,,theism ,,or ,,atheism  ,,the ,,great  
,,alternative  ,by ,,chapman ,,cohen    
,,the ,,pioneer ,,press1  #fa1          
,farringdon ,street1 ----,e4,c4#d----   
#aiba4     ,contents4   ,part ,i4  ,,an 
,,examination ,,of ,,theism4            
,,page  ,chapter ,i4     ,what is ,god8 
#i  ,chapter ,,ii4    ,the ,origin of   
the ,idea of ,god      #bj  ,chapter    
,,iii4   ,have we a ,religious ,sense8  
#cg  ,chapter ,,iv4    ,the ,argument   
from ,existence        #di  ,chapter ,v4
     ,the ,argument from ,causation     
#ei  ,chapter ,,vi4    ,the ,argument   
from ,design           #fi  ,chapter    
,,vii4   ,the ,disharmonies of ,nature  
#he  ,chapter ,,viii4  ,god and         
,evolution                  #id         
,chapter ,,ix4    ,the ,problem of ,pain
               #aaj   ,part ,,ii4       
,,substitutes ,,for ,,atheism4  ,chapter
 ,x4     ,a ,question of ,prejudice     
#aca  ,chapter ,,xi4    ,what is        
,atheism8                  #ach         
,chapter ,,xii4   ,spencer and the      

,unknowable        #aea  ,chapter       
,,xiii4  ,agnosticism                   
#afi  ,chapter ,,xiv4   ,atheism and    
,morals                #aha  ,chapter   
,,xv4    ,atheism ,inevitable           
#aid     ,,preface4   ,shrouded in the  
cloak of philosophy1 the question of the
 existence of ,god continues to attract 
attention1 and1 ,i may add1 to command  
more respect than it deserves4 ,for it  
is only by a subterfuge that it assumes 
the rank of philosophy4 ,god enters into
 philosophy only when it is beginning to
 lose caste in its proper home1 and then
 in its new environment it undergoes    
such a transformation as to contain very
 little likeness to its former1 and     
proper1 self4 ,it disowns its parentage 
and claims another origin1 and1 like so 
many genealogists devising pedigrees for
 the parvenu1 certain philosophers      
attempt to map out for the newcomer an  
ancestry to which he can establish no   
valid claim4 ,nothing would1 indeed1    
surprise the ancestor more than to be   

brought face to face with his           
descendant4 ,he would not be more       
astonished than would the ancient       
,eohippus on meeting with a modern      
dray-horse4 ,in anthropology or history 
the idea of ,god may fairly claim a     
place1 but it has no place in philosophy
 on any sensible meaning of the word4   
,the consequence of this transference of
 the idea of ,god to the sphere of      
philosophy is the curious position that 
the ,god in which people believe is not 
the ,god whose existence is made the    
product of an argument1 and the ,god of 
the argument is not the ,god of belief4 
,the theory and the fact have no more   
likeness to each other than a chestnut  
horse has to a horse-chestnut4 ,a       
fallacy is perpetuated by appealing to a
 fact1 but the fact immediately         
discredits the fallacy by disowning it  
in practice4 ,the grounds upon which the
 belief in ,god is supposed to rest1 the
 reasoning from which it springs1 are   
seen to follow the belief instead of    

preceding it4 ,the roots are in the air1
 and on closer inspection are seen to be
 artificial adornments1 so many         
imitations that have been hung there for
 the purpose of imposing on near-sighted
 or careless observers4  ,the purpose of
 the following pages is to make clear   
the nature of this alliance and to      
expose the real character of what we are
 asked to worship4 ,there are1 of       
course1 many on whose ears any amount of
 reasoning will fall without effect4 ,to
 that class this book will not appeal2  
it may be questioned whether many will  
even read it4 ,they will go on          
professing the belief they have always  
professed1 and taking pride in the fact 
that they have an intellect which is    
superior to proof1 and which disdains   
evidence when it runs contrary to my    
belief4 ,others will1 ,i expect1        
complain that the treatment of so solemn
 a subject is not reverent enough4 ,but 
why any subject should be treated       
reverently1 as a condition of           

examination1 is more than ,i have ever  
been able to discover4 ,it is asking the
 inquirer to commence his investigation 
with a half-promise to find something   
good in what he is about to examine4    
,whether a thing is worthy of reverence 
or not is a conclusion that must follow 
investigation1 not precede it4 ,and one 
does not observe any particular         
reverence shown by the religious person 
towards those beliefs in which he does  
not happen to believe4  ,but there are  
some who will read thoughtfully an      
examination of so old a subject as      
,theism1 and it is to those that these  
pages are addressed4 ,one cannot hope to
 say anything that is strikingly new on 
so well worn a subject as the existence 
of ,god1 but there are many who will    
read an old subject when presented in a 
new work1 and even then there is also   
the possibility of presenting an old    
topic in a slightly new form4 ,and ,i   
think these will find the main lines of 
the defence set up by the ,goddite dealt

 with in a manner that should at least  
make the point at issue clear4          
,finally1 it is one aim of this book to 
press home the point that the logical   
issue is between ,theism and ,atheism4  
,that there is no logical halting place 
between the two1 and that any attempt to
 call a halt is little more than a      
concession to a desire for mental or    
social convenience1 seems to me as clear
 as anything can well be4 ,and there is 
really nothing gained1 ultimately1 by   
the halt4 ,disinclination on the part of
 the non-,theist to push the issue to   
its logical conclusion is treated by the
 ,theist as inability to do so1 and is  
used as an argument in support of his   
own belief4 ,in matters of the          
intellect1 compromise is almost always a
 dangerous policy4 ,it heartens one's   
enemies and disheartens one's friends4  
,and there is really no adequate reason 
why those who have given up belief in   
deity should continue to treat this     
master superstition of the ages as      

though it were one of our most valuable 
inheritances1 to be surrendered with    
lowered heads and sinking hearts4 ,we   
who know both sides know that in giving 
up the belief in deity we have lost     
nothing of value1 nothing that need     
cause us a single regret4 ,and on that  
point we certainly can speak with       
authority2 for we have been where the   
,theist is1 he has not been where we    
are4 ,many of us know quite well all    
that is meant by the fear and trembling 
with which the believer looks upon a    
world without ,god4 ,and we know how    
idle the fear is--as idle as a child's  
fear of the dark4 ,what the world is    
like with ,god1 there is all the        
experience of history to inform us2 and 
it would indeed be strange if love and  
brotherhood1 armed with the weapons that
 science has given us1 could not produce
 a better human society than has ever   
existed under the dominion of the ,gods4
     ,part ,i4  ,,an ,,examination ,,of 
,,theism4     ,,chapter ,i4  ,,what ,,is

 ,,god8   ,soon after that famous       
,atheist1 ,charles ,bradlaugh1 entered  
the ,house of ,commons1 it is said that 
a fellow member approached him with the 
remark1 ,good ,god1 ,bradlaugh1 what    
does it matter whether there is a ,god  
or not8 ,bradlaugh's answer is not      
recorded1 but one is impelled to open   
the present examination of the belief in
 ,god1 by putting the same question in  
another form4 ,is the belief in ,god1 as
 we are so often assured1 one of the    
most important questions that can engage
 the attention of man8 ,under certain   
conditions one can conceive a rational  
answer in the affirmative4 ,where the   
mental and social conditions are such   
that men seriously believe the incidence
 of natural forces on mankind to be     
determined by the direct action of ,god1
 one can appreciate right belief        
concerning him being treated as of first
 rate importance4 ,in such circumstances
 wrong ideas are the equivalent of      
disaster4 ,but we are not in that       

condition to-day4 ,it is1 indeed1 common
 ground with all educated men and women 
that natural happenings are independent 
of divine control to at least the extent
 that natural forces affect all alike1  
and without the least reference to      
religious beliefs4 ,fire burns and water
 drowns1 foods sustain and poisons kill1
 no matter what our opinions on theology
 may be4 ,in an earthquake or a war     
there is no observable relation between 
casualties and religious opinions4 ,we  
are1 in fact1 told by theologians that  
it is folly to expect that there should 
be4 ,a particular providence is no      
longer in fashion2 ,god1 we are told1   
works only through general laws1 and    
that is only another way of saying that 
our opinions about ,god have no direct  
or observable influence on our          
well-being4 ,it is a tacit admission    
that human welfare depends upon our     
knowledge and manipulation of the forces
 by which we are surrounded4 ,there may 
be a ,god behind these forces1 but that 

neither determines the extent of our    
knowledge of them or our power to       
manipulate them4 ,the belief in ,god    
becomes a matter of1 at best1 secondary 
importance1 and quite probably of no    
importance whatever4  ,but if that be so
 why bother about the belief8 ,is that  
not a reason for leaving it alone and   
turning our attention to other matters8 
,the answer to that is that the belief  
in ,god is not of so detached a         
character as this advice assumes4 ,in   
the course of ages the belief in ,god   
has acquired associations that give it  
the character of a highly obstructive   
force4 ,it has become so entangled with 
inculcated notions of right and wrong   
that it is everywhere used as a buttress
 for institutions which have either     
outgrown their utility1 or are in need  
of serious modification in the interests
 of the race4 ,the opposition           
encountered in any attempt to deal with 
marriage1 divorce1 or education1 are    
examples of the way in which religious  

ideas are permitted to interfere with   
subjects that should be treated solely  
from the standpoint of social utility4  
,the course of human development has    
been such that religion has hitherto    
occupied a commanding position in       
relation to social laws and customs1    
with the result that it is often found  
difficult to improve either until the   
obstructive influence of religious      
beliefs has been dealt with4  ,it is    
not1 then1 because ,i believe the       
question of the existence of ,god to be 
of intrinsic importance that an         
examination of its validity is here     
undertaken4 ,its importance to-day is of
 a purely contingent character4 ,the    
valid ground for now discussing its     
truth is that it is at present allowed  
to obstruct the practical conduct of    
life4 ,and under similar circumstances  
it would be important to investigate the
 historical accuracy of ,old ,mother    
,hubbard or ,jack and the ,beanstalk4   
,any belief1 no matter what its nature1 

must be dealt with as a fact of some    
social importance1 so long as it is     
believed by large numbers to be         
essential to the right ordering of life4
 ,whether true or false1 beliefs are    
facts--mental and social facts1 and the 
scheme of things which leaves them out  
of account is making a blunder of the   
most serious kind4  ,certainly1         
conditions were never before so         
favourable for the delivery of a        
considered judgment on the question of  
the belief in ,god4 ,on the one side we 
have from natural science an account of 
the universe which rules the operations 
of deity out of court4 ,and on the other
 side we have a knowledge of the mode of
 origin of the belief which should leave
 us in no doubt as to its real value4   
,we hope to show later that the question
 of origin is really decisive2 that in  
reaching conclusions concerning the     
origin of the god-idea we are passing   
judgment as to its value4 ,that the     
masters of this form of investigation   

have not usually1 and in so many words1 
pushed their researches to their logical
 conclusions is no reason why we should 
refrain from doing so4 ,facts are in    
themselves of no great value4 ,it is the
 conclusions to which they point that   
are the important things4  ,if the      
conclusions to which we refer are sound1
 then the whole basis of theism crumbles
 away4 ,if we are to regard the god-idea
 as an evolution which began in         
misunderstandings of nature that were   
rooted in the ignorance of primitive    
man1 it would seem clear that no matter 
how refined or developed the idea may   
become1 it can rest on no other or      
sounder basis than that which is        
presented to us in the psychology of    
primitive man4 ,each stage of theistic  
belief grows out of the preceding stage1
 and if it can be shown that the        
beginning of this evolution arose in a  
huge blunder ,i quite fail to see how   
any subsequent development can convert  
this unmistakable blunder into a        

demonstrable truth4 ,to take a case in  
point4 ,when it was shown that so far as
 witchcraft rested on observed facts    
these could be explained on grounds     
other than those of the malevolent      
activities of certain old women1 the    
belief in witchcraft was not purified1  
neither did it advance to any so-called 
higher stage2 it was simply abandoned as
 a useless and mischievous explanation  
of facts that could be otherwise        
accounted for4 ,are we logically        
justified in dealing with the belief in 
,god on any other principle8 ,we cannot 
logically discard the world of the      
savage and still retain his             
interpretation of it4 ,if the grounds   
upon which the savage constructed his   
theory of the world1 and from which grew
 all the ghosts and gods with which he  
believed himself to be surrounded1 if   
these grounds are false1 how can we     
still keep in substance to conclusions  
that are admittedly based on false      
premises8 ,we can say with tolerable    

certainty that had primitive man known  
what we know about nature the gods would
 never have been born4 ,civilised man   
does not discover gods1 he discards     
them4 ,it was a profound remark of      
,feurbach's1 that religion is ultimately
 anthropology1 and it is anthropology   
that gives to all forms of theism the   
death blow4  ,in our own time1 at least1
 it is not difficult to see that the    
word ,god retains its influence with    
many because of the indefinite manner in
 which it is used4 ,it is never easy to 
say what a person has in his mind when  
he uses the word4 ,in most cases one    
would be safe in saying that nothing at 
all is meant4 ,it is just one of those  
blessed words where the comfort felt in 
their use is proportionate to the lack  
of definite meaning that accompanies    
them4 ,a frank confession of ignorance  
is something that most people heartily  
dislike1 and where problems are         
persistent and difficult of solution    
what most people are in search of is a  

narcotic4 ,that ,god is one of the most 
popular of narcotics will be denied by  
none who study the psychology of the    
average man or woman4  ,when not used as
 a narcotic1 ,god is brought into an    
argument as though it stood for a term  
which carried a well defined and well   
understood meaning4 ,in work after work 
dealing with theism one looks in vain   
for some definition of ,god4 ,all that  
one can do is to gather the author's    
meaning from the course of his argument1
 and that is not always an easy task4   
,the truth is1 of course1 that instead  
of the word carrying with it a generally
 understood meaning there is no word    
that is more loosely used or which      
carries a greater variety of meanings4  
,its connotations are endless1 and range
 from the aggressively man-like deity of
 the primitive savage up--or down--to   
the abstract force of the mathematical  
physicist and the shadowy ,absolute of  
the theologising metaphysician4 ,the    
consequence of this is to find commonly 

that while it is one kind of a god that 
is being set up in argument1 it is      
really another god that is being        
defended and even believed in4 ,when we 
find people talking of entering into    
communion with ,god1 or praying to ,god1
 it is quite certain they do not        
conceive him as a mere mathematical     
abstraction1 or as a mere symbol of an  
unknown force4 ,it is impossible to     
conceive any sane man or woman          
extracting comfort from praying or      
talking to a god who could not think1 or
 feel1 or hear4 ,and if he possesses    
qualities that the religious attitude   
implies1 we endow him with all the      
attributes of personality1 and1 be it   
noted1 of human personality4 ,either one
 ,god is believed in in fact while      
another is established in theory1 or an 
elaborate argument is presented which   
serves no other purpose than a disguise 
for the fact that there is no genuine   
belief left4  ,an example of the        
misleading way in which words are used  

is supplied by ,sir ,oliver ,lodge1 who 
for a man of science shows an amazing   
capacity for making use of unscientific 
language4 ,in his ,man and the          
,universe1 discussing the attributes of 
deity1 he says1 ,let no worthy attribute
 be denied to the deity4 ,in            
anthropomorphism there are many errors1 
but there is one truth4 ,whatever worthy
 attributes belong to man1 be it        
personality or any other1 its existence 
in the universe is thereby admitted2 it 
belongs to the all4 ,putting on one side
 the fallacy involved in speaking of    
attributes as though they were good or  
bad in themselves1 one wonders why ,sir 
,oliver limits this inference to the    
worthy attributes8 ,unworthy attributes 
are as real as worthy ones4 ,if honesty 
exists so does dishonesty4 ,kindness is 
as real as cruelty4 ,and if we must     
credit the deity with possessing all the
 good attributes1 to whom must we credit
 the bad ones8 ,a little later ,sir     
,oliver does admit that we must credit  

the deity with the bad attributes also1 
but adds that they are dying out4 ,but  
as they are part of the deity1 their    
decay must mean that the deity is also  
undergoing a process of change1 of      
education1 and is as much subject to the
 law of growth as we are4 ,surely that  
is not what people mean when they speak 
about ,god4 ,a god who is only a part of
 the cosmic process ceases to be a god  
in any reasonable sense of the term4    
,professor ,mellone1 in his ,god and the
 ,world1 says that the word ,god becomes
 a name for the infinite system of law  
regarded as a whole 7p4 #abb74 ,if that 
were really all that was meant by the   
word the matter would not be worth      
discussing4 ,god as a symbol of a       
generalisation is a mere name1 and as   
such is as good as any other name4 ,but1
 again1 it is plain that people mean    
more than that when they speak about    
,god4 ,if ,god is a name for universal  
law1 let any really religious man try   
the plan of substituting in his prayers 

and in his thoughts the phrase          
,universal ,law for ,god1 and then see  
how long he will retain his religion4   
,as ,mr4 ,balfour points out 7,theism   
and ,humanism1 p4 #bj71 the god of      
religion and the god of philosophy      
represent two distinct beings1 and it is
 hard to see how the two can be fused   
into one4 ,the plain truth is that it is
 impossible to now make the existence of
 the god of religion reasonable1 and the
 plan adopted is that of arguing for the
 existence of something about which     
there is often no dispute1 and then     
introducing as the product of the       
argument something that has never been  
argued for at all4 ,it is the           
philosophic analogue of the hat and     
omelette trick4  ,in this connection    
some well considered words of ,sir      
,james ,frazer are well worth noting4   
,he says3--        ,by a god ,i         
understand a superhuman and supernatural
 being1 of a      spiritual and personal
 nature1 who controls the world or some 

part      of it on the whole for good1  
and who is endowed with intellectual    
faculties1 moral feelings1 and active   
powers1 which we can only      conceive 
on the analogy of human faculties1      
feelings1 and      activities1 though we
 are bound to suppose that in the divine
      nature they exist in an infinitely
 higher degree1 than the                
corresponding faculties1 feelings1 and  
activities of man4 ,in short1      by a 
,god ,i mean a beneficent supernatural  
spirit1 the ruler of the      world or  
of some part of it1 who resembles man in
 nature though he      excels him in    
knowledge1 goodness1 and power4 ,this   
is1 ,i think1 the      sense in which   
the ordinary man speaks of a ,god1 and  
,i believe that      he is right in so  
doing4 ,i am aware that it has been not 
unusual1      especially of late years1 
to apply the name of ,god to very       
different conceptions1 to empty it of   
all implications of      personality1   
and to reduce it to signifying something

 very large      and very vague1 such as
 the ,infinite or the ,absolute         
7whatever      these hard words may     
signify7 the great ,first ,cause1 the   
,universal      ,substance1 the stream  
of tendency by which all things seek to 
fulfil the law of their being1 and so   
forth4 ,now1 without      expressing    
opinion as to the truth or falsehood of 
the views      implied by such          
applications of the name of ,god1 ,i    
cannot but      regard them as          
illegitimate extensions of the term1 in 
short1 an      abuse of language1 and ,i
 venture to protest against it in the   
interest1 not only of verbal accuracy1  
but of clear thinking1      because it  
is apt to conceal from ourselves and    
others a real and      very important   
change of thought2 in particular it may 
lead many to      imagine that the      
persons who use the name of ,god in one 
or other of      these extended senses  
retain theological opinions which they  
may in      fact have long abandoned4   

,thus the misuse of the name of ,god may
      resemble the stratagem in war of  
putting up dummies to make an      enemy
 imagine that a fort is still held long 
after it has been      abandoned by the 
garrison4 7,the ,belief in ,immortality2
 pp4 #i-aj4      ,vol4 ,i474   ,this    
expression of opinion from an           
authoritative quarter is very much      
needed4 ,the fear of public opinion     
displayed by many advanced thinkers is  
in this country one of the greatest     
obstacles to rapid advance4 ,it is      
simply deplorable to observe the trouble
 taken by some to coin new names1 or the
 illegitimate use made of old ones1 for 
no other discoverable reason than that  
of disguising from the world the fact   
that the orthodox beliefs are no longer 
held4 ,the need of to-day is not so much
 liberal thought as strong and          
courageous thought2 and one would       
cheerfully hand back to orthodoxy a     
fairly large parcel of a certain type of
 heretical thinker in exchange for a    

single one who used plain language to   
express clear convictions4  ,what is it 
that the mass of believers have in their
 minds when they speak of ,god8 ,there  
can be no doubt but that what the plain 
man has always understood by ,god is a  
person4 ,every book of religious        
devotion implies this2 every prayer that
 is offered takes it for granted that   
someone will listen1 and probably grant 
the petition4 ,god is personal1 ,god is 
just1 ,god is beneficent1 ,god is       
intelligent1 these are conceptions that 
are bound up with all the religions of  
the world1 and without which they would 
lack both significance and value4 ,a    
very acute theistic writer1 ,mr4 ,w4 ,h4
 ,mallock1 puts this quite plainly when 
he says that the ,god of theism is      
represented as revealing himself in the 
universe1 firstly1 as the mind which    
animates and moves everything1 secondly1
 as a purposing mind which is infinitely
 wise and powerful1 and has created a   
perfect universe with a view to some    

perfect end2 and lastly1 as an ethical  
mind which out of all the things created
 by it1 has selected men as the object  
of a preferential love4 ,a personality  
which thinks and wills and loves and    
hates4 ,that is what mankind in the mass
 have always meant by ',god4'  ,indeed1 
any other kind of ,god is inconceivable4
 ,whatever may be the metaphysical      
subtleties employed1 we come ultimately 
to that4 ,it is this1 the older and the 
vital conception that is being fought   
for4 ,the arguments for any other kind  
of existence are mere subterfuges4 ,the 
pleas for an ,absolute or an            
,unconditioned are only used to buttress
 the older conception1 and never till   
the older one has lost its force4 ,the  
unconditioned ,god is argued for only   
that it may serve as the basis for the  
belief in a personal one4 ,what is      
proved is not what is asked for2 what is
 asked for is not what is proved4 ,no   
wonder that so eminent a writer as ,mr4 
,f4 ,h4 ,bradley feels constrained to   

give these verbalistic thimble riggers a
 smart rap over the knuckles1 as in the 
following passage3--        ,most of    
those who insist on the personality of  
,god are      intellectually dishonest4 
,they desire one conclusion1 and1 to    
reach      it1 they argue for another4  
,but the second1 if proved1 is quite    
different1 and answers their purpose    
only because they obscure it      and   
confound it with the first4444 ,the     
deity they want1 is1 of      course1    
finite1 a person much like themselves1  
with thoughts and      feelings limited 
and mutable in the process of time4444  
,and for      their purpose1 what is not
 this is really nothing4 7,appearance   
and      ,reality2 p4 #ecb74   ,and it  
is really what people mean by ,god that 
is decisive4 ,it is not at all a        
question of what they might be made to  
mean1 or what they ought to mean4 ,it is
 wholly a matter of what they do mean4  
,and to say that what people intend to  
affirm in an expression of belief is not

 true1 is to say that the belief itself 
is false4 ,if the ,god ,i believe in is 
a delusion1 then my ,god ceases to      
exist4 ,true1 ,i may if ,i think it     
worth while acquire another one1 but    
that will not revive the first4 ,it is  
what people believe that is the         
important question1 not what some       
ingenious speculator may succeed in     
making the belief stand for4  ,honestly 
to be of service to theism the ,god     
established must be a person4 ,to be    
intelligible1 having regard to the      
historical developments of religion1 the
 ,god proved must be a person4 ,the     
relation demanded by religion between   
man and ,god must be of a personal      
character4 ,no man can love a pure      
abstraction2 he might as reasonably fall
 in love with a triangle or profess     
devotion to the equator4 ,the ,god of   
religion must be a person1 and it is    
precisely that1 as a controlling force  
of the universe1 in which modern thought
 finds it more and more difficult to    

believe1 and which modern science       
decisively rejects4 ,and in rejecting   
this the death blow is given to those   
religious ideas1 which however disguised
 find their origin in the fear-stricken 
ignorance of the primitive savage4      
,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,the ,,origin ,,of    
,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,god4   ,the alleged 
universality of the belief in ,god is   
only inferentially an argument for its  
truth4 ,the inference is that if men    
have everywhere developed a particular  
belief1 this general agreement could    
only have been reached as a consequence 
of a general experience4 ,a universal   
effect implies a universal cause4 ,so   
put the argument seems impressive4 ,as a
 matter of fact the statement is one    
long tissue of fallacies and unwarranted
 assumptions4  ,in the first place1 even
 admitting the universal pressure of    
certain facts1 it by no means follows   
that the theistic interpretation of     
those facts is the only one admissible4 
,there is no exception to the fact that 

men have everywhere come to the         
conclusion that the earth was flat1 and 
yet a wider and truer knowledge proved  
that universal belief to be quite false4
 ,the fact of a certain belief being    
universal only warrants the assumption  
that the belief itself has a cause1 but 
it tells us nothing whatever concerning 
its truthfulness4 ,the truth here is    
that the argument from universality     
dates its origin from a stage of human  
culture suitable to the god idea itself1
 a stage when very little was known     
concerning the workings of the mind or  
the laws of mental development4         
,otherwise it would have been seen that 
all the universality of a belief really 
proves is the universality of the human 
mind--and that means that1 given an     
organism of a certain kind1 it will     
react in substantially an identical     
manner to the same stimuli4 ,thus it is 
not surprising to find that as the human
 organism is everywhere fundamentally   
alike1 it has everywhere come to the    

same conclusions in face of the same set
 of conditions4 ,a man reacts to the    
universe in one way1 and a jelly fish in
 another way4 ,and universality is as   
true of the reactions of the latter as  
it is of those of the former4  ,and this
 means that a delusion may be as        
widespread as truth1 a false inference  
may gain as general an acceptance as a  
true one4 ,what belief has been more    
general than the belief in witches1     
fairies1 and the like8 ,but we see in   
the prevalence of these and similar     
beliefs1 not a presumption of their     
truth1 but only the grounds for a search
 after the conditions1 social and       
psychological1 which gave them birth4   
,the truth is that the conditions which 
give rise to the belief in gods are     
found in all ages1 and no one would be  
more surprised than the ,atheist to find
 it otherwise4 ,but here1 precisely as  
in the case of good and bad spirits1 the
 vital question is not that people have 
everywhere believed in the existence of 

supernatural beings1#a but an           
understanding of the conditions from    
which the beliefs themselves have grown4
 ,that alone can determine whether in   
studying the god idea we are studying   
the acquisition of a truth or the growth
 of a fallacy4  ,next1 while it may be  
granted1 at least provisionally1 that   
the belief in supernatural beings is    
universal1 against that has to be set   
the fact that the whole tendency of     
social development is to narrow the     
range of the belief1 to restrict the    
scope of its authority1 and to so       
attenuate it that it becomes of no value
 precisely where it is supposed to be of
 most use4 ,the belief in ,god is least 
questioned where civilisation is lowest2
 it is called into the most serious     
question where civilisation is most     
advanced4 ,to-day the belief in ,god is 
only universal in the sense that some   
representatives of it are to be found in
 all societies4 ,the majority may still 
profess to have it1 but it has ceased to

 be universal in the strict sense of the
 term4 ,nor will it be disputed that the
 number of convinced disbelievers is    
everywhere on the increase4 ,the fact is
 everywhere lamented by the official    
exponents of religion4 ,all that we can 
say is that the belief in ,god is       
universal--with those who believe in    
him4 ,and even here universality of     
belief is only secured by their         
refraining from discussing precisely    
what it is they mean by ,god1 and what  
it is they believe in4 ,there is        
agreement in obscurity1 each one        
dreading to see clearly the features of 
his assumed friend for fear he should   
recognise the face of an enemy4         
,finally1 the suspicious feature must be
 pointed out that the belief in ,god    
owes its existence1 not to the trained  
and educated observation of civilised   
times1 but to the uncritical reflection 
of the primitive mind4 ,it has its      
origin there1 and it would indeed be    
remarkable if1 while in almost every    

other direction the primitive mind      
showed itself to be hopelessly wrong1 in
 its interpretation of the world in this
 particular respect it has proved itself
 to be altogether right4 ,as a matter of
 fact1 this primitive assumption is     
going the way of the others1 the only   
difference being that it is passing     
through more phases than some4 ,but the 
decay is plain to all save those who    
refuse to see4 ,the process of          
refinement cannot go on for ever4 ,in   
other matters knowledge passes from a   
nebulous and indefinite stage to a      
precise and definite one4 ,in the case  
of theism it pursues an opposite course4
 ,from the very definite god1 or gods1  
of primitive mankind we advance to the  
vague and indefinite god of the modern  
theist--a ,god who1 apparently1 means   
nothing and does nothing1 and at most   
stands as a symbol for our irremovable  
ignorance4 ,clearly this process cannot 
go on for ever4 ,the work of attenuation
 must stop at some point4 ,and one may  

safely predict that just as the advance 
of scientific knowledge has taken over  
one department after another that was   
formerly regarded as within the province
 of religion1 so one day it will be     
borne in upon all that an hypothesis    
such as that of theism1 which does      
nothing and explains nothing1 may be    
profitably dispensed with4  ,what really
 remains for discussion is a problem of 
socio-psychology4 ,that is1 we have to  
determine the conditions of origin of so
 widespread a belief1 but which we      
believe to be false4 ,the materials for 
answering this question are now at our  
command1 and whatever differences of    
opinion there may be concerning the     
stages of development1 there is very    
little concerning their essential       
character4 ,and it is not without       
significance that this question of      
origin is one that the present-day      
apologists of theism seem pretty        
unanimous in leaving severely alone4    
,let us commence with the fact that     

religion is something that is acquired4 
,every work on the origin of religion   
assumes it1 and all investigation       
warrants the assumption4 ,the question  
at issue is the mode of acquisition4    
,and here one word of caution is        
advisable4 ,the wide range of religious 
ideas and their existence at a very low 
culture stage1 precludes the assumption 
that religious ideas are generated in   
the same conscious way as are scientific
 theories4 ,even with the modern mind   
our conclusions concerning many of the  
affairs of life are formed in a         
semi-conscious manner4 ,most frequently 
they are generated subconsciously1 and  
are only consciously formulated under   
pressure of circumstances4 ,and if we   
are to understand religion aright we    
must be on our guard against attributing
 to primitive mankind a degree of       
scientific curiosity and reflective     
power to which it can lay no claim4 ,we 
have to allow for what one writer well  
calls physiological thought1 thought1   

that is1 which rises subconsciously and 
has its origin in the pressure of       
insistent experience4  ,a comprehensive 
survey of religious beliefs show that   
there are only two things that can be   
said to be common to them all4 ,they    
differ in teachings1 in their           
conceptions of deity1 and in modes of   
worship4 ,but all religions agree in    
believing in some kind of ghostly       
existence and in a continued life beyond
 the grave4 ,i use the expression1      
ghostly existence1 because we can really
 trace the idea of ,god backward until  
we lose the definite figure in a very   
general conception1 much as astronomers 
have taught us to lose a definite world 
in the primitive fire-mist4 ,so when we 
get beyond the culture stage at which we
 meet with the definite man-like ,god1  
we encounter an indefinite thought stage
 at which we can dimly mark the         
existence of a frame of mind that was to
 give birth to the more concrete        
conception4  ,the most general term for 

the belief in the various orders of gods
 thus becomes the belief in invisible1  
super-material beings1 like1 and yet    
superior to man4 ,it is for this reason 
that ,professor ,tylor's definition of  
religion as the belief in spiritual     
beings--so long as we do not use the    
term spiritual in its modern            
sense--seems to me the moat satisfactory
 definition yet offered4 ,it is the one 
point on which all religions agree1 and 
for this reason may be regarded as their
 essential feature4  ,this taken for    
granted1 our next point of enquiry is1  
,what was there in the conditions of    
primitive life that would give rise to a
 belief in this super-material1 or in   
modern language1 spiritual existence8   
,now there are at least two sets of     
experiences that seem adequate to the   
required explanation4 ,the one is       
normal1 the other abnormal4 ,the first  
is connected directly with the universal
 experience of dreams4 ,the savage is1  
as ,tylor says1 a severely practical    

person4 ,he believes what he sees and1  
one may add1 he sees what he believes4  
,knowing nothing of the distinction we  
draw between a fact and an illusion1    
ignorant of the functions1 or even the  
existence of a nervous system1 the      
dreams of a savage are to him as real as
 his waking experiences4 ,he does not   
say ,i dreamed ,i saw ,so-,so1 but like 
the ,biblical characters he says1 ,i saw
 ,so-,so in a dream4 ,the two forms of  
expression carry all the difference     
between fact and fancy4 ,one thing is   
therefore obvious to the savage         
mind--something escapes from the body1  
travels about1 and returns4 ,such a     
conviction does not represent the       
conclusions of a genius speculating upon
 the meaning of unexplained facts4 ,it  
is a conviction steadily built up by the
 pressure of unvarying experience1 as   
steadily as is the conviction that fire 
burns or that water is wet4 ,the very   
universality of the belief is proof that
 it had some such sub-conscious origin4 

,a second class of experiences lead to  
the same conclusion4 ,in temporary loss 
of consciousness the savage again sees  
proof of the existence of a double4     
,with epilepsy or insanity there is     
offered decisive proof that some spirit 
has taken possession of the individual's
 body4 ,even in civilised countries this
 belief was widely held hardly more than
 a century ago4 ,and both these classes 
of experience are enforced by the belief
 that the shadow of a man1 an echo1 a   
reflection seen in water1 etc41 are all 
real things4 ,the proofs that the belief
 in a soul does originate in this way   
are now so plentiful that exact         
references are needless4 ,examination of
 primitive religious beliefs all over   
the world yield the one result1 without 
there being any evidence to the         
contrary4  ,primitive philosophy does   
not stop here4 ,man dreams of things as 
well as of persons1 and a general       
extension of the belief in a ghost or   
double is made until it covers almost   

everything4 ,as ,tylor says1 the        
doctrine of souls is worked out with    
remarkable breadth and consistency4 ,the
 souls of animals are recognised by a   
natural extension from the theory of    
human souls2 the souls of trees and     
plants follow in some vague partial way2
 and the souls of inanimate objects     
expand the category to the extremest    
boundary4 ,the reasoning of the         
primitive mind is thus1 given its       
limitations and unsound premises1       
uncompromisingly logical4 ,one can trace
 the processes of reasoning more easily 
than is the case with modern man because
 it is less disturbed by cross-currents 
of acquired knowledge and conflicting   
interests4  ,i am giving but the barest 
outline of a vast subject because ,i am 
desirous of keeping the attention of the
 reader on what ,i believe to be the    
main issue4 ,for that reason ,i am not  
discussing whether animism--the         
vitalising of inanimate objects--has an 
independent origin1 or whether it is a  

mere extension of the ghost theory4     
,either theory does not affect my main  
position1 which is that the idea of ,god
 is derived from the ignorance of       
primitive humanity1 and has no other    
authority than a misunderstanding of    
natural facts4 ,on that point the       
agreement among all schools of          
anthropologists is now very general4    
,personally1 however1 ,i do not believe 
that men would ever have given a soul to
 trees or other natural objects unless  
they had first given them to living     
beings1 and had thus familiarised       
themselves with the conception of a     
double4  ,at present1 though1 we are on 
the track of the gods4 ,the belief that 
every human being1 and nearly every     
object1 possesses a soul1 ends in       
surrounding man with a cloud of spirits 
against which he has to be always on his
 guard4 ,the general situation is well  
put by ,miss ,kingsley1 who gives a     
picture of the ,west ,african that may  
well stand for the savage world in      

general4        ,everything happens by  
the action of spirits4 ,the thing he    
does      himself is done by the spirit 
within acting on his body1 the matter   
with which that spirit is associated4   
,everything that is done by      other  
things is done by their spirit          
associated with their      particular   
mass of matter4444 ,the native will     
point out to you a      lightning       
stricken tree and tell you its spirit   
has been killed4 ,he      will tell you1
 when the earthen cooking pot is broken1
 it has lost      its spirit4 ,if his   
weapon failed him1 it is because he has 
stolen      or made its spirit sick by  
means of his influence on other spirits 
of the same class4444 ,in every action  
of his life he shows you how      he    
lives with a great1 powerful spirit     
world around him4 ,you see      him     
before running out to hunt or fight     
rubbing stuff in his weapon      to     
strengthen the spirit that is in it2    
telling it the while what      care he  

has taken of it2 running through a list 
of what he had      given it before1    
though these things had been hard to    
give2 and      begging it1 in the hour  
of his dire necessity1 not to fail      
him4444      ,you see him bending over  
the face of the river1 talking to its   
spirit with proper incantations1 asking 
it when it meets an enemy      to upset 
his canoe and destroy him 444 or1 as ,i 
have myself seen in      ,congo         
,francaise1 to take down with it1 away  
from his village1 the      pestilence of
 the spotted death4 7,west ,african     
,studies2 pp4      #cid-e74   ,when     
,feurbach said that the realm of memory 
was the world of souls1 he expressed a  
profound truth in a striking manner4 ,it
 is dreams1 swoons1 catalepsy1 with     
their allied states which suggest the   
existence of a double or ghost4 ,even in
 the absence of the mass of evidence    
from all quarters in support of this1   
the fact of the ghost always being      
pictured as identical in clothing and   

figure with the dead man would be almost
 enough to demonstrate its dream origin4
 ,into that aspect of the matter1       
however1 we do not now intend to enter4 
,we are now only concerned with the     
bearing of the ghost theory on the      
origin of ,god4 ,another step or two and
 we shall have reached that point4      
,believing himself surrounded on all    
sides by a world of ghosts the great    
concern of the savage is to escape their
 ill-will or to secure their favour4    
,affection and fear--fear that the      
ghost1 if his wants are neglected1 will 
wreak vengeance through the agency of   
disease1 famine1 or accident--leads     
insensibly to the ghosts of one's       
relations becoming objects of           
veneration1 propitiation1 and petition4 
,all ghosts receive some attention for a
 certain time after death1 but naturally
 special and sustained honours are      
reserved for the heads of families1#b   
and for such as have been distinguished 
for various qualities during life4 ,in  

this way ancestor worship becomes one of
 the most general forms of religious    
observances1 and the gradual development
 of the great man or the deceased       
ancestor into a deity follows by easy   
stages4 ,the principles of ancestor     
worship1 to again cite the indispensible
 ,tylor1 are not difficult to           
understand3--        ,they plainly keep 
up the social relations of the living   
world4 ,the      dead ancestor1 now     
passed into a deity1 simply goes on     
protecting3      his own family and     
receiving suit and service from them as 
of old2      the dead chief still       
watches over his own tribe1 still holds 
his      authority by helping friends   
and harming enemies1 still rewards the  
right and sharply punishes the wrong4   
,that this deification of ancestors and 
of dead men actually takes place is     
indisputable4 ,the ,mythologies of      
,greece and ,rome offer numerous        
examples1 and the deification of the    
,roman ,emperors became the regular     

rule4 ,numerous examples to the same end
 are supplied from ,india by ,mr4 ,w4   
,crookes and ,sir ,a4 ,c4 ,lyall4 ,that 
this way of honouring the dead is not   
limited to natives is shown by the      
famous case of ,general ,nicholson1 who 
actually received the honour of         
deification during his lifetime4 ,anyone
 who cares to consult those storehouses 
of information1 ,spencer's ,principles  
of ,sociology 7,vol4 ,i471 ,tylor's     
,primitive ,culture1 and ,frazer's      
,golden ,bough will find the whole      
god-making process set forth with a     
wealth of illustration that can hardly  
fail to carry conviction4 ,finally1 in  
the case of ,japan and ,china we have   
living examples of an organised system  
of religion based upon the deification  
of ancestors4#c  ,it will make it easier
 to understand the evolution of the god 
from the ghost if we bear in mind that  
with primitive man the gods are         
conceived neither as independent        
existences nor as creators4 ,even       

immortality is not asserted of them4    
,the modern notions of deity1 largely   
due to the attempt to accommodate the   
idea of god to certain metaphysical and 
philosophical conceptions1 are so       
intermingled with the primitive idea1   
that there is always the danger of      
reading into the primitive intelligence 
more than was ever there4 ,the          
consequence is that by confusing the two
 senses of the word many find it        
difficult to realise how one has grown  
out of the other4 ,such ideas as those  
of creation and independence are quite  
foreign to the primitive mind4 ,savages 
are like children in this respect2 their
 interest in things is primarily of a   
practical character4 ,a child does not  
begin by asking how a thing came to be2 
it asks what it is for or what it does4 
,so the prime concern of the savage is1 
what are certain things for8 what will  
they do8 are they injurious or          
beneficial8 ,it is because of this      
practical turn of mind that so much     

attention is paid to the ghost1 having  
once accepted its existence as a fact4  
,the superiority of the gods do not     
consist in their substantial difference 
from himself1 but in the greater power  
for good or evil conferred upon them by 
their invisible existence4 ,creation is 
a conception that does not arise until  
the capacity for philosophical          
speculation has developed4 ,then        
reflection sets to work2 the nature of  
the god undergoes modification1 and the 
long process of accommodating primitive 
religious beliefs to later knowledge    
commences1 the end of which we have not 
yet seen4  ,the process of reading      
modern speculations into the religion of
 the savage leads to some curious       
results1 one of which we cannot forbear 
mentioning4 ,in his little work on      
,animism ,mr4 ,edward ,clodd1 after     
tracing the fundamental ideas of        
religion to primitive delusion1 says3-- 
,herein 7i4e41 in dream and visions7 are
 to be found the sufficing              

materials for a belief in an entity in  
the body1 but not of it1      which can 
depart and return at will1 and which man
 everywhere has      more or less       
vaguely envisaged as his double or other
 self4444      ,the distinction between 
soul and body1 which explained to man   
his      own actions1 was the key to the
 actions of animate and inanimate       
things4 ,a personal life and will       
controlled them4 ,this was              
obviously brought home to him more      
forcibly in the actions of      living  
things1 since these so closely resembled
 his own that he saw      no difference 
between themselves and him4 ,not in this
 matter alone      have the intuitions  
of the savage found their confirmation  
in the      discoveries of modern       
science4444 ,ignorant of the reflection 
of      sound1 how else could he account
 for the echoes flung back from the     
hillside8 ,ignorant of the law of the   
interruption of light1 how      else    
could he explain the advancing and      

retreating shadows8 ,in      some sense 
they must be alive2 an inference        
supported by modern      science4   ,the
 italics in the above passages are mine1
 and they serve to illustrate how       
certain writers manage to introduce     
quite misleading conceptions to their   
readers4 ,it almost causes one to cease 
wondering at the persistence of religion
 when one finds a writer accepting the  
results of anthropological research1 and
 at the same time claiming that savage  
intuitions are confirmed by modern      
science4 ,if that be true1 then all that
 ,mr4 ,clodd has previously written must
 be dismissed as untrue4 ,the statement 
is1 however1 quite inaccurate4 ,the     
inference drawn by the savage is not    
supported by modern science4 ,neither on
 the existence of a soul nor on the     
existence of a god1 nor on the nature of
 disease1 nor on the causes of physical 
or psychical states has science         
confirmed the intuitions 7whatever that 
conveniently cloudy word may mean7 of   

the primitive savage4 ,the acquisition  
of correct views would indeed be an easy
 thing if they could be gained by the   
intuitions of an untaught savage4  ,the 
assertion that in some sense natural    
forces must be alive 7as though there   
can be any real sense in a term except  
the right sense71 and that this         
inference is supported by modern        
physics1 is an illustration of that     
playing with words which is fatal to    
exact thought4 ,the only sense in which 
the expression is used in physics is    
that of active1 and both active and     
alive owe their vogue to the necessity  
for controverting the older view that   
natural forces are inert or dead and    
need some external force to produce     
anything4 ,it is a mere figure of       
speech2 the evil is when it is taken and
 used as an exact expression of         
scientific fact4 ,let a reader of ,mr4  
,clodd ask himself whether the life he  
thinks of when he speaks of forces being
 alive is animal life1 and he will at   

once see the absurdity of the statement4
 ,and if he does not mean animal life1  
what life does he mean8  ,putting on one
 side all such attempts at              
accommodation1 we may safely say that   
given the origin of religion in the     
manner indicated1 one may trace--at     
least in outline--the development of    
religion from the primitive ghost       
worship up to the rituals and beliefs of
 current creeds4 ,i do not mean by this 
that all religious beliefs and practices
 spring directly from ghost worship4    
,once religion is established1 and the  
myth-making capacity let loose1         
additions are made that are due to all  
sorts of causes4 ,the ,romans and       
,greeks1 for example1 seem to have      
created a number of deities out of pure 
abstractions--gods of peace1 of war1 of 
fortune1 and so forth4 ,why particular  
deities were invented1 and how they     
became attached to particular groups of 
phenomena1 are questions that it is     
often impossible to answer with any     

great degree of certainty1 but why there
 should be any gods at all is a question
 that can be answered1 ,i think1 on the 
lines above indicated4  ,the way in     
which the primitive ghost worship       
probably paved the way for some of the  
doctrines of the higher religions may be
 seen on taking a story such as the     
death and resurrection of the ,gospel   
,jesus4 ,in his treatise on ,the ,attis 
,mr4 ,grant ,allen made the ingenious   
suggestion that the greater fertility of
 the ground on and near the grave1 owing
 to the food placed there to feed the   
ghost1 would produce in the savage mind 
the conviction that this increased      
fertility was due to the beneficent     
activity of the double of the dead man4 
,reasoning from this basis1 it would be 
a simple conclusion that the production1
 or lack1 of crops was everywhere due to
 the action of good or evil spirits4 ,in
 the next place1 it must be remembered  
that it is the act of dying which raises
 the human being to the level of a      

guardian spirit or god2 and from this to
 the production of a god by ceremonial  
killing would be a natural and an easy  
step4 ,in this last respect1 at least1  
we are upon the firm ground of fact1 and
 not on that of mere theory4 ,if a      
reader will take the trouble to peruse  
the numerous examples collected by      
,tylor in the first chapter of his      
,primitive ,culture1 and those provided 
by ,frazer in the ,golden ,bough1 he    
will find the evidence for this         
overwhelming4 ,examples of the practice 
of killing a human being and burying his
 body under the foundations of a castle 
or a bridge are very common1 and the    
modern custom of burying coins under a  
foundation-stone is a harmless and      
interesting survival of this custom4 ,in
 some parts of ,africa a boy and girl   
are buried where a village is to be     
established4 ,in ,polynesia the central 
pillar of a temple was placed on the    
body of a human victim4 ,in ,scotland   
there is the legend that ,st4 ,columba  

buried the body of ,st4 ,oran under his 
monastery to make the building secure4  
,any country will supply stories of a   
similar kind4 ,finally1 we have the     
amusing story of the manner in which    
,sir ,richard ,burton narrowly escaped  
deification4 ,exploring in ,afghanistan 
in the disguise of a ,mohammedan fakir1 
he received a friendly hint that he     
would do well to get off without delay4 
,he expressed surprise1 as the people   
seemed very fond of him4 ,that1 it was  
explained1 was the cause of the trouble4
 ,they thought so much of him they      
intended to kill him1 and thus retain so
 excellent a man with them for ever4    
,when ,tylor wrote1 the prevalent       
impression was that this killing of     
human beings was due to a desire to     
appease the spirits of the place4 ,later
 investigation showed that instead of a 
sacrifice it was a creation4 ,the       
purpose was to create a local god who   
would watch over the building or        
settlement4 ,god-making was thus shown  

to be a universal practice4  ,our next  
step must be taken in the company of    
,sir ,james ,frazer4 ,on all-fours with 
the practice of creating a guardian     
deity for a building is that of making a
 similar guardian for crops and         
vegetation4 ,the details of this        
practice are interesting1 but they need 
not now detain us4 ,it is enough that   
the practice existed1 and1 as ,frazer   
shows1 was an annual practice4 ,year by 
year the god was killed in order that   
the seed might ripen and the harvest be 
secured4 ,in some cases the body was cut
 up and pieces buried in the fields2 in 
other cases it was burned and the ashes 
scattered over the ground4 ,gradually   
the ritual becomes more elaborate1 but  
the central idea remains intact that of 
a human being converted into a god by   
being killed1 a man sacrificed for the  
benefit of the tribe4 ,in the light of  
these researches the ,new ,testament    
story becomes only a more recent version
 of a widespread savage superstition4   

,the time of the sacrifice1 the         
symbolism1 the practices all prove this4
 ,the crucified ,saviour1 in honour of  
whom all the ,christian cathedrals and  
churches of the world are built1 is only
 another late survival of the god-making
 practice of primitive savagery4  ,the  
gods are1 then1 ultimately deified      
ghosts4 ,they are born of misinterpreted
 subjective and objective experiences4  
,this is among the surest and most      
firmly established results of modern    
investigation4 ,it matters not what     
modifications later knowledge may       
demand2 it will only mean a change of   
form1 not of substance4 ,on any         
scientific theory we are bound to       
explain the origin of the gods in terms 
of human error4 ,and no subsequent      
development can alter its character4 ,we
 may trace the various stages of a      
universal delusion1 but nothing can     
convert a delusion into a reality4 ,it  
is now universally recognised that the  
primitive notions of gods represent     

false conclusions from misunderstood    
facts4 ,no one now believes that the    
visions seen during sleep are proofs of 
a wandering double4 ,no one believes    
that it is necessary to supply the ghost
 of the dead with food1 or with weapons1
 or with wives4 ,we do not believe that 
the wind1 the stars1 the waters are     
alive or are capable of being influenced
 by our petitions4 ,all the phenomena   
upon which the god idea was originally  
built are now known to be susceptible to
 a radically different explanation4 ,and
 if this is so1 what other foundations  
have we on which to build a belief in   
,god8 ,there is none4 ,there is only one
 plausible reason for the belief in     
,god1 and that is the reason advanced by
 the savage4 ,when we get beyond that we
 are not dealing with reasons for       
holding the belief1 but only with       
excuses for retaining it4               
,unfortunately1 thousands are familiar  
with the excuses1 and only a few with   
the reasons4 ,were it otherwise a great 

deal of what follows need never have    
been written4  ,,footnotes3  #a ,both   
the words supernatural and ,god are here
 used somewhat loosely4 ,in fact the    
conception of the supernatural arises   
gradually1 and as a consequence of      
developing knowledge which1 so to speak1
 splits the universe into two4 ,so also 
with the belief in ,god4 ,there is      
clearly an earlier form in which there  
exists a kind of mental plasma from     
which the more definite conception of   
,god is subsequently formed4 ,on this   
topic the reader may consult ,the       
,threshold of ,religion1 by ,r4 ,r4     
,marett1 #aiad4  #b ,for the importance 
of this in the history of religion see  
,fustel de ,coulanges' ,the ,ancient    
,city4  #c ,the perpetuation of this    
earlier stage of religion in ,china and 
,japan appears to make the transition to
 ,free-thought easier than in countries 
where religion has under-gone a more    
advanced evolution4 ,in both the        
countries named1 the better minds find  

it quite easy to treat their religion as
 merely the respect paid to ancestors1  
and thus divest it of the supernatural  
element4 ,in ,christian countries there 
is also the attempt to restate beliefs  
in terms of current morality and        
sociology1 but the transition is more   
difficult4     ,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,have 
,,we ,a ,,religious ,,sense8   ,in all  
discussions of theism there is one point
 that is usually overlooked4 ,this is   
that theism is in the nature of a       
hypothesis4 ,and1 like every hypothesis1
 its value is proportionate to the      
extent to which it offers a satisfactory
 explanation of the facts with which it 
professes to deal4 ,if it can offer no  
explanation its value is nil4 ,if its   
explanation is only partial1 its value  
will be determined by the degree to     
which it can claim superiority over any 
other hypothesis that is before us4 ,but
 every hypothesis implies two things4   
,there is a group of things to be       
explained1 and there is the hypothesis  

itself that is offered in explanation4  
,in the harmony of the two1 and in the  
possibility of verification1 lies the   
only proof of truth that can be offered4
  ,if this be granted it at once        
disposes of the plea that a conviction  
of the existence of ,god springs from   
some special quality of the mind which  
enables man to arrive at a conclusion in
 a manner different from the way in     
which conclusions concerning other      
subjects are reached4 ,intuition as a   
method of discovering truth is pure     
delusion4 ,all that can be rationally   
meant by such a word as intuition is    
summarised experience4 ,when we speak of
 knowing a thing intuitively1 all that  
we can mean is that1 experience having  
furnished us with a sufficient guidance1
 we are able to reach a conclusion so   
rapidly that we cannot follow the steps 
of the mental process involved4 ,that   
this is so is seen in the fact that our 
intuitions always follow the line of our
 experience4 ,a stockbroker may         

intuitively foresee a rise or fall of   
the market1 but his intuition will fail 
him when considering the possibilities  
of a chemical composition4 ,to say that 
a man knows a thing by intuition is only
 one way of saying that he does not know
 how he knows it--that is1 he is unable 
to trace the stages of his own mental   
operations4 ,and in this sense intuition
 is universal4 ,it belongs as much to   
the cooking of a dumpling as it does to 
the belief in deity4  ,but it is evident
 that when the theist talks of          
intuition1 what he has in mind is       
something very different from this4 ,he 
is thinking of some special quality of  
mind that operates independently of     
experience1 either racial or individual4
 ,and this simply does not exist4 ,in   
religion man is never putting into      
operation qualities of mind different   
from those he employs in other          
directions4 ,whether we call a state of 
mind religious or not is determined1 not
 by the mental processes involved1 but  

by the object to which it is directed4  
,hatred and love1 anger1 pleasure1 awe1 
curiosity1 reverence1 even worship1 are 
exactly the same whether directed       
towards ,god or towards anything else4  
,human qualities are fundamentally      
identical1 and may be expressed in      
relation to all sorts of objects4  ,the 
attempt to mark religion off from the   
rest of life1 to be approached by       
special methods and in a special frame  
of mind1 takes many forms1 and it may be
 illustrated by the manner in which it  
is dealt with by ,professor ,arthur     
,thomson4 ,in a little work entitled ,an
 ,introduction to ,science1 and         
specially intended for general          
consumption1 he remarks1 as a piece of  
advice to his readers3--        ,we     
would remind ourselves and our readers  
that the whole subject      should be   
treated with reverence and sympathy1 for
 it is hardly      possible to          
exaggerate the august role of religion  
in human life4      ,whatever be our    

views1 we must recognise that just as   
the great      mathematicians and       
metaphysicians represent the aristocracy
 of the      human intellect1 so the    
great religious geniuses represent the  
aristocracy of human emotion4 ,and in   
this connection it is probably          
useful to bear in mind that in all      
discussions about religious      ideas  
or feelings we should ourselves be in an
 exalted mood1 and      yet with a      
compelling sense of our own limitations1
 and of the      vastness and           
mysteriousness of the world4   ,if      
,professor ,thomson had been writing on 
,frames of ,mind ,fatal to ,scientific  
,investigation he could hardly have     
chosen a better illustration of his     
thesis4 ,one may safely say that anyone 
who started an examination of religion  
in this spirit1 and maintained it       
throughout his examination1 would       
perform something little short of a     
miracle did he reach a sound conclusion4
 ,a feeling of sympathy may pass1 but   

why reverence8 ,reverence is a very     
complex state1 but it certainly includes
 respect and a certain measure of       
affection4 ,and how is one to rationally
 have respect or affection for anything 
before one has ascertained that they are
 deserving of either8 ,is anyone who    
happens to believe that religion is not 
worthy of reverence to be ruled out as  
being unfit to express an opinion8      
,clearly1 on this rule1 either we compel
 a man to sacrifice his sense of        
self-respect before we will allow him to
 be heard1 or we pack the jury with     
persons who confess to have reached a   
decision before they have heard the     
evidence4 ,it would almost seem from the
 expression that while examining        
religion we should be in an exalted mood
 that ,professor ,thomson has in view   
the last contingency4 ,for by an exalted
 mood we can only understand a religious
 mood--that is1 we must believe in      
religion before we examine it1 otherwise
 our examination is profanity4 ,well1   

that is just the cry of the priest in   
all ages4 ,and while it is sound        
religion1 there is no question of its   
being shocking science4 ,even the mere  
feeling of exaltation is not to be      
encouraged during a scientific          
investigation4 ,one can understand      
,kepler when he had discovered the true 
laws of planetary motion1 or ,newton    
when he embraced in one magnificent     
generalisation the fall of a stone and  
the revolution of a planet1 experiencing
 a feeling of exaltation2 but exaltation
 must follow1 not precede1 the          
conclusion4 ,at any rate1 there are few 
scientific teachers who would encourage 
such a feeling during investigation4    
,leaving for a moment the question of   
religious geniuses being the aristocrats
 of human emotion1 we may take the same 
writer's view of the limitations of     
science1 thus providing an opening for  
the intrusion of religion4 ,this is     
given in the form of a criticism of the 
following well-known passage from       

,huxley3--        ,if the fundamental   
proposition of evolution is true1       
namely1 that      the entire world1     
animate and inanimate1 is the result of 
the      mutual interaction1 according  
to definite laws1 of forces possessed   
by the molecules which made up the      
primitive nebulosity of the             
universe2 then it is no less certain    
that the present actual world           
reposed potentially in the cosmic       
vapour1 and that an intelligence1       
if great enough1 could from his         
knowledge of the properties of the      
molecules of that vapour have predicted 
the state of the fauna in      ,great   
,britain in #ahhh with as much certitude
 as we say what will      happen to the 
vapour of our breath on a cold day in   
winter4   ,now1 if the principle of     
evolution be accepted1 the truth of     
,huxley's statement appears to be       
self-evident4 ,it may be that no        
intelligence capable of making such a   
calculation will ever exist1 but the    

abstract possibility remains4 ,professor
 ,thomson calls it a very strong and    
confident statement1 which illustrates  
the need for philosophical criticism4   
,his criticism of ,huxley's statement is
 based on two grounds4 ,these are3 7#a7 
,no complete physico-chemical           
description has ever been given of any  
distinctively vital activity2 and 7#b7  
the physical description of things      
cannot cover biological phenomena1 nor  
can the biological description cover    
mental and moral phenomena4 ,there is1  
he says1        ,the physical order of  
nature--the inorganic world--where      
mechanism      reigns supreme4 7#b7     
,there is the vital order of nature--the
 world      of organisms--where         
mechanism proves insufficient4 7#c7     
,there is the      physical order of    
nature--the world of mind--where        
mechanism is      irrelevant4 ,thus     
there are three fundamental             
sciences--,physics1      ,biology1 and  
,psychology--each with characteristic   

questions1      categories and formulae4
   ,now1 however earnestly ,huxley's    
statement calls for criticism1 it is    
clear to us that nothing useful in that 
direction is offered by ,prof4 ,thomson4
 ,it is quite plain that the abstract   
possibility of such a calculation as    
that named by ,huxley can never be ruled
 out by science1 since such a conception
 lies at the root of all scientific     
thinking4 ,after all1 want of knowledge 
only proves--want of knowledge2 and ,sir
 ,oliver ,lodge would warn ,prof4       
,thomson of the extreme danger of       
resting an argument on the ignorance of 
science at any particular time4#d  ,i   
note this statement of ,professor       
,thomson's chiefly because it           
illustrates a very common method of     
dealing with the mechanistic or         
non-theistic view of the universe4 ,in  
this matter ,professor ,thomson may     
claim the companionship of ,sir ,oliver 
,lodge1 who says1 ,materialism is       
appropriate to the material world1 not  

as a philosophy1 but as a working creed1
 as a proximate1 an immediate formula   
for guiding research4 ,everything beyond
 that belongs to another region1 and    
must be reached by other methods4 ,to   
explain the psychical in terms of       
physics and chemistry is simply         
impossible4444 ,the extreme school of   
biologists 444 ought to say1 if they    
were consistent1 there is nothing but   
physics and chemistry at work anywhere4 
,with both these writers there is the   
common assumption that the mechanist    
assumes there is a physical and chemical
 explanation of all phenomena4 ,and the 
assumption is false4 ,there is a story  
of a well-known lecturer on physiology  
who commenced an address on the stomach 
by remarking that that organ had been   
called this1 that1 and the other1 but   
the one thing he wished his students to 
bear in mind was that it was a stomach4 
,so the mechanist1 while firmly         
believing that there is an ascending    
unity in all natural phenomena1 is never

 silly enough to deny that living things
 are alive1 or that thinking beings     
think4  ,but unless ,professor ,thomson 
does impute this to the mechanist1 we   
quite fail to see the relevance his     
assertion that there are three          
departments1 physics1 biology1 and      
psychology1 each with its characteristic
 questions1 categories1 and formulae4   
,of course1 there are1 and equally1 of  
course1 physical laws will not cover    
biological facts2 nor will biological   
laws cover psychological ones4 ,this is 
not due to any occult cause1 but to the 
simple fact that as each group of       
phenomena has its characteristic        
features1 each set of laws are framed to
 cover the phenomena presented by that  
group4 ,otherwise there would be no need
 of these special laws4 ,it is          
astonishing how paralysing is the effect
 of the theistic obsession on the minds 
of even scientific men1 since it leads  
them to ignore what is really a basic   
consideration in scientific method4     

,perhaps a word or two more on this     
topic is advisable4 ,if it is           
permissible to arrange natural phenomena
 in a serial order1 we may place them in
 succession as physical1 chemical1      
biological1 and psychological4 ,but     
these names represent no more than      
descriptions of certain features that   
are to the group common1 otherwise the  
grouping would be useless and           
impossible4 ,and it is part of the      
business of science to frame            
laws--descriptions--of phenomena such as
 will enable us to express their        
characteristic features in a brief      
formula4 ,it is1 therefore1 quite true  
to say that you cannot express vital    
phenomena in terms of physics or        
chemistry4 ,and no materialist who took 
the trouble to understand materialism1  
instead of taking a statement of what it
 is from an anti-materialist1 ever      
thought otherwise4 ,each specific group 
of phenomena can only be covered by laws
 that belong to that group1 and which   

were framed for that express purpose4 ,a
 psychological fact can no more be      
expressed in terms of chemistry than a  
physical fact can be expressed in terms 
of biology4 ,these truths are as plain  
to the mechanist as they are to the     
vitalist4 ,mental life1 the scientific  
categories1 are real to all2 the only   
question at issue is that of their      
origin4  ,to explain is to make         
intelligible1 and in that sense all     
scientific explanation consists in the  
establishing of equivalents4 ,when we   
say that ,a1 ,b1 ,c are the factors of  
,d1 we have asserted ,d is the          
equivalent of ,a1 ,b1 ,c--plus1 of      
course1 all that results from the       
combination of the factors4 ,when we say
 that we have explained the formation of
 water by showing it to be the product  
of ,h4#b4,o4 we have shown that whether 
we say water or use the chemical formula
 we are making identical statements4 ,if
 we are working out a problem in        
dynamics we meet with exactly the same  

principle4 ,we must prove that the      
resultant accounts for all the forces in
 operation at the time4 ,now1 all that  
the mechanist claims is that it is      
extremely probable that one day the     
scientist will be able to work out the  
exact physico-chemical conditions that  
are the equivalents of biological       
phenomena1 and1 in turn1 the            
physico-chemical-biological conditions  
that are the equivalents of             
psychological phenomena4 ,very          
considerable progress has already been  
made in this direction1 and1 as ,sir    
,oliver ,lodge says1 there are probably 
very few scientific men who would deny  
the likelihood of this being done4  ,but
 this does not deny the existence of    
differences between these groups of     
phenomena2 neither does it assert that  
we can describe the characteristic      
features of one group in terms that     
belong to another group4 ,once a group  
of phenomena1 biological1 or chemical is
 there1 we must have special formulae to

 describe them1 otherwise there would be
 no need for these divisions4 ,it is    
admitted that the earth was at one time 
destitute of life2 it is also admitted  
that there are forms of life destitute  
of those features which we call mind4   
,and1 whatever be their mode of origin1 
once introduced they must be dealt with 
in special terms4 ,psychological facts  
must be expressed in terms of           
psychology1 biological facts in terms of
 biology1 and chemical facts in terms of
 chemistry4 ,you may give the chemical  
and physical equivalent of a sunset4    
,that is one aspect4 ,you may also give 
the psychological explanation of the    
emotion of man on beholding it4 ,that is
 another aspect4 ,but you cannot express
 the psychological fact in terms of     
chemistry because it belongs to quite   
another category4 ,a psychological fact1
 as such1 is ultimate4 ,so is a chemical
 or a biological fact4 ,if by analysis  
you reduce the psychological fact to its
 chemical and biological equivalents1   

its character as a psychological fact is
 destroyed4 ,that is the product of the 
synthesis1 and to seek in analysis for  
what only exists in synthesis1 is surely
 to altogether misunderstand the spirit 
of scientific method4 ,the curious thing
 is that a mere layman should have to   
correct men of science on this matter4  
,we can now return to ,prof4 ,thomson's 
attempt to claim for religion a special 
place in the sphere of emotion4 ,he     
claims1 in the passage already cited1   
that as the great mathematicians and    
metaphysicians represent the aristocracy
 of human intellect so the great        
religious geniuses represent the        
aristocracy of human emotion4 ,there is 
nothing new in this claim1 neither is   
there any evidence of its truth4        
,coleridge's dictum that the proper     
antithesis to religion is poetry is open
 to serious objection1 but there is more
 to be said for it than may be said for 
the antithesis set up by ,prof4         
,thomson4 ,as a matter of fact1         

religious geniuses have often pursued   
their work with as much attention to    
scientific precision as was possible1   
and have prided themselves that they    
made no appeal to mere emotion4         
,justification by emotion has only been 
attempted when other means of securing  
conviction has failed4 ,and the appeal  
to emotion has become popular for very  
obvious reasons4 ,it enables the        
ordinary theologian to feel a           
comfortable superiority over a ,spencer 
or a ,darwin4 ,it enables mediocrities  
to enjoy the feeling of being wise      
without the trouble of acquiring wisdom4
 ,it enables inherited prejudices to    
rank as reasoned convictions4 ,and1 in  
addition1 there is nothing that cannot  
be conveniently proved or disproved by  
such a method4  ,in whatever form the   
distinction is met with it harbours a   
fallacy4 ,intellectual activity is not  
and cannot be divorced from emotion4    
,there are states of mind in which      
feeling predominates1 and there are     

others in which reason predominates4    
,but all intellectual states involve a  
feeling element4 ,the often-made remark 
that feeling and intellect are in       
conflict is true only in the sense that 
ultimately certain intellectual states1 
plus their associated feelings1 are in  
conflict with other intellectual states 
plus their associated feelings4 ,to     
realise this one need only consider the 
sheer pleasure that results from the    
rapid sweep of the mind through a       
lengthy chain of reasoning1 and the     
positive pain that ensues when the terms
 of a proposition baffles comprehension4
 ,the force of this is admitted by      
,prof4 ,thomson in the remark that man  
at the limit of his endeavour has fallen
 back on religion4 ,quite so2 that is   
the painful feelings evoked by an       
intellectual failure have thrown a      
certain type of mind back on religion4  
,in this they have acted like one who   
flies to a drug for relief from a pain  
he lacks the courage to bear4 ,they take

 a narcotic when1 often enough1 the real
 need is for a stimulant4  ,in sober    
truth religion is no more necessarily   
connected with the emotions than are    
other subjects of investigation4 ,those 
who have made the pursuit of cold       
scientific truth their life's work have 
shown every whit as much ardour and     
passion as those who have given their   
life to religion4 ,the picture of man   
sacrificing himself in the cause of     
religion is easily matched by a         
,vesalius haunting the charnel houses of
 ,europe1 and risking the most loathsome
 diseases in the interests of scientific
 research4 ,the abiding passion for     
truth in a character such as that of    
,roger ,bacon or ,bruno easily matches  
the enthusiasm of the missionary monk4  
,the passion and the enthusiasm for     
science is less advertised than the     
passion and the enthusiasm for religion1
 but it is quite as real1 and certainly 
not less valuable4 ,the state of mind of
 ,kepler on discovering the laws of     

planetary motion was hardly less        
ecstatic than that of a religious       
visionary describing his sense of       
spiritual communion4 ,only in the case  
of the scientist1 it is emotion guided  
by reason1 not reason checked and partly
 throttled by emotion4  ,when1          
therefore1 ,matthew ,arnold defined     
religion as morality touched with       
emotion1 he substituted a fallacy for a 
definition4 ,primarily religion is as   
much a conviction as is the ,copernican 
system of astronomy4 ,it exists first as
 an idea2 it only exists as an emotion  
at a later stage4 ,there is really no   
such thing as a religious emotion1 there
 are only emotions connected with       
religion4 ,originally all religion is in
 the nature of an inference from        
observed or experienced facts4 ,this    
inference may not be of the elaborate   
kind that we associate with modern      
scientific work1 but it is there4 ,the  
inference is an illogical one1 but under
 the conditions inevitable4 ,and being  

an inference religion is not primarily  
an emotion but a conviction1 and it must
 stand or fall by its intellectual      
trustworthiness4 ,it seems1 indeed1     
little less than a truism to say that   
unless men first of all believed        
something about religion they could     
never have emotions concerning it4 ,hope
 and fear may colour our convictions1   
they may prevent the formation of       
correct opinions1 but they originate in 
connection with a belief in every case4 
,and an emotion1 if it be a healthful   
one1 must be ultimately capable of      
intellectual justification4 ,when this  
cannot be done1 when we have mere       
emotion pleaded as a ground for         
rejecting rational examination1 we have 
irrationalism driven to its last ditch4 
,,footnote3  #d ,the present            
powerlessness of science to explain or  
originate life is a convenient weapon   
wherewith to fell a pseudo-scientific   
antagonist who is dogmatising too loudly
 out of bounds2 but it is not perfectly 

secure as a permanent support4444 ,life 
in its ultimate elements and on its     
material side is such a simple thing1 it
 is but a slight extension of known     
chemical and physical forces4444 ,i     
apprehend that there is not a biologist 
but believes 7perhaps quite erroneously7
 that sooner or later the discovery will
 be made1 and that a cell discharging   
all the essential functions of life will
 be constructed out of inorganic        
material4 7,man and the ,universe1      
,chap4 ,i474     ,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,the 
,,argument ,,from ,,existence4   ,what1 
now1 are the facts upon which the modern
 believer in deity professes to base his
 belief and what are the arguments used 
to defend the position taken up8        
,premising that the reasons advanced for
 the belief in deity are more in the    
nature of excuses than aught else1 we   
may take first of all the argument      
derived from the mere existence of the  
universe1 with the alleged impossibility
 of conceiving it as self-existent4     

,along with that there may also be taken
 as a variant of the argument from      
existence1 the alleged impossibility of 
a natural order that should result from 
the inherent properties of natural      
forces4 ,now it is at least plain that  
whatever difficulty there is in thinking
 of the universe as either self-existing
 or self-adjusting is in no degree      
lessened by assuming a ,god as the      
originator and sustainer of the whole4  
,the most that it does is to move the   
difficulty back a step1 and while with  
many out of sight out of mind is as true
 of their attitude towards mental       
problems as it is towards the more      
ordinary things of life1 the policy can 
hardly be commended in serious          
intellectual discussions4 ,it is not a  
bit easier to think of self-existence or
 self-direction in connection with a god
 than it is in connection with the      
universe4 ,and if we must rest          
ultimately with an insoluble difficulty1
 it is surely better to stop with the   

existence we know rather than to        
introduce a second existence which for  
all we know may be quite mythical4  ,it 
is no reply to say that the idea of ,god
 involves self-existence4 ,it does      
nothing of the kind1 or at least it can 
do so only by our making yet another    
assumption that is as unjustifiable as  
the previous one4 ,if ,god is a         
personality1 we have no conception of a 
personality that is self-existent4 ,the 
only personality that we know is the    
human personality1 and that is certainly
 derived4 ,our whole knowledge of human 
personality is that of something which  
is derived from pre-existing            
personalities1 each of which is a centre
 of derived influences4 ,of personality 
as either the cause or the commencement 
of a series we have not the slightest   
conception4 ,and the man who says he has
 can never have carefully examined the  
contents of his own mind4  ,the truth is
 that the fact of the existence of the  
universe provides no ground for argument

 in favour of either ,atheism or        
,theism4 ,existence is a common datum   
for all4 ,some existence must be assumed
 in all argument since all argument     
implies something that is to be         
discussed and explained4 ,and for that  
very reason we can offer no explanation 
of existence itself1 since all          
explanation means the merging of one    
class of facts in a larger class4 ,the  
largest class of facts we have is that  
which is included in the term universe1 
and we cannot explain that by assuming  
another existence--,god--about which we 
know nothing4 ,to explain the unknown by
 the known is an intelligible procedure4
 ,to explain the known by the unknown is
 to forsake all intellectual sanity4    
,thus every difficulty that surrounds   
the conception of the universe as an    
ultimate fact1 surrounds the existence  
of ,god as an ultimate fact4 ,you cannot
 get rid of a difficulty by giving it   
another name4 ,and whether we call      
ultimate existence ,god1 or matter1 or  

substance1 is of no vital importance to 
anyone who keeps his mind on the real   
issue that has to be decided4 ,if the   
question1 ,what is the cause of         
existence8 be a legitimate one1 it      
applies no less to the existence of ,god
 than it does to the existence of       
matter1 or force1 or substance4 ,all    
that we gain is another problem which we
 add to the problems we already possess4
 ,we increase our burden without        
enlarging our comprehension4 ,if1 on the
 other hand1 it is said that we need an 
all embracing formula that will make our
 conception of the universe coherent1 it
 may be replied that we have that in    
such a conception as the persistence of 
force4 ,and it is surely better to keep 
to a formula that does at least work1   
than to devise one that is altogether   
useless4  ,the inherent weakness of the 
theistic conception will be best seen by
 taking an orthodox presentation of the 
argument under consideration4 ,in his   
well-known work on ,theism1 ,professor  

,flint says that granting all the atoms 
of matter to be eternal1 grant that all 
the properties and forces1 which with   
the smallest degree of plausibility can 
be claimed for them to be eternal and   
indestructible1 and it is still beyond  
expression improbable that these atoms1 
with these forces1 if unarranged1       
uncombined1 unutilised by a presiding   
mind1 would give rise to anything       
entitled to be called a universe4 ,it is
 millions to one that they would never  
produce the simplest of the regular     
arrangements which we comprehend under  
the designation of course of nature4    
7,theism2 pp4 #ajg-h47  ,now this is an 
admirably clear and terse statement of  
an argument which is often presented in 
so verbose a manner that its real nature
 is1 to a considerable extent1          
disguised4 ,but in this case1 clearness 
of statement makes for ease of          
refutation1 as will be seen4  ,for1     
instead of the statement being1 as the  
writer seems to think1 almost           

self-evidently true1 it is almost       
obtrusively false4 ,instead of its being
 millions to one1 given matter and force
 with all their present properties1     
against the present arrangement of      
things occurring1 it is inconceivable1  
assuming that nothing but the atoms and 
their properties exist1 that any other  
arrangement than the present one should 
have resulted4 ,for the present natural 
order is not something that is1 so to   
speak1 separable from our conception of 
natural forces1 it is something that has
 grown out of and is the expression of  
the idea of nature4 ,thus1 given a      
proper understanding of the principle of
 gravitation1 and it is impossible to   
conceive an unsupported stone not       
falling to the ground4 ,given a proper  
conception of the properties of the     
constituents of a chemical compound1 and
 we can only conceive one result as     
possible4 ,in all cases our conception  
of what must occur follows from the     
nature of the forces themselves4 ,this  

is necessarily the case since the       
conception of the ultimate properties of
 matter has been built up by the        
observation of the actual results4 ,and 
one simply cannot conceive an alteration
 in these results without thinking of   
some alteration or modification of the  
causes of which they are the expression4
 ,what is true of the part is true of   
the whole4 ,the present structure of the
 world stands as the inevitable outcome 
of the play of natural forces4 ,this is 
both the expression of an actual fact   
and a condition of coherent thought4    
,uniformity of results from uniformity  
of conditions is a pre-requisite to sane
 thinking4  ,in reality1 the expression 
millions to one is no more than an      
appeal to man's awe in facing a         
stupendous mechanism1 and his feeling of
 impotence when dealing with so complex 
a subject as the evolution of a world4  
,it can only mean that to a certain     
state of knowledge it seems millions to 
one against the present order resulting4

 ,but to a certain state of knowledge it
 would seem millions to one against so  
fluid a thing as water ever becoming    
solid4 ,to others it is a commonplace   
thing and a necessary consequence of the
 properties of water itself4 ,to a      
savage it would be millions to one      
against a cloud of fire mist ever       
becoming a world with a highly          
diversified fauna and flora4 ,to a      
scientist there is nothing more in it   
than antecedent and consequent4 ,such   
expressions as its being millions to one
 against certain things happening is    
never really more than an appeal to     
ignorance2 it means only that our       
knowledge is not great enough to permit 
our tracing the successive stages of the
 evolution before us4 ,once the         
scientific conception of the universe is
 grasped1 the marvel is not that the    
present order exists1 the marvel would  
be that any other order should be1 or   
that any radical alteration in it should
 occur4  ,and there really is no need to

 throw the whole universe at the head of
 the sceptic4 ,that is an attempt to    
overcome him with sheer weight4         
,intrinsically there is nothing more    
marvellous in the evolution of a        
habitable globe from the primitive      
nebula1 than there is in the fact that  
an unsupported stone always falls to the
 ground4 ,it is only our familiarity    
with the one experience and our lack of 
knowledge concerning the other that     
gives us the condition of wonder in the 
one case and lack of it in the other4   
,in the light of modern knowledge order 
is1 as ,w4 ,h4 ,mallock says1 a physical
 platitude1 not a divine paradox4       
,moreover1 if the odds are a million to 
one against the existence of the present
 arrangement existing1 the odds would be
 equally great against the existence of 
any other arrangement4 ,and as the odds 
are equally great against all--seeing   
that some arrangement must exist--there 
can be no logical value in using the    
argument against one arrangement in     

particular4 ,the same question1 ,why    
this arrangement and none other8 might  
arise in any case4  ,finally1 the       
absurdity of arguing that the order of  
nature compels a belief in deity may be 
seen by realising the fact that our     
conception of order is itself the       
product of the experienced sequence     
which constitutes the order in question4
 ,our ideas of order are not independent
 of the world1 they are its product--an 
expression of the relation between      
organism and environment4 ,given a      
different organism1 with different sense
 organs1 and the world would appear     
different4 ,on the other hand the whole 
structure of man is the result of the   
existing conditions4 ,assume the order  
to be changed1 and the human            
organism--presuming it still to exist1  
will undergo corresponding              
modifications4 ,it would not find less  
order or less beauty1 the order and the 
beauty would simply be found in another 
direction4 ,and1 presumably1 the theist 

would still point to the existence of   
that order as clear proof of a designing
 intelligence4  ,something needs to be  
said here on a more recent form of the  
argument from the order of nature than  
the one we have been discussing4 ,there 
is no vital distinction between the old 
and the new form1 but a variation in    
terms seems to produce on some minds a  
conviction of newness--itself a proof   
that the nature of the old form had     
never been fully realised4  ,this new   
form is that based upon what is called  
,directivity4 ,recognising that it is no
 longer possible to successfully dispute
 the scientific proposition that the    
state of the universe at any one moment 
must be taken as the result of all the  
conditions then prevailing1 and1        
therefore1 it is to the operation of the
 ultimate properties of matter1 force1  
ether1--or whatever name we choose to   
give to the substance of the            
universe--it is argued that we          
nevertheless require some directing     

force which will set1 and keep the      
universe on its present track4  ,but    
there is really nothing in this beyond  
the now familiar appeal to human        
impotence4 ,we do not know1 ,we cannot  
see1 are quite excellent reasons for    
saying nothing at all1 but the very     
worst ground on which to make positive  
statements1 or on which to base positive
 beliefs4 ,the only condition that would
 justify our making human ignorance a   
ground on which to make statements of   
the kind named would be that we had     
demonstrably exhausted the possibilities
 of natural forces1 and no further      
developments were possible in this      
direction4 ,far from this being the case
 there is not a single man of science   
who would dissent from the statement    
that we are only upon the threshold of a
 knowledge of their possibilities4  ,and
 this assumption of direction is        
unconvincing1 if not suicidal in        
character4 ,assuming that direction may 
have occurred1 the fact of direction    

adds nothing to the qualities or        
possibilities of existence1 any more    
than the directivity of a chemist adds  
to the possibilities of certain elements
 when he brings them into combination4  
,unless the possibilities of the        
compound were already in the elements   
guidance would be useless4 ,and1 in the 
same way1 unless the capacity for       
producing the universe we see already   
existed in the atoms themselves1 no     
amount of direction could have produced 
it4 ,god simply takes the place of the  
chemist bringing certain chemical       
elements in1 of the engineer guiding    
certain forces along a particular       
channel4 ,but no new capacity is        
created1 and all that is done by either 
the chemist or the engineer might occur 
without their interference4 ,otherwise  
it could not occur at all4  ,now there  
is no denying that natural forces do    
produce the phenomena around us4 ,that  
is undeniable4 ,and whether there be a  
god or not this fact remains quite      

unaffected4 ,all that ,god can do is to 
set up certain combinations4 ,but this  
does not exclude the possibility of this
 combination taking place without the   
operation of deity4 ,in fact1 it implies
 it4 ,either1 then1 natural forces      
possess the capacity to produce the     
universe as we see it1 or they do not4  
,if they do not1 then it is impossible  
for us to conceive in what way even     
deity could produce it4 ,if1 on the     
other hand1 they have this capacity1 the
 argument for the existence of deity    
loses its force1 and the theist is bound
 to admit that all that he claims as due
 to the action of deity might have      
happened without him4 ,the theists own  
argument1 if logically pursued ends in  
divesting it of all coercive value4  ,it
 is curious that the theist should fail 
to see that a much stronger argument for
 the operation of deity would have been 
of a negative character1 to have proved 
that in some way ,god manifested an     
inhibitive influence and thus prevented 

certain things occurring which would    
have transpired but for his             
interference4 ,regularity1 or order is1 
as we have seen1 the necessary          
consequence of the persistence of force4
 ,and so long as natural forces continue
 to express themselves in the way in    
which experience has led us to expect   
there is no need for us to think of     
anything beyond4 ,the principle of      
inertia is with us here1 for if it be   
true that force will persist in a given 
direction unless deflected from its     
course by some other force1 it must be  
equally true that all forces will work  
out a given consequence unless they are 
deflected from their course by the      
operation of some superior force4  ,now 
if it were possible for the theist to   
show that in certain cases the normal   
consequences of known forces did not    
transpire1 and that the aberration could
 not be accounted for by the operation  
of any other conceivable force1 it might
 be argued with some degree of          

plausibility that there exists a        
controlling power beyond which answers  
to ,god4 ,that might afford a plausible 
case for directivity4 ,but to insist    
upon the prevalence of natural order    
will not help the case for theism4 ,it  
will rather embarrass it4 ,it may1 of   
course1 impress all those whose         
conception of scientific method is      
poor--and sometimes one thinks that this
 is all that is deliberately aimed      
at--but it will not affect anyone else4 
,to the informed mind it will appear    
that the ,goddite is weakening his case 
with every step he takes in the         
direction of what he apparently believes
 to be a demonstration of its logical   
invulnerability4     ,,chapter ,v4      
,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,causation4    
,the argument from causation may        
logically follow that from existence1 of
 which it may be regarded as a part4 ,it
 is presented under various forms1 and  
when stated in a persuasive manner1 is  
next to the argument from design1       

probably as popular as any4 ,the        
principal reason for this is1 ,i think1 
that very few people are concerned with 
thinking out exactly what is meant by   
causation1 and the proposition that     
every event must have a cause1 wins a   
ready assent1 and when followed by the  
assertion that therefore the universe   
must have had a cause1 which is ,god1   
the reasoning1 or rather the parody of  
reasoning1 appeals to many4 ,there is a 
show of reason and logic1 but little    
more4  ,quite unquestionably a great    
deals depends upon what is meant by     
causation1 and still more upon the use  
made of the law of causation by theists4
 ,thus we have seen it urged against    
,materialists that neural activity      
cannot be the equivalent of thought     
because they do not resemble each other4
 ,and in another direction we meet with 
the same idea in the assertion that the 
cause must be equal to the effect1 by   
which it is apparently meant that the   
cause must be similar to the effect1 and

 that unless we can discern in the cause
 the same qualities manifested by the   
effect1 we have not established the fact
 of causation at all4  ,the complete and
 perfect answer to this last view is    
that the qualities manifest in an effect
 never are manifest in the cause1 were  
it so it would be impossible to         
distinguish one from the other4 ,the    
theist is1 as is often the case1 saying 
one thing and meaning another4 ,what he 
says is that the cause must be adequate 
to the effect4 ,there is no dispute     
here4 ,but what he proceeds to argue is 
that the effect must be discernible in  
the cause1 which is a different         
statement altogether4 ,when he says that
 an effect cannot be greater than its   
cause1 what he means is that an effect  
cannot be different from its cause1     
which is downright nonsense4 ,he asks1  
,how can that which has not life produce
 life8 as though the question were on   
all fours with the necessity for a man  
to possess twenty shillings before he   

can give change for a sovereign4  ,of   
course1 the reply to all this is that   
the factors which when combined produce 
an effect always give something of which
 when uncombined they show no trace4    
,there is no trace2 of sweetness in the 
constituents of sugar of lead1 or of    
blueness in the constituents of blue    
vitriol4 ,in not a single case1 if we   
are to follow the logic of the theist1  
is there a cause adequate to produce an 
effect1 if we are to follow the         
reasoning of some theists2 in each case 
we should have to assume some occult    
agent as responsible for the result4 ,in
 reality and in strict scientific truth1
 it is of the very essence of causation 
that there shall be present in the      
effect some quality or qualities that   
are not present in the cause4 ,and all  
the confusion may be eliminated if there
 is borne in mind the simple and single 
consideration that in studying an effect
 it is the qualities of a combination   
with which we are properly concerned4   

,and to expect to find in analysis that 
which is the product of synthesis is in 
the highest degree absurd4  ,sir ,oliver
 ,lodge in his little work on ,life and 
,matter properly corrects the fallacy   
with which ,i have been dealing1 and    
points out that properties can be       
possessed by an aggregate or an         
assemblage of particles1 which in the   
particles themselves did not in the     
slightest degree exist4 ,but in his     
desire to find a basis for his theism   
immediately falls into an error in an   
opposite direction4 ,we are on safe     
ground1 he says1 in asserting that      
whatever is in a part must be in the    
whole4 ,this is true if it is meant that
 as the whole contains the part1 the    
part is in the whole4 ,but in that sense
 the statement was hardly worth the     
making4 ,what his argument demands is   
the meaning that as man is possessed of 
mind1 and as man is part of nature1     
therefore nature1 as a whole1 manifests 
mind4 ,and that is not true4 ,mind may  

be a special manifestation of a special 
arrangement of forces1 and only         
occurring under special conditions4     
,what ,sir ,oliver says1 then1 is that  
the properties of a part are in the     
whole1 because the part is included in  
whole4 ,what he implies1 and without    
this implication his argument is        
meaningless1 is that the properties of a
 part belong to all parts of the whole4 
,and that is a statement so grotesquely 
untrue that ,i suspect ,sir ,oliver     
would be the first to disown the plain  
implications of his own argument4  ,and 
here is ,sir ,oliver's illustration of  
his argument3--        the fact an apple
 has pips legitimises the assertion that
 an apple      tree has pips 444 but it 
would be a childish misunderstanding to 
expect to find actual pips in the trunk 
of a tree4   ,now1 why should the fact  
that an apple has pips legitimise the   
statement that an apple tree has pips1  
any more than it legitimises the        
statement that the soil from which it   

springs has pips8 ,and if the tree has  
not actual pips1 in what sense does it  
possess them8 ,if the reply is that it  
possesses them potentially1 one may meet
 that with the rejoinder that           
potentially pips1 and everything else1  
including ,sir ,oliver ,lodge1 were     
contained in the primitive nebulae4 ,as 
a matter of fact the apple tree does not
 contain pips either actually or        
potentially4 ,in his championship of    
theism our scientist forgets his        
science4 ,what the apple tree possesses 
is the capacity for building up a fruit 
with pips with the aid of material      
extracted from the soil beneath and from
 the air around4 ,these pips are no more
 in the tree than they are in the air or
 the soil--not even as a figure of      
speech4 ,one might1 from any point of   
view1 as reasonably look for the colour 
and shape and smell of an apple in the  
tree as to look for the pips4 ,the      
properties of the tree is really one of 
the factors in the production of a      

result4 ,sir ,oliver makes the mistake  
of writing as though the tree was the   
only factor in the problem4  ,this is   
not the place in which to enter on an   
exhaustive inquiry as to the nature of  
causation4 ,it is enough to point out   
that the whole theistic fallacy rests   
here on the assumption that we are      
dealing with two things1 when as a      
matter of fact we are dealing with only 
one4 ,cause and effect are not two      
separate things1 they are the same thing
 viewed under two different aspects4    
,when1 for example1 ,i ask for the cause
 of gunpowder and am told that it is    
sulphur1 charcoal1 and nitre1 or for a  
cause of sulphuric acid and am given    
sulphide of iron and oxygen1 it is clear
 that considered separately these       
ingredients are not causes at all4      
,whether charcoal and sulphur will      
become part of the cause of gunpowder or
 not will depend upon the presence of   
the third agent2 whether sulphide of    
iron will rank as part of the cause of  

sulphuric acid will depend upon the     
presence of oxygen4 ,in every case it is
 the assemblage of appropriate factors  
that constitute a real cause4 ,but given
 the factors1 gunpowder does not follow 
their assemblage1 it is their assemblage
 that is expressed by the result4 ,there
 is no succession in time1 the result is
 instantaneous with the assemblage of   
the factors4 ,the effect is the         
registration1 so to speak1 of the       
combination of the factors4  ,now if    
what has been said be admitted as       
correct the argument for the existence  
of ,god as based upon the fact of       
causation breaks down completely4 ,if   
cause and effect are the expressions of 
a relation1 and if they are not two     
things1 but only one1 under two aspects1
 cause being the name for the related   
powers of the factors1 and effect the   
name for their assemblage1 to talk1 as  
does the theist1 of working back along  
the chain of causes until we reach ,god1
 is nonsense4 ,even if we could achieve 

this feat of regression1 we could not   
reach by this means a ,god distinct from
 the universe4 ,for1 as discovering the 
cause of any effect means no more than  
analysing an effect into its factors1   
the problem would ultimately be that of 
dealing with the question of how        
something already existing transformed  
itself into the existing universe4 ,a   
form of a very doubtful ,pantheism might
 be reached in this way1 but not theism4
  ,but here a fresh difficulty presents 
itself to the theist4 ,a cause1 as ,i   
have pointed out1 must consist of at    
least two factors or two forces4 ,this  
is absolutely indispensable4 ,but       
assuming that we have got back to a     
point prior to the existence of the     
universe1 we have on the theistic       
theory1 not two factors1 but only one4  
,the essential condition for an act of  
causation is lacking4 ,a single factor  
could only repeat itself4 ,by this      
method the theist might reach ,god4 ,but
 having got there1 there he would       

remain4 ,he is left with ,god and       
nothing else1 and with no possibility of
 reaching anything else4  ,we land in   
the same dilemma if we pursue another   
road4 ,philosophers of certain schools  
place existence in two categories4      
,there is the world of appearance       
7phenomena71 and there is the world of  
reality or substance 7noumena74 ,we know
 phenomena and their laws1 they say1 but
 no more4 ,we do not know1 and cannot   
know1 ,substance in itself2 and the     
theist promptly adds that this unknown  
substance is but another name for ,god4 
,the philosopher also warns us against  
applying the laws of the phenomenal     
world to noumena1 reminding us that what
 we call laws of nature have been       
devised to explain the world as it      
presents itself to our consciousness4   
,and to this we have the theological    
analogue in the warning not to measure  
the infinite by the finite or to judge  
,god by human standards4  ,now granting 
all this1 let us see how the argument   

stands4 ,the laws of phenomena belong   
exclusively to the phenomenal world4    
,their application and their validity   
are restricted to the world of          
phenomena4 ,when we leave this region we
 are in a sphere to which they are quite
 inapplicable4 ,what1 then1 can be meant
 by speaking of ,god as a ,first ,cause8
 ,cause is a phenomenal term1 it        
expresses the relations between         
phenomena1 and it has no meaning when   
applied to this assumed and unknown     
reality4 ,we are in the position of one 
who is trying to use a colour scale in a
 world where vision does not exist4 ,the
 theist is trying1 in a similar way1 to 
use the conception of cause1 which is   
created to express the relations between
 phenomena1 in a world where phenomena  
have no existence4 ,thus1 when the      
theist1 to use his own words1 has traced
 back an effect to a cause1 and this to 
a prior cause1 and so on1 till he has   
reached a ,first ,cause1 what happens8  
,simply this4 ,at the end of the chain  

of phenomena the theist makes a mighty  
jump and gains the noumenon4 ,but       
between this and the phenomenon he can  
establish no relation whatever4 ,it     
cannot be a cause of phenomena because  
on his own showing causation is a       
phenomenal thing4 ,he has worked back   
along the chain of causation1 discarding
 link after link on his journey4        
,finally1 he reaches ,god and discards  
the lot4 ,and here he is left clinging  
with no intelligible way of getting back
 again4 ,if on the other hand1 he       
relates ,god to phenomena he has failed 
to get what he requires4 ,he has merely 
added one more link to his chain of     
phenomena1 and the first cause remains  
as far off as ever4 ,for if ,god is not 
related to phenomena he ceases to be a  
cause of phenomena in the only sense in 
which he is of use to the theistic      
hypothesis4  ,further1 one may ask1 ,why
 travel back along the chain of         
causation to discover ,god8 ,what is    
gained by travelling along an infinite  

series1 and saying suddenly1 ,at this   
point ,i espy ,god4 ,confessedly we may 
trace back phenomena as far as we will  
without finding ourselves a step nearer 
a commencement4 ,all we get is a        
transformation of pre-existing material 
into new forms4 ,consequently all the   
evidence that exists at the moment we   
cease our journey existed when we began 
it4 ,in short1 if ,god can be shown to  
be the efficient cause of phenomena     
anywhere1 he can be shown to be the     
cause everywhere1 and the proof may be  
produced through phenomena immediately  
at hand as well as from those removed   
from us by an indefinite number of      
stages4 ,the evidence becomes neither   
stronger nor more relevant by being put 
farther back4 ,proof is not like wine1  
its quality does not improve with age4  
,to say that we must pause somewhere may
 be true1 but that is only reminding us 
that both human time and human energy   
are limited4 ,but it is certainly       
foolish to first of all induce mental   

exhaustion1 and then use it as the      
equivalent of a positive and valuable   
discovery4  ,and even though by some    
undiscovered method we had reached that 
metaphysical nightmare a cause of all   
phenomena1 and in defiance of all       
intelligibility had christened it a     
,first ,cause1 how would that satisfy   
the causal craving8 ,professor ,campbell
 ,fraser very properly says that the old
 form of each new phenomenon as much    
needs explanation as the new form itself
 did1 and this need is certainly neither
 satisfied nor destroyed by referring   
one form of existence to another4 ,if   
,a4 is explained by ,b4 we are driven to
 explain ,b4 by ,c41 and so on          
indefinitely4 ,or if we can stop with   
,a4 or ,b4 then the causal craving is   
not so persistent as was supposed1 and  
man can rest content within the limit of
 recognised limitations4 ,for what      
,professor ,fraser calls an absolutely  
originating cause is only such so long  
as we have not reached it4 ,we are      

satisfied with an imaginary ,b4 as an   
explanation of the actual ,a4 so long as
 ,b4 does not come within our grasp4 ,so
 soon as it has become the originating  
cause of the phenomenon in hand we are  
off on a further search4 ,first has no  
other intelligible sense or meaning than
 this4 ,first in relation to a given    
cluster of phenomenon we may grant2     
,first in the sense of calling for no   
further explanation is downright        
theological lunacy4  ,an eternal ,first 
cause could only be such in relation to 
an eternal effect4 ,and in that case it 
could not be prior to the effect since  
the effect is only the existing factors 
combined4 ,causation cannot carry us    
beyond phenomena since it has no meaning
 apart from phenomena4 ,the notion that 
because every phenomenon has a cause    
therefore there must be a cause for     
phenomena as a whole--meaning by this   
for the sum total of phenomena--is      
wholly absurd4 ,it is not sound science1
 it is not good philosophy1 it is not   

even commonsense4 ,it is simply nonsense
 which is given an air of dignity       
because it is clothed in philosophic    
language4 ,you cannot rise from         
phenomena to the theist's ,god2 first1  
because1 as ,i have said1 cause and     
effect are names for the relation that  
is seen to exist between one phenomenon 
and another1 and the theist is seeking  
after something that is above all       
relations4 ,to postulate something that 
is not phenomena as the cause of        
phenomena1 is like discussing the       
possibility of a bird's flight and      
dismissing the possibility of an        
atmosphere4 ,secondly1 causation can    
give no clue to a ,god because the      
search for causes is a search for the   
conditions under which phenomena occur4 
,and when we have described these       
conditions we have fulfilled all the    
conditions required to establish an act 
of causation4 ,the theist1 in short1    
commences with a wrong conception of    
causation4 ,he proceeds by applying to  

one sphere language and principles from 
another1 and to which they can have no  
possible application1 and where they    
have no intelligibility4 ,and having    
completely confused the issue1 he ends  
with a conclusion which1 even on his own
 showing1 has no logical relation to the
 premises laid down4     ,,chapter ,,vi4
  ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,design4     
,kant called the argument from design   
the oldest1 the clearest1 and the most  
adapted to the ordinary human reason1 of
 all the arguments advanced on behalf of
 the belief in ,god4 ,kant's dictum1 it 
will be observed1 omits all opinion as  
to its quality1 and his own criticism of
 it left it a sorry wreck4 ,john ,stuart
 ,mill treated it far more respectfully1
 and commenced his examination of it    
with the flattering introduction1 ,we   
now at last reach an argument of a      
really scientific character1 and1       
although he did not find the argument   
convincing1 gave it a most respectful   
dismissal4 ,the purpose of the present  

chapter is to show that the argument    
from design in nature is in the last    
degree unscientific1 that the analogy it
 seeks to establish is a false one1 that
 it is completely and hopelessly        
irrelevant to the point at issue1 and   
that one might grant nearly all it asks 
for1 and even then show that it does not
 prove what it sets out to prove4 ,that 
such an argument should have1 and for so
 long1 exerted so much influence over   
the human mind1 gives one anything but a
 flattering impression of the power of  
reason in human affairs4  ,true it is   
that of late years the argument from    
design has felt the influence of the    
growth of the idea of evolution1 and the
 champions of theism have used it with  
much greater caution1 and under an      
obvious sense that it no longer wielded 
its old authority4 ,the fact that this  
is so forms a commentary on the         
statement so often made that man's      
craving for an ultimate cause leads to  
the belief in ,god4 ,the truth being    

that man--the average man--only seeks   
for an explanation of immediate         
happenings4 ,once the immediate thing   
before him is explained his curiosity is
 allayed4 ,the average man lives        
mentally from hand to mouth1 and        
troubles as little about ultimate       
explanations as he does about the       
exhaustion of the coal supply4  ,it is a
 point of some significance that the    
perception of design in nature1 as with 
the belief in deity1 is1 if one may use 
the expression1 pre-scientific in point 
of origin4 ,what ,i mean by that is that
 it originates at a time when no other  
explanation of the origin of natural    
adaptations existed4 ,it did not        
establish itself as one of several rival
 explanations and in virtue of its own  
strength4 ,it was established simply    
because no other explanation was at the 
time conceivable4 ,and so soon as       
another explanation1 such as that of    
natural selection1 was placed before the
 world1 the origin of adaptations as a  

product of an extra-natural designing   
intelligence became to most educated    
minds simply impossible4 ,the perception
 of design in nature was1 as a matter of
 fact1 no more than a special           
illustration of the animistic frame of  
mind which reads vitality into all      
natural happenings4 ,it is impossible to
 find in the statement that particular  
adaptations in nature are designed      
anything more scientific than one can   
find in the belief that rain is the     
product of a heavenly rain-cow1 or that 
flashes of lightning are spears thrown  
by competing heavenly warriors4 ,it is  
the language only that differs in the   
two cases4 ,the frame of mind indicated 
in the two cases are identical4  ,the   
attractiveness of the argument from     
design lies in its nearness to hand and 
in its appeal to facts1 combined with   
the impossibility of verification4 ,that
 nature is full of strange and curious  
examples of adaptation is clear to all1 
although the significance of these      

adaptations are by no means so clear4   
,moreover1 a very casual study of these 
cases show that they are better         
calculated to dazzle than to convince4  
,the presentation of a number of more or
 less elaborate facts of adaptation1    
followed with the remark that we are    
unable to see how such cases could have 
been brought about in the absence of a  
designing intelligence1 is1 at best1 an 
appeal to human weakness and ignorance4 
,the reverse of such a position is that 
if we had complete knowledge of the     
causes at work1 the assumption of design
 might be found to be quite unnecessary4
 ,we cannot see is only the equivalent  
of we do not know1 and that is a        
shockingly bad basis on which to build  
an argument4  ,when1 therefore1 an      
eminent electrician like ,professor     
,fleming says1 ,we have overwhelming    
proof that in the manufacture of the    
infinite number of substances made in   
,nature's laboratory there must be at   
all stages some directivity1 this can   

only mean that ,professor ,fleming      
cannot see the way in which these       
substances are made4 ,it does not mean  
that he sees how they are made4 ,and in 
saying this he is in no better position 
than was ,kepler1 who after describing  
the true laws of planetary motion1 when 
he came to the question of why the      
planets should describe these motions   
fell back on the theory of ,angelic     
intelligences as the cause4 ,the true   
explanation came with the physics of    
,galileo and ,newton1 and with that1    
farewell to the angelic directivity4    
,the only reason for ,kepler's angels   
was his ignorance of the causes of      
planetary motion4 ,the only reason why  
,professor ,fleming says that the atoms 
have to be guided into certain positions
 to build up the complex molecules is   
that he is unable to isolate this       
assumed directive force and to show it  
in operation2 he is like a modern       
,kepler faced with something the cause  
of which he doesn't know1 and lugging in

 ,god to save further trouble4 ,it is an
 assumption of knowledge where no       
knowledge exists4 ,god is always what   
,spinoza called it1 the asylum of       
ignorance4 ,when causes are unknown ,god
 is brought forward4 ,when causes are   
known ,god retires into the background4 
,god is not an explanation1 it is a     
narcotic4  ,the argument from design    
rests upon the existence in nature of   
adaptations either general or special4  
,and quite obviously the value of       
evidence derived from adaptations will  
be determined by the existence of       
non-adaptations4 ,if1 that is1 it can be
 shown that a certain assemblage of     
forces produce adaptation1 while in     
another instance they fail to produce   
it1 it would then be logical to argue   
that the difference was due to the      
directive power being withdrawn in the  
latter case4 ,but that as we know is    
never the case4 ,what we see is always  
the same conditions producing the same  
effects4 ,we are never able to say1     

,here are natural forces working minus a
 directing intelligence1 and here is an 
assemblage of the same forces working   
plus the addition of a directing        
intelligence4 ,if we could do that we   
should be able to attribute the         
difference to the new factor4 ,but this 
we are never able to do4 ,and it is an  
elementary principle of scientific      
method that before we can assert the    
existence of a distinct force or factor1
 the possibility of isolation must be   
shown4 ,adaptation can1 then1 only be   
demonstrated by non-adaptation4 ,and    
non-adaptation in nature simply does not
 exist1 except in relation to an ideal  
end created by ourselves4  ,surprising  
as this may appear to some1 examination 
shows it to be no more than a truism1   
and that granted1 the whole strength of 
the argument from adaptation1 whether in
 the inorganic or the organic world1    
disappears4  ,to see the matter the more
 clearly1 let us drop for a time the    
word adaptation and substitute the word 

process4 ,for that after all is what    
nature presents us with4 ,we see        
processes and we see results4 ,it is    
because we create an end for these      
processes that we class them as well or 
ill adapted to achieve it4 ,we make a   
gun1 and say it is ill or well made as  
it shoots well or ill4 ,but whether it  
carries straight or not the relation of 
the shooting to the construction of the 
gun remains the same4 ,judging the gun  
merely from its construction1 the       
product answers completely to the       
combination of its parts4 ,constructed  
in one way the gun cannot but shoot     
straight4 ,constructed in another way   
the gun cannot but shoot crookedly4 ,and
 the only reason we have for calling one
 good and the other bad is that we      
desire a particular result4 ,but the    
goodness or badness has nothing to do   
with the thing itself4 ,its adaptation  
to the end produced is as perfect in the
 one case as in the other4 ,it could    
produce no other result than the one    

that actually emerges without an        
alteration in the means employed4 ,a    
thing is what it is because it is the   
combination of all the forces that      
produce it4 ,and to ask us to marvel at 
the result of a process1 when the one is
 the product of the other is like asking
 us to express our surprise that twice  
two equal four4 ,twice two equal four   
because four is the sum of the factors1 
and no one dreams of praising ,god      
because they don't sometimes make four  
and a half4 ,the argument from          
adaptations in nature is1 when examined1
 just about as impressive as the        
reasoning of the curate who saw the hand
 of ,providence in the fact that death  
came at the end of life instead of in   
the middle of it4  ,adaptation is not1  
then1 a singular fact in nature1 but a  
universal one4 ,it is everywhere1 in the
 case of death as in that of life4 ,it  
is the same in the case of a child born 
a marvel of health and beauty as in that
 of one born deformed and diseased4     

,there is nothing else but adaptations  
of means to ends in nature1 however     
displeasing some of them may be to us4  
,the harmony which the theist perceives 
in nature is not the expression of plan1
 it is the inevitable outcome of the    
properties of existence4 ,given matter  
and force1 and it requires no directive 
intelligence to produce the existing    
order1 it would indeed require a ,god to
 prevent its occurrence4  ,it is the    
same if we take the case of animal life 
alone4 ,to say that animal life is      
adapted to its environment1 and to say  
that animal life exists1 is to say the  
same thing in two ways4 ,whether animal 
forms are fashioned by divine           
intelligence or not1 the fact of        
adaptation remains2 for adaptation is   
the essential condition of existence4   
,and as adaptation is the condition of  
existence1 it follows that an animal's  
feelings1 structure1 and functions will 
be developed in accordance with the     
nature of the environment4 ,if the      

conditions of existence were different  
from what they are animal life would    
show corresponding modifications4 ,but  
all the same we should observe the same 
correspondence between animal life and  
its surroundings4 ,here1 again1 we have 
a fact transformed1 without the         
slightest warranty1 into a purpose4     
,now1 if the theist could prove that out
 of a number of equally possible lines  
of development living beings show one   
fixed form1 and that against the        
compulsion of environmental forces1 he  
would do something to prove the         
probability of some sort of guidance4   
,but that we know cannot be done4 ,the  
forms of life are infinite in number4   
,they vary within all possible limits2  
and always in terms of environmental    
conditions4 ,in brief1 what is said to  
occur with ,god1 can be shown to be     
inevitable without him4 ,god in nature  
is a wholly gratuitous hypothesis4      
,later it will be seen that the whole   
basis of the argument from design is    

fallacious2 that it proceeds along      
altogether wrong lines1 and that the    
final objection to it is that it is     
completely irrelevant to the point at   
issue4 ,for the moment1 however1 we     
proceed with a criticism of the argument
 as usually stated4  ,it must be borne  
in mind that what the theist desires to 
reach is a ,creator1 but it is obvious  
that this plea can never give us more   
than a mere designer working on         
materials that already exist4 ,of       
necessity design implies two things1    
difficulties to be overcome1 and skill  
or wisdom in overcoming them4 ,design is
 an understandable thing in connection  
with man1 because man is always occupied
 in overcoming the resistance of forces 
that exist quite independently of him1  
and which operate without reference to  
his needs or desires4 ,but it would be  
absurd to assume design on the part of  
one for whom difficulties had no        
existence1 or on the part of one who    
himself created the forces that had to  

be overcome1 and endowed them with all  
the properties which made the work of   
design necessary4 ,granting the         
relevance of the data upon which the    
belief in design rests1 one could only  
assume1 with ,mill1 that the author of  
the ,cosmos worked under limitations2   
that he was obliged to adapt himself to 
conditions independent of his will1 and 
to attain his ends by such arrangements 
as these conditions admitted of4  ,in   
the next place1 the argument for design 
is an argument from analogy1 and an     
analogy can by its very nature never    
give a complete demonstration4 ,it can  
never offer more than a probability1    
more or less convincing as the analogy  
is more of less complete4 ,but in the   
case under consideration the analogy is 
considerably less rather than more4     
,paley's classical illustration--taken  
almost verbatim from ,malebranche1 but  
as old otherwise as the days of ,greek  
philosophy1 where a statute took its    
place--was that of a watch4 ,and the    

conclusion was drawn that as the parts  
of a watch bear obvious marks of having 
been made with a view to a particular   
end1 so the animal structure and the    
universe as a whole bear similar marks  
of having been designed4 ,it is true    
that of late years the ,paleyan form of 
the argument has been disavowed by most 
scholarly advocates of theism1 but as   
they immediately proceed to make use of 
arguments that are substantially        
identical with it1 the repudiation does 
not seem of great consequence4 ,it      
reminds one of a government that is     
compelled by the force of public opinion
 to openly repudiate one of its         
officials1 and having removed him from  
the office in which the misdemeanour was
 committed1 immediately appoints him to 
one of an increased dignity and with a  
larger salary4  ,thus1 we have          
,professor ,fiske saying that ,paley's  
simile of a watch is no longer          
applicable to such a world as this      
7,idea of ,god2 p4 #aca71 and ,prof4    

,sorley telling us that the age of      
,paley and of the ,bridgewater          
,treatises is past 7,moral ,values and  
the ,idea of ,god2 p4 #cbg71 and ,mr4   
,balfour repudiating ,paley as having   
been ruled out of court by ,darwinism   
7,humanism and ,theism1 chapter ,,ii474 
,but as ,fiske puts the flower in the   
place of the watch1 ,sorley1 the moral  
nature of man1 and ,balfour1 the        
conditions of animal life1 it is not    
quite clear why if the ,paleyan argument
 is invalid1 the new form is any more   
intellectually respectable4 ,the essence
 of the ,paleyan argument was the       
assertion of a mind behind phenomena1   
the workings of which could be seen in  
the forms of animal life4 ,and whether  
we find that proof in the growth of a   
flower1 or in the moral sense of man1 or
 in the creation of natural conditions  
that impel the development of life along
 a certain road1 the distinction is not 
vital4 ,we are still finding proofs of  
,god in the structure of the world      

7where otherwise1 indeed1 are we to find
 it87 and we are still depending on the 
supposed likeness between the works of  
human intelligence and natural products4
  ,and that analogy is wholly false4    
,the argument from design aims at       
proving that all things are made by a   
creative intelligence4 ,it is not merely
 animals that are designed2 they are    
selected as no more than striking       
individual examples of a general truth4 
,everything1 if theism be true1 must be 
ultimately due to manufacture4 ,but the 
whole significance of the ,paleyan      
argument from design is that behind the 
manufactured article which we recognise 
as such1 there are other articles or    
other things that are not manufactured4 
,the traveller1 says ,paley1 who comes  
across a watch recognises in the        
relation of its parts evidences of      
workmanship4 ,but he does not see in the
 breaking of a wave on the shore1 or in 
the piling up of sand in the desert1 or 
in a pebble on the beach1 the same      

tokens of workmanship4 ,in the very act 
of attempting to prove that some things 
are made1 the theist is compelled to    
assume that all things are not made4 ,he
 can only gain a victory at the price of
 confessing a defeat4  ,but is there any
 real analogy between the works of man  
and the universe at large8 ,let us take 
a familiar example4 ,it is1 we are told 
in a very familiar illustration1 as     
absurd to imagine that the world as it  
exists is the work of unguided natural  
forces1 as it would be to believe that  
the rows of letters in a compositor's   
stick had of their own contained force  
arranged themselves in intelligible     
sentences4 ,the absurdity of the last   
supposition is admitted1 but why is that
 so8 ,obviously because we have the     
previous knowledge that the type itself 
is a manufactured thing1 and that its   
arrangement in orderly sentences is the 
work of intelligent men4 ,thus1 what    
occurs when we come across a particular 
example of type setting is that we      

compare our present experience with     
other experiences and recognise it as   
belonging to a particular class4 ,so    
with the watch4 ,the only reason we have
 for believing that a watch is made is  
that of our previous knowledge that such
 things are made4 ,the present judgment 
is based upon past experience4 ,but the 
case of animal forms1 and still more the
 universe at large1 offers no such      
analogy4 ,we know nothing of world      
makers nor of animal makers4 ,we have no
 previous experience to go upon1 nor    
have we any things of a similar kind1   
known to be made1 with which we can     
compare them4 ,instead of the points of 
resemblance between the two things being
 so numerous as to compel belief1 they  
agree in one particular only1 that of   
existence4 ,at most all we are left with
 is the palpably absurd position that   
because man selects and adjusts means to
 a given end1 therefore any combination 
of forces in nature which produce a     
certain result must also be the         

expression of conscious intention4      
,some apparent force even to this flimsy
 conclusion might be given if nature    
could be said to be working towards a   
given end4 ,but we do not find this4    
,what we see is a multitude of forces at
 work1 the action of each of which often
 results in the negation of the other4  
,put on one side the larger1 but not the
 least pregnant fact that animal life is
 only maintained in the face of numerous
 agencies1 inorganic and organic1 that  
are apparently bent upon its            
destruction2 put on one side also the   
fact that multitudes of parasites--as   
much the result of design as any other  
form of life--are constantly preying    
upon and destroying forms of life higher
 than themselves1 and there still remain
 myriads of facts altogether            
inconsistent and completely             
irreconcilable with the hypothesis of a 
creative intelligence shaping the course
 of affairs to a given end4 ,to take    
only one illustration of this4 ,what is 

to be said of the myriads of animals    
that are born into the world only to    
perish before reaching an age at which  
they can play their part in the         
perpetuation of the species8 ,are we to 
believe that the same deity who         
fashioned these forms of life created at
 the same time a number of forces that  
were certain to destroy them8 ,clearly  
we are bound to assume1 either that this
 hypothetical ,being pursues a number of
 mutually destructive plans1 or that    
there are a number of designers at work 
and at war with each other1 or that none
 at all exist4  ,if we are to judge     
nature from the standpoint of human     
intelligence1 then we must logically    
decide that it is full of waste1 full of
 bungling1 full of plans that come to   
nothing1 of ends that are never         
realised1 of pain and misery that might 
have been avoided by the exercise of    
almost ordinary intelligence4 ,there are
 few animals concerning which a         
competent anatomist or physiologist     

could not suggest some improvement in   
their construction by which their       
functions might be more efficiently     
performed4 ,nor does it seem quite      
impossible to have so adjusted natural  
forces that the development of life     
might have been accomplished without the
 present enormous waste of material4 ,it
 is almost stupid to ask1 as did the    
late ,dr4 ,martineau1 what right have we
 to judge the world from a purely       
humanistic point of view4 ,the whole    
argument from design is based upon a    
humanistic point of view4 ,the ,atheist 
is only calling the attention of the    
theist to the consequences of his own   
argument4  ,i leave for a later chapter1
 the moral aspect of the design         
argument4 ,i am at present concerned    
with its purely logical presentation4   
,and the crowning charge here is not    
that it is inconclusive1 not that it    
falls short1 as ,mill thought1 of a     
complete analogy1 the decisive rejection
 of it is based upon the fact that it is

 absolutely irrelevant4 ,the argument   
has no bearing on the issue2 the        
evidence has no relation to the case4   
,what is the essence of the argument    
from design8 ,it is based upon certain  
adaptations that are observed to exist4 
,but adaptation is1 as we have shown1 a 
universal quality of existence4 ,it     
exists in every case1 and no more in one
 case than in another4 ,and when the    
theist says that because certain things 
work together therefore god arranged it1
 an apt query is1 ,how do you know8 ,one
 may even say1 ,granting there is a     
,god1 how do you know that what is was  
actually designed by him8 ,it is no use 
replying that the way things work       
together prove design1 for things always
 work together4 ,they cannot do         
otherwise4 ,any group of forces work    
together to produce a given result4     
,that is part of the universal fact of  
adaptation which the theist holds up as 
though it were a divine miracle instead 
of1 as ,mallock says1 a physical        

platitude4  ,let us take an illustration
 from everyday life4 ,a man tries his   
hand at building a bicycle4 ,when it is 
finished the wheels are not true1 the   
frame is unsteady1 the whole thing is   
ready to fall to pieces and is          
absolutely unrideable4 ,is any one      
warranted in declaring that because the 
parts have all been brought together by 
me therefore the resulting machine was  
an act of design8 ,clearly not4 ,what ,i
 designed was a machine perfect after   
its kind4 ,what appeared was the        
miserable structure that is before us4  
,on the other hand that machine with all
 its imperfections might have been      
designed by me4 ,i might1 for some      
purpose deliberately have intended to   
make a machine that would not carry a   
rider4 ,and when would anyone be        
logically justified in saying which of  
the two kinds of machines express my    
design8 ,clearly1 only when he had a    
knowledge of my intention4 ,apart from a
 knowledge of an intention preceding an 

act the inference of design is          
unwarrantable4  ,now1 assuming the      
existence of a ,god1 and who stands in  
the same relation to the world that ,i  
do to the machine1 how can anyone know  
that the world as it is expresses design
 any more than did my home-made bicycle8
 ,in this case1 as in the former1 what  
is needed to justify the assumption of  
design is a knowledge of intention4 ,one
 must know what the assumed maker       
intended and then see how far the actual
 result realises it4  ,design1 in short1
 although it may be expressed in a      
physical form is not a physical thing1  
but a psychic fact4 ,you cannot by      
examining physical processes and results
 reach design4 ,you cannot start with a 
material fact and reach intention4 ,you 
must begin with intention and compare it
 with the physical result4 ,things may  
be as they are whether design is        
involved or not4 ,it is only by a       
knowledge of intention1 and a comparison
 of that with the fact before us that we

 can be certain of design4 ,proof of    
design is not found in the capacity of  
certain clusters of circumstances or    
forces to realise a particular result1  
but in a knowledge that they correspond 
with an intention which we know to have 
existed before the result occurs4  ,to  
warrant a logical belief in design in   
nature three things are essential4      
,first1 one must assume that a ,god     
exists4 ,second1 one must take it for   
granted that one has a knowledge of the 
intention in the mind of the deity      
before the alleged designed thing is    
brought into existence4 ,finally1 one   
must be able to compare the result with 
the intention and demonstrate their     
agreement4 ,but the impossibility of    
knowing the first two things is         
apparent4 ,and without the first two the
 third is of no value whatever4 ,for we 
have no means of reaching the first     
except through the third4 ,and until we 
get to the first we cannot make use of  
the third4 ,we are thus in a hopeless   

impasse4 ,no examination of nature can  
lead back to ,god because we lack the   
necessary starting point4 ,all the      
volumes that have been written1 and all 
the sermons that have been preached     
depicting the wisdom of organic         
structures are so much waste of paper   
and breath4 ,they prove nothing1 and can
 prove nothing4 ,they assume at the     
beginning all they require at the end4  
,their ,god is not something reached by 
way of inference1 it is something       
assumed at the very outset4  ,what the  
theist does at every step of his        
reasoning is to read his own feelings   
and desires into nature4 ,the design he 
talks so glibly about is in him1 not    
outside of him4 ,as well might a maggot 
in a cheese argue that the world was    
designed for him because the agreement  
between his structure and it are so     
harmonious4 ,in relation to their       
surroundings man and the maggot are in  
the same position4 ,and in the economy  
of nature man is of no more consequence 

than the maggot4 ,there is a more       
complex synthesis of forces here than   
there1 a more subtle exhibition of      
nature's infinite capacity for evolving 
fresh forms of life1 and that is all4   
,it is man himself who paints a         
distorted picture of himself on the     
surface of things1 who reads his own    
passions and desires into nature1 and   
then admires a marvel created by        
himself4 ,to he who correctly visualises
 the process of the evolution of deity1 
the existence of ,god is hardly to-day a
 question for discussion4 ,there is a   
discussion only of the history of the   
belief1 and in that is found its        
strongest condemnation4     ,,chapter   
,,vii4  ,,the ,,disharmonies ,,of       
,,nature4   ,it has already been        
indicated that it is not really         
necessary1 in order to prove design1 to 
establish the fact that the design is   
perfect or that it exhibits complete    
goodness4 ,it is enough that there be   
design4 ,its moral quality or value is  

quite another question4 ,nevertheless1  
it will be as well to deal with this    
latter aspect of the subject1 and to see
 what kind of plan it is that nature    
does exhibit1 even assuming the         
existence of some design4  ,now it is   
evident that if there be design in      
nature1 and if the design is the        
expression of a single supreme mind one 
quality of that plan should be unity4   
,the products should1 so to speak1      
dovetail into each other in such a way  
that they work together1 and even       
harmonise with each other4 ,but this is1
 notoriously1 not the case4 ,if from one
 point of view there is a certain       
harmony throughout the world of living  
beings in virtue of which life is       
preserved1 it is at least equally true  
that from another point of view the     
harmony is one of destruction4 ,and in  
the end death wins4 ,sooner or later    
death overtakes all forms of life1 while
 in the grand total of living beings    
born into the world1 a far larger number

 perish than can reach maturity4 ,wasted
 effort is the mildest judgment that can
 be passed upon these abortive attempts4
 ,and not only does death eventually win
 in the case of each individual1 and    
against which may be set the            
consideration that in the economy of    
nature death plays a part in the        
development of life1 but eventually     
death will1 if we are to trust science1 
reap a sweeping and universal triumph by
 the consummation of terrestrial        
conditions that will render the         
maintenance of life impossible4  ,or1   
again1 the relations of species are     
clearly not what we have a right to     
expect in the working out of a          
reasonably wise and benevolent plan4 ,it
 is a general truth that1 with the      
exception of a few instances1 chiefly   
connected with the relations existing   
between insects and flowers1 the        
development of one species in relation  
to another is not that of mutual        
helpfulness4 ,the general rule here is  

that of mutual injury4 ,the carnivora   
prey on the herbivora and upon each     
other2 and the herbivora crush each     
other by methods that are as effective  
as the method of direct attack4 ,any    
variation is good provided it be of     
advantage to its possessor4 ,and the    
good of the one kind may mean the       
destruction of another order4 ,all the  
exquisite design shown in the           
development of the finer feelings of    
man1 and upon which theistic            
sentimentalists love to dwell1 may be   
seen in the structure of those parasites
 which destroy man and bring his finer  
feelings to naught4 ,the late ,theodore 
,roosevelt says of the ,brazilian       
forests3--        ,in these forests the 
multitude of insects that bite1 sting1  
devour1      and prey on other          
creatures1 often with accompaniments of 
atrocious      suffering1 passes belief4
 ,the very pathetic myths of beneficent 
nature could not deceive even the least 
wise being if he once saw      the iron 

cruelty of life in the tropics4 ,of     
course1 nature--in      common parlance 
a wholly inaccurate term1 by the way1   
especially      when used to express a  
single entity--is entirely ruthless1 no 
less      so as regards types than as   
regards individuals1 and entirely       
indifferent to good or evil1 and works  
out her ends or no ends      with utter 
disregard of pain and woe 7,cited by ,e4
 ,d4 ,fawcett in      ,the ,world as    
,imagination2 pp4 #ega-b74   ,and ,mr4  
,carveth ,reade expresses the same thing
 in a more elaborate summing up3--      
,the merciless character of organic     
evolution appears to us1 first1      in 
reckless propagation and the consequent 
destruction4 ,every      species is as  
prolific as it can be compatibly with   
the development      of its individuals2
 and the deaths that ensue from         
inanition1      disease1 violence1      
present a stupefying scene4 ,the best   
one can say      for it is that1 as life
 rises in the organic scale1 the death  

rate      declines4 ,yet even man still 
suffers outrageously by violence1       
disease1 inanition2 the notion that     
,malthus's ,law no longer holds      of 
civilised man is a foolish delusion4    
,but more sinister than the      direct 
destruction of life is the spectacle of 
innumerable species      profiting by a 
life1 parasitic or predatory1 at the    
expense of      others4 ,the parasites  
refute the vulgar prejudice that        
evolution is      by the measure of man1
 progressive2 adaptation is indifferent 
to      better or worse1 except as to   
each species1 that its offspring        
shall survive by atrophy and            
degradation4 ,the predatory species     
flourish as if in derision of moral     
maxims2 we see that though      human   
morality is natural to man1 it is far   
from expressing the      whole of       
,nature4 ,animals1 at first             
indistinguishable vegetables1           
devour them and enjoy a far richer life4
 ,animals that eat other      animals   

are nearly always superior not only in  
strength1 grace and      agility but in 
intelligence4 ,there are exceptions to  
this rule2      some snakes eat monkeys 
7thanking ,providence71 and the elephant
 is      content with foliage2 but      
compare cats and wolves with the        
ungulates that make a first concoction  
of herbs for their sake4 ,it      is    
true that our monkey kin are chiefly    
frugivorous2 for it may be              
plausibly argued that man was first     
differentiated by becoming              
definitely carnivorous1 a sociable      
hunter1 as it were1 a wolf-ape4         
,hence the advantage of longer legs1 the
 use of weapons1 the upright      gait  
and defter hands to use and make        
weapons1 more strategic      brains1    
tribal organisation1 and hence          
liberation from the tropical            
forest1 and citizenship of the world4   
,the greater part of his      subsequent
 history is equally unedifying3 having  
made the world his      prey1 he says   

that ,god made the world to that end1   
and those who      have preyed upon     
their fellows1 and enslaved them1 and   
flourished      upon it1 have declared  
that to have been the intention of      
nature4      7,the ,metaphysics of      
,nature2 pp4 #cdd-e74   ,a perpetual    
pulling down and building up1 and the   
building altogether dependent upon the  
demolition4 ,the tiger built with tastes
 and capacities for catching the        
gazelle3 the gazelle built with         
capacities that enable it to escape the 
tiger4 ,there is no evidence here of the
 existence of a single mind working out 
an intelligent plan4 ,at most we have   
either the proof for a number of warring
 powers1 each one striving to destroy   
what the other is striving to create1 or
 a single mind that has deliberately    
fashioned things so that each part may  
work for the destruction of the other   
part1 the whole to presently end in a   
grand catastrophe4  ,but that is not    
all4 ,if we limit our attention to man1 

can it be said that we find in the human
 structure what we might reasonably     
expect to find if man be indeed the     
crown of the divine plan1 the event to  
which1 for untold ages1 all things were 
designedly tending8 ,what we actually do
 find is that the structure of man1     
physically and mentally1 is such as to  
altogether negative the notion of       
complete or harmonious adjustment to    
environment4 ,that the human has within 
it a large number of vestigial          
structures--some scientists place it as 
high as one hundred and seventy--is now 
well known1 and forms at the same time  
one of the evidences of evolution and an
 impeachment of the theistic theory4    
,there is only need to instance now the 
vermiform appendage1 which forms the    
seat of appendicitis1 the wisdom teeth1 
of very little use1 and one of the most 
fruitful of causes of disease of the    
teeth1 the hair which covers the human  
body1 now of no use whatever1 except to 
form a lodgment for microbes1 and so    

makes the acquisition of disease the    
more certain4 ,in addition to the number
 of rudimentary organs that actually    
encourage disease--,metchnikoff counts  
among these the larger intestine--the   
body is full of rudimentary muscles and 
structures that when not positively     
harmful1 impose a tax on the organism   
for which no corresponding service is   
performed4  ,the meaning and            
significance of these structures are1   
however1 so well recognised that one    
need not dwell upon their existence4    
,not so well known is the complementary 
fact that just as in his physical       
structure man bears evidence of his     
emergence from lower forms of life1     
which result in a certain degree of     
disharmony between him and an ideal     
environment1 so in his psychic life his 
instincts and feelings are often such as
 to prevent that ideal adaptation which 
so many desire4 ,the earlier conception 
of optimistic evolutionists that the    
instincts of man were1 through the      

operation of natural selection1         
converted into beneficent guides is     
quite faulty4 ,in itself this was       
probably a survival of the theism which 
tried to prove that this was the best of
 all possible worlds1 and which led     
evolutionists to try and prove that     
their theory was also ethically         
desirable4 ,at any rate1 the theory of  
the wholly beneficent nature of human   
instincts is not tenable4 ,our instincts
 are inherited from our animal          
ancestors2 they were brought to fruition
 under conditions different in form from
 those which obtain with human beings1  
with the result that whether an instinct
 is helpful or the contrary depends     
largely upon the educational quality of 
the environment1 and even then inherited
 tendencies may be so strong as to make 
them a source of danger to the community
 rather than of benefit4  ,it is noted1 
for example1 that a deal of what may be 
called crime1 or at least lawlessness1  
is the result of an individual being    

born with tendencies developed in a way 
that fits him for an environment of     
centuries ago1 rather than an           
environment of to-day4 ,very many of our
 national heroes of a few centuries ago 
would rank as criminals to-day1 just as 
many of our criminals to-day would1 had 
they been born a few centuries since1   
have been handed down to us as examples 
of chivalry or of national heroism4     
,instead of what one may call the       
natural endowments of man pointing      
towards a more civilised form of life1  
they point to a less civilised form1    
while it is the artificially or socially
 induced feelings and ideas that point  
to a better future4  ,thus1 if we take  
the primitive or brute feeling of       
retaliation we find it assuming the form
 of war4 ,and without discussing the    
value of war in the past1 or even its   
admissibility in special circumstances  
in the present1 ,i do not think it will 
be seriously disputed that the great    
need of the present is to transfer that 

feeling from the lower level of brute   
force to the higher one of adventure in 
the interests of science and human      
betterment4 ,here it is not the         
existence of a lofty god-given endowment
 that puts man out of harmony with his  
environment2 it is1 on the contrary1 the
 operation of an earlier form of feeling
 manifestation which retards the coming 
of a better day4  ,there is1 in fact1   
not a single quality of human nature    
that can be said to act with inerrancy4 
,the baby seizes objects                
indiscriminately and puts them in its   
mouth4 ,the man falling into the water  
does the very thing he should not       
do--throws up his arms4 ,intense cold   
lulls to somnolency1 instead of rousing 
to activity4 ,the love of children1 on  
which the preservation of the race      
depends1 is absent with many2 while with
 others the sexual instinct undergoes   
strange and morbid manifestations4 ,a   
complete list of these disharmonies     
would fill a volume--indeed1            

,metchnikoff1 in his ,nature of ,man1   
has filled half a volume with describing
 some of the instances of physiological 
disharmony1 and then has not exhausted  
the list4  ,it would indeed seem as if  
nature1 with its method of never        
creating a new organ or structure1 but  
only transforming and utilising an old  
one1 had attached a penalty to every    
successful attempt to rise above a      
certain level4 ,if man will walk upright
 she sees to it that his doing so shall 
involve a great liability to hernia4 ,if
 he will live in cities1 she has ready  
the ravage of consumption4 ,if he will  
use clothing she makes him carry round a
 coating of useless hair as a method of 
trapping disease microbes4 ,so soon as  
one disease is conquered another is     
discovered4 ,pleasures have their       
reverse side in pains1 and to some pains
 the pleasures bear a small relation1   
being chiefly of the character of the   
pains being absent4 ,as a social animal 
man is only imperfectly adapted to the  

state1 there going on a constant warfare
 between his egoistic and altruistic    
impulses4 ,in fact1 it would certainly  
be an arguable proposition1 if we allow 
intention in nature1 to say that man was
 intended to remain at the animal level1
 and that1 having so far defeated       
nature's intention1 he is dogged by a   
disappointed creator1 and made to pay   
the fullest price that can be exacted   
for every step of progress achieved4    
,of course1 of proof of design in nature
 there is positively none4 ,design1 as  
,i have said1 is not a natural fact1 but
 a purely human construction4 ,but1 if  
admitted1 it is a two edged weapon4     
,for1 if assumed anywhere1 it must be   
assumed to exist everywhere4 ,and       
designing intelligence must be made     
responsible for the whole scheme4 ,but  
this the most extravagant piety refuses 
to do4 ,either we have the primitive    
theory of a devil who divides with ,god 
the responsibility for the state of the 
world1 or we have the plea that evil may

 be only good disguised1 or good in the 
making1 or it is argued that we have to 
contemplate the plan as a whole1 and    
must wait for some future state to pass 
judgment4 ,and whichever view we take1  
there is the implied admission that the 
plan of creation as we know it cannot be
 harmonised with the theory of ,god that
 modern theism places before us4 ,and   
instead of man being the miracle of     
perfection that an earlier generation   
saw in his structure1 we know that the  
human structure is such that1 given the 
power to create1 science could really   
fashion1 in the light of its present    
knowledge1 a better organism4  ,finally1
 disharmony is implied in and           
necessitated by the very fact of        
progress4 ,progress means a better      
adjustment1 and the discomfort of       
maladjustment is the spur to            
improvement4 ,a perfect equilibrium is  
as impossible as perpetual motion1 and  
it is only with a perfect equilibrium   
that change1 which is the condition of  

progress1 would cease4 ,the ceaseless   
desire for something better is1         
therefore1 in itself an impeachment of  
things as they are4 ,it is an indication
 of there being something wanting1 of   
the existence of a want of complete     
harmony between man and his             
surroundings4 ,nor is the case of the   
theist bettered if he retorts that      
without the sense of imperfection or of 
dissatisfaction there would be no such  
thing as a conscious striving after     
improvement4 ,that may be admitted1 but 
that is only proving that perfection can
 never be achieved1 and that even in    
this last resort ,god has so designed   
things as to make a mock of man at the  
end4 ,the want of complete harmony that 
is seen in the physical structure of man
 is carried over into his mental life4  
,if theism be true man is mocked by a   
mirage4 ,and the knowledge is made the  
more depressing by the belief that the  
plan is not accidental1 it is not a     
product of the working of non-conscious 

forces1 it is the preordained outcome of
 a plan that was deliberately resolved  
on by a being with full power to devise 
some thing wiser and better4 ,at the    
side of that1 any theory of things is1  
by comparison1 hopeful and inspiring4   
,,chapter ,,viii4  ,,god ,,and          
,,evolution4   ,there is no logical     
connection between what is called the   
,moral government of the universe and   
the belief in ,god1 but it must be      
confessed that the criticism of the     
belief from the point of view of moral  
feeling is of considerable importance4  
,this is in itself a striking           
illustration of the reaction of social  
developments on religious beliefs4 ,for 
there is originally no connection       
between morality and the belief in ,god4
 ,man does not believe in the gods      
because they are moral1 but because they
 are there4 ,if they are1 to his mind1  
good1 that is so much the better4 ,but  
whether they are good or bad they have  
to be faced as facts4 ,the gods1 in     

short belong to the region of belief1   
while morality belongs to that of       
practice4 ,it is in the nature of       
morality that it should be implicit in  
practice long before it is explicit in  
theory4 ,morality belongs to the group  
and is rooted in certain impulses that  
are a product of the essential          
conditions of group life4 ,it is as     
reflection awakens that men are led to  
speculate upon the nature and origin of 
the moral feelings4 ,morality1 whether  
in practice or in theory1 is thus based 
upon what is4 ,on the other hand1       
religion1 whether it be true or false1  
is in the nature of a discovery4        
,however crude or uninformed the        
thinking1 the belief in ,god must be    
regarded as the product of reflection4  
,the situation is not unfairly described
 by ,dr4 ,jastrow3--        ,the various
 rites practiced by primitive society in
 order to ward      off evils1 or to    
secure the protection of dreaded powers 
or      spirits1 are based primarily on 

logical considerations4 ,if a           
certain stone is regarded as sacred1 it 
is probably because it is               
associated with some misfortune1 or some
 unusual piece of good      luck4       
,someone sitting on the stone may have  
died2 or on sleeping on      it may have
 seen a remarkable vision1 which was    
followed by a      signal victory over a
 dangerous foe4444 ,in all this1        
however1      ethical considerations are
 remarkable for their absence4444       
,taking      again so common a belief   
among all peoples as the influence for  
good or evil exerted by the dead upon   
the living and the numerous             
practices to which it gives rise 444 it 
will be difficult to      discover in   
these beliefs the faintest suggestion of
 any ethical      influence4 ,it is not 
the good but the powerful spirits that  
are      invoked2 an appeal to them is  
not made by showing them examples of    
kindness1 justice1 or noble deeds1 but  
by bribes1 flatteries1 and      threats4

 7,the ,study of ,religion2 ,ch4 ,,vi474
   ,so we have ,tylor also endorsing    
this opinion by remarking that1 ,the    
popular idea that the moral government  
of the universe is an essential tenet of
 natural religion simply falls to the   
ground4 ,savage animism is almost devoid
 of that ethical element which1 to the  
educated1 modern mind1 is the very      
mainspring of religion4 ,and ,hoffding  
says that1 ,in the lowest forms of it   
with which we are acquainted religion   
cannot be said to have any ethical      
significance4 ,the gods appear as powers
 on which man is dependent1 but not as  
patterns of conduct or administrators of
 an ethical world order4444 ,not till   
men have discovered ethical problems in 
practical life and have developed an    
ethical feeling 444 can the figures of  
the gods assume an ethical character4   
7,philosophy of ,religion2 pp4 #cbc-d74 
,it is quite unnecessary to multiply    
evidence1 the truth of the matter would 
seem obvious4 ,one cannot conceive man  

actually ascribing ethical qualities to 
his gods before he becomes sufficiently 
developed to formulate moral rules for  
his own guidance1 and to create moral   
laws for his fellow man4 ,the           
moralisation of the gods will then      
follow as a matter of course4 ,and      
thereafter we can plainly observe the   
operation of the moral sense on the     
belief in god1 and upon the recognition 
of crude power4 ,man really modifies his
 gods in terms of the ideal human being4
 ,paul's picture of a god who uses man  
as the potter uses his clay could never 
flourish in a society which believed in 
the rights of man4 ,and so soon as that 
conception developes so soon does man   
begin to revise his conception of god4  
,so with almost every great change in   
the form of government or in the notions
 of right and wrong4 ,in a slave state1 
,god favours slavery4 ,when slavery     
gives place to another form of labour   
the gods are equally vigorous in its    
condemnation4 ,the history of the belief

 in witch burning1 heresy hunting1      
eternal damnation1 etc41 all illustrate 
the same point--religious teachings are 
all modified and moralised in accordance
 with the changing moral conceptions of 
mankind4 ,it is not the gods who        
moralise man1 it is man who moralises   
the gods4  ,the gods have their         
beginnings as mere powers4 ,they are    
feared because they are1 not for the    
moral value of what they are4 ,social   
development does all the rest4 ,but with
 that development the feeling of        
helplessness1 of weakness1 decays and   
there arises the demand that if god is  
to be worshipped he must prove worthy of
 it4 ,the conviction arises very        
gradually1 but it is there1 and it      
becomes a powerful solvent of religious 
ideas4 ,merely to govern is not enough1 
,god must govern well1 and in terms of  
what we have come to understand by the  
word ,justice4 ,and to the minds of     
millions of moderns1 when tried by that 
test the idea of god breaks down4 ,that 

there is a god who rules the universe is
 one question2 that he rules it well and
 in accord with what is understood when 
we talk of morality1 is quite another4  
,the two questions are quite distinct   
since the first might be true and the   
second false4 ,we have already seen how 
slender are the grounds for believing in
 the first2 we have now to show that the
 reasons for believing in the second are
 quite as unsatisfactory4  ,theism has  
been defined as consisting in the belief
 in a ,god who is wise1 powerful1 and   
loving1 and who has selected man as the 
object of his preferential care1 and to 
this may be added the statement that    
most modern theists would extend that   
care to the whole of sentient life4     
,god's care must be over all his        
creatures1 and although this care may be
 subservient to some wide and far-seeing
 plan1 there must be nothing that looks 
like obvious carelessness or criminal   
neglect4  ,to what conclusion do the    
facts point when they are examined in   

the light of modern knowledge8 ,does the
 world supply us with the kind of       
picture that one would expect to see if 
it were really presided over by divine  
love under the guidance of divine       
wisdom1 and backed by divine power8 ,the
 proof that it does not is shown in the 
almost endless attempts made to         
harmonise the world as it is with the   
world as theory would have it be4 ,and a
 theory that needs so much defending1   
explaining1 and qualifying must have    
something radically weak about it4 ,that
 there is evil in the world all admit1  
that it offers prima facie objection to 
the theistic hypothesis is confessed by 
the many attempts made to fit in this   
evil with the existence of ,god1 to     
prove that it works in some mysterious  
way for some larger good1 or that its   
presence cannot be dispensed with       
profitably4 ,the question of why the    
world is as it is with a god such as we 
are told exists1 is1 as ,canon ,green   
says1 the really vital question1 for it 

touches the very heart of religion4     
7,the ,problem of ,evil2 p4 #df47 ,how1 
then1 does the ,theist deal with it8    
,broadly1 two methods are adopted4 ,in  
the one case we are presented with the  
order of the world1 or the course of    
evolution1 as indicative of a beneficent
 scheme4 ,this claims to freely adopt   
all that science has to say concerning  
the development of life and to prove    
that this is in harmony with the        
legitimate demands of the moral sense4  
,the second is the more orthodox way1   
and taking the world as it is1 claims   
that pain and suffering play a          
disciplinary and educational part in the
 life of the individual4 ,we will take  
these in the order named4  ,when dealing
 with the argument from design little   
was said concerning the evolutionary    
explanation of the special adaptations  
that meet us in the animal world4 ,it   
was thought better to fix attention on  
the purely logical value of the argument
 presented4 ,it is now necessary to look

 a little closer at the ethical         
implications of the evolutionary        
process4  ,it has been pointed out that 
all life involves a special degree of   
adaptation between an organism and its  
environment4 ,destroy that adjustment   
and life ceases to exist4 ,how is that  
adjustment secured8 ,the answer of the  
pre-,darwinian was that it represented a
 deliberate design on the part of ,god4 
,against this ,darwinism propounds a    
theory of automatic or mechanical       
adjustment which makes the calling in of
 deity altogether gratuitous4 ,and it   
remains gratuitous1 no matter how far   
the scope of the theory of natural      
selection may be modified4 ,but given   
the continuous variations which we know 
to exist with all kinds of life1 given  
any sort of competition between animals 
as to which shall live1 given even a    
degree of adaptation below which an     
animal cannot fall and live1 and it is  
at once plain that the better           
adaptations will live and the poorer    

adapted will be eliminated4 ,this       
process is analogous to that by which   
man has managed to breed so many        
varieties of domesticated animals and   
plants1 some of the varieties presenting
 so marked a difference from the        
original type that if found in a state  
of nature they would often be classed as
 a distinct species4 ,man selects the   
variation that pleases him1 eliminates  
or segregates the type that does not1   
and by following up the process         
eventually produces a distinct and fixed
 variation4 ,it was because of the      
likeness of what goes on in the case of 
the breeder to what we see actually     
going on in nature that ,darwin used the
 phrase ,natural ,selection as          
descriptive of the process4 ,it was not 
an exact phrase1 and it was not meant to
 be exact4 ,for one thing--a very       
important thing1 while a breeder        
selects1 nature eliminates4 ,man's      
action1 in relation to the type         
preserved1 is positive4 ,nature's       

attitude in relation to the type        
preserved is negative4 ,this is a very  
important distinction2 and it is one    
that is fatal to the claims of theism4  
,for if it points to a plan in nature it
 points to one that aims at killing off 
all that can be killed1 and only sparing
 those who are able to protect          
themselves against its attack4 ,and one 
is left wondering at the type of mind   
which can see goodness and wisdom in a  
plan that goes1 on generation1 after    
generation manufacturing an inferior or 
defective type in enormous numbers in   
order that a few superior specimens may 
be found1 these in their turn to become 
inferior by the arrival of some other   
specimens a little more fortunate in    
their endowment4 ,one hardly knows at   
which to marvel the most--at the        
clumsiness of the plan1 or at the       
brutality of the design4  ,it was soon  
realised that the old argument from     
design was no longer possible4 ,but if  
one can only get far enough away from   

the possibility of proof or disproof    
there is always a chance for the        
,goddite4 ,so it was argued that        
inasmuch as natural selection meant the 
emergence of a higher type1 and as there
 was no room for design within the      
process1 might not the process itself be
 an expression of design8 ,there might  
still be room for what ,huxley1 with one
 of those foolish concessions to        
established opinion which is the bane of
 ,english thought1 called the wider     
teleology4 ,this was a teleology which  
placed a designing mind at the back of  
the evolutionary process1 and arranging 
it with a view to a preconceived end4   
,the process then becomes1 to use       
,spencer's phrase1 a beneficent one1    
since it eliminates the poorer specimens
 and leaves the better ones to          
perpetuate the species4 ,we are thus    
asked to imagine a divine wisdom        
selecting the better and destroying the 
inferior much as an omniscient ,eugenist
 might destroy at birth all human beings

 of an undesirable type4  ,the weakness 
of the thesis lies primarily in the fact
 that in the case of the breeder he has 
to take the animal as he finds it1      
subject to the play of forces1 the      
characteristics of which are determined 
for him4 ,he has to make the best of the
 situation4 ,in the case of the deity he
 creates the animals with which he is   
assumed to be experimenting1 he creates 
the forces with all their qualities1 and
 thus determines the nature of the      
situation4 ,quite certainly no breeder  
would waste his time in breeding over a 
number of generations if he could secure
 the desired type at once4 ,the whole of
 the argument of the advocate of the    
wider teleology is that ,god wanted the 
higher type4 ,but if that is so why did 
he not produce it at once8 ,what useful 
purpose could be served by producing at 
the end of a lengthy and murderous      
process what might just as well have    
been secured at the beginning8 ,it is   
not wisdom but unadulterated stupidity  

to take thousands of years securing what
 might have been as well done in the    
twinkling of an eye4  ,there is1 in     
short1 no justification in the creation 
of a process so long as the end at which
 the process is aiming can be reached by
 a less tortuous method4 ,as ,mr4 ,f4   
,c4 ,s4 ,schiller says3--        ,so    
long as we are dealing with finite      
factors1 the function of pain      and  
the nature of evil can be more or less  
understood1 but as soon      as it is   
supposed to display the working of an   
infinite power      everything becomes  
wholly unintelligible4 ,we can no longer
 console      ourselves with the hope   
that good becomes the final goal of ill1
      we can no longer fancy that       
imperfection serves any secondary       
purpose in the economy of the universe4 
,a process by which evil      becomes   
good is unintelligible as the action of 
a truly infinite      power which can   
attain its end without a process2 it is 
absurd to      ascribe imperfection as a

 secondary result to a power which can  
attain all its aims without evil4 ,hence
 the world process1 and      the        
intelligent purpose we fancy we detect  
in it must be      illusory4444 ,god can
 have no purpose1 and the world cannot  
be in      process4444 ,if the world is 
the product of an infinite power it is  
utterly unknowable1 because its process 
and its nature would be      alike      
unnecessary and unaccountable4 7,riddles
 of the ,sphinx2 pp4      #cah-ai74     
,besides1 as ,i have already pointed    
out1 in the process as it meets us in   
nature there is not a selection for     
preservation1 but a selection for       
killing4 ,with the breeder preservation 
is primary4 ,it is of no value to him to
 kill1 it is the preservation of a      
desired type that is all important4 ,in 
nature1 so far as we can see1 the whole 
aim is to destroy4 ,it is not the       
fittest that are preserved so much as it
 is the unfittest that are killed4 ,the 
fittest are left alive for no other     

apparent reason than that nature is     
unable to kill them4 ,the truth of this 
is seen in the fact that where there is 
no death there is no evolution of a     
higher type4 ,in the case of diseases   
that kill there is a gradual development
 of an immune type--which introduces the
 paradox that the healthiest diseases   
from which a race may suffer are those  
that are most deadly4 ,where a disease  
does not kill there is no development   
against it4 ,it is the winnowing fan of 
death that makes for the development of 
animal life4 ,and the correct picture of
 nature--if we must picture an          
intelligence behind it--would be that of
 an intelligence aiming at killing all1 
and only failing in its purpose because 
the natural endowment of some placed    
them beyond its power4  ,and1 without   
examining the question begging word     
higher1 it may be said that natural     
selection does not make for the uniform 
covering of the earth with              
representatives of higher types4 ,if in 

some parts of the world the higher have 
replaced the lower types1 elsewhere the 
lower have replaced the higher4 ,natural
 selection1 in fact1 works without      
reference to whether the form which     
survives is higher or lower4 ,all that  
matters is adaptation4 ,the germ of     
malaria renders whole tracts of the     
earth uninhabitable to those whom we    
consider representative of the higher   
culture4 ,in other parts an alteration  
of the rainfall may crush out a         
civilisation1 and leave a handful of    
nomadic tribes as the sole denizens of  
lands where once a lofty civilisation   
flourished4 ,throughout the whole of    
nature there is never the slightest     
indication that forces operate with the 
slightest reference to what we are      
accustomed to consider the higher       
interests of the race4  ,moreover1 from 
the standpoint of an apologetic theism1 
we are entitled to ask precisely what is
 meant by this justification of the     
evolutionary process in terms of the    

production of a higher type4 ,the       
justification of a painful or a costly  
experience by an individual is two-fold4
 ,first1 it is the only way1 perhaps1 in
 which certain things may be learned or 
accomplished1 and1 second1 it is the    
individual who passes through the       
experience who benefits thereby4 ,but   
suppose a person entered on a course of 
training with the absolute certainty    
that he would never survive it4 ,should 
we be justified in forcing the course on
 him8 ,clearly not4 ,the whole would be 
regarded as a wasted effort and as an   
exhibition of gratuitous cruelty4  ,now 
when we look closely at this            
evolutionary process1 who is it that    
benefits thereby8 ,in a vague way we    
speak of the race benefiting4 ,but the  
race is made up of individuals1 and     
while it may be said the individual     
benefits from the experience through    
which the race has passed1 it cannot be 
truthfully said that he is the better   
because he has gained from experience4  

,he does not pass through the           
discipline1 he simply registers1 so to  
speak1 the result4 ,and1 therefore1 so  
far as he is concerned1 he is exactly in
 the position that the first man would  
have been had he possessed the          
endowment1 social1 and individual1 which
 the present man has4 ,there is no      
greater fallacy than that contained in  
the common saying that man learns       
through experience4 ,individually1 so   
far as civilisation is concerned1 that  
is not true4 ,were it true1 civilisation
 would be impossible4 ,if each man had  
to start where our primitive ancestors  
started1 and learn from experience1 we  
should end where the first generation of
 socialised human beings ended1 and the 
generations of men would represent an   
endless series of first steps to which  
there would be no second ones4 ,what the
 individual learns from experience is   
very little and would never serve to    
lift him from out the ranks of savagery4
 ,what he learns from the experience of 

the race is much1 and gives the whole   
distinction between the civilised man   
and the savage4 ,it is the discipline of
 the race1 that experience which meets  
each of us in the form of traditions1   
counsels1 institutions1 etc41 from which
 we get the really vital lessons of     
life4 ,but if that is so the attempted  
justification of natural processes on   
the ground that ,god designed them as   
they are so that man might learn from   
experience breaks down4 ,the individual 
does not so learn1 but is presented with
 the products of the experience of      
others1 and which he accepts in the vast
 majority of cases without even putting 
it to the test4 ,and1 therefore1 the    
method by which man learns was open from
 the start4 ,had there been some man who
 could have told us generations ago all 
that has been slowly discovered since1  
we should all have been the better for  
it1 and we should have learned then     
exactly as we have learned since4 ,and  
if ,god was really anxious to teach us1 

what possible objection could there be  
to his teaching us in some such way8 ,in
 other words1 how can we justify the    
process if the result is possible by any
 other method8  ,the standpoint of the  
theist is that ,god develops the species
 in order to benefit the individual4    
,but the order is that the individual is
 sacrificed to benefit the species--so  
far as any benefit can be traced4 ,for  
it must be noted that it is not the     
individual who has passed through all   
the suffering1 who has lived through the
 years of semi-animal life1 or through  
the years of tyranny1 that finally      
emerges strengthened and triumphant4 ,it
 is a different individual altogether4  
,the greatest benefit is secured by     
those who come latest1 and who have done
 the least to secure it4 ,the reward    
bears no relation to the personal       
desert4 ,and at the end what happens8   
,if we are to be guided by the lessons  
of science1 we must believe that one day
 the human race will cease to exist1    

just as certainly as one day it began to
 exist4 ,and what are we to think of the
 almighty wisdom and goodness which is  
responsible for all8 ,an almighty       
intelligence designs a process to       
produce a perfect animal through the    
sufferings of myriads of other animals4 
,it takes thousands and thousands of    
generations to complete the process1 and
 meantime every year is bringing the    
whole plan nearer to extinction4 ,divine
 wisdom6 ,anything nearer complete      
stupidity and futility it would be      
difficult to conceive4  ,i know that at 
this point it will be said that ,i am   
leaving out of account the future life1 
and that the story of human growth is to
 be continued elsewhere4 ,but that will 
certainly not meet all that has been    
said above4 ,and it is a curious manner 
of meeting an objection based upon the  
only phase of existence that we know    
with assurance to tell us that our      
indictment will receive a complete      
refutation in another state of existence

 of which we know nothing at all4 ,the  
reply is in itself an admission of the  
truth of the charges4 ,if life admitted 
of a moral justification here there     
would be no need to appeal to some other
 life in which these blemishes are made 
good4 ,if some other life is needed to  
correct the moral abnormalities of this 
one1 then the indictment of the ,atheist
 is justified4 ,and one is left again   
wondering why1 if almighty intelligence 
could make all things straight in the   
next world1 why the same intelligence   
could not have made the necessary       
corrections in this one4  ,the truth is 
that the ,god of the evolutionary       
process is as much a myth as is the god 
of special creation4 ,he has all the    
blemishes of the other one--one step    
removed4 ,the ,paleyan ,god had at least
 the merit of coming to close grips with
 his work4 ,the evolutionary one shields
 himself behind the fact that the work  
is done by his agents1 and then it is   
found that he created the agents for    

this special work and all that they do  
is the product of the qualities with    
which he endowed them4 ,if anything the 
evolutionary deity is more objectionable
 than the older one4 ,and if theists    
will examine nature candidly and with an
 open mind1 they will see that it is so4
 ,i do not know that anyone has drawn a 
more truthful picture of natural        
processes as they appear from the point 
of view of being the product of a divine
 intelligence than has ,mr4 ,w4 ,h4     
,mallock1 and his picture is the more   
deadly as coming from a champion of     
theism4 ,if1 he says1 theists will look 
the facts of the universe steadily in   
the face3        ,what they will see    
will astonish them4 ,they will see that 
if there      is anything at the back of
 this vast process1 with a consciousness
      and a purpose in any way          
resembling our own--a being who knows   
what      he wants and is doing his best
 to get it--he is instead of a holy     
and all-wise ,god1 a scatter-brained1   

semi-powerful1 semi-impotent            
monster4 ,they will recognise as clearly
 as they ever did the old      familiar 
facts which seemed to them evidences of 
,god's wisdom1      love1 and goodness2 
but they will find that these facts1    
when taken      in connection with the  
others1 only supply us with a standard  
in      the nature of this ,being       
himself by which most of his acts are   
exhibited to us as those of a criminal  
madman4 ,if he had been      blind1 he  
had not sin2 but if we maintain that he 
can see1 then his      sin remains4     
,habitually a bungler as he is1 and     
callous when not      actively cruel1 we
 are forced to regard him1 when he seems
 to      exhibit benevolence1 as not    
divinely benevolent1 but merely weak    
and capricious1 like a boy who fondles a
 kitten and the next moment      sets a 
dog at it1 and not only does his moral  
character fall from      him bit by bit 
but his dignity disappears also4 ,the   
orderly      processes of the stars and 

the larger phenomena of nature are      
suggestive of nothing so much as a      
wearisome ,court ceremonial             
surrounding a king who is unable to     
understand or to break away      from   
it2 whilst the thunder and whirlwind1   
which have from time      immemorial    
been accepted as special revelations of 
his awful power      and majesty1       
suggest1 if they suggest anything of a  
personal      character at all1 merely  
some blackguardly larrikin kicking his  
heels in the clouds1 not perhaps bent on
 mischief1 but indifferent      to the  
fact that he is causing it4444          
,the truth is1 if we consider the       
universe as a whole1 it fails to        
suggest a conscious and purposive ,god  
at all2 and it fails to do so      not  
because the processes of evolution as   
such preclude the idea      that a ,god 
might have made use of them for a       
definite purpose1 but      because when 
we come to consider these processes in  
detail1 and      view them in the light 

of the only purposes they suggest1 we   
find      them to be such that a ,god   
who could deliberately have been guilty 
of them would be a ,god too absurd1 too 
monstrous1 too mad to be      credible4 
7,religion as a ,credible ,doctrine2 pp4
 #agf-h74   ,as we have already seen1   
the attempt to find a plan in the       
processes of evolution breaks down      
hopelessly4 ,on analysis1 the supposed  
plan turns out to be nothing more than a
 perception of some sort of regularity1 
and as regularity is an inescapable     
condition of existence1 all that it     
proves is existence4 ,on that point     
there is no dispute4 ,and the moral     
justification of the cosmic process     
while intellectually indefensible1 adds 
an element of moral repulsion4 ,that the
 process as we know it is morally       
repugnant is shown by the appeal to the 
future1 the request to suspend judgment 
till such time as the plan is completed1
 when it is hoped that the end will     
justify the means4 ,god1 it is trusted1 

will justify himself in the future4 ,but
 in his anxiety to impress upon us the  
fact that ,god has a moral future the   
theist forgets that he has had a past1  
and that past is a black one4 ,the      
uncounted generations of suffering in   
the past is not to be compensated by a  
probable happiness in the future4 ,the  
myriads of organisms that have lived    
incomplete lives1 and ended them in     
deaths of suffering are not cancelled by
 the probability that at some time1     
still in the future1 a comparatively    
small number will lead lives of         
happiness4 ,the record is there1 there  
is blood upon the hand1 and not all the 
apologies of a self-convicted animism   
can ever wipe it clean4     ,,chapter   
,,ix4  ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,pain4     
,the problem of how to harmonise the    
existence of a ,god as believers picture
 him to be with a world such as         
experience discloses1 is as old as      
theology4 ,and the problem will         
disappear only when theology is given up

 as an aggregate of question begging    
words and gratuitous hypotheses based   
upon a foundation of primitive ignorance
 and inherited delusion4 ,for the       
majority of those questions that are    
properly called theological are not of  
the necessary order4 ,questions such as 
those connected with the mutations of   
matter1 the development of life1 the    
growth of society1 or the nature and    
clash of human passions cannot be       
evaded4 ,they are present in the facts  
themselves4 ,but the problems of        
theology are self-created2 they arise   
out of certain beliefs1 and have no     
existence apart from those beliefs4     
,they are the joint product of beliefs  
which are wholly useless1 in conflict   
with facts with which they cannot be    
squared4  ,what is known as ,the        
,problem of ,evil is an apt illustration
 of the truth of what has been said4    
,here there is created a problem which  
is not alone quite gratuitous1 but it   
succeeds in inverting the real question 

at issue4 ,for unless we accept the     
world as the product of a good and wise 
,god1 there is no problem of evil for us
 to explain4 ,the problem of evil is1   
given such a deity1 how to account for  
the existence of evil1 or1 if it exists1
 how account for its continuance4 ,the  
problem is created by the theory4       
,dismiss the theory and no problem is   
left4 ,and it is in line with what is   
done in other directions1 that1 having  
created the difficulty1 the theist      
should present it to the non-theist as  
one of the questions that he must       
answer4  ,in reality there is no problem
 of evil in connection with ethics4 ,the
 ethical problem is not the existence of
 evil1 but the emergence of good2 not1  
that is1 why do men do wrong1 but why do
 they do right4 ,that life should cease 
to be is not at all wonderful1 but that 
with so many potential dangers around   
the organism1 the actions of living     
beings should become so automatically   
adapted to their surroundings as to shun

 the actions which destroy life1 and    
perform such actions as maintain it--at 
least1 to such an extent as secures the 
preservation of the species--may well   
arouse surprise and give birth to       
enquiry4 ,so with the question of evil  
and suffering in the world4 ,that these 
exist is undeniable1 but the enquiry    
they suggest is only on all fours with  
the enquiry suggested by any other      
natural fact1 while the ethical problem 
centres1 not around the existence of    
wrong action1 but around the emergence  
of right conduct4 ,it is the evolution  
of happiness that forms the kernel of   
the ethical problem1 not the evolution  
of pain4  ,the earlier form of the      
,christian apologetic took the form of a
 dualistic theory of the world4 ,there  
were two powers1 ,god and the devil1 and
 between them they shared the           
responsibility for all good and evil4   
,so far1 good4 ,but this was clearly    
saving the goodness of ,god at the      
expense of his omnipotence4 ,moreover1  

if ,god was to be thought of as the     
creator of the universe1 the theory1 as 
,mill said1 paid him the doubtful       
compliment of making him the creator of 
,satan1 and1 therefore1 the creator of  
evil once removed4 ,or1 if not1 ,god and
 the devil were left as rival monarchs  
quarrelling over a territory that       
appeared to exist apart from and        
independent of either4  ,but nowadays   
the devil has gone out of fashion4 ,very
 few of the clergy ever mention him1 and
 although an attempt was made to        
reinstate him some years ago by the     
author of ,evil and ,evolution1 the     
endeavour was a failure4 ,and bereft of 
the convenient scapegoat1 the devil1 the
 present day theist is compelled to     
attempt an apology for evil that will   
appeal to natural and verifiable facts  
for confirmation1 or which must1 at     
least1 not be in conflict with them4 ,if
 theism is to stand1 a place and a      
meaning must be found for the evil in   
the world1 and found in such a way that 

it either relieves ,god of the          
responsibility for its existence or its 
being can be shown to harmonise with his
 assumed character4 ,it is no longer    
possible to fall back on ,paul's        
position that the potter is at liberty  
to doom one pot to honour and the other 
to dishonour4 ,the moral responsibility 
for the kind of pots he turns out cannot
 be so easily evaded4 ,as ,professor    
,sorley says1 ,if ethical theism is to  
stand1 the evil in the world cannot be  
referred to ,god in the same way as the 
good is referred to him4 ,somehow1 he   
must be relieved of the responsibility  
for its existence1 or a purpose for it  
must be found4  ,now1 curiously enough1 
modern theists hover between the two    
positions4 ,professor ,sorley1          
representing one position1 says that the
 only way to avoid referring evil to    
,god is by the postulate of human       
freedom4 7,moral ,values and the ,idea  
of ,god1 p4 #dfi47 ,this is also the way
 out adopted by ,canon ,green in ,the   

,problem of ,evil1 and it turns upon a  
mere play on words4 ,thus1 ,canon ,green
 says that there is one thing ,god could
 not do4 ,he could not force him to be  
good1 i4e41 to choose virtue freely1 for
 the idea of forcing a free being to    
choose involves a contradiction4 ,and   
,professor ,sorley says more elaborately
 that things occur in the universe which
 are not due to ,god's will1 although   
they must have happened with his        
permission 444 a higher range of power  
and perfection is shown in the creation 
of free beings than in the creation of  
beings whose every thought and action   
are pre-determined by their ,creator1   
and while he admits there is limitations
 to man's power of choice1 he holds that
 there is one form of choice that is    
always there1 and that is the choice of 
good and evil4 7,moral ,values and the  
,idea of ,god1 pp4 #dfi-gj47  ,in all   
this one can see little more than verbal
 confusion4 ,to commence with ,canon    
,green1 which will also cover much that 

,prof4 ,sorley says on the same point4  
,when we are told man must choose virtue
 freely in order that what he does shall
 partake of the character of morality1  
it is plain that he is using the word   
forced in two senses4 ,in the one sense 
force may mean no more than a           
determinant4 ,thus we may say that our  
sympathies force us to act in such and  
such a way4 ,or the religious man may   
say that the love of ,god forces him to 
act in such and such a manner4 ,force   
here means any consideration that will  
lead to action1 and no one can object to
 its use in this sense4  ,a second      
meaning of force is that of compulsion  
from without1 as when a strong man gets 
hold of a weak one and by exertion of   
physical strength compels him to do     
something that he is disinclined to do1 
or when one forces another by threat of 
punishment4 ,in this latter sense no one
 dreams of harmonising force with moral 
action4 ,neither law nor common sense   
does so4 ,but compulsion in the sense of

 one's actions being forced by a mental 
or moral disposition no one outside an  
asylum would dispute4 ,and what ,canon  
,green does is to ask us to reject the  
idea of a moral action being forced1 in 
the sense of external compulsion1 and   
then uses it in the sense of an absence 
of dispositions that will lead to       
certain courses of conduct4  ,it is     
probable that the ,canon would reject   
this interpretation of his statement1   
but if it does not mean this1 then his  
argument is unintelligible4 ,for if it  
is admitted that what man does is the   
product of his mental or moral          
dispositions1 in other words1 of his    
nature1 and if1 as is undeniable1 the   
nature with which he fronts the world is
 the product of heredity and            
environment1 he would no more be forced 
to do good had ,god given him impulses  
strong enough to overcome all tendency  
to evil than he is now when his impulses
 come to him from his ancestors and his 
general social heredity4  ,all that is  

implied in a moral act is free choice4  
,but choice is free1 not when it is     
independent of organic promptings2 that 
is absurd2 but when those organic       
promptings are allowed to find          
expression4 ,there is no other rational 
meaning to choice than this4 ,choice    
does not tell us how it is determined1  
on that point it can say nothing1 any   
more than a child can say why it chooses
 sugar in preference to cayenne pepper4 
,its choice1 we say1 is determined by   
its taste4 ,and its taste is determined 
by--8 ,to answer that question we must  
call in the chemist and the             
physiologist1 and they probably will    
tell us why our choice moves in one     
direction rather than in another4  ,when
 men like ,canon ,green talk of the     
morality of an action being dependent   
upon our choice between right and wrong1
 what they probably have in their minds 
is the perception of right and wrong4   
,for we may perceive the possibility of 
one course while we are performing      

another4 ,but the power of choice is    
clearly limited4 ,a man cannot choose to
 be a mathematician1 however much he may
 see the desirability of becoming one4  
,and many a man may in the moral sphere 
see the advisability of his being       
different in character from what he is1 
but may altogether lack the capacity of 
becoming such4 ,and the power of choice 
differs not only with each individual1  
but with the same individual at         
different times4 ,finally1 the more     
fixed the character of the individual   
the less conscious he is of choice1 or  
of a sense of freedom to do differently 
from what he actually does1 and as this 
applies with equal force to character1  
whether it be good or bad1 we reach1    
finally1 the suicidal position that the 
more fundamentally moral a man becomes1 
the less moral he is4#e  ,now seeing    
that all our educational processes aim  
at making the good character1 so to     
speak1 automatic1 that is1 to quite fill
 the mind with worthy motives and wise  

power of choice1 and seeing also that a 
character is good so far as this is     
done1 will some one explain in what way 
moral character would have suffered had 
,god so made man that he would have had 
intelligence enough to always choose the
 good and reject the bad8 ,for1 be it   
noted1 the apology put forward for the  
present state of affairs is that man is 
in a state of probation1 he is passing  
through a course of moral discipline1   
and it is essential that he should      
experience the possibility to do wrong1 
and even to occasionally do the wrong4  
,and the end of the process of tuition  
is1 what8 ,the production of a perfect  
being in whom there shall not be a      
proneness to do wrong1 to whose purified
 moral nature wrong doing shall be quite
 foreign4 ,that is to say that we are to
 reach as a result of this long         
roundabout process1 with all its waste  
and bungling1 just what might have been 
established at the beginning4 ,for      
either the perfect moral being is       

without the quality which we have just  
been assured is essential to morality1  
or the whole argument is reduced to     
nonsense4  ,for it is impossible to     
assume that the bad man chooses to be   
bad with a full perception of the       
consequences of his actions1 and at the 
same time with the power to do          
otherwise4 ,we all agree that the right 
choice is ultimately a wise choice1 and 
that if we could all trace out the      
consequences of all we do1 we should    
realise that it was to our real interest
 to act rightly4 ,and if that is        
admitted1 it follows that the choice to 
do evil is the product of               
short-sightedness1 or of some defect of 
temperament which prevents our standing 
up against the temptations of the       
moment4 ,and our ethical education is   
mainly directed to making good this     
defect in our make up4 ,but suppose that
 amount of wisdom or strength had been  
an endowment of our nature from the     
outset1 is there any conceivable way in 

which we should have been the worse for 
it8 ,for even as it is there are some   
people who do make a fairly wise and    
right choice1 and whose high-water mark 
of excellence is not reached through the
 crime and folly of the revival meeting 
convert4 ,are they the worse because    
they have never yielded to evil8 ,is the
 naturally good man really a less worthy
 character than the one whose           
comparative goodness is only reached    
through and after a lengthy course of   
evil living8 ,and if not1 in what way   
would the race have been worsened had we
 all been as fortunately circumstanced8 
,if it was really ,god's purpose to have
 a race of men and women who should be  
both good and wise1 it remains for the  
theist to show in what way the plan     
would not have been as well served by   
making them at once with a sufficiency  
of intelligence to act in the real      
interests of themselves and of all      
around them4  ,coming closer to earth   
the theist attempts to find a           

justification for the existing order of 
things by finding a use for pain and    
suffering in their educational influence
 on human nature1 and in the            
impossibility of altering for the better
 the consequences of natural law4  ,the 
real question at issue1 says one of the 
most eloquent of modern theists1 the    
late ,dr4 ,martineau1 is whether the    
laws of which complaint is made work    
such harm that they ought never to have 
been enacted2 or whether1 in spite of   
occasional disasters in their path1 the 
sentient existence of which they are the
 conditions has in its history a vast   
excess of blessing4 7,study of ,religion
 ,,ii41 p4 #ia47 ,and ,canon ,green1 who
 uses some of ,dr4 ,martineau's ideas   
without the latter's eloquence or power 
of reasoning1 asks1 ,if ,god were to    
say1 ',you condemn me for this          
suffering6 ,well1 take my creative power
 and re-create the world to please      
yourself and to suit your own sense of  
justice and mercy' could we think out a 

world that should be better than this   
one8 7,problem of ,evil1 p4 #dh47  ,now 
both these methods of raising the       
question--and they are representative of
 a whole group--serve but to confuse the
 issue4 ,for no one denies that some    
benefit may result from the present     
cosmical structure4 ,but that does not  
touch the complaint that the structure  
is not such as fits in with the         
existence of a presiding intelligence   
such as theism asks us to accept4 ,and  
the question of ,canon ,green's whether 
we could turn out a better universe than
 the one that actually exists1 is wide  
of the mark also4 ,if ,i purchase a     
motor car as the work of a genius in    
car-building1 and find when ,i get my   
purchase home that it cannot be made to 
run1 it does not destroy the justice of 
my complaint to ask whether ,i could    
build a better one or not4 ,the         
important thing is that the car is not  
what it should be1 and judging by the   
product the builder is not what he is   

represented to be either4 ,dr4          
,martineau was far too keen a           
controversialist to adopt ,canon        
,green's foolish retort1 but he does    
seek to parry the force of the atheist  
criticism by saying that ,god if once he
 commits his will to any determinate    
method1 and for the realisation of his  
ends selects and institutes a scheme of 
instrumental rules1 he thereby shuts the
 door on a thousand things that might   
have been done before4 7,study1 p4 #he74
 ,to that one may reply1 so much the    
worse for his judgment2 while if the    
fact of his having once adopted a       
determinate method caused him to resolve
 to stick to it1 in spite of its        
consequences in practice1 and           
irrespective of the beneficial results  
that might have followed its            
modification1 we can only regret that   
the deity was not acquainted with       
,emerson's opinion that a foolish       
consistency is the bugbear of little    
minds4 ,even what is said to be the     

greatest mind of all might easily have  
benefited from the warning4  ,canon     
,green tries another line of reply1     
which is not in the least more          
convincing4 ,he pictures to us a father 
who1 by misappropriating trust funds1   
brings disgrace to the whole of his     
family4 ,the mother is driven to despair
 and drink4 ,the sister dies for want of
 food1 the brother finds his career     
ruined4 ,the disaster is complete1 and  
,canon ,green says it is inevitable     
because we cannot have a world in which 
the relations of parents and children   
exist without having them suffer from   
each other's faults4 ,so far as the     
present world goes that is true4 ,but it
 is certainly a strange reply to the    
complaint that an arrangement is unjust 
to say that as the injustice results    
from the arrangement1 therefore1 we have
 no cause for complaint4 ,and that we   
are unable to make a better world is    
beside the mark4 ,between the perception
 of an injustice1 and the ability to    

remove it there is a world of           
difference1 and although we may be      
unable to remedy the defect the defect  
remains4  ,but1 indeed1 human nature    
does try to produce a world in which    
such happenings as those depicted shall 
either not occur or their consequences  
shall be reduced to a minimum4 ,we do   
not hang a son for his parents' crime1  
nor do humane people blame children for 
the shortcomings of their parents4 ,to  
some extent we try to correct the       
consequences that follow1 and even      
though the endeavour be futile1 that is 
in itself an indictment of the existing 
order4 ,man does at least try to correct
 the injustices his ,god is said to have
 created4  ,it is overlooked also that  
the evils which follow from wrong       
actions are not confined to those       
immediately connected1 and who may      
conceivably have their resentment to    
some extent dulled1 if not lessened1 by 
that fact4 ,people in no way connected1 
and who can have no perception of the   

cause of their suffering1 who are       
unconscious of everything1 save the one 
fact that they are suffering1 feel its  
consequences4 ,when a great war spreads 
devastation all over the world1 can it  
be said that any useful purpose is      
served by the sufferings of millions who
 are not in the slightest degree aware  
of the cause of their agony8 ,when a    
shady financial operation brings an     
innocent man to ruin1 and effects all   
the consequences which ,canon ,green    
imagines resulting from the defaulting  
parent1 how can it be said that the     
catastrophe admits of ethical           
justification8 ,in many cases the       
thought of the injury experienced acts  
itself as a fresh cause of degradation4 
,it creates a rankling and a bitterness 
which depresses and inhibits the power  
to struggle1 unless it be the desire to 
struggle for revenge against a condition
 of things of which the evil results are
 only too apparent4 ,people are not     
merely punished for the evil they do2   

they are punished for the evil that     
others do1 and the punishment1 so far as
 we can see1 bears no observable        
relation to the wrong done4 ,there is no
 ethical relation between actions and   
consequences4 ,not alone is the         
incidence of an action dependent upon   
personal qualities--some will suffer    
more from having accidentally told an   
untruth than others will suffer from    
having committed gross and deliberate   
fraud--but nature is absolutely careless
 of whether what ,i do is motived by    
good or bad intentions4 ,if ,i get a    
wetting through going out to help some  
one in distress1 the consequences will  
be exactly the same as though ,i had got
 wet going out to commit a burglary or a
 murder4 ,and when ,dr4 ,martineau talks
 of the natural penalties for guilt1 and
 adds that sin being there1 it would be 
simply monstrous that there should be no
 suffering and would fully justify the  
despair which now raises its sickly cry 
of complaint against the retributory    

wretchedness of human transgression     
7,study ,,ii41 p4 #ajf71 the reply is   
that there are no such things as natural
 penalties for guilt4 ,there are only   
consequences of actions1 and they are   
the same whatever be the moral quality  
of the actions performed4 ,in the same  
way that nature may in the course of an 
earthquake destroy the homes of a dozen 
worthy families and leave a gambling    
hell untouched1 so it will in other     
directions punish where a man1 from good
 intentions1 places himself in the path 
of punishment1 and refrain from         
afflicting one whose selfishness or     
greed has guarded him against attack4   
,there are natural consequences of      
actions1 there are no natural penalties 
for guilt1 and there are no natural     
rewards for innocence4 ,rewards and     
penalties are the creation of man1 and  
it is only in the form of a figure of   
speech that we can apply them to nature4
  ,it is equally idle to speak of pain  
as a form of discipline4 ,professor     

,sorley says that if the pain in the    
world can be turned to the increase of  
goodness1 then its existence offers no  
insuperable objection to the ethical    
view of reality4 ,so ,dr4 ,martineau    
says that suffering is the moral        
discipline through which our nature     
arrives at its true elevation4 ,it is   
needless to multiply quotations2 such   
statements are the commonplaces of      
theistic controversy1 and almost any    
book that one cares to pick up will     
supply further illustrations1 if they be
 required4 ,none can reject them1       
because no theist can afford to candidly
 admit that the world we know offers no 
justification for his belief4 ,the      
belief in the goodness of ,god1 as      
,canon ,green says1 is a belief that is 
absolutely fundamental to all religion1 
and if the facts as we see them do not  
support the belief1 some apology must be
 found that will marry the theory to the
 fact4  ,nevertheless1 the belief in the
 disciplinary power of pain or suffering

 is1 if not quite illusory1 so nearly so
 that it is useless for the purpose for 
which it is brought forward4 ,in the    
first place1 it does not require very   
profound study to see that whatever are 
the lessons taught by suffering they are
 seldom proportionate to the conduct    
which cause them1 nor do those who      
suffer reap the alleged disciplinary    
benefit of their suffering4 ,let us take
 a common case4 ,a mother goes out and  
leaves a child near an unguarded fire4  
,the mother returns to find the child   
burned to death4 ,where is the          
discipline here8 ,certainly the child   
cannot have gained any4 ,but there is1  
of course1 the mother4 ,the mother has  
learned such a lesson that she will     
never forget it1 and will never again   
commit the same blunder4 ,there we have 
it4 ,a child is allowed to die by a     
hideously cruel death in order that a   
mother may learn a lesson in            
carefulness4 ,it is good to learn from  
other sources that ,god's ways are not  

our ways4 ,a man who tried to imitate   
them1 and who burned one of his children
 in order to teach its mother how to    
look after the rest1 would soon find    
himself in the criminal court1 or in an 
asylum4 ,but what would be insanity or  
criminal cruelty in the case of man1    
becomes1 in the alembic of religious    
apologetic1 goodness and wisdom in ,god4
  ,the theory that it is the function of
 pain to elevate and to discipline is   
simply not true4 ,one has only to look  
to see that in countless cases the      
effect of pain is disaster4 ,the world's
 best work is not born of pain but of   
pleasure4 ,there is no pain and no      
suffering1 there is hardly even toil1 in
 the work of a genius4 ,in all the      
higher walks of music1 of art1 of       
literature1 the work is perfect in      
proportion as the worker finds himself  
in agreeable and pleasant surroundings4 
,and what is true of the higher aspect  
of art is true also of life in general4 
,life may be lived in spite of pain1 as 

good work may be done in spite of       
discouraging circumstances1 but one     
might as well talk of a plant           
flourishing because of poor soil1 or    
sharp frosts1 as to speak of life       
becoming better because of pain4  ,the  
normal function of pain is to depress1  
that of pleasure is to heighten4 ,as    
,spencer said1 every pain lowers the    
tide of life2 every pleasure raises the 
tide of life4 ,it is one of the         
commonest of sights to see those        
suffering from illness becoming more    
self-centred1 less careful of others1   
and to see the disintegrating           
consequences of disease on character4   
,here and there one may find a character
 that has had its rough edges smoothed  
down by suffering1 but for every case of
 that kind one may find a score of an   
opposite order4 ,it is not the underfed1
 badly clothed1 neglected child that is 
likely to make the best citizen1 but the
 one that has the best chance of        
developing itself in healthy            

surroundings4 ,and it is a curious      
commentary1 if it were true1 to argue   
that a good and wise ,god so arranged   
things that pain and suffering1 even    
undeserved suffering1 should be the main
 way for the development of character4  
,a strange but not uncommon argument is 
used by ,canon ,green in dealing with   
the suffering incidental to the various 
disasters that overtake mankind from    
time to time4 ,suffering1 he says1 has a
 certain element of martyrdom about it4 
,even evils due to human greed and      
carelessness bring some benefit in their
 train4 ,thus1 apropos of the ,titanic  
disaster3--        ,every such disaster 
tends to produce some improvement for   
future      generations4 ,shipowners are
 forced to supply more boats1 wireless  
instalment is required on all ships2 the
 idle rich are led to think      less of
 saving useless time and more of saving 
lives1 their own and      those of men  
in the stokeholds4 ,in a sense those who
 perish may be      said to be unwilling

 martyrs who by their deaths purchase   
some      advantage for others4 ,it will
 be said that it is a great price to    
pay for a small advantage1 and one which
 might have been cheaply      gained in 
some other ways4 ,that is so4 ,but so   
too the ways of      nature are cruel4  
,so many seeds must be sown1 so many    
young animals      or birds or fishes   
born1 so many must be trampled out of   
existence1      that only the best may  
survive4 7,problem of ,evil2 pp4        
#afc-d74   ,that certainly puts all the 
owners of slum property1 all the        
grasping shipowners1 all those who      
batten and fatten on other people's     
welfare in a most favourable light4 ,we 
have been thinking them almost criminals
 when they were in reality public       
benefactors4 ,they lead to many         
improvements1 and even though the       
improvements come too late to benefit   
those who suffer from the evils1 yet    
they do come--sometimes4 ,certainly it  
might give some comfort if the sufferers

 knew what it was they were being       
sacrificed for1 and that others would be
 benefited by their death4 ,but they do 
not1 and we are therefore bound to      
conclude that whatever satisfaction is  
felt is by those who survive4 ,when a   
,titanic sinks it must be the people on 
shore who see the element of goodness in
 it since it makes travelling easier for
 them4 ,and the kindness developed in   
one who can excuse the brutalities of   
nature because it brings some benefit to
 himself is of a rather startling       
nature4  ,the fundamental fault in all  
reasoning of this order lies in the     
assumption that pain ceases to be pain  
if it can be shown to bring good to some
 one4 ,but that it not so4 ,pleasure and
 pain are not quantitative things1      
increments of which can be carried on   
from generation to generation and a     
balance struck at the end1 much as one  
strikes a balance between the profits   
and losses of a year's trading4 ,all    
suffering and all enjoyment are of      

necessity personal4 ,suffering is not   
increased by extending it over a million
 instances4 ,there was not more pain    
because a larger number happened to be  
be killed in the ,european war than are 
killed in a borderland skirmish4 ,there 
were a larger number of people involved 
in the one case than in the other1 but  
that is all4 ,multiplying the number of 
cases makes a greater appeal to a       
sluggish imagination1 but it adds       
nothing substantial to the fact4        
,feeling1 whether it be pleasant or     
painful1 is a matter of individual      
experience1 and that being so it is not 
the number of people who suffer through 
no fault of their own1 and1 so far as   
one can see1 without any benefit        
proportionate to the suffering          
experienced1 but the fact of there being
 this suffering at all4 ,that is the    
point the theist must face2 it is the   
one point he systematically avoids4     
,another form of the same argument meets
 us in the familiar plea that bodily    

pain sounds the alarm bell of disease in
 time for its removal4 ,in some sense it
 may be admitted that a painful feeling1
 in certain circumstances1 does act as a
 warning that persistence will lead to  
disaster4 ,but it is not universally    
true in the sense and in the degree that
 is needed to justify the argument1 and 
it is a warning out of all proportion to
 the danger faced4 ,in the first place1 
pain cannot be a warning against        
disease1 it can only be an indication of
 its presence4 ,it does not warn us     
against the dangers of a contemplated   
course of conduct1 nor can it tell us   
what conduct has led to the pain        
experienced4 ,and in the case of        
contagious diseases1 what amount of     
warning is there given8 ,in some case   
the victim is stricken and is dead in so
 short a time as not to know with what  
it is he has been afflicted1 and        
certainly without any chance of being   
warned4 ,what warning is there in the   
case of a violent poison8 ,or what      

relation is there between pains felt and
 dangers run8 ,the most dangerous       
diseases may have painless beginnings1  
and be well rooted in the system before 
the victim is driven by discomfort to   
seek medical advice4 ,on the other hand1
 a corn or a toothache1 neither of them 
very deadly ailments1 create pain out of
 all proportion to their gravity4 ,and  
if we take the case of excessive cold we
 have here an instance where instead of 
pain acting as a warning1 the danger    
just acts as an anaesthetic4 ,the victim
 is oppressed by drowsiness1 sinks into 
insensibility1 finally death4 ,here it  
is not the approach of death that is    
painful1 but the return to life1 the    
pain of restoring circulation being very
 severe indeed4  ,fear1 which may be    
classed as a species of pain1 appears to
 act1 in the majority of instances1 as  
an enemy1 rather than as a friend to the
 animal experiencing it4 ,thus          
,professor ,mosso points out that in the
 animal organism there exists a number  

of harmful reactions that increase in   
number the graver the peril becomes4 ,we
 have all read of the fascination of the
 bird by the serpent1 and there are     
other animals that in the presence of an
 enemy become so palsied with fear as to
 become incapable of defence1 even that 
of flight4 ,and with man it is not as   
the danger becomes most acute that his  
nerves become steadier and his courage  
firmer4 ,the opposite is probably more  
often the case4 ,in all these cases it  
is as though nature had lured the animal
 or man into a position of grave danger1
 and then does its best to divest him of
 adequate means of defence against it4  
,common sense revolts against the       
doctrine that pain is a good thing1 and 
the fact of this is everywhere seen in  
the attempt of man to get rid of it4 ,no
 one trusts it as a sure warning against
 disease1 no one turns to it as a means 
of purifying character4 ,all these pleas
 are the mere platitudes of a religious 
apologetic trying to harmonise a        

primitive theory of things with a larger
 knowledge and a more developed moral   
sense4 ,pain and suffering in the world 
remain facts whether we believe in the  
existence of a ,god or not1 but we are  
at least freed from the paralysing      
horror of the belief that all the       
suffering and pain in nature is part of 
a plan4 ,if man realised all that that  
belief involved it might indeed rob his 
mind of all strength to struggle against
 the forces that make for his           
destruction4 ,fortunately no race of    
people could act upon the logical       
implications of the theistic theory and 
maintain its existence4 ,in practice1 as
 well as in theory1 theism has had to   
come to terms with facts4 ,and now the  
series of adjustments have almost       
reached their end4 ,the belief in ,god  
has been traced to its origin1 and we   
know it to have issued in an altogether 
discredited view of the world and of    
man4 ,we know that man does not discover
 ,god1 he invents him1 and an invention 

is properly discarded when a better     
instrument is forthcoming4 ,to-day the  
hypothesis of ,god stands in just the   
same relation to the better life of     
to-day as the fire drill of the savage  
does to the modern method of obtaining a
 light4 ,the belief in ,god may continue
 awhile in virtue of the lack of        
intelligence of some1 of the            
carelessness of others1 and of the      
conservative character of the mass4 ,but
 no amount of apologising can make up   
for the absence of genuine knowledge1   
nor can the flow of the finest eloquence
 do aught but clothe in regal raiment   
the body of a corpse4  ,,footnote3  #e  
,i have discussed this question at      
length in my ,determinism or ,free      
,will4     ,part ,,ii4  ,,substitutes   
,,for ,,atheism4     ,,chapter ,x4  ,a  
,,question ,,of ,,prejudice4   ,it      
affords some ground for surprise that   
there should be so great a resentment   
shown against religious disbelief in    
general and against ,atheism in         

particular4 ,we have here more than the 
mere rejection of a theory or view of   
life4 ,there is a certain emotional     
resentment1 a shrinking from the one who
 is guilty of disbelief1 such as is not 
explainable on ordinary grounds4 ,the   
attitude is ridiculous1 so ridiculous   
that many who adopt it are ashamed to   
openly acknowledge it1 but it is there1 
and its existence calls for explanation4
  ,we believe this is to be found in the
 peculiar history of the god-idea       
combined with primitive theories of     
social life4 ,like many frames of mind  
that persist in civilised society1 this 
attitude towards disbelief has its roots
 in a conception of the world that has  
been generally discarded and in social  
conditions that have ceased to exist    
among civilised people4 ,to begin with1 
we have the fact that religion dominates
 the life of primitive man to a degree  
that is almost inconceivable to the     
modern mind4 ,the anger of the tribal   
gods has to be always reckoned with4    

,what they desire must be done1 what    
they do not desire must be avoided4 ,in 
the next place there exists a very      
strong sense of collective              
responsibility4 ,what one member of a   
tribe does the whole of the tribe is    
responsible for1 both to the members of 
other tribes and to the gods4 ,we see a 
survival of this in the reversion to a  
more primitive state of things that     
takes place during a war4 ,in some      
circumstances hatred of the whole of a  
people with whom a nation is at war     
becomes a duty1 and all are responsible 
for the offences of each4 ,so in        
primitive times an offence against the  
gods became an act of treason against   
the tribe4 ,it might expose the whole of
 the tribe to disaster4  ,it is not1 it 
must be noted1 that primitive man is    
fond of the gods1 or jealous of their   
honour2 he is not any more fond of them 
than is the modern citizen of the       
tax-collector4 ,and no one will ever    
really understand the question of       

religion until he rids himself of the   
notion that primitive man spends his    
time looking for gods or that he is     
happy in their company4 ,he is simply   
afraid that a single unruly member may  
get the whole tribe into a serious      
difficulty4 ,the savage is severely     
practical2 his conduct rests upon       
grounds of1 to him1 the most obvious    
utility1 and his treatment of the       
heretic leaves little to be desired on  
the score of effectiveness4 ,the        
unbeliever is a dangerous person1 and he
 is promptly suppressed4 ,the first     
heretic died a martyr to the tribe2 the 
last heretic will die a martyr to the   
race4  ,primitive conditions die out1   
but primitive feelings linger1 and      
although in theory we have reached the  
stage of believing that each person must
 bear the consequences of his own       
religious opinions1 the deeply rooted   
dislike to the man who rejects the rule 
of the gods remains4  ,historically we  
have also to reckon with the operations 

of an interested priesthood1 but leaving
 that on one side as a secondary        
development it would seem that one must 
trace to some such cause as the one     
above indicated the deep and widespread 
dislike to such a term as atheism1 even 
by many who to all intents and purposes 
are atheist in their opinion4 ,certainly
 in this country1 where compromise is   
more fashionable than in many other     
places1 the dislike to the word is      
partly due to its uncompromising        
character4 ,it is clear cut and         
definite4 ,its connotations cannot be   
misunderstood by any one who takes the  
word in its literal meaning4 ,the       
,theist is one who believes in a        
personal ,god4 ,the ,atheist is one who 
is without belief in a personal ,god4   
,the meaning is clear1 and the implied  
mental attitude is plain4 ,it is opposed
 to theism1 and has no significance     
apart from ,theism4 ,and1 as will be    
seen1 when non-theists quarrel with it1 
it is only because it is mis-stated or  

misunderstood4  ,but most people dislike
 clear cut terms4 ,they prefer to exist 
in an atmosphere of mental ambiguity and
 intellectual fog which blurs outlines  
and obscures differences4 ,unbeliever is
 preferable to some1 sceptic--presumably
 because of its age and philosophical   
associations1 is a greater favourite1   
and ,agnostic is more beloved than      
either--the latter has indeed been      
pressed into the service of a more or   
less nebulous religion4 ,as it is said1 
,we are all ,socialists nowadays1 so it 
is said that we are unbelievers or      
,agnostics nowadays4 ,but no one says we
 are all ,atheists nowadays4 ,timidity  
can find no use for a word of that      
character4 ,of course1 if a man believes
 that some word other than ,atheism best
 describes his state of mind1 he has a  
perfect right to select the one that    
seems fittest4 ,but when one finds      
non-theists repudiating the name of     
,atheist with as much moral indignation 
as though they had been accused of      

shoplifting1 one cannot help the        
suspicion that the heat displayed is not
 unconnected with some lurking fear of  
the respectabilities4 ,it does seem that
 while many may have outgrown all fear  
of the ,god of orthodoxy1 the fear of   
the god of social pressure remains4  ,so
 far as the ,theist is concerned it is  
quite understandable that his objection 
to ,atheism should involve a certain    
moral element4 ,that would result from  
what has already been said concerning   
the cause of the fear of heresy4 ,still 
one would have thought that in these    
days it would require a person of almost
 abnormal stupidity to assume that      
disbelief in ,god has its roots in a    
defective moral character4 ,the facts   
would warrant a quite opposite          
conclusion4 ,in the first place1 the    
rejection of any well-established belief
 argues a degree of independence of mind
 that is1 unfortunately1 not common4    
,the ordinary mind follows the common   
route4 ,it is the extraordinary mind    

that strikes out from the beaten path4  
,the heretic1 whether in politics or in 
religion1 may be wrong1 but there is    
always with him the guarantee of a      
certain measure of mental strength that 
is not1 on the face of the matter1      
present with one who follows the        
orthodox path4 ,and that in itself      
represents a type of mind of no little  
social value4 ,moreover1 ,i for one1 am 
quite ready to assert that1 class for   
class1 the ,freethinker does represent a
 type of mind considerably above the    
average4 ,that this is not more         
generally recognised is due to the      
policy of the religious advocate in     
contrasting the uneducated ,freethinker 
with the educated believer4  ,secondly1 
it strikes one as almost insane to      
assume that in a ,christian country     
,atheism should be professed as a cloak 
or as an excuse for misconduct4 ,they   
who talk in this strain greatly         
undervalue the accommodating power of   
religion4 ,is there a single form of    

rascality known to man for which        
religion has not been able to provide a 
sanction8 ,if there is ,i have failed to
 come across it4 ,the use of religion   
made by tyranny in all ages and in all  
countries is proof of how accommodating 
it is to man's passions and interests4  
,the picture of the dying murderer      
meeting his end1 filled with the        
consolation of religion1 and certain of 
his speedy salvation1 contains a lesson 
that all may read if they will4  ,error 
there may be in any case where opinion  
is concerned1 but profession of an      
opinion that paves the way for suspicion
 and persecution provides a prima facie 
guarantee of honesty that cannot be     
furnished by the advocacy of one that   
stands high in the public favour4 ,for  
aught ,i know to the contrary1 every one
 of ,england's ,bishops may be quite    
honest men4 ,but there can be no        
certainty about it so long as the       
profession carries with it all it does4 
,the dice are loaded in favour of       

conviction4 ,but the man who faces      
social ostracism1 and even loss of      
liberty in defence of an opinion1 is    
giving a hostage to truth such as none  
other can give4  ,this association of   
heresy with a defective moral character 
is a very old game4 ,it has been played 
by all religions1 and1 it must be       
admitted1 with considerable success4    
,writing in the second century ,lucian  
shows us the same policy at work in his 
day4 ,in one of his dialogues1 when the 
,atheist has refuted one after another  
the theistic arguments of his opponent1 
the defender of the gods turns on his   
opponent with--        ,you god robbing1
 shabby1 villainous1 infamous1          
halter-sick      vagabond6 ,does not    
everybody know that your father was a   
tatterdemalion1 and your mother no      
better than she should be8 that      you
 murdered your brother and are guilty of
 other execrable crimes8      ,you lewd1
 lying1 rascally1 abominable varlet4    
,that type of disputant is still with   

us1 and is still supporting his beliefs 
with the same tactics4 ,and it is       
successful with some4 ,there is a       
certain snobbishness in human nature    
that makes it seek the association of   
well-known names and shun all of those  
with an unfashionable reputation4 ,to   
observe the way in which some people    
will introduce into their conversation1 
speeches1 or writings1 the names of     
well-known men1 is a revelation of this 
mental snobbery4 ,and the moral         
equivalent of this is the fear of being 
found in the company of an opinion that 
has been branded as immoral4 ,such      
people have all the fear of an unpopular
 opinion that a savage has of a tribal  
taboo--it is1 in fact1 a survival of the
 same spirit that gave the tribal taboo 
its force4 ,it is1 thus1 not a very     
difficult matter to warn people off an  
undesirable opinion4 ,samuel ,taylor    
,coleridge relates how the clergy raised
 the cry of ,atheism against him1       
although he had never advanced further  

than ,deism4 ,and it is to his credit   
that in referring to this charge he     
said3--        ,little do these men know
 what ,atheism is4 ,not one man in a    
thousand      has either strength of    
mind or goodness of heart to be an      
,atheist4      ,i repeat it4 ,not one   
man in a thousand has either strength of
 mind      or goodness of heart to be an
 ,atheist4   ,and we have also the      
oft-quoted testimony of the late        
,professor ,tyndall3--        ,it is my 
comfort to know that there are amongst  
us many whom the      gladiators of     
pulpit would call ,atheists and         
,materialists1 whose      lives1        
nevertheless1 as tested by any          
accessible standard of      morality    
would contrast more than favourably with
 the lives of      those who seek to    
stamp them with this offensive brand4   
,when ,i say      offensive1 ,i refer   
merely to the intention of those who use
 such      terms1 and not because       
,atheism or ,materialism1 when compared 

with      many of the notions ventilated
 in the columns of religious            
newspapers has any particular           
offensiveness to me4 ,if ,i wish to     
find men who are scrupulous in their    
adherence to engagements1      whose    
words are their bond1 and to whom moral 
shiftiness of any      kind is          
subjectively unknown1 if ,i wanted a    
loving father1 a      faithful husband1 
an honourable neighbour1 and a just     
citizen1 ,i      would seek him among   
the band of ,atheists to which ,i refer4
 ,i have      known some of the most    
pronounced amongst them1 not only in    
life1      but in death--seeing them    
approaching with open eyes the          
inexorable      goal1 with no dread of a
 hangman's whip1 with no hope of a      
heavenly crown1 and still as mindful of 
their duties1 as if their      eternal  
future depended upon their latest deeds4
   ,still the moral cry is too useful   
with the crowd to lead to the conviction
 that anything one could say would lead 

to its disuse4 ,in the dialogue of      
,lucian's to which we have referred1 and
 after the theist has been refuted by   
the ,atheist1 ,hermes consoles the chief
 deity1 ,zeus1 by telling him that even 
though a few may have been won over by  
the arguments of the ,atheist1 the vast 
majority1 the whole mass of uneducated  
,greeks and the ,barbarians everywhere1 
still remain firm in their faith4 ,and  
although ,zeus replies that he would    
prefer one sensible man to a thousand   
fools1 when a case depends upon the     
adherence of the relatively foolish1    
numbers will always bring some          
consolation to the champions of an      
intellectually distressed creed4        
,,chapter ,,xi4  ,,what ,,is ,,atheism8 
,between ,atheism and ,theism there is  
no logical halting place4 ,but there    
are1 unfortunately1 many illogical ones4
 ,few possess the capacity for pushing  
their ideas to a logical conclusion1 and
 some position is finally discovered    
which has the weakness of both extremes 

with the strength of neither4 ,with many
 there is vague talk of a ,power        
manifested in the universe1 and by      
giving this the dignity of capital      
letters it is evidently hoped that ether
 people will recognise it as an         
equivalent for ,god4 ,but power1 with or
 without capitals1 is not ,god4 ,it is  
not the existence of a ,power that forms
 the kernel of the dispute between the  
,theist and the ,atheist1 but what that 
power is like4 ,the issue arises on the 
point of whether it is personal or not4 
,that it is1 is what the religious man  
believes4 ,as ,mr4 ,balfour says1 when  
the plain man speaks of ,god he means a 
,god whom men can love1 to whom men can 
pray1 who takes sides1 who has purposes 
and preferences1 whose attributes1      
however conceived1 leaves the           
possibility of a personal relation      
between ,himself and those whom he has  
created4 7,theism and ,humanism1 p4     
#ba47 ,what the genuine believer has in 
view is not the worthless abstraction of

 a rationalised metaphysic1 but the     
personal being of historic theology4    
,it is now my purpose to take a few of  
these substitutes for ,atheism by the   
aid of which some persons seek to mark  
themselves off from a declared and      
reasoned unbelief4 ,as outstanding      
examples of this one may take two men of
 no less eminence than ,herbert ,spencer
 and ,professor ,huxley4 ,both of these 
men have rendered great service to      
advanced thought1 but both have only    
succeeded in repudiating ,atheism by    
misstating and misrepresenting it4 ,in  
addition to the service that ,spencer   
unwittingly rendered the current        
religion by his use of the ,unknowable  
7with which we deal fully later71 a     
further help was given by his           
destruction of an ,atheism that had no  
existence4 ,this remarkable performance 
will be found in the first part of his  
,first ,principles4 ,respecting the     
origin of the universe1 he tells us1    
there are three intelligible            

propositions--although neither of these1
 on his own showing1 is intelligible4   
,we may assert that it is self-existent1
 that it is self-created1 or that it is 
created by an external agency4 ,all     
three propositions1 he proceeds to show1
 are equally inconceivable4 ,the        
noticeable thing about the performance  
is that ,atheism is identified with the 
proposition that the universe is        
self-existent4 ,a very slight           
acquaintance with the writings of       
representative ,atheists would have     
shown ,mr4 ,spencer that the origin of  
the universe is one of those questions  
on which ,atheism has wisely been       
silent1 and it has also insisted that   
all attempts to deal with such a        
question can only result in a           
meaningless string of words4 ,to the    
,atheist1 the universe--the sum of      
existence--is a fact that no amount of  
reasoning can get behind or beyond4 ,to 
think of the universe as a whole is an  
impossibility2 while to talk of its     

origin is to assume1 first1 that it did 
originate1 and1 second1 that we have    
some means by which we can transcend all
 the known limits of the human mind4    
,the ,atheist can say1 and has said1    
with ,mr4 ,spencer himself--whose final 
statement of ,agnosticism differs in no 
material respect from ,atheism1 that in 
discussing the origin of the universe1  
we can only succeed in multiplying      
impossibilities of thought by every     
attempt we make to explain its          
existence4 ,no one has pointed out more 
clearly than ,mr4 ,spencer that infinity
 is not a conception1 but the negation  
of one4 ,the pity is that he did not    
realise that in taking up this position 
he was on exactly the same level of     
criticism that ,atheists have pursued4  
,for them the universe is an ultimate   
fact2 all that we can do is to mark the 
ceaseless changes always going on around
 us1 and to develope our capacity for   
modifying their action in the interests 
of human welfare4 ,farther than this our

 knowledge does not and cannot go2 and  
it may be added that even though our    
knowledge could go beyond the world of  
phenomena1 such knowledge would not be  
of the slightest possible value4  ,it   
may also be pointed out that1 just as it
 is not true that ,atheism attempts to  
explain the origin of the universe1 so  
it is unfair to tie the ,atheist down to
 any particular theory of cosmic        
evolution4 ,as a mental attitude        
,atheism is quite independent of any    
theory of cosmic working1 so long as    
that theory does not involve an appeal  
to deity4 ,as we shall see1 ,atheism1   
from the point of view both of history  
and etymology1 stands for the negation  
of theism1 and its final justification  
must be found in the untenability of the
 theistic position4  ,rightly enough it 
may be argued that the acceptance of    
,atheism implies a certain general      
mental attitude towards both cosmic and 
social questions1 but the ,atheist1 as  
such1 is no more committed to a special 

scientific theory than he is committed  
to a special theory of government4 ,of  
course1 it is convenient for the ,theist
 to first of all saddle his opponent    
with a set of social or scientific      
beliefs1 and then to assume that in     
attacking those beliefs he is           
demolishing ,atheism1 but it is none the
 less fighting on a false issue4 ,all   
that ,atheism necessarily involves is   
that all forms of ,theism are logically 
untenable1 and consequently the only    
effective method of destroying ,atheism 
is to establish its opposite4           
,professor ,huxley's treatment of       
,atheism proceeds on similar lines to   
that already dealt with1 but is more    
elaborate in character4 ,discussing the 
nature of his own opinions he repudiates
 all sympathy with ,atheism1 because3   
the problem of the ultimate cause of    
existence is one which seems      to me 
to be hopelessly out of reach of my poor
 powers4 ,of all the      senseless     
babble ,i have ever had occasion to     

read1 the      demonstrations of those  
philosophers who undertake to tell us   
about      the nature of ,god would be  
the worst1 if they were not surpassed by
      the still greater absurdities of  
the philosophers who try to prove       
there is no ,god4 7,on the ,hypothesis  
the ,animals are ,automata47   ,and on  
another occasion1 replying to a         
correspondent1 he expresses the opinion 
that ,atheism is1 on philosophical      
grounds1 untenable1 that there is no    
evidence of the god of the theologians  
is true enough1 but strictly scientific 
reasoning can take us no further4 ,when 
we know nothing we can neither affirm   
nor deny with propriety4 7,life and     
,letters1 p4 #afb47  ,here1 again1 we   
have the common error that ,atheism     
seeks in some way to explain the        
ultimate cause of existence4 ,and this  
in spite of continuous disclaimers that 
all search for a first cause1 or for a  
cause of existence is midsummer madness4
 ,the fault here1 we suspect1 is that   

both writers took their statement of    
,atheism1 not from ,atheistic writers   
but from their opponents4 ,but it is    
none the less surprising that it was not
 recognised that both a first cause and 
an ultimate cause of existence1 are1    
strictly speaking1 theistic questions4  
,i do not mean that these questions may 
not suggest themselves to non-theists1  
but that when they are raised clearly   
and definitely they are seen to belong  
to a class of questions to which no     
rational answer is possible4 ,to the    
,theist1 however1 the questions arise   
from his primary assumptions4 ,his      
theory is one of final causes2 his deity
 is postulated as the cause of          
existence1 and he cannot give up the    
questions as hopeless without admitting 
his position to be indefensible4 ,it is 
quite usual for the theist to propound  
problems which only arise on his own    
assumptions1 and then call upon his     
opponents for answers to them1 but there
 is no justification whatever for       

non-theists playing the same game4      
,atheism has nothing to do with final   
causes1 and therefore is not concerned  
with defending its illogicalities4      
,theism is a doctrine of final causes1  
and in arguing that it is absurd to     
express an opinion upon the subject     
,professor ,huxley was adding a good    
reason in support of the position he    
believed himself to be destroying4      
,huxley's other objection to ,atheism is
 that it perpetuates the absurdity of   
trying to prove there is no ,god4 ,how  
far is that true8 ,or in what sense is  
it true8 ,the danger in all discussion  
on this point lies in our taking it for 
granted that ,god conveys a definite and
 identical meaning to all people4 ,but  
this is very far from being the case4   
,what anyone means by ,god it is        
impossible to say until some further    
description has been given4 ,when this  
has been done1 and not until then1 ,god 
may become the subject of affirmation or
 denial4 ,until then we are playing with

 empty words4 ,by itself ,god means     
nothing4 ,it offers the possibility of  
neither negation nor affirmation4  ,now 
,professor ,huxley would have readily   
admitted that the truth of a proposition
 may be denied whenever its terms       
involve a contradiction4 ,and the ground
 of this is the sheer impossibility of  
bringing the terms together in thought4 
,that a circle may be square1 or that   
parallel lines may enclose a space1 are 
propositions the truth of which may be  
denied offhand4 ,the ground of this is  
that the conception of squareness and   
circularity1 of straight lines and an   
enclosed space are mutually destructive1
 they cancel each other4 ,and so far as 
,atheism may be said to involve the     
denial of particular gods that denial is
 based upon precisely similar grounds4  
,when defined it is seen that the       
attributes of this defined god cancel   
each other as effectually as squareness 
rules out the idea of a circle2 either  
this or they are simply unthinkable4    

,you cannot have an infinite personality
 any more than you can have a six-sided 
octagon1 nor can you posit an infinite  
personality without divesting the terms 
of all meaning4  ,it may also be noted  
in passing that both the theist and the 
,agnostic actually do deny the existence
 of particular gods without the least   
hesitation4 ,no rational ,agnostic would
 hesitate to deny the existence of      
,jupiter1 ,javeh1 ,allah1 or ,brahma4   
,no ,christian would hesitate to deny   
the existence of the gods of a tribe of 
savages4 ,even believers in the current 
theology have evolved beyond the stage  
of the primitive ,christians1 who       
accepted the existence of the ,pagan    
deities with the proviso that they were 
demons4 ,and it is a mere verbal quibble
 to say that these people merely deny   
each other's conception of deity4 ,each 
man's conception of god is his god1 and 
to say that no being answering to that  
conception exists is to say that his god
 does not exist1 and in relation to the 

god denied the denier is in exactly the 
position in which he places the         
,atheist4  ,so far then the ,atheism of 
each is just a question of degree or of 
relation4 ,so far as ,atheism involves  
the denial of deity the follower of one 
religion is an ,atheist in relation to  
the followers of every other religion4  
,each religion--among civilised         
people--is atheistic from the standpoint
 of the followers of other gods4 ,the   
affirmation of one god involves the     
denial of other gods4 ,this would really
 seem to be the historical significance 
of the term4 ,the early ,christians were
 called atheists by the ,pagans1 and    
some of them accepted it without demur4 
,at a later date ,spinoza1 ,voltaire1   
,paine1 and others were called atheists1
 and the epithet has lost its force     
to-day only because the evolution of    
thought has broken down many religious  
barriers1 and is rapidly dividing people
 into two groups--those who believe in  
some god and who believe in none at all4

 ,now all that ,atheism--conscious and  
reflective ,atheism--does is to carry a 
step further the restricted denial of   
the ordinary religionist4 ,the          
,christian theist denies every god but  
his own4 ,the ,atheist1 seeing no more  
evidence for the existence of the       
,christian deity than for the existence 
of any of the deities discarded by the  
,christian1 seeing1 further1 that there 
are exactly the same contradictions     
involved in assuming the existence of   
any one of the world's deities1 places  
the ,christian deity on the list as     
among those gods in whose existence he  
does not believe1 and whose existence1  
so far as it is defined1 may be         
logically denied4  ,the really          
distinguishing feature of philosophic   
,atheism is its comprehensiveness1 the  
ranking of all known deities1 big and   
little1 ancient and modern1 savage and  
civilised1 gross and subtle1 upon the   
same level4 ,historically1 we see them  
all originating in the same conditions1 

passing through substantially the same  
phases of development1 finally to meet  
with the same fate as civilisation      
developes4 ,in this respect ,atheism has
 to be considered in its historic       
developments4 ,it begins1 as we have    
seen in the rejection of a particular   
god1 in favour of some other deity4 ,it 
is only at a very much later stage that 
the whole idea of god is subjected to   
examination and analysis in such a way  
as to lead to the rejection of the      
conception of god as a whole4 ,but with 
that aspect of the subject we shall be  
concerned later4  ,but does ,atheism    
deny the existence of any possible god8 
,this question might admit of a simple  
answer if one only knew precisely what  
it meant4 ,it is easy enough to         
understand what is meant by ,god so long
 as we keep to any or all of the gods of
 the world's religions4 ,but what is    
meant by god standing alone and         
undefined8 ,historically ,god means a   
deity believed in by some people1 some  

where1 at some time4 ,and if we put on  
one side these particular gods we have  
nothing left that can be either affirmed
 or denied4 ,god in the abstract is not 
a real existence any more than tree in  
the abstract is a real existence4 ,there
 is a pine tree1 a pear tree1 an apple  
tree1 etc41 but there is and can be no  
tree apart from some particular tree4   
,so with god4 ,there are particular     
gods1 but if we do away with these1 we  
have no god left as a separate          
existence4 ,god then becomes a mere word
 conveying no meaning whatever4 ,atheism
 does not deny the existence of a god   
for the same reason that it does not    
deny the existence of ,abracadabra--both
 terms mean as much1 or as little4 ,and 
it is more than absurd for people who   
have rejected theism to continue using  
the word god as though it had a quite   
definite meaning apart from the gods of 
the various theologies4 ,we have        
,professor ,huxley admitting that there 
is no evidence of the existence of the  

god of the theologians1 and we imagine  
that he would have met the affirmation  
of their existence with a flat          
contradiction4 ,at any rate he would    
have been quite justified in doing so4  
,but when he asserts1 with a show of    
logical precision1 but in reality with  
great looseness1 that it is preposterous
 to assert that there is no god because 
he cannot be such as we think him to be1
 he is using language for which no      
precise meaning can be found4 ,to be    
intelligible1 the sentence implies that 
we have some conception answering to the
 terms used1 and this1 as we have       
pointed out with almost wearisome       
insistence1 is not the case4 ,it is not 
a case of saying to the theist1 ,i fully
 understand your hypothesis1 but as at  
present ,i do not see enough evidence to
 convince me of its truth or to         
demonstrate its error ,i must suspend   
judgment4 ,we do not understand it4 ,and
 when we seek to we discover that the   
terms of the proposition we are asked to

 accept refuse to be brought together   
within the compass of a single          
conception4 ,suspended judgment where   
the subject under discussion is         
understandable is right and proper1 but 
it is quite out of place1 and indeed    
cannot exist1 where the proposition     
before us is void of meaning4 ,in such  
circumstances suspended judgment is     
absurd1 and it may be added that the    
affirmation or negation of such a       
proposition is absurd likewise4  ,only  
one other word need be said on this     
point4 ,it may be urged that educated   
believers mean by ,god not the          
anthropomorphic deity of the theologies1
 but a personal intelligence controlling
 things4 ,but this is really not less   
anthropomorphic than the form in which  
the god idea meets us in the popular    
theologies4 ,its anthropomorphism is    
only1 to unobservant minds1 less        
apparent4 ,the conception of an         
intelligent1 personal being controlling 
nature is not fundamentally less        

objectionable than the frankly man-like 
being of the early theologies4          
,intelligence1 as we know it 7and to    
talk of an intelligence that is unlike  
the intelligence we know is absurd7 is  
as much a characteristic of human1 or   
animal1 organisation1 as arms and legs  
are4 ,mind1 after all1 is only known to 
us as a function of an organism4 ,that  
it is more than this1 or other than     
this1 is a pure assumption4 ,and to     
divest ,god of all physical parts1 while
 retaining his functions1 is sheer      
nonsense4 ,there is the personal        
intelligence of ,smith1 or ,brown1 or   
,robinson1 but it is absurd to wipe out 
all the particular ,smiths1 and ,browns1
 and ,robinsons1 and then talk as though
 their qualities continue in existence4 
,so with ,god4 ,if we reject all the    
gods of the theologies one after        
another1 what god have we left to talk  
about8 ,all we have left is the memory  
of a delusion4  ,it is equally          
fallacious to talk of ,god as an        

equivalent of force in the abstract1 or 
as the equivalent of some               
non-intelligent force4 ,this is not what
 people ever meant1 or mean1 by god4    
,what religious folk believe in1 what   
they pray to1 is a person who can hear  
them1 and who can do things4 ,a god only
 dimly apprehended may be tolerated1 but
 for how long will faith continue to    
worship an existence that can neither do
 nor hear nor sympathise8 ,there is a   
limit to even religious folly4 ,and even
 a savage only worships sticks and      
stones after he endows them with life   
and intelligence4  ,finally1 if there is
 one thing clear to the modern mind it  
is that science has no room in its      
theory of things for an over-ruling     
intelligence4 ,sir ,oliver ,lodge well  
sums up the attitude of science in the  
following sentences3--,orthodox science 
shows us a self-contained and           
self-sufficient universe1 not in touch  
with anything above or beyond           
itself--the general trend and outline of

 it known--nothing supernatural or      
miraculous1 no intervention of beings   
other than ourselves1 being conceived   
possible4 7,man and the ,universe1 p4   
#ad1 ,popular ed47 ,personally1 we      
question whether there are any          
scientists of repute who really believe 
in the existence of a personal          
intelligence above or beyond nature4    
,some may make professions to the       
contrary1 but it will usually be found  
that the qualifications introduced rob  
their professions of all value4         
,certainly their teaching is destitute  
of any such conception4 ,modern         
scientific thought leaves no room for   
the operations of deity4 ,the miraculous
 is generally discarded4 ,response to   
prayer is whittled down to a species of 
self-delusion1 to be valued on account  
of its subjective influence only4 ,the  
scientific theory of things1 incomplete 
as it may be in many of its details1    
leaves no room for the operations of a  
god4 ,not alone does it leave no room   

for a god1 but if the scientific        
conception of the world is to stand1    
then it would be necessary to repeat    
,bakunine's mot1 and to say1 ,if there  
were a god it would be necessary to     
destroy him4 ,you simply cannot have at 
one and the same time a universe in     
which all that occurs is the consequence
 of calculable and indestructible       
forces1 the operations of which can be  
foreseen and relied upon1 and a universe
 controlled by a self-determining deity1
 capable of modifying the action of     
these same forces4 ,you may have one or 
the other1 but it is sheer lunacy to    
imagine that you can have both4 ,either 
uniformity with invariable causation1 or
 a world in which every scientific      
calculation must be prefaced with the   
,d4,v4 of a prayer meeting4 ,and the    
,atheist1 who accepts the principles of 
modern science1 says1 not merely that he
 is without a belief in god1 but that he
 fails to see any necessity for his     
existence1 or anything for him to do if 

he did exist4 ,he passes the gods of the
 world in review and categorically      
dismisses each one as a myth4 ,in doing 
this he has the concurrence of all      
theists in discarding every god save    
one--his own4 ,the ,atheist simply      
applies the same rule to each1 and metes
 out the same judgment to all4          
,,chapter ,,xii4  ,,spencer ,,and ,,the 
,,unknowable4   ,we have already        
referred to the use made by religionists
 of ,spencer's ,unknowable4 ,this theory
 was not without its forerunners1 and in
 ,england was already in the field in   
the teachings of ,hamilton and ,mansel4 
,spencer gave it a still greater vogue4 
,as he presented it1 it came before the 
world with all the prestige attaching to
 its association with one of the most   
comprehensive of modern thinkers1 and   
one of the most influential in the      
schools of evolutionary philosophy4 ,it 
was also connected with a world theory  
that claimed to be strictly scientific  
in its character4 ,it became not only a 

fashion in certain circles1 it founded a
 school1 and gained numerous followers  
in the religious world4 ,its author     
propounded it as a basis on which to    
reconcile religion and science1 and many
 were ready to accept it as such4       
,printed in all the glory of capital    
letters1 appearing sometimes as ,the    
,ultimate ,reality1 sometimes as the    
,unconditioned1 sometimes as an         
,infinite and ,eternal ,energy1 it was  
equally impressive under all its forms4 
,it provided just that solemn kind of   
formula that the religious mind is      
accustomed to hear1 and if it was as    
meaningless as the ,athanasian ,creed1  
is was1 for that reason1 quite as       
satisfying4 ,it gave all the comfort of 
a religious confession of faith1 and it 
has been the parent of a whole host of  
more recent apologies for ,god4  ,in    
itself the ,unknowable was harmless     
enough4 ,its philosophic value is not   
great1 its scientific utility is nil4   
,to say that everything proceeds from an

 ,ultimate ,reality is not very helpful1
 and to follow on with the declaration  
that we know nothing about it1 and that 
it would be of no use to us if we did1  
does not sound very encouraging4 ,it    
reminds one of the description of the   
horse that had only two faults--one that
 it was hard to catch1 and the other    
that it was no good when it was caught4 
,we repeat with all solemnity the       
formula that all things proceed from an 
infinite and eternal energy1 and that   
this is the ,ultimate ,reality1 and then
 find that in relation to any and every 
question we are precisely where we were4
 ,its acceptance in certain religious   
circles1 and its use later1 may be taken
 as evidence of the fact that what the  
pious mind longs for is not sense but   
satisfaction4  ,still there remains     
cause for wonder that this ,unknowable  
should ever have been taken as affording
 foundation for the belief in deity4    
,the most extreme materialist or        
,atheist need not be in the slightest   

degree disconcerted on being told things
 proceed from an ,infinite and ,eternal 
,energy4 ,it is only what the ,atheist  
has said1 minus the capital letters4 ,he
 has affirmed his conviction1 that all  
phenomena result from the permutations  
of matter and force1 which are eternal  
because no time limit can be placed to  
their operations4 ,and you do not add   
anything material to the statement by   
printing it in capital letters4 ,that   
the ,spencerian abstraction should have 
been taken as a substitute for deity    
proves how desperate the situation is4  
,drowning men clutch at straws1 and a   
disintegrating deity hopes to renew his 
strength by the lavish use of capital   
letters4  ,for1 after all1 what the     
theist needs is1 not an eternal energy1 
but a personality4 ,an inscrutable      
existence will not do4 ,there is no     
dispute that something exists4 ,there is
 no quarrel over mere existence4 ,it is 
with the nature of what exists and the  
mode of its operation that the issue    

arises4 ,the theist needs a special kind
 of energy1 a special form of existence1
 a special kind of reality if his case  
is to be established4 ,it will not do   
for ,mr4 ,spencer to assure him that    
this ,ultimate ,reality is higher than  
personal4 ,how ,mr4 ,spencer knows that 
something1 the nature of which is       
unknown1 is higher than something else1 
is more than one can tell4 ,but that    
does not matter4 ,higher or lower1 it is
 all the same4 ,either way it is        
different from personal1 and if it is   
different it is not the same1 it is not 
personal4 ,whatever other qualities this
 ,ultimate ,reality has or lacks1 it    
must have that one if it is to be of use
 to the theist4 ,and to say that it is  
higher than personal is to say that it  
is not personal at all1 and to repeat in
 a roundabout manner what the ,atheist  
has been saying all the time4  ,what now
 is ,spencer's theory of an ultimate    
reality that must for ever remain       
unknowable8 ,following a line of thought

 that had been steadily gaining ground  
since ,hume--although much older than   
,hume--,spencer holds that in final     
analysis all our knowledge is a         
knowledge of mental states and their    
relations4 ,beyond this we know nothing1
 and can never know anything4           
,nevertheless1 while we cannot know     
anything beyond consciousness1 the      
conditions of thinking oblige us to     
assume that something exists as the     
cause of our states of mind4 ,just as   
black implies something that is not     
black1 hard something that is not hard1 
so we must conceive1 as against the     
conditioned1 relative existence of our  
conscious states1 an unconditioned1     
absolute existence as their cause4 ,it  
is this assumed1 but completely unknown 
cause of our conscious states1 and of   
all else1 that ,spencer distinguishes as
 the ,unknowable1 the ,unconditioned1   
the ,absolute1 etc41 and which appears  
to have brought so much consolation to  
hard-pressed theists4  ,i have no       

intention of discussing here the        
philosophic value of the ,unknowable4   
,but one may say1 in passing1 that even 
from that point of view ,spencer is     
untrue to his own ,agnosticism in       
speaking of the ,unconditioned as the   
cause of phenomena4 ,for causation is a 
category of the conditioned1 it belongs 
to the world we know4 ,it is not        
something that exists beyond            
consciousness1 it is something that is  
supplied by consciousness and which     
possesses validity only within the world
 of phenomena4 ,on ,spencer's own theory
 of relativity a cause only exists in   
relation to an effect4 ,destroy the one 
and you destroy the other4 ,thus1 if the
 ,unknowable is a cause of phenomena it 
ceases to be the unconditioned and      
becomes part of the phenomenal order4   
,if1 on the other hand1 it is not part  
of the phenomenal sequence1 it cannot   
stand to phenomena in a genuine casual  
relation4 ,it is1 however1 only fair to 
point out that between the ,unknowable  

and the evolutionary philosophy of      
,spencer the only connection between    
them is that they are both in the same  
work4 ,in all probability it is an      
unconscious survival of ,spencer's      
earlier theism1 which was active at the 
time the ,synthetic ,philosophy was     
originally planned1 but which became    
more and more attenuated as ,spencer    
grew older1 and disappears entirely from
 the more important volumes of the      
series4 ,and but for the help it has    
been supposed to give the belief in god1
 the ,unknowable would only have ranked 
as a harmless speculation of no value to
 anyone or to anything4 ,this is        
substantially admitted in a postscript  
to the #ahii edition of ,first          
,principles4 ,at the conclusion of the  
section entitled ,the ,unknowable1 he   
says3--        ,the reader is not called
 on to judge respecting any of the      
arguments or conclusions contained in   
the foregoing five chapters      and in 
the above paragraphs4 ,the subjects on  

which we are about to      enter are    
independent of the subjects thus far    
discussed2 and he      may reject any or
 all of that which has gone before while
 leaving      himself free to accept any
 or all of that which is now to come4   
,in other words1 the ,unknowable is a   
pure abstraction1 having no organic     
connection with the ,synthetic          
,philosophy1 or indeed with any         
philosophy of value4 ,mr4 ,spencer's    
warning to his readers seems to quite   
justify ,mr4 ,bradley's rather caustic  
comment1 ,i do not wish to be           
irreverent1 but ,mr4 ,spencer's attitude
 towards his ,unknowable strikes me as a
 pleasantry1 the point of which lies in 
its unconsciousness4 ,it seems a        
proposal to take something for ,god     
simply and solely because we do not know
 what the devil it can be4 7,note to p4 
#abh of ,appearance and ,reality47  ,the
 curious thing is that ,mr4 ,spencer    
really offers his readers two theories  
of the nature of religion4 ,one is      

contained in his ,principles of         
,sociology1 and so far as it traces all 
religious ideas to the delusions and    
illusions of the primitive savage is    
substantially that held by all modern   
anthropologists4 ,the other is contained
 in his ,first ,principles1 and the two 
theories1 like parallel lines1 never    
meet4 ,though born in the same brain    
they are quite distinct1 and even       
contradictory4  ,the substance of this  
second theory may be summarised as      
follows3--  #a4 ,the conditions of human
 thought compel the recognition of an   
unknowable reality of which all         
phenomena are the expression4  #b4 ,the 
function of religion1 from the earliest 
time1 has been the assertion of the     
existence of an unknowable reality1 and 
to keep alive a consciousness of the    
insoluble mystery surrounding it4  #c4  
,the function of science is to deal with
 the known and the knowable1 with all   
that is presented in experience1 with   
the world of phenomena exclusively4  #d4

 ,religion having for its subject matter
 the unknown and unknowable1 while      
science has for its subject matter the  
known and the knowable1 religion and    
science are not antagonistic1 but       
complementary4 ,conflicts only arise    
when one trespasses on the other's      
department1 and a recognition of the    
true line of demarcation effectually    
reconciles these hitherto hostile       
forces4  ,a very obvious criticism of   
number one is in affirming a            
consciousness of an ,unknowable1 its    
quality of unknowableness is            
annihilated4 ,existence can only be     
predicated of that which affects        
consciousness in some manner2 and so far
 as ,i have the slightest apprehension  
or consciousness of anything existing1  
to that extent it ceases to be the      
unknowable4 ,our knowledge of it may be 
imperfect or altogether erroneous2 we   
may feel it impossible that we should   
ever rightly understand it2 but so far  
as we think about it we are bound to    

assimilate it to the best of our        
knowledge1 even though it be only under 
the category of force4 ,in brief1       
unknowableness is not a property or     
quality by which a thing may be         
apprehended2 it is a name for complete  
mental vacuity4 ,it does not refer to   
the thing itself1 it refers only to us4 
,it is a pure negation which ,spencer1  
by sheer verbal play converts into a    
quasi-positive conception4 ,a           
consciousness of things unknown can     
never be more than a consciousness of   
ignorance4 ,there is only one way to    
prove the existence of an unknowable1   
and that is to know nothing about       
it--not even to know that there is      
something about which we know nothing4  
,but1 says ,spencer1 to say that we     
cannot know the absolute is1 by         
implication1 to affirm that there is an 
absolute4 ,certainly1 if we take an     
infirmity of language to be the         
equivalent of a necessity of existence1 
not otherwise4 ,when ,i say that we     

cannot know a four-sided triangle ,i do 
not affirm by implication that a        
four-sided triangle exists4 ,i am       
asserting that the phrase1 a four-sided 
triangle1 involves conceptions that     
cannot be brought together in           
consciousness1 and so dismiss it as     
being without meaning4  ,the truth is   
that every one of ,spencer's attempts to
 prove the existence of an unknowable   
turns out on examination to be no more  
than a proof of the existence of an     
unknown1 and this is not disputed at any
 time or by anyone4 ,thus1 after being  
told that a known cannot be thought of  
apart from an unknown1 we are           
informed3--        ,positive knowledge  
does not1 and never can1 fill the whole 
region      of possible thought4 ,at the
 utmost reach of discovery there arises1
      and must ever arise1 the question1
 ,what lies beyond8 ,as it is           
impossible to think of a limit to space 
so as to exclude the idea      of space 
lying outside that limit1 so we cannot  

conceive of any      explanation        
profound enough to exclude the question1
 ,what is the      explanation of the   
explanation8   ,with this we can all    
agree1 but it does not bring us any     
nearer an unknowable4 ,it is perfectly  
true that thought can never be          
comprehensive enough to exhaust the     
possibilities of existence1 since it is 
of the essence of thinking to limit and 
define4 ,but it is a sheer impossibility
 to think of what lies beyond the       
boundary of our knowledge as unknowable1
 so far as we think of it at all1 we    
must conceive it as the unknown but     
possibly knowable4 ,the unknown can only
 be thought of thus because it is only  
as it is1 by assumption1 brought into   
line with what is already known that it 
can be thought about at all4 ,we are    
compelled to think of what lies beyond  
the limits of our actual knowledge in   
the same way as a traveller thinks of   
the fauna and flora of an untravelled   
country4 ,the new region may present    

many new features1 but until actual     
observation has taken place1 these new  
features will only be thought of as more
 or less unusual combinations of known  
animal and vegetable life4 ,they are    
substantially identical with what is    
already known4  ,no stranger notion ever
 occurred to a great thinker than that  
religion and science represent parallel 
and distinct lines of development1 each 
having its own sphere of operation4 ,it 
is all the more remarkable when we      
remember that with ,spencer religion    
means all religion1 past and present1   
civilised and savage4 ,and no one is    
more precise in pointing out how all    
religious ideas find their beginnings in
 the conditions of primitive life4 ,and 
that being the case1 one wonders whether
 we are to picture primitive man as a   
profound metaphysical philosopher1      
speculating on that which lies behind   
phenomena1 contemplating an insoluble   
,mystery1 and paying homage to an       
,ultimate ,reality8 ,nothing could be   

more absurd4 ,thinking begins in        
concrete images1 not in abstractions4   
,we have only to note the development of
 intelligence in children to realise    
this4 ,and primitive man1 not being a   
mystic nor a metaphysician1 bases his   
religion1 not upon a reality that       
transcends experience1 but upon a       
presumed fact1 and what is to him the   
best known of all facts4 ,and even with 
modern men it may safely be said that   
they worship ,god for what they believe 
they know about him1 not because they   
believe him to be unknown and           
unknowable4  ,spencer himself may be    
cited in support of this4 ,in his       
,principles of ,sociology1 where the    
,unknowable plays no part whatever1 he  
concludes after an elaborate survey of  
the facts1 that the imagination of      
primitive man is reminiscent1 not       
constructive2 his power of thought is   
feeble1 he is without the quick         
curiosity of civilised man1 there is an 
absence of the conception of causation1 

he accepts things as they appear1       
without any vivid desire to inquire into
 their real nature or their connection  
with other events1 and is without       
abstract ideas4 ,clearly1 here is not a 
very promising subject from which to    
derive even the germ of the idea of a   
,reality transcending experience4       
,spencer also1 and quite properly1      
insists that religious ideas are1 under 
the condition of their origin1 national 
ideas2 that we must accept the truth    
that the laws of thought are everywhere 
the same1 and that1 given the data as   
known to primitive man1 the inference   
drawn by him is a reasonable inference4 
,with this we agree1 but it gives the   
death blow to the previous statement as 
to the essential nature of religion1 and
 its essential differentiation from     
science4 ,for given the constitution of 
the primitive mind1 its ignorance of    
causation and general lack of knowledge1
 religion commences not in some search  
after an eternal reality1 but in a      

natural misunderstanding of observed    
facts4 ,primitive religion is just a    
reasoned misunderstanding of phenomena  
that in later1 and better informed ages1
 are given an altogether different      
explanation4  ,that this is so1 ,spencer
 himself makes plain4 ,for he shows1    
step by step1 how the experience of     
dreams1 echoes1 shadows1 etc41 combine  
to produce the belief in unseen agencies
 differing in no essential from man save
 that of possessing greater power and in
 being invisible4 ,from dreams and other
 subjective experiences he derives the  
idea of a double1 from death that of a  
ghost4 ,hence the ceremonies round the  
grave1 and the attention paid to the    
double of the dead man1 which           
subsequently developes into ancestor    
worship4 ,the same train of thought     
gives a double to objects other than    
human beings4 ,hence ,animism1          
,totemism1 and their numerous subsidiary
 developments4 ,spencer insists1 not    
only that all religions have a natural  

genesis1 but also that behind           
supernatural beings of all orders there 
has been in every case a human          
personality--in other words1 every god  
is developed from a ghost1 ancestor     
worship is the root of every religion4  
,to this he will admit no exception1 and
 referring to the ,jewish religion1 he  
asks contemptuously3--        ,must we  
recognise a single exception to the     
general truth thus far      verified    
everywhere8 ,while among all races in   
all regions1 from the      earliest     
times down to the present1 the          
conceptions of deities have      been   
naturally evolved in the way shown1 must
 we conclude that a      small clan of  
the ,semitic race had given to it       
supernaturally a      conception which1 
though superficially like the rest1 was 
in      substance absolutely unlike     
them4   ,and in about half a dozen pages
 he shows conclusively that the         
,biblical ,god had exactly a similar    
origin to other gods4  ,now if this     

account of religious origins means      
anything at all 7and in spite of        
differences between anthropologists it  
is in substance the account of the      
origin of religion given by all7 it     
means that instead of religion and      
science moving along parallel lines1    
religion is simply primitive science4   
,religion and science1 as a very able   
theistic writer says1 touch and oppose  
each other as rival methods of          
explaining1 not solely or mainly the    
life and nature of man1 but the universe
 taken as a whole1 man forming a part of
 it4 7,w4 ,h4 ,mallock1 ,religion as a  
,credible ,doctrine1 p4 ii47 ,both are  
concerned with the same facts1 and their
 respective claims to consideration     
depend entirely on their ability to     
explain the facts4 ,for the reasons     
given by ,spencer1 man's earliest       
interpretation of things is inevitably  
vitalistic4 ,ghosts--the primitive      
protoplasm from which the gods are      
made--are assumed1 and once assumed     

dominate the savage intelligence4 ,fear 
combines with ignorance to resist any   
conception that will wrest power from   
the hands of these extra-natural agents1
 ,nature's haughty lords1 rule all1 and 
their dynasty is the hardest of all to  
overthrow4  ,in spite1 however1 of all  
opposition the mechanical theory of     
things develops1 and in developing      
establishes a clear division between the
 two conceptions of nature4 ,but the    
line of demarcation is not that stated  
by ,spencer4 ,religion no more asserts  
the existence of an ,unknown ,verity1   
than it asserts a fourth dimension of   
space4 ,nor is science concerned with   
denying the existence of something of   
which we know nothing1 and can never    
know anything4 ,the essential feature of
 religion is that it offers a vitalistic
 explanation of the world as against the
 mechanical explanation offered by      
science4 ,and in this religion stands   
for the earlier as against the later    
expression of human knowledge4 ,it is   

the eternal champion of savage thought  
against civilised intelligence4 ,its    
whole significance lies in the          
persistence of animistic modes of       
thinking under civilised conditions4    
,this conclusion1 be it observed1 is one
 that is quite borne out by ,spencer's  
own explanation of the nature of        
religion4 ,nor do we know of a more     
remarkable instance of a front rank     
thinker propounding in one part of his  
work a theory bearing no relation       
whatever to the remaining portion1 and  
in addition disproving his own theory at
 every point4  ,spencer's reconciliation
 of science and religion1 which in one  
form or another is continually in       
evidence1 is only one degree less       
remarkable than the fact of its being   
accepted by so many religionists as     
satisfactory4 ,following the line of his
 untenable theory that religion and     
science pursue parallel lines1 he points
 out that the agent which has effected  
the purification 7of religion7 has been 

science4 ,that is1 the growth of the    
mechanical theory has driven back the   
vitalistic one4 ,this is purification   
only in the sense that a defaulting     
cashier purifies the firm he robs4 ,as  
fact or experience proves that certain  
familiar changes always happen in the   
same sequence1 there begins to fade from
 the mind the conception of a special   
personality to whose variable will they 
were before ascribed4 ,this process of  
annexation is1 says ,spencer1 science   
teaching religion its true function4 ,as
 a matter of fact1 science has given    
religion no instruction1 it has merely  
issued prohibitions4 ,it has warned     
religion that there are certain things  
it must not meddle with1 certain        
departments on which it must not        
encroach4 ,in this way religion has been
 forced farther and farther back1 until 
it is left with what8 ,not with anything
 that can be known1 or is known2 it is  
left supreme in the kingdom of nowhere1 
ruling over an empire of nothing at all4

 ,and so long as religion strives for a 
more tangible possession so long must   
there be a conflict between science and 
religion4 ,but--as the limits of        
possible cognition are established1 the 
causes of possible conflict will        
diminish4 ,and a permanent peace will be
 reached when science becomes fully     
convinced that its explanations are     
proximate and relative2 while religion  
becomes fully convinced that the mystery
 it contemplates is ultimate and        
absolute4 ,so1 when science has         
monopolised the entire field of human   
knowledge1 actual and possible1 and when
 religion is satisfied that it knows    
nothing1 and never can know anything of 
the object of its worship1 that it can  
offer nothing in the shape of counsel or
 advice1 but that its function is to sit
 in owl-like solemnity1 contemplating   
nothing1 meanwhile offering man an      
eternal conundrum that he must          
everlastingly give up1 then1 and not    
till then1 there will be peace between  

science and religion4 ,and this is      
called a reconciliation4 ,mr4 ,spencer  
finds two combatants engaged in deadly  
conflict1 he murders one and offers the 
other the corpse1 with the hope that now
 they will live peacefully together4    
,the scientist is asked to be content   
with all there is4 ,the religious man is
 asked to find comfort in the reflection
 that science must eventually monopolise
 the entire field of knowledge1 but     
that1 in return1 religion will be left  
free to work in an unknowable region1 to
 occupy itself with an unknowable       
object1 and to eternally cry all is     
mystery in an amended philosophic       
version of the ,athanasian ,creed4  ,as 
a piece of humour this is superb4 ,so   
also is the following3 ,science has been
 obliged to abandon the attempt to      
include within the boundaries of        
knowledge that which cannot be known1   
and so has yielded up to religion that  
which of right belonged to it4 ,capital6
 ,science gives up to religion that     

which cannot be known1 and as it does   
not know what it is1 that cannot be     
known1 it surrenders to religion        
absolute vacuity as the proper sphere   
for its operations4 ,and even this is   
accompanied with the proviso that if it 
happens to have made a mistake1 the     
ceded territory will be at once         
reclaimed4 ,science would certainly be  
vindictive if after having murdered     
religion it declined to live peaceably  
with its corpse4  ,the distinction      
between science and religion is1 in     
truth1 neither fundamental nor original4
 ,it is one that arises gradually in the
 history of mental development4 ,and1   
therefore1 when a man such as ,professor
 ,arthur ,thomson describes religion as 
being concerned with the recognition of 
the existence of an independent         
spiritual reality1 the reply is that    
religion commences as just an           
explanation of nature in terms of the   
then existing knowledge and culture4    
,religion is just a crude form of       

science4 ,the separation of the world   
into a religious and a scientific sphere
 arises when the religious              
interpretation of natural happenings    
gets discredited by advancing knowledge4
 ,if one takes such an illustration as  
that of witchcraft the nature of the    
process is clear4 ,first we have the    
interpretation of certain forms of      
dementia and delusion in terms of       
religion4 ,later we have the same facts 
interpreted in terms of positive        
knowledge and the religious explanation 
is rejected4 ,and that1 in a sentence is
 the whole history of religion1 once we 
have cleared away the verbiage with     
which the subject is surrounded4  ,the  
truth of what has just been said is     
often obscured by unintelligible talk of
 growth in religion4 ,it is claimed that
 we acquire truer views of deity1 and a 
process of growth is asserted analogous 
to that which meets us in knowledge in  
general4 ,let us see what truth there is
 in this4  ,in ordinary instances when  

we speak of growth we imply one of three
 things4 ,either there is increase in   
size1 or there is an enlargement of     
function1 or there is an increase in    
knowledge4 ,so long as we keep to these 
plain meanings of growth there can be no
 confusion4 ,but none of these meanings 
fit the case of religion4 ,certainly    
there has been no increase in the size  
of religion--it does not1 that is1 cover
 a larger area4 ,on the contrary it is  
continually being warned off more and   
more territory4 ,it becomes more and    
more a negligible quantity4 ,one need   
not go back to primitive times to prove 
this1 any country will supply instances4
 ,the displacement of religious by other
 considerations is observable on all    
sides4  ,there has certainly been no    
growth in the functions exercised by    
religion4 ,its function as law-giver in 
the physical world is now definitely    
abandoned1 and all it asks is that      
science will let it alone4 ,in ethics   
and sociology it still maintains a      

precarious kind of an existence1 but it 
no longer claims supreme power4 ,it is  
content to urge its utility as a source 
of inspiration1 to rank as one among a  
number of other forces that are frankly 
secular in nature4 ,finally there has   
been no growth in the shape of an       
extension of knowledge of the object of 
religious belief4 ,of the nature of     
deity we know no more than did our      
earliest ancestors4 ,in earlier         
generations the nature of ,god1 his aims
 and intentions1 were discussed with the
 same degree of confidence that one now 
sees displayed in discussing schemes of 
sanitation4 ,the modern believer is now 
more anxious to impress upon the world  
how little he knows about ,god1 or how  
little it is possible for him to know4  
,this is not surprising except in the   
fact that it is called religious growth4
 ,and if this be a sign of growth one   
wonders what would be considered        
indications of decay4 ,historically     
religious life presents us1 not with a  

process of growth1 but one of shrinkage4
 ,to reduce the gods from many to few1  
and from a few to one is not growth4 ,to
 limit the functions of deity from those
 of a direct1 particular1 and universal 
character1 to an indirect1 general form 
is not growth4 ,to refine the idea of a 
personal deity until it becomes that of 
a mere abstract force1 is not growth4   
,all these are so many modifications of 
the religious idea under pressure of    
advancing knowledge--so many attempts to
 state religion in such a way that it   
can conflict with nothing we know to be 
true because it answers to nothing of   
which we are certain4  ,the idea of     
,god1 the idea of religion1 does not    
begin in a mystery or in some abstract  
conception1 but in an assumed knowledge 
of certain concrete facts of experience4
 ,man believes in the gods because of   
what he thinks he knows about them1 not 
because of what he does not know4 ,the  
talk of a mystery is the jargon of a    
priesthood which finds it profitable to 

keep the lay mind at a distance4        
,increased emphasis is placed on mystery
 because religious teachers are alive to
 the danger of basing their beliefs upon
 matters that can be brought to the test
 of experience4 ,mystery mongering is   
not the beginning of religion1 but a    
sign of its approaching demise4         
,mysticism1 too1 is no more than a cover
 for a sanctuary that has been emptied  
of all worthy of respect4 ,but if       
religion is to really live1 it must have
 some knowledge1 no matter how little or
 how imperfect1 of the subject with     
which it professes to deal4 ,a religion 
that does not possess this1 but is      
compelled to hand over the whole of life
 to secular science1 signs its own death
 warrant4 ,it commits suicide to save   
itself from execution4 ,and as people   
realise this they turn to clear-eyed    
science for guidance1 leaving religion  
to such representatives of primitive    
animism as still survive in a civilised 
community4     ,,chapter ,,xiii4        

,,agnosticism4   ,the primary difficulty
 in dealing with ,agnosticism is its    
elusive character4 ,it is a word of     
various and vague meanings1 and many of 
those who use it seem to have no great  
anxiety to fix its meaning with any     
degree of precision4 ,it is used now in 
a philosophic and now in a religious    
sense1 and its use in the one connection
 is justified by its use in another4 ,it
 has become1 in the half century of its 
existence1 as indefinite as religion1   
and about as enlightening4 ,on the one  
side it appears as a counsel of mental  
integrity with which everyone will      
agree1 and on the other1 the religious  
side1 it will vary from a form that is  
identical1 with that much-dreaded       
,atheism1 to a religious or reverent    
,agnosticism that reminds one--mentally 
and morally--of ,methodism minus its    
creed4 ,indeed1 to say that a man is an 
,agnostic nowadays tells one no more    
than calling a man religious indicates  
to which one of the world's sects he    

gives his adherence4  ,the only aspect  
of ,agnosticism that we are here vitally
 concerned with is its relation to      
religion1 or specifically with the      
god-idea4 ,but it will be necessary to  
say a word1 in passing1 on at least one 
other phase4  ,and first as to the      
origin of the term4 ,the credit for the 
first use of the term has always been   
given to the late ,professor ,huxley4   
,mr4 ,r4 ,h4 ,hutton says that ,huxley  
first suggested the word at a meeting of
 friends in the house of ,mr4 ,james    
,knowles in #ahfi4 ,professor ,huxley   
says that he deliberately adopted it    
because1 ,when ,i reached intellectual  
maturity and began to ask myself whether
 ,i was an atheist1 a theist1 or a      
pantheist2 a materialist1 or an         
idealist1 a ,christian1 or a            
freethinker1 ,i found that the more ,i  
learned and reflected the less ready was
 the answer1 until at last ,i came to   
the conclusion that ,i had neither art  
nor part with any of these denominations

 except the last4444 ,so ,i took thought
 and invented what ,i conceived to be   
the appropriate title of 'agnostic4'    
,and he goes on to explain that the term
 was used as antithetical to the gnostic
 of ,church history who knew all about  
things of which ,huxley felt himself in 
ignorance4 ,to all of which one may say 
that ,huxley appears to have given      
himself a lot of needless trouble4 ,in  
philosophy there was the term ,sceptic1 
and in relation to religion the term    
,atheist was ready to hand4 ,the latter 
term certainly covered all that ,huxley 
meant by ,agnosticism as applied to the 
god-idea4 ,the plain1 and perhaps brutal
 truth1 is that ,huxley was just        
illustrating the fatal tendency of      
,english public men to seek for a label 
that will mark them off from an         
unfashionable heresy even more clearly  
than it separates them from a crumbling 
orthodoxy4 ,it is certainly suggestive  
to find1 in this connection1 a ,french  
writer of distinction1 ,m4 ,emile       

,boutmy1 pointing out that in ,france1  
,spencer1 ,mill1 and ,huxley would all  
have been professed atheists4 7,the     
,english ,people1 p4 #dd47 ,but ,france 
is ,france1 and has always possessed the
 courage to follow ideas to their       
logical conclusion4  ,when it comes to a
 definition of ,agnosticism ,professor  
,huxley's position becomes still more   
difficult of understanding4             
,agnosticism1 he says1 is a method the  
essence of which may be expressed in a  
single principle4 ,positively the       
principle may be expressed2 in matters  
of the intellect follow your reason so  
far as it will take you without regard  
to any other consideration4 ,and        
negatively2 in matters of the intellect1
 do not pretend that conclusions are    
certain which are not demonstrated or   
demonstrable4 ,so far as this goes we   
have here perfectly sound advice4 ,but  
why call it ,agnosticism8 ,it is no more
 than the perfectly sound advice that we
 must be honest in our investigations1  

and make no claim to certainty where the
 conditions of certainty do not exist4  
,but we have no more right to call this 
,agnosticism than we have to give the   
multiplication table a sectarian or     
party label4  ,nor do we believe for a  
moment that what ,huxley had in view1 or
 what other agnostics have in view1 is  
no more than a counsel of intellectual  
perfection4 ,what is really at issue    
here is one's attitude of mind in       
relation to the belief in ,god4 ,it is  
in pretending to know about ,god that   
the theist finds himself at issue with  
the ,agnostic1 and it is to mark himself
 off from the theist that the ,agnostic 
gives himself a special label4 ,and the 
trouble of the ,agnostic is that so soon
 as he begins to justify his position1  
either he states the atheistic case or  
he fails altogether to make his case    
good4  ,there is1 perhaps1 one other    
topic on which agnosticism may be       
professed1 and that is in connection    
with the question of what is known as   

the problem of existence4 ,we may       
profess our belief in the reality of an 
external world1 but deny that any       
knowledge of it is possible4 ,here we   
assert that what substance1 or reality1 
or thing in itself1 is we do not know   
and cannot know4 ,but while many        
attempts are made under the name of the 
,absolute1 etc41 to identify this with  
,god1 it is really nothing of the kind4 
,the belief or disbelief in an external 
reality is a problem in philosophy1 it  
has no genuine connection with theology4
 ,to identify the two is a mere         
dialectical subterfuge4 ,mere existence 
is an ultimate fact that must be        
accepted by all4 ,it is only on the     
question of its nature that controversy 
can arise4  ,whatever may be claimed on 
behalf of ,agnosticism1 it certainly    
cannot be claimed that it carries a     
clear and a definite meaning4 ,as we    
have seen1 ,professor ,huxley used the  
word to indicate the fact that he was   
without knowledge of certain things4    

,but what things8 ,to answer that we    
have to go beyond the word itself--that 
is1 we have to define the definition4   
,as it stands we may profess agnosticism
 in relation to anything from the       
prospects of a general election within a
 given period to the question of whether
 ,mars is inhabited or not4 ,if1 then1  
it is said that what is implied is that 
the ,agnostic is without a knowledge of 
,god1 or without a belief in ,god1 the  
reply is that is exactly the position of
 the ,atheist4 ,and there was no need   
whatever to coin a new word1 if all that
 was wanted was to express the atheistic
 position4 ,still less justifiable was  
it to proceed to misinterpret ,atheism  
in order to justify a departure that    
need never have been made4  ,one cannot 
at this point forbear a word on         
,mr4--afterwards ,sir--,leslie          
,stephen's curious justification of his 
choice of the word ,agnosticism4 ,after 
the enlightening remark that the word   
,atheist carries with it an unpleasant  

connotation1 he says3--        ,dogmatic
 ,atheism--the doctrine that there is no
 ,god1 whatever may      be meant by    
,god--is to say the least of it a rare  
phase of opinion4      ,the word        
,agnosticism1 on the other hand1 seems  
to imply a fairly      accurate         
appreciation of a form of creed already 
common and daily      spreading4 ,the   
,agnostic is one who asserts--what no   
one      denies--that there are limits  
to human intelligence4 7,an             
,agnostic's ,apology2 p4 #a74   ,and he 
then goes on to assert that the subject 
matter of theology lies beyond these    
limits4  ,now putting on one side this  
perversion of the meaning of ,atheism1  
was it really worth while to coin a new 
word to affirm what no one denies8      
,theists do not deny the limitations of 
knowledge1 on the contrary1 they are    
always affirming it4 ,neither do all    
theists deny that ,god is unknowable4   
,that has been affirmed by them over and
 over again4 ,what they have claimed is 

that ,god is apprehended rather than    
known1 and they affirm his existence on 
much the same grounds that others assert
 the real existence of an external      
world4 ,professor ,flint's comments on  
,stephen's performance are quite to the 
point1 and the more noteworthy as coming
 from a clergyman4 ,he says3        ,the
 word ,atheist is a thoroughly honest1  
unambiguous term4 ,it means      one who
 does not believe in ,god1 and it means 
neither more nor      less4 ,it implies 
neither blame nor approval1 neither     
desert of      punishment nor of reward4
 ,if a purely dogmatic ,atheism be a    
rare      phase of opinion critical     
,atheism is a very common one1 and there
      is also a form of ,atheism which  
is professedly sceptical or             
agnostic1 but often in reality dogmatic 
or gnostic4 7,agnosticism2      p4 #fi74
   ,the more carefully one examines the 
reasons given for the preference for the
 word ,agnosticism1 the clearer it      
becomes that the real motive is not the 

wish to obtain mental clarity1 but the  
desire to avoid association with a term 
that carries1 religiously1 disagreeable 
associations4 ,the care taken by so many
 who call themselves ,agnostics to      
explain to the religious world that they
 are not atheists1 is almost enough to  
prove this4 ,indeed1 the position is    
well summed up by ,mr4 ,john ,m4        
,robertson3--        ,the best argument 
for the use of the name ,agnostic is    
simply that      the word ,atheist has  
been so long covered with all manner of 
ignorant calumny that it is expedient to
 use a new term which      though in    
some respects faulty1 has a fair start1 
and will in time      have a recognised 
meaning4 ,the case1 so stated1 is       
reasonable2 but      there is the per   
contra that whatever the motive with    
which the      name is used1 it is now  
tacked to half a dozen conflicting forms
 of      doctrine1 varying loosely      
between ,theism and ,pantheism4 ,the    
name of      ,atheist escapes that      

drawback4 ,its unpopularity has saved it
 from      half-hearted and half-minded 
patronage4   ,so that1 on the best      
showing1 we are to take ,agnostic on the
 professed ground that it is more exact 
than ,atheism1 but on the real ground   
that it is less unpopular1 waiting      
meanwhile for the time when it shall    
have become more exact than it is by    
becoming accepted in the same sense as  
the ,atheism that has previously been   
rejected4 ,courage and                  
straightforwardness saves a lot of      
trouble4  ,mr4 ,bailey ,saunders 7,quest
 of ,faith1 p4 #g7 calls agnosticism a  
plea on behalf of suspended judgment1   
and this is a favourite expression4 ,it 
gives one an air of impartiality1 with  
the comforting reflection that it will  
please the socially stronger side4 ,but 
suspended judgment on what8 ,to hold    
one's judgment in suspense implies that 
we have at least a workable             
comprehension of the subject in dispute1
 and that judgment is suspended because 

the evidence produced is not adequate to
 command decision4 ,but is that the case
 here8 ,does the ,agnostic claim that   
the evidence produced by the theist is  
merely inadequate1 or that it is        
irrelevant8 ,surely he holds the latter 
position4 ,and if that is the case1 then
 he does not suspend judgment1 for the  
simple reason that there is no case made
 out concerning which judgment is to be 
suspended4 ,there is simply no case     
before the court4 ,for the ,agnostic1 no
 more than the ,atheist1 can attach no  
intelligible meaning to ,god4 ,he must  
have it defined to understand it1 and   
when it is defined he rejects it without
 ceremony4 ,and it is quite obvious that
 when an ,agnostic says1 ,i know nothing
 about ,god1 he means more than that2   
otherwise it would not be worth the     
saying4 ,he really means that no one    
else knows either4 ,he asserts that a   
knowledge of god is impossible to       
anyone1 because it does not present the 
possibility of being known4 ,god1       

standing alone is a meaningless word1   
and how can one suspend judgment        
concerning the truth of an              
unintelligible proposition8  ,for here  
are the plain facts of the situation4   
,if we ask the ,agnostic whether he     
suspends judgment concerning the        
existence of the gods of any savage     
peoples1 the reply is in the negative4  
,if we put the same question concerning 
the god of the ,bible1 or of the        
,mohammedan1 or of any other of the     
world's theologies we receive the same  
answer4 ,there is nothing here to       
suspend judgment about1 the characters  
and qualities of the gods being such    
that there admits of no doubt as to     
their imaginary character4 ,or if it is 
said that the ,agnostic1 while          
dismissing the gods of the various      
theologies1 savage and civilised1 as    
being impossible1 suspends judgment as  
to the existence of a supreme mind1 or  
of a creative intelligence1 the reply is
 that one cannot suspend judgment as to 

the possible existence of an            
inconceivability4 ,for mind must be     
mind1 as we know it4 ,and it is a       
downright absurdity to speak of the     
possible existence of a mind while      
divesting it of all the qualities that  
characterise mind as we know it4 ,really
 between the statement that ,a4 does not
 exist1 and the affirmation that ,a4    
does exist1 but differs in every        
conceivable particular from all known   
,a4's there is no difference whatever4  
,we are denying its existence in the    
very act of affirming it4  ,further1 we 
quite agree with ,mr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4       
,schiller 7,riddles of the ,sphinx1 pp4 
#ag-ai7 that in practice such suspense  
of judgment is impossible4 ,we suspend  
our judgment as to whether we shall die 
to-morrow or at some indefinite future  
date1 and for that reason we make our   
arrangements in view of either          
contingency4 ,we suspend judgment as to 
the honesty of an employee1 and our     
attitude towards him is governed by that

 fact4 ,and so with the question of a   
god4 ,in one way or another we are bound
 to indicate our judgment on the        
subject4 ,we must act either as though  
we believe in the possibility or in the 
impossibility of divine interference4   
,if the mental hesitancy of the         
respectable ,agnostic were accompanied  
by a corresponding timidity in action   
life would be impossible4  ,a less      
common plea on behalf of ,agnosticism1  
but one on which a word must be said1 is
 that the agnostic attitude is more     
reverential than that of atheism4 ,but  
why in the name of all that is          
reasonable should one profess reverence 
towards something of which one knows    
nothing8 ,reverence1 to be intelligible1
 must be directed towards an intelligent
 object1 and we must have grounds for   
believing it to be worthy of reverence4 
,reverence towards our fellow creatures 
is a reasonable enough sentiment1 but   
what is there reasonable in an          
expression of reverence towards         

something that can only be thought      
of--and even this is unwarranted--as a  
force8 ,the truth is that this          
expression of reverence is no more than 
the flickering survival of religion4    
,numbers have reached the stage at which
 they can perceive the unreasonable     
nature of religious beliefs1 but they   
have not yet managed to achieve         
liberation from the traditional         
emotional attitude towards these        
beliefs4 ,in other words1 the           
development of the emotional and the    
intellectual sides of their nature have 
been unequal1 and for these the         
,unknowable has simply served as a peg  
on which to hang religious feelings that
 have been robbed of all intellectual   
support4 ,the semi-religious ,agnostic  
thus represents a transition form1      
interesting enough to all who observe   
how curiously decaying types strive to  
perpetuate themselves1 but which is     
bound to disappear in the process of    
intellectual evolution4  ,finally1 one  

would like from the ,agnostic some      
authoritative announcement as to his    
position in relation to what is known   
concerning the origin of the god-idea4  
,so far as professed theists are        
concerned one expects this to be        
ignored4 ,on the part of non-theists one
 expects a more logical attitude4 ,in   
this case it is common ground with the  
,atheist and the ,agnostic that the idea
 of god owes its beginnings to the      
ignorance of primitive man4 ,we know the
 facts on which this idea was based1 and
 we know that all these are now         
differently explained4 ,the belief that 
there is a god governing nature is just 
one of those blunders made by primitive 
man1 and is on all fours with the       
numerous other blunders he makes        
concerning himself and the world around 
him4 ,knowing this1 and accepting this1 
believing that god springs from the same
 set of conditions that gave rise to    
fairies and spirits of various kinds1   
one would like to know on what ground   

the ,agnostic definitely rejects the    
grounds on which the idea of god is     
based1 while professing a state of      
suspended judgment about the existence  
of the object created by this primitive 
blunder4 ,it is certainly surprising to 
find those who accept the natural origin
 of the god-idea1 when they come to deal
 with current religion talk as though it
 were merely a question of the          
inconclusiveness of religious arguments4
 ,it is nothing of the kind4 ,the final 
reply to the arguments set forth on     
behalf of ,theism is1 not that they are 
inconclusive1 but that they are         
absolutely irrelevant to the question at
 issue4 ,we cannot remain undecided     
because there is nothing to remain      
undecided about4 ,we know that the idea 
of god is pure myth1 and was never      
anything but myth4 ,a belief that began 
in error1 and which has no other basis  
than error1 cannot by any possible      
argument be converted into a truth4 ,the
 old question was1 ,can man by searching

 find out ,god8 ,the modern answer is an
 emphatic affirmative4 ,substantially we
 have by searching found out ,god4 ,we  
know the origin and history of one of   
the greatest delusions that ever        
possessed the human mind4 ,god has been 
found out4 ,analytically and            
synthetically we understand the god-idea
 as previous generations could not      
understand it4 ,it has been explained2  
and the logical consequence of the      
explanation is--,atheism4  ,ultimately1 
then1 we come to this3 7#a7 ,the        
,agnosticism that concerns itself with a
 confession of ignorance concerning the 
nature of existence1 has no necessary   
connection with religion1 and is only   
made to have such by a confusion of two 
distinct things4 7#b7 ,the plea of a    
suspended judgment is invalid1 since    
there is nothing about which one can    
suspend a decision4 7#c7 ,the           
,agnosticism that professes a           
semi-religious feeling of reverence     
towards the ,unknowable is fundamentally

 upon all fours with the religious      
feelings of the ordinary believer4      
,worshipping the ,unknowable is more    
ridiculous than worshipping ,huxley's   
wilderness of apes4 ,the apes might take
 some intelligent interest in the antics
 of their devotees2 but to print our    
hypostatised ignorance in capital       
letters and then profess a feeling of   
veneration for it is as ridiculous a    
proceeding as the world has seen4 ,after
 all1 an absurdity is never quite so    
grotesque as when it is tricked out in  
scientific phrases and paraded as the   
outcome of profound philosophic         
thinking4 7#d7 ,the only ,agnosticism   
that seems capable of justifying itself 
is an ,agnosticism that is              
indistinguishable from ,atheism4 ,to    
again cite ,professor ,flint1 ,atheist  
means one who does not believe in ,god1 
and it means neither more nor less4 ,the
 ,agnostic is also one who is without   
belief in a god1 every argument he uses 
to justify his position is and has been 

used as a justification of ,atheism4    
,atheist is really a thoroughly honest1 
unambiguous term1 it admits of no       
paltering and of no evasion1 and the    
need of the world1 now as ever1 is for  
clear-cut issues and unambiguous speech4
     ,,chapter ,,xiv4  ,,atheism ,,and  
,,morals4   ,looking at the world as it 
is one cannot forbear a mild wonder at  
the fears expressed at the probable     
consequences to morals of a general     
acceptance of ,atheism4 ,one would have 
thought that the world would not run a  
very great danger of becoming worse on  
that account1 and that1 seeing the way  
in which all forms of rascality have    
flourished1 and still maintain          
themselves1 without in the least        
disturbing people's religious           
convictions1 one might even feel        
inclined to risk a change in the hopes  
of improvement4 ,mainly1 indeed1 one    
might say that those who are affected by
 religious belief are such as can very  
well do without it1 while those who     

stand in urgent need of moral           
improvement seldom show that their      
religious belief has any very beneficial
 effect on their conduct4  ,yet nothing 
is more common than to find the theist1 
when driven off all other grounds of    
defence1 protesting against a deliberate
 propaganda of ,atheism on the ground of
 its probable harmful consequences to   
morals4 ,this1 not because those who    
have publicly professed ,atheism are    
open to the charge of loose living1 but 
on account of those who at present      
believe in religion1 and whose loss of  
belief would possibly upset their moral 
equilibrium4 ,it is a curious position  
for a theist to take up1 since it       
implies that while the ,atheist as we   
know him shows no deterioration of      
character in consequence of his loss of 
belief1 we cannot be so certain of the  
present believers in deity4 ,they are   
formed of poorer clay1 and once         
convinced that there is no ,god with    
whom they have to reckon1 there is no   

telling what will happen4 ,so we are    
urged to let well alone1 and leave      
believers with their illusions lest     
their loss should present us with a very
 unpleasant reality4  ,this fear is     
expressed in various ways1 but in one   
way or another it is tolerably common4  
,the following which reached me from a  
well known man of letters probably puts 
the argument as fairly and as           
temperately as it can be put1 and       
therefore in dealing with that ,i cannot
 be accused of taking the theist at an  
unfair advantage4 ,his conclusions are  
summarised in the following paragraphs4 
7,the summary is the author's1 not      
mine47  7#a7 ,the decentish code of     
morals which prevails in this twentieth 
century is the outcome of all the human 
ages4 ,from the very first1 everywhere  
and all the time1 it has1 and continues 
to be1 inextricably intertwined and     
influenced by ,theistic beliefs1 even   
when and where such beliefs have been   
the crudest and most debased form of    

polytheism4  7#b7 ,the ethical          
atmosphere in which we now live1 after  
having had such an origin and history1  
remains strongly and frankly pervaded by
 religion of a ,theistic type4 ,atheist1
 ,agnostic1 and ,theist alike have to   
live in this atmosphere1 and consciously
 or unconsciously1 are subject to its   
influence4  7#c7 ,even if we could set  
up a wholly secular code of morals1     
derived entirely from the exigencies of1
 tribal1 communal1 and national life1 ,i
 take it that such a code would be      
inadequate to form the type of          
individual character we most admire1 and
 which acts under a sense of ought      
rather than of must4 ,the latter is     
often the mere demand of gregarious or  
individual comfort and convenience2 the 
former may be quite opposed to the      
inclinations of the individual1 and yet 
bring into play irksome but ennobling   
springs of action which a purely secular
 code cannot touch4  ,now these         
statements put the case for the theist  

as moderately and as well as it can be  
put1 and ,i think that they are worthy  
of a little careful examination4 ,it may
 be observed that there is no           
insinuation that ,atheists are actually 
worse than other people1 only the fear  
that in the absence of some form of     
theism the higher ethical motive cannot 
be roused1 and that therefore character 
will suffer4 ,well1 we are none of us   
free from the contagion of our          
environment1 and the most powerful      
influences are often enough those that  
it would be difficult to specify in any 
given instance4 ,it is not only that the
 influence of the higher members of     
society affect the lower4 ,the lower is 
not without its influence on the higher4
 ,but the question here is not really   
whether we are all exposed to the       
general influence of the group to which 
we belong1 that1 ,i think1 is           
undeniable1 the real question at issue  
is whether the determining influence on 
conduct is theistic or not4 ,and ,i     

think it will be found that while the   
one thing is asserted it is the other   
that is proven4  ,so far as the first   
proposition is concerned it may be taken
 for granted that our present state is  
the product of all past evolution1 and  
that in the course of that evolution    
theistic beliefs have been closely--not 
inextricably--connected with morals4    
,but this is not alone true of morality1
 it is true of every branch of human    
thought and of every aspect of human    
life4 ,art1 science1 literature1 have   
all been closely connected with         
religious beliefs4 ,necessarily so4     
,early human history is spent under the 
shadow of superstition1 and its         
dominating influence affects the form of
 every aspect of life4 ,but as the      
course of development has been to       
separate the essential from the         
non-essential and to place most of each 
department of life on a self-supporting 
basis1 it would not seem an unreasonable
 conclusion that ethics will follow the 

same lines4 ,in fact1 it is following   
the same lines4 ,there are few educated 
people nowadays who would claim that    
morality cannot exist apart from        
religion1 they are content to say1 as my
 correspondent does1 that in the absence
 of religion belief the higher aspects  
of morality will suffer4  ,our morality1
 we are told1 is the outcome of all the 
human ages4 ,i go further than that and 
assert that it is the outcome of all the
 human and of all the animal ages4      
,there is no break in nature1 and to the
 evolutionist the development of the    
human from the animal is plain4 ,and it 
should scarcely need pointing out       
nowadays that nearly every one of the   
fundamental qualities of man can be seen
 in germ in the animal world4 ,i only   
emphasise the point here because it is  
so often forgotten that morality is     
fundamentally the expression of those   
conditions under which associated life  
is found possible and profitable1 and   
that so far as any quality is declared  

to be moral its justification and       
meaning must be found in that direction4
 ,the question of incentive we will come
 to later2 for the moment it is enough  
to insist upon the fact that morality is
 fashioned1 in its fundamentals1 with   
reference to facts1 not with reference  
to speculative beliefs4 ,beliefs may    
influence morality for awhile1 but the  
persistent operation of social selection
 secures a general conformity between   
conduct and the conditions upon which   
life depends4 ,that is the fundamental  
fact to be remembered in all discussions
 of morality1 although it is the fact   
that is most often ignored4 ,ultimately 
life determines moral teaching1 it is   
not moral teaching that determines life4
  ,life not alone determines morality1  
but it determines religion as well4     
,what else is the meaning of all those  
discarded forms of religious belief1    
those bodies of dead gods1 that meet the
 student of history as the remains of   
extinct animals meet the geologist in   

his unravelment of the story of the     
earth's vicissitudes8 ,they are the     
result of a lack of adaptation to new   
conditions to which they could not      
accommodate themselves4 ,once the gods  
lorded it over man as the gigantic      
dinosaur lorded it in his day over      
lesser animals4 ,and in the one case1 as
 in the other1 a change in the          
environment brought about their doom4   
,natural selection determines the       
survival of religions as of animal      
forms1 and a religion to survive must   
become increasingly utilitarian in      
character1 certainly there is a point   
beyond which the opposite tendency      
cannot be carried4  ,assume1 for        
example1 that a religion existed of a   
grossly anti-social character1 one that 
teaches doctrines that are subversive of
 the general social well-being4 ,one of 
two things must result4 ,if the religion
 is strong enough to enforce its        
teaching the society it dominates will  
disappear1 and the religion will die out

 with it4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it    
cannot enforce its teaching1 or can get 
it accepted only in a modified form1    
then either the religion disappears in  
its original form1 or it is modified to 
get itself established4 ,to live1       
religion must establish some sort of    
harmony between its teachings and the   
conditions of life4 ,it may retard the  
development of life1 but it must not    
retard to the point of destruction4     
,this is all that is really involved in 
what is called the purification of      
religious teaching4 ,in reality there is
 no such thing4 ,the purification is a  
modification1 and it is modified in     
order that it may become acceptable to  
the society in which it is existing4    
,the ascetic epidemic1 the various      
disgusting sects that have sprung into  
existence from time to time during the  
course of ,christian history1 have all  
died out from this cause4 ,as with the  
individual1 so with society1 the forces 
of which we are conscious generally move

 upon the surface4 ,of the underlying   
ones we are mostly unaware4  ,the truth 
is1 then1 that behind all our           
consciously elaborated theories of life 
there are operative the unconscious or  
sub-conscious forces of evolution4      
,there is1 of course1 a certain area of 
conduct in which speculative opinions   
play their part1 and where actions may  
be arbitrarily classed as good or bad4  
,but this area is1 of necessity1        
limited1 and for the reasons that have  
been given above4 ,properly understood  
morality is not something very abstract1
 but something that is very concrete4   
,the underlying reason for morality is  
always the same1 and we are compelled to
 hark back to it for justification4 ,and
 no rejection of religion can alter the 
basis upon which morality rests4  ,the  
proposition that ,atheist1 ,agnostic1   
and ,theist breathe the same atmosphere 
and are affected by the same influences 
is1 therefore1 one that is two-edged4   
,if our intellectual atmosphere is      

saturated with religious influences1 it 
is also saturated with social influences
 of a much more fundamental character1  
and which have been perpetually         
correcting religious extravagances4 ,and
 it is at least open to the ,atheist to 
retort that we have to thank this       
circumstance that religious beliefs have
 not been more injurious than has been  
actually the case4 ,if1 for example1 the
 ascetic epidemic of the early          
,christian centuries had increased in   
force and had continued operative1      
,european society would have            
disappeared4 ,that this was not the case
 was due to the strength of the sexual  
and social instincts1 against which     
religion was unable to maintain its     
hold4 ,in the change of opinion over the
 better way to spend ,sunday1 or in the 
decay of the doctrine of eternal        
damnation1 we have the same point       
illustrated4 ,right through history it  
has been the social instincts that have 
acted as a corrective to religious      

extravagance4 ,and it is worth noting   
that with the exception of a little gain
 from the practice of casuistry1        
religions have contributed nothing      
towards the building up of a science of 
ethics4 ,on the contrary it has been a  
very potent cause of confusion and      
obstruction4 ,fictitious vices and      
virtues have been created and the real  
moral problem lost sight of4 ,it gave   
the world the morality of the prison    
cell1 instead of the tonic of the       
rational life4 ,and it was indeed       
fortunate for the race that conduct was 
not ultimately dependent upon a mass of 
teachings that had their origin in the  
brains of savages1 and were brought to  
maturity during the darkest period of   
,european civilisation4  ,in dealing    
with the two first propositions ,i have1
 by implication1 answered the           
third--namely1 that a wholly secular    
authentic code of morals would be       
inadequate to form the highest type of  
character2 it might supply a must1 but  

it could not supply an ought4  ,the     
first and obvious reply to an objection 
of this kind is that our working code of
 morals is secular already4 ,in life1 if
 we observe without prejudice1 it is not
 difficult to see that one's neighbours1
 friends1 social class1 etc41 have far  
more force in shaping conduct than      
speculative theories4 ,in its widest    
sense natural selection determines what 
actions shall be declared to be moral4  
,of this we may take the universal      
feeling against homicide4 ,this is but  
an expression of the truth that social  
life would be impossible were it        
otherwise4 ,and when we pass from the   
general to the special we meet with much
 the same principle operating in        
society4 ,the average burglar pursues   
his calling with no special sense of its
 wrongness1 although he may have a keen 
sense of its dangers4 ,but while        
burgling with a fairly easy conscience1 
he does flinch at breaking the code of  
honour set up by his fellow-burglars4   

,and at the other extreme we have the   
gentleman with his code of honour which 
forbids him not to pay a gambling debt1 
but takes no count of keeping a poor    
tradesman out of his money4 ,in each of 
these cases the determining factor is   
not theory but fact1 and the fact here  
is association with our fellow          
countrymen or with a special social     
class4 ,morality1 in short1 is social or
 nothing4 ,moral laws are meaningless   
apart from social life4 ,every moral    
command implies the existence of a      
social medium1 and it is no more than a 
study in history to see how this social 
medium has been continuously shaping and
 reshaping human nature4 ,the           
determination here is not conscious1 but
 it is real1 however much disguised it  
may be by various forms or theories4    
,and when we realise this1 it is no more
 than a truism to say that a change in  
religious belief can no more destroy    
morality than a change in government can
 destroy society4  ,but in saying that  

the essence of morality is unreasoning  
,i do not mean that it is unreasonable4 
,all ,i mean is that it can receive a   
reasonable justification1 and that no   
matter how lofty the development it has 
its basis in the fundamental conditions 
of associated animal and human life4 ,we
 may surround the subject with a vague  
and attractive idealistic verbalism1 but
 we come back to this as a starting     
point4 ,the love of family1 with all its
 attendant values1 rests upon the fact  
of crude sexual desire1 refined1 of     
course1 during the passing of many      
generations1 but dependent upon it all  
the same4 ,remove the sexual desire and 
the family feelings are inexplicable4   
,thus1 the reason for the existence of  
the sexual instinct is race             
preservation1 but the end has been      
achieved in a quite unreasoning manner4 
,in the animal world at large there is  
certainly no conscious desire for the   
production of offspring1 nor is there   
with the mass of human beings4 ,there is

 the desire to gratify an impulse1 and  
very little more4 ,and for the          
strengthening of an instinct there need 
not be1 nor is there1 any consciousness 
of its social value4 ,all that is       
necessary is that it shall be useful4   
,natural selection attends to the rest4 
,this will1 ,i think1 supply an answer  
to the contention that secular ethics   
can supply a must1 but not an ought2    
that is1 it may show that an individual 
should act in accordance with his       
inclinations1 but in cases where these  
clash with the social well being1 it can
 supply no reason why the former should 
give way to the latter4  ,the argument  
rests upon a dual confusion4 ,first1 the
 moral ought is no more than an         
organised and conscious form of must1   
and not something distinct from it4 ,one
 may test the matter by taking a case4  
,a man says1 ,i ought so to work as to  
promote the general welfare of society4 
,if we seek to find the source of this  
feeling we come ultimately upon the     

feeling of tribal solidarity in virtue  
of which certain tribes survive in the  
struggle for existence4 ,it is          
gregariousness struggling into          
consciousness4 ,the moral ought is an   
idealised form of the primitive tribal  
must4 ,and the must of primitive life is
 encouraged and developed because it is 
one of the conditions of survival4  ,the
 second point of confusion is based upon
 a supposed opposition between          
individual inclinations and an ideal    
conception of duty4 ,that the two are   
often1 as a matter of fact1 in conflict1
 must be admitted4 ,and the cause is    
that while our inclinations represent a 
heritage from the past1 our ideals are a
 projection into the future4 ,but the   
contention is based upon their supposed 
permanent hostility1 and that need not  
be taken for granted4 ,for the whole    
course of social evolution tends to     
bring about a substantial identification
 of personal and social well-being4     
,more and more as the race develops it  

is being recognised that there is no    
real individual life apart from social  
life1 of which it is the creation and   
the expression4 ,such antagonism as     
exists is the inevitable result of a    
conflict between an organism and its    
adaptation to a changing environment4   
,and from this point of view the whole  
growth of man is in the nature of an    
expansion of his sympathies and sense of
 duty over an ever-widening area4 ,the  
primitive egoism of the tribal          
individual is extended to the nation1   
that of the nation to the empire1 and   
thence to the whole of humanity4 ,there 
is no destruction or denial of self in  
such cases1 it is a development of the  
sense of self over an enlarging area4   
,finally1 if a secular code of morals   
will not suffice1 it is sheer rhetoric  
to say that religion is powerful enough 
to operate where naturalism fails4 ,on  
the contrary1 in a civilised community  
religious appeals tend to become secular
 appeals in disguise4 ,on the admission 

of ,christian advocates the two most    
powerful appeals that can be made are on
 the one hand1 in the name of the       
fatherhood of god1 and on the other1 the
 conception of the ,mother and the      
,child4 ,and what are these but appeals 
to the secular and social feelings of   
man in the name of religion8 ,it may be 
granted that ,atheism in its appeals to 
mankind often fails1 but in this respect
 is it any worse off than religion8     
,why1 one of the standing complaints of 
religious preachers in all ages is that 
their message falls so frequently on    
deaf ears4 ,there is no more certainty  
that the religious appeal will meet with
 success1 than there is that any other  
appeal will be successful4 ,and there is
 the unquestionable fact that morality  
has become stronger as the power of     
religion has weakened4 ,the higher      
qualities have asserted themselves      
during a period of religious            
disintegration1 and the student of      
morals sees in this a promise of a      

further development in the future4  ,and
 to all prophecies as to the effects of 
,atheism on the morality of the future  
there is the apt reply that they are    
prophecies and nothing else4 ,and in    
this respect it is dangerous for the    
,christian theist to appeal to history4 
,for while the consequences of ,atheism 
can be no more than a forecast1 which   
may or may not be justified1 the record 
of ,christianity is before the world4   
,and we know that the period during     
which the influence of ,christian theism
 was strongest1 was the period when the 
intellectual life of civilised man was  
at its lowest1 morality at its weakest1 
and the general outlook most hopeless4  
,religious control gave us heresy hunts1
 and ,jew hunts1 burnings for           
witchcraft1 and magic in the place of   
medicine4 ,it gave us the ,inquisition  
and the auto da fe1 the fires of        
,smithfield and the night of ,st4       
,bartholomew4 ,it gave us the war of    
sects and it helped powerfully to       

establish the sect of war4 ,it gave us  
life without happiness1 and death       
cloaked with terror4 ,the ,christian    
record is before us1 and it is such that
 every ,church blames the others for its
 existence4 ,quite as certainly we      
cannot point to a society that has been 
dominated by ,freethinking ideas1 but we
 can point to their existence in all    
ages1 and can show that all progress is 
due to their presence4 ,we can show that
 progressive ideas have originated with 
the least1 and have been opposed by the 
most religious sections of society4     
,what religion has done for the world we
 know2 what freethought will do we can  
only guess4 ,but we are confident that  
as honesty is possible without the      
falsity of religion1 as duty may be done
 with no other incentive than its       
visible consequences on the people      
around us1 so life may be lived in      
honour and closed in peace with no other
 inspiration than comes from the        
contemplation of the human stream from  

which we emerge and into which we       
finally go4     ,,chapter ,,xv4         
,,atheism ,,inevitable4   ,between      
,theism and ,atheism the logical mind   
may halt1 but it cannot rest for long1  
and in the end the logic of fact works  
its way4 ,compromise1 while it may delay
 the end without preventing its         
inevitability1 is quite out of place in 
matters of the intellect4 ,in the world 
of practice compromise is often         
unavoidable1 but in that of ideas the   
sole concern should be for truth4 ,when 
,whately said that the man who commenced
 by loving ,christianity more than truth
 would continue by loving his own sect  
more than any other1 and end by loving  
himself more than all1 he placed his    
finger on the great moral danger of     
compromise where opinion is concerned4  
,it begins1 ostensibly1 by considering  
the respect due to an opponent's case1  
it continues by sacrificing the respect 
that is due one's own1 and it ends by   
giving a new sense of value to the very 

opinion it aims at destroying4 ,no      
quarter is the only sound rule in       
intellectual warfare1 where to take     
prisoners is only one degree less       
dishonouring than to be taken captive   
oneself4 ,and the value of an opinion is
 never wholly in the opinion itself4 ,no
 small part of its worth is derived from
 the way in which it is held1 and the   
importance which is placed upon it4     
,when ,professor ,tylor said that the   
deepest of all divisions in the history 
of human thought was that which divided 
,animism from ,materialism1 he was      
saying what ,i have been endeavouring to
 say1 in another manner1 in the         
foregoing pages4 ,atheism and           
supernaturalism are fundamental         
divisions in human thought1 and         
divisions that connote an irreconcilable
 antagonism4 ,the terms not only mark a 
division1 they are the badges of a      
movement1 the indication of a           
pilgrimage4 ,dr4 ,tylor's own work and  
the work of his fellow labourers tell   

the story in detail1 and although no one
 is in a position to write finis to it1 
there is no doubt as to what its end    
will be4 ,and the manner of the         
pilgrimage is quite plain4 ,the starting
 point is the creation by the befogged  
ignorance of primitive man of that      
welter of ghosts and gods which make so 
much of early existence a veritable     
nightmare4 ,the journey commences in a  
world in which the supernatural is      
omnipresent1 in which man's chief       
endeavours is given to win the good will
 or avert the anger of the ghosts and   
gods to whom he has himself given being4
 ,and the end1 the last stage of the    
pilgrimage1 is a world in which         
mechanical operations take the place of 
disembodied intelligences1 or of        
supernatural powers4 ,from a world in   
which the gods are everything and do    
everything to a world in which the gods 
are nothing and do nothing4 ,the story  
of that transition is the record of one 
of the greatest revolutions that has    

happened in the history of mankind4 ,its
 real greatness and far-reaching        
significance is not always adequately   
recognised1 even by those who welcome it
 gladly4 ,indeed1 the narrower interests
 that suffer from this revolution are   
more keenly alive to its importance than
 are those who benefit from its         
consummation4 ,that is1 perhaps1 what   
one ought to expect from the known      
course of human history4 ,for history   
would not be what it is1 nor would      
reforms be so difficult of              
accomplishment were it not possible to  
persuade the slave that his servitude   
guards him from the very evils it       
perpetuates4  ,incidentally the nature  
of that revolution has been indicated in
 the preceding pages4 ,but a more       
connected view will form a fitting close
 to this work4 ,nothing more than the   
barest of outlines can be attempted1 but
 such as it is it may serve to          
illustrate the truth that ,atheism is   
more than the speculative philosophy of 

a few1 that it is in sober truth the    
logical outcome of mental growth4 ,so   
far as any phase of human life can be   
called inevitable ,atheism may lay claim
 to being inescapable4 ,all mental      
growth can be seen leading to it1 just  
as we can see one stage of social       
development giving a logical starting   
point for another stage1 and which could
 have been foretold had our knowledge of
 all the forces in operation been       
precise enough4 ,atheism is1 so to      
speak1 implicit in the growth of        
knowledge2 its complete expression is   
the consummation of a process that began
 with the first questionings of         
religion4 ,and the completion of the    
process means the death of              
supernaturalism in all its forms4       
,religion1 it has already been said1 is 
something that is acquired1 and although
 that sounds little better than a       
commonplace1 yet reflection proves it to
 contain an important truth4 ,for it is 
in the nature of the acquisition that   

its significance lies4 ,whatever be the 
earliest stages of religion it is at all
 events clear that its earliest form is 
in the nature of a hypothesis1 even     
though only of the semi-conscious kind  
that exists when man is brought into    
touch with some new and overpowering    
experience4 ,religious ideas are put    
forth in explanation of something4 ,but 
all explanation whether by savage or    
civilised man1 must be in terms of      
existing knowledge4 ,no other method is 
possible4 ,we must explain the unknown  
in terms of the known1 and our          
explanation will be the more elaborate  
and the nearer the truth as our         
knowledge of the nature of the forces   
are the more exact and extensive4 ,a    
knowledge of the laws of condensation   
and evaporation enables a modern to give
 an explanation of the meaning of a     
shower of rain that is simply impossible
 to man in an earlier stage of culture4 
,in every case the facts are the same1  
and in each case the explanation given  

depends upon the knowledge acquired4    
,now one radical distinction between an 
early and a modern explanation of the   
world is that whereas the former moves  
from within outward1 the latter moves   
from without inward4 ,uncivilised man   
explains the world by himself2 civilised
 man explains himself by the world4 ,the
 savage describes the world in terms of 
his own feelings and passions1 the      
scientist regards human qualities as    
resulting from the relation which man   
holds to the forces around him4 ,the    
process1 while presenting a radical     
difference in form1 is yet fundamentally
 one in essence4 ,ignorant of all that  
we connote by such an expression as     
natural forces1 whatever explanation is 
offered by the savage is necessarily in 
terms of the only force with which he is
 acquainted4 ,but it happens that the   
only forces which he then fancies he    
understands are those represented by his
 own organisation4 ,what he is conscious
 of doing is prompted by his own will   

and intelligence4 ,he hurts when he is  
angry1 he rewards when he is pleased1   
and he makes the same assumption        
regarding the things around him4 ,so far
 as he explains nature he vitalises it4 
,vital force becomes the symbol of all  
force4 ,and this result expresses a     
mental law that is universally          
operative4 ,the civilised mind differs  
from the savage mind not because the    
brain functions differently in the two  
cases1 but solely in consequence of the 
wider and truer knowledge of the causes 
of natural phenomena which civilised man
 possesses4 ,we arrive at different     
conclusions because we start from       
different premises4 ,inevitably1        
therefore1 the first attempt of man to  
deal with nature takes the form of      
assuming the operation of a number of   
personal intelligences4 ,natural objects
 are alive1 and everything that happens 
to man1 from the cradle to the grave1 is
 thought of as being either alive or    
controlled by living beings4 ,the world 

is filled with a crowd of ghostly beings
 exercising more or less discordant     
functions4 ,against this riot of gods   
the conception of natural law developes 
but slowly4 ,quite apart from the       
natural inertia of the human mind1 the  
fact of questioning the power of these  
assumed beings involves to the primitive
 mind an element of grave danger4 ,all  
sorts of things may happen if the gods  
are offended1 and in self-defence the   
tribe feels bound to suppress the critic
 of religion and of religious ideas4    
,but once the step is taken1 the area   
over which the gods rule is to that     
extent restricted1 and with that step   
,atheism may be said to be born4  ,what 
,lange said in the opening sentences of 
his classic ,history of ,materialism1   
that ,materialism is as old as          
philosophy1 but not older1 may be said  
with equal truth of ,atheism4 ,that1    
too1 is as old as philosophy1 since it  
begins with man's attempts to break away
 from that primitive interpretation of  

nature which sees in all phenomena the  
action of personal intelligences4 ,it is
 of no importance in which branch of    
knowledge the departure was made1       
whichever department one takes the      
process can be seen at work4 ,astronomy 
appears to have been the branch of      
knowledge in which the powers of the    
gods were earliest restricted1 although 
it was not until the discoveries of     
,copernicus1 ,galileo1 ,newton1 and     
,laplace were given to the world that   
,god vanished altogether from that      
region4 ,geology follows with the       
teaching that chemical1 thermal1 and    
other known forces leave nothing for the
 gods to accomplish4 ,biology and       
sociology1 dealing with more complex    
forces1 are much later in the field1 but
 they tread the same path4 ,they provide
 a refuge for ,god for awhile1 but it is
 evident that their complete            
dispossession is no more than a question
 of time4 ,and even though the very     
complex character of the forces working 

in these latter departments should      
prevent us ever acquiring the same      
degree of prevision that exists in other
 classes1 no difference will be made to 
the general result4 ,the principle will 
be fairly established and our ignorance 
of details will no longer be made the   
ground for assertions which1 if made at 
all1 should rest upon the most exact    
knowledge4 ,god will be left with       
nothing to do1 and man will not for ever
 go on worshipping a ,god whose sole    
recommendation is that he exists1 nor   
will the common sense of civilised      
people hold on to a hypothesis when     
there is nothing left for that          
hypothesis to explain4  ,the single and 
outstanding characteristic of the       
conception of god at all times and under
 all conditions is that it is the       
equivalent of ignorance4 ,in primitive  
times it is ignorance of the character  
of natural forces that leads to the     
assumption of the existence of gods1 and
 in this respect the god-idea has       

remained true to itself throughout4     
,even to-day whenever the principle of  
,god is invoked a very slight           
examination is enough to show that the  
only reason for this being done is our  
ignorance of the subject before us4 ,why
 does anyone assume that we must believe
 in ,god in order to explain the        
beginnings of life8 ,why is ,god assumed
 to be responsible for the order of     
nature8 ,why must we assume ,god to     
explain mind8 ,the answer to these and  
to all similar questions is that we do  
not know1 in the sense that we know the 
cause of planetary motions1 how these   
things came to be4 ,it is not what we   
know about them that leads to the       
assumption of god1 but what we do not   
know4 ,and the converse of that is that 
so soon as knowledge replaces ignorance 
,god will be dispensed with4 ,it is     
never a case of believing in ,god       
because of the actual knowledge we      
possess1 but always the appeal to       
weakness and ignorance4 ,from this point

 of view the colloquial ,god only knows6
 expresses the appeal to ignorance even 
more clearly than the elaborate argument
 of the sophisticated apologist4  ,this 
aspect of the matter was well put by    
,spinoza4 ,believers in the argument    
from design1 he says1 have a method of  
argument that is a reduction1 not to the
 impossible1 but to ignorance4 ,thus1   
,if a stone falls from a roof on to     
someone's head and kills him1      they 
will demonstrate by their new method    
that the stone fell to      kill the    
man2 for if it had not by ,god's will   
fallen with that      object1 how could 
so many circumstances 7and there are    
often many      concurrent              
circumstances7 have all happened        
together by chance4      ,perhaps you   
will answer that the event is due to the
 facts that the      wind was blowing1  
and the man was walking that way4 ,but  
why1 they      will insist1 was the wind
 blowing1 and why was the wind at that  
very time blowing that way8 ,if you     

again answer1 that the wind had         
then sprung up because the sea had begun
 to be agitated the day      before1 the
 weather having been previously calm1   
and that the man      had been invited  
by a friend1 they will again insist3    
,but why was      the sea agitated1 and 
why was the man invited at that time8   
,so      they will pursue their question
 from cause to cause1 till at last      
you take refuge in the will of ,god--in 
other words1 the sanctuary      of      
ignorance4 7,appendix to ,ethics2 pt4   
#a7   ,the sanctuary of ignorance ,god  
has always been1 and the sanctuary of   
ignorance it will remain to the end4 ,it
 has no other function in life4 ,a      
consciousness of this is shown by the   
upholders of ,theism in the eagerness   
with which they welcome every supposed  
demonstration of the impotence of       
science1 and of the resistance          
everywhere offered to the development of
 scientific advance4  ,so far1 then1 as 
the progress of life makes for the      

growth of knowledge1 so far may we      
safely claim that the development of    
thought makes for ,atheism1 as we have  
just said1 and to do the religious world
 justice it has always been quick to    
realise this1 and every great scientific
 generalisation--as well as many smaller
 ones1 has been resisted on the ground  
that they were atheistic in character   
and tended to take the control of the   
world out of ,god's hands4 ,present-day 
theists are apt to condemn this attitude
 of their predecessors1 but it can      
hardly be denied that the logic lies    
with the earlier representatives4 ,a    
,god who does nothing might1 for all    
practical purposes1 as well be          
non-existent4 ,and a ,god who is merely 
in the background of things1 who may be 
responsible for their origin1 but having
 originated them surrenders all control 
over their operations1 is hardly more   
serviceable4 ,the modern theist saves   
his ,god only by leaving him a          
negligible quantity in a universe he is 

supposed to sustain and govern4  ,and it
 cannot be too often emphasised that the
 whole basis of exact or positive       
science is atheistic--that is1 it is    
compelled to ignore even the possibility
 of the existence of ,god4 ,every       
scientific generalisation rests upon the
 constancy of natural forces4 ,on no    
other basis is it possible to give a    
scientific interpretation to what has   
gone before or to anticipate what is to 
happen in the future4 ,every scientific 
calculation assumes that in the world   
with which it deals causation is        
invariable and universal4 ,but if we are
 to assume the operations of a ,god at  
any time or point every scientific      
calculation would have to be accompanied
 with the ,d4,v4 of a prayer meeting4   
,to argue from the past to the future   
would be futile4 ,god might have        
operated then1 no one could be certain  
he will operate now4 ,or he might have  
operated in the far past1 but he might  
not in the future4 ,in either case the  

assumption of a ,god would be fatal to  
exact scientific calculations4 ,thus in 
sheer self defence1 in order to preserve
 its character as science1 science is   
compelled to discard even the           
possibility of the existence of a       
controlling intelligence4 ,as one       
eminent theistic advocate admits1       
,science has no need1 and indeed1 can   
make no use1 in any particular instance 
of the theistic hypothesis4#f ,it is    
only when supernaturalism is partly     
excluded from human thought that science
 can be said to really commence its     
existence2 and in proportion as our     
conception of the universe becomes that 
of an aggregate of non-conscious        
forces--or of a single force with many  
forms producing given results under     
given conditions1 only then does our    
view of the universe reach completion4  
,a study of the nature and tendency of  
human development does1 therefore1      
provide a very strong presumption in    
favour of atheism4 ,all growth here is  

in favour of atheism and away from      
theism4 ,in the beginning we have the   
gods everywhere and dominating          
everything4 ,they do everything and     
control everything4 ,god is the one     
universal primitive hypothesis4 ,and all
 subsequent development is to its       
discrediting4 ,there is no growth in the
 idea of god1 there is only an          
attenuation4 ,the gods grow fewer as the
 race approaches maturity4 ,their       
activities cease as man becomes aware of
 the character of the forces around him4
 ,and it may be further noted that this 
decline of the belief in deity is       
brought about as much by sheer pressure 
of experience as by pure reason4 ,the   
majority of people do not reason        
themselves out of the belief in god1    
they outgrow it4 ,people cease to       
believe in the gods because they        
experience no compulsion to believe in  
them4 ,the logic of fact is ultimately  
more powerful than the logic of theory1 
and as environmental forces brought the 

gods into existence1 so environmental   
forces carry them out again4  ,now      
,atheism does but make explicit in words
 what has long been implicit in         
practice4 ,it takes the god-idea1       
examines it1 and explains it out of     
existence4 ,it admits the reality of    
gods as it admits the reality of ghosts 
and fairies and witches4 ,they are      
subjective1 not objective1 realities4   
,atheism takes the god-idea1 explains   
its origin1 describes its subsequent    
development1 and in so doing indicates  
its ultimate fate4 ,in this sense       
,atheism is1 as ,i have said1 no more   
than the final stage of a long          
historical process4 ,the theistic phase 
of thought is an inevitable one in human
 evolution1 but it is no more a         
permanent one than is the belief in     
hobgoblins4 ,one might here paraphrase  
,bacon and say1 ,a little philosophy    
inclineth a man to belief in the gods1  
but depth in philosophy leads to their  
rejection as a false and useless        

hypothesis4 ,it is true that thinking   
brought the gods into the world2 it is  
also true that adequate thinking carries
 them out again4  ,the cardinal truth   
is1 of course1 that the hypothesis of   
mind in nature does not owe its         
existence to an exact knowledge of      
things but to its absence4 ,its origin  
must be sought in a pre-scientific age  
and its persistence in a number of      
extraneous circumstances which have     
perpetuated a belief that would         
otherwise have inevitably disappeared4  
,and it would indeed be a matter for    
surprise if this belief--said by theists
 to be of all beliefs the most          
profound--should be the one speculation 
on which savage thought has justified   
itself4 ,on no other question did the   
primitive mind reach truth4 ,universally
 its speculations concerning the world  
were discovered to be wrong4 ,on this   
one topic we are asked to believe that  
the savage was absolutely right4  ,from 
the age of fetichism--rightly called by 

,comte the creative age in theology--the
 history of the god-idea has been a     
history of a series of modifications and
 rejections4 ,scarce an invention that  
has not slain a god1 scarce a discovery 
has not marked the burying-place of a   
discarded deity4 ,criticism reduced the 
gods in number and limited them in      
power4 ,advancing knowledge pushed them 
back till nature1 rid of her haughty    
lords1 is conceived as a huge mechanism1
 self-acting1 self-adjusting1 and       
self-repairing4 ,even in the mouths of  
religionists ,god to-day stands for     
little more than a force4 ,we must not  
describe him as personal1 as            
intelligent1 or as conscious1 and       
between this and the existence assumed  
by atheistic science it is impossible to
 detect any vital difference4 ,atheism1 
then1 takes its stand upon the observed 
trend of human history1 upon a scrutiny 
of the facts of nature1 and upon an     
examination of the origin and contents  
of the god-idea4 ,and upon these grounds

 it may fairly claim to be irrefutable  
and inevitable4 ,circumstances may      
obstruct its universal acceptance as a  
reasoned mental attitude1 but that      
merely delays1 it does not destroy the  
certainty of its final triumph4  ,with  
the supposed direful consequences that  
would follow the triumph of ,atheism ,i 
have not dealt with at length4 ,these   
are the bugbears which the designing    
normally employ in order to frighten the
 timid and credulous4 ,mental           
uprightness and moral integrity are     
certainly not the property of one       
religion1 nor can it be said with truth 
that they belong to any4 ,and examining 
the histories of religion it is a fair  
assumption that in whatever direction   
the world may suffer from the           
disappearance of religion there will be 
no moral catastrophe4 ,looking at the   
whole course of human history1 and      
noting how the vilest and most ruinous  
practices have been ever associated with
 religion1 and have ever relied upon    

religion for support1 the cause for     
speculation is1 not what will happen to 
the world when religion dies out1 but   
how human society has managed to        
flourish while the belief in the gods   
ruled4  ,fortunately for human society  
nature has not left the operation of the
 fundamental virtues dependent upon the 
acceptance of this or that theory of the
 world4 ,the social and family          
instincts1 which are inseparable from   
our nature as men and women1 and which  
operate in ways of which we are largely 
unconscious1 are the grounds of all the 
higher and finer virtues1 and while a   
change in opinion may affect their      
operation here and there1 it can never  
alter their fundamental character4      
,conduct1 in short1 comes from life1 it 
is not the creation of a theory to be   
dismissed by resolution or refashioned  
by a vote4  ,what ,atheism would mean in
 practice would be an enormous          
concentration of energy upon purely     
human affairs1 and a judgment of conduct

 in terms of human happiness and        
prosperity4 ,and that certainly         
furnishes no cause for alarm4 ,it is1   
indeed1 our greatest need4 ,we need an  
awakening to the untapped power and     
possibilities of human nature4 ,if the  
gods die1 man their creator still lives2
 and the creative energy which once     
covered the face of nature with         
innumerable gods1 which spent itself in 
the attempt to win their favour1 and    
which called forth a heaven in the      
endeavour to redress the wrongs of      
earth1 may1 if properly applied1 yet    
cover the earth with homes in which men 
and women1 rendered purer by love and   
stronger by knowledge1 will rise        
superior to the fabled gods before whom 
they once bowed in blind adoration4     
,,footnote3  #f ,prof4 ,ward ,naturalism
 and ,agnosticism ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #bc4