,the ,categories   ,by  ,aristotle      
,translated by ,e4 ,m4 ,edghill         
,section #a  ,part #a  ,things are said 
to be named 'equivocally' when1 though  
they have a common name1 the definition 
corresponding with the name differs for 
each4 ,thus1 a real man and a figure in 
a picture can both lay claim to the name
 'animal'2 yet these are equivocally so 
named1 for1 though they have a common   
name1 the definition corresponding with 
the name differs for each4 ,for should  
any one define in what sense each is an 
animal1 his definition in the one case  
will be appropriate to that case only4  
,on the other hand1 things are said to  
be named 'univocally' which have both   
the name and the definition answering to
 the name in common4 ,a man and an ox   
are both 'animal'1 and these are        
univocally so named1 inasmuch as not    
only the name1 but also the definition1 
is the same in both cases3 for if a man 
should state in what sense each is an   
animal1 the statement in the one case   

would be identical with that in the     
other4  ,things are said to be named    
'derivatively'1 which derive their name 
from some other name1 but differ from it
 in termination4 ,thus the grammarian   
derives his name from the word          
'grammar'1 and the courageous man from  
the word 'courage'4    ,part #b  ,forms 
of speech are either simple or          
composite4 ,examples of the latter are  
such expressions as 'the man runs'1 'the
 man wins'2 of the former 'man'1 'ox'1  
'runs'1 'wins'4  ,of things themselves  
some are predicable of a subject1 and   
are never present in a subject4 ,thus   
'man' is predicable of the individual   
man1 and is never present in a subject4 
,by being 'present in a subject' ,i do  
not mean present as parts are present in
 a whole1 but being incapable of        
existence apart from the said subject4  
,some things1 again1 are present in a   
subject1 but are never predicable of a  
subject4 ,for instance1 a certain point 
of grammatical knowledge is present in  

the mind1 but is not predicable of any  
subject2 or again1 a certain whiteness  
may be present in the body 7for colour  
requires a material basis71 yet it is   
never predicable of anything4  ,other   
things1 again1 are both predicable of a 
subject and present in a subject4 ,thus 
while knowledge is present in the human 
mind1 it is predicable of grammar4      
,there is1 lastly1 a class of things    
which are neither present in a subject  
nor predicable of a subject1 such as the
 individual man or the individual horse4
 ,but1 to speak more generally1 that    
which is individual and has the         
character of a unit is never predicable 
of a subject4 ,yet in some cases there  
is nothing to prevent such being present
 in a subject4 ,thus a certain point of 
grammatical knowledge is present in a   
subject4    ,part #c  ,when one thing is
 predicated of another1 all that which  
is predicable of the predicate will be  
predicable also of the subject4 ,thus1  
'man' is predicated of the individual   

man2 but 'animal' is predicated of      
'man'2 it will1 therefore1 be predicable
 of the individual man also3 for the    
individual man is both 'man' and        
'animal'4  ,if genera are different and 
co-ordinate1 their differentiae are     
themselves different in kind4 ,take as  
an instance the genus 'animal' and the  
genus 'knowledge'4 ',with feet'1        
'two-footed'1 'winged'1 'aquatic'1 are  
differentiae of 'animal'2 the species of
 knowledge are not distinguished by the 
same differentiae4 ,one species of      
knowledge does not differ from another  
in being 'two-footed'4  ,but where one  
genus is subordinate to another1 there  
is nothing to prevent their having the  
same differentiae3 for the greater class
 is predicated of the lesser1 so that   
all the differentiae of the predicate   
will be differentiae also of the        
subject4    ,part #d  ,expressions which
 are in no way composite signify        
substance1 quantity1 quality1 relation1 
place1 time1 position1 state1 action1 or

 affection4 ,to sketch my meaning       
roughly1 examples of substance are 'man'
 or 'the horse'1 of quantity1 such terms
 as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits  
long'1 of quality1 such attributes as   
'white'1 'grammatical'4 ',double'1      
'half'1 'greater'1 fall under the       
category of relation2 'in the market    
place'1 'in the ,lyceum'1 under that of 
place2 'yesterday'1 'last year'1 under  
that of time4 ',lying'1 'sitting'1 are  
terms indicating position1 'shod'1      
'armed'1 state2 'to lance'1 'to         
cauterize'1 action2 'to be lanced'1 'to 
be cauterized'1 affection4  ,no one of  
these terms1 in and by itself1 involves 
an affirmation2 it is by the combination
 of such terms that positive or negative
 statements arise4 ,for every assertion 
must1 as is admitted1 be either true or 
false1 whereas expressions which are not
 in any way composite such as 'man'1    
'white'1 'runs'1 'wins'1 cannot be      
either true or false4    ,part #e       
,substance1 in the truest and primary   

and most definite sense of the word1 is 
that which is neither predicable of a   
subject nor present in a subject2 for   
instance1 the individual man or horse4  
,but in a secondary sense those things  
are called substances within which1 as  
species1 the primary substances are     
included2 also those which1 as genera1  
include the species4 ,for instance1 the 
individual man is included in the       
species 'man'1 and the genus to which   
the species belongs is 'animal'2 these1 
therefore--that is to say1 the species  
'man' and the genus 'animal1-are termed 
secondary substances4  ,it is plain from
 what has been said that both the name  
and the definition of the predicate must
 be predicable of the subject4 ,for     
instance1 'man' is predicated of the    
individual man4 ,now in this case the   
name of the species 'man' is applied to 
the individual1 for we use the term     
'man' in describing the individual2 and 
the definition of 'man' will also be    
predicated of the individual man1 for   

the individual man is both man and      
animal4 ,thus1 both the name and the    
definition of the species are predicable
 of the individual4  ,with regard1 on   
the other hand1 to those things which   
are present in a subject1 it is         
generally the case that neither their   
name nor their definition is predicable 
of that in which they are present4      
,though1 however1 the definition is     
never predicable1 there is nothing in   
certain cases to prevent the name being 
used4 ,for instance1 'white' being      
present in a body is predicated of that 
in which it is present1 for a body is   
called white3 the definition1 however1  
of the colour 'white' is never          
predicable of the body4  ,everything    
except primary substances is either     
predicable of a primary substance or    
present in a primary substance4 ,this   
becomes evident by reference to         
particular instances which occur4       
',animal' is predicated of the species  
'man'1 therefore of the individual man1 

for if there were no individual man of  
whom it could be predicated1 it could   
not be predicated of the species 'man'  
at all4 ,again1 colour is present in    
body1 therefore in individual bodies1   
for if there were no individual body in 
which it was present1 it could not be   
present in body at all4 ,thus everything
 except primary substances is either    
predicated of primary substances1 or is 
present in them1 and if these last did  
not exist1 it would be impossible for   
anything else to exist4  ,of secondary  
substances1 the species is more truly   
substance than the genus1 being more    
nearly related to primary substance4    
,for if any one should render an account
 of what a primary substance is1 he     
would render a more instructive account1
 and one more proper to the subject1 by 
stating the species than by stating the 
genus4 ,thus1 he would give a more      
instructive account of an individual man
 by stating that he was man than by     
stating that he was animal1 for the     

former description is peculiar to the   
individual in a greater degree1 while   
the latter is too general4 ,again1 the  
man who gives an account of the nature  
of an individual tree will give a more  
instructive account by mentioning the   
species 'tree' than by mentioning the   
genus 'plant'4  ,moreover1 primary      
substances are most properly called     
substances in virtue of the fact that   
they are the entities which underlie    
everything else1 and that everything    
else is either predicated of them or    
present in them4 ,now the same relation 
which subsists between primary substance
 and everything else subsists also      
between the species and the genus3 for  
the species is to the genus as subject  
is to predicate1 since the genus is     
predicated of the species1 whereas the  
species cannot be predicated of the     
genus4 ,thus we have a second ground for
 asserting that the species is more     
truly substance than the genus4  ,of    
species themselves1 except in the case  

of such as are genera1 no one is more   
truly substance than another4 ,we should
 not give a more appropriate account of 
the individual man by stating the       
species to which he belonged1 than we   
should of an individual horse by        
adopting the same method of definition4 
,in the same way1 of primary substances1
 no one is more truly substance than    
another2 an individual man is not more  
truly substance than an individual ox4  
,it is1 then1 with good reason that of  
all that remains1 when we exclude       
primary substances1 we concede to       
species and genera alone the name       
'secondary substance'1 for these alone  
of all the predicates convey a knowledge
 of primary substance4 ,for it is by    
stating the species or the genus that we
 appropriately define any individual    
man2 and we shall make our definition   
more exact by stating the former than by
 stating the latter4 ,all other things  
that we state1 such as that he is white1
 that he runs1 and so on1 are irrelevant

 to the definition4 ,thus it is just    
that these alone1 apart from primary    
substances1 should be called substances4
  ,further1 primary substances are most 
properly so called1 because they        
underlie and are the subjects of        
everything else4 ,now the same relation 
that subsists between primary substance 
and everything else subsists also       
between the species and the genus to    
which the primary substance belongs1 on 
the one hand1 and every attribute which 
is not included within these1 on the    
other4 ,for these are the subjects of   
all such4 ,if we call an individual man 
'skilled in grammar'1 the predicate is  
applicable also to the species and to   
the genus to which he belongs4 ,this law
 holds good in all cases4  ,it is a     
common characteristic of all substance  
that it is never present in a subject4  
,for primary substance is neither       
present in a subject nor predicated of a
 subject2 while1 with regard to         
secondary substances1 it is clear from  

the following arguments 7apart from     
others7 that they are not present in a  
subject4 ,for 'man' is predicated of the
 individual man1 but is not present in  
any subject3 for manhood is not present 
in the individual man4 ,in the same way1
 'animal' is also predicated of the     
individual man1 but is not present in   
him4 ,again1 when a thing is present in 
a subject1 though the name may quite    
well be applied to that in which it is  
present1 the definition cannot be       
applied4 ,yet of secondary substances1  
not only the name1 but also the         
definition1 applies to the subject3 we  
should use both the definition of the   
species and that of the genus with      
reference to the individual man4 ,thus  
substance cannot be present in a        
subject4  ,yet this is not peculiar to  
substance1 for it is also the case that 
differentiae cannot be present in       
subjects4 ,the characteristics          
'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are      
predicated of the species 'man'1 but not

 present in it4 ,for they are not in    
man4 ,moreover1 the definition of the   
differentia may be predicated of that of
 which the differentia itself is        
predicated4 ,for instance1 if the       
characteristic 'terrestrial' is         
predicated of the species 'man'1 the    
definition also of that characteristic  
may be used to form the predicate of the
 species 'man'3 for 'man' is            
terrestrial4  ,the fact that the parts  
of substances appear to be present in   
the whole1 as in a subject1 should not  
make us apprehensive lest we should have
 to admit that such parts are not       
substances3 for in explaining the phrase
 'being present in a subject'1 we       
stated' that we meant 'otherwise than as
 parts in a whole'4  ,it is the mark of 
substances and of differentiae that1 in 
all propositions of which they form the 
predicate1 they are predicated          
univocally4 ,for all such propositions  
have for their subject either the       
individual or the species4 ,it is true  

that1 inasmuch as primary substance is  
not predicable of anything1 it can never
 form the predicate of any proposition4 
,but of secondary substances1 the       
species is predicated of the individual1
 the genus both of the species and of   
the individual4 ,similarly the          
differentiae are predicated of the      
species and of the individuals4         
,moreover1 the definition of the species
 and that of the genus are applicable to
 the primary substance1 and that of the 
genus to the species4 ,for all that is  
predicated of the predicate will be     
predicated also of the subject4         
,similarly1 the definition of the       
differentiae will be applicable to the  
species and to the individuals4 ,but it 
was stated above that the word          
'univocal' was applied to those things  
which had both name and definition in   
common4 ,it is1 therefore1 established  
that in every proposition1 of which     
either substance or a differentia forms 
the predicate1 these are predicated     

univocally4  ,all substance appears to  
signify that which is individual4 ,in   
the case of primary substance this is   
indisputably true1 for the thing is a   
unit4 ,in the case of secondary         
substances1 when we speak1 for instance1
 of 'man' or 'animal'1 our form of      
speech gives the impression that we are 
here also indicating that which is      
individual1 but the impression is not   
strictly true2 for a secondary substance
 is not an individual1 but a class with 
a certain qualification2 for it is not  
one and single as a primary substance   
is2 the words 'man'1 'animal'1 are      
predicable of more than one subject4    
,yet species and genus do not merely    
indicate quality1 like the term 'white'2
 'white' indicates quality and nothing  
further1 but species and genus determine
 the quality with reference to a        
substance3 they signify substance       
qualitatively differentiated4 ,the      
determinate qualification covers a      
larger field in the case of the genus   

that in that of the species3 he who uses
 the word 'animal' is herein using a    
word of wider extension than he who uses
 the word 'man'4  ,another mark of      
substance is that it has no contrary4   
,what could be the contrary of any      
primary substance1 such as the          
individual man or animal8 ,it has none4 
,nor can the species or the genus have a
 contrary4 ,yet this characteristic is  
not peculiar to substance1 but is true  
of many other things1 such as quantity4 
,there is nothing that forms the        
contrary of 'two cubits long' or of     
'three cubits long'1 or of 'ten'1 or of 
any such term4 ,a man may contend that  
'much' is the contrary of 'little'1 or  
'great' of 'small'1 but of definite     
quantitative terms no contrary exists4  
,substance1 again1 does not appear to   
admit of variation of degree4 ,i do not 
mean by this that one substance cannot  
be more or less truly substance than    
another1 for it has already been stated 
that this is the case2 but that no      

single substance admits of varying      
degrees within itself4 ,for instance1   
one particular substance1 'man'1 cannot 
be more or less man either than himself 
at some other time or than some other   
man4 ,one man cannot be more man than   
another1 as that which is white may be  
more or less white than some other white
 object1 or as that which is beautiful  
may be more or less beautiful than some 
other beautiful object4 ,the same       
quality1 moreover1 is said to subsist in
 a thing in varying degrees at different
 times4 ,a body1 being white1 is said to
 be whiter at one time than it was      
before1 or1 being warm1 is said to be   
warmer or less warm than at some other  
time4 ,but substance is not said to be  
more or less that which it is3 a man is 
not more truly a man at one time than he
 was before1 nor is anything1 if it is  
substance1 more or less what it is4     
,substance1 then1 does not admit of     
variation of degree4  ,the most         
distinctive mark of substance appears to

 be that1 while remaining numerically   
one and the same1 it is capable of      
admitting contrary qualities4 ,from     
among things other than substance1 we   
should find ourselves unable to bring   
forward any which possessed this mark4  
,thus1 one and the same colour cannot be
 white and black4 ,nor can the same one 
action be good and bad3 this law holds  
good with everything that is not        
substance4 ,but one and the selfsame    
substance1 while retaining its identity1
 is yet capable of admitting contrary   
qualities4 ,the same individual person  
is at one time white1 at another black1 
at one time warm1 at another cold1 at   
one time good1 at another bad4 ,this    
capacity is found nowhere else1 though  
it might be maintained that a statement 
or opinion was an exception to the rule4
 ,the same statement1 it is agreed1 can 
be both true and false4 ,for if the     
statement 'he is sitting' is true1 yet1 
when the person in question has risen1  
the same statement will be false4 ,the  

same applies to opinions4 ,for if any   
one thinks truly that a person is       
sitting1 yet1 when that person has      
risen1 this same opinion1 if still held1
 will be false4 ,yet although this      
exception may be allowed1 there is1     
nevertheless1 a difference in the manner
 in which the thing takes place4 ,it is 
by themselves changing that substances  
admit contrary qualities4 ,it is thus   
that that which was hot becomes cold1   
for it has entered into a different     
state4 ,similarly that which was white  
becomes black1 and that which was bad   
good1 by a process of change2 and in the
 same way in all other cases it is by   
changing that substances are capable of 
admitting contrary qualities4 ,but      
statements and opinions themselves      
remain unaltered in all respects3 it is 
by the alteration in the facts of the   
case that the contrary quality comes to 
be theirs4 ,the statement 'he is        
sitting' remains unaltered1 but it is at
 one time true1 at another false1       

according to circumstances4 ,what has   
been said of statements applies also to 
opinions4 ,thus1 in respect of the      
manner in which the thing takes place1  
it is the peculiar mark of substance    
that it should be capable of admitting  
contrary qualities2 for it is by itself 
changing that it does so4  ,if1 then1 a 
man should make this exception and      
contend that statements and opinions are
 capable of admitting contrary          
qualities1 his contention is unsound4   
,for statements and opinions are said to
 have this capacity1 not because they   
themselves undergo modification1 but    
because this modification occurs in the 
case of something else4 ,the truth or   
falsity of a statement depends on facts1
 and not on any power on the part of the
 statement itself of admitting contrary 
qualities4 ,in short1 there is nothing  
which can alter the nature of statements
 and opinions4 ,as1 then1 no change     
takes place in themselves1 these cannot 
be said to be capable of admitting      

contrary qualities4  ,but it is by      
reason of the modification which takes  
place within the substance itself that a
 substance is said to be capable of     
admitting contrary qualities2 for a     
substance admits within itself either   
disease or health1 whiteness or         
blackness4 ,it is in this sense that it 
is said to be capable of admitting      
contrary qualities4  ,to sum up1 it is a
 distinctive mark of substance1 that1   
while remaining numerically one and the 
same1 it is capable of admitting        
contrary qualities1 the modification    
taking place through a change in the    
substance itself4  ,let these remarks   
suffice on the subject of substance4    
,part #f  ,quantity is either discrete  
or continuous4 ,moreover1 some          
quantities are such that each part of   
the whole has a relative position to the
 other parts3 others have within them no
 such relation of part to part4         
,instances of discrete quantities are   
number and speech2 of continuous1 lines1

 surfaces1 solids1 and1 besides these1  
time and place4  ,in the case of the    
parts of a number1 there is no common   
boundary at which they join4 ,for       
example3 two fives make ten1 but the two
 fives have no common boundary1 but are 
separate2 the parts three and seven also
 do not join at any boundary4 ,nor1 to  
generalize1 would it ever be possible in
 the case of number that there should be
 a common boundary among the parts2 they
 are always separate4 ,number1          
therefore1 is a discrete quantity4  ,the
 same is true of speech4 ,that speech is
 a quantity is evident3 for it is       
measured in long and short syllables4 ,i
 mean here that speech which is vocal4  
,moreover1 it is a discrete quantity for
 its parts have no common boundary4     
,there is no common boundary at which   
the syllables join1 but each is separate
 and distinct from the rest4  ,a line1  
on the other hand1 is a continuous      
quantity1 for it is possible to find a  
common boundary at which its parts join4

 ,in the case of the line1 this common  
boundary is the point2 in the case of   
the plane1 it is the line3 for the parts
 of the plane have also a common        
boundary4 ,similarly you can find a     
common boundary in the case of the parts
 of a solid1 namely either a line or a  
plane4  ,space and time also belong to  
this class of quantities4 ,time1 past1  
present1 and future1 forms a continuous 
whole4 ,space1 likewise1 is a continuous
 quantity2 for the parts of a solid     
occupy a certain space1 and these have a
 common boundary2 it follows that the   
parts of space also1 which are occupied 
by the parts of the solid1 have the same
 common boundary as the parts of the    
solid4 ,thus1 not only time1 but space  
also1 is a continuous quantity1 for its 
parts have a common boundary4           
,quantities consist either of parts     
which bear a relative position each to  
each1 or of parts which do not4 ,the    
parts of a line bear a relative position
 to each other1 for each lies somewhere1

 and it would be possible to distinguish
 each1 and to state the position of each
 on the plane and to explain to what    
sort of part among the rest each was    
contiguous4 ,similarly the parts of a   
plane have position1 for it could       
similarly be stated what was the        
position of each and what sort of parts 
were contiguous4 ,the same is true with 
regard to the solid and to space4 ,but  
it would be impossible to show that the 
parts of a number had a relative        
position each to each1 or a particular  
position1 or to state what parts were   
contiguous4 ,nor could this be done in  
the case of time1 for none of the parts 
of time has an abiding existence1 and   
that which does not abide can hardly    
have position4 ,it would be better to   
say that such parts had a relative      
order1 in virtue of one being prior to  
another4 ,similarly with number3 in     
counting1 'one' is prior to 'two'1 and  
'two' to 'three'1 and thus the parts of 
number may be said to possess a relative

 order1 though it would be impossible to
 discover any distinct position for     
each4 ,this holds good also in the case 
of speech4 ,none of its parts has an    
abiding existence3 when once a syllable 
is pronounced1 it is not possible to    
retain it1 so that1 naturally1 as the   
parts do not abide1 they cannot have    
position4 ,thus1 some quantities consist
 of parts which have position1 and some 
of those which have not4  ,strictly     
speaking1 only the things which ,i have 
mentioned belong to the category of     
quantity3 everything else that is called
 quantitative is a quantity in a        
secondary sense4 ,it is because we have 
in mind some one of these quantities1   
properly so called1 that we apply       
quantitative terms to other things4 ,we 
speak of what is white as large1 because
 the surface over which the white       
extends is large2 we speak of an action 
or a process as lengthy1 because the    
time covered is long2 these things      
cannot in their own right claim the     

quantitative epithet4 ,for instance1    
should any one explain how long an      
action was1 his statement would be made 
in terms of the time taken1 to the      
effect that it lasted a year1 or        
something of that sort4 ,in the same    
way1 he would explain the size of a     
white object in terms of surface1 for he
 would state the area which it covered4 
,thus the things already mentioned1 and 
these alone1 are in their intrinsic     
nature quantities2 nothing else can     
claim the name in its own right1 but1 if
 at all1 only in a secondary sense4     
,quantities have no contraries4 ,in the 
case of definite quantities this is     
obvious2 thus1 there is nothing that is 
the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 
'three cubits long'1 or of a surface1 or
 of any such quantities4 ,a man might1  
indeed1 argue that 'much' was the       
contrary of 'little'1 and 'great' of    
'small'4 ,but these are not             
quantitative1 but relative2 things are  
not great or small absolutely1 they are 

so called rather as the result of an act
 of comparison4 ,for instance1 a        
mountain is called small1 a grain large1
 in virtue of the fact that the latter  
is greater than others of its kind1 the 
former less4 ,thus there is a reference 
here to an external standard1 for if the
 terms 'great' and 'small' were used    
absolutely1 a mountain would never be   
called small or a grain large4 ,again1  
we say that there are many people in a  
village1 and few in ,athens1 although   
those in the city are many times as     
numerous as those in the village3 or we 
say that a house has many in it1 and a  
theatre few1 though those in the theatre
 far outnumber those in the house4 ,the 
terms 'two cubits long'1 'three cubits  
long'1 and so on indicate quantity1 the 
terms 'great' and 'small' indicate      
relation1 for they have reference to an 
external standard4 ,it is1 therefore1   
plain that these are to be classed as   
relative4  ,again1 whether we define    
them as quantitative or not1 they have  

no contraries3 for how can there be a   
contrary of an attribute which is not to
 be apprehended in or by itself1 but    
only by reference to something external8
 ,again1 if 'great' and 'small' are     
contraries1 it will come about that the 
same subject can admit contrary         
qualities at one and the same time1 and 
that things will themselves be contrary 
to themselves4 ,for it happens at times 
that the same thing is both small and   
great4 ,for the same thing may be small 
in comparison with one thing1 and great 
in comparison with another1 so that the 
same thing comes to be both small and   
great at one and the same time1 and is  
of such a nature as to admit contrary   
qualities at one and the same moment4   
,yet it was agreed1 when substance was  
being discussed1 that nothing admits    
contrary qualities at one and the same  
moment4 ,for though substance is capable
 of admitting contrary qualities1 yet no
 one is at the same time both sick and  
healthy1 nothing is at the same time    

both white and black4 ,nor is there     
anything which is qualified in contrary 
ways at one and the same time4          
,moreover1 if these were contraries1    
they would themselves be contrary to    
themselves4 ,for if 'great' is the      
contrary of 'small'1 and the same thing 
is both great and small at the same     
time1 then 'small' or 'great' is the    
contrary of itself4 ,but this is        
impossible4 ,the term 'great'1          
therefore1 is not the contrary of the   
term 'small'1 nor 'much' of 'little'4   
,and even though a man should call these
 terms not relative but quantitative1   
they would not have contraries4  ,it is 
in the case of space that quantity most 
plausibly appears to admit of a         
contrary4 ,for men define the term      
'above' as the contrary of 'below'1 when
 it is the region at the centre they    
mean by 'below'2 and this is so1 because
 nothing is farther from the extremities
 of the universe than the region at the 
centre4 ,indeed1 it seems that in       

defining contraries of every kind men   
have recourse to a spatial metaphor1 for
 they say that those things are         
contraries which1 within the same class1
 are separated by the greatest possible 
distance4  ,quantity does not1 it       
appears1 admit of variation of degree4  
,one thing cannot be two cubits long in 
a greater degree than another4          
,similarly with regard to number3 what  
is 'three' is not more truly three than 
what is 'five' is five2 nor is one set  
of three more truly three than another  
set4 ,again1 one period of time is not  
said to be more truly time than another4
 ,nor is there any other kind of        
quantity1 of all that have been         
mentioned1 with regard to which         
variation of degree can be predicated4  
,the category of quantity1 therefore1   
does not admit of variation of degree4  
,the most distinctive mark of quantity  
is that equality and inequality are     
predicated of it4 ,each of the aforesaid
 quantities is said to be equal or      

unequal4 ,for instance1 one solid is    
said to be equal or unequal to another2 
number1 too1 and time can have these    
terms applied to them1 indeed can all   
those kinds of quantity that have been  
mentioned4  ,that which is not a        
quantity can by no means1 it would seem1
 be termed equal or unequal to anything 
else4 ,one particular disposition or one
 particular quality1 such as whiteness1 
is by no means compared with another in 
terms of equality and inequality but    
rather in terms of similarity4 ,thus it 
is the distinctive mark of quantity that
 it can be called equal and unequal4    
,section #b   ,part #g  ,those things   
are called relative1 which1 being either
 said to be of something else or related
 to something else1 are explained by    
reference to that other thing4 ,for     
instance1 the word 'superior' is        
explained by reference to something     
else1 for it is superiority over        
something else that is meant4           
,similarly1 the expression 'double' has 

this external reference1 for it is the  
double of something else that is meant4 
,so it is with everything else of this  
kind4 ,there are1 moreover1 other       
relatives1 e4g4 habit1 disposition1     
perception1 knowledge1 and attitude4    
,the significance of all these is       
explained by a reference to something   
else and in no other way4 ,thus1 a habit
 is a habit of something1 knowledge is  
knowledge of something1 attitude is the 
attitude of something4 ,so it is with   
all other relatives that have been      
mentioned4 ,those terms1 then1 are      
called relative1 the nature of which is 
explained by reference to something     
else1 the preposition 'of' or some other
 preposition being used to indicate the 
relation4 ,thus1 one mountain is called 
great in comparison with another2 for   
the mountain claims this attribute by   
comparison with something4 ,again1 that 
which is called similar must be similar 
to something else1 and all other such   
attributes have this external reference4

 ,it is to be noted that lying and      
standing and sitting are particular     
attitudes1 but attitude is itself a     
relative term4 ,to lie1 to stand1 to be 
seated1 are not themselves attitudes1   
but take their name from the aforesaid  
attitudes4  ,it is possible for         
relatives to have contraries4 ,thus     
virtue has a contrary1 vice1 these both 
being relatives2 knowledge1 too1 has a  
contrary1 ignorance4 ,but this is not   
the mark of all relatives2 'double' and 
'triple' have no contrary1 nor indeed   
has any such term4  ,it also appears    
that relatives can admit of variation of
 degree4 ,for 'like' and 'unlike'1      
'equal' and 'unequal'1 have the         
modifications 'more' and 'less' applied 
to them1 and each of these is relative  
in character3 for the terms 'like' and  
'unequal' bear a reference to something 
external4 ,yet1 again1 it is not every  
relative term that admits of variation  
of degree4 ,no term such as 'double'    
admits of this modification4 ,all       

relatives have correlatives3 by the term
 'slave' we mean the slave of a master1 
by the term 'master'1 the master of a   
slave2 by 'double'1 the double of its   
half2 by 'half'1 the half of its double2
 by 'greater'1 greater than that which  
is less2 by 'less'1 less than that which
 is greater4  ,so it is with every other
 relative term2 but the case we use to  
express the correlation differs in some 
instances4 ,thus1 by knowledge we mean  
knowledge of the knowable2 by the       
knowable1 that which is to be           
apprehended by knowledge2 by perception1
 perception of the perceptible2 by the  
perceptible1 that which is apprehended  
by perception4  ,sometimes1 however1    
reciprocity of correlation does not     
appear to exist4 ,this comes about when 
a blunder is made1 and that to which the
 relative is related is not accurately  
stated4 ,if a man states that a wing is 
necessarily relative to a bird1 the     
connexion between these two will not be 
reciprocal1 for it will not be possible 

to say that a bird is a bird by reason  
of its wings4 ,the reason is that the   
original statement was inaccurate1 for  
the wing is not said to be relative to  
the bird qua bird1 since many creatures 
besides birds have wings1 but qua winged
 creature4 ,if1 then1 the statement is  
made accurate1 the connexion will be    
reciprocal1 for we can speak of a wing1 
having reference necessarily to a winged
 creature1 and of a winged creature as  
being such because of its wings4        
,occasionally1 perhaps1 it is necessary 
to coin words1 if no word exists by     
which a correlation can adequately be   
explained4 ,if we define a rudder as    
necessarily having reference to a boat1 
our definition will not be appropriate1 
for the rudder does not have this       
reference to a boat qua boat1 as there  
are boats which have no rudders4 ,thus  
we cannot use the terms reciprocally1   
for the word 'boat' cannot be said to   
find its explanation in the word        
'rudder'4 ,as there is no existing word1

 our definition would perhaps be more   
accurate if we coined some word like    
'ruddered' as the correlative of        
'rudder'4 ,if we express ourselves thus 
accurately1 at any rate the terms are   
reciprocally connected1 for the         
'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue
 of its rudder4 ,so it is in all other  
cases4 ,a head will be more accurately  
defined as the correlative of that which
 is 'headed'1 than as that of an animal1
 for the animal does not have a head qua
 animal1 since many animals have no     
head4  ,thus we may perhaps most easily 
comprehend that to which a thing is     
related1 when a name does not exist1 if1
 from that which has a name1 we derive a
 new name1 and apply it to that with    
which the first is reciprocally         
connected1 as in the aforesaid          
instances1 when we derived the word     
'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'4 
,all relatives1 then1 if properly       
defined1 have a correlative4 ,i add this
 condition because1 if that to which    

they are related is stated as haphazard 
and not accurately1 the two are not     
found to be interdependent4 ,let me     
state what ,i mean more clearly4 ,even  
in the case of acknowledged             
correlatives1 and where names exist for 
each1 there will be no interdependence  
if one of the two is denoted1 not by    
that name which expresses the           
correlative notion1 but by one of       
irrelevant significance4 ,the term      
'slave'1 if defined as related1 not to a
 master1 but to a man1 or a biped1 or   
anything of that sort1 is not           
reciprocally connected with that in     
relation to which it is defined1 for the
 statement is not exact4 ,further1 if   
one thing is said to be correlative with
 another1 and the terminology used is   
correct1 then1 though all irrelevant    
attributes should be removed1 and only  
that one attribute left in virtue of    
which it was correctly stated to be     
correlative with that other1 the stated 
correlation will still exist4 ,if the   

correlative of 'the slave' is said to be
 'the master'1 then1 though all         
irrelevant attributes of the said       
'master'1 such as 'biped'1 'receptive of
 knowledge'1 'human'1 should be removed1
 and the attribute 'master' alone left1 
the stated correlation existing between 
him and the slave will remain the same1 
for it is of a master that a slave is   
said to be the slave4 ,on the other     
hand1 if1 of two correlatives1 one is   
not correctly termed1 then1 when all    
other attributes are removed and that   
alone is left in virtue of which it was 
stated to be correlative1 the stated    
correlation will be found to have       
disappeared4  ,for suppose the          
correlative of 'the slave' should be    
said to be 'the man'1 or the correlative
 of 'the wing' is 'the bird'2 if the    
attribute 'master' be withdrawn from    
'the man'1 the correlation between 'the 
man' and 'the slave' will cease to      
exist1 for if the man is not a master1  
the slave is not a slave4 ,similarly1 if

 the attribute 'winged' be withdrawn    
from 'the bird'1 'the wing' will no     
longer be relative2 for if the so-called
 correlative is not winged1 it follows  
that 'the wing' has no correlative4     
,thus it is essential that the          
correlated terms should be exactly      
designated2 if there is a name existing1
 the statement will be easy2 if not1 it 
is doubtless our duty to construct      
names4 ,when the terminology is thus    
correct1 it is evident that all         
correlatives are interdependent4        
,correlatives are thought to come into  
existence simultaneously4 ,this is for  
the most part true1 as in the case of   
the double and the half4 ,the existence 
of the half necessitates the existence  
of that of which it is a half4          
,similarly the existence of a master    
necessitates the existence of a slave1  
and that of a slave implies that of a   
master2 these are merely instances of a 
general rule4 ,moreover1 they cancel one
 another2 for if there is no double it  

follows that there is no half1 and vice 
versa2 this rule also applies to all    
such correlatives4 ,yet it does not     
appear to be true in all cases that     
correlatives come into existence        
simultaneously4 ,the object of knowledge
 would appear to exist before knowledge 
itself1 for it is usually the case that 
we acquire knowledge of objects already 
existing2 it would be difficult1 if not 
impossible1 to find a branch of         
knowledge the beginning of the existence
 of which was contemporaneous with that 
of its object4  ,again1 while the object
 of knowledge1 if it ceases to exist1   
cancels at the same time the knowledge  
which was its correlative1 the converse 
of this is not true4 ,it is true that if
 the object of knowledge does not exist 
there can be no knowledge3 for there    
will no longer be anything to know4 ,yet
 it is equally true that1 if knowledge  
of a certain object does not exist1 the 
object may nevertheless quite well      
exist4 ,thus1 in the case of the        

squaring of the circle1 if indeed that  
process is an object of knowledge1      
though it itself exists as an object of 
knowledge1 yet the knowledge of it has  
not yet come into existence4 ,again1 if 
all animals ceased to exist1 there would
 be no knowledge1 but there might yet be
 many objects of knowledge4  ,this is   
likewise the case with regard to        
perception3 for the object of perception
 is1 it appears1 prior to the act of    
perception4 ,if the perceptible is      
annihilated1 perception also will cease 
to exist2 but the annihilation of       
perception does not cancel the existence
 of the perceptible4 ,for perception    
implies a body perceived and a body in  
which perception takes place4 ,now if   
that which is perceptible is            
annihilated1 it follows that the body is
 annihilated1 for the body is a         
perceptible thing2 and if the body does 
not exist1 it follows that perception   
also ceases to exist4 ,thus the         
annihilation of the perceptible involves

 that of perception4  ,but the          
annihilation of perception does not     
involve that of the perceptible4 ,for if
 the animal is annihilated1 it follows  
that perception also is annihilated1 but
 perceptibles such as body1 heat1       
sweetness1 bitterness1 and so on1 will  
remain4  ,again1 perception is generated
 at the same time as the perceiving     
subject1 for it comes into existence at 
the same time as the animal4 ,but the   
perceptible surely exists before        
perception2 for fire and water and such 
elements1 out of which the animal is    
itself composed1 exist before the animal
 is an animal at all1 and before        
perception4 ,thus it would seem that the
 perceptible exists before perception4  
,it may be questioned whether it is true
 that no substance is relative1 as seems
 to be the case1 or whether exception is
 to be made in the case of certain      
secondary substances4 ,with regard to   
primary substances1 it is quite true    
that there is no such possibility1 for  

neither wholes nor parts of primary     
substances are relative4 ,the individual
 man or ox is not defined with reference
 to something external4 ,similarly with 
the parts3 a particular hand or head is 
not defined as a particular hand or head
 of a particular person1 but as the hand
 or head of a particular person4 ,it is 
true also1 for the most part at least1  
in the case of secondary substances2 the
 species 'man' and the species 'ox' are 
not defined with reference to anything  
outside themselves4 ,wood1 again1 is    
only relative in so far as it is some   
one's property1 not in so far as it is  
wood4 ,it is plain1 then1 that in the   
cases mentioned substance is not        
relative4 ,but with regard to some      
secondary substances there is a         
difference of opinion2 thus1 such terms 
as 'head' and 'hand' are defined with   
reference to that of which the things   
indicated are a part1 and so it comes   
about that these appear to have a       
relative character4 ,indeed1 if our     

definition of that which is relative was
 complete1 it is very difficult1 if not 
impossible1 to prove that no substance  
is relative4 ,if1 however1 our          
definition was not complete1 if those   
things only are properly called relative
 in the case of which relation to an    
external object is a necessary condition
 of existence1 perhaps some explanation 
of the dilemma may be found4  ,the      
former definition does indeed apply to  
all relatives1 but the fact that a thing
 is explained with reference to         
something else does not make it         
essentially relative4  ,from this it is 
plain that1 if a man definitely         
apprehends a relative thing1 he will    
also definitely apprehend that to which 
it is relative4 ,indeed this is         
self-evident3 for if a man knows that   
some particular thing is relative1      
assuming that we call that a relative in
 the case of which relation to something
 is a necessary condition of existence1 
he knows that also to which it is       

related4 ,for if he does not know at all
 that to which it is related1 he will   
not know whether or not it is relative4 
,this is clear1 moreover1 in particular 
instances4 ,if a man knows definitely   
that such and such a thing is 'double'1 
he will also forthwith know definitely  
that of which it is the double4 ,for if 
there is nothing definite of which he   
knows it to be the double1 he does not  
know at all that it is double4 ,again1  
if he knows that a thing is more        
beautiful1 it follows necessarily that  
he will forthwith definitely know that  
also than which it is more beautiful4   
,he will not merely know indefinitely   
that it is more beautiful than something
 which is less beautiful1 for this would
 be supposition1 not knowledge4 ,for if 
he does not know definitely that than   
which it is more beautiful1 he can no   
longer claim to know definitely that it 
is more beautiful than something else   
which is less beautiful3 for it might be
 that nothing was less beautiful4 ,it   

is1 therefore1 evident that if a man    
apprehends some relative thing          
definitely1 he necessarily knows that   
also definitely to which it is related4 
,now the head1 the hand1 and such things
 are substances1 and it is possible to  
know their essential character          
definitely1 but it does not necessarily 
follow that we should know that to which
 they are related4 ,it is not possible  
to know forthwith whose head or hand is 
meant4 ,thus these are not relatives1   
and1 this being the case1 it would be   
true to say that no substance is        
relative in character4 ,it is perhaps a 
difficult matter1 in such cases1 to make
 a positive statement without more      
exhaustive examination1 but to have     
raised questions with regard to details 
is not without advantage4    ,part #h   
,by 'quality' ,i mean that in virtue of 
which people are said to be such and    
such4  ,quality is a term that is used  
in many senses4 ,one sort of quality let
 us call 'habit' or 'disposition'4      

,habit differs from disposition in being
 more lasting and more firmly           
established4 ,the various kinds of      
knowledge and of virtue are habits1 for 
knowledge1 even when acquired only in a 
moderate degree1 is1 it is agreed1      
abiding in its character and difficult  
to displace1 unless some great mental   
upheaval takes place1 through disease or
 any such cause4 ,the virtues1 also1    
such as justice1 self-restraint1 and so 
on1 are not easily dislodged or         
dismissed1 so as to give place to vice4 
,by a disposition1 on the other hand1 we
 mean a condition that is easily changed
 and quickly gives place to its         
opposite4 ,thus1 heat1 cold1 disease1   
health1 and so on are dispositions4 ,for
 a man is disposed in one way or another
 with reference to these1 but quickly   
changes1 becoming cold instead of warm1 
ill instead of well4 ,so it is with all 
other dispositions also1 unless through 
lapse of time a disposition has itself  
become inveterate and almost impossible 

to dislodge3 in which case we should    
perhaps go so far as to call it a habit4
  ,it is evident that men incline to    
call those conditions habits which are  
of a more or less permanent type and    
difficult to displace2 for those who are
 not retentive of knowledge1 but        
volatile1 are not said to have such and 
such a 'habit' as regards knowledge1 yet
 they are disposed1 we may say1 either  
better or worse1 towards knowledge4     
,thus habit differs from disposition in 
this1 that while the latter in          
ephemeral1 the former is permanent and  
difficult to alter4  ,habits are at the 
same time dispositions1 but dispositions
 are not necessarily habits4 ,for those 
who have some specific habit may be said
 also1 in virtue of that habit1 to be   
thus or thus disposed2 but those who are
 disposed in some specific way have not 
in all cases the corresponding habit4   
,another sort of quality is that in     
virtue of which1 for example1 we call   
men good boxers or runners1 or healthy  

or sickly3 in fact it includes all those
 terms which refer to inborn capacity or
 incapacity4 ,such things are not       
predicated of a person in virtue of his 
disposition1 but in virtue of his inborn
 capacity or incapacity to do something 
with ease or to avoid defeat of any     
kind4 ,persons are called good boxers or
 good runners1 not in virtue of such and
 such a disposition1 but in virtue of an
 inborn capacity to accomplish something
 with ease4 ,men are called healthy in  
virtue of the inborn capacity of easy   
resistance to those unhealthy influences
 that may ordinarily arise2 unhealthy1  
in virtue of the lack of this capacity4 
,similarly with regard to softness and  
hardness4 ,hardness is predicated of a  
thing because it has that capacity of   
resistance which enables it to withstand
 disintegration2 softness1 again1 is    
predicated of a thing by reason of the  
lack of that capacity4  ,a third class  
within this category is that of         
affective qualities and affections4     

,sweetness1 bitterness1 sourness1 are   
examples of this sort of quality1       
together with all that is akin to these2
 heat1 moreover1 and cold1 whiteness1   
and blackness are affective qualities4  
,it is evident that these are qualities1
 for those things that possess them are 
themselves said to be such and such by  
reason of their presence4 ,honey is     
called sweet because it contains        
sweetness2 the body is called white     
because it contains whiteness2 and so in
 all other cases4  ,the term 'affective 
quality' is not used as indicating that 
those things which admit these qualities
 are affected in any way4 ,honey is not 
called sweet because it is affected in a
 specific way1 nor is this what is meant
 in any other instance4 ,similarly heat 
and cold are called affective qualities1
 not because those things which admit   
them are affected4 ,what is meant is    
that these said qualities are capable of
 producing an 'affection' in the way of 
perception4 ,for sweetness has the power

 of affecting the sense of taste2 heat1 
that of touch2 and so it is with the    
rest of these qualities4  ,whiteness and
 blackness1 however1 and the other      
colours1 are not said to be affective   
qualities in this sense1 but because    
they themselves are the results of an   
affection4 ,it is plain that many       
changes of colour take place because of 
affections4 ,when a man is ashamed1 he  
blushes2 when he is afraid1 he becomes  
pale1 and so on4 ,so true is this1 that 
when a man is by nature liable to such  
affections1 arising from some           
concomitance of elements in his         
constitution1 it is a probable inference
 that he has the corresponding          
complexion of skin4 ,for the same       
disposition of bodily elements1 which in
 the former instance was momentarily    
present in the case of an access of     
shame1 might be a result of a man's     
natural temperament1 so as to produce   
the corresponding colouring also as a   
natural characteristic4 ,all conditions1

 therefore1 of this kind1 if caused by  
certain permanent and lasting           
affections1 are called affective        
qualities4 ,for pallor and duskiness of 
complexion are called qualities1        
inasmuch as we are said to be such and  
such in virtue of them1 not only if they
 originate in natural constitution1 but 
also if they come about through long    
disease or sunburn1 and are difficult to
 remove1 or indeed remain throughout    
life4 ,for in the same way we are said  
to be such and such because of these4   
,those conditions1 however1 which arise 
from causes which may easily be rendered
 ineffective or speedily removed1 are   
called1 not qualities1 but affections3  
for we are not said to be such in virtue
 of them4 ,the man who blushes through  
shame is not said to be a constitutional
 blusher1 nor is the man who becomes    
pale through fear said to be            
constitutionally pale4 ,he is said      
rather to have been affected4  ,thus    
such conditions are called affections1  

not qualities4 ,in like manner there are
 affective qualities and affections of  
the soul4 ,that temper with which a man 
is born and which has its origin in     
certain deep-seated affections is called
 a quality4 ,i mean such conditions as  
insanity1 irascibility1 and so on3 for  
people are said to be mad or irascible  
in virtue of these4 ,similarly those    
abnormal psychic states which are not   
inborn1 but arise from the concomitance 
of certain other elements1 and are      
difficult to remove1 or altogether      
permanent1 are called qualities1 for in 
virtue of them men are said to be such  
and such4  ,those1 however1 which arise 
from causes easily rendered ineffective 
are called affections1 not qualities4   
,suppose that a man is irritable when   
vexed3 he is not even spoken of as a    
bad-tempered man1 when in such          
circumstances he loses his temper       
somewhat1 but rather is said to be      
affected4 ,such conditions are therefore
 termed1 not qualities1 but affections4 

,the fourth sort of quality is figure   
and the shape that belongs to a thing2  
and besides this1 straightness and      
curvedness and any other qualities of   
this type2 each of these defines a thing
 as being such and such4 ,because it is 
triangular or quadrangular a thing is   
said to have a specific character1 or   
again because it is straight or curved2 
in fact a thing's shape in every case   
gives rise to a qualification of it4    
,rarity and density1 roughness and      
smoothness1 seem to be terms indicating 
quality3 yet these1 it would appear1    
really belong to a class different from 
that of quality4 ,for it is rather a    
certain relative position of the parts  
composing the thing thus qualified      
which1 it appears1 is indicated by each 
of these terms4 ,a thing is dense1 owing
 to the fact that its parts are closely 
combined with one another2 rare1 because
 there are interstices between the      
parts2 smooth1 because its parts lie1 so
 to speak1 evenly2 rough1 because some  

parts project beyond others4  ,there may
 be other sorts of quality1 but those   
that are most properly so called have1  
we may safely say1 been enumerated4     
,these1 then1 are qualities1 and the    
things that take their name from them as
 derivatives1 or are in some other way  
dependent on them1 are said to be       
qualified in some specific way4 ,in     
most1 indeed in almost all cases1 the   
name of that which is qualified is      
derived from that of the quality4 ,thus 
the terms 'whiteness'1 'grammar'1       
'justice'1 give us the adjectives       
'white'1 'grammatical'1 'just'1 and so  
on4  ,there are some cases1 however1 in 
which1 as the quality under             
consideration has no name1 it is        
impossible that those possessed of it   
should have a name that is derivative4  
,for instance1 the name given to the    
runner or boxer1 who is so called in    
virtue of an inborn capacity1 is not    
derived from that of any quality2 for   
both those capacities have no name      

assigned to them4 ,in this1 the inborn  
capacity is distinct from the science1  
with reference to which men are called1 
e4g4 boxers or wrestlers4 ,such a       
science is classed as a disposition2 it 
has a name1 and is called 'boxing' or   
'wrestling' as the case may be1 and the 
name given to those disposed in this way
 is derived from that of the science4   
,sometimes1 even though a name exists   
for the quality1 that which takes its   
character from the quality has a name   
that is not a derivative4 ,for instance1
 the upright man takes his character    
from the possession of the quality of   
integrity1 but the name given him is not
 derived from the word 'integrity'4 ,yet
 this does not occur often4  ,we may    
therefore state that those things are   
said to be possessed of some specific   
quality which have a name derived from  
that of the aforesaid quality1 or which 
are in some other way dependent on it4  
,one quality may be the contrary of     
another2 thus justice is the contrary of

 injustice1 whiteness of blackness1 and 
so on4 ,the things1 also1 which are said
 to be such and such in virtue of these 
qualities1 may be contrary the one to   
the other2 for that which is unjust is  
contrary to that which is just1 that    
which is white to that which is black4  
,this1 however1 is not always the case4 
,red1 yellow1 and such colours1 though  
qualities1 have no contraries4  ,if one 
of two contraries is a quality1 the     
other will also be a quality4 ,this will
 be evident from particular instances1  
if we apply the names used to denote the
 other categories2 for instance1 granted
 that justice is the contrary of        
injustice and justice is a quality1     
injustice will also be a quality3       
neither quantity1 nor relation1 nor     
place1 nor indeed any other category but
 that of quality1 will be applicable    
properly to injustice4 ,so it is with   
all other contraries falling under the  
category of quality4  ,qualities admit  
of variation of degree4 ,whiteness is   

predicated of one thing in a greater or 
less degree than of another4 ,this is   
also the case with reference to justice4
 ,moreover1 one and the same thing may  
exhibit a quality in a greater degree   
than it did before3 if a thing is white1
 it may become whiter4  ,though this is 
generally the case1 there are           
exceptions4 ,for if we should say that  
justice admitted of variation of degree1
 difficulties might ensue1 and this is  
true with regard to all those qualities 
which are dispositions4 ,there are some1
 indeed1 who dispute the possibility of 
variation here4 ,they maintain that     
justice and health cannot very well     
admit of variation of degree themselves1
 but that people vary in the degree in  
which they possess these qualities1 and 
that this is the case with grammatical  
learning and all those qualities which  
are classed as dispositions4 ,however   
that may be1 it is an incontrovertible  
fact that the things which in virtue of 
these qualities are said to be what they

 are vary in the degree in which they   
possess them2 for one man is said to be 
better versed in grammar1 or more       
healthy or just1 than another1 and so   
on4  ,the qualities expressed by the    
terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do
 not appear to admit of variation of    
degree1 nor indeed do any that have to  
do with figure4 ,for those things to    
which the definition of the triangle or 
circle is applicable are all equally    
triangular or circular4 ,those1 on the  
other hand1 to which the same definition
 is not applicable1 cannot be said to   
differ from one another in degree2 the  
square is no more a circle than the     
rectangle1 for to neither is the        
definition of the circle appropriate4   
,in short1 if the definition of the term
 proposed is not applicable to both     
objects1 they cannot be compared4 ,thus 
it is not all qualities which admit of  
variation of degree4  ,whereas none of  
the characteristics ,i have mentioned   
are peculiar to quality1 the fact that  

likeness and unlikeness can be          
predicated with reference to quality    
only1 gives to that category its        
distinctive feature4 ,one thing is like 
another only with reference to that in  
virtue of which it is such and such2    
thus this forms the peculiar mark of    
quality4  ,we must not be disturbed     
because it may be argued that1 though   
proposing to discuss the category of    
quality1 we have included in it many    
relative terms4 ,we did say that habits 
and dispositions were relative4 ,in     
practically all such cases the genus is 
relative1 the individual not4 ,thus     
knowledge1 as a genus1 is explained by  
reference to something else1 for we mean
 a knowledge of something4 ,but         
particular branches of knowledge are not
 thus explained4 ,the knowledge of      
grammar is not relative to anything     
external1 nor is the knowledge of music1
 but these1 if relative at all1 are     
relative only in virtue of their genera2
 thus grammar is said be the knowledge  

of something1 not the grammar of        
something2 similarly music is the       
knowledge of something1 not the music of
 something4  ,thus individual branches  
of knowledge are not relative4 ,and it  
is because we possess these individual  
branches of knowledge that we are said  
to be such and such4 ,it is these that  
we actually possess3 we are called      
experts because we possess knowledge in 
some particular branch4 ,those          
particular branches1 therefore1 of      
knowledge1 in virtue of which we are    
sometimes said to be such and such1 are 
themselves qualities1 and are not       
relative4 ,further1 if anything should  
happen to fall within both the category 
of quality and that of relation1 there  
would be nothing extraordinary in       
classing it under both these heads4     
,section #c   ,part #i  ,action and     
affection both admit of contraries and  
also of variation of degree4 ,heating is
 the contrary of cooling1 being heated  
of being cooled1 being glad of being    

vexed4 ,thus they admit of contraries4  
,they also admit of variation of degree3
 for it is possible to heat in a greater
 or less degree2 also to be heated in a 
greater or less degree4 ,thus action and
 affection also admit of variation of   
degree4 ,so much1 then1 is stated with  
regard to these categories4  ,we spoke1 
moreover1 of the category of position   
when we were dealing with that of       
relation1 and stated that such terms    
derived their names from those of the   
corresponding attitudes4  ,as for the   
rest1 time1 place1 state1 since they are
 easily intelligible1 ,i say no more    
about them than was said at the         
beginning1 that in the category of state
 are included such states as 'shod'1    
'armed'1 in that of place 'in the       
,lyceum' and so on1 as was explained    
before4    ,part #aj  ,the proposed     
categories have1 then1 been adequately  
dealt with4 ,we must next explain the   
various senses in which the term        
'opposite' is used4 ,things are said to 

be opposed in four senses3 7i7 as       
correlatives to one another1 7ii7 as    
contraries to one another1 7iii7 as     
privatives to positives1 7iv7 as        
affirmatives to negatives4  ,let me     
sketch my meaning in outline4 ,an       
instance of the use of the word         
'opposite' with reference to            
correlatives is afforded by the         
expressions 'double' and 'half'2 with   
reference to contraries by 'bad' and    
'good'4 ,opposites in the sense of      
'privatives' and 'positives' are        
'blindness' and 'sight'2 in the sense of
 affirmatives and negatives1 the        
propositions 'he sits'1 'he does not    
sit'4  7i7 ,pairs of opposites which    
fall under the category of relation are 
explained by a reference of the one to  
the other1 the reference being indicated
 by the preposition 'of' or by some     
other preposition4 ,thus1 double is a   
relative term1 for that which is double 
is explained as the double of something4
 ,knowledge1 again1 is the opposite of  

the thing known1 in the same sense2 and 
the thing known also is explained by its
 relation to its opposite1 knowledge4   
,for the thing known is explained as    
that which is known by something1 that  
is1 by knowledge4 ,such things1 then1 as
 are opposite the one to the other in   
the sense of being correlatives are     
explained by a reference of the one to  
the other4  7ii7 ,pairs of opposites    
which are contraries are not in any way 
interdependent1 but are contrary the one
 to the other4 ,the good is not spoken  
of as the good of the bad1 but as the   
contrary of the bad1 nor is white spoken
 of as the white of the black1 but as   
the contrary of the black4 ,these two   
types of opposition are therefore       
distinct4 ,those contraries which are   
such that the subjects in which they are
 naturally present1 or of which they are
 predicated1 must necessarily contain   
either the one or the other of them1    
have no intermediate1 but those in the  
case of which no such necessity obtains1

 always have an intermediate4 ,thus     
disease and health are naturally present
 in the body of an animal1 and it is    
necessary that either the one or the    
other should be present in the body of  
an animal4 ,odd and even1 again1 are    
predicated of number1 and it is         
necessary that the one or the other     
should be present in numbers4 ,now there
 is no intermediate between the terms of
 either of these two pairs4 ,on the     
other hand1 in those contraries with    
regard to which no such necessity       
obtains1 we find an intermediate4       
,blackness and whiteness are naturally  
present in the body1 but it is not      
necessary that either the one or the    
other should be present in the body1    
inasmuch as it is not true to say that  
everybody must be white or black4       
,badness and goodness1 again1 are       
predicated of man1 and of many other    
things1 but it is not necessary that    
either the one quality or the other     
should be present in that of which they 

are predicated3 it is not true to say   
that everything that may be good or bad 
must be either good or bad4 ,these pairs
 of contraries have intermediates3 the  
intermediates between white and black   
are grey1 sallow1 and all the other     
colours that come between2 the          
intermediate between good and bad is    
that which is neither the one nor the   
other4  ,some intermediate qualities    
have names1 such as grey and sallow and 
all the other colours that come between 
white and black2 in other cases1        
however1 it is not easy to name the     
intermediate1 but we must define it as  
that which is not either extreme1 as in 
the case of that which is neither good  
nor bad1 neither just nor unjust4  7iii7
 'privatives' and 'positives' have      
reference to the same subject4 ,thus1   
sight and blindness have reference to   
the eye4 ,it is a universal rule that   
each of a pair of opposites of this type
 has reference to that to which the     
particular 'positive' is natural4 ,we   

say that that is capable of some        
particular faculty or possession has    
suffered privation when the faculty or  
possession in question is in no way     
present in that in which1 and at the    
time at which1 it should naturally be   
present4 ,we do not call that toothless 
which has not teeth1 or that blind which
 has not sight1 but rather that which   
has not teeth or sight at the time when 
by nature it should4 ,for there are some
 creatures which from birth are without 
sight1 or without teeth1 but these are  
not called toothless or blind4  ,to be  
without some faculty or to possess it is
 not the same as the corresponding      
'privative' or 'positive'4 ',sight' is a
 'positive'1 'blindness' a 'privative'1 
but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent
 to 'sight'1 'to be blind' is not       
equivalent to 'blindness'4 ,blindness is
 a 'privative'1 to be blind is to be in 
a state of privation1 but is not a      
'privative'4 ,moreover1 if 'blindness'  
were equivalent to 'being blind'1 both  

would be predicated of the same subject2
 but though a man is said to be blind1  
he is by no means said to be blindness4 
,to be in a state of 'possession' is1 it
 appears1 the opposite of being in a    
state of 'privation'1 just as           
'positives' and 'privatives' themselves 
are opposite4 ,there is the same type of
 antithesis in both cases2 for just as  
blindness is opposed to sight1 so is    
being blind opposed to having sight4    
,that which is affirmed or denied is not
 itself affirmation or denial4 ,by      
'affirmation' we mean an affirmative    
proposition1 by 'denial' a negative4    
,now1 those facts which form the matter 
of the affirmation or denial are not    
propositions2 yet these two are said to 
be opposed in the same sense as the     
affirmation and denial1 for in this case
 also the type of antithesis is the     
same4 ,for as the affirmation is opposed
 to the denial1 as in the two           
propositions 'he sits'1 'he does not    
sit'1 so also the fact which constitutes

 the matter of the proposition in one   
case is opposed to that in the other1   
his sitting1 that is to say1 to his not 
sitting4  ,it is evident that           
'positives' and 'privatives' are not    
opposed each to each in the same sense  
as relatives4 ,the one is not explained 
by reference to the other2 sight is not 
sight of blindness1 nor is any other    
preposition used to indicate the        
relation4 ,similarly blindness is not   
said to be blindness of sight1 but      
rather1 privation of sight4 ,relatives1 
moreover1 reciprocate2 if blindness1    
therefore1 were a relative1 there would 
be a reciprocity of relation between it 
and that with which it was correlative4 
,but this is not the case4 ,sight is not
 called the sight of blindness4  ,that  
those terms which fall under the heads  
of 'positives' and 'privatives' are not 
opposed each to each as contraries1     
either1 is plain from the following     
facts3 ,of a pair of contraries such    
that they have no intermediate1 one or  

the other must needs be present in the  
subject in which they naturally subsist1
 or of which they are predicated2 for it
 is those1 as we proved1 in the case of 
which this necessity obtains1 that have 
no intermediate4 ,moreover1 we cited    
health and disease1 odd and even1 as    
instances4 ,but those contraries which  
have an intermediate are not subject to 
any such necessity4 ,it is not necessary
 that every substance1 receptive of such
 qualities1 should be either black or   
white1 cold or hot1 for something       
intermediate between these contraries   
may very well be present in the subject4
 ,we proved1 moreover1 that those       
contraries have an intermediate in the  
case of which the said necessity does   
not obtain4 ,yet when one of the two    
contraries is a constitutive property of
 the subject1 as it is a constitutive   
property of fire to be hot1 of snow to  
be white1 it is necessary determinately 
that one of the two contraries1 not one 
or the other1 should be present in the  

subject2 for fire cannot be cold1 or    
snow black4 ,thus1 it is not the case   
here that one of the two must needs be  
present in every subject receptive of   
these qualities1 but only in that       
subject of which the one forms a        
constitutive property4 ,moreover1 in    
such cases it is one member of the pair 
determinately1 and not either the one or
 the other1 which must be present4  ,in 
the case of 'positives' and             
'privatives'1 on the other hand1 neither
 of the aforesaid statements holds good4
 ,for it is not necessary that a subject
 receptive of the qualities should      
always have either the one or the other2
 that which has not yet advanced to the 
state when sight is natural is not said 
either to be blind or to see4 ,thus     
'positives' and 'privatives' do not     
belong to that class of contraries which
 consists of those which have no        
intermediate4 ,on the other hand1 they  
do not belong either to that class which
 consists of contraries which have an   

intermediate4 ,for under certain        
conditions it is necessary that either  
the one or the other should form part of
 the constitution of every appropriate  
subject4 ,for when a thing has reached  
the stage when it is by nature capable  
of sight1 it will be said either to see 
or to be blind1 and that in an          
indeterminate sense1 signifying that the
 capacity may be either present or      
absent2 for it is not necessary either  
that it should see or that it should be 
blind1 but that it should be either in  
the one state or in the other4 ,yet in  
the case of those contraries which have 
an intermediate we found that it was    
never necessary that either the one or  
the other should be present in every    
appropriate subject1 but only that in   
certain subjects one of the pair should 
be present1 and that in a determinate   
sense4 ,it is1 therefore1 plain that    
'positives' and 'privatives' are not    
opposed each to each in either of the   
senses in which contraries are opposed4 

,again1 in the case of contraries1 it is
 possible that there should be changes  
from either into the other1 while the   
subject retains its identity1 unless    
indeed one of the contraries is a       
constitutive property of that subject1  
as heat is of fire4 ,for it is possible 
that that that which is healthy should  
become diseased1 that which is white1   
black1 that which is cold1 hot1 that    
which is good1 bad1 that which is bad1  
good4 ,the bad man1 if he is being      
brought into a better way of life and   
thought1 may make some advance1 however 
slight1 and if he should once improve1  
even ever so little1 it is plain that he
 might change completely1 or at any rate
 make very great progress2 for a man    
becomes more and more easily moved to   
virtue1 however small the improvement   
was at first4 ,it is1 therefore1 natural
 to suppose that he will make yet       
greater progress than he has made in the
 past2 and as this process goes on1 it  
will change him completely and establish

 him in the contrary state1 provided he 
is not hindered by lack of time4 ,in the
 case of 'positives' and 'privatives'1  
however1 change in both directions is   
impossible4 ,there may be a change from 
possession to privation1 but not from   
privation to possession4 ,the man who   
has become blind does not regain his    
sight2 the man who has become bald does 
not regain his hair2 the man who has    
lost his teeth does not grow a new set4 
7iv7 ,statements opposed as affirmation 
and negation belong manifestly to a     
class which is distinct1 for in this    
case1 and in this case only1 it is      
necessary for the one opposite to be    
true and the other false4  ,neither in  
the case of contraries1 nor in the case 
of correlatives1 nor in the case of     
'positives' and 'privatives'1 is it     
necessary for one to be true and the    
other false4 ,health and disease are    
contraries3 neither of them is true or  
false4 ',double' and 'half' are opposed 
to each other as correlatives3 neither  

of them is true or false4 ,the case is  
the same1 of course1 with regard to     
'positives' and 'privatives' such as    
'sight' and 'blindness'4 ,in short1     
where there is no sort of combination of
 words1 truth and falsity have no place1
 and all the opposites we have mentioned
 so far consist of simple words4  ,at   
the same time1 when the words which     
enter into opposed statements are       
contraries1 these1 more than any other  
set of opposites1 would seem to claim   
this characteristic4 ',socrates is ill' 
is the contrary of ',socrates is well'1 
but not even of such composite          
expressions is it true to say that one  
of the pair must always be true and the 
other false4 ,for if ,socrates exists1  
one will be true and the other false1   
but if he does not exist1 both will be  
false2 for neither ',socrates is ill'   
nor ',socrates is well' is true1 if     
,socrates does not exist at all4  ,in   
the case of 'positives' and             
'privatives'1 if the subject does not   

exist at all1 neither proposition is    
true1 but even if the subject exists1 it
 is not always the fact that one is true
 and the other false4 ,for ',socrates   
has sight' is the opposite of ',socrates
 is blind' in the sense of the word     
'opposite' which applies to possession  
and privation4 ,now if ,socrates exists1
 it is not necessary that one should be 
true and the other false1 for when he is
 not yet able to acquire the power of   
vision1 both are false1 as also if      
,socrates is altogether non-existent4   
,but in the case of affirmation and     
negation1 whether the subject exists or 
not1 one is always false and the other  
true4 ,for manifestly1 if ,socrates     
exists1 one of the two propositions     
',socrates is ill'1 ',socrates is not   
ill'1 is true1 and the other false4     
,this is likewise the case if he does   
not exist2 for if he does not exist1 to 
say that he is ill is false1 to say that
 he is not ill is true4 ,thus it is in  
the case of those opposites only1 which 

are opposite in the sense in which the  
term is used with reference to          
affirmation and negation1 that the rule 
holds good1 that one of the pair must be
 true and the other false4    ,part #aa 
,that the contrary of a good is an evil 
is shown by induction3 the contrary of  
health is disease1 of courage1          
cowardice1 and so on4 ,but the contrary 
of an evil is sometimes a good1         
sometimes an evil4 ,for defect1 which is
 an evil1 has excess for its contrary1  
this also being an evil1 and the mean1  
which is a good1 is equally the contrary
 of the one and of the other4 ,it is    
only in a few cases1 however1 that we   
see instances of this3 in most1 the     
contrary of an evil is a good4  ,in the 
case of contraries1 it is not always    
necessary that if one exists the other  
should also exist3 for if all become    
healthy there will be health and no     
disease1 and again1 if everything turns 
white1 there will be white1 but no      
black4 ,again1 since the fact that      

,socrates is ill is the contrary of the 
fact that ,socrates is well1 and two    
contrary conditions cannot both obtain  
in one and the same individual at the   
same time1 both these contraries could  
not exist at once3 for if that ,socrates
 was well was a fact1 then that         
,socrates was ill could not possibly be 
one4  ,it is plain that contrary        
attributes must needs be present in     
subjects which belong to the same       
species or genus4 ,disease and health   
require as their subject the body of an 
animal2 white and black require a body1 
without further qualification2 justice  
and injustice require as their subject  
the human soul4  ,moreover1 it is       
necessary that pairs of contraries      
should in all cases either belong to the
 same genus or belong to contrary genera
 or be themselves genera4 ,white and    
black belong to the same genus1 colour2 
justice and injustice1 to contrary      
genera1 virtue and vice2 while good and 
evil do not belong to genera1 but are   

themselves actual genera1 with terms    
under them4    ,part #ab  ,there are    
four senses in which one thing can be   
said to be 'prior' to another4          
,primarily and most properly the term   
has reference to time3 in this sense the
 word is used to indicate that one thing
 is older or more ancient than another1 
for the expressions 'older' and 'more   
ancient' imply greater length of time4  
,secondly1 one thing is said to be      
'prior' to another when the sequence of 
their being cannot be reversed4 ,in this
 sense 'one' is 'prior' to 'two'4 ,for  
if 'two' exists1 it follows directly    
that 'one' must exist1 but if 'one'     
exists1 it does not follow necessarily  
that 'two' exists3 thus the sequence    
subsisting cannot be reversed4 ,it is   
agreed1 then1 that when the sequence of 
two things cannot be reversed1 then that
 one on which the other depends is      
called 'prior' to that other4  ,in the  
third place1 the term 'prior' is used   
with reference to any order1 as in the  

case of science and of oratory4 ,for in 
sciences which use demonstration there  
is that which is prior and that which is
 posterior in order2 in geometry1 the   
elements are prior to the propositions2 
in reading and writing1 the letters of  
the alphabet are prior to the syllables4
 ,similarly1 in the case of speeches1   
the exordium is prior in order to the   
narrative4  ,besides these senses of the
 word1 there is a fourth4 ,that which is
 better and more honourable is said to  
have a natural priority4 ,in common     
parlance men speak of those whom they   
honour and love as 'coming first' with  
them4 ,this sense of the word is perhaps
 the most far-fetched4  ,such1 then1 are
 the different senses in which the term 
'prior' is used4  ,yet it would seem    
that besides those mentioned there is   
yet another4 ,for in those things1 the  
being of each of which implies that of  
the other1 that which is in any way the 
cause may reasonably be said to be by   
nature 'prior' to the effect4 ,it is    

plain that there are instances of this4 
,the fact of the being of a man carries 
with it the truth of the proposition    
that he is1 and the implication is      
reciprocal3 for if a man is1 the        
proposition wherein we allege that he is
 true1 and conversely1 if the           
proposition wherein we allege that he is
 true1 then he is4 ,the true            
proposition1 however1 is in no way the  
cause of the being of the man1 but the  
fact of the man's being does seem       
somehow to be the cause of the truth of 
the proposition1 for the truth or       
falsity of the proposition depends on   
the fact of the man's being or not      
being4  ,thus the word 'prior' may be   
used in five senses4    ,part #ac  ,the 
term 'simultaneous' is primarily and    
most appropriately applied to those     
things the genesis of the one of which  
is simultaneous with that of the other2 
for in such cases neither is prior or   
posterior to the other4 ,such things are
 said to be simultaneous in point of    

time4 ,those things1 again1 are         
'simultaneous' in point of nature1 the  
being of each of which involves that of 
the other1 while at the same time       
neither is the cause of the other's     
being4 ,this is the case with regard to 
the double and the half1 for these are  
reciprocally dependent1 since1 if there 
is a double1 there is also a half1 and  
if there is a half1 there is also a     
double1 while at the same time neither  
is the cause of the being of the other4 
,again1 those species which are         
distinguished one from another and      
opposed one to another within the same  
genus are said to be 'simultaneous' in  
nature4 ,i mean those species which are 
distinguished each from each by one and 
the same method of division4 ,thus the  
'winged' species is simultaneous with   
the 'terrestrial' and the 'water'       
species4 ,these are distinguished within
 the same genus1 and are opposed each to
 each1 for the genus 'animal' has the   
'winged'1 the 'terrestrial'1 and the    

'water' species1 and no one of these is 
prior or posterior to another2 on the   
contrary1 all such things appear to be  
'simultaneous' in nature4 ,each of these
 also1 the terrestrial1 the winged1 and 
the water species1 can be divided again 
into subspecies4 ,those species1 then1  
also will be 'simultaneous' in point of 
nature1 which1 belonging to the same    
genus1 are distinguished each from each 
by one and the same method of           
differentiation4  ,but genera are prior 
to species1 for the sequence of their   
being cannot be reversed4 ,if there is  
the species 'water-animal'1 there will  
be the genus 'animal'1 but granted the  
being of the genus 'animal'1 it does not
 follow necessarily that there will be  
the species 'water-animal'4  ,those     
things1 therefore1 are said to be       
'simultaneous' in nature1 the being of  
each of which involves that of the      
other1 while at the same time neither is
 in any way the cause of the other's    
being2 those species1 also1 which are   

distinguished each from each and opposed
 within the same genus4 ,those things1  
moreover1 are 'simultaneous' in the     
unqualified sense of the word which come
 into being at the same time4    ,part  
#ad  ,there are six sorts of movement3  
generation1 destruction1 increase1      
diminution1 alteration1 and change of   
place4  ,it is evident in all but one   
case that all these sorts of movement   
are distinct each from each4 ,generation
 is distinct from destruction1 increase 
and change of place from diminution1 and
 so on4 ,but in the case of alteration  
it may be argued that the process       
necessarily implies one or other of the 
other five sorts of motion4 ,this is not
 true1 for we may say that all          
affections1 or nearly all1 produce in us
 an alteration which is distinct from   
all other sorts of motion1 for that     
which is affected need not suffer either
 increase or diminution or any of the   
other sorts of motion4 ,thus alteration 
is a distinct sort of motion2 for1 if it

 were not1 the thing altered would not  
only be altered1 but would forthwith    
necessarily suffer increase or          
diminution or some one of the other     
sorts of motion in addition2 which as a 
matter of fact is not the case4         
,similarly that which was undergoing the
 process of increase or was subject to  
some other sort of motion would1 if     
alteration were not a distinct form of  
motion1 necessarily be subject to       
alteration also4 ,but there are some    
things which undergo increase but yet   
not alteration4 ,the square1 for        
instance1 if a gnomon is applied to it1 
undergoes increase but not alteration1  
and so it is with all other figures of  
this sort4 ,alteration and increase1    
therefore1 are distinct4  ,speaking     
generally1 rest is the contrary of      
motion4 ,but the different forms of     
motion have their own contraries in     
other forms2 thus destruction is the    
contrary of generation1 diminution of   
increase1 rest in a place1 of change of 

place4 ,as for this last1 change in the 
reverse direction would seem to be most 
truly its contrary2 thus motion upwards 
is the contrary of motion downwards and 
vice versa4  ,in the case of that sort  
of motion which yet remains1 of those   
that have been enumerated1 it is not    
easy to state what is its contrary4 ,it 
appears to have no contrary1 unless one 
should define the contrary here also    
either as 'rest in its quality' or as   
'change in the direction of the contrary
 quality'1 just as we defined the       
contrary of change of place either as   
rest in a place or as change in the     
reverse direction4 ,for a thing is      
altered when change of quality takes    
place2 therefore either rest in its     
quality or change in the direction of   
the contrary may be called the contrary 
of this qualitative form of motion4 ,in 
this way becoming white is the contrary 
of becoming black2 there is alteration  
in the contrary direction1 since a      
change of a qualitative nature takes    

place4    ,part #ae  ,the term 'to have'
 is used in various senses4 ,in the     
first place it is used with reference to
 habit or disposition or any other      
quality1 for we are said to 'have' a    
piece of knowledge or a virtue4 ,then1  
again1 it has reference to quantity1 as1
 for instance1 in the case of a man's   
height2 for he is said to 'have' a      
height of three or four cubits4 ,it is  
used1 moreover1 with regard to apparel1 
a man being said to 'have' a coat or    
tunic2 or in respect of something which 
we have on a part of ourselves1 as a    
ring on the hand3 or in respect of      
something which is a part of us1 as hand
 or foot4 ,the term refers also to      
content1 as in the case of a vessel and 
wheat1 or of a jar and wine2 a jar is   
said to 'have' wine1 and a corn-measure 
wheat4 ,the expression in such cases has
 reference to content4 ,or it refers to 
that which has been acquired2 we are    
said to 'have' a house or a field4 ,a   
man is also said to 'have' a wife1 and a

 wife a husband1 and this appears to be 
the most remote meaning of the term1 for
 by the use of it we mean simply that   
the husband lives with the wife4  ,other
 senses of the word might perhaps be    
found1 but the most ordinary ones have  
all been enumerated4