,,the ,,american ,,type ,,of ,,isthmian ,,canal ,,hon4 ,,john ,,fairfield ,,dryden ,illustration3 ,,the ,,john ,f4 ,,dryden ,,statue ,the above is a picture of the bronze statue of the late ,united ,states ,senator ,john ,f4 ,dryden1 ,founder of ,the ,prudential and ,pioneer of ,industrial insurance in ,america1 erected by the ,john ,f4 ,dryden ,memorial ,association1 with this inscription3 ,a tribute of esteem and affection from the field and office force4 ,the statue is located at the ,home ,office of ,the ,prudential1 ,newark1 ,n4,j41 and is unique1 being the gift of a staff of over #af1jjj employees4 ,it cost #ae1jjj4 ,the sculptor was ,karl ,bitter4 ,no4 #h ,,panama-,,pacific ,,exposition ,,memorial ,,publications ,,of ,,the ,,prudential ,,insurance ,,company ,,of ,,america ,,the ,,american ,,type ,,of ,,isthmian ,,canal ,,speech ,,by ,,hon4 ,,john ,,fairfield ,,dryden ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,,june #ad1 #aijf #aiae ,,prudential ,,press1 ,,newark1 ,,new ,,jersey ,the ancient ,dream of ,navigators has at last been realized in the completion and successful operation of the ,,panama ,,canal1 fittingly commemorated by the ,panama-,pacific ,international ,exposition4 ,among the men who contributed in a measurable degree to the attainment of this national ideal was the late ,united ,states ,senator1 ,,john ,f4 ,,dryden1 ,president of ,,the ,,prudential4 ,as a member of the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,canals1 ,mr4 ,dryden1 after mature and extended consideration1 gave the weight of his influence and vote in favor of the lock-level principle of canal construction4 ,the lock-level type was finally decided upon1 although the majority of ,mr4 ,dryden's conferees and the ,international ,board of ,consulting ,engineers at first strongly favored the sea-level type4 ,by his determined support of the one and his well-reasoned opposition to the other1 ,mr4 ,dryden was able to secure the enactment of legislation in accordance with his views and to bring about the completion of this tremendous undertaking within our time1 thus leaving a permanent imprint upon the country's history4 ,,the ,,american ,,type ,,of ,,isthmian ,,canal ,it was on ,june #ad1 #aijf1 when the ,canal subject was up for final consideration1 that ,mr4 ,dryden addressed the ,senate4 ,the official records show that ,s4 #faia1 to provide for the construction of a sea-level canal connecting the waters of the ,atlantic and ,pacific oceans1 and the method of construction1 was before ,congress1 and it was in opposition to this measure that ,mr4 ,dryden patriotically pledged his devotion to ,american enterprise and ,american ability by declaring for the lock-level type of canal1 built by ,american engineers and under ,american supervision1 concluding with the following words1 which deserve to be recalled on this memorable occasion as a tribute to the native genius and enterprise of the ,american people3 ,i am entirely convinced that the judgment and experience of ,american engineers in favor of a lock canal may be relied upon with entire confidence and that such an enterprise will be brought to a successful termination4 ,i believe that in a national undertaking of this kind1 fraught with the gravest possible political and commercial consequences1 only the judgment of our own people should govern1 for the protection of our own interests1 which are primarily at stake4 ,i also prefer to accept the view and convictions of the members of the ,isthmian ,commission1 and of its chief engineer1 a man of extraordinary ability and large experience4 ,it is a subject upon which opinions will differ and upon which honest convictions may be widely at variance1 but in a question of such surpassing importance to the nation1 ,i1 for one1 shall side with those who take the ,american point of view1 place their reliance upon ,american experience1 and show their faith in ,american engineers4 ,the ,panama ,canal problem has reached a stage where a decision should be made to fix permanently the type of the waterway1 whether it shall be a sea-level or a lock canal4 ,an immense amount of evidence on the subject has in the past and during recent years been presented to ,congress4 ,an overwhelming amount of expert opinion has been collected1 and an ,international ,board of ,consulting ,engineers has made a final report to the ,president1 in which experts of the highest standing divide upon the question4 ,the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,canals has likewise divided4 ,it is an issue of transcendent importance1 involving the expenditure of an enormous sum of money1 and political and commercial consequences of the greatest magnitude1 not only to the ,american people1 but to the world at large4 ,the report of the ,international ,board has been printed and placed before ,congress4 ,a critical discussion of the facts and opinion presented by this ,board1 all more or less of a technical and involved nature1 would unduly impose upon the time of the ,senate at this late day of the session4 ,in addition1 there is the testimony of witnesses called before the ,senate committee1 which has also been printed in three large volumes1 exceeding #c1jjj pages of printed matter4 ,to properly separate the evidence for and against one type of canal or the other1 to argue upon the facts1 which present the greatest conflict of engineering opinion of modern times1 would be a mere waste of effort and time1 since the evidence and opinions are as far apart and as irreconcilable as the final conclusions themselves4 ,it is1 therefore1 rather a question which the practical experience and judgment of members of ,congress must decide1 and ,i have entire confidence that the will of the nation1 as expressed in its final mandate1 will be carried into successful execution1 whether that mandate be for lock canal or sea-level waterway4 ,the ,panama ,canal presents at once the most interesting and the most stupendous project of mankind to overcome by human ingenuity what ,nature herself seems to have attempted1 but in vain4 ,from the time when the first ,spanish navigators extended their explorations into every bay and inlet of the ,central ,american isthmus1 to discover1 if possible1 a short route to the ,indies1 or from ,cadiz to ,cathay1 the human mind has not been willing to rest content and accept as insurmountable the natural obstacles on the ,isthmus which prevent uninterrupted communication between the ,atlantic and the ,pacific4 ,excepting1 possibly1 ,arctic explorations1 in all the romantic history of ancient and modern commerce1 in all the annals of the early navigators and explorers1 there is no chapter that equals in interest the never-ceasing efforts to make the ,central ,american isthmus a natural highway for the world's commerce--a direct route of trade and transportation from the uttermost ,east to the uttermost ,west4 ,as early as #aecf ,charles ,v ordered an exploration of the ,chagres ,river to learn whether a ship canal could not be substituted for an existing wagon road1 and ,philip ,,ii1 in #aefa1 had a similar survey made in ,nicaragua for the same purpose4 ,from that day to this the greatest minds in commerce and engineering have given their attention to the problem of an interoceanic waterway2 every conceivable plan has been considered1 every possible road has been explored1 and every mile of land and sea has been gone over to find the best and most practical solution of the problem4 ,the history of these early attempts is most interesting1 but it is no longer of practical value1 for it has no direct bearing upon present-day problems4 ,most of the efforts were wasted1 and many of them were ill advised1 but the present can profitably consider the more important lessons of the past4 ,it was written in the book of fate that this enterprise1 the most important in the world of commerce and navigation1 should be ,american in its ending as it had been in its practical beginning4 ,from the day when the first train of cars crossed the ,isthmus from ,panama to ,aspinwall1 to facilitate the transportation of passengers and freight across the narrow belt of land connecting the northern and southern continents1 the imperative necessity of a ship canal was made apparent4 ,just as the railway followed the earlier wagon roads of the ,spanish adventurers1 so a ship canal will naturally succeed or supplement the railway4 ,natural conditions on the ,isthmus materially enhance the physical difficulties to be overcome in canal construction4 ,even the precise locality or section best adapted to the purpose has for many years been a question of serious doubt4 ,the ,isthmus of ,tehuantepec1 the ,nicaraguan route1 the utilizing of a lake of large extent1 and finally the narrow band of land and mountain chain at ,panama1 each offers distinct advantages peculiar to itself1 with corresponding disadvantages or local difficulties not met with in the others4 ,many other projects have been advanced2 in all1 at least some twenty distinct routes have been laid out by scientific surveys1 but the most eminent ,american engineering talent1 considering impartially the natural advantages and local obstacles of each1 finally1 in #ahdi1 decided upon the isthmus between the ,bay of ,panama and ,limon ,bay as the most feasible for the building of the railroad1 and some fifty years later for the building of the ,isthmian ,canal4 ,every further study1 survey1 and inquiry has confirmed the wisdom of the earlier choice1 which has been adopted as the best and as the permanent plan of the ,american government1 which is now to build a canal at the expense of the nation1 but for the ultimate benefit of all mankind4 ,the ,panama railway marked the beginning of a new era in the history of interoceanic communication4 ,the great practical usefulness of the road soon made the construction of a canal a commercial necessity4 ,the eyes of all the world were upon the ,isthmus1 but no nation made the subject a matter of more profound study and inquiry than the ,united ,states4 ,one surveying party followed another1 and every promising project received careful consideration4 ,the conflicting evidence1 the great engineering difficulties1 the natural obstacles1 and1 most of all1 the ,civil ,war1 delayed active efforts2 but public interest was maintained and the general public continued to view the project with favor and to demand an ,american canal4 ,during the seventies a ,french commission made surveys and investigations on the ,isthmus which terminated in the efforts of ,de ,lesseps1 who undertook to construct a canal1 and1 in #ahgi1 called an international scientific congress to consider the project in all its aspects and determine upon a practical solution4 ,the ,united ,states was invited to be represented by two official delegates1 and accordingly ,president ,hayes appointed ,admiral ,ammen and ,a4,c4 ,menocal1 of the ,united ,states ,navy1 both of whom had been connected with surveys and explorations on the ,isthmus4 ,mr4 ,menocal presented his plan for a canal by way of ,nicaragua1 but it was evident that the ,wyse project1 of a canal by way of the ,isthmus of ,panama1 had the majority in its favor1 and the only question to determine was whether the canal to be constructed should be a sea-level or a lock canal4 ,the ,american delegates were convinced1 in the light of their knowledge and experience1 that a sea-level canal would be impracticable1 if not impossible4 ,in this they were seconded by ,sir ,john ,hawkshaw1 a man thoroughly familiar with canal problems1 and who exposed the hopelessness of an attempt to make a sea-level ship canal1 pointing out that there would be a cataract of the ,chagres ,river at ,matachin of #db feet1 which in periods of floods would be #gh feet high1 and a body of water that would be #cf feet deep1 with a width of #a1ejj feet4 ,opposition to the sea-level project proved of no avail4 ,the facts were ignored or treated with indifference by the ,french1 who were determined upon a canal at ,panama and at sea level1 resting their conclusions upon the success at ,suez1 with which enterprise many of those present at the congress1 in addition to ,de ,lesseps1 had been connected4 ,but the problems and conditions to be met on the ,isthmus of ,panama were decidedly different from those at ,suez1 and subsequent experience proved the serious error of the sea-level plan as finally adopted4 ,the congress included a large assemblage of non-professional men1 and of the ,french engineers present only one or two had ever been on the ,isthmus4 ,the final vote was seventy-five in favor of and eight opposed to a sea-level canal4 ,rear-admiral ,ammen said3 ,i abstained from voting on the ground that only able engineers can form an opinion after careful study of what is actually possible and what is relatively economical in the construction of a ship canal4 ,of those in favor of a sea-level canal not one had made a practical and exhaustive study of the facts4 ,the project at this stage was in a state of hopeless confusion4 ,in spite of these obstacles1 ,de ,lesseps1 with undaunted courage1 proceeded to organize a company for the construction of a sea-level canal4 ,as soon as possible after the adjournment of the scientific congress of #ahgi the ,panama ,canal ,company was organized1 with ,ferdinand ,de ,lesseps as president4 ,the company purchased the ,wyse concession1 and by #ahhj sufficient funds had been secured to proceed with the preliminary work4 ,the next two years were used for scientific investigations1 surveys1 etc41 and the actual work commenced in #ahhc4 ,the plan adopted was for a sea-level canal having a depth of #bi4e feet and a bottom width of #gb feet4 ,this plan in outline and intent was adhered to practically to the cessation of operations in #ahhh4 ,in that year operations on the ,isthmus came to an end for want of funds4 ,the failure of the company proved disastrous to a very large number of shareholders1 mostly ,french peasants of small means1 and for a time the project of interoceanic communication by way of ,panama seemed hopeless4 ,the experience1 however1 proved clearly the utter impossibility of private enterprise carrying forward a project of such magnitude and which had attained a stage where large additional funds were needed to make good enormous losses1 due to errors in plans1 to miscarriage of effort1 and1 last but not least1 to fraud on stupendous scale4 ,with admirable courage1 however1 the affairs of the first ,panama ,canal ,company were reorganized1 after the appointment of a receiver1 on ,february #d1 #ahhi4 ,a scientific commission of inquiry was appointed to reinvestigate the entire project and report upon the work actually accomplished and its value in future operations4 ,the commission1 made up of eminent engineers1 sent five of its members to the ,isthmus to study the technical aspects of the problem1 and a final report was rendered on ,may #e1 #ahij4 ,the recommendation of the commission was for the construction of a canal with locks1 the abandonment of the sea-level idea1 and for a further and still more thorough inquiry into the facts1 upon the ground that the accumulated data were far from possessing the precision essential to a definite project4 ,this took the project of canal construction out of the domain of preconceived ideas based upon guesswork into the substantial field of a scientific undertaking for commercial purposes4 ,the receiver at once commenced to reorganize the affairs of the company1 and accordingly1 on ,october #ba1 #ahid1 the new ,panama ,canal ,company came into existence under the general laws of ,france4 ,the charter of the new company provided for the appointment of a technical committee to formulate a final project for the completion of the canal4 ,this committee was organized in ,february1 #ahif1 and reached a unanimous conclusion on ,november #af1 #ahih1 embodied in an elaborate report1 which is probably the most authoritative document ever presented on an engineering subject4 ,the recommendation of the commission was unanimously in favor of a lock canal4#a ,the subsequent history of the ,de ,lesseps project and the ,american effort for a practical route across the ,isthmus are still fresh in our minds and need not be restated4 ,the ,spanish-,american war and the voyage of the ,oregon by way of ,cape ,horn1 more than any other causes1 combined to direct the attention of the ,american people to conditions on the ,isthmus1 and led to the public demand that by one route or another an ,american waterway be constructed within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable cost4 ,it will serve no practical purpose to recite the subsequent facts and the chain of events which led to the passage of the act of ,march #c1 #ahii1 which authorized the ,president to have a full and complete investigation made of the entire subject of ,isthmian canals4 ,a million dollars was appropriated for the expenses of a commission1 and in pursuance of the provisions of the act the ,president appointed a commission consisting of ,rear-admiral ,walker1 ,united ,states ,navy1 president1 and nine members eminent in their respective professions as experts or engineers4 ,a report was rendered under the date of ,november #cj1 #aija1 in which the cost of constructing a canal by way of ,nicaragua was estimated at #ahi1hfd1jfb and by way of ,panama at #ahd1bcc1ceh1 including in the last estimate #dj1jjj1jjj for the estimated value of the rights and property of the ,new ,panama ,canal ,company4 ,the company1 however1 held its property at a much higher value1 or some #aji1jjj1jjj1 which the ,commission considered exorbitant1 and thus the only alternative was to recommend the construction of a canal by way of the ,nicaraguan route4 ,convinced1 however1 that the ,american people were in earnest1 the ,new ,panama ,company expressed a willingness to reconsider the matter1 and finally agreed to the purchase price fixed by the ,isthmian ,commission4 ,by the ,spooner act1 passed ,june #bh1 #aijb1 ,congress authorized the ,president to purchase the property of the ,new ,panama ,canal ,company for a price not exceeding #dj1jjj1jjj1 the title to the property having been fully investigated and found valid4 ,the ,isthmian ,commission1 therefore1 recommended to ,congress the purchase of the property1 but the majority of the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,canals disagreed1 and it is only to the courage and rare ability of the late ,senator ,hanna and his associates1 as minority members of the committee1 that the nation owes the abandonment of the ,nicaraguan project1 the acquirement of the ,panama ,canal rights at a reasonable price and the making of the project a national enterprise4 ,the report of the minority members of the ,senate committee was made under date of ,may #ca1 #aijb4 ,it is1 without question1 a most able and comprehensive dissertation upon the subject1 and forms a most valuable addition to the truly voluminous literature of ,isthmian canal construction4 ,the report was signed by ,senators ,hanna1 ,pritchard1 ,millard1 and ,kittredge4 ,we consider1 said the committee1 that the ,panama route is the best route for an isthmian canal to be owned1 constructed1 controlled1 and protected by the ,united ,states4 ,it was a bold challenge of the conclusions of the majority members of the committee1 but in entire harmony with and in strict conformity to the views and final conclusions of the ,isthmian ,commission4 ,the minority report was accepted by the ,congress and a canal at ,panama became an ,american enterprise for the benefit of the ,american people and the world at large4 ,such1 in broad outline1 is the present status of the ,panama ,canal4 ,a grave question presents itself at this time1 which demands to be disposed of by ,congress1 and to which all others are subservient4 ,shall the waterway be a sea-level or a lock canal8 ,it is a question of tremendous importance--a question of choice equally as important as the one of the route itself4 ,a choice must be made1 and it must be made soon4 ,all the subsidiary work1 all the related enterprises1 depend upon the fundamental difference in type4 ,opinions differ as widely to-day as they did at the time when the project was first considered by the international committee in #ahgi4 ,engineers of the highest standing at home and abroad have expressed themselves for or against one type or the other1 but it is a question upon which no complete agreement is possible4 ,in theory a sea-level canal has unquestionable advantages1 but1 practically1 the elements of cost and time necessary for the construction preclude to-day1 as they did in #ahid1 when the ,new ,canal ,company recommenced active operations1 the building of a sea-level canal4 ,it is not a question of the ideally most desirable1 but of the practically most expedient1 that confronts the ,american people and demands solution4 ,the ,new ,panama ,canal ,company had approved the lock plan1 which placed the minimum elevation of the summit level at #ig4e feet above the sea and the maximum level at #ajb4e feet above the same datum4 ,in the words of ,prof4 ,william ,h4 ,burr3 ,it provided for a depth of #bi4e feet of water and a bottom width of canal prism of about #ih feet1 except at special places1 where this width was increased4 ,a dam was to be built near ,bohio1 which would thus form an artificial lake1 with its surface varying from #eb4e to #fe4f feet above the sea4 ,the location of this line was practically the same as that of the old company4 ,the available length of each lock chamber was #gch feet1 while the available width was #hb feet1 the depth in the clear being #cb feet #aj inches4 ,the lifts were to vary from #bf to #cc feet4 ,it was estimated that the cost of finishing the canal on this plan would be #aja1hej1jjj1 exclusive of administration and financing4 ,the ,isthmian ,commission of #ahii-aija considered the project1 reexamined into the facts1 and as stated by ,professor ,burr-- ,the feasibility of a sea-level canal1 but with a tidal lock at the ,panama end1 was carefully considered by the ,commission1 and an approximate estimate of the cost of completing the work on that plan was made4 ,in round numbers this estimated cost was about #bej1jjj1jjj1 and the time required to complete the work would probably be nearly or quite twice that needed for the construction of a canal with locks4 ,the ,commission therefore adopted a project for the canal locks4 ,both plans and estimates were carefully developed in accordance therewith4 ,professor ,burr1 now in favor of a sea-level canal1 then concurred in the report in favor of a lock canal4 ,since the ,panama canal became the property of the nation a vast amount of necessary and preliminary work has been done preparatory to the actual construction of the canal4 ,a complete civil government of the ,canal ,zone has been established1 an army of experts and engineers has been organized1 the work of sanitation and police control is in excellent hands1 and the ,isthmus1 or1 more properly speaking1 the ,canal ,zone1 is to-day in a better1 cleaner1 and more healthful condition than at any previous time in its history4 ,a considerable amount of excavation and necessary improvements in transportation facilities have been carried to a point where further work must stop until the ,isthmian ,commission knows the final plan or type of the canal4 ,the reports which have been made of the work of the ,commission during its two years of actual control are a complete and affirmative answer to the question whether what has been done so far has been done wisely and well1 and the facts and evidence prove that the present state of affairs on the ,isthmus is in all respects to the credit of the nation4 ,now1 it is evident that the question of plan or type of canal is largely one for engineers to determine1 but even a layman can form an intelligent opinion1 without entering into all the details of so complex a problem as the relative advantage or disadvantage of a sea-level versus a lock canal4 ,this much1 however1 is readily apparent1 that a sea-level canal will cost a vast amount of money and may take twice the time to build1 while it will not necessarily accommodate a larger traffic or ships of a larger size4 ,a lock canal can be built which will meet all requirements2 it can be built deep enough and wide enough to accommodate the largest vessels afloat2 it can be so built that transit across the ,isthmus can be effected in a reasonably short period of time--in a word1 it is a practical project1 which will solve every pending question involved in the construction of a transisthmian canal in a practical way1 at a reasonable cost1 and within a reasonable period of time4 ,to determine the question the ,president appointed an ,international ,board of ,consulting ,engineers4 ,the ,board included in its membership the world's foremost men in engineering science1 and the report is without question a most valuable document4 ,the ,president1 in his address to the members of the ,board on ,september #aa1 #aije1 outlined his views with regard to the desirability of a sea-level canal1 if such a one could be constructed at a reasonable cost within a reasonable time4 ,he said-- ,if to build a sea-level canal will but slightly increase the risk and will take but little longer than a multilock high-level canal1 this1 of course1 is preferable4 ,but if to adopt the plan of a sea-level canal means to incur great hazard and to incur indefinite delay1 then it is not preferable4 ,the problem as viewed by the ,american people could not be more concisely stated4 ,other things equal1 a sea-level canal1 no doubt1 would be preferable2 but it remains to be shown that such a canal would in all essentials provide safe1 cheap1 and earlier navigation across the ,isthmus than a lock canal4 ,for1 as the ,president further said on the same occasion1 there are two essential considerations3 ,first1 the greatest possible speed of construction2 second1 the practical certainty that the proposed plan will be feasible2 that it can be carried out with the minimum risk2 and in conclusion that-- ,there may be good reason why the delay incident to the adoption of a plan for an ideal canal should be incurred2 but if there is not1 then ,i hope to see the canal constructed on a system which will bring to the nearest possible date in the future the time when it is practicable to take the first ship across the ,isthmus--that is1 which will in the shortest time possible secure a ,panama waterway between the oceans of such a character as to guarantee permanent and ample communication for the greatest ships of our ,navy and for the largest steamers on either the ,atlantic or the ,pacific4 ,the delay in transit of the vessels owing to additional locks would be of small consequence when compared with shortening the time for the construction of the canal or diminishing the risks in the construction4 ,in short1 ,i desire your best judgment on all the various questions to be considered in choosing among the various plans for a comparatively high-level multilock canal1 for a lower-level canal with fewer locks1 and for a sea-level canal4 ,finally1 ,i urge upon you the necessity of as great expedition in coming to a decision as is compatible with thoroughness in considering the conditions4 ,the ,board organized and met in the city of ,washington on ,september #a1 #aije1 and on the #ajth of ,january1 #aijf1 or about four months later1 made its final report to the ,president through the ,secretary of ,war4 ,the ,board divided upon the question of type for the proposed canal1 a majority of eight--five foreign engineers and three ,american engineers--being in favor of a canal at sea-level1 while a minority of five--all ,american engineers--favored a lock canal at a summit level of eighty-five feet4 ,the two propositions require separate consideration1 each upon its own merits1 before a final opinion can be arrived at as to the best type of a waterway adapted to our needs and requirements under existing conditions4 ,upon a question so involved and complex1 where the most eminent engineers divide and disagree1 a layman can not be expected to view the problem otherwise than as a business proposition which1 demanding solution1 must be disposed of by a strictly impartial examination of the facts4 ,weighed and tested by practical experience in other fields of commercial enterprise1 it is probably not going too far to say1 as in fact it has been said1 that there is entirely too much mere engineering opinion upon this subject and not a well-defined concentrated mass of data and solid convictions4 ,it is equally true1 and should be kept in mind1 that the time given by the ,board to the consideration of the subject in all its practical bearings1 including an examination of actual conditions on the ,isthmus1 was limited to so short a period that it would be contrary to all human experience that this report should represent an infallible or final verdict for or against either of the two propositions4 ,it is necessary to keep in mind certain facts which may be concisely stated1 and which ,i do not think have been previously brought to the attention of ,congress4 ,while the ,board had been appointed by the ,president on ,june #bd1 #aije1 the first business meeting did not take place until ,september #ast1 and the final meeting of the full ,board occurred on ,november #bdth of the same year4 ,this was the twenty-seventh meeting during a period of eighty-five days1 after which there were three more meetings of the ,american members1 the last having been held on ,january #ca1 #aijf4 ,thus the actual proceedings of the full ,board were condensed into twenty-seven meetings during less than three months1 a part of which time--or1 to be specific1 six days--was spent on the ,isthmus4 ,the minutes of the proceedings have been printed and form a part of the final report made to the ,president under date of ,january #aj1 #aijf4 ,they do not afford as complete an insight into the business transactions of the ,board as would be desirable1 and the evidence is wanting that the subject was as thoroughly discussed in all its details1 with particular reference to the two propositions of a sea-level or a lock canal1 as would seem necessary4 ,very important features necessary to the sea-level plan were treated in the most superficial way1 guessed at1 or wholly ignored4 ,i do not hesitate to say that no banking house in the world called upon to provide funds necessary for an enterprise of this magnitude as a private undertaking would advance a single dollar upon a project as it is here presented by the majority of the ,board to the ,american ,congress as the final conclusion of engineers of the highest standing4 ,the ,board1 as ,i have said1 divided upon the question1 and by a majority of eight pronounced in favor of a sea-level against a minority of five in favor of a lock canal4 ,let us inquire how this conclusion1 of momentous importance to the nation1 was arrived at and whether the minutes of the ,board furnish a conclusive answer4 ,as early as the sixth meeting1 or on ,september #afth--that is1 after the ,board had been only fifteen days in existence--a resolution was introduced by ,mr4 ,hunter1 chief engineer of the ,manchester ,ship ,canal1 requesting that a special committee be appointed to prepare at once a project for a sea-level canal4 ,mr4 ,spooner4--,what was the date of the resolution with respect to the lock canal8 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,october #c;d1 seventeen days afterwards4 ,in marked contrast1 it was not until after the ,board had visited the ,isthmus and while the members were on their way home--that is1 at sea--on ,october #c;d1 that1 on motion of ,mr4 ,stearns1 a corresponding committee was appointed to prepare plans for a lock canal4 ,the recital of dates is of very considerable importance1 for it is evident that there was a decided and early preference on the part of certain members of the ,board for a sea-level canal1 and that to this particular project more attention was given and a more determined attempt was made to secure data in its defense than to the corresponding project for a lock canal4 ,that is to say1 while the special committee for the consideration of a sea-level canal had been appointed on ,september #afth1 the corresponding committee to consider the lock project was not appointed until ,october #c;d1 or seventeen days later1 with the additional disadvantage of the ,board being on the ocean1 with no opportunity to send for persons and papers during the short period of time remaining to take into due consideration all the facts pertaining to a lock canal1 for1 as ,i have said before1 the last business meeting was held on ,november #bdth4 ,mr4 ,foraker4--,mr4 ,president---- ,the ,vice ,president4--,does the ,senator from ,new ,jersey yield to the ,senator from ,ohio8 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,certainly4 ,mr4 ,foraker4--,i would like to ask the ,senator whether on the #afth of ,september1 when this motion was made by ,mr4 ,hunter1 if ,i remember correctly1 the ,board of ,engineers had completed their investigations and explorations on the ,isthmus8 ,i did not observe4 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,no4 ,mr4 ,kittredge4--,mr4 ,president---- ,the ,vice ,president4--,does the ,senator from ,new ,jersey yield to the ,senator from ,south ,dakota8 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,i yield4 ,mr4 ,kittredge4--,if the ,senator from ,new ,jersey will permit me1 ,i will be glad to answer the question of the ,senator from ,ohio4 ,the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers sailed from ,new ,york on the #bhth of ,september for the ,isthmus and returned about the middle or #bjth of ,october4 ,mr4 ,foraker4--,sailed from the ,isthmus8 ,mr4 ,kittredge4--,sailed from ,new ,york for the ,isthmus4 ,mr4 ,foraker4--,then the motion was made by ,mr4 ,hunter before the ,board of ,engineers left the ,united ,states4 ,mr4 ,kittredge4--,certainly2 to appoint a committee of investigation4 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,i should like to say at this point that while ,i have gladly yielded to ,senators1 ,i think it is quite probable that before ,i get through ,i shall cover any questions that may be asked4 ,i would prefer to complete my remarks1 and then ,i shall be very glad to answer any questions that ,senators may choose to ask4 ,mr4 ,foraker4--,i beg pardon4 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,i was glad to yield to the ,senator4 ,mr4 ,foraker4--,the speech is a very interesting one4 99 99 99 99 99 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,there is nothing in the minutes of the ,board which disclosed that either proposition received the necessary deliberate consideration of the extremely complex and important details entering into the two respective projects1 but it is evident that1 regarding the sea-level proposition at least1 there was a decided bias practically from the outset1 which matured in the majority report favoring that proposition4 ,what was in the minds of the members1 what was done outside of the ,board meetings1 by what means or methods conclusions were reached1 has not been made a matter of record and is not1 therefore1 within the knowledge of ,congress4 ,it is true that the respective reports of the two committees were brought before the ,board as a whole on ,november #adth and that the subject was discussed at some length on ,november #ahth1 when each member of the ,board expressed his views for or against one of the two projects4 ,but there remained only ten days before the last business meeting of the ,board was held1 when the foreign members sailed for home4 ,the final reports1 as they are now before ,congress1 apparently never received the proper and extended consideration of the ,board as a whole1 and the minority report favoring a lock canal seems never to have been discussed upon its merits at all4 ,when ,i recall the very different procedure of the technical commission appointed by the ,new ,panama ,canal ,company1 which extended its consideration of the subject from ,february #c1 #ahif1 to ,september #h1 #ahih1 during which time ninety-seven stated meetings and a large number of informal meetings were held1 ,i say1 it seems to me1 from a practical business point of view1 casting no reflection upon either the ability or the fairness of judgment of the members of the ,international ,board1 that the mere element of time should weigh decidedly in favor of the verdict of the technical commission of #ahih1 which was unanimous for a lock canal4 ,of the technical commission of #ahif-ahih1 ,mr4 ,hunter1 chief engineer of the ,manchester ,ship ,canal1 was a member1 and he at that time1 without a word of dissent1 joined the other members in giving the unanimous and emphatic expression of the committee in favor of a lock canal4 ,mr4 ,teller4--,mr4 ,president---- ,the ,vice ,president4--,does the ,senator from ,new ,jersey yield to the ,senator from ,colorado8 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,certainly4 ,mr4 ,teller4--,will the ,senator kindly repeat the date of that8 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,of the technical commission of #ahif-ahih1 ,mr4 ,hunter1 the chief engineer of the ,manchester ,canal1 was a member4 ,the technical commission was of the new ,french company4 ,mr4 ,teller4--,you refer to the commission of the new ,french company8 ,mr4 ,dryden4--,yes1 sir2 the commission of the new ,french company4 ,why he should now change his views and convictions and why he should now be so emphatic and pronounced in favor of a sea-level project is not set forth in anything that has been printed or been communicated to the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,canals4 ,this hurried action1 this scanty consideration1 as ,i have stated1 is the foundation upon which the advocates of the sea-level plan rest their appeal for support4 ,this is the report and the evidence upon which ,congress is requested to pronounce in favor of a sea-level project and give its indorsement to a plan which will involve the country in at least #ajj1jjj1jjj of additional expenditure and which will delay the opening of the canal for practical purposes of navigation possibly for ten years or more after the lock canal can be finished and opened for use4 ,the ,isthmian ,commission restates certain points in a clear and precise way1 which leaves no escape from the conclusion that both as to time and cost the majority members of the ,board materially underestimated important factors1 and that they have every reason to believe that the total estimate of cost of a sea-level canal should be raised to #bgb1jjj1jjj1 and that the estimate of time for construction should be increased to at least fifteen and a half years4 ,but under certain readily conceivable conditions it is practically certain that the construction of a sea-level canal will consume not less than twenty years4 ,the ,isthmian ,commission reexamined carefully the question of relative efficiency of the proposed sea-level canal compared with a lock canal1 and they pronounce emphatically and unequivocally in favor of the lock project4 ,they consider that the assumed danger from accidents to locks by passing vessels or otherwise is greatly exaggerated1 and hold that while no doubt accidents may occur1 and possibly will occur1 such dangers can and will be sufficiently guarded against by an effective method of supervision and control4 ,they hold that a lock canal properly constructed and managed is in no sense a menace to the safety of vessels1 and that much practical experience and particularly the half-century of successful operation of the ,soo ,canal have demonstrated the contrary beyond dispute4 ,they point out that the canal with locks at a level of eighty-five feet will be a waterway three times the size1 in navigable area1 of the projected sea-level canal1 and1 omitting the locks from consideration1 will therefore afford three times the shipping facilities4 ,they show that in the sea-level canal there will be many and serious curves1 while in the lock canal the courses are straight and changes of direction will be made at intersecting tangents1 the same as in our river navigation1 in which serious accidents are practically unknown4 ,they show that the courses in a lock canal can be marked with ranges which will greatly facilitate navigation1 particularly at night4 ,the ,commission points out that the argument of the majority of the ,board1 that locks will limit the traffic capacity of the canal1 carries very little if any weight1 and they refer to the experience of the ,soo ,canal1 through which there passes annually a larger traffic than through all the other ship canals of the world combined4 ,finally1 the ,isthmian ,commission discusses the cost of operation and maintenance4 ,the majority of the ,board submit no details upon this most important item in canal construction and subsequent operation4 ,what banking house in the world would advance a single dollar upon a canal or railway project upon a mere statement of the probable ultimate cost1 but with no corresponding information as to cost of maintenance and operation6 ,having been appointed to reexamine into all the facts1 and1 so to speak1 to reconsider the entire project1 the majority seriously erred in omitting from their report the necessary data and calculations for an accurate and trustworthy estimate of the cost of operation and maintenance of a sea-level canal4 ,from this point of view and in the light of the facts as presented by the ,board for or against either project1 the ,isthmian ,commission could not consistently act otherwise than to give their final approval to the more specific and practical recommendations of the minority members of the ,board1 and they properly say that it appears that the canal proposed by the minority of the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers can be built in half the time and for a little more than half of the cost of the canal proposed by the majority of the ,board4 ,they advance a number of specific reasons why a lock canal when completed will for all practical purposes--commercial1 military1 and naval--be a better canal than a sea-level waterway with a tidal lock1 as proposed by the majority members of the ,board4 ,the report of the ,board was carefully and critically examined by ,chief ,engineer ,stevens1 of the ,isthmian ,commission and in actual charge of engineering matters on the ,isthmus4 ,mr4 ,stevens is a man of very large practical ,american engineering experience1 and he adds to the finding of the ,commission the weight of his authority1 decidedly and unequivocally in favor of a lock canal4 ,he states as the sum of his conclusions that1 all things considered1 the lock or high-level canal is preferable to the sea-level type1 so-called1 for the reason that it will provide a safer and quicker passage for ships2 that it will provide beyond question the best solution of the vital problem of how safely to care for the flood waters of the ,chagres and other streams2 that provision is offered in the lock project for enlarging its capacity to almost any extent at very much less expense of time and money than can be provided for by any sea-level plan2 that its cost of operation1 maintenance1 and fixed charges1 including interest1 will be very much less than any sea-level canal1 and that the time and cost of its construction will not be more than one-half that of a canal of the sea-level type2 that the lock project will permit of navigation by night2 and that1 finally1 even at the same cost in time and money1 ,mr4 ,stevens would favor the adoption of the high-level lock canal plan in preference to that of the proposed sea-level canal4 ,to these observations and comments the ,secretary of ,war1 under whose supervision this great work is going on1 adds his opinion1 which is decidedly and unequivocally in favor of a lock canal4 ,in his letter to the ,president1 ,mr4 ,taft goes into all the important details of the subject and reveals a masterly grasp of the situation as it confronts the ,american people at the present time4 ,he calls attention to the fact that lock navigation is not an experiment2 that all the locks in the proposed canal are duplicated1 thereby minimizing such dangers as are inherent in any canal project1 and he adds that experience shows that with proper plans and regulations the dangers are much more imaginary than real4 ,he goes into the facts of the proposed great dam to be constructed at ,gatun and points out that such construction is not experimental1 but sustained by large ,american experience1 which is larger1 perhaps1 than that of any other country in the world4 ,he gives his indorsement to the views of the ,isthmian ,commission and its chief engineer that the estimated cost of time and money for completing a sea-level canal is not correctly stated by the majority members of the ,board1 and that the cost1 in all probability1 will be at least #be1jjj1jjj more1 while1 in his opinion1 eighteen to twenty years will be necessary to complete the sea-level project4 ,he also holds that the military advantages will be decidedly in favor of a lock canal4 ,this is practically the present status of facts and opinions regarding the canal problem as it is now before ,congress1 except that since ,january the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,canals has collected a large mass of additional and valuable testimony4 ,restating the facts in a somewhat different way1 ,congress is asked to give its final approval to the sea-level proposition1 chiefly favored by foreigners1 and to give its disapproval to the project of a lock canal1 favored by ,american engineers4 ,congress is asked to rely in the main upon the experience gained in the management of the ,suez ,canal1 where the conditions are essentially and fundamentally different from what they are or ever will be on the ,isthmus of ,panama1 and to disregard the more than fifty years' experience in the successful management of the lock canals connecting the ,great ,lakes4 ,congress is asked to pronounce against the lock canal because in the management of the ship canal at ,manchester several accidents have occurred1 due to carelessness or ignorance in navigation1 and we are asked to disregard the successful record of the ,soo ,canal1 in the management of which only three accidents1 of no very serious importance1 have occurred during more than fifty years4 ,in no other country in the world has there been more experience with lock canals than in this4 ,for nearly a hundred years the ,erie ,canal has been one of our most successful of inland waterways1 connecting the ocean with the ,great ,lakes4 ,the ,erie ,canal is #chg miles in length1 has #gb locks1 and is now being enlarged1 to accommodate barges of a thousand tons1 at a cost of #aja1jjj1jjj4 ,we have the ,ohio ,canal1 with #aej locks2 the ,miami and ,erie ,canal1 with #ic locks2 the ,pennsylvania ,canal1 with #ga locks2 the ,chesapeake and ,ohio ,canal1 with #gc locks2 and numerous other inland waterways of lesser importance4 ,it is a question of degree and not of kind1 for the problem is the same in all essentials1 and confronts ,congress as much in the proposed deep waterway connecting tide-water with the ,great ,lakes1 in which locks are proposed with a lift of #dj feet or more1 or very considerably in excess of the proposed lift of the locks on the ,isthmian ,canal4 ,the proposed ship canal from ,lake ,erie to the ,ohio ,river provides for #cd locks4 ,the suggested canal from ,lake ,michigan to the ,illinois and ,mississippi rivers provides for #cg locks1 and1 finally1 the projected ship canal from the ,st4 ,lawrence ,river to ,lake ,huron contemplates #bb locks4 ,so that lock canals of exceptional magnitude are not only in existence1 but new canals of this type are contemplated in the ,united ,states and ,canada4 ,in other words1 ,congress is asked to regard with preference the judgment and opinions of foreign engineers and to disregard the judgment and opinions of ,american engineers4 ,we are seriously asked to completely disregard ,american opinion1 as voiced by the ,isthmian ,commission1 responsible for the enterprise as a whole2 as voiced by the ,secretary of ,war1 responsible for the time being for the proper execution of the work2 as voiced by ,chief ,engineer ,stevens1 who stands foremost among ,americans in his profession2 and finally1 as voiced by all the engineers now on the ,isthmus1 who have a practical knowledge of the actual conditions1 and who are as thoroughly familiar as any class of men with the problems which confront us and with the conditions which will have to be met4 ,i for one1 leaving out of consideration for the present details which are subject to modification and change1 believe that it will be a fatal error for the nation to commit itself to the practically hopeless and visionary sea-level project and to delay for many years the opening of this much needed waterway connecting the ,atlantic with the ,pacific4 ,i for one am opposed to a waste of untold millions and to additional burdens of needless taxation1 while the project of a lock canal offers every practical advantage1 offers a canal within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable cost1 offers a waterway of enormous advantage to ,american shipping1 of the greatest possible value to the nation in the event of war1 and the opportunity for the ,american people to carry into execution at the earliest possible moment what has been called the dream of navigators1 and what has thus far defied the engineering skill of ,european nations4 ,but in addition to the evidence presented for or against a sea-level or lock canal project by the two conflicting reports of the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers1 there is now available a very considerable mass of testimony of ,american engineers who were called as witnesses before the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,canals4 ,the testimony has been printed as a separate document and makes a volume of nearly a thousand pages4 ,much of this evidence is conflicting1 much of it is mere engineering opinion1 much of it comes perilously near to being engineering guesswork1 but a large part of it is of practical value and may safely be relied upon to guide the ,congress in an effort to arrive at a final and correct conclusion respecting the type of canal best adapted to our needs and requirements4 ,a critical examination and review of this testimony1 as presented to the ,senate ,committee from day to day for nearly five months1 including the testimony of administrative officers and others1 relating to ,panama ,canal affairs generally1 is not practicable at this stage of the session4 ,among others1 the committee examined ,mr4 ,john ,f4 ,stevens1 chief engineer1 upon all the essential points in controversy1 regarding which1 in the light of additional experience and a very considerable amount of new and more exact information1 ,mr4 ,stevens reaffirms his convictions in favor of the practicability and superior advantages of a lock canal4 ,in opposition to the views and conclusions of ,mr4 ,stevens1 ,prof4 ,william ,h4 ,burr pronounced himself emphatically in favor of the sea-level project4 ,as a member of the former ,isthmian ,commission1 reporting upon the type of canal1 ,mr4 ,burr had signed the report in favor of the lock project1 but as a member of the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers he had sided with the majority favoring the sea-level canal4 ,thus engineering opinion is as apt as any other human opinion to undergo a change1 and the convictions of one year in favor of a proposition may change into opposite convictions1 favoring an opposite proposition1 only a few years later4 ,mr4 ,william ,barclay ,parsons1 also a member of the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers1 who had signed the report in favor of the sea-level project1 gave further evidence before the committee1 restating his views and convictions in favor of the sea-level type4 ,mr4 ,william ,noble1 an engineer of large experience1 for some years in charge of the ,soo ,canal1 and who1 as a member of the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers1 had signed the report in favor of a lock project1 restates his views and convictions in favor of a lock canal4 ,mr4 ,noble had also been a member of the ,isthmian ,commission of #aijb1 reporting at that time in favor of a lock canal4 ,mr4 ,frederick ,p4 ,stearns1 the foremost ,american authority on earth-dam construction1 gave evidence regarding the safety of the proposed dams at ,gatun and other points4 ,his views and conclusions are based upon large practical experience and a profound theoretical knowledge of the subject4 ,mr4 ,stearns had also been a member of the ,consulting ,board of ,engineers and as such had signed the report of the minority in favor of the lock project4 ,he reaffirmed his views favoring a lock canal with a dam at ,gatun4 ,mr4 ,john ,f4 ,wallace1 former chief engineer1 gave testimony in favor of the sea-level type and strongly opposed the lock project4 ,col4 ,oswald ,h4 ,ernst1 ,united ,states ,army1 than whom probably few are more thoroughly familiar with conditions on the ,isthmus and the entire project of canal construction1 declared himself to be strongly in favor of the lock-canal project4 ,gen4 ,peter ,c4 ,hains1 ,united ,states ,army1 equally well qualified to express an opinion on the subject in all its important points1 pronounced himself strongly and unequivocally in favor of a lock canal4 ,illustration3 ,,panama ,,canal ,,zone ,illustration3 ,,profile ,,of ,,canal ,gen4 ,henry ,l4 ,abbot1 ,united ,states ,army1 one of the highest authorities on river hydraulics1 thoroughly familiar with ,mississippi ,river flood problems1 a former member of the ,international ,technical ,commission1 of the ,new ,panama ,canal ,company1 and for a time its consulting engineer1 a member of different ,isthmian commissions1 and also a member of the consulting board1 reemphasized his conviction1 sustained by much valuable evidence1 in favor of the lock-canal project4 ,general ,abbot1 as a member of the consulting board1 had signed the report of the minority in favor of a lock canal4 ,gen4 ,george ,w4 ,davis1 ,united ,states ,army1 for a time governor of the ,canal ,zone and president of the ,international ,board of ,consulting ,engineers1 restated his views and convictions as opposed to the lock-canal type and in favor of the sea-level project4 ,the last witness1 ,mr4 ,b4,m4 ,harrod1 an engineer of large experience1 for many years connected with levee construction and familiar with the flood problems of the ,mississippi ,river1 submitted a statement in which he restated his views in favor of a lock canal4 ,so that1 summing up the evidence of twelve engineers examined before the committee 7including ,mr4 ,lindon ,w4 ,bates71 there were eight ,american engineers strongly and unequivocally in favor of a lock canal1 while four expressed their views to the contrary4 ,subjecting the mass of testimony to a critical examination1 ,i cannot draw any other conclusion or arrive at any other conviction than that the lock project1 in the light of the facts and large experience1 has decidedly the advantage over the sea-level proposition4 ,and this view is strengthened by the fact that the opinion of the engineers most competent to judge--that is1 men like ,mr4 ,noble1 who has thoroughly studied lock-canal construction1 management1 and navigation1 who as a member of the ,united ,states ,deep ,waterway ,commission reexamined probably as thoroughly as any living authority into the entire subject of the mechanics and practice of lock canals--is emphatically opposed to the sea-level proposition4 ,when a man like ,mr4 ,stearns1 of national and international reputation as a waterworks engineer1 who for many years has been in charge of the extensive construction work of the ,massachusetts ,metropolitan ,water and ,sewerage ,board1 and who probably has as large a practical and theoretical knowledge of earth-dam construction as any living authority1 declares himself to be strongly in favor of the lock project and believes in the entire safety of the dams required in connection therewith1 ,i hold that such a judgment may be relied upon and that it should govern in national affairs as it would govern in private affairs if the canal construction were a business enterprise and involved the risk of private capital4 ,when we find a man like ,mr4 ,harrod1 who for many years has been in charge of levee construction in ,louisiana1 thoroughly familiar with the theory and practice of river and flood control1 express himself in favor of the lock project and in opposition to the sea-level canal1 ,i hold that we may with entire confidence accept his judgment as a governing principle in arriving at a final decision respecting the type of the canal to be finally fixed by the ,congress4 ,and1 going back to the minority report of the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers1 we find that ,mr4 ,joseph ,ripley1 the general superintendent at present in charge of the ,soo ,canal1 and ,mr4 ,isham ,randolph1 chief engineer of the sanitary district of ,chicago1 and thoroughly familiar with canal construction and management1 both ,american engineers of much experience and high standing1 pronounce themselves in favor of a lock canal4 ,when confronted by these facts1 ,i for one would rely upon ,american engineers1 ,american conviction and ,american experience1 and accept the lock-canal proposition4 ,in this matter1 as in all other practical problems1 we may safely take the business point of view1 and calculate without bias or prejudice the respective advantages and disadvantages2 and the more thorough the method of reasoning and logic applied to the canal problem the more emphatic and incontrovertible the conclusion that the ,congress should decide in favor of a plan which will give us a navigable waterway across the ,isthmus within a measurable distance of time and with a reasonable expenditure of money1 as opposed to a visionary theory of an ideal canal which may ultimately be constructed1 possibly for the exclusive benefit of future generations1 but at an enormous waste of money1 time1 and opportunity4 ,i do not think we want to repeat at this late stage of the canal problem the fatal error of ,de ,lesseps1 who1 when he had the opportunity in #ahgi to make a choice of a practical waterway1 being influenced by his great success at ,suez1 upon the most fragmentary evidence and in the absence of definite knowledge of actual conditions1 decided beforehand in favor of a sea-level canal4 ,it was largely his bias and prejudice which proved fatal to the enterprise and to himself4 ,i may recall that the so-called international congress of #ahgi was a mere subterfuge2 that the opinions of eminent engineers1 including all the ,americans1 were opposed to a sea-level project and in favor of a lock canal1 but ,de ,lesseps had made his plans1 he had arrived at his decision1 and in his own words1 at a meeting of the ,american ,society of ,civil ,engineers held in ,january1 #ahhj1 said1 ,i would have put my hat on and walked out if any other plan than a sea-level canal project had been adopted4 ,the situation to-day is very similar to the critical state of the canal question in #aijb4 ,what was then a question of choice of route is to-day a question of choice of plan4 ,what was then a geographical conflict is to-day a conflict of engineering opinions4 ,it has been made clear by the reference to the report of the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers and by the testimony of the engineers before the ,senate committee that the opinion of eminent experts is so widely at variance that there is little1 if any1 hope of an ultimate reconciliation4 ,it is a choice of one plan or the other--of a sea-level or a lock canal4 ,in respect to either plan a mass of testimony and data exists1 which has been brought forward to sustain one view or the other4 ,in respect to either plan there are advantages and disadvantages4 ,the majority of the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,canals have reported favorably a bill providing for the construction of a canal at sea level4 ,from this majority opinion the minority of the committee emphatically and unequivocally dissent1 and in their report they express themselves in favor of the lock canal4 ,the minority report calls attention to the changed conditions and requirements1 which now demand a canal of much larger dimensions than originally proposed4 ,even as late as #aija the depth of the canal prism was to be only #ce feet1 against #dj to #de feet in the project of only five years later4 ,the bottom width has been increased from #aej to #bjj feet and over4 ,the length of the locks has been changed from #gdj to #ijj feet1 and the width from #hd to #ij feet4 ,these facts must be kept in mind1 for they bear upon the questions of time and cost1 and a sea-level or lock canal1 as proposed to-day1 is in all respects a very much larger affair1 demanding very superior facilities for traffic1 than any previous canal project ever suggested or proposed4 ,this change in plans was made necessary by the ,spooner act1 which provides for a canal of such dimensions that the largest ship now building1 or likely to be built within a reasonable period of time1 can be accommodated4 ,now1 the estimated saving in money alone by adopting the lock plan--that is1 on the original investment1 to say nothing of accumulating interest charges--would be at least #ajj1jjj1jjj4 ,granting all that is said in favor of a sea-level canal1 it is not apparent by any evidence produced that such a canal would prove a material advantage over a lock canal4 ,all its assumed advantages are entirely offset by the vastly greater cost and longer period of time necessary for construction1 and ,i am confident that they would not be considered for a moment if the canal were built as a commercial enterprise4 ,i do not think that they should hold good where the canal is the work of the nation1 because a vast sum of money otherwise needed will be eventually sunk if the sea-level project is adopted1 and entirely upon the theory that if certain conditions should arise then it would be better to have a sea-level than a lock canal4 ,we have never before proceeded in national undertakings upon such an assumption2 we have never before1 as far as ,i know1 deliberately disregarded every principle of economy in money and time2 we have never before in national projects attempted to conform to merely theoretical ideas1 but we have always adhered to practical1 hard common-sense notions of what is best under the circumstances4 ,the majority of the committee attack the proposition that the proposed lock canal will have locks with dimensions far exceeding any that have ever been made4 ,if this principle were adopted in every other line of human effort all advancement would come to an end--even the canal enterprise itself--for1 as it stands to-day1 it far exceeds in magnitude any corresponding effort ever made by this or any other nation4 ,they say that the proposed flight of three locks at ,gatun would be objectionable and unsafe1 but we have the evidence of ,american engineers of the highest standing1 whose reputations are at stake1 who are absolutely confident that these locks can be constructed and operated with entire safety4 ,the committee say that the entry through and exit from these contiguous locks is attended with very great danger to the lock gates and to the ships as well2 but if mere inherent danger of possible accidents were an objection there would be no great steamships1 no great battleships1 no great bridges and tunnels1 no great undertakings of any kind4 ,the committee point out that accidents have occurred in the ,soo ,canal and in the ,manchester ,ship ,canal2 but the conditions1 in the first place1 were decidedly different1 and1 in the second place1 they proved of no serious consequence as a hindrance to traffic and did no material injury to the canal4 ,the ,soo ,canal has been in operation as a lock canal for some fifty years2 it has been enlarged from time to time1 and to-day accommodates a larger traffic than passes through all other ship canals of the world combined4 ,it is a sufficient answer to the objections to say that this experience should have a determining influence in arriving at a conclusion1 for the inherent problems of lock-canal construction are as well understood by ,american engineers as any other problems or questions in engineering science4 ,the proposed deep waterway with a #cj-;foot channel from ,chicago to tide-water1 which has been surveyed by direction of ,congress1 proposes an expenditure of #cjc1jjj1jjj1 and several locks with a lift of #dj feet or more4 ,the enlargement of the ,erie ,canal by the ,state of ,new ,york1 at an expenditure of #aja1jjj1jjj1 involves engineering problems1 including lock construction1 not essentially different from those inherent in the lock-canal project at ,panama2 and if these problems can be solved by our engineers at home1 it stands to reason that we may rely upon their judgment that they can be solved at ,panama4 ,the majority of the ,senate committee object to the proposed dam at ,gatun1 and say that-- ,earth dams founded on the drift and silt of ages1 through which water habitually percolates1 to be increased by the pressure of the #he-;foot lock when made1 have been referred to by many of our technical advisers as another element of danger4 ,the vast masses of earth piled on this alluvial base to the height of #ace feet will certainly settle1 and as the drift material of this base or foundation has varying depth1 to #bej feet or more1 the settlement of the new mass1 as well as its base1 will be unequal1 and it is predicted that cracks and fissures in the dam will be formed1 which will be reached and used by the water under the pressure above mentioned1 and will cause the destruction of the dam and the draining off of the great lake upon which the integrity of the entire canal rests4 ,but all of this is mere conjecture4 ,the evidence of ,engineer ,stearns1 a man of large experience1 and of ,engineer ,harrod1 familiar with river hydraulics and levee construction1 and of many others1 is emphatically to the contrary4 ,there is not an ,american engineer of ability1 nor an ,american contractor of experience1 who would not undertake to build the proposed dam at ,gatun and guarantee its safety and permanency without any hesitation whatever4 ,the alternative proposal of a dam at ,gamboa would be as objectionable upon much the same ground1 and the dam there1 which is indispensable to the sea-level project1 has also been considered unsafe by some of the engineers4 ,in all questions of this kind the aggregate experience of mankind ought to have greater weight than the abstract theories of individuals1 and ,i am confident that our engineers1 who have so successfully solved problems of the greatest magnitude in the reclamation projects of the far ,west and in the control and regulation of the floods of the ,mississippi ,river1 will solve with equal success similar problems at ,panama4 ,the committee further says that the sea-level project contemplates the removal of some #aaj1jjj1jjj cubic yards of material1 while the lock canal would require the removal of only about half that quantity1 or1 in other words1 that there is a difference of some #eg1jjj1jjj cubic yards1 which1 to omit to take out 444 is to confess our impotence1 which is not characteristic of the ,american people or their engineers or contractors4 ,by this method of reasoning a nation which can build a battleship of #af1jjj tons displacement is impotent if it can not build one of twice that tonnage1 and if this reason applies to quantity of material1 why not say that a nation which can dig a canal #aej feet wide through a mountain some seven miles in length admits its impotence if it can not dig one #cjj feet wide1 or #fjj feet1 if it should please to do so8 ,but why should it be less difficult or a declaration of impotency on the part of our engineers to build a safe lock canal including a satisfactory and safe controlling dam at ,gatun8 ,as ,i conceive the problem1 it is one of reasonable compromise1 and while ,i do not question the ability of ,american engineers and contractors to build a sea-level canal1 ,i am convinced by the facts in evidence that they can not do it within the time and for the money assumed by the advocates of the sea-level project4 ,this question of time is of supreme importance4 ,ten years in a nation's life is often a long space in national history4 ,many times the map of the world has been changed in less than a decade4 ,no man in #ahij anticipated the war with ,spain in #ahih1 and no man in #aijf can say what important event may not happen before the next decade has passed4 ,the progress during peace is far greater in its permanent effect than the changes brought about by war4 ,the world's commerce1 the social1 commercial1 and political development of the ,south ,american republics and of ,asiatic nations1 all depend1 more or less1 upon the completion of an ,isthmian waterway4 ,it is the duty of this nation1 since we have assumed this task1 to construct a waterway across the ,isthmus within the shortest reasonable period of time4 ,valuable years have passed1 valuable opportunities have gone by4 ,in #ahhd ,de ,lesseps1 with supreme confidence and upon the judgment of his engineers1 anticipated the opening of the ,panama ,canal in #ahhh4 ,that was nearly twenty years ago4 ,shall it be twenty years more before that greatest event in the world's commercial history takes place8 ,had ,de ,lesseps in #ahgi gone before the ,international ,congress with a proposition for a feasible canal at reasonable cost1 free from prejudice or bias1 had he then adopted the ,american suggestion for a lock canal1 he would probably have lived to see its completion1 and the world for fifteen years would have had the use of a practical waterway across the ,isthmus4 ,as to safety in operation1 which the committee discuss in their report1 there is one very important point to be kept in mind1 and that is that nine-tenths1 or possibly a larger proportion1 of shipping will be of vessels of relatively small size4 ,if this should be the case1 then the sea-level project contemplates a canal chiefly designed to meet the possible needs of a very small number of vessels of largest size1 while the lock canal provides primarily for the accommodation of the class of steamships which of necessity would make the largest practical use of the ,isthmian waterway4 ,now1 it stands to reason that special precautions would be employed during the passage of a very large vessel1 either merchantman or man-of-war1 and even if necessity should demand the rapid passage of a fleet of vessels1 say twenty or thirty1 it is not conceivable that a condition would arise which could not be efficiently safeguarded against by those in actual charge and responsible for safety in the management of the canal4 ,considering the immense tonnage passing through the ,soo ,canal1 which would not be equaled in the ,panama ,canal for a century to come1 the very few and relatively unimportant accidents which have occurred during the fifty years of operation of that waterway are in every respect the most suggestive indorsement of the lock-canal project which could be advanced4 ,the time of transit1 in the opinion of the majority committee of the ,senate1 would be somewhat longer in the case of a lock canal4 ,this may be so1 though much depends upon the class of ships passing through and their number4 ,to the practical navigator the loss of a few hours would be a negligible quantity compared with the higher tolls that will necessarily be charged if an additional #ajj1jjj1jjj is expended in construction and an additional interest burden of at least #b1jjj1jjj per annum has to be provided for4 ,i understand that the actual value of an hour or two in the case of commercial ships of average size would be a matter of comparatively no importance in contrast with the all-suggestive fact that the alternative project of a sea-level canal would provide no navigation whatever across the ,isthmus for probably ten years more4 ,if it is an advantage to gain an hour or two in transit ten years hence by having no transisthmian shipping facilities for the ten years in the meantime1 then it might as well be argued that it would be better to project a sea-level canal #cjj feet wide at every point1 so that the commerce of the year #bjjj may be properly provided for4 ,but to the practical navigator of the year #aiaf1 who leaves the port of ,new ,york for ,san ,francisco by way of ,cape ,horn1 a possible loss of two or three hours or more would be many times preferable1 if the ,isthmus were open for traffic1 to a certain loss of from forty to fifty days to make the voyage all around ,south ,america4 ,upon the question of cost of maintenance the majority committee in their report point out that the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers did not submit the details of any estimate of cost of maintenance1 repairs1 etc41 but they say that this factor was properly taken into account by the minority favoring a lock canal4 ,now1 there is probably no more important question connected with the whole canal problem than this1 for if the annual expense of maintenance1 to be provided for by ,congressional appropriations1 should attain such an exorbitant figure as to make any fair return upon the investment impossible1 it is conceivable that the most serious political and financial consequences might arise and the success of the enterprise itself might be placed in jeopardy4 ,upon a maximum cost1 in round figures1 of #bjj1jjj1jjj for a lock canal1 and of #cjj1jjj1jjj as a minimum for a sea-level canal1 the additional annual interest charge would be at least #b1jjj1jjj4 ,but ,mr4 ,stearns estimates that under certain conditions a sea-level canal might cost as much as #daj1jjj1jjj1 which would add millions of dollars more per annum to the fixed charges which must be included in the cost of maintenance1 to say nothing of a possibly much higher cost of operation4 ,nor can ,i agree to the statement that the cost of operation of a sea-level canal would be #hjj1jjj per annum less than in the case of a lock canal2 but1 on the contrary1 ,i am fully satisfied that the expense would be very much greater in the sea-level project1 if proper allowance is made for interest charges upon the additional outlay1 which cannot be rightfully ignored4 ,upon this important point the evidence of the engineers and of the minority members of the ,board is strongly in favor of the lock-canal project4 ,as regards ultimate cost1 the estimates of the majority are very much more indefinite and conjectural than the more carefully prepared estimates of the minority of the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers4 ,upon this point the majority of the ,senate committee say3 ,there are two estimates now before the ,senate1 both originating with the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers4 ,the basis of computation of cost at certain unit prices was adopted unanimously by the ,board1 and we are told that the cost1 with the #bj per cent4 allowance for contingencies1 will be1 for the sea-level canal1 the sum of #bdg1jba1bjj4 ,your committee has adopted the figures stated by the majority on page #fd of its report of a total of #bej1jjj1jjj for the ultimate final cost of the sea-level canal4 ,the estimate of the minority for a lock canal at a level of eighty-five feet is1 in round figures1 #adj1jjj1jjj1 or about #aaj1jjj1jjj less than for a sea-level canal1 which would represent a difference of #b1bjj1jjj per annum in interest charges at the lowest possible rate of two per cent4 ,the majority of the ,senate committee attempt to meet this difference by capitalizing the estimated higher maintenance charge1 which they fix at #hjj1jjj per annum1 and they thus increase the total cost of a lock canal by #dj1jjj1jjj2 but this1 ,i hold1 involves a serious financial error1 unless a corresponding allowance is made for the ultimate cost of the sea-level project4 ,there is1 however1 no serious disagreement upon the point that a sea-level canal in any event would cost a very much larger sum as an original outlay1 certainly not less than #abj1jjj1jjj more1 and1 in all probability1 in the opinion of qualified engineers1 including ,mr4 ,stevens1 the chief engineer1 twice that sum4 ,reference is made in the report to the probable value of the land which will be inundated under the lock-canal project with a dam at ,gatun1 the value of which has been placed at approximately #cjj1jjj4 ,the majority of the ,senate committee estimate that this amount might reach #aj1jjj1jjj1 or as much as was paid for the entire ,canal ,zone4 ,the estimate is based upon the price of certain lands required by the government near the city of ,panama1 but one might as well estimate the worth of land in the ,adirondacks by the prices paid for real estate in lower ,new ,york4 ,the item1 no doubt1 requires to be properly taken into account1 but two independent estimates fix the probable sum at #cjj1jjj for lands which are otherwise practically valueless and which would only acquire value the moment the ,united ,states should need them4 ,in my opinion1 the value of these lands will not form a serious item in the total cost of the canal1 and ,i have every reason to believe that independent estimates of the minority engineers of the ,consulting ,board1 and of ,mr4 ,stevens1 may be relied upon as conservative4 ,the majority of the ,senate committee further say that-- ,it is not necessary to dwell upon the fact that all naval commanders and commercial masters of the great national and private vessels of the world are almost to a man opposed unalterably to the introduction of any lock to lift vessels over the low summit that nature has left for us to remove4 ,i am not aware that any material evidence of this character has come before the ,senate ,committee on ,isthmian ,affairs1 investigating conditions at ,panama4 ,i do know this1 however1 that until very recently it has been the ,american project to construct a lock canal4 ,all the former advocates of an ,american canal by way of ,panama or ,nicaragua1 or by any other route1 contemplated a lock canal of a much more complex character than the present ,panama project4 ,all the advocates of a canal across the ,isthmus1 including many distinguished engineers in the army and navy1 have been in favor of a lock canal1 and almost without exception have reported upon the feasibility of a lock canal across the ,isthmus and upon its advantages to commerce and navigation1 and in military and naval operations in case of war4 ,the ,nicaragua ,canal1 as recommended to ,congress and as favored by the first ,walker ,commission1 provided for a lock project far more complex than the proposition now under consideration4 ,colonel ,totten1 who built the ,panama railroad1 recommended as early as #aheg the construction of a lock canal2 ,naval ,commissioner ,lull1 who made a careful survey of the ,isthmus in #ahgd1 recommended a lock canal with a summit level of #abd feet and with #bd locks4 ,admiral ,ammen1 who1 by authority of the ,secretary of ,war1 attended the ,isthmian ,congress of #ahgi1 favored a lock project1 in strong opposition to the visionary plan of ,de ,lesseps4 ,admiral ,selfridge and many other naval officers who have been connected with ,isthmian surveying and exploration have never1 to my knowledge1 by as much as a word expressed their apprehensions regarding the feasibility or practicability of a lock canal4 ,as a matter of fact and canal history1 the lock project has very properly been considered an ,american conception of the proper treatment of the ,panama canal problem4 ,mr4 ,c4,d4 ,ward1 an ,american engineer of great ability1 as early as #ahgi suggested a plan almost identical with the one now recommended by the minority of the ,consulting ,board1 including a dam at ,gatun1 instead of ,bohio or ,gamboa2 and1 in the words of a former president of the ,american ,society of ,civil ,engineers1 ,mr4 ,welsh1 ,the first thought of an ,american engineer on looking at ,m4 ,de ,lesseps' raised map is to convert the valley of the lower ,chagres into an artificial lake some twenty miles long by a dam across the valley at or near a point where the proposed canal strikes it1 a few miles from ,colon1 such as was advocated by ,c4,d4 ,ward in #ahgi4 ,the site referred to was ,gatun1 and this was written in #ahhj1 when the sea-level project had full sway4 ,so that it is going entirely too far to say that all naval commanders and commercial masters are in favor of the sea-level project4 ,admiral ,walker himself1 as president of the former ,isthmian ,commission1 and as president of the ,nicaraguan ,board1 favored a lock canal4 ,eminent army engineers1 like ,abbot1 ,hains1 ,ernst1 and others1 favor the lock project4 ,it requires no very extensive knowledge of navigation to make it clear that passing through a waterway which for #ce miles1 or #ga per cent4 of its distance1 will have a width of #ejj feet or more1 compared with one which1 for the larger part1 or for some forty-one miles1 will have a width of only #bjj feet or less1 must appeal to the sense of security of the skipper while taking his vessel through the canal4 ,but it is a question of general principles1 and not of personal preference4 ,our concern is with a matter of fact1 and not with a theory4 ,no ship-owner on the ,great ,lakes considers it a serious hindrance to navigation for vessels to pass through the lock of the ,soo ,canal2 no shipper running #a1jjj-ton barges through the future ,erie ,canal will have the least apprehension of danger or destruction2 no captain navigating a vessel or boat through the proposed deep waterway from the ocean to the ,lakes will hesitate to pass through locks with a proposed lift of over forty feet4 ,these apprehensions are imaginary and not real4 ,they are not derived from experience or from a summary statement of shipmasters and naval officers1 but from the individual expressions and prejudice of a few who are opposed to the lock project4 ,i am confident that if the matter is left to the practical navigator1 to the ship-owner1 and to the self-reliant naval officer1 there will be no serious disagreement with the opinion that a lock canal1 which can be built within a reasonable period of time1 is preferable to any sea-level canal which may be built and opened to navigation twenty years hence or later4 ,there are two objections made by the majority of the ,senate committee against a lock canal which require more extended consideration4 ,these are1 the protection of the canal in case of war and the danger of serious injury or total destruction by possible earth movements or so-called earthquakes4 ,regarding the military aspects of the canal problem1 the majority of the ,senate committee say3 ,the ,spooner act and the ,hay-,varilla treaty contemplated the fortification and military protection of the canal route4 ,no proposition affecting this policy is now before the ,senate4 ,in so far as the type of canal to be adopted has a bearing upon the jeopardy to or immunity of the canal from risk of malicious injury1 the subject of safety and protection is pertinent and most important4 ,if a canal of one type would be more liable to injury than another1 this liability should under no circumstances be neglected in determining the type or plan4 ,it does not require argument that the use of the canal by the ,united ,states will cease if the control passes to a hostile power between which and the ,united ,states a state of war exists1 but this is true whatever the type may be4 ,as the majority of the committee point out1 no proposition affecting this project is now before the ,senate4 ,in my opinion1 none is necessary4 ,the neutrality of the canal is1 by implication at least1 assured1 and we have pledged our national good faith that the waterway will be open to all the nations of the world4 ,some time in the future1 when the canal is completed and an accepted fact1 it may be advisable to adopt the course pursued in the case of the ,suez ,canal4 ,the original concession for that canal provided1 by section #c1 for its subsequent fortification1 but this was never carried into effect4 ,by a convention dated ,december #bb1 #ahhh1 among ,great ,britain1 ,germany1 and other nations1 the free navigation of the ,suez ,canal was made a matter of international agreement1 and the same has been reprinted as ,senate ,document ,no4 #aea1 ,fifty-sixth ,congress1 first session1 under date of ,february #f1 #aijj4 ,this1 in any event1 is a problem of the future4 ,the canal is the property of the ,united ,states1 and we shall always retain control4 ,in the event of war we shall rely with confidence upon our navy to protect our interests on the ,pacific and in the ,caribbean ,sea1 but even more may we rely upon the all-important fact that it could never be to the interest of any other nation sufficient in size to be at war with us to destroy this international waterway1 which will become an important necessity to the commerce of each and all4 ,no neutral nation engaged in extensive commerce or trade would for an instant allow another nation at war with the ,united ,states to injure or destroy the canal or to seriously interfere with the traffic passing through it4 ,to destroy as much as a single lock1 to injure as much as a single gate1 would be considered equal to an act of war by every commercial nation of the earth4 ,in this simple fact lies a greater assurance of safety than in all the treaties which might be made or in all the fortifications which might be established to protect the canal4 ,the majority of the committee well say in their report1 that the power of mischief is within easy reach of all4 ,the possibility of an assumed occurrence is very remote from its reasonable probability4 ,we have to rely upon our own good faith and the watchful eyes of our officers4 ,against possible contingencies1 such as are implied in the assumed destruction of the locks by dynamite or other high explosives1 we can do no more than take the same precautions which we take in all other matters of national importance4 ,we have to take our chances the same as any other nation would2 the same as commercial enterprise would4 ,certainly the remote possibility of such an event1 the still more remote contingency that the injury would be serious or fatal to the operation of the canal1 should not govern in a decision to construct a canal for the use of the present generation rather than for the generations to come4 ,no canal can be built free from vulnerable points2 no forts1 no battleships1 can be built free from such a risk4 ,it would be folly to delay the construction of a canal2 it would be folly to sink a hundred million dollars or more upon so remote a contingency as this1 which belongs to the realm of fanciful or morbid imagination rather than to the domain of substantial fact and actual experience4 ,as a last resort1 the opposition to a lock canal brings forward the earthquake argument4 ,it is a curious reminder of the early and bitter opposition to the building of the ,suez ,canal2 its enemies had to fall back upon the absurd theory that the canal would prove a failure because the blowing sands of the desert would soon fill the channel4 ,it was seriously proposed to erect a stone wall four feet high on each side of the embankment to provide against this imaginary danger to the canal4 ,another early objection to the ,suez ,canal was that the ,red ,sea level was #cj feet above the level of the ,mediterranean1 only set at rest in #ahdg by a special commission1 which included ,mr4 ,robert ,stephenson1 the great son of a great father1 bitter to the last in his opposition to the canal1 which he considered an impracticable engineering scheme4 ,there was much talk about the assumed prevalence of strong westerly winds on the southern ,mediterranean coast1 and the danger of constantly increasing deposits of the ,nile1 it was said1 would render the establishment of a port impossible4 ,it was necessary to place a war-ship for a whole winter at anchor three miles from the shore to prove the error of this assumption and set at rest a foolish rumor which came near proving fatal to the enterprise4 ,earthquakes have occurred on the ,isthmus1 and there is record of one shock of some consequence in #ahhb4 ,the matter has been inquired into in a general way by the various ,isthmian commissions1 and assumed some prominence during the discussions and debates regarding a choice of routes4 ,it was plain to even the least informed that the volcanic belt of ,nicaragua constituted a real menace to a canal in that region2 and one of the strongest arguments advanced in the minority report of the ,senate committee of #aijb1 submitted by ,senator ,kittredge1 now a leading advocate of the sea-level project1 in opposition to the ,nicaragua ,canal1 was the assertion of the practical freedom of the ,panama ,isthmus from the danger of earth movements4 ,the minority of the ,senate committee of #aijb in their report1 summing up the final reasons in favor of the ,panama route 7section #ab71 said3 ,at ,panama earthquakes are few and unimportant1 while the ,nicaraguan route passes over a well-known coastal weakness4 ,only five disturbances of any sort were recorded at ,panama1 all very slight1 while similar official records at ,san ,jose de ,costa ,rica1 near the route of the ,nicaragua ,canal1 show for the same period fifty shocks1 a number of which were severe4 7,p4 #aa1 ,s4 ,rep4 #ghc1 part #b1 #egth ,cong41 #ast session1 ,may #ca1 #aijb47 ,in another part of their report the committee said3 ,with the dreadful lessons of ,martinique and ,st4 ,vincent fresh in our minds1 we should be utterly inexcusable if we deliberately selected a route for an ,isthmian canal in a region so volcanic and dangerous1 when a route is open to us which is exposed to none of these dangers and is in every other respect more advantageous4 ,and they quote ,professor ,heilprin1 an authority on the subject1 in part1 as follows3 ,it has1 however1 been known for a full quarter of a century that the main ,andes do not traverse the ,isthmus of ,panama1 and that there are no active or recently decayed volcanoes in any part of the ,isthmus4 ,so far1 however1 as danger from direct volcanic contacts is concerned1 the ,panama route is exempt4 7,pp4 #bb-bc47 ,and further3 ,this district represents the most stable portion of ,central ,america4 ,no volcanic eruptions have occurred there since the end of the ,miocene epoch1 and there are no active volcanoes between ,chiriqui and ,tolima1 a distance of about four hundred miles4 ,such earthquakes as have occurred are chiefly those proceeding from the disturbed districts on either hand1 with intensity much diminished by the distance traversed4 ,the canal lies in a sort of dead angle of comparative safety4 ,the report continues3 ,the situation being1 then1 that the danger from volcanoes at ,panama is nothing1 and that from earthquakes practically nothing1 while at ,nicaragua the canal would be situated in one of the most dangerous regions of the world from both these causes1 the question should be considered settled4 ,this was the opinion of the committee of #aijb2 it was emphatic and plain in its language2 it had considered expert views and the available data4 ,it had before it the full report of the ,nicaragua ,canal ,commission1 printed under date of ,may #aeth of the same year1 ,chapter ,,vii of which considers the subject at much greater length than has been done since that time and with a full knowledge of the facts and free from bias or prejudice4 ,with the then recent occurrence at ,mount ,pelee in mind1 and with a full understanding of the liability of the ,isthmus to seismic shocks of minor importance1 the committee emphatically indorsed the lock-canal project at ,panama4 ,much can be said with regard to this matter1 and it is one which should1 and no doubt will1 receive the most careful consideration of the engineers in charge of the work4 ,seismic disturbances have occurred in all parts of the world1 and they have occurred at ,panama4 ,where they are not directly of volcanic origin they appear to be the result of subsidence or contraction of the earth's crust1 and they have occurred and caused serious destruction far from centers of volcanic activity1 among other places1 at ,lisbon1 ,portugal1 and at ,charleston1 ,s4,c4 ,some sections of the earth1 as for illustration ,japan and the ,philippines1 are no doubt more subject to these movements than others1 and sections subject to such movements at one period of time may be exempt for many years if not forever thereafter4 ,the fearful earthquake which affected ,charleston1 ,s4,c41 in #ahhf had no corresponding precedent in that section1 nor has it been followed by a similar disturbance4 ,regardless of the terrible experience of #ahhf1 the government has now in course of construction at ,charleston a navy-yard1 and a great dry-dock1 costing many millions of dollars1 which will be operated by locks or gates1 and1 ,i presume1 the question of earthquakes or earth movements has not been raised in any of the reports which have been made regarding this undertaking4 ,earthquakes formerly were quite frequent in ,new ,england1 and they extended to ,new ,york during the early years of our history1 and for a time ,boston and ,newbury1 ,mass41 ,deerfield1 ,n4,h41 and particularly ,east ,haddam1 ,conn41 were the centers of seismic activity1 which by inference might be used as an argument against our navy-yards at ,portsmouth1 ,n4,h41 and ,charlestown1 ,mass41 our torpedo station at ,newport1 or the fortifications at ,willets ,point4 ,the earthquake which destroyed ,lisbon in #agee might with equal propriety be used as an argument against the building of the extensive docks and fortifications at ,gibraltar1 but no one1 ,i think1 has ever questioned the solidity of the ,rock4 ,seismology is a very complex branch of geologic inquiry and it is a subject regarding which very little of determining value is known4 ,theories have been advanced that under certain geological conditions earth movements would be comparatively infrequent1 if not impossible4 ,whether such conditions exist at ,panama would have to be determined by the investigations of qualified experts4 ,it would seem1 however1 from such data as are available1 that the local conditions are decidedly favorable to a comparative immunity of this region from serious seismic shocks1 at least such as would do great and general damage4 ,nor can it be argued that the locks and dams would be exposed to special risk4 ,the earthquake of #ahhb did more or less damage1 but the reports are of a very fragmentary character4 ,newspaper reports in matters of this kind have very small value4 ,injury was done to the railway1 but not of very serious consequence4 ,if the risk exists1 it would affect equally a sea-level canal1 in that it would threaten the tidal lock1 the dam at ,gamboa1 and the excavation through ,culebra cut4 ,very little is known regarding earthquake motions1 and there are very few seismic elements which are really calculable in conformity to a mathematical theory of probability4 ,it is a subject which has not received the attention in this country of which it is deserving1 but enough of seismic motion is known to warrant the conclusion that the ,senate committee of #aijb was1 in all human probability1 entirely correct when it made light of the danger of the probability of seismic shocks at ,panama4 ,in fine1 the earthquake argument has little or no force against a lock-canal project1 and it has never received serious consideration as such or been used in arguments against a lock canal until the recent ,san ,francisco disaster brought the subject prominently before the public4 ,it is a danger as remote as a possible destruction of the proposed terminal plants at ,colon and ,panama by flood waves equal in magnitude to the one which destroyed ,galveston in #aijj1 but such dangers are inherent in all human undertakings4 ,they must be taken as a matter of chance and remote possibility1 which for all present purposes may be left out of account1 except that the subject should receive the due consideration of the engineers and perhaps be made a matter of special and comprehensive inquiry by the ,geological ,survey4 ,in any serious consideration of the facts for or against a lock canal1 ,i am confident that the earthquake risk may safely be ignored4 ,the comprehensive report of the minority members of the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,affairs is a sufficient and conclusive answer to all the important points which are in controversy1 and it remains for ,congress to cut the ,gordian knot and put an end to an interminable discussion of much solid and substantial conviction on the one hand and of a vast amount of opinion and guesswork on the other hand4 ,all of the evidence1 all of the supplementary expert testimony which may be obtained upon the merits of the two propositions1 will not change the position of those who rest their conclusions upon ,american experience and upon the judgment of ,american engineers1 and who favor a lock canal4 ,while there is no doubt that such a canal can be constructed and can be made a practicable waterway1 there is a very serious question whether a sea-level canal can be constructed and made a safe and practicable waterway1 at least within the limits of the estimated amount of cost and within the estimated time4 ,the view which ,i have tried to impress upon the ,senate is nothing more nor less than a business view of what is1 for all practical purposes1 only a business proposition4 ,if a lock canal can be built1 useful for all purposes1 at half the cost and within half the time of a sea-level canal1 then ,i can come to no other conclusion than that a lock canal would be decidedly to our political and commercial advantage4 ,a decision1 however1 should be arrived at4 ,the canal project has reached a stage where the final plan or type must be determined1 and it is the duty of ,congress to act and to fix1 for once and for all time1 the type of canal1 with the same courage and freedom from prejudice or bias as was the case in the decision which finally fixed the route by way of ,panama4 ,any amount of additional testimony and expert opinion will only add to the confusion and tend to produce a more hopeless state of affairs4 ,let ,congress fix the type in broad outlines and leave it to responsible engineers in actual charge to solve problems in detail1 and to adapt themselves to local conditions and to new problems which in the course of construction are certain to arise4 ,let us take counsel of the past1 most of all from the experience gained in the construction of the ,suez ,canal1 an engineering and commercial success which challenges the admiration of the world4 ,we know how near it came to utter defeat by the conflict of opinion1 by the intrigue of conniving and jealous powers1 and last1 but not least1 by the ill-founded apprehensions and fears of those who were searching the vast domain of conjecture and remote possibilities for arguments to cause a temporary delay or ultimate abandonment4 ,it is not difficult to secure the opinion of eminent authority for or against any project when the facts themselves are in dispute1 and when the objects and aims are not well defined4 ,the great ,lord ,palmerston1 the most bitter opponent of the ,suez ,canal scheme1 in want of a more convincing argument1 seriously claimed that ,france would send soldiers disguised as workmen to the ,isthmus of ,suez1 later to take possession of ,egypt and make it a ,french colony4 ,by one method or another ,palmerston tried to defeat the scheme in its beginning and to bring it to disaster during the period of construction4 ,it is a far from creditable story4 ,history always more or less repeats itself1 whether it be in politics or engineering enterprise1 but in few affairs are there more convincing parallels than in the canal projects of ,panama and ,suez4 ,lord ,palmerston and ,sir ,henry ,bulwer1 then the ambassador at ,constantinople1 did all in their power to destroy public confidence in the enterprise1 and they were completely successful in preventing ,english investments in the stock of the canal4#b ,it was the same ,sir ,henry ,bulwer who1 in #ahej1 succeeded by questionable diplomatic methods in foisting upon the ,american people a treaty which was contrary to their best interests and which for half a century was a hindrance and barrier to an ,american ,isthmian canal4 ,we owe it chiefly to the masterly and straightforward statesmanship of the late ,john ,hay that this obstacle to our progress was disposed of to the entire satisfaction of both nations4 ,i refer to these matters1 which are facts of history1 only to point out how an interminable discussion of matters of detail is certain to delay and do great injury to projects which should only receive ,congressional consideration in broad outlines and upon fundamental principles4 ,if we are to enter into a discussion of engineering conflicts1 if we are to deliberate upon mere matters of structural detail1 then an entire session of ,congress will not suffice to solve all the problems which will arise in connection with that enterprise in the course of time4 ,i draw attention to the ,suez experience solely to point out the error of taking into serious account minor and far-fetched objections which assume an undue magnitude in the public mind when they are presented in lurid colors of impending disasters to a national enterprise of vast extent and importance4 ,so eminent an engineer as ,mr4 ,robert ,stephenson by his expert opinion deluded the ,british people into the belief that the ,suez ,canal would not be practicable2 that1 even if completed1 it would be nothing but a stagnant ditch4 ,said ,palmerston to ,de ,lesseps3 ,all the engineers of ,europe might say what they pleased1 he knew more than they did1 and his opinion would never change one iota1 and he would oppose the work to the end4 ,stephenson confirmed this view and held that the canal would never be completed except at an enormous expense1 too great to warrant any expectation of return--a judgment both ill advised and erroneous as was clearly proved by subsequent events4 ,i need only say that the ,suez ,canal is to-day an extremely profitable waterway1 and that although the work was commenced and brought to completion without a single ,english shilling1 through ,french enterprise and upon the judgment of ,french engineers1 it was only a comparatively few years later when1 as a matter of necessity and logical sequence1 the controlling interest in the canal was purchased by the ,english government1 which has since made of that waterway the most extensive use for purposes of peace and of war4 ,these are the facts of history1 and they are not disputed4 ,shall history repeat itself8 ,shall we delay or miscarry in our efforts to complete a canal across the ,isthmus of ,panama upon similar pretensions of assumed dangers and possibilities of disaster1 all more or less the result of engineering guesswork8 ,shall we take fright at the talk about the mischief-maker with his stick of dynamite1 bent upon the destruction of the locks and the vital parts of the machinery1 when history has its parallel during the ,suez ,canal agitation in the ,arab shepherd1 who1 flushed with the opportunity for mischief and with a few strokes of a pickax1 could empty the canal in a few minutes8 ,shall we be swayed by foolish fears and apprehensions of earthquakes or tidal waves1 and waste millions of money and years of time upon a pure conjecture1 a pure theory deduced from fragmentary facts8 ,again the facts of canal history furnish the parallel of ,stephenson and other engineers1 who successfully frightened ,english investors out of the ,suez enterprise by the statement that the canal would soon fill up with the moving sands of the desert1 that one of the lakes through which the canal would pass would soon fill up with salt1 that navigation of the ,red ,sea would be too dangerous and difficult1 that ships would fear to approach ,port ,said because of dangerous seas1 and1 finally1 that in any event it would be impossible to keep the passage open to the ,mediterranean4 ,it was this kind of guesswork and conjecture which was advanced as an argument by engineers of eminence and sustained by one of the foremost statesmen of the century4 ,how absurd it all seems now in the sunlight of history6 ,the ,panama ,canal is a business enterprise1 even if carried on by the nation1 and with a thorough knowledge of the general facts and principles we require no more expert evidence1 so called1 nor additional volumes of engineering testimony4 ,the nation is committed to the construction of a canal4 ,the enterprise is one of imperative necessity to commerce1 navigation1 and national defense1 and any further discussion1 any needless waste of time and money1 is little short of indifference to the national interests and objects which are at stake4 ,of objections to either plan there is no end1 and there will be no end as long as the subject remains open for discussion4 ,to answer such objections in detail1 to search the records for proof in support of one theory or another1 is a mere waste of time which can lead to no possible useful result4 ,among others1 for illustration1 there has been placed before us a letter from the chief engineer of the ,manchester ,ship ,canal1 who is emphatically in favor of a sea-level waterway4 ,it would have been much more interesting and much more valuable to the members of ,congress to have received from ,mr4 ,hunter a statement as to why he should have changed his opinions2 or why1 in #ahih1 he should have signed the unanimous report of the technical commission in favor of a lock canal1 while now he so emphatically sustains those who favor the sea-level project4 ,it is not going too far to say1 appealing to the facts of history1 that ,mr4 ,hunter may be seriously in error in this matter and may have drawn upon his imagination rather than upon his engineering experience1 the same as ,mr4 ,robert ,stephenson was in serious error in his bitter opposition to the canal enterprise at ,suez4 ,mr4 ,hunter1 in his letter1 argues1 among other points1 that the lifts of the proposed locks would be without precedent4 ,without precedent8 ,why1 of course1 they would be without precedent4 ,is not practically every large ,american engineering enterprise without precedent8 ,was not the ,erie ,canal1 completed in #ahbe1 without precedent8 ,were not the first steamboat and the first locomotive without precedent8 ,were not the ,hoosac ,tunnel and the ,brooklyn ,bridge feats of ,american engineering enterprise without precedent8 ,without precedent is the great barge canal which the ,state of ,new ,york is about to build1 which will mean a complete reconstruction of the existing waterway which connects the ocean with the ,great ,lakes4#c ,all this is without precedent4 ,but it is ,american4 ,it is progress1 and takes the necessary risk to leave the world better1 at least in a material way1 than we found it4 ,in the proposed deep waterway1 which is certain some day to be built to connect the uttermost ends of the ,great ,lakes with tide-water on the ,atlantic1 able and competent engineers of the largest experience have designed locks with a lift of #eb feet4#d ,that will be without precedent4 ,on the ,oswego ,canal1 proposed as a part of the new barge canal of the ,state of ,new ,york1 there will be six locks1 two of which will each have a lift of #bh feet1#e and that will be without precedent1 but neither dangerous nor detrimental to navigation interests4 ,need ,i further appeal to the facts of past canal history8 ,is it necessary to recite one of the best known and most honorable chapters in the history of inland waterways--,i mean the problems and difficulties inherent in the great project of constructing the canal of ,languedoc1 or ,canal du ,midi1 which forms a water communication between the ,mediterranean and the ,garonne and between the ,garonne and the ,atlantic ,ocean1 one of the best known canals in ,france and in the world8 ,need ,i refer to that pathetic story of its chief engineer1 ,riquet1 one of the greatest of ,french patriots1 who1 in his abiding faith in this great engineering feat1 stood practically alone8 ,need ,i recall that he met with scant assistance from the government1 with the most strenuous opposition from his countrymen2 that he was treated even as a madman and that he died of a broken heart before the great work was finished8 ,that canal stands to-day as an engineering masterwork and as a most suggestive illustration of man's ingenuity and power to overcome apparently insuperable natural obstacles4 ,it has been in existence and successful operation1 ,i think1 since #afha4 ,for a sixth part of its distance it is carried over mountains deeply excavated4 ,it has1 ,i think1 ninety-nine locks and viaducts1 and as one of its most wonderful features it has an octuple lock1 or eight locks in flight1 like a ladder from the top of a cliff to the valley below4 ,if in #afha a ,french engineer had the ability and the daring to conceive and construct an octuple lock1 will any one maintain that more than two hundred years later1 with all the enormous advance in engineering1 with a better knowledge of hydraulics and a more perfect method of transportation and handling of materials--will any one maintain that we are not to-day competent to construct successfully a lock canal such as is proposed to be built at ,panama upon the judgment of ,american engineers8 ,mr4 ,president1 the overshadowing importance of the subject has led me to extend my remarks far beyond my original intention4 ,i express my strong convictions in favor of a lock canal and of the necessity for an early and specific declaration of ,congress regarding the final plan or type of canal which the nation wants to have built at ,panama4 ,i am confident that it lies entirely within our power and means to build either type of waterway2 that our engineering skill can successfully solve the technical problems involved in either the lock or the sea-level plan2 but there is one all-important factor which controls1 and which1 in my opinion1 should have more weight than any other1 and that is the element of time4 ,if ,i could advance no other reasons1 if ,i knew of no better argument in favor of a lock canal1 my convictions would sustain the project which can be completed within a measurable distance of years and for the benefit and to the advantage of the present generation4 ,time flies1 and the years pass rapidly4 ,shall this project languish and linger and become the spoil of political controversy and a subject of political attack8 ,can we conceive of anything more likely to prove disastrous to the canal project than political strife1 which proved the undoing of the ,french canal enterprise at ,panama8 ,shall the success of this great project be imperiled by the possible changes in the fortunes of parties8 ,shall we incur the risk that changes in economic conditions1 hard times1 or panic and industrial depressions may bring about8 ,time flies1 and in the progress of industry and commerce1 in international competition and the growth of modern nations1 no factor is of more supreme importance than the years1 with new opportunities for political and commercial development4 ,shall we1 then1 neglect our chances8 ,shall we fail to make the most of this the greatest opportunity for the extension of our commerce and navigation into the most distant seas which will ever come to us in our history1 because of the demands of idealists1 who1 with theoretical notions of the ultimately desirable1 would deprive the nation and the world of what is necessary and indispensable to those who are living now8 ,vast commercial and political consequences will follow the opening of the transisthmian waterway4 ,in the annals of commerce and navigation it is not conceivable that there will ever be a greater event or one fraught with more momentous consequences than uninterrupted navigation between the ,atlantic and the ,pacific4 ,little enough can we comprehend or anticipate what the far-distant future will bring forth1 but this much we know--that it is our duty to solve the problems of to-day and not to indulge in dreams and fancies in a vain effort to solve the problems of a far-distant future4 ,but money also counts4 ,can we defend an expenditure of an additional #ajj1jjj1jjj or more for objects so remote1 and upon a basis of theory and fact so slender and so open to question1 when a plan and a project feasible and practicable is before us which will meet all of our needs and the needs of generations to come8 ,shall we disregard in the building of this canal every principle of a sound national economy and commit ourselves to an enormous waste of funds and to the imposition of needless burdens upon the taxpayers of this nation and upon the commerce of the world8 ,at least #b1jjj1jjj more per annum will be required in additional interest charges1 at least #ajj1jjj1jjj more will be necessary as an original investment4 ,do we fully realize what that amount of money would do if applied to other national purposes and projects8 ,i want to place on record my convictions and the reasons governing my vote in favor of the minority report for a lock canal across the ,isthmus at ,panama4 ,i entered upon an investigation of the subject without prejudice or bias and have examined the facts as they have been presented and as they are a matter of record and of history4 ,i have heard or read with care the evidence as it has been presented by the ,board of ,consulting ,engineers and the vast amount of oral testimony before the ,senate ,committee on ,interoceanic ,affairs4 ,i am confident that the minority judgment is the better and that it can be more relied upon1 because it is strictly in conformity with the entire history of the ,isthmian canal project4 ,i am confident that the objections which have been raised against the lock plan are an undue exaggeration of difficulties such as are inherent in every great engineering project1 and which1 ,i have not the slightest doubt1 will be successfully solved by ,american engineers1 in the light of ,american experience1 exactly as similar difficulties have been solved in many other enterprises of great magnitude4 ,i am not impressed with the reasons and arguments advanced by those who favor the sea-level project1 for they do not appeal to me as being sound1 and in some instances they come perilously near to being engineering guesswork characteristic of the earlier enterprises of ,de ,lesseps4 ,i cannot but think that bias and prejudice are largely responsible for the judgment of foreign engineers so pronounced in favor of a sea-level project4 ,furthermore1 ,i am entirely convinced that the judgment and experience of ,american engineers in favor of a lock canal may be relied upon with entire confidence1 and that such an enterprise will be brought to a successful termination4 ,i believe that in a national undertaking of this kind1 fraught with the gravest possible political and commercial consequences1 only the judgment of our own people should govern1 for the protection of our own interests1 which are primarily at stake4 ,i also prefer to accept the view and convictions of the members of the ,isthmian ,commission1 and of its chief engineer1 a man of extraordinary ability and large experience4 ,it is a subject upon which opinions will differ and upon which honest convictions may be widely at variance1 but in a question of such surpassing importance to the nation1 ,i1 for one1 shall side with those who take the ,american point of view1 place their reliance upon ,american experience1 and show their faith in ,american engineers4 ,illustration3 ,founded by ,,john ,f4 ,,dryden ,pioneer of ,industrial ,insurance in ,america ,,the ,,prudential ,,insurance ,,company ,,of ,,america ,incorporated under the laws of the ,state of ,new ,jersey ,,forrest ,f4 ,,dryden1 ,president ,,home ,,office1 ,,newark1 ,,new ,,jersey ,,footnotes3 #a ,report of the ,new ,panama ,canal ,company of ,france2 ,senate ,document #ahh1 #efth ,congress1 #ast session1 ,february #bj1 #aijj4 #b ,the ,maritime ,canal of ,suez1 from its inauguration1 ,november #ag1 #ahfi1 to the year #ahhd1 by ,prof4 ,j4,e4 ,nourse1 ,u4,s4,n41 ,washington1 #ahhd 7,senate ,document #aih1 #dhth ,congress1 #ast session74 #c ,for a history of ,american canal building enterprises see ,history of ,new ,york ,canals1 ch4 #e4 #d ,report of the ,board of ,engineers on ,deep ,waterways1 ,h4 of ,r41 ,doc4 ,no4 #adi1 #efth ,congress4 #b;d session1 ,atlas4 #e ,history of ,new ,york ,canals1 ,appendix ,l4 ,annual ,report of the ,state ,engineer and ,surveyor4 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,albany1 ,n4,y41 #aije4