,,the    ,,philosophy    ,,of ,,the     
,,moral ,,feelings4    ,,by    ,,john   
,,abercrombie1 ,m4,d4 ,,oxon4  ,,edin4  
,v4 ,p4 ,r4 ,s4 ,e4    ,,fellow ,,of    
,,the ,,royal ,,college ,,of            
,,physicians ,,of ,,edinburgh2          
,,member ,,of ,,the ,,royal ,,academy   
,,of ,,medicine ,,of ,,france2   ,,and  
,,first ,,physician ,,to ,,her ,,majesty
 ,,in ,,scotland4    ,,fifth ,,edition4 
,,london3   ,,john ,,murray1 ,,albemarle
 ,,street4   ,,mdcccxxxix4              
,,edinburgh3    ,printed by ,balfour and
 ,jack1 ,niddry ,street4     ,,preface4 
,in a former work1 the ,author          
endeavoured to delineate1 in a simple   
and popular form1 the leading facts     
relating to the ,intellectual ,powers1  
and to trace the principles which ought 
to guide us in the ,investigation of    
,truth4 ,the volume which he now offers 
to the public attention1 is intended as 
a sequel to these ,inquiries2 and his   
object in it is to investigate1 in the  
same unpretending manner1 the ,moral    

,feelings of the ,human ,mind1 and the  
principles which ought to regulate our  
volitions and our conduct as moral and  
responsible beings4 ,the two branches of
 investigation are1 in many respects1   
closely connected2 and1 on this account1
 it may often happen1 that1 in the      
present work1 principles are assumed as 
admitted or proved1 which1 in the       
former1 were stated at length1 with the 
evidence by which they are supported4   
,in presenting a fifth edition of this  
volume1 the ,author feels most deeply   
the favourable manner in which it has   
been received1 and the notice which has 
been bestowed upon it by those whose    
approbation he regards as a distinction 
of the most gratifying kind4 ,he had two
 objects chiefly in view when he        
ventured upon this investigation4 ,the  
one was to divest his inquiry of all    
unprofitable speculation1 and to shew   
that the philosophy of the moral        
feelings bears directly upon a practical
 purpose of the highest moment1--the    

mental and moral culture of every       
rational being4 ,the other was to shew  
the close and important relation which  
exists between this science and the     
doctrines of revealed religion1 and the 
powerful evidence which is derived1 for 
the truth of both1 from the manner in   
which they confirm and illustrate each  
other4 ,these two sources of knowledge  
cannot be separated1 in the estimation  
of any one who feels the deep interest  
of the inquiry1 and seriously prosecutes
 the important question1--what is truth4
 ,if we attempt to erect the philosophy 
of morals into an independent science1  
we shall soon find that its highest     
inductions only lead us to a point      
beyond which we are condemned to wander 
in doubt and in darkness4 ,but1 on the  
other hand1 by depreciating philosophy1 
or the light which is derived from the  
moral impressions of the mind1 we       
deprive ourselves of a most important   
source of evidence in support of        
revelation4 ,for it is from these       

impressions1 viewed in connexion with   
the actual state of man1 that we learn  
the necessity1 and the moral            
probability1 of a revelation2 and it is 
by principles existing in the mind that 
we are enabled to feel the power of that
 varied and incontrovertible evidence1  
by which revelation comes to the candid 
inquirer with all the authority of      
truth4    ,,edinburgh1 ,november #ahch4 
99       99       99       99       99  
,,contents4     ,,preliminary           
,,observations4    ,,section ,i4        
,,nature ,,and ,,importance ,,of ,,the  
,,science ,,of ,,the   ,,moral          
,,feelings4     ,division of the ,mental
 ,powers into ,intellectual and ,moral  
#a    ,harmony which ought to exist     
between these classes                   
#c    ,causes by which this harmony is  
interrupted1--and means   of            
counteracting them                      
#c    ,interest of the science of the   
,moral ,feelings                        
#e    ,peculiar sources of ,knowledge   

bearing upon it1 from the   light of    
,conscience1 and of ,divine ,revelation 
#g     ,,section ,,ii4    ,,first       
,,truths ,,in ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,the
 ,,moral   ,,feelings4     ,analogy     
between ,first ,truths1 or ,intuitive   
,principles   of ,belief1 in            
,intellectual1 and in ,moral ,science   
#aa    ,classification of ,first ,truths
 in ,moral ,science1 as impressions     
arising out of each other1 by an obvious
 chain   of relations                   
#af    #a4 ,perception of the nature and
 quality of actions1   as just or       
unjust1--right or wrong2--and a         
conviction of duties which a man owes to
   other men4    #b4 ,conviction of the 
existence and attributes of a   ,great  
,first ,cause1 and ,moral ,governor4    
#c4 ,conviction of ,moral               
,responsibility4    #d4 ,impression of  
,future ,existence4    ,importance of   
these convictions1 as intuitive articles
 of   belief                            
#ah          99       99       99       

99       99     ,,the ,,philosophy      
,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,feelings4          
,analysis of ,man as a ,moral ,being    
#bg     ,i4 ,,the ,,desires--,,the      
,,affections--and ,,self-,,love4        
,,ii4 ,,the ,,will4    ,,iii4  ,,the    
,,moral ,,principle1 or ,,conscience4   
,,iv4  ,,the ,,moral ,,relation ,,of    
,,man ,,towards ,,the ,,deity4          
99       99       99       99       99  
,,part ,i4    ,,the ,,desires--,,the    
,,affections--,,and ,,self-,,love4      
,,section ,i4         ,,the ,,desires   
#cf    #a4  ,desire of the ,animal      
,propensities                           
#cg    #b4  ,desire of ,wealth--,avarice
                                        
#ch    #c4  ,desire of ,power--,ambition
                                        
#ci    #d4  ,desire of                  
,superiority--,emulation                
#dj    #e4 ,desire of ,society          
#da    #f4  ,desire of ,esteem or       
,approbation                            
#db    #g4  ,desire of ,knowledge       

#df    #h4   ,desire of ,moral          
,improvement                            
#dg    -- ,desire of ,action            
#di    ,importance of a ,due ,regulation
 of the ,desires                        
#ej     ,,section ,,ii4        ,,the    
,,affections                            
#ec    ,i4 ,,justice                    
#ee    #a4  ,justice to the ,interests  
of others--,integrity                   
#ei    #b4  ,justice to the ,freedom of 
,action of others                       
#ei    #c4  ,justice to the ,reputation 
of others                               
#fj    #d4  ,justice in estimating the  
,conduct and ,character of others       
#fa    #e4 ,justice to the ,opinions of 
others--,candour                        
#fb    #f4 ,justice to the ,feelings of 
others                                  
#fc    #g4 ,justice to the ,moral       
,condition of others                    
#fd     ,,ii4 ,,compassion ,,and        
,,benevolence                           
#ff    #a4 ,benevolence towards the     

,distresses of others                   
#fi    #b4 ,benevolence towards the     
,reputation of others                   
#gj    #c4 ,benevolence towards the     
,character and ,conduct of              
others1--including ,forgiveness of      
,injuries                            #ga
    #d4 ,benevolence towards the        
,feelings of others                     
#ga    #e4 ,benevolence towards         
improving the ,moral ,condition   of    
others                                  
#gc     ,,iii4  ,,veracity              
#gd    #a4   ,the ,love of ,truth1 in   
the ,reception of it                    
#gf    #b4  ,veracity in delivering     
statements1--including ,sincerity       
#gh    #c4   ,truth of ,purpose1 or     
,correct fulfilment of ,promises        
#hb     ,,iv4 ,,friendship1 ,,love1     
,,and ,,gratitude                       
#hc     ,v4 ,,patriotism                
#hd    ,,the ,,domestic ,,affections    
#he    ,,the ,,defensive ,,affections1  
,,anger1 ,,jealousy1   ,,resentment     

#hi    ,important ,influence produced   
upon the ,exercise of the   ,affections1
    ,by ,attention                      
#ib    ,by ,habit                       
#ig    ,feeling of ,moral ,approbation  
attached to the ,exercise   of the      
,affections                             
#ajj    ,happiness arising from a due   
,exercise of the                        
,affections2--,influence   of ,temper   
#ajf     ,,section ,,iii4               
,,self-,,love                           
#aaj    ,sense in which the term is     
employed                                
#aaa    ,tendency of a true and         
,rational ,self-love                    
#aaa    ,morbid ,exercise of            
it1--,selfishness                       
#aaf    ,disinterested ,conduct and     
,self-denial                            
#aag          99       99       99      
99       99     ,,part   ,,ii4    ,,of  
,,the ,,will                            
#aai    ,simple ,volition1 its ,origin  
from one of the ,desires or             

,affections                             
#aai    ,operation of ,moral ,causes on 
the ,will                               
#abj    ,nature of these ,causes1 and   
,source of the ,diversity of   their    
operation in different individuals      
#abc    ,circumstances required for the 
,uniformity of their ,operation3--      
#a4 ,knowledge                          
#abh    ,truths of ,natural and         
,revealed ,religion4    #b4 ,attention  
#acb    ,its influence on ,moral        
,decisions4    #c4 ,moral ,habits       
#acg    ,origin and ,progress of        
,derangement of ,moral ,harmony4        
,influence of ,habits upon ,character   
#adb    ,means of ,correcting ,injurious
 ,moral ,habits                         
#adc    ,practical ,conclusions from    
these ,principles4 ,important           
,influence of ,moral ,habits            
#ade    ,necessity and ,probability of  
,divine ,aid in correcting   ,moral     
,derangement                            
#adi    ,influence of the ,mental       

operation called ,faith                 
#aeb          99       99       99      
99       99     ,,part ,,iii4    ,,of   
,,the ,,moral ,,principle1 ,,or         
,,conscience                            
#aee    ,proofs of the ,existence of    
,conscience as a ,distinct ,principle   
of the mind                             
#aef    ,nature of its ,operation as the
 ,regulating ,principle                 
#aeg    ,analogy between it and ,reason 
#aeh    ,its ,influence in conveying an 
,impression of the ,moral   ,attributes 
of the ,deity                           
#afc    ,knowledge derived from this    
,source                                 
#afd    ,comparison of the ,divine      
,attributes with the ,actual   ,state of
 ,man                                   
#afg    ,difficulties arising from this 
,comparison removed only   by the       
,christian ,revelation                  
#afi    ,mental ,process by which the   
,regulating ,power of ,conscience   is  
,impaired or ,lost                      

#agb    ,influence of this ,condition   
upon the ,judgment in regard   to ,moral
 ,truth                                 
#agf    ,influence of ,attention in     
,moral ,decisions                       
#agi    ,man's responsibility for his   
belief                                  
#ahb   ,important relation between      
,moral ,emotions and   voluntary        
,intellectual ,processes                
#ahc     ,,appendix ,,to ,,part ,,iii4  
,sec4 #a4--,,of ,,the ,,origin ,,and    
,,immutability ,,of ,,moral             
,,distinctions ,,and ,,theories ,,of    
,,morals                                
#aij    ,origin of ,our ,idea of ,virtue
 and ,vice                              
#aic    ,system of ,mandeville          
#aie    ,system of ,clarke and          
,wollaston                              
#aig    ,system of ,utility             
#aih    ,selfish ,system                
#aii    ,system of ,paley               
#bja    ,defect of these ,systems in not
 acknowledging the   ,supreme ,authority

 of ,conscience                         
#bjf    ,objections to the belief of a  
uniformity of ,moral   ,feeling which   
have been founded on the practices   of 
barbarous nations                       
#baf    ,system of ,dr4 ,smith1 or      
,theory of ,sympathy                    
#bai    ,province of ,reason in ,moral  
,decisions                              
#bbb    ,remarks on the ,observations of
 some late   ,writers respecting the    
,corruption of ,conscience              
#bbg     ,sec4 #b4--,,of ,,the ,,harmony
 ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,feelings          
#bca    ,consistency of ,character      
arising from this ,harmony1--and        
,defects of ,character to which it is   
opposed                                 
#bcg          99       99       99      
99       99     ,,part ,,iv4     ,,of   
,,the ,,moral ,,relation ,,of ,,man     
,,towards ,,the ,,deity                 
#bdc    ,view of the ,divine ,character 
in reference to this ,regulation        
#bdd    ,regulation of the ,moral       

,feelings which ought to arise out   of 
it                                      
#bde    #a4   ,habitual effort to       
cultivate a ,sense of the ,divine       
,presence1 and to regulate the ,moral   
,feelings and ,character by it          
#bde    #b4   ,submission to the        
appointments of ,providence             
#beb    #c4   ,sense of ,moral          
,imperfection and ,guilt1 and           
,supplication for ,mercy1 with ,reliance
 on   ,divine ,aid                      
#bed    #d4   ,sense of ,gratitude1     
,affection1 and ,love                   
#bee    ,conduct and ,character arising 
out of this ,condition of   the ,moral  
,feelings                               
#bef    ,means of ,cultivating it       
#bfb    ,nature and ,operation of ,faith
                                        
#bfd    ,province of ,faith in the      
,philosophy of the ,moral ,feelings     
#bfi    ,truths which are its more      
,immediate ,object                      
#bgc    ,its ,influence on the ,moral   

,condition                              
#bgf    ,province of ,faith in the      
,scheme of ,christianity                
#bhb    ,certain ,errors regarding      
,faith                                  
#bhg    ,harmony of ,christian ,truth   
with the ,philosophy of the   ,moral    
,feelings                               
#bij     ,,preliminary ,,observations4  
,,sect4 ,i4  ,,nature ,,and ,,importance
 ,,of ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,the ,,moral
 ,,feelings4   ,man is to be            
contemplated as an intellectual1 and as 
a moral being4 ,by his intellectual     
powers1 he acquires the knowledge of    
facts1 observes their connexions1 and   
traces the conclusions which arise out  
of them4 ,these mental operations1      
however1 even in a high state of        
cultivation1 may be directed entirely to
 truths of an extrinsic kind1--that is1 
to such as do not exert any influence   
either on the moral condition of the    
individual1 or on his relations to other
 sentient beings4 ,they may exist in an 

eminent degree in the man who lives only
 for himself1 and feels little beyond   
the personal wants1 or the selfish      
enjoyments of the hour that is passing  
over him4  ,but1 when we contemplate man
 as a moral being1 new relations open on
 our view1 and these are of mightier    
import4 ,we find him occupying a place  
in a great system of moral government1  
in which he has an important station to 
fill and high duties to perform4 ,we    
find him placed in certain relations to 
a great moral ,governor1 who presides   
over this system of things1 and to a    
future state of being for which the     
present scene is intended to prepare    
him4 ,we find him possessed of powers   
which qualify him to feel these         
relations1 and of principles calculated 
to guide him through the solemn         
responsibilities which attend his state 
of moral discipline4  ,these two parts  
of his mental constitution we perceive  
to be remarkably distinct from each     
other4 ,the former may be in vigorous   

exercise in him who has little feeling  
of his moral condition1--and the latter 
may be in a high state of culture in the
 man1 who1 in point of intellectual     
acquirement1 knows little beyond the    
truths which it most concerns him to    
know1--those great but simple principles
 which guide his conduct as a           
responsible being4  ,in a well-regulated
 mind1 there is an intimate harmony and 
co-operation between these two          
departments of the mental economy4      
,knowledge1 received through the powers 
of sensation and simple intellect1      
whether relating to external things1 or 
to mental phenomena1--and conclusions   
derived from these through the powers of
 reasoning1 ought all to contribute to  
that which is the highest state of      
man1--his purity as a moral being4 ,they
 ought all to lend their aid towards the
 cultivation of those principles of his 
nature which bind him to his            
fellow-men2--and those higher principles
 still1 which raise his feeble powers to

 the ,eternal ,incomprehensible ,one1   
the first great cause of all things1 and
 the moral ,governor of the universe4   
,a slight degree of observation is      
sufficient to convince us1 that such a  
regulated condition of the mental       
constitution does not exist in the      
generality of mankind4 ,it is not my    
present purpose to inquire into the     
causes by which this is primarily       
deranged2 but it may be interesting to  
trace some of the circumstances which   
bear a part in producing the            
derangement4 ,in our present state of   
being1 we are surrounded with objects of
 sense2 and the mind is kept1 in a great
 degree1 under the influence of external
 things4 ,in this manner it often       
happens1 that facts and considerations  
elude our attention1 and deeds escape   
from our memory1 in a manner which would
 not occur1 were the mind left at       
liberty to recall its own associations1 
and to feel the influence of principles 
which are really part of the mental     

constitution4 ,it is thus that1 amid the
 bustle of life1 the attention is apt to
 be engrossed by considerations of a    
local and an inferior character2--while 
facts and motives of the highest moment 
are overlooked1 and deeds of our own1   
long gone by1 escape from our           
remembrance4 ,we thus lose a correct    
sense of our moral condition1 and yield 
to the agency of present and external   
things1 in a manner disproportioned to  
their real value4 ,for our highest      
concern as moral beings is with things  
future1 and things unseen1 and often    
with circumstances in our own moral     
history1 long past1 and perhaps         
forgotten4 ,hence the benefit of        
retirement and calm reflection1 and of  
every thing that tends to withdraw us   
from the impression of sensible objects1
 and lends us to feel the superiority of
 things which are not seen4 ,under such 
influence1 the mind displays an         
astonishing power of recalling the past 
and grasping the future1--and of viewing

 objects in their true relations1 to    
itself and to each other4 ,the first of 
these1 indeed1 we see exemplified in    
many affections1 in which the mind is   
cut off1 in a greater or less degree1   
from its intercourse with the external  
world1 by causes acting upon the bodily 
organization4 ,in another work ,i have  
described many remarkable examples of   
the mind1 in this condition1 recalling  
its old impressions respecting things   
long past and entirely forgotten2 and   
the facts there stated call our         
attention in a very striking manner to  
its inherent powers and its independent 
existence4  ,this subject is one of     
intense interest1 and suggests          
reflections of the most important kind1 
respecting the powers and properties of 
the thinking principle4 ,in particular1 
it leads us to a period1 which we are   
taught to anticipate even by the        
inductions of intellectual science1     
when1 the bodily frame being dissolved1 
the thinking and reasoning essence shall

 exercise its peculiar faculties in a   
higher state of being4 ,there are facts 
in the mental phenomena which give a    
high degree of probability to the       
conjecture1 that the whole transactions 
of life1 with the motives and moral     
history of each individual1 may then be 
recalled by a process of the mind       
itself1 and placed1 as at a single      
glance1 distinctly before him4 ,were we 
to realize such a mental condition1 we  
should not fail to contemplate the      
impressions so recalled1 with feelings  
very different from those by which we   
are apt to be misled amid the influence 
of present and external things4--,the   
tumult of life is over2--pursuits1      
principles1 and motives1 which once bore
 an aspect of importance1 are viewed    
with feelings more adapted to their true
 value4--,the moral principle recovers  
that authority1 which1 amid the contests
 of passion1 had been obscured or       
lost2--each act and each emotion is seen
 in its relations to the great dictates 

of truth1 and each pursuit of life in   
its real bearing on the great concerns  
of a moral being2--and the whole assumes
 a character of new and wondrous import1
 when viewed in relation to that        
,incomprehensible ,one1 who is then     
disclosed in all his attributes as a    
moral governor4--,time past is          
contracted into a point1 and that the   
infancy of being2--time to come is seen 
expanding into eternal existence4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,such are the views which open on him   
who would inquire into the essence by   
which man is distinguished as a rational
 and moral being4 ,compared with it1    
what are all the phenomena of           
nature1--what is all the history of the 
world1--the rise and fall of            
empires1--or the fate of those who rule 
them4 ,these derive their interest from 
local and transient relations1--but this
 is to exist for ever4 ,that science1   
therefore1 must be considered as the    
highest of all human pursuits1 which    

contemplates man in his relation to     
eternal things4 ,with its importance we 
must feel its difficulties2 and1 did we 
confine the investigation to the mere   
principles of natural science1 we should
 feel these difficulties to be          
insurmountable4 ,but1 in this great     
inquiry1 we have two sources of         
knowledge1 to which nothing analogous is
 to be found in the history of physical 
science1 and which will prove infallible
 guides1 if we resign ourselves to their
 direction with sincere desire to       
discover the truth4 ,these are1--the    
light of conscience1--and the light of  
divine revelation4 ,in making this      
statement1 ,i am aware that ,i tread on 
delicate ground1--and that some will    
consider an appeal to the sacred        
writings as a departure from the strict 
course of philosophical inquiry4 ,this  
opinion1 ,i am satisfied1 is entirely at
 variance with truth1--and1 in every    
moral investigation1 if we take the     
inductions of sound philosophy1 along   

with the dictates of conscience1 and the
 light of revealed truth1 we shall find 
them to constitute one uniform and      
harmonious whole1 the various parts of  
which tend1 in a remarkable manner1 to  
establish and illustrate each other4    
,if1 indeed1 in any investigation of    
moral science1 we disregard the light   
which is furnished by the sacred        
writings1 we resemble an astronomer who 
should rely entirely on his unaided     
sight1 and reject those optical         
inventions which extend so remarkably   
the field of his vision1 as to be to him
 the revelation of things not seen4     
,could we suppose a person thus         
entertaining doubts respecting the      
knowledge supplied by the telescope1 yet
 proceeding in a candid manner to       
investigate its truth1 he would         
perceive1 in the telescopic observations
 themselves1 principles developed which 
are calculated to remove his suspicions4
 ,for1 in the limited knowledge which is
 furnished by vision alone1 he finds    

difficulties which he cannot explain1   
apparent inconsistencies which he cannot
 reconcile1 and insulated facts which he
 cannot refer to any known principle4   
,but1 in the more extended knowledge    
which the telescope yields1 these       
difficulties disappear1 facts are       
brought together which seemed           
unconnected or discordant1 and the      
universe appears one beautiful system of
 order and consistency4 ,it is the same 
in the experience of the moral inquirer1
 when he extends his views beyond the   
inductions of reason1 and corrects his  
conclusions by the testimony of ,god4   
,discordant principles are brought      
together1 doubts and difficulties       
disappear1 and beauty1 order1 and       
harmony are seen to pervade the         
government of the ,deity4 ,in this      
manner there also arises a species of   
evidence for the doctrines of           
revelation1 which is entirely           
independent of the external proofs of   
its divine origin2 and which1 to the    

candid mind1 invests it with all the    
characters of authenticity and truth4   
,from these combined sources of         
knowledge1 thus illustrating and        
confirming each other1 we are enabled to
 attain1 in moral inquiries1 a degree of
 certainty adapted to their high        
importance4 ,we do so when1 with sincere
 desire to discover the truth1 we resign
 ourselves to the guidance of the light 
which is within1 aided as it is by that 
light from heaven which shines upon the 
path of the humble inquirer4 ,cultivated
 on these principles1 the science is    
fitted to engage the most powerful mind2
 while it will impart strength to the   
most common understanding4 ,it          
terminates in no barren speculations1   
but tends directly to promote peace on  
earth1 and good-will among men4 ,it is  
calculated both to enlarge the          
understanding1 and to elevate and purify
 the feelings1 and thus to cultivate the
 moral being for the life which is to   
come4 ,it spreads forth to the view1    

becoming smoother and brighter the      
farther it is pursued2 and the rays     
which illuminate the path converge in   
the throne of ,him who is ,eternal4     
,,sect4 ,,ii4  ,,of ,,first ,,truths    
,,in ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the      
,,moral ,,feelings4   ,the knowledge    
which we receive through our            
intellectual powers is referable to two 
classes4 ,these may be distinguished by 
the names of acquired knowledge1 and    
intuitive or fundamental articles of    
belief4 ,the former is procured by the  
active use of our mental powers1 in     
collecting facts1 tracing their         
relations1 and observing the deductions 
which arise out of particular           
combinations of them4 ,these constitute 
the operations which ,i have referred to
 in another work1 under the heads of    
processes of investigation1 and         
processes of reasoning4 ,the full       
exercise of them requires a certain     
culture of the mental faculties1 and    
consequently is confined to a           

comparatively small number of men4 ,we  
perceive1 however1 that such culture is 
not essential to every individual1--for 
many are very deficient in it who yet   
are considered as persons of sound mind1
 and capable of discharging their duties
 in various situations of life in a     
creditable and useful manner4  ,but the 
knowledge which we derive from the other
 source is of immediate and essential   
importance to men of every degree2 and1 
without it1 no individual could engage1 
with confidence1 in any of the common   
transactions of life1 or make any       
provision for his protection or comfort1
 or even for the continuance of his     
existence4 ,these are the principles    
also treated of1 in a former work1 under
 the name of ,first ,truths4 ,they are  
not1 like our knowledge of the other    
kind1 the result of any process either  
of investigation or of reasoning1 and1  
for the possession of them1 no man      
either depends upon his own observation1
 or has recourse to that of other men4  

,they are a part of his mental          
constitution1 arising1 with a feeling of
 absolute certainty1 in every sound     
mind2 and1 while they admit of no proof 
by processes of reasoning1 sophistical  
objections brought against them can be  
combated only by an appeal to the       
consciousness of every man1 and to the  
absolute conviction which forces itself 
upon the whole mass of mankind4  ,if the
 ,creator has thus implanted in the mind
 of man principles to guide him in his  
intellectual and physical relations1    
independently of any acquired knowledge1
 we might naturally expect to find him  
endowed1 in the same manner1 with       
principles adapted to his more important
 relations as a moral being4 ,we might  
naturally expect1 that1 in these high   
concerns1 he would not be left to the   
knowledge which he might casually       
acquire1 either through his own powers  
of investigation or reasoning1 or       
through instruction received from other 
men4 ,impressions adapted to this       

important end we accordingly find       
developed in a remarkable manner1--and  
they are referable to that part of our  
constitution1 which holds so important a
 place in the philosophy of the mind1 by
 which we perceive differences in the   
moral aspect of actions1 and approve or 
disapprove of them as right or wrong4   
,the convictions derived from this      
source seem to occupy the same place in 
the moral system1 that first truths1 or 
intuitive articles of belief1 do in the 
intellectual4 ,like them1 also1 they    
admit of no direct proofs by processes  
of reasoning2 and1 when sophistical     
arguments are brought against them1 the 
only true answer consists in an appeal  
to the conscience of every              
uncontaminated mind2--by which we mean  
chiefly the consciousness of its own    
moral impressions1 in a mind which has  
not been degraded in its moral          
perceptions by a course of personal     
depravity4 ,this is a consideration of  
the utmost practical importance2 and it 

will probably appear that many          
well-intended arguments1 respecting the 
first principles of moral truth1 have   
been inconclusive1 in the same manner as
 were attempts to establish first truths
 by processes of reasoning1--because the
 line of argument adopted in regard to  
them was one of which they are not      
susceptible4 ,the force of this analogy 
is in no degree weakened by the fact1   
that there is1 in many cases1 an        
apparent difference between that part of
 our mental constitution1 on which is   
founded our conviction of first truths1 
and that principle from which is derived
 our impression of moral truth3--,for   
the former continues the same in every  
mind which is neither obscured by idiocy
 nor distorted by insanity2 but the     
moral feelings become vitiated by a     
process of the mind itself1 by which it 
has gradually gone astray from          
rectitude4 ,hence the difference we find
 in the decisions of different men1     
respecting moral truth1 arising from    

peculiarities in their own mental       
condition2--and hence that remarkable   
obscuration of mind1 at which some men  
at length arrive1 by which the judgment 
is entirely perverted respecting the    
first great principles of moral purity4 
,when1 therefore1 we appeal to certain  
principles in the mental constitution1  
as the source of our first impressions  
of moral truth1 our appeal is made      
chiefly to a mind which is neither      
obscured by depravity1 nor bewildered by
 the refinements of a false             
philosophy3--it is made to a mind in    
which conscience still holds some degree
 of its rightful authority1 and in which
 there is a sincere and honest desire to
 discover the truth4 ,these two elements
 of character must go together in every 
correct inquiry in moral science2 and1  
to a man in an opposite condition1 we   
should no more appeal1 in regard to the 
principles of moral truth1 than we      
should take from the fatuous person or  
the maniac our test of those first      

principles of intellectual truth1 which 
are allowed to be original elements of  
belief in every sound mind4  ,to remedy 
the evils arising from this diversity   
and distortion of moral perception1 is  
one of the objects of divine revelation4
 ,by means of it there is introduced a  
fixed and uniform standard of moral     
truth2 but1 it is of importance to      
remark1 that1 for the authority of this1
 an appeal is made to principles in the 
mind itself1 and that every part of it  
challenges the assent of the man in whom
 conscience has not lost its power in   
the mental economy4         99       99 
99       99       99  ,keeping in view  
the distinction which has now been      
referred to1 it would appear1 that there
 are certain first principles of moral  
truth1 which arise in the mind by the   
most simple process of                  
reflection1--either as constituting its 
own primary moral convictions1 or as    
following from its consciousness of     
these convictions by a plain and obvious

 chain of relations4 ,these are chiefly 
the following4  ,i4 ,a perception of the
 nature and quality of actions1 as just 
or unjust1--right or wrong2--and a      
conviction of certain duties1 as of     
justice1 veracity1 and benevolence1     
which every man owes to his fellow-men4 
,every man1 in his own case1 again1     
expects the same offices from others2   
and1 on this reciprocity of feeling1 is 
founded the precept1 which is felt to be
 one of universal obligation1 to do to  
others as we would that they should do  
to us4  ,,ii4 ,from this primary moral  
impression1 there arises1 by a most     
natural sequence1 a conviction of the   
existence and superintendence of a great
 moral ,governor of the universe1--a    
being of infinite perfection and        
infinite purity4 ,a belief in this      
,being1 as the first great cause1 is    
derived1 as we have formerly seen1 by a 
simple step of reasoning1 from a survey 
of the works of nature1 taken in        
connexion with the ,first ,truth1 that  

every event must have an adequate cause4
 ,our sense of his moral attributes     
arises1 with a feeling of equal         
certainty1 when1 from the moral         
impressions of our own minds1 we infer  
the moral attributes of him who thus    
formed us4  ,,iii4 ,from these combined 
impressions1 there naturally springs a  
sense of moral responsibility2--or a    
conviction1 that1 for the due           
performance of the duties which are     
indicated by the conscience1 or moral   
consciousness1 man is responsible to the
 ,governor of the universe2--and        
farther1 that to this ,being he owes1   
more immediately1 a certain homage of   
the moral feelings1 entirely distinct   
from the duties which he owes to his    
fellow-men4  ,,iv4 ,from this chain of  
moral convictions1 it is impossible to  
separate a deep impression of continued 
existence1 or of a state of being beyond
 the present life1--and of that as a    
state of moral retribution4         99  
99       99       99       99  ,the     

consideration of these important objects
 of belief will afterwards occur to us  
in various parts of our inquiry4 ,they  
are briefly stated here1 in reference to
 the place which they hold as ,first    
,truths1 or primary articles of moral   
belief1 which arise by a natural and    
obvious chain of sequence1 in the moral 
conviction of every sound understanding4
 ,for the truth of them we appeal not to
 any process of reasoning1 properly so  
called1 but to the conviction which     
forces itself upon every regulated mind4
 ,neither do we go abroad among savage  
nations1 to inquire whether the         
impression of them be universal2 for    
this may be obscured in communities1 as 
it is in individuals1 by a course of    
moral degradation4 ,we appeal to the    
casuist himself1 whether1 in the calm   
moment of reflection1 he can divest     
himself of their power4 ,we appeal to   
the feelings of the man who1 under the  
consciousness of guilt1 shrinks from the
 dread of a present ,deity and the      

anticipation of a future reckoning4 ,but
 chiefly we appeal to the conviction of 
him1 in whom conscience retains its     
rightful supremacy1 and who habitually  
cherishes these momentous truths1 as his
 guides in this life in its relation to 
the life that is to come4  ,in applying 
to these important articles of belief   
the name of ,first ,truths1 or primary  
principles of moral conviction1 ,i do   
not mean to ascribe to them any thing of
 the nature of innate ideas4 ,i mean    
only that they arise1 with a rapid or   
instantaneous conviction entirely       
distinct from what we call a process of 
reasoning1 in every regulated mind1 when
 it is directed1 by the most simple     
course of reflection1 to the phenomena  
of nature without1 and to the moral     
feelings of which it is conscious       
within4 ,it appears to be a point of the
 utmost practical importance1 that we   
should consider them as thus arising out
 of principles which form a part of our 
moral constitution2 as it is in this way

 only that we can consider them as      
calculated to influence the mass of     
mankind4 ,for1 if we do not believe them
 to arise1 in this manner1 by the       
spontaneous exercise of every           
uncorrupted mind1 there are only two    
methods by which we can suppose them to 
originate2--the one is a direct         
revelation from the ,deity1--the other  
is a process of reasoning or of         
investigation1 properly so called1      
analogous to that by which we acquire   
the knowledge of any principle in       
natural science4 ,we cannot believe that
 they are derived entirely from         
revelation1 because we find the belief  
existing where no revelation is known1  
and because we find the sacred writers  
appealing to them as sources of         
conviction existing in the mental       
constitution of every man4 ,there is an 
obvious absurdity1 again1 in supposing  
that principles1 which are to regulate  
the conduct of responsible beings1      
should be left to the chance of being   

unfolded by processes of reasoning1 in  
which different minds may arrive at     
different conclusions1 and in regard to 
which many are incapable of following   
out any argument at all4 ,what is called
 the argument a priori for the existence
 and attributes of the ,deity1 for      
instance1 conveys little that is        
conclusive to most minds1 and to many is
 entirely incomprehensible4 ,the same   
observation may be applied to those     
well-intended and able arguments1 by    
which the probability of a future state 
is shewn from analogy and from the      
constitution of the mind4 ,these are    
founded chiefly on three                
considerations1--the tendency of virtue 
to produce happiness1 and of vice to be 
followed by misery1--the unequal        
distribution of good and evil in the    
present life1--and the adaptation of our
 moral faculties to a state of being    
very different from that in which we are
 at present placed4 ,there is much in   
these arguments calculated to elevate   

our conceptions of our condition as     
moral beings1 and of that future state  
of existence for which we are destined2 
and there is much scope for the highest 
powers of reasoning1 in shewing the     
accordance of these truths with the     
soundest inductions of true philosophy4 
,but1 notwithstanding all their truth   
and all their utility1 it may be doubted
 whether they are to any one the        
foundation of his faith in another state
 of being4 ,it must be admitted1 at     
least1 that their force is felt by those
 only whose minds have been in some     
degree trained to habits of reasoning1  
and that they are therefore not adapted 
to the mass of mankind4 ,but the truths 
which they are intended to establish are
 of eternal importance to men of every  
degree1 and we should therefore expect  
them to rest upon evidence which finds  
its way with unerring aim to the hearts 
of the unlearned4 ,the unanswerable     
reasonings of ,butler never reached the 
ear of the gray-haired pious peasant1   

but he needs not their powerful aid to  
establish his sure and certain hope of a
 blessed immortality4 ,it is no         
induction of logic that has transfixed  
the heart of the victim of deep remorse1
 when he withers beneath an influence   
unseen by human eye1 and shrinks from   
the anticipation of a reckoning to come4
 ,in both1 the evidence is within1--a   
part of the original constitution of    
every rational mind1 planted there by   
him who framed the wondrous fabric4     
,this is the power of conscience2--with 
an authority1 which no man can put away 
from him1 it pleads at once for his own 
future existence1 and for the moral     
attributes of an omnipotent and         
ever-present ,deity4 ,in a healthy state
 of the moral feelings1 the man         
recognises its claim to supreme         
dominion4 ,amid the degradation of      
guilt1 it still raises its voice and    
asserts its right to govern the whole   
man2 and1 though its warnings are       
disregarded1 and its claims disallowed1 

it proves within his inmost soul an     
accuser that cannot be stilled1 and an  
avenging spirit that never is quenched4 
,similar observations apply to the      
uniformity of moral distinctions1 or the
 conviction of a certain line of conduct
 which man owes to his fellow-men4      
,there have been many controversies and 
various contending systems in reference 
to this subject1 but ,i submit that the 
question may be disposed of in the same 
manner as the one now mentioned4        
,certain fixed and defined principles of
 relative duty appear to be recognised  
by the consent of mankind1 as an        
essential part of their moral           
constitution1 by as absolute a          
conviction as that by which are         
recognised our bodily qualities4 ,the   
hardened criminal1 whose life has been a
 course of injustice and fraud1 when at 
length brought into circumstances which 
expose him to the knowledge or the      
retribution of his fellow-men1 expects  
from them veracity and justice1 or      

perhaps even throws himself upon their  
mercy4 ,he thus recognises such         
principles as a part of the moral       
constitution1 just as the blind man1    
when he has missed his way1 asks        
direction of the first person he        
meets1--presuming upon the latter       
possessing a sense which1 though lost to
 him1 he still considers as belonging to
 every sound man4 ,in defending himself1
 also1 the criminal shews the same      
recognition4 ,for1 his object is to     
disprove the alleged facts1 or to frame 
excuses for his conduct2--he never      
attempts to question those universal    
principles by which he feels that his   
actions must be condemned1 if the facts 
are proved against him4 ,without such   
principles1 indeed1 thus universally    
recognised1 it is evident that the whole
 system of human things would go into   
confusion and ruin4 ,human laws may     
restrain or punish gross acts of        
violence and injustice2 but they can    
never provide for numberless methods by 

which a man may injure his neighbour1 or
 promote his own interest at the expense
 of others4 ,there are1 in fact1 but a  
very few cases which can be provided for
 by any human institution2 it is a      
principle within that regulates the     
whole moral economy4 ,in its extent and 
importance1 when compared with all the  
devices of man1 it may be likened to    
those great principles which guide the  
movements of the universe1 contrasted   
with the contrivances by which men      
produce particular results for their own
 convenience2 and one might as well     
expect to move a planet by machinery1 or
 propel a comet by the power of steam1  
as to preserve the semblance of order in
 the moral world1 without those         
fundamental principles of rectitude     
which form a part of the original       
constitution of every rational being4   
,farther1 as each man has the           
consciousness of these principles in    
himself1 he has the conviction that     
similar principles exist in others4     

,hence arises the impression1 that1 as  
he judges of their conduct by his own   
moral feelings1 so will they judge of   
him by corresponding feelings in        
themselves4 ,in this manner is produced 
that reciprocity of moral impression1 by
 which a man feels the opinion of his   
fellow-men to be either a reward or a   
punishment2 and hence also springs that 
great rule of relative duty1 which      
teaches us to do to others as we would  
that they should do to us4 ,this        
uniformity of moral feeling and         
affection even proves a check upon those
 who have subdued the influence of these
 feelings in themselves4 ,thus1 a man   
who has thrown off all sense of justice1
 compassion1 or benevolence1 is still   
kept under a certain degree of control  
by the conviction of these impressions  
existing in those by whom he is         
surrounded4 ,there are indeed men in the
 world1 as has been remarked by ,butler1
 in whom this appears to be the only    
restraint to which their conduct is     

subjected4  ,upon the whole1 therefore1 
there seems to be ground for assuming1  
that the articles of belief1 which have 
been the subject of the preceding       
observations1 are primary principles    
arising with an immediate feeling of    
conviction in our moral constitution2   
and that they correspond with those     
elements in our intellectual economy1   
which are commonly called ,first        
,truths1--principles which are now      
universally admitted to require no other
 evidence than the conviction which     
forces itself upon every sound          
understanding4     ,,philosophy  ,,of   
,,the ,,moral ,,feelings4   ,when we    
analyze the principles which distinguish
 man as a moral being1 our attention is 
first directed to his actions1 as the   
external phenomena by which we judge of 
his internal principles4 ,it is familiar
 to every one1 however1 that the same   
action may proceed from very different  
motives1 and that1 when we have the     
means of estimating motives or          

principles1 it is from these that we    
form our judgment respecting the moral  
condition of the individual1 and not    
from his actions alone4 ,when we        
consider separately the elements which  
enter into the economy of an intelligent
 and responsible agent1 they seem to    
resolve themselves into the following3--
  ,i4 ,his actual conduct1 or actions4  
,,ii4 ,in determining his conduct1 the  
immediate principle is his will1 or     
simple volition4 ,he wills some         
act1--and the act follows of course1    
unless it be prevented by restraint from
 without1 or by physical inability to   
perform it4 ,these alone can interfere  
with a man following the determination  
of his will1 or simple volition4  ,,iii4
 ,the objects of will or simple volition
 are referable to two classes1--objects 
to be obtained1--and actions to be      
performed to others2--and these are     
connected with two distinct mental      
conditions1 which exist previously to   
the act of volition4 ,in regard to      

objects to be obtained1 this mental     
condition is ,desire2--in regard to     
actions towards others1 it is           
,affection4 ,the ,desires and           
,affections1 therefore1 hold a place in 
the mind previous to volition4 ,from one
 of them originates the mental state    
which1 under certain regulations1 leads 
to volition1 or to our willing a certain
 act4 ,the act1 which is then the result
 of the volition1 consists either in    
certain efforts towards attaining the   
object desired1--or in certain conduct  
towards other men1 amusing out of our   
affections or mental feelings towards   
them4 ,the ,desires and ,affections1    
therefore1 may be considered as the     
primary or moving powers1 from which our
 actions proceed4 ,in connection with   
them we have to keep in view another    
principle1 which has an extensive       
influence on our conduct in regard to   
both these classes of emotions4 ,this is
 ,self-love2--which leads us to seek our
 own protection1 comfort1 and advantage4

 ,it is a sound and legitimate principle
 of action when kept in its proper      
place2--when allowed to usurp an undue  
influence1 it degenerates into          
selfishness2 and it then interferes in a
 material degree with the exercise of   
the affections1 or1 in other words1 with
 our duty to other men4  ,,iv4 ,we have 
next to attend to the fact1 that every  
desire is not followed by actual        
volition towards obtaining the          
object2--and that every affection does  
not lead to the conduct which might flow
 from it4 ,thus a man may feel a desire 
which1 after consideration1 he          
determines not to gratify4 ,another may 
experience an affection1 and not act    
upon it2--he may feel benevolence or    
friendship1 and yet act1 in the         
particular case1 with cold              
selfishness2--or he may feel the impulse
 of anger1 and yet conduct himself with 
forbearance4 ,when1 therefore1 we go    
another step backwards in the chain of  
moral sequences1 our attention is       

directed to certain principles by which 
the determination is actually           
decided1--either according to the desire
 or affection which is present to the   
mind1 or in opposition to it4 ,this     
brings us to a subject of the utmost    
practical importance3--and the          
principles1 which thus decide the       
determination of the mind1 are referable
 to two heads4  7#a47 ,the determination
 or decision may arise out of a certain 
state of arrangement of the moving      
powers themselves1 in consequence of    
which some one of them has acquired a   
predominating influence in the moral    
system4 ,this usually results from      
habit1 or frequent indulgence1 as we    
shall see in a subsequent part of our   
inquiry4 ,a man1 for example1 may desire
 an object1 but perceive that the       
attainment would require a degree of    
exertion greater than he is disposed to 
devote to it4 ,this is the              
preponderating love of ease1 a branch of
 self-love4 ,another may perceive that  

the gratification would impair his good 
name1 or the estimation in which he is  
anxious to stand in the eyes of other   
men2--this is the predominating love of 
approbation1 or regard to character4 ,in
 the same manner1 a third may feel that 
it would interfere with his schemes of  
avarice or ambition1--and so in regard  
to the other desires4 ,on a similar     
principle1 a man may experience a strong
 impulse of anger1 but perceive that    
there would be danger in gratifying it1 
or that he would promote his reputation 
or his interest by not acting upon      
it2--he may experience a benevolent     
affection1 but feel that the exercise   
would interfere too much with his       
personal interest or comfort4  7#b47    
,the determination may arise from a     
sense of duty1 or an impression of moral
 rectitude1 apart from every            
consideration of a personal nature4     
,this is the ,moral ,principle or       
,conscience2--in every mind in a state  
of moral health1 it is the supreme and  

regulating principle1 preserving among  
the moving powers a certain harmony to  
each other1 and to the principles of    
moral rectitude4 ,it often excites to   
conduct which requires a sacrifice of   
self-love1 and so prevents this         
principle from interfering with the     
sound exercise of the affections4 ,it   
regulates the desires1 and restrains    
them by the simple rule of purity2--it  
directs and regulates the affections in 
the same manner by the high sense of    
moral responsibility2 and it thus       
maintains order and harmony in the whole
 moral system4  ,one of the chief       
diversities of human character1 indeed1 
arises from the circumstance of one man 
being habitually influenced by the      
simple and straight-forward principle of
 duty1 and another merely by a kind of  
contest between desires and motives of a
 very inferior or selfish nature4 ,thus 
also we acquire a knowledge of the moral
 temperament of different men1 and learn
 to adapt our measures accordingly in   

our transactions with them4 ,in         
endeavouring1 for example1 to excite    
three individuals to some act of        
usefulness1 we come to know1 that in one
 we have only to appeal to his sense of 
duty2 in another to his vanity or love  
of approbation2 while we have no hope of
 making any impression on the third1    
unless we can make it appear to bear    
upon his interest4  ,v4 ,the principles 
referred to under the preceding heads   
are chiefly those which regulate the    
connexion of man with his fellow-men4   
,but there is another class of emotions1
 in their nature distinct from these2   
though1 in a practical point of view1   
they are much connected4 ,these are the 
emotions which arise out of his relation
 to the ,deity4 ,the regulation of the  
moral feelings1 in reference to this    
relation1 will therefore come to be     
considered in a department of the       
inquiry devoted to themselves1 in       
connexion with the views of the         
character and attributes of ,god1 which 

we obtain from the light of reason and  
conscience4         99       99       99
       99       99  ,this analysis of   
the principles which constitute the     
moral feelings indicates the farther    
division of our inquiry in the following
 manner3--  ,i4 ,the ,desires1--the     
,affections1--and ,self-love4  ,,ii4    
,the ,will4  ,,iii4 ,the ,moral         
,principle1 or ,conscience4  ,,iv4 ,the 
moral relation of man towards the       
,deity4  ,these constitute what may be  
called the active principles of man1 or 
those which are calculated to decide his
 conduct as a moral and responsible     
being4 ,in connexion with them1 there is
 another class of feelings1 which may be
 called passive or connecting emotions4 
,they exert a considerable influence of 
a secondary kind2 but1 in an ,essay     
which is meant to be essentially        
practical1 it perhaps will not be       
necessary to do more than enumerate them
 in such a manner as to point out their 
relation to the active principles4      

,when an object presents qualities on   
account of which we wish to obtain it1  
we feel desire4 ,if we have reason to   
think that it is within our reach1 we   
experience hope2 and the effect of this 
is to encourage us in our exertions4 ,if
 we arrive at such a conviction as      
leaves no doubt of the attainment1 this 
is confidence1 one of the forms of that 
state of mind which we call faith4 ,if  
we see no prospect of attaining it1 we  
give way to despair1--and this leads us 
to abandon all exertion for the         
attainment4 ,when we obtain the object  
we experience pleasure or joy2 if we are
 disappointed1 we feel regret4 ,if1     
again1 we have the prospect of some evil
 which threatens us1 we experience fear1
 and are thereby excited to exertions   
for averting it4 ,if we succeed in doing
 so1 we experience joy2 if not1 we feel 
sorrow4 ,if the evil seem unavoidable1  
we again give way to despair1 and are   
thus led to relinquish all attempts to  
avert it4--,similar emotions attend on  

the affections4 ,when we experience an  
affection1 we desire to be able to act  
upon it4 ,when we see a prospect of     
doing so1 we hope2 if there seem to be  
none1 we despair of accomplishing our   
object4 ,when we have acted upon a      
benevolent affection1 or according to   
the dictates of the moral principle1 we 
experience self-approbation2 when the   
contrary1 we feel remorse4 ,when either 
a desire or an affection has acquired an
 undue influence1 so as to carry us     
forward in a manner disproportioned to  
its real and proper tendencies1 it      
becomes a passion4     ,,part ,i4  ,,of 
,,the ,,desires1 ,,the ,,affections1    
,,and ,,self-,,love4     ,,sect4 ,i4    
,,the ,,desires4  ,desire is the        
immediate movement or act of the mind   
towards an object which presents some   
quality on account of which we wish to  
obtain it4 ,the objects of desire1      
therefore1 embrace all those attainments
 and gratifications1 which mankind      
consider worthy of being sought after4  

,the object pursued in each particular  
case1 is determined by the views1       
habits1 and moral dispositions of the   
individual4 ,in this manner1 one person 
may regard an object1 as above every    
other worthy of being sought after1     
which to another appears insignificant  
or worthless4 ,the principles which     
regulate these diversities1 and         
consequently form one of the great      
differences in human character1 belong  
to a subsequent part of our inquiry4    
,in forming a classification of the     
desires1 we must be guided simply by the
 nature of the various objects which are
 desired4 ,those which may be specified 
as the most prevalent1 and the most     
clearly to be distinguished as separate1
 may be referred to the following heads4
  ,i4 ,the gratification of the animal  
propensities1--commonly called the      
appetites4 ,these1 which we possess in  
common with the lower animals1 are      
implanted in us for important purposes2 
but they require to be kept under the   

most rigid control1 both of reason and  
of the moral principle4 ,when they are  
allowed to break through these          
restraints1 and become leading          
principles of action1 they form a       
character the lowest in the scale1      
whether intellectual or moral2 and it is
 impossible to contemplate a more       
degraded condition of a rational and    
moral being4 ,the consequences to       
society are also of the most baneful    
nature4 ,without alluding to the glutton
 or to the drunkard1 what accumulated   
guilt1 degradation1 and wretchedness    
follow the course of the                
libertine1--blasting whatever comes     
within the reach of his influence1 and  
extending a demoralizing power alike to 
him who inflicts and to those who suffer
 the wrong4 ,thus is constituted a class
 of evils1 of which no human law can    
take any adequate cognizance1 and which 
therefore raise our views1 in a special 
and peculiar manner1 to a supreme ,moral
 ,governor4  ,,ii4 ,the ,desire of      

,wealth1 commonly called                
,avarice2--though avarice is perhaps    
justly to be regarded as the morbid     
excess or abuse of the propensity4 ,this
 is properly to be considered as        
originating in the desire to possess the
 means of procuring other               
gratifications4 ,but1 by the influence  
of habit1 the desire is transferred to  
the thing itself1 and it often becomes a
 kind of mania1 in which there is the   
pure love of gain1 without the          
application of it to any other kind of  
enjoyment4 ,it is a propensity which    
may1 in a remarkable manner1 engross the
 whole character1 acquiring strength by 
continuance1 and it is then generally   
accompanied by a contracted selfishness1
 which considers nothing as mean or     
unworthy that can be made to contribute 
to the ruling passion4 ,this may be the 
case even when the propensity is        
regulated by the rules of justice2--if  
it break through this restraint1 it     
leads to fraud1 extortion1 deceit1 and  

injustice1--and1 under another form1 to 
theft or robbery4 ,it is therefore      
always in danger of being opposed to the
 exercise of the benevolent affections1 
leading a man to live for himself1 and  
to study only the means calculated to   
promote his own interest4  ,,iii4 ,the  
,desire of ,power1 or ,ambition4 ,this  
is the love of ruling1--or giving the   
law to a circle whether more or less    
extensive4 ,when it becomes the         
governing propensity1 the strongest     
principles of human nature give way     
before it1--even those of personal      
comfort and safety4 ,this we see in the 
conqueror1 who braves every danger1     
difficulty1 and privation1 for the      
attainment of power2 and in the         
statesman1 who sacrifices for it every  
personal advantage1 perhaps health and  
peace4 ,the principle1 however1 assumes 
another form1 which1 according to its   
direction1 may aim at a higher object4  
,such is the desire of exercising power 
over the minds of men2 of persuading a  

multitude1 by arguments or eloquence1 to
 deeds of usefulness2 of pleading the   
cause of the oppressed2--a power of     
influencing the opinions of others1 and 
of guiding them into sound sentiments   
and virtuous conduct4 ,this is a species
 of power1 the most gratifying by far to
 an exalted and virtuous mind1 and one  
calculated to carry benefit to others   
wherever it is exerted4  ,,iv4 ,the     
,desire of ,superiority1 or ,emulation4 
,this is allied to the former1 except   
that it does not include any direct wish
 to rule1 but aims simply at the        
acquirement of pre-eminence4 ,it is a   
propensity of extensive influence1 and  
not easily confined within the bounds of
 correct principle4 ,it is apt to lead  
to undue means for the accomplishment of
 its object2 and every real or imagined 
failure tends to excite hatred and envy4
 ,hence it requires the most careful    
regulation and1 when much encouraged in 
the young1 is not free from the danger  
of generating malignant passions4 ,its  

influence and tendency1 as in other     
desires1 depend in a great measure on   
the objects to which it is directed4 ,it
 may be seen in the man who seeks to    
excel his associates in the gaiety of   
his apparel1 the splendour of his       
equipage1 or the luxury of his table4   
,it is found in him whose proud         
distinction is to be the most fearless  
rider at a steeple-chase or a           
fox-hunt1--or to perform some other     
exploit1 the only claim of which to     
admiration consists in its never having 
been performed before4 ,the same        
principle1 directed to more worthy      
objects1 may influence him who seeks to 
be distinguished in some high pursuit1  
calculated to confer a lasting benefit  
upon his country or on human kind4  ,v4 
,the ,desire of ,society4 ,this has been
 considered by most writers on the      
subject as a prominent principle of     
human nature1 shewing itself at all     
periods of life1 and in all conditions  
of civilization4 ,in persons shut up    

from intercourse with their fellow-men1 
it has manifested itself in the closest 
attachment to animals2 as if the human  
mind could not exist without some object
 on which to exercise the feelings      
intended to bind man to his fellows4 ,it
 is found in the union of men in civil  
society and social intercourse1--in the 
ties of friendship1 and the still closer
 union of the domestic circle4 ,it is   
necessary for the exercise of all the   
affections2 and even our weaknesses     
require the presence of other men4      
,there would be no enjoyment of rank or 
wealth1 if there were none to           
admire2--and even the misanthrope       
requires the presence of another to whom
 his spleen may be uttered4 ,the abuse  
of this principle leads to the          
contracted spirit of party4  ,,vi4 ,the 
,desire of ,esteem and ,approbation4    
,this is a principle of most extensive  
influence1 and is in many instances the 
source of worthy and useful displays of 
human character4 ,though inferior to the

 high sense of moral obligation1 it may 
yet be considered a laudable            
principle1--as when a man seeks the     
approbation of others by deeds of       
benevolence1 public spirit1 or          
patriotism1--by actions calculated to   
promote the advantage or the comfort    
either of communities or individuals4   
,in the healthy exercise of it1 a man   
desires the approbation of the good2--in
 the distorted use of it1 he seeks      
merely the praise of a party1 or        
perhaps1 by deeds of a frivolous or even
 vicious character1 aims at the applause
 of associates whose praise is          
worthless4 ,according to the object to  
which it is directed1 therefore1 the    
desire of approbation may be the        
attribute either of a virtuous or a     
perverted mind4 ,but it is a principle1 
which1 in general1 we expect to find    
operating in every well-regulated mind1 
under certain restrictions4 ,thus a man 
who is totally regardless of            
character1--that is1 of the opinion of  

all others respecting his conduct1 we   
commonly consider as a person lost to   
correct virtuous feeling4 ,on the other 
hand1 however1 there may be instances in
 which it is the quality of a man of the
 greatest mind to pursue some course to 
which from adequate motives1 he has     
devoted himself1 regardless alike of the
 praise or the disapprobation of other  
men4 ,the character in which the love of
 approbation is a ruling principle is   
therefore modified by the direction of  
it4 ,to desire the approbation of the   
virtuous1 leads to conduct of a         
corresponding kind1 and to steadiness   
and consistency in such conduct4 ,to    
seek the approbation of the vicious1    
leads1 of course1 to an opposite        
character4 ,but there is a third        
modification1 presenting a subject of   
some interest1 in which the prevailing  
principle of the man is a general love  
of approbation1 without any             
discrimination of the characters of     
those whose praise is sought1 or of the 

value of the qualities on account of    
which he seeks it4 ,this is vanity2 and 
it produces a conduct wavering and      
inconsistent1--perpetually changing with
 the circumstances in which the         
individual is placed4 ,it often leads   
him to aim at admiration for            
distinctions of a very trivial          
character1--or even for qualities which 
he does not really possess4 ,it thus    
includes the love of flattery4 ,pride1  
on the other hand1 as opposed to vanity1
 seems to consist in a man entertaining 
a high opinion of himself1 while he is  
indifferent to the opinion of           
others2--thus we speak of a man who is  
too proud to be vain4  ,our regard to   
the opinion of others is the origin of  
our respect to character1 in matters    
which do not come under the higher      
principle of morals2 and is of extensive
 influence in promoting the harmonies1  
proprieties1 and decencies of society4  
,it is thus the foundation of good      
breeding1 and leads to kindness and     

accommodation in little matters which do
 not belong to the class of duties4 ,it 
is also the source of what we usually   
call decorum and propriety1 which lead a
 man to conduct himself in a manner     
becoming his character and              
circumstances1 in regard to things which
 do not involve any higher principle4   
,for1 apart entirely from any           
consideration either of morality or     
benevolence1 there is a certain line of 
conduct which is unbecoming in all men2 
and there is conduct which is becoming  
in some1 though it might not in other   
men1--and in some circumstances1 though 
it might not be so in others4 ,it is    
unnecessary to add1 how much of a man's 
respectability in life often depends    
upon finding his way1 with proper       
discrimination1 through the relations of
 society which are amenable to this     
principle2 or1 by how many actions1     
which are not really wrong1 a man may   
render himself despised and ridiculous4 
,the love of esteem and approbation is  

also of extensive influence in the      
young1--both in the conduct of education
 and the cultivation of general         
character2 and it is not liable to the  
objections1 formerly referred to1 which 
apply to the principle of ,emulation4   
,it leads also to those numerous        
expedients by which persons of various  
character seek for themselves notoriety 
or a name3 or desire to leave a         
reputation behind them1 when they are no
 more4 ,this is the love of posthumous  
fame1 a subject which has afforded an   
extensive theme both for the philosopher
 and the humorist4  ,,vii4 ,the ,desire 
of ,knowledge1 or of ,intellectual      
,improvement1--including the principle  
of ,curiosity4 ,the tendency of this    
high principle must depend1 as in the   
former cases1 on its regulation1 and the
 objects to which it is directed4 ,these
 may vary from the idle tattle of the   
day1 to the highest attainments in      
literature or science4 ,the principle   
may be applied to pursuits of a         

frivolous or useless kind1 and to such  
acquirements as lead only to pedantry or
 sophism2--or it may be directed to a   
desultory application1 which leads to a 
superficial acquaintance with a variety 
of subjects1 without a correct knowledge
 of any of them4 ,on the other hand1 the
 pursuit of knowledge may be allowed to 
interfere with important duties which we
 owe to others1 in the particular       
situation in which we are placed4 ,a    
well-regulated judgment conducts the    
propensity to worthy objects2 and       
directs it in such a manner as to make  
it most useful to others4 ,with such due
 regulation1 the principle ought to be  
carefully cultivated in the young4 ,it  
is closely connected with that activity 
of mind which seeks for knowledge on    
every subject that comes within its     
reach1 and which is ever on the watch to
 make its knowledge more correct and    
more extensive4  ,,viii4 ,the ,desire of
 ,moral ,improvement4 ,this leads to the
 highest state of man3 and it bears this

 peculiar character1 that it is adapted 
to men in every scale of society1 and   
tends to diffuse a beneficial influence 
around the circle with which the        
individual is connected4 ,the desire of 
power may exist in many1 but its        
gratification is limited to a few3--he  
who fails may become a discontented     
misanthrope2 and he who succeeds may be 
a scourge to his species4 ,the desire of
 superiority or of praise may be        
misdirected in the same manner1 leading 
to insolent triumph on the one hand1 and
 envy on the other4 ,even the thirst for
 knowledge may be abused1 and many are  
placed in circumstances in which it     
cannot be gratified4 ,but the desire of 
moral improvement commends itself to    
every class of society1 and its object  
is attainable by all4 ,in proportion to 
its intensity and its steadiness1 it    
tends to make the possessor both a      
happier and a better man1 and to render 
him the instrument of diffusing         
happiness and usefulness to all who come

 within the reach of his influence4 ,if 
he be in a superior station1 these      
results will be felt more extensively2  
if he be in a humble sphere1 they may be
 more limited2 but their nature is the  
same1 and their tendency is equally to  
elevate the character of man4 ,this     
mental condition consists1 as we shall  
afterwards have occasion to shew more   
particularly1 in a habitual recognition 
of the supreme authority of conscience  
over the whole intellectual and moral   
system1 and in a habitual effort to have
 every desire and every affection       
regulated by the moral principle1 and by
 a sense of the divine will4 ,it leads  
to a uniformity of character which can  
never flow from any lower source1 and to
 a conduct distinguished by the anxious 
discharge of every duty1 and the        
practice of the most active benevolence4
  ,the ,emotions which have been now    
briefly mentioned seem to include the   
more important of those which pertain to
 the class of ,desires4 ,there is1      

however1 another principle which ought  
to be mentioned as a leading peculiarity
 of human nature1 though it may be      
somewhat difficult to determine the     
class to which it belongs4 ,this is the 
,desire of ,action1--the restless       
activity of mind1 which leads it to     
require some object on which its powers 
must be exercised1 and without which it 
preys upon itself and becomes miserable4
 ,on this principle we are to explain   
several facts which are of frequent     
observation4 ,a person accustomed to a  
life of activity longs for ease and     
retirement1 and1 when he has            
accomplished his purpose1 finds himself 
wretched4 ,the frivolous engagements of 
the unoccupied are referable to the same
 principle4 ,they arise1 not from any   
interest which such occupations really  
possess1 but simply from the desire of  
mental excitement1--the felicity of     
having something to do4 ,the pleasure of
 relaxation1 indeed1 is known to those  
only who have regular and interesting   

employment4 ,continued relaxation soon  
becomes a weariness2 and1 on this       
ground1 we may safely assert1 that the  
greatest degree of real enjoyment       
belongs1 not to the luxurious man of    
wealth1 or the listless votary of       
fashion1 but to the middle classes of   
society1 who1 along with the comforts of
 life1 have constant and important      
occupation4 ,apart1 indeed1 from actual 
suffering1 ,i believe there is nothing  
in the external circumstances of        
individuals1 of greater or more habitual
 importance for promoting personal      
happiness1 than stated1 rational1 and   
interesting employment4         99      
99       99       99       99  ,the     
mental condition which we call ,desire  
appears to lie in a great measure at the
 foundation of character2--and1 for a   
sound moral condition1 it is required   
that the desires be directed to worthy  
objects1--and that the degree or        
strength of them be accommodated to the 
true and relative value of each of these

 objects4 ,if the desires are thus      
directed1 worthy conduct will be likely 
to follow in a steady and uniform       
manner4 ,if they are allowed to break   
from the restraints of reason1 and the  
moral principle1 the man is left at the 
mercy of unhallowed passion1 and is     
liable to those irregularities which    
naturally result from such a derangement
 of the moral feelings4 ,if1 indeed1 we 
would see the evils produced by desire1 
when not thus controlled1 we have only  
to look at the whole history of human   
kind4 ,what accumulated miseries arise  
from the want of due regulation of the  
animal propensities1 in the various     
forms in which it degrades the character
 of rational and moral beings4--,what   
evils spring from the love of money1 and
 from the desire of power2--from the    
contests of rivals1 and the tumults of  
party1--what envy1 hatred1 malignity1   
and revenge4--,what complicated         
wretchedness follows the train of       
ambition1--contempt of human suffering1 

countries depopulated1 and fields       
deluged with blood4 ,such are the       
results of desire1 when not directed to 
objects worthy of a moral being1 and not
 kept under the rigid control of        
conscience1 and the immutable laws of   
moral rectitude4 ,when1 in any of these 
forms1 a sensual or selfish propensity  
is allowed to pass the due boundary     
which is fixed for it by reason and the 
moral principle1 the mental harmony is  
destroyed1 and even the judgment itself 
comes to be impaired and distorted in   
that highest of all inquiries1 the      
search after moral truth4  ,the desires1
 indeed1 may exist in an ill-regulated  
state1 while the conduct is yet         
restrained by various principles1 such  
as submission to human laws1 a regard to
 character1 or even a certain feeling of
 what is morally right1 contending with 
the vitiated principle within4 ,but this
 cannot be considered as the healthy    
condition of a moral being4 ,it is only 
when the desire itself is sound1 that we

 can say the man is in moral health4 ,he
 who grieves at his abstinence1 says    
,aristotle1 is a voluptuary2--and this  
also is the great principle so often and
 so strikingly enforced in the sacred   
writings2 ,keep thy heart with all      
diligence1 because out of it are the    
issues of life4 ,blessed are the pure in
 heart1 for they shall see ,god4 ,thus1 
there are desires which are folly1 and  
there are desires which are vice1 even  
though they should not be followed by   
indulgence2 and there are desires which 
tend to purify and elevate the moral    
nature1 though their objects should be  
beyond the reach of our full attainment 
in the present state of being4 ,perfect 
moral purity is not the lot of man in   
this transient state1 and is not to be  
attained by his own unaided efforts4    
,but1 subservient to it is that warfare 
within1 that earnest and habitual desire
 after the perfection of a moral being1 
which is felt to be the great object of 
life1 when it is viewed in relation to  

the life which is to come4 ,for this    
attainment1 however1 man must feel his  
total inadequacy1--and the utmost       
efforts of human reason have failed in  
unfolding the requisite aid4 ,the       
conviction is thus forced upon us1 that 
a higher influence is necessary1 and    
this influence is fully disclosed by the
 light of revealed truth4 ,we are there 
taught to look for a power from on high1
 capable of effecting what human efforts
 cannot accomplish1--the purification of
 the heart4     ,sect4 ,,ii4  ,the      
,affections4   ,as the desires are      
calculated to bring some gratification  
to ourselves1 the ,affections lead us to
 our relations to other men1 and to a   
certain line of conduct which arises out
 of these relations4 ,they are to be    
viewed as original principles of our    
nature1 planted in us for wise purposes1
 and the operation of them is to be     
considered as distinct1 both from that  
of the moral principle and of           
reason1--that is1 from any sense of duty

 or the moral rectitude of the conduct  
to which they lead1 and from any        
calculation of its propriety and        
utility4 ,thus1 when the mother devotes 
her attention by day and night to her   
infant1 if from sickness or helplessness
 in want of her special care1 and       
perseveres in doing so1 with total      
disregard to her own ease1 health1 or   
comfort1 she is not influenced either by
 a sense of duty1 or by any feeling of  
the utility of her conduct3 she acts    
upon an impulse within1 which she feels 
to be a part of her constitution1 and   
which carries her forward in a          
particular course of anxious and        
protracted exertion by the power of     
itself alone4 ,this distinction appears 
to be of the utmost practical           
importance1 and we shall have occasion  
to refer to it more particularly in the 
sequel4  ,an ,affection1 therefore1     
maybe considered as an original feeling 
or emotion existing in ourselves1 which 
leads us to a particular conduct towards

 other men1 without reference to any    
principle except the intuitive impulse  
of the emotion itself4 ,the ,affections 
have been divided into the ,benevolent  
and ,malevolent2 but these titles appear
 to be incorrect1 especially the        
latter1--as the due exercise of the     
emotions to which it refers does not    
properly include what is called         
malevolence4 ,they only tend to guard us
 against certain conduct in other men2  
and1 when they are allowed to go beyond 
this1 that is1 to actual malevolence or 
revenge1 the application is morbid4 ,it 
will therefore accord better with the   
nature of these emotions1 to give them  
the names of ,uniting1 and ,defensive   
,affections2--the former including      
justice1 benevolence1 veracity1         
friendship1 love1 gratitude1 patriotism1
 and the domestic affections2--the      
latter1 jealousy1 disapprobation1 and   
anger4   ,i4 ,,justice4  ,there may be  
some difference of opinion in regard to 
the propriety of including justice among

 the affections2 but it seems to be more
 nearly allied to them than to any of   
the other classes of moral emotions     
which have been mentioned1 and it may1  
therefore1 as a mere matter of          
arrangement1 be conveniently introduced 
here4 ,strictly speaking1 it might      
perhaps be considered as a combined     
operation of an affection and the moral 
principle2 but this is matter of        
speculation alone4 ,the important       
consideration relating to it is1--that1 
in whatever manner it arises1 the sense 
of ,justice is a primary and essential  
part of our moral constitution1         
conveying the distinct impression of    
certain conduct which a man owes to his 
fellow-men1 without regard to any       
considerations of a personal nature1 and
 apart from all positive enactments or  
laws1 either divine or human4 ,the      
requirements of ,justice embrace certain
 points in which every man has an       
absolute right1 and in regard to which  
it is the absolute duty of every other  

man not to interfere with him4 ,these   
rights have usually been divided into   
three classes2--what ,i have a right to 
possess1 and no man has any right to    
take from me1--what ,i have a right to  
do1 and no man has any title to prevent 
me from doing1--what ,i have a right to 
expect from other men1 and it is their  
absolute duty to perform4 ,these        
principles form the basis of what is    
called ,natural ,jurisprudence1 a code  
of relative duty deriving its authority 
from impressions which are found in the 
moral feelings of all mankind1 without  
regard to the enactments of any         
particular civil society4 ,in the actual
 arrangements of civil communities1     
these great principles of justice are   
combined with others which are derived  
merely from utility or expediency1 as   
calculated to promote the peace or the  
advantage of the community4 ,these may  
differ in different countries1 and they 
cease to be binding when the enactments 
on which they rest are abrogated or     

changed4 ,but no difference of place can
 alter1 and no laws can destroy1 the    
essential requirements of justice4  ,in 
these observations1 it will be remarked1
 the word ,justice is used as expressing
 a principle of individual character2   
and it is in this sense that it is to be
 properly classed with the affections4  
,the term is employed in another sense1 
namely1 that of distributive and        
corrective justice1 which regulates the 
claims of individuals in a community1   
requires restitution or compensation for
 any deviation from such claims1 or     
punishes those who have violated them4  
,it is in the former sense that justice 
is properly to be considered as a branch
 of the philosophy of the moral         
feelings2 but the same general          
principles apply to both4  ,the sense of
 ,justice1 therefore1 consists in a     
feeling experienced by every man1 of a  
certain line of conduct which he owes to
 other men in given circumstances2 and  
this seems to be referable to the       

following heads1--attending to their    
interest1--not interfering with their   
freedom of action1--preserving their    
reputation1--estimating their character 
and motives1--judging of their          
opinions1--consulting their             
feelings1--and preserving or improving  
their moral condition4 ,as a guide for  
his conduct in particular instances1 a  
man has usually a distinct impression of
 what he thinks due by other men towards
 himself2 justice requires that he      
rigidly extend to others the same       
feelings and conduct which1 in similar  
circumstances1 he expects from them4    
7#a47 ,justice is due to the persons1   
property1 and interest of others4 ,this 
constitutes ,integrity or ,honesty4 ,it1
 of course1 implies abstaining from     
every kind of injury1 and preserving a  
conscientious regard to their rights4   
,in this last respect1 it allows us to  
exercise a prudent attention to our own 
interest1 provided the means be fair and
 honourable1 and that we carefully      

abstain from injuring others by the     
measures we employ for this purpose4    
,the great rule for our guidance1 in all
 such cases1 is found in the immutable  
principles of moral rectitude2 the test 
of our conduct in regard to individual  
instances is1 that it be such as1 were  
our own interest concerned1 we should   
think fair and honourable in other men4 
7#b47 ,justice requires us not to       
interfere with the freedom of action of 
others4 ,this constitutes personal      
liberty2--but in all civil communities  
the right is liable to certain          
restrictions2--as when a man uses his   
freedom of action to the danger or      
injury of other men4 ,the principles of 
justice may also recognise a man's      
surrendering1 to a certain extent1 his  
personal liberty1 by mutual and         
voluntary compact1 as in the case of    
servants1 apprentices1 soldiers1 c42 but
 they are opposed to slavery1 in which  
the individual concerned is not a party 
to the arrangement4   7#c47 ,justice    

enjoins a regard to the reputation of   
others4 ,this consists in avoiding every
 thing that could be injurious to their 
good name1 either by direct evil        
speaking1 or such insinuations as might 
give rise to suspicion or prejudice     
against them4 ,it must extend also to   
the counteracting of such insinuations1 
when we hear them made by others1       
especially in circumstances in which the
 individual injured has no opportunity  
of defending himself4 ,it includes1     
farther1 that we do not deny to others1 
even to rivals1 any praise or credit    
which is justly due to them4 ,there is1 
however1 one modification1 equally      
consistent with justice1 to which the   
former of these rules is liable2 namely1
 that1 in certain cases1 we may be      
required to make a statement prejudicial
 to an individual1 when duty to a third 
party or to the public makes it         
incumbent on us to do so4 ,in such a    
case1 a person guided by the rules of   
justice will go no farther than is      

actually required by the circumstances2 
and will at all times beware of         
propagating a report injurious to       
another1 though he should know it to be 
strictly true1 unless he is called upon 
by special duty to communicate it4      
7#d47 ,justice requires us not only to  
avoid injuring an individual in the     
estimation of other men1 but to exercise
 the same fairness in forming our own   
opinion of his character1 without being 
misled or biased by passion or          
prejudice4 ,this consists in estimating 
his conduct and motives with calmness   
and impartiality2 in regard to          
particular instances1 making full       
allowance for the circumstances in which
 he was placed1 and the feelings by     
which he was1 or might be1 at the time1 
naturally influenced4 ,when an action   
admits of being referred to different   
motives1 justice consists in taking the 
more favourable view1 if we can do so   
with strict regard to truth1 instead of 
harshly and hastily assigning a motive  

which is unworthy4 ,such justice in     
regard to character and motives we      
require to exercise with peculiar care1 
when the conduct referred to has been in
 any way opposed to our own self-love4  
,in these cases we must be especially on
 our guard against the influence of the 
selfish principle1 which might lead to  
partial and distorted views of actions  
and motives1 less favourable to others1 
and more favourable to ourselves1 than  
justice warrants4 ,when viewed in this  
manner1 we may often perceive1 that     
conduct1 which gave rise to emotions of 
displeasure as injurious to us1 was     
fully warranted by some conduct on our  
own part1 or was required by some higher
 duty which the individual owed to      
another4   7#e47 ,justice is to be      
exercised in judging of the opinions and
 statements of others4 ,this constitutes
 ,candour4 ,it consists in giving a fair
 and deliberate hearing to opinions1    
statements1 and arguments1 and weighing 
fairly and honestly their tendency4 ,it 

is1 therefore1 opposed to prejudice1    
blind attachment to preconceived        
opinions1 and that narrow disputatious  
spirit which delights in captious       
criticism1 and will hear nothing with   
calmness that is opposed to its own     
views2 which distorts or misrepresents  
the sentiments of its opponents1        
ascribing them to unworthy motives1 or  
deducing from them conclusions which    
they do not warrant4 ,candour1          
accordingly1 may be considered as a     
compound of justice and the love of     
truth4 ,it leads us to give due         
attention to the opinions and statements
 of others1--in all cases to be chiefly 
solicitous to discover truth1 and1 in   
statements of a mixed character1        
containing perhaps much error and       
fallacy1 anxiously to discover and      
separate what is true4 ,it has          
accordingly been remarked1 that a turn  
for acute disputation1 and minute and   
rigid criticism1 is often the           
characteristic of a contracted and      

prejudiced mind2 and that the most      
enlarged understandings are always the  
most indulgent to the statements of     
others1--their leading object being to  
discover truth4   7#f47 ,justice is due 
to the feelings of others2 and this     
applies to many circumstances which do  
not affect either their interest or     
their reputation4 ,without injuring them
 in any of these respects1 or in our own
 good opinion1 we may behave to them in 
such a manner as to wound their         
feelings4 ,there are minds of an extreme
 delicacy1 which1 in this respect1 are  
peculiarly sensitive2--towards these a  
person of correct feelings strives to   
conduct himself with suitable           
tenderness4 ,we may find1 however1      
persons of honest and upright minds1 who
 would shrink from the least approach to
 real injury1 but yet neglect the       
necessary attention to the feelings2 and
 may even confer a real benefit in such 
a manner as to wound the individual to  
whom they intended kindness4 ,the lower 

degrees of this principle pertain to    
what is called mere good breeding1 which
 has been defined benevolence in        
trifles2 but the higher degrees may     
restrain from conduct which1 without any
 real injury1 inflicts permanent pain4  
,to this head we may perhaps also refer 
a due regard to the estimate which we   
lead a man to form of himself4 ,this is 
opposed to flattery on the one hand1 and
 on the other to any unnecessary        
depreciation of his character4 ,flattery
 indeed is also to be considered as a   
violation of veracity4   7#g47 ,while1  
upon the principles which have been     
referred to1 we abstain from injuring   
the interests1 the reputation1 or the   
feelings of others1 there is another    
class of injuries1 of still higher      
magnitude1 which the conscientious mind 
will avoid with peculiar anxiety1       
namely1 injuries done to the moral      
principles of other men4 ,these form a  
class of offences of which no human law 
takes any adequate cognizance1 but we   

know that they possess a character of   
the deepest malignity4 ,deep guilt      
attaches to the man who1 by persuasion  
or ridicule1 has unhinged the moral     
feelings of another1 or has been the    
means of leading him astray from the    
paths of virtue4 ,of equal1 or even     
greater malignity1 is the aspect of the 
writer1 whose works have contributed to 
violate the principles of truth and     
rectitude1--to pollute the imagination1 
or corrupt the heart4 ,inferior         
offenders are promptly seized by public 
authority1 and suffer the award of      
public justice2 but the destroyer of the
 moral being often walks securely       
through his own scene of moral          
discipline1 as if no power could reach  
the measure of his guilt but the hand of
 the ,eternal4  ,to the same head we are
 to assign the extensive and important  
influence of example4 ,there are few men
 who have not in this respect some      
power1 but it belongs more particularly 
to persons in situations of rank and    

public eminence4 ,it is matter of deep  
regret1 both to the friend of virtue and
 the friend of his country1 when any of 
these are found manifesting disregard to
 sacred things1 or giving an air of     
fashion to what is calculated to corrupt
 the moral principles of the unthinking 
classes of society4 ,if they are        
restrained by no higher motive1 the     
feelings of patriotism1 and even of     
personal safety1 ought to produce a     
solemn caution2 and it becomes them     
seriously to consider1 whether they may 
not thus be sowing among the ignorant   
multitude the seeds of tumult1          
revolution1 and anarchy4   ,,ii4        
,,compassion ,,and ,,benevolence4       
,great diversity exists in the condition
 of different individuals in the present
 state1--some being in circumstances of 
ease1 wealth1 and comfort1--others of   
pain1 deprivation1 and sorrow4 ,such    
diversities we must consider as an      
arrangement established by the great    
,disposer of all things1 and calculated 

to promote important purposes in his    
moral government4 ,many of these        
purposes are entirely beyond the reach  
of our faculties2 but1 as holding a     
prominent place among them1 we may      
safely reckon the cultivation of our    
moral feelings1 especially the          
affections of compassion and            
benevolence4 ,the due exercise of these 
is1 therefore1 calculated to promote a  
double object1 namely1 the alleviation  
of distress in others1--and the         
cultivation in ourselves of a mental    
condition peculiarly adapted to a state 
of moral discipline4 ,by bringing us    
into contact with individuals in various
 forms and degrees of suffering1 they   
tend continually to remind us1 that the 
present scene is but the infancy of our 
existence1--that the beings whom we thus
 contemplate are the children of the    
same ,almighty ,father with ourselves1  
inheriting the same nature1 possessed of
 the same feelings1 and soon to enter   
upon another state of existence1 when   

all the distinctions which are to be    
found in this world shall cease for     
ever4 ,they tend thus to withdraw us    
from the power of self-love1 and the    
deluding influence of present things2   
and habitually to raise our views to    
that future life1 for which the present 
is intended to prepare us4 ,the due     
cultivation of the benevolent           
affections1 therefore1 is not properly  
to be considered as the object of moral 
approbation1 but rather as a process of 
moral culture4 ,they may enable us in   
some degree to benefit others1 but their
 chief benefit is to ourselves4 ,by     
neglecting them1 we both incur much     
guilt1 and deprive ourselves of an      
important mean of improvement4 ,the     
diligent exercise of them1 besides being
 a source of moral advantage1 is        
accompanied with a degree of mental     
enjoyment which carries with it its own 
reward4 ,such appears to be the correct 
view which we ought to take of the      
arrangement established by the ,creator 

in this part of our constitution4 ,it is
 calculated to correct a misconception  
of an important kind1 which considers   
the exercise of the benevolent          
affections as possessing a character of 
merit4 ,to this subject we shall have   
occasion to refer more particularly in  
the sequel4  ,the exercise of the       
benevolent affections may be briefly    
treated of1 under nearly the same heads 
as those referred to when considering   
the principle of ,justice2--keeping in  
mind that they lead to greater exertion 
for the benefit of others1 and thus     
often demand a greater sacrifice of self
 love1 than is included under the mere  
requirements of justice4 ,on the other  
hand1 benevolence is not to be exercised
 at the expense of ,justice2 as would be
 the case1 if a man were found relieving
 distress by such expedients as involve 
the necessity of withholding the payment
 of just debts1 or imply the neglect or 
infringement of some duty which he owes 
to another4   7#a47 ,compassion and     

benevolent exertion are due towards     
alleviating the distresses of others4   
,this exercise of them1 in many         
instances1 calls for a decided sacrifice
 of personal interest1 and1 in others1  
for considerable personal exertion4 ,we 
feel our way to the proper measure of   
these sacrifices1 by the high principle 
of moral duty1 along with that mental   
exercise which places us in the         
situation of others1 and1 by a kind of  
reflected self-love1 judges of the      
conduct due by us to them in our        
respective circumstances4--,the details 
of this subject would lead us into a    
field too extensive for our present     
purpose4 ,pecuniary aid1 by those who   
have the means1 is the most easy form in
 which benevolence can be gratified1 and
 that which often requires the least1 if
 any1 sacrifice of personal comfort or  
self-love4 ,the same affection maybe    
exercised in a degree much higher in    
itself1 and often much more useful to   
others1 by personal exertion and        

personal kindness4 ,the former1 compared
 with the means of the individual1 may  
present a mere mockery of mercy2 while  
the latter1 even in the lowest walks of 
life1 often exhibit the brightest       
displays of active usefulness that can  
adorn the human character4 ,this high   
and pure benevolence not only is        
dispensed with willingness1 when        
occasions present themselves2 but seeks 
out opportunities for itself1 and feels 
in want of its natural and healthy      
exercise when deprived of an object on  
which it may be bestowed4   7#b47       
,benevolence is to be exercised towards 
the reputation of others4 ,this consists
 not only in avoiding any injury to     
their characters1 but in exertions to   
protect them against the injustice of   
others1--to correct                     
misrepresentations1--to check the course
 of slander1 and to obviate the efforts 
of those who would poison the confidence
 of friends1 or disturb the harmony of  
society4   7#c47 ,benevolence is to be  

exercised towards the character and     
conduct of others2 especially when these
 have been in opposition to our personal
 interest or self-love4 ,this consists  
in viewing their conduct with indulgence
 and forbearance1 assigning the most    
favourable motives1--and making every   
allowance for their feelings1 and the   
circumstances in which they were placed4
 ,it leads us also to avoid all         
suspicions and jealousies which are not 
clearly justified by fact2 and to       
abstain to the utmost from taking       
offence1--by putting upon the conduct of
 others the best construction of which  
it will possibly admit4 ,it extends     
still farther to the actual forgiveness 
of injuries1 and the repaying of evil   
with good1--a conduct represented in the
 sacred writings as one of the highest  
attainments the human character can     
reach1 in so far as regards its relation
 to other men4   7#d47 ,benevolence is  
to be exercised towards the feelings of 
others2 and this applies to many        

situations in which neither their       
interest nor their character is         
concerned4 ,it includes those exercises 
of the kindly affections which produce  
so powerful an influence in all the     
relations of life1 but which it is      
impossible for any description to       
delineate4 ,it comprehends all our      
social and civil connexions1 but seems  
peculiarly to belong to our intercourse 
with inferiors and dependents4 ,its most
 anxious exercise may often relate      
merely to trifles1 but it extends to    
innumerable circumstances in which we   
may surrender our own feelings to those 
of others1 and our own convenience or   
gratification to theirs4 ,it implies    
solicitude to avoid wounding the        
feelings by pride1 selfishness1 or      
fretfulness1--by suspicions1            
imputations1 and jealousies1--or by     
allowing insignificant things to ruffle 
the temper and derange the social       
comfort4 ,many1 who are not deficient in
 what we usually call deeds of          

benevolence1 are too apt to forget1 that
 a most important exercise of true      
benevolence consists in the habitual    
cultivation of courtesy1 gentleness1 and
 kindness2 and that on these            
dispositions often depends our influence
 upon the comfort and happiness of      
others1 in a greater degree than on any 
deeds of actual beneficence4--,to this  
department1 also1 we may refer the high 
character of the peace-maker1 whose     
delight it is to allay angry feelings1  
even when he is in no degree personally 
interested1 and to bring together as    
friends and brethren1 those who have    
assumed the attitude of hatred and      
revenge4   7#e47 ,benevolence is to be  
exercised in regard to the moral        
degradation of others1 including their  
ignorance and vice4 ,this prevents us   
from deriving satisfaction from moral   
evil1 even though it should contribute  
to our advantage1 as might often happen 
from the misconduct of rivals or        
enemies4 ,it implies also that highest  

species of usefulness which aims at     
raising the moral condition of man1--by 
instructing the ignorant1 rescuing the  
unwary1 and reclaiming the vicious4     
,this exalted benevolence will therefore
 also seek to extend the light of divine
 truth to nations that sit in moral     
darkness2 and looks anxiously for the   
period when the knowledge of            
,christianity shall dispel every false  
faith1 and put an end to the horrors of 
superstition4     ,,iii4 ,veracity4     
,in our mental impressions relating to  
veracity1 we have a striking            
illustration of the manner in which we  
rely on this class of moral feelings1 as
 instinctive in the constitution of the 
mind4 ,on a certain confidence in the   
veracity of mankind is founded so much  
of the knowledge on which we constantly 
depend1 that1 without it1 the whole     
system of human things would go into    
confusion4 ,it relates to all the       
intelligence which we derive from any   
other source than our own personal      

observation3--for example1 to all that  
we receive through the historian1 the   
traveller1 the naturalist1 or the       
astronomer4 ,even in regard to the most 
common events of a single day1 we often 
proceed on a confidence in the veracity 
of a great variety of individuals4      
,there is1 indeed1 a natural tendency to
 truth in all men1 unless where this    
principle is overcome by some strong    
selfish purpose to be answered by       
departing from it3--and there is an     
equally strong tendency to rely on the  
veracity of others1 until we have learnt
 certain cautions by our actual         
experience of mankind4 ,hence children  
and inexperienced persons are easily    
imposed upon by unfounded               
statements3--and the most practised liar
 confides in the credulity of those whom
 he attempts to deceive4 ,deception1    
indeed1 would never accomplish its      
purpose1 if it were not from the        
impression that men generally speak     
truth4 ,it is obvious also1 that the    

mutual confidence which men have in each
 other1 both in regard to veracity of   
statement1 and to sincerity of intention
 respecting engagements1 is that which  
keeps together the whole of civil       
society4 ,in the transactions of        
commerce it is indispensable1 and       
without it all the relations of civil   
life would go into disorder4 ,when      
treating of the intellectual powers in  
another work1 ,i considered the         
principles which regulate our confidence
 in human testimony2 and it is          
unnecessary to recur to them in this    
place4 ,our present object is briefly to
 analyze the elements which are         
essential to veracity1 when we view it  
as a moral emotion1 or a branch of      
individual character4 ,these appear to  
be three1--correctness in ascertaining  
facts1--accuracy in relating them1--and 
truth of purpose1 or fidelity in the    
fulfilment of promises4  7#a47 ,an      
important element of veracity is        
correctness in ascertaining facts4 ,this

 is essential to the ,love of ,truth4   
,it requires us to exercise the most    
anxious care respecting every statement 
which we receive as true2 and not to    
receive it as such1 until we are        
satisfied that the authority on which it
 is asserted is of a nature on which we 
can fully rely1 and that the statement  
contains all the facts to which our     
attention ought to be directed4 ,it     
consequently guards us against those    
limited views1 by which party spirit or 
a love of favourite dogmas leads a man  
to receive the facts which favour a     
particular opinion1 and neglect those   
which are opposed to it4 ,the sound     
exercise of judgment1 which is connected
 with this love of truth1 differs       
therefore from the art of ingenious     
disputation1 and is often found directly
 at variance with it4 ,the same         
principle is applicable to the truths   
which are derived as deductions from    
processes of reasoning4 ,it is thus     
opposed to all sophistical arguments1   

and partial or distorted reasonings1 by 
which disputants strive to establish    
particular systems1 instead of engaging 
in an honest and simple inquiry after   
truth4 ,the love of truth1 therefore1 is
 of equal importance in the reception of
 facts1 and in the formation of         
opinions2 and it includes also a        
readiness to relinquish our own         
opinions1 when new facts or arguments   
are presented to us which are calculated
 to overturn them4 ,the practice of this
 sincere and candid search after truth1 
on every subject to which the mind may  
be directed1 ought to be cultivated in  
early life with the most assiduous care4
 ,it is a habit of the mind which must  
exercise a most important influence in  
the culture both of moral and           
intellectual character4  ,in the        
reception of truth1 especially on the   
evidence of testimony1 we acquire by    
experience a degree of caution1 arising 
from having been sometimes deceived4 ,in
 minds of a certain description1 this   

may be allowed to produce a suspicion   
with regard to all evidence1--in other  
words1 ,scepticism4 ,the want of the    
necessary and proper caution1 again1    
leads to ,credulity4 ,it is the part of 
a well-regulated mind to avoid both     
these extremes1 by attentively weighing 
the evidence and the character of the   
witnesses1 and giving to each           
circumstance its due influence in the   
conclusion4  7#b47 ,closely connected   
with the love of truth in receiving1 is 
the exercise of veracity in the         
statement of facts1 whether derived from
 our personal observation or received by
 testimony from others4 ,it consists not
 only in the most scrupulous accuracy of
 relation1 but also in giving it in such
 a manner as to convey a correct        
impression to the hearer4 ,it is        
consequently opposed to all those       
methods by which either a false         
statement may be made to assume the     
appearance of truth1 or one essentially 
true may be so related as to convey a   

false impression4  ,direct fallacy may  
consist in the alleged facts being      
absolutely false1 or in some of them    
being so1--in facts being wanting or    
kept out of view which would give a     
different import to the whole           
statement1--or in some of the facts     
being disguised1 distorted1 or coloured1
 so as to alter materially the          
impression conveyed by them4 ,but1      
besides such actual fallacy1 there are  
various methods by which a statement    
literally true may be so related as to  
convey an erroneous impression4 ,facts  
may be connected together in such a     
manner as to give the appearance of a   
relation of cause and effect1 when they 
are in truth entirely unconnected2--or  
an event may be represented as common   
which has occurred only in one or two   
instances4 ,the character of an         
individual may be assumed from a single 
act1 which1 if the truth were known1    
might be seen to be opposed to his real 
disposition1 and accounted for by the   

circumstances in which he happened at   
the time to be placed4 ,events may be   
connected together1 which were entirely 
disjoined1 and conclusions deduced from 
this fictitious connexion1 which are of 
course unfounded4 ,several of these     
sources of fallacy may be illustrated by
 a ludicrous example4 ,a traveller from 
the continent has represented the       
venality of the ,british ,house of      
,commons to be such1 that1 whenever the 
minister of the ,crown enters the house1
 there is a general cry for places4 ,it 
may be true that a cry of places has    
gone round the house at certain times1  
when business was about to commence1 or 
to be resumed after an                  
interval1--meaning1 of course1 that     
members were to take their seats4 ,it is
 very probable1 that1 on some occasion1 
this may have occurred at the moment    
when the minister entered1--so that the 
statement of the traveller might1 in    
point of fact1 be strictly true4 ,the   
erroneous impression which he endeavours

 to convey by it1 arises from three     
sources of fallacy1 which the anecdote  
will serve to illustrate1 namely1--the  
false meaning he gives to the word      
employed1--connecting it with the       
entrance of the minister as cause and   
effect1--and representing the connexion 
as uniform which happened to occur in   
that particular instance4 ,in the same  
manner it will appear1 that a false     
impression may be conveyed respecting   
the conduct of an individual1--by       
assigning motives which are entirely    
imaginary1--by connecting things        
together which have no relation1--by    
keeping out of view circumstances which 
would afford an explanation or          
palliation of his conduct1--or by       
attaching to his words a different      
meaning from that which he intended to  
convey by them4 ,the common saying1 that
 there are two ways of telling a story1 
does not therefore refer to what is     
strictly to be called fabrication or    
falsehood2 but to those distortions or  

colourings of circumstances1 which1     
however slight in themselves1 have the  
effect of essentially changing the      
impression made by the whole4  ,to      
veracity1 under this department1 we are 
also to refer the rule1--of giving to   
others an honest and fair impression of 
our views1 motives1 and intentions4     
,this is ,sincerity4 ,it is opposed to  
hypocrisy1 that unworthy display of     
human character1 in which a man         
disguises his real sentiments1 and1 on  
the contrary1 professes principles which
 he neither feels nor values1 merely for
 the purpose of promoting his selfish   
interests4 ,such a character exhibits a 
singular combination of moral           
delinquencies4 ,it is founded on the    
lowest selfishness1 and includes a      
departure from veracity and honesty4    
,but besides1 it implies a knowledge of 
virtuous principles1 and of their proper
 tendencies1 while there is a practical 
denial of their influence4 ,sincerity is
 also opposed to flattery1 which tends  

to give a man a false impression of our 
opinion1 and of our feelings towards    
him1 and likewise leads him to form a   
false estimate of his own character4 ,it
 is opposed also to simulation or double
 dealing1 by which a man1 for certain   
purposes professes sentiments towards   
another which he does not feel1 or      
intentions which he does not entertain4 
7#c47 ,the third element of veracity is 
,truth of ,purpose1 or fidelity in the  
fulfilment of promises4 ,this is opposed
 to actual departure from what was      
distinctly promised2 likewise to all    
those evasions by which one may convey  
an impression1 or excite the hope of an 
intention which he does not mean to     
fulfil1--or avoid the performance of a  
real or implied engagement on any other 
ground than inability to perform it4 ,by
 this straight-forward integrity of     
purpose1 an individual gives a clear    
impression of what he honestly intends  
to perform2 and performs it1 though     
circumstances may have occurred to make 

the fulfilment disagreeable or even     
injurious to himself3--he sweareth to   
his own hurt1 says a sacred writer1 and 
changeth not4     ,,iv4 ,,friendship1   
,,love1 ,,and ,,gratitude4   ,these     
affections are so nearly allied1 that1  
in this slight analysis1 they may be    
taken together4 ,they consist in a      
personal and peculiar attachment to an  
individual1 founded either upon some    
qualities in himself1 or some benefits  
he has conferred on us1 or on some one  
in whom we are interested4 ,the feelings
 and conduct to which they give rise    
correspond with those referred to under 
the preceding affections1 with this     
difference1 that1 in many instances1    
they lead to a much greater sacrifice of
 personal interest and comfort1 than    
usually proceeds either from justice or 
simple benevolence4 ,the exertions      
arising out of them are directed1       
according to the division formerly      
given1 to promoting the interest or     
comfort of the object of our            

regard1--preserving1 defending1 or      
advancing his reputation1--treating his 
feelings with peculiar tenderness1--and 
his failings with peculiar              
indulgence1--receiving his opinions with
 peculiar favour1--and anxiously        
endeavouring to improve his intellectual
 and moral condition4 ,this last        
consideration is justly reckoned the    
highest office of friendship2--it is to 
be regretted that its operation is      
sometimes impeded by another feeling1   
which leads us to be blind to the       
failings and deficiencies of those whom 
we love4--,in exercising simple love and
 friendship1 we rejoice in the advantage
 and happiness of the object1 though    
they should be accomplished by          
others1--but1 in exercising gratitude1  
we are not satisfied unless they be     
effected in some measure by ourselves4  
,v4 ,,patriotism4   ,patriotism is1     
perhaps1 not properly to be considered  
as a distinct principle of our nature2  
but rather as a result of a combination 

of the other affections4 ,it leads us1  
by every means in our power1 to promote 
the peace and the prosperity of our     
country1--and to discourage1 to the     
utmost of our ability1 whatever tends to
 the contrary4 ,every member of the     
community has something in his power in 
this respect4 ,he may set an example1 in
 his own person1 of dutiful and loyal   
respect to the first authority1 of      
strict obedience to the laws1 and       
respectful submission to the            
institutions of his country4 ,he may    
oppose the attempts of factious         
individuals to sow among the ignorant   
the seeds of discontent1 tumult1 or     
discord4 ,he may oppose and repress     
attempts to injure the revenue of the   
state2 may aid in the preservation of   
public tranquillity1 and in the         
execution of public justice4 ,finally1  
he may zealously exert himself in       
increasing the knowledge and improving  
the moral habits of the people1--two of 
the most important means by which the   

conscientious man1 in any rank of life1 
may aid in conferring a high and        
permanent benefit on his country4       
,,vi4 ,,the ,,domestic ,,affections4    
,in this extensive and interesting class
 are included1 conjugal affection1--the 
parental feelings1--filial              
reverence1--and the ties of brothers and
 sisters4--,these call forth1 in a still
 higher degree1 the feelings and        
exertions already referred to1 and a    
still greater sacrifice of personal     
ease1 advantage1 and comfort1 in the    
anxious and diligent discharge of the   
duties resulting from them4 ,in the     
conjugal relation1 they lead us to the  
tenderness1 the confidence1 the mutual  
forbearance1 the united exertions of    
those1 who have one hope1 one interest1 
and one course of duty4 ,the parental   
relation implies the highest possible   
degree of that feeling which studies the
 advantage of the object of our         
care1--the promotion of his             
happiness1--the improvement of his      

mind1--the culture of his               
affections1--the formation of his       
habits2 the anxious watching over the   
development of his character1 both as an
 intellectual and a moral being4 ,the   
filial relation requires1 in an equal   
degree1 respect1 affection1 submission1 
and confidence1--a deference to parental
 opinion and control2 and an impression 
that those parts of parental management1
 which may often be disagreeable1 are   
guided by a sincere desire to promote   
the highest interests of the object of  
this affectionate regard4  ,among the   
feelings of our nature which have less  
of earth in them than heaven1 are those 
which bind together the domestic circle 
in the various sympathies1 affections1  
and duties1 which belong to this class  
of tender relations4 ,it is beautiful   
also to observe1 how these affections   
arise out of each other1 and how the    
right exercise of them tends to their   
mutual cultivation4--,the father ought  
to consider the son as1 of all earthly  

concerns1 the highest object of his     
anxious care2--and should watch over the
 development of his intellectual        
character1 and the culture of his moral 
feelings4 ,in the zealous prosecution of
 this great purpose1 he should study to 
convey a clear impression1 that he is   
influenced purely by a feeling of solemn
 responsibility1 and an anxious desire  
to promote the highest interests4 ,when 
parental watchfulness is thus mingled   
with confidence and kindness1 the son   
will naturally learn to estimate alike  
the conduct itself1 and the principles  
from which it sprung1 and will look to  
the faithful parent as his safest guide 
and counsellor1 and most valued earthly 
friend4 ,if we extend the same          
principles to the relation between the  
mother and the daughter1 they apply with
 equal or even greater force4 ,in the   
arrangements of society1 these are      
thrown more constantly into each other's
 company2 and that watchful             
superintendence may be still more       

habitually exercised1 which1 along with 
the great concern of cultivating the    
intellectual and moral being1 neglects  
not those graces and delicacies which   
belong peculiarly to the female         
character4 ,it is not by direct         
instruction alone1 that1 in such a      
domestic circle1 the highest principles 
and best feelings of our nature are     
cultivated in the minds of the young4   
,it is by the actual exhibition of the  
principles themselves1 and a uniform    
recognition of their supreme            
importance2--it is by a parental        
conduct1 steadily manifesting the       
conviction1 that1 with every proper     
attention to the acquirements1 the      
accomplishments1 and the comforts of    
life1 the chief concern of moral beings 
relates to the life which is to come4 ,a
 domestic society1 bound together by    
these principles1 can retire1 as it     
were1 from the haunts of men1 and       
retreat within a sanctuary where the    
storms of the world cannot enter4--,when

 thus met together in the interchange of
 mutual affection and mutual confidence1
 they present the anticipation of that  
period1 when1 after the tumults of life 
are over1 they shall meet again1 no     
wanderer lost1 a family in heaven4      
,,the ,,defensive ,,affections4  ,the   
feelings of jealousy1 anger1 and        
resentment1 are1 not less than the other
 affections1 to be considered as part of
 our moral constitution2 and they are   
calculated to answer important purposes1
 provided they are kept under the strict
 control of reason and the moral        
principle4 ,their proper object is      
primarily a sense of blameable conduct  
in others2 and they lead us to use      
proper measures for protecting ourselves
 against such conduct4 ,while we thus   
disapprove of the character and conduct 
of men in certain circumstances1 we are 
led1 by our feelings of justice and     
benevolence1 to take part with the      
injured and oppressed against the       
oppressors1--or to protect those who are

 threatened with injuries1 by measures  
for defeating the schemes of their      
enemies4 ,a still more refined exercise 
of this class of feelings leads us to   
seek the reformation of the offender1   
and to convert him from an enemy into a 
friend4  ,resentment1 in cases which    
concern the public peace1 naturally     
leads to the infliction of punishment2  
the object of which is to prevent       
similar conduct in others1 not to       
gratify personal vengeance4 ,hence it is
 required to be done in a public        
manner1--with proper deliberation and   
coolness1--and with an exact adaptation 
of the penalty to the offence1 and to   
the object to be attained4 ,the person  
injured is not likely to do this with   
the requisite impartiality and candour2 
for we are apt to feel too deeply       
injuries offered to ourselves1 and not  
to make the propel allowance for the    
feelings of others1 and the             
circumstances which led to the offence4 
,the higher degrees1 indeed1 of these   

tendencies usually go together1--they1  
who are most susceptible of offences1   
and most irritable under them1 being    
generally least inclined to make        
allowances for others4 ,hence1 in all   
cases1 our disapprobation of personal   
vengeance1 or of a man taking the law   
into his own hands2 and our perfect     
sympathy with the protectors of the     
public peace1 when they dispassionately 
investigate a case of injury1 and calmly
 adapt their measures to the real object
 to be attained by them1--the protection
 of the community4  ,the defensive      
affections are exercised in an          
unwarranted manner1 when they are       
allowed to be excited by trifling       
causes2 when they are1 in degree1       
disproportioned to the offence1 or      
prolonged in a manner which it did not  
require2 and when they lead1 in any     
measure1 to retaliation or revenge4 ,the
 sound exercise of them1 therefore1 is  
opposed to that irascibility which takes
 fire on trivial occasions1 or without  

due consideration of the intentions of  
the agent1 or the circumstances in which
 he was placed1--to a disposition to    
resentment on occasions which do not    
warrant it1--and1 on all occasions1 to  
harbouring the feeling after the offence
 and all its consequences have passed   
over4         99       99       99      
99       99  ,before concluding the     
subject of the affections1 there are    
three points respecting them which      
remain to be mentioned as briefly as    
possible1--the influence of ,attention1 
combined with a certain act of          
,imagination1--the influence of         
,habit1--and the estimate of the feeling
 of ,moral ,approbation which the       
exercise of the affections is calculated
 to produce4   ,i4 ,in every exercise of
 the affections1 a most important       
influence is produced by ,attention1    
aided by a certain act of imagination4  
,this consists of directing the mind    
intensely and habitually to all the     
considerations which ought to guide us  

in the particular relation to which the 
affection refers4 ,it leads us to place 
ourselves in the situation of others1   
and1 with a kind of personal1 or almost 
selfish interest1 to enter into their   
wants1 their anxieties1 and their       
feelings2 and thus1 in their place1 to  
judge of the emotions and the conduct   
which are due from us to them4 ,such is 
the exercise of one who wishes to follow
 the great rule of doing to others as he
 would that they should do to him4 ,he  
is not satisfied with the merely decent 
discharge of the duties which arise from
 the affections1 but studies intensely  
the requirements which attach to his    
particular situation1--searches out the 
individuals1 towards whom they ought to 
be exercised1 and enters into their     
condition and their feelings with minute
 and tender interest4 ,many who shew no 
want of friendly and benevolent         
affection1 when an individual case is   
strongly brought before them1 are       
deficient in the kind of exercise which 

would lead them1 in this manner1 to find
 their way to that correct exercise of  
the affections which really belongs to a
 scene of moral discipline4 ,such an    
exercise is adapted to every situation  
in life1 and tends to guard a man1 in   
his various relations1 against the      
hindrances which indolence1 self-love1  
and pure inattention are apt to bring in
 the way of his peculiar duties1--and of
 his discharging them with due regard to
 the feelings of others4  ,this mental  
exercise1 of extensive application to   
the benevolent affections1 constitutes  
what is usually called ,sympathy4 ,it is
 composed of an act of ,imagination and 
,self-love1 by which we transfer        
ourselves1 as it were1 into the         
situation of other men1 and thereby     
regulate our conduct towards them4 ,it  
is however to be kept in mind1 that the 
principle of self-love1 thus brought    
into action1 is the test1 not the rule  
of our conduct4 ,this is a point on     
which there has been much vague and     

useless speculation2 and from not       
attending to the distinction1 some have 
referred our ideas of benevolence       
entirely to the principle of            
selfishness4 ,such discussions are      
equally unsound and unprofitable1 and   
are to be placed on a footing with the  
speculations of the scholastic          
philosophy1 which we now look back upon 
merely as matters of historical         
curiosity4 ,the application of          
self-love1 in the manner which has been 
referred to1 is chiefly useful in       
enabling us fully to appreciate the     
facts of the individual case1 as we     
would do if we were personally          
interested4 ,the rule of our conduct is 
quite distinct from this1 and rests on  
those fundamental principles of justice 
and compassion which form a part of our 
moral constitution4 ,in the practical   
application of them1 they are very much 
aided by the moral principle or         
conscience4  ,the man1 who acts         
habitually under the influence of these 

rules1 learns to question himself       
rigidly respecting the claims and duties
 which result from his moral relations2 
and the feelings and circumstances of   
those with whom they bring him into     
contact4 ,what1 7he asks himself7 is the
 line of action which belongs to me in  
regard to that individual1--what are his
 feelings in his present                
situation1--what are the feelings and   
conduct which he expects from me1--and  
what are those which ,i would expect    
from him were ,i in his circumstances   
and he in mine8 ,it is not a due        
regulation of the affections alone that 
arises from this wholesome state of     
mental discipline4 ,it is a moral       
culture to the mind itself1 which may   
often be fraught with the most important
 results4 ,for the man who exercises it 
realizes to himself the feelings of     
poverty1--the agonies of bereavement1   
the impressions of the bed of           
death2--and thus1 without the pain of   
suffering1 he may reap a portion of     

those important moral benefits which    
suffering is calculated to yield4       
,there is another view still to be taken
 of the advantages derived from that    
mental discipline which consists in     
attention to all the relations included 
under the affections4 ,when habitually  
exercised1 it may often bring before the
 mind important circumstances in our    
moral relations1 which are apt to make  
an inadequate impression amid the       
distractions of present things4 ,when   
the parent1 for example1 looks around   
the objects of his tender affection1    
what a new impulse is communicated by   
the thought1 that the present life is   
but the infancy of their being2 and that
 his chief and highest concern is to    
train them for immortality4 ,a similar  
impulse must be given to the            
philanthropist1 when he considers that  
the individuals1 who share his          
benevolent attentions1 are1 like        
himself1 passing through a scene of     
discipline to a higher state of         

existence1 where they will assume a     
place corresponding to their rank in the
 scale of moral beings4 ,the refined    
philanthropy thus arising1 while it     
neglects no proper attention to the     
distresses of the present life1 will    
seek chiefly to contend with those      
greater evils which degrade the moral   
nature1 and sever the immortal spirit   
from its ,god4 ,he1 who judges upon this
 extended principle1 will learn to form 
a new estimate of the condition of man4 
,amid the pride of wealth and the       
splendour of power1 he may mourn over a 
being lost to every feeling of his high 
destiny2 and1 by the death-bed of the   
peasant1 amid discomfort and suffering1 
he may contemplate with interest a      
purified spirit rising to immortality4  
,,ii4 ,next to the power of attention1  
we have to notice the influence produced
 upon the affections by ,habit4 ,this is
 founded upon a principle of our nature1
 by which a remarkable relation exists  
between the affections and the actions  

which arise out of them4 ,the tendency  
of all emotions is to become weaker by  
repetition1 or to be less acutely felt  
the oftener they are experienced4 ,the  
tendency of actions1 again1 as we have  
seen when treating of the ,intellectual 
,powers1 is to become easier by         
repetition1--so that those1 which at    
first require close and continued       
attention1 come to be performed without 
effort1 and almost without              
consciousness4 ,now an affection        
properly consists of an emotion leading 
to an action2 and the natural progress  
of the mind1 in the proper exercise of  
the affection1 is1 that the emotion     
becomes less acutely felt1 as the action
 becomes easier and more                
familiar4--,thus1 a scene of            
wretchedness1 or a tale of sorrow1 will 
produce in the inexperienced an         
intensity of emotion not felt by him    
whose life has been devoted to deeds of 
mercy2 and a superficial observer is apt
 to consider the condition of the latter

 as one of insensibility1 produced by   
familiarity with scenes of distress4 ,it
 is1 on the contrary1 that healthy and  
natural progress of the mind1 in which  
the emotion is gradually diminished in  
force as it is followed by its proper   
actions1--that is1 as the mere intensity
 of feeling is exchanged for the habit  
of active benevolence4 ,but that this   
may take place in the sound and healthy 
manner1 the emotion must be steadily    
followed by the action which belongs to 
it4 ,if this be neglected1 the harmony  
of the moral process is destroyed1 and1 
as the emotion becomes weakened1 it is  
succeeded by cold insensibility or      
barren selfishness4  ,this is a subject 
of much importance1--and there are two  
conclusions which arise out of it       
respecting the cultivation of the       
benevolent affections4 ,the one relates 
to the bad effects of fictitious scenes 
of sorrow1 as represented on the stage1 
or in works of fancy4 ,the evil arising 
from these appears to be that which has 

now been referred to2--the emotion is   
produced without the corresponding      
action1 and the consequence is likely to
 be a cold and useless sentimentalism1  
instead of a sound cultivation of the   
benevolent affections4--,the second     
is1--that1 in cultivating the benevolent
 affections in the young1 we should be  
careful to observe the process so       
clearly pointed out by the philosophy of
 the moral feelings4 ,they should be    
familiarized with actual scenes of      
suffering1 but this ought to be         
accompanied by deeds of minute and      
active kindness1 so as to produce a full
 and lively impression of the wants and 
feelings of the sufferer4 ,on this      
ground1 also1 ,i think we should at     
first even abstain1 in a great measure1 
from giving young persons the cautions  
they will afterwards find so requisite1 
respecting the character of the objects 
of their benevolence1 and the           
impositions so frequently practised by  
the poor4 ,suspicions of this kind might

 tend to interfere with the important   
moral process which ought to be our     
first object1--the necessary cautions   
will afterwards be learned with little  
difficulty4  ,the best mode of          
contending with the evils of pauperism1 
on the principles of political economy1 
is a problem on which ,i presume not to 
enter4 ,but1 on the principles of moral 
science1 a consideration of the utmost  
importance should never be              
forgotten1--the great end to be answered
 by the varieties of human condition in 
the cultivation of the benevolent       
affections4 ,political science passes   
its proper boundary when it is permitted
 in any degree to interfere with this   
high principle2--and1 on the other hand1
 it is not to be denied1 that this      
important purpose is in a great measure 
frustrated by many of those             
institutions1 which cut off the direct  
intercourse of the prosperous and the   
wealthy with those whom providence has  
committed to them1 in this scene of     

moral discipline1 as the objects of     
their benevolent care4   ,,iii4 ,the    
third point1 which remains to be briefly
 mentioned1 is the feeling of moral     
approbation1 or rather the impression of
 merit1 which is frequently attached to 
the exercise of the affections4 ,this   
important subject has been already      
referred to4 ,when the mother1 with     
total disregard to her health and       
comfort1 devotes herself to watching    
over her child1 she is not influenced by
 any sense of duty1 nor do we attach to 
her conduct the feeling of moral        
approbation4 ,she acts simply upon an   
impulse within1 which she perceives to  
be a part of her constitution1 and which
 carries her forward with unshrinking   
firmness in a particular course of      
laborious and anxious service4 ,she may1
 indeed1 be sensible that the violation 
of these feelings would expose her to   
the reprobation of her kind2 but she    
does not imagine that the zealous       
fulfilment of them entitles her to any  

special praise4 ,the same principle     
applies to all the affections4 ,they are
 a part of our moral constitution1      
intended to bind men together by certain
 offices of justice1 friendship1 and    
compassion2 and have been well named by 
a distinguished writer1 the voice of    
,god within us4 ,they serve a purpose in
 our moral economy1 analogous to that   
which the appetites answer in our       
physical system4 ,the appetite of       
hunger1 for example1 ensures a regular  
supply of nourishment1 in a manner which
 could never have been provided for by  
any process of reasoning2 though an     
exercise of reason is still applicable  
to preserving over it a certain         
regulation and control4 ,in the same    
manner1 the various feelings of our     
moral nature have each a defined purpose
 to answer1 both in respect to our own  
mental economy and our relations to our 
fellow-men2 and in the due exercise of  
them they ought to be controlled and    
regulated by the moral principle4 ,the  

violation of these feelings1 therefore1 
places man below the level of a moral   
being2 but the performance of them does 
not entitle him to assume the claim of  
merit4 ,he is merely bearing his part in
 a certain arrangement1 from which he is
 himself to derive benefit1 as a being  
holding a place in that system of things
 which these feelings are intended to   
keep together in harmony and order4 ,in 
regard to the great principles of       
veracity and justice1 every one         
perceives this to be true4 ,in all      
mercantile transactions1 for example1 a 
character for high honour and integrity 
leads not only to respect1 but to that  
confidence which is closely connected   
with prosperity4--,these qualities1     
indeed1 are as essential to a man's own 
interest as they are to his duty to     
other men2 and if he does gain an       
advantage by fraud and deceit1 it is    
only when he escapes detection2--that   
is1 while he preserves the reputation of
 the very qualities which he has        

violated4 ,but this truth applies       
equally to the affections more strictly 
benevolent4 ,the man who lives in the   
habitual exercise of a cold and barren  
selfishness1 and seeks only his own     
gratification or interest1 has indeed1  
in some sense1 his punishment in the    
contempt and aversion with which he is  
viewed by his fellow-men4 ,much more    
than this1 however1 attaches to such a  
character2--he has violated the         
principles given him for his guidance in
 the social system2--he has fallen from 
his sound condition as a moral being2   
and incurs actual guilt in the eye of a 
righteous ,governor1 whose will the     
order of this lower world is intended to
 obey4 ,but it by no means follows1 that
 the man1 who performs in a certain     
manner the relations of justice1        
friendship1 and compassion1 is thereby  
entitled to claim merit in the view of  
the ,almighty ,governor of the universe4
 ,he merely acts his part in the present
 system of moral economy1 for which he  

has been adapted4 ,he is so constituted 
as to derive satisfaction from the      
exercise of these affections2 and1 on   
the other hand1 he receives an          
appropriate reward in the reciprocal    
exercise of similar affections by other 
men1 and in the general harmony of      
society which results from them4 ,an    
extensive culture of the affections1    
therefore1 may go on without the        
recognition of the moral principle1 or  
that state of mind which habitually     
feels the presence of the ,deity1 and   
desires to have the whole character in  
subjection to his will4 ,we are not     
entitled to acknowledge the operation of
 that great principle1 unless when the  
affections are exercised in             
circumstances which imply a strong and  
decided sacrifice of self-love to the   
authority of ,god4 ,this appears to     
correspond with the distinction so      
strikingly stated in the sacred         
writings--,if ye love them which love   
you1 what reward have ye8 do not even   

the publicans the same8--,i say unto    
you1 love your enemies1--bless them that
 curse you1 do good to them that hate   
you1 pray for them which despitefully   
use you and persecute you4  ,on this    
branch of the subject it is also to be  
observed1 that there is a kind of       
compensating power among the affections 
themselves1 by which1 in the intercourse
 of men1 they act as checks upon each   
other4 ,thus resentment acts as a check 
upon injustice2 and the dread of        
exciting anger in others has probably an
 influence1 in preserving the peace and 
harmonies of society1 which we often    
ascribe to a higher principle4 ,in      
regard to the affections more strictly  
benevolent1 these are also influenced1  
in a similar manner1 by the feeling of  
disapprobation which attends any        
remarkable departure from their         
requirements4 ,when we keep in mind1    
along with this consideration1 the      
manner in which all men are influenced1 
in one degree or another1 by the love of

 approbation or regard to character1 we 
perceive in the moral system a beautiful
 principle of compensation1 tending to  
promote in it a certain degree of       
harmony4 ,this is remarkably            
illustrated1 for example1 in the general
 feeling of disapprobation which is     
attached to ingratitude1 and to         
violation of filial affection or        
parental duty1 and even to any marked   
neglect of the common calls of humanity4
 ,along with this we are also to keep in
 mind1 that a man is universally        
considered as in the lowest state of    
human nature1 who1 in these respects1   
has become regardless of                
character1--that is1 of the estimation  
with which his conduct is viewed by his 
fellow-men4  ,in regard to both the     
affections and the desires1 we are      
farther to remember that deep and       
extensive influence1 upon the happiness 
of the individual himself1 which results
 from a due regulation of these         
feelings2--the pure mental enjoyment of 

him whose affections are under sound    
regulation1 and whose desires are       
habitually directed to those objects    
which are in the highest degree worthy  
of being sought after4 ,this mental     
tranquillity is also represented to us1 
in a very striking manner1 by the       
influence of those dispositions which we
 usually refer to the head of ,temper4  
,what a constant source of pure         
enjoyment is a meek and placid spirit1  
the desires of which are moderate and   
under due regulation1--which puts upon  
every thing the best construction it    
will admit of1--is slow to take         
offence1--seeks no distinction1--but    
views itself with humility1 and others  
with candour1 benevolence1 and          
indulgence4 ,such a disposition makes   
the man happy in himself1 and a source  
of happiness and peace to all around    
him4 ,on the other hand1 what an        
unceasing source of mental disquiet and 
turbulence is the opposite              
disposition1--jealous1 envious1 and     

censorious1--ready to take offence at   
trifles1 and often to construe          
incidental occurrences into intended and
 premeditated insults1--prone to put    
unfavourable constructions upon the     
conduct of others1 and thus continually 
to surround itself with imaginary       
enemies1 and imaginary neglects and     
injuries4 ,such a temper is a continual 
torment to the individual himself1 and  
the cause of disputes and jealousies    
among those with whom he is connected4  
,we cannot fail1 also1 to perceive that 
the man of ill-regulated passions       
injures his own true interest and       
happiness1 as much as he violates his   
duty to others1 and that his course of  
life is often productive of degradation1
 disease1 and wretchedness4 ,in all this
 we see a beautiful example of the wise 
arrangements of the ,creator1 who1 in   
the structure of our moral nature1 has  
connected our own peace and happiness   
with a state of feeling calculated to   
promote the happiness and peace of all  

around us4 ,we cannot be at a loss to   
conclude what a different scene the     
world would present1 if such feelings   
were universally cultivated2 and1 on the
 other hand1 we must observe how much of
 the actual misery that exists in the   
world arises from derangement of moral  
feeling1 and the various consequences   
which result from it both to individuals
 and communities4 ,we find also1 by     
innumerable examples1 the remarkable    
influence produced1 by a due cultivation
 of these feelings1 in alleviating1 both
 in ourselves and others1 the physical  
evils which are inseparable from the    
present state4 ,it is farther to be     
remarked1 as a fact worthy of the       
deepest attention1 that the only        
distinct information conveyed to us in  
,scripture1 respecting the happiness of 
the righteous in a future state1        
is1--that it will consist chiefly in a  
perfect knowledge of the divine         
character1 and a conformity of the soul 
to the moral perfections of the ,deity4 

,it doth not yet appear1 says the sacred
 writer1 what we shall be2 but we know  
that when he shall appear1 we shall be  
like him1 for we shall see him as he is4
  ,in concluding the whole subject of   
the affections1 ,i have only farther to 
remark1--that the regulated state of the
 moral feelings1 which has been the     
subject of the preceding observations1  
seems to correspond with the quality so 
emphatically described in the sacred    
writings under the name of ,charity4 ,it
 is there uniformly represented as the  
great test of the moral condition2 and  
we find exposed1 in the most striking   
manner1 the worthlessness of all        
endowments which are not accompanied by 
this regulation of the whole character4 
,we cannot1 therefore1 conclude this    
subject in a more appropriate manner1   
than by a passage in which1 by a few    
most powerful expressions1 a code of    
ethical science is laid before us with a
 clearness and a force1 which put to    
nought all human composition3--,though  

,i speak with the tongues of men and of 
angels1 and have not charity1 ,i am     
become as sounding brass1 or a tinkling 
cymbal4 ,and though ,i have the gift of 
prophecy1 and understand all mysteries1 
and all knowledge2 and though ,i have   
all faith1 so that ,i could remove      
mountains1 and have not charity1 ,i am  
nothing4 ,and though ,i bestow all my   
goods to feed the poor1 and though ,i   
give my body to be burned1 and have not 
charity1 it profiteth me nothing4       
,charity suffereth long1 and is kind2   
charity envieth not2 charity vaunteth   
not itself1 is not puffed up1 doth not  
behave itself unseemly1 seeketh not her 
own1 is not easily provoked1 thinketh no
 evil2 rejoiceth not in iniquity1 but   
rejoiceth in the truth2 beareth all     
things1 believeth all things1 hopeth all
 things1 endureth all things4 ,charity  
never faileth2 but whether there be     
prophecies1 they shall fail2 whether    
there be tongues1 they shall cease2     
whether there be knowledge1 it shall    

vanish away4 ,for we know in part1 and  
we prophecy in part4 ,but when that     
which is perfect is come1 then that     
which is in part shall be done away4    
,when ,i was a child1 ,i spake as a     
child1 ,i understood as a child1 ,i     
thought as a child3 but when ,i became a
 man1 ,i put away childish things4 ,for 
now we see through a glass1 darkly2 but 
then face to face2 now ,i know in part2 
but then shall ,i know even as also ,i  
am known4 ,and now abideth faith1 hope1 
charity1 these three1--but the greatest 
of these is charity4     ,,sect4 ,,iii4 
,,self-,,love4   ,there has been some   
dispute respecting the term ,self-love1 
both as to its general propriety1 and as
 to the mental feelings which ought to  
be referred to it4 ,there can be no     
doubt that there is1 in our             
constitution1 a principle or propensity 
which leads us to study our own         
interest1 gratification1 and comfort2   
and that1 in many instances1 it becomes 
the ruling principle of the character4  

,it is in this sense that ,i use the    
term self-love1 without entering into   
any discussion regarding the strict     
logical propriety of it4 ,like the other
 mental feelings1 it is to be considered
 as part of our moral constitution1 and 
calculated to answer important purposes1
 provided it be kept in its proper      
place1 and do not encroach upon the     
duties and affections which we owe to   
other men4 ,when thus regulated1 it     
constitutes prudence1 or a just regard  
to our own interest1 safety1 and        
happiness2 when it becomes morbid in its
 exercise1 it degenerates into          
selfishness4  ,a sound and rational     
self-love ought to lead us to seek our  
own true happiness1 and should prove a  
check upon those appetites and passions 
which interfere with this2 for many of  
them1 it must be allowed1 may be not    
less adverse to our own real interest   
and comfort1 than they are to our duty  
to other men4 ,it should lead us1       
therefore1 to avoid every thing1 not    

only that is opposed to our interest1   
but that is calculated to impair our    
peace of mind1 and that harmony of the  
moral feelings without which there can  
be no real happiness4 ,this includes a  
due regulation of the desires1 and a due
 exercise of the affections1 as a moral 
condition which promotes our own welfare
 and comfort4 ,self-love1 viewed in this
 manner1 appears to be placed as a      
regulating principle among the other    
powers1--much inferior indeed to the    
great principle of conscience1 so far as
 regards the moral condition of the     
individual1--but calculated to answer   
important purposes in promoting the     
harmonies of society4 ,the impression1  
on which its influence rests1 appears to
 be simply the comfort and satisfaction 
which arise to ourselves from a certain 
regulation of the desires1 and a certain
 exercise of the affections1 while      
feelings of an opposite kind follow a   
different conduct4 ,these sources of    
satisfaction are manifold4 ,we may      

reckon among them the pleasure attached 
to the exercise of the affections       
themselves1 a feature of our moral      
constitution of the most interesting    
kind1--the true mental peace and        
enjoyment which spring from benevolence1
 friendship1 meekness1 forgiveness1 and 
the whole train of the kindly           
feelings1--the gratitude of those who   
have experienced the effects of our     
kindness1--the respect and approbation  
of those whose esteem we feel to be     
valuable1--and the return of similar    
affections and good offices from other  
men4 ,on the other hand1 we have to keep
 in mind the mental agony and           
distraction which arise from jealousy1  
envy1 hatred1 and resentment1--the sense
 of shame and disgrace which follow a   
certain line of conduct1--and the       
distress which often arises purely from 
the contempt and disapprobation of our  
fellow-men4 ,disgrace1 says ,butler1 is 
as much avoided as bodily pain2 we may  
safely say that it is much more avoided1

 and that it inflicts a suffering of a  
much more severe and permanent nature4  
,it must likewise accord with the       
observation of every one1 that among the
 circumstances1 which most frequently   
injure our peace and impair our comfort1
 are those which ruffle the mind by     
mortifying our self-love4 ,there is also
 a feeling of dissatisfaction and       
self-reproach which follows any neglect 
of a due exercise of the affections1 and
 which1 in a well regulated mind1       
disturbs the mental tranquillity fully  
as much as the disapprobation of other  
men4 ,it is farther evident1 that the   
man of ungoverned passions1 and         
ill-regulated affections1 impairs his   
own peace and happiness as much as he   
violates his duties to others1--for his 
course of life is productive1 not only  
of degradation in the eyes of his       
fellow-men1 but often of mental anguish1
 misery1 disease1 and premature death4  
,there is not1 perhaps1 a state of more 
intense suffering1 than when the        

depraved heart1 disappointed of those   
gratifications to which it is enslaved1 
and shut up from the excitements by     
which it seeks to escape from the       
horrors of reflection1 is thrown back   
upon itself to be its own tormentor4 ,to
 run the risk of such consequences1 for 
the gratification of a present appetite 
or passion1 is clearly opposed to the   
dictates of a sound self-love1 as has   
been distinctly shewn by ,bishop        
,butler2 and when in such a case1       
self-love prevails over an appetite or  
passion1 we perceive it operating as a  
regulating principle in the moral       
system4 ,it does so1 indeed1 merely by  
the impression1 that a certain          
regulation of the moral feelings is     
conducive to our own true and present   
happiness2 and thus shews a wonderful   
power of compensation among these       
feelings1 referable entirely to this    
source4 ,but it is quite distinct from  
the great principle of conscience1 which
 directs us to a certain line of conduct

 on the pure and high principle of moral
 duty1 apart from all considerations of 
a personal nature1--which leads a man to
 act upon nobler motives than those     
which result from the most refined      
self-love1 and calls for the            
mortification of all personal feelings1 
when these interfere1 in the smallest   
degree1 with the requirements of duty4  
,this distinction ,i conceive to be of  
the utmost practical importance2 as it  
shews a principle of regulation among   
the moral feelings themselves1 by which 
a certain exercise of the affections is 
carried on in a manner which contributes
 in a high degree to the harmonies of   
society1 but which does not convey any  
impression of moral approbation or merit
 that can be applied to the agent4      
,self-love1 then1 leads us to consult   
our own feelings1 and to seek directly  
our own interest and happiness4 ,the    
affections lead us to allow for the     
feelings1 and consider the advantage and
 comfort of other men2 and a certain    

balance between these principles is     
essential to the healthy state of the   
moral being4 ,it is seldom that the     
affections are likely to acquire an     
undue influence1 but there is great     
danger of self-love degenerating into   
selfishness1 which interferes with the  
duties we owe to others4 ,we have       
formerly alluded to the means1 referable
 to the due exercise of the affections1 
and even to a sound and rational        
self-love1 by which this should be in   
part prevented4 ,when these are not     
sufficient1 the appeal is to conscience2
 or a distinct reference of individual  
cases is made to the great principle of 
moral rectitude4 ,we find1 accordingly1 
this principle called into action1 when 
a man has become sensible of important  
defects in his moral habits4 ,thus1 we  
may see a man1 who has long given way to
 a peevish or irascible disposition1    
that is1 to selfish acting upon his own 
feelings1 without due regard to the     
feelings of others1 setting himself to  

contend with this propensity upon the   
score of moral duty2 while another1 of a
 placid disposition1 has no need of     
bringing the principle into action for  
such a purpose4 ,in the same manner1 a  
person who has indulged a cold          
contracted selfishness may1 under the   
influence of the same great principle1  
perform deeds of benevolence and        
kindness4 ,thus we perceive that the    
moral principle or sense of duty1 when  
it is made the regulating motive of     
action1 is calculated to control        
self-love1 and preserve the proper      
harmony between it and the exercise of  
the affections4  ,when the principle of 
self-love becomes deranged in its       
exercise and objects1 it leads to those 
habits by which a man seeks his own     
gratification1 in a way which interferes
 with his duties to other men4 ,this he 
may do by an undue pursuit of any of the
 desires1--whether avarice1 ambition1   
love of eminence1 or love of fame2--and 
the desire of knowledge itself may be so

 indulged as to assume the same         
character4 ,even deeds of benevolence   
and kindness may be performed on this   
principle1--as when a man1 by such      
actions1 seeks only the applause of the 
public1 or the approbation of certain   
individuals from whom1 it may be1 he    
expects to derive advantage4--,hence the
 value we attach1 in the exercise of all
 the affections1 to what we call        
disinterested conduct1--to him who does 
good by stealth1 or who performs acts of
 exalted justice1 generosity1 or        
forbearance1 under circumstances which  
exclude every idea of a selfish         
motive1--or when self-interest and      
personal feeling are strongly and       
obviously opposed to them4 ,such conduct
 commands the cordial approbation of all
 classes of men2 and it is striking to  
remark how1 in the highest conception of
 such a character that fancy can        
delineate1 we are met by the sublime    
morality of the sacred writings1        
impressed upon us by the purest of all  

motives1 the imitation of ,him who is   
the giver of all good2--love your       
enemies1--bless them that curse you2--do
 good to them that hate you1--and pray  
for them which despitefully use you and 
persecute you2--that ye may be the      
children of your ,father which is in    
heaven3 for he maketh his sun to rise on
 the evil and on the good1 and sendeth  
rain on the just and on the unjust4--,if
 any man will be my disciple1 says the  
same great author of ,christianity1--let
 him deny himself4     ,,part ,,ii4     
,,of ,,the ,,will4   ,will or ,simple   
,volition is that state of mind which   
immediately precedes action2--,we will a
 certain act2 and the act follows1      
unless it be prevented either by        
external restraint1 or by physical      
inability to perform it4  ,the actions  
thus produced arise out of the mental   
emotions formerly treated of1--the      
desires1 and the affections4--,we desire
 an object1 or we experience one of the 
affections2--the next mental act1       

according to the regular course of a    
reflecting mind1 is proposing to        
ourselves the question1--shall we       
gratify the desire1--shall we exercise  
the affection4 ,then follows the process
 of considering or deliberating4--,we   
perceive1 perhaps1 a variety of         
considerations or inducements1--some of 
which are in favour of gratifying the   
desire or exercising the affection1     
others opposed to it4 ,we therefore     
proceed to weigh the relative force of  
these opposing motives1 with the view of
 determining which of them we shall     
allow to regulate our decision4 ,we1 at 
length1 make up our mind on this1 and   
resolve1 we shall suppose1 to do the    
act2--this is followed by the mental    
condition of willing or simple volition4
  ,in the chain of mental operations    
which1 in such a case1 intervene between
 the desire and the volition1 a class of
 agents is brought into view which act  
upon the mind as moral causes of its    
volitions2--these are usually called    

motives1--or principles of action4 ,when
 treating of this subject as a branch of
 the philosophy of the intellectual     
powers1 ,i endeavoured to shew the      
grounds on which we believe1 that there 
are facts1 truths1 motives1 or moral    
causes1 which have a tendency thus to   
influence the determinations of the     
mind1 with a uniformity similar to that 
which we observe in the operation of    
physical causes4 ,for the due operation 
of moral causes1 indeed1 certain        
circumstances are required in the       
individual on whom they are expected to 
operate1 and1 without these1 they may   
fail in their operation4 ,it is         
necessary that he should be fully       
informed in regard to them as truths    
addressed to his understanding1--that he
 direct his attention to them with      
suitable intensity1 and exercise his    
reasoning powers upon their             
tendencies1--and that he be himself in a
 certain healthy state of moral feeling4
 ,in all our intercourse with mankind1  

accordingly1 we proceed upon an absolute
 confidence in the uniformity of the    
operation of these causes1 provided we  
are acquainted with the moral condition 
of the individual4 ,we can foretel1 for 
example1 the respective effects which a 
tale of distress will have upon a       
cold-hearted miser1 and a man of active 
benevolence1 with the same confidence   
with which we can predict the different 
actions of an acid upon an alkali and   
upon a metal2--and there are individuals
 in regard to whose integrity and       
veracity1 in any situation in which they
 can be placed1 we have a confidence    
similar to that with which we rely on   
the course of nature4 ,in this manner we
 gradually acquire1 by experience1 a    
knowledge of mankind2 precisely as1 by  
observation or experiment1 we acquire a 
knowledge of the operation of physical  
agents4 ,thus we come to know that one  
man is absolutely to be relied on1 in   
regard to a particular line of conduct  
in given circumstances2--and that       

another is not to be relied on1 if any  
thing should come in the way1 affecting 
his own pleasure or interest4 ,in       
endeavouring to excite various          
individuals to the same conduct in a    
particular case1 we learn1 that in one1 
we have to appeal only to his sense of  
duty1--in another1 to his love of       
approbation2--while1 on a third1 nothing
 will make any impression except what   
bears upon his interest or his pleasure4
 ,again1 when we find that1 in a        
particular individual1 certain motives  
or truths fail of the effects which we  
have observed them to produce in others1
 we endeavour to impress them upon his  
mind1 and to rouse his attention to     
their bearings and tendencies2--and this
 we do from the conviction1 that these  
truths have a certain uniform tendency  
to influence the volitions of a moral   
being1 provided he can be induced       
seriously to attend to them1 and        
provided he is in that moral condition  
which is required for their efficiency4 

,in all such cases1 which are familiar  
to every one1 we recognise1 therefore1 a
 uniform relation between certain moral 
causes or motives1 and the              
determinations of the human mind in     
willing certain acts4 ,it is no         
objection to this1 that men act in very 
different ways with the same motives    
before them2--for this depends upon     
their own moral condition4 ,when        
treating of the intellectual powers1 ,i 
alluded to the metaphysical             
controversies connected with this       
subject1 and ,i do not mean to recur to 
them here4 ,our present object is       
entirely of a practical nature1--namely1
 to investigate the circumstances which 
are required for the due operation of   
motives or moral causes1 and the manner 
in which the moral feelings may be so   
deranged1 that these fail of producing  
their natural or proper effects4        
99       99       99       99       99  
,let us1 then1 suppose an individual    
deliberating in regard to the line of   

conduct he shall pursue in a particular 
case2--the circumstances or impressions 
which are calculated to act upon him as 
moral causes in determining his         
volition1--that is1 in deciding his     
conduct1 are chiefly the following3     
7#a47 ,self-love1 which prompts him to  
seek his own ease1 interest1 or         
gratification4 7#b47 ,certain affections
 which lead him to take into view duties
 which he owes to other men2 such as1   
justice1 benevolence1 c4 7#c47 ,the     
impression of moral rectitude or moral  
responsibility4 ,this is derived from   
the great principle of conscience1 aided
 by the truths of religious belief4     
7#d47 ,we ought to add reason of        
judgment1 which leads him to perceive   
certain tendencies of actions1 apart    
from their moral aspect4 ,now1 in       
deciding on his conduct in any          
particular instance1 one man makes every
 thing bend to his own interest or      
pleasure1--with little regard to the    
interests of others2--unless in so far  

as the absolute requirements of justice 
are concerned1 the infringement of which
 might expose him to loss of reputation1
 or even to punishment4--,another       
surrenders a certain portion of his     
personal gratification to the advantage 
or comfort of others1 purely as an      
exercise of feeling from which he       
experiences satisfaction2--influenced1  
also1 probably1 in some measure1 by a   
regard to character1 or the love of     
approbation4 ,in such a man1 it becomes1
 in individual instances1 a matter of   
calculation1 what degree of the         
sacrifice of personal ease1 interest1 of
 feeling1 is to be made to this         
principle of action4 ,a third           
contemplates the case purely as one of  
duty of moral responsibility1 and acts  
upon this principle1 though it may      
involve a degree of personal exertion1  
or a sacrifice of personal feeling1 in  
itself disagreeable or even injurious to
 him2 that is1 though the strongest     
personal motives would lead to a        

different conduct4 ,let the case1 again1
 refer to one of the desires1 bearing no
 immediate relation to the interests of 
other men4 ,one man goes directly into  
the gratification of it1 without any    
consideration4 ,another1 who feels the  
same desire1 considers the influence    
which the indulgence would be likely to 
have on his health1 interest1 or        
reputation4--,this may be considered as 
simply an exercise of judgment1 combined
 with a certain operation of self-love4 
,a third views the aspect of the deed   
purely as a question of moral           
responsibility1--and1 if he sees cause1 
decides against it on this ground       
alone2--though he should perceive that  
it might be gratified without any danger
 to his health1 interest1 or reputation1
 or even that it might contribute to his
 advantage4  ,we have thus presented to 
us three characters2--one who acts upon 
the high and pure ground of moral       
principle2--one who acts from motives of
 a more contracted and personal nature1 

though1 in certain instances1 his       
conduct may be the same2--and one who   
goes straight forward to the            
gratification of a ruling desire or     
governing propensity1 without attending 
to motives of either class4 ,the first  
is a uniform character1 on whose conduct
 we depend in any given circumstances1  
with a confidence similar to that with  
which we rely on the operation of       
physical agents4 ,for we know the       
uniform tendencies of the motives or    
moral causes by which he is habitually  
influenced1 and we know his moral       
temperament4 ,we have nearly the same   
kind of knowledge respecting him1 which 
we have of the tendencies of chemical   
agents towards each other1 and which    
enables us with perfect confidence to   
foretel their actions4 ,the third has   
also a uniformity of conduct1 though of 
a very different kind4 ,we know1        
likewise1 his moral condition1 and1 to  
predict his conduct1 we require only to 
learn the particular inducements or     

temptations to which he is exposed in a 
given instance4 ,the second we cannot   
rely or calculate upon2 for we have not 
the means of tracing the conflicting    
views by which he may be influenced in a
 particular case1 or the principle on   
which he may ultimately decide between  
them4 ,they involve the strength of the 
inclination1--and the degree of power   
exerted over it by the class of personal
 or selfish motives by which he is      
influenced4--,in regard to various      
instances of ill-regulated desire1 we   
must add his hope of evading            
detection1--as on this depends1 in a    
great measure1 the kind of evils dreaded
 by him in reference to the indulgence4 
,these taken together imply a           
complicated moral calculation1 of which 
it is impossible for another man to     
trace the result4  ,there cannot be an  
inquiry of more intense interest than to
 investigate the causes in which        
originate the differences among these   
three characters2 or1 in other words1   

the principles on which we can explain  
the fact1 that the will of individuals  
may be influenced so differently with   
the same motives before them4 ,these    
appear to be referable to three         
heads1--,knowledge1--,attention1--and   
,moral ,habits4   ,i4 ,a primary and    
essential element1 in the due regulation
 of the will1 is a correct knowledge of 
the truths and motives which tend to    
influence its determinations4 ,the      
highest class of these comprehends the  
truths of religious belief1--a series of
 moral causes1 the tendencies of which  
are of the most important kind1 and     
calculated to exert a uniform power over
 every man who surrenders himself to    
their guidance4 ,for this purpose1 a    
correct knowledge of them is required1  
and1 to all who have this knowledge     
within their reach1 the careful         
acquisition involves a point of the     
deepest moral responsibility4 ,the      
sacred writers speak in the strongest   
terms of the guilt attached to voluntary

 ignorance3 and this must be obvious to 
every one who considers the clearness   
with which the highest truths are       
disclosed1 and the incontrovertible     
evidence by which they are supported4   
,this applies equally to the principles 
both of natural and of revealed         
religion4 ,the important truths of      
natural religion are partly matters of  
the most simple induction from the      
phenomena of nature which are           
continually before us2 and partly       
impressed upon our own moral            
constitution in the clearest and most   
forcible manner4 ,from the planet       
revolving in its appointed orbit1 to the
 economy of the insect on which we      
tread1 all nature demonstrates1 with a  
power which we cannot put away from us1 
the great incomprehensible ,one1 a being
 of boundless perfections and infinite  
wisdom4 ,in regard to his moral         
attributes1 also1 he has not left       
himself without a witness2 for a sense  
of these he has impressed upon us in the

 clearest manner in that wondrous part  
of our constitution1--the moral         
principle or conscience4 ,from these two
 sources may be derived a knowledge of  
the character of the ,deity1 and of our 
relation to him as moral beings2--and   
the man is left entirely without excuse 
who fails to direct to them his most    
earnest attention1 and to make the      
impressions derived from them the       
habitual rule of his volitions1 and the 
guide of his whole character4 ,he hath  
the rule of right within1 says ,butler1 
all that is wanting is1--that he        
honestly attend to it4  ,similar        
observations apply with equal or greater
 force to the truths of revealed        
religion4 ,these are supported by a     
weight of miraculous evidence1 and are  
transmitted to us by a chain of         
testimony1 carrying absolute conviction 
to the mind of every candid inquirer4   
,they are farther confirmed by a        
probability1 and a force of internal    
evidence1 which fix themselves upon the 

moral feelings of every sound           
understanding with a power which is     
irresistible4 ,the whole is addressed to
 us as rational beings2 it is pressed   
upon our attention as creatures destined
 for another state of existence2 and the
 duty is imposed upon every individual  
seriously to examine and to consider4   
,every man is in the highest degree     
responsible for the care with which he  
has informed himself of these evidences1
 and for the attention with which he has
 given to every part of them its due    
weight in the solemn inquiry4 ,he is    
farther responsible for the influence of
 previously formed prejudice1 or that   
vitiated state of his moral feelings1   
which prevents him from approaching the 
subject with the simplicity of a mind   
which is seriously desirous of the      
truth4 ,from the want of these essential
 elements of character1 it may very     
often happen1 that a man may fancy he   
has formed his opinions after much      
examination1 while the result of his    

prejudiced or frivolous inquiry has been
 only to fix him in delusion and        
falsehood4 ,among the singular          
sophistries1 indeed1 by which some men  
shut their minds against inquiries of   
the highest import1 is a kind of        
impression1 not perhaps distinctly      
avowed in words1 but clearly recognised 
in practice1 that these subjects of     
belief are in great measure matters of  
opinion1--instead of being felt to rest 
upon the basis of immutable and eternal 
truth4 ,can any thing be more striking  
than the manner in which a late         
distinguished poet expresses himself on 
the subject of a future life1--as if    
this truth were a mere opinion which    
could be taken up or laid down at       
pleasure1 to suit the taste of the      
individual inquirer2--,of the two1 ,i   
should think the long sleep better than 
the agonized vigil4 ,but men1 miserable 
as they are1 cling so to any thing like 
life1 that they probably would prefer   
damnation to quiet4 ,besides1 they think

 themselves so important in the         
creation1 that nothing less can satisfy 
then pride1--the insects6#a ,such is the
 frivolous sophistry by which one1 who  
holds a high rank in the literature of  
his country1 could put away from him the
 most momentous inquiry that can engage 
the attention of a rational being4      
,footnote #a3 ,byron's ,letters1        
,moore's ,life1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #eha4    
,,ii4 ,next to the acquisition of       
knowledge1 and the formation of         
opinions1 calculated to act upon us as  
moral beings1 is the important rule of  
habitually attending to them1 so as to  
bring their influence to bear upon our  
volitions4 ,he1 who honestly attends to 
what is passing within1 will perceive   
that this is a voluntary exercise of his
 thinking and reasoning faculties4 ,when
 a particular desire is present to his  
mind1 he has the power to act upon the  
first impulse1 or upon a very partial   
and limited1 perhaps a distorted1 view  
of the considerations and motives by    

which he ought to be influenced2--and he
 has the power to suspend acting1 and   
direct his attention deliberately and   
fully to the facts and principles which 
are calculated to guide his             
determination4 ,this is the first great 
step in that remarkable chain of        
sequences which belong to the regulation
 of the will4 ,it is what every one is  
conscious of2 and1 putting aside all    
those metaphysical subtleties in which  
the subject has been involved1 this     
constitutes man a free and responsible  
agent4 ,in this important process1 the  
first mental state is a certain movement
 of one of the desires or one of the    
affections2--we may use the term        
,inclination as including both4 ,the    
second is a reference of the inclination
 to the moral causes or motives which   
more peculiarly apply to it1--especially
 the indications of conscience1 and the 
principles of moral rectitude4--,if     
these be found to harmonize with the    
inclination1 volition and action follow1

 with the full concurrence of every     
moral feeling4 ,if the inclination be   
condemned by these1 it is1 in a         
well-regulated mind1 instantly          
dismissed1 and the healthy condition of 
the moral being is preserved4 ,but this 
voluntary and most important mental     
process may be neglected2--the          
inclination may be suffered to engross  
the mind and occupy fully the           
attention3--the power may not be        
exercised of directing it to moral      
causes and motives1 and of comparing    
with them the inclination which is      
present4 ,the consequence may be1 that  
the man runs heedlessly into volition   
and action1 from which the due exercise 
of this process of the mind might have  
preserved him4  ,but a third condition  
may take place which presents a subject 
of the highest interest4 ,the moral     
causes may be so far attended to1 as to 
prevent the inclination from being      
followed by action2 while the           
inclination is still cherished1 and the 

mind is allowed to dwell1 with a certain
 feeling of regret1 on the object which 
it had been obliged to deny itself4     
,though the actual deed be thus         
prevented1 the harmony of the moral     
feelings is destroyed2--and that mental 
condition is lost which is strictly to  
be called purity of heart4 ,for this    
consists in the desires and affections1 
as well as the conduct1 being in strict 
subjection to the indications of        
conscience and the principles of moral  
rectitude4 ,the inclination1 thus       
cherished1 gradually acquires greater   
ascendency over the moral feelings2--at 
each succeeding contest1 it more and    
more occupies the mind2 the attention is
 less and less directed to the moral    
truths and motives which are opposed to 
it2 the inclination at length acquires  
the predominance1 and is followed by    
volition4 ,this is what we mean by a man
 being carried away by passion1 in      
opposition to his moral conviction2 for 
passion consists in a desire or an      

affection which has been allowed to     
engross the mind1 until it gradually    
overpowers the moral causes which are   
calculated to counteract its influence4 
,now in the whole of this course each   
single movement of the mind is felt to  
be entirely voluntary4 ,from that step1 
which constitutes the first departure   
from moral purity1 the process consists 
in a desire being cherished which the   
moral feelings condemn2 while1 at each  
succeeding step1 the influence of these 
feelings is gradually weakened1 and     
finally destroyed4 ,such is the economy 
of the human heart1 and such the chain  
of sequences to be traced in the moral  
history of every man1 who1 with a       
conviction upon his mind of what is     
right1 has followed the downward course 
which gradually led him astray from     
virtue4 ,when we trace such a process   
backwards in a philosophical point of   
view1 the question still recurs1--what  
was the first step1 or that by which the
 mind was led into the course which thus

 terminated in favour of vice4 ,in the  
wonderful chain of sequences1 which has 
been established in the mental          
constitution1 it would appear that a    
very slight movement only is required   
for deranging the delicate harmony which
 ought to exist among the moral         
feelings2 but this each individual feels
 to be entirely voluntary4 ,it may      
consist in a desire being cherished     
which the moral feelings                
disapprove2--and1 though the effect at  
first may be small1 a morbid influence  
has arisen1 which gains strength by     
continuance1 and at last acquires the   
power of a moral habit4 ,the more the   
desire is cherished1 the less is the    
attention directed to the considerations
 or moral causes by which it might be   
counteracted4 ,in this manner1 according
 to the mental economy1 these causes    
gradually lose their power over the     
volitions or determinations of the mind1
 and1 at a certain period of this       
progress1 the judgment itself comes to  

be changed respecting the moral aspect  
of the deed4  ,there is still another   
mental condition to be mentioned in     
connexion with this subject2 in which   
the harmony of the moral feelings may be
 destroyed1 without the action          
following4 ,this takes places when the  
inclination is cherished1 as in the     
former case1 in opposition to the       
indications of conscience2 while the    
action is opposed by some inferior      
motives1--as a regard to reputation or  
interest4 ,the deed may thus be         
prevented1 and the interests of society 
may benefit by the difference2 but1 so  
far as regards the individual himself1  
the disruption of moral harmony is the  
same2 and his moral aspect must be      
similar in the eye of the ,almighty     
,one1 who regards not the outward       
appearance alone1 but who looketh into  
the heart4 ,in this manner it may very  
often happen1 that strong inducements to
 vice are resisted from motives         
referring merely to health1 or to       

character4 ,but this is not to overcome 
temptation1--it is only to balance one  
selfish feeling against another4        
,,iii4 ,from the state of mind which has
 now been referred to1 there gradually  
results a ,moral ,habit4 ,this is a     
mental condition1 in which a desire or  
an affection1 repeatedly acted upon1 is1
 after each repetition1 acted upon with 
less and less effort1--and1 on the other
 hand1 a truth or moral principle1 which
 has been repeatedly passed over without
 adequate attention1 after every such   
act makes less and less impression1     
until at length it ceases to exert any  
influence over the moral feelings or the
 conduct4 ,i had occasion to illustrate 
this remarkable principle in another    
point of view1 when treating of the     
connexion between the emotions of       
sympathy and benevolence1 and the       
conduct which naturally arises out of   
them4 ,this conduct at first may require
 a certain effort1 and is accompanied by
 a strong feeling of the emotion which  

leads to it4 ,but1 after each           
repetition1 the acts go on with less    
feeling of the emotion1 and less        
reference to the principle from which   
they spring1 while there is             
progressively forming the habit of      
active benevolence4 ,it is precisely the
 same with habits of vice4 ,at first a  
deed requires an effort1--and a powerful
 contest with moral principles1 and it  
is speedily followed by that feeling of 
regret1 to which superficial observers  
give the name of repentance4 ,this is   
the voice of conscience1 but its power  
is more and more diminished after each  
repetition of the deed2--even the       
judgment becomes perverted respecting   
the first great principles of moral     
rectitude2 and acts1 which at first     
occasioned a violent conflict1 are gone 
into without remorse1 or almost without 
perception of their moral aspect4 ,a man
 in this situation may still retain the 
knowledge of truths and principles which
 at one time exerted an influence over  

his conduct2 but they are now matters of
 memory alone4 ,their power as moral    
causes is gone1 and even the judgment is
 altered respecting their moral         
tendencies4 ,he views them now perhaps  
as the superstitions of the vulgar1 or  
the prejudices of a contracted          
education2 and rejoices1 it may be1 in  
his emancipation from their authority4  
,he knows not1--for he has not the moral
 perception now to know1 that he has    
been pursuing a downward course1 and    
that the issue1 on which he             
congratulates himself1 consists in his  
last degradation as a moral being4 ,even
 in this state of moral destitution1    
indeed1 the same warning principle may  
still raise its voice1--unheeded but not
 subdued1--repelled as an enemy1 not    
admitted as a friendly monitor and      
guide4 ,i have not the smallest         
influence over ,lord ,byron1 in this    
particular1 writes one of the chosen    
friends of that distinguished           
individual1--if ,i had1 ,i certainly    

should employ it to eradicate from his  
great mind the delusions of             
,christianity1 which1 in spite of his   
reason1 seem perpetually to recur1 and  
to lay in ambush for the hours of       
sickness and distress4 ,it would be     
interesting to know what the particular 
impressions were1 from which this       
sympathizing friend was anxious to      
rescue the poet4 ,they were probably the
 suggestions of a power within1 which1  
in certain seasons of reflection1       
compelled his attention in spite of his 
attempts to reason against it1--pleading
 with authority for a present ,deity1   
and a life to come4  ,the principle of  
,habit1 therefore1 holds a most         
important place in the moral condition  
of every man2 and it applies equally to 
any species of conduct1 or any train of 
mental operations1 which1 by frequent   
repetition1 have become so familiar1 as 
not to be accompanied by a recognition  
of the principles in which they         
originated4 ,in this manner good habits 

are continued without any immediate     
sense of the right principles by which  
they were formed2 but they arose from a 
frequent and uniform acting upon these  
principles1 and on this is founded the  
moral approbation which we attach to    
habits of this description4 ,in the same
 manner1 habits of vice1 and habits of  
inattention to any class of duties1 are 
perpetuated without a sense of the      
principles and affections which they    
violate2 but this arose from a frequent 
violation of these principles1 and a    
frequent repulsion of these affections1 
until they gradually lost their power   
over the conduct2 and in this consists  
the guilt of habits4 ,thus1 one person  
acquires habits of benevolence1         
veracity1 and kindness1--of minute      
attention to his various duties1--of    
correct mental discipline1--and active  
direction of his thoughts to all those  
objects of attention which ought to     
engage a well regulated mind3--,another 
sinks into habits of listless vacuity or

 frivolity of mind1--of vicious         
indulgence and contracted               
selfishness1--of neglect of important   
duties1 disregard to the feelings of    
others1 and total indifference to all   
those considerations and pursuits which 
claim the highest regard of every       
responsible being2 and the striking fact
 is1 that1 after a certain period1 all  
this may go on without a feeling that   
aught is wrong either in the moral      
condition1 or the state of mental       
discipline2 such is the power of a moral
 habit4  ,the important truth1          
therefore1 is deserving of the deepest  
and most habitual attention1 that       
character consists in a great measure in
 habits1 and that habits arise out of   
individual actions and individual       
operations of the mind4 ,hence the      
importance of carefully weighing every  
action of our lives1 and every train of 
thought that we encourage in our minds2 
for we never can determine the effect of
 a single act1 or a single mental       

process1 in giving that influence to the
 character1 or to the moral condition1  
the result of which shall be decisive   
and permanent4 ,in the whole history of 
habits1 indeed1 we see a wondrous       
display of that remarkable order of     
sequences which has been established in 
our mental constitution1 and by which   
every man becomes1 in an important      
sense1 the master of his own moral      
destiny4 ,for each act of virtue tends  
to make him more virtuous2 and each act 
of vice gives new strength to an        
influence within1 which will certainly  
render him more more vicious4  ,these   
considerations have a practical tendency
 of the utmost interest4 ,in subduing   
habits of an injurious character1 the   
laws of mental sequences1 which have now
 been referred to1 must be carefully    
acted upon4 ,when the judgment1         
influenced by the indications of        
conscience1 is convinced of the         
injurious nature of the habit1 the      
attention must be steadily and          

habitually directed to the truths which 
produced this impression4 ,there will   
thus arise desire to be delivered from  
the habit1--or1 in other words1 to      
cultivate the course of action that is  
opposed to it4 ,this desire1 being      
cherished in the mind1 is then made to  
bear upon every individual case in which
 a propensity is felt towards particular
 actions1 or particular mental          
processes1 referable to the habit4 ,the 
new inclination is at first acted upon  
with an effort1 but1 after every        
instance of success1 less effort is     
required1 until at length the new course
 of action is confirmed1 and overpowers 
the habit to which it was opposed4 ,but 
that this result may take place1 it is  
necessary that the mental process be    
followed1 in the manner distinctly      
indicated by the philosophy of the moral
 feelings2 for if this is not attended  
to1 the expected effect may not follow1 
even under circumstances which appear1  
at first sight1 most likely to produce  

it4 ,on this principle we are to explain
 the fact1 that bad habits may be long  
suspended by some powerful extrinsic    
influence1 while they are in no degree  
broken4 ,thus1 a person addicted to     
intemperance will bind himself by an    
oath to abstain1 for a certain time1    
from intoxicating liquors4 ,in an       
instance which has been related to me1  
an individual under this process        
observed the most rigid sobriety for    
five years1 but was found in a state of 
intoxication the very day after the     
period of abstinence expired4 ,in such a
 case1 the habit is suspended by the    
mere influence of the oath2 but the     
desire continues unsubdued1 and resumes 
all its former power whenever this      
artificial restraint is withdrawn4 ,the 
effect is the same as if the man had    
been in confinement during the period1  
or had been kept from his favourite     
indulgence by some other restraint      
entirely of an external kind2 the       
gratification was prevented1 but his    

moral nature continued unchanged4       
,these principles may be confidently    
stated as facts in the moral            
constitution of man1 challenging the    
assent of every candid observer of human
 nature4 ,several conclusions seem to   
arise out of them1 of the utmost        
practical importance4 ,we perceive1 in  
the first place1 a state which the mind 
may attain1 in which there is such a    
disruption of its moral harmony1 that no
 power appeals in the mind itself       
capable of restoring it to a healthy    
condition4 ,this important fact in the  
philosophy of human nature has been     
clearly recognised1 from the earliest   
ages1 on the mere principles of human   
science4 ,it is distinctly stated by    
,aristotle in his ,nicomachean ,ethics1 
where he draws a striking comparison    
between a man who1 being first misled by
 sophistical reasonings1 has gone into a
 life of voluptuousness1 under an       
impression that he was doing no         
wrong1--and one who has followed the    

same course in opposition to his own    
moral convictions4 ,the former he       
contends might be reclaimed by argument2
 but the latter he considers as         
incurable4 ,in such a state of mind1    
therefore1 it follows1 by an induction  
which cannot be controverted1 either    
that the evil is irremediable and       
hopeless1 or that we must look for a    
power from without the mind which may   
afford an adequate remedy4 ,we are thus 
led to perceive the adaptation and the  
probability of the provisions of        
,christianity1 where an influence is    
indeed disclosed to us1 capable of      
restoring the harmony which has been    
lost1 and raising man anew to his place 
as a moral being4 ,we cannot hesitate to
 believe that the ,power1 who framed the
 wondrous fabric1 may thus hold         
intercourse with it1 and redeem it from 
disorder and ruin4 ,on the contrary1 it 
accords with the highest conceptions we 
can form of the benevolence of the      
,deity1 that he should thus look upon   

his creatures in their hour of need2 and
 the system disclosing such             
communication appears1 upon every       
principle of sound philosophy1 to be one
 of harmony1 consistency1 and truth4    
,the subject1 therefore1 leads our      
attention to that inward change1 so     
often the scoff of the profane1 but to  
which so prominent a place is assigned  
in the sacred writings1 in which a man  
is said to be created anew by a power   
from ,heaven1 and elevated in his whole 
views and feelings as a moral being4    
,sound philosophy teaches us1 that there
 is a state in which nothing less than  
such a complete transformation can      
restore the man to a healthy moral      
condition1 and that1 for producing it1  
nothing will avail but an influence from
 without the mind1--a might and a power 
from the same ,almighty ,one who        
originally framed it4 ,philosophy       
teaches1 in the clearest manner1 that a 
portion of mankind require such a       
transformation2 ,christianity informs us

 that it is required by all4 ,when the  
inductions of science and the dictates  
of revelation harmonize to this extent1 
who shall dare to assert that the latter
 are not truth4 ,who1 that places       
himself in the presence of a being of   
infinite purity1 will say1 he requires  
not such a change2 or that1 for the     
production of it1 he needs no agency1   
beyond the resources of his own mind4   
,if none be found who is entitled to    
believe he forms the exception1 we are  
forced into the acknowledgement of the  
truth1 so powerfully impressed upon us  
in the sacred writings1 that1 in the eye
 of the ,almighty ,one1 no man in       
himself is righteous2 and that his own  
power avails not for restoring him to a 
state of moral purity4  ,from the whole 
of this inquiry1 we see the deep        
influence of habits1 and the fearful    
power which they may acquire over the   
whole moral system2 considerations of   
the highest practical interest to those 
who would prevent the formation of      

habits of an injurious nature1 or who1  
feeling their influence1 strive to be   
delivered from them4 ,there is indeed a 
point in this downward course1 where the
 habit has acquired undisputed power1   
and the whole moral feelings yield to it
 unresisting submission4 ,peace may then
 be within1 but that peace is the       
stillness of death2 and1 unless a voice 
from heaven shall wake the dead1 the    
moral being is lost4 ,but1 in the       
progress towards this fearful issue1    
there maybe a tumult1 and a contest1 and
 a strife1 and the voice of conscience  
may still command a certain attention to
 its warnings4 ,while there are these   
indications of life1 there is yet hope  
of the man2 but on each moment is now   
suspended his moral existence4 ,let him 
retire from the influence of external   
things2 and listen to that voice within1
 which1 though often unheeded1 still    
pleads for ,god4 ,let him call to aid   
those high truths which relate to the   
presence and inspection of this being of

 infinite purity1 and the solemnities of
 a life which is to come4 ,above all1   
let him look up in humble supplication  
to that pure and holy ,one1 who is the  
witness of this warfare1--who will      
regard it with compassion1 and impart   
his powerful aid4 ,but let him not      
presumptuously rely on this aid1 as if  
the victory were already secured4 ,the  
contest is but begun2 and there must be 
a continued effort1 and unceasing       
watchfulness1--a habitual direction of  
the attention to those truths which1 as 
moral causes1 are calculated to act upon
 the mind1--and a constant reliance upon
 the power from on high which is felt to
 be real and indispensable4 ,with all   
this provision1 his progress may be     
slow2 for the opposing principle1 and   
the influence of established moral      
habits1 may be felt contending for their
 former dominion2 but by each advantage 
that is achieved over them1 their power 
will be broken1 and finally destroyed4  
,now in all this contest towards the    

purity of the moral being1 each step is 
no less a process of the mind itself    
than the downward course by which it was
 preceded4 ,it consists in a surrender  
of the will to the suggestions of       
conscience1 and a habitual direction of 
the attention to those truths which are 
calculated to act upon the moral        
volitions4 ,in this course1 the man     
feels that he is authorized to look for 
a might and an influence not his own4   
,this is no imaginary or mysterious     
impression1 which one may fancy that he 
feels1 and then pass on contented with  
the vision2 but a power which acts      
through the healthy operations of his   
own mind2 it is in his own earnest      
exertions1 as a rational being1 to      
regulate these operations1 that he is   
encouraged to expect its communication2 
and it is in feeling these assuming the 
characters of moral health1 that he has 
the proof of its actual presence4  ,and 
where is the improbability that the pure
 and holy ,one1 who framed the wondrous 

moral being1 may thus hold intercourse  
with it1 and impart an influence in its 
hour of deepest need4 ,according to the 
utmost of our conceptions1 it is the    
highest of his works1--for he has       
endowed it with the power of rising to  
the contemplation of himself1 and with  
the capacity of aspiring to the         
imitation of his own moral perfections4 
,we cannot1 for a moment1 doubt1 that   
his eye must reach its inmost movements1
 and that all its emotions1 and desires1
 and volitions1 are exposed to his view4
 ,we must believe that he looks with    
displeasure when he perceives them      
wandering from himself2 and contemplates
 with approbation the contest1 when the 
spirit strives to throw off its moral   
bondage1 and to fight its way upwards to
 a conformity to his will4 ,upon every  
principle of sound philosophy1 all this 
must be open to his inspection2 and we  
can perceive nothing opposed to the     
soundest inductions of reason in the    
belief1 that he should impart an        

influence to the feeble being in this   
high design1 and conduct him to its     
accomplishment4 ,in all this1 in fact1  
there is so little improbability1 that  
we find it impossible to suppose it     
could be otherwise4 ,we find it         
impossible to believe1 that such a      
mental process could go on without the  
knowledge of him whose presence is in   
every place1--or that1 looking upon it1 
he should want either the power or the  
willingness to impart his effectual aid4
  ,but1 independently of our conviction 
of an actual communication from the     
,deity1 there is a power in the mind    
itself1 which is calculated to draw down
 upon it an influence of the most       
efficient kind4 ,this is produced by the
 mental process which we call ,faith3   
and it may be illustrated by an         
impression which many must have         
experienced4 ,let us suppose that we    
have a friend of exalted intelligence   
and virtue1 who has often exercised over
 us a commanding influence1--restraining

 us from pursuits to which we felt an   
inclination1--exciting us to virtuous   
conduct1--and elevating1 by his         
intercourse with us1 our impressions of 
a character on which we wished to form  
our own4 ,let us suppose that we are    
removed to a distance from this friend1 
and that circumstances of difficulty or 
danger occur1 in which we feel the want 
of a guide and counsellor4 ,in the      
reflections which the situation         
naturally gives rise to1 the image of   
our friend is brought before us2 an     
influence is conveyed analogous to that 
which was often produced by his presence
 and his counsel2--and we feel as if he 
were actually present1 to tender his    
advice and watch our conduct4 ,how much 
would this impression be increased1     
could we farther entertain the thought1 
that this absent friend was able1 in    
some way1 to communicate with us1 so far
 as to be aware of our present          
circumstances1 and to perceive our      
efforts to recall the influence of his  

character upon our own4--,such is the   
intercourse of the soul with            
,god4--,every movement of the mind is   
known to him2 his eye is present with   
it1 when1 in any situation of duty1     
distress1 or mental discipline1 the man1
 under this exercise of faith1 realizes 
the presence and character of the       
,deity1 and solemnly inquires how1 in   
the particular instance1 his moral      
feelings and his conduct will appear in 
the eye of him who seeth in secret4     
,this is no vision of the imagination1  
but a fact supported by every principle 
of sound reason1--the influence which a 
man brings down upon himself1 when1 by  
an effort of his own mind1 he thus      
places himself in the immediate presence
 of the ,almighty4 ,the man who does so 
in every decision of life is he who     
lives by faith2--and1 whether we regard 
the inductions of reason1 or the        
dictates of sacred truth1 such a man is 
taught to expect an influence greater   
and more effectual still4 ,this is a    

power immediately from ,god1 which shall
 be to him direction in every           
doubt1--light in every                  
darkness1--strength in his utmost       
weakness1--and comfort in all           
distress2--a power which shall bear upon
 all the principles of his moral nature1
 when he carries on the mighty conflict 
of bringing every desire and every      
volition under a conformity to the      
divine will4 ,we again hazard with      
confidence the assertion1 that in all   
this there is no improbability2--but    
that1 on the contrary1 the improbability
 is entirely on the other side1--in     
supposing that any such mental process  
could take place1 without the knowledge 
and the interposition of that           
incomprehensible ,one1 whose eye is upon
 all his works4     ,,part ,,iii4  ,,of 
,,the ,,moral ,,principle1 ,,or         
,,conscience4   ,there has been much    
dispute respecting the nature and even  
the existence of the ,moral ,principle1 
as a distinct element of our mental     

constitution2 but this controversy may  
probably be considered as allied to     
other speculations of a metaphysical    
nature1 in regard to which a kind of    
evidence was sought of which the        
subjects are not susceptible4 ,without  
arguing respecting the propriety of     
speaking of a separate power or         
principle1 we simply contend for the    
fact1 that there is a mental exercise1  
by which we feel certain actions to be  
right and certain others wrong4 ,it is  
an element or a movement of our moral   
nature which admits of no analysis1 and 
no explanation2 and is referable to no  
other principle than a simple           
recognition of the fact1 which forces   
itself upon the conviction of every man 
who looks into the processes of his own 
mind4 ,of the existence and the nature  
of this most important principle1       
therefore1 the evidence is entirely     
within4 ,we appeal to the consciousness 
of every man1 that he perceives a power 
which1 in particular cases1 warns him of

 the conduct which he ought to pursue1  
and administers a solemn admonition when
 he has departed from it4 ,for1 while   
his judgment conveys to him an          
impression1 both of the tendencies and  
certain of the qualities of actions1 he 
has1 besides this1 a feeling by which he
 views the actions with approbation or  
disapprobation1 in reference purely to  
their moral aspect1 and without any     
regard to their consequences4 ,when we  
refer to the sacred writings1 we find   
the principle of conscience represented 
as a power of such importance1--that1   
without any acquired knowledge1 or any  
actual precepts1 it is sufficient to    
establish1 in every man1 such an        
impression of his duty as leaves him    
without excuse in the neglect of        
it3--,for when the ,gentiles1 which have
 not the law1 do by nature the things   
contained in the law1 these1 having not 
the law1 are a law unto themselves2     
which shew the work of the law written  
in their hearts1 then conscience also   

bearing witness1 and their thoughts the 
meanwhile accusing or else excusing one 
another4 ,we even find a power assigned 
to the decisions of conscience1         
differing in extent only1 but not in    
kind1 from the judgment of the          
,almighty2--,if our heart condemn us1   
,god is greater than our heart1 and     
knoweth all things4  ,the province of   
conscience then appears to be1 to convey
 to man a certain conviction of what is 
morally right and wrong1 in regard to   
conduct in individual cases1--and to the
 general exercise of the desires or     
affections4 ,this it does independently 
of any acquired knowledge1 and without  
reference to any other standard of duty4
 ,it does1 so1 by a rule of right which 
it carries within itself1--and by       
applying this to the primary moral      
feelings1 that is1 the desires and      
affections1 so as to indicate among them
 a just and healthy balance towards each
 other4 ,the desires direct us to       
certain gratifications which we feel to 

be worthy of acquirement1 and the       
affections lead us to a certain course  
of conduct which we feel to be agreeable
 to ourselves1 or useful to others4     
,but1 to act under the influence of     
conscience is to perform actions1 simply
 because we feel them to be right1 and  
to abstain from others1 simply because  
we feel them to be wrong1--without      
regard to any other impression1 or to   
the consequences of the actions either  
to ourselves or others4 ,he1 who on this
 principle performs an action1 though it
 may be highly disagreeable to him1 or  
abstains from another though it may be  
highly desirable1 is a conscientious    
man4 ,such a man1 under the influence of
 habit1 comes to act more and more      
easily under the suggestions of         
conscience1 and to be more and more set 
free from every feeling and propensity  
that is opposed to it4 ,conscience seems
 therefore to hold a place among the    
moral powers1 analogous to that which   
reason holds among the                  

intellectual2--and1 when we view it in  
this relation1 there appears a beautiful
 harmony pervading the whole economy of 
the mind4  ,by certain intellectual     
operations1 man acquires the knowledge  
of a series of facts1--he remembers     
them1--he separates and classifies      
them1--and forms them into new          
combinations4 ,but1 with the most active
 exercise of all these operations1 his  
mind might present an accumulation of   
facts1 without order1 harmony1 or       
utility2--without any principle of      
combination1 or combined only in those  
fantastic and extravagant forms which   
appear in the conceptions of the maniac4
 ,it is ,reason that reduces the whole  
into order and harmony1--by comparing1  
distinguishing1 and tracing their true  
analogies and relations1--and then by   
deducing truths as conclusions from the 
whole4 ,it is in this manner            
particularly1 that a man acquires a     
knowledge of the uniform actions of     
bodies on each other1--and1 confiding in

 the uniformity of these actions1 learns
 to direct his means to the ends which  
he has in view4 ,he knows also his own  
relations to other sentient beings1--and
 adapts his conduct to them1 according  
to the circumstances in which he is     
placed1--the persons with whom he is    
connected1--and the objects which he    
wishes to accomplish4 ,he learns to     
accommodate his measures to new         
circumstances as they arise1--and thus  
is guided and directed through his      
physical relations4 ,when reason is     
suspended1 all this harmony is          
destroyed4 ,the visions of the mind are 
acted upon as facts2 things are combined
 into fantastic forms1 entirely apart   
from their true relations2--conduct is  
widely at variance with what            
circumstances require2--ends are        
attempted by means which have no        
relation to them2--and the ends         
themselves are equally at variance with 
those which are suitable to the         
circumstances of the individual4 ,such  

is the maniac1 whom accordingly we shut 
up1 to prevent him from being dangerous 
to the public2--for he has been known to
 mistake so remarkably the relation of  
things1 and the conduct adapted to his  
circumstances1 as to murder his most    
valuable friend1 or his own helpless    
infant4  ,in all this process there is a
 striking analogy to certain conditions 
of the moral feelings1 and to the       
control which is exercised over them by 
the principle of ,conscience4 ,by       
self-love1 a man is led to seek his own 
gratification or advantage2--and the    
desires direct him to certain objects by
 which these propensities may be        
gratified4 ,but the affections carry    
forth his views to other men with whom  
he is connected by various relations1   
and to the offices of justice1 veracity1
 and benevolence1 which arise out of    
them4 ,conscience is the regulating     
power1 which1 acting upon the desires   
and affections1 as reason does upon a   
series of facts1 preserves among them   

harmony and order4 ,it does so by       
repressing the propensity of            
selfishness1 and reminding the man of   
the true relation between regard to his 
own interest and the duties he owes to  
other men4 ,it regulates his senses and 
pursuits1 by carrying his views beyond  
present feelings and present            
gratifications1 to future times and     
future consequences1--and by raising his
 attention to his relation to the great 
moral ,governor of the universe4 ,he    
thus learns to adapt his conduct and    
pursuits1 not to present and transient  
feelings1 but to an extended view of his
 great and true interests as a moral    
being4 ,such is conscience1--still1 like
 reason1 pointing out the moral ends a  
man ought to pursue1 and guiding him in 
the means by which he ought to pursue   
them2--and the man does not act in      
conformity with the constitution of his 
nature1 who does not yield to conscience
 the supremacy and direction over all   
his other feelings and principles of    

action4 ,but the analogy does not stop  
here2--for we can also trace a condition
 in which this controlling influence of 
conscience is suspended or lost4 ,i     
formerly endeavoured to trace the manner
 in which this derangement arises1 and  
have now only to allude to its influence
 on the harmony of the moral feelings4  
,self-love degenerates into low selfish 
gratification3 the desires are indulged 
without any other restraint than that   
which arises from a mere selfish        
principle1--as a regard to health1      
perhaps in some degree to reputation2   
the affections are exercised only in so 
far as similar principles impose a      
certain degree of attention to them3    
present and momentary impulses are acted
 upon1 without any regard to future     
results3 conduct is adapted to present  
gratification1 without the perception   
either of its moral aspect1 or its      
consequences to the man himself as a    
responsible being2 and without regard to
 the means by which these feelings are  

gratified4 ,in all this violation of    
moral harmony1 there is no derangement  
of the ordinary exercise of judgment4   
,in the most remarkable example that can
 be furnished by the history of human   
depravity1 the man may be as acute as   
ever in the details of business or the  
pursuits of science4 ,there is no       
diminution of his sound estimate of     
physical relations1--for this is the    
province of reason4 ,but there is a     
total derangement of his sense and      
approbation of moral relations1--for    
this is conscience4 ,such a condition of
 mind1 then1 appears to be1 in reference
 to the moral feelings1 what insanity is
 in regard to the intellectual4 ,the    
intellectual maniac fancies himself a   
king1 surrounded by every form of       
earthly splendour1--and this            
hallucination is not corrected even by  
the sight of his bed of straw and all   
the horrors of his cell4 ,the moral     
maniac pursues his way1 and thinks      
himself a wise and a happy man3--- but  

feels not that he is treading a downward
 course1 and is lost as a moral being4  
99       99       99       99       99  
,in the preceding observations          
respecting the moral principle or       
conscience1 ,i have alluded chiefly to  
its influence in preserving a certain   
harmony among the other feelings1--in   
regulating the desires by the           
indications of moral purity1--and       
presenting self-love from interfering   
with the duties and affections which we 
owe to other men4 ,but there is another 
and a most important purpose which is   
answered by this faculty1 and that is to
 make us acquainted with the moral      
attributes of the ,deity4 ,in strict    
philosophical language we ought perhaps 
to say1 that this high purpose is       
accomplished by a combined operation of 
conscience and reason2 but1 however this
 may be1 the process appeals clear and  
intelligible in its nature1 and fully   
adapted to the end now assigned to it4  
,from a simple exercise of mind1        

directed to the great phenomena of      
nature1 we acquire the knowledge of a   
,first ,cause1--a being of infinite     
power and infinite wisdom2 and this     
conclusion is impressed upon us in a    
peculiar manner1 when1 from our own     
bodily and mental endowments1 we infer  
the attributes of him who framed us3--he
 that planted the ear1 says a sacred    
writer1 shall he not hear2--he that     
formed the eye1 shall he not see2--he   
that teacheth man knowledge1 shall not  
he know8 ,when we trace backwards a     
series of finite yet intelligent beings1
 we must arrive at one of two           
conclusions3--,we must either trace the 
series through an infinite and eternal  
succession of finite beings1 each the   
cause of the one which succeeded it2--or
 we must refer the commencement of the  
series to one great intelligent being1  
himself uncaused1 infinite1 and eternal4
 ,to trace the series to one being1     
finite1 yet uncaused1 is totally        
inadmissible2 and not less so is the    

conception of finite beings in an       
infinite and eternal series4 ,the belief
 of one infinite being1 self-existent   
and eternal1 is1 therefore1 the only    
conclusion at which we can arrive1 as   
presenting any characters of credibility
 or truth4 ,the superintending care1 the
 goodness1 and benevolence of the       
,deity1 we learn1 with a feeling of     
equal certainty1 from the ample         
provision he has made for supplying the 
wants and ministering to the comfort of 
all the creatures whom he has made4     
,this part of the argument1 also1 is in 
the clearest manner insisted upon in the
 sacred writings2 when the apostle      
,paul1 in calling upon the people of    
,lystra to worship the true ,god1 who   
made heaven and earth1 adds1 as a source
 of knowledge from which they ought to  
learn his character2--he left not       
himself without a witness1 in that he   
did good1 and gave us rain from heaven  
and fruitful seasons1 filling our hearts
 with food and gladness4  ,a being1 thus

 endowed with infinite power1 wisdom1   
and goodness1 we cannot conceive to     
exist without moral feelings2 and1 by a 
process equally obvious1 we arrive at a 
distinct knowledge of these1 when1 from 
the moral perceptions of our own minds1 
we infer the moral attributes of him who
 thus formed us4 ,we have certain       
impressions of justice1 veracity1       
compassion1 and moral purity1 in regard 
to our own conduct1--we have a distinct 
approbation of these qualities in       
others1--and we attach a feeling of     
disapprobation to the infringement of   
them4 ,by a simple step of reasoning1   
which conveys an impression of absolute 
conviction1 we conclude1 that he1 who   
formed us with these feelings1          
possesses1 in his own character1        
corresponding moral attributes1 which1  
while they resemble in kind1 must       
infinitely exceed in degree1 those      
qualities in the wisest and the best of 
men4 ,in our actual observation of      
mankind1 we perceive these attributes   

impaired in their exercise by human     
weakness1 distorted by human            
passion1--and impeded in their operation
 by personal wants1 personal feelings1  
and selfish interests4 ,but1 apart from 
such deteriorating causes1 we have a    
certain abstract idea of the full and   
perfect exercise of those qualities2 and
 it is in this pure and perfect form    
that we ascribe them to the ,almighty4  
,in him1 they can be impeded by no      
weakness1--distorted by no passion1 and 
impaired in their operation by no       
personal interest4 ,we therefore        
conclude him to be perfect in the       
exercise of all these moral attributes1 
and to take the most rigid estimate of  
any infringement of them by man3--this  
is what we call the holiness of ,god4   
,even the man1 who has himself departed 
from moral rectitude1 still feels a     
power within1 which points with         
irresistible force to what is purity1   
and fixes upon him a conviction that    
,god is pure4  ,when we view such a     

,being1 apart from any inferior         
creature1 all seems harmony and         
consistency2--we have only to           
contemplate him as high and holy1 and   
enjoying perfect happiness in his own   
spotless attributes4 ,but1 when we view 
him in relation to man in a state of    
moral discipline1 and1 in that state1   
tainted deeply with moral evil1 a       
difficulty arises of an appalling       
magnitude4 ,there is ample scope now1 we
 perceive1 for the exercise of his      
holiness1 veracity1 and justice2 and he 
appeals in sublime and terrible majesty1
 in his exalted character as a moral    
governor4 ,but1 amid such a display1    
there is an obvious interruption to the 
exercise of compassion1--especially in  
that essential department of it1--mercy 
or forgiveness4 ,this attribute may be  
exercised without restraint by an       
individual1 where his own interests     
alone are concerned1 because in him it  
involves only a sacrifice of self-love4 
,but forgiveness in a moral governor    

either implies an actual change of      
purpose1 or supposes a former decision  
to have been made without sufficient    
knowledge of1 or due attention to1 all  
the facts by which he ought to have been
 influenced2--it denotes either undue   
rigour in the law1 or ignorance or      
inattention in him who administers it1  
and it may very often interfere with the
 essential requisites of justice4 ,but1 
in a moral governor of infinite         
perfection1 there can be neither        
ignorance of facts nor change of        
purpose2--the requirements of his       
justice must stand unshaken2 and his    
law1 written on the hearts of all his   
rational creatures1 must be upheld1 in  
the face of the universe1 as holy1 and  
just1 and good4 ,is1 then1 the exercise 
of mercy to be excluded from our        
conception of the divine character1--and
 is there no forgiveness with           
,god4--,the soundest inductions of      
philosophy1 applied to the actual state 
of man1 bring us to this momentous      

question2 but the highest efforts of    
human science fail to answer it4 ,it is 
in this our utmost need1 that we are met
 by the dictates of revelation1 and are 
called to humble the pride of our reason
 before that display of the harmony and 
integrity of the divine character4 ,we  
there learn the truths1 far beyond the  
inductions of human science1 and the    
utmost conceptions of human             
thought1--that an atonement is made1 a  
sacrifice offered2--and that the        
exercise of forgiveness is consistent   
with the perfections of the ,deity4     
,thus1 by a process of the mind itself1 
which seems to present every element of 
fair and logical reasoning1 we arrive at
 a full conviction of the necessity1 and
 the moral probability1 of that truth   
which forms the great peculiarity of the
 ,christian revelation4 ,more than any  
other in the whole circle of religious  
belief it rises above the inductions of 
science1 while reason1 in its soundest  
conclusions1 recognises its probability1

 and receives its truth2 and it stands  
forth alone1 simply proposed to our     
belief1 and offered to our acceptance1  
on that high but peculiar evidence by   
which is supported the testimony of     
,god4  ,the truth of these              
considerations is impressed upon us in  
the strangest manner1 when we turn our  
attention to the actual moral condition 
of mankind4 ,when we contemplate man1 as
 he is displayed to us by the soundest  
inductions of philosophy1--his capacity 
for distinguishing truth from falsehood1
 and evil from good2 the feelings and   
affections which bind him to his fellow 
men1 and the powers which enable him to 
rise to intercourse with ,god3--when we 
consider the power1 which sits among his
 other principles and feelings1 as a    
faithful monitor and guide1 carrying in 
itself a rule of rectitude without any  
other knowledge1 and a right to govern  
without reference to any other          
authority2 we behold a fabric complete  
and harmonious in all its parts1 and    

eminently worthy of its ,almighty       
,maker2--we behold an ample provision   
for peace1 and order1 and harmony1 in   
the whole moral world4 ,but1 when we    
compare with these inductions the actual
 state of man1 as displayed to us in the
 page of history1 and in our own daily  
observation1 the conviction is forced   
upon us1 that some mighty change has    
taken place in this beauteous system1   
some marvellous disruption of its moral 
harmony4 ,the manner in which this      
condition arose1--or the origin of moral
 evil under the government of ,god1 is a
 question entirely beyond the reach of  
the human faculties4--,it is one of     
those1 however1 on which it is simply   
our duty to keep in mind1 that our      
business is1 not with the explanation1  
but with the facts2--for1 even by the   
conclusions of philosophy1 we are       
compelled to believe1 that man has      
fallen from his high estate1--and that a
 pestilence has gone abroad over the    
face of the moral creation4  ,in        

arriving at this conclusion1 it is not  
with the inductions of moral science    
alone1 that we compare or contrast the  
actual state of man4 ,for one bright    
example has appeared in our world1 in   
whom was exhibited human nature in its  
highest state of order and harmony4 ,in 
regard to the mighty purposes which he  
came to accomplish1 indeed1 philosophy  
fails us1 and we are called to submit   
the inductions of our reason to the     
testimony of ,god4 ,but1 when we        
contemplate his whole character purely  
as a matter of historical truth1--the   
conviction is forced upon us1 that this 
was the highest state of man2--and the  
inductions of true science harmonize    
with the impression of the ,roman       
,centurion1 when1 on witnessing the     
conclusion of the earthly sufferings of 
the ,messiah1 he exclaimed--truly this  
was the ,son of ,god4         99        
99       99       99       99  ,when we 
endeavour to trace the manner1 in which 
mankind have departed so widely from    

this high pattern1 we arrive at moral   
phenomena of which we can offer no      
explanation4 ,but an inquiry of much    
greater importance is to mark the       
process by which1 in individual         
instances1 conscience ceases to be the  
regulating principle of the character2  
and this is a simple and legitimate     
object of philosophical observation4    
,there cannot1 indeed1 be an inquiry of 
more intense and solemn interest1 than  
to trace the chain of sequences which   
has been established in the mind of man 
as a moral being4 ,we can view it only  
as a matter of fact1 without being able 
to refer it to any other principle than 
the will of ,him who framed us2--but the
 facts which are before us claim the    
serious attention of every man1 who     
would cultivate that most important of  
all pursuits1--the knowledge of his own 
moral condition4 ,the fact to which ,i  
chiefly allude is a certain relation1   
formerly referred to1 between the truths
 which are calculated to act upon us as 

moral causes1 and the mental emotions   
which ought to result from them2--and   
between these emotions and a certain    
conduct which they tend to produce4 ,if 
the due harmony between these be        
carefully cultivated1 the result is a   
sound moral condition2 but by every     
instance in which this harmony is       
violated1 a morbid influence is         
introduced1 which gains strength in each
 succeeding volition1 and carries       
disorder through the moral economy4 ,we 
have formerly illustrated this important
 moral process1 by the relation between 
the emotion of compassion1 and the      
conduct which ought to arise from it4   
,if this tendency of the emotion be     
diligently cultivated1 the result is the
 habit of active benevolence2--but1 if  
the emotion be violated1 its influence  
is progressively diminished1 and a      
character is produced of cold and barren
 selfishness4  ,a similar chain of      
sequences is to be observed respecting  
the operation of those great truths1    

which1 under the regulating power of    
conscience1 are calculated to act as    
moral causes in our mental economy2--we 
may take1 for example1 the truths       
relating to the character and           
perfections of the ,deity1 and the      
influence which these ought to produce  
upon every rational being4 ,we have seen
 the knowledge which we derive from the 
light of nature respecting the          
attributes of ,god1 when1 from his works
 around us1 we discover him as a being  
of infinite power1 wisdom1 and goodness2
 and when1 from the moral impressions of
 our own minds1 we infer his perfections
 as a moral ,governor of infinite       
holiness1 justice1 and truth4 ,by a     
proper direction of the mind to the     
truths which are thus conveyed to us    
respecting the ,deity1 there would      
naturally arise a corresponding chain of
 emotions of which he is the object4    
,these are a sense of veneration towards
 him1 as infinitely great1 wise1 and    
powerful1--of love and thankfulness1 as 

infinitely good1--and of habitual regard
 to his authority and will1 as a moral  
governor of purity and justice1 and as  
requiring a corresponding character in  
all his creatures4 ,a close and constant
 relation ought to be preserved between 
these truths and these emotions1 and on 
this depends the moral harmony of the   
mind4 ,the preservation of this harmony1
 again1 is intimately connected with a  
mental process which every man feels to 
be voluntary1--or in his power to       
perform1 if he wills4 ,it consists in a 
careful direction of the mind to such   
truths1 so as to enable them to act as  
moral causes in the mental economy3--by 
the established order of moral          
sequences1 the emotions naturally       
follow3--these are then to be cherished 
with satisfaction and reverence2 and a  
corresponding influence upon the        
character and conduct is the farther    
consequence4 ,but the first step in this
 important process may be               
neglected2--the mind may not be directed

 with due care to the truths which thus 
claim its highest regard1--and the      
natural result is a corresponding       
deficiency in the emotions and conduct  
which ought to flow from them4 ,this    
will be the case in a still higher      
degree1 if there has been formed any    
actual derangement of the moral         
condition1--if deeds have been          
committed1 or even desires cherished1   
and mental habits acquired1 by which the
 indications of conscience have been    
violated4 ,the moral harmony of the mind
 is then lost1 and1 however slight may  
be the first impression1 a morbid       
influence has begun to operate in the   
mental economy1 which tends gradually to
 gain strength1 until it becomes a      
ruling principle in the whole character4
 ,the truths connected with the divine  
perfections are now neither invited nor 
cherished1 but are felt to be intruders 
which disturb the mental tranquillity4  
,the attention ceases to be directed to 
them1 and the corresponding emotions    

vanish from the mind4 ,such appears to  
be the moral history of those1 who1 in  
the striking language of the sacred     
writings1 do not like to retain ,god in 
their knowledge4  ,when the harmony of  
the mind has been impaired to this      
extent1 another mental condition arises1
 according to the wondrous system of    
moral sequences4 ,this consists in a    
distortion of the understanding itself1 
regarding the first great principles of 
moral truth4 ,for1 a fearless           
contemplation of the truth1 respecting  
the divine perfections1 having become   
inconsistent with the moral condition of
 the mind1 there next arises a desire to
 discover a view of them more in        
accordance with its own feelings4 ,this 
is followed1 in due course1 by a        
corresponding train of its own          
speculations2 and these1 by a mind so   
prepared1 are received as truth4 ,the   
inventions of the mind itself thus      
become the regulating principles of its 
emotions1 and this mental process1      

advancing from step to step1 terminates 
in moral degradation and anarchy4       
,nothing can be more striking than the  
manner in which these great principles  
of ethical science are laid down in the 
sacred writings2--the invisible things  
of him from the creation of the world   
are clearly seen1 being understood by   
the things that are made1 even his      
eternal power and ,godhead1 so that they
 are without excuse3 ,because that1 when
 they knew ,god1 they glorified him not 
as ,god1 neither were thankful2 but     
became vain in their imaginations1 and  
their foolish heart was darkened4       
,professing themselves to be wise1 they 
became fools2 and changed the glory of  
the uncorruptible ,god into an image    
made like to corruptible man1 and to    
birds1 and four-footed beasts1 and      
creeping things4--,and even as they did 
not like to retain ,god in their        
knowledge1 ,god gave them over to a     
reprobate mind1 to do those things which
 are not convenient4 ,the various steps1

 in this course of moral degradation1   
are here represented as a judicial      
infliction by the ,deity4 ,but this     
solemn view of the subject is in no     
degree inconsistent with the principle1 
that it takes place according to a chain
 of sequences existing in the mind      
itself4 ,for the ,almighty ,one1 who is 
said to inflict as a judgment this state
 of moral ruin1 is the same who         
established it as the uniform result of 
a process in the mental economy1 to be  
traced in the history of every man who  
has followed the downward course which  
led him astray from virtue4  ,to the    
principles which have now been stated1  
we are also to refer a point in the     
philosophy of human nature which        
presents a subject of most interesting  
reflection4 ,i allude to the fact1 that 
the great truths of religious belief are
 so often rejected1 by men who have     
acquired a reputation for exalted powers
 of understanding in other departments  
of intellectual inquiry4 ,the fact is   

one of intense interest2 and we can     
scarcely wonder that superficial        
observers should have deduced from it an
 impression1 that it implies something  
defective in the evidence by which these
 truths are proposed to our reception4  
,but the conclusion is entirely         
unwarranted1 and the important principle
 cannot be too often repeated1 that the 
attainment of truth in moral inquiries  
is essentially connected with the moral 
condition of the inquirer4 ,on this     
depends the anxious care with which he  
has directed his mind to the high       
pursuit1 under a deep and solemn feeling
 of its supreme importance4 ,on this    
depends the sincere and humble and      
candid love of truth with which he has  
conducted it1 apart alike from prejudice
 and frivolity4 ,for without these      
essential elements of character1 the    
most exalted intellect may fail of      
reaching the truth1--the most acute     
understanding may only wander into      
delusion and falsehood4         99      

99       99       99       99  ,before  
concluding this subject1 there is       
another point which deserves to be      
alluded to2--namely1 the influence      
produced upon all our moral judgments   
and decisions by ,attention4 ,this      
important process of the mind we have   
had occasion to mention in various parts
 of our inquiry4 ,it consists1 as we    
have seen1 in directing the thoughts1   
calmly and deliberately1 to all the     
facts and considerations by which we    
ought to be influenced in the particular
 case which is under our view2 and it   
should be accompanied by an anxious and 
sincere desire to be guided1 both in our
 opinions and conduct1 by the true and  
relative tendency of each of them4 ,it  
is a voluntary process of the mind which
 every man has the power to perform2 and
 on the degree in which it is habitually
 exercised1 depend some of the great    
differences between one man and another 
in their moral condition4 ,we have      
repeatedly had occasion to mention that 

morbid state of the mind1 in which moral
 causes seem to have lost their proper  
influence1 both on the volitions of the 
will1 and even on the conclusions of the
 judgment3--,but it is a truth which    
cannot be too often referred to1 how    
much this condition is influenced by the
 mental process which we are now        
considering4 ,it originates1 indeed1 in 
some degree of that distortion of moral 
feeling1 in consequence of which the    
inclinations wander from the strict path
 of rectitude2--but the primary effect  
of this loss of mental harmony1 and that
 by which it is perpetuated1 appears to 
be chiefly a habitual misdirection of   
the attention1--or a total want of      
consideration of the truths and motives1
 by which the moral judgments and       
decisions ought to be influenced4 ,apart
 from this condition of the mind1       
indeed1 there is reason to believe1 that
 the actual differences in moral        
judgment are in different men less than 
we are apt to imagine4 ,let any honest  

man1 says ,butler1 before he engages in 
any course of action1 ask himself1--is  
this ,i am going to do right1 or is it  
wrong1--is it good1 or is it evil3--,i  
do not in the least doubt but that these
 questions would be answered agreeably  
to truth and virtue1 by almost any fair 
man in almost any circumstances4 ,it is 
in a great measure from the want of this
 simple exercise of attention1 or of    
what in common language we call calm    
reflection1 that men are led away1 by   
passion1 prejudice1 and distorted moral 
habits1 into courses of action which    
their own sober judgment would          
condemn2--and when a man1 who has thus  
departed from rectitude1 begins to      
retrace his way1 the first great point  
is that where he pauses in his downward 
career1 and seriously proposes to       
himself the question1 whether the course
 he has followed be worthy of a moral   
being4 ,i allude not here to the means  
by which a man is led to take this      
momentous step in his moral history1 but

 only to the mental process of which it 
consists4 ,it is primarily nothing more 
than an exercise of attention1 calmly   
and deliberately directed to the truths 
and considerations by which his moral   
decisions ought to be influenced2 but1  
when a man has once been brought into   
this attitude of deep and serious       
thought1 conscience comes to bear its   
part in the solemn process2 and the     
inquirer is likely to arrive at just    
conclusions on those great questions of 
which he feels the importance to his    
moral condition4  ,it is on the         
principles now referred to1 that1       
according to a doctrine which has been  
often and keenly controverted1 we hold a
 man to be responsible for his belief4  
,the state of mind which constitutes    
belief is1 indeed1 one over which the   
will has no direct power4 ,but belief   
depends upon evidence2--the result of   
even the best evidence is entirely      
dependant on attention2--and attention  
is a voluntary intellectual state over  

which we have a direct and absolute     
control4 ,as it is1 therefore1 by       
prolonged and continued attention that  
evidence produces belief1 a man may     
incur the deepest guilt by his disbelief
 of truths which he has failed to       
examine with the care which is due to   
them4 ,this exercise is entirely under  
the control of the will2 but the will to
 exercise it respecting moral truth is  
closely connected with the love of that 
truth2 and this is intimately dependent 
on the state of moral feeling of the    
mind4 ,it is thus that a man's moral    
condition influences the conclusions of 
his judgment2--and it is thus1 that on  
the great questions of moral truth1     
there may be guilt attached to a process
 of the understanding1 while there is   
both guilt and moral degradation in that
 mental condition from which it springs4
  ,a similar relation exists1 as was    
formerly stated1 between all our moral  
emotions1 and processes which are felt  
to be entirely voluntary4 ,these        

emotions are1 properly speaking1 not the
 objects of volition1 nor do they arise 
directly at our bidding2 but1 according 
to the constitution of the mind1 they   
are the natural or established result of
 certain intellectual processes1 and1 in
 some sense1 even of bodily action1 both
 of which are entirely voluntary4 ,the  
emotions of compassion and benevolence1 
for example1 are the natural result of  
the sight or even the description of    
scenes of distress2 and the primary     
steps in this process are entirely      
within our power to perform1 if we will4
 ,we can visit the afflicted family1    
listen to their tale of distress1 and   
consider their circumstances1--that is1 
give our attention to them in such a    
manner that the natural and proper      
effect may be produced upon our moral   
feelings4 ,we can give the same kind of 
attention1 and with a similar result1 to
 a case which is only described to us by
 another2 or we may neglect all this    
mental process4 ,engrossed with the     

business or the frivolities of life1 we 
may keep ourselves at a distance from   
the persons and the scenes that might   
operate in this manner on our moral     
feelings2--we may refuse to listen to   
the tale of sorrow1 or1 if compelled to 
hear it1 we may give it little attention
 and no consideration4 ,the moral       
feeling does not follow1 and this       
course1 after a certain repetition1     
terminates in confirmed and barren      
selfishness4 ,we see many instances in  
which we distinctly recognise this      
course of mental or moral sequence4 ,if1
 in regard to a particular case of      
distress1 for example1 we have come to a
 deliberate conviction of the           
worthlessness of the individual1 and    
have determined to withhold our aid1 we 
refuse to see him1 and we decline       
hearing from another any thing more of  
his history2--we say1 we have made up   
our mind not to allow our compassion to 
be any more worked upon in his favour4  
,we thus recognise the natural relation 

between the sight or even the           
description of distress1 and the        
production of certain feelings in       
ourselves3--and we recognise also the   
legitimate means for preventing this    
influence in certain cases1 in which1 by
 a deliberate act of judgment1 we have  
determined against having these feelings
 excited4 ,if1 notwithstanding this     
determination1 we happen to be brought  
within the influence of the distress    
which we wished to avoid1 we consider   
this as a sufficient ground for acting1 
in the instance1 against our sober      
judgment4 ,we had determined against it1
 we say1 but what can you do when you   
see people starving4 ,we thus recognise 
as legitimate that process by which1 in 
certain cases1 we keep ourselves beyond 
this influence2 but we attach no feeling
 of approbation to the moral condition  
of him who1 being subjected to the      
influence1 can resist it2 that is1 who  
can really come into contact with       
distress1 and shut his heart against it4

 ,and even with regard to the course    
which we here recognise as legitimate1  
much caution is required1 before we     
allow a process of the judgment to      
interfere with the natural and healthy  
course of the moral feelings4 ,if the   
interference arises1 not from a sound   
process of the understanding1 but from a
 course in which selfishness bears a    
considerable part1 an injurious         
influence upon the moral condition of   
the mind is the necessary consequence4  
,we thus perceive that1 in the chain of 
sequences relating to the benevolent    
feelings1 there are three distinct      
steps1--two of which are entirely under 
the control of the will4 ,a man has it  
entirely in his power to place himself  
in contact with objects of distress1 and
 to follow out the call of duty in      
considering their circumstances1 and    
entering into their feelings4 ,the      
natural result is a train of emotions   
which arise in his own mind1 prompting  
him to a particular line of conduct4 ,to

 act upon these emotions is again under 
the power of his will2 and if the whole 
of this chain of sequences be duly      
followed1 the result is a sound         
condition of this part of the moral     
economy4 ,if either of the voluntary    
steps be neglected or violated1 the     
mental harmony is lost1 and a habit is  
formed of unfeeling selfishness4  ,the  
principle1 which has thus been          
illustrated by the benevolent           
affections1 is equally true of our other
 moral emotions4 ,these emotions are    
closely connected with certain truths1  
which are calculated to give use to     
them1 according to the constitution of  
our moral economy4 ,now1 the careful    
acquisition of the knowledge of these   
truths1 and a serious direction of the  
attention to their tendencies1 are      
intellectual processes which are as much
 under the power of our will1 as are the
 acts of visiting and giving attention  
to scenes of distress2 and the due      
cultivation of them involves an equal   

degree of moral responsibility4 ,this   
again is connected with the remarkable  
power which we possess over the         
succession of our thoughts4 ,we can     
direct the mind into a particular train2
 we can continue it and dwell upon it   
with calm and deliberate attention1 so  
that the truths1 which it brings before 
us1 may produce their natural and proper
 effect on our moral feelings4 ,the     
emotions thus excited lead to a certain 
line of conduct1 which also is          
voluntary2 and on the due cultivation of
 this chain of sequences depends a      
healthy moral condition4 ,but we may    
neglect those parts of the sequence     
which are under the control of our will4
 ,we may abstain from directing our     
attention to such truths2 we may view   
them in a slight1 frivolous1 or         
distorted manner1 or we may dismiss them
 altogether2 and if any degree of the   
emotions should be excited1 we may make 
no effort towards the cultivation of the
 conduct to which they would lead us4   

,the due cultivation of this power over 
the succession of our thoughts1 is that 
which constitutes one of the great      
differences between one man and another1
 both as intellectual and moral         
beings2--and1 though correct moral      
emotions are not properly the objects of
 volition1 it is thus that a man may    
incur the deepest moral guilt in the    
want of them4  ,the subject also leads  
to conclusions of the greatest          
importance respecting the principles on 
which we ought to conduct religious     
instruction1 particularly in regard to  
the cultivation of religious emotions4  
,it reminds us of the important law of  
our nature1 that all true cultivation of
 religious emotion must be founded upon 
a sound culture of the understanding in 
the knowledge of religious truth1 and a 
careful direction of the powers of      
reasoning and judging1 both to its      
evidences and its tendencies4 ,all      
impulse that does not arise in this     
manner can be nothing more than an      

artificial excitement of feeling1 widely
 different from the emotion of a        
regulated mind4 ,such a system generates
 wild enthusiasm2--and the principle is 
of peculiar and essential importance in 
the education of the young4 ,in then    
susceptible minds religious emotion is  
easily produced1 and1 by a particular   
management1 may be fostered for a time4 
,but those who have been trained in this
 manner are little qualified to meet the
 collisions of active life1 and we need 
not wonder if they should make shipwreck
 of a faith which has not been founded  
in knowledge4         99       99       
99       99       99  ,before leaving   
the subject of the ,moral ,principle1   
there are two points closely connected  
with it which remain to be noticed4 ,the
 one relates to the origin and          
immutability of moral distinctions1 and1
 in connexion with this1 a class of     
speculations which hold a conspicuous   
place in the history of ,ethical        
science1 under the name of ,theories of 

,morals4 ,the other refers to a certain 
harmony or principle of arrangement1    
which the different moral feelings ought
 to preserve towards each other in a    
well-regulated mind4     ,sec4 ,i4--,,of
 ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,immutability    
,,of ,,moral ,,distinctions ,,and       
,,theories ,,of ,,morals4   ,in treating
 of the moral powers1 ,i have considered
 various feelings as distinct parts of  
our constitution1 each intended to      
answer a specific purpose in the present
 scene of moral discipline4 ,i am aware 
of an objection that may be urged       
against this mode of viewing the        
subject1--namely1 that it is an         
unnecessary multiplication of original  
principles4 ,i am not inclined to       
dispute respecting the term1 original   
principles4 ,i only contend for the     
fact1 that there are certain feelings or
 propensities which are found to operate
 in the whole of mankind2 and1 with     
regard to these1 ,i consider our object 
to be1 simply to view man as he is4 ,in 

his physical relations1 we find him     
endowed with a variety of senses1 and a 
great variety of bodily functions1--each
 adapted to its proper purpose1 and all 
distinct from each other2 and the       
physiologist is content to view them    
simply as they are4 ,were he to exercise
 his ingenuity upon them1 he might      
contend with much plausibility1 that it 
is highly incorrect to speak of five    
distinct and separate senses2--for that 
they are all merely modifications of    
sensation1 differing only in the various
 kinds of the external impression4      
,thus1 what is vulgarly called sight is 
the simple sensation of light1--and     
hearing is merely the sensation of      
sound4 ,this would be all very          
true1--but it does not appear to        
elucidate the subject2 nor1 by any      
ingenuity of such speculation1 could we 
be enabled to know more concerning these
 senses than when we called them sight  
and hearing4 ,in the same manner it     
would appear1 that the course of        

inquiry1 respecting our moral feelings1 
is simply to observe what these feelings
 really are1 and what are their obvious 
tendencies4 ,when we have done so on    
adequate foundation1 ,i conceive we have
 every reason for considering them as   
principles implanted in us by the       
,creator1 for guidance in our present   
relations2 and1 like the functions of   
our bodies1 so the powers and feelings  
of our minds shew a wonderful adaptation
 and design1 worthy of their ,omnipotent
 ,cause4 ,but we can know nothing of    
them beyond the facts1--and nothing is  
to be gained by any attempt1 however    
ingenious1 to simplify or explain them4 
,we have formerly had occasion to allude
 to various speculations of a similar   
character1 respecting the powers of     
perception and simple intellect1--all of
 which have now given way before the    
general admission of the truth1 that1 on
 the questions to which they refer1 no  
human sagacity can carry us one step    
beyond the simple knowledge of the      

facts4  ,it will probably be admitted1  
that there have been many similar       
unprofitable speculations in the        
philosophy of the moral feelings2 and   
that these speculations1 instead of     
throwing any light upon the subject1    
have tended rather to withdraw the      
attention of inquirers from the         
questions of deep and serious importance
 connected with the investigation4      
,among these1 perhaps1 we may reckon    
some of the doctrines which hold a      
prominent place in the history of this  
branch of science1--under the name of   
,theories of ,morals4 ,these doctrines  
agree in admitting the fact1 that there 
are among mankind certain notions       
respecting right and wrong1--moral and  
immoral actions2 and they then profess  
to account for these impressions1--or to
 explain how men come to think one      
action right and another wrong4 ,a brief
 view of these theories may properly    
belong to an outline of this department 
of science4         99       99       99

       99       99  ,in contemplating   
the conduct of men as placed in certain 
relations towards each other1 we        
perceive some actions which we pronounce
 to be right1 and others which we       
pronounce to be wrong4 ,in forming our  
opinion of them in this manner1 we refer
 to the intentions of the actor1 and1 if
 we are satisfied that he really        
intended what we see to be the effect or
 the tendency of his conduct1 or even   
that he purposed something which he was 
prevented from accomplishing1 we view   
him with feelings of moral approbation  
or disapprobation1--or1 in other words1 
apply to him the award of praise or     
blame4 ,such is our simple idea of      
virtue or vice1 as applied either to the
 act or the agent4 ,we have a conviction
 that there is a line of conduct to     
which ourselves and others are bound by 
a certain kind of obligation2--a        
departure from this constitutes moral   
demerit or vice2--a correct observance  
of it constitutes virtue4  ,this appears

 to be our primary impression of vice   
and virtue4 ,the next question is1 what 
is the origin of the impression1 or on  
what ground is it that we conclude      
certain actions to be right and others  
wrong4 ,is it merely from a view of     
their consequences to ourselves or      
others2 or do we proceed upon an        
absolute conviction of certain conduct  
being right1 and certain other wrong1   
without carrying the mind farther than  
the simple act1 or the simple intention 
of the actor1--without any consideration
 of the effects or the tendencies of the
 action4 ,this is the question which has
 been so keenly agitated in the         
speculations of ,ethical science1       
namely1 respecting the origin and nature
 of moral distinctions4 ,on the one     
hand1 it is contended1 that these moral 
impressions are in themselves immutable1
 and that an absolute conviction of     
their immutability is fixed upon us in  
that part of our constitution which we  
call ,conscience1 in other words1 there 

is a certain conduct to which we are    
bound by a feeling of obligation1 apart 
from all other considerations whatever1 
and we have an impression that a        
departure from this in ourselves or     
others constitutes vice4 ,on the other  
hand1 it is maintained1 that these      
distinctions are entirely arbitrary1 or 
arise out of circumstances1 so that what
 is vice in one case may be virtue in   
another4 ,those who have adopted the    
latter hypothesis have next to explain1 
what the circumstances are which give   
rise1 in this manner1 to our impressions
 of vice and virtue1 moral approbation  
or disapprobation4 ,the various modes of
 explaining this impression have led to 
the ,theories of ,morals4  ,the system  
of ,mandeville ascribes our impressions 
of moral rectitude entirely to the      
enactments of legislators4 ,man1 he     
says1 naturally seeks only his own      
gratification1 without any regard to the
 happiness of other men4 ,but           
legislators found that it would be      

necessary to induce him1 in some way1 to
 surrender a position of his personal   
gratification for the good of others1   
and so to promote the peace and harmony 
of society4 ,to accomplish this with    
such a selfish being1 it was necessary  
to give him some equivalent for the     
sacrifice he thus made2 and the         
principle of his nature which they fixed
 upon1 for this purpose1 was his love of
 praise4 ,they made certain laws for the
 general good1 and then flattered       
mankind into the belief that it was     
praiseworthy to observe them1 and noble 
to sacrifice a certain degree of their  
own gratification for the good of       
others4 ,what we call virtue thus       
resolves itself into the love of praise4
 ,in regard to such a system as this1 it
 has been thought sufficient to point   
out the distinction between the         
immutable principles of morality and    
those arrangements which are dependent  
upon mere enactment4 ,such are many of  
the regulations and restrictions of     

commerce4 ,they are intended for the    
public good1 and1 while they are in     
force1 it is the duty of every good     
citizen to obey them4 ,a change of the  
law1 however1 changes their character1  
for they possess in themselves none of  
the qualities of merit or demerit4 ,but 
no laws can alter1 and no statutes      
modify1 those great principles of moral 
conduct which are graved indelibly on   
the conscience of all classes of men4   
,kings1 it has been said1 may make laws1
 but cannot create a virtue4  ,by       
another modification of this system1 our
 impressions of virtue and vice are said
 to be derived entirely from mutual     
compact4 ,men1 finding that there was a 
certain course of action which would    
contribute to their mutual advantage1   
and vice versa1 entered into an         
agreement to observe certain conduct1   
and abstain from certain other4 ,the    
violation of this compact constituted   
vice1 the observance of it virtue4  ,by 
a theory1 supported by some eminent men1

 as ,clark and ,wollaston1 virtue was   
considered to depend on a conformity of 
the conduct to a certain sense of the   
fitness of things1--or the truth of     
things4 ,the meaning of this1 it must be
 confessed1 is rather obscure4 ,it      
however evidently refers the essence of 
virtue to a relation perceived by a     
process of reason2 and therefore may be 
held as at variance with the belief of  
the impression being universal4         
,according to the ,theory of ,utility1  
as warmly supported by ,mr4 ,hume1 we   
estimate the virtue of an action and an 
agent entirely by their usefulness4 ,he 
seems to refer all our mental           
impressions to two principles1 reason   
and taste4 ,reason gives us simply the  
knowledge of truth or falsehood1 and is 
no motive of action4 ,taste gives an    
impression of pleasure or pain1--so     
constitutes happiness or misery1 and    
becomes a motive of action4 ,to this he 
refers our impressions of beauty and    
deformity1 vice and virtue4 ,he has1    

accordingly1 distinctly asserted that   
the words right and wrong signify       
nothing more than sweet or sour1        
pleasant or painful1 being only effects 
upon the mind of the spectator produced 
by the contemplation of certain         
conduct1--and this1 as we have already  
seen1 resolves itself into the          
impression of its usefulness4 ,an       
obvious objection to the system of      
utility was1 that it might be applied to
 the effects of inanimate matter as     
correctly as to the deeds of a voluntary
 agent4 ,a printing-press or a          
steam-engine might be as meritorious as 
a man of extensive virtue4 ,to obviate  
this1 ,mr4 ,hume was driven to a        
distinction1 which in fact amounted to  
giving up the doctrine1 namely1 that the
 sense of utility must be combined with 
a feeling of approbation4 ,this leads us
 back to the previous question1 on what 
this feeling of approbation is founded1 
and at once recognises a principle1     
distinct from the mere perception of    

utility4 ,virtuous conduct may indeed   
always contribute to general utility1 or
 general happiness1 but this is an      
effect only1 not the cause or the       
principle which constitutes it virtuous4
 ,this important distinction has been   
well stated by ,professor ,mills of     
,oxford4 ,he defines morality to be1--an
 obedience to the law and constitution  
of man's nature1 assigned him by the    
,deity in conformity to his own         
essential and unchangeable attributes1  
the effect of which is the general      
happiness of his creatures4#b--,we may  
safely assert1 that whatever is right is
 also expedient for man2 but the        
converse by no means follows1--that what
 is expedient1 that is what mankind     
think would be expedient1 comes to be   
right4  ,footnote #b3 ,lecture on the   
,theory of ,moral ,obligation4 ,oxford1 
#ahcj4  ,we now come to the ,selfish    
,system of morals1 according to which   
the fundamental principle of the conduct
 of mankind is a desire to promote their

 own gratification or interest4 ,this   
theory has appeared in various forms1   
from a very early period in the history 
of ,ethical science2 but the most       
remarkable promoter of it in more modern
 times was ,mr4 ,hobbes4 ,according to  
him1 man is influenced entirely by what 
seems calculated1 more immediately1 or  
more remotely1 to promote his own       
interest2 whatever does so1 he considers
 as right1--the opposite as wrong4 ,he  
is driven to society by necessity1 and  
then1 whatever promotes the general     
good1 he considers as ultimately        
calculated to promote his own4 ,this    
system is founded upon a fallacy1       
similar to that referred to under the   
former head4 ,virtuous conduct does     
impart gratification1 and that of the   
highest kind2 and1 in the strictest     
sense of the word1 it promotes the true 
interest of the agent1 but this tendency
 is the effect1 not the cause2 and never
 can be considered as the principle     
which imparts to conduct its character  

of virtue2 nor do we perform it merely  
because it affords us gratification1 or 
promotes our interest4 ,the hypothesis1 
indeed1 may be considered as distinctly 
contradicted by facts1--for1 even in our
 own experience1 it is clear1 that the  
pleasure attending an act of generosity 
or virtue in ourselves1 as well as our  
approbation of it in others1 is         
diminished or destroyed by the          
impression that there was a selfish     
purpose to answer by it4  ,there is a   
modification of the selfish system which
 attempts to get rid of its more        
offensive aspect by a singular and      
circuitous chain of moral emotions4 ,we 
have experienced1 it is said1 that a    
certain attention to the comfort or     
advantage of others contributes to our  
own4 ,a kind of habit is thus formed1 by
 which we come at last to seek the      
happiness of others for their own       
sake2--so that1 by this process1        
actions1 which at first were considered 
only as inexpedient1 from being opposed 

to self-love1 at length and insensibly  
come to be considered as immoral4 ,this 
can be considered as nothing more than  
an ingenious play upon words1 and       
deserves only to be mentioned as a      
historical fact1 in a view of those     
speculations by which this important    
subject has been obscured and           
bewildered4         99       99       99
       99       99  ,another            
modification of the theories of morals  
remains to be mentioned2--namely1 that  
of the distinguished ,paley4 ,this      
eminent writer is decidedly opposed to  
the doctrine of a moral sense or moral  
principle2 but the system which he      
proposes to substitute in its place must
 be acknowledged to be liable to        
considerable objections4 ,he commences  
with the proposition that virtue is     
doing good to mankind1 in obedience to  
the will of ,god1 and for the sake of   
everlasting happiness4 ,the good of     
mankind1 therefore1 is the subject1--the
 will of ,god1 the rule1--and           

everlasting happiness1 the motive of    
human virtue4 ,the will of ,god1 he     
subsequently goes on to shew1 is made   
known to us1 partly by revelation1 and  
partly by what we discover of his       
designs and dispositions from his works1
 or1 as we usually call it1 the light of
 nature4 ,from this last source he      
thinks it is clearly to be inferred1    
that ,god wills and wishes the happiness
 of his creatures2 consequently1 actions
 which promote that will and wish must  
be agreeable to him1 and the contrary4  
,the method of ascertaining the will of 
,god concerning any action1 by the light
 of nature1 therefore1 is to inquire    
into the tendency of the action to      
promote or diminish general happiness4  
,proceeding on those grounds1 he then   
arrives at the conclusion1 that whatever
 is expedient is right2 and that it is  
the utility of any moral rule alone1    
which constitutes the obligation of it4 
,in his further elucidation of this     
theory1 ,dr4 ,paley admits1 that an     

action may be useful1 in an individual  
case1 which is not right4 ,to constitute
 it right1 it is necessary that it shall
 be expedient upon the whole1--at the   
long run1 in all its effects1 collateral
 and remote1 as well as those which are 
immediate and direct4  ,in presuming to 
offer a criticism upon ,paley1 ,i       
readily concede to the defenders of his 
system1 that it is not to be classed    
with the utilitarianism of ,hume and    
,godwin2 and that it is not1 correctly  
speaking1 chargeable with selfishness1  
in holding out the happiness of a future
 state as a motive to virtue4 ,the      
latter part of his system is clearly    
countenanced by the sacred writings2 and
 it does appear to be a stretch of      
language1 to apply the term selfishness 
to the longing which the sincere        
,christian feels for the full enjoyment 
of ,god4 ,in regard to the former part  
of his doctrine1 again1 it appears that 
,paley meant to propose the will of ,god
 as the rule or obligation of morals1   

and utility only as a criterion or      
guide2 though it must be confessed that 
his language is liable to much          
misconstruction1 and is somewhat at     
variance with itself4 ,the real         
objection to the doctrine of ,paley1 ,i 
apprehend1 lies in his unqualified      
rejection of the supreme authority of   
conscience1 and in the mental operation 
which he substitutes in its place1      
namely1 a circuitous process of         
reasoning1 in each individual1          
respecting the entire and ultimate      
expediency of actions4 ,there are two   
considerations which appear to present  
serious objections to this part of the  
system as a doctrine to be applied to   
practical purposes4 7#a47 ,if we suppose
 a man deliberating respecting an       
action1 which he perceives would be     
eminently expedient and useful in an    
individual case1 and which he feels to  
be highly desirable in its immediate    
reference to that case1--we may         
naturally ask1 whether he is in a likely

 condition to find his way to a sound   
conclusion respecting the consequences  
of the action upon the whole1 at the    
long run1 in all its consequences1      
remote and collateral4--,it may         
certainly be doubted whether1 in any    
case1 there is not great danger of      
differences of opinion arising1         
respecting this extended and ultimate   
expediency3--and it must be admitted    
that1 in the man now referred to1 the   
very circumstances of his perception of 
great and immediate utility1 and the    
state of desire connected with it1 would
 constitute a moral condition which     
might interfere1 in a very material     
degree1 with his calculation as to its  
ultimate expediency4 ,upon whatever     
system we proceed1 ,i fear it must be   
conceded as a fact1 that there is a     
singular propensity in the mass of      
mankind to consider their own pains and 
pleasures before those of other men2 and
 that this propensity must interfere    
with the cool course of moral           

calculation which the system of utility 
must consider as indispensable4 7#b47   
,independently of this consideration1 we
 may be allowed to doubt1 whether any   
human being can arrive at such an       
extensive knowledge1 as this theory     
seems to render necessary1 of all the   
consequences of an action1 remote and   
collateral4 ,this would appear to       
constitute a kind and degree of         
knowledge to be found only in the       
,omniscience of the ,deity4 ,it is1 in  
fact1 by giving its full weight to this 
difficulty1 that the doctrine of utility
 has been employed by some foreign      
writers1 in their attempts to undermine 
the whole foundation of morals4 ,the    
goodness of actions1 says ,beausobre1 in
 his ,pyrrhonisme ,raisonable1 depends  
upon their consequences1 which man      
cannot foresee1 nor accurately          
ascertain4 ,what harmony1 indeed1 or    
what consistency of moral sentiment can 
we expect from a system1 by which man   
himself is made the judge of the code of

 morals to which he is to be subject1   
and by which his decisions1 on a        
question so momentous1 are made to lest 
on those remote consequences of actions 
which he must feel to be beyond the     
reach of his limited faculties4  ,if    
these observations be well-founded1 ,i  
think we cannot hesitate to maintain1   
that1 on such a nice calculation of     
consequences1 it is impossible to found 
a rule of morals in any degree adapted  
to the necessities of man4 ,the same    
objection applies to every doctrine1    
which does not recognise the supreme    
authority of conscience as an original  
part of our moral constitution1 warning 
us of certain conduct as immutably      
right1 and certain other conduct as     
immutably wrong1 without any regard     
either to our own advantage1 or to our  
judgment of the tendency of the deeds4  
,whenever we depart from this great     
principle1 we reduce every moral        
decision to what must primarily be a    
process of reasoning1 and in which1 from

 the intricate calculation of           
consequences which necessarily arises1  
there can scarcely fail to be           
differences of opinion respecting the   
tendency of actions1 instead of that    
absolute conviction which the deep      
importance of the subject renders       
indispensable4 ,it may1 farther1 be     
confidently stated1 as a matter of fact1
 that a conscientious man1 in           
considering an action which involves a  
point of moral duty1 does not enter upon
 any such calculation of its            
consequences4 ,he simply asks           
himself1--is it right8--and so decides1 
according to an impulse within1 which he
 feels to be a part of his moral        
constitution1 susceptible of no         
explanation1 and not admitting of being 
referred to any other principle4 ,i     
confess1 indeed1 that ,i cannot         
perceive1 how the doctrine of utility1  
in any of its forms1 can be reconciled  
with the principle of moral             
responsibility4 ,for what we commonly   

call vice and virtue1 must resolve      
themselves merely into differences of   
opinion respecting what is most         
expedient in all its consequences1      
remote and collateral4 ,we have already 
alluded to the considerations which must
 make this decision one of extreme      
difficulty2--and how can we ascribe     
moral guilt to that1 which1 though in   
vulgar language we may call it vice1    
must very often be nothing more than an 
error in judgment respecting this       
ultimate good4  ,in regard to the whole 
of this important subject1 ,i cannot see
 the necessity for the circuitous mental
 operations which have been made to     
apply to it2 nor can ,i enter into the  
repugnance1 shewn by various classes of 
moralists1 against the belief of a      
process or a principle in our           
constitution1 given us for a guide in   
our moral relations4 ,it is unnecessary 
to dispute about its name1 or even about
 its origin2--for the former is of no   
importance1 and of the latter we know   

nothing4 ,the question relates simply to
 its existence as a mental exercise     
distinct from any process of reasoning1 
and the only criterion1 to which the    
question can be referred1 is an appeal  
to the moral feelings of every          
individual4 ,is there not a mental      
movement or feeling1 call it what we    
may1 by which we have a perception of   
actions as just or unjust1 right or     
wrong2 and by which we experience shame 
or remorse respecting our own conduct in
 particular instances1 and indignation  
against the conduct of others4 ,every   
one is conscious of such a mental       
exercise1 and there are two             
considerations which1 ,i think1 may be  
referred to as moral facts1 shewing a   
clear and decided difference between it 
and any simple process of reasoning4    
7#a47 ,i would ask whether1 in deciding 
on his conduct1 every man is not        
conscious of two classes of actions1 in 
regard to which the processes of his    
mind differ widely from each other4 ,in 

deciding respecting actions of the one  
class1 he carefully and anxiously       
deliberates on their tendencies1--that  
is1 their utility towards himself1 or to
 others whose welfare he has in view2   
and he reflects on what was the result  
of his conduct in similar cases1 on     
former occasions4 ,in deciding          
respecting actions of the other class1  
he enters into no such calculations2--he
 feels an immediate impression1 that a  
certain course is right1 and a certain  
other wrong1 without looking a single   
step into their tendencies4 ,every one  
is conscious of this difference1 between
 acting from a perception of utility and
 from a feeling of obligation or a sense
 of duty2 and it would be difficult to  
prove that any perception of utility    
alone ever amounts to a sense of        
obligation4 7#b47 ,in that class of     
actions to which is properly applied a  
calculation of utility1 we see the most 
remarkable differences in judgment      
manifested by men1 whom we regard as    

holding a high place in respect both of 
integrity and talent4 ,let us take for  
example the measures of political       
economy4 ,a conscientious statesman     
feels that he is bound to pursue        
measures calculated to promote the good 
of his country2 but the individual      
measures are often questions of         
expediency or utility4 ,and what an     
endless diversity of judgment do we     
observe respecting them2 and how often  
do we find measures proposed by able    
men1 as calculated to produce important 
public benefit1 which others1 of no     
inferior name1 with equal confidence1   
condemn as frivolous1 or even dangerous4
 ,if there can be such a difference of  
opinion respecting one class of actions1
 we cannot avoid the impression that    
there may be similar differences        
respecting others1 whenever the decision
 is left to a simple process of reason2 
and we cannot but feel some misgivings1 
as to what the state of human society   
would be1 if men1 in their moral        

decisions were kept together by no other
 ties than the speculations of each     
individual respecting general utility4  
,in any such process1 we can see no     
provision for that uniformity of feeling
 required for the class of actions in   
which are concerned our moral           
decisions2--and ,i can see nothing      
unphilosophical in the belief1 that the 
,creator has provided1 in reference to  
these1 a part or a process in our moral 
constitution1 which is incapable of     
analysis1--but which proves1 as ,butler 
has termed it1 a rule of right within1  
to every man who honestly attends to it4
  ,to this view of the subject ,i would 
add only one consideration1 which alone 
appears to present an insurmountable    
objection to the doctrine of utility in 
all its modifications2 namely1 that any 
correct ideas of the utility of an      
action can be derived only from         
experience4 ,the study of the principles
 of morality1 therefore1 would consist  
of a series of observations or          

experiments1 by which valid conclusions 
might be ascertained2 and an individual1
 entering upon the momentous question1  
would require either to trust to the    
conclusions of others1 or to make the   
observations and experiments for        
himself4 ,in the former case1 he could  
not fail to perceive the precarious     
nature of the basis on which he was     
receiving principles of such weighty    
importance4 ,he could not fail to       
remark1 that1 in other sciences1 unsound
 and premature deductions had been      
brought forward1 even on high authority1
 and allowed to usurp the place of      
truth4 ,how is he to be satisfied1 that1
 in this highest of all inquiries1      
similar errors had not been committed4  
,to avoid such uncertainty1 he may      
resolve to make the observations or     
experiments for himself1 and to trust   
only to his own conclusions4 ,but here  
he is met by another difficulty of      
appalling magnitude4 ,for a lifetime may
 not suffice to bring the experiments to

 a close2 and1 during this1 he must     
remain in the same uncertainty on the   
great principles of morals1 as          
respecting the periods of a comet1      
which1 having been seen for a day1 darts
 off into its eccentric orbit1 and may  
not return for a century4 ,how can it   
accord with our convictions of the      
wisdom of ,him who made us1 that he     
should have made us thus4  ,the         
foundation of all these ,theories of    
,morals1 then1 seems to be the          
impression1 that there is nothing right 
or wrong1 just or unjust in itself2 but 
that our ideas of right and wrong1      
justice and injustice1 arise either from
 actual law or mutual compact1 or from  
our view of the tendencies of actions4  
,another modification of these theories1
 liable1 as it is sometimes stated1 to  
similar objection1 ascribes the origin  
of right and wrong directly to the will 
of the ,deity1 and holds that there is  
nothing wrong which might not have been 
right1 if he had so ordained it4  ,by   

the immutability of moral distinctions1 
as opposed to these theories1 we        
mean1--that there are certain actions   
which are immutably right1 and which we 
are bound in duty to perform1 and       
certain actions which are immutably     
wrong1 apart from any other             
consideration whatever2--and that an    
absolute conviction of this is fixed    
upon us1 in the moral principle or      
conscience1 independently of knowledge  
derived from any other source respecting
 the will or laws of the ,almighty4     
,this important distinction has been    
sometimes not unaptly expressed by      
saying of such actions1--not that they  
are right because the ,deity has        
commanded them1--but that he has        
commanded them because they are right4  
,by this system1 therefore1 which refers
 our moral impressions to the supreme   
authority of conscience1 a principle is 
disclosed1 which1 independently even of 
revelation1 not only establishes an     
absolute conviction of the laws of moral

 rectitude1 but leads us to the         
impression of moral responsibility and a
 moral ,governor2 and as immediately    
flowing from this1 a state of future    
retribution4 ,we have already shewn this
 to accord with the declarations of the 
sacred writings1 and it is evidently the
 only system on which we can account for
 that uniformity of moral sentiment     
which is absolutely required for the    
harmonies of society4 ,for it is1 in    
fact1 on a conviction of this feeling in
 ourselves1 and of the existence of a   
similar and universal principle in      
others1 that is founded all the mutual  
confidence which keeps mankind together4
 ,it is this reciprocity of moral       
feeling that proves a constant check    
upon the conduct of men in the daily    
transactions of life2 but1 to answer    
this purpose1 there is evidently        
required an impression of its           
uniformity1--or a conviction that the   
actions1 which we disapprove in others  
will be condemned in us by the unanimous

 decision of other men4 ,it is equally  
clear that we have no such impression of
 a uniformity of sentiment on any other 
subject1 except on those referable to   
the class of first truths2 and this     
immediately indicates a marked          
distinction between our moral           
impressions1 and any of those           
conclusions at which we arrive by a     
process of the understanding4 ,it is    
clear1 also1 that this uniformity can   
arise from no system1 which either      
refers us directly to the will of ,god1 
or is liable to be affected by the      
differences which may exist in the      
judgment1 the moral taste1 the personal 
feelings1 or the interests of different 
individuals4 ,it must be1 in itself1    
fixed and immutable1 conveying an       
absolute conviction which admits of no  
doubt and no difference of opinion4     
,such is the great principle of         
conscience4 ,however its warnings may be
 neglected1 and its influence obscured  
by passion and moral degradation1 it    

still asserts its claim to govern the   
whole man4 ,had it strength1 says       
,butler1 as it had right2 had it power1 
as it had manifest authority1 it would  
absolutely govern the world4         99 
99       99       99       99  ,in      
opposition to this belief of a          
uniformity of moral feeling1 much       
importance has been attached to the     
practices of certain ancient and some   
barbarous nations1 as the encouragement 
of theft in ,sparta1 and the exposure of
 the aged among certain tribes in       
,india4 ,such instances prove no        
diversity of moral feeling2 but a       
difference of practice1 arising from    
certain specialities1 real or supposed1 
by which1 in the particular cases1 the  
influence of the primary moral feeling  
is1 for the time1 set aside4 ,it is of  
no importance to the argument1 whether  
the disturbing principle thus operating 
be the result of an absurd local policy 
or a barbarous superstition4 ,it is     
enough that we see a principle1 which1  

in point of fact1 does thus operate1    
suspending1 in the particular instances1
 the primary moral impression4 ,it was  
not that1 in ,sparta1 there was any     
absence of the usual moral feeling in   
regard to theft in the abstract1--but   
that the cultivation of habits of       
activity and enterprise1 which arose    
from the practice1 was considered as a  
national object of the highest          
importance1 in a small and warlike      
state1 surrounded by powerful enemies4  
,it is precisely in the same manner1    
that1 in individual conduct1 a man may  
be misled by passion or by interest to  
do things which his sober judgment      
condemns4 ,in doing so1 there is no want
 of the ordinary moral feeling which    
influences other men2 but he has brought
 himself to violate this feeling1 for   
certain purposes which he finds to be   
highly desirable2 and then1 probably1   
seeks to defend his conduct to the      
satisfaction of his own mind1 and of the
 minds of others4 ,he has a distinct    

perception of what is right1 while he   
does what is wrong4 ,there are numerous 
facts which illustrate the same         
principle1 and shew the recognition of  
correct moral feelings1 even in those   
who habitually and daringly violate     
them2--as the laws of honour and honesty
 which robbers observe towards each     
other1--and the remarkable fidelity of  
smugglers towards their associates4 ,in 
some of the tribes in the ,south ,seas1 
also1 most remarkable for their         
dishonesty1 it was found1 that while    
they encouraged each other in pillaging 
strangers1 theft was most severely      
punished among themselves4 ,need ,i     
farther refer1 on this subject1 to the  
line of argument adopted in the great   
question of slavery4 ,it is directed to 
the palliating circumstances in the     
actual state of slavery1 not to a broad 
defence of slavery itself4 ,its object  
is to shew1 that slavery1 under all its 
present circumstances1 may be reconciled
 with the principles of humanity and    

justice3--no attempt is ever made to    
prove1 that it is consistent with these 
principles to tear a human being from   
his country and his kindred1 and make   
him a slave4#c  ,footnote #c3 ,see this 
subject eloquently argued in ,dr4       
,chalmers' ,bridgewater ,treatise4  ,on 
this subject we are sometimes           
triumphantly asked1 where is the        
conscience of the ,inquisitor1--as if   
the moral condition of such an          
individual incontestably proved1 that   
there can be no such power as we        
consider conscience to be4 ,but ,i think
 it cannot be doubted1 that1 as in the  
more common cases which have been       
mentioned1 the conscience of the        
,inquisitor comes gradually to be       
accommodated to the circumstances in    
which he has voluntarily placed himself4
 ,this remarkable moral process has been
 repeatedly referred to4 ,it may        
originate in various causes4 ,it may    
arise from passion1 or an ill-regulated 
state of the desires or affections of   

the mind2 it may arise from motives of  
interest1 leading a man by small and    
gradual steps into actions which his    
sober judgment condemns2 or false       
opinions1 however received1 may be      
allowed to fasten on the mind1 until1   
from want of candid examination1 they   
come to be invested with the authority  
of truth4 ,in the moral process which   
follows1 each single step is slight1 and
 its influence almost imperceptible2 but
 this influence is perpetuated1 and     
gains strength in each succeeding step1 
until the result is a total derangement 
of the moral harmony of the mind4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,it remains only that we briefly notice 
the system of ,dr4 ,adam ,smith1        
commonly called the theory of ,sympathy4
 ,according to this ingenious writer1 it
 is required for our moral sentiments   
respecting an action1 that we enter into
 the feelings both of the agent1 and of 
him to whom the action relates4 ,if we  
sympathize with the feelings and        

intentions of the agent1 we approve of  
his conduct as right1--if not1 we       
consider it as wrong4 ,if1 in the       
individual to whom the action refers1 we
 sympathize with a feeling of gratitude1
 we regard the agent as worthy of       
praise1--if with a feeling of           
resentment1 the contrary4 ,we thus      
observe our feelings respecting the     
conduct of others1 in cases in which we 
are not personally concerned1--then     
apply these rules to ourselves1 and thus
 judge of our own conduct4 ,this very   
obvious statement1 however1 of what     
every man feels1 does not supply the    
place of a fundamental rule of right and
 wrong2 and indeed ,dr4 ,smith does not 
appear to contend that it does so4 ,it  
applies only to the application of a    
principle1 not to the origin of it4 ,our
 sympathy can never be supposed to      
constitute an action right or wrong2 but
 it enables us to apply to individual   
cases a principle of right and wrong    
derived from another source2--and to    

clear our judgment in doing so1 from the
 blinding influence of those selfish    
feelings by which we are so apt to be   
misled when we apply it directly to     
ourselves4 ,in estimating our own       
conduct1 we then apply to it those      
conclusions which we have made with     
regard to the conduct of others1--or we 
imagine others applying the same process
 in regard to us1 and consider how our  
conduct would appeal to an impartial    
observer4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,this1 however1 is a most  
important principle in regard to our    
moral decisions1--namely1 the process by
 which we view an action1 or a course of
 conduct1 in another1 and then apply the
 decision to ourselves4 ,when the power 
of moral judgment is obscured or        
deadened in regard to our own conduct1  
by self-love or deranged moral habits1  
all the correctness of judgment is often
 preserved respecting the actions of    
others4 ,it is thus that men are led on 
by interest or passion into courses of  

action1 which1 if viewed calmly and     
dispassionately1 they would not         
deliberately defend even in themselves1 
and which1 when viewed in others1 they  
promptly condemn4 ,this principle is    
beautifully illustrated in the sacred   
writings1 when the prophet went to the  
king of ,israel1 and laid before him the
 hypothetical case of a rich man1 who   
had committed an act of gross and       
unfeeling injustice against a poor      
neighbour4 ,the monarch was instantly   
roused to indignation1 and pronounced a 
sentence of severe but righteous        
vengeance against the oppressor1--when  
the prophet turned upon him with the    
solemn denunciation1 ,thou art the man4 
,his moral feeling in regard to his own 
conduct was dead2 but his power of      
correct moral decision when applied to  
another was undiminished4         99    
99       99       99       99  ,in      
regard to the whole of this subject1 an 
important distinction is to be made     
between the fundamental principle1 from 

which actions derive their character of 
right and wrong1--and the application of
 reason in judging of their tendencies4 
,before concluding this part of the     
subject1 therefore1 we have to add a    
very few observations on the influence  
exerted on our moral decisions by       
reason1--always however in subserviency 
to the great principle of conscience4   
,the office of reason appears to be1 in 
the first place1 to judge of the        
expediency1 propriety1 and consequences 
of actions1 which do not involve any    
feeling of moral duty4 ,in regard to the
 affections1 again1 a process of reason 
is often necessary1 not only respecting 
the best mode of exercising them1 but   
also1 in many cases1 in deciding whether
 we shall exercise them at all4 ,thus1  
we may feel compassion in a particular  
instance1 but perceive the individual to
 be so unworthy1 that what we could do  
would be of no benefit to him4 ,in such 
a case we may feel it to be a matter not
 only of prudence1 but of duty1 to      

resist the affection1 and to reserve the
 aid we have to bestow for persons more 
deserving4  ,in cases in which an       
impression of moral duty is concerned1  
an exercise of reason is still in many  
instances1 necessary1 for enabling us to
 adapt our means to the end which we    
desire to accomplish4 ,we may feel an   
anxious wish to promote the interest or 
relieve the distress of another1 or to  
perform some high and important         
duty1--but call reason to our aid       
respecting the most effectual and the   
most judicious means of doing so4       
,conscience1 in such cases1 produces the
 intention1--reason suggests the        
means2--and it is familiar to every one 
that these do not always harmonize4     
,thus a man may be sound in his         
intentions1 who errs in judgment        
respecting the means for carrying them  
into effect4 ,in such cases1 we attach  
our feeling of moral approbation to the 
intention only1--we say the man meant   
well1 but erred in judgment2--and to    

this error we affix no feeling of moral 
disapprobation1--unless1 perhaps1 in    
some cases1 we may blame him for acting 
precipitately on his own judgment1      
instead of taking the advice of those   
qualified to direct him4 ,we expect such
 a man to acquire wisdom from           
experience1 by observing the deficiency 
of his judgment in reference to his     
intentions2 and1 in future instances1 to
 learn to take advice4 ,there are other 
circumstances in which an exercise of   
reason is frequently brought into action
 in regard to moral decisions2--as in   
some cases in which one duty appears to 
interfere with another2--likewise in    
judging whether1 in particular          
instances1 any rule of duty is          
concerned1 or whether we are at liberty 
to take up the case simply as one of    
expediency or utility4 ,in making their 
decisions in doubtful cases of this     
description1 we observe great           
differences in the habits of judging in 
different individuals4 ,one shews the   

most minute and scrupulous anxiety1 to  
discover whether the case involves any  
principle of duty1--and a similar       
anxiety in acting suitably when he has  
discovered it4 ,this is what we call a  
strictly conscientious man4 ,another1   
who shews no want of a proper sense of  
duty when the line is clearly drawn1 has
 less anxiety in such cases as these1   
and may sacrifice minute or doubtful    
points to some other feeling1--as       
self-interest or even friendship1--where
 the former individual might have       
discovered a principle of duty4  ,reason
 is also concerned in judging of a      
description of cases1 in which a        
modification of moral feeling arises    
from the complexity of actions1--or1 in 
other words1 from the circumstances in  
which the individual is placed4 ,this   
may be illustrated by the difference of 
moral sentiment which we attach to the  
act of taking away the life of          
another1--when this is done by an       
individual under the impulse of         

revenge1--by the same individual in     
self-defence1--or by a judge in the     
discharge of his public duty4  ,there is
 still another office frequently        
assigned to ,reason in moral            
decisions1--as when we speak of a man   
acting upon ,reason as opposed to       
passion4 ,this however is1 correctly    
speaking1 only a different use of the   
term2 and it means that he acts upon a  
calm consideration of the motives by    
which he ought to be influenced1 instead
 of being hurried away by a desire or an
 affection which has been allowed to    
usurp undue influence4         99       
99       99       99       99  ,the     
important distinction1 therefore1 which 
these observations have been intended to
 illustrate1 may be briefly             
recapitulated in the following manner4  
,our impression of the aspect of        
actions1 as right or wrong1 is conveyed 
by a principle in the human mind        
entirely distinct from a simple exercise
 of reason1--and the standard of moral  

rectitude derived from this source is1  
in its own nature1 fixed and immutable4 
,but there are many cases in which an   
exercise of reason may be employed1 in  
referring particular actions to this    
standard1 or trying them1 as it were1 by
 means of it4 ,any such mental process1 
however1 is only to be considered as a  
kind of test applied to individual      
instances1 and must not be confounded   
with the standard to which it is the    
office of this test to refer them4      
,right or virtuous conduct does1 in     
point of fact1 contribute to general    
utility1 as well as to the advantage of 
the individual1 in the true and extended
 sense of that term1 and these          
tendencies are perceived by ,reason4    
,but it is neither of these that        
constitutes it right4 ,this is founded  
entirely on a different principle1--the 
immutable rule of moral rectitude2 it is
 perceived by a different part of our   
constitution1--the moral principle1 or  
conscience2 and1 by the operation of    

this principle1 we pronounce it right1  
without any reference to its            
consequences either to ourselves or     
others4         99       99       99    
99       99  ,the preceding             
observations1 on ,conscience1 ,i leave  
nearly as they stood in the second      
edition of this volume4 ,since the      
publication of that edition1 ,i have    
seen various discussions of this        
important question1 but have found      
nothing to alter the opinion ,i have    
expressed1 respecting the nature and the
 authority of conscience as an original 
principle in our moral constitution2 and
 ,i see no system by which we can escape
 from the numerous difficulties         
surrounding every other view of the     
subject4 ,in particular1 ,i cannot      
perceive what is gained by those who    
refer our moral decisions to a process  
of reason or judgment alone4 ,for by    
judgment1 in the ordinary and recognised
 acceptation of the term1 ,i can        
understand nothing more than a power of 

comparing two or more facts or          
impressions together1 and tracing their 
relations4 ,when we apply such a mental 
process to a question of morals1 it can 
amount to nothing more than a comparison
 of our conduct with some standard4 ,if 
those who hold the doctrine referred to1
 mean any thing more than this1--if they
 allow the mind a power of moral        
decision independently of any such      
standard1 then this is precisely what we
 mean by conscience1 and the controversy
 resolves itself1 like not a few that   
have gone before it1 into a dispute     
about a name4 ,if they do not allow the 
mind such a power1 it then becomes them 
to say1 what is the standard by which   
its moral judgments are to be formed1   
and whence it is derived4 ,it appears1  
,i think1 distinctly1 that it can be    
derived only from one of two sources4   
,it must either be received through     
divine revelation2 or it must be the    
result of our speculations respecting   
utility1 in one or other of the forms in

 which that doctrine is presented to us4
 ,there does not appear to be any middle
 course2 and accordingly some late      
writers1 who reject the latter system1  
while they do not admit the authority of
 conscience1 seem to refer our moral    
impressions entirely to the will of the 
,deity as made known to us by           
revelation4 ,i have formerly stated what
 seem to me to be insuperable objections
 to this doctrine4 ,it appears1 indeed1 
to be distinctly opposed by the very    
words of ,scripture1 which clearly      
recognise a power1 or a process in the  
mind by which those who are without law1
 that is1 without a revelation1 are a   
law unto themselves1 their consciences  
bearing witness1 and their thoughts     
accusing or else excusing one another4  
,it does1 ,i confess1 appear to me1 that
 some late excellent and respectable    
writers1 in their apprehension of not   
giving sufficient prominence to the     
doctrine of human depravity1 have       
greatly under-rated the actual power of 

conscience1 and have thus injured in a  
most essential manner the important     
argument which is derived from the moral
 impressions of the mind4 ,true it is1  
indeed1 that the nature of man is       
degenerate1 and that the effect of this 
appears in his disregarding and         
disobeying that monitor within4 ,i am   
not disposed to differ from the writers 
referred to1 respecting the existence   
and the extent of this degeneracy1 but  
rather as to the manner in which it     
operates in the actual moral condition  
of mankind4 ,i do not say that there is 
in human nature more good than they     
assign to it1 but that there is more    
knowledge of what is good2 not that men 
do better than these writers allege1 but
 that they have a greater sense of what 
they ought to do4 ,those who maintain   
the absolute and unusual corruption of  
conscience may also be reminded of the  
remarkable differences which are        
admitted to exist in different men1 and 
the manner in which moral feeling is    

gradually obscured or overpowered by a  
course of personal depravity4 ,the facts
 are universally admitted respecting the
 contest with moral principle which     
attends the first stages of vice1 and   
the remorse which follows4 ,but after   
each departure from virtue1 this        
opposing influence is progressively     
weakened1 and at length destroyed4 ,in  
this progress1 then1 we must admit two  
distinct conditions of the moral        
feelings1--one in which conscience      
distinctly points at what is right1     
however its warnings may be             
disregarded1--and another in which its  
warning influence is weakened or lost4  
,in the former condition1 ,i think we   
may affirm that it asserts its right and
 its authority1 though its strength and 
its power are departed2 and it does not 
appear to be saying too much1 if we say 
in the striking language of ,butler1 had
 it strength as it had right1--had it   
power as it had manifest authority1 it  
would absolutely govern the world4      

,sec4 ,,ii4--,,of ,,the ,,harmony ,,of  
,,the ,,moral ,,feelings4   ,on whatever
 system we may consider the moral       
feelings1 we perceive that there are    
various classes of them1--each answering
 a special purpose in our relations as  
accountable beings4 ,some of them1 we   
have seen1 refer to objects of desire1  
the attainment of which appears likely  
to bring satisfaction4 ,others lead us  
to those relations which we bear to our 
fellow-men4 ,a third class1 which       
remains to be considered1 calls our     
attention to the relation in which we   
stand to the moral ,governor of the     
universe1 and to a certain regulation of
 the moral feelings arising out of this 
relation4 ,but this is still another    
inquiry of the deepest interest1        
connected with this subject1 namely1    
regarding the harmony or principle of   
arrangement1 which these various classes
 of moral emotions ought to bear towards
 each other4 ,they all form parts of our
 constitution1 and deserve a certain    

degree of attention1 which must be      
carefully adapted to the relative       
importance of each2 and the correct     
adjustment of this harmony is one of the
 objects to be answered by the moral    
principle1 combined with a sound        
exercise of judgment4 ,the rules which  
apply to it may be stated in the        
following manner4  ,when we consider man
 as an immortal being1 passing through a
 course of discipline to another state  
of existence1 it is obvious that his    
highest consideration is his own moral  
condition1 and the aspect in which he   
stands towards the ,deity4 ,in immediate
 connexion with this first of all       
concerns are the great and general      
principles of justice and veracity1 as  
referring to our connexion with all     
mankind1 and a class of private         
responsibilities which peculiarly regard
 each individual in his domestic        
relations2 such as the duties of        
children to then parents1 and parents to
 their children2--the latter1           

particularly1 presenting a class of the 
most solemn kind1 as it embraces the    
concerns of the present life1 and of    
that which is to come4 ,then follow the 
duties of benevolence1 friendship1 and  
patriotism2 after these1 the ordinary   
avocations of life1 as the acquisition  
of knowledge and the pursuits of        
business2 and finally1 those personal   
recreations and enjoyments1 which1 when 
kept in their proper place1 are         
legitimate and necessary to every human 
being4 ,these are all proper and        
laudable1 provided they are kept in a   
proper subserviency to each other4 ,but 
the important consideration is1 that a  
man maybe acting unworthily of his moral
 nature1 when he devotes himself to any 
one of them in a manner which encroaches
 upon the harmony of the whole4  ,to    
begin with the lowest of them1 it is    
unnecessary to state how this remark    
applies to the man whose life is devoted
 to pursuits which rank no higher than  
recreation or amusement4 ,it must be    

obvious to every one of the smallest    
degree of reflection1 that such a man is
 living only for the present life4 ,what
 cannot be denied of mere amusement1    
must also be admitted respecting a life 
of business1 however important in       
themselves the concerns may be which    
engross the mind4 ,they still refer only
 to present things1 and carry not the   
thoughts beyond the moment which bounds 
the period of moral discipline4 ,even   
the engagements of benevolence and      
public usefulness1 estimable as they    
are1 may be allowed to usurp an improper
 place2 and they do so1 if they withdraw
 the attention from responsibilities and
 duties which belong more particularly  
to ourselves as individuals1--such as   
the duties of parents and of            
children1--and the other claims which   
arise out of the relations of domestic  
life4 ,finally1 it is ever to be kept in
 mind1 that no engagements of any       
description must be allowed to interfere
 with obligations1 of the highest       

interest to every man1--those which     
relate to his own moral condition1 in   
the sight of ,him who is now his        
witness1 and will soon be his ,judge4   
,from want of due attention to this     
consideration1 year after year glides   
over us1 and life hastens to its close1 
amid cares and toils and anxieties which
 relate only to the present world4      
,thus1 fame may be acquired1 or wealth  
accumulated2 or1 after a laborious      
ascent1 a man may have gained the height
 of ambition1--when the truth bursts    
upon him that life is nearly over1 while
 its great business is yet to           
begin1--the preparation of the moral    
being for an eternal existence4  ,it is 
scarcely necessary to add1 on the other 
hand1 that attention to this first of   
all concerns must not be allowed to     
estrange the mind from the various      
duties and responsibilities of active   
life4 ,it is only1 indeed1 when the     
conduct is regulated by partial and     
unsound motives1 that some of these     

objects of attention are allowed to     
usurp the place of others4 ,he who acts1
 not from the high principles of moral  
duty1 but from a desire of notoriety1 or
 the applause of men1 may devote himself
 to much benevolence and usefulness of a
 public and ostensible kind2 while he   
neglects duties of a higher1 though more
 private nature1--and overlooks         
entirely1 it may be1 his own moral      
condition4 ,the ascetic1 on the         
contrary1 shuts himself up in his cell1 
and imagines that he pleases ,god by    
meditation and voluntary austerities4   
,but this is not the part of him who    
truly feels his varied relations1 and   
correctly estimates his true            
responsibilities4--,it is striking1     
also1 to remark1 how the highest        
principles lead to a character of       
harmony and consistency1 which all      
inferior motives fail entirely in       
producing4 ,the man1 who estimates most 
deeply and correctly his own moral      
relations to an ever-present and        

presiding ,deity1 will also feel his way
 through the various duties of life1    
with a degree of attention adapted to   
each of them4 ,in the retirements of    
domestic life1 he is found in the       
anxious discharge of the high           
responsibilities which arise out of its 
relations4 ,he is found in the path of  
private benevolence and public          
usefulness1 manifesting the kind and    
brotherly interest of one who acts on   
the purest of all motives1--the love of 
,god1 and a principle of devotedness to 
his service4 ,whether exposed to the    
view of his fellow-men1 or seen only by 
,him who seeth in secret1 his conduct is
 the same1--for the principles on which 
he acts have1 in both situations1 equal 
influence4 ,in the ordinary concerns of 
life1 the power of these principles is  
equally obvious4 ,whether he engage in  
its business1 or partake of its         
enjoyments2--whether he encounter its   
difficulties1 or meet its pains1        
disappointments1 and sorrows1--he walks 

through the whole with the calm dignity 
of one who views all the events of the  
present life1 in then immediate         
reference to a life which is to come4   
99       99       99       99       99  
,the high consistency of character1     
which results from this regulated       
condition of the moral feelings1 tends  
thus to promote a due attention to the  
various responsibilities connected with 
the situation in which the individual is
 placed4 ,it does so1 by leading him1   
with anxious consideration1 to feel his 
way through these requirements1 and to  
recognise the supreme authority of      
conscience over his whole moral system4 
,it does so1 especially1 by habitually  
raising his views to the eternal ,one1  
who is the witness of all his conduct1  
and to whom he is responsible for his   
actions in each relation of life4 ,it   
thus tends to preserve him from all     
those partial and inconsistent courses1 
into which men are led by the mere      
desire of approbation1 or love of       

distinction1 or by any other of those   
inferior motives which are really       
resolvable into self-love4  ,such       
uniformity of moral feeling is equally  
opposed to another distortion of        
character1 not less at variance with a  
sound condition of the mind4 ,this is   
what may be called religious pretension1
 showing itself by much zeal for        
particular opinions and certain external
 observances1 while there is no         
corresponding influence upon the moral  
feelings and the character4 ,the truths1
 which form the great object of         
religious belief1 are of so momentous a 
kind1 that1 when they are really        
believed1 they cannot fail to produce   
effects of the most decided and most    
extensive nature2--and1 where this      
influence is not steadily exhibited1    
there is a fatal error in the moral     
economy1--there is either               
self-deception1 or an intention to      
deceive others4 ,from such inconsistency
 of character arises an evil1 which has 

a most injurious influence upon two     
descriptions of persons4 ,those of one  
class are led to assign an undue        
importance to the profession of a       
peculiar creed and the mere externals of
 religion1--to certain observations     
which are considered as characteristic  
of a particular party1 and to abstinence
 from certain indulgences or pursuits   
which that party disapprove4 ,those of  
the other class1 finding1 in many       
instances1 much zeal for these          
peculiarities1 without a state of moral 
feeling adapted to the truths which are 
professed1 are apt to consider the whole
 as either pretence or delusion4  ,in   
their mutual error there is to both     
matter of important warning4 ,it becomes
 the latter to beware1 lest1 misled by  
the failings of weak or inconsistent    
men1 they withdraw their attention from 
truths of solemn import to themselves as
 moral beings4 ,there may be much       
pretension where there is no real       
feeling2 but are they from this entitled

 to infer1 there is not a reality in    
that which these pretenders counterfeit4
 ,by a slight gilding1 articles of      
trifling value are made to assume the   
appearance of gold2 but would it be     
reasonable to contend1 that there are no
 articles of intrinsic worth which these
 are made to imitate4 ,the fair         
induction is1 in both instances1 the    
opposite4 ,were there no such articles  
of pure gold1 this ingenuity would not  
be employed in fabricating base         
imitations2 and the hypocrite would not 
assume qualities he does not possess1   
where there not real virtues1 from a    
resemblance to which he hopes to procure
 for his character that ostensible value
 which may enable it to deceive4 ,but   
let those who have detected this        
deception beware of founding upon it    
conclusions which it does not warrant4  
,they have not found the reality here1  
but there is not the less a pure and    
high standard which claims their utmost 
regard4 ,if they search for it either   

among inconsistent or among designing   
men1 they seek the living among the     
dead4 ,let them contemplate it          
especially as it is displayed in the    
character of the ,messiah3 in him it was
 exhibited in a manner which demands the
 imitation of every rational man1 while 
it challenges the cordial assent of the 
most acute understanding1 that this is  
the perfection of a moral being4  ,on   
the other hand1 let those1 who profess  
to be influenced by the highest of all  
motives1 study to exhibit their habitual
 influence in a consistent uniformity of
 the whole character4 ,it is easy to    
acquire a peculiar phraseology1 to show 
much zeal for peculiar opinions1 and    
rigid attention to peculiar observances2
 and1 among a party1 it is not difficult
 to procure a name1 by condemning       
certain other compliances which by them 
are technically styled the manners of   
the world4 ,but all this1 it is evident1
 may be assumed2 it may be1 and probably
 often is1 no better than a name2 it    

often amounts to nothing more than      
substituting one kind of excitement for 
another1 while the moral being continues
 unchanged4 ,true religion is seated in 
the heart1 and sends out from thence a  
purifying influence over the whole      
character4 ,in its essential nature it  
is a contest within1 open only to the   
eye of ,him who seeth in secret4 ,it    
seeks not1 therefore1 the applause of   
men2 and it shrinks from that spurious  
religionism whose prominent characters  
are talk1 and pretension1 and external  
observance1 often accompanied by        
uncharitable censure4 ,like its divine  
pattern1 it is meek and lowly1--it is   
pure and peaceable1 gentle and easy to  
be intreated1 full of mercy and of good 
fruits1 without partiality and without  
hypocrisy4 ,it aims not at an           
ostentatious display of principles1 but 
at a steady exhibition of fruits4       
,qualities1 which it cultivates with    
especial care1 are humility1 and        
charity1 and mercy1--the mortification  

of every selfish passion1 and the denial
 of every selfish indulgence4 ,when thus
 exhibited in its true and genuine      
characters1 it commands the respect of  
every sound understanding1 and          
challenges the assent of all to its     
reality and its truth1 as the highest   
principle that can regulate the conduct 
of a moral being4     ,,part ,,iv4  ,,of
 ,,the ,,moral ,,relation ,,of ,,man    
,,towards ,,the ,,deity4   ,the healthy 
state of a moral being is strikingly    
referred1 in the sacred writings1 to    
three great                             
heads1--justice1--benevolence1--and a   
conformity of the moral feelings to a   
reverential sense of the presence and   
perfections of the ,deity2--to do       
justly1 to love mercy1 and to walk      
humbly with thy ,god4 ,the two former of
 these considerations lead us to the    
duties which a man owes to his          
fellow-men2--the latter calls our       
attention to that homage of the mind and
 of the heart which he owes peculiarly  

to ,god4 ,for the duties of the former  
class we are equally responsible to him1
 as the moral ,governor of the universe1
 but their immediate reference is to our
 connexions with other men2--those of   
the latter class respect our relation to
 the ,deity himself1 and consequently   
consist1 in a great measure1 in the     
purity and devotedness of the mind4 ,in 
human systems of ethics1 attention has  
been chiefly directed to the obligations
 of social and relative morality2--but  
the two classes are closely associated  
in the sacred writings2 and the sound   
condition of the moral feelings is      
pointed out as that acquirement which1  
along with a corresponding integrity of 
character1 qualifies man1 in an especial
 manner1 for intercourse with the       
,deity4 ,who shall ascend unto the hill 
of the ,lord1 or who shall stand in his 
holy place4 ,he that hath clean hands   
and a pure heart1 who hath not lifted up
 his soul unto vanity1 nor sworn1       
deceitfully4--,blessed are the pure in  

heart1 for they shall see ,god4  ,such  
declarations challenge the assent and   
absolute conviction of every sound      
understanding4 ,are we1 as responsible  
creatures1 placed in immediate relation 
to a great moral ,governor1 a being of  
infinite purity and boundless           
perfections3--,is the structure of our  
bodies1 and the still more wonderful    
fabric of our minds1 alike the work of  
his hand3--,then it is impossible to put
 away from us the impression1--that each
 movement of these minds must be fully  
exposed to his inspection4 ,it is       
equally impossible to repel from us the 
solemn truth1--that it is by the        
desires1 the feelings1 and the motives  
of action which exist there1 that our   
condition is to be estimated in his     
sight1--and that a man1 whose conduct to
 his fellow-men does not violate        
propriety and justice1 may be in a state
 of moral degradation in the eyes of him
 who seeth in secret2--for1 says the    
sacred writer1 man looketh on the       

outward appearance1 but the ,lord       
looketh on the heart4  ,there cannot1   
therefore1 be an inquiry of more intense
 interest1 than what is that condition  
of the heart and of the mind which every
 man ought to seek after1 when he       
considers himself as exposed to the     
continual inspection of the ,almighty4  
,it may1 perhaps1 be briefly referred to
 the following heads4   ,i4 ,a habitual 
effort to cultivate a sense of the      
divine presence1--and a habitual desire 
to have the whole moral condition       
regulated by this impression4 ,it       
implies1 therefore1 sacred respect to   
the character of the ,deity1 and is     
opposed to every kind of profaneness1 or
 aught by which one might weaken1 in    
himself or others1 the reverential      
feeling due towards the character1 and  
even the name of the ,almighty4 ,this   
must be extended1 not to the outward    
conduct alone1 but to the desires and   
affections of the heart4 ,there is a    
state of mind formerly referred to1 in  

which a desire1 which the moral feelings
 disapprove1 may not be followed by     
volition2 while the desire is still     
indulged1 and the mind is allowed to    
cherish it with some feeling of regret1 
or even to luxuriate with a sense of    
pleasure in the imaginary gratification4
 ,in the same manner1 a malevolent      
affection to our fellow-men may be      
checked from producing injurious        
conduct1 while the feeling still rankles
 in the heart1 in the form of envy or   
hatred4 ,these mental conditions1 while 
they are widely at variance with the    
healthy state of a rational and         
responsible being1 must be regarded by  
the ,deity as constituting moral guilt  
and moral degradation4 ,nor is it only  
on the mind1 which cherishes malevolent 
passions and impure desires and         
imaginations1 that the ,holy ,one must  
look with a feeling of condemnation4    
,there may be another mental condition1 
in which the thoughts and desires are   
directed to transient and frivolous     

objects1 and thus run to waste amid the 
trifles of the passing hour1 without any
 feeling of the truths and motives which
 demand the attention of moral beings4  
,the pursuits of such a man may have    
nothing in them that is referable either
 to impure desire or malevolent         
affection4 ,they may be the acquisition 
of wealth1--the grasp after power1--the 
love of distinction1--or a devotedness  
to merely trivial occupations2--while   
there is a total neglect of those great 
concerns which really demand our chief  
and highest regard4 ,amid the legitimate
 and even the laudable pursuits of      
ordinary life1 we are too apt to lose   
sight of those duties and               
responsibilities which attend a state of
 moral discipline1--and that culture of 
the soul required as a preparation for  
the future state of existence to which  
we are hastening4 ,but we cannot doubt  
that these considerations bear an       
important aspect in the eye of the      
,deity2 and that the mind in which they 

hold not a habitual influence is        
contemplated by him as in a state of    
moral destitution4  ,there are1         
accordingly1 two classes of characters  
clearly pointed out in the sacred       
writings1--namely1 one in whom the      
conduct indicates the depravity         
within1--and another1 in whom the       
external character preserves a          
respectable aspect in the estimation of 
men1 while the moral feelings are in a  
corrupted condition in the sight of     
,god4 ,we have formerly endeavoured to  
trace the laws to which this fact is to 
be referred1 on the principles of the   
philosophy of the human mind3--they are 
chiefly two3 7#a47 ,we have seen that   
there are original principles in our    
nature which lead to a certain exercise 
of justice1 veracity1 and benevolence1  
independently of any recognition of     
divine authority4 ,they are a part of   
our moral constitution1 and calculated  
to promote important purposes in the    
harmony of human society2 and they carry

 along with them a certain principle of 
reciprocal compensation1 which is       
entirely distinct from any impression of
 their moral aspect4 ,the man who is    
deficient in them1 indeed1 incurs guilt2
 but a certain discharge of them may    
arise from mere natural1 or even selfish
 feeling1 unconnected with any sense of 
responsibility2 and this consequently   
conveys no impression of moral          
approbation4 ,in the very exercise of   
them a man receives his reward1 partly  
by a feeling of satisfaction1 which from
 the constitution of his nature1 they   
are calculated to yield1 and partly as a
 member of that community where they    
promote peace1 and order1 and harmony2  
and he is not entitled to look farther1 
or to claim from them any feeling of    
merit in the sight of the ,deity4 7#b47 
,a second principle1 which bears an     
important relation to this subject1 is  
the manner in which a man's character is
 influenced by the particular motive or 
pursuit to which he has resigned the    

guidance of his conduct4 ,one surrenders
 himself to the animal propensities1 and
 becomes a selfish profligate1          
insensible to every right principle of  
action1 while his depraved condition is 
obvious to all around him4 ,a second    
devotes himself to ambition2--and a     
third to avarice3--,these ruling        
passions1 it may be1 are found to be    
adverse to the selfish indulgence and   
open profligacy of the former2 and a    
character may arise out of them         
distinguished by much that is decent1   
and respectable1 and worthy of          
approbation in the eye of man4 ,in a    
fourth1 the ruling motive may be the    
desire of esteem and approbation2 and   
this may1 and often does1 become a      
principle of such influence1 as to      
overpower1 in a great measure1 the      
selfish propensities1 and to produce a  
character estimable not only for justice
 and veracity1 but a high degree of     
active benevolence4 ,such a man         
sacrifices to his ruling passion much   

that might be turned to the purposes of 
ambition1 avarice1 or selfish           
indulgence1 by those who are guided by  
these propensities2 and1 in doing so1 he
 has his reward4 ,he finds it in the    
gratification of that principle which in
 him has become predominant2 and1 rather
 than forfeit the esteem of those whose 
approbation he values1 he will submit to
 much personal exertion1 and sacrifice  
much selfish advantage1 which others    
might deem highly worthy of attainment4 
,but all this may go on without any     
recognition of divine authority2 and may
 all exist in a man in whom there is    
much impurity of desire1 and much       
deficiency of moral feeling4 ,it is all 
referable to a motive of a personal     
nature1 and1 in the gratification of    
this1 his ruling principle is satisfied4
  ,the state of mind which is under the 
influence of a habitual sense of the    
divine presence may1 therefore1 be      
considered under two relations1--the one
 referring more immediately to the      

,deity1--the other to our fellow-men4   
,the former seems chiefly to include an 
effort to have every desire1 thought1   
and imagination of the heart1 regulated 
by a sense of the presence and the      
purity of ,god1 and in conformity to his
 will4 ,amid much feeling of deficiency 
in these respects1 it leads our         
attention to that interesting mental    
condition1 in which there is a contest  
and a warfare within1--and a prevailing 
opposition to every thing that is at    
variance with the purity of a moral     
being4 ,the second division includes the
 cultivation of feelings of kindness and
 benevolence towards all men2--the love 
of justice1--the love of truth1--the    
love of peace1--the forgiveness of      
injuries1--the mortification of         
selfishness2--in a word1 the earnest and
 habitual desire to promote the comfort 
and alleviate the distresses of others4 
,from these two mental conditions must  
spring a character1 distinguished alike 
by piety towards ,god1 and by high      

integrity1 benevolence1 and active      
usefulness towards man4 ,he who         
earnestly cultivates this purity within1
 feels that he requires continual       
watchfulness1 and a constant direction  
of the mind to those truths and moral   
causes which are calculated to influence
 his volitions4 ,he feels farther that  
he is in need of a might not his own in 
this high design2 but for this he knows 
also he can look1 with humble confidence
 and hope1 when1 under a sense of moral 
weakness1 he asks its powerful aid4     
,,ii4 ,a humble and dutiful submission  
to the appointments of ,providence1--as 
part of a great system which is         
regulated by infinite wisdom4 ,the man1 
who bears upon his mind this sublime    
impression1 has learnt to contemplate   
the ,almighty ,one as disposing of the  
events of the lower world1 and assigning
 to each of his rational creatures the  
place which he occupies4 ,that place1   
whatever it may be1 he perceives has    
attached to it special duties and       

responsibilities1--and calls for the    
cultivation of moral qualities          
peculiarly adapted to it4 ,is it one of 
comfort1 wealth1 or influence1--solemn  
obligations arise out of the means of   
usefulness which these command4 ,is it  
one of humble life1 privation1 or actual
 suffering1--each of these also has its 
peculiar duties1 and each is to be      
contemplated as belonging to a great    
system of moral discipline1 in which no 
part can be wanting in consistency with 
the harmony of the whole4 ,such a       
submission of the soul to the           
appointments of ,god does not preclude  
the use of all legitimate means for     
bettering our condition1 or for         
preventing or removing sources of       
distress4 ,but when1 under the proper   
use of such means1 these are not        
removed1 it leads us habitually to that 
higher power1 to whose will all such    
attempts must be subservient2--and1     
while it elevates our thoughts above    
present events and second causes1 it    

reminds us of that great scheme of      
discipline through which we are passing1
 and the purposes which these events are
 calculated to promote in our own moral 
improvement4 ,viewed under such         
feelings1 the ills of life lose that    
aspect in which we are too apt to       
contemplate them2 and will be considered
 with new and peculiar interest1 as     
essential to that system1 the great     
object of which is to prepare and purify
 us for a higher state of being4        
,,iii4 ,a sense of moral imperfection   
and guilt1--and that humility and devout
 self-abasement which arise out of it4  
,this must be a prominent feeling in    
every one who views his own conduct1 and
 his mental emotions1 in reference to   
the purity of ,god4 ,it naturally leads 
to supplication for his mercy and       
forgiveness2 and1 in the wondrous       
display of his character1 given in the  
sacred writings1 a provision is         
disclosed1 in virtue of which the       
exercise of mercy is made consistent    

with the truth and justice of a moral   
governor4 ,this dispensation of peace we
 find habitually represented as adapted 
to man in a state of spiritual          
destitution3 and no mental condition is 
more frequently referred to1 as         
acceptable with the ,deity1 than that   
which consists of contrition and        
lowliness of mind4--,thus sayeth the    
high and lofty ,one that inhabiteth     
eternity1 whose name is ,holy2 ,i dwell 
in the high and holy place1 with him    
also that is of a contrite and humble   
spirit1--to revive the spirit of the    
humble1 and to revive the heart of the  
contrite ones4 ,with this state of mind 
is very naturally associated a sense of 
moral weakness1--and a constant reliance
 on divine aid1 both for direction      
through life1 and for the culture of the
 moral being4   ,,iv4 ,it is only       
necessary to add1--a profound sense of  
gratitude and love towards the ,deity as
 the giver of all good1--as our daily   
preserver and benefactor4 ,these        

feelings will have a special reference  
to the display which he has given of his
 character1 as merciful1 gracious1 and  
slow to anger2 and to the provision     
which he has made for the recovery and  
restoration of his fallen creatures1    
through ,god manifest in the flesh4 ,of 
this divine person1 and the work which  
he came to accomplish1 philosophy       
presumes not to speculate2--but we have 
seen the light afforded1 by the         
inductions of moral science1 respecting 
the probability of this revelation1--and
 its adaptation to the actual state of  
man in his relation to the ,deity4 ,we  
have seen the impression conveyed by the
 character of the ,messiah1 considered  
merely as matter of historical          
truth1--exhibiting such a pattern1 as   
never appeared in our world1 except in  
him1 of a pure and perfect moral being4 
,we have seen1 farther1 the             
incontrovertible nature of that         
evidence1 transmitted by testimony1 and 
confirmed1 as it is1 in a very peculiar 

manner1 by periodical observances1 on   
which the whole revelation is           
supported2--and the inductions of sound 
philosophy harmonize with the           
impressions of the man1 who1 feeling his
 own moral necessities1 yields his      
cordial assent to this mystery of ,god1 
and seeks in its provisions his peace in
 the life that now is1 and his hope for 
the life that is to come4         99    
99       99       99       99  ,from the
 whole mental condition1 thus slightly  
delineated1 there will naturally arise a
 character and conduct adapted to the   
feelings and principles which rule      
within4 ,this implies1 as we have seen1 
a due regulation of the desires1 and a  
habitual direction of them to objects of
 real and adequate importance1--a       
diligent cultivation and exercise of all
 the affections1--and a conduct         
distinguished1 in the highest degree1 by
 purity1 integrity1 veracity1 and active
 benevolence4 ,it implies a profound    
submission to the will of the ,almighty1

 which puts to silence every murmuring  
or repining thought under any           
dispensation of his providence4 ,it     
comprehends the habitual suppression of 
every selfish principle1 and the        
constant aspiration after a state of    
moral feeling1 which proposes to itself 
no lower standard than that which will  
bear the inspection of a being of       
infinite purity4 ,this character seems  
to correspond with that high tone of    
morals enjoined in the sacred writings4 
,its elements are defined and           
clear2--would we seek to estimate its   
sublimity and its truth1 we have only to
 compare it with those distorted and    
temporizing systems which have resulted 
from the inventions of men4 ,a feeling  
of dissatisfaction1 the same in kind1   
though it may differ in degree1 will    
attach to them all2 and there is none in
 which we can confidently rest1 until we
 rise to the sublime morality of the    
gospel4 ,that great system of ethical   
purity comes to us under the sanction of

 divine revelation1 and established by  
the miraculous evidence by which the    
proof of this is conveyed2 but it is    
independent of any other support than   
that which it carries in                
itself1--consistency with the character 
of ,god1--and harmony with the best     
feelings of man4 ,in yielding an        
absolute consent to its supreme         
authority1 we require no external       
evidence4 ,we have only to look at the  
record in its own majestic simplicity1  
tried by the highest inductions of the  
philosophy of the moral feelings1 to    
enable us to point to the morality of   
the gospel1 and to say with unshrinking 
confidence1--this is truth4  ,if we     
would seek for that1 which must be of   
all conceivable things of the highest   
moment both for the peace and the       
improvement of the moral being1 it is to
 be found in the habit of mind1 in which
 there is the uniform contemplation of  
the divine character1 with a constant   
reliance on the guidance of the         

,almighty in every action of life4 ,one 
thing1 says an inspired writer1 have ,i 
desired of the ,lord1 that will ,i seek 
after2 that ,i may dwell in the house of
 the ,lord all the days of my life1 to  
behold the beauty of the ,lord1 and to  
inquire in his temple4--,the man1 who   
thus cultivates the habitual impression 
of the divine presence1 lives in an     
atmosphere peculiarly his own4 ,the     
storms which agitate the lower world may
 blow around or beneath1 but they touch 
not him2--as the traveller has seen from
 the mountain's top the war of elements 
below1 while he stood in unclouded      
sunshine4 ,in the works1 and ways1 and  
perfections of the ,eternal ,one1 he    
finds a subject of exalted              
contemplation1 in comparison with which 
the highest inquiries of human science  
sink into insignificance4 ,it is an     
exercise1 also1 which tends at once to  
elevate and to purify the mind4 ,it     
raises us from the minor concerns and   
transient interests which are so apt to 

occupy us1--to that wondrous field in   
which worlds on worlds compose one      
universe1--and to that mind which bade  
them move in their appointed orbits1 and
 maintains them all in undeviating      
harmony4 ,while it thus teaches us to   
bend in humble adoration before a wisdom
 which we cannot fathom1 and a power    
which we cannot comprehend1 it directs  
our attention to a display of moral     
attributes which at once challenge our  
reverence and demand our imitation4 ,by 
thus leading us to compare ourselves    
with the supreme excellence1 it tends to
 produce true humility1 and1 at the same
 time1 that habitual aspiration after   
moral improvement which constitutes the 
highest state of man4 ,the proud1 says  
an eloquent writer1 look down upon the  
earth1 and see nothing that creeps upon 
its surface more noble than             
themselves2--the humble look upwards to 
their ,god4 ,this disposition of mind1  
so far from being opposed to the        
acquirements of philosophy1 sits with   

peculiar grace upon the man who1 through
 the most zealous cultivation of human  
science1 ascends to the ,eternal ,cause4
 ,the farther he advances in the wonders
 of nature1 the higher he rises in his  
adoration of the power and the wisdom   
which guide the whole2--,where others   
see a sun1 he sees a ,deity4 ,and then1 
in every step of life1 whether of       
danger1 distress1 or difficulty1 the man
 who cultivates this intercourse with   
the incomprehensible ,one inquires in   
his temple4 ,he inquires for the        
guidance of divine wisdom1 and the      
strength of divine aid1 in his progress 
through the state of moral              
discipline2--he inquires1 in a peculiar 
manner1 for this aid in the culture of  
his moral being1 when he views this     
mighty undertaking in its important     
reference to the life which is to       
come2--he inquires for a discernment of 
the ways of ,divine ,providence1 as he  
either feels it in his own concerns1 or 
views it in the chain of events which   

are going on in the world around him4   
,he learns to trace the whole to the    
same unerring hand which guides the     
planet in its course2 and thus rests in 
the absolute conviction that the economy
 of ,providence is one great and        
magnificent system of design and order  
and harmony4 ,these1 we repeat with     
confidence1 are no visions of the       
imagination1 but the sound inductions of
 a calm and rational philosophy4 ,they  
are conclusions which compel the assent 
of every candid inquirer1 when he       
follows out that investigation of mighty
 import1--what is ,god1--and what is    
that essence in man which he has endowed
 with the power of rising to himself4   
,to enlarge upon these important        
subjects would lead us away from the    
proper design of a work1 which is       
intended chiefly to investigate the     
light we derive from the phenomena of   
the mind itself4 ,the points which have 
been stated1 as arising out of the      
impressions of every sound              

understanding1 challenge the assent of  
all who believe in a present and        
presiding ,deity1--a being of infinite  
power and wisdom1 and of perfect purity4
 ,with him who calls in question this   
sublime truth1 we have no common        
feeling1 and no mutual premises on which
 an argument can be founded4 ,we must   
therefore leave him to sit in solitary  
pride1 while he views the chaos which   
his fancy has framed1 and strives to    
reconcile the discordant elements of a  
system1 in which there are effects      
without a cause1 and harmony without a  
regulating power2 and in which the mind 
can perceive no element of credibility1 
consistency1 or truth4  ,with this      
slight outline1 therefore1 we must quit 
a subject of the deepest interest1 but  
which belongs rather to the theologian  
than to the inquirer in mental          
science2--and proceed briefly to        
investigate the means by which the      
condition of the moral feelings1 which  
has been the subject of the preceding   

observations1 may be promoted and       
cultivated as the regulating principle  
of the whole character4 ,two views may  
be taken of this point1 which1 though   
they harmonize with each other in       
practice1 are to be considered in their 
philosophical aspect as distinct4  ,the 
restoration of man from a state of      
estrangement1 anarchy1 or moral death1  
we are taught in the sacred writings to 
refer to a power from without the       
mind1--an influence directly from ,god4 
,we have seen the various considerations
 derived from the phenomena of the mind1
 and our impressions of the divine      
character1 giving to this great doctrine
 a probability which claims the assent  
of every correct understanding4 ,but1   
without in any degree losing sight of   
the truth and the importance of this    
principle1 the immediate object of our  
attention1 as a branch of mental        
science1 is rather the process of the   
mind itself1 by means of which a        
habitual influence is produced upon the 

whole character4 ,this is a compound    
operation which may probably be analysed
 in the following manner4 ,it seems to  
be composed of reason1--attention1--and 
a modification of conception4 ,the      
province of ,reason is to examine the   
truth of the statements or doctrines1   
which are proposed to the mind1 as      
calculated to act upon its moral        
feelings2--and1 upon this being done in 
a correct manner1 must depend the       
validity of the subsequent parts of the 
mental process4 ,this being premised1 it
 is the office of ,attention1 aided by  
reason1 to direct the mind assiduously  
to the truths1 so as fully to perceive  
their relations and tendencies4 ,by the 
farther process1 analogous to           
,conception1 they are then placed before
 us1 in such a manner as to give them   
the effect of real and present          
existence4 ,by these means1 truths      
relating to things for which we have not
 the evidence of our senses1 or         
referring to events which are future1   

but fully expected to happen1 are kept  
before the mind1 and influence the moral
 feelings and the character1 in the same
 manner as if the facts believed were   
actually seen1 or the events expected   
were taking place in our view4 ,this    
mental operation is ,faith2--and1 for   
the sound exercise of it1 the           
constituent elements now mentioned are  
essentially necessary4 ,the truth must  
be received by the judgment upon        
adequate evidence2 and1 by the other    
parts of the process1 it must be so kept
 before the mind1 that it may exercise  
such a moral influence as might arise   
from the actual vision or present       
existence1 of the things believed4      
,attention to these considerations will 
probably enable us to discover some of  
the fallacies which have obscured and   
bewildered this important subject4 ,when
 the impression1 which is thus allowed  
to influence the mind1 is one which has 
not been received by the judgment1 upon 
due examination1 and adequate evidence  

of its truth1--this is enthusiasm1 not  
faith4--,our present course of inquiry  
does not lead us to treat of the notions
 which have1 in various individuals1    
been thus allowed to usurp the place of 
truth4 ,to those who would preserve     
themselves from the influence of such1  
the first great inquiry1 respecting     
their own mental impressions1 ought to  
be1--are they facts1--and on what       
evidence do they rest which can satisfy 
a sound understanding that they are so4 
,on the other hand is to be avoided an  
error1 not less dangerous than the      
wildest fancies of the enthusiast1 and  
not less unworthy of a regulated mind4  
,this consists in treating real and     
important truths as if they were visions
 of the imagination1 and thus dismissing
 them1 without examination1 from the    
influence which they ought to produce   
upon the moral feelings4 ,it is singular
 also to remark1 how these two          
modifications of character may be traced
 to a condition of the reasoning powers1

 essentially the same4 ,the former      
receives a fiction of the imagination1  
and rests upon it as truth4 ,the latter1
 acting upon some prejudice or mental   
impression1 which has probably no better
 foundation1 puts away real and         
important truths without any examination
 of the evidence on which they are      
founded4 ,the misapplication of the     
reasoning powers is the same in both4   
,it consists in proceeding upon mere    
impression1 without exercising the      
judgment on the question of its         
evidence1--or on the facts and          
considerations which are opposed to it4 
,two characters of a very opposite      
description thus meet in that mental    
condition1 which draws them equally1    
though in different directions1 astray  
from the truth4  ,when a truth has fully
 received the sanction of the judgment1 
the second office of faith is1 by       
attention and conception1 to keep it    
habitually before the mind1 so that it  
may produce its proper influence upon   

the character4 ,this is to live by      
faith2--and in this consists that       
operation of the great principle1 which 
effectually distinguishes it from all   
pretended feelings and impressions      
assuming its name4 ,we speak1 in common 
language1 of a head-knowledge which does
 not affect the heart2--and of a man who
 is sound in his creed1 while he shews  
little of its influence upon his        
conduct4 ,the mental condition of such a
 man presents a subject of intense      
interest4 ,his alleged belief1 it is    
probable1 consists merely in words1 or  
in arguing ingeniously on points to     
which he attaches no real value4 ,these 
may have been impressed upon him by     
education2--they may constitute the     
creed of a party to which he has devoted
 himself2 and he may argue in support of
 them with all the energy of party zeal4
 ,in the same manner1 a man may contend 
warmly in favour of compassion1 whose   
conduct shows a cold and barren         
selfishness2--but this is not           

benevolence2--and the other is not      
faith4 ,both are empty professions of a 
belief in certain truths1 which have    
never fixed themselves in the mind1 so  
as to become regulating principles or   
moral causes in the mental constitution4
 ,we may indeed suppose another         
character1 slightly removed from this1  
in which the truths have really received
 the approbation of the judgment1 and   
yet fail to produce their proper        
influence4 ,this arises from distorted  
moral habits1 and a vitiated state of   
the moral faculties1 which have         
destroyed the healthy balance of the    
whole economy of the mind4 ,the         
consequence is1 that the man perceives  
and approves of truths1 without feeling 
their tendencies1 and without           
manifesting their power4  ,intimately   
connected with this subject1 also1 is a 
remarkable principle in our mental      
constitution1 formerly referred to1--the
 relation between certain facts or      
truths1 and certain moral emotions1     

which naturally arise from them1        
according to the chain of sequences     
which has been established in the       
economy of the mind4 ,a close connexion 
thus exists between our intellectual    
habits and our moral feelings1 which    
leads to consequences of the utmost     
practical moment4 ,though we have little
 immediate voluntary power over our     
moral emotions1 we have a power over the
 intellectual processes with which these
 are associated4 ,we can direct the mind
 to truths1 and we can cherish trains of
 thought1 which are calculated to       
produce correct moral feelings2--and we 
can avoid or banish mental images or    
trains of thought1 which have an        
opposite tendency4 ,this is the power   
over the succession of our thoughts1 the
 due exercise of which forms so         
important a feature of a well-regulated 
mind1 in regard to intellectual         
culture2--its influence upon us as moral
 beings is of still higher and more     
vital importance4  ,the sound exercise  

of that mental condition which we call  
,faith consists1 therefore1 in the      
reception of certain truths by the      
judgment1--the proper direction of the  
attention to their moral                
tendencies1--and the habitual influence 
of them upon the feelings and the       
conduct4 ,when the sacred writers tell  
us that1 without faith1 it is impossible
 to please ,god1--and when they speak of
 a man being saved by faith1--it is not 
to a mere admission of certain truths as
 part of his creed1 that they ascribe   
consequences so important2 but to a     
state in which these truths are         
uniformly followed out to certain       
results1 which they are calculated to   
produce1 according to the usual course  
of sequences in every sound mind4 ,this 
principle is strikingly illustrated by  
one of these writers1 by reference to a 
simple narrative4 ,during the invasion  
of ,canaan by the armies of ,israel1 two
 men were sent forward as spies to bring
 a report concerning the city of        

,jericho4 ,the persons engaged in this  
mission were received in a friendly     
manner1 by a woman whose house was upon 
the wall of the city2--when their       
presence was discovered1 she hid them   
from their pursuers2 and finally enabled
 them to escape1 by letting them down by
 a cord from a window4 ,before taking   
leave of them1 she expressed her firm   
conviction1 that the army to which they 
belonged was soon to take possession of 
,jericho1 and of the whole country1 and 
she made them swear to her that1 when   
this should take place1 they would shew 
mercy to her father's house4 ,the       
engagement was strictly fulfilled4 ,when
 the city was taken1 and the other      
inhabitants destroyed1 the woman was    
preserved1 with all her kindred4 ,in    
this very simple occurrence1 the woman  
is represented1 by the sacred writer1 as
 having been saved by faith4 ,the object
 of her faith was the event which she   
confidently expected1--that the city of 
,jericho was to be destroyed4 ,the      

ground of her faith was the rapid manner
 in which the most powerful nations had 
already fallen before the armies of     
,israel1--led1 as she believed1 by a    
divine power4 ,acting upon this         
conviction1 in the manner in which a    
belief so deeply affecting her personal 
safety was likely to influence any sound
 mind1 she took means for her           
preservation1 by making friends of the  
spies4 ,her faith saved her1 because    
without it she would not have made this 
provision2 but1 unless she had followed 
out her belief to the measure which was 
calculated to effect this object1 the   
mere belief of the event would have     
availed her nothing4 ,when we therefore 
ascribe important results to faith1 or  
to any other mental operation1 we       
ascribe them not to the operation       
itself1 but to this followed out to the 
consequences which it naturally         
produces1 according to the constitution 
of the human mind4 ,in the same manner1 
we may speak of one man1 in a certain   

state of danger or difficulty1 being    
saved by his wisdom1 and another by his 
strength4 ,in doing so1 we ascribe such 
results1 not to the mere possession of  
these qualities1 but to the efforts     
which naturally arose from them1 in the 
circumstances in which the individual   
was placed4 ,and1 when the inspired     
writer says1 that without faith it is   
impossible to please ,god1--he certainly
 refers to no mere mental impression1   
and to no barren system of opinions2 but
 to the reception of certain truths1    
which in our present state of being are 
entirely the objects of faith1 and to   
all that influence1 upon the moral      
feelings and the character1 which these 
must produce upon every mind that really
 believes them4         99       99     
99       99       99  ,on this great    
subject1 much misconception appears to  
have arisen from not sufficiently       
attending to the condition in which1 as 
moral beings1 we are placed in the      
present state of existence1 and the     

important part which must be performed  
by the mental exercise called faith4 ,as
 physical and intellectual beings1 we   
have certain relations to the objects by
 which we are surrounded1 and with these
 we communicate by means of our bodily  
senses4 ,but1 as moral beings1 our      
relations are entirely of a different   
nature2 and the facts and motives1 which
 are calculated to act upon us in these 
relations1 are chiefly the objects of   
faith3 that is1 they are not cognizable 
by any of our senses1 but are to be     
received by a different part of our     
constitution1 and upon a separate kind  
of evidence4 ,this1 accordingly1 is the 
simple but important distinction1       
referred to by the sacred writer1 when1 
in allusion to our condition as moral   
beings1 he says1--we walk by faith1 not 
by sight4 ,the objects of sight1 here   
intended to express all the objects of  
sense1 exercise over us a habitual and  
powerful influence4 ,they constantly    
obtrude themselves upon our notice      

without any exertion of our own2 and it 
requires a peculiar exercise of mind to 
withdraw our attention from them1 and to
 feel the power of events which are     
future1 and of things which are not     
seen4 ,this mental exercise is ,faith4  
,its special province1 as we have seen1 
is to receive truths which are presented
 directly to the mind1--to place them   
before us with all the vividness of     
actual and present existence1--and to   
make them exert upon us an agency       
analogous to that which is produced by  
objects of sight4 ,the next great point 
in our inquiry1 therefore1 is1 what are 
the truths which are calculated thus to 
operate upon us as moral beings1 and    
which it is the object of faith to bring
 habitually before us4         99       
99       99       99       99  ,when we 
withdraw our minds from the influence of
 sensible things1 and send forth our    
attention to those truths which are the 
province of faith1 the first great      
object which meets our view is the      

eternal incomprehensible ,one1 the moral
 governor of the universe1--a being of  
infinite perfections and infinite       
purity4 ,from the stupendous works of   
nature1 we trace his operation as the   
great ,first ,cause1--and infer1 with   
absolute certainty1 his boundless power 
and wisdom1 and his independent         
existence4 ,the impress of his moral    
attributes he has fixed with indelible  
certainty1 upon our moral               
perceptions1--where1 in the light of    
conscience1 co-operating with a simple  
process of reason1 we perceive him to be
 a being of infinite holiness1 and of   
unerring truth and justice4 ,our        
knowledge of these attributes is not the
 result of any process of reasoning     
which can admit of deliberation or      
doubt4 ,they force themselves upon our  
conviction by the most simple principles
 of induction1 when1 from our own mental
 and moral endowments1 we infer the     
perfections of him who formed us4  ,from
 every conception we can form of such a 

being1 we have an equally insuperable   
conviction of his universal             
presence1--that he is the witness not   
only of our conduct1 but of the thoughts
 and imaginations of the heart2--and    
that from these1 as indicating our real 
condition1 and not from our conduct     
alone1 our moral aspect is estimated by 
him1--the pure and holy ,one who seeth  
in secret4 ,each moment1 as it passes   
rapidly over us1 we know is bringing us 
nearer to that period1 when all our     
hopes and fears for this world shall lie
 with us in the grave4 ,but we feel also
 that this is the entrance to another   
state of being1--a state of moral       
retribution1 where the eternal ,one is  
to be disclosed in all his attributes as
 a moral governor4 ,these considerations
 fix themselves upon the mind1 with a   
feeling of yet new and more tremendous  
interest1 when we farther take into view
 that this future existence stretches   
out before us into endless duration4    
,this is the truth so powerfully        

expressed by the sacred writer1 in terms
 which by their brevity convey1 in the  
most adequate manner1 their overwhelming
 import1--,the things which are seen are
 temporal1 but the things which are not 
seen are eternal4  ,these truths are not
 the visions of enthusiasm2 neither are 
they the result of any process of       
reasoning1 by which different men may   
arrive at different conclusions4 ,they  
force themselves upon our conviction    
with a power which we cannot put away   
from us1 when we turn our attention to  
the solemn inquiry1 what we are1 and    
what is ,god4 ,in the sacred writings   
they are detailed and illustrated1 in a 
connected and harmonious manner2 and are
 impressed upon us with the force of a  
revelation from the ,deity himself4 ,but
 the principles there disclosed meet    
with an impression1 in our moral        
constitution1 which pleads with         
authority for their truth4 ,it is the   
province of faith to keep these         
habitually before the mind1 and to cause

 them to influence the feelings and the 
conduct1 as if they were objects of     
sense1--as if the ,deity1 in all the    
purity of his character were actually   
disclosed to our view1--or as if we were
 present at that dread hour which shall 
witness his righteous retribution4 ,the 
man who thus feels their power1 and     
exhibits their influence upon his       
character1 is he who lives by faith4    
,when1 under this mental exercise1 a man
 brings himself into the immediate      
presence of the eternal ,one2--when he  
arraigns himself1 as it were1 before the
 bar of the omniscient ,judge2--when he 
places before him that future state     
which stretches forth into endless      
existence1--a train of feelings must    
arise in his mind1 to which he was a    
stranger1 so long as he placidly        
resigned himself to the influence of    
sensible things4 ,he views this being of
 infinite purity1 as one who has been   
all his life the daily witness of his   
conduct2 and feels that even the secrets

 of the heart have been at all times    
open to divine inspection4 ,each day1 as
 it passed unheeded over him1 was a     
portion gone by of his period of moral  
discipline2 and each1 as it glided amid 
the frivolities of life1 or the active  
pursuit of temporal good1 had its moral 
aspect assigned to it in the judgment of
 the eternal mind4 ,along with these    
impressions1 which no reflecting man can
 put away from him1 a voice within      
forces upon him the conviction1 that1   
were his whole history disclosed to his 
fellow-men1 he would1 even in their     
estimation1 be found wanting4 ,how much 
more deeply must this be fixed upon his 
inmost soul1 when he feels that the     
whole is1 at one glance1 exposed to the 
eye of omniscience2 and that an hour is 
rapidly approaching1 when a strict      
account must be rendered1 and a         
righteous sentence pronounced1 the      
result of which will extend into eternal
 existence4 ,with these truths upon his 
mind1 what reflecting man can view1     

without awe1 the moment which is to     
close his state of moral                
discipline1--when1 disencumbered from   
his earthly tenement1 he shall find     
himself alone with ,god1--and there     
shall burst upon his astonished         
faculties the blaze of an endless day4  
,these are not speculations of fancy1   
but eternal truth4 ,the man who         
habitually acts under their influence1  
knows that his faith rests upon a       
conviction which cannot be shaken1 when 
he recognises in all his ways the       
presence and the inspection of the      
,deity1--when he feels the obligation to
 have even the desires and affections   
under subjection to his will1--and when 
he resigns himself to his guidance and  
asks his powerful aid1 both for the     
conduct of this life1 and the           
preparation for the life which is to    
come4         99       99       99      
99       99  ,solemn is the hour when a 
man thus retires from the tumult of     
life1 and seriously proposes to himself 

the question1--what is his condition as 
a moral being2 what have been his       
leading pursuits in this life which is  
hastening to a close2 what is his aspect
 in the view of that incomprehensible   
,one1 who perceives at a single glance  
the whole details of his moral history4 
,is he safe to meet the full splendour  
of that eye2--has he no apprehension1   
that1 when called to account in the     
immediate presence of unerring purity1  
he may not be able to answer4 ,the man  
lives not1 who can appeal to his own    
heart and say1 after serious inquiry1   
that he can thus meet the penetrating   
search of him1 whose knowledge is       
perfect1 as his purity is infinite3 ,the
 man lives not1 who can look back upon  
his whole life1 without feeling1 that1  
in the sight of this unspotted ,one1 he 
is polluted with guilt3 ,and1 if his    
heart condemn him1 with all its         
partiality for his own views and        
feelings1 and all its forgetfulness of  
many points in his moral history1 he    

must feel that ,god is greater than his 
heart1 and knoweth all things4 ,under   
such an impression1 to what refuge shall
 he betake himself4 ,does he appeal to  
an indefinite idea of the mercy of the  
,deity2--it must be evident that this   
conveys no distinct principle1 and will 
not bear the confidence which is        
essential to hope and peace4 ,for we    
cannot go to the extent of supposing a  
mercy so indiscriminate1 that the ,deity
 will depart from all the laws which he 
has made1 and which he has impressed    
upon us as a part of our moral          
constitution4 ,this would be ascribing1 
to infinite wisdom1 an indecision and a 
change of purpose1 unworthy of the      
weakest human lawgiver4 ,if1 then1 we do
 not boldly assume this position1 how   
are we to draw the line where such mercy
 is to terminate2--and where the        
,almighty is to appear in his character 
of justice1 as a righteous moral        
governor4 ,if we find that each         
individual fixes a different standard1  

and that each extends it so as to favour
 his own condition1 it is clear that the
 system presents no character of truth1 
and that it is incapable of ministering 
to the consolation of him who feels his 
own necessities1 and seriously          
contemplates the character of ,god4 ,he 
must perceive that to apply such        
reasoning to human enactments1 would be 
to represent them as a mockery of       
justice2 and that it is impossible thus 
to argue1 respecting the laws of him who
 is infinite in holiness and boundless  
in wisdom4 ,he cannot but acknowledge   
that a universe governed in such a      
manner would run into irremediable      
confusion and anarchy2 and will find it 
impossible1 on any principle which human
 reasoning can furnish1 to arrive at any
 other decision than this1--that the    
,judge of all the earth must be         
unchanging in his purposes1 and         
impartial in his justice4  ,to this     
conclusion we are led by the clearest   
inductions of moral science2--but1 at   

this momentous point1 philosophy fails  
us4 ,no human power can find a refuge1  
to which the mind can betake itself     
under a sense of guilt2--no human wisdom
 can answer the inquiry of mighty       
import1 can ,god be just and yet justify
 the ungodly4 ,but here we are met by a 
light from heaven1 which has burst upon 
the scene of doubt and of darkness2 and 
are called to bring down the pride of   
our reason1 in humble submission to the 
testimony of ,god4 ,it comes supported  
by a weight of evidence1 which          
challenges the cordial assent of the    
most acute understanding1 and the power 
of which will be best appreciated by    
those1 who1 with sincere desire for     
truth1 have made the highest attainments
 in the laws of rigid inquiry4 ,it      
discloses an atonement made for         
sin1--and an influence from heaven1     
calculated to restore the moral being to
 the purity in which it was formed4 ,it 
thus meets alike the necessities of man1
 as in a state of actual guilt1 and a   

state of moral degradation4 ,for the    
one1 it displays a scheme of mercy in   
which the integrity of the divine       
character is vindicated1 while pardon is
 extended to transgressors4 ,to the     
other1 it offers power from heaven1     
which will correct the disorders of the 
moral constitution1 and raise the man   
anew to the likeness of ,god4 ,it thus  
forms a harmonious whole1 uniform and   
consistent in itself1--worthy of the    
character of ,god1--and adapted to the  
condition of man2 and1 to every one who 
feels his own moral necessities1 and    
estimates the purity of the ,deity1 it  
brings an absolute conviction of its    
truth4  ,a participation in the benefits
 of this revelation of divine mercy is  
said1 in the sacred writings1 to be     
received by ,faith2 and this expression 
has given rise to controversies and     
contending systems1 which have involved 
the subject in much perplexity4 ,while  
some have restricted the operation of   
,faith to the mere belief of a certain  

system of opinions1 others have referred
 to it a series of mysterious           
impressions1 and enthusiastic feelings1 
at variance with every dictate of sound 
reasoning4 ,the principle of faith1     
however1 holds so prominent a place in  
the scheme of ,christian truth1 that    
some clear notions respecting its nature
 must be felt to be of the highest      
interest4 ,it holds also1 as we have    
formerly seen1 a most important position
 in the philosophy of the moral         
feelings1--being that mental operation1 
by which we receive a certain class of  
truths1 of the utmost consequence to us 
as responsible beings4 ,it is a process 
which every one feels1 but which cannot 
be defined2--and it can be illustrated  
only by tracing its influence1 in regard
 to those objects to which it is more   
particularly directed4  ,the objects of 
faith are twofold1--truths addressed to 
the understanding1--and benefits offered
 or promised4 ,we have formerly had     
occasion to trace the action of faith in

 regard to truth1--especially a class of
 truths which are calculated1 when      
really believed1 to exert a powerful    
effect upon our moral feelings and      
conduct4 ,its operation1 we have seen1  
is to bring these truths before us in   
such a manner1 that they exert the same 
kind of influence as if the facts or    
events were objects of sense4 ,the man  
who believes these truths1 so as thus   
habitually to feel then power1 is he who
 receives them in faith4 ,this is the   
province of faith in regard to          
truth2--we have next to analyze its     
operation in regard to offered or       
promised benefits1--and this we can best
 do by means of an example4  ,let us    
take the illustration of a man affected 
with a disease supposed to be           
mortal2--he is told that a remedy has   
been discovered of infallible efficacy2 
and that a person is at hand who is     
ready to administer it4 ,does he        
perceive his danger2--does he believe   
the virtue of the remedy2--does he      

confide in the sincerity of the         
individual who offers it2--this is      
faith4 ,the immediate and natural result
 of his faith is1 that he asks for the  
remedy which is offered2--and this      
result is inseparable from such belief1 
according to the uniform sequence of    
volitions in every sound mind4 ,the man 
who professes to admit the facts1 and   
does not shew such a result of belief1  
professes what he does not actually     
feel4 ,if he perceives not the extent of
 his danger1 he asks not the remedy1    
because he values it not2--and the same 
effect may follow1 if he doubts either  
its efficacy1 or the sincerity of him   
who offers it4 ,in this case1 it is also
 to be observed1 that a reflection is   
thrown upon the character of this       
individual1 by imputing to him an offer 
of what he has either not the power or  
the intention to perform4 ,but if the   
man really believes the truths1 he      
applies for the remedy2 and he receives 
it4 ,thus his faith saves him1 because  

by means of it he bought the offered    
aid4 ,could we suppose him merely to    
admit the facts1 without asking the     
remedy1 his belief would avail him      
nothing4  ,such appeals to be the simple
 view we are to take of ,faith1 when we 
apply it to the great benefits which are
 presented to us in the ,christian      
revelation4 ,this is addressed to us as 
beings in a state both of guilt and of  
depravity2 and as having no means of our
 own1 by which we can rescue ourselves  
from condemnation and impurity4 ,it     
unfolds a dispensation of peace1 by     
which1 in perfect consistency with the  
harmony of his character1 the ,deity    
offers mercy and forgiveness1--and an   
influence from himself which has power  
to purify the moral being4 ,these       
benefits are conferred on every one who 
believes2 and who is he that            
believes3--the man who is convinced of  
his guilt1 and perceives his            
impurity2--who feels his inability to   
rescue himself2--who admits the efficacy

 of the remedy1 and confides in the     
sincerity with which it is              
offered2--this is he who believes4 ,his 
faith saves him2 because1 acting on his 
conviction1 according to the uniform    
sequence of volitions in every sound    
mind1 he asks the promised aid1 and     
asking receives it4 ,much of the        
confusion1 in which the subject has been
 involved1 appears to have arisen from  
metaphysical refinements1 by which the  
various parts of this mental process are
 separated from each other4 ,they form  
one harmonious whole1 which cannot be   
broken4 ,the man will not seek the      
remedy1 who believes not its efficacy1  
and perceives not his moral necessities2
 but1 however he may profess to admit   
these facts1 if he follows not out his  
belief to its natural result1 by        
applying for the remedy1 his mere belief
 will not profit him4 ,the grounds1 on  
which these truths are addressed to us1 
are contained in that chain of evidence 
on which is founded the whole system of 

,christianity1--taken along with the    
conviction1 which every man receives of 
his actual moral condition1 from the    
voice of conscience within4 ,a sense of 
the sincerity of the offer we derive    
from our impression of the unchangeable 
attributes of the ,deity4 ,accordingly1 
he who believes is said to give glory to
 ,god1--that is1 to receive his         
statements with absolute confidence1 and
 to form an honourable conception of the
 sincerity of his intentions4 ,he who   
believes not1 rejects the statements of 
the ,almighty as false1--and treats him 
with the contempt which we apply to one 
whom we suppose to promise what he has  
no intention to bestow4 ,the man who    
comes to ,god1 with the hope of         
acceptance1 is therefore required to    
come in the assurance of faith1 or an   
implicit conviction that he is sincere  
in his intentions of bestowing the      
blessings which he offers2 and whosoever
 has not this assurance does dishonour  
to the divine character1--or maketh ,god

 a liar4  ,it were vain to enter upon   
the various systems and opinions1 in    
which this important doctrine has been  
misrepresented by its enemies1 and often
 perverted by those who profess to be   
its friends4 ,two of these may be       
briefly noticed4 ,some have maintained  
that the doctrine of an unconditional   
pardon sets aside the obligations of    
morality1--because it has no regard to  
the personal character of the           
individual1--or holds out the offer of  
acceptance to faith1 without obedience4 
,others contend that an essential part  
of faith is an immediate and absolute   
assurance of a man's own acceptance in  
the sight of the ,deity2 and that he who
 has not this is in a state of unbelief4
 ,these two opinions1 so different from 
each other1 are equally founded upon    
misconception of the nature and         
provisions of the ,christian economy4   
,in regard to the former1 it is only    
necessary to remark1 that the revelation
 of ,christian truth is not confined to 

an offer of pardon to the guilty2--its  
great object is the recovery and        
purification of the moral being2 and    
there is an essential and inviolable    
union between these two parts of the    
great scheme of redemption4 ,it provides
 in the most effectual manner for the   
interests of morality1 by the           
purification of the desires and         
affections1 the springs of action2--it  
is the morality of the heart4 ,it       
proclaims a system of morals1 more pure 
and more exalted far than ever was      
contemplated by the wisest of men2--it  
exhibits an example of the perfect state
 of a moral being1 in the character of  
the ,messiah2--and it enforces the      
imitation of this example as            
indispensable in every one who professes
 to be his disciple4 ,these different   
parts of the scheme can never be        
separated1 and there cannot be a greater
 perversion of reasoning1 or a greater  
misconception of the prominent features 
of the gospel of peace1 than to allege  

that it does not provide1 in the most   
effectual manner1 for the highest       
interests of morality4  ,the other      
opinion is equally founded upon         
error1--namely1 that which considers it 
essential to faith1 that a man be       
assured of his personal acceptance in   
the sight of the ,deity4 ,it is obvious 
that this is a sophism clearly opposed  
to sound reasoning1 and to the first    
principles of the philosophy of the     
moral feelings4 ,for faith1 viewed as a 
mental process1 must always have for its
 object facts2 and these facts must rest
 upon such evidence1 as is sufficient to
 convince the understanding of their    
truth4 ,to talk of faith1 without such  
facts and such evidence1 is a mere      
logical fallacy1 or an absurdity in     
terms4 ,but there is no disclosure of   
the personal acceptance of any          
individual1 and consequently1 on no     
principle of sound reasoning can this   
ever be considered as the object of     
faith4 ,this doctrine1 therefore1       

applies a most important principle of   
the mind1 not to facts1 which alone can 
warrant the exercise of faith1 but to a 
vision of the imagination1 which admits 
of no evidence1 and cannot be subjected 
to any test of its truth4  ,widely      
different from all such flimsy and      
imaginary hypotheses is the great system
 of ,christian truth1--harmonious and   
consistent in itself1 and challenging   
the approbation of the soundest         
understanding4 ,it reveals1 as we have  
seen1 a dispensation of mercy1 in       
accordance with the highest ideas we can
 form of the divine perfections4 ,it is 
supported by a chain of evidence1 which 
carries conviction to the mind of the   
most rigid inquirer2 and thus it is a   
sound and legitimate object of faith4   
,it reveals also a provision for        
purifying the moral nature2 and this in 
every case accompanies the dispensation 
of mercy to those who receive it4 ,the  
effects of this powerful agency1        
therefore1 become the test and the      

evidence of the reality of faith4 ,does 
a man seek a proof of his               
acceptance1--the reference is to facts  
in his own moral condition4 ,he is to   
look for it in a change which is taking 
place in his character1--a new direction
 of his desires1--a new regulation of   
his affections1--a habitual impression1 
to which he was a stranger before1 of   
the presence and the perfections of the 
,deity--and a new light which has burst 
upon his view1 respecting his relations 
to this life and to that which is to    
come4 ,he is to seek this evidence in a 
mind1 which aims at no lower standard   
than that which will bear the constant  
inspection of infinite purity2--he is to
 seek it1 and to manifest it to others1 
in a spirit which takes no lower pattern
 than that model of perfection1--the    
character of the ,messiah4 ,these       
acquirements1 indeed1 are looked upon1  
not as a ground of acceptance1 but a    
test of moral condition2 not as1 in any 
degree1 usurping the place of the great 

principle of faith1 but as its fruits   
and evidences4 ,as these1 then1 are the 
only proofs of the reality of this      
principle1 so they are the only basis on
 which a man can rest any sound         
conviction of his moral aspect in the   
sight of the ,deity2--and that system is
 founded on delusion and falsehood1     
which1 in this respect1 holds out any   
other ground of confidence than the     
purification of the heart1 and a        
corresponding harmony of the whole      
character4 ,such attainment1 indeed1 is 
not made at once1 nor is it ever made in
 a full and perfect manner in the       
present state of being2 but1 where the  
great principle has been fixed within1  
there is a persevering effort1 and a    
uniform contest1 and a continual        
aspiration after conformity to the great
 model of perfection4 ,each step that a 
man gains in this progress serves to    
extend his view of the high pattern to  
which his eye is steadily directed2 and1
 as his knowledge of it is thus         

enlarged1 he is led by comparison to    
feel more and more deeply his own       
deficiency4 ,it thus produces increasing
 humility1 and an increasing sense of   
his own imperfection1 and causes him    
continually to feel1 that1 in this      
warfare1 he requires a power which is   
not in man4 ,but he knows also that this
 is provided1 as an essential part of   
the great system on which his hope is   
established4 ,amid much weakness1       
therefore1 and many infirmities1 his    
moral improvement goes forward4 ,faint  
and feeble at first1 as the earliest    
dawn of the morning1 it becomes brighter
 and steadier as it proceeds in its     
course1 and1 as the shining light1      
shineth more and more unto the perfect  
day4   ,,the ,,end4  ,,edinburgh3       
,printed by ,balfour and ,jack1 ,niddry 
,street4