,transcriber's ,notes3 ,some            
typographical errors have been          
corrected4 ,a complete list follows the 
text4 ,words in ,greek in the original  
are transliterated and placed between   
plus signs4 ,in the transliterations e3 
and o3 represent the vowel with a       
circumflex4 ,words italicized in the    
original are surrounded by underscores4 
,,the ,,approach ,,to ,,philosophy      
,,by ,,prof4 ,,ralph ,,barton ,,perry   
,,the ,,free ,,man ,,and ,,the ,,soldier
   ,,the ,,moral ,,economy   ,,the      
,,approach ,,to ,,philosophy   ,,charles
 ,,scribner',s ,,sons     ,,the         
,,approach ,,to ,,philosophy   ,,by     
,,ralph ,,barton ,,perry1 ,,ph4,d4      
,,assistant ,,professor ,,of            
,,philosophy ,,in ,,harvard ,,university
   ,,charles ,,scribner',s ,,sons       
,,new ,,york ,,chicago ,,boston         
,,copyright1 #aije1 ,,by ,,charles      
,,scribner',s ,,sons  ,printed in the   
,united ,states of ,america ,f          
,,this ,,volume ,,is ,,dedicated ,,to   

,,my ,,father  ,,as ,a ,,token ,,of ,,my
 ,,love ,,and ,,esteem     ,,preface    
,in an essay on ,the ,problem of        
,philosophy at the ,present ,time1      
,professor ,edward ,caird says that     
philosophy is not a first venture into a
 new field of thought1 but the          
rethinking of a secular and religious   
consciousness which has been developed1 
in the main1 independently of           
philosophy4vii3,a ,if there be any      
inspiration and originality in this     
book1 they are due to my great desire   
that philosophy should appear in its    
vital relations to more familiar        
experiences4 ,if philosophy is1 as is   
commonly assumed1 appropriate to a phase
 in the development of every individual1
 it should grow out of interests to     
which he is already alive4 ,and if the  
great philosophers are indeed never     
dead1 this fact should manifest itself  
in their classic or historical          
representation of a perennial outlook   
upon the world4 ,i am not seeking to    

attach to philosophy a fictitious       
liveliness1 wherewith to insinuate it   
into the good graces of the student4 ,i 
hope rather to be true to the meaning of
 philosophy4 ,for there is that in its  
stand-point and its problem which makes 
it universally significant entirely     
apart from dialectic and erudition4     
,these are derived interests1           
indispensable to the scholar1 but quite 
separable from that modicum of          
philosophy which helps to make the man4 
,the present book is written for the    
sake of elucidating the inevitable      
philosophy4 ,it seeks to make the reader
 more solicitously aware of the         
philosophy that is in him1 or to provoke
 him to philosophy in his own interests4
 ,to this end ,i have sacrificed all    
else to the task of mediating between   
the tradition and technicalities of the 
academic discipline and the more common 
terms of life4  ,the purpose of the book
 will in part account for those         
shortcomings that immediately reveal    

themselves to the eye of the scholar4   
,in ,part ,i various great human        
interests have been selected as points  
of departure4 ,i have sought to         
introduce the general stand-point and   
problem of philosophy through its       
implication in practical life1 poetry1  
religion1 and science4 ,but in so doing 
it has been necessary for me to deal    
shortly with topics of great independent
 importance1 and so risk the disfavor of
 those better skilled in these several  
matters4 ,this is evidently true of the 
chapter which deals with natural        
science4 ,but the problem which ,i there
 faced differed radically from those of 
the foregoing chapters1 and the method  
of treatment is correspondingly         
different4 ,in the case of natural      
science one has to deal with a body of  
knowledge which is frequently regarded  
as the only knowledge4 ,to write a      
chapter about science from a            
philosophical stand-point is1 in the    
present state of opinion1 to undertake a

 polemic against exclusive naturalism1  
an attitude which is itself             
philosophical1 and as such is well known
 in the history of philosophy as        
positivism or agnosticism4 ,i have      
avoided the polemical spirit and method 
so far as possible1 but have1           
nevertheless1 here taken sides against a
 definite philosophical position4 ,this 
chapter1 together with the ,conclusion1 
is therefore an exception to the purely 
introductory and expository             
representation which ,i have1 on the    
whole1 sought to give4 ,the relatively  
great space accorded to the discussion  
of religion is1 in my own belief1 fair  
to the general interest in this topic1  
and to the intrinsic significance of its
 relation to philosophy4  ,i have in    
,part ,,ii undertaken to furnish the    
reader with a map of the country to     
which he has been led4 ,to this end ,i  
have attempted a brief survey of the    
entire programme of philosophy4 ,an     
accurate and full account of            

philosophical terms can be found in such
 books as ,kuelpe's ,introduction to    
,philosophy and ,baldwin's ,dictionary  
of ,philosophy1 and an attempt to       
emulate their thoroughness would be     
superfluous1 even if it were conformable
 to the general spirit of this book4    
,the scope of ,part ,,ii is due in part 
to a desire for brevity1 but chiefly to 
the hope of furnishing an epitome that  
shall follow the course of the natural  
and historical differentiation of the   
general philosophical problem4          
,finally1 ,i have in ,part ,,iii sought 
to present the tradition of philosophy  
in the form of general types4 ,my       
purpose in undertaking so difficult a   
task is to acquaint the reader with     
philosophy in the concrete2 to show how 
certain underlying principles may       
determine the whole circle of           
philosophical ideas1 and give them unity
 and distinctive flavor4 ,part ,,ii     
offers a general classification of      
philosophical problems and conceptions  

independently of any special point of   
view4 ,but ,i have in ,part ,,iii sought
 to emphasize the point of view1 or the 
internal consistency that makes a system
 of philosophy out of certain answers to
 the special problems of philosophy4 ,in
 such a division into types1 lines are  
of necessity drawn too sharply4 ,there  
will be many historical philosophies    
that refuse to fit1 and many            
possibilities unprovided for4 ,i must   
leave it to the individual reader to    
overcome this abstractness through his  
own reflection upon the intermediate and
 variant stand-points4  ,although the   
order is on the whole that of           
progressive complexity1 ,i have sought  
to treat each chapter with independence 
enough to make it possible for it to be 
read separately2 and ,i have provided a 
carefully selected bibliography in the  
hope that this book may serve as a      
stimulus and guide to the reading of    
other books4  ,the earlier chapters have
 already appeared as articles3 ,chapter 

,i in the ,international ,journal of    
,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,xiii1 ,no4 #d2 ,chapter
 ,,ii in the ,philosophical ,review1    
,vol4 ,,xi1 ,no4 #f2 ,chapter ,,iii in  
the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,xiv1 ,no4 #e2      
,chapter ,,iv in the ,international     
,journal of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,xv1 ,no4   
#a2 and some paragraphs of ,chapter ,v  
in the ,journal of ,philosophy1         
,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1  
,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #g4 ,i am indebted to the
 editors of these periodicals for       
permission to reprint with minor        
changes4  ,in the writing of this1 my   
first book1 ,i have been often reminded 
that a higher critic1 skilled in the    
study of internal evidence1 could       
probably trace all of its ideas to      
suggestions that have come to me from my
 teachers and colleagues of the         
,department of ,philosophy in ,harvard  
,university4 ,i have unscrupulously     
forgotten what of their definite ideas  
,i have adapted to my own use1 but not  
that ,i received from them the major    

portion of my original philosophical    
capital4 ,i am especially indebted to   
,professor ,william ,james for the      
inspiration and resources which ,i have 
received from his instruction and       
personal friendship4                    
,,ralph ,,barton ,,perry4  ,,cambridge1 
,march1 #aije4   ,,footnotes3  vii3,a   
,edw4 ,caird3 ,literature and           
,philosophy1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bjg4         
,,table ,,of ,,contents   ,,part ,i     
,,approach ,,to ,,the ,,problem ,,of    
,,philosophy                            
,,page  ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,practical 
,,man ,,and ,,the ,,philosopher         
#c    ,sect4   #a4 ,is ,philosophy a    
,merely ,academic ,interest8            
#c   ,sect4   #b4 ,life as a            
,starting-point for ,thought            
#d   ,sect4   #c4 ,the ,practical       
,knowledge of ,means                    
#h   ,sect4   #d4 ,the ,practical       
,knowledge of the ,end or ,purpose      
#aj   ,sect4   #e4 ,the ,philosophy of  
the ,devotee1 the ,man of ,affairs1 and 

the ,voluptuary                         
#ab   ,sect4   #f4 ,the ,adoption of    
,purposes and the ,philosophy of ,life  
#ag  ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,poetry ,,and     
,,philosophy                            
#bd    ,sect4   #g4 ,who is the         
,philosopher-,poet8                     
#bd   ,sect4   #h4 ,poetry as           
,appreciation                           
#be   ,sect4   #i4 ,sincerity in        
,poetry4 ,whitman                       
#bg   ,sect4  #aj4 ,constructive        
,knowledge in ,poetry4 ,shakespeare     
#cj   ,sect4  #aa4 ,philosophy in       
,poetry4 ,the ,world-view4 ,omar        
,khayyam       #cf   ,sect4  #ab4       
,wordsworth                             
#ch   ,sect4  #ac4 ,dante               
#db   ,sect4  #ad4 ,the ,difference     
between ,poetry and ,philosophy         
#dh  ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,religious 
,,experience                            
#ec    ,sect4  #ae4 ,the ,possibility of
 ,defining ,religion                    
#ec   ,sect4  #af4 ,the ,profitableness 

of ,defining ,religion                  
#ed   ,sect4  #ag4 ,the ,true ,method of
 ,defining ,religion                    
#ef   ,sect4  #ah4 ,religion as ,belief 
#ei   ,sect4  #ai4 ,religion as ,belief 
in a ,disposition or ,attitude          
#fb   ,sect4  #bj4 ,religion as ,belief 
in the ,disposition of the ,residual    
,environment1 or ,universe              
#fd   ,sect4  #ba4 ,examples of         
,religious ,belief                      
#ff   ,sect4  #bb4 ,typical ,religious  
,phenomena4 ,conversion                 
#fi   ,sect4  #bc4 ,piety               
#gb   ,sect4  #bd4 ,religious           
,instruments1 ,symbolism1 and ,modes of 
,conveyance                             
#gd   ,sect4  #be4 ,historical ,types of
 ,religion4 ,primitive ,religions       
#gg   ,sect4  #bf4 ,buddhism            
#gh   ,sect4  #bg4 ,critical ,religion  
#gi  ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the              
,,philosophical ,,implications ,,of     
,,religion                #hb    ,sect4 
#bh4 ,resume of ,psychology of ,religion

                         #hb   ,sect4   
#bi4 ,religion ,means to be ,true       
#hb   ,sect4  #cj4 ,religion ,means to  
be ,practically ,true4 ,god is a        
,disposition from which ,consequences   
,may ,rationally                  be    
,expected                               
#he   ,sect4  #ca4 ,historical ,examples
 of ,religious ,truth and ,error4 ,the  
,religion of ,baal                      
#hh   ,sect4  #cb4 ,greek ,religion     
#hi   ,sect4  #cc4 ,judaism and         
,christianity                           
#ib   ,sect4  #cd4 ,the ,cognitive      
,factor in ,religion                    
#if   ,sect4  #ce4 ,the ,place of       
,imagination in ,religion               
#ig   ,sect4  #cf4 ,the ,special        
,functions of the ,religious            
,imagination      #aja   ,sect4  #cg4   
,the ,relation between ,imagination and 
,truth in ,religion  #aje   ,sect4  #ch4
 ,the ,philosophy ,implied in ,religion 
and in ,religions     #ajh  ,,chapter   
,v4 ,,natural ,,science ,,and           

,,philosophy                            
#aad    ,sect4  #ci4 ,the ,true         
,relations of ,philosophy and ,science4 
,misconceptions and ,antagonisms        
#aad   ,sect4  #dj4 ,the ,spheres of    
,philosophy and ,science                
#aag   ,sect4  #da4 ,the ,procedure of a
 ,philosophy of ,science                
#abj   ,sect4  #db4 ,the ,origin of the 
,scientific ,interest                   
#abc   ,sect4  #dc4 ,skill as ,free     
#abc   ,sect4  #dd4 ,skill as ,social   
#abf   ,sect4  #de4 ,science for        
,accommodation and ,construction        
#abg   ,sect4  #df4 ,method and         
,fundamental ,conceptions of ,natural   
,science4                  ,the         
,descriptive ,method                    
#abh   ,sect4  #dg4 ,space1 ,time1 and  
,prediction                             
#acj   ,sect4  #dh4 ,the ,quantitative  
,method                                 
#acb   ,sect4  #di4 ,the ,general       
,development of ,science                
#acd   ,sect4  #ej4 ,the ,determination 

of the ,limits of ,natural ,science     
#ace   ,sect4  #ea4 ,natural ,science is
 ,abstract                              
#acf   ,sect4  #eb4 ,the ,meaning of    
,abstractness in ,truth                 
#aci   ,sect4  #ec4 ,but ,scientific    
,truth is ,valid for ,reality           
#adb   ,sect4  #ed4 ,relative ,practical
 ,value of ,science and ,philosophy     
#adc   ,,part ,,ii  ,,the ,,special     
,,problems ,,of ,,philosophy  ,,chapter 
,,vi4 ,,metaphysics ,,and ,,epistemology
                             #adi       
,sect4  #ee4 ,the ,impossibility of an  
,absolute ,division of the              
,problem of ,philosophy                 
#adi   ,sect4  #ef4 ,the ,dependence of 
the ,order of ,philosophical ,problems  
upon the ,initial ,interest             
#aeb   ,sect4  #eg4 ,philosophy as the  
,interpretation of ,life                
#aeb   ,sect4  #eh4 ,philosophy as the  
,extension of ,science                  
#aed   ,sect4  #ei4 ,the ,historical    
,differentiation of the ,philosophical  

,problem                                
#aee   ,sect4  #fj4 ,metaphysics ,seeks 
a ,most ,fundamental ,conception        
#aeg   ,sect4  #fa4 ,monism and         
,pluralism                              
#aei   ,sect4  #fb4 ,ontology and       
,cosmology ,concern ,being and ,process 
#aei   ,sect4  #fc4 ,mechanical and     
,teleological ,cosmologies              
#afj   ,sect4  #fd4 ,dualism            
#afb   ,sect4  #fe4 ,the ,new ,meaning  
of ,monism and ,pluralism               
#afc   ,sect4  #ff4 ,epistemology ,seeks
 to ,understand the ,possibility of     
,knowledge                              
#afd   ,sect4  #fg4 ,scepticism1        
,dogmatism1 and ,agnosticism            
#aff   ,sect4  #fh4 ,the ,source and    
,criterion of ,knowledge according to   
,empiricism and ,rationalism4 ,mysticism
               #afh   ,sect4  #fi4 ,the 
,relation of ,knowledge to its ,object  
according to                  ,realism1 
and the ,representative ,theory         
#agb   ,sect4  #gj4 ,the ,relation of   

,knowledge to its ,object according to  
,idealism                               
#age   ,sect4  #ga4 ,phenomenalism1     
,spiritualism1 and ,panpsychism         
#agf   ,sect4  #gb4 ,transcendentalism1 
or ,absolute ,idealism                  
#agg  ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,normative
 ,,sciences ,,and ,,the ,,problems ,,of 
,,religion     #ahj    ,sect4  #gc4 ,the
 ,normative ,sciences                   
#ahj   ,sect4  #gd4 ,the ,affiliations  
of ,logic                               
#ahb   ,sect4  #ge4 ,logic ,deals with  
the ,most ,general ,conditions of ,truth
                  in ,belief            
#ahc   ,sect4  #gf4 ,the ,parts of      
,formal ,logic4 ,definition1            
,self-evidence1                         
,inference1 and ,observation            
#ahd   ,sect4  #gg4 ,present            
,tendencies4 ,theory of the ,judgment   
#ahg   ,sect4  #gh4 ,priority of        
,concepts                               
#ahh   ,sect4  #gi4 ,aesthetics ,deals  
with the ,most ,general ,conditions of  

,beauty4 ,subjectivistic and            
,formalistic ,tendencies   #ahi   ,sect4
  #hj4 ,ethics ,deals with the ,most    
,general ,conditions of ,moral          
,goodness                               
#aia   ,sect4  #ha4 ,conceptions of the 
,good4 ,hedonism                        
#aia   ,sect4  #hb4 ,rationalism        
#aic   ,sect4  #hc4 ,eudaemonism and    
,pietism4 ,rigorism and ,intuitionism   
#aid   ,sect4  #hd4 ,duty and ,freedom4 
,ethics and ,metaphysics                
#aif   ,sect4  #he4 ,the ,virtues1      
,customs1 and ,institutions             
#aih   ,sect4  #hf4 ,the ,problems of   
,religion4 ,the ,special ,interests of  
,faith                                  
#aii   ,sect4  #hg4 ,theology ,deals    
with the ,nature and ,proof of ,god     
#bjj   ,sect4  #hh4 ,the ,ontological   
,proof of ,god                          
#bjj   ,sect4  #hi4 ,the ,cosmological  
,proof of ,god                          
#bjc   ,sect4  #ij4 ,the ,teleological  
,proof of ,god                          

#bjd   ,sect4  #ia4 ,god and the ,world4
 ,theism and ,pantheism                 
#bje   ,sect4  #ib4 ,deism              
#bjf   ,sect4  #ic4 ,metaphysics and    
,theology                               
#bjg   ,sect4  #id4 ,psychology is the  
,theory of the ,soul                    
#bjh   ,sect4  #ie4 ,spiritual          
,substance                              
#bji   ,sect4  #if4 ,intellectualism and
 ,voluntarism                           
#baj   ,sect4  #ig4 ,freedom of the     
,will4 ,necessitarianism1 ,determinism1 
and ,indeterminism                      
#baa   ,sect4  #ih4 ,immortality4       
,survival and ,eternalism               
#bab   ,sect4  #ii4 ,the ,natural       
,science of ,psychology4 ,its ,problems 
and                  ,method            
#bac   ,sect4 #ajj4 ,psychology and     
,philosophy                             
#baf   ,sect4 #aja4 ,transition from    
,classification by ,problems to         
,classification by ,doctrines4          
,naturalism4                            

,subjectivism4 ,absolute ,idealism4     
,absolute ,realism   #bag   ,,part ,,iii
  ,,systems ,,of ,,philosophy  ,,chapter
 ,,viii4 ,,naturalism                   
#bbc    ,sect4 #ajb4 ,the ,general      
,meaning of ,materialism                
#bbc   ,sect4 #ajc4 ,corporeal ,being   
#bbd   ,sect4 #ajd4 ,corporeal          
,processes4 ,hylozoism and ,mechanism   
#bbe   ,sect4 #aje4 ,materialism and    
,physical ,science                      
#bbh   ,sect4 #ajf4 ,the ,development of
 the ,conceptions of ,physical          
,science4 ,space and ,matter            
#bbh   ,sect4 #ajg4 ,motion and its     
,cause4 ,development and ,extension of  
the                  ,conception of     
,force                                  
#bca   ,sect4 #ajh4 ,the ,development   
and ,extension of the ,conception of    
,energy                                 
#bcf   ,sect4 #aji4 ,the ,claims of     
,naturalism                             
#bci   ,sect4 #aaj4 ,the ,task of       
,naturalism                             

#bda   ,sect4 #aaa4 ,the ,origin of the 
,cosmos                                 
#bdb   ,sect4 #aab4 ,life4 ,natural     
,selection                              
#bdd   ,sect4 #aac4 ,mechanical         
,physiology                             
#bdf   ,sect4 #aad4 ,mind4 ,the         
,reduction to ,sensation                
#bdg   ,sect4 #aae4 ,automatism         
#bdh   ,sect4 #aaf4 ,radical            
,materialism4 ,mind as an ,epiphenomenon
           #bej   ,sect4 #aag4          
,knowledge4 ,positivism and ,agnosticism
                   #beb   ,sect4 #aah4  
,experimentalism                        
#bee   ,sect4 #aai4 ,naturalistic       
,epistemology not ,systematic           
#bef   ,sect4 #abj4 ,general ,ethical   
,stand-point                            
#beh   ,sect4 #aba4 ,cynicism and       
,cyrenaicism                            
#bei   ,sect4 #abb4 ,development of     
,utilitarianism4 ,evolutionary          
,conception                  of ,social 
,relations                              

#bfj   ,sect4 #abc4 ,naturalistic       
,ethics not ,systematic                 
#bfb   ,sect4 #abd4 ,naturalism as      
,antagonistic to ,religion              
#bfc   ,sect4 #abe4 ,naturalism as the  
,basis for a ,religion of ,service1     
,wonder1 and ,renunciation              
#bfe  ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,subjectivism    
#bfg    ,sect4 #abf4 ,subjectivism      
,originally ,associated with ,relativism
 and                  ,scepticism       
#bfg   ,sect4 #abg4 ,phenomenalism and  
,spiritualism                           
#bga   ,sect4 #abh4 ,phenomenalism as   
,maintained by ,berkeley4 ,the ,problem 
,inherited from ,descartes and ,locke   
#bgb   ,sect4 #abi4 ,the ,refutation of 
,material ,substance                    
#bge   ,sect4 #acj4 ,the ,application of
 the ,epistemological ,principle        
#bgg   ,sect4 #aca4 ,the ,refutation of 
a ,conceived ,corporeal ,world          
#bgh   ,sect4 #acb4 ,the ,transition to 
,spiritualism                           
#bhj   ,sect4 #acc4 ,further ,attempts  

to ,maintain ,phenomenalism             
#bha   ,sect4 #acd4 ,berkeley's         
,spiritualism4 ,immediate ,knowledge of 
the                  ,perceiver         
#bhd   ,sect4 #ace4 ,schopenhauer's     
,spiritualism1 or ,voluntarism4         
,immediate                  ,knowledge  
of the ,will                            
#bhe   ,sect4 #acf4 ,panpsychism        
#bhg   ,sect4 #acg4 ,the ,inherent      
,difficulty in ,spiritualism4 ,no       
,provision                  for         
,objective ,knowledge                   
#bhh   ,sect4 #ach4 ,schopenhauer's     
,attempt to ,universalize ,subjectivism4
                  ,mysticism            
#bij   ,sect4 #aci4 ,objective          
,spiritualism                           
#bib   ,sect4 #adj4 ,berkeley's         
,conception of ,god as ,cause1          
,goodness1 and                  ,order  
#bic   ,sect4 #ada4 ,the ,general       
,tendency of ,subjectivism to ,transcend
                  ,itself               
#big   ,sect4 #adb4 ,ethical ,theories4 

,relativism                             
#bih   ,sect4 #adc4 ,pessimism and      
,self-denial                            
#bii   ,sect4 #add4 ,the ,ethics of     
,welfare                                
#cjj   ,sect4 #ade4 ,the ,ethical       
,community                              
#cjb   ,sect4 #adf4 ,the ,religion of   
,mysticism                              
#cjc   ,sect4 #adg4 ,the ,religion of   
,individual ,cooperation with ,god      
#cjd  ,,chapter ,x4 ,,absolute ,,realism
                                        
#cjf    ,sect4 #adh4 ,the ,philosopher's
 ,task1 and the ,philosopher's ,object1 
or the ,absolute                        
#cjf   ,sect4 #adi4 ,the ,eleatic       
,conception of ,being                   
#cji   ,sect4 #aej4 ,spinoza's          
,conception of ,substance               
#caa   ,sect4 #aea4 ,spinoza's ,proof of
 ,god1 the ,infinite ,substance4 ,the   
,modes and the ,attributes              
#cab   ,sect4 #aeb4 ,the ,limits of     
,spinoza's ,argument for ,god           

#cae   ,sect4 #aec4 ,spinoza's          
,provision for the ,finite              
#cag   ,sect4 #aed4 ,transition to      
,teleological ,conceptions              
#cag   ,sect4 #aee4 ,early ,greek       
,philosophers not ,self-critical        
#cai   ,sect4 #aef4 ,curtailment of     
,philosophy in the ,age of the ,sophists
    #cai   ,sect4 #aeg4 ,socrates and   
the ,self-criticism of the ,philosopher 
#cba   ,sect4 #aeh4 ,socrates's         
,self-criticism a ,prophecy of ,truth   
#cbc   ,sect4 #aei4 ,the ,historical    
,preparation for ,plato                 
#cbd   ,sect4 #afj4 ,platonism3 ,reality
 as the ,absolute ,ideal or ,good       
#cbf   ,sect4 #afa4 ,the ,progression of
 ,experience toward ,god                
#cbi   ,sect4 #afb4 ,aristotle's        
,hierarchy of ,substances in ,relation  
to                  ,platonism          
#ccb   ,sect4 #afc4 ,the ,aristotelian  
,philosophy as a ,reconciliation of     
,platonism and ,spinozism               
#cce   ,sect4 #afd4 ,leibniz's          

,application of the ,conception of      
,development                  to the    
,problem of ,imperfection               
#ccf   ,sect4 #afe4 ,the ,problem of    
,imperfection ,remains ,unsolved        
#cch   ,sect4 #aff4 ,absolute ,realism  
in ,epistemology4 ,rationalism          
#cci   ,sect4 #afg4 ,the ,relation of   
,thought and its ,object in ,absolute   
,realism                                
#cdj   ,sect4 #afh4 ,the ,stoic and     
,spinozistic ,ethics of ,necessity      
#cdb   ,sect4 #afi4 ,the ,platonic      
,ethics of ,perfection                  
#cdd   ,sect4 #agj4 ,the ,religion of   
,fulfilment and the ,religion of        
,renunciation                           
#cdf  ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,absolute        
,,idealism                              
#cdi    ,sect4 #aga4 ,general           
,constructive ,character of ,absolute   
,idealism     #cdi   ,sect4 #agb4 ,the  
,great ,outstanding ,problems of        
,absolutism            #cea   ,sect4    
#agc4 ,the ,greek ,philosophers and the 

,problem of ,evil4 ,the                 
,task of the ,new ,absolutism           
#ceb   ,sect4 #agd4 ,the ,beginning of  
,absolute ,idealism in ,kant's ,analysis
                  of ,experience        
#ced   ,sect4 #age4 ,kant's ,principles 
,restricted to the ,experiences which   
they ,set in ,order                     
#cef   ,sect4 #agf4 ,the ,post-,kantian 
,metaphysics is a ,generalization of    
the ,cognitive and ,moral ,consciousness
 as ,analyzed                  by ,kant4
 ,the ,absolute ,spirit                 
#ceh   ,sect4 #agg4 ,fichteanism1 or the
 ,absolute ,spirit as ,moral ,activity  
#cfj   ,sect4 #agh4 ,romanticism1 or the
 ,absolute ,spirit as ,sentiment        
#cfa   ,sect4 #agi4 ,hegelianism1 or the
 ,absolute ,spirit as ,dialectic        
#cfa   ,sect4 #ahj4 ,the ,hegelian      
,philosophy of ,nature and ,history     
#cfc   ,sect4 #aha4 ,resume4 ,failure of
 ,absolute ,idealism to ,solve the      
,problem of ,evil                       
#cfe   ,sect4 #ahb4 ,the ,constructive  

,argument for ,absolute ,idealism is    
,based upon the ,subjectivistic ,theory 
of ,knowledge   #cfh   ,sect4 #ahc4 ,the
 ,principle of ,subjectivism ,extended  
to ,reason        #cga   ,sect4 #ahd4   
,emphasis on ,self-consciousness in     
,early ,christian                       
,philosophy                             
#cgb   ,sect4 #ahe4 ,descartes's        
,argument for the ,independence of the  
,thinking ,self                         
#cgd   ,sect4 #ahf4 ,empirical ,reaction
 of the ,english ,philosophers          
#cgf   ,sect4 #ahg4 ,to ,save ,exact    
,science ,kant ,makes it ,dependent on  
,mind   #cgg   ,sect4 #ahh4 ,the        
,post-,kantians ,transform ,kant's      
,mind-in-general                  into  
an ,absolute ,mind                      
#chj   ,sect4 #ahi4 ,the ,direct        
,argument4 ,the ,inference from the     
,finite                  ,mind to the   
,infinite ,mind                         
#chb   ,sect4 #aij4 ,the ,realistic     
,tendency in ,absolute ,idealism        

#che   ,sect4 #aia4 ,the ,conception of 
,self-consciousness ,central in the     
,ethics of ,absolute ,idealism4 ,kant   
#chf   ,sect4 #aib4 ,kantian ,ethics    
,supplemented through the ,conceptions  
of                  ,universal and      
,objective ,spirit                      
#chh   ,sect4 #aic4 ,the ,peculiar      
,pantheism and ,mysticism of ,absolute  
,idealism                               
#cij   ,sect4 #aid4 ,the ,religion of   
,exuberant ,spirituality                
#cic  ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,conclusion     
#cie    ,sect4 #aie4 ,liability of      
,philosophy to ,revision ,due to its    
,systematic ,character                  
#cie   ,sect4 #aif4 ,the ,one ,science  
and the ,many ,philosophies             
#cif   ,sect4 #aig4 ,progress in        
,philosophy4 ,the ,sophistication or    
,eclecticism of the ,present ,age       
#cih   ,sect4 #aih4 ,metaphysics4 ,the  
,antagonistic ,doctrines of ,naturalism 
and ,absolutism                         
#cii   ,sect4 #aii4 ,concessions from   

the ,side of ,absolutism4 ,recognition  
of ,nature4 ,the ,neo-,fichteans        
#dja   ,sect4 #bjj4 ,the ,neo-,kantians 
#djc   ,sect4 #bja4 ,recognition of the 
,individual4 ,personal ,idealism        
#djd   ,sect4 #bjb4 ,concessions from   
the ,side of ,naturalism4 ,recognition  
of                  ,fundamental        
,principles                             
#dje   ,sect4 #bjc4 ,recognition of the 
,will4 ,pragmatism                      
#djg   ,sect4 #bjd4 ,summary and        
,transition to ,epistemology            
#djh   ,sect4 #bje4 ,the ,antagonistic  
,doctrines of ,realism and ,idealism4   
,realistic ,tendency in ,empirical      
,idealism                #dji   ,sect4  
#bjf4 ,realistic ,tendency in ,absolute 
,idealism4 ,the ,conception             
of ,experience                          
#daj   ,sect4 #bjg4 ,idealistic         
,tendencies in ,realism4 ,the ,immanence
                  ,philosophy           
#dab   ,sect4 #bjh4 ,the ,interpretation
 of ,tradition as the ,basis for a ,new 

,construction                           
#dac   ,sect4 #bji4 ,the ,truth of the  
,physical ,system1 but ,failure of      
,attempt to ,reduce all ,experience to  
it              #dad   ,sect4 #baj4     
,truth of ,psychical ,relations but     
,impossibility of                       
,general ,reduction to them             
#dae   ,sect4 #baa4 ,truth of ,logical  
and ,ethical ,principles4 ,validity of  
,ideal of ,perfection1 but              
,impossibility of ,deducing             
the ,whole of ,experience from it       
#dae   ,sect4 #bab4 ,error and ,evil    
cannot be ,reduced to the ,ideal        
#dag   ,sect4 #bac4 ,collective         
,character of the ,universe as a ,whole 
#dai   ,sect4 #bad4 ,moral ,implications
 of ,such ,pluralistic ,philosophy4     
,purity of the ,good                    
#dbj   ,sect4 #bae4 ,the ,incentive to  
,goodness                               
#dbb   ,sect4 #baf4 ,the ,justification 
of ,faith                               
#dbc   ,sect4 #bag4 ,the ,worship and   

,service of ,god                        
#dbe   ,sect4 #bah4 ,the ,philosopher   
and the ,standards of the ,market-,place
   #dbe   ,sect4 #bai4 ,the ,secularism 
of the ,present ,age                    
#dbg   ,sect4 #bbj4 ,the ,value of      
,contemplation for ,life                
#dbh  ,,bibliography                    
#dca  ,,index                           
#dda     ,,part ,i  ,,approach ,,to     
,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,philosophy       
,,chapter ,i  ,,the ,,practical ,,man   
,,and ,,the ,,philosopher   ,sidenote3  
,is ,philosophy a ,merely ,academic     
,interest8  ,sect4 #a4 ,philosophy      
suffers the distinction of being        
regarded as essentially an academic     
pursuit4 ,the term philosophy1 to be    
sure1 is used in common speech to denote
 a stoical manner of accepting the      
vicissitudes of life2 but this          
conception sheds little or no light upon
 the meaning of philosophy as a branch  
of scholarship4 ,the men who write the  
books on ,epistemology or ,ontology1 are

 regarded by the average man of affairs1
 even though he may have enjoyed a      
higher education1 with little sympathy  
and less intelligence4 ,not even        
philology seems less concerned with the 
real business of life4 ,the pursuit of  
philosophy appears to be a phenomenon of
 extreme and somewhat effete culture1   
with its own peculiar traditions1       
problems1 and aims1 and with little or  
nothing to contribute to the real       
enterprises of society4 ,it is easy to  
prove to the satisfaction of the        
philosopher that such a view is         
radically mistaken4 ,but it is another  
and more serious matter to bridge over  
the very real gap that separates        
philosophy and common-sense4 ,such an   
aim is realized only when philosophy is 
seen to issue from some special interest
 that is humanly important2 or when1    
after starting in thought at a point    
where one deals with ideas and interests
 common to all1 one is led by the       
inevitableness of consistent thinking   

into the sphere of philosophy4          
,sidenote3 ,life as a ,starting-point   
for ,thought4  ,sect4 #b4 ,there is but 
one starting-point for reflection when  
all men are invited to share in it4     
,though there be a great many special   
platforms where special groups of men   
may take their stand together1 there is 
only one platform broad enough for all4 
,this universal stand-point1 or common  
platform1 is life4 ,it is our more      
definite thesis1 then1 that philosophy1 
even to its most abstruse technicality1 
is rooted in life2 and that it is       
inseparably bound up with the           
satisfaction of practical needs1 and the
 solution of practical problems4  ,every
 man knows what it is to live1 and his  
immediate experience will verify those  
features of the adventure that stand out
 conspicuously4 ,to begin with1 life is 
our birthright4 ,we did not ask for it1 
but when we grew old enough to be       
self-conscious we found ourselves in    
possession of it4 ,nor is it a gift to  

be neglected1 even if we had the will4  
,as is true of no other gift of nature1 
we must use it1 or cease to be4 ,there  
is a unique urgency about life4 ,but we 
have already implied more1 in so far as 
we have said that it must be used1 and  
have thereby referred to some form of   
movement or activity as its inseparable 
attribute4 ,to live is to find one's    
self compelled to do something4 ,to do  
something--there is another implication 
of life3 some outer expression1 some    
medium in which to register the degree  
and form of its activity4 ,such we      
recognize as the environment of life1   
the real objects among which it is      
placed2 which it may change1 or from    
which it may suffer change4 ,not only do
 we find our lives as unsolicited active
 powers1 but find1 as well1 an arena    
prescribed for their exercise4 ,that we 
shall act1 and in a certain time and    
place1 and with reference to certain    
other realities1 this is the general    
condition of things that is encountered 

when each one of us discovers life4 ,in 
short1 to live means to be compelled to 
do something under certain              
circumstances4  ,there is another very  
common aspect of life that would not at 
first glance seem worthy of mention4    
,not only does life1 as we have just    
described it1 mean opportunity1 but it  
means self-conscious opportunity4 ,the  
facts are such as we have found them to 
be1 and as each one of us has previously
 found them for himself4 ,but when we   
discover life for ourselves1 we who make
 the discovery1 and we who live1 are    
identical4 ,from that moment we both    
live1 and know that we live4 ,moreover1 
such is the essential unity of our      
natures that our living must now express
 our knowing1 and our knowing guide and 
illuminate our living4 ,consider the    
allegory of the centipede4 ,from the    
beginning of time he had manipulated his
 countless legs with exquisite          
precision4 ,men had regarded him with   
wonder and amazement4 ,but he was       

innocent of his own art1 being a        
contrivance of nature1 perfectly        
constructed to do her bidding4 ,one day 
the centipede discovered life4 ,he      
discovered himself as one who walks1 and
 the newly awakened intelligence1 first 
observing1 then foreseeing1 at length   
began to direct the process4 ,and from  
that moment the centipede1 because he   
could not remember the proper order of  
his going1 lost all his former skill1   
and became the poor clumsy victim of his
 own self-consciousness4 ,this same     
self-consciousness is the inconvenience 
and the great glory of human life4 ,we  
must stumble along as best we can1      
guided by the feeble light of our own   
little intelligence4 ,if nature starts  
us on our way1 she soon hands over the  
torch1 and bids us find the trail for   
ourselves4 ,most men are brave enough to
 regard this as the best thing of all2  
some despair on account of it4 ,in      
either case it is admittedly the true   
story of human life4 ,we must live as   

separate selves1 observing1 foreseeing1 
and planning4 ,there are two things that
 we can do about it4 ,we can repudiate  
our natures1 decline the responsibility1
 and degenerate to the level of those   
animals that never had our chance2 or we
 can leap joyously to the helm1 and with
 all the strength and wisdom in us guide
 our lives to their destination4 ,but if
 we do the former1 we shall be unable to
 forget what might have been1 and shall 
be haunted by a sense of ignominy2 and  
if we do the second1 we shall experience
 the unique happiness of fulfilment and 
self-realization4  ,life1 then1 is a    
situation that appeals to intelligent   
activity4 ,humanly speaking1 there is no
 such thing as a situation that is not  
at the same time a theory4 ,as we live  
we are all theorists4 ,whoever has any  
misgivings as to the practical value of 
theory1 let him remember that1 speaking 
generally of human life1 it is true to  
say that there is no practice that does 
not issue at length from reflection4    

,that which is the commonest experience 
of mankind is the conjunction of these  
two1 the thought and the deed4 ,and as  
surely as we are all practical          
theorists1 so surely is philosophy the  
outcome of the broadening and deepening 
of practical theory4 ,but to understand 
how the practical man becomes the       
philosopher1 we must inquire somewhat   
more carefully into the manner of his   
thought about life4  ,sidenote3 ,the    
,practical ,knowledge of ,means4  ,sect4
 #c4 ,let anyone inspect the last moment
 in his life1 and in all probability he 
will find that his mind was employed to 
discover the means to some end4 ,he was 
already bent upon some definite         
achievement1 and was thoughtful for the 
sake of selecting the economical and    
effectual way4 ,his theory made his     
practice skilful4 ,so through life his  
knowledge shows him how to work his     
will4 ,example1 experience1 and books   
have taught him the uses of nature and  
society1 and in his thoughtful living he

 is enabled to reach the goal he has set
 for the next hour1 day1 or year of his 
activity4 ,the long periods of human    
life are spent in elaborating the means 
to some unquestioned end4 ,here one     
meets the curious truth that we wake up 
in the middle of life1 already making   
headway1 and under the guidance of some 
invisible steersman4 ,when first we take
 the business of life seriously1 there  
is a considerable stock in trade in the 
shape of habits1 and inclinations to all
 sorts of things that we never          
consciously elected to pursue4 ,since we
 do not begin at the beginning1 our     
first problem is to accommodate         
ourselves to ourselves1 and our first   
deliberate acts are in fulfilment of    
plans outlined by some predecessor that 
has already spoken for us4 ,the same    
thing is true of the race of men4 ,at a 
certain stage in their development men  
found themselves engaged in all manner  
of ritual and custom1 and burdened with 
concerns that were not of their own     

choosing4 ,they were burning incense1   
keeping festivals1 and naming names1 all
 of which they must now proceed to      
justify with myth and legend1 in order  
to render intelligible to themselves the
 deliberate and self-conscious          
repetition of them4 ,even so much       
justification was left to the few1 and  
the great majority continued to seek    
that good which social usage            
countenanced and individual             
predisposition confirmed4 ,so every man 
of us acts from day to day for love's   
sake1 or wealth's sake1 or power's sake1
 or for the sake of some near and       
tangible object2 reflecting only for the
 greater efficiency of his endeavor4    
,sidenote3 ,the ,practical ,knowledge of
 the ,end or ,purpose4  ,sect4 #d4 ,but 
if this be the common manner of thinking
 about life1 it does not represent the  
whole of such thought4 ,nor does it     
follow that because it occupies us so   
much1 it is therefore correspondingly   
fundamental4 ,like the myth makers of   

old1 we all want more or less to know   
the reason of our ends4 ,here1 then1 we 
meet with a somewhat different type of  
reflection upon life1 the reflection    
that underlies the adoption of a life   
purpose4 ,it is obvious that most ends  
are selected for the sake of other ends1
 and so are virtually means4 ,thus one  
may struggle for years to secure a      
college education4 ,this definite end   
has been adopted for the sake of a      
somewhat more indefinite end of         
self-advancement1 and from it there     
issues a whole series of minor ends1    
which form a hierarchy of steps         
ascending to the highest goal of        
aspiration4 ,now upon the face of things
 we live very unsystematic lives1 and   
yet were we to examine ourselves in this
 fashion1 we should all find our lives  
to be marvels of organization4 ,their   
growth1 as we have seen1 began before we
 were conscious of it2 and we are       
commonly so absorbed in some particular 
flower or fruit that we forget the      

roots1 and the design of the whole4 ,but
 a little reflection reveals a          
remarkable unitary adjustment of parts4 
,the unity is due to the dominance of a 
group of central purposes4 ,judged from 
the stand-point of experience1 it seems 
bitter irony to say that everyone gets  
from life just what he wishes4 ,but a   
candid searching of our own hearts will 
incline us to admit that1 after all1 the
 way we go and the length we go is      
determined pretty much by the kind and  
the intensity of our secret longing4    
,that for which in the time of choice we
 are willing to sacrifice all else1 is  
the formula that defines the law of each
 individual life4 ,all this is not      
intended to mean that we have each named
 a clear and definite ideal which is our
 chosen goal4 ,on the contrary1 such a  
conception may be almost meaningless to 
some of us4 ,in general the higher the  
ideal the vaguer and less vivid is its  
presentation to our consciousness4 ,but1
 named or unnamed1 sharp or blurred1    

vivid or half-forgotten1 there may be   
found in the heart of every man that    
which of all things he wants to be1 that
 which of all deeds he wants to do4 ,if 
he has had the normal youth of dreaming1
 he has seen it1 and warmed to the      
picture of his imagination2 if he has   
been somewhat more thoughtful than the  
ordinary1 his reason has defined it1 and
 adopted it for his vocation2 if        
neither1 it has been present as an      
undertone throughout the rendering of   
his more inevitable life4 ,he will      
recognize it when it is named as the    
desire to do the will of ,god1 or to    
have as good a time as possible1 or to  
make other people as happy as possible1 
or to be equal to his responsibilities1 
or to fulfil the expectation of his     
mother1 or to be distinguished1 wealthy1
 or influential4 ,this list of ideals is
 miscellaneous1 and ethically reducible 
to more fundamental concepts1 but these 
are the terms in which men are          
ordinarily conscious of their most      

intimate purposes4 ,we must now inquire 
respecting the nature of the thought    
that determines the selection of such a 
purpose1 or justifies it when it has    
been unconsciously accepted4  ,sidenote3
 ,the ,philosophy of the ,devotee1 the  
,man of ,affairs1 and the ,voluptuary4  
,sect4 #e4 ,what is most worth while8   
,so far as human action is concerned    
this obviously depends upon what is     
possible1 upon what is expected of us by
 our own natures1 and upon what         
interests and concerns are conserved by 
the trend of events in our environment4 
,what ,i had best do1 presupposes what  
,i have the strength and the skill to   
do1 what ,i feel called upon to do1 and 
what are the great causes that are      
entitled to promotion at my hands4 ,it  
seems that practically we cannot        
separate the ideal from the real4 ,we   
may feel that the highest ideal is an   
immediate utterance of conscience1 as   
mysterious in origin as it is           
authoritative in expression4 ,we may be 

willing to defy the universe1 and       
expatriate ourselves from our natural   
and social environment1 for the sake of 
the holy law of duty4 ,such men as      
,count ,tolstoi have little to say of   
the possible1 or the expedient1 or the  
actual1 and are satisfied to stand      
almost alone against the brutal facts of
 usage and economy4 ,we all have a      
secret sense of chivalry1 that prompts1 
however ineffectually1 to a like        
devotion4 ,but that which in such moral 
purposes appears to indicate a severance
 of the ideal and the real1 is1 if we   
will but stop to consider1 only a       
severance of the ideal and the apparent4
 ,the martyr is more sure of reality    
than the adventurer4 ,he is convinced   
that though his contemporaries and his  
environment be against him2 the         
fundamental or eventual order of things 
is for him4 ,he believes in a spiritual 
world more abiding1 albeit less obvious1
 than the material world4 ,though every 
temporal event contradict him1 he lives 

in the certainty that eternity is his4  
,such an one may have found his ideal in
 the voice of ,god and ,his prophets1 or
 he may have been led to ,god as the    
justification of his irresistible ideal2
 but in either case the selection of his
 ideal is reasonable to him in so far as
 it is harmonious with the ultimate     
nature of things1 or stands for the     
promise of reality4 ,in this wise1      
thought about life expands into some    
conception of the deeper forces of the  
world1 and life itself1 in respect of   
its fundamental attachment to an ideal1 
implies some belief concerning the      
fundamental nature of its environment4  
,but lest in this account life be       
credited with too much gravity and      
import1 or it seem to be assumed that   
life is all knight-errantry1 let us turn
 to our less quixotic1 and perhaps more 
effectual1 man of affairs4 ,he works for
 his daily bread1 and for success in his
 vocation4 ,he has selected his vocation
 for its promise of return in the form  

of wealth1 comfort1 fame1 or influence4 
,he likewise performs such additional   
service to his family and his community 
as is demanded of him by public opinion 
and his own sense of responsibility4 ,he
 may have a certain contempt for the man
 who sees visions4 ,this may be his     
manner of testifying to his own         
preference for the ideal of usefulness  
and immediate efficiency4 ,but even so  
he would never for an instant admit that
 he was pursuing a merely conventional  
good4 ,he may be largely imitative in   
his standards of value1 recognizing such
 aims as are common to some time or     
race2 nevertheless none would be more   
sure than he of the truth of his ideal4 
,question him1 and he will maintain that
 his is the reasonable life under the   
conditions of human existence4 ,he may  
maintain that if there be a ,god1 he can
 best serve ,him by promoting the       
tangible welfare of himself and those   
dependent upon him4 ,he may maintain    
that1 since there is no ,god1 he must   

win such rewards as the world can give4 
,if he have something of the heroic in  
him1 he may tell you that1 since there  
is no ,god1 he will labor to the        
uttermost for his fellow-men4 ,where he 
has not solved the problem of life for  
himself1 he may believe himself to be   
obeying the insight of some one wiser   
than himself1 or of society as expressed
 in its customs and institutions4 ,but  
no man ever admitted that his life was  
purely a matter of expediency1 or that  
in his dominant ideal he was the victim 
of chance4 ,in the background of the    
busiest and most preoccupied life of    
affairs1 there dwells the conviction    
that such living is appropriate to the  
universe2 that it is called for by the  
circumstances of its origin1            
opportunities1 and destiny4  ,finally1  
the man who makes light of life has of  
all men the most transparent inner      
consciousness4 ,in him may be clearly   
observed the relation between the ideal 
and the reflection that is assumed to   

justify it4       ,a ,moment's ,halt--a 
momentary taste       ,of ,being from   
the ,well amid the ,waste--       ,and  
,lo6--the phantom ,caravan has reach'd  
,the ,nothing it set out from-- 4 4 4   
,we are no other than a moving row      
,of ,magic ,shadow-shapes that come and 
go       ,round with the ,sun-illumin'd 
,lantern held       ,in ,midnight by the
 ,master of the ,show4  ,where the      
setting of life is construed in these   
terms1 there is but one natural and     
appropriate manner of life4 ,once       
believing in the isolation and          
insignificance of life1 one is sceptical
 of all worth save such as may be tasted
 in the moment of its purchase4 ,if     
one's ideas and experiences are no      
concern of the world's1 but incidents of
 a purely local and transient interest1 
they will realize most when they realize
 an immediate gratification4 ,where one 
does not believe that he is a member of 
the universe1 and a contributor to its  
ends1 he does well to minimize the      

friction that arises from its accidental
 propinquity1 and to kindle some little 
fire of enjoyment in his own lonely     
heart4 ,this is the life of abandonment 
to pleasure1 accompanied by the         
conviction that the conditions of life  
warrant no more strenuous or heroic     
plan4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,adoption of     
,purposes and the ,philosophy of ,life4 
,sect4 #f4 ,in such wise do we adopt the
 life purpose1 or justify it when       
unconsciously adopted4 ,the pursuit of  
an ideal implies a belief in its        
effectuality4 ,such a belief will       
invariably appear when the groundwork of
 the daily living is laid bare by a     
little reflection4 ,and if our analysis 
has not been in error1 there is         
something more definite to be obtained  
from it4 ,we all believe in the         
practical wisdom of our fundamental     
ideals2 but we believe1 besides1 that   
such wisdom involves the sanction of the
 universe as a whole4 ,the momentousness
 of an individual's life will be        

satisfied with nothing less final than  
an absolutely wise disposition of it4   
,for every individual1 his life is all  
his power and riches1 and is not to be  
spent save for the greatest good that he
 can reasonably pursue4 ,but the        
solution of such a problem is not to be 
obtained short of a searching of entire 
reality4 ,every life will represent more
 or less of such wisdom and             
enlightenment2 and in the end the best  
selection of ideal will denote the      
greatest wealth of experience4 ,it is   
not always true that he who has seen    
more will live more wisely1 for in an   
individual case instinct or authority   
may be better sources of aspiration than
 experience4 ,but we trust instinct and 
authority because we believe them to    
represent a comprehensive experience on 
the part of the race as a whole1 or on  
the part of ,god4 ,he whose knowledge is
 broadest and truest would know best    
what is finally worth living for4 ,on   
this account1 most men can see no more  

reasonable plan of life than obedience  
to ,god's will1 for ,god in the         
abundance of his wisdom1 and since all  
eternity is plain before him1 must see  
with certainty that which is supremely  
worthy4  ,we mean1 then1 that the       
selection of our ideals shall be        
determined by the largest possible      
knowledge of the facts pertaining to    
life4 ,we mean to select as one would   
select who knew all about the           
antecedents and surroundings and remote 
consequences of life4 ,in our own       
weakness and finitude we may go but a   
little way in the direction of such an  
insight1 and may prefer to accept the   
judgment of tradition or authority1 but 
we recognize a distinct type of         
knowledge as alone worthy to justify an 
individual's adoption of an ideal4 ,that
 type of knowledge is the knowledge that
 comprehends the universe in its        
totality4 ,such knowledge does not      
involve completeness of information     
respecting all parts of reality4 ,this1 

humanly speaking1 is both unattainable  
and inconceivable4 ,it involves rather a
 conception of the kind of reality that 
is fundamental4 ,for a wise purpose it  
is unnecessary that we should know many 
matters of fact1 or even specific laws1 
provided we are convinced of the inner  
and essential character of the universe4
 ,some of the alternatives are matters  
of every-day thought and speech4 ,one   
cannot tell the simplest story of human 
life without disclosing them4 ,to live  
the human life means to pursue ideals1  
that is1 to have a thing in mind1 and   
then to try to accomplish it4 ,here is  
one kind of reality and power4 ,the     
planetary system1 on the other hand1    
does not pursue ideals1 but moves       
unconscious of itself1 with a mechanical
 precision that can be expressed in a   
mathematical formula2 and is            
representative of another kind of       
reality and power4 ,hence a very common 
and a very practical question3 ,is there
 an underlying law1 like the law of     

gravitation1 fundamentally and          
permanently governing life1 in spite of 
its apparent direction by ideal and     
aspiration8 ,or is there an underlying  
power1 like purpose1 fundamentally and  
permanently governing the planetary     
system and all celestial worlds1 in     
spite of the apparent control of blind  
and irresistible forces8 ,this is a     
practical question because nothing could
 be more pertinent to our choice of     
ideals4 ,nothing could make more        
difference to life than a belief in the 
life or lifelessness of its environment4
 ,the faiths that generate or confirm   
our ideals always refer to this great   
issue4 ,and this is but one1 albeit the 
most profound1 of the many issues that  
arise from the desire to obtain some    
conviction of the inner and essential   
character of life4 ,though so intimately
 connected with practical concerns1     
these issues are primarily the business 
of thought4 ,in grappling with them1    
thought is called upon for its greatest 

comprehensiveness1 penetration1 and     
self-consistency4 ,by the necessity of  
concentration1 thought is sometimes led 
to forget its origin and the source of  
its problems4 ,but in naming itself     
philosophy1 thought has only recognized 
the definiteness and earnestness of its 
largest task4 ,philosophy is still      
thought about life1 representing but the
 deepening and broadening of the common 
practical thoughtfulness4  ,we who began
 together at the starting-point of life1
 have now entered together the haven of 
philosophy4 ,it is not a final haven1   
but only the point of departure for the 
field of philosophy proper4             
,nevertheless that field is now in the  
plain view of the man who occupies the  
practical stand-point4 ,he must         
recognize in philosophy a kind of       
reflection that differs only in extent  
and persistence from the reflection that
 guides and justifies his life4 ,he may 
not consciously identify himself with   
any one of the three general groups     

which have been characterized4 ,but if  
he is neither an idealist1 nor a        
philistine1 nor a pleasure lover1 surely
 he is compounded of such elements1 and 
does not escape their implications4 ,he 
desires something most of all1 even     
though his highest ideal be only an     
inference from the gradation of his     
immediate purposes4 ,this highest ideal 
represents what he conceives to be the  
greatest worth or value attainable in   
the universe1 and its adoption is based 
upon the largest generalization that he 
can make or borrow4 ,the complete       
justification of his ideal would involve
 a true knowledge of the essential      
character of the universe4 ,for such    
knowledge he substitutes either         
authority or his own imperfect insight4 
,but in either case his life is         
naturally and organically correlated    
with a thought about the universe in its
 totality1 or in its deepest and        
essential character4 ,such thought1 the 
activity and its results1 is philosophy4

 ,hence he who lives is1 ipso facto1 a  
philosopher4 ,he is not only a potential
 philosopher1 but a partial philosopher4
 ,he has already begun to be a          
philosopher4 ,between the fitful or     
prudential thinking of some little man  
of affairs1 and the sustained thought of
 the devoted lover of truth1 there is   
indeed a long journey1 but it is a      
straight journey along the same road4   
,philosophy is neither accidental nor   
supernatural1 but inevitable and normal4
 ,philosophy is not properly a vocation1
 but the ground and inspiration of all  
vocations4 ,in the hands of its devotees
 it grows technical and complex1 as do  
all efforts of thought1 and to pursue   
philosophy bravely and faithfully is to 
encounter obstacles and labyrinths      
innumerable4 ,the general problem of    
philosophy is mother of a whole brood of
 problems1 little and great4 ,but       
whether we be numbered among its        
devotees1 or their beneficiaries1 an    
equal significance attaches to the truth

 that philosophy is continuous with     
life4     ,,chapter ,,ii  ,,poetry ,,and
 ,,philosophy   ,sidenote3 ,who is the  
,philosopher-,poet8  ,sect4 #g4 ,as the 
ultimate criticism of all human         
interests1 philosophy may be approached 
by avenues as various as these          
interests4 ,only when philosophy is     
discovered as the implication of        
well-recognized special interests1 is   
the significance of its function fully  
appreciated4 ,for the sake of such a    
further understanding of philosophy1    
those who find either inspiration or    
entertainment in poetry are invited in  
the present chapter to consider certain 
of the relations between poetry and     
philosophy4  ,we must at the very outset
 decline to accept unqualifiedly the    
poet's opinion in the matter1 for he    
would not think it presumptuous to      
incorporate philosophy in poetry4 ,no   
man1 said ,coleridge1 was ever yet a    
great poet without being at the same    
time a great philosopher4 ,this would   

seem to mean that a great poet is a     
great philosopher1 and more too4 ,we    
shall do better to begin with the       
prosaic and matter of fact minimum of   
truth3 some poetry is philosophical4    
,this will enable us to search for the  
portion of philosophy that is in some   
poetry1 without finally defining their  
respective boundaries4 ,it may be that  
all true poetry is philosophical1 as it 
may be that all true philosophy is      
poetical2 but it is much more certain   
that much actual poetry is far from     
philosophical1 and that most actual     
philosophy was not conceived or written 
by a poet4 ,the mere poet and the mere  
philosopher must be tolerated1 if it be 
only for the purpose of shedding light  
upon the philosopher-poet and the       
poet-philosopher4 ,and it is to the     
philosopher-poet that we turn1 in the   
hope that under the genial spell of     
poetry we may be brought with           
understanding to the more forbidding    
land of philosophy4  ,sidenote3 ,poetry 

as ,appreciation4  ,sect4 #h4 ,poetry is
 well characterized1 though not defined1
 as an interpretation of life4 ,the term
 life here signifies the human purposive
 consciousness1 and active pursuit of   
ends4 ,an interpretation of life is1    
then1 a selection and account of such   
values in human experience as are       
actually sought or are worth the        
seeking4 ,for the poet all things are   
good or bad1 and never only matters of  
fact4 ,he is neither an annalist nor a  
statistician1 and is even an observer   
only for the sake of a higher design4   
,he is one who appreciates1 and         
expresses his appreciation so fittingly 
that it becomes a kind of truth1 and a  
permanently communicable object4 ,that  
unbodied joy1 the skylark's song and    
flight1 is through the genius of        
,shelley so faithfully embodied1 that it
 may enter as a definite joy into the   
lives of countless human beings4 ,the   
sensuous or suggestive values of nature 
are caught by the poet's quick feeling  

for beauty1 and fixed by his creative   
activity4 ,or with his ready sympathy he
 may perceive the value of some human   
ideal or mastering passion1 and make it 
a reality for our common feeling4 ,where
 the poet has to do with the base and   
hateful1 his attitude is still          
appreciative4 ,the evil is apprehended  
as part of a dramatic whole having      
positive moral or aesthetic value4      
,moral ideas may appear in both poetry  
and life as the inspiration and         
justification of struggle4 ,where there 
is no conception of its moral           
significance1 the repulsive possesses   
for the poet's consciousness the        
aesthetic value of diversity and        
contrast4 ,even where the evil and ugly 
is isolated1 as in certain of           
,browning's dramatic monologues1 it     
forms1 both for the poet and the reader1
 but a part of some larger perception of
 life or character1 which is sublime or 
beautiful or good4 ,poetry involves1    
then1 the discovery and presentation of 

human experiences that are satisfying   
and appealing4 ,it is a language for    
human pleasures and ideals4 ,poetry is  
without doubt a great deal more than    
this1 and only after a careful analysis 
of its peculiar language could one      
distinguish it from kindred arts2 but it
 will suffice for our purposes to       
characterize and not differentiate4     
,starting from this most general truth  
respecting poetry1 we may now look for  
that aspect of it whereby it may be a   
witness of philosophical truth4         
,sidenote3 ,sincerity in ,poetry4       
,whitman4  ,sect4 #i4 ,for the answer to
 our question1 we must turn to an       
examination of the intellectual elements
 of poetry4 ,in the first place1 the    
common demand that the poet shall be    
accurate in his representations is      
suggestive of an indispensable          
intellectual factor in his genius4 ,as  
we have seen1 he is not to reproduce    
nature1 but the human appreciative      
experience of nature4 ,nevertheless1 he 

must even here be true to his object4   
,his art involves his ability to express
 genuinely and sincerely what he himself
 experiences in the presence of nature1 
or what he can catch of the inner lives 
of others by virtue of his intelligent  
sympathy4 ,no amount of emotion or even 
of imagination will profit a poet1      
unless he can render a true account of  
them4 ,to be sure1 he need not define1  
or even explain2 for it is his function 
to transfer the immediate qualities of  
experience3 but he must be able to speak
 the truth1 and1 in order to speak it1  
he must have known it4 ,in all this1    
however1 we have made no demand that the
 poet should see more than one thing at 
a time4 ,sincerity of expression does   
not require what is distinctly another  
mode of intelligence1 comprehensiveness 
of view4 ,it is easier1 and accordingly 
more usual1 to render an account of the 
moments and casual units of experience1 
than of its totality4 ,there are poets1 
little and great1 who possess the       

intellectual virtue of sincerity1       
without the intellectual power of       
synthesis and reconciliation4 ,this     
distinction will enable us to separate  
the intelligence exhibited in all       
poetry1 from that distinct form of      
intelligence exhibited in such poetry as
 is properly to be called philosophical4
  ,the barbarian in poetry has recently 
been defined as the man who regards his 
passions as their own excuse for being2 
who does not domesticate them either by 
understanding their cause or by         
conceiving their ideal goal4#bh3a ,one  
will readily appreciate the application 
of this definition to ,walt ,whitman4   
,what little unity there is in this     
poet's world1 is the composition of a   
purely sensuous experience1       ,the  
earth expending right hand and left     
hand1       ,the picture alive1 every   
part in its best light1       ,the music
 falling in where it is wanted1 and     
stopping where           it is not      
wanted4  ,in many passages ,whitman     

manifests a marvellous ability to       
discover and communicate a fresh        
gladness about the commonest            
experiences4 ,we cannot but rejoice with
 him in all sights and sounds4 ,but     
though we cannot deny him truth1 his    
truth is honesty and not understanding4 
,the experiences in which he discovers  
so much worth1 are random and           
capricious1 and do not constitute a     
universe4 ,to the solution of ultimate  
questions he contributes a sense of     
mystery1 and the conviction       ,that 
you are here--that life exists and      
identity1       ,that the powerful play 
goes on1 and you may contribute a verse4
  ,his world is justly described by the 
writer just quoted as a phantasmagoria  
of continuous visions1 vivid1           
impressive1 but monotonous and hard to  
distinguish in memory1 like the waves of
 the sea or the decorations of some     
barbarous temple1 sublime only by the   
infinite aggregation of parts4#cj3b  ,as
 is ,walt ,whitman1 so are many poets   

greater and less4 ,some who have seen   
the world-view1 exhibit the same        
particularism in their lyric moods2     
although1 generally speaking1 a poet who
 once has comprehended the world1 will  
see the parts of it in the light of that
 wisdom4 ,but ,walt ,whitman is         
peculiarly representative of the poetry 
that can be true1 without being wise in 
the manner that we shall come shortly to
 understand as the manner of philosophy4
 ,he is as desultory in his poet        
raptures as is the common man when he   
lives in his immediate experiences4 ,the
 truth won by each is the clear vision  
of one thing1 or of a limited collection
 of things1 and not the broad inclusive 
vision of all things4  ,sidenote3       
,constructive ,knowledge in ,poetry4    
,shakespeare4  ,sect4 #aj4 ,the         
transition from ,whitman to ,shakespeare
 may seem somewhat abrupt1 but the very 
differences between these poets serve to
 mark out an interesting affinity4      
,neither has put any unitary            

construction upon human life and its    
environment4 ,neither1 as poet1 is the  
witness of any world-view2 which will   
mean for us that neither is a           
philosopher-poet4 ,as respects          
,shakespeare1 this is a hard saying4 ,we
 are accustomed to the critical judgment
 that finds in the ,shakespearian dramas
 an apprehension of the universal in    
human life4 ,but though this judgment is
 true1 it is by no means conclusive as  
respects ,shakespeare's relation to the 
philosophical type of thought4 ,for     
there can be universality without       
philosophy4 ,thus1 to know the groups   
and the marks of the vertebrates is to  
know a truth which possesses generality1
 in contradistinction to the            
particularism of ,whitman's poetic      
consciousness4 ,even so to know well the
 groups and marks of human character1   
vertebrate and invertebrate1 is to know 
that of which the average man1 in his   
hand to hand struggle with life1 is     
ignorant4 ,such a wisdom ,shakespeare   

possessed to a unique degree1 and it    
enabled him to reconstruct human life4  
,he did not merely perceive human states
 and motives1 but he understood human   
nature so well that he could create     
consistent men and women4 ,moreover1    
,shakespeare's knowledge was not only   
thus universal in being a knowledge of  
general groups and laws1 but also in    
respect of its extensity4 ,his          
understanding was as rich as it was     
acute4 ,it is true1 then1 that          
,shakespeare read human life as an open 
book1 knowing certainly the manner of   
human thinking and feeling1 and the     
power and interplay of human motives4   
,but it is equally true1 on the other   
hand1 that he possessed no unitary      
conception of the meaning and larger    
relations of human life4 ,such a        
conception might have been expressed    
either by means of the outlook of some  
dominating and persistent type of       
personality1 or by a pervading          
suggestion of some constant             

world-setting for the variable          
enterprise of mankind4 ,it could appear 
only provided the poet's appreciation of
 life in detail were determined by an   
interpretation of the meaning of life as
 a whole4 ,shakespeare apparently       
possessed no such interpretation4 ,even 
when ,hamlet is groping after some      
larger truth that may bear upon the     
definite problems of life1 he represents
 but one1 and that a strange and        
unusual1 type of human nature4 ,and     
,hamlet's reflections1 it should be     
noted1 have no outcome4 ,there is no    
,shakespearian answer to the riddles    
that ,hamlet propounds4 ,the poet's     
genius is not less amazing for this     
fact2 indeed1 his peculiar distinction  
can only be comprehended upon this      
basis4 ,shakespeare put no construction 
upon life1 and by virtue of this very   
reserve accomplished an art of          
surpassing fidelity and vividness4 ,the 
absence of philosophy in ,shakespeare1  
and the presence of the most            

characteristic quality of his genius1   
may both be imputed by the one          
affirmation1 that there is no           
,shakespearian point of view4  ,this    
truth signifies both gain and loss4 ,the
 philosophical criticism of life may    
vary from the ideal objectivity of      
absolute truth1 to the subjectivity of a
 personal religion4 ,philosophy aims to 
correct the partiality of particular    
points of view by means of a point of   
view that shall comprehend their        
relations1 and effect such              
reconciliations or transformations as   
shall enable them to constitute a       
universe4 ,philosophy always assumes the
 hypothetical view of omniscience4 ,the 
necessity of such a final criticism is  
implicit in every scientific item of    
knowledge1 and in every judgment that is
 passed upon life4 ,philosophy makes a  
distinct and peculiar contribution to   
human knowledge by its heroic effort to 
measure all knowledges and all ideals by
 the standard of totality4 ,nevertheless

 it is significant that no human        
individual can possibly possess the     
range of omniscience4 ,the most adequate
 knowledge of which any generation of   
men is capable1 will always be that     
which is conceived by the most synthetic
 and vigorously metaphysical minds2 but 
every individual philosophy will        
nevertheless be a premature synthesis4  
,the effort to complete knowledge is the
 indispensable test of the adequacy of  
prevailing conceptions1 but the         
completed knowledge of any individual   
mind will shortly become an historical  
monument4 ,it will belong primarily to  
the personal life of its creator1 as the
 articulation of his personal covenant  
with the universe4 ,there is a sound    
justification for such a conclusion of  
things in the case of the individual1   
for the conditions of human life make it
 inevitable2 but it will always possess 
a felt unity1 and many distinct         
features1 that are private and          
subjective4 ,now such a projection of   

personality1 with its coloring and its  
selection1 ,shakespeare has avoided2 and
 very largely as a consequence1 his     
dramas are a storehouse of genuine human
 nature4 ,ambition1 mercy1 hate1        
madness1 guilelessness1 conventionality1
 mirth1 bravery1 deceit1 purity--these1 
and all human states and attributes save
 piety1 are upon his pages as real1 and 
as mysterious withal1 as they are in the
 great historical society4 ,for an      
ordinary reader1 these states and       
attributes are more real in ,hamlet or  
,lear than in his own direct experience1
 because in ,hamlet and ,lear he can see
 them with the eye and intelligence of  
genius4 ,but ,shakespeare is the world  
all over again1 and there is loss as    
well as gain in such realism4 ,here is  
human life1 no doubt1 and a brilliant   
pageantry it is2 but human life as      
varied and as problematic as it is in   
the living4 ,shakespeare's fundamental  
intellectual resource is the historical 
and psychological knowledge of such     

principles as govern the construction of
 human natures4 ,the goods for which men
 undertake1 and live or die1 are any    
goods1 justified only by the actual     
human striving for them4 ,the virtues   
are the old winning virtues of the      
secular life1 and the heroisms of the   
common conscience4 ,beyond its empirical
 generality1 his knowledge is universal 
only in the sense that space and time   
are universal4 ,his consciousness       
contains its representative creations1  
and expresses them unspoiled by any     
transforming thought4 ,his poetic       
consciousness is like the very stage to 
which he likens all the world3 men and  
women meet there1 and things happen     
there4 ,the stage itself creates no     
unity save the occasion and the place4  
,shakespeare's consciousness is         
universal because it is a fair field    
with no favors4 ,but even so it is      
particular1 because1 though each may    
enter and depart in peace1 when all     
enter together there is anarchy and a   

babel of voices4 ,all ,shakespeare is   
like all the world seen through the eyes
 of each of its inhabitants4 ,human     
experience in ,shakespeare is human     
experience as everyone feels it1 as     
comprehensive as the aggregate of       
innumerable lives4 ,but human experience
 in philosophy is the experience of all 
as thought by a synthetic mind4 ,hence  
the wealth of life depicted by          
,shakespeare serves only to point out   
the philosopher's problem1 and to       
challenge his powers4 ,here he will find
 material1 and not results2 much to     
philosophize about1 but no philosophy4  
,sidenote3 ,philosophy in ,poetry4 ,the 
,world-,view4 ,omar ,khayyam4  ,sect4   
#aa4 ,the discussion up to this point   
has attributed to poetry very definite  
intellectual factors that nevertheless  
do not constitute philosophy4 ,walt     
,whitman speaks his feeling with truth1 
but in general manifests no             
comprehensive insight4 ,shakespeare has 
not only sincerity of expression but an 

understanding mind4 ,he has a knowledge 
not only of particular experiences1 but 
of human nature2 and a consciousness    
full and varied like society itself4    
,but there is a kind of knowledge       
possessed by neither1 the knowledge     
sought by coordinating all aspects of   
human experience1 both particular and   
general4 ,not even ,shakespeare is wise 
as one who1 having seen the whole1 can  
fundamentally interpret a part4 ,but    
though the philosopher-poet may not yet 
be found1 we cannot longer be ignorant  
of his nature4 ,he will be1 like all    
poets1 one who appreciates experiences  
or finds things good1 and he will       
faithfully reproduce the values which he
 discovers4 ,but he must justify himself
 in view of the fundamental nature of   
the universe4 ,the values which he      
apprehends must be harmonious1 and so   
far above the plurality of goods as to  
transcend and unify them4 ,the          
philosopher-poet will find reality as a 
whole to be something that accredits the

 order of values in his inner life4 ,he 
will not only find certain things to be 
most worthy objects of action or        
contemplation1 but he will see why they 
are worthy1 because he will have        
construed the judgment of the universe  
in their favor4  ,in this general sense1
 ,omar ,khayyam is a philosopher-poet4  
,to be sure his universe is quite the   
opposite of that which most poets       
conceive1 and is perhaps profoundly     
antagonistic to the very spirit of      
poetry2 but it is none the less true    
that the joys to which ,omar invites us 
are such as his universe prescribes for 
human life4       ,some for the ,glories
 of ,this ,world2 and some       ,sigh  
for the ,prophet's ,paradise to come2   
,ah1 take the ,cash1 and let the ,credit
 go1       ,nor heed the rumble of a    
distant ,drum4  ,herein is both poetry  
and philosophy1 albeit but a poor brand 
of each4 ,we are invited to occupy      
ourselves only with spiritual cash1     
because the universe is spiritually     

insolvent4 ,the immediately gratifying  
feelings are the only feelings that the 
world can guarantee4 ,omar ,khayyam is a
 philosopher-poet1 because his immediate
 delight in youth's sweet-scented       
manuscript is part of a consciousness   
that vaguely sees1 though it cannot     
grasp1 this sorry scheme of things      
entire4       ,drink for you know not   
whence you come1 nor why2       ,drink  
for you know not why you go1 nor where4 
,sidenote3 ,wordsworth4  ,sect4 #ab4    
,but the poet in his world-view         
ordinarily sees other than darkness4    
,the same innate spiritual enterprise   
that sustains religious faith leads the 
poet more often to find the universe    
positively congenial to his ideals1 and 
to ideals in general4 ,he interprets    
human experience in the light of the    
spirituality of all the world4 ,it is to
 ,wordsworth that we of the present age 
are chiefly indebted for such imagery1  
and it will profit us to consider       
somewhat carefully the philosophical    

quality of his poetry4  ,walter ,pater1 
in introducing his appreciation of      
,wordsworth1 writes that an intimate    
consciousness of the expression of      
natural things1 which weighs1 listens1  
penetrates1 where the earlier mind      
passed roughly by1 is a large element in
 the complexion of modern poetry4 ,we   
recognize at once the truth of this     
characterization as applied to          
,wordsworth4 ,but there is something    
more distinguished about this poet's    
sensibility even than its extreme       
fineness and delicacy2 a quality that is
 suggested1 though not made explicit1 by
 ,shelley's allusion to ,wordsworth's   
experience as a sort of thought in      
sense4 ,nature possessed for him not    
merely enjoyable and describable        
characters of great variety and         
minuteness1 but an immediately          
apprehended unity and meaning4 ,it would
 be a great mistake to construe this    
meaning in sense as analogous to the    
crude symbolism of the educator         

,froebel1 to whom1 as he said1 the world
 of crystals proclaimed1 in distinct and
 univocal terms1 the laws of human life4
 ,wordsworth did not attach ideas to    
sense1 but regarded sense itself as a   
communication of truth4 ,we readily call
 to mind his unique capacity for        
apprehending the characteristic flavor  
of a certain place in a certain moment  
of time1 the individuality of a         
situation4 ,now in such moments he felt 
that he was receiving intelligences1    
none the less direct and significant for
 their inarticulate form4 ,like the boy 
on ,windermere1 whom he himself         
describes1                              
while he hung      ,loitering1 a gentle 
shock of mild surprise      ,has carried
 far into his heart the voice      ,of  
mountain torrents2 or the visible scene 
,would enter unawares into his mind1    
,with all its solemn imagery1 its rocks1
      ,its woods1 and that uncertain    
heaven received      ,into the bosom of 
the steady lake4  ,for our purpose it is

 essential that we should recognize in  
this appreciation of nature1 expressed  
in almost every poem that ,wordsworth   
wrote1 a consciousness respecting the   
fundamental nature of the world4        
,conversation1 as we know1 denotes an   
interchange of commensurable meanings4  
,whatever the code may be1 whether words
 or the most subtle form of suggestion1 
communication is impossible without     
community of nature4 ,hence1 in         
believing himself to be holding converse
 with the so-called physical world1     
,wordsworth conceives that world as     
fundamentally like himself4 ,he finds   
the most profound thing in all the world
 to be the universal spiritual life4 ,in
 nature this life manifests itself most 
directly1 clothed in its own proper     
dignity and peace4 ,but it may be       
discovered in the humanity that is most 
close to nature1 in the avocations of   
plain and simple people1 and the        
unsophisticated delights of children2   
and1 with the perspective of            

contemplation1 even among the multitudes
 of that huge city4  ,so ,wordsworth is 
rendering a true account of his own     
experience of reality when1 as in ,the  
,prelude1 he says unequivocally3        
,a gracious spirit o'er this earth      
presides1       ,and in the heart of    
man2 invisibly       ,it comes to works 
of unreproved delight1       ,and       
tendency benign2 directing those        
,who care not1 know not1 think not1 what
 they do4  ,wordsworth is not a         
philosopher-poet because by searching   
his pages we can find an explicit       
philosophical creed such as this1 but   
because all the joys of which his       
poet-soul compels him to sing have their
 peculiar note1 and compose their       
peculiar harmony1 by virtue of such an  
indwelling consciousness4 ,here is one  
who is a philosopher in and through his 
poetry4 ,he is a philosopher in so far  
as the detail of his appreciation finds 
fundamental justification in a          
world-view4 ,from the immanence of the  

universal heart there follows1 not      
through any mediate reasoning1 but by   
the immediate experience of its         
propriety1 a conception of that which is
 of supreme worth in life4 ,the highest 
and best of which life is capable is    
contemplation1 or the consciousness of  
the universal indwelling of ,god4 ,of   
those who fail to live thus fittingly in
 the midst of the divine life1 ,walter  
,pater speaks for ,wordsworth as        
follows3       ,to higher or lower ends 
they move too often with something of   
a sad countenance1 with hurried and     
ignoble gait1 becoming1                 
unconsciously1 something like thorns1 in
 their anxiety to bear      grapes2 it  
being possible for people1 in the       
pursuit of even      great ends1 to     
become themselves thin and impoverished 
in      spirit and temper1 thus         
diminishing the sum of perfection in    
the world at its very sources4#db3c     
,the quiet and worshipful spirit1 won by
 the cultivation of the emotions        

appropriate to the presence of nature   
and society1 is the mark of the         
completest life and the most acceptable 
service4 ,thus for ,wordsworth the      
meaning of life is inseparable from the 
meaning of the universe4 ,in            
apprehending that which is good and     
beautiful in human experience1 he was   
attended by a vision of the totality of 
things4 ,herein he has had to do1 if not
 with the form1 at any rate with the    
very substance of philosophy4           
,sidenote3 ,dante4  ,sect4 #ac4         
,unquestionably the supreme             
philosopher-poet is ,dante4 ,he is not  
only philosophical in the temper of his 
mind1 but his greatest poem is the      
incarnation of a definite system of     
philosophy1 the most definite that the  
world has seen4 ,that conception of the 
world which in the thirteenth century   
found argumentative and orderly         
expression in the ,summa ,theologiae of 
,thomas of ,aquino1 and constituted the 
faith of the church1 is visualized by   

,dante1 and made the basis of an        
interpretation of life4  ,the ,divina   
,commedia deals with all the heavens to 
the ,empyrean itself1 and with all      
spiritual life to the very presence of  
,god4 ,it derives its imagery from the  
cosmology of the day1 its dramatic      
motive from the ,christian and ,greek   
conceptions of ,god and his dealings    
with the world4 ,sin is punished because
 of the justice of ,god2 knowledge1     
virtue1 and faith lead1 through ,god's  
grace and mercy manifested in ,christ1  
to a perpetual union with ,him4 ,hell1  
purgatory1 and paradise give place and  
setting to the events of the drama4 ,but
 the deeper meaning of the poem is      
allegorical4 ,in a letter quoted by     
,lowell1 ,dante writes3       ,the      
literal subject of the whole work is the
 state of the      soul after death1    
simply considered4 ,but if the work be  
taken      allegorically the subject is 
man1 as by merit or demerit1            
through freedom of the will1 he renders 

himself liable to the      reward or    
punishment of justice4#dc3d  ,in other  
words1 the inner and essential meaning  
of the poem has to do not with external 
retribution1 but with character1 and the
 laws which determine its own proper    
ruin or perfection4 ,the punishments    
described in the ,inferno are accounts  
of the state of guilt itself1           
implications of the will that has chosen
 the part of brutishness4 ,sin itself is
 damnable and deadening1 but the        
knowledge that the soul that sinneth    
shall die is the first way of           
emancipation from sin4 ,the guidance of 
,virgil through hell and purgatory      
signifies the knowledge of good and     
evil1 or moral insight1 as the guide of 
man through this life of struggle and   
progress4 ,the earthly paradise1 at the 
close of the ,purgatorio1 represents the
 highest state to which human character 
can attain when choice is determined by 
ordinary experience1 intelligence1 and  
understanding4 ,here man stands alone1  

endowed with an enlightened conscience4 
,here are uttered the last words of     
,virgil to ,dante1 the explorer of the  
spiritual country3       ,expect no more
 or word or sign from me4 ,free1        
upright1 and      sane is thine own free
 will1 and it would be wrong not to act 
according to its pleasure2 wherefore    
thee over thyself ,i crown      and     
mitre4#dd3e  ,but moral self-reliance is
 not the last word4 ,as ,beatrice1 the  
image of tenderness and holiness1 comes 
to ,dante in the earthly paradise1 and  
leads him from the summit of purgatory  
into the heaven of heavens1 and even to 
the eternal light2 so there is added to 
the mere human1 intellectual1 and moral 
resources of the soul1 the sustaining   
power of the divine grace1 the          
illuminating power of divine truth1 and 
the transforming power of divine love4  
,through the aid of this higher wisdom1 
the journey of life becomes the way to  
,god4 ,thus the allegorical truth of the
 ,divina ,commedia is not merely an     

analysis of the moral nature of man1 but
 the revelation of a universal spiritual
 order1 manifesting itself in the moral 
evolution of the individual1 and above  
all in his ultimate community with the  
eternal goodness4       ,thou shouldst  
not1 if ,i deem aright1 wonder more at  
thy      ascent1 than at a stream if    
from a high mountain it descends      to
 the base4 ,a marvel it would be in     
thee1 if1 deprived of      hindrance1   
thou hadst sat below1 even as quiet by  
living fire      in earth would be4#de3f
  ,such1 in brief1 is ,dante's          
world-view1 so suggestive of the freer  
idealistic conceptions of later thought 
as to justify a recent characterization 
of him as one who1 accepting without a  
shadow of a doubt or hesitation all the 
constitutive ideas of mediaeval thought 
and life1 grasped them so firmly and    
gave them such luminous expression that 
the spirit in them broke away from the  
form4#df3g  ,but it must be added1 as in
 the case of ,wordsworth1 that ,dante is

 a philosopher-poet not because ,st4    
,thomas ,aquinas appears and speaks with
 authority in the ,thirteenth ,canto of 
the ,paradiso1 nor even because a       
philosophical doctrine can be           
consistently formulated from his        
writings1 but because his consciousness 
of life is informed with a sense of its 
universal bearings4 ,there is a famous  
passage in the ,twenty-second ,canto of 
the ,paradiso1 in which ,dante describes
 himself as looking down upon the earth 
from the starry heaven4       ',thou art
 so near the ultimate salvation1' began 
,beatrice1      'that thou oughtest to  
have thine eyes clear and sharp4 ,and   
therefore ere thou further enterest it1 
look back downward1      and see how    
great a world ,i have already set       
beneath thy feet1      in order that thy
 heart1 so far as it is able1 may       
present      itself joyous to the       
triumphant crowd which comes glad       
through      this round ether4' ,with my
 sight ,i returned through each and     

all the seven spheres1 and saw this     
globe such that ,i smiled      at its   
mean semblance2 and that counsel ,i     
approve as the best      which holds it 
of least account2 and he who thinks of  
other      things maybe called truly    
worthy4  ,dante's scale of values is    
that which appears from the starry      
heaven4 ,his austere piety1 his         
invincible courage1 and his             
uncompromising hatred of wrong1 are     
neither accidents of temperament nor    
blind reactions1 but compose the proper 
character of one who has both seen the  
world from ,god1 and returned to see    
,god from the world4 ,he was1 as ,lowell
 has said1 a man of genius who could    
hold heartbreak at bay for twenty years1
 and would not let himself die till he  
had done his task2 and his power was not
 obstinacy1 but a vision of the ways of 
,god4 ,he knew a truth that justified   
him in his sacrifices1 and made a great 
glory of his defeat and exile4 ,even so 
his poetry or appreciation of life is   

the expression of an inward             
contemplation of the world in its unity 
or essence4 ,it is but an elaboration of
 the piety which he attributes to the   
lesser saints of paradise1 when he has  
them say3       ,nay1 it is essential to
 this blessed existence to hold         
ourselves within the divine will1       
whereby our very wills are      made    
one4 ,so that as we are from stage to   
stage throughout      this realm1 to all
 the realm is pleasing1 as to the ,king 
who      inwills us with ,his will4 ,and
 ,his will is our peace2 it is      that
 sea whereunto is moving all that which 
,it creates and      which nature       
makes4#dg3h  ,sidenote3 ,the ,difference
 between ,poetry and ,philosophy4       
,sect4 #ad4 ,there now remains the brief
 task of distinguishing the             
philosopher-poet from the philosopher   
himself4 ,the philosopher-poet is one   
who1 having made the philosophical point
 of view his own1 expresses himself in  
the form of poetry4 ,the philosophical  

point of view is that from which the    
universe is comprehended in its         
totality4 ,the wisdom of the philosopher
 is the knowledge of each through the   
knowledge of all4 ,wherein1 then1 does  
the poet1 when possessed of such wisdom1
 differ from the philosopher proper8 ,to
 this question one can give readily     
enough the general answer1 that the     
difference lies in the mode of          
utterance4 ,furthermore1 we have already
 given some account of the peculiar     
manner of the poet4 ,he invites us to   
experience with him the beautiful and   
moving in nature and life4 ,that which  
the poet has to express1 and that which 
he aims to arouse in others1 is an      
appreciative experience4 ,he requires   
what ,wordsworth calls an atmosphere of 
sensation in which to move his wings4   
,therefore if he is to be philosophical 
in intelligence1 and yet essentially a  
poet1 he must find his universal truth  
in immediate experience4 ,he must be one
 who1 in seeing the many1 sees the one4 

,the philosopher-poet is he who         
visualizes a fundamental interpretation 
of the world4 ,a poem1 says one poet1 is
 the very image of life expressed in its
 eternal truth4  ,the philosopher       
proper1 on the other hand1 has the      
sterner and less inviting task of       
rendering such an interpretation        
articulate to thought4 ,that which the  
poet sees1 the philosopher must define4 
,that which the poet divines1 the       
philosopher must calculate4 ,the        
philosopher must dig for that which the 
poet sees shining through4 ,as the poet 
transcends thought for the sake of      
experience1 the philosopher must        
transcend experience for the sake of    
thought4 ,as the poet sees all1 and all 
in each1 so the philosopher1 knowing    
each1 must think all consistently       
together1 and then know each again4 ,it 
is the part of philosophy to collect and
 criticise evidence1 to formulate and   
coordinate conceptions1 and finally to  
define in exact terms4 ,the reanimation 

of the structure of thought is          
accomplished primarily in religion1     
which is a general conception of the    
world made the basis of daily living4   
,for religion there is no subjective    
correlative less than life itself4      
,poetry is another and more             
circumscribed means of restoring thought
 to life4 ,by the poet's imagination1   
and through the art of his expression1  
thought may be sensuously perceived4 ,if
 the time should ever come1 says        
,wordsworth1 when what is now called    
,science1 thus familiarized to men1     
shall be ready to put on1 as it were1 a 
form of flesh1 and blood1 the ,poet will
 lend his divine spirit to aid the      
transfiguration1 and will welcome the   
,being thus produced1 as a dear and     
genuine inmate of the household of      
man4#ej3i ,as respects truth1 philosophy
 has an indubitable priority4 ,the very 
sternness of the philosopher's task is  
due to his supreme dedication to truth4 
,but if validity be the merit of        

philosophy1 it can well be supplemented 
by immediacy1 which is the merit of     
poetry4 ,presuppose in the poet         
conviction of a sound philosophy1 and we
 may say with ,shelley1 of his          
handiwork1 that it is the perfect and   
consummate surface and bloom of all     
things2 it is as the odor and the color 
of the rose to the texture of the       
elements which compose it1 as the form  
and splendor of unfaded beauty to the   
secrets of anatomy and corruption4      
,indeed1 as he adds1 what were our      
consolations on this side of the        
grave--and our aspirations beyond it--if
 poetry did not ascend to bring light   
and fire from those eternal regions     
where the owl-winged faculty of         
calculation dare not ever soar8#ea3aj   
,the unity in outlook1 attended by      
differences of method and form1 which   
may exist between poet and philosopher1 
is signally illustrated by the relation 
between ,goethe and ,spinoza4 ,what     
,goethe saw and felt1 ,spinoza proved   

and defined4 ,the universal and eternal 
substance was to ,spinoza1 as           
philosopher1 a theorem1 and to ,goethe1 
as poet1 a perception and an emotion4   
,goethe writes to ,jacobi that when     
philosophy lays itself out for division1
 he cannot get on with it1 but when it  
confirms our original feeling as though 
we were one with nature1 it is welcome  
to him4 ,in the same letter ,goethe     
expresses his appreciation of ,spinoza  
as the complement of his own nature3    
,his all-reconciling peace contrasted   
with my all-agitating      endeavor2 his
 intellectual method was the opposite   
counterpart      of my poetic way of    
feeling and expressing myself2 and even 
the inflexible regularity of his logical
 procedure1 which      might be         
considered ill-adapted to moral         
subjects1 made me his      most         
passionate scholar and his devoted      
adherent4 ,mind and      heart1         
understanding and sense1 were drawn     
together with an      inevitable        

elective affinity1 and this at the same 
time      produced an intimate union    
between individuals of the most         
different types4#ea3aa  ,it appears1    
then1 that some poets share with all    
philosophers that point of view from    
which the horizon line is the boundary  
of all the world4 ,poetry is not always 
or essentially philosophical1 but may be
 so2 and when the poetic imagination    
restores philosophy to immediacy1 human 
experience reaches its most exalted     
state1 excepting only religion itself1  
wherein ,god is both seen and also      
served4 ,nor is the part of philosophy  
in poetry and religion either ignoble or
 presumptuous1 for1 humanly speaking1   
the owl-winged faculty of calculation is
 the only safe and sure means of access 
to that place on high1       ,where the 
nightingale doth sing       ,not a      
senseless1 tranced thing1       ,but a  
divine melodious truth2                 
,philosophic numbers smooth2            
,tales and golden histories       ,of   

heaven and its mysteries4   ,,footnotes3
  #bh3a ,george ,santayana1 in his      
,poetry and ,religion1 p4 #agf4  #cj3b  
,santayana3 op4 cit41 p4 #ahj4  #db3c   
,appreciations1 p4 #ei4  #dc3d ,letter  
to ,can ,grande4 ,see ,lowell's ,essay  
on ,dante1 p4 #cd4  #dd3e ,purgatorio1  
,canto ,,xxvii4 ,translation by ,norton4
  #de3f ,paradiso1 ,canto ,i4  #df3g    
,edward ,caird1 in his ,literature and  
,philosophy1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bd4  #dg3h   
,paradiso1 ,canto ,,iii4  #ej3i         
,observations prefixed to the second    
edition of ,lyrical ,ballads4  #ea3aj ,a
 ,defence of ,poetry4  #ea3aa ,quoted by
 ,caird in his ,literature and          
,philosophy1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #fj4          
,,chapter ,,iii  ,,the ,,religious      
,,experience   ,sidenote3 ,the          
,possibility of ,defining ,religion4    
,sect4 #ae4 ,the least religious        
experience is so mysterious and so      
complex that a moderate degree of       
reflection upon it tends to a sense of  
intellectual impotence4 ,if ,i speak1   

says ,emerson1 ,i define and confine1   
and am less4 ,one would gladly set down 
religion among the unspeakable things   
and avoid the imputation of degrading   
it4 ,it is certain that the enterprise  
of defining religion is at present in   
disrepute4 ,it has been undertaken so   
often and so unsuccessfully that        
contemporary students for the most part 
prefer to supply a list of historical   
definitions of religion1 and let their  
variety demonstrate their futility4     
,metaphysicians and psychologists agree 
that in view of the differences of      
creed1 ritual1 organization1 conduct1   
and temperament that have been true of  
different religions in different times  
and places1 one may as well abandon the 
idea that there is a constant element4  
,but on the other hand we have the      
testimony afforded by the name religion2
 and the ordinary judgments of men to   
the effect that it signifies something  
to be religious1 and to be more or less 
religious4 ,there is an elementary      

logical principle to the effect that a  
group name implies certain common group 
characters4 ,impatience with abstract or
 euphemistic definitions should not     
blind us to the truth4 ,even the        
psychologist tends in his description of
 religious phenomena to single out and  
emphasize what he calls a typical       
religious experience4 ,and the same     
applies to the idealist's treatment of  
the matter4#ed3a ,religion1 he reasons1 
is essentially a development of which   
the true meaning can be seen only in the
 higher stages4 ,the primitive religion 
is therefore only implicit religion4    
,but lower stages cannot be regarded as 
belonging to a single development with  
higher stages1 if there be not some     
actual promise of the later in the      
earlier1 or some element which endures  
throughout4 ,it is unavoidable1 then1 to
 assume that in dealing with religion we
 are dealing with a specific and        
definable experience4  ,sidenote3 ,the  
,profitableness of ,defining ,religion4 

,sect4 #af4 ,the profitableness of      
undertaking such a definition is another
 matter4 ,it may well be that in so     
human and practical an affair as        
religion1 definition is peculiarly      
inappropriate4 ,but is there not a human
 and practical value in the very        
defining of religion8 ,is there not a   
demand for it in the peculiar relation  
that exists between religion and the    
progress of enlightenment8 ,religion    
associates itself with the habits of    
society4 ,the progress of enlightenment 
means that more or less all the time1   
and very profoundly at certain critical 
times1 society must change its habits4  
,the consequence is that religion is    
likely to be abandoned with the old     
habits4 ,the need of a new religion is  
therefore a chronic one4 ,the reformer  
in religion1 or the man who wishes to be
 both enlightened and religious1 is     
chiefly occupied with the problem of    
disentangling religion pure and         
undefiled from definite discredited     

practices and opinions4 ,and the        
solution of the problem turns upon some 
apprehension of the essence of religion4
 ,there is a large amount of necessary  
and unnecessary tragedy due to the      
extrinsic connection between ideas and  
certain modes of their expression4      
,there can be no more serious and urgent
 duty than that of expressing as        
directly1 and so as truly as possible1  
the great permanent human concerns4 ,the
 men to whom educational reform has been
 largely due have been the men who have 
remembered for their fellows what this  
whole business of education is after all
 for4 ,comenius and ,pestalozzi served  
society by stripping educational        
activity of its historical and          
institutional accessories1 and laying   
bare the genuine human need that these  
are designed to satisfy4 ,there is a    
similar virtue in the insistent attempt 
to distinguish between the essential and
 the accessory in religion4  ,sidenote3 
,the ,true ,method of ,defining         

,religion4  ,sect4 #ag4 ,although       
declining to be discouraged by the      
conspicuousness of past failures in this
 connection1 one may well profit by     
them4 ,the amazing complexity of        
religious phenomena must somehow be seen
 to be consistent with their common     
nature4 ,the religious experience must  
not only be found1 but must also be     
reconciled with the varieties of        
religious experience4 ,the inadequacy of
 the well-known definitions of religion 
may be attributed to several causes4    
,the commonest fallacy is to define     
religion in terms of a religion4 ,my    
definition of religion must include my  
brother's religion1 even though he live 
on the other side of the globe1 and my  
ancestor's religion1 in spite of his    
prehistoric remoteness4 ,error may      
easily arise through the attempt to     
define religion in terms of my own      
religion1 or what ,i conceive to be the 
true religion4 ,whatever the relation   
between ideal religion and actual       

religion1 the field of religion contains
 by common consent cults that must on   
their own grounds condemn one another2  
religions that are bad religions1 and   
yet religions4  ,a more enlightened     
fallacy1 and a more dangerous one1 is   
due to the supposition that religion can
 be defined exclusively in terms of some
 department of human nature4 ,there have
 been descriptions of religion in terms 
of feeling1 intellect1 and conduct      
respectively4 ,but it is always easy to 
overthrow such a description1 by raising
 the question of its application to     
evidently religious experiences that    
belong to some other aspect of life4    
,religion is not feeling1 because there 
are many phlegmatic1 ,god-fearing men   
whose religion consists in good works4  
,religion is not conduct1 for there are 
many mystics whose very religion is     
withdrawal from the field of action4    
,religion is not intellection1 for no   
one has ever been able to formulate a   
creed that is common to all religions4  

,yet without a doubt one must look for  
the essence of religion in human nature4
 ,the present psychological interest in 
religion has emphasized this truth4     
,how1 then1 may we describe it in terms 
of certain constant conditions of human 
life1 and yet escape the abstractness of
 the facultative method8 ,modern        
psychology suggests an answer in        
demonstrating the interdependence of    
knowledge1 feeling1 and volition4#eh3b  
,the perfect case of this unity is      
belief4 ,the believing experience is    
cognitive in intent1 but practical and  
emotional as well in content4 ,i believe
 what ,i take for granted2 and the      
object of my belief is not merely known1
 but also felt and acted upon4 ,what ,i 
believe expresses itself in my total    
experience4  ,there is some hope1 then1 
of an adequate definition of the        
religious experience1 if it be regarded 
as belonging to the psychological type  
of belief4#eh3c ,belief1 however1 is a  
broader category than religion4 ,there  

must be some religious type of          
believing4 ,an account of religion in   
terms of believing1 and the particular  
type of it here in question1 would1     
then1 constitute the central stem of a  
psychology of religion1 and affords the 
proper conceptions for a description of 
the religious experience4 ,even here the
 reservation must be made that belief is
 always more than the believing state1  
in that it means to be true4#ei3d ,hence
 to complete an account of religion one 
should consider its object1 or its      
cognitive implications4 ,but this direct
 treatment of the relation between      
religion and philosophy must be deferred
 until in the present chapter we shall  
have come to appreciate the inwardness  
of the religious consciousness4 ,to this
 end we must permit ourselves to be     
enlightened by the experience of        
religious people as viewed from within4 
,it is not our opinion of a man's       
religion that is here in question1 but  
the content and meaning which it has for

 him4       ,i would have you1 says     
,fielding1 in his ,hearts of ,men1 go   
and kneel beside the ,mahommedan as he  
prays at the sunset      hour1 and put  
your heart to his and wait for the echo 
that      will surely come4 4 4 4 ,i    
would have you go to the hillman        
smearing the stone with butter that his 
god may be pleased1 to      the woman   
crying to the forest god for her sick   
child1 to the      boy before his monks 
learning to be good4 ,no matter where   
you      go1 no matter what the faith is
 called1 if you have the      hearing   
ear1 if your heart is in unison with the
 heart of the      world1 you will hear 
always the same song4#ei3e  ,sidenote3  
,religion as ,belief4  ,sect4 #ah4 ,the 
general identification of religion with 
belief is made without serious          
difficulty4 ,the essential factor in    
belief1 is1 as we have seen1 the        
reaction of the whole personality to a  
fixed object or accepted situation4 ,a  
similar principle underlies common      

judgments about a man's religion4 ,he is
 accounted most religious whose religion
 penetrates his life most intimately4   
,in the man whose religion consists in  
the outer exercise of attendance upon   
church1 we recognize the sham4 ,he      
appears to be religious4 ,he does one of
 the things which a religious man would 
do2 but an object of religious faith is 
not the constant environment of his     
life4 ,he may or may not feel sure of   
,god from his pew1 but ,god is not among
 the things that count in his daily     
life4 ,god does not enter into his      
calculations or determine his scale of  
values4 ,again1 discursive thinking is  
regarded as an interruption of religion4
 ,when ,i am at pains to justify my     
religion1 ,i am already doubting2 and   
for common opinion doubt is identical   
with irreligion4 ,in so far as ,i am    
religious1 my religion stands in no need
 of justification1 even though ,i regard
 it as justifiable4 ,in my religious    
experience ,i am taking something for   

granted2 in other words ,i act about it 
and feel about it in a manner that is   
going to be determined by the special   
conditions of my mood and temperament4  
,the mechanical and prosaic man         
acknowledges ,god in his mechanical and 
prosaic way4 ,he believes in divine     
retribution as he believes in commercial
 or social retribution4 ,he is as       
careful to prepare for the next world as
 he is to be respectable in this4 ,the  
poet1 on the other hand1 believes in    
,god after the manner of his genius4    
,though he worship ,god in spirit he may
 conduct his life in an irregular manner
 peculiar to himself4 ,difference of    
mood in the same individual may be      
judged by the same measure4 ,when ,god  
is most real to him1 brought home to him
 most vividly1 or consciously obeyed1 in
 these moments he is most religious4    
,when1 on the other hand1 ,god is merely
 a name to him1 and church a routine1 or
 when both are forgotten in the daily   
occupations1 he is least religious4 ,his

 life on the whole is said to be        
religious in so far as periods of the   
second type are subordinated to periods 
of the first type4 ,further well-known  
elements of belief1 corollaries of the  
above1 are evidently present in         
religion4 ,a certain imagery remains    
constant throughout an individual's     
experience4 ,he comes back to it as to a
 physical object in space4 ,and although
 religion is sporadically an exclusive  
and isolated affair1 it tends strongly  
to be social4 ,the religious object1 or 
,god1 is a social object1 common to me  
and to my neighbor1 and presupposed in  
our collective undertakings4 ,this      
reduction of religion to the type of the
 believing state should thus provide us 
with an answer to that old and          
fundamental question concerning the     
relative priority of faith and works4   
,the test of the faith is in the works1 
and the works are religious in so far as
 they are the expression of the faith4  
,religion is not the doing of anything  

nor the feeling of anything nor the     
thinking of anything1 but the reacting  
as a whole1 in terms of all possible    
activities of human life1 to some       
accepted situation4  ,sidenote3         
,religion as ,belief in a ,disposition  
or ,attitude4  ,sect4 #ai4 ,we may now  
face the more interesting but difficult 
question of the special character of    
religious belief4 ,in spite of the fact 
that in these days the personality of   
,god is often regarded as a transient   
feature of religion1 that type of belief
 which throws most light upon the       
religious experience is the belief in   
persons4 ,our belief in persons consists
 in the practical recognition of a more 
or less persistent disposition toward   
ourselves4 ,the outward behavior of our 
fellow-men is construed in terms of the 
practical bearing of the attitude which 
it implies4 ,the extraordinary feature  
of such belief is the disproportion     
between its vividness and the direct    
evidence for it4 ,of this we are most   

aware in connection with those          
personalities which we regard as        
distinctly friendly or hostile to       
ourselves4 ,we are always more or less  
clearly in the presence of our friends  
and enemies4 ,their well-wishing or     
their ill-wishing haunts the scene of   
our living4 ,there is no more important 
constituent of what the psychologists   
call our general feeling tone4 ,there   
are times when we are entirely possessed
 by a state that is either exuberance in
 the presence of those who love us1 or  
awkwardness and stupidity in the        
presence of those whom we believe to    
suspect and dislike us4 ,the latter     
state may easily become chronic4 ,many  
men live permanently in the presence of 
an accusing audience4 ,the inner life   
which expresses itself in the words1    
,everybody hates me6 is perhaps the most
 common form of morbid                  
self-consciousness4 ,on the other hand1 
buoyancy of spirits springs largely from
 a constant faith in the good-will of   

one's fellows4 ,in this case one is     
filled with a sense of security1 and is 
conscious of a sympathetic reinforcement
 that adds to private joys and          
compensates for private sorrows4 ,and   
this sense of attitude is wonderfully   
discriminating4 ,we can feel the        
presence of a great man1 a formidable   
person1 a superior or inferior1 one who 
is interested or indifferent to our     
talk1 and all the subtlest degrees of   
approval and disapproval4  ,a similar   
sensibility may quicken us even in      
situations where no direct individual   
attitude to ourselves is implied4 ,we   
regard places and communities as        
congenial when we are in sympathy with  
the prevailing purposes or standards of 
value4 ,we may feel ill at ease or      
thoroughly at home in cities where we   
know no single human soul4 ,indeed1 in a
 misanthrope like ,rousseau 7and who has
 not his ,rousseau moods67 the mere     
absence of social repression arouses a  
most intoxicating sense of tunefulness  

and security4 ,nature plays the part of 
an indulgent parent who permits all     
sorts of personal liberties4       ,the 
view of a fine country1 a succession of 
agreeable      prospects1 a free air1 a 
good appetite1 and the health ,i gain   
by walking2 the freedom of inns1 and the
 distance from      everything that can 
make me recollect the dependence of my  
situation1 conspire to free my soul1 and
 give boldness to my      thoughts1     
throwing me1 in a manner1 into the      
immensity of      things1 where ,i      
combine1 choose1 and appropriate them to
 my      fancy1 without restraint or    
fear4 ,i dispose of all nature as ,i    
please4#fd3f  ,sidenote3 ,religion as   
,belief in the ,disposition of the      
,residual ,environment1 or ,universe4   
,sect4 #bj4 ,in such confidence or      
distrust1 inspired originally by the    
social environment1 and similarly       
suggested by other surroundings of life1
 we have the key to the religious       
consciousness4 ,but it is now time to   

add that in the case of religion these  
attitudes are concerned with the        
universal or supernatural rather than   
with present and normal human           
relationships4 ,religious reactions are 
total reactions4       ,to get at them1 
says ,william ,james1 you must go behind
 the      foreground of existence and   
reach down to that curious sense      of
 the whole residual cosmos as an        
everlasting presence1      intimate or  
alien1 terrible or amusing1 lovable or  
odious1      which in some degree       
everyone possesses4 ,this sense of the  
world's presence1 appealing as it does  
to our peculiar      individual         
temperament1 makes us either strenuous  
or careless1      devout or blasphemous1
 gloomy or exultant about life at large2
      and our reaction1 involuntary and 
inarticulate and often half             
unconscious as it is1 is the completest 
of all our answers to      the question1
 ',what is the character of this        
universe in which      we dwell8'#fe3g  

,this residual environment1 or          
profounder realm of tradition and       
nature1 may have any degree of unity    
from chaos to cosmos4 ,for religion its 
significance lies in the idea of        
original and far-reaching power rather  
than in the idea of totality4 ,but that 
which is at first only beyond1 is       
practically the same object as that     
which comes in the development of       
thought to be conceived as the world or 
the universe4 ,we may therefore use     
these latter terms to indicate the      
object of religion1 until the treatment 
of special instances shall define it    
more precisely4 ,religion is1 then1     
man's sense of the disposition of the   
universe to himself4 ,we shall expect to
 find1 as in the social phenomena with  
which we have just dealt1 that the      
manifestation of this sense consists in 
a general reaction appropriate to the   
disposition so attributed4 ,he will be  
fundamentally ill at ease1 profoundly   
confident1 or will habitually take      

precautions to be safe4 ,the ultimate   
nature of the world is here no          
speculative problem4 ,the savage who    
could feel some joy at living in the    
universe would be more religious than   
the sublimest dialectician4 ,it is in   
the vividness of the sense of this      
presence that the acuteness of religion 
consists4 ,i am religious in so far as  
the whole tone and temper of my living  
reflects a belief as to what the        
universe thinks of such as me4          
,sidenote3 ,examples of ,religious      
,belief4  ,sect4 #ba4 ,the examples that
 follow are selected because their      
differences in personal flavor serve to 
throw into relief their common religious
 character4 ,theodore ,parker1 in       
describing his own boyhood1 writes as   
follows3       ,i can hardly think      
without a shudder of the terrible effect
      the doctrine of eternal damnation 
had on me4 ,how many1 many      hours   
have ,i wept with terror as ,i lay on my
 bed1 till1      between praying and    

weeping1 sleep gave me repose4 ,but     
before      ,i was nine years old this  
fear went away1 and ,i saw clearer      
light in the goodness of ,god4 ,but for 
years1 say from seven      till ten1 ,i 
said my prayers with much devotion1 ,i  
think1 and      then continued to       
repeat1 ',lord1 forgive my sins1' till  
sleep      came on me4#fg3h  ,compare   
with this ,stevenson's ,christmas letter
 to his mother1 in which he says3       
,the whole necessary morality is        
kindness2 and it should      spring1 of 
itself1 from the one fundamental        
doctrine1 ,faith4      ,if you are sure 
that ,god1 in the long run1 means       
kindness by      you1 you should be     
happy2 and if happy1 surely you should  
be      kind4#fg3i  ,here is destiny    
frowning and destiny smiling1 but in    
each case so real1 so present1 as to be 
immediately responded to with helpless  
terror and with grateful                
warm-heartedness4  ,the author of the   
,imitatio ,christi speaks thus of the   

daily living of the ,christian3         
,the life of a ,christian who has       
dedicated himself to the      service of
 ,god should abound with eminent virtues
 of all      kinds1 that he may be      
really the same person which he is by   
outward appearance and profession4      
,indeed1 he ought not only      to be   
the same1 but much more1 in his inward  
disposition of      soul2 because he    
professes to serve a ,god who sees the  
inward      parts1 a searcher of the    
heart and reins1 a ,god and ,father of  
spirits3 and therefore1 since we are    
always in ,his sight1 we      should be 
exceedingly careful to avoid all        
impurity1 all that      may give offence
 to ,him whose eyes cannot behold       
iniquity4 ,we      should1 in a word1 so
 far as mortal and frail nature can1    
imitate the blessed angels in all manner
 of holiness1 since      we1 as well as 
they1 are always in ,his presence4 4 4 4
 ,and good      men have always this    
notion of the thing4 ,for they depend   

upon      ,god for the success of all   
they do1 even of their best and         
wisest undertakings4#fh3aj  ,such is to 
be the practical acknowledgment of ,god 
in the routine of life4 ,the more direct
 response to this presence appears      
abundantly in ,st4 ,augustine's         
conversation and reminiscence with ,god4
       ,how evil have not my deeds been2
 or if not my deeds my words2      or if
 not my words my will8 ,but ,thou1 ,o   
,lord1 art good and      merciful1 and  
,thy right hand had respect unto the    
profoundness      of my death1 and      
removed from the bottom of my heart that
      abyss of corruption4 ,and this was
 the result1 that ,i willed      not to 
do what ,i willed1 and willed to do what
 thou      willedst4 4 4 4 ,how sweet   
did it suddenly become to me to be      
without the delights of trifles6 ,and   
what at one time ,i      feared to lose1
 it was now a joy to me to put away4    
,for ,thou      didst cast them away    
from me1 ,thou true and highest         

sweetness4      ,thou didst cast them   
away1 and instead of them didst enter in
      ,thyself--sweeter than all        
pleasure1 though not to flesh and       
blood2 brighter than all light1 but more
 veiled than all      mysteries2 more   
exalted than all honor1 but not to the  
exalted      in their own conceits4 ,now
 was my soul free from the gnawing      
cares of seeking and getting4 4 4 4 ,and
 ,i babbled unto ,thee my               
brightness1 my riches1 and my health1   
the ,lord my ,god4#fi3aa  ,in these two 
passages we meet with religious conduct 
and with the supreme religious          
experience1 the direct worship of ,god4 
,in each case the heart of the matter is
 an individual's indubitable conviction 
of the world's favorable concern for    
him4 ,the deeper order of things        
constitutes the real and the profoundly 
congenial community in which he lives4  
,sidenote3 ,typical ,religious          
,phenomena3 ,conversion4  ,sect4 #bb4   
,let us now apply this general account  

of the religious experience to certain  
typical religious phenomena3 conversion2
 piety2 and religious instruments1      
symbolisms1 and modes of conveyance4    
,although recent study of the phenomenon
 of conversion has brought to light a   
considerable amount of interesting      
material1 there is some danger of       
misconceiving its importance4 ,the      
psychology of conversion is primarily   
the psychology of crisis or radical     
alteration1 rather than the psychology  
of religion4 ,for the majority of       
religious men and women conversion is an
 insignificant event1 and in very many  
cases it never occurs at all4 ,religion 
is more purely present where it is      
normal and monotonous4 ,but this        
phenomenon is nevertheless highly       
significant in that religion and        
irreligion are placed in close          
juxtaposition1 and the contribution of  
religion at its inception thereby       
emphasized4 ,in general it is found that
 conversion takes place during the      

period of adolescence4 ,but this is the 
time of the most sudden expansion of the
 environment of life2 a time when there 
is the awakening consciousness of many a
 new presence4 ,this is sometimes       
expressed by saying that it is a period 
of acute self-consciousness4 ,life is   
conscious of itself as over against its 
inheritance2 the whole setting of life  
sweeps into view4 ,some solution of the 
life problem1 some coming to terms with 
the universe1 is the normal issue of it4
 ,religious conversion signifies1 then1 
that in this fundamental adjustment a   
man defines and accepts for his life a  
certain attitude on the part of the     
universe4 ,the examples cited by the    
psychologists1 as well as the           
generalizations which they derive1 bear 
out this interpretation4       ,general 
,booth1 the founder of the ,salvation   
,army1 considers      that the first    
vital step in saving outcasts consists  
in      making them feel that some      
decent human being cares enough for     

them to take an interest in the question
 whether they are to      rise or       
sink4#ga3ab  ,the new state is here one 
of courage and hope stimulated by the   
glow of friendly interest4 ,the convert 
is no longer out in the cold4 ,he is    
told that the world wishes him well1 and
 this is brought home to him through    
representations of the tenderness of    
,christ1 and through the direct         
ministerings of those who mediate it4   
,but somehow the convert must be        
persuaded to realize all this4 ,he must 
believe it before it can mean anything  
to him4 ,he is therefore urged to       
pray--a proceeding that is at first     
ridiculous to him1 since it involves    
taking for granted what he disbelieves4 
,but therein lies the critical point4   
,it is peculiar to the object in this   
case that it can exist only for one who 
already believes in it4 ,the            
psychologists call this the element of  
self-surrender4 ,to be converted a man  
must somehow suffer his surroundings to 

put into him a new heart1 which may     
thereupon confirm its object4 ,such     
belief is tremendously tenacious because
 it so largely creates its own evidence4
 ,once believe that ,god1 in the long   
run1 means kindness by you1 and you are 
likely to stand by it to the end--the   
more so in this case because the        
external evidence either way is to the  
average man so insufficient4 ,such a    
belief as this is inspired in the       
convert1 not by reasoning1 but by all   
the powers of suggestion that           
personality and social contagion can    
afford4  ,sidenote3 ,piety4  ,sect4 #bc4
 ,the psychologists describe piety as a 
sense of unity4 ,one feels after reading
 their accounts that they are too       
abstract4 ,for there are many kinds of  
unity1 characteristic of widely varying 
moods and states4 ,any state of rapt    
attention is a state of unity1 and this 
occurs in the most secular and humdrum  
moments of life4 ,nor does it help      
matters to say that in the case of      

religion this unity must have been      
preceded by a state of division2 for we 
cannot properly characterize any state  
of mind in terms of another state unless
 the latter be retained in the former4  
,and that which is characteristic of the
 religious sense of unity would seem to 
be just such an overcoming of           
difference4 ,there is a recognition of  
two distinct attitudes1 which may be    
more or less in sympathy with one       
another1 but which are both present even
 in their fullest harmony4 ,were ,i to  
be taken out of myself so completely as 
to forget myself1 ,i should inevitably  
lose that sense of sympathy from which  
arises the peculiar exultation of       
religious faith1 a heightened experience
 of the same type with the freedom and  
spontaneity that ,i experience in the   
presence of those with whom ,i feel most
 in accord4 ,the further graces and     
powers of religion readily submit to a  
similar description4 ,my sense of       
positive sympathy expresses itself in an

 attitude of well-wishing2 living in an 
atmosphere of kindness ,i instinctively 
endeavor to propagate it4 ,my buoyancy  
is distinctly of that quality which to a
 lesser degree is due to any sense of   
social security2 my power is that of one
 who works in an environment that       
reenforces him4 ,i experience the       
objective or even cosmical character of 
my enterprises4 ,they have a momentum   
which makes me their instrument rather  
than their perpetrator4 ,a paradoxical  
relation between religion and morality  
has always interested observers of      
custom and history4 ,religion is        
apparently as capable of the most       
fiendish malevolence as of the most     
saintly gentleness4 ,fielding writes    
that1       ,when religion is brought   
out or into daily life and used as      
a guide or a weapon in the world it has 
no effect either for      good or evil4 
,its effect is simply in strengthening  
the heart1      in blinding the eyes1 in
 deafening the ears4 ,it is an          

intensive force1 an intoxicant4 ,it     
doubles or trebles a man's      powers4 
,it is an impulsive force sending him   
headlong down the      path of emotion1 
whether that path lead to glory or to   
infamy4      ,it is a tremendous        
stimulant1 that is all4#gd3ac  ,religion
 does not originate life purposes or    
define their meaning1 but stimulates    
them by the same means that works in all
 corporate and social activity4 ,to work
 with the universe is the most          
tremendous incentive that can appeal to 
the individual will4 ,hence in highly   
ethical religions the power for good    
exceeds that of any other social and    
spiritual agency4 ,such religion makes  
present1 actual1 and real1 that good on 
the whole which the individual otherwise
 tends to distinguish from that which is
 good for him4 ,in daily life the       
morally valid and the practically urgent
 are commonly arrayed against one       
another2 but the ethical religion makes 
the valid urgent4  ,sidenote3 ,religious

 ,instruments1 ,symbolism1 and ,modes of
 ,conveyance4  ,sect4 #bd4 ,the         
instruments of religion are legion1 and 
it is in order here only to mention     
certain prominent cases in which their  
selection would seem to have direct     
reference to the provocation and        
perpetuation of such a sense of attitude
 as we have been describing4 ,this is   
true in a general way of all symbolism4 
,there is no essential difference       
between the religious symbol and such   
symbols as serve to remind us of human  
relationships4 ,in both cases the       
perceptual absence of will is           
compensated for by the presence of some 
object associated with that will4 ,the  
function of this object is due to its   
power to revive and perpetuate a certain
 special social atmosphere4 ,but the    
most important vehicle of religion has  
always been personality4 ,it is1 after  
all1 to priests1 prophets1 and believers
 that religious cults have owed their   
long life4 ,the traits that mark the    

prophet are both curious and sublime4   
,he is most remarkable for the          
confidence with which he speaks for the 
universe4 ,whether it be due to lack of 
a sense of humor or to a profound       
conviction of truth1 is indifferent to  
our purpose4 ,the power of such men is  
undoubtedly in their suggestion of a    
force greater than they1 whose designs  
they bring directly and socially to the 
attention of men4 ,the prophet in his   
prophesying is indeed not altogether    
distinguished from ,god1 and it is      
through the mediation of a directly     
perceptible human attitude that a divine
 attitude gets itself fixed in the      
imagination of the believer4 ,what is   
true of the prophet is equally true of  
the preacher whose function it is not to
 represent ,god in his own person1 but  
to depict him with his tongue4 ,it is   
generally recognized that the preacher  
is neither a moralizer nor a theologian4
 ,but it is less perfectly understood   
that it is his function to suggest the  

presence of ,god4 ,his proper language  
is that of the imagination1 and the     
picture which he portrays is that of a  
reciprocal social relationship between  
man and the ,supreme ,master of the     
situation of life4 ,he will not define  
,god or prove ,god1 but introduce ,him  
and talk about ,him4 ,and at the same   
time the association of prayer and      
worship with his sermon1 and the        
atmosphere created by the meeting       
together of a body of disciples1 will   
act as the confirmation of his          
suggestions of such a living presence4  
,the conveyance of any single religious 
cult from generation to generation      
affords a signal illustration of the    
importance in religion of the           
recognition of attitude4 ,religions     
manage somehow to survive any amount of 
transformation of creed and ritual4 ,it 
is not what is done1 or what is thought1
 that identifies the faith of the first 
,christians with that of the last1 but a
 certain reckoning with the disposition 

of ,god4 ,the successive generations of 
,christians are introduced into the     
spiritual world of their fathers1 with  
its furnishing of hopes and fears       
remaining substantially the same2 and   
their ,christianity consists in their   
continuing to live in it with only a    
slight and gradual renovation4 ,to any  
given individual ,god is more or less   
completely represented by his elders in 
the faith in their exhortations and     
ministerings2 and through them he fixes 
as the centre of his system an image of 
,god his accuser or redeemer4           
,sidenote3 ,historical ,types of        
,religion4 ,primitive ,religions4       
,sect4 #be4 ,the complete verification  
of this interpretation of the religious 
experience would require the application
 of it to the different historical      
cults4 ,in general the examination of   
such instances is entirely beyond the   
scope of this chapter2 but a brief      
consideration may be given to those     
which seem to afford reasonable grounds 

for objection4  ,first1 it may be said  
that in primitive religions1 notably in 
fetichism1 tabooism1 and totemism1 there
 is no recognition of a cosmical unity4 
,it is quite evident that there is no   
conception of a universe4 ,but it is    
equally evident that the natural and    
historical environment in its generality
 has a very specific practical          
significance for the primitive believer4
 ,it is often said with truth that these
 earliest religions are more profoundly 
pantheistic than polytheistic4 ,man     
recognizes an all-pervading interest    
that is capable of being directed to    
himself4 ,the selection of a deity is   
not due to any special qualification for
 deification possessed by the individual
 object itself1 but to the tacit        
presumption that1 as ,thales said1 all  
things are full of gods4 ,the           
disposition of residual reality         
manifests to the believer no consistency
 or unity1 but it is nevertheless the   
most constant object of his will4 ,he   

lives in the midst of a capriciousness  
which he must appease if he is to       
establish himself at all4  ,sidenote3   
,buddhism4  ,sect4 #bf4 ,secondly1 in   
the case of ,buddhism we are said to    
meet with a religion that is essentially
 atheistic4       ,whether ,buddhas     
arise1 ,o priests1 or whether ,buddhas  
do not      arise1 it remains a fact and
 the fixed and necessary                
constitution of being1 that all its     
constituents are      transitory4#gh3ad 
,the secret of life lies in the         
application of this truth3         ,o   
builder6 ,i've discovered thee6         
,this fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild6  
,thy rafters all are broken now1        
,and pointed roof demolished lies6      
,this mind has demolition reached1      
,and seen the last of all desire6#gh3ae 
,the case of ,buddha himself and of the 
exponents of his purely esoteric        
doctrine1 belong to the reflective type 
which will presently be given special   
consideration4 ,but with the ordinary   

believer1 even where an extraneous but  
almost inevitable polytheism is least in
 evidence1 the religious experience     
consists in substantially the same      
elements that appear in theistic        
religions4 ,the individual is here      
living appropriately to the ultimate    
nature of things1 with the ceaseless    
periods of time in full view4 ,that     
which is brought home to him is the     
illusoriness and hollowness of things   
when taken in the spirit of active      
endeavor4 ,the only profound and abiding
 good is nothingness4 ,while nature and 
society conspire to mock him1 ,nirvana  
invites him to its peace4 ,the religious
 course of his life consists in the use 
of such means as can win him this end4  
,from the stand-point of the universe he
 has the sympathy only of that wisdom   
whose essence is self-destruction4 ,and 
this truth is mediated by the           
imagination of divine sympathy1 for the 
,blessed ,one remains as the perpetual  
incarnation of his own blessedness4     

,sidenote3 ,critical ,religion4  ,sect4 
#bg4 ,finally there remains the         
consideration of the bearing of this    
interpretation upon the more refined and
 disciplined religions4 ,the religion of
 the critically enlightened man is less 
naive and credulous in its imagery4 ,god
 tends to vanish into an ideal or a     
universal1 into some object of          
theoretical definition4 ,here we are on 
that borderland where an assignment of  
individual cases can never be made with 
any certainty of correctness4 ,we can   
generalize only by describing the       
conditions that such cases must fulfil  
if they are properly to be denominated  
religious4 ,and there can be no question
 of the justice of deriving such a      
description from the reports of         
historical and institutional religions4 
,an idealistic philosophy will1 then1 be
 a religion just in so far as it is     
rendered practically vivid by the       
imagination4 ,such imagination must     
create and sustain a social             

relationship4 ,the question of the      
legitimacy of this imagination is       
another matter4 ,it raises the issue    
concerning the judgment of truth implied
 in religion1 and this is the topic of  
the next chapter4 ,at any rate the      
religious experience may be realized by 
virtue of the metaphorical or poetical  
representation of a situation as one of 
intercommunication between persons1     
where reflective definition at the same 
time denies it4 ,the human worshipper   
may supply the personality of ,god from 
himself1 viewing himself as from the    
divine stand-point4 ,but whatever       
faculty supplies this indispensable     
social quality of religion1 he who      
defines ,god as the ultimate goodness or
 the ultimate truth1 has certainly not  
yet worshipped ,him4 ,he begins to be   
religious only when such an ideal       
determines the atmosphere of his daily  
living2 when he regards the immanence of
 such an ideal in nature and history as 
the object of his will2 and when he     

responds to its presence in the spirit  
of his conduct and his contemplation4   
,,footnotes3  #ed3a ,cf4 ,caird3 ,the   
,evolution of ,religion1 ,lectures ,,ii1
 ,,iii4  #eh3b ,cf4 ,leuba3             
,introduction to a ,psychological ,study
 of ,religion1 ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4  
#aie4  #eh3c ,cf4 ,leuba3 ,ibid4  #ei3d 
,cf4 ,sect4 #bi4  #ei3e ,p4 #cbb4  #fd3f
 ,rousseau3 ,confessions1 ,book ,,iv1 p4
 #abe4  #fe3g ,william ,james3 ,the     
,varieties of ,religious ,experience1 p4
 #ce4 ,the italics are mine4 ,i am in   
the present chapter under constant      
obligation to this wonderfully          
sympathetic and stimulating book4  #fg3h
 ,chadwick3 ,theodore ,parker1 p4 #ah4  
#fg3i ,stevenson3 ,letters1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4
 #bbi4  #fh3aj ,thomas a ,kempis3       
,imitation of ,christ1 ,chap4 ,,xix4    
,translation by ,stanhope1 p4 #dd4      
#fi3aa ,st4 ,augustine3 ,confessions1   
,book ,i1 ,chap4 ,i4 ,translation in    
,schaff3 ,nicene and ,post-,nicene      
,fathers1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #abi4  #ga3ab    

,james3 ,varieties of ,religious        
,experience1 p4 #bjc4  #gd3ac ,fielding3
 op4 cit41 p4 #aeb4  #gh3ad ,warren3    
,buddhism in ,translations1 p4 #ad4     
#gh3ae ,ibid41 p4 #hc4     ,,chapter    
,,iv  ,,the ,,philosophical             
,,implications ,,of ,,religion          
,sidenote3 ,resume of ,psychology of    
,religion4  ,sect4 #bh4 ,it has been    
maintained that religion is closely     
analogous to one's belief in the        
disposition toward one's self of men or 
communities4 ,in the case of religion   
this disposition is attributed to the   
more or less vaguely conceived residual 
environment that is recognized as lying 
outside of the more familiar natural and
 social relations4 ,after the rise of   
science this residual environment tends 
to be conceived as a unity which is     
ultimate or fundamental1 but for the    
religious consciousness it is more      
commonly regarded as a general source of
 influence practically worthy of        
consideration4 ,such a belief1 like all 

belief1 is vitally manifested1 with such
 emphasis upon action1 feeling1 or      
intellection as temperament and mood may
 determine4  ,sidenote3 ,religion ,means
 to be ,true4  ,sect4 #bi4 ,but if the  
psychology of belief is the proper      
starting-point for a description of the 
religious experience1 it is none the    
less suggestive of the fact that        
religion1 just because it is belief1 is 
not wholly a matter for psychology4 ,for
 religion means to be true1 and thus    
submits itself to valuation as a case of
 knowledge4 ,the psychological study of 
religion is misleading when accepted as 
a substitute for philosophical          
criticism4 ,the religious man takes his 
religion not as a narcotic1 but as an   
enlightenment4 ,its subjective worth is 
due at any rate in part to the          
supposition of its objective worth4 ,as 
in any case of insight1 that which warms
 the heart must have satisfied the mind4
 ,the religious experience purports to  
be the part of wisdom1 and to afford    

only such happiness as increasing wisdom
 would confirm4 ,and the charm of truth 
cannot survive its truthfulness4 ,hence1
 though religion may be described1 it   
cannot be justified1 from the           
stand-point of therapeutics4 ,were such 
the case it would be the real problem of
 religious leaders to find a drug       
capable of giving a constantly pleasant 
tone to their patient's experience4#hc3a
 ,there would be no difference between  
priests and physicians who make a       
specialty of nervous diseases1 except   
that the former would aim at a more     
fundamental and perpetual suggestion of 
serenity4 ,now no man wants to be even a
 blessed fool4 ,he does not want to     
dwell constantly in a fictitious world1 
even if it be after his own heart4 ,he  
may from the cynical point of view      
actually do so1 but if he be religious  
he thinks it is reality1 and is         
satisfied only in so far as he thinks   
so4 ,he regards the man who has said in 
his heart that there is no ,god as the  

fool1 and not because he may have to    
suffer for it1 but because he is        
cognitively blind to the real nature of 
things4 ,piety1 on the other hand1 he   
regards as the standard experience1 the 
most veracious life4 ,hence1 it is not  
an accident that religion has had its   
creeds and its controversies1 its wars  
with science and its appeals to         
philosophy4 ,the history of these       
affairs shows that religion commonly    
fails to understand the scope of its own
 demand for truth2 but they have issued 
from the deep conviction that one's     
religion is1 implicitly1 at least1 in   
the field of truth2 that there are      
theoretical judgments whose truth would 
justify or contradict it4  ,this general
 fact being admitted1 there remains the 
task to which the present discussion    
addresses itself1 that of defining the  
kind of theoretical judgment implied in 
religion1 and the relation to this      
central cognitive stem of its           
efflorescences of myth1 theology1 and   

ritual4 ,it is impossible to separate   
the stem and the efflorescence1 or to   
determine the precise spot at which     
destruction of the tissue would prove   
fatal to the plant1 but it is possible  
to obtain some idea of the relative     
vitality of the parts4  ,sidenote3      
,religion ,means to be ,practically     
,true4 ,god is a ,disposition from which
 ,consequences ,may ,rationally be      
,expected4  ,sect4 #cj4 ,the difficulty 
of reaching a definite statement in this
 matter is due to the fact that the     
truth in which any religious experience 
centres is a practical and not a        
scientific truth4 ,a practical truth    
does not commit itself to any single    
scientific statement1 and can often     
survive the overthrow of that scientific
 statement in which at any given time it
 has found expression4 ,in other words1 
an indefinite number of scientific      
truths are compatible with a single     
practical truth4 ,an instance of this is
 the consistency with my expectation of 

the alternation of day and night1 of    
either the ,ptolemaic or ,copernican    
formulation of the solar system4 ,now   
expectation that the sun will rise      
to-morrow is an excellent analogue of my
 religious belief4 ,celestial mechanics 
is as relevant to the one as metaphysics
 to the other4 ,neither is overthrown   
until a central practical judgment is   
discredited1 and either could remain    
true through a very considerable        
alteration of logical definition2 but   
neither is on this account exempt from  
theoretical responsibility4 ,in so far  
as religion deliberately enters the     
field of science1 and defines its       
formularies with the historical or      
metaphysical method1 this difficulty    
does not1 of course1 exist4 ,grant that 
the years of ,methuselah's life1 or the 
precise place and manner of the         
temptation of ,jesus1 or the definition 
of ,christ in the terms of the          
,athanasian ,creed1 are constitutive of 
,christianity1 and the survival of that 

religion will be determined by the      
solution of ordinary problems of        
historical or metaphysical research4    
,but the ,christian will very properly  
claim that his religion is only         
externally and accidentally related to  
such propositions1 since they are never 
or very rarely intended in his          
experience4 ,as religious he is occupied
 with ,christ as his saviour or with    
,god as his protector and judge4 ,the   
history of ,jesus or the metaphysics of 
,god essentially concern him only in so 
far as they may or may not invalidate   
this relationship4 ,he cares only for   
the power and disposition of the divine1
 and these are affected by history and  
metaphysics only in so far as he has    
definitely put them to such proof4  ,for
 my religion is my sense of a practical 
situation1 and only when that has been  
proved to be folly has my religion      
become untrue4 ,my ,god is my practical 
faith1 my plan of salvation4 ,my        
religion is overthrown if ,i am         

convinced that ,i have misconceived the 
situation and mistaken what ,i should do
 to be saved4 ,the conception of ,god is
 very simple practically1 and very      
complex theoretically1 a fact that      
confirms its practical genesis4 ,my     
conception of ,god contains an idea of  
my own interests1 an idea of the        
disposition of the universe toward my   
interests1 and some working plan for the
 reconciliation of these two terms4     
,these three elements form a practical  
unity1 but each is capable of emphasis1 
and a religion may be transformed       
through the modification of any one of  
them4 ,it appears1 then1 as has always  
been somewhat vaguely recognized1 that  
the truth of religion is ethical as well
 as metaphysical or scientific4 ,my     
religion will be altered by a change in 
my conception of what constitutes my    
real interest1 a change in my conception
 of the fundamental causes of reality1  
or a change in my conception of the     
manner in which my will may or may not  

affect these causes4 ,god is neither an 
entity nor an ideal1 but always a       
relation of entity to ideal3 reality    
regarded from the stand-point of its    
favorableness or unfavorableness to     
human life1 and prescribing for the     
latter the propriety of a certain       
attitude4  ,sidenote3 ,historical       
,examples of ,religious ,truth and      
,error4 ,the ,religion of ,baal4  ,sect4
 #ca4 ,the range of historical examples 
is limitless1 but certain of these are  
especially calculated to emphasize the  
application of a criterion to religion4 
,such is the case with ,elijah's        
encounter with the prophets of ,baal1 as
 narrated in the ,old ,testament4       
,and ,elijah came near unto all the     
people1 and said1 ,how long      halt ye
 between two opinions8 ,if ,yahweh be   
,god1 follow him3      but if ,baal1    
then follow him4 4 4 4 ,and call ye on  
the name of      your god1 and ,i will  
call on the name of ,yahweh3 and the    
,god      that answereth by fire1 let   

him be ,god4 4 4 4 ,and ,elijah said    
unto the prophets of ,baal1 ,choose you 
one bullock for      yourselves1 and    
dress it first2 for ye are many2 and    
call on      the name of your god1 but  
put no fire under4 ,and they took the   
bullock which was given them1 and they  
dressed it1 and called      on the name 
of ,baal from morning even until noon1  
saying1 ,o      ,baal1 hear us4 ,but    
there was no voice1 nor any that        
answered4 4 4 4 ,and it came to pass at 
noon1 that ,elijah      mocked them1 and
 said1 ,cry aloud3 for he is a god2     
either he      is musing1 or he is gone 
aside1 or he is in a journey1 or        
peradventure he sleepeth1 and must be   
awaked4 ,and they cried      aloud1 and 
cut themselves after their manner with  
knives and      lances1 till the blood  
gushed out upon them4 4 4 4 ,but there  
was neither voice1 nor any to answer1   
nor any that      regarded4#hh3b  ,the  
religion of the followers of ,baal here 
consists in a belief in the practical   

virtue of a mode of address and form of 
ritual associated with the traditions   
and customs of a certain social group4  
,the prophets of this cult agree to     
regard the experiment proposed by       
,elijah as a crucial test1 and that     
which is disproved from its failure is a
 plan of action4 ,these prophets relied 
upon the presence of a certain motivity1
 from which a definite response could be
 evoked by an appeal which they were    
peculiarly able to make2 but though they
 prophesied until the time of the       
offering of the evening oblation1 there 
was none that regarded4  ,sidenote3     
,greek ,religion4  ,sect4 #cb4 ,an      
equally familiar and more instructive   
example is the refutation of the ,greek 
national religion by ,lucretius4 ,the   
conception of life which ,lucretius     
finds unwarranted is best depicted in   
,homer4 ,there we hear of a society     
composed of gods and men4 ,though the   
gods1 on the one hand1 have their own   
history1 their affairs are never sharply

 sundered from those of men1 who1 on the
 other hand1 must constantly reckon with
 them1 gauge their attitude1 and seek   
their favor by paying tribute to their  
individual humors and preferences4 ,in  
the ,ninth ,book of the ,iliad1 ,phoenix
 addresses himself to the recalcitrant  
,achilles as follows3                   
,it fits not one that moves      ,the   
hearts of all1 to live unmov'd1 and     
succor hates for loves4      ,the ,gods 
themselves are flexible2 whose virtues1 
honors1 pow'rs1      ,are more than     
thine1 yet they will bend their breasts 
as we bend          ours4               
,perfumes1 benign devotions1 savors of  
offerings burn'd1      ,and holy rites1 
the engines are with which their hearts 
are turn'd1      ,by men that pray to   
them4#ij3c  ,here is a general          
recognition of that which makes         
sacrifice rational4 ,it is because he   
conceives this presupposition to be     
mistaken1 that ,lucretius declares the  
practices and fears which are founded   

upon it to be folly4 ,it is the same    
with all that is practically based upon 
the expectation of a life beyond the    
grave4 ,the correction of the popular   
religion is due in his opinion to that  
true view of the world taught by        
,epicurus1 whose memory ,lucretius thus 
invokes at the opening of the ,third    
,book of the ,de ,rerum ,natura3        
,thee1 who first wast able amid such    
thick darkness to raise      on high so 
bright a beacon and shed a light on the 
true      interests of life1 thee ,i    
follow1 glory of the ,greek race1       
and plant now my footsteps firmly fixed 
in thy imprinted      marks4 4 4 4 ,for 
soon as thy philosophy issuing from a   
godlike intellect has begun with loud   
voice1 to proclaim the      nature of   
things1 the terrors of the mind are     
dispelled1 the      walls of the world  
part asunder1 ,i see things in operation
      throughout the whole void3 the    
divinity of the gods is      revealed   
and their tranquil abodes which neither 

winds do      shake nor clouds drench   
with rains nor snow congealed by sharp  
frost harms with hoary fall3 an ever    
cloudless ether      o'ercanopies them1 
and they laugh with light shed largely  
round4 ,nature too supplies all their   
wants and nothing ever      impairs     
their peace of mind4 ,but on the other  
hand the      ,acherusian quarters#ia3d 
are nowhere to be seen1 though earth    
is no bar to all things being descried1 
which are in operation      underneath  
our feet throughout the void4#ia3e  ,in 
another passage1 after describing the   
,phrygian worship of ,cybele1 he        
comments as follows3       ,all which1  
well and beautifully as it is set forth 
and told1      is yet widely removed    
from true reason4 ,for the nature of    
gods      must ever in itself of        
necessity enjoy immortality together    
with supreme repose1 far removed and    
withdrawn from our      concerns2 since 
exempt from every pain1 exempt from all 
dangers1 strong in its own resources1   

not wanting aught of us1      it is     
neither gained by favors nor moved by   
anger4 4 4 4 ,the      earth however is 
at all time without feeling1 and because
 it      receives into it the           
first-beginnings of many things1 it     
brings them forth in many ways into the 
light of the      sun4#ia3f  ,if the    
teaching of ,epicurus be true it is     
evident that those who offered hecatombs
 with the idea that they were thereby   
mitigating anger1 or securing special   
dispensation1 were playing the fool4    
,they were appealing to a fictitious    
motivity1 one not grounded in the nature
 of things4 ,to one for whom the walls  
of the world had parted asunder1 such a 
procedure was no longer possible2 though
 he might choose to call the sea        
,neptune and reverence the earth as     
mother of the gods4#ib3g  ,sidenote3    
,judaism and ,christianity4  ,sect4 #cc4
 ,the history of religion contains no   
more impressive and dramatic chapter    
than that which records the development 

of the religion of the ,jews4 ,passing  
over its obscure beginnings in the      
primitive ,semitic cult1 we find this   
religion first clearly defined as tribal
 self-interest sanctioned by            
,yahweh4#ib3h ,god's interest in his    
chosen people determines the prosperity 
of him who practices the social virtues4
       ,the name of ,yahweh is a strong 
tower3 the righteous runneth      into  
it1 and is safe4       ,he that is      
steadfast in righteousness shall attain 
unto      life4       ,to do justice and
 judgment is more acceptable to ,yahweh 
than      sacrifice4#ic3i  ,but in time 
it is evident to the believer that his  
experience does not bear out this       
expectation4 ,neither as a ,jew nor as a
 righteous man does he prosper more than
 his neighbor4 ,he comes1 therefore1 to 
distrust the virtue of his wisdom4      
,then ,i saw that wisdom excelleth      
folly1 as far as light      excelleth   
darkness4 ,the wise man's eyes are in   
his head1 and      the fool walketh in  

darkness3 and yet ,i perceived that one 
event happeneth to them all4 ,then said 
,i in my heart1 ,as it      happeneth to
 the fool1 so will it happen even to me2
 and why      was ,i then more wise8    
,then ,i said in my heart1 that this    
also      was vanity4 ,for of the wise  
man1 even as of the fool1 there is      
no remembrance forever2 seeing that in  
the days to come all      will have been
 already forgotten4 ,and how doth the   
wise man      die even as the fool6 ,so 
,i hated life2 because the work that    
is wrought under the sun was grievous   
unto me3 for all is      vanity and a   
striving after wind4#ic3aj  ,it is      
evident that he who expects the favor of
 fortune in return for his observance of
 precept is mistaken4 ,the work that is 
wrought under the sun makes no special  
provision for him during his lifetime4  
,unless the cry of vanity is to be the  
last word there must be a               
reinterpretation of the promise of ,god4
 ,this appears in the new ideal of      

patient submission1 and the chastened   
faith that expects only the love of     
,god4 ,and those whom ,god loves ,he    
will not forsake4 ,they will come to    
their own1 if not here1 then beyond1    
according to ,his inscrutable but       
unswerving plan4       ,the sacrifices  
of ,god are a broken spirit3 a broken   
and a      contrite heart1 ,o ,god1 thou
 wilt not despise4       ,for thus saith
 the high and lofty ,one that inhabiteth
      eternity1 whose name is ,holy3 ,i 
dwell in the high and holy      place1  
with him also that is of a contrite and 
humble spirit1      to revive the spirit
 of the humble1 and to revive the heart 
of      the contrite ones4#id3aa  ,in   
this faith ,judaism merges into         
,christianity4#id3ab ,in the whole      
course of this evolution ,god is        
regarded as the friend of his people1   
but his people learn to find a new      
significance in his friendship4 ,that   
which is altered is the conduct which   
that friendship requires and the        

expectation which it determines4 ,the   
practical ideal which the relationship  
sanctions1 changes gradually from that  
of prudence to that of goodness for its 
own sake4 ,god1 once an instrument      
relevant to human temporal welfare1 has 
come to be an object of disinterested   
service4  ,no such transformation as    
this was absolutely realized during the 
period covered by the writings of the   
,old ,testament1 nor has it even yet    
been realized in the development of     
,christianity4 ,but the evolution of    
both ,judaism and ,christianity has     
taken this direction4 ,the criterion of 
this evolution is manifestly both       
ethical and metaphysical4 ,a ,christian 
avows that he rates purity of character 
above worldly prosperity1 so that the   
former cannot properly be prized for the
 sake of the latter4 ,furthermore1 he   
shares more or less unconsciously such  
philosophical and scientific opinions as
 deny truth to the conception of special
 interferences and dispensations from a 

supernatural agency4 ,therefore he looks
 for no fire from heaven to consume his 
sacrifice4 ,but his religion is         
nevertheless a practical expectation4   
,he believes that ,god is good1 and that
 ,god loves him and sustains him4 ,he   
believes that there obtains between     
himself1 in so far as good1 and the     
universe sub specie eternitatis1 a real 
sympathy and reciprocal reenforcement4  
,he believes that he secures through the
 profoundly potent forces of the        
universe that which he regards as of    
most worth2 and that somewhat is added  
to these forces by virtue of his        
consecration4 ,the ,god of the          
,christians cannot be defined short of  
some such account as this1 inclusive of 
an ideal1 an attitude1 and an           
expectation4 ,in other words the ,god of
 the ,christians is to be known only in 
terms of the ,christlike outlook upon   
life1 in which the disciple is taught to
 emulate the master4 ,when moral and    
intellectual development shall have     

discredited either its scale of values1 
or its conviction that cosmical events  
are in the end determined in accordance 
with that scale of values1 then         
,christianity must either be            
transformed1 or be untenable for the    
wise man4 ,if we have conceived the     
essence of ,christianity too broadly or 
vaguely1 it does not much matter for our
 present purposes4 ,its essence is1 at  
any rate1 some such inwardness of life  
resolving ideality and reality into one1
 and drawing upon objective truth only  
to the extent required for the          
confirming of that relation4  ,sidenote3
 ,the ,cognitive ,factor in ,religion4  
,sect4 #cd4 ,we conclude1 then1 our     
attempt to emphasize the cognitive      
factor in religion1 with the thesis that
 every religion centres in a practical  
secret of the universe4 ,to be religious
 is to believe that a certain           
correlation of forces1 moral and        
factual1 is in reality operative1 and   
that it determines the propriety and    

effectiveness of a certain type of      
living4 ,whatever demonstrates the      
futility1 vanity1 or self-deception of  
this living1 discredits the religion4   
,and1 per contra1 except as they define 
or refute such practical truth1 religion
 is not essentially concerned with      
theoretical judgments4  ,sidenote3 ,the 
,place of ,imagination in ,religion4    
,sect4 #ce4 ,but neither religion nor   
any other human interest consists in    
essentials4 ,such a practical conviction
 as that which has been defined         
inevitably flowers into a marvelous     
complexity1 and taps for its nourishment
 every spontaneity of human nature4 ,if 
it be said that only the practical      
conviction is essential1 this is not the
 same as to say that all else is        
superfluous4 ,there may be no single    
utterance that my religion could not    
have spared1 and yet were ,i to be      
altogether dumb my religion would1      
indeed1 be as nothing4 ,for if ,i       
believe1 ,i accept a presence in my     

world1 which as ,i live will figure in  
my dreams1 or in my thoughts1 or in my  
habits4 ,and each of these expressions  
of myself will have a truth if it do but
 bear out my practical acceptance of    
that presence4 ,the language of         
religion1 like that of daily life1 is   
not the language of science except it   
take it upon itself to be so4 ,there is 
scarcely a sentence which ,i utter in my
 daily intercourse with men which is not
 guilty of transgressions against the   
canons of accurate and definite         
thinking4 ,yet if ,i deceive neither    
myself nor another1 ,i am held to be    
truthful1 even though my language deal  
with chance and accident1 material      
purposes and spiritual causes1 and      
though ,i vow that the sun smiles or the
 moon lets down her hair into the sea4  
,science is a special interest in the   
discovery of unequivocal and fixed      
conceptions1 and employs its terms with 
an unalterable connotation4 ,but no such
 algebra of thought is indispensable to 

life or conversation1 and its lack is no
 proof of error4 ,such is the case also 
with that eminently living affair1      
religion4 ,i may if ,i choose1 and ,i   
will if my reasoning powers be at all   
awakened1 be a theologian4 ,but         
theology1 like science1 is a special    
intellectual spontaneity4 ,st4 ,thomas1 
the master theologian1 did not glide    
unwittingly from prayer into the        
quaestiones of the ,summa ,theologiae1  
but turned to them as to a fresh        
adventure4 ,theology is inevitable1     
because humanly speaking adventure is   
inevitable4 ,for man1 with his          
intellectual spontaneity1 every object  
is a problem2 and did he not seek sooner
 or later to define salvation1 there    
would be good reason to believe that he 
did not practically reckon with any4    
,but this is similarly and independently
 true of the imagination1 the most      
familiar means with which man clothes   
and vivifies his convictions1 the       
exuberance with which he plays about    

them and delights to confess them4 ,the 
imagination of religion1 contributing   
what ,matthew ,arnold called its poetry 
and eloquence1 does not submit itself to
 such canons as are binding upon        
theology or science1 but exists and     
flourishes in its own right4  ,the      
indispensableness to religion of the    
imagination is due to that faculty's    
power of realizing what is not          
perceptually present4 ,religion is not  
interested in the apparent1 but in the  
secret essence or the transcendent      
universal4 ,and yet this interest is a  
practical one4 ,imagination may         
introduce one into the vivid presence of
 the secret or the transcendent4 ,it is 
evident that the religious imagination  
here coincides with poetry4 ,for it is  
at least one of the interests of poetry 
to cultivate and satisfy a sense for the
 universal2 to obtain an immediate      
experience or appreciation that shall   
have the vividness without the          
particularism of ordinary perception4   

,and where a poet elects so to view the 
world1 we allow him as a poet the       
privilege1 and judge him by the         
standards to which he submits himself4  
,that upon which we pass judgment is the
 fitness of his expression4 ,this       
expression is not1 except in the case of
 the theoretical mystic1 regarded as    
constituting the most valid form of the 
idea1 but is appreciated expressly for  
its fulfilment of the condition of      
immediacy4 ,the same sort of critical   
attitude is in order with the fruits of 
the religious imagination4 ,these may or
 may not fulfil enough of the           
requirements of that art to be properly 
denominated poetry2 but like poetry they
 are the translation of ideas into a    
specific language4 ,they must not1      
therefore1 be judged as though they     
claimed to excel in point of validity1  
but only in point of consistency with   
the context of that language4 ,and the  
language of religion is the language of 
the practical life4 ,such translation is

 as essential to an idea that is to     
enter into the religious experience1 as 
translation into terms of immediacy is  
essential to an idea that is to enter   
into the appreciative consciousness of  
the poet4 ,no object can find a place in
 my religion until it is conjoined with 
my purposes and hopes2 until it is taken
 for granted and acted upon1 like the   
love of my friends1 or the courses of   
the stars1 or the stretches of the sea4 
,sidenote3 ,the ,special ,functions of  
the ,religious ,imagination4  ,sect4    
#cf4 ,the religious imagination1 then1  
is to be understood and justified as    
that which brings the objects of        
religion within the range of living4    
,the central religious object1 as has   
been seen1 is an attitude of the        
residuum or totality of things4 ,to be  
religious one must have a sense for the 
presence of an attitude1 like his sense 
for the presence of his human fellows1  
with all the added appreciation that is 
proper in the case of an object that is 

unique in its mystery or in its majesty4
 ,it follows that the religious         
imagination fulfils its function in so  
far as it provides the object of        
religion with properties similar to     
those which lend vividness and reality  
to the normal social relations4  ,the   
presence of one's fellows is in part the
 perceptual experience of their bodies4 
,to this there corresponds in religion  
some extraordinary or subtle appearance4
 ,the gods may in visions or dreams be  
met with in their own proper            
embodiments2 or1 as is more common1 they
 may be regarded as present for         
practical purposes3 in some inanimate   
object1 as in the case of the fetish2 in
 some animal species1 as in the case of 
the totem2 in some place1 as in the case
 of the shrine2 or even in some human   
being1 as in the case of the inspired   
prophet and miracle worker4 ,in more    
refined and highly developed religions  
the medium of ,god's presence is less   
specific4 ,he is perceived with         

--a sense sublime      ,of something far
 more deeply interfused1      ,whose    
dwelling is the light of setting suns1  
,and the round ocean and the living air1
      ,and the blue sky1 and in the mind
 of man4  ,god is here found in an      
interpretation of the common and the    
natural1 rather than in any individual  
and peculiar embodiment4 ,and here the  
poet's appreciation1 if not his art1 is 
peculiarly indispensable4  ,but1        
furthermore1 his fellows are inmates of 
the household of man in that he knows   
their history4 ,they belong to the      
temporal context of actions and events4 
,similarly1 the gods must be historical4
 ,the sacred traditions or books of     
religion are largely occupied with this 
history4 ,the more individual and       
anthropomorphic the gods1 the more local
 and episodic will be the account of    
their affairs4 ,in the higher religions 
the acts of ,god are few and momentous1 
such as creation or special providence2 
or they are identical with the events of

 nature and human history when these are
 construed as divine4 ,to find ,god in  
this latter way requires an             
interpretation of the course of events  
in terms of some moral consistency1 a   
faith that sees some purpose in their   
evident destination4  ,there is still   
another and a more significant way in   
which men recognize one another3 the way
 of address and conversation4 ,and men  
have invariably held a similar          
intercourse with their gods4 ,to this   
category belong communion and prayer1   
with all their varieties of expression4 
,i have no god until ,i address him4    
,this will be the most direct evidence  
of what is at least from my point of    
view a social relation4 ,there can be no
 general definition of the form which   
this address will take4 ,there may be as
 many special languages1 as many        
attitudes1 and as much playfulness and  
subtlety of symbolism as in human       
intercourse4 ,but1 on the other hand1   
there are certain utterances that are   

peculiarly appropriate to religion4 ,in 
so far as he regards his object as      
endowed with both power and goodness the
 worshipper will use the language of    
adoration2 and the sense of his         
dependence will speak in terms of       
consecration and thanksgiving4       ,o 
,god1 thou art my ,god2 early will ,i   
seek thee3       ,my soul thirsteth for 
thee1 my flesh longeth for thee1        
,in a dry and weary land1 where no water
 is4       ,so have ,i looked upon thee 
in the sanctuary1       ,to see thy     
power and thy glory4       ,for thy     
loving-kindness is better than life2    
,my lips shall praise thee4  ,these are 
expressions of a hopeful faith2 but1 on 
the other hand1 ,god may be addressed in
 terms of hatred and distrust4          
,who is most wretched in this dolorous  
place8       ,i think myself2 yet ,i    
would rather be       ,my miserable self
 than ,he1 than ,he       ,who formed   
such creatures to his own disgrace4     
,the vilest thing must be less vile than

 ,thou       ,from whom it had its      
being1 ,god and ,lord6       ,creator of
 all woe and sin6 abhorred1             
,malignant and implacable4#ajd3ac  ,in  
either case there may be an indefinite  
degree of hyperbole4 ,the language of   
love and hate1 of confidence and        
despair1 is not the language of         
description4 ,in this train of the      
religious consciousness there is        
occasion for whatever eloquence man can 
feel1 and whatever rhetorical luxuriance
 he can utter4  ,sidenote3 ,the         
,relation between ,imagination and      
,truth in ,religion4  ,sect4 #cg4 ,such 
considerations as these serve to account
 for the exercise and certain of the    
fruits of the religious imagination1 and
 to designate the general criterion     
governing its propriety4 ,but how is one
 to determine the boundary between the  
imaginative and the cognitive8 ,it is   
commonly agreed that what religion says 
and does is not all intended literally4 
,but when is expression of religion only

 poetry and eloquence1 and when is it   
matter of conviction8 ,if we revert     
again to the cognitive aspect of        
religion1 it is evident that there is   
but one test to apply3 whatever either  
fortifies or misleads the will is       
literal conviction4 ,this test cannot be
 applied absolutely1 because it can     
properly be applied only to the         
intention of an individual experience4  
,however ,i may express my religion1    
that which ,i express1 is1 we have seen1
 an expectation4 ,the degree to which ,i
 literally mean what ,i say is then the 
degree to which it determines my        
expectations4 ,whatever adds no item to 
these expectations1 but only recognizes 
and vitalizes them1 is pure imagination4
 ,but it follows that it is entirely    
impossible from direct inspection to    
define any given expression of religious
 experience as myth1 or to define the   
degree to which it is myth4 ,it submits 
to such distinctions only when viewed   
from the stand-point of the concrete    

religious experience which it expresses4
 ,any such given expression could easily
 be all imagination to one1 and all     
conviction to another4 ,consider the    
passage which follows3       ,and ,i saw
 the heaven opened2 and behold1 a white 
horse1 and      he that sat thereon1    
called ,faithful and ,true2 and in      
righteousness he doth judge and make    
war4 ,and his eyes are a      flame of  
fire1 and upon his head are many        
diadems2 and he hath      a name        
written1 which no one knoweth but he    
himself4 ,and he is      arrayed in a   
garment sprinkled with blood3 and his   
name is      called ,the ,word of       
,god4#ajf3ad  ,is this all rhapsody1 or 
is it in part true report8 ,there is    
evidently no answer to the question so  
conceived4 ,but if it were to express my
 own religious feeling it would have    
some specific proportion of literal and 
metaphorical significance1 according to 
the degree to which its detail          
contributes different practical values  

to me4 ,it might then be my guide-book  
to the heavens1 or only my testimony to 
the dignity and mystery of the function 
of ,christ4  ,the development of        
religion bears in a very important way  
upon this last problem4 ,the factor of  
imagination has undoubtedly come to have
 a more clearly recognized role in      
religion4 ,there can be no doubt that   
what we now call myths were once        
beliefs1 and that what we now call      
poetry was once history4 ,if we go back 
sufficiently far we come to a time when 
the literal and the metaphorical were   
scarcely distinguishable1 and this      
because science had not emerged from the
 early animistic extension of social    
relations4 ,men meant to address their  
gods as they addressed their fellows1   
and expected them to hear and respond1  
as they looked for such reactions within
 the narrower circle of ordinary        
intercourse4 ,the advance of science has
 brought into vogue a description of    
nature that inhibits such expectations4 

,the result has been that men1          
continuing to use the same terms1       
essentially expressive as they are of a 
practical relationship1 have come to    
regard them as only a general expression
 of their attitude4 ,the differences of 
content that are in excess of factors of
 expectation remain as poetry and myth4 
,on the other hand1 it is equally       
possible1 if not equally common1 for    
that which was once imagined to come to 
be believed4 ,such a transformation is1 
perhaps1 normally the case when the     
inspired utterance passes from its      
author to the cult4 ,the prophets and   
sweet singers are likely to possess an  
exuberance of imagination not           
appreciated by their followers2 and for 
this reason almost certainly            
misunderstood4 ,for these reasons it is 
manifestly absurd to fasten the name of 
myth or the name of creed upon any      
religious utterance whatsoever1 unless  
it be so regarded from the stand-point  
of the personal religion which it       

originally expressed1 or unless one     
means by so doing to define it as an    
expression of his own religion4 ,he who 
defines the myth of creation1 or the    
poetical story of ,samson1 as parts of  
the pre-,christian ,judaic religion1    
exhibits a total loss of historical     
sense4 ,the distinction between         
cognition and fancy does not exist among
 objects1 but only in the intending     
experience2 hence1 for me to attach my  
own distinction to any individual case  
of belief1 viewed apart from the        
believer1 is an utterly confusing       
projection of my own personality into   
the field of my study4  ,sidenote3 ,the 
,philosophy ,implied in ,religion and in
 ,religions4  ,sect4 #ch4 ,only after   
such considerations as these are we     
qualified to attack that much-vexed     
question as to whether religion deals   
invariably with a personal god4 ,it is  
often assumed in discussion of this     
question that personal god1 as well as  
god1 is a distinct and familiar kind of 

entity1 like a dragon or centaur2 its   
existence alone being problematical4    
,this is doubly false to the religious  
employment of such an object4 ,if it be 
true that in religion we mean by ,god a 
practical interpretation of the world1  
whatsoever be its nature1 then the      
personality of ,god must be a derivative
 of the attitude1 and not of the nature 
of the world4 ,given the practical      
outlook upon life1 there is no definable
 world that cannot be construed under   
the form of ,god4 ,my god is my world   
practically recognized in respect of its
 fundamental or ultimate attitude to my 
ideals4 ,in the sense1 then1 conveyed by
 this term attitude my god will         
invariably possess the characters of    
personality4 ,but the degree to which   
these characters will coincide with the 
characters which ,i assign to human     
persons1 or the terms of any logical    
conception of personality1 cannot be    
absolutely defined4 ,anthropomorphisms  
may be imagination or they may be       

literal conviction4 ,this will depend1  
as above maintained1 upon the degree to 
which they determine my expectations4   
,suppose the world to be theoretically  
conceived as governed by laws that are  
indifferent to all human interests4 ,the
 practical expression of this conception
 appears in the naturalism of           
,lucretius1 or ,diogenes1 or ,omar      
,khayyam4 ,living in the vivid presence 
of an indifferent world1 ,i may picture 
my gods as leading their own lives in   
some remote realm which is inaccessible 
to my petitions1 or as regarding me with
 sinister and contemptuous cruelty4 ,in 
the latter case ,i may shrink and cower1
 or return them contempt for contempt4  
,i mean this literally only if ,i look  
for consequences following directly from
 the emotional coloring which ,i have   
bestowed upon them4 ,it may well be that
 ,i mean merely to regard myself sub    
specie eternitatis1 in which case ,i am 
personifying in the sense of free       
imagination4 ,in the religion of        

enlightenment the divine attitude tends 
to belong to the poetry and eloquence of
 religion rather than to its cognitive  
intent4 ,this is true even of optimistic
 and idealistic religion4 ,the love and 
providence of ,god are less commonly    
supposed to warrant an expectation of   
special and arbitrary favors1 and have  
come more and more to mean the play of  
my own feeling about the general central
 conviction of the favorableness of the 
cosmos to my deeper or moral concerns4  
,but the factor of personality cannot   
possibly be entirely eliminated1 for the
 religious consciousness creates a      
social relationship between man and the 
universe4 ,such an interpretation of    
life is not a case of the pathetic      
fallacy1 unless it incorrectly reckons  
with the inner feeling which it         
attributes to the universe4 ,it is an   
obvious practical truth that the total  
or residual environment is significant  
for life4 ,grant this and you make      
rational a recognition of that          

significance1 or a more or less constant
 sense of coincidence or conflict with  
cosmical forces4 ,permit this           
consciousness to stand1 and you make    
some expression of it inevitable4 ,such 
an expression may1 furthermore1 with    
perfect propriety and in fulfilment of  
human nature1 set forth and transfigure 
this central belief until it may enter  
into the context of immediacy4  ,thus   
any conception of the universe          
whatsoever may afford a basis for       
religion4 ,but there is no religion that
 does not virtually make a more definite
 claim upon the nature of things1 and   
this entirely independently of its      
theology1 or explicit attempt to define 
itself4 ,every religion1 even in the    
very living of it1 is naturalistic1 or  
dualistic1 or pluralistic1 or           
optimistic1 or idealistic1 or           
pessimistic4 ,and there is in the realm 
of truth that which justifies or refutes
 these definite practical ways of       
construing the universe4 ,but no        

historical religion is ever so vague    
even as this in its philosophical       
implications4 ,indeed1 we shall always  
be brought eventually to the inner      
meaning of some individual religious    
experience1 where no general criticism  
can be certainly valid4  ,there is1     
then1 a place in religion for that which
 is not directly answerable to          
philosophical or scientific standards4  
,but there is always1 on the other hand1
 an element of hope which conceives the 
nature of the world1 and means to be    
grounded in reality4 ,in respect of that
 element1 philosophy is indispensable to
 religion4 ,the meaning of religion is1 
in fact1 the central problem of         
philosophy4 ,there is a virtue in       
religion like that which ,emerson       
ascribes to poetry4 ,the poet is in the 
right attitude2 he is believing2 the    
philosopher1 after some struggle1 having
 only reasons for believing4 ,but       
whatever may be said to the             
disparagement of its dialectic1         

philosophy is the justification of      
religion1 and the criticism of          
religions4 ,to it must be assigned the  
task of so refining positive religion as
 to contribute to the perpetual         
establishment of true religion4 ,and to 
philosophy1 with religion1 belongs the  
task of holding fast to the idea of the 
universe4 ,there is no religion except  
before you begin1 or after you have     
rested from1 your philosophical         
speculation4 ,but in the universe these 
interests have a common object4 ,as     
philosophy is the articulation and      
vindication of religion1 so is religion 
the realization of philosophy4 ,in      
philosophy thought is brought up to the 
elevation of life1 and in religion      
philosophy1 as the sum of wisdom1 enters
 into life4   ,,footnotes3  #hc3a ,as   
,plato interprets the scepticism of     
,protagoras to mean that one state of   
mind cannot be more true than another1  
but only better or worse4 ,cf4          
,theaetetus1 #afg4  #hh3b ,quoted with  

some omissions from ,i ,kings1          
#ah3ba-bi4 ,the ,hebrew term ,yahweh1   
the name of the national deity1 has been
 substituted for the ,english           
translation1 the ,lord4  #ij3c ,iliad1  
,book ,,ix1 lines #dfg sq4 ,translation 
by ,chapman4  #ia3d ,the supposed abode 
of departed spirits4  #ia3e ,lucretius3 
,de ,rerum ,natura1 ,book ,,iii1 lines  
#a sq4 ,translated by ,munro4  #ia3f    
,ibid41 ,book ,,ii1 lines #fdd sq4      
#ib3g ,it would be interesting to       
compare the equally famous criticism of 
,greek religion in ,plato's ,republic1  
,book ,,ii1 #cgg sq4  #ib3h ,cf4 ,w4    
,robertson ,smith's admirable account of
 the ,semitic religions3  ,what is      
requisite to religion is a practical    
acquaintance with the rules on which the
 deity acts and on which he expects his 
worshippers to frame their conduct--what
 in ,,ii ,kings1 #ag3bf is called the   
'manner1' or rather the 'customary law' 
7mishpat71 of the god of the land4 ,this
 is true even of the religion of        

,israel4 ,when the prophets speak of the
 knowledge of ,god1 they always mean a  
practical knowledge of the laws and     
principles of ,his government in        
,israel1 and a summary expression for   
religion as a whole is 'the knowledge   
and fear of ,jehovah1' i4 e41 the       
knowledge of what ,jehovah prescribes1  
combined with a reverent obedience4 ,the
 ,religion of the ,semites1 p4 #bc4     
#ic3i ,proverbs1 #ah3aj2 #aa3ai2 #ba3c4 
#ic3aj ,ecclesiastes1 #b3ac sq4  #id3aa 
,psalms1 #ea3ag2 ,isaiah1 #eg3ae4       
#id3ab ,in this discussion of ,judaism  
,i am much indebted to ,matthew         
,arnold's ,literature and ,dogma1       
especially ,chapters ,i and ,,ii4       
#ajd3ac ,james ,thomson3 ,the ,city of  
,dreadful ,night4 ,quoted by ,james1 in 
,the ,will to ,believe1 etc41 p4 #de4   
#ajf3ad ,revelation1 #ai3aa-ac4         
,,chapter ,v  ,,natural ,,science ,,and 
,,philosophy   ,sidenote3 ,the ,true    
,relations of ,philosophy and ,science4 
,misconceptions and ,antagonisms4       

,sect4 #ci4 ,in the case of natural     
science we meet not only with a special 
human interest1 but with a theoretical  
discipline4 ,we are confronted1         
therefore1 with a new question3 that of 
the relation within the body of human   
knowledge of two of its constituent     
members4 ,owing to the militant temper  
of the representatives of both science  
and philosophy1 this has long since     
ceased to be an academic question1 and  
has frequently been met in the spirit of
 rivalry and partisanship4 ,but the true
 order of knowledge is only temporarily 
distorted by the brilliant success of a 
special type of investigation2 and the  
conquests of science are now so old a   
story that critical thought shows a     
disposition to judge of the issue with  
sobriety and logical highmindedness4    
,in the seventeenth century a newly     
emancipated and too sanguine reason     
proposed to know the whole of nature at 
once in terms of mathematics and        
mechanics4 ,thus the system of the      

,englishman ,hobbes was science swelled 
to world-proportions1 simple1 compact1  
conclusive1 and all-comprehensive4      
,philosophy proposed to do the work of  
science1 but in its own grand manner4   
,the last twenty years of ,hobbes's     
life1 spent in repeated discomfiture at 
the hands of ,seth ,ward1 ,wallis1      
,boyle1 and other scientific experts of 
the new ,royal ,society1 certified      
conclusively to the failure of this     
enterprise1 and the experimental        
specialist thereupon took exclusive     
possession of the field of natural law4 
,but the idealist1 on the other hand1   
reconstructed nature to meet the demands
 of philosophical knowledge and         
religious faith4 ,there issued1 together
 with little mutual understanding and   
less sympathy1 on the one hand          
positivism1 or exclusive                
experimentalism1 and on the other hand a
 rabid and unsympathetic                
transcendentalism4 ,hume1 who consigned 
to the flames all thought save abstract 

reasoning concerning quantity or number1
 and experimental reasoning concerning  
matter of fact and existence2 ,comte1   
who assigned metaphysics to an immature 
stage in the development of human       
intelligence2 and ,tyndall1 who reduced 
the religious consciousness to an       
emotional experience of mystery1 are    
typical of the one attitude4 ,the other 
is well exhibited in ,schelling's       
reference to the blind and thoughtless  
mode of investigating nature which has  
become generally established since the  
corruption of philosophy by ,bacon1 and 
of physics by ,boyle4 ,dogmatic         
experimentalism and dogmatic idealism   
signify more or less consistently the   
abstract isolation of the scientific and
 philosophical motives4  ,there is      
already a touch of quaintness in both of
 these attitudes4 ,we of the present are
 in the habit of acknowledging the      
autonomy of science1 and the            
unimpeachable validity of the results of
 experimental research in so far as they

 are sanctioned by the consensus of     
experts4 ,but at the same time we       
recognize the definiteness of the task  
of science1 and the validity of such    
reservations as may be made from a      
higher critical point of view4 ,science 
is to be transcended in so far as it is 
understood as a whole4 ,philosophy is   
critically empirical2 empirical1 because
 it regards all bona fide descriptions  
of experience as knowledge2 critical1   
because attentive to the conditions of  
both general and special knowledge4 ,and
 in terms of a critical empiricism so   
defined1 it is one of the problems of   
philosophy to define and appraise the   
generating problem of science1 and so to
 determine the value assignable to      
natural laws in the whole system of     
knowledge4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,spheres of 
,philosophy and ,science4  ,sect4 #dj4  
,if this be the true function of        
philosophy with reference to science1   
several current notions of the relations
 of the spheres of these disciplines may

 be disproved4 ,in the first place1     
philosophy will not be all the sciences 
regarded as one science4 ,science tends 
to unify without any higher criticism4  
,the various sciences already regard the
 one nature as their common object1 and 
the one system of interdependent laws as
 their common achievement4 ,the         
philosopher who tries to be all science 
at once fails ignominiously because he  
tries to replace the work of a          
specialist with the work of a           
dilettante2 and if philosophy be        
identical with that body of truth       
accumulated and organized by the        
cooperative activity of scientific men1 
then philosophy is a name and there is  
no occasion for the existence of the    
philosopher as such4 ,secondly1         
philosophy will not be the assembling of
 the sciences2 for such would be a      
merely clerical work1 and the           
philosopher would much better be        
regarded as non-existent than as a      
book-keeper4 ,nor1 thirdly1 is          

philosophy an auxiliary discipline that 
may be called upon in emergencies for   
the solution of some baffling problem of
 science4 ,a problem defined by science 
must be solved in the scientific manner4
 ,science will accept no aid from the   
gods when engaged in her own campaign1  
but will fight it out according to her  
own principles of warfare4 ,and as long 
as science moves in her own plane1 she  
can acknowledge no permanent barriers4  
,there is then no need of any           
superscientific research that shall     
replace1 or piece together1 or extend   
the work of science4 ,but the savant is 
not on this account in possession of the
 entire field of knowledge4 ,it is true 
that he is not infrequently moved to    
such a conviction when he takes us about
 to view his estates4 ,together we      
ascend up into heaven1 or make our beds 
in sheol1 or take the wings of the      
morning and dwell in the uttermost parts
 of the sea--and look in vain for       
anything that is not work done1 or work 

projected1 by natural science4 ,persuade
 him1 however1 to define his estates1   
and he has circumscribed them4 ,in his  
definition he must employ conceptions   
more fundamental than the working       
conceptions that he employs within his  
field of study4 ,indeed1 in viewing his 
task as definite and specific he has    
undertaken the solution of the problem  
of philosophy4 ,the logical             
self-consciousness has been awakened1   
and there is no honorable way of putting
 it to sleep again4 ,this is precisely  
what takes place in any account of the  
generating problem of science4 ,to      
define science is to define at least one
 realm that is other than science1 the  
realm of active intellectual endeavor   
with its own proper categories4 ,one    
cannot reflect upon science and assign  
it an end1 and a method proper to that  
end1 without bringing into the field of 
knowledge a broader field of experience 
than the field proper to science1       
broader at any rate by the presence in  

it of the scientific activity itself4   
,here1 then1 is the field proper to     
philosophy4 ,the scientist qua scientist
 is intent upon his own determinate     
enterprise4 ,the philosopher comes into 
being as one who is interested in       
observing what it is that the scientist 
is so intently doing4 ,in taking this   
interest he has accepted as a field for 
investigation that which he would       
designate as the totality of interests  
or the inclusive experience4 ,he can    
carry out his intention of defining the 
scientific attitude only by standing    
outside it1 and determining it by means 
of nothing less than an exhaustive      
searching out of all attitudes4         
,philosophy is1 to be sure1 itself a    
definite activity and an attitude1 but  
an attitude required by definition to be
 conscious of itself1 and1 if you       
please1 conscious of its own            
consciousness1 until its attitude shall 
have embraced in its object the very    
principle of attitudes4 ,philosophy     

defines itself and all other human tasks
 and interests4 ,none have furnished a  
clearer justification of philosophy than
 those men of scientific predilections  
who have claimed the title of agnostics4
 ,a good instance is furnished by a     
contemporary physicist1 who has chosen  
to call his reflections                 
antimetaphysical4       ,physical       
science does not pretend to be a        
complete view of      the world2 it     
simply claims that it is working toward 
such a      complete view in the future4
 ,the highest philosophy of the         
scientific investigator is precisely    
this toleration of an      incomplete   
conception of the world and the         
preference for it1      rather than an  
apparently perfect1 but inadequate      
conception4#abj3a  ,it is apparent that 
if one were to challenge such a         
statement1 the issue raised would at    
once be philosophical and not           
scientific4 ,the problem here stated and
 answered1 requires for its solution the

 widest inclusiveness of view1 and a    
peculiar interest in critical reflection
 and logical coordination4  ,sidenote3  
,the ,procedure of a ,philosophy of     
,science4  ,sect4 #da4 ,one may be      
prepared for a knowledge of the economic
 and social significance of the railway 
even if one does not know a throttle    
from a piston-rod1 provided one has     
broad and well-balanced knowledge of the
 interplay of human social interests4   
,one's proficiency here requires one to 
stand off from society1 and to obtain a 
perspective that shall be as little     
distorted as possible4 ,the reflection  
of the philosopher of science requires a
 similar quality of perspective4 ,all   
knowledges1 together with the knowing of
 them1 must be his object yonder1       
standing apart in its wholeness and     
symmetry4 ,philosophy is the least      
dogmatic1 the most empirical1 of all    
disciplines1 since it is the only       
investigation that can permit itself to 
be forgetful of nothing4  ,but the most 

comprehensive view may be the most      
distorted and false4 ,the true order of 
knowledge is the difficult task of      
logical analysis1 requiring as its chief
 essential some determination of the    
scope of the working conceptions of the 
different independent branches of       
knowledge4 ,in the case of natural      
science this would mean an examination  
of the method and results characteristic
 of this field1 for the sake of defining
 the kind of truth which attaches to the
 laws which are being gradually         
formulated4 ,but one must immediately   
reach either the one or the other of two
 very general conclusions4 ,if the laws 
of natural science cover all possible   
knowledge of reality1 then there is left
 to philosophy only the logical function
 of justifying this statement4 ,logic   
and natural science will then constitute
 the sum of knowledge4 ,if1 on the other
 hand1 it be found that the aim of      
natural science is such as to exclude   
certain aspects of reality1 then        

philosophy will not be restricted to    
logical criticism1 but will have a      
cognitive field of its own4 ,the great  
majority of philosophers have assumed   
the latter of these alternatives to be  
true1 while most aggressive scientists  
have intended the former in their       
somewhat blind attacks upon metaphysics4
 ,although the selection of either of   
these alternatives involves us in the   
defence of a specific answer to a       
philosophical question1 the issue is    
inevitable in any introduction to       
philosophy because of its bearing upon  
the extent of the field of that study4  
,furthermore there can be no better     
exposition of the meaning of philosophy 
of science than an illustration of its  
exercise4 ,the following1 then1 is to be
 regarded as on the one hand a tentative
 refutation of positivism1 or the claim 
of natural science to be coextensive    
with knowable reality2 and on the other 
hand a programme for the procedure of   
philosophy with reference to natural    

science4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,origin of the
 ,scientific ,interest4  ,sect4 #db4    
,science issues through imperceptible   
stages from organic habits and instincts
 which signify the possession by living 
creatures of a power to meet the        
environment on its own terms4 ,every    
organism possesses such a working       
knowledge of nature1 and among men the  
first science consists in those habitual
 adjustments common to men and          
infra-human organisms4 ,man is already  
practising science before he recognizes 
it4 ,as skill it distinguishes itself   
early in his history from lore1 or      
untested tradition4 ,skill is           
familiarity with general kinds of       
events1 together with ability to        
identify an individual with reference to
 a kind1 and so be prepared for the     
outcome4 ,thus man is inwardly prepared 
for the alternation of day and night1   
and the periods of the seasons4 ,he     
practically anticipates the procession  
of natural events in the countless      

emergencies of his daily life4 ,but     
science in the stricter sense begins    
when skill becomes free and social4     
,sidenote3 ,skill as ,free4  ,sect4 #dc4
 ,skill may be said to be free when the 
essential terms of the action have been 
abstracted from the circumstances       
attending them in individual            
experiences1 and are retained as ideal  
plans applicable to any practical       
occasion4 ,the monkey who swings with a 
trapeze from his perch on the side of   
the cage1 counts upon swinging back     
again without any further effort on his 
own part4 ,his act and its successful   
issue signify his practical familiarity 
with the natural motions of bodies4 ,we 
can conceive such a performance to be   
accompanied by an almost entire failure 
to grasp its essentials4 ,it would then 
be necessary for nearly the whole       
situation to be repeated in order to    
induce in the monkey the same action and
 expectation4 ,he would require a       
similar form1 color1 and distance4 ,but 

he might1 on the other hand1 regard as  
practically identical all suspended and 
freely swinging bodies capable of       
affording him support1 and quite        
independently of their shape1 size1     
time1 or place4 ,in this latter case his
 skill would be applicable to the widest
 possible number of cases that could    
present themselves4 ,having a discerning
 eye for essentials1 he would lose no   
chance of a swing through looking for   
more than the bare necessities4 ,when   
the physicist describes the pendulum in 
terms of a formula such as t            
#bpisquareroot7l_/g7 he exhibits a      
similar discernment4 ,he has found that 
the time occupied by an oscillation of  
any pendulum may be calculated          
exclusively in terms of its length and  
the acceleration due to gravity4 ,the   
monkey's higher proficiency and the     
formula alike represent a knowledge that
 is free in the sense that it is        
contained in terms that require no      
single fixed context in immediacy4 ,the 

knowledge is valid wherever these       
essential terms are present2 and        
calculations may be based upon these    
essential terms1 while attendant        
circumstances vary ad infinitum4 ,such  
knowledge is said to be general or      
universal4  ,there is another element of
 freedom1 however1 which so far has not 
been attributed to the monkey's         
knowledge1 but which is evidently       
present in that of the physicist4 ,the  
former has a practical ability to deal  
with a pendulum when he sees it4 ,the   
latter1 on the other hand1 knows about a
 pendulum whether one be present or not4
 ,his knowledge is so retained as always
 to be available1 even though it be not 
always applicable4 ,his knowledge is not
 merely skill in treating a situation1  
but the possession of resources which he
 may employ at whatever time1 and in    
whatever manner1 may suit his interests4
 ,knowing what he does about the        
pendulum1 he may act from the idea of   
such a contrivance1 and with the aid of 

it construct some more complex          
mechanism4 ,his formulas are his        
instruments1 which he may use on any    
occasion4 ,suppose that a situation with
 factors a1 b1 and c requires factor d  
in order to become ,m1 as desired4 ,such
 a situation might easily be hopeless   
for an organism reacting directly to the
 stimulus abc1 and yet be easily met by 
a free knowledge of d4 ,one who knows   
that l1 m1 and n will produce d1 may by 
these means provide the missing factor1 
complete the sum of required conditions1
 abcd1 and so obtain the end ,m4 ,such  
indirection might be used to obtain any 
required factor of the end1 or of any   
near or remote means to the end4 ,there 
is1 in fact1 no limit to the complexity 
of action made possible upon this basis2
 for since it is available in idea1 the 
whole range of such knowledge may be    
brought to bear upon any individual     
problem4  ,sidenote3 ,skill as ,social4 
,sect4 #dd4 ,but knowledge of this free 
type becomes at the same time social or 

institutional4 ,it consists no longer in
 a skilful adaptation of the individual 
organism1 but in a system of terms      
common to all intelligence1 and         
preserved in those books and other      
monuments which serve as the articulate 
memory of the race4 ,a knowledge that is
 social must be composed of unequivocal 
conceptions and fixed symbols4 ,the     
mathematical laws of the exact sciences 
represent the most successful attainment
 of this end so far as form is          
concerned4 ,furthermore1 the amount of  
knowledge may now be increased from     
generation to generation through the    
service of those who make a vocation of 
its pursuit4 ,natural science is thus a 
cumulative racial proficiency1 which any
 individual may bring to bear upon any  
emergency of his life4  ,sidenote3      
,science for ,accommodation and         
,construction4  ,sect4 #de4 ,such       
proficiency as science affords is in    
every case the anticipation of          
experience4 ,this has a twofold value   

for mankind1 that of accommodation1 and 
that of construction4 ,primitively1     
where mere survival is the function of  
the organism as a whole1 the value of   
accommodation is relatively fundamental4
 ,the knowledge of what may be expected 
enables the organism to save itself by  
means of its own counter-arrangement of 
natural processes4 ,construction is here
 for the sake of accommodation4 ,but    
with the growth of civilization         
construction becomes a positive         
interest1 and man tends to save himself 
for definite ends4 ,accommodation comes 
to take place for the sake of           
construction4 ,science then supplies the
 individual with the ways and means     
wherewith to execute life purposes which
 themselves tend to assume an absolute  
value that cannot be justified merely on
 the ground of science4  ,sidenote3     
,method and ,fundamental ,conceptions of
 ,natural ,science4 ,the ,descriptive   
,method4  ,sect4 #df4 ,if natural       
science be animated by any special      

cognitive interest1 this motive should  
appear in the development of its method 
and fundamental conceptions4 ,if that   
interest has been truly defined1 it     
should now enable us to understand the  
progressive and permanent in scientific 
investigation as directly related to it4
 ,for the aim of any discipline         
exercises a gradual selection from among
 possible methods1 and gives to its laws
 their determinate and final form4  ,the
 descriptive method is at the present   
day fully established4 ,a leading moral 
of the history of science is the        
superior usefulness of an exact account 
of the workings of nature to an         
explanation in terms of some qualitative
 potency4 ,explanation has been         
postponed by enlightened science until  
after a more careful observation of     
actual processes shall have been made2  
and at length it has been admitted that 
there is no need of any explanation but 
perfect description4 ,now the practical 
use of science defined above1 requires  

no knowledge beyond the actual order of 
events4 ,for such a purpose sufficient  
reason signifies only sufficient        
conditions4 ,all other considerations   
are irrelevant1 and it is proper to     
ignore them4 ,such has actually been the
 fate of the so-called metaphysical     
solution of special problems of nature4 
,the case of ,kepler is the classic     
instance4 ,this great scientist         
supplemented his laws of planetary      
motion with the following speculation   
concerning the agencies at work3        
,we must suppose one of two things3     
either that the moving      spirits1 in 
proportion as they are more removed from
 the sun1      are more feeble2 or that 
there is one moving spirit in the       
centre of all the orbits1 namely1 in the
 sun1 which urges each      body the    
more vehemently in proportion as it is  
nearer2 but in      more distant spaces 
languishes in consequence of the        
remoteness and attenuation of its       
virtue4#abi3b  ,the following passage   

from ,hegel affords an interesting      
analogy3       ,the moon is the         
waterless crystal which seeks to        
complete      itself by means of our    
sea1 to quench the thirst of its arid   
rigidity1 and therefore produces ebb and
 flow4#abi3c  ,no scientist has ever    
sought to refute either of these        
theories4 ,they have merely been        
neglected4  ,they were advanced in      
obedience to a demand for the ultimate  
explanation of the phenomena in         
question1 and were obtained by applying 
such general conceptions as were most   
satisfying to the reasons of their      
respective authors4 ,but they           
contributed nothing whatsoever to a     
practical familiarity with the natural  
course of events1 in this case the times
 and places of the planets and the      
tides4 ,hence they have not been used in
 the building of science4 ,in our own   
day investigators have become conscious 
of their motive1 and do not wait for    
historical selection to exclude powers  

and reasons from their province4 ,they  
deliberately seek to formulate exact    
descriptions4 ,to this end they employ  
symbols that shall serve to identify the
 terms of nature1 and formulas that     
shall define their systematic           
relationship4 ,these systems must be    
exact1 or deductions cannot be made from
 them4 ,hence they tend ultimately to   
assume a mathematical form of           
expression4  ,sidenote3 ,space1 ,time1  
and ,prediction4  ,sect4 #dg4 ,but      
science tends to employ for these       
systems only such conceptions as relate 
to prediction2 and of these the most    
fundamental are space and time4 ,the    
first science to establish its method   
was the science of astronomy1 where     
measurement and computation in terms of 
space and time were the most obvious    
means of description2 and the general   
application of the method of astronomy  
by ,galileo and ,newton1 or the         
development of mechanics1 is the most   
important factor in the establishment of

 modern science upon a permanent working
 basis4 ,the persistence of the term    
cause1 testifies to the fact that       
science is primarily concerned with the 
determination of events4 ,its           
definitions of objects are means of     
identification1 while its laws are      
dynamical1 i4 e41 have reference to the 
conditions under which these objects    
arise4 ,thus the chemist may know less  
about the properties of water than the  
poet2 but he is pre-eminently skilled in
 its production from elements1 and      
understands similarly the compounds into
 which it may enter4 ,now the general   
conditions of all anticipation1 whereby 
it becomes exact and verifiable1 are    
spacial and temporal4 ,a predictable    
event must be assigned to what is here  
now1 or there now2 or what is here then1
 or there then4 ,an experimentally      
verifiable system must contain          
space-time variables1 for which can be  
substituted the here and now of the     
experimenter's immediate experience4    

,hence science deals primarily with     
calculable places and moments4 ,the     
mechanical theory of nature owes its    
success to a union of space and time    
through its conceptions of matter and   
motion4#acb3d ,and the projected theory 
of energetics must satisfy the same     
conditions4  ,sidenote3 ,the            
,quantitative ,method4  ,sect4 #dh4     
,but1 furthermore1 science has1 as we   
have seen1 an interest in freeing its   
descriptions from the peculiar angle and
 relativity of an individual's          
experience1 for the sake of affording   
him knowledge of that with which he must
 meet4 ,science enlightens the will by  
acquainting it with that which takes    
place in spite of it1 and for which it  
must hold itself in readiness4 ,to this 
end the individual benefits himself in  
so far as he eliminates himself from the
 objects which he investigates4 ,his    
knowledge is useful in so far as it is  
valid for his own indefinitely varying  
stand-points1 and those of other wills  

recognized by him in his practical      
relations4 ,but in attempting to        
describe objects in terms other than    
those of a specific experience1 science 
is compelled to describe them in terms  
of one another4 ,for this purpose the   
quantitative method is peculiarly       
serviceable4 ,with its aid objects      
permit themselves to be described as    
multiples of one another1 and as        
occupying positions in relation to one  
another4 ,when all objects are described
 strictly in terms of one another1 they 
are expressed in terms of arbitrary     
units1 and located in terms of arbitrary
 spacial or temporal axes of reference4 
,thus there arises the universe of the  
scientific imagination1 a vast          
complexity of material displacements and
 transformations1 without color1 music1 
pleasure1 or any of all that rich       
variety of qualities that the least of  
human experiences contains4 ,it does not
 completely rationalize or even         
completely describe such experiences1   

but formulates their succession4 ,to    
this end they are reduced to terms that 
correspond to no specific experience1   
and for this very reason may be         
translated again into all definable     
hypothetical experiences4 ,the solar    
system for astronomy is not a bird's-eye
 view of elliptical orbits1 with the    
planets and satellites in definite      
phases4 ,nor is it this group of objects
 from any such point of view1 or from   
any number of such points of view2 but a
 formulation of their motions that will 
serve as the key to an infinite number  
of their appearances4 ,or1 consider the 
picture of the ichthysauria romping in  
the mesozoic sea1 that commonly         
accompanies a text-book of geology4 ,any
 such picture1 and all such pictures1   
with their coloring and their temporal  
and spacial perspective1 are imaginary4 
,no such special and exclusive manifolds
 can be defined as having been then and 
there realized4 ,but we have a          
geological knowledge of this period1    

that fulfils the formal demands of      
natural science1 in so far as we can    
construct this and countless other      
specific experiences with reference to  
it4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,general           
,development of ,science4  ,sect4 #di4  
,science1 then1 is to be understood as  
springing from the practical necessity  
of anticipating the environment4 ,this  
anticipation appears first as congenital
 or acquired reactions on the part of   
the organism4 ,such reactions imply a   
fixed coordination or system in the     
environment whereby a given circumstance
 determines other circumstances2 and    
science proper arises as the formulation
 of such systems4 ,the requirement that 
they shall apply to the phenomena that  
confront the will1 determines their     
spacial1 temporal1 and quantitative     
form4 ,the progress of science is marked
 by the growth of these conceptions in  
the direction of comprehensiveness on   
the one hand1 and of refinement and     
delicacy on the other4 ,man lives in an 

environment that is growing at the same 
time richer and more extended1 but with 
a compensatory simplification in the    
ever closer systematization of          
scientific conceptions under the form of
 the order of nature4  ,sidenote3 ,the  
,determination of the ,limits of        
,natural ,science4  ,sect4 #ej4 ,at the 
opening of this chapter it was          
maintained that it is a function of     
philosophy to criticise science through 
its generating problem1 or its          
self-imposed task viewed as determining 
its province and selecting its          
categories4 ,the above account of the   
origin and method of science must       
suffice as a definition of its          
generating problem1 and afford the basis
 of our answer to the question of its   
limits4 ,enough has been said to make it
 clear that philosophy is not in the    
field of science1 and is therefore not  
entitled to contest its result in detail
 or even to take sides within the       
province of its special problems4       

,furthermore1 philosophy should not aim 
to restrain science by the imposition of
 external barriers4 ,whatever may be    
said of the sufficiency of its          
categories in any region of the world1  
that body of truth of which mathematics1
 mechanics1 and physics are the         
foundations1 must be regarded as a whole
 that tends to be all-comprehensive in  
its own terms4 ,there remains for       
philosophy1 then1 the critical          
examination of these terms1 and the     
appraisal as a whole of the truth that  
they may express4  ,sidenote3 ,natural  
,science is ,abstract4  ,sect4 #ea4 ,the
 impossibility of embracing the whole of
 knowledge within natural science is due
 to the fact that the latter is         
abstract4 ,this follows from the fact   
that natural science is governed by a   
selective interest4 ,the formulation of 
definitions and laws in exclusively     
mechanical terms is not due to the      
exhaustive or even pre-eminent reality  
of these properties1 but to their       

peculiar serviceableness in a verifiable
 description of events4 ,natural science
 does not affirm that reality is        
essentially constituted of matter1 or   
essentially characterized by motion2 but
 is interested in the mechanical aspect 
of reality1 and describes it quite      
regardless of other evident aspects and 
without meaning to prejudice them4 ,it  
is unfortunately true that the scientist
 has rarely been clear in his own mind  
on this point4 ,it is only recently that
 he has partially freed himself from the
 habit of construing his terms as final 
and exhaustive4#acg3e ,this he was able 
to do even to his own satisfaction1 only
 by allowing loose rein to the          
imagination4 ,consider the example of   
the atomic theory4 ,in order to describe
 such occurrences as chemical           
combination1 or changes in volume and   
density1 the scientist has employed as a
 unit the least particle1 physically    
indivisible and qualitatively           
homogeneous4 ,look for the atom in the  

body of science1 and you will find it in
 physical laws governing expansion and  
contraction1 and in chemical formulas4  
,there the real responsibility of       
science ends4 ,but whether through the  
need of popular exposition1 or the      
undisciplined imagination of the        
investigator himself1 atoms have figured
 in the history of thought as round     
corpuscles of a grayish hue scurrying   
hither and thither1 and armed with      
special appliances wherewith to lock in 
molecular embrace4 ,although this is    
nonsense1 we need not on that account   
conclude that there are no atoms4 ,there
 are atoms in precisely the sense       
intended by scientific law1 in that the 
formulas computed with the aid of this  
concept are true of certain natural     
processes4 ,the conception of ether     
furnishes a similar case4 ,science is   
not responsible for the notion of a     
quivering gelatinous substance pervading
 space1 but only for certain laws that1 
e4 g41 describe the velocity of light in

 terms of the vibration4 ,it is true    
that there is such a thing as ether1 not
 as gratuitously rounded out by the     
imagination1 with various attributes of 
immediate experience1 but just in so far
 as this concept is employed in verified
 descriptions of radiation1 magnetism1  
or electricity4 ,strictly speaking      
science asserts nothing about the       
existence of ether1 but only about the  
behavior1 e4 g41 of light4 ,if true     
descriptions of this and other phenomena
 are reached by employing units of wave 
propagation in an elastic medium1 then  
ether is proved to exist in precisely   
the same sense that linear feet are     
proved to exist1 if it be admitted that 
there are #ij1jjj1jjj x #e1bhj of them  
between the earth and the sun4 ,and to  
imagine in the one case a jelly with all
 the qualities of texture1 color1 and   
the like1 that an individual object of  
sense would possess1 is much the same as
 in the other to imagine the heavens    
filled with foot-rules and              

tape-measures4 ,there is but one safe   
procedure in dealing with scientific    
concepts3 to regard them as true so far 
as they describe1 and no whit further4  
,to supplement the strict meaning which 
has been verified and is contained in   
the formularies of science1 with such   
vague predicates as will suffice to make
 entities of them1 is mere ineptness and
 confusion of thought4 ,and it is only  
such a supplementation that obscures    
their abstractness4 ,for a mechanical   
description of things1 true as it       
doubtless is1 is even more indubitably  
incomplete4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,meaning of
 ,abstractness in ,truth4  ,sect4 #eb4  
,but though the abstractness involved in
 scientific description is open and     
deliberate1 we must come to a more      
precise understanding of it1 if we are  
to draw any conclusion as to what it    
involves4 ,in his ,principles of ,human 
,knowledge1 the ,english philosopher    
,bishop ,berkeley raises the question as
 to the universal validity of           

mathematical demonstrations4 ,if we     
prove from the image or figure of an    
isosceles right triangle that the sum of
 its angles is equal to two right       
angles1 how can we know that this       
proposition holds of all triangles8     
,to which ,i answer1 that1 though the   
idea ,i have in view      whilst ,i make
 the demonstration be1 for instance1    
that of an      isosceles rectangular   
triangle whose sides are of a           
determinate length1 ,i may nevertheless 
be certain it extends      to all other 
rectilinear triangles1 of what sort or  
bigness      soever4 ,and that because  
neither the right angle1 nor the        
equality1 nor determinate length of the 
sides are at all      concerned in the  
demonstration4 ,it is true the diagram  
,i have      in view includes all these 
particulars2 but then there is not      
the least mention made of them in the   
proof of the      proposition4#adj3f    
,of the total conditions present in the 
concrete picture of a triangle1 one may 

in one's calculations neglect as many as
 one sees fit1 and work with the        
remainder4 ,then1 if one has clearly    
distinguished the conditions used1 one  
may confidently assert that whatever has
 been found true of them holds          
regardless of the neglected conditions4 
,these may be missing or replaced by    
others1 provided the selected or 7for   
any given investigation7 essential      
conditions are not affected4 ,that which
 is true once is true always1 provided  
time is not one of its conditions2 that 
which is true in one place is true      
everywhere1 provided location is not one
 of its conditions4 ,but1 given any     
concrete situation1 the more numerous   
the conditions one ignores in one's     
calculations1 the less adequate are     
one's calculations to that situation4   
,the number of its inhabitants1 and any 
mathematical operation made with that   
number1 is true1 but only very          
abstractly true of a nation4 ,a similar 
though less radical abstractness        

appertains to natural science4 ,simple  
qualities of sound or color1 and        
distinctions of beauty or moral worth1  
together with many other ingredients of 
actual experience attributed therein to 
the objects of nature1 are ignored in   
the mechanical scheme4 ,there is a      
substitution of certain mechanical      
arrangements in the case of the first   
group of properties1 the simple         
qualities of sense1 so that they may be 
assimilated to the general scheme of    
events1 and their occurrence predicted4 
,but their intrinsic qualitative        
character is not reckoned with1 even in 
psychology1 where the physiological     
method finally replaces them with brain 
states4 ,over and above these neglected 
properties of things there remain the   
purposive activities of thought4 ,it is 
equally preposterous to deny them and to
 describe them in mechanical terms4 ,it 
is plain1 then1 that natural science    
calculates upon the basis of only a     
fraction of the conditions that present 

themselves in actual experience4 ,its   
conclusions1 therefore1 though true so  
far as they go1 and they may be         
abstractly true of everything1 are      
completely true of nothing4  ,sidenote3 
,but ,scientific ,truth is ,valid for   
,reality4  ,sect4 #ec4 ,such1 in brief1 
is the general charge of inadequacy     
which may be urged against natural      
science1 not in the spirit of           
detraction1 but for the sake of a more  
sound belief concerning reality4 ,the   
philosopher falls into error no less    
radical than that of the dogmatic       
scientist1 when he charges the scientist
 with untruth1 and attaches to his      
concepts the predicate of unreality4    
,the fact that the concepts of science  
are selected1 and only inadequately true
 of reality1 should not be taken to mean
 that they are sportive or arbitrary4   
,they are not devices or abbreviations1 
in any sense that does not attach to    
such symbolism as all thought involves4 
,nor are they merely hypothetical1      

though like all thought they are subject
 to correction4#adb3g ,the scientist    
does not merely assert that the equation
 for energy is true if nature's capacity
 for work be measurable1 but that such  
is actually the case4 ,the statistician 
does not arrive at results contingent   
upon the supposition that men are       
numerable1 but declares his sums and    
averages to be categorically true4      
,similarly scientific laws are true2    
only1 to be sure1 so far as they go1 but
 with no condition save the condition   
that attaches to all knowledge1 viz41   
that it shall not need correction4 ,the 
philosophy of science1 therefore1 is not
 the adversary of science1 but          
supervenes upon science in the interests
 of the ideal of final truth4 ,no       
philosophy of science is sound which    
does not primarily seek by an analysis  
of scientific concepts to understand    
science on its own grounds4 ,philosophy 
may understand science better than      
science understands itself1 but only by 

holding fast to the conviction of its   
truth1 and including it within whatever 
account of reality it may be able to    
formulate4  ,sidenote3 ,relative        
,practical ,value of ,science and       
,philosophy4  ,sect4 #ed4 ,though       
philosophy be the most ancient and most 
exalted of human disciplines1 it is not 
infrequently charged with being the most
 unprofitable4 ,science has amassed a   
fortune of information1 which has       
facilitated life and advanced           
civilization4 ,is not philosophy1 on the
 other hand1 all programme and idle     
questioning8 ,in the first place1 no    
questioning is idle that is logically   
possible4 ,it is true that philosophy   
shows her skill rather in the asking    
than in the answering of questions4 ,but
 the formal pertinence of a question is 
of the greatest significance4 ,no valid 
though unanswered question can have a   
purely negative value1 and especially as
 respects the consistency or            
completeness of truth4 ,but1 in the     

second place1 philosophy with all its   
limitations serves mankind as           
indispensably as science4 ,if science   
supplies the individual with means of   
self-preservation1 and the instruments  
of achievement1 philosophy supplies the 
ideals1 or the objects of deliberate    
construction4 ,such reflection as       
justifies the adoption of a fundamental 
life purpose is always philosophical4   
,for every judgment respecting final    
worth is a judgment sub specie          
eternitatis4 ,and the urgency of life   
requires the individual to pass such    
judgments4 ,it is true that however     
persistently reflective he may be in the
 matter1 his conclusion will be         
premature in consideration of the amount
 of evidence logically demanded for such
 a judgment4 ,but he must be as wise as 
he can1 or he will be as foolish as     
conventionality and blind impulse may   
impel him to be4 ,philosophy determines 
for society what every individual must  
practically determine upon for himself1 

the most reasonable plan of reality as a
 whole which the data and reflection of 
an epoch can afford4 ,it is philosophy's
 service to mankind to compensate for   
the enthusiasm and concentration of the 
specialist1 a service needed in every   
present day4 ,apart from the            
philosopher1 public opinion is the      
victim of sensationalism1 and individual
 opinion is further warped by accidental
 propinquity4 ,it is the function of    
philosophy to interpret knowledge for   
the sake of a sober and wise belief4    
,the philosopher is the true prophet1   
appearing before men in behalf of that  
which is finally the truth4 ,he is the  
spokesman of the most considerate and   
comprehensive reflection possible at any
 stage in the development of human      
thought4 ,owing to a radical            
misconception of function1 the man of   
science has in these later days begun to
 regard himself as the wise man1 and to 
teach the people4 ,popular materialism  
is the logical outcome of this          

determination of belief by natural      
science4 ,it may be that this is due as 
much to the indifference of the         
philosopher as to the forwardness of the
 scientist1 but in any case the result  
is worse than conservative loyalty to   
religious tradition4 ,for religion is   
corrected surely though slowly by the   
whole order of advancing truth4 ,its    
very inflexibility makes it proof       
against an over-emphasis upon new truth4
 ,it has generally turned out in time   
that the obstinate man of religion was  
more nearly right than the adaptable    
intellectual man of fashion4 ,but       
philosophy1 as a critique of science for
 the sake of faith1 should provide the  
individual religious believer with      
intellectual enlightenment and          
gentleness4 ,the quality1 orderliness1  
and inclusiveness of knowledge1 finally 
determine its value2 and the            
philosopher1 premature as his synthesis 
may some day prove to be1 is the wisest 
man of his own generation4 ,from him the

 man of faith should obtain such        
discipline of judgment as shall enable  
him to be fearless of advancing         
knowledge1 because acquainted with its  
scope1 and so intellectually candid with
 all his visions and his inspirations4  
,,footnotes3  #abj3a ,ernst ,mach3      
,science of ,mechanics4 ,translation by 
,mc,cormack1 p4 #dfd4 ,no one has made  
more important contributions than       
,professor ,mach to a certain definite  
modern philosophical movement4 ,cf4     
,sect4 #bjg4  #abi3b ,whewell3 ,history 
of the ,inductive ,sciences1 ,vol4 ,i1  
p4 #bhi4 ,quoted from ,kepler3          
,mysterium ,cosmographicum4  #abi3c     
,quoted by ,sidgwick in his ,philosophy1
 its ,scope and ,relations1 p4 #hi4     
#acb3d ,the reader is referred to ,mr4  
,bertrand ,russell's chapters on matter 
and motion in his ,principles of        
,mathematics1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,material       
particles he defines as many-one        
relations of all times to some places1  
or of all terms of a continuous         

one-dimensional series t to some terms  
of a continuous three-dimensional series
 s4 ,similarly1 when different times1   
throughout any period however short1 are
 correlated with different places1 there
 is motion2 when different times1       
throughout some period however short1   
are all correlated with the same place1 
there is rest4 ,op4 cit41 p4 #dgc4      
#acg3e ,that the scientist still permits
 himself to teach the people a loose    
exoteric theory of reality1 is proven by
 ,professor ,ward's citation of         
instances in his ,naturalism and        
,agnosticism4 ,so eminent a physicist as
 ,lord ,kelvin is quoted as follows3    
,you can imagine particles of something1
 the thing whose motion constitutes     
light4 ,this thing we call the          
luminiferous ether4 ,that is the only   
substance we are confident of in        
dynamics4 ,one thing we are sure of1 and
 that is the reality and substantiality 
of the luminiferous ether4 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 
#aac4  #adj3f ,berkeley3 ,principles of 

,human ,knowledge1 ,introduction4       
,edition of ,fraser1 p4 #bdh4  #adb3g   
,the reader who cares to pursue this    
topic further is referred to the        
writer's discussion of ,professor       
,ward's ,philosophy of ,science in the  
,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and
 ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4   
#ac4     ,,part ,,ii  ,,the ,,special   
,,problems ,,of ,,philosophy            
,,chapter ,,vi  ,,metaphysics ,,and     
,,epistemology   ,sidenote3 ,the        
,impossibility of an ,absolute ,division
 of the ,problem of ,philosophy4  ,sect4
 #ee4 ,the stand-point and purpose of   
the philosopher define his task1 but    
they do not necessarily prearrange the  
division of it4 ,that the task is a     
complex one1 embracing many subordinate 
problems which must be treated seriatim1
 is attested both by the breadth of its 
scope and the variety of the interests  
from which it may be approached4 ,but   
this complexity is qualified by the     
peculiar importance which here attaches 

to unity4 ,that which lends             
philosophical quality to any reflection 
is a steadfast adherence to the ideals  
of inclusiveness and consistency4       
,hence1 though the philosopher must of  
necessity occupy himself with           
subordinate problems1 these cannot be   
completely isolated from one another1   
and solved successively4 ,perspective is
 his most indispensable requisite1 and  
he has solved no problem finally until  
he has provided for the solution of all4
 ,his own peculiar conceptions are those
 which order experience1 and reconcile  
such aspects of it as other interests   
have distinguished4 ,hence the          
compatibility of any idea with all other
 ideas is the prime test of its         
philosophical sufficiency4 ,on these    
grounds it may confidently be asserted  
that the work of philosophy cannot be   
assigned by the piece to different      
specialists1 and then assembled4 ,there 
are no special philosophical problems   
which can be finally solved upon their  

own merits4 ,indeed1 such problems could
 never even be named1 for in their      
discreteness they would cease to be     
philosophical4  ,the case of metaphysics
 and epistemology affords an excellent  
illustration4 ,the former of these is   
commonly defined as the theory of       
reality or of first principles1 the     
latter as the theory of knowledge4 ,but 
the most distinctive philosophical      
movement of the nineteenth century      
issues from the idea that knowing and   
being are identical4#aej3a ,the prime   
reality is defined as a knowing mind1   
and the terms of reality are interpreted
 as terms of a cognitive process4 ,ideas
 and logical principles constitute the  
world4 ,it is evident that in this      
,hegelian philosophy epistemology       
embraces metaphysics4 ,in defining the  
relations of knowledge to its object1   
one has already defined one's           
fundamental philosophical conception1   
while logic1 as the science of the      
universal necessities of thought1 will  

embrace the first principles of reality4
 ,now1 were one to divide and arrange   
the problems of philosophy upon this    
basis1 it is evident that one would not 
have deduced the arrangement from the   
general problem of philosophy1 but from 
a single attempted solution of that     
problem4 ,it might serve as an          
exposition of ,hegel1 but not as a      
general philosophical programme4        
,another case in point is provided by   
the present-day interest in what is     
called pragmatism4#aea3b ,this doctrine 
is historically connected with ,kant's  
principle of the primacy of the         
practical reason1 in which he maintained
 that the consciousness of duty is a    
profounder though less scientific       
insight than the knowledge of objects4  
,the current doctrine maintains that    
thought with its fruits is an expression
 of interest1 and that the will which   
evinces and realizes such an interest is
 more original and significant than that
 which the thinking defines4 ,such a    

view attaches a peculiar importance to  
the springs of conduct1 and in its more 
systematic development#aeb3c has        
regarded ethics as the true propaedeutic
 and proof of philosophy4 ,but to make  
ethics the key-stone of the arch1 is to 
define a special philosophical system2  
for it is the very problem of philosophy
 to dispose the parts of knowledge with 
a view to systematic construction4 ,the 
relation of the provinces of            
metaphysics1 epistemology1 logic1 and   
ethics cannot1 then1 be defined without 
entering these provinces and answering  
the questions proper to them4           
,sidenote3 ,the ,dependence of the      
,order of ,philosophical ,problems upon 
the ,initial ,interest4  ,sect4 #ef4    
,since the above terms exist1 however1  
there can be no doubt but that important
 divisions within the general aim of    
philosophy have actually been made4 ,the
 inevitableness of it appears in the    
variety of the sources from which that  
aim may spring4 ,the point of departure 

will always determine the emphasis and  
the application which the philosophy    
receives4 ,if philosophy be needed to   
supplement more special interests1 it   
will receive a particular character from
 whatever interest it so supplements4   
,he who approaches it from a definite   
stand-point will find in it primarily an
 interpretation of that stand-point4    
,sidenote3 ,philosophy as the           
,interpretation of ,life4  ,sect4 #eg4  
,there are two sources of the           
philosophical aim1 which are perennial  
in their human significance4 ,he1       
firstly1 who begins with the demands of 
life and its ideals1 looks to philosophy
 for a reconciliation of these with the 
orderly procedure of nature4 ,his       
philosophy will receive its form from   
its illumination of life1 and it will be
 an ethical or religious philosophy4    
,spinoza1 the great seventeenth-century 
philosopher who justified mysticism     
after the manner of mathematics1#aec3d  
displays this temper in his philosophy3 

,after experience had taught me that all
 the usual      surroundings of social  
life are vain and futile2 seeing that   
none of the objects of my fears         
contained in themselves      anything   
either good or bad1 except in so far as 
the mind is      affected by them1 ,i   
finally resolved to inquire whether     
there      might be some real good      
having power to communicate itself1     
which would affect the mind singly1 to  
the exclusion of all      else3 whether1
 in fact1 there might be anything of    
which the      discovery and attainment 
would enable me to enjoy continuous1    
supreme1 and unending happiness4#aec3e  
,in pursuance of this aim1 though he    
deals with the problem of being in the  
rigorous logical fashion of his day1 the
 final words of his great work are1 ,of 
,human ,freedom3       ,whereas the wise
 man1 in so far as he is regarded as    
such1 is      scarcely at all disturbed 
in spirit1 but1 being conscious of      
himself1 and of ,god1 and of things1 by 

a certain eternal      necessity1 never 
ceases to be1 but always possesses true 
acquiescence of his spirit4 ,if the way 
which ,i have pointed      out as       
leading to this result seems exceedingly
 hard1 it may      nevertheless be      
discovered4 ,needs must it be hard1     
since it is      so seldom found4 ,how  
would it be possible if salvation were  
ready to our hand1 and could without    
great labor be found1      that it      
should be by almost all men neglected8  
,but all things      excellent are as   
difficult as they are rare4#aed3f       
,sidenote3 ,philosophy as the ,extension
 of ,science4  ,sect4 #eh4 ,on the other
 hand1 one who looks to philosophy for  
the extension and correction of         
scientific knowledge will be primarily  
interested in the philosophical         
definition of ultimate conceptions1 and 
in the method wherewith such a          
definition is obtained4 ,thus the       
philosophy of the scientist will tend to
 be logical and metaphysical4 ,such is  

the case with ,descartes and ,leibniz1  
who are nevertheless intimately related 
to ,spinoza in the historical           
development of philosophy4              
,several years have now elapsed1 says   
the former1 since ,i      first became  
aware that ,i had accepted1 even from my
 youth1      many false opinions for    
true1 and that consequently what ,i     
afterward based on such principles was  
highly doubtful2 and      from that time
 ,i was convinced of the necessity of   
undertaking      once in my life to rid 
myself of all the opinions ,i had       
adopted1 and of commencing anew the work
 of building from the      foundation1  
if ,i desired to establish a firm and   
abiding      superstructure in the      
sciences4#aee3g  ,leibniz's mind was    
more predominantly logical even than    
,descartes's4 ,he sought in philosophy a
 supreme intellectual synthesis1 a      
science of the universe4                
,although1 he says retrospectively1 ,i  
am one of those who      have worked    

much at mathematics1 ,i have none the   
less      meditated upon philosophy from
 my youth up2 for it always      seemed 
to me that there was a possibility of   
establishing      something solid in    
philosophy by clear demonstrations4 4 4 
4      ,i perceived1 after much         
meditation1 that it is impossible to    
find the principles of a real unity in  
matter alone1 or in      that which is  
only passive1 since it is nothing but a 
collection or aggregation of parts ad   
infinitum4#aee3h  ,sidenote3 ,the       
,historical ,differentiation of the     
,philosophical ,problem4  ,sect4 #ei4   
,though these types are peculiarly      
representative1 they are by no means    
exhaustive4 ,there are as many          
possibilities of emphasis as there are  
incentives to philosophical reflection4 
,it is not possible to exhaust the      
aspects of experience which may serve as
 bases from which such thought may      
issue1 and to which1 after its synthetic
 insight1 it may return4 ,but it is     

evident that such divisions of          
philosophy represent in their order1 and
 in the sharpness with which they are   
sundered1 the intellectual autobiography
 of the individual philosopher4 ,there  
is but one method by which that which is
 peculiar either to the individual1 or  
to the special position which he adopts1
 may be eliminated4 ,though it is       
impossible to tabulate the empty        
programme of philosophy1 we may name    
certain special problems that have      
appeared in its history4 ,since this    
history comprehends the activities of   
many individuals1 a general validity    
attaches to it4 ,there has been1        
moreover1 a certain periodicity in the  
emergence of these problems1 so that it 
may fairly be claimed for them that they
 indicate inevitable phases in the      
development of human reflection upon    
experience4 ,they represent a normal    
differentiation of interest which the   
individual mind1 in the course of its   
own thinking1 tends to follow4 ,it is   

true that it can never be said with     
assurance that any age is utterly blind 
to any aspect of experience4 ,this is   
obviously the case with the practical   
and theoretical interests which have    
just been distinguished4 ,there is no   
age that does not have some practical   
consciousness of the world as a whole1  
nor any which does not seek more or less
 earnestly to universalize its science4 
,but though it compel us to deal        
abstractly with historical epochs1 there
 is abundant compensation in the        
possibility which this method affords of
 finding the divisions of philosophy in 
the manifestation of the living         
philosophical spirit4  ,sidenote3       
,metaphysics ,seeks a ,most ,fundamental
 ,conception4  ,sect4 #fj4 ,to ,thales1 
one of the ,seven ,wise ,men of ,greece1
 is commonly awarded the honor of being 
the founder of ,european philosophy4 ,if
 he deserve this distinction1 it is on  
account of the question which he raised1
 and not on account of the answer which 

he gave to it4 ,aristotle informs us    
that ,thales held water to be the       
material cause of all things4#aeg3i     
,this crude theory is evidently due to  
an interest in the totality of things1  
an interest which is therefore          
philosophical4 ,but the interest of this
 first philosopher has a more definite  
character4 ,it looks toward the         
definition in terms of some single      
conception1 of the constitution of the  
world4 ,as a child might conceivably    
think the moon to be made of green      
cheese1 so philosophy in its childhood  
thinks here of all things as made of    
water4 ,water was a well-known          
substance1 possessing well-known        
predicates4 ,to define all nature in    
terms of it1 was to maintain that in    
spite of superficial differences1 all   
things have these predicates in common4 
,they are the predicates which qualify  
for reality1 and compose a community of 
nature from which all the individual    
objects and events of nature arise4 ,the

 successors of ,thales were evidently   
dissatisfied with his fundamental       
conception1 because of its lack of      
generality4 ,they seized upon vaguer    
substances like air and fire1 for the   
very definiteness of the nature of water
 forbids the identification of other    
substances with it4 ,but what is so     
obviously true of water is scarcely less
 true of air and fire2 and it appeared  
at length that only a substance         
possessing the most general characters  
of body1 such as shape1 size1 and       
mobility1 could be thought as truly     
primeval and universal4 ,in this wise a 
conception like our modern physical     
conception of matter came at length into
 vogue4 ,now the problem of which these 
were all tentative solutions is1 in     
general1 the problem of metaphysics2    
although this term belongs to a later   
era1 arising only from the accidental   
place of the discussion of first        
principles after physics in the system  
of ,aristotle4 ,the attempt to secure a 

most fundamental conception which       
attaches some definite meaning to the   
reality including and informing every   
particular thing1 is metaphysics4       
,sidenote3 ,monism and ,pluralism4      
,sect4 #fa4 ,it must not be supposed    
that metaphysics is dogmatically        
committed to the reduction of all       
reality to a unity of nature4 ,it is    
quite consistent with its purpose that  
the parts of reality should be found to 
compose a group1 or an indefinite       
multitude of irreducibly different      
entities4 ,but it is clear that even    
such an account of things deals with    
what is true of all reality1 and even in
 acknowledging the variety of its       
constituents1 attributes to them some   
kind of relationship4 ,the degree to    
which such a relationship is regarded as
 intimate and essential1 determines the 
degree to which any metaphysical system 
is monistic1#aei3aj rather than         
pluralistic4 ,but the significance of   
this difference will be better          

appreciated after a further             
differentiation of the metaphysical     
problem has been noted4  ,sidenote3     
,ontology and ,cosmology ,concern ,being
 and ,process4  ,sect4 #fb4 ,it has     
already been suggested that the test of 
,thales's conception lay in the         
possibility of deriving nature from it4 
,a world principle must be fruitful4    
,now an abstract distinction has        
prevailed more or less persistently in  
metaphysics1 between the general        
definition of being1 called ontology1   
and the study of the processes wherewith
 being is divided into things and       
events4 ,this latter study has to do    
primarily with the details of experience
 enumerated and systematized by the     
natural sciences4 ,to reconcile these1  
or the course of nature1 with the       
fundamental definition of being1 is the 
problem of cosmology4 ,cosmology is the 
construing of the prima facie reality in
 terms of the essential reality4 ,it is 
the proof and the explanation of        

ontology4 ,since the most familiar part 
of the prima facie reality1 the part    
almost exclusively noticed by the naive 
mind1 is embraced within the field of   
the physical sciences1 the term         
cosmology has come more definitely to   
signify the philosophy of nature4 ,it   
embraces such an examination of space1  
time1 matter1 causality1 etc41 as seeks 
to answer the most general questions    
about them1 and provide for them in the 
world thought of as most profoundly     
real4 ,such a study receives its        
philosophical character from its        
affiliation with ontology1 as the latter
 would find its application in          
cosmology4  ,sidenote3 ,mechanical and  
,teleological ,cosmologies4  ,sect4 #fc4
 ,but in addition to the consideration  
of the various parts of nature1         
cosmology has commonly dealt with a     
radical and far-reaching alternative    
that appeared at the very dawn of       
metaphysics4 ,differences may arise     
within a world constituted of a single  

substance or a small group of ultimate  
substances1 by changes in the relative  
position and grouping of the parts4     
,hence the virtue of the conception of  
motion4 ,the theory which explains all  
differences by motions of the parts of a
 qualitatively simple world1 is called  
mechanism4 ,another source of change    
familiar to naive experience is will1 or
 the action of living creatures4        
,according to the mechanical theory1    
changes occur on account of the natural 
motions of the parts of matter2         
according to the latter or teleological 
conception1 changes are made by a       
formative agency directed to some end4  
,among the early ,greek philosophers1   
,leucippus was an exponent of mechanism4
       ,he says that the worlds arise   
when many bodies are collected          
together into the mighty void from the  
surrounding space and      rush         
together4 ,they come into collision1 and
 those which are      of similar shape  
and like form become entangled1 and from

      their entanglement the heavenly   
bodies arise4#afa3aa  ,anaxagoras1 on   
the other hand1 was famed for his       
doctrine of the ,nous1 or ,intelligence1
 to whose direction he attributed the   
whole process of the world4 ,the        
following is translated from extant     
fragments of his book1 peri physeo3s3   
,and ,nous had power over the whole     
revolution1 so that it      began to    
revolve in the beginning4 ,and it began 
to revolve      first from a small      
beginning2 but the revolution now       
extends      over a larger space1 and   
will extend over a larger still4 ,and   
all the things that are mingled together
 and separated off and                  
distinguished are all known by the      
,nous4 ,and ,nous set in order      all 
things that were to be and that were1   
and all things that      are not now and
 that are1 and this revolution in which 
now      revolve the stars and the sun  
and the moon1 and the air and      the  
ether that are separated off4#afb3ab    

,sidenote3 ,dualism4  ,sect4 #fd4 ,it is
 clear1 furthermore1 that the doctrine  
of ,anaxagoras not only names a distinct
 kind of cause1 but also ascribes to it 
an independence and intrinsic importance
 that do not belong to motion4 ,whereas 
motion is a property of matter1         
intelligence is an originative power    
working out purposes of its own         
choosing4 ,hence we have here to do with
 a new ontology4 ,if we construe        
ultimate being in terms of mind1 we have
 a definite substitute for the physical 
theories outlined above4 ,such a theory 
is scarcely to be attributed to any     
,greek philosopher of the early period2 
it belongs to a more sophisticated stage
 in the development of thought1 after   
the rise of the problem of epistemology4
 ,but ,anaxagoras's sharp distinction   
between the material of the world on the
 one hand1 and the author of its order  
and evolution on the other1 is in itself
 worthy of notice4 ,it contains the germ
 of a recurrent philosophical dualism1  

which differs from pluralism in that it 
finds two and only two fundamental      
divisions of being1 the physical1       
material1 or potential on the one hand1 
and the mental1 formal1 or ideal on the 
other4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,new ,meaning of
 ,monism and ,pluralism4  ,sect4 #fe4   
,finally1 the alternative possibilities 
which these cosmological considerations 
introduce1 bear directly upon the       
general question of the interdependence 
of the parts of the world1 a question   
which has already appeared as pertinent 
in ontology4 ,monism and pluralism now  
obtain a new meaning4 ,where the world  
process is informed with some singleness
 of plan1 as teleology proposes1 the    
parts are reciprocally necessary1 and   
inseparable from the unity4 ,where1 on  
the other hand1 the processes are random
 and reciprocally fortuitous1 as        
,leucippus proposes1 the world as a     
whole is an aggregate rather than a     
unity4 ,in this way uniformity in kind  
of being may prevail in a world the     

relations of whose parts are due to     
chance1 while diversity in kind of being
 may prevail in a world knit together by
 some thorough-going plan of            
organization4 ,thus monism and pluralism
 are conceptions as proper to cosmology 
as to ontology4  ,but enough has been   
said to demonstrate the interdependence 
of ontology and cosmology1 of the theory
 of being and the theory of             
differentiation and process4 ,such      
problems can be only abstractly         
sundered1 and the distinctive character 
of any metaphysical system will usually 
consist in some theory determining their
 relation4 ,philosophy returns to these 
metaphysical problems with its thought  
enriched and its method complicated1    
after becoming thoroughly alive to the  
problems of epistemology1 logic1 and    
ethics4  ,sidenote3 ,epistemology ,seeks
 to ,understand the ,possibility of     
,knowledge4  ,sect4 #ff4 ,epistemology  
is the theory of the possibility of     
knowledge1 and issues from criticism and

 scepticism4 ,if we revert again to the 
history of ,greek philosophy1 we find a 
first period of enterprising speculation
 giving place to a second period of     
hesitancy and doubt4 ,this phase of     
thought occurs simultaneously with the  
brilliantly humanistic age of ,pericles1
 and it is undoubtedly true that energy 
is withdrawn from speculation largely   
for the sake of expending it in the more
 lively and engaging pursuits of        
politics and art4 ,but there are patent 
reasons within the sphere of philosophy 
itself for entailment of activity and   
taking of stock4 ,for three centuries   
men have taken their philosophical      
powers for granted1 and used them       
without questioning them4 ,repeated     
attacks upon the problem of reality have
 resulted in no consensus of opinion1   
but only in a disagreement among the    
wise men themselves4 ,a great variety of
 mere theories has been substituted for 
the old unanimity of religious tradition
 and practical life4 ,it is natural     

under these circumstances to infer that 
in philosophy man has overreached       
himself4 ,he would more profitably busy 
himself with affairs that belong to his 
own sphere1 and find a basis for life in
 his immediate relations with his       
fellows4 ,the sophists1 learned in      
tradition1 and skilled in disputation1  
but for the most part entirely lacking  
in originality1 are the new prophets4   
,as teachers of rhetoric and morals1    
they represent the practical and secular
 spirit of their age2 while in their    
avoidance of speculation1 and their     
critical justification of that course1  
they express its sceptical philosophy4  
,sidenote3 ,scepticism1 ,dogmatism1 and 
,agnosticism4  ,sect4 #fg4 ,in their    
self-justification certain of the       
sophists attached themselves to a       
definite doctrine maintained by those of
 their predecessors and contemporaries  
who were atomists1 or followers of that 
same ,leucippus whom we have quoted4    
,this doctrine was the result of an     

attempt to construe perception in terms 
of the motion of atoms4 ,outer objects  
were said to give off fine particles    
which1 through the mediation of the     
sense organs1 impinged upon the         
soul-atom4 ,but it was evident even to  
the early exponents of this theory that 
according to such an account1 each      
perceiver is relegated to a world       
peculiar to his own stand-point4 ,his   
perception informs him concerning his   
own states as affected by things1 rather
 than concerning the things themselves4 
,upon this ground the great sophist     
,protagoras is said to have based his   
dictum3 ,panto3n chre3mato3n metron     
anthro3pos1--,man is the measure of all 
things4 ,this is the classic statement  
of the doctrine of relativity4 ,but we  
have now entered into the province of   
epistemology1 and various alternatives  
confront us4 ,reduce thought to         
perception1 define perception as        
relative to each individual1 and you    
arrive at scepticism1 or the denial of  

the possibility of valid knowledge4     
,plato expounds this consequence in the 
well-known discussion of ,protagoras    
that occurs in the ,theaetetus4       ,i
 am charmed with his doctrine1 that what
 appears is to each      one1 but ,i    
wonder that he did not begin his book on
 ,truth with      a declaration that a  
pig or a dog-faced baboon1 or some other
      yet stranger monster which has    
sensation1 is the measure of      all   
things2 then he might have shown a      
magnificent contempt      for our       
opinion of him by informing us at the   
outset that      while we were          
reverencing him like a ,god for his     
wisdom1 he      was no better than a    
tadpole1 not to speak of his            
fellow-men--would not this have produced
 an overpowering      effect8 ,for if   
truth is only sensation1 and no man can 
discern      another's feelings better  
than he1 or has any superior right      
to determine whether his opinion is true
 or false1 but each1      as we have    

several times repeated1 is to himself   
the sole      judge1 and everything that
 he judges is true and right1 why1      
my friend1 should ,protagoras be        
preferred to the place of      wisdom   
and instruction1 and deserve to be well 
paid1 and we      poor ignoramuses have 
to go to him1 if each one is the measure
      of his own wisdom8 4 4 4 ,the     
attempt to supervise or refute      the 
notions or opinions of others would be a
 tedious and      enormous piece of     
folly1 if to each man his own are right2
 and      this must be the case if      
,protagoras's ,truth is the real truth1 
and the philosopher is not merely       
amusing himself by giving      oracles  
out of the shrine of his book4#afg3ac   
,this is the full swing of the pendulum 
from dogmatism1 or the uncritical       
conviction of truth4 ,a modified form of
 scepticism has been developed in these 
later days under the influence of       
natural science1 and is called          
agnosticism or positivism4 ,it accepts  

the ,protagorean doctrine only in the   
sense of attributing to human knowledge 
as a whole an incapacity for exceeding  
the range of perception4 ,beyond this   
realm of natural science1 where theories
 can be sensibly verified1 lies the     
unknowable realm1 more real1 but forever
 inaccessible4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,source 
and ,criterion of ,knowledge ,according 
to ,empiricism and ,rationalism4        
,mysticism4  ,sect4 #fh4 ,it is         
important to note that both scepticism  
and agnosticism agree in regarding      
perception as the essential factor in   
knowledge4 ,so far at any rate as our   
knowledge is concerned1 the             
certification of being consists in      
perceivability4 ,knowledge is           
coextensive with actual and possible    
human experience4 ,this account of the  
source and criterion of knowledge is    
called empiricism1 in distinction from  
the counter-theory of rationalism4  ,the
 rationalistic motive was a quickening  
influence in ,greek philosophy long     

before it became deliberate and         
conspicuous in ,socrates and ,plato4    
,parmenides1 founder of the ,eleatic    
,school1 has left behind him a poem     
divided into two parts3 ,the ,way of    
,truth and ,the ,way of ,opinion4#afh3ad
 ,in the first of these he expounds his 
esoteric philosophy1 which is a         
definition of being established by      
dialectical reasoning4 ,he finds that   
being must be single1 eternal1 and      
changeless1 because otherwise it cannot 
be thought and defined without          
contradiction4 ,the method which        
,parmenides here employs presupposes    
that knowledge consists in understanding
 rather than perception4 ,indeed1 he    
regards the fact that the world of the  
senses is manifold and mutable as of    
little consequence to the wise man4 ,the
 world of sense is the province of      
vulgar opinion1 while that of reason is 
the absolute truth revealed only to the 
philosopher4 ,the truth has no concern  
with appearance1 but is answerable only 

to the test of rationality4 ,that world 
is real which one is able by thinking to
 make intelligible4 ,the world is what a
 world must be in order to be possible  
at all1 and the philosopher can deduce  
it directly from the very conditions of 
thought which it must satisfy4 ,he who  
would know reality may disregard what   
seems to be1 provided he can by         
reflective analysis discover certain    
general necessities to which being must 
conform4 ,this is rationalism in its    
extreme form4  ,the rationalism of      
,socrates was more moderate1 as it was  
more fruitful than that of ,parmenides4 
,as is well known1 ,socrates composed no
 philosophical books1 but sought to     
inculcate wisdom in his teaching and    
conversation4 ,his method of inculcating
 wisdom was to evoke it in his          
interlocutor by making him considerate  
of the meaning of his speech4 ,through  
his own questions he sought to arouse   
the questioning spirit1 which should    
weigh the import of words1 and be       

satisfied with nothing short of a       
definite and consistent judgment4 ,in   
the ,platonic dialogues the ,socratic   
method obtains a place in literature4   
,in the ,theaetetus1 which is1 perhaps1 
the greatest of all epistemological     
treatises1 ,socrates is represented as  
likening his vocation to that of the    
midwife4       ,well1 my art of         
midwifery is in most respects like      
theirs1      but differs in that ,i     
attend men1 and not women1 and ,i look  
after their souls when they are in      
labor1 and not after their      bodies3 
and the triumph of my art is in         
thoroughly examining      whether the   
thought which the mind of the young man 
brings      forth is a false idol or a  
noble and true birth4 ,and1 like the    
midwives1 ,i am barren1 and the reproach
 which is often made      against me1   
that ,i ask questions of others and have
 not the      wit to answer them myself1
 is very just2 the reason is that       
the god compels me to be a midwife1 but 

does not allow me to      bring forth4  
,and therefore ,i am not myself at all  
wise1 nor      have ,i anything to show 
which is the invention or birth of my   
own soul1 but those who converse with me
 profit4 4 4 4 ,it is      quite clear  
that they never learned anything from   
me2 the      many fine discoveries to   
which they cling are of their own       
making4#aga3ae  ,the principle          
underlying this method is the insistence
 that a proposition1 to be true of      
reality1 must at least bespeak a mind   
that is true to itself1 internally      
luminous1 and free from contradiction4  
,that which is to me nothing that ,i can
 express in form that will convey       
precise meaning and bear analysis1 is so
 far nothing at all4 ,being is not1 as  
the empiricist would have it1 ready at  
hand1 ours for the looking1 but is the  
fruit of critical reflection4 ,only     
reason1 overcoming the relativity of    
perception1 and the chaos of popular    
opinion1 can lay hold on the universal  

truth4  ,a very interesting tendency to 
clothe the articulations of thought with
 the immediacy of perception is         
exhibited in mysticism1 which attributes
 the highest cognitive power to an      
experience that transcends thought1 an  
ineffable insight that is the occasional
 reward of thought and virtuous living4 
,this theory would seem to owe its great
 vigor to the fact that it promises to  
unite the universality of the rational  
object with the vivid presence of the   
empirical object1 though it sacrifices  
the definite content of both4 ,the      
mystic1 empiricist1 and rationalist are 
in these several ways led to revise     
their metaphysics upon the basis of     
their epistemology1 or to define reality
 in terms dictated by the means of      
knowing it4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,relation  
of ,knowledge to its ,object ,according 
to ,realism1 and the ,representative    
,theory4  ,sect4 #fi4 ,but within the   
general field of epistemology there has 
arisen another issue of even greater    

significance in its bearing upon        
metaphysics4 ,the first issue1 as we    
have seen1 has reference to the         
criterion of knowledge1 to the          
possibility of arriving at certainty    
about reality1 and the choice of means  
to that end4 ,a second question arises1 
concerning the relation between the     
knowledge and its object or that which  
is known4 ,this problem does not at     
first appear as an epistemological      
difficulty1 but is due to the emphasis  
which the moral and religious interests 
of men give to the conception of the    
self4 ,my knowing is a part of me1 a    
function of that soul whose welfare and 
eternal happiness ,i am seeking to      
secure4 ,indeed1 my knowing is1 so the  
wise men have always taught1 the        
greatest of my prerogatives4 ,wisdom    
appertains to the philosopher1 as folly 
to the fool4 ,but though my knowledge be
 a part of me1 and in me1 the same      
cannot1 lightly at any rate1 be said of 
what ,i know4 ,it would seem that ,i    

must distinguish between the knowledge1 
which is my act or state1 an event in my
 life1 and the known1 which is object1  
and belongs to the context of the outer 
world4 ,the object of knowledge would   
then be quite independent of the        
circumstance that ,i know it4 ,this     
theory has acquired the name of         
realism1#agc3af and is evidently as     
close to common sense as any            
epistemological doctrine can be said to 
be4 ,if the knowledge consists in some  
sign or symbol which in my mind stands  
for the object1 but is quite other than 
the object1 realism is given the form   
known as the representative theory4     
,this theory is due to a radical        
distinction between the inner world of  
consciousness and the outer world of    
things1 whereby in knowledge the outer  
object requires a substitute that is    
qualified to belong to the inner world4 
,where1 on the other hand1 no specific  
and exclusive nature is attributed to   
the inner world1 realism may flourish   

without the representative theory4 ,in  
such a case the object would be regarded
 as itself capable of entering into any 
number of individual experiences or of  
remaining outside them all1 and without 
on either account forfeiting its        
identity4 ,this view was taken for      
granted by ,plato1 but is elaborately   
defended in our own day4 ,during the    
intervening period epistemology has been
 largely occupied with difficulties     
inherent in the representative theory1  
and from that discussion there has      
emerged the theory of idealism1#age3ag  
the great rival theory to that of       
realism4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,relation of  
,knowledge to its ,object ,according to 
,idealism4  ,sect4 #gj4 ,the            
representative theory contains at least 
one obvious difficulty4 ,if the thinker 
be confined to his ideas1 and if the    
reality be at the same time beyond these
 ideas1 how can he ever verify their    
report8 ,indeed1 what can it mean that  
an idea should be true of that which    

belongs to a wholly different category8 
,how under such circumstances can that  
which is a part of the idea be          
attributed with any certainty to the    
object8 ,once grant that you know only  
your ideas1 and the object reduces to an
 unknown x1 which you retain to account 
for the outward pointing or reference of
 the ideas1 but which is not missed if  
neglected4 ,the obvious though radical  
theory of idealism is almost inevitably 
the next step4 ,why assume that there is
 any object other than the state of     
mind1 since all positive content belongs
 to that realm8 ,the eighteenth century 
,english philosopher1 ,bishop ,berkeley1
 was accused by his contemporaries of   
wilful eccentricity1 and even madness1  
for his boldness in accepting this      
argument and drawing this conclusion3   
,the table ,i write on ,i say exists2   
that is1 ,i see and feel      it3 and if
 ,i were out of my study ,i should say  
it existed2      meaning thereby that if
 ,i was in my study ,i might perceive   

it1      or that some other spirit      
actually does perceive it4 ,there was   
an odor--that is1 it was smelt2 there   
was a sound--that is1 it      was heard2
 a color or figure1 and it was perceived
 by sight or      touch4 ,this is all   
that ,i can understand by these and the 
like      expressions4 ,for as to what  
is said of the absolute      existence  
of unthinking things1 without any       
relation to their      being perceived1 
that is to me perfectly unintelligible4 
,their      esse is percipi2 nor is it  
possible that they should have      any 
existence out of the minds or thinking  
thing which      perceives them4#agf3ah 
,sidenote3 ,phenomenalism1              
,spiritualism1 and ,panpsychism4  ,sect4
 #ga4 ,in this paragraph ,berkeley      
maintains that it is essential to       
things1 or at any rate to their         
qualities1 that they be perceived4 ,this
 principle when expressed as an         
epistemological or metaphysical         
generalization1 is called phenomenalism4

 ,but in another phase of his thought   
,berkeley emphasizes the perceiver1 or  
spirit4 ,the theory which maintains that
 the only real substances are these     
active selves1 with their powers and    
their states1 has been called somewhat  
vaguely by the name of                  
spiritualism4#agf3ai ,philosophically it
 shows a strong tendency to develop into
 either panpsychism or                  
transcendentalism4 ,the former is       
radically empirical4 ,its classic       
representative is the ,german pessimist 
,schopenhauer1 who defined reality in   
terms of will because that term         
signified to him most eloquently the    
directly felt nature of the self4 ,this 
immediate revelation of the true        
inwardness of being serves as the key to
 an intuitive interpretation of the     
gradations of nature1 and will finally  
awaken a sense of the presence of the   
universal ,will4  ,sidenote3            
,transcendentalism1 or ,absolute        
,idealism4  ,sect4 #gb4                 

,transcendentalism1 or absolute         
idealism1 on the other hand1 emphasizes 
the rational activity1 rather than the  
bare subjectivity1 of the self4 ,the    
term transcendental has become          
associated with this type of idealism   
through ,kant1 whose favorite form of   
argument1 the transcendental deduction1 
was an analysis of experience with a    
view to discovering the categories1 or  
formal principles of thought1 implied in
 its meaning4 ,from the ,kantian method 
arose the conception of a standard or   
absolute mind for the standard          
experience4 ,this mind is transcendental
 not in the sense of being alien1 but in
 the sense of exceeding the human mind  
in the direction of what this means and 
strives to be4 ,it is the ideal or      
normal mind1 in which the true reality  
is contained1 with all the chaos of     
finite experience compounded and        
redeemed4 ,there is no being but the    
absolute1 the one all-inclusive         
spiritual life1 in whom all things are  

inherent1 and whose perfection is the   
virtual implication of all purposive    
activities4       ,god's life 4 4 4 sees
 the one plan fulfilled through all the 
manifold lives1 the single consciousness
 winning its purpose      by virtue of  
all the ideas1 of all the individual    
selves1 and      of all the lives4 ,no  
finite view is wholly illusory4 ,every  
finite intent taken precisely in its    
wholeness is fulfilled in      the      
,absolute4 ,the least life is not       
neglected1 the most      fleeting act is
 a recognized part of the world's       
meaning4 ,you      are for the divine   
view all that you know yourself at this 
instant to be4 ,but you are also        
infinitely more4 ,the      preciousness 
of your present purposes to yourself is 
only a      hint of that preciousness   
which in the end links their meaning    
to the entire realm of ,being4#agh3bj   
,the fruitfulness of the philosopher's  
reflective doubt concerning his own     
powers is now evident4 ,problems are    

raised which are not merely urgent in   
themselves1 but which present wholly new
 alternatives to the metaphysician4     
,rationalism and empiricism1 realism and
 idealism1 are doctrines which1 though  
springing from the epistemological query
 concerning the possibility of          
knowledge1 may determine an entire      
philosophical system4 ,they bear upon   
every question of metaphysics1 whether  
the fundamental conception of being1 or 
the problems of the world's unity1      
origin1 and significance for human life4
   ,,footnotes3  #aej3a ,the            
post-,kantian movement in               
,germany--especially in so far as       
influenced by ,hegel4 ,see ,chap4 ,,xii4
  #aea3b ,cf4 ,sect4 #bjc4  #aeb3c ,e4  
g41 the system of ,fichte4 ,cf4 ,sect4  
#agg4  #aec3d ,see ,chap4 ,,xi4  #aec3e 
,spinoza3 ,on the ,improvement of the   
,understanding4 ,translation by ,elwes1 
p4 #c4  #aed3f ,spinoza3 ,ethics1 ,part 
,v1 ,proposition ,,xlii4 ,translation by
 ,elwes1 p4 #bgj4  #aee3g ,descartes3   

,meditations1 ,i4 ,translation by       
,veitch1 p4 #ig4  #aee3h ,leibniz3 ,new 
,system of the ,nature of ,substances4  
,translation by ,latta1 pp4 #bii1 #cjj4 
#aeg3i ,burnet3 ,early ,greek           
,philosophy1 p4 #db4  #aei3aj ,no little
 ambiguity attaches to the term monism  
in current usage1 because of its        
appropriation by those who maintain that
 the universe is unitary and homogeneous
 in physical terms 7cf4 ,sect4 #ajh74   
,it should properly be used to emphasize
 the unity of the world in any terms4   
#afa3aa ,burnet3 ,op4 cit41 p4 #ceh4    
#afb3ab ,burnet3 ,op4 cit41 p4 #bhd4    
#afg3ac ,plato3 ,theaetetus1 #afa4      
,translation by ,jowett4 ,references to 
,plato are to the marginal paging4      
#afh3ad ,burnet3 ,early ,greek          
,philosophy1 pp4 #ahd1 #ahg4  #aga3ae   
,plato3 ,theaetetus1 #aej ,b4           
,translation by ,jowett4  #agc3af ,much 
ambiguity attaches to the terms realism 
and idealism in current usage4 ,the     
first had at one time in the history of 

philosophy a much narrower meaning than 
that which it now possesses4 ,it was    
used to apply to those who1 after       
,plato1 believed in the independent     
reality of ideas1 universals1 or general
 natures4 ,realists in this sense were  
opposed to nominalists and              
conceptualists4 ,nominalism maintained  
the exclusive reality of individual     
substances1 and reduced ideas to        
particular signs having1 like the name1 
a purely symbolical or descriptive      
value4 ,conceptualism sought to unite   
realism and nominalism through the      
conception of mind1 or an individual    
substance whose meanings may possess    
universal validity4 ,though this dispute
 was of fundamental importance          
throughout the mediaeval period1 the    
issues involved have now been restated4 
,realism in the old sense will1 if held1
 come within the scope of the broader   
epistemological realism defined above4  
,nominalism is covered by empirical     
tendencies1 and conceptualism by modern 

idealism4  ,the term idealism is        
sometimes applied to ,plato on account  
of his designation of ideas as the      
ultimate realities4 ,this would be a    
natural use of the term1 but in our own 
day it has become inseparably associated
 with the doctrine which attributes to  
being a dependence upon the activity of 
mind4 ,it is of the utmost importance to
 keep these two meanings clear4 ,in the 
preferred sense ,plato is a realist1 and
 so opposed to idealism4  ,the term     
idealism is further confused on account 
of its employment in literature and     
common speech to denote the control of  
ideals4 ,although this is a kindred     
meaning1 the student of philosophy will 
gain little or no help from it1 and will
 avoid confusion if he distinguishes the
 term in its technical use and permits  
it in that capacity to acquire an       
independent meaning4  #age3ag ,see note1
 p4 #agc4  #agf3ah ,berkeley3           
,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 ,part 
,i1 ,fraser's edition1 p4 #bei4  #agf3ai

 ,to be distinguished from the religious
 sect which bears the same name4        
#agh3bj ,quoted from ,professor ,josiah 
,royce's ,the ,world and the            
,individual1 ,first ,series1 pp4        
#dbf-dbg4     ,,chapter ,,vii  ,,the    
,,normative ,,sciences ,,and ,,the      
,,problems ,,of ,,religion   ,sidenote3 
,the ,normative ,sciences4  ,sect4 #gc4 
,there are three sets of problems whose 
general philosophical importance depends
 upon the place which metaphysics       
assigns to the human critical faculties4
 ,man passes judgment upon that which   
claims to be true1 beautiful1 or good1  
thus referring to ideals and standards  
that define these values4 ,attempts to  
make these ideals explicit1 and to      
formulate principles which regulate     
their attainment1 have resulted in the  
development of the three so-called      
normative sciences3 logic1 aesthetics1  
and ethics4 ,these sciences are said to 
owe their origin to the ,socratic       
method1 and it is indeed certain that   

their problem is closely related to the 
general rationalistic attitude4#ahj3a   
,in ,plato's dialogue1 ,protagoras1 one 
may observe the manner of the inception 
of both ethics and logic4 ,the question 
at issue between ,socrates and the      
master sophist ,protagoras1 is          
concerning the possibility of teaching  
virtue4 ,protagoras conducts his side of
 the discussion with the customary      
rhetorical flourish1 expounding in set  
speeches the tradition and usage in     
which such a possibility is accepted4   
,socrates1 on the other hand1 conceives 
the issue quite differently4 ,one can   
neither affirm nor deny anything of     
virtue unless one knows what is meant by
 it4 ,even the possession of such a     
meaning was scarcely recognized by      
,protagoras1 who was led by ,socrates's 
questions to attribute to the various   
virtues an external grouping analogous  
to that of the parts of the face4 ,but  
,socrates shows that since justice1     
temperance1 courage1 and the like1 are  

admittedly similar in that they are all 
virtues1 they must have in common some  
essence1 which is virtue in general4    
,this he seeks to define in the terms1  
virtue is knowledge4 ,the interest which
 ,socrates here shows in the reduction  
of the ordinary moral judgments to a    
system centering in some single         
fundamental principle1 is the ethical   
interest4 ,but this is at the same time 
a particular application of the general 
rationalistic method of definition1 and 
of the general rationalistic postulate  
that one knows nothing until one can    
form unitary and determinate            
conceptions4 ,the recognition which     
,socrates thus gives to criteria of     
knowledge is an expression of the       
logical interest4 ,in a certain sense1  
indeed1 the whole labor of ,socrates was
 in the cause of the logical interest4  
,for he sought to demonstrate that      
belief is not necessarily knowledge2    
that belief may or may not be true4 ,in 
order that it shall be true1 and        

constitute knowledge1 it must be        
well-grounded1 and accompanied by an    
understanding of its object4 ,socrates  
thus set the problem of logic1 the      
discovery1 namely1 of those characters  
by virtue of the possession of which    
belief is knowledge4  ,sidenote3 ,the   
,affiliations of ,logic4  ,sect4 #gd4   
,logic deals with the ground of belief1 
and thus distinguishes itself from the  
psychological account of the elements of
 the believing state4#ahb3b ,but it is  
not possible sharply to sunder          
psychology and logic4 ,this is due to   
the fact that the general principles    
which make belief true1 may be regarded 
quite independently of this fact4 ,they 
then become the most general truth1     
belonging to the absolute1 archetypal   
realm1 or to the mind of ,god4#ahb3c    
,when the general principles of         
certainty are so regarded1 logic can be 
distinguished from metaphysics only by  
adding to the study of the general      
principles themselves1 the study of the 

special conditions 7mainly              
psychological7 under which they may be  
realized among men4 ,in the history of  
human thought the name of logic belongs 
to the study of this attainment of      
truth1 as the terms aesthetics and      
ethics belong to the studies of the     
attainment of beauty and goodness4#ahc3d
 ,it is evident that logic will have a  
peculiar importance for the rationalist4
 ,for the empiricist1 proposing to      
report upon things as they are given1   
will tend on the whole to maintain that 
knowledge has no properties save those  
which are given to it by its special    
subject-matter4 ,one cannot1 in short1  
define any absolute relationship between
 the normative sciences and the other   
branches of philosophy4  ,sidenote3     
,logic ,deals with the ,most ,general   
,conditions of ,truth in ,belief4       
,sect4 #ge4 ,logic is the formulation1  
as independently as possible of special 
subject-matter1 of that which conditions
 truth in belief4 ,since logic is       

concerned with truth only in so far as  
it is predicated of belief1 and since   
belief in so far as true is knowledge1  
logic can be defined as the formulation 
of the most general principles of       
knowledge4 ,the principles so formulated
 would be those virtually used to       
justify belief or to disprove the       
imputation of error4  ,sidenote3 ,the   
,parts of ,formal ,logic4 ,definition1  
,self-evidence1 ,inference1 and         
,observation4  ,sect4 #gf4 ,what is     
called formal logic is animated with the
 hope of extracting these formulations  
directly from an analysis of the        
procedure of thought4 ,the most general 
logical principles which have appeared  
in the historical development of formal 
logic are definition1 self-evidence1    
inference1 and observation4 ,each of    
these has been given special study1 and 
each has given rise to special issues4  
,definition has to do with the formation
 of concepts1 or determinate and        
unequivocal meanings4 ,the universality 

of such concepts1 and their consequent  
relation to particular things1 was1 as  
we have seen1 investigated at a very    
early date1 and gave rise to the great  
realistic-nominalistic                  
controversy4#ahd3e ,a large part of the 
logical discussion in the ,platonic     
dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier
 eristic1 a form of disputation in favor
 with the sophists1 and consisting in   
the adroit use of ambiguity4#ahd3f ,it  
is natural that in its first conscious  
self-criticism thought should discover  
the need of definite terms4 ,the        
perpetual importance of definition has  
been largely due to the great prestige  
in modern philosophy of the method of   
geometry1 which was regarded by         
,descartes and ,spinoza as the model for
 systems of necessary truth4            
,self-evidence is the principle         
according to which conviction of truth  
follows directly from an understanding  
of meaning4 ,in the practice of his     
intellectual midwifery1 ,socrates       

presupposed that thought is capable of  
bringing forth its own certainties4 ,and
 rationalism has at all times regarded  
truth as ultimately accredited by       
internal marks recognizable by reason4  
,such truth arrived at antecedent to    
acquaintance with instances is called a 
priori1 as distinguished from a         
posteriori knowledge1 or observation    
after the fact4 ,there can be no        
principles of self-evidence1 but        
logicians have always been more or less 
concerned with the enumeration of       
alleged self-evident principles1 notably
 those of contradiction and identity4 ,a
 philosophical interest in the          
mathematical method has led to a logical
 study of axioms1 but with a view rather
 to their fruitfulness than their       
intrinsic truth4 ,indeed1 the interest  
in self-evident truth has always been   
subordinate to the interest in          
systematic truth1 and the discovery of  
first principles most commonly serves to
 determine the relative priority of     

definite concepts1 or the correct point 
of departure for a series of inferences4
  ,the greater part of the famous       
,aristotelian logic consists in a study 
of inference1 or the derivation of new  
knowledge from old knowledge4 ,aristotle
 sought to set down and classify every  
method of advancing from premises4 ,the 
most important form of inference which  
he defined was the syllogism1 a scheme  
of reasoning to a conclusion by means of
 two premises having one term in common4
 ,from the premises all men are mortal  
and ,socrates is a man1 one may conclude
 that ,socrates is mortal4 ,this is an  
instance not only of the syllogism in   
general1 but of its most important mood1
 the subsumption of a particular case   
under a general rule4 ,since the decline
 of ,aristotle's influence in philosophy
 there has been a notable decrease of   
interest in the different forms of      
inference2 though its fundamental       
importance as the very bone and sinew of
 reasoning or deductive thinking has    

never been challenged4 ,its loss of     
pre-eminence is in part due to the      
growth of empiricism1 stimulated by the 
writings of ,lord ,bacon in the         
seventeenth century1 and fostered by the
 subsequent development of experimental 
science4  ,observation is the           
fundamental logical principle of        
empiricism4 ,for a radical empiricism1  
knowledge would consist of descriptive  
generalizations based upon the summation
 of instances4 ,that branch of logic    
which deals with the advance from       
individual instances to general         
principles1 is called inductive logic4  
,it has resulted in the announcement of 
canons of accuracy and freedom from     
preconception1 and in the methodological
 study of hypothesis1 experiment1 and   
verification4 ,rules for observation    
directed to the end of discovering      
causes1 constitute the most famous part 
of the epoch-making logic of ,j4 ,s4    
,mills4#ahg3g  ,sidenote3 ,present      
,tendencies4 ,theory of the ,judgment4  

,sect4 #gg4 ,there are two significant  
tendencies in contemporary logic4       
,theories of the judgment have arisen in
 the course of an attempt to define the 
least complexity that must be present in
 order that thought shall come within   
the range of truth and error4 ,it is    
evident that no one either knows or is  
in error until he takes some attitude   
which lays claim to knowledge4 ,denoting
 by the term judgment this minimum of   
complexity in knowledge1 an important   
question arises as to the sense in which
 the judgment involves the subject1     
predicate1 and copula that are commonly 
present in its propositional form4      
,sidenote3 ,priority of ,concepts4      
,sect4 #gh4 ,but a more important       
logical development has been due to the 
recent analysis of definite accredited  
systems of knowledge4 ,the study of the 
fundamental conceptions of mathematics  
and mechanics1 together with an         
examination of the systematic structure 
of these sciences1 furnishes the most   

notable cases4 ,there are two senses in 
which such studies may be regarded as   
logical4 ,in the first place1 in so far 
as they bring to light the inner        
coherence of any body of truth1 the kind
 of evidence upon which it rests1 and   
the type of formal perfection which it  
seeks1 they differ from formal logic    
only in that they derive their criteria 
from cases1 rather than from the direct 
analysis of the procedure of thought4   
,and since formal logic must itself make
 experiments1 this difference is not a  
radical one4 ,the study of cases tends  
chiefly to enrich methodology1 or the   
knowledge of the special criteria of    
special sciences4 ,in the second place1 
such studies serve to define the        
relatively few simple truths which are  
common to the relatively many complex   
truths4 ,a study of the foundations of  
arithmetic reveals more elementary      
conceptions1 such as class and order1   
that must be employed in the very       
definition of number itself1 and so are 

implied in every numerical calculation4 
,it appears similarly that the axioms of
 geometry are special axioms which      
involve the acceptance of more general  
axioms or indefinables4#ahi3h ,logic in 
this sense1 then1 is the enumeration of 
conceptions and principles in the order 
of their indispensableness to knowledge4
 ,and while it must be observed that the
 most general conceptions and principles
 of knowledge are not necessarily those 
most significant for the existent world1
 nevertheless the careful analysis which
 such an enumeration involves is        
scarcely less fruitful for metaphysics  
than for logic4  ,sidenote3 ,aesthetics 
,deals with the ,most ,general          
,conditions of ,beauty4 ,subjectivistic 
and ,formalistic ,tendencies4  ,sect4   
#gi4 ,aesthetics is the formulation1 as 
independently as possible of special    
subject-matter1 of that which conditions
 beauty4 ,as logic commonly refers to a 
judgment of truth1 so aesthetics at any 
rate refers to a judgment implied in    

appreciation4 ,but while it is generally
 admitted that truth itself is by no    
means limited to the form of the        
judgment1 the contrary is frequently    
maintained with reference to beauty4    
,the aphorism1 ,de gustibus non est     
disputandum1 expresses a common opinion 
to the effect that beauty is not a      
property belonging to the object of     
which it is predicated1 but a property  
generated by the appreciative           
consciousness4 ,according to this       
opinion there can be no beauty except in
 the case of an object's presence in an 
individual experience4 ,investigators   
must of necessity refuse to leave       
individual caprice in complete          
possession of the field1 but they have  
in many cases occupied themselves       
entirely with the state of aesthetic    
enjoyment in the hope of discovering its
 constant factors4 ,the opposing        
tendency defines certain formal         
characters which the beautiful object   
must possess4 ,evidently the latter     

school will attribute a more profound   
philosophical importance to the         
conception of beauty1 since for them it 
is a principle that obtains in the world
 of being4 ,this was the first notable  
contention1 that of ,plato4 ,but even   
with the emphasis laid upon the         
subjective aspect of the aesthetic      
experience1 great metaphysical          
importance may be attached to it1 where1
 as in the case of the ,german          
,romanticists1 reality is deliberately  
construed as a spiritual life which is  
to be appreciated rather than           
understood4  ,as in the case of logic1 a
 strong impulse has manifested itself in
 aesthetics to deal with groups of      
objects that lie within its province1   
rather than directly with its concepts  
and principles4 ,the first special      
treatise on aesthetics1 the ,poetics of 
,aristotle1 belongs to this type of     
inquiry1 as does all criticism of art in
 so far as it aims at the formulation of
 general principles4  ,sidenote3 ,ethics

 ,deals with the ,most ,general         
,conditions of ,moral ,goodness4  ,sect4
 #hj4 ,ethics1 the oldest and most      
popular of the normative sciences1 is   
the formulation1 as independently as    
possible of special subject-matter1 of  
that which conditions goodness of       
conduct4 ,ethics is commonly concerned  
with goodness only in so far as it is   
predicated of conduct1 or of character1 
which is a more or less permanent       
disposition to conduct4 ,since conduct1 
in so far as good1 is said to constitute
 moral goodness1 ethics may be defined  
as the formulation of the general       
principles of morality4 ,the principles 
so formulated would be those virtually  
employed to justify conduct1 or to      
disprove the imputation of immorality4  
,sidenote3 ,conceptions of the ,good4   
,hedonism4  ,sect4 #ha4 ,the student of 
this science is confronted with a very  
considerable diversity of method and    
differentiation of problems4 ,the       
earliest and most profound opposition of

 doctrine in ethics arose from the      
differences of interpretation of which  
the teaching of ,socrates is capable4   
,his doctrine is1 as we have seen1      
verbally expressed in the proposition1  
virtue is knowledge4 ,socrates was      
primarily concerned to show that there  
is no real living without an            
understanding of the significance of    
life4 ,to live well is to know the end  
of life1 the good of it all1 and to     
govern action with reference to that    
end4 ,virtue is therefore the practical 
wisdom that enables one to live         
consistently with his real intention4   
,but what is the real intention1 the end
 or good of life8 ,in the ,protagoras1  
where ,plato represents ,socrates as    
expounding his position1 virtue is      
interpreted to mean prudence1 or        
foresight of pleasurable and painful    
consequences4 ,he who knows1 possesses  
all virtue in that he is qualified to   
adapt himself to the real situation and 
to gain the end of pleasure4 ,all men1  

indeed1 seek pleasure1 but only virtuous
 men seek it wisely and well4       ,and
 do you1 ,protagoras1 like the rest of  
the world1 call some      pleasant      
things evil and some painful things     
good8--for ,i am      rather disposed to
 say that things are good in as far as  
they      are pleasant1 if they have no 
consequences of another sort1      and  
in as far as they are painful they are  
bad4#aib3i  ,according to this view     
painful things are good only when they  
lead eventually to pleasure1 and        
pleasant things evil only when their    
painful consequences outweigh their     
pleasantness4 ,hence moral differences  
reduce to differences of skill in the   
universal quest for pleasure1 and       
sensible gratification is the ultimate  
standard of moral value4 ,this ancient  
doctrine1 known as hedonism1 expressing 
as it does a part of life that will not 
suffer itself for long to be denied1 is 
one of the great perennial tendencies of
 ethical thought4 ,in the course of many

 centuries it has passed through a      
number of phases1 varying its conception
 of pleasure from the tranquillity of   
the wise man to the sensuous            
titillations of the sybarite1 and from  
the individualism of the latter to the  
universalism of the humanitarian4 ,but  
in every case it shows a respect for the
 natural man1 praising morality for its 
disciplinary and instrumental value in  
the service of such human wants as are  
the outgrowth of the animal instinct of 
self-preservation4  ,sidenote3          
,rationalism4  ,sect4 #hb4 ,but if a    
man's life be regarded as a truer       
representation of his ideals than is his
 spoken theory1 there is little to      
identify ,socrates with the hedonists4  
,at the conclusion of the defence of his
 own life1 which ,plato puts into his   
mouth in the well-known ,apology1 he    
speaks thus3       ,when my sons are    
grown up1 ,i would ask you1 ,o my       
friends1 to      punish them2 and ,i    
would have you trouble them1 as ,i have 

troubled you1 if they seem to care about
 riches1 or anything1      more than    
about virtue2 or if they pretend to be  
something      when they are really     
nothing1--then reprove them1 as ,i have 
reproved you1 for not caring about that 
for which they ought      to care1 and  
thinking that they are something when   
they are      really nothing4#aid3aj    
,it is plain that the man ,socrates     
cared little for the pleasurable or     
painful consequences of his acts1       
provided they were worthy of the high   
calling of human nature4 ,a man's virtue
 would now seem to possess an intrinsic 
nobility4 ,if knowledge be virtue1 then 
on this basis it must be because        
knowledge is itself excellent4 ,virtue  
as knowledge contributes to the good by 
constituting it4 ,we meet here with the 
rationalistic strain in ethics4 ,it     
praises conduct for the inherent worth  
which it may possess if it express that 
reason which the ,stoics called the     
ruling part4 ,the riches of wisdom      

consist for the hedonist in their       
purchase of pleasure4 ,for the          
rationalist1 on the other hand1 wisdom  
is not coin1 but itself the very        
substance of value4  ,sidenote3         
,eudaemonism and ,pietism4 ,rigorism and
 ,intuitionism4  ,sect4 #hc4            
,rationalism has undergone modifications
 even more significant than those of    
hedonism1 and involving at least one    
radically new group of conceptions4     
,among the ,greeks rationalism and      
hedonism alike are eudaemonistic4 ,they 
aim to portray the fulness of life that 
makes the happy man4 ,in the ethics of  
,aristotle1 whose synthetic mind weaves 
together these different strands1 the   
,greek ideal finds its most complete    
expression as the high-minded man1 with 
all his powers and trappings4 ,but the  
great spiritual transformation which    
accompanied the decline of ,greek       
culture and the rise of ,christianity1  
brought with it a new moral sensibility1
 which finds in man no virtue of        

himself1 but only through the grace of  
,god4       ,and the virtues themselves1
 says ,st4 ,augustine1 if they      bear
 no relation to ,god1 are in truth vices
 rather than      virtues2 for although 
they are regarded by many as truly moral
      when they are desired as ends in  
themselves and not for the      sake of 
something else1 they are1 nevertheless1 
inflated and      arrogant1 and         
therefore not to be viewed as virtues   
but as      vices4#aie3aa  ,the new     
ideal is that of renunciation1          
obedience1 and resignation4 ,ethically  
this expresses itself in pietism4       
,virtue is good neither in itself nor on
 account of its consequences1 but       
because it is conformable to the will of
 ,god4 ,the extreme inwardness of this  
ideal is characteristic of an age that  
despaired of attainment1 whether of     
pleasure or knowledge4 ,to all1 even the
 persecuted1 it is permitted to obey1   
and so gain entrance into the kingdom of
 the children of ,god4 ,but as every    

special study tends to rely upon its own
 conceptions1 pietism1 involving as it  
does a relation to ,god1 is replaced by 
rigorism and intuitionism4 ,the former  
doctrine defines virtue in terms of the 
inner attitude which it expresses4 ,it  
must be done in the spirit of           
dutifulness1 because one ought1 and     
through sheer respect for the law which 
one's moral nature affirms4             
,intuitionism has attempted to deal with
 the source of the moral law by defining
 conscience as a special faculty or     
sense1 qualified to pass directly upon  
moral questions1 and deserving of       
implicit obediences4 ,it is             
characteristic of this whole tendency to
 look for the spring of virtuous living1
 not in a good which such living        
obtains1 but in a law to which it owes  
obedience4  ,sidenote3 ,duty and        
,freedom4 ,ethics and ,metaphysics4     
,sect4 #hd4 ,this third general ethical 
tendency has thus been of the greatest  
importance in emphasizing the           

consciousness of duty1 and has brought  
both hedonism and rationalism to a      
recognition of its fundamental          
importance4 ,ethics must deal not only  
with the moral ideal1 but also with the 
ground of its appeal to the individual1 
and his obligation to pursue it4 ,in    
connection with this recognition of     
moral responsibility1 the problem of    
human freedom has come to be regarded in
 the light of an inevitable point of    
contact between ethics and metaphysics4 
,that which is absolutely binding upon  
the human will can be determined only in
 view of some theory of its ultimate    
nature4 ,on this account the            
rationalistic and hedonistic motives are
 no longer abstractly sundered1 as in   
the days of the ,stoics and ,epicureans1
 but tend to be absorbed in broader     
philosophical tendencies4 ,hedonism     
appears as the sequel to naturalism2 or1
 more rarely1 as part of a theistic     
system whose morality is divine         
legislation enforced by an appeal to    

motives of pleasure and pain4           
,rationalism1 on the other hand1 tends  
to be absorbed in rationalistic or      
idealistic philosophies1 where man's    
rational nature is construed as his bond
 of kinship with the universe4  ,ethics 
has exhibited from the beginning a      
tendency to universalize its conceptions
 and take the central place in          
metaphysics4 ,thus with ,plato good     
conduct was but a special case of       
goodness1 the good being the most       
general principle of reality4#aih3ab ,in
 modern times ,fichte and his school    
have founded an ethical metaphysics upon
 the conception of duty4#aih3ac ,in     
these cases ethics can be distinguished 
from metaphysics only by adding to the  
study of the good or of duty1 a study of
 the special physical1 psychological1   
and social conditions under which       
goodness and dutifulness may obtain in  
human life4 ,it is possible to attach   
the name of ethics1 and we have seen the
 same to be true of logic1 either to a  

realm of ideal truth or to that realm   
wherein the ideal is realized in        
humanity4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,virtues1    
,customs1 and ,institutions4  ,sect4    
#he4 ,a systematic study of ethics      
requires that the virtues1 or types of  
moral practice1 shall be interpreted in 
the light of the central conception of  
good1 or of conscience4 ,justice1       
temperance1 wisdom1 and courage were    
praised by the ,greeks4 ,christianity   
added self-sacrifice1 humility1 purity1 
and benevolence4 ,these and other       
virtues have been defined1 justified1   
and co-ordinated with the aid of a      
standard of moral value or a canon of   
duty4  ,there is in modern ethics a     
pronounced tendency1 parallel to those  
already noted in logic and aesthetics1  
to study such phenomena belonging to its
 field as have become historically      
established4 ,a very considerable       
investigation of custom1 institutions1  
and other social forces has led to a    
contact of ethics with anthropology and 

sociology scarcely less significant than
 that with metaphysics4         99      
99       99       99       99           
,sidenote3 ,the ,problems of ,religion4 
,the ,special ,interests of ,faith4     
,sect4 #hf4 ,in that part of his        
philosophy in which he deals with faith1
 the great ,german philosopher ,kant    
mentions ,god1 ,freedom1 and            
,immortality as the three pre-eminent   
religious interests4 ,religion1 as we   
have seen1 sets up a social relationship
 between man and that massive drift of  
things which determines his destiny4 ,of
 the two terms of this relation1 ,god   
signifies the latter1 while freedom and 
immortality are prerogatives which      
religion bestows upon the former4 ,man1 
viewed from the stand-point of religion 
as an object of special interest to the 
universe1 is said to have a soul2 and by
 virtue of this soul he is said to be   
free and immortal1 when thought of as   
having a life in certain senses         
independent of its immediate natural    

environment4 ,the attempt to make this  
faith theoretically intelligible has led
 to the philosophical disciplines known 
as theology and psychology4#aii3ad      
,sidenote3 ,theology ,deals with the    
,nature and ,proof of ,god4  ,sect4 #hg4
 ,theology1 as a branch of philosophy1  
deals with the proof and the nature of  
,god4 ,since ,god is not primarily a    
theoretical conception1 the proof of    
,god is not properly a philosophical    
problem4 ,historically1 this task has   
been assumed as a legacy from ,christian
 apologetics2 and it has involved1 at   
any rate so far as ,european philosophy 
is concerned1 the definition of ultimate
 being in such spiritual terms as make  
possible the relation with man          
postulated in ,christianity4 ,for this  
it has been regarded as sufficient to   
ascribe to the world an underlying unity
 capable of bearing the predicates of   
perfection1 omnipotence1 and            
omniscience4 ,each proof of ,god has    
defined him pre-eminently in terms of   

some one of these his attributes4       
,sidenote3 ,the ,ontological ,proof of  
,god4  ,sect4 #hh4 ,the ontological     
proof of ,god held the foremost place in
 philosophy's contribution to           
,christianity up to the eighteenth      
century4 ,this proof infers the         
existence from the ideal of ,god1 and so
 approaches the nature of ,god through  
the attribute of perfection4 ,it owes   
the form in which it was accepted in the
 ,middle ,ages and ,renaissance to ,st4 
,anselm1 ,archbishop of ,canterbury at  
the close of the eleventh century4 ,he  
argued from the idea of a most perfect  
being to its existence1 on the ground   
that non-existence1 or existence only in
 idea1 would contradict its perfection4 
,it is evident that the force of this   
argument depends upon the necessity of  
the idea of ,god4 ,the argument was     
accepted in ,scholastic                 
,philosophy#bja3ae largely because of   
the virtual acceptance of this          
necessity4 ,mediaeval thought was under 

the dominance of the philosophical ideas
 of ,plato and ,aristotle1 and through  
them rationalism had come to be the     
unquestioned starting-point for all     
thought4 ,for ,plato reality and        
rationality meant one and the same      
thing1 so that the ultimate reality was 
the highest principle of rationality1   
which he conceived to be the idea of the
 good4 ,in the case of ,aristotle the   
ideal of rationality was conceived to   
determine the course of the cosmical    
evolution as its immanent final cause4  
,but in itself it was beyond the world1 
or transcendent4 ,for ,plato perfection 
itself is reality1 whereas for          
,aristotle perfection determines the    
hierarchical order of natural           
substances4 ,the latter theory1 more    
suitable to the uses of ,christianity1  
because it distinguished between ,god   
and the world1 was incorporated into the
 great school systems4 ,but both        
theories contain the essence of the     
ontological proof of ,god4 ,in thought  

one seeks the perfect truth1 and posits 
it as at once the culmination of insight
 and the meaning of life4 ,the ideal of 
,god is therefore a necessary idea1     
because implied in all the effort of    
thought as the object capable of finally
 satisfying it4 ,st4 ,anselm adds little
 to the force of this argument1 and does
 much to obscure its real significance4 
,in stating the ontological argument the
 term perfection has been expressly     
emphasized1 because it may be taken to  
embrace both truth and goodness4 ,owing 
to a habit of thought1 due in the main  
to ,plato1 it was long customary to     
regard degrees of truth and goodness as 
interchangeable1 and as equivalent to   
degrees of reality4 ,the ens realissimum
 was in its completeness the highest    
object both of the faculty of cognition 
and of the moral will4 ,but even in the 
scholastic period these two different   
aspects of the ideal were clearly       
recognized1 and led to sharply divergent
 tendencies4 ,more recently they have   

been divided and embodied in separate   
arguments4 ,the epistemological argument
 defines ,god in terms of that absolute 
truth which is referred to in every     
judgment4 ,under the influence of       
idealism this absolute truth has taken  
the form of a universal mind1 or        
all-embracing standard experience1      
called more briefly the absolute4 ,the  
ethical argument1 on the other hand1    
conceives ,god as the perfect goodness  
implied in the moral struggle1 or the   
power through which goodness is made to 
triumph in the universe to the          
justification of moral faith4 ,while the
 former of these arguments identifies   
,god with being1 the latter defines ,god
 in terms of the intent or outcome of   
being4 ,thus1 while the epistemological 
argument does not distinguish ,god and  
the world1 the latter does so1 assuming 
that independent reality can be         
attributed to the stages of a process   
and to the purpose that dominates it4   
,sidenote3 ,the ,cosmological ,proof of 

,god4  ,sect4 #hi4 ,the cosmological    
proof of ,god approaches him through the
 attribute of creative omnipotence4 ,the
 common principle of causal explanation 
refers the origin of natural events to  
similar antecedent events4 ,but there   
must be some first cause from which the 
whole series is derived1 a cause which  
is ultimate1 sufficient to itself1 and  
the responsible author of the world4    
,because ,god's function as creator was 
a part of the ,christian teaching1 and  
because explanation by causes is        
habitual with common sense1 this        
argument has had great vogue4 ,but in   
philosophy it has declined in           
importance1 chiefly because it has been 
absorbed in arguments which deal with   
the kind of causality proper to a first 
cause or world-ground4 ,the argument    
that follows is a case in point4        
,sidenote3 ,the ,teleological ,proof of 
,god4  ,sect4 #ij4 ,the teleological    
proof argues that the world can owe its 
origin only to an intelligent first     

cause4 ,the evidence for this is        
furnished by the cunning contrivances   
and beneficent adaptations of nature4   
,these could not have come about through
 chance or the working of mechanical    
forces1 but only through the foresight  
of a rational will4 ,this argument      
originally infers ,god from the         
character of nature and history2 and the
 extension of mechanical principles to  
organic and social phenomena1 especially
 as stimulated by ,darwin's principle of
 natural selection1 has tended greatly  
to diminish its importance4 ,when1 on   
the other hand1 for nature and history  
there are substituted the intellectual  
and moral activities themselves1 and the
 inference is made to the ideal which   
they imply1 the teleological argument   
merges into the ontological4 ,but the   
old-fashioned statement of it remains in
 the form of religious faith1 and in    
this capacity it has had the approval   
even of ,hume and ,kant1 the            
philosophers who have contributed most  

forcibly to its overthrow as a          
demonstration of ,god4 ,they agree that 
the acknowledgment of ,god in nature and
 history is the sequel to a theistic    
belief1 and an inevitable attitude on   
the part of the religious consciousness4
  ,sidenote3 ,god and the ,world4       
,theism and ,pantheism4  ,sect4 #ia4    
,another group of ideas belonging to    
philosophical theology consists of three
 generalizations respecting ,god's      
relation to the world1 known as theism1 
pantheism1 and deism4 ,although1        
theoretically1 these are corollaries of 
the different arguments for ,god1 two of
 them1 theism and pantheism1 owe their  
importance to their rivalry as religious
 tendencies4 ,theism emphasizes that    
attitude to ,god which recognizes in him
 an historical personage1 in some sense 
distinct from both the world and man1   
which are his works and yet stand in an 
external relationship to him4 ,it       
expresses the spirit of ethical and     
monotheistic religion1 and is therefore 

the natural belief of the ,christian4   
,pantheism appears in primitive religion
 as an animistic or polytheistic sense  
of the presence of a divine principle   
diffused throughout nature4 ,but it     
figures most notably in the history of  
religions1 in the highly reflective     
,brahmanism of ,india4 ,in sharp        
opposition to ,christianity1 this       
religion preaches the indivisible unity 
of the world and the illusoriness of the
 individual's sense of his own          
independent reality4 ,in spite of the   
fact that such a doctrine is alien to   
the spirit of ,christianity1 it enters  
into ,christian theology through the    
influence of philosophy4 ,the           
theoretical idea of ,god tends1 as we   
have seen1 to the identification of him 
with the world as its most real         
principle4 ,or it bestows upon him a    
nature so logical and formal1 and so far
 removed from the characters of         
humanity1 as to forbid his entering into
 personal or social relations4 ,such    

reflections concerning ,god find their  
religious expression in a mystical sense
 of unity1 which has in many cases      
either entirely replaced or profoundly  
modified the theistic strain in         
,christianity4 ,in current philosophy   
pantheism appears in the epistemological
 argument which identifies ,god with    
being2 while the chief bulwark of theism
 is the ethical argument1 with its      
provision for a distinction between the 
actual world and ideal principle of     
evolution4  ,sidenote3 ,deism4  ,sect4  
#ib4 ,while theism and pantheism appear 
to be permanent phases in the philosophy
 of religion1 deism is the peculiar     
product of the eighteenth century4 ,it  
is based upon a repudiation of          
supernaturalism and enthusiasm1 on the  
one hand1 and a literal acceptance of   
the cosmological and teleological proofs
 on the other4 ,religions1 like all     
else1 were required1 in this epoch of   
clear thinking1 to submit to the canons 
of experimental observation and         

practical common sense4 ,these authorize
 only a natural religion1 the           
acknowledgment in pious living of a ,god
 who1 having contrived this natural     
world1 has given it over to the rule1   
not of priests and prophets1 but of     
natural law4 ,the artificiality of its  
conception of ,god1 and the calculating 
spirit of its piety1 make deism a much  
less genuine expression of the religious
 experience than either the moral       
chivalry of theism or the intellectual  
and mystical exaltation of pantheism4   
,sidenote3 ,metaphysics and ,theology4  
,sect4 #ic4 ,the systematic development 
of philosophy leads to the inclusion of 
conceptions of ,god within the problem  
of metaphysics1 and the subordination of
 the proof of ,god to the determination 
of the fundamental principle of reality4
 ,there will always remain1 however1 an 
outstanding theological discipline1     
whose function it is to interpret       
worship1 or the living religious        
attitude1 in terms of the theoretical   

principles of philosophy4  ,sidenote3   
,psychology is the ,theory of the ,soul4
  ,sect4 #id4 ,psychology is the theory 
of the soul4 ,as we have already seen1  
the rise of scepticism directs attention
 from the object of thought to the      
thinker1 and so emphasizes the self as a
 field for theoretical investigation4   
,but the original and the dominating    
interest in the self is a practical one4
 ,the precept1 gno3thi seauton1 has its 
deepest justification in the concern for
 the salvation of one's soul4 ,in       
primitive and half-instinctive belief   
the self is recognized in practical     
relations4 ,in its animistic phase this 
belief admitted of such relations with  
all living creatures1 and extended the  
conception of life very generally to    
natural processes4 ,thus in the         
beginning the self was doubtless        
indistinguishable from the vital        
principle4 ,in the first treatise on    
psychology1 the peri ,psyche3s of       
,aristotle1 this interpretation finds a 

place in theoretical philosophy4 ,for   
,aristotle the soul is the entelechy of 
the body--that function or activity     
which makes a man of it4 ,he recognized1
 furthermore1 three stages in this      
activity3 the nutritive1 sensitive1 and 
rational souls1 or the vegetable1       
animal1 and distinctively human natures1
 respectively4 ,the rational soul1 in   
its own proper activity1 is man's       
highest prerogative1 the soul to be     
saved4 ,by virtue of it man rises above 
bodily conditions1 and lays hold on the 
divine and eternal4 ,but ,plato1 who1 as
 we have seen1 was ever ready to grant  
reality to the ideal apart from the     
circumstances of its particular         
embodiment1 had already undertaken to   
demonstrate the immortality of the soul 
on the ground of its distinctive        
nature4#bji3af ,according to his way of 
thinking1 the soul's essentially moral  
nature made it incapable of destruction 
through the operation of natural causes4
 ,it is evident1 then1 that there were  

already ideas in vogue capable of       
interpreting the ,christian teaching    
concerning the existence of a soul1 or  
of an inner essence of man capable of   
being made an object of divine interest4
  ,sidenote3 ,spiritual ,substance      
,sect4 #ie4 ,the immediate effect of    
,christianity was to introduce into     
philosophy as one of its cardinal       
doctrines the theory of a spiritual     
being1 constituting the true self of the
 individual1 and separable from the     
body4 ,the difference recognized in     
,plato and ,aristotle between the divine
 spark and the appetitive and perceptual
 parts of human nature was now          
emphasized4 ,the former 7frequently     
called the spirit1 to distinguish it    
from the lower soul7 was defined as a   
substance having the attributes of      
thought and will4 ,the fundamental      
argument for its existence was the      
immediate appeal to self-consciousness2 
and it was further defined as           
indestructible on the ground of its     

being utterly discontinuous and         
incommensurable with its material       
environment4 ,this theory survives at   
the present day in the conception of    
pure activity1 but on the whole the     
attributes of the soul have superseded  
its substance4  ,sidenote3              
,intellectualism and ,voluntarism4      
,sect4 #if4 ,intellectualism and        
voluntarism are the two rival           
possibilities of emphasis when the soul 
is defined in terms of its known        
activities4 ,wherever the essence of    
personality is in question1 as also     
occurs in the case of theology1 thought 
and will present their respective claims
 to the place of first importance4      
,intellectualism would make will merely 
the concluding phase of thought1 while  
voluntarism would reduce thought to one 
of the interests of a general appetency4
 ,it is evident that idealistic theories
 will be much concerned with this       
question of priority4 ,it is also true1 
though less evident1 that               

intellectualism1 since it emphasizes the
 general and objective features of the  
mind1 tends to subordinate the          
individual to the universal2 while      
voluntarism1 emphasizing desire and     
action1 is relatively individualistic1  
and so1 since there are many            
individuals1 also pluralistic4#baa3ag   
,sidenote3 ,freedom of the ,will4       
,necessitarianism1 ,determinism1 and    
,indeterminism4  ,sect4 #ig4 ,the       
question of the freedom of the will     
furnishes a favorite controversial topic
 in philosophy4 ,for the interest at    
stake is no less than the individual's  
responsibility before man and ,god for  
his good or bad works4 ,it bears alike  
upon science1 religion1 and philosophy1 
and is at the same time a question of   
most fundamental practical importance4  
,but this diffusion of the problem has  
led to so considerable a complication of
 it that it becomes necessary in        
outlining it to define two issues4 ,in  
the first place1 the concept of freedom 

is designed to express generally the    
distinction between man and the rest of 
nature4 ,to make man in all respects the
 product and creature of his natural    
environment would be to deny freedom and
 accept the radically necessitarian     
doctrine4 ,the question still remains1  
however1 as to the causes which dominate
 man4 ,he may be free from nature1 and  
yet be ruled by ,god1 or by             
distinctively spiritual causes1 such as 
ideas or character4 ,where in general   
the will is regarded as submitting only 
to a spiritual causation proper to its  
own realm1 the conception is best named 
determinism2 though in the tradition of 
philosophy it is held to be a doctrine  
of freedom1 because contrasted with the 
necessitarianism above defined4 ,there  
remains indeterminism1 which attributes 
to the will a spontaneity that makes    
possible the direct presence to it of   
genuine alternatives4 ,the issue may    
here coincide with that between         
intellectualism and voluntarism4 ,if1   

e4g41 in ,god's act of creation1 his    
ideals and standards are prior to his   
fiat1 his conduct is determined2 whereas
 it is free in the radical or           
indeterministic sense if his ideals     
themselves are due to his sheer will4   
,this theory involves at a certain point
 in action the absence of cause4 ,on    
this account the free will is often     
identified with chance1 in which case it
 loses its distinction from nature1 and 
we have swung round the circle4         
,sidenote3 ,immortality4 ,survival and  
,eternalism4  ,sect4 #ih4 ,there is     
similar complexity in the problem       
concerning immortality4 ,were the       
extreme claims of naturalism to be      
established1 there would be no ground   
whatsoever upon which to maintain the   
immortality of man1 mere dust returning 
unto dust4 ,the philosophical concept of
 immortality is due to the supposition  
that the quintessence of the            
individual's nature is divine4#bac3ah   
,but several possibilities are at this  

point open to us4 ,the first would      
maintain the survival after death of a  
recognizable and discrete personality4  
,another would suppose a preservation   
after death1 through being taken up into
 the life of ,god4 ,still another1 the  
theory commonly maintained on the ground
 of rationalistic and idealistic        
metaphysics1 would deny that immortality
 has to do with life after death1 and   
affirm that it signifies the perpetual  
membership of the human individual in a 
realm of eternity through the truth or  
virtue that is in him4 ,but this        
interpretation evidently leaves open the
 question of the immortality of that    
which is distinctive and personal in    
human nature4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,natural 
,science of ,psychology4 ,its ,problems 
and ,method4  ,sect4 #ii4 ,so far we    
have followed the fortunes only of the  
spirit of man4 ,what of that lower soul 
through which he is identified with the 
fortunes of his body8 ,when philosophy  
gradually ceased1 in the sixteenth and  

seventeenth centuries1 to be the        
handmaid of religion1 there arose a     
renewed interest in that part of human  
nature lying between the strictly       
physiological functions1 on the one     
hand1 and thought and will on the other4
 ,descartes and ,spinoza analyzed what  
they called the passions1 meaning such  
states of mind as are conditioned by a  
concern for the interests of the body4  
,at a later period1 certain ,english    
philosophers1 following ,locke1 traced  
the dependence of ideas upon the senses4
 ,their method was that of              
introspection1 or the direct examination
 by the individual of his own ideas1 and
 for the sake of noting their origin and
 composition from simple factors4 ,the  
lineal descendants of these same        
,english philosophers defined more      
carefully the process of association1   
whereby the complexity and sequence of  
ideas are brought about1 and made       
certain conjectures as to its dependence
 upon properties and transactions in the

 physical brain4 ,these are the three   
main philosophical sources of what has  
now grown to be the separate natural    
science of psychology4 ,it will be noted
 that there are two characteristics     
which all of these studies have in      
common4 ,they deal with the experience  
of the individual as composing his own  
private history1 and tend to attribute  
the specific course which this private  
history takes to bodily conditions4 ,it 
is only recently that these             
investigations have acquired sufficient 
unity and exclusiveness of aim to       
warrant their being regarded as a       
special science4 ,but such is now so far
 the case that the psychologist of this 
type pursues his way quite independently
 of philosophy4 ,it is true his research
 has advanced considerably beyond his   
understanding of its province4 ,but it  
is generally recognized that he must    
examine those very factors of           
subjectivity which the natural scientist
 otherwise seeks to evade1 and1         

furthermore1 that he must seek to       
provide for them in nature4 ,he treats  
the inner life in what ,locke called the
 plain historical method1 that is to    
say1 instead of interpreting and        
defining its ideas1 he analyzes and     
reports upon its content4 ,he would not 
seek to justify a moral judgment1 as    
would ethics1 or to criticise the       
cogency of thought1 as would logic2 but 
only to describe the actual state as he 
found it4 ,in order to make his data    
commensurable with the phenomena of     
nature1 he discovers or defines bodily  
conditions for the subjective content   
which he analyzes4 ,his fundamental     
principle of method is the postulate of 
psycho-physical parallelism1 according  
to which he assumes a state of brain or 
nervous system for every state of mind4 
,but in adopting a province and a method
 the psychologist foregoes finality of  
truth after the manner of all natural   
science4 ,he deals admittedly with an   
aspect of experience1 and his           

conclusions are no more adequate to the 
nature of the self than they are to the 
nature of outer objects4 ,an admirable  
reference to this abstract division of  
experience occurs in ,kuelpe's          
,introduction to ,philosophy3       ,for
 the developed consciousness1 as for the
 naive1 every      experience is an     
unitary whole2 and it is only the habit 
of      abstract reflection upon        
experience that makes the objective     
and subjective worlds seem to fall apart
 as originally      different forms of  
existence4 ,just as a plane curve can be
      represented in analytical geometry
 as the function of two      variables1 
the abscissae and the ordinates1 without
 prejudice      to the unitary course of
 the curve itself1 so the world of      
human experience may be reduced to a    
subjective and an      objective factor1
 without prejudice to its real          
coherence4#bae3ai  ,sidenote3           
,psychology and ,philosophy4  ,sect4    
#ajj4 ,the problems of psychology1 like 

those of theology1 tend to disappear as 
independent philosophical topics4 ,the  
ultimate nature of the self will        
continue to interest philosophers--more 
deeply1 perhaps1 than any aspect of     
experience--but their conception of it  
will be a corollary of their metaphysics
 and epistemology4 ,the remainder of the
 field of the old philosophical         
psychology1 the introspective and       
experimental analysis of special states 
of mind1 is already the province of a   
natural science which is becoming more  
and more free from the stand-point and  
method of philosophy4  ,sidenote3       
,transition from ,classification by     
,problems to ,classification by         
,doctrines4 ,naturalism4 ,subjectivism4 
,absolute ,idealism4 ,absolute ,realism4
  ,sect4 #aja4 ,reminding ourselves anew
 that philosophical problems cannot be  
treated in isolation from one another1  
we shall hereinafter seek to become     
acquainted with general stand-points    
that give systematic unity to the issues

 which have been enumerated4 ,such      
stand-points are not clearly defined by 
those who occupy them1 and they afford  
no clear-cut classification of all      
historical philosophical philosophies4  
,but system-making in philosophy is     
commonly due to the moving in an        
individual mind of some most significant
 idea2 and certain of these ideas have  
reappeared so frequently as to define   
more or less clearly marked tendencies1 
or continuous strands1 out of which the 
history of thought is forever weaving   
itself4 ,such is clearly the case with  
naturalism4 ,from the beginning until   
now there have been men whose philosophy
 is a summation of the natural sciences1
 whose entire thought is based upon an  
acceptance of the methods and the       
fundamental conceptions of these        
disciplines4 ,this tendency stands in   
the history of thought for the          
conviction that the visible and tangible
 world which interacts with the body is 
veritable reality4 ,this philosophy is  

realistic and empirical to an extent    
entirely determined by its belief       
concerning being4 ,but while naturalism 
is only secondarily epistemological1    
subjectivism and absolute idealism have 
their very source in the                
self-examination and the self-criticism 
of thought4 ,subjectivism signifies the 
conviction that the knower cannot escape
 himself4 ,if reality is to be kept     
within the range of possible knowledge1 
it must be defined in terms of the      
processes or states of selves4 ,absolute
 idealism arises from a union of this   
epistemological motive with a           
recognition of what are regarded as the 
logical necessities to which reality    
must submit4 ,reality must be both      
knowledge and rational knowledge2 the   
object1 in short1 of an absolute mind1  
which shall be at once all-containing   
and systematic4 ,this rationalistic     
motive was1 however1 not originally     
associated with an idealistic           
epistemology1 but with the common-sense 

principle that being is discovered and  
not constituted by thought4 ,such an    
absolute realism is1 like naturalism1   
primarily metaphysical rather than      
epistemological2 but1 unlike naturalism1
 it seeks to define reality as a logical
 or ethical necessity4  ,under these    
several divisions1 then1 we shall meet  
once more with the special problems of  
philosophy1 but this time they will be  
ranged in an order that is determined by
 some central doctrine4 ,they will      
appear as parts not of the general      
problem of philosophy1 but of some      
definite system of philosophy4          
,,footnotes3  #ahj3a ,cf4 ,sect4 #fh4   
#ahb3b ,the ,socratic distinction       
between the logical and the             
psychological treatment of belief finds 
its best expression in ,plato's         
,gorgias1 especially1 #ded1 #dee4 ,cf4  
also ,sect4 #bi4  #ahb3c ,thus1 e4 g4   
,hegel4 ,see ,sect4 #agi4 ,cf4 also     
,sects4 #aii1 #bjj4  #ahc3d ,cf4 ,sect4 
#hd4  #ahd3e ,see ,sect4 #fi1 note4     

#ahd3f ,the reader will find a good     
illustration of eristic in ,plato's     
,euthydemus1 #bge4  #ahg3g ,the reader  
can find these rules1 and the detail of 
the traditional formal logic1 in any    
elementary text-book1 such as1 e4 g41   
,jevons3 ,elements of ,logic4  #ahi3h   
,what is called the algebra of logic    
seeks to obtain an unequivocal symbolic 
expression for these truths4  #aib3i    
,plato3 ,protagoras1 #cea4 ,translation 
by ,jowett4  #aid3aj ,plato3 ,apology1  
#da4 ,translation by ,jowett4  #aie3aa  
,quoted by ,paulsen in his ,system of   
,ethics4 ,translation by ,thilly1 p4    
#fi4  #aih3ab ,cf4 ,sect4 #afj4  #aih3ac
 ,cf4 ,sect4 #agg4  #aii3ad ,concerning 
the duty of philosophy to religion in   
these matters1 cf4 ,descartes3          
,meditations1 ,dedication4 ,translation 
by ,veitch1 p4 #ha4  #bja3ae ,the       
school-philosophy that flourished from  
the eleventh to the fifteenth century1  
under the authority of the church4      
#bji3af ,especially in the ,phaedo4     

#baa3ag ,schopenhauer is a notable      
exception4 ,cf4 ,sects4 #ace1 #ach4     
#bac3ah ,it is interesting1 however1 to 
observe that current spiritualistic     
theories maintain a naturalistic theory 
of immortality1 verifiable1 it is       
alleged1 in certain extraordinary       
empirical observations4  #bae3ai        
,translation by ,pillsbury and          
,titchener1 p4 #ei4     ,,part ,,iii    
,,systems ,,of ,,philosophy             
,,chapter ,,viii  ,,naturalism#bbc3a    
,sidenote3 ,the ,general ,meaning of    
,materialism4  ,sect4 #ajb4 ,the meaning
 conveyed by any philosophical term     
consists largely of the distinctions    
which it suggests4 ,its peculiar        
quality1 like the physiognomy of the    
battle-scarred veteran1 is a composite  
of the controversies which it has       
survived4 ,there is1 therefore1 an      
almost unavoidable confusion attendant  
upon the denomination of any early phase
 of philosophy as materialism4 ,but in  
the historical beginnings of thought1 as

 also in the common-sense of all ages1  
there is at any rate present a very     
essential strand of this theory4 ,the   
naive habit of mind which1 in the sixth 
century before ,christ1 prompted        
successive ,greek thinkers to define    
reality in terms of water1 air1 and     
fire1 is in this respect one with that  
exhibited in ,dr4 ,samuel ,johnson's    
smiting the ground with his stick in    
curt refutation of ,bishop ,berkeley's  
idea-philosophy4 ,there is a theoretical
 instinct1 not accidental or perverse1  
but springing from the very             
life-preserving equipment of the        
organism1 which attributes reality to   
tangible space-filling things           
encountered by the body4 ,for obvious   
reasons of self-interest the organism is
 first of all endowed with a sense of   
contact1 and the more delicate senses   
enter into its practical economy as     
means of anticipating or avoiding       
contact4 ,from such practical           
expectations concerning the proximity of

 that which may press upon1 injure1 or  
displace the body1 arise the first crude
 judgments of reality4 ,and these are at
 the same time the nucleus of naive     
philosophy and the germinal phase of    
materialism4  ,sidenote3 ,corporeal     
,being4  ,sect4 #ajc4 ,the first        
philosophical movement among the ,greeks
 was a series of attempts to reduce the 
tangible world to unity1 and of these   
the conception offered by ,anaximander  
is of marked interest in its bearing    
upon the development of materialism4    
,this philosopher is remarkable for     
having defined his first principle1     
instead of having chosen it from among  
the different elements already          
distinguished by common-sense4 ,he      
thought the unity of nature to consist  
in its periodic evolution from and      
return into one infinite sum of material
 7to apeiron71 which1 much in the manner
 of the nebula of modern science1 is    
conceived as both indeterminate in its  
actual state and infinitely rich in its 

potentiality4 ,the conception of matter1
 the most familiar commonplace of       
science1 begins to be recognizable4 ,it 
has here reached the point of signifying
 a common substance for all tangible    
things1 a substance that in its own     
general and omnipresent nature is       
without the special marks that          
distinguish these tangible things from  
one another4 ,and in so far the         
philosophy of ,anaximander is           
materialistic4  ,sidenote3 ,corporeal   
,processes4 ,hylozoism and ,mechanism4  
,sect4 #ajd4 ,but the earliest thinkers 
are said to be hylozoists1 rather than  
strict materialists1 because of their   
failure to make certain distinctions in 
connection with the processes of matter4
 ,the term hylozoism unites with the    
conception of the formless material of  
the world 7hyle371 that of an animating 
power to which its formations and       
transformations are due4 ,hylozoism     
itself was not a deliberate synthesis of
 these two conceptions1 but a primitive 

practical tendency to universalize the  
conception1 of life4 ,such animism      
instinctively associates with an        
object's bulk and hardness a capacity   
for locomotion and general initiative4  
,and the material principles defined by 
the philosophers retain this vague and  
comprehensive attribute as a matter of  
course1 until it is distinguished and   
separated through attempts to understand
 it4  ,that aspect of natural process   
which was most impressive to ,greek     
minds of the reflective type was the    
alternation of generation and decay4 ,in
 full accord with his more ancient      
master1 ,epicurus1 the ,latin poet      
,lucretius writes3       ,thus neither  
can death-dealing motions keep the      
mastery      always1 nor entomb         
existence forevermore2 nor1 on the other
      hand1 can the birth and increase  
giving motions of things      preserve  
them always after they are born4 ,thus  
the war of      first beginnings waged  
from eternity is carried on with        

dubious issue3 now here1 now there1 the 
life-bringing elements      of things   
get the mastery and are o'ermastered in 
turn3 with      the funeral wail blends 
the cry which babies raise when they    
enter the borders of light2 and no night
 ever followed day1      nor morning    
night1 that heard not1 mingling with the
 sickly      infant's cries1 wailings of
 the attendants on death and black      
funeral4#bbf3b  ,in a similar vein1 the 
earliest conceptions of natural         
evolution attributed it to the coworking
 of two principles1 that of ,love or    
union and that of ,hate or dissolution4 
,the process is here distinguished from 
the material of nature1 but is still    
described in the language of practical  
life4 ,a distinction between two aspects
 of vital phenomena is the next step4   
,these may be regarded in respect either
 of the motion and change which attend  
them1 or the rationality which informs  
them4 ,life is both effective and       
significant4 ,although neither of these 

ideas ever wholly ceases to be          
animistic1 they may nevertheless be     
applied quite independently of one      
another4 ,the one reduces the primitive 
animistic world to the lower end of its 
scale1 the other construes it in terms  
of a purposive utility commensurable    
with that of human action4 ,now it is   
with mechanism1 the former of these     
diverging ways1 that the development of 
materialism is identified4 ,for this    
philosophy a thing need have no value to
 justify its existence1 nor any acting  
intelligence to which it may owe its    
origin4 ,its bulk and position are      
sufficient for its being1 and the       
operation of forces capable of          
integrating1 dividing1 or moving it is  
sufficient for its derivation and       
history4 ,in short1 there is no rhyme or
 reason at the heart of things1 but only
 actual matter distributed by sheer     
force4 ,with this elimination of the    
element of purposiveness from the       
hylozoistic world1 the content and      

process of nature are fitted to one     
another4 ,matter is that which is moved 
by force1 and force is the determining  
principle of the motions of matter4     
,materialism is now definitely equipped 
with its fundamental conceptions4       
,sidenote3 ,materialism and ,physical   
,science4  ,sect4 #aje4 ,the central    
conceptions of materialism as a         
philosophical theory differ from those  
employed in the physical sciences only  
in what is demanded of them4 ,the       
scientist reports upon physical         
phenomena without accepting any further 
responsibility1 while those who like    
,lucretius maintain a physical          
metaphysics1 must1 like him1 prove that 
the minute bodies of matter from        
everlasting continually uphold the sum  
of things4 ,but1 though they employ them
 in their own way1 materialists and all 
other exponents of naturalism derive    
their central conceptions from the      
physical sciences1 and so reflect the   
historical development through which    

these sciences have passed4 ,to certain 
historical phases of physical science1  
in so far as these bear directly upon   
the meaning of naturalism1 we now turn4 
,sidenote3 ,the ,development of the     
,conceptions of ,physical ,science4     
,space and ,matter4  ,sect4 #ajf4 ,from 
the earliest times down to the present  
day the groundwork of materialism has   
most commonly been cast in the form of  
an atomic theory4 ,democritus1 the first
 system-builder of this school1 adopted 
the conception of indivisible particles 
7atomoi71 impenetrable in their         
occupancy of space1 and varying among   
themselves only in form1 order1 and     
position4 ,to provide for the motion    
that distributes them he conceived them 
as separated from one another by empty  
space4 ,from this it follows that the   
void is as real as matter1 or1 as       
,democritus himself is reputed to have  
said1 thing is not more real than       
no-thing4  ,but atomism has not been by 
any means universally regarded as the   

most satisfactory conception of the     
relation between space and matter4 ,not 
only does it require two kinds of being1
 with the different attributes of       
extension and hardness1                 
respectively1#bbi3c but it would also   
seem to be experimentally inadequate in 
the case of the more subtle physical    
processes1 such as light4 ,the former of
 these is a speculative consideration1  
and as such had no little weight with   
the ,french philosopher ,descartes1     
whose divisions and definitions so      
profoundly affected the course of       
thought in these matters after the      
sixteenth century4 ,holding also that a 
vacuum or space in which there is       
absolutely no body is repugnant to      
reason1 and that an indivisible         
space-filling particle is               
self-contradictory1 he was led to       
identify space and matter2 that is1 to  
make matter as indispensable to space as
 space to matter4 ,there is1 then1 but  
one kind of corporeal being1 whose      

attribute is extension1 and whose modes 
are motion and rest4 ,the most famous   
application of the mechanical           
conceptions which he bases upon this    
first principle1 is his theory of the   
planets1 which are conceived to be      
embedded in a transparent medium1 and to
 move with it1 vortex fashion1 about the
 sun4#bcj3d  ,but the conception of the 
space-filling continuity of material    
substance owes its prominence at the    
present time to the experimental        
hypothesis of ether4 ,this substance1   
originally conceived to occupy the      
intermolecular spaces and to serve as a 
medium for the propagation of           
undulations1 is now regarded by many    
physicists as replacing matter4 ,it is  
the great hope of science at the present
 day1 says a contemporary exponent of   
naturalism1 that hard and heavy matter  
will be shown to be ether in            
motion4#bca3e ,such a theory would      
reduce bodies to the relative           
displacements of parts of a continuous  

substance1 which would be first of all  
defined as spacial1 and would possess   
such further properties as special      
scientific hypotheses might require4    
,two broadly contrasting theories thus  
appear3 that which defines matter as a  
continuous substance coextensive with   
space2 and that which defines it as a   
discrete substance divided by empty     
space4 ,but both theories are seriously 
affected by the peculiarly significant  
development of the conception of force4 
,sidenote3 ,motion and its ,cause4      
,development and ,extension of the      
,conception of ,force4  ,sect4 #ajg4 ,in
 the ,cartesian system the cause of     
motion was pressure within a plenum4    
,but in the seventeenth century this    
notion encountered the system of        
,newton1 a system which seemed to       
involve action at a distance4 ,in the   
year #agbh ,voltaire wrote from ,london3
       ,when a ,frenchman arrives in    
,london1 he finds a very great          
change1 in philosophy as well as in most

 other things4 ,in      ,paris he left  
the world all full of matter2 here he   
finds      absolute vacua4 ,at ,paris   
the universe is seen filled up with     
ethereal vortices1 while here the same  
space is occupied with      the play of 
the invisible forces of gravitation4 ,in
 ,paris the      earth is painted for us
 longish like an egg1 and in ,london it 
is oblate like a melon4 ,at ,paris the  
pressure of the moon      causes the ebb
 and flow of tides2 in ,england1 on the 
other      hand1 the sea gravitates     
toward the moon1 so that at the same    
time when the ,parisians demand high    
water of the moon1 the      gentlemen of
 ,london require an ebb4#bcb3f  ,but    
these differences are not matters of    
taste1 nor even rival hypotheses upon an
 equal footing4 ,the ,newtonian system  
of mechanics1 the consummation of a     
development initiated by ,galileo1      
differed from the vortex theory of      
,descartes as exact science differs from
 speculation and unverified conjecture4 

,and this difference of method carried  
with it eventually certain profound     
differences of content1 distinguishing  
the ,newtonian theory even from that of 
,democritus1 with which it had so much  
in common4 ,although ,democritus had    
sought to avoid the element of          
purposiveness in the older hylozoism by 
referring the motions of bodies as far  
as possible to the impact of other      
bodies1 he nevertheless attributed these
 motions ultimately to weight1          
signifying thereby a certain downward   
disposition4 ,now it is true that in his
 general belief ,newton himself is not  
free from hylozoism4 ,he thought of the 
motions of the planets themselves as    
initiated and quickened by a power      
emanating ultimately from ,god4 ,they   
are impressed by an intelligent ,agent1 
and       can be the effect of nothing  
else than the wisdom and skill      of a
 powerful ever-living ,agent who1 being 
in all places1 is      more able by his 
will to move the bodies within his      

boundless      uniform sensorium1 and   
thereby to form and reform the parts    
of the universe1 than we are by our will
 to move the parts of      our own      
bodies4#bcc3g  ,but by the side of these
 statements must be set his famous      
disclaimer1 hypotheses non fingo4 ,in   
his capacity of natural philosopher he  
did not seek to explain motions1 but    
only to describe them4 ,disbelieving as 
he did in action at a distance1 he saw  
no possibility of explanation short of a
 reference of them to ,god2 but such    
hypotheses he thought to be no proper   
concern of science4 ,as a consequence1  
the mathematical formulation of motions 
came1 through him1 to be regarded as the
 entire content of mechanics4 ,the      
notion of an efficient cause of motion  
is still suggested by the term force1   
but even this term within the system of 
mechanics refers always to a definite   
amount of motion1 or measurement of     
relative motion4 ,and the same is true  
of attraction1 action1 reaction1 and the

 like4 ,the further explanation of      
motion1 the definition of a virtue or   
potency that produces it1 first a       
neglected problem1 then an irrelevant   
problem1 is finally1 for a naturalistic 
philosophy in which this progression is 
completed1 an insoluble problem4 ,for   
the sequel to this purely descriptive   
procedure on the part of science is the 
disavowal of metaphysics by those who   
will have no philosophy but science4    
,thus the scientific conservatism of    
,newton has led to the positivistic and 
agnostic phase of naturalism4 ,but a    
further treatment of this development   
must be reserved until the issue of     
epistemology shall have been definitely 
raised4  ,a different emphasis within   
the general mechanical scheme1 attaching
 especial importance to the conceptions 
of force and energy1 has led to a rival 
tendency in science and a contrasting   
type of naturalism4 ,the mechanical     
hypotheses hitherto described are all of
 a simple and readily depicted type4    

,they suggest an imagery quite in accord
 with common-sense and with observation 
of the motions of great masses like the 
planets4 ,material particles are        
conceived to move within a containing   
space2 the motions of corpuscles1 atoms1
 or the minute parts of ether1 differing
 only in degree from those of visible   
bodies4 ,the whole physical universe may
 be represented in the imagination as an
 aggregate of bodies participating in   
motions of extraordinary complexity1 but
 of one type4 ,but now let the emphasis 
be placed upon the determining causes   
rather than upon the moving bodies      
themselves4 ,in other words1 let the    
bodies be regarded as attributive and   
the forces as substantive4 ,the result  
is a radical alteration of the          
mechanical scheme and the transcendence 
of common-sense imagery4 ,this was one  
direction of outgrowth from the work of 
,newton4 ,his force of gravitation      
prevailed between bodies separated by   
spaces of great magnitude4 ,certain of  

the followers of ,newton1 notably       
,cotes1 accepting the formulas of the   
master but neglecting his allusions to  
the agency of ,god1 accepted the        
principle of action at a distance4      
,force1 in short1 was conceived to      
pervade space of itself4 ,but if force  
be granted this substantial and         
self-dependent character1 what further  
need is there of matter as a separate   
form of entity8 ,for does not the       
presence of matter consist essentially  
in resistance1 itself a case of force8  
,such reflections as these led          
,boscovich and others to the radical    
departure of defining material particles
 as centres of force4  ,sidenote3 ,the  
,development and ,extension of the      
,conception of ,energy4  ,sect4 #ajh4   
,but a more fruitful hypothesis of the  
same general order is due to the        
attention directed to the conception of 
energy1 or capacity for work1 by        
experimental discoveries of the         
possibility of reciprocal               

transformations without loss1 of motion1
 heat1 electricity1 and other processes4
 ,the principle of the conservation of  
energy affirms the quantitative         
constancy of that which is so           
transformed1 measured1 for example1 in  
terms of capacity to move units of mass 
against gravity4 ,the exponents of what 
is called energetics have in many cases 
come to regard that the quantity of     
which is so conserved1 as a substantial 
reality whose forms and distributions   
compose nature4 ,a contemporary         
scientist1 whose synthetic and dogmatic 
habit of mind has made him eminent in   
the ranks of popular philosophy1 writes 
as follows3       ,mechanical and       
chemical energy1 sound and heat1 light  
and      electricity1 are mutually      
convertible2 they seem to be but        
different modes of one and the same     
fundamental force or      energy4       
,thence follows the important thesis of 
the unity of      all natural forces1   
or1 as it may also be expressed1 the    

'monism of energy4'#bcf3h  ,the         
conception of energy seems1 indeed1 to  
afford an exceptional opportunity to    
naturalism4 ,we have seen that the      
matter-motion theory was satisfied to   
ignore1 or regard as insoluble1 problems
 concerning the ultimate causes of      
things4 ,furthermore1 as we shall       
presently see to better advantage1 the  
more strictly materialistic type of     
naturalism must regard thought as an    
anomaly1 and has no little difficulty   
with life4 ,but the conception of energy
 is more adaptable1 and hence better    
qualified to serve as a common          
denominator for various aspects of      
experience4 ,the very readiness with    
which we can picture the corpuscular    
scheme is a source of embarrassment to  
the seeker after unity4 ,that which is  
so distinct is bristling with           
incompatibilities4 ,the most aggressive 
materialist hesitates to describe       
thought as a motion of bodies in space4 
,energy1 on the other hand1 exacts      

little if anything beyond the character 
of measurable power4 ,thought is at any 
rate in some sense a power1 and to some 
degree measurable4 ,recent discoveries  
of the dependence of capacity for mental
 exertion upon physical vitality and    
measurements of chemical energy received
 into the system as food1 and somehow   
exhausted by the activities of thought1 
have lent plausibility to the hypothesis
 of a universal energy of which physical
 and psychical processes are alike      
manifestations4 ,and the conception of  
energy seems capable not only of        
unifying nature1 but also of satisfying 
the metaphysical demand for an efficient
 and moving cause4 ,this term1 like     
force and power1 is endowed with such a 
significance by common sense4 ,indeed1  
naturalism would seem here to have swung
 round toward its hylozoistic           
starting-point4 ,the exponent of        
energetics1 like the naive animistic    
thinker1 attributes to nature a power   
like that which he feels welling up     

within himself4 ,when he acts upon the  
environment1 like meets like4           
,energetics1 it is true1 may obtain a   
definite meaning for its central        
conception from the measurable behavior 
of external bodies1 and a meaning that  
may be quite free from vitalism or      
teleology4 ,but in his extension of the 
conception the author of a philosophical
 energetics abandons this strict        
meaning1 and blends his thought even    
with a phase of subjectivism1 known as  
panpsychism4#bch3i ,this theory regards 
the inward life of all nature as        
homogeneous with an immediately felt    
activity or appetency1 as energetics    
finds the inner life to be homogeneous  
with the forces of nature4 ,both owe    
their philosophical appeal to their     
apparent success in unifying the world  
upon a direct empirical basis1 and to   
their provision for the practical sense 
of reality4  ,such1 in brief1 are the   
main alternatives available for a       
naturalistic theory of being1 in        

consequence of the historical           
development of the fundamental          
conceptions of natural science4         
,sidenote3 ,the ,claims of ,naturalism4 
,sect4 #aji4 ,we turn now to an         
examination of the manner in which      
naturalism1 equipped with working       
principles1 seeks to meet the special   
requirements of philosophy4 ,the        
conception of the unity of nature is    
directly in the line of a purely        
scientific development1 but naturalism  
takes the bold and radical step of      
regarding nature so unified as          
coextensive with the real1 or at any    
rate knowable1 universe4 ,it will be    
remembered that among the early ,greeks 
,anaxagoras had referred the creative   
and formative processes of nature to a  
non-natural or rational agency1 which he
 called the ,nous4 ,the adventitious    
character of this principle1 the        
external and almost purely nominal part 
which it played in the actual cosmology 
of ,anaxagoras1 betrayed it into the    

hands of the atomists1 with their more  
consistently naturalistic creed4        
,better1 these maintain1 the somewhat   
dogmatic extension of conceptions proved
 to be successful in the description of 
nature1 than a vague dualism which can  
serve only to distract the scientific   
attention and people the world with     
obscurities4 ,there is a remarkable     
passage in ,lucretius in which atomism  
is thus written large and inspired with 
cosmical eloquence3       ,for verily   
not by design did the first-beginnings  
of things      station themselves each  
in its right place guided by keen       
intelligence1 nor did they bargain sooth
 to say what motions      each should   
assume1 but because many in number and  
shifting      about in many ways        
throughout the universe1 they are driven
      and tormented by blows during     
infinite time past1 after trying        
motions and unions of every kind at     
length they fall into      arrangements 
such as those out of which our sum of   

things has      been formed1 and by     
which too it is preserved through many  
great years1 when once it has been      
thrown into the appropriate             
motions1 and causes the streams to      
replenish the greedy sea      with      
copious river waters1 and the earth1    
fostered by the heat      of the sun1 to
 renew its produce1 and the race of     
living      things to come up and       
flourish1 and the gliding fires of ether
      to live3 all which these several  
things could in no wise bring      to   
pass1 unless a store of matter could    
rise up from infinite      space1 out of
 which store they are wont to make up in
 due      season whatever has been      
lost4#bdj3aj  ,the prophecy of ,la      
,place1 the great ,french mathematician1
 voices the similar faith of the        
eighteenth century in a mechanical      
understanding of the universe3          
,the human mind1 in the perfection it   
has been able to give to      astronomy1
 affords a feeble outline of such an    

intelligence4      ,its discoveries in  
mechanics and in geometry1 joined to    
that      of universal gravitation1 have
 brought it within reach of             
comprehending in the same analytical    
expressions the past and      future    
states of the system of the             
world4#bda3aa  ,as for ,god1 the        
creative and presiding intelligence1 ,la
 ,place had no need of any such         
hypothesis4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,task of   
,naturalism4  ,sect4 #aaj4 ,but these   
are the boasts of ,homeric heroes before
 going into battle4 ,the moment such a  
general position is assumed there arise 
sundry difficulties in the application  
of naturalistic principles to special   
interests and groups of facts4 ,it is   
one thing to project a mechanical scheme
 in the large1 but quite another to make
 explicit provision within it for the   
origin of nature1 for life1 for the     
human self with its ideals1 and for     
society with its institutions4 ,the     
naturalistic method of meeting these    

problems involves a reduction all along 
the line in the direction of such       
categories as are derived from the      
infra-organic world4 ,that which is not 
like the planetary system must be       
construed as mechanical by indirection  
and subtlety4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,origin  
of the ,cosmos4  ,sect4 #aaa4 ,the      
origin of the present known natural     
world was the first philosophical       
question to be definitely met by        
science4 ,the general form of solution  
which naturalism offers is anticipated  
in the most ancient theories of nature4 
,these already suppose that the observed
 mechanical processes of the circular or
 periodic type1 like the revolutions and
 rotations of the stars1 are incidents  
in a historical mechanical process of a 
larger scale4 ,prior to the present     
fixed motions of the celestial bodies1  
the whole mass of cosmic matter         
participated in irregular motions       
analogous to present terrestrial        
redistributions4 ,such motions may be   

understood to have resulted in the      
integration of separate bodies1 to which
 they at the same time imparted a rotary
 motion4 ,it is such a hypothesis that  
,lucretius paints in his bold1          
impressionistic colors4  ,but the       
development of mechanics paved the way  
for a definite scientific theory1 the   
so-called nebular hypothesis1 announced 
by ,la ,place in #agif1 and by the      
philosopher ,kant at a still earlier    
date4 ,largely through the ,newtonian   
principle of the parallelogram of       
forces1 the present masses1 orbits1 and 
velocities were analyzed into a more    
primitive process of concentration      
within a nebulous or highly diffused    
aggregate of matter4 ,and with the aid  
of the principle of the conservation of 
energy this theory appears to make      
possible the derivation of heat1 light1 
and other apparently non-mechanical     
processes from the same original energy 
of motion4  ,but a persistently         
philosophical mind at once raises the   

question of the origin of this primeval 
nebula itself1 with a definite          
organization and a vast potential energy
 that must1 after all1 be regarded as a 
part of nature rather than its source4  
,several courses are here open to       
naturalism4 ,it may maintain that the   
question of ultimate origin is          
unanswerable2 it may regard such a      
process of concentration as extending   
back through an infinitely long         
past2#bdc3ab or1 and this is the        
favorite alternative for more           
constructive minds1 the historical      
cosmical process may be included within 
a still higher type of periodic process1
 which is regarded as eternal4 ,this    
last course has been followed in the    
well-known synthetic naturalism of      
,herbert ,spencer4 ,evolution1 he says1 
is the progressive integration of matter
 and dissipation of motion4 ,but such a 
process eventually runs down1 and may be
 conceived as giving place to a         
counter-process of devolution which     

scatters the parts of matter and gathers
 another store of potential motion4 ,the
 two processes in alternation will then 
constitute a cosmical system without    
beginning or end4  ,in such wise a      
sweeping survey of the physical universe
 may be thought in the terms of natural 
science4 ,the uniformitarian method in  
geology1 resolving the history of the   
crust of the earth into known processes1
 such as erosion and igneous            
fusion2#bdd3ac and spectral analysis1   
with its discoveries concerning the     
chemical constituents of distant bodies 
through the study of their light1 have  
powerfully reenforced this effort of    
thought1 and apparently completed an    
outline sketch of the universe in terms 
of infra-organic processes4  ,sidenote3 
,life4 ,natural ,selection4  ,sect4     
#aab4 ,but the cosmos must be made      
internally homogeneous in these same    
terms4 ,there awaits solution1 in the   
first place1 the serious problem of the 
genesis and maintenance of life within a

 nature that is originally and          
ultimately inorganic4 ,the assimilation 
of the field of biology and physiology  
to the mechanical cosmos had made little
 real progress prior to the nineteenth  
century4 ,mechanical theories had1      
indeed1 been projected in the earliest  
age of philosophy1 and proposed anew in 
the seventeenth century4#bde3ad         
,nevertheless1 the structural and       
functional teleology of the organism    
remained as apparently irrefutable      
testimony to the inworking of some      
principle other than that of mechanical 
necessity4 ,indeed1 the only fruitful   
method applicable to organic phenomena  
was that which explained them in terms  
of purposive adaptation4 ,and it was its
 provision for a mechanical             
interpretation of this very principle   
that gave to the ,darwinian law of      
natural selection1 promulgated in #ahei 
in the ,origin of ,species1 so profound 
a significance for naturalism4 ,it      
threatened to reduce the last stronghold

 of teleology1 and completely to        
dispense with the intelligent ,author of
 nature4  ,darwin's hypothesis sought to
 explain the origin of animal species by
 survival under competitive conditions  
of existence through the possession of a
 structure suited to the environment4   
,only the most elementary organism need 
be presupposed1 together with slight    
variations in the course of subsequent  
generations1 and both may be conceived  
to arise mechanically4 ,there will then 
result in surviving organisms a gradual 
accumulation of such variations as      
promote survival under the special      
conditions of the environment4 ,such a  
principle had been suggested as early as
 the time of ,empedocles1 but it        
remained for ,darwin to establish it    
with an unanswerable array of           
observation and experimentation4 ,if any
 organism whatsoever endowed with the   
power of generation be allowed to have  
somehow come to be1 naturalism now      
promises to account for the whole       

subsequent history of organic phenomena 
and the origin of any known species4    
,sidenote3 ,mechanical ,physiology4     
,sect4 #aac4 ,but what of life itself8  
,the question of the derivation of      
organic from inorganic matter has proved
 insoluble by direct means1 and the case
 of naturalism must here rest upon such 
facts as the chemical homogeneity of    
these two kinds of matter1 and the      
conformity of physiological processes to
 more general physical laws4 ,organic   
matter differs from inorganic only      
through the presence of proteid1 a      
peculiar product of known elements1     
which cannot be artificially produced1  
but which is by natural means           
perpetually dissolved into these        
elements without any discoverable       
residuum4 ,respiration may be studied as
 a case of aerodynamics1 the circulation
 of the blood as a case of              
hydrodynamics1 and the heat given off in
 the course of work done by the body as 
a case of thermodynamics4 ,and although 

vitalistic theories still retain a place
 in physiology1 as do teleological      
theories in biology1 on the whole the   
naturalistic programme of a reduction of
 organic processes to the type of the   
inorganic tends to prevail4  ,sidenote3 
,mind4 ,the ,reduction to ,sensation4   
,sect4 #aad4 ,the history of naturalism 
shows that1 as in the case of life1 so  
also in the case of mind1 its hypotheses
 were projected by the ,greeks1 but     
precisely formulated and verified only  
in the modern period of science4 ,in the
 philosophy of ,democritus the soul was 
itself an atom1 finer1 rounder1 and     
smoother than the ordinary1 but         
thoroughly a part of the mechanism of   
nature4 ,the processes of the soul are  
construed as interactions between the   
soul and surrounding objects4 ,in       
sensation1 the thing perceived produces 
images by means of effluxes which       
impinge upon the soul-atom4 ,these      
images are not true reports of the outer
 world1 but must be revised by thought  

before its real atomic structure        
emerges4 ,for this higher critical      
exercise of thought ,democritus devised 
no special atomic genesis4 ,the result  
may be expressed either as the          
invalidity of such operations of mind as
 he could provide for in his universe1  
or the irreducibility to his chosen     
first principles of the very thought    
which defined them4 ,later naturalism   
has generally sacrificed epistemology to
 cosmology1 and reduced thought to      
sensation4 ,similarly1 will has been    
regarded as a highly developed case of  
instinct4 ,knowledge and will1 construed
 as sensation and instinct1 may thus be 
interpreted in the naturalistic manner  
within the field of biology4  ,sidenote3
 ,automatism4  ,sect4 #aae4 ,but the    
actual content of sensation1 and the    
actual feelings which attend upon the   
promptings of instinct1 still stubbornly
 testify to the presence in the universe
 of something belonging to a wholly     
different category from matter and      

motion4 ,the attitude of naturalism in  
this crucial issue has never been fixed 
and unwavering1 but there has gradually 
come to predominate a method of denying 
to the inner life all efficacy and real 
significance in the cosmos1 while       
admitting its presence on the scene4 ,it
 is a strange fact of history that      
,descartes1 the ,french philosopher who 
prided himself on having rid the soul of
 all dependence on nature1 should have  
greatly contributed to this method4 ,but
 it is perhaps not so strange when we   
consider that every dualism is1 after   
all1 symmetrical1 and that consequently 
whatever rids the soul of nature at the 
same time rids nature of the soul4 ,it  
was ,descartes who first conceived the  
body and soul to be utterly distinct    
substances4 ,the corollary to this      
doctrine was his automatism1 applied in 
his own system to animals other than    
man1 but which those less concerned with
 religious tradition and less firmly    
convinced of the soul's originating     

activity were not slow to apply         
universally4 ,this theory conceived the 
vital processes to take place quite     
regardless of any inner consciousness1  
or even without its attendance4 ,to this
 radical theory the ,french materialists
 of the eighteenth century were         
especially attracted4 ,with them the    
active soul of ,descartes1 the distinct 
spiritual entity1 disappeared4 ,this    
latter author had himself admitted a    
department of the self1 which he called 
the passions1 in which the course and   
content of mind is determined by bodily 
conditions4 ,extending this conception  
to the whole province of mind1 they     
employed it to demonstrate the          
thorough-going subordination of mind to 
body4 ,la ,mettrie1 a physician and the 
author of a book entitled ,l',homme     
,machine1 was first interested in this  
thesis by a fever delirium1 and         
afterward adduced anatomical and        
pathological data in support of it4 ,the
 angle from which he views human life is

 well illustrated in the following3     
,what would have sufficed in the case of
 ,julius ,caesar1 of      ,seneca1 of   
,petronius1 to turn their fearlessness  
into timidity      or braggartry8 ,an   
obstruction in the spleen1 the liver1 or
 the      vena portae4 ,for the         
imagination is intimately connected     
with these viscera1 and from them arise 
all the curious      phenomena of       
hypochondria and hysteria4 4 4 4 ',a    
mere nothing1      a little fibre1 some 
trifling thing that the most subtle     
anatomy cannot discover1 would have made
 two idiots out of      ,erasmus and    
,fontenelle4'#bej3ae  ,sidenote3        
,radical ,materialism4 ,mind as an      
,epiphenomenon4  ,sect4 #aaf4 ,the      
extreme claim that the soul is a        
physical organ of the body1 identical   
with the brain1 marked the culmination  
of this militant materialism1 so good an
 instance of that over-simplification   
and whole-hearted conviction            
characteristic of the doctrinaire       

propagandism of ,france4 ,locke1 the    
,englishman1 had admitted that possibly 
the substance which thinks is corporeal4
 ,in the letters of ,voltaire this      
thought has already found a more        
positive expression3       ,i am body1  
and ,i think2 more ,i do not know4      
,shall ,i then      attribute to an     
unknown cause what ,i can so easily     
attribute      to the only fruitful     
cause ,i am acquainted with8 ,in fact1  
where is the man who1 without an absurd 
godlessness1 dare      assert that it is
 impossible for the ,creator to endow   
matter      with thought and            
feeling8#bea3af  ,finally1 ,holbach1 the
 great systematizer of this movement1   
takes the affair out of the hands of the
 ,creator and definitively announces    
that a sensitive soul is nothing but a  
human brain so constituted that it      
easily receives the motions communicated
 to it4#bea3ag  ,this theory has been   
considerably tempered since the age of  
,holbach4 ,naturalism has latterly been 

less interested in identifying the soul 
with the body1 and more interested in   
demonstrating its dependence upon       
specific bodily conditions1 after the   
manner of ,la ,mettrie4 ,the so-called  
higher faculties1 such as thought and   
will1 have been related to central or   
cortical processes of the nervous       
system1 processes of connection and     
complication which within the brain     
itself supplement the impulses and      
sensations congenitally and externally  
stimulated4 ,the term epiphenomenon has 
been adopted to express the distinctness
 but entire dependence of the mind4 ,man
 is a conscious automaton4 ,the real    
course of nature passes through his     
nervous system1 while consciousness     
attends upon its functions like a       
shadow1 present but not                 
efficient4#beb3ah  ,sidenote3           
,knowledge1 ,positivism and             
,agnosticism4  ,sect4 #aag4 ,holbach's  
,systeme de la ,nature1 published in    
#aggj1 marks the culmination of the     

unequivocally materialistic form of     
naturalism4 ,its epistemological        
difficulties1 always more or less in    
evidence1 have since that day sufficed  
to discredit materialism1 and to foster 
the growth of a critical and apologetic 
form of naturalism known as positivism  
or agnosticism4 ,the modesty of this    
doctrine does not1 it is true1 strike   
very deep4 ,for1 although it disclaims  
knowledge of ultimate reality1 it also  
forbids anyone else to have any4        
,knowledge1 it affirms1 can be of but   
one type1 that which comprises the      
verifiable laws governing nature4 ,all  
questions concerning first causes are   
futile1 a stimulus only to excursions of
 fancy popularly mistaken for knowledge4
 ,the superior certainty and stability  
which attaches to natural science is to 
be permanently secured by the savant's  
steadfast refusal to be led away after  
the false gods of metaphysics4  ,but    
though this is sufficient ground for an 
agnostic policy1 it does prove an       

agnostic theory4 ,the latter has sprung 
from a closer analysis of knowledge1    
though it fails to make a very brave    
showing for thoroughness and            
consistency4 ,the crucial point has     
already been brought within our view4   
,the general principles of naturalism   
require that knowledge shall be reduced 
to sensations1 or impressions of the    
environment upon the organism4 ,but the 
environment and the sensations do not   
correspond4 ,the environment is matter  
and motion1 force and energy2 the       
sensations are of motions1 to be sure1  
but much more conspicuously of colors1  
sounds1 odors1 pleasures1 and pains4    
,critically1 this may be expressed by   
saying that since the larger part of    
sense-perception is so unmistakably     
subjective1 and since all knowledge     
alike must be derived from this source1 
knowledge as a whole must be regarded as
 dealing only with appearances4 ,there  
are at least three agnostic methods     
progressing from this point4 ,all agree 

that the inner or essential reality is  
unfathomable4 ,but1 in the first place1 
those most close to the tradition of    
materialism maintain that the most      
significant appearances1 the primary    
qualities1 are those which compose a    
purely quantitative and corporeal world4
 ,the inner essence of things may at any
 rate be approached by a monism of      
matter or of energy4 ,this theory is    
epistemological only to the extent of   
moderating its claims in the hope of    
lessening its responsibility4 ,another  
agnosticism places all sense qualities  
on a par1 but would regard physics and  
psychology as complementary reports upon
 the two distinct series of phenomena in
 which the underlying reality expresses 
itself4 ,this theory is epistemological 
to the extent of granting knowledge1    
viewed as perception1 as good a standing
 in the universe as that which is       
accorded to its object4 ,but such a     
dualism tends almost irresistibly to    
relapse into materialistic monism1      

because of the fundamental place of     
physical conceptions in the system of   
the sciences4 ,finally1 in another and a
 more radical phase of agnosticism1 we  
find an attempt to make full provision  
for the legitimate problems of          
epistemology4 ,the only datum1 the only 
existent accessible to knowledge1 is    
said to be the sensation1 or state of   
consciousness4 ,in the words of ,huxley3
       ,what1 after all1 do we know of  
this terrible 'matter' except      as a 
name for the unknown and hypothetical   
cause of states of      our own         
consciousness8 ,and what do we know of  
that 'spirit'      over whose threatened
 extinction by matter a great           
lamentation      is arising1 4 4 4      
except that it is also a name for an    
unknown      and hypothetical cause1 or 
condition1 of states of                 
consciousness8#bee3ai  ,the physical    
world is now to be regarded as a        
construction which does not assimilate  
to itself the content of sensations1 but

 enables one to anticipate them4 ,the   
sensation signifies a contact to which  
science can provide a key for practical 
guidance4  ,sidenote3 ,experimentalism4 
,sect4 #aah4 ,this last phase of        
naturalism is an attempt to state a pure
 and consistent experimentalism1 a      
workable theory of the routine of       
sensations4 ,but it commonly falls into 
the error of the vicious circle4 ,the   
hypothetical cause of sensations is said
 to be matter4 ,from this point of view 
the sensation is a complex1 comprising  
elaborate physical and physiological    
processes4 ,but these processes         
themselves1 on the other hand1 are said 
to be analyzable into sensations4 ,now  
two such methods of analysis cannot be  
equally ultimate4 ,if all of reality is 
finally reducible to sensations1 then   
the term sensation must be used in a new
 sense to connote a self-subsistent     
being1 and can no longer refer merely to
 a function of certain physiological    
processes4 ,the issue of this would be  

some form of idealism or of the         
experience-philosophy that is now coming
 so rapidly to the front4#bef3bj ,but   
while it is true that idealism has      
sometimes been intended1 and that a     
radically new philosophy of experience  
has sometimes been closely approached1  
those1 nevertheless1 who have developed 
experimentalism from the naturalistic   
stand-point have in reality achieved    
only a thinly disguised materialism4    
,for the very ground of their           
agnosticism is materialistic4#bef3ba    
,knowledge of reality itself is said to 
be unattainable1 because knowledge1 in  
order to come within the order of       
nature1 must be regarded as reducible to
 sensation2 and because sensation       
itself1 when regarded as a part of      
nature1 is only a physiological process1
 a special phenomenon1 in no way        
qualified to be knowledge that is true  
of reality4  ,sidenote3 ,naturalistic   
,epistemology not ,systematic4  ,sect4  
#aai4 ,perhaps1 after all1 it would be  

as fair to the spirit of naturalism to  
relieve it of responsibility for an     
epistemology4 ,it has never thoroughly  
reckoned with this problem4 ,it has     
deliberately selected from among the    
elements of experience1 and been so     
highly constructive in its method as to 
forfeit its claim to pure empiricism2   
and1 on the other hand1 has1 in this    
same selection of categories and in its 
insistence upon the test of experiment1 
fallen short of a thorough-going        
rationalism4 ,while1 on the one hand1 it
 defines and constructs1 it does so1 on 
the other hand1 within the field of     
perception and with constant reference  
to the test of perception4 ,the         
explanation and justification of this   
procedure is to be found in the aim of  
natural science rather than in that of  
philosophy4 ,it is this special         
interest1 rather than the general       
problem of being1 that determines the   
order of its categories4 ,naturalism as 
an account of reality is acceptable only

 so far as its success in satisfying    
specific demands obtains for it a       
certain logical immunity4 ,these demands
 are unquestionably valid and           
fundamental1 but they are not           
coextensive with the demand for truth4  
,they coincide rather with the immediate
 practical need of a formulation of the 
spacial and temporal changes that       
confront the will4 ,hence naturalism is 
acceptable to common-sense as an account
 of what the every-day attitude to the  
environment treats as its object4       
,naturalism is common-sense about the   
outer world1 revised and brought up to  
date with the aid of the results of     
science4 ,its deepest spring is the     
organic instinct for the reality of the 
tangible1 the vital recognition of the  
significance of that which is on the    
plane of interaction with the body4     
99       99       99       99       99  
,sidenote3 ,general ,ethical            
,stand-point4  ,sect4 #abj4 ,oddly      
enough1 although common-sense is ready  

to intrust to naturalism the description
 of the situation of life1 it prefers to
 deal otherwise with its ideals4        
,indeed1 common-sense is not without a  
certain suspicion that naturalism is the
 advocate of moral reversion4 ,it is    
recognized as the prophecy of the brute 
majority of life1 of those              
considerations of expediency and        
pleasure that are the warrant for its   
secular moods rather than for its       
sustaining ideals4 ,and that strand of  
life is indeed its special province4    
,for the naturalistic method of         
reduction must find the key to human    
action among those practical conditions 
that are common to man and his inferiors
 in the scale of being4 ,in short1 human
 life1 like all life1 must be construed 
as the adjustment of the organism to its
 natural environment for the sake of    
preservation and economic advancement4  
,sidenote3 ,cynicism and ,cyrenaicism4  
,sect4 #aba4 ,early in ,greek philosophy
 this general idea of life was          

picturesquely interpreted in two        
contrasting ways1 those of the ,cynic   
and the ,cyrenaic4 ,both of these wise  
men postulated the spiritual            
indifference of the universe at large1  
and looked only to the contact of life  
with its immediate environment4 ,but    
while the one hoped only to hedge       
himself about1 the other sought         
confidently the gratification of his    
sensibilities4 ,the figure of the ,cynic
 is the more familiar4 ,diogenes of the 
tub practised self-mortification until  
his dermal and spiritual callousness    
were alike impervious4 ,from behind his 
protective sheath he could without      
affectation despise both nature and     
society4 ,he could reckon himself more  
blessed than ,alexander1 because1 with  
demand reduced to the minimum1 he could 
be sure of a surplus of supply4 ,having 
renounced all goods save the bare       
necessities of life1 he could neglect   
both promises and threats and be played 
upon by no one4 ,he was securely        

intrenched within himself1 an           
unfurnished habitation1 but the citadel 
of a king4 ,the ,cyrenaic1 on the other 
hand1 did not seek to make impervious   
the surface of contact with nature and  
society1 but sought to heighten its     
sensibility1 that it might become a     
medium of pleasurable feeling4 ,for the 
inspiration with which it may be pursued
 this ideal has nowhere been more       
eloquently set forth than in the pages  
of ,walter ,pater1 who styles himself   
the new ,cyrenaic4       ,not the fruit 
of experience1 but experience itself1 is
 the      end4 ,a counted number of     
pulses only is given to us of a         
variegated1 dramatic life4 ,how may we  
see in them all that is      to be seen 
in them by the finest senses8 ,how shall
 we pass      most swiftly from point to
 point1 and be present always at the    
focus where the greatest number of vital
 forces unite in their      purest      
energy8       ,to burn always with this 
hard1 gemlike flame1 to maintain this   

ecstacy1 is success in life4 4 4 4      
,while all melts under our      feet1 we
 may well catch at any exquisite        
passion1 or any      contribution to    
knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon
 to      set the spirit free for a      
moment1 or any stirring of the          
senses1 strange dyes1 strange colors1   
and curious odors1 or      work of the  
artist's hands1 or the face of one's    
friend4 ,not      to discriminate every 
moment some passionate attitude in those
      about us1 and in the brilliancy of
 their gifts some tragic      dividing  
of forces on their ways1 is1 on this    
short day of      frost and sun1 to     
sleep before evening4#bfa3bb  ,sidenote3
 ,development of ,utilitarianism4       
,evolutionary ,conception of ,social    
,relations4  ,sect4 #abb4 ,in the course
 of modern philosophy the ethics of     
naturalism has undergone a              
transformation and development that     
equip it much more formidably for its   
competition with rival theories4 ,if the

 ,cynic and ,cyrenaic philosophies of   
life seem too egoistic and narrow in    
outlook1 this inadequacy has been       
largely overcome through the modern     
conception of the relation of the       
individual to society4 ,man is regarded 
as so dependent upon social relations   
that it is both natural and rational for
 him to govern his actions with a       
concern for the community4 ,there was a 
time when this relation of dependence   
was viewed as external1 a barter of     
goods between the individual and        
society1 sanctioned by an implied       
contract4 ,thomas ,hobbes1 whose        
unblushing materialism and egoism       
stimulated by opposition the whole      
development of ,english ethics1         
conceived morality to consist in rules  
of action which condition the stability 
of the state1 and so secure for the     
individual that peace which             
self-interest teaches him is essential  
to his welfare4       ,and therefore so 
long a man is in the condition of mere  

nature1 which is a condition of war1 as 
private appetite is      the measure of 
good and evil3 and consequently all men 
agree      on this1 that peace is good1 
and therefore also the ways or          
means of peace1 which1 as ,i have showed
 before1 are 'justice1'                 
'gratitude1' 'modesty1' 'equity1'       
'mercy1' and the rest of      the laws  
of ,nature1 are good2 that is to say1   
'moral virtues'2      and their contrary
 'vices1' evil4#bfb3bc  ,jeremy         
,bentham1 the apostle of utilitarianism 
in the eighteenth century1 defined      
political and social sanctions through  
which the individual could purchase     
security and good repute with action    
conducive to the common welfare4 ,but   
the nineteenth century has understood   
the matter better--and the idea of an   
evolution under conditions that select  
and reject1 is here again the           
illuminating thought4 ,no individual1   
evolutionary naturalism maintains1 has  
survived the perils of life without     

possessing as an inalienable part of his
 nature1 congenital like his egoism1    
certain impulses and instinctive desires
 in the interest of the community as a  
whole4 ,the latest generation of a race 
whose perpetuation has been conditioned 
by a capacity to sustain social         
relations and make common cause against 
a more external environment1 is moral1  
and does not adopt morality in the      
course of a calculating egoism4         
,conscience is the racial instinct of   
self-preservation uttering itself in the
 individual member1 who draws his very  
life-blood from the greater organism4   
,sidenote3 ,naturalistic ,ethics not    
,systematic4  ,sect4 #abc4 ,this latest 
word of naturalistic ethics has not won 
acceptance as the last word in ethics1  
and this in spite of its indubitable    
truth within its scope4 ,for the deeper 
ethical interest seeks not so much to   
account for the moral nature as to      
construe and justify its promptings4    
,the evolutionary theory reveals the    

genesis of conscience1 and demonstrates 
its continuity with nature1 but this    
falls as far short of realizing the     
purpose of ethical study as a history of
 the natural genesis of thought would   
fall short of logic4 ,indeed1 naturalism
 shows here1 as in the realm of         
epistemology1 a persistent failure to   
appreciate the central problem4 ,its    
acceptance as a philosophy1 we are again
 reminded1 can be accounted for only on 
the score of its genuinely rudimentary  
character4 ,as a rudimentary phase of   
thought it is both indispensable and    
inadequate4 ,it is the philosophy of    
instinct1 which should in normal        
development precede a philosophy of     
reason1 in which it is eventually       
assimilated and supplemented4           
,sidenote3 ,naturalism as ,antagonistic 
to ,religion4  ,sect4 #abd4 ,there is1  
finally1 an inspiration for life which  
this philosophy of naturalism may       
convey--atheism1 its detractors would   
call it1 but none the less a faith and a

 spiritual exaltation that spring from  
its summing up of truth4 ,it is well    
first to realize that which is          
dispiriting in it1 its failure to       
provide for the freedom1 immortality1   
and moral providence of the more        
sanguine faith4       ,for what is man  
looked at from this point of view8 4 4 4
 ,man1      so far as natural science by
 itself is able to teach us1 is no      
longer the final cause of the universe1 
the ,heaven-descended      heir of all  
the ages4 ,his very existence is an     
accident1 his      story a brief and    
transitory episode in the life of one of
 the      meanest of the planets4 ,of   
the combination of causes which         
first converted a dead organic compound 
into the living      progenitors of     
humanity1 science1 indeed1 as yet knows 
nothing4 ,it is enough that from such   
beginnings famine1      disease1 and    
mutual slaughter1 fit nurses of the     
future lords      of creation1 have     
gradually evolved1 after infinite       

travail1 a      race with conscience    
enough to feel that it is vile1 and     
intelligence enough to know that it is  
insignificant4 4 4 4 ,we      sound the 
future1 and learn that after a period1  
long compared      with the individual  
life1 but short indeed compared with the
      divisions of time open to our     
investigation1 the energies of      our 
system will decay1 the glory of the sun 
will be dimmed1      and the earth1     
tideless and inert1 will no longer      
tolerate the      race which has for a  
moment disturbed its solitude4 ,man will
      go down into the pit1 and all his 
thoughts will perish4 ,the      uneasy  
consciousness1 which in this obscure    
corner has for a      brief space broken
 the contented silence of the universe1 
will      be at rest4 ,matter will know 
itself no longer4 ',imperishable        
monuments' and 'immortal deeds1' death  
itself1 and love      stronger than     
death1 will be as though they had never 
been4      ,nor will anything that is be

 better or be worse for all that        
the labor1 genius1 devotion1 and        
suffering of man have      striven      
through countless generations to        
effect4#bfe3bd  ,sidenote3 ,naturalism  
as the ,basis for a ,religion of        
,service1 ,wonder1 and ,renunciation4   
,sect4 #abe4 ,but though our philosopher
 must accept the truth of this terrible 
picture1 he is not left without         
spiritual resources4 ,the abstract      
religion provided for the agnostic      
faithful by ,herbert ,spencer does not1 
it is true1 afford any nourishment to   
the religious nature4 ,he would have men
 look for a deep spring of life in the  
negative idea of mystery1 the apotheosis
 of ignorance1 while religious faith to 
live at all must lay hold upon reality4 
,but there does spring from naturalism a
 positive religion1 whose fundamental   
motives are those of service1 wonder1   
and renunciation3 service of humanity in
 the present1 wonder at the natural     
truth1 and renunciation of a universe   

keyed to vibrate with human ideals4     
,have you1 writes ,charles ,ferguson1   
had dreams of ,nirvana      and sickly  
visions and raptures8 ,have you imagined
 that the      end of your life is to be
 absorbed back into the life of ,god1   
and to flee the earth and forget all8   
,or do you want to walk      on air1 or 
fly on wings1 or build a heavenly city  
in the      clouds8 ,come1 let us take  
our kit on our shoulders1 and go out    
and build the city here4#bfe3be  ,for   
,haeckel natural religion is such as    
the astonishment with which we gaze upon
 the starry heavens      and the        
microscopic life in a drop of water1 the
 awe with      which we trace the       
marvellous working of energy in the     
motion      of matter1 the reverence    
with which we grasp the universal       
dominance of the law of substance       
throughout the      universe4#bff3bf    
,there is a deeper and a sincerer note  
in the stout1 forlorn humanism of       
,huxley3       ,that which lies before  

the human race is a constant struggle   
to maintain and improve1 in opposition  
to the ,state of ,nature1      the      
,state of ,art of an organized polity2  
in which1 and by      which1 man may    
develop a worthy civilization1 capable  
of      maintaining and constantly      
improving itself1 until the             
evolution of our globe shall have       
entered so far upon its      downward   
course that the cosmic process resumes  
its sway2 and1      once more1 the      
,state of ,nature prevails over the     
surface of      our planet4#bff3bg      
,,footnotes3  #bbc3a ,,preliminary      
,,note4--,by naturalism is meant that   
system of philosophy which defines the  
universe in the terms of natural        
science4 ,in its dogmatic phase1 wherein
 it maintains that being is corporeal1  
it is called materialism4 ,in its       
critical phase1 wherein it makes the    
general assertion that the natural      
sciences constitute the only possible   
knowledge1 whatever be the nature of    

reality itself1 it is called positivism1
 agnosticism1 or simply naturalism4     
#bbf3b ,lucretius3 ,de ,rerum ,natura1  
,bk4 ,,ii1 lines #efi-ehj4 ,translation 
by ,munro4  #bbi3c ,the reader will find
 an interesting account of these        
opposing views in ,locke's chapter on   
,space1 in his ,essay ,concerning ,human
 ,understanding4  #bcj3d ,descartes     
distinguished his theory from that of   
,democritus in the ,principles of       
,philosophy1 ,part ,,iv1 ,sect4 ccii4   
#bca3e ,pearson3 ,grammar of ,science1  
pp4 #bei-bfj4 ,cf4 ibid41 ,chap4 ,,vii1 
entire4  #bcb3f ,quoted in ,ueberweg3   
,history of ,philosophy1 ,,ii1 p4 #abd4 
#bcc3g ,quoted from the ,opticks of     
,newton by ,james ,ward1 in his         
,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 ,i1 p4    
#dc4  #bcf3h ,haeckel3 ,riddle of the   
,universe4 ,translation by ,mc,cabe1 p4 
#bed4  ,the best systematic presentation
 of energetics is to be found in        
,ostwald's ,vorlesungen ueber           
,natur-,philosophie4 ,herbert ,spencer1 

in his well-known ,first ,principles1   
makes philosophical use of both force   
and energy4  #bch3i ,cf4 ,chap4 ,,ix4   
#bdj3aj ,lucretius3 ,op4 cit41 ,bk4 ,i1 
lines #ajba-abcg4  #bda3aa ,quoted from 
,la ,place's essay on ,probability by   
,ward3 ,op4 cit41 ,i1 p4 #da4  #bdc3ab  
,an interesting account and criticism of
 such a theory 7,clifford's7 is to be   
found in ,royce's ,spirit of ,modern    
,philosophy1 ,lecture ,x4  #bdd3ac ,this
 method replaced the old theory of      
catastrophes through the efforts of the 
,english geologists1 ,hutton            
7#agbf-agig7 and ,lyell 7#agfg-ahdi74   
#bde3ad ,harvey's discovery of the      
circulation of the blood1 published in  
#afbh1 was regarded as a step in this   
direction4  #bej3ae ,from the account of
 ,la ,mettrie in ,lange3 ,history of    
,materialism4 ,translation by ,thomas1  
,,ii1 pp4 #fg-fh4  #bea3af ,quoted from 
,voltaire's ,london ,letter on the      
,english1 by ,lange3 ,op4 cit41 ,,ii1 p4
 #ah4  #bea3ag ,quoted by ,lange3 ,op4  

cit41 ,,ii1 p4 #aac4  #beb3ah ,the      
phrase psycho-physical parallelism1     
current in psychology1 may mean         
automatism of the kind expounded above1 
and may also mean dualism4 ,it is used  
commonly as a methodological principle  
to signify that no causal relationship  
between mind and body1 but one of       
correspondence1 is to be looked for in  
empirical psychology4 ,cf4 ,sect4 #ii4  
#bee3ai ,quoted by ,ward3 ,op4 cit41 ,i1
 p4 #ah4  #bef3bj ,there are times when 
,huxley1 e4 g41 would seem to be on the 
verge of the ,berkeleyan idealism4 ,cf4 
,chap4 ,,ix4  #bef3ba ,for the case of  
,karl ,pearson1 read his ,grammar of    
,science1 ,chap4 ,,ii4  #bfa3bb ,pater3 
,the ,renaissance1 pp4 #bdi-bej4        
#bfb3bc ,hobbes3 ,leviathan1 ,chap4     
,,xv4  #bfe3bd ,quoted from ,balfour3   
,foundations of ,belief1 pp4 #bi-ca4    
#bfe3be ,ferguson3 ,religion of         
,democracy1 p4 #aj4  #bff3bf ,haeckel3  
,op4 cit41 p4 #cdd4  #bff3bg ,huxley3   
,evolution and ,ethics1 p4 #de4         

,collected ,essays1 ,vol4 ,,ix4         
,,chapter ,,ix  ,,subjectivism#bfg3a    
,sidenote3 ,subjectivism ,originally    
,associated with ,relativism and        
,scepticism4  ,sect4 #abf4 ,when1 in the
 year #agaj1 ,bishop ,berkeley          
maintained the thesis of empirical      
idealism1 having rediscovered it and    
announced it with a justifiable sense of
 originality1 he provoked a kind of     
critical judgment that was keenly       
annoying if not entirely surprising to  
him4 ,in refuting the conception of     
material substance and demonstrating the
 dependence of being upon mind1 he at   
once sought1 as he did repeatedly in    
later years1 to establish the world of  
practical belief1 and so to reconcile   
metaphysics and common-sense4 ,yet he   
found himself hailed as a fool and a    
sceptic4 ,in answer to an inquiry       
concerning the reception of his book in 
,london1 his friend ,sir ,john ,percival
 wrote as follows3       ,i did but name
 the subject matter of your book of     

,principles to some ingenious friends of
 mine and they      immediately treated 
it with ridicule1 at the same time      
refusing to read it1 which ,i have not  
yet got one to do4 ,a      physician of 
my acquaintance undertook to discover   
your      person1 and argued you must   
needs be mad1 and that you ought      to
 take remedies4 ,a bishop pitied you1   
that a desire of      starting something
 new should put you upon such an        
undertaking4 ,another told me that you  
are not gone so far as      another     
gentleman in town1 who asserts not only 
that there is      no such thing as     
,matter1 but that we ourselves have no  
being      at all4#bfh3b  ,there can be 
no doubt but that the idea of the       
dependence of real things upon their    
appearance to the individual is a       
paradox to common-sense4 ,it is a       
paradox because it seems to reverse the 
theoretical instinct itself1 and to     
define the real in those very terms     
which disciplined thought learns to     

neglect4 ,in the early history of       
thought the nature of the thinker       
himself is recognized as that which is  
likely to distort truth rather than that
 which conditions it4 ,when the wise    
man1 the devotee of truth1 first makes  
his appearance1 his authority is        
acknowledged because he has renounced   
himself4 ,as witness of the universal   
being he purges himself of whatever is  
peculiar to his own individuality1 or   
even to his human nature4 ,in the       
aloofness of his meditation he escapes  
the cloud of opinion and prejudice that 
obscures the vision of the common man4  
,in short1 the element of belief        
dependent upon the thinker himself is   
the dross which must be refined away in 
order to obtain the pure truth4 ,when1  
then1 in the critical epoch of the      
,greek sophists1 ,protagoras declares   
that there is no belief that is not of  
this character1 his philosophy is       
promptly recognized as scepticism4      
,protagoras argues that sense qualities 

are clearly dependent upon the actual   
operations of the senses1 and that all  
knowledge reduces ultimately to these   
terms4       ,the senses are variously  
named hearing1 seeing1 smelling2        
there is the sense of heat1 cold1       
pleasure1 pain1 desire1      fear1 and  
many more which are named1 as well as   
innumerable      others which have no   
name2 with each of them there is born an
      object of sense1--all sorts of    
colors born with all sorts of      sight
 and sounds in like manner with hearing1
 and other      objects with the other  
senses4#bfi3c  ,if the objects are born 
with the senses1 it follows that they   
are born with and appertain to the      
individual perceiver4       ,either     
show1 if you can1 that our sensations   
are not      relative and individual1   
or1 if you admit that they are          
individual1 prove that this does not    
involve the consequence      that the   
appearance becomes1 or1 if you like to  
say1 is to the      individual          

only4#bgj3d  ,the same motif is thus    
rendered by ,walter ,pater in the       
,conclusion of his ,renaissance3        
,at first sight experience seems to bury
 us under a flood of      external      
objects1 pressing upon us with a sharp  
and      importunate reality1 calling us
 out of ourselves in a thousand         
forms of action4 ,but when reflexion    
begins to act upon those      objects   
they are dissipated under its influence2
 the cohesive      force seems suspended
 like a trick of magic2 each object is  
loosed into a group of                  
impressions--color1 odor1 texture--in   
the mind of the observer4 4 4 4         
,experience1 already reduced to      a  
swarm of impressions1 is ringed round   
for each one of us by      that thick   
wall of personality through which no    
real voice has      ever pierced on its 
way to us1 or from us to that which we  
can      only conjecture to be without4 
,every one of these impressions      is 
the impression of the individual in his 

isolation1 each      mind keeping as a  
solitary prisoner its own dream of a    
world4  ,the ,protagorean generalization
 is due to the reflection that all      
experience is some individual           
experience1 that no subject of discourse
 escapes the imputation of belonging to 
some individual's private history4 ,the 
individual must start with his own      
experiences and ideas1 and he can never 
get beyond them1 for he cannot see      
outside his own vision1 or even think   
outside his own mind4 ,the scepticism of
 this theory is explicit1 and the       
formulas of ,protagoras--the famous ,man
 is the measure of all things1 and the  
more exact formula1 ,the truth is what  
appears to each man at each             
time#bga3e--;have been the articles of  
scepticism throughout the history of    
thought4  ,sidenote3 ,phenomenalism and 
,spiritualism4  ,sect4 #abg4 ,there is1 
therefore1 nothing really surprising in 
the reception accorded the new          
philosophy of ,bishop ,berkeley4 ,a     

sceptical relativism is the earliest    
phase of subjectivism1 and its avoidance
 at once becomes the most urgent problem
 of any philosophy which proposes to    
proceed forth from this principle4 ,and 
this problem ,berkeley meets with great 
adroitness and a wise recognition of    
difficulties4 ,but his sanguine         
temperament and speculative interest    
impel him to what he regards as the     
extension of his first principle1 the   
reintroduction of the conception of     
substance under the form of spirit1 and 
of the objective order of nature under  
the form of the mind of ,god4 ,in short1
 there are two motives at work in him1  
side by side3 the epistemological       
motive1 restricting reality to          
perceptions and thoughts1 and the       
metaphysical-religious motive1 leading  
him eventually to the definition of     
reality in terms of perceiving and      
thinking spirits4 ,and from the time of 
,berkeley these two principles1         
phenomenalism and spiritualism1 have    

remained as distinct and alternating    
phases of subjectivism4 ,the former is  
its critical and dialectical conception1
 the latter its constructive and        
practical conception4  ,sidenote3       
,phenomenalism as ,maintained by        
,berkeley4 ,the ,problem ,inherited from
 ,descartes and ,locke4  ,sect4 #abh4   
,as phenomenalism has its classic       
statement and proof in the writings of  
,berkeley1 we shall do well to return to
 these4 ,the fact that this philosopher 
wished to be regarded as the prophet of 
common-sense has already been mentioned4
 ,this purpose reveals itself explicitly
 in the series of ,dialogues between    
,hylas and ,philonous4 ,the form in     
which ,berkeley here advances his thesis
 is further determined by the manner in 
which the lines were drawn in his day of
 thought4 ,the world of enlightened     
public opinion was then threefold1      
consisting of ,god1 physical nature1 and
 the soul4 ,in the early years of the   
seventeenth century ,descartes had      

sharply distinguished between the two   
substances--mind1 with its attribute of 
thought2 and body1 with its attribute of
 extension--and divided the finite world
 between them4 ,god was regarded as the 
infinite and sustaining cause of both4  
,stated in the terms of epistemology1   
the object of clear thinking is the     
physical cosmos1 the subject of clear   
thinking the immortal soul4 ,the realm  
of perception1 wherein the mind is      
subjected to the body1 embarrasses the  
,cartesian system1 and has no clear     
title to any place in it4 ,and without  
attaching cognitive importance to this  
realm1 the system is utterly dogmatic in
 its epistemology4#bgc3f ,for what one  
substance thinks1 must be assumed to be 
somehow true of another quite           
independent substance without any medium
 of communication4 ,now between         
,descartes and ,berkeley appeared the   
sober and questioning ,essay ,concerning
 ,human ,understanding1 by ,john ,locke4
 ,this is an interesting combination    

7they cannot be said to blend7 of       
traditional metaphysics and             
revolutionary epistemology4 ,the        
universe still consists of ,god1 the    
immortal thinking soul1 and a corporeal 
nature1 the object of its thought4 ,but1
 except for certain proofs of ,god and  
self1 knowledge is entirely reduced to  
the perceptual type1 to sensations1 or  
ideas directly imparted to the mind by  
the objects themselves4 ,to escape      
dogmatism it is maintained that the real
 is what is observed to be present4 ,but
 ,locke thinks the qualities so         
discovered belong in part to the        
perceiver and in part to the substance  
outside the mind4 ,color is a case of   
the former1 a secondary quality2 and    
extension a case of the latter1 a       
primary quality4 ,and evidently the     
above empirical test of knowledge is not
 equally well met in these two cases4   
,when ,i see a red object ,i know that  
red exists1 for it is observed to be    
present1 and ,i make no claim for it    

beyond the present4 ,but when ,i note   
that the red object is square1 ,i am    
supposed to know a property that will   
continue to exist in the object after ,i
 have closed my eyes or turned to       
something else4 ,here my claim exceeds  
my observation1 and the empirical       
principle adopted at the outset would   
seem to be violated4 ,berkeley develops 
his philosophy from this criticism4 ,his
 refutation of material substance is    
intended as a full acceptance of the    
implications of the new empirical       
epistemology4 ,knowledge is to be all of
 the perceptual type1 where what is     
known is directly presented2 and1 in    
conformity with this principle1 being is
 to be restricted to the content of the 
living pulses of experience4  ,sidenote3
 ,the ,refutation of ,material          
,substance4  ,sect4 #abi4 ,berkeley1    
then1 beginning with the threefold world
 of ,descartes and of common-sense1     
proposes to apply ,locke's theory of    
knowledge to the discomfiture of        

corporeal nature4 ,it was a radical     
doctrine1 because it meant for him and  
for his contemporaries the denial of all
 finite objects outside the mind4 ,but  
at the same time it meant a restoration 
of the homogeneity of experience1 the   
re-establishment of the qualitative     
world of every-day living1 and so had   
its basis of appeal to common-sense4    
,the encounter between ,hylas1 the      
advocate of the traditional philosophy1 
and ,philonous1 who represents the      
author himself1 begins with an exchange 
of the charge of innovation4       ,hyl4
 ,i am glad to find there was nothing in
 the accounts ,i      heard of you4     
,phil4 ,pray1 what were those8          
,hyl4 ,you were represented1 in last    
night's conversation1 as      one who   
maintained the most extravagant opinion 
that ever      entered into the mind of 
man1 to wit1 that there is no such      
thing as material substance in the      
world4       ,phil4 ,that there is no   
such thing as what philosophers         

call material substance1 ,i am seriously
 persuaded3 but if ,i      were made to 
see anything absurd or sceptical in     
this1 ,i      should then have the same 
reason to renounce this that ,i         
imagine ,i have now to reject the       
contrary opinion4       ,hyl4 ,what6 can
 anything be more fantastical1 more     
repugnant      to ,common-,sense1 or a  
more manifest piece of ,scepticism1 than
      to believe there is no such thing 
as matter8       ,phil4 ,softly1 good   
,hylas4 ,what if it should prove that   
you1      who hold there is1 are1 by    
virtue of that opinion1 a greater       
sceptic1 and maintain more paradoxes and
 repugnances to      ,common-,sense1    
than ,i who believe no such thing8#bgf3g
  ,philonous now proceeds with his case4
 ,beginning by obtaining from ,hylas the
 admission that pleasure and pain are   
essentially relative and subjective1 he 
argues that sensations such as heat1    
since they are inseparable from these   
feelings1 must be similarly regarded4   

,and he is about to annex other         
qualities in turn to this core of       
subjectivity1 when ,hylas enters a      
general demurrer3       ,hold1          
,philonous1 ,i now see what it was      
deluded me all this      time4 ,you     
asked me whether heat and cold1         
sweetness and      bitterness1 were not 
particular sorts of pleasure and pain2  
to      which ,i answered simply that   
they were4 ,whereas ,i should have      
thus distinguished3--those qualities as 
perceived by us1 are      pleasures or  
pains2 but not as existing in the       
external      objects4 ,we must not     
therefore conclude absolutely1 that     
there      is no heat in the fire1 or   
sweetness in the sugar1 but only        
that heat or sweetness1 as perceived by 
us1 are not in the      fire or         
sugar4#bgf3h  ,sidenote3 ,the           
,application of the ,epistemological    
,principle4  ,sect4 #acj4 ,here the     
argument touches upon profound issues4  
,philonous now assumes the extreme      

empirical contention that knowledge     
applies only to its own psychological   
moment1 that its object in no way       
extends beyond that individual situation
 which we call the state of knowing4    
,the full import of such an epistemology
 ,berkeley never recognized1 but he is  
clearly employing it here1 and the      
overthrow of ,hylas is inevitable so    
long as he does not challenge it or turn
 it against his opponent4 ,this1        
however1 as a protagonist of ,berkeley's
 own making1 he fails to do1 and he     
plays into ,philonous's hands by        
admitting that what is known only in    
perception must for that reason consist 
in perception4 ,he frankly owns that it 
is vain to stand out any longer1 that   
colors1 sounds1 tastes1 in a word1 all  
those termed secondary qualities1 have  
certainly no existence without the      
mind4#bgg3i  ,hylas has now arrived at  
the distinction between primary and     
secondary qualities4 ,extension1        
,figure1 ,solidity1 ,gravity1 ,motion1  

and ,rest are the attributes of an      
external substance which is the cause of
 sensations4 ,but the same              
epistemological principle readily       
reduces these also to dependence on     
mind1 for1 like the secondary qualities1
 their content is given only in         
perception4 ,hylas is then driven to    
defend a general material substratum1   
which is the cause of ideas1 but to     
which none of the definite content of   
these ideas can be attributed4 ,in      
short1 he has put all the content of    
knowledge on the one side1 and admitted 
its inseparability from the perceiving  
spirit1 and left the being of things    
standing empty and forlorn on the other4
 ,this amounts1 as ,philonous reminds   
him1 to the denial of the reality of the
 known world4       ,you are therefore1 
by your principles1 forced to deny the  
reality of sensible things2 since you   
made it to consist in      an absolute  
existence exterior to the mind4 ,that is
 to say1      you are a downright       

sceptic4 ,so ,i have gained my point1   
which      was to show your principles  
led to ,scepticism4#bgh3aj  ,sidenote3  
,the ,refutation of a ,conceived        
,corporeal ,world4  ,sect4 #aca4 ,having
 advanced the direct empiricist argument
 for phenomenalism1 ,berkeley now gives 
the rationalistic motive an opportunity 
to express itself in the queries of     
,hylas as to whether there be not an    
absolute extension1 somehow abstracted  
by thought from the relativities of     
perception4 ,is there not at least a    
conceivable world independent of        
perception8  ,the answers of ,philonous 
throw much light upon the ,berkeleyan   
position4 ,he admits that thought is    
capable of separating the primary from  
the secondary qualities in certain      
operations1 but at the same time denies 
that this is forming an idea of them as 
separate4       ,i acknowledge1 ,hylas1 
it is not difficult to form general     
propositions and reasonings about those 
qualities1 without      mentioning any  

other2 and1 in this sense1 to consider  
or treat      of them abstractedly4     
,but1 how doth it follow that1 because  
,i      can pronounce the word motion by
 itself1 ,i can form the idea      of it
 in my mind exclusive of body8 or1      
because theorems may      be made of    
extension and figures1 without any      
mention of      great or small1 or any  
other sensible mode or quality1         
that therefore it is possible such an   
abstract idea of      extension1 without
 any particular size or figure1 or      
sensible      quality1 should be        
distinctly formed1 and apprehended by   
the      mind8 ,mathematicians treat of 
quantity1 without regarding what        
other sensible qualities it is attended 
with1 as being      altogether          
indifferent to their demonstrations4    
,but1 when      laying aside the words1 
they contemplate the bare ideas1 ,i     
believe you will find1 they are not the 
pure abstracted ideas      of           
extension4#bgi3aa  ,berkeley denies that

 we have ideas of pure extension or     
motion1 because1 although we do actually
 deal with these and find them          
intelligible1 we can never obtain a     
state of mind in which they appear as   
the content4 ,he applies this           
psychological test because of his       
adherence to the general empirical      
postulate that knowledge is limited to  
the individual content of its own       
individual states4 ,it is a universally 
received maxim1 he says1 that everything
 which exists is particular4 ,now the   
truth of mathematical reckoning is not  
particular1 but is valid wherever the   
conditions to which it refers are       
fulfilled4 ,mathematical reckoning1 if  
it is to be particular1 must be regarded
 as a particular act or state of some   
thinker4 ,its truth must then be        
construed as relative to the interests  
of the thinker1 as a symbolism which has
 an instrumental rather than a purely   
cognitive value4 ,this conclusion cannot
 be disputed short of a radical stand   

against the general epistemological     
principle to which ,berkeley is so far  
true1 the principle that the reality    
which is known in any state of thinking 
or perceiving is the state itself4      
,sidenote3 ,the ,transition to          
,spiritualism4  ,sect4 #acb4 ,this      
concludes the purely phenomenalistic    
strain of ,berkeley's thought4 ,he has  
taken the immediate apprehension of     
sensible objects in a state of mind     
centring about the pleasure and pain of 
an individual1 to be the norm of        
knowledge4 ,he has further maintained   
that knowledge cannot escape the        
particularity of its own states4 ,the   
result is that the universe is composed 
of private perceptions and ideas4       
,strictly on the basis of what has      
preceded1 ,hylas is justified in        
regarding this conclusion as no less    
sceptical than that to which his own    
position had been reduced2 for while he 
had been compelled to admit that the    
real is unknowable1 ,philonous has      

apparently defined the knowable as      
relative to the individual4 ,but the    
supplementary metaphysics which had     
hitherto been kept in the background is 
now revealed4 ,it is maintained that    
though perceptions know no external     
world1 they do nevertheless reveal a    
spiritual substance of which they are   
the states4 ,although it has hitherto   
been argued that the esse of things is  
in their percipi1 this is now replaced  
by the more fundamental principle that  
the esse of things is in their percipere
 or velle4 ,the real world consists not 
in perceptions1 but in perceivers4      
,sidenote3 ,further ,attempts to        
,maintain ,phenomenalism4  ,sect4 #acc4 
,now it is at once evident that the     
epistemological theory which has been   
,berkeley's dialectical weapon in the   
foregoing argument is no longer         
available4 ,and those who have cared    
more for this theory than for           
metaphysical speculation have attempted 
to stop at this point1 and so to        

construe phenomenalism as to make it    
self-sufficient on its own grounds4     
,such attempts are so instructive as to 
make it worth our while to review them  
before proceeding with the development  
of the spiritualistic motive in         
subjectivism4  ,the world is to be      
regarded as made up of                  
sense-perceptions1 ideas1 or phenomena4 
,what is to be accepted as the          
fundamental category which gives to all 
of these terms their subjectivistic     
significance8 ,so far there seems to be 
nothing in view save the principle of   
relativity4 ,the type to which these    
were reduced was that of the peculiar or
 unsharable experience best represented 
by an individual's pleasure and pain4   
,but relativity will not work as a      
general principle of being4 ,it consigns
 the individual to his private mind1 and
 cannot provide for the validity of     
knowledge enough even to maintain       
itself4 ,some other course1 then1 must  
be followed4 ,perception may be given a 

psycho-physical definition1 which       
employs physical terms as               
fundamental2#bhb3ab but this flagrantly 
contradicts the phenomenalistic first   
principle4 ,or1 reality may be regarded 
as so stamped with its marks as to      
insure the proprietorship of thought4   
,but this definition of certain         
objective entities of mind1 of beings   
attributed to intelligence because of   
their intrinsic intelligibility1 is     
inconsistent with empiricism1 if indeed 
it does not lead eventually to a realism
 of the ,platonic type4#bhc3ac ,finally1
 and most commonly1 the terms of        
phenomenalism have been retained after  
their original meaning has been suffered
 to lapse4 ,the impressions of ,hume1 e4
 g41 are the remnant of the ,berkeleyan 
world with the spirit stricken out4     
,there is no longer any point in calling
 them impressions1 for they now mean    
only elements or qualities4 ,as a       
consequence this outgrowth of the       
,berkeleyanism epistemology is at       

present merging into a realistic        
philosophy of experience4#bhc3ad ,any   
one1 then1 of these three may be the    
last state of one who undertakes to     
remain exclusively faithful to the      
phenomenalistic aspect of               
,berkeleyanism1 embodied in the         
principle esse est percipi4  ,sidenote3 
,berkeley's ,spiritualism4 ,immediate   
,knowledge of the ,perceiver4  ,sect4   
#acd4 ,let us now follow the fortunes of
 the other phase of subjectivism--that  
which develops the conception of the    
perceiver rather than the perceived4    
,when ,berkeley holds that       all the
 choir of heaven and furniture of the   
,earth1 in a      word1 all those bodies
 which compose the mighty frame of the  
world1 have not any subsistence without 
a ,mind1  his thought has transcended   
the epistemology with which he overthrew
 the conception of material substance1  
in two directions4 ,for neither mind of 
the finite type nor mind of the divine  
type is perceived4 ,but the first of    

these may yet be regarded as a direct   
empirical datum1 even though sharply    
distinguished from an object of         
perception4 ,in the third dialogue1     
,philonous thus expounds this new kind  
of knowledge3       ,i own ,i have      
properly no idea1 either of ,god or any 
other      spirit2 for these being      
active1 cannot be represented by        
things perfectly inert1 as our ideas    
are4 ,i do nevertheless      know that  
,i1 who am a spirit or thinking         
substance1 exist as      certainly as ,i
 know my ideas exist4 ,farther1 ,i know 
what ,i      mean by the terms ,i and   
myself2 and ,i know this                
immediately or intuitively1 though ,i do
 not perceive it as ,i      perceive a  
triangle1 a color1 or a sound4#bhd3ae   
,the knowledge here provided for may be 
regarded as empirical because the       
reality in question is an individual    
present in the moment of the knowledge4 
,particular acts of perception are said 
directly to reveal not only perceptual  

objects1 but perceiving subjects4 ,and  
the conception of spiritual substance1  
once accredited1 may then be extended to
 account for social relations and to    
fill in the nature of ,god4 ,the latter 
extension1 in so far as it attributes   
such further predicates as universality 
and infinity1 implies still a third     
epistemology1 and threatens to pass over
 into rationalism4 ,but the knowledge of
 one's fellow-men may1 it is claimed1 be
 regarded as immediate1 like the        
knowledge of one's self4 ,perceptual and
 volitional activity has a sense for    
itself and also a sense for other like  
activity4 ,the self is both             
self-conscious and socially conscious in
 an immediate experience of the same    
type4  ,sidenote3 ,schopenhauer's       
,spiritualism1 or ,voluntarism4         
,immediate ,knowledge of the ,will4     
,sect4 #ace4 ,but this general          
spiritualistic conception is developed  
with less singleness of purpose in      
,berkeley than among the voluntarists   

and panpsychists who spring from        
,schopenhauer1 the orientalist1         
pessimist1 and mystic among the ,german 
,kantians of the early nineteenth       
century4 ,his great book1 ,die ,welt als
 ,wille und ,vorstellung1 opens with the
 phenomenalistic contention that the    
world is my idea4 ,it soon appears1     
however1 that the my is more profoundly 
significant than the idea4 ,nature is my
 creation1 due to the working within me 
of certain fixed principles of thought1 
such as space1 time1 and causality4 ,but
 nature1 just because it is my creation1
 is less than me3 is but a manifestation
 of the true being for which ,i must    
look within myself4 ,but this inner self
 cannot be made an object of thought1   
for that would be only to create another
 term of nature4 ,the will itself1 from 
which such creation springs1 is that    
which is most immediate in one's        
consciousness1 and makes itself known in
 a direct manner in its particular acts4
 ,the term will is used by ,schopenhauer

 as a general term covering the whole   
dynamics of life1 instinct and desire1  
as well as volition4 ,it is that sense  
of life-preserving and life-enhancing   
appetency which is the conscious        
accompaniment of struggle4 ,with its aid
 the inwardness of the whole world may  
now be apprehended4       ,whoever has  
now gained from all these expositions a 
knowledge      in abstracto1 and        
therefore clear and certain1 of what    
everyone knows directly in concreto1 i4 
e41 as feeling1 a      knowledge that   
his will is the real inner nature of his
      phenomenal being1 4 4 4 and that  
his will is that which is      most     
immediate in his consciousness1 4 4 4   
will find that of      itself it affords
 him the key to the knowledge of the    
inmost      being of the whole of       
nature2 for he now transfers it to all  
those phenomena which are not given to  
him1 like his own      phenomenal       
existence1 both in direct and indirect  
knowledge1      but only in the latter1 

thus merely one-sidedly as idea         
alone4#bhg3af  ,the heart of reality is 
thus known by an intuitive              
interpretation1 which begins at home in 
the individual's own heart4  ,sidenote3 
,panpsychism4  ,sect4 #acf4 ,the        
panpsychist follows the same course of  
reflection4 ,there is an outwardness and
 an inwardness of nature1 corresponding 
to the knower's body on the one hand1   
and his feeling or will on the other4   
,with this principle in hand one may    
pass down the whole scale of being and  
discover no breach of continuity4 ,such 
an interpretation of nature has been    
well set forth by a contemporary writer1
 who quotes the following from the      
botanist1 ,c4 v4 ,naegeli3              
,sensation is clearly connected with the
 reflex actions of      higher animals4 
,we are obliged to concede it to the    
other      animals also1 and we have no 
grounds for denying it to plants        
and inorganic bodies4 ,the sensation    
arouses in us a condition      of       

comfort and discomfort4 ,in general1 the
 feeling of      pleasure arises when   
the natural impulses are satisfied1 the 
feeling of pain when they are not       
satisfied4 ,since all      material     
processes are composed of movements of  
molecules and      elementary atoms1    
pleasure and pain must have their seat  
in      these particles4 4 4 4 ,thus the
 same mental thread runs      through   
all material phenomena4 ,the human mind 
is nothing but      the highest         
development on our earth of the mental  
processes      which universally animate
 and move nature4#bhh3ag  ,according to 
panpsychism1 then1 physical nature is   
the manifestation of an appetency or    
bare consciousness generalized from the 
thinker's awareness of his most intimate
 self4 ,such appetency or bare          
consciousness is the essential or       
substantial state of that which appears 
as physical nature4  ,sidenote3 ,the    
,inherent ,difficulty in ,spiritualism4 
,no ,provision for ,objective           

,knowledge4  ,sect4 #acg4 ,we must now  
turn to the efforts which this doctrine 
has made to maintain itself against the 
sceptical trend of its own epistemology4
 ,for precisely as in the case of       
phenomenalism its dialectical principle 
threatens to be self-destructive4       
,immediate presence is still the test of
 knowledge4 ,but does not immediate     
presence connote relativity and         
inadequacy1 at best2 an initial phase of
 knowledge that must be supplemented and
 corrected before objective reality and 
valid truth are apprehended8 ,does not  
the individuality of the individual     
thinker connote the very maximum of     
error8 ,indeed1 spiritualism would seem 
to have exceeded even ,protagoreanism   
itself1 and to have passed from         
scepticism to deliberate nihilism4 ,the 
object of knowledge is no longer even1  
as with the phenomenalist1 the thinker's
 thought1 but only his thinking4 ,and if
 the thinker's thought is relative to   
him1 then the thinker's act of thinking 

is the very vanishing-point of          
relativity1 the negative term of a      
negating relation4 ,how is a real1 a    
self-subsistent world to be composed of 
such8 ,impelled by a half-conscious     
realization of the hopelessness of this 
situation1 the exponent of spiritualism 
has sought to universalize his          
conception2 to define an absolute or    
ultimate spirit other than the          
individual thinker1 though known in and 
through him4 ,but it is clear that this 
development of spiritualism1 like all of
 the speculative procedure of           
subjectivism1 threatens to exceed the   
scope of the original principle of      
knowledge4 ,there is a strong           
presumption against the possibility of  
introducing a knowledge of ,god by the  
way of the particular presentations of  
an individual consciousness4  ,sidenote3
 ,schopenhauer's ,attempt to            
,universalize ,subjectivism4 ,mysticism4
  ,sect4 #ach4 ,schopenhauer must be    
credited with a genuine effort to accept

 the metaphysical consequences of his   
epistemology4 ,his epistemology1 as we  
have seen1 defined knowledge as         
centripetal4 ,the object of real        
knowledge is identical with the subject 
of knowledge4 ,if ,i am to know the     
universal will1 therefore1 ,i must in   
knowing become that will4 ,and this     
,schopenhauer maintains4 ,the innermost 
heart of the individual into which he   
may retreat1 even from his private will1
 is--the universal4 ,but there is       
another way of arriving at the same     
knowledge4 ,in contemplation ,i may     
become absorbed in principles and laws1 
rather than be diverted by the          
particular spacial and temporal objects1
 until 7and this is peculiarly true of  
the aesthetic experience7 my interest no
 longer distinguishes itself1 but       
coincides with truth4 ,in other words1  
abstract thinking and pure willing are  
not opposite extremes1 but adjacent     
points on the deeper or transcendent    
circle of experience4 ,one may reach    

this part of the circle by moving in    
either of two directions that at the    
start are directly opposite3 by turning 
in upon the subject or by utterly giving
 one's self up to the object4 ,reality  
obtains no definition by this means4    
,philosophy1 for ,schopenhauer1 is      
rather a programme for realizing the    
state in which ,i will the universal and
 know the universal will4 ,the final    
theory of knowledge1 then1 is mysticism1
 reality directly apprehended in a      
supreme and incommunicable experience1  
direct and vivid1 like perception1 and  
at the same time universal1 like        
thought4 ,but the empiricism with which 
,schopenhauer began1 the appeal to a    
familiar experience of self as will1 has
 meanwhile been forgotten4 ,the idea as 
object of my perception1 and the will as
 its subject were in the beginning      
regarded as common and verifiable items 
of experience4 ,but who1 save the       
occasional philosopher1 knows a         
universal will8 ,nor have attempts to   

avoid mysticism1 while retaining        
,schopenhauer's first principle1 been   
successful4 ,certain voluntarists and   
panpsychists have attempted to do       
without the universal will1 and define  
the world solely in terms of the many   
individual wills4 ,but1 as ,schopenhauer
 himself pointed out1 individual wills  
cannot be distinguished except in terms 
of something other than will1 such as   
space and time4 ,the same is true if for
 will there be substituted inner feeling
 or consciousness4 ,within this category
 individuals can be distinguished only  
as points of view1 which to be          
comparable at all must contain common   
objects1 or be defined in terms of a    
system of relations like that of the    
physical world or that of an ethical    
community4 ,the conception of pure will 
or pure feeling inevitably attaches to  
itself that of an undivided unity1 if   
for no other reason because there is no 
ground for distinction4 ,and such a     
unity1 a will or consciousness that is  

no particular act or idea1 can be known 
only in the unique experience which     
mysticism provides4  ,sidenote3         
,objective ,spiritualism4  ,sect4 #aci4 
,the way of ,schopenhauer is the way of 
one who adheres to the belief that what 
the thinker knows must always be a part 
of himself1 his state or his activity4  
,from this point of view the important  
element of being1 its very essence or   
substance1 is not any definable nature  
but an immediate relation to the knower4
 ,the consequence is that the universe  
in the last analysis can only be defined
 as a supreme state or activity into    
which the individual's consciousness may
 develop4 ,spiritualism has1 however1   
other interests1 interests which may be 
quite independent of epistemology4 ,it  
is speculatively interested in a kind of
 being which it defines as spiritual1   
and in terms of which it proposes to    
define the universe4 ,such procedure is 
radically different from the            
epistemological criticism which led     

,berkeley to maintain that the esse of  
objects is in their percipi1 or         
,schopenhauer to maintain that the world
 is my idea1 or that led both of these  
philosophers to find a deeper reality in
 immediately intuited self-activity4    
,for now it is proposed to understand   
spirit1 discover its properties1 and to 
acknowledge it only where these         
properties appear4 ,i may now know      
spirit as an object2 which in its       
properties1 to be sure1 is quite        
different from matter1 but which like   
matter is capable of subsisting quite   
independently of my knowledge4 ,this is 
a metaphysical spiritualism quite       
distinct from epistemological           
spiritualism1 and by no means easily    
made consistent therewith4 ,indeed1 it  
exhibits an almost irrepressible        
tendency to overstep the bounds both of 
empiricism and subjectivism1 an         
historical connection with which alone  
justifies its introduction in the       
present chapter4  ,sidenote3 ,berkeley's

 ,conception of ,god as ,cause1         
,goodness and ,order4  ,sect4 #adj4 ,to 
return again to the instructive example 
of ,bishop ,berkeley1 we find him       
proving ,god from the evidence of him in
 experience1 or the need of him to      
support the claims of experience4       
,but1 whatever power ,i may have over my
 own thoughts1 ,i find      the ideas   
actually perceived by ,sense have not a 
like      dependence on my will4 ,when  
in broad daylight ,i open my      eyes1 
it is not in my power to choose whether 
,i shall see or      no1 or to determine
 what particular objects shall present  
themselves to my view3 and so likewise  
as to the hearing and      other senses2
 the ideas imprinted on them are not    
creatures of      my will4 ,there is    
therefore some other ,will or ,spirit   
that      produces them4       ,the     
ideas of ,sense are more strong1 lively1
 and distinct than      those of the    
,imagination2 they have likewise a      
steadiness1      order1 and coherence1  

and are not excited at random1 as those 
which are the effects of human wills    
often are1 but in a      regular train  
or series--the admirable connection     
whereof      sufficiently testifies the 
wisdom and benevolence of its           
,author4 ,now the set rules1 or         
established methods1 wherein the        
,mind we depend on excites in us the    
ideas of ,sense1 are called      the    
laws of nature4#bid3ah  ,of the         
attributes of experience here in        
question1 independence or steadiness is 
not regarded as prima facie evidence of 
spirit1 but rather as an aspect of      
experience for which some cause is      
necessary4 ,but it is assumed that the  
power to produce1 with which such a     
cause must be endowed1 is the peculiar  
prerogative of spirit1 and that this    
cause gives further evidence of its     
spiritual nature1 of its eminently      
spiritual nature1 in the orderliness and
 the goodness of its effects4       ,the
 force that produces1 the intellect that

 orders1 the      goodness that perfects
 all things is the ,supreme             
,being4#bid3ai  ,that spirit is         
possessed of causal efficacy1 ,berkeley 
has in an earlier passage proved by a   
direct appeal to the individual's sense 
of power4       ,i find ,i can excite   
ideas in my mind at pleasure1 and vary  
and shift the scene as oft as ,i think  
fit4 ,it is no more than      willing1  
and straightway this or that idea arises
 in my      fancy2 and by the same power
 it is obliterated and makes way        
for another4 ,this making and unmaking  
of ideas doth very      properly        
denominate the mind active4 ,thus much  
is certain and      grounded on         
experience3 but when we talk of         
unthinking agents1      or of exciting  
ideas exclusive of volition1 we only    
amuse      ourselves with words4#bie3bj 
,although ,berkeley is here in general  
agreement with a very considerable      
variety of philosophical views1 it will 
be readily observed that this doctrine  

tends to lapse into mysticism whenever  
it is retained in its purity4 ,berkeley 
himself admitted that there was no idea 
of such power4 ,and philosophers will as
 a rule either obtain an idea           
corresponding to a term or amend the    
term--always excepting the mystical     
appeal to an inarticulate and           
indefinable experience4 ,hence pure     
power revealed in an ineffable immediate
 experience tends to give place to kinds
 of power to which some definite meaning
 may be attached4 ,the energy of        
physics1 defined by measurable          
quantitative equivalence1 is a case in  
point4 ,the idealistic trend is in      
another direction1 power coming to      
signify ethical or logical connection4  
,similarly1 in the later philosophy of  
,berkeley himself1 ,god is known by the 
nature of his activity rather than by   
the fact of his activity2 and we are    
said to account for a thing1 when we    
show that it is so best4 ,god's power1  
in short1 becomes indistinguishable from

 his universality attended with the     
attributes of goodness and orderliness4 
,but this means that the analogy of the 
human spirit1 conscious of its own      
activity1 is no longer the basis of the 
argument4 ,by the divine will is now    
meant ethical principles1 rather than   
the here am ,i willing of the empirical 
consciousness4 ,similarly the divine    
mind is defined in terms of logical     
principles1 such as coherence and order1
 rather than in terms of the here am ,i 
thinking of the finite knower himself4  
,but enough has been said to make it    
plain that this is no longer the        
stand-point of empirio-idealism4        
,indeed1 in his last philosophical      
writing1 the ,siris1 ,berkeley is so far
 removed from the principles of         
knowledge which made him at once the    
disciple and the critic of ,locke1 as to
 pronounce himself the devotee of       
,platonism and the prophet of           
transcendentalism4 ,the former strain   
appears in his conclusion that the      

principles of science are neither       
objects of sense nor imagination2 and   
that intellect and reason are alone the 
sure guides to truth4#big3ba ,his       
transcendentalism appears in his belief 
that such principles1 participating in  
the vital unity of the ,individual      
,purpose1 constitute the meaning and so 
the substantial essence of the universe4
  ,sidenote3 ,the ,general ,tendency of 
,subjectivism to ,transcend ,itself4    
,sect4 #ada4 ,such then are the various 
paths which lead from subjectivism to   
other types of philosophy1 demonstrating
 the peculiar aptitude of the former for
 departing from its first principle4    
,beginning with the relativity of all   
knowable reality to the individual      
knower1 it undertakes to conceive       
reality in one or the other of the terms
 of this relation1 as particular state  
of knowledge or as individual subject of
 knowledge4 ,but these terms develop an 
intrinsic nature of their own1 and      
become respectively empirical datum1 and

 logical or ethical principle4 ,in      
either case the subjectivistic principle
 of knowledge has been abandoned4 ,those
 whose speculative interest in a        
definable objective world has been less 
strong than their attachment to this    
principle1 have either accepted the     
imputation of scepticism1 or had        
recourse to the radical epistemological 
doctrine of mysticism4  ,sidenote3      
,ethical ,theories4 ,relativism4  ,sect4
 #adb4 ,since the essence of            
subjectivism is epistemological rather  
than metaphysical1 its practical and    
religious implications are various4 ,the
 ethical theories which are corollary to
 the tendencies expounded above1 range  
from extreme egoism to a mystical       
universalism4 ,the close connection     
between the former and relativism is    
evident1 and the form of egoism most    
consistent with epistemological         
relativism is to be found among those   
same ,sophists who first maintained this
 latter doctrine4 ,if we may believe    

,plato1 the ,sophists sought to create  
for their individual pupils an          
appearance of good4 ,in the ,theaetetus1
 ,socrates is represented as speaking   
thus on behalf of ,protagoras3          
,and ,i am far from saying that wisdom  
and the wise man have no      existence2
 but ,i say that the wise man is he who 
makes the      evils which are and      
appear to a man1 into goods which are   
and      appear to him4 4 4 4 ,i say    
that they 7the wise men7 are the        
physicians of the human body1 and the   
husbandmen of      plants--for the      
husbandmen also take away the evil and  
disordered sensations of plants1 and    
infuse into them good and      healthy  
sensations as well as true ones2 and the
 wise and good      rhetoricians make   
the good instead of the evil seem just  
to      states2 for whatever appears to 
be just and fair to a state1      while 
sanctioned by a state1 is just and fair 
to it2 but the      teacher of wisdom   
causes the good to take the place of the

      evil1 both in appearance and in   
reality4#bii3bb  ,as truth is           
indistinguishable from the appearance of
 truth to the individual1 so good is    
indistinguishable from a particular     
seeming good4 ,the supreme moral value  
according to this plan of life is the   
agreeable feeling tone of that dream    
world to which the individual is forever
 consigned4 ,the possible perfection of 
an experience which is reduced to a     
swarm of impressions1 and ringed round  
for each one of us by a thick wall of   
personality has been brilliantly        
depicted in the passage already quoted  
from ,walter ,pater1 in whom the        
naturalistic and subjectivistic motives 
unite4#bii3bc ,if all my experience is  
strictly my own1 then my good must      
likewise be my own4 ,and if all of my   
experience is valid only in its instants
 of immediacy1 then my best good must   
likewise consist in some exquisite      
passion1 or stirring of the senses4     
,sidenote3 ,pessimism and ,self-denial4 

,sect4 #adc4 ,but for ,schopenhauer the 
internal world opens out into the       
boundless and unfathomable sea of the   
universal will4 ,if ,i retire from the  
world upon my own private feelings1 ,i  
am still short of the true life1 for ,i 
am asserting myself against the world4  
,i should seek a sense of unison with a 
world whose deeper heart-beats ,i may   
learn to feel and adopt as the rhythm of
 my own4 ,the folly of willing for one's
 private self is the ground of          
,schopenhauer's pessimism4       ,all   
willing arises from want1 therefore from
 deficiency1      and therefore from    
suffering4 ,the satisfaction of a wish  
ends      it2 yet for one wish that is  
satisfied there remain at least      ten
 which are denied4 ,further1 the desire 
lasts long1 the      demands are        
infinite2 the satisfaction is short and 
scantily      measured out4 ,but even   
the final satisfaction is itself only   
apparent2 every satisfied wish at once  
makes room for a new      one1 both are 

illusions2 the one is known to be so1   
the other      not yet4 ,no attained    
object of desire can give lasting       
satisfaction1 but merely a fleeting     
gratification2 it is like      the alms 
thrown to the beggar1 that keeps him    
alive to-day      that his misery may be
 prolonged till the morrow4 4 4 4 ,the  
subject of willing is thus constantly   
stretched on the      revolving wheel of
 ,ixion1 pours water into the sieve of  
the      ,danaids1 is the ever-longing  
,tantalus4#cjj3bd  ,the escape from this
 torture and self-deception is possible 
through the same mystical experience1   
the same blending with the universe that
 conditions knowledge4  ,sidenote3 ,the 
,ethics of ,welfare4  ,sect4 #add4 ,but 
though pleasant dreaming be the most    
consistent practical sequel to a        
subjectivistic epistemology1 its        
individualism presents another basis for
 life with quite different possibilities
 of emphasis4 ,it may develop into an   
aggressive egoism of the type           

represented by the sophist              
,thrasymachus1 in his proclamation that 
might is right1 justice the interest of 
the stronger4#cja3be ,but more commonly 
it is tempered by a conception of social
 interest1 and serves as the champion of
 action against contemplation4 ,the     
gospel of action is always              
individualistic4 ,it requires of the    
individual a sense of his independence1 
and of the real virtue of his           
initiative4 ,hence those voluntarists   
who emphasize the many individual wills 
and decline to reduce them1 after the   
manner of ,schopenhauer1 to a universal1
 may be said to afford a direct         
justification of it4 ,it is true that   
this practical realism threatens the    
tenability of an epistemological        
idealism1 but the two have been united1 
and because of their common emphasis    
upon the individual such procedure is   
not entirely inconsequential4 ,friedrich
 ,paulsen1 whose panpsychism has already
 been cited1 is an excellent case in    

point4 ,the only good1 he maintains1 is 
welfare1 the fulfilment of those natural
 desires which both distinguish the     
individual and signify his continuity   
with all grades of being4       ,the    
goal at which the will aims does not    
consist in a maximum      of pleasurable
 feelings1 but in the normal exercise of
 the      vital functions for which the 
species is predisposed4 ,in the         
case of man the mode of life is on the  
whole determined by the      nature of  
the historical unity from which the     
individual      evolves as a member4    
,here the objective content of life1    
after      which the will strives1 also 
enters into consciousness with      the 
progressive evolution of presentation2  
the type of life      becomes a         
conscious ideal of life4#cjb3bf  ,here1 
contrary to the teaching of             
,schopenhauer1 the good consists in     
individual attainment1 the extension and
 fulfilment of the distinct interests   
that arise from the common fund of      

nature4 ,to be and to do to the         
uttermost1 to realize the maximum from  
nature's investment in one's special    
capacities and powers--this is indeed   
the first principle of a morality of    
action4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,ethical       
,community4  ,sect4 #ade4 ,but a type of
 ethics still further removed from the  
initial relativism has been adopted and 
more or less successfully assimilated by
 subjectivistic philosophies4 ,accepting
 ,berkeley's spirits1 with their        
indefinite capacities1 and likewise the 
stability of the ideal principles that  
underlie a ,god-administered world1 and 
morality becomes the obedience which the
 individual renders to the law4 ,the    
individual1 free to act in his own      
right1 cooperates with the purposes of  
the general spiritual community1 whose  
laws are worthy of obedience though not 
coercive4 ,the recognition of such a    
spiritual citizenship1 entailing        
opportunities1 duties1 and obligations1 
rather than thraldom1 partakes of the   

truth as well as the inadequacy of      
common-sense4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,religion
 of ,mysticism4  ,sect4 #adf4 ,as for   
religion1 at least two distinct         
practical appreciations of the universe 
have been historically associated with  
this chapter in philosophy4 ,the one of 
these is the mysticism of ,schopenhauer1
 the religious sequel to a              
universalistic voluntarism4             
,schopenhauer's ethics1 his very        
philosophy1 is religion4 ,for the good  
and the true are alike attainable only  
through identification with the         
,absolute ,will4 ,this consummation of  
life1 transcending practical and        
theoretical differences1 engulfing and  
effacing all qualities and all values1  
is like the ,nirvana of the ,orient--a  
positive ideal only for one who has     
appraised the apparent world at its real
 value4       ,rather do we freely      
acknowledge that what remains after the 
entire abolition of will is for all     
those who are still full      of will   

certainly nothing2 but1 conversely1 to  
those in whom      the will has turned  
and has denied itself1 this our world1  
which is so real1 with all it's suns and
 milky-ways--is      nothing4#cjd3bg    
,sidenote3 ,the ,religion of ,individual
 ,cooperation with ,god4  ,sect4 #adg4  
,from the union of the two motives of   
voluntarism and individualism springs   
another and a more familiar type of     
religion1 that of cooperative spiritual 
endeavor4 ,in the religion of           
,schopenhauer the soul must utterly lose
 itself for the sake of peace2 here the 
soul must persist in its own being and  
activity for the sake of the progressive
 goodness of the world4 ,for            
,schopenhauer ,god is the universal     
solution1 in which all motions cease and
 all differences disappear2 here ,god is
 the ,general of moral forces4 ,the     
deeper and more significant universe is 
a society of rational agents1 acting    
under the eye of      ,providence1      
concurring in one design to promote the 

common      benefit of the whole1 and   
conforming their actions to the         
established laws and order of the       
,divine parental wisdom3      wherein   
each particular agent shall not consider
 himself      apart1 but as the member  
of a great ,city1 whose author and      
founder is ,god3 in which the civil laws
 are no other than the      rules of    
virtue and the duties of religion3 and  
where      everyone's true interest is  
combined with his duty4#cjd3bh  ,but so 
uncompromising an optimism is not       
essential to this religion4 ,its        
distinction lies rather in its          
acceptance of the manifest plurality of 
souls1 and its appeal to the faith that 
is engendered by service4#cje3bi ,as    
,william ,james has said3       ,even   
,god's being is sacred from ours4 ,to   
cooperate with his      creation by the 
best and rightest response seems all he 
wants      of us4 ,in such cooperation  
with his purposes1 not in any           
chimerical speculative conquest of him1 

not in any theoretical      drinking of 
him up1 must lie the real meaning of our
      destiny4#cje3cj   ,,footnotes3    
#bfg3a ,,preliminary ,,note4 ,by        
,subjectivism is meant that system of   
philosophy which construes the universe 
in accordance with the epistemological  
principle that all knowledge is of its  
own states or activities4 ,in so far as 
subjectivism reduces reality to states  
of knowledge1 such as perceptions or    
ideas1 it is phenomenalism4 ,in so far  
as it reduces reality to a more internal
 active principle such as spirit or     
will1 it is spiritualism4  #bfh3b       
,berkeley3 ,complete ,works1 ,vol4 ,i1  
p4 #ceb4 ,fraser's edition4  #bfi3c     
,plato3 ,theaetetus1 #aef4 ,translation 
by ,jowett4 ,the italics are mine4      
#bgj3d ,plato3 ,op4 cit41 #aff4  #bga3e 
ale3thes ho hekasto3 hekastote dokei4   
#bgc3f ,for another issue out of this   
situation1 cf4 ,sects4 #ahe-ahg4  #bgf3g
 ,berkeley3 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4    
#chj-cha4  #bgf3h ,ibid41 p4 #chi4      

#bgg3i ,ibid41 p4 #cig4  #bgh3aj ,ibid41
 p4 #dah4  #bgi3aa ,ibid41 pp4 #djc-djd4
  #bhb3ab ,cf4 ,pearson3 ,grammar of    
,science1 ,chap4 ,,ii4 ,see above1      
,sect4 #aah4  #bhc3ac ,see ,chap4 ,,xi4 
,cf4 also ,sect4 #adj4  #bhc3ad ,the    
same may be said of the permanent       
possibilities of sensation1 proposed by 
,j4 ,s4 ,mill4 ,such possibilities      
outside of actual perception are either 
nothing or things such as they are known
 to be in perception4 ,in either case   
they are not perceptions4  ,in ,ernst   
,mach's ,analysis of ,sensations1 the   
reader will find an interesting         
transition from sensationalism to       
realism through the substitution of the 
term ,bestandtheil for ,empfindung4     
7,see ,translation by ,williams1 pp4    
#ah-bj47 ,see below1 ,sect4 #bjg4       
#bhd3ae ,berkeley3 ,op4 cit41 p4 #ddg4  
#bhg3af ,schopenhauer3 ,the ,world as   
,will and ,idea4 ,translation by        
,haldane and ,kemp1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ada4  
#bhh3ag ,quoted from ,naegeli3 ,die     

,mechanisch-physiologische ,theorie der 
,abstammungslehre1 by ,friedrich        
,paulsen1 in his ,introduction to       
,philosophy4 ,translation by ,thilly1 p4
 #ajc4  #bid3ah ,berkeley3 ,op4 cit41 p4
 #bgc4  #bid3ai ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4
 #bgb-bgc4  #bie3bj ,op4 cit41 ,vol4    
,,iii1 p4 #bgh4  #big3ba ,op4 cit41     
,vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #bdi4  #bii3bb ,plato3  
,theaetetus1 #afg4 ,translation by      
,jowett4  #bii3bc ,see ,sect4 #aba4     
#cjj3bd ,schopenhauer3 ,op4 cit4        
,translation by ,haldane and ,kemp1     
,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #bec-bed4  #cja3be ,see   
,plato3 ,republic1 ,bk4 ,i1 #cch4       
#cjb3bf ,paulsen3 ,op4 cit41 p4 #dbc4   
#cjd3bg ,schopenhauer3 ,op4 cit4        
,translation by ,haldane and ,kemp1 p4  
#ecb4  #cjd3bh ,berkeley3 ,op4 cit41    
,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ach4  #cje3bi ,for an   
interesting characterization of this    
type of religion1 cf4 ,royce3 ,spirit of
 ,modern ,philosophy1 p4 #df4  #cje3cj  
,james3 ,the ,will to ,believe1 p4 #ada4
     ,,chapter ,x  ,,absolute           

,,realism#cjf3a   ,sidenote3 ,the       
,philosopher's ,task1 and the           
,philosopher's ,object1 or the          
,absolute4  ,sect4 #adh4 ,no one has    
understood better than the philosopher  
himself that he cannot hope to be       
popular with men of practical           
common-sense4 ,indeed1 it has commonly  
been a matter of pride with him4 ,the   
classic representation of the           
philosopher's faith in himself is to be 
found in ,plato's ,republic4 ,the       
philosopher is there portrayed in the   
famous cave simile as one who having    
seen the light itself can no longer     
distinguish the shadows which are       
apparent to those who sit perpetually in
 the twilight4 ,within the cave of      
shadows he is indeed less at his ease   
than those who have never seen the sun4 
,but since he knows the source of the   
shadows1 his knowledge surrounds that of
 the shadow connoisseurs4 ,and his      
equanimity need not suffer from the     
contempt of those whom he understands   

better than they understand themselves4 
,the history of philosophy is due to the
 dogged persistence with which the      
philosopher has taken himself seriously 
and endured the poor opinion of the     
world4 ,but the pride of the philosopher
 has done more than perpetuate the      
philosophical outlook and problem2 it   
has led to the formulation of a definite
 philosophical conception1 and of two   
great philosophical doctrines4 ,the     
conception is that of the absolute2 and 
the doctrines are that of the absolute  
being1 and that of the absolute self or 
mind4 ,the former of these doctrines is 
the topic of the present chapter4       
,among the early ,greeks the role of the
 philosopher was one of superlative     
dignity4 ,in point of knowledge he was  
less easily satisfied than other men4   
,he thought beyond immediate practical  
problems1 devoting himself to a         
profounder reflection1 that could not   
but induce in him a sense of superior   
intellectual worth4 ,the familiar was   

not binding upon him1 for his thought   
was emancipated from routine and        
superficiality4 ,furthermore his        
intellectual courage and resolution did 
not permit him to indulge in triviality1
 doubt1 or paradox4 ,he sought his own  
with a faith that could not be denied4  
,even ,heraclitus the ,dark1 who was    
also called the ,weeping ,philosopher1  
because he found at the very heart of   
nature that transiency which the        
philosophical mind seeks to escape1 felt
 himself to be exalted as well as       
isolated by that insight4 ,but this     
sentiment of personal aloofness led at  
once to a division of experience4 ,he   
who knows truly belongs to another and  
more abiding world4 ,as there is a      
philosophical way of thought1 there is a
 philosophical way of life1 and a       
philosophical object4 ,since the        
philosopher and the common man do not   
see alike1 the terms of their experience
 are incommensurable4 ,in ,parmenides   
the ,eleatic this motive is most        

strikingly exhibited4 ,there is a ,way  
of ,truth which diverges from the ,way  
of ,opinion4 ,the philosopher walks the 
former way alone4 ,and there is an      
object of truth1 accessible only to one 
who takes this way of truth4 ,parmenides
 finds this object to be the content of 
pure affirmation4       ,one path only  
is left for us to speak of1 namely1 that
 ,it      is4 ,in it are very many      
tokens that what is1 is uncreated and   
indestructible1 alone1 complete1        
immovable1 and without end4      ,nor   
was it ever1 nor will it be2 for now it 
is1 all at once1      a continuous      
one4#cjh3b  ,the philosophy of          
,parmenides1 commonly called the        
,eleatic ,philosophy1 is notable for    
this emergence of the pure concept of   
absolute being as the final object of   
knowledge4 ,the philosopher aims to     
discover that which is1 and so turns    
away from that which is not or that     
which ceases to be4 ,the negative and   
transient aspects of experience only    

hinder him in his search for the        
eternal4 ,it was the great ,eleatic     
insight to realize that the outcome of  
thought is thus predetermined2 that the 
answer to philosophy is contained in the
 question of philosophy4 ,the           
philosopher1 in that he resolutely      
avoids all partiality1 relativity1 and  
superficiality1 must affirm a complete1 
universal1 and ultimate being as the    
very object of that perfect knowledge   
which he means to possess4 ,this object 
is known in the history of these        
philosophies as the infinite or         
absolute4#cji3c  ,sidenote3 ,the        
,eleatic ,conception of ,being4  ,sect4 
#adi4 ,the ,eleatic reasons somewhat as 
follows4 ,the philosopher seeks to know 
what is4 ,the object of his knowledge   
will then contain as its primary and    
essential predicate1 that of being4 ,it 
is a step further to define being in    
terms of this essential predicate4      
,parmenides thinks of being as a power  
or strength1 a positive self-maintenance

 to which all affirmations refer4 ,the  
remainder of the ,eleatic philosophy is 
the analysis of this concept and the    
proof of its implications4 ,being must  
persist through all change1 and span all
 chasms4 ,before being there can be only
 nothing1 which is the same as to say   
that so far as being is concerned there 
is no before4 ,similarly there can be no
 after or beyond4 ,there can be no      
motion1 change1 or division of being1   
because being will be in all parts of   
every division1 and in all stages of    
every process4 ,hence being is uncreated
 and indestructible1 alone1 complete1   
immovable1 and without end4  ,the       
argument turns upon the application to  
being as a whole of the meaning and the 
implications of only being4 ,being is   
the affirmative or positive4 ,from that 
alone1 one can derive only such         
properties as eternity or unity4 ,for   
generation and decay and plurality may  
belong to that which is also affirmative
 and positive1 but not to that which is 

affirmative and positive only4 ,the     
,eleatic philosophy is due1 then1 to the
 determination to derive the whole of   
reality from the bare necessity of      
being1 to cut down reality to what flows
 entirely from the assertion of its only
 known necessary aspect1 that of being4 
,we meet here in its simplest form a    
persistent rationalistic motive1 the    
attempt to derive the universe from the 
isolation and analysis of its most      
universal character4 ,as in the case of 
every well-defined philosophy1 this     
motive is always attended by a besetting
 problem4 ,here it is the accounting for
 what1 empirically at least1 is alien to
 that universal character4 ,and this    
difficulty is emphasized rather than    
resolved by ,parmenides in his          
designation of a limbo of opinion1 in   
which is no true belief at all1 to which
 the manifold of common experience with 
all its irrelevancies can be relegated4 
,sidenote3 ,spinoza's ,conception of    
,substance4  ,sect4 #aej4 ,the ,eleatic 

philosophy1 enriched and supplemented1  
appears many centuries later in the     
rigorous rationalism of ,spinoza4#caa3d 
,with ,spinoza philosophy is a          
demonstration of necessities after the  
manner of geometry4 ,reality is to be   
set forth in theorems derived from      
fundamental axioms and definitions4 ,as 
in the case of ,parmenides1 these       
necessities are the implications of the 
very problem of being4 ,the             
philosopher's problem is made to solve  
itself4 ,but for ,spinoza that problem  
is more definite and more pregnant4 ,the
 problematic being must not only be1 but
 must be sufficient to itself4 ,what the
 philosopher seeks to know is primarily 
an intrinsic entity4 ,its nature must be
 independent of other natures1 and my   
knowledge of it independent of my       
knowledge of anything else4 ,reality is 
something which need not be sought      
further4 ,so construed1 being is in     
,spinoza's philosophy termed substance4 
,it will be seen that to define         

substance is to affirm the existence of 
it1 for substance is so defined as to   
embody the very qualification for       
existence4 ,whatever exists exists under
 the form of substance1 as that which is
 in itself1 and is conceived through    
itself3 in other words1 that of which a 
conception can be formed independently  
of any other conception4#cab3e          
,sidenote3 ,spinoza's ,proof of ,god1   
the ,infinite ,substance4 ,the ,modes   
and the ,attributes4  ,sect4 #aea4      
,there remains but one further          
fundamental thesis for the establishment
 of the ,spinozistic philosophy1 the    
thesis which maintains the exclusive    
existence of the one absolutely infinite
 being1 or ,god4 ,the exclusive         
existence of ,god follows from his      
existence1 because of the exhaustiveness
 of his nature4 ,his is the nature      
consisting in infinite attributes1 of   
which each expresses eternal and        
infinite essentiality4 ,he will contain 
all meaning1 and all possible meaning1  

within his fixed and necessary          
constitution4 ,it is evident that if    
such a ,god exist1 nothing can fall     
outside of him4 ,one such substance must
 be the only substance4 ,but upon what  
grounds are we to assert ,god's         
existence8  ,to proceed further with    
,spinoza's philosophy we must introduce 
two terms which are scarcely less       
fundamental in his system than that of  
substance4 ,the one of these is         
attribute1 by which he means kind or    
general property2 the other is mode1 by 
which he means case or individual thing4
 ,spinoza's proof of ,god consists in   
showing that no single mode1 single     
attribute1 or finite group of modes or  
attributes1 can be a substance2 but only
 an infinite system of all modes of all 
attributes4 ,translated into common     
speech this means that neither kinds nor
 cases1 nor special groups of either1   
can stand alone and be of themselves1   
but only the unity of all possible cases
 of all possible kinds4  ,the argument  

concerning the possible substantiality  
of the case or individual thing is      
relatively simple4 ,suppose an attribute
 or kind1 ,a1 of which there are cases  
am#a1 am#b1 am#c1 etc4 ,the number of   
cases is never involved in the nature of
 the kind1 as is seen for example in the
 fact that the definition of triangle   
prescribes no special number of         
individual triangles4 ,hence am#a1 am#b1
 am#c1 etc41 must be explained by       
something outside of their nature4      
,their being cases of ,a does not       
account for their existing severally4   
,this is ,spinoza's statement of the    
argument that individual events1 such as
 motions or sensations1 are not         
self-dependent1 but belong to a context 
of like events which are mutually       
dependent4  ,the question of the        
attribute is more difficult4 ,why may   
not an attribute as a complete domain of
 interdependent events1 itself be       
independent or substantial8 ,spinoza's  
predecessor1 ,descartes1 had maintained 

precisely that thesis in behalf of the  
domain of thought and the domain of     
space4 ,spinoza's answer rests upon the 
famous ontological argument1 inherited  
from scholasticism and generally        
accepted in the first period of modern  
philosophy4 ,the evidence of existence1 
he declares1 is clear and distinct      
conceivability4       ,for a person to  
say that he has a clear and             
distinct--that      is1 a true--idea of 
a substance1 but that he is not sure    
whether such substance exists1 would be 
the same as if he said      that he had 
a true idea1 but was not sure whether or
 no it was      false4#cad3f  ,now we   
can form a clear and distinct idea of an
 absolutely infinite being that shall   
have all possible attributes4 ,this idea
 is a well-recognized standard and      
object of reference for thought4 ,but it
 is a conception which is highly        
qualified1 not only through its         
clearness and distinctness1 but also    
through its abundance of content4 ,it   

affirms itself therefore with a         
certainty that surpasses any other      
certainty1 because it is supported by   
each and every other certainty1 and even
 by the residuum of possibility4 ,if any
 intelligible meaning be permitted to   
affirm itself1 so much the more         
irresistible is the claim of this       
infinitely rich meaning4 ,since every   
attribute contributes to its validity1  
the being with infinite attributes is   
infinitely or absolutely valid4 ,the    
conclusion of the argument is now       
obvious4 ,if the being constituted by   
the infinite attributes exists1 it      
swallows up all possibilities and exists
 exclusively4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,limits  
of ,spinoza's ,argument for ,god4       
,sect4 #aeb4 ,the vulnerable point in   
,spinoza's argument can thus be         
expressed3 that which is important is   
questionable1 and that which is         
unquestionable is of doubtful           
importance4 ,have ,i indeed a clear and 
distinct idea of an absolutely infinite 

being8 ,the answer turns upon the       
meaning of the phrase idea of4 ,it is   
true ,i can add to such meaning as ,i   
apprehend the thought of possible other 
meaning1 and suppose the whole to have a
 definiteness and systematic unity like 
that of the triangle4 ,but such an idea 
is problematic4 ,i am compelled to use  
the term possible1 and so to confess the
 failure of definite content to measure 
up to my idea4 ,my idea of an absolutely
 infinite being is like my idea of a    
universal language3 ,i can think of it1 
but ,i cannot think it out1 for lack of 
data or because of the conflicting      
testimony of other data4 ,if ,i mean the
 infinity of my being to be a term of   
inclusiveness1 and to insist that the   
all must be1 and that there can be      
nothing not included in the all1 ,i can 
scarcely be denied4 ,but it is          
reasonable to doubt the importance of   
such a truth4 ,if1 on the other hand1 ,i
 mean that my infinite being shall have 
the compactness and organic unity of a  

triangle1 ,i must admit that such a     
being is indeed problematic4 ,the degree
 to which the meaning of the part is    
dependent upon the meaning of the whole1
 or the degree to which the geometrical 
analogy is to be preferred to the       
analogy of aggregates1 like the events  
within a year1 is a problem that falls  
quite outside ,spinoza's fundamental    
arguments4  ,sidenote3 ,spinoza's       
,provision for the ,finite4  ,sect4     
#aec4 ,but the advance of ,spinoza over 
the ,eleatics must not be lost sight of4
 ,the modern philosopher has so         
conceived being as to provide for parts 
within an individual unity4 ,the        
geometrical analogy is a most           
illuminating one1 for it enables us to  
understand how manyness may be          
indispensable to a being that is        
essentially unitary4 ,the triangle as   
triangle is one4 ,but it could not be   
such without sides and angles4 ,the     
unity is equally necessary to the parts1
 for sides and angles of a triangle     

could not be such without an arrangement
 governed by the nature triangle4 ,the  
whole of nature may be similarly        
conceived3 as the reciprocal necessity  
of natura naturans1 or nature defined in
 respect of its unity1 and natura       
naturata1 or nature specified in detail4
 ,there is some promise here of a       
reconciliation of the ,way of ,opinion  
with the ,way of ,truth4 ,opinion would 
be a gathering of detail1 truth a       
comprehension of the intelligible unity4
 ,both would be provided for through the
 consideration that whatever is complete
 and necessary must be made up of       
incompletenesses that are necessary to  
it4  ,sidenote3 ,transition to          
,teleological ,conceptions4  ,sect4     
#aed4 ,this consideration1 however1 does
 not receive its most effective         
formulation in ,spinoza4 ,the isolation 
of the parts1 the actual severalty and  
irrelevance of the modes1 still presents
 a grave problem4 ,is there a kind of   
whole to which not only parts but       

fragments1 or parts in their very       
incompleteness1 are indispensable8 ,this
 would seem to be true of a progression 
or development1 since that would require
 both perfection as its end1 and degrees
 of imperfection as its stages4 ,spinoza
 was prevented from making much of this 
idea by his rejection of the principle  
of teleology4 ,he regarded appreciation 
or valuation as a projection of personal
 bias4 ,nature has no particular goal in
 view1 and final causes are mere human  
figments4 ,the perfection of things is  
to be reckoned only from their own      
nature and power4#cah3g ,the            
philosophical method which ,spinoza here
 repudiates1 the interpretation of the  
world in moral terms1 is ,platonism1 an 
independent and profoundly important    
movement1 belonging to the same general 
realistic type with ,eleaticism and     
,spinozism4 ,absolute being is again the
 fundamental conception4 ,here1 however1
 it is conceived that being is primarily
 not affirmation or self-sufficiency1   

but the good or ideal4 ,there are few   
great metaphysical systems that have not
 been deeply influenced by ,platonism2  
hence the importance of understanding it
 in its purity4 ,to this end we must    
return again to the early ,greek        
conception of the philosopher2 for      
,platonism1 like ,eleaticism1 is a      
sequel to the philosopher's             
self-consciousness4  ,sidenote3 ,early  
,greek ,philosophers not ,self-critical4
  ,sect4 #aee4 ,although the first      
,greek philosophers1 such men as        
,thales1 ,heraclitus1 ,parmenides1 and  
,empedocles1 were clearly aware of their
 distinction and high calling1 it by no 
means follows that they were good judges
 of themselves4 ,their sense of         
intellectual power was unsuspecting2 and
 they praised philosophy without        
definitely raising the question of its  
meaning4 ,they were like unskilled      
players who try all the stops and scales
 of an organ1 and know that somehow they
 can make a music that exceeds the      

noises1 monotones or simple melodies of 
those who play upon lesser instruments4 
,they knew their power rather than their
 instrument or their art4 ,the first    
philosophers1 in short1 were            
self-conscious but not self-critical4   
,sidenote3 ,curtailment of ,philosophy  
in the ,age of the ,sophists4  ,sect4   
#aef4 ,the immediately succeeding phase 
in the history of ,greek philosophy was 
a curtailment1 but only in the most     
superficial sense a criticism1 of the   
activity of the philosopher4 ,in the    
,periclean ,age philosophy suffered more
 from inattention than from refutation4 
,the scepticism of the sophists1 who    
were the knowing men of this age1 was   
not so much conviction as indisposition4
 ,they failed to recognize the old      
philosophical problem2 it did not appeal
 to them as a genuine problem4 ,the     
sophists were the intellectual men of an
 age of humanism1 individualism1 and    
secularism4 ,these were years in which  
the circle of human society1 the state  

with its institutions1 citizenship with 
its manifold activities and interests1  
bounded the horizon of thought4 ,what   
need to look beyond8 ,life was not a    
problem1 but an abundant opportunity and
 a sense of capacity4 ,the world was not
 a mystery1 but a place of entertainment
 and a sphere of action4 ,of this the   
sophists were faithful witnesses4 ,in   
their love of novelty1 irreverence1     
impressionism1 elegance of speech1 and  
above all in their praise of individual 
efficiency1 they preached and pandered  
to their age4 ,their public1 though it  
loved to abuse them1 was the greatest   
sophist of them all--brilliant and      
capricious1 incomparably rich in all but
 wisdom4 ,the majority belonged to what 
,plato called the sight-loving1         
art-loving1 busy class4 ,this is an age1
 then1 when the man of practical        
common-sense is pre-eminent1 and the    
philosopher with his dark sayings has   
passed away4 ,the pride of wisdom has   
given way to the pride of power and the 

pride of cleverness4 ,the many men      
pursue the many goods of life1 and there
 is no spirit among them all who1       
sitting apart in contemplation1 wonders 
at the meaning of the whole4  ,sidenote3
 ,socrates and the ,self-criticism of   
the ,philosopher4  ,sect4 #aeg4 ,but in 
their midst there moved a strange       
prophet1 whom they mistook for one of   
themselves4 ,socrates was not one who   
prayed in the wilderness1 but a man of  
the streets and the market-place1 who   
talked rather more incessantly than the 
rest1 and apparently with less right4   
,he did not testify to the truth1 but   
pleaded ignorance in extenuation of an  
exasperating habit of asking questions4 
,there was1 however1 a humor and a      
method in his innocence that arrested   
attention4 ,he was a formidable         
adversary in discussion from his very   
irresponsibility2 and he was especially 
successful with the more rhetorical     
sophists because he chose his own       
weapons1 and substituted critical       

analysis1 question and answer1 for the  
long speeches to which these teachers   
were habituated by their profession4 ,he
 appeared to be governed by an          
insatiable inquisitiveness1 and a       
somewhat malicious desire to discredit  
those who spoke with authority4  ,but to
 those who knew him better1 and         
especially to ,plato1 who knew him best1
 ,socrates was at once the sweetest and 
most compelling spirit of his age4      
,there was a kind of truth in the       
quality of his character4 ,he was       
perhaps the first of all reverent men4  
,in the presence of conceit his         
self-depreciation was ironical1 but in  
another presence it was most genuine1   
and his deepest spring of thought and   
action4 ,this other presence was his own
 ideal4 ,socrates was sincerely humble  
because1 expecting so much of           
philosophy1 he saw his own deficiency4  
,unlike the unskilled player1 he did not
 seek to make music2 but he loved music1
 and knew that such music as is indeed  

music was beyond his power4 ,on the     
other hand he was well aware of his     
superiority to those in whom            
self-satisfaction was possible because  
they had no conception of the ideal4 ,of
 such he could say in truth that they   
did not know enough even to realize the 
extent of their ignorance4 ,the world   
has long been familiar with the vivid   
portrayal of the ,socratic consciousness
 which is contained in ,plato's         
,apology4 ,socrates had set out in life 
with the opinion that his was an age of 
exceptional enlightenment4 ,but as he   
came to know men he found that after all
 no one of them really knew what he was 
about4 ,each sight-loving1 art-loving1  
busy man was quite blind to the meaning 
of life4 ,while he was capable of       
practical achievement1 his judgments    
concerning the real virtue of his       
achievements were conventional and      
ungrounded1 a mere reflection of        
tradition and opinion4 ,when asked      
concerning the meaning of life1 or the  

ground of his opinions1 he was thrown   
into confusion or aggravated to         
meaningless reiteration4 ,such men1     
,socrates reflected1 were both unwise   
and confirmed in their folly through    
being unconscious of it4 ,because he    
knew that vanity is vanity1 that opinion
 is indeed mere opinion1 ,socrates felt 
himself to be the wisest man in a       
generation of dogged unwisdom4          
,sidenote3 ,socrates's ,self-criticism a
 ,prophecy of ,truth4  ,sect4 #aeh4 ,it 
is scarcely necessary to point out that 
this insight1 however negatively it be  
used1 is a revelation of positive       
knowledge4 ,heraclitus and ,parmenides  
claimed to know2 ,socrates disclaimed   
knowledge for reasons4 ,like all real   
criticism this is at once a confounding 
of error and a prophecy of truth4 ,the  
truth so discovered is indeed not       
ordinary truth concerning historical or 
physical things1 but not on that account
 less significant and necessary4 ,this  
truth1 it will also be admitted1 is     

virtually rather than actually set forth
 by ,socrates himself4 ,he knew that    
life has some meaning which those who   
live with conviction desire at heart to 
realize1 and that knowledge has         
principles with which those who speak   
with conviction intend to be consistent4
 ,there is1 in short1 a rational life   
and a rational discourse4 ,furthermore1 
a rational life will be a life wisely   
directed to the end of the good2 and a  
rational discourse one constructed with 
reference to the real natures of things1
 and the necessities which flow from    
these natures4 ,but ,socrates did not   
conclusively define either the meaning  
of life or the form of perfect          
knowledge4 ,he testified to the         
necessity of some such truths1 and his  
testimony demonstrated both the         
blindness of his contemporaries and also
 his own deficiency4  ,sidenote3 ,the   
,historical ,preparation for ,plato4    
,sect4 #aei4 ,the character and method  
of ,socrates have their best foil in the

 sophists1 but their bearing on the     
earlier philosophers is for our purposes
 even more instructive4 ,unlike         
,socrates these philosophers had not    
made a study of the task of the         
philosopher4 ,they were                 
philosophers--spectators of all time and
 all existence2 but they were           
precritical or dogmatic philosophers1 to
 whom it had not occurred to define the 
requirements of philosophy4 ,they knew  
no perfect knowledge other than their   
own actual knowledge4 ,they defined     
being and interpreted life without      
reflecting upon the quality of the      
knowledge whose object is being1 or the 
quality of insight that would indeed be 
practical wisdom4 ,but when through     
,socrates the whole philosophical       
prospect is again revealed after the    
period of humanistic concentration1 it  
is as an ideal whose possibilities1     
whose necessities1 are conceived before 
they are realized4 ,socrates celebrates 
the role of the philosopher without     

assigning it to himself4 ,the new       
philosophical object is the philosopher 
himself2 and the new insight a knowledge
 of knowledge itself4 ,these three types
 of intellectual procedure1 dogmatic    
speculation concerning being1 humanistic
 interest in life1 and the              
self-criticism of thought1 form the     
historical preparation for ,plato1 the  
philosopher who defined being as the    
ideal of thought1 and upon this ground  
interpreted life4  ,there is no more    
striking case in history of the subtle  
continuity of thought than the relation 
between ,plato and his master ,socrates4
 ,the wonder of it is due to the absence
 of any formulation of doctrine on the  
part of ,socrates himself4 ,he only     
lived and talked2 and yet ,plato created
 a system of philosophy in which he is  
faithfully embodied4 ,the form of       
embodiment is the dialogue1 in which the
 talking of ,socrates is perpetuated and
 conducted to profounder issues1 and in 
which his life is both rendered and     

interpreted4 ,but as the vehicle of     
,plato's thought preserves and makes    
perfect the ,socratic method1 so the    
thought itself begins with the ,socratic
 motive and remains to the end an       
expression of it4 ,the presentiment of  
perfect knowledge which distinguished   
,socrates from his contemporaries       
becomes in ,plato the clear vision of a 
realm of ideal truth4  ,sidenote3       
,platonism3 ,reality as the ,absolute   
,ideal or ,good4  ,sect4 #afj4 ,plato   
begins his philosophy with the          
philosopher and the philosopher's       
interest4 ,the philosopher is a lover1  
who like all lovers longs for the       
beautiful4 ,but he is the supreme lover1
 for he loves not the individual        
beautiful object but the ,absolute      
,beauty itself4 ,he is a lover too in   
that he does not possess1 but somehow   
apprehends his object from afar4 ,though
 imperfect1 he seeks perfection2 though 
standing like all his fellows in the    
twilight of half-reality1 he faces      

toward the sun4 ,now it is the          
fundamental proposition of the ,platonic
 philosophy that reality is the sun     
itself1 or the perfection whose         
possession every wise thinker covets1   
whose presence would satisfy every      
longing of experience4 ,the real is that
 beloved object which is truly          
beautiful1 delicate1 perfect1 and       
blessed4 ,there is both a serious ground
 for such an affirmation and an         
important truth in its meaning4 ,the    
ground is the evident incompleteness of 
every special judgment concerning       
experience4 ,we understand only in part1
 and we know that we understand only in 
part4 ,what we discover is real enough  
for practical purposes1 but even        
common-sense questions the true reality 
of its objects4 ,special judgments seem 
to terminate our thought abruptly and   
arbitrarily4 ,we give the best answer we
 can1 but such answers do not come as   
the completion of our thinking4 ,our    
thought is in some sense surely a       

seeking1 and it would appear that we are
 not permitted to rest and be satisfied 
at any stage of it4 ,if we do so we are 
like the sophists--blind to our own     
ignorance4 ,but it is equally true that 
our thought is straightforward and      
progressive4 ,we are not permitted to   
return to earlier stages1 but must push 
on to that which is not less1 but more1 
than what we have as yet found4 ,there  
is good hope1 then1 of understanding    
what the ideal may be from our knowledge
 of the direction which it impels us to 
follow4  ,but to understand ,plato's    
conception of the progression of        
experience we must again catch up the   
,socratic strain which he weaves into   
every theme4 ,for ,socrates1 student of 
life and mankind1 all objects were      
objects of interest1 and all interests  
practical interests4 ,one is ignorant   
when one does not know the good of      
things2 opinionative when one rates     
things by conventional standards2 wise  
when one knows their real good4 ,in     

,platonism this practical interpretation
 of experience appears in the principle 
that the object of perfect knowledge is 
the good4 ,the nature of things which   
one seeks to know better is the good of 
things1 the absolute being which is the 
goal of all thinking is the very good   
itself4 ,plato does not use the term    
good in any merely utilitarian sense4   
,indeed it is very significant that for 
,plato there is no cleavage between     
theoretical and practical interests4 ,to
 be morally good is to know the good1 to
 set one's heart on the true object of  
affection2 and to be theoretically sound
 is to understand perfection4 ,the good 
itself is the end of every aim1 that in 
which all interests converge4 ,hence it 
cannot be defined1 as might a special   
good1 in terms of the fulfilment of a   
set of concrete conditions1 but only in 
terms of the sense or direction of all  
purposes4 ,the following passage occurs 
in the ,symposium3       ,the true order
 of going or being led by others to the 

things      of love1 is to use the      
beauties of earth as steps along which  
he mounts upward for the sake of that   
other beauty1 going from      one to    
two1 and from two to all fair forms1 and
 from fair      forms to fair actions1  
and from fair actions to fair notions1  
until from fair notions he arrives at   
the notion of absolute      beauty1 and 
at last knows what the essence of beauty
      is4#cbi3h  ,sidenote3 ,the        
,progression of ,experience toward ,god4
  ,sect4 #afa4 ,there is1 then1 a true  
order of going1 and an order that leads 
from one to many1 from thence to forms1 
from thence to morality1 and from thence
 to the general objects of thought or   
the ideas4 ,in the ,republic1 where the 
proper education of the philosopher is  
in question1 it is proposed that he     
shall study arithmetic1 geometry1       
astronomy1 and dialectic4 ,thus in each 
case mathematics is the first advance in
 knowledge1 and dialectic the nearest to
 perfection4 ,most of ,plato's examples 

are drawn from mathematics4 ,this       
science replaces the variety and        
vagueness of the forms of experience    
with clear1 unitary1 definite1 and      
eternal natures1 such as the number and 
the geometrical figure4 ,thus certain   
individual things are approximately     
triangular1 but subject to alteration1  
and indefinitely many4 ,on the other    
hand the triangle as defined by geometry
 is the fixed and unequivocal nature or 
idea which such experiences suggest2 and
 the philosophical mind will at once    
pass to it from these4 ,but the         
mathematical objects are themselves not 
thoroughly understood when understood   
only in mathematical terms1 for the     
foundations of mathematics are          
arbitrary4 ,and the same is true of all 
the so-called special sciences4 ,even   
the scientists themselves1 says ,plato1 
only dream about being1 but never can   
behold the waking      reality so long  
as they leave the hypotheses they use   
unexamined1 and are unable to give an   

account of them4 ,for      when a man   
knows not his own first principle1 and  
when the      conclusion and            
intermediate steps are also constructed 
out of      he knows not what1 how can  
he imagine that such a conventional     
statement will ever become              
science8#ccj3i  ,within the science of  
dialectics we are to understand the     
connections and sequences of ideas      
themselves1 in the hope of eliminating  
every arbitrariness and conventionality 
within a system of truth that is pure   
and self-luminous rationality4 ,to this 
science1 which is the great interest of 
his later years1 ,plato contributes only
 incomplete studies and experiments4 ,we
 must be satisfied with the playful     
answer with which1 in the ,republic1 he 
replies to ,glaucon's entreaty that he  
proceed at once from the prelude or     
preamble to the chief strain1 and       
describe that in like manner3 ,dear     
,glaucon1 you will not be able to follow
 me here1 though ,i would do my best4   

,but a philosophical system has been    
projected4 ,the real is that perfect    
significance or meaning which thought   
and every interest suggests1 and toward 
which there is in experience an         
appreciable movement4 ,it is this       
significance which makes things what    
they really are1 and which constitutes  
our understanding of them4 ,in itself it
 transcends the steps which lead to it2 
for ,god1 says ,plato1 mingles not with 
men4 ,but it is nevertheless the meaning
 of human life4 ,and this we can readily
 conceive4 ,the last word may transform 
the sentence from nonsense into sense1  
and it would be true to say that its    
sense mingles not with nonsense4        
,similarly the last touch of the brush  
may transform an inchoate mass of color 
into a picture1 disarray into an object 
of beauty2 and its beauty mingles not   
with ugliness4 ,so life1 when it finally
 realizes itself1 obtains a new and     
incommensurable quality of perfection in
 which humanity is transformed into     

deity4 ,there is frankly no provision   
for imperfection in such a world4 ,in   
his later writings ,plato sounds his    
characteristic note less frequently1 and
 permits the ideal to create a cosmos   
through the admixture of matter4 ,but in
 his moment of inspiration1 the         
,platonist will have no sense for the   
imperfect4 ,it is the darkness behind   
his back1 or the twilight through which 
he passes on his way to the light4 ,he  
will use even the beauties of earth only
 as steps along which he mounts upward  
for the sake of that other beauty4      
,sidenote3 ,aristotle's ,hierarchy of   
,substances in ,relation to ,platonism4 
,sect4 #afb4 ,we have met1 then1 with   
two distinct philosophical doctrines    
which arise from the conception of the  
absolute1 or the philosopher's peculiar 
object3 the doctrine of the absolute    
being or substance1 and that of the     
absolute ideal or good4 ,both doctrines 
are realistic in that they assume       
reality to be demonstrated or revealed1 

rather than created1 by knowledge4 ,both
 are rationalistic in that they develop 
a system of philosophy from the problem 
of philosophy1 or deduce a definition of
 reality from the conception1 of        
reality4 ,there remains a third doctrine
 of the same type--the philosophy of    
,aristotle1 the most elaborately        
constructed system of ,greek antiquity1 
and the most potent influence exerted   
upon the ,scholastic ,philosophy of the 
long mediaeval period4 ,this philosophy 
was rehabilitated in the eighteenth     
century by ,leibniz1 the brilliant      
librarian of the court of ,hanover4 ,the
 extraordinary comprehensiveness of     
,aristotle's philosophy makes it quite  
impossible to render here even a general
 account of it4 ,there is scarcely any  
human discipline that does not to some  
extent draw upon it4 ,we are concerned  
only with the central principles of the 
metaphysics4  ,upon the common ground of
 rationalism and realism1 ,plato and    
,aristotle are complementary in temper1 

method1 and principle4 ,plato's is the  
genius of inspiration and fertility1    
,aristotle's the genius of erudition1   
mastery1 and synthesis4 ,in form1       
,plato's is the gift of expression1     
,aristotle's the gift of arrangement4   
,plato was born and bred an aristocrat1 
and became the lover of the best--the   
uncompromising purist2 ,aristotle is    
middle-class1 and limitlessly wide1     
hospitable1 and patient in his          
interests4 ,thus while both are         
speculative and acute1 ,plato's mind is 
intensive and profound1 ,aristotle's    
extensive and orderly4 ,it was          
inevitable1 then1 that ,aristotle should
 find ,plato one-sided4 ,the philosophy 
of the ideal is not worldly enough to be
 true4 ,it is a religion rather than a  
theory of reality4 ,aristotle1 however1 
would not renounce it1 but construe it  
that it may better provide for nature   
and history4 ,this is the significance  
of his new terminology4 ,matter1 to     
which ,plato reluctantly concedes some  

room as a principle of degradation in   
the universe1 is now admitted to good   
standing4 ,matter or material is        
indispensable to being as its           
potentiality or that out of which it is 
constituted4 ,the ideal1 on the other   
hand1 loses its exclusive title to the  
predicate of reality1 and becomes the   
form1 or the determinate nature which   
exists only in its particular           
embodiments4 ,the being or substance is 
the concrete individual1 of which these 
are the abstracted aspects4 ,aristotle's
 form1 like ,plato's idea1 is a         
teleological principle4 ,the essential  
nature of the object is its perfection4 
,it is furthermore essential to the     
object that it should strive after a    
higher perfection4 ,with ,aristotle1    
however1 the reality is not the         
consummation of the process1 the highest
 perfection in and for itself1 but the  
very hierarchy of objects that ascends  
toward it4 ,the highest perfection1 or  
,god1 is not itself coextensive with    

being1 but the final cause of           
being--that on account of which the     
whole progression of events takes place4
 ,reality is the development with all of
 its ascending stages from the maximum  
of potentiality1 or matter1 to the      
maximum of actuality1 or ,god the pure  
form4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,aristotelian    
,philosophy as a ,reconciliation of     
,platonism and ,spinozism4  ,sect4 #afc4
 ,to understand the virtue of this      
philosophy as a basis for the           
reconciliation of different interests1  
we must recall the relation between     
,plato and ,spinoza4 ,their             
characteristic difference appears to the
 best advantage in connection with      
mathematical truth4 ,both regarded      
geometry as the best model for          
philosophical thinking1 but for         
different reasons4 ,spinoza prized      
geometry for its necessity1 and proposed
 to extend it4 ,his philosophy is the   
attempt to formulate a geometry of      
being1 which shall set forth the        

inevitable certainties of the universe4 
,plato1 on the other hand1 prized       
geometry rather for its definition of   
types1 for its knowledge of pure or     
perfect natures such as the circle and  
triangle1 which in immediate experience 
are only approximated4 ,his philosophy  
defines reality similarly as the        
absolute perfection4 ,applied to nature 
,spinozism is mechanical1 and looks for 
necessary laws1 while ,platonism is     
teleological1 and looks for adaptation  
and significance4 ,aristotle's position 
is intermediate4 ,with ,plato he affirms
 that the good is the ultimate          
principle4 ,but this very principle is  
conceived to govern a universe of       
substances1 each of which maintains its 
own proper being1 and all of which are  
reciprocally determined in their        
changes4 ,final causes dominate nature1 
but work through efficient causes4      
,reality is not pure perfection1 as in  
,platonism1 nor the indifferent         
necessity1 as in ,spinozism1 but the    

system of beings necessary to the       
complete progression toward the highest 
perfection4 ,the ,aristotelian          
philosophy promises1 then1 to overcome  
both the hard realism of ,parmenides and
 ,spinoza1 and also the supernaturalism 
of ,plato4  ,sidenote3 ,leibniz's       
,application of the ,conception of      
,development to the ,problem of         
,imperfection4  ,sect4 #afd4 ,but it    
promises1 furthermore1 to remedy the    
defect common to these two doctrines1   
the very besetting problem of this whole
 type of philosophy4 ,that problem1 as  
has been seen1 is to provide for the    
imperfect within the perfect1 for the   
temporal incidents of nature and history
 within the eternal being4 ,many        
absolutist philosophers have declared   
the explanation of this realm to be     
impossible1 and have contented          
themselves with calling it the realm of 
opinion or appearance4 ,and this realm  
of opinion or appearance has been used  
as a proof of the absolute4 ,zeno1 the  

pupil of ,parmenides1 was the first to  
elaborate what have since come to be    
known as the paradoxes of the empirical 
world4 ,most of these paradoxes turn    
upon the infinite extension and         
divisibility of space and time4 ,zeno   
was especially interested in the        
difficulty of conceiving motion1 which  
involves both space and time1 and       
thought himself to have demonstrated its
 absurdity and impossibility4#ccg3aj    
,his argument is thus the complement of 
,parmenides's argument for the          
indivisible and unchanging substance4   
,now the method which ,zeno here adopts 
may be extended to cover the whole realm
 of nature and history4 ,we should then 
be dialectically driven from this realm 
to take refuge in absolute being4 ,but  
the empirical world is not destroyed by 
disparagement1 and cannot long lack     
champions even among the absolutists    
themselves4 ,the reconciliation of      
nature and history with the absolute    
being became the special interest of    

,leibniz1 the great modern              
,aristotelian4 ,as a scientist and man  
of affairs1 he was profoundly           
dissatisfied with ,spinoza's resolution 
of nature1 the human individual1 and the
 human society into the universal being4
 ,he became an advocate of individualism
 while retaining the general aim and    
method of rationalism4  ,like           
,aristotle1 ,leibniz attributes reality 
to individual substances1 which he calls
 monads2 and like ,aristotle he         
conceives these monads to compose an    
ascending order1 with ,god1 the monad of
 monads1 as its dominating goal4        
,furthermore1 every substance is like an
 entire world and like      a mirror of 
,god1 or indeed of the whole world which
 it      portrays1 each one in its own  
fashion2 almost as the same city      is
 variously represented according to the 
various situations      of him who is   
regarding it4 ,thus the universe is     
multiplied in      some sort as many    
times as there are substances1 and the  

glory      of ,god is multiplied in the 
same way by as many wholly              
different representations of his        
works4#cch3aa  ,the very glory of ,god1 
then1 requires the innumerable finite   
individuals with all their              
characteristic imperfections1 that the  
universe may lack no possible shade or  
quality of perspective4  ,sidenote3 ,the
 ,problem of ,imperfection ,remains     
,unsolved4  ,sect4 #afe4 ,but the       
besetting problem is in fact not solved1
 and is one of the chief incentives to  
that other philosophy of absolutism     
which defines an absolute spirit or     
mind4 ,both ,aristotle and ,leibniz     
undertake to make the perfection which  
determines the order of the hierarchy of
 substances1 at the same time the       
responsible author of the whole         
hierarchy4 ,in this case the dilemma is 
plain4 ,if the divine form or the divine
 monad be other than the stages that    
lead up to it1 these latter cannot be   
essential to it1 for ,god is by         

definition absolutely self-sufficient4  
,if1 on the other hand1 ,god is         
identical with the development in its   
entirety1 then two quite incommensurable
 standards of perfection determine the  
supremacy of the divine nature1 that of 
the whole and that of the highest parts 
of the whole4 ,the union of these two   
and the definition of a perfection which
 may be at once the development and its 
goal1 is the task of absolute idealism4 
,sidenote3 ,absolute ,realism in        
,epistemology4 ,rationalism4  ,sect4    
#aff4 ,of the two fundamental questions 
of epistemology1 absolute realism       
answers the one explicitly1 the other   
implicitly4 ,as respects the source of  
the most valid knowledge1 ,parmenides1  
,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,spinoza are all    
agreed3 true knowledge is the work of   
reason1 of pure intellection4 ,plato is 
the great exponent of dialectic1 or the 
reciprocal affinities and necessities of
 ideas4 ,aristotle is the founder of    
deductive logic4 ,spinoza proposes to   

consider even human actions and desires 
as though he were concerned with lines1 
planes1 and solids4 ,empirical data may 
be the occasion1 but cannot be the      
ground of the highest knowledge4        
,according to ,leibniz1       it seems  
that necessary truths1 such as we find  
in pure      mathematics1 and especially
 in arithmetic and geometry1 must       
have principles whose proof does not    
depend upon instances1      nor1        
consequently1 upon the witness of the   
senses1 although      without the senses
 it would never have come into our heads
 to      think of them4#cdj3ab          
,sidenote3 ,the ,relation of ,thought   
and its ,object in ,absolute ,realism4  
,sect4 #afg4 ,the answers which these   
philosophies give to the question of the
 relation between the state of knowledge
 and its object1 divide them into two   
groups4 ,among the ancients reason is   
regarded as the means of emancipation   
from the limitations of the private     
mind4 ,the sleeping turn aside each into

 a world of his own1 but the waking--the
 wise men--have one and the same world4 
,what the individual knows belongs to   
himself only in so far as it is         
inadequate4 ,hence for ,plato the ideas 
are not the attributes of a mind1 but   
that self-subsistent truth to which1 in 
its moments of insight1 a mind may have 
access4 ,opinion is my own1 the truth is
 being4 ,the position of ,aristotle is  
equally clear4 ,actual knowledge1 he    
maintains1 is identical with its object4
  ,spinoza and ,leibniz belong to       
another age4 ,modern philosophy began   
with a new emphasis upon                
self-consciousness4 ,in his celebrated  
argument--,i think1 hence ,i am 7cogito 
ergo sum7--,descartes established the   
independent and substantial reality of  
the thinking activity4 ,the ,i think is 
recognized as in itself a fundamental   
being1 known intuitively to the thinker 
himself4 ,now although ,spinoza and     
,leibniz are finally determined by the  
same motives that obtain in the cases of

 ,plato and ,aristotle1 they must reckon
 with this new distinction between the  
thinker and his object4 ,the result in  
the case of ,spinoza is the doctrine of 
parallelism1 in which mind is defined as
 an infinite attribute of substance1 an 
aspect or phase coextensive with the    
whole of being4 ,the result in the case 
of ,leibniz is his doctrine of          
representation and pre-established      
harmony1 whereby each monadic substance 
is in itself an active spiritual entity1
 and belongs to the universe through its
 knowledge of a specific stage of the   
development of the universe4 ,but both  
,spinoza and ,leibniz subordinate such  
conceptions as these to the fundamental 
identity that pervades the whole4 ,with 
,spinoza the attributes belong to the   
same absolute substance1 and with       
,leibniz the monads represent the one   
universe4 ,and with both1 finally1 the  
perfection of knowledge1 or the         
knowledge of ,god1 is indistinguishable 
from its object1 ,god himself4 ,the     

epistemological subtleties peculiar to  
these philosophers are not stable       
doctrines1 but render inevitable either 
a return to the simpler and bolder      
realism of the ,greeks1 or a passing    
over into the more radical and          
systematic doctrine of absolute         
idealism4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,stoic and   
,spinozistic ,ethics of ,necessity4     
,sect4 #afh4 ,we have met with two      
general motives1 both of which are      
subordinated to the doctrine of an      
absolute being postulated and sought by 
philosophy4 ,the one of these motives   
leads to the conception of the          
absolutely necessary and immutable      
substance1 the other to the conception  
of a consummate perfection4 ,there is an
 interpretation of life appropriate to  
each of these conceptions4 ,both agree  
in regarding life seriously1 in defining
 reason or philosophy as the highest    
human activity1 and in emphasizing the  
identity of the individual's good with  
the good of the universe4 ,but there are

 striking differences of tone and       
spirit4  ,although the metaphysics of   
the ,stoics have various affiliations1  
the ,stoic code of morality is the true 
practical sequel to the                 
,eleatic-,spinozistic view of the world4
 ,the ,stoic is one who has set his     
affections on the eternal being4 ,he    
asks nothing of it for himself1 but     
identifies himself with it4 ,the saving 
grace is a sense of reality4 ,the       
virtuous man is not one who remakes the 
world1 or draws upon it for his private 
uses2 even less one who rails against   
it1 or complains that it has used him   
ill4 ,he is rather one who recognizes   
that there is but one really valid      
claim1 that of the universe itself4 ,but
 he not only submits to this claim on   
account of its superiority2 he makes it 
his own4 ,the discipline of ,stoicism is
 the regulation of the individual will  
to the end that it may coincide with the
 universal will4 ,there is a part of man
 by virtue of which he is satisfied with

 what things are1 whatever they be4     
,that part1 designated by the ,stoics as
 the ruling part1 is the reason4 ,in so 
far as man seeks to understand the laws 
and natures which actually prevail1 he  
cannot be discontented with anything    
whatsoever that may be known to him4    
,for1 in so far as we are intelligent   
beings1 we cannot desire      anything  
save that which is necessary1 nor yield 
absolute      acquiescence to anything1 
save to that which is true3             
wherefore1 in so far as we have a right 
understanding of these      things1 the 
endeavor of the better part of ourselves
 is in      harmony with the order of   
nature as a whole4#cdd3ac  ,in agreement
 with this teaching of ,spinoza's is the
 famous ,stoic formula to the effect    
that nothing can happen contrary to the 
will of the wise man1 who is free       
through his very acquiescence4 ,if      
reason be the proper ruling part1 the   
first step in the moral life is the     
subordination of the appetitive nature  

and the enthronement of reason4 ,one who
 is himself rational will then recognize
 the fellowship of all rational beings1 
and the unitary and beneficent          
rationality of the entire universe4 ,the
 highest morality is thus already upon  
the plane of religion4  ,sidenote3 ,the 
,platonic ,ethics of ,perfection4       
,sect4 #afi4 ,with ,spinoza and the     
,stoics1 the perfection of the          
individual is reduced to what the       
universe requires of him4 ,the good man 
is willing to be whatever he must be1   
for the sake of the whole with which    
through reason he is enabled to identify
 himself4 ,with ,plato and ,aristotle   
the perfection of the individual himself
 is commended1 that the universe may    
abound in perfection4 ,the good man is  
the ideal man--the expression of the    
type4 ,and how different the quality of 
a morality in keeping with this         
principle6 ,the virtues which ,plato    
enumerates--temperance1 courage1 wisdom1
 and justice--compose a consummate human

 nature4 ,he is thinking not of the     
necessities but of the possibilities of 
life4 ,knowledge of the truth will      
indeed be the best of human living1 but 
knowledge is not prized because it can  
reconcile man to his limitations2 it is 
the very overflowing of his cup of life4
 ,the youth are to       dwell in the   
land of health1 amid fair sights and    
sounds2 and      beauty1 the effluence  
of fair works1 will visit the eye and   
ear1 like a healthful breeze from a     
purer region1 and      insensibly draw  
the soul even in childhood into harmony 
with      the beauty of reason4#cde3ad  
,aristotle's account of human perfection
 is more circumstantial and more        
prosaic4 ,the function of man is an     
activity of soul in accordance with     
reason1 and his happiness or well-being 
will consist in the fulness of rational 
living4 ,but such fulness requires a    
sphere of life that will call forth and 
exercise the highest human capacities4  
,aristotle frankly pronounces external  

goods to be indispensable1 and happiness
 to be therefore a gift of the gods4    
,the rational man will acquire a certain
 exquisiteness or finesse of action1 a  
mean of conduct2 and this virtue will be
 diversified through the various        
relations into which he must enter1 and 
the different situations which he must  
meet4 ,he will be not merely brave1     
temperate1 and just1 as ,plato would    
have him1 but liberal1 magnificent1     
gentle1 truthful1 witty1 friendly1 and  
in all self-respecting or high-minded4  
,in addition to these strictly moral    
virtues1 he will possess the            
intellectual virtues of prudence and    
wisdom1 the resources of art and        
science2 and will finally possess the   
gift of insight1 or intuitive reason4   
,speculation will be his highest        
activity1 and the mark of his kinship   
with the gods who dwell in the perpetual
 contemplation of the truth4  ,sidenote3
 ,the ,religion of ,fulfilment1 and the 
,religion of ,renunciation4  ,sect4     

#agj4 ,aristotle's ethics expresses the 
buoyancy of the ancient world1 when the 
individual does not feel himself        
oppressed by the eternal reality1 but   
rejoices in it4 ,he is not too conscious
 of his sufferings to be disinterested  
in his admiration and wonder4 ,it is    
this which distinguishes the religion of
 ,plato and ,aristotle from that of the 
,stoics and ,spinoza4 ,with both alike1 
religion consists not in making the     
world1 but in contemplating it2 not in  
cooperating with ,god1 but in           
worshipping him4 ,plato and ,aristotle1 
however1 do not find any antagonism     
between the ways of ,god and the natural
 interests of men4 ,god does not differ 
from men save in his exalted perfection4
 ,the contemplation and worship of him  
comes as the final and highest stage of 
a life which is organic and continuous  
throughout4 ,the love of ,god is the    
natural love when it has found its true 
object4       ,for he who has been      
instructed thus far in the things of    

love1 and who has learned to see the    
beautiful in due order      and         
succession1 when he comes toward the end
 will suddenly      perceive a nature of
 wondrous beauty--and this1 ,socrates1  
is      that final cause of all our     
former toils1 which in the first        
place is everlasting--not growing and   
decaying1 or waxing and      waning2 in 
the next place not fair in one point of 
view and      foul in another1 4 4 4 or 
in the likeness of a face or hands      
or any other part of the bodily frame1  
or in any form of      speech or        
knowledge1 nor existing in any other    
being2 4 4 4      but beauty only1      
absolute1 separate1 simple1 and         
everlasting1      which without         
diminution and without increase1 or any 
change1      is imparted to the         
ever-growing and perishing beauties of  
all      other things4#cdg3ae  ,the     
religion of ,spinoza is the religion of 
one who has renounced the favor of the  
universe4 ,he was deprived early in life

 of every benefit of fortune1 and set   
out to find the good which required no  
special dispensation but only the common
 lot and the common human endowment4 ,he
 found that good to consist in the      
conviction of the necessity1 made       
acceptable through the supremacy of the 
understanding4 ,the like faith of the   
,stoics makes of no account the         
difference of fortune between ,marcus   
the emperor and ,epictetus the slave4   
,for two reasons1 then1 it is right to  
be content with that      which happens 
to thee2 the one because it was done for
 thee      and prescribed for thee1 and 
in a manner had reference to      thee1 
originally from the most ancient causes 
spun with thy      destiny2 and the     
other because even that which comes     
severally      to every man is to the   
power which administers the universe a  
cause of felicity and perfection1 nay   
even of its very      continuance4 ,for 
the integrity of the whole is mutilated1
 if      thou cuttest off anything      

whatever from the conjunction and       
the continuity either of the parts or of
 the causes4 ,and thou      dost cut    
off1 as far as it is in thy power1 when 
thou art      dissatisfied1 and in a    
manner triest to put anything out of    
the way4#cdh3af   ,,footnotes3  #cjf3a  
,by ,absolute ,realism is meant that    
system of philosophy which defines the  
universe as the absolute being1 implied 
in knowledge as its final object1 but   
assumed to be independent of knowledge4 
,in the ,spinozistic system this        
absolute being is conceived under the   
form of substance1 or self-sufficiency2 
in ,platonism under the form of         
perfection2 and in the ,aristotelian    
system under the form of a hierarchy of 
substances4  #cjh3b ,burnet3 ,early     
,greek ,philosophy1 p4 #ahe4  #cji3c    
,when contrasted with the temporal realm
 of generation and decay1 this ultimate 
object is often called the eternal4     
#caa3d ,holland1 #afcb-afgg4  #cab3e    
,spinoza3 ,ethics1 ,part ,i4            

,translation by ,elwes1 p4 #de4  #cad3f 
,ibid41 p4 #di4  #cah3g ,ibid41 pp4 #gg1
 #ha4  #cbi3h ,plato3 ,symposium1 #baa4 
,translation by ,jowett4  #ccj3i ,plato3
 ,republic1 #ecc4 ,translation by       
,jowett4  #ccg3aj ,see ,burnet3 ,op4    
cit41 pp4 #cbb-ccc4  #cch3aa ,leibniz3  
,discourse on ,metaphysics4 ,translation
 by ,montgomery1 p4 #ae4  ,in so far as 
the monads are spiritual this doctrine  
tends to be subjectivistic4 ,cf4 ,chap4 
,,ix4  #cdj3ab ,leibniz3 ,new ,essays on
 the ,human ,understanding4 ,translation
 by ,latta1 p4 #cfc4  #cdd3ac ,spinoza3 
,op4 cit41 ,part ,,iv4 ,translation by  
,elwes1 p4 #bdc4  #cde3ad ,plato3 ,op4  
cit41 #dja4  #cdg3ae ,plato3 ,symposium1
 #baj-baa4 ,translation by ,jowett4     
#cdh3af ,marcus ,aurelius ,antoninus3   
,thoughts4 ,translation by ,long1 p4    
#ada4     ,,chapter ,,xi  ,,absolute    
,,idealism#cdi3a   ,sidenote3 ,general  
,constructive ,character of ,absolute   
,idealism4  ,sect4 #aga4 ,absolute      
idealism is the most elaborately        

constructive of all the historical types
 of philosophy4 ,though it may have     
overlooked elementary truths1 and have  
sought to combine irreconcilable        
principles1 it cannot be charged with   
lack of sophistication or subtlety4 ,its
 great virtue is its recognition of     
problems--its exceeding circumspection2 
while its great promise is due to its   
comprehensiveness--its generous         
provision for all interests and points  
of view4 ,but its very breadth and      
complexity render this philosophy       
peculiarly liable to the equivocal use  
of conceptions4 ,this may be readily    
understood from the nature of the       
central doctrine of absolute idealism4  
,according to this doctrine it is       
proposed to define the universe as an   
absolute spirit2 or a being infinite1   
ultimate1 eternal1 and self-sufficient1 
like the being of ,plato and ,spinoza1  
but possessing at the same time the     
distinguishing properties of spirit4    
,such conceptions as self-consciousness1

 will1 knowledge1 and moral goodness are
 carried over from the realm of human   
endeavor and social relations to the    
unitary and all-inclusive reality4 ,now 
it has been objected that this procedure
 is either meaningless1 in that it so   
applies the term spirit as to contradict
 its meaning2 or prejudicial to         
spiritual interests1 in that it         
neutralizes the properties of spirit    
through so extending their use4 ,thus   
one may contend that to affirm that the 
universe as a whole is spirit is        
meaningless1 since moral goodness       
requires special conditions and         
relations that cannot be attributed to  
the universe as a whole2 or one may     
contend that such doctrine is           
prejudicial to moral interests because  
by attributing spiritual perfection to  
the totality of being it discredits all 
moral loyalties and antagonisms4 ,the   
difficulties that lie in the way of     
absolute idealism are due1 then1 to the 
complexity of its synthesis1 to its     

complementary recognition of differences
 and resolution of them into unity4 ,but
 this synthesis is due to the urgency of
 certain great problems which the first 
or realistic expression of the          
absolutist motive left undiscovered and 
unsolved4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,great       
,outstanding ,problems of ,absolutism4  
,sect4 #agb4 ,it is natural to approach 
so deliberate and calculating a         
philosophy from the stand-point of the  
problems which it proposes to solve4    
,one of these is the epistemological    
problem of the relation between the     
state of knowledge and its object4      
,naturalism and absolute realism side   
with common-sense in its assumption that
 although the real object is essential  
to the valid state of knowledge1 its    
being known is not essential to the real
 object4 ,subjectivism1 on the other    
hand1 maintains that being is           
essentially the content of a knowing    
state1 or an activity of the knower     
himself4 ,absolute idealism proposes to 

accept the general epistemological      
principle of subjectivism2 but to       
satisfy the realistic demand for a      
standard1 compelling object1 by setting 
up an absolute knower1 with whom all    
valid knowledge must be in agreement4   
,this epistemological statement of      
absolute idealism is its most mature    
phase2 and the culminating phase1 in    
which it shows unmistakable signs of    
passing over into another doctrine4 ,we 
must look for its pristine inspiration  
in its solution of another fundamental  
problem3 that of the relation between   
the absolute and the empirical4 ,like   
absolute realism1 this philosophy       
regards the universe as a unitary and   
internally necessary being1 and         
undertakes to hold that being           
accountable for every item of           
experience4 ,but we have found that     
absolute realism is beset with the      
difficulty of thus accounting for the   
fragmentariness and isolation of the    
individual4 ,the contention that the    

universe must really be a rational or   
perfect unity is disputed by the evident
 multiplicity1 irrelevance1 and         
imperfection in the foreground of       
experience4 ,the inference to perfection
 and the confession of imperfection seem
 equally unavoidable4 ,rational         
necessities and empirical facts are out 
of joint4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,greek       
,philosophers and the ,problem of ,evil4
 ,the ,task of the ,new ,absolutism4    
,sect4 #agc4 ,even ,plato had been      
conscious of a certain responsibility   
for matters of fact4 ,inasmuch as he    
attached the predicate of reality to the
 absolute perfection1 he made that being
 the only source to which they could be 
referred4 ,perhaps1 then1 he suggests1  
they are due to the very bounteousness  
of ,god4       ,he was good1 and no     
goodness can ever have any jealousy of  
anything4 ,and being free from jealousy1
 he desired that all      things should 
be as like himself as possible4#ceb3b   
,plotinus1 in whom ,platonism is        

leavened by the spirit of an age which  
is convinced of sin1 and which is       
therefore more keenly aware of the      
positive existence of the imperfect1    
follows out this suggestion4 ,creation  
is emanation--the overflow of ,god's    
excess of goodness4 ,but one does not   
readily understand how goodness1        
desiring all things to be like itself1  
should thereupon create evil--even to   
make it good4 ,the ,aristotelian        
philosophy1 with its conception of the  
gradation of substances1 would seem to  
be better equipped to meet the          
difficulty4 ,a development requires     
stages2 and every finite thing may thus 
be perfect in its way and perfect in its
 place1 while in the absolute truth or  
,god there is realized the meaning of   
the whole order4 ,but if so1 there is   
evidently something that escapes ,god1  
to wit1 the meaningless and unfitness1  
the error and evil1 of the stages in    
their successive isolation4 ,nor is it  
of any avail to insist 7as did ,plato1  

,aristotle1 and ,spinoza alike7 that    
these are only privation1 and therefore 
not to be counted in the sum of reality4
 ,for privation is itself an experience1
 with a great variety of implications1  
moral and psychological2 and these      
cannot be attributed to ,god or deduced 
from him1 in consideration of his       
absolute perfection4  ,the task of the  
new absolutism is now in clear view4    
,the perfect must be amended to admit   
the imperfect4 ,the absolute            
significance must be so construed as to 
provide for the evident facts2 for the  
unmeaning things and changes of the     
natural order2 for ignorance1 sin1      
despair1 and every human deficiency4    
,the new philosophy is to solve this    
problem by defining a spiritual         
absolute1 and by so construing the life 
or dynamics of spirit1 as to demonstrate
 the necessity of the very imperfection 
and opposition which is so baffling to  
the realist4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,beginning
 of ,absolute ,idealism in ,kant's      

,analysis of ,experience4  ,sect4 #agd4 
,absolute idealism1 which is essentially
 a modern doctrine1 does not begin with 
rhapsodies1 but with a very sober       
analysis of familiar truths1 conducted  
by the most sober of all philosophers1  
,immanuel ,kant4 ,this philosopher lived
 in ,konigsberg1 ,germany1 at the close 
of the eighteenth century4 ,he is       
related to absolute idealism much as    
,socrates is related to ,platonism3 he  
was not himself speculative1 but        
employed a critical method which was    
transformed by his followers into a     
metaphysical construction4 ,it is       
essential to the understanding both of  
,kant and of his more speculative       
successors1 to observe that he begins   
with the recognition of certain         
non-philosophical truths--those of      
natural science and the moral           
consciousness4 ,he accepts the order of 
nature formulated in the ,newtonian     
dynamics1 and the moral order           
acknowledged in the common human        

conviction of duty4 ,and he is          
interested in discovering the ground    
upon which these common affirmations    
rest1 the structure which virtually     
supports them as types of knowledge4    
,but a general importance attaches to   
the analysis because these two types of 
knowledge 7together with the aesthetic  
judgment1 which is similarly analyzed7  
are regarded by ,kant as coextensive    
with experience itself4 ,the very least 
experience that can be reported upon at 
all is an experience of nature or duty1 
and as such will be informed with their 
characteristic principles4 ,let us      
consider the former type4 ,the simplest 
instance of nature is the experience of 
the single perceived object4 ,in the    
first place1 such an object will be     
perceived as in space and time4 ,these  
,kant calls the forms of intuition4 ,an 
object cannot even be presented or given
 without them4 ,but1 furthermore1 it    
will be regarded as substance1 that is1 
as having a substratum that persists    

through changes of position or quality4 
,it will also be regarded as causally   
dependent upon other objects like       
itself4 ,causality1 substance1 and like 
principles to the number of twelve1     
,kant calls the categories of the       
understanding4 ,both intuition and      
understanding are indispensable to the  
experience of any object whatsoever4    
,they may be said to condition the      
object in general4 ,their principles    
condition the process of making         
something out of the manifold of        
sensation4 ,but similarly1 every moral  
experience recognizes what ,kant calls  
the categorical imperative4 ,the        
categorical imperative is the law of    
reasonableness or impartiality in       
conduct1 requiring the individual to act
 on a maxim which he can will to be law 
universal4 ,no state of desire or       
situation calling for action means      
anything morally except in the light of 
this obligation4 ,thus certain          
principles of thought and action are    

said to be implicit in all experience4  
,they are universal and necessary in the
 sense that they are discovered as the  
conditions not of any particular        
experience1 but of experience in        
general4 ,this implicit or virtual      
presence in experience in general1 ,kant
 calls their transcendental character1  
and the process of explicating them is  
his famous ,transcendental ,deduction4  
,sidenote3 ,kant's ,principles          
,restricted to the ,experiences which   
they ,set in ,order4  ,sect4 #age4 ,the 
restriction which ,kant puts upon his   
method is quite essential to its        
meaning4 ,i deduce the categories1 for  
example1 just in so far as ,i find them 
to be necessary to perception4 ,without 
them my perception is blind1 ,i make    
nothing of it2 with them my experience  
becomes systematic and rational4 ,but   
categories which ,i so deduce must be   
forever limited to the role for which   
they are defined4 ,categories without   
perceptions are empty2 they have        

validity solely with reference to the   
experience which they set in order4     
,indeed1 ,i cannot even complete that   
order4 ,the orderly arrangement of parts
 of experience suggests1 and suggests   
irresistibly1 a perfect system4 ,i can  
even define the ideas and ideals through
 which such a perfect system might be   
realized4 ,but ,i cannot in the ,kantian
 sense attach reality to it because it  
is not indispensable to experience4 ,it 
must remain an ideal which regulates my 
thinking of such parts of it as fall    
within the range of my perception2 or it
 may through my moral nature become the 
realm of my living and an object of     
faith4 ,in short1 ,kant's is essentially
 a critical philosophy1 a logical and   
analytical study of the special terms   
and relations of human knowledge4 ,he   
denies the validity of these terms and  
relations beyond this realm4 ,his       
critiques are an inventory of the       
conditions1 principles1 and prospects of
 that cognition which1 although not     

alone ideally conceivable1 is alone     
possible4  ,sidenote3 ,the              
,post-,kantian ,metaphysics is a        
,generalization of the ,cognitive and   
,moral ,consciousness as ,analyzed by   
,kant4 ,the ,absolute ,spirit4  ,sect4  
#agf4 ,with the successors of ,kant1 as 
with the successors of ,socrates1 a     
criticism becomes a system of           
metaphysics4 ,this transformation is    
effected in the post-,kantians by a     
generalization of the human cognitive   
consciousness4 ,according to ,kant's    
analysis it contains a manifold of sense
 which must be organized by categories  
in obedience to the ideal of a rational 
universe4 ,the whole enterprise1 with   
its problems given in perception1 its   
instruments available in the activities 
of the understanding1 and its ideals    
revealed in the reason1 is an organic   
spiritual unity1 manifesting itself in  
the self-consciousness of the thinker4  
,now in absolute idealism this very     
enterprise of knowledge1 made universal 

and called the absolute spirit or mind1 
is taken to be the ultimate reality4    
,and here at length would seem to be    
afforded the conception of a being to   
which the problematic and the rational1 
the data and the principles1 the natural
 and the ideal1 are alike indispensable4
 ,we are now to seek the real not in the
 ideal itself1 but in that spiritual    
unity in which appearance is the        
incentive to truth1 and natural         
imperfection the spring to goodness4    
,this may be translated into the        
language which ,plato uses in the       
,symposium1 when ,diotima is revealing  
to ,socrates the meaning of love4 ,the  
new reality will be not the loved one1  
but love itself4       ,what then is    
,love8 ,is he mortal8       ,no4        
,what then8       ,as in the former     
instance1 he is neither mortal nor      
immortal1      but is a mean between    
them4       ,what is he then1 ,diotima8 
,he is a great spirit1 and like all that
 is spiritual he is      intermediate   

between the divine and the mortal4#cei3c
  ,reality is no longer the ,god who    
mingles not with men1 but that power    
which1 as ,diotima further says1        
interprets and conveys to the gods the  
prayers and sacrifices of men1 and to   
men the commands and rewards of the     
gods4  ,in speaking for such an         
idealism1 ,emerson says3                
,everything good is on the highway4 ,the
 middle region of our      being is the 
temperate zone4 ,we may climb into the  
thin and      cold realm of pure        
geometry and lifeless science1 or sink  
into      that of sensation4 ,between   
these extremes is the equator of        
life1 of thought1 of spirit1 of poetry4 
4 4 4 ,the mid-world is      best4#cei3d
  ,the new reality is this highway of   
the spirit1 the very course and raceway 
of self-consciousness4 ,it is traversed 
in the movement and self-correction of  
thought1 in the interest in ideals1 or  
in the submission of the will to the    
control of the moral law4  ,sidenote3   

,fichteanism1 or the ,absolute ,spirit  
as ,moral ,activity4  ,sect4 #agg4 ,it  
is the last of these phases of          
self-consciousness that ,fichte1 who was
 ,kant's immediate successor1 regards as
 of paramount importance4 ,as ,platonism
 began with the ideal of the good or the
 object of life1 so the new idealism    
begins with the conviction of duty1 or  
the story of life4 ,being is the living 
moral nature compelled to build itself a
 natural order wherein it may obey the  
moral law1 and to divide itself into a  
community of moral selves through which 
the moral virtues may be realized4      
,nature and society flow from the       
conception of an absolute moral         
activity1 or ego4 ,such an ego could not
 be pure and isolated and yet be moral4 
,the evidence of this is the common     
moral consciousness4 ,my duty compels me
 to act upon the not-self or            
environment1 and to respect and         
cooperate with other selves4 ,fichte's  
absolute is this moral consciousness    

universalized and made eternal4 ,moral  
value being its fundamental principle   
the universe must on that very account  
embrace both nature1 or moral           
indifference1 and humanity1 or moral    
limitation4  ,sidenote3 ,romanticism1 or
 the ,absolute ,spirit as ,sentiment4   
,sect4 #agh4 ,but the ,romanticists1 who
 followed close upon ,fichte1 were      
dissatisfied with so hard and exclusive 
a conception of spiritual being4 ,life1 
they said1 is not all duty4 ,indeed1 the
 true spiritual life is quite other1 not
 harsh and constrained1 but free and    
spontaneous--a wealth of feeling playing
 about a constantly shifting centre4    
,spirit is not consecutive and          
law-abiding1 but capricious and wanton1 
seeking the beautiful in no orderly     
progression1 but in a refined and       
versatile sensibility4 ,if this be the  
nature of spirit1 and if spirit be the  
nature of reality1 then he is most wise 
who is most rich in sentiment4 ,the     
,romanticists were the exponents of an  

absolute sentimentalism4 ,and they did  
not prove it1 but like good             
sentimentalists they felt it4           
,sidenote3 ,hegelianism1 or the         
,absolute ,spirit as ,dialectic4  ,sect4
 #agi4 ,hegel1 the master of the new    
idealism1 set himself the task of       
construing spirit in terms as           
consecutive as those of ,fichte1 and as 
comprehensive as those of the           
,romanticists4 ,like ,plato1 he found in
 dialectic the supreme manifestation of 
the spiritual life4 ,there is a certain 
flow of ideas which determines the      
meaning of experience1 and is the truth 
of truths4 ,but the mark of the new     
prophet is this3 the flow of ideas      
itself is a process of self-correction  
due to a sense of error4 ,thus bare     
sensation is abstract and bare thought  
is abstract4 ,the real1 however1 is not 
merely the concrete in which they are   
united1 but the very process in the     
course of which through knowledge of    
abstraction thought arrives at the      

concrete4 ,the principle of negation is 
the very life of thought1 and it is the 
life of thought1 rather than the outcome
 of thought1 which is reality4 ,the most
 general form of the dialectical process
 contains three moments3 the moment of  
thesis1 in which affirmation is made2   
the moment of antithesis1 in which the  
opposite asserts itself2 and the moment 
of synthesis1 in which a reconciliation 
is effected in a new thesis4 ,thus      
thought is the progressive overcoming of
 contradiction2 not the state of freedom
 from contradiction1 but the act of     
escaping it4 ,such processes are more   
familiar in the moral life4 ,morality   
consists1 so even common-sense asserts1 
in the overcoming of evil4 ,character is
 the resistance of temptation2 goodness1
 a growth in grace through discipline4  
,of such1 for ,hegel1 is the very       
kingdom of heaven4 ,it is the task of   
the philosopher1 a task to which ,hegel 
applies himself most assiduously1 to    
analyze the battle and the victory upon 

which spiritual being nourishes itself4 
,and since the deeper processes are     
those of thought1 the ,hegelian         
philosophy centres in an ordering of    
notions1 a demonstration of that        
necessary progression of thought which1 
in its whole dynamical logical history1 
constitutes the absolute idea4          
,sidenote3 ,the ,hegelian ,philosophy of
 ,nature and ,history4  ,sect4 #ahj4    
,the ,hegelian philosophy1 with its     
emphasis upon difference1 antagonism1   
and development1 is peculiarly qualified
 to be a philosophy of nature and       
history4 ,those principles of spiritual 
development which logic defines are     
conceived as incarnate in the evolution 
of the world4 ,nature1 as the very      
antithesis to spirit1 is now understood 
to be the foil of spirit4 ,in nature    
spirit alienates itself in order to     
return enriched4 ,the stages of nature  
are the preparation for the reviving of 
a spirituality that has been            
deliberately forfeited4 ,the            

,romanticists1 whether philosophers like
 ,schelling or poets like ,goethe and   
,wordsworth1 were led by their feeling  
for the beauty of nature to attribute to
 it a much deeper and more direct       
spiritual significance4 ,but ,hegel and 
the ,romanticists alike are truly       
expressed in ,emerson's belief that the 
spiritual interpretation of nature is   
the true science4       ,the poet alone 
knows astronomy1 chemistry1 vegetation1 
and      animation1 for he does not stop
 at these facts1 but employs      them  
as signs4 ,he knows why the plain or    
meadow of space was      strown with    
these flowers we call suns and moons and
 stars2      why the great deep is      
adorned with animals1 with men1 and     
gods2 for in every word he speaks he    
rides on them as the      horses of     
thought4#cfd3e  ,the new awakening of   
spirit which is for ,hegel the          
consummation of the natural evolution1  
begins with the individual or subjective
 spirit1 and develops into the social or

 objective spirit1 which is morality and
 history4 ,history is a veritable       
dialectic of nations1 in the course of  
which the consciousness of individual   
liberty is developed1 and coordinated   
with the unity of the state4 ,the       
highest stage of spirit incarnate is    
that of absolute spirit1 embracing art1 
religion1 and philosophy4 ,in art the   
absolute idea obtains expression in     
sensuous existence1 more perfectly in   
classical than in the symbolic art of   
the ,orient1 but most perfectly in the  
romantic art of the modern period4 ,in  
religion the absolute idea is expressed 
in the imagination through worship4 ,in 
,oriental pantheism1 the individual is  
overwhelmed by his sense of the         
universal2 in ,greek religion1 ,god is  
but a higher man2 while in ,christianity
 ,god and man are perfectly united in   
,christ4 ,finally1 in philosophy the    
absolute idea reaches its highest       
possible expression in articulate       
thought4  ,sidenote3 ,resume4 ,failure  

of ,absolute ,idealism to ,solve the    
,problem of ,evil4  ,sect4 #aha4 ,such  
is absolute idealism approached from the
 stand-point of antecedent metaphysics4 
,it is the most elaborate and subtle    
provision for antagonistic differences  
within unity that the speculative mind  
of man has as yet been able to make4 ,it
 is the last and most thorough attempt  
to resolve individual and universal1    
temporal and eternal1 natural and ideal1
 good and evil1 into an absolute unity  
in which the universal1 eternal1 ideal1 
and good shall dominate1 and in which   
all terms shall be related with such    
necessity as obtains in the definitions 
and theorems of geometry4 ,there is to  
be some absolute meaning which is       
rational to the uttermost and the       
necessary ground of all the incidents of
 existence4 ,thought could undertake no 
more ambitious and exacting task4 ,nor  
is it evident after all that absolute   
idealism enjoys any better success in   
this task than absolute realism4 ,the   

difference between them becomes much    
less marked when we reflect that the    
former1 like the latter1 must reserve   
the predicate of being for the unity of 
the whole4 ,even though evil and        
contradiction belong to the essence of  
things1 move in the secret heart of a   
spiritual universe1 the reality is not  
these in their severalty1 but that life 
within which they fall1 the story within
 which they earn a place4 ,and if       
absolute idealism has defined a new     
perfection1 it has at the same time     
defined a new imperfection4 ,the        
perfection is rich in contrast1 and thus
 inclusive of both the lights and shades
 of experience2 but the perfection      
belongs only to the composition of these
 elements within a single view4 ,it is  
not necessary to such perfection that   
the evil should ever be viewed in       
isolation4 ,the idealist employs the    
analogy of the drama or the picture     
whose very significance requires the    
balance of opposing forces2 or the      

analogy of the symphony in which a      
higher musical quality is realized      
through the resolution of discord into  
harmony4 ,but none of these unities     
requires any element whatsoever that    
does not partake of its beauty4 ,it is  
quite irrelevant to the drama that the  
hero should himself have his own view of
 events with no understanding of their  
dramatic value1 as it is irrelevant to  
the picture that an unbalanced fragment 
of it should dwell apart1 or to the     
symphony that the discord should be     
heard without the harmony4 ,one may     
multiply without end the internal       
differences and antagonisms that        
contribute to the internal meaning1 and 
be as far as ever from understanding the
 external detachment of experiences that
 are not rational or good in themselves4
 ,and it is precisely this kind of fact 
that precipitates the whole problem4 ,we
 do not judge of sin and error from     
experiences in which they conduct to    
goodness and truth1 but from experiences

 in which they are stark and unresolved4
  ,in view of such considerations many  
idealists have been willing to confess  
their inability to solve this problem4  
,to quote a recent expositor of ,hegel1 
,we need not1 after all1 be surprised at
 the apparently      insoluble problem  
which confronts us4 ,for the question   
has      developed into the old         
difficulty of the origin of evil1 which 
has always baffled both theologians and 
philosophers4 ,an      idealism which   
declares that the universe is in reality
      perfect1 can find1 as most forms  
of popular idealism do1 an      escape  
from the difficulties of the existence  
of evil1 by      declaring that the     
universe is as yet only growing towards 
its      ideal perfection4 ,but this    
refuge disappears with the reality      
of time1 and we are left with an awkward
 difference between      what philosophy
 tells us must be1 and what our life    
tells us      actually is4#cfh3f  ,if   
the philosophy of eternal perfection    

persists in its fundamental doctrine in 
spite of this irreconcilable conflict   
with life1 it is because it is believed 
that that doctrine must be true4 ,let us
 turn1 then1 to its more constructive   
and compelling argument4  ,sidenote3    
,the ,constructive ,argument for        
,absolute ,idealism is ,based upon the  
,subjectivistic ,theory of ,knowledge4  
,sect4 #ahb4 ,the proof of absolute     
idealism is supposed by the majority of 
its exponents to follow from the problem
 of epistemology1 and more particularly 
from the manifest dependence of truth   
upon the knowing mind4 ,in its initial  
phase absolute idealism is              
indistinguishable from subjectivism4    
,like that philosophy it finds that the 
object of knowledge is inseparable from 
the state of knowledge throughout the   
whole range of experience4 ,since the   
knower can never escape himself1 it may 
be set down as an elementary fact that  
reality 7at any rate whatever reality   
can be known or even talked about7 owes 

its being to mind4  ,thus ,green1 the   
,english neo-,hegelian1 maintains that  
an object which no consciousness        
presented to itself would not be an     
object at all1 and wonders that this    
principle is not generally taken for    
granted and made the starting-point for 
philosophy4#cfi3g ,however1 unless the  
very term object is intended to imply   
presence to a subject1 this principle is
 by no means self-evident1 and must be  
traced to its sources4  ,we have already
 followed the fortunes of that empirical
 subjectivism which issues from the     
relativity of perception4 ,at the very  
dawn of philosophy it was observed that 
what is seen1 heard1 or otherwise       
experienced through the senses1 depends 
not only upon the use of sense-organs1  
but upon the special point of view      
occupied by each individual sentient    
being4 ,it was therefore concluded that 
the perceptual world belonged to the    
human knower with his limitations and   
perspective1 rather than to being       

itself4 ,it was this epistemological    
principle upon which ,berkeley founded  
his empirical idealism4 ,believing      
knowledge to consist essentially in     
perception1 and believing perception to 
be subjective1 he had to choose between 
the relegation of being to a region     
inaccessible to knowledge1 and the      
definition of being in terms of         
subjectivity4 ,to avoid scepticism he   
accepted the latter alternative4 ,but   
among the ,greeks with whom this theory 
of perception originated1 it drew its   
meaning in large part from the          
distinction between perception and      
reason4 ,thus we read in ,plato's       
,sophist3       ,and you would allow    
that we participate in generation with  
the body1 and by perception2 but we     
participate with the soul      by       
thought in true essence1 and essence you
 would affirm to be      always the same
 and immutable1 whereas generation      
varies4#cgj3h  ,it is conceived that    
although in perception man is condemned 

to a knowledge conditioned by the       
affections and station of his body1 he  
may nevertheless escape himself and lay 
hold on the true essence of things1 by  
virtue of thought4 ,in other words1     
knowledge1 in contradistinction to      
opinion1 is not made by the subject1 but
 is the soul's participation in the     
eternal natures of things4 ,in the      
moment of insight the varying course of 
the individual thinker coincides with   
the unvarying truth2 but in that moment 
the individual thinker is ennobled      
through being assimilated to the truth1 
while the truth is no more1 no less1 the
 truth than before4  ,sidenote3 ,the    
,principle of ,subjectivism ,extended to
 ,reason4  ,sect4 #ahc4 ,in absolute    
idealism1 the principle of subjectivism 
is extended to reason itself4 ,this     
extension seems to have been originally 
due to moral and religious interests4   
,from the moral stand-point the         
contemplation of the truth is a state1  
and the highest state of the individual 

life4 ,the religious interest unifies   
the individual life and directs         
attention to its spiritual development4 
,among the ,greeks of the middle period 
life was as yet viewed objectively as   
the fulfilment of capacities1 and       
knowledge was regarded as perfection of 
function1 the exercise of the highest of
 human prerogatives4 ,but as moral and  
religious interests became more         
absorbing1 the individual lived more and
 more in his own self-consciousness4    
,even before the ,christian era the     
,greek philosophers themselves were     
preoccupied with the task of winning a  
state of inner serenity4 ,thus the      
,stoics and ,epicureans came to look    
upon knowledge as a means to the        
attainment of an inner freedom from     
distress and bondage to the world4 ,in  
other words1 the very reason was        
regarded as an activity of the self1 and
 its fruits were valued for their       
enhancement of the welfare of the self4 
,and if this be true of the ,stoics and 

the ,epicureans1 it is still more       
clearly true of the neo-,platonists of  
the ,christian era1 who mediate between 
the ancient and mediaeval worlds4       
,sidenote3 ,emphasis on                 
,self-consciousness in ,early ,christian
 ,philosophy4  ,sect4 #ahd4 ,it is well 
known that the early period of          
,christianity was a period of the most  
vivid self-consciousness4 ,the          
individual believed that his natural and
 social environment was alien to his    
deeper spiritual interests4 ,he         
therefore withdrew into himself4 ,he    
believed himself to have but one duty1  
the salvation of his soul2 and that duty
 required him to search his innermost   
springs of action in order to uproot any
 that might compromise him with the     
world and turn him from ,god4 ,the drama
 of life was enacted within the circle  
of his own self-consciousness4          
,citizenship1 bodily health1 all forms  
of appreciation and knowledge1 were     
identified in the parts they played     

here4 ,in short the ,christian          
consciousness1 although renunciation was
 its deepest motive1 was reflexive and  
centripetal to a degree hitherto unknown
 among the ,european peoples4 ,and when 
with ,st4 ,augustine theoretical        
interests once more vigorously asserted 
themselves1 this new emphasis was in the
 very foreground4 ,st4 ,augustine wished
 to begin his system of thought with a  
first indubitable certainty1 and        
selected neither being nor ideas1 but   
self4 ,st4 ,augustine's genius was      
primarily religious1 and the            
,confessions1 in which he records the   
story of his hard winning of peace and  
right relations with ,god1 is his most  
intimate book4 ,how faithfully does he  
represent himself1 and the blend of     
paganism and ,christianity which was    
distinctive of his age1 when in his     
systematic writings he draws upon       
religion for his knowledge of truth6 ,in
 all my living1 he argues1 whether ,i   
sin or turn to ,god1 whether ,i doubt or

 believe1 whether ,i know or am         
ignorant1 in all ,i know that ,i am ,i4 
,each and every state of my             
consciousness is a state of my self1 and
 as such1 sure evidence of my self's    
existence4 ,if one were to follow ,st4  
,augustine's reflections further1 one   
would find him reasoning from his own   
finite and evil self to an infinite and 
perfect ,self1 which centres like his in
 the conviction that ,i am ,i1 but is   
endowed with all power and all worth4   
,one would find him reflecting upon the 
possible union with ,god through the    
exaltation of the human                 
self-consciousness4 ,but this conception
 of ,god as the perfect self is so much 
a prophecy of things to come1 that more 
than a dozen centuries elapsed before it
 was explicitly formulated by the       
post-,kantians4 ,we must follow its more
 gradual development in the philosophies
 of ,descartes and ,kant4  ,sidenote3   
,descartes's ,argument for the          
,independence of the ,thinking ,self4   

,sect4 #ahe4 ,when at the close of the  
sixteenth century the ,frenchman1 ,rene 
,descartes1 sought to construct         
philosophy anew and upon secure         
foundations1 he too selected as the     
initial certainty of thought the        
thinker's knowledge of himself4 ,this   
principle now received its classic      
formulation in the proposition1 ,cogito 
ergo sum--,i think1 hence ,i am4 ,the   
argument does not differ essentially    
from that of ,st4 ,augustine1 but it now
 finds a place in a systematic and      
critical metaphysics4 ,in that my       
thinking is certain of itself1 says     
,descartes1 in that ,i know myself      
before ,i know aught else1 my self can  
never be dependent for its being upon   
anything else that ,i may come to know4 
,a thinking self1 with its knowledge and
 its volition1 is quite capable of      
subsisting of itself4 ,such is1 indeed1 
not the case with a finite self1 for all
 finitude is significant of limitation1 
and in recognizing my limitations ,i    

postulate the infinite being or ,god4   
,but the relation of my self to a       
physical world is quite without         
necessity4 ,human nature1 with soul and 
body conjoined1 is a combination of two 
substances1 neither of which is a       
necessary consequence of the other4 ,as 
a result of this combination the soul is
 to some extent affected by the body1   
and the body is to some extent directed 
by the soul2 but the body could         
conceivably be an automaton1 as the soul
 could conceivably be1 and will in      
another life become1 a free spirit4 ,the
 consequences of this dualism for       
epistemology are very grave4 ,if        
knowledge be the activity of a          
self-subsistent thinking spirit1 how can
 it reveal the nature of an external    
world8 ,the natural order is now        
literally external4 ,it is true that the
 whole body of exact science1 that      
mechanical system to which ,descartes   
attached so much importance1 falls      
within the range of the soul's own      

thinking4 ,but what assurance is there  
that it refers to a province of its     
own--a physical world in space8         
,descartes can only suppose that clear  
and distinct ideas must be trusted as   
faithful representations4 ,it is true   
the external world makes its presence   
known directly1 when it breaks in upon  
the soul in sense-perception4 ,but      
,descartes's rationalism and love of    
mathematics forbade his attaching       
importance to this criterion4 ,real     
nature1 that exactly definable and      
predictable order of moving bodies      
defined in physics1 is not known through
 sense-perception1 but through thought4 
,its necessities are the necessities of 
reason4 ,descartes finds himself1 then1 
in the perplexing position of seeking an
 internal criterion for an external     
world4 ,the problem of knowledge so     
stated sets going the whole             
epistemological movement of the         
eighteenth century1 from ,locke through 
,berkeley and ,hume to ,kant4 ,and the  

issue of this development is the        
absolute idealism of ,kant's successors4
  ,sidenote3 ,empirical ,reaction of the
 ,english ,philosophers4  ,sect4 #ahf4  
,of the ,english philosophers who       
prepare the way for the epistemology of 
,kant1 ,hume is the most radical and    
momentous4 ,it was he who roused ,kant  
from his dogmatic slumbers to the task  
of the ,critical ,philosophy4 ,hume is  
one of the two possible consequences of 
,descartes4 ,one who attaches greater   
importance to the rational necessities  
of science than to its external         
reference1 is not unwilling that nature 
should be swallowed up in mind4 ,with   
,malebranche1 ,descartes's immediate    
successor in ,france1 nature is thus    
provided for within the archetypal mind 
of ,god4 ,with the ,english             
philosophers1 on the other hand1        
externality is made the very mark of    
nature1 and as a consequence            
sense-perception becomes the criterion  
of scientific truth4 ,this empirical    

theory of knowledge1 inaugurated and    
developed by ,locke and ,berkeley1      
culminates in ,hume's designation of the
 impression as the distinguishing       
element of nature1 at once making up its
 content and certifying to its          
externality4 ,the processes of nature   
are successions of impressions2 and the 
laws of nature are their uniformities1  
or the expectations of uniformity which 
their repetitions engender4 ,hume does  
not hesitate to draw the logical        
conclusion4 ,if the final mark of truth 
is the presence to sense of the         
individual element1 then science can    
consist only of items of information and
 probable generalizations concerning    
their sequences4 ,the effect is observed
 to follow upon the cause in fact1 but  
there is no understanding of its        
necessity2 therefore no absolute        
certainty attaches to the future effects
 of any cause4  ,sidenote3 ,to ,save    
,exact ,science ,kant ,makes it         
,dependent on ,mind4  ,sect4 #ahg4 ,but 

what has become of the dream of the     
mathematical physicist8 ,is the whole   
system of ,newton1 that brilliant       
triumph of the mechanical method1       
unfounded and dogmatic8 ,it is the      
logical instability of this body of     
knowledge1 made manifest in the         
well-founded scepticism of ,hume1 that  
rouses ,kant to a re-examination of the 
whole foundation of natural science4    
,the general outline of his analysis has
 been developed above4 ,it is of        
importance here to understand its       
relations to the problem of ,descartes4 
,contrary to the view of the ,english   
philosophers1 natural science is1 says  
,kant1 the work of the mind4 ,the       
certainty of the causal relation is due 
to the human inability to think         
otherwise4 ,hume is mistaken in         
supposing that mere sensation gives us  
any knowledge of nature4 ,the very least
 experience of objects involves the     
employment of principles which are      
furnished by the mind4 ,without the     

employment of such principles1 or in    
bare sensation1 there is no intelligible
 meaning whatsoever4 ,but once admit the
 employment of such principles and      
formulate them systematically1 and the  
whole ,newtonian order of nature is seen
 to follow from them4 ,furthermore1     
since these principles or categories are
 the conditions of human experience1 are
 the very instruments of knowledge1 they
 are valid wherever there is any        
experience or knowledge4 ,there is but  
one way to make anything at all out of  
nature1 and that is to conceive it as an
 order of necessary events in space and 
time4 ,newtonian science is part of such
 a general conception1 and is therefore 
necessary if knowledge is to be possible
 at all1 even the least4 ,thus ,kant    
turns upon ,hume1 and shuts him up to   
the choice between the utter abnegation 
of all knowledge1 including the         
knowledge of his own scepticism1 and the
 acceptance of the whole body of exact  
science4  ,but with nature thus         

conditioned by the necessities of       
thought1 what has become of its         
externality8 ,that1 ,kant admits1 has   
indeed vanished4 ,kant does not attempt1
 as did ,descartes1 to hold that the    
nature which mind constructs and        
controls1 exists also outside of mind4  
,the nature that is known is on that    
very account phenomenal1                
anthropocentric--created by its         
cognitive conditions4 ,descartes was    
right in maintaining that               
sense-perception certifies to the       
existence of a world outside the mind1  
but mistaken in calling it nature and   
identifying it with the realm of        
science4 ,in short1 ,kant acknowledges  
the external world1 and names it the    
thing-in-itself2 but insists that       
because it is outside of mind it is     
outside of knowledge4 ,thus is the      
certainty of science saved at the cost  
of its metaphysical validity4 ,it is    
necessarily true1 but only of a         
conditioned or dependent world4 ,and in 

saving science ,kant has at the same    
time prejudiced metaphysics in general4 
,for the human or naturalistic way of   
knowing is left in sole possession of   
the field1 with the higher interest of  
reasons in the ultimate nature of being1
 degraded to the rank of practical      
faith4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,post-,kantians 
,transform ,kant's ,mind-in-general into
 an ,absolute ,mind4  ,sect4 #ahh4 ,the 
transformation of this critical and     
agnostic doctrine into absolute idealism
 is inevitable4 ,the metaphysical       
interest was bound to avail itself of   
the speculative suggestiveness with     
which the ,kantian philosophy abounds4  
,the transformation turns upon ,kant's  
assumption that whatever is constructed 
by the mind is on that account          
phenomenon or appearance4 ,kant has     
carried along the presumption that      
whatever is act or content of mind is on
 that account not real object or        
thing-in-itself4 ,we have seen that this
 is generally accepted as true of the   

relativities of sense-perception4 ,but  
is it true of thought8 ,the             
post-,kantian idealist maintains that   
that depends upon the thought4 ,the     
content of private individual thinking  
is in so far not real object2 but it    
does not follow that this is true of    
such thinking as is universally valid4  
,now ,kant has deduced his categories   
for thought in general4 ,there are no   
empirical cases of thinking except the  
human thinkers2 but the categories are  
not the property of any one human       
individual or any group of such         
individuals4 ,they are the conditions of
 experience in general1 and of every    
possibility of experience4 ,the         
transition to absolute idealism is now  
readily made4 ,thought in general       
becomes the absolute mind1 and          
experience in general its content4 ,the 
thing-in-itself drops out as having no  
meaning4 ,the objectivity to which it   
testified is provided for in the        
completeness and self-sufficiency which 

is attributed to the absolute           
experience4 ,indeed1 an altogether new  
definition of subjective and objective  
replaces the old4 ,the subjective is    
that which is only insufficiently       
thought1 as in the case of relativity   
and error2 the objective is that which  
is completely thought4 ,thus the natural
 order is indeed phenomenal2 but only   
because the principles of science are   
not the highest principles of thought1  
and not because nature is the fruit of  
thought4 ,thus ,hegel expresses his     
relation to ,kant as follows3           
,according to ,kant1 the things that we 
know about are to us      appearances   
only1 and we can never know their       
essential      nature1 which belongs to 
another world1 which we cannot          
approach4 4 4 4 ,the true statement of  
the case is as follows4      ,the things
 of which we have direct consciousness  
are mere      phenomena1 not for us     
only1 but in their own nature2 and the  
true and proper case of these things1   

finite as they are1 is      to have     
their existence founded not in          
themselves1 but in the      universal   
divine idea4 ,this view of things1 it is
 true1 is as      idealist as ,kant's1  
but in contradistinction to the         
subjective idealism of the ,critical    
,philosophy should be      termed       
,absolute ,idealism4#chb3i  ,sidenote3  
,the ,direct ,argument4 ,the ,inference 
from the ,finite ,mind to the ,infinite 
,mind4  ,sect4 #ahi4 ,absolute idealism 
is thus reached after a long and devious
 course of development4 ,but the        
argument may be stated much more        
briefly4 ,plato1 it will be remembered1 
found that experience tends ever to     
transcend itself4 ,the thinker finds    
himself compelled to pursue the ideal of
 immutable and universal truth1 and must
 identify the ultimate being with that  
ideal4 ,similarly ,hegel says3          
,that upward spring of the mind         
signifies that the being which      the 
world has is only a semblance1 no real  

being1 no absolute      truth2 it       
signifies that beyond and above that    
appearance1      truth abides in ,god1  
so that true being is another name for  
,god4#chb3aj  ,the further argument of  
absolute idealism differs from that of  
,plato in that the dependence of truth  
upon the mind is accepted as a first    
principle4 ,the ideal with which        
experience is informed is now the state 
of perfect knowledge1 rather than the   
system of absolute truth4 ,the content  
of the state of perfect knowledge will  
indeed be the system of absolute truth1 
but none the less content1 precisely as 
finite knowledge is the content of a    
finite mind4 ,in pursuing the truth1 ,i 
who pursue1 aim to realize in myself a  
certain highest state of knowledge4     
,were ,i to know all truth ,i should    
indeed have ceased to be the finite     
individual who began the quest1 but the 
evolution would be continuous and the   
character of self-consciousness would   
never have been lost4 ,i may say1 in    

short1 that ,god or being1 is my perfect
 cognitive self4  ,the argument for     
absolute idealism is a constructive     
interpretation of the subjectivistic    
contention that knowledge can never     
escape the circle of its own activity   
and states4 ,to meet the demand for a   
final and standard truth1 a demand which
 realism meets with its doctrine of a   
being independent of any mind1 this     
philosophy defines a standard mind4 ,the
 impossibility of defining objects in   
terms of relativity to a finite self1   
conducts dialectically to the conception
 of the absolute self4 ,the sequel to my
 error or exclusiveness1 is truth or    
inclusiveness4 ,the outcome of the      
dialectic is determined by the symmetry 
of the antithesis4 ,thus1 corrected     
experience implies a last correcting    
experience2 partial cognition1 complete 
cognition2 empirical subject1           
transcendental subject2 finite mind1 an 
absolute mind4 ,the following statement 
is taken from a contemporary exponent of

 the philosophy3       ,what you and ,i 
lack1 when we lament our human          
ignorance1 is      simply a certain     
desirable and logically possible state  
of      mind1 or type of experience2 to 
wit1 a state of mind in which      we   
should wisely be able to say that we had
 fulfilled in      experience what we   
now have merely in idea1 namely1 the    
knowledge1 the immediate and felt       
presence1 of what we now      call the  
,absolute ,reality4 4 4 4 ,there is an  
,absolute      ,experience for which the
 conception of an absolute reality1     
i4 e41 the conception of a system of    
ideal truth1 is      fulfilled by the   
very contents that get presented to this
      experience4 ,this ,absolute       
,experience is related to our           
experience as an organic whole to its   
own fragments4 ,it is an      experience
 which finds fulfilled all that the     
completest      thought can conceive as 
genuinely possible4 ,herein lies its    
definition as an ,absolute4 ,for the    

,absolute ,experience1 as for      ours1
 there are data1 contents1 facts4 ,but  
these data1 these      contents1        
express1 for the ,absolute ,experience1 
its own      meaning1 its thought1 its  
ideas4 ,contents beyond these that it   
possesses1 the ,absolute ,experience    
knows to be1 in genuine      truth1     
impossible4 ,hence its contents are     
indeed      particular1--a selection    
from the world of bare or merely        
conceptual possibilities1--but they form
 a self-determined      whole1 than     
which nothing completer1 more organic1  
more      fulfilled1 more transparent1  
or more complete in meaning1 is         
concretely or genuinely possible4 ,on   
the other hand1 these      contents are 
not foreign to those of our finite      
experience1      but are inclusive of   
them in the unity of one life4#che3aa   
,sidenote3 ,the ,realistic ,tendency in 
,absolute ,idealism4  ,sect4 #aij4 ,as  
has been already intimated1 at the      
opening of this chapter1 the inclusion  

of the whole of reality within a single 
self is clearly a questionable          
proceeding4 ,the need of avoiding the   
relativism of empirical idealism is     
evident4 ,but if the very meaning of the
 self-consciousness be due to a certain 
selection and exclusion within the      
general field of experience1 it is      
equally evident that the relativity of  
self-consciousness can never be overcome
 through appealing to a higher self4    
,one must appeal from the self to the   
realm of things as they are4 ,indeed1   
although the exponents of this          
philosophy use the language of          
spiritualism1 and accept the idealistic 
epistemology1 their absolute being tends
 ever to escape the special characters  
of the self4 ,and inasmuch as the       
absolute self is commonly set over      
against the finite or empirical self1 as
 the standard and test of truth1 it is  
the less distinguishable from the       
realist's order of independent beings4  
,sidenote3 ,the ,conception of          

,self-consciousness ,central in the     
,ethics of ,absolute ,idealism4 ,kant4  
,sect4 #aia4 ,but however much absolute 
idealism may tend to abandon its        
idealism for the sake of its absolutism 
within the field of metaphysics1 such is
 not the case within the field of ethics
 and religion4 ,the conception of the   
self here receives a new emphasis4 ,the 
same self-consciousness which admits to 
the highest truth is the evidence of    
man's practical dignity4 ,in virtue of  
his immediate apprehension of the       
principles of selfhood1 and his direct  
participation in the life of spirit1 man
 may be said to possess the innermost   
secret of the universe4 ,in order to    
achieve goodness he must therefore      
recognize and express himself4 ,the     
,kantian philosophy is here again the   
starting-point4 ,it was ,kant who first 
gave adequate expression to the         
,christian idea of the moral            
self-consciousness4       ,duty6 ,thou  
sublime and mighty name that dost       

embrace      nothing charming or        
insinuating1 but requirest submission1  
and      yet seekest not to move the    
will by threatening aught that          
would arouse natural aversion or terror1
 but merely holdest      forth a law    
which of itself finds entrance into the 
mind1      4 4 4 a law before which all 
inclinations are dumb1 even      though 
they secretly counterwork it2 what      
origin is there      worthy of thee1 and
 where is to be found the root of thy   
noble      descent which proudly rejects
 all kindred with the      inclinations 
4 4 4 8 ,it can be nothing less than a  
power which      elevates man above     
himself1 4 4 4 a power which connects   
him      with an order of things that   
only the understanding can              
conceive1 with a world which at the same
 time commands the      whole sensible  
world1 and with it the empirically      
determinable      existence of man in   
time1 as well as the sum total of all   
ends4#chg3ab  ,with ,kant there can be  

no morality except conduct be attended  
by the consciousness of this duty       
imposed by the higher nature upon the   
lower4 ,it is this very recognition of a
 deeper self1 of a personality that     
belongs to the sources and not to the   
consequences of nature1 that constitutes
 man as a moral being1 and only such    
action as is inspired with a reverence  
for it can be morally good4 ,kant does  
little more than to establish the       
uncompromising dignity of the moral     
will4 ,in moral action man submits to a 
law that issues from himself in virtue  
of his rational nature4 ,here he yields 
nothing1 as he owes nothing1 to that    
appetency which binds him to the natural
 world4 ,as a rational being he himself 
affirms the very principles which       
determine the organization of nature4   
,this is his freedom1 at once the ground
 and the implication of his duty4 ,man  
is free from nature to serve the higher 
law of his personality4  ,sidenote3     
,kantian ,ethics ,supplemented through  

the ,conceptions of ,universal and      
,objective ,spirit4  ,sect4 #aib4 ,there
 are two respects in which ,kant's      
ethics has been regarded as inadequate  
by those who draw from it their         
fundamental principles4 ,it is said that
 ,kant is too rigoristic1 that he makes 
too stern a business of morality1 in    
speaking so much of law and so little of
 love and spontaneity4 ,there are good  
reasons for this4 ,kant seeks to isolate
 the moral consciousness1 and dwell upon
 it in its purity1 in order that he may 
demonstrate its incommensurability with 
the values of inclination and           
sensibility4 ,furthermore1 ,kant may    
speak of the principle of the absolute1 
and recognize the deeper eternal order  
as a law1 but he may not1 if he is to be
 consistent with his own critical       
principles1 affirm the metaphysical     
being of such an order4 ,with his       
idealistic followers it is possible to  
define the spiritual setting of the     
moral life1 but with ,kant it is only   

possible to define the antagonism of    
principles4 ,hence the greater optimism 
of the post-,kantians4 ,they know that  
the higher law is the reality1 and that 
he who obeys it thus unites himself with
 the absolute self4 ,that which for     
,kant is only a resolute obedience to   
more valid principles1 to rationally    
superior rules for action1 is for       
idealism man's appropriation of his     
spiritual birthright4 ,since the law is 
the deeper nature1 man may respect and  
obey it as valid1 and at the same time  
act upon it gladly in the sure knowledge
 that it will enhance his eternal       
welfare4 ,indeed1 the knowledge that the
 very universe is founded upon this law 
will make him less suspicious of nature 
and less exclusive in his adherence to  
any single law4 ,he will be more        
confident of the essential goodness of  
all manifestations of a universe which  
he knows to be fundamentally spiritual4 
,but it has been urged1 secondly1 that  
the ,kantian ethics is too formal1 too  

little pertinent to the issues of life4 
,kant's moral law imposes only obedience
 to the law1 or conduct conceived as    
suitable to a universal moral community4
 ,but what is the nature of such conduct
 in particular8 ,it may be answered that
 to maintain the moral                  
self-consciousness1 to act dutifully and
 dutifully only1 to be self-reliant and 
unswerving in the doing of what one     
ought to do1 is to obtain a very        
specific character4 ,but does this not  
leave the individual's conduct to his   
own interpretation of his duty8 ,it was 
just this element of individualism which
 ,hegel sought to eliminate through the 
application of his larger philosophical 
conception4 ,if that which expresses    
itself within the individual            
consciousness as the moral law be indeed
 the law of that self in which the      
universe is grounded1 it will appear as 
objective spirit in the evolution of    
society4 ,for ,hegel1 then1 the most    
valid standard of goodness is to be     

found in that customary morality which  
bespeaks the moral leadings of the      
general humanity1 and in those          
institutions1 such as the family and the
 state1 which are the moral acts of the 
absolute idea itself4 ,finally1 in the  
realm of absolute spirit1 in art1 in    
revealed religion1 and in philosophy1   
the individual may approach to the      
self-consciousness which is the perfect 
truth and goodness in and for itself4   
,sidenote3 ,the ,peculiar ,pantheism and
 ,mysticism of ,absolute ,idealism4     
,sect4 #aic4 ,where the law of life is  
the implication in the finite           
self-consciousness of the eternal and   
divine self-consciousness1 there can be 
no division between morality and        
religion1 as there can be none between  
thought and will4 ,whatever man seeks is
 in the end ,god4 ,as the perfect       
fulfilment of the thinking self1 ,god is
 the truth2 as the perfect fulfilment of
 the willing self1 ,god is the good4    
,the finite self-consciousness finds    

facts that are not understood1 and so   
seeks to resolve itself into the perfect
 self wherein all that is given has     
meaning4 ,on the other hand1 the finite 
self-consciousness finds ideals that are
 not realized1 and so seeks to resolve  
itself into that perfect self wherein   
all that is significant is given4 ,all  
interests thus converge toward          
some state of conscious spirit in which 
the opposition of      cognition and    
volition is overcome--in which we       
neither judge      our ideas by the     
world1 nor the world by our ideas1 but  
are      aware that inner and outer are 
in such close and necessary      harmony
 that even the thought of possible      
discord has become      impossible4 ,in 
its unity not only cognition and        
volition1 but      feeling also1 must be
 blended and united4 ,in some way or    
another it must have overcome the rift  
in discursive      knowledge1 and the   
immediate must for it be no longer the  
alien4 ,it must be as direct as art1 as 

certain and universal      as           
philosophy4#cia3ac  ,the religious      
consciousness proper to absolute        
idealism is both pantheistic and        
mystical1 but with distinction4         
,platonism is pantheistic in that nature
 is resolved into ,god4 ,all that is not
 perfect is esteemed only for its       
promise of perfection4 ,and ,platonism  
is mystical in that the purification and
 universalization of the affections     
brings one in the end to a perfection   
that exceeds all modes of thought and   
speech4 ,with ,spinoza1 on the other    
hand1 ,god may be said to be resolved   
into nature4 ,nature is made divine1 but
 is none the less nature1 for its       
divinity consists in its absolute       
necessity4 ,spinoza's pantheism passes  
over into mysticism because the absolute
 necessity exceeds in both unity and    
richness the laws known to the human    
understanding4 ,in absolute idealism1   
finally1 both ,god and nature are       
resolved into the self4 ,for that which 

is divine in experience is              
self-consciousness1 and this is at the  
same time the ground of nature4 ,thus in
 the highest knowledge the self is      
expanded and enriched without being left
 behind4 ,the mystical experience proper
 to this philosophy is the consciousness
 of identity1 together with the sense of
 universal immanence4 ,the individual   
self may be directly sensible of the    
absolute self1 for these are one        
spiritual life4 ,thus ,emerson says3    
,it is a secret which every intellectual
 man quickly learns1      that beyond   
the energy of his possessed and         
conscious      intellect he is capable  
of a new energy 7as of an intellect     
doubled on itself71 by abandonment to   
the nature of things2      that beside  
his privacy of power as an individual   
man1 there      is a great public power 
upon which he can draw1 by unlocking1   
at all risks1 his human doors1 and      
suffering the ethereal      tides to    
roll and circulate through him2 then he 

is caught up      into the life of the  
,universe1 his speech is thunder1 his   
thought is law1 and his words are       
universally intelligible as      the    
plants and animals4 ,the poet knows that
 he speaks      adequately then only    
when he speaks somewhat wildly1 or 'with
      the flower of the mind'2 not with 
the intellect used as an      organ1 but
 with the intellect released from all   
service and      suffered to take its   
direction from its celestial            
life4#cic3ad  ,sidenote3 ,the ,religion 
of ,exuberant ,spirituality4  ,sect4    
#aid4 ,but the distinguishing flavor and
 quality of this religion arises from   
its spiritual hospitality4 ,it is not1  
like ,platonism1 a contemplation of the 
best2 nor1 like pluralistic idealisms1 a
 moral knight-errantry4 ,it is neither a
 religion of exclusion1 nor a religion  
of reconstruction1 but a profound       
willingness that things should be as    
they really are4 ,for this reason its   
devotees have recognized in ,spinoza    

their true forerunner4 ,but idealism is 
not ,spinozism1 though it may contain   
this as one of its strains4 ,for it is  
not the worship of necessity1 ,emerson's
 beautiful necessity1 which makes man   
brave in believing that he cannot shun a
 danger that is appointed1 nor incur one
 that is not2 but the worship of that   
which is necessary4  ,not only must one 
understand that every effort1 however   
despairing1 is an element of sense in   
the universal significance2       that  
the whole would not be what it is were  
not precisely      this finite purpose  
left in its own uniqueness to speak     
precisely its own word--a word which no 
other purpose can      speak in the     
language of the divine will2#cid3ae  but
 one must have a zest for such          
participation1 and a heart for the      
divine will which it profits4 ,indeed1  
so much is this religion a love of life1
 that it may1 as in the case of the     
,romanticists1 be a love of caprice4    
,battle and death1 pain and joy1 error  

and truth--all that belongs to the story
 of this mortal world1 are to be felt as
 the thrill of health1 and relished as  
the essences of ,god4 ,religion is an   
exuberant spirituality1 a fearless      
sensibility1 a knowledge of both good   
and evil1 and a will to serve the good1 
while exulting that the evil will not   
yield without a battle4   ,,footnotes3  
#cdi3a ,by ,absolute ,idealism is meant 
that system of philosophy which defines 
the universe as the absolute spirit1    
which is the human moral1 cognitive1 or 
appreciative consciousness              
universalized2 or as the absolute1      
transcendental mind1 whose state of     
complete knowledge is implied in all    
finite thinking4  #ceb3b ,plato3        
,timaeus1 #bi4 ,translation by ,jowett4 
#cei3c ,plato3 ,symposium1 #bjb4        
,translation by ,jowett4  #cei3d        
,emerson3 ,essays1 ,second ,series1 pp4 
#fe-ff4  #cfd3e ,emerson3 ,op4 cit41 p4 
#be4  ,the possibility of conflict      
between this method of nature study and 

the empirical method of science is      
significantly attested by the           
circumstance that in the year #ahja     
,hegel published a paper in which he    
maintained1 on the ground of certain    
numerical harmonies1 that there could be
 no planet between ,mars and ,jupiter1  
while at almost exactly the same time   
,piazzi discovered ,ceres1 the first of 
the asteroids4  #cfh3f ,mc,taggart3     
,studies in ,hegelian ,dialectic1 p4    
#aha4  #cfi3g ,green3 ,prolegomena to   
,ethics1 p4 #ae4  #cgj3h ,plato3 ,the   
,sophist1 #bdh4 ,translation by ,jowett4
  #chb3i ,hegel3 ,encyclopaedie1 ,sect4 
#de1 lecture note4 ,quoted by           
,mc,taggart3 ,op4 cit41 p4 #fi4  #chb3aj
 ,hegel3 ,encyclopaedie1 ,sect4 #ej4    
,quoted by ,mc,taggart3 ,op4 cit41 p4   
#gj4  #che3aa ,royce3 ,conception of    
,god1 pp4 #ai1 #dc-dd4  ,this argument  
is well summarized in ,green's statement
 that the existence of one connected    
world1 which is the presupposition of   
knowledge1 implies the action of one    

self-conditioning and self-determining  
mind4 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 p4 #aha4 
#chg3ab ,kant3 ,critical ,examination of
 ,practical ,reason4 ,translated by     
,abbott in ,kant's ,theory of ,ethics1  
p4 #ahj4  #cia3ac ,quoted from          
,mc,taggart3 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bca-bcb4   
#cic3ad ,emerson3 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #cj-ca4
  #cid3ae ,royce3 ,the ,world and the   
,individual1 ,first ,series1 p4 #dfe4   
,,chapter ,,xii  ,,conclusion           
,sidenote3 ,liability of ,philosophy to 
,revision1 ,due to its ,systematic      
,character4  ,sect4 #aie4 ,one who      
consults a book of philosophy in the    
hope of finding there a definite body of
 truth1 sanctioned by the consensus of  
experts1 cannot fail to be disappointed4
 ,and it should now be plain that this  
is due not to the frailties of          
philosophers1 but to the meaning of     
philosophy4 ,philosophy is not additive1
 but reconstructive4 ,natural science   
may advance step by step without ever   
losing ground2 its empirical discoveries

 are in their severalty as true as they 
can ever be4 ,thus the stars and the    
species of animals may be recorded      
successively1 and each generation of    
astronomers and zoologists may take up  
the work at the point reached by its    
forerunners4 ,the formulation of results
 does1 it is true1 require constant     
correction and revision--but there is a 
central body of data which is little    
affected1 and which accumulates from age
 to age4 ,now the finality of scientific
 truth is proportional to the modesty of
 its claims4 ,items of truth persist1   
while the interpretation of them is     
subject to alteration with the general  
advance of knowledge2 and1 relatively   
speaking1 science consists in items of  
truth1 and philosophy in their          
interpretation4 ,the liability to       
revision in science itself increases as 
that body of knowledge becomes more     
highly unified and systematic4 ,thus the
 present age1 with its attempt to       
construct a single comprehensive system 

of mechanical science1 is peculiarly an 
age when fundamental conceptions are    
subjected to a thorough                 
re-examination--when1 for example1 so   
ancient a conception as that of matter  
is threatened with displacement by that 
of energy4 ,but philosophy is           
essentially unitary and systematic--and 
thus superlatively liable to revision4  
,sidenote3 ,the ,one ,science and the   
,many ,philosophies4  ,sect4 #aif4 ,it  
is noteworthy that it is only in this   
age of a highly systematic natural      
science that different systems are      
projected1 as in the case just noted of 
the rivalry between the strictly        
mechanical1 or corpuscular1 theory and  
the newer theory of energetics4 ,it has 
heretofore been taken for granted that  
although there may be many philosophies1
 there is but one body of science4 ,and 
it is still taken for granted that the  
experimental detail of the individual   
science is a common fund1 to the        
progressive increase of which the       

individual scientist contributes the    
results of his special research2 there  
being rival schools of mechanics1       
physics1 or chemistry1 only in so far as
 fundamental conceptions or principles  
of orderly arrangement are in question4 
,but philosophy deals exclusively with  
the most fundamental conceptions and the
 most general principles of orderly     
arrangement4 ,hence it is significant of
 the very task of philosophy that there 
should be many tentative systems of     
philosophy1 even that each philosopher  
should project and construct his own    
philosophy4 ,philosophy as the truth of 
synthesis and reconciliation1 of        
comprehensiveness and coordination1 must
 be a living unity4 ,it is a thinking of
 entire experience1 and can be          
sufficient only through being           
all-sufficient4 ,the heart of every     
philosophy is a harmonizing insight1 an 
intellectual prospect within which all  
human interests and studies compose     
themselves4 ,such knowledge cannot be   

delegated to isolated co-laborers1 but  
will be altogether missed if not loved  
and sought in its indivisible unity4    
,there is no modest home-keeping        
philosophy2 no safe and conservative    
philosophy1 that can make sure of a part
 through renouncing the whole4 ,there is
 no philosophy without intellectual     
temerity1 as there is no religion       
without moral temerity4 ,and the one is 
the supreme interest of thought1 as the 
other is the supreme interest of life4  
,sidenote3 ,progress in ,philosophy4    
,the ,sophistication or ,eclecticism of 
the ,present ,age4  ,sect4 #aig4 ,though
 the many philosophies be inevitable1 it
 must not be concluded that there is    
therefore no progress in philosophy4    
,the solution from which every great    
philosophy is precipitated is the       
mingled wisdom of some latest age1 with 
all of its inheritance4 ,the positive   
knowledge furnished by the sciences1 the
 refinements and distinctions of the    
philosophers1 the ideals of             

society--these and the whole sum of     
civilization are its ingredients4 ,where
 there is no single system of philosophy
 significant enough to express the age1 
as did the systems of ,plato1 ,thomas   
,aquinas1 ,descartes1 ,locke1 ,kant1    
,hegel1 and the others who belong to the
 roll of the great philosophers1 there  
exists a general sophistication1 which  
is more elusive but not less            
significant4 ,the present age--at any   
rate from its own stand-point--is not an
 age of great philosophical systems4    
,such systems may indeed be living in   
our midst unrecognized2 but historical  
perspective cannot safely be            
anticipated4 ,it is certain that no     
living voice is known to speak for this 
generation as did ,hegel1 and even      
,spencer1 for the last4 ,there is1      
however1 a significance in this very    
passing of ,hegel and ,spencer1--an     
enlightenment peculiar to an age which  
knows them1 but has philosophically     
outlived them4 ,there is a moral in the 

history of thought which just now no    
philosophy1 whether naturalism1 or      
transcendentalism1 realism or idealism1 
can fail to draw4 ,the characterization 
of this contemporary eclecticism or     
sophistication1 difficult and uncertain 
as it must needs be1 affords the best   
summary and interpretation with which to
 conclude this brief survey of the      
fortunes of philosophy4  ,sidenote3     
,metaphysics4 ,the ,antagonistic        
,doctrines of ,naturalism and           
,absolutism4  ,sect4 #aih4 ,since the   
problem of metaphysics is the crucial   
problem of philosophy1 the question of  
its present status is fundamental in any
 characterization of the age4 ,it will  
appear from the foregoing account of the
 course of metaphysical development that
 two fundamental tendencies have        
exhibited themselves from the beginning4
 ,the one of these is naturalistic and  
empirical1 representing the claims of   
what common sense calls matters of fact2
 the other is transcendental and        

rational1 representing the claims of the
 standards and ideals which are immanent
 in experience1 and directly manifested 
in the great human interests of thought 
and action4 ,these tendencies have on   
the whole been antagonistic2 and the    
clear-cut and momentous systems of      
philosophy have been fundamentally      
determined by either the one or the     
other4  ,thus materialism is due to the 
attempt to reduce all of experience to  
the elements and principles of          
connection which are employed by the    
physical sciences to set in order the   
actual motions1 or changes of place1    
which the parts of experience undergo4  
,materialism maintains that the motions 
of bodies are indifferent to            
considerations of worth1 and denies that
 they issue from a deeper cause of      
another order4 ,the very ideas of such  
non-mechanical elements or principles   
are here provided with a mechanical     
origin4 ,similarly a phenomenalism1 like
 that of ,hume1 takes immediate presence

 to sense as the norm of being and      
knowledge4 ,individual items1 directly  
verified in the moment of their         
occurrence1 are held to be at once the  
content of all real truth1 and the      
source of those abstract ideas which the
 misguided rationalists mistake for real
 truth4  ,but the absolutist1 on the    
other hand1 contends that the thinker   
must mean something by the reality which
 he seeks4 ,if he had it for the        
looking1 thought would not be1 as it so 
evidently is1 a purposive endeavor4 ,and
 that which is meant by reality can be  
nothing short of the fulfilment or final
 realization of this endeavor of        
thought4 ,to find out what thought      
seeks1 to anticipate the consummation of
 thought and posit it as real1 is       
therefore the first and fundamental     
procedure of philosophy4 ,the mechanism 
of nature1 and all matters of fact1 must
 come to terms with this absolute       
reality1 or be condemned as mere        
appearance4 ,thus ,plato distinguishes  

the world of generation in which we     
participate by perception1 from the true
 essence in which we participate by     
thought2 and ,schelling speaks of the   
modern experimental method as the       
corruption of philosophy and physics1 in
 that it fails to construe nature in    
terms of spirit4  ,sidenote3            
,concessions from the ,side of          
,absolutism4 ,recognition of ,nature4   
,the ,neo-,fichteans4  ,sect4 #aii4 ,now
 it would never occur to a sophisticated
 philosopher of the present1 to one who 
has thought out to the end the whole    
tradition of philosophy1 and felt the   
gravity of the great historical issues1 
to suffer either of these motives to    
dominate him to the exclusion of the    
other4 ,absolutism has long since ceased
 to speak slightingly of physical       
science1 and of the world of perception4
 ,it is conceded that motions must be   
known in the mechanical way1 and matters
 of fact in the matter-of-fact way4     
,furthermore1 the prestige which science

 enjoyed in the nineteenth century1 and 
the prestige which the empirical and    
secular world of action has enjoyed to a
 degree that has steadily increased     
since the ,renaissance1 have convinced  
the absolutist of the intrinsic         
significance of these parts of          
experience4 ,they are no longer reduced1
 but are permitted to flourish in their 
own right4 ,from the very councils of   
absolute idealism there has issued a    
distinction which is fast becoming      
current1 between the ,world of          
,appreciation1 or the realm of moral and
 logical principles1 and the ,world of  
,description1 or the realm of empirical 
generalizations and mechanical          
causes4#djb3a ,it is indeed maintained  
that the former of these is             
metaphysically superior2 but the latter 
is ranked without the disparagement of  
its own proper categories4  ,with the   
,fichteans this distinction corresponds 
to the distinction in the system of     
,fichte between the active moral ego1   

and the nature which it posits to act   
upon4 ,but the neo-,fichteans are       
concerned to show that the nature so    
posited1 or the ,world of ,description1 
is the realm of mechanical science1 and 
that the entire system of mathematical  
and physical truth is therefore morally 
necessary4#djc3b  ,sidenote3 ,the       
,neo-,kantians4  ,sect4 #bjj4 ,a more   
pronounced tendency in the same         
direction marks the work of the         
neo-,kantians4 ,these philosophers      
repudiate the spiritualistic metaphysics
 of ,schopenhauer1 ,fichte1 and ,hegel1 
believing the real significance of ,kant
 to lie in his critical method1 in his  
examination of the first principles of  
the different systems of knowledge1 and 
especially in his analysis of the       
foundations of mathematics and          
physics4#djc3c ,in approaching          
mathematics and physics from a general  
logical stand-point1 these neo-,kantians
 become scarcely distinguishable in     
interest and temper from those          

scientists who approach logic from the  
mathematical and physical stand-point4  
,sidenote3 ,recognition of the          
,individual4 ,personal ,idealism4       
,sect4 #bja4 ,the finite1 moral         
individual1 with his peculiar spiritual 
perspective1 has long since been        
recognized as essential to the meaning  
of the universe rationally conceived4   
,but in its first movement absolute     
idealism proposed to absorb him in the  
indivisible absolute self4 ,it is now   
pointed out that ,fichte1 and even      
,hegel himself1 means the absolute to be
 a plurality or society of              
persons4#djd3d ,it is commonly conceded 
that the will of the absolute must      
coincide with the wills of all finite   
creatures in their severalty1 that ,god 
wills in and through men4#djd3e         
,corresponding to this individualistic  
tendency on the part of absolute        
idealism1 there has been recently       
projected a personal idealism1 or       
humanism1 which springs freshly and     

directly from the same motive4 ,this    
philosophy attributes ultimate          
importance to the human person with his 
freedom1 his interests1 his control over
 nature1 and his hope of the advancement
 of the spiritual kingdom through       
cooperation with his fellows4#dje3f     
,sidenote3 ,concessions from the ,side  
of ,naturalism4 ,recognition of         
,fundamental ,principles4  ,sect4 #bjb4 
,naturalism exhibits a moderation and   
liberality that is not less striking    
than that of absolutism4 ,this abatement
 of its claims began in the last century
 with agnosticism4 ,it was then conceded
 that there is an order other than that 
of natural science2 but this order was  
held to be inaccessible to human        
knowledge4 ,such a theory is essentially
 unstable because it employs principles 
which define a non-natural order1 but   
refuses to credit them or call them     
knowledge4 ,the agnostic is in the      
paradoxical position of one who knows of
 an unknowable world4 ,present-day      

naturalism is more circumspect4 ,it has 
interested itself in bringing to light  
that in the very procedure of science   
which1 because it predetermines what    
nature shall be1 cannot be included     
within nature4 ,to this interest is due 
the rediscovery of the rational         
foundations of science4 ,it was already 
known in the seventeenth century that   
exact science does not differ radically 
from mathematics1 as mathematics does   
not differ radically from logic4        
,mathematics and mechanics are now being
 submitted to a critical examination    
which reveals the definitions and       
implications upon which they rest1 and  
the general relation of these to the    
fundamental elements and necessities of 
thought4#djf3g  ,sidenote3 ,recognition 
of the ,will4 ,pragmatism4  ,sect4 #bjc4
 ,this rationalistic tendency in        
naturalism is balanced by a tendency    
which is more empirical1 but equally    
subversive of the old ultra-naturalism4 
,goethe once wrote3       ,i have       

observed that ,i hold that thought to be
 true which is      fruitful for me4 4 4
 4 ,when ,i know my relation to myself  
and      to the outer world1 ,i say that
 ,i possess the truth4  ,similarly1 it  
is now frequently observed that all     
knowledge is humanly fruitful1 and it is
 proposed that this shall be regarded as
 the very criterion of truth4 ,according
 to this principle science as a whole1  
even knowledge as a whole1 is primarily 
a human utility4 ,the nature which      
science defines is an artifact or       
construct4 ,it is designed to express   
briefly and conveniently what man may   
practically expect from his environment4
 ,this tendency is known as pragmatism4 
,it ranges from systematic doctrines1   
reminiscent of ,fichte1 which seek to   
define practical needs and deduce       
knowledge from them1 to the more        
irresponsible utterances of those who   
liken science to shorthand1#djg3h and   
mathematics to a game of chess4 ,in any 
case pragmatism attributes to nature a  

certain dependence on will1 and         
therefore implies1 even when it does not
 avow1 that will with its peculiar      
principles or values cannot be reduced  
to the terms of nature4 ,in short1 it   
would be more true to say that nature   
expresses will1 than that will expresses
 nature4#djh3i  ,sidenote3 ,summary1 and
 ,transition to ,epistemology4  ,sect4  
#bjd4 ,such1 then1 is the contemporary  
eclecticism as respects the central     
problem of metaphysics4 ,there are      
naturalistic and individualistic        
tendencies in absolutism2 rationalistic 
and ethical tendencies in naturalism2   
and finally the independent and         
spontaneous movements of personal       
idealism and pragmatism4  ,since the    
rise of the ,kantian and post-,kantian  
philosophy1 metaphysics and epistemology
 have maintained relations so intimate  
that the present state of the former    
cannot be characterized without some    
reference to the present state of the   
latter4 ,indeed1 the very issues upon   

which metaphysicians divide are most    
commonly those provoked by the problem  
of knowledge4 ,the counter-tendencies of
 naturalism and absolutism are always   
connected1 and often coincide with1 the 
epistemological opposition between      
empiricism1 which proclaims perception1 
and rationalism1 which proclaims reason1
 to be the proper organ of knowledge4   
,the other great epistemological        
controversy does not bear so direct and 
simple a relation to the central        
metaphysical issues1 and must be        
examined on its own account4  ,sidenote3
 ,the ,antagonistic ,doctrines of       
,realism and ,idealism4 ,realistic      
,tendency in ,empirical ,idealism4      
,sect4 #bje4 ,the point of controversy  
is the dependence or independence of the
 object of knowledge on the state of    
knowledge2 idealism maintaining that    
reality is the knower or his content of 
mind1 realism1 that being known is a    
circumstance which appertains to some   
reality1 without being the indispensable

 condition of reality as such4 ,now the 
sophisticated thought of the present age
 exhibits a tendency on the part of     
these opposite doctrines to approach and
 converge4 ,it has been already remarked
 that the empirical idealism of the     
,berkeleyan type could not avoid        
transcending itself4 ,hume1 who omitted 
,berkeley's active spirits1 no longer   
had any subjective seat or locus for the
 perceptions to which ,berkeley had     
reduced the outer world4 ,and           
perceptions which are not the states of 
any subject1 retain only their intrinsic
 character and become a series of       
elements4 ,when there is nothing beyond1
 which appears1 and nothing within to   
which it appears1 there ceases to be any
 sense in using such terms as           
appearance1 phenomenon1 or impression4  
,the term sensation is at present       
employed in the same ill-considered     
manner4 ,but empirical idealism has come
 gradually to insist upon the importance
 of the content of perception1 rather   

than the relation of perception to a    
self as its state4 ,the terms element   
and experience1 which are replacing the 
subjectivistic terms1 are frankly       
realistic4#daj3aj  ,sidenote3 ,realistic
 ,tendency in ,absolute ,idealism4 ,the 
,conception of ,experience4  ,sect4     
#bjf4 ,there is a similar realistic     
trend in the development of absolute    
idealism4 ,the pure ,hegelian philosophy
 was notably objective4 ,the principles 
of development in which it centres were 
conceived by ,hegel himself to manifest 
themselves most clearly in the          
progressions of nature and history4     
,many of ,hegel's followers have been   
led by moral and religious interests to 
emphasize consciousness1 and1 upon      
epistemological grounds1 to lay great   
stress upon the necessity of the union  
of the parts of experience within an    
enveloping self4 ,but absolute idealism 
has much at heart the overcoming of     
relativism1 and the absolute is defined 
in order to meet the demand for a being 

that shall not have the cognitive       
deficiencies of an object of finite     
thought4 ,so it is quite possible for   
this philosophy1 while maintaining its  
traditions on the whole1 to abandon the 
term self to the finite subject1 and    
regard its absolute as a system of      
rational and universal                  
principles--self-sufficient because     
externally independent and internally   
necessary4 ,hence the renewed study of  
categories as logical1 mathematical1 or 
mechanical principles1 and entirely     
apart from their being the acts of a    
thinking self4  ,furthermore1 it has    
been recognized that the general demand 
of idealism is met when reality is      
regarded as not outside of or other than
 knowledge1 whatever be true of the     
question of dependence4 ,thus the       
conception of experience is equally     
convenient here1 in that it signifies   
what is immediately present in          
knowledge1 without affirming it to      
consist in being so presented4#daa3aa   

,sidenote3 ,idealistic ,tendencies in   
,realism4 ,the ,immanence ,philosophy4  
,sect4 #bjg4 ,and at this point idealism
 is met by a latter-day realism4 ,the   
traditional modern realism springing    
from ,descartes was dualistic4 ,it was  
supposed that reality in itself was     
essentially extra-mental1 and thus under
 the necessity of being either          
represented or misrepresented in        
thought4 ,but the one of these          
alternatives is dogmatic1 in that       
thought can never test the validity of  
its relation to that which is           
perpetually outside of it2 while the    
other is agnostic1 providing only for   
the knowledge of a world of appearance1 
an improper knowledge that is in fact   
not knowledge at all4  ,but realism is  
not necessarily dualistic1 since it     
requires only that being shall not be   
dependent upon being known4             
,furthermore1 since empiricism is       
congenial to naturalism1 it is an easy  
step to say that nature is directly     

known in perception4 ,this first takes  
the form of positivism1 or the theory   
that only such nature as can be directly
 known can be really known4 ,but this   
agnostic provision for an unknown world 
beyond1 inevitably falls away and leaves
 reality as that which is directly      
known1 but not conditioned by knowledge4
 ,again the term experience is the most 
useful1 and provides a common ground for
 idealistic realism with realistic      
idealism4 ,a new epistemological        
movement makes this conception of       
experience its starting-point4 ,what is 
known as the immanence philosophy       
defines reality as experience1 and means
 by experience the subject matter of all
 knowledge--not defined as such1 but    
regarded as capable of being such4      
,experience is conceived to be both in  
and out of selves1 cognition being but  
one of the special systems into which   
experience may enter4#dac3ab  ,sidenote3
 ,the ,interpretation of ,tradition as  
the ,basis for a ,new ,construction4    

,sect4 #bjh4 ,does this eclecticism of  
the age open any philosophical prospect8
 ,is it more than a general             
compromise--a confession of failure on  
the part of each and every radical and  
clear-cut doctrine of metaphysics and   
epistemology8 ,there is no final answer 
to such a question short of an          
independent construction1 and such      
procedure would exceed the scope of the 
present discussion4 ,but there is an    
evident interpretation of tradition that
 suggests a possible basis for such     
construction4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,truth of
 the ,physical ,system1 but ,failure of 
,attempt to ,reduce ,all ,experience to 
it4  ,sect4 #bji4 ,suppose it to be     
granted that the categories of nature   
are quite self-sufficient4 ,this would  
mean that there might conceivably be a  
strictly physical order1 governed only  
by mechanical principles1 and by the    
more general logical and mathematical   
principles4 ,the body of physical       
science so extended as to include such  

general conceptions as identity1        
difference1 number1 quality1 space1 and 
time1 is the account of such an order4  
,this order need have no value1 and need
 not be known4 ,but reality as a whole  
is evidently not such a strictly        
physical order1 for the definition of   
the physical order involves the         
rejection of many of the most familiar  
aspects of experience1 such as its value
 and its being known in conscious       
selves4 ,materialism1 in that it        
proposes to conceive the whole of       
reality as physical1 must attempt to    
reduce the residuum to physical terms1  
and with no hope of success4 ,goodness  
and knowledge cannot be explained as    
mass and force1 or shown to be          
mechanical necessities4  ,sidenote3     
,truth of ,psychical ,relations1 but    
,impossibility of ,general ,reduction to
 ,them4  ,sect4 #baj4 ,are we then to   
conclude that reality is not physical1  
and look for other terms to which we may
 reduce physical terms8 ,there is no    

lack of such other terms4 ,indeed1 we   
could as fairly have begun elsewhere4   
,thus some parts of experience compose  
the consciousness of the individual1 and
 are said to be known by him4           
,experience so contained is connected by
 the special relation of being known    
together4 ,but this relation is quite   
indifferent to physical1 moral1 and     
logical relations4 ,thus we may be      
conscious of things which are physically
 disconnected1 morally repugnant1 and   
logically contradictory1 or in all of   
these respects utterly irrelevant4      
,subjectivism1 in that it proposes to   
conceive the whole of reality as        
consciousness1 must attempt to reduce   
physical1 moral1 and logical relations  
to that co-presence in consciousness    
from which they are so sharply          
distinguished in their very definition4 
,the historical failure of this attempt 
was inevitable4  ,sidenote3 ,truth of   
,logical and ,ethical ,principles4      
,validity of ,ideal of ,perfection1 but 

,impossibility of ,deducing the ,whole  
of ,experience from it4  ,sect4 #baa4   
,but there is at least one further      
starting-point1 the one adopted by the  
most subtle and elaborate of all        
reconstructive philosophies4 ,logical   
necessities are as evidently real as    
bodies or selves4 ,it is possible to    
define general types of inference1 as   
well as compact and internally necessary
 systems such as those of mathematics4  
,there is a perfectly distinguishable   
strain of pure rationality in the       
universe4 ,whether or not it be possible
 to conceive a pure rationality as      
self-subsistent1 inasmuch as there are  
degrees it is at any rate possible to   
conceive of a maximum of rationality4   
,but similarly there are degrees of     
moral goodness4 ,it is possible to      
define with more or less exactness a    
morally perfect person1 or an ideal     
moral community4 ,here again it may be  
impossible that pure and unalloyed      
goodness should constitute a universe of

 itself4 ,but that a maximum of         
goodness1 with all of the accessories   
which it might involve1 should be thus  
self-subsistent1 is quite conceivable4  
,it is thus possible to define an       
absolute and perfect order1 in which    
logical necessity1 the interest of      
thought1 or moral goodness1 the interest
 of will1 or both together1 should be   
realized to the maximum4 ,absolutism    
conceives reality under the form of this
 ideal1 and attempts to reconstruct     
experience accordingly4 ,but is the     
prospect of success any better than in  
the cases of materialism and            
subjectivism8 ,it is evident that the   
ideal of logical necessity is due to the
 fact that certain parts of knowledge   
approach it more closely than others4   
,thus mechanics contains more that is   
arbitrary than mathematics1 and         
mathematics more than logic4 ,similarly1
 the theory of the evolution of the     
planetary system1 in that it requires   
the assumption of particular distances  

and particular masses for the parts of  
the primeval nebula1 is more arbitrary  
than rational dynamics4 ,it is          
impossible1 then1 in view of the parts  
of knowledge which belong to the lower  
end of the scale of rationality1 to     
regard reality as a whole as the maximum
 of rationality2 for either a purely    
dynamical1 a purely mathematical1 or a  
purely logical1 realm would be more     
rational4 ,the similar disproof of the  
moral perfection of reality is so       
unmistakable as to require no           
elucidation4 ,it is evident that even   
where natural necessities are not       
antagonistic to moral proprieties1 they 
are at any rate indifferent to them4    
,sidenote3 ,error and ,evil ,cannot be  
,reduced to the ,ideal4  ,sect4 #bab4   
,but thus far no reference has been made
 to error and to evil4 ,these are the   
terms which the ideals of rationality   
and goodness must repudiate if they are 
to retain their meaning4 ,nevertheless  
experience contains them and psychology 

describes them4 ,we have already        
followed the efforts which absolute     
idealism has made to show that logical  
perfection requires error1 and that     
moral perfection requires evil4 ,is it  
conceivable that such efforts should be 
successful8 ,suppose a higher logic to  
make the principle of contradiction the 
very bond of rationality4 ,what was     
formerly error is now indispensable to  
truth4 ,but what of the new error--the  
unbalanced and mistaken thesis1 the     
unresolved antithesis1 the scattered and
 disconnected terms of thought8 ,these  
fall outside the new truth as surely as 
the old error fell outside the old      
truth4 ,and the case of moral goodness  
is precisely parallel4 ,the higher      
goodness may be so defined as to require
 failure and sin4 ,thus it may be       
maintained that there can be no true    
success without struggle1 and no true   
spiritual exaltation except through     
repentance4 ,but what of failure        
unredeemed1 sin unrepented1 evil        

uncompensated and unresolved8 ,nothing  
has been gained after all but a new     
definition of goodness--and a new       
definition of evil4 ,and this is an     
ethical1 not a metaphysical question4   
,the problem of evil1 like the problem  
of error1 is as far from solution as    
ever4 ,indeed1 the very urgency of these
 problems is due to metaphysical        
absolutism4 ,for this philosophy defines
 the universe as a perfect unity4       
,measured by the standard of such an    
ideal universe1 the parts of finite     
experience take on a fragmentary and    
baffling character which they would not 
otherwise possess4 ,the absolute        
perfection must by definition both      
determine and exclude the imperfect4    
,thus absolutism bankrupts the universe 
by holding it accountable for what it   
can never pay4  ,sidenote3 ,collective  
,character of the ,universe as a ,whole4
  ,sect4 #bac4 ,if the attempt to       
construct experience in the special     
terms of some part of experience be     

abandoned1 how is reality to be defined8
 ,it is evident that in that case there 
can be no definition of reality as such4
 ,it must be regarded as a collection of
 all elements1 relations1 principles1   
systems1 that compose it4 ,all truths   
will be true of it1 and it will be the  
subject of all truths4 ,reality is at   
least physical1 psychical1 moral1 and   
rational4 ,that which is physical is not
 necessarily moral or psychical1 but may
 be either or both of these4 ,thus it is
 a commonplace of experience that what  
has bulk and weight may or may not be   
good1 and may or may not be known4      
,similarly1 that which is psychical may 
or may not be physical1 moral1 or       
rational2 and that which is moral or    
rational may or may not be physical and 
psychical4 ,there is1 then1 an          
indeterminism in the universe1 a mere   
coincidence of principles1 in that it   
contains physical1 psychical1 moral1    
logical orders1 without being in all    
respects either a physical1 a psychical1

 a moral1 or a logical necessity4#dbj3ac
 ,reality or experience itself is       
neutral in the sense of being           
exclusively predetermined by no one of  
the several systems it contains4 ,but   
the different systems of experience     
retain their specific and proper        
natures1 without the compromise which is
 involved in all attempts to extend some
 one until it shall embrace them all4   
,if such a universe seems inconceivably 
desultory and chaotic1 one may always   
remind one's self by directly consulting
 experience that it is not only found   
immediately and unreflectively1 but     
returned to and lived in after every    
theoretical excursion4  ,sidenote3      
,moral ,implications of such a          
,pluralistic ,philosophy4 ,purity of the
 ,good4  ,sect4 #bad4 ,but what         
implications for life would be contained
 in such a philosophy8 ,even if it be   
theoretically clarifying1 through being 
hospitable to all differences and       
adequate to the multifarious demands of 

experience1 is it not on that very      
account morally dreary and stultifying8 
,is not its refusal to establish the    
universe upon moral foundations         
destructive both of the validity of     
goodness1 and of the incentive to its   
attainment8 ,certainly not--if the      
validity of goodness be determined by   
criteria of worth1 and if the incentive 
to goodness be the possibility of making
 that which merely exists1 or is        
necessary1 also good4  ,this philosophy 
does not1 it is true1 define the good1  
but it makes ethics autonomous1 thus    
distinguishing the good which it        
defines1 and saving it from compromise  
with matter-of-fact1 and logical or     
mechanical necessity4 ,the criticism of 
life is founded upon an independent     
basis1 and affords justification1 of a  
selective and exclusive moral idealism4 
,just because it is not required that   
the good shall be held accountable for  
whatever is real1 the ideal can be kept 
pure and intrinsically worthy4 ,the     

analogy of logic is most illuminating4  
,if it be insisted that whatever exists 
is logically necessary1 logical         
necessity must be made to embrace that  
from which it is distinguished by       
definition1 such as contradiction1 mere 
empirical existence1 and error4 ,the    
consequence is a logical chaos which has
 in truth forfeited the name of logic4  
,similarly a goodness defined to make   
possible the deduction from it of moral 
evil or moral indifference loses the    
very distinguishing properties of       
goodness4 ,the consequence is an ethical
 neutrality which invalidates the moral 
will4 ,a metaphysical neutrality1 on the
 other hand1 although denying that      
reality as such is predestined to       
morality--and thus affording no         
possibility of an ethical               
absolutism--becomes the true ground for 
an ethical purism4  ,sidenote3 ,the     
,incentive to ,goodness4  ,sect4 #bae4  
,but1 secondly1 there can be no lack of 
incentive to goodness in a universe     

which1 though not all-good1 is in no    
respect incapable of becoming good4     
,that which is mechanically or logically
 necessary1 and that which is           
psychically present1 may be good4 ,and  
what can the realization of goodness    
mean if not that what is natural and    
necessary1 actual and real1 shall be    
also good4 ,the world is not good1 will 
not be good1 merely through being what  
it is1 but is or shall be made good     
through the accession of goodness4 ,it  
is this belief that the real is not     
necessarily1 but may be1 good2 that the 
ideal is not necessarily1 but may be1   
realized2 which has inspired every faith
 in action4 ,philosophically it is only 
a question of permitting such faith to  
be sincere1 or condemning it as shallow4
 ,if the world be made good through     
good-will1 then the faith of moral      
action is rational2 but if the world be 
good because whatever is must be good1  
then moral action is a tread-mill1 and  
its attendant and animating faith only  

self-deception4 ,moral endeavor is the  
elevation of physical and psychical     
existence to the level of goodness4     
,relate the inheritance to life1 convert
 the tradition into a      servant of   
character1 draw upon the history for    
support in the      struggles of the    
spirit1 declare a war of extermination  
against the total evil of the world2 and
 then raise new armies      and organize
 into fighting force every belief       
available in the      faith that has    
descended to you4#dbc3ad  ,evil is here 
a practical1 not a theoretical1 problem4
 ,it is not to be solved by thinking it 
good1 for to think it good is to deaden 
the very nerve of action2 but by        
destroying it and replacing it with     
good4  ,sidenote3 ,the ,justification of
 ,faith4  ,sect4 #baf4 ,the             
justification of faith is in the promise
 of reality4 ,for what1 after all1 would
 be the meaning of a faith which        
declares that all things1 good1 bad1 and
 indifferent1 are everlastingly and     

necessarily what they are--even if it   
were concluded on philosophical grounds 
to call that ultimate necessity good4   
,faith has interests2 faith is faith in 
goodness or beauty4 ,then what more just
 and potent cause of despair than the   
thought that the ideal must be held     
accountable for error1 ugliness1 and    
evil1 or for the indifferent necessities
 of nature8#dbd3ae ,are ideals to be    
prized the less1 or believed in the     
less1 when there is no ground for their 
impeachment8 ,how much more hopeful for 
what is worth the hoping1 that nature   
should discern ideals and take some     
steps toward realizing them1 than that  
ideals should have created nature--such 
as it is6 ,how much better a report can 
we give of nature for its ideals1 than  
of the ideals for their handiwork1 if it
 be nature6 ,emerson writes3            
,suffice it for the joy of the universe 
that we have not      arrived at a wall1
 but at interminable oceans4 ,our life  
seems      not present so much as       

prospective2 not for the affairs on     
which it is wasted1 but as a hint of    
this vast-flowing vigor4      ,most of  
life seems to be mere advertisement of  
faculty2      information is given us   
not to sell ourselves cheap2 that we    
are very great4 ,so1 in particulars1 our
 greatness is always in      a tendency 
or direction1 not in an action4 ,it is  
for us to      believe in the rule1 not 
in the exception4 ,the noble are thus   
known from the ignoble4 ,so in accepting
 the leading of the      sentiments1 it 
is not what we believe concerning the   
immortality of the soul or the like1 but
 the universal      impulse to believe1 
that is the material circumstance and is
      the principal fact in the history 
of the globe4#dbe3af  ,sidenote3 ,the   
,worship and ,service of ,god4  ,sect4  
#bag4 ,if ,god be rid of the imputation 
of moral evil and indifference1 he may  
be intrinsically worshipful1 because    
regarded under the form of the highest  
ideals4 ,and if the great cause of      

goodness be in fact at stake1 ,god may  
both command the adoration of men       
through his purity1 and reenforce their 
virtuous living through representing to 
them that realization of goodness in the
 universe at large which both contains  
and exceeds their individual endeavor4  
,sidenote3 ,the ,philosopher and the    
,standards of the ,marketplace4  ,sect4 
#bah4 ,bishop ,berkeley wrote in his    
,commonplace ,book3       ,my           
speculations have the same effect as    
visiting foreign      countries3 in the 
end ,i return where ,i was before1 but  
my      heart at ease1 and enjoying life
 with new satisfaction4  ,if it be      
essential to the meaning of philosophy  
that it should issue from life1 it is   
equally essential that it should return 
to life4 ,but this connection of        
philosophy with life does not mean its  
reduction to the terms of life as       
conceived in the market-place4          
,philosophy cannot emanate from life1   
and quicken life1 without elevating and 

ennobling it1 and will therefore always 
be incommensurable with life narrowly   
conceived4 ,hence the philosopher must  
always be as little understood by men of
 the street as was ,thales by the       
,thracian handmaiden4 ,he has an        
innocence and a wisdom peculiar to his  
perspective4       ,when he is reviled1 
he has nothing personal to say in answer
      to the civilities of his          
adversaries1 for he knows no scandals   
of anyone1 and they do not interest him2
 and therefore he is      laughed at for
 his sheepishness2 and when others are  
being      praised and glorified1 he    
cannot help laughing very sincerely     
in the simplicity of his heart2 and this
 again makes him look      like a fool4 
,when he hears a tyrant or king         
eulogized1 he      fancies that he is   
listening to the praises of some keeper 
of      cattle--a swineherd1 or         
shepherd1 or cowherd1 who is being      
praised for the quantity of milk which  
he squeezes from them2      and he      

remarks that the creature whom they     
tend1 and out of      whom they squeeze 
the wealth1 is of a less tractable and  
more      insidious nature4 ,then1      
again1 he observes that the great man   
is of necessity as ill-mannered and     
uneducated as any      shepherd1 for he 
has no leisure1 and he is surrounded by 
a      wall1 which is his mountain-pen4 
,hearing of enormous landed             
proprietors of ten thousand acres and   
more1 our philosopher      deems this to
 be a trifle1 because he has been       
accustomed to      think of the whole   
earth2 and when they sing the praises of
      family1 and say that some one is a
 gentleman because he has      had seven
 generations of wealthy ancestors1 he   
thinks that      their sentiments only  
betray the dulness and narrowness of    
vision of those who utter them1 and who 
are not educated      enough to look at 
the whole1 nor to consider that every   
man      has had thousands and thousands
 of progenitors1 and among them         

have been rich and poor1 kings and      
slaves1 ,hellenes and      barbarians1  
many times over4#dbg3ag  ,it is not to  
be expected that the opinion of the     
narrow1 keen1 little1 legal mind should 
appreciate the philosophy which has     
acquired the music of speech1 and hymns 
the true life which is lived by         
immortals or men blessed of heaven4     
,complacency cannot understand          
reverence1 nor secularism1 religion4    
,sidenote3 ,the ,secularism of the      
,present ,age4  ,sect4 #bai4 ,if we may 
believe the report of a contemporary    
philosopher1 the present age is made    
insensible to the meaning of life       
through preoccupation with its very     
achievements3       ,the world of finite
 interests and objects has rounded      
itself1      as it were1 into a separate
 whole1 within which the mind of        
man can fortify itself1 and live securus
 adversus deos1 in      independence of 
the infinite4 ,in the sphere of thought1
      there has been forming itself an  

ever-increasing body of      science1   
which1 tracing out the relation of      
finite things to      finite things1    
never finds it necessary to seek for a  
beginning or an end to its infinite     
series of phenomena1 and      which     
meets the claims of theology with the   
saying of the      astronomer1 ',i do   
not need that hypothesis4' ,in the      
sphere of      action1 again1 the       
complexity of modern life presents a    
thousand isolated interests1 crossing   
each other in ways too      subtle to   
trace out--interests commercial1 social1
 and      political--in pursuing one or 
other of which the individual      may  
find ample occupation for his existence1
 without ever      feeling the need of  
any return upon himself1 or seeing any  
reason to ask himself whether this      
endless striving has any      meaning or
 object beyond itself4#dbh3ah           
,sidenote3 ,the ,value of ,contemplation
 for ,life4  ,sect4 #bbj4 ,there is no  
dignity in living except it be in the   

solemn presence of the universe2 and    
only contemplation can summon such a    
presence4 ,moreover1 the sessions must  
be not infrequent1 for memory is short  
and visions fade4 ,truth does not       
require1 however1 to be followed out of 
the world4 ,there is a speculative      
detachment from life which is less      
courageous1 even if more noble1 than    
worldliness4 ,such is ,dante's exalted  
but mediaeval intellectualism4          
,and it may be said that 7as true       
friendship between men      consists in 
each wholly loving the other7 the true  
philosopher      loves every part of    
wisdom1 and wisdom every part of the    
philosopher1 inasmuch as she draws all  
to herself1 and allows      no one of   
his thoughts to wander to other things4 
,even though1 as ,aristotle thought1    
pure contemplation be alone proper to   
the gods in their perfection and        
blessedness1 for the sublunary world    
this is less worthy than that balance   
and unity of faculty which distinguished

 the humanity of the ,greek4            
,then1 writes ,thucydides1 we are lovers
 of the beautiful1      yet simple in   
our tastes1 and we cultivate the mind   
without      loss of manliness4 ,wealth 
we employ1 not for talk and             
ostentation1 but when there is a real   
use for it4 ,to avoid      poverty with 
us is no disgrace2 the true disgrace is 
in doing      nothing to avoid it4 ,an  
,athenian citizen does not neglect the  
,state because he takes care of his own 
household2 and even      those of us who
 are engaged in business have a very    
fair idea      of politics4 ,we alone   
regard a man who takes no interest in   
public affairs not as a harmless1 but as
 a useless character2      and if few of
 us are originators1 we are all sound   
judges1 of      a policy4 ,the great    
impediment to action is1 in our opinion1
      not discussion1 but the want of   
that knowledge which is gained      by  
discussion preparatory to action4 ,for  
we have a peculiar      power of        

thinking before we act1 and of acting   
too1 whereas      other men are         
courageous from ignorance1 but hesitate 
upon      reflection4#dbi3ai  ,thus life
 may be broadened and deepened without  
being made thin and ineffectual4 ,as the
 civil community is related to the      
individual's private interests1 so the  
community of the universe is related to 
the civil community4 ,there is a        
citizenship in this larger community    
which requires a wider and more generous
 interest1 rooted in a deeper and more  
quiet reflection4 ,the world1 however1  
is not to be left behind1 but served    
with a new sense of proportion1 with the
 peculiar fortitude and reverence which 
are the proper fruits of philosophy4    
,this is that which will indeed dignify 
and exalt knowledge1      if            
contemplation and action may be more    
nearly and straitly      conjoined and  
united together than they have been2 a  
conjunction like unto that of the two   
highest planets3 ,saturn1      the      

planet of rest and contemplation1 and   
,jupiter1 the planet      of civil      
society and action4#dcj3bj              
,,footnotes3  #djb3a ,cf4 ,josiah       
,royce3 ,the ,spirit of ,modern         
,philosophy1 ,lecture ,,xii2 ,the ,world
 and the ,individual1 ,second ,series4  
#djc3b ,cf4 ,hugo ,muensterberg3        
,psychology and ,life4 ,the more        
important writings of this school are3  
,die ,philosophie im ,beginn des        
zwanzigsten ,jahrhunderts1 edited by    
,wilhelm ,windelband1 and contributed to
 by ,windelband1 ,h4 ,rickert1 ,o4      
,liebmann1 ,e4 ,troeltsch1 ,b4 ,bauch1  
and others4 ,this book contains an      
excellent bibliography4 ,also1 ,rickert3
 ,der ,gegenstand der ,erkenntnis2 ,die 
,grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen    
,begriffsbildung1 and other works4      
,windelband3 ,praeludien2 ,geschichte   
und ,naturwissenschaft4 ,muensterberg3  
,grundzuege der ,psychologie4 ,eucken3  
,die ,grundbegriffe der ,gegenwart4     
#djc3c ,cf4 ,f4 ,a4 ,lange3 ,history of 

,materialism1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chap4 ,i1 on 
,kant and ,materialism2 also ,alois     
,riehl3 ,introduction to the ,theory of 
,science and ,metaphysics4 ,translation 
by ,fairbanks4 ,the more important      
writings of this school are3 ,hermann   
,cohen3 ,kant's ,theorie der ,erfahrung2
 ,die ,logik der reinen ,erkenntniss1   
and other works4 ,paul ,natorp3         
,sozialpaedagogik2 ,einleitung in die   
,psychologie nach kritischer ,methode1  
and other works4 ,e4 ,cassirer3         
,leibniz' ,system in seinen             
wissenschaftlichen ,grundlagen4 ,riehl3 
,der philosophische ,kriticismus1 und   
seine ,bedeutung fur die ,positive      
,wissenschaft4 ,cf4 also ,e4 ,husserl3  
,logische ,untersuchungen4  #djd3d ,cf4 
,j4 ,m4 ,e4 ,mc,taggart3 ,studies in    
,hegelian ,cosmology1 ,chap4 ,,iii4     
#djd3e ,cf4 ,royce3 ,the ,conception of 
,god1 ,supplementary ,essay1 pp4        
#ace-cbb2 ,the ,world and the           
,individual1 ,first ,series4  #dje3f    
,this movement began as a criticism of  

,hegelianism in behalf of the human     
personality4 ,cf4 ,andrew ,seth3        
,hegelianism and ,personality2 ,man and 
the ,cosmos2 ,two ,lectures on ,theism4 
,g4 ,h4 ,howison3 ,the ,limits of       
,evolution4 ,the important writings of  
the more independent movement are3      
,william ,james3 ,the ,will to ,believe4
 ,h4 ,sturt1 editor3 ,personal          
,idealism1 ,philosophical ,essays by    
,eight ,members of ,oxford ,university4 
,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller3 ,humanism4 ,henri
 ,bergson3 ,essai sur les donnees       
immediates de la conscience2 ,matiere et
 memoire4 ,this movement is closely     
related to that of ,pragmatism4 ,see    
under ,sect4 #bjc4  #djf3g ,cf4         
,bertrand ,russell3 ,principles of      
,mathematics1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,among the more 
important writings of this movement are 
the following3 ,giuseppi ,peano3        
,formulaire de ,mathematique1 published 
by the ,rivista di matematica1 ,tom4    
,i-,,iv4 ,richard ,dedekind3 ,was sind  
und was sollen die ,zahlen8 ,georg      

,cantor3 ,grundlagen einer allgemeinen  
,mannigfaltigkeitslehre4 ,louis         
,couturat3 ,de l',infini ,mathematique1 
and articles in ,revue de ,metaphysique 
et de ,morale4 ,a4 ,n4 ,whitehead3 ,a   
,treatise on ,universal ,algebra4       
,heinrich ,hertz3 ,die ,prinzipien der  
,mechanik4 ,henri ,poincare3 ,la        
,science et l',hypothese4 ,for the      
bearing of these investigations on      
philosophy1 see ,royce3 ,the ,sciences  
of the ,ideal1 in ,science1 ,vol4 ,,xx1 
,no4 #eaj4  #djg3h ,the term used by    
,karl ,pearson in his ,grammar of       
,science4  #djh3i ,the important        
,english writings of the recent         
independent movement known as pragmatism
 are3 ,c4 ,s4 ,peirce3 ,illustrations of
 the ,logic of ,science1 in ,popular    
,science ,monthly1 ,vol4 ,,xii4 ,w4     
,james3 ,the ,pragmatic ,method1 in     
,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1   
and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,i2     
,humanism and ,truth1 in ,mind1 ,vol4   
,,xiii1 ,n4 ,s42 ,the ,essence of       

,humanism1 in ,jour4 of ,phil41 ,psych41
 and ,sc4 ,meth41 ,vol4 ,,ii 7with      
bibliography72 ,the ,will to ,believe4  
,john ,dewey3 ,studies in ,logical      
,theory4 ,w4 ,caldwell3 ,pragmatism1 in 
,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xxv41 ,n4 ,s4 ,see also  
literature on personal idealism1 ,sect4 
#bja4 ,a similar tendency has appeared  
in ,france in ,bergson1 ,le,roy1        
,milhaud1 and in ,germany in ,simmel4   
#daj3aj ,cf4 ,ernst ,mach3 ,analysis of 
,sensation4 ,translation by ,williams4  
#daa3aa ,cf4 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley3          
,appearance and ,reality4  #dac3ab ,cf4 
,carstanjen3 ,richard ,avenarius1 and   
his ,general ,theory of ,knowledge1     
,empiriocriticism4 ,translation by ,h4  
,bosanquet1 in ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,vi1 ,n4   
,s4 ,also ,james3 ,does ,consciousness  
,exist8 and ,a ,world of ,pure          
,experience1 in ,jour4 of ,phil41       
,psych41 and ,sc4 ,meth41 ,vol4 ,i2 ,the
 ,thing and its ,relations1 ibid41 ,vol4
 ,,ii4  ,the standard literature of this
 movement is unfortunately not available

 in ,english4 ,among the more important 
writings are3 ,r4 ,avenarius3 ,kritik   
der reinen ,erfahrung2 ,der menschliche 
,weltbegriff1 and other works4 ,joseph  
,petzoldt3 ,einfuehrung in die          
,philosophie der reinen ,erfahrung4     
,ernst ,mach3 ,die ,analyse der         
,empfindung und das ,verhaeltniss des   
,physischen zum ,psychischen1 #b4 ,auff4
 ,wilhelm ,schuppe3 ,grundriss der      
,erkenntnisstheorie und ,logik4         
,friedrich ,carstanjen3 ,einfuehrung in 
die ,kritik der reinen ,erfahrung--an   
exposition of ,avenarius4 ,also articles
 by the above1 ,r4 ,willy1 ,r4 v4       
,schubert-,soldern1 and others1 in the  
,vierteljahrsschrift fur                
wissenschaftliche ,philosophie4  #dbj3ac
 ,it is not1 of course1 denied that     
there may be other orders1 such as1 e4  
g41 an aesthetic order2 or that there   
may be definite relations between these 
orders1 such as1 e4 g41 the             
psycho-physical relation4  #dbc3ad      
,quoted from ,george ,a4 ,gordon3 ,the  

,new ,epoch for ,faith1 p4 #bg4  #dbd3ae
 ,cf4 ,james3 ,the ,will to ,believe1   
essay on ,the ,dilemma of ,determinism1 
passim4  #dbe3af ,essays1 ,second       
,series1 p4 #ge4  #dbg3ag ,plato3       
,theaetetus1 #agd-age4 ,translation by  
,jowett4  #dbh3ah ,e4 ,caird3           
,literature and ,philosophy1 ,vol4 ,i1  
pp4 #bah-bai4  #dbi3ai ,translation by  
,jowett4 ,quoted by ,laurie in his      
,pre-,christian ,education1 p4 #bac4    
#dcj3bj ,bacon3 ,advancement of         
,learning1 ,book ,i4     ,,bibliography 
,the references contained in this       
bibliography have been selected on the  
score of availability in ,english for   
the general reader and beginning student
 of philosophy4 ,but ,i have sought     
wherever possible to include passages   
from the great philosophers and men of  
letters4 ,these are placed first in the 
list1 followed by references to         
contemporary writers and secondary      
sources4   ,,chapter ,i1 ,,the          
,,practical ,,man ,,and ,,the           

,,philosopher4  ,,plato3 ,republic1     
especially ,book ,,vii4 ,translations by
 ,jowett and ,vaughan4 ,theaetetus1 #agb
 ff4 ,translation by ,jowett4           
,,aristotle3 ,ethics1 ,book ,x4         
,translation by ,welldon4  ,,marcus     
,,aurelius3 ,thoughts4 ,translation by  
,long4  ,,epictetus3 ,discourses4       
,translation by ,long4  ,,bacon3 ,the   
,advancement of ,learning4  ,,emerson3  
,representative ,men--,plato2 or the    
,philosopher4 ,conduct of               
,life--,culture4 ,essays1 ,second       
,series--,experience4         99        
99       99       99       99  ,,royce1 
,,josiah3 ,spirit of ,modern            
,philosophy4 ,introduction4  ,,hibben1  
,j4 ,g43 ,problems of ,philosophy4      
,introduction4   ,,chapter ,,ii1        
,,poetry ,,and ,,philosophy4  ,,plato3  
,republic1 ,books ,,ii and ,,iii4       
,translation by ,jowett4 7,criticism of 
the poets as demoralizing47             
,,wordsworth3 ,observations ,prefixed to
 the ,second ,edition of the ,lyrical   

,ballads4  ,,shelley3 ,defence of       
,poetry4  ,,everett1 ,c4 ,c43 ,poetry1  
,comedy1 and ,duty4 7discussion of the  
,philosophy of ,poetry47 ,essays1       
,theological and ,literary4 7,on the    
,poetry of ,emerson1 ,goethe1 ,tennyson1
 ,browning47  ,,caird1 ,,edward3        
,literature and ,philosophy4            
7,wordsworth1 ,dante1 ,goethe1 etc47    
,,royce1 ,,josiah3 ,studies of ,good and
 ,evil4 ,essay on ,tennyson and         
,pessimism4  ,,santayana1 ,,george3     
,poetry and ,religion4 7,philosophy of  
poetry2 ,greek ,poetry1 ,shakespeare1   
etc47  ,,sneath1 ,e4 ,h43 ,philosophy in
 ,poetry3 ,a ,study of ,sir ,john       
,davies's ,poem1 ,nosce ,teipsum4       
,,chapters ,,iii ,,and ,,iv1 ,,religion4
  ,,plato3 ,republic1 ,book ,,iii4      
,translations by ,jowett and ,vaughan4  
7,criticism of religion from the        
stand-point of morality and politics47  
,,st4 ,,augustine3 ,confessions4        
,translation by ,pusey4 7,document of   
religious experience47  ,,thomas ,a     

,,kempis3 ,imitation of ,christ4        
,translation by ,stanhope4 7,mediaeval  
programme of personal religion47        
,,spinoza3 ,theological-political       
,treatise4 ,translation by ,elwes4 7,one
 of the first great pleas for religious 
liberty and one of the first attempts to
 define the essential in religion47     
,,kant3 ,critique of ,pure ,reason--the 
,canon of ,pure ,reason4 ,translation by
 ,max ,mueller4 ,critique of ,practical 
,reason4 ,translation by ,abbott in     
,theory of ,ethics4 7,defines religion  
as the province of faith1 distinguishes 
it from knowledge1 and relates it to    
morality47  ,,schleiermacher3 ,on       
,religion4 ,speeches to its ,cultured   
,despisers4 ,translation by ,oman4      
7,ponderous1 dogmatic in its philosophy1
 but profound and sympathetic in its    
understanding of religion47  ,,arnold3  
,literature and ,dogma4 7,on the essence
 of religion as exemplified in ,judaism 
and ,christianity47         99       99 
99       99       99  ,,sabatier1 ,a43  

,outlines of a ,philosophy of ,religion 
based on ,psychology and ,history4      
,translation by ,seed4 ,religions of    
,authority and the ,religion of the     
,spirit4 ,translation by ,houghton4     
7,these books emphasize the essential   
importance of the believer's attitude to
 ,god47  ,,james1 ,,william3 ,the       
,varieties of ,religious ,experience4   
7,a rich storehouse of religion1        
sympathetically interpreted47           
,,everett1 ,c4 ,c43 ,the ,psychological 
,elements of ,religious ,faith4 7,a     
study in the definition and meaning of  
religion47  ,,caird1 ,,edward3          
,evolution of ,religion4 7,indoctrinated
 with the author's idealistic           
philosophy47  ,,fielding1 ,h43 ,the     
,hearts of ,men4 7,a plea for the       
universal religion4 ,special feeling for
 ,indian religions47  ,,harnack1 ,a43   
,what is ,christianity8 ,translation by 
,saunders4 7,attempt to define the      
essence of ,christianity47  ,,palmer1   
,g4 ,h43 ,the ,field of ,ethics1        

,chapters ,v and ,,vi4 7,on the relation
 of ethics and religion47  ,,brown1 ,w4 
,a43 ,the ,essence of ,christianity4    
7,special study of the definition of    
religion47  ,,jastrow1 ,m43 ,the ,study 
of ,religion4 7,method of history and   
psychology of religion47  ,,smith1 ,w4  
,,robertson3 ,the ,religion of the      
,semites4 7,excellent study of tribal   
religions47  ,,clarke1 ,w4 ,n43 ,what   
,shall ,we ,think of ,christianity8 7,an
 interpretation of ,christianity47      
,,leuba1 ,j4 ,h43 ,introduction to a    
,psychological ,study of ,religion4 ,in 
,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #aie4      
,,starbuck1 ,e4 ,d43 ,the ,psychology of
 ,religion4   ,,chapter ,v1 ,,the       
,,philosophical ,,criticism ,,of        
,,science4#dcd3;,a  ,,plato3 ,republic1 
,book ,,vii1 #ebf ff4 ,translations by  
,jowett and ,vaughan4 ,phaedo1 #if ff4  
,translation by ,jowett4  ,,berkeley3   
,alciphron1 the ,fourth ,dialogue4      
,siris1 especially #bcd-bfd4 7,on the   
failure of the scientist to grasp the   

deeper truth respecting causes and      
substances47  ,,descartes3 ,discourse on
 ,method4 ,translation by ,veitch4      
,,spinoza3 ,on the ,improvement of the  
,understanding4 ,translation by ,elwes4 
,,kant3 ,critique of ,pure              
,reason--,transcendental ,aesthetic and 
,transcendental ,analytic4 ,translation 
by ,max ,mueller4 7,studies of the      
,method of ,science47         99        
99       99       99       99  ,,ward1  
,,james3 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism4  
7,full but clear account of recent      
development of natural science1 and     
criticism of its use as philosophy47    
,,mach1 ,,ernst3 ,science of ,mechanics4
 7,historical and methodological47      
,,james1 ,,william3 ,principles of      
,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,chap4 xxviii4 
7,emphasizes the practical interest     
underlying science47  ,,royce1 ,,josiah3
 ,the ,world and the ,individual1       
,second ,series1 ,man and ,nature4      
7,interpretation of the province of     
natural science from the stand-point of 

absolute idealism47  ,,pearson1 ,,karl3 
,the ,grammar of ,science4 7,the limits 
of science from the scientific          
stand-point47  ,,clifford1 ,w4 ,k43     
,lectures and ,essays3 ,on the ,aims and
 ,instruments of ,scientific ,thought2  
,the ,philosophy of the ,pure ,sciences2
 ,on the ,ethics of ,belief4  ,,huxley1 
,t4 ,h43 ,method and ,results4 7,the    
positivistic position47  ,,muensterberg1
 ,,hugo3 ,psychology and ,life4         
7,epistemological limitations of natural
 science applied to psychology1 from    
idealistic stand-point47  ,,fullerton1  
,g4 ,e43 ,a ,system of ,metaphysics1    
,part ,,ii4  ,,taylor1 ,a4 ,e43         
,elements of ,metaphysics1 ,book ,,iii4 
,,chapters ,,vi ,,and ,,vii1 ,,the      
,,special ,,problems ,,of ,,philosophy4 
,,plato3 ,dialogues1 especially         
,protagoras and ,theaetetus4            
,translation by ,jowett4 7,the actual   
genesis of special problems47         99
       99       99       99       99    
,,kuelpe1 ,,oswald3 ,introduction to    

,philosophy4 ,translation by ,pillsbury 
and ,titchener4 7,full and accurate     
account of the traditional terms and    
doctrines of philosophy47  ,,hibben1 ,j4
 ,g43 ,problems of ,philosophy4 7,brief 
and elementary47  ,,sidgwick1 ,,henry3  
,philosophy1 its ,scope and ,relations4 
,,paulsen1 ,,friedrich3 ,introduction to
 ,philosophy4 ,translation by ,thilly4  
,,baldwin1 ,j4 ,m43 ,dictionary of      
,philosophy4 7,full1 and convenient for 
reference47  ,,ferrier1 ,j4 ,f43        
,lectures on ,greek ,philosophy4        
7,interpretation of the beginning and   
early development of philosophy47       
,,burnet1 ,j43 ,early ,greek            
,philosophy4 ,translation of the        
sources4  ,,fairbanks1 ,a43 ,the ,first 
,philosophers of ,greece4  ,,gomperz1   
,,th43 ,greek ,thinkers1 ,vol4 ,i4      
,translation by ,magnus4 7,on the first 
development of philosophical problems47 
,,palmer1 ,g4 ,h43 ,the ,field of       
,ethics4 7,on the relations of the      
ethical problem47  ,,puffer1 ,,ethel3   

,the ,psychology of ,beauty4 7,on the   
relations of the aesthetical problem47  
,,chapter ,,viii1 ,,naturalism4#dcf3;,a 
,,lucretius3 ,on the ,nature of ,things4
 ,translation by ,munro4 7,early        
materialism47  ,,hobbes3 ,metaphysical  
,system4 ,edited by ,calkins4           
,leviathan1 ,part ,i4 7,modern          
materialism47         99       99       
99       99       99  ,,buechner1       
,,louis3 ,force and ,matter4            
,translation by ,collingwood4           
7,nineteenth century materialism47      
,,janet1 ,,paul3 ,materialism of the    
,present ,day4 ,translation by ,masson4 
,,lange1 ,f4 ,a43 ,history of           
,materialism4 ,translation by ,thomas4  
,,haeckel1 ,,ernst3 ,the ,riddle of the 
,universe4 ,translation by ,mc,cabe4    
7,monism of ,energy47  ,,clifford1 ,w4  
,k43 ,lectures and ,essays3 ,the ,ethics
 of ,belief2 ,cosmic ,emotion2 ,body and
 ,mind4 7,positivism47  ,,huxley1 ,t4   
,h43 ,evolution and ,ethics2            
,prolegomena4 7,distinguishes between   

the moral and natural47 ,science and    
,hebrew ,tradition2 ,science and        
,christian ,tradition4 7,controversies  
of the naturalist with ,gladstone and   
,duke of ,argyle47  ,,spencer1          
,,herbert3 ,first ,principles4 7,the    
systematic evolutionary philosophy47    
,principles of ,ethics4 7,ethics of     
naturalism47 ,the ,nature and ,reality  
of ,religion4 7,controversy with        
,frederick ,harrison47  ,,balfour1 ,a4  
,j43 ,foundations of ,belief1 ,part ,i4 
7,on the religious1 moral1 and aesthetic
 consequences of naturalism47  ,,pater1 
,,walter3 ,marius the ,epicurean4       
7,refined hedonism47  ,,romanes1 ,g4    
,j43 ,thoughts on ,religion4            
7,approached from stand-point of        
science47  ,,bentham1 ,j43 ,introduction
 to the ,principles of ,morals and      
,legislation4 7,utilitarian47           
,,stephen1 ,l43 ,science of ,ethics4    
7,evolutionary and social47   ,,chapter 
,,ix1 ,,subjectivism4  ,,plato3         
,theaetetus4 ,translation by ,jowett4   

7,exposition and criticism of           
,protagoras47  ,,berkeley3 ,three       
,dialogues between ,hylas and           
,philonous2 ,principles of ,human       
,knowledge4  ,,hume3 ,an ,enquiry       
,concerning ,human ,understanding4      
,,schopenhauer3 ,the ,world as ,will and
 ,idea4 ,translation by ,haldane and    
,kemp4  ,,mill1 ,j4 ,s43 ,an            
,examination of ,sir ,william           
,hamilton's ,philosophy1 ,x-,,xiii4     
99       99       99       99       99  
,,clifford1 ,w4 ,k43 ,lectures and      
,essays3 ,on the ,nature of ,things in  
,themselves4 7,panpsychism47  ,,deussen1
 ,,paul3 ,elements of ,metaphysics4     
,translation by ,duff4 7,following      
,schopenhauer and ,oriental philosophy47
  ,,paulsen1 ,,fr43 ,introduction to    
,philosophy4 7,panpsychism47  ,,strong1 
,c4 ,a43 ,why the ,mind ,has a ,body4   
7,panpsychism47  ,,james1 ,,william3    
,reflex ,action and ,theism1 in ,the    
,will to ,believe4 7,morality and       
religion of individualism47   ,,chapter 

,x1 ,,absolute ,,realism4  ,,parmenides3
 ,fragments4 ,arrangement and           
translation by ,burnet or ,fairbanks4   
,,plato3 ,republic1 ,books ,,vi and     
,,vii4 ,translations by ,jowett and     
,vaughan4 ,symposium1 ,phaedrus1        
,phaedo1 ,philebus4 ,translation by     
,jowett4  ,,aristotle#dcg3;,a3          
,psychology4 ,translations by ,hammond  
and ,wallace4 ,ethics4 ,translation by  
,welldon4  ,,spinoza3 ,ethics1          
especially ,parts ,i and ,v4            
,translations by ,elwes and ,willis4    
,,leibniz3 ,monadology1 and ,selections4
 ,translation by ,latta4 ,discourse on  
,metaphysics4 ,translation by           
,montgomery4  ,,marcus ,,aurelius3      
,thoughts4 ,translation by ,long4       
,,epictetus3 ,discourses4 ,translation  
by ,long4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,,caird1 ,,edward3 ,the    
,evolution of ,theology in the ,greek   
,philosophers4 7,the central conceptions
 of ,plato and ,aristotle47  ,,joachim3 
,a ,study of the ,ethics of ,spinoza4   

,,chapter ,,xi1 ,,absolute ,,idealism4  
,,descartes3 ,meditations4 ,translation 
by ,veitch4  ,,kant3 ,critique of ,pure 
,reason4 ,translation by ,max ,mueller4 
,critique of ,practical ,reason4        
,translation by ,abbott1 in ,kant's     
,theory of ,ethics4  ,,fichte#dcg3;,a3  
,science of ,ethics4 ,translation by    
,kroeger4 ,popular ,works3 ,the ,nature 
of the ,scholar2 ,the ,vocation of ,man2
 ,the ,doctrine of ,religion4           
,translation by ,smith4  ,,schiller3    
,aesthetic ,letters1 ,essays1 and       
,philosophical ,letters4 ,translation by
 ,weiss4 7,romanticism47                
,,hegel#dcg3;,a3 ,ethics4 ,translation  
by ,sterrett4 ,logic4 ,translation1 with
 ,introduction1 by ,wallace4 ,philosophy
 of ,mind4 ,translation1 with           
,introduction1 by ,wallace4 ,philosophy 
of ,religion4 ,translation by ,spiers   
and ,sanderson4 ,philosophy of ,right4  
,translation by ,dyde4  ,,green1 ,t4    
,h43 ,prolegomena to ,ethics4           
,,emerson3 ,the ,conduct of             

,life--,fate4 ,essays1 ,first           
,series--,the ,over-,soul2 ,circles4    
,essays1 ,second ,series--,the ,poet2   
,experience2 ,nature4 7,the appreciation
 of life consistent with absolute       
idealism47  ,,wordsworth3 ,poems1       
passim4  ,,coleridge3 ,aids to          
,reflection4 ,the ,friend4  ,,royce1    
,j43 ,spirit of ,modern ,philosophy4    
7,sympathetic exposition of ,kant1      
,fichte1 ,romanticism1 and ,hegel47 ,the
 ,conception of ,god4 7,the             
epistemological argument47 ,the ,world  
and the ,individual1 ,first ,series4    
7,systematic development of absolute    
idealism2 its moral and religious       
aspects47  ,,caird1 ,,edward3 ,the      
,critical ,philosophy of ,kant4         
7,exposition and interpretation from    
stand-point of later idealism47         
,,everett1 ,c4 ,c43 ,fichte's ,science  
of ,knowledge4  ,,mctaggart1 ,j4 ,m4    
,e43 ,studies in ,hegelian ,dialectic4  
,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology4       
,,footnotes3  #dcd3;,a ,for further     

contemporary writings on this topic1 see
 foot-notes under ,sects4 #aii1 #bjj1   
#bjc4  #dcf3;,a ,for histories of       
philosophy1 see supplementary           
bibliography at end4  #dcg3;,a ,the     
,metaphysics of ,aristotle1 ,fichte1 and
 ,hegel must be found by the ,english   
reader mainly in the secondary sources4 
,,supplementary ,,bibliography ,,on     
,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4      
,i4--,,general4  ,,rogers3 ,student's   
,history of ,philosophy4 7,elementary   
and clear2 copious quotations47         
,,weber3 ,history of ,philosophy4       
,translation by ,thilly4 7,comprehensive
 and compact47  ,,windelband3 ,a        
,history of ,philosophy4 ,translation by
 ,tufts4 7,emphasis upon the problems   
and their development47  ,,erdmann3     
,history of ,philosophy4 ,translation   
edited by ,hough2 in three volumes4     
7,detailed and accurate exposition47    
,,ueberweg3 ,a ,history of ,philosophy4 
,translation by ,morris and ,porter1 in 
two volumes4 7,very complete2 excellent 

account of the literature47             
,,ii4--,,special ,,periods4  ,,ferrier3 
,lectures on ,greek ,philosophy4        
7,excellent introduction47  ,,marshall3 
,short ,history of ,greek ,philosophy4  
7,brief and clear47  ,,windelband3      
,history of ,ancient ,philosophy4       
,translation by ,cushman4 7,very        
accurate and scholarly2 also brief47    
,,zeller3 ,pre-,socratic ,philosophy4   
,translation by ,alleyne4 ,socrates and 
the ,socratic ,schools4 ,translation by 
,reichel4 7,full and accurate47         
,,gomperz3 ,greek ,thinkers4 ,translated
 by ,magnus1 in four volumes4 7,very    
full2 especially on ,plato4 ,goes no    
further than ,plato47  ,,burnet3 ,early 
,greek ,philosophy4 7,translations of   
fragments1 with commentary47            
,,fairbanks3 ,the ,first ,philosophers  
of ,greece4 7,translations of fragments1
 with commentary47  ,,turner3 ,history  
of ,philosophy4 7,excellent account of  
,scholastic philosophy47  ,,royce3 ,the 
,spirit of ,modern ,philosophy4 7,very  

illuminating introductory exposition of 
modern idealism47  ,,falckenberg3       
,history of ,modern ,philosophy4        
,,hoeffding3 ,history of ,modern        
,philosophy4 ,translation by ,meyer1 in 
two volumes4 7,full and good47          
,,index     ,,absolute1 the1 #cjg1 #cji1
 #ccb1 #cia1 #cib1 #djj1 #djd2          
being1 #cjh2     substance1 #cab2       
ideal1 #cbf2     spirit1 #cdi 7note71   
#ceh ff42     mind1 #cdi 7note71 #ceh1  
#chj1 #cbb ff4    ,,absolute ,,idealism1
 chap4 xi2     general meaning1 #agg1   
#cdi 7note71 #djj2     criticism of1    
#cdi1 #cfe1 #che1 #daa1 #daf2           
epistemology of1 #cfh ff42     as       
related to ,kant1 #chj2     direct      
argument for1 #chc2     ethics of1 #chf 
ff42     religion of1 #cij ff42     of  
present day1 #djb ff41 #daj4            
,,absolute ,,realism1 chap4 x2          
general meaning1 #cjf 7note71 #djj2     
epistemology of1 #cci2     ethics of1   
#cdb2     religion of1 #cdf2            
criticism of1 #cch1 #daf4    ,,abstract1

 the1 #aci4    ,,activity1 #bji1 #bhe1  
#bie4    ,,aesthetics1 #ahi4            
,,agnosticism1 #afh1 #beb ff4           
,,anaxagoras1 #bci2     quoted1 #afb4   
,,anaximander1 #bbd4    ,,anselm1       
,,saint1 #bjj4    ,,anthropomorphism1   
#aji4    ,,appreciation1 #be1 #djb4     
,,aristotle1 in formal logic1 #ahf2     
ethics of1 #aie1 #cde2     psychology   
of1 #bjh2     philosophy of1 #cjf1 #ccb 
ff42     and ,plato1 #ccc1 #ccf2     and
 ,spinoza1 #ccf2     epistemology of1   
#cci2     religion of1 #cdf1 #dbi2      
on evil1 #cec4    ,,atomism1 #aff1 #bbi4
     ,also see under ,,leucippus1 and   
,,democritus4    ,,attitude1 #fb4       
,,attribute1 in ,spinoza1 #cab ff4      
,,augustine1 ,,saint1     on communion  
with ,god1 #fh2     on pietism1 #aie2   
his conception of self1 #cgb4           
,,automatism1 #bdh4     ,,baal1 religion
 of1 #hh4    ,,bacon1 ,,francis1 on     
thought and action1 #dcj4    ,,balfour1 
,a4 ,j41 on materialism1 #bfd4          
,,beauty1 in aesthetics1 #ahi2     in   

,plato1 #cbg1 #ccb4    ,,being1 ,eleatic
 conception of1 #cjh ff4    ,,belief1   
key to definition of religion1 #eh2     
general characters applied to religion1 
#ei ff42     in persons and             
dispositions1 #fb2     examples of      
religions1 #ff ff42     object of       
religions1 #fe1 #hb1 #ig2     relation  
to logic1 #ahb1 #ahc4    ,,bentham1     
#bfb4    ,,berkeley1 on idealism1 #agf2 
relation to common-sense1 #bfg2     his 
refutation of material substance1 #bge  
ff42     epistemology of1 #bgg1 #bif1   
#cfi2     theory of mathematics1 #bgi2  
his spiritualism1 #bhj1 #bhd1 #bib2     
his conception of ,god1 #bhd1 #bic2     
ethics of1 #cjb2     religion of1 #cjd4 
,,buddhism1 #gh4     ,,cause1 in        
science1 #aca2     ,god as first1 #bjc2 
of motion1 #bca ff42     spirit as1 #bic
 ff4    ,,christianity1 persistence of1 
#gf2     essence of1 #hf2               
development from ,judaism1 #id2         
ethics of1 #aie1 #aih1 #chf2     idea of
 ,god in1 #bjj ff41 #bje2     emphasis  

on self-consciousness in1 #cgb4         
,,comte1 #aae4    ,,contemplation1 #dbh4
    ,,conversion1 #fi ff4    ,,corporeal
 ,,being1 #bbd2     processes of1 #bbe2 
,berkeley's critique of1 #bgh2          
historical conceptions of1 #bbi4        
,,cosmological ,,proof1 the1 of ,god1   
#bjc4    ,,cosmology1 general meaning   
of1 #aei2     mechanism in1 #afa1 #bbe2 
teleology in1 #afa4    ,,cosmos1 origin 
of1 #bdb4    ,,critical ,,method1 #cai  
ff4    ,,cynicism1 #bei4                
,,cyrenaicism1 #bei4     ,,dante1 as    
philosopher-poet1 #db ff42     general  
meaning of the ,divine ,comedy1 #dc2    
and ,thomas ,aquinas1 #dc1 #df2     his 
vision of the ways of ,god1 #df2     on 
contemplation1 #dbh4    ,,darwin1 #bjd4 
,,deism1 #bjg4    ,,democritus1 #bdg4   
,also see ,,atomism4    ,,descartes1 on 
function of philosophy1 #aed2           
dualism of1 #bgb1 #dab2     his theory  
of space and matter1 #bbi2              
automatism of1 #bdh2     epistemology   
of1 #cda1 #cge2     his conception of   

self1 #cgd4    ,,description1 as method 
of science1 #abh4    ,,dialectic1 in    
,plato1 #cbj2     in ,hegel1 #cfa4      
,,diogenes1 #bei4    ,,dogmatism1 #afg4 
,,dualism1 general meaning1 #afb2     of
 ,descartes1 #bgb1 #dab4    ,,duty1     
#aif1 #cef1 #cfj1 #chf4                 
,,eclecticism1 contemporary1 #cih ff41  
#dac4    ,,eleatics4     ,see under     
,,parmenides1 and ,,zeno4    ,,emerson1 
on spirit1 #cei2     on nature1 #cfd2   
on absolute1 #cib2     on necessity1    
#cic2     on faith1 #dbd4               
,,empiricism1 general meaning1 #afh2    
in logic1 #ahg2     in naturalism1 #beb 
ff42     of ,locke1 #bgd2     of        
,berkeley1 #bgd ff4    ,,energy1        
development of1 conception of1 #bcf ff4 
,,epistemology1 relation to metaphysics1
 #aej2     definition of1 #afd2         
fundamental problems of1 #afh1 #agb2    
argument for ,god from1 #bjb2     of    
naturalism1 #bdh1 #beb ff41 #beg2     of
 ,descartes1 #bgc1 #cda1 #cge2     of   
,berkeley1 #bgg1 #bif2     of absolute  

realism1 #cci1 #cea2     of ,leibniz1   
#cdj1 #cda2     of ,plato1 #cdj1 #cda2  
of ,hume1 #cgf2     of ,aristotle1 #cdj1
 #cda2     of absolute idealism1 #cea1  
#cfh ff42     of present day1 #djh ff4  
,,eternal1 the1 #cji4    ,,ether1 #bcj4 
,,ethics1 relation to metaphysics1 #aea1
 #aif ff41 #cfj2     its origin in      
,socratic method1 #aha2     definition  
of1 #aia2     special problems and      
theories in1 #aia ff42     of ,socrates1
 #aib1 #aid2     of ,aristotle1 #aie1   
#cde2     of naturalism1 #beh ff42      
of subjectivism1 #bih ff42     of       
,schopenhauer1 #bii2     argument for   
,god from1 #bjc2     individualism in1  
#cja2     pluralism in1 #cjb1 #dba2     
of ,stoics and ,spinoza1 #cdb2          
,platonic1 #cdb2     of ,kant1 #chf2    
of absolute idealism1 #chh4             
,,eudaemonism1 #aie4    ,,evil1         
,,problem ,,of1 #cag1 #ccf1 #cci1 #ceb1 
#cfe ff42     in ,greek philosophy1     
#ceb2     in absolute idealism1 #cfg1   
#dah4    ,,evolution1 of cosmos1 #bdb   

ff42     of morality1 #bfb4             
,,experience1 #daj1 #daa1 #dab2         
analysis of1 by ,kant1 #ced4            
,,faith1 #dbd2     special interests of1
 #aii4     ,see also ,,religion and     
,,belief4    ,,ferguson1 ,,chas41       
quoted1 #bfe4    ,,fichte1 #cfj1 #djb4  
,,fielding1 ,h41 quoted on religion1    
#ei1 #gd4    ,,force1 development of    
conception of1 #bca ff4    ,,form1 in   
,aristotle1 #ccd4    ,,freedom1 in      
ethics1 #aif1 #chh2     meanings and    
theories1 #baa4     ,,god1 as guarantee 
of ideals1 #ah1 #dbe2     personality   
of1 #fb1 #ajh ff42     ,st4 ,augustine's
 communion with1 #fh2     presence of1  
#fh2     as a disposition from which    
consequences may be expected1 #he2      
meaning of1 in religion1 #hg2     idea  
of1 in ,judaism and ,christianity1 #ib2 
why historical1 #ajb2     social        
relation with1 #ajc2     the ontological
 proof of1 #bjj2     ethical and        
epistemological arguments for1 #bjb2    
cosmological proof of1 #bjc2            

teleological proof of1 #bjd2            
relation to the world1 in theism1       
pantheism and deism1 #bje ff42     will 
of1 #bab2     conception of1 in         
,berkeley1 #bhd1 #bic ff42              
conception and proof of1 in ,spinoza1   
#cab ff41 #cib1 #cic2     conception of1
 in ,plato1 #cca1 #ceb1 #cia1 #cic2     
conception of1 in ,leibniz1 #cch1 #cec4 
,also see ,,absolute4    ,,goethe1 on   
,spinoza1 and on philosophy1 #ea2     on
 pragmatism1 #djg4    ,,good1 the1      
theories of1 in ethics1 #aia ff42       
and the real1 #cbf ff41 #dba ff4        
,,greek1 religion1 in ,homer and        
,lucretius1 #hi2     ideals1 #aie1 #aih1
 #dbi4    ,,green1 ,t4 ,h41 quoted1     
#cfi1 #che 7note74     ,,haeckel1       
quoted1 #bcf1 #bff4    ,,hedonism1 #aib4
    ,,hegel1 on science1 #abi2          
philosophy of1 #aej1 #cfa ff42          
relation to ,kant1 #cha2     on the     
absolute1 #chb2     ethics of1 #cij4    
,,heraclitus1 #cjh4    ,,history1       
philosophy of1 in ,hegel1 #cfc4         

,,hobbes1 his misconception of relations
 of philosophy and science1 #aae2       
quoted on ethics1 #bfa4    ,holbach1    
#bea1 #beb4    ,,homer1 on ,greek       
religion1 #ij4    ,,humanism1 #cbj1     
#djd1 #dje4    ,,hume1 positivism of1   
#aae1 #cgg2     phenomenalism of1 #bhc2 
and ,descartes1 #cgf4    ,,huxley1      
quoted1 #bee1 #bff4    ,,hylozoism1     
#bbe4     ,,ideal1 the1 in ,plato1 #cbf2
     validity of1 #daf4    ,,idealism1  
various meanings of term1 #agc 7note72  
meaning of1 as theory of knowledge1 #age
 ff41 #dji2     of present day1 #dji    
ff42     empirical1 see ,,subjectivism1 
,,phenomenalism1 ,,spiritualism2        
absolute1 see ,,absolute ,,idealism4    
,,ideals1 in life1 #aj ff42     adoption
 of1 #ag ff4    ,,ideas1 the1 in ,plato1
 #cbi4    ,,imagination1 in poetry1 #ii2
     place of1 in religion1 #hj1 #ig    
ff42     special functions of1 in       
religion1 #aja ff42     scope of1 in    
religion1 #aje ff42     and the         
personality of ,god1 #aaj4    ,,imitatio

 ,,christi1 quoted1 #fh4    ,,immanence 
,,theory1 #dab1 #dac4    ,,immortality1 
#bab4    ,,individualism1 #cja1 #cbj1   
#cch1 #djd4    ,,intuitionism1 in       
ethics1 #aif4     ,,james1 ,,william1   
quoted on religion1 #fe1 #ga1 #cje4     
,,judaism1 development of1 #ib2     and 
,christianity1 #id4     ,,kant1 his     
transcendentalism1 #agg1 #cef2     his  
critique of knowledge1 #ced ff41 #cgg   
ff42     and absolute idealism1 #chj2   
ethics of1 #chf4    ,,kepler1 quoted1   
#abi4    ,,knowledge1 of the means in   
life1 #h2     of the end1 #aj2     in   
poetry1 #bg ff42     in religion1 #hb1  
#he1 #ig1 #aje2     general theory of1  
on epistemology1 #afd ff42     problem  
of source and criterion of1 #afh ff42   
problem of relation to its object1 #agb 
ff41 #bgg1 #cdj1 #cea1 #cfh ff42        
relation of logic to1 #ahc ff42         
account of1 in naturalism1 #bec ff4     
,also see ,,epistemology4     ,,la      
,,mettrie1 quoted1 #bej4    ,,la        
,,place1 #bdb2 quoted1 #bda4            

,,leibniz1 on function of philosophy1   
#aee2     philosophy of1 #ccc1 #ccf ff42
     epistemology of1 #cci4             
,,leucippus1 quoted1 #afa4    ,,life1 as
 a starting-point for thought1 #c2      
definition of1 #e ff42     and          
self-consciousness1 #f2     philosophy  
of #ag ff41 #aec2     mechanical theory 
of1 #bdd ff42     return of philosophy  
to1 #dbg ff42     contemplation in1     
#dbh4    ,,locke1 epistemology of1 #bgc4
    ,,logic1 origin in ,socratic method1
 #aha2     affiliations of1 #ahb1 #ahh2 
definition of1 #ahc2     parts of       
formal1 #ahd ff42     present tendencies
 in1 #ahg ff42     algebra of1 #ahi4    
,,lucretius1 his criticism of ,greek    
religion1 quoted1 #hi ff42     on       
mechanism1 #bbf1 #bdj4     ,,mctaggart1 
,j4 ,m4 ,e41 on ,hegel1 #cfg2     on the
 absolute1 #cia4    ,,mach1 ,e41 #bhc2  
on philosophy and science1 #abj4        
,,malebranche1 #cgf4    ,,marcus        
,,aurelius1 #cdh4    ,,materialism1     
#bed1 #bef2     general meaning1 #bbc1  

#dad2     development1 #bbd ff42     and
 science1 #bbh2     ,french1 #bdi2      
theory of mind in1 #bej4                
,,mathematics1 importance in science1   
#acb2     logic in1 #ahh2               
,berkeley's conception of1 #bgi2        
,plato's conception of1 #cbi1 #cce2     
,spinoza's conception of1 #caa1 #cce4   
,,matter1 #bbe1 #bbh2     and space1    
#bbi2     ,berkeley's refutation of1    
#bge ff42     in ,plato and ,aristotle1 
#ccd4    ,,mechanical ,,theory1         
practical significance of its extension 
to the       world at large1 #bj2     in
 cosmology1 #afa1 #bbe2     of          
,descartes1 #bca2     of ,newton #bcb2  
of origin of cosmos1 #bdb2     of life1 
#bdd2     in ,spinoza1 #ccf4            
,,metaphysics1 relation to epistemology1
 #aej2     relation to ethics1 #aea1    
#aif ff42     definition of1 #aeh2      
relation to logic1 #ahh2     relation to
 theology1 #bjg2     present tendencies 
in1 #cii ff41 #djh4    ,,mill1 ,j4 ,s41 
#bhc 7note74    ,,mind1 explanation of  

in naturalism1 #bcg1 #bdg ff42     of   
,god1 in ,berkeley1 #bhd1 #bid1 #bif2   
absolute1 #cdi 7note71 #ceh1 #chb ff4   
,also see under ,,self1 and ,,soul4     
,,mode1 in ,spinoza1 #cac4    ,,monads1 
in ,leibniz1 #cch4    ,,monism1 #aei1   
#afc4    ,,morality1 and religion1 #gc2 
grounds of1 according to ,kant1 #cef2   
incentive to1 #dbb4    ,,mysticism1     
general account1 #aga2                  
,schopenhauer's1 #bij2     types of     
religions1 #cia4     ,,naegeli1 ,c4 v41 
quoted1 #bhg4    ,,natural ,,science1   
true relations of1 with philosophy1     
#aaf2     sphere of1 with reference to  
philosophy1 #aag ff42     philosophy of1
 its procedure1 #aba1 #ace1 #adb1 #aed1 
#dja2     origin of1 as special         
interest1 #abc ff42     human value of1 
#abf1 #abg1 #adc2     method and        
fundamental conceptions of1 #djf1 #abh  
ff42     general development of1 #acd2  
limits of1 because abstract1 #acf ff41  
#dad2     validity of1 #adb2     logic  
and1 #ahh2     development of           

conceptions in1 #bbi ff42     grounds   
of1 according to ,kant1 #cee1 #cgg2     
,hume on1 #cgg2     permanence and      
progress in1 #cie ff4    ,,natural      
,,selection1 #bjd1 #bde4                
,,naturalism1 chap4 viii2     general   
meaning1 #bag1 #bbc 7note71 #cii2       
claims of1 #bci2     task of1 #bda2     
criticism of1 #aag1 #beg1 #bfc2     of  
present day1 #dje1 #dab4     ,also see  
under ,,materialism1 and ,,positivism4  
,,nature1 #afj1 #bdd1 #ccg2     in      
,berkeley1 #bid2     in ,spinoza1 #cag1 
#cch2     in ,hegel1 #cfc2     in ,kant1
 #cgg ff42     in contemporary          
philosophy1 #dja4     ,also see         
,,natural ,,science1 and ,,naturalism4  
,,nebular ,,hypothesis1 #bdb4           
,,necessity1 of will1 #baa2     ethics  
of1 #cdb2     religion of1 #cic4        
,,neo-,,fichteans1 #djb1 #djc 7note74   
,,neo-,,kantians1 #djc4    ,,newton1    
#bcb1 #bce1 #bdb1 #cee1 #cgg4           
,,normative ,,sciences1 the1 #ahj4      
,,omar ,,khayyam1 quoted1 #af2     as a 

philosopher-poet1 #cf4    ,,ontological 
,,proof1 of ,god1 #bjj4    ,,ontology1  
#aei4    ,,optimism1 #ajd1 #chh1 #dbb1  
#dbd4     ,,panpsychism1 #agf1 #bch1    
#bhe ff4    ,,pantheism1 in primitive   
religion1 #gh2     general meaning1     
#bje2     types of1 #cij4    ,,parker1  
,,theodore1 quoted on religion1 #fg4    
,,parmenides1 and rationalism1 #afh2    
philosophy of1 #cjh ff41 #ccg2     and  
,aristotle1 #ccf4    ,,pater1 ,,walter1 
on ,wordsworth1 #ch2     on             
,cyrenaicism1 #bfj2     on subjectivism1
 #bgj4    ,,paulsen1 ,,friedrich1 ethics
 of1 quoted1 #cjb4    ,,pearson1 ,,karl1
 quoted1 #bcj4    ,,perception4 ,see    
,,sense-,,perception4    ,,personal     
,,idealism1 #djd1 #dje4                 
,,personality1 of ,god1 important in    
understanding of religion1 #fb2         
essential to religion8 #ajh ff4         
,,persons1 description of belief in1    
#fb2     imagination of1 #aja1 #aaj4    
,,pessimism1 #ajd1 #bii1 #dbd4          
,,phenomenalism1 general meaning1 #agf1 

#bfg 7note72     of ,berkeley1 #bgb1    
#bge ff42     of ,hume1 #bhc2           
various tendencies in1 #bha4            
,,philosopher1 the practical man and    
the1 chap4 i2     the role of the1 #cjf1
 #dbf4    ,,philosophy1 commonly        
misconceived1 #c2     of the devotee1   
#ac2     of the man of affairs1 #ad2    
of the voluptuary1 #af2     of life1 its
 general meaning1 #ag ff41 #aec2     its
 relations with poetry1 chap4 ii1 #aab2 
lack of1 in ,shakespeare1 #cc2     as   
expression of personality1 #cc2     as  
premature1 #cc2     in poetry of ,omar  
,khayyam1 #cf2     in poetry of         
,wordsworth1 #ch ff42     in poetry of  
,dante1 #db ff42     difference between 
philosophy and poetry1 #dh ff42     in  
religion1 #ajh ff42     compared with   
religion1 #aab2     true attitude of1   
toward science1 #aaf2     sphere of1 in 
relation to science1 #aag1 #cie ff42    
procedure of1 with reference to science1
 #aba1 #ace1 #adb1 #aed1 #afj2     human
 value of1 #adc1 #dbf ff42     can its  

problem be divided8 #adi1 #aee2         
origin of1 #aeg2     special problems   
of1 chap4 vi1 vii2     and psychology1  
#baf2     peculiar object of1 #cjh2     
self-criticism in1 #cai ff41 #cbe2      
permanence and progress in1 #cie ff42   
contemporary1 #cih ff4    ,,physical4   
,see ,,corporeal ,,being1 ,,materialism1
 etc4    ,,physiology1 #bdf4    ,,piety1
 description and interpretation of1 #gb2
     in ethics1 #aie4    ,,plato1 on    
,protagoras1 #afg1 #bfi1 #bgj1 #bih2    
quoted1 on ,socrates1 #agj1 #aib1 #aid2 
historical preparation for1 #cbd2       
psychology of1 #bji2     philosophy of1 
#cjf1 #cah1 #cbf ff41 #chb2     and     
,aristotle1 #ccc2     and ,spinoza1     
#cah1 #cce2     epistemology of1 #cci2  
ethics of1 #cdb2     religion of1 #cdf1 
#cia1 #cic2     on evil1 #ceb2     on   
spirit1 #cei2     on reason and         
perception1 #cgj2     on the            
philosopher1 #dbf4    ,,pluralism1      
general meaning of1 #aei1 #afc1 #dai2   
in ethics1 #cjb1 #dba ff42     in       

religion1 #cjd4    ,,poetry1 relations  
with philosophy1 chap4 ii2     as       
appreciation1 #be2     virtue of        
sincerity in1 #bg2     the barbarian in1
 #bh2     constructive knowledge in1    
#cj2     difference between philosophy  
and1 #dh ff4    ,,positivism1 on        
relation of philosophy and science1     
#aae1 #abb2     general meaning of1     
#afh1 #bcd1 #beb ff41 #dab4             
,,practical ,,knowledge1 of means1 #h   
ff42     of end or purpose1 #aj ff42    
implied in religion1 #he1 #ig2          
philosophy as1 #aec4    ,,practical     
,,man1 the1 and the philosopher1 chap4  
i2     his failure to understand        
philosophy1 #c2     his ideal1 #ad2     
virtually a philosopher1 #bb4           
,,pragmatism1 #aea1 #djg1 #djh4         
,,prayer1 #ajc4    ,,prediction1 in     
science1 #acj4    ,,present ,,day1      
philosophy of the1 #cih ff4             
,,protagoras1 scepticism of1 #aff1 #bga2
     subjectivism of1 #bfi2     ethics  
of1 #bih4    ,,psychology1 of religion1 

#eh1 #hb2     inadequate to religion1   
#hb2     as branch of philosophy1 #bjh  
ff41 #baf2     as natural science1 #bac2
     affiliations of1 #bae2     limits  
of1 #dae4    ,,psycho-,,physical        
,,parallelism1 #bae1 #beb4    ,,purpose1
 in life1 #aj ff42     adoption of      
life-purpose1 #ag ff42     practical    
significance of1 in the world at large1 
#bj4     ,also see ,,teleology1 ,,ideal1
 etc4     ,,qualities1 primary and      
secondary1 #bed1 #bgd1 #bgg4            
,,rationalism1 general meaning1 #afh1   
#daf2     in logic1 #ahj1 #ahd2     in  
ethics1 #aic2     of eleatics1 #caj2    
of ,spinoza1 #caa2     in absolute      
realism1 #cci2     criticism of1 #dah4  
,,realism1 various meanings of term1    
#agc 7note72     meaning of1 as theory  
of knowledge1 #agb2     of ,parmenides1 
#cjh ff42     of ,plato and ,aristotle1 
#cda2     of present day1 #dji ff4      
,,reason1 #cgj4     ,see ,,rationalism4 
,,relativism1 #aff1 #bfg ff42     in    
ethics1 #bih4    ,,religion1 chaps4 iii1

 iv2     relation to poetry and         
philosophy1 #di1 #eb2     difficulty of 
defining1 #ec2     possibility of       
defining1 #ed2     profitableness of    
defining1 #ed2     true method of       
defining1 #ef2     misconceptions of1   
#ef2     as possessing the psychological
 character of belief1 #ei ff42          
degree of1 in individuals and moods1    
#fj1 #fa2     definition of1 as belief  
in disposition of universe1 #fd ff41    
#hb2     and morality1 #gc2             
symbolism in1 #ge2     prophet and      
preacher of1 #ge2     conveyance of1    
#gf2     primitive1 #gg2     ,buddhism1 
#gh2     the critical or enlightened    
type of1 #hj2     means to be true1 #hb 
ff42     implies a practical truth1 #he2
     cases of truth and error in1 #hh   
ff42     of ,baal1 #hh2     ,greek1 #hi2
     of ,jews1 its development1 #ib2    
,christian1 #id2     definition of      
cognitive factor in1 #ig2     place of  
imagination in1 #hj1 #ig ff42           
special functions of imagination in1    

#aja ff42     relation of imagination   
and truth in1 #aje2     philosophy      
implied in1 #ajh ff42     is personal   
god essential to1 #ajh2     compared    
with philosophy1 #aab2     compared with
 science1 #ade2     special             
philosophical problems of1 #aii ff42    
of naturalism1 #bfc ff42     of         
subjectivism and spiritualism1 #cjb ff42
     of ,plato and ,aristotle1 #cdf1    
#cic2     of ,stoics and ,spinoza1 #cdh1
 #cic2     philosophy of1 in ,hegel1    
#cfe2     of absolute idealism1 #cij ff4
    ,,religious ,,phenomena1            
interpretation of1 #fi ff4              
,,representative ,,theory1 of knowledge1
 #agd1 #dab4    ,,romanticism1 #cfa4    
,,rousseau1 quoted on nature1 #fd4      
,,royce1 ,,josiah1 quoted on absolute   
idealism1 #agh1 #chd1 #cid4             
,,santayana1 ,,george1 quoted on poetry 
#bh1 #bi4    ,,scepticism1 #aff1 #bfg   
ff4     ,see under ,,positivism1 and    
,,agnosticism4    ,,schelling1          
misconception of science1 #aaf4         

,,scholasticism1 #ccc2     idea of ,god 
in1 #bja4    ,,schopenhauer1 his        
panpsychism or voluntarism1 #agg1 #bhe  
ff42     universalizes subjectivism1    
#bij2     mysticism of1 #bij2     ethics
 of1 #bii2     religion of1 #cjc4       
,,science4     ,also see under ,,natural
 ,,science1 and ,,normative ,,science4  
,,secularism1 of ,shakespeare1 #cd2     
of ,periclean ,age1 #cbj2     of present
 age1 #dbg4    ,,self1 problem of1 #baf2
     proof of1 in ,st4 ,augustine1 #cgb2
     proof of1 in ,descartes1 #cgd2     
deeper moral of1 #chg2     in           
contemporary philosophy1 #daa1 #dac4    
,also see ,,soul1 and ,,mind4           
,,self-,,consciousness1 essential to    
human life1 #f2     development of      
conception of1 #cga ff42     in absolute
 idealism1 #chc2     in idealistic      
ethics1 #chf4    ,,sensationalism1 #bdg1
 #bee1 #bfi4    ,,sense-,,perception1   
#afh1 #bdg1 #bfi1 #cgj2     being as1 in
 ,berkeley1 #bha4    ,,shakespeare1     
general criticism of1 #cj ff42     his  

universality1 #ca2     lack of          
philosophy in1 #cc4    ,,shelley1 quoted
 on poetry1 #ej4    ,,social            
,,relations1 belief inspired by1        
analogue of religion1 #fb2              
imagination of1 extended to ,god1 #aja4 
,,socrates1 rationalism of1 #afi2       
and normative science1 #ahj2     ethics 
of1 #aib1 #aid2     method of1 #cba ff4 
,,sophists1 the1 epistemology of1 #afe2 
scepticism of1 #bga1 #cbj2     ethics   
of1 #bih1 #cja2     age of1 #cbj4       
,,soul1 the1 in ,aristotle1 #bjh2     in
 ,plato1 #bji2     as substance1 #bji2  
intellectualism and voluntarism in      
theory of1 #baj2     immortality of1    
#bab2     ,berkeley's theory of1 #bhd4  
,also see under ,,mind1 and ,,self4     
,,space1 importance in science1 #acj2   
and matter1 #bbi4    ,,spencer1 #bcf    
7note71 #bdc1 #bfe4    ,,spinoza1 and   
,goethe1 #ea2     quoted on philosophy  
and life1 #aec2     philosophy of1 #cjf1
 #caa ff42     criticism and estimate   
of1 #cae ff42     and ,plato1 #cah1     

#cce2     and ,aristotle1 #ccf2         
epistemology of1 #cci2     ethics of1   
#cdb2     religion of1 #cdh1 #cib1 #cic4
    ,,spirit1 the absolute1 #ceh ff4    
,,spiritualism1 general meaning1 #agf1  
#bfg 7note72     in ,berkeley1 #bhj1    
#bib2     in ,schopenhauer1 #bhe2       
criticism of1 #bhh2     objective1 #bib4
    ,,stevenson1 ,r4 ,l41 quoted on     
religion1 #fg4    ,,stoicism1 ethics of1
 #cdb2     religion of1 #cdh4           
,,subjectivism1 chap4 ix2     general   
meaning1 #age1 #bah1 #bfg 7note71 #dae2 
in aesthetics1 #aij2     of ,berkeley1  
#bge ff42     universalization of1 in   
,schopenhauer1 #bij2     criticism of1  
#big1 #dae2     ethics of1 #bih ff42    
in absolute idealism1 #cfh2     of      
present day1 #dji4    ,,substance1      
spiritual1 #bji1 #bhd2     material1    
,berkeley's refutation of1 #bge ff42    
,spinoza's conception of1 #caa2     the 
infinite1 in ,spinoza1 #cab2            
,aristotle's conception of1 #ccd2       
,leibniz's conception of1 #cch4         

,,symbolism1 in religion1 #ge4          
,,teleology1 in cosmology1 #afa2        
proof of ,god from1 #bjd2     ,spinoza  
on1 #cah2     in ,plato1 #cbf ff41 #ccf2
     in ,aristotle1 #ccf4    ,,theism1  
#bje4    ,,theology1 relation to        
religion1 #ih2     in philosophy1 #aii  
ff42     relation to metaphysics1 #bjg4 
,,thomson1 ,j41 quoted1 #ajd4           
,,thought1 and life1 #f ff42     as     
being1 in ,hegel1 #cfa ff4              
,,thucydides1 on thought and action1    
#dbi4    ,,time1 importance in science1 
#acj4    ,,transcendentalism1 #agg1 #cdi
 7note71 #cef4     ,see ,,idealism1     
absolute4    ,,tyndall1 #aae4           
,,universal1 scientific knowledge as1   
#abe1 #aci4    ,,universe1 the1 as      
object of religious reaction1 #fd2      
common object of philosophy and         
religion1 #aab2     as collective1 #dai4
    ,,utilitarianism1 #bfa4             
,,virtue1 #aih1 #cde4    ,,voltaire1    
quoted1 #bca1 #bea4    ,,voluntarism1 in
 psychology1 #baj2     in ,schopenhauer1

 #bhe4     ,,whitman1 ,,walt1 #bg ff4   
,,will1 in psychology1 #baj2     freedom
 and determination of1 #baa2     in     
,schopenhauer1 #agg2     as cause1 in   
,berkeley1 #bic ff42     in pragmatism1 
#djg4    ,,wordsworth1 as               
philosopher-poet1 #ch ff42     his sense
 for the universal1 #dj2     quoted on  
poetry and philosophy1 #dh1 #ej4        
,,zeno1 #ccg4     ,,transcriber',s      
,,notes3   ,ellipses match the original4
  ,numbers in braces are subscripted in 
the original4  ,the symbol for section  
has been replaced by ,sect4  ,variations
 in spelling have been left as in the   
original4  ,the word ,phoenix uses an oe
 ligature in the original4  ,the        
following corrections have been made to 
the text3       ,page xv3 ,,chapter     
,,vi4 ,,metaphysics ,,and               
,,epistemologyoriginal has              
,,epistomology       ,page #gj3 ,the    
psychologyoriginal has pyschology of    
conversion       ,page #ic3 him who     
practicesoriginal has practises the     

social      virtues       ,page #afe3   
reality have resulted in no             
consensusoriginal has      concensus of 
opinion       ,page #aif3 but in a law  
to which itoriginal has its owes        
obedience       ,page #bfa3 'justice1'  
'gratitude1' 'quotation mark missing in 
originalmodesty1'       ,page #bhc3     
retained after their originaloriginal   
has orignal      meaning       ,page    
#bhh3 nothing but the highest           
developmentoriginal has      devolpment 
on our earth       ,page #cbe3          
philosopher who defined being asoriginal
 has a the      ideal       ,page #dje3 
,henri ,bergson3 ,essaioriginal has     
,essoi sur les      donnees immediates  
de la conscience       ,page #dcd3      
,,thomas ,aoriginal has acute accent    
which should be      grave accent       
,,kempis3 ,imitation of ,christ4        
,page #dcf3 ,,huxley1 ,t4 ,h43          
,evolution and ,ethics2                 
,prolegomena4original has ,prologomena  
#ea3aa ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #fj4period is       

missing in original       #aii3ad       
religion in these matters1 cf4original  
has ,cf4      ,descartes3       #bhg3af 
,translation by ,haldane and            
,kemporiginal has ,komp