,transcriber's ,note3 ,words in ,greek in the original are transliterated and placed between plus signs4 ,words italicized in the original are surrounded by underscores4 ,characters superscripted in the original are inclosed in brackets4 ,,essays ,,towards ,a ,,theory ,,of ,,knowledge ,rosalind3 ,i pray you1 what is't o'clock8 ,orlando3 ,you should ask me1 what time o' day2 there's no clock in the forest4 ,as ,you ,like ,it1 ,act ,,iii4 ,sc4 #b4 ,,essays ,,towards ,a ,,theory ,,of ,,knowledge ,,by ,,alexander ,,philip ,f4,r4,s4,e ,illustration ,,london ,,george ,,routledge ,,sons ,,limited ,,new ,,york3 ,e4 ,p4 ,,dutton ,,co4 #aiae he gar achromatos te kai aschematistos kai anaphes ousia ontos ousa psyches kybernete monoi theatei no1 peri hen to tes alethous epistemes genos1 touton echei ton topon4--,,phaedrus4 ,,preface ,two years ago1 in the preface to another essay1 the present writer ventured to affirm that ,civilisation moves rather towards a chaos than towards a cosmos4 ,but he could not foretell that the descensus ,averni would be so alarmingly rapid4 ,when we find ,science1 which has done so much and promised so much for the happiness of mankind1 devoting so large a proportion of its resources to the destruction of human life1 we are prone to ask despairingly--,is this the end8 ,if not2 how are we to discover and assure for stricken ,humanity the vision and the possession of a ,better ,land8 ,not certainly by the ostentatious building of peace-palaces nor even by the actual accomplishment of successful war4 ,only by the discovery of true first principles of ,thought and ,action can ,humanity be redeemed4 ,undeterred by the confused tumult of to-day we must still seek a true understanding of what knowledge is--what are its powers and what also are its limitations4 ,nor may we forget that other principle of life--with which it is so quaintly contrasted in ,lord ,bacon's translation of the ,pauline aphorism--,knowledge bloweth up1 ,charity buildeth up4 ,january #aiae4 ,,contents ,,page ,i ,,time ,,and ,,periodicity #aa ,,ii ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,physical ,,concepts #ag ,,iii ,,the ,,two ,,typical ,,theories ,,of ,,knowledge #cf ,,iv ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,energy #ha ,,essays ,,towards ,a ,,theory ,,of ,,knowledge ,i ,,time ,,and ,,periodicity ,we can measure ,time in one way only--by counting repeated motions4 ,apart from the operation of the physical ,law of ,periodicity we should have no natural measures of ,time4 ,if that statement be true it follows that apart from the operation of this law we could not attain to any knowledge of ,time4#aa3a ,perhaps this latter proposition may not at first be readily granted4 ,few1 probably1 would hesitate to admit that in a condition in which our experience was a complete blank we should be unable to acquire any knowledge of ,time2 but it may not be quite so evident that in a condition in which experience consisted of a multifarious but never repeated succession of impressions the ,knowledge of ,time would be equally awanting4#ab3a ,yet so it is4 ,the operation of the ,law of ,periodicity is necessary to the measurement of ,time4 ,it is by means1 and only by means1 of periodic pulsative movements that we ever do or can measure ,time4 ,now1 apart from some sort of measurement ,time would be unknowable4 ,a time which was neither long nor short would be meaningless4 ,the idea of unquantified ,time cannot be conceived or apprehended4 ,time to be known must be measured4 ,periodicity1 therefore1 is essential to our ,knowledge of ,time4 ,but ,nature amply supplies us with this necessary instrument4 ,the ,law of ,periodicity prevails widely throughout ,nature4 ,it absolutely dominates ,life4 ,the centre of animal vitality is to be found in the beating heart and breathing lungs4 ,pulsation qualifies not merely the nutrient life but the musculo-motor activity as well4 ,eating1 ,walking1--all our most elementary movements are pulsatory4 ,we wake and sleep1 we grow weary and rest4 ,we are born and we die1 we are young and grow old4 ,all animal life is determined by this ,law4 ,periodicity--generally at a longer interval of pulsation--equally affects the vegetal forms of life4 ,the plant is sown1 grows1 flowers1 and fades4 ,periodicity is to us less obvious in the inanimate world of molecular changes2 yet it is in operation even there4 ,but it is more especially in the natural motions of those so-called material masses which constitute our physical environment that ,periodicity most eminently prevails4 ,indeed it was by astronomers that the operation of this ,law was first definitely recognised and recorded4 ,periodicity is the scientific name for the ,harmony of the ,spheres4 ,the two periodic motions which most essentially affect and concern us human beings are necessarily the two periodic motions of the globe which we inhabit--its rotation upon its axis which gives us the alternation of ,day and ,night1 and its revolution round the ,sun which gives us the year with its ,seasons4 ,to the former of these1 animal life seems most directly related2 to the latter1 the life of the vegetal orders4 ,it is evident that the forms of animal life on the globe are necessarily determined by the periodic law of the ,earth's diurnal rotation4 ,this accounts for the alternations of waking and sleeping1 working and resting1 and so forth4 ,in like manner the more inert vitality of the vegetable kingdom is determined by the periodic law of the ,earth's annual revolution4 ,when fanciful speculators seek to imagine what kind of living beings might be encountered on the other planets of our system1 they usually make calculations as to the force of gravity on the surface of these planets and conjure up from such data the possible size of the inhabitants1 their relative strength and agility of movement1 etc4 ,so far so good4 ,but the first question we should ask1 before proceeding to our speculative synthesis1 should rather be the length of the planet's diurnal rotation and annual revolution periods4 ,certain planets1 such as ,mars and ,venus1 have rotation periods not very different from those of our own ,earth4#ad3a ,other things being equal1 therefore1 a certain similarity of animal life must be supposed possible on these planets4 ,on the other hand1 the marked difference in their revolution period would lead us to expect a very wide divergence between their lower forms of life1 if any such there be1 and our own terrestrial vegetation4 ,the shorter the annual period the more would the vegetal approximate to the animal1 and vice versa4 ,it would1 however1 be foolish to waste more time over a speculation so remote4 ,but these two facts remain unshaken3--7#a7 ,that our measurements and whole science of ,time depend absolutely on the operation throughout ,nature of the ,law of ,periodicity1 and 7#b7 that the periodicities which affect and determine animal and vegetal life upon our ,earth are the periodic movements of rotation and revolution of that ,earth itself4 ,now it is to the curvilinear motions of the heavenly bodies that we must ascribe our subjection to the periodic law4 ,if these heavenly bodies moved for ever in straight lines1 as they would do if unacted on by natural forces1 the periodic rhythm of ,nature would disappear4 ,it is to the fact that all ,nature is under the constraint due to the constant silent operation of physical ,force that we owe1 therefore1 the law which determines the most essential features of vitality4 ,the pulsations in which life consists and by which it is sustained are attributable to the constraint and limitation which we recognise as the effect of the operation of ,natural ,force4 ,it is to this same cause that we ascribe the resistance of cohering masses in virtue of which sensation arises and by which our experience is punctuated4 ,it is by means of these obstructions to free activity that our experience is denoted1 and by reference to these that it is cognised4 ,indeed1 ,activity itself as we know it depends upon and presupposes the existence of these cohering masses4 ,thus the operation of ,natural ,force and the constraint and limitation which are thereby imposed upon our activity appear at once to determine the conditions of life and to furnish the fundamental implements of ,knowledge4 ,we cannot overleap the barriers by which ,life is constrained4 ,these1 whilst1 on the one hand they seem to create the environment which sustains ,life1 on the other hand seem to impose upon it the limitations under which it inevitably fails and dies4 ,we cannot even in imagination conceive1 either as reality or as fancy1 the illimitable puissance of a ,life perfectly free and unrestrained4 ,yet the assurance that ,perfect ,love could overcome the bonds of ,materiality and ,death encourages in mankind the ,hope of an existence beyond the impenetrable veil of physical limitation4 ,and this at any rate may be admitted1 namely1 that that dynamic condition in which materiality arises is also the condition-precedent of ,tridimensionality1 of ,force1 of ,time1 and of ,mutation4 ,but we cannot thus account for the elan vital itself4 ,,footnotes3 #aa3a ,plato in the dialogue ,timaeus tells us that ,time was born with the ,heavens1 and that ,sun1 ,moon1 and ,planets were created in order that ,time might be4 #ab3a ,this might be contrasted with the statement of ,m4 ,bergson who tells us 7,evolution creatrice1 p4 #aa73 ,plus nous approfondirons la nature du temps plus nous comprendrons que duree signifie invention1 creation de formes1 elaboration continue de l'absolument nouveau4 #ad3a ,recently1 we believe1 astronomers have favoured the view that the day of ,venus is equal in length to her year4 ,,ii ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,physical ,,concepts ,penser c'est sentir1 said ,condillac4 ,it is evident1 said ,bishop ,berkeley1 to one who takes a survey of the objects of ,human ,knowledge that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the ,mind1 or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination either combining1 dividing1 or barely representing those originally perceived in the foresaid ways4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill tells us1 ,the points1 lines1 circles1 and squares which one has in his mind are1 ,i apprehend1 simply copies of points1 lines1 circles1 and squares which he has known in his experience1 and again1 ,the character of necessity ascribed to the truths of ,mathematics and even1 with some reservations to be hereafter made1 the peculiar certainty attributed to them is an illusion4 ,in the case of the definitions of ,geometry there exist no real things exactly conformable to the definitions4 ,again ,taine1 ,les images sont les exactes reproductions de la sensation4 ,again ,diderot1 ,pour imaginer il faut colorer un fond et detacher de ce fait des points en leur supposant une couleur differente de celle du fond4 ,restituez a ces points la meme couleur qu'au fond1--a l'instant ils se confondent avec lui et la figure disparait1 etc4 ,again1 ,dr4 ,ernest ,mach1 ,vienna1 remarks1 ,we are aware of but one species of elements of ,consciousness3 sensations4 ,in our perceptions of ,space we are dependent on sensations4 ,dr4 ,mach repeatedly refers to space-sensations1 and indeed affirms that all sensation is spatial in character4#ah3a ,according to the view of ,knowledge of which we have extracted examples above1 the ideas of the mind are originally furnished to it by sensation1 from which therefore are derived1 not necessarily all our ,thoughts1 but all the materials of ,discourse1 all that constitutes the essence of ,knowledge4 ,our purpose at the moment is to show that this view is altogether false1 and our counter proposition is1 that it is from our ,activity that we derive our fundamental conceptions of the external world2 that sensations only mark the interruptions in the dynamic ,activity in which we as potent beings partake1 and that they serve therefore to denote and distinguish our ,experience1 but do not constitute its essence4 ,we do not propose now to devote any time to the work of showing that sensations from their very nature could never become the instruments of ,knowledge4 ,we propose rather to turn to the principal ideas of the external world which are the common equipment of the ,mind in order to ascertain whether in point of fact they are derived from ,sensation4 ,of course to some extent the answer depends on what we mean by ,sensation4 ,if by that term we intend our whole ,experience of the external1 then of course it necessarily follows--or1 at least1 we admit--that our ,knowledge of the external must be thence derived4 ,but such a use of the term is loose1 misleading1 and infrequent4 ,the only safe course is to confine the term ,sensation to the immediate data of the five senses--touch1 sight1 hearing1 smell1 and taste1 with probably the addition of muscular and other internal feelings4 ,it is in this sense that the word is usually employed1 and has been employed by the ,sensationalist ,school themselves4 ,now we might perhaps begin by taking the idea of ,time as a concept constantly employed in ,discourse1 but of which it would be absurd to suggest that it is supplied to us by ,sensation4 ,it might1 however1 be urged in reply that the idea of ,time is not derived from the external world at all1 but is furnished to us directly by the operations of the ,mind1 and that therefore its intellectual origin need not involve any exception to the general rule that the materials of our ,knowledge of the world are furnished by ,sensation alone4 ,without1 therefore1 entering upon any discussion of the interesting question as to what is the real nature of ,time1 we shall pass to the idea of ,space4 ,mach1 the writer whom we have already quoted1 in his essay on ,space and ,geometry speaks constantly and freely of sensations of ,space1 and as there can be no denial of the fact that ,space is a constituent of the external world1 it would seem to follow that those who hold ,sensation to be the only source of our ,knowledge must be obliged to affirm the possibility of sensations of ,space4 ,mach indeed claims to distinguish physiological ,space1 geometrical ,space1 visual ,space1 tactual ,space as all different and yet apparently harmoniously blended in our ,experience4 ,he is1 however1 sadly wanting in clearness of statement4 ,he never tells us when and where exactly we do have a sensation of ,space4 ,in truth he never gets behind the postulate of an all-enveloping tridimensional world2 so that he throughout assumes ,space as a datum1 and his inquiry is an effort to rediscover ,space where he has already placed it4 ,let us1 however1 consider for a moment what can be meant by a sensation of ,space4 ,does it not look very like a contradiction in terms8 ,pure ,space1 if it means anything1 means absolute material emptiness and vacuity4 ,how1 then1 by any possibility can it give rise to a sensation8 ,what sensory organ can it be conceived as affecting8 ,how and in what way can it be felt8 ,the truth is the idea of ,space is essentially negative4 ,it represents absence of physical obstruction of every kind4 ,no doubt1 we may describe it positively as a possibility of free movement1 and such a description is at once true and important4 ,yet even it involves a negative4 ,the term free is in reality1 though not in form1 a negative term and means unconstrained4 ,and the reason why such a term is necessarily negative is to be found in the fact that a state of dynamic constraint is the essential condition under which we enter upon our organic existence4 ,freedom is a negation of the ,actual4 ,absolute freedom is a condition only theoretically possible1 and is essentially the negation of the state of restraint in which our life is maintained4 ,but the definition last quoted is nevertheless valuable because it clearly shows what really is the origin of the idea of ,space4 ,it proves that the idea of ,space is a representation of one condition of our ,activity4 ,it is because the primary work of ,thought is to represent the forms of our dynamic ,activity that we find the idea of ,space so necessary and fundamental4 ,but it will perhaps be argued that our ordinary sensations carry with them a spatial meaning and implication1 and that indirectly1 therefore1 our sensations do supply us with the idea of ,space4 ,it will readily be agreed that if this is so of any sensations it is pre-eminently true of the sensations of vision and touch4 ,indeed1 it will perhaps not be disputed that the ordinary vident man derives from the sensations of vision his most common spatial conceptions4 ,we propose1 therefore1 to inquire very briefly how the character of spatial extension becomes associated with the data of ,vision4 ,the objects of ,vision appear to be displayed before us in immense multitude1 each distinct from its adjacent neighbour1 yet all inter-related as parts of one single whole--the presentation thus constituting what is called ,extensity4 ,this is the most commonly employed meaning of the term spatial4 ,yet it is evidently in its origin rather temporal than spatial4 ,in ordinary movement we encounter by touch various obstacles1 but only a very few of these impress us at any one moment of time4 ,on the contrary1 they succeed one after the other4 ,to the blind1 therefore1 as ,platner long ago remarked3 ,time serves instead of ,space4 ,in ,vision1 on the other hand1 a large number1 which it would take a very long time to encounter in touch1 are presented simultaneously4 ,in this there is an immense practical advantage1 the result being that we come habitually to direct our every action by reference to the data of ,sight4 ,now it is because these data--so simultaneously presented--are employed by us as the guides of action that their presentation acquires the character which we denominate ,extensity4 ,the simultaneous occurrence of a large number of ,sounds does not seem to us to present such a character4 ,but let us suppose that all the objects which constitute obstacles to our ,activity emitted ,sounds by which they were recognised2 it is not doubtful that these would then come to be employed by us as the guides of our ,activity and would acquire in our minds the character of ,extensity4 ,they would arrange themselves in a cotemporaneous1 extensive1 or spatial relation to one another just as the objects of ,vision do at present4 ,it is only1 therefore1 when we come to employ the simultaneous presentation of ,vision as the instrument of our ,activity and the guide of ,action that it acquires the character commonly called extensive4 ,successive visual sensations convey no extensive suggestion4 ,it is important to realise the nature of this peculiar feature in the data of ,vision4 ,the sounds which we hear1 the odours which we smell1 are the immediate result of certain undulations affecting the appropriate organ of sensation4 ,we refer these to the object in which the undulations originate4 ,in like manner a light which we see is referred to its objective luminous source4 ,but light also and in addition is reflected from1 and thus reveals the presence of the whole body of our resistant environment4 ,hence is derived the coloured presentation of ,vision to which the character of extensity attaches4 ,nothing similar takes place in the case of the other distantial sensations4 ,if sonorous undulations excited vibration in every resistant object of the environment they would undoubtedly come to arrange themselves in an order resembling the extensity suggested by ,vision1 though the slower rate of transmission of sound would detract from the practical simultaneity in the effect which1 as we have seen1 largely accounts for the perception of visual extensity4 ,the universal diffusion of sunlight is also a determining factor4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the matter becomes still clearer when we contrast the experience of vident men with what we have been able to learn of the experiences of the blind4 ,nowhere have we found this aspect of the question discussed with the same clearness and ability as by ,m4 ,pierre ,villey in his recently published essay1 ,le ,monde des ,aveugles--,part ,,iii4 ,the blind man1 as he remarks1 requires representations in order to command his movements4 ,we must then penetrate the mind of the blind and ascertain what are his representations4 ,are they1 he asks1 muscular images combined by temporal relations1 or are they images of a spatial order8 ,he replies without hesitation3 ,both1 but1 above all1 spatial images4 ,it is clear1 he says1 that the modalities of the action of the blind are explained by spatial representations4 ,these must be derived from touch4 ,what1 then1 can be the spatial representations which arise from touch8 ,the blind1 he says1 are often asked1 ,how do you figure to yourself such and such an object1 a chair1 a table1 a triangle8 ,m4 ,villey quotes ,diderot as affirming that the blind cannot imagine4 ,according to ,diderot1 images require colour1 and colour being totally wanting to the blind the nature of their imagination was to him inconceivable4 ,the common opinion1 says ,m4 ,villey1 is entirely with ,diderot4 ,it does not believe that the blind can have images of the objects around him4 ,the photographic apparatus is awanting and the photograph cannot therefore be there4 ,diderot was a sensationalist4 ,for this school1 as ,villey remarks1 l'image est le decalque de la sensation1 and he refers not merely to ,condillac the friend of ,diderot but to his continuator ,taine whose dictum we have already quoted4 ,diderot attempts to solve the problem by maintaining that tactual sensations occupy an extended space which the blind in thought can add to or contract1 and in this way equip himself with spatial conceptions4 ,there would1 on this view1 as ,m4 ,villey remarks1 be a complete heterogeneity between the imagination of the blind and that of the vident4 ,m4 ,villey denies this altogether4 ,he affirms that the image of an object which the blind acquires by touch readily divests itself of the characters of tactual sensation and differs profoundly from these4 ,he takes the example of a chair4 ,the vident apprehends its various features simultaneously and at once2 the blind1 by successive tactual palpations4 ,but he maintains that the evidence of the blind is unanimous on this point1 that once formed in the mind the idea of the chair presents itself to him immediately as a whole1--the order in which its features were ascertained is not preserved1 and does not require to be repeated4 ,indeed1 the idea divests itself of the great bulk of the tactual details by which it was apprehended1 whilst the muscular sensations which accompanied the act of palpation never seek to be joined with the idea4 ,this divestiture of sensation proceeds to such an extent that there is nothing left beyond what ,m4 ,villey calls the pure form4 ,the belief in the reality of the object he refers to its resistance4 ,the origin of each of these is exertional4 ,the features upon which the mind dwells1 if it dwells upon them at all1 are les qualites qui sont constamment utiles pour la pratique--in a word1 the dynamic significance of the thing4 ,we may remark that much the same is true of the ideas of the vident4 ,in ordinary ,discourse we freely employ our ideas of external objects without ever attempting a detailed reproduction of the visual image4 ,such a reproduction would be both impracticable and unnecessary1 and would involve such a sacrifice of time as to render ,discourse altogether impossible4 ,all that the ,mind of the vident ordinarily grasps and utilises in his discursive employment of the idea of any physical thing is what we have ventured to call its dynamic significance4 ,and the very careful analysis which ,m4 ,villey has made of the mental conceptions of the blind clearly shows that in their case he has reached exactly the same conclusion4 ,our fundamental conceptions of the external world are therefore derived from and are built up out of the data of our exertional ,activity combined with the interruptions which that ,activity perpetually encounters1 and in which sensations arise4 ,it would indeed be a useful work of psychological analysis if the conditions of exertional action were carefully and systematically investigated--much more useful than most of the trifling experiments to which psychological laboratories are usually devoted4 ,the principal elements of such a scheme would be-- 7#a7 ,the force of gravity4 ,this force constantly operating constrains the organism to be in constant contact with the earth on which we live4 ,but1 further1 it gives us the definite idea of ,direction4 ,it is from the action of gravity that we derive our distinction between ,up and ,down from which as a starting-point we build up our conception of tridimensional ,space4 ,and in this respect it must be remembered that as the areas of spheres are proportional to the squares of their radii it necessarily follows that gravity if it acts uniformly in tridimensional ,space must vary in intensity in proportion to the square of the distance of the point of application from the centre of origin4 ,gravity and tridimensionality are in short necessarily connected4 7#b7 ,the same law which determines the force of gravity seems to determine also the force of cohesion1 and therefore the form of material bodies4 ,these1 therefore1 are necessarily subject also to tridimensionality1 and in the force which generates solid form we find a second source of our elementary spatial ideas4 ,such form is the expression of an obstacle to action which determines all our movements1 and in which we discover those forms of the limitations of activity which we call spatial characters4 7#c7 ,organic ,dualism is a third determinant of activity1 and thus also a source of spatial ideas4 ,the structural dualism of the human body1 its right and left1 its front and back1 etc41 furnish our activity with a set of constant forms to which its action must conform1 and which necessarily also partake of1 and help us to conceive of tridimensional form4 ,it is interesting to note that this dualism characterises the organs specially adapted to serve exertional action rather than those which serve our vegetal or nutrient life4 ,the way in which our spatial conceptions are ever extended and built up out of the data of action is also well illustrated in the case of the blind1 and to this also ,m4 ,villey devotes an interesting chapter under the title ,la conquete des representations spatiales4 ,this is effected in their case by the high development of what we must call active touch4 ,just as we distinguish between hearing and listening1 between seeing and looking1 so must we distinguish between touching and palpation4 ,mere passive touch gives a certain amount of information1 but comparatively little4 ,it is necessary to explore2 that is what is done in active touch--palpation--of different degrees4 ,the sensitiveness of the skin varies at different places from the tongue downwards4 ,palpation by the fingers marks a further stage4 ,the blind also1 we are told1 largely employ the feet in walking as a source of locative data4 ,to the concepts reached by such palpation with the hand1 ,m4 ,villey gives the name of ,manual ,space4 ,in this connection he thinks it necessary to distinguish between synthetic touch and analytic touch--the former resulting from the simultaneous application of different parts of the hand on the surface of a body1 the latter that which we owe to the movements of our fingers when having only one point of contact with the object the fingers follow its contour4 ,various examples of the delicacy of the information thus obtainable are given4 ,following two straight lines with the thumb and index respectively1 a blind man can acquire by practice a sensibility so complete as to enable him to detect the slightest divergence from parallelism4 ,the analysis passes on from the data of ,space manual to those of ,space brachial2 then to the information derived from walking and other movements of the lower limbs1 and then to the co-ordination of the information derived from the sensations of hearing1 which is necessarily very important to the blind4 ,the conclusion of the whole matter is that our principal spatial ideas are common alike to the blind and the vident4 ,both can be taught and are taught the same geometry4 ,both understand one another in the description of spatial conditions4 ,the common element cannot possibly be supplied either by the data of visual sensation which the blind do not possess1 or by the data of passive tactual sensation which the vident hardly ever employ4 ,une etendue commune se retrouverait a la fois dans les donnees de la vue et dans celles du toucher4 ,the common element is furnished by the common laws and forms of our exertional ,activity by means of which and in terms of which we all construct our conceptions of the dynamic world of our environment4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it is from our dynamic ,activity also that we derive our conception of ,force4 ,force1 though it is studied scientifically in the measurement of the great natural forces which operate constantly1 is originally known to us in the stress or pressure to which muscular exertion in contact with a material body gives rise4 ,such a force if it could be correctly measured1 would record the rate at which ,energy was undergoing transmutation1 and it is from such experience of pressure that our idea of ,force is originally derived4 ,the mass of bodies is usually measured by their weight1 i4e4 by gravity4 ,its absolute measurement must be in terms of momentum4 ,the true estimate of the ,energy of a body moving under the impulse of a constant ,force is stated in the formula #a_/b,,mv#b4 ,to ascertain ,m1 therefore1 we must have given ,f and ,v1 and these are both conceptions the original idea of which is derived from our exertional activity4 ,quantity of ,matter originally means the same as amount of resistance to initiation of motion1 at first estimated by the varying amount of personal muscular energy required to effect the motion in question1 thereafter objectively and scientifically by comparison with some independent standard whereby a more exact estimation can be attained than was possible by a mere reference to the varying inferences of the individual who might exert the force4 ,space1 ,mass1 ,force are all therefore ideas which are furnished to us out of our experience as potent actors1 and the recognition of this great truth provides us with the means of clearly apprehending and co-relating our conceptions of the external world1 the framework of our ,knowledge4 ,the true distinction between a percept and a concept is just that a percept is a concept associated with the dynamic system discovered in and by our exertional activity4 ,in like manner we find here the true solution of the many questions which have been raised as to the distinction between general and abstract1 singular and concrete terms4 ,language expresses action3 the roots of language are expressions of the elementary acts which make up experience4 ,they are therefore general4 ,each applies to every act of the class in question4 ,they are also concrete4 ,that is so because they refer to exertional activities4 ,abstract terms are terms abstracted from this dynamic reference4 ,thus white is concrete because colour is a property of the dynamic world4 ,but when this property is considered apart from its dynamic support it is called whiteness1 and becomes abstract4 ,in the case of purely mental qualities the term is regarded as abstract simply because the quality is in every reference extra dynamic4 ,thus candour1 justice are called abstract terms2 they are properties of the ,mind4 ,but a property of the dynamic system1 e4g4 ,gravitation1 does not strike us as abstract--the sole distinction being the dynamic reference which the latter term implies4 ,it will even be seen that there is sometimes a shading off of abstract quality4 ,thus ,justice as an attribute of the ,mind strikes us as a purely abstract term4 ,but as the word takes up a dynamic reference so does its abstraction diminish4 ,thus in the expression ,administration of ,justice the abstractive suggestion is less pronounced2 till in the person of ,justice ,shallow it vanishes in the very concrete4 ,behind and beneath all these considerations we should never lose sight of the great main facts--that thought is an activity2 that its function therefore is to represent or reproduce our pure exertional activity2 that such representation is at the basis of all our concepts of externality2 that sensation1 per se is mere interruption of activity2 that per se it possesses no spatial or extensive or external suggestiveness2 that sensations nevertheless serve to denote or give feature and particularity to our experience of activity2 that all perception of the external is at bottom therefore a mental representation of exertional activity and its forms1 denoted1 punctuated1 identified by sensation1 which latter by itself1 we repeat1 carries no suggestion of externality4 ,this view revolutionises the whole psychology of ,perception1 and therefore1 though it at once gives to that science a much-needed unity1 clarity1 and simplicity1 it will naturally be accepted with reluctance by the laborious authors of the cumbrous theories still generally current4 ,,footnotes3 #ah3a ,his reason is that we ab origine localise sensations with reference to our organism4 ,this1 of course1 means by reference to the system of potent energy in which our organism essentially consists4 ,,iii ,,the ,,two ,,typical ,,theories ,,of ,,knowledge ,the evolution of living organisms is in general a gradual and continuous process4 ,but it is nevertheless true that it presents well-marked stages and can best be described by reference to these4 ,frequently1 moreover1 the meaning and true nature of the movement at one stage is only revealed after a subsequent stage has been reached4 ,the development of a brain or cerebrum marks one important advance4 ,the presence of this organ renders possible to the animal in varying degree what are called representations of objects1 and the faculty of making such representations appears to be a condition precedent to the development of deliberation1 volition1 and purposive action as opposed to reflex or instinctive activity4 ,the latter is specially characteristic of other orders of organic existence such as the ,articulata--being remarkably exemplified in the activities of the social insects such as the bee4 ,the advent of man with his faculty of ,discourse may be regarded as marking another distinct stage in the evolutionary movement--a stage1 moreover1 the operations of which throw light upon the whole nature of cerebral representations4 ,the faculty of rational ,discourse1 as ,max ,mueller pointed out1 is denominated in ,greek by the word logos1 applicable at once to the mental activity and to its appropriate expression in speech4 ,discourse is an instrument by means of which man has been enabled to construct his whole system of representations of the world in which he lives1 the system of what is commonly called his ,knowledge4 ,human ,knowledge just is the body of man's representations of his ,experience in the world of which he forms a part4 ,it is not necessary to insist here on the gradual but remarkable growth and extension which ,human ,knowledge has undergone during the last two thousand years4 ,concurrently with its extension man's ability to control the forces of ,nature has been enlarged and increased4 ,at the same time1 however1 that extension has rendered possible false developments and aberrations to which the more limited representations of the brute are less liable4 ,with the faculty of rational ,discourse constantly striving to extend the bounds of ,knowledge1 man came in time to attempt to give an account not only of the immediate objects which surround him1 but of the whole choir of ,heaven and furniture of ,earth4 ,in this advance the ,greeks took a leading part4 ,when we first make acquaintance through historical records with the intellectual activity of the ,greek mind1 we find it engaged in the construction of various such schemes for an explanation of the world--usually called cosmogonies4 ,it was at this stage of intellectual progress that what we might call an interruption occurred in the normal process of evolution4 ,great intellectual activity had for some time prevailed in the ,greek communities2 several men of conspicuous genius--notably ,heracleitus and ,parmenides--had carried speculation as to the origin and nature of the world to a height hitherto undreamt of4 ,these achievements and the consciousness of continual progress had engendered in ,athens particularly what might be called an epidemic of intellectual pride4 ,on this scene ,socrates appeared1 plain1 blunt1 critical4 ,his teaching was in effect an appeal to men to reflect3 to turn their attention away from the world which they were supposed to be explaining to the contemplation of their own ,minds by which the explanation was furnished4 gnothi seauton was his motto4 ,all explanations of the ,universe or of ,experience were1 as he showed1 vain unless the ,cognitive ,faculty by which they were constructed were operating truly4 ,in particular1 the process of ,rational ,discourse implied the use of concrete general terms1 which were recognised to be the essential instruments of ,cognition4 ,socrates therefore devoted his attention specially to a critical examination of these general terms and also of the abstract terms which were the familiar instruments of ,discourse4 ,the ,greeks of that day were endowed with a singular clearness of intellectual vision4 ,they readily recognised that ,knowledge was an intellectual process2 they appreciated the activity of ,thought or ,rational ,discourse as essential to its formation4 ,they quite understood that ,knowledge is not of the nature of a photograph--a resemblant pictorial reproduction of the data furnished by sensation4 ,only very casually and occasionally do we ever attempt to supply ourselves with a resemblant reproduction of our sensations4 ,obviously such a reproduction would only be of value memorially and could tell us nothing new4 ,these early ,greeks realised this1 and they appear to have realised also pretty clearly that it would be impossible by means of such pictorial impressions to establish any community of ,knowledge4 ,it is of the essence of ,knowledge that it is something which can be communicated to1 and which is the common possession of1 several individuals4 ,that can never be true of sensation4 ,we can never tell whether our sensations are the same as those of other people--never at any rate by means of sensations themselves2 never unless and until such sensations have been inter-related by some other instrument4 ,a mere photographic reproduction of sensation is thus quite useless as a means of ,knowledge4 ,in some way or other general terms supply the common bond4 ,the recognition of this fact was one of the great results of the ,socratic discussion4 ,this explains the immense importance which ,socrates naturally attached to the criticism of general and abstract terms4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the work of ,socrates in this direction was immediately taken up and carried much further by ,plato4 ,plato maintained that these general and abstract terms were in truth the names of ideas 7eide7 with which the mind is naturally furnished1 and further that these ideas corresponded to and typified the eternal forms of things--the essential constituents of the real world4 ,knowledge was possible because there were such eternal forms or ideal elements--the archetypes--of which the eide were the counterparts and representations4 ,knowledge1 ,plato held1 was concerned solely with these eternal forms1 not with sensation at all4 ,the sensible world was in a state of constant flux and could not be the object of true science4 ,its apprehension was effected by a faculty or capacity 7,republic1 v4 #dgh-gi7 midway between ,knowledge and nescience to which he applied the term doxa1 frequently translated opinion1 but which in this connection would be much more accurately rendered1 sensible impression1 or even perception4 ,at any rate1 the term opinion is a very unhappy one1 and does not convey the true meaning at all1 for no voluntary intellective act on the part of the subject was implied by the term4 ,now intelligence in constructing a scheme of ,knowledge is active4 ,the ideas are the instruments of this activity4 ,plato's doctrine of ideas was probably designed or conceived by him as affording an explanation also of the community of ,knowledge4 ,he emphasised the fluent instability of the sensible impression1 and as we have already pointed out1 sensation in itself labours also under this drawback that it contains and affords no common nexus whereby the conceptions or perceptions of one man can be compared or related with those of another4 ,indeed1 if ,experience were composed solely of sensations1 each individual would be an isolated solipsistic unit--incapable of rational ,discourse or communication with his fellow-men4 ,to cure this defect1 ,plato offered the ideas--universal forms common to the intelligence of every rational being4 ,not only would they render possible a common ,knowledge of ,reality--the existence of such ideas would necessarily also give permanence1 fixity1 law1 and order to our intellectual activity4 ,our ,knowledge would not be a mere random succession of impressions1 but a definitely determined organic unity4 ,in all this argument it must be remembered ,plato never said or suggested that the intellect of man--thus equipped with ideal forms--was thereby enabled to become1 or did become1 the creator of the world by and in which each one believes himself to be surrounded and included4 ,he always distinguished between ,idea and ,reality1 between ,thought and ,thing4 ,the ideas were types of the forms immanent in things themselves4 ,it has been said by some scholars that he generally distinguished between the two by the employment of distinct terms1 applying eidos to the mental conception and idea to the substantial form4 ,this verbal distinction was accepted by many scholars of the epoch of ,liddell and ,scott and ,davies and ,vaughan4 ,a reference to this distinction in the present writer's essay on ,the ,dynamic ,foundation of ,knowledge provoked at the instance of one critic the allegation that it is not borne out by a critical study of the ,platonic texts4 ,that is a matter of little moment and one upon which the writer cannot claim to pronounce4 ,the important point is that in one way or another ,plato undoubtedly distinguished between and indeed contrasted the idea and the substantial form4 ,no trace of the solipsism which results from their being confounded and which has ultimately brought to destruction the imposing edifice of ,hegelian ,thought is to be found in his writings4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,platonic doctrine of ideas speedily found an energetic critic in ,aristotle4 ,in ,aristotle's view1 it was quite unnecessary and unwarrantable to postulate the existence in the ,mind of ideal forms or counterparts of the substantial forms of ,reality4 ,this1 according to him1 was a wholly unnecessary reduplication4 ,he was content to believe that the mind found and recognised the essential forms of things when they were presented to it in perceptive ,experience4 ,universalia in re were conceived by him as sufficiently explaining the genesis of cognition without the postulation of any such universalia extra rem4 99 99 99 99 99 ,to the ,platonic doctrine he offered the further objection that the eternal forms of things which that doctrine affirmed and which it declared to be represented in their ideal types were necessarily impotential4 ,there was no generative power in the pure activity of ,thought4 ,if1 therefore1 the essentials of ,reality were ideal1 it followed that they also were impotent1 and incapable of causative efficacy4 ,the sensible world1 however1 was a fluent and perpetually generated stream1 which required some potent cause to uphold it4 ,the eternal ,reality which sustained the world was for him an ,energy constantly generating the actual1 and no conception which failed to provide for this process of causative generation of the things of ,sense could in his view adequately account for the phenomena of ,nature nor consequently could constitute the system of science4 ,in this argument ,aristotle undoubtedly expressed a profound truth1 but it may perhaps be admitted that he rather failed to appreciate fully the difficulty which the ,platonic doctrine was designed to meet--that1 namely1 of providing some sort of common nexus or unifying principle by which the validity of ,knowledge could be maintained4 ,for he had no certain means of showing that the potent energy of ,nature was unitary and homogeneous4 ,he is frequently described as a sensationalist1 but such a view is certainly incorrect4 ,this1 however1 may be admitted--that he sought the essentials of ,reality not in the ,mind but in the ,object4 ,it may be fairly claimed that to this extent he occupied common ground with the sensationalists1 in that he was an adherent of the tabula rasa view of the ,mind1 expressed in the maxim3-- ,nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit in sensu4 99 99 99 99 99 ,plato and ,aristotle may be taken as typical of the two principal intellectual tendencies which have characterised all subsequent speculation--the ,platonist1 he who finds in the constitution of the ,mind the eternal principles or at least the types of the eternal principles of ,reality2 the ,aristotelian1 he for whom these seem to reside in the object and1 in the act of ,cognition1 are merely impressed upon1 transferred to1 presented to1 or otherwise introduced into or apprehended by the ,mind4 ,the ,aristotelian view of ,nature as an energetic process failed to impress itself upon his successors4 ,greek ,philosophy soon after ,aristotle's death decayed or was deprived of its early vigour1 and the doctrine which survived the wreck was essentially derived1 however imperfectly1 from the ,platonic theory4 ,throughout the first fifteen hundred years of the ,christian era this doctrine undoubtedly dominated the course of speculation--a speculation of which much is now forgotten and almost as much was certainly barren and unfruitful1 but of which we would entertain a very mistaken notion if we were to imagine that it was not often pursued with great subtlety and acumen4 ,one natural result of the fact that such a principle dominated human thought was the prevalence of a belief that the explanation of ,nature and natural processes could be derived from the cognitive faculty itself4 ,our cognition of our immediate surroundings was doubtless continuously corrected by immediate practical tests4 ,but the science of a more extended view of ,nature was vitiated by this false principle and in consequence for many centuries our whole ,knowledge of ,nature remained unprogressive and unfruitful4 ,causa aequat effectum1 ,nature abhors a vacuum1 are examples of the maxims derived or supposed to be derived from the necessities of our ,reason1 and by the aid of which it was vainly hoped to attain a knowledge of ,nature and natural laws4 ,the principle was in itself unsound4 ,the necessary laws of our rational faculty could discover to us only the essentials of that faculty itself4 ,the maxims by which it was sought to constitute a priori a scheme of natural laws could not justly claim descent from the necessities of ,thought4 ,had the ,schoolmen formed a true conception of the nature of ,knowledge they would never have imagined that any necessity of ,thought obliged them to believe that a #aj lb4 weight would fall to the ground more rapidly than a #a lb4 weight4 ,equally true is it that their scientific principles had not been derived from any study of the action of natural law4 ,they were unacknowledged intellectual orphans4 ,the movement associated with the names of ,galileo1 ,bruno1 ,bacon1 ,kepler1 and ,newton owed its origin and its success to the abandonment of this vicious principle4 ,so far as ,nature was concerned1 the ,mind was regarded as a tabula rasa1 and the physician set himself to ascertain the laws of nature not by reflection upon his own mental processes or requirements1 but by experiment with and observation of natural processes themselves4 ,the result has been the establishment of modern science--the greatest triumph which the human mind has yet achieved4 ,in a criticism of the writer's essay on ,the ,dynamic ,foundation of ,knowledge in the ,revue neo-scolastique of ,louvain1 the critic wrote as follows3 ,remarquons qu'il n'a pas compris la synthese scolastique du moyen age1 elle qui cependant a concilie d'une facon admirable l'actuel et le potentiel dans l'explication de la nature des choses4 ,il s'est mepris aussi sur les caracteres de la methode scolastique de connaitre la constitution intime du monde experimental2 il croit cette methode exclusivement deductive4 ,we have felt that candour demanded that we should quote the foregoing passage--coming as it does from a source exceptionally well qualified to express an opinion4 ,if we have nevertheless allowed ourselves in the precedent paragraphs of this essay to express again the view which this critic seeks to qualify1 but which we still think in the main sound1 we are at the same time very glad to be able in this way to invite attention to the undoubted fact that the distinction between the actual and the potential was recognised by the schoolmen as of a very deep significance4 ,we believe further that the real secret of the failure of mediaevalism to extend its ,knowledge of ,nature was not so much a preference for deductive over inductive methods as the failure to realise that ,nature was a dynamic operation4 ,it is important1 then1 to understand accurately what is the method of ,science4 ,the external world of our ,experience seems to be composed of sensible impressions4 ,the ever present visual panorama combined with the constant occurrence of other sensations suggests that ,nature is1 as has so often been asserted1 simply another name for the sensible presentation4 ,a truer view of ,nature was adumbrated by ,aristotle when he formulated the theory of an ,energy ever generative of the sensible4 ,if the founders of ,science did not fully grasp the ,aristotelian conception1 it is at least certain that they looked upon ,nature not merely as a sensible presentation but as a process--a dynamic operation4 ,it was to the study of these operations1 to the measurement of the natural forces or normal categories of physical action that ,galileo and ,newton devoted themselves4 ,the true estimate of a moving force may indeed be said to have been their first great problem1 just as the law of universal gravitation was their grandest generalisation4 ,it was to this sure instinct that the founders of ,science owed their success4 ,had they devoted themselves to the mere study of sensations--of blue things and green things1 of hard things and soft things1 of loud things and silent things--,science as an efficient and co-ordinated system would never have come into being4 99 99 99 99 99 ,having struck the right path1 they moved rapidly along it1 leaving the ,schoolmen and ,philosophers behind them1 suspicious1 hostile1 and amazed4 ,but ,philosophy did not remain altogether negative4 ,the new movement extended itself to ,metaphysics1 and under the leadership of ,descartes a resolute effort was made to reform ,philosophy on sympathetic lines4 ,it was in the true spirit of ,socrates that ,descartes advanced his famous method of ,doubt4 ,the whole fabric of beliefs and rational principles was to be subjected to a re-examination1 and ,descartes found himself on bedrock when he touched his famous ,cogito1 ergo sum4 ,the simple fact or act of ,doubt implied the ,activity--the ,reality therefore--of the ,doubter4 ,but the cogitant subject was reduced very much to the condition of a tabula rasa1 and when ,descartes proceeded to fill up the blank with a rediscovery on more scientific lines of the essentials of ,cognition he found his basal feature in ,extension4 ,tridimensional ,space seemed the simple elementary framework of our ,knowledge of ,nature4 ,the method of ,descartes was further extended by the ,english philosopher ,locke4 ,those qualities which formed the elements of ,knowledge were described by him as the primary qualities of body2 the sensible presentation comprised also the secondary qualities which seemed to be in some way superposed upon and contained within the former4 99 99 99 99 99 ,our fundamental ideas of ,nature were called by ,locke sensible ideas4 ,these ideas were derived from our sensible ,experience1 and it is only just to ,locke to point out that1 when examined in detail1 his sensible ideas are seen to be not mere qualifications of sensation1 but rather the elementary characters of ,nature viewed as a dynamic process and discovered by our ,activity4 ,yet the ambiguous term sensible ideas unfortunately led to their being regarded as ideas derived1 not from our action in any form1 but from pure sensation alone4 ,this extraordinary error was intensified in the speculation of ,berkeley and ,hume4 ,experience with them appeared to consist solely of a succession of sensations appearing to1 impressing1 or affecting a tabula rasa of consciousness4 ,of course in such a state of affairs all ,knowledge would be impossible4 ,the scepticism which logically followed from such a doctrine was too universal to be capable even of the fiction that it was credible4 ,berkeley1 it is true1 endeavoured to save the situation by postulating the incessant and immediate intervention of the ,deity as the sustainer of the sensible panorama4 ,this purely arbitrary and fictitious expedient was entirely rejected by ,hume1 who with fearless honesty carried to its ultimate results the direct consequences of the doctrine and then complacently left human ,knowledge to take care of itself4 99 99 99 99 99 ,a masterly protest against the position of ,hume was made by his countryman ,reid1 who in his ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind very clearly pointed out the fundamental difference between the sensible accompaniments or constituents of our ,experience and the real and independently existent substratum by which that ,experience is sustained and organised4 ,his argument1 though it attracted considerable attention1 did not1 however1 affect as deeply as might have been expected the future of philosophic speculation1 probably because he offered no new clue or key whereby to detect the origin and account for the presence in our ,experience of those enduring and substantial elements or forms by which it is sustained1 but on the contrary left their recognition to what he rather vaguely described as common sense4 99 99 99 99 99 ,much more influential was the elaborate answer of ,kant1 which has profoundly affected the course of ,metaphysics since its publication4 ,reverting in principle to the platonic method1 ,kant again sought the enduring elements1 the fundamentals of ,science1 in the constitution of the cognitive faculty itself4 ,but very differently from ,plato he discovered these in the categories or essential forms of intellective action1--the category of causality and dependence and the so-called forms of the transcendental aesthetic--,time and ,space4 ,under these categories the indefinite data of sensation were thought to be organised into a cognisable system4 ,a rapid advance of speculation along the lines signalised by ,kant took place after his work was published1 and for many years this movement was regarded by a large part of the speculative world as the most hopeful and progressive of philosophic efforts1 and by its own votaries as placing them in a position of superiority to all other schools of thought4 ,the thoroughness of their studies and introspective methods to some extent justified1 or at least excused the arrogance of their pretensions4 ,but it is to-day almost unnecessary even to criticise this ,philosophy4 ,from the first it was foredoomed to failure1 and had no prospect of succeeding where ,plato--equipped with armour from the same forge--had already failed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,kantianism like ,platonism failed because it still left the sensible unaccounted for4 ,not only did it fail to tell us whence came these sensations which1 however transitory and unreal1 constantly saluted our consciousness and largely constituted our ,experience2 it failed also to show us how they could be brought into relation with the faculty of ,knowledge4 ,finding its elemental forms in the structure of the organ of ,knowledge1 it failed to tell us how we ever managed by means of these to get beyond our own subjective states1 or how we ever came to think that there was a ,world outside of the individual consciousness1 by the categories of which1 according to them1 our cognitions of such a ,world were called into being4 ,for if ,reality were unknowable except by and through the categories1 then our ,knowledge of ,reality was the creature of our own mental activity1 and we must still remain unable to understand why we should suppose that we had got beyond ourselves4 ,these defects of ,kantianism were early recognised by ,schopenhauer1 who also appears to have realised that what was wanted was another and a new key to unlock the gateway of ,knowledge4 ,knowledge was in essence an affirmation or series of affirmations about a real ,world distinct from the ,knower4 ,it was surely now obvious that the warrant for such affirmations and the source of their validity must come from somewhere beyond the cognitive faculty itself4 ,the source upon which men again and again have seemed to fall back is ,sensation2 but ,sensation being transitory and dependent for its existence upon its being felt can really give us no help4 ,some other1 some self-existent thing is wanted1 and with considerable insight ,schopenhauer suggested that the key was to be found in the ,will4 ,but this theory1 though it has lately attracted considerable attention1 can hardly be claimed as offering any definite prospect of a solution4 ,its cardinal defect is that it still fails to show how the sensible arises4 ,it is supposed to be generated out of pure ,volition1 but no causal nexus1 no direct connection of any kind is immediately apparent between the two1 and ,schopenhauer in developing his theory did nothing to supply the want4 ,the doctrine cannot therefore be regarded as more than a helpful stepping-stone to the true answer4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in recent years various forms of opportunist philosophies under the names of ,pragmatism1 ,pluralism1 etc41 have endeavoured to elude the pressure of the dilemma and to solace mankind for the failure of ,kantianism by advising them to accept ,experience as it is4 ,but though such a counsel of resignation may in a popular sense of the term be regarded as philosophical it can hardly be accepted as a solution4 99 99 99 99 99 ,we find1 then1 that since man first began to inquire reflectively upon the nature of his cognitive faculty his speculation has followed one or other of two great lines or divisions of theory1 neither of which has been found to afford intellectual satisfaction4 ,we have 7#a7 the theory that seeks in some way or other to derive the real constituents of ,science from the constitution of the cognitive faculty itself4 ,to this theory1 which has inspired one whole stream of speculation from ,plato to ,hegel1 there are at least two absolutely fatal objections4 7a7 ,it fails altogether to account for the sensible presentation which however fluent and unstable appears to stand in a direct and even unique relation to the real4 ,it fails to let us understand how that relation arises1 how the sensible is generated1 or how it enters into our consciousness4 7b7 ,we are unable under this theory to discover how we ever reach a ,knowledge of the real ,world1 how we can get beyond ourselves1 how if the ,mind in its search for truth is perpetually intercepted by its own forms it can ever furnish us with any genuine cognitions of the external4 7#b7 ,we have the theory that the essential forms of ,reality are to be found in the ,object and are thence supplied to the ,understanding1 which plays the part merely of a receptive surface or tabula rasa4 ,in the hands of ,aristotle this doctrine took the form of an affirmation that ,nature must be regarded as an energetic process containing within itself the potency by which it perpetually generated the actual4 ,promising as it was in ,aristotle's hands1 this speculation was not carried forward or assimilated by his immediate successors4 ,indeed1 it was practically forgotten until the intellectual revival of the sixteenth century1 which inaugurated the foundations of modern ,science4 ,however little the fact may have been consciously recognised even by the leaders of scientific discovery1 this was the conception of ,nature which inspired and sustained the scientific advance4 ,in the department of philosophic speculation1 however1 it appeared only under the debased and misleading form of a belief that the sensible presentation was the true source of the contents of ,cognition1 that it was from ,sensation that the ,mind of ,man derived the whole fabric of ,science4 ,penser c'est sentir was the form in which it was expressed by ,condillac1 but was equally the view which commended itself to ,berkeley1 at least in his early writings1 to ,hume1 and to a whole army of successors down to ,j4 ,s4 ,mill4 ,we hope we have already sufficiently emphasised the falsity of such a view4 ,obviously1 if the ,mind were merely the passive recipient of a stream of impressions1 no sort of rational ,discourse1 no scientific or cognitive effort could ever have been stimulated into activity1 and the very ideas of causality and relation1 indeed all that we associate with the exercise of the understanding1 could never have been called into being4 ,upon neither of these views of the nature of ,knowledge can we arrive at any consistent or intelligible conception of its genesis1 nature1 or method of operation4 ,what1 then1 must we do8 ,it is hardly doubtful that if we are to make any progress we must find another and a new key whereby to unlock the double door that bars the entrance to the inner shrine of truth4 ,now the fundamental1 or at least a fundamental error characteristic of all these various efforts after a solution is to be found in the fact that they view the ,world as a static thing rather than as a kinetic process4 ,the ,world to vision seems a great still thing in or on which no doubt innumerable bodies are moving to and fro1 but which itself--the fundamental thing--is solid and unchanging4 ,but this is an illusion4 ,the seemingly unchanging features are changeless only in the monotony of their constant mutation4 ,cohering masses are rigid in respect only of the constancy of the dynamic process of transmutation in which cohesion consists4 ,the sun shines eternally steady only in consequence of the ceaseless kinetic energies which give it being4 ,what we are ever doing in rational ,discourse1 what ,knowledge constantly accomplishes1 is to furnish an account1 a reproduction of a series of operations4 ,the ,world is a process--an activity4 ,that was recognised as long ago as the days of ,heracleitus1 but his disciples did not--although we think there is good ground for believing that he did#fj3a--;his disciples did not realise that a process1 whilst it implies constant flux and change1 implies also something permanent even in its mutations1 something which undergoes the change and sustains the flow4 ,to understand a thing is to discover how it operates4 ,the eternal forms of things are laws of natural action4 ,such are the law of gravitation1 the laws of optics or of chemical combination4 ,a static picture unless so interpreted must be at once valueless and meaningless4 ,it follows that ,thought and ,discourse1 in furnishing us with ,knowledge1 must themselves be active1 and must in some way or other reproduce the activity of ,nature4 ,thought1 in short1 is an ,activity which reproduces the activity of things1 the activity in which the phenomena of ,nature arise4 ,but how do we arrive at any apprehension of ,natural ,action8 ,what informs us that ,nature is a potency ever operative8 ,what suggests to us the conception of potency at all8 ,we reply that we arrive at the idea of potent action because we are ourselves active beings4 ,our organism maintains itself by constant physiological activities4 ,these are the permanent constancies of transmutation which constitute the organism4 ,but superimposed upon these there are our voluntary exertional activities4 ,by these latter we necessarily mingle with and indeed participate in the action of the natural forces which 7as we usually say7 surround us1 but which in point of fact do more than surround us4 ,the disparate grouping of natural bodies in vision blinds us to the fact that we are really not merely surrounded by but are mingled with and participate in the dynamic system4#fa3a ,we are continually pressing with our weight upon the bodies on which we rest1 we are continually exerting or resisting the pressure of so-called adhering masses--resistance-points in one dynamic system of which we are ourselves a part4 ,thus it is that in our exertional action we reveal to our consciousness not only the forms of our own activity but the forms of the dynamic system which contains and yet transcends the ,sensible and the ,ideal4 ,the theory we have suggested enables us to proceed at once to a rational explanation of ,sensation4 ,sensation is obstructed action4 ,a detailed consideration of as many as you like to take of the myriad constituents of our sensible ,experience will continually and without exception confirm this simple fact4 ,in ,nature it is the potent action which is real4 ,it alone can be directly represented by the activity of ,thought4 ,the mere obstruction of activity is not a real thing1 hence the unreal character of ,sensation4 ,yet the obstruction being an obstruction of the real action of ,nature is1 if not real1 at least actual and immediate4 ,nay1 its presence in our ,experience1 however mutable and unstable it may be1 is the only sure test and guarantee of ,reality4 ,each of the two leading theories which have dominated speculation presents one partial aspect of the truth4 ,the eternal cognisable element of ,reality is apprehended1 as the ,platonist holds1 by the intellect and by the intellect alone4 ,to that extent the ,platonist is right4 ,that cognisable element is ,action4 ,but ,action is denoted for us only in the obstructions which it encounters4 ,these obstructions constitute our ,world of ,sensible ,experience1 which is therefore for each of us the sure indicator of the ,real4 ,in recognising this fact the sensationalist is right in his turn4 99 99 99 99 99 ,not only does the dynamic conception of ,nature enable us to account for ,sensation1 but it lets us see how the ,sensible ,world becomes a constituent of ,experience4 ,it is by and through its obstructions and these only that we featurise or denote our ,experience4 ,it is by the breaks1 the turnings in the road that we cognise its course4 ,it is by the line of rocks and breakers that we define the shore4 ,but we must not mistake the turnings for the roadway nor the shore for the ocean4 ,it is in and by our activity that we discover this ,world of sensible obstructions4 ,the features of the ,sensible ,world correspond therefore to the laws of our exertional activity1 but the correspondence is relational1 not resemblant4 ,just so1 it is by the reflection of ,light that we discover the forms of the obstacle which solid bodies oppose to the radiant undulation4 ,the resultant colours correspond to the form of these obstructions2 but the correspondence is relational not resemblant4 ,the same is true of sounds1 of tactual sensations1 of every other sensible obstacle to pure activity4 ,by the clouds of smoke we follow or used to follow the progress of the battle1 but the battle is something other than a cloud of smoke4 ,we are1 as ,plato told us in his famous allegory1 like prisoners in a cave--our attitude averted from the aperture1 and it is only by the shadows cast upon the cavern wall that we can interpret the events which are transacting themselves outside4 ,in one sense1 therefore1 the whole sensible and spatial ,world is real4 ,at least it is actual2 and it affords us the materials from which we construct our scheme of phenomena1 and by which the kinetic process of ,reality is denoted and conceived4 ,the question ever and anon occurs to us--,how upon this view can we solve the problem of transcendence8 ,how even on this view of the case do we manage to get beyond ourselves8 ,how are we in any way helped thereto by the fact that ,reality consists in potent action rather than in ,sensation8 ,again1 the answer is significant4 ,in action1 that is1 in exertional action1 we are really part of a larger whole4 ,our exertional action is ab initio mingled in and forms really an integral part of the dynamic system in which our life is involved4 ,the ever operative forces of ,gravity1 ,cohesion1 ,chemical ,affinity1 and so forth are the phenomenal expression of the laws of energetic transmutation in which we partake and of which we are organically a part1 however apparently separate and disparate our bodies may seem to be4 ,it is life and feeling1 not action1 which really distinguish the individual from his environment1 at least from his material dynamic environment4 ,be it noted that what is required is not an explanation of how we transcend ,experience4 ,that by no effort can we ever do in ,knowledge4 ,all we are required to explain is how we transcend our ,thought and our ,sensibility4 ,the answer is3 ,our ,experience begins in action1 and it begins therefore in a sphere which is beyond the mere subjective ,consciousness1 and yet is organically one with the organs of ,cognition and ,feeling4 ,it is only by a visual fiction that we come to regard our active selves as distinct from the dynamic system4 ,we cannot1 in fact1 shake off the bonds of corporeality1 of gravity1 of all the various restraints of our organic activity4 ,relatively1 however1 the cerebral activity of ,thought is liberated from the stresses of the dynamic environment2 hence the apparent freedom and independence1 under certain conditions1 of ,thought1 ,imagination1 and ,volition4 ,a great difficulty in realising this view of ,experience is to be found in the apparent ,solidity and ,inertia of material bodies4 ,sensible experiences group themselves round these constancies4 ,but a material body1 when its sensible concomitants are abstracted1 is nothing more than a permanent process of energy transmutation the interruption of which in one form or another may originate ,sensation4 ,it follows that the world of spatially extended bodies is a homogeneous and consistent whole1 reflecting in its laws and forms the real operations by which it is constituted and sustained4 ,but all this actual ,world is nevertheless phenomenal only1 albeit the phenomena are derived from and related to the ,real as change is to the thing which changes4 ,to a large extent we are misled by the impressive prominence of the visual data4 ,in vision we are presented with a system of inter-related and simultaneously occurring sensations which we find by experience to be the sure and certain indicators of the potent obstructions which our activity encounters4 ,for this reason we habitually make use of the visual sign as the guide and instrument of our exertional activity1 and this habitual use leads us to regard the visual presentation as the essential form of ,reality4 ,however sure we are that that is a false view1 it yet is very difficult to retrace our steps and re-enter the elemental darkness which involves the blind4 ,the philosophic value of the interpretation of ,experience by the blind ought therefore to be very great4 ,observations made on the experiences of the blind and of those to whom vision has been restored are not very numerous1 but many of these recorded by ,plainer1 the friend of ,leibniz1 and others are of the highest value1 and remarkably confirm the view for which we have been contending4 ,undoubtedly1 so far as we are aware1 the most valuable contribution to this aspect of the discussion is to be found in a little volume recently published in ,paris under the title ,le ,monde des ,aveugles4 ,the author1 ,m4 ,pierre ,villey1 is himself blind4 ,in the interests of ,science he has cast aside the delicacy and reserve which have generally prevented the blind from analysing or at least from discussing the import of their experiences4 ,he is also fortunately possessed of a philosophic and highly cultivated intellect1 and has not failed to make himself acquainted with the general course of metaphysical speculation4 ,the present writer has been in correspondence with ,m4 ,villey1 whose conclusions remarkably confirm the view for which this essay contends1 and he finds that ,m4 ,villey recognises the truth of that view4 ,individual quotations would only detract from the cumulative effect of his argument1 but we may refer in particular to the interesting discussion as to the relations between the space concepts of the blind and those of the vident4 ,the blind can be taught1 and are taught1 geometry1 and can discuss and understand spatial and geometrical problems4 ,the sensible furniture by which the spatial conceptions of the blind are denoted obviously cannot be visual1 and are no doubt largely tactual1 whilst on the other hand the vident utilise the visual data to the almost total exclusion of any other4 ,there must therefore be some common measure by means of which a community is established between the spatial conceptions of the blind and those of the vident4 ,m4 ,villey concludes and clearly shows that the common medium is to be found in the fact that our spatial conceptions are fundamentally based upon and are expressive of the discoveries of our exertional activity4 ,touch1 in short1 is an ambiguous term and includes both passive sensations and those forms of ,activity which we describe when we use the term feel as a transitive verb4 ,just as we distinguish between seeing and looking or between hearing and listening1 so should we distinguish between touch passive and touch active or palpation4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the view of ,science which we have endeavoured to explain has received a notable confirmation from the establishment during the latter part of the nineteenth century of the scientific doctrine of ,energy4#fi3a ,the culmination of the scientific fabric of which ,galileo and ,newton laid the foundations was reached when it was demonstrated that the whole physical universe must be regarded as composed of ,energy1 either kinetic and actually undergoing transmutation from one form to another1 or potential and quiescent yet containing within itself the quantifiable capacity of transformation4 ,the objective correlatives of the different classes of sensible experiences are found to be different forms which this ,energy assumes--the kinetic energy of a mass in motion1 the radiant energy of ,light1 the energy of ,heat1 the potential energy of chemical separation1 etc4--all these have now at length been shown to be forms of one real thing capable under appropriate conditions of being transmuted into each other and of which not only the inter-transmutability but the equivalent values can be calculated and have been found by experiment to be fixed and definite4 ,thus the mechanical equivalent of heat is a fixed and definite quantity4 ,the ,energy of a body in motion can be measured and stated in terms of mass and velocity4 ,the profound conception of ,aristotle1 under which ,nature was regarded as a potent ,energy containing within itself the capacity of generating the phenomenal ,world1 has again been revived and realised--but with great additions4 ,the theory in the hands of ,science is now not only confirmed by incessant experiment1 but the relation which it affirms between reality and phenomenon has been quantified4 ,moreover1 the actual operations under which the potential generates the actual have1 so to say1 been laid bare to view2 and lastly1 the inter-transmutability of all forms of ,energy and its real unity have been established4 ,the doctrine has therefore received a confirmation of which ,aristotle did not dream1 and its explanation has at the same time received an illumination which his vague if profound adumbration could never afford4 ,with this added support the true conception of human knowledge has received new strength4 ,the theory is still1 nevertheless1 not to be grasped without a resolute effort of reflection4 ,it involves an inversion of our everyday conceptions more radical than that which was demanded by the ,copernican theory of astronomy1 and we know that that theory--offered to and rejected by mankind before the beginning of the ,christian era--had to wait through sixteen or seventeen hundred years before it secured an acceptance1 at first grudging and even now not always adequate4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ordinary metaphysical student has hitherto rather resented the idea that in order to a true solution of the problem of ,knowledge he must acquaint himself with the fundamental conceptions of physics4 ,yet so it is4 ,it may perhaps be hoped that when the first strangeness of the new position has disappeared the conditions may be accepted with greater readiness4 ,at any rate1 a correct apprehension of our fundamental conceptions of the world of our external experience is indispensable4 ,no theory can wholly dispense with such conceptions4 ,it is therefore essential that1 however elementary1 they should be clear and not contradictory4 ,philosophy has always vaguely realised and exacted as much4 ,the need is now imperative4 ,some years ago1 in an essay on ,schopenhauer1 the author1 ,mr4 ,saunders1 remarked1 ,how the matter of which my arm is composed and that state of consciousness which ,i call my ,will imagine anyone calling ,will a state of consciousness6 are conjoined is a mystery beyond the reach of ,science1 and the man who can solve it is the man for whom the world is waiting4 ,well1 if that be so1 then the world need not wait any longer4 ,the required explanation is offered to metaphysics by the scientific work of the physicians who built up and consolidated the modern doctrine of ,energy4 ,it is true that most of them have continued to postulate the reality of material bodies4 ,for their purpose there was no real difficulty in doing so4 ,what they required was a datum of configuration1 a phenomenal basis upon which their calculations could proceed and in terms of which1 as a point of origin1 their statement of transmutations was made4 ,the persistence of material bodies is a condition precedent to the phenomenal manifestations in which our ,experience arises4 ,organic existence in every form and the world in which it arises presuppose the actuality of these4 ,but dynamically they are merely the phenomenal result of certain permanent forces constantly in operation4 ,to beings1 if there be such1 inhabiting the ,ether there is little doubt but that a gravitation system like that of the sun and its planets must present a corporate rigidity and identity somewhat similar to that which cohering masses present to our intelligence4 ,but1 in terms of reality1 ,energy1 potential and kinetic1 containing within itself the potency which generates the actual and sustains the constant transmutation in which phenomena arise is the sole and only postulate4 ,the rise of meta-geometrical methods and other branches of scientific speculation have led in recent years to a considerable amount of very interesting inquiry into the nature of our fundamental geometrical conceptions4 ,strange to say1 a large body of respectable mathematicians have been found to favour the extraordinary view that our mathematical conceptions are derived from ,sensation4 ,we do not propose here to discuss at length this idea4 ,it is merely another form of the old sensationalist view of ,knowledge1 but we suggest that the conditions of the problem will readily appear in their true light and real nature whenever such inquirers realise the fact that our exertional activity is the source of our cognitions of the external1 and that therefore our pure exertional activity is the source of the basal concepts of geometry4 ,here lies the root of the distinction between pure and empirical science4 ,the propositions of geometry1 being derived from our own pure activity1 are of the former class2 the inductive conclusions of physical experimental science1 being gathered by observation and measurement from sensible data1 are empirical and approximate4 ,a geometrical proposition--such1 for example1 as the assertion that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles--is not merely approximate4 ,it has no dependence on measurement4 ,it is absolutely true4 ,it is ascertained deductively1 and therefore measurement is not involved1 and is never employed4 ,its truth is not ascertained by measurement4 ,it is not verified by measurement4 ,it in no degree depends upon the sensible figure4 ,it is equally true for every human being whatever be the degree of accuracy of the figure by the aid of which he studies it1 or indeed whether he studies it by figure or otherwise1 as must necessarily be the case with the born blind4 ,there may be many different forms of energetic transmutation which may determine many other forms of space besides that form of tridimensional space in which our ,activity is involved4 ,for such1 a different geometry may and will be applicable2 but for the tridimensional conditions of our activity the proposition is necessary and absolute4 ,no measurement of any stellar parallax1 however minute and whatever the result might be1 could have any bearing on its truth4 ,geometry is the science of the pure forms of our motor activity amidst corporeal bodies4 ,a useful illustration of our argument is to be drawn from a consideration of the question of phonetic spelling4 ,occasionally we find persons urging that all spelling should be an exact reproduction of sound4 ,indeed1 an improved alphabet has been designed to enable the idea to be carried out with greater accuracy4 ,now it is quite true that it is by their sound that we recognise or denote our words4 ,hence our alphabet was originally phonetic in principle1 and indeed still is so1 although the correspondence is imperfect4 ,as the use of visible signs develops spelling seems to fall into certain fixed frames and to deviate more and more from pure phonetic simplicity4 ,but why is this so8 ,it is because the sounds are merely the symbols or indicators of the different forms of vocal articulation 7vocal acts71 and it is really as the symbols and indicators of these actions that they possess any meaning and acquire such permanence and identity as they have4 ,the phonetic system1 therefore1 becomes in use subordinated to the expression of the acts by which are produced these radical vocables which constitute the essentials of rational ,discourse4 ,in all this the process of the expression of words in spelling is a microcosmic counterpart of the process of cognition as we have tried to explain it4 ,it is noteworthy that the same thing necessarily happens in the case of any new system of spelling4 ,the most prominent advocates of phonetic spelling have been also the authors of a system of phonetic shorthand4 ,like the written and printed alphabet of ,europe1 the alphabet of ,phonography was made phonetic4 ,indeed it started off as a more nearly perfect phonetic system than the ordinary ,european alphabet4 ,but as its use advances its employment undergoes the same change4 ,the phonetic symbols are abbreviated by grammalogues and contractions1 and this proceeds in accordance with a principle unconsciously recognised but which really depends on the same inherent necessity to preserve in a consistent form the expression of the radical vocables of ,speech4 ,finally1 in the hands of the expert stenographer the system of phonetic shorthand 7though he still uses the sound as the guide and indicator of his actions7 is as far removed from a pure phonetic representation as the ordinary method of spelling4 ,indeed1 unless some such suprasensible and unifying principle were available1 phonetic spelling would speedily perish in an infinity of degenerate variations4 ,we adduce this illustration as one which very well confirms our main argument4 ,we have no desire to discuss on its merits the general question of ,spelling ,reform1 which of course is quite apart from the attempt to establish a scheme of spelling on a purely phonetic basis4 ,a more rational system of spelling is nevertheless an object worthy of all consideration4 99 99 99 99 99 ,intellectualism and sensationalism have both broken down4 ,the world of speculation is anxiously looking for a new clue4 ,witness the pathetic eagerness with which it clutches at every floating straw4 ,the innumerable isms by which it seeks ever and anon to keep itself afloat are most of them but the sometimes unrecognisable wreckage of the old systems drifting about under very inappropriate names4 ,such terms as ,realism and ,idealism are freely used 7generally prefixing the adjective new7 by writers in philosophic periodicals in a sense which might make ,plato1 ,aquinas1 or ,kant turn in their graves4 ,we see their votaries encumbered with the trappings of a futile erudition of the insignificant or clinging pathetically to the insecure relics of teleological doctrine1 or1 still less virile1 seeking support in a return to the unscientific tales of supernatural spiritualism4 ,such efforts are vain4 ,only by facing the facts with all their consequences1 whatever these may be and whatever they may involve for the proudest aspirations of mankind--only thus can truth be attained4 ,and lest any should say that we preach an unrelieved pessimism1 let us remind such that ,knowledge is not after all the source of ,life1 that another category and a different principle--that1 namely1 which we indicate under the term ,love-divine--must have generated the potent current of ,life1 and that no one should close the door against the hopes of the human ,intelligence until he has discovered what are the limits imposed upon what ,perfect ,love can do4 ,the question still remains whether mankind will be equal to the effort required to assimilate the essential truth4 ,they very nearly failed to assimilate the ,copernican cosmogony4 ,for sixteen hundred years after it was first offered to mankind the race preferred to grope in the darkness and confinement of a false conception4 ,if they succeed in accomplishing the reception of the new truth1 unheard-of progress may be looked for4 ,if they fail1 civilisation must disappear and humanity decline4 ,there is no middle course4 ,as ,bacon remarked1 in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only to ,god and angels to be lookers-on4 ,we know how stubbornly the ,ptolemaic cosmogony still clings to our conceptions1 how largely it still dominates--or till recently did dominate--the religious cosmography of the most civilised peoples4 ,in ,philosophy our leading teachers seem as yet to have a very feeble appreciation of the new conditions4 ,they turn greedily to the eloquent pages of ,l',evolution creatrice1 but however earnestly they search they cannot find there any definite solution of the difficulties of the age-old problem4 ,they wander wearily through the mazes of psychological detail or wage almost childish logomachies over the interpretation of each other's essays4 ,philosophical magazines are filled with articles which reflect this state of the philosophic mind4 ,philosophical congresses meet and argue and go home2 ,gifford lecturers prelect2 yet so far as can be seen there is little sign that the key has been grasped4 ,the great fact remains obscured amidst a mass of words4 ,the elucidation of the problem of ,knowledge demands certain improvements in our philosophic terminology4 ,language as a rule is a very unerring philosopher1 and words shaped and polished by long usage generally express1 more truly than those who use them realise1 the essential reality of things4 ,yet these long-enduring errors of the ages which we have been discussing here have left their impress too on the terminology of ,metaphysics4 ,thought and ,action are in common speech contrasted1 and the distinction expresses an essential truth4 ,but when we seek to say further that both of these are ,activities1 we are stating another truth in terms which are hardly consistent with the previously contrasted distinction4 ,it might be better if ,action and ,active could be applied generally to both and if the term exertion could be substituted for ,action in describing the forms of activity which we denominate motor4 ,to that suggestion1 however1 there are also serious objections4 ,the words derived from ago have historically a special application to the exertional and dynamic4 ,we leave the question to our readers as one of which it is of considerable importance to find a satisfactory solution4 ,in the foregoing pages our object has been to illustrate the erroneous conceptions by which the theory of human cognition has been obscured and to explain briefly what we conceive to be the true solution4 ,the argument in support of the doctrine here explained has been more fully presented by the present writer in an essay entitled ,the ,dynamic ,foundation of ,knowledge1 to which the reader who desires to study the question further must now be referred4 ,,footnotes3 #fj3a ,kosmon tonde ton auton akanton oute tis theon oute anthropon epoiese1 all' en aiei kai esti kai estai pyr aeizoon haptomenon metra kai aposbennymenon metra4 ,quoted by ,clement of ,alexandria1 etc4 7,the ,first ,philosophers of ,greece1 by ,a4 ,fairbanks1 p4 #bh47 #fa3a ,la subdivision do la matiere en corps isoles est relative a notre perception 7,evolution creatrice1 p4 #ac74 #fi3a ,for a clear brief summary of the theory the reader may be referred to a little work by ,sir ,william ,ramsay1 ,f4,r4,s41 entitled ,elements and ,electrons1 pp4 #h-ae4 ,,iv ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,energy#ha3a ,the problem of ,metaphysics--the nature of ,reality--still presses for a solution4 ,agnosticism is but a cautious idealism--a timid phenomenalism4 ,that philosophy1 however named1 which proclaims that the experience of life is nothing more than a vain show1 a pantomime of sensations distinguished only from ideas by their greater intensity and distinctness1 is not only a confession of failure4 ,it is a denial of fact4 ,to know the nature of the ,absolute as such1 to present the ,absolute to finite minds as it must be presented1 if that be possible1 to the ,absolute itself1 must ever remain impossible to man4 ,but it is equally true that to attempt such a task has never been the urgent mission of ,philosophy4 ,the distinction between the ,ideal and the ,real1 between the conceptual and the perceptual1 is quite certainly and incessantly recognised4 ,agnosticism can neither deny the fact successfully1 nor solve the speculative difficulties which its recognition raises up4 ,the ,real and the ,ideal1 essentially distinct yet mockingly similar1 for ever blend and intermingle in the composite experience of life4 ,truly to discriminate and unravel these1--validly to separate the ,ideal element which impregnates that ,reality which we are for ever compelled to postulate and recognise1 still remains the great problem of ,philosophy--humbler perhaps and more practical1 but not less profound than any vain attempt to discover to finite conception the ,absolute as it is in itself4 ,therefore it is that the efforts of negative and agnostic criticism to dispense with the recognition of ,reality as a necessary postulate of our activity are foredoomed to failure4 ,they leave us not a solitude which we might pretend to be peace1 but a seething sea of troubles urgently demanding a new attempt to reveal the unity which must underlie the infinite diversity of experience4 ,such1 indeed1 seems to us the present position of ,metaphysics2 and1 what is more important1 it appears to react with increasing force upon the theories and investigations of ,science4 ,the problem of ,reality is thus at present not without a special and increasing interest for the students of ,physical ,science4 ,until lately they have been taught and have always maintained that ,matter is the direct object of sense-perception4 ,no doubt it is long since ,philosophy has urged that our conceptions of the external world are a mentally constructed system4 ,but this doctrine has made but little impression upon the students of ,natural ,science4 ,the objective origin of our sensations and the apparently objective reality also of the intelligible qualities and operative laws of the external world are too strongly impressed upon their minds4 ,idealism and ,transcendentalism have carried no conviction to them4 ,still1 the difficulties of common sense have continued to grow4 ,recent developments of scientific theory have increased the urgency of the problem1 but they seem to us also to suggest a solution the beneficial results of which affect the whole of ,metaphysics4 ,we refer to the doctrine of ,energy1 which occupies now as great a place in the physical sciences as the doctrine of ,evolution does in the zoological sciences4 ,natural philosophers have for some time taught that there are two ,real ,things in the physical universe--,matter and ,energy4 ,it seems a very striking theory4 ,has it received the attention it deserves from the student of ,metaphysics8 ,we are convinced that it has not3 and the reason he most frequently gives for this neglect is that1 being a purely scientific doctrine1 it does not come within his sphere4 ,science1 we are told1 deals with the phenomenal world internally considered2 ,philosophy with the relations of the phenomenal world to ,reality1 and with the nature of the transcendental elements in our ,knowledge4 ,this may be generally true4 ,nevertheless1 ,philosophy and ,science have surely concepts in common4 ,they both refer to the same thing when they speak of ,space2 we presume also when they speak of ,matter4 ,indeed1 ,philosophy analyses the conceptions involved not only in scientific reasoning1 but in the most common and ordinary mental processes4 ,it analyses them with special reference to the relations between the ,phenomenal and the ,real--a question which1 though it always lies latent1 does not in ordinary circumstances arise in urgent form4 ,it is therefore evident that the fundamental conceptions of ,science do fall within the purview of ,philosophy4 ,the study of ,physics can be carried on practically as a study of phenomena--of ,heat1 ,colours1 ,sounds1 ,forces1 etc41 all of which are kinds of phenomena--without the expression of any dogmatic and formulated opinion as to their relation with ,reality4 ,physics can speak of mass and weight and avoid all reference to ,matter2 but there always is1 in scientific reasoning1 an implicit reference to ,reality1 and it facilitates1 therefore1 the expression of scientific reasoning1 when the account of a physical process is stated with reference to a supposed reality1 such as ,matter4 ,and in making such reference ,science is thinking of the thing-in-itself4 ,it is a reference beyond phenomena4 ,heat1 ,light1 ,sound1 ,force1 are names of classes of phenomena1 and the great discovery of ,physics during the nineteenth century has been that these are all transformable into each other1 and bear definite numerical relations to each other in proportion to which such transformations take place4 ,science availing itself of this discovery1 unifies its conception of ,nature and gives expression to the doctrine of the inter-transmutability of the various classes of physical phenomena by postulating an entity called ,energy1 and regarding the various classes of phenomena as transmutations which this entity undergoes4 ,but ,science has been reluctant to recognise that it is now entitled to dispense with the postulation of ,matter4 ,the theory1 as announced by the leading men of science1 has therefore been to the effect that there exist in the physical universe two real things--,matter and ,energy--in place of one only1 as commonly supposed for so long4 ,now we maintain1 on the contrary1 that such a statement of physical theory is erroneous and redundant2 that ,science is not obliged to postulate two such entities2 that the concept of ,energy supplies all her requirements2 and that the employment of that conception obviates the very serious contradictions which are involved in any assumption of a real entity of the nature of ,matter as ordinarily understood--a conception of which the very description involves difficulties which have perplexed thinking men for more than two centuries4 ,our argument on this point involves consideration of the place occupied by ,energy in a potential form4 ,whilst the transformability of ,heat1 ,light1 ,sound1 and other physical phenomena in definite numerical ratios has led to their being all regarded as actual manifestations of transmutations proceeding in one real thing1 occasionally there is a seeming break in the catena2 no phenomenon can be detected into which the heat or light or other immediately preceding manifestation has been transformed2 but1 later on1 the co-relative reappears1 and by an argument as strong as that which asserts the continuous identity of an intelligence before1 during1 and after a temporary suspension of consciousness1 the student of ,physics maintains the continued existence in posse1 if not in esse1 of the ,energy which by appropriate action he can again reveal in an active or kinetic manifestation4 ,hence arises the conception of potential ,energy4 ,the ,energy to which we attribute the force of cohesion which any particular body can on occasion manifest1 we believe to exist potentially whilst that body continues unacted upon4 ,our belief is confirmed by our experience of the certainty with which1 on the recurrence of the given conditions1 the force always again manifests itself4 ,in like manner the potential ,energy to which we attribute the ,force of ,gravitation we believe to exist at all times1 even when not kinetically active4 ,indeed1 it only manifests itself when a transmutation is taking place into some other form of ,energy4 ,now it is the universal association of these two forms of potential ,energy with the common and fundamental data of our sense-experience that has suggested the construction in our minds of the conception of ,matter1 and furnished us with the ideas of solidity1 impenetrability1 and weight which constitute its groundwork4 ,our view1 therefore1 is that the concept of materiality can1 in the way just indicated1 be in all cases analysed into1 and derived from1 the conception of ,energy2 and that ,science1 if consistent1 cannot postulate the reality of ,matter as well4 ,potential ,energy adequately supplies the demand for a real substratum of which phenomena are the manifestation4 ,the whole question is very well worth the attention1 not only of scientific students but of metaphysicians4 ,the inquiry will distinctly gain if it receive the auxiliary attention of those who have studied the process by which we form our mental conceptions1 and whilst the students of ,physics deserve the honours of discovery1 they cannot safely dispense with such assistance1 for which the present confused and inconsistent state of the fundamental definitions of ,physical ,science most urgently calls4 ,there is here a neglected but very interesting field for the metaphysician's efforts4 ,recent scientific writings contain enough to show us that men of science are already beginning to recognise not only the inconsistency of the theory of two real things1 but the dominating significance of the conception of ,energy1 and are gradually coming to claim for the conception of ,matter little more than recognition as the vehicle of energetic transmutation4 ,let us then for the moment accept the position that ,science--ridding itself of redundant theory--postulates ,energy as the real thing-in-itself1 in terms of which it frames its statement of physical phenomena1 and let us examine briefly the effects which the acceptance of this new postulate is likely to have on philosophic speculation4 ,all my ,presentment1 all the content of my sense-experience1 according to this theory1 ,i attribute to a multifarious continuous series of transmutations constantly proceeding in some portion of the system of ,energy which constitutes the real substratum of phenomena4 ,i study1 measure1 and classify the different species of these transmutations2 ,i associate particular sensations and classes of sensations with particular transmutations1 and ,i thence infer the existence in posse or in esse of more or less ,energy in some particular form transmuting itself according to some one or other definite physical law4 ,i infer also the existence of various supplies of potential ,energy constantly available1 and of other intelligent agents like myself4 ,i associate every such intelligent agent with a particular series or group of sense-experiences1 and further ,i assume that the world at his ,presentment1 consists for him in a similar series of transmutations continuously going on in that portion of the energetic system which ,i believe in a similar way to constitute such person's bodily organism4 ,thus by the same process of reasoning by which ,i am led to believe that my own ,presentment consists in the energetic transmutations proceeding in my organism1 ,i explain the universality of the experience of all intelligent agents4 ,in my own case1 by that union of consciousness with physical energy which accompanies the manifestation of life1 ,i am immediately related with that portion of the energetic system which is the real substratum of my organism1 and am made conscious of the series of transmutations occurring at that particular point in it which is represented by my sensory system4 ,in the case of others1 from certain of the transmutations occurring in my ,presentment1 ,i am led to infer the existence of other similar microcosmic systems in the energetic macrocosm of the physical universe4 ,this is all very well as a theory1 but if all ,i know is the series of transmutations occurring in the portion of the system of ,energy related directly to my intelligence1 how did ,i ever learn to infer from these transmutations the existence of that ,energy underlying them1 and still more of the whole energetic system extending far beyond my organism8 ,how do ,i deduce from transmutations proceeding in the portion of the energetic system which constitutes the real substratum of my organism the existence1 not only of that substratum itself1 but of other portions of the system similarly related to other intelligences1 and of the energetic system as a whole8 ,how do ,i get beyond my ,presentment8 ,how pass from ,ideality to ,existence8 ,i answer that ,i never could by any chance or possibility have got beyond it or got any suggestion of the ,reality had ,i been merely related to my ,presentment as a passive and percipient subject4 ,in point of fact1 however1 ,i am in relation with the energetic system not merely or primarily as an ,intelligence percipient of the transmutations proceeding in it at a particular point1 but also as a ,will initiative to some extent of such transmutations and capable of influencing and directing the physical process4 ,life necessarily involves a process of energetic transmutation constantly proceeding at that portion of the system of ,energy which constitutes my organism1 and ,i am there related as ,will with a larger system which embraces the part in which intelligence is developed4 ,fundamentally1 life manifests itself in all grades of the zoologic hierarchy as a union of ,volition 7or what appears in action as ,volition7 with some particular point in the universe of physical ,energy1 the union constituting what we call a living organism4 ,despite its profound importance to us personally and to our race1 we should not forget that1 objectively considered1 the brain in man and the higher animals is merely a special organ highly developed by use1 as the trunk is in the elephant1 the middle phalanx in the horse1 or wings in the bird4 ,intelligence is hardly to any extent a necessity of the vital union of the ,will with the energetic system4 ,it is not at all developed in the vegetal kingdom1 hardly at all in some branches of the animal1 and there may conceivably be an infinite number of other kingdoms in which it may be either undeveloped1 or very differently developed1 or superseded by some other manifestation by us unimaginable4 ,its development indeed seems to be concurrent with the development of a locomotive faculty--a striking confirmation of the theory that it is in our activity that we derive the suggestions which call forth the exercise of the ,understanding and transform sensation into perception4 ,it is only with a comparative fraction of the organism that ,i am related as a passively percipient intelligence4 ,i am directly or indirectly related as ,will1 as an originative cause of activity1 with a larger portion of my organism1 many parts of which are quite distinct from the cognitive portion4 ,now it is from my relation as ,will with ,energy other than and beyond the energetic transmutations which constitute my ,presentment that ,i discover the energetic system of ,nature1 as a real thing--beyond1 underlying1 and by its transmutations constitutive of my ,presentment4 ,many of the transmutations which occur in my ,presentment ,i recognise as attributable to my own volitional activity operating upon my energetic organism1 and in my own activity there is thus suggested to me a source of phenomena lying beyond these phenomena themselves4 ,a transmutation initiated in my brain is a pure idea4 ,the key which suggests to me the real world is the occurrence of transmutations ascribable to my activity operating beyond the sphere which constitutes my ,presentment4 ,it is in this way that ,i originally discover the real energetic substratum to the phenomenal world of my ,presentment4 ,i learn from the transmutations to infer the agency and operation of the underlying energy1 and thus gradually construct my whole systematic conception of the real world in which ,i live and move and have my being4 ,this view of my activity and of the consequences of my relation as ,will to the energetic system represented by my organism1 including the portion thereof related to my intelligence1 supplies us therefore with a key to the inevitable reference of thoughts to things4 ,i distinguish in my active experience a clear difference between wishing and willing1 and further between willing and effective action4 ,my ,power--the ,energy related to my ,will--the exertion of which is necessary to translate ,volition into an overt result--is a limited and quantifiable thing1 but that such a hidden energetic medium or substratum underlies all phenomena is evident from the fact that ,i do not will directly the appearance of any given phenomenon4 ,i may wish that4 ,but when the ,volition is reached and the wish transformed into overt exertion ,i find myself involved in the multifarious processes of an energetic system which ,i may so far influence1 but which is nevertheless in many ways constantly going on irrespective of my ,volition4 ,i may wish to avoid pain and may will certain exertions with that view1 but the consequences may be the reverse of what ,i wished4 ,this shows that the ,volition operates immediately not on the sensation but on the energetic system4 ,in all cases between ,volition and overt result there seems to be erected and constantly maintained around me a vast energetic system1 a part but only a small part of which1 namely the ,energy of my organism1 can be influenced directly by my ,will1 whilst1 even in immediate relation with that part1 transmutations beyond the reach of my ,will are constantly going on4 ,indeed1 what fundamentally distinguishes ,volition from ,desire is its relation to the energetic system4 ,the doctrine of ,energy therefore puts in a new and clearer light the whole theory of ,causation4 ,it is common for philosophers to talk of invariable sequence as the criterion of ,causality4 ,but1 in fact1 that is quite fallacious4 ,no one ever regards a phenomenon as the cause of another phenomenon4 ,we ascribe ,causality to the energetic transmutation which in some form or other we inevitably believe to accompany the appearance of every phenomenon4 ,we never postulate a causal relation between day and night--the most notable case of invariable sequence4 ,when we say the fire warms the room1 or the horse draws the cart1 or the sun ripens the corn1 it is the ,energy which we rightly or wrongly associate with the visual sensation referred to in the words fire and horse and sun of which we are thinking1 and by no means of these visual sensations themselves4 ,as has been well said1 we never suppose that the leading carriage of the train draws those behind it1 although their relation of sequence is quite as close to it as to the engine4 ,true1 it is and must be from and by phenomena only that ,i infer and measure the transmutations of ,energy1 but the transmutations measured are operations of the real thing-in-itself postulated by ,science4 ,the existence of such ,energy is suggested to me primarily in my experience of my own activity in which ,i recognise my power of doing work--a quantifiable and measurable thing1 homogeneous with the ,energy in respect of which ,science states the relations and conditions of all physical phenomena4 ,my most incessant mental act is that by which1 on the analogy of my own active experience1 ,i refer all phenomena to the underlying energetic system4 ,this reference it is which transforms sensation into perception2 and the constant affirmation of this reference is the great function of the synthetic mental activity of the understanding1 and is at once the origin and explanation of that imperative mental tendency which metaphysicians call the law of ,causality4 ,how1 then1 does this doctrine affect the theory of the nature of ,space8 ,if it be true that the world as my ,presentment consists in the transmutations occurring in that particular part of the energetic system which constitutes the real substratum of the brain1 then phenomena as a whole must arise in transmutation1 in a process of ,becoming rather than in a state of ,being1 and ,space must be the content1 the condition1 in which that process proceeds4 ,the laws of ,space1 therefore1 are laws1 so to speak1 of motion1 not of position4 ,the most absolutely still and motionless visual presentation is really a series of constant transmutations of ,energy and the form of ,space is constituted by the laws of transmutation1 which are thus at once the necessary conditions of my perception and the universal conditions of all sense-perception4 ,space1 therefore1 does not contain the real thing which sustains the phenomenal world any more than it does the reality which underlies my conscious self4 ,it is the universal condition of the transmutations which constitute phenomena2 and it therefore contains all these phenomena1 including my body as phenomenon and only as phenomenon4 ,its form is discovered by my organic motor activity1 and in representing this activity the mind constructs its concepts of ,space and ,extension4 ,this view of the nature of ,space1 by relating its forms and laws with the objective1 and a-logical thing-in-itself in virtue of the transmutations of which our sense-experience occurs1 relieves an obvious difficulty which must always have been felt in accepting without qualification the purely ,kantian view which regarded it as a category imposed by the ,intelligence upon the otherwise unknowable world of sense4 ,the most ardent assertors of the ideality of ,space have hitherto apparently had difficulty in avoiding the tendency to conceive it as the persistent all-embracing objective content of the thing-in-itself1 not merely of the phenomenon1 although the latter only might enter into ,knowledge4 ,the doctrine1 however1 which presents our conception of ,space as discovered in our activity amid resistant transmutation-processes not only establishes its ideality but at the same time explains the relation which its form nevertheless bears to the objective material laws of the sensible presentation4 ,it liberates the mind from the oppressive necessity of regarding ,space as still somehow objectively extending and containing the real world4 ,it also relieves an obvious difficulty which confronts the ,philosophy of ,schopenhauer in locating those transcendental forms of the phenomenon which are imposed a priori upon the presentation1 and yet are not to be found in the pure ,volition4 ,of course1 it must never be forgotten that my whole sentient experience consists primarily of the series of energetic transmutations occurring at that part of the energetic system which is in immediate vital relation with my consciousness4 ,it is my experience of active exertion1 of moving1 speaking1 etc41 which gives a suggestion of the real energetic world4 ,the transmutations of the real ,energy of the world beyond my organism never enter my ,consciousness4 ,transmutations arising beyond my body only enter the presentation by influencing the cerebral process4 ,the luminous undulation and the sound-wave must both produce transmutation of the cerebral ,energy in order to affect ,consciousness4 ,yet the various characters of the transmitted impulses are distinguishable in the resultant cerebral transmutations4 ,thus ,i feel sensations of hardness1 roughness1 pain1 colour1 sound1 etc4 ,it is by a process of mental construction that ,i associate these with the forms of my exertional activity1 and thus frame my conceptions of real bodies in the world around me--those which ,i more directly associate with the ,energy subject to my ,volition being conceived as representing my body4 ,for reasons of convenience1 ,i refer those conceptions chiefly to the co-ordinated visual presentation1 and thus build up my conception of the extended world of material things4 ,science is possible because all transmutations of ,energy take place according to definite numerical laws and ratios4 ,the whole work of ,science is to explain every phenomenon in terms of its definite transmutation of ,energy4 ,these definite numerical laws and processes are characteristic of all ,energy transmutation1 and thus regulate the experience of every intelligent being4 ,it is in virtue of these that our separate systems of knowledge correspond1 and that we are thus presented each with corresponding aspects of one outer world4 ,the laws which regulate the cerebral changes that accompany sense-presentation are for me the necessary a priori laws of perception4 ,it is because these laws operate in common in all brains that community of intercourse is possible amongst mankind4 ,it is because of the further fact that the whole of the transmutations of ,energy which constitute physical phenomena compose a numerically inter-related and regulated system that ,science and rational knowledge are possible to the intellect of man4 ,our knowledge is what we are obliged to think and assert regarding experience2 but the universality of experience is not explained merely by the common nature and general laws of ,intelligence1 but depends also on the generality of the laws under which the transmutations of ,energy proceed4 ,we are now1 therefore1 by the aid of the doctrine of ,energy1 better able than before to distinguish accurately between the ,ideal and the ,real as contrasted elements in our experience4 ,my ,presentment as a whole consists in the transmutation-processes--in the sensations1 feelings1 perceptions1 images1 ideas--in short1 in all that is going on at the point where 7,i necessarily express myself in terms of spatial relations1 though in this connection these are figurative7 my sentience and intelligence are developed4 ,my whole ,presentment is1 therefore1 in one sense subjective1 or1 as some would say1 ideal4 ,for me1 my ,presentment is the impression produced on1 the condition established in1 my ,consciousness in virtue of what is going on at this so-called point of contact4 ,what we mean1 therefore1 by the subjectivity or ideality of the ,presentment is the aspect of energetic transmutations when viewed as affecting my ,consciousness in contrast with their obverse aspect when viewed as transmutations in the objective system4 ,as my ,presentment1 they are all subjective or ideal1 and it is in this reference that ,berkeley and ,hume1 for instance1 speak of ideas of sense1 such as the colour blue1 the heat of the fire1 the pain of a blow4 ,these1 constituting the bulk of the ,presentment1 they distinguish from what ,berkeley called ideas of the imagination--those stimulated or originated1 or1 as he said1 excited1 by the intelligence itself4 ,whilst he contended that both classes are ideal or subjective1 in respect that they are constituents of the ,presentment1 the latter have an additional title to subjectivity in respect of their origin1 and constitute what are called ideas when the word is used in contra-distinction to sensations--such pure ideas occurring in response to a subjective impulse4 ,on the other hand1 there is a sense in which the ,presentment is1 if not real1 at least actual and objective4 ,so far as we know1 ,intelligence never develops except in conjunction with an organism--that is1 in vital relation with physical ,energy4 ,my ,presentment is constituted by the occurrence and depends upon the continuance of the transmutations or operations proceeding at the related point in the energetic system4 ,even pure ideas1 though subjective not only in regard to aspect but in regard to their origin1 are objective in respect that they also consist in an energetic transmutation4 ,herein lies the germ of truth to be discovered even in the unintelligent dogmatism of those philosophers who assert the absolute ,reality of my ,presentment1 as such--not merely its actuality4 ,it is comparatively seldom1 however1 either in ,science or ,philosophy1 that we meet a thinker prepared to go as far as that4 ,most take refuge in a distinction between primary and secondary qualities of bodies1 classing my sensations as non-resembling secondary qualities1 which they admit cannot be conceived to exist without the mind in the form in which they make up my ,presentment1 but reserving five or six primary qualities--solidity1 extension1 figure1 motion1 rest--which they conceive to exist independently1 just as they enter into my ,presentment4 ,in point of fact1 however1 these so-called primary qualities are not the names of intuitions1 but are abstractions or generalisations of the most general and necessary elements of my active ,experience by reference to which ,i mentally construct my world4 ,the transmutations of ,energy are not a never-repeated accidental kaleidoscope4 ,they proceed according to constant1 definite1 measurable laws1 and though subordinate variations are infinite and make up the details of my ,presentment1 the general laws and conditions according to which all ,energy transmutes are definite1 and constitute the general features or qualities of my ,experience1 and these are the so-called primary qualities of bodies regarded in the light of the doctrine of ,energy4 ,the primary quality of extension1 in particular1 is a conception resulting from the association of my visual ,presentment with my power of active exertion1 and the delusive tendency to regard this quality as in some sense primarily and fundamentally real is due to the unconscious recognition of the fact that it is in virtue of my power1 or association as an agent with the energetic system1 that ,i derive a suggestion of the real world beyond the phenomena which constitute my experience4 ,i cannot exist without some development of activity4 ,hence are derived my conceptions of free space and of resistance between bodies4 ,my primary sensations are the sensations of touch1 and the primary impulse of thought is to relate these with my active exertions4 ,when sight is first restored to the blind the first impulse is to regard the new sensation as a form of touch4 ,its intellectual suggestiveness is a development4 ,the system or stream of transmutations in which my volitional activity principally takes part is that represented by the operation of the forces of ,gravitation and ,cohesion2 the system which influences my visual sensations is a quite different series4 ,the changes in this latter series1 by their greater rapidity1 enable me to anticipate the other series1 and for this and other reasons ,i employ these sensations to signalise and symbolise the transmutations proceeding in the series with which ,i am more immediately related as an active and willing agent4 ,all transmutations1 if they result in sensations1 must do so by producing changes in the ,energy of my organism1 and must therefore be conditioned by the general laws which regulate the changes which occur there1 or1 in other words1 must be contained within a self-consistent spatial condition2 but the differences in the characters of visual ,space1 as it is called1 and the spatial content of my activity1 reflect the differences in the series of energetic transmutations with which they are respectively connected4 ,we see more clearly1 therefore1 with the aid of the doctrine of ,energy1 the import of the theory of transcendental aesthetic enunciated by ,kant1 who first pointed out that there are elements1 and those the most necessary and universal1 in the sense-presentation which bear the character of ideality as fully as the most subjective efforts of our ideative activity4 ,more particularly do we illustrate the ideality of ,space as a cognition precedent to experience4 ,it is because general laws constantly operative regulate the transmutations which constitute the individual's ,presentment that it is possible for him to abstract from and generalise the data of sense2 and it is because the subjective process of ,ideation1 by which we mean our representative mental activity in its widest sense1 consists also in transmutations under the same general laws of the same portion of the energetic organism1 that it is possible to frame general ideas4 ,these general laws of organic transmutation are the a priori conditions of the necessary determination in time of all existences in the world of phenomena4 ,the form1 therefore1 of the phenomenon1 in the language of ,kant1 is constituted by the transmutations of the ,energy immediately related to consciousness2 the matter of the phenomenon is constituted by the varieties produced in these by the transmitted transmutations from the ,energy beyond--just as the musician may produce a constant variety of harmonies upon his instrument1 but all must be conditioned by the relations fixed and established between the notes of which the instrument is composed4 ,transmutations of the cerebral ,energy may be stimulated not only from without1 but by subjective impulse from within2 but in either case the laws of these transmutations are the necessary form of experience1 and it is the possibility of transmutation upon an internal and subjective impulse which makes possible the formation of synthetical judgments a priori4 ,it is as if the organ were not only responsive to impressions upon its keyboard from without1 but were also automotive and could originate harmonies in its own notes2 and as if1 moreover1 it were endowed with consciousness so as to receive an intuition of both classes of music4 ,the former would correspond to sensations1 the latter to ideas2 and we might imagine such an instrument by presenting to itself its own system of notes1 contriving thus to frame a priori a synthetical system of these general musical laws which would constitute the necessary and universal form of its whole musical experience4 ,to complete the perhaps fantastic analogy we must imagine the world to be one co-ordinated musical system1 and our instrument to be endowed with the power of playing upon the other keyboards2 of thence deriving the suggestion of the distinction between the internal and external impulses which respectively awakened harmonies within itself2 and lastly1 of thus at length conceiving in the spirit of science that the necessary and universal laws which it recognised as the most subjective and fundamental conditions of its own operation1 at the same time regulated the activity of the entire musical universe4 ,how natural it would be for such an intelligent musical instrument1 if unhappily endowed with common sense1 to believe and assert that the real substance of the universe consisted solely of sounds4 ,yet how evident would it be to us from our standpoint of more absolute knowledge that the whole orchestra of sounds1 although actual and quite distinct from consciousness1 was still merely phenomenal1 and yet withal1 in its every expression1 revealed the laws and structure of reality--of the system of things in themselves--a system the reality of which was dissimilar to those appearances1 though all its laws and structure could be studied and derived from them4 ,berkeley1 therefore1 erred seriously when he described the idea as a fainter sensation4 ,faint subjective reproductions of our sensations1 as of blue1 green1 or the like1 constitute a very insignificant element in our mental furniture4 ,we seldom pursue so far into detail the ideative effort4 ,severely and effectively as ,berkeley criticised ,locke's account of abstract ideas1 the fact remains that abstraction is a primary feature of our whole conceptual system2 and the abstractable elements of the sensible presentation being the necessary constituents of all ideative representation are properly denominated ideal4 ,the one element of particularity which every idea lacks is the reference to the transmitted transmutation to which the sensible phenomenon owes its origin4 ,we derive such reference to the external solely from the obstructions which our free activity encounters and without which we could receive no suggestion of the non-ego1 and in particular no suggestion of the dynamic element which fundamentally distinguishes things from thoughts4 ,the empirical content of experience--the so-called secondary qualities of bodies--are often called in their subjective aspect ideal because the mental impression is obviously very different from the transmutation objectively regarded4 ,but this is to confound the ideal with the subjective1 which latter term is that properly applicable both to the sensible impression and to purely mental activity4 ,the primary qualities1 being the general laws or forms of organic ,energy-transmutation1 are in a higher sense ideal1 for they are the necessary conditions under which both sense-presentation and ideative representation proceed4 ,whilst1 therefore1 as ,kant maintained1 they are the a priori element in perception1 they at the same time constitute the laws which regulate all ,energy-transmutation within our experience both organic and extra-organic4 ,we hold1 therefore1 to the ,platonic doctrine that whilst1 on the one hand1 the sensible is only an object of thought in so far as it partakes of the intelligible1 on the other hand the idea is not only a type for the individual mind1 but is partaker also of the laws which penetrate the system of things4 ,idealism as a ,philosophy1 in denying the validity of any reference of the content of the ,presentment to a further existence outside of the subjective experience1 has induced that wider use of the term idea which applies it to the whole actuality of experience in its subjective aspect4 ,with the advance of ,philosophy we must revert to that more ancient use of the term idea which confines its extension into the realm of the perceptual to those elements of the sensible presentation which can be reproduced by the conceptual activity of the subject1 and which in asserting1 for instance1 the ideality of ,space1 reminds us at the same time that ,ideality implies not merely subjectivity1 but the expression or representation also of some aspect of those laws which regulate the system of ,reality4 ,but is not common sense right1 after all8 ,do ,i really mean to say that tables1 chairs1 houses1 mountains--the whole world of my ,presentment1 are to be regarded as shrivelled up and located in my brain1 or in the energetic correlative of my brain8 ,is the whole ,universe1 as known to me or conceived by me1 contained within a minute portion of itself--the brain8 ,now ,science does say something very like this1 and the logical difficulties of the position are very pressing4 ,but they cannot be got over by attempting to revert to common sense1 because to assert that all my conceived ,universe is immediately perceived by me as it exists1 would seem to involve a diffusion of my intelligence throughout ,space which is still more inconceivable and self-contradictory4 ,even apart from this implication1 the assumption of the ,reality of the phenomenal world destroys itself4 ,to assume the reality of so-called material particles is to lay the foundation of an argument which surely leads to the conclusion that the whole world of my consciousness is produced by and consists in motions in that certain small group of these same molecules which is assumed to make up my brain4 ,the solution is only reached when we discover that the error lies in forgetting that the ,reality which is the seat of my ,presentment is itself unperceived1 and that what ,i commonly call a body and a brain are the phenomena occurring in my ,presentment1 and which ,i associate with such real substratum4 ,the real substratum of my ,presentment is a part of the energetic ,universe1 which is constantly undergoing transmutations4 ,wherever such ,energy is united1 in an organism1 with consciousness these transmutations1 as affecting and perceived by such consciousness1 constitute its ,presentment or sense-experience2 and aided by the constructive activity of thought expand1 as it were1 subjectively into a whole world of experience1 as the electric current vibrating darkly along the narrow confines of the wire suddenly expands at the carbon point into the luminous undulations which light a city4 ,we admit1 therefore1 to the full the actuality and objectivity of the sensible presentation4 ,we only deny that it is the real thing-in-itself4 ,the latter is not discovered by sense4 ,my energetic organism is like a well-fitting garment2 ,i do not feel it at all4 ,i feel only changes or transmutations taking place in it4 ,be not alarmed1 therefore1 for your common-sense world4 ,we leave it to you intact and actual--not deducting even a single primary quality4 ,allowing fully for the extent to which1 little suspected by you1 it is a mentally constructed system1 its elements are still actual and objective2 they are modes of ,reality2 extension and the other primary qualities are qualities of these modes4 ,moreover1 the ,ego1 ,i1 myself1 as ,will1 as a continuously identic intelligent agent1 am not given to myself immediately in my ,presentment1 any more than is the real object4 ,the existence of my ,ego1 of my cogitant self1 is an inference which ,i am compelled to draw from the facts of my mental activity4 ,cogito1 ergo sum4 ,similarly1 my energetic organism is the real a-logical thing-in-itself which ,i am compelled to postulate in order to explain my perception of physical phenomena in the light of my physical activity2 ago1 ergo possum4 ,we must not overlook the unique position in our ,presentment occupied by the visual presentation4 ,its universality1 simultaneousness1 minute accuracy1 quantifiability1 etc41 are such that it is really to the visual ,presentment that ,i refer all other elements in my sense-experience4 ,i think of them with reference to it4 ,in connection with it ,i mentally construct my world4 ,i associate with some modification of the visual presentation the phenomena resultant upon the energetic activity of my own organism1 and the other forces and potential ,energies which that activity reveals and suggests4 ,it is thus that ,i derive the compound idea of ,body as consisting of ,figure1 ,extension1 and ,solidity4 ,the continued appearance in my visual presentation of the grey colour which ,i am now seeing is to me the sign of the continued persistence of that potential ,energy in virtue of which ,i regard it as the appearance of a solid extended stone wall4 ,everything is referred to the visual presentation1 and it is in reference to it that the mind works in constructing its world4 ,the whole theory of molecular action is a theory constructed in reference to the visual presentation--the reality of which1 strangely1 it seems to result in overthrowing4 ,a born-blind man could never have invented the conception of atoms or molecules4 ,this is well worth thinking over4 ,the visual presentation is not really fundamental2 and we must undo the inversion induced by its great convenience whereby we refer to it all the other elements of our sense-experience and conceive of our activity and our whole actual world by reference to the visible sign4 ,it is in consequence of this reference to the visual that bodies are thought of as discrete units1 so that it is difficult to conceive that the real thing in virtue of which we experience the perception of1 say1 a heap of stones1 is truly more or less potential ,energy--just as the continuous process of thought is very different from the disparate symbols of speech4 ,i habitually refer to the visual extended image as the primary basis of my idea of the world1 or of any particular part of the world1 such as my dining-room4 ,why8 ,simply because1 for the reasons already noted1 the sense of sight is the sense of universal reference4 ,in principle it is the same habitual tendency which makes me associate every element of my world with its appropriate name4 ,it is different in the case of other sensations4 ,when ,i am absent from ,niagara ,i do not1 in thinking of it1 primarily conceive of it as a roar of sound4 ,i think of certain motions of mass which1 if ,i were present1 would occasion the subjective sensations of sound4 ,but for the habitual tendency arising from the universal reference to the visible ,i would do the same in the case of the visual image4 ,all ,i am necessitated to think is a real event--a real1 physical1 dynamical transmutation--proceeding quite independently of my perception or presence2 and if ,i can only manage to realise that ,i must1 for philosophical purposes1 eliminate my reference to visual as well as to audible or other sensations1 ,i will understand that all ,i am entitled to1 and all ,i can1 without hopeless contradiction1 postulate as real thing existing independently of my perception1 is a transmutation of ,energy4 ,this energy is imperceptible1 unextended1 unfigured1 yet it is by no means a mere logical or mental necessity or associative tendency4 ,on the contrary1 it is very real4 ,it sustains my every act4 ,by an imperative mental necessity ,i am obliged1 by inference from my experiences as an active and percipient agent1 to postulate the energetic system in which ,i am involved1 and with one particular centre in which ,i am organically related4 ,but we recall at this point that ,science says she must still postulate ,matter as the vehicle of ,energy4 ,but what does that mean except that the subject of her studies is the sensible presentation which itself consists of energy transmutation in part constantly changing but with relatively permanent and recurrent elements8 ,these more permanent elements constitute what we call bodies4 ,if the sensible presentation consisted exclusively of one continuous1 unchanging phenomenon1 ,reason would never be stimulated1 and ,personality1 ,cause1 ,power would never have been postulated or conceived4 ,but the transmutation is constantly accelerated--incessantly fluctuates and varies4 ,certain of these variations ,i recognise as related to my own volitional activity1 and ,i am thus furnished with a key which enables me1 by a sympathetic analogy1 to attribute all the changes in my experience to various agents1 each related to the other by the intervention of this system of physical ,energy4 ,some of these ,i can further trace to the initiative of ,volition of myself or other persons2 others ,i can only recognise as integral parts of the vast energetic system of ,nature1 the stimulus of which ,i cannot follow further4 ,the reality of ,matter is said to be proved by its indestructibility2 but this characteristic can easily be resolved into 7#a7 the indestructibility of ,space and ,extension which we have seen to be merely another name for the necessity or inevitable universality of the general laws and conditions of ,energy transmutation1 and 7#b7 the indestructibility of the ,energy to the transmutations of which we attribute the forces of ,cohesion and ,gravitation4 ,all vital activity is but a producing of changes in the stream of transmutation4 ,we never do1 nor in the nature of things do we ever try to1 increase or diminish the quantity of the real ,energy itself4 ,we instinctively recognise the objective source of our physical power1 and this has led some thinkers to suppose that the indestructibility of ,matter is an a priori datum of thought4 ,but such a belief is quite unfounded4 ,all it amounts to is a recognition that the destruction of ,matter is beyond our power--a necessary consequence of the fact that we merely act upon the transmutation-process4 ,many a long contest between the supporters of a priori and experiential knowledge can be set at rest by this view of the mediating functions of the energetic organism4 ,the reflections which we have thus briefly noted and illustrated open a wide field for inquiry4 ,the scientific doctrine of ,energy would seem to be pregnant with momentous consequences for ,philosophy1 and it is worth while for metaphysicians to devote to this subject the deepest and most deliberate thought4 ,the results cannot easily be grasped by a mere cursory perusal of memoranda1 in which we have only sketched a few salient aspects of the doctrine4 ,we deprecate unwarrantable assurance1 and are fully conscious of the difficulty of adequately expressing thought on such a theme2 but we have not written rashly nor without good grounds for asking attention4 ,science1 it seems to us1 postulates in ,energy an a-logical1 unextended1 real thing-in-itself in terms of which the phenomena of ,physics can be adequately and quantifiably stated4 ,at the same time it furnishes ,philosophy with a theory of the objectively real thing-in-itself which satisfied those necessities of thought by which we are constrained to interpret our sense-experience by a constant reference to a ,reality beyond it--a necessity due to our association as ,actors with an ,energy beyond that which is the seat of our ,presentment4 ,such a view avoids the incurable difficulties and contradictions involved in the theory of the reality of extended material substance1 or in any theory1 indeed1 which asserts the reality--as presented--of the sensible presentation4 ,physical ,reality thus conceived is consistently thinkable as co-existent with the thing-in-itself--be it ultimately ,intelligence or ,volition--of which our cognitive and conative existence is a manifestation4 ,and such a doctrine1 by explaining all phenomena as transmutations proceeding 7according to the definite mathematical laws prevailing throughout the whole ,universe of ,energy7 at that point in the system which is organically related to ,consciousness1 accounts at once for the apparent apriority and necessity of the qualities of ,space1 and at the same time for their evident universality and objectivity4 ,in a word1 it would rather seem as if ,science1 unconscious of its pregnant possibilities1 has not only formulated a theory which co-ordinates and unifies the entire fabric of physical knowledge1 but has also at length furnished ,philosophy with the key to that problem the solution of which has1 in the words of ,schopenhauer1 been the main endeavour of philosophers for more than two centuries1 namely1 to separate by a correctly drawn line of cleavage the ,ideal--that which belongs to our knowledge as such--from the ,real1 that which exists independently of us2 and thus to determine the relation of each to the other4 ,to us it seems not strange that ,philosophy should in the end be indebted to ,science for this solution--nor should ,science1 in the hour of her greatest speculative victory1 object too hastily to the assistance which the thinker1 trained to the study of the process of thought1 can render in clarifying and restating in its metaphysical aspects a theory which1 if profoundly conceived1 and formulated by men of science from ,rumford and ,davy to ,stewart1 ,tait1 and ,kelvin1 was partially anticipated by the metaphysician who conceived the world as will and idea4 ,we maintain1 therefore1 that the presentation of sense1 the continuum or manifold1 or what you will1 consists in the transmutations of a real substance itself unextended and unperceived2 that the laws of these transmutations are what constitute the geometric all-containing ,space2 that at a point in this real energetic system organically related to the intelligent self1 the transmutations occurring there constitute the individual's sensible experience2 that his mind1 by also actively influencing the system at that point1 can stimulate the train of transmutations which constitute his world of ideas2 that the mind can discover itself as ,will influencing transmutations in the organism which are transmitted through a wider1 larger portion of the system2 and can recognise the transmutations at the related point as influenced sometimes by its own ,volition and sometimes by other agents4 ,we seek to bring the added light of scientific theory to reconcile the conflict between the law and the fact1 between the objects of reflection and the objects of sense1 between the world of thought and the world of phenomena1--the problem which ,plato raised and which has since been the central problem of ,metaphysics4 ,in doing so we present a doctrine which not only maintains the truth of the ,ideal1 and the actuality of the phenomenal1 and the relative reality of both1 but which proves1 with all the cogency of ,science1 how it is that the ,sensible is permeated by and made knowable only by the ,ideal1 by the laws of the transmutations which constitute actuality1 and that1 on the other hand1 the ,ideal only enters experience as the regulative principle of the ever-transmuting ,reality4 ,the world consists not merely of phenomena1 nor of phenomena and laws which regulate them4 ,these are but transitional and imperfect aspects of ,reality4 ,our standard of ,truth and ,reality1 says a recent writer1 moves us on towards an individual with laws of its own1 and to laws which form the vital substance of a single existence4 ,we approach such a goal in the conception of ,energy--the laws of whose constant transmutations are what we call ,nature4 ,we must distinguish ,energy as ,absolute ,reality from such conceptions as ,activity1 which is its subjective aspect1 or as ,force1 which is really the rate at which ,energy is1 in certain cases1 transformed4 ,dynamics1 which investigates ,force1 is a study of the fundamental transmutations of ,energy4 ,it postulates ,energy as the ,real ,entity in terms of which it can frame a satisfactory theory of dynamical phenomena4 ,the metaphysical labours of the century which has elapsed since ,kant have not been altogether in vain4 ,the deeper thinkers are pretty nearly agreed that the ,absolute is not to be identified with its appearances4 ,how far they can bring home this view in practical form to the intelligence of man is another matter4 ,plato doubtless saw the truth in a sort of beatific vision1 but the tide of speculation ebbed after his death1 and its healing waters never inundated the deserts of mediaeval thought4 ,the discursive weakness in which the speculation of the transcendental ,philosophy seems to dissipate itself makes us fear a similar decline4 ,metaphysics must receive the assistance of the great speculative achievement of ,physics4 ,it must realise that ,science can postulate a ,reality unperceived and unqualified by the conditions of sense1 but in terms of which ,science can explain the whole phenomena of the sensible presentation in their objective aspect1--explain these as transmutations of ,reality1 proceeding in accordance with the general mathematical laws under which ,reality transmutes itself4 ,it may be said that reason requires us to think that the ,universe is a unity4 ,where do you embrace within ,reality1 in such a view of it1 ,intelligence1 ,volition1 ,feeling8 ,we answer3 ,of course1 obviously ,reality1 as postulated by ,physics1 does not contain these4 ,but the ,real ,thing postulated by ,physics is but one aspect of the whole1 and may be1 must be1 merged in a higher ,reality--of which phenomena1 on the one hand1 and ,thought1 ,conation1 ,feeling on the other1 are the appearances4 ,that involves a further advance1 the attainment of a higher degree of ,truth which would bridge the ,dualism of ,thought and ,existence1 of ,self and ,not-self1 of ,spirit and ,nature1 and whilst1 on the one hand1 such ,reality must fundamentally be a-logical1 on the other hand ,energy may owe its energy to ,spirit4 ,in the dualism which we must1 in experience1 recognise1 we notice one fundamental distinction3 quantification1 measurability1 appear the attributes of the physical2 quality1 ideality1 of the spiritual4 ,the apprehension1 therefore1 of the doctrine of ,energy should accomplish in clarity and security the abolition of the intolerable contradictions which have hitherto involved the search for ,reality amid its appearances4 ,we think it suggests the most satisfying explanation of the distinction which separates1 and the principle which relates ,ideality and ,externality1 and should obviate the almost childish efforts of transcendentalists to expound the relation of the ,mind to a body which is involved in1 and which is yet--for the individual--distinguished1 they cannot tell us how1 from the whole system of ,nature4 ,of course1 neither ,thought nor ,volition1 as such1 can be the absolute ,reality4 ,they1 like ,physical ,force1 are but transmutations1 affections1 phases of ,reality4 ,nor1 again1 is ,energy1 as a quality1 a correct description of the ,absolute1 as such4 ,the ,absolute1 as such1 we cannot describe2 but in studying1 as ,physics does1 the relations of physical phenomena and stating these in terms of ,reality1 it conveniently gives ,reality a name appropriate to its own standpoint4 ,metaphysics rightly declines to be required to study special branches of ,science4 ,nothing but grotesque absurdity ensues when this precaution is overlooked4 ,yet ,metaphysics has hitherto thought itself the better of a little logic1 and in the future it will have to grasp the scientific conception of ,reality4 ,there is nothing else for it2 and1 after all1 it is remarkable how far the most fundamental conceptions of ,metaphysics are dependent on a physical origin4 ,surely it is of primary importance to realise the effect upon our conceptions of ,space and ,extension of the doctrine of the transmutations of ,energy4 ,even the profoundest metaphysicians have seemingly failed to explain how ,space1 ,matter1 and ,extension are related with ,reality4 ,you cannot ignore this difficulty by saying that these are the working conceptions of particular branches of ,physical ,science4 ,but when you realise that physical phenomena1 even the most permanent and rigid1 are by scientific demonstration but transmutations of the real thing1 you may then understand that ,space1 ,body1 and ,extension are but the laws and conditions of the process4 ,as appearances1 and within the realm of phenomena1 they seem still what they have always seemed4 ,so much we still concede without diminution or obscurity2 and at the same time we can harmonise them as they could never be harmonised before with postulated ,reality4 ,it is the same with ,time4 ,the facts of memory would seem to imply that there is no succession in the ,absolute4 ,we are always present at all times of our life4 ,in recollecting a past event we are contemplating no mere image1 but the actual past event itself4 ,our chronometry depends on the annual motion of the ,earth round the ,sun4 ,it has thus a purely physical basis4 ,we might illustrate the application of the doctrine of ,energy to every department of ,metaphysics4 ,but such is not the object of the present essay4 ,we merely desire to indicate briefly some of the many aspects of the theory1 and if only we have been able to suggest a line of inquiry1 the primary object of this essay has been attained4 ,,footnotes3 #ha3a ,originally printed in #ahih1 now revised and rewritten4 ,printed by ,,morrison ,,gibb ,,limited1 ,edinburgh ,,by ,,the ,,same ,,author ,,the ,,dynamic ,,foundation ,,of ,,knowledge ,crown #hvo4 #ccj pp4 #fs4 net ,mr4 ,philip1 a thinker of considerable acuteness1 expounds further the dynamic theory of knowledge which he propounded in ',matter and ,energy' and the ',doctrine of ,energy4' ,what we are really sensible of in the external world is mutation2 but the consciousness of our own activity suggests the existence of something behind phenomena4 ,the reality which sustains experience is found to be1 in essence1 power--power conceived as an energy containing within itself the principle of its own evolution2 an energy constantly transmuting itself1 and in its transmutations furnishing the entire presentation of sense4 ,the universal application of this concept unifies science or the knowledge of nature2 and the dynamic theory is applied by ,mr4 ,philip to life1 economics1 and education4 ,times4 ,well written1 and contains much sound analysis of perception and the like1 with much that is debatable but suggestive and stimulating4--,nature4 ,the argument is conducted with great ability and thoroughness1 and the writer reveals a most accurate acquaintance with the results of both science and philosophy4--,glasgow ,herald4 ,,kegan ,,paul1 ,,trench1 ,t,r,ue,b,n,e,r1 ,,co41 ,,ltd4 ,,broadway ,,house1 #fh-gd ,,carter ,,lane1 ,,london1 ,e4,c4