1 following the  
principles of neo-,darwinism1 regards   
instinct as a sum of accidental         
differences preserved by selection3 such
 and such a useful behavior1 naturally  
adopted by the individual in virtue of  
an accidental predisposition of the     
germ1 has been transmitted from germ to 
germ1 waiting for chance to add fresh   
improvements to it by the same method4  
,the other type regards instinct as     
lapsed intelligence3 the action1 found  
useful by the species or by certain of  
its representatives1 is supposed to have
 engendered a habit1 which1 by          
hereditary transmission1 has become an  
instinct4 ,of these two types of theory1
 the first has the advantage of being   
able to bring in hereditary transmission
 without raising grave objection2 for   
the accidental modification which it    

places at the origin of the instinct is 
not supposed to have been acquired by   
the individual1 but to have been        
inherent in the germ4 ,but1 on the other
 hand1 it is absolutely incapable of    
explaining instincts as sagacious as    
those of most insects4 ,these instincts 
surely could not have attained1 all at  
once1 their present degree of           
complexity2 they have probably evolved2 
but1 in a hypothesis like that of the   
neo-,darwinians1 the evolution of       
instinct could have come to pass only by
 the progressive addition of new pieces 
which1 in some way1 by happy accidents1 
came to fit into the old4 ,now it is    
evident that1 in most cases1 instinct   
could not have perfected itself by      
simple accretion3 each new piece really 
requires1 if all is not to be spoiled1 a
 complete recasting of the whole4 ,how  
could mere chance work a recasting of   
the kind8 ,i agree that an accidental   
modification of the germ may be passed  
on hereditarily1 and may somehow wait   

for fresh accidental modifications to   
come and complicate it4 ,i agree also   
that natural selection may eliminate all
 those of the more complicated forms of 
instinct that are not fit to survive4   
,still1 in order that the life of the   
instinct may evolve1 complications fit  
to survive have to be produced4 ,now    
they will be produced only if1 in       
certain cases1 the addition of a new    
element brings about the correlative    
change of all the old elements4 ,no one 
will maintain that chance could perform 
such a miracle3 in one form or another  
we shall appeal to intelligence4 ,we    
shall suppose that it is by an effort1  
more or less conscious1 that the living 
being develops a higher instinct4 ,but  
then we shall have to admit that an     
acquired habit can become hereditary1   
and that it does so regularly enough to 
ensure an evolution4 ,the thing is      
doubtful1 to put it mildly4 ,even if we 
could refer the instincts of animals to 
habits intelligently acquired and       

hereditarily transmitted1 it is not     
clear how this sort of explanation could
 be extended to the vegetable world1    
where effort is never intelligent1 even 
supposing it is sometimes conscious4    
,and yet1 when we see with what sureness
 and precision climbing plants use their
 tendrils1 what marvelously combined    
manoeuvres the orchids perform to       
procure their fertilization by means of 
insects1#fh how can we help thinking    
that these are so many instincts8  ,this
 is not saying that the theory of the   
neo-,darwinians must be altogether      
rejected1 any more than that of the     
neo-,lamarckians4 ,the first are        
probably right in holding that evolution
 takes place from germ to germ rather   
than from individual to individual2 the 
second are right in saying that at the  
origin of instinct there is an effort   
7although it is something quite         
different1 we believe1 from an          
intelligent effort74 ,but the former are
 probably wrong when they make the      

evolution of instinct an accidental     
evolution1 and the latter when they     
regard the effort from which instinct   
proceeds as an individual effort4 ,the  
effort by which a species modifies its  
instinct1 and modifies itself as well1  
must be a much deeper thing1 dependent  
solely neither on circumstances nor on  
individuals4 ,it is not purely          
accidental1 although accident has a     
large place in it2 and it does not      
depend solely on the initiative of      
individuals1 although individuals       
collaborate in it4  ,compare the        
different forms of the same instinct in 
different species of hymenoptera4 ,the  
impression derived is not always that of
 an increasing complexity made of       
elements that have been added together  
one after the other4 ,nor does it       
suggest the idea of steps up a ladder4  
,rather do we think1 in many cases at   
least1 of the circumference of a circle1
 from different points of which these   
different varieties have started1 all   

facing the same centre1 all making an   
effort in that direction1 but each      
approaching it only to the extent of its
 means1 and to the extent also to which 
this central point has been illumined   
for it4 ,in other words1 instinct is    
everywhere complete1 but it is more or  
less simplified1 and1 above all1        
simplified differently4 ,on the other   
hand1 in cases where we do get the      
impression of an ascending scale1 as if 
one and the same instinct had gone on   
complicating itself more and more in one
 direction and along a straight line1   
the species which are thus arranged by  
their instincts into a linear series are
 by no means always akin4 ,thus1 the    
comparative study1 in recent years1 of  
the social instinct in the different    
apidae proves that the instinct of the  
meliponines is intermediary in          
complexity between the still rudimentary
 tendency of the humble bees and the    
consummate science of the true bees2 yet
 there can be no kinship between the    

bees and the meliponines4#fi ,most      
likely1 the degree of complexity of     
these different societies has nothing to
 do with any greater or smaller number  
of added elements4 ,we seem rather to be
 before a musical theme1 which had first
 been transposed1 the theme as a whole1 
into a certain number of tones and on   
which1 still the whole theme1 different 
variations had been played1 some very   
simple1 others very skilful4 ,as to the 
original theme1 it is everywhere and    
nowhere4 ,it is in vain that we try to  
express it in terms of any idea3 it must
 have been1 originally1 felt rather than
 thought4 ,we get the same impression   
before the paralyzing instinct of       
certain wasps4 ,we know that the        
different species of hymenoptera that   
have this paralyzing instinct lay their 
eggs in spiders1 beetles or             
caterpillars1 which1 having first been  
subjected by the wasp to a skilful      
surgical operation1 will go on living   
motionless a certain number of days1 and

 thus provide the larvae with fresh     
meat4 ,in the sting which they give to  
the nerve-centres of their victim1 in   
order to destroy its power of moving    
without killing it1 these different     
species of hymenoptera take into        
account1 so to speak1 the different     
species of prey they respectively       
attack4 ,the ,scolia1 which attacks a   
larva of the rose-beetle1 stings it in  
one point only1 but in this point the   
motor ganglia are concentrated1 and     
those ganglia alone3 the stinging of    
other ganglia might cause death and     
putrefaction1 which it must avoid4#gj   
,the yellow-winged ,sphex1 which has    
chosen the cricket for its victim1 knows
 that the cricket has three             
nerve-centres which serve its three     
pairs of legs--or at least it acts as if
 it knew this4 ,it stings the insect    
first under the neck1 then behind the   
prothorax1 and then where the thorax    
joins the abdomen4#ga ,the ,ammophila   
,hirsuta gives nine successive strokes  

of its sting upon nine nerve-centres of 
its caterpillar1 and then seizes the    
head and squeezes it in its mandibles1  
enough to cause paralysis without       
death4#gb ,the general theme is the     
necessity of paralyzing without killing2
 the variations are subordinated to the 
structure of the victim on which they   
are played4 ,no doubt the operation is  
not always perfect4 ,it has recently    
been shown that the ,ammophila sometimes
 kills the caterpillar instead of       
paralyzing it1 that sometimes also it   
paralyzes it incompletely4#gc ,but1     
because instinct is1 like intelligence1 
fallible1 because it also shows         
individual deviations1 it does not at   
all follow that the instinct of the     
,ammophila has been acquired1 as has    
been claimed1 by tentative intelligent  
experiments4 ,even supposing that the   
,ammophila has come in course of time to
 recognize1 one after another1 by       
tentative experiment1 the points of its 
victim which must be stung to render it 

motionless1 and also the special        
treatment that must be inflicted on the 
head to bring about paralysis without   
death1 how can we imagine that elements 
so special of a knowledge so precise    
have been regularly transmitted1 one by 
one1 by heredity8 ,if1 in all our       
present experience1 there were a single 
indisputable example of a transmission  
of this kind1 the inheritance of        
acquired characters would be questioned 
by no one4 ,as a matter of fact1 the    
hereditary transmission of a contracted 
habit is effected in an irregular and   
far from precise manner1 supposing it is
 ever really effected at all4  ,but the 
whole difficulty comes from our desire  
to express the knowledge of the         
hymenoptera in terms of intelligence4   
,it is this that compels us to compare  
the ,ammophila with the entomologist1   
who knows the caterpillar as he knows   
everything else--from the outside1 and  
without having on his part a special or 
vital interest4 ,the ,ammophila1 we     

imagine1 must learn1 one by one1 like   
the entomologist1 the positions of the  
nerve-centres of the caterpillar--must  
acquire at least the practical knowledge
 of these positions by trying the       
effects of its sting4 ,but there is no  
need for such a view if we suppose a    
sympathy 7in the etymological sense of  
the word7 between the ,ammophila and its
 victim1 which teaches it from within1  
so to say1 concerning the vulnerability 
of the caterpillar4 ,this feeling of    
vulnerability might owe nothing to      
outward perception1 but result from the 
mere presence together of the ,ammophila
 and the caterpillar1 considered no     
longer as two organisms1 but as two     
activities4 ,it would express1 in a     
concrete form1 the relation of the one  
to the other4 ,certainly1 a scientific  
theory cannot appeal to considerations  
of this kind4 ,it must not put action   
before organization1 sympathy before    
perception and knowledge4 ,but1 once    
more1 either philosophy has nothing to  

see here1 or its rle begins where that  
of science ends4  ,whether it makes     
instinct a compound reflex1 or a habit  
formed intelligently that has become    
automatism1 or a sum of small accidental
 advantages accumulated and fixed by    
selection1 in every case science claims 
to resolve instinct completely either   
into intelligent actions1 or into       
mechanisms built up piece by piece like 
those combined by our intelligence4 ,i  
agree indeed that science is here within
 its function4 ,it gives us1 in default 
of a real analysis of the object1 a     
translation of this object in terms of  
intelligence4 ,but is it not plain that 
science itself invites philosophy to    
consider things in another way8 ,if our 
biology was still that of ,aristotle1 if
 it regarded the series of living beings
 as unilinear1 if it showed us the whole
 of life evolving towards intelligence  
and passing1 to that end1 through       
sensibility and instinct1 we should be  
right1 we1 the intelligent beings1 in   

turning back towards the earlier and    
consequently inferior manifestations of 
life and in claiming to fit them1       
without deforming them1 into the molds  
of our understanding4 ,but one of the   
clearest results of biology has been to 
show that evolution has taken place     
along divergent lines4 ,it is at the    
extremity of two of these lines--the two
 principal--that we find intelligence   
and instinct in forms almost pure4 ,why1
 then1 should instinct be resolvable    
into intelligent elements8 ,why1 even1  
into terms entirely intelligible8 ,is it
 not obvious that to think here of the  
intelligent1 or of the absolutely       
intelligible1 is to go back to the      
,aristotelian theory of nature8 ,no     
doubt it is better to go back to that   
than to stop short before instinct as   
before an unfathomable mystery4 ,but1   
though instinct is not within the domain
 of intelligence1 it is not situated    
beyond the limits of mind4 ,in the      
phenomena of feeling1 in unreflecting   

sympathy and antipathy1 we experience in
 ourselves--though under a much vaguer  
form1 and one too much penetrated with  
intelligence--something of what must    
happen in the consciousness of an insect
 acting by instinct4 ,evolution does but
 sunder1 in order to develop them to the
 end1 elements which1 at their origin1  
interpenetrated each other4 ,more       
precisely1 intelligence is1 before      
anything else1 the faculty of relating  
one point of space to another1 one      
material object to another2 it applies  
to all things1 but remains outside them2
 and of a deep cause it perceives only  
the effects spread out side by side4    
,whatever be the force that is at work  
in the genesis of the nervous system of 
the caterpillar1 to our eyes and our    
intelligence it is only a juxtaposition 
of nerves and nervous centres4 ,it is   
true that we thus get the whole outer   
effect of it4 ,the ,ammophila1 no doubt1
 discerns but a very little of that     
force1 just what concerns itself2 but at

 least it discerns it from within1 quite
 otherwise than by a process of         
knowledge--by an intuition 7lived rather
 than represented71 which is probably   
like what we call divining sympathy4  ,a
 very significant fact is the swing to  
and fro of scientific theories of       
instinct1 from regarding it as          
intelligent to regarding it as simply   
intelligible1 or1 shall ,i say1 between 
likening it to an intelligence lapsed   
and reducing it to a pure mechanism4#gd 
,each of these systems of explanation   
triumphs in its criticism of the other1 
the first when it shows us that instinct
 cannot be a mere reflex1 the other when
 it declares that instinct is something 
different from intelligence1 even fallen
 into unconsciousness4 ,what can this   
mean but that they are two symbolisms1  
equally acceptable in certain respects1 
and1 in other respects1 equally         
inadequate to their object8 ,the        
concrete explanation1 no longer         
scientific1 but metaphysical1 must be   

sought along quite another path1 not in 
the direction of intelligence1 but in   
that of sympathy4         99       99   
99       99       99  ,instinct is      
sympathy4 ,if this sympathy could extend
 its object and also reflect upon       
itself1 it would give us the key to     
vital operations--just as intelligence1 
developed and disciplined1 guides us    
into matter4 ,for--we cannot too often  
repeat it--intelligence and instinct are
 turned in opposite directions1 the     
former towards inert matter1 the latter 
towards life4 ,intelligence1 by means of
 science1 which is its work1 will       
deliver up to us more and more          
completely the secret of physical       
operations2 of life it brings us1 and   
moreover only claims to bring us1 a     
translation in terms of inertia4 ,it    
goes all round life1 taking from outside
 the greatest possible number of views  
of it1 drawing it into itself instead of
 entering into it4 ,but it is to the    
very inwardness of life that intuition  

leads us--by intuition ,i mean instinct 
that has become disinterested1          
self-conscious1 capable of reflecting   
upon its object and of enlarging it     
indefinitely4  ,that an effort of this  
kind is not impossible1 is proved by the
 existence in man of an aesthetic       
faculty along with normal perception4   
,our eye perceives the features of the  
living being1 merely as assembled1 not  
as mutually organized4 ,the intention of
 life1 the simple movement that runs    
through the lines1 that binds them      
together and gives them significance1   
escapes it4 ,this intention is just what
 the artist tries to regain1 in placing 
himself back within the object by a kind
 of sympathy1 in breaking down1 by an   
effort of intuition1 the barrier that   
space puts up between him and his model4
 ,it is true that this aesthetic        
intuition1 like external perception1    
only attains the individual4 ,but we can
 conceive an inquiry turned in the same 
direction as art1 which would take life 

in general for its object1 just as      
physical science1 in following to the   
end the direction pointed out by        
external perception1 prolongs the       
individual facts into general laws4 ,no 
doubt this philosophy will never obtain 
a knowledge of its object comparable to 
that which science has of its own4      
,intelligence remains the luminous      
nucleus around which instinct1 even     
enlarged and purified into intuition1   
forms only a vague nebulosity4 ,but1 in 
default of knowledge properly so called1
 reserved to pure intelligence1         
intuition may enable us to grasp what it
 is that intelligence fails to give us1 
and indicate the means of supplementing 
it4 ,on the one hand1 it will utilize   
the mechanism of intelligence itself to 
show how intellectual molds cease to be 
strictly applicable2 and on the other   
hand1 by its own work1 it will suggest  
to us the vague feeling1 if nothing     
more1 of what must take the place of    
intellectual molds4 ,thus1 intuition may

 bring the intellect to recognize that  
life does not quite go into the category
 of the many nor yet into that of the   
one2 that neither mechanical causality  
nor finality can give a sufficient      
interpretation of the vital process4    
,then1 by the sympathetic communication 
which it establishes between us and the 
rest of the living1 by the expansion of 
our consciousness which it brings about1
 it introduces us into life's own       
domain1 which is reciprocal             
interpenetration1 endlessly continued   
creation4 ,but1 though it thereby       
transcends intelligence1 it is from     
intelligence that has come the push that
 has made it rise to the point it has   
reached4 ,without intelligence1 it would
 have remained in the form of instinct1 
riveted to the special object of its    
practical interest1 and turned outward  
by it into movements of locomotion4     
,how theory of knowledge must take      
account of these two faculties1         
intellect and intuition1 and how also1  

for want of establishing a sufficiently 
clear distinction between them1 it      
becomes involved in inextricable        
difficulties1 creating phantoms of ideas
 to which there cling phantoms of       
problems1 we shall endeavor to show a   
little further on4 ,we shall see that   
the problem of knowledge1 from this     
point of view1 is one with the          
metaphysical problem1 and that both one 
and the other depend upon experience4   
,on the one hand1 indeed1 if            
intelligence is charged with matter and 
instinct with life1 we must squeeze them
 both in order to get the double essence
 from them2 metaphysics is therefore    
dependent upon theory of knowledge4     
,but1 on the other hand1 if             
consciousness has thus split up into    
intuition and intelligence1 it is       
because of the need it had to apply     
itself to matter at the same time as it 
had to follow the stream of life4 ,the  
double form of consciousness is then due
 to the double form of the real1 and    

theory of knowledge must be dependent   
upon metaphysics4 ,in fact1 each of     
these two lines of thought leads to the 
other2 they form a circle1 and there can
 be no other centre to the circle but   
the empirical study of evolution4 ,it is
 only in seeing consciousness run       
through matter1 lose itself there and   
find itself there again1 divide and     
reconstitute itself1 that we shall form 
an idea of the mutual opposition of the 
two terms1 as also1 perhaps1 of their   
common origin4 ,but1 on the other hand1 
by dwelling on this opposition of the   
two elements and on this identity of    
origin1 perhaps we shall bring out more 
clearly the meaning of evolution itself4
  ,such will be the aim of our next     
chapter4 ,but the facts that we have    
just noticed must have already suggested
 to us the idea that life is connected  
either with consciousness or with       
something that resembles it4            
,throughout the whole extent of the     
animal kingdom1 we have said1           

consciousness seems proportionate to the
 living being's power of choice4 ,it    
lights up the zone of potentialities    
that surrounds the act4 ,it fills the   
interval between what is done and what  
might be done4 ,looked at from without1 
we may regard it as a simple aid to     
action1 a light that action kindles1 a  
momentary spark flying up from the      
friction of real action against possible
 actions4 ,but we must also point out   
that things would go on in just the same
 way if consciousness1 instead of being 
the effect1 were the cause4 ,we might   
suppose that consciousness1 even in the 
most rudimentary animal1 covers by right
 an enormous field1 but is compressed in
 fact in a kind of vise3 each advance of
 the nervous centres1 by giving the     
organism a choice between a larger      
number of actions1 calls forth the      
potentialities that are capable of      
surrounding the real1 thus opening the  
vise wider and allowing consciousness to
 pass more freely4 ,in this second      

hypothesis1 as in the first1            
consciousness is still the instrument of
 action2 but it is even more true to say
 that action is the instrument of       
consciousness2 for the complicating of  
action with action1 and the opposing of 
action to action1 are for the imprisoned
 consciousness the only possible means  
to set itself free4 ,how1 then1 shall we
 choose between the two hypotheses8 ,if 
the first is true1 consciousness must   
express exactly1 at each instant1 the   
state of the brain2 there is strict     
parallelism 7so far as intelligible7    
between the psychical and the cerebral  
state4 ,on the second hypothesis1 on the
 contrary1 there is indeed solidarity   
and interdependence between the brain   
and consciousness1 but not parallelism3 
the more complicated the brain becomes1 
thus giving the organism greater choice 
of possible actions1 the more does      
consciousness outrun its physical       
concomitant4 ,thus1 the recollection of 
the same spectacle probably modifies in 

the same way a dog's brain and a man's  
brain1 if the perception has been the   
same2 yet the recollection must be very 
different in the man's consciousness    
from what it is in the dog's4 ,in the   
dog1 the recollection remains the       
captive of perception2 it is brought    
back to consciousness only when an      
analogous perception recalls it by      
reproducing the same spectacle1 and then
 it is manifested by the recognition1   
acted rather than thought1 of the       
present perception much more than by an 
actual reappearance of the recollection 
itself4 ,man1 on the contrary1 is       
capable of calling up the recollection  
at will1 at any moment1 independently of
 the present perception4 ,he is not     
limited to playing his past life again2 
he represents and dreams it4 ,the local 
modification of the brain to which the  
recollection is attached being the same 
in each case1 the psychological         
difference between the two recollections
 cannot have its ground in a particular 

difference of detail between the two    
cerebral mechanisms1 but in the         
difference between the two brains taken 
each as a whole4 ,the more complex of   
the two1 in putting a greater number of 
mechanisms in opposition to one another1
 has enabled consciousness to disengage 
itself from the restraint of one and all
 and to reach independence4 ,that things
 do happen in this way1 that the second 
of the two hypotheses is that which must
 be chosen1 is what we have tried to    
prove1 in a former work1 by the study of
 facts that best bring into relief the  
relation of the conscious state to the  
cerebral state1 the facts of normal and 
pathological recognition1 in particular 
the forms of aphasia4#ge ,but it could  
have been proved by pure reasoning1     
before even it was evidenced by facts4  
,we have shown on what                  
self-contradictory postulate1 on what   
confusion of two mutually incompatible  
symbolisms1 the hypothesis of           
equivalence between the cerebral state  

and the psychic state rests4#gf  ,the   
evolution of life1 looked at from this  
point1 receives a clearer meaning1      
although it cannot be subsumed under any
 actual idea4 ,it is as if a broad      
current of consciousness had penetrated 
matter1 loaded1 as all consciousness is1
 with an enormous multiplicity of       
interwoven potentialities4 ,it has      
carried matter along to organization1   
but its movement has been at once       
infinitely retarded and infinitely      
divided4 ,on the one hand1 indeed1      
consciousness has had to fall asleep1   
like the chrysalis in the envelope in   
which it is preparing for itself wings2 
and1 on the other hand1 the manifold    
tendencies it contained have been       
distributed among divergent series of   
organisms which1 moreover1 express these
 tendencies outwardly in movements      
rather than internally in               
representations4 ,in the course of this 
evolution1 while some beings have fallen
 more and more asleep1 others have more 

and more completely awakened1 and the   
torpor of some has served the activity  
of others4 ,but the waking could be     
effected in two different ways4 ,life1  
that is to say consciousness launched   
into matter1 fixed its attention either 
on its own movement or on the matter it 
was passing through2 and it has thus    
been turned either in the direction of  
intuition or in that of intellect4      
,intuition1 at first sight1 seems far   
preferable to intellect1 since in it    
life and consciousness remain within    
themselves4 ,but a glance at the        
evolution of living beings shows us that
 intuition could not go very far4 ,on   
the side of intuition1 consciousness    
found itself so restricted by its       
envelope that intuition had to shrink   
into instinct1 that is1 to embrace only 
the very small portion of life that     
interested it2 and this it embraces only
 in the dark1 touching it while hardly  
seeing it4 ,on this side1 the horizon   
was soon shut out4 ,on the contrary1    

consciousness1 in shaping itself into   
intelligence1 that is to say in         
concentrating itself at first on matter1
 seems to externalize itself in relation
 to itself2 but1 just because it adapts 
itself thereby to objects from without1 
it succeeds in moving among them and in 
evading the barriers they oppose to it1 
thus opening to itself an unlimited     
field4 ,once freed1 moreover1 it can    
turn inwards on itself1 and awaken the  
potentialities of intuition which still 
slumber within it4  ,from this point of 
view1 not only does consciousness appear
 as the motive principle of evolution1  
but also1 among conscious beings        
themselves1 man comes to occupy a       
privileged place4 ,between him and the  
animals the difference is no longer one 
of degree1 but of kind4 ,we shall show  
how this conclusion is arrived at in our
 next chapter4 ,let us now show how the 
preceding analyses suggest it4  ,a      
noteworthy fact is the extraordinary    
disproportion between the consequences  

of an invention and the invention       
itself4 ,we have said that intelligence 
is modeled on matter and that it aims in
 the first place at fabrication4 ,but   
does it fabricate in order to fabricate 
or does it not pursue involuntarily1 and
 even unconsciously1 something entirely 
different8 ,fabricating consists in     
shaping matter1 in making it supple and 
in bending it1 in converting it into an 
instrument in order to become master of 
it4 ,it is this mastery that profits    
humanity1 much more even than the       
material result of the invention itself4
 ,though we derive an immediate         
advantage from the thing made1 as an    
intelligent animal might do1 and though 
this advantage be all the inventor      
sought1 it is a slight matter compared  
with the new ideas and new feelings that
 the invention may give rise to in every
 direction1 as if the essential part of 
the effect were to raise us above       
ourselves and enlarge our horizon4      
,between the effect and the cause the   

disproportion is so great that it is    
difficult to regard the cause as        
producer of its effect4 ,it releases it1
 whilst settling1 indeed1 its direction4
 ,everything happens as though the grip 
of intelligence on matter were1 in its  
main intention1 to let something pass   
that matter is holding back4  ,the same 
impression arises when we compare the   
brain of man with that of the animals4  
,the difference at first appears to be  
only a difference of size and           
complexity4 ,but1 judging by function1  
there must be something else besides4   
,in the animal1 the motor mechanisms    
that the brain succeeds in setting up1  
or1 in other words1 the habits          
contracted voluntarily1 have no other   
object nor effect than the              
accomplishment of the movements marked  
out in these habits1 stored in these    
mechanisms4 ,but1 in man1 the motor     
habit may have a second result1 out of  
proportion to the first3 it can hold    
other motor habits in check1 and        

thereby1 in overcoming automatism1 set  
consciousness free4 ,we know what vast  
regions in the human brain language     
occupies4 ,the cerebral mechanisms that 
correspond to the words have this in    
particular1 that they can be made to    
grapple with other mechanisms1 those1   
for instance1 that correspond to the    
things themselves1 or even be made to   
grapple with one another4 ,meanwhile    
consciousness1 which would have been    
dragged down and drowned in the         
accomplishment of the act1 is restored  
and set free4#gg  ,the difference must  
therefore be more radical than a        
superficial examination would lead us to
 suppose4 ,it is the difference between 
a mechanism which engages the attention 
and a mechanism from which it can be    
diverted4 ,the primitive steam-engine1  
as ,newcomen conceived it1 required the 
presence of a person exclusively        
employed to turn on and off the taps1   
either to let the steam into the        
cylinder or to throw the cold spray into

 it in order to condense the steam4 ,it 
is said that a boy employed on this     
work1 and very tired of having to do it1
 got the idea of tying the handles of   
the taps1 with cords1 to the beam of the
 engine4 ,then the machine opened and   
closed the taps itself2 it worked all   
alone4 ,now1 if an observer had compared
 the structure of this second machine   
with that of the first without taking   
into account the two boys left to watch 
over them1 he would have found only a   
slight difference of complexity4 ,that  
is1 indeed1 all we can perceive when we 
look only at the machines4 ,but if we   
cast a glance at the two boys1 we shall 
see that whilst one is wholly taken up  
by the watching1 the other is free to go
 and play as he chooses1 and that1 from 
this point of view1 the difference      
between the two machines is radical1 the
 first holding the attention captive1   
the second setting it at liberty4 ,a    
difference of the same kind1 we think1  
would be found between the brain of an  

animal and the human brain4  ,if1 now1  
we should wish to express this in terms 
of finality1 we should have to say that 
consciousness1 after having been        
obliged1 in order to set itself free1 to
 divide organization into two           
complementary parts1 vegetables on one  
hand and animals on the other1 has      
sought an issue in the double direction 
of instinct and of intelligence4 ,it has
 not found it with instinct1 and it has 
not obtained it on the side of          
intelligence except by a sudden leap    
from the animal to man4 ,so that1 in the
 last analysis1 man might be considered 
the reason for the existence of the     
entire organization of life on our      
planet4 ,but this would be only a manner
 of speaking4 ,there is1 in reality1    
only a current of existence and the     
opposing current2 thence proceeds the   
whole evolution of life4 ,we must now   
grasp more closely the opposition of    
these two currents4 ,perhaps we shall   
thus discover for them a common source4 

,by this we shall also1 no doubt1       
penetrate the most obscure regions of   
metaphysics4 ,however1 as the two       
directions we have to follow are clearly
 marked1 in intelligence on the one     
hand1 in instinct and intuition on the  
other1 we are not afraid of straying4 ,a
 survey of the evolution of life        
suggests to us a certain conception of  
knowledge1 and also a certain           
metaphysics1 which imply each other4    
,once made clear1 this metaphysics and  
this critique may throw some light1 in  
their turn1 on evolution as a whole4    
,,footnotes3  ,footnote #ea3 ,this view 
of adaptation has been noted by ,m4,f4  
,marin in a remarkable article on the   
origin of species1 ,l',origine des      
espces 7,revue scientifique1 ,nov4      
#aija1 p4 #ehj74  ,footnote #eb3 ,de    
,saporta and ,marion1 ,l'volution des   
cryptogames1 #ahha1 p4 #cg4  ,footnote  
#ec3 ,on fixation and parasitism in     
general1 see the work of ,houssay1 ,la  
,forme et la vie1 ,paris1 #aijj1 pp4    

#gba-hjg4  ,footnote #ed3 ,cope1 op4    
cit4 p4 #gf4  ,footnote #ee3 ,just as   
the plant1 in certain cases1 recovers   
the faculty of moving actively which    
slumbers in it1 so the animal1 in       
exceptional circumstances1 can replace  
itself in the conditions of the         
vegetative life and develop in itself an
 equivalent of the chlorophyllian       
function4 ,it appears1 indeed1 from     
recent experiments of ,maria von        
,linden1 that the chrysalides and the   
caterpillars of certain lepidoptera1    
under the influence of light1 fix the   
carbon of the carbonic acid contained in
 the atmosphere 7,m4 von ,linden1       
,l',assimilation de l'acide carbonique  
par les chrysalides de ,lpidoptres1     
,c4,r4 de la ,soc4 de biologie1 #aije1  
pp4 #fib ff474  ,footnote #ef3 ,archives
 de physiologie1 #ahib4  ,footnote #eg3 
,de ,manacine1 ,quelques observations   
exprimentales sur l'influence de        
l'insomnie absolue 7,arch4 ital4 de     
biologie1 t4 xxi41 #ahid1 pp4 #cbb ff474

 ,recently1 analogous observations have 
been made on a man who died of inanition
 after a fast of thirty-five days4 ,see1
 on this subject1 in the ,anne          
biologique of #ahih1 p4 #cch1 the rsum  
of an article 7in ,russian7 by          
,tarakevitch and ,stchasny4  ,footnote  
#eh3 ,cuvier said3 ,the nervous system  
is1 at bottom1 the whole animal2 the    
other systems are there only to serve   
it4 7,sur un nouveau rapprochement      
tablir entre les classes qui composent  
le regne animal1 ,arch4 du ,musum       
d'histoire naturelle1 ,paris1 #ahab1 pp4
 #gc-hd47 ,of course1 it would be       
necessary to apply a great many         
restrictions to this formula--for       
example1 to allow for the cases of      
degradation and retrogression in which  
the nervous system passes into the      
background4 ,and1 moreover1 with the    
nervous system must be included the     
sensorial apparatus on the one hand and 
the motor on the other1 between which it
 acts as intermediary4 ,cf4 ,foster1    

art4 ,physiology1 in the ,encyclopaedia 
,britannica1 ,edinburgh1 #ahhe1 p4 #ag4 
,footnote #ei3 ,see1 on these different 
points1 the work of ,gaudry1 ,essai de  
palontologie philosophique1 ,paris1     
#ahif1 pp4 #ad-af and #gh-gi4  ,footnote
 #fj3 ,see1 on this subject1 ,shaler1   
,the ,individual1 ,new ,york1 #aijj1 pp4
 #aah-abe4  ,footnote #fa3 ,this point  
is disputed by ,m4 ,ren ,quinton1 who   
regards the carnivorous and ruminant    
mammals1 as well as certain birds1 as   
subsequent to man 7,r4 ,quinton1 ,l',eau
 de mer milieu organique1 ,paris1 #aijd1
 p4 #dce74 ,we may say here that our    
general conclusions1 although very      
different from ,m4 ,quinton's1 are not  
irreconcilable with them2 for if        
evolution has really been such as we    
represent it1 the vertebrates must have 
made an effort to maintain themselves in
 the most favorable conditions of       
activity--the very conditions1 indeed1  
which life had chosen in the beginning4 
,footnote #fb3 ,m4 ,paul ,lacombe has   

laid great stress on the important      
influence that great inventions have    
exercised on the evolution of humanity  
7,p4 ,lacombe1 ,de l'histoire considre  
comme science1 ,paris1 #ahid4 ,see1 in  
particular1 pp4 #afh-bdg74  ,footnote   
#fc3 ,bouvier1 ,la ,nidification des    
abeilles  l'air libre 7,c4,r4 de l',ac4 
des sciences1 #g mai #aijf74  ,footnote 
#fd3 ,plato1 ,phaedrus1 #bfe ,e4        
,footnote #fe3 ,we shall return to these
 points in the next chapter4  ,footnote 
#ff3 ,we shall return to this point in  
chapter iii41 p4 #bei4  ,footnote #fg3  
,matire et mmoire1 chap4 i4  ,footnote  
#fh3 ,see the two works of ,darwin1     
,climbing ,plants and ,the              
,fertilization of ,orchids by ,insects4 
,footnote #fi3 ,buttel-,reepen1 ,die    
phylogenetische ,entstehung des         
,bienenstaates 7,biol4 ,centralblatt1   
xxiii4 #aijc71 p4 #ajh in particular4   
,footnote #gj3 ,fabre1 ,souvenirs       
entomologiques1 #c;e srie1 ,paris1      
#ahij1 pp4 #a-fi4  ,footnote #ga3       

,fabre1 ,souvenirs entomologiques1 #are 
srie1 ,paris1 #c;e dition1 ,paris1      
#ahid1 pp4 #ic ff4  ,footnote #gb3      
,fabre1 ,nouveaux souvenirs             
entomologiques1 ,paris1 #ahhb1 pp4 #ad  
ff4  ,footnote #gc3 ,peckham1 ,wasps1   
,solitary and ,social1 ,westminster1    
#aije1 pp4 #bh ff4  ,footnote #gd3 ,see1
 in particular1 among recent works1     
,bethe1 ,drfen wir den ,ameisen und     
,bienen psychische ,qualitten           
zuschreiben8 7,arch4 f4 d4 ges4         
,physiologie1 #ahih71 and ,forel1 ,un   
,aperu de psychologie compare 7,anne    
psychologique1 #ahie74  ,footnote #ge3  
,matire et mmoire1 chaps4 ii4 and iii4  
,footnote #gf3 ,le ,paralogisme         
psycho-physiologique 7,revue de         
mtaphysique1 ,nov4 #aijd74  ,footnote   
#gg3 ,a geologist whom we have already  
had occasion to cite1 ,n4,s4 ,shaler1   
well says that when we come to man1 it  
seems as if we find the ancient         
subjection of mind to body abolished1   
and the intellectual parts develop with 

an extraordinary rapidity1 the structure
 of the body remaining identical in     
essentials 7,shaler1 ,the               
,interpretation of ,nature1 ,boston1    
#ahii1 p4 #ahg74     ,,chapter ,,iii    
,,on ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,life--,,the 
,,order ,,of ,,nature ,,and ,,the ,,form
 ,,of ,,intelligence   ,in the course of
 our first chapter we traced a line of  
demarcation between the inorganic and   
the organized1 but we pointed out that  
the division of unorganized matter into 
separate bodies is relative to our      
senses and to our intellect1 and that   
matter1 looked at as an undivided whole1
 must be a flux rather than a thing4 ,in
 this we were preparing the way for a   
reconciliation between the inert and the
 living4  ,on the other side1 we have   
shown in our second chapter that the    
same opposition is found again between  
instinct and intelligence1 the one      
turned to certain determinations of     
life1 the other molded on the           
configuration of matter4 ,but instinct  

and intelligence1 we have also said1    
stand out from the same background1     
which1 for want of a better name1 we may
 call consciousness in general1 and     
which must be coextensive with universal
 life4 ,in this way1 we have disclosed  
the possibility of showing the genesis  
of intelligence in setting out from     
general consciousness1 which embraces   
it4  ,we are now1 then1 to attempt a    
genesis of intellect at the same time as
 a genesis of material bodies--two      
enterprises that are evidently          
correlative1 if it be true that the main
 lines of our intellect mark out the    
general form of our action on matter1   
and that the detail of matter is ruled  
by the requirements of our action4      
,intellectuality and materiality have   
been constituted1 in detail1 by         
reciprocal adaptation4 ,both are derived
 from a wider and higher form of        
existence4 ,it is there that we must    
replace them1 in order to see them issue
 forth4  ,such an attempt may appear1 at

 first1 more daring than the boldest    
speculations of metaphysicians4 ,it     
claims to go further than psychology1   
further than cosmology1 further than    
traditional metaphysics2 for psychology1
 cosmology and metaphysics take         
intelligence1 in all that is essential  
to it1 as given1 instead of1 as we now  
propose1 engendering it in its form and 
in its matter4 ,the enterprise is in    
reality much more modest1 as we are     
going to show4 ,but let us first say how
 it differs from others4  ,to begin with
 psychology1 we are not to believe that 
it engenders intelligence when it       
follows the progressive development of  
it through the animal series4           
,comparative psychology teaches us that 
the more an animal is intelligent1 the  
more it tends to reflect on the actions 
by which it makes use of things1 and    
thus to approximate to man4 ,but its    
actions have already by themselves      
adopted the principal lines of human    
action2 they have made out the same     

general directions in the material world
 as we have2 they depend upon the same  
objects bound together by the same      
relations2 so that animal intelligence1 
although it does not form concepts      
properly so called1 already moves in a  
conceptual atmosphere4 ,absorbed at     
every instant by the actions it performs
 and the attitudes it must adopt1 drawn 
outward by them and so externalized in  
relation to itself1 it no doubt plays   
rather than thinks its ideas2 this play 
none the less already corresponds1 in   
the main1 to the general plan of human  
intelligence4#gh ,to explain the        
intelligence of man by that of the      
animal consists then simply in following
 the development of an embryo of        
humanity into complete humanity4 ,we    
show how a certain direction has been   
followed further and further by beings  
more and more intelligent4 ,but the     
moment we admit the direction1          
intelligence is given4  ,in a cosmogony 
like that of ,spencer1 intelligence is  

taken for granted1 as matter also at the
 same time4 ,we are shown matter obeying
 laws1 objects connected with objects   
and facts with facts by constant        
relations1 consciousness receiving the  
imprint of these relations and laws1 and
 thus adopting the general configuration
 of nature and shaping itself into      
intellect4 ,but how can we fail to see  
that intelligence is supposed when we   
admit objects and facts8 ,a priori and  
apart from any hypothesis on the nature 
of the matter1 it is evident that the   
materiality of a body does not stop at  
the point at which we touch it3 a body  
is present wherever its influence is    
felt2 its attractive force1 to speak    
only of that1 is exerted on the sun1 on 
the planets1 perhaps on the entire      
universe4 ,the more physics advances1   
the more it effaces the individuality of
 bodies and even of the particles into  
which the scientific imagination began  
by decomposing them3 bodies and         
corpuscles tend to dissolve into a      

universal interaction4 ,our perceptions 
give us the plan of our eventual action 
on things much more than that of things 
themselves4 ,the outlines we find in    
objects simply mark what we can attain  
and modify in them4 ,the lines we see   
traced through matter are just the paths
 on which we are called to move4        
,outlines and paths have declared       
themselves in the measure and proportion
 that consciousness has prepared for    
action on unorganized matter--that is to
 say1 in the measure and proportion that
 intelligence has been formed4 ,it is   
doubtful whether animals built on a     
different plan--a mollusc or an insect1 
for instance--cut matter up along the   
same articulations4 ,it is not indeed   
necessary that they should separate it  
into bodies at all4 ,in order to follow 
the indications of instinct1 there is no
 need to perceive objects1 it is enough 
to distinguish properties4              
,intelligence1 on the contrary1 even in 
its humblest form1 already aims at      

getting matter to act on matter4 ,if on 
one side matter lends itself to a       
division into active and passive bodies1
 or more simply into coexistent and     
distinct fragments1 it is from this side
 that intelligence will regard it2 and  
the more it busies itself with dividing1
 the more it will spread out in space1  
in the form of extension adjoining      
extension1 a matter that undoubtedly    
itself has a tendency to spatiality1 but
 whose parts are yet in a state of      
reciprocal implication and              
interpenetration4 ,thus the same        
movement by which the mind is brought to
 form itself into intellect1 that is to 
say1 into distinct concepts1 brings     
matter to break itself up into objects  
excluding one another4 ,the more        
consciousness is intellectualized1 the  
more is matter spatialized4 ,so that the
 evolutionist philosophy1 when it       
imagines in space a matter cut up on the
 very lines that our action will follow1
 has given itself in advance1 ready     

made1 the intelligence of which it      
claims to show the genesis4             
,metaphysics applies itself to a work of
 the same kind1 though subtler and more 
self-conscious1 when it deduces a priori
 the categories of thought4 ,it         
compresses intellect1 reduces it to its 
quintessence1 holds it tight in a       
principle so simple that it can be      
thought empty3 from this principle we   
then draw out what we have virtually put
 into it4 ,in this way we may no doubt  
show the coherence of intelligence1     
define intellect1 give its formula1 but 
we do not trace its genesis4 ,an        
enterprise like that of ,fichte1        
although more philosophical than that of
 ,spencer1 in that it pays more respect 
to the true order of things1 hardly     
leads us any further4 ,fichte takes     
thought in a concentrated state1 and    
expands it into reality2 ,spencer starts
 from external reality1 and condenses it
 into intellect4 ,but1 in the one case  
as in the other1 the intellect must be  

taken at the beginning as given--either 
condensed or expanded1 grasped in itself
 by a direct vision or perceived by     
reflection in nature1 as in a mirror4   
,the agreement of most philosophers on  
this point comes from the fact that they
 are at one in affirming the unity of   
nature1 and in representing this unity  
under an abstract and geometrical form4 
,between the organized and the          
unorganized they do not see and they    
will not see the cleft4 ,some start from
 the inorganic1 and1 by compounding it  
with itself1 claim to form the living2  
others place life first1 and proceed    
towards matter by a skilfully managed   
decrescendo2 but1 for both1 there are   
only differences of degree in           
nature--degrees of complexity in the    
first hypothesis1 of intensity in the   
second4 ,once this principle is         
admitted1 intelligence becomes as vast  
as reality2 for it is unquestionable    
that whatever is geometrical in things  
is entirely accessible to human         

intelligence1 and if the continuity     
between geometry and the rest is        
perfect1 all the rest must indeed be    
equally intelligible1 equally           
intelligent4 ,such is the postulate of  
most systems4 ,any one can easily be    
convinced of this by comparing doctrines
 that seem to have no common point1 no  
common measure1 those of ,fichte and    
,spencer for instance1 two names that we
 happen to have just brought together4  
,at the root of these speculations1     
then1 there are the two convictions     
correlative and complementary1 that     
nature is one and that the function of  
intellect is to embrace it in its       
entirety4 ,the faculty of knowing being 
supposed coextensive with the whole of  
experience1 there can no longer be any  
question of engendering it4 ,it is      
already given1 and we merely have to use
 it1 as we use our sight to take in the 
horizon4 ,it is true that opinions      
differ as to the value of the result4   
,for some1 it is reality itself that the

 intellect embraces2 for others1 it is  
only a phantom4 ,but1 phantom or        
reality1 what intelligence grasps is    
thought to be all that can be attained4 
,hence the exaggerated confidence of    
philosophy in the powers of the         
individual mind4 ,whether it is dogmatic
 or critical1 whether it admits the     
relativity of our knowledge or claims to
 be established within the absolute1 a  
philosophy is generally the work of a   
philosopher1 a single and unitary vision
 of the whole4 ,it is to be taken or    
left4  ,more modest1 and also alone     
capable of being completed and          
perfected1 is the philosophy we         
advocate4 ,human intelligence1 as we    
represent it1 is not at all what ,plato 
taught in the allegory of the cave4 ,its
 function is not to look at passing     
shadows nor yet to turn itself round and
 contemplate the glaring sun4 ,it has   
something else to do4 ,harnessed1 like  
yoked oxen1 to a heavy task1 we feel the
 play of our muscles and joints1 the    

weight of the plow and the resistance of
 the soil4 ,to act and to know that we  
are acting1 to come into touch with     
reality and even to live it1 but only in
 the measure in which it concerns the   
work that is being accomplished and the 
furrow that is being plowed1 such is the
 function of human intelligence4 ,yet a 
beneficent fluid bathes us1 whence we   
draw the very force to labor and to     
live4 ,from this ocean of life1 in which
 we are immersed1 we are continually    
drawing something1 and we feel that our 
being1 or at least the intellect that   
guides it1 has been formed therein by a 
kind of local concentration4 ,philosophy
 can only be an effort to dissolve again
 into the ,whole4 ,intelligence1        
reabsorbed into its principle1 may thus 
live back again its own genesis4 ,but   
the enterprise cannot be achieved in one
 stroke2 it is necessarily collective   
and progressive4 ,it consists in an     
interchange of impressions which1       
correcting and adding to each other1    

will end by expanding the humanity in us
 and making us even transcend it4  ,but 
this method has against it the most     
inveterate habits of the mind4 ,it at   
once suggests the idea of a vicious     
circle4 ,in vain1 we shall be told1 you 
claim to go beyond intelligence3 how can
 you do that except by intelligence8    
,all that is clear in your consciousness
 is intelligence4 ,you are inside your  
own thought2 you cannot get out of it4  
,say1 if you like1 that the intellect is
 capable of progress1 that it will see  
more and more clearly into a greater and
 greater number of things2 but do not   
speak of engendering it1 for it is with 
your intellect itself that you would    
have to do the work4  ,the objection    
presents itself naturally to the mind4  
,but the same reasoning would prove also
 the impossibility of acquiring any new 
habit4 ,it is of the essence of         
reasoning to shut us up in the circle of
 the given4 ,but action breaks the      
circle4 ,if we had never seen a man     

swim1 we might say that swimming is an  
impossible thing1 inasmuch as1 to learn 
to swim1 we must begin by holding       
ourselves up in the water and1          
consequently1 already know how to swim4 
,reasoning1 in fact1 always nails us    
down to the solid ground4 ,but if1 quite
 simply1 ,i throw myself into the water 
without fear1 ,i may keep myself up well
 enough at first by merely struggling1  
and gradually adapt myself to the new   
environment3 ,i shall thus have learnt  
to swim4 ,so1 in theory1 there is a kind
 of absurdity in trying to know         
otherwise than by intelligence2 but if  
the risk be frankly accepted1 action    
will perhaps cut the knot that reasoning
 has tied and will not unloose4         
,besides1 the risk will appear to grow  
less1 the more our point of view is     
adopted4 ,we have shown that intellect  
has detached itself from a vastly wider 
reality1 but that there has never been a
 clean cut between the two2 all around  
conceptual thought there remains an     

indistinct fringe which recalls its     
origin4 ,and further we compared the    
intellect to a solid nucleus formed by  
means of condensation4 ,this nucleus    
does not differ radically from the fluid
 surrounding it4 ,it can only be        
reabsorbed in it because it is made of  
the same substance4 ,he who throws      
himself into the water1 having known    
only the resistance of the solid earth1 
will immediately be drowned if he does  
not struggle against the fluidity of the
 new environment3 he must perforce still
 cling to that solidity1 so to speak1   
which even water presents4 ,only on this
 condition can he get used to the       
fluid's fluidity4 ,so of our thought1   
when it has decided to make the leap4   
,but leap it must1 that is1 leave its   
own environment4 ,reason1 reasoning on  
its powers1 will never succeed in       
extending them1 though the extension    
would not appear at all unreasonable    
once it were accomplished4 ,thousands   
and thousands of variations on the theme

 of walking will never yield a rule for 
swimming3 come1 enter the water1 and    
when you know how to swim1 you will     
understand how the mechanism of swimming
 is connected with that of walking4     
,swimming is an extension of walking1   
but walking would never have pushed you 
on to swimming4 ,so you may speculate as
 intelligently as you will on the       
mechanism of intelligence2 you will     
never1 by this method1 succeed in going 
beyond it4 ,you may get something more  
complex1 but not something higher nor   
even something different4 ,you must take
 things by storm3 you must thrust       
intelligence outside itself by an act of
 will4  ,so the vicious circle is only  
apparent4 ,it is1 on the contrary1 real1
 we think1 in every other method of     
philosophy4 ,this we must try to show in
 a few words1 if only to prove that     
philosophy cannot and must not accept   
the relation established by pure        
intellectualism between the theory of   
knowledge and the theory of the known1  

between metaphysics and science4        
99       99       99       99       99  
,at first sight1 it may seem prudent to 
leave the consideration of facts to     
positive science1 to let physics and    
chemistry busy themselves with matter1  
the biological and psychological        
sciences with life4 ,the task of the    
philosopher is then clearly defined4 ,he
 takes facts and laws from the          
scientists' hand2 and whether he tries  
to go beyond them in order to reach     
their deeper causes1 or whether he      
thinks it impossible to go further and  
even proves it by the analysis of       
scientific knowledge1 in both cases he  
has for the facts and relations1 handed 
over by science1 the sort of respect    
that is due to a final verdict4 ,to this
 knowledge he adds a critique of the    
faculty of knowing1 and also1 if he     
thinks proper1 a metaphysic2 but the    
matter of knowledge he regards as the   
affair of science and not of philosophy4
  ,but how does he fail to see that the 

real result of this so-called division  
of labor is to mix up everything and    
confuse everything8 ,the metaphysic or  
the critique that the philosopher has   
reserved for himself he has to receive1 
ready-made1 from positive science1 it   
being already contained in the          
descriptions and analyses1 the whole    
care of which he left to the scientists4
 ,for not having wished to intervene1 at
 the beginning1 in questions of fact1 he
 finds himself reduced1 in questions of 
principle1 to formulating purely and    
simply in more precise terms the        
unconscious and consequently            
inconsistent metaphysic and critique    
which the very attitude of science to   
reality marks out4 ,let us not be       
deceived by an apparent analogy between 
natural things and human things4 ,here  
we are not in the judiciary domain1     
where the description of fact and the   
judgment on the fact are two distinct   
things1 distinct for the very simple    
reason that above the fact1 and         

independent of it1 there is a law       
promulgated by a legislator4 ,here the  
laws are internal to the facts and      
relative to the lines that have been    
followed in cutting the real into       
distinct facts4 ,we cannot describe the 
outward appearance of the object without
 prejudging its inner nature and its    
organization4 ,form is no longer        
entirely isolable from matter1 and he   
who has begun by reserving to philosophy
 questions of principle1 and who has    
thereby tried to put philosophy above   
the sciences1 as a court of cassation is
 above the courts of assizes and of     
appeal1 will gradually come to make no  
more of philosophy than a registration  
court1 charged at most with wording more
 precisely the sentences that are       
brought to it1 pronounced and           
irrevocable4  ,positive science is1 in  
fact1 a work of pure intellect4 ,now1   
whether our conception of the intellect 
be accepted or rejected1 there is one   
point on which everybody will agree with

 us1 and that is that the intellect is  
at home in the presence of unorganized  
matter4 ,this matter it makes use of    
more and more by mechanical inventions1 
and mechanical inventions become the    
easier to it the more it thinks matter  
as mechanism4 ,the intellect bears      
within itself1 in the form of natural   
logic1 a latent geometrism that is set  
free in the measure and proportion that 
the intellect penetrates into the inner 
nature of inert matter4 ,intelligence is
 in tune with this matter1 and that is  
why the physics and metaphysics of inert
 matter are so near each other4 ,now1   
when the intellect undertakes the study 
of life1 it necessarily treats the      
living like the inert1 applying the same
 forms to this new object1 carrying over
 into this new field the same habits    
that have succeeded so well in the old2 
and it is right to do so1 for only on   
such terms does the living offer to our 
action the same hold as inert matter4   
,but the truth we thus arrive at becomes

 altogether relative to our faculty of  
action4 ,it is no more than a symbolic  
verity4 ,it cannot have the same value  
as the physical verity1 being only an   
extension of physics to an object which 
we are a priori agreed to look at only  
in its external aspect4 ,the duty of    
philosophy should be to intervene here  
actively1 to examine the living without 
any reservation as to practical utility1
 by freeing itself from forms and habits
 that are strictly intellectual4 ,its   
own special object is to speculate1 that
 is to say1 to see2 its attitude toward 
the living should not be that of        
science1 which aims only at action1 and 
which1 being able to act only by means  
of inert matter1 presents to itself the 
rest of reality in this single respect4 
,what must the result be1 if it leave   
biological and psychological facts to   
positive science alone1 as it has left1 
and rightly left1 physical facts8 ,it   
will accept a priori a mechanistic      
conception of all nature1 a conception  

unreflected and even unconscious1 the   
outcome of the material need4 ,it will a
 priori accept the doctrine of the      
simple unity of knowledge and of the    
abstract unity of nature4  ,the moment  
it does so1 its fate is sealed4 ,the    
philosopher has no longer any choice    
save between a metaphysical dogmatism   
and a metaphysical skepticism1 both of  
which rest1 at bottom1 on the same      
postulate1 and neither of which adds    
anything to positive science4 ,he may   
hypostasize the unity of nature1 or1    
what comes to the same thing1 the unity 
of science1 in a being who is nothing   
since he does nothing1 an ineffectual   
,god who simply sums up in himself all  
the given2 or in an eternal ,matter from
 whose womb have been poured out the    
properties of things and the laws of    
nature2 or1 again1 in a pure ,form which
 endeavors to seize an unseizable       
multiplicity1 and which is1 as we will1 
the form of nature or the form of       
thought4 ,all these philosophies tell   

us1 in their different languages1 that  
science is right to treat the living as 
the inert1 and that there is no         
difference of value1 no distinction to  
be made between the results which       
intellect arrives at in applying its    
categories1 whether it rests on inert   
matter or attacks life4  ,in many cases1
 however1 we feel the frame cracking4   
,but as we did not begin by             
distinguishing between the inert and the
 living1 the one adapted in advance to  
the frame in which we insert it1 the    
other incapable of being held in the    
frame otherwise than by a convention    
which eliminates from it all that is    
essential1 we find ourselves1 in the    
end1 reduced to regarding everything the
 frame contains with equal suspicion4   
,to a metaphysical dogmatism1 which has 
erected into an absolute the factitious 
unity of science1 there succeeds a      
skepticism or a relativism that         
universalizes and extends to all the    
results of science the artificial       

character of some among them4 ,so       
philosophy swings to and fro between the
 doctrine that regards absolute reality 
as unknowable and that which1 in the    
idea it gives us of this reality1 says  
nothing more than science has said4 ,for
 having wished to prevent all conflict  
between science and philosophy1 we have 
sacrificed philosophy without any       
appreciable gain to science4 ,and for   
having tried to avoid the seeming       
vicious circle which consists in using  
the intellect to transcend the          
intellect1 we find ourselves turning in 
a real circle1 that which consists in   
laboriously rediscovering by metaphysics
 a unity that we began by positing a    
priori1 a unity that we admitted blindly
 and unconsciously by the very act of   
abandoning the whole of experience to   
science and the whole of reality to the 
pure understanding4  ,let us begin1 on  
the contrary1 by tracing a line of      
demarcation between the inert and the   
living4 ,we shall find that the inert   

enters naturally into the frames of the 
intellect1 but that the living is       
adapted to these frames only            
artificially1 so that we must adopt a   
special attitude towards it and examine 
it with other eyes than those of        
positive science4 ,philosophy1 then1    
invades the domain of experience4 ,she  
busies herself with many things which   
hitherto have not concerned her4        
,science1 theory of knowledge1 and      
metaphysics find themselves on the same 
ground4 ,at first there may be a certain
 confusion4 ,all three may think they   
have lost something4 ,but all three will
 profit from the meeting4  ,positive    
science1 indeed1 may pride itself on the
 uniform value attributed to its        
affirmations in the whole field of      
experience4 ,but1 if they are all placed
 on the same footing1 they are all      
tainted with the same relativity4 ,it is
 not so1 if we begin by making the      
distinction which1 in our view1 is      
forced upon us4 ,the understanding is at

 home in the domain of unorganized      
matter4 ,on this matter human action is 
naturally exercised2 and action1 as we  
said above1 cannot be set in motion in  
the unreal4 ,thus1 of physics--so long  
as we are considering only its general  
form and not the particular cutting out 
of matter in which it is manifested--we 
may say that it touches the absolute4   
,on the contrary1 it is by              
accident--chance or convention1 as you  
please--that science obtains a hold on  
the living analogous to the hold it has 
on matter4 ,here the use of conceptual  
frames is no longer natural4 ,i do not  
wish to say that it is not legitimate1  
in the scientific meaning of the term4  
,if science is to extend our action on  
things1 and if we can act only with     
inert matter for instrument1 science can
 and must continue to treat the living  
as it has treated the inert4 ,but1 in   
doing so1 it must be understood that the
 further it penetrates the depths of    
life1 the more symbolic1 the more       

relative to the contingencies of action1
 the knowledge it supplies to us        
becomes4 ,on this new ground philosophy 
ought then to follow science1 in order  
to superpose on scientific truth a      
knowledge of another kind1 which may be 
called metaphysical4 ,thus combined1 all
 our knowledge1 both scientific and     
metaphysical1 is heightened4 ,in the    
absolute we live and move and have our  
being4 ,the knowledge we possess of it  
is incomplete1 no doubt1 but not        
external or relative4 ,it is reality    
itself1 in the profoundest meaning of   
the word1 that we reach by the combined 
and progressive development of science  
and of philosophy4  ,thus1 in renouncing
 the factitious unity which the         
understanding imposes on nature from    
outside1 we shall perhaps find its true1
 inward and living unity4 ,for the      
effort we make to transcend the pure    
understanding introduces us into that   
more vast something out of which our    
understanding is cut1 and from which it 

has detached itself4 ,and1 as matter is 
determined by intelligence1 as there is 
between them an evident agreement1 we   
cannot make the genesis of the one      
without making the genesis of the other4
 ,an identical process must have cut out
 matter and the intellect1 at the same  
time1 from a stuff that contained both4 
,into this reality we shall get back    
more and more completely1 in proportion 
as we compel ourselves to transcend pure
 intelligence4         99       99      
99       99       99  ,let us then      
concentrate attention on that which we  
have that is at the same time the most  
removed from externality and the least  
penetrated with intellectuality4 ,let us
 seek1 in the depths of our experience1 
the point where we feel ourselves most  
intimately within our own life4 ,it is  
into pure duration that we then plunge  
back1 a duration in which the past1     
always moving on1 is swelling           
unceasingly with a present that is      
absolutely new4 ,but1 at the same time1 

we feel the spring of our will strained 
to its utmost limit4 ,we must1 by a     
strong recoil of our personality on     
itself1 gather up our past which is     
slipping away1 in order to thrust it1   
compact and undivided1 into a present   
which it will create by entering4 ,rare 
indeed are the moments when we are      
self-possessed to this extent3 it is    
then that our actions are truly free4   
,and even at these moments we do not    
completely possess ourselves4 ,our      
feeling of duration1 ,i should say the  
actual coinciding of ourself with       
itself1 admits of degrees4 ,but the more
 the feeling is deep and the coincidence
 complete1 the more the life in which it
 replaces us absorbs intellectuality by 
transcending it4 ,for the natural       
function of the intellect is to bind    
like to like1 and it is only facts that 
can be repeated that are entirely       
adaptable to intellectual conceptions4  
,now1 our intellect does undoubtedly    
grasp the real moments of real duration 

after they are past2 we do so by        
reconstituting the new state of         
consciousness out of a series of views  
taken of it from the outside1 each of   
which resembles as much as possible     
something already known2 in this sense  
we may say that the state of            
consciousness contains intellectuality  
implicitly4 ,yet the state of           
consciousness overflows the intellect2  
it is indeed incommensurable with the   
intellect1 being itself indivisible and 
new4  ,now let us relax the strain1 let 
us interrupt the effort to crowd as much
 as possible of the past into the       
present4 ,if the relaxation were        
complete1 there would no longer be      
either memory or will--which amounts to 
saying that1 in fact1 we never do fall  
into this absolute passivity1 any more  
than we can make ourselves absolutely   
free4 ,but1 in the limit1 we get a      
glimpse of an existence made of a       
present which recommences               
unceasingly--devoid of real duration1   

nothing but the instantaneous which dies
 and is born again endlessly4 ,is the   
existence of matter of this nature8 ,not
 altogether1 for analysis resolves it   
into elementary vibrations1 the shortest
 of which are of very slight duration1  
almost vanishing1 but not nothing4 ,it  
may be presumed1 nevertheless1 that     
physical existence inclines in this     
second direction1 as psychical existence
 in the first4  ,behind spirituality on 
the one hand1 and materiality with      
intellectuality on the other1 there are 
then two processes opposite in their    
direction1 and we pass from the first to
 the second by way of inversion1 or     
perhaps even by simple interruption1 if 
it is true that inversion and           
interruption are two terms which in this
 case must be held to be synonymous1 as 
we shall show at more length later on4  
,this presumption is confirmed when we  
consider things from the point of view  
of extension1 and no longer from that of
 duration alone4  ,the more we succeed  

in making ourselves conscious of our    
progress in pure duration1 the more we  
feel the different parts of our being   
enter into each other1 and our whole    
personality concentrate itself in a     
point1 or rather a sharp edge1 pressed  
against the future and cutting into it  
unceasingly4 ,it is in this that life   
and action are free4 ,but suppose we let
 ourselves go and1 instead of acting1   
dream4 ,at once the self is scattered2  
our past1 which till then was gathered  
together into the indivisible impulsion 
it communicated to us1 is broken up into
 a thousand recollections made external 
to one another4 ,they give up           
interpenetrating in the degree that they
 become fixed4 ,our personality thus    
descends in the direction of space4 ,it 
coasts around it continually in         
sensation4 ,we will not dwell here on a 
point we have studied elsewhere4 ,let us
 merely recall that extension admits of 
degrees1 that all sensation is extensive
 in a certain measure1 and that the idea

 of unextended sensations1 artificially 
localized in space1 is a mere view of   
the mind1 suggested by an unconscious   
metaphysic much more than by            
psychological observation4  ,no doubt we
 make only the first steps in the       
direction of the extended1 even when we 
let ourselves go as much as we can4 ,but
 suppose for a moment that matter       
consists in this very movement pushed   
further1 and that physics is simply     
psychics inverted4 ,we shall now        
understand why the mind feels at its    
ease1 moves about naturally in space1   
when matter suggests the more distinct  
idea of it4 ,this space it already      
possessed as an implicit idea in its own
 eventual detension1 that is to say1 of 
its own possible extension4 ,the mind   
finds space in things1 but could have   
got it without them if it had had       
imagination strong enough to push the   
inversion of its own natural movement to
 the end4 ,on the other hand1 we are    
able to explain how matter accentuates  

still more its materiality1 when viewed 
by the mind4 ,matter1 at first1 aided   
mind to run down its own incline2 it    
gave the impulsion4 ,but1 the impulsion 
once received1 mind continues its       
course4 ,the idea that it forms of pure 
space is only the schema of the limit at
 which this movement would end4 ,once in
 possession of the form of space1 mind  
uses it like a net with meshes that can 
be made and unmade at will1 which1      
thrown over matter1 divides it as the   
needs of our action demand4 ,thus1 the  
space of our geometry and the spatiality
 of things are mutually engendered by   
the reciprocal action and reaction of   
two terms which are essentially the     
same1 but which move each in the        
direction inverse of the other4 ,neither
 is space so foreign to our nature as we
 imagine1 nor is matter as completely   
extended in space as our senses and     
intellect represent it4  ,we have       
treated of the first point elsewhere4   
,as to the second1 we will limit        

ourselves to pointing out that perfect  
spatiality would consist in a perfect   
externality of parts in their relation  
to one another1 that is to say1 in a    
complete reciprocal independence4 ,now1 
there is no material point that does not
 act on every other material point4     
,when we observe that a thing really is 
there where it acts1 we shall be led to 
say 7as ,faraday#gi was7 that all the   
atoms interpenetrate and that each of   
them fills the world4 ,on such a        
hypothesis1 the atom or1 more generally1
 the material point1 becomes simply a   
view of the mind1 a view which we come  
to take when we continue far enough the 
work 7wholly relative to our faculty of 
acting7 by which we subdivide matter    
into bodies4 ,yet it is undeniable that 
matter lends itself to this subdivision1
 and that1 in supposing it breakable    
into parts external to one another1 we  
are constructing a science sufficiently 
representative of the real4 ,it is      
undeniable that if there be no entirely 

isolated system1 yet science finds means
 of cutting up the universe into systems
 relatively independent of each other1  
and commits no appreciable error in     
doing so4 ,what else can this mean but  
that matter extends itself in space     
without being absolutely extended       
therein1 and that in regarding matter as
 decomposable into isolated systems1 in 
attributing to it quite distinct        
elements which change in relation to    
each other without changing in          
themselves 7which are displaced1 shall  
we say1 without being altered71 in      
short1 in conferring on matter the      
properties of pure space1 we are        
transporting ourselves to the terminal  
point of the movement of which matter   
simply indicates the direction8  ,what  
the ,transcendental ,aesthetic of ,kant 
appears to have established once for all
 is that extension is not a material    
attribute of the same kind as others4   
,we cannot reason indefinitely on the   
notions of heat1 color1 or weight3 in   

order to know the modalities of weight  
or of heat1 we must have recourse to    
experience4 ,not so of the notion of    
space4 ,supposing even that it is given 
empirically by sight and touch 7and     
,kant has not questioned the fact7 there
 is this about it that is remarkable    
that our mind1 speculating on it with   
its own powers alone1 cuts out in it1 a 
priori1 figures whose properties we     
determine a priori3 experience1 with    
which we have not kept in touch1 yet    
follows us through the infinite         
complications of our reasonings and     
invariably justifies them4 ,that is the 
fact4 ,kant has set it in clear light4  
,but the explanation of the fact1 we    
believe1 must be sought in a different  
direction to that which ,kant followed4 
,intelligence1 as ,kant represents it to
 us1 is bathed in an atmosphere of      
spatiality to which it is as inseparably
 united as the living body to the air it
 breathes4 ,our perceptions reach us    
only after having passed through this   

atmosphere4 ,they have been impregnated 
in advance by our geometry1 so that our 
faculty of thinking only finds again in 
matter the mathematical properties which
 our faculty of perceiving has already  
deposed there4 ,we are assured1         
therefore1 of seeing matter yield itself
 with docility to our reasonings2 but   
this matter1 in all that it has that is 
intelligible1 is our own work2 of the   
reality in itself we know nothing and   
never shall know anything1 since we only
 get its refraction through the forms of
 our faculty of perceiving4 ,so that if 
we claim to affirm something of it1 at  
once there rises the contrary           
affirmation1 equally demonstrable1      
equally plausible4 ,the ideality of     
space is proved directly by the analysis
 of knowledge indirectly by the         
antinomies to which the opposite theory 
leads4 ,such is the governing idea of   
the ,kantian criticism4 ,it has inspired
 ,kant with a peremptory refutation of  
empiricist theories of knowledge4 ,it   

is1 in our opinion1 definitive in what  
it denies4 ,but1 in what it affirms1    
does it give us the solution of the     
problem8  ,with ,kant1 space is given as
 a ready-made form of our perceptive    
faculty--a veritable deus ex machina1 of
 which we see neither how it arises1 nor
 why it is what it is rather than       
anything else4 ,things-in-themselves are
 also given1 of which he claims that we 
can know nothing3 by what right1 then1  
can he affirm their existence1 even as  
problematic8 ,if the unknowable reality 
projects into our perceptive faculty a  
sensuous manifold capable of fitting    
into it exactly1 is it not1 by that very
 fact1 in part known8 ,and when we      
examine this exact fitting1 shall we not
 be led1 in one point at least1 to      
suppose a pre-established harmony       
between things and our mind--an idle    
hypothesis1 which ,kant was right in    
wishing to avoid8 ,at bottom1 it is for 
not having distinguished degrees in     
spatiality that he has had to take space

 ready-made as given--whence the        
question how the sensuous manifold is   
adapted to it4 ,it is for the same      
reason that he has supposed matter      
wholly developed into parts absolutely  
external to one another2--whence        
antinomies1 of which we may plainly see 
that the thesis and antithesis suppose  
the perfect coincidence of matter with  
geometrical space1 but which vanish the 
moment we cease to extend to matter what
 is true only of pure space4 ,whence1   
finally1 the conclusion that there are  
three alternatives1 and three only1     
among which to choose a theory of       
knowledge3 either the mind is determined
 by things1 or things are determined by 
the mind1 or between mind and things we 
must suppose a mysterious agreement4    
,but the truth is that there is a       
fourth1 which does not seem to have     
occurred to ,kant--in the first place   
because he did not think that the mind  
overflowed the intellect1 and in the    
second place 7and this is at bottom the 

same thing7 because he did not attribute
 to duration an absolute existence1     
having put time1 a priori1 on the same  
plane as space4 ,this alternative       
consists1 first of all1 in regarding the
 intellect as a special function of the 
mind1 essentially turned toward inert   
matter2 then in saying that neither does
 matter determine the form of the       
intellect1 nor does the intellect impose
 its form on matter1 nor have matter and
 intellect been regulated in regard to  
one another by we know not what         
pre-established harmony1 but that       
intellect and matter have progressively 
adapted themselves one to the other in  
order to attain at last a common form4  
,this adaptation has1 moreover1 been    
brought about quite naturally1 because  
it is the same inversion of the same    
movement which creates at once the      
intellectuality of mind and the         
materiality of things4  ,from this point
 of view the knowledge of matter that   
our perception on one hand and science  

on the other give to us appears1 no     
doubt1 as approximative1 but not as     
relative4 ,our perception1 whose rle it 
is to hold up a light to our actions1   
works a dividing up of matter that is   
always too sharply defined1 always      
subordinated to practical needs1        
consequently always requiring revision4 
,our science1 which aspires to the      
mathematical form1 over-accentuates the 
spatiality of matter2 its formulae are1 
in general1 too precise1 and ever need  
remaking4 ,for a scientific theory to be
 final1 the mind would have to embrace  
the totality of things in block and     
place each thing in its exact relation  
to every other thing2 but in reality we 
are obliged to consider problems one by 
one1 in terms which are1 for that very  
reason1 provisional1 so that the        
solution of each problem will have to be
 corrected indefinitely by the solution 
that will be given to the problems that 
will follow3 thus1 science as a whole is
 relative to the particular order in    

which the problems happen to have been  
put4 ,it is in this meaning1 and to this
 degree1 that science must be regarded  
as conventional4 ,but it is a           
conventionality of fact so to speak1 and
 not of right4 ,in principle1 positive  
science bears on reality itself1        
provided it does not overstep the limits
 of its own domain1 which is inert      
matter4  ,scientific knowledge1 thus    
regarded1 rises to a higher plane4 ,in  
return1 the theory of knowledge becomes 
an infinitely difficult enterprise1 and 
which passes the powers of the intellect
 alone4 ,it is not enough to determine1 
by careful analysis1 the categories of  
thought2 we must engender them4 ,as     
regards space1 we must1 by an effort of 
mind sui generis1 follow the progression
 or rather the regression of the        
extra-spatial degrading itself into     
spatiality4 ,when we make ourselves     
self-conscious in the highest possible  
degree and then let ourselves fall back 
little by little1 we get the feeling of 

extension3 we have an extension of the  
self into recollections that are fixed  
and external to one another1 in place of
 the tension it possessed as an         
indivisible active will4 ,but this is   
only a beginning4 ,our consciousness1   
sketching the movement1 shows us its    
direction and reveals to us the         
possibility of continuing it to the end2
 but consciousness itself does not go so
 far4 ,now1 on the other hand1 if we    
consider matter1 which seems to us at   
first coincident with space1 we find    
that the more our attention is fixed on 
it1 the more the parts which we said    
were laid side by side enter into each  
other1 each of them undergoing the      
action of the whole1 which is           
consequently somehow present in it4     
,thus1 although matter stretches itself 
out in the direction of space1 it does  
not completely attain it2 whence we may 
conclude that it only carries very much 
further the movement that consciousness 
is able to sketch within us in its      

nascent state4 ,we hold1 therefore1 the 
two ends of the chain1 though we do not 
succeed in seizing the intermediate     
links4 ,will they always escape us8 ,we 
must remember that philosophy1 as we    
define it1 has not yet become completely
 conscious of itself4 ,physics          
understands its rle when it pushes      
matter in the direction of spatiality2  
but has metaphysics understood its rle  
when it has simply trodden in the steps 
of physics1 in the chimerical hope of   
going further in the same direction8    
,should not its own task be1 on the     
contrary1 to remount the incline that   
physics descends1 to bring back matter  
to its origins1 and to build up         
progressively a cosmology which would   
be1 so to speak1 a reversed psychology8 
,all that which seems positive to the   
physicist and to the geometrician would 
become1 from this new point of view1 an 
interruption or inversion of the true   
positivity1 which would have to be      
defined in psychological terms4         

99       99       99       99       99  
,when we consider the admirable order of
 mathematics1 the perfect agreement of  
the objects it deals with1 the immanent 
logic in numbers and figures1 our       
certainty of always getting the same    
conclusion1 however diverse and complex 
our reasonings on the same subject1 we  
hesitate to see in properties apparently
 so positive a system of negations1 the 
absence rather than the presence of a   
true reality4 ,but we must not forget   
that our intellect1 which finds this    
order and wonders at it1 is directed in 
the same line of movement that leads to 
the materiality and spatiality of its   
object4 ,the more complexity the        
intellect puts into its object by       
analyzing it1 the more complex is the   
order it finds there4 ,and this order   
and this complexity necessarily appear  
to the intellect as a positive reality1 
since reality and intellectuality are   
turned in the same direction4  ,when a  
poet reads me his verses1 ,i can        

interest myself enough in him to enter  
into his thought1 put myself into his   
feelings1 live over again the simple    
state he has broken into phrases and    
words4 ,i sympathize then with his      
inspiration1 ,i follow it with a        
continuous movement which is1 like the  
inspiration itself1 an undivided act4   
,now1 ,i need only relax my attention1  
let go the tension that there is in me1 
for the sounds1 hitherto swallowed up in
 the sense1 to appear to me distinctly1 
one by one1 in their materiality4 ,for  
this ,i have not to do anything2 it is  
enough to withdraw something4 ,in       
proportion as ,i let myself go1 the     
successive sounds will become the more  
individualized2 as the phrases were     
broken into words1 so the words will    
scan in syllables which ,i shall        
perceive one after another4 ,let me go  
farther still in the direction of dream3
 the letters themselves will become     
loose and will be seen to dance along1  
hand in hand1 on some fantastic sheet of

 paper4 ,i shall then admire the        
precision of the interweavings1 the     
marvelous order of the procession1 the  
exact insertion of the letters into the 
syllables1 of the syllables into the    
words and of the words into the         
sentences4 ,the farther ,i pursue this  
quite negative direction of relaxation1 
the more extension and complexity ,i    
shall create2 and the more the          
complexity in its turn increases1 the   
more admirable will seem to be the order
 which continues to reign1 undisturbed1 
among the elements4 ,yet this complexity
 and extension represent nothing        
positive2 they express a deficiency of  
will4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the order
 must grow with the complexity1 since it
 is only an aspect of it4 ,the more we  
perceive1 symbolically1 parts in an     
indivisible whole1 the more the number  
of the relations that the parts have    
between themselves necessarily          
increases1 since the same undividedness 
of the real whole continues to hover    

over the growing multiplicity of the    
symbolic elements into which the        
scattering of the attention has         
decomposed it4 ,a comparison of this    
kind will enable us to understand1 in   
some measure1 how the same suppression  
of positive reality1 the same inversion 
of a certain original movement1 can     
create at once extension in space and   
the admirable order which mathematics   
finds there4 ,there is1 of course1 this 
difference between the two cases1 that  
words and letters have been invented by 
a positive effort of humanity1 while    
space arises automatically1 as the      
remainder of a subtraction arises once  
the two numbers are posited4#hj ,but1 in
 the one case as in the other1 the      
infinite complexity of the parts and    
their perfect cordination among         
themselves are created at one and the   
same time by an inversion which is1 at  
bottom1 an interruption1 that is to say1
 a diminution of positive reality4      
99       99       99       99       99  

,all the operations of our intellect    
tend to geometry1 as to the goal where  
they find their perfect fulfilment4     
,but1 as geometry is necessarily prior  
to them 7since these operations have not
 as their end to construct space and    
cannot do otherwise than take it as     
given7 it is evident that it is a latent
 geometry1 immanent in our idea of      
space1 which is the main spring of our  
intellect and the cause of its working4 
,we shall be convinced of this if we    
consider the two essential functions of 
intellect1 the faculty of deduction and 
that of induction4  ,let us begin with  
deduction4 ,the same movement by which  
,i trace a figure in space engenders its
 properties3 they are visible and       
tangible in the movement itself2 ,i     
feel1 ,i see in space the relation of   
the definition to its consequences1 of  
the premisses to the conclusion4 ,all   
the other concepts of which experience  
suggests the idea to me are only in part
 constructible a priori2 the definition 

of them is therefore imperfect1 and the 
deductions into which these concepts    
enter1 however closely the conclusion is
 linked to the premisses1 participate in
 this imperfection4 ,but when ,i trace  
roughly in the sand the base of a       
triangle1 as ,i begin to form the two   
angles at the base1 ,i know positively1 
and understand absolutely1 that if these
 two angles are equal the sides will be 
equal also1 the figure being then able  
to be turned over on itself without     
there being any change whatever4 ,i know
 it before ,i have learnt geometry4     
,thus1 prior to the science of geometry1
 there is a natural geometry whose      
clearness and evidence surpass the      
clearness and evidence of other         
deductions4 ,now1 these other deductions
 bear on qualities1 and not on          
magnitudes purely4 ,they are1 then1     
likely to have been formed on the model 
of the first1 and to borrow their force 
from the fact that1 behind quality1 we  
see magnitude vaguely showing through4  

,we may notice1 as a fact1 that         
questions of situation and of magnitude 
are the first that present themselves to
 our activity1 those which intelligence 
externalized in action resolves even    
before reflective intelligence has      
appeared4 ,the savage understands better
 than the civilized man how to judge    
distances1 to determine a direction1 to 
retrace by memory the often complicated 
plan of the road he has traveled1 and so
 to return in a straight line to his    
starting-point4#ha ,if the animal does  
not deduce explicitly1 if he does not   
form explicit concepts1 neither does he 
form the idea of a homogeneous space4   
,you cannot present this space to       
yourself without introducing1 in the    
same act1 a virtual geometry which will1
 of itself1 degrade itself into logic4  
,all the repugnance that philosophers   
manifest towards this manner of         
regarding things comes from this1 that  
the logical work of the intellect       
represents to their eyes a positive     

spiritual effort4 ,but1 if we understand
 by spirituality a progress to ever new 
creations1 to conclusions               
incommensurable with the premisses and  
indeterminable by relation to them1 we  
must say of an idea that moves among    
relations of necessary determination1   
through premisses which contain their   
conclusion in advance1 that it follows  
the inverse direction1 that of          
materiality4 ,what appears1 from the    
point of view of the intellect1 as an   
effort1 is in itself a letting go4 ,and 
while1 from the point of view of the    
intellect1 there is a petitio principii 
in making geometry arise automatically  
from space1 and logic from geometry--on 
the contrary1 if space is the ultimate  
goal of the mind's movement of          
detension1 space cannot be given without
 positing also logic and geometry1 which
 are along the course of the movement of
 which pure spatial intuition is the    
goal4  ,it has not been enough noticed  
how feeble is the reach of deduction in 

the psychological and moral sciences4   
,from a proposition verified by facts1  
verifiable consequences can here be     
drawn only up to a certain point1 only  
in a certain measure4 ,very soon appeal 
has to be made to common sense1 that is 
to say1 to the continuous experience of 
the real1 in order to inflect the       
consequences deduced and bend them along
 the sinuosities of life4 ,deduction    
succeeds in things moral only           
metaphorically1 so to speak1 and just in
 the measure in which the moral is      
transposable into the physical1 ,i      
should say translatable into spatial    
symbols4 ,the metaphor never goes very  
far1 any more than a curve can long be  
confused with its tangent4 ,must we not 
be struck by this feebleness of         
deduction as something very strange and 
even paradoxical8 ,here is a pure       
operation of the mind1 accomplished     
solely by the power of the mind4 ,it    
seems that1 if anywhere it should feel  
at home and evolve at ease1 it would be 

among the things of the mind1 in the    
domain of the mind4 ,not at all2 it is  
there that it is immediately at the end 
of its tether4 ,on the contrary1 in     
geometry1 in astronomy1 in physics1     
where we have to do with things external
 to us1 deduction is all-powerful6      
,observation and experience are         
undoubtedly necessary in these sciences 
to arrive at the principle1 that is1 to 
discover the aspect under which things  
must be regarded2 but1 strictly         
speaking1 we might1 by good luck1 have  
hit upon it at once2 and1 as soon as we 
possess this principle1 we may draw from
 it1 at any length1 consequences which  
experience will always verify4 ,must we 
not conclude1 therefore1 that deduction 
is an operation governed by the         
properties of matter1 molded on the     
mobile articulations of matter1         
implicitly given1 in fact1 with the     
space that underlies matter8 ,as long as
 it turns upon space or spatialized     
time1 it has only to let itself go4 ,it 

is duration that puts spokes in its     
wheels4         99       99       99    
99       99  ,deduction1 then1 does not 
work unless there be spatial intuition  
behind it4 ,but we may say the same of  
induction4 ,it is not necessary indeed  
to think geometrically1 nor even to     
think at all1 in order to expect from   
the same conditions a repetition of the 
same fact4 ,the consciousness of the    
animal already does this work1 and      
indeed1 independently of all            
consciousness1 the living body itself is
 so constructed that it can extract from
 the successive situations in which it  
finds itself the similarities which     
interest it1 and so respond to the      
stimuli by appropriate reactions4 ,but  
it is a far cry from a mechanical       
expectation and reaction of the body1 to
 induction properly so called1 which is 
an intellectual operation4 ,induction   
rests on the belief that there are      
causes and effects1 and that the same   
effects follow the same causes4 ,now1 if

 we examine this double belief1 this is 
what we find4 ,it implies1 in the first 
place1 that reality is decomposable into
 groups1 which can be practically       
regarded as isolated and independent4   
,if ,i boil water in a kettle on a      
stove1 the operation and the objects    
that support it are1 in reality1 bound  
up with a multitude of other objects and
 a multitude of other operations2 in the
 end1 ,i should find that our entire    
solar system is concerned in what is    
being done at this particular point of  
space4 ,but1 in a certain measure1 and  
for the special end ,i am pursuing1 ,i  
may admit that things happen as if the  
group water-kettle-stove were an        
independent microcosm4 ,that is my first
 affirmation4 ,now1 when ,i say that    
this microcosm will always behave in the
 same way1 that the heat will           
necessarily1 at the end of a certain    
time1 cause the boiling of the water1 ,i
 admit that it is sufficient that a     
certain number of elements of the system

 be given in order that the system      
should be complete2 it completes itself 
automatically1 ,i am not free to        
complete it in thought as ,i please4    
,the stove1 the kettle and the water    
being given1 with a certain interval of 
duration1 it seems to me that the       
boiling1 which experience showed me     
yesterday to be the only thing wanting  
to complete the system1 will complete it
 to-morrow1 no matter when to-morrow may
 be4 ,what is there at the base of this 
belief8 ,notice that the belief is more 
or less assured1 according as the case  
may be1 but that it is forced upon the  
mind as an absolute necessity when the  
microcosm considered contains only      
magnitudes4 ,if two numbers be given1 ,i
 am not free to choose their difference4
 ,if two sides of a triangle and the    
contained angle are given1 the third    
side arises of itself and the triangle  
completes itself automatically4 ,i can1 
it matters not where and it matters not 
when1 trace the same two sides          

containing the same angle3 it is evident
 that the new triangles so formed can be
 superposed on the first1 and that      
consequently the same third side will   
come to complete the system4 ,now1 if my
 certitude is perfect in the case in    
which ,i reason on pure space           
determinations1 must ,i not suppose     
that1 in the other cases1 the certitude 
is greater the nearer it approaches this
 extreme case8 ,indeed1 may it not be   
the limiting case which is seen through 
all the others and which colors them1   
accordingly as they are more or less    
transparent1 with a more or less        
pronounced tinge of geometrical         
necessity8#hb ,in fact1 when ,i say that
 the water on the fire will boil to-day 
as it did yesterday1 and that this is an
 absolute necessity1 ,i feel vaguely    
that my imagination is placing the stove
 of yesterday on that of to-day1 kettle 
on kettle1 water on water1 duration on  
duration1 and it seems then that the    
rest must coincide also1 for the same   

reason that1 when two triangles are     
superposed and two of their sides       
coincide1 their third sides coincide    
also4 ,but my imagination acts thus only
 because it shuts its eyes to two       
essential points4 ,for the system of    
to-day actually to be superimposed on   
that of yesterday1 the latter must have 
waited for the former1 time must have   
halted1 and everything become           
simultaneous3 that happens in geometry1 
but in geometry alone4 ,induction       
therefore implies first that1 in the    
world of the physicist as in that of the
 geometrician1 time does not count4 ,but
 it implies also that qualities can be  
superposed on each other like           
magnitudes4 ,if1 in imagination1 ,i     
place the stove and fire of to-day on   
that of yesterday1 ,i find indeed that  
the form has remained the same2 it      
suffices1 for that1 that the surfaces   
and edges coincide2 but what is the     
coincidence of two qualities1 and how   
can they be superposed one on another in

 order to ensure that they are          
identical8 ,yet ,i extend to the second 
order of reality all that applies to the
 first4 ,the physicist legitimates this 
operation later on by reducing1 as far  
as possible1 differences of quality to  
differences of magnitude2 but1 prior to 
all science1 ,i incline to liken        
qualities to quantities1 as if ,i       
perceived behind the qualities1 as      
through a transparency1 a geometrical   
mechanism4#hc ,the more complete this   
transparency1 the more it seems to me   
that in the same conditions there must  
be a repetition of the same fact4 ,our  
inductions are certain1 to our eyes1 in 
the exact degree in which we make the   
qualitative differences melt into the   
homogeneity of the space which subtends 
them1 so that geometry is the ideal     
limit of our inductions as well as of   
our deductions4 ,the movement at the end
 of which is spatiality lays down along 
its course the faculty of induction as  
well as that of deduction1 in fact1     

intellectuality entire4         99      
99       99       99       99  ,it      
creates them in the mind4 ,but it       
creates also1 in things1 the order which
 our induction1 aided by deduction1     
finds there4 ,this order1 on which our  
action leans and in which our intellect 
recognizes itself1 seems to us          
marvelous4 ,not only do the same general
 causes always produce the same general 
effects1 but beneath the visible causes 
and effects our science discovers an    
infinity of infinitesimal changes which 
work more and more exactly into one     
another1 the further we push the        
analysis3 so much so that1 at the end of
 this analysis1 matter becomes1 it seems
 to us1 geometry itself4 ,certainly1 the
 intellect is right in admiring here the
 growing order in the growing           
complexity2 both the one and the other  
must have a positive reality for it1    
since it looks upon itself as positive4 
,but things change their aspect when we 
consider the whole of reality as an     

undivided advance forward to successive 
creations4 ,it seems to us1 then1 that  
the complexity of the material elements 
and the mathematical order that binds   
them together must arise automatically  
when within the whole a partial         
interruption or inversion is produced4  
,moreover1 as the intellect itself is   
cut out of mind by a process of the same
 kind1 it is attuned to this order and  
complexity1 and admires them because it 
recognizes itself in them4 ,but what is 
admirable in itself1 what really        
deserves to provoke wonder1 is the      
ever-renewed creation which reality1    
whole and undivided1 accomplishes in    
advancing2 for no complication of the   
mathematical order with itself1 however 
elaborate we may suppose it1 can        
introduce an atom of novelty into the   
world1 whereas this power of creation   
once given 7and it exists1 for we are   
conscious of it in ourselves1 at least  
when we act freely7 has only to be      
diverted from itself to relax its       

tension1 only to relax its tension to   
extend1 only to extend for the          
mathematical order of the elements so   
distinguished and the inflexible        
determinism connecting them to manifest 
the interruption of the creative act3 in
 fact1 inflexible determinism and       
mathematical order are one with this    
very interruption4  ,it is this merely  
negative tendency that the particular   
laws of the physical world express4     
,none of them1 taken separately1 has    
objective reality2 each is the work of  
an investigator who has regarded things 
from a certain bias1 isolated certain   
variables1 applied certain conventional 
units of measurement4 ,and yet there is 
an order approximately mathematical     
immanent in matter1 an objective order1 
which our science approaches in         
proportion to its progress4 ,for if     
matter is a relaxation of the           
inextensive into the extensive and1     
thereby1 of liberty into necessity1 it  
does not indeed wholly coincide with    

pure homogeneous space1 yet is          
constituted by the movement which leads 
to space1 and is therefore on the way to
 geometry4 ,it is true that laws of     
mathematical form will never apply to it
 completely4 ,for that1 it would have to
 be pure space and step out of duration4
  ,we cannot insist too strongly that   
there is something artificial in the    
mathematical form of a physical law1 and
 consequently in our scientific         
knowledge of things4#hd ,our standards  
of measurement are conventional1 and1 so
 to say1 foreign to the intentions of   
nature3 can we suppose that nature has  
related all the modalities of heat to   
the expansion of the same mass of       
mercury1 or to the change of pressure of
 the same mass of air kept at a constant
 volume8 ,but we may go further4 ,in a  
general way1 measuring is a wholly human
 operation1 which implies that we really
 or ideally superpose two objects one on
 another a certain number of times4     
,nature did not dream of this           

superposition4 ,it does not measure1 nor
 does it count4 ,yet physics counts1    
measures1 relates quantitative          
variations to one another to obtain     
laws1 and it succeeds4 ,its success     
would be inexplicable1 if the movement  
which constitutes materiality were not  
the same movement which1 prolonged by us
 to its end1 that is to say1 to         
homogeneous space1 results in making us 
count1 measure1 follow in their         
respective variations terms that are    
functions one of another4 ,to effect    
this prolongation of the movement1 our  
intellect has only to let itself go1 for
 it runs naturally to space and         
mathematics1 intellectuality and        
materiality being of the same nature and
 having been produced in the same way4  
,if the mathematical order were a       
positive thing1 if there were1 immanent 
in matter1 laws comparable to those of  
our codes1 the success of our science   
would have in it something of the       
miraculous4 ,what chances should we have

 indeed of finding the standard of      
nature and of isolating exactly1 in     
order to determine their reciprocal     
relations1 the very variables which     
nature has chosen8 ,but the success of a
 science of mathematical form would be  
no less incomprehensible1 if matter did 
not already possess everything necessary
 to adapt itself to our formulae4 ,one  
hypothesis only1 therefore1 remains     
plausible1 namely1 that the mathematical
 order is nothing positive1 that it is  
the form toward which a certain         
interruption tends of itself1 and that  
materiality consists precisely in an    
interruption of this kind4 ,we shall    
understand then why our science is      
contingent1 relative to the variables it
 has chosen1 relative to the order in   
which it has successively put the       
problems1 and why nevertheless it       
succeeds4 ,it might have been1 as a     
whole1 altogether different1 and yet    
have succeeded4 ,this is so1 just       
because there is no definite system of  

mathematical laws1 at the base of       
nature1 and because mathematics in      
general represents simply the side to   
which matter inclines4 ,put one of those
 little cork dolls with leaden feet in  
any posture1 lay it on its back1 turn it
 up on its head1 throw it into the air3 
it will always stand itself up again1   
automatically4 ,so likewise with matter3
 we can take it by any end and handle it
 in any way1 it will always fall back   
into some one of our mathematical       
formulae1 because it is weighted with   
geometry4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,but the philosopher will  
perhaps refuse to found a theory of     
knowledge on such considerations4 ,they 
will be repugnant to him1 because the   
mathematical order1 being order1 will   
appear to him to contain something      
positive4 ,it is in vain that we assert 
that this order produces itself         
automatically by the interruption of the
 inverse order1 that it is this very    
interruption4 ,the idea persists1 none  

the less1 that there might be no order  
at all1 and that the mathematical order 
of things1 being a conquest over        
disorder1 possesses a positive reality4 
,in examining this point1 we shall see  
what a prominent part the idea of       
disorder plays in problems relative to  
the theory of knowledge4 ,it does not   
appear explicitly1 and that is why it   
escapes our attention4 ,it is1 however1 
with the criticism of this idea that a  
theory of knowledge ought to begin1 for 
if the great problem is to know why and 
how reality submits itself to an order1 
it is because the absence of every kind 
of order appears possible or            
conceivable4 ,it is this absence of     
order that realists and idealists alike 
believe they are thinking of--the       
realist when he speaks of the regularity
 that objective laws actually impose on 
a virtual disorder of nature1 the       
idealist when he supposes a sensuous    
manifold which is cordinated 7and       
consequently itself without order7 under

 the organizing influence of our        
understanding4 ,the idea of disorder1 in
 the sense of absence of order1 is then 
what must be analyzed first4 ,philosophy
 borrows it from daily life4 ,and it is 
unquestionable that1 when ordinarily we 
speak of disorder1 we are thinking of   
something4 ,but of what8  ,it will be   
seen in the next chapter how hard it is 
to determine the content of a negative  
idea1 and what illusions one is liable  
to1 what hopeless difficulties          
philosophy falls into1 for not having   
undertaken this task4 ,difficulties and 
illusions are generally due to this1    
that we accept as final a manner of     
expression essentially provisional4     
,they are due to our bringing into the  
domain of speculation a procedure made  
for practice4 ,if ,i choose a volume in 
my library at random1 ,i may put it back
 on the shelf after glancing at it and  
say1 ,this is not verse4 ,is this what  
,i have really seen in turning over the 
leaves of the book8 ,obviously not4 ,i  

have not seen1 ,i never shall see1 an   
absence of verse4 ,i have seen prose4   
,but as it is poetry ,i want1 ,i express
 what ,i find as a function of what ,i  
am looking for1 and instead of saying1  
,this is prose1 ,i say1 ,this is not    
verse4 ,in the same way1 if the fancy   
takes me to read prose1 and ,i happen on
 a volume of verse1 ,i shall say1 ,this 
is not prose1 thus expressing the data  
of my perception1 which shows me verse1 
in the language of my expectation and   
attention1 which are fixed on the idea  
of prose and will hear of nothing else4 
,now1 if ,mons4 ,jourdain heard me1 he  
would infer1 no doubt1 from my two      
exclamations that prose and poetry are  
two forms of language reserved for      
books1 and that these learned forms have
 come and overlaid a language which was 
neither prose nor verse4 ,speaking of   
this thing which is neither verse nor   
prose1 he would suppose1 moreover1 that 
he was thinking of it3 it would be only 
a pseudo-idea1 however4 ,let us go      

further still3 the pseudo-idea would    
create a pseudo-problem1 if ,m4         
,jourdain were to ask his professor of  
philosophy how the prose form and the   
poetry form have been superadded to that
 which possessed neither the one nor the
 other1 and if he wished the professor  
to construct a theory of the imposition 
of these two forms upon this formless   
matter4 ,his question would be absurd1  
and the absurdity would lie in this1    
that he was hypostasizing as the        
substratum of prose and poetry the      
simultaneous negation of both1          
forgetting that the negation of the one 
consists in the affirmation of the      
other4  ,now1 suppose that there are two
 species of order1 and that these two   
orders are two contraries within one and
 the same genus4 ,suppose also that the 
idea of disorder arises in our mind     
whenever1 seeking one of the two kinds  
of order1 we find the other4 ,the idea  
of disorder would then have a clear     
meaning in the current practice of life3

 it would objectify1 for the convenience
 of language1 the disappointment of a   
mind that finds before it an order      
different from what it wants1 an order  
with which it is not concerned at the   
moment1 and which1 in this sense1 does  
not exist for it4 ,but the idea would   
not admit a theoretical use4 ,so if we  
claim1 notwithstanding1 to introduce it 
into philosophy1 we shall inevitably    
lose sight of its true meaning4 ,it     
denotes the absence of a certain order1 
but to the profit of another 7with which
 we are not concerned72 only1 as it     
applies to each of the two in turn1 and 
as it even goes and comes continually   
between the two1 we take it on the way1 
or rather on the wing1 like a           
shuttlecock between two battledores1 and
 treat it as if it represented1 not the 
absence of the one or other order as the
 case may be1 but the absence of both   
together--a thing that is neither       
perceived nor conceived1 a simple verbal
 entity4 ,so there arises the problem   

how order is imposed on disorder1 form  
on matter4 ,in analyzing the idea of    
disorder thus subtilized1 we shall see  
that it represents nothing at all1 and  
at the same time the problems that have 
been raised around it will vanish4  ,it 
is true that we must begin by           
distinguishing1 and even by opposing one
 to the other1 two kinds of order which 
we generally confuse4 ,as this confusion
 has created the principal difficulties 
of the problem of knowledge1 it will not
 be useless to dwell once more on the   
marks by which the two orders are       
distinguished4  ,in a general way1      
reality is ordered exactly to the degree
 in which it satisfies our thought4     
,order is therefore a certain agreement 
between subject and object4 ,it is the  
mind finding itself again in things4    
,but the mind1 we said1 can go in two   
opposite ways4 ,sometimes it follows its
 natural direction3 there is then       
progress in the form of tension1        
continuous creation1 free activity4     

,sometimes it inverts it1 and this      
inversion1 pushed to the end1 leads to  
extension1 to the necessary reciprocal  
determination of elements externalized  
each by relation to the others1 in      
short1 to geometrical mechanism4 ,now1  
whether experience seems to us to adopt 
the first direction or whether it is    
drawn in the direction of the second1 in
 both cases we say there is order1 for  
in the two processes the mind finds     
itself again4 ,the confusion between    
them is therefore natural4 ,to escape   
it1 different names would have to be    
given to the two kinds of order1 and    
that is not easy1 because of the variety
 and variability of the forms they take4
 ,the order of the second kind may be   
defined as geometry1 which is its       
extreme limit2 more generally1 it is    
that kind of order that is concerned    
whenever a relation of necessary        
determination is found between causes   
and effects4 ,it evokes ideas of        
inertia1 of passivity1 of automatism4   

,as to the first kind of order1 it      
oscillates no doubt around finality2 and
 yet we cannot define it as finality1   
for it is sometimes above1 sometimes    
below4 ,in its highest forms1 it is more
 than finality1 for of a free action or 
a work of art we may say that they show 
a perfect order1 and yet they can only  
be expressed in terms of ideas          
approximately1 and after the event4     
,life in its entirety1 regarded as a    
creative evolution1 is something        
analogous2 it transcends finality1 if we
 understand by finality the realization 
of an idea conceived or conceivable in  
advance4 ,the category of finality is   
therefore too narrow for life in its    
entirety4 ,it is1 on the other hand1    
often too wide for a particular         
manifestation of life taken separately4 
,be that as it may1 it is with the vital
 that we have here to do1 and the whole 
present study strives to prove that the 
vital is in the direction of the        
voluntary4 ,we may say then that this   

first kind of order is that of the vital
 or of the willed1 in opposition to the 
second1 which is that of the inert and  
the automatic4 ,common sense            
instinctively distinguishes between the 
two kinds of order1 at least in the     
extreme cases2 instinctively1 also1 it  
brings them together4 ,we say of        
astronomical phenomena that they        
manifest an admirable order1 meaning by 
this that they can be foreseen          
mathematically4 ,and we find an order no
 less admirable in a symphony of        
,beethoven1 which is genius1            
originality1 and therefore              
unforeseeability itself4  ,but it is    
exceptional for order of the first kind 
to take so distinct a form4 ,ordinarily1
 it presents features that we have every
 interest in confusing with those of the
 opposite order4 ,it is quite certain1  
for instance1 that if we could view the 
evolution of life in its entirety1 the  
spontaneity of its movement and the     
unforeseeability of its procedures would

 thrust themselves on our attention4    
,but what we meet in our daily          
experience is a certain determinate     
living being1 certain special           
manifestations of life1 which repeat1   
almost1 forms and facts already known2  
indeed1 the similarity of structure that
 we find everywhere between what        
generates and what is generated--a      
similarity that enables us to include   
any number of living individuals in the 
same group--is to our eyes the very type
 of the generic3 the inorganic genera   
seem to us to take living genera as     
models4 ,thus the vital order1 such as  
it is offered to us piecemeal in        
experience1 presents the same character 
and performs the same function as the   
physical order3 both cause experience to
 repeat itself1 both enable our mind to 
generalize4 ,in reality1 this character 
has entirely different origins in the   
two cases1 and even opposite meanings4  
,in the second case1 the type of this   
character1 its ideal limit1 as also its 

foundation1 is the geometrical necessity
 in virtue of which the same components 
give the same resultant4 ,in the first  
case1 this character involves1 on the   
contrary1 the intervention of something 
which manages to obtain the same total  
effect although the infinitely complex  
elementary causes may be quite          
different4 ,we insisted on this last    
point in our first chapter1 when we     
showed how identical structures are to  
be met with on independent lines of     
evolution4 ,but1 without looking so far1
 we may presume that the reproduction   
only of the type of the ancestor by his 
descendants is an entirely different    
thing from the repetition of the same   
composition of forces which yields an   
identical resultant4 ,when we think of  
the infinity of infinitesimal elements  
and of infinitesimal causes that concur 
in the genesis of a living being1 when  
we reflect that the absence or the      
deviation of one of them would spoil    
everything1 the first impulse of the    

mind is to consider this army of little 
workers as watched over by a skilled    
foreman1 the vital principle1 which is  
ever repairing faults1 correcting       
effects of neglect or absentmindedness1 
putting things back in place3 this is   
how we try to express the difference    
between the physical and the vital      
order1 the former making the same       
combination of causes give the same     
combined effect1 the latter securing the
 constancy of the effect even when there
 is some wavering in the causes4 ,but   
that is only a comparison2 on           
reflection1 we find that there can be no
 foreman1 for the very simple reason    
that there are no workers4 ,the causes  
and elements that physico-chemical      
analysis discovers are real causes and  
elements1 no doubt1 as far as the facts 
of organic destruction are concerned2   
they are then limited in number4 ,but   
vital phenomena1 properly so called1 or 
facts of organic creation open up to us1
 when we analyze them1 the perspective  

of an analysis passing away to infinity3
 whence it may be inferred that the     
manifold causes and elements are here   
only views of the mind1 attempting an   
ever closer and closer imitation of the 
operation of nature1 while the operation
 imitated is an indivisible act4 ,the   
likeness between individuals of the same
 species has thus an entirely different 
meaning1 an entirely different origin1  
to that of the likeness between complex 
effects obtained by the same composition
 of the same causes4 ,but in the one    
case as in the other1 there is likeness1
 and consequently possible              
generalization4 ,and as that is all that
 interests us in practice1 since our    
daily life is and must be an expectation
 of the same things and the same        
situations1 it is natural that this     
common character1 essential from the    
point of view of our action1 should     
bring the two orders together1 in spite 
of a merely internal diversity between  
them which interests speculation only4  

,hence the idea of a general order of   
nature1 everywhere the same1 hovering   
over life and over matter alike4 ,hence 
our habit of designating by the same    
word and representing in the same way   
the existence of laws in the domain of  
inert matter and that of genera in the  
domain of life4  ,now1 it will be found 
that this confusion is the origin of    
most of the difficulties raised by the  
problem of knowledge1 among the ancients
 as well as among the moderns4 ,the     
generality of laws and that of genera   
having been designated by the same word 
and subsumed under the same idea1 the   
geometrical order and the vital order   
are accordingly confused together4      
,according to the point of view1 the    
generality of laws is explained by that 
of genera1 or that of genera by that of 
laws4 ,the first view is characteristic 
of ancient thought2 the second belongs  
to modern philosophy4 ,but in both      
ancient and modern philosophy the idea  
of generality is an equivocal idea1     

uniting in its denotation and in its    
connotation incompatible objects and    
elements4 ,in both there are grouped    
under the same concept two kinds of     
order which are alike only in the       
facility they give to our action on     
things4 ,we bring together the two terms
 in virtue of a quite external likeness1
 which justifies no doubt their         
designation by the same word for        
practice1 but which does not authorize  
us at all1 in the speculative domain1 to
 confuse them in the same definition4   
,the ancients1 indeed1 did not ask why  
nature submits to laws1 but why it is   
ordered according to genera4 ,the idea  
of genus corresponds more especially to 
an objective reality in the domain of   
life1 where it expresses an             
unquestionable fact1 heredity4 ,indeed1 
there can only be genera where there are
 individual objects2 now1 while the     
organized being is cut out from the     
general mass of matter by his very      
organization1 that is to say naturally1 

it is our perception which cuts inert   
matter into distinct bodies4 ,it is     
guided in this by the interests of      
action1 by the nascent reactions that   
our body indicates--that is1 as we have 
shown elsewhere1#he by the potential    
genera that are trying to gain          
existence4 ,in this1 then1 genera and   
individuals determine one another by a  
semi-artificial operation entirely      
relative to our future action on things4
 ,nevertheless the ancients did not     
hesitate to put all genera in the same  
rank1 to attribute the same absolute    
existence to all of them4 ,reality thus 
being a system of genera1 it is to the  
generality of the genera 7that is1 in   
effect1 to the generality expressive of 
the vital order7 that the generality of 
laws itself had to be brought4 ,it is   
interesting1 in this respect1 to compare
 the ,aristotelian theory of the fall of
 bodies with the explanation furnished  
by ,galileo4 ,aristotle is concerned    
solely with the concepts high and low1  

own proper place as distinguished from  
place occupied1 natural movement and    
forced movement2#hf the physical law in 
virtue of which the stone falls         
expresses for him that the stone regains
 the natural place of all stones1 to    
wit1 the earth4 ,the stone1 in his view1
 is not quite stone so long as it is not
 in its normal place2 in falling back   
into this place it aims at completing   
itself1 like a living being that grows1 
thus realizing fully the essence of the 
genus stone4#hg ,if this conception of  
the physical law were exact1 the law    
would no longer be a mere relation      
established by the mind2 the subdivision
 of matter into bodies would no longer  
be relative to our faculty of           
perceiving2 all bodies would have the   
same individuality as living bodies1 and
 the laws of the physical universe would
 express relations of real kinship      
between real genera4 ,we know what kind 
of physics grew out of this1 and how1   
for having believed in a science unique 

and final1 embracing the totality of the
 real and at one with the absolute1 the 
ancients were confined1 in fact1 to a   
more or less clumsy interpretation of   
the physical in terms of the vital4     
,but there is the same confusion in the 
moderns1 with this difference1 however1 
that the relation between the two terms 
is inverted3 laws are no longer reduced 
to genera1 but genera to laws2 and      
science1 still supposed to be uniquely  
one1 becomes altogether relative1       
instead of being1 as the ancients       
wished1 altogether at one with the      
absolute4 ,a noteworthy fact is the     
eclipse of the problem of genera in     
modern philosophy4 ,our theory of       
knowledge turns almost entirely on the  
question of laws3 genera are left to    
make shift with laws as best they can4  
,the reason is1 that modern philosophy  
has its point of departure in the great 
astronomical and physical discoveries of
 modern times4 ,the laws of ,kepler and 
of ,galileo have remained for it the    

ideal and unique type of all knowledge4 
,now1 a law is a relation between things
 or between facts4 ,more precisely1 a   
law of mathematical form expresses the  
fact that a certain magnitude is a      
function of one or several other        
variables appropriately chosen4 ,now1   
the choice of the variable magnitudes1  
the distribution of nature into objects 
and into facts1 has already something of
 the contingent and the conventional4   
,but1 admitting that the choice is      
hinted at1 if not prescribed1 by        
experience1 the law remains none the    
less a relation1 and a relation is      
essentially a comparison2 it has        
objective reality only for an           
intelligence that represents to itself  
several terms at the same time4 ,this   
intelligence may be neither mine nor    
yours3 a science which bears on laws may
 therefore be an objective science1     
which experience contains in advance and
 which we simply make it disgorge2 but  
it is none the less true that a         

comparison of some kind must be effected
 here1 impersonally if not by any one in
 particular1 and that an experience made
 of laws1 that is1 of terms related to  
other terms1 is an experience made of   
comparisons1 which1 before we receive   
it1 has already had to pass through an  
atmosphere of intellectuality4 ,the idea
 of a science and of an experience      
entirely relative to the human          
understanding was therefore implicitly  
contained in the conception of a science
 one and integral1 composed of laws3    
,kant only brought it to light4 ,but    
this conception is the result of an     
arbitrary confusion between the         
generality of laws and that of genera4  
,though an intelligence be necessary to 
condition terms by relation to each     
other1 we may conceive that in certain  
cases the terms themselves may exist    
independently4 ,and if1 beside relations
 of term to term1 experience also       
presents to us independent terms1 the   
living genera being something quite     

different from systems of laws1 one     
half1 at least1 of our knowledge bears  
on the thing-in-itself1 the very        
reality4 ,this knowledge may be very    
difficult1 just because it no longer    
builds up its own object and is obliged1
 on the contrary1 to submit to it2 but1 
however little it cuts into its object1 
it is into the absolute itself that it  
bites4 ,we may go further3 the other    
half of knowledge is no longer so       
radically1 so definitely relative as    
certain philosophers say1 if we can     
establish that it bears on a reality of 
inverse order1 a reality which we always
 express in mathematical laws1 that is  
to say in relations that imply          
comparisons1 but which lends itself to  
this work only because it is weighted   
with spatiality and consequently with   
geometry4 ,be that as it may1 it is the 
confusion of two kinds of order that    
lies behind the relativism of the       
moderns1 as it lay behind the dogmatism 
of the ancients4  ,we have said enough  

to mark the origin of this confusion4   
,it is due to the fact that the vital   
order1 which is essentially creation1 is
 manifested to us less in its essence   
than in some of its accidents1 those    
which imitate the physical and          
geometrical order2 like it1 they present
 to us repetitions that make            
generalization possible1 and in that we 
have all that interests us4 ,there is no
 doubt that life as a whole is an       
evolution1 that is1 an unceasing        
transformation4 ,but life can progress  
only by means of the living1 which are  
its depositaries4 ,innumerable living   
beings1 almost alike1 have to repeat    
each other in space and in time for the 
novelty they are working out to grow and
 mature4 ,it is like a book that        
advances towards a new edition by going 
through thousands of reprints with      
thousands of copies4 ,there is1 however1
 this difference between the two cases1 
that the successive impressions are     
identical1 as well as the simultaneous  

copies of the same impression1 whereas  
representatives of one and the same     
species are never entirely the same1    
either in different points of space or  
at different moments of time4 ,heredity 
does not only transmit characters2 it   
transmits also the impetus in virtue of 
which the characters are modified1 and  
this impetus is vitality itself4 ,that  
is why we say that the repetition which 
serves as the base of our               
generalizations is essential in the     
physical order1 accidental in the vital 
order4 ,the physical order is automatic2
 the vital order is1 ,i will not say    
voluntary1 but analogous to the order   
willed4  ,now1 as soon as we have       
clearly distinguished between the order 
that is willed and the order that is    
automatic1 the ambiguity that underlies 
the idea of disorder is dissipated1 and1
 with it1 one of the principal          
difficulties of the problem of          
knowledge4  ,the main problem of the    
theory of knowledge is to know how      

science is possible1 that is to say1 in 
effect1 why there is order and not      
disorder in things4 ,that order exists  
is a fact4 ,but1 on the other hand1     
disorder1 which appears to us to be less
 than order1 is1 it seems1 of right4    
,the existence of order is then a       
mystery to be cleared up1 at any rate a 
problem to be solved4 ,more simply1 when
 we undertake to found order1 we regard 
it as contingent1 if not in things1 at  
least as viewed by the mind3 of a thing 
that we do not judge to be contingent we
 do not require an explanation4 ,if     
order did not appear to us as a conquest
 over something1 or as an addition to   
something 7which something is thought to
 be the absence of order71 ancient      
realism would not have spoken of a      
matter to which the ,idea superadded    
itself1 nor would modern idealism have  
supposed a sensuous manifold that the   
understanding organizes into nature4    
,now1 it is unquestionable that all     
order is contingent1 and conceived as   

such4 ,but contingent in relation to    
what8  ,the reply1 to our thinking1 is  
not doubtful4 ,an order is contingent1  
and seems so1 in relation to the inverse
 order1 as verse is contingent in       
relation to prose and prose in relation 
to verse4 ,but1 just as all speech which
 is not prose is verse and necessarily  
conceived as verse1 just as all speech  
which is not verse is prose and         
necessarily conceived as prose1 so any  
state of things that is not one of the  
two orders is the other and is          
necessarily conceived as the other4 ,but
 it may happen that we do not realize   
what we are actually thinking of1 and   
perceive the idea really present to our 
mind only through a mist of affective   
states4 ,any one can be convinced of    
this by considering the use we make of  
the idea of disorder in daily life4     
,when ,i enter a room and pronounce it  
to be in disorder1 what do ,i mean8 ,the
 position of each object is explained by
 the automatic movements of the person  

who has slept in the room1 or by the    
efficient causes1 whatever they may be1 
that have caused each article of        
furniture1 clothing1 etc41 to be where  
it is3 the order1 in the second sense of
 the word1 is perfect4 ,but it is order 
of the first kind that ,i am expecting1 
the order that a methodical person      
consciously puts into his life1 the     
willed order and not the automatic3 so  
,i call the absence of this order       
disorder4 ,at bottom1 all there is that 
is real1 perceived and even conceived1  
in this absence of one of the two kinds 
of order1 is the presence of the other4 
,but the second is indifferent to me1 ,i
 am interested only in the first1 and ,i
 express the presence of the second as a
 function of the first1 instead of      
expressing it1 so to speak1 as a        
function of itself1 by saying it is     
disorder4 ,inversely1 when we affirm    
that we are imagining a chaos1 that is  
to say a state of things in which the   
physical world no longer obeys laws1    

what are we thinking of8 ,we imagine    
facts that appear and disappear         
capriciously4 ,first we think of the    
physical universe as we know it1 with   
effects and causes well proportioned to 
each other2 then1 by a series of        
arbitrary decrees1 we augment1 diminish1
 suppress1 so as to obtain what we call 
disorder4 ,in reality we have           
substituted will for the mechanism of   
nature2 we have replaced the automatic  
order by a multitude of elementary      
wills1 just to the extent that we       
imagine the apparition or vanishing of  
phenomena4 ,no doubt1 for all these     
little wills to constitute a willed     
order1 they must have accepted the      
direction of a higher will4 ,but1 on    
looking closely at them1 we see that    
that is just what they do3 our own will 
is there1 which objectifies itself in   
each of these capricious wills in turn1 
and takes good care not to connect the  
same with the same1 nor to permit the   
effect to be proportional to the        

cause--in fact makes one simple         
intention hover over the whole of the   
elementary volitions4 ,thus1 here again1
 the absence of one of the two orders   
consists in the presence of the other4  
,in analyzing the idea of chance1 which 
is closely akin to the idea of disorder1
 we find the same elements4 ,when the   
wholly mechanical play of the causes    
which stop the wheel on a number makes  
me win1 and consequently acts like a    
good genius1 careful of my interests1 or
 when the wholly mechanical force of the
 wind tears a tile off the roof and     
throws it on to my head1 that is to say 
acts like a bad genius1 conspiring      
against my person3 in both cases ,i find
 a mechanism where ,i should have looked
 for1 where1 indeed1 it seems as if ,i  
ought to have found1 an intention4 ,that
 is what ,i express in speaking of      
chance4 ,and of an anarchical world1 in 
which phenomena succeed each other      
capriciously1 ,i should say again that  
it is a realm of chance1 meaning that ,i

 find before me wills1 or rather        
decrees1 when what ,i am expecting is   
mechanism4 ,thus is explained the       
singular vacillation of the mind when it
 tries to define chance4 ,neither       
efficient cause nor final cause can     
furnish the definition sought4 ,the mind
 swings to and fro1 unable to rest1     
between the idea of an absence of final 
cause and that of an absence of         
efficient cause1 each of these          
definitions sending it back to the      
other4 ,the problem remains insoluble1  
in fact1 so long as the idea of chance  
is regarded as a pure idea1 without     
mixture of feeling4 ,but1 in reality1   
chance merely objectifies the state of  
mind of one who1 expecting one of the   
two kinds of order1 finds himself       
confronted with the other4 ,chance and  
disorder are therefore necessarily      
conceived as relative4 ,so if we wish to
 represent them to ourselves as         
absolute1 we perceive that we are going 
to and fro like a shuttle between the   

two kinds of order1 passing into the one
 just at the moment at which we might   
catch ourself in the other1 and that the
 supposed absence of all order is really
 the presence of both1 with1 besides1   
the swaying of a mind that cannot rest  
finally in either4 ,neither in things   
nor in our idea of things can there be  
any question of presenting this disorder
 as the substratum of order1 since it   
implies the two kinds of order and is   
made of their combination4  ,but our    
intelligence is not stopped by this4 ,by
 a simple sic jubeo it posits a disorder
 which is an absence of order4 ,in so   
doing it thinks a word or a set of      
words1 nothing more4 ,if it seeks to    
attach an idea to the word1 it finds    
that disorder may indeed be the negation
 of order1 but that this negation is    
then the implicit affirmation of the    
presence of the opposite order1 which we
 shut our eyes to because it does not   
interest us1 or which we evade by       
denying the second order in its         

turn--that is1 at bottom1 by            
re-establishing the first4 ,how can we  
speak1 then1 of an incoherent diversity 
which an understanding organizes8 ,it is
 no use for us to say that no one       
supposes this incoherence to be realized
 or realizable3 when we speak of it1 we 
believe we are thinking of it2 now1 in  
analyzing the idea actually present1 we 
find1 as we said before1 only the       
disappointment of the mind confronted   
with an order that does not interest it1
 or a swaying of the mind between two   
kinds of order1 or1 finally1 the idea   
pure and simple of the empty word that  
we have created by joining a negative   
prefix to a word which itself signifies 
something4 ,but it is this analysis that
 we neglect to make4 ,we omit it1       
precisely because it does not occur to  
us to distinguish two kinds of order    
that are irreducible to one another4    
,we said1 indeed1 that all order        
necessarily appears as contingent4 ,if  
there are two kinds of order1 this      

contingency of order is explained3 one  
of the forms is contingent in relation  
to the other4 ,where ,i find the        
geometrical order1 the vital was        
possible2 where the order is vital1 it  
might have been geometrical4 ,but       
suppose that the order is everywhere of 
the same kind1 and simply admits of     
degrees which go from the geometrical to
 the vital3 if a determinate order still
 appears to me to be contingent1 and can
 no longer be so by relation to an order
 of another kind1 ,i shall necessarily  
believe that the order is contingent by 
relation to an absence of itself1 that  
is to say by relation to a state of     
things in which there is no order at    
all4 ,and this state of things ,i shall 
believe that ,i am thinking of1 because 
it is implied1 it seems1 in the very    
contingency of order1 which is an       
unquestionable fact4 ,i shall therefore 
place at the summit of the hierarchy the
 vital order2 then1 as a diminution or  
lower complication of it1 the           

geometrical order2 and finally1 at the  
bottom of all1 an absence of order1     
incoherence itself1 on which order is   
superposed4 ,this is why incoherence has
 the effect on me of a word behind which
 there must be something real1 if not in
 things1 at least in thought4 ,but if ,i
 observe that the state of things       
implied by the contingency of a         
determinate order is simply the presence
 of the contrary order1 and if by this  
very fact ,i posit two kinds of order1  
each the inverse of the other1 ,i       
perceive that no intermediate degrees   
can be imagined between the two orders1 
and that there is no going down from the
 two orders to the incoherent4 ,either  
the incoherent is only a word1 devoid of
 meaning1 or1 if ,i give it a meaning1  
it is on condition of putting           
incoherence midway between the two      
orders1 and not below both of them4     
,there is not first the incoherent1 then
 the geometrical1 then the vital2 there 
is only the geometrical and the vital1  

and then1 by a swaying of the mind      
between them1 the idea of the           
incoherent4 ,to speak of an uncordinated
 diversity to which order is superadded 
is therefore to commit a veritable      
petitio principii2 for in imagining the 
uncordinated we really posit an order1  
or rather two4         99       99      
99       99       99  ,this long        
analysis was necessary to show how the  
real can pass from tension to extension 
and from freedom to mechanical necessity
 by way of inversion4 ,it was not enough
 to prove that this relation between the
 two terms is suggested to us1 at once1 
by consciousness and by sensible        
experience4 ,it was necessary to prove  
that the geometrical order has no need  
of explanation1 being purely and simply 
the suppression of the inverse order4   
,and1 for that1 it was indispensable to 
prove that suppression is always a      
substitution and is even necessarily    
conceived as such3 it is the            
requirements of practical life alone    

that suggest to us here a way of        
speaking that deceives us both as to    
what happens in things and as to what is
 present to our thought4 ,we must now   
examine more closely the inversion whose
 consequences we have just described4   
,what1 then1 is the principle that has  
only to let go its tension--may we say  
to detend--in order to extend1 the      
interruption of the cause here being    
equivalent to a reversal of the effect8 
,for want of a better word we have      
called it consciousness4 ,but we do not 
mean the narrowed consciousness that    
functions in each of us4 ,our own       
consciousness is the consciousness of a 
certain living being1 placed in a       
certain point of space2 and though it   
does indeed move in the same direction  
as its principle1 it is continually     
drawn the opposite way1 obliged1 though 
it goes forward1 to look behind4 ,this  
retrospective vision is1 as we have     
shown1 the natural function of the      
intellect1 and consequently of distinct 

consciousness4 ,in order that our       
consciousness shall coincide with       
something of its principle1 it must     
detach itself from the already-made and 
attach itself to the being-made4 ,it    
needs that1 turning back on itself and  
twisting on itself1 the faculty of      
seeing should be made to be one with the
 act of willing--a painful effort which 
we can make suddenly1 doing violence to 
our nature1 but cannot sustain more than
 a few moments4 ,in free action1 when we
 contract our whole being in order to   
thrust it forward1 we have the more or  
less clear consciousness of motives and 
of impelling forces1 and even1 at rare  
moments1 of the becoming by which they  
are organized into an act3 but the pure 
willing1 the current that runs through  
this matter1 communicating life to it1  
is a thing which we hardly feel1 which  
at most we brush lightly as it passes4  
,let us try1 however1 to instal         
ourselves within it1 if only for a      
moment2 even then it is an individual   

and fragmentary will that we grasp4 ,to 
get to the principle of all life1 as    
also of all materiality1 we must go     
further still4 ,is it impossible8 ,no1  
by no means2 the history of philosophy  
is there to bear witness4 ,there is no  
durable system that is not1 at least in 
some of its parts1 vivified by          
intuition4 ,dialectic is necessary to   
put intuition to the proof1 necessary   
also in order that intuition should     
break itself up into concepts and so be 
propagated to other men2 but all it     
does1 often enough1 is to develop the   
result of that intuition which          
transcends it4 ,the truth is1 the two   
procedures are of opposite direction3   
the same effort1 by which ideas are     
connected with ideas1 causes the        
intuition which the ideas were storing  
up to vanish4 ,the philosopher is       
obliged to abandon intuition1 once he   
has received from it the impetus1 and to
 rely on himself to carry on the        
movement by pushing the concepts one    

after another4 ,but he soon feels he has
 lost foothold2 he must come into touch 
with intuition again2 he must undo most 
of what he has done4 ,in short1         
dialectic is what ensures the agreement 
of our thought with itself4 ,but by     
dialectic--which is only a relaxation of
 intuition--many different agreements   
are possible1 while there is only one   
truth4 ,intuition1 if it could be       
prolonged beyond a few instants1 would  
not only make the philosopher agree with
 his own thought1 but also all          
philosophers with each other4 ,such as  
it is1 fugitive and incomplete1 it is1  
in each system1 what is worth more than 
the system and survives it4 ,the object 
of philosophy would be reached if this  
intuition could be sustained1           
generalized and1 above all1 assured of  
external points of reference in order   
not to go astray4 ,to that end a        
continual coming and going is necessary 
between nature and mind4  ,when we put  
back our being into our will1 and our   

will itself into the impulsion it       
prolongs1 we understand1 we feel1 that  
reality is a perpetual growth1 a        
creation pursued without end4 ,our will 
already performs this miracle4 ,every   
human work in which there is invention1 
every voluntary act in which there is   
freedom1 every movement of an organism  
that manifests spontaneity1 brings      
something new into the world4 ,true1    
these are only creations of form4 ,how  
could they be anything else8 ,we are not
 the vital current itself2 we are this  
current already loaded with matter1 that
 is1 with congealed parts of its own    
substance which it carries along its    
course4 ,in the composition of a work of
 genius1 as in a simple free decision1  
we do1 indeed1 stretch the spring of our
 activity to the utmost and thus create 
what no mere assemblage of materials    
could have given 7what assemblage of    
curves already known can ever be        
equivalent to the pencil-stroke of a    
great artist87 but there are1 none the  

less1 elements here that pre-exist and  
survive their organization4 ,but if a   
simple arrest of the action that        
generates form could constitute matter  
7are not the original lines drawn by the
 artist themselves already the fixation 
and1 as it were1 congealment of a       
movement871 a creation of matter would  
be neither incomprehensible nor         
inadmissible4 ,for we seize from within1
 we live at every instant1 a creation of
 form1 and it is just in those cases in 
which the form is pure1 and in which the
 creative current is momentarily        
interrupted1 that there is a creation of
 matter4 ,consider the letters of the   
alphabet that enter into the composition
 of everything that has ever been       
written3 we do not conceive that new    
letters spring up and come to join      
themselves to the others in order to    
make a new poem4 ,but that the poet     
creates the poem and that human thought 
is thereby made richer1 we understand   
very well3 this creation is a simple act

 of the mind1 and action has only to    
make a pause1 instead of continuing into
 a new creation1 in order that1 of      
itself1 it may break up into words which
 dissociate themselves into letters     
which are added to all the letters there
 are already in the world4 ,thus1 that  
the number of atoms composing the       
material universe at a given moment     
should increase runs counter to our     
habits of mind1 contradicts the whole of
 our experience2 but that a reality of  
quite another order1 which contrasts    
with the atom as the thought of the poet
 with the letters of the alphabet1      
should increase by sudden additions1 is 
not inadmissible2 and the reverse of    
each addition might indeed be a world1  
which we then represent to ourselves1   
symbolically1 as an assemblage of atoms4
  ,the mystery that spreads over the    
existence of the universe comes in great
 part from this1 that we want the       
genesis of it to have been accomplished 
at one stroke or the whole of matter to 

be eternal4 ,whether we speak of        
creation or posit an uncreated matter1  
it is the totality of the universe that 
we are considering at once4 ,at the root
 of this habit of mind lies the         
prejudice which we will analyze in our  
next chapter1 the idea1 common to       
materialists and to their opponents1    
that there is no really acting duration1
 and that the absolute--matter or       
mind--can have no place in concrete     
time1 in the time which we feel to be   
the very stuff of our life4 ,from which 
it follows that everything is given once
 for all1 and that it is necessary to   
posit from all eternity either material 
multiplicity itself1 or the act creating
 this multiplicity1 given in block in   
the divine essence4 ,once this prejudice
 is eradicated1 the idea of creation    
becomes more clear1 for it is merged in 
that of growth4 ,but it is no longer    
then of the universe in its totality    
that we must speak4  ,why should we     
speak of it8 ,the universe is an        

assemblage of solar systems which we    
have every reason to believe analogous  
to our own4 ,no doubt they are not      
absolutely independent of one another4  
,our sun radiates heat and light beyond 
the farthest planet1 and1 on the other  
hand1 our entire solar system is moving 
in a definite direction as if it were   
drawn4 ,there is1 then1 a bond between  
the worlds4 ,but this bond may be       
regarded as infinitely loose in         
comparison with the mutual dependence   
which unites the parts of the same world
 among themselves2 so that it is not    
artificially1 for reasons of mere       
convenience1 that we isolate our solar  
system3 nature itself invites us to     
isolate it4 ,as living beings1 we depend
 on the planet on which we are1 and on  
the sun that provides for it1 but on    
nothing else4 ,as thinking beings1 we   
may apply the laws of our physics to our
 own world1 and extend them to each of  
the worlds taken separately2 but nothing
 tells us that they apply to the entire 

universe1 nor even that such an         
affirmation has any meaning2 for the    
universe is not made1 but is being made 
continually4 ,it is growing1 perhaps    
indefinitely1 by the addition of new    
worlds4  ,let us extend1 then1 to the   
whole of our solar system the two most  
general laws of our science1 the        
principle of conservation of energy and 
that of its degradation--limiting them1 
however1 to this relatively closed      
system and to other systems relatively  
closed4 ,let us see what will follow4   
,we must remark1 first of all1 that     
these two principles have not the same  
metaphysical scope4 ,the first is a     
quantitative law1 and consequently      
relative1 in part1 to our methods of    
measurement4 ,it says that1 in a system 
presumed to be closed1 the total energy1
 that is to say the sum of its kinetic  
and potential energy1 remains constant4 
,now1 if there were only kinetic energy 
in the world1 or even if there were1    
besides kinetic energy1 only one single 

kind of potential energy1 but no more1  
the artifice of measurement would not   
make the law artificial4 ,the law of the
 conservation of energy would express   
indeed that something is preserved in   
constant quantity4 ,but there are1 in   
fact1 energies of various kinds1#hh and 
the measurement of each of them has     
evidently been so chosen as to justify  
the principle of conservation of energy4
 ,convention1 therefore1 plays a large  
part in this principle1 although there  
is undoubtedly1 between the variations  
of the different energies composing one 
and the same system1 a mutual dependence
 which is just what has made the        
extension of the principle possible by  
measurements suitably chosen4 ,if1      
therefore1 the philosopher applies this 
principle to the solar system complete1 
he must at least soften its outlines4   
,the law of the conservation of energy  
cannot here express the objective       
permanence of a certain quantity of a   
certain thing1 but rather the necessity 

for every change that is brought about  
to be counterbalanced in some way by a  
change in an opposite direction4 ,that  
is to say1 even if it governs the whole 
of our solar system1 the law of the     
conservation of energy is concerned with
 the relationship of a fragment of this 
world to another fragment rather than   
with the nature of the whole4  ,it is   
otherwise with the second principle of  
thermodynamics4 ,the law of the         
degradation of energy does not bear     
essentially on magnitudes4 ,no doubt the
 first idea of it arose1 in the thought 
of ,carnot1 out of certain quantitative 
considerations on the yield of thermic  
machines4 ,unquestionably1 too1 the     
terms in which ,clausius generalized it 
were mathematical1 and a calculable     
magnitude1 entropy1 was1 in fact1 the   
final conception to which he was led4   
,such precision is necessary for        
practical applications4 ,but the law    
might have been vaguely conceived1 and1 
if absolutely necessary1 it might have  

been roughly formulated1 even though no 
one had ever thought of measuring the   
different energies of the physical      
world1 even though the concept of energy
 had not been created4 ,essentially1 it 
expresses the fact that all physical    
changes have a tendency to be degraded  
into heat1 and that heat tends to be    
distributed among bodies in a uniform   
manner4 ,in this less precise form1 it  
becomes independent of any convention2  
it is the most metaphysical of the laws 
of physics since it points out without  
interposed symbols1 without artificial  
devices of measurements1 the direction  
in which the world is going4 ,it tells  
us that changes that are visible and    
heterogeneous will be more and more     
diluted into changes that are invisible 
and homogeneous1 and that the           
instability to which we owe the richness
 and variety of the changes taking place
 in our solar system will gradually give
 way to the relative stability of       
elementary vibrations continually and   

perpetually repeated4 ,just so with a   
man who keeps up his strength as he     
grows old1 but spends it less and less  
in actions1 and comes1 in the end1 to   
employ it entirely in making his lungs  
breathe and his heart beat4  ,from this 
point of view1 a world like our solar   
system is seen to be ever exhausting    
something of the mutability it contains4
 ,in the beginning1 it had the maximum  
of possible utilization of energy3 this 
mutability has gone on diminishing      
unceasingly4 ,whence does it come8 ,we  
might at first suppose that it has come 
from some other point of space1 but the 
difficulty is only set back1 and for    
this external source of mutability the  
same question springs up4 ,true1 it     
might be added that the number of worlds
 capable of passing mutability to each  
other is unlimited1 that the sum of     
mutability contained in the universe is 
infinite1 that there is therefore no    
ground on which to seek its origin or to
 foresee its end4 ,a hypothesis of this 

kind is as irrefutable as it is         
indemonstrable2 but to speak of an      
infinite universe is to admit a perfect 
coincidence of matter with abstract     
space1 and consequently an absolute     
externality of all the parts of matter  
in relation to one another4 ,we have    
seen above what we must think of this   
theory1 and how difficult it is to      
reconcile with the idea of a reciprocal 
influence of all the parts of matter on 
one another1 an influence to which      
indeed it itself makes appeal4 ,again it
 might be supposed that the general     
instability has arisen from a general   
state of stability2 that the period in  
which we now are1 and in which the      
utilizable energy is diminishing1 has   
been preceded by a period in which the  
mutability was increasing1 and that the 
alternations of increase and diminution 
succeed each other for ever4 ,this      
hypothesis is theoretically conceivable1
 as has been demonstrated quite         
recently2 but1 according to the         

calculations of ,boltzmann1 the         
mathematical improbability of it passes 
all imagination and practically amounts 
to absolute impossibility4#hi ,in       
reality1 the problem remains insoluble  
as long as we keep on the ground of     
physics1 for the physicist is obliged to
 attach energy to extended particles1   
and1 even if he regards the particles   
only as reservoirs of energy1 he remains
 in space3 he would belie his rle if he 
sought the origin of these energies in  
an extra-spatial process4 ,it is there1 
however1 in our opinion1 that it must be
 sought4  ,is it extension in general   
that we are considering in abstracto8   
,extension1 we said1 appears only as a  
tension which is interrupted4 ,or1 are  
we considering the concrete reality that
 fills this extension8 ,the order which 
reigns there1 and which is manifested by
 the laws of nature1 is an order which  
must be born of itself when the inverse 
order is suppressed2 a detension of the 
will would produce precisely this       

suppression4 ,lastly1 we find that the  
direction1 which this reality takes1    
suggests to us the idea of a thing      
unmaking itself2 such1 no doubt1 is one 
of the essential characters of          
materiality4 ,what conclusion are we to 
draw from all this1 if not that the     
process by which this thing makes itself
 is directed in a contrary way to that  
of physical processes1 and that it is   
therefore1 by its very definition1      
immaterial8 ,the vision we have of the  
material world is that of a weight which
 falls3 no image drawn from matter1     
properly so called1 will ever give us   
the idea of the weight rising4 ,but this
 conclusion will come home to us with   
still greater force if we press nearer  
to the concrete reality1 and if we      
consider1 no longer only matter in      
general1 but1 within this matter1 living
 bodies4  ,all our analyses show us1 in 
life1 an effort to remount the incline  
that matter descends4 ,in that1 they    
reveal to us the possibility1 the       

necessity even of a process the inverse 
of materiality1 creative of matter by   
its interruption alone4 ,the life that  
evolves on the surface of our planet is 
indeed attached to matter4 ,if it were  
pure consciousness1 a fortiori if it    
were supra-consciousness1 it would be   
pure creative activity4 ,in fact1 it is 
riveted to an organism that subjects it 
to the general laws of inert matter4    
,but everything happens as if it were   
doing its utmost to set itself free from
 these laws4 ,it has not the power to   
reverse the direction of physical       
changes1 such as the principle of       
,carnot determines it4 ,it does1        
however1 behave absolutely as a force   
would behave which1 left to itself1     
would work in the inverse direction4    
,incapable of stopping the course of    
material changes downwards1 it succeeds 
in retarding it4 ,the evolution of life 
really continues1 as we have shown1 an  
initial impulsion3 this impulsion1 which
 has determined the development of the  

chlorophyllian function in the plant and
 of the sensori-motor system in the     
animal1 brings life to more and more    
efficient acts by the fabrication and   
use of more and more powerful           
explosives4 ,now1 what do these         
explosives represent if not a storing-up
 of the solar energy1 the degradation of
 which energy is thus provisionally     
suspended on some of the points where it
 was being poured forth8 ,the usable    
energy which the explosive conceals will
 be expended1 of course1 at the moment  
of the explosion2 but it would have been
 expended sooner if an organism had not 
happened to be there to arrest its      
dissipation1 in order to retain it and  
save it up4 ,as we see it to-day1 at the
 point to which it was brought by a     
scission of the mutually complementary  
tendencies which it contained within    
itself1 life is entirely dependent on   
the chlorophyllian function of the      
plant4 ,this means that1 looked at in   
its initial impulsion1 before any       

scission1 life was a tendency to        
accumulate in a reservoir1 as do        
especially the green parts of           
vegetables1 with a view to an           
instantaneous effective discharge1 like 
that which an animal brings about1      
something that would have otherwise     
flowed away4 ,it is like an effort to   
raise the weight which falls4 ,true1 it 
succeeds only in retarding the fall4    
,but at least it can give us an idea of 
what the raising of the weight was4#ij  
,let us imagine a vessel full of steam  
at a high pressure1 and here and there  
in its sides a crack through which the  
steam is escaping in a jet4 ,the steam  
thrown into the air is nearly all       
condensed into little drops which fall  
back1 and this condensation and this    
fall represent simply the loss of       
something1 an interruption1 a deficit4  
,but a small part of the jet of steam   
subsists1 uncondensed1 for some seconds2
 it is making an effort to raise the    
drops which are falling2 it succeeds at 

most in retarding their fall4 ,so1 from 
an immense reservoir of life1 jets must 
be gushing out unceasingly1 of which    
each1 falling back1 is a world4 ,the    
evolution of living species within this 
world represents what subsists of the   
primitive direction of the original jet1
 and of an impulsion which continues    
itself in a direction the inverse of    
materiality4 ,but let us not carry too  
far this comparison4 ,it gives us but a 
feeble and even deceptive image of      
reality1 for the crack1 the jet of      
steam1 the forming of the drops1 are    
determined necessarily1 whereas the     
creation of a world is a free act1 and  
the life within the material world      
participates in this liberty4 ,let us   
think rather of an action like that of  
raising the arm2 then let us suppose    
that the arm1 left to itself1 falls     
back1 and yet that there subsists in it1
 striving to raise it up again1         
something of the will that animates it4 
,in this image of a creative action     

which unmakes itself we have already a  
more exact representation of matter4 ,in
 vital activity we see1 then1 that which
 subsists of the direct movement in the 
inverted movement1 a reality which is   
making itself in a reality which is     
unmaking itself4  ,everything is obscure
 in the idea of creation if we think of 
things which are created and a thing    
which creates1 as we habitually do1 as  
the understanding cannot help doing4 ,we
 shall show the origin of this illusion 
in our next chapter4 ,it is natural to  
our intellect1 whose function is        
essentially practical1 made to present  
to us things and states rather than     
changes and acts4 ,but things and states
 are only views1 taken by our mind1 of  
becoming4 ,there are no things1 there   
are only actions4 ,more particularly1 if
 ,i consider the world in which we live1
 ,i find that the automatic and strictly
 determined evolution of this well-knit 
whole is action which is unmaking       
itself1 and that the unforeseen forms   

which life cuts out in it1 forms capable
 of being themselves prolonged into     
unforeseen movements1 represent the     
action that is making itself4 ,now1 ,i  
have every reason to believe that the   
other worlds are analogous to ours1 that
 things happen there in the same way4   
,and ,i know they were not all          
constructed at the same time1 since     
observation shows me1 even to-day1      
nebulae in course of concentration4     
,now1 if the same kind of action is     
going on everywhere1 whether it is that 
which is unmaking itself or whether it  
is that which is striving to remake     
itself1 ,i simply express this probable 
similitude when ,i speak of a centre    
from which worlds shoot out like rockets
 in a fireworks display--provided1      
however1 that ,i do not present this    
centre as a thing1 but as a continuity  
of shooting out4 ,god thus defined1 has 
nothing of the already made2 ,he is     
unceasing life1 action1 freedom4        
,creation1 so conceived1 is not a       

mystery2 we experience it in ourselves  
when we act freely4 ,that new things can
 join things already existing is absurd1
 no doubt1 since the thing results from 
a solidification performed by our       
understanding1 and there are never any  
things other than those that the        
understanding has thus constituted4 ,to 
speak of things creating themselves     
would therefore amount to saying that   
the understanding presents to itself    
more than it presents to itself--a      
self-contradictory affirmation1 an empty
 and vain idea4 ,but that action        
increases as it goes on1 that it creates
 in the measure of its advance1 is what 
each of us finds when he watches himself
 act4 ,things are constituted by the    
instantaneous cut which the             
understanding practices1 at a given     
moment1 on a flux of this kind1 and what
 is mysterious when we compare the cuts 
together becomes clear when we relate   
them to the flux4 ,indeed1 the          
modalities of creative action1 in so far

 as it is still going on in the         
organization of living forms1 are much  
simplified when they are taken in this  
way4 ,before the complexity of an       
organism and the practically infinite   
multitude of interwoven analyses and    
syntheses it presupposes1 our           
understanding recoils disconcerted4     
,that the simple play of physical and   
chemical forces1 left to themselves1    
should have worked this marvel1 we find 
hard to believe4 ,and if it is a        
profound science which is at work1 how  
are we to understand the influence      
exercised on this matter without form by
 this form without matter8 ,but the     
difficulty arises from this1 that we    
represent statically ready-made material
 particles juxtaposed to one another1   
and1 also statically1 an external cause 
which plasters upon them a skilfully    
contrived organization4 ,in reality1    
life is a movement1 materiality is the  
inverse movement1 and each of these two 
movements is simple1 the matter which   

forms a world being an undivided flux1  
and undivided also the life that runs   
through it1 cutting out in it living    
beings all along its track4 ,of these   
two currents the second runs counter to 
the first1 but the first obtains1 all   
the same1 something from the second4    
,there results between them a modus     
vivendi1 which is organization4 ,this   
organization takes1 for our senses and  
for our intellect1 the form of parts    
entirely external to other parts in     
space and in time4 ,not only do we shut 
our eyes to the unity of the impulse    
which1 passing through generations1     
links individuals with individuals1     
species with species1 and makes of the  
whole series of the living one single   
immense wave flowing over matter1 but   
each individual itself seems to us as an
 aggregate1 aggregate of molecules and  
aggregate of facts4 ,the reason of this 
lies in the structure of our intellect1 
which is formed to act on matter from   
without1 and which succeeds by making1  

in the flux of the real1 instantaneous  
cuts1 each of which becomes1 in its     
fixity1 endlessly decomposable4         
,perceiving1 in an organism1 only parts 
external to parts1 the understanding has
 the choice between two systems of      
explanation only3 either to regard the  
infinitely complex 7and thereby         
infinitely well-contrived7 organization 
as a fortuitous concatenation of atoms1 
or to relate it to the incomprehensible 
influence of an external force that has 
grouped its elements together4 ,but this
 complexity is the work of the          
understanding2 this incomprehensibility 
is also its work4 ,let us try to see1 no
 longer with the eyes of the intellect  
alone1 which grasps only the already    
made and which looks from the outside1  
but with the spirit1 ,i mean with that  
faculty of seeing which is immanent in  
the faculty of acting and which springs 
up1 somehow1 by the twisting of the will
 on itself1 when action is turned into  
knowledge1 like heat1 so to say1 into   

light4 ,to movement1 then1 everything   
will be restored1 and into movement     
everything will be resolved4 ,where the 
understanding1 working on the image     
supposed to be fixed of the progressing 
action1 shows us parts infinitely       
manifold and an order infinitely well   
contrived1 we catch a glimpse of a      
simple process1 an action which is      
making itself across an action of the   
same kind which is unmaking itself1 like
 the fiery path torn by the last rocket 
of a fireworks display through the black
 cinders of the spent rockets that are  
falling dead4         99       99       
99       99       99  ,from this point  
of view1 the general considerations we  
have presented concerning the evolution 
of life will be cleared up and          
completed4 ,we will distinguish more    
sharply what is accidental from what is 
essential in this evolution4  ,the      
impetus of life1 of which we are        
speaking1 consists in a need of         
creation4 ,it cannot create absolutely1 

because it is confronted with matter1   
that is to say with the movement that is
 the inverse of its own4 ,but it seizes 
upon this matter1 which is necessity    
itself1 and strives to introduce into it
 the largest possible amount of         
indetermination and liberty4 ,how does  
it go to work8  ,an animal high in the  
scale may be represented in a general   
way1 we said1 as a sensori-motor nervous
 system imposed on digestive1           
respiratory1 circulatory systems1 etc4  
,the function of these latter is to     
cleanse1 repair and protect the nervous 
system1 to make it as independent as    
possible of external circumstances1 but1
 above all1 to furnish it with energy to
 be expended in movements4 ,the         
increasing complexity of the organism is
 therefore due theoretically 7in spite  
of innumerable exceptions due to        
accidents of evolution7 to the necessity
 of complexity in the nervous system4   
,no doubt1 each complication of any part
 of the organism involves many others in

 addition1 because this part itself must
 live1 and every change in one point of 
the body reverberates1 as it were1      
throughout4 ,the complication may       
therefore go on to infinity in all      
directions2 but it is the complication  
of the nervous system which conditions  
the others in right1 if not always in   
fact4 ,now1 in what does the progress of
 the nervous system itself consist8 ,in 
a simultaneous development of automatic 
activity and of voluntary activity1 the 
first furnishing the second with an     
appropriate instrument4 ,thus1 in an    
organism such as ours1 a considerable   
number of motor mechanisms are set up in
 the medulla and in the spinal cord1    
awaiting only a signal to release the   
corresponding act3 the will is employed1
 in some cases1 in setting up the       
mechanism itself1 and in the others in  
choosing the mechanisms to be released1 
the manner of combining them and the    
moment of releasing them4 ,the will of  
an animal is the more effective and the 

more intense1 the greater the number of 
the mechanisms it can choose from1 the  
more complicated the switchboard on     
which all the motor paths cross1 or1 in 
other words1 the more developed its     
brain4 ,thus1 the progress of the       
nervous system assures to the act       
increasing precision1 increasing        
variety1 increasing efficiency and      
independence4 ,the organism behaves more
 and more like a machine for action1    
which reconstructs itself entirely for  
every new act1 as if it were made of    
india-rubber and could1 at any moment1  
change the shape of all its parts4 ,but1
 prior to the nervous system1 prior even
 to the organism properly so called1    
already in the undifferentiated mass of 
the amoeba1 this essential property of  
animal life is found4 ,the amoeba       
deforms itself in varying directions2   
its entire mass does what the           
differentiation of parts will localize  
in a sensori-motor system in the        
developed animal4 ,doing it only in a   

rudimentary manner1 it is dispensed from
 the complexity of the higher organisms2
 there is no need here of the auxiliary 
elements that pass on to motor elements 
the energy to expend2 the animal moves  
as a whole1 and1 as a whole also1       
procures energy by means of the organic 
substances it assimilates4 ,thus1       
whether low or high in the animal scale1
 we always find that animal life        
consists 7#a7 in procuring a provision  
of energy2 7#b7 in expending it1 by     
means of a matter as supple as possible1
 in directions variable and unforeseen4 
,now1 whence comes the energy8 ,from the
 ingested food1 for food is a kind of   
explosive1 which needs only the spark to
 discharge the energy it stores4 ,who   
has made this explosive8 ,the food may  
be the flesh of an animal nourished on  
animals and so on2 but1 in the end it is
 to the vegetable we always come back4  
,vegetables alone gather in the solar   
energy1 and the animals do but borrow it
 from them1 either directly or by some  

passing it on to others4 ,how then has  
the plant stored up this energy8        
,chiefly by the chlorophyllian function1
 a chemicism sui generis of which we do 
not possess the key1 and which is       
probably unlike that of our             
laboratories4 ,the process consists in  
using solar energy to fix the carbon of 
carbonic acid1 and thereby to store this
 energy as we should store that of a    
water-carrier by employing him to fill  
an elevated reservoir3 the water1 once  
brought up1 can set in motion a mill or 
a turbine1 as we will and when we will4 
,each atom of carbon fixed represents   
something like the elevation of the     
weight of water1 or like the stretching 
of an elastic thread uniting the carbon 
to the oxygen in the carbonic acid4 ,the
 elastic is relaxed1 the weight falls   
back again1 in short the energy held in 
reserve is restored1 when1 by a simple  
release1 the carbon is permitted to     
rejoin its oxygen4  ,so that all life1  
animal and vegetable1 seems in its      

essence like an effort to accumulate    
energy and then to let it flow into     
flexible channels1 changeable in shape1 
at the end of which it will accomplish  
infinitely varied kinds of work4 ,that  
is what the vital impetus1 passing      
through matter1 would fain do all at    
once4 ,it would succeed1 no doubt1 if   
its power were unlimited1 or if some    
reinforcement could come to it from     
without4 ,but the impetus is finite1 and
 it has been given once for all4 ,it    
cannot overcome all obstacles4 ,the     
movement it starts is sometimes turned  
aside1 sometimes divided1 always        
opposed2 and the evolution of the       
organized world is the unrolling of this
 conflict4 ,the first great scission    
that had to be effected was that of the 
two kingdoms1 vegetable and animal1     
which thus happen to be mutually        
complementary1 without1 however1 any    
agreement having been made between them4
 ,it is not for the animal that the     
plant accumulates energy1 it is for its 

own consumption2 but its expenditure on 
itself is less discontinuous1 and less  
concentrated1 and therefore less        
efficacious1 than was required by the   
initial impetus of life1 essentially    
directed toward free actions3 the same  
organism could not with equal force     
sustain the two functions at once1 of   
gradual storage and sudden use4 ,of     
themselves1 therefore1 and without any  
external intervention1 simply by the    
effect of the duality of the tendency   
involved in the original impetus and of 
the resistance opposed by matter to this
 impetus1 the organisms leaned some in  
the first direction1 others in the      
second4 ,to this scission there         
succeeded many others4 ,hence the       
diverging lines of evolution1 at least  
what is essential in them4 ,but we must 
take into account retrogressions1       
arrests1 accidents of every kind4 ,and  
we must remember1 above all1 that each  
species behaves as if the general       
movement of life stopped at it instead  

of passing through it4 ,it thinks only  
of itself1 it lives only for itself4    
,hence the numberless struggles that we 
behold in nature4 ,hence a discord1     
striking and terrible1 but for which the
 original principle of life must not be 
held responsible4  ,the part played by  
contingency in evolution is therefore   
great4 ,contingent1 generally1 are the  
forms adopted1 or rather invented4      
,contingent1 relative to the obstacles  
encountered in a given place and at a   
given moment1 is the dissociation of the
 primordial tendency into such and such 
complementary tendencies which create   
divergent lines of evolution4           
,contingent the arrests and set-backs2  
contingent1 in large measure1 the       
adaptations4 ,two things only are       
necessary3 7#a7 a gradual accumulation  
of energy2 7#b7 an elastic canalization 
of this energy in variable and          
indeterminable directions1 at the end of
 which are free acts4  ,this twofold    
result has been obtained in a particular

 way on our planet4 ,but it might have  
been obtained by entirely different     
means4 ,it was not necessary that life  
should fix its choice mainly upon the   
carbon of carbonic acid4 ,what was      
essential for it was to store solar     
energy2 but1 instead of asking the sun  
to separate1 for instance1 atoms of     
oxygen and carbon1 it might             
7theoretically at least1 and1 apart from
 practical difficulties possibly        
insurmountable7 have put forth other    
chemical elements1 which would then have
 had to be associated or dissociated by 
entirely different physical means4 ,and 
if the element characteristic of the    
substances that supply energy to the    
organism had been other than carbon1 the
 element characteristic of the plastic  
substances would probably have been     
other than nitrogen1 and the chemistry  
of living bodies would then have been   
radically different from what it is4    
,the result would have been living forms
 without any analogy to those we know1  

whose anatomy would have been different1
 whose physiology also would have been  
different4 ,alone1 the sensori-motor    
function would have been preserved1 if  
not in its mechanism1 at least in its   
effects4 ,it is therefore probable that 
life goes on in other planets1 in other 
solar systems also1 under forms of which
 we have no idea1 in physical conditions
 to which it seems to us1 from the point
 of view of our physiology1 to be       
absolutely opposed4 ,if its essential   
aim is to catch up usable energy in     
order to expend it in explosive actions1
 it probably chooses1 in each solar     
system and on each planet1 as it does on
 the earth1 the fittest means to get    
this result in the circumstances with   
which it is confronted4 ,that is at     
least what reasoning by analogy leads   
to1 and we use analogy the wrong way    
when we declare life to be impossible   
wherever the circumstances with which it
 is confronted are other than those on  
the earth4 ,the truth is that life is   

possible wherever energy descends the   
incline indicated by ,carnot's law and  
where a cause of inverse direction can  
retard the descent--that is to say1     
probably1 in all the worlds suspended   
from all the stars4 ,we go further3 it  
is not even necessary that life should  
be concentrated and determined in       
organisms properly so called1 that is1  
in definite bodies presenting to the    
flow of energy ready-made though elastic
 canals4 ,it can be conceived 7although 
it can hardly be imagined7 that energy  
might be saved up1 and then expended on 
varying lines running across a matter   
not yet solidified4 ,every essential of 
life would still be there1 since there  
would still be slow accumulation of     
energy and sudden release4 ,there would 
hardly be more difference between this  
vitality1 vague and formless1 and the   
definite vitality we know1 than there   
is1 in our psychical life1 between the  
state of dream and the state of waking4 
,such may have been the condition of    

life in our nebula before the           
condensation of matter was complete1 if 
it be true that life springs forward at 
the very moment when1 as the effect of  
an inverse movement1 the nebular matter 
appears4  ,it is therefore conceivable  
that life might have assumed a totally  
different outward appearance and        
designed forms very different from those
 we know4 ,with another chemical        
substratum1 in other physical           
conditions1 the impulsion would have    
remained the same1 but it would have    
split up very differently in course of  
progress2 and the whole would have      
traveled another road--whether shorter  
or longer who can tell8 ,in any case1 in
 the entire series of living beings no  
term would have been what it now is4    
,now1 was it necessary that there should
 be a series1 or terms8 ,why should not 
the unique impetus have been impressed  
on a unique body1 which might have gone 
on evolving8  ,this question arises1 no 
doubt1 from the comparison of life to an

 impetus4 ,and it must be compared to an
 impetus1 because no image borrowed from
 the physical world can give more nearly
 the idea of it4 ,but it is only an     
image4 ,in reality1 life is of the      
psychological order1 and it is of the   
essence of the psychical to enfold a    
confused plurality of interpenetrating  
terms4 ,in space1 and in space only1 is 
distinct multiplicity possible3 a point 
is absolutely external to another point4
 ,but pure and empty unity1 also1 is met
 with only in space2 it is that of a    
mathematical point4 ,abstract unity and 
abstract multiplicity are determinations
 of space or categories of the          
understanding1 whichever we will1       
spatiality and intellectuality being    
molded on each other4 ,but what is of   
psychical nature cannot entirely        
correspond with space1 nor enter        
perfectly into the categories of the    
understanding4 ,is my own person1 at a  
given moment1 one or manifold8 ,if ,i   
declare it one1 inner voices arise and  

protest--those of the sensations1       
feelings1 ideas1 among which my         
individuality is distributed4 ,but1 if  
,i make it distinctly manifold1 my      
consciousness rebels quite as strongly2 
it affirms that my sensations1 my       
feelings1 my thoughts are abstractions  
which ,i effect on myself1 and that each
 of my states implies all the others4 ,i
 am then 7we must adopt the language of 
the understanding1 since only the       
understanding has a language7 a unity   
that is multiple and a multiplicity that
 is one2#ia but unity and multiplicity  
are only views of my personality taken  
by an understanding that directs its    
categories at me2 ,i enter neither into 
one nor into the other nor into both at 
once1 although both1 united1 may give a 
fair imitation of the mutual            
interpenetration and continuity that ,i 
find at the base of my own self4 ,such  
is my inner life1 and such also is life 
in general4 ,while1 in its contact with 
matter1 life is comparable to an        

impulsion or an impetus1 regarded in    
itself it is an immensity of            
potentiality1 a mutual encroachment of  
thousands and thousands of tendencies   
which nevertheless are thousands and    
thousands only when once regarded as    
outside of each other1 that is1 when    
spatialized4 ,contact with matter is    
what determines this dissociation4      
,matter divides actually what was but   
potentially manifold2 and1 in this      
sense1 individuation is in part the work
 of matter1 in part the result of life's
 own inclination4 ,thus1 a poetic       
sentiment1 which bursts into distinct   
verses1 lines and words1 may be said to 
have already contained this multiplicity
 of individuated elements1 and yet1 in  
fact1 it is the materiality of language 
that creates it4  ,but through the      
words1 lines and verses runs the simple 
inspiration which is the whole poem4    
,so1 among the dissociated individuals1 
one life goes on moving3 everywhere the 
tendency to individualize is opposed and

 at the same time completed by an       
antagonistic and complementary tendency 
to associate1 as if the manifold unity  
of life1 drawn in the direction of      
multiplicity1 made so much the more     
effort to withdraw itself on to itself4 
,a part is no sooner detached than it   
tends to reunite itself1 if not to all  
the rest1 at least to what is nearest to
 it4 ,hence1 throughout the whole realm 
of life1 a balancing between            
individuation and association4          
,individuals join together into a       
society2 but the society1 as soon as    
formed1 tends to melt the associated    
individuals into a new organism1 so as  
to become itself an individual1 able in 
its turn to be part and parcel of a new 
association4 ,at the lowest degree of   
the scale of organisms we already find  
veritable associations1 microbial       
colonies1 and in these associations1    
according to a recent work1 a tendency  
to individuate by the constitution of a 
nucleus4#ib ,the same tendency is met   

with again at a higher stage1 in the    
protophytes1 which1 once having quitted 
the parent cell by way of division1     
remain united to each other by the      
gelatinous substance that surrounds     
them--also in those protozoa which begin
 by mingling their pseudopodia and end  
by welding themselves together4 ,the    
colonial theory of the genesis of higher
 organisms is well known4 ,the protozoa1
 consisting of one single cell1 are     
supposed to have formed1 by assemblage1 
aggregates which1 relating themselves   
together in their turn1 have given rise 
to aggregates of aggregates2 so         
organisms more and more complicated1 and
 also more and more differentiated1 are 
born of the association of organisms    
barely differentiated and elementary4#ic
 ,in this extreme form1 the theory is   
open to grave objections3 more and more 
the idea seems to be gaining ground1    
that polyzoism is an exceptional and    
abnormal fact4#id ,but it is none the   
less true that things happen as if every

 higher organism was born of an         
association of cells that have          
subdivided the work between them4 ,very 
probably it is not the cells that have  
made the individual by means of         
association2 it is rather the individual
 that has made the cells by means of    
dissociation4#ie ,but this itself       
reveals to us1 in the genesis of the    
individual1 a haunting of the social    
form1 as if the individual could develop
 only on the condition that its         
substance should be split up into       
elements having themselves an appearance
 of individuality and united among      
themselves by an appearance of          
sociality4 ,there are numerous cases in 
which nature seems to hesitate between  
the two forms1 and to ask herself if she
 shall make a society or an individual4 
,the slightest push is enough1 then1 to 
make the balance weigh on one side or   
the other4 ,if we take an infusorian    
sufficiently large1 such as the         
,stentor1 and cut it into two halves    

each containing a part of the nucleus1  
each of the two halves will generate an 
independent ,stentor2 but if we divide  
it incompletely1 so that a protoplasmic 
communication is left between the two   
halves1 we shall see them execute1 each 
from its side1 corresponding movements3 
so that in this case it is enough that a
 thread should be maintained or cut in  
order that life should affect the social
 or the individual form4 ,thus1 in      
rudimentary organisms consisting of a   
single cell1 we already find that the   
apparent individuality of the whole is  
the composition of an undefined number  
of potential individualities potentially
 associated4 ,but1 from top to bottom of
 the series of living beings1 the same  
law is manifested4 ,and it is this that 
we express when we say that unity and   
multiplicity are categories of inert    
matter1 that the vital impetus is       
neither pure unity nor pure             
multiplicity1 and that if the matter to 
which it communicates itself compels it 

to choose one of the two1 its choice    
will never be definitive3 it will leap  
from one to the other indefinitely4 ,the
 evolution of life in the double        
direction of individuality and          
association has therefore nothing       
accidental about it3 it is due to the   
very nature of life4  ,essential also is
 the progress to reflexion4 ,if our     
analysis is correct1 it is              
consciousness1 or rather                
supra-consciousness1 that is at the     
origin of life4 ,consciousness1 or      
supra-consciousness1 is the name for the
 rocket whose extinguished fragments    
fall back as matter2 consciousness1     
again1 is the name for that which       
subsists of the rocket itself1 passing  
through the fragments and lighting them 
up into organisms4 ,but this            
consciousness1 which is a need of       
creation1 is made manifest to itself    
only where creation is possible4 ,it    
lies dormant when life is condemned to  
automatism2 it wakens as soon as the    

possibility of a choice is restored4    
,that is why1 in organisms unprovided   
with a nervous system1 it varies        
according to the power of locomotion and
 of deformation of which the organism   
disposes4 ,and in animals with a nervous
 system1 it is proportional to the      
complexity of the switchboard on which  
the paths called sensory and the paths  
called motor intersect--that is1 of the 
brain4 ,how must this solidarity between
 the organism and consciousness be      
understood8  ,we will not dwell here on 
a point that we have dealt with in      
former works4 ,let us merely recall that
 a theory such as that according to     
which consciousness is attached to      
certain neurons1 and is thrown off from 
their work like a phosphorescence1 may  
be accepted by the scientist for the    
detail of analysis2 it is a convenient  
mode of expression4 ,but it is nothing  
else4 ,in reality1 a living being is a  
centre of action4 ,it represents a      
certain sum of contingency entering into

 the world1 that is to say1 a certain   
quantity of possible action--a quantity 
variable with individuals and especially
 with species4 ,the nervous system of an
 animal marks out the flexible lines on 
which its action will run 7although the 
potential energy is accumulated in the  
muscles rather than in the nervous      
system itself72 its nervous centres     
indicate1 by their development and their
 configuration1 the more or less        
extended choice it will have among more 
or less numerous and complicated        
actions4 ,now1 since the awakening of   
consciousness in a living creature is   
the more complete1 the greater the      
latitude of choice allowed to it and the
 larger the amount of action bestowed   
upon it1 it is clear that the           
development of consciousness will appear
 to be dependent on that of the nervous 
centres4 ,on the other hand1 every state
 of consciousness being1 in one aspect  
of it1 a question put to the motor      
activity and even the beginning of a    

reply1 there is no psychical event that 
does not imply the entry into play of   
the cortical mechanisms4 ,everything    
seems1 therefore1 to happen as if       
consciousness sprang from the brain1 and
 as if the detail of conscious activity 
were modeled on that of the cerebral    
activity4 ,in reality1 consciousness    
does not spring from the brain2 but     
brain and consciousness correspond      
because equally they measure1 the one by
 the complexity of its structure and the
 other by the intensity of its          
awareness1 the quantity of choice that  
the living being has at its disposal4   
,it is precisely because a cerebral     
state expresses simply what there is of 
nascent action in the corresponding     
psychical state1 that the psychical     
state tells us more than the cerebral   
state4 ,the consciousness of a living   
being1 as we have tried to prove        
elsewhere1 is inseparable from its brain
 in the sense in which a sharp knife is 
inseparable from its edge3 the brain is 

the sharp edge by which consciousness   
cuts into the compact tissue of events1 
but the brain is no more coextensive    
with consciousness than the edge is with
 the knife4 ,thus1 from the fact that   
two brains1 like that of the ape and    
that of the man1 are very much alike1 we
 cannot conclude that the corresponding 
consciousnesses are comparable or       
commensurable4  ,but the two brains may 
perhaps be less alike than we suppose4  
,how can we help being struck by the    
fact that1 while man is capable of      
learning any sort of exercise1 of       
constructing any sort of object1 in     
short of acquiring any kind of motor    
habit whatsoever1 the faculty of        
combining new movements is strictly     
limited in the best-endowed animal1 even
 in the ape8 ,the cerebral              
characteristic of man is there4 ,the    
human brain is made1 like every brain1  
to set up motor mechanisms and to enable
 us to choose among them1 at any        
instant1 the one we shall put in motion 

by the pull of a trigger4 ,but it       
differs from other brains in this1 that 
the number of mechanisms it can set up1 
and consequently the choice that it     
gives as to which among them shall be   
released1 is unlimited4 ,now1 from the  
limited to the unlimited there is all   
the distance between the closed and the 
open4 ,it is not a difference of degree1
 but of kind4  ,radical therefore1 also1
 is the difference between animal       
consciousness1 even the most            
intelligent1 and human consciousness4   
,for consciousness corresponds exactly  
to the living being's power of choice2  
it is coextensive with the fringe of    
possible action that surrounds the real 
action3 consciousness is synonymous with
 invention and with freedom4 ,now1 in   
the animal1 invention is never anything 
but a variation on the theme of routine4
 ,shut up in the habits of the species1 
it succeeds1 no doubt1 in enlarging them
 by its individual initiative2 but it   
escapes automatism only for an instant1 

for just the time to create a new       
automatism4 ,the gates of its prison    
close as soon as they are opened2 by    
pulling at its chain it succeeds only in
 stretching it4 ,with man1 consciousness
 breaks the chain4 ,in man1 and in man  
alone1 it sets itself free4 ,the whole  
history of life until man has been that 
of the effort of consciousness to raise 
matter1 and of the more or less complete
 overwhelming of consciousness by the   
matter which has fallen back on it4 ,the
 enterprise was paradoxical1 if1 indeed1
 we may speak here otherwise than by    
metaphor of enterprise and of effort4   
,it was to create with matter1 which is 
necessity itself1 an instrument of      
freedom1 to make a machine which should 
triumph over mechanism1 and to use the  
determinism of nature to pass through   
the meshes of the net which this very   
determinism had spread4 ,but1 everywhere
 except in man1 consciousness has let   
itself be caught in the net whose meshes
 it tried to pass through3 it has       

remained the captive of the mechanisms  
it has set up4 ,automatism1 which it    
tries to draw in the direction of       
freedom1 winds about it and drags it    
down4 ,it has not the power to escape1  
because the energy it has provided for  
acts is almost all employed in          
maintaining the infinitely subtle and   
essentially unstable equilibrium into   
which it has brought matter4 ,but man   
not only maintains his machine1 he      
succeeds in using it as he pleases4     
,doubtless he owes this to the          
superiority of his brain1 which enables 
him to build an unlimited number of     
motor mechanisms1 to oppose new habits  
to the old ones unceasingly1 and1 by    
dividing automatism against itself1 to  
rule it4 ,he owes it to his language1   
which furnishes consciousness with an   
immaterial body in which to incarnate   
itself and thus exempts it from dwelling
 exclusively on material bodies1 whose  
flux would soon drag it along and       
finally swallow it up4 ,he owes it to   

social life1 which stores and preserves 
efforts as language stores thought1     
fixes thereby a mean level to which     
individuals must raise themselves at the
 outset1 and by this initial stimulation
 prevents the average man from          
slumbering and drives the superior man  
to mount still higher4 ,but our brain1  
our society1 and our language are only  
the external and various signs of one   
and the same internal superiority4 ,they
 tell1 each after its manner1 the       
unique1 exceptional success which life  
has won at a given moment of its        
evolution4 ,they express the difference 
of kind1 and not only of degree1 which  
separates man from the rest of the      
animal world4 ,they let us guess that1  
while at the end of the vast            
spring-board from which life has taken  
its leap1 all the others have stepped   
down1 finding the cord stretched too    
high1 man alone has cleared the         
obstacle4  ,it is in this quite special 
sense that man is the term and the end  

of evolution4 ,life1 we have said1      
transcends finality as it transcends the
 other categories4 ,it is essentially a 
current sent through matter1 drawing    
from it what it can4 ,there has not1    
therefore1 properly speaking1 been any  
project or plan4 ,on the other hand1 it 
is abundantly evident that the rest of  
nature is not for the sake of man3 we   
struggle like the other species1 we have
 struggled against other species4       
,moreover1 if the evolution of life had 
encountered other accidents in its      
course1 if1 thereby1 the current of life
 had been otherwise divided1 we should  
have been1 physically and morally1 far  
different from what we are4 ,for these  
various reasons it would be wrong to    
regard humanity1 such as we have it     
before our eyes1 as pre-figured in the  
evolutionary movement4 ,it cannot even  
be said to be the outcome of the whole  
of evolution1 for evolution has been    
accomplished on several divergent lines1
 and while the human species is at the  

end of one of them1 other lines have    
been followed with other species at     
their end4 ,it is in a quite different  
sense that we hold humanity to be the   
ground of evolution4  ,from our point of
 view1 life appears in its entirety as  
an immense wave which1 starting from a  
centre1 spreads outwards1 and which on  
almost the whole of its circumference is
 stopped and converted into oscillation3
 at one single point the obstacle has   
been forced1 the impulsion has passed   
freely4 ,it is this freedom that the    
human form registers4 ,everywhere but in
 man1 consciousness has had to come to a
 stand2 in man alone it has kept on its 
way4 ,man1 then1 continues the vital    
movement indefinitely1 although he does 
not draw along with him all that life   
carries in itself4 ,on other lines of   
evolution there have traveled other     
tendencies which life implied1 and of   
which1 since everything interpenetrates1
 man has1 doubtless1 kept something1 but
 of which he has kept only very little4 

,it is as if a vague and formless being1
 whom we may call1 as we will1 man or   
superman1 had sought to realize himself1
 and had succeeded only by abandoning a 
part of himself on the way4 ,the losses 
are represented by the rest of the      
animal world1 and even by the vegetable 
world1 at least in what these have that 
is positive and above the accidents of  
evolution4  ,from this point of view1   
the discordances of which nature offers 
us the spectacle are singularly         
weakened4 ,the organized world as a     
whole becomes as the soil on which was  
to grow either man himself or a being   
who morally must resemble him4 ,the     
animals1 however distant they may be    
from our species1 however hostile to it1
 have none the less been useful         
traveling companions1 on whom           
consciousness has unloaded whatever     
encumbrances it was dragging along1 and 
who have enabled it to rise1 in man1 to 
heights from which it sees an unlimited 
horizon open again before it4  ,it is   

true that it has not only abandoned     
cumbersome baggage on the way2 it has   
also had to give up valuable goods4     
,consciousness1 in man1 is pre-eminently
 intellect4 ,it might have been1 it     
ought1 so it seems1 to have been also   
intuition4 ,intuition and intellect     
represent two opposite directions of the
 work of consciousness3 intuition goes  
in the very direction of life1 intellect
 goes in the inverse direction1 and thus
 finds itself naturally in accordance   
with the movement of matter4 ,a complete
 and perfect humanity would be that in  
which these two forms of conscious      
activity should attain their full       
development4 ,and1 between this humanity
 and ours1 we may conceive any number of
 possible stages1 corresponding to all  
the degrees imaginable of intelligence  
and of intuition4 ,in this lies the part
 of contingency in the mental structure 
of our species4 ,a different evolution  
might have led to a humanity either more
 intellectual still or more intuitive4  

,in the humanity of which we are a part1
 intuition is1 in fact1 almost          
completely sacrificed to intellect4 ,it 
seems that to conquer matter1 and to    
reconquer its own self1 consciousness   
has had to exhaust the best part of its 
power4 ,this conquest1 in the particular
 conditions in which it has been        
accomplished1 has required that         
consciousness should adapt itself to the
 habits of matter and concentrate all   
its attention on them1 in fact determine
 itself more especially as intellect4   
,intuition is there1 however1 but vague 
and above all discontinuous4 ,it is a   
lamp almost extinguished1 which only    
glimmers now and then1 for a few moments
 at most4 ,but it glimmers wherever a   
vital interest is at stake4 ,on our     
personality1 on our liberty1 on the     
place we occupy in the whole of nature1 
on our origin and perhaps also on our   
destiny1 it throws a light feeble and   
vacillating1 but which none the less    
pierces the darkness of the night in    

which the intellect leaves us4  ,these  
fleeting intuitions1 which light up     
their object only at distant intervals1 
philosophy ought to seize1 first to     
sustain them1 then to expand them and so
 unite them together4 ,the more it      
advances in this work1 the more will it 
perceive that intuition is mind itself1 
and1 in a certain sense1 life itself3   
the intellect has been cut out of it by 
a process resembling that which has     
generated matter4 ,thus is revealed the 
unity of the spiritual life4 ,we        
recognize it only when we place         
ourselves in intuition in order to go   
from intuition to the intellect1 for    
from the intellect we shall never pass  
to intuition4  ,philosophy introduces us
 thus into the spiritual life4 ,and it  
shows us at the same time the relation  
of the life of the spirit to that of the
 body4 ,the great error of the doctrines
 on the spirit has been the idea that by
 isolating the spiritual life from all  
the rest1 by suspending it in space as  

high as possible above the earth1 they  
were placing it beyond attack1 as if    
they were not thereby simply exposing it
 to be taken as an effect of mirage6    
,certainly they are right to listen to  
conscience when conscience affirms human
 freedom2 but the intellect is there1   
which says that the cause determines its
 effect1 that like conditions like1 that
 all is repeated and that all is given4 
,they are right to believe in the       
absolute reality of the person and in   
his independence toward matter2 but     
science is there1 which shows the       
interdependence of conscious life and   
cerebral activity4 ,they are right to   
attribute to man a privileged place in  
nature1 to hold that the distance is    
infinite between the animal and man2 but
 the history of life is there1 which    
makes us witness the genesis of species 
by gradual transformation1 and seems    
thus to reintegrate man in animality4   
,when a strong instinct assures the     
probability of personal survival1 they  

are right not to close their ears to its
 voice2 but if there exist souls capable
 of an independent life1 whence do they 
come8 ,when1 how and why do they enter  
into this body which we see arise1 quite
 naturally1 from a mixed cell derived   
from the bodies of its two parents8 ,all
 these questions will remain unanswered1
 a philosophy of intuition will be a    
negation of science1 will be sooner or  
later swept away by science1 if it does 
not resolve to see the life of the body 
just where it really is1 on the road    
that leads to the life of the spirit4   
,but it will then no longer have to do  
with definite living beings4 ,life as a 
whole1 from the initial impulsion that  
thrust it into the world1 will appear as
 a wave which rises1 and which is       
opposed by the descending movement of   
matter4 ,on the greater part of its     
surface1 at different heights1 the      
current is converted by matter into a   
vortex4 ,at one point alone it passes   
freely1 dragging with it the obstacle   

which will weigh on its progress but    
will not stop it4 ,at this point is     
humanity2 it is our privileged          
situation4 ,on the other hand1 this     
rising wave is consciousness1 and1 like 
all consciousness1 it includes          
potentialities without number which     
interpenetrate and to which consequently
 neither the category of unity nor that 
of multiplicity is appropriate1 made as 
they both are for inert matter4 ,the    
matter that it bears along with it1 and 
in the interstices of which it inserts  
itself1 alone can divide it into        
distinct individualities4 ,on flows the 
current1 running through human          
generations1 subdividing itself into    
individuals4 ,this subdivision was      
vaguely indicated in it1 but could not  
have been made clear without matter4    
,thus souls are continually being       
created1 which1 nevertheless1 in a      
certain sense pre-existed4 ,they are    
nothing else than the little rills into 
which the great river of life divides   

itself1 flowing through the body of     
humanity4 ,the movement of the stream is
 distinct from the river bed1 although  
it must adopt its winding course4       
,consciousness is distinct from the     
organism it animates1 although it must  
undergo its vicissitudes4 ,as the       
possible actions which a state of       
consciousness indicates are at every    
instant beginning to be carried out in  
the nervous centres1 the brain          
underlines at every instant the motor   
indications of the state of             
consciousness2 but the interdependency  
of consciousness and brain is limited to
 this2 the destiny of consciousness is  
not bound up on that account with the   
destiny of cerebral matter4 ,finally1   
consciousness is essentially free2 it is
 freedom itself2 but it cannot pass     
through matter without settling on it1  
without adapting itself to it3 this     
adaptation is what we call              
intellectuality2 and the intellect1     
turning itself back toward active1 that 

is to say free1 consciousness1 naturally
 makes it enter into the conceptual     
forms into which it is accustomed to see
 matter fit4 ,it will therefore always  
perceive freedom in the form of         
necessity2 it will always neglect the   
part of novelty or of creation inherent 
in the free act2 it will always         
substitute for action itself an         
imitation artificial1 approximative1    
obtained by compounding the old with the
 old and the same with the same4 ,thus1 
to the eyes of a philosophy that        
attempts to reabsorb intellect in       
intuition1 many difficulties vanish or  
become light4 ,but such a doctrine does 
not only facilitate speculation2 it     
gives us also more power to act and to  
live4 ,for1 with it1 we feel ourselves  
no longer isolated in humanity1 humanity
 no longer seems isolated in the nature 
that it dominates4 ,as the smallest     
grain of dust is bound up with our      
entire solar system1 drawn along with it
 in that undivided movement of descent  

which is materiality itself1 so all     
organized beings1 from the humblest to  
the highest1 from the first origins of  
life to the time in which we are1 and in
 all places as in all times1 do but     
evidence a single impulsion1 the inverse
 of the movement of matter1 and in      
itself indivisible4 ,all the living hold
 together1 and all yield to the same    
tremendous push4 ,the animal takes its  
stand on the plant1 man bestrides       
animality1 and the whole of humanity1 in
 space and in time1 is one immense army 
galloping beside and before and behind  
each of us in an overwhelming charge    
able to beat down every resistance and  
clear the most formidable obstacles1    
perhaps even death4  ,,footnotes3       
,footnote #gh3 ,we have developed this  
point in ,matire et mmoire1 chaps4 ii4  
and iii41 notably pp4 #gh-hj and        
#afi-ahf4  ,footnote #gi3 ,faraday1 ,a  
,speculation concerning ,electric       
,conduction 7,philosophical ,magazine1  
#c;d4 series1 vol4 xxiv474  ,footnote   

#hj3 ,our comparison does no more than  
develop the content of the term ,greek3 
logos1 as ,plotinus understands it4 ,for
 while the ,greek3 logos of this        
philosopher is a generating and         
informing power1 an aspect or a fragment
 of the ,greek3 psych1 on the other hand
 ,plotinus sometimes speaks of it as of 
a discourse4 ,more generally1 the       
relation that we establish in the       
present chapter between extension and   
detension resembles in some aspects that
 which ,plotinus supposes 7some         
developments of which must have inspired
 ,m4 ,ravaisson7 when he makes extension
 not indeed an inversion of original    
,being1 but an enfeeblement of its      
essence1 one of the last stages of the  
procession1 7see in particular1 ,enn4   
,,iv4 iii4 #i-aa1 and ,,iii4 vi4        
#ag-ah74 ,yet ancient philosophy did not
 see what consequences would result from
 this for mathematics1 for ,plotinus1   
like ,plato1 erected mathematical       
essences into absolute realities4 ,above

 all1 it suffered itself to be deceived 
by the purely superficial analogy of    
duration with extension4 ,it treated the
 one as it treated the other1 regarding 
change as a degradation of immutability1
 the sensible as a fall from the        
intelligible4 ,whence1 as we shall show 
in the next chapter1 a philosophy which 
fails to recognize the real function and
 scope of the intellect4  ,footnote #ha3
 ,bastian1 ,the ,brain as an ,organ of  
the ,mind1 pp4 #bad-af4  ,footnote #hb3 
,we have dwelt on this point in a former
 work4 ,see the ,essai sur les donnes   
immdiates de la conscience1 ,paris1     
#ahhi1 pp4 #aee-afj4  ,footnote #hc3    
,op4 cit4 chaps4 i4 and ii4 passim4     
,footnote #hd3 ,cf4 especially the      
profound studies of ,m4 ,ed4 ,le ,roy in
 the ,revue de mtaph4 et de morale4     
,footnote #he3 ,matire et mmoire1       
chapters iii4 and iv4  ,footnote #hf3   
,see in particular1 ,phys41 iv4 #bae a  
#b2 v4 #bcj b #ab2 viii4 #bee a #b2 and 
,de ,caelo1 iv4 #a-e2 ii4 #bif b #bg2   

iv4 #cjh a #cd4  ,footnote #hg3 ,de     
,caelo1 iv4 #caj a #cd ,greek3 to d' eis
 ton autou topon pherethai hekaoton to  
eis to autou eidos esti pheresthai4     
,footnote #hh3 ,on these differences of 
quality see the work of ,duhem1         
,l'volution de la mcanique1 ,paris1     
#aije1 pp4 #aig ff4  ,footnote #hi3     
,boltzmann1 ,vorlesungen ber            
,gastheorie1 ,leipzig1 #ahih1 pp4 #bec  
ff4  ,footnote #ij3 ,in a book rich in  
facts and in ideas 7,la ,dissolution    
oppose a l'volution1 ,paris1 #ahii71 ,m4
 ,andr ,lalande shows us everything     
going towards death1 in spite of the    
momentary resistance which organisms    
seem to oppose4--,but1 even from the    
side of unorganized matter1 have we the 
right to extend to the entire universe  
considerations drawn from the present   
state of our solar system8 ,beside the  
worlds which are dying1 there are       
without doubt worlds that are being     
born4 ,on the other hand1 in the        
organized world1 the death of           

individuals does not seem at all like a 
diminution of life in general1 or like a
 necessity which life submits to        
reluctantly4 ,as has been more than once
 remarked1 life has never made an effort
 to prolong indefinitely the existence  
of the individual1 although on so many  
other points it has made so many        
successful efforts4 ,everything is as if
 this death had been willed1 or at least
 accepted1 for the greater progress of  
life in general4  ,footnote #ia3 ,we    
have dwelt on this point in an article  
entitled ,introduction  la mtaphysique  
7,revue de mtaphysique et de morale1    
,january1 #aijc1 pp4 #a-be74  ,footnote 
#ib3 ,cf4 a paper written 7in ,russian7 
by ,serkovski1 and reviewed in the ,anne
 biologique1 #ahih1 p4 #cag4  ,footnote 
#ic3 ,ed4 ,perrier1 ,les ,colonies      
animales1 ,paris1 #ahig 7#bnd edition74 
,footnote #id3 ,delage1 ,l',hrdit1 #bnd 
edition1 ,paris1 #aijc1 p4 #ig4 ,cf4 by 
the same author1 ,la ,conception        
polyzoque des tres 7,revue scientifique1

 #ahif1 pp4 #fda-fec74  ,footnote #ie3  
,this is the theory maintained by       
,kunstler1 ,delage1 ,sedgwick1 ,labb1   
etc4 ,its development1 with             
bibliographical references1 will be     
found in the work of ,busquet1 ,les tres
 vivants1 ,paris1 #ahii4     ,,chapter  
,,iv  ,,the ,,cinematographical         
,,mechanism ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,the  
,,mechanistic ,,illusion--,a ,,glance   
,,at ,,the ,,history ,,of               
,,systems#if--,,real ,,becoming ,,and   
,,false ,,evolutionism4   ,it remains   
for us to examine in themselves two     
theoretical illusions which we have     
frequently met with before1 but whose   
consequences rather than principle have 
hitherto concerned us4 ,such is the     
object of the present chapter4 ,it will 
afford us the opportunity of removing   
certain objections1 of clearing up      
certain misunderstandings1 and1 above   
all1 of defining more precisely1 by     
contrasting it with others1 a philosophy
 which sees in duration the very stuff  

of reality4  ,matter or mind1 reality   
has appeared to us as a perpetual       
becoming4 ,it makes itself or it unmakes
 itself1 but it is never something made4
 ,such is the intuition that we have of 
mind when we draw aside the veil which  
is interposed between our consciousness 
and ourselves4 ,this1 also1 is what our 
intellect and senses themselves would   
show us of matter1 if they could obtain 
a direct and disinterested idea of it4  
,but1 preoccupied before everything with
 the necessities of action1 the         
intellect1 like the senses1 is limited  
to taking1 at intervals1 views that are 
instantaneous and by that very fact     
immobile of the becoming of matter4     
,consciousness1 being in its turn formed
 on the intellect1 sees clearly of the  
inner life what is already made1 and    
only feels confusedly the making4 ,thus1
 we pluck out of duration those moments 
that interest us1 and that we have      
gathered along its course4 ,these alone 
we retain4 ,and we are right in so      

doing1 while action only is in question4
 ,but when1 in speculating on the nature
 of the real1 we go on regarding it as  
our practical interest requires us to   
regard it1 we become unable to perceive 
the true evolution1 the radical         
becoming4 ,of becoming we perceive only 
states1 of duration only instants1 and  
even when we speak of duration and of   
becoming1 it is of another thing that we
 are thinking4 ,such is the most        
striking of the two illusions we wish to
 examine4 ,it consists in supposing that
 we can think the unstable by means of  
the stable1 the moving by means of the  
immobile4  ,the other illusion is near  
akin to the first4 ,it has the same     
origin1 being also due to the fact that 
we import into speculation a procedure  
made for practice4 ,all action aims at  
getting something that we feel the want 
of1 or at creating something that does  
not yet exist4 ,in this very special    
sense1 it fills a void1 and goes from   
the empty to the full1 from an absence  

to a presence1 from the unreal to the   
real4 ,now the unreality which is here  
in question is purely relative to the   
direction in which our attention is     
engaged1 for we are immersed in         
realities and cannot pass out of them2  
only1 if the present reality is not the 
one we are seeking1 we speak of the     
absence of this sought-for reality      
wherever we find the presence of        
another4 ,we thus express what we have  
as a function of what we want4 ,this is 
quite legitimate in the sphere of       
action4 ,but1 whether we will or no1 we 
keep to this way of speaking1 and also  
of thinking1 when we speculate on the   
nature of things independently of the   
interest they have for us4 ,thus arises 
the second of the two illusions4 ,we    
propose to examine this first4 ,it is   
due1 like the other1 to the static      
habits that our intellect contracts when
 it prepares our action on things4 ,just
 as we pass through the immobile to go  
to the moving1 so we make use of the    

void in order to think the full4  ,we   
have met with this illusion already in  
dealing with the fundamental problem of 
knowledge4 ,the question1 we then said1 
is to know why there is order1 and not  
disorder1 in things4 ,but the question  
has meaning only if we suppose that     
disorder1 understood as an absence of   
order1 is possible1 or imaginable1 or   
conceivable4 ,now1 it is only order that
 is real2 but1 as order can take two    
forms1 and as the presence of the one   
may be said to consist in the absence of
 the other1 we speak of disorder        
whenever we have before us that one of  
the two orders for which we are not     
looking4 ,the idea of disorder is then  
entirely practical4 ,it corresponds to  
the disappointment of a certain         
expectation1 and it does not denote the 
absence of all order1 but only the      
presence of that order which does not   
offer us actual interest4 ,so that      
whenever we try to deny order           
completely1 absolutely1 we find that we 

are leaping from one kind of order to   
the other indefinitely1 and that the    
supposed suppression of the one and the 
other implies the presence of the two4  
,indeed1 if we go on1 and persist in    
shutting our eyes to this movement of   
the mind and all it involves1 we are no 
longer dealing with an idea2 all that is
 left of disorder is a word4 ,thus the  
problem of knowledge is complicated1 and
 possibly made insoluble1 by the idea   
that order fills a void and that its    
actual presence is superposed on its    
virtual absence4 ,we go from absence to 
presence1 from the void to the full1 in 
virtue of the fundamental illusion of   
our understanding4 ,that is the error of
 which we noticed one consequence in our
 last chapter4 ,as we then anticipated1 
we must come to close quarters with this
 error1 and finally grapple with it4 ,we
 must face it in itself1 in the         
radically false conception which it     
implies of negation1 of the void and of 
the nought4#ig  ,philosophers have paid 

little attention to the idea of the     
nought4 ,and yet it is often the hidden 
spring1 the invisible mover of          
philosophical thinking4 ,from the first 
awakening of reflection1 it is this that
 pushes to the fore1 right under the    
eyes of consciousness1 the torturing    
problems1 the questions that we cannot  
gaze at without feeling giddy and       
bewildered4 ,i have no sooner commenced 
to philosophize than ,i ask myself why  
,i exist2 and when ,i take account of   
the intimate connection in which ,i     
stand to the rest of the universe1 the  
difficulty is only pushed back1 for ,i  
want to know why the universe exists2   
and if ,i refer the universe to a       
,principle immanent or transcendent that
 supports it or creates it1 my thought  
rests on this principle only a few      
moments1 for the same problem recurs1   
this time in its full breadth and       
generality3 ,whence comes it1 and how   
can it be understood1 that anything     
exists8 ,even here1 in the present work1

 when matter has been defined as a kind 
of descent1 this descent as the         
interruption of a rise1 this rise itself
 as a growth1 when finally a ,principle 
of creation has been put at the base of 
things1 the same question springs up3   
,how--why does this principle exist     
rather than nothing8  ,now1 if ,i push  
these questions aside and go straight to
 what hides behind them1 this is what ,i
 find3--,existence appears to me like a 
conquest over nought4 ,i say to myself  
that there might be1 that indeed there  
ought to be1 nothing1 and ,i then wonder
 that there is something4 ,or ,i        
represent all reality extended on       
nothing as on a carpet3 at first was    
nothing1 and being has come by          
superaddition to it4 ,or1 yet again1 if 
something has always existed1 nothing   
must always have served as its          
substratum or receptacle1 and is        
therefore eternally prior4 ,a glass may 
have always been full1 but the liquid it
 contains nevertheless fills a void4 ,in

 the same way1 being may have always    
been there1 but the nought which is     
filled1 and1 as it were1 stopped up by  
it1 pre-exists for it none the less1 if 
not in fact at least in right4 ,in      
short1 ,i cannot get rid of the idea    
that the full is an embroidery on the   
canvas of the void1 that being is       
superimposed on nothing1 and that in the
 idea of nothing there is less than in  
that of something4 ,hence all the       
mystery4  ,it is necessary that this    
mystery should be cleared up4 ,it is    
more especially necessary1 if we put    
duration and free choice at the base of 
things4 ,for the disdain of metaphysics 
for all reality that endures comes      
precisely from this1 that it reaches    
being only by passing through not-being1
 and that an existence which endures    
seems to it not strong enough to conquer
 non-existence and itself posit itself4 
,it is for this reason especially that  
it is inclined to endow true being with 
a logical1 and not a psychological nor a

 physical existence4 ,for the nature of 
a purely logical existence is such that 
it seems to be self-sufficient and to   
posit itself by the effect alone of the 
force immanent in truth4 ,if ,i ask     
myself why bodies or minds exist rather 
than nothing1 ,i find no answer2 but    
that a logical principle1 such as ,a,a1 
should have the power of creating       
itself1 triumphing over the nought      
throughout eternity1 seems to me        
natural4 ,a circle drawn with chalk on a
 blackboard is a thing which needs      
explanation3 this entirely physical     
existence has not by itself wherewith to
 vanquish non-existence4 ,but the       
logical essence of the circle1 that is  
to say1 the possibility of drawing it   
according to a certain law--in short1   
its definition--is a thing which appears
 to me eternal3 it has neither place nor
 date2 for nowhere1 at no moment1 has   
the drawing of a circle begun to be     
possible4 ,suppose1 then1 that the      
principle on which all things rest1 and 

which all things manifest possesses an  
existence of the same nature as that of 
the definition of the circle1 or as that
 of the axiom ,a,a3 the mystery of      
existence vanishes1 for the being that  
is at the base of everything posits     
itself then in eternity1 as logic itself
 does4 ,true1 it will cost us rather a  
heavy sacrifice3 if the principle of all
 things exists after the manner of a    
logical axiom or of a mathematical      
definition1 the things themselves must  
go forth from this principle like the   
applications of an axiom or the         
consequences of a definition1 and there 
will no longer be place1 either in the  
things nor in their principle1 for      
efficient causality understood in the   
sense of a free choice4 ,such are       
precisely the conclusions of a doctrine 
like that of ,spinoza1 or even that of  
,leibniz1 and such indeed has been their
 genesis4  ,now1 if we could prove that 
the idea of the nought1 in the sense in 
which we take it when we oppose it to   

that of existence1 is a pseudo-idea1 the
 problems that are raised around it     
would become pseudo-problems4 ,the      
hypothesis of an absolute that acts     
freely1 that in an eminent sense        
endures1 would no longer raise up       
intellectual prejudices4 ,the road would
 be cleared for a philosophy more nearly
 approaching intuition1 and which would 
no longer ask the same sacrifices of    
common sense4  ,let us then see what we 
are thinking about when we speak of     
,nothing4 ,to represent ,nothing1 we    
must either imagine it or conceive it4  
,let us examine what this image or this 
idea may be4 ,first1 the image4  ,i am  
going to close my eyes1 stop my ears1   
extinguish one by one the sensations    
that come to me from the outer world4   
,now it is done2 all my perceptions     
vanish1 the material universe sinks into
 silence and the night4--,i subsist1    
however1 and cannot help myself         
subsisting4 ,i am still there1 with the 
organic sensations which come to me from

 the surface and from the interior of my
 body1 with the recollections which my  
past perceptions have left behind       
them--nay1 with the impression1 most    
positive and full1 of the void ,i have  
just made about me4 ,how can ,i suppress
 all this8 ,how eliminate myself8 ,i can
 even1 it may be1 blot out and forget my
 recollections up to my immediate past2 
but at least ,i keep the consciousness  
of my present reduced to its extremest  
poverty1 that is to say1 of the actual  
state of my body4 ,i will try1 however1 
to do away even with this consciousness 
itself4 ,i will reduce more and more the
 sensations my body sends in to me3 now 
they are almost gone2 now they are gone1
 they have disappeared in the night     
where all things else have already died 
away4 ,but no6 ,at the very instant that
 my consciousness is extinguished1      
another consciousness lights up--or     
rather1 it was already alight3 it had   
arisen the instant before1 in order to  
witness the extinction of the first2 for

 the first could disappear only for     
another and in the presence of another4 
,i see myself annihilated only if ,i    
have already resuscitated myself by an  
act which is positive1 however          
involuntary and unconscious4 ,so1 do    
what ,i will1 ,i am always perceiving   
something1 either from without or from  
within4 ,when ,i no longer know anything
 of external objects1 it is because ,i  
have taken refuge in the consciousness  
that ,i have of myself4 ,if ,i abolish  
this inner self1 its very abolition     
becomes an object for an imaginary self 
which now perceives as an external      
object the self that is dying away4 ,be 
it external or internal1 some object    
there always is that my imagination is  
representing4 ,my imagination1 it is    
true1 can go from one to the other1 ,i  
can by turns imagine a nought of        
external perception or a nought of      
internal perception1 but not both at    
once1 for the absence of one consists1  
at bottom1 in the exclusive presence of 

the other4 ,but1 from the fact that two 
relative noughts are imaginable in turn1
 we wrongly conclude that they are      
imaginable together3 a conclusion the   
absurdity of which must be obvious1 for 
we cannot imagine a nought without      
perceiving1 at least confusedly1 that we
 are imagining it1 consequently that we 
are acting1 that we are thinking1 and   
therefore that something still subsists4
  ,the image1 then1 properly so called1 
of a suppression of everything is never 
formed by thought4 ,the effort by which 
we strive to create this image simply   
ends in making us swing to and fro      
between the vision of an outer and that 
of an inner reality4 ,in this coming and
 going of our mind between the without  
and the within1 there is a point1 at    
equal distance from both1 in which it   
seems to us that we no longer perceive  
the one1 and that we do not yet perceive
 the other3 it is there that the image  
of ,nothing is formed4 ,in reality1 we  
then perceive both1 having reached the  

point where the two terms come together1
 and the image of ,nothing1 so defined1 
is an image full of things1 an image    
that includes at once that of the       
subject and that of the object and1     
besides1 a perpetual leaping from one to
 the other and the refusal ever to come 
to rest finally on either4 ,evidently   
this is not the nothing that we can     
oppose to being1 and put before or      
beneath being1 for it already includes  
existence in general4  ,but we shall be 
told that1 if the representation of     
,nothing1 visible or latent1 enters into
 the reasonings of philosophers1 it is  
not as an image1 but as an idea4 ,it may
 be agreed that we do not imagine the   
annihilation of everything1 but it will 
be claimed that we can conceive it4 ,we 
conceive a polygon with a thousand      
sides1 said ,descartes1 although we do  
not see it in imagination3 it is enough 
that we can clearly represent the       
possibility of constructing it4 ,so with
 the idea of the annihilation of        

everything4 ,nothing simpler1 it will be
 said1 than the procedure by which we   
construct the idea of it4 ,there is1 in 
fact1 not a single object of our        
experience that we cannot suppose       
annihilated4 ,extend this annihilation  
of a first object to a second1 then to a
 third1 and so on as long as you please3
 the nought is the limit toward which   
the operation tends4 ,and the nought so 
defined is the annihilation of          
everything4 ,that is the theory4 ,we    
need only consider it in this form to   
see the absurdity it involves4  ,an idea
 constructed by the mind is an idea only
 if its pieces are capable of           
coexisting2 it is reduced to a mere word
 if the elements that we bring together 
to compose it are driven away as fast as
 we assemble them4 ,when ,i have defined
 the circle1 ,i easily represent a black
 or a white circle1 a circle in         
cardboard1 iron1 or brass1 a transparent
 or an opaque circle--but not a square  
circle1 because the law of the          

generation of the circle excludes the   
possibility of defining this figure with
 straight lines4 ,so my mind can        
represent any existing thing whatever as
 annihilated2--but if the annihilation  
of anything by the mind is an operation 
whose mechanism implies that it works on
 a part of the whole1 and not on the    
whole itself1 then the extension of such
 an operation to the totality of things 
becomes self-contradictory and absurd1  
and the idea of an annihilation of      
everything presents the same character  
as that of a square circle3 it is not an
 idea1 it is only a word4 ,so let us    
examine more closely the mechanism of   
the operation4  ,in fact1 the object    
suppressed is either external or        
internal3 it is a thing or it is a state
 of consciousness4 ,let us consider the 
first case4 ,i annihilate in thought an 
external object3 in the place where it  
was1 there is no longer anything4--,no  
longer anything of that object1 of      
course1 but another object has taken its

 place3 there is no absolute void in    
nature4 ,but admit that an absolute void
 is possible3 it is not of that void    
that ,i am thinking when ,i say that the
 object1 once annihilated1 leaves its   
place unoccupied2 for by the hypothesis 
it is a place1 that is a void limited by
 precise outlines1 or1 in other words1 a
 kind of thing4 ,the void of which ,i   
speak1 therefore1 is1 at bottom1 only   
the absence of some definite object1    
which was here at first1 is now         
elsewhere and1 in so far as it is no    
longer in its former place1 leaves      
behind it1 so to speak1 the void of     
itself4 ,a being unendowed with memory  
or prevision would not use the words    
void or nought2 he would express only   
what is and what is perceived2 now1 what
 is1 and what is perceived1 is the      
presence of one thing or of another1    
never the absence of anything4 ,there is
 absence only for a being capable of    
remembering and expecting4 ,he          
remembered an object1 and perhaps       

expected to encounter it again2 he finds
 another1 and he expresses the          
disappointment of his expectation 7an   
expectation sprung from recollection7 by
 saying that he no longer finds         
anything1 that he encounters nothing4   
,even if he did not expect to encounter 
the object1 it is a possible expectation
 of it1 it is still the falsification of
 his eventual expectation that he       
expresses by saying that the object is  
no longer where it was4 ,what he        
perceives in reality1 what he will      
succeed in effectively thinking of1 is  
the presence of the old object in a new 
place or that of a new object in the old
 place2 the rest1 all that is expressed 
negatively by such words as nought or   
the void1 is not so much thought as     
feeling1 or1 to speak more exactly1 it  
is the tinge that feeling gives to      
thought4 ,the idea of annihilation or of
 partial nothingness is therefore formed
 here in the course of the substitution 
of one thing for another1 whenever this 

substitution is thought by a mind that  
would prefer to keep the old thing in   
the place of the new1 or at least       
conceives this preference as possible4  
,the idea implies on the subjective side
 a preference1 on the objective side a  
substitution1 and is nothing else but a 
combination of1 or rather an            
interference between1 this feeling of   
preference and this idea of             
substitution4  ,such is the mechanism of
 the operation by which our mind        
annihilates an object and succeeds in   
representing in the external world a    
partial nought4 ,let us now see how it  
represents it within itself4 ,we find in
 ourselves phenomena that are produced1 
and not phenomena that are not produced4
 ,i experience a sensation or an        
emotion1 ,i conceive an idea1 ,i form a 
resolution3 my consciousness perceives  
these facts1 which are so many          
presences1 and there is no moment in    
which facts of this kind are not present
 to me4 ,i can1 no doubt1 interrupt by  

thought the course of my inner life2 ,i 
may suppose that ,i sleep without       
dreaming or that ,i have ceased to      
exist2 but at the very instant when ,i  
make this supposition1 ,i conceive      
myself1 ,i imagine myself watching over 
my slumber or surviving my annihilation1
 and ,i give up perceiving myself from  
within only by taking refuge in the     
perception of myself from without4 ,that
 is to say that here again the full     
always succeeds the full1 and that an   
intelligence that was only intelligence1
 that had neither regret nor desire1    
whose movement was governed by the      
movement of its object1 could not even  
conceive an absence or a void4 ,the     
conception of a void arises here when   
consciousness1 lagging behind itself1   
remains attached to the recollection of 
an old state when another state is      
already present4 ,it is only a          
comparison between what is and what     
could or ought to be1 between the full  
and the full4 ,in a word1 whether it be 

a void of matter or a void of           
consciousness1 the representation of the
 void is always a representation which  
is full and which resolves itself on    
analysis into two positive elements3 the
 idea1 distinct or confused1 of a       
substitution1 and the feeling1          
experienced or imagined1 of a desire or 
a regret4  ,it follows from this double 
analysis that the idea of the absolute  
nought1 in the sense of the annihilation
 of everything1 is a self-destructive   
idea1 a pseudo-idea1 a mere word4 ,if   
suppressing a thing consists in         
replacing it by another1 if thinking the
 absence of one thing is only possible  
by the more or less explicit            
representation of the presence of some  
other thing1 if1 in short1 annihilation 
signifies before anything else          
substitution1 the idea of an            
annihilation of everything is as absurd 
as that of a square circle4 ,the        
absurdity is not obvious1 because there 
exists no particular object that cannot 

be supposed annihilated2 then1 from the 
fact that there is nothing to prevent   
each thing in turn being suppressed in  
thought1 we conclude that it is possible
 to suppose them suppressed altogether4 
,we do not see that suppressing each    
thing in turn consists precisely in     
replacing it in proportion and degree by
 another1 and therefore that the        
suppression of absolutely everything    
implies a downright contradiction in    
terms1 since the operation consists in  
destroying the very condition that makes
 the operation possible4  ,but the      
illusion is tenacious4 ,though          
suppressing one thing consists in fact  
in substituting another for it1 we do   
not conclude1 we are unwilling to       
conclude1 that the annihilation of a    
thing in thought implies the            
substitution in thought of a new thing  
for the old4 ,we agree that a thing is  
always replaced by another thing1 and   
even that our mind cannot think the     
disappearance of an object1 external or 

internal1 without thinking--under an    
indeterminate and confused form1 it is  
true--that another object is substituted
 for it4 ,but we add that the           
representation of a disappearance is    
that of a phenomenon that is produced in
 space or at least in time1 that        
consequently it still implies the       
calling up of an image1 and that it is  
precisely here that we have to free     
ourselves from the imagination in order 
to appeal to the pure understanding4    
,let us therefore no longer speak1 it   
will be said1 of disappearance or       
annihilation2 these are physical        
operations4 ,let us no longer represent 
the object ,a as annihilated or absent4 
,let us say simply that we think it     
non-existent4 ,to annihilate it is to   
act on it in time and perhaps also in   
space2 it is to accept1 consequently1   
the condition of spatial and temporal   
existence1 to accept the universal      
connection that binds an object to all  
others1 and prevents it from            

disappearing without being at the same  
time replaced4 ,but we can free         
ourselves from these conditions2 all    
that is necessary is that by an effort  
of abstraction we should call up the    
idea of the object ,a by itself1 that we
 should agree first to consider it as   
existing1 and then1 by a stroke of the  
intellectual pen1 blot out the clause4  
,the object will then be1 by our decree1
 non-existent4  ,very well1 let us      
strike out the clause4 ,we must not     
suppose that our pen-stroke is          
self-sufficient--that it can be isolated
 from the rest of things4 ,we shall see 
that it carries with it1 whether we will
 or no1 all that we tried to abstract   
from4 ,let us compare together the two  
ideas--the object ,a supposed to exist1 
and the same object supposed            
non-existent4  ,the idea of the object  
,a1 supposed existent1 is the           
representation pure and simple of the   
object ,a1 for we cannot represent an   
object without attributing to it1 by the

 very fact of representing it1 a certain
 reality4 ,between thinking an object   
and thinking it existent1 there is      
absolutely no difference4 ,kant has put 
this point in clear light in his        
criticism of the ontological argument4  
,then1 what is it to think the object ,a
 non-existent8 ,to represent it         
non-existent cannot consist in          
withdrawing from the idea of the object 
,a the idea of the attribute existence1 
since1 ,i repeat1 the representation of 
the existence of the object is          
inseparable from the representation of  
the object1 and indeed is one with it4  
,to represent the object ,a non-existent
 can only consist1 therefore1 in adding 
something to the idea of this object3 we
 add to it1 in fact1 the idea of an     
exclusion of this particular object by  
actual reality in general4 ,to think the
 object ,a as non-existent is first to  
think the object and consequently to    
think it existent2 it is then to think  
that another reality1 with which it is  

incompatible1 supplants it4 ,only1 it is
 useless to represent this latter       
reality explicitly2 we are not concerned
 with what it is2 it is enough for us to
 know that it drives out the object ,a1 
which alone is of interest to us4 ,that 
is why we think of the expulsion rather 
than of the cause which expels4 ,but    
this cause is none the less present to  
the mind2 it is there in the implicit   
state1 that which expels being          
inseparable from the expulsion as the   
hand which drives the pen is inseparable
 from the pen-stroke4 ,the act by which 
we declare an object unreal therefore   
posits the existence of the real in     
general4 ,in other words1 to represent  
an object as unreal cannot consist in   
depriving it of every kind of existence1
 since the representation of an object  
is necessarily that of the object       
existing4 ,such an act consists simply  
in declaring that the existence attached
 by our mind to the object1 and         
inseparable from its representation1 is 

an existence wholly ideal--that of a    
mere possible4 ,but the ideality of an  
object1 and the simple possibility of an
 object1 have meaning only in relation  
to a reality that drives into the region
 of the ideal1 or of the merely         
possible1 the object which is           
incompatible with it4 ,suppose the      
stronger and more substantial existence 
annihilated3 it is the attenuated and   
weaker existence of the merely possible 
that becomes the reality itself1 and you
 will no longer be representing the     
object1 then1 as non-existent4 ,in other
 words1 and however strange our         
assertion may seem1 there is more1 and  
not less1 in the idea of an object      
conceived as not existing than in the   
idea of this same object conceived as   
existing2 for the idea of the object not
 existing is necessarily the idea of the
 object existing with1 in addition1 the 
representation of an exclusion of this  
object by the actual reality taken in   
block4  ,but it will be claimed that our

 idea of the non-existent is not yet    
sufficiently cut loose from every       
imaginative element1 that it is not     
negative enough4 ,no matter1 we shall be
 told1 though the unreality of a thing  
consist in its exclusion by other       
things2 we want to know nothing about   
that4 ,are we not free to direct our    
attention where we please and how we    
please8 ,well then1 after having called 
up the idea of an object1 and thereby1  
if you will have it so1 supposed it     
existent1 we shall merely couple to our 
affirmation a 'not1' and that will be   
enough to make us think it non-existent4
 ,this is an operation entirely         
intellectual1 independent of what       
happens outside the mind4 ,so let us    
think of anything or let us think of the
 totality of things1 and then write in  
the margin of our thought the 'not1'    
which prescribes the rejection of what  
it contains3 we annihilate everything   
mentally by the mere fact of decreeing  
its annihilation4--,here we have it6    

,the very root of all the difficulties  
and errors with which we are confronted 
is to be found in the power ascribed    
here to negation4 ,we represent negation
 as exactly symmetrical with            
affirmation4 ,we imagine that negation1 
like affirmation1 is self-sufficient4   
,so that negation1 like affirmation1    
would have the power of creating ideas1 
with this sole difference that they     
would be negative ideas4 ,by affirming  
one thing1 and then another1 and so on  
ad infinitum1 ,i form the idea of ,all2 
so1 by denying one thing and then other 
things1 finally by denying ,all1 ,i     
arrive at the idea of ,nothing4--,but it
 is just this assimilation which is     
arbitrary4 ,we fail to see that while   
affirmation is a complete act of the    
mind1 which can succeed in building up  
an idea1 negation is but the half of an 
intellectual act1 of which the other    
half is understood1 or rather put off to
 an indefinite future4 ,we fail to see  
that while affirmation is a purely      

intellectual act1 there enters into     
negation an element which is not        
intellectual1 and that it is precisely  
to the intrusion of this foreign element
 that negation owes its specific        
character4  ,to begin with the second   
point1 let us note that to deny always  
consists in setting aside a possible    
affirmation4#ih ,negation is only an    
attitude taken by the mind toward an    
eventual affirmation4 ,when ,i say1     
,this table is black1 ,i am speaking of 
the table2 ,i have seen it black1 and my
 judgment expresses what ,i have seen4  
,but if ,i say1 ,this table is not      
white1 ,i surely do not express         
something ,i have perceived1 for ,i have
 seen black1 and not an absence of      
white4 ,it is therefore1 at bottom1 not 
on the table itself that ,i bring this  
judgment to bear1 but rather on the     
judgment that would declare the table   
white4 ,i judge a judgment and not the  
table4 ,the proposition1 ,this table is 
not white1 implies that you might       

believe it white1 that you did believe  
it such1 or that ,i was going to believe
 it such4 ,i warn you or myself that    
this judgment is to be replaced by      
another 7which1 it is true1 ,i leave    
undetermined74 ,thus1 while affirmation 
bears directly on the thing1 negation   
aims at the thing only indirectly1      
through an interposed affirmation4 ,an  
affirmative proposition expresses a     
judgment on an object2 a negative       
proposition expresses a judgment on a   
judgment4 ,negation1 therefore1 differs 
from affirmation properly so called in  
that it is an affirmation of the second 
degree3 it affirms something of an      
affirmation which itself affirms        
something of an object4  ,but it follows
 at once from this that negation is not 
the work of pure mind1 ,i should say of 
a mind placed before objects and        
concerned with them alone4 ,when we     
deny1 we give a lesson to others1 or it 
may be to ourselves4 ,we take to task an
 interlocutor1 real or possible1 whom we

 find mistaken and whom we put on his   
guard4 ,he was affirming something3 we  
tell him he ought to affirm something   
else 7though without specifying the     
affirmation which must be substituted74 
,there is no longer then1 simply1 a     
person and an object2 there is1 in face 
of the object1 a person speaking to a   
person1 opposing him and aiding him at  
the same time2 there is a beginning of  
society4 ,negation aims at some one1 and
 not only1 like a purely intellectual   
operation1 at some thing4 ,it is of a   
pedagogical and social nature4 ,it sets 
straight or rather warns1 the person    
warned and set straight being possibly1 
by a kind of doubling1 the very person  
that speaks4  ,so much for the second   
point2 now for the first4 ,we said that 
negation is but the half of an          
intellectual act1 of which the other    
half is left indeterminate4 ,if ,i      
pronounce the negative proposition1     
,this table is not white1 ,i mean that  
you ought to substitute for your        

judgment1 ,the table is white1 another  
judgment4 ,i give you an admonition1 and
 the admonition refers to the necessity 
of a substitution4 ,as to what you ought
 to substitute for your affirmation1 ,i 
tell you nothing1 it is true4 ,this may 
be because ,i do not know the color of  
the table2 but it is also1 it is indeed 
even more1 because the white color is   
that alone that interests us for the    
moment1 so that ,i only need to tell you
 that some other color will have to be  
substituted for white1 without having to
 say which4 ,a negative judgment is     
therefore really one which indicates a  
need of substituting for an affirmative 
judgment another affirmative judgment1  
the nature of which1 however1 is not    
specified1 sometimes because it is not  
known1 more often because it fails to   
offer any actual interest1 the attention
 bearing only on the substance of the   
first4  ,thus1 whenever ,i add a not to 
an affirmation1 whenever ,i deny1 ,i    
perform two very definite acts3 7#a7 ,i 

interest myself in what one of my       
fellow-men affirms1 or in what he was   
going to say1 or in what might have been
 said by another ,me1 whom ,i           
anticipate2 7#b7 ,i announce that some  
other affirmation1 whose content ,i do  
not specify1 will have to be substituted
 for the one ,i find before me4 ,now1 in
 neither of these two acts is there     
anything but affirmation4 ,the sui      
generis character of negation is due to 
superimposing the first of these acts   
upon the second4 ,it is in vain1 then1  
that we attribute to negation the power 
of creating ideas sui generis1          
symmetrical with those that affirmation 
creates1 and directed in a contrary     
sense4 ,no idea will come forth from    
negation1 for it has no other content   
than that of the affirmative judgment   
which it judges4  ,to be more precise1  
let us consider an existential1 instead 
of an attributive1 judgment4 ,if ,i say1
 ,the object ,a does not exist1 ,i mean 
by that1 first1 that we might believe   

that the object ,a exists3 how1 indeed1 
can we think of the object ,a without   
thinking it existing1 and1 once again1  
what difference can there be between the
 idea of the object ,a existing and the 
idea pure and simple of the object ,a8  
,therefore1 merely by saying ,the object
 ,a1 ,i attribute to it some kind of    
existence1 though it be that of a mere  
possible1 that is to say1 of a pure     
idea4 ,and consequently1 in the judgment
 ,the object ,a is not1 there is at     
first an affirmation such as ,the object
 ,a has been1 or ,the object ,a will be1
 or1 more generally1 ,the object ,a     
exists at least as a mere possible4     
,now1 when ,i add the two words is not1 
,i can only mean that if we go further1 
if we erect the possible object into a  
real object1 we shall be mistaken1 and  
that the possible of which ,i am        
speaking is excluded from the actual    
reality as incompatible with it4        
,judgments that posit the non-existence 
of a thing are therefore judgments that 

formulate a contrast between the        
possible and the actual 7that is1       
between two kinds of existence1 one     
thought and the other found71 where a   
person1 real or imaginary1 wrongly      
believes that a certain possible is     
realized4 ,instead of this possible1    
there is a reality that differs from it 
and rejects it3 the negative judgment   
expresses this contrast1 but it         
expresses the contrast in an            
intentionally incomplete form1 because  
it is addressed to a person who is      
supposed to be interested exclusively in
 the possible that is indicated1 and is 
not concerned to know by what kind of   
reality the possible is replaced4 ,the  
expression of the substitution is       
therefore bound to be cut short4        
,instead of affirming that a second term
 is substituted for the first1 the      
attention which was originally directed 
to the first term will be kept fixed    
upon it1 and upon it alone4 ,and1       
without going beyond the first1 we shall

 implicitly affirm that a second term   
replaces it in saying that the first is 
not4 ,we shall thus judge a judgment    
instead of judging a thing4 ,we shall   
warn others or warn ourselves of a      
possible error instead of supplying     
positive information4 ,suppress every   
intention of this kind1 give knowledge  
back its exclusively scientific or      
philosophical character1 suppose in     
other words that reality comes itself to
 inscribe itself on a mind that cares   
only for things and is not interested in
 persons3 we shall affirm that such or  
such a thing is1 we shall never affirm  
that a thing is not4  ,how comes it1    
then1 that affirmation and negation are 
so persistently put on the same level   
and endowed with an equal objectivity8  
,how comes it that we have so much      
difficulty in recognizing that negation 
is subjective1 artificially cut short1  
relative to the human mind and still    
more to the social life8 ,the reason is1
 no doubt1 that both negation and       

affirmation are expressed in            
propositions1 and that any proposition1 
being formed of words1 which symbolize  
concepts1 is something relative to      
social life and to the human intellect4 
,whether ,i say ,the ground is damp or  
,the ground is not damp1 in both cases  
the terms ground and damp are concepts  
more or less artificially created by the
 mind of man--extracted1 by his free    
initiative1 from the continuity of      
experience4 ,in both cases the concepts 
are represented by the same conventional
 words4 ,in both cases we can say indeed
 that the proposition aims at a social  
and pedagogical end1 since the first    
would propagate a truth as the second   
would prevent an error4 ,from this point
 of view1 which is that of formal logic1
 to affirm and to deny are indeed two   
mutually symmetrical acts1 of which the 
first establishes a relation of         
agreement and the second a relation of  
disagreement between a subject and an   
attribute4 ,but how do we fail to see   

that the symmetry is altogether external
 and the likeness superficial8 ,suppose 
language fallen into disuse1 society    
dissolved1 every intellectual           
initiative1 every faculty of            
self-reflection and of self-judgment    
atrophied in man3 the dampness of the   
ground will subsist none the less1      
capable of inscribing itself            
automatically in sensation and of       
sending a vague idea to the deadened    
intellect4 ,the intellect will still    
affirm1 in implicit terms4 ,and         
consequently1 neither distinct concepts1
 nor words1 nor the desire of spreading 
the truth1 nor that of bettering        
oneself1 are of the very essence of the 
affirmation4 ,but this passive          
intelligence1 mechanically keeping step 
with experience1 neither anticipating   
nor following the course of the real1   
would have no wish to deny4 ,it could   
not receive an imprint of negation2 for1
 once again1 that which exists may come 
to be recorded1 but the non-existence of

 the non-existing cannot4 ,for such an  
intellect to reach the point of denying1
 it must awake from its torpor1         
formulate the disappointment of a real  
or possible expectation1 correct an     
actual or possible error--in short1     
propose to teach others or to teach     
itself4  ,it is rather difficult to     
perceive this in the example we have    
chosen1 but the example is indeed the   
more instructive and the argument the   
more cogent on that account4 ,if        
dampness is able automatically to come  
and record itself1 it is the same1 it   
will be said1 with non-dampness2 for the
 dry as well as the damp can give       
impressions to sense1 which will        
transmit them1 as more or less distinct 
ideas1 to the intelligence4 ,in this    
sense the negation of dampness is as    
objective a thing1 as purely            
intellectual1 as remote from every      
pedagogical intention1 as               
affirmation4--,but let us look at it    
more closely3 we shall see that the     

negative proposition1 ,the ground is not
 damp1 and the affirmative proposition1 
,the ground is dry1 have entirely       
different contents4 ,the second implies 
that we know the dry1 that we have      
experienced the specific sensations1    
tactile or visual for example1 that are 
at the base of this idea4 ,the first    
requires nothing of the sort2 it could  
equally well have been formulated by an 
intelligent fish1 who had never         
perceived anything but the wet4 ,it     
would be necessary1 it is true1 that    
this fish should have risen to the      
distinction between the real and the    
possible1 and that he should care to    
anticipate the error of his             
fellow-fishes1 who doubtless consider as
 alone possible the condition of wetness
 in which they actually live4 ,keep     
strictly to the terms of the            
proposition1 ,the ground is not damp1   
and you will find that it means two     
things3 7#a7 that one might believe that
 the ground is damp1 7#b7 that the      

dampness is replaced in fact by a       
certain quality x4 ,this quality is left
 indeterminate1 either because we have  
no positive knowledge of it1 or because 
it has no actual interest for the person
 to whom the negation is addressed4 ,to 
deny1 therefore1 always consists in     
presenting in an abridged form a system 
of two affirmations3 the one            
determinate1 which applies to a certain 
possible2 the other indeterminate1      
referring to the unknown or indifferent 
reality that supplants this possibility4
 ,the second affirmation is virtually   
contained in the judgment we apply to   
the first1 a judgment which is negation 
itself4 ,and what gives negation its    
subjective character is precisely this1 
that in the discovery of a replacement  
it takes account only of the replaced1  
and is not concerned with what replaces4
 ,the replaced exists only as a         
conception of the mind4 ,it is          
necessary1 in order to continue to see  
it1 and consequently in order to speak  

of it1 to turn our back on the reality1 
which flows from the past to the        
present1 advancing from behind4 ,it is  
this that we do when we deny4 ,we       
discover the change1 or more generally  
the substitution1 as a traveller would  
see the course of his carriage if he    
looked out behind1 and only knew at each
 moment the point at which he had ceased
 to be2 he could never determine his    
actual position except by relation to   
that which he had just quitted1 instead 
of grasping it in itself4  ,to sum up1  
for a mind which should follow purely   
and simply the thread of experience1    
there would be no void1 no nought1 even 
relative or partial1 no possible        
negation4 ,such a mind would see facts  
succeed facts1 states succeed states1   
things succeed things4 ,what it would   
note at each moment would be things     
existing1 states appearing1 events      
happening4 ,it would live in the actual1
 and1 if it were capable of judging1 it 
would never affirm anything except the  

existence of the present4  ,endow this  
mind with memory1 and especially with   
the desire to dwell on the past2 give it
 the faculty of dissociating and of     
distinguishing3 it will no longer only  
note the present state of the passing   
reality2 it will represent the passing  
as a change1 and therefore as a contrast
 between what has been and what is4 ,and
 as there is no essential difference    
between a past that we remember and a   
past that we imagine1 it will quickly   
rise to the idea of the possible in     
general4  ,it will thus be shunted on to
 the siding of negation4 ,and especially
 it will be at the point of representing
 a disappearance4 ,but it will not yet  
have reached it4 ,to represent that a   
thing has disappeared1 it is not enough 
to perceive a contrast between the past 
and the present2 it is necessary besides
 to turn our back on the present1 to    
dwell on the past1 and to think the     
contrast of the past with the present in
 terms of the past only1 without letting

 the present appear in it4  ,the idea of
 annihilation is therefore not a pure   
idea2 it implies that we regret the past
 or that we conceive it as regrettable1 
that we have some reason to linger over 
it4 ,the idea arises when the phenomenon
 of substitution is cut in two by a mind
 which considers only the first half1   
because that alone interests it4        
,suppress all interest1 all feeling1 and
 there is nothing left but the reality  
that flows1 together with the knowledge 
ever renewed that it impresses on us of 
its present state4  ,from annihilation  
to negation1 which is a more general    
operation1 there is now only a step4    
,all that is necessary is to represent  
the contrast of what is1 not only with  
what has been1 but also with all that   
might have been4 ,and we must express   
this contrast as a function of what     
might have been1 and not of what is2 we 
must affirm the existence of the actual 
while looking only at the possible4 ,the
 formula we thus obtain no longer       

expresses merely a disappointment of the
 individual2 it is made to correct or   
guard against an error1 which is rather 
supposed to be the error of another4 ,in
 this sense1 negation has a pedagogical 
and social character4  ,now1 once       
negation is formulated1 it presents an  
aspect symmetrical with that of         
affirmation2 if affirmation affirms an  
objective reality1 it seems that        
negation must affirm a non-reality      
equally objective1 and1 so to say1      
equally real4 ,in which we are both     
right and wrong3 wrong1 because negation
 cannot be objectified1 in so far as it 
is negative2 right1 however1 in that the
 negation of a thing implies the latent 
affirmation of its replacement by       
something else1 which we systematically 
leave on one side4 ,but the negative    
form of negation benefits by the        
affirmation at the bottom of it4        
,bestriding the positive solid reality  
to which it is attached1 this phantom   
objectifies itself4 ,thus is formed the 

idea of the void or of a partial nought1
 a thing being supposed to be replaced1 
not by another thing1 but by a void     
which it leaves1 that is1 by the        
negation of itself4 ,now1 as this       
operation works on anything whatever1 we
 suppose it performed on each thing in  
turn1 and finally on all things in      
block4 ,we thus obtain the idea of      
absolute ,nothing4 ,if now we analyze   
this idea of ,nothing1 we find that it  
is1 at bottom1 the idea of ,everything1 
together with a movement of the mind    
that keeps jumping from one thing to    
another1 refuses to stand still1 and    
concentrates all its attention on this  
refusal by never determining its actual 
position except by relation to that     
which it has just left4 ,it is therefore
 an idea eminently comprehensive and    
full1 as full and comprehensive as the  
idea of ,all1 to which it is very       
closely akin4  ,how then can the idea of
 ,nought be opposed to that of ,all8 ,is
 it not plain that this is to oppose the

 full to the full1 and that the         
question1 ,why does something exist8 is 
consequently without meaning1 a         
pseudo-problem raised about a           
pseudo-idea8 ,yet we must say once more 
why this phantom of a problem haunts the
 mind with such obstinacy4 ,in vain do  
we show that in the idea of an          
annihilation of the real there is only  
the image of all realities expelling one
 another endlessly1 in a circle2 in vain
 do we add that the idea of             
non-existence is only that of the       
expulsion of an imponderable existence1 
or a merely possible existence1 by a    
more substantial existence which would  
then be the true reality2 in vain do we 
find in the sui generis form of negation
 an element which is not                
intellectual--negation being the        
judgment of a judgment1 an admonition   
given to some one else or to oneself1 so
 that it is absurd to attribute to      
negation the power of creating ideas of 
a new kind1 viz4 ideas without          

content2--in spite of all1 the          
conviction persists that before things1 
or at least under things1 there is      
,nothing4 ,if we seek the reason of this
 fact1 we shall find it precisely in the
 feeling1 in the social and1 so to      
speak1 practical element1 that gives its
 specific form to negation4 ,the        
greatest philosophic difficulties arise1
 as we have said1 from the fact that the
 forms of human action venture outside  
of their proper sphere4 ,we are made in 
order to act as much as1 and more than1 
in order to think--or rather1 when we   
follow the bent of our nature1 it is in 
order to act that we think4 ,it is      
therefore no wonder that the habits of  
action give their tone to those of      
thought1 and that our mind always       
perceives things in the same order in   
which we are accustomed to picture them 
when we propose to act on them4 ,now1 it
 is unquestionable1 as we remarked      
above1 that every human action has its  
starting-point in a dissatisfaction1 and

 thereby in a feeling of absence4 ,we   
should not act if we did not set before 
ourselves an end1 and we seek a thing   
only because we feel the lack of it4    
,our action proceeds thus from nothing  
to something1 and its very essence is to
 embroider something on the canvas of   
nothing4 ,the truth is that the nothing 
concerned here is the absence not so    
much of a thing as of a utility4 ,if ,i 
bring a visitor into a room that ,i have
 not yet furnished1 ,i say to him that  
there is nothing in it4 ,yet ,i know the
 room is full of air2 but1 as we do not 
sit on air1 the room truly contains     
nothing that at this moment1 for the    
visitor and for myself1 counts for      
anything4 ,in a general way1 human work 
consists in creating utility2 and1 as   
long as the work is not done1 there is  
nothing--nothing that we want4 ,our life
 is thus spent in filling voids1 which  
our intellect conceives under the       
influence1 by no means intellectual1 of 
desire and of regret1 under the pressure

 of vital necessities2 and if we mean by
 void an absence of utility and not of  
things1 we may say1 in this quite       
relative sense1 that we are constantly  
going from the void to the full3 such is
 the direction which our action takes4  
,our speculation cannot help doing the  
same2 and1 naturally1 it passes from the
 relative sense to the absolute sense1  
since it is exercised on things         
themselves and not on the utility they  
have for us4 ,thus is implanted in us   
the idea that reality fills a void1 and 
that ,nothing1 conceived as an absence  
of everything1 pre-exists before all    
things in right1 if not in fact4 ,it is 
this illusion that we have tried to     
remove by showing that the idea of      
,nothing1 if we try to see in it that of
 an annihilation of all things1 is      
self-destructive and reduced to a mere  
word2 and that if1 on the contrary1 it  
is truly an idea1 then we find in it as 
much matter as in the idea of ,all4     
99       99       99       99       99  

,this long analysis has been necessary  
to show that a self-sufficient reality  
is not necessarily a reality foreign to 
duration4 ,if we pass 7consciously or   
unconsciously7 through the idea of the  
nought in order to reach that of being1 
the being to which we come is a logical 
or mathematical essence1 therefore      
non-temporal4 ,and1 consequently1 a     
static conception of the real is forced 
on us3 everything appears given once for
 all1 in eternity4 ,but we must accustom
 ourselves to think being directly1     
without making a detour1 without first  
appealing to the phantom of the nought  
which interposes itself between it and  
us4 ,we must strive to see in order to  
see1 and no longer to see in order to   
act4 ,then the ,absolute is revealed    
very near us and1 in a certain measure1 
in us4 ,it is of psychological and not  
of mathematical nor logical essence4 ,it
 lives with us4 ,like us1 but in certain
 aspects infinitely more concentrated   
and more gathered up in itself1 it      

endures4  ,but do we ever think true    
duration8 ,here again a direct taking   
possession is necessary4 ,it is no use  
trying to approach duration3 we must    
install ourselves within it straight    
away4 ,this is what the intellect       
generally refuses to do1 accustomed as  
it is to think the moving by means of   
the unmovable4  ,the function of the    
intellect is to preside over actions4   
,now1 in action1 it is the result that  
interests us2 the means matter little   
provided the end is attained4 ,thence it
 comes that we are altogether bent on   
the end to be realized1 generally       
trusting ourselves to it in order that  
the idea may become an act2 and thence  
it comes also that only the goal where  
our activity will rest is pictured      
explicitly to our mind3 the movements   
constituting the action itself either   
elude our consciousness or reach it only
 confusedly4 ,let us consider a very    
simple act1 like that of lifting the    
arm4 ,where should we be if we had to   

imagine beforehand all the elementary   
contractions and tensions this act      
involves1 or even to perceive them1 one 
by one1 as they are accomplished8 ,but  
the mind is carried immediately to the  
end1 that is to say1 to the schematic   
and simplified vision of the act        
supposed accomplished4 ,then1 if no     
antagonistic idea neutralizes the effect
 of the first idea1 the appropriate     
movements come of themselves to fill out
 the plan1 drawn in some way by the void
 of its gaps4 ,the intellect1 then1 only
 represents to the activity ends to     
attain1 that is to say1 points of rest4 
,and1 from one end attained to another  
end attained1 from one rest to another  
rest1 our activity is carried by a      
series of leaps1 during which our       
consciousness is turned away as much as 
possible from the movement going on1 to 
regard only the anticipated image of the
 movement accomplished4  ,now1 in order 
that it may represent as unmovable the  
result of the act which is being        

accomplished1 the intellect must        
perceive1 as also unmovable1 the        
surroundings in which this result is    
being framed4 ,our activity is fitted   
into the material world4 ,if matter     
appeared to us as a perpetual flowing1  
we should assign no termination to any  
of our actions4 ,we should feel each of 
them dissolve as fast as it was         
accomplished1 and we should not         
anticipate an ever-fleeting future4 ,in 
order that our activity may leap from an
 act to an act1 it is necessary that    
matter should pass from a state to a    
state1 for it is only into a state of   
the material world that action can fit a
 result1 so as to be accomplished4 ,but 
is it thus that matter presents itself8 
,a priori we may presume that our       
perception manages to apprehend matter  
with this bias4 ,sensory organs and     
motor organs are in fact cordinated with
 each other4 ,now1 the first symbolize  
our faculty of perceiving1 as the second
 our faculty of acting4 ,the organism   

thus evidences1 in a visible and        
tangible form1 the perfect accord of    
perception and action4 ,so if our       
activity always aims at a result into   
which it is momentarily fitted1 our     
perception must retain of the material  
world1 at every moment1 only a state in 
which it is provisionally placed4 ,this 
is the most natural hypothesis4 ,and it 
is easy to see that experience confirms 
it4  ,from our first glance at the      
world1 before we even make our bodies in
 it1 we distinguish qualities4 ,color   
succeeds to color1 sound to sound1      
resistance to resistance1 etc4 ,each of 
these qualities1 taken separately1 is a 
state that seems to persist as such1    
immovable until another replaces it4    
,yet each of these qualities resolves   
itself1 on analysis1 into an enormous   
number of elementary movements4 ,whether
 we see in it vibrations or whether we  
represent it in any other way1 one fact 
is certain1 it is that every quality is 
change4 ,in vain1 moreover1 shall we    

seek beneath the change the thing which 
changes3 it is always provisionally1 and
 in order to satisfy our imagination1   
that we attach the movement to a mobile4
 ,the mobile flies for ever before the  
pursuit of science1 which is concerned  
with mobility alone4 ,in the smallest   
discernible fraction of a second1 in the
 almost instantaneous perception of a   
sensible quality1 there may be trillions
 of oscillations which repeat           
themselves4 ,the permanence of a        
sensible quality consists in this       
repetition of movements1 as the         
persistence of life consists in a series
 of palpitations4 ,the primal function  
of perception is precisely to grasp a   
series of elementary changes under the  
form of a quality or of a simple state1 
by a work of condensation4 ,the greater 
the power of acting bestowed upon an    
animal species1 the more numerous1      
probably1 are the elementary changes    
that its faculty of perceiving          
concentrates into one of its instants4  

,and the progress must be continuous1 in
 nature1 from the beings that vibrate   
almost in unison with the oscillations  
of the ether1 up to those that embrace  
trillions of these oscillations in the  
shortest of their simple perceptions4   
,the first feel hardly anything but     
movements2 the others perceive quality4 
,the first are almost caught up in the  
running-gear of things2 the others      
react1 and the tension of their faculty 
of acting is probably proportional to   
the concentration of their faculty of   
perceiving4 ,the progress goes on even  
in humanity itself4 ,a man is so much   
the more a man of action as he can      
embrace in a glance a greater number of 
events3 he who perceives successive     
events one by one will allow himself to 
be led by them2 he who grasps them as a 
whole will dominate them4 ,in short1 the
 qualities of matter are so many stable 
views that we take of its instability4  
,now1 in the continuity of sensible     
qualities we mark off the boundaries of 

bodies4 ,each of these bodies really    
changes at every moment4 ,in the first  
place1 it resolves itself into a group  
of qualities1 and every quality1 as we  
said1 consists of a succession of       
elementary movements4 ,but1 even if we  
regard the quality as a stable state1   
the body is still unstable in that it   
changes qualities without ceasing4 ,the 
body pre-eminently--that which we are   
most justified in isolating within the  
continuity of matter1 because it        
constitutes a relatively closed         
system--is the living body2 it is1      
moreover1 for it that we cut out the    
others within the whole4 ,now1 life is  
an evolution4 ,we concentrate a period  
of this evolution in a stable view which
 we call a form1 and1 when the change   
has become considerable enough to       
overcome the fortunate inertia of our   
perception1 we say that the body has    
changed its form4 ,but in reality the   
body is changing form at every moment2  
or rather1 there is no form1 since form 

is immobile and the reality is movement4
 ,what is real is the continual change  
of form3 form is only a snapshot view of
 a transition4 ,therefore1 here again1  
our perception manages to solidify into 
discontinuous images the fluid          
continuity of the real4 ,when the       
successive images do not differ from    
each other too much1 we consider them   
all as the waxing and waning of a single
 mean image1 or as the deformation of   
this image in different directions4 ,and
 to this mean we really allude when we  
speak of the essence of a thing1 or of  
the thing itself4  ,finally things1 once
 constituted1 show on the surface1 by   
their changes of situation1 the profound
 changes that are being accomplished    
within the ,whole4 ,we say then that    
they act on one another4 ,this action   
appears to us1 no doubt1 in the form of 
movement4 ,but from the mobility of the 
movement we turn away as much as we can2
 what interests us is1 as we said above1
 the unmovable plan of the movement     

rather than the movement itself4 ,is it 
a simple movement8 ,we ask ourselves    
where it is going4 ,it is by its        
direction1 that is to say1 by the       
position of its provisional end1 that we
 represent it at every moment4 ,is it a 
complex movement8 ,we would know above  
all what is going on1 what the movement 
is doing--in other words1 the result    
obtained or the presiding intention4    
,examine closely what is in your mind   
when you speak of an action in course of
 accomplishment4 ,the idea of change is 
there1 ,i am willing to grant1 but it is
 hidden in the penumbra4 ,in the full   
light is the motionless plan of the act 
supposed accomplished4 ,it is by this1  
and by this only1 that the complex act  
is distinguished and defined4 ,we should
 be very much embarrassed if we had to  
imagine the movements inherent in the   
actions of eating1 drinking1 fighting1  
etc4 ,it is enough for us to know1 in a 
general and indefinite way1 that all    
these acts are movements4 ,once that    

side of the matter has been settled1 we 
simply seek to represent the general    
plan of each of these complex movements1
 that is to say the motionless design   
that underlies them4 ,here again        
knowledge bears on a state rather than  
on a change4 ,it is therefore the same  
with this third case as with the others4
 ,whether the movement be qualitative or
 evolutionary or extensive1 the mind    
manages to take stable views of the     
instability4 ,and thence the mind       
derives1 as we have just shown1 three   
kinds of representations3 7#a7          
qualities1 7#b7 forms of essences1 7#c7 
acts4  ,to these three ways of seeing   
correspond three categories of words3   
adjectives1 substantives1 and verbs1    
which are the primordial elements of    
language4 ,adjectives and substantives  
therefore symbolize states4 ,but the    
verb itself1 if we keep to the clear    
part of the idea it calls up1 hardly    
expresses anything else4         99     
99       99       99       99  ,now1 if 

we try to characterize more precisely   
our natural attitude towards ,becoming1 
this is what we find4 ,becoming is      
infinitely varied4 ,that which goes from
 yellow to green is not like that which 
goes from green to blue3 they are       
different qualitative movements4 ,that  
which goes from flower to fruit is not  
like that which goes from larva to nymph
 and from nymph to perfect insect3 they 
are different evolutionary movements4   
,the action of eating or of drinking is 
not like the action of fighting3 they   
are different extensive movements4 ,and 
these three kinds of movement           
themselves--qualitative1 evolutionary1  
extensive--differ profoundly4 ,the trick
 of our perception1 like that of our    
intelligence1 like that of our language1
 consists in extracting from these      
profoundly different becomings the      
single representation of becoming in    
general1 undefined becoming1 a mere     
abstraction which by itself says nothing
 and of which1 indeed1 it is very rarely

 that we think4 ,to this idea1 always   
the same1 and always obscure or         
unconscious1 we then join1 in each      
particular case1 one or several clear   
images that represent states and which  
serve to distinguish all becomings from 
each other4 ,it is this composition of a
 specified and definite state with      
change general and undefined that we    
substitute for the specific change4 ,an 
infinite multiplicity of becomings      
variously colored1 so to speak1 passes  
before our eyes3 we manage so that we   
see only differences of color1 that is  
to say1 differences of state1 beneath   
which there is supposed to flow1 hidden 
from our view1 a becoming always and    
everywhere the same1 invariably         
colorless4  ,suppose we wish to portray 
on a screen a living picture1 such as   
the marching past of a regiment4 ,there 
is one way in which it might first occur
 to us to do it4 ,that would be to cut  
out jointed figures representing the    
soldiers1 to give to each of them the   

movement of marching1 a movement varying
 from individual to individual although 
common to the human species1 and to     
throw the whole on the screen4 ,we      
should need to spend on this little game
 an enormous amount of work1 and even   
then we should obtain but a very poor   
result3 how could it1 at its best1      
reproduce the suppleness and variety of 
life8 ,now1 there is another way of     
proceeding1 more easy and at the same   
time more effective4 ,it is to take a   
series of snapshots of the passing      
regiment and to throw these             
instantaneous views on the screen1 so   
that they replace each other very       
rapidly4 ,this is what the cinematograph
 does4 ,with photographs1 each of which 
represents the regiment in a fixed      
attitude1 it reconstitutes the mobility 
of the regiment marching4 ,it is true   
that if we had to do with photographs   
alone1 however much we might look at    
them1 we should never see them animated3
 with immobility set beside immobility1 

even endlessly1 we could never make     
movement4 ,in order that the pictures   
may be animated1 there must be movement 
somewhere4 ,the movement does indeed    
exist here2 it is in the apparatus4 ,it 
is because the film of the cinematograph
 unrolls1 bringing in turn the different
 photographs of the scene to continue   
each other1 that each actor of the scene
 recovers his mobility2 he strings all  
his successive attitudes on the         
invisible movement of the film4 ,the    
process then consists in extracting from
 all the movements peculiar to all the  
figures an impersonal movement abstract 
and simple1 movement in general1 so to  
speak3 we put this into the apparatus1  
and we reconstitute the individuality of
 each particular movement by combining  
this nameless movement with the personal
 attitudes4 ,such is the contrivance of 
the cinematograph4 ,and such is also    
that of our knowledge4 ,instead of      
attaching ourselves to the inner        
becoming of things1 we place ourselves  

outside them in order to recompose their
 becoming artificially4 ,we take        
snapshots1 as it were1 of the passing   
reality1 and1 as these are              
characteristic of the reality1 we have  
only to string them on a becoming1      
abstract1 uniform and invisible1        
situated at the back of the apparatus of
 knowledge1 in order to imitate what    
there is that is characteristic in this 
becoming itself4 ,perception1           
intellection1 language so proceed in    
general4 ,whether we would think        
becoming1 or express it1 or even        
perceive it1 we hardly do anything else 
than set going a kind of cinematograph  
inside us4 ,we may therefore sum up what
 we have been saying in the conclusion  
that the mechanism of our ordinary      
knowledge is of a cinematographical     
kind4  ,of the altogether practical     
character of this operation there is no 
possible doubt4 ,each of our acts aims  
at a certain insertion of our will into 
the reality4 ,there is1 between our body

 and other bodies1 an arrangement like  
that of the pieces of glass that compose
 a kaleidoscopic picture4 ,our activity 
goes from an arrangement to a           
rearrangement1 each time no doubt giving
 the kaleidoscope a new shake1 but not  
interesting itself in the shake1 and    
seeing only the new picture4 ,our       
knowledge of the operation of nature    
must be exactly symmetrical1 therefore1 
with the interest we take in our own    
operation4 ,in this sense we may say1 if
 we are not abusing this kind of        
illustration1 that the cinematographical
 character of our knowledge of things is
 due to the kaleidoscopic character of  
our adaptation to them4  ,the           
cinematographical method is therefore   
the only practical method1 since it     
consists in making the general character
 of knowledge form itself on that of    
action1 while expecting that the detail 
of each act should depend in its turn on
 that of knowledge4 ,in order that      
action may always be enlightened1       

intelligence must always be present in  
it2 but intelligence1 in order thus to  
accompany the progress of activity and  
ensure its direction1 must begin by     
adopting its rhythm4 ,action is         
discontinuous1 like every pulsation of  
life2 discontinuous1 therefore1 is      
knowledge4 ,the mechanism of the faculty
 of knowing has been constructed on this
 plan4 ,essentially practical1 can it be
 of use1 such as it is1 for speculation8
 ,let us try with it to follow reality  
in its windings1 and see what will      
happen4  ,i take of the continuity of a 
particular becoming a series of views1  
which ,i connect together by becoming in
 general4 ,but of course ,i cannot stop 
there4 ,what is not determinable is not 
representable3 of becoming in general ,i
 have only a verbal knowledge4 ,as the  
letter x designates a certain unknown   
quantity1 whatever it may be1 so my     
becoming in general1 always the same1   
symbolizes here a certain transition of 
which ,i have taken some snapshots2 of  

the transition itself it teaches me     
nothing4 ,let me then concentrate myself
 wholly on the transition1 and1 between 
any two snapshots1 endeavor to realize  
what is going on4 ,as ,i apply the same 
method1 ,i obtain the same result2 a    
third view merely slips in between the  
two others4 ,i may begin again as often 
as ,i will1 ,i may set views alongside  
of views for ever1 ,i shall obtain      
nothing else4 ,the application of the   
cinematographical method therefore leads
 to a perpetual recommencement1 during  
which the mind1 never able to satisfy   
itself and never finding where to rest1 
persuades itself1 no doubt1 that it     
imitates by its instability the very    
movement of the real4 ,but though1 by   
straining itself to the point of        
giddiness1 it may end by giving itself  
the illusion of mobility1 its operation 
has not advanced it a step1 since it    
remains as far as ever from its goal4   
,in order to advance with the moving    
reality1 you must replace yourself      

within it4 ,install yourself within     
change1 and you will grasp at once both 
change itself and the successive states 
in which it might at any instant be     
immobilized4 ,but with these successive 
states1 perceived from without as real  
and no longer as potential immobilities1
 you will never reconstitute movement4  
,call them qualities1 forms1 positions1 
or intentions1 as the case may be1      
multiply the number of them as you will1
 let the interval between two           
consecutive states be infinitely small3 
before the intervening movement you will
 always experience the disappointment of
 the child who tries by clapping his    
hands together to crush the smoke4 ,the 
movement slips through the interval1    
because every attempt to reconstitute   
change out of states implies the absurd 
proposition1 that movement is made of   
immobilities4  ,philosophy perceived    
this as soon as it opened its eyes4 ,the
 arguments of ,zeno of ,elea1 although  
formulated with a very different        

intention1 have no other meaning4  ,take
 the flying arrow4 ,at every moment1    
says ,zeno1 it is motionless1 for it    
cannot have time to move1 that is1 to   
occupy at least two successive          
positions1 unless at least two moments  
are allowed it4 ,at a given moment1     
therefore1 it is at rest at a given     
point4 ,motionless in each point of its 
course1 it is motionless during all the 
time that it is moving4  ,yes1 if we    
suppose that the arrow can ever be in a 
point of its course4 ,yes again1 if the 
arrow1 which is moving1 ever coincides  
with a position1 which is motionless4   
,but the arrow never is in any point of 
its course4 ,the most we can say is that
 it might be there1 in this sense1 that 
it passes there and might stop there4   
,it is true that if it did stop there1  
it would be at rest there1 and at this  
point it is no longer movement that we  
should have to do with4 ,the truth is   
that if the arrow leaves the point ,a to
 fall down at the point ,b1 its movement

 ,,ab is as simple1 as indecomposable1  
in so far as it is movement1 as the     
tension of the bow that shoots it4 ,as  
the shrapnel1 bursting before it falls  
to the ground1 covers the explosive zone
 with an indivisible danger1 so the     
arrow which goes from ,a to ,b displays 
with a single stroke1 although over a   
certain extent of duration1 its         
indivisible mobility4 ,suppose an       
elastic stretched from ,a to ,b1 could  
you divide its extension8 ,the course of
 the arrow is this very extension2 it is
 equally simple and equally undivided4  
,it is a single and unique bound4 ,you  
fix a point ,c in the interval passed1  
and say that at a certain moment the    
arrow was in ,c4 ,if it had been there1 
it would have been stopped there1 and   
you would no longer have had a flight   
from ,a to ,b1 but two flights1 one from
 ,a to ,c and the other from ,c to ,b1  
with an interval of rest4 ,a single     
movement is entirely1 by the hypothesis1
 a movement between two stops2 if there 

are intermediate stops1 it is no longer 
a single movement4 ,at bottom1 the      
illusion arises from this1 that the     
movement1 once effected1 has laid along 
its course a motionless trajectory on   
which we can count as many immobilities 
as we will4 ,from this we conclude that 
the movement1 whilst being effected1    
lays at each instant beneath it a       
position with which it coincides4 ,we do
 not see that the trajectory is created 
in one stroke1 although a certain time  
is required for it2 and that though we  
can divide at will the trajectory once  
created1 we cannot divide its creation1 
which is an act in progress and not a   
thing4 ,to suppose that the moving body 
is at a point of its course is to cut   
the course in two by a snip of the      
scissors at this point1 and to          
substitute two trajectories for the     
single trajectory which we were first   
considering4 ,it is to distinguish two  
successive acts where1 by the           
hypothesis1 there is only one4 ,in      

short1 it is to attribute to the course 
itself of the arrow everything that can 
be said of the interval that the arrow  
has traversed1 that is to say1 to admit 
a priori the absurdity that movement    
coincides with immobility4  ,we shall   
not dwell here on the three other       
arguments of ,zeno4 ,we have examined   
them elsewhere4 ,it is enough to point  
out that they all consist in applying   
the movement to the line traversed1 and 
supposing that what is true of the line 
is true of the movement4 ,the line1 for 
example1 may be divided into as many    
parts as we wish1 of any length that we 
wish1 and it is always the same line4   
,from this we conclude that we have the 
right to suppose the movement           
articulated as we wish1 and that it is  
always the same movement4 ,we thus      
obtain a series of absurdities that all 
express the same fundamental absurdity4 
,but the possibility of applying the    
movement to the line traversed exists   
only for an observer who keeping outside

 the movement and seeing at every       
instant the possibility of a stop1 tries
 to reconstruct the real movement with  
these possible immobilities4 ,the       
absurdity vanishes as soon as we adopt  
by thought the continuity of the real   
movement1 a continuity of which every   
one of us is conscious whenever he lifts
 an arm or advances a step4 ,we feel    
then indeed that the line passed over   
between two stops is described with a   
single indivisible stroke1 and that we  
seek in vain to practice on the         
movement1 which traces the line1        
divisions corresponding1 each to each1  
with the divisions arbitrarily chosen of
 the line once it has been traced4 ,the 
line traversed by the moving body lends 
itself to any kind of division1 because 
it has no internal organization4 ,but   
all movement is articulated inwardly4   
,it is either an indivisible bound      
7which may occupy1 nevertheless1 a very 
long duration7 or a series of           
indivisible bounds4 ,take the           

articulations of this movement into     
account1 or give up speculating on its  
nature4  ,when ,achilles pursues the    
tortoise1 each of his steps must be     
treated as indivisible1 and so must each
 step of the tortoise4 ,after a certain 
number of steps1 ,achilles will have    
overtaken the tortoise4 ,there is       
nothing more simple4 ,if you insist on  
dividing the two motions further1       
distinguish both on the one side and on 
the other1 in the course of ,achilles   
and in that of the tortoise1 the        
sub-multiples of the steps of each of   
them2 but respect the natural           
articulations of the two courses4 ,as   
long as you respect them1 no difficulty 
will arise1 because you will follow the 
indications of experience4 ,but ,zeno's 
device is to reconstruct the movement of
 ,achilles according to a law           
arbitrarily chosen4 ,achilles with a    
first step is supposed to arrive at the 
point where the tortoise was1 with a    
second step at the point which it has   

moved to while he was making the first1 
and so on4 ,in this case1 ,achilles     
would always have a new step to take4   
,but obviously1 to overtake the         
tortoise1 he goes about it in quite     
another way4 ,the movement considered by
 ,zeno would only be the equivalent of  
the movement of ,achilles if we could   
treat the movement as we treat the      
interval passed through1 decomposable   
and recomposable at will4 ,once you     
subscribe to this first absurdity1 all  
the others follow4#ii  ,nothing would be
 easier1 now1 than to extend ,zeno's    
argument to qualitative becoming and to 
evolutionary becoming4 ,we should find  
the same contradictions in these4 ,that 
the child can become a youth1 ripen to  
maturity and decline to old age1 we     
understand when we consider that vital  
evolution is here the reality itself4   
,infancy1 adolescence1 maturity1 old    
age1 are mere views of the mind1        
possible stops imagined by us1 from     
without1 along the continuity of a      

progress4 ,on the contrary1 let         
childhood1 adolescence1 maturity and old
 age be given as integral parts of the  
evolution1 they become real stops1 and  
we can no longer conceive how evolution 
is possible1 for rests placed beside    
rests will never be equivalent to a     
movement4 ,how1 with what is made1 can  
we reconstitute what is being made8     
,how1 for instance1 from childhood once 
posited as a thing1 shall we pass to    
adolescence1 when1 by the hypothesis1   
childhood only is given8 ,if we look at 
it closely1 we shall see that our       
habitual manner of speaking1 which is   
fashioned after our habitual manner of  
thinking1 leads us to actual logical    
dead-locks--dead-locks to which we allow
 ourselves to be led without anxiety1   
because we feel confusedly that we can  
always get out of them if we like3 all  
that we have to do1 in fact1 is to give 
up the cinematographical habits of our  
intellect4 ,when we say ,the child      
becomes a man1 let us take care not to  

fathom too deeply the literal meaning of
 the expression1 or we shall find that1 
when we posit the subject child1 the    
attribute man does not yet apply to it1 
and that1 when we express the attribute 
man1 it applies no more to the subject  
child4 ,the reality1 which is the       
transition from childhood to manhood1   
has slipped between our fingers4 ,we    
have only the imaginary stops child and 
man1 and we are very near to saying that
 one of these stops is the other1 just  
as the arrow of ,zeno is1 according to  
that philosopher1 at all the points of  
the course4 ,the truth is that if       
language here were molded on reality1 we
 should not say ,the child becomes the  
man1 but ,there is becoming from the    
child to the man4 ,in the first         
proposition1 becomes is a verb of       
indeterminate meaning1 intended to mask 
the absurdity into which we fall when we
 attribute the state man to the subject 
child4 ,it behaves in much the same way 
as the movement1 always the same1 of the

 cinematographical film1 a movement     
hidden in the apparatus and whose       
function it is to superpose the         
successive pictures on one another in   
order to imitate the movement of the    
real object4 ,in the second proposition1
 becoming is a subject4 ,it comes to the
 front4 ,it is the reality itself2      
childhood and manhood are then only     
possible stops1 mere views of the mind2 
we now have to do with the objective    
movement itself1 and no longer with its 
cinematographical imitation4 ,but the   
first manner of expression is alone     
conformable to our habits of language4  
,we must1 in order to adopt the second1 
escape from the cinematographical       
mechanism of thought4  ,we must make    
complete abstraction of this mechanism1 
if we wish to get rid at one stroke of  
the theoretical absurdities that the    
question of movement raises4 ,all is    
obscure1 all is contradictory when we   
try1 with states1 to build up a         
transition4 ,the obscurity is cleared   

up1 the contradiction vanishes1 as soon 
as we place ourselves along the         
transition1 in order to distinguish     
states in it by making cross cuts       
therein in thought4 ,the reason is that 
there is more in the transition than the
 series of states1 that is to say1 the  
possible cuts--more in the movement than
 the series of positions1 that is to    
say1 the possible stops4 ,only1 the     
first way of looking at things is       
conformable to the processes of the     
human mind2 the second requires1 on the 
contrary1 that we reverse the bent of   
our intellectual habits4 ,no wonder1    
then1 if philosophy at first recoiled   
before such an effort4 ,the ,greeks     
trusted to nature1 trusted the natural  
propensity of the mind1 trusted language
 above all1 in so far as it naturally   
externalizes thought4 ,rather than lay  
blame on the attitude of thought and    
language toward the course of things1   
they preferred to pronounce the course  
of things itself to be wrong4  ,such1   

indeed1 was the sentence passed by the  
philosophers of the ,eleatic school4    
,and they passed it without any         
reservation whatever4 ,as becoming      
shocks the habits of thought and fits   
ill into the molds of language1 they    
declared it unreal4 ,in spatial movement
 and in change in general they saw only 
pure illusion4 ,this conclusion could be
 softened down without changing the     
premisses1 by saying that the reality   
changes1 but that it ought not to       
change4 ,experience confronts us with   
becoming3 that is sensible reality4 ,but
 the intelligible reality1 that which   
ought to be1 is more real still1 and    
that reality does not change4 ,beneath  
the qualitative becoming1 beneath the   
evolutionary becoming1 beneath the      
extensive becoming1 the mind must seek  
that which defies change1 the definable 
quality1 the form or essence1 the end4  
,such was the fundamental principle of  
the philosophy which developed          
throughout the classic age1 the         

philosophy of ,forms1 or1 to use a term 
more akin to the ,greek1 the philosophy 
of ,ideas4  ,the word ,greek3 eidos1    
which we translate here by ,idea1 has1  
in fact1 this threefold meaning4 ,it    
denotes 7#a7 the quality1 7#b7 the form 
or essence1 7#c7 the end or design 7in  
the sense of intention7 of the act being
 performed1 that is to say1 at bottom1  
the design 7in the sense of drawing7 of 
the act supposed accomplished4 ,these   
three aspects are those of the          
adjective1 substantive and verb1 and    
correspond to the three essential       
categories of language4 ,after the      
explanations we have given above1 we    
might1 and perhaps we ought to1         
translate ,greek3 eidos by view or      
rather by moment4 ,for ,greek3 eidos is 
the stable view taken of the instability
 of things3 the quality1 which is a     
moment of becoming2 the form1 which is a
 moment of evolution2 the essence1 which
 is the mean form above and below which 
the other forms are arranged as         

alterations of the mean2 finally1 the   
intention or mental design which        
presides over the action being          
accomplished1 and which is nothing else1
 we said1 than the material design1     
traced out and contemplated beforehand1 
of the action accomplished4 ,to reduce  
things to ,ideas is therefore to resolve
 becoming into its principal moments1   
each of these being1 moreover1 by the   
hypothesis1 screened from the laws of   
time and1 as it were1 plucked out of    
eternity4 ,that is to say that we end in
 the philosophy of ,ideas when we apply 
the cinematographical mechanism of the  
intellect to the analysis of the real4  
,but1 when we put immutable ,ideas at   
the base of the moving reality1 a whole 
physics1 a whole cosmology1 a whole     
theology follows necessarily4 ,we must  
insist on the point4 ,not that we mean  
to summarize in a few pages a philosophy
 so complex and so comprehensive as that
 of the ,greeks4 ,but1 since we have    
described the cinematographical         

mechanism of the intellect1 it is       
important that we should show to what   
idea of reality the play of this        
mechanism leads4 ,it is the very idea1  
we believe1 that we find in the ancient 
philosophy4 ,the main lines of the      
doctrine that was developed from ,plato 
to ,plotinus1 passing through ,aristotle
 7and even1 in a certain measure1       
through the ,stoics71 have nothing      
accidental1 nothing contingent1 nothing 
that must be regarded as a philosopher's
 fancy4 ,they indicate the vision that a
 systematic intellect obtains of the    
universal becoming when regarding it by 
means of snapshots1 taken at intervals1 
of its flowing4 ,so that1 even to-day1  
we shall philosophize in the manner of  
the ,greeks1 we shall rediscover1       
without needing to know them1 such and  
such of their general conclusions1 in   
the exact proportion that we trust in   
the cinematographical instinct of our   
thought4         99       99       99   
99       99  ,we said there is more in a

 movement than in the successive        
positions attributed to the moving      
object1 more in a becoming than in the  
forms passed through in turn1 more in   
the evolution of form than the forms    
assumed one after another4 ,philosophy  
can therefore derive terms of the second
 kind from those of the first1 but not  
the first from the second3 from the     
first terms speculation must take its   
start4 ,but the intellect reverses the  
order of the two groups2 and1 on this   
point1 ancient philosophy proceeds as   
the intellect does4 ,it installs itself 
in the immutable1 it posits only ,ideas4
 ,yet becoming exists3 it is a fact4    
,how1 then1 having posited immutability 
alone1 shall we make change come forth  
from it8 ,not by the addition of        
anything1 for1 by the hypothesis1 there 
exists nothing positive outside ,ideas4 
,it must therefore be by a diminution4  
,so at the base of ancient philosophy   
lies necessarily this postulate3 that   
there is more in the motionless than in 

the moving1 and that we pass from       
immutability to becoming by way of      
diminution or attenuation4  ,it is      
therefore something negative1 or zero at
 most1 that must be added to ,ideas to  
obtain change4 ,in that consists the    
,platonic non-being1 the ,aristotelian  
matter--a metaphysical zero which1      
joined to the ,idea1 like the           
arithmetical zero to unity1 multiplies  
it in space and time4 ,by it the        
motionless and simple ,idea is refracted
 into a movement spread out             
indefinitely4 ,in right1 there ought to 
be nothing but immutable ,ideas1        
immutably fitted to each other4 ,in     
fact1 matter comes to add to them its   
void1 and thereby lets loose the        
universal becoming4 ,it is an elusive   
nothing1 that creeps between the ,ideas 
and creates endless agitation1 eternal  
disquiet1 like a suspicion insinuated   
between two loving hearts4 ,degrade the 
immutable ,ideas3 you obtain1 by that   
alone1 the perpetual flux of things4    

,the ,ideas or ,forms are the whole of  
intelligible reality1 that is to say1 of
 truth1 in that they represent1 all     
together1 the theoretical equilibrium of
 ,being4 ,as to sensible reality1 it is 
a perpetual oscillation from one side to
 the other of this point of equilibrium4
  ,hence1 throughout the whole          
philosophy of ,ideas there is a certain 
conception of duration1 as also of the  
relation of time to eternity4 ,he who   
installs himself in becoming sees in    
duration the very life of things1 the   
fundamental reality4 ,the ,forms1 which 
the mind isolates and stores up in      
concepts1 are then only snapshots of the
 changing reality4 ,they are moments    
gathered along the course of time2 and1 
just because we have cut the thread that
 binds them to time1 they no longer     
endure4 ,they tend to withdraw into     
their own definition1 that is to say1   
into the artificial reconstruction and  
symbolical expression which is their    
intellectual equivalent4 ,they enter    

into eternity1 if you will2 but what is 
eternal in them is just what is unreal4 
,on the contrary1 if we treat becoming  
by the cinematographical method1 the    
,forms are no longer snapshots taken of 
the change1 they are its constitutive   
elements1 they represent all that is    
positive in ,becoming4 ,eternity no     
longer hovers over time1 as an          
abstraction2 it underlies time1 as a    
reality4 ,such is exactly1 on this      
point1 the attitude of the philosophy of
 ,forms or ,ideas4 ,it establishes      
between eternity and time the same      
relation as between a piece of gold and 
the small change--change so small that  
payment goes on for ever without the    
debt being paid off4 ,the debt could be 
paid at once with the piece of gold4 ,it
 is this that ,plato expresses in his   
magnificent language when he says that  
,god1 unable to make the world eternal1 
gave it ,time1 a moving image of        
eternity4#ajj  ,hence also arises a     
certain conception of extension1 which  

is at the base of the philosophy of     
,ideas1 although it has not been so     
explicitly brought out4 ,let us imagine 
a mind placed alongside becoming1 and   
adopting its movement4 ,each successive 
state1 each quality1 each form1 in      
short1 will be seen by it as a mere cut 
made by thought in the universal        
becoming4 ,it will be found that form is
 essentially extended1 inseparable as it
 is from the extensity of the becoming  
which has materialized it in the course 
of its flow4 ,every form thus occupies  
space1 as it occupies time4 ,but the    
philosophy of ,ideas follows the inverse
 direction4 ,it starts from the ,form2  
it sees in the ,form the very essence of
 reality4 ,it does not take ,form as a  
snapshot of becoming2 it posits ,forms  
in the eternal2 of this motionless      
eternity1 then1 duration and becoming   
are supposed to be only the degradation4
 ,form thus posited1 independent of     
time1 is then no longer what is found in
 a perception2 it is a concept4 ,and1 as

 a reality of the conceptual order      
occupies no more of extension than it   
does of duration1 the ,forms must be    
stationed outside space as well as above
 time4 ,space and time have therefore   
necessarily1 in ancient philosophy1 the 
same origin and the same value4 ,the    
same diminution of being is expressed   
both by extension in space and detention
 in time4 ,both of these are but the    
distance between what is and what ought 
to be4 ,from the standpoint of ancient  
philosophy1 space and time can be       
nothing but the field that an incomplete
 reality1 or rather a reality that has  
gone astray from itself1 needs in order 
to run in quest of itself4 ,only it must
 be admitted that the field is created  
as the hunting progresses1 and that the 
hunting in some way deposits the field  
beneath it4 ,move an imaginary pendulum1
 a mere mathematical point1 from its    
position of equilibrium3 a perpetual    
oscillation is started1 along which     
points are placed next to points1 and   

moments succeed moments4 ,the space and 
time which thus arise have no more      
positivity than the movement itself4    
,they represent the remoteness of the   
position artificially given to the      
pendulum from its normal position1 what 
it lacks in order to regain its natural 
stability4 ,bring it back to its normal 
position3 space1 time and motion shrink 
to a mathematical point4 ,just so1 human
 reasonings are drawn out into an       
endless chain1 but are at once swallowed
 up in the truth seized by intuition1   
for their extension in space and time is
 only the distance1 so to speak1 between
 thought and truth4#aja ,so of extension
 and duration in relation to pure ,forms
 or ,ideas4 ,the sensible forms are     
before us1 ever about to recover their  
ideality1 ever prevented by the matter  
they bear in them1 that is to say1 by   
their inner void1 by the interval       
between what they are and what they     
ought to be4 ,they are for ever on the  
point of recovering themselves1 for ever

 occupied in losing themselves4 ,an     
inflexible law condemns them1 like the  
rock of ,sisyphus1 to fall back when    
they are almost touching the summit1 and
 this law1 which has projected them into
 space and time1 is nothing other than  
the very constancy of their original    
insufficiency4 ,the alternations of     
generation and decay1 the evolutions    
ever beginning over and over again1 the 
infinite repetition of the cycles of    
celestial spheres--this all represents  
merely a certain fundamental deficit1 in
 which materiality consists4 ,fill up   
this deficit3 at once you suppress space
 and time1 that is to say1 the endlessly
 renewed oscillations around a stable   
equilibrium always aimed at1 never      
reached4 ,things re-enter into each     
other4 ,what was extended in space is   
contracted into pure ,form4 ,and past1  
present1 and future shrink into a single
 moment1 which is eternity4  ,this      
amounts to saying that physics is but   
logic spoiled4 ,in this proposition the 

whole philosophy of ,ideas is           
summarized4 ,and in it also is the      
hidden principle of the philosophy that 
is innate in our understanding4 ,if     
immutability is more than becoming1 form
 is more than change1 and it is by a    
veritable fall that the logical system  
of ,ideas1 rationally subordinated and  
cordinated among themselves1 is         
scattered into a physical series of     
objects and events accidentally placed  
one after another4 ,the generative idea 
of a poem is developed in thousands of  
imaginations which are materialized in  
phrases that spread themselves out in   
words4 ,and the more we descend from the
 motionless idea1 wound on itself1 to   
the words that unwind it1 the more room 
is left for contingency and choice4     
,other metaphors1 expressed by other    
words1 might have arisen2 an image is   
called up by an image1 a word by a word4
 ,all these words run now one after     
another1 seeking in vain1 by themselves1
 to give back the simplicity of the     

generative idea4 ,our ear only hears the
 words3 it therefore perceives only     
accidents4 ,but our mind1 by successive 
bounds1 leaps from the words to the     
images1 from the images to the original 
idea1 and so gets back1 from the        
perception of words--accidents called up
 by accidents--to the conception of the 
,idea that posits its own being4 ,so the
 philosopher proceeds1 confronted with  
the universe4 ,experience makes to pass 
before his eyes phenomena which run1    
they also1 one behind another in an     
accidental order determined by          
circumstances of time and place4 ,this  
physical order--a degeneration of the   
logical order--is nothing else but the  
fall of the logical into space and time4
 ,but the philosopher1 ascending again  
from the percept to the concept1 sees   
condensed into the logical all the      
positive reality that the physical      
possesses4 ,his intellect1 doing away   
with the materiality that lessens being1
 grasps being itself in the immutable   

system of ,ideas4 ,thus ,science is     
obtained1 which appears to us1 complete 
and ready-made1 as soon as we put back  
our intellect into its true place1      
correcting the deviation that separated 
it from the intelligible4 ,science is   
not1 then1 a human construction4 ,it is 
prior to our intellect1 independent of  
it1 veritably the generator of ,things4 
,and indeed1 if we hold the ,forms to be
 simply snapshots taken by the mind of  
the continuity of becoming1 they must be
 relative to the mind that thinks them1 
they can have no independent existence4 
,at most we might say that each of these
 ,ideas is an ideal4 ,but it is in the  
opposite hypothesis that we are placing 
ourselves4 ,ideas must then exist by    
themselves4 ,ancient philosophy could   
not escape this conclusion4 ,plato      
formulated it1 and in vain did          
,aristotle strive to avoid it4 ,since   
movement arises from the degradation of 
the immutable1 there could be no        
movement1 consequently no sensible      

world1 if there were not1 somewhere1    
immutability realized4 ,so1 having begun
 by refusing to ,ideas an independent   
existence1 and finding himself          
nevertheless unable to deprive them of  
it1 ,aristotle pressed them into each   
other1 rolled them up into a ball1 and  
set above the physical world a ,form    
that was thus found to be the ,form of  
,forms1 the ,idea of ,ideas1 or1 to use 
his own words1 the ,thought of ,thought4
 ,such is the ,god of                   
,aristotle--necessarily immutable and   
apart from what is happening in the     
world1 since he is only the synthesis of
 all concepts in a single concept4 ,it  
is true that no one of the manifold     
concepts could exist apart1 such as it  
is in the divine unity3 in vain should  
we look for the ideas of ,plato within  
the ,god of ,aristotle4 ,but if only we 
imagine the ,god of ,aristotle in a sort
 of refraction of himself1 or simply    
inclining toward the world1 at once the 
,platonic ,ideas are seen to pour       

themselves out of him1 as if they were  
involved in the unity of his essence3 so
 rays stream out from the sun1 which    
nevertheless did not contain them4 ,it  
is probably this possibility of an      
outpouring of ,platonic ,ideas from the 
,aristotelian ,god that is meant1 in the
 philosophy of ,aristotle1 by the active
 intellect1 the ,greek3 nous that has   
been called ,greek3 poitikos--that is1  
by what is essential and yet unconscious
 in human intelligence4 ,the ,greek3    
nous poitikos is ,science entire1       
posited all at once1 which the          
conscious1 discursive intellect is      
condemned to reconstruct with           
difficulty1 bit by bit4 ,there is then  
within us1 or rather behind us1 a       
possible vision of ,god1 as the         
,alexandrians said1 a vision always     
virtual1 never actually realized by the 
conscious intellect4 ,in this intuition 
we should see ,god expand in ,ideas4    
,this it is that does everything1#ajb   
playing in relation to the discursive   

intellect1 which moves in time1 the same
 rle as the motionless ,mover himself   
plays in relation to the movement of the
 heavens and the course of things4      
,there is1 then1 immanent in the        
philosophy of ,ideas1 a particular      
conception of causality1 which it is    
important to bring into full light1     
because it is that which each of us will
 reach when1 in order to ascend to the  
origin of things1 he follows to the end 
the natural movement of the intellect4  
,true1 the ancient philosophers never   
formulated it explicitly4 ,they confined
 themselves to drawing the consequences 
of it1 and1 in general1 they have marked
 but points of view of it rather than   
presented it itself4 ,sometimes1 indeed1
 they speak of an attraction1 sometimes 
of an impulsion exercised by the prime  
mover on the whole of the world4 ,both  
views are found in ,aristotle1 who shows
 us in the movement of the universe an  
aspiration of things toward the divine  
perfection1 and consequently an ascent  

toward ,god1 while he describes it      
elsewhere as the effect of a contact of 
,god with the first sphere and as       
descending1 consequently1 from ,god to  
things4 ,the ,alexandrians1 we think1 do
 no more than follow this double        
indication when they speak of procession
 and conversion4 ,everything is derived 
from the first principle1 and everything
 aspires to return to it4 ,but these two
 conceptions of the divine causality can
 only be identified together if we bring
 them1 both the one and the other1 back 
to a third1 which we hold to be         
fundamental1 and which alone will enable
 us to understand1 not only why1 in what
 sense1 things move in space and time1  
but also why there is space and time1   
why there is movement1 why there are    
things4  ,this conception1 which more   
and more shows through the reasonings of
 the ,greek philosophers as we go from  
,plato to ,plotinus1 we may formulate   
thus3 ,the affirmation of a reality     
implies the simultaneous affirmation of 

all the degrees of reality intermediate 
between it and nothing4 ,the principle  
is evident in the case of number3 we    
cannot affirm the number #aj without    
thereby affirming the existence of the  
numbers #i1 #h1 #g1 4441 etc4--in short1
 of the whole interval between #aj and  
zero4 ,but here our mind passes         
naturally from the sphere of quantity to
 that of quality4 ,it seems to us that1 
a certain perfection being given1 the   
whole continuity of degradations is     
given also between this perfection1 on  
the one hand1 and the nought1 on the    
other hand1 that we think we conceive4  
,let us then posit the ,god of          
,aristotle1 thought of thought--that is1
 thought making a circle1 transforming  
itself from subject to object and from  
object to subject by an instantaneous1  
or rather an eternal1 circular process3 
as1 on the other hand1 the nought       
appears to posit itself1 and as1 the two
 extremities being given1 the interval  
between them is equally given1 it       

follows that all the descending degrees 
of being1 from the divine perfection    
down to the absolute nothing1 are       
realized automatically1 so to speak1    
when we have posited ,god4  ,let us then
 run through this interval from top to  
bottom4 ,first of all1 the slightest    
diminution of the first principle will  
be enough to precipitate ,being into    
space and time2 but duration and        
extension1 which represent this first   
diminution1 will be as near as possible 
to the divine inextension and eternity4 
,we must therefore picture to ourselves 
this first degradation of the divine    
principle as a sphere turning on itself1
 imitating1 by the perpetuity of its    
circular movement1 the eternity of the  
circle of the divine thought2 creating1 
moreover1 its own place1 and thereby    
place in general1#ajc since it includes 
without being included and moves without
 stirring from the spot2 creating also  
its own duration1 and thereby duration  
in general1 since its movement is the   

measure of all motion4#ajd ,then1 by    
degrees1 we shall see the perfection    
decrease1 more and more1 down to our    
sublunary world1 in which the cycle of  
birth1 growth and decay imitates and    
mars the original circle for the last   
time4 ,so understood1 the causal        
relation between ,god and the world is  
seen as an attraction when regarded from
 below1 as an impulsion or a contact    
when regarded from above1 since the     
first heaven1 with its circular         
movement1 is an imitation of ,god and   
all imitation is the reception of a     
form4 ,therefore1 we perceive ,god as   
efficient cause or as final cause1      
according to the point of view4 ,and yet
 neither of these two relations is the  
ultimate causal relation4 ,the true     
relation is that which is found between 
the two members of an equation1 when the
 first member is a single term and the  
second a sum of an endless number of    
terms4 ,it is1 we may say1 the relation 
of the gold-piece to the small change1  

if we suppose the change to offer itself
 automatically as soon as the gold piece
 is presented4 ,only thus can we        
understand why ,aristotle has           
demonstrated the necessity of a first   
motionless mover1 not by founding it on 
the assertion that the movement of      
things must have had a beginning1 but1  
on the contrary1 by affirming that this 
movement could not have begun and can   
never come to an end4 ,if movement      
exists1 or1 in other words1 if the small
 change is being counted1 the gold piece
 is to be found somewhere4 ,and if the  
counting goes on for ever1 having never 
begun1 the single term that is eminently
 equivalent to it must be eternal4 ,a   
perpetuity of mobility is possible only 
if it is backed by an eternity of       
immutability1 which it unwinds in a     
chain without beginning or end4  ,such  
is the last word of the ,greek          
philosophy4 ,we have not attempted to   
reconstruct it a priori4 ,it has        
manifold origins4 ,it is connected by   

many invisible threads to the soul of   
ancient ,greece4 ,vain1 therefore1 the  
effort to deduce it from a simple       
principle4#aje ,but if everything that  
has come from poetry1 religion1 social  
life and a still rudimentary physics and
 biology be removed from it1 if we take 
away all the light material that may    
have been used in the construction of   
the stately building1 a solid framework 
remains1 and this framework marks out   
the main lines of a metaphysic which is1
 we believe1 the natural metaphysic of  
the human intellect4 ,we come to a      
philosophy of this kind1 indeed1        
whenever we follow to the end1 the      
cinematographical tendency of perception
 and thought4 ,our perception and       
thought begin by substituting for the   
continuity of evolutionary change a     
series of unchangeable forms which are  
turn by turn1 caught on the wing1 like  
the rings at a merry-go-round1 which the
 children unhook with their little stick
 as they are passing4 ,now1 how can the 

forms be passing1 and on what stick are 
they strung8 ,as the stable forms have  
been obtained by extracting from change 
everything that is definite1 there is   
nothing left1 to characterize the       
instability on which the forms are laid1
 but a negative attribute1 which must be
 indetermination itself4 ,such is the   
first proceeding of our thought3 it     
dissociates each change into two        
elements--the one stable1 definable for 
each particular case1 to wit1 the ,form2
 the other indefinable and always the   
same1 ,change in general4 ,and such1    
also1 is the essential operation of     
language4 ,forms are all that it is     
capable of expressing4 ,it is reduced to
 taking as understood or is limited to  
suggesting a mobility which1 just       
because it is always unexpressed1 is    
thought to remain in all cases the      
same4--,then comes in a philosophy that 
holds the dissociation thus effected by 
thought and language to be legitimate4  
,what can it do1 except objectify the   

distinction with more force1 push it to 
its extreme consequences1 reduce it into
 a system8 ,it will therefore construct 
the real1 on the one hand1 with definite
 ,forms or immutable elements1 and1 on  
the other1 with a principle of mobility 
which1 being the negation of the form1  
will1 by the hypothesis1 escape all     
definition and be the purely            
indeterminate4 ,the more it directs its 
attention to the forms delineated by    
thought and expressed by language1 the  
more it will see them rise above the    
sensible and become subtilized into pure
 concepts1 capable of entering one      
within the other1 and even of being at  
last massed together into a single      
concept1 the synthesis of all reality1  
the achievement of all perfection4 ,the 
more1 on the contrary1 it descends      
toward the invisible source of the      
universal mobility1 the more it will    
feel this mobility sink beneath it and  
at the same time become void1 vanish    
into what it will call the non-being4   

,finally1 it will have on the one hand  
the system of ideas1 logically          
cordinated together or concentrated into
 one only1 on the other a quasi-nought1 
the ,platonic non-being or the          
,aristotelian matter4--,but1 having cut 
your cloth1 you must sew it4 ,with      
supra-sensible ,ideas and an            
infra-sensible non-being1 you now have  
to reconstruct the sensible world4 ,you 
can do so only if you postulate a kind  
of metaphysical necessity in virtue of  
which the confronting of this ,all with 
this ,zero is equivalent to the         
affirmation of all the degrees of       
reality that measure the interval       
between them--just as an undivided      
number1 when regarded as a difference   
between itself and zero1 is revealed as 
a certain sum of units1 and with its own
 affirmation affirms all the lower      
numbers4 ,that is the natural postulate4
 ,it is that also that we perceive as   
the base of the ,greek philosophy4 ,in  
order then to explain the specific      

characters of each of these degrees of  
intermediate reality1 nothing more is   
necessary than to measure the distance  
that separates it from the integral     
reality4 ,each lower degree consists in 
a diminution of the higher1 and the     
sensible newness that we perceive in it 
is resolved1 from the point of view of  
the intelligible1 into a new quantity of
 negation which is superadded to it4    
,the smallest possible quantity of      
negation1 that which is found already in
 the highest forms of sensible reality1 
and consequently a fortiori in the lower
 forms1 is that which is expressed by   
the most general attributes of sensible 
reality1 extension and duration4 ,by    
increasing degradations we will obtain  
attributes more and more special4 ,here 
the philosopher's fancy will have free  
scope1 for it is by an arbitrary decree1
 or at least a debatable one1 that a    
particular aspect of the sensible world 
will be equated with a particular       
diminution of being4 ,we shall not      

necessarily end1 as ,aristotle did1 in a
 world consisting of concentric spheres 
turning on themselves4 ,but we shall be 
led to an analogous cosmology--,i mean1 
to a construction whose pieces1 though  
all different1 will have none the less  
the same relations between them4 ,and   
this cosmology will be ruled by the same
 principle4 ,the physical will be       
defined by the logical4 ,beneath the    
changing phenomena will appear to us1 by
 transparence1 a closed system of       
concepts subordinated to and cordinated 
with each other4 ,science1 understood as
 the system of concepts1 will be more   
real than the sensible reality4 ,it will
 be prior to human knowledge1 which is  
only able to spell it letter by letter2 
prior also to things1 which awkwardly   
try to imitate it4 ,it would only have  
to be diverted an instant from itself in
 order to step out of its eternity and  
thereby coincide with all this knowledge
 and all these things4 ,its immutability
 is therefore1 indeed1 the cause of the 

universal becoming4  ,such was the point
 of view of ancient philosophy in regard
 to change and duration4 ,that modern   
philosophy has repeatedly1 but          
especially in its beginnings1 had the   
wish to depart from it1 seems to us     
unquestionable4 ,but an irresistible    
attraction brings the intellect back to 
its natural movement1 and the metaphysic
 of the moderns to the general          
conclusions of the ,greek metaphysic4   
,we must try to make this point clear1  
in order to show by what invisible      
threads our mechanistic philosophy      
remains bound to the ancient philosophy 
of ,ideas1 and how also it responds to  
the requirements1 above all practical1  
of our understanding4         99        
99       99       99       99  ,modern1 
like ancient1 science proceeds according
 to the cinematographical method4 ,it   
cannot do otherwise2 all science is     
subject to this law4 ,for it is of the  
essence of science to handle signs1     
which it substitutes for the objects    

themselves4 ,these signs undoubtedly    
differ from those of language by their  
greater precision and their higher      
efficacy2 they are none the less tied   
down to the general condition of the    
sign1 which is to denote a fixed aspect 
of the reality under an arrested form4  
,in order to think movement1 a          
constantly renewed effort of the mind is
 necessary4 ,signs are made to dispense 
us with this effort by substituting1 for
 the moving continuity of things1 an    
artificial reconstruction which is its  
equivalent in practice and has the      
advantage of being easily handled4 ,but 
let us leave aside the means and        
consider only the end4 ,what is the     
essential object of science8 ,it is to  
enlarge our influence over things4      
,science may be speculative in its form1
 disinterested in its immediate ends2 in
 other words we may give it as long a   
credit as it wants4 ,but1 however long  
the day of reckoning may be put off1    
some time or other the payment must be  

made4 ,it is always then1 in short1     
practical utility that science has in   
view4 ,even when it launches into       
theory1 it is bound to adapt its        
behavior to the general form of         
practice4 ,however high it may rise1 it 
must be ready to fall back into the     
field of action1 and at once to get on  
its feet4 ,this would not be possible   
for it1 if its rhythm differed          
absolutely from that of action itself4  
,now action1 we have said1 proceeds by  
leaps4 ,to act is to re-adapt oneself4  
,to know1 that is to say1 to foresee in 
order to act1 is then to go from        
situation to situation1 from arrangement
 to rearrangement4 ,science may consider
 rearrangements that come closer and    
closer to each other2 it may thus       
increase the number of moments that it  
isolates1 but it always isolates        
moments4 ,as to what happens in the     
interval between the moments1 science is
 no more concerned with that than are   
our common intelligence1 our senses and 

our language3 it does not bear on the   
interval1 but only on the extremities4  
,so the cinematographical method forces 
itself upon our science1 as it did      
already on that of the ancients4        
,wherein1 then1 is the difference       
between the two sciences8 ,we indicated 
it when we said that the ancients       
reduced the physical order to the vital 
order1 that is to say1 laws to genera1  
while the moderns try to resolve genera 
into laws4 ,but we have to look at it in
 another aspect1 which1 moreover1 is    
only a transposition1 of the first4     
,wherein consists the difference of     
attitude of the two sciences toward     
change8 ,we may formulate it by saying  
that ancient science thinks it knows its
 object sufficiently when it has noted  
of it some privileged moments1 whereas  
modern science considers the object at  
any moment whatever4  ,the forms or     
ideas of ,plato or of ,aristotle        
correspond to privileged or salient     
moments in the history of things--those1

 in general1 that have been fixed by    
language4 ,they are supposed1 like the  
childhood or the old age of a living    
being1 to characterize a period of which
 they express the quintessence1 all the 
rest of this period being filled by the 
passage1 of no interest in itself1 from 
one form to another form4 ,take1 for    
instance1 a falling body4 ,it was       
thought that we got near enough to the  
fact when we characterized it as a      
whole3 it was a movement downward2 it   
was the tendency toward a centre2 it was
 the natural movement of a body which1  
separated from the earth to which it    
belonged1 was now going to find its     
place again4 ,they noted1 then1 the     
final term or culminating point 7,greek3
 telos1 akm7 and set it up as the       
essential moment3 this moment1 that     
language has retained in order to       
express the whole of the fact1 sufficed 
also for science to characterize it4 ,in
 the physics of ,aristotle1 it is by the
 concepts high and low1 spontaneous     

displacement and forced displacement1   
own place and strange place1 that the   
movement of a body shot into space or   
falling freely is defined4 ,but ,galileo
 thought there was no essential moment1 
no privileged instant4 ,to study the    
falling body is to consider it at it    
matters not what moment in its course4  
,the true science of gravity is that    
which will determine1 for any moment of 
time whatever1 the position of the body 
in space4 ,for this1 indeed1 signs far  
more precise than those of language are 
required4  ,we may say1 then1 that our  
physics differs from that of the        
ancients chiefly in the indefinite      
breaking up of time4 ,for the ancients1 
time comprises as many undivided periods
 as our natural perception and our      
language cut out in it successive facts1
 each presenting a kind of              
individuality4 ,for that reason1 each of
 these facts admits1 in their view1 of  
only a total definition or description4 
,if1 in describing it1 we are led to    

distinguish phases in it1 we have       
several facts instead of a single one1  
several undivided periods instead of a  
single period2 but time is always       
supposed to be divided into determinate 
periods1 and the mode of division to be 
forced on the mind by apparent crises of
 the real1 comparable to that of        
puberty1 by the apparent release of a   
new form4--,for a ,kepler or a ,galileo1
 on the contrary1 time is not divided   
objectively in one way or another by the
 matter that fills it4 ,it has no       
natural articulations4 ,we can1 we ought
 to1 divide it as we please4 ,all       
moments count4 ,none of them has the    
right to set itself up as a moment that 
represents or dominates the others4     
,and1 consequently1 we know a change    
only when we are able to determine what 
it is about at any one of its moments4  
,the difference is profound4 ,in fact1  
in a certain aspect it is radical4 ,but1
 from the point of view from which we   
are regarding it1 it is a difference of 

degree rather than of kind4 ,the human  
mind has passed from the first kind of  
knowledge to the second through gradual 
perfecting1 simply by seeking a higher  
precision4 ,there is the same relation  
between these two sciences as between   
the noting of the phases of a movement  
by the eye and the much more complete   
recording of these phases by            
instantaneous photography4 ,it is the   
same cinematographical mechanism in both
 cases1 but it reaches a precision in   
the second that it cannot have in the   
first4 ,of the gallop of a horse our eye
 perceives chiefly a characteristic1    
essential or rather schematic attitude1 
a form that appears to radiate over a   
whole period and so fill up a time of   
gallop4 ,it is this attitude that       
sculpture has fixed on the frieze of the
 ,parthenon4 ,but instantaneous         
photography isolates any moment2 it puts
 them all in the same rank1 and thus the
 gallop of a horse spreads out for it   
into as many successive attitudes as it 

wishes1 instead of massing itself into a
 single attitude1 which is supposed to  
flash out in a privileged moment and to 
illuminate a whole period4  ,from this  
original difference flow all the others4
 ,a science that considers1 one after   
the other1 undivided periods of         
duration1 sees nothing but phases       
succeeding phases1 forms replacing      
forms2 it is content with a qualitative 
description of objects1 which it likens 
to organized beings4 ,but when we seek  
to know what happens within one of these
 periods1 at any moment of time1 we are 
aiming at something entirely different4 
,the changes which are produced from one
 moment to another are no longer1 by the
 hypothesis1 changes of quality2 they   
are quantitative variations1 it may be  
of the phenomenon itself1 it may be of  
its elementary parts4 ,we were right    
then to say that modern science is      
distinguishable from the ancient in that
 it applies to magnitudes and proposes  
first and foremost to measure them4 ,the

 ancients did indeed try experiments1   
and on the other hand ,kepler tried no  
experiment1 in the proper sense of the  
word1 in order to discover a law which  
is the very type of scientific knowledge
 as we understand it4 ,what             
distinguishes modern science is not that
 it is experimental1 but that it        
experiments and1 more generally1 works  
only with a view to measure4  ,for that 
reason it is right1 again1 to say that  
ancient science applied to concepts1    
while modern science seeks              
laws--constant relations between        
variable magnitudes4 ,the concept of    
circularity was sufficient to ,aristotle
 to define the movement of the heavenly 
bodies4 ,but1 even with the more        
accurate concept of elliptical form1    
,kepler did not think he had accounted  
for the movement of planets4 ,he had to 
get a law1 that is to say1 a constant   
relation between the quantitative       
variations of two or several elements of
 the planetary movement4  ,yet these are

 only consequences--differences that    
follow from the fundamental difference4 
,it did happen to the ancients          
accidentally to experiment with a view  
to measuring1 as also to discover a law 
expressing a constant relation between  
magnitudes4 ,the principle of           
,archimedes is a true experimental law4 
,it takes into account three variable   
magnitudes3 the volume of a body1 the   
density of the liquid in which the body 
is immersed1 the vertical pressure that 
is being exerted4 ,and it states indeed 
that one of these three terms is a      
function of the other two4  ,the        
essential1 original difference must     
therefore be sought elsewhere4 ,it is   
the same that we noticed first4 ,the    
science of the ancients is static4      
,either it considers in block the change
 that it studies1 or1 if it divides the 
change into periods1 it makes of each of
 these periods a block in its turn3     
which amounts to saying that it takes no
 account of time4 ,but modern science   

has been built up around the discoveries
 of ,galileo and of ,kepler1 which      
immediately furnished it with a model4  
,now1 what do the laws of ,kepler say8  
,they lay down a relation between the   
areas described by the heliocentric     
radius-vector of a planet and the time  
employed in describing them1 a relation 
between the longer axis of the orbit and
 the time taken up by the course4 ,and  
what was the principle discovered by    
,galileo8 ,a law which connected the    
space traversed by a falling body with  
the time occupied by the fall4          
,furthermore1 in what did the first of  
the great transformations of geometry in
 modern times consist1 if not in        
introducing--in a veiled form1 it is    
true--time and movement even in the     
consideration of figures8 ,for the      
ancients1 geometry was a purely static  
science4 ,figures were given to it at   
once1 completely finished1 like the     
,platonic ,ideas4 ,but the essence of   
the ,cartesian geometry 7although       

,descartes did not give it this form7   
was to regard every plane curve as      
described by the movement of a point on 
a movable straight line which is        
displaced1 parallel to itself1 along the
 axis of the abscissae--the displacement
 of the movable straight line being     
supposed to be uniform and the abscissa 
thus becoming representative of the     
time4 ,the curve is then defined if we  
can state the relation connecting the   
space traversed on the movable straight 
line to the time employed in traversing 
it1 that is1 if we are able to indicate 
the position of the movable point1 on   
the straight line which it traverses1 at
 any moment whatever of its course4     
,this relation is just what we call the 
equation of the curve4 ,to substitute an
 equation for a figure consists1        
therefore1 in seeing the actual position
 of the moving points in the tracing of 
the curve at any moment whatever1       
instead of regarding this tracing all at
 once1 gathered up in the unique moment 

when the curve has reached its finished 
state4  ,such1 then1 was the directing  
idea of the reform by which both the    
science of nature and mathematics1 which
 serves as its instrument1 were renewed4
 ,modern science is the daughter of     
astronomy2 it has come down from heaven 
to earth along the inclined plane of    
,galileo1 for it is through ,galileo    
that ,newton and his successors are     
connected with ,kepler4 ,now1 how did   
the astronomical problem present itself 
to ,kepler8 ,the question was1 knowing  
the respective positions of the planets 
at a given moment1 how to calculate     
their positions at any other moment4 ,so
 the same question presented itself1    
henceforth1 for every material system4  
,each material point became a           
rudimentary planet1 and the main        
question1 the ideal problem whose       
solution would yield the key to all the 
others was1 the positions of these      
elements at a particular moment being   
given1 how to determine their relative  

positions at any moment4 ,no doubt the  
problem cannot be put in these precise  
terms except in very simple cases1 for a
 schematized reality2 for we never know 
the respective positions of the real    
elements of matter1 supposing there are 
real elements2 and1 even if we knew them
 at a given moment1 the calculation of  
their positions at another moment would 
generally require a mathematical effort 
surpassing human powers4 ,but it is     
enough for us to know that these        
elements might be known1 that their     
present positions might be noted1 and   
that a superhuman intellect might1 by   
submitting these data to mathematical   
operations1 determine the positions of  
the elements at any other moment of     
time4 ,this conviction is at the bottom 
of the questions we put to ourselves on 
the subject of nature1 and of the       
methods we employ to solve them4 ,that  
is why every law in static form seems to
 us as a provisional instalment or as a 
particular view of a dynamic law which  

alone would give us whole and definitive
 knowledge4  ,let us conclude1 then1    
that our science is not only            
distinguished from ancient science in   
this1 that it seeks laws1 nor even in   
this1 that its laws set forth relations 
between magnitudes3 we must add that the
 magnitude to which we wish to be able  
to relate all others is time1 and that  
modern science must be defined          
pre-eminently by its aspiration to take 
time as an independent variable4 ,but   
with what time has it to do8  ,we have  
said before1 and we cannot repeat too   
often1 that the science of matter       
proceeds like ordinary knowledge4 ,it   
perfects this knowledge1 increases its  
precision and its scope1 but it works in
 the same direction and puts the same   
mechanism into play4 ,if1 therefore1    
ordinary knowledge1 by reason of the    
cinematographical mechanism to which it 
is subjected1 forbears to follow        
becoming in so far as becoming is       
moving1 the science of matter renounces 

it equally4 ,no doubt1 it distinguishes 
as great a number of moments as we wish 
in the interval of time it considers4   
,however small the intervals may be at  
which it stops1 it authorizes us to     
divide them again if necessary4 ,in     
contrast with ancient science1 which    
stopped at certain so-called essential  
moments1 it is occupied indifferently   
with any moment whatever4 ,but it always
 considers moments1 always virtual      
stopping-places1 always1 in short1      
immobilities4 ,which amounts to saying  
that real time1 regarded as a flux1 or1 
in other words1 as the very mobility of 
being1 escapes the hold of scientific   
knowledge4 ,we have already tried to    
establish this point in a former work4  
,we alluded to it again in the first    
chapter of this book4 ,but it is        
necessary to revert to it once more1 in 
order to clear up misunderstandings4    
,when positive science speaks of time1  
what it refers to is the movement of a  
certain mobile ,t on its trajectory4    

,this movement has been chosen by it as 
representative of time1 and it is1 by   
definition1 uniform4 ,let us call ,t#a1 
,t#b1 ,t#c1 444 etc41 points which      
divide the trajectory of the mobile into
 equal parts from its origin ,t#j4 ,we  
shall say that #a1 #b1 #c1 444 units of 
time have flowed past1 when the mobile  
is at the points ,t#a1 ,t#b1 ,t#c1 444  
of the line it traverses4 ,accordingly1 
to consider the state of the universe at
 the end of a certain time t1 is to     
examine where it will be when ,t is at  
the point ,tt of its course4 ,but of the
 flux itself of time1 still less of its 
effect on consciousness1 there is here  
no question2 for there enter into the   
calculation only the points ,t#a1 ,t#b1 
,t#c1 444 taken on the flux1 never the  
flux itself4 ,we may narrow the time    
considered as much as we will1 that is1 
break up at will the interval between   
two consecutive divisions ,tn and       
,tn--#a2 but it is always with points1  
and with points only1 that we are       

dealing4 ,what we retain of the movement
 of the mobile ,t are positions taken on
 its trajectory4 ,what we retain of all 
the other points of the universe are    
their positions on their respective     
trajectories4 ,to each virtual stop of  
the moving body ,t at the points of     
division ,t#a1 ,t#b1 ,t#c1  444 we make 
correspond a virtual stop of all the    
other mobiles at the points where they  
are passing4 ,and when we say that a    
movement or any other change has        
occupied a time t1 we mean by it that we
 have noted a number t of               
correspondences of this kind4 ,we have  
therefore counted simultaneities2 we    
have not concerned ourselves with the   
flux that goes from one to another4 ,the
 proof of this is that ,i can1 at       
discretion1 vary the rapidity of the    
flux of the universe in regard to a     
consciousness that is independent of it 
and that would perceive the variation by
 the quite qualitative feeling that it  
would have of it3 whatever the variation

 had been1 since the movement of ,t     
would participate in this variation1 ,i 
should have nothing to change in my     
equations nor in the numbers that figure
 in them4  ,let us go further4 ,suppose 
that the rapidity of the flux becomes   
infinite4 ,imagine1 as we said in the   
first pages of this book1 that the      
trajectory of the mobile ,t is given at 
once1 and that the whole history1 past1 
present and future1 of the material     
universe is spread out instantaneously  
in space4 ,the same mathematical        
correspondences will subsist between the
 moments of the history of the world    
unfolded like a fan1 so to speak1 and   
the divisions ,t#a1 ,t#b1 ,t#c1 444 of  
the line which will be called1 by       
definition1 the course of time4 ,in the 
eyes of science nothing will have       
changed4 ,but if1 time thus spreading   
itself out in space and succession      
becoming juxtaposition1 science has     
nothing to change in what it tells us1  
we must conclude that1 in what it tells 

us1 it takes account neither of         
succession in what of it is specific nor
 of time in what there is in it that is 
fluent4 ,it has no sign to express what 
strikes our consciousness in succession 
and duration4 ,it no more applies to    
becoming1 so far as that is moving1 than
 the bridges thrown here and there      
across the stream follow the water that 
flows under their arches4  ,yet         
succession exists2 ,i am conscious of   
it2 it is a fact4 ,when a physical      
process is going on before my eyes1 my  
perception and my inclination have      
nothing to do with accelerating or      
retarding it4 ,what is important to the 
physicist is the number of units of     
duration the process fills2 he does not 
concern himself about the units         
themselves and that is why the          
successive states of the world might be 
spread out all at once in space without 
his having to change anything in his    
science or to cease talking about time4 
,but for us1 conscious beings1 it is the

 units that matter1 for we do not count 
extremities of intervals1 we feel and   
live the intervals themselves4 ,now1 we 
are conscious of these intervals as of  
definite intervals4 ,let me come back   
again to the sugar in my glass of       
water3#ajf why must ,i wait for it to   
melt8 ,while the duration of the        
phenomenon is relative for the          
physicist1 since it is reduced to a     
certain number of units of time and the 
units themselves are indifferent1 this  
duration is an absolute for my          
consciousness1 for it coincides with a  
certain degree of impatience which is   
rigorously determined4 ,whence comes    
this determination8 ,what is it that    
obliges me to wait1 and to wait for a   
certain length of psychical duration    
which is forced upon me1 over which ,i  
have no power8 ,if succession1 in so far
 as distinct from mere juxtaposition1   
has no real efficacy1 if time is not a  
kind of force1 why does the universe    
unfold its successive states with a     

velocity which1 in regard to my         
consciousness1 is a veritable absolute8 
,why with this particular velocity      
rather than any other8 ,why not with an 
infinite velocity8 ,why1 in other words1
 is not everything given at once1 as on 
the film of the cinematograph8 ,the more
 ,i consider this point1 the more it    
seems to me that1 if the future is bound
 to succeed the present instead of being
 given alongside of it1 it is because   
the future is not altogether determined 
at the present moment1 and that if the  
time taken up by this succession is     
something other than a number1 if it has
 for the consciousness that is installed
 in it absolute value and reality1 it is
 because there is unceasingly being     
created in it1 not indeed in any such   
artificially isolated system as a glass 
of sugared water1 but in the concrete   
whole of which every such system forms  
part1 something unforeseeable and new4  
,this duration may not be the fact of   
matter itself1 but that of the life     

which reascends the course of matter2   
the two movements are none the less     
mutually dependent upon each other4 ,the
 duration of the universe must therefore
 be one with the latitude of creation   
which can find place in it4  ,when a    
child plays at reconstructing a picture 
by putting together the separate pieces 
in a puzzle game1 the more he practices1
 the more and more quickly he succeeds4 
,the reconstruction was1 moreover1      
instantaneous1 the child found it       
ready-made1 when he opened the box on   
leaving the shop4 ,the operation1       
therefore1 does not require a definite  
time1 and indeed1 theoretically1 it does
 not require any time4 ,that is because 
the result is given4 ,it is because the 
picture is already created1 and because 
to obtain it requires only a work of    
recomposing and rearranging--a work that
 can be supposed going faster and       
faster1 and even infinitely fast1 up to 
the point of being instantaneous4 ,but1 
to the artist who creates a picture by  

drawing it from the depths of his soul1 
time is no longer an accessory2 it is   
not an interval that may be lengthened  
or shortened without the content being  
altered4 ,the duration of his work is   
part and parcel of his work4 ,to        
contract or to dilate it would be to    
modify both the psychical evolution that
 fills it and the invention which is its
 goal4 ,the time taken up by the        
invention1 is one with the invention    
itself4 ,it is the progress of a thought
 which is changing in the degree and    
measure that it is taking form4 ,it is a
 vital process1 something like the      
ripening of an idea4  ,the painter is   
before his canvas1 the colors are on the
 palette1 the model is sitting--all this
 we see1 and also we know the painter's 
style3 do we foresee what will appear on
 the canvas8 ,we possess the elements of
 the problem2 we know in an abstract    
way1 how it will be solved1 for the     
portrait will surely resemble the model 
and will surely resemble also the       

artist2 but the concrete solution brings
 with it that unforeseeable nothing     
which is everything in a work of art4   
,and it is this nothing that takes time4
 ,nought as matter1 it creates itself as
 form4 ,the sprouting and flowering of  
this form are stretched out on an       
unshrinkable duration1 which is one with
 their essence4 ,so of the works of     
nature4 ,their novelty arises from an   
internal impetus which is progress or   
succession1 which confers on succession 
a peculiar virtue or which owes to      
succession the whole of its             
virtue--which1 at any rate1 makes       
succession1 or continuity of            
interpenetration in time1 irreducible to
 a mere instantaneous juxtaposition in  
space4 ,this is why the idea of reading 
in a present state of the material      
universe the future of living forms1 and
 of unfolding now their history yet to  
come1 involves a veritable absurdity4   
,but this absurdity is difficult to     
bring out1 because our memory is        

accustomed to place alongside of each   
other1 in an ideal space1 the terms it  
perceives in turn1 because it always    
represents past succession in the form  
of juxtaposition4 ,it is able to do so1 
indeed1 just because the past belongs to
 that which is already invented1 to the 
dead1 and no longer to creation and to  
life4 ,then1 as the succession to come  
will end by being a succession past1 we 
persuade ourselves that the duration to 
come admits of the same treatment as    
past duration1 that it is1 even now1    
unrollable1 that the future is there1   
rolled up1 already painted on the       
canvas4 ,an illusion1 no doubt1 but an  
illusion that is natural1 ineradicable1 
and that will last as long as the human 
mind6  ,time is invention or it is      
nothing at all4 ,but of time-invention  
physics can take no account1 restricted 
as it is to the cinematographical       
method4 ,it is limited to counting      
simultaneities between the events that  
make up this time and the positions of  

the mobile ,t on its trajectory4 ,it    
detaches these events from the whole1   
which at every moment puts on a new form
 and which communicates to them         
something of its novelty4 ,it considers 
them in the abstract1 such as they would
 be outside of the living whole1 that is
 to say1 in a time unrolled in space4   
,it retains only the events or systems  
of events that can be thus isolated     
without being made to undergo too       
profound a deformation1 because only    
these lend themselves to the application
 of its method4 ,our physics dates from 
the day when it was known how to isolate
 such systems4 ,to sum up1 while modern 
physics is distinguished from ancient   
physics by the fact that it considers   
any moment of time whatever1 it rests   
altogether on a substitution of         
time-length for time-invention4  ,it    
seems then that1 parallel to this       
physics1 a second kind of knowledge     
ought to have grown up1 which could have
 retained what physics allowed to       

escape4 ,on the flux itself of duration 
science neither would nor could lay     
hold1 bound as it was to the            
cinematographical method4 ,this second  
kind of knowledge would have set the    
cinematographical method aside4 ,it     
would have called upon the mind to      
renounce its most cherished habits4 ,it 
is within becoming that it would have   
transported us by an effort of sympathy4
 ,we should no longer be asking where a 
moving body will be1 what shape a system
 will take1 through what state a change 
will pass at a given moment3 the moments
 of time1 which are only arrests of our 
attention1 would no longer exist2 it is 
the flow of time1 it is the very flux of
 the real that we should be trying to   
follow4 ,the first kind of knowledge has
 the advantage of enabling us to foresee
 the future and of making us in some    
measure masters of events2 in return1 it
 retains of the moving reality only     
eventual immobilities1 that is to say1  
views taken of it by our mind4 ,it      

symbolizes the real and transposes it   
into the human rather than expresses it4
 ,the other knowledge1 if it is         
possible1 is practically useless1 it    
will not extend our empire over nature1 
it will even go against certain natural 
aspirations of the intellect2 but1 if it
 succeeds1 it is reality itself that it 
will hold in a firm and final embrace4  
,not only may we thus complete the      
intellect and its knowledge of matter by
 accustoming it to install itself within
 the moving1 but by developing also     
another faculty1 complementary to the   
intellect1 we may open a perspective on 
the other half of the real4 ,for1 as    
soon as we are confronted with true     
duration1 we see that it means creation1
 and that if that which is being unmade 
endures1 it can only be because it is   
inseparably bound to what is making     
itself4 ,thus will appear the necessity 
of a continual growth of the universe1  
,i should say of a life of the real4    
,and thus will be seen in a new light   

the life which we find on the surface of
 our planet1 a life directed the same   
way as that of the universe1 and inverse
 of materiality4 ,to intellect1 in      
short1 there will be added intuition4   
,the more we reflect on it1 the more we 
shall find that this conception of      
metaphysics is that which modern science
 suggests4  ,for the ancients1 indeed1  
time is theoretically negligible1       
because the duration of a thing only    
manifests the degradation of its        
essence3 it is with this motionless     
essence that science has to deal4       
,change being only the effort of a form 
toward its own realization1 the         
realization is all that it concerns us  
to know4 ,no doubt the realization is   
never complete3 it is this that ancient 
philosophy expresses by saying that we  
do not perceive form without matter4    
,but if we consider the changing object 
at a certain essential moment1 at its   
apogee1 we may say that there it just   
touches its intelligible form4 ,this    

intelligible form1 this ideal and1 so to
 speak1 limiting form1 our science      
seizes upon4 ,and possessing in this the
 gold-piece1 it holds eminently the     
small money which we call becoming or   
change4 ,this change is less than being4
 ,the knowledge that would take it for  
object1 supposing such knowledge were   
possible1 would be less than science4   
,but1 for a science that places all the 
moments of time in the same rank1 that  
admits no essential moment1 no          
culminating point1 no apogee1 change is 
no longer a diminution of essence1      
duration is not a dilution of eternity4 
,the flux of time is the reality itself1
 and the things which we study are the  
things which flow4 ,it is true that of  
this flowing reality we are limited to  
taking instantaneous views4 ,but1 just  
because of this1 scientific knowledge   
must appeal to another knowledge to     
complete it4 ,while the ancient         
conception of scientific knowledge ended
 in making time a degradation1 and      

change the diminution of a form given   
from all eternity--on the contrary1 by  
following the new conception to the end1
 we should come to see in time a        
progressive growth of the absolute1 and 
in the evolution of things a continual  
invention of forms ever new4  ,it is    
true that it would be to break with the 
metaphysics of the ancients4 ,they saw  
only one way of knowing definitely4     
,their science consisted in a scattered 
and fragmentary metaphysics1 their      
metaphysics in a concentrated and       
systematic science4 ,their science and  
metaphysics were1 at most1 two species  
of one and the same genus4 ,in our      
hypothesis1 on the contrary1 science and
 metaphysics are two opposed although   
complementary ways of knowing1 the first
 retaining only moments1 that is to say1
 that which does not endure1 the second 
bearing on duration itself4 ,now1 it was
 natural to hesitate between so novel a 
conception of metaphysics and the       
traditional conception4 ,the temptation 

must have been strong to repeat with the
 new science what had been tried on the 
old1 to suppose our scientific knowledge
 of nature completed at once1 to unify  
it entirely1 and to give to this        
unification1 as the ,greeks had already 
done1 the name of metaphysics4 ,so1     
beside the new way that philosophy might
 have prepared1 the old remained open1  
that indeed which physics trod4 ,and1 as
 physics retained of time only what     
could as well be spread out all at once 
in space1 the metaphysics that chose the
 same direction had necessarily to      
proceed as if time created and          
annihilated nothing1 as if duration had 
no efficacy4 ,bound1 like the physics of
 the moderns and the metaphysics of the 
ancients1 to the cinematographical      
method1 it ended with the conclusion1   
implicitly admitted at the start and    
immanent in the method itself3 ,all is  
given4  ,that metaphysics hesitated at  
first between the two paths seems to us 
unquestionable4 ,the indecision is      

visible in ,cartesianism4 ,on the one   
hand1 ,descartes affirms universal      
mechanism3 from this point of view      
movement would be relative1#ajg and1 as 
time has just as much reality as        
movement1 it would follow that past1    
present and future are given from all   
eternity4 ,but1 on the other hand 7and  
that is why the philosopher has not gone
 to these extreme consequences71        
,descartes believes in the free will of 
man4 ,he superposes on the determinism  
of physical phenomena the indeterminism 
of human actions1 and1 consequently1 on 
time-length a time in which there is    
invention1 creation1 true succession4   
,this duration he supports on a ,god who
 is unceasingly renewing the creative   
act1 and who1 being thus tangent to time
 and becoming1 sustains them1           
communicates to them necessarily        
something of his absolute reality4 ,when
 he places himself at this second point 
of view1 ,descartes speaks of movement1 
even spatial1 as of an absolute4#ajh    

,he therefore entered both roads one    
after the other1 having resolved to     
follow neither of them to the end4 ,the 
first would have led him to the denial  
of free will in man and of real will in 
,god4 ,it was the suppression of all    
efficient duration1 the likening of the 
universe to a thing given1 which a      
superhuman intelligence would embrace at
 once in a moment or in eternity4 ,in   
following the second1 on the contrary1  
he would have been led to all the       
consequences which the intuition of true
 duration implies4 ,creation would have 
appeared not simply as continued1 but   
also as continuous4 ,the universe1      
regarded as a whole1 would really       
evolve4 ,the future would no longer be  
determinable by the present2 at most we 
might say that1 once realized1 it can be
 found again in its antecedents1 as the 
sounds of a new language can be         
expressed with the letters of an old    
alphabet if we agree to enlarge the     
value of the letters and to attribute to

 them1 retro-actively1 sounds which no  
combination of the old sounds could have
 produced beforehand4 ,finally1 the     
mechanistic explanation might have      
remained universal in this1 that it can 
indeed be extended to as many systems as
 we choose to cut out in the continuity 
of the universe2 but mechanism would    
then have become a method rather than a 
doctrine4 ,it would have expressed the  
fact that science must proceed after the
 cinematographical manner1 that the     
function of science is to scan the      
rhythm of the flow of things and not to 
fit itself into that flow4--,such were  
the two opposite conceptions of         
metaphysics which were offered to       
philosophy4  ,it chose the first4 ,the  
reason of this choice is undoubtedly the
 mind's tendency to follow the          
cinematographical method1 a method so   
natural to our intellect1 and so well   
adjusted also to the requirements of our
 science1 that we must feel doubly sure 
of its speculative impotence to renounce

 it in metaphysics4 ,but ancient        
philosophy also influenced the choice4  
,artists for ever admirable1 the ,greeks
 created a type of supra-sensible truth1
 as of sensible beauty1 whose attraction
 is hard to resist4 ,as soon as we      
incline to make metaphysics a           
systematization of science1 we glide in 
the direction of ,plato and of          
,aristotle4 ,and1 once in the zone of   
attraction in which the ,greek          
philosophers moved1 we are drawn along  
in their orbit4  ,such was the case with
 ,leibniz1 as also with ,spinoza4 ,we   
are not blind to the treasures of       
originality their doctrines contain4    
,spinoza and ,leibniz have poured into  
them the whole content of their souls1  
rich with the inventions of their genius
 and the acquisitions of modern thought4
 ,and there are in each of them1        
especially in ,spinoza1 flashes of      
intuition that break through the system4
 ,but if we leave out of the two        
doctrines what breathes life into them1 

if we retain the skeleton only1 we have 
before us the very picture of ,platonism
 and ,aristotelianism seen through      
,cartesian mechanism4 ,they present to  
us a systematization of the new physics1
 constructed on the model of the ancient
 metaphysics4  ,what1 indeed1 could the 
unification of physics be8 ,the         
inspiring idea of that science was to   
isolate1 within the universe1 systems of
 material points such that1 the position
 of each of these points being known at 
a given moment1 we could then calculate 
it for any moment whatever4 ,as1        
moreover1 the systems thus defined were 
the only ones on which the new science  
had hold1 and as it could not be known  
beforehand whether a system satisfied or
 did not satisfy the desired condition1 
it was useful to proceed always and     
everywhere as if the condition was      
realized4 ,there was in this a          
methodological rule1 a very natural     
rule--so natural1 indeed1 that it was   
not even necessary to formulate it4 ,for

 simple common sense tells us that when 
we are possessed of an effective        
instrument of research1 and are ignorant
 of the limits of its applicability1 we 
should act as if its applicability were 
unlimited2 there will always be time to 
abate it4 ,but the temptation must have 
been great for the philosopher to       
hypostatize this hope1 or rather this   
impetus1 of the new science1 and to     
convert a general rule of method into a 
fundamental law of things4 ,so he       
transported himself at once to the      
limit2 he supposed physics to have      
become complete and to embrace the whole
 of the sensible world4 ,the universe   
became a system of points1 the position 
of which was rigorously determined at   
each instant by relation to the         
preceding instant and theoretically     
calculable for any moment whatever4 ,the
 result1 in short1 was universal        
mechanism4 ,but it was not enough to    
formulate this mechanism2 what was      
required was to found it1 to give the   

reason for it and prove its necessity4  
,and the essential affirmation of       
mechanism being that of a reciprocal    
mathematical dependence of all the      
points of the universe1 as also of all  
the moments of the universe1 the reason 
of mechanism had to be discovered in the
 unity of a principle into which could  
be contracted all that is juxtaposed in 
space and successive in time4 ,hence1   
the whole of the real was supposed to be
 given at once4 ,the reciprocal         
determination of the juxtaposed         
appearances in space was explained by   
the indivisibility of true being1 and   
the inflexible determinism of successive
 phenomena in time simply expressed that
 the whole of being is given in the     
eternal4  ,the new philosophy was going1
 then1 to be a recommencement1 or rather
 a transposition1 of the old4 ,the      
ancient philosophy had taken each of the
 concepts into which a becoming is      
concentrated or which mark its apogee3  
it supposed them all known1 and gathered

 them up into a single concept1 form of 
forms1 idea of ideas1 like the ,god of  
,aristotle4 ,the new philosophy was     
going to take each of the laws which    
condition a becoming in relation to     
others and which are as the permanent   
substratum of phenomena3 it would       
suppose them all known1 and would gather
 them up into a unity which also would  
express them eminently1 but which1 like 
the ,god of ,aristotle and for the same 
reasons1 must remain immutably shut up  
in itself4  ,true1 this return to the   
ancient philosophy was not without great
 difficulties4 ,when a ,plato1 an       
,aristotle1 or a ,plotinus melt all the 
concepts of their science into a single 
one1 in so doing they embrace the whole 
of the real1 for concepts are supposed  
to represent the things themselves1 and 
to possess at least as much positive    
content4 ,but a law1 in general1        
expresses only a relation1 and physical 
laws in particular express only         
quantitative relations between concrete 

things4 ,so that if a modern philosopher
 works with the laws of the new science 
as the ,greek philosopher did with the  
concepts of the ancient science1 if he  
makes all the conclusions of a physics  
supposed omniscient converge on a single
 point1 he neglects what is concrete in 
the phenomena--the qualities perceived1 
the perceptions themselves4 ,his        
synthesis comprises1 it seems1 only a   
fraction of reality4 ,in fact1 the first
 result of the new science was to cut   
the real into two halves1 quantity and  
quality1 the former being credited to   
the account of bodies and the latter to 
the account of souls4 ,the ancients had 
raised no such barriers either between  
quality and quantity or between soul and
 body4 ,for them1 the mathematical      
concepts were concepts like the others1 
related to the others and fitting quite 
naturally into the hierarchy of the     
,ideas4 ,neither was the body then      
defined by geometrical extension1 nor   
the soul by consciousness4 ,if the      

,greek3 psych of ,aristotle1 the        
entelechy of a living body1 is less     
spiritual than our soul1 it is because  
his ,greek3 oma1 already impregnated    
with the ,idea1 is less corporeal than  
our body4 ,the scission was not yet     
irremediable between the two terms4 ,it 
has become so1 and thence a metaphysic  
that aims at an abstract unity must     
resign itself either to comprehend in   
its synthesis only one half of the real1
 or to take advantage of the absolute   
heterogeneity of the two halves in order
 to consider one as a translation of the
 other4 ,different phrases will express 
different things if they belong to the  
same language1 that is to say1 if there 
is a certain relationship of sound      
between them4 ,but if they belong to two
 different languages1 they might1 just  
because of their radical diversity of   
sound1 express the same thing4 ,so of   
quality and quantity1 of soul and body4 
,it is for having cut all connection    
between the two terms that philosophers 

have been led to establish between them 
a rigorous parallelism1 of which the    
ancients had not dreamed1 to regard them
 as translations and not as inversions  
of each other2 in short1 to posit a     
fundamental identity as a substratum to 
their duality4 ,the synthesis to which  
they rose thus became capable of        
embracing everything4 ,a divine         
mechanism made the phenomena of thought 
to correspond to those of extension1    
each to each1 qualities to quantities1  
souls to bodies4  ,it is this           
parallelism that we find both in        
,leibniz and in ,spinoza--in different  
forms1 it is true1 because of the       
unequal importance which they attach to 
extension4 ,with ,spinoza1 the two terms
 ,thought and ,extension are placed1 in 
principle at least1 in the same rank4   
,they are1 therefore1 two translations  
of one and the same original1 or1 as    
,spinoza says1 two attributes of one and
 the same substance1 which we must call 
,god4 ,and these two translations1 as   

also an infinity of others into         
languages which we know not1 are called 
up and even forced into existence by the
 original1 just as the essence of the   
circle is translated automatically1 so  
to speak1 both by a figure and by an    
equation4 ,for ,leibniz1 on the         
contrary1 extension is indeed still a   
translation1 but it is thought that is  
the original1 and thought might dispense
 with translation1 the translation being
 made only for us4 ,in positing ,god1 we
 necessarily posit also all the possible
 views of ,god1 that is to say1 the     
monads4 ,but we can always imagine that 
a view has been taken from a point of   
view1 and it is natural for an imperfect
 mind like ours to class views1         
qualitatively different1 according to   
the order and position of points of     
view1 qualitatively identical1 from     
which the views might have been taken4  
,in reality the points of view do not   
exist1 for there are only views1 each   
given in an indivisible block and       

representing in its own way the whole of
 reality1 which is ,god4 ,but we need to
 express the plurality of the views1    
that are unlike each other1 by the      
multiplicity of the points of view that 
are exterior to each other2 and we also 
need to symbolize the more or less close
 relationship between the views by the  
relative situation of the points of view
 to one another1 their nearness or their
 distance1 that is to say1 by a         
magnitude4 ,that is what ,leibniz means 
when he says that space is the order of 
coexistents1 that the perception of     
extension is a confused perception 7that
 is to say1 a perception relative to an 
imperfect mind71 and that nothing exists
 but monads1 expressing thereby that the
 real ,whole has no parts1 but is       
repeated to infinity1 each time         
integrally 7though diversely7 within    
itself1 and that all these repetitions  
are complementary to each other4 ,in    
just the same way1 the visible relief of
 an object is equivalent to the whole   

set of stereoscopic views taken of it   
from all points1 so that1 instead of    
seeing in the relief a juxtaposition of 
solid parts1 we might quite as well look
 upon it as made of the reciprocal      
complementarity of these whole views1   
each given in block1 each indivisible1  
each different from all the others and  
yet representative of the same thing4   
,the ,whole1 that is to say1 ,god1 is   
this very relief for ,leibniz1 and the  
monads are these complementary plane    
views2 for that reason he defines ,god  
as the substance that has no point of   
view1 or1 again1 as the universal       
harmony1 that is to say1 the reciprocal 
complementarity of monads4 ,in short1   
,leibniz differs from ,spinoza in this1 
that he looks upon the universal        
mechanism as an aspect which reality    
takes for us1 whereas1 ,spinoza makes of
 it an aspect which reality takes for   
itself4  ,it is true that1 after having 
concentrated in ,god the whole of the   
real1 it became difficult for them to   

pass from ,god to things1 from eternity 
to time4 ,the difficulty was even much  
greater for these philosophers than an  
,aristotle or a ,plotinus4 ,the ,god of 
,aristotle1 indeed1 had been obtained by
 the compression and reciprocal         
compenetration of the ,ideas that       
represent1 in their finished state or in
 their culminating point1 the changing  
things of the world4 ,he was1 therefore1
 transcendent to the world1 and the     
duration of things was juxtaposed to    
,his eternity1 of which it was only a   
weakening4 ,but in the principle to     
which we are led by the consideration of
 universal mechanism1 and which must    
serve as its substratum1 it is not      
concepts or things1 but laws or         
relations that are condensed4 ,now1 a   
relation does not exist separately4 ,a  
law connects changing terms and is      
immanent in what it governs4 ,the       
principle in which all these relations  
are ultimately summed up1 and which is  
the basis of the unity of nature1       

cannot1 therefore1 be transcendent to   
sensible reality2 it is immanent in it1 
and we must suppose that it is at once  
both in and out of time1 gathered up in 
the unity of its substance and yet      
condemned to wind it off in an endless  
chain4 ,rather than formulate so        
appalling a contradiction1 the          
philosophers were necessarily led to    
sacrifice the weaker of the two terms1  
and to regard the temporal aspect of    
things as a mere illusion4 ,leibniz says
 so in explicit terms1 for he makes of  
time1 as of space1 a confused           
perception4 ,while the multiplicity of  
his monads expresses only the diversity 
of views taken of the whole1 the history
 of an isolated monad seems to be hardly
 anything else than the manifold views  
that it can take of its own substance3  
so that time would consist in all the   
points of view that each monad can      
assume towards itself1 as space consists
 in all the points of view that all     
monads can assume towards ,god4 ,but the

 thought of ,spinoza is much less clear1
 and this philosopher seems to have     
sought to establish1 between eternity   
and that which has duration1 the same   
difference as ,aristotle made between   
essence and accidents3 a most difficult 
undertaking1 for the ,greek3 yl of      
,aristotle was no longer there to       
measure the distance and explain the    
passage from the essential to the       
accidental1 ,descartes having eliminated
 it for ever4 ,however that may be1 the 
deeper we go into the ,spinozistic      
conception of the inadequate1 as related
 to the adequate1 the more we feel      
ourselves moving in the direction of    
,aristotelianism--just as the           
,leibnizian monads1 in proportion as    
they mark themselves out the more       
clearly1 tend to approximate to the     
,intelligibles of ,plotinus4#aji ,the   
natural trend of these two philosophies 
brings them back to the conclusions of  
the ancient philosophy4  ,to sum up1 the
 resemblances of this new metaphysic to 

that of the ancients arise from the fact
 that both suppose ready-made--the      
former above the sensible1 the latter   
within the sensible--a science one and  
complete1 with which any reality that   
the sensible may contain is believed to 
coincide4 ,for both1 reality as well as 
truth are integrally given in eternity4 
,both are opposed to the idea of a      
reality that creates itself gradually1  
that is1 at bottom1 to an absolute      
duration4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,now1 it might easily be   
shown that the conclusions of this      
metaphysic1 springing from science1 have
 rebounded upon science itself1 as it   
were1 by ricochet4 ,they penetrate the  
whole of our so-called empiricism4      
,physics and chemistry study only inert 
matter2 biology1 when it treats the     
living being physically and chemically1 
considers only the inert side of the    
living3 hence the mechanistic           
explanations1 in spite of their         
development1 include only a small part  

of the real4 ,to suppose a priori that  
the whole of the real is resolvable into
 elements of this kind1 or at least that
 mechanism can give a complete          
translation of what happens in the      
world1 is to pronounce for a certain    
metaphysic--the very metaphysic of which
 ,spinoza and ,leibniz have laid down   
the principles and drawn the            
consequences4 ,certainly1 the           
psycho-physiologist who affirms the     
exact equivalence of the cerebral and   
the psychical state1 who imagines the   
possibility1 for some superhuman        
intellect1 of reading in the brain what 
is going on in consciousness1 believes  
himself very far from the metaphysicians
 of the seventeenth century1 and very   
near to experience4 ,yet experience pure
 and simple tells us nothing of the     
kind4 ,it shows us the interdependence  
of the mental and the physical1 the     
necessity of a certain cerebral         
substratum for the psychical            
state--nothing more4 ,from the fact that

 two things are mutually dependent1 it  
does not follow that they are           
equivalent4 ,because a certain screw is 
necessary to a certain machine1 because 
the machine works when the screw is     
there and stops when the screw is taken 
away1 we do not say that the screw is   
the equivalent of the machine4 ,for     
correspondence to be equivalence1 it    
would be necessary that to any part of  
the machine a definite part of the screw
 should correspond--as in a literal     
translation in which each chapter       
renders a chapter1 each sentence a      
sentence1 each word a word4 ,now1 the   
relation of the brain to consciousness  
seems to be entirely different4 ,not    
only does the hypothesis of an          
equivalence between the psychical state 
and the cerebral state imply a downright
 absurdity1 as we have tried to prove in
 a former essay1#aaj but the facts1     
examined without prejudice1 certainly   
seem to indicate that the relation of   
the psychical to the physical is just   

that of the machine to the screw4 ,to   
speak of an equivalence between the two 
is simply to curtail1 and make almost   
unintelligible1 the ,spinozistic or     
,leibnizian metaphysic4 ,it is to accept
 this philosophy1 such as it is1 on the 
side of ,extension1 but to mutilate it  
on the side of ,thought4 ,with ,spinoza1
 with ,leibniz1 we suppose the unifying 
synthesis of the phenomena of matter    
achieved1 and everything in matter      
explained mechanically4 ,but1 for the   
conscious facts1 we no longer push the  
synthesis to the end4 ,we stop half-way4
 ,we suppose consciousness to be        
coextensive with a certain part of      
nature and not with all of it4 ,we are  
thus led1 sometimes to an               
epiphenomenalism that associates        
consciousness with certain particular   
vibrations and puts it here and there in
 the world in a sporadic state1 and     
sometimes to a monism that scatters     
consciousness into as many tiny grains  
as there are atoms2 but1 in either case1

 it is to an incomplete ,spinozism or to
 an incomplete ,leibnizianism that we   
come back4 ,between this conception of  
nature and ,cartesianism we find1       
moreover1 intermediate historical       
stages4 ,the medical philosophers of the
 eighteenth century1 with their cramped 
,cartesianism1 have had a great part in 
the genesis of the epiphenomenalism and 
monism of the present day4         99   
99       99       99       99  ,these   
doctrines are thus found to fall short  
of the ,kantian criticism4 ,certainly1  
the philosophy of ,kant is also imbued  
with the belief in a science single and 
complete1 embracing the whole of the    
real4 ,indeed1 looked at from one       
aspect1 it is only a continuation of the
 metaphysics of the moderns and a       
transposition of the ancient            
metaphysics4 ,spinoza and ,leibniz had1 
following ,aristotle1 hypostatized in   
,god the unity of knowledge4 ,the       
,kantian criticism1 on one side at      
least1 consists in asking whether the   

whole of this hypothesis is necessary to
 modern science as it was to ancient    
science1 or if part of the hypothesis is
 not sufficient4 ,for the ancients1     
science applied to concepts1 that is to 
say1 to kinds of things4 ,in compressing
 all concepts into one1 they therefore  
necessarily arrived at a being1 which we
 may call ,thought1 but which was rather
 thought-object than thought-subject4   
,when ,aristotle defined ,god the       
,greek3 noses nosis1 it is probably on  
,greek3 noses1 and not on ,greek3 nosis 
that he put the emphasis4 ,god was the  
synthesis of all concepts1 the idea of  
ideas4 ,but modern science turns on     
laws1 that is1 on relations4 ,now1 a    
relation is a bond established by a mind
 between two or more terms4 ,a relation 
is nothing outside of the intellect that
 relates4 ,the universe1 therefore1 can 
only be a system of laws if phenomena   
have passed beforehand through the      
filter of an intellect4 ,of course1 this
 intellect might be that of a being     

infinitely superior to man1 who would   
found the materiality of things at the  
same time that he bound them together3  
such was the hypothesis of ,leibniz and 
of ,spinoza4 ,but it is not necessary to
 go so far1 and1 for the effect we have 
here to obtain1 the human intellect is  
enough3 such is precisely the ,kantian  
solution4 ,between the dogmatism of a   
,spinoza or a ,leibniz and the criticism
 of ,kant there is just the same        
distance as between it may be maintained
 that-- and it suffices that--4 ,kant   
stops this dogmatism on the incline that
 was making it slip too far toward the  
,greek metaphysics2 he reduces to the   
strict minimum the hypothesis which is  
necessary in order to suppose the       
physics of ,galileo indefinitely        
extensible4 ,true1 when he speaks of the
 human intellect1 he means neither yours
 nor mine3 the unity of nature comes    
indeed from the human understanding that
 unifies1 but the unifying function that
 operates here is impersonal4 ,it       

imparts itself to our individual        
consciousnesses1 but it transcends them4
 ,it is much less than a substantial    
,god2 it is1 however1 a little more than
 the isolated work of a man or even than
 the collective work of humanity4 ,it   
does not exactly lie within man2 rather1
 man lies within it1 as in an atmosphere
 of intellectuality which his           
consciousness breathes4 ,it is1 if we   
will1 a formal ,god1 something that in  
,kant is not yet divine1 but which tends
 to become so4 ,it became so1 indeed1   
with ,fichte4 ,with ,kant1 however1 its 
principal rle was to give to the whole  
of our science a relative and human     
character1 although of a humanity       
already somewhat deified4 ,from this    
point of view1 the criticism of ,kant   
consisted chiefly in limiting the       
dogmatism of his predecessors1 accepting
 their conception of science and        
reducing to a minimum the metaphysic it 
implied4  ,but it is otherwise with the 
,kantian distinction between the matter 

of knowledge and its form4 ,by regarding
 intelligence as pre-eminently a faculty
 of establishing relations1 ,kant       
attributed an extra-intellectual origin 
to the terms between which the relations
 are established4 ,he affirmed1 against 
his immediate predecessors1 that        
knowledge is not entirely resolvable    
into terms of intelligence4 ,he brought 
back into philosophy--while modifying it
 and carrying it on to another          
plane--that essential element of the    
philosophy of ,descartes which had been 
abandoned by the ,cartesians4  ,thereby 
he prepared the way for a new           
philosophy1 which might have established
 itself in the extra-intellectual matter
 of knowledge by a higher effort of     
intuition4 ,coinciding with this matter1
 adopting the same rhythm and the same  
movement1 might not consciousness1 by   
two efforts of opposite direction1      
raising itself and lowering itself by   
turns1 become able to grasp from within1
 and no longer perceive only from       

without1 the two forms of reality1 body 
and mind8 ,would not this twofold effort
 make us1 as far as that is possible1   
re-live the absolute8 ,moreover1 as1 in 
the course of this operation1 we should 
see intellect spring up of itself1 cut  
itself out in the whole of mind1        
intellectual knowledge would then appear
 as it is1 limited1 but not relative4   
,such was the direction that ,kantianism
 might have pointed out to a revivified 
,cartesianism4 ,but in this direction   
,kant himself did not go4  ,he would    
not1 because1 while assigning to        
knowledge an extra-intellectual matter1 
he believed this matter to be either    
coextensive with intellect or less      
extensive than intellect4 ,therefore he 
could not dream of cutting out intellect
 in it1 nor1 consequently1 of tracing   
the genesis of the understanding and its
 categories4 ,the molds of the          
understanding and the understanding     
itself had to be accepted as they are1  
already made4 ,between the matter       

presented to our intellect and this     
intellect itself there was no           
relationship4 ,the agreement between the
 two was due to the fact that intellect 
imposed its form on matter4 ,so that not
 only was it necessary to posit the     
intellectual form of knowledge as a kind
 of absolute and give up the quest of   
its genesis1 but the very matter of this
 knowledge seemed too ground down by the
 intellect for us to be able to hope to 
get it back in its original purity4 ,it 
was not the thing-in-itself1 it was only
 the refraction of it through our       
atmosphere4  ,if now we inquire why     
,kant did not believe that the matter of
 our knowledge extends beyond its form1 
this is what we find4 ,the criticism of 
our knowledge of nature that was        
instituted by ,kant consisted in        
ascertaining what our mind must be and  
what ,nature must be if the claims of   
our science are justified2 but of these 
claims themselves ,kant has not made the
 criticism4 ,i mean that he took for    

granted the idea of a science that is   
one1 capable of binding with the same   
force all the parts of what is given1   
and of cordinating them into a system   
presenting on all sides an equal        
solidity4 ,he did not consider1 in his  
,critique of ,pure ,reason1 that science
 became less and less objective1 more   
and more symbolical1 to the extent that 
it went from the physical to the vital1 
from the vital to the psychical4        
,experience does not move1 to his view1 
in two different and perhaps opposite   
ways1 the one conformable to the        
direction of the intellect1 the other   
contrary to it4 ,there is1 for him1 only
 one experience1 and the intellect      
covers its whole ground4 ,this is what  
,kant expresses by saying that all our  
intuitions are sensuous1 or1 in other   
words1 infra-intellectual4 ,and this    
would have to be admitted1 indeed1 if   
our science presented in all its parts  
an equal objectivity4 ,but suppose1 on  
the contrary1 that science is less and  

less objective1 more and more           
symbolical1 as it goes from the physical
 to the psychical1 passing through the  
vital3 then1 as it is indeed necessary  
to perceive a thing somehow in order to 
symbolize it1 there would be an         
intuition of the psychical1 and more    
generally of the vital1 which the       
intellect would transpose and translate1
 no doubt1 but which would none the less
 transcend the intellect4 ,there would  
be1 in other words1 a supra-intellectual
 intuition4 ,if this intuition exist1 a 
taking possession of the spirit by      
itself is possible1 and no longer only a
 knowledge that is external and         
phenomenal4 ,what is more1 if we have an
 intuition of this kind 7,i mean an     
ultra-intellectual intuition7 then      
sensuous intuition is likely to be in   
continuity with it through certain      
intermediaries1 as the infra-red is     
continuous with the ultra-violet4       
,sensuous intuition itself1 therefore1  
is promoted4 ,it will no longer attain  

only the phantom of an unattainable     
thing-in-itself4 ,it is 7provided we    
bring to it certain indispensable       
corrections7 into the absolute itself   
that it will introduce us4 ,so long as  
it was regarded as the only material of 
our science1 it reflected back on all   
science something of the relativity     
which strikes a scientific knowledge of 
spirit2 and thus the perception of      
bodies1 which is the beginning of the   
science of bodies1 seemed itself to be  
relative4 ,relative1 therefore1 seemed  
to be sensuous intuition4 ,but this is  
not the case if distinctions are made   
between the different sciences1 and if  
the scientific knowledge of the         
spiritual 7and also1 consequently1 of   
the vital7 be regarded as the more or   
less artificial extension of a certain  
manner of knowing which1 applied to     
bodies1 is not at all symbolical4 ,let  
us go further3 if there are thus two    
intuitions of different order 7the      
second being obtained by a reversal of  

the direction of the first71 and if it  
is toward the second that the intellect 
naturally inclines1 there is no         
essential difference between the        
intellect and this intuition itself4    
,the barriers between the matter of     
sensible knowledge and its form are     
lowered1 as also between the pure forms 
of sensibility and the categories of the
 understanding4 ,the matter and form of 
intellectual knowledge 7restricted to   
its own object7 are seen to be          
engendering each other by a reciprocal  
adaptation1 intellect modeling itself on
 corporeity1 and corporeity on          
intellect4  ,but this duality of        
intuition ,kant neither would nor could 
admit4 ,it would have been necessary1 in
 order to admit it1 to regard duration  
as the very stuff of reality1 and       
consequently to distinguish between the 
substantial duration of things and time 
spread out in space4 ,it would have been
 necessary to regard space itself1 and  
the geometry which is immanent in space1

 as an ideal limit in the direction of  
which material things develop1 but which
 they do not actually attain4 ,nothing  
could be more contrary to the letter1   
and perhaps also to the spirit1 of the  
,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,no doubt1  
knowledge is presented to us in it as an
 ever-open roll1 experience as a push of
 facts that is for ever going on4 ,but1 
according to ,kant1 these facts are     
spread out on one plane as fast as they 
arise2 they are external to each other  
and external to the mind4 ,of a         
knowledge from within1 that could grasp 
them in their springing forth instead of
 taking them already sprung1 that would 
dig beneath space and spatialized time1 
there is never any question4 ,yet it is 
indeed beneath this plane that our      
consciousness places us2 there flows    
true duration4  ,in this respect1 also1 
,kant is very near his predecessors4    
,between the non-temporal1 and the time 
that is spread out in distinct moments1 
he admits no mean4 ,and as there is     

indeed no intuition that carries us into
 the non-temporal1 all intuition is thus
 found to be sensuous1 by definition4   
,but between physical existence1 which  
is spread out in space1 and non-temporal
 existence1 which can only be a         
conceptual and logical existence like   
that of which metaphysical dogmatism    
speaks1 is there not room for           
consciousness and for life8 ,there is1  
unquestionably4 ,we perceive it when we 
place ourselves in duration in order to 
go from that duration to moments1       
instead of starting from moments in     
order to bind them again and to         
construct duration4  ,yet it was to a   
non-temporal intuition that the         
immediate successors of ,kant turned1 in
 order to escape from the ,kantian      
relativism4 ,certainly1 the ideas of    
becoming1 of progress1 of evolution1    
seem to occupy a large place in their   
philosophy4 ,but does duration really   
play a part in it8 ,real duration is    
that in which each form flows out of    

previous forms1 while adding to them    
something new1 and is explained by them 
as much as it explains them2 but to     
deduce this form directly from one      
complete ,being which it is supposed to 
manifest1 is to return to ,spinozism4   
,it is1 like ,leibniz and ,spinoza1 to  
deny to duration all efficient action4  
,the post-,kantian philosophy1 severe as
 it may have been on the mechanistic    
theories1 accepts from mechanism the    
idea of a science that is one and the   
same for all kinds of reality4 ,and it  
is nearer to mechanism than it imagines2
 for though1 in the consideration of    
matter1 of life and of thought1 it      
replaces the successive degrees of      
complexity1 that mechanism supposed by  
degrees of the realization of an ,idea  
or by degrees of the objectification of 
a ,will1 it still speaks of degrees1 and
 these degrees are those of a scale     
which ,being traverses in a single      
direction4 ,in short1 it makes out the  
same articulations in nature that       

mechanism does4 ,of mechanism it retains
 the whole design2 it merely gives it a 
different coloring4 ,but it is the      
design itself1 or at least one half of  
the design1 that needs to be re-made4   
,if we are to do that1 we must give up  
the method of construction1 which was   
that of ,kant's successors4 ,we must    
appeal to experience--an experience     
purified1 or1 in other words1 released1 
where necessary1 from the molds that our
 intellect has formed in the degree and 
proportion of the progress of our action
 on things4 ,an experience of this kind 
is not a non-temporal experience4 ,it   
only seeks1 beyond the spatialized time 
in which we believe we see continual    
rearrangements between the parts1 that  
concrete duration in which a radical    
recasting of the whole is always going  
on4 ,it follows the real in all its     
sinuosities4 ,it does not lead us1 like 
the method of construction1 to higher   
and higher generalities--piled-up       
stories of a magnificent building4 ,but 

then it leaves no play between the      
explanations it suggests and the objects
 it has to explain4 ,it is the detail of
 the real1 and no longer only the whole 
in a lump1 that it claims to illumine4  
99       99       99       99       99  
,that the thought of the nineteenth     
century called for a philosophy of this 
kind1 rescued from the arbitrary1       
capable of coming down to the detail of 
particular facts1 is unquestionable4    
,unquestionably1 also1 it felt that this
 philosophy ought to establish itself in
 what we call concrete duration4 ,the   
advent of the moral sciences1 the       
progress of psychology1 the growing     
importance of embryology among the      
biological sciences--all this was bound 
to suggest the idea of a reality which  
endures inwardly1 which is duration     
itself4 ,so1 when a philosopher arose   
who announced a doctrine of evolution1  
in which the progress of matter toward  
perceptibility would be traced together 
with the advance of the mind toward     

rationality1 in which the complication  
of correspondences between the external 
and the internal would be followed step 
by step1 in which change would become   
the very substance of things--to him all
 eyes were turned4 ,the powerful        
attraction that ,spencerian evolutionism
 has exercised on contemporary thought  
is due to that very cause4 ,however far 
,spencer may seem to be from ,kant1     
however ignorant1 indeed1 he may have   
been of ,kantianism1 he felt1           
nevertheless1 at his first contact with 
the biological sciences1 the direction  
in which philosophy could continue to   
advance without laying itself open to   
the ,kantian criticism4  ,but he had no 
sooner started to follow the path than  
he turned off short4 ,he had promised to
 retrace a genesis1 and1 lo6 he was     
doing something entirely different4 ,his
 doctrine bore indeed the name of       
evolutionism2 it claimed to remount and 
redescend the course of the universal   
becoming2 but1 in fact1 it dealt neither

 with becoming nor with evolution4  ,we 
need not enter here into a profound     
examination of this philosophy4 ,let us 
say merely that the usual device of the 
,spencerian method consists in          
reconstructing evolution with fragments 
of the evolved4 ,if ,i paste a picture  
on a card and then cut up the card into 
bits1 ,i can reproduce the picture by   
rightly grouping again the small pieces4
 ,and a child who working thus with the 
pieces of a puzzle-picture1 and putting 
together unformed fragments of the      
picture finally obtains a pretty colored
 design1 no doubt imagines that he has  
produced design and color4 ,yet the act 
of drawing and painting has nothing to  
do with that of putting together the    
fragments of a picture already drawn and
 already painted4 ,so1 by combining     
together the most simple results of     
evolution1 you may imitate well or ill  
the most complex effects2 but of neither
 the simple nor the complex will you    
have retraced the genesis1 and the      

addition of evolved to evolved will bear
 no resemblance whatever to the movement
 of evolution4  ,such1 however1 is      
,spencer's illusion4 ,he takes reality  
in its present form2 he breaks it to    
pieces1 he scatters it in fragments     
which he throws to the winds2 then he   
integrates these fragments and          
dissipates their movement4 ,having      
imitated the ,whole by a work of mosaic1
 he imagines he has retraced the design 
of it1 and made the genesis4  ,is it    
matter that is in question8 ,the        
diffused elements which he integrates   
into visible and tangible bodies have   
all the air of being the very particles 
of the simple bodies1 which he first    
supposes disseminated throughout space4 
,they are1 at any rate1 material points1
 and consequently unvarying points1     
veritable little solids3 as if solidity1
 being what is nearest and handiest to  
us1 could be found at the very origin of
 materiality6 ,the more physics         
progresses1 the more it shows the       

impossibility of representing the       
properties of ether or of               
electricity--the probable base of all   
bodies--on the model of the properties  
of the matter which we perceive4 ,but   
philosophy goes back further even than  
the ether1 a mere schematic figure of   
the relations between phenomena         
apprehended by our senses4 ,it knows    
indeed that what is visible and tangible
 in things represents our possible      
action on them4 ,it is not by dividing  
the evolved that we shall reach the     
principle of that which evolves4 ,it is 
not by recomposing the evolved with     
itself that we shall reproduce the      
evolution of which it is the term4  ,is 
it the question of mind8 ,by compounding
 the reflex with the reflex1 ,spencer   
thinks he generates instinct and        
rational volition one after the other4  
,he fails to see that the specialized   
reflex1 being a terminal point of       
evolution just as much as perfect will1 
cannot be supposed at the start4 ,that  

the first of the two terms should have  
reached its final form before the other 
is probable enough2 but both the one and
 the other are deposits of the evolution
 movement1 and the evolution movement   
itself can no more be expressed as a    
function solely of the first than solely
 of the second4 ,we must begin by mixing
 the reflex and the voluntary4 ,we must 
then go in quest of the fluid reality   
which has been precipitated in this     
twofold form1 and which probably shares 
in both without being either4 ,at the   
lowest degree of the animal scale1 in   
living beings that are but an           
undifferentiated protoplasmic mass1 the 
reaction to stimulus does not yet call  
into play one definite mechanism1 as in 
the reflex2 it has not yet choice among 
several definite mechanisms1 as in the  
voluntary act2 it is1 then1 neither     
voluntary nor reflex1 though it heralds 
both4 ,we experience in ourselves       
something of this true original activity
 when we perform semi-voluntary and     

semi-automatic movements to escape a    
pressing danger4 ,and yet this is but a 
very imperfect imitation of the         
primitive character1 for we are         
concerned here with a mixture of two    
activities already formed1 already      
localized in a brain and in a spinal    
cord1 whereas the original activity was 
a simple thing1 which became diversified
 through the very construction of       
mechanisms like those of the spinal cord
 and brain4 ,but to all this ,spencer   
shuts his eyes1 because it is of the    
essence of his method to recompose the  
consolidated with the consolidated1     
instead of going back to the gradual    
process of consolidation1 which is      
evolution itself4  ,is it1 finally1 the 
question of the correspondence between  
mind and matter8 ,spencer is right in   
defining the intellect by this          
correspondence4 ,he is right in         
regarding it as the end of an evolution4
 ,but when he comes to retrace this     
evolution1 again he integrates the      

evolved with the evolved--failing to see
 that he is thus taking useless trouble1
 and that in positing the slightest     
fragment of the actually evolved he     
posits the whole--so that it is vain for
 him1 then1 to pretend to make the      
genesis of it4  ,for1 according to him1 
the phenomena that succeed each other in
 nature project into the human mind     
images which represent them4 ,to the    
relations between phenomena1 therefore1 
correspond symmetrically relations      
between the ideas4 ,and the most general
 laws of nature1 in which the relations 
between phenomena are condensed1 are    
thus found to have engendered the       
directing principles of thought1 into   
which the relations between ideas have  
been integrated4 ,nature1 therefore1 is 
reflected in mind4 ,the intimate        
structure of our thought corresponds1   
piece by piece1 to the very skeleton of 
things--,i admit it willingly2 but1 in  
order that the human mind may be able to
 represent relations between phenomena1 

there must first be phenomena1 that is  
to say1 distinct facts1 cut out in the  
continuity of becoming4 ,and once we    
posit this particular mode of cutting up
 such as we perceive it to-day1 we posit
 also the intellect such as it is       
to-day1 for it is by relation to it1 and
 to it alone1 that reality is cut up in 
this manner4 ,is it probable that       
mammals and insects notice the same     
aspects of nature1 trace in it the same 
divisions1 articulate the whole in the  
same way8 ,and yet the insect1 so far as
 intelligent1 has already something of  
our intellect4 ,each being cuts up the  
material world according to the lines   
that its action must follow3 it is these
 lines of possible action that1 by      
intercrossing1 mark out the net of      
experience of which each mesh is a fact4
 ,no doubt1 a town is composed          
exclusively of houses1 and the streets  
of the town are only the intervals      
between the houses3 so1 we may say that 
nature contains only facts1 and that1   

the facts once posited1 the relations   
are simply the lines running between the
 facts4 ,but1 in a town1 it is the      
gradual portioning of the ground into   
lots that has determined at once the    
place of the houses1 their general      
shape1 and the direction of the streets3
 to this portioning we must go back if  
we wish to understand the particular    
mode of subdivision that causes each    
house to be where it is1 each street to 
run as it does4 ,now1 the cardinal error
 of ,spencer is to take experience      
already allotted as given1 whereas the  
true problem is to know how the         
allotment was worked4 ,i agree that the 
laws of thought are only the integration
 of relations between facts4 ,but1 when 
,i posit the facts with the shape they  
have for me to-day1 ,i suppose my       
faculties of perception and intellection
 such as they are in me to-day2 for it  
is they that portion the real into lots1
 they that cut the facts out in the     
whole of reality4 ,therefore1 instead of

 saying that the relations between facts
 have generated the laws of thought1 ,i 
can as well claim that it is the form of
 thought that has determined the shape  
of the facts perceived1 and consequently
 their relations among themselves3 the  
two ways of expressing oneself are      
equivalent2 they say at bottom the same 
thing4 ,with the second1 it is true1 we 
give up speaking of evolution4 ,but1    
with the first1 we only speak of it1 we 
do not think of it any the more4 ,for a 
true evolutionism would propose to      
discover by what modus vivendi1         
gradually obtained1 the intellect has   
adopted its plan of structure1 and      
matter its mode of subdivision4 ,this   
structure and this subdivision work into
 each other2 they are mutually          
complementary2 they must have progressed
 one with the other4 ,and1 whether we   
posit the present structure of mind or  
the present subdivision of matter1 in   
either case we remain in the evolved3 we
 are told nothing of what evolves1      

nothing of evolution4  ,and yet it is   
this evolution that we must discover4   
,already1 in the field of physics       
itself1 the scientists who are pushing  
the study of their science furthest     
incline to believe that we cannot reason
 about the parts as we reason about the 
whole2 that the same principles are not 
applicable to the origin and to the end 
of a progress2 that neither creation nor
 annihilation1 for instance1 is         
inadmissible when we are concerned with 
the constituent corpuscles of the atom4 
,thereby they tend to place themselves  
in the concrete duration1 in which alone
 there is true generation and not only a
 composition of parts4 ,it is true that 
the creation and annihilation of which  
they speak concern the movement or the  
energy1 and not the imponderable medium 
through which the energy and the        
movement are supposed to circulate4 ,but
 what can remain of matter when you take
 away everything that determines it1    
that is to say1 just energy and movement

 themselves8 ,the philosopher must go   
further than the scientist4 ,making a   
clean sweep of everything that is only  
an imaginative symbol1 he will see the  
material world melt back into a simple  
flux1 a continuity of flowing1 a        
becoming4 ,and he will thus be prepared 
to discover real duration there where it
 is still more useful to find it1 in the
 realm of life and of consciousness4    
,for1 so far as inert matter is         
concerned1 we may neglect the flowing   
without committing a serious error3     
matter1 we have said1 is weighted with  
geometry2 and matter1 the reality which 
descends1 endures only by its connection
 with that which ascends4 ,but life and 
consciousness are this very ascension4  
,when once we have grasped them in their
 essence by adopting their movement1 we 
understand how the rest of reality is   
derived from them4 ,evolution appears   
and1 within this evolution1 the         
progressive determination of materiality
 and intellectuality by the gradual     

consolidation of the one and of the     
other4 ,but1 then1 it is within the     
evolutionary movement that we place     
ourselves1 in order to follow it to its 
present results1 instead of recomposing 
these results artificially with         
fragments of themselves4 ,such seems to 
us to be the true function of           
philosophy4 ,so understood1 philosophy  
is not only the turning of the mind     
homeward1 the coincidence of human      
consciousness with the living principle 
whence it emanates1 a contact with the  
creative effort3 it is the study of     
becoming in general1 it is true         
evolutionism and consequently the true  
continuation of science--provided that  
we understand by this word a set of     
truths either experienced or            
demonstrated1 and not a certain new     
scholasticism that has grown up during  
the latter half of the nineteenth       
century around the physics of ,galileo1 
as the old scholasticism grew up around 
,aristotle4  ,,footnotes3  ,footnote    

#if3 ,the part of this chapter which    
treats of the history of systems1       
particularly of the ,greek philosophy1  
is only the very succinct rsum of views 
that we developed at length1 from #aijj 
to #aijd1 in our lectures at the ,collge
 de ,france1 especially in a course on  
the ,history of the ,idea of ,time      
7#aijb-aijc74 ,we then compared the     
mechanism of conceptual thought to that 
of the cinematograph4 ,we believe the   
comparison will be useful here4         
,footnote #ig3 ,the analysis of the idea
 of the nought which we give here 7pp4  
#bge-bih7 has appeared before in the    
,revue philosophique 7,november #aijf74 
,footnote #ih3 ,kant1 ,critique of ,pure
 ,reason1 #bnd edition1 p4 #gcg3 ,from  
the point of view of our knowledge in   
general 444 the peculiar function of    
negative propositions is simply to      
prevent error4 ,cf4 ,sigwart1 ,logik1   
#bnd edition1 vol4 i4 pp4 #aej ff4      
,footnote #ii3 ,that is1 we do not      
consider the sophism of ,zeno refuted by

 the fact that the geometrical          
progression a7#a  #a_/n  #a_/n#b        
#a_/n#c 1444 etc47--in which a          
designates the initial distance between 
,achilles and the tortoise1 and n the   
relation of their respective            
velocities--has a finite sum if n is    
greater than #a4 ,on this point we may  
refer to the arguments of ,f4 ,evellin1 
which we regard as conclusive 7see      
,evellin1 ,infini et quantit1 ,paris1   
#ahhj1 pp4 #fc-ig2 cf4 ,revue           
philosophique1 vol4 xi41 #ahha1 pp4     
#efd-efh74 ,the truth is that           
mathematics1 as we have tried to show in
 a former work1 deals and can deal only 
with lengths4 ,it has therefore had to  
seek devices1 first1 to transfer to the 
movement1 which is not a length1 the    
divisibility of the line passed over1   
and then to reconcile with experience   
the idea 7contrary to experience and    
full of absurdities7 of a movement that 
is a length1 that is1 of a movement     
placed upon its trajectory and          

arbitrarily decomposable like it4       
,footnote #ajj3 ,plato1 ,timaeus1 #cg   
,d4  ,footnote #aja3 ,we have tried to  
bring out what is true and what is false
 in this idea1 so far as spatiality is  
concerned 7see ,chapter ,,iii474 ,it    
seems to us radically false as regards  
duration4  ,footnote #ajb3 ,aristotle1  
,de anima1 #dcj a #ad ,greek3 kai hestin
 ho men toioutos nous t pynta ginesthai1
 ho de t panta poiein1 s hexis tis1 oion
 to phs4 tropon gar tina ka to phs poiei
 ta dynamei onta chrmata energeia       
chrmata4  ,footnote #ajc3 ,de caelo1 ii4
 #bhg a #ab ,greek3 ts eschats          
periphoras oute kenon estin exthen oute 
topos4 ,phys4 iv4 #bab a #cd ,greek3 to 
de pan esti men hs kinsetai hesti d' hs 
ou4 hs men gar holon1 hama ton topon hou
 metaballei4 kykl de kinsetai1 tn morin 
gar outos ho topos4  ,footnote #ajd3 ,de
 caelo1 i4 #bgi a #ab ,greek3 oude      
chronos hestin hex tou ouranou4 ,phys4  
viii4 #bea b #bg ,greek3 ho chronos     
pathos ti kinses4  ,footnote #aje3      

,especially have we left almost entirely
 on one side those admirable but        
somewhat fugitive intuitions that       
,plotinus was later to seize1 to study  
and to fix4  ,footnote #ajf3 ,see page  
#aj4  ,footnote #ajg3 ,descartes1       
,principes1 ii4  #bi4  ,footnote #ajh3  
,descartes1 ,principes1 ii4  #cf ff4    
,footnote #aji3 ,in a course of lectures
 on ,plotinus1 given at the ,collge de  
,france in #ahig-ahih1 we tried to bring
 out these resemblances4 ,they are      
numerous and impressive4 ,the analogy is
 continued even in the formulae employed
 on each side4  ,footnote #aaj3 ,le     
,paralogisme psycho-physiologique       
7,revue de mtaphysique et de morale1    
,nov4 #aijd1 pp4 #hie-ijh74 ,cf4 ,matire
 et mmoire1 ,paris1 #ahif1 chap4 i4     
,,index  7,compiled by the ,translator7 
,abolition of everything a              
self-contradiction1 #bhj1 #bhc1 #bif1   
#bih   idea of1 #bgi1 #bhb1 #bhc1 #bie1 
#bif4     ,see ,nought  ,absence of     
order1 #bca1 #bcd1 #bgd4     ,see       

,disorder  ,absolute and freedom1 #bgg  
reality1 #ii1 #bbh-i1 #bfi1 #ceh1 #cfa  
reality of the person1 #bfi   time and  
the1 #bci1 #bdj1 #bih1 #cdj1 #cdd       
,absoluteness of duration1 #bjf   of    
understanding1 xi1 #dg1 #aeb1 #aij1     
#aig1 #aii  ,abstract becoming1 #cjd-g  
multiplicity1 #beg-i   time1 #i1 #ag1   
#bj-b1 #cg1 #ci1 #df1 #ea1 #afc1 #cah-i1
 #ccf1 #ceb-c  ,accident and essence in 
,aristotle's philosophy1 #cec   in      
evolution1 #hf-g1 #ajd1 #aad-e1 #abg1   
#afi1 #agj1 #beb1 #bed-e1 #bff1 #bfg1   
#cbf-g  ,accidental variations1 #ee1    
#fc1 #fh1 #fi1 #gd1 #he-f1 #afh         
,accumulation of energy1 function of    
vegetable organisms1 #bec1 #bee         
,achilles and tortoise1 in ,zeno1 #caa1 
#cab-c  ,acquired characters1           
inheritance of1 #gf-i1 #hc-d1 #hg1 #afi1
 #agj1 #agc1 #bca  ,act1 consciousness  
as inadequacy of1 to representation1    
#add   form 7or essence71 quality1 three
 classes of representation1 #cjb-c      
,action1 creativeness of free1 #aib1    

#bdg   and concepts1 #afj1 #big   and   
consciousness1 xiii1 #e1 #adc-d1 #ade1  
#agi-hj1 #bjg1 #bfb   discontinuity of1 
#aed1 #cjg   freedom of1 in animals1    
#acj   as function of nervous system1   
#bfb-c   indivisibility of1 #id1 #ie1   
#cjh-i   and inert matter1 #if1 #acf1   
#ada-b1 #aef1 #ahg1 #aih1 #bbf1 #cff    
instinct and1 #acf1 #ada   instrument   
of1 consciousness1 #ahj   instrument of1
 life1 #afb   instrument of matter1     
#afa1 #aih-i   as instrument of         
consciousness1 #ahj   and intellect4    
,see ,intellect and action   intensity  
of consciousness varies with ratio of   
possible1 to real1 #ade   meaning of1   
#cja-c   moves from want to fulness1    
#big1 #bih   organism a machine for1    
#beb1 #bed1 #cjj   and perception1 #e1  
#aa1 #ab1 #ic1 #ahh1 #ahi1 #bjf1        
#bbg-cj1 #cjj1 #cjg1 #cfh   possible1   
#ab1 #ac1 #if1 #add1 #ade1 #adf-g1 #aei1
 #afe1 #agi-ha1 #ahh1 #bfd   and        
science1 #ic1 #aie-f1 #aih-i1 #cbi-cj   
and space1 #bjc   sphere of the         

intellect1 #aee   tension in a free1    
#bjj1 #bjg1 #bch1 #bdj1 #cja-b          
,activity1 dissatisfaction the          
starting-point of1 #big   of instinct1  
continuous with vital process1 #aci1    
#adj   life as1 #abh-i1 #bdg   mutually 
inverse factors in vital1 #bdh   and    
nervous system1 #aaj1 #acj1 #acb-c1     
#acd-e1 #ahj1 #beb1 #bfa-c   organism   
as1 #agd   potential4 ,see ,action1     
possible   tension of free1 #bjj1 #bjb1 
#bjg-h1 #bbc-d1 #bcg1 #bci1 #cjj-a   and
 torpor in evolution1 #aji1 #aaa1 #aac1 
#aad1 #aai-bj1 #abi-cj1   #ace-f1 #aha1 
#bib   vital1 has evolved divergently1  
#acd     ,see ,divergent lines of       
evolution  ,adaptation1 #ej-a1 #ee1     
#eg-h1 #ei1 #gj1 #aja1 #abi1 #acc1 #aib1
 #bee1 #bgj1 #cje-f   and causation1    
#ajb   mutual1 between materiality and  
intellectuality1 #ahg1 #bjf-g   and     
progress1 #aja-b  ,adequate and         
inadequate in ,spinoza1 #cec            
,adjectives1 substantives and verbs1    
#cjc-d1 #cae  ,aesthetics and           

philosophy1 #agg  ,affection1 ,role of1 
in the idea of chance1 #bcd   in the    
idea of nought1 #bha-c1 #bhi1 #bic1     
#bie1 #bif   in negation1 #bhf-g        
,affirmation and negation1 #bhe-f1 #bic 
,age and individuality1 #ae-f           
,albuminoid substances1 #aba-b          
,alciope1 #if  ,alexandrian philosophy1 
#cbb1 #cbc  ,algae in illustration of   
probable consciousness in vegetable     
forms1 #aab  ,alimentation1 #aac-d1     
#aag1 #bdg  ,allegory of the ,cave1 #aia
  ,alternations of increase and decrease
 of mutability of the universe1 #bde-f  
,alveolar froth1 #cc-d  ,ambiguity of   
the idea of generality in philosophy1   
#bcj-a1 #cbj-a   of primitive organisms1
 #ii1 #aab1 #aac1 #abi-cj  ,ammophila   
hirsuta1 paralyzing instinct in1 #agc   
,amoeba1 in illustration of imitation of
 the living by the unorganized1 #cc-f   
in illustration of the ambiguity of     
primitive organisms1 #ii   in           
illustration of the mobility            
characteristic of animals1 #ajh   in    

illustration of the explosive           
expenditure of energy characteristic    
of animals1 #abj1 #bec  ,anagenesis1 #cd
  ,anarchy1 idea of1 #bcc1 #bcd4    ,see
 ,disorder  ,anatomy1 comparative1 and  
transformism1 #be  ,ancient philosophy1 
,achilles and tortoise1 #caa-b          
,alexandrian philosophy1 #cbb-c         
,allegory of the ,cave1 #aia   ,anima   
7,de71 #cbb note   ,apogee of sensible  
object1 #cdd1 #cde1 #cdi   ,archimedes1 
#cdc-d   ,aristotle1 #ace1 #agd-e1      
#bbg-h1 #cad1 #caf1 #cba1 #cbc1 #cbd1   
#cbh-cc1 #cdg1 #cdi1    #cec1 #cef1 #cgj
   ,arrow of ,zeno1 #cjh-ac   ascent    
toward ,god1 in ,aristotle1 #cbc        
,astronomy1 ancient and modern1 #ccd-f  
attraction and impulsion in1 #cbc-d     
becoming in1 #cac-d1 #cag   bow and     
indivisibility of motion1 #cjh-i        
,caelo 7,de71 of ,aristotle1 #cbb note1 
#cbd note   and ,cartesian geometry1    
#ccd-e   causality in1 #cbc1 #cbe-f     
change in1 #cac-d1 #cag1 #cbh-i1 #cdb-c 
cinematographical nature of1 #cae       

circularity of ,god's thought1 #cbc-d   
concentric spheres1 #cbh   concepts1    
#cbf-g1 #cef   conversion and procession
 in1 #cbc   degradation of ideas into   
sensible flux1 #cag-h1 #cba1 #cbc-d1    
#cbg1 #cbh1    #cdc-e1 #ceb-c   degrees 
of reality1 #cbc-d1 #cbg   diminution1  
derivation of becoming by4 ,see         
,degradation of ,ideas1 etc4   duration1
 #cag-i note1 #cbc-d1 #cbg-i   ,eleatic 
philosophy1 #cjh1 #cad   ,enneads of    
,plotinus1 #baj note   essence and      
accident1 #ced   essence or form1 #cad-e
   eternal1 #cag-h1 #cbd-f   ,eternity1 
#cag-h1 #cbj1 #cbd1 #cbh-i   extension1 
#baj note1 #cah1 #cbd1 #cbg   form or   
idea1 #cad-bj1 #cbb1 #cbg1 #cbi-ca1 #ceb
   geometry1 ,cartesian1 and ancient    
philosophy1 #ccd   ,god of ,aristotle1  
#aif-g1 #cbb-d1 #cdi1 #ceb1 #cef        
,greek3 hyl1 #cec   ,idea1 #cad-bb1     
#ceb-c   and indivisibility of motion1  
#cjg-h1 #caa   intelligible reality in1 
#cbf   intelligibles of ,plotinus1 #cec 
,greek3 logos1 of ,plotinus1 #baj note  

matter in ,aristotle's philosophy1 #caf1
 #cbg   and modern astronomy1 #ccc-d1   
#cce   and modern geometry1 #ccc-d   and
 modern philosophy1 #bbf-g1 #bbh-i1     
#bcb1 #bha-b1 #cdd-e1 #cdf1 #cdi-ea1    
#cfd1    #cfi   and modern science1     
#cbi-cj1 #ccf1 #cdb-c1 #cdd-e1 #ceg     
motion in1 #cjg-h1 #cab-c   necessity   
in1 #cbg   ,greek3 noses nosis1 #cef    
non-being1 #caf1 #cbg   ,greek3 nous    
poitikos1 #cbb   oscillation about      
being1 sensible reality as1 #cag-h      
,physics of ,aristotle1 #bbg-h note1    
#cbd note1 #ccj-a   ,plato1 #dh1 #aef1  
#aia1 #baj note1 #caf-h1 #cba-d1 #cbg1  
#ccj1 #cdh1 #cdi   ,plotinus1 #baj1     
#caf1 #cbc1 #cbf note1 #cdi1 #ceb-d     
procession in ,alexandrian philosophy1  
#cbc   ,greek3 psych1 #baj note1 #cej   
realism in1 #bcb   refraction of idea   
through matter or non-being1 #cag       
sectioning of becoming1 #cah-i          
sensible reality1 #cad1 #caf-h1 #cba1   
#cbg-i1 #ceb-c   ,greek3 sma1 #cej      
space and time1 #cag-i1 #cbj   ,timaeus1

 #cah note   time in ancient and in     
modern science1 #ccj-a1 #ccf-g1 #cda-d  
time and space1 #cag-i1 #cbj   vision of
 ,god in ,alexandrian philosophy1 #cbb  
,zeno1 #cjh1 #cac  ,ancient science and 
modern1 #cbi-ca1 #ccf-g1 #cdb-e1 #ceg   
,anima 7,de71 of ,aristotle1 #cbb note  
,animal kingdom1 #ab1 #aje-f1 #aai-ba1  
#abf1 #abi1 #aca-b1 #acd-f1 #acg-h1     
#aci1 #agi1    #ahd-e  ,animals1        
#aje-dg1 #afg1 #agj1 #aha1 #ahc1 #ahg1  
#bab1 #bad1 #bdf1 #beb1 #bec1 #bed1     
#bfb-e1 #bfg1 #bga1 #bic1 #cja          
deduction in1 #bab   induction in1 #bad 
and man1 #aci-dc1 #ahc1 #ahg1 #ahh1     
#bab1 #bfc1 #bfd1 #bfg   and man in     
respect to brain1 #ahc1 #ahd-e1 #bfc-e  
and man in respect to consciousness1    
#aci-dc1 #ahj1 #ahc1 #ahg1 #ahh1 #aib1  
#bab1 #bfc-h   and man in respect to    
instruments of action1 #aci-dc1 #aej-a  
and man in respect to intelligence1     
#acg-h1 #ahg1 #ahh1 #aia-b1 #bab   and  
plants1 #aje-ci1 #abd-f1 #adc1 #ade1    
#adf-g1 #afh-gj1 #aha-b1 #bec1 #bed1    

#bic   and plants in respect to activity
 of consciousness1 #aji1 #aaa1 #aac1    
#aai-ba1 #abh-i1 #acb1 #acd-f1 #adb-c1  
#add1 #aha-b1 #bic   and plants in      
respect to function1 #aag-h1 #aba-b1    
#abg   and plants in respect to         
instinct1 #afg1 #agj   and plants in    
respect to mobility1 #aji1 #aaj1 #aac1  
#abi-cj1 #acb-c1 #ace1 #aha   and plants
 in respect to nature of consciousness1 
#acd-e  ,antagonistic currents of the   
vital impetus1 #abi1 #ace-f1 #aha1 #ahd1
 #bej1    #beh-i  ,anthophora1 #adf-g   
,antinomies of ,kant1 #bjd1 #bje        
,antipathy4 ,see ,sympathy1 ,feeling1   
,divination  ,antithesis and thesis1    
#bje  ,ants1 #aja1 #acd1 #adj1 #aeg     
,ape's brain and consciousness          
contrasted with man's1 #bfc  ,aphasia1  
#aha  ,apidae1 social instinct in the1  
#aga  ,apogee of instinct in the        
hymenoptera and of intelligence in man1 
#agd-e     ,see ,evolutionary           
superiority  ,apogee of sensible object1
 in philosophy of ,ideas1 #cdc-d1 #cdi  

,approximateness of the knowledge of    
matter1 #bjf-g  ,approximation1 in      
matter1 to the mathematical order1 #bah4
     ,see ,order  ,archimedes1 #ccc-d   
,aristotle4 ,see ,ancient ,philosophy1  
,aristotle  ,arrow1 ,flying1 of ,zeno1  
#cjh-i1 #caj1 #cab-c  ,art1 #f-g1 #bi   
note1 #de1 #hi1 #agg  ,artemia ,salina1 
transformations of1 #gb1 #gc            
,arthropods in evolution1 #acj-e1 #adb  
,articulate species1 #acc               
,articulations of matter relative to    
action1 #aef1 #cfg   of motion1 #caj-a  
of real time1 #ccb-c  ,artificial1 how  
far scientific knowledge is1 #aig1      
#bah-i   instruments1 #ach1 #aci1 #adj-a
  ,artist1 in illustration of the       
creativeness of duration1 #cdj-a        
,ascending cosmic movement1 #aa1 #bjh1  
#bge1 #cfi  ,ascent toward ,god1 in     
,aristotle1 #cbc  ,association of       
organisms1 #bfj4     ,see ,individuation
   universal oscillation between        
association and individuation1 #bei1    
#bfj4     ,see ,societies  ,astronomy   

and deduction1 #bac   and the inert     
order1 #bbd   modern1 in reference to   
ancient science1 #ccd-f  ,atmosphere of 
spatiality bathing intelligence1 #bjd   
,atom1 #bdj1 #bed1 #bee   as an         
intellectual view of matter1 #bjc1 #bej 
and interpenetration1 #bjg  ,attack and 
defence in evolution1 #aca-b            
,attention1 #b1 #adh-i1 #aed1 #ahd1 #bji
   discontinuity of1 #b   in man and in 
lower animals1 #ahd4     ,see ,tension  
and instinct1 ,tension as inverted      
extension1    ,tension of personality1  
,sympathetic appreciation1 etc41        
,relaxation and intellect  ,attraction  
and impulsion in ,greek philosophy1     
#cbc1 #cbd  ,attribute and subject1 #adh
  ,automatic activity1 #ade   as        
instrument of voluntary1 #beb   order1  
#bbd1 #bca-d4     ,see ,negative        
movement1 etc41 ,geometrical order      
,automatism1 #abg1 #adc-d1 #agd1 #bbc-d1
 #bfa1 #bfd   ,background of instinct   
and intelligence1 consciousness as1 #ahf
  ,backward-looking attitude of the     

intellect1 #dg1 #dh1 #bcg  ,baldwin1    
,j4,m41 #bg note  ,ballast of           
intelligence1 #aeb1 #bcj1 #bci1 #cfi-gj 
,bastian1 #bab note  ,bateson1 #fc      
,becoming1 #afd1 #bcf1 #bdh-i1 #bgc1    
#bii-cjd1 #cjg-h1 #cac-d1 #caf1 #ccg-h1 
#cdb-c1 #cde1 #cfc   in ancient         
philosophy1 #cac-d1 #cag   in           
,descartes's philosophy1 #cdf   in      
,eleatic philosophy1 #cac-d1 #cae   in  
general1 or abstract becoming1 #cjd1    
#cjf-g   instantaneous and static views 
of1 #bgb1 #cjd-e   states of1 falsely so
 called1 #afd1 #bdg-h1 #bgc1 #bih-cja1  
#cjg-h   in the successors of ,kant1    
#cfc4     ,see ,change1 ,new1 ,duration1
 ,time1 ,views of reality  ,bees1 #aja1 
#adj1 #adb1 #adf1 #aff1 #agb            
,beethoven1 #bbd  ,berthold1 #cd note   
,bethe1 #agf note  ,bifurcations of     
tendency1 #ed4     ,see ,divergent lines
 of evolution  ,biology1 #ab1 #be1 #bf1 
#ca-b1 #dc1 #afh-i1 #agd-e1 #aid-f      
evolutionist1 #afh-i   and philosophy1  
#dc1 #aid-f   and physico-chemistry1 #bf

  ,blaringhem1 #he  ,bodies1 #aef1 #ahh1
 #ahi1 #cjj-a1 #cfj4     ,see ,inert    
matter as a relaxation of the unextended
 into the   extended defined as bundles 
of qualities1 #cdi  ,bois-,reymond      
7,du71 #ch  ,boltzmann1 #bde  ,bombines1
 social instincts in1 #aga  ,bouvier1   
#adb note  ,bow1 strain of1 illustrating
 indivisibility of motion1 #cjh-aj      
,brain and consciousness1 #e1 #aji1     
#aaj1 #agi-hj1 #ahc-d1 #bab note1 #beb1 
#bfa-d1 #bgj1 #ced1 #cef1 #cff4     ,see
 ,nervous ,system in man and lower      
animals1 #ahc1 #ahd1 #bfc-e  ,brandt1   
#ff note  ,breast-,plate1 in reference  
to animal mobility1 #acj1 #aca4     ,see
 ,carapace1 ,cellulose envelope         
,brown-,squard1 #hj-b  ,bulb1 medullary1
 in the development of the nervous      
system1 #aaj1 #beb  ,busquet1 #bei note 
,btschli1 #cc note  ,buttel-,reepen1    
#aga note  ,butterflies1 in illustration
 of variation from evolutionary type1   
#gb   ,caelo 7,de71 of ,aristotle1 #cbb 
note1 #cbd note  ,calcareous sheath1 in 

reference to animal mobility1 #acj-a    
,calkins1 #af note  ,canal1 in          
illustration of the relation of function
 and structure1 #ic  ,canalization1 in  
illustration of the function of animal  
organisms1 #ic1    #ie1 #aaj1 #abf1     
#bef1 #bgj  ,canvas1 embroidering       
something on the1 of nothing1 #big      
,caprice1 an attribute not of freedom   
but of mechanism1 #dg  ,carapace1 in    
reference to animal mobility1 #acj-a    
,carbohydrates1 in reference to the     
function of the animal organism1 #aba-b 
,carbon1 in reference to the function of
 organisms1 #ajg1 #aac1 #aad1 #aag1     
#bed1 #bee  ,carbonic acid1 in reference
 to the function of organisms1 #bed1    
#bee  ,carnot1 #bdc1 #bdf1 #bef         
,cartesian geometry1 compared with      
ancient1 #ccd  ,cartesianism1 #cde1     
#cef1 #ceh  ,cartesians1 #ceh4 ,see     
,spinoza1 ,leibniz  ,carving1 the1 of   
matter by intellect1 #aee  ,categorical 
propositions1 characteristic of         
instinctive knowledge1 #adi-ej          

,categories1 conceptual1 x1 xiii1 #dh1  
#adg1 #adh-i1 #afe1 #ahi-ij1 #aie-g1    
#bjg1    #bbj-a1 #beg-fj1 #bfe1 #ceh1   
#cfa4     ,see ,concept deduction of1   
and genesis of the intellect1 #aif1     
#bjg1 #cei4     ,see ,genesis of matter 
and of the intellect   innate1 #adg1    
#adh-i   misfit for the vital1 x1 xiii1 
#dh1 #afe1 #aie-i1 #bbj-a1 #beg-i   in  
reference to the adaptation to each     
other of the matter and form of         
knowledge1 #cfa  ,cats1 in illustration 
of the law of correlation1 #fg  ,causal 
relation in ,aristotle1 #cbe   between  
consciousness and movement1 #aaa   in   
,greek philosophy1 #cbd-e  ,causality1  
mechanical1 a category which does not   
apply to life1 x1 xiv1 #agg   in the    
philosophy of ,ideas1 #cbc-f  ,causation
 and adaptation1 #aja1 #ajb   final1    
involves mechanical1 #dd  ,cause and    
effect as mathematical functions of each
 other1 #bj1 #ba   efficient1 #bch1     
#bgg1 #cbc   efficient1 in ,aristotle's 
philosophy1 #cbd   efficient1 in        

,leibniz's philosophy1 #cec   final1    
#dj1 #dd1 #bch   final1 in ,aristotle's 
philosophy1 #cbd   by impulsion1 release
 and unwinding1 #gc   mechanical1 as    
containing effect1 #ad1 #bcc1 #bfi   in 
the vital order1 #ie1 #afd  ,cave1      
,plato's allegory of the1 #aia  ,cell1  
#af1 #bd1 #cc1 #afb1 #aff1 #afg1 #bfj1  
#bfi   as artificial construct1 #afb    
in the colonial theory1 #bfj   division1
 #af1 #bd1 #cc   instinct in the1 #aff1 
#afg   in relation to the soul1 #bfi    
,cellulose envelope in reference to     
vegetable immobility and torpor1 #ajh1  
#aaa1 #acj  ,cerebral activity and      
consciousness1 #e1 #aji-aj1 #ahj-a1     
#ahc-d1 #bab note1     #beb1 #bec1 #bfa1
 #bfd1 #bfh1 #bgj1 #cej1 #cea1 #ced1    
#cee1 #cff   mechanism1 #e1 #beb1 #bec1 
#bfb1 #bfd1 #cff  ,cerebro-spinal       
system1 #abd4 ,see ,nervous system      
,certainty of induction1 #bae1 #baf     
,chance analogous to disorder1 #bcc1    
#bcd4     ,see ,affection   in          
evolution1 #hf-g1 #ajd1 #aad-e1 #abf1   

#afi-gj1 #aga1 #beb1 #bed1 #bee1 #bff1  
#bfg1 #cbf-g4     ,see ,indetermination 
,change1 #a1 #g-h1 #ah1 #he-f1 #bdh1    
#bge1 #bid1 #cjj-cjd1 #cjh1 #cac-d1     
#cag1 #cbf1    #cbh-i1 #cdc-d1 #cdd-e   
in ancient philosophy1 #cac-d1 #caf-g1  
#cbe-f1 #cbg-i1 #cdc1 #cde   in ,eleatic
 philosophy1 #cad   known only from     
within1 #cjg-h  ,chaos1 #bcb4     ,see  
,disorder  ,character1 moral1 #e1       
#ii-ajj  ,charrin1 #ha note  ,chemistry1
 #bg1 #cd-f1 #ee1 #gb1 #gd1 #ih1 #aid1  
#bbf1 #bef1 #bfj  ,child1 intelligence  
in1 #adg-h   adolescence of1 in         
illustration of evolutionary becoming1  
#caa-c  ,chipped stone1 in paleontology1
 #aci  ,chlorophyllian function1 #ajg-i1
 #aad1 #aag1 #bdf1 #bec  ,choice1 #aaj1 
#abe1 #adc-e1 #agi1 #ahj1 #beb1 #bfj-d1 
#bgf1 #cff   and consciousness1 #aaj1   
#agi1 #bfj-d  ,chrysalis1 #aad note     
,cinematograph1 #cjf-g1 #cci-dj         
,cinematographical character of ancient 
philosophy1 #cae-f   of intellectual    
knowledge1 #cjf1 #cjg1 #cab-h1 #cbc-d1  

#cca-c1 #cdf   of language1 #cjf-g1     
#cab-e   of modern science1 #cbi-ca1    
#ccf-g1 #cda-c1 #cde1 #cdf1 #cdg        
,circle of the given1 broken by action1 
#aib1 #bdg   logical and physical1 #bgg 
vicious1 in intellectualist philosophy1 
#aic1 #aig1 #cbj   vicious1 in the      
intuitional method is only apparent1    
#aib1 #aic  ,circularity of ,god's      
thought in ,aristotle's philosophy1 #cbd
   of each special evolution1 #abh      
,circulation1 protoplasmic1 imitated1   
#cb-c   in plants and animals1 #ajh     
,circumstances in the determination of  
evolution1 #aja-b1 #abh-i1 #acc1 #ach1  
#adb1 #aej-a1 #afg1 #afh1 #agj-a1 #aic1 
#aid1 #beb1 #bef   in relation to       
special instincts1 #ach1 #afh1 #aic     
,classes of words corresponding to the  
three kinds of representation1 #cjc-d   
,clausius1 #bdc  ,clearness             
characteristic of intellect1 #afj       
,cleft between the organized and the    
unorganized1 #aij1 #aif-i  ,climbing    
plants1 instincts of1 #agj note         

,coincidence of matter with space as in 
,kant1 #bjf1 #bjg1 #bdd   of mind with  
intellect as in ,kant1 #dh1 #bjf   of   
qualities1 #baf   of seeing and willing1
 #bcg   of self with self1 definition of
 the feeling of duration1 #aii-bjj      
,coleopter1 instinct in1 #adf  ,colonial
 theory1 #bei1 #bfj  ,colonies1         
microbial1 #bei  ,color variation in    
lizards1 #gb1 #gd  ,coming and going of 
the mind between the without and the    
within gives rise     to the idea of    
,nothing1 #bgi   between nature and     
mind1 the true method of philosophy1    
#bci  ,common-sense1 #bi1 #aec1 #afa1   
#bac1 #bbd1 #bgg   defined as continuous
 experience of the real1 #bac           
,comparison of ancient philosophy with  
modern1 #bbf1 #bbh-i1 #bcb1 #cbh-i1     
#cde-f1 #cdi-ea1 #cec-d1 #cef           
,compenetration1 #ceb-c4 ,see           
,interpenetration  ,complementarity of  
forms evolved1 xii1 xiii1 #ea1 #aja1    
#ajc1 #aac1 #aaf-g1    #ace1 #acf1 #bed1
 #bee   of instinct and intelligence1   

#adf1 #agc4     ,see ,opposition of     
,instinct and ,intelligence   of        
intuition and intellect1 #cdc1 #cde   in
 the powers of life1 #di1 #if-g1 #adj-c1
 #agg1 #agh-i1 #ahc-e1 #bci1 #bdf1      
#bed1 #cdc   of science and metaphysics1
 #cdd  ,complexity of the order of      
mathematics1 #bjh-aj1 #bag1 #bea        
,compound reflex1 instinct as a1 #agd   
,concentration1 intellect as1 #aia1 #cja
   of personality1 #aih-i1 #bja         
,concentric spheres in ,aristotle's     
philosophy1 #cbh  ,concept accessory to 
action1 ix   analogy of1 with the solid 
body1 ix   in animals1 #ahg             
externality of1 #afj1 #afh1 #age-h1     
#aii-bjj1 #bea1 #cjf1 #caa1 #cad        
fringed about with intuition1 #df   and 
image distinguished1 #afj1 #bgi         
impotent to grasp life1 ix-xiii1 #di    
intellect the concept-making faculty1   
vi1 #di   misfit for the vital1 #dh     
representation of the act by which the  
intellect is fixed on things1 #afa      
synthesis of1 in ancient philosophy1    

#cbe-f1 #cef4     ,see ,categories1     
,externality1 ,frames1 ,image1 ,space1  
,symbol  ,conditions1 external1 in      
evolution1 #abh-i1 #acc1 #ach1 #ada-b1  
#aej-a1 #aff-g1    #afh1 #agj1 #aic1    
#aid1 #bea1 #bef1 #beg   external1 in   
determination of special instinct1      
#ada-b1 #aej-a1 #afg1    #afh1 #aga     
,conduct1 mechanism and finality in the 
evolution of1 #dg4     ,see ,freedom1   
,determination1 ,indetermination        
,confused plurality of life1 #beg       
,conjugation of ,infusoria1 #af         
,consciousness and action1 ix1 #e1 #add1
 #ade1 #agi-hj1 #bjg1 #bfj-a            
consciousness as appendage to action1 ix
   consciousness as arithmetical        
difference between possible and real    
activity1 #ade   consciousness as       
auxiliary to action1 #agi-hj            
consciousness as inadequacy of act to   
representation1 #add   consciousness as 
instrument of action1 #ahj              
consciousness as interval between       
possible and real action1 #ade1 #agi    

consciousness as light from zone of     
possible actions surrounding the    real
 act1 #agi   consciousness and          
locomotion1 #bfb   consciousness plugged
 up by action1 #add1 #ade4     ,see     
,torpor1 ,sleep   consciousness as      
sketch of action1 #bjg   intensity of1  
varies with ratio of possible to real   
action1 #ade  ,consciousness in animals1
 as distinguished from the consciousness
 of    plants1 #acj1 #ace-f1 #adc   as  
distinguished from the consciousness of 
man1 #aci-dc1 #ahj1 #ahc1 #ahd1         
#ahg1 #ahh1 #bab1 #bfc-i4     ,see      
,torpor1 ,sleep   characteristic of     
animals1 torpor of plants1 #aji1 #aaa1  
#aac1 #abj1 #abh-i1    #ace-f1 #aha1    
#ahb1 #bib   as background of instinct  
and intelligence1 #ahf   and brain1     
#ahj1 #bfb1 #bfc1 #bfi1 #bgj1 #ced   and
 choice1 #aaj1 #add-e1 #agi1 #bfb-d     
coextensive with universal life1 #ahf1  
#bgj   and creation1 consciousness as   
demand for creation1 #bfa   current of1 
penetrating matter1 #aha1 #bgj   as     

deficiency of instinct1 #ade   in dog   
and man1 #ahj   double form of1 #agi    
function of1 #bjg   as hesitation or    
choice1 #adc1 #add   imprisonment of1   
#ahj1 #ahc-d1 #bfd   as invention and   
freedom1 #bfd1 #bgj   in man as         
distinguished from1 in lower forms of   
life1 #ahj1 #bfc1 #bfd1    #bfg1 #bfh   
and matter1 #agi1 #aha-b   as motive    
principle of evolution1 #aha-b          
nullified1 as distinguished from the    
absence of consciousness1 #adc   and the
 organism1 #bgj   in plants1 #aca1      
#ace-f1 #adc   as world principle1 #bcg1
 #bfa  ,conservation of energy1 #bdc1   
#bdd  ,construction1 #aci-db1 #aej-a1   
#aef1 #aeg-h1 #ahj1 #ahb4     ,see      
,manufacture1 ,solid   the              
characteristic work of intellect1 #afc-d
   as the method of ,kant's successors1 
#cfd-e  ,contingency1 #if1 #bee1 #bfh4  
,see ,accident1 ,chance   the1 of order1
 #bca1 #bce  ,continuation of vital     
process in instinct1 #ach1 #aci1 #aff1  
#afg1 #bdf4     ,see ,variations1 ,vital

 process  ,continuity1 #a1 #bf1 #bi-cj1 
#cg1 #ach-dj1 #aed1 #afb-d1 #beh1 #cjb1 
#cjf-g1 #caa-b1     #cba1 #cbe-f1       
#cbi-cj1 #cdg   of becoming1 #cjf-g1    
#cab   of change1 #cbe-f   of evolution1
 #ah1 #ai   of extension1 #aed   of     
germinative plasma1 #bf1 #cg   of       
instinct with vital process1 #aci1 #adj1
 #aff-g1 #bdf   of life1 #a-aa1 #bi1    
#afc-d1 #beh   of living substance1 #afb
   of psychic life1 #a1 #cj   of the    
real1 #cjb1 #cbi-cj   of sensible       
intuition with ultra-intellectual1 #cfa 
of sensible universe1 #cdf              
,conventionality of science1 #bjg       
,conversion and procession in           
,alexandrian philosophy1 #cbc  ,cook1   
,plato's comparison of the1 and the     
dialectician1 #aef  ,cope1 #ce note1    
#gg1 #aaa  ,correlation1 law of1 #ff1   
#fg  ,correspondence between mind and   
matter in ,spencer1 #cfh4     ,see      
,simultaneity  ,cortical mechanism1     
#beb1 #bec1 #bfb4     ,see ,cerebral    
mechanism  ,cosmogony and genesis of    

matter1 #ahh4     ,see ,genesis of      
matter and of intellect1 ,spencer       
,cosmology the1 that follows from the   
philosophy of ,ideas1 #cae1 #cbh   as   
reversed psychology1 #bjh               
,counterweight representation as1 to    
action1 #ade  ,counting simultaneities1 
the measurement of time is1 #cch1 #cda-b
  ,creation1 xi1 #g1 #aa1 #ab1 #bb1 #bi1
 #cj1 #de1 #ic1 #ajj1 #aja1 #ajc1 #aje1 
#ajh1 #aad1     #abh-ca1 #afa1 #afc-d1  
#agh1 #bjj1 #bag1 #bah1 #bbc1 #bbf1     
#bcj1 #bcg-dj1 #bfa1     #bgj1 #bge1    
#cci-dj   in ,descartes's philosophy1   
#cde   of intellect1 #bdh-i   of matter1
 #bcg1 #bci1 #bdg-h1 #bdi4     ,see     
,materiality the inversion of           
spirituality   of present by past1 #e1  
#bj-c1 #bg1 #afg1 #aii-bjb   the vital  
order as1 #bcj  ,creative evolution1 #g1
 #ae1 #ba1 #bg1 #bi1 #cf1 #cg1 #fe1     
#ajj1 #ajd-e1 #afa1    #afc1 #bbc-d1    
#bcj-a1 #bcg1 #bfd1 #bfi  ,creativeness 
of free action1 #aib1 #bdc   of         
invention1 #bej  ,creeping plants in    

illustration of vegetable mobility1 #ajh
  ,cricket victim of paralyzing instinct
 of sphex1 #agb  ,criterion1 quest of a1
 #ec ff4   of evolutionary rank1 #acc1  
#bfe  ,criticism1 ,kantian1 #bje1 #bhg  
note1 #cef1 #cfj-b   of knowledge1      
#aid-e  ,cross-cuts through becoming by 
intellect1 #cad4     ,see ,views of     
reality   through matter by perception1 
#bjf  ,cross-roads of vital tendency1   
#ea1 #eb1 #ed1 #aaj1 #abf  ,crustacea1  
#ai1 #aaa1 #abi-cj  ,crystal            
illustrating 7by contrast7              
individuation1 #ab  ,cunot1 #gi note    
,culminating points of evolutionary     
progress1 #ej1 #acc-e4     ,see         
,evolutionary superiority  ,current1    
#bf1 #bg1 #ea1 #ahe1 #bcf1 #bcg1 #bej1  
#bff1 #bfi  ,currents1 antagonistic1    
#bej   of existence1 #ahe   of life     
penetrating matter1 #bf1 #bg1 #bff1 #bgj
   vital1 #bf1 #bg1 #ea1 #bcg1 #bff1    
#bgj   of will penetrating matter1 #bcg 
,curves1 as symbol of life1 #cb1 #ij1   
#bac  ,cuts through becoming by the     

intellect1 #cac-d4     ,see ,views of   
reality1 ,snapshots in illustration1    
etc4   through matter by perception1    
#bjf  ,cuvier1 #abe note   ,dantec      
7,le71 #ah note1 #cd note  ,darwin1     
#fb-e1 #ff1 #gb1 #ajh1 #agj note        
,darwinism1 #ef1 #he1 #hf  ,dastre1 #cf 
note  ,dead1 the1 is the object of      
intellect1 #afe  ,dead-locks in         
speculation1 #aee1 #cab  ,death1 #bdf   
note1 #bga  ,declivity descended by     
matter1 #bjh1 #bdf1 #bef1 #cci-dj4      
,see ,descending movement  ,decomposing 
and recomposing powers characteristic of
 intellect1 #aeg1 #bea  ,deduction1     
analogy between1 related to moral sphere
 and tangent to    curve1 #bac   and    
astronomy1 #bac   duration refractory   
to1 #bac   geometry the ideal limit of1 
#bac-bf1 #cfa   in animals1 #bab        
inverse to positive spiritual effort1   
#bab   nature of1 #baa   physics and1   
#bac   weakness of1 in psychology and   
moral science1 #bac  ,defence and attack
 in evolution1 #acb  ,deficiency of will

 the negative condition of mathematical 
order and    complexity1 #bji           
,definition in the realm of life1 #ac1  
#aje1 #ajf  ,degenerates1 #acc-e        
,dgnrescence snile 7,la71 by            
,metchnikoff1 #ah note  ,degradation of 
energy1 #bda1 #bdb1 #bdf   of the       
extra-spatial into the spatial1 #bjg    
of the ideas into the sensible flux in  
ancient philosophy1 #cag-i1    #cbd-e1  
#cbg-i1 #cca1 #cdc1 #cde1 #ceb-c        
,degrees of being in the successors of  
,kant1 #cfb-c  ,degrees of reality in   
,greek philosophy1 #cbd1 #cbg  ,delage1 
#ei note1 #ha note1 #bfj note           
,delamare1 #ha note  ,deliberation1 #add
  ,de ,manacine1 #abd note  ,deposit1   
instinct and intelligence as deposits1  
emanations1 issues1 or    aspects of    
life1 x1 xii1 xiii1 #di1 #ajc1 #aje1    
#acf1 #cfe  ,de ,saporta1 #ajg note     
,descartes1 #bhj1 #ccd1 #cde1 #cdf1     
#cec1 #ceh   becoming1 #cde-f           
creation1 #cdf   determinism1 #cde      
duration1 #cdf   freedom1 #cde1 #cdf    

geometry1 #ccd   ,god1 #cdf   image and 
idea or concept1 #bha   indeterminism1  
#cde   mechanism1 #cde1 #cdf   motion1  
#cdf   vacillation between abstract time
 and real duration1 #cde  ,descending   
movement of existence1 #aa1 #bjb1 #bjc1 
#bjh1 #bga1 #bge1 #cfi  ,design1        
motionless1 of action the object of     
intellect1 #aed-e1 #bii1    #cja-b1 #cjc
  ,detention in the dream state1 #bjb   
of intuition in intellect1 #bch         
,determination1 #gf-g1 #abi-cj1 #bbc1   
#bdf  ,determinism1 #bag1 #bfd1 #cde1   
#cdh4 ,see ,inert matter1 ,geometry   in
 ,descartes1 #cde  ,development1 #acc1  
#acd-e1 #ada4     ,see ,order1          
,progress1 ,evolution1 ,superiority     
,deviation from type1 #hb-d  ,dialect   
and intuition in philosophy1 #bch       
,dichotomy of the real in modern        
philosophy1 #cej  ,differentiation of   
parts in an organism1 #bec1 #bfj        
,dilemma of any systematic metaphysics1 
#aie1 #aig1 #bcj  ,diminution1          
derivation of becoming from being by1 in

 ancient philosophy1    #caf1 #cag1     
#cbb1 #cbc-d1 #cbg-h1 #cdc-e1 #ceb      
geometrical order as1 or lower          
complication of the vital order1 #bcf   
,dionaea illustrating certain animal    
characteristics in plants1 #ajg1        
#ajh1 #aji  ,discontinuity of action1   
#aed1 #cjf-g   of attention1 #b   of    
extension relative to action1 #aed1 #afc
   of knowledge1 #cjf   of living       
substance1 #afc   a positive idea1 #aed 
,discontinuous the object of intellect1 
#aed  ,discord in nature1 #abg1 #abh1   
#bed-e1 #bfg  ,disorder1 #dj1 #ajd1     
#bbb-c1 #bbe-f1 #bcb-e1 #bgd4     ,see  
,expectation1 ,order1 mathematical1     
,orders of reality1 two  ,disproportion 
between an invention and its            
consequences1 #ahb  ,dissociation as a  
cosmic principle opposed to association1
 #bfj   of tendencies1 #ed1 #hi1 #ace1  
#bed1 #bee1 #beg1 #beh4     ,see        
,divergent lines of evolution           
,distance1 extension as the1 between    
what is and what ought to be1 #cah-i1   

#cbg-h1 #cca  ,distinct multiplicity in 
the dream state1 #bja1 #baj   of the    
inert1 #beg  ,distinctness              
characteristic of the intellect1 #afj1  
#bcg1 #bea   characteristic of          
perception1 #bbg1 #bea   as spatiality1 
#bjc1 #bjg-h1 #bdd1 #bej  ,divergent    
lines of evolution1 xii1 #ed1 #ee1 #hg1 
#ig-aja1 #ajc-d1 #ajf1 #ajg1    #aji1   
#aab1 #aac1 #aaf1 #aai1 #acj1 #acb1     
#acd-e1 #adb1 #adi1 #aej1 #afh1 #agc1   
#aha1    #bed1 #bee1 #bff1 #bfg4        
,see ,dissociation of tendencies1       
,complementarity1 etc41 ,schisms     in 
the primitive impulsion of life         
,diversity1 sensible1 #bje1 #bbj-a1     
#bca1 #bce1 #bcf  ,divination1 instinct 
as1 #agf4     ,see ,sympathy1 etc4      
,divisibility of extension1 #aed1 #afb  
,division as function of intellect1     
#aeb1 #aed1 #afb-c1 #ahi   of labor1    
#ii1 #aaj1 #aah1 #aeg1 #aff1 #bfj   of  
labor in cells1 #aff  ,dog and man1     
consciousness in1 #ahj  ,dogmatism of   
the ancient epistemology contrasted with

 the relativism of    the modern1 #bcj  
of ,leibniz and ,spinoza1 #cef-g        
skepticism1 and relativism1 #aif-g1 #bcj
  ,dogs and the law of correlation1 #ff 
,domestication of animals and heredity1 
#hj  ,dominants of ,reinke1 #db note    
,dorfmeister1 #gb  ,dream1 #add1 #ahj-a1
 #bjb1 #bji1 #bef4     ,see             
,interpenetration1 ,relaxation1         
,detention1 ,recollection   as          
relaxation1 #bjb  ,driesch1 #db note    
,drosera1 #ajg1 #ajh1 #aji  ,dufourt1   
#abd note  ,duhem1 #bdb note  ,dunan1   
,ch41 xv note  ,duration1 xiv note1 #b1 
#d-f1 #h-aa1 #ae1 #ag1 #ba1 #bb1 #cg1   
#ci1 #df1 #ea1    #aii1 #bja1 #bjf1     
#bac1 #baf1 #bdj1 #bgb1 #bgc1 #bgf1     
#bih-i1 #cjh-i1 #cag-h1 #cai    note1   
#cbd1 #cbh1 #ccb1 #cci1 #cdb1 #cdc1     
#cde1 #ced1 #cfa1 #cfc-d   absoluteness 
of1 #bjf   and deduction1 #bac   in     
,descartes's philosophy1 #cdf   gnawing 
of1 #d1 #h1 #df   indivisibility of1 #f1
 #cjh-i   and induction1 #baf   and the 
inert1 #cdc-d   in the philosophy of the

 ,ideas1 #caf-g1 #cai note1 #cbd1 #cbg1 
#cbh-i   rhythm of1 #aa1 #abh1 #cdf4    
,see ,creation1 ,evolution1 ,invention1 
,time1 ,unforeseeableness1              
,uniqueness   ,echinoderms in reference 
to animal mobility1 #acj1 #aca          
,efficient cause in conception of       
chance1 #bcd   ,spinoza and1 #bfi       
,effort in evolution1 #agj  ,greek3     
,eidos1 #cad-e  ,eimer1 #ee1 #gb1 #gc1  
#hf  ,elaborateness of the mathematical 
order1 #bjh-aj1 #bag1 #bea  ,eleatic    
philosophy1 #cjh1 #cad-e  ,emanation1   
logical thought an1 issue1 aspect or    
deposit of life1 ix1 xii1    xiii1 #di  
,embroidering something on the canvas of
 nothing1 #big  ,embroidery by          
descendants on the canvas handed down by
 ancestors1 #bc  ,embryo1 #ah1 #ai1 #bf1
 #bg1 #ge1 #ha1 #hi1 #aja1 #aff         
,embryogeny1 comparative1 and           
transformism1 #be  ,embryonic life1 #bg1
 #aff  ,empirical study of evolution the
 centre of the theory of knowledge and  
of    the theory of life1 #agh          

theories of knowledge1 #bje  ,empty1    
thinking the full by means of the empty1
 #bgc-d  ,end in ,eleatic philosophy1   
#cad-e   of science is practical        
utility1 #cbi  ,energy1 #aae-g1 #abj-c1 
#bdb1 #bdc1 #bde1 #bdf1 #beb-e1 #bef1   
#beg1 #bfb   conservation of1 #bdb      
degradation of1 #bdb1 #bdc1 #bdf        
solar1 stored by plants1 released by    
animals1 #bde1 #bed  ,enneadae of       
,plotinus1 #baj note  ,entelechy of     
,driesch1 #db note  ,entropy1 #bdc      
,environment in evolution1 #abi1 #acc1  
#ach1 #adj1 #adb1 #aej1 #afg1 #afh1     
#agj1    #aib1 #aic1 #beb1 #bef1 #beg   
and special instincts1 #ach1 #afh1 #aib1
 #aic  ,epiphenomenalism1 #bfb  ,essence
 and accidents in ,aristotle's          
philosophy1 #cec   or form in ,eleatic  
philosophy1 #cad-e   the meaning of1    
#cjb-c  ,essences 7or forms71 qualities 
and acts1 the three kinds of            
representation1 #cjc-d  ,eternity1 #ci1 
#bih1 #cad1 #cag1 #cbj1 #cbd1 #cbh1     
#cdf1 #ceb1 #ced   in the philosophy of 

,ideas1 #caf-g1 #cai1 #cbd1 #cbh   in   
,spinoza's philosophy1 #cec  ,euglena1  
#aaf  ,evellin1 #caa note  ,eventual    
actions1 #aa1 #if4     ,see ,possible   
activity  ,evolution1 ix-xv1 #ah1 #bj1  
#bb1 #bd1 #be1 #bf-g1 #cg1 #df-ee1 #fc1 
#fh1 #gi     note1 #hd-h1 #ig-aje1 #ajg1
 #aac1 #aaf1 #abf1 #abg1 #abi-cj1       
#aca-b1     #acc1 #acd1 #acf1 #ach-dj1  
#ada-b1 #adc1 #afa1 #aff1 #afg1 #afh-gb1
 #agc1 #agd1     #age1 #agi1 #aha1 #ahb1
 #ahe1 #ahf1 #aij1 #aic1 #aih-i1 #bjg-h1
 #bbd1 #bca1 #bdb     note1 #bdf1 #bdh1 
#bdi1 #bea1 #beb1 #bed1 #bfd-f1 #bfh1   
#bgc1 #cjb1 #caa1     #cde1 #cei1 #cfj1 
#cff   accident in1 #ajd1 #afi1 #agj1   
#agc1 #agd1 #bea1 #beb   animal1 a      
progress toward mobility1 #aca          
antagonistic tendencies in1 #ajc1 #aac1 
#ahe   automatic and determinate1 is    
action being undone1 #bdh   blind alleys
 of1 #abi   circularity of each special1
 #abh   complementarity of the divergent
 lines of1 #ig-ajb1 #ajc1 #aaf          
conceptually inexpressible1 #di1 #ej1   

#eb1 #ec1 #abg1 #aha1 #bgc   continuity 
of1 #ah1 #ai1 #bf1 #cg1 #df1 #bgc1 #cjb1
 #cab1 #cde   creative1 #g1 #ae1 #ba1   
#bg1 #cj1 #cf1 #cg1 #fe1 #ajj1 #aje1    
#afa1 #afb1 #afc1 #bbc1    #bcj1 #bch1  
#bfd1 #bfi   culminating points of1 #ej1
 #acc1 #agd1 #ahe1 #bfe1 #bff1 #bfh     
development by1 #acc1 #acd1 #ada-b      
divergent lines of1 xii1 #ec1 #ed1 #hg1 
#ig-aja1 #ajc-d1 #ajg1 #agc-d1 #bdf     
and duration1 #bj1 #bb1 #cg1 #de-f      
empirical study of1 the centre of the   
theory of knowledge and of life1    #agh
   and environment1 #aja-c1 #abi1 #acc1 
#ach1 #adb1 #aej1 #afg1 #afh1 #afi1     
#aib1    #aic1 #bea1 #bef1 #beg   of    
instinct1 #agj1 #aga1 #agd-e4     ,see  
,divergent lines1 etc41 ,culminating    
points1 etc41 ,evolution    and         
environment   of intellect1 x-xii1 #aec1
 #ahf1 #ahi-ij1 #aic1 #aih-i1 #bjg-h1   
#cei1 #cfj4     ,see ,divergent lines1  
etc41 ,culminating points1 etc41        
,genesis    of matter and of intellect  
as invention1 #cdd   of man1 #bfd1 #bff1

 #bfh4 ,see ,culminating points1 etc4   
motive principle of1 is consciousness1  
#aha   of species product of the vital  
impetus opposed by matter1 #bdg-h1 #bed 
and transformism1 #bd   unforeseeable1  
#dg1 #dh1 #ec1 #hf1 #bbd   variation in1
 #bc-d1 #ee1 #fc1 #fh1 #gb note1 #he1   
#aca1 #acg-h1 #afg1 #afi1    #aga1 #bfd 
,evolutionary1 qualitative1 and         
extensive motion #cjb-c1 #caa1 #cab     
superiority1 #acc-e1 #agd-e4     ,see   
,success1 ,criterion of evolutionary    
rank1 ,culminating points1 etc4         
,evolutionism1 x-xii1 xiv1 #gg1 #hd1    
#cfd  ,exhaustion of the mutability of  
the universe1 #ccg-h  ,existence1       
logical1 as contrasted with psychical   
and physical1 #bgf1 #cfb   of matter    
tends toward instantaneity1 #bja   of   
self means change1 #a ff4               
superaddition of1 upon nothingness1 #bgf
  ,expectation1 #bad-f1 #bba1 #bbb1     
#bbf1 #bcc1 #bce1 #bgd1 #bha1 #bib   in 
conception of disorder1 #bba1 #bbb1     
#bbf1 #bcc1 #bcd1 #bce1 #bgd   in       

conception of void or naught1 #bhb1 #bib
  ,experience1 #ach1 #adg1 #agg1 #aig1  
#bjd1 #bbi1 #cba1 #ced1 #cei1 #cfc1 #cfh
  ,explosion1 illustrating cause by     
release1 #gc  ,explosive character of   
animal energy1 #aaf1 #aai1 #abj1 #bdf   
of organization1 #ib  ,explosives1      
manufacture of1 by plants and use by    
animals1 #bdf1 #bed  ,extension1 #adi1  
#aed1 #afa1 #bjb1 #bjc1 #bjg1 #baa1     
#bbc1 #bcf1 #bde1 #cah-bj1    #cbd1     
#cbg1 #cea1 #ceb   continuity of1 #aed  
discontinuity of1 relative to action1   
#aed1 #afb   as the distance between    
what is and what ought to be1 #cah      
divisibility of1 #aed1 #afb   the most  
general property of matter1 #aed1 #bej1 
#bea   the inverse movement to tension1 
#bde   of knowledge1 #aej   in          
,leibniz's philosophy1 #cea1 #ceb   of  
matter in space1 #bjd1 #baa   in the    
philosophy of ,ideas1 #cah-i1 #cbc-d1   
#cbg   and relaxation1 #bjb1 #bjg1 #bji1
 #baa1 #bab1 #bah1 #bbc1 #bde   in      
,spinoza's philosophy1 #cej   in the    

,transcendental ,aesthetic1 #bjc   unity
 of1 #aeh-i   as weakening of the       
essence of being1 in ,plotinus1 #baj    
note  ,extensive1 evolutionary and      
qualitative motion1 #cjb-c1 #caa1 #cab  
,external conditions in evolution1 #abh1
 #acc1 #acg1 #ada-b1 #aej-a1 #afg1      
#afh1 #agj1 #aib1 #aic1 #beb1 #bef1 #beg
   finality1 #da  ,externality of       
concepts1 #afj1 #afh1 #agd1 #agg1 #aii1 
#bea1 #cje1 #caa-d   the most general   
property of matter1 #aed1 #bej1 #bea    
,externalized action in distinction from
 internalized1 #adg1 #afe4     ,see     
,somnambulism1 etc41 ,automatic         
activity1 etc4  ,eye of mollusc and     
vertebrate compared1 #fj1 #ge1 #gg1 #hd1
 #hf1 #hg-h   ,fabre1 #agb note         
,fabrication4 ,see ,construction        
,fallacies1 two fundamental1 #bgb1 #bgc 
,fallacy of thinking being by not-being1
 #bgf1 #bgg1 #bhd1 #big-h   of thinking 
the full by the empty1 #bgc-e   of      
thinking motion by the motionless1 #bgb1
 #bgc1 #big-h1 #cjg-h1 #cji-ad          

,fallibility of instinct1 #agb-c        
,falling back of matter upon            
consciousness1 #bfd   bodies1 comparison
 of ,aristotle and ,galileo1 #bbh1      
#cca-b1 #ccd   weight1 figure of        
material world1 #bde1 #bdf  ,familiar1  
the1 is the object of intellect1 #afc1  
#afd1 #aii1 #bgj  ,faraday1 #bjc        
,fasting1 in reference to primacy of    
nervous system over the other           
physiological systems1 #abd  ,fauna1    
menace of torpor in primitive1 #acj     
,feeling in the conception of chance1   
#bjg   and instinct1 #adc1 #agd-e       
,fencing-master1 illustrating hereditary
 transmission1 #gi  ,ferments1 certain  
characteristics of1 #ajf  ,fertilization
 of orchids by insects1 by ,darwin1 #agj
 note  ,fichte's conception of the      
intellect1 #ahi-ij1 #ceg  ,filings1     
iron1 in illustration of the relation of
 structure to    function1 #id1 #ie     
,film1 cinematographic1 figure of       
abstract motion1 #cjd-f  ,final cause1  
#dj1 #de1 #bcd1 #cbe   conception of1   

involves conception of mechanical cause1
 #dd   ,god as1 in ,aristotle1 #cbb-c   
,finalism1 #ci-ec1 #eh1 #gd1 #hh-ig1    
#aja-e1 #abf-h  ,finality1 #da1 #afd1   
#agg-h1 #ahe1 #bbc1 #bbd1 #bff          
external and internal1 #da   misfit for 
the vital1 #agg1 #bbc-d1 #bbe1 #bff     
and the unforeseeableness of life1 #afd1
 #ahe  ,fischel1 #ge note  ,fish in     
illustration of animal tendency to      
mobility1 #acj1 #aca  ,fixation of      
nutritive elements1 #ajg-i1 #aac1 #aag1 
#bdf1 #bdg1 #bec  ,fixity1 #ajh-ac1     
#aah1 #aai1 #acj1 #aee4     ,see ,torpor
   apparent or relative1 #aee           
cellulose envelope and the1 of plants1  
#ajh1 #aaa1 #acj   of extension1 #aee   
of plants1 #ajh-ac1 #aah1 #aai1 #acj-a  
of torpid animals1 #acj  ,flint hatchets
 and human intelligence1 #acg  ,fluidity
 of life1 #aec1 #afe1 #aic    of matter 
as a whole1 #ahf1 #cfi  ,flux of        
material bodies1 #bfe    of reality1    
#bej1 #bea1 #ccg1 #cdb1 #cdd  ,flying   
arrow of ,zeno1 #cjh1 #cji1 #caj        

,focalization of personality1 #bja      
,food1 #ajf-i1 #aac-d1 #aag1 #abj1 #aba1
 #bdf1 #bdg1 #bed  ,foraminifera1       
failure of certain1 to evolve1 #aig     
,force1 #abf-g1 #ada1 #adi1 #aej1 #age1 
#bdf1 #bed1 #cci   life a1 inverse to   
matter1 #bdf   limitedness of vital     
force1 #abf1 #abg1 #ada1 #adi1 #afb     
time as1 #cci-dj  ,forel1 #agf note     
,foreseeing1 #h1 #bh1 #bi1 #cj1 #cg1    
#de1 #dg1 #if4     ,see                 
,unforeseeableness  ,form1 xi1 #ea1     
#aja1 #ajd1 #aac1 #aaf-h1 #abi1 #ace-f1 
#adh-ec1 #aee1 #aef1 #afj1    #afd1     
#aie-g1 #bbb1 #bcg1 #bej1 #bee1 #cjb1   
#cjc1 #cad1 #cag1 #cah1 #cbb1 #cda1     
#ceg1 #cei1 #cfa1 #cfb   complementarity
 of forms evolved1 xi1 #ea1 #aja1 #ajd1 
#aac1 #aaf-h1 #ace-f1    #bee           
expansion of the forms of consciousness1
 xii1 xiii   7or essences71 qualities   
and acts the three kinds of             
representation1    #cjb-c   ,god as pure
 form in ,aristotle1 #aif1 #cbb   or    
idea in ancient philosophy1 #cag1 #cah1 

#ccj   of intelligence1 xiv1 #dh1 #adg1 
#adh1 #afe1 #aij1 #aie1 #aif1 #aih1     
#bjg1 #bai1    #beg-i1 #bff1 #ceh-i1    
#cfa4 ,see ,concept   and matter in     
creation1 #bci1 #bej   and matter in    
knowledge1 #aie1 #cfa   a snapshot view 
of transition1 #cjb  ,formal knowledge1 
#aeb   logic1 #bib  ,forms of           
sensibility1 #cfa  ,fossil species1 #ajb
  ,foster1 #abe note  ,fox in           
illustration of animal intelligence1    
#ach  ,frames of the understanding1     
#df-g1 #dh1 #aej-b1 #agc1 #agg1 #aig-i1 
#bai-bj1    #bbc-d1 #beh1 #bgj1 #cac1   
#ceh1 #cfd   fit the inert1 #aig1 #bah  
inadequate to reality entire1 #cfd      
misfit for the vital1 x1 xiii1 xiv1 #df1
 #dh1 #agc1 #agg1 #aig-i1 #bbc1    #beh1
 #cac   product of life1 #ceh           
transform freedom into necessity1 #bgj  
utility of1 lies in their unlimited     
application1 #adi-ej1 #aeb  ,freedom1   
#aa1 #dh1 #abf1 #acj1 #afc1 #afd1 #bjj1 
#bjb1 #bjg1 #bjh1 #bag1 #bbc1 #bca1     
#bcg1 #bci1 #bdg1 #bdi1 #bfd-f1 #bfi1   

#bgj1 #bgg1 #cjj1 #cci-da1 #cde1 #cdf   
the absolute as freely acting1 #bgg     
affirmed by conscience1 #bfi   animal   
characteristic rather than vegetable1   
#abi-cj   caprice attribute not of1 but 
of mechanism1 #dg   coextensiveness of  
consciousness with1 #aaa1 #aab1 #bjb1   
#bfd1 #bgj   of creation and life1 #bdg1
 #bed1 #bee   creativeness of1 #bbc1    
#bci1 #bdh   in ,descartes's philosophy1
 #cde1 #cdf   as efficient causality1   
#bgg   inversion of necessity1 #bcf     
and liberation of consciousness1 #bfe1  
#bff4     ,see ,imprisonment of         
consciousness   and novelty1 #ab1 #afc1 
#afd1 #bjj1 #bah1 #bca1 #bci1 #bdi1     
#bgj1 #cci-db   order in1 #bbc          
property of every organism1 #abi-ca     
relaxation of1 into necessity1 #bag     
tendency of1 to self-negation in habit1 
#abg   tension of1 #bjj1 #bja1 #bjb1    
#bjg1 #bbc1 #bcg1 #cja   transformed by 
the understanding into necessity1 #bgj  
,see ,spontaneity  ,fringe of           
intelligence around instinct1 #acf   of 

intuition around intellect1 xii1 xiii1  
#df   of possible action around real    
action1 #agi1 #bgb  ,froth1 alveolar1 in
 imitation of organic phenomena1 #cc-d  
,full1 fallacy of thinking the1 by the  
empty1 #bgc-f  ,function1 ix1 #c1 #e1   
#dd1 #df1 #dg1 #hh-ij1 #id1 #ie1        
#ajf-aj1 #aac1 #aad1 #aag1 #abj1        
#aba1 #abg1 #acb1 #adj1 #ada1 #ade1     
#aeb1 #aec1 #aeg1 #afa1 #afc1 #afd1     
#afh1 #agc-e1    #ahf-ib1 #aii1 #bjf1   
#bjg1 #bcc1 #bcg1 #bdf1 #bea1 #bed-f1   
#bfb1 #bfc1 #bgj1 #bgc1    #bih1 #cjf1  
#cdf1 #ceh1 #cfi   accumulation of      
energy the function of vegetable        
organisms1 #bed1 #bee   action the1 of  
intellect1 ix1 #ab1 #dd1 #dg1 #ic1 #afa1
 #afb1 #ahf-h1 #bjf1 #bea1    #bgc1 #cje
   action the1 of nervous system1 #bfb1 
#bfc   alimentation1 #ajf1 #ajg1 #abj1  
#aba1 #bdf1 #bed   of animals is        
canalization of energy1 #ic1 #aaj1 #abf1
 #bee1 #bef   carbon and the1 of        
organisms1 #ajg1 #aac1 #aad1 #aag1 #bed1
 #bee   chlorophyllian1 #ajg-i1 #aad1   

#aag1 #bdf1 #bed   concept-making the1  
of intellect1 x1 #di   of consciousness3
 sketching movements1 #bjg              
construction the1 of intellect1 #ajh    
illumination of action1 of perception1  
#e1 #bjf1 #cjg-h   of intelligence3     
action1 ix1 #ab1 #dd1 #df1 #ic1 #afj1   
#afb1 #ahf-h1 #bjf1 #bea1    #bgc1      
#cjg-h   of intelligence3               
concept-making1 x1 #ej   of             
intelligence3 construction1 #afj1 #afc1 
#aha-b   of intelligence3 division1     
#aed1 #aee1 #afb1 #ahi   of             
intelligence3 illumination of action by 
perception1 #e1 #bjf1 #cja   of         
intelligence3 repetition1 #afd1 #aii1   
#bad-f   of intelligence3 retrospection1
 #dg1 #bcg   of intelligence3 connecting
 same with same1 #aii1 #bcc1 #bgj   of  
intelligence3 scanning the rhythm of the
 universe1 #cdf   of intelligence3      
tactualizing all perception1 #afh   of  
intelligence3 unification1 #aeb1 #aed1  
#ceg   of the nervous system3 action1   
#bfb1 #bfc   and organ1 #hh-ij1 #id1    

#ie1 #acb-c1 #adj1 #ada1 #aeh4     ,see 
,function and structure   and organ in  
arthropods1 vertebrates and man1 #acb-c 
of the organism1 #id1 #ajf-aj1 #aab1    
#aad1 #aag1 #abj1 #abf1 #agc-e1 #bdf1   
#bec-f   of the organism1 alimentation1 
#ajf1 #ajg1 #abj1 #aba1 #bdf1 #bed   of 
the organism1 animal3 canalization of   
energy1 #ic1 #aaj1 #abf1 #bee1 #bef   of
 the organism1 carbon in1 #ajg1 #aac1   
#aad1 #aag1 #bed1 #bee   of the         
organism1 chlorophyllian function1      
#ajg-i1 #aad1 #aag1 #bdf1 #bdg1 #bed    
of the organism1 primary functions of   
life3 storage and expenditure of        
energy1 #bed-f   of the organism1       
vegetable3 accumulation of energy1 #bed1
 #bee   of philosophy3 adoption of the  
evolutionary movement of life and       
consciousness1 #cgj   of science1 #afh1 
#cdf   sketching movements the1 of      
consciousness1 #bjg   and structure1    
#ee1 #fb1 #ff1 #fi1 #gd1 #ge1 #gf1 #hf1 
#hh-ia1 #ic1 #id1 #if1 #aah1    #acb1   
#adj1 #ada1 #aeh1 #afb1 #bej1 #beb1 #bef

   tactualizing all perception the1 of  
science1 #afh   of vegetable organism3  
accumulation of energy1 #bed1 #bee      
,functions of life1 the two3 storage and
 expenditure of energy1 #bed-f          
,galileo1 homogeneity of time in1 #ccb  
his influence on metaphysics1 #bj1 #bbh 
his influence on modern science1 #ccd1  
#cce   extension of ,galileo's physics1 
#ceg1 #cgj   his theory of the fall of  
bodies compared with ,aristotle's1 #bbh1
 #cca1    #ccb1 #ccd  ,ganoid           
breast-plate of ancient fishes1 in      
reference to animal mobility1    #acj1  
#aca  ,gaudry1 #acj note  ,genera1      
relation of1 to individuals1 #bbf       
relation of1 to laws1 #bbe1 #bbf1 #ccj  
potential1 #bbf-g   and signs1 #aeh     
,generality1 ambiguity of the idea of1  
in philosophy1 #bbi-ca1 #bcf            
,generalization dependent on repetition1
 #bcj1 #bca   distinguished from        
transference of sign1 #aeh   in the     
vital and mathematical orders1 #bbd1    
#bbe1 #bcj  ,generic1 type of the3      

similarity of structure between         
generating and    generated1 #bbc1 #bbd 
,genesis1 xiii1 xiv1 #aec1 #ahf-aii1    
#bjg1 #cei1 #cfj   of intellect1 xiii1  
xiv1 #aec1 #ahf1 #ahg1 #aij1 #aic1 #aid1
 #aif-g1 #bjg1    #bfd1 #cfj   of       
knowledge1 #aia   of matter1 xiii1 xiv1 
#aec1 #ahf1 #ahh1 #aij1 #aic1 #aii1     
#bjg1 #cfj  ,genius and the willed      
order1 #bbc1 #bcg  ,genus4 ,see ,genera 
,geometrical1 the1 is the object of the 
intellect1 #aij  ,geometrical order as a
 diminution or lower complication of the
 vital1    #bbc1 #bbe1 #bcf1 #ccj4      
,see ,genera1 ,relation of1 to laws     
mutual contingency of1 and vital order1 
#bce     ,see ,mathematical order       
space1 relation of1 to the spatiality of
 things1 #bjc  ,geometrism1 the latent1 
of intellect1 #aid1 #baa-c  ,geometry1  
fitness of1 to matter1 #aj   goal of    
intellectual operations1 #baa1 #bac1    
#bah   ideal limit of induction and     
deduction1 #bad-h1 #cfa4     ,see       
,space1 ,descending movement of         

existence   modern1 compared with       
ancient1 #cf1 #afa1 #ccc-d   natural1   
#aid1 #baa-b   perception impregnated   
with1 #bje1 #bcj   reasoning in1        
contrasted with reasoning concerning    
life1 #g1 #h   scientific1 #afa1 #baa   
,germ1 accidental predisposition of1 in 
,neo-,darwinism1 #afh1 #afi1 #agj       
,germ-plasm1 continuity of1 #bg1 #cg1   
#gh-hc  ,giard1 #hd  ,glucose in organic
 function1 #abb1 #abc  ,glycogen in     
organic function1 #abb-d  ,god1 as      
activity1 #bdi   of ,aristotle1 #aif1   
#cbb1 #cbe1 #cdi1 #cec1 #cef-g   ascent 
toward1 in ,aristotle's philosophy1     
#cbb-c   circularity of ,god's thought1 
in ,aristotle's philosophy1 #cbd1 #cbe  
in ,descartes's philosophy1 #cdf1 #cdg  
as efficient cause in ,aristotle's      
philosophy1 #cbd   as hypostasis of the 
unity of nature1 #aif1 #cbb1 #ceg   in  
,leibniz's philosophy1 #ceb1 #cec1      
#cef-g   as eternal matter1 #aif-g   as 
pure form1 #aif-g1 #cbb   in ,spinoza's 
philosophy1 #cea1 #ceg  ,greek          

philosophy4 ,see ,ancient philosophy    
,green parts of plants1 #ajg-i1 #aad1   
#aag1 #bdf1 #bdg1 #bed  ,growing old1   
#ae  ,growth1 creation is1 #bdj-a1 #bge 
and novelty1 #bca   of the powers of    
life1 #acb1 #acd-e   reality is1 #bcg   
of the universe1 #cdc1 #cde  ,gurin1    
,p41 #ei note  ,guinea-pig1 in          
illustration of hereditary transmission1
 #hj1 #ha   ,habit and consciousness    
annulled1 #adc   form of knowledge a    
habit or bent of attention1 #adh   and  
heredity1 #gh1 #ic1 #afi1 #agj1 #agc4   
,see ,acquired characters1 inheritance  
of   instinct as an intelligent1 #agc-d 
and invention in animals1 #bfd   and    
invention in man1 #bfe   tendency of    
freedom to self-negation in1 #abg-h     
,harmony between instinct and life1 and 
between intelligence and the    inert1  
#ahg1 #aid-e1 #aih   of the organic     
world is complementarity due to a common
 original    impulse #ej1 #ea1 #ajc1    
#aaf1 #aah   pre-established1 #bje1 #bjf
   in radical finalism1 #abg-h4     ,see

 ,discord  ,hartog1 #fj note  ,hatchets1
 ancient flint1 and human intellect1    
#acg  ,heliocentric radius-vector in    
,kepler's laws1 #ccc-d  ,hereditary     
transmission1 #gf-hc1 #hg1 #afh-i1 #agj1
 #agc1 #bbe-f1 #bcj   domestication of  
animals and1 #hj-a   habit and1 #gi1    
#hc1 #afi1 #agj1 #agc  ,hesitation or   
choice1 consciousness as1 #adc1 #add    
,heteroblastia and identical structures 
on divergent lines of evolution1 #ge    
,heymons1 #gb note  ,history as creative
 evolution1 #f1 #ae1 #ba1 #bf1 #bi1 #cf1
 #cg1 #fe-f1 #ajc-d1    #aje1 #afc1     
#bfd1 #bfi   of philosophy1 #bch  ,hive 
as an organism1 #aff  ,homo faber1      
designation of human species1 #aci      
,homogeneity of space1 #aef1 #bab   the 
sphere of intellect1 #afc   of time in  
,galileo1 #ccb  ,horse-fly illustrating 
the object of instinct1 #adf  ,houssay1 
#aji note  ,human and animal attention1 
#ahd   and animal brain1 #ahd1 #bfc-e   
and animal consciousness1 #aci-dc1 #ahj1
 #ahc1 #ahd1 #ahg1 #ahh1 #aia1    #bab1 

#bfc-h   and animal instruments of      
action1 #aci-dc1 #aej   and animal      
intelligence1 #ach1 #ahg1 #ahh1 #aia1   
#aib1 #bab   and animal invention1      
relation of1 to habit1 #bfd1 #bfe       
intellect and language1 #aeg-h          
intellect and manufacture1 #acg1 #ach   
,humanity in evolution1 #acd1 #acg-i1   
#adb1 #adg1 #aeh1 #aha1 #ahd1 #ahe1     
#bfd-ga4     ,see ,culminating points1  
etc4   goal of evolution1 #bff1 #bfg    
,huxley1 #ch  ,hydra and individuality1 
#ac  ,greek3 ,hyl of ,aristotle1 #cec   
,hymenoptera1 the culmination of        
arthropod and instinctive evolution1    
#acd1 #agc-d   as entomologists1 #adf1  
#agb-c   organization and instinct in1  
#adj   paralyzing instinct of1 #adf1    
#agb1 #agc-d   social instincts of1     
#aja1 #aga  ,hypostasis of the unity of 
nature1 ,god as1 #aif-g1 #cbb1 #cef     
,hypothetical propositions              
characteristic of intellectual          
knowledge1 #adi-ej   ,idea or form in   
ancient philosophy1 #di1 #cad1 #caf-g1  

#cah1 #cbi-cj   in ancient philosophy1  
,greek3 eidos1 #cad-e   in ancient      
philosophy1 ,platonic1 #dh   and image  
in ,descartes1 #bhj  ,idealism1 #bcb    
,idealists and realists alike assume the
 possibility of an absence of    order1 
#bbj1 #bcb  ,identical structures in    
divergent lines of evolution1 #ee1      
#fj-a1 #fb1 #fi1    #gd-g1 #hf1 #aai    
,illumination of action the function of 
perception1 #e1 #bjf1 #cjg  ,image and  
idea in ,descartes1 #bhj   distinguished
 from concept1 #afj-a1 #bhj  ,imitation 
of being in ,greek philosophy1 #cbd1    
#cbg   of instinct by science1 #afh-i1  
#agc-d   of life in intellectual        
representation1 #d1 #cc1 #hh-i1 #aja1   
#agf1 #bjh1    #bji1 #bac1 #bbf1 #bei1  
#cda1 #cfe   of life by the unorganized1
 #cc1 #ce1 #cf   of motion by           
intelligence1 #cje1 #cjg-h1 #cab1 #cac1 
#cbi4     ,see ,imitation of the real1  
etc4   of the physical order by the     
vital1 #bcj   of the real by            
intelligence1 #beh1 #bgj1 #cjg          

,immobility of extension1 #aee   and    
plants1 #ajh-ac1 #aah1 #aai1 #acj   of  
primitive and torpid animals1 #acj-a    
relative and apparent2 mobility real1   
#aee  ,impatience1 duration as1 #aj1    
#cci-dj  ,impelling cause1 #gc          
,impetus1 vital1 divergence of1 #bf-g1  
#ea-e1 #ig-aje1 #aaj1 #aah-i1 #abf-g1   
#aca1 #acd-f1 #beg1 #beh1 #bff1 #bgj    
vital1 limitedness of1 #abf1 #ada1      
#adh-i1 #bed   vital1 loaded with       
matter1 #bci   vital1 as necessity for  
creation1 #beb1 #bfa   vital1           
transmission of1 through organisms1 #be1
 #bg1 #gi1 #he1 #hg1 #hh1    #bcj1 #bca1
 #bej1 #bea   vital1 ,see ,impulse of   
life  ,implement1 the animal1 is        
natural3 the human1 artificial1 #aci-dc 
artificial1 #acg-dj1 #aej-a             
constructing1 function of intelligence1 
#aei1 #ahb-c   life known to            
intelligence only as1 #afb   matter     
known to intelligence only as1 #afa1    
#aih   natural1 #ada1 #ade1 #aej        
organized1 #ada1 #ade1 #aej             

unorganized1 #acg-i1 #ada1 #aej-a       
,implicit knowledge1 #adh  ,impotence of
 intellect and perception to grasp life1
 #agf-h  ,imprisonment of consciousness1
 #ahj-c1 #bfd-f  ,impulse of life1      
divergence of1 #bf1 #bg1 #ea-e1 #ig-aje1
 #aaj1 #aah-i1    #abf-g1 #aca1 #acd-f1 
#beg1 #beh1 #bff1 #bgj   limitedness of1
 #abf1 #ada1 #adh-i1 #bed   loaded with 
matter1 #bci   tendency to mobility1    
#aca1 #acb   as necessity for creation1 
#beb1 #bfa   negates itself1 #bdg1 #bdh 
prolonged in evolution1 #bdf   prolonged
 in our will1 #bci   transmitted through
 generations of organisms1 #be1 #bf1    
#gi1 #he1 #hg1    #bcj1 #bca   unity of1
 #bjb1 #bej1 #bgj  ,impulsion and       
attraction in ,greek philosophy1 #cbc-d 
release and unwinding1 the three kinds  
of cause1 #gc   given to mind by matter1
 #bjb  ,inadequacy of act to            
representation1 consciousness as1 #adc  
,inadequate and adequate in ,spinoza1   
#cec  ,inanition1 illustrating primacy  
of nervous system1 #abd note            

,incoherence1 #bcf4     ,see ,absence of
 order1 ,chance1 ,chaos   in nature1    
#ajd  ,incommensurability of free act   
with conceptual idea1 #dg1 #bja   of    
instinct and intelligence1 #afg-h1 #age 
,incompatibility of developed           
tendencies1 #ajd1 #afh  ,independent    
variable1 time as1 #bj1 #cce-f          
,indetermination1 #hf1 #aad1 #abf1 #beb1
 #bec1 #cbf4     ,see ,accident in      
evolution  ,indeterminism in ,descartes1
 #cde  ,individual1 viewed by           
intelligence as aggregate of molecules  
and of    facts1 #bej-a   and division  
of labor1 #adj   in evolutionist        
biology1 #afi1 #aga1 #bdf note   and    
genus1 #bbf-i   mind in philosophy1 #aia
   aesthetic intuition only attains the1
 #agg   and society1 #bfj1 #bfe         
transmits the vital impetus1 #bej1 #bei1
 #bgj  ,individuality never absolute1 x1
 #ab1 #ac1 #af1 #ai1 #db1 #bfj   and    
age1 #ae-bc1 #bg1 #dc   corporeal1      
physics tends to deny1 #ahh1 #ahi1 #bjh4
     ,see ,interpenetration1            

,obliteration of outlines1 ,solidarity  
of the parts of matter   and generality1
 #bbf-h   the many and the one in the   
idea of1 x1 #beh   as plan of possible  
influence1 #aa  ,individuation never    
absolute1 x1 #ab-af1 #dc1 #bfj   as a   
cosmic principle in contrast with       
association1 #bei-fj   property of life1
 #ab-e   partly the work of matter1     
#beg-h1 #bei1 #bgj  ,indivisibility of  
action1 #id1 #ie   of duration1 #f1 #cjh
   of invention1 #afd   of life1 #bbe1  
#bgj-a4     ,see ,unity   of life of    
motion1 #cjg-aa  ,induction in animals1 
#bad   certainty of1 approached as      
factors approach pure magnitudes1 #bbb1 
#bbc   and duration1 #baf   and         
expectation1 #bad-f   geometry the ideal
 limit of1 #bad-h1 #cfa4     ,see       
,space1 ,geometry1 ,reasoning1          
,descending movement of matter1 etc4    
and magnitude1 #bae1 #baf   repetition  
the characteristic function of          
intellect1 #afd1 #aii1 #bje-af   and    
space1 #baf4     ,see ,space as the     

ideal limit1 ,systems1 etc4  ,industry1 
ix1 #afa1 #afb1 #afd  ,inert matter and 
action1 #if1 #acf1 #ada1 #aee1 #ahg1    
#aih1 #bbe1 #cfg   in ,aristotle1 #caf1 
#cbg1 #cec   bodies1 #g1 #h1 #ab1 #ad1  
#bj1 #ba1 #aef1 #aei1 #agd1 #ahf1 #ahh1 
#ahi1 #bjd1 #bac1    #bae1 #bbh1 #bdj1  
#bda1 #bih1 #cjj1 #cda1 #cdb1 #cdf-h1   
#cfj   ,creation of4 ,see ,inert matter 
the inversion of life   flux of1 #ahf1  
#bfe1 #bgc1 #cfi   and form1 #adh1 #adi1
 #aeg1 #bci1 #bej   genesis of1 #ahh    
homogeneity of1 #aef   imitation of     
living matter by1 #cc1 #ce1 #cf         
imitation of physical order by vital1   
#bcj   instantaneity of1 #aj1 #bja   and
 intellect1 ix1 #ca1 #ada1 #aei-fb1     
#afd1 #afe1 #afg-h1 #age1 #agi1 #aha1   
#ahf1     #ahg1 #aie1 #aif1 #aig1 #aih1 
#bje-ab1 #baf-i1 #bbd1 #bfd1 #bgj1 #cai1
 #cfi   the inversion or interruption of
 life1 #ic1 #id1 #ih1 #ii1 #abh-i1 #aec1
 #agg1    #ahf1 #ahi1 #aij1 #aif1 #aig1 
#bja1 #bjc1 #bjh1 #baf-i1 #bca1 #bce1   
#bcf1 #bci1 #bdj1    #bde-ej1 #beb1     

#bed1 #bef1 #beh1 #bei1 #bfa1 #bfd1     
#bfg1 #bgb1 #bgf1 #cai1    #cci-dj1     
#cdc4     ,see ,inert matter1 order     
inherent in   knowledge of1 approximate 
but not relative1 #bjf   the metaphysics
 and the physics of1 #aie-f   as        
necessity1 #beb1 #bfd   the order       
inherent in1 #dj1 #ajc1 #aec1 #bja1     
#bjg-ab1 #baf1 #bbf-g1 #bcj-f1    #bde1 
#bea1 #bfc1 #bgd1 #cai-bj4     ,see     
,inert matter1 inversion of life        
penetration of1 by life1 #be1 #bf1 #ea1 
#agi1 #aha1 #bcg1 #bci1 #bff1 #bgj1 #bga
   and perception1 #ab1 #bjf1 #bbf   and
 the psychical1 #bja1 #bjb1 #bje1 #bfi1 
#bgj1 #cej1 #cfg   solidarity of the    
parts of1 #ahh1 #bjb1 #bjg1 #bda1       
#beg-i1 #bgj1 #bga1 #ceb   and space1   
#aj1 #aec1 #ahi1 #bjd-aa1 #bad1 #bdd1   
#bej1 #bea1 #beg   in ,spencer's        
philosophy1 #cfe  ,inertia1 #agf1 #bbd  
,infant1 intelligence in1 #adg1 #adh    
,inference a beginning of invention1    
#ach  ,inferiority in evolutionary rank1
 #agd-e  ,influence1 possible1 #aa1 #ahi

  ,infusoria1 conjugation of1 #ae       
development of the eye from its stage   
in1 #fj-a1 #gb1 #gh1 #hd   and          
individuation1 #bfj   and mechanical    
explanations1 #cd1 #ce   vegetable      
function in1 #aaf  ,inheritance of      
acquired characters4 ,see ,hereditary   
transmission  ,innate knowledge1 #adf-g1
 #aej-a  ,innateness of the categories1 
#adh1 #adi-ej  ,inorganic matter4 ,see  
,inert matter  ,insectivorous plants1   
#ajg-i  ,insects1 #ai1 #aja1 #ajg1 #abf1
 #aca1 #acd1 #ace1 #adj-a1 #adf1 #adg1  
#aeg1 #aff1    #afi1 #aga-e1 #ahh       
apogee of instinct in hymenoptera1 #acd1
 #agc-d   consciousness and instinct1   
#ade1 #afg1 #agc   continuity of        
instinct with organization1 #aci1 #ade  
fallibility of instinct in1 #agb-c      
instinct in general in1 #afi1 #agc-d    
language of ants1 #aeg-h   object of    
instinct in1 #adf   paralyzing instinct 
in1 #adf1 #aga1 #agb-c   social instinct
 in1 #aja1 #aeg-h1 #aga   special       
instincts as variations on a theme1     

#afg4     ,see ,arthropods in evolution 
,insensible variation1 #fc1 #ff         
,inspiration of a poem an undivided     
intuitive act1 contrasted with its      
intellectual imitation in words1 #bji1  
#baj1 #beh4     ,see ,sympathy          
,instantaneity of the intellectual view1
 #ca1 #gj1 #hd1 #hi1 #aii1 #bja-b1 #bjg1
    #bbf1 #bdi1 #beh1 #bgc1 #cjj-f1     
#caa1 #cad1 #cca-c1 #cdb1 #cea1 #ceb    
,instinct and action on inert matter1   
#acf1 #ada   in animals as distinguished
 from plants1 #agj   in cells1 #aff     
and consciousness1 #adc-e1 #aff1 #afg1  
#agc1 #agd1 #age1 #ahf   culmination of1
 in evolution1 #acc1 #agd-e4     ,see   
,arthropods in evolution1 ,evolutionary 
superiority   fallibility of1 #agc-d    
in insects in general1 #afi1 #agc-d     
and intelligence1 xii1 #ea1 #ajj1 #ajc1 
#aac1 #aaf-h1 #acb-g1 #ada-c1 #ade1     
#aej1    #aeb1 #aei1 #afh-gj1 #agc-i1   
#ahd-e1 #ahf1 #aig-h1 #bch1 #bdf1 #bed1 
#bee1 #bei1    #bfg1 #bfh1 #cdc1 #cde1  
#cff   and intuition1 #agg1 #agh-i1 #aha

   object of1 #adf-eb1 #afe1 #afh1      
#agb-i1 #ahf1 #ahi1 #aie1 #bcd1 #bed    
and organization1 #bc-d1 #ach-dj1 #ade1 
#aff-h1 #aga-b1 #agc1 #agf1 #aic1       
#aid1 #bfd   paralyzing1 in certain     
hymenoptera1 #adf1 #aga1 #agb-c   in    
plants1 #agj1 #aga   social1 of insects1
 #aja1 #aeg-h1 #aga  ,instinctive       
knowledge1 #adh1 #afg1 #afh1 #agc-d     
learning1 #aic   metaphysics1 #aib1     
#bfi1 #bgj1 #bgg  ,instrument1 action   
as1 of consciousness1 #ahj   animal1 is 
natural2 human artificial1 #aci-dc      
automatic activity as instrument of     
voluntary1 #beb   consciousness as1 of  
action1 #ahj   intelligence3 the        
function of intelligence is to construct
    instruments1 #aei1 #aib-c           
intelligence transforms life into an1   
#afb   intelligence transforms matter   
into an1 #afa1 #aih   intelligence3 the 
instruments of intelligence are         
artificial1 ix1 #acg-i1    #adj-a1      
#aej-a   natural or organized           
instruments of instinct1 #adj-a1 #ade1  

#aej  ,intellect and action1 ix1 #aa1   
#bi1 #dd-h1 #ic1 #acf1 #adb1 #aeb-g1    
#afb1 #agi1    #ahf1 #ahg1 #aib1 #aie1  
#aig-h1 #bai1 #bbj1 #bbf-i1 #bea1 #bgj1 
#bgc1 #big-i1 #cja1    #cjb1 #cjf1 #cbi1
 #cdf-g   in animals1 #ahg   ,fichte's  
conception of the1 #ahi1 #aij1 #ceg     
function of the1 #e1 #aa1 #ab1 #dd-ej1  
#ib1 #ic1 #abf1 #acg-de1 #adi-fj1       
#afb-d1    #afh1 #agd1 #agf1 #aha1      
#ahg-ii1 #bjd-h1 #bad-i1 #bbi1 #bcc1    
#bcg1 #bda1 #bdb1    #bdf1 #bdg1 #bea1  
#bgj1 #bij1 #bih1 #bii1 #cbh1 #ccf1     
#ccg1 #cda1 #cdb1 #cdg1    #cdh1 #cef1  
#ceg   genesis of the1 xi-xv1 #di1 #ajc1
 #ajd-e1 #abf-g1 #aeb1 #aec1 #ahf1 #ahg1
 #ahi1    #aic1 #aid1 #aie1 #aih1 #bjg1 
#bdg-i1 #ceh1 #cei1 #cff   as inversion 
of intuition1 #g1 #h1 #aa1 #ab1 #df1    
#di1 #ea1 #hf1 #hh-ia1 #ic1 #id1        
#ajc-d1 #aac1 #aaf-h1 #abi1 #acb1 #acc1 
#ace1 #acf1 #aci-dc1 #ade1 #aeg1 #afa1  
#afh-hj1 #aha1 #ahc1 #ahd1 #ahe1        
#aij-bjd1 #bjg-ab1 #baf-h1 #bba1 #bbc1  
#bbe-f1    #bcj-c1 #bce1 #bcf1 #bch1    

#bde-eb1 #bed-i1 #bfd1 #bfg-ga1 #bgf1   
#bgg1 #cac1 #ccj1    #cci1 #cdb-e1 #cfa1
 #cfi   and language1 #d1 #adh1 #aeh-fj1
 #beh1 #bfe1 #bib1 #cjc1 #cjd1 #cab1    
#cac1 #cbf   and matter1 ix-xv1 #aj1    
#aa1 #dh-i1 #ib1 #ace1 #acf1 #ada1 #adb1
 #aeb-d1 #aee1    #afj1 #afa1 #afe1     
#afh1 #age1 #agi1 #aha1 #ahb1 #ahf-g1   
#aij1 #aic1 #aid1 #aie1    #aih1 #aii1  
#bja-d1 #bje-aj1 #bac1 #bae1 #bah-bj1   
#bbd1 #bbe-cj1 #bdj-b1 #bde1    #bdf1   
#bdh-eb1 #bed1 #bef-i1 #bfd1 #bgj1 #bga1
 #bgb1 #bgc1 #bge1 #big-h1 #cjf1        
#cai1 #cba1 #cbi1 #cdj1 #cda-c1 #cdg-i1 
#cee1 #ceh-fa1 #cfh1 #cfi   mechanism of
 the1 ix-xv1 #d1 #cj1 #cb1 #dg-i1 #gj1  
#hd-e1 #hh-i1 #aja1 #acg-h1     #aej-e1 
#aef-g1 #afj1 #afa1 #afd1 #afe1 #afg1   
#afh1 #agc1 #agd1 #agf1 #agg1    #ahf1  
#ahg1 #aij-c1 #aid-bah1 #bbc-dj1 #bdd1  
#bdf-g1 #bdi-ea1 #bed1 #bee1 #beg1      
#beh1 #bff1 #bgj1 #bgc1 #bgf-g1 #bib1   
#cjj-ba1 #cbe1 #cbi1 #ccj1 #ccb1 #ccg1  
#cch1    #cci1 #cda-h1 #cea1 #ceh-i1    
#cfa-b1 #cfc-d1 #cfe1 #cfg   object of  

the1 ix-xv1 #g1 #h1 #aj1 #ag1 #bj1 #ba1 
#cj1 #ca1 #cd1 #ce1 #cg1 #df-i1    #eb1 
#ga1 #gd1 #hd1 #hg-ib1 #ic1 #ie1 #ajb1  
#ajc1 #aci1 #adj1 #adi1 #aeb-ff1 #afh1  
#agc1 #age-i1 #ahj1 #aha1 #ahf1 #aij1   
#aic-baa1 #bac1 #baf-bj1 #bbc1 #bbd1    
#bbf1    #bbh-cj1 #bcc1 #bcg1 #bch1     
#bdj1 #bde1 #bdi-ea1 #bed1 #bee1 #beg-i1
 #bfa1 #bfd1    #bfe1 #bgj1 #bga1 #bgc1 
#bgd1 #bih-cad1 #cah-bb1 #cbf1 #cbh1    
#cbi1 #ccb-h1 #cdb1    #cdd-i1 #cea1    
#ceb-g1 #cei-fa1 #cfc1 #cfe1 #cfi-gj    
and perception1 #d-e1 #aa1 #ab1 #ic-d1  
#afa-b1 #afh1 #agf-g1 #ahh1 #ahi1 #bje1 
#bjg1 #bbf-g1 #bbh-i1 #bcj1 #bch1       
#bdi-ea1 #bgc1 #bii-cjj1 #cja1 #cjf1    
#cei-fj   and rhythm1 #bii1 #cjj-a1     
#cjf-g1 #cbi1 #ccg1 #cdf-g   and        
science1 #h-ab1 #ca1 #ib-c1 #aeb1 #aec1 
#aeg-h1 #aei1 #afj-a1 #afb-c1 #afh1     
#agc-f1 #ahg1 #aic-h1 #bjb1 #bjd1       
#bjg-i1 #bad-f1 #bag1 #bbe-f1 #bbh-i1   
#bda1    #bea1 #bgj1 #bgc1 #big-h1 #cjf1
 #cba1 #cbb1 #cbi1 #ccc-e1 #cde1 #cdf-h1
 #ced1    #cef1 #ceg1 #cei-fj1 #cfb-c1  

#cfi-gj   and space1 #aj-aa1 #aed1      
#aef-g1 #afj-c1 #agd-e1 #agf-g1 #ahi1   
#bjb-d1 #bjg-ab1    #bae1 #bah1 #bbb-c1 
#bdd1 #bde1 #bej1 #bea1 #beg-h1 #cfa-b  
and time1 #d1 #h-i1 #ag1 #ah1 #bj-b1    
#cf1 #ci1 #de-f1 #dg1 #ea1 #afc1 #cjj1  
#cja1    #cca-b1 #cce-g1 #cda           
possibility of transcending the1 xii1   
xiii1 #dh1 #aeb1 #agg-h1 #aic-d1        
#aih-bjj1 #bje-f1 #bjg-h1 #bff1 #cfj-a4 
,see ,philosophy1 ,intelligence         
,intellectualism1 hesitation of         
,descartes between1 and intuitionism1   
#cde  ,intelligence and action1 #acg-da1
 #aej1 #aed-e1 #afa1 #afb-c1 #aha1 #ahi1
 #aih1 #cjf   animal1 #ach1 #ahg1 #ahh1 
#bab   categories of1 x1 #dh1 #aie-f    
of the child1 #adg-h   and              
consciousness1 #ahg   culmination of1   
#acj1 #aci-dj1 #agd-e4     ,see         
,superiority   genesis of1 #acf1 #agg-h1
 #cff   and the individual1 #bea   and  
instinct1 #aji1 #ace1 #acf1 #ada1 #adb1 
#afh-gj1 #agc-g1 #agi1 #ahf1 #aig1      
#bji1 #bch1 #bei1 #bfg   in ,kant's     

philosophy1 #ceg-h   and laws1 #bbi-cj  
limitations of1 #aeb   and matter1 #aeb1
 #aei-fj1 #afa-b1 #age1 #agi1 #aha1     
#ahf1 #ahi1 #aid-h1 #bcj1    #bcg1 #bej1
 #cfi1 #cgj   mechanism of1 #aeb1 #aec1 
#afd1 #afe   and motion1 #aec1 #aei-fj1 
#bgd1 #cjc-g1 #cab1 #cac1 #cbi   object 
of1 #ade-ef1 #afa1 #afb1 #age1 #agi1    
#bej   practical nature of1 ix-xv1      
#acg-i1 #ada1 #aej-a1 #bdg-h1 #cje1     
#cjf1 #cbh-i   and reality1 ix-xv1      
#afa-b1 #agg1 #bcg1 #bea1 #beh1 #bfi1   
#bga1 #cjg   and science1 #age1 #agf1   
#aic1 #aid-e   and signs1 #aeg1 #aeh1   
#aei1 #afj   and space1 #bje     ,see   
,intellect1 ,understanding1 ,reason     
,intelligent1 the1 contrasted with the  
merely intelligible1 #age  ,intelligible
 reality in ancient philosophy1 #caf-g  
world1 #afj-a  ,intelligibles of        
,plotinus1 #cec  ,intension of          
knowledge1 #adi-ej  ,intensity of       
consciousness varies with ratio of      
possible to real    action1 #add-e      
,intention as contrasted with mechanism1

 #bcc4     ,see ,automatic order1       
,willed order   of life the object of   
instinct1 #agf1 #bcc  ,interaction1     
universal1 #ahh-i  ,interest as cause of
 variation1 #aca   in representation of 
nought1 #bif1 #big4     ,see ,affection1
 rle of1 etc4  ,internal finality1 #da  
,internality of instinct1 #afh1 #agd-e1 
#agf-g   of subject in object the       
condition of knowledge of reality1 #cjg1
    #cag1 #ceh-i  ,interpenetration1    
#afa1 #afb1 #agd-e1 #agg1 #ahd note1    
#ahh1 #ahi1 #bja-c1    #bjg-h1 #beg1    
#beh1 #bgj1 #cai-bj1 #cda1 #ceb         
,interruption1 materiality an1 of       
positivity1 #bai1 #bdf1 #bdg-h1 #cai-bj4
     ,see ,inverse relation1 etc4       
,interval of time1 #h-i1 #bb1 #bc       
between what is done and what might be  
done covered by consciousness1 #agi     
,intuition1 continuity between sensible 
and ultra-intellectual1 #cfj-a          
dialectic and1 in philosophy1 #bch4     
,see ,intellect as inversion of         
intuition   fringe of1 around the       

nucleus of intellect1 xiii1 #ab1 #df1   
#di1 #aic   and instinct1 #agf-i1 #ahb  
and intellect in theoretical knowledge1 
#agf-i1 #bgj-a  ,intuitional cosmology  
as reversed psychology1 #bjg-h          
metaphysics contrasted with intellectual
 or systematic1 #aia-b1    #bfh-gj1     
#bgg-h   method of philosophy1 apparent 
vicious circle of1 #aia-d1 #aie-h       
,intuitionism in ,spinoza1 #cdg-h   and 
intellectualism in ,descartes1 #cde-f   
,invention1 consciousness as1 and       
freedom1 #bfd1 #bgj-a   creativeness of1
 #afd1 #bcg1 #cdj1 #cda   disproportion 
between1 and its consequences1 #aha1    
#ahb-c   duration as1 #aj-a   evolution 
as1 #ajb-c1 #bee1 #cdd-e   fervor of1   
#afd   indivisibility of1 #afd          
inference a beginning of1 #ach          
mechanical1 #adb-c1 #aid-e   of steam   
engine as epoch-marking1 #ach-i   time  
as1 #cda   unforeseeableness of1 #afd   
upspringing of1 #afd     ,see ,new      
,inverse relation of the physical and   
psychical1 #abf-g1 #adc-d1 #ade1 #agc-d1

    #agg-h1 #bja1 #bjb1 #bjf-g1 #bjh1   
#baj-a1 #bab1 #bag1 #bah1 #bbb1 #bbc1   
#bcf1 #bdj1    #bde1 #bdf1 #bdg-h1 #bdi1
 #bef1 #beg1 #bfa1 #bfd1 #bfe1 #bgj1    
#cai-bj  ,irreversibility of duration4  
,see ,repetition  ,isolated systems of  
matter1 #bjd1 #bac1 #bae1 #bda1 #bdb1   
#cda1 #cdb1 #cdf1 #cdg-h4     ,see      
,bodies   ,janet1 ,paul1 #fj-a note     
,jennings1 #ce note  ,jourdain and the  
two kinds of order1 #bba                
,juxtaposition1 #bjg-h1 #cch1 #cci1     
#cda4   ,cf4 ,succession                
,kaleidoscopic variation1 #gd  ,kant1   
antinomies of1 #bjd-e1 #bjf   becoming  
in ,kant's successors1 #cfb             
coincidence of matter with space in     
,kant's philosophy1 #bjf1 #bjg-h1 #bdd  
construction the method of ,kant's      
successors1 #cfd-e   his criticism of   
pure reason1 #bje1 #bhg note1 #cef-fb1  
#cfd   degrees of being in ,kant's      
successors1 #cfb-c   duration in ,kant's
 successors1 #cfb-c   intelligence in   
,kant's philosophy1 #bcj1 #ceg          

ontological argument in ,kant's         
philosophy1 #bhe   space and time in    
,kant's philosophy1 #bjd-f   and        
,spencer1 #cfd     ,see ,mind and       
matter1 ,sensuous manifold1             
,thing-in-itself  ,kantianism1 #ceh1    
#cfd  ,katagenesis1 #cd  ,kepler1       
#bbh-i1 #ccb-e  ,knowledge and action1  
#aej1 #aic-d1 #aif1 #aig1 #bjf-g1 #bjh1 
#bah   criticism of1 #aic-d             
discontinuity of1 #cjf   extension of1  
#adi   form of1 #adh1 #aid-e1 #ceh-cfb  
formal1 #aeb   genesis of1 #aij   innate
 or natural1 #adf-ej   instinct in1     
#adc1 #add1 #aff-i1 #agc1 #agg1 #aib-c1 
#aih1 #bfh   intellect in1 ix-xv1 #dh1  
#adi1 #afb-d1 #agg1 #agi1 #aic-d1       
#aif-i1 #bjf-g1 #bjh1    #bah1 #bcg1    
#bch1 #bea1 #bgj1 #cje1 #cjf1 #cab1     
#cac1 #cae1 #cag1 #cbe1 #cca-b1    #cdb1
 #cdc1 #cdg-h1 #cei-fj1 #cfa   intension
 of1 #adi-ej   of reality viewed as the 
internality of subject in object1 #cjg1 
#cag1 #ceh-i   intuition and intellect  
in theoretical knowledge1 #agd-g1 #agi1 

#bch1    #bgj1 #cdb-d   matter of1      
#aid-e1 #ceg-h1 #cei-fb   of matter1 xi1
 #dh1 #bjf-g1 #cfj-a   object of1 ix-xv1
 #a1 #dh1 #adg1 #adh1 #aei-fj1 #afc1    
#afd1 #aig-i1 #bgj1    #cdb1 #cei-fj    
fundamental problem of1 #bgc-e   as     
relative to certain requirements of the 
mind1 #aeb1 #aij-a1 #bcj   scientific1  
#aic-d1 #aif-h1 #bjf1 #bjg1 #bah        
theory of1 xiii1 #agg1 #agi1 #aig1      
#bjd-e1 #bjg-h1 #bbi1 #bca              
unconscious1 #adb-f1 #adf1 #aej1 #afe1  
#aff   alleged unknowableness of the    
thing-in-itself1 #bje1 #bjf  ,kunstler1 
#bfj note   ,labb #bfj note  ,labor1    
division of1 #ii1 #aaj1 #aah1 #adj1     
#aeg1 #aff1 #bfj  ,lalande1 ,andr1 #bdf 
note  ,lamarck1 #ge-f  ,lamarckism1     
#ge-f1 #gg1 #hd-hg  ,language1 #d1 #adg1
 #aeg-fj1 #beh1 #bfe1 #bic1 #cjb-c1     
#cje1 #cab-d1 #cbj  ,la ,place1 #ch     
,lapsed intelligence1 instinct as1 #afi1
 #age  ,larvae1 #ai1 #adj1 #ade-ff1     
#agb-c  ,latent geometrism of intellect1
 #aid1 #baa-b  ,law of correlation1 #ff1

 #fg   and genera1 #bbf-i1 #ccj         
heliocentric radius-vector in ,kepler's 
laws1 #ccd   imprint of relations and   
laws upon consciousness in ,spencer's   
philosophy1 #ahh   and intuitional      
philosophy1 #agf-g   physical1          
contrasted with the laws of our codes1  
#bah-i   physical1 expression of the    
negative movement1 #bah   physical1     
mathematical form of1 #bah1 #bai1       
#bbi-cj1 #bda   relation as1 #bbh1      
#bbi-cj  ,learning1 instinctive1 #aib1  
#aic  ,le ,dantec1 #ah note  ,leibniz1  
cause in1 #bgg   dogmatism of1 #cef1    
#ceg   extension in1 #cea1 #ceb   ,god  
in1 #cea1 #ceb1 #cef   mechanism in1    
#cdh1 #cea1 #cee1 #cef   his philosophy 
a systematization of physics1 #cdg      
space in1 #cea-b   teleology in1 #ci1   
#dj   time in1 #ceb1 #cfb  ,lepidoptera1
 #aad note1 #acd  ,le ,roy1 ,ed41 #bah  
note  ,liberation of consciousness1     
#ahc-d1 #bfe1 #bff  ,liberty4 ,see      
,freedom  ,life as activity1 #abh-i1    
#bdf   cause in the realm of1 #id1 #afd 

complementarity of the powers of1 ix-xv1
 #be-f1 #bg1 #ea-e1 #ig-aje1 #aaj1      
#aac1 #aaf-i1 #abf-g1 #aca-f1 #adj-c1   
#agf1 #agg1 #ahc1 #ahd1 #bdf1 #bed-g1   
#bff1    #bgj1 #cdc1 #cdd-e             
consciousness coextensive with1 #ahf1   
#beg1 #bgj1 #cfb-c   mutual contingency 
of the orders of life and matter1 #bce  
continuity of1 #a-aa1 #bi1 #cj1 #afb1   
#afc1 #beh   as creation1 #eg-h1 #afa-b1
 #bbc1 #bcj1 #bdf1 #bdg-h1 #beb1 #bed1  
#bee   symbolized by a curve1 #ca1 #hi1 
#ij   embryonic1 #aff   and finality1   
#dd1 #hi1 #afd1 #ahe1 #bbb-c   fluidity 
of1 #aec1 #afe1 #aia-b1 #aic   as free1 
#abi-cj   function of1 #ic-d1 #ajf-aj1  
#aac1 #aad1 #aag1 #abj1 #aba1 #abf-g1   
#agc-e1    #bdf1 #bed-f   harmony of the
 realm of1 #ej1 #ea1 #ajc1 #aaf1 #aag-h1
 #abg   imitation of the inert by1 #bcj 
imitation of1 by the inert1 #cc-f       
impulse of1 prolonged in our will1 #bci 
and individuation1 #ab-d1 #bf1 #bg1     
#gi-hj1 #he1 #hg1 #hh1 #abg-h1 #adi1    
#aie-f1     #bcj1 #bca1 #bej1 #bei1     

#bfa1 #bfi1 #cjj-a1 #cjb-c4     ,see    
,individuality   indivisibility of1     
#bbe-f1 #bgj   and instinct4 #acf-dj1   
#ade1 #afe-h1 #agj1 #agb1 #agc1 #age-i1 
#ahf1 #aib-g1 #bcc1    #bfd1 #cff   and 
intellect1 ix-xv1 #ac1 #cb-e1 #dd-i1    
#hi1 #aja1 #ajb-c1 #ajd-e1 #abg1 #acf1  
#aeb1 #afj-e1 #afh1 #agc-d1 #agf-i1     
#aha1 #aia-bja1 #bjf1 #bjg1 #bac1 #bbj1 
#bbb-c1 #bbd1 #bbe-f1 #beg-fa1 #bff1    
#bgj1 #cjj-a1 #cdb1 #cee1 #cei-fa1 #cfe1
 #cff   and interpenetration1 #bga   as 
inversion of the inert1 #f-g1 #h1 #agf1 
#agg1 #ahf1 #aij1 #aia1 #aif1   #aig1   
#bja1 #bjb1 #bjg1 #bjh-i1 #baj-a1 #bab1 
#baf1 #bag1 #bah1 #bbb-c1 #bbe-f1       
#bcb1 #bce1 #bcf1 #bch1 #bci1 #bde-ej1  
#bfd1 #cbi-ca   a limited force1 #abf1  
#abg1 #ada1 #adh1 #adi1 #bed   and      
memory1 #afg   penetrating matter1 #bf1 
#bg1 #eb1 #agi1 #aha1 #ahb1 #bcg1 #bci1 
#bff1 #bfi-gj   as tendency to mobility1
 #abh1 #aca1 #acb   and physics and     
chemistry1 #ca1 #cc1 #ce1 #cf1 #bbe-f   
in other planets1 #bef   as             

potentiality1 #beh   repetition in1 and 
in the inert1 #bbd1 #bbe1 #bcj1 #bca    
sinuousness of1 #ga1 #ih1 #ii1 #ajb1    
#aab1 #aac1 #aaf1 #abi-cj1 #bab         
social1 #ach1 #adj1 #aeg-h1 #bfe   in   
other solar systems1 #bef   and         
evolution of species1 #bdg-h1 #bed1 #bfi
   theory of1 and theory of knowledge1  
xii1 #agg1 #agi1 #aig                   
unforeseeableness of1 #f1 #h-i1 #bj1    
#bf-g1 #bh1 #bi1 #cg1 #de-f1 #dg1 #dh1  
#eb1    #hf1 #if1 #afc1 #afd1 #ahd1     
#bbc-d1 #bdi1 #cci1 #cda   unity of1    
#bej1 #bfh1 #bgj   as a wave flowing    
over matter1 #bea1 #bff     ,see        
,impulse of1 ,organic substance1        
,organism1 ,organization1     ,vital    
impetus1 ,vital order1 ,vital principle1
 ,vitalism1 ,willed order  ,limitations 
of instinct and of intelligence1 #aeb   
,limitedness of the scope of ,galileo's 
physics1 #ceg1 #cgj   of the vital      
impetus1 #abf1 #abg1 #ada1 #adh1 #adi1  
#bee  ,linden1 ,maria von1 #aad note    
,lingulae illustrating failure to       

evolve1 #ajb  ,lizards1 color variation 
in1 #gb1 #gd  ,locomotion and           
consciousness1 #ajh1 #aaa1 #aae1 #bfa4  
,see ,mobility1 ,movement  ,logic and   
action1 ix1 #dd1 #df1 #afb1 #agi        
formal1 #bib   genesis of1 x-xi1        
xiii-xiv1 #di1 #ajc1 #ajd-e1 #acf1      
#aia-b1 #aic1 #cja1    #cei1 #cff   and 
geometry1 ix1 #afa1 #agf1 #bab          
impotent to grasp life1 x1 #ac1 #cb1    
#ce1 #cf1 #df-i1 #hi1 #aja1 #aeb1       
#afb-e1    #aid-bja1 #bje1 #bjf1 #bac1  
#bai1 #bbj1 #bbb1 #bbc1 #bbe-f1 #bef-fa1
 #bff1 #bgj1    #cac1 #cee1 #cfj-a1 #cfe
   natural1 #afa1 #aid-e   of number1   
#bjh   and physics1 #cai-bj1 #cba   and 
time1 #d1 #bgg     ,see ,intellect1     
,intelligence1 ,understanding1 ,order1  
mathematical  ,logical existence        
contrasted with psychical and physical1 
#bgg1 #bih1    #cbh1 #cfa-b             
categories1 x1 #dh1 #aie1 #aif   and    
physical contrasted1 #bgf-g  ,logik1 by 
,sigwart1 #bhg note  ,greek3 logos1 in  
,plotinus1 #baj note  ,looking backward1

 the attitude of intellect1 #df1 #bcg   
,lumbriculus1 #ac   ,machinery and      
intelligence1 #ada  ,machines1 natural  
and artificial1 #aci4     ,see          
,implement1 ,instrument   organisms1 for
 action1 #beb1 #bed1 #cjj-a  ,magnitude1
 certainty of induction approached as   
factors approach pure    magnitudes1    
#bae-af   and modern science1 #ccc1 #cce
  ,man in evolution1 attention1 #ahd    
brain1 #ahc1 #ahd1 #bfc-e               
consciousness1 #aci-dc1 #ahj1 #aha1     
#ahc1 #ahe1 #ahg1 #ahh1 #aia-b1 #bab1   
#bfb-h   goal1 #acd1 #agd-e1 #ahe1 #bff1
 #bfg1 #bfi1 #bgj   habit and invention1
 #bfe   intelligence1 #acc1 #acg-i1     
#adc1 #adf1 #agd1 #age1 #ahg1 #ahh1     
#bab1 #bff1 #bfg   language1 #aeh       
,manacine 7de71 #abd note  ,manufacture1
 the aim of intellect1 #acg1 #ach1 #ade1
 #aeb-d1 #aei-fe1 #aha1 #aia1    #aib1  
#aii1 #bea1 #bih   and organization1    
#ib1 #ic1 #abf-g1 #aci-dc1 #aej   and   
repetition1 #dd1 #de1 #aee-h     ,see   
,construction1 ,solid1 ,utility  ,many  

and one1 categories inapplicable to     
life1 x1 #afb-c1 #agg-h1 #beg1   #bfa1  
#bfh   in the idea of individuality1    
#beh     ,see ,multiplicity  ,martin1   
,j41 #ajb note  ,marion1 #ajg note      
,material knowledge1 #aeb               
,materialists1 #bdj  ,materiality the   
inversion of spirituality1 #bab         
,mathematical order4 ,see ,inert matter1
 ,order  ,matter4 ,see ,inert matter    
,maturation as creative evolution1      
#dg-h1 #bcj  ,maupas1 #ce note          
,measurement a human convention1 #bah1  
#bdb   of real time an illusion1 #ccf-dj
  ,mechanical account of action after   
the fact1 #dg   cause1 x1 #cd1 #ce1 #dj1
 #dd1 #agg1 #bcd1 #bce   procedure of   
intellect1 #afe   invention1 #ach1 #adj1
 #aid-e   necessity1 #dg1 #bae1 #baf1   
#bah1 #bcf1 #beb1 #bfe1 #bgj1 #cbg      
,mechanics of transformation1 #cb       
,mechanism1 cerebral1 #beb1 #bec1 #bfb1 
#bfc1 #bfe1 #cff4     ,see ,cerebral    
activity and consciousness   of the eye1
 #hh   instinct as1 #agf-g   of         

intellect4 ,see ,intellect1 mechanism of
   and intention1 #bcc4     ,see        
,automatic order1 ,willed order   life  
more than1 x1 xiv note1 #gh-i           
,mechanistic philosophy1 xii1 xiv1 #ag1 
#bi1 #cj1 #cg1 #gd1 #hh-if1 #aja1 #ajb1 
#aid-e1 #bah1 #bbc1 #bfd1 #cde1 #cdf1   
#cdg1 #cdh1 #cea1 #cee1 #cef1 #cfb      
,medical philosophers of the eighteenth 
century1 #cef   science1 #afe           
,medullary bulb in the development of   
the nervous system1 #beb   and          
consciousness1 #aaj  ,memory1 #e1 #ag1  
#bj1 #ba1 #afg1 #afh1 #ahj1 #aha1 #bja  
,menopause in illustration of crisis of 
evolution1 #ai  ,mental life1 unity of1 
#bfh  ,metamorphoses of larvae1 #aci-dj1
 #adf-g1 #aff  ,metaphysics and         
duration1 #bgf   and epistemology1 #agg1
 #agi1 #ahe1 #aig1 #bjh-i   ,galileo's  
influence on1 #bj1 #bch   instinctive1  
#aia-b1 #bfi1 #bgj1 #bgg-h   and        
intellect1 #ahi-ij   and matter1 #aid   
natural1 #ba1 #cbe   and science1       
#agf-g1 #aid-e1 #aih1 #bjh-i1 #cdd1     

#ced1 #cfi-gj   systematic1 #aia1 #aib1 
#aid1 #aie-f1 #bch1 #bfi1 #bgj1 #cdg    
,metchnikoff1 #ah note  ,method of      
philosophy1 #aia-b  ,microbes1          
illustrating divergence of tendency1    
#aag  ,microbial colonies1 #bei  ,mind1 
individual1 in philosophy1 #aia   and   
intellect1 #dh-i1 #bje-f   knowledge as 
relative to certain requirements of the 
mind1 #aeb1    #aij-a1 #bcj   and       
matter1 #ahh-i1 #bja1 #bjb1 #bjc1       
#bje-f1 #bfd1 #bfi1 #bgj1 #cej1 #cfe-i  
,see ,psychic1 ,psycho-physiological    
parallelism1 ,psychology and            
,philosophy1 ,greek3 psych  ,minot1     
,sedgwick1 #ag note  ,mobility1 tendency
 toward1 characterizes animals1 #aji1   
#aaj1 #aac1 #abi-cb1    #ace1 #ahj   and
 consciousness1 #ajh1 #aaa1 #aae-f1 #bfa
   and intellect1 #aed-e1 #afa-b1 #afc1 
#cjj1 #cbf1 #cbg1 #ccg   of intelligent 
signs1 #aeh1 #aei   life as tendency    
toward1 #abg-h1 #aca1 #acb   in plants1 
#aab1 #ace     ,see ,motion  ,mbius1 #fj
 note  ,model necessary to the          

constructive work of intellect1 #afd1   
#aff-g  ,modern astronomy compared with 
ancient science1 #ccd1 #cce   geometry  
compared with ancient science1 #ca1     
#afa1 #ccd   idealism1 #bca   philosophy
 compared with ancient1 #bbe-i1 #bca1   
#cbg-h1 #cdd1 #cde1    #cdi-ea1 #ced1   
#cef-g   philosophy3 parallelism of body
 and mind in1 #ahj1 #cej1 #cee1 #cef    
science3 cinematographical character of1
 #cbi1 #ccj1 #ccf1 #cda1 #cdb1 #cdf-g   
science compared with ancient1 #cbi-cf1 
#cdb-e1 #cef-g   science1 ,galileo's    
influence on1 #ccd1 #cce   science1     
,kepler's influence on1 #ccd   science1 
magnitudes the object of1 #ccc1 #cce    
science1 time an independent variable   
in1 #bj1 #cce  ,molecules1 #bea         
,molluscs1 illustrating animal tendency 
to mobility1 #abi-ca   perception in1   
#ahi   vision in1 #fj1 #ge1 #gg1 #hc1   
#hf1 #hg  ,monads of ,leibniz1 #cea-d   
,monera1 #abf  ,monism1 #cee  ,moral    
sciences1 weakness of deduction in1 #bab
  ,morat1 #abc note  ,morgan1 ,l41 #gi  

note1 #hj  ,motion1 abstract1 #cjd      
articulations of1 #caj-a   an animal    
characteristic1 #beb   and the          
cinematograph1 #cjd-e   continuity of1  
#caj   in ,descartes1 #cdf-g            
evolutionary1 extensive and qualitative1
 #cjb1 #cjc1 #caa1 #cab   in general    
7i4e4 abstract71 #cjd-e   indivisibility
 of1 #cjf-g1 #caa1 #ccf-g1 #cch   and   
instinct1 #aci-dj1 #cca-b   and         
intellect1 #ga1 #aee1 #aef1 #aei-fj1    
#bgc1 #bgd1 #bih1 #cag-h1 #cba1 #cbi1   
#cca-b1 #cch1 #cdd-e   organization of1 
#caj-a   track laid by motion along its 
course1 #cjh-aa1 #ccg1 #cch     ,see    
,mobility1 ,movement  ,motive principle 
of evolution3 consciousness1 #aha-b     
,motor mechanisms1 cerebral1 #beb1 #bec1
 #bfc1 #bfe  ,moulin-,quignon1 quarry   
of1 #acg  ,moussu1 #ha  ,movement and   
animal life1 #ajh1 #aca1 #acb           
ascending1 #ab1 #aja1 #ajc1 #ajd1 #ahe1 
#bjh-i1 #baj-a1 #cfi-gj4     ,see ,vital
 impetus   consciousness and1 #aaa1     
#aah1 #add-e1 #bjg-h   descending1      

#aa-b1 #bjb-d1 #bjg-aj1 #bab1 #bdf1     
#beb1 #bef1 #bgj1 #bgf1 #cci1    #cfa1  
#cfi-gj   goal of1 the object of the    
intellect1 #aee1 #bii-cjj1 #cjb1 #cjc   
intellect unable to grasp1 #cac   mutual
 inversion of cosmic movements1 #abf-g1 
#adc1 #add1 #agc-d1 #agf1 #agg1         
#bji-aj1 #bab1 #bag1 #bah1 #bbb-c1 #bcf1
 #bde-ea1 #bfa1 #bfd1 #bfe1 #bgb1 #cdb-c
   life as1 #aff1 #agf-g   and the      
nervous system1 #aaj1 #acb1 #acd1 #ahj1 
#bfb-c   of plants1 #aji1 #ace-f        
,see ,mobility1 ,motion1 ,locomotion1   
,current1 ,tendency1 ,impetus1          
,impulse1 ,impulsion  ,movements1       
antagonistic cosmic1 #abh-i1 #ace1 #aha1
 #ahe1 #bej1 #bei4     ,see ,movement1  
,mutual inversion of cosmic             
,multiplicity1 abstract1 #beg1 #bei     
distinct1 #bjb1 #bji-aj1 #beg4 ,see     
,interpenetration   does not apply to   
life1 x1 #afb1 #agg1 #beg1 #bfa1 #bgj   
,mutability1 exhaustion of1 of the      
universe1 #bdd1 #bde  ,mutations1       
sudden1 #bh1 #fb-c1 #fd-h   theory of1  

#he-f   ,natural geometry1 #aie-f1      
#baa-b   instrument1 #ada1 #add-e1      
#aej-a   or innate knowledge1 #adg1     
#aej-a   logic1 #afa1 #aid-e            
metaphysic1 #ba1 #cbe-f   selection1    
#ed1 #ef-g1 #ei-fj1 #fa-e1 #fh1 #ie1    
#afi-gj  ,nature1 ,aristotelian theory  
of1 #ace1 #agd   discord in1 #abg-h1    
#bee1 #bfg   facts and relations in1    
#cfh   incoherence in1 #ajd   as inert  
matter1 #afa-b1 #bah1 #bai1 #bbh-i1     
#bci1 #bde1 #bfd1 #bhj-a1 #cjc1    #cef1
 #cei-fj1 #cfg   as life1 #ajj1 #ach1   
#aci-dj1 #ada-b1 #adc1 #add-e1 #aej1    
#aed1 #aee-f1 #bbg1    #bda1 #bfj1 #bfi1
 #bgj1 #cja-b   order of1 #bbe-f   as   
ordered diversity1 #bca1 #bcc   unity   
of1 #aje1 #aij1 #aia1 #aie1 #aif-i1     
#cbb1 #ceb-g1 #ceh  ,nebula1 cosmic1    
#bdi1 #beg  ,necessity for creation1    
vital impetus as1 #beb1 #bfa   and death
 of individuals1 #bdf note   and        
freedom1 #bah1 #bcf1 #bgj   in ,greek   
philosophy1 #cbf-g   in induction1 #bae1
 #baf   and matter1 #beb1 #bfd          

,negation1 #bge1 #bhe-ig4 ,see ,nought  
,negative cause of mathematical order1  
#bag4 ,see ,inverse relation1 etc4      
cosmic principle1 #abf-g1 #adc1 #add1   
#agc-d1 #agf-g1 #bji1 #bab1 #bah1       
#bbc-d1    #bcf1 #bde-ea1 #bfa1 #bfd-e1 
#bgb1 #bdc4     ,see ,inert matter1     
,opposition of the two ultimate cosmic  
movements1 etc4  ,neo-,darwinism1 #ee1  
#ef1 #he1 #hf1 #afi-gj                  
,neo-,lamarckism1 #db note  ,nervous    
system a centre of action1 #aji1 #acj-a1
 #acb1 #acd-e1 #ahj1 #bec1 #bfa-c   of  
the plant1 #aad   primacy of1 #abj-a1   
#abf-g1 #beb  ,neurone and              
indetermination1 #abf  ,new1 freedom and
 the1 #aa-b1 #afd1 #afe1 #aii-bjj1 #bah1
 #bcj1 #bci1 #bdi1    #bgj1 #cci-db     
,newcomen1 #ahd  ,newton1 #cce          
,nitrogen and the function of organisms1
 #ajh1 #aac-d1 #aag1 #bee  ,greek3 noses
 nosis of ,aristotle1 #cef              
,non-existence4 ,see ,nought  ,nothing4 
,see ,nought  ,nought1 conception of    
the1 #bgc-hj1 #bha-c1 #bhi-ij1 #bib-h1  

#caf-g1 #cbg4     ,see ,negation1       
,pseudo-ideas1 etc4  ,greek3 nous       
poitikos of ,aristotle1 #cbb  ,novelty4 
,see new4  ,nucleus intelligence as the 
luminous1 enveloped by instinct1 #aff-g 
in microbial colonies1 #bei             
intelligence as the solid1 bathed by a  
mist of instinct1 #aic1 #aid   of       
,stentor1 #bfj  ,number illustrating    
degrees of reality1 #cbd-e1 #cbg   logic
 of1 #bjh  ,nuptial flight1 #adf        
,nutritive elements1 fixation of1       
#ajg-i1 #aad1 #aag1 #bdf1 #bdg1 #bed    
,nymph 7,zool471 #aci1 #adf   ,object of
 this book1 ix-xv   of instinct1        
#adf-eb1 #afc1 #age-i   of intellect1   
#adf-eb1 #afa-e1 #age1 #agi1 #aij-a1    
#aii-bjj1 #bcg1 #bej1    #beb1 #bgj1    
#bgc1 #bih-cjd1 #cjg-h1 #caa-b1 #ced1   
#cei   internality of subject in1 the   
condition of knowledge of reality1      
#cjg-h1 #cag-h1 #cei   of knowledge1    
#adg1 #adh-i1 #aei-fj   idea of1        
contrasted with that   of universal     
interaction1 #aa1 #ahh-i1 #bjg-h   of   

philosophy as contrasted with object of 
science1 #aie-f1 #bbj-a1 #bbe-f1        
#bbg1 #bci1 #bea1 #bgj1 #bgc1 #big-i1   
#cje-f1 #cdg   of science1 #cbi1 #ccb-c1
 #cce-f  ,obliteration of outlines in   
the real1 #aa1 #ahh1 #ahi1 #bjg-h       
,oenothera ,lamarckiana1 #fc1 #he-f     
,old1 growing4 ,see ,age   the1 is the  
object of the intellect1 #afc1 #afd1    
#aii1 #bgj  ,one and many in the idea of
 individuality1 x1 #beh4 ,see ,unity    
,ontological argument in ,kant1 #bhd    
,opposition of the two ultimate cosmic  
movements1 #abh-i1 #age-f1 #agi1        
#ahf1 #bja1 #bjc1 #bch1 #bdh1 #bed1     
#bei1 #bfa1 #bfg4     ,see ,inverse     
relation of the physical and psychical  
,orchids1 instincts of1 #agj  ,order and
 action1 #bbf-g   complementarity of the
 two orders1 #ade-f1 #agc-d1 #bba-b4    
,see ,order1 ,mutual inversion of the   
two orders   mutual contingency of the  
two orders1 #bca1 #bce   and disorder1  
#dj1 #ajc-d1 #bbj-b1 #bbe-f1 #bca-f1    
#bgd   mutual inversion of the two      

orders1 #ahf1 #bja1 #bjb1 #bjf-i1 #baa1 
#bab1    #baf-h1 #bai-ba1 #bbb-c1       
#bbe-f1 #bcj1 #bcb1 #bce1 #bcf1 #bch1   
#bdj1 #bde-h1    #bef1 #beg1 #beh1 #bfd1
 #bgj1 #bgd1 #cac1 #ccj   mathematical1 
#aec1 #bji-aa1 #bag-i1 #bbc-f1 #bcj-c1  
#bcf1 #bde1 #bea1 #bgj1 #ccj-a   of     
nature1 #bbe-f1 #bca1 #bcc   as         
satisfaction1 #bbb1 #bbc1 #bgd   vital1 
#id-e1 #afd1 #bbb-g1 #bcj1 #bce1 #bcf1  
#bcg1 #ccj-a   willed1 #bbd1 #bci       
,organ and function1 #hh-ia1 #ic-d1 #ie1
 #acb1 #adj1 #ada1 #aeg1 #afa-b         
,organic destruction and                
physico-chemistry1 #bbf   substance1    
#aca1 #adj1 #ada-b1 #adi1 #afb-c1       
#aie-f1 #bdj note1 #bee1 #bfg   world1  
cleft between1 and the inorganic1 #aij1 
#aia1 #aif1 #aig-h   world1 harmony of1 
#ej-a1 #ajc1 #ajd1 #aaf1 #aah1 #abf-g   
world1 instinct the procedure of1 #afe  
,organism and action1 #abc-d1 #abe1     
#agd1 #bec1 #bed1 #cjj-a   ambiguity of 
primitive1 #ii1 #aab1 #aac1 #aaf1 #abi1 
#acj   association of organisms1 #bfj   

change and the1 #cja1 #cjb-c            
complementarity of intelligence and     
instinct in the1 #ada-b1 #aej1 #aha1    
#ahd1 #ahe   complexity of the1 #afb1   
#bej1 #beb1 #bec1 #bfj   consciousness  
and the1 #aaa1 #ade1 #agi1 #ahj1 #bfb1  
#bgj   contingency of the actual        
chemical nature of the1 #bee1 #beg      
differentiation of parts in1 #beb1 #bfj4
     ,see ,organism1 complexity of      
extension of1 by artificial instruments1
 #ada1 #afa   freedom the property of   
every1 #acj1 #aca   function of1 #bf1   
#bg1 #gi1 #hj1 #he1 #hg1 #hh1 #ic-d1    
#ajf-aaj1 #aac1 #aad1 #aag1    #abj1    
#aba1 #abf-g1 #abh1 #acf1 #agc-e1 #bcj1 
#bca1 #bdf1 #bdg1 #bej1 #bea1 #bed1     
#bee1 #bef1 #beh1 #bgj   function and   
structure1 #ee1 #fa1 #fb1 #fi1 #gd1 #ge1
 #gf-g1 #hf1 #hh-ia1 #ic-d1     #ie1    
#if-g1 #aah-i1 #acb1 #aci1 #adj1 #aeg-h1
 #afa-c1 #bej1 #beb1 #bef   generality  
typified by similarity among organisms1 
#bbc1 #bbd1 #bbh-i1 #bcj   hive as1 #aff
   and individuation1 x1 #ab1 #ac1 #ae1 

#bc1 #bf-g1 #db1 #adi1 #aie-f1 #bbe-f1  
#bbh-i1 #bei1 #bfj1 #bfa1 #bgj   mutual 
interpenetration of organisms1 #agg-h   
mechanism of the1 #ca1 #ib-c1 #id       
philosophy and the1 #aie-f   unity of   
the1 #agf-h  ,organization of action1   
#adb1 #ade1 #adg-h1 #aej1 #aha1 #ahd1   
#ahe   of duration1 #e-f1 #ae1 #be1 #bf 
explosive character of1 #ib   and       
instinct1 #bd1 #ach-df1 #aej1 #afe-g1   
#aga-b1 #agc1 #agf1 #aib-c1 #aid1 #bfd  
and intellect1 #afa-b   and manufacture1
 #ib1 #ic1 #id-e1 #if1 #abf-h   is the  
modus vivendi between the antagonistic  
cosmic    currents1 #aha1 #bej1 #bed    
of motion1 #caj   and perception1 #bbf-g
  ,originality of the willed order1 #bbd
  ,orthogenesis1 #fi1 #hf-g             
,oscillation between association and    
individuation1 #bei1 #bfa4     ,see     
,societies   of ether1 #cja-b   of      
instinct and intelligence about a mean  
position1 #acf   of pendulum1           
illustrating space and time in ancient  
philosophy1    #cah-i1 #cbj   between   

representation of inner and outer       
reality1 #bgi-hj   of sensible reality  
in ancient philosophy about being1      
#caf-h  ,outlines of perception the plan
 of action1 #e1 #aa1 #ab1 #ic1 #ahh1    
#ahi1 #bjd-e1    #bjf-g1 #bbf-g1 #bbh-i1
 #bcj1 #bej1 #bii-cjj1 #cjf  ,oxygen1   
#aad1 #bed1 #bee   ,paleontology1 #bd-e1
 #abi1 #aci  ,paleozoic era1 #ajb       
,parallelism1 psycho-physiological1     
#ahj1 #cej1 #cea1 #cee1 #cef            
,paralyzing instinct in hymenoptera1    
#aci-dj1 #adf1 #agb1 #agd-e  ,parasites1
 #ajf1 #ajh1 #aji1 #aaa-ac1 #acd-e      
,parasitism1 #acb  ,passivity1 #bbb-d   
,past1 subsistence of1 in present1 #d1  
#bj-c1 #bf-g1 #ajh1 #aii-bjb  ,peckham1 
#agc-d note  ,pecten1 illustrating      
identical structures in divergent lines 
of    evolution1 #fb1 #fc1 #ge          
,pedagogical and social nature of       
negation1 #bhg-ig  ,pedagogy and the    
function of the intellect1 #afe         
,penetration1 reciprocal1 #afa-b4       
,see ,interpenetration  ,perception and 

action1 #d-e1 #aa1 #ab1 #ic1 #ahh1 #ahi1
 #bjf1 #bbf-g1 #bbh-i1    #cjj-a1 #cjf-g
   and becoming1 #agf-g1 #cjc-f         
cinematographical character of1 #bjf-g1 
#bdi1 #bea1 #cca-b   distinctness of1   
#bbf-g1 #bej   and geometry1 #bje1 #bcj 
in molluscs1 #ahh   and organization1   
#bbf-g   prolonged in intellect1 #afa-b1
 #bgc   reaction in1 #bfd   and         
recollection1 #ahj1 #aha   refracts     
reality1 #bjd1 #bch1 #cei-fj   rhythm   
of1 #bii-cjj1 #cja   and science1 #afh  
,permanence an illusion1 #bii-cja       
,peron1 #hj  ,perrier1 ,ed41 #bfj note  
,personality1 absolute reality of1 #bfi 
concentration of1 #bja1 #bjb   and      
matter1 #bfi1 #bgj   the object of      
intuition1 #bfh   tension of1 #aii1     
#bjj1 #bja  ,perthes1 ,boucher de1 #acg 
,phaedrus1 #aef note  ,phagocytes and   
external finality1 #db  ,phagocytosis   
and growing old1 #ah  ,phantom ideas and
 problems1 #agg1 #bgg1 #bhc1 #bif       
,philosophical explanation contrasted   
with scientific explanation1 #afh       

,philosophy and art1 #agf-g   and       
biology1 #dc-d1 #aid-f   and experience1
 #aig-h   function of #bi-cj1 #hd-e1    
#ic-d1 #afh1 #agc-d1 #aid-g1 #aih1 #bfh1
 #bfi1 #cfi-gj   history of1 #bch       
incompletely conscious of itself1       
#bjg-h1 #bji   individual mind in1 #aia 
and intellect1 ix-xv   intellect and    
intuition in1 #bch   of intuition1      
#agf-g1 #aia-d1 #aif1 #aig1 #bgg        
method of1 #aia-b1 #aid1 #aie1 #bci     
object of1 #bci   and the organism1     
#aie-f   and physics1 #aid1 #bjh   and  
psychology1 #aid1 #aif   and science1   
#age1 #aif-g1 #bjh1 #cde1 #cgj     ,see 
,ancient philosophy1 ,cosmology1        
,finalism1 ,mechanistic     philosophy1 
,metaphysics1 ,modern philosophy1       
,post-,kantian philosophy  ,phonograph  
illustrating unwinding cause1 #gc       
,phosphorescence1 consciousness compared
 to1 #bfb  ,photograph1 illustrating the
 nature of the intellectual view of     
reality1 #ca1 #cjd-e  ,photography1     
instantaneous1 illustrating the         

mechanism of the    intellect1 #cca-b1  
#ccc  ,physical existence1 as contrasted
 with logical1 #bgf1 #big-h1 #cbh1 #cfa 
laws1 their precise form artificial1    
#bah1 #bai1 #bbi1 #bdj-a   laws and the 
negative cosmic movement1 #bah          
operations the object of intelligence1  
#age1 #bej   order1 imitation of1 by the
 vital1 #bcj   science1 #agf-g          
,physicochemistry and organic           
destruction1 #bbf   and biology1 #be-f1 
#bi-cj1 #cd1 #ce1 #cf1 #ee1 #eg1 #ih1   
#aid  ,physics1 ancient1 logic spoiled1 
#cbj1 #cba-b   of ancient philosophy1   
#cae1 #cbj1 #cba-b1 #cee   of           
,aristotle1 #bbh note1 #cbd note1 #cca1 
#ccb   and deduction1 #bac   of         
,galileo1 #ceg1 #cfi-gj   and           
individuality of bodies1 #ahh1 #bjh   as
 inverted psychics1 #bjb   and logic1   
#cai-bj1 #cba   and metaphysics1 #aid1  
#bjh   and mutability1 #bde   success   
of1 #bah1 #bai  ,pigment-spot and       
adaptation1 #fj1 #fa1 #ga-c1 #gf-g   and
 heredity1 #hc1 #hd  ,pinguicula1       

certain animal characteristics of1 #ajg 
,plan1 motionless1 of action the object 
of intellect1 #aee1 #bih-i1 #cja-b1 #cjc
  ,planets1 life in other1 #bef  ,plants
 and animals in evolution1 #aje-ci1     
#adb-c1 #add1 #ade-f1 #adg1 #afh1       
#afi-gj1 #aha1 #ahb1 #ahc-d1 #ahe1 #bed1
 #bfg   complementarity of1 to animals1 
#ahc-d1 #ahe1 #bfg   consciousness of1  
#aji1 #aaa1 #aac1 #abj1 #abh-ce1 #adb-c1
 #add1 #aha1 #ahb1 #bib4     ,see       
,torpor1 ,sleep   function of1 #ajg-i1  
#aac1 #aad1 #aag1 #bdf1 #bdg1 #bed1 #bef
   function and structure in1 #fg1      
#gg-h1 #gi   individuation in1 #ab      
instinct in1 #agj1 #aga   and mobility1 
#ajh1 #aji1 #aaa-ac1 #aah-i1 #abi1 #acj1
 #ace-f   parallelism of evolution with 
animals1 #ei-fj1 #ajf-h1 #aaf           
supporters of all life1 #bga   variation
 of1 #he1 #hf  ,plasma1 continuity of   
germinative1 #be-f1 #db1 #gh-hc         
,plastic substances1 #bee  ,plato1 #di1 
#aef1 #aia1 #baj note1 #caf1 #cah1 #cai1
 #cbj1 #cba1 #cbg1 #ccj1 #cdg1 #cdi     

,platonic ideas1 #di1 #cae-f1 #cba1     
#cbb1 #cbg1 #ccj1 #ceb  ,plotinus1 #baj 
note1 #cad-e1 #cbc1 #cbd note1 #cdi1    
#ceb1 #cec  ,plurality1 confused1 of    
life1 #beg4     ,see ,interpenetration  
,poem1 sounds of1 distinct to           
perception2 the sense indivisible to    
intuition1 #bji   illustrating creation 
of matter1 #bdj1 #cai-bj  ,greek3       
poitikos1 nous1 of ,aristotle1 #cbb     
,polymorphism of ants1 bees1 and wasps1 
#adj   of insect societies1 #aeg        
,polyzoism1 #bfj  ,positive reality1    
#bjh1 #bab4 ,see ,reality  ,positivity1 
materiality an inversion or interruption
 of1 #bai1 #bdf1    #bdg-h1 #cai-bj     
,possible activity as a factor in       
consciousness1 #aa1 #ab1 #if1 #add1     
#ade1    #adf-g1 #aeh-i1 #afe1 #agi1    
#ahj1 #aha1 #ahi1 #bfd1 #cfh            
existence1 #bij1 #bie  ,post-,kantian   
philosophy1 #cfb1 #cfc  ,potential      
activity4 ,see ,possible activity       
genera1 #bbf   knowledge1 #adb-g1 #aej1 
#aff  ,potentiality1 life as an immense1

 #beh1 #bgj   zone of1 surrounding acts1
 #agi1 #ahj1 #aha1 #bfd4 ,see ,possible 
activity  ,powers of life1              
complementarity of1 xii1 xiii1 #bf1 #bg1
 #ea-e1 #ig-aje1 #aaj1    #aac1 #aaf-h1 
#aai1 #abf-g1 #aca-f1 #adj-c1 #agf1     
#agg1 #ahc1 #ahd1 #bdf1 #bed1 #bee1     
#beg1 #bff1 #bgj1 #cdc1 #cde  ,practical
 nature of perception and its           
prolongation in intellect and           
science1 #acg-da1 #aej1 #aic-d1 #aif1   
#aig1 #bjf1 #bjg-h1 #bah1 #bdg-h1 #bgc1 
#bha1 #cje1 #cjf-g1 #cbh1 #cbi          
,prestablished harmony1 #bje-f1 #bjg    
,present1 creation of1 by past1 #e1     
#bj-c1 #bf-g1 #afg1 #aii-bjb            
,prevision4 ,see ,foreseeing  ,primacy  
of nervous system1 #abj-f1 #beb         
,primary instinct1 #ach-i1 #afh         
,primitive organisms1 ambiguous forms   
of1 #ii1 #aab1 #aac1 #aaf1 #abi1 #acj   
,procession in ,alexandrian philosophy1 
#cbc  ,progress1 adaptation and1 #aja   
ff4   evolutionary1 #ej1 #acc1 #acd1    
#ach1 #ada-b1 #agc-d1 #age1 #ahe1       

#bfd-e1 #bff  ,prose and verse1         
illustrating the two kinds of orders1   
#bba1 #bcb  ,protophytes1 colonizing of1
 #bei  ,protoplasm1 circulation of1     
#cb-c1 #ajh   and senescence1 #ah1 #ai  
imitation of1 #cb-c1 #ce   primitive1   
and the nervous system1 #abd1 #abf-g    
of primitive organisms1 #ii1 #ajh1 #aji 
and the vital principle1 #db-c          
,protozoa1 association of1 #bei-fa      
ageing of1 #af   of ambiguous form1 #aab
   and individuation1 #ad1 #bei-fa      
mechanical explanation of movements of1 
#cc   and nervous system1 #abf          
reproduction of1 #ad  ,pseudo-ideas and 
problems1 #agg1 #bgg1 #bhc1 #bif        
,pseudoneuroptera1 division of labor    
among1 #adj  ,greek3 pschn of           
,aristotle1 #cej   of ,plotinus1 #baj   
note  ,psychic activity1 twofold nature 
of1 #acf1 #adj-a1 #adb-c   life1        
continuity of1 #a-aa1 #bi-cj  ,psychical
 existence contrasted with logical1     
#bgf1 #big-h1 #cbg-h1 #cfa   nature of  
life1 #beg  ,psychics inverted physics1 

#bja1 #bjb4     ,see ,inverse relation  
of the physical and psychical           
,psychology and deduction1 #bab-c   and 
the genesis of intellect1 #ahg1 #aid1   
#aie-f1 #aig   intuitional cosmology as 
reversed1 #bjh-i  ,psycho-physiological 
parallelism1 #ahj1 #cej1 #cea1 #cee1    
#cef  ,puberty1 illustrating crises in  
evolution1 #ai1 #cbj-a   ,qualitative1  
evolutionary and extensive becoming1    
#cac   motion1 #cjb-c1 #cjd1 #caa       
,qualities1 acts1 forms1 the classes of 
representation1 #cjc1 #cad   bodies as  
bundles of1 #cjj-a   coincidence of1    
#cji   and movements1 #bii-cjj   and    
natural geometry1 #baa   superimposition
 of1 in induction1 #baf  ,quality is    
change1 #bii-cjj   in ,eleatic          
philosophy1 #cad-e   and quantity in    
ancient philosophy1 #cbc-d   and        
quantity in modern philosophy1 #cej     
and rhythm1 #cjj-b  ,quaternary         
substances1 #aba  ,quinton1 ,ren1 #acd  
note   ,radius-vector1 ,heliocentric1 in
 ,kepler's laws1 #ccd  ,rank1           

evolutionary1 #ej1 #acc-e1 #agc-d1 #bfe 
,reaction1 rle of1 in perception1 #bbf-g
  ,ready-made categories1 x1 xiv1 #dh1  
#bcg1 #bej1 #bea1 #bgc1 #caa1 #cba1     
#cbi1 #ced1 #cei  ,real activity as     
distinguished from possible1 #ade       
common-sense is continuous experience of
 the1 #bac   continuity of the1 #cjb1   
#cbi   dichotomy of the1 in modern      
philosophy1 #cdi   imitation of the1 by 
intelligence1 #ij1 #bjd1 #beh1 #bgj1    
#cjg1 #cee   obliteration of outlines in
 the1 #aa-b1 #ahh1 #ahi1 #bjg-h         
representation of the1 by science1      
#bjc-d  ,realism1 ancient1 #bca-b       
,realists and idealists alike assume    
possibility of absence of order1        
#bbj1 #bca-b  ,reality1 absolute1 #aih1 
#bbh-i1 #bcj1 #bfi1 #cei-fj1 #cfa   as  
action1 #dg1 #aia-b1 #aid-e1 #bdi       
degrees of1 #cbc1 #cbg   in dogmatic    
metaphysics1 #aif   double form of1     
#agi-hj1 #baf1 #bcj-a1 #bcf   as        
duration1 #aa-b1 #bag1 #bgb   as flux1  
#afe1 #bej1 #bea1 #bid1 #ccg1 #cch1 #cdb

   and the frames of the intellect1     
#cfc-d1 #cfe4     ,see ,frames of the   
understanding   as freedom1 #bdg   of   
genera in ancient philosophy1 #bbf-g    
is growth1 #bci   imitation of1 by the  
intellect1 #hi-ij1 #cfe   and the       
intellect1 #eb1 #hi-ij1 #aec1 #aia1     
#aib1 #cad-e1 #cee-f   intelligible1 in 
ancient philosophy1 #cag   knowledge of1
 #cjg-h1 #cag1 #ceh-i   and mechanism1  
#cea1 #ced-e   as movement1 #ij1 #aee1  
#cja-b1 #cab   and not-being1 #bgf1     
#bhj1 #bhe   of the person1 #bfi        
refraction of1 through the forms of     
perception1 #bjd1 #bch1 #cei-fj   and   
science1 #aid1 #aif1 #aih1 #aii1 #bjc-d1
 #bjf-h1 #ced1 #ceg   sensible1 in      
ancient philosophy1 #cad1 #cag1 #cba1   
#cbg1 #cbh1 #ceb   symbol of1 xi1 #cj-a1
 #ga1 #hh-i1 #ic-d1 #aie-f1 #aig1 #bji1 
#bdj1 #cdb1    #cfj-a1 #cfi             
undefinable conceptually1 #ac1 #di      
unknowable in ,kant1 #bje   unknowable  
in ,spencer1 xi   views of1 #cj-a1 #ga1 
#hd1 #hh1 #aii1 #bja1 #bjf-g1 #bbe-f1   

#bdi1 #beh1 #bgc1    #cjj-g1 #caa1 #cad1
 #cca-b1 #cdb1 #cea1 #ceb  ,reason and  
life1 #g1 #h1 #dh1 #afa   cannot        
transcend itself1 #aic-d  ,reasoning and
 acting1 #aib-c   and experience1 #bjc-d
   and matter1 #bjd-e1 #bjh-i   on      
matter and life1 #g1 #h  ,recollection1 
dependence of1 on special circumstances1
 #afg1 #ahj   in the dream1 #bjb1 #bjg-h
   and perception1 #ahj1 #aha           
,recommencing1 continual1 of the present
 in the state of relaxation1 #bja       
,recomposing1 decomposing and1 the      
characteristic powers of intellect1     
#aeg1 #bea  ,record1 false comparison of
 memory with1 #e  ,reflection1 #aeh-i   
,reflex activity1 #aaj   compound1      
#agc-d1 #age-f  ,refraction of the idea 
through matter or non-being1 #caf-g   of
 reality through forms of perception1   
#bjd1 #bch1 #cei-fj  ,regeneration and  
individuality1 #ac1 #ad  ,register of   
time1 #af1 #bj1 #cg  ,reinke1 #db note  
,relation1 imprint of relations and laws
 upon consciousness1 #ahh   as law1     

#bbi1 #bcj-a   and thing1 #adg-eb1      
#aef-g1 #afj1 #afa1 #ahg1 #bjb1 #ceb1   
#ceg  ,relativism1 epistemological1     
#aif1 #aig1 #bcj  ,relativity of        
immobility1 #aee   of the intellect1 xi1
 #dh-i1 #aeb1 #aec1 #ahg1 #aie-f1       
#aig-h1 #aii1 #bai1    #bgc1 #cjf-g1    
#cfj-a   of knowledge1 #aeb1 #aia1 #bcj 
of perception1 #bbf-g1 #bbh1 #cjj-a     
,relaxation in the dream state1 #bja1   
#bji-aj   and extension1 #bja1 #bjg-h1  
#bji1 #baj1 #bab1 #bah1 #bbc1 #bde   and
 intellect1 #bjj1 #bjg-h1 #bji1 #bab1   
#bah   logic a1 of virtual geometry1    
#bab   matter a1 of unextended into     
extended1 #bah   memory vanishes in     
complete1 #bjj   necessity as1 of       
freedom1 #bah   present continually     
recommences in the state of relaxation1 
#bjj   will vanishes in complete1 #bjj1 
#bjg-h     ,see ,tension  ,releasing    
cause1 #gc1 #gd1 #aae1 #aah-i1 #abj     
,repetition and generalization1 #bcj-a1 
#bcb   and fabrication1 #dd-e1 #df1     
#aee-h   and intellect1 #aef-g1 #aii1   

#bad-f   of states1 #e-f1 #g-h1 #bh-i1  
#cj1 #cf1 #de-f1 #dg   in the vital and 
in the mathematical order1 #bbe1 #bbf1  
#bcj1 #bca  ,representation and action1 
#adc-d1 #ade1 #ahj   classes of3        
qualities1 forms1 acts1 #cjb-c1 #cad    
and consciousness1 #adc-d   of motion1  
#aei-fj1 #cjc-d1 #cje1 #cjf-g1 #cjh1    
#cac1 #cae1 #cdd-e   of the ,nought1    
#bgc-hj1 #bha-d1 #bhi-cag1 #cbg         
,represented or internalized action     
distinguished from externalized         
action1 #add-g1 #aeh-i1 #afe            
,reproduction and individuation1 #ac1   
#ad  ,resemblance4 ,see ,similarity     
,reservoir1 organism a1 of energy1 #aae1
 #aaf1 #abe-f1 #bde1 #bdf1 #bed  ,rest  
and motion in ,zeno1 #cjh-ab            
,retrogression in evolution1 #acc1 #acd 
,retrospection the function of          
intellect1 #dg-h1 #bcg  ,reversed       
psychology3 intuitional cosmology1 #bjh 
,rhizocephala and animal mobility1 #aaa 
,rhumbler1 #cd note  ,rhythm of         
duration1 #aa-b1 #abg-h1 #cjj-a1 #cde-g 

intelligence adopts the1 of action1     
#cje-f   of perception1 #bii-cjj1 #cja  
and quality1 #cja   scanning the1 of the
 universe the function of science1      
#cdf-g   of science must coincide with  
that of action1 #cbj   of the universe  
untranslatable into scientific formulae1
 #ccg  ,rings of arthropods1 #acb-c     
,ripening1 creative evolution as1 #dg-h1
 #cdj-a  ,romanes1 #aci  ,roule1 #bg    
note  ,roy 7,le71 ,ed41 #bah note       
,salamandra maculata1 vision in1 #ge    
,salensky1 #ge note  ,same1 function of 
intellect connecting same with same1    
#aii-bjj1 #bcc1 #bgj  ,samter and       
,heymons1 #gb note  ,saporta 7,de71 #aab
 note  ,savage's sense of distance and  
direction1 #bab  ,skepticism or         
dogmatism the dilemma of any systematic 
metaphysics1    #aie-f1 #aig1 #bcj-a    
,schisms in the primitive impulsion of  
life1 #bed-e1 #beg4     ,see ,divergent 
lines of evolution  ,scholasticism1 #cgj
  ,science and action1 #ic1 #aie1 #aih1 
#cbh-i   ancient1 and modern1 #cbi-cg1  

#cdb-e1 #ceg   astronomy1 ancient and   
modern1 #ccd-e1 #ccf   cartesian        
geometry and ancient geometry1 #ccc-d   
cinematographical character of modern1  
#cbi1 #ccj1 #ccf-g1 #cdj-a1 #cdb1 #cde-h
   conventionality of a certain aspect  
of1 #bjf-g   and deduction1 #bab-c   and
 discontinuity1 #afa-b   function of1   
#ib1 #afg-h1 #agc-d1 #agf-g1 #aic-d1    
#aie-f1 #aih-i1 #cbh-i1 #cdf-g          
,galileo's influence on modern1 #ccc-d1 
#cce   and instinct1 #afi1 #agj1 #agc-d1
 #age1 #aic-e   and intelligence1 #agf1 
#agg1 #aic-f   ,kepler's influence on   
modern1 #ccd   and matter1 #aid-e1      
#bjf-g1 #bjh   modern4 ,see ,modern     
science   object of1 #aie-f1 #bbj1 #bba1
 #bea1 #bgj-a1 #bgc1 #bif-h1 #cjf-g1    
#cbh-i1    #ccb-c1 #cce-f1 #cdg-h   and 
perception1 #afh   and philosophy1      
#age-f1 #aif-g1 #bjh-i1 #cdd1 #cgj      
physical4 ,see ,physics and reality4    
,see ,reality and science   and time1   
#h-ac1 #bj1 #cce-h   unity of1 #aie-f1  
#aig1 #bbh-i1 #bcj1 #cba-b1 #cbc1       

#cdd-e1 #cdg-h1 #cdi1 #ced1    #cee-f1  
#cei-fj1 #cfb-c  ,scientific concepts1  
#cch-dj   explanation and philosophical 
explanation1 #afh   formulae1 #ccg      
geometry1 #afa1 #baa   knowledge1       
#aic-d1 #aif-g1 #aih1 #aii1 #bjg1 #bjh1 
#bah  ,sclerosis and ageing1 #ai        
,scolia1 paralyzing instinct in1 #agb   
,scope of action indefinitely extended  
by intelligent instruments1 #ada   of   
,galileo's physics1 #ceg1 #cgj  ,scott1 
#fc note  ,sea-urchin and individuality1
 #ac  ,sailles1 #bi note  ,secondary    
instincts1 #aci1 #afh  ,sectioning of   
becoming in the philosophy of ideas1    
#cag-h   of matter by perception1       
#bjf-g1 #bdi1 #bea  ,sedgwick1 #bfj note
  ,seeing and willing1 coincidence of1  
in intuition1 #bcg  ,selection1 natural1
 #ed1 #ef-g1 #ei-fj1 #fa-b1 #fc1 #fd1   
#fh1 #ie-f1 #afi1 #agj  ,self1          
coincidence of1 with1 #aii   existence  
of1 means change1 #a ff4   knowledge of1
 #a ff4  ,senescence1 #ae-bc1 #bf-g1    
#db-c  ,sensation and space1 #bjb       

,sense-perception4 ,see ,perception     
,sensible flux1 #caf-g1 #cah1 #cba1     
#cbb1 #cbg1 #cdc1 #cde   intuition and  
ultra-intellectual1 #cfj-a   object1    
apogee of1 #cdb-c1 #cdd-e1 #cdi         
reality1 #cad1 #cag1 #cai1 #cbg1 #cbh1  
#ceb  ,sensibility1 forms of1 #cfa      
,sensitive plant1 in illustration of    
mobility in plants1 #aji  ,sensori-motor
 system4 ,see ,nervous system  ,sensuous
 manifold1 #bje1 #bba1 #bcb1 #bce1 #bcf 
,sentiment1 poetic1 in illustration of  
individuation1 #beh1 #bei  ,serkovski1  
#bei note  ,serpula1 in illustration of 
identical evolution in divergent lines1 
#if  ,sexual cells1 #ad1 #bf1 #bg1      
#gi-ha  ,sexuality parallel in plants   
and animals1 #eh-fj1 #aai-ba  ,shaler1  
,n4,s41 #acc note1 #ahd note  ,sheath1  
calcareous1 in illustration of animal   
tendency to mobility1 #acj-a  ,signs1   
function of1 #aeh1 #aei1 #afj   the     
instrument of science1 #cbi-cj          
,sigwart1 #bhg note  ,silurian epoch1   
failure of certain species to evolve    

since1 #ajb  ,similarity among          
individuals of same species the type of 
generality1    #bbd-f1 #bbh-i1 #bcj-a   
and mechanical causality1 #dd1 #de      
,simultaneity1 to measure time is merely
 to count simultaneities1 #i1    #ccf1  
#ccg1 #cda  ,sinuousness of evolution1  
#ga1 #ih1 #ajb1 #bab-c  ,sitaris1       
unconscious knowledge of1 #adf1 #adg    
,situation and magnitude1 problems of1  
#baa  ,sketching movements1 function of 
consciousness1 #bjg-h  ,sleep1 #abi-ca1 
#ace1 #aha  ,snapshot1 in illustration  
of intellectual representation of       
motion1    #cje1 #cjf1 #cac1 #cae1 #cdd 
,see ,view of reality1                  
,cinematographical character1 etc4      
form defined as a1 of transition1       
#cja-b1 #cag1 #cah1 #cba-b1 #cde        
,social instinct1 #aja1 #adj1 #aeh1     
#aga-b   life1 #ach1 #adj1 #aeh1 #bfe   
and pedagogical character of negation1  
#bhg-ig  ,societies1 #aja1 #aca-b1 #aeh1
 #aga-b1 #bei  ,society and the         
individual1 #bfj1 #bfe  ,solar energy   

stored by plants1 released by animals1  
#bdf1 #bed   systems1 #bda-d1 #bdf note1
 #bef1 #bgj   systems1 life in other1   
#bef  ,solid1 concepts analogous to     
solids1 ix   intellect as a solid       
nucleus1 #aic1 #aid   the material of   
construction and the object of the      
intellect1 #aec1    #aed1 #afa1 #afb1   
#bea  ,solidarity between brain and     
consciousness1 #ahj1 #bfb   of the parts
 of matter1 #bjc1 #bjg-h1 #bda1 #bga    
,solidification operated by the         
understanding1 #bdi  ,greek3 sma in     
,aristotle1 #cej  ,somnambulism and     
consciousness1 #add1 #ade1 #aei  ,soul  
and body1 #cej   and cell1 #bfi         
creation of1 #bgj  ,space and action1   
#bjc   in ancient philosophy1 #cah1 #cai
   and concepts1 #afj-a1 #afc1 #agd-e1  
#agf-g1 #ahh-i1 #beg-i   geometrical1   
#bjc   homogeneity of1 #aef1 #bab   and 
induction1 #baf   in ,kant's philosophy1
 #bje1 #bjf1 #bjg1 #bdd   in ,leibniz's 
philosophy1 #cea   and matter1 #ahi1    
#bjb-ac1 #bdd1 #beg1 #bfd1 #cfa-b1 #cfh 

and time in ,kant's philosophy1 #bje-f  
unity and multiplicity determinations   
of1 #ceg-i     ,see ,extension          
,spatiality atmosphere of1 bathing      
intelligence1 #bje   degradation of the 
extra-spatial1 #bjg   and distinctness1 
#bjc1 #bjg1 #bdd1 #bej1 #beg-i   and    
geometrical space1 #bjc1 #baa1 #bac1    
#bah   and mathematical order1 #bjh1    
#bji  ,special instincts and            
environment1 #ach1 #afh1 #aib-c1 #aid   
and recollections1 #afg1 #afh1 #ahj   as
 variations on a theme1 #afg1 #agb1 #bfd
  ,species1 articulate1 #acc   evolution
 of1 #bdg1 #bee1 #bfi   and external    
finality1 #abh-i1 #acj-a1 #acb1 #bff    
fossil1 #ajb   human1 as goal of        
evolution1 #bff1 #bfg   human1 styled   
homo faber1 #aci   and instinct1 #adj1  
#afg1 #agj-b1 #bfd   and life1 #afg     
similarity within1 #bbc-f1 #bbh-i1      
#bcj-a  ,speculation1 dead-locks in1    
xii1 #aee1 #aef1 #cab1 #cac-d   object  
of philosophy1 #dd1 #aeb1 #aif1 #aih1   
#bbj1 #bbe-f1 #bbg1 #bea1 #bgj-a1       

#bgc1 #big-h1 #cjf-g1 #cag1 #cdg-h      
,spencer1 ,herbert1 xi1 xiv1 #gh-i1     
#aec1 #ahh1 #ahi1 #aij1 #cfd1 #cfe      
,spencer's evolutionism1 correspondence 
between mind and matter in1 #cfh        
cosmogony in1 #ahh   imprint of         
relations and laws upon consciousness   
in1 #ahh   matter in1 #cfe1 #cfg   mind 
in1 #cfe1 #cfg  ,spheres1 concentric1 in
 ,aristotle's philosophy1 #cbh  ,sphex1 
paralyzing instinct in1 #agb-e  ,spiders
 and paralyzing hymenoptera1 #agb       
,spinal cord1 #aaj  ,spinoza1 the       
adequate and the inadequate1 #cec       
cause1 #bgg   dogmatism1 #cef1 #ceg     
eternity1 #cec   extension1 #cej   ,god1
 #cea1 #ceg   intuitionism1 #cdg        
mechanism1 #cdh1 #ceb1 #cee1 #cef       
time1 #cfb  ,spirit1 #bea1 #bfi1 #bgj   
,spirituality and materiality1 #abh-i1  
#bja-c1 #caf-g1 #bjh-i1 #baj-a1 #bab-c1 
#bag1 #bah1 #bai1 #bbb-c1 #bcg1 #bch1   
#bde1 #bdg-h1 #bdi1 #bea1 #bed1 #bef1   
#beg1    #bei1 #bfa1 #bfg1 #bgj-a1 #bgb1
 #bgf1 #cdc  ,spontaneity of life1 #hf1 

#bcg4 ,see ,freedom   and mechanism1 #dj
   in vegetables1 #aji   and the willed 
order1 #bbd  ,sport 7biol471 #fc        
,starch1 in the function of vegetable   
kingdom1 #aad  ,states of becoming1 #a1 
#ac1 #afc1 #bdg-h1 #bii1 #cjj1 #cjg     
,static character of the intellect1     
#aee-f1 #afc1 #bgd1 #bih   views of     
becoming1 #bgc  ,stehasny1 #abd note    
,steam-engine and bronze1 parallel as   
epoch-marking1 #ach-i  ,stentor and     
individuality1 #bfj  ,stoics1 #caf      
,storing of solar energy by plants1     
#bdf1 #bec-f  ,strain of bow and        
indivisibility of motion1 #cjh  ,stream1
 duration as a1 #ci1 #cch  ,structure   
and function4 ,see ,function and        
structure   identical1 in divergent     
lines of evolution1 #ee1 #fj1 #fa-b1    
#fc1 #fi1 #gc-d1    #ge1 #gf-g1 #hc1    
#hf1 #hg1 #aah-i  ,subject and          
attribute1 #adg-h  ,substance1          
albuminoid1 #abj-a   continuity of      
living1 #afb   organic1 #aba1 #aca1     
#adj1 #adb1 #adi1 #afb-c1 #aie-g note1  

#bee1 #bfg   in ,spinoza's philosophy1  
#cej   ternary substances1 #aba         
,substantives1 adjectives1 verbs1       
correspond to the three classes of      
representation1 #cjb-d  ,substitution   
essential to representation of the      
,nought1 #bha1 #bhc-d1    #bhi-ij1 #bia1
 #bid1 #bif  ,success of physics1 #bah1 
#bai-bj   and superiority1 #acc1 #bfd-e 
,succession in time1 #aj1 #cci1 #cdj1   
#cda1 #cde4 ,cf4 ,juxtaposition         
,successors of ,kant1 #cfc1 #cfd        
,sudden mutations1 #bh1 #fb-c1 #fd-e1   
#fh-i  ,sun1 #aae1 #bda1 #cbc           
,superaddition of existence upon        
nothingness1 #bgf   of order upon       
disorder1 #bcf1 #bge  ,superimposition4 
,see ,measurement of qualities1 in      
induction1 #baf  ,superiority1          
evolutionary1 #acc-e1 #agc1 #agd-e      
,superman1 #bfg  ,supraconsciousness1   
#bfa  ,survival of the fit1 #afi4       
,see ,natural selection  ,swim1 learning
 to1 as instinctive learning1 #aic1 #aid
  ,symbol1 the concept is a1 #afa1 #bji1

 #cda-b   of reality1 xi1 #cj-a1 #ga1   
#hh-i1 #ic1 #aie-f1 #baj1 #bdj1 #cdb1   
#cfj-a1 #cfi-gj  ,symbolic knowledge of 
life1 #aii1 #cdb1 #cfj  ,symbolism1     
#agf1 #ahj1 #cfj  ,sympathetic or       
intuitive knowledge1 #bji1 #baj1 #cdb   
,sympathy1 instinct is1 #afd1 #afh1     
#agb-h1 #cdb-c4     ,see ,divination1   
,feeling1 ,inspiration  ,systematic     
metaphysics1 dilemma of1 #aie1 #aif1    
#bcj-a   contrasted with intuitional1   
#aia-b1 #aic-d1 #bch1 #bfi1 #bgj1 #bgg1 
#cdf-h   postulate of1 #aij1 #aie       
,systematization of physics1 ,liebniz's 
philosophy1 #cdg  ,systems1 isolated1   
#i-ac1 #bjc1 #bad1 #bae1 #bda1 #bdb1    
#cdb1 #cdg-i   ,tangent and curve1      
analogy with deduction and the moral    
sphere1 #bad   analogy with             
physico-chemistry and life1 #ca         
,tarakevitch1 #abd note  ,teleology4    
,see ,finalism  ,tendency1 antagonistic 
tendencies of life1 #ac1 #ih1 #ajc1     
#aac1 #ace1 #aej   antagonistic         
tendencies in development of nervous    

system1 #abd-e   complementary          
tendencies of life1 #ea1 #ajc1 #ace1    
#aej1 #afh1 #bdf   to dissociation1 #bfj
   divergent tendencies of life1 #ed1   
#hi1 #ii1 #aja1 #ajg-h1 #aji-aj1 #aab1  
#aaf-h1 #acd1 #ace1 #aej1 #aha1 #bdf1   
#bed-h   to individuation1 #ac   life a 
tendency to act on inert matter1 #if    
toward mobility in animals1 #aji1 #aaj1 
#aac1 #abg-h1 #abi-cc1 #ace1 #aha1 #ahb 
the past exists in present tendency1 #e 
to reproduce1 #ac   of species to       
change1 #he-hf   mathematical symbols of
 tendencies1 #bb1 #bc   toward systems1 
in matter1 #aj   transmission of1 #hj-a 
a vital property is a1 #ac  ,tension and
 extension1 #bcf1 #bde   and freedom1   
#bjj-b1 #bjg-h1 #bbc1 #bcg1 #bci1 #cjj-b
   matter the inversion of vital1 #bci  
of personality1 #aii-bjj1 #bja1 #bjg-h1 
#bcg1 #bci1 #cjj  ,ternary substances1  
#aba  ,theology consequent upon         
philosophy of ideas1 #caf  ,theoretic   
fallacies1 #bfc1 #bfd   knowledge and   
instinct1 #agg1 #bfh   knowledge and    

intellect1 #aee1 #agg1 #agi1 #bch1 #bgj1
 #cdb1 #cdc  ,theorizing not the        
original function of the intellect1     
#aed-e  ,theory of knowledge1 xiii1     
#agh1 #ahj1 #ahd-e1 #aig1 #bjd1 #bjg-h1 
#bji1    #bbh-i1 #bca   of life1 xiii1  
#agh1 #ahj1 #aig  ,thermodynamics1      
#bda-b4     ,see ,conservation of       
energy1 ,degradation of energy  ,thesis 
and antithesis1 #bje  ,thing as         
distinguished from motion1 #ahg1 #bjb1  
#bdg-h1 #bdi1 #bii-cjj   as             
distinguished from relation1 #adg1 #adh1
 #aej1 #aeb1 #aeh-i1 #aei-fj1    #afa1  
#ahg1 #bjb1 #ceb1 #cef-g   and mind1    
#bjf   as solidification operated by    
understanding1 #bdi  ,thing-in-itself1  
#bje1 #bjf1 #bcj-a1 #cab  ,timaeus1 #cah
 note  ,time and the absolute1 #bdj1    
#bda1 #big-h1 #cci1 #cdc-d   abstract1  
#ba1 #bb1 #cg1 #ci   articulations of   
real1 #cca-c   as force1 #af1 #de-f1    
#dg1 #ea1 #ajc1 #cci   homogeneous1 #ag1
 #ah1 #afc-d1 #cca-c   as independent   
variable1 #bj1 #cce-g   interval of1 #i1

 #bb1 #bc   as invention1 #cda-b   in   
,leibniz's philosophy1 #cea1 #ceb1 #cfb 
and logic1 #d1 #bgg   and simultaneity1 
#i1 #ccf1 #ccg1 #cda   in modern science
 #cba-cg1 #cda-e   and space in ,kant1  
#bje   and space in ancient philosophy1 
#cah1 #cai4     ,see ,duration  ,tools  
and intellect1 #acg-da1 #aej-a4     ,see
 ,implement  ,torpor1 in evolution1     
#aji1 #aaa1 #aac1 #aad note1 #abj1      
#abh-ce1 #aha1 #bib  ,tortoise1         
,achilles and the1 in ,zeno1 #caa       
,touch1 science expresses all perception
 as touch1 #afh   is to vision as       
intelligence to instinct1 #afi  ,track  
laid by motion along its course1        
#cji-ab1 #ccg  ,transcendental          
,aesthetic1 #bjc  ,transformation1 #cb1 
#gb1 #gc1 #aca1 #bca1 #bfc              
,transformism1 #bc-e  ,transition1 form 
a snapshot view of1 #cja-b1 #caf-g1     
#cah1 #cba1 #cdd-e  ,transmissibility of
 acquired characters1 #ge-hd1 #hg1 #afh1
 #afi1 #agb-c1    #bbe-f1 #bcj-a        
,transmission of the vital impetus1 #bf1

 #bg1 #gi1 #he1 #hg1 #hh1 #ic-d1 #aaj1  
#abf-g1 #abh1 #bcj1 #bca1 #bdf1 #bee1   
#bef1 #beg1 #bei1 #bgj  ,trigger-action 
of motor mechanisms1 #bgb  ,triton1     
,regeneration in1 #ge  ,tropism and     
psychical activity1 #ce note  ,truth    
seized in intuition1 #cah-bj            
,unconscious effort1 #agj   instinct1   
#adb-c1 #add1 #ade-f1 #adg1 #aff        
knowledge1 #ade-h1 #aej-a               
,unconsciousness1 two kinds of1 #add    
,undefinable1 reality1 #ac1 #dh         
,understanding1 absoluteness of1 #aec-d1
 #aij-a1 #aig-h1 #aii1 #bjj   and       
action1 ix1 xi1 #agi   genesis of the1  
ix-xv1 #di1 #ahi1 #bjg-h1 #beg-i1 #cei1 
#cfa-b   and geometry1 ix1 xii   and    
innateness of categories1 #adg1 #adh-i  
and intuition1 #df-g   and life1 ix-xv1 
#ac1 #cb-c1 #df-ej1 #hh-i1 #aja1 #adg-h1
 #adi1 #aeb1 #afb-e1    #agc-d1 #agf-g1 
#agh1 #aie-bja1 #bac1 #bbj1 #bbb-c1     
#bbd1 #bbf1 #beg-i1 #bfa1    #bff1 #bgj1
 #bga1 #cac1 #cfa-b1 #cfe   and inert   
matter1 #aff1 #afh1 #agi1 #aid-e1 #aih1 

#bje-f1 #bjg1 #bai1 #cee   and the      
ready-made1 xiii1 #dh1 #bcg1 #bej1 #bea1
 #bgc1 #caa1 #cba1 #cbh-i1    #ced1 #ceh
   and the solid1 ix   unlimited scope  
of the1 #adi1 #aej1 #aeb     ,see       
,intellect1 ,intelligence1 ,concept1    
,categories1 ,frames     of the         
understanding1 ,logic  ,undone1         
automatic and determinate evolution is  
action being1 #bdi  ,unfolding cause1   
#gc1 #gd  ,unforeseeableness of action1 
#dg   of duration1 #f1 #afd1 #cdj-b   of
 evolution1 #dg1 #dh1 #eb1 #hf1 #bbd    
of invention1 #afd   of life1 #afd1 #ahd
   and the willed order1 #bbd1 #cdb-c   
,see ,foreseeing  ,unification as the   
function of the intellect1 #aeb1 #aed1  
#ceg-h  ,uniqueness of phases of        
duration1 #afd  ,unity of extension1    
#aed   of knowledge1 #aie-f   of life1  
#ajf-g1 #bej1 #bfh1 #bga   of mental    
life1 #bfh   and multiplicity as        
determinations of space1 #cea-c   of    
nature1 #ajd-e1 #ahi-ij1 #aia1 #aie-f1  
#aig1 #aii1 #cbb1 #ceb1 #cef-h   of the 

organism1 #agf-g   of science1 #aie-f1  
#aig1 #bbh-i1 #bcj1 #cba1 #cbb1 #cdd-e1 
#cdg1 #cei-fj1 #cfb-c  ,universal       
interaction1 #ahh1 #ahi   life1         
consciousness coextensive with1 #ahf1   
#beg1 #bgj  ,universe1 continuity of1   
#cdf   ,descartes's1 #cdf   physical1   
and the idea of disorder1 #bcc1 #bge    
duration of1 #aj1 #aa1 #bda   evolution 
of1 #bda1 #bdf note   growth of1 #cdb-c1
 #cdd   movement of1 in ,aristotle1 #cbc
   mutability of1 #bdd1 #bde   as       
organism1 #ca1 #bda   as realization of 
plan1 #dj   rhythm of1 #ccg1 #cci1      
#cdf-g   states of1 considered by       
science1 #ccf1 #ccg   as unification of 
physics1 #cdh-i1 #ceg  ,unknowable1 the1
 of evolutionism1 xi   the1 in ,kant1   
#bjd1 #bje1 #bjf  ,unmaking1 the nature 
of the process of materiality1 #bde1    
#bdh1 #bdi1    #bea1 #bgb1 #cdb-c       
,unorganized bodies1 #g-h1 #ad1 #bj1    
#ba1 #ahf4     ,see inert matter        
instruments1 #acg-i1 #adj-a1 #aej-a     
matter1 cleft between1 and the          

organized1 #aij1 #aia1 #aif1 #aig-i     
matter1 imitation of the organized by1  
#cc-d1 #ce1 #cf   matter and science1   
#aid-f   matter4 ,see inert matter      
,unwinding cause1 #gc   of immutability 
in ,greek philosophy1 #cbe1 #ceb        
,upspringing of invention1 #afd         
,utility1 #d-e1 #aej1 #aeb1 #aed-e1     
#aeh-i1 #afj1 #afh1 #ahg1 #aie-f1       
#bdg-h1    #big-h1 #cbh-i1 #ccj         
,vanessa levana and ,vanessa prorsa1    
transformation of1 #gb  ,variable1 time 
as an independent1 #bj1 #ccf            
,variation1 accidental1 #ee1 #fc-d1 #fh1
 #he1 #afh-i   of color1 in lizards1    
#gb1 #gd   by deviation1 #hb-c1 #hd   of
 evolutionary type1 #bc-d1 #gb note1    
#aca-b1 #acg-h1 #afg1 #afi1 #aga-b1 #bfd
   insensible1 #fc1 #fh   interest as   
cause of1 #aca-b   in plants1 #he-hf    
,vegetable kingdom4 ,see ,plants  ,verb1
 relation expressed by1 #adh  ,verbs1   
substantives and adjectives1 #cjc       
,verse and prose1 in illustration of the
 two kinds of order1 #bba1 #bcb         

,vertebrate1 ix1 #abf1 #acj1 #aca-d1    
#ada  ,vibrations1 matter analyzed into 
elementary1 #bja  ,vicious circle1      
apparent1 of intuitionism1 #aib-d1      
#aif-g   of intellectualism1 #aid1 #aig1
 #cah-i1 #cbj  ,view1 intellectual1 of  
becoming1 #d1 #ij-a1 #bgc1 #bih-i1 #cjd1
 #cje1 #caj1 #cbf-g   intellectual1 of  
matter1 #bjc1 #bdj1 #bej1 #bed1 #bee    
of reality1 #bjf  ,vignon1 ,p41 #ce note
  ,virtual actions1 #ab4     ,see       
,possible action   geometry1 #bab       
,vise1 consciousness compressed in a1   
#agi  ,vision of ,god1 in ,alexandrian  
philosophy1 #cbb   in molluscs4 ,see    
,eye of molluscs1 etc4   in ,salamandra 
maculata1 #ge  ,vital activity1 #acd-f1 
#aci1 #adj1 #aff-i1 #bdf1 #bdg-h        
current1 #bf1 #bg1 #ec-e1 #hj1 #he1 #hg1
 #hh1 #if-aje1 #aah-i1 #abj1 #bcj-a1    
#bcb1 #bci1 #beg1 #bff1 #bgj   impetus1 
#ej-a1 #ec-e1 #he1 #hg1 #hh1 #ih-aje1   
#aah-i1 #abf-g1 #abh1 #aca-b1    #ada-b1
 #adh-i1 #aej1 #bah1 #bcj-a1 #bcb1      
#bdg-h1 #bej1 #beb1 #bed-e1 #bfa        

order1 cause in1 #cd1 #ce1 #id-e1 #afd  
order1 finality and1 #bbc-e1 #bbf       
order1 generalization in the1 and in the
 mathematical order contrasted1    #bbe1
 #bbf1 #bcj-a   order1 and the          
geometrical order1 #bbb-c1 #bbe1 #bbf1  
#bcj1 #bca1 #bce1    #bcf1 #ccj-a       
order1 imitation of physical order by   
vital1 #bcj   principle1 #db1 #dc1 #bbe1
 #bbf   order1 repetition in the vital  
and the mathematical orders contrasted1 
#bbe1 #bbf1 #bcj1 #bca   process1 #aff-g
  ,vitalism1 #db1 #dc  ,void1           
representation of1 #bgc1 #bgd1 #bge1    
#bgg-h1 #bha1 #bhc-d1 #bhi-ij1    #bia1 
#bib1 #bid1 #bif1 #bih  ,voisin1 #hj    
,volition and cerebral mechanism1 #bec-d
  ,voluntary activity1 #aaj1 #beb       
,vries 7de71 #bd1 #fc note1 #he         
,wasps1 instinct in1 #adj1 #agb         
,weapons and intellect1 #acg  ,weismann1
 #bf1 #gh1 #hj-a  ,will and caprice1 #dg
   and cerebral mechanism1 #beb         
current of1 penetrating matter1 #bcg    
insertion of1 into reality1 #cje-f1 #cjg

   and relaxation1 #bja1 #bjg-h   and   
mechanism in disorder1 #bcc   tension   
of1 #aii1 #bja1 #bjg-h  ,willed order1  
mutual contingency of willed order and  
mathematical    order1 #bca-c           
unforeseeability in the1 #bbd1 #cdb-c   
,willing1 coincidence of seeing and1 in 
intuition1 #bcg  ,wilson1 ,e4,b41 #cf   
,wolff1 #ge note  ,words and states1 #d1
 #cjb-c   three classes of1             
corresponding to three classes of       
representation1    #cjb-c1 #cac-d       
,world1 intelligible1 #afb-c            
principle3 conciousness1 #bcg1 #bfa     
,worms1 in illustration of ambiguity of 
primitive organisms1 #acj               
,yellow-winged sphex1 paralyzing        
instinct in1 #agb   ,zeno on motion1    
#cjh-ac  ,zone of potentialities        
surrounding acts1 #agi-hj1 #aha1 #bfd   
,zoology1 #abh-i  ,zoospores of algae1  
in illustration of mobility in plants1  
#aab