,transcriber's note3 ,there is no author cited on the book's title page2 however1 the book's spine shows ,a ,field ,officer ,page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed in curly braces1 e4g4 #ii4 ,they have been located where page breaks occurred in the original book4 ,for its ,index1 a page number has been placed only at the start of that section4 ,footnotes have been renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of their respective chapters4 ,the book's ,index has a number of references to footnotes1 e4g4 the 7note7 entry under ,boer ,war4 ,in such cases1 check the referenced page to see which footnote7s7 are relevant4 ,,lectures ,,on ,,land ,,warfare ,a ,,tactical ,,manual ,,for ,,the ,,use ,,of ,,infantry ,,officers ,an examination of the ,principles which underlie the ,art of ,warfare1 with illustrations of the ,principles by examples taken from ,military ,history1 from the ,battle of ,thermopylae ,b4,c4 #dhj1 to the ,battle of the ,sambre ,november #a-aa1 #aiah ,london ,william ,clowes and ,sons1 ,ltd4 #id ,jermyn ,street1 ,s4,w4#a #aibb ,first printed ,march1 #aibb vii ,,preface ,the ,lectures in this volume are based upon the official ,text-books issued by the ,imperial ,general ,staff and upon the works of recognised authorities on the ,art of ,warfare4 ,the aim of the ,author is to examine the ,principles which underlie the ,art of ,warfare1 and to provide illustrations from ,military ,history of the successes which have attended knowledge and intelligent application of ,text-book ,principles1 and of the disasters which have accompanied ignorance or neglect of the teaching provided by the ,text-books4 ,the dry bones of the official publications are clothed with materials which may be supplemented at will by the student of ,military ,history1 and the ,lectures may thus1 it is hoped1 be of assistance to ,infantry ,officers1 either in the course of their own studies1 or as a convenient groundwork upon which the instruction of others may be based4 ,the scope of the work may be gathered from the ,table of ,contents and from the ,index1 and it will be seen that the general ,principles underlying the ,art of ,warfare are included in the scheme1 while advantage has been taken of the revision of the official ,text-books to incorporate in the ,lectures the lessons gained from the experience of leaders in the ,great ,war4 ,upwards of #bcj citations are made of ,battle incidents1 and1 as an example of the ,author's methods1 attention may perhaps be directed to the reinforcement of the ,text-book ,principle of co-operation and mutual support by the citation of an instance1 on the grand viii scale1 by ,army ,corps 7during the ,first ,battle of the ,marne71 and on the minor scale1 by tanks1 bombers1 aircraft1 and riflemen 7during the ,first ,battle of the ,somme72 to the successful application of established ,principles by the ,advanced ,guard ,commander at ,nachod1 and to the neglect of those ,principles by ,jeb ,stuart at ,evelington ,heights1 and by the ,prussian ,advanced ,guard ,commanders in #ahgj2 and to the value of ,musketry ,training by instancing the successes achieved at the ,heights of ,abraham1 at ,bunker ,hill1 ,corua1 and at ,fredericksburg1 which were repeated during the ,retreat from ,mons and at the ,second ,battle of the ,somme4 ,while every effort has been made to achieve accuracy in citation1 and to avoid ambiguity or error in the enunciation of ,principles1 the ,author will be very grateful if his readers will notify to him 7at the address of the ,publishers7 any inaccuracies or omissions which may come under their notice4 ,,london1 ,march1 #aibb4 ix ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,,pages ,,chronological ,,list ,,of ,,battles ,,cited 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 xv-xvii ,,publications ,,cited ,,in ,,the ,,lectures 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 xix ,,the ,,art ,,of ,,warfare 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #a-e ,principles of ,war--,popular fallacies--,authorities quoted in support of ,fixed ,principles 7,gen4 ,b4 ,taylor1 ,c4 ,s4 ,army2 ,marshal ,foch2 ,marshal ,haig7--,necessity for ,study 7,gen4 ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley2 ,marshal ,french2 ,marshal ,foch2 ,napoleon7--,common ,sense 7,abraham ,lincoln and ,jefferson ,davis2 ,general ,grant7--,higher ,ranks ,fallacy 7,col4 ,henderson2 ,gen4 ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley7--,necessity for ,study proved 7,col4 ,henderson74 ,,strategy ,,and ,,tactics 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #f-bc ,definitions--,theatre of ,operations the ,kingdom of ,strategy2 ,field of ,battle the ,province of ,tactics--,tactics subservient to ,strategy 7,lord ,roberts's ,advance2 ,first ,battle of ,somme2 ,first ,battle of ,cambrai2 ,gen4 ,lew ,wallace at the ,monocacy2 ,marshal ,grouchy at ,wavre7--,moral--,idiosyncracies of leaders 7,napoleon at ,austerlitz2 ,wellington at ,sauroren2 ,lee and ,jackson versus ,abraham ,lincoln7--,national ,moral 7,foch1 quoted7--,discipline and ,mobility 7,battle of ,hastings7--,marching ,power 7,stonewall ,jackson7--,time--,weather--,health--,hu man ,nature 7,fabius and ,roman people2 ,mc,clellan and his ,government2 ,thomas at ,nashville2 ,roberts in ,south ,africa7--,the ,spirit of ,france 7,nous sommes trahis of #ahgj and cheers of the poilus in #aiag7--;,great ,britain--,america--,lord ,roberts's previous warning 7,germany strikes when ,germany's hour has struck7--,col4 ,henderson on moral of ,british and ,american troops--,the ,contemptible ,little ,army--,the ,new ,armies 7,tribute from ,marshal ,haig endorsed by ,marshal ,foch7--,changes in ,methods of ,warfare--,value of official ,text-books4 ,,the ,,battle 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #bd-cb ,the ,battle is the only argument of ,war--,characteristics of the ,battle 7,issue uncertain2 ,human factor2 ,value of ,reserves2 ,superiority at point of ,attack7--,lee's partial attacks at ,malvern ,hill of no avail--,phases of the ,battle--,information and the ,initiative 7,salamanca2 ,first ,battle of the ,marne2 ,battle of ,baccarat7--,development of the ,battle 7,surprise2 ,like a bolt from the blue as at ,chancellorsville or ,first ,battle of ,cambrai2 ,marshal ,foch on value of ,surprise7--,the ,decisive ,blow--,arbela4 x ,,how ,,battles ,,are ,,influenced 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #cc-dd ,commander's influence by his ,orders and by his employment of ,reserves--,subordinates must bring to fruit the scheme of the higher command--,the fog of battle--,information--,co-operation 7on grand scale at ,first ,battle of the ,marne2 on minor scale at ,gneudecourt7--,fire ,tactics--,value of withholding fire 7,heights of ,abraham2 ,bunker ,hill2 ,fredericksburg2 ,retreat from ,mons7--,enfilade and ,reverse ,fire 7,the ,bluff in ,ypres ,salient7--,movement--,advancing under ,fire--,withdrawing under ,fire in ,delaying ,action--,holding on 7,untimely surrender at ,soissons2 ,stubborn defence at ,first and ,second ,battles of ,ypres2 ,trnes ,wood2 ,bourlon ,village2 ,polygon ,wood2 ,givenchy7--,covering ,fire--,fire and ,movement inseparably associated4 ,,types ,,of ,,battle ,,action 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #de-ej ,three distinct systems--,the ,defensive ,battle seldom effects positive results 7,gettysburg2 ,fredericksburg7--,the ,offensive ,battle 7,marlborough2 ,frederick the ,great2 ,napoleon2 ,wellington2 ,grant2 ,franco-,prussian ,war2 ,battle of ,blenheim described7--,the ,defensive-,offensive ,battle 7,marengo2 ,austerlitz2 ,dresden2 ,vittoria2 ,orthez2 ,toulouse2 ,waterloo2 ,final ,battles of the ,great ,war2 ,battle of ,waterloo described7--,opportunities for restoring the battle 7,antietam7--,chancellorsville a great ,defensive-,offensive ,battle--,passing from the guard to the thrust 7,second ,battle of the ,marne74 ,,the ,,attack 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #ea-fi ,culminating point of all manoeuvres--,quick decision required or ,position ,warfare will supervene--,second ,battle of the ,somme--,methods of ,attack--,two plans--,decisive blow on pre-determined spot or in direction ascertained by fighting--,strength of the ,attack--,disposition of the ,troops--,forward ,body1 ,supports and ,local ,reserves--,general ,reserve--,the ,commander's ,plans--,the ,position of ,assembly 7,banks's single column defeated by ,forrest in ,red ,river ,valley7--,the ,attacking ,force 7,st4 ,privat2 ,plevna7--,the ,decisive ,attack--,advantages and ,disadvantages of ,frontal and ,flank ,attacks--,decisive ,attack must be followed up 7,gettysburg2 ,chattanooga7--,detailing the ,units--,artillery in ,attack 7,verneville2 ,colenso2 mobility and protection of modern ,artillery7--,cavalry in ,attack 7,appomattox and ,paardeberg2 ,ramadie2 ,bagdadieh2 ,gaines's ,mill2 ,gettysburg2 ,first ,battle of ,cambrai2 ,battle of ,amiens2 ,second ,battle of ,le ,cateau2 ,archangel ,front2 ,battle of the ,sambre7--,royal ,engineers--,medical ,arrangements--,supply--,commander's ,position--,battle ,reports--,reorganisation and ,pursuit 7,success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined47 ,,formation ,,of ,,infantry ,,for ,,the ,,attack 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #gj-ge ,the ,platoon 7,square and ,diamond ,formations2 ,ground ,scouts2 ,flank ,scouts2 ,behind a ,barrage7--,the ,platoon ,commander 7,appreciating the situation7--,the ,company--,the ,company ,commander--,the ,battalion--,the ,battalion ,commander 7,personal examples2 ,monchy le ,preux2 ,battle of ,cambrai2 ,second ,battle of the ,somme74 xi ,,defensive ,,action 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #gf-ig ,counter-attack the soul of ,defence--,reasons for adopting defensive attitude 7,chancellorsville7--,defensive-,offensi ve ,battles 7,marengo1 ,austerlitz1 and ,waterloo7--,obligatory ,defensive--7,nachod2 ,thermopylae2 ,horatius ,codes2 ,second ,battle of the ,somme2 ,rorke's ,drift2 ,le ,quesnoy7--,voluntary occupation for future use 7,salamanca2 ,soissons2 ,hal and ,tubize7--,delaying ,action--,the ,offensive ,spirit--,defence in ,modern ,warfare--,inventions have strengthened the ,defence 7,quotations from ,marshals ,foch and ,french and from ,f4 ,s4 ,r47--,position ,warfare and its characteristics--,entrenchments 7,torres ,vedras7--,defensive ,systems--,choosing a position 7,framework of artillery and machine guns filled in with defensive posts manned by ,infantry7--,the ,outpost ,zone--,the ,battle ,position--,the ,semi-,permanent ,system--,pill-boxes and ,concrete ,forts--,common characteristics of ,defensive ,action--,the ,active ,defence--,position must suit plans--,must not be too extensive or too narrow 7,cond-,mons-,binche ,line2 ,retreat from ,mons2 ,ypres7--,field of ,fire--,flanks--,cover--,artillery positions--,depth--,lateral ,communications--,lines of ,withdrawal--,changes of ,base 7,retreat from ,mons2 ,seven ,days' ,battle2 ,campaign in the ,wilderness7--,luring victorious enemy away from battlefield 7,grouchy at ,wavre7--,line for ,decisive ,counter-,attack 7,ramillies2 ,belgians behind ,river ,gette7--,dividing the ,troops--,troops to hold the ,position--,rle of ,local ,reserves 7,talavera2 ,fredericksburg7--,general ,reserve for ,decisive ,counter-,attack 7,spottsylvania7--,artillery positions--,division into ,sectors--,position of ,general ,reserve 7,second ,battle of the ,somme7--,position and ,action of the ,cavalry 7,rolia1 ,chancellorsville2 ,gettysburg2 ,sadowa2 ,rezonville2 ,balaclava2 ,first ,battle of ,le ,cateau2 ,retreat from ,mons2 ,cugny2 ,no ,german ,cavalry available in ,second ,battle of the ,somme to counteract defensive action of ,british squadrons7--,rallying ,place--,reorganisation and ,pursuit after ,decisive ,counter-attack4 ,,protection ,,and ,,reconnaissance 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #ih-aja ,marshal ,foch on ,surprise--,detachments provided to protect ,main ,body--,close connection between ,protection and ,reconnaissance--,radius of ,reconnoitre increased by ,aircraft--,position ,warfare 7,air ,photographs2 ,observation ,posts2 ,patrols2 ,raiding ,parties2 ,entrenchments2 ,box ,respirators2 ,camouflage7--,manoeuvre ,warfare 7,protection from ,aircraft2 ,advanced ,guard2 ,flank ,guard2 ,rear ,guard2 ,outposts74 ,,the ,,advanced ,,guard 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #ajb-aac ,i never expected it a disgraceful admission--,every moving force requires a ,guard--,strength 7,numbers employed depend upon size of force protected and tactical situation2 ,strategical ,advanced ,guard enables ,tactical ,advanced ,guard to be reduced7--,distance--,in ,advances 7,dash and resolution required but interests of ,main ,body paramount7--,in ,retreats--,training must be realistic--,tactical ,principles 7,vanguard for ,reconnaissance2 ,main ,guard for ,resistance2 ,communication essential2 ,error at ,sulphur ,springs2 ,success at ,fredericksburg and ,first ,battle of the ,marne2 ,false tactics of ,prussian ,advanced ,guards in #ahgj-ahga2 ,excellent work at ,nachod7--,advanced ,guard ,problems 7seven examples1 including ,jeb ,stuart at ,evelington ,heights74 xii ,,flank ,,attacks ,,and ,,flank ,,guards 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #aad-aah ,vulnerability of ,flanks and necessity for ,guards--,who furnishes them--,tactics similar to those prescribed for ,advanced ,guards--,lines of ,communications--,convoys--,raids on the ,lines of ,communications 7,gen4 ,turner ,ashby2 ,jeb ,stuart2 ,stonewall ,jackson's skill2 ,col4 ,madritov's ,raid2 ,sannah's ,post2 ,ramdam74 ,,the ,,rear ,,guard 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #aai-abh ,nature of ,rear ,guard work--,strength--,composition-- ,distribution--,distance--,tactical ,principles 7,rear ,party watches2 ,main ,guard fights for ,time2 ,sannah's ,post7--,training--,eye for ,ground 7,napoleon2 ,gen4 ,r4 ,e4 ,lee7--,examples of ,rear ,guard ,work 7,first ,battle of ,le ,cateau and the ,retreat from ,mons2 ,second ,battle of the ,somme2 ,les ,boeufs2 ,le ,quesnoy2 ,rolia2 ,corua2 ,value of ,musketry2 ,bristow ,station2 ,j4 ,v4 ,moreau74 ,,outposts 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #abi-adj ,outposts prevent interference with plans and provide security by ,observation and ,resistance--,strength--,observation 7,aircraft2 ,mobile ,patrols2 ,outpost ,companies7--,resistance 7,infantry1 ,artillery1 and ,machine guns2 ,sentry ,groups1 ,piquets1 ,supports1 and ,reserves7--,distance 7,effective fire of various arms the controlling factor7--,outpost ,commander--,information and ,orders--,the ,outpost ,line of ,resistance--,the ,outpost ,company 7,piquets1 ,supports1 ,detached ,posts1 ,reserves2 the ,piquet ,commander2 ,patrols2 ,sentry ,groups7--,day and ,night ,work--,disasters through neglect of ,tactical ,principles 7,chateau of ,chambord2 ,tweefontein7--,battle ,outposts 7,broenbeek2 ,fredericksburg74 ,,tactical ,,reconnaissance 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #ada-adc ,reconnaissance for ,attack--,intelligence ,officers--,reconnaissance by ,raids--,position ,warfare--,reconnaissance for ,defence--,position ,warfare4 ,,night ,,operations 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #add-aed ,reason for ,operations by ,night 7,secrecy2 ,frederick the ,great's ,coat7--,night ,marches 7,direction2 ,protection2 ,secrecy2 ,connection7--,rules of ,thumb--,night ,advances 7,surprise2 ,direction2 ,position of ,deployment2 ,connection7--,night ,assaults 7,first ,battle of the ,somme2 ,serre ,hill2 ,vimy ,ridge2 ,messines-,wytschaete2 ,villers ,brtonneux2 ,morlancourt2 ,spottsylvania7--,limitations of ,night ,assaults--,smoke and its advantages and disadvantages--,successful and unsuccessful ,night ,assaults 7,rappahannock ,station--,peiwar ,kotal--,tel-el-,kebir2 ,stormberg2 ,magersfontein7--,position of ,deployment--,distinguishing ,badges1 etc4--,watchword--,precautions against ,checks--,secrecy--,rules of ,thumb4 xiii ,,fighting ,,in ,,close ,,country 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #aee-afc ,restrictions on view and on movement--,advantages for ,attack against ,defence--,savage ,warfare 7,isandhlwana2 ,rorke's ,drift2 ,tofrik2 ,toski2 ,teutoberger ,wald7--,civilised ,warfare 7,villages and ,woods attract troops2 ,gravelotte2 ,spicheren2 ,worth2 the ,wilderness2 ,sedan2 ,defence of ,bazeilles2 ,noisseville7--,attack on ,woods 7,tanks2 ,gauche2 ,villers ,guislain2 ,messines7--,advancing from captured position--,defence of ,woods--,fighting patrols--,attack on ,villages 7,tanks2 ,light ,mortars7--,defence of ,villages 7,delaying ,action2 ,providing a funnel74 ,,characteristics ,,of ,,the ,,various ,,arms 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #afd-agg ,close combination of all arms required--,infantry 7,extent and limitations of mobility2 the decisive arm in battle2 the ,rifle and ,bayonet2 the ,lewis gun2 ,ranges of rifles and machine guns2 ,grenades2 ,hand ,grenades2 ,rifle ,grenades2 ,light ,mortars2 ,machine guns7--,mounted ,troops 7,cavalry2 ,mounted ,rifles2 ,cyclists7--,artillery--,light ,artillery 7,pack ,guns2 ,pack ,howitzers2 ,horse ,artillery3 ,field ,guns2 ,field ,howitzers7--,light ,guns against ,aircraft and ,tanks--,medium ,artillery--7,medium ,guns2 ,medium ,howitzers7--,heavy ,artillery 7,heavy ,guns2 ,heavy ,howitzers7--,super-,heavy ,artillery 7,super-,heavy ,guns2 ,super-,heavy ,howitzers7--,table of ,artillery ,ranges--,mortars and ,light ,mortars--,royal ,engineers--,tanks--,aircraft 7,aeroplanes2 ,kite ,balloons7--,gas--,smoke4 ,,operation ,,orders 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #agh-agi ,orders should be written when possible--,should be fool proof--,ambiguity to be avoided--,the enemy are 4 4 4 ,my intention is 4 4 4 ,you will--,initiative not to be hampered4 ,,index 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #aha-ahi xv ,,chronological ,,table ,,of ,,battles ,,pages ,defence of ,sublician ,bridge 7,legendary7 #gg ,pass of ,thermopylae 7,b4,c4 #dhj7 #gg ,battle of ,arbela 7,b4,c4 #cca7 #cb ------ ,cannae 7,b4,c4 #baf7 #ad ,defeat of ,varus by ,arminius 7,a4,d4 #i7 #aef-aeg ,battle of ,stamford ,bridge 7,sept4 #be1 #ajff7 #ab ------ ,hastings 7,oct4 #ad1 #ajff7 #aa-ab ------ ,blenheim 7,aug4 #b1 #agjd7 #df-dg ------ ,ramillies 7,may #bc1 #agjf7 #df1 #ia ------ ,malplaquet 7,sept4 #aa1 #agji7 #df ------ ,leuthen 7,dec4 #e1 #ageg7 #df ,heights of ,abraham 7,sept4 #ac1 #agei7 #ch ,battle of ,bunker ,hill 7,june #ag1 #agge7 #ch ------ ,ettlingen 7,july #i-aj1 #agif7 #abh ------ ,marengo 7,june #ad1 #ahjj7 #dg1 #gf ------ ,hohenlinden 7,dec4 #c1 #ahjj7 #abh ------ ,austerlitz 7,dec4 #b1 #ahje7 #i-aj1 #dg1 #gf1 #abe ------ ,jena 7,oct4 #ad1 #ahjf7 #abe ------ ,rolia 7,aug4 #ag1 #ahjh7 #ie1 #abg ------ ,corua 7,jan4 #af1 #ahji7 #abg-abh ------ ,talavera 7,july #bg-bh1 #ahji7 #ib ,lines of ,torres ,vedras 7,oct4-,nov4 #ahaj7 #hb-hc ,battle of ,salamanca 7,july #bb1 #ahab7 #bg1 #gh ------ ,vittoria 7,june #ba1 #ahac7 #dg ------ ,sauroren 7,july #bh1 #ahac7 #aj ------ ,dresden 7,aug4 #bf-bg1 #ahac7 #dg1 #hi ------ ,orthez 7,feb4 #bg1 #ahad7 #dg ,defence of ,soissons 7,march #c1 #ahad7 #da1 #gh ,battle of ,toulouse 7,april #aj1 #ahad7 #dg ----- ,quatre ,bras 7,june #af1 #ahae7 #dh ------ ,ligny 7,june #af1 #ahae7 #h1 #dg1 #ij-ia ------ ,waterloo 7,june #ah1 #ahae7 #h1 #dg-dh1 #gf1 #gi ------ ,wavre 7,june #ah-ai1 #ahae7 #h1 #ia ------ ,balaclava 7,oct4 #bf1 #ahed7 #if ,shenandoah ,valley ,campaign 7#ahfb7 #c1 #d1 #ab1 #aag ,battle of ,mc,dowell 7,may #h1 #ahfb7 #ab ------ ,cross ,keys 7,june #f1 #ahfb7 #aag ,seven ,days' ,battle 7,june-,july1 #ahfb7 #ad1 #ij ,battle of ,gaines's ,mill 7,june #bg1 #ahfb7 #ad1 #fe ------ ,malvern ,hill 7,july #a-c1 #ahfb7 #ae1 #be-bf1 #fe1 #aab1 #aag xvi ,battle of ,evelington ,heights 7,july #c1 #ahfb7 #aab-aac ------ ,bull ,run 7#b7 7,aug4 #bh1 #ahfb7 #ab ------ ,antietam 7,sept4 #ag1 #ahfb7 #ad1 #ae1 #dh ------ ,fredericksburg 7,nov4 #ae1 #ahfb7 #ad1 #bb1 #ch1 #df1 #ib1 #ajh1 #aci-adj ------ ,chancellorsville 7,may #b-c1 #ahfc7 #ab1 #cj1 #dh1 #gf1 #ie1 #aag ------ ,gettysburg 7,july #a-c1 #ahfc7 #ae1 #de1 #fa1 #ie-if1 #aag ------ ,sulphur ,springs 7,oct4 #ab1 #ahfc7 #ajh ------ ,bristow ,station 7,oct4 #ad1 #ahfc7 #abh ------ ,rappahannock ,station 7,nov4 #g1 #ahfc7 #aea ------ ,chattanooga 7,nov4 #be1 #ahfc7 #fa-fb ------ ,pleasant ,hill 7,april1 #ahfd7 #ei ------ ,the ,wilderness 7,may #ab1 #ahfd7 #ij1 #ic1 #ig1 #aag1 #abe-abf1 #adi-aej1 #aeh ------ ,monocacy 7,july #h1 #ahfd7 #g ------ ,nashville 7,dec4 #ae-af1 #ahfd7 #ae ------ ,appomattox 7,april #i1 #ahfe7 #ae1 #fd ------ ,nachod 7,june #bg1 #ahff7 #ah1 #gg1 #aaj ------ ,sadowa 7,july #c1 #ahff7 #if ------ ,spicheren 7,aug4 #f1 #ahgj7 #ajh-aji1 #aeh ------ ,worth 7,aug4 #f1 #ahgj7 #aji1 #aeh1 #aei ------ ,colombey 7,aug4 #ad1 #ahgj7 #aji-aaj ------ ,rezonville 7,aug4 #af1 #ahgj7 #if ------ ,gravelotte 7,aug4 #ah1 #ahgj7 #aeh ------ ,verneville 7,aug4 #ah1 #ahgj7 #fc ------ ,st4 ,privat 7,aug4 #ah1 #ahgj7 #fj ------ ,noisseville 7,aug4 #ca1 #ahgj7 #aei ------ ,sedan 7,sept4 #a1 #ahgj7 #af1 #aei ------ ,metz 7,oct4 #bg1 #ahgj7 #af ------ ,chambord 7,dec4 #i1 #ahgj7 #ach ------ ,plevna 7,dec4 #aj1 #ahgg7 #fj ------ ,peiwar ,kotal 7,dec4 #b1 #ahgh7 #aea ------ ,isandhlwana 7,jan4 #bb1 #ahgi7 #gh1 #aef ------ ,rorke's ,drift 7,jan4 #bb1 #ahgi7 #gg-gh1 #aef ------ ,tel-el-,kebir 7,sept4 #ac1 #ahhb7 #aec-aed ------ ,tofrik 7,march #bb1 #ahhe7 #aef ------ ,toski 7,aug4 #c1 #ahhi7 #aef ------ ,adowa 7,feb4 #bf1 #ahif7 #bb ------ ,stormberg 7,dec4 #aj1 #ahii7 #aeb ------ ,magersfontein 7,dec4 #aj-aa1 #ahii7 #aeb ------ ,colenso 7,dec4 #ae1 #ahii7 #fc ------ ,ramdam 7,feb4 #ac1 #aijj7 #aah ------ ,paardeberg 7,feb4 #bg1 #aijj7 #af1 #fd ------ ,sannah's ,post 7,march #ca1 #aijj7 #aah1 #abd ------ ,tweefontein 7,dec4 #bd1 #aija7 #ach ------ ,the ,yalu 7,may #a1 #aijd7 #aag-aah ,the ,great ,war ,battle of ,le ,gateau 7,aug4 #aiad7 #abf ------ ,river ,gette 7,aug4 #aiad7 #ia ,cond-,mons-,binche 7,aug4 #bb-bc1 #aiad7 #hg ,battle of ,charleroi 7,aug4 #bc1 #aiad7 #hh ------ ,baccarat 7,aug4 #be1 #aiad7 #bh ,retreat from ,mons 7,aug4 #aiad7 #ai1 #ch1 #hg-hh1 #ij1 #if1 #abg1 #afe xvii ,first ,battle of the ,marne 7,sept4 #aiad7 #bg-bi1 #cf-cg1 #eb1 #ajh ,first ,battle of ,ypres 7,oct4 #bj-,nov4 #bj1 #aiad7 #ai1 #bj1 #da-db1 #hh ,second ,battle of ,ypres 7,april #bb-,may #ah1 #aiae7 #bj1 #db1 #agf ,defence of ,verdun 7,feb4-,aug4 #aiaf7 #g1 #af ,battle of ,ypres ,salient 7,march #b1 #aiaf7 #ci ,first ,battle of the ,somme 7,july #a-,nov4 #ah1 #aiaf7 #g1 #ac1 #bb1 #cg1 #db1 #ec1 #adh1 #aga1 #age1 #agf-agg ,battle of ,serre ,hill 7,feb4 #aj-aa1 #aiag7 #adh-adi ------ ,messines 7,june #g1 #aiag7 #bj1 #adi1 #afj ,chemin des ,dames 7,april-,july1 #aiag7 #af ,battle of ,vimy 7,april #i1 #aiag7 #adi ------ ,arras 7,april #i-;,june #g1 #aiag7 #agj ,monchy le ,preux 7,april #ad1 #aiag7 #ge ,third ,battle of ,ypres 7,sept4 #bf1 #aiag7 #db-dc1 #aci ,battle of ,broenbeek 7,oct4 #i1 #aiag7 #aci ,first ,battle of ,cambrai 7,nov4 #bj1 #aiag7 #g1 #cj1 #db1 #ff1 #ge1 #afj ,the ,piave ,line 7,italy7 7,nov4 #be1 #aiag7 #g ,second ,battle of the ,somme 7,march #ba-;,april #aa1 #aiah7 #bj1 #cd1 #dc1 #eb-ec1 #ef1 #ff1 #ge1 #gg1 #gh1 #ie1 #if1 #abf-abg1 #agd ,battle of ,villers-,brtonneux 7,april #bd-be1 #aiah7 #adi ------ ,morlancourt 7,june #aj1 #aiah7 #adi ,second ,battle of the ,marne 7,july #ah1 #aiah7 #di ,battle of ,amiens 7,aug4 #h-ac1 #aiah7 #ba1 #ff ------ ,bapaume 7,aug4 #ba-,sept4 #a1 #aiah7 #ba ------ ,havrincourt and ,epehy 7,sept4 #ab-ah1 #aiah7 #ba ,second ,battle of ,cambrai 7,sept4 #bg-,oct4 #e1 #aiah7 #ba1 #agj ,battle of ,flanders 7,sept4 #bh-,oct4 #ad1 #aiah7 #ba ,second ,battle of ,le ,cateau 7,oct4 #f-ab1 #aiah7 #ba1 #ff1 #if ,battle of the ,selle 7,oct4 #ag-be1 #aiah7 #ba ------ ,sambre 7,nov4 #a-aa1 #aiah7 #ba1 #fe1 #fg ,armistice ,day 7,nov4 #aa1 #aiah7 #fe1 #afi ,mesopotamia ,battle of ,ramadie 7,sept4 #bg-bi1 #aiag7 #fd ------ ,bagdadieh 7,march #bf1 #aiah7 #fd-fe ,north ,russia ,archangel ,province 7,aug4-,sept4 #aiah7 #ff-fg xix ,,publications ,,cited ,,in ,,the ,,lectures ,field ,service ,regulations1 ,parts ,i4 and ,,ii4 ,infantry ,training1 ,parts ,i4 and ,,ii4 ,,clery1 ,major-,general ,sir ,c4 ,f41 ,k4,c4,b43 ,minor ,tactics4 ,,creasy1 ,sir ,edward3 ,fifteen ,decisive ,battles at the ,world4 ,,foch1 ,marchal ,ferdinand3 ,principles of ,war4 ,,french ,,of ,,ypres1 ,field-,marshal ,earl1 ,k4,p43 #aiad4 ,,grant1 ,general ,ulysses ,s41 ,united ,states ,army3 ,memoirs4 ,,haig ,,of ,,bemersyde1 ,field-,marshal ,earl1 ,k4,t43 ,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches4 ,,haking1 ,lieut4-,general ,sir ,r4 ,c4 ,b41 ,g4,b4,e43 ,staff ,bides1 etc4 ,,hamley1 ,general ,sir ,e4 ,b41 ,k4,c4,b43 ,operations of ,war4 ,,henderson1 ,colonel ,g4 ,f4 ,r41 ,c4,b43 ,stonewall ,jackson4 ,the ,science of ,war4 ,,napier1 ,sir ,william ,francis ,patrick1 ,k4,c4,b42 ,history of the ,peninsular ,war4 ,,ole ,,luk-,,oie4 ,see ,,swinton4 ,,swinton1 ,major-,general ,e4 ,d41 ,c4,b43 ,the ,green ,curve4 ,,taylor1 ,general ,r41 ,confederate ,states ,army3 ,destruction and ,reconstruction4 #a ,,lectures ,,on ,,land ,,warfare ,,the ,,art ,,of ,,warfare ,the ,art of ,war1 like every other art1 possesses its theory1 its principles2 otherwise1 it would not be an art4--,,marshal ,,foch4 ,the ,art of ,war1 like any other art1 is based upon certain fixed principles1 and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his goal4 ,the long and laborious line of study is the only safe way1 and there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road4 ,one of these pitfalls is dug by those who maintain1 whenever a new war breaks out1 that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the scrap-heap and attention paid only to the problems of the hour4 ,another is the alluring trap that ,warfare is merely a matter of common sense2 and a third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the ,general1 and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the ,subaltern ,officer4 ,,knowledge ,,of ,,principles ,,essential4--,with regard to the first of these difficulties1 the opinions of recognised authorities on the ,art of ,warfare may be consulted4 ,the cardinal principles on which the art of war is based are few and unchangeable1 resembling in this the code of morality2 but their application varies with the theatre of the war1 the genius and temper of the people engaged1 and the kind of arms employed 7,general ,r4 ,taylor1 ,c4,s4 ,army74 ,although the manifold inventions of modern times have given to warfare #b a wider scope and fresh materials1 it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past2 but it applies these laws with means more numerous1 more powerful1 and more delicate 7,marshal ,foch74 ,this war has given us no new principles2 but different mechanical appliances--and in particular the rapid improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes1 the use of immense numbers of machine guns and ,lewis guns1 the employment of vast quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles1 the enormous expansion of artillery1 and the provision of great masses of motor transport--have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services4 ,much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working 7,marshal ,haig74 ,the laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand1 but their successful application on the field of battle requires that they should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects4 ,the mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns1 and by the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground 7,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley74 ,a lifelong experience of military study and thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be instinctive4 ,i know that in putting the ,science of ,war into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form1 so to speak1 part of one's flesh and blood4 ,in war there is little time to think1 and the right thing to do must come like a flash--it must present itself to the mind as perfectly obvious 7,marshal ,french74 ,the same idea is expressed by the ,generalissimo of the largest victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind4 ,generally speaking1 grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect4 ,it is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in order to make war or even to understand #c war4 ,no study is possible on the battlefield2 one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows4 ,in order to do even a little one has to know a great deal1 and to know it well4 4 4 4 ,the right solution imposes itself2 namely1 the application1 according to circumstances1 of fixed principles4 4 4 4 ,incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circumstances1 for knowledge is within the reach of all 7,marshal ,foch72 and in the words of ,napoleon's own maxim3 ,the only way to learn the art of war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains4 ,,the ,,common-,,sense ,,fallacy4--,the fallacy that warfare is merely a matter of common sense has been exposed by ,colonel ,g4 ,f4 ,r4 ,henderson1 in his contrast of the conduct of the ,american ,civil ,war of #ahfa-ahfe1 when it was controlled by ,president ,lincoln and his ,cabinet in ,washington1 and when it was handed over without reserve to a professional soldier in the field 7,general ,grant74 ,few mortals have possessed common sense in greater abundance than ,abraham ,lincoln1 and yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans1 which were frequently brought to nought by such interference1 and but for a like hindrance of the ,confederate generals by ,jefferson ,davis this well-intentioned common sense would have been even more disastrous4 ,men who1 aware of their ignorance1 would probably have shrunk from assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army 7,henderson1 ,stonewall ,jackson74 ,in ,june1 #ahfc1 the ,confederate ,armies were scattered from ,strasburg 7in the ,valley7 to ,fredericksburg 7in ,spottsylvania72 ,general ,hooker1 commanding the ,army of the ,potomac in the field1 begged to be allowed to attack ,lee's ,corps in detail4 ,success was certain1 but permission was refused4 ,the one and only idea of the ,federal ,government was to keep the ,army of the ,potomac between ,lee and the ,federal ,capital4 #d ,,the ,,higher ,,ranks ,,fallacy4--,the same writer has also protested vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field is confined to the higher ranks4 ,every officer in charge of a detached force or flying column1 every officer who for the time being has to act independently1 every officer in charge of a patrol1 is constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations2 and success or failure1 even where the force is insignificant1 will depend upon his familiarity with strategical principles 7,the ,science of ,war74 ,in the same way1 ,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley1 in ,the ,operations of ,war ,explained1 points out that a commander who cannot look beyond the local situation is not competent to command a detachment1 however small4 ,in addition1 it must be remembered that superior knowledge of the art of war1 thorough acquaintance with duty1 and large experience1 seldom fail to command submission and respect4 ,troops fight with marked success when they feel that their leader knows his job1 and in every ,army troops are the critics of their leaders4 ,the achievements of ,jackson's forces in the ,shenandoah ,valley ,campaign of #ahfb were almost superhuman1 but under ,stonewall ,jackson the apparently impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved4 ,general ,ewell1 one of ,jackson's commanders1 stated that he shivered whenever one of ,stonewall's couriers approached him4 ,i was always expecting him to order me to assault the ,north ,pole6 ,but1 if he had ordered1 we should have done it6 ,,the ,,necessity ,,for ,,study4--,it is not pretended by any sane writer that study alone will make a perfect officer1 for it is universally recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the knowledge gained by direct and immediate association with troops in the field2 nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant1 or confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute by nature4 ,but the quick1 #e the resolute1 the daring1 deciding and acting rapidly1 as is their nature1 will be all the more likely to decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art they are called upon to practise 7,the ,science of ,war74 ,theory1 applied to the profession of arms1 is to some a word of most obnoxious sound1 but it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the advice1 or to take warning from the practice1 of ,napoleon1 of ,wellington1 of ,foch1 and of many of the most famous generals of history4 ,a man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of ,napoleon's warfare would hardly fail in all circumstances to make his enemy's communications his first objective2 and if ,wellington's tactical methods had become a second nature to him it would be strange indeed if he were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack4 4 4 4 ,the same tactical principles regulate the combat of a large force and a small1 and it is the thorough grasp of the principles1 combined with courage and coolness1 that makes a capable leader1 whether of a platoon or an army corps 7,the ,science of ,war74 #f ,,strategy ,,and ,,tactics ,,definitions4--,strategy and ,tactics have often been treated by non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the soldier's profession1 but while they may indeed be separately defined it will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered4 ,the theatre of operations is the kingdom of ,strategy1 the province of ,tactics is the field of battle1 but when the battlefield is reached it so far transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of operations that no tactical end is worth aiming at in preference to striking with all available strength at the field force of the enemy1 and this1 it will be seen1 is the goal of all strategical combinations4 ,strategy must ever be striving for ,tactical success2 ,tactics must ever keep in mind the ,strategical situation and must constantly aim at creating fresh ,strategical opportunities4 ,tactics without ,strategy resembles a man without legs2 ,strategy without ,tactics is like a man without arms 7,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley74 ,to seek out the enemy's armies--the centre of the adversary's power--in order to beat and destroy them2 to adopt1 with this sole end in view1 the direction and tactics which will lead to it in the quickest and safest way3 such is the whole mental attitude of modern war4 ,no ,strategy can henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring ,tactical results1 victory by fighting 7,marshal ,foch74 ,local successes on the field of battle often have effects that are felt throughout the theatre of operations4 ,lord ,roberts's advance on ,pretoria relieved the pressure on ,kimberley in the west and on ,ladysmith in the east1 and these centres are upwards of #cjj miles apart4 ,the #g ,first ,battle of the ,somme 7,july #a1 #aiaf7 not only relieved the pressure on ,verdun but held in position large enemy forces which would otherwise have been employed against our ,allies in the ,east4 ,general ,byng's surprise attack at ,cambrai 7,november #bj1 #aiag7 was followed by a determined counter-attack by the ,germans on ,november #cj1 which appeared to nullify the results achieved from ,november #bj to #be2 but there is evidence that ,german divisions intended for the ,italian theatre were diverted to the ,cambrai front1 and it is probable that the further concentration of ,german forces against ,italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period1 when our ,allies were making their first stand on the ,piave ,line 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,a tactical defeat may sometimes be risked to serve a strategic end4 ,in ,june1 #ahfd1 ,general ,hunter was operating with a ,federal army in the ,shenandoah ,valley1 and owing to shortage of supplies was forced to fall back4 ,in so doing he uncovered the ,national ,capital1 and ,general ,early was sent by the ,confederate ,commander-in-,chief to capture ,washington4 ,general ,grant took immediate steps to protect the capital by the dispatch of troops1 and to further this end1 ,general ,lew ,wallace1#a on his own initiative1 confronted ,early's corps at the ,monocacy on ,july #h1 #ahfd4 ,he met the enemy and was defeated1 but he delayed ,early's corps until the troops sent by ,grant were in position4 ,if ,early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements ,i had sent4 ,general ,wallace contributed on this occasion1 by the defeat of the troops under him1 a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory 7,grant's ,memoirs74 ,a tactical success may be not only useless1 but actually inopportune1 if it is out of accord with the plans of the higher command4 ,on the morning of ,june #ah1 #ahae1 ,marshal ,grouchy was in #h pursuit of the ,prussians whom ,napoleon had defeated on ,june #af at ,ligny4 ,although urged to march to the sound of the cannon 7at ,waterloo71 ,grouchy pushed on eastwards1 where he found ,thielmann's ,prussian ,corps of #af1jjj men holding the passage across the ,dyle at ,wavre4 ,the ,battle of ,wavre was begun at #d p4m4 on ,june #ah1 and by #aa a4m4 on the next day ,grouchy was victorious4 ,but his victory was barren4 ,his tactical achievement was useless to the higher command and had exposed his own force to considerable danger4 ,as he sat down to pen a vainglorious dispatch to the ,emperor1 he received the news that ,napoleon was a fugitive and the ,imperial ,army defeated and scattered4 ,grouchy's feeble and false manoeuvres had permitted ,blcher to join forces with ,wellington4 ,to the ,emperor's dismay it was the ,prussians who came from the eastward to the sound of the cannon3 ,c'est les ,prussiens qui viennent6 ,,moral4--,it is seen that ,strategy may be defined as the art of concentrating troops at the required strength1 at the required time1 at the required place1 for the purpose of overthrowing the enemy's main armies2 while ,tactics may be defined as the art of arranging and handling troops so concentrated for the purpose of defeating the enemy when encountered4 ,but although ,strategy may be considered as the art of bringing an opponent to battle1 and ,tactics as the art of defeating him in action1 there are excluded from these definitions many considerations which influence a commander in the field4 ,the art of war does not commence with a strategical reconnaissance from the air1 or the saddle1 to ascertain whether1 and if so in what locality and in what strength1 hostile troops are being concentrated4 ,from information so obtained1 the physical force of an enemy may indeed be determined2 but in war 7said ,napoleon7 moral force is to the physical 7that is1 to numbers and #i armament7 as three to one1 and upwards of a hundred years later the same idea has again been expressed4 ,to understand war you must go beyond its instruments and materials2 you must study in the book of history1 conscientiously analysed1 armies1 troops in movement and in action1 with their needs1 their passions1 their devotions1 their capacities of all kinds4 ,that is the essence of the subject1 that is the point of departure for a reasonable study of the art of war 7,marshal ,foch74 ,and while dealing with moral force it must be remembered that the moral force of opposing leaders of nations or of armies is at least as important as that of the nations or armies themselves1 for a war is a struggle between human intelligences rather than between masses of men4 ,there have been soldiers' battles but never a soldiers' campaign 7,the ,science of ,war74 ,it was not the ,roman legions which conquered ,gaul1 it was ,caesar4 ,it was not the ,french ,army which reached the ,weser and the ,inn1 it was ,turenne 7,napoleon74 ,a commander must1 therefore1 take into account the character1 the moral fibre1 as well as the ability and the means at the disposal of his adversary4 ,he must project his mind to his adversary's council chamber1 and putting himself in his place must conjecture how a man of that character and of that ability will act under the given circumstances4 ,history supplies many examples of mental activity of this kind4#b ,napoleon predicted the impetuous onset of the ,russian left wing against his right at ,austerlitz1 ,dec4 #b1 #ahje1 because he knew the temperament of the ,tsar ,alexander4 ,at ,austerlitz1 the most brilliant of all his battles1 ,napoleon had #gj1jjj troops and was confronted by #hj1jjj ,austrians and ,russians drawn up on the ,heights of ,pratzen4 ,his plan was to draw the weight of the ,russian attack against his right--which was so disposed as to invite the headstrong and #aj self-confident ,tsar to administer a lesson in generalship to ,napoleon--and then to launch a superior attack against the ,heights1 which contained a village and a knoll1 the key to the position2 and finally to hurl his ,general ,reserve in a decisive counter-attack on the ,russians when they were involved in battle with his right wing4 ,when the rattle of musketry and booming of the guns showed that his right was engaged1 ,napoleon launched ,murat1 ,bernadotte1 and ,soult against the allied centre2 when ,soult was master of the village and the knoll1 and as the broken remnants of the enemy's centre were streaming down the reverse slopes of the ,pratzen ,ridge1 the ,french centre wheeled round to the right and threw itself upon the flank and rear of the ,russians1 who were still heavily engaged in their original attack4 ,these operations were completely successful and over #dj1jjj of the opposing armies were accounted for4 ,wellington defeated ,soult at ,sauroren in the ,pyrenees 7,july #bh1 #ahac7 by taking advantage of a minor incident4 ,he had ridden forward to see the disposition of the ,french forces1 and as his men cheered him all along the line1 he turned to his staff and said1 ,soult is a very cautious commander4 ,he will delay his attack to find out what those cheers mean2 that will give time for the ,sixth ,division to arrive and ,i shall beat him--and the event turned out exactly as he had predicted4 ,generals ,r4 ,e4 ,lee and ,t4 ,j4 ,jackson frequently played upon the nervousness of ,president ,lincoln for the safety of ,washington1 and by threatening to cross the ,potomac induced him to withdraw troops that were advancing against ,richmond4 ,,national ,,moral4--,the moral fibre of the nation and of the troops must also be taken into consideration4 ,the common theory that1 in order to win1 an army must have superiority of rifles and cannon1 better bases1 more wisely chosen positions1 is radically false4 ,for it leaves out of account the most important part of the #aa problem1 that which animates it and makes it live1 man--with his moral1 intellectual1 and physical qualities 7,marshal ,foch74 ,,discipline ,,and ,,morality4--,the discipline1 courage1 and endurance of the troops1 as well as the cause for which they are fighting1 are at least of equal importance to their armament and numbers4 ,if their discipline and leading be defective1 ,providence seldom sides with the big battalions 4 4 4 and troops that cannot march are untrustworthy auxiliaries 7,the ,science of ,war74 ,an army which cannot march well is almost certain to be outmanoeuvred4 ,a general whose strategy is based upon time calculations that are rendered inaccurate by the breakdown of the marching power of his troops runs grave risk of disaster4 ,it is therefore necessary that the question of marching should be studied1 not only by generals and staff officers1 but by regimental officers and men4 ,it is on the latter that the hardships and exertions fall1 and their cheerful endurance can best be ensured by teaching them the great results attainable by an army which can move faster and further than its adversary1 as well as the dangers incurred by an army which allows itself to be out-marched4 4 4 4 ,superior mobility alone enabled ,frederick the ,great to move 'like a panther round an ox' so as to place his army across the enemy's flank4 ,the discipline of his troops enabled him to apply the principles of combination 7,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley74 ,nothing compensates for absence of discipline2 and the constant watchfulness that is necessary in war1 even when danger seems remote1 can only be secured by discipline1 which makes of duty a habit 7,general ,r4 ,taylor1 ,c4,s4 ,army74 ,at the ,battle of ,hastings 7,oct4 #ad1 #ajff7 lack of discipline and disobedience of orders changed the fate of the ,english nation and brought about the ,norman ,conquest4 ,harold1 the ,english king1 had defeated the forces of ,harold ,hadraade1 #ab ,king of ,norway1 at ,stamford ,bridge in ,yorkshire 7,sept4 #be1 #ajff74 ,four days later1 ,duke ,william of ,normandy landed in ,pevensey ,bay1 with #fj1jjj horse and foot4 ,harold hastened south to meet him with troops exhausted by battle and marching4 ,after halting six days in ,london to collect reinforcements1 the ,english force entrenched itself on the hill of ,sautlache and awaited attack4 ,the ,normans were unable to penetrate the abattis1 but they gained the victory which changed the whole history of the ,english race by the stratagem of a feigned retreat4 ,harold's undisciplined auxiliaries1 contrary to direct orders 7which were obeyed by the regular troops in the centre71 swarmed out of the palisades in pursuit of the fleeing ,normans1 who suddenly turned about and penetrated the ,english lines mingled with the discomfited auxiliaries4 ,had the irregulars shown the same sense of discipline as the regulars there had been no ,norman ,conquest4 ,with regard to marching1 ,general ,t4 ,j4 ,jackson once observed1 in reply to an allusion to his severe marching1 that it is better to lose one man in marching than five in fighting4 ,acting on this principle he invariably surprised his enemy1 the most notable instances being his surprise of ,milroy at ,mc,dowell1 of ,banks and ,fremont in the ,valley1 of ,mc,clellan's right at ,gaines's ,mill1 of ,pope at the ,second ,manassas1 and his last and greatest of ,hooker at ,chancellorsville4 ,,time4--,time is often a supreme factor in warfare1 and the superior mobility of troops will gain for their commander a great strategical advantage4 ,reserves are of little value if they cannot be concentrated at the right spot at the right moment1 and steamships1 railways1 and mechanical transport thus play an important part in war4 ,the mobility of infantry is often the deciding factor in battle1 and campaigns have been won by the legs of soldiers as much as by their arms4 #ac ,,weather4--,the weather is an important factor in war1 and its influence appears to have increased in modern times4 ,mists and fogs militate against observation by aircraft1 and poor visibility interferes with the work of artillery4 ,roads are broken up by the weight of modern traffic1 and in a shelled area the craters become impassable after a few days rain1 making the supply of food1 stores and ammunition a serious problem4 ,such conditions multiply the difficulties of attack1 as the ground of the encounter consists principally of hastily dug trenches which become running streams of mud2 and they assist the defence1 as the pursuit is delayed1 while the ground behind the defending force is less liable to be churned up by shell fire4 ,the bad weather of ,september1 #aiaf1 caused a delay in the ,allied advance against ,sailly-,saillesel and ,le ,transloy and made it necessary to abandon the plan at the moment when previous successes seemed to have brought it within the grasp of the commanders4 ,as the season advanced and the bad weather continued the plans of the ,allies had to be reduced1 and the brilliant successes already achieved afforded some indication of what might have been accomplished had the weather permitted the plans to be carried out as originally intended4 ,,health4--,wars may be won or lost by the standard of health and moral of the opposing forces4 ,moral depends to a very large extent upon the feeding and general well-being of the troops4 ,badly supplied troops will invariably be low in moral1 and an army ravaged by disease ceases to be a fighting force4 ,the feeding and health of the fighting forces are dependent upon the rearward services1 and so it may be argued that with the rearward services rests victory or defeat 7,marshal ,haig74 ,,human ,,nature4--,human nature is affected by discipline1 fear1 hunger1 confidence in or distrust of leaders1 and by a variety of other influences1 and human #ad nature is more important than armament and numbers4 ,no great deeds have ever been performed by an army in which the qualities of courage and steadfast endurance are wanting 7,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley71 and the steadfast endurance of a nation and of its leaders is also a factor of supreme importance4 ,time occupied in preparation for battle1 or in manoeuvring for the weather gauge1 is seldom wasted2 but it involves the risk of a weak-kneed executive yielding to popular clamour4 ,against the strategical and tactical genius of ,hannibal1 ,quintus ,fabius ,maximus invoked the aid of time to afford him opportunities to strike4 ,his ,fabian ,tactics have become proverbial1 and earned for him at the time the opprobrious epithet ,cunctator1 which the epigram#c of ,ennius has immortalised in his honour4 ,popular clamour led to a division of authority with ,varro1 and to the disaster of ,cannae 7,b4,c4 #baf74 ,general ,g4 ,b4 ,mc,clellan was recalled from the ,army of the ,potomac on account of his failure to convert the drawn battle of the ,antietam 7,sept4 #ag1 #ahfb7 into a victory1 and the army was handed over to ,general ,burnside1 who suffered defeat at ,fredericksburg 7,dec4 #ac1 #ahfb7 with terrible slaughter4 ,but the stout heart of the ,american nation quickly rallied1 and inspired by the loyal determination of ,abraham ,lincoln the ,united ,states turned once more to their apparently hopeless task 7,colonel ,g4 ,f4 ,r4 ,henderson74 ,mc,clellan's forte was organisation1 and although at first slow in the field1 he had assembled and trained a magnificent fighting force1 with which he was feeling his way to victory4 ,he suffered defeat indeed at ,gaines's ,mill 7,june #bg1 #ahfb71 the first act in the drama of the ,seven ,days' ,battle around ,richmond4 ,day after day he fell back through swamp and forest1 battling with ,lee's victorious troops4 ,but there was no further disaster4 ,under the most adverse and dispiriting circumstances the ,army of the ,potomac fairly held their own until #ae they reached the impregnable position of ,malvern ,hill4 ,there ,mc,clellan turned at bay and repulsed with heavy slaughter the disjointed attacks of the ,army of ,northern ,virginia4 ,he had withdrawn his army intact and had effected a change of base1 unknown to the ,confederate ,general ,staff1 from the ,york ,river to the ,james4 ,this proved his strategic power1 as did the dispositions at ,malvern ,hill 7,july #a1 #ahfb7 his tactical ability1 and his work was accomplished in spite of the intrigues of politicians and the opposition of the executive1 and in face of the military genius of ,generals ,r4 ,e4 ,lee and ,t4 ,j4 ,jackson4 ,at the ,antietam he forced the ,confederates to give battle1 and although tactically indecisive1 the engagement caused the withdrawal of ,lee's army into ,virginia4 ,mc,clellan's successors were far less competent1 and the magnificent ,army of the ,potomac met with frequent disasters1 until it formed the solid nucleus of the forces of ,general ,meade1 which inflicted upon ,lee his first defeat and saved the ,union at ,gettysburg 7,july #a-c1 #ahfc71 and finally under ,grant1 in conjunction with the ,armies of the ,west1 crushed the life out of the ,confederacy at ,appomattox4 ,general ,g4 ,h4 ,thomas1 in command of the ,u4,s4 ,army of the ,cumberland1 refused battle with the ,confederates in ,nashville until he had prepared cavalry and made every other arrangement for pursuit4 ,constancy of purpose was the salient feature of ,thomas's military character4 ,he would not fight until he was ready4 ,the civil authorities urgently demanded that he should advance4 ,so great was the tension that ,grant finally sent ,general ,j4 ,a4 ,logan to supersede ,thomas2 but before ,logan arrived ,thomas had won the ,battle of ,nashville 7,dec4 #ae-af1 #ahfd71 the most crushing victory of the war4 ,lord ,roberts landed in ,cape ,town on ,jan4 #aj1 #aijj1 and popular expectation was degenerating into impatience when a co-ordinated advance of ,french's cavalry and the ,sixth and ,ninth ,infantry ,divisions #af resulted in the relief of beleagured cities distant from the field of battle1 and in the surrender on the field of ,cronje's force at ,paardeberg 7,feb4 #bg1 #aijj71 on the anniversary of ,majuba4 ,,the ,,spirit ,,of ,,france4--,in all calculations on which a declaration of war is based the moral fibre of the actual and potential enemy nations is fully considered4 ,it is difficult to imagine that the ,headquarters ,staff of the ,german and ,austrian ,armies failed to bring under review the moral of the nations against whom their armies were to be launched in ,july1 #aiad4 ,the ,spirit of ,france had shown no signs of deterioration1 but was to be quelled by a rapid advance through neutral territories1 to bring about a bewildered collapse1 as in #ahgj1 before the ,russian mobilisation was complete1 and ,nous sommes trahis was again to be heard from the disheartened troops4 ,but the calm determination of the commander and his generals in the dark days of ,august1 #aiad1 prevented the bewildered collapse1 and the ,defence of ,verdun from ,february to ,august1 #aiaf1 and the cheers of the poilus1 as they recaptured the ,chemin des ,dames in ,april-,july1 #aiag1 replaced the capitulation of ,sedan and of ,metz and the ,nous sommes trahis of #ahgj4 ,,great ,,britain4--,britain was not expected to take an active part in the struggle1 and if she did the affairs of ,ireland1 the ,suffragette movement1 and the general decadence of the nation would prevent a whole-hearted prosecution of the war4 ,a small force only could be sent to ,europe2 it would be swallowed up in the bewildered collapse1 and no reinforcements could be spared4 ,the extent of the miscalculation is shown in ,mr4 ,lloyd ,george's speech in the ,house of ,commons on ,july #c1 #aiai1 in which the ,prime ,minister stated that the ,british ,empire had put #g1gjj1jjj men under arms1 had raised #i1ejj1jjj1jjj pounds in taxes and loans1 and had suffered upwards of #h1jjj1jjj casualties on land and #ag sea4 ,it was also shown that during the last two years of the war the ,british armies had borne the brunt of the heaviest fighting on the ,western ,front in ,france and at the same time had destroyed the armed forces of the ,turkish ,empire in the ,east4 ,the risk of compelling ,britain to take part was undertaken1 and the first great strategical blunder of the war was committed4 ,,america4--,in the third year of the ,war ,america had gradually been brought into the arena1 and a further miscalculation arrayed the hundred millions of a free and united nation against the autocracies of ,central ,europe4 ,,lord ,,roberts4--,other brains than ,german had considered the possibility of an armed conflict in ,europe4 ,for many years ,lord ,roberts had advocated universal military service in the ,united ,kingdom1 as a procedure beneficial in itself1 and imperative on account of the clear intentions of the ,headquarters ,staff of the ,german ,army4 ,germany strikes when ,germany's hour has struck1 was his warning note1 and although apparently unheeded by the nation1 his warning was not without effect upon the training of the ,regular ,army4 ,,colonel ,,henderson4--,military writers in the ,united ,kingdom had also considered the possibility of a conflict with the armed forces of ,germany1 and in all their treatises the moral of the nation was passed under review4 ,colonel ,g4 ,f4 ,r4 ,henderson1 in ,the ,science of ,war1 had even envisaged a struggle in which not only the troops of ,britain and the ,overseas ,dominions but those of the ,united ,states would take part1 and his estimate of the moral of the race on both sides of the ,atlantic1 and in both hemispheres1 was fully justified by the events of the ,war4 ,colonel ,henderson found in the race something more than toughness in its moral fibre1 for he adds1 ,tactical ability is the birthright of #ah our race4 4 4 4 ,in a conflict on the vastest scale 7the ,american ,civil ,war7 the tactics of the ,american troops1 at a very early period1 were superior to those of the ,prussians in #ahff4 ,in ,strategy1 controlled as it was on both sides by the civil governments and not by the military chiefs1 grave errors were committed1 but on the field of battle the racial instinct asserted itself4 ,nor were the larger tactical manoeuvres even of #ahgj an improvement on those of the ,american campaigns4 4 4 4 ,but in #ahgh1 ,skobeleff1 the first of ,european generals to master the problem of the offensive1 knew the ,american ,war 'by heart1' and in his successful assaults on the ,turkish redoubts he followed the plan of the ,american generals on both sides1 when attempting to carry such positions2 to follow up the assaulting columns with fresh troops1 without waiting for the first column to be repulsed4 ,after the ,civil ,war1 ,general ,forrest1 a cavalry leader of the ,confederate ,states ,army1 was asked to what he attributed his success in so many actions4 ,he replied3 ,well1 ,i reckon ,i got there first with the most men1 thereby stating in a nutshell the key to the ,art of ,war4 ,at ,nachod1 the ,austrian commander had numbers on his side1 yet he sent into action part only of his forces1 and it was by numbers that he was beaten 7,marshal ,foch74 ,with regard to the moral of the race ,colonel ,henderson makes this emphatic statement3 ,in the last nine months of the ,american ,civil ,war1 time and again1 according to all precedent1 one side or the other ought to have been whipped1 but it declined to be anything of the sort4 ,the losses show this4 ,this was due in no small measure to the quality which the troops on both sides inherited from the stock that furnished his infantry to the ,duke of ,wellington4 ,never to know when they were beaten was a characteristic of both ,north and ,south4 ,,the ,,contemptible ,,little ,,army4--,in place of the general decadence of the ,british race1 upon which the ,german ,staff appear to have relied1 this characteristic #ai quality of endurance was exhibited by ,french's ,contemptible ,little ,army during the ,retreat from ,mons in ,august1 #aiad1 at the ,first ,battle of ,ypres 7,october #bj1 #aiad71 and at the ,second ,battle of ,ypres 7,april #bb1 #aiae74 ,of his ,contemptible ,little ,army ,marshal ,french writes in his book1 #aiad3 ,the ,british ,army had indeed suffered severely1 and had performed a herculean task in reaching its present position in such fighting form1 and its moral had withstood the ordeal4 ,i think the ,germans were probably justified in doubting our offensive powers1 but the thing they forgot was the nation from which we spring4 ,,the ,,new ,,armies4--,from #aiae to #aiah the ,new ,armies1 raised1 equipped1 and trained during the ,war1 and representing the ,empire in arms1 displayed the same inherent quality1 and disproved for ever the charge of decadence that had been brought against the ,british race4 ,that these troops should have accomplished so much under such conditions1 and against an army and a nation whose chief concern for so many years had been preparation for war1 constitutes a feat of which the history of our nation records no equal4 4 4 4 ,troops from every part of the ,british ,isles and from every ,dominion and quarter of the ,empire1 whether ,regulars1 ,territorials1 or men of the ,new ,armies1 have borne a share in the battle4 4 4 4 ,among all the long roll of victories borne on the colours of our regiments1 there has never been a higher test of the endurance and resolution of our ,infantry4 ,they have shown themselves worthy of the highest traditions of our race1 and of the proud records of former wars 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatch1 ,december #bc1 #aiaf74 ,our new and hastily trained armies have shown once again that they are capable of meeting and beating the enemy's best troops1 even under conditions which favoured his defence to a degree which it required the greatest endurance1 determination1 and heroism to #bj overcome 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatch1 ,december #be1 #aiag74 ,it is no disparagement of the gallant deeds performed on other fronts to say that1 in the stubborn struggle for the line of hills which stretches from ,wytschaete to ,passchendaele1 the great armies that to-day are shouldering the burden of our ,empire have shown themselves worthy of the regiments which1 in ,october and ,november of #aiad1 made ,ypres take rank for ever amongst the most glorious of ,british battles 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatch1 ,december #be1 #aiag74 ,the ,british infantryman has always had the reputation of fighting his best in an uphill battle1 and time and again in the history of our country1 by sheer tenacity and determination of purpose1 has won victory from a numerically superior foe4 ,thrown once more upon the defensive by circumstances over which he had no control1 but which will not persist1 he has shown himself to possess in full measure the traditional qualities of his race 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatch1 ,july #bj1 #aiah74 ,throughout this long period of incessant fighting against greatly superior numbers the behaviour of all arms of the ,british forces engaged was magnificent4 ,what they achieved is best described in the words of the ,french ,general 7,maistre7 under whose orders they came1 who wrote of them3 ',they have enabled us to establish a barrier against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered themselves4 ,cela aucun des tmoins franais ne l'oubliera' 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatch1 ,december #ba1 #aiah74 ,after four years of fighting1 at the close of a defensive campaign of the utmost severity1 protracted by the efforts of the enemy from ,march #ba-;,july #ag1 #aiah1 the ,new ,armies passed from the guard to the thrust4 ,they were everywhere victorious1 and in nine pitched battles they captured upwards of #age1jjj prisoners and #b1fjj guns4 ,in order to estimate the ardour and endurance of these troops during this final stage1 it will be enough to mention the dates and importance of the main events-- #ba ,battle of ,amiens 7,aug4 #h-ac7 in which the ,,iv4 ,army took #bb1jjj prisoners and more than #djj guns4 ,battle of ,bapaume 7,aug4 #ba-,sept4 #a7 ,,iii4 ,army and ,left ,wing of ,,iv4 ,army3 #cd1jjj prisoners1 #bgj guns4 ,battle of the ,scarpe 7,aug4 #bf-,sept4 #c7 ,i4 ,army3 #af1jjj prisoners1 #bjj guns4 ,battle of ,haerincourt and ,ephy 7,sept4 #ab-ah7 ,,iv4 and ,,iii4 ,armies3 #ab1jjj prisoners1 #ajj guns4 ,battle of ,cambrai and the ,hindenburg ,line 7,sept4 #bg-,oct4 #e7 ,,iv41 ,,iii41 and ,i4 ,armies4 ,ended in the breaking of the ,hindenburg ,line and in the capture of #ce1jjj prisoners and #chj guns4 ,battle of ,flanders 7,sept4 #bh-,oct4 #ad7 ,,ii4 ,army3 #e1jjj prisoners1 #ajj guns4 ,battle of ,le ,cateau 7,oct4 #f-ab7 ,,iv41 ,,iii41 and ,i4 ,armies3 #ab1jjj prisoners1 #bej guns4 ,battle of the ,selle 7,oct4 #ag-be7 ,,iv4 and ,,iii4 ,armies3 #bj1jjj prisoners1 #dge guns4 ,battle of the ,sambre 7,nov4 #a-aa7 ,,iv41 ,,iii41 and ,i4 ,armies3 #ai1jjj prisoners1 #dej guns4 7,marshal ,foch47 ,,changes ,,in ,,method4--,the principles which underlie the ,art of ,war would thus appear to be based on constant factors1 but the methods of their application are susceptible to change1 for in their application the principles are subject to the influence of successive inventions4 ,gunpowder abolished the bow and arrow and the knight in armour2 the bayonet affixed to the musket superseded the pike2 the rifle outranged the musket2 the breech-loader and the magazine attachment progressively increased the rate of fire2 smokeless powder rendered a firing line almost invisible2 the flat trajectory of the small-arms bullet increased the danger-zone in an advance2 the increased power1 mobility1 and accuracy of the field gun#d rendered certain #bb formations obsolete in the attack2 the general advance in the rate and accuracy of fire from rifles1 machine guns1 and artillery made attack on a strongly organised position possible only when surprise in the time and place of the thrust neutralises the advantages of the defence1 or when an overwhelming barrage of shells and bullets covers the advance and smothers the enemy's resistance4 ,the advent of a third service1 by the addition of the ,air to the ,sea and ,land ,services1 increased the facilities for reconnaissance#e and added to the difficulties of concealing movement during the hours of daylight4 ,these and similar influences have brought about changes in certain respects1 amongst which the most pronounced is the increased use of field entrenchments1 and tactical methods have been evolved to meet the necessities of the case1 or modified to suit the new requirements4#f ,but no inventions can shift the burden of war from the shoulders of the infantryman4 ,despite the enormous development of mechanical invention in every phase of warfare1 the place which the infantryman has always held as the main substance and foundation of an army is as secure to-day as in any period of history4 ,the infantryman remains the backbone of defence and the spearhead of the attack4 ,at no time has the reputation of the ,british infantryman been higher1 or his achievement more worthy of his renown4 4 4 4 ,immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be1 they cannot by themselves decide a campaign4 ,their true rle is that of assisting the infantryman4 4 4 4 ,they cannot replace him4 ,only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 #bc ,,the ,,text-,,books4--,changes in tactical methods are recorded from time to time in circulars issued by the ,general ,staff1 to be embodied eventually in the official text-books4 ,these text-books 7,infantry ,training and ,field ,service ,regulations7 are the foundation upon which the study of ,infantry ,tactics should be based1 and of these books ,colonel ,g4 ,f4 ,r4 ,henderson has left behind him the following opinion3 ,that portion of our own text-books which refers to ,infantry in ,attack and ,defence is merely the essence of ,tactics4 ,there is no single sentence that is not of primary importance1 no single principle laid down that can be violated with impunity1 no single instruction that should not be practised over and over again4 ,after four years of warfare1 in which the principles enunciated in the text-books had been put to the most searching of all tests 7i4e4 practical application in ,war71 the ,general ,staff of the ,army was able to preface a list of its recent publications with the following exhortation3 ,it must be remembered that the principles laid down in ,field ,service ,regulations and in ,infantry ,training are still the basis of all sound knowledge4 ,at the close of the final victorious campaign1 ,marshal ,haig emphasised the truth of this claim3 ,the longer the war lasted the more emphatically has it been realised that our original organisation and training were based on correct principles4 ,the danger of altering them too much1 to deal with some temporary phase1 has been greater than the risk of adjusting them too little4 4 4 4 ,the experience gained in this war alone1 without the study and practice of lessons learned from other campaigns1 could not have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics which have characterised the fighting4 ,there was required also the sound basis of military knowledge supplied by our ,training ,manuals and ,staff ,colleges4 #a ,author of ,ben ,hur4 #b ,for an example in military fiction1 see ,the ,second ,degree in ,the ,green ,curve4 #c ,unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem4 #d ,the term field gun was limited to the #ah-pounder until the ,boer ,war1 when heavy guns were used as mobile artillery4 ,in the ,great ,war1 mechanical transport brought into the field of battle guns of the largest calibre4 ,quick-firing field guns were first used by the ,abyssinians against the ,italians at the ,battle of ,adowa 7,february #bi1 #ahif74 #e ,reconnoitring balloons were first used by the ,army of the ,potomac at the ,battle of ,fredericksburg 7,december #ab1 #ahfb74 ,aeroplanes were used in warfare for the first time in #aiaa1 during the ,italo-,turkish campaign in ,tripoli1 ,north ,africa4 #f ,heavily armoured cars1 known as ,tanks1 were introduced during the ,first ,battle of the ,somme1 ,september #ae1 #aiaf4 #bd ,,the ,,battle ,theoretically1 a well conducted battle is a decisive attack successfully carried out4--,,marshal ,,foch4 ,the ,art of ,war1 in order to arrive at its aim 7which is to impose its will upon the enemy71 knows but one means1 the destruction of the adversary's organised forces4 ,so we arrive at the battle1 the only argument of war1 the only proper end that may be given to strategical operations1 and we begin by establishing the fact that to accomplish the aim of war the battle cannot be purely defensive4 ,the results of a defensive battle are exclusively negative2 it may check the enemy in his march2 it may prevent him from achieving his immediate aim2 but it never leads to his destruction1 and so is powerless to achieve the wished-for victory4 ,therefore1 every defensive battle must terminate with an offensive action or there will be no result 7,marshal ,foch74 ,,characteristics ,,of ,,the ,,battle4--,no two battles are precisely similar1 but there are certain characteristics common to every battle4 ,in the first place1 the issue is almost always uncertain1 for events which no human sagacity could provide against may occur to defeat the wisest plans4 ,the best chances1 therefore1 are on the side of the commander who is provided with sufficient means to achieve his object1 who forms his plans with the greatest sagacity1 and executes them with the greatest ability4 ,decisive success has followed the combinations of great commanders1 and in the long run victory pays homage to knowledge of the principles which underlie the art of war4 #be ,in the second place1 the human factor always plays its part in battle4 ,troops lacking in discipline are liable to panic in face of a sudden disaster1 and even the best troops are liable to become unsteady if their flank is gained4 ,in the third place1 a comparatively small body of fresh troops thrown into action at the right moment against greater numbers1 if the latter are exhausted by fighting1 may achieve a success out of all proportion to their numbers4 ,for this reason a prudent commander will endeavour to retain under his control some portion of his reserves1 to be thrown in after his adversary has exhausted his own reserve power4 ,to be superior at the point of attack is the ,art of ,warfare in a nutshell1 and for this reason attacks on separate points of a position must be properly synchronised to be effective4 ,the unbeaten enemy will otherwise possess a mobile reserve with which to reinforce threatened points4 ,the attacks must be so timed that he throws them in piecemeal or fails to reach the point mainly threatened4 ,mc,clellan's position with the ,army of the ,potomac on ,malvern ,hill 7,july #a1 #ahfb7 was a desperate position to attack in front1 but it could have been turned on the right4 ,the hill dominated the ground to the north1 and also the road on which ,lee's ,army of ,northern ,virginia was approaching1 and was crowned with numerous heavy guns1 against which ,lee's artillery was powerless4 ,it was ,lee's intention to open with an attack by a division1 supported by two brigades1 on the right of the position1 and when this force was at grips with the ,army of the ,potomac1 to assault the centre with a bayonet charge4 ,about #e p4m4 the sound of cheering was heard near the right of the position1 and mistaking this for the signal1 ,general ,d4 ,h4 ,hill launched the attack on the centre4 ,the first line of defence was carried1 but the ,northern ,army was unoccupied in the other parts of the line1 and reinforcements quickly #bf beat off the attack with heavy loss4 ,after this attack had failed1 ,magruder's division arrived in position and the attack on the right flank was delivered with similar results4 ,both attacks were carried out with superb courage1 but partial blows of this nature are without the first elements of success1 and ,mc,clellan's movements were not again molested4 ,,phases ,,of ,,the ,,battle4--,there are three principal phases of every battle4 ,information must be obtained by observation and by fighting2 advantage must be taken of information so obtained to strike where the blow or blows will be most effective2 success obtained by fighting must be developed until the enemy is annihilated4 ,information and the ,initiative4--,much work requires to be done in the air and on the land before the rival armies come face to face4 ,aircraft and the independent cavalry 7advanced mounted troops and fast tanks detached from divisions for the purpose71 endeavour to ascertain whether1 and if so in what locality and in what strength1 troops are being concentrated by the enemy4 ,from information so obtained the ,headquarters ,staff are able to conjecture the intentions and aims of the enemy1 and the extent to which their own intentions and aims have been perceived by the enemy4 ,after the enemy is encountered this information is at the service of the ,commander of the troops1 but it will generally require to be supplemented by fighting4 ,on each side the commander will be striving to obtain the initiative1 to impose his will upon his opponent1 for the commander who loses the initiative is compelled to conform to the plans and movements of his adversary1 instead of bringing into operation plans and movements better suited to his own purposes4 ,each is scheming to obtain or retain the liberty of manoeuvre1 in the same way as1 in the days of sailing ships1 a naval commander strove to get the weather gauge in every encounter4 ,the initiative won by the ,strategy of one commander #bg is sometimes wrested from him by the ,tactics of his adversary4 ,this was exemplified at the ,battle of ,salamanca 7,july #bb1 #ahab74 ,wellington1 the generalissimo of the ,anglo-,portuguese forces1 had decided to withdraw behind the ,river ,tormes to the stronghold ,ciudad ,rodrigo1 and had dispatched his train to that centre4 ,the ,french ,commander 7,marmont71 in his eagerness to intercept ,wellington's line of retreat1 moved part of his force to the ,heights of ,miranda1 thus threatening ,wellington's right and rear1 but leaving a gap of two miles between the detached force and his main army4 ,wellington noted the fresh disposition of ,marmont's army through his telescope1 and exclaiming1 ,that will do6 he abandoned all idea of the withdrawal which had been forced upon him by ,marmont's previous manoeuvres1 and hurled part of his force against the detached body 7which was defeated before ,marmont could send assistance7 and at the same time barred the progress of the main army1 which was forced to leave the field4 ,wellington afterwards declared1 ,i never saw an army receive such a beating4 ,if the ,spanish ,general in alliance with ,wellington had not1 contrary to the most explicit instructions1 evacuated the ,castle of ,alba de ,tormes 7which commanded the fords over which the ,french retreated71 not one-third of ,marmont's army would have escaped 7,napier74 ,as at ,salamanca1 where the liberty of manoeuvre which had been won by the ,strategy of ,marmont was wrested from him by the ,tactics of ,wellington1 so at the final phase of the ,first ,battle of the ,marne 7,september1 #aiad71 the initiative was regained by tactical adroitness4 ,rapidity of action was the great ,german asset1 while that of ,russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops4 ,to obtain a quick decision the ,germans went to every length4 ,of the main routes for the invasion of ,france chosen for their armies1 two led through the neutral territories of ,luxemburg and ,belgium1 and only one through ,france1 and their advance there broke #bh down1 almost at the first1 at the only point where it was legitimately conducted1 for the ,german armies failed to pierce the ,french ,front at the ,gap of ,charmes 7,vosges71 and their defeat at the ,battle of ,baccarat 7,august #be1 #aiad7 led to the decisive defeat at the ,first ,battle of the ,marne4 ,they then abandoned1 for the moment1 all hopes of a quick decision in a war of manoeuvre and retiring to their prepared lines of defence on the ,aisne1 relied upon methodically prepared and regularly constructed trench systems1 and upon the hand grenade1 the trench mortar1 and the other weapons of close combat1 for superiority in a long campaign of trench siege warfare1 which endured until the collapse of ,russia in #aiag freed for an offensive movement on the requisite scale in #aiah upwards of #a1ejj1jjj men4 ,at the ,first ,battle of the ,marne1 the five ,german armies1 which were following up the ,franco-,british left and centre1 were extended from ,amiens to ,verdun1 but on ,september #h1 #aiad1 the ,german ,i4 ,army 7,general von ,kluck7 was so placed by the impetuosity of the march that a wide gap separated it from the remainder of the ,german forces4 ,to the north-west of ,paris a new ,french ,army1 collected from the ,metropolitan garrison and from the south-eastern frontier1 had been assembled and pushed out in motor transports by the zeal and intelligence of the ,military ,governor of ,paris 7,general ,gallieni72 and to avoid this menace to his flank and line of communications1 and to regain touch with the other ,german armies1 one of which 7under the ,crown ,prince7 was unsuccessfully engaged in battle1 ,general von ,kluck adopted the extremely hazardous course of a flank march1 across the front of the ,franco-,british left wing4 ,upon receiving intelligence of this manoeuvre from the ,air ,service in ,paris1 ,general ,joffre1 seeing the opportunity of gaining the initiative1 ordered an advance to the attack on ,september #f1 and the ,first ,battle of the ,marne1 which resulted from this order1 changed the character of the fighting on the #bi ,western ,front4 ,the decisive blow was strategical rather than tactical4 ,it was delivered on a battlefield of #f1jjj square miles1 and involved1 throughout that area1 a struggle of six great armies1 numbering in all #gjj1jjj troops1 against a similar number of armies of at least equal strength4 ,no counter-attack on such a scale had previously been delivered in any campaign1 and the scarcely interrupted advance of the ,german armies received a permanent check1 while the strategic aim of the ,german ,staff1 namely1 the speedy annihilation in the field of the ,franco-,british armies1 had to be definitely abandoned4 ,,development ,,of ,,the ,,battle4--,the atmosphere of battle is thus depicted in ,the ,science of ,war3 ,when two armies are face to face and one is superior in numbers to the other1 the commander of the smaller army is confronted by two problems4 ,if the superior army is not yet concentrated1 or is so distributed that the different parts cannot readily support each other1 it may be defeated in detail4 ,if the superior army is already concentrated1 its commander may be induced1 by one means or another1 to make detachments1 and thus to be weak everywhere4 ,the first problem is solved by rapidity of manoeuvre1 surprise marches1 secrecy1 feints to bewilder the adversary in his concentration1 and action on unexpected lines4 ,the second1 by skilful threatening of points for the defence of which the adversary will detach forces2 by concealment of his dispositions2 and by drawing the adversary into terrain where part only of his superior forces can be employed4 ,the power of striking 'like a bolt from the blue' is of the greatest value in war4 ,surprise was the foundation of almost all the great strategical combinations of the past1 as it will be of those to come4 ,the first thought and the last of the great general is to outwit his adversary and to strike where he is least expected4 ,to what ,federal soldier did it occur on the #cj morning of ,chancellorsville 7,may #b-h1 #ahfc7 that ,lee1 confronted by #ij1jjj ,northerners1 would detach ,stonewall ,jackson with more than half his own force of #dc1jjj to attack his adversary in the rear 7,the ,science of ,war74 ,surprise was the chief cause of success in the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai 7,november #bj1 #aiag7 when ,general ,sir ,julian ,byng launched the ,,iii4 ,army at dawn against the highly organised defensive position known as the ,hindenburg ,line4 ,the wire entanglements in front of this position were exceptionally deep1 and had not been broken by gun-fire4 ,behind them the ,germans were resting in apparent security and such information as they were able to obtain by raiding reconnaissances was not corroborated by the fierce and prolonged artillery bombardment which was at that time regarded as the inseparable prelude to an attack in force4 ,the advance was preceded by battalions of ,tanks1 with ,infantry in close support1 and was followed by ,cavalry1 to round up fugitives and disorganise reinforcements4 ,the artillery had previously been strengthened and was directed against the support and reserve lines1 to prevent the ,germans from massing for counter-attacks and to break up their formations4 ,aircraft carried out reconnaissance during the battle from a low altitude and harassed the defenders with fire action4 ,an advance was made into the strongest part of the ,german defensive system on a twenty-mile front to a depth of five miles1 and secured upwards of #aa1jjj prisoners1 #aej guns1 and considerable quantities of stores and materials1 and although after-events neutralised the initial successes1 the advance of ,november #bj1 #aiag1 will ever remain an example of the value of surprise in war4 ,surprise strikes with terror even those who are by far the stronger4 ,a new weapon of war may ensure it1 or a sudden appearance of a force larger than the adversary's1 or a concentration of forces upon a point at which the adversary is not ready instantaneously to parry the blow4 ,but if the methods #ca be various1 the aim is always to produce the same moral effect upon the enemy--terror--by creating in him at the swift apparition of unexpected and incontestably powerful means1 the sentiment of impotence1 the conviction that he cannot conquer--that is to say1 that he is conquered4 ,and this supreme blow of unexpected vigour need not be directed upon the whole of the enemy's army4 ,for an army is an animate and organised being1 a collection of organs1 of which the loss even of a single one leads to death 7,marshal ,foch74 ,at almost any period of the battle1 and in almost every phase of fighting1 surprise can be brought about by a sudden and unexpected outburst of effective machine gun or other form of fire4 ,a sudden effective fire will have a particularly demoralising effect on the enemy2 it is often advantageous1 therefore1 to seek for surprise effects of this sort by temporarily withholding fire 7,infantry ,training1 #aiba74 ,,the ,,decisive ,,blow4--,the preparatory action and the development usually take the form of a converging movement of separated forces1 so timed as to strike the adversary's front and flank simultaneously1 in order to threaten the enemy's line of communications1 for the line of supply is as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being4 ,perhaps no situation is more pitiable than that of a commander who has permitted an enemy to sever his communications4 ,he sees the end of his resources at hand1 but not the means to replenish them 7,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley74 ,the decisive blow will be delivered by the ,general ,reserve1 which will be secretly concentrated and launched as secretly as possible2 and the commander of the whole force will so distribute his troops that about half his available force can be kept in hand for this decisive blow1 on a part of the enemy's front if sufficient penetration has been effected1 or on a flank4 ,the point chosen becomes the vital #cb point1 and success there means success at all points4 ,once routed1 the enemy must be relentlessly pursued and prevented from regaining order and moral4 ,a battle was fought in the year ,b4,c4 #cca1 nearly #b1cjj years ago1 at ,arbela1#a in ,mesopotamia1 the ,eastern theatre of operations in the ,great ,war of #aiad-ah1 and it deserves study to show the eternal nature of the main principles which underlie the ,art of ,war4 ,alexander the ,great invaded the territories of ,darius1 ,king of the ,medes and ,persians1 with the strategic aim of defeating his adversary's main armies in a decisive battle4 ,the ,macedonian forces were preceded by an ,advanced ,guard of ,cavalry1 and from information obtained by the ,vanguard1 ,alexander was made aware of the strength and position of the ,persian forces4 ,by a careful reconnaissance of the ground in company with his ,corps ,commanders1 ,alexander was able to forestall a projected movement1 and by advancing in two lines of battle in such a way that his troops could at any moment be thrown into a compact figure fringed with spears1 which formed an impenetrable hedge against cavalry1 he found a remedy for the disadvantages of the ground1 which afforded no protection to either of his flanks4 ,after advancing in these two lines ,alexander manoeuvred his troops into a phalanx1 or wedge-shaped figure1 and this wedge he drove into the masses of the enemy to force the wings asunder4 ,in spite of local reverses in parts of the field1 the depth and weight of the main attack carried it through the enemy's forces3 the survivors were captured or dispersed1 and the victory was complete4 #a ,the site of this battle was probably ,gaugamela1 about #fj miles from the present ,arbil1 which is #dj miles from ,mosul1 on the ,baghdad road4 #cc ,,how ,,battles ,,are ,,influenced ,once troops are launched in battle their success or failure depends upon such influences as the commander can bring to bear1 upon the co-operation of his subordinate commanders1 and upon the moral and training of the troops engaged4 ,,the ,,commander',s ,,influence is shown1 first in his orders for the operations1 and later by the method in which he employs the forces retained in his hand for the decisive blow4 ,personal control1 by the commander1 of troops committed to battle1 is not only impossible but should be unnecessary1 as such control and leading is the function of his subordinates1 who should be fully acquainted with his intentions and must be trusted to carry them into execution4 ,other1 and more important1 duties have to be undertaken by the commander1 and it is essential that he should not allow his attention to be diverted from his main object by local incidents1 which are matters for his subordinates to deal with4 ,a sound system of command is based upon three facts3 an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from headquarters2 the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation2 intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than mechanical obedience 7,the ,science of ,war74 ,a campaign resolves itself into a struggle between human intelligences4 ,each commander will endeavour to defeat his adversary in battle1 and his principal weapon is his ,general ,reserve4 ,if he can exhaust the reserve power of his adversary1 while maintaining his own intact1 he can proceed to victory at his own time1 and he will endeavour to exhaust the hostile reserves by causing #cd them to be thrown in piecemeal1 in ignorance of the spot where the decisive blow is to fall4 ,during the campaign on the ,western ,front in #aiah the ,allies were able to conserve their strength throughout the attacks from ,march #ba to ,july #ae1 and when they passed from the guard to the thrust they extended their front of attack from day to day1 calculating correctly that this gradual extension would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall1 and would cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal4 ,the subordinate commanders must bring to fruit with all the means at their disposal the scheme of the higher command1 therefore they must1 above all1 understand that thought and then make of their means the use best suited to circumstances--of which1 however1 they are the only judge4 4 4 4 ,the ,commander-in-,chief cannot take the place of his subordinates--he cannot think and decide for them4 ,in order to think straight and to decide rightly it would be necessary for him to see through their eyes1 to look at things from the place in which they actually stand1 to be everywhere at the same moment 7,marshal ,foch74 ,students of military history will remember that the ,prussian ,commander-in-,chief and his ,chief ,staff ,officer1 during the highly successful campaign of #ahgj-ga1 did not come within sound of the guns until five pitched battles had been fought by their subordinate commanders4 ,outside the fog of battle1 with its absorbing interests and distractions1 the commander can retain his sense of proportion#a and can decide where and when he will make his final effort4 ,news of the battle reaches him from his immediate subordinates1 and from the accounts of successes and failures he is able to judge the weaknesses and strength of his own and his adversary's dispositions1 to use part of his reserves as reinforcements1 #ce if he must1 or to husband them with confidence in the success of the operations1 until the time comes for him to launch them for the final blow4 ,,information4--,in order that the commander's influence may be exerted to the best advantage it is essential that all vital information should reach him promptly1 and that his orders should be communicated without delay4 ,subordinate commanders must keep their superiors and commanders of neighbouring units regularly informed as to the progress of the battle1 and of important changes in the situation as they occur4 ,runners1 who can be trusted to carry a verbal message or written order1 are attached to each unit engaged and to its headquarters4 ,higher units than battalions can usually depend on the ,signal ,service for intercommunication1 but whenever necessary1 a supply of runners and mounted orderlies must be available for their use4 ,this ensures co-operation1 and enables mutual support to be rendered4 ,information received must be transmitted at once to all whom it concerns1 and orders received from superiors must be communicated without delay to commanders of all units affected4 ,,co-,,operation4--,co-operation when in contact with the enemy is no easy matter to bring about4 ,there are1 however1 three means of overcoming the difficulty3 constant communication between the units2 thorough reconnaissance of the ground over which the movements are to be made2 clear and well-considered orders 7,the ,science of ,war74 ,each commander who issues orders for ,attack or ,defence should assemble his subordinate commanders1 if possible in view of the ground over which the troops are to operate1 explain his orders1 and satisfy himself that each subordinate understands his respective task4 ,combination depends on the efficiency of the chain of control connecting the brain of the commander through all grades down to the #cf corporal's squad2 on the intelligence of subordinate leaders in grasping and applying the commander's plans2 on the discipline which ensures intelligent obedience to the directing will2 and on the mobility which gives rapid effect to that will1 and permits advantage to be taken of fleeting opportunities4 ,every fresh development in the means of transmitting orders and information rapidly1 permits of an extension of the commander's influence1 and makes more perfect combination possible and over wider areas 7,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley74 ,even when1 and particularly when1 forces are engaged in battle1 reconnaissance must be carried on and information gained must be communicated at once4 ,it will frequently happen that a suitable moment for the decisive attack1 or decisive counter-stroke1 will be found only after long and severe fighting4 ,systematic arrangements for obtaining1 sifting1 and transmitting information throughout the battle are therefore of the highest importance4 ,information must be gained not only by troops and aircraft actually engaged1 but by supports and reserves1 who will often be able to see what is invisible to the forward troops4 ,in such cases1 more than in any other1 information must be communicated at once4 ,by intelligent observation superintending commanders can co-operate with one another1 can anticipate situations as they develop1 and decide at the time what steps will be necessary to meet them4 ,a general reconnaissance will be in progress during every modern battle by observers in aircraft and in observation balloons4 ,in addition1 local reconnaissance by means of patrols and scouts will usually discover an opening that might otherwise be lost1 and may warn a commander of an intended movement against him1 which might otherwise develop into a disagreeable surprise4 ,co-operation and ,mutual ,support were developed in their highest form by the ,allied ,corps ,commanders in the ,first ,battle of the ,marne 7,august-,september1 #aiad74 #cg ,in this campaign close on #a1ejj1jjj troops were engaged on both sides1 and the ,corps ,commanders1 particularly those of the ,french ,,vi4 ,army 7,manoury71 ,,iii4 ,army 7,sarrail71 and the ,military ,governor of ,paris 7,gallieni71 were continuously in touch with one another1 and frequently rendered assistance1 unasked1 by fire and by movement4 ,co-operation of a novel kind was exhibited on a minor scale during the ,first ,battle of the ,somme4 ,an attack was launched on ,gueudecourt 7,september #bf1 #aiaf7 by the #bast ,division1 and a protecting trench was captured as a preliminary to the larger movement4 ,a tank1 followed up by infantry bombers1 proceeded along the parapet of the trench firing its machine guns1 while an aeroplane swooped over the trench firing its ,lewis guns4 ,the survivors in the trench surrendered1 and the garrison was collected by supporting infantry1 who advanced in response to signals from the aeroplane4 ,,fire ,,tactics4--,it has already been noted that the battle is the only argument of war2 it is also the final test of training1 and on the battlefield no part of the syllabus is more severely tested than that devoted to musketry4 ,the fire tactics of an army1 its combination of fire and movement1 the direction and control by the leaders and the fire discipline of the rank and file1 make for success or failure on the field of battle4 ,the fire must be directed by the fire unit commander against an objective chosen with intelligence and accurately defined2 it must be controlled by the sub-unit commander1 who must be able to recognise the objectives indicated1 to regulate the rate of fire1 and to keep touch with the state of the ammunition supply4 ,fire discipline must be maintained1 so that there is the strictest compliance with verbal orders and signals1 and application on the battlefield of the habits inculcated during the training period4 ,the time when fire is to be opened is often left to the discretion of the fire-unit commander1 but1 generally speaking1 fire should be opened by an #ch attacking force only when a further advance without opening fire is impossible2 and even in defence1 when access to the ammunition reserve is likely to be far easier than in an attack1 withholding fire until close range is reached is generally more effective than opening at a longer range4 ,the tactical value of a withering fire at close range from a hitherto passive defender has again and again been proved in battle4 ,on the ,heights of ,abraham 7,september #ac1 #agei7 ,general ,wolfe had assembled his troops and he awaited ,montcalm's attack4 ,not a shot was fired by the defenders until the attacking force was within forty paces1 and three minutes later a bayonet charge into the broken foe swept the ,french helplessly before it4 ,at the ,battle of ,bunker ,hill 7,june #ag1 #agge7 the ,american colonists inflicted a loss of #df per cent4 on the assaulting ,british force1 by reserving their fire until the badges and buttons of the tunics could be clearly identified4 ,at the ,battle of ,fredericksburg 7,december #ac1 #ahfb7 ,general ,meagher's ,irish ,brigade of the ,u4,s4 ,army of the ,potomac assaulted ,marye's ,hill1 #a1bjj strong4 ,the defending ,confederates reserved their fire until the assailants were #ajj yards from their position and drove them off with a loss of #icg out of the #a1bjj4 ,in ,august1 #aiad1 the ,british ,regular ,army1 during the ,retreat from ,mons1 reserved their fire until the ,germans arrived at the most deadly point of their rifles' trajectory1 and again and again drove off all except the dead and mortally wounded4 ,throughout the ,great ,war1 troops fully trained in the ,british system of musketry and using the short magazine ,lee ,enfield rifle1 proved beyond dispute the values of the system and of the weapon4 ,in a review of the methods adopted to check the great ,german offensive in the spring of #aiah1 a circular issued by the ,general ,staff states3 ,rapid rifle fire was the decisive factor in these operations4 ,the men had confidence in their rifles and knew how to use them4 ,superiority of fire can only be gained by the close #ci co-operation of the artillery and infantry at every stage of the battle1 and unless infantry co-operate1 the artillery is not likely to produce any decisive effect4 ,long-range machine-gun fire is an important auxiliary to the artillery in covering and supporting the advance of attacking infantry4 ,enfilade fire1 the most telling of all1 is more easily brought to bear than of old owing to the increase in the effective range and in the rate of fire4 ,supports and local reserves will usually co-operate most effectively with forward troops by bringing fire to bear upon the flank of such bodies of the enemy as are holding up a movement by frontal fire4 ,during the counter-attack for the recapture of ,the ,bluff1 in the ,ypres ,salient 7,march #b1 #aiaf7 by troops of the #crd and #agth ,divisions1 the right and centre gained their objectives4 ,the left attacking party1 at the first attempt1 failed to reach the ,german trenches1 but those who had penetrated to the ,german line on the right realised the situation and brought a ,lewis gun to bear on the enemy's line of resistance1 completely enfilading his trenches1 and thus enabling the left company to reach its goal4 ,,movement4--,the influence of movement is inseparable from that of fire1 as it enables fire to be opened and is a means of escaping the full effects of fire2 while it is often possible to move one unit only in conjunction with the fire of another4 ,it can also be used to relieve one unit from the effects of fire concentrated upon it by moving another unit against the enemy4 ,a steady and rapid advance of troops has the twofold effect of closing to a range from which an ascendency in the fire-fight can be secured1 and also of reducing the losses of the advancing force1 for if the troops remained stationary in the open under heavy fire1 at a known range1 the losses would clearly be greater than if they advanced1 and would be suffered without gaining ground towards the objective1 while the closer the #dj assaulting line gets to the objective1 and the steadier its advance1 the less confidence will the enemy have in their power to stem the advance1 and the fewer casualties will be suffered in consequence4 ,no sealed pattern is laid down as to the movement and formation of infantry under fire1 but certain definite principles are put forward in the text-books4 ,where security is the first need1 as in the case of protecting forces 7advanced1 flank1 or rear guards71 movement should be effected by bounds from one tactical position to another under covering fire from supporting troops2 where the objective is the primary consideration1 security must be subordinated to the need of reaching the objective4 ,against artillery fire1 or long-range infantry fire1 the formation recommended by the text-books is small shallow columns1 each on a narrow front1 such as platoons in fours or sections in file1 arranged on an irregular front1 so that the range from the enemy's guns to each is different4 ,troops coming suddenly under such fire will avoid casualties more easily by moving forward and outwards in this way rather than by remaining under such cover as may be improvised in a position the exact range of which is obviously known to the enemy4 ,against effective machine-gun or rifle fire deployment into line1 or into arrowhead formation with the flanks thrown well back1 is preferable to a single line extended at so many paces interval1 as it is scarcely more vulnerable and is infinitely easier to control4 ,in retiring1 losses are generally heavier than in advancing1 or in maintaining a fire-fight from the position gained until a diversion by supporting troops enables a further bound to be made4 ,the enemy is generally able to deliver a well-directed stream of lead against retiring troops1 mainly because he is less harassed by the return fire4 ,retirements must therefore be carried out on the principle of alternate bounds under covering fire of co-operating bodies1 which withdraw1 in their turn1 under covering fire from the troops they have protected4 #da ,such alternate retirements are the essence of rear-guard tactics1 but1 although certain other phases of battle action justify the withdrawal of troops1 it must always be remembered that a position held against counter-attack is better than a position captured by assault1 for it is a position that does not require to be assaulted4 ,it is often impossible to predict the value of resistance at a particular point1 and the fate of a nation may depend upon a platoon commander's grit in holding on at all costs4 ,in the campaign of #ahad1 ,brigadier-,general ,moreau was sent to the ,fortress of ,soissons1 with instructions to hold the town4 ,his garrison consisted of about #a1bjj all arms1 with #bj guns4 ,at #aj4cj a4m4 on ,march #b1 the fortress was bombarded by ,winzingerode's ,russians and ,blow's ,prussians1 and at #h p4m4 an assault was delivered4 ,this was easily repulsed and a counter-attack threw back the assailants to their own lines4 ,the bombardment was resumed until #aj p4m41 when the garrison had a total loss of #bc killed and #abc wounded4 ,during the night the besiegers sent a flag of truce to ,moreau1 and on ,march #c that general capitulated with all the honours of war in order to preserve #a1jjj fighting men for the ,emperor4 ,his action cost ,napoleon his throne1 for had ,moreau held out the ,emperor would have crushed his most implacable foe1 ,blcher 7who escaped from the toils in which he was enmeshed1 vi the bridge at ,soissons71 and the campaign would have been at an end4 ,if ,moreau had exhausted all the means of defence1 as the regulations of war ordain1 he could certainly have held out for another #dh hours1 and as heavy firing was audible in the vicinity it should have been clear to him that help was at hand4 ,at the ,first ,battle of ,ypres 7,october #bj-,november #bj1 #aiad7 the ,regular ,army of the ,united ,kingdom1 at the outset1 was filling so extensive a gap in the defensive line1 that in many parts there was but one rifle for #ag yards of front1 and there were neither local nor general reserves4 ,the #db assaulting ,german forces greatly outnumbered the defenders and brought up machine guns and artillery in overpowering strength4 ,the ,british artillery was not only overweighted but was so short of ammunition that ,marshal ,french was compelled to limit their daily number of rounds4 ,but the line was held1 and a counter-attack1 headed by the #bnd ,battalion of the ,worcestershire ,regiment1 on ,october #ca1 with the bayonet1 restored the line at ,gheluvelt1 at the most critical moment of the battle1 and the ,germans did not get through the defences4 ,this stubborn resistance threw the ,germans behind their entrenchments1 and the ,advance to ,calais was stemmed by ,french's ,contemptible ,little ,army4 ,at the ,second ,battle of ,ypres 7,april #bb-,may #ah1 #aiae7 surprise in the time and nature of the attack1 by the secret concentration of forces and the introduction of poison gas1 gained an initial advantage for the ,germans and left the ,british flank uncovered4 ,a ,canadian division counter-attacked on the ,german flank1 and by ,may #ah the ,allies had regained many of the captured positions4 ,during the ,first ,battle of the ,somme troops of the ,royal ,west ,kent and the ,queen's ,regiments effected a lodgment in ,trnes ,wood 7,july #ad1 #aiaf74 ,they maintained their position all night in the northern corner of the wood1 although completely surrounded by the enemy1 and assisted in the final capture and clearance of the wood at #h a4m4 the next day4 ,similar instances occurred in ,bourlon ,village 7,november #be-bg1 #aiag7 when parties of the #acth ,east ,surrey ,regiment held out in the south-east corner of the village1 during a ,german counter-attack1 and maintained their position until touch was re-established with them #dh hours later2 and in a group of fortified farms south of ,polygon ,wood 7,september #bf1 #aiag7 during the ,third ,battle of ,ypres1 when two companies of the ,argyll and ,sutherland ,highlanders held out all night1 although isolated from the rest of the #ccrd and #cith ,divisions1 until a renewed attack #dc cleared the district of hostile forces4 ,on ,april #i1 #aiah1 during the ,germans' desperate endeavours to break through the investing ,allies' lines1 the ruins of ,givenchy were held by the #eeth ,west ,lancashire 7,territorial7 ,division1 and the right edge of the neck through which von ,arnim and von ,quast hoped to extend1 in order to widen the wedge into the ,valley of the ,lys1 was firmly held1 while the left edge 7the ,messines ,ridge7 was recaptured by a counter-attack by the #ith ,division4 ,the centre of the line was also stoutly held by the ,guards' and other divisions1 many of which had suffered heavy losses in the ,v4 ,army during the ,german attack in the last week of ,march4 ,after #ba days of the most stubborn fighting 7,march #ba-;,april #aa1 #aiah7 of which the ,attack on the ,lys had formed part1 ,marshal ,sir ,d4 ,haig issued an order of the day emphasising the value of holding each position at all costs4 ,every position must be held to the last man4 ,there must be no retirement4 4 4 4 ,the safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment4 4 4 4 ,victory will belong to the side which holds out longest4 ,sir ,d4 ,haig's after-order1 on ,april #bc1 #aiah 7,st4 ,george's ,day71 awarded special praise to the troops under his command4 ,the number of divisions employed by the ,germans from ,march #ba to ,april #bc1 #aiah1 against the ,british alone was #ajb 7approximately #a1ejj1jjj troops71 and many of them were thrown in twice or three times4 ,in resisting the heavy blows which such a concentration of troops has enabled the enemy to direct against the ,british ,army1 all ranks1 arms1 and services have behaved with a gallantry1 courage1 and resolution for which no praise can be too high 7,haig's ,dispatch74 ,,covering ,,fire4--,the energetic and determined support of the infantry by fire is the main duty of machine-gun units throughout the whole course of the battle4 ,in the attack1 machine-gun platoons1 ,lewis gun sections1 #dd or rifle sections detailed to give covering fire1 must take care to select as targets those bodies of the enemy whose fire is chiefly checking the advance4 ,machine-gun platoons are sometimes brigaded1 and at others left to battalion commanders1 and their action after a temporary success in providing covering fire may depend upon their tactical distribution at the time4 ,infantry platoons detailed to give covering fire must join in the advance as soon as their own fire ceases to be effective in aiding the forward troops1 unless definite orders to the contrary have been received4 ,,fire ,,and ,,movement4--,it is thus seen that ,fire and ,movement are inseparably associated1 and judiciously employed in combination they enable infantry to achieve its object in battle1 to bring such a superiority of fire to bear as to make an advance to close quarters possible1 so that the enemy may be induced to surrender or may be overwhelmed by a bayonet assault2 and to prepare by similar means for further advances1 until the enemy is entirely hemmed in or completely routed4 #a ,in fiction1 this point 7that the generalissimo must not allow his sense of proportion to be distorted by local successes or reverses7 is clearly brought out in ,the ,point of ,view1 a story in ,the ,green ,curve by ,ole-,luk-,oie 7,general ,swinton74 #de ,,types ,,of ,,battle ,,action ,a battle must practically always be of the nature of ,attack and ,defence1 but the attitude originally assumed by either of the opposing forces may be reversed during an engagement4 ,a vigorous counter-attack by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the adversary on the defensive1 while an assailant may fight a delaying action in one part of the field1 although in another part his action may be essentially offensive4 ,there are three distinct systems of ,battle ,action3 the entirely defensive2 the entirely offensive2 and the combined1 or defensive-offensive system4 ,,the ,,defensive ,,battle has seldom effected positive results1 except1 perhaps1 at ,gettysburg 7,july #a-c1 #ahfc71 where ,meade permitted ,lee to break his forces against a strong position1 with the result that the ,army of ,northern ,virginia had to withdraw1 and the invasion of the ,north came to an end4 ,it must1 however1 be borne in mind that ,general ,lee was badly served by his subordinate1 and ,general ,meade's success was largely due to this factor4 ,on the second day of ,gettysburg 7,july #b1 #ahfc71 ,general ,j4 ,b4 ,hood's #ast ,division of ,general ,j4 ,longstreet's ,i4 ,army ,corps was deploying round the left of the ,federal ,army south of the ,round ,tops4 ,he saw a chance to strike and requested permission from ,longstreet4 ,hood's plan was the only one which gave a reasonable chance of decisive victory with the troops available4 ,longstreet1 in obedience to the letter of his orders1 but contrary to their spirit1 refused to sanction ,hood's advance4 ,longstreet's failure to seize a fleeting opportunity sounded the death-knell of the ,confederate cause4 #df ,burnside was defeated at ,fredericksburg 7,december #aj-af1 #ahfb7 by purely defensive tactics1 but ,lee had intended to follow up his victory by a decisive counter-blow1 which ,burnside escaped by extricating the ,army of the ,potomac before the blow fell4 ,success1 even to the limited degree achieved by ,meade or ,lee1 seldom follows the adoption of purely defensive tactics4 ,there is no such thing as an 'impregnable position1' for any position the defence of which is merely passive is bound to be carried at last by a manoeuvring enemy 7,marshal ,foch74 ,,the ,,offensive ,,battle4--,the ,entirely ,offensive system has been employed by many of the greatest commanders1 including ,marlborough at ,blenheim 7,august #b1 #agjd71 ,ramillies 7,may #bc1 #agjf71 and ,malplaquet 7,september #aa1 #agji72 ,frederick the ,great1 notably at ,leuthen 7,december #e1 #ageg72 ,napoleon1 ,wellington1 and ,grant1 as also by the ,prussian generals at almost every engagement in the campaigns of #ahff and #ahgj-ga4 ,the disadvantage of the system is that lack of success may entail not only a local disaster but the wreck and annihilation of the whole army4 ,at the ,battle of ,blenheim 7,august #b1 #agjd71 ,marlborough1 the greatest captain of his age1 had concentrated his forces with those of ,prince ,eugene of ,savoy the previous day and commanded an army of #ef1jjj men with #eb guns4 ,he was confronted by the joint armies of ,marshal ,tallard and the ,elector of ,bavaria1 amounting to #fj1jjj men with #fa guns4 ,it was necessary for ,marlborough to attack before ,villeroy joined the enemy1 or to withdraw until a more favourable opportunity presented itself4 ,the right flank of his opponents rested on high hills1 which were protected by detached posts1 and the left flank on the ,danube1 while opposite the centre was the marshy valley of the ,river ,nebel1 with several branches running through the swampy ground4 ,marlborough decided that a battle #dg was absolutely necessary and he attacked the next day4 ,like ,hannibal1 he relied principally on his cavalry for achieving his decisive success1 and this predilection was known to the opposing commanders4 ,he attacked the enemy's right and left wings1 and when heavily engaged with varying fortunes launched his decisive attack against the centre1 where the difficulties of the ground caused it to be least expected4 ,marlborough lost #e1jjj killed and #h1jjj wounded4 ,the vanquished armies were almost destroyed1 at least #dj1jjj being accounted for1 with #ab1jjj killed1 #ad1jjj wounded and missing1 and #ad1jjj prisoners4 ,,the ,,defensive-,,offensive ,,battle4--,the ,defensive-,offensive system consists in taking up a position which the enemy must attack1 and in delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the adversary has exhausted his strength4 ,this system has been employed in almost every campaign4 ,by such means ,napoleon achieved his classic victories of ,marengo 7,june #ad1 #ahjj71 ,austerlitz 7,december #b1 #ahje71 and ,dresden 7,august #bg1 #ahac72 and ,wellington his ,peninsular victories at ,vittoria 7,june #ba1 #ahac71 ,orthez 7,february #bg1 #ahad71 and ,toulouse 7,april #aj1 #ahad71 in addition to his final triumph at ,waterloo 7,june #ah1 #ahae72 and it was the method adopted by ,marshal ,foch in the decisive campaign of #aiah1 which endured from ,march until the ,armistice in ,november4 ,at the ,battle of ,waterloo 7,june #ah1 #ahae71 the decisive counter-stroke was delivered1 in accordance with ,wellington's pre-arranged plan1 by a force coming from a distance to the scene of action4 ,on the morning of ,june #ag1 when ,wellington resolved to make a stand at ,waterloo1 he was aware that the ,prussians1 who were mostly young troops1 had been beaten at ,ligny2 that ,napoleon had1 before that battle1 over #abj1jjj men1 and that he himself had1 all told1 #fh1jjj1 of whom #ca1jjj1 including the ,king's ,german ,legion1 were #dh ,british4 ,yet he withdrew from ,quatre ,bras with the full determination of standing at ,waterloo and of fighting ,napoleon's army1 if ,marshal ,blcher would come to his assistance with one ,army ,corps4 ,napoleon attacked on ,june #ah with #gb1jjj men and #bdf guns1 against ,wellington's #fh1jjj men with #aef guns1 at #aa a4m41 but he was unable to shift the line or break through the squares4 ,at #d4cj p4m4 one of ,blcher's corps was delivering the promised counter-attack against ,napoleon's line of communications4 ,soon after #i p4m4 ,wellington and ,blcher met at ,la ,belle ,alliance1 ,napoleon's headquarters before the battle1 and the pursuit was in full swing4 ,opportunities for restoring the battle and for turning impending defeat into a crushing victory are frequently offered during an engagement4 ,general ,lee's thin lines at ,antietam or ,sharpsburg 7,september #ag1 #ahfb71 slowly fed by men jaded by heavy marching1 were sorely pressed1 but there was a lull in the ,federal attack when ,hooker's advance was checked4 ,had ,general ,mc,clellan at that moment thrown in his last man and his last horse in a vigorous reinforcing attack1 ,antietam would not have been a drawn battle1 and ,lee would not have retired at his leisure into ,virginia4 ,lee's great victory at ,chancellorsville 7,may #b-c1 #ahfc71 although marred by the accident which deprived him of ,stonewall ,jackson1 was a striking instance of the success of the ,defensive-,offensive system at the hands of a great commander1 who defeated #ij1jjj troops with less than half that number1 by a containing defence with #ac1jjj men and a decisive counter-stroke with the remainder4 ,but while this combined system is regarded by most authorities as the best1 when circumstances warrant its adoption1 it is the highest test of generalship to seize the right moment to pass from the guard to the thrust4 ,this is the problem which confronted ,marshal ,foch1 the generalissimo of the ,allied ,forces1 during the great #di ,german offensive movement on the ,western ,front in #aiah4 ,the defensive rle endured from ,march #ba until ,july #ag1 #aiah1 and although many local counter-attacks were made along the whole battle front1 the ,allies did not pass from the guard to the thrust until the decisive counter-stroke was commenced in the ,second ,battle of the ,marne 7,july #ah1 #aiah7 on a front of #bg miles from ,fontenoy to ,belleau1 which drove the ,germans back across the ,marne on ,july #bj4 ,,the ,,second ,,battle ,,of ,,the ,,marne 7,july #ah1 #aiah74--,the great ,german offensive of ,march-,june1 #aiah1 was renewed on ,july #ae1 when the artillery preparation opened shortly after midnight and troops were poured across the ,marne in small boats and over pontoon bridges4 ,the attack was not unexpected4 ,adequate reserves were ready and in place1 and a heavy counter-bombardment on the ,german troops in their positions of assembly1 close to their front-line trenches1 caused heavy casualties4 ,the ,germans succeeded in penetrating the ,french and ,american positions in parts of the #ej-mile front to a maximum depth of #d miles south-west of ,reims1 but on the ,plains of ,champagne little progress was made and the attack lost its momentum4 ,during the attack of ,march #ba1 #aiah1 the advance was not held up until it was within striking distance of its ultimate objective1 and the offensive on the ,aisne in ,may1 #aiah1 secured an advance of #ab miles4 ,captured documents showed that the attack of ,july east of ,reims was intended to reach the ,marne at ,eperney and ,chalons1 an advance of #ba miles4 ,a feature of the earlier days of the battle was a spirited counter-attack near ,fossoy 7on the extreme left of the ,german forces7 by a division of the ,american ,army which thrust the ,germans behind their first line and captured upwards of #a1jjj prisoners1 the ground regained in the river bend being consolidated and held by the ,american division4 ,the battle continued for three days before the ,german #ej attack was brought to a standstill1 and at #d4hj a4m4 on ,july #ah a counter-attack by the ,french1 ,american1 and ,italian forces changed the whole aspect of the campaign1 and led to the final triumph of the ,allies and to the downfall of the ,central ,powers4 #ea ,,the ,,attack ,surprise is at all times the assailant's strongest weapon4--,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aibj74 ,the aim of every commander who possesses the power of manoeuvre is to seek out the enemy and destroy his organised forces4 ,the ,attack is the culminating point of all manoeuvres to this end1 and every commander will endeavour to achieve his aim by a sudden and unexpected assault on a part of the enemy's defences4 ,the achievement of this aim is only possible when a commander has assembled a sufficient force for his purpose1 and has obtained1 by reconnaissance and by fighting1 information as to the vulnerability of the hostile position4 ,the commander will then endeavour to break the enemy's formation so suddenly as to disconcert all his plans2 to retain a compact force with which to follow up the blow without giving the enemy a moment's breathing space2 to drive a wedge into the heart of his disordered masses1 forcing his wings asunder2 and to pursue and annihilate the scattered forces of the enemy4 ,unless a decision is quickly obtained in the opening weeks of a modern campaign the opposing armies tend to become immobile1 chiefly owing to the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments4 ,the armies will then be distributed in great depth1 and the attackers are faced with the necessity of breaking through not one position only1 but a series of positions1 extending back to a depth of several miles 7,infantry ,training1 #aiba74 ,penetration1 followed by the sundering of the ,franco-,british ,armies1 was clearly the intention of the ,german #eb ,high ,command in the ,second ,battle of the ,somme1 which opened on ,march #ba1 #aiah4 ,the ,german ,armies had entrenched themselves after the ,first ,battle of the ,marne 7,september1 #aiad71 and for #dc months had been confronted by the ,allied ,nations of ,britain1 ,france1 and ,belgium1 reinforced at the close by ,portuguese troops and by the ,national ,army of the ,united ,states4 ,within the investing lines of the ,western ,front the ,german ,armies were besieged1 the barrier reaching from the ,belgian coast to the frontier of ,switzerland1 while the armies of ,austria-,hungary were similarly penned in by the army of ,italy1 from ,switzerland to the ,adriatic4 ,the internal collapse of ,russia1 in #aiag1 enabled von ,hindenburg to assume the offensive1 with upwards of #a1ejj1jjj men released from the ,eastern ,front1 and part of this reserve power was projected1 with the ,austro-,hungarian ,armies1 in a fierce attack on the ,italian lines4 ,the success of this manoeuvre continued until reinforcements were dispatched from other parts of the ,allied lines1 and a diversion in the region of ,cambrai by the ,british ,,iii4 ,army1 under ,sir ,julian ,byng 7,november #bj1 #aiag71 prevented the dispatch of further ,german reserve power to the ,italian ,front1 and necessitated a counter-thrust in ,france4 ,the battlefields of ,france again resumed their importance as the vital point in the theatre of operations1 and in the spring of #aiah1 profiting by the improved positions and prospects in the ,west1 ,ludendorff attempted to break through the investing lines on a #ej-mile front4 ,the attack was heralded by a terrific bombardment1 and culminated in a desperate thrust against the ,british ,armies north and south of the ,river ,somme1 the points of penetration aimed at being the ,british right1 where it was linked up with the ,french on the ,river ,oise1 in the neighbourhood of ,la ,fre1 and the ,british line of communications in the neighbourhood of ,amiens4 ,the whole ,british line opposite the thrust was hurled back and the territory regained by the ,franco-,british #ec advance on the ,somme in ,july1 #aiaf1 was recaptured by the ,german ,armies4 ,but this was not a battle for towns or territory1 as the ,german hammer blows were intended to drive a wedge between the ,british and ,french ,armies1 to roll up the ,british flank northwards to the sea-coast and the ,french flank southwards to ,paris1 and to capture the main line of communication between these ,northern and ,southern ,armies4 ,by skilful reinforcement of threatened points1 ,marshal ,haig frustrated the primary object of the attack1 and by the aid of the ,french ,armies the whole line fell back1 disputing the ground with the utmost resolution1 and maintaining the line without losing touch between the south and north4 ,the ,german wedge was thrust in1 but every attempt to effect a breach and to pour through the line was frustrated by the ,allies4 ,during the battle the ,french and ,british ,armies became intermingled1 and to preserve unity of control a ,generalissimo was appointed in the person of ,general ,foch1 who had commanded the ,french ,,ix4 ,army at the ,first ,battle of the ,marne in ,september1 #aiad1 and the ,french ,armies of the ,somme during the advance in ,july1 #aiaf4 ,general ,pershing1 commanding the ,army of the ,united ,states1 gave a free hand to the ,generalissimo to incorporate ,american troops wherever they might be needed in the field1 and ,marshal ,haig and ,general ,retain remained in command of the ,british and ,french ,armies4 ,,methods ,,of ,,attack4--,the object of every attack is to break down the enemy's resistance by the weight and direction of fire and to complete his overthrow by assault1 by the delivery of a decisive blow with as large a portion as possible of the attacking force against a selected point or portion of the enemy's position4 ,the term ,decisive ,attack does not imply that the influence of other attacks is indecisive1 but rather that it is the culmination of gradually increasing pressure relentlessly applied to the enemy from the moment when contact with him is first obtained4 #ed ,,two ,,plans ,,of ,,attack4--,there are two plans of attack4 ,in the first1 the direction in which the decisive blow is to be delivered is determined beforehand2 an adequate force is detailed and pushed forward for this purpose1 and at the same time another part of the force is detailed to attack another portion of the enemy's position1 to keep his attention there1 to pin his troops in position1 to prevent him sending reinforcements to the part mainly threatened1 and ultimately to drive home with the successful assault of the main attack4 ,the rest of the force is small and is retained in ,general ,reserve to meet emergencies4 ,in the second plan1 a general action is developed by a part of the attacking force and the remainder is retained in ,general ,reserve1 to be thrown in when the opportunity arrives1 at the right time and in the right place4 ,in this case1 the remainder is not less than half the available force4 ,the first plan can be adopted when the commander of the attacking force has definite information as to the extent of the enemy's position1 when he knows where its flanks rest and when he knows the approximate strength of the forces arrayed against him4 ,it must also be possible1 without undue risk1 to divide the attacking force into parties of such strength that neither can be overwhelmed by the enemy in detail1 and it is to be noted that in the case of a serious check there is only a small ,general ,reserve to restore the battle4 ,the second plan can be adopted when information is incomplete1 and owing to the strong force retained by the commander in ,general ,reserve1 the situation can be exploited and developed by fighting without undue risk4 ,,strength ,,of ,,the ,,attack4--,it must always be remembered that a commander can never be too strong when making an attack1 for he can never be perfectly sure of what force he may encounter1 or at what moment the adversary may make a counter-attack4 ,an attack #ee on an enemy presupposes a superiority of force at the place where the attack is made1 for war is but the art of being stronger than the enemy at the right place at the right time1 and for an attack to have a reasonable hope of success the attackers1 at the point where the penetration takes place1 must be superior4 ,,disposition ,,of ,,the ,,troops4--,each phase of the ,attack will normally require three separate bodies of troops for its execution3 a ,forward ,body to seek out for1 and when located attack1 the enemy along the whole front of the sector allotted to it and by relentless pressure to wear down the enemy's resistance in order to discover the weak portions of the defence2 ,supports to penetrate the weak portions of the defence and forthwith to attack the flanks and rear of those portions of the defence which are holding up the ,attack2 with ,local ,reserves for dealing with local counter-attacks2 and a ,general ,reserve by means of which the commander exploits success or retrieves failure4 ,,the ,,forward ,,body1 ,,the ,,supports1 ,,and ,,the ,,local ,,reserves4--,the paramount duty of all leaders in the firing line is to get their troops forward1 and if every leader is imbued with the determination to close with the enemy1 he will be unconsciously assisting his neighbour also1 for1 as a rule1 the best method of supporting a neighbouring unit is to advance4 ,but an attack is often held up by well-directed machine-gun fire1 and by determined and well-trained riflemen in concealed or well-prepared positions4 ,the tactics to be pursued under these circumstances are thus outlined in ,infantry ,training1 #aiba3 ,when forward troops are held up by the enemy's organised fire at close ranges they must keep him pinned to his ground and absorb his attention by maintaining a vigorous fire and working their way closer when opportunity offers4 ,it will be the duty of the ,supports to turn the flank of1 and enfilade1 that portion of the enemy's defences where a garrison is opposing #ef the ,forward ,body4 ,to achieve this1 ,supports may have to quit their direct line of advance and follow in the wake of a neighbouring unit1 which is able to advance4 ,it must constantly be borne in mind that pressure should be brought on the enemy by supporting troops in places where the attack is progressing rather than where it is held up1 never by the mere reinforcement or thickening up of a line of troops who have been unable to advance4 ,there must be no slackening of pressure1 meanwhile1 by the forward troops who are temporarily held up1 or the defenders will be able to turn their attention to the flanking attacks which are being directed against them4 ,the ,local ,reserves are for local counter-attacks by fire or movement against similar efforts by the ,local ,reserves of the enemy4 ,in modern campaigns this work is effectively carried out by the overhead fire of machine guns distributed in depth1 and the mobile ,local ,reserves may thus consist of smaller units detached for the purpose by the ,forward ,body or by the ,supports4 ,during the great ,german offensive in the spring of #aiah the ,attacks on the ,somme and the ,lys were constantly held up by the vigour and tenacity of the ,franco-,british defence1 and to meet the necessities of the case the following instructions were issued by the ,german ,general ,staff3 ,if the assaulting troops are held up by machine-gun fire they are to lie down and keep up a steady rifle fire1 while ,supports in the rear and on the flank try to work round the flanks and rear of the machine-gun nests which are holding up the ,attack4 ,meanwhile1 the commander of the battalion which is responsible for the ,attack is to arrange for artillery and light trench-mortar support1 and should protect his own flanks from machine-gun fire by means of smoke4 ,,the ,,general ,,reserve4--,in a modern campaign against civilised troops it will seldom1 or never1 happen that the efforts of the ,forward ,body1 ,supports1 and ,local ,reserves will annihilate the enemy and so prevent him from regaining cohesion and fighting power4 ,even if #eg every part of the position against which an assault is delivered is captured and held1 the enemy will not1 by that means alone1 cease to exist as a fighting force1 and if he is permitted to withdraw with a semblance of order and moral the work of the ,attacking ,force will be of little avail4 ,the destruction of the enemy and not the mere capture of the ground of the encounter is the ultimate aim of the commander4 ,he will1 therefore1 accept the best available opportunity for the destruction of the enemy by overwhelming them in some part of the battlefield during the successful operations of his ,attacking ,force4 ,it may1 however1 happen that the efforts of the ,attacking ,force are generally unsuccessful and the enemy may be on the point of gaining the upper hand4 ,by means of the ,general ,reserve the commander exploits the success or retrieves the failure of the ,attacking ,force4 ,the commander will have selected some point or position in the enemy's defensive system against which he can direct his decisive attack4 ,this point cannot1 as a rule1 be determined until it has been revealed by the successes of the ,forward ,body and the ,supports1 and when it has been selected it must be struck unexpectedly and in the greatest possible strength4 ,while1 therefore1 the ,forward ,body1 ,supports1 and ,local ,reserves must be adequate in numbers for the task allotted to them1 a commander will generally retain about half his available force for the delivery of the ,decisive ,attack1 and when this decisive blow has been delivered the ,reserve will carry on the pursuit of the beaten enemy until such time as other ,infantry1 or ,cavalry1 or ,tanks1 have caught up and passed them4 ,if the attacking troops fail to obtain their objective the commander has at his disposal the means of relieving exhausted troops and of dealing with the decisive counter-attack of the enemy4 ,,the ,,commander',s ,,plans4--,once troops are committed to the assault the commander is powerless to divert them to another purpose4 ,his control is exercised in #eh the correct interpretation or adaptation of his original plan by his subordinate commanders4 ,before launching his troops to the attack in accordance with the decisions arrived at from information received1 the commander will assemble his subordinates and the representatives of co-operating arms or formations in order that his plans may be explained4 ,this conference should be held at such a time as will enable his subordinates to explain their rle to the sub-unit commanders4 ,wherever possible the conference should be preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the ground over which the attack is to be made1 otherwise a map of the district concerned must be substituted for the actual view4 ,the commander will be influenced in his plans by the state of the campaign at the time of the decision to attack4 ,in the opening stages of a campaign in a thickly populated country1 and generally throughout a campaign in less settled districts1 a war of manoeuvre will lead to the ,encounter ,battle1 and the objective to be aimed at will be limited only by the power of endurance of his troops1 the weather conditions1 and the possibility of supplying his victorious troops with ammunition and food4 ,under other conditions1 the objective will be subject to further limitations1 as the defensive position will be organised in great depth1 and while effective penetration will thus be more difficult to achieve it must1 of necessity1 be accompanied by widening in proportion to its depth in order that space for manoeuvre and facility for communication may be secured4 ,the ,infantry ,attack will be conducted on the same lines in both forms of battle1 but the greater the organisation of the defensive position the more limited will be the depth to which the attack can be carried on and the greater difficulty will there be in launching reserves in pursuit4 ,,the ,,position ,,of ,,assembly4--,a column in march formation will very rarely move to its attack position1 or jumping-off place1 from column of route except #ei where there are concealed lines of approach to the spot4 ,a ,position of ,assembly will therefore be assigned1 and this will be chosen with a view to cover for the troops and facilities for the issue of food and hot drink1 the distribution of ammunition and the filling of water bottles4 ,as a general rule1 it is left to the battalion commander to select ,positions of ,assembly for each of his companies4 ,when large bodies of troops are assembled with a view to immediate action1 it must always be remembered that large forces cannot be moved by a single road if all arms are to be brought into action at the right moment4 ,in ,april1 #ahfd1 ,general ,banks1 with #be1jjj ,u4,s4 troops1 moved from ,grand ,ecore to ,pleasant ,hill in the ,red ,river ,valley4 ,although lateral roads existed1 his column marched on one main road only1 and twenty miles separated his front and rear4 ,as he came into action with ,general ,forrest1 of the ,confederate ,army1 the head of his column was defeated and thrown back again and again by forces inferior in total strength1 but superior on the field of the encounter4 ,had ,general ,banks used two or more parallel roads1 which were available for his use1 the ,confederates on the spot would have been quickly overpowered4 ,,the ,,attacking ,,force4--,the commander must decide against which portion or portions of the hostile position1 or along which lines of advance1 his ,fire ,attack shall be developed4 ,as the object of this movement is to pin the enemy to his position1 to wear down his resistance generally1 and particularly at the point where the ,decisive ,attack is to be delivered1 as well as to effect a lodgment in the position1 it is clear that the greater the extent of the objective the better1 and one or both flanks should be threatened if possible4 ,but whenever a ,fire ,attack is developed it must be in sufficient strength to occupy the enemy's attention fully and it must be carried through with vigour once begun4 ,one #fj to three rifles per yard of the objective to be assailed is generally regarded as the requisite strength of the ,forward ,body1 ,supports1 and ,local ,reserves4 ,at ,st4 ,privat 7,august #ah1 #ahgj7 a first and second line made a frontal attack and came under fire of the ,french chassepots1 to which their own shorter-ranged rifles could make no effective reply4 ,the lines pressed on1 but were ultimately brought to a standstill through lack of reinforcements1 which could have been sent up against the flank of the fire position which was holding up the attack1 under cover of the fire of the troops in position1 and would thus have carried the ,forward ,body to the assault4 ,equally unsuccessful was ,osman ,pasha's attempt to break through the investing lines at ,plevna 7,december #aj1 #ahgg74 ,with #ae1jjj troops he pierced the ,russian lines1 and another resolute effort would have carried the sortie through the investing forces4 ,but the #ae1jjj ,supports could not get out of the town as the bridges and gates were blocked with fugitives and wagons4 ,,the ,,decisive ,,attack4--,the commander must also decide the point and direction of the ,decisive ,attack4 ,this will be made on a part of the front or on a flank1 and it may be predetermined in accordance with information concerning the hostile dispositions1 or it may have to be ascertained by further fighting4 ,the advantages of a ,frontal ,attack are that1 if successful1 the enemy's force is broken in two parts1 the separated wings may be driven back in divergent directions and overwhelmed in detail1 and a decisive victory is thus obtained4 ,the disadvantages are that the force assaulting a part of the enemy's front draws upon itself the concentrated fire of the whole hostile line1 and unless the ,fire ,attack can master this fire the decisive blow will be held up1 while an unsuccessful frontal attack invites the enemy to advance and to envelop the assailants4 ,the advantages of a ,flank ,attack are that #fa the enemy's line of retreat is threatened1 and only the threatened flank can concentrate its fire on the assailant4 ,the disadvantages of a ,flank ,attack are that the enveloping troops have to face a similar danger on their own outer flank1 for upon this point the defender will almost certainly direct his counter-stroke1 and for this reason a decisive blow on the enemy's flank must be followed up by strong reserves4 ,the flank chosen for attack will be that which affords the best opportunities for converging fire from the supporting artillery1 which gives the best line of advance for the infantry1 and where success will have the most decisive results1 the last depending mainly on the extent to which the enemy's line of retreat is threatened4 ,where the various requisites are in conflict1 the flank affording the greatest advantages for converging fire from the artillery will be chosen4 ,nothing destroys the moral of men in action so speedily and effectually as a flank attack1 and except by this method good infantry will seldom be beaten4 ,a decisive attack1 to be completely successful1 must be followed up by fresh troops before the assaulting waves have been checked4 ,lee had crossed the ,potomac and desired to defeat the last army of the ,federals in the east and drive the ,northern ,government from ,washington4 ,the battle of ,gettysburg lasted three days 7,july #a-c1 #ahfc74 ,on the first1 the army of ,northern ,virginia was uniformly successful2 on the second1 the fortunes of battle swayed to and fro2 on the third1 ,lee decided to make a ,napoleonic decisive attack with half his available troops against ,meade's centre4 ,but the spirited attack of the first #ae1jjj1 after penetrating the line1 was checked1 and the remaining #ae1jjj did not arrive in support1 so that the attack died down1 was repulsed1 and withdrew in disorder4 ,at ,chattanooga 7,november #be1 #ahfh7 ,grant's decisive attack was successful1 although delivered against a part of the position which appeared to be impregnable1 on account of the strength of the attack1 through #fb distribution in depth2 #be1jjj men were hurled against the entrenchments in three lines1 and the support of the third line carried the waves of the attack through the defences4 ,,detailing ,,the ,,units4--,the commander will detail the units for carrying out the ,fire ,attack1 which will generally require one to three rifles per yard of the objective4 ,this force will be placed under a definite commander1 who will distribute it into a ,forward ,body to develop the attack in the firing line2 ,supports1 to enable the ,forward ,body to assault the position2 and ,local ,reserves to maintain or restore the advantages gained1 their main function being to repel counter-attacks by similar bodies of the enemy and to maintain the offensive spirit4 ,the commander will also detail the units for carrying out the ,decisive ,attack1 which will require three to five rifles per yard of the portion of the position against which it is projected4 ,this force1 under a definite commander1 is distributed for the attack in depth1 so that the strength and weight of the blow carries it home against all opposition4 ,the force is retained by the commander of the whole attacking troops1 to be thrown in at the right time and in the right place4 ,it also remains in hand to restore the battle in case of an unexpected check1 or to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the troops if it is desired to break off the engagement4 ,,the ,,artillery4--,the position of the artillery will be settled in consultation with the artillery commander1 the decision resting on the objects in view1 which are1 to assist the infantry in its advance by keeping down hostile gun and rifle fire--therefore1 in the initial stages1 a commanding position is required2 during the decisive stage concentration on the objective of the decisive blow is required2 and after the successful assault guns may be required to be hurried forward to repel #fc counter-attacks1 to break down protracted opposition1 and to complete the rout by harassing the fleeing enemy4 ,when the attack is directed against a position the defence of which is known to have been elaborately organised1 a pre-arranged covering fire in the form of an artillery barrage1 lifted in successive stages as the attack advances1 may require to be organised some time before the attack is launched4 ,it will be necessary to detail an escort for the guns1 unless the distribution of the troops for the attack already provides such protection4 ,at the ,battle of ,verneville 7,august #ah1 #ahgj7 the #ith ,prussian ,corps ,artillery had been pushed forward against the ,french position at ,armandvillers-,folie4 ,the fire of the ,french infantry caused a loss of #ac officers and #ahg other ranks1 and one battery was disabled1 before the guns were withdrawn4 ,there was no infantry escort to keep the attacking riflemen at a distance4 ,at the ,battle of ,colenso 7,december #ae1 #ahii7 two batteries of field artillery advanced into action without an escort1 and without previous reconnaissance unlimbered on a projecting spit of land in a loop of the ,tugela ,river4 ,frontal fire from hidden trenches on the opposite bank and enfilade fire from a re-entrant flank killed all the horses and the greater part of the personnel1 and although the utmost gallantry was shown by all ranks ten of the twelve guns were left in ,boer hands4 ,infantry regimental officers and battalion commanders must be acquainted with the amount of ammunition carried by their accompanying artillery1 in order that ammunition may not be wasted by calling for fire on targets of secondary importance4 ,all reserves1 whether they have been specially detailed or not for the purpose1 must of their own accord make every effort to assist in getting forward guns and ammunition4 ,one of the outstanding lessons of the ,war of #aiad-aiah is the possibility of placing even the heaviest artillery close behind the infantry fighting line owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction and to the security against #fd counter-attack provided by the deadly fire of the magazine rifles and machine guns of their escort1 and of the ,lewis guns allotted to the batteries themselves4 ,,the ,,cavalry4--,the opportunities for cavalry action in an attack depend upon the character of the defensive operations4 ,against a highly organised defensive position there will be no openings for mounted troops until a wide penetration gives space for manoeuvre4 ,before the attack during an ,encounter ,battle the cavalry will have been out on reconnaissance in front of the attacking force2 during the attack they may be called on to assist by dismounted fire action1 and by local counter-strokes as mounted troops 7against cavalry1 or against infantry disorganised by the breakdown of a movement71 but must not be allowed to impair their speed or freshness2 after the successful assault the ,pursuit is their special duty1 not necessarily on the heels of the enemy1 but on lines parallel to their retreat1 to hamper his movements1 to round up stragglers1 and to threaten their communications4 ,generally speaking1 such a position as is required will be found on a flank1 or slightly in advance of a flank of the attacking force4 ,cavalry make it possible for a general to adopt the most skilful of all manoeuvres1 the converging attack1 and properly handled1 as at ,appomattox or ,paardeberg1 to bring about the crowning triumph of ,grand ,tactics1 the hemming in a force so closely that it has either to attack at a disadvantage or to surrender 7,henderson74 ,in the ,mesopotamian campaign a surprise attack of ,general ,sir ,s4 ,maude's forces on ,september #bg-bi1 #aiag1 against the ,turkish forces assembling near ,ramadie1 #fe miles north-west of ,baghdad1 was converted into the surrender of the ,turkish commander and about #d1jjj all arms by the enveloping tactics of the ,anglo-,indian ,cavalry ,division4 ,a similar manoeuvre on ,march #bf1 #aiah1 by the cavalry of the ,mesopotamian ,field ,force 7commanded at that time by ,general ,sir ,w4 ,r4 ,marshall1 #fe who succeeded after ,general ,maude's death from cholera71 resulted in the surrender of over #e1jjj ,turks1 including a divisional commander1 #bb miles north-west of ,hit4 ,the prisoners were fugitives from the battle of ,baghdadieh1 and the cavalry were astride their communications4 ,on the morning of the ,armistice 7,november #aa1 #aiah7 two ,british ,cavalry ,divisions were on the march east of the ,scheldt1 and before orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line #aj miles in front of our infantry outposts4 ,there is no doubt that1 had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue1 the enemy's disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,the absence of cavalry at the critical moment has often decided the issue of a campaign4 ,after the action of ,gaines's ,mill 7,june #bg1 #ahfb7 ,general ,j4 ,e4 ,b4 ,stuart was dispatched by ,lee with the ,confederate cavalry on a false scent to ,white ,house1 south of the ,york ,river1 to which base ,lee believed ,mc,clellan to be retreating4 ,but ,mc,clellan had shifted his base to ,harrison's ,landing1 on the ,james ,river1 and the ,confederate cavalry did not regain touch with the ,army of the ,potomac until ,july #c1 two days after the failure of ,lee's attack on ,malvern ,hill4 ,had ,stuart been available with his cavalry throughout that critical period ,mc,clellan's huge trains would have fallen an easy prey to the ,confederate horsemen1 and the roads through the forests and swamps to ,malvern ,hill could have been blocked4 ,absence of cavalry before the first day of ,gettysburg 7,july #a1 #ahfc7 hampered the ,confederate leaders1 and lack of information caused them to act with unnecessary caution when boldness would have carried everything before them4 ,general ,stuart had once more been sent away on a raiding expedition4 ,after the victorious attack of ,general ,early's division a handful of ,general ,buford's ,u4,s4 cavalry enabled the defeated #ast ,corps of ,meade's army to save their guns and to retire unmolested4 ,a thousand #ff ,confederate sabres would have brushed ,buford aside1 and ,july #a would have been disastrous to the ,national cause4 ,during the ,german offensive of ,march-,july1 #aiah1 even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions might have driven a wedge between the ,french and ,british ,armies4 ,their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,during the ,battle of ,cambrai 7,november #bj1 #aiag7 a squadron of the ,fort ,garry ,horse crossed the ,scheldt ,canal1 and after capturing a ,german battery and dispersing a large body of infantry1 maintained itself by rifle fire in a sunken road until nightfall1 when it withdrew to the ,british lines with its prisoners4 ,during the ,battle of ,amiens 7,august #h-ah1 #aiah7 the cavalry were concentrated behind the battle front by a series of night marches1 and on the first day of the battle they advanced #bc miles from their position of assembly4 ,throughout the battle they rendered most gallant and valuable service4 ,during the ,second ,battle of ,le ,cateau 7,october #f-ab1 #aiah7 cavalry were instrumental in harassing the enemy in his retreat and preventing him from completing the destruction of the railway1 and when the infantry were held up by heavy machine-gun fire from ,cattigny ,wood and ,clary a dashing charge by the ,fort ,garry ,horse gained a footing in ,cattigny ,wood and assisted our infantry to press forward4 ,further east1 ,dragoon ,guards and ,canadian ,cavalry were instrumental in the capture of ,hennechy1 ,reumont1 and ,troisvilles 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,in the early stages of the campaign in ,north ,russia 7,august-,september1 #aiah7 a handful of cavalry on either bank of the ,north ,dwina ,river could have kept the ,bolshevik forces constantly on the run1 and could have prevented the successive reorganisation of their demoralised forces1 which the slower progress of the pursuing infantry was unable to accomplish4 ,a few squadrons of cavalry could have dispersed the whole #fg ,bolshevik force in the ,archangel ,province4 ,tanks are usefully employed in the pursuit1 as artillery1 the only effective enemy of the tank1 is unlikely to remain in action with the rearward troops of a disorganised enemy2 and a new terror has been added to the pursuit by the advent of self-propelled1 man-carrying ,aircraft1 armed with machine guns and bombs1 and possibly even with light quick-firing artillery4 ,during the final stages of the victorious ,allied ,advance in ,november1 #aiah1 the retreating ,german ,armies were continuously harassed from the air4 ,throughout the day 7,november #e1 #aiah7 the roads1 packed with the enemy's troops and transport1 afforded excellent targets to our airmen1 who took full advantage of their opportunities1 despite the unfavourable weather4 ,over #cj guns1 which bombs and machine-gun fire from the air had forced the enemy to abandon1 were captured by a battalion of the #beth ,division in the field near ,le ,presau 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,,the ,,royal ,,engineers4--,the position and employment of the ,royal ,engineers will be determined by the commander who issues orders for the ,attack1 and as the main function of this corps in the ,attack is the removal or bridging of obstacles to the advance1 and the strengthening of the position when captured1 the ,royal ,engineers will probably remain with the troops to which the decisive attack is entrusted4 ,,medical ,,arrangements4--,the position of hospitals and clearing stations will be settled in consultation with the ,s4,m4,o4 ,aid posts and advanced dressing stations will be established under battalion arrangements in connection with the medical officer of the units concerned4 ,,supply4--,the position of the ,train1 with its reserve supplies of ammunition and of food for men and horses1 will depend upon facilities for communication with the attacking force and upon security against artillery fire #fh or surprise attack from the air or land4 ,the position will probably be well in rear1 and at the junction of roads leading forward to the attacking troops4 ,rations will be brought up to units under arrangements by the commanders of the battalion or other units concerned4 ,,the ,,commander',s ,,position4--,the position of the commander who issues the orders for the ,attack must be fixed1 and must be made known to subordinate commanders1 as it will be the place to which reports will be sent4 ,in the case of a small force the commander will generally stay with the ,general ,reserve2 if the force is fairly large1 and composed of all arms1 he will probably be on the main artillery position2 but in the case of a large force he should be well out of reach of the distraction of local incidents4 ,if the commander of a large force moves from his stated position he must leave a senior officer of his staff to represent him on the spot and to forward urgent communications to him in his changed position4 ,in the case of a small force a commander who vacates his stated position must arrange to leave a runner in the position stated as his headquarters1 in order that messages may reach him without delay4 ,,battle ,,reports4--,the successful exploitation of success depends largely on the accuracy of the information gained by the commander from all parts of the battlefield4 ,reports are required from all who have information to impart and they should be made out on previously prepared message cards1 stating the exact position of the sender at the time of the report2 the progress made by the unit under the command of the sender1 or by neighbouring or other units whose action has been observed2 the degree of the enemy's resistance2 enemy movements2 and the plans of the officer making the report and the method to be adopted in carrying out such plans4 #fi ,,reorganisation ,,and ,,pursuit4--,once a successful assault has been delivered1 subordinate commanders must immediately regain control of their commands1 and must see that the fleeing enemy is pursued by fire1 while local reserves follow up and secure the position against counter-attack4 ,superior commanders must take steps to organise the pursuit1 to cut off the enemy's line of retreat1 and to complete his overthrow4 ,no victory is ever complete if the enemy is permitted to retire unmolested from the field of battle1 and given time to recover order and moral4 ,never let up in a pursuit while your troops have strength to follow was a favourite maxim of ,stonewall ,jackson4 ,the pursuit is the task of the infantry until it is taken over by aircraft1 cavalry1 and tanks1 and the limits to which the infantry will carry the pursuit will be fixed by the commander1 who will bear in mind the principle that ,success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aibj774 ,if the fruits of victory are to be secured the work must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still reeling under the shock of defeat4 ,a few hours' delay gives him time to recover his equilibrium1 to organise a rearguard1 and to gain several miles on his rearward march4 ,in modern warfare motor transport may enable the comparatively immobile infantry to achieve the mobility of cavalry1 if arrangements for embussing them have previously been made1 and in a few hours infantry may thus be transported beyond the reach of pursuit4 #gj ,,formation ,,of ,,infantry ,,for ,,the ,,attack ,only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won4--,,marshal ,,haig4 ,the formations in which ,infantry move to the ,attack must be such as will enable them to achieve their object by the combination of ,fire and ,movement4 ,for this purpose1 the forward troops must be furnished with supports belonging to the same unit as themselves1 in order that a connected leading may produce a joint action of the whole4 ,,the ,,platoon4--,the smallest unit which can be divided into independent bodies1 each capable of ,fire and ,movement1 is the platoon1 the four sections of which can pin the enemy to his position by fire and can manoeuvre round his flanks4 ,the normal distribution of the platoon for the ,attack is either the ,square or the ,diamond ,formation4 ,in the ,square ,formation1 two sections are forward covering the frontage allotted to the platoon1 and the remaining two sections are in support1 in such formation as may keep them in readiness for instant manoeuvre with due regard to the avoidance of unnecessary loss4 ,in the ,diamond ,formation1 one section leads to reconnoitre and to pin down the enemy1 while the remaining three sections are held in readiness to manoeuvre for the decisive attack at the point in the enemy's defence which offers the best prospect of success4 ,the ,diamond ,formation is that best suited to an ,attack in an ,encounter ,battle1 when the nature of the enemy's dispositions are imperfectly known4 ,it possesses the great advantage of preserving #ga the power of manoeuvre for three-quarters of the platoon until the action of the leading section has developed the situation4 ,in each case 7except when the ,attack is launched against a highly organised defensive position71 the forward sections will be preceded by ,ground ,scouts1 to find the most covered line of advance and the best fire positions1 and to guard against ambush4 ,these ,ground ,scouts advance until checked1 when they remain in observation until joined by the leading sections4 ,during the early stages of the ,attack in an ,encounter ,battle ,flank ,scouts may be required until such time as the deployment of the platoon renders them unnecessary4 ,against a highly organised defensive system platoons may not be able to advance to the ,attack without a barrage1 and it is essential that all movements should conform exactly to the timing of the barrage and that the troops should keep under the back edge of the shrapnel curtain1 so as to deliver their assault before the enemy has time to bring rifles and machine guns into play4 ,under such circumstances1 ,ground scouts must be dispensed with4 ,such a position will not be attacked without careful previous reconnaissance and the lines of advance will have been chosen beforehand4 ,the ,square ,formation will be that usually adopted for attacks on highly organised defensive positions1 with the two rifle sections forward and the two ,lewis-gun sections in support4 ,the ,lewis-gun sections are thus able to protect the flanks of the rifle sections1 and to deal with isolated enemy machine guns1 or concealed bodies of riflemen1 which might come into action with reverse or enfilade fire after the forward sections have passed over the occupied ground4 ,,the ,,platoon ,,commander4--,the platoon commander must explain the situation to his subordinates and point out the line of advance4 ,he should usually move with the forward sections during the preparatory #gb phase of an ,attack1 and when the forward sections have been committed to the ,attack he should assume control of the supporting sections and move with them4 ,if his platoon is in support1 he will thus be with the forward sections before the platoon is involved in the fight4 ,the success of ,infantry in the ,attack depends not only on dash1 control1 and leading1 but upon the intelligent co-operation of support commanders1 who must keep themselves acquainted with the course of the battle by intelligent observation and will thus possess an appreciation of the situation before involving their men in action1 and can direct the supports to the right spot at the right time1 to influence the battle by fire and by movement1 without hesitation or delay4 ,,the ,,company4--,the normal distribution of the company1 when acting with other companies of the battalion1 is two platoons forward and two in support4 ,to meet the expectation of a stubborn resistance1 or to cover an unusually extensive frontage1 three platoons may be forward1 with one in support2 and where information as to the enemy's dispositions is lacking1 but strong opposition is unlikely1 one platoon may be forward with three in support1 thus enabling the company commander to use any or all the supports to influence the attack on obtaining information as to the point in the enemy's position which offers the best prospect of success4 ,when the frontage allotted to a company is above the normal1 the leading platoons should not endeavour to cover the whole front1 but gaps should be left between them2 otherwise the men will be so widely extended as to deprive the leaders of the power of control4 ,when a company is acting independently1 the normal formation will be two platoons forward1 with one in support1 and one in reserve4 ,,the ,,company ,,commander4--,the company commander will allot the tasks and the frontages of his #gc platoons and give orders as to their distribution1 and must state where he will be himself during the ,attack4 ,his position will be determined by the necessity of keeping informed throughout the ,attack of the situation and of the progress of his platoons1 and he is responsible that all essential information on these points is passed back to the battalion commander4 ,he must also keep in touch with companies on his flanks1 sending out patrols for this purpose1 if necessary2 and must use every opportunity afforded by the fire or smoke provided by other units or arms to get forward or round the enemy's flanks4 ,he will use his supporting platoons to push through where the resistance is weak in order to turn the flank of those portions of the enemy which are holding up the advance4 ,as soon as this temporary phase has been brought to a successful conclusion the company commander must reorganise his platoons and secure their advance on the objective4 ,when the objective has been gained the position must be consolidated and patrols sent out to prevent surprise4 ,,the ,,battalion4--,the distribution of the battalion depends entirely upon the nature of the task allotted to it4 ,where the enemy's dispositions are known and considerable resistance is anticipated in the earlier stages of the ,attack1 the battalion will normally be distributed with two companies forward1 one in support and one in reserve4 ,the forward body should thus be strong enough to develop the ,attack to such a point that a decisive blow can be delivered by the supports against the main resistance1 and the reserve company is in hand for the completing stages of the action or for stabilising the local battle4 ,where the enemy's dispositions and the degree of resistance are still the subject of conjecture1 one company only may be forward1 with two in support1 so that the main strength of the battalion will not be committed to any definite rle before it is needed and before the situation of the enemy is discovered4 #gd ,,the ,,battalion ,,commander4--,the powers of personal control of a battalion commander upon the field of battle are limited1 and success will depend1 in a great measure1 on the clearness of the orders which commit his leading companies to the ,attack 7,infantry ,training1 #aiba74 ,the battalion commander should be supplied with any details concerning the enemy and of co-operating troops4 ,he must understand his objective1 the limits of his frontage1 and the extent of help which he will receive from the other arms4 ,in addition to such information as is supplied regarding the enemy's strength and dispositions1 particularly with regard to wire 7or other obstacles7 and machine guns1 he must ascertain the best positions of assembly for his companies1 the best lines of approach to the objective1 the most covered line of advance for his supports and reserves1 and the best position for his own headquarters during each stage of the ,attack4 ,in his orders for the ,attack he will reveal all information concerning the movements and dispositions of the enemy and of co-operating troops and arms2 he will allot tasks to the companies and to the machine-gun platoon 7if not brigaded7 and will define the frontage of the forward companies2 he will also detail the assembly positions1 give compass-bearings for the advance1 describe the action of other arms in support1 make the necessary signalling arrangements1 notify the zero hour1 arrange for the synchronisation of watches1 notify his own position before1 during1 and after the ,attack1 and indicate the point to which reports are to be sent1 notify the medical arrangements1 and issue instructions as to the collection of stragglers1 the escort and destination of prisoners1 the supply of ammunition1 and the equipment to be worn4 ,the quartermaster will receive orders as to the bringing up of rations during the battle4 ,before issuing to the ,attack a proportion of officers and other ranks will be detailed to remain behind1 to replace casualties when the engagement is over4 #ge ,the position of the battalion commander will be chosen with a view to keeping in touch with the progress of the ,attack in all its stages and of influencing the fight by means of the reserves4 ,personal control is difficult to exercise once troops are committed to the fight1 but opportunities for rapid decision were frequently offered to battalion commanders in the ,great ,war1 and seized with a success which transformed a check into a victory4 ,in #aiaf a battalion commander of the ,coldstream ,guards1 seeing his command disorganised by fire and resistance1 by personal example rallied and reorganised the waves of the ,attack and added the necessary momentum to the assault1 which then reached its objective4 ,on ,april #ad1 #aiag1 the commander of a battalion of the ,royal ,newfoundland ,regiment witnessed the launching of a local counter-attack by the ,germans on the village of ,monchy-le-,preux1 and by a rapid advance with the fighting portion of his headquarters1 staved off the attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the #hhth ,brigade enabled it to be driven back in disorder4 ,on ,november #cj1 #aiag1 during the ,german counter-attack from ,fontaine ,notre ,dame to ,tadpole ,copse1 in the ,northern ,sector of the ,cambrai zone1 the ,germans forced their way into our foremost positions1 and opened a gap between the #a_/fth and #a_/aeth ,london ,regiments4 ,local counter-attacks led by the two battalion commanders with all available men1 including the personnel of their respective headquarters1 once more restored the situation4 ,in ,march1 #aiah1 during the most critical period of the ,german thrust at ,amiens1 a battalion commander of the ,border ,regiment again and again1 on horseback and on foot1 personally restored the situation4 #gf ,,defensive ,,action ,the soul of the ,defence is the ,counter-,attack4--,,marshal ,,foch4 ,defensive action may be initiated by a commander in the field1 or it may be imposed upon him by the enemy1 and a commander may rely upon fortification to assist him in defeating the enemy1 or he may employ manoeuvre to effect or to postpone a decision4 ,a commander may desire to pin the enemy to an attack upon a fortified position1 garrisoned by a portion only of his force1 while he detaches another 7and probably greater7 portion to attack the enemy from an unexpected quarter4 ,an outstanding example of this form of action is exhibited in the ,battle of ,chancellorsville 7,may #b-c1 #ahfc71 where ,lee kept at bay ,hooker's army of #ij1jjj with one-third of his force and detached ,stonewall ,jackson with #cj1jjj men to attack the ,federal rear4 ,action of this kind is peculiarly effective1 but it requires a secrecy which modern aircraft would almost certainly unveil1 and if the manoeuvre failed to escape observation it would probably result in disaster both to the retaining force and to the detached troops4 ,a different form of the combination of defence with manoeuvre is the ,defensive-,offensive battle1 with examples of which the history of ,warfare is amply supplied--,marengo1 ,austerlitz1 and ,waterloo being typical battles of this nature4 ,in this form of defensive action a commander invites the enemy to attack a well-chosen position1 and after exhausting the enemy's strength and holding up the assault1 the commander passes from the guard to the thrust and overwhelms #gg the exhausted foe by an irresistible and sustained counter-attack with all the means at his disposal4 ,a position is sometimes occupied as a matter of necessity1 sometimes merely as a matter of tactical prudence4 ,at ,nachod 7,june #bg1 #ahff7 the ,prussian ,advanced ,guard hurriedly established a defensive position and kept at bay the whole ,austrian ,army1 while the ,prussian ,army emerged in security from a defile and manoeuvred into battle array4 ,the ,pass of ,thermopylae was occupied in ,b4,c4 #dhj by #a1djj ,greeks under ,leonidas1 ,king of ,sparta1 to withstand the ,persian hosts of ,xerxes1 and although the ,greek force was destroyed by an attack from the rear 7through the disclosure of a secret path by a renegade in the ,persian service71 the resistance offered to the invincible ,persians emboldened the ,greeks in their future encounters1 and led to the ultimate defeat of the invaders4 ,according to the legendary history of ,rome1 ,horatius ,cocles and two companions defended the ,sublician ,bridge over the ,tiber against ,lars ,porsena and the whole army of the ,etruscans4 ,this legendary heroism was equalled or surpassed during the ,second ,battle of the ,somme 7,march #ba1 #aiah74 ,the bridges across the ,crozat and ,somme ,canals were destroyed1 though in some cases not with entire success1 it being probable that certain of them were still practicable for infantry4 ,instances of great bravery occurred in the destruction of these bridges4 ,in one case1 when the electrical connection for firing the demolition charge had failed1 the officer responsible for the destruction of the bridge personally lit the instantaneous fuse and blew up the bridge4 ,by extraordinary good fortune he was not killed 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,at ,rorke's ,drift 7,january #bb1 #ahgi7 a force of #hj other ranks of the #bdth ,regiment1 under ,lieutenants ,chard and ,bromhead1 with about #dj hospital cases1 drove off the repeated attacks of #d1jjj ,zulus1 part of ,cetewayo's army which had surprised and annihilated the garrison #gh at ,isandhlwana earlier the same day4 ,an astounding feat of arms was performed by a small body of troops during the withdrawal of the ,british ,army in face of the overwhelming ,german attack at the ,second ,battle of the ,somme4 ,a detachment of about #ajj officers and men of the #fast ,brigade1 #bjth ,division1 was detailed to cover the withdrawal of their division at ,le ,quesnoy 7,march #bg1aiah74 ,under the command of their ,brigade-,major 7,captain ,e4 ,p4 ,combe1 ,m4,c47 the detachment successfully held the enemy at bay from early morning until #f p4m41 when the eleven survivors withdrew under orders1 having accomplished their task4 ,there are many instances of the occupation of an area for an actual or potential tactical purpose4 ,before the ,battle of ,salamanca 7,july #bb1 #ahab7 a ,spanish force had been detached by ,wellington to cover a ford of the ,river ,tormes by occupying the castle of ,alba de ,tormes1 but the force was withdrawn without ,wellington's knowledge1 and ,marmont's defeated army retired unmolested over the ford to the fortress of ,valladolid4 ,in the campaign of #ahad1 ,napoleon placed a garrison of #a1bjj in the ,fortress of ,soissons1 but on ,march #c1ahad1 the garrison capitulated without exhausting all the means of defence as the regulations of ,war ordain1 and the bridge at ,soissons enabled ,blcher and ,blow to unite their forces across the ,river ,aisne4 ,in the ,waterloo campaign1 ,wellington stationed #ag1jjj men at ,hal and ,tubize1 #h miles from his right on the field of battle at ,waterloo1 to repel a possible turning movement and to form a rallying point if his centre was broken1 and with #fg1jjj men took up a position astride the ,nivelle-,brussels and ,charleroi-,brussels roads which met at ,mont ,st4 ,jean4 ,he was deprived of the services of this detachment and modern criticism has been directed against this disposition of his forces4 ,it is1 however1 permissible to suggest that the security of his right flank1 and the possession of a rallying point1 inspired him with the confidence which enabled him to #gi withstand the sustained attacks of ,napoleon until the arrival of ,blcher's corps permitted him to overwhelm his adversary4 ,a further form of defensive action is the occupation of a series of extemporised positions and the orderly withdrawal to a further series before the actual assault of the enemy1 resistance being combined with manoeuvre for the purpose of delaying the enemy's advance or of holding up his pursuit4 ,delaying action of this kind is commonly employed in rearguard fighting1 when the object to be gained is time rather than position1 and the offensive action of the defender is limited to local counter-attacks at favourable or desperate moments4 ,but the guiding principle in all defensive operations1 including delaying action1 must be that when an enemy has liberty of manoeuvre1 the passive occupation of a position1 however strong1 can rarely be justified1 and always involves the risk of crushing defeat 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aibj774 ,,the ,,offensive ,,spirit4--,although there are many forms of defensive action the soul of the ,defence in every case is a vigorous offensive spirit4 ,in the ,active ,defence1 the ,decisive ,counter-,attack1 ending in the overthrow of the enemy1 is the manoeuvre originally in view when the defensive rle is adopted4 ,in the ,passive ,defence against superior numbers4 ,local ,counter-,attacks end with the recapture of a tactical point or the repulse of a determined assault1 and in the ,delaying ,action they overwhelm by surprise fire or assault a detached force which has advanced with such rapidity as to enable the defenders1 without undue risk1 to cut off and annihilate the isolated enemy body4 ,whatever the tactical situation1 it is by the vigour of the offensive spirit alone that success may be achieved in the face of a determined enemy4 ,,modern ,,warfare4--,in modern warfare the defensive position plays a part of increasing importance1 owing #hj to the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments4 ,machine guns and barbed wire permit the rapid organisation of defensive points of a value which cannot be disputed4 ,in particular1 they have given to a trench1 or to a natural obstacle1 a solidity which permits a front to be extended in a manner unsuspected before this war2 they permit the prompt consolidation of a large system that is easy to hold 7,marshal ,foch74 ,the modern rifle and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the ,defence as against the ,attack4 ,it has thus become a practical operation to place the heaviest artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting line1 not only owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction but also because the old dread of losing the guns before they could be got away no longer exists 7,marshal ,french74 ,it is thus possible to hold the forward positions of a highly organised defensive system with a minimum of exposure to loss1 the extra strength of the position counterbalancing the reduction in numbers1 but a preference for defensive action of this kind may generally be regarded as an admission that a victorious outcome of the campaign is not anticipated at the time of its adoption in the theatre in which it is employed4 ,it is of paramount importance that in those parts of a theatre of operations where a commander aims at decision a war of movement must never be allowed to lapse into position warfare so long as a further advance is possible4 ,position warfare can never of itself achieve victory 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aibj774 ,however strong entrenchments may be they will not defeat the adversary's main armies1 nor can they withstand indefinitely the attacks of a determined and well-armed enemy4 ,it is scarcely even probable that an army behind entrenchments can by that means alone inflict such losses on its assailants as will enable the initiative1 or liberty of manoeuvre1 to be regained and the assailant's main armies to be defeated4 ,the operations on both sides #ha are in the nature of a siege1 and however prolonged the siege1 the advantage will be gained in the long run by superiority of aggressive action in the air and over and under the ground4 ,in addition to the absence of opportunity for the grand offensive there are two further points of difference between defensive action in ,position ,warfare and the defence in a ,war of ,manoeuvre4 ,the first of these is the inevitable absence of flanks to be assailed1 as the operations necessitate a connected line of strong points from sea to sea1 or from the sea to the impassable barrier of neutral territory4 ,mounted troops are therefore doomed to inaction in their most important sphere1 until the lines have been breached and the enemy is forced to retreat1 and the opportunities for delivering flank attacks are meanwhile confined to the infantry1 and will be due to irregularities in the alignment of the strong points1 upon which enfilade fire may be brought to bear4 ,the second point of difference is the abundance of time at the disposal of commanders for developing and rehearsing elaborate systems of attack and defence1 and for obtaining detailed plans of the hostile works1 through continuous reconnaissance by the ,air ,service4 ,in most countries there must be1 of necessity1 a prolonged period of inactivity on both sides in a ,position ,war1 owing to the severity of winter conditions1 or to the occurrence of the rainy season1 and during that period it will seldom be possible to penetrate the enemy's main defences on such a scale as to bring about the grand offensive4 ,but this is a period of inactivity in appearance rather than in fact1 for no defensive system is ever perfect1 no strong point but needs further consolidation1 new trenches are constantly constructed or improved1 and fresh areas are covered with wire entanglements4 ,guns of all calibres1 underground mines and light mortars are ever at work1 demolishing1 wounding1 and killing1 while lachrymatory and asphyxiating shell-fire is to be expected at all times4 ,on a smaller scale1 snipers on both sides have a daily bag1 and #hb observers are ever at their posts noting every change1 however insignificant1 and every new piece of work2 listening posts are detecting hostile plans1 while patrols are collecting information and raiding parties are reconnoitring1 destroying defences1 and inflicting losses1 it being the first principle of a raid that it should result in greater losses to the enemy than to the troops which carry it out4 ,,entrenchments4--,entrenchments have been employed in the defence from the earliest times4 ,the ,roman walls in ,britain1 the ,great ,wall of ,china1 the earthworks in the ,russian ,war of #ahed-ahee1 in the ,american ,civil ,war of #ahfa-ahfd1 in the ,russo-,turkish ,war of #ahgh1 and the ,russo-,japanese ,war of #aijd-aije are notable examples4 ,but in no war previous to that of #aiad-aiah have they played so important a part4 ,one of the most famous series of entrenchments in previous wars were those constructed in #ahaj by ,colonel ,r4 ,fletcher1 of the ,royal ,engineers1 at ,torres ,vedras4 ,these fortifications extended for #ej miles and contained #abf closed works1 mounting #bdg guns1 and behind these lines ,wellington amassed stores and reinforcements until the retreat of ,massna enabled him to resume the initiative4 ,in front of these lines everything that could support the ,french armies had been removed2 behind them ,wellington's forces were well provided in every respect4 ,on ,october #aj1 #ahaj1 ,massna was confronted by the entrenchments1 the existence of which had been kept a profound secret1 while their strength prevented them from being carried by assault4 ,before the end of ,october a ,portuguese spy wrote to ,wellington3 ,heaven forgive me if ,i wrong the ,french in believing they have eaten my cat 7,napier74 ,during the night of ,november #ad-ae1 ,massna broke up his camp and withdrew4 ,but it was not the lines of ,torres ,vedras which won back the ,peninsula4 ,spain and ,portugal were saved by the bold march northwards #hc to ,vittoria4 ,in six weeks ,wellington marched1 with #ajj1jjj men1 #fjj miles1 passed six great rivers1 gained one decisive battle1 invested two fortresses1 and drove #abj1jjj veteran ,french troops from ,spain 7,napier74 ,,defensive ,,systems4--,whether it is the intention of the commander to resume the offensive at an early date or whether it is likely that the defensive system will be occupied for a considerable period1 the principles on which the construction of all defences should be undertaken are the same4 ,all defensive systems should be planned from the outset in such a way that they can easily be adapted to the requirements of a prolonged defence4 ,the ground must be thoroughly reconnoitred and should at the first be divided into a series of tactical posts and defended localities4 ,these posts should be self-supporting1 but should be so sited that the garrisons mutually support each other by fire4 ,the gaps between the posts must be covered by the fire of the garrison of the posts1 and machine guns may also be sited to bring fire to bear from positions in rear and to the flanks 7,infantry ,training1 #aiba74 ,this principle must govern the choice of the position to be defended as well as the organisation of the position for defence1 and troops detailed for the defence of an area must continue to improve the defensive arrangements in that area until such time as the offensive is resumed4 ,,choosing ,a ,,position4--,the framework of the modern defence consists of artillery and machine guns2 into this framework are fitted the defence posts or defended localities garrisoned by infantry1 who are responsible for holding their ground at all costs and for inflicting the greatest possible loss on the enemy4 ,a commander will require a position which affords elasticity for increasing the resistance as the attackers penetrate the defences1 and depth will thus be essential4 ,he will require a position wide enough to prevent the whole of his front being masked by a retaining attack of a part of the #hd enemy's forces while a strong flank attack is simultaneously delivered2 and in a ,war of ,manoeuvre he will require facilities for the ,decisive ,counter-,attack4 ,the depth of the position will develop automatically in a ,war of ,position1 but it must always be sufficient to enable troops to assemble in rear of the forward position before moving up and to afford rest to troops when withdrawn from the front line4 ,the width of the position will generally depend upon the strength of the defending force1 the guiding principle being to keep about half the force in ,general ,reserve2 if1 therefore1 the remainder of the force is insufficient for the purpose of holding the defences the position is too wide for the tactical requirements of the ,active ,defence4 ,in ,position ,warfare1 however1 a defensive system must necessarily be extended beyond the limits that are practicable in the ,active ,defence1 and the numbers available for the garrison are supplemented by denying ground to the attack by means of obstacles1 the removal of which is prevented by machine-gun and rifle fire4 ,,the ,,outpost ,,zone4--,for the ,active ,defence of a position the defensive system will consist of an ,outpost ,zone and a ,battle ,position4 ,the ,outpost ,zone is garrisoned by a protective force which keeps a constant watch on the enemy and absorbs the first shock of the attack1 watch being kept by means of well-concealed sentry posts on the ,line of ,observation1 supported by a chain of small self-contained defensive posts1 while resistance is offered by a series of self-contained1 mutually supporting defence posts on the ,outpost ,line of ,resistance4 ,,the ,,battle ,,position4--,the ,battle ,position will be established in the area in which the commander decides to fight out the battle and break the enemy's attack4 ,it therefore forms the keystone of the whole defensive position and must be organised in depth to afford elasticity for defensive action4 ,in principle1 in order to protect #he the battle position from being obliterated by a preliminary bombardment1 it should be beyond effective range of the enemy's mortars 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aibj774 ,,the ,,semi-,,permanent ,,system4--,when a campaign is prolonged in any area without decisive results a ,war of ,position may be developed by one or both of the combatants4 ,in such cases the ,outpost ,zone is developed into an intricate trench system1 with protective avenues leading from front to rear and with deep dugouts to protect the garrison from artillery fire4 ,the ,battle ,position will probably coincide with the ,outpost ,zone1 the trenches being used for the purposes of observation until the fire positions are manned to resist an assault4 ,in parts of the line on the ,western ,front of the ,great ,war1 ,pill-box forts1 constructed of concrete1 took the place of continuous lines of trenches4 ,these machine-gun forts were garrisoned1 according to size1 by groups from #e to #ej strong1 and were echeloned in plan1 to sweep all approaches1 and together to command with their mutually supporting fire the whole area over which they were spread1 the intervening ground being entangled with wire so placed as to invite attacking troops into places where flanking fire may be poured into them4 ,the advantages of the pill-box system over the continuous line of strong points are principally defensive4 ,fewer men are required for them than for the trench systems1 and there is less liability of loss from artillery fire4 ,but there are certain grave disadvantages4 ,well-directed artillery fire is liable to destroy some of the pill boxes1 and a direct hit from a heavy gun will possibly put a larger fort out of action1 thus crippling the defence by the removal of a peg on which the whole scheme depends4 ,supports and reserves are necessarily far in rear and must be brought up through the open to repel successful attacks1 while a defensive scheme #hf composed entirely on the pill-box plan is less suitable for aggressive action than entrenchments1 there being fewer facilities for assembling troops prior to the attack4 ,,common ,,characteristics4--,whatever the system of defence or phase of warfare1 every commander must guard his flanks and keep in touch with neighbouring units4 ,he must always be ready to assist a neighbouring commander by enfilade fire or by a relieving counter-attack2 or to throw back a defensive flank in the event of a neighbouring post being captured by the enemy4 ,each post1 occupied for the ,defence 7except in ,delaying ,actions1 where manoeuvre takes the place of a settled resistance71 forms a self-contained centre of resistance1 capable of all-round fire1 and the duty of the garrison is to defend the area allotted to it to the last man and the last round4 ,,the ,,active ,,defence4--,the ,active ,defence may be considered according to the reason which prompted the commander of the force to occupy the position4 ,it may have been deliberately chosen as a position which the enemy must attack1 and in the hope of delivering during that attack a crushing and decisive counter-blow2 or it may have been chosen of necessity1 to meet an attack by deployment on the ground of the encounter1 with the same hope of delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the opportunity arrives4 ,there is little difference in the steps to be taken by the commander1 as in the first case a ,general ,reserve is specially detailed for the counter-stroke2 and in the second1 the position will be held with as few troops as the tactical situation permits1 in order to provide as large a ,general ,reserve as possible for the ,grand ,offensive4 ,a commander will be influenced by many considerations in his choice of a defensive position3-- 7i7 ,the position must suit the plan of operations2 it must be in the enemy's way1 and this the commander must be able to judge from the map4 ,it is #hg to be noted that to bar the enemy's way it is not always essential to get astride his lines of advance1 as a position on parallel lines1 threatening his flank and rear1 cannot be ignored by the enemy1 unless he is strong enough to detach a part of his force to mask the defender's position1 while he proceeds to his objective with his main army4 ,it was a mistake to assume that in order to cover ,turin one had to stand astride the road leading to that town2 the armies united at ,dego would have covered ,turin1 because they would have stood on the flank of the road leading to that town 7,napoleon74 7ii7 ,the position must not be too extensive for the troops at the disposal of the commander1 and this will be governed by the extent of the line to be actually held4 ,it will consist of a series of mutually supporting tactical points1 which can be held as pivots on which to hinge the defence of the position1 and the object must be to obtain the maximum of fire effect on all ground over which the enemy can advance with the minimum of exposure to his fire4 ,a rough-and-ready rule is that unless one rifle per yard of the frontage occupied can be supplied by the troops to hold the position 7which should not exceed one-half the available force7 then the position is too extensive and should be narrowed4 ,on the other hand1 too narrow a front may enable the enemy to develop1 early in the engagement1 strong flank attacks1 which may make the position untenable before the time is ripe for the assumption of the offensive4 ,the ,cond-,mons-,binche line held on ,august #bb-bc1 #aiad1 by ,sir ,j4 ,french's army 7,i4 ,corps1 ,general ,sir ,d4 ,haig2 ,,ii4 ,corps1 ,general ,sir ,h4 ,l4 ,smith-,dorrien7 had a total width of #be miles1 and the troops at disposal1 including ,general ,sir ,e4 ,h4 ,h4 ,allenby's ,cavalry ,division1 consisted of about #ge1jjj all arms4 ,the frontage actually held did not exhaust half this force at the rate of one rifle per yard1 and a position in rear had also been selected1 between ,jerlain and ,maubeuge1 with a frontage of #ae miles4 ,the ,retreat from ,mons was #hh due not to the excessive width of frontage1 but to the success of the ,german attack on the ,french ,v4 ,corps at ,charleroi 7,august #bc1 #aiad71 which left the right flank of the ,british ,army in the air1 while two ,german ,corps were working round the left flank4 ,the ,british ,,iii4 ,corps 7,general ,sir ,w4 ,p4 ,pulteney7 did not arrive until the retreat was in full swing4 ,at the ,first ,battle of ,ypres 7,october #ca1 #aiad7 many parts of the line were held with one rifle for #ag yards1 and there were no ,supports or ,local or ,general ,reserves4 ,yet the line was not only maintained but a counter-attack at ,gheluvelt thrust the attacking ,germans behind their entrenchments4 7iii7 ,there must be a clear field of fire to prevent the enemy approaching unmolested within effective range1 and particularly within close range1 from which the enemy will endeavour to establish an ascendency in the fire-fight4 7iv7 ,the flanks must be secure1 or at least as strong as possible4 ,a flank resting on a deep river or a marsh may be regarded as secure1 and a flank extending to the sea1 or to the boundary of a neutral ,state4 ,a flank on high ground which commands all approaches and provides means of distant observation may be called strong4 ,it is a great advantage if one flank can be posted so strongly as to compel the enemy to make his main attack on the other1 as this will enable the defender to forecast the direction of the decisive attack and to dispose his ,general ,reserve to meet and overwhelm it4 7v7 ,there should be facilities for cover on the position and concealed avenues of approach from the rear4 ,a crest affords cover on the reverse slopes and woods provide concealment1 while time enables artificial means to be adopted4 ,tactical cover can be provided by cavalry and advanced troops in the early stages of manoeuvre-battle1 and in removing this cover the troops can withdraw in such a way as to lure the enemy on #hi to a false position4 ,they can also induce premature deployments by the enemy1 and movements across the front of the real position4 7vi7 ,there should be good artillery positions to provide effective fire on all hostile avenues of approach1 and counter-battery work on hostile artillery positions4 ,there should also be firm ground and good roads for the movement of guns1 and an absence of landmarks for the enemy to range on4 ,guns of the heaviest calibre take part in all modern battles1 their disposition being settled in conference with the artillery commander4 ,a battery of field artillery requires #ajj yards frontage for its six guns1 and there is usually an interval of #be yards between batteries4 7vii7 ,there must be depth to allow for the disposal and movement of the ,supports and ,reserves1 and for manoeuvres to recapture the forward defences1 or to issue to the counter-attack4 7viii7 ,there must be good lateral and frontal communication in order that any part of the line can be quickly reinforced4 ,a position astride an unfordable stream1 or high ridge or deep ravine should therefore be avoided4 ,at the ,battle of ,dresden 7,august #bf1 #ahac7 the ,allies were encamped on the left bank of the ,elbe4 ,their forces were posted on the heights1 but the position was cut transversely by a deep ravine1 so that the left wing was isolated from the centre and right4 ,this vicious disposition did not escape the penetrating eye of ,napoleon1 who attacked their isolated wing with superior forces and routed it completely1 with the capture of #aj1jjj prisoners1 before any assistance could arrive4 ,the task of creating lateral communications1 if none exist1 is of the utmost importance1 as they enable a commander to achieve the primary object of every military manoeuvre1 to meet the enemy with superior forces at the desired point4 7ix7 ,there should be good lines of withdrawal1 and these should be horizontal1 or only slightly oblique1 to #ij the main position1 and not parallel with the general alignment4 ,this is a point of the first importance1 for if the ,lines of ,communication lead straight to the rear a force that is overwhelmed by the attack can withdraw to selected positions and towards its base1 if it can keep the line intact and prevent its flanks being turned4 ,a wide base1 with alternative lines of approach1 is of the greatest value1 and when there is undue risk of the ,lines of ,communication to a base being intercepted1 an alternative base1 with lines of withdrawal thereto from the unexposed flank1 is an acceptable safeguard1 as the defence can be protracted while the withdrawing force concentrates upon the changed base4 ,such a change of base was effected by ,marshal ,french during the ,retreat from ,mons1 and amongst many historical examples may be quoted ,general ,mc,clellan's transfer of the ,army of the ,potomac from the ,york to the ,james ,river in ,july1 #ahfb1 during the ,seven ,days' ,battle around ,richmond4 ,general ,grant changed his base no fewer than five times during the ,campaign in the ,wilderness 7,may1 #ahfd71 from ,washington to ,orange and ,alexandria ,railroad1 then to ,fredericksburg on the ,rappahannock1 then to ,port ,royal1 further east on that river1 then to ,white ,house on the ,pamunkey 7a branch of the ,york ,river71 and finally to the ,james ,river4 ,his army was always well supplied1 even his enormous numbers of wounded were carried straight away to the base and thence to ,washington1 without any difficulty1 and he had no obstacles whatever to fight against as regards either feeding his army or keeping up the supply of ammunition 7,henderson74 ,in withdrawing a defeated wing it may even be advantageous to rally the troops at a point distant from the field of battle1 and to cause the pursuer1 uncertain as to the direction of the retreat1 to make detachments which can be overthrown by sudden counter-attacks1 or to lure a pursuer from the field where their presence is required1 as ,grouchy was lured after ,napoleon's defeat of the ,prussians at ,ligny #ia 7,june #af1 #ahae74 ,the object of ,napoleon's attack on the ,allies was the separation of ,wellington's ,anglo-,belgian force from the ,prussian ,army under ,blcher1 and after the defeat of the latter at ,ligny the ,emperor directed ,marshal ,grouchy to pursue the ,prussians and to drive them eastwards4 ,grouchy conducted a leisurely pursuit and engaged an insignificant part of the ,prussian ,army 7,the ,battle of ,wavre1 ,june #ah-ai1 #ahae71 while the main body of the ,prussians moved westwards and assisted in the overthrow of ,napoleon at ,waterloo4 7x7 ,there should be favourable ground and a good line of advance for the ,decisive ,counter-,attack4 ,in order1 therefore1 to overthrow the enemy1 a position should not be chosen behind an impassable feature which neither side can cross4 ,at ,ramillies 7,may #bc1 #agjf71 one wing of the enemy was posted behind a marsh1 where it was both unassailable and unable to attack4 ,marlborough1 therefore1 ignored that wing entirely1 and bringing his whole force against the remaining wing1 won easily a decisive victory4 ,the only occasions when an impassable feature is welcome are in the ,passive ,defence of a small force against overwhelming odds 7as was seen in ,august1 #aiad1 when the ,belgians occupied a position behind the ,river ,gette71 and in the ,delaying ,action of a ,rear-guard fighting for time for the ,main ,body to get away4 ,in such cases a ,decisive ,counter-,attack is not contemplated4 ,,occupation ,,of ,a ,,defensive ,,position4--,the framework of the defence is provided by artillery and machine-gun fire2 the backbone of the offence is the infantry4 ,the ,commander will divide the troops into 7a7 ,troops to hold the position1 and 7b7 ,general ,reserve1 the golden rule being to make 7a7 as small as the tactical situation permits in order that 7b7 may be as large as possible1 and its work absolutely decisive4 ,under no circumstances #ib should the ,general ,reserve be much below half the available force4 ,of these two portions1 the ,troops to hold the position consist of infantry occupying a series of mutually supporting tactical strong points1 not necessarily continuous1 and of irregular alignment so as to cover with the defender's fire not only the ground over which the enemy can advance1 but the front and flanks of neighbouring strong points4 ,this line will be strengthened1 as and when necessary1 by throwing in the supports1 and it will be assisted at critical moments by the local reserves1 which1 coming up unseen1 will deliver local counter-attacks on the assaulting enemy1 and will thus restore the battle at threatened points by relieving the pressure on the front line4 ,their work completed they will be rallied and withdrawn again into local reserve1 and it is highly important that they should be kept well under control1 or their successful efforts may be neutralised by local reserves of the attacking force4 ,at ,talavera 7,july #bg1 #ahji7 a portion of the ,british force followed up the repulsed ,french columns too far1 and being in turn broken and driven back1 was pursued closely by the enemy and retired in disorder to the position4 ,at the battle of ,fredericksburg 7,december #ac1 #ahfb7 two brigades emerged from the ,confederate position and drove ,meade's division of the ,army of the ,potomac out of their lines4 ,but they rushed on with reckless impetuosity and were finally driven back with heavy loss4 ,local counter-attacks keep alive an offensive spirit in the defenders1 exhaust the enemy's powers1 draw his reserves into the battle1 and thus prepare the opportunity for the ,decisive ,counter-,attack4 ,the local reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the flank1 which can thus be protected at need by determined counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force4 ,the ,general ,reserve is for the ,decisive ,counter-,attack and is held for this purpose in the hands of the #ic commander of the whole force1 in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main attack4 ,the opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only when the enemy has thrown into action his own ,general ,reserve for the decisive attack1 and has received a check4 ,a bold and resolute counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success4 ,but the assumption of the grand offensive should not be confined to the ,general ,reserve alone4 ,commanders of sections of the defence who are permitted by the local situation to do so1 must at once join in the decisive counter-attack1 unless express orders to the contrary have been received2 and any definite success obtained must be the signal for the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour4 ,this opportunity will be fleeting1 and there must be no delay in seizing it4 ,every preparation must therefore be made in anticipation of the opportunity so that a pre-arranged plan may be put into execution4 ,to initiate a counter-attack on a large scale without due time for preparation1 co-ordination1 and movement of troops is to court failure1 with heavy casualties and resulting demoralisation 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aibj774 ,that the soul of the defence is the counter-attack was shown at the battle of ,spottsylvania 7,may #ab1 #ahfd74 ,general ,hancock's ,corps 7from ,grant's combined armies7 had assaulted and captured part of ,lee's entrenchments in the ,wilderness of ,virginia2 #bj1jjj men had assaulted and captured the ,salient1 taking #d1jjj prisoners2 they then pressed forward1 and sweeping everything before them1 drove a wedge right into the ,confederate position4 ,but ,lee1 recognising the weakness of the ,salient1 had caused another line of entrenchments to be constructed about half a mile in rear4 ,by this second line the ,federals were suddenly brought up4 ,the confusion was very great1 the battalions had intermingled in the excitement of the charge1 and the officers could neither make their orders #id heard nor form their men for another rush4 ,lee threw in his reserves4 ,he made a tremendous counter-attack4 ,every single battalion he could collect was ordered to attack1 and the vigour of the blow was such that the whole of these #bj1jjj men were driven back beyond the first line of entrenchments1 and the ,confederates recaptured their first position 7,henderson74 ,he will select positions for the ,artillery1 in consultation with the commander of that arm1 the objects in view being3 to command lines of approach so that the assailant may be shelled and forced to deploy early and so to indicate his plan of attack2 to delay the advance2 to combine with the infantry in the close defence of the main position2 to support local counter-attacks2 to destroy hostile batteries by counter-battery work2 and to combine eventually in the ,decisive ,counter-,attack4 ,the increased mobility of guns of the heaviest calibre owing to motor traction1 and the increased defensive power of the protective quick-firing small arms1 enable guns to be placed close behind the infantry firing line without undue risk of capture4 ,he will divide the position into sectors1 each garrisoned by a distinct unit1 under a definite commander4 ,the mutually supporting tactical points 7farmsteads1 villages1 woods1 ridges1 knolls1 etc47 will usually be held in groups1 under group commanders1 with definite subordinate commanders1 and the group commander will probably control the local reserves of that group1 with which he can assist any of the units in times of need4 ,the units from which such groups are formed will usually be complete sections4 ,he will decide the position of the ,general ,reserve4 ,this will be the locality best suited for the advance to the decisive counter-attack1 if it is to be delivered from a distance2 or near the point where the enemy's decisive attack is expected1 if it is intended to hurl the ,general ,reserve into the flank and rear of the enemy's main #ie attack while it is heavily engaged with the troops holding the position4 ,as surprise is essential to success1 the position of the ,general ,reserve should be concealed as long as possible4 ,the position of the ,general ,reserve will depend upon the ascertained intentions of the enemy4 ,at the ,second ,battle of the ,somme 7,march #ba1 #aiah7 the intentions of the ,german commander were ascertained during the first day's fighting4 ,as by this time 7i4e4 the evening of ,march #ba7 it had become clear that practically the whole of the enemy's striking force had been committed to this one battle1 my plans already referred to for collecting reserves from other parts of the ,british front were put into immediate execution4 ,by drawing away local reserves and thinning out the front not attacked1 it was possible to reinforce the battle by eight divisions before the end of the month 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,he must decide the position1 and to some extent the action1 of the ,cavalry4 ,before defensive action in a ,war of ,manoeuvre the cavalry have been out on reconnaissance1 and during the early stages they have endeavoured to lure the assailants on to a false position4 ,during the battle they will frustrate the efforts of opposing mounted troops1 will protect a vulnerable flank1 and will assist generally by dismounted fire action4 ,after the victorious counter-attack they will emerge in pursuit4 ,in case of a reverse they will delay the enemy's victorious advance by fire action and by mounted tactics to protect the withdrawing forces from the depredations of hostile cavalry4 ,a position near a flank will usually be occupied4 ,there have been many examples of protection by cavalry of a force that has been worsted4 ,after the ,combat of ,rolia 7,august #ag1 #ahjh7 ,general ,delaborde retreated by alternate masses1 protecting his movements by short1 vigorous charges of cavalry4 ,at ,chancellorsville 7,may #c1 #ahfc71 and on the first day of ,gettysburg 7,july #a1 #ahfc71 a handful of ,united ,states #if cavalry held up the pursuit and staved off disaster4 ,at ,kniggratz 7,sadowa71 7,july #c1 #ahff71 the charges of the ,austrian cavalry drove back the ,prussian ,horse and enabled ,benedek's defeated troops to get back in safety4 ,at ,rezonville 7,august #af1 #ahgj7 von ,bredow's ,cavalry ,brigade was ordered to charge the ,french batteries and their infantry escort1 in order to give some breathing time for the hard-pressed ,prussian infantry4 ,the charge was successful and the time was gained1 but as at ,balaclava 7,october #bf1 #ahed7 there were few survivors from ,von ,bredow's ,todtenritt 7death ride74 ,after the battle of ,le ,cateau 7,august #bf1 #aiah7 and during the ,retreat from ,mons1 the ,british cavalry1 under ,general ,allenby1 effectively held off the enemy and enabled the ,british troops to move unmolested4 ,during the great ,german offensive in the spring of #aiah the withdrawal of the troops at ,cugny 7,march #bd1 #aiah7 was made possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the #afth ,cavalry ,brigade1 which broke through the ,german line1 taking over #ajj prisoners1 and sabring a large number of the enemy4 ,during the retreat in that area units of the #bnd and #crd ,cavalry ,divisions proved so effective in delaying the enemy's advance that other units were horsed during the progress of the battle in order to increase the supply of cavalry4 ,without the assistance of mounted troops1 skilfully handled and gallantly led1 the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before the ,french reinforcements had had time to arrive4 4 4 4 ,the absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle4 ,had the ,german command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions1 a wedge might have been driven between the ,french and ,british ,armies4 ,their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 #ig ,he must select a rallying place in rear of the main position from which to recapture the front line1 as ,general ,lee recovered the ,salient in the ,wilderness of ,virginia4 ,he must arrange for the reorganisation of his victorious forces and for the pursuit and complete overthrow of the enemy4 #ih ,,protection ,,and ,,reconnaissance ,surprise consists in the hard fact that the enemy suddenly appears in considerable numbers without his presence having been known to be so near for want of information2 and without it being possible to assemble against him for want of protection4--,,marshal ,,foch4 ,every commander of a force1 however large or small1 is responsible for the protection of his command against surprise1 and a force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when protection is furnished in every direction from which interference is possible4 ,detachments are therefore provided by every commander1 their duty being to warn him if hostile forces are discovered in the vicinity of such forces1 and to gain time1 at all risks and at any sacrifice1 for the commander of the troops they protect to carry out his plans unimpeded by the enemy4 ,a mission of protection does not necessarily imply a defensive attitude1 it will often be better performed by an offensive 7,marshal ,foch74 ,there is the closest connection between ,reconnaissance and ,protection4 ,it is only by finding out the location1 strength and movements of the enemy that a commander can decide how best to protect his troops1 and the forces he employs to protect his troops against surprise will very largely prevent the enemy finding out his own strength and dispositions4 ,detailed and timely information about the enemy and the theatre of operations is a necessary factor in ,war and the value of the information depends on whether it can reach the authorities in time to be of use4 ,facilities for reconnaissance have been enormously increased by the introduction of man-carrying1 self-propelled ,aircraft4 ,before their introduction reconnaissance #ii at a distance from the forward troops was limited by the speed and endurance of the cavalryman's horse1 and by the skill of the cavalry scout in penetrating the preventive screen of hostile cavalry1 and in escaping the net spread out to catch him on the return journey4 ,his radius of operations was comparatively small1 that of the arial observer is practically unlimited1 as his machine will carry him over the hostile area1 and unless he is driven down by opposing aircraft1 or crippled by defensive fire from the ground1 he returns in a comparatively short space of time to his base1 with his budget of news1 and may bring with him a series of photographs4 ,,position ,,warfare4--,when opposing forces are entrenched at no great distance from one another1 photographs taken from the air lead to the discovery of new works from which the intentions of the enemy can be predicted4 ,on the ,western ,front in the ,great ,war1 photographs taken from the air revealed the construction in the ,german training area of actual sectors of ,british trenches in facsimile1 thus indicating the rehearsal of an attack on a definite part of the line4 ,hostile aircraft are prevented from carrying out similar observational journeys1 the resistance of defending squadrons is overcome1 and whenever a favourable target is presented1 casualties are caused by bullets and bombs4 ,observers report all suspicious movements and changes in trench construction1 and from photographs taken at daily intervals maps of hostile trenches are constructed and revised4 ,infantry patrols and raiding parties are sent out by night and by day1 and information is gleaned from the uniforms and badges of captured prisoners as to the distribution of hostile troops1 while changes in the plan of trenches1 in the siting of wire entanglements1 or in the emplacements of guns and mortars are duly noted4 ,in addition1 troops in observation posts1 in or ahead of the front line1 in favourable and unsuspected #ajj localities1 are constantly observing the enemy1 and sentries over all posts containing troops are ready at all times of the day and night to alarm the local garrisons4 ,resistance is afforded by a series of mutually supporting strong points1 sufficiently garrisoned by troops who guard against surprise and hold their ground against attack4 ,entrenchments1 with dug-outs and shelters1 provide protection from fire1 and barbed wire entanglements prevent unbroken rushes by the enemy1 and entice him into openings that are swept by rifle and machine-gun fire4 ,box respirators and other appliances nullify the effects of gas1 and camouflage disguises the position of trenches1 troops1 guns1 and dumps1 and so screens them from observation and direct bombardment1 while it provides unsuspected means of observing the enemy's movements4 ,,manoeuvre ,,warfare4--,in a ,war of ,manoeuvre the steps taken to obtain security against surprise vary with the situation of the troops4 ,hostile aircraft flying high from the ground are dealt with by counter-attack by armed aeroplanes1 but as arial fighting requires space for manoeuvre hostile machines flying within #c1jjj feet of the ground must be dealt with by machine gun1 ,lewis gun1 or concentrated rifle fire1 except in cases where it is essential to conceal from the enemy that a certain position or locality is occupied1 and where the troops are so well hidden as to escape detection unless they open fire4 ,movement is easily detected by low-flying aeroplanes1 and in fair weather troops can be recognised as hostile or friendly by an observer at #ejj feet1 while movements of formed bodies on a road are visible at #e1jjj feet4 ,troops remaining stationary in shaded places may easily escape observation1 and if small bodies in irregular formation lie face downwards they are difficult to detect1 even in the open4 ,when a force is in movement1 detachments move with it to afford protection in every direction from which interference #aja is possible2 and when a force is at rest1 detachments with similar duties secure it from disturbance and keep off attack until it can be met or developed without disadvantage4 ,these phases are dealt with under the headings of ,,the ,,advanced ,,guard1 ,,flank ,,attacks ,,and ,,flank ,,guards1 ,,the ,,rear ,,guard1 and ,,outposts4 #ajb ,,the ,,advanced ,,guard ,fabius1 the saviour of ,rome1 used to say that a commander could not make a more disgraceful excuse than to plead1 ',i never expected it4' ,it is1 in truth1 a most shameful reason for any soldier to urge4 ,imagine everything1 expect everything4--,,seneca1 ,de ,ira4 ,every moving body of troops must be protected by detachments1 the force detached to precede the advance being known as an ,advanced ,guard1 and when a body of troops so protected halts1 the responsibility for protection during the halts remains with the troops which have been protecting the march until they are relieved1 the commander of the ,advanced ,guard exercising his discretion as to halting at once or moving forward to occupy a position which may be of more tactical advantage4 ,,strength4--,the strength of this ,guard depends on the proximity of the enemy1 but it must always be strong enough to brush aside slight opposition1 so that the advance of the force it is covering may not be delayed by small hostile forces1 and to resist the enemy1 when encountered in strength1 for such time as will enable the force it is covering to prepare to meet or deliver an attack4 ,no general rule as to the numerical strength of an ,advanced ,guard can be given1 as the number of troops required depends almost entirely upon the tactical situation and the country through which the protected force is passing4 ,it should1 however1 whenever possible be composed of a complete unit or formation under its own commander1 and it is found in practice that an ,advanced ,guard will seldom be less than one-eighth or more than a quarter of the whole #ajc force4 ,when a large force is advancing in several columns on parallel roads it will be preceded by a ,strategical ,advanced ,guard1 which protects the front and flanks of all the columns4 ,the ,tactical ,advanced ,guard provided by each column may then be reduced in strength4 ,,distance4--,the distance at which it moves ahead of the force it is covering depends upon the nature of the country through which the force is moving1 upon the strength of the ,main ,body1 and upon the tactical situation1 but it must always be sufficient to enable the ,main ,body to deploy1 to get into battle formation--unmolested by the enemy's artillery1 if required to do so4 ,it is clear1 therefore1 that the larger the ,main ,body the greater the distance must be1 as more time will be required for deployment4 ,the ,advanced ,guard of a ,brigade of infantry1 with artillery1 would move at a distance of #a to #b miles between the ,main ,guard and the ,main ,body1 with the mounted patrols of the ,vanguard #d to #e miles ahead of the ,main ,body4 ,these mounted patrols would discover the presence of an enemy1 and with the supports of the ,vanguard would feel for his strength and ascertain his dispositions4 ,the ,main ,guard would either assist in brushing him away or would resist1 in the best available position1 any attempts to attack the ,main ,body while the latter formed up for battle4 ,,in ,,advances4--,infantry forming part of an ,advanced ,guard to a force advancing must always act with dash and resolution1 but their action must always be regulated by the one motive of complying with the intentions of the commander of the force they are covering4 ,any action contemplated by the ,advanced ,guard commander must therefore be considered from the point of view of its effects upon the plans of the commander of the main body1 but if these plans are not known1 the guiding principle will be to regulate his action solely in the interests #ajd of the force he is covering1 and by driving in the advanced troops of the enemy he will obtain information which will assist his superior in coming to a decision1 without interfering with his liberty of action1 whereas hesitation and delay may give the initiative to the enemy4 ,for this reason1 a wide turning movement by the ,advanced ,guard troops is seldom possible1 as time is thereby lost and the front of the ,main ,body is uncovered4 ,the ruling factor should be the discovery of some tactical locality held by the enemy1 the capture of which will compel his whole line to fall back4 ,if this point can be discovered the whole energies of the ,advanced ,guard should be directed against it alone1 and elsewhere a defensive attitude should be adopted1 to avoid surprise of or interference with the ,main ,body 7,general ,r4 ,c4 ,b4 ,haking74 ,it must always be assumed that the enemy will have taken all the necessary steps to protect himself and to hamper reconnaissance by an adversary4 ,if1 therefore1 hostile troops are known to be in a certain locality1 opposition must be expected before that locality is reached1 and study of the map should enable the ,advanced ,guard commander to determine the approximate neighbourhood in which opposition may be expected4 ,,in ,,retreats4--,while it is clear that a force advancing towards the enemy must always be preceded by an ,advanced ,guard it must not be forgotten that a force withdrawing from the enemy must also be so protected1 even when it is moving in or towards friendly territory4 ,such a force will not only prevent the ,main ,body being surprised by an energetic enemy1 pursuing swiftly and getting round to attack where he is least expected1 but will also prevent the ,main ,body being delayed by obstacles1 and can delay the pursuit by preparing bridges1 etc41 for demolition1 which can be completed by the ,rear ,guard when the ,main ,body has passed over #aje them4 ,it can also reconnoitre the route to be followed1 so that the ,main ,body can proceed without delay4 ,,training4--,in formulating any scheme for the exercise of troops in ,advanced ,guard work all officers and other ranks should be made to understand the nature of the scheme1 and should be informed 7a7 whether the force is advancing or retreating1 whether it is moving before or after action with the enemy1 and whether it is in a friendly or a hostile country2 7b7 what is known of the enemy2 7c7 the direction and objective of the march2 7d7 the general intentions of the commander of the ,main ,body2 and 7e7 the general instructions issued to the commander of the ,advanced ,guard4 ,unless such exercises are carried out in a practical manner1 young officers and inexperienced ,n4,c4,o4's will get the impression that an ,advanced ,guard consists merely of a procession of small bodies of infantry1 strung out at fixed intervals on a single road4 ,it is of the highest importance that the training should be carried out on the lines that would be adopted in action 7,g4,h4,q4 ,circular74 ,,tactical ,,principles4--,speed of advance is the first consideration when not in contact with the enemy4 ,hence an ,advanced ,guard will move on a narrow front along roads and other channels of communication1 with such distances between advanced and supporting bodies as to avoid possibility of surprise4 ,when in contact with1 or in the vicinity of1 the enemy1 security and speed of advance are equal considerations4 ,hence the ,advanced ,guard should move by bounds on a broad fighting front across country 7,infantry ,training1 #aiba74 ,before an ,advanced ,guard commander moves off in compliance with his instructions he will take certain steps in accordance with these tactical principles4 ,he will divide his troops into two portions1 known as the ,vanguard and the ,main ,guard1 and as the duties of the #ajf ,vanguard are reconnaissance in general1 as well as the protection in particular of the ,main ,guard1 it will contain a large proportion of mobile troops1 with infantry for assault and resistance1 and engineers for clearing the way through or over obstacles4 ,aircraft1 in advance of the ,vanguard1 not only increase the area under search and expedite the discovery of the enemy1 but prevent surprise and assist the ,advanced ,guard as a whole by close co-operation in feeling for and fighting the enemy when encountered4 ,in order to reconnoitre one must compel the enemy to show himself wherever he may be4 ,to this end he has to be attacked until the extent of his position has been clearly defined4 ,but the attack is made with the intention not to bring on an action4 ,the skirmishing lines will advance1 but they must be able to disengage themselves at a given moment4 ,pressure is exercised from a distance without allowing the forces exerting that pressure to become tied up 7,marshal ,foch74 ,the duty of the ,main ,guard is ,resistance1 that is to say1 fighting4 ,it will therefore consist mainly of infantry1 with artillery and machine guns1 and the troops will move in the order in which they will come into action4 ,the ,vanguard will be preceded by scouts1 special attention being paid to roads and tracks parallel with the advance4 ,this screen is followed by the remainder of the ,vanguard1 in collected formation1 until it is in contact with or in the vicinity of the enemy1 with protection at all times against local surprise4 ,the ,main ,guard follows1 in touch with the ,vanguard1 and with local protection4 ,both portions have definite commanders1 and the commander of the whole ,advanced ,guard will probably move with the supports of the ,vanguard4 ,the commander will also determine the relative distances between the ,vanguard and the ,main ,guard1 these being regulated by the strength of the ,advanced ,guard1 and being based upon the necessity of one part supporting the other4 ,the distance of the #ajg ,advanced ,guard ahead of the ,main ,body may have been mentioned in the operation orders1 but if it is left to the discretion of the ,advanced ,guard commander he will be guided solely by the interests of the force he is covering1 and his decision will be influenced by the nature of the country 7whether it is open1 or intersected by woods1 hedges1 sunken roads1 etc41 which make observation even by aircraft a matter of great difficulty7 and by the tactical situation1 such distance being chosen as will suit these conditions1 while admitting the fulfilment of the objects in view1 viz43--to obtain information concerning the enemy and to prevent hostile reconnaissance2 to prevent surprise and delay2 and to enable the ,main ,body to deploy into battle formation without interruption by the enemy's fire4 ,it is also the duty of the commander to ensure communication between the various parts of the ,advanced ,guard and between that force and the ,main ,body1 by arranging for mounted orderlies and cyclists1 signallers and connecting files1 in addition to the contact patrols furnished by the ,air ,service1 and to such telegraphic and telephonic communication as can be provided in the field by the ,signals4 ,this is of the first importance1 as the action of the commanders of the ,advanced ,guard and of the ,main ,body will depend on information received1 and not only must information be gained by every available means1 but it must also be communicated without delay to all concerned while it is fresh and before it becomes stale4 ,it must also be remembered that negative information 7e4g4 that such and such a village has been thoroughly searched and no trace of the enemy found7 is at least of equal value to positive information4 ,the repetition or confirmation of information already sent are also of importance1 as it is clearly of value to a commander to know positively that the enemy is still absent1 or still present1 at a certain time in a certain locality4 ,in the ,american ,civil ,war1 during an encounter battle between #ajh advanced troops1 the commander of the cavalry of the ,united ,states ,army held up the ,confederate advanced troops4 ,a sharp fight took place at ,sulphur ,springs 7,october #ab1 #ahfc7 and the ,united ,states cavalry commander became so absorbed in the battle that he failed to send information to headquarters1 and ,general ,meade did not learn that he was in contact with the ,army of ,northern ,virginia until late in the afternoon4 ,in the campaign of ,fredericksburg1 ,general ,r4 ,e4 ,lee1 with the ,army of ,northern ,virginia1 was confronted by ,general ,burnside1 with the ,army of the ,potomac4 ,on ,november #ae1 #ahfb1 a patrol of ,confederate cavalry discovered ,burnside's troops moving eastwards1 and another patrol brought news the same day that gunboats and transports had entered ,acguia ,creek on the ,potomac4 ,these two pieces of information1 collected at points #dj miles distant from one another1 gave ,lee an insight into his opponent's design4 ,information gained by aircraft on ,september #d and #e1 #aiad1 and communicated immediately to ,general ,joffre1 led to the discovery of the flank march across the ,franco-,british front by the ,german ,i4 ,army1 and to the decisive counter-attack at the ,first ,battle of the ,marne 7,september #f1 #aiad74 ,the ,advanced ,guard commander must be careful how he becomes seriously engaged1 and must avoid any enterprise not strictly in accordance with the known intentions of the commander of the ,main ,body4 ,the tendency to independent action of this kind1 which militates against the success of the best laid plans1 was very observable in the early battles of the ,franco-,prussian ,war of #ahgj-ahga4 ,actions were hastily entered on by ,advanced ,guards1 maintained with varying success by the gradual arrival of reinforcements1 and finally concluded with barren results and losses in excess of those inflicted4 ,at the ,battle of ,spicheren 7,august #f1 #ahgj7 the ,advanced ,guard of the #adth ,prussian ,division commenced the battle1 which had to #aji be sustained for three hours by #aa battalions against #ci4 ,during the next three hours #h more battalions arrived1 and at the conclusion of the battle only #bg battalions and #aj batteries in all had come into action against a whole ,french ,corps1 and there were two ,french ,corps within reach of the one engaged4 ,had these marched to the sound of the cannon1 as ,napoleon would have marched1 the #adth ,prussian ,division would have been unable to extricate itself without complete disaster4 ,at the ,battle of ,worth 7,august #f1 #ahgj7 the ,prussian ,crown ,prince had expressed his intention not to engage the ,french on that day4 ,yet the ,advanced ,guard of the ,v4 ,corps brought on a battle into which the ,bavarian ,corps was perforce drawn4 ,the ,crown ,prince sent word for the action to be discontinued1 but the advanced troops were so seriously involved in the battle that reinforcements had to be sent into action4 ,although tactically successful the battle was out of accord with the settled plans of the ,commander-in-,chief4 ,in the same way the ,advanced ,guard of the ,,vii4 ,prussian ,corps1 contrary to the letter and the spirit of the orders of the commander of the ,i4 ,army1 precipitated an action at ,colombey 7,august #ad1 #ahgj74 ,other troops were drawn into the fight1 and finally the whole of the ,i4 ,army was engaged in a battle which its commander not only disapproved but had expressly forbidden4 ,the battle had no tactical or strategical results1 and heavy losses were sustained on both sides4 ,precipitate action of this kind prevents the troops being engaged in the most advantageous manner4 ,for when a small force is engaged against a larger one it becomes necessary1 as reinforcements arrive1 to move them up to support some point already hard pressed1 and the whole force is thus used up and disseminated1 instead of being employed collectively where an effective blow may be struck4 ,thus the direction of the fight is surrendered to the enemy1 as at ,spicheren and ,colombey4 ,the ,french positions were so strong that the ,german #aaj reinforcements as they arrived were frittered away in support of troops already engaged1 and the state of the latter during the action was frequently very critical4 ,at ,colombey the battle resolved itself into a desperate struggle along the front of the ,french position1 where the ,prussians made little impression1 while their losses considerably exceeded those inflicted on the ,french 7,clery74 ,it is thus seen that the commander of the ,advanced ,guard must limit his aggressive action in accordance with his instructions and with the tactical and strategical requirements of the force he is covering4 ,but his action in protecting the ,main ,body is unfettered by any considerations of prudence1 and must ever be vigorous and resolute1 any risks being taken that ensure the safety of the ,main ,body4 ,on the morning of the ,battle of ,nachod 7,june #bg1 #ahff7 the ,advanced ,guard of ,general ,steinmetz's ,v4 ,corps 7of the ,army of the ,crown ,prince of ,prussia7 was in bivouacs on a plateau1 after emerging from a long and narrow defile through which the ,main ,body must march to the open country beyond4 ,about #h a4m4 the cavalry of the ,vanguard was checked by the advanced troops of the ,,vi4 ,austrian ,corps4 ,it was imperative that the ,prussian ,advanced ,guard should hold the plateau until the ,main ,body had extricated itself from the defile4 ,by the rapid and accurate fire of the infantry and horse artillery1 and the co-operation of the cavalry against the ,austrian squadrons1 the thin line was maintained for more than three hours4 ,less than #g battalions of infantry1 with #ac squadrons of cavalry and #c batteries of light artillery1 kept in check #ba battalions1 #aa squadrons1 and #d batteries4 ,had the ,advanced ,guard suffered itself to be driven back on the ,main ,body in the defile a disaster could scarcely have been avoided1 and owing to the steadfast endurance of the ,advanced ,guard the ,main ,body was able to drive the ,austrian ,corps from the field4 ,,advanced ,,guard ,,problems4--,the ,advanced ,guard commander must be able to appreciate without delay #aaa the situation which confronts his force1 and to solve the problem before him with regard solely to the interests of the force he is covering4 7a7 ,if the ,vanguard is held up by the enemy who is ascertained to be inferior in strength to the ,advanced ,guard1 the commander will transmit information to the ,main ,body and will attack vigorously to disperse the enemy1 in order that the movements of the ,main ,body may not be delayed4 ,a fire attack would be organised on the front of the enemy1 supported by close-range artillery fire1 and a turning movement with ,lewis guns and rifles on one or both flanks4 ,if the enemy held to a covered position they could be ejected by rifle bombers or light mortars from a flank1 while artillery and machine guns prevented aimed fire at the attacking force4 7b7 ,if fire is opened on the ,vanguard and definite information as to the strength and dispositions of the enemy cannot be ascertained1 such information as had been gained would be transmitted and a bold procedure would be adopted in order that the information might be supplemented as quickly as possible4 ,the commander would reinforce his ,vanguard with infantry from the ,main ,guard1 and should be able to force the enemy to disclose his position and strength1 but unless ordered to do so would take care not to become so involved in action that the ,main ,body would be compelled to come up and extricate them4 7c7 ,if the enemy is encountered when the ,advanced ,guard commander knows that it is the intention of his superior to deliver an attack the information would be transmitted with an outline of the steps taken in seizing and securing all tactical points that will be of service to the ,main ,body4 ,the ,advanced ,guard would work on a wider front than would otherwise be used by a force of that strength1 and the artillery would be posted with a view to its position being adopted as the main artillery position4 #aab 7d7 ,if1 under similar circumstances1 the intention not to be drawn into a decisive engagement is known by the ,advanced ,guard commander he would limit his activities to reconnaissance of the enemy's position and numbers1 and while hampering the enemy and preventing him from finding out particulars concerning the ,main ,body1 he must take care not to become involved in a general engagement4 7e7 ,a case may easily occur in which vigorous action is demanded1 whether the commander of the ,main ,body intends to attack at once or to defer an engagement4 ,such a situation would arise if the ,vanguard discovered the approach of the enemy towards a ridge or other position of tactical advantage1 and if the ,advanced ,guard commander could1 by a rapid advance1 forestall the enemy in the occupation of such a position1 his failure to do so1 or hesitation in waiting for explicit orders to do so1 would be a grave neglect of duty4 7f7 ,in the ,american ,civil ,war a tactical blunder of another kind1 due to the impetuosity of the commander of the ,independent ,cavalry of the ,army of ,northern ,virginia1 prevented the ,southern commander from obtaining a great strategical advantage over the ,army of the ,potomac4 ,the latter force had been withdrawn by ,general ,mc,clellan1 after the ,seven ,days' ,battle around ,richmond1 to a secure position at ,malvern ,hill1 where the assaults of the ,army of ,northern ,virginia were beaten back with heavy losses4 ,mc,clellan continued the withdrawal and had reached ,harrison's ,landing on the ,james ,river4 ,the ,independent ,cavalry of the ,southern ,army had previously been dispatched on a false scent1 but at #i a4m4 on ,july #c touch was regained with the ,northern forces1 which were sighted from ,evelington ,heights 7,july #c1 #ahfb71 a commanding ridge within two miles of the bivouacs of the ,army of the ,potomac1 which was resting in apparent security1 with inadequate precautions against surprise4 ,general ,j4 ,e4 ,b4 ,stuart1 the ,confederate cavalry commander1 #aac reached ,evelington ,heights with #a1bjj sabres and carbines and one light howitzer1 and the whole ,army of the ,potomac1 #ij1jjj all arms1 was in bivouacs in full view from the ,heights1 and it was clear that his presence was not suspected4 ,the nearest column of the force he was covering was six miles away1 and there remained about ten hours of daylight4 ,it is easy to see1 after the event1 that this was a case where ,silence is golden4 ,stuart should have sent the information to ,lee and to every column commander1 urging them to press on at all speed1 while he occupied the ,heights with his dismounted men with the determination to hold his position with fire action1 if discovered1 until the arrival of one or more columns of the ,army of ,northern ,virginia4 ,but he failed to appreciate the situation1 and forgetting the larger question1 he seized the opportunity to spread panic in the ranks of the ,army of the ,potomac1 and opened fire with his one light howitzer4 ,the ,northerners recovered from the panic caused by this unexpected attack1 when it was realised that only one gun was in action against them1 and attacked and captured the ,heights1 and were strongly entrenched there before the nearest ,confederate column arrived4 7g7 ,among the examples of ,advanced ,guard work in ,marshal ,foch's ,principles of ,war is a problem for a battalion as the ,advanced ,guard of a ,brigade4 ,what is the problem the battalion commander has to solve8 ,it consists in preparing for the brigade to go into action against an enemy who may debouch from ,bettwiller4 ,what does the brigade require for such an action8 ,it requires the space necessary for the full employment of its forces1 and the time necessary for their arrival and deployment4 ,in order to achieve that double task the battalion commander orders his troops to occupy the whole space necessary1 and places them in points where they may hold on for the necessary time4 #aad ,,flank ,,attacks ,,and ,,flank ,,guards ,a man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of ,napoleon's warfare would hardly fail to make his enemy's communications his first objective4---,col4 ,g4 ,f4 ,r4 ,,henderson4 ,the ,flanks are the most vulnerable points of an army1 for an attack upon these points subjects the defenders to enfilade fire1 and is delivered by troops arrayed in attack formation against an enemy that is not in a position to repel the attack4 ,the consequences of a successful ,flank ,attack are so far-reaching that every effort will be made by a commander to bring about such a consummation in order that he may sever his adversary's communications1 bring him to the end of his resources1 and deprive him of the means of replenishing them4 ,if1 therefore1 there is any possibility of a column on the march being attacked in flank a force must be detached to protect that flank1 and if both flanks are exposed to attack both must be similarly protected4 ,the flank is the most vulnerable part of a moving column1 and an attack driven home upon that part has every prospect of success1 for it will be delivered by a force that is distributed in depth against a force that is protracted in width after changing front to meet the attack1 and the absence of depth in the defending force will deprive the defence of the principal source of strength in resisting attack4 ,an independent column is liable to attack on either of its flanks1 unless the nature of the country through which it is passing provides security for one or the other in the form of an impenetrable feature 7such as a wide1 #aae trackless marsh71 or an impassable barrier 7such as a neutral frontier74 ,the outer columns of a force moving on parallel routes will have an exposed flank1 while their inner flank is protected by maintaining touch with the neighbouring column4 ,flank ,guards may be furnished by the ,main ,body1 or by the ,advanced ,guard1 and this point will be made clear in the orders for the operations4 ,their composition1 strength1 and distribution1 and the interval at which they move on the flank of the ,main ,body1 are similar to those of an ,advanced ,guard1 while their action under all circumstances is governed by the same tactical considerations1 the principle underlying every action of a ,flank ,guard commander being compliance with the known intentions of the commander of the ,main ,body1 and the sacrifice of the interests of the ,flank ,guard to preserve the interests of the ,main ,body4 ,the same duties of reconnaissance and protection have also to be carried out1 and communication with the ,main ,body has to be maintained4 ,for the purposes of reconnaissance and communication ,aircraft are even more effective than in ,advanced ,guard work1 while observation patrols supplement and confirm the reports of arial observers4 ,the work of protection varies with the nature of the country through which the ,guard and the ,main ,body are moving at the particular time4 ,in open country the ,flank ,guard may be keeping pace with the ,main ,body at a regularly maintained interval1 and on parallel lines4 ,in close country1 and in hilly or mountainous districts1 it may be necessary to occupy a successive series of tactical positions on the exposed flank1 any of which can be reinforced and held at need to safeguard the passage of the ,main ,body4 ,in order that the whole column may be protected1 from the head of the ,main ,body to the train in rear1 unbroken touch must be maintained both with the ,advanced and the ,rear ,guard1 and incursions between these forces and itself must be prevented by the ,flank ,guard4 #aaf ,in addition to the protection of a column on the march1 ,flank ,guard work is of the highest importance on the ,lines of ,communications and in the protection of ,convoys4 ,on the ,lines of ,communications raids from the air or land may always be expected in ,manoeuvre ,warfare1 and one flank is usually more vulnerable than the other4 ,a ,convoy1 when parked1 is liable to attack from any quarter2 and when on the march it may be assailed from any direction1 especially when the adversary can detach mounted troops1 or infantry rendered mobile by motor transport1 or raiding bodies carried in ,aircraft4 ,frequently1 however1 one flank only of the ,lines of ,communications is vulnerable owing to the geographical or tactical situation1 and the work of protecting traffic or ,convoys on the ,lines of ,communications is ,flank ,guard work1 with due precautions against surprise from all quarters1 the ,main ,guard remaining with the ,convoy and securing its safe arrival at its destination1 rather than seeking an encounter with the enemy4 ,the most efficient way to protect a ,convoy is to piquet the road daily with troops sent out from posts on the line2 but when it is necessary to send a ,convoy by a route which cannot be protected in this way a special escort must be provided4 ,the commander of an escort will not engage the enemy if his task can be accomplished without fighting4 ,if fighting is inevitable the enemy should be engaged as far from the ,convoy as possible1 and it will not be halted and parked1 except as a last resort4 ,in the case of mechanical transport the whole of the escort will be carried in motor vehicles1 and except where parallel roads are in existence1 little can be done to secure flank protection while on the move4 ,a portion of such escort will move with the ,convoy and a portion will be sent ahead to secure any bridges or defiles which have to be passed1 the outlet of any defile being secured before the ,convoy is permitted to enter the defile4 ,in the case of a horsed ,convoy the escort will usually consist of infantry1 with a proportion #aag of mobile troops4 ,small ,advanced and ,rear ,guards will be detailed and sufficient men will be posted along the column to ensure order and easy communication4 ,the remainder of the escort will usually move on that flank from which attack is most likely4 ,the far-ranging raid on the ,lines of ,communications was a notable feature of the ,american ,civil ,war4 ,it was freely employed on both sides and was often harmful to the object of the attack and usually profitable to the raiders1 especially to those of the ,south1 by reason of the replenishment of stores4 ,general ,turner ,ashby1 the dashing cavalry leader in the ,shenandoah ,valley1 was a constant source of terror to the ,northern ,generals1 and his death while protecting the movements to ,cross ,keys 7,june #f1 #ahfb7 was a terrible blow to ,stonewall ,jackson1 who employed his mounted troops with more skill than any other commander1 ,confederate or ,federal4 ,general ,r4 ,e4 ,lee possessed a great cavalry leader in ,j4 ,e4 ,b4 ,stuart1 but cool-headed as he was1 ,lee appears to have been fascinated by the idea of throwing a great body of horsemen across his enemy's communications1 spreading terror among his supply trains1 cutting his telegraphs and destroying his magazines4 ,yet in hardly a single instance did such expeditions inflict more than temporary discomfort on the enemy2 and the ,confederate ,armies were led more than once into false manoeuvres for want of the information which only the cavalry could supply4 ,lee at ,malvern ,hill and ,gettysburg1 and1 on the side of the ,north1 ,hooker at ,chancellorsville1 and ,grant at ,spottsylvania1 owed defeat in great measure to the absence of their mounted troops on raiding excursions4 ,in the ,valley1 on the contrary1 success was made possible because ,jackson kept his cavalry to its legitimate duty 7,henderson ,stonewall ,jackson74 ,in the ,russo-,japanese ,war a column of #ejj ,cossacks1 under ,colonel ,madritov1 made a bold raid on the communications of the ,japanese ,i4 ,army in the last days of ,april1 #aijd4 ,the raid involved a #aah ride of #bdj miles and was carried out in entire ignorance of the imminent attack upon ,general ,zasulich's force by the ,japanese ,i4 ,army at the ,battle of the ,yalu 7,may #a1 #aijd74 ,on arrival at his objective ,colonel ,madritov found nothing to attack1 as the base of the ,japanese ,i4 ,army had been shifted from the ,korean frontier to a shorter sea base at the ,yalu mouth4 ,on his return he found his ,general in disordered flight1 and had his small force been available at the ,battle of the ,yalu it could have protected the retreat to ,hamatan and ,feng-hwang-cheng4 ,raids and attacks outside the centre of operations1 however daring1 have no permanent value4 ,in the ,south ,african ,war a disaster to a ,convoy at ,sannah's ,post1 or ,koorn ,spruit 7,march #ca1 #aijj71 was caused by the absence of precautions in front of a retreating force1 the wagons being permitted to enter a defile 7the ,spruit crossed the road at right-angles and was held by the ,boers7 before the exit had been secured4 ,earlier in the same campaign a ,convoy of #hjj wagons was lost at ,ramdam 7,february #ac1 #aijj74 ,an ambushed force of ,boers killed all the transport animals and the wagons were abandoned4 ,no escort had been provided for the ,convoy1 which entered the ambushed area without previous reconnaissance4 ,throughout the ,south ,african ,war the activities of ,de ,wet emphasised the vulnerability of the ,lines of ,communications4 ,where the tactical situation permits1 arrangements should be made to protect the ,lines of ,communications by offensive action4 ,an engagement may be invited in a suitable position1 the protecting troops holding the raiders with a ,delaying ,action while reinforcements are summoned to converge on the battlefield for the purpose of surrounding and exterminating the raiders4 #aai ,,the ,,rear ,,guard ,a ,rear ,guard is essential to a force advancing in order to pick up the stragglers1 to keep off marauders1 and to prevent surprise by an energetic enemy who may detach a force for a surprise attack on the rear of the advancing column4 ,but its most important work is the protection of a retreating force1 and this work will vary in difficulty with the freshness and enterprise of the enemy and the spirit and determination of the force that is being pursued4 ,generally speaking1 ,rear ,guard fighting against an unexhausted enemy is the most difficult and most dangerous of all military enterprises4 ,when a ,rear ,guard halts to fight it is being separated every minute from the ,main ,body1 which is moving away from it1 while every minute brings reinforcements to the enemy4 ,the work requires great tactical skill1 as it is the duty of the commander to delay pursuit by occupying positions from which he withdraws at the last moment1 without becoming involved in a general engagement1 from the meshes of which it may be necessary for the ,main ,body to return and extricate him4 ,the work also requires great moral courage1 as it is the duty of the commander to risk the loss of his force if by so doing he is adopting the only means of saving the ,main ,body4 ,,strength4--,the strength of the ,rear ,guard will depend upon the energy1 strength1 and closeness of the pursuit1 the condition of the ,main ,body 7and whether it is withdrawing voluntarily or upon compulsion after an unsuccessful engagement7 and upon the nature of the country1 but it will generally amount to not less than #abj one-fifth or more than one-third of the whole force1 and will be selected1 as a rule1 from those who have been least severely engaged4 ,,composition4--,its composition depends upon the work to be performed1 and this calls for detachments of all arms of the land service1 in addition to ,aircraft1 which can prevent surprise by reconnaissance over the hostile area and can harass the pursuing columns by day and by night by fire-action with ,lewis guns and bombs4 ,mounted troops are required to extend the area watched and to prolong the resistance by reason of their superior mobility1 in addition to their counter-action as cavalry4 ,artillery are required to open long-range fire on the enemy's columns and so to cause delay by deployment2 and to concentrate upon them while in1 or emerging from1 a defile4 ,infantry and ,machine-gun ,platoons are required for prolonged fire-fights and local counter-attacks1 during which sudden bursts of machine and ,lewis-gun fire will do the greatest execution4 ,engineers provide sappers for the creation of obstacles and traps1 and for the demolition of bridges and viaducts4 ,mechanical ,transport may be required to add to the mobility of the infantry4 ,the ,medical ,service is called upon to provide attention and ambulances for the wounded and for the sick and worn-out troops4 ,,distribution4--,the ,rear ,guard is divided into two parts--the ,rear ,party and the ,main ,guard4 ,the ,rear ,party consists1 like the ,vanguard of the ,advanced ,guard1 of patrols and supports2 the rest of the force forms the ,main ,guard1 and marches in the order in which the troops are required1 viz43 ,artillery 7with escort71 ,mounted ,troops 7if any remain over from the ,rear ,party71 ,infantry1 ,medical ,services and ,ambulances1 and the ,sappers of the ,royal ,engineers4 ,the guns can thus open fire whenever required1 and the sappers1 who are furthest away from the pursuit1 will have the longer time to prepare obstacles and demolitions1 the #aba latter being completed by the ,rear ,party4 ,communication must always be secured and maintained between the ,rear ,party and the ,main ,guard1 and between the ,rear ,guard and the ,main ,body4 ,,distance4--,the distance at which the ,rear ,guard works is governed by the duty it has to perform1 viz43 to permit the withdrawal of the ,main ,body to be carried out without interruption by the enemy1 and to effect this it will usually be necessary for the ,machine ,gun and ,infantry ,platoons of the ,main ,guard to keep within effective range of positions from which hostile artillery might molest the ,main ,body4 ,the commander will probably remain with this part of his force1 as its work is of the highest importance2 in any case his position must be made known and there should be definite commanders of the ,rear ,party and the ,main ,guard4 ,but while the distance separating the ,rear ,guard from the ,main ,body must be sufficient1 it must not be too great1 or the enemy may penetrate between it and the ,main ,body1 and not only will the ,rear ,guard be cut off and liable to destruction but it will cease to protect the ,main ,body4 ,,tactical ,,principles4--,the tactical work of a ,rear ,guard is carried out according to the following principles3-- ,the ,rear ,party watches1 and it must watch all the roads and tracks by which the pursuing force can advance1 and is responsible that the enemy does not get round the flanks 7which may or may not be specially protected by ,flank ,guards74 ,reconnaissance by ,aircraft for the discovery of intended outflanking movements is probably of greater value in ,rear ,guard work than in any other military action4 ,the ,rear ,party also resists the hostile advanced troops as long as possible1 withdrawing before it is outflanked4 ,an outflanking manoeuvre is specially convenient when attacking a ,rear ,guard1 for the latter cannot fulfil its mission once it has been turned 7,marshal ,foch74 #abb ,the ,main ,guard fights for time4 ,if the withdrawal is more or less unmolested1 or if such pursuit as is offered can be dealt with by the ,rear ,party1 the ,main ,guard can continue its march1 taking care not to close in on the ,main ,body2 and while falling back it can demolish bridges1 create obstacles1 prepare ambushes1 and so on1 employing all devices 7within the laws of war7 for delaying the enemy4 ,when hotly pursued it must gain time at all costs for the army it is covering1 and must not allow itself to be driven back on to the ,main ,body2 or it will hamper that force and cease to protect it4 ,time can be gained by compelling the enemy to halt to reconnoitre a position1 by making him deploy into attack formation1 and by making him go out of his way in order to envelop a flank4 ,but before an attack reaches a position in such strength as to ensure success1 and before the enveloping force can achieve its object1 sub-divisions of the ,main ,guard will withdraw in succession under covering fire from those still in the line1 which also withdraw in their turn under covering fire from the sub-divisions in their new positions1 to tactical points further back1 from which again they cover the withdrawal of the forces which had protected their own movement4 ,certain points must be noted about the positions chosen for these successive fire-fights1 and the choice of the positions is so difficult that an experienced staff officer should be specially detailed for the work1 ,positions chosen must be in the enemy's way and the lines of withdrawal to them must not converge2 they must be easy to defend and difficult to attack2 the flanks must be secure from direct attack and effective enfilade fire1 necessitating a wide detour 7and consequent gain of time from the enemy7 before they can be threatened2 long-range artillery fire on the lines of approach should be possible in order to delay and break up the enemy's advance2 and each position chosen for the next line of resistance should be unseen by the #abc pursuing enemy1 and sufficiently far away from the line last occupied to induce him to resume his march formation4 ,this will necessitate a repetition on the part of the enemy of all the stages of the attack--the discovery and the report on the position1 the decision to attack1 and the deployment into attack formation4 ,it will often be of advantage for a ,rear ,guard to take up a delaying position one or two hours before dark1 as the enemy will then have to attack with darkness approaching and may wish to defer the attack until daylight1 thus gaining several hours for the protected force4 ,the first position taken up by a ,rear ,guard after an unsuccessful fight must be held longer1 as a rule1 than the subsequent positions1 because when once the defeated army has got well away along the roads and has regained some semblance of organisation1 the march continues without interruption unless some obstacle has to be crossed 7,general ,haking1 ,staff ,rides74 ,it can also be noted that as it is seldom the intention of the ,rear ,guard commander to deliver a decisive counter-attack1 he can detail a very large proportion of his force to hold the successive positions1 with local reserves1 for purely local counter-attacks2 and for the same reason1 an obstacle in front of his position 7which would make that position unsuitable for the ,active ,defence1 as it would prevent the advance of the ,general ,reserve to the decisive counter-attack7 is most welcome in the ,delaying ,action of a ,rear ,guard fighting for time for its ,main ,body4 ,when at length a line of resistance is evacuated1 the heavy artillery will be withdrawn first to move to a distant fire position1 then the slow moving infantry and the light artillery 7under the protective fire of the aircraft and mobile troops71 and last the cavalry and other mobile troops1 who by reason of their superior mobility1 can hang on to the last and can protect the flanks of the ,rear ,guard as they fall back1 before #abd resuming their work as a ,rear ,party1 observing and resisting the advanced troops of the pursuing force4 ,during a close pursuit the ,rear ,guard commander will be called upon to exercise all his faculties and to exert all his tactical ability in handling his command4 ,one of the most anxious times before him will be when the ,main ,body is passing through a defile1 as such a passage will not only delay its march but will make its columns particularly vulnerable and helpless4 ,in the case of defiles ,napoleon's maxim must be borne in mind3 ,it is contrary to the principles of war to let one's parks and heavy artillery enter a defile if the other end is not held also4 ,at ,sannah's ,post 7,march #ca1 #aijj7 the train was permitted to enter a defile caused by the banks of the ,koorn ,river without the previous occupation of that defile1 and all the wagons were captured4 ,this not only emphasises the necessity for an ,advanced ,guard in retreat1 but points to the need of tactical knowledge on the part of the ,rear ,guard commander1 especially in mountainous country or in terrain cut up by woods and marshes1 where the train is liable to cause delays1 as the withdrawing force is compelled to march in a long drawn column4 ,extra time must be gained by the ,main ,guard to enable the ,main ,body to emerge from the defile4 ,the ,rear ,guard commander must therefore adapt his plans to suit the country through which the ,main ,body has to pass1 as well as the country in which he will himself fight ,delaying ,actions4 ,a good map and ability to use it1 and close co-operation with the ,main ,body1 must be determining factors for success or failure4 ,,training4--,when troops are being exercised in ,rear ,guard work opportunities should be taken to explain the difficulties of choosing suitable positions1 of withdrawing from them when involved in battle1 of the paramount necessity for mutual support1 and of accepting #abe any risk that may be required to safeguard the ,main ,body4 ,stress should be laid upon the importance of ,fire ,tactics 7the judicious combination of ,fire and ,movement71 the greatest of all factors in a successful ,rear ,guard battle1 and upon the ability to read and understand a map1 an essential qualification in all movements of troops and indispensable in ,rear ,guard fighting4 ,from the map a platoon commander must be able to predict the probable line of the enemy's advance against the line of resistance as well as the best route to be taken when1 at length1 he withdraws his platoon to another fire position in rear2 while he must be prepared to throw his platoon in local counter-attack on the flank or rear of an assaulting party that has become detached from its supports and therefore affords a fleeting opportunity for a local fighting success1 and a rapid advance for this purpose along a route unseen to the foe1 a speedy reorganisation after victory1 and a rapid withdrawal to the point of issue1 or to a line in rear1 can best be achieved by use of the map and reconnaissance of the ground of the encounter4 ,,eye ,,for ,,ground4--,one of the secrets of ,napoleon's extraordinary successes was his eye for ground4 ,it was not until ,i went to ,jena and ,austerlitz that ,i really grasped what an important part an eye for ground like ,napoleon's1 or blindness as to ground like his opponent's at both those battles1 may play in ,grand ,tactics1 that is1 the art of generalship 7,colonel ,g4 ,f4 ,r4 ,henderson1 ,the ,science of ,war74 ,the same was true of ,general ,r4 ,e4 ,lee1 particularly in the ,wilderness ,campaign1 when it was not only the entrenchments but the natural features of the ground on which he relied in his defensive tactics4 ,his eye for ground must have been extraordinary4 ,the campaign was fought over a very large area1 an area of very close country1 with few marked natural features2 and yet in the midst of woods1 jungles1 and streams1 with very little time at his disposal1 he always seems to have selected positions than which none could have been stronger 7,colonel ,g4 ,f4 ,r4 ,henderson1 ,the ,science of ,war74 ,,examples ,,of ,,rear ,,guard ,,work4--,during the ,retreat from ,mons the ,rear ,guard of the ,,ii4 ,corps of the ,british ,expeditionary ,force delayed the pursuit by the daring and devotion of its cavalry and artillery1 and by subordinating its plans to the interests of the ,main ,body enabled the ,corps ,commander 7,general ,sir ,h4 ,smith-,dorrien7 not only to throw off the pursuit but to effect a junction with the other wing of the ,british ,army4 ,the retreat took place after the ,first ,battle of ,le ,cateau 7,august #bf1 #aiad71 and during the period of the retreat the insecurity of the ,british ,army through the breakdown of a co-operating force rendered it liable to disaster4 ,but the moral of ,marshal ,french and his commanders1 the stubborn fighting instincts of the ,british race1 and the excellence of the musketry training of the ,regular ,army in times of peace1 prevented the retreat from becoming a rout4 ,the care taken in training the troops in ,fire ,tactics1 and particularly in reloading with eyes on the mark and butts to the shoulder1 was most abundantly justified4 ,the accuracy and volume of the rifle fire deceived the enemy as to the nature of the troops employed against them1 and the dismounted troops and infantry with their rifles were reported as battalions of machine gunners4 ,during the ,second ,battle of the ,somme 7,march1 #aiah71 the ,british ,,iii1 and ,v4 ,armies fought a series of ,rear ,guard battles1 and the enemy's advance was made at a very heavy cost4 ,units retreated stubbornly from one position to another as they found them turned and threatened with isolation2 but at many points fierce engagements were fought1 and whenever the enemy attempted a frontal attack he was beaten off with loss 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,the machine gun proved its effectiveness again and again during the ,british #abg withdrawal1 and twelve machine guns of the #fcrd ,division1 posted in ,les ,boeufs 7,march #bd1 #aiah71 held up the enemy's advance from ,morval at a critical period1 and enabled the division to reach the position assigned to it4 ,the losses inflicted on the enemy by machine-gun and rifle and ,lewis-gun bullets were so heavy that by ,march #be ,von ,below's ,,xvii4 ,army was described in ,german dispatches as quite exhausted4 ,during the same battle a detachment of about #ajj officers and other ranks1 under the command of the ,brigade-,major of the #fast ,brigade1 held the enemy at bay from early morning until #f p4m4 at ,le ,quesnoy 7,march #bg1 #aiah7 and enabled the #bjth ,division to retire to its destined position4 ,at the ,combat of ,rolia 7,august #ag1 #ahjh7 the ,french ,general ,delaborde was outnumbered by the ,anglo-,portuguese forces under ,sir ,a4 ,wellesley1 and being driven from his first and second positions he withdrew to the mountains4 ,during his retreat he brought every arm into action at the proper time 4 4 4 and retreated by alternative masses1 protecting his movements by short1 vigorous charges of cavalry 4 4 4 and he fell back1 disputing the ground1 to ,quinta de ,bugagliera 7,napier74 ,in ,december1 #ahjh1 and ,january1 #ahji1 ,general ,sir ,john ,moore withdrew to ,corua before the armies of ,napoleon 7and when the ,emperor returned to ,madrid1 before those of ,marshal ,soult74 ,he conducted his long and arduous retreat with sagacity1 intelligence1 and fortitude 7,napier71 and it is interesting to note that as in the ,retreat from ,mons in #aiad and at the ,second ,battle of the ,somme in #aiah1 so in the rear-guard actions which preceded the embarkation of ,sir ,john ,moore's ,army1 the musketry of the ,british troops was the deciding factor3 the ,english muskets were all new1 the ammunition fresh2 and whether from the peculiar construction of the muskets1 the physical strength and coolness of the men1 or all combined1 #abh the ,english fire is the most destructive known 7,napier74 ,at ,bristow ,station 7,october #ad1 #ahfc7 during ,general ,meade's campaign in ,northern ,virginia 7after his defeat of ,general ,lee at ,gettysburg1 ,july #a-c1 #ahfc71 a surprise attack by ,stuart's cavalry and infantry from ,general ,rode's ,division caused the withdrawal of the ,federal troops4 ,general ,warren covered the retirement and eventually withdrew his own forces unmolested after beating off several attacks with close-range musket fire4 ,jean ,victor ,moreau1 one of the greatest generals of the ,french ,republic1 became a general of division at the age of #cc1 and by his skill in extricating his forces from apparently certain disaster established in retreat a far greater reputation for generalship than his brilliant victories secured for him4 ,in the spring of #agif he defeated ,latour at ,rastatt and the ,archduke ,charles at ,ettlingen1 and drove the ,austrians back to the ,danube1 but owing to the defeat and retreat of ,jourdan he was compelled to regain the ,rhine in a desperate and apparently hopeless effort4 ,yet he not only preserved his army intact but brought with him over #e1jjj prisoners4 ,in #agih he again saved his army from destruction when hard pressed by the ,russians and ,austrians in ,italy4 ,retreat was by no means his only or favourite manoeuvre1 as he subsequently gained victory after victory over the ,austrians in the campaign of #ahjj1 drove them back behind the ,river ,inn1 and won the decisive victory of ,hohenlinden 7,december #c1 #ahjj71 where the ,austrians and their ,bavarian allies lost #ag1jjj men and #gd guns against a total loss of #e1jjj on the side of the ,french4 #abi ,,outposts ,opposing forces come into conflict through the encounter of the ,advanced ,guards of moving columns2 through the approach of a pursuing force to the ,rear ,guard of a retreating enemy2 through the attack of a moving force on an enemy in position2 and through the renewal of an engagement which has died down between opposing forces4 ,every commander will endeavour to prevent interference with his plans and future movements1 and while striving to surprise and outwit the enemy he will exert every endeavour to prevent the application of this vital principle by the enemy4 ,the commander of a force that is at rest will require security for that force in order that its rest may be undisturbed1 and he will require the security to be assured in order that his plans for the overthrow of the enemy may be developed4 ,he will1 therefore1 detach a portion of his force to ensure this security by observation1 to prevent the secret occupation of localities the hostile possession of which will interfere with his plans2 and by resistance to hostile movements he will secure the rest of the ,main ,body4 ,the force detailed to protect troops at rest is known as ,outposts1 and their duty is to preserve the security of the ,main ,body4 ,outposts protect the ,main ,body from surprise by ,observation1 and if attacked they gain time by ,resistance until the commander of the ,main ,body can put his plans into execution by the occupation of the position in which he intends to receive attack4 ,observation is carried out by ,aircraft1 by ,patrols 7mobile troops by day and infantry by night71 and by ,sentries2 ,resistance is provided by ,sentry ,groups and by troops #acj in defensive positions1 called the ,piquets1 which have other troops as ,supports4 ,in certain cases a ,local ,reserve and a ,general ,reserve are also provided4 ,,strength4--,work in the ,outpost ,line is most exhausting4 ,not a man or a horse should be employed there if their services can be dispensed with1 and although the number of troops allotted for the work depends almost entirely upon the nature of the country and the tactical situation1 it is laid down in the text-books that if an unnecessarily large proportion of the whole force is so employed the force will suffer in efficiency4 ,it can also be seen that although the work is of the first importance and fraught with the greatest difficulties1 it is clearly possible for a comparatively small body of troops to carry it out4 ,observation requires intelligence and vigilance rather than numbers2 ,resistance can be provided by the ,delaying ,action on a wide front of small numbers of skilled troops with the relative advantage conferred upon them in defence by machine guns and small arms1 and with the assurance of support from their ,main ,body close at hand4 ,,observation4--,a force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when every body of the enemy within striking distance is so closely watched that it can make no movement by night or day without its becoming known immediately to the observers of the ,outposts4 ,by day the ,outpost commander will carry out ,reconnaissance some distance ahead of his position by means of ,aircraft and ,patrols of mounted troops and cyclists1 while the commander of each ,outpost company keeps the approaches to the position under observation by sentries1 so posted as to see and hear unobserved by a hostile force4 ,by night1 the ,aircraft and mounted troops are unable to render much assistance as moving patrols1 and the work of ,reconnaissance and ,observation falls upon the platoons of the ,outpost companies4 #aca ,,resistance4--,for the purposes of ,resistance the ,outpost commander will rely upon his infantry and upon such artillery and machine guns as may be allotted to him1 and if the area he is occupying is that in which the commander of the ,main ,body will meet attack the ,outposts will be provided with a greater proportion of artillery and machine guns4 ,resistance is offered by the entrenchment of each ,sentry ,group in an all-round post1 and depth and elasticity are given to the defence by the establishment of entrenched ,piquets in selected1 mutually supporting positions commanding with their fire every avenue of approach1 covering the flanks of neighbouring ,piquets1 and so arranged in plan as to bring converging fire upon the enemy as he advances to the attack4 ,these ,piquet positions will be strengthened1 when required1 by the ,supports1 who will either assist in manning the defences of the ,piquets or will occupy similarly prepared defensive posts on the flank4 ,local ,reserves may sometimes be required for local counter-attacks1 and in certain cases a ,general ,reserve is provided4 ,the degree of ,resistance to be offered by the ,sentry ,groups depends on the tactical situation and will be specified by the ,outpost commander4 ,in certain cases the ,sentry ,groups are permitted in face of a heavy attack to fall back to the ,piquets1 but if they do so they must be warned of the danger of arriving headlong on the ,piquet only just ahead of the enemy4 ,in consequence of this danger such retirements are rarely permissible at night4 ,the ,piquets are generally posted on the ,outpost ,line of ,resistance1 in which case they hold their positions to the last man and the last round1 until further orders are received from the commander of the force protected4 ,,distance4--,the distance of the ,outpost position from the troops protected is regulated by the time the latter will require to prepare for action and by the importance of preventing the enemy's field artillery from #acb approaching within effective range of the ground on which these troops will deploy if attacked4 ,heavy guns and mortars1 although motor traction gives them great mobility1 are unlikely to accompany the enemy's ,advanced ,guard1 and preparation to withstand or prevent their fire will not usually be required from ,outpost troops4 ,the effective range of shrapnel is #e1ejj yards1 the limit of the effective range of machine guns is #b1jjj yards1 and of ,lewis guns and rifles the effective limit is #a1djj yards4 ,the position on which the ,main ,body will deploy will thus be protected from the shrapnel of field artillery1 if the possible fire-positions of that arm are brought under effective fire from machine guns #c1ejj yards from the ,position of ,deployment1 with ,lewis guns and rifles about #ejj yards further forward4 ,on the other hand1 especially in the case of small forces 7against which artillery will not be likely to be sent71 the distance must not be such as would permit of the ,outposts being cut off1 or as would necessitate the employment of an undue proportion of men on ,outpost duty4 ,,the ,,outpost ,,commander4--,before halting1 a commander should first decide on his dispositions in case of attack1 and then arrange the quartering of his command and the general position of the ,outposts4 ,in the case of a small independent force the commander of the force will usually himself detail the whole of the ,outpost troops1 and will either retain the command in his own hand or appoint an officer to command them1 ,in such a case the disposition of the troops will probably be that of a perimeter camp1 preparation being made against attack from all directions4 ,in the case of large bodies ,outpost troops will usually consist of all arms1 and a definite commander will always be appointed4 ,this commander will1 when necessary1 divide the ,outpost line into sectors1 delegating responsibility for the holding of each sector to the commander of a subordinate unit or formation1 and defining the limits #acc of sectors by distinctive features such as trees1 cottages1 or streams4 ,the tops of hills or the bottoms of valleys are not suitable as tactical boundaries1 and roads should be inclusive to one or other sector1 for a road used as a boundary may be neglected by one of the commands it divides under the impression that it is the duty of the other command to patrol it4 ,,information ,,and ,,orders4--,the ,outpost commander must have definite information on the following points3-- ,i4 ,what is known of the enemy and information concerning friendly bodies of troops working against the enemy4 ,,ii4 ,the intentions of the commander of the force he is protecting1 where the ,main ,body will rest and the period it will stay there1 and whether it is intended to engage the enemy if he advances1 and if so on what position4 ,,iii4 ,the general line of the ,outposts1 the troops at disposal for the work1 and whether there are other troops on the left and right4 ,,iv4 ,the hour at which the ,outposts are to be relieved and the place to which reports are to be sent4 ,after receiving the above information he will give such orders as are immediately necessary for protection against surprise4 ,he will then allot the task of ,observation to his mobile troops and will decide on a ,line of ,resistance for the ,outpost troops4 ,he will co-ordinate his arrangements with those of neighbouring ,outpost commanders and will ensure that no ground on his flanks remains unwatched4 ,the ,outpost commander will then issue orders to his subordinate commanders on the following points3-- 7#a7 ,information concerning the enemy and his own troops so far as they affect the ,outposts4 7#b7 ,the general line to be occupied and his frontage and limits of each subordinate commander4 7#c7 ,the distribution of the mobile troops1 artillery1 and machine guns4 #acd 7#d7 ,instructions as to the degree of resistance to be offered and the general line of the ,outpost ,line of ,resistance4 7#e7 ,special arrangements by night4 7#f7 ,regulations as to smoking1 fires1 and cooking4 7#g7 ,the hour at which the ,outposts will be relieved4 7#h7 ,the place to which reports are to be sent4 7#i7 ,instructions as to the accommodation of the ,reserves 7if any are provided7 and whether the ,supports 7and ,reserves1 if any7 may take off accoutrements1 etc4 ,when he receives information that the ,outposts are in position1 he will transmit the information to the commander who appointed him4 ,,the ,,outpost ,,line ,,of ,,resistance4--,retirements under fire to a supporting line are dangerous1 especially at night4 ,as a general rule1 therefore1 the ,piquets should be posted on the ,outpost ,line of ,resistance4 ,co-operation1 intercommunication1 and the exercise of command will be facilitated by placing the ,piquets along well-defined natural features1 or in the vicinity of roads4 ,but the tactical situation may demand that the line adopted should afford facilities for a most stubborn resistance as well as facilities for observation1 and the former necessity will far outweigh the latter4 ,if the force is likely to remain halted for several days1 especially if the operations are likely to lapse into ,position ,warfare1 commanding ground is of great value to the artillery1 and the ,outpost ,line of ,resistance will probably develop into the ,outpost zone of a defensive position4 ,on the other hand1 if halted for only one night1 artillery will not be largely employed1 and commanding ground is not essential4 ,,the ,,outpost ,,company4--,the ,outpost ,company is the ,outpost infantry unit1 the company commander providing ,piquets1 ,supports1 and ,detached ,posts as required4 ,upon receiving his orders the commander will move his command1 with due precautions against #ace surprise1 to the allotted ground where the men will be halted under cover4 ,before proceeding to the part of the line assigned to him the commander of the ,outpost company will detail a force to precede his advance and cover his operations1 and the force so pushed forward will not be withdrawn until his ,piquets have entrenched themselves4 ,by the map he can decide the number of ,piquets he will require1 in accordance with the number of roads to be watched1 the facilities for resistance1 and the requirements for patrolling4 ,the extent of frontage allotted to an ,outpost company depends upon the number of avenues of approach 7roads and tracks1 and open1 unfenced country7 to be watched1 and under ordinary circumstances a frontage up to #a1ejj or #b1jjj yards may be allotted to a company with #d platoons at fighting strength4 ,each ,piquet should consist of a complete unit and should be posted on a good defensive position4 ,the ,support 7or ,supports1 if more than one is detailed for the company frontage7 should also be composed of a complete unit1 and should generally be posted #djj to #hjj yards in rear of the ,piquets1 with good lines of approach to each4 ,detached ,posts may be required1 to watch an extreme flank1 or to occupy a position in front of the ,sentry line1 where the enemy might otherwise collect unseen for the attack or initiate steps for hostile reconnaissance4 ,a further use is to deal with traffic through the line1 where a main road has no ,piquet upon it4 ,the ,outpost company commander must inform his ,piquet commander1 and his immediate superior1 of his position1 as all reports received by the ,piquets require to be sent to him1 and his superior commander will need to keep in communication with him at all times4 ,the first duty of a ,piquet commander 7who is almost invariably a ,platoon commander7 is to consolidate his position by entrenchment and by all available means1 and to prepare a range card1 so that the enemy may not approach without heavy loss2 and if the ,piquet has a ,support ordered to reinforce it in case #acf of attack1 the entrenchments must be constructed to accommodate the supporting troops 7including the ,sentry ,groups thrown out1 if these have been ordered to withdraw to the ,piquet in case of a heavy attack74 ,the commander must impress on all men of his ,piquet the importance of gaining a clear mental picture of their surroundings while daylight lasts1 so that they may the more easily find their way about by night4 ,on his way to the position the ,piquet commander will decide from the map what roads he has to watch and where sentries will need to be posted1 and he will provide from his platoon1 patrols and sentries 7with the necessary reliefs for the patrols71 will detail the various duties1 and will make the necessary sanitary arrangements4 ,his sentries should be posted as expeditiously as possible1 and his patrols sent out at once4 ,the number of patrols to be furnished depends upon the nature of the country1 and as each patrol requires two reliefs1 their number should not be greater than circumstances demand4 ,the duties of infantry patrols are to search the ground and buildings1 etc41 for about #b1jjj yards in front of the sentry line1 to find out whether the enemy is there or not1 and if the enemy is found to be close at hand to watch his movements and report frequently4 ,the number of ,sentry ,groups depends upon the nature of the country and the height of the line of observation1 but between them the groups must be answerable for the whole of the ground in front of their ,piquet 7up to its junction on the left and right with neighbouring ,piquets74 ,a ,sentry ,group consists of #f men under a ,n4,c4,o4 7#b on duty and #d off71 and groups are usually posted not more than #djj yards from their ,piquet1 and hold their ground unless ordered to withdraw4 ,if invisible from their ,piquet a connecting sentry should be posted by the ,piquet commander4 ,sentry ,groups required for night dispositions only will not be posted until after dark4 ,in order to prevent the men of the ,piquet being unnecessarily disturbed at night the ,n4,c4,o4 and #acg men of each relief must be made to bivouac together1 apart from other reliefs and from the remainder of the ,piquet4 ,a sentry will always be posted over the ,piquet1 to watch the ,sentry ,groups and connecting sentries1 and ready to alarm the ,piquet at any moment of need4 ,patrols consist as a rule of a complete unit of #c to #h men under a ,n4,c4,o41 and should be formed of men trained as scouts1 although it will sometimes be possible to use only single scouts for this purpose1 owing to the vigilance of the enemy4 ,standing patrols may also have to be furnished1 if required to watch some special point1 particularly at night1 or at the junction of roads converging towards the ,piquet line1 at cross roads1 etc41 when they are out of sight of the sentries4 ,the ,piquet will stand to arms1 every man in his allotted place1 an hour before dawn1 and will remain alert until the patrols 7which are invariably sent out about that time7 have reported absence of movement by the enemy4 ,outposts are generally relieved at dawn1 so that the force is doubled at the hour of danger4 ,all troops in the ,outpost ,line must entrench themselves1 if posted as sentries1 or in the ,piquet or ,support positions1 and must be ready at any moment to resist a sudden attack4 ,a detachment of ,royal ,engineers will usually be available to superintend the consolidation of the main position4 ,,day ,,and ,,night ,,work4--,by day1 the work of an ,outpost ,line will consist in ,reconnaissance of the approaches for some miles by the ,aircraft and mounted troops and cyclists1 while infantry1 with artillery and machine guns1 hold the ,line of ,resistance4 ,by night1 the mounted troops will be withdrawn1 except such ,cossack ,posts 7standing patrols of mounted troops7 and ,vedettes 7mounted sentries71 as it may be deemed necessary to leave established in front of the line1 while ,aircraft will have much difficulty in discerning movement4 ,the whole work of observation and resistance therefore falls on the infantry1 who may be in their day #ach position or may be withdrawn to the reverse slope of a ridge1 in order to obtain a sky line by night upon which to train their rifles4 ,neglect of the ,principles of ,war is almost inevitably followed by disaster1 and ,protection is the first of the ,tactical ,principles4 ,during the later stages of the ,franco-,prussian ,war a ,french force of the strength of a brigade was billeted in the ,chateau of ,chambord 7,december #i1 #ahgj71 which stands in a large park1 near ,blois4 ,no outpost precautions were taken1 and the ,chateau was captured by two companies of ,prussian infantry4 ,the minor disasters suffered by ,british arms in the ,south ,african ,war were almost entirely due to neglect of the warnings contained in the official text-books4 ,in spite of the established superiority of the ,boers in mobility and vigilance the most elementary precautions against surprise were frequently neglected4 ,at ,tweefontein 7,december #bd1 #aija7 a force of ,yeomanry was surprised in an unprotected camp by a mobile force of ,boers1 and heavy losses were suffered4 ,the mystic atmosphere of ,christmas ,eve was insufficient protection against the militancy of ,christian ,de ,wet4 ,,battle ,,outposts4--,when a battle dies down at night1 or when the forces are in close proximity and a battle is imminent1 the whole of the troops must be kept in readiness for instant action4 ,protection by ,outposts in the normal formation is generally impossible and can only be provided by patrols1 who keep touch with the enemy without causing unnecessary alarms or looking for purposeless encounters1 and by sentries over the ,forward ,troops1 which take the place of the ,piquets4 ,the troops must be ready at any moment to repel attacks with bullets and bayonets4 ,unless otherwise ordered1 the patrols should refrain altogether from aggressive action and should confine their operations to secret observation of the enemy4 ,it is1 however1 essential that touch with the enemy #aci should be maintained as advances1 withdrawals1 and other surprise movements1 are usually prepared and often carried out under cover of darkness when hostile troops are within striking distance4 ,in the ,american ,civil ,war1 by losing touch with the ,northern ,army1 the ,southern ,army permitted it to escape although it had been very severely mauled4 ,during the ,third ,battle of ,ypres 7,july #ca-,november #f1 #aiag7 the ,allies renewed the attack on a six-mile front from ,zonnebeke to ,langemarck 7the junction of the ,franco-,british ,armies in ,flanders74 ,this action1 known as the ,battle of ,broenbeck1 or ,brombeek 7,october #i1 #aiag71 was marked by the successful repulse of counter-attacks by the #ast ,battalion ,royal ,newfoundland ,regiment through the correct employment of ,battle ,outposts4 ,germans massing for the counter-attack in ,taube ,farm were pinned by ,lewis-gun and rifle fire1 while a message sent to the supporting artillery caused the annihilation of the enemy2 another attacking force was destroyed by ,lewis-gun and rifle fire1 before it was launched4 ,a defensive flank was also formed under heavy fire1 and from this flank a further counter-attack was similarly dealt with4 ,the casualties of the ,newfoundlanders throughout this battle were #ej killed1 #ad missing1 and #acb wounded out of a total strength of #ejj all ranks1 and the losses inflicted by them probably exceeded #hjj4 ,after the ,battle of ,fredericksburg 7,december #ac1 #ahfb7 the ,army of the ,potomac under ,gen4 ,burnside eluded the vigilance of ,gen4 ,r4 ,e4 ,lee1 who had defeated it on ,december #ac1 #ahfb4 ,burnside withdrew 7,december #ae1 #ahfb7 across the ,potomac to ,stafford ,heights with the whole of his army1 under cover of a heavy storm4 ,if special orders had been given by the ,outpost commanders for constant and vigorous patrolling1 and if scouts had been instructed to penetrate the ,federal lines from time to time at all risks1 ,burnside could have been attacked at a disadvantage while on the move and should have been driven into the ,potomac4 #adj ,during the battle itself a ,confederate ,brigade was surprised in its own front line through failure to patrol a triangular wood which jutted out in front of the position and screened the brigade on the left with which touch was not maintained4 ,at all times of action with enemy forces all ground to the front or flank must be kept under close observation1 or surprise may lead to disaster4 #ada ,,tactical ,,reconnaissance ,reconnaissance during battle has been dealt with under ,influences on the ,battle and in other lectures1 and owing to the close connection between the two subjects a number of points concerning reconnaissance in general have been noted in dealing with ,protection4 ,it has also been seen that observation by ,aircraft1 ,patrols1 and ,sentries is essential to ,protection both in ,position ,warfare and the ,war of ,manoeuvre1 and that ,reconnaissance is the essence of ,protection4 ,there remain1 however1 two forms of ,reconnaissance that have not yet been considered1 namely3 the ,reconnaissance of a ,position with a view to attacking it1 and the ,reconnaissance of an unoccupied position with a view to occupying it for defence4 ,,reconnaissance ,,for ,,attack4--,the first of these is the constant duty of all commanders in the line during ,position ,warfare1 and it is carried out by ,patrols and ,raiding ,parties1 who provide information which supplements the photographs and reports of the ,air ,service1 and enables a commander to arrive at a decision4 ,in a ,war of ,manoeuvre reconnaissance by the ,air ,service is equally important1 and it is supplemented by the work of the ,patrols of the ,advanced ,guard1 but principally by that of specially selected ,intelligence ,officers1 working in conjunction with1 or independent of1 the ,vanguard4 ,such officers would be in possession of information which it might not be possible to reveal to the commander of the ,patrols of the ,vanguard1 and their special training would give an added value to their report4 ,the chief #adb points to be ascertained concerning a hostile position are3-- ,i4 ,the extent of the position occupied4 ,,ii4 ,weak points of the position4 ,,iii4 ,points1 the capture of which would facilitate enfilade or reverse fire1 and would thus render the rest of the position untenable4 ,,iv4 ,best line of attack4 ,v4 ,supporting positions1 for covering1 converging1 enfilade1 and traversing fire4 ,it should be possible to gather this information without alarming the enemy1 or giving notice of impending attack4 ,information on further points can be gained by fighting1 and ,reconnaissance by ,raids is a common feature of ,position ,warfare4 ,by such means additional information can be gained1 as to3-- ,,vi4 ,names of regiments holding the position1 judged from identity discs1 badges1 buttons1 etc4 ,,vii4 ,whether preparations are being made for an attack 7discoverable by ear as well as eye71 or bombardment1 etc4 7from examination of shell dumps1 etc474 ,,viii4 ,position of machine guns 7,pill-boxes or other71 mortars1 etc4 ,,ix4 ,condition of intervening ground and of the wire entanglements4 ,x4 ,effects of recent bombardments4 ,,xi4 ,moral of the enemy4 ,,reconnaissance ,,for ,,occupation4--,in the ,reconnaissance of a ,position with a view to occupying it for the purposes of receiving attack1 the points to be noted are3-- ,i4 ,the best line for the establishment of a series of mutually supporting tactical points to be held by the infantry4 #adc ,,ii4 ,the best means of protecting the flanks4 ,,iii4 ,the best position for the artillery and machine guns4 ,,iv4 ,the tactical key to the position4 ,v4 ,the line from which attack may be expected4 ,,vi4 ,the best line for the counter-attack4 ,,vii4 ,the positions for the supports and reserves4 and1 additionally1 in the case of a ,war of ,manoeuvre3-- ,,viii4 ,the best position for the cavalry4 ,,ix4 ,alternative positions in rear from which1 after reorganisation1 to recapture the front line1 with the best line of withdrawal to them4 ,additional information would be required in ,position ,warfare as to the best lines for avenues communicating from the old to the new position1 and as to the time required to consolidate the new position against attack 7including the conversion of the parados into parapet1 etc474 #add ,,night ,,operations ,there are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in certain military operations4 ,secrecy is usually the aim of all movement1 and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the ,air ,service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements being made during the hours of darkness4 ,in all ,night ,operations 7except marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day7 surprise is the main object2 secrecy of preparation is therefore essential1 and steps must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement1 and to prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of subordinates4 ,orders will be communicated beforehand only to those officers from whom action is required1 and until the troops reach the position of assembly no more should be made known to them than is absolutely necessary4 ,it may even be advisable1 in order to deceive spies1 that misleading orders should originally be given out4 ,secrecy of intention as well as of preparation is essential4 ,frederick the ,great is reported to have said1 ,if ,i thought my coat knew my plans ,i would burn it6 ,,night ,,marches4--,night ,marches are the movement of columns in march formation1 and their object may be merely to avoid the heat of the day2 but they are also one of the chief means by which a commander can outwit1 deceive1 and surprise the enemy--the principal aim of the strategist--by outflanking his position1 by anticipating him in the occupation of a locality1 or by eluding him by the secret withdrawal of a force which appeared to be in a situation favourable to his plans4 #ade ,forces may also be secretly concentrated to decide the issue of a battle that is imminent1 or of a battle that has begun in daylight4 ,long marches of this nature rarely culminate in an attack1 and when shorter movements are made with such an object in view1 the ,march may be said to terminate when the ,position of ,assembly is reached1 and from that point to become an ,advance or an ,assault4 ,there are certain essentials to success3-- ,i4 ,direction towards the objective must always be maintained4 ,the route must therefore be reconnoitred beforehand1 and marked by the ,advanced ,guard during the march1 and if there are any intricacies in the route1 such as deviations from a well-defined road1 local guides should be secured4 ,across open country a general direction can be maintained by means of the stars1 and when these are not visible1 by the compass4 7,see ,chapter ,,viii41 ,manual of ,map ,reading47 ,,ii4 ,protection against surprise attacks must be provided by ,advanced1 ,flank1 and ,rear ,guards1 but 7except in the obvious case of columns of mounted troops only7 mounted troops will not be employed in this service4 ,the ,advanced ,guard will be small1 and will usually consist of ,patrols within #ajj yards of the column1 followed by connecting files1 with the rest of the ,advanced ,guard in collective formation4 ,the ,rear ,guard will also be smaller and nearer than during a daylight march4 ,flanks will usually be protected by small bodies holding tactical positions1 posted by the ,advanced ,guard1 and withdrawn by the ,rear ,guard4 ,,iii4 ,secrecy must be maintained1 and orders issued as late as possible1 and the preparations carried on without ostentation4 ,the march #adf itself must be conducted in absolute silence and without lights of any kind4 ,care must be taken to prevent or muffle sounds1 and horses likely to neigh must be left with the train4 ,in the case of a march to elude the enemy1 ,outposts will remain in position until daylight and will be secretly withdrawn1 to rejoin the column at the first opportunity1 and bivouac fires1 etc41 will be kept burning4 ,,iv4 ,connection4--,every commander must have and must maintain a fixed place in the column1 and an orderly officer must be detached from each unit to headquarters1 so that instructions may be conveyed to such commanders at all times4 ,units must be closed up1 and the usual distances lessened or dispensed with1 and connection must be maintained between units and their sub-divisions4 ,the pace should be uniform1 but not more than #b miles an hour can be expected on a dark night1 including halts4 ,the time and periods of halts should be arranged before starting1 and units must regain any distance lost before halting4 ,after crossing or clearing an obstacle the column should advance its own length and then be halted until reported to be closed up again1 and staff officers should be detailed to superintend these matters4 ,in addition to these general principles there are certain axioms1 which must become rules of thumb with all concerned3-- ,an officer must march in rear of each unit4 ,all ranks must be informed what to do in case of alarm or attack4 ,fire will not be opened without orders4 ,magazines will be charged1 but no cartridge placed in the chamber4 ,there must be absolute silence1 no smoking1 no lights4 #adg ,when halted1 men may lie down in their places1 but must not quit the ranks4 ,,night ,,advances4--,night advances are the movement of deployed troops to gain ground towards the hostile position with a view to delivering an assault at dawn4 ,they may take place as a preliminary to an engagement1 or to continue one already begun with increased prospects of success4 ,in the first case they are usually the sequel to a ,night ,march1 and in either case they are generally followed by an attack at dawn4 ,surprise is the main object1 even when they are undertaken for the purpose of gaining ground difficult to cross in daylight1 from which to renew an engagement1 as frequently happens during a campaign in a ,war of ,manoeuvre1 while such advances are common features of ,position ,warfare4 ,in any case the ground won must be consolidated immediately1 as a counter-attack at or before dawn may always be expected1 and if the ground offers difficulties for entrenching1 the necessary materials must be carried by the troops4 ,successive advances of this nature may enable the troops to reach a jumping-off place for the final assault1 and such advances may be made on successive nights1 the ground won being defended meanwhile against counter-attacks4 ,unless troops are already deployed for the advance1 a ,position of ,assembly will need to be selected1 with a further ,position of ,deployment2 but these positions sometimes coincide4 ,the deployment will be1 as a rule1 into shallow columns on a narrow frontage at deploying intervals1 in order that the final deployment of the leading columns into the ,forward ,troops of the ,attack may take place without delay when the moment for the assault arrives4 ,on reaching the objective of the advance these columns would deploy into line1 and each unit would entrench itself on the new position4 ,as it is essential for success that direction should be maintained and connection preserved1 the ground over which the advance is to be made must be #adh examined beforehand and landmarks noted1 and touch must be kept by means of ropes or any available device4 ,care must also be taken in consolidating the position that the entrenchments have a general alignment towards the enemy and that they are so sited as to protect from enfilade fire4 ,night ,assaults4--,night ,assaults are delivered by troops already deployed into attack formation4 ,it is an established tactical principle that when the conditions of the fire-fight are likely to be favourable1 it is probably better to accept the inevitable casualties that must result from a struggle for fire supremacy1 rather than adopt the undoubted hazards of a night assault4 ,these conditions are frequently so unfavourable in ,position ,warfare1 owing to the strength of consolidated positions and to the increasing accuracy and density of artillery fire1 that assaults are made of necessity in the hours of darkness1 in preference to those of daylight4 ,during the ,battle of the ,somme 7,july #a-ag1 #aiaf7 a night advance was made by seven divisions on a front of about #d miles4 ,the troops moved out in the early hours of ,july #ad1 for a distance of about #a1djj yards1 and lined up in the darkness below a crest some #cjj to #ejj yards from the enemy's trenches4 ,their advance was covered by strong patrols and their correct deployment had been ensured by white tapes laid out on the ground earlier in the night of ,july #ac-ad4 ,the whole movement was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case4 ,the assault was delivered at #c4be a4m41 when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short range1 and along the whole front attacked the troops were preceded by an effective artillery barrage4 ,they swept over the enemy's first-line trenches and consolidated their position in the defences beyond4 ,on the night of ,february #aj-aa1 #aiag1 the #cbnd ,division attacked and captured #a1ejj yards of trench #adi line at the foot of the ,serre ,hill4 ,the division formed up after dark and the attack began at #h4cj p4m41 the objective was captured1 and at #e a4m4 a determined counter-attack was repulsed4 ,the capture of the ,vimy ,ridge by ,canadian troops was due to an assault launched some time before dawn on ,april #i1 #aiag3 and the ,british victory of ,messines 7,june #g1 #aiag7 to an assault launched at #c4aj a4m4 ,in the latter case the ,wytschaete-,messines position1 one of the ,germans' most important strongholds on the ,western ,front1 consisted of forward defences with an elaborate and intricate system of well-wired trenches and strong points1 forming a defensive belt over a mile in depth1 and the ,germans had omitted no precautions to make the position impregnable 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,nineteen deep mines under this position were fired at #c4aj a4m41 and this was the signal for the assault1 which was immediately successful and was carried out under intense artillery protecting fire4 ,by nightfall of ,june #g the whole position had been recaptured1 heavy losses inflicted1 and over #g1jjj prisoners taken at a comparatively slight cost1 by the ,,ii4 ,army1 under ,general ,sir ,h4 ,c4 ,o4 ,plumer4 ,during the ,german offensive in #aiah a counter-attack by three brigades was launched by night against the village of ,villers ,brtonneux4 ,the attack was launched at #aj p4m4 on the night of ,april #bd-be4 ,by daybreak the village was surrounded1 and by the afternoon it was entirely recaptured with upwards of #a1jjj prisoners4 ,among the offensive operations which preceded the general advance of the ,allies in ,july1 #aiah1 was a highly successful night attack by the #bnd ,australian ,division1 on a front of about #b miles1 south of ,morlancourt 7,june #aj1 #aiah74 ,at #d4ce a4m4 on ,may #ab1 #ahfd1 one of ,general ,ulysses ,grant's ,corps1 under ,general ,hancock1 assaulted the ,salient1 part of ,general ,robert ,lee's entrenchments in ,the ,wilderness of ,virginia 7,spottsylvania74 #bj1jjj men were assembled and a night advance was made1 #aej directed by compass1 on an unusually dark and stormy night1 with part of the line of the advance densely wooded4 ,the assault was ordered for #d a4m41 but a dense fog delayed the signal until #d4ce a4m4 ,when the order was given1 one of the divisions had some difficulty in making its way through a wood and marsh1 but contrived to keep up with the others1 and reached the abattis at the same time4 ,the assault resulted in the capture of #d1jjj prisoners and inflicted losses with the bayonet of over #b1jjj1 with a total loss to the assailants of about #b1jjj4 ,this manoeuvre consisted of a night march by compass of a whole corps to a ,position of ,assembly within #a1bjj yards of the hostile outposts1 of an advance before dawn1 and of a final assault of #bj1jjj troops4 ,the captured salient was afterwards retaken by the ,confederates by a decisive counter-attack1 rendered possible by the provision1 in rear of the salient1 of a second line of entrenchments 7see ,battle of ,spottsylvania74 ,owing to the risks of confusion and the limitations imposed on the attacking movement1 ,night ,assaults do not now carry the same comparative advantages over ,daylight ,attacks as was the case before the introduction of ,smoke4 ,hence they will be restricted to attacks on a very limited objective1 as in the case of raids or attempts to capture special tactical localities4 ,but by employing ,smoke only two elements of ,surprise can be achieved4 ,the direction and weight of the blow are concealed1 but the appearance of ,smoke will warn the enemy to expect an attack1 and the time of the blow is thus revealed4 ,smoke will probably be employed extensively in modern warfare and1 except against an ill-trained and undisciplined enemy1 assaults by night will generally be undertaken to gain tactical points1 to drive in advanced troops and ,outposts1 to capture advanced and detached posts1 to rush an isolated force guarding a bridge or defile1 and in carrying out enterprises of a similar nature1 in order to gain advantages #aea for further operations in daylight4 ,when more important assaults are made1 a larger force than a brigade will seldom be thrown against a single objective1 although a series of objectives may be simultaneously attacked with success over a wide front4 ,a ,night ,assault was delivered by two ,federal brigades on the ,confederate bridgehead at ,rappahannock ,station 7,november #g1 #ahfc74 ,one of the brigades was ultimately repulsed1 but the other penetrated the ,confederate position and cut off the retreat4 ,upwards of #a1ejj of the defenders were captured or killed1 and the small remnant evacuated the bridgehead4 ,in the ,second ,afghan ,war1 ,general ,sir ,f4 ,roberts marched up to the high passes leading out of the ,kurram into the interior of ,afghanistan1 with a column of #c1bjj all ranks and #ac guns4 ,he was opposed by the ,amir's force of about #ah1jjj men with #aa guns at ,peiwar ,kotal 7,december #b1 #ahgh74 ,sir ,f4 ,roberts detached the greater part of his force to occupy the heights on the flank of the ,afghan position and attacked at daylight4 ,the ,night ,march and subsequent attack were completely successful4 ,the enemy was defeated with great loss and all his guns captured1 the ,british losses being #bj killed and #gh wounded4 ,tel-el-,kebir was an example of a ,night ,march in battle formation of a force of #aa1jjj infantry1 #b1jjj cavalry1 and #fj guns1 to attack an entrenched position at dawn1 the object being to surprise the enemy and to cross the danger zone without exposing the assaulting troops to a prolonged fire action4 ,it resulted in a victory which decided the ,egyptian campaign1 and added the ,nile ,valley to the ,british ,empire4 ,sir ,garnet ,wolesley's force advanced in four columns marching abreast1 with its left resting on the railway1 and was successfully carried out1 the troops reaching a position1 varying from #cjj to #ijj yards distance from the objective1 the assault being delivered at the conclusion of the march4 ,the ,egyptian ,army1 under ,arabi ,pasha1 fought steadily1 and again and again renewed the fight1 after falling back #aeb within their entrenchments1 but their flank was turned and the whole position captured4 ,the ,british loss was only #dei all ranks1 and the ,egyptians lost upwards of #b1ejj killed and wounded1 the remaining #bc1jjj being dispersed or captured4 ,a daylight advance and assault of so strong a position could not have been successfully carried through at so small a cost to the attacking troops4 ,in the ,south ,african ,war there were two examples of the unsuccessful ,night ,attack4 ,major-,general ,gatacre essayed a ,night ,march followed by a ,night ,attack upon the ,boers' position at ,stormberg 7,december #aj1 #ahii71 but he was misled by his guides in unknown ground and was himself surprised by the ,boers and forced to retire with a loss of over #gjj officers and other ranks4 ,on the following day ,lord ,methuen delivered an attack upon ,cronje's position between the ,upper ,modder ,river and the ,kimberley road4 ,in a ,night ,attack on ,magersfontein ,hill 7,december #aa1 #ahii7 the ,highland ,brigade came under heavy fire while still in assembly formation and lost its ,brigadier 7,a4 ,g4 ,wauchope7 and #gej officers and other ranks4 ,in the later stages of the ,south ,african ,war1 however1 ,night ,marches followed by ,raids were employed with marked success1 particularly in the ,eastern ,transvaal in ,november and ,december1 #aija4 ,except when the assaulting troops are already in position1 it will be necessary to choose ,positions of ,assembly and of ,deployment1 and to precede the advance in the preliminary stages by lines of scouts1 ahead and on the flanks1 within #ajj yards of the following troops4 ,on arrival at the jumping-off place these advanced scouts will await the arrival of the assaulting force1 and they should be directed to mark the ground for the various units4 ,a scout from each ,forward ,platoon can thus mark the inner flank on which his ,platoon will rest1 and the direction of the whole line will be assured4 ,the troops will usually advance1 during the earlier #aec stages1 in shallow columns on narrow frontages1 at deploying intervals1 and may maintain this formation until the halted line of scouts is reached4 ,owing to the frequent necessity for halts to correct intervals1 etc41 and the inherent difficulties of movements by night in open formations1 no greater rate than #a mile an hour can be counted on4 ,when several objectives are in view a corresponding series of ,positions of ,assembly and ,deployment will be required1 and care must be taken that the various advancing forces do not converge4 ,owing to the difficulty of recognition1 a distinguishing mark will usually be worn by the troops engaged1 a watchword will usually be adopted and made known to all ranks1 and the commander and staff should wear easily distinguishable badges4 ,if hostile patrols are encountered it is essential that they should be silenced1 and any one encountered who is deficient of the badge and ignorant of the watchword should be similarly treated4 ,the risk of an assault being held up by unforeseen obstacles must also be provided against1 and ,engineers or ,pioneer ,infantry should be present for removing such obstacles4 ,if fire is opened by the enemy it is clear that all hope of surprise has vanished1 and the troops must then press on at all costs2 for if they advance as rapidly as possible they have a reasonable prospect of achieving their object1 whereas a halt will increase the enemy's power of resistance1 and withdrawal will almost certainly end in disaster4 ,in order that secrecy may be observed1 details of the assault will usually be withheld from all except superior commanders from whom action is required1 until the ,position of ,assembly is reached2 but before the troops leave that position all ranks must be made to understand the objective in general1 the particular task of the unit1 and the formation to be adopted at the ,position of ,deployment4 ,in addition to this information1 and to a knowledge of the general tactical principles involved1 #aed there are certain axioms which must become rules of thumb with all ranks3-- ,fire must not be opened without orders4 ,magazines must be charged but no cartridge placed in the chamber4 ,until daylight the bayonet only to be used4 ,absolute silence to be maintained until the signal for the assault is given4 ,no smoking2 no lights4 ,if obstacles are encountered each man will lie down in his place until they are removed4 ,if hostile fire is opened1 all ranks must press on at once with the utmost spirit and determination and overpower the enemy with the bayonet4 #aee ,,fighting ,,in ,,close ,,country ,close country has a marked influence on ,tactics owing to the restrictions it imposes on view and on movement4 ,forest1 jungle1 and bush1 mountains and ravines1 rivers and streams are natural obstacles1 while cultivation adds woods and plantations1 fences and hedges1 high growing crops1 farm houses1 villages and towns1 with sunken roads below the surface of the adjoining land1 and civilisation brings in its train a network of railways and canals with embankments and bridges1 and the natural difficulties of close country are thereby increased4 ,the obstruction to movement is more or less constant1 except in continental climates1 where frost and snow render movement possible in winter over the deepest rivers or marshes1 and over roads and tracks which are scarcely practicable in the summer season4 ,the obstruction to view is greater when trees and hedges are in leaf than when the leaves have fallen4 ,when the advantages and disadvantages of fighting in close country are weighed in the balance there appears to be a distinct tendency in favour of the ,attack over the ,defence4 ,an ,attacking force can usually obtain cover in the early stages of the action and loss can therefore be avoided in approaching the objective1 while the screening of its movements and dispositions generally enables the ,attacking force to surprise the ,defence as to the direction and weight of the blow to be delivered4 ,troops fighting in close country are often unable to see what is going on around them1 and the sense of security is lessened by the knowledge that a flank may be successfully assailed without warning4 ,this favours the #aef ,attack more than the ,defence1 as the counter-attack1 which is the soul of all defensive operations1 requires previous organisation to be thoroughly effective4 ,,savage ,,warfare4--,in ,savage ,warfare the inherent difficulties of fighting in close country are often increased by the disparity of numbers on the side of the civilised troops and by the fanatical courage of the savages4 ,discipline1 self-reliance1 vigilance1 and judgment in the application of the ,principles of ,war1 are required to overcome these added difficulties4 ,a vigorous offensive1 ,strategical as well as ,tactical1 is always the best method of conducting operations in ,savage ,warfare1 and for the purpose of ,protection vigilance must be exercised to an even greater degree than in any other form of warfare4 ,at ,isandhlwana 7,january #bb1 #ahgi7 the ,british camp at the foot of ,isandhlwana ,hill was surprised and overwhelmed by a ,zulu ,army1 #aj1jjj strong1 and almost the whole of the garrison killed2 and yet in the evening of the same day #abj all ranks 7#dj sick being included in that number7 beat off the repeated attacks of #d1jjj ,zulus at ,rorke's ,drift4 ,in the operations after the fall of ,khartoum a desert column under ,major-,general ,sir ,j4 ,mc,neill was surprised in dense bush while constructing a zeriba at ,tofrik 7,march #bb1 #ahhe71 but after twenty minutes' fierce fighting the ,mahdist ,arabs were driven off with more than #a1jjj killed4 ,in the operations in ,upper ,egypt against the invading ,mahdists a vigorous strategical and tactical offensive led to the ,battle of ,toski 7,august #c1 #ahhi7 and resulted in the defeat and complete destruction of the invaders1 with but slight loss to the ,anglo-,egyptian force under ,general ,sir ,f4 ,w4 ,grenfell4 ,at the beginning of the ,christian ,era three well-disciplined ,roman legions were decoyed into the fastnesses of the ,teutoberger ,wald 7,a4,d4 #i7 and there attacked and annihilated by the ,cherusci1 a ,saxon tribe1 under their king ,arminius1 and this defeat of ,quintilius ,varus is included by ,sir ,edward ,creasey among the #aeg ,fifteen ,decisive ,battles of the ,world4 ,fighting in close country against more or less savage tribes is frequently the task of ,british troops in ,east and ,west ,africa1 while the ,indian ,frontier constantly requires to be defended by expeditions against tribal levies in hilly and mountainous districts4 ,in ,field ,service ,regulations 7,part ,,ii471 #aiba1 the peculiarities of various savage races by whom the ,outposts of the ,british ,empire are liable to be assailed are carefully noted4 ,,in ,,civilized ,,warfare4--,the military history of ,europe and ,america abounds with accounts of fierce fighting in close country4 ,in all ages woods and villages play an important part in war4 ,they form natural magnets for troops operating in their neighbourhood4 ,the fact of their being easily visible1 and named on maps1 causes them to be adopted as objectives in the ,attack or as boundaries in the ,defence1 and in all operations troops are instinctively drawn towards them in search of cover1 or to obtain water1 supplies1 and shelter4 ,their situation is also likely to make them of tactical importance1 as woods are frequently on the slopes of hills and may be occupied in a defensive scheme to force an assailant to deploy before reaching the main position1 while villages are naturally situated on roads1 which must be guarded as they are the normal avenues of approach for all troops4 ,in ,position ,warfare the wood and the village are of the highest importance1 and whenever they are situated along the alignment1 or near the front1 of a defensive position1 they may always be assumed to be occupied and strongly organised as part of a series of mutually supporting tactical points4 ,the names of woods1 large and small1 and of the most insignificant villages1 were of everyday occurrence in reports on the fighting on the ,western ,front in the ,great ,war as the scene of furious encounters1 of attacks and counter-attacks1 and there are #fg references to copses1 woods1 and forests in ,marshal ,haig's ,dispatches4 ,it #aeh appears1 however1 to be generally admitted that close country in general1 and woods and villages in particular1 favour ,delaying ,action rather than a protracted ,defence1 and in ,position ,warfare the advantages are therefore in favour of the ,attack on account of the facilities offered for surprise through the concealment of movement4 ,there are many instances of successful ,delaying ,action in woods and villages4 ,some of the characteristics of such fighting were exemplified in the ,franco-,prussian ,war4 ,at the ,battle of ,gravelotte 7,august #ah1 #ahgj7 the ,bois de ,vaux1 on the left of the ,french position1 induced ,marshal ,bazaine to mass his reserves on that flank1 as it appeared to invite attack2 whereas he was defeated by a turning movement on the other flank4 ,during an attack through the ,bois de ,vaux a ,prussian infantry battalion became so scattered that all cohesion was lost1 a common danger in wood fighting4 ,at the earlier ,battle of ,spicheren 7,august #f1 #ahgj71 however1 two battalions maintained their order and cohesion in ,pfaffen ,wood1 and by moving through it in narrow columns were able to debouch in good order4 ,a tendency to loss of discipline through loss of control was exemplified at the same battle4 ,other ,prussian troops had captured ,gifert ,wood and the officers were unable to organise an attack on a further position through the reluctance of the troops to leave the shelter of the wood4 ,at the ,battle of ,worth 7,august #f1 #ahgj7 two ,french battalions held up the attack of #ah1jjj ,prussians for over an hour in the ,niederwald1 although no fortifications were employed2 the difficulty of debouching from a captured wood was then experienced by the ,prussians1 as the farther edge was kept under heavy fire by ,french troops in the neighbouring ,elsasshausen ,copse4 ,a decisive counter-attack cannot usually be organised in such warfare1 although ,lee managed to employ #ag1jjj troops for that purpose with complete success at the ,battle of the ,wilderness 7,may #e-f1 #ahfd74 ,local #aei counter-attacks1 however1 are the normal incidents of defensive operations in woods1 and in the ,niederwald1 at the ,battle of ,worth1 several spirited counter-attacks were made by the #ifth ,french ,regiment4 ,villages are even more attractive to troops than woods1 and they figure in all battles as local centres of resistance4 ,one of the most spirited defences of a village took place at the ,battle of ,sedan 7,september #a1 #ahgj7 when a heroic struggle was maintained by ,french marine infantry in the village of ,bazeilles1 and after the white flag had been hoisted over the ,fortress of ,sedan the fight was stubbornly maintained at the village of ,balan1 the second line of defence of the ,bazeilles position4 ,visitors to the battlefield of ,sedan are shown a little inn with the title1 ,a ,la ,dernire ,cartouche1 in commemoration of the struggle4 ,a highly successful ,night ,attack was made by the ,french on the village of ,noisseville 7,august #ca1 #ahgj71 the normal difficulties of defending the village being increased by the surprise and the darkness4 ,,the ,,attack ,,on ,,woods4--,the opening stages of the attack on a wood resemble those in the attack on any other position1 but once the outer fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak points must be achieved4 ,flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under these circumstances1 as they may succeed before the other defending troops are aware of the threatened attack1 but the utmost precaution is necessary to avoid traps1 and scouts must precede all movement1 while advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close range4 ,supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help4 ,machine guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support1 the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on #afj stockaded defenders4 ,small woods should usually be attacked from the flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards1 while machine guns and ,lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders4 ,during the ,german counter-attacks at ,cambrai 7,november #cj-;,december #d1 #aiag7 ,tanks were effectively employed in wood and village fighting1 and were in a great measure responsible for the capture of ,gauche ,wood1 acting in co-operation with dismounted ,indian cavalry of the #eth ,cavalry ,division and with the ,guards' ,division2 but although they reached the outskirts of ,villers ,guislain they were forced to withdraw1 as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to the fire of the enemy's machine guns4 ,at the ,battle of ,messines 7,june #g1 #aiag7 a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance by overcoming the machine guns posted in ,fanny's ,farm4 ,generally speaking1 however1 tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods1 owing to the many insuperable obstructions1 and their sphere of usefulness is limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of approach4 ,during the fighting for the interior of the wood reconnaissance during battle is of the highest importance1 and the flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded1 on account of the liability to counter-attack4 ,touch must also be kept1 to avoid loss of direction4 ,in the advance from the captured position great tactical skill is required1 and if the defenders have established a fire position within close range it may only be possible to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or neutralised that position4 ,it may even be necessary to hold the rear edge against counter-attack and to debouch1 after reorganisation1 from both flanks or from the opposite edge1 to advance in two bodies against the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in the further edge4 ,if the fire position is to be carried by direct assault1 or if #afa it can be got under control and the advance is to be continued1 the successful troops must be reorganised within the wood 7care being taken to avoid concentration in salients7 and must deploy before advancing1 to bound forward in one rush until clear of the wood4 ,,defence ,,of ,a ,,wood4--,the outer edge of a wood is particularly vulnerable1 but some portions of it must of necessity be occupied for purposes of observation and resistance 7particularly at night71 while the unoccupied portions are heavily entangled and made subject to enfilade fire from the occupied positions1 machine and ,lewis guns being particularly suitable for the defensive positions1 in concealed and strengthened emplacements4 ,the perimeter should be divided into sections garrisoned by complete units under definite commanders4 ,lines of defence must also be established in the interior1 and lateral communications opened up through the trees1 with easily distinguished marks to direct troops issuing to counter-attacks1 and time will be saved by making several tracks rather than one wide road4 ,the second line of defence should contain an all-round defensive position from which all avenues of approach can be swept by machine and ,lewis guns1 and this position should also provide facilities for sorties to counter-attack4 ,if the wood is too far from the ,outpost ,zone of the defence to serve as a factor in the scheme steps must be taken to neutralise the advantages offered to an attacking force in a concealed avenue of approach1 either by the use of gas1 or by bringing such a fire on the exits from the wood that a debouching enemy may suffer heavy loss or annihilation4 ,in most cases1 an attacking force will be harassed1 and a show of opposition will be made1 in such a wood by fighting patrols1 and obstacles can be placed in the near edge1 with entanglements outside1 so planned as to induce the attacking force to collect in lanes enfiladed by machine guns4 #afb ,,the ,,attack ,,on ,,villages4--,there are three phases in the attack on a village as in the attack on a wood4 ,in the fight for the outer edge1 the front will probably be harassed by a fire attack1 while one or both flanks are assaulted by all four sections of the platoon1 under cover of fire from machine guns and ,lewis guns4 ,the second phase may require reorganisation before the attack on the village itself1 during which1 reconnaissance1 co-operation1 and dispatch of information1 are of the highest importance4 ,all captured points must be immediately consolidated and the attack must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour4 ,troops must be trained to enter buildings from the rear1 and to advance along the right edge of roads1 close to the walls and buildings there1 to make hostile fire difficult without undue exposure4 ,light mortars and rifle bombs1 which can be fired into windows partially barricaded1 or to fall behind street barricades1 are an important adjunct to the rifle and bayonet1 and machine guns and ,lewis guns will have many opportunities in assisting or repelling a counter-attack and of keeping down the enemy's fire from a commanding position at the end of a street4 ,the ,tank is at its best in this form of warfare1 as it can surmount or demolish almost any street barricade1 and can be followed up at once by the infantry1 but it must always be regarded as an auxiliary to the infantry1 and not as a principal4 ,in the third phase1 the advance from the captured village1 while the supports are mopping up such of the garrison as have survived the capture1 previous reorganisation and deployment will probably be as essential as in wood fighting1 and during all the phases of the struggle in woods and villages sudden counter-attacks must always be expected and local reserves to repel them must be provided4 ,in issuing from the village1 rapid bounds to points from which the fire positions in rear can be brought under control will also be required4 #afc ,,defence ,,of ,a ,,village4--,it is difficult to avoid the inclusion of villages in a scheme of defence on account of the facilities afforded for water1 cover1 and shelter1 but while villages assist in the ,delaying ,action they are liable to become shell traps in a prolonged defence1 unless there is good cellarage accommodation1 while the local effect of a bursting shell is also increased4 ,there are certain principles common to all defensive action in village fighting3-- 7#a7 ,the garrison should consist of a definite unit or formation under a definite commander4 7#b7 ,the forward troops should be posted in front of the edge of the village1 partly because of the vulnerability of the actual edge to artillery fire but mainly to prevent the attack from establishing itself in the forward buildings4 ,in the case of a small village it will often be advantageous to occupy positions on the flanks commanding the edge by fire1 with a view to enticing the attack into the funnel thus provided4 7#c7 ,supports and ,reserves must be centralised in order that they may be readily available for instantaneous local counter-attacks1 by which means alone a village can be defended against a determined enemy4 7#d7 ,houses should be loopholed and windows sand-bagged1 while house-to-house communication must be improvised to increase the defenders' power of manoeuvre4 7#e7 ,the interior of the village should be defended by the cross fire of machine guns and ,lewis guns1 but while churches and halls1 and the inner edge of village greens and of squares1 should be prepared for determined resistance1 such places should not be occupied as billets1 owing to the risk of loss from artillery bombardment4 7#f7 ,the natural difficulties of maintaining control in village fighting require to be counteracted by increased effort and vigilance on the part of all leaders1 and special arrangements must be made for collecting information in report centres1 the position of which must be made known to all ranks in the defending force4 #afd ,,characteristics ,,of ,,the ,,various ,,arms ,the full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination1 and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand the characteristics of the other arms4 ,each has its special characteristics and functions1 and is dependent on the co-operation of the others 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 ,an intelligent understanding of 'the other man's job' is the first essential of successful co-operation4--,,marshal ,,haig4 ,,infantry ,infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 ,the speed with which infantry can advance1 and the distance which can be covered in one day1 are the only limits to the striking power of well-trained infantry4 ,in the ,great ,war these limits were largely removed by the use of ,mechanical ,transport1 and this means of transportation will be used increasingly in ,modern ,warfare1 in order to bring fresh troops into or near the scene of action1 or to expedite the removal of exhausted troops from the battlefield4 ,against these natural limits to mobility are the compensating advantages of the power of infantry to move into and over almost any ground by day or by night1 and the rapidity with which trained infantrymen can find or improvise cover4 ,the main object of battle is to close with the enemy and to destroy him by killing or capture1 and it is this power to close with the enemy which makes infantry the decisive arm in battle4 ,,the ,,rifle ,,and ,,bayonet4--,the rifle is the principal infantry weapon1 and the ,british ,short-magazine #afe ,lee-,enfield rifle is the best rifle in action4 ,a trained rifleman can fire #ae aimed shots in a minute1 reloading with the butt in the shoulder and eyes on the mark4 ,with the bayonet affixed the rifle is the principal weapon of close combat for delivering or repelling an assault1 and in ,night ,assaults infantry depend entirely upon the bayonet4 ,,the ,,entrenching ,,tool1 carried by all other ranks1 is an invaluable adjunct to the rifle bullet and to the bayonet4 ,in a ,war of ,manoeuvre1 when infantry are frequently compelled to improvise defences on the field of battle1 by night as well as by day1 the value of the ,entrenching ,tool can scarcely be exaggerated4 ,in ,position ,warfare1 and in the organisation of an area for prolonged defence in a ,war of ,manoeuvre1 heavier tools and materials of all kinds are available for the consolidation of the defences1 but for the rapid construction of temporary defences by day or by night the ,entrenching ,tool alone has been proved to be highly effective4 ,when troops are digging themselves in at night with this weapon care must be taken that some system is adopted to obtain a more or less regular line facing in the right direction4 ,by the extension of the men of an infantry section at arm's length facing the enemy1 and by moving the two men on each flank two paces outwards1 and the two centre men two paces backwards1 and then causing the section to dig on the line of their toes1 there will result 7even on the darkest night7 a short fire trench with a central traverse4 ,this sectional trench can be connected at the first opportunity with trenches dug by other sections similarly extended4 ,during the ,retreat from ,mons 7,august-,september1 #aiad7 the ,contemptible ,little ,army1 under ,marshal ,french1 frequently obtained1 by means of the ,entrenching ,tool alone1 shelter from bullets1 and a system of fire trenches which cost the pursuing ,germans hundreds of lives and materially delayed their movements4 #aff ,,the ,,lewis ,,gun4--,the ,lewis gun is an automatic rifle1 firing the same ammunition as the ,s4-,m4-,l4-,e4 rifle1 and two ,lewis-gun sections are included in each infantry platoon4 ,the rate of fire is increased by the automatic action of the gun1 the maximum rate permitting a drum of #dg rounds to be fired in less than ten seconds1 while one or two rounds only may be fired if so required4 ,the mobility of the ,lewis-gun sections is the same as that of other sections of the infantry platoon4 ,,ranges ,,of ,,rifles ,,and ,,machine ,,guns ,close range4 ,up to #hjj yards4 ,effective range4 ,over #hjj yards up to #b1jjj yards4 ,long range4 ,over #b1jjj yards up to #b1ijj yards4 ,,grenades4--,hand grenades and rifle grenades are adjuncts to the rifle and bayonet and the ,lewis gun4 ,their principal use is in clearing fortified posts1 especially in ,position ,warfare4 ,the hand grenade1 or bomb thrown by hand1 is limited in range by the skill and strength of the thrower1 and #cj to #dj yards may be regarded as the maximum distance4 ,the rifle grenade is effective up to about #djj yards1 and is generally employed to provide a local barrage or to search cover4 ,in the latter case1 a high angle of descent is used as with mortars or howitzers4 ,,light ,,mortars4--,the ,light ,mortar ,section is an integral part of every infantry battalion1 and although sometimes brigaded for special purposes the sections normally work with their own battalions4 ,a section of #b light mortars1 firing #aa-lb4 bombs1 consists of #a officer and #bj other ranks1 and requires #b horses and #a ,g4,s4 limbered wagon4 ,owing to the high angle of descent the bombs can be fired behind1 and can search1 high cover1 while the mortars themselves are not very conspicuous objects and can be #afg readily moved for short distances1 while they come into action in #cj seconds4 ,the comparatively slow flight of the bombs1 however1 enables the enemy to discover the location of the mortars1 and necessitates the use of expedients to avoid counter-artillery fire4 ,a maximum rate of #cj to #dj rounds a minute can be maintained for two or three minutes1 if ammunition is available1 and at an angle of #de degrees a range of #gjj yards can be obtained4 ,,machine ,,guns4--,the principal characteristic of the machine gun is its power of delivering a concentrated volume of fire which can be sustained almost indefinitely1 subject to limitations of ammunition supply4 ,the ease with which the gun can be concealed in action and its fire controlled enable advantage to be taken of surprise effect 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 ,the ,machine-gun ,platoon is an integral part of every infantry battalion1 but in ,attack machine guns are frequently grouped for the purpose of providing overhead or other covering fire1 while in ,defence they form1 with the artillery1 the framework into which the defensive dispositions are fitted1 and by reason of their fire-power machine guns enable a commander to economise in the number of infantry allotted to a purely defensive rle4 ,the ranges are those given above for rifles and ,lewis guns1 and the rate of fire is about #bj times that of a rifle1 while #a1ejj to #b1jjj rounds may be fired continuously at a moment of need4 ,,mounted ,,troops ,,cavalry4--,the principal characteristic of cavalry is its mobility4 ,this enables it to attack unexpectedly2 to defend with determination while retaining the power to break off an action more easily than infantry2 to gain information and to afford protection at a considerable distance from the force protected2 and to confirm #afh and exploit the success obtained in battle4 ,cavalry is capable1 if required1 of undertaking most operations for which infantry would usually be employed1 but the demands made by the care of horses reduce the number of rifles which can actually be placed in action2 and it therefore lacks depth in comparison with similar infantry formations 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 ,the cavalry arms are the lance and sword for mounted action2 horse artillery usually work with cavalry1 and the arms employed by cavalry for dismounted action are the rifle1 the machine gun1 and the ,hotchkiss rifle4 ,examples of the employment of cavalry in modern warfare are given throughout the ,lectures4 ,,mounted ,,rifles4--,the characteristics and methods of employment of mounted rifles are similar to those of cavalry1 with the exception that they are not equipped for mounted action4 ,mounted rifles1 like cavalry1 enable a commander to extend his attack or defence in a manner that is most bewildering to infantry1 and attempts by infantry to outflank a defending force of mounted rifles are generally frustrated by the mobility of the defending force1 as was exemplified in the ,south ,african ,war of #ahii-aijb4 ,,cyclists4--,under favourable conditions cyclists possess greater mobility than cavalry1 and they can develop greater fire-power1 as no horse-holders are required4 ,they are1 however1 dependent upon roads1 they are vulnerable on the move1 they cannot fight without dismounting1 and they must return to their bicycles after action2 whereas cavalry horse-holders can meet dismounted troopers at a prearranged spot4 ,,artillery ,the rle of artillery is to assist the other arms in breaking down opposition1 and to afford all possible #afi support to the infantry1 with whom the eventual decision rests 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 ,all classes of artillery are included in modern military operations4 ,motor traction enables the heaviest guns to be brought to the battlefield and to be removed when a commander decides to withdraw from battle1 while the increase in the defensive power of obstacles and small arms fire1 combined with the increase in mobility afforded by motor traction1 enables all but super-heavy artillery 7which require a railway mounting7 to be placed close behind the infantry in ,attack and ,defence4 ,it is1 however1 obvious that the closest support can be given by the guns that are weakest in shell-power1 on account of the superiority in mobility possessed by the lighter guns4 ,in ,modern ,warfare a great proportion of the work of artillery is carried out1 of necessity1 in the hours of darkness1 owing to the frequency of movement by night to avoid arial observation1 and to the consequent use of indirect artillery fire to inflict losses during such movements4 ,the artillery personnel therefore requires to be relieved with greater frequency than in the days before the use of aircraft4 ,the growth of artillery during the war was symbolical of the continual changes in the methods of warfare1 its numbers and power increasing out of all proportion to the experience of previous wars4 ,the #dhf pieces of light and medium artillery with which we took the field in ,august1 #aiad1 were represented at the date of the ,armistice by #f1dcg guns and howitzers of all natures1 including pieces of the heaviest calibre 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,from the commencement of our offensive in ,august1 #aiah1 to the conclusion of the ,armistice some #gjj1jjj tons of artillery ammunition were expended by the ,british ,armies on the ,western ,front4 ,for the fortnight from ,august #ba to ,september #c1 our daily average expenditure exceeded #agj #aa1jjj tons1 while for the three days of the crucial battle on ,september #bg1 #bh1 and #bi 7,second ,battle of ,cambrai7 nearly #fe1jjj tons of ammunition were fired by our artillery 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,in the ,table of ,artillery ,ranges on p4 #agc1 the effective ranges of light artillery firing ,h4,e4 shell are based on the use of ,no4 #ajf fuse4 ,the invention of a new fuse known as '#ajf1' which was first used at the ,battle of ,arras 7,april #i-;,june #g1 #aiag71 enabled wire entanglements to be easily and quickly destroyed1 and so modified our methods of attacking organised positions4 ,by bursting the shell the instant it touched the ground1 and before it had become buried1 the destructive effect of the explosion was greatly increased4 ,it became possible to cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition1 and the factor of surprise was given a larger part in operations 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,artillery is classed under the designations ,light1 ,medium1 ,heavy1 and ,super-,heavy4 ,,light ,,guns4--,pack ,guns1 with a calibre of #b4ge inches1 are weakest in shell-power1 but they possess a mobility greater than any other artillery and can be moved in country which would present insuperable obstacles to wheeled traffic4 ,pack ,howitzers1 with a calibre of #c4g inches1 are particularly valuable in close country1 the high angle of descent enabling the attack or defence to search the steepest cover4 ,horse ,artillery ,guns1 firing a #ac-pound shell1 are the most mobile of all wheeled artillery and are normally employed with mounted troops4 ,all ranks of the ,royal ,horse ,artillery are mounted1 and its mobility is scarcely less than that of cavalry4 ,field ,guns1 with a calibre of #c inches1 firing an #ah-pound shell1 are the principal artillery weapon of a field army4 ,although inferior in mobility to ,pack or ,horse ,artillery1 they have greater shell-power and afford the principal support to infantry in closing with or repelling the enemy4 ,their power to inflict casualties #aga by enfilade fire with shrapnel makes them specially suitable in the defence1 and the accuracy of modern weapons enables them to co-operate in the ,attack with covering fire1 under the protection of which infantry may advance unimpeded to the assault4 ,in addition to their normal functions1 and to their employment in counter-battery work1 they can be employed in the reduction of defences by bombardment with ,high ,explosive shells1 in neutralising an area by the use of gas shells1 or in providing artificial cover by the production of ,smoke4 ,field ,howitzers1 with a calibre of #d4e inches1 have increased offensive power and practically the same mobility as field guns4 ,light guns are the principal weapons for protection against ,aircraft and for defence against ,tanks4 ,the ,tank is powerless against artillery1 and its most effective enemy is light artillery4 ,during the ,first ,battle of the ,somme a new terror was added to the ,british attack by the introduction of the ,tank1 which surmounted inequalities in the ground1 crushed the wire defences1 and crossed the trenches4 ,although accompanied by infantry1 it was regarded as an all-conquering and decisive factor4 ,at one period of the battle1 however1 a number of ,tanks were placed out of action by a single field gun1 manned and fired with the greatest gallantry by a single ,german artillery officer1 who fired point-blank at each ,tank as it surmounted the crest of a rise4 ,infantry were in close support1 and a single ,lewis-gun section could have prevented the use of the field gun4 ,,medium ,,guns4--,medium guns1 firing a #fj-pound shell1 are principally employed in counter-battery work and in fulfilling the functions of #ah-pound field guns at a greater range and with greater force4 ,medium ,howitzers occupy the same relative position1 their offensive power being greater than that of the ,field ,howitzer4 #agb ,,heavy ,,guns4--,heavy guns of #f-;inch calibre1 firing a shell of #ajj pounds1 are used against targets beyond the range of light and medium guns1 and with greater effect4 ,heavy ,howitzers1 of #h-;inch or #i4b-;inch calibre1 are principally employed against covered batteries and strong defences1 or for destroying wire entanglements with instantaneous fuses4 ,,super-,,heavy ,,guns4--,super-heavy guns of a calibre of #i4b inches and upwards are usually carried on railway mountings1 and while they possess a high muzzle velocity1 considerable shell-power1 and a high degree of mobility 7which enables them to come into action in any part of the battlefield where suitable rails have been laid71 their arc of fire is very restricted and their life is short4 ,super-,heavy ,howitzers1 of #ab-;inch or #ah-;inch calibre1 possess similar advantages and disadvantages to super-heavy guns4 ,their normal use is the destruction of permanent defences1 the breaking down of bridges1 etc4 ,the #ab-;inch weapon is also used on tractor-drawn mountings and is highly effective in counter-battery work4 ,the table on p4 #agc is based upon particulars given on p4 #bf of ,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba74 ,,royal ,,engineers ,all arms are responsible for the construction of their own works of defence4 ,it is the duty of the ,royal ,engineers to assist them by engineer reconnaissances1 plans1 advice1 technical supervision1 provision of materials and the construction of works requiring special technical skill4 4 4 4 ,although trained as fighting troops1 engineers should be regarded as reserves to be used only as a last resource2 casualties in their ranks are not easy to replace1 and they may become needlessly involved in the fighting and lost for work which may have an important bearing on the operations 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 #agc ,,table ,,of ,,artillery ,,ranges ,weapon ,effective ,range 7,yds47 ,light ,artillery ,h4,e4 ,shell ,shrapnel ,pack ,guns 7#b4ge in47 #e1hjj #d1jjj ,pack ,howitzers 7#c4g in47 #e1ijj ,horse ,artillery ,guns 7#ac pr47 #h1ejj #e1jjj ,field ,guns 7#ah pr47 #i1ejj #e1ejj ,field ,howitzers 7#d4e in47 #g1jjj ,medium ,artillery ,medium ,guns 7#fj pr47 #ae1ejj -- ,medium ,howitzers 7#f in47 #aj1jjj ,heavy ,artillery ,heavy ,guns 7#f in47 #ai_/bj1jjj ,heavy ,howitzers 7#h in47 #ab1cjj -- 7#i4b in7 #ac1jjj ,super-,heavy ,artillery ,super-,heavy ,guns 7#i4b in47 #bd1ejj -- 7#ab in47 #bh1bjj -- 7#ad in47 #ce1fjj -- ,super-,heavy ,howitzers 7#ab in47 #ad1cjj 7#ah in7 #bc1jjj ,weapon ,maximum ,range 7,yds47 ,light ,artillery ,h4,e4 ,shell ,shrapnel ,pack ,guns 7#b4ge in47 #e1hjj #e1ejj ,pack ,howitzers 7#c4g in47 #e1ijj ,horse ,artillery ,guns 7#ac pr47 #h1ejj #f1djj ,field ,guns 7#ah pr47 #i1ejj #f1ejj ,field ,howitzers 7#d4e in47 #g1jjj ,medium ,artillery ,medium ,guns 7#fj pr47 #ae1ejj #ae1cjj ,medium ,howitzers 7#f in47 #aj1jjj ,heavy ,artillery ,heavy ,guns 7#f in47 #ai_/bj1jjj #ai_/bj1jjj ,heavy ,howitzers 7#h in47 #ab1cjj 7#i4b in7 #ac1jjj ,super-,heavy ,artillery ,super-,heavy ,guns 7#i4b in47 #bd1ejj #bd1ejj 7#ab in47 #bh1bjj #bf1ajj 7#ad in47 #ce1fjj -- ,super-,heavy ,howitzers 7#ab in47 #ad1cjj 7#ah in7 #bc1jjj ,the maximum range of ,medium ,mortars is #a1ejj yards2 of ,light ,mortars #gjj yards4 #agd ,,carey',s ,,force4--,during the ,second ,battle of the ,somme a mixed force1 including details1 stragglers1 schools personnel1 tunnelling companies1 army troops companies1 field survey companies1 and ,canadian and ,american ,engineers1 had been got together and organised by ,major-,gen4 ,p4 ,g4 ,grant1 the ,chief ,engineer to the ,v4 ,army4 ,on ,march #bf these were posted by ,general ,grant1 in accordance with orders given by the ,v4 ,army commander1 on the line of the old ,amiens defences between ,mezires1 ,marcelcave1 and ,hamel4 ,subsequently1 as ,general ,grant could ill be spared from his proper duties1 he was directed to hand over command of his force to ,major-,gen4 ,g4 ,g4 ,s4 ,carey4 ,except for ,general ,carey's force there were no reinforcements of any kind behind the divisions1 which had been fighting for the most part since the opening of the battle4 4 4 4 ,on ,march #bh our line from ,marcelcave to the ,somme was manned by ,carey's ,force1 with the #ast ,cavalry ,division in close support4 4 4 4 ,on ,march #bi the greater part of the ,british front south of the ,somme was held by ,carey's ,force1 assisted by the #ast ,cavalry ,division and such troops of the divisions originally engaged as it had not yet been found possible to withdraw4 ,in rear of these troops1 a few of the divisions of the ,v4 ,army were given a brief opportunity to reassemble 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,,tanks ,tanks are moving fortresses containing light artillery1 machine guns1 and rifles1 and while capable of inflicting heavy losses by fire they can also destroy obstacles1 weapons1 and personnel4 ,their garrisons are protected against the fire of small arms and from shrapnel bullets1 but they are very vulnerable to other forms of artillery fire4 ,their mobility and radius of action are governed by the amount of petrol carried and by the physical endurance of the crew1 but except over deep cuttings1 #age broad streams1 swamps1 very heavily shelled ground1 rocky and mountainous country1 or in thick woods they can move without difficulty4 ,the power of delivering successful surprise attacks against almost any type of defences is one of the most important advantages of the use of ,tanks in large numbers 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 ,during the ,first ,battle of the ,somme 7,september #a-,november #ah1 #aiaf7 ,our new heavily armoured cars1 known as ',tanks1' now brought into action for the first time1 successfully co-operated with the infantry1 and coming as a surprise to the enemy rank and file1 gave valuable help in breaking down their resistance4 4 4 4 ,these cars proved of great value on various occasions1 and the personnel in charge of them performed many deeds of remarkable valour 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,,aircraft ,two classes of ,aircraft are used in the field4 ,aeroplanes1 which are self-propelled and have an almost unlimited radius of action2 and ,kite ,balloons1 which1 in favourable weather1 can be towed by a lorry and can be moved frequently without loss of efficiency4 ,,aeroplanes are of the greatest value for reconnaissance and inter-communication1 and not only obtain1 and return to their base with1 information of the highest value1 but facilitate personal reconnaissance of the battlefield by commanders and staff officers4 ,their offensive and defensive action is also very great and the moral effect of their offensive action is of the highest value4 ,although aeroplane squadrons are mobile units they lose efficiency if the units are moved too frequently4 ,the action of aircraft in various phases of fighting is dealt with throughout the ,lectures4 ,,kite ,,balloons carry two observers1 who can remain in telephonic communication with the ground up to a #agf height of #e1jjj feet4 ,inflated balloons can be moved in favourable weather at a maximum speed of #h miles an hour while at a height of about #ejj feet4 ,their extreme vulnerability to artillery fire prevents their use close to the battle front4 ,,gas ,the advisability of employing gas as a military weapon is a matter for consideration by the authorities concerned before a campaign begins4 ,once authorised1 however1 and assuming that weather conditions are favourable1 gas may be expected to play a part in every action4 4 4 4 ,the different methods in which gas can be employed make it a weapon which can be used by all arms1 thus ,artillery deal with gas shells1 ,infantry with light mortar gas bombs1 ,aircraft with arial gas bombs1 and ,engineers with all methods of use that call for special manipulation 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 ,gas was introduced by the ,germans during the ,second ,battle of ,ypres 7,april #bb-,may #ah1 #aiae71 and the numerous experiments and trials necessary before gas can be used1 and the great preparations which have to be made for its manufacture1 show that its employment was not the result of a desperate decision1 but had been prepared for deliberately4 ,during the ,first ,battle of the ,somme 7,september #a-,november #ah1 #aiaf7 the employment by the enemy of gas and liquid flame as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways to protect our troops from their effects1 but also to devise means to make use of the same instruments of destruction4 4 4 4 ,since we have been compelled1 in self-defence1 to use similar methods1 it is satisfactory to be able to record1 on the evidence of prisoners1 of documents captured1 and of our own observation1 that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks1 while the means of protection adopted by us #agg have proved thoroughly effective 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 ,,smoke ,smoke can be discharged from ,artillery shells1 ,artillery or infantry mortar bombs1 ,infantry rifle grenades1 smoke candles1 ,aircraft bombs1 ,engineers' stationary generators1 or the exhaust pipe of ,tanks4 ,it is used to conceal movement for the purposes of surprise or for reducing casualties1 and can be so employed as to impose night conditions on the enemy while one's own troops retain the natural visibility2 but while the weight and direction of an intended blow may thus be hidden from the enemy a warning is given of the time of its delivery4 ,it is possible1 however1 to mystify1 as well as to surprise1 the enemy by the use of smoke1 and its strategical and tactical value will ensure its adoption in ,modern ,warfare4 ,in the closing battles of the ,great ,war the use of smoke shells for covering the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed with increasing frequency and effect 7,sir ,d4 ,haig's ,dispatches74 #agh ,,operation ,,orders ,combatant officers of every rank are required to issue orders of some kind or other1 and orders for operations should always be committed to paper when circumstances permit4 ,the object of an operation order is to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intentions of the commander1 and with full co-operation between all units4 ,operation orders of a complicated nature are unlikely to be required from the pen of infantry officers in the junior ranks1 and the rules for drafting orders are stated in detail in the official text-books1 for the use of officers of the ranks that will be required to issue them4 ,the general principles underlying orders of all kinds are that they should be fool proof1 and it has been remarked that the writer of orders should always remember that at least one silly ass will try to misunderstand them4 ,they must1 therefore1 be void of all ambiguity1 and while containing every essential piece of information1 and omitting everything that is clearly known already to the recipients1 they should be confined to facts1 and conjecture should be avoided4 ,an operation order must contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more4 ,it should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself1 and1 especially in the case of large forces1 will only enter into details when details are absolutely necessary4 ,any attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything which he1 with a fuller knowledge of local conditions1 should be better able to decide on the spot1 is likely to cramp his initiative in dealing with unforeseen developments1 and will be avoided4 ,in #agi particular1 such expressions as ',will await further orders' should be avoided 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 ,apart from the standing rules as to the printing of names of places in block type1 including a reference to the map used1 dating and signing the orders1 numbering the copies1 and stating the time and method of issue1 etc41 the general tenour of all operation orders will always be3 ,the enemy are4 4 4 4 ,my intention is4 4 4 4 ,you will4 4 4 4 ,in other words1 all that is known about the enemy1 and of our own troops1 that is essential for the purposes of the order1 should be revealed2 then the general intention of the commander who issues the orders2 then the part in the operations that is to be played by the recipient4 ,but the method of attaining the object will be left to the utmost extent possible to the recipient1 with due regard to his personal characteristics4 ,it is essential that subordinates should not only be able to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief orders or instructions1 but should also be able to take upon themselves1 whenever necessary1 the responsibility of departing from1 or of varying1 the orders they may have received 7,field ,service ,regulations1 vol4 ii4 7#aiba774 #aha ,,index ,active defence1 the1 #hf-ia ,adowa1 battle of1 7note7 #bb ,advanced guard1 the1 #ajb-aac distance1 #ajc information1 #ajg-ajh in advances1 #ajc in retreats1 #ajd-aje1 #abd main guard1 #aje-ajf ,nachod1 #gg night1 #ade problems1 #aaj-aac strategical1 #ajc strength of1 #ajb-ajc tactical1 #ajc tactics of1 #ajc-ajd1 #aje-aac training1 #aje vanguard1 #aje-ajf ,advances1 night1 #adg-adh ,advancing under fire1 #ci-dd ,arial observation1 7note7 #bb1 #ih-ii photographs1 #ii ,aircraft1 characteristics of1 #afi1 #aga1 #age-agf advanced guard1 #ajg communication by1 #cg1 #ajg1 #aae flank guard1 #aae gas1 #agf outposts1 #abi-acj1 #acg position warfare1 #ha-hb protection by1 #ha1 #ih-ii protection from1 #ajj pursuit by1 #fg1 #fi rear guard1 #bj1 #abj reconnaissance by1 #h1 #bf1 #cj1 #cf1 #ih-ii1 #ajj1 #ada smoke1 #agg ,alexander the ,great1 #cb ,allenby1 ,general ,viscount1 ,g4,c4,b41 #hg1 #if ,america and the ,great ,war1 #ag ,american attack at ,fossoy1 #di ,american ,civil ,war1 #c1 #hb 7,see also ,battles by name47 ,amiens1 battle of1 #ba1 #eb1 #ff ,antietam1 battle of1 #ad1 #ae1 #dh ,appomattox1 battle of1 #ae1 #fd ,appreciation of the ,situation1 #gb ,arabi ,pasha1 #aea ,arbela1 battle of1 #cb ,archangel ,province1 #ff-fg ,archduke ,charles1 #abh ,argyll and ,sutherland ,highlanders1 #db-dc ,armandvillers-,folie1 #fc ,armies1 the new1 #ai-bb ,arminius1 victory of1 #aef-aeg ,armistice ,day1 #aiah1 #fe ,army1 ,contemptible ,little1 #ah-ai of ,north ,virginia1 #be1 #fe-ff of the ,cumberland1 #ae of the ,potomac1 #c1 #ad-ae1 #be ,arras1 battle of1 #agj ,art of warfare1 #a-e ,artillery1 characteristics of1 #afh-agc barrage1 #ga development of1 #ba-bb effective range1 #acb escorts1 #fc-fd gas shells1 #agf growth of1 #afi-agj heavy1 #agb1 #agc in attack1 #fb-fd1 in defence1 #hc1 #hi in retreat1 #abj1 #abc light1 #agj-aga medium1 #aga mobility of1 #fc-fd outpost1 #aca1 #acd pack1 #agj positions1 #id ranges1 #agc smoke shells1 #agg super-heavy1 #agb1 #agc ,ashby1 ,gen4 ,turner1 ,c4,s4,a41 #aag ,assaults by night1 #adh-aed ,assembly1 position of1 #eh-ei1 #adg ,attack1 the1 #ea-ge aircraft in1 #fg artillery in1 #fb-fd battalion in1 #gc-ge cavalry1 #fd-fg close country1 #aee-aef company in1 #gb-gc co-operation1 #be-bf1 #ce-cg1 #ci decisive1 #ef-eg1 #fj-fb disposition of troops1 #ee engineers1 #fg fire1 #fb flank1 #fa formation for1 #gj-ge forward body1 #ee-ef frontal1 #fj-fa general reserve1 #ef-eg holding1 #ab1 #cj1 #dh1 #ei1 #fb1 #gf1 #ie1 #aag local reserve1 #ee-ef medical arrangements1 #fg methods of1 #ec opening fire1 #cg-ch platoon in1 #gj-gb reconnaissance for1 #ada-adb smoke1 #agg strength of1 #ed-ee supply1 #fg-fh supports1 #ee-ef two plans of1 #ed villages1 #afb woods1 #aei-afa ,attacking force1 the1 #ei-fj ,austerlitz1 battle of1 #i-aj1 #dg1 #gf ,australians at ,morlancourt1 #adi ,avenues1 communicating1 #adc ,baccarat1 battle of1 #bh ,bagdadieh1 battle of1 #fd-fe ,balaclava ,charge1 #if ,balloons1 observation by1 #bb1 #age-agf ,banks1 ,gen41 ,u4,s4,a41 #ei ,bapaume1 battle of1 #ba ,barrage1 the1 #ga ,base1 the1 #ij1 #aah ,battalion in attack1 #gc-ge ,battle1 the1 #bd-ej characteristics of1 #bd-bf decisive blow1 #ca-cb development of the1 #bi-ca influences on the1 #cc-dd information1 #bf-bh initiative1 #bf-bh outposts1 #ach-adj phases of the1 #bf-bi position1 the1 #hd-he reports1 #fh the defensive1 #de-df the defensive-offensive1 #dg-di the encounter1 #eh the offensive1 #df-dg types of1 #de-ej ,bavaria1 ,elector of1 #df ,bayonet1 the1 #afd-afe in night operations1 #aed ,bazaine1 ,marchal1 #aeh ,bazeilles1 defence of1 #aei ,benedek1 ,marshal1 #if ,bernadotte1 ,marshal1 #aj ,blenheim1 battle of1 #df-dg ,blcher1 ,marshal1 #h1 #da1 #dh1 #gh ,bluff1 the 7,ypres71 #ci ,boer ,war1 7note7 #ba ,bois de ,vaux1 #aeh ,bombs1 light mortar1 #aff-afg 7,see also ,grenades47 ,border ,regiment1 #ge ,bourlon ,village1 #db ,bristow ,station1 #abh ,british efforts1 #aiad-aiah1 #af-ag moral1 #af-bb ,broenbeek1 #aci ,bromhead1 ,lieut41 #gg ,blow1 ,general von1 #gh ,bunker ,hill1 battle of1 #ch ,burnside1 ,gen41 ,u4,s4,a41 #ad1 #df1 #ajh1 #aci-adj ,byng of ,vimy1 ,gen4 ,lord1 ,g4,c4,b41 #g1 #eb ,cambrai1 first battle of1 #g1 #cj-ca1 #eb1 #ff1 #ge1 #afj second battle of1 #ba1 #agj ,camouflage1 #ajj ,canadian cavalry1 #ff engineers1 #agd infantry at ,vimy1 #adi ,canadians at ,ypres1 #db ,cannae1 battle of1 #ad ,carey1 ,maj4-,gen4 ,g4 ,g4 ,s41 ,c4,b41 #agd ,carey's force1 #agd ,cattigny ,wood1 #ff ,cavalry1 characteristics of1 #afg-afh cossack posts1 #acg in attack1 #fd-fg in defence1 #ie-if in pursuit1 #fd-fe1 #fi in retreat1 #ie-if1 #abj1 #abc-abd ,mesopotamian campaign1 #fd-fe outposts1 #acg protection by1 #ih-ii1 #aaj raids by1 #aag-aah reconnaissance by1 #h1 #bf1 #cb1 #fe-ff1 #ajf1 #aab-aac vedettes1 #acg ,cetewayo1 #gg-gh ,chambord1 ,chateau de1 #ach ,chancellorsville1 battle of1 #ab1 #cj1 #dh1 #gf1 #ie1 #aag ,changes in warfare1 #ba-bc ,characteristics of the various arms1 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