,,mind ,,and ,,motion ,,and ,,monism    
,,by ,,the ,,late    ,,george ,,john    
,,romanes1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d41 ,f4,r4,s4  
,,honorary ,,fellow ,,of ,,gonville     
,,and ,,caius ,,college1 ,,cambridge    
,,london ,,longmans1 ,,green1 ,,and     
,,co4 ,,and ,,new ,,york #ahie   ,oxford
   ,,horace ,,hart1 ,,printer ,,to ,,the
 ,,university        ,,works ,,by       
,,george ,,john ,,romanes1 ,m4,a41      
,,ll4,d41 ,f4,r4,s4      ,,darwin1 ,,and
 ,,after ,,darwin3 an ,exposition of the
 ,darwinian ,theory1     and a          
,discussion on ,post-,darwinian         
,questions4      ,,part ,i4 ,,the       
,,darwinian ,,theory4 ,with ,portrait of
 ,darwin and #abe     ,illustrations4   
,crown #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4      ,,part    
,,ii4 ,,post-,,darwinian ,,questions3   
,,heredity ,,and ,,utility4 ,crown      
#hvo4      ,,an ,,examination ,,of      
,,weismannism4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4        
,,mind ,,and ,,motion ,,and ,,monism4   
,crown #hvo4      ,,thoughts ,,on       
,,religion4 ,edited1 with a ,preface1 by

 ,,charles ,,gore1     ,m4,a41 ,canon of
 ,westminster4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4  
,london     ,,longmans1 ,,green  ,,co4  
,,preface   ,of the contents of this    
little volume the section on ,mind and  
,motion which forms1 in accordance with 
a suggestion of the author's1 a general 
introduction1 was delivered at          
,cambridge as the ,rede ,lecture in     
#ahhe1 and was printed in the           
,contemporary ,review for ,june in that 
year4 ,the chapter on ,the ,world as an 
,eject was published1 almost as it now  
stands1 in the ,contemporary ,review for
 ,july1 #ahhf4 ,a paper on ,the ,fallacy
 of ,materialism1 of which ,mr4 ,romanes
 incorporated the more important parts  
in the ,essay on ,monism1 was           
contributed to the ,nineteenth ,century 
for ,december1 #ahhb4 ,the rest was left
 in ,,ms4 and was probably written in   
#ahhi or #ahij4  ,the subjects here     
discussed frequently occupied ,mr4      
,romanes' keen and versatile mind4 ,had 
not the hand of death fallen upon him   

while so much of the ripening grain of  
his thought still remained to be finally
 garnered1 some modifications and       
extensions of the views set forth in the
 ,essay on ,monism would probably have  
been introduced4 ,attention may be      
drawn1 for example1 to the sentence on  
p4 #aci1 italicized by the author       
himself1 in which it is contended that  
the will as agent must be identified    
with the principle of ,causality4 ,i    
have reason to believe that the chapter 
on ,the ,world as an ,eject would1 in a 
final revision of the ,essay as a whole1
 have been modified so as to lay stress 
on this identification of the human will
 with the principle of ,causality in the
 world at large--a doctrine the relation
 of which to the teachings of           
,schopenhauer will be evident to        
students of philosophy4  ,but the hand  
of death closed on the thinker ere his  
thought had received its full and       
ultimate expression4 ,when in ,july1    
#ahic1 ,i received from ,mr4 ,romanes   

instructions with regard to the         
publication of that which now goes forth
 to the world in his name1 his end      
seemed very near2 and he said with      
faltering voice1 in tones the pathos of 
which lingers with me still1 that this  
and much besides must1 he feared1 be    
left unfinished4 ,he suggested that     
perhaps ,i might revise the parts in the
 light of the whole4 ,but ,i have       
thought it best to leave what he had    
written as he wrote it1 save for quite  
unimportant emendations1 lest in        
revising ,i should cast over it the     
shadow of my own opinions4  ,it only    
remains to add that the conclusions     
reached in this ,essay should be studied
 in connection with the later ,thoughts 
on ,religion which ,canon ,gore has     
recently edited4                        
,c4 ,,ll4 ,m4   ,,bristol1   ,may1      
#ahie4       ,,contents                 
,,page    ,,mind ,,and ,,motion         
#a    ,,monism                          
#ci    ,,introduction                   

#da    ,,chapter     ,i4 ,,spiritualism 
#dg              ,,ii4 ,,materialism    
#ee             ,,iii4 ,,monism         
#gi              ,,iv4 ,,the ,,world    
,,as ,,an ,,eject                       
#hh               ,v4 ,,the ,,will ,,in 
,,relation ,,to ,,materialism ,,and     
,,spiritualism  #aai              ,,vi4 
,,the ,,will ,,in ,,relation ,,to       
,,monism                        #abi    
,,mind ,,and ,,motion  ,,rede ,,lecture1
 #ahhe4   ,the earliest writer who      
deserves to be called a psychologist is 
,hobbes2 and if we consider the time    
when he wrote1 we cannot fail to be     
surprised at what ,i may term his       
prevision of the most important results 
which have now been established by      
science4 ,he was the first clearly to   
sound the note which has ever since     
constituted the bass1 or fundamental    
tone1 of scientific thought4 ,let us    
listen to it through the clear          
instrumentality of his own language3--  
',all the qualities called sensible are1

 in the object which causeth      them1 
but so many motions of the matter by    
which it presseth on our      organs    
diversely4 ,neither in us that are      
pressed are they anything      else but 
divers motions2 for motion produceth    
nothing but      motion4444 ,the cause  
of sense is the external body or object1
 which      presseth the organ proper to
 each sense1 either immediately1 as in  
taste and touch1 or mediately1 as in    
hearing1 seeing1 and smelling2          
which pressure1 by the mediation of the 
nerves1 and other strings      and      
membranes of the body1 continued inwards
 to the brain and      heart1 causeth   
there a resistance1 or counter-pressure1
 or      endeavour4444 ,and because     
going1 speaking1 and the like           
voluntary motions1 depend always upon a 
precedent thought of      whither1 which
 way1 and what2 it is evident that the  
imagination or idea is the first        
internal beginning of all      voluntary
 motion4 ,and although unstudied men do 

not conceive any      motion at all to  
be there1 where the thing moved is      
invisible2 or      the space it is moved
 in is1 for the shortness of it1        
insensible2      yet that doth not      
hinder1 but that such motions are4      
,these small      beginnings of motion1 
within the body of man1 before they     
appear in      walking1 speaking1       
striking1 and other visible actions1 are
      commonly called ,,endeavour#a4'   
,these quotations are sufficient to show
 that the system of ,hobbes was         
prophetic of a revelation afterwards    
declared by two centuries of scientific 
research4 ,for they show how plainly he 
taught that all our knowledge of the    
external world is a knowledge of motion2
 and1 again1 that all our acquisitions  
of knowledge and other acts of mind     
themselves imply1 as he elsewhere says1 
some kind of 'motion1 agitation1 or     
alteration1 which worketh in the brain4'
 ,that he conceived such motion1        
agitation1 or alteration to be1 from its

 extreme minuteness1 'invisible' and    
'insensible1' or1 as we should now say1 
molecular1 is likewise evident4 ,i can  
therefore imagine the delight with which
 he would hear me speak when ,i say1    
that it is no longer a matter of        
keen-sighted speculation1 but a matter  
of carefully demonstrated fact1 that all
 our knowledge of the external world is 
nothing more than a knowledge of motion4
 ,for all the forms of energy have now  
been proved to be but modes of motion2  
and even matter1 if not in its ultimate 
constitution vortical motion1 at all    
events is known to us only as changes of
 motion3 all that we perceive in what we
 call matter is change in modes of      
motion4 ,we do not even know what it is 
that moves2 we only know that when some 
modes of motion pass into other modes1  
we perceive what we understand by       
matter4 ,it would take me too long to   
justify this general statement so that  
it should be intelligible to every one2 
but ,i am confident that all persons who

 understand such subjects will1 when    
they think about it1 accept this general
 statement as one which is universally  
true4 ,and1 if so1 they will agree with 
,hobbes that all our knowledge of the   
external world is a knowledge of motion4
  ,now1 if it would have been thus a joy
 to ,hobbes to have heard to-day how    
thoroughly he has been justified in his 
views touching the external world1 with 
no less joy would he have heard that he 
has been equally justified in his views 
touching the internal world4 ,for it has
 now been proved1 beyond the possibility
 of dispute1 that it is only in virtue  
of those invisible movements which he   
inferred that the nervous system is     
enabled to perform its varied functions4
  ,to many among the different kinds of 
movement going on in the external world1
 the animal body is adapted to respond  
by its own movements as best suits its  
own welfare2 and the mechanism whereby  
this is effected is the neuro-muscular  
system4 ,those kinds of movement going  

on in the external world which are      
competent to evoke responsive movements 
in the animal body are called by        
physiologists stimuli4 ,when a stimulus 
falls upon the appropriate sensory      
surface1 a wave of molecular movement is
 sent up the attached sensory nerve to a
 nerve-centre1 which thereupon issues   
another wave of molecular movement down 
a motor nerve to the group of muscles   
over whose action it presides2 and when 
the muscles receive this wave of nervous
 influence they contract4 ,this kind of 
response to stimuli is purely           
mechanical1 or non-mental1 and is       
ordinarily termed reflex action4 ,the   
whole of the spinal cord and lower part 
of the brain are made up of             
nerve-centres of reflex action2 and1 in 
the result1 we have a wonderfully       
perfect machine in the animal body      
considered as a whole4 ,for while the   
various sensory surfaces are severally  
adapted to respond to different kinds of
 external movement--the eye to light1   

the ear to sound1 and so on--any of     
these surfaces may be brought into      
suitable relation with any of the       
muscles of the body by means of the     
cerebro-spinal nerve-centres and their  
intercommunications4  ,so much1 then1   
for the machinery of the body4 ,we must 
now turn to consider the corporeal seat 
of the mind1 or the only part of the    
nervous system wherein the agitation of 
nervous matter is accompanied with      
consciousness4 ,this is composed of a   
double nerve-centre1 which occurs in all
 vertebrated animals1 and the two parts 
of which are called the cerebral        
hemispheres4 ,in man this double        
nerve-centre is so large that it        
completely fills the arch of the skull1 
as far down as the level of the         
eyebrows4 ,the two hemispheres of which 
it consists meet face to face in the    
middle line of the skull1 from the top  
of the nose backwards4 ,each hemisphere 
is composed of two conspicuously        
distinct parts1 called respectively the 

grey matter and the white matter4 ,the  
grey matter is external1 enveloping the 
white matter like a skull-cap1 and is   
composed of an inconceivable number of  
nerve-cells connected together by       
nerve-fibres4 ,it is computed that in a 
human brain there cannot be less than a 
thousand millions of cells1 and five    
thousand millions of fibres4 ,the white 
matter is composed only of nerve-fibres1
 which pass downwards in great strands  
of conducting tissue to the lower       
centres of the brain and spinal cord4   
,so that the whole constitutes one      
system1 with the grey matter of the     
cerebral hemispheres at the apex or     
crown4  ,that the grey matter of the    
cerebral hemispheres is the exclusive   
seat of mind is proved in two ways4 ,in 
the first place1 if we look to the      
animal kingdom as a whole1 we find that1
 speaking generally1 the intelligence of
 species varies with the mass of this   
grey matter4 ,or1 in other words1 we    
find that the process of mental         

evolution1 on its physical side1 has    
consisted in the progressive development
 of this grey matter superimposed upon  
the pre-existing nervous machinery1     
until it has attained its latest and    
maximum growth in man4  ,in the second  
place1 we find that when the grey matter
 is experimentally removed from the     
brain of animals1 the animals continue  
to live2 but are completely deprived of 
intelligence4 ,all the lower            
nerve-centres continue to perform their 
mechanical adjustments in response to   
suitable stimulation2 but they are no   
longer under the government of the mind4
 ,thus1 for instance1 when a bird is    
mutilated in this way1 it will continue 
to perform all its reflex               
adjustments--such as sitting on a perch1
 using its wings when thrown into the   
air1 and so forth2 but it no longer     
remembers its nest or its young1 and    
will starve to death in the midst of its
 food1 unless it be fed artificially4   
,again1 if the grey matter of only one  

hemisphere be removed1 the mind is taken
 away from the corresponding 7i4 e4 the 
opposite7 side of the body1 while it    
remains intact on the other side4 ,for  
example1 if a dog be deprived of one    
hemisphere1 the eye which was supplied  
from it with nerve-fibres continues able
 to see1 or to transmit impressions to  
the lower nerve-centre called the optic 
ganglion2 for this eye will then        
mechanically follow the hand waved in   
front of it4 ,but if the hand should    
hold a piece of meat1 the dog will show 
no mental recognition of the meat1 which
 of course it will immediately seize if 
exposed to the view of its other eye4   
,the same thing is found to happen in   
the case of birds3 on the injured side  
sensation1 or the power of responding to
 a stimulus1 remains intact2 while      
perception1 or the power of mental      
recognition1 is destroyed4  ,this       
description applies to the grey matter  
of the cerebral hemispheres as a whole4 
,but of course the question next arises 

whether it only acts as a whole1 or     
whether there is any localization of    
different intellectual faculties in     
different parts of it4 ,now1 in answer  
to this question1 it has long been known
 that the faculty of speech is          
definitely localized in a part of the   
grey matter lying just behind the       
forehead2 for1 when this part is        
injured1 a man loses all power of       
expressing even the most simple ideas in
 words1 while the ideas themselves      
remain as clear as ever4 ,it is         
remarkable that in each individual only 
this part of one hemisphere appears to  
be used2 and there is some evidence to  
show that left-handed persons use the   
opposite side from right-handed4        
,moreover1 when the side which is       
habitually in use is destroyed1 the     
corresponding part of the other         
hemisphere begins to learn its work1 so 
that the patient may in time recover his
 use of language4  ,within the last few 
years the important discovery has been  

made1 that by stimulating with          
electricity the surface of the grey     
matter of the hemispheres1 muscular     
movements are evoked2 and that certain  
patches of the grey matter1 when thus   
stimulated1 always throw into action the
 same groups of muscles4 ,in other      
words1 there are definite local areas of
 grey matter1 which1 when stimulated1   
throw into action definite groups of    
muscles4 ,the surface of the cerebral   
hemispheres has now been in large       
measure explored and mapped out with    
reference to these so-called            
motor-centres2 and thus our knowledge of
 the neuro-muscular machinery of the    
higher animals 7including man7 has been 
very greatly furthered4 ,here ,i may    
observe parenthetically that1 as the    
brain is insentient to injuries         
inflicted upon its own substance1 none  
of the experiments to which ,i have     
alluded entail any suffering to the     
animals experimented upon2 and it is    
evident that the important information  

which has thus been gained could not    
have been gained by any other method4 ,i
 may also observe that as these         
motor-centres occur in the grey matter  
of the hemispheres1 a strong probability
 arises that they are not only the      
motor-centres1 but also the volitional  
centres which originate the intellectual
 commands for the contraction of this   
and that group of muscles4              
,unfortunately we cannot interrogate an 
animal whether1 when we stimulate a     
motor-centre1 we arouse in the animal's 
mind an act of will to throw the        
corresponding group of muscles into     
action2 but that these motor-centres are
 really centres of volition is pointed  
to by the fact1 that electrical stimuli 
have no longer any effect upon them when
 the mental faculties of the animal are 
suspended by anaesthetics1 nor in the   
case of young animals where the mental  
faculties have not yet been sufficiently
 developed to admit of voluntary        
co-ordination among the muscles which   

are concerned4 ,on the whole1 then1 it  
is not improbable that on stimulating   
artificially these motor-centres of the 
brain1 a physiologist is actually       
playing from without1 and at his own    
pleasure1 upon the volitions of the     
animal4  ,turning1 now1 from this brief 
description of the structure and leading
 functions of the principal parts of the
 nervous system1 ,i propose to consider 
what we know about the molecular        
movements which go on in different parts
 of this system1 and which are concerned
 in all the processes of reflex         
adjustment1 sensation1 perception1      
emotion1 instinct1 thought1 and         
volition4  ,first of all1 the rate at   
which these molecular movements travel  
through a nerve has been measured1 and  
found to be about #ajj feet per second1 
or somewhat more than a mile a minute1  
in the nerves of a frog4 ,in the nerves 
of a mammal it is just about twice as   
fast2 so that if ,london were connected 
with ,new ,york by means of a mammalian 

nerve instead of an electric cable1 it  
would require nearly a whole day for a  
message to pass4  ,next1 the time has   
also been measured which is required by 
a nerve-centre to perform its part in a 
reflex action1 where no thought or      
consciousness is involved4 ,this time1  
in the case of the winking reflex1 and  
apart from the time required for the    
passage of the molecular waves up and   
down the sensory and motor nerves1 is   
about #a_/bj of a second4 ,such is the  
rate at which a nerve-centre conducts   
its operations when no consciousness or 
volition is involved4 ,but when         
consciousness and volition are involved1
 or when the cerebral hemispheres are   
called into play1 the time required is  
considerably greater4 ,for the          
operations on the part of the           
hemispheres which are comprised in      
perceiving a simple sensation 7such as  
an electrical shock7 and the volitional 
act of signalling the perception1 cannot
 be performed in less than #a_/ab of a  

second1 which is nearly twice as long as
 the time required by the lower         
nerve-centres for the performance of a  
reflex action4 ,other experiments prove 
that the more complex an act of         
perception1 the more time is required   
for its performance4 ,thus1 when the    
experiment is made to consist1 not      
merely in signalling a perception1 but  
in signalling one of two or more        
perceptions 7such as an electrical shock
 on one or other of the two hands1 which
 of five letters is suddenly exposed to 
view1 c471 a longer time is required for
 the more complex process of            
distinguishing which of the two or more 
expected stimuli is perceived1 and in   
determining which of the appropriate    
signals to make in response4 ,the time  
consumed by the cerebral hemispheres in 
meeting a 'dilemma' of this kind is from
 #a_/e to #a_/bj of a second longer than
 that which they consume in the case of 
a simpler perception4 ,therefore1       
whenever mental operations are          

concerned1 a relatively much greater    
time is required for a nerve-centre to  
perform its adjustments than when a     
merely mechanical or non-mental response
 is needed2 and the more complex the    
mental operation the more time is       
necessary4 ,such may be termed the      
physiology of deliberation4  ,so much1  
then1 for the rate at which molecular   
movements travel through nerves1 and the
 times which nerve-centres consume in   
performing their molecular adjustments4 
,we may next consider the researches    
which have been made within the last few
 months upon the rates of these         
movements themselves1 or the number of  
vibrations per second with which the    
particles of nervous matter oscillate4  
,if1 by means of a suitable apparatus1 a
 muscle is made to record its own       
contraction1 we find that during all the
 time it is in contraction1 it is       
under-going a vibratory movement at the 
rate of about nine pulsations per       
second4 ,what is the meaning of this    

movement8 ,the meaning is that the act  
of will in the brain1 which serves as a 
stimulus to the contraction of the      
muscle1 is accompanied by a vibratory   
movement in the grey matter of the      
brain2 that this movement is going on at
 the rate of nine pulsations per second2
 and that the muscle is giving a        
separate or distinct contraction in     
response to every one of these nervous  
pulsations4 ,that such is the true      
explanation of the rhythm in the muscle 
is proved by the fact that if1 instead  
of contracting a muscle by an act of the
 will1 it be contracted by means of a   
rapid series of electrical shocks       
playing upon its attached nerve1 the    
record then furnished shows a similar   
trembling going on in the muscle as in  
the previous case2 but the tremors of   
contraction are now no longer at the    
rate of nine per second3 they correspond
 beat for beat with the interruptions of
 the electrical current4 ,that is to    
say1 the muscle is responding separately

 to every separate stimulus which it    
receives through the nerve2 and further 
experiment shows that it is able thus to
 keep time with the separate shocks1    
even though these be made to follow one 
another so rapidly as #a1jjj per second4
 ,therefore we can have no doubt that   
the slow rhythm of nine per second under
 the influence of volitional            
stimulation1 represents the rate at     
which the muscle is receiving so many   
separate impulses from the brain3 the   
muscle is keeping time with the         
molecular vibrations going on in the    
cerebral hemispheres at the rate of nine
 beats per second4 ,careful tracings    
show that this rate cannot be increased 
by increasing the strength of the       
volitional stimulus2 but some           
individuals--and those usually who are  
of quickest intelligence--display a     
somewhat quicker rate of rhythm1 which  
may be as high as eleven per second4    
,moreover1 it is found that by          
stimulating with strychnine any of the  

centres of reflex action1 pretty nearly 
the same rate of rhythm is exhibited by 
the muscles thus thrown into            
contraction2 so that all the nerve-cells
 in the body are thus shown to have in  
their vibrations pretty nearly the same 
period1 and not to be able to vibrate   
with any other4 ,for no matter how      
rapidly the electrical shocks are       
allowed to play upon the grey matter of 
the cerebral hemispheres1 as            
distinguished from the nerve-trunks     
proceeding from them to the muscles1 the
 muscles always show the same rhythm of 
about nine beats per second3 the        
nerve-cells1 unlike the nerve-fibres1   
refuse to keep time with the electric   
shocks1 and will only respond to them by
 vibrating at their own intrinsic rate  
of nine beats per second4  ,thus much1  
then1 for the rate of molecular         
vibration which goes on in              
nerve-centres4 ,but the rate of such    
vibration which goes on in sensory and  
motor nerves may be very much more      

rapid4 ,for while a nerve-centre is only
 able to originate a vibration at the   
rate of about nine beats per second1 a  
motor-nerve1 as we have already seen1 is
 able to transmit a vibration of at     
least #a1jjj beats per second2 and a    
sensory nerve which at the surface of   
its expansion is able to respond        
differently to differences of musical   
pitch1 of temperature1 and even of      
colour1 is probably able to vibrate very
 much more rapidly even than this4 ,we  
are not1 indeed1 entitled to conclude   
that the nerves of special sense vibrate
 in actual unison1 or synchronize1 with 
these external sources of stimulation2  
but we are1 ,i think1 bound to conclude 
that they must vibrate in some numerical
 proportion to them 7else we should not 
perceive objective differences in sound1
 temperature1 or colour72 and even this 
implies that they are probably able to  
vibrate at some enormous rate4  ,with   
further reference to these molecular    
movements in sensory nerves1 the        

following important observation has been
 made--viz4 that there is a constant    
ratio between the amount of agitation   
produced in a sensory nerve1 and the    
intensity of the corresponding          
sensation4 ,this ratio is not a direct  
one4 ,as ,fechner states it1 ',sensation
 varies1 not as the stimulus1 but as the
 logarithm of the stimulus4' ,thus1 for 
instance1 if #a1jjj candles are all     
throwing their light upon the same      
screen1 we should require ten more      
candles to be added before our eyes     
could perceive any difference in the    
amount of illumination4 ,but if we begin
 with only #ajj candles shining upon the
 screen1 we should perceive an increase 
in the illumination by adding a single  
candle4 ,and what is true of sight is   
equally true of all the other senses3 if
 any stimulus is increased1 the smallest
 increase of sensation first occurs when
 the stimulus rises one per cent1 above 
its original intensity4 ,such being the 
law on the side of sensation1 suppose   

that we place upon the optic nerve of an
 animal the wires proceeding from a     
delicate galvanometer1 we find that     
every time we stimulate the eye with    
light1 the needle of the galvanometer   
moves1 showing electrical changes going 
on in the nerve1 caused by the molecular
 agitations4 ,now these electrical      
changes are found to vary in intensity  
with the intensity of the light used as 
a stimulus1 and they do so very nearly  
in accordance with the law of sensation 
just mentioned4 ,so we say that in      
sensation the cerebral hemispheres are1 
as it were1 acting the part of          
galvanometers in appreciating the amount
 of molecular change which is going on  
in sensory nerves2 and that they record 
their readings in the mind as faithfully
 as a galvanometer records its readings 
on the dial4         99       99        
99       99       99  ,hitherto we have 
been considering certain features in the
 physiology of nervous action1 so far as
 this can be appreciated by means of    

physiological instruments4 ,but we have 
just seen that the cerebral hemispheres 
may themselves be regarded as such      
instruments1 which record in our minds  
their readings of changes going on in   
our nerves4 ,hence1 when other          
physiological instruments fail us1 we   
may gain much additional insight        
touching the movements of nervous matter
 by attending to the thoughts and       
feelings of our own minds2 for these are
 so many indices of what is going on in 
the cerebral hemispheres4 ,i therefore  
propose next to contemplate the mind1   
considered thus as a physiological      
instrument4  ,the same scientific       
instinct which led ,hobbes so truly to  
anticipate the progress of physiology1  
led him not less truly to anticipate the
 progress of psychology4 ,for just as he
 was the first to enunciate the         
fundamental principle of nerve-action in
 the vibration of molecules1 so was he  
likewise the first to enunciate the     
fundamental principle of psychology in  

the association of ideas4 ,and the great
 advance of knowledge which has been    
made since his day with respect to both 
these principles1 entitles us to be much
 more confident than even he was that   
they are in some way intimately united4 
,moreover1 the manner in which they are 
so united we have begun clearly to      
understand4 ,for we know from our study 
of nerve-action in general1 that when   
once a wave of invisible or molecular   
movement passes through any line of     
nerve-structure1 it leaves behind it a  
change in the structure such that it is 
afterwards more easy for a similar wave1
 when started from the same point1 to   
pursue the same course4 ,or1 to adopt a 
simile from ,hobbes1 just as water upon 
a table flows most readily in the lines 
which have been wetted by a previous    
flow1 so the invisible waves of         
nerve-action pass most readily in the   
lines of a previous passage4 ,this is   
the reason why in any exercise requiring
 muscular co-ordination1 or dexterity1  

'practice makes perfect3' the           
nerve-centres concerned learn to perform
 their work by frequently repeating it1 
because in this way the needful lines of
 wave-movement in the structure of the  
nerve-centre are rendered more and more 
permeable by use4 ,now we have seen that
 in the nerve-centres called the        
cerebral hemispheres1 wave-movement of  
this kind is accompanied with feeling4  
,changes of consciousness follow step by
 step these waves of movement in the    
brain1 and therefore when on two        
successive occasions the waves of       
movement pursue the same pathway in the 
brain1 they are attended with a         
succession of the same ideas in the     
mind4 ,thus we see that the tendency of 
ideas to recur in the same order as that
 in which they have previously occurred1
 is merely an obverse expression of the 
fact that lines of wave-movement in the 
brain become more and more permeable by 
use4 ,so it comes that a child can learn
 its lessons by frequently repeating    

them2 so it is that all our knowledge is
 accumulated2 and so it is that all our 
thinking is conducted4  ,a wholly new   
field of inquiry is thus opened up4 ,by 
using our own consciousness as a        
physiological instrument of the greatest
 delicacy1 we are able to learn a great 
deal about the dynamics of brain-action 
concerning which we should otherwise    
remain in total ignorance4 ,but the     
field of inquiry thus opened up is too  
large for me to enter upon to-day4 ,i   
will therefore merely observe1 in       
general terms1 that although we are     
still very far from understanding the   
operations of the brain in thought1     
there can be no longer any question that
 in these operations of the brain we    
have what ,i may term the objective     
machinery of thought4 ',not every       
thought to every thought succeeds       
indifferently1' said ,hobbes4 ,starting 
from this fact1 modern physiology has   
clearly shown why it is a fact2 and     
looking to the astonishing rate at which

 the science of physiology is now       
advancing1 ,i think we may fairly expect
 that within a time less remote than the
 two centuries which now separate us    
from ,hobbes1 the course of ideas in a  
given train of thought will admit of    
having its footsteps tracked in the     
corresponding pathways of the brain4 ,be
 this1 however1 as it may1 even now we  
know enough to say that1 whether or not 
these footsteps will ever admit of being
 thus tracked in detail1 they are all   
certainly present in the cerebral       
structures of each one of us4 ,what we  
know on the side of mind as logical     
sequence1 is on the side of the nervous 
system nothing more than a passage of   
nervous energy through one series of    
cells and fibres rather than through    
another3 what we recognize as truth is  
merely the fact of the brain vibrating  
in tune with ,nature4         99        
99       99       99       99  ,such    
being the intimate relation between     
nerve-action and mind-action1 it has    

become the scientifically orthodox      
teaching that the two stand to one      
another in the relation of cause to     
effect4 ,one of the most distinguished  
of my predecessors in this place1 the   
,president of the ,royal ,society1 has  
said in one of the most celebrated of   
his lectures3--',we have as much reason 
for regarding the mode of motion of the 
nervous system as the cause of the state
 of consciousness1 as we have for       
regarding any event as the cause of     
another4' ,and1 by way of perfectly     
logical deduction from this statement1  
,professor ,huxley argues that thought  
and feeling have nothing whatever to do 
with determining action3 they are merely
 the bye-products of cerebration1 or1 as
 he expresses it1 the indices of changes
 which are going on in the brain4 ,under
 this view we are all what he terms     
conscious automata1 or machines which   
happen1 as it were by chance1 to be     
conscious of some of their own          
movements4 ,but the consciousness is    

altogether adventitious1 and bears the  
same ineffectual relation to the        
activity of the brain as a steam-whistle
 bears to the activity of a locomotive1 
or the striking of a clock to the       
time-keeping adjustments of the         
clock-work4 ,here1 again1 we meet with  
an echo of ,hobbes1 who opens his work  
on the ,commonwealth with these words3--
       ',nature1 the art whereby ,god   
hath made and governs the world1 is by  
the art of man1 as in many other things1
 in this also imitated1      that it can
 make an artificial animal4 ,for seeing 
life is but a      motion of limbs1 the 
beginning whereof is in the principal   
part      within2 why may we not say1   
that all automata 7engines that move    
themselves by springs and wheels as doth
 a watch71 have an      artificial life8
 ,for what is the heart1 but a spring2  
and the      nerves1 but so many        
strings2 and the joints1 but so many    
wheels1 giving motion to the whole body1
 such as was intended by      the       

artificer#b8'  ,now1 this theory of     
conscious automatism is not merely a    
legitimate outcome of the theory that   
nervous changes are the causes of mental
 changes1 but it is logically the only  
possible outcome4 ,nor do ,i see any way
 in which this theory can be fought on  
grounds of physiology4 ,if we persist in
 regarding the association between brain
 and thought exclusively from a         
physiological point of view1 we must of 
necessity be materialists4 ,further1 so 
far as we are physiologists our         
materialism can do us no harm4 ,on the  
contrary1 it is to us of the utmost     
service1 as at once the simplest        
physiological explanation of facts      
already known1 and the best working     
hypothesis to guide us in our further   
researches4 ,but it does not follow from
 this that the theory of materialism is 
true4 ,the bells of ,st4 ,mary's over   
the way always ring for a quarter of an 
hour before the ,university sermon2 yet 
the ringing of the bells is not the     

cause of the sermon1 although1 as long  
as the association remains constant1    
there would be no harm in assuming1 for 
any practical purposes1 that it is so4  
,but just as we should be wrong in      
concluding1 if we did not happen to know
 so much about the matter as we do1 that
 the ,university sermon is produced by  
the vibration of bells in the tower of  
,st4 ,mary's ,church1 so we may be      
similarly wrong if we were definitely to
 conclude that the sermon is produced by
 the vibration of a number of little    
nerve-cells in the brain of the         
preacher4  ,now1 if time permitted1 and 
if ,i supposed that you would all care  
to go with me into matters of some      
abstruseness1 ,i could certainly prove  
that whatever the connexion between body
 and mind may be1 we have the best      
possible reasons for concluding that it 
is not a causal connexion4 ,these       
reasons are1 of course1                 
extra-physiological2 but they are not on
 this account less conclusive4 ,within  

the limits of a lecture1 however1 ,i can
 only undertake to give an outline      
sketch of what ,i take to be the        
overwhelming argument against           
materialism4  ,we have first the general
 fact that all our knowledge of motion1 
and so of matter1 is merely a knowledge 
of the modifications of mind4 ,that is  
to say1 all our knowledge of the        
external world--including the knowledge 
of our own brains--is merely a knowledge
 of our own mental states4 ,let it be   
observed that we do not even require to 
go so far as the irrefutable position of
 ,berkeley1 that the existence of an    
external world without the medium of    
mind1 or of being without knowing1 is   
inconceivable4 ,it is enough to take our
 stand on a lower level of abstraction1 
and to say that whether or not an       
external world can exist apart from mind
 in any absolute or inconceivable sense1
 at any rate it cannot do so for us4 ,we
 cannot think any of the facts of       
external nature without presupposing the

 existence of a mind which thinks them2 
and therefore1 so far at least as we are
 concerned1 mind is necessarily prior to
 everything else4 ,it is for us the only
 mode of existence which is real in its 
own right2 and to it1 as to a standard1 
all other modes of existence which may  
be inferred must be referred4           
,therefore1 if we say that mind is a    
function of motion1 we are only saying1 
in somewhat confused terminology1 that  
mind is a function of itself4  ,such1   
then1 ,i take to be a general refutation
 of materialism4 ,to use but a mild     
epithet1 we must conclude that the      
theory is unphilosophical1 seeing that  
it assumes one thing to be produced by  
another thing1 in spite of an obvious   
demonstration that the alleged effect is
 necessarily prior to its cause4 ,such1 
,i say1 is a general refutation of      
materialism4 ,but this is far from being
 all4 ',motion1' says ,hobbes1          
'produceth nothing but motion2' and yet 
he immediately proceeds to assume that  

in the case of the brain it produces1   
not only motion1 but mind4 ,he was      
perfectly right in saying that with     
respect to its movements the animal body
 resembles an engine or a watch2 and if 
he had been acquainted with the products
 of higher evolution in watch-making1 he
 might with full propriety have argued1 
for instance1 that in the compensating  
balance1 whereby a watch adjusts its own
 movements in adaptation to external    
changes of temperature1 a watch is      
exhibiting the mechanical aspect of     
volition4 ,and1 similarly1 it is perhaps
 possible to conceive that the          
principles of mechanism might be more   
and more extended in their effects1     
until1 in so marvellously perfected a   
structure as the human brain1 all the   
voluntary movements of the body might be
 originated in the same mechanical      
manner as are the compensating movements
 of a watch2 for this1 indeed1 as we    
have seen1 is no more than happens in   
the case of all the nerve-centres other 

than the cerebral hemispheres4 ,if this 
were so1 motion would be producing      
nothing but motion1 and upon the subject
 of brain-action there would be nothing 
further to say4 ,without consciousness  
,i should be delivering this lecture2   
without consciousness you would be      
hearing it2 and all the busy brains in  
this ,university would be conducting    
their researches1 or preparing for their
 examinations1 mindlessly4 ,strange as  
such a state of things might be1 still  
motion would be producing nothing but   
motion2 and1 therefore1 if there were   
any mind to contemplate the facts1 it   
would encounter no philosophical        
paradox3 it would merely have to        
conclude that such were the astonishing 
possibilities of mechanism4 ,but1 as the
 facts actually stand1 we find that this
 is not the case4 ,we find1 indeed1 that
 up to a certain level of complexity    
mechanism alone is able to perform all  
the compensations or adjustments which  
are performed by the animal body2 but we

 also find that beyond this level such  
compensations or adjustments are never  
performed without the intervention of   
consciousness4 ,therefore1 the theory of
 automatism has to meet the unanswerable
 question--,how is it that in the       
machinery of the brain motion produces  
this something which is not motion8     
,science has now definitely proved the  
correlation of all the forces2 and this 
means that if any kind of motion could  
produce anything else that is not       
motion1 it would be producing that which
 science would be bound to regard as in 
the strictest sense of the word a       
miracle4 ,therefore1 if we are to take  
our stand upon science--and this is what
 materialism professes to do--we are    
logically bound to conclude1 not merely 
that the evidence of causation from body
 to mind is not so cogent as that of    
causation in any other case1 but that in
 this particular case causation may be  
proved1 again in the strictest sense of 
the term1 a physical impossibility4  ,to

 adduce only one other consideration4   
,apart from all that ,i have said1 is it
 not in itself a strikingly suggestive  
fact that consciousness only1 yet       
always1 appears upon the scene when the 
adjustive actions of any animal body    
rise above the certain level of         
intricacy to which ,i have alluded8     
,surely this large and general fact     
points with irresistible force to the   
conclusion1 that in the performance of  
these more complex adjustments1         
consciousness--or the power of feeling  
and the power of willing--is of some    
use4 ,assuredly on the principles of    
evolution1 which materialists at all    
events cannot afford to disregard1 it   
would be a wholly anomalous fact that so
 wide and important a class of faculties
 as those of mind should have become    
developed in constantly ascending       
degrees throughout the animal kingdom1  
if they were entirely without use to    
animals4 ,and1 be it observed1 this     
consideration holds good whatever views 

we may happen to entertain upon the     
special theory of natural selection4    
,for the consideration stands upon the  
general fact that all the organs and    
functions of animals are of use to      
animals3 we never meet1 on any large or 
general scale1 with organs and functions
 which are wholly adventitious4 ,is it  
to be supposed that this general        
principle fails just where its presence 
is most required1 and that the highest  
functions of the highest organs of the  
highest animals stand out of analogy    
with all other functions in being       
themselves functionless8 ,to this       
question ,i1 for one1 can only answer1  
and answer unequivocally1 ,no4 ,as a    
rational being who waits to take a wider
 view of the facts than that which is   
open to the one line of research pursued
 by the physiologist1 ,i am forced to   
conclude that not without a reason does 
mind exist in the frame of things2 and  
that apart from the activity of mind1   
whereby motion is related to that which 

is not motion1 this planet could never  
have held the wonderful being1 who in   
multiplying has replenished the earth   
and subdued it--holding dominion over   
the fish of the sea1 and over the fowl  
of the air1 and over every living thing 
that moveth4  ,what1 then1 shall we say 
touching this mysterious union of mind  
and motion8 ,having found it physically 
impossible that there should be a causal
 connexion proceeding from motion to    
mind1 shall we try to reverse the terms1
 and suppose a causal connexion         
proceeding from mind to motion8 ,this is
 the oldest and still the most popular  
theory--the theory of spiritualism4     
,and1 no doubt1 in one important respect
 it is less unphilosophical than the    
opposite theory of materialism4 ,for    
spiritualism supposes the causation to  
proceed from that which is the source of
 our idea of causality--the mind3 not   
from that into which this idea has been 
read--the brain4 ,therefore1 if         
causation were to be accepted as a      

possibility either way1 it would be less
 unreasonable to suppose mental changes 
the causes of material changes than vice
 versa2 for we should then at least be  
starting from the basis of immediate    
knowledge1 instead of from the          
reflection of that knowledge in what we 
call the external world4 ,seeing that   
the external world is known to us only  
as motion1 it is logically impossible   
for the mind to infer its own causation 
from the external world2 for this would 
be to infer that it is an effect of     
motion1 which would be the same as      
saying that it is an effect of its own  
knowledge2 and this would be absurd4    
,but1 on the other hand1 it is not thus 
logically impossible for the mind to    
infer that it may be the cause of some  
of its own knowledge1 or1 in other      
words1 that it may have in some measure 
the power of producing what it knows as 
motion4 ,and when the mind does infer   
this1 no logic on earth is able to touch
 the inference2 the position of pure    

idealism is beyond the reach of         
argument4 ,nevertheless1 it is opposed  
to the whole momentum of science4 ,for  
if mind is supposed1 on no matter how   
small a scale1 to be a cause of motion1 
the fundamental axiom of science is     
impugned4 ,this fundamental axiom is    
that energy can neither be created nor  
destroyed--that just as motion can      
produce nothing but motion1 so1         
conversely1 motion can be produced by   
nothing but motion4 ,regarded1          
therefore1 from the stand-point of      
physical science1 the theory of         
spiritualism is in precisely the same   
case as the theory of materialism3 that 
is to say1 if the supposed causation    
takes place1 it can only be supposed to 
do so by way of miracle4  ,and this is a
 conclusion which the more clear-sighted
 of the idealists have expressly        
recognized4 ,that subtle and most       
entertaining thinker1 for example1 the  
late ,professor ,green of ,oxford1 has  
said that the self-conscious volition of

 man 'does not consist in a series of   
natural events1 444 is not natural in   
the ordinary sense of that term2 not    
natural at any rate in any sense in     
which naturalness would imply its       
determination by antecedent events1 or  
by conditions of which it is not itself 
the source4'  ,thus the theory of       
spiritualism1 although not directly     
refutable by any process of logic1 is   
certainly enfeebled by its collision    
with the instincts of physical science4 
,in necessarily holding the facts of    
consciousness and volition              
super-natural1 extra-natural1 or        
non-natural1 the theory is opposed to   
the principle of continuity4            
,spiritualism being thus unsatisfactory1
 and materialism impossible1 is there   
yet any third hypothesis in which we may
 hope to find intellectual rest8 ,in my 
opinion there is4 ,if we unite in a     
higher synthesis the elements both of   
spiritualism and of materialism1 we     
obtain a product which satisfies every  

fact of feeling on the one hand1 and of 
observation on the other4 ,the manner in
 which this synthesis may be effected is
 perfectly simple4 ,we have only to     
suppose that the antithesis between mind
 and motion--subject and object--is     
itself phenomenal or apparent3 not      
absolute or real4 ,we have only to      
suppose that the seeming duality is     
relative to our modes of apprehension2  
and1 therefore1 that any change taking  
place in the mind1 and any corresponding
 change taking place in the brain1 are  
really not two changes1 but one change4 
,when a violin is played upon we hear a 
musical sound1 and at the same time we  
see a vibration of the strings4         
,relatively to our consciousness1       
therefore1 we have here two sets of     
changes1 which appear to be very        
different in kind2 yet we know that in  
an absolute sense they are one and the  
same3 we know that the diversity in     
consciousness is created only by the    
difference in our modes of perceiving   

the same event--whether we see or       
whether we hear the vibration of the    
strings4 ,similarly1 we may suppose that
 a vibration of nerve-strings and a     
process of thought are really one and   
the same event1 which is dual or diverse
 only in relation to our modes of       
perceiving it4  ,the great advantage of 
this theory is that it supposes only one
 stream of causation1 in which both mind
 and motion are simultaneously          
concerned4 ,the theory1 therefore1      
escapes all the difficulties and        
contradictions with which both          
spiritualism and materialism are beset4 
,thus1 motion is supposed to be         
producing nothing but motion2           
mind-changes nothing but mind-changes3  
both producing both simultaneously1     
neither could be what it is without the 
other1 because without the other neither
 could be the cause which in fact it is4
 ,impossible1 therefore1 is the         
supposition of the materialist that     
consciousness is adventitious1 or that  

in the absence of mind changes of brain 
could be what they are2 for it belongs  
to the very causation of these changes  
that they should have a mental side4    
,the use of mind to animals is thus     
rendered apparent2 for intelligent      
volition is thus shown to be a true     
cause of adjustive movement1 in that the
 cerebration which it involves could not
 otherwise be possible3 the causation   
would not otherwise be complete4  ,a    
simple illustration may serve at once to
 render this doctrine more easily       
intelligible1 and to show that1 if      
accepted1 the doctrine1 as it appears to
 me1 terminates the otherwise           
interminable controversy on the freedom 
of the will4  ,in an ,edison lamp the   
light which is emitted from the burner  
may be said indifferently to be caused  
by the number of vibrations per second  
going on in the carbon1 or by the       
temperature of the carbon2 for this rate
 of vibration could not take place in   
the carbon without constituting that    

degree of temperature which affects our 
eyes as luminous4 ,similarly1 a train of
 thought may be said indifferently to be
 caused by brain-action or by           
mind-action2 for1 ex hypothesi1 the one 
could not take place without the other4 
,now1 when we contemplate the phenomena 
of volition by themselves1 it is as     
though we were contemplating the        
phenomena of light by themselves3       
volition is produced by mind in brain1  
just as light is produced by temperature
 in carbon4 ,and just as we may         
correctly speak of light as the cause1  
say1 of a photograph1 so we may         
correctly speak of volition as the cause
 of bodily movement4 ,that particular   
kind of physical activity which takes   
place in the carbon could not take place
 without the light which causes a       
photograph2 and1 similarly1 that        
particular kind of physical activity    
which takes place in the brain could not
 take place without the volition which  
causes a bodily movement4 ,so that      

volition is as truly a cause of bodily  
movement as is the physical activity of 
the brain2 seeing that1 in an absolute  
sense1 the cause is one and the same4   
,but if we once clearly perceive that   
what in a relative sense we know as     
volition is1 in a similar sense1 the    
cause of bodily movement1 we terminate  
the question touching the freedom of the
 will4 ,for this question in its last   
resort--and apart from the ambiguity    
which has been thrown around it by some 
of our metaphysicians--is merely the    
question whether the will is to be      
regarded as a cause of ,nature4 ,and the
 theory which we have now before us     
sanctions the doctrine that it may be so
 regarded1 if only we remember that its 
causal activity depends upon its        
identity with the obverse aspect known  
as cerebration1 without which identity  
in apparent duality neither volition nor
 cerebration could be the cause which in
 fact they are4 ,it thus becomes a mere 
matter of phraseology whether we speak  

of the will determining1 or being       
determined by1 changes going on in the  
external world2 just as it is but a     
matter of phraseology whether we speak  
of temperature determining1 or being    
determined by1 molecular vibration4 ,all
 the requirements alike of the free-will
 and of the bond-will hypotheses are    
thus satisfied by a synthesis which     
comprises them both4 ,on the one hand1  
it would be as impossible for an        
unconscious automaton to do the work or 
to perform the adjustments of a         
conscious agent1 as it would be for an  
,edison lamp to give out light and cause
 a photograph when not heated by an     
electric current4 ,on the other hand1 it
 would be as impossible for the will to 
originate bodily movement without the   
occurrence of a strictly physical       
process of cerebration1 as it would be  
for light to shine in an ,edison lamp   
which had been deprived of its          
carbon-burner4  ,it may be said of this 
theory that it is highly speculative1   

not verifiable by any possible          
experiment1 and therefore at best is but
 a mere guess4 ,all which is1 no doubt1 
perfectly true2 but1 on the other hand1 
we must remember that this theory comes 
to us as the only one which is logically
 possible1 and at the same time         
competent to satisfy the facts alike of 
the outer and of the inner world4 ,it is
 a speculation in the sense of not being
 verifiable by experiment2 but it has   
much more value than ordinarily attaches
 to an unverifiable speculation1 in that
 there is really no alternative         
hypothesis to be considered3 if we      
choose to call it a guess1 we must at   
the same time remember it is a guess    
where it does not appear that any other 
is open4 ,once more to quote ,hobbes1   
who1 as we have seen1 was himself a     
remarkable instance of what he here     
says3 ',the best prophet naturally is   
the best guesser2 and the best guesser1 
he that is most versed and studied in   
the matters he guesses at4' ,in this    

case1 therefore1 the best prophet is not
 the physiologist1 whose guess ends in  
materialism2 nor the purely mental      
philosopher1 whose guess ends in        
spiritualism2 but rather the man who1   
being 'versed and studied' in all the   
facts appertaining to both sides of the 
matter1 ends in the only alternative    
guess which remains open4 ,and if that  
most troublesome individual1 the 'plain 
man' of ,locke1 should say it seems at  
least opposed to common sense to suppose
 that there is anything in a burning    
candle or a rolling billiard-ball       
substantially the same as mind1 the     
answer is that if he could look into my 
brain at this moment he would see       
nothing there but motion of molecules1  
or motion of masses2 and apart from the 
accident of my being able to tell him   
so1 his 'common sense' could never have 
divined that these motions in my brain  
are concerned in the genesis of my      
spoken thoughts4         99       99    
99       99       99  ,it is obvious    

that from this hypothesis as to the     
substantial identity of mind and motion1
 two important questions arise2 and ,i  
feel that some reference to these       
questions is in present circumstances   
forced upon me1 because they have both  
been considered in precisely the same   
connexion by one of the most powerful   
intellects that was ever sent out into  
the world by this ,university4 ,i mean  
the late ,professor ,clifford4 ,as my   
intimate and valued friend1 ,i desire to
 mention his name in this place with all
 the affection1 as well as with all the 
admiration1 to which ,i well know it is 
so fully entitled2 and if ,i appear to  
mention him only in order to disagree   
with him1 this is only because ,i know  
equally well that in his large and      
magnanimous thought differences of      
philosophical opinion were never felt to
 weaken the bonds of friendship4  ,in   
his well-known lecture on ,body and     
,mind1 ,professor ,clifford adopted the 
hypothesis of identity which we are now 

considering1 and from it was led to the 
conclusion that if in the case of       
cerebral processes motion is one with   
mind1 the same must be true of motion   
wherever it occurs2 or1 as he expressed 
it subsequently1 the whole universe must
 be made of mind-stuff4 ,but in his     
view1 although matter in motion presents
 what may be termed the raw material of 
mind1 it is only in the highly          
elaborated constitution of the human    
brain that this raw material is         
sufficiently wrought up to yield a      
self-conscious personality4 ,hence the  
dissolution of a human brain implies the
 dissolution of a human mind2 and hence 
also the universe1 although entirely    
composed of mind-stuff1 is itself       
mindless4 ,now1 all ,i have to say about
 these two deductions is this--they do  
not necessarily follow from the theory  
which is before us4 ,in holding that the
 mind of man perishes with his body1 and
 that above the mind of man there is no 
other1 ,clifford may have been right1 or

 may have been wrong4 ,i am not here to 
discuss at length any questions of such 
supreme importance4 ,but ,i feel that ,i
 am here to insist upon the one point   
which is immediately connected with my  
subject2 and this is1 that whether or   
not ,clifford was right in his          
conclusions1 these conclusions certainly
 did not follow by way of any logical   
sequence from his premises4 ,because    
within the limits of human experience   
mind is only known as associated with   
brain1 it clearly does not follow that  
mind cannot exist in any other mode4 ,it
 does not even follow that any          
probability upon this matter can be thus
 established4 ,the basis of analogy on  
which ,clifford sought to rear an       
inference of cosmical extent1 was       
restricted to the one instance of mind  
as known upon one planet2 and1          
therefore1 it is hard to imagine a more 
precarious use of that precarious method
 which is called by logicians simple    
enumeration4 ,indeed1 even for what it  

is worth1 the inference may be pointed  
with quite as much effect in precisely  
the opposite direction4 ,for we have    
seen how little it is that we understand
 of the one mode in which we certainly  
know that mind does exist2 and if from  
this little we feel impelled to conclude
 that there is a mode of mind which is  
not restricted to brain1 but            
co-extensive with motion1 is            
consubstantial and co-eternal with all  
that was1 and is1 and is to come2 have  
we not at least a suggestion1 that high 
as the heavens are above the earth1 so  
high above our thoughts may be the      
thoughts of such a mind as this8 ,i     
offer no opinion upon the question      
whether the general order of ,nature    
does not require some one explanatory   
cause2 nor upon the question whether the
 mind of man itself does not point to   
something kindred in the self-existing  
origin of things4 ,i am not concerned to
 argue any point upon which ,i feel that
 opinions may legitimately differ4 ,i am

 only concerned to show that1 in so far 
as any deductions can be drawn from the 
theory which is before us1 they make at 
least as much against as in favour of   
the cosmical conclusions arrived at by  
,clifford4  ,on ,february #ag1 in the   
year #afjj1 when the streets of ,rome   
were thronged with pilgrims from all the
 quarters of ,christendom1 while no less
 than fifty cardinals were congregated  
for the ,jubilee2 into the densely      
crowded ,campo di ,fiori a man was led  
to the stake1 where1 'silent and        
self-sustained1' before the eyes of all 
nations1 he perished in the flames4     
,that death was the death of a martyr3  
it was met voluntarily in attestation of
 truth4 ,but most noble of all the noble
 army to which he belonged1 the name of 
that man is written large in history1 as
 the name of one who had fortitude to   
die1 not in the cause of religious      
belief1 but in that of scientific       
conviction4 ,for why did ,bruno suffer8 
,he suffered1 as we all know1 because he

 refused to recant his persuasion of the
 truth of the ,copernican theory4 ,why1 
then1 do ,i adduce the name of ,bruno at
 the close of this lecture8 ,i do so    
because1 as far as ,i have been able to 
ascertain1 he was the first clearly to  
enunciate the monistic theory of things 
to which the consideration of my subject
 has conducted us4 ,this theory--or that
 as to the substantial identity of mind 
and motion--was afterwards espoused1 in 
different guises1 by sundry other       
writers2 but to ,bruno belongs the merit
 of its original publication1 and it was
 partly for his adherence to this       
publication that he died4 ,to this day  
,bruno is ordinarily termed a pantheist1
 and his theory1 which in the light of  
much fuller knowledge ,i am advocating1 
,pantheism4 ,i do not care to consider a
 difference of terms1 where the only    
distinction resides in so unintelligible
 an idea as that of the creation of     
substance4 ,it is more to the purpose to
 observe that in the mind of its first  

originator--and this a mind which was   
sufficiently clear in its thought to die
 for its perception of astronomical     
truth--the theory of ,pantheism was but 
a sublime extension of the then         
contracted views of ,theism4 ,and ,i    
think that we of to-day1 when we look to
 the teaching of this martyr of science1
 will find that in his theory alone do  
we meet with what ,i may term a         
philosophically adequate conception of  
,deity4 ,if the advance of natural      
science is now steadily leading us to   
the conclusion that there is no motion  
without mind1 must we not see how the   
independent conclusion of mental science
 is thus independently confirmed--the   
conclusion1 ,i mean1 that there is no   
being without knowing8 ,to me1 at least1
 it does appear that the time has come  
when we may begin1 as it were in a      
dawning light1 to see that the study of 
,nature and the study of ,mind are      
meeting upon this greatest of possible  
truths4 ,and if this is the case--if    

there is no motion without mind1 no     
being without knowing--shall we infer1  
with ,clifford1 that universal being is 
mindless1 or answer with a dogmatic     
negative that most stupendous of        
questions--,is there knowledge with the 
,most ,high8 ,if there is no motion     
without mind1 no being without knowing1 
may we not rather infer1 with ,bruno1   
that it is in the medium of mind1 and in
 the medium of knowledge1 we live1 and  
move1 and have our being8  ,this1 ,i    
think1 is the direction in which the    
inference points1 if we are careful to  
set the logical conditions with complete
 impartiality4 ,but the ulterior        
question remains1 whether1 so far as    
science is concerned1 it is here        
possible to point any inference at all3 
the whole orbit of human knowledge may  
be too narrow to afford a parallax for  
measurements so vast4 ,yet even here1 if
 it be true that the voice of science   
must thus of necessity speak the        
language of agnosticism1 at least let us

 see to it that the language is pure2   
let us not tolerate any barbarisms      
introduced from the side of aggressive  
dogma4 ,so shall we find that this new  
grammar of thought does not admit of any
 constructions radically opposed to more
 venerable ways of thinking2 even if we 
do not find that the often-quoted words 
of its earliest formulator apply with   
special force to its latest             
dialects--that if a little knowledge of 
physiology and a little knowledge of    
psychology dispose men to atheism1 a    
deeper knowledge of both1 and1 still    
more1 a deeper thought upon their       
relations to one another1 will lead men 
back to some form of religion1 which1 if
 it be more vague1 may also be more     
worthy than that of earlier days4       
',it is a beauteous evening1 calm and   
free2     ,the holy time is quiet as a  
nun1     ,breathless with adoration2 the
 broad sun     ,is sinking down in its  
tranquillity2     ,the gentleness of    
heaven is on the sea3     ,listen6 the  

mighty being is awake1     ,and doth    
with his eternal motion make     ,a     
sound like thunder1 everlastingly4'     
,,footnotes3  ,footnote #a3 ,leviathan1 
pt4 i4 chaps1 i4 and vi4  ,footnote #b3 
,leviathan1 ,introduction4     ,,monism 
',das ,ich ist nicht aus ,leib und      
,seele zusammengesetzt1 sondern es      
ist eine bestimmte ,entwicklungsstufe   
des ,wesens1 das von      verschiedenem 
,standpunkt betrachtet in koerperliches 
und geistiges      ,dasein              
auseinanderfaellt4'--,wundt1            
,vorlesungen ueber die                  
,menschen-und ,thierseele1 i4 #bic4     
,,introduction4   ,in no respect has the
 progress of physical science exercised 
a more profound influence upon          
philosophical thought than it has by    
proving an apparently quantitative      
relation between material changes and   
mental changes4 ,it has always been     
known that there is qualitative         
relation4 ,even long before mankind     
suspected that the brain was in any way 

connected with thought1 it was well     
understood that alcohol and other       
poisons exercised their sundry          
influences on the mind in virtue of     
influences which they exercised upon the
 body2 and even the lowest savages must 
always have been aware that a blow on   
the head is followed by insensibility4  
,but it was not until the rise of       
,physiology that this qualitative       
relation between corporeal changes and  
mental changes was gradually found to be
 a quantitative one--or that every      
particular change of mind had an exact  
and invariable counterpart in some      
particular change of body4 ,it is       
needless for me to detail the successive
 steps in the long course of            
physiological discovery whereby this    
great fact has been established2 it is  
enough to say that the fact is          
established to the satisfaction of every
 physiologist4  ,now1 when once the     
relation between material changes and   
mental changes has been thus recognized 

as quantitative--or1 which is the same  
thing1 when once the association has    
been recognized as both invariable and  
exact--there arises the question as to  
how this relation is to be explained4   
,formally considered--or considered as a
 matter of logical statement            
irrespective of the relative            
probabilities which they may present1   
either to the minds of different        
individuals or to the general           
intelligence of the race--it appears to 
me that the possible hypotheses are here
 seven in number4       ,i4 ,the mental 
changes may cause the material changes4 
,,ii4 ,the material changes may cause   
the mental changes4       ,,iii4 ,there 
may be no causation either way1 because 
the association      may be only a      
phenomenal association--the two         
apparently diverse      classes of      
phenomena being really one and the same4
       ,,iv4 ,there may be no causation 
either way1 because the association     
may be due to a harmony pre-established 

by a superior mind4       ,v4 ,there may
 be no causation either way1 because the
 association      may always be due to  
chance4       ,,vi4 ,there may be no    
causation either way1 because the       
material      order may not have any    
real existence at all1 being merely an  
ideal      creation of the mental order4
       ,,vii4 ,whether or not there be  
any causation either way1 the           
association may be one which it is      
necessarily beyond the power of      the
 human mind to explain4  ,so far as ,i  
can see1 this list of possible answers  
to the question before us is exhaustive4
 ,i will next show why1 in my opinion1  
the last four of them may be excluded in
 limine4  ,the suggestion of            
pre-established harmony 7,,iv7 merely   
postpones the question3 it assumes a    
higher mind as adjusting                
correspondencies between known minds and
 animal bodies with respect to the      
activities of each2 and1 therefore1 it  
either leaves untouched the ultimate    

question concerning the relation of mind
 7as such7 to matter1 or else it answers
 this question in terms of spiritualism 
7,i74  ,the suggestion of chance 7,v7 is
 effectually excluded by the doctrine of
 chances3 even in any one individual    
mind1 the association between mental    
changes and material changes is much too
 intimate1 constant1 and detailed to    
admit of any one reasonably supposing   
that it can be due only to chance4  ,the
 suggestion of pure idealism 7,,vi7     
ultimately implies that the thinking    
,ego is itself the sole existence--a    
position which cannot1 indeed1 be turned
 by any assault of logic2 but one which 
is nevertheless too obviously opposed to
 common sense to admit of any serious   
defence2 its immunity from direct attack
 arises only from the gratuitous nature 
of its challenge to prove a negative    
7namely1 that the thinking ,ego is not  
the sole existence71 and this a negative
 which is necessarily beyond the region 
of proof4  ,lastly1 the suggestion that 

the problem is necessarily insoluble    
7,,vii7 does not deserve to be regarded 
as an hypothesis at all2 for to suppose 
that the problem is necessarily         
insoluble is merely to exclude the      
supposition of there being any          
hypothesis available4  ,in view of these
 several considerations1 it appears to  
me that1 although in a formal sense we  
may say there are altogether seven      
possible answers to the question before 
us1 in reality1 or for the purposes of  
practical discussion1 there are nowadays
 but three--namely those which head the 
above list1 and which ,i will now       
proceed to consider4  ,i have named     
these three hypotheses in the order of  
their appearance during the history of  
philosophical thought4 ,the earliest is 
the spiritualistic4 ,as far back as we  
can trace the conceptions of primitive  
man1 we meet with an unquestioning      
belief that it is his spirit which      
animates his body2 and1 starting from   
this belief as explanatory of the       

movements of his own body1 he readily   
attributes movements elsewhere to       
analogous agencies--the theory of       
animism in ,nature thus becoming the    
universal theory in all early stages of 
culture4 ,it also appears to be the     
theory most natural to our own children 
during the early years of their dawning 
intelligence1 and would doubtless       
continue through life in the case of    
every individual human being1 were he   
not subsequently instructed in the      
reasons which have led to its rejection 
by many other members of his race4      
,these reasons1 as already observed1    
have been furnished in their entirety   
only within comparatively recent times2 
not until ,physiology was able to prove 
how intimate is the association between 
cerebral processes and mental processes 
did it become possible for materialism  
to turn the tables upon spiritualism1 by
 simply inverting the hypothesis4       
,lastly1 although the theory of ,monism 
7,,iii7 may be traced back at least as  

far as the pantheistic thought of       
,buddhism1 it there had reference to    
theology as distinguished from          
psychology4 ,and even as presented in   
the writings of ,bruno1 ,spinoza1 and   
other so-called monists prior to the    
present century1 the hypothesis         
necessarily lacked completeness on      
account of the absence of knowledge     
afterwards supplied by physiology4 ,for 
,monism1 in the sense of this term as ,i
 shall use it1 may be metaphorically    
regarded as the child of the two        
pre-existing theories1 ,spiritualism and
 ,materialism4 ,the birth of this child 
was necessarily impossible before both  
its parents had reached mature age4 ,on 
the one hand it was necessary that the  
theory of ,spiritualism should have     
outgrown its infancy as ,animism1 its   
childhood as ,polytheism1 before it     
entered upon its youth as               
,monotheism--or before it was able to   
supply material for the conception of   
,monism as a theory of cosmical extent4 

,on the other hand1 ,materialism        
required to grow into the fullness of   
manhood1 under the nursing influence of 
,science1 before it was possible to     
engender this new-born offspring2 for   
this offspring is new-born4 ,the theory 
of ,monism1 as we are about to consider 
it1 is a creature of our own generation2
 and it is only as such that ,i desire  
to call attention to the child4 ,in     
order1 however1 to do this1 ,i must     
follow the example of biographers in    
general1 and begin by giving a brief    
sketch of both the parents4             
,,chapter ,i4  ,,spiritualism4   ,in    
proceeding to consider the opposite     
theories of ,spiritualism and           
,materialism1 it is before all else     
desirable to be perfectly clear upon the
 point of theory whereby they are       
essentially distinguished4 ,this point  
is that which is raised by the question 
whether mind is the cause or the effect 
of motion4 ,both theories are dualistic1
 and therefore agree in holding that    

there is causation as between mind and  
motion3 they differ only in their       
teaching as to the direction in which   
the causation proceeds4 ,of course1 out 
of this fundamental difference there    
arise many secondary differences4 ,the  
most important of these secondary       
differences has reference to the nature 
of the eternal or self-existing         
substance4 ,both theories agree that    
there is such a substance2 but on the   
question whether this substance be      
mental or material1 the two theories    
give contradictory answers1 and         
logically so4 ,for1 if mind as we       
directly know it 7namely1 in ourselves7 
is taken to be a cause of motion1 within
 our experience mind is accredited with 
priority2 and hence the inference that  
elsewhere1 or universally1 mind is prior
 to motion4 ,furthermore1 as motion     
cannot take place without something     
which moves1 this something is likewise 
supposed to have been the result of     
mind3 hence the doctrine of the creation

 by mind both of matter and of energy4  
,on the other hand1 the theory of       
materialism1 by refusing to assign      
priority to mind as known directly in   
ourselves1 naturally concludes that mind
 is elsewhere1 or universally1 the      
result of matter in motion--in other    
words1 that matter in motion is the     
eternal or self-existing substance1 and1
 as such1 the cause of mind wherever    
mind occurs4  ,i may observe1 in        
passing1 that although this cosmical    
deduction from the theory of materialism
 is1 as ,i have said1 natural1 it is not
 7as is the case with the corresponding 
deduction from the theory of            
spiritualism7 inevitable4 ,for it is    
logically possible that even though all 
known minds be the results of matter in 
motion1 matter in motion may            
nevertheless itself be the result of an 
unknown mind4 ,this1 indeed1 is the     
position virtually adopted by ,locke in 
his celebrated controversy with the     
,bishop of ,worcester4 ,having been     

taken to task by this divine for the    
materialistic tendency of his writings1 
,locke defends himself by denying the   
necessary character of the deduction    
which we are now considering4 ,for      
example1 he insists1 ',i see no         
contradiction in it that the first      
eternal thinking being should1 if he    
pleased1 give to certain systems of     
created senseless matter1 put together  
as he thinks fit1 some degrees of sense1
 perception1 and thought3 though1 as ,i 
think1 ,i have proved 7lib4 ,,iv1 ch4   
#aj and #ad c471 it is no less than a   
contradiction to suppose matter 7which  
is evidently in its own nature void of  
sense and thought7 should be that       
eternal first thinking being4' ,under   
this view1 it will be observed1 mind is 
supposed to have the ultimate priority1 
and thus to have been the original or   
creating cause of matter in motion1     
which1 in turn1 becomes the cause 7or1  
at least1 the conditional condition7 of 
mind of a lower order4 ,this view1      

however1 need not detain us1 inasmuch as
 it can only be held by those who1 on   
grounds independent of philosophical    
thinking1 already believe in mind as the
 ,first ,cause or ,eternal ,being3 this 
belief granted1 there is1 of course1 an 
end of any question as between          
,spiritualism and ,materialism4 ,i have1
 therefore1 only mentioned this possible
 phase of spiritualistic theory1 in     
order to show that the theory of        
,materialism as applied to a human being
 does not necessarily involve an        
extension of that theory to the cosmos4 
,but ,i hold this distinction as of no  
practical value3 it merely indicates a  
logical possibility which no one would  
be likely to entertain except on grounds
 independent of those upon which the    
philosophical dispute between           
,spiritualism and ,materialism must be  
confined4  ,of more practical importance
 is the remark already made1 namely1    
that the fundamental or diagnostic      
distinction between these two species of

 theory consists only in the views which
 they severally take on the question of 
causality4 ,this remark is of practical 
importance1 because in the debate       
between spiritualists and materialists  
it is often lost sight of3 nay1 in some 
cases1 it is even expressly ignored4    
,obviously1 when it is either           
intentionally or unintentionally        
disregarded1 the debate ceases to be    
directed to the question under          
discussion1 and may then wander         
aimlessly over the whole field of       
collateral speculation4 ,throughout the 
present essay1 therefore1 the discussion
 will be restricted to the only topic   
which we have to discuss--namely1       
whether mind is the cause of motion1    
motion the cause of mind1 or neither the
 cause of the other4  ,the view to be   
first considered--namely1 that mind is  
the cause of motion--obviously has one  
great advantage over the opposite view3 
it supposes the causality to proceed    
from that which is the source of our    

idea of causality 7the mind72 not from  
that into which this idea has been read 
by the mind4 ,hence1 it is so far less  
difficult to imagine that mental changes
 are the cause of bodily changes than   
vice versa2 for upon this hypothesis we 
are starting at least from the substance
 of immediate knowledge1 and not from   
the reflection of that knowledge in what
 we call the external world4  ,on the   
other hand1 the theory of ,spiritualism 
labours under certain speculative       
difficulties which appear to me         
overwhelming4 ,the most formidable of   
these difficulties arises from the      
inevitable collision of the theory with 
the scientific doctrine of the          
conservation of energy4 ,whether or not 
we adopt the view that all causation of 
a physical kind is ultimately an        
expression of the fact that matter and  
energy are indestructible#c1 it is      
equally certain that this               
indestructibility is a necessary        
condition to the occurrence of causation

 as natural4 ,therefore1 if the mind of 
man is capable of breaking in as an     
independent cause upon the otherwise    
uniform system of natural causation1 the
 only way in which it could do so would 
be by either destroying or creating     
certain quanta of either matter or      
energy or both4 ,but to suppose the mind
 capable of doing any of these things   
would be to suppose that the mind is a  
cause in some other sense than a        
physical or a natural cause2 it would be
 to suppose that the mind is a          
super-natural cause1 or1 more plainly1  
that all mental activity1 so far as it  
is an efficient cause of bodily         
movement1 is of the nature of a miracle4
  ,this conclusion1 which appears to me 
unavoidably implicated in the           
spiritualistic hypothesis1 is not merely
 improbable per se1 but admits of being 
shown virtually impossible if we proceed
 to consider the consequences to which  
it necessarily leads4 ,a sportsman1 for 
example1 pulls the trigger of a gun1    

thereby initiating a long train of      
physical causes1 which we may take up at
 the point where the powder is          
discharged1 the shot propelled1 and the 
bird dropped4 ,here the man's volition  
is supposed to have broken in upon the  
otherwise continuous stream of physical 
causes--first by modifying the molecular
 movements of his brain1 so as to       
produce the particular co-ordination of 
neuro-muscular movement required to take
 accurate aim and to fire at the right  
moment2 next by converting a quantity of
 gunpowder into gas1 propelling a       
quantity of lead through the air2 and   
finally1 by killing a bird4 ,now1       
without tracing the matter further than 
this1 let us consider how enormous a    
change the will of the man has          
introduced1 even by so trivial an       
exercise of its activity4 ,no doubt the 
first change in the material world was  
exceedingly slight3 the molecular       
movement in the cortex of his brain was 
probably not more than might be         

dynamically represented by some small   
fraction of a foot-pound4 ,but so       
intricate is the nexus of physical      
causality throughout the whole domain of
 ,nature1 that the intervention of even 
so minute a disturbance ab extra is     
obviously bound to continue to assert an
 influence of ever-widening extent as   
well as of everlasting duration4 ,the   
heat generated by the explosion of the  
powder1 the changed disposition of the  
shot1 the death of the bird--leading to 
innumerable physical changes as to      
stoppage of many mechanical processes   
previously going on in the bird's body1 
loss of animal heat1 c41 and also to    
innumerable vital changes1 leading to a 
stoppage of all the mechanical changes  
which the bird would have helped to     
condition had it lived to die some other
 death1 to propagate its kind1 and thus 
indirectly condition an incalculable    
number of future changes that would have
 been brought about by the ever         
increasing number of its                

descendants--these and an indefinite    
number of other physical changes must   
all be held to have followed as a direct
 consequence of the man's volition thus 
suddenly breaking in as an independent  
cause upon the otherwise uniform course 
of ,nature4 ,now1 ,i say that1 apart    
from some system of pre-established     
harmony1 it appears simply inconceivable
 that the order of ,nature could be     
maintained at all1 if it were thus      
liable to be interfered with at any     
moment in any number of points4 ,and if 
the spiritualist takes refuge in the    
further hypothesis of a pre-established 
harmony between acts of human 7not to   
add brute7 volition and causes of a     
natural kind1 we have only to observe   
that he thus lands himself in a         
speculative position which is           
practically identical with that occupied
 by the materialist4 ,for the only      
difference between the two positions    
then is that the necessity which the    
materialist takes to be imposed on human

 volition by the system of natural      
causation1 is now taken by the          
spiritualist to be equally imposed by a 
super-natural volition4 ,the necessity  
which binds the human volition must be  
equally rigid in either case2 and       
therefore it can make no practical      
difference whether the source of it be  
regarded as natural or super-natural1   
material or mental3 so that a man be    
fated to will only in certain ways--and 
this with all the rigour which belongs  
to causation as physical--it is scarcely
 worth while to dispute whether the     
predestination is of ,god or of ,nature4
 ,there can be no question1 however1    
that in this matter the possibility     
which ,i have supposed to be suggested  
by the spiritualist is more far-fetched 
than that which obviously lies to the   
hand of the materialist2 and1 moreover1 
that it too plainly wears the appearance
 of a desperate device to save a hollow 
theory4  ,it remains to add that this   
great difficulty against the            

spiritualistic theory has been revealed 
in all its force only during the present
 generation4 ,since the days of         
fetishism1 indeed1 the difficulty has   
always been an increasing one--growing  
with the growth of the perception of    
uniformity on the one hand1 and of      
mechanical as distinguished from        
volitional agency on the other4 ,but it 
was not until the correlation of all the
 physical forces had been proved by     
actual experiment1 and the scientific   
doctrine of the conservation of energy  
became as a consequence firmly          
established1 that the difficulty in     
question assumed the importance of a    
logical barrier to the theory of mental 
changes acting as efficient causes of   
material changes4  ,,footnotes3         
,footnote #c3 ,in the opinion of some   
modern writers the indestructibility of 
matter and the conservation of energy   
are alone sufficient to explain all the 
facts of natural causation4 ',for1' it  
is urged1 'if in any case similar       

antecedents did not determine similar   
consequents1 on one or other of these   
occasions some quantum of force1 or of  
matter1 or of both1 must have           
disappeared--or1 which is the same      
thing1 the law of causation cannot have 
been constant4' ,in a future chapter ,i 
shall have to recur to this view4       
,meanwhile ,i have only to observe that 
whether or not the law of causation is  
nothing more than a re-statement of the 
fact that matter and energy are         
indestructible1 it is equally true that 
this fact is at least a necessary       
condition to the operation of that law4 
,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,materialism4   ,this 
is the theory which presents great      
fascination to the student of physical  
science4 ,by laborious investigation    
physiology has established the fact     
beyond the reach of rational dispute1   
that there is a constant relation of    
concomitancy between cerebral action and
 thought4 ,within experience mind is    
found in constant and definite          

association with that highly complex and
 peculiar disposition of matter called a
 living brain4 ,the size and elaboration
 of this peculiar structure throughout  
the animal kingdom stand in conspicuous 
proportion to the degree of intelligence
 displayed2 while the impairment of this
 structure1 whether by congenital       
defect1 mutilation1 anaemia1 decay1 or  
appropriate poison1 entails             
corresponding impairment of mental      
processes4 ,thus much being established1
 no reasonable man can hesitate in      
believing the relation between neurosis 
and psychosis to be a constant and      
concomitant relation1 so that the step  
between this1 and regarding it as a     
causal relation1 seems indeed a small   
one4 ,for1 in all matters of physical   
inquiry1 whenever we have proved a      
constant relation of concomitancy in a  
sequence ,a ,b1 we call ,a the cause of 
,b2 and1 therefore1 it has been         
frequently said that the evidence of    
causation between neurosis and psychosis

 is recognized causation4 ,lastly1 to   
fortify this hypothesis1 materialists   
point to the doctrine of the            
conservation of energy1 which is        
supplied by the science of physics as a 
sort of buttress in this matter to the  
teachings of physiology4 ,for1 as this  
doctrine compels us to believe that the 
chain of physical causation involved in 
cerebral processes can nowhere be broken
 or deflected ab extra1 we are compelled
 to believe that the mental processes1  
which are correlatively associated with 
these cerebral processes1 can nowhere   
escape from 'the charmed circle of the  
forces1' so that whether we look to the 
detailed teachings of physiology1 or to 
the more general teachings of physics1  
we alike perceive that natural science  
appears to leave no locus for mind other
 than as a something which is in some   
way a result of motion4  ,the position  
of ,materialism being thus at first     
sight so naturally strong1 and having   
been in recent years so fortified by the

 labours of physiology1 it is not       
surprising that in the present          
generation ,materialism should be in the
 ascendant4 ,it is the simple truth1 as 
a learned and temperate author1 speaking
 from the side of theology1 has recently
 said1 that       ',materialism is a    
danger to which individuals and         
societies will      always be more or   
less exposed4 ,the present generation1  
however1      and especially the        
generation which is growing up1 will    
obviously      be very especially       
exposed to it2 as much so1 perhaps1 as  
any      generation in the history of   
the world4 ,within the last thirty      
years the great wave of spiritualistic  
or idealistic thought 444      has been 
receding and decreasing2 and another1   
which is in the main      driven by     
materialistic forces1 has been gradually
 rising behind1      vast and           
threatening4 ,it is but its crest that  
we at present see2      it is but a     
certain vague shaking produced by it    

that we at present      feel2 but we    
shall probably soon enough fail not both
 to see and      feel it fully and      
distinctly#d4'  ,such being the present 
importance of ,materialism1 ,i shall    
devote the present chapter to a         
consideration of this theory4 ,each of  
the points in the argument for          
,materialism which ,i have mentioned    
above admits1 of course1 of elaboration2
 but ,i think that their enumeration    
contains all that is essential to the   
theory in question4 ,it now devolves    
upon us to inquire whether this theory  
is adequate to meet the facts4  ,and    
here ,i may as well at once give it as  
my own opinion that1 of however much    
service the theory of ,materialism may  
be1 up to a certain point1 it can never 
be accepted by any competent mind as a  
final explanation of the facts with     
which it has to deal4 ,unquestionable as
 its use may be as a fundamental        
hypothesis in physiology and medicine1  
it is wholly inadequate as a hypothesis 

in philosophy4 ,that is to say1 so long 
as there is a constant relation of      
concomitancy found by experience to     
obtain between neural processes and     
mental processes1 so long no harm can   
accrue to physical science by assuming1 
for its own purposes1 that this relation
 is a causal one4 ,but as soon as the   
question concerning the validity of this
 assumption is raised into the region of
 philosophy1 it receives the answer that
 the assumption cannot be allowed to    
pass4 ,for where the question becomes   
one not as to the fact of the           
association but as to its nature1       
philosophy1 which must have regard to   
the facts of mind no less than to those 
of matter1 must pronounce that the      
hypothesis is untenable2 for the        
hypothesis of this association being one
 of causality acting from neurosis to   
psychosis1 cannot be accepted without   
doing violence1 not merely to our       
faculty of reason1 but to our very idea 
of causation itself4  ,a very small     

amount of thinking is enough to show    
that what ,i call my knowledge of the   
external world1 is merely a knowledge of
 my own mental modifications4 ,a step   
further and ,i find that my idea of     
causation as a principle in the external
 world is derived from my knowledge of  
this principle in the internal world4   
,for ,i find that my idea of force and  
energy in the external world is a mere  
projection of the idea which ,i have of 
effort within the region of my own      
consciousness2 and therefore my only    
idea of causation is that which is      
originally derived from the experience  
which ,i have of this principle as      
obtaining among my own mental           
modifications4  ,if once we see plainly 
that the idea of causation is derived   
from within1 and that what we call the  
evidence of physical causation is really
 the evidence of mental modifications   
following one another in a definite     
sequence1 we shall then clearly see1 not
 merely that we have no evidence1 but   

that we can have no evidence of         
causation as proceeding from object to  
subject4 ,however cogent the evidence   
may appear at first sight to be1 it is  
found to vanish like a cloud as soon as 
it is exposed to the light of adequate  
contemplation4 ,in the very act of      
thinking the evidence1 we are virtually 
denying its possibility as evidence2 for
 as evidence it appeals only to the     
mind1 and since the mind can only know  
its own sequences1 the evidence must be 
presenting to the mind an account of its
 own modifications2 from the mere fact1 
therefore1 of its being accepted as     
thinkable1 the evidence is proved to be 
illusory4  ,to uneducated men it appears
 an indisputable fact of 'common sense' 
that the colour of a flower exists as   
perceived in the flower1 apart from any 
relation to the percipient mind4 ,a     
physiologist has gone further into the  
thicket of things1 and finds that the   
way is not so simple as this4 ,he       
regards the quality of colour as        

necessarily related to the faculty of   
visual perception2 does not suppose that
 the colour exists as such in the       
flower1 but thinks of the something     
there as a certain order of vibrations  
which1 when brought into relation with  
consciousness through the medium of     
certain nerves1 gives rise to the       
perception experienced2 and in order to 
account for the translation into visual 
feeling of an event so unlike that      
feeling as is the process taking place  
in the flower1 physiologists have       
recourse to an elaborate theory1 such as
 that of ,helmholtz or ,hering4 ,in     
other words1 physiologists here fully   
recognize that colour1 or any other     
thing perceived1 only exists as         
perceived in virtue of a subjective     
element blending with an objective2 the 
thing as perceived is recognized as     
having no existence apart from its      
relation to a percipient mind4 ,now1    
although physiologists are at one with  
the philosophers thus far1 it is to be  

feared that very frequently they are in 
the same position as the above-mentioned
 'uneducated men1' when it becomes      
needful to press still further into the 
thicket4 ,for after having distinguished
 the necessity of recognizing a         
mind-element in any possible theory of  
perception1 they forthwith proceed to   
disregard this element when passing from
 the ground of perception to that of    
thought4 ,although the ideas of matter1 
motion1 causation1 and so on1 are       
themselves as much the offspring of a   
thinking mind1 with its environment1 as 
the perception of colour is a conceiving
 of the percipient mind1 with its       
environment1 these ideas are            
inconsistently supposed to stand for    
equivalent realities of the external    
world--to truly represent things that   
are virtually independent of any        
necessary relation to mind4 ,or1 as the 
case has recently been well put by      
,principal ,caird3       ',you cannot   
get mind as an ultimate product of      

matter1 for in the      very attempt to 
do so you have already begun with mind4 
,the      easiest step of any such      
inquiry involves categories of thought1 
and it is in terms of thought that the  
very problem you are      investigating 
can be so much as stated4 ,you cannot   
start in your      investigations with a
 bare1 self-identical1 objective fact1  
stripped of every ideal element or      
contribution from thought4 ,the         
least and lowest part of outward        
observation is not an independent       
entity--fact minus mind1 and out of     
which mind may1 somewhere or      other1
 be seen to emerge2 but it is fact or   
object as it appears to      an         
observing mind1 in the medium of        
thought1 having mind or thought      as 
an inseparable factor of it4 ,whether   
there be such a thing as an             
absolute world outside of thought1      
whether there be such things as         
matter and material atoms existing in   
themselves before any mind      begins  

to perceive or think about them1 is not 
the question before      us4 ,if it were
 possible to conceive of such atoms1 at 
any rate you1      before you begin to  
make anything of them1 must think them2 
and you      can never1 by thinking     
about atoms1 prove that there is no such
      thing as thought other than as an 
ultimate product of atoms4 ,before      
you could reach thought or mind as a    
last result you must needs              
eliminate from it the data of the       
problem with which you start1 and       
that you can never do1 any more than you
 can stand on your own      shoulders or
 outstrip your own shadow4444 ,in one   
word1 to      constitute the reality of 
the outward world--to make possible the 
minimum of knowledge1 nay1 the very     
existence for us of molecules      and  
atoms--you must needs presuppose that   
thought or thinking self1      which    
some would persuade us is to be educed  
or evolved from      them4444 ,to make  
thought a function of matter is thus1   

simply1 to      make thought a function 
of itself#e4'  ,from this reasoning     
there can be no escape2 and it is more  
rational for a man to believe that      
colour exists as such in a flower than1 
after having plainly seen that such     
cannot be the case1 forthwith to        
disregard the teaching of this analogy1 
and to imagine that any apparent        
evidence of mind as a result of matter  
or motion can possibly be entertained as
 real evidence4  ,remembering1 then1    
that from the nature of this particular 
case it is as impossible for mind to    
prove its own causation as it is for    
water to rise above its source1 it may  
still be well1 for the sake of further  
argument1 to sink this general          
consideration1 and to regard such       
spurious evidence of causation as is    
presented by ,materialism1 without      
prejudice arising from its being prima  
facie inadmissible4  ,materialists1 as  
already observed1 are fond of saying    
that the evidence of causation from     

neurosis to psychosis is as good as such
 evidence can be proved to be in any    
other case4 ,now1 quite apart from the  
general considerations just adduced to  
show that from the peculiar nature of   
this case there can here be no such     
evidence at all--quite apart from this1 
and treating the problem on the lower   
ground of the supposed analogy1 it may  
be clearly shown that the statement is  
untrue4 ,for a little thought will show 
that in point of fact the only          
resemblance between this supposed case  
of causation and all other cases of     
recognized causation1 consists in the   
invariability of the correlation between
 cerebral processes and mental          
processes2 in all other points the      
analogy fails4 ,for in all cases of     
recognized causation there is a         
perceived connexion between the cause   
and the effect2 the antecedents are     
physical1 and the consequents are       
physical4 ,but in the case before us    
there is no perceived1 or even          

conceivable1 connexion between the cause
 and the effect2 for the causes are     
supposed to be physical and the effects 
mental4 ,and the antithesis thus posited
 is alone sufficient to separate toto   
coelo the case of causation supposed    
from that of all cases of causation     
recognized4 ,from the singularly clear  
and well-balanced statement of this     
subject given by ,professor ,allman in  
his ,presidential ,address before the   
,british ,association1 ,i may here fitly
 quote the following3--       ',if we   
could see any analogy between thought   
and any one of the      admitted        
phenomena of matter1 we should be       
justified in the first      of these    
conclusions 7i4 e4 that of ,materialism7
 as the simplest1      and as affording 
a hypothesis most in accordance with the
      comprehensiveness of natural laws2
 but between thought and the            
physical phenomena of matter there is   
not only no analogy1 but no             
conceivable analogy2 and the obvious and

 continuous path which we      have     
hitherto followed up in our reasonings  
from the phenomena of      lifeless     
matter through those of living matter   
here comes suddenly      to an end4 ,the
 chasm between unconscious life and     
thought is deep      and impassable1 and
 no transitional phenomena can be found 
by      which1 as by a bridge1 we may   
span it over#f4'  ,and1 not unduly to   
multiply quotations1 ,i shall only      
adduce one more from another of the few 
eminent men of science who have seen    
their way clearly in this matter1 and   
have expressed what they have seen in   
language as clear as their vision4      
,professor ,tyndall writes3--           
',the passage from the physics of the   
brain to the corresponding      facts of
 consciousness is unthinkable4 ,granted 
that a definite      thought and a      
definite molecular action in the brain  
occur      simultaneously1 we do not    
possess the intellectual organ1 nor     
apparently any rudiment of the organ1   

which would enable us to      pass1 by a
 process of reasoning1 from the one     
phenomenon to the      other4 ,they     
appear together but we do not know why4 
,were our minds      and senses so      
expanded1 strengthened1 and illuminated1
 as to enable      us to see and feel   
the very molecules of the brain2 were we
 capable      of following all their    
motions1 all their groupings1 all their 
electrical discharges1 if such there be2
 and were we intimately      acquainted 
with the corresponding states of thought
 and feeling1 we      should be as far  
as ever from the solution of the        
problem4 ,how are      these physical   
processes connected with the facts of   
consciousness8      ,the chasm between  
the two classes of phenomena would still
 remain      intellectually             
impassable#g4'  ,next1 in all cases of  
recognized causation there is a         
perceived equivalency between cause and 
effect1 such equivalency belonging to   
the very essence of that in which we    

conceive causation to consist4 ,but as  
between matter and motion on the one    
side1 and feeling and thought on the    
other1 there can be no such equivalency 
conceivable4 ,that no such equivalency  
is conceivable may be rendered apparent 
on grounds of ,materialism itself4 ,for 
,materialism is bound to accept the     
fundamental doctrine of modern          
physics--that1 viz4 as to the           
conservation of energy--and therefore it
 becomes evident that unless we         
assimilate thought with energy1 there is
 no possibility of a causal relation1 or
 a relation of equivalency1 as obtaining
 between the one and the other4 ,for    
however little we may know about        
brain-dynamics1 materialists1 at least1 
must take it for granted that in every  
process of cerebration the matter and   
force concerned are indestructible      
quantities1 and therefore that all their
 possible equations are fully satisfied1
 could we but follow them out4          
,howsoever complex we may suppose the   

flux and reflux of forces to be within  
the structure of a living brain1 it is  
no more possible for any one of the     
forces concerned to escape from brain to
 mind1 than it would be for such an     
escape to occur in a steam-engine or a  
watch2 the doctrine of the conservation 
of energy forms an insuperable bar to   
the supposition that any equation in the
 region of physics can be left          
unsatisfied1 in order to pass over and  
satisfy some other equation in the      
region of psychics4  ,of course in      
saying this ,i am aware that some of the
 more clear-sighted of the materialists 
have plainly perceived this difficulty  
in all its magnitude1 and so have felt  
that unless it can be met1 any theory of
 ,materialism must necessarily contain a
 radical contradiction of principles4   
,some few materialists have therefore   
sought to meet the difficulty in the    
only way it can be met1 viz4 by boldly  
asserting the possibility of thought and
 energy being transmutable4 ,on this    

view thought becomes a mode of motion1  
and takes its rank among the forces as  
identical in nature with heat1 light1   
electricity1 and the rest4 ,but this    
view is also inherently impossible4 ,for
 suppose1 as a matter of argument1 that 
physiologists should discover a         
mechanical equivalent of thought1 so    
that we might estimate the value of a   
calculation in thermal units1 or the    
'labour of love' in foot-pounds3 still  
we should not be out of our             
difficulties2 we should only have to cut
 a twist of flax to find a lock of iron4
 ,for by thus assimilating thought with 
energy1 we should in no wise have       
explained the fundamental antithesis    
between subject and object4 ,the fact   
would remain1 if possible1 more         
unaccountable than ever1 that mind      
should present absolutely no point of   
real analogy with motion4 ,involved with
 the essential idea of motion is the    
idea of extension2 suppress the latter  
and the former must necessarily vanish1 

for motion only means transition in     
space of something itself extended4 ,but
 thought1 as far as we can possibly know
 it1 is known and distinguished by the  
very peculiarity of not having          
extension4 ,therefore1 even if we were  
to find a mechanical equivalent of      
thought1 thought would still not be     
proved a mode of motion4 ,on the        
contrary1 what would be proved would be 
that1 in becoming transformed into      
thought1 energy had ceased to be energy2
 in passing out of its relation to space
 it would cease to exist as energy1 and 
if it again passed into that relation it
 would only be by starting de novo on a 
new course of history4 ,therefore the   
proof that thought has a mechanical     
equivalent would simply amount to the   
proof1 not that thought is energy1 but  
that thought destroys energy4 ,and if   
,materialism were to prove this1        
,materialism would commit suicide4 ,for 
if once it were proved that the relation
 of energy to thought is such that      

thought is able to absorb or temporarily
 to annihilate energy1 the whole        
argument of ,materialism would be       
inverted1 and whatever evidence there is
 of causation as between mind and matter
 would become available in all its force
 on the side of ,spiritualism4 ,this    
seems plain1 for if it even were        
conceivable--which most distinctly it is
 not--that a motor could ever become a  
motive1 and so pass from the sphere of  
dynamics into the sphere of             
consciousness1 the fact would go to     
prove1 not that the motor was the cause 
of the motive1 but rather that the      
motive was the cause of destroying the  
motor2 so that at that point the        
otherwise unbroken chain of physical    
sequences was interrupted by the motive 
striking in upon it1 and in virtue of   
the mysterious power supposed to have   
been proved by physiology1 cancelling   
the motor1 so allowing the nerve-centre 
to act as determined by the motive4  ,of
 course ,i wish it to be understood that

 ,i believe we are here dealing with    
what ,i may call1 in perhaps suitably   
contradictory terms1 inconceivable      
conceptions4 ,but let it be remembered  
that ,i am not responsible for this     
ambiguity2 ,i am only showing what must 
be the necessary outcome of analysis if 
we begin by endeavouring phenomenally to
 unite the most antithetical of         
elements--mind and motion4 ,materialism1
 at least1 will not be the gainer should
 it ever be proved that in the complex  
operations of the brain a unique        
exception occurs to the otherwise       
universal law of the conservation of    
energy in space4  ,we may1 therefore1   
quit the suggestion that the difficulty 
experienced by ,materialism of showing  
an equivalency between neurosis and     
psychosis can ever be met by assuming   
that some day mental processes may admit
 of being expressed in terms of         
physical4 ,but before leaving this      
difficulty with regard to equivalency1  
,i may mention one other point that     

seems to me of importance in connexion  
with it4 ,i have already said that if we
 suppose causation to proceed from brain
 to mind1 we must suppose this essential
 requirement of equivalency between the 
cerebral causes and the mental effects  
to be satisfied somewhere4  ,but where  
are we to say that it is satisfied8     
,even if we suppose that thought has a  
mechanical equivalent1 and that         
causation proceeds in the direction from
 energy to thought1 still1 when we have 
regard to the supposed effects1 we find 
that even yet they bear no kind of      
equivalency to their supposed causes4   
,the brain of a ,shakespeare probably   
did not1 as a system1 exhibit so much   
energy as does the brain of an elephant2
 and the cerebral operations of a       
,darwin may not have had a very         
perceptibly larger mechanical equivalent
 than those of a banker's clerk4 ,yet in
 the world of thought the difference    
between our estimate of the results1 or 
'work done1' in these cases is such as  

to drive all ideas of equivalency to the
 winds4 ,doubtless1 a materialist will  
answer that it is not fair to take our  
estimate of 'work done' in the world of 
mind as the real equivalent of the      
energy supposed to have passed over from
 the world of motion1 seeing that our   
estimate is based1 not on the           
quantitative amount of thought produced1
 but rather on its qualitative character
 with reference to the social           
requirements of the race4 ,but to this  
it is enough to answer that we have no  
means of gauging the quantity of thought
 produced other than by having regard to
 its effects in the world of mind1 and  
this we cannot do except by having      
regard to its qualitative character4    
,many a man1 for instance1 must have    
consumed more than a thousand times the 
brain-substance and brain-energy that   
,shelley expended over his ',ode to a   
,skylark1' and yet as a result have     
produced an utterly worthless poem4     
,now1 in what way are we to estimate the

 'work done' in two such cases1 except  
by looking to the relative effects      
produced in the only region where they  
are produced1 viz4 in the region of     
mind8 ,yet1 when we do so estimate them1
 what becomes of the evidence of        
equivalency between the physical causes 
and the psychical effects8  ,now if     
thus1 whether or not we try to form an  
estimate1 it is impossible to show any  
semblance of equivalency between the    
supposed causes and the alleged effects1
 how can any one be found to say that   
the evidence of causation is here as    
valid as it is in any other case8 ,the  
truth rather is that the alleged effects
 stand out of every relation to the     
supposed causes1 with the exception only
 of being associated in time4  ,there   
still remains one other enormous        
difficulty in the way of the theory of  
,materialism2 it necessarily embodies   
the theory of conscious automatism1 and 
is therefore called upon to explain why 
consciousness and thought have ever     

appeared upon the scene of things at    
all4 ,that this is the necessary        
position of ,materialism is easily      
proved as follows4 ,we have already seen
 that ,materialism would commit suicide 
by supposing that energy could be       
transmuted into thought1 for this would 
amount to nothing short of supposing the
 destruction of energy as such2 and to  
suppose energy thus destructible would  
be to open wide the door of             
spiritualism4 ,materialism1 therefore1  
is logically bound to argue in this way3
 ,we cannot conceive of a conscious     
idea1 or mental change1 as in any way   
affecting the course of a cerebral      
reflex1 or material change2 while1 on   
the other hand1 our knowledge of the    
conservation of energy teaches us as an 
axiom that the cerebral changes must    
determine each other in their sequence  
as in a continuous series4 ,nowhere can 
we suppose the physical process to be   
interrupted or diverted by the psychical
 process2 and therefore we must conclude

 that thought and volition really play  
no part whatever in determining action4 
,thoughts and feelings are but indices  
which show in the mirror of the mind    
certain changes that are proceeding in  
the matter of the brain1 and are as     
inefficient in influencing those changes
 as the shadow of a cloud is powerless  
to direct the movements of that of which
 it is the shadow4  ,but when           
,materialism reaches1 in a clear and    
articulate manner1 this inference as a  
conclusion necessary from its premises1 
it becomes opposed at once to common    
sense and to the requirements of        
methodical reason4 ,it becomes opposed  
to common sense because we all feel it  
is practically impossible to believe    
that the world would now have been      
exactly what it is even if              
consciousness1 thought1 and volition had
 never appeared upon the scene--that    
railway trains would have been running  
filled with mindless passengers1 or that
 telephones would have been invented by 

brains that could not think to speak to 
ears that could not hear4 ,and the      
conclusion is opposed to the            
requirements of methodical reason1      
because reason to be methodical is bound
 to have an answer to the question that 
immediately arises from the conclusion4 
,this question simply is1 ,why have     
consciousness1 thought1 and volition    
ever been called into existence2 and why
 are they related1 as they are related1 
to cerebral action8 ,materialism1 by    
here undertaking to prove that these    
things stand uselessly isolated from all
 other things1 is bound to show some    
reason why they ever came to be1 and to 
be what they are4 ,for observe1 it is   
not merely that these things exist in a 
supposed unnecessary relation to all    
other things2 the fact to be explained  
is that they exist in a most intimately 
woven and invariable connexion with     
certain highly complex forms of organic 
structure and certain highly peculiar   
distributions of physical force4 ,yet   

these unique and extraordinary things   
are supposed by automatism to be always 
results and never causes2 in the theatre
 of things they are supposed to be      
always spectators and never actors2 in  
the laboratory of life they are supposed
 to be always by-products2 and therefore
 in the order of nature they are        
supposed to have no raison d'etre4 ,such
 a state of matters would be accountable
 enough if the stream of mental changes 
were but partly1 occasionally1 and      
imperfectly associated with the stream  
of material changes2 but as the         
association is so minute1 invariable1   
and precise1 the hypothesis of the      
association being merely accidental1 or 
not requiring explanation1 becomes1 at  
the bar of methodical reasoning1        
self-convicted of absurdity4  ,the state
 of the case1 then1 simply is that two  
distinct facts stand to be explained by 
the theory of conscious                 
automatism--first1 why psychosis should 
ever have been developed as a mysterious

 appendage to neurosis2 and1 secondly1  
why the association between these things
 should be so intimate and precise4     
,assuredly1 on the principles of        
evolution1 which materialists at least  
cannot afford to disregard1 it would be 
a wholly anomalous fact that so wide and
 general a class of phenomena as those  
of mind should have become developed in 
constantly ascending degrees throughout 
the animal kingdom1 if they are entirely
 without use to animals4 ,if psychosis  
is1 as supposed1 a function of neurosis1
 the doctrine of natural selection alone
 would forbid us to imagine that this   
function differs from all other         
functions in being itself functionless4 
,if it would be detrimental to the      
theory of natural selection that any one
 isolated structure--such as the tail of
 a rattlesnake--should be adapted to    
perform a function useless to the animal
 possessing it1 how utterly destructive 
of that theory would be the fact that   
all the phenomena of mind have been     

elaborated as functions of nerve-tissue 
without any one of them ever having been
 of any use either to the individual or 
to the species4 ,and the difficulty that
 thus arises is magnified without limit 
when we remember that the phenomena of  
mind are invariable in their association
 with cerebral structure1 grade for     
grade1 and process for process4  ,it is 
of no argumentative use to point to the 
fact that many adaptive movements in    
animals are performed by nerve-centres  
apart from any association with         
consciousness or volition1 because all  
the facts on this head go to prove that 
consciousness and volition come in most 
suggestively just where adaptive        
movements begin to grow varied and      
complex1 and then continue to develop   
with a proportional reference to the    
growing variety and complexity of these 
movements4 ,the facts1 therefore1       
irresistibly lead to the conclusion 7if 
we argue here as we should in the case  
of any other function7 that             

consciousness and volition are functions
 of nerve-tissue super-added to its     
previous functions1 in order to meet new
 and more complex demands on its powers 
of adaptation4  ,neither is it of any   
argumentative use to point to the fact  
that adaptive actions which originally  
are performed with conscious volition   
may by practice come to be performed    
without conscious volition4 ,for it is  
certain that no adaptive action of quite
 a novel kind is ever performed from the
 first without consciousness of its     
performance1 and therefore1 although it 
is true that by repetition its          
performance may become mechanical or    
unconscious1 this does not prove that   
consciousness was without use in        
producing the adaptive action4 ,it only 
proves that after a nervous mechanism   
has been elaborated by the help of      
consciousness1 consciousness may be     
withdrawn and leave the finished        
mechanism to work alone2 the structure  
having been completed1 the scaffolding  

necessary to its completion may be      
removed4  ,but passing over this        
difficulty which the theory of conscious
 automatism seems bound to encounter in 
its collision with the theory of natural
 selection1 the most insuperable of all 
its difficulties arises from the bare   
fact1 which it cannot explain1 that     
conscious intelligence exists1 and      
exists in the most intimate relation    
with one peculiar kind of material      
structure4 ,for automatists must concede
 that the evidence of causation in the  
region of mind is at least as cogent as 
it is in the region of matter1 seeing   
that the whole science of psychology is 
only rendered possible as a science by  
the fundamental fact of observation that
 mental antecedents determine mental    
consequents4 ,therefore1 if we call a   
physical sequence ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and a     
mental sequence a1 b1 c automatists have
 to explain1 not merely why there should
 be such a thing as a mental sequence at
 all1 but also why the sequence a1 b1 c 

should always proceed1 link for link1   
with the sequence ,a1 ,b1 ,c4 ,it       
clearly is no answer to say that the    
sequence ,a1 ,b1 ,c implies the         
successive activity of certain definite 
nerve-centres ,a'1 ,b'1 ,c' which have  
for their subjective effects the        
sequence a1 b1 c so that whenever the   
sequence ,a1 ,b1 ,c occurs the sequence 
a1 b1 c must likewise occur4 ,this is no
 answer1 because it merely restates the 
hypothesis of automatism1 and begs the  
whole question to be discussed4 ,what   
methodical reason demands as an answer  
is simply why the sequence ,a1 ,b1 ,c   
even though we freely grant it due to   
the successive activity of certain      
definite nerve-centres1 should be       
attended by the sequence a1 b1 c4       
,reason perceives clearly enough that   
the sequence a1 b1 c belongs to a wholly
 different category from the sequence   
,a1 ,b1 ,c the one being immediately    
known as a process taking place in a    
something which is without extension or 

physical properties of any kind1 and the
 other taking place in a something which
 when1 translated by the previous       
something1 we recognize as having       
extension and the other antithetical    
properties which we class together as   
physical4 ,there would of course be no  
difficulty if the sequence ,a1 ,b1 ,c   
continued through any amount of         
complexity in the same conceivable      
category of being2 so that there would  
be nothing actually inconceivable in    
cerebral sequence--changes running      
through ,d1 ,e1 ,f1 c41 to an extent    
sufficient to cause unconscious         
automatism of any degree of complexity4 
,but that which does require explanation
 from automatists is why automatism     
should have become associated with      
consciousness1 and this so intimately   
that every change in the sequence ,a1   
,b1 ,c1 c41 is accompanied by a         
particular and corresponding change in  
the sequence a1 b1 c1 c4 ,thus1 to take 
a definite illustration1 if on seeing   

the sun ,i think of a paper on solar    
physics1 and from this pass to thinking 
of ,mr4 ,norman ,lockyer1 and from this 
to speculating on the probability of    
certain supposed elements being really  
compounds1 there is here a definite     
causal connexion in the sequence of my  
thoughts4 ,but it is the last           
extravagance of absurdity to tell me    
that the accompanying causal sequences  
going on in my brain happen to have     
exactly corresponded to the sequences   
which were taking place in the mind1 the
 two trains of sequences being each     
definite and coherent in themselves1 and
 yet each proceeding link for link in   
lines parallel with the other4 ,without 
some theory of pre-established          
harmony--which1 of course1 it is no part
 of automatism to entertain--it would1  
on the doctrine of chances alone1 be    
impossible to suppose that the causal   
sequences in the brain always happen to 
be just those which1 by running link for
 link with another set of causal        

sequences taking place in the mind1     
enable both the series to be definite   
and coherent in themselves4 ,therefore1 
before reason can allow the theory of   
automatism to pass1 it must be told how 
this wonderful fact of parallelism is to
 be explained4 ,there must be some      
connexion between the intrinsically     
coherent series ,a1 ,b1 ,c and the no   
less intrinsically coherent sequence a1 
b1 c1 which may be taken as an          
explanation why they coincide each to   
each4 ,what is this connexion8 ,we do   
not know2 but we have now seen that1    
whatever it is1 it cannot be an ordinary
 causal connexion--first1 because the   
doctrine of the conservation of energy  
makes it incumbent on us to believe that
 the procession of physical cause and   
effect is complete within the region of 
brain--a closed circle1 as it were1 from
 which no energy can1 without           
argumentative suicide1 be supposed to   
escape into the region of mind2 and     
next1 because1 even were this difficulty

 disregarded1 it is unaccountable that  
the causative influence 7whatever it is 
supposed to be71 which passes over from 
the region of physics into that of      
psychics1 should be such as to render   
the psychical series coherent in itself1
 when on the physical side the series   
must be determined by purely physical   
conditions1 having no reference         
whatsoever to psychical requirements4   
,thus it is argumentatively impossible  
for ,materialism to elude the necessity 
of explaining the kind of connexion     
which it supposes to subsist between    
neurosis and psychosis2 and forasmuch as
 the above considerations clearly show  
this connexion cannot be accepted as one
 of ordinary causality without some     
answer being given to the questions     
which reason has to ask1 ,materialism   
must be ruled out of court if she fails 
to respond to the demand4 ,but it is no 
less clearly impossible that she can    
respond to the demand1 and therefore at 
the bar of ,philosophy ,materialism must

 be pronounced1 for this as well as for 
the reasons previously cited1           
conspicuously inadequate to account for 
the facts4  ,,footnotes3  ,footnote #d3 
,professor ,flint1 ,antitheistic        
,theories1 p4 #ii4  ,footnote #e3       
,philosophy of ,religion1 pp4 #ie1 #ii1 
and #aja4  ,footnote #f3 ,british       
,association ,report1 #ahgi1 p4 #bh4    
,footnote #g3 ,british ,association     
,report1 #ahfh4 ,trans4 of ,sections1 p4
 #e4     ,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,monism4    
,we have seen1 then1 that both the      
alternative theories of ,spiritualism   
and ,materialism are found1 when        
carefully examined1 to be so beset with 
difficulties of a necessary and         
fundamental kind1 that it is impossible 
to entertain either without closing our 
eyes to certain contradictions which    
they severally and inherently present4  
,we may1 indeed1 go even further than   
this1 and affirm that to suppose mind   
the cause of motion or motion the cause 
of mind is equally to suppose that which

 in its very nature as a supposition is 
neither true nor untrue1 but            
nonsensical4 ,for1 as ,prof4 ,clifford  
has said in his essay on ,body and      
,mind1--       ',it may be conceived    
that1 at the same time with every       
exercise of      volition1 there is a   
disturbance of the physical laws2 but   
this      disturbance1 being perceptible
 to me1 would be a physical fact        
accompanying the volition1 and could not
 be volition itself1 which      is not  
perceptible to me4 ,whether there is    
such a disturbance of      the physical 
laws or no is a question of fact to     
which we have the      best of reasons  
for giving a negative answer2 but the   
assertion      that another man's       
volition1 a feeling in his consciousness
 which      ,i cannot perceive1 is part 
of the train of physical facts which ,i 
may perceive1--this is neither true nor 
untrue1 but nonsense2 it is      a      
combination of words whose corresponding
 ideas will not go      together#h4'    

,and seeing that the correlatives are in
 each case the same1 it is similarly    
'nonsense' to assert the converse       
proposition3 or1 in other words1 it is  
equally nonsense to speak of mental     
action causing cerebral action1 or of   
cerebral action causing mental          
action--nonsense of the same kind as it 
would be to speak of the ,pickwick      
,papers causing a storm at sea1 or the  
eruption of a volcano causing the       
forty-seventh proposition in the first  
book of ,euclid4  ,we see1 then1 that   
two of the three possible theories of   
things contain the elements of their own
 destruction3 when carefully analyzed1  
both these theories are found to present
 inherent contradictions4 ,on this      
account the third1 or only alternative  
theory1 comes to us with a large        
antecedent presumption in its favour4   
,for it comes to us1 as it were1 on a   
clear field1 or with the negative       
advantage of having no logical rivals to
 contend with4 ,the other two           

suggestions having been weighed in the  
balance and found wanting1 we are free  
to look to the new-comer as quite       
unopposed4 ,this new-comer must1 indeed1
 be interrogated as carefully as his    
predecessors1 and1 like them1 must be   
judged upon his own merits4 ,but as he  
constitutes our last possible hope of   
solving the question which he professes 
himself able to solve1 the absolute     
failure of his predecessors entitles him
 to a patient hearing4 ,by the method of
 exclusion his voice is now the only    
voice that remains to be heard1 and     
unless it can speak to better purpose   
than the others1 we shall have no       
alternative but to abandon the facts as 
inexplicable1 or to confess that it is  
necessarily impossible for the human    
mind ever to arrive at any theory of    
things4  ,before proceeding to state or 
to examine this third and last of the   
suggested theories1 it is desirable--in 
order still further to define its status
 a priori--that ,i should exhibit the   

reason why the two other suggestions    
have necessarily failed4 ,for to my mind
 it is perfectly obvious that this      
reason is to be found1 and found only1  
in the fact that they are both          
dualistic4 ,the inherent1 the fatal1 and
 the closely similar difficulties which 
attach to both the dualistic theories1  
attach to them merely because they are  
dualistic4 ,the 'nonsense' of each of   
them is really identical1 and arises    
only because they both make the same    
irrational attempt to find more in the  
effect than they have put into the      
cause4 ,in other words1 both the        
dualistic theories suppose that the     
physical chains of causation is complete
 within itself1 and that the mental     
chain is also complete within itself3   
yet they both proceed to the            
contradiction that one of these chains  
is able to allow some of its causal     
influence to escape1 as it were1 in     
order to constitute the other chain4 ,it
 makes no difference1 in point of logic1

 whether such an escape is supposed to  
take place from the physical chain      
7materialism7 or from the mental chain  
7spiritualism73 in either case the      
fundamental principle of causality is   
alike impugned--the principle1 that is1 
of there being an equivalency between   
cause and effect1 such that you cannot  
get more out of your effect than you    
have put into your cause4 ,both these   
dualistic theories1 although they take  
opposite views as to which of the two   
chains of causation is the cause of the 
other1 nevertheless agree in supposing  
that there are two chains of causation1 
and that one of them does act causally  
upon the other3 and it is in this matter
 of their common consent that they both 
commit suicide4 ,every process in the   
physical sphere must be supposed to have
 its equations satisfied within that    
sphere3 else the doctrine of the        
conservation of energy would be         
contravened1 and thus the causation     
contemplated could no longer be         

contemplated as physical4 ,similarly1   
every process in the mental sphere must 
be supposed to have its equations       
satisfied within that sphere3 else the  
causation contemplated could no longer  
be contemplated as mental3 some of the  
equations must be supposed not to have  
been satisfied within the mental sphere1
 but to have been carried over into the 
physical sphere--thus to have either    
created or destroyed certain quantities 
of energy within that sphere1 and thus1 
also1 to have introduced elements of    
endless confusion into the otherwise    
orderly system of ,nature4  ,from this  
vice of radical contradiction1 to which 
both the dualistic theories are         
committed1 the monistic theory is free4 
,moreover1 as we shall immediately find1
 it is free to combine the elements of  
truth which severally belong to both the
 other theories4 ,these other theories  
are each concerned with what they see   
upon different sides of the same shield4
 ,the facts which they severally receive

 they severally report1 and their       
reports appear to contradict each other4
 ,but truth can never be really in      
contradiction with other truth2 and it  
is reserved for ,monism1 by taking a    
simultaneous view of both sides1 to     
reconcile the previously apparent       
contradictions4 ,for these and other    
reasons1 which will unfold themselves as
 we proceed1 ,i fully agree with the    
late ,professor ,clifford where he says 
of this theory--',it is not merely a    
speculation1 but is a result to which   
all the greatest minds that have studied
 this question 7the relation between    
body and mind7 in the right way have    
gradually been approximating for a long 
time4' ,this theory is1 as we have      
already seen1 that mental phenomena and 
physical phenomena1 although apparently 
diverse1 are really identical4  ,if we  
thus unite in a higher synthesis the    
elements both of spiritualism and of    
materialism1 we obtain a product which  
satisfies every fact of feeling on the  

one hand1 and of observation on the     
other4 ,we have only to suppose that the
 antithesis between mind and            
motion--subject and object--is itself   
phenomenal or apparent3 not absolute or 
real4 ,we have only to suppose that the 
seeming duality is relative to our modes
 of apprehension3 and1 therefore1 that  
any change taking place in the mind1 and
 any corresponding change taking place  
in the brain1 are really not two        
changes1 but one change4 ,when a violin 
is played upon we hear a musical sound1 
and at the same time we see a vibration 
of the strings4 ,relatively to our      
consciousness1 therefore1 we have here  
two sets of changes1 which appear to be 
very different in kind2 yet we know that
 in an absolute sense they are one and  
the same3 we know that the diversity in 
consciousness is created only by the    
difference in our mode of perceiving the
 same events--whether we see or whether 
we hear the vibration of the strings4   
,similarly1 we may suppose that a       

vibration of nerve-strings and a process
 of thought are really one and the same 
event1 which is dual or diverse only in 
relation to our modes of perceiving it4 
,or1 to take another and a better       
illustration1 in an ,edison lamp the    
light which is emitted from the burner  
may be said indifferently to be caused  
by the number of vibrations per second  
going on in the carbon1 or by the       
temperature of the carbon2 for this rate
 of vibration could not take place in   
the carbon without constituting that    
degree of temperature which affects our 
eyes as luminous4 ,similarly1 a train of
 thought may be said indifferently to be
 caused by brain-action or by           
mind-action2 for1 ex hypothesi1 the one 
could not take place without the other4 
,now when we contemplate the phenomena  
of volition by themselves1 it is as     
though we were contemplating the        
phenomena of light by themselves3       
volition is produced by mind in brain1  
just as light is produced by temperature

 in carbon4 ,and just as we may         
correctly speak of light as the cause1  
say1 of a photograph1 so we may         
correctly speak of volition as the cause
 of bodily movement4 ,that particular   
kind of physical activity which takes   
place in the carbon could not take place
 without the light which causes a       
photograph2 and1 similarly1 that        
particular kind of physical activity    
which takes place in the brain could not
 take place without the volition which  
causes a bodily movement4 ,so that      
volition is as truly a cause of bodily  
movement as is the physical activity of 
the brain2 seeing that1 in an absolute  
sense1 the cause is one and the same4   
,but if we once clearly perceive that   
what in a relative sense we know as     
volition is1 in a similar sense1 the    
cause of bodily movement1 we terminate  
the question touching the freedom of the
 will4 ,it thus becomes a mere matter of
 phraseology whether we speak of the    
will determining1 or being determined   

by1 changes going on in the external    
world2 just as it is but a matter of    
phraseology whether we speak of         
temperature determining1 or being       
determined by1 molecular vibration4 ,all
 the requirements alike of the free-will
 and of the bond-will hypotheses are    
thus satisfied by a synthesis which     
comprises them both4 ,on the one hand1  
it would be as impossible for an        
unconscious automaton to do the work or 
to perform the adjustments of a         
conscious agent1 as it would be for an  
,edison lamp to give out light and cause
 a photograph when not heated by an     
electric current4 ,on the other hand1 it
 would be as impossible for the will to 
originate bodily motion without the     
occurrence of a strictly physical       
process of cerebration1 as it would be  
for light to shine in an ,edison lamp   
which had been deprived of its          
carbon-burner4  ,the great advantage of 
this theory is1 that it supposes only   
one stream of causation1 in which both  

mind and motion are simultaneously      
concerned4 ,the theory1 therefore1      
escapes all the difficulties and        
contradictions with which both          
spiritualism and materialism are beset4 
,thus1 motion is supposed to be         
producing nothing but motion2           
mind-changes nothing but                
mind-changes--both producing both       
simultaneously3 neither could be what it
 is without the other1 because without  
the other neither could be the cause    
which in fact it is4 ,impossible1       
therefore1 is the supposition of the    
materialist that consciousness is       
adventitious1 or that in the absence of 
mind the changes of the brain could be  
what they are2 for it belongs to the    
very causation of these movements that  
they should have a mental side4 ,and    
equally impossible is the supposition of
 the spiritualist that the cerebral     
processes are adventitious1 or that in  
the absence of brain the changes of the 
mind could be what they are2 for it     

belongs to the very causation of these  
changes that they should have a material
 side4 ,furthermore1 the use of mind to 
animals and to men is thus rendered     
apparent2 for intelligent volition is   
thus shown to be a true cause of        
adjustive movement1 in that the         
cerebration which it involves could not 
otherwise be possible3 the causation    
would not otherwise be complete4        
,,footnotes3  ,footnote #h3 ,lectures   
and ,essays1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #ef-g4        
,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,the ,,world ,,as ,,an
 ,,eject4   ,in the ,introduction to    
this essay ,i have sought to show that  
there are1 for the purposes of practical
 discussion1 but three theories of the  
,world of ,being4 ,there is1 first1 the 
theory of ,materialism1 which supposes  
matter in motion to be the ultimate or  
self-existing ,reality1 and1 therefore1 
the cause of mind4 ,next1 there is the  
theory of ,spiritualism1 which supposes 
mind to be the ultimate ,reality1 and1  
therefore1 the cause of matter in       

motion4 ,lastly1 there is the theory of 
,monism which supposes matter in motion 
to be substantially identical with mind1
 and1 therefore1 that as between mind   
and matter in motion there is no causal 
relation either way4 ,in the foregoing  
chapters ,i have considered these three 
theories1 and argued that of them the   
last-mentioned is the only one which    
satisfies all the facts of feeling on   
the one hand1 and of observation on the 
other4 ,the theory of ,monism alone is  
able to explain1 without inherent       
contradiction1 the phenomena both of the
 subjective and objective spheres4  ,it 
is my present purpose to extend the     
considerations already presented4       
,assuming the theory of ,monism1 ,i     
desire to ascertain the result to which 
it will lead when applied to the        
question whether we ought to regard the 
external world as of a character mental 
or non-mental4 ,as observed in my ,rede 
,lecture 7supra1 p4 #cc71 this question 
has already been considered by the late 

,professor ,clifford1 who decided that  
on the monistic theory the probability  
pointed towards the external world being
 of a character non-mental2 that1       
although the whole universe is composed 
of 'mind-stuff1' the universe as a whole
 is mindless4 ,this decision ,i then    
briefly criticized2 it is now my object 
to contemplate the matter somewhat more 
in detail4  ,i will assume1 on account  
of reasons previously given1 that when  
we speak of matter in motion we do not  
at all know what it is that moves1 nor  
do we know at all what it is that we    
mean by motion4 ,therefore if1 as       
unknown quantities1 we call matter a and
 motion b1 all we are entitled to affirm
 is that a  b  z1 where z is a known    
quantity1 or mind4 ,obversely stated1 we
 may say that the known quantity z is   
capable of being resolved into the      
unknown a  b4 ,but1 inasmuch as both a  
and b are unknown1 we may simplify      
matters by regarding their sum as a     
single unknown quantity x1 which we take

 to be substantially identical with its 
obverse aspect known as z4  ,here1 then1
 are our data4 ,the theory of ,monism   
teaches that what we perceive as matter 
in motion1 x1 is the obverse of what we 
know as mind1 z4 ,what1 then1 do we know
 of z8 ,in the first place1 we well know
 that this is the only entity with which
 we are acquainted1 so to speak1 at     
first hand2 all our knowledge of x      
7which is the only other knowledge we   
possess7 is possible only in so far as  
we are able to translate it into terms  
of z4 ,in the next place1 we know that z
 is itself an entity of the most        
enormous complexity4 ,standing as a     
symbol of the whole range of individual 
subjectivity1 it may be said to         
constitute for each individual the      
symbol of his own personality--or the   
sum total of his conscious life4 ,now   
each individual knows by direct         
knowledge that his conscious life is1 as
 ,i have said1 of enormous complexity1  
and that numberless ingredients of      

feeling1 thought1 and volition are      
therein combined in numberless ways4    
,therefore the symbol z may be          
considered as the sum of innumerable    
constituent parts1 grouped inter se in  
numberless systems of more or less      
complexity4  ,from these considerations 
we arrive at the following conclusions4 
,the theory of ,monism teaches that all 
z is x2 but it does not1 therefore1     
necessarily teach that all x is z4      
,nevertheless1 it does teach that if all
 x is not z1 this must be because x is  
z1 plus something more than z1 as a     
little thought will be sufficient to    
show4 ,thus1 the four annexed diagrams  
exhaust the logical possibilities of any
 case1 where the question is as to the  
inclusion or exclusion of one quantity  
by another4 ,in ,fig4 #a the two        
quantities are coincident2 in ,fig #b   
the one is wholly included by the other2
 in ,fig4 #c it is partially included2  
and in ,fig4 #d wholly excluded4 ,now in
 the present case1 and upon the data    

supplied1 the logical possibilities are 
exhausted by ,figs4 #a and #b4 ,for1    
upon these data1 ,figs4 #c and #d       
obviously represent logical             
impossibilities2 no part of ,mind can1  
according to these data1 stand outside  
the limits of ,matter and ,motion4      
,therefore1 if the ,ego is not          
coincident with the ,non-ego 7or if all 
x is not z1 as in ,fig4 #a71 this can   
only be because the ,ego is less        
extensive than the ,non-ego 7or because 
x is z plus something more than z1 as in
 ,fig4 #b74  ,illustration3 ,fig4 #a    
,illustration3 ,fig4 #b  ,illustration3 
,fig4 #c  ,illustration3 ,fig4 #d  ,of  
these two logical possibilities         
,idealism1 in its most extreme form1 may
 adopt the first4 ,for ,idealism in this
 form may hold that apart from the ,ego 
there is no external world2 that outside
 of z there is no x2 that the only esse 
is the percipi4 ,but1 as very few       
persons nowadays are prepared to go the 
length of seriously maintaining that in 

actual fact there is no external world  
save in so far as this is perceived by  
the individual mind1 ,i need not wait to
 consider this possibility4 ,we are thus
 practically shut up to a consideration 
of the possibility marked #b4           
,illustration3 ,fig4 #e  ,illustration3 
,fig4 #f  ,illustration3 ,fig4 #g  ,the 
theory of ,monism1 then1 teaches that x 
is z plus something more than z2 and    
therefore it becomes a matter of great  
moment to consider the probable nature  
of the overplus4 ,for it obviously does 
not follow that because x is greater    
than z in a logical sense1 therefore x  
must be greater than z in a             
psychological sense4 ,save upon the     
theory of ,idealism 7with which ,monism 
is not specially concerned7 the amount  
7whatever it may be7 wherein x is       
greater than z1 may not present any     
psychological signification at all4 ,we 
may find that the surface of our globe  
is considerably larger than that of the 
dry land1 and yet it may not follow that

 the mental-life to be met with in the  
sea is psychologically superior to that 
which occurs on dry land4 ,if1          
therefore1 we represent by comparative  
shading degrees of psychological        
excellence1 it is evident that the      
theory of ,monism must entertain the    
three possibilities indicated           
diagrammatically in ,figs4 #e1 #f1 and  
#g4 ,it makes no difference what the    
comparative areas of x and z may be1 or 
whether x be uniformly shaded throughout
 its extent4 ,all we have so far to     
notice is that the fact of logical      
inclusion does not necessarily carry    
with it the implication of psychological
 superiority4  ,next we must notice that
 besides our own subjectivities1 we have
 cognizance of being surrounded by many 
other inferred subjectivities more or   
less like in kind 7i4 e4 other human    
minds72 and also yet many other inferred
 subjectivities more or less unlike1 but
 all inferior 7i4 e4 the minds of lower 
animals1 young children1 and idiots74   

,following ,clifford1 ,i will call these
 inferred subjectivities by the name of 
ejects1 and assign to them the symbol y4
 ,thus1 in the following discussion1 x  
the objective world1 y  the ejective    
world1 and z  subjective world4 ,now1   
the theory of ,monism supposes that x1  
y1 and z are all alike in kind1 but     
present no definite teaching as to how  
far they may differ in degree4 ,we may1 
however1 at once allow that between the 
psychological value of z and that of y  
there is a wide difference of degree2   
and also that1 while the value of z is a
 fixed quantity1 that of y varies       
greatly in the different parts of the   
area y4 ,our scheme1 therefore1 will now
 adopt this form--  ,illustration  ,but 
the important question remains how we   
ought to shade x4 ,according to         
,clifford1 this ought scarcely to be    
shaded at all1 while according to       
theologians 7and theists generally7 it  
ought to be shaded so much more deeply  
than either y or z1 that the joint      

representation in one diagram would only
 be possible by choosing for the shading
 of x a colour different from that      
employed for y and z1 and assigning to  
that colour a representative value      
higher than that assigned to the other  
in the ratio of one to infinity4 ,it    
will be my object to estimate the       
relative probability of these rival     
estimates of the psychological value of 
x4  ,starting from z as our centre1 we  
know that this is an isolated system of 
subjectivity1 and hence we infer that   
all y is composed of analogous systems1 
resembling one another as to their      
isolation1 and differing only in their  
degrees of psychological value4 ,now    
this1 translated into terms of x 7or    
into terms of objectivity7 means that z 
is an isolated system of matter in      
motion1 and that the same has to be said
 of all the constituent parts of y4 ,in 
other words1 both subjectivity and      
ejectivity are only known under the     
condition of being isolated from        

objectivity2 which1 obversely           
considered1 means that the matter in    
motion here concerned is temporarily    
separated off from the rest of the      
objective world1 in such wise that it   
forms a distinct system of its own4 ,if 
any part of the objective world rudely  
forces its way within the machinery of  
that system1 it is at the risk of       
disarranging the machinery and stopping 
its work--as is the case when a bullet  
enters the brain4 ,such converse as the 
brain normally holds with the external  
world1 is held through the appointed    
channels of the senses1 whereby         
appropriate causation is supplied to    
keep the otherwise isolated system at   
work4 ,we know1 from physiological      
evidence1 that when such external       
causation is withheld1 the isolated     
system ceases to work2 therefore1 the   
isolation1 although complete under one  
point of view1 under another point of   
view is incomplete4 ,it is complete only
 in the sense in which the isolation of 

a machine is complete--i4 e4 it is in   
itself a working system1 yet its working
 is ultimately dependent upon causation 
supplied from without in certain        
appropriate ways4 ,this truth is        
likewise testified to on the obverse    
aspect of psychology4 ,for analysis     
shows that all our mental processes     
7however complex they may be internally7
 are ultimately dependent on impressions
 of the external world gained through   
the senses4 ,whether regarded           
objectively or subjectively1 therefore1 
we find that it is the business of the  
isolated system to elaborate1 by its    
internal processes1 the raw materials   
which are supplied to it from without4  
,seeing1 then1 that the isolation of the
 system is thus only partial1 we may    
best apply to it the term circumscribed4
 ,such partial isolation or             
circumscription of matter in motion--so 
that it shall in itself constitute a    
little working microcosm--appears to be 
the first condition to the being of a   

subjective personality4 ,why1 then1 does
 not the working of a machine present a 
subjective side8  ,our answer to this   
question is to be found in the following
 considerations4 ,we are going upon the 
hypothesis that all mind is matter in   
motion1 and that all matter in motion is
 mind--or1 as ,clifford phrased it1 that
 all the external world is composed of  
mind-stuff4 ,no matter how lightly we   
may shade x1 we are assuming that it    
must be shaded1 and not left perfectly  
white4 ,now1 both mind and matter in    
motion admit of degrees3 first as to    
quantity1 next as to velocity1 and      
lastly as to complexity4 ,but the       
degrees of matter in motion are found1  
in point of observable fact1 not to     
correspond with those of mind1 save in  
the last particular of complexity1 where
 there is unquestionably an evident     
correspondence4 ,therefore it is that a 
machine1 although conforming to the     
prime condition of subjectivity in being
 a circumscribed system of matter in    

motion1 nevertheless does not attain to 
subjectivity3 the x does not rise to z  
because the internal processes of x are 
not sufficiently intricate1 or their    
intricacy is not of the appropriate     
kind4 ,from which it follows that       
although1 as ,i have said1 all matter in
 motion is mind1 merely as matter in    
motion 7or irrespective of the kinds and
 degrees of both7 it may not necessarily
 be mind in the elaborated form of      
consciousness3 it may only be the raw   
material of mind--or1 as ,clifford      
called it1 mind-stuff4 ,thus1 although  
all conscious volition is matter in     
motion1 it does not follow that all     
matter in motion is conscious volition4 
,which serves to restate the question as
 to how far it is probable1 or          
improbable1 that all matter in motion is
 conscious volition--i4e4 how deeply we 
ought to shade x4  ,well1 the first     
thing to be considered in answering this
 question is that1 according to the     
theory of ,monism1 we know that it is   

within the range of possibility for     
matter in motion to reach a level of    
intricacy which shall yield conscious   
volition1 and even self-conscious       
thought of an extremely high order of   
development4 ,therefore1 the only       
question is as to whether it is         
possible1 or in any way probable1 that  
matter in motion as occurring in x      
resembles1 in point of intricacy1 matter
 in motion as occurring in z4 ,professor
 ,clifford perceived that this is the   
core of the question1 and staked the    
whole answer to it on an extremely      
simple issue4 ,he said that unless we   
can show in the disposition of heavenly 
bodies some morphological resemblance to
 the structure of a human brain1 we are 
precluded from rationally entertaining  
any probability that self-conscious     
volition belongs to the universe4       
,obviously1 this way of presenting the  
case is so grossly illogical that even  
the exigencies of popular exposition    
cannot be held to justify the           

presentation4 ,for aught that we can    
know to the contrary1 not merely the    
highly specialized structure of the     
human brain1 but even that of nervous   
matter in general1 may only be one of a 
thousand possible ways in which the     
material and dynamical conditions       
required for the apparition of          
self-consciousness can be secured4 ,to  
imagine that the human brain of         
necessity exhausts these possibilities  
is in the last degree absurd4           
,therefore1 we may suggest the following
 presentation of ,clifford's case as one
 that is less obviously inadequate3--if 
any resemblance to the material and     
dynamical conditions of the microcosm   
can be detected in the macrocosm1 we    
should have good reason to ascribe to   
the latter those attributes of          
subjectivity which we know as belonging 
to the former2 but if no such           
resemblance can be traced1 we shall have
 some reason to suppose that these      
attributes do not belong to the         

universe4 ,even this1 however1 ,i should
 regard as much too wide a statement of 
the case4 ,to take the particular       
conditions under which alone            
subjectivity is known to occur upon a   
single planet as exhausting the         
possibilities of its occurrence         
elsewhere1 is too flagrant a use of the 
method of simple enumeration to admit of
 a moment's countenance4 ,even the      
knowledge that we have of the two great 
conditions under which terrestrial      
subjectivities occur--circumscription   
and complexity--is only empirical4 ,it  
may well be that elsewhere 7or apart    
from the conditions imposed by nervous  
tissue7 subjectivity is possible        
irrespective both of circumscription and
 of complexity4 ,therefore1 properly or 
logically regarded1 the great use of the
 one exhibition of subjectivity         
furnished to human experience1 is the   
proof thus furnished that subjectivity  
is possible under some conditions2 and  
the utmost which on the grounds of such 

proof human experience is entitled to   
argue is1 that probably1 if subjectivity
 is possible elsewhere1 its possibility 
is given by those conditions of         
circumscription and complexity in the   
material and dynamical relations        
concerned1 which we find to be the      
invariable and quantitative concomitants
 of subjectivity within experience4 ,but
 this is a widely different thing from  
saying that the only kind of such       
circumscription and complexity--or the  
only disposition of these               
relations--which can present a          
subjective side is that which is found  
in the structures and functions of a    
nervous system4  ,now1 if we fix our    
attention merely on this matter of      
complexity1 and refuse to be led astray 
by obviously false analogies of a more  
special kind1 ,i think there can be no  
question that the macrocosm does furnish
 amply sufficient opportunity1 as it    
were1 for the presence of subjectivity1 
even if it be assumed that subjectivity 

can only be yielded by an order of      
complexity analogous to that of a       
nervous system4 ,for1 considering the   
material and dynamical system of the    
universe as a whole1 it is obvious that 
the complexity presented is greater than
 that of any of its parts4 ,not only is 
it true that all these parts are        
included in the whole1 and that even the
 visible sidereal system alone presents 
movements of enormous intricacy#i1 but  
we find1 for instance1 that even within 
the limits of this small planet there is
 presented to actual observation a      
peculiar form of circumscribed complex1 
fully comparable with that of the       
individual brain1 and yet external to   
each individual brain4 ,for the         
so-called 'social organism1' although   
composed of innumerable individual      
personalities1 is1 with regard to each  
of its constituent units1 a part of the 
objective world--just as the human brain
 would be1 were each of its constituent 
cells of a construction sufficiently    

complex to yield a separate personality4
  ,if to this it be objected that1 as a 
matter of fact1 the social organism does
 not possess a self-conscious           
personality1 ,i will give a twofold     
answer4 ,in the first place1 ,who told  
the objector that it has not8 ,for aught
 that any one of its constituent        
personalities can prove to the contrary1
 this social organism may possess       
self-conscious personality of the most  
vivid character3 its constituent human  
minds may be born into it and die out of
 it as do the constituent cells of the  
human body3 it may feel the throes of   
war and famine1 rejoice in the comforts 
of peace and plenty3 it may appreciate  
the growth of civilization as its       
passage from childhood to maturity4 ,if 
this at first sight appears a grotesque 
supposition1 we must remember that it   
would appear equally so to ascribe such 
possibilities to the individual brain1  
were it not for the irrelevant accident 
of this particular form of complex      

standing in such relation to our own    
subjectivity that we are able to verify 
the fact of its ejectivity4 ,thus1 for  
aught that we can tell to the contrary1 
,comte may have been even more justified
 than his followers suppose1 in teaching
 the personification of ,humanity4      
,but1 in the next place1 if the social  
organism is not endowed with            
personality1 this may be for either one 
of two reasons4 ,all the conditions     
required for attaining so high a level  
of psychical perfection may not be here 
present2 or else the level of psychical 
perfection may be higher than that which
 we know as personality4 ,this latter   
alternative will be considered in       
another relation by-and-by1 so ,i will  
not dwell upon it now4 ,but with        
reference to all these possible         
contingencies1 ,i may observe that we   
are not without clear indications of the
 great fact that the high order of      
complexity which has been reached by the
 social organism is accompanied by      

evidence of something which we may least
 dimly define as resembling             
subjectivity4 ,in numberless ways1 which
 ,i need not wait to enumerate1 we      
perceive that society exhibits the      
phenomena both of thought and conduct4  
,and these phenomena cannot always be   
explained by regarding them as the sum  
of the thoughts and actions of its      
constituent individuals--or1 at least1  
they can only be so regarded by         
conceding that the thoughts and actions 
of the constituent individuals1 when    
thus summated1 yield a different product
 from that which would be obtained by a 
merely arithmetical computation of the  
constituent parts3 the composite product
 differs from its component elements1 as
 ,h#b,o differs from #b;,h  ,o4 ,the    
general truth of this remark will1 ,i   
believe1 be appreciated by all          
historians4 ,seeing that ideas are      
often1 as it is said1 'in the air'      
before they are condensed in the mind of
 individual genius1 we habitually speak 

of the ',zeit-geist' as the product of a
 kind of collective psychology1 which is
 something other than the mere sum of   
all the individual minds of a           
generation4 ,that is to say1 we regard  
society as an eject1 and the more that a
 man studies the thought and conduct of 
society1 the more does he become        
convinced that we are right in so       
regarding it4 ,of course this eject is  
manifestly unlike that which we form of 
another individual mind3 it is much more
 general1 vague1 and so far unlike the  
pattern of our own subjectivity that    
even to ascribe to it the important     
attribute of personality is felt1 as we 
have just seen1 to approach the         
grotesque4 ,still1 in this vague and    
general way we do ascribe to society    
ejective existence3 we habitually think 
of the whole world of human thought and 
feeling as a psychological complex1     
which is other than1 and more than1 a   
mere shorthand enumeration of all the   
thoughts and feelings of all individual 

human beings4  ,the ejective existence  
thus ascribed to society serves as a    
stepping-stone to the yet more vague and
 general ascription of such existence to
 the ,cosmos4 ,at first1 indeed1 or     
during the earliest stages of culture1  
the ascription of ejective existence to 
the external world is neither vague nor 
general3 on the contrary1 it is most    
distinct and specific4 ,beginning in the
 rudest forms of animism1 where every   
natural process admits of being         
immediately attributed to the volitional
 agency of an unseen spirit1            
anthropomorphism sets out upon its long 
course of development1 which proceeds   
pari passu with the development of      
abstract thought4 ,man1 as it has been  
truly said1 universally makes ,god in   
his own image2 and it is difficult to   
see how the case could be otherwise4    
,universally the eject must assume the  
pattern of the subject1 and it is only  
in the proportion that this pattern     
presents the features of abstract       

thinking that the image which it throws 
becomes less and less man-like4 ,hence1 
as ,mr4 ,fiske has shown in detail1 so  
soon as anthropomorphism has assumed its
 highest state of development1 it begins
 to be replaced by a continuous growth  
of 'deanthropomorphism1' which1 passing 
through polytheism into monotheism1     
eventually ends in a progressive        
'purification' of theism--by which is   
meant a progressive metamorphosis of the
 theistic conception1 tending to remove 
from ,deity the attributes of ,humanity4
 ,the last of these attributes to       
disappear is that of personality1 and   
when this final ecdysis has been        
performed1 the eject which remains is so
 unlike its original subject1 that1 as  
we shall immediately find1 it is        
extremely difficult to trace any points 
of resemblance between them4  ,now it is
 with this perfect1 or imago condition  
of the world-eject1 that we have to do4 
,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 in what ,i      
consider the profoundest reaches of his 

philosophic thought1 has well shown1 on 
the one hand1 how impossible it is to   
attribute to ,deity any of the specific 
attributes of mind as known to ourselves
 subjectively2 and1 on the other hand1  
how it is possible to conceive          
'symbolically' that the universe may be 
instinct with a 'quasi-psychical'       
principle1 as greatly transcending      
personality as personality transcends   
mechanical motion#aj4 ,accepting1 then1 
the world-eject in this its highest     
conceivable stage of evolution1 ,i      
desire to contemplate it under the light
 of the monistic theory4  ,we have seen 
that1 whether we look upon the          
subjective or objective face of         
personality1 we find that personality   
arises from limitation--or1 as ,i have  
previously termed it1 circumscription4  
,now1 we have no evidence1 nor are we   
able to conceive1 of the external world 
as limited2 consequently we are not able
 to conceive1 of the world-eject as     
personal4 ,but1 inasmuch as personality 

arises only from limitation1 the        
conclusion that the world-eject is      
impersonal does not tend to show that it
 is of lower psychical value than       
conscious personality3 on the contrary1 
it tends to show that it is probably of 
higher psychical value4 ,true1 we are   
not able to conceive actually of mind as
 impersonal2 but we can see that this   
merely arises from our only experience  
of mind being given under conditions of 
personality2 and1 as just observed1 it  
is possible to conceive symbolically    
that there may be a form of mind as     
greatly transcending personality as     
personality transcends mechanical       
motion4  ,now1 although we cannot       
conceive of such a mind actually1 we may
 most probably make the nearest approach
 to conceiving of it truly1 by          
provisionally ascribing to it the       
highest attributes of mind as known to  
ourselves1 or the attributes which      
belong to human personality4 ,just as a 
thinking insect would derive a better1  

or more true1 conception of human       
personality by considering it ejectively
 than by considering it objectively 7or 
by considering the mind-processes as    
distinguished from the brain-processes71
 so1 if there is a form of mind         
immeasurably superior to our own1 we may
 probably gain a more                   
faithful--howsoever still               
inadequate--conception of it by         
contemplating its operations ejectively 
than by doing so objectively4 ,i will1  
therefore1 speak of the world-eject as  
presenting conscious volition1 on the   
understanding that if x does not present
 either consciousness or volition1 this 
must be--according to the fundamental   
assumption of psychism on which we are  
now proceeding--because x presents      
attributes at least as much higher than 
consciousness or volition as these are  
higher than mechanical motion4 ,for when
 we consider the utmost that our        
conscious volition is able to accomplish
 in the way of contrivance--how limited 

its knowledge1 how short its duration1  
how restricted its range1 and how       
imperfect its adaptations--we can only  
conclude that if the ultimate           
constitution of all things is pyschical1
 the philosophy of the ,cosmos becomes a
 'philosophy of the ,unconscious' only  
because it is a philosophy of the       
,superconscious4  ,now1 if once we feel 
ourselves able to transcend the         
preliminary--and doubtless very         
considerable--difficulty of symbolically
 conceiving the world-eject as          
super-conscious1 and 7because not       
limited7 also super-personal1 ,i think  
there can be no question that the       
world-object furnishes overwhelming     
proof of psychism4 ,i candidly confess  
that ,i am not myself able to overcome  
the preliminary difficulty in question4 
,by discharging the elements of         
personality and conscious volition from 
the world-eject1 ,i appear to be        
discharging from my conception of mind  
all that most distinctively belongs to  

that conception2 and thus ,i seem to be 
brought back again to the point from    
which we started3 the world-eject       
appears to have again resolved itself   
into the unknown quantity x4 ,but here  
we must distinguish between actual      
conception and symbolical conception4   
,although it is unquestionably true that
 ,i can form no actual conception of    
,mind save as an eject of personality   
and conscious volition1 it is a question
 whether ,i am not able to form a       
symbolical conception of ,mind as thus  
extended4 ,for ,i know that             
consciousness1 implying as it does      
continual change in serial order of     
circumscribed mental processes1 is not  
7symbolically considered7 the highest   
conceivable exhibition of ,mind2 and    
just as a mathematician is able to deal 
symbolically with space of n dimensions1
 while only able really to conceive of  
space as limited to three dimensions1 so
 ,i feel that ,i ought not to limit the 
abstract possibilities of mental being  

by what ,i may term the accidental      
conditions of my own being4  ,i need    
scarcely wait to show why it appears to 
me that if this position is granted1 the
 world-object furnishes1 as ,i have     
said1 overwhelming proof of psychism2   
for this proof has been ably presented  
by many other writers4 ,there is first  
the antecedent improbability that the   
human mind should be the highest        
manifestation of subjectivity in this   
universe of infinite objectivity4 ,there
 is next the fact that throughout this  
universe of infinite objectivity--so    
far1 at least1 as human observation can 
extend--there is unquestionable evidence
 of some one integrating principle1     
whereby all its many and complex parts  
are correlated with one another in such 
wise that the result is universal order4
 ,and if we take any part of the whole  
system--such as that of organic nature  
on this planet--to examine in more      
detail1 we find that it appears to be   
instinct with contrivance4 ,so to speak1

 wherever we tap organic nature1 it     
seems to flow with purpose2 and1 as we  
shall presently see1 upon the monistic  
theory the evidence of purpose is here  
in no way attenuated by a full          
acceptance of any of the 'mechanical'   
explanations furnished by science4 ,now1
 these large and important facts of     
observation unquestionably point1 as    
just observed1 to some one integrating  
principle as pervading the ,cosmos2 and1
 if so1 we can scarcely be wrong in     
supposing that among all our conceptions
 it must hold nearest kinship to that   
which is our highest conception of an   
integrating cause--viz41 the conception 
of psychism4 ,assuredly no human mind   
could either have devised or maintained 
the working of even a fragment of       
,nature2 and1 therefore1 it seems but   
reasonable to conclude that the         
integrating principle of the whole--the 
,spirit1 as it were1 of the             
,universe--must be something which1     
while as ,i have said holding nearest   

kinship with our highest conception of  
disposing power1 must yet be            
immeasurably superior to the psychism of
 man4 ,the world-eject thus becomes     
invested with a psychical value as      
greatly transcending in magnitude that  
of the human mind1 as the material frame
 of the universe transcends in its      
magnitude the material frame of the     
human body4 ,therefore1 without in any  
way straining the theory of ,monism1 we 
may provisionally shade x more deeply   
than z1 and this in some immeasurable   
degree4         99       99       99    
99       99  ,one other matter remains  
to be considered with reference to this 
world-eject as sanctioned by ,monism4   
,it leaves us free to regard all natural
 causation as a direct exhibition of    
psychism4 ,the prejudice against        
anything approaching a theistic         
interpretation of the ,universe nowadays
 arises chiefly from the advance of     
physical science having practically     
revealed the ubiquity of natural causes4

 ,it is felt that when a complete       
explanation of any given phenomenon has 
been furnished in terms of these causes1
 there is no need to go further2 the    
phenomenon has been rendered            
intelligible on its mechanical side1 and
 therefore it is felt that we have no   
reason to suppose that it presents a    
mental side--any supplementary causation
 of a mental kind being regarded as     
superfluous4 ,even writers who expressly
 repudiate this reasoning prove         
themselves to be habitually under its   
influence2 for we constantly find that  
such writers1 after conceding the       
mechanical explanations as far as these 
have been proved1 take their stand upon 
the more intricate phenomena of ,nature 
where1 as yet1 the mechanical           
explanations are not forthcoming4       
,whether it be at the origin of life1   
the origin of sentiency1 of instinct1 of
 rationality1 of morality1 or of        
religion1 these writers habitually argue
 that here1 at least1 the purely        

mechanical interpretations fail2 and    
that here1 consequently1 there is still 
room left for a psychical               
interpretation4 ,of course the pleading 
for theism thus supplied is seen by     
others to be of an extremely feeble     
quality2 for while1 on the one hand1 it 
rests only upon ignorance of natural    
causation 7as distinguished from any    
knowledge of super-natural causation71  
on the other hand1 abundant historical  
analogies are available to show that it 
is only a question of time when pleading
 of this kind will become more and more 
restricted in its subject-matter1 till  
eventually it be altogether silenced4   
,but the pleading which ,monism is here 
able to supply can never be silenced4   
,for1 according to ,monism1 all matter  
in motion is mind2 and1 therefore1      
matter in motion is merely the objective
 revelation1 to us and for us1 of that  
which in its subjective aspect--or in   
its ultimate reality--is mind4 ,just as 
the operations of my friend's mind can  

only be revealed to me through the      
mechanical operations of his body1 so it
 may very well be that the operations of
 the ,supreme ,mind 7supposing such to  
exist7 can only be revealed to me       
through the mechanical operations of    
,nature4 ,the only difference between   
the two cases is that while ,i am able1 
in the case of my friend's mind1 to     
elicit responses of mechanical movement 
having a definite and intended relation 
to the operations of my own mind1       
similarly expressed to him2 such is not 
the case with ,nature4 ,with the        
friend-eject ,i am able to converse2 but
 not so with the world-eject#aa4 ,this  
great difference1 however1 although     
obviously depriving me of any such      
direct corroboration of psychism in the 
world-eject as that which ,i thus derive
 of psychism in the friend-eject1 ought 
not to be regarded by me as amounting1  
in the smallest degree1 to disproof of  
psychism in the world-eject4 ,the fact  
that ,i am not able to converse with the

 world-eject is merely a negative fact1 
and should not be allowed to tell       
against any probability 7otherwise      
derived7 in favour of psychism as       
belonging to that eject4 ,there may be a
 thousand very good reasons why ,i      
should be precluded from such           
converse--some of which1 indeed1 ,i can 
myself very clearly perceive4  ,the     
importance of ,monism in thus enabling  
us rationally to contemplate all        
processes of physical causation as      
possibly immediate exhibitions of       
psychism1 is difficult to overrate4 ,for
 it entirely discharges all distinction 
between the mechanical and the mental2  
so that if physical science were        
sufficiently advanced to yield a full   
natural explanation of all the phenomena
 within human experience1 mankind would 
be in a position to gain as complete a  
knowledge as is theoretically possible  
of the psychological character of the   
world-eject4 ,already we are able to    
perceive the immense significance of    

being able to regard any sequence of    
natural causation as the merely         
phenomenal aspect of the ontological    
reality--the merely outward             
manifestation of an inward meaning4     
,thus1 for example1 ,i am listening to a
 sonata of ,beethoven's played by       
,madame ,schumann4 ,helmholtz tells me  
all that he knows about the physics and 
physiology of the process1 both beyond  
and within my brain4 ,but ,i feel that1 
even if ,helmholtz were able to tell me 
very much more than he can1 so long as  
he is dealing with these objective      
explanations1 he is at work only upon   
the outer skin of the whole matter4 ,the
 great reality is the mind of ,beethoven
 communicating to my mind through the   
complex intervention of three different 
brains with their neuro-muscular        
systems1 and an endless variety of      
aerial vibrations proceeding from a     
pianoforte4 ,the method of communication
 has nothing more to do with the reality
 communicated than have the paper and   

ink of this essay to do with the ideas  
which they serve to convey4 ,in each    
case a vehicle of symbols is necessary  
in order that one mind should           
communicate with another2 but in both   
cases this is a vehicle of symbols1 and 
nothing more4 ,everywhere1 therefore1   
the reality may be psychical1 and the   
physical symbolic2 everywhere matter in 
motion may be the outward and visible   
sign of an inward and spiritual grace4  
,take again the case of morality and    
religion4 ,because science1 by its      
theory of evolution1 appears to be in a 
fair way of explaining the genesis of   
these things by natural causes1 theists 
are taking alarm2 it is felt by them    
that if morality can be fully explained 
by utility1 and religion by             
superstition1 the reality of both is    
destroyed4 ,but ,monism teaches that    
such a view is entirely erroneous4 ,for1
 according to ,monism1 the natural      
causation of morality and religion has  
nothing whatever to do with the ultimate

 truth of either4 ,the natural causation
 is merely a record of physical         
processes1 serving to manifest the      
psychical processes4 ,nor can it make   
any difference1 as regards the ultimate 
veracity of the moral and religious     
feelings1 that they have been developed 
slowly by natural causes2 that they were
 at first grossly selfish on the one    
hand1 and hideously superstitious on the
 other2 that they afterwards went       
through a long series of changes1 none  
of which therefore can have fully       
corresponded with external truth2 or    
that even now they may be both extremely
 far from any such correspondence4 ,all 
that such considerations go to prove is1
 that it belongs to the natural method  
of mental evolution in man that with    
advancing culture his ejective          
interpretations of ,nature should more  
and more nearly approximate the truth4  
,the world-eject must necessarily vary  
with the character of the human subject2
 but this does not prove that the       

ejective interpretation has throughout  
been wrong in method3 it only proves    
that such interpretation has been       
imperfect--and necessarily imperfect--in
 application4  ,such1 then1 ,i conceive 
to be one of the most important         
consequences of the monistic theory4    
,namely1 that by regarding physical     
causation as everywhere but the         
objective or phenomenal aspect of an    
ejective or ontological reality1 it     
furnishes a logical basis for a theory  
of things which is at the same time     
natural and spiritual4 ,on the objective
 aspect1 the explanations furnished by  
reason are of necessity physical1 while1
 on the ejective aspect1 such           
explanations are of necessity           
metaphysical--or rather1 let us say1    
hyper-physical4 ,but these two orders of
 explanation are different only because 
their modes of interpreting the same    
events are different4 ,the objective    
explanation which was given 7as we      
supposed7 by ,helmholtz of the effects  

produced on the human brain by hearing a
 sonata1 was no doubt perfectly sound   
within its own category2 but the        
ejective explanation of these same      
effects which is given by a musician is 
equally sound within its category4 ,and 
similarly1 if instead of the man-object 
we contemplate the world-object physical
 causation becomes but the phenomenal   
aspect of psychical causation2 the      
invariability of its sequence becomes   
but the expression of intentional order2
 the iron rigidity of natural law       
becomes the sensuous manifestation of an
 unalterable consistency as belonging to
 the ,supreme ,volition4  ,my object in 
this paper has been to show that the    
views of the late ,professor ,clifford  
concerning the influence of ,monism on  
,theism are unsound4 ,i am in full      
agreement with him in believing that    
,monism is destined to become the       
generally accepted theory of things1    
seeing that it is the only theory of    
things which can receive the sanction of

 science on the one hand and of feeling 
on the other4 ,but ,i disagree with him 
in holding that this theory is fraught  
with implications of an anti-theistic   
kind4 ,in my opinion this theory leaves 
the question of ,theism very much where 
it was before4 ,that is to say1 while   
not furnishing any independent proof of 
,theism1 it likewise fails to furnish   
any independent disproof4 ,the reason   
why in ,clifford's hands this theory    
appeared to furnish independent         
disproof1 was because he persisted in   
regarding the world only as an object3  
he did not entertain the possibility    
that the world might also be regarded as
 an eject4 ,yet1 that the world1 under  
the theory of ,monism1 is at least as   
susceptible of an ejective as it is of  
an objective interpretation1 ,i trust   
that ,i have now been able to show4 ,and
 this is all that ,i have endeavoured to
 show4 ,as a matter of methodical       
reasoning it appears to me that ,monism 
alone can only lead to ,agnosticism4    

,that is to say1 it leaves a clear field
 of choice as between ,theism and       
,atheism2 and1 therefore1 to a carefully
 reasoning ,monist1 there are three     
alternatives open4 ,he may remain a     
,monist1 and nothing more2 in which case
 he is an agnostic4 ,he may entertain   
what appears to him independent evidence
 in favour of ,theism1 and thus he may  
become a theist4 ,or he may entertain   
what appears to him independent evidence
 in favour of ,atheism1 and thus he may 
become an atheist4 ,but1 in any case1 so
 far as his ,monism can carry him1 he is
 left perfectly free either to regard   
the world as an object alone1 or to     
regard the world as also an eject#ab4   
,,footnotes3  ,footnote #i3 ,if we      
imagine the visible sidereal system     
compressed within the limits of a human 
skull1 so that all its movements which  
we now recognize as molar should become 
molecular1 the complexity of such       
movement would probably be as great as  
that which takes place in a human brain4

 ,yet to this must be added all the     
molecular movements which are now going 
on in the sidereal system1 visible and  
invisible4  ,footnote #aj3 ,principles  
of ,psychology1 vol4 i4 pp4 #aei-fa2    
,essays1 vol4 iii4 pp4 #bdf-i2 and      
,first ,principles1 p4 #bf4  ,footnote  
#aa3 ,it is1 however1 the belief of all 
religious persons that even this        
distinction does not hold4 ,if they are 
right in their belief1 the distinction  
would then become one as to the mode of 
converse4 ,in this case what is called  
communion with the ,supreme ,mind must  
be supposed to be a communion sui       
generis3 the converse of mind with mind 
is here direct1 or does not require to  
be translated into the language of      
mechanical signs3 it is subjective1 not 
ejective4 ,still1 even here we must     
believe that the physical aspect        
accompanies the psychical1 although not 
necessarily observed4 ,an act of prayer1
 for example1 is1 on its physical       
aspect1 an act of cerebration3 so is the

 answer 7supposing it genuine71 in as   
far as the worshipper is concerned4     
,thus prayer and its answer 7according  
to ,monism7 resemble all the other      
processes of ,nature in presenting an   
objective side of strictly physical     
causation4 ,nor is it possible that the 
case could be otherwise1 if all mental  
processes consist in physical process1  
and vice versa4 ,it is obvious that this
 consideration has important bearings on
 the question as to the physical        
efficacy of prayer4 ,from a monistic    
point of view both those who affirm and 
those who deny such efficacy are equally
 in the right1 and equally in the wrong2
 they are merely quarrelling upon       
different sides of the same shield4     
,for1 according to ,monism1 if the      
theologians are right in supposing that 
the ,supreme ,mind is the hearer of     
prayer in any case1 they are also right 
in supposing that the ,mind must        
necessarily be able to grant what is    
called physical answers1 seeing that in 

order to grant any answer 7even of the  
most apparently spiritual kind7 some    
physical change must be produced1 if it 
be only in the brain of the petitioner4 
,on the other hand1 the scientists are  
equally right in maintaining that no    
physical answer to prayer can be of the 
nature of a miracle1 or produced        
independently of strictly physical      
causation2 for1 if so1 the physical and 
the psychical would no longer be        
coincident4 ,but1 until the scientists  
are able to perform the hopeless task of
 proving where the possibilities of     
physical causation end1 as a mere matter
 of abstract speculation and going upon 
the theory of ,monism1 it is evident    
that the theologians may have any       
latitude they choose to claim1 both as  
regards this matter and that of         
so-called miracles4  ,footnote #ab3 ,it 
may be explained that by ,agnosticism ,i
 understand a theory of things which    
abstains from either affirming or       
denying the existence of ,god4 ,it thus 

represents1 with regard to ,theism1 a   
state of suspended judgement2 and all it
 undertakes to affirm is1 that1 upon    
existing evidence1 the being of ,god is 
unknown4 ,but the term ,agnosticism is  
frequently used in a widely different   
sense1 as implying belief that the being
 of ,god is not merely now unknown1 but 
must always remain unknowable4 ,it is   
therefore often represented that ,mr4   
,herbert ,spencer1 in virtue of his     
doctrine of the ,unknowable1 is a kind  
of apostle of ,agnosticism4 ,this1      
however1 ,i conceive to be a great      
mistake4 ,the distinctive features of   
,mr4 ,spencer's doctrine of the         
,unknowable are not merely non-agnostic1
 but anti-agnostic4 ,for the doctrine   
affirms that we have this much knowledge
 of ,god--namely1 that if ,he exists1   
,he must for ever be unknown4 ,without  
question1 this would be a most important
 piece of definite knowledge with regard
 to ,deity1 negative though it be2 and1 
therefore1 any man who holds it has no  

right to be called an agnostic4  ,to me 
it has always seemed that the doctrine  
of the ,unknowable1 in so far as it     
differs from the doctrine of the        
,unknown1 is highly unphilosophical4 ,by
 what right can it be affirmed that     
,deity1 if ,he exists1 may not reveal   
the fact of ,his existence              
to-morrow--and this to the whole human  
race without the possibility of doubt8  
,or1 if there be a ,god1 who is to say  
that there certainly cannot be a future 
life1 in which each individual man may  
have unquestionable proof of ,theism8   
,it is a perfectly philosophical        
statement for any one to make that1 as  
matters now stand1 he can see no        
evidence of ,theism2 but to say that he 
knows the human race never can have such
 evidence1 is a most unphilosophical    
statement1 seeing that it could only be 
justified by absolute knowledge4 ,and1  
on this account1 ,i say that the        
doctrine of the ,unknowable1 in so far  
as it differs from the doctrine of the  

,unknown1 is the very reverse of        
agnostic4  ,now1 the theory of ,monism  
alone1 as observed in the text1 appears 
to be purely agnostic in the sense just 
explained4 ,if in some parts of the     
foregoing essay ,i appear to have been  
arguing in favour of theistic           
implications1 this has only been in     
order to show 7as against ,clifford7    
that the world does admit of being      
regarded as an eject4 ,but inasmuch     
as--religious faith apart--we are not   
able to verify any such ejective        
interpretation1 we are not able to      
estimate its value4 ,monism sanctions   
the shading of x as deeply as we choose2
 but the shading which it sanctions is  
only provisional4     ,,chapter ,v4     
,,the ,,will ,,in ,,relation ,,to       
,,materialism ,,and ,,spiritualism4     
,in the foregoing chapters ,i have      
considered the theory of ,monism1 first 
in contrast with the theories of        
,materialism and of ,spiritualism1 and  
next in relation to the theory of       

,theism4 ,in this chapter and that which
 succeeds it ,i propose to consider     
,monism in relation to the ,will4 ,to do
 this it is needful to begin by         
considering the problems which are      
presented by the ,will in relation to   
the older theories of ,materialism on   
the one hand and of ,spiritualism on the
 other4  ,although the phenomena of     
volition have occupied so large a       
province of philosophical literature1   
the fundamental problems which arise in 
connexion with them are only two in     
number1 and both admit of being stated  
in extremely simple terms4 ,the         
historical order in which these two     
problems have arisen is the inverse of  
their logical order4 ,for while in      
logical order the two problems would    
stand thus--,is the ,will an agent8 ,if 
so1 is it a free agent8--in actual      
discussion it was long taken for granted
 that the ,will is an agent1 and hence  
the only controversy gathered round the 
question whether the ,will is a free    

agent4 ,descartes1 indeed1 seems to have
 entertained the prior question with    
regard to animals1 and there are        
passages in the ,leviathan which may be 
taken to imply that ,hobbes entertained 
this question with regard to man4 ,but  
it was not until recent years that any  
such question could stand upon a basis  
of science as distinguished from        
speculation2 the question did not admit 
of being so much as stated in terms of  
science until physiology was in a       
position openly to challenge our right  
to assume that the ,will is an agent4   
,such a challenge physiology has now    
given1 and even declared that any       
assumption of volitional agency is1 in  
the presence of adequate physiological  
knowledge1 impossible4  ,the two        
problems which ,i thus state separately 
are often1 and indeed generally1        
confused together2 but for the purpose  
of clear analysis it is of the first    
importance that they should be kept     
apart4 ,in order to show the wide       

distinction between them1 we may best   
begin with a brief consideration of what
 it is that the two problems severally  
involve2 and to do this we may best take
 the problems in what ,i have called    
their logical order4  ,first1 then1 as  
regards the question whether the ,will  
is an agent1 the rival theories of      
,materialism and ,spiritualism stand to 
one another in a relation of            
contradiction4 ,for it is of the essence
 of ,spiritualism to regard the ,will as
 an agent1 or as an original cause of   
bodily movement1 and therefore as a true
 cause in ,nature4 ,on the other hand1  
it is of the essence of ,materialism to 
deny that the ,will is an agent4        
,hitherto1 indeed1 materialists as a    
body have not expressly recognized this 
implication as necessarily belonging to 
their theory2 but that this implication 
does necessarily belong to their        
theory--or rather1 ,i should say1 really
 constitutes its most distinctive       
feature--admits of being easily shown4  

,for the theory that material changes   
are the causes of mental changes        
necessarily terminates in the so-called 
theory of conscious automatism--or the  
theory that so far as the conditions to 
bodily action are concerned1            
consciousness is adventitious1 bearing  
the same ineffectual relation to the    
activity of the brain as the striking of
 a clock bears to the time-keeping      
adjustments of the clock-work4 ,from    
this conclusion there is no possibility 
of escape1 if once we accept the        
premises of ,materialism2 and therefore 
,i say it belongs to the essence of     
,materialism to deny the agency of      
,will4  ,just as necessarily does it    
belong to the essence of ,monism to     
affirm the agency of ,will4 ,for1       
according to this theory1 while motion  
is producing nothing but motion1        
mind-change nothing but mind-change1    
both are producing both simultaneously2 
neither could be what it is without the 
other1 for each is to the other a       

necessary counterpart or supplement1 in 
the absence of which the whole causation
 7whether regarded from the physical or 
mental side7 would not be complete4     
,now1 in my opinion the importance of   
the view thus presented by the theory of
 ,monism is1 for all purposes of        
psychological analysis1 inestimable4 ,it
 is impossible nowadays that such       
analysis can proceed very far in any    
direction without confronting the facts 
presented by physiology3 hence it is    
impossible for such analysis to confine 
itself exclusively to the spiritual or  
subjective side of psychology4 ,on the  
other hand1 in so far as such analysis  
has regard to the material or objective 
side1 it has hitherto appeared to       
countenance--in however disguised a     
form--the dogmatic denial of the ,will  
as an agent4 ,hence the supreme         
importance to psychology of reconciling 
the hitherto rival theories of          
,spiritualism and ,materialism in the   
higher synthesis which is furnished by  

the theory of ,monism4 ,for1 obviously1 
in the absence of any philosophical     
justification of the ,will as an agent1 
we are without any guarantee that all   
psychological inquiry is not a vain     
beating of the air4 ,if1 as ,materialism
 necessarily implies1 the ,will is not a
 cause in ,nature1 there would be no    
reason in ,nature for the agency either 
of feeling or of intelligence4 ,feeling 
and intelligence would1 therefore1 stand
 as ciphers in the general constitution 
of things2 and any inquiry touching     
their internal system of causation could
 have no reference to any scientific    
inquiry touching causation in general4  
,i am aware that this truth is          
habitually overlooked by psychologists2 
but it is none the less a truth of      
fundamental importance to the whole     
superstructure of this science4 ,or1 in 
other words1 unless psychologists will  
expressly consent to rear their science 
on the basis provided by the            
philosophical theory of ,monism1 there  

is nothing to save it from logical      
disintegration2 apart from this basis1  
the whole science is1 so to speak1 built
 in the air1 like an unsubstantial      
structure of clouds4 ,psychologists1 ,i 
repeat1 habitually ignore this fact1 and
 constantly speak of feeling and        
intelligence as true causes of adjustive
 action2 but by so doing they merely beg
 from this contradictory theory of      
,spiritualism a flat denial of the      
fundamental postulate on which they     
elsewhere proceed--the postulate1       
namely1 that mental changes are         
determined by cerebral changes4         
,consider1 for example1 the following   
passage from ,mr4 ,spencer's ,principles
 of ,psychology 7,sec4 #abe71 which     
serves to show in brief compass the     
logical incoherency which in this matter
 runs through his whole work3--         
',those races of beings only can have   
survived in which1 on the      average1 
agreeable or desired feelings went along
 with activities      conducive to the  

maintenance of life1 while disagreeable 
and      habitually-avoided feelings    
went along with activities directly or  
indirectly destructive of life2 and     
there must ever have been1      other   
things equal1 the most numerous and     
long-continued survivals      among     
races in which these adjustments of     
feelings to actions were      the best1 
tending ever to bring about perfect     
adjustment4'  ,the argument here is that
 the 'adjustments of feelings to        
actions1' when once attained1 leads in  
turn to an adjustment of actions to     
feelings--or1 as ,i have myself stated  
the argument in my ,mental ,evolution in
 ,animals1 'the raison d'etre of        
,pleasure and ,pain has been that of    
furnishing organisms with guides to     
adjustive action3 moreover1 as in the   
case of direct sensation dictating any  
simple adjustment for the sake of       
securing an immediate good1 so in the   
case of instinct dictating a more       
intricate action for the sake of        

eventually securing a more remote good  
7whether for self1 progeny1 or          
community72 and so1 likewise1 in the    
case of reason dictating a still more   
intricate adjustment for the sake of    
securing a good still more remote--in   
all cases1 that is1 where volition is   
concerned1 pleasures and pains are the  
guides of action4' ,but thus to affirm  
that pleasures and pains are the guides 
of action is merely another way of      
affirming that the ,will is an agent--a 
cause of bodily movement1 and1 as such1 
a cause in ,nature4 ,now1 as we have    
seen1 ,mr4 ,spencer not only affirms    
this--or rather assumes it--but proceeds
 to render an a priori explanation of   
the accuracy of the guidance4 ,yet he   
nowhere considers the fundamental       
question--,why should we suppose that   
the ,will is an agent at all8 ,assuredly
 the answer given by physiology to this 
question is a simple denial that we have
 any justification so to regard the     
,will3 in view of her demonstration of  

conscious automatism1 she can see no    
reason why there should be any connexion
 at all between a subjective feeling of 
pleasure or pain and an objective fact  
of 'agreement or disagreement with the  
environment'--nay1 one of the most      
eminent of her priesthood has declared  
that there is no more connexion between 
the ambition of a ,napoleon and a       
general commotion of ,europe1 than there
 is between the puff of a steam-whistle 
and the locomotion of a train4 ,and1 as 
,i have now repeatedly insisted1 on     
grounds of physiology alone this is the 
only logical conclusion at which it is  
possible to arrive4 ,yet ,mr4 ,spencer1 
while elsewhere proceeding on the lines 
of physiology1 whenever he encounters   
the question of the agency of ,will1    
habitually jumps the whole gulf that    
separates ,materialism from             
,spiritualism4 ,and this wonderful feat 
of intellectual athletics is likewise   
performed1 so far at least as ,i am     
aware1 by every other psychologist who  

has proceeded on the lines of           
physiology4 ,indeed1 the logical        
incoherency is not so serious in ,mr4   
,spencer's case as it is in that of many
 other writers whom ,i need not wait to 
name4 ,for ,mr4 ,spencer does not seek  
to found his system on a basis of avowed
 ,materialism1 and1 therefore1 he may be
 said to have left this fundamental     
question of volitional agency in        
abeyance4 ,but all those writers who    
have reared their systems of psychology 
on a basis of avowed ,materialism--or1  
which is the same thing1 on a basis of  
physiology alone--lay themselves open to
 the charge of grossest inconsistency   
when they thus assume that the ,will is 
an agent4 ,it is impossible that these  
writers can both have their cake and eat
 it4 ,either they must forego their     
,materialism1 or else they must cease to
 speak of 'motives determining action1' 
'conduct being governed by pleasures and
 pains1' 'voluntary movements in their  
last resort being all due to bodily     

feelings1' 'the highest morality and the
 lowest vice being alike the result of a
 pursuit of happiness1' c4 c4 ,and1 so  
far as ,i can see1 it is only in the way
 above indicated1 or on the theory of   
,monism1 that it is possible1 without   
ignoring the facts of physiology on the 
one hand or those of psychology on the  
other1 philosophically to save the      
agency of ,will4  ,from this brief      
exposition it may be gathered that on   
the materialistic theory it is          
impossible that the ,will can be1 in any
 sense of the term1 an agent2 that on   
the spiritualistic theory the ,will is  
regarded as an agent1 but only in the   
sense of a non-natural or miraculous    
cause2 and1 lastly1 that on the monistic
 theory the ,will is saved as an agent1 
or may be properly regarded and as      
properly denominated a true cause1 in   
the ordinary sense of that term4 ,for   
this1 as well as for other reasons which
 need not here be specified1 ,i accept  
in philosophy the theory of ,monism2 and

 am thus entitled in psychology to      
proceed upon the doctrine that the ,will
 is an agent4 ,we have next to consider 
the ulterior question whether upon this 
theory the ,will may be properly        
regarded as a free agent4  ,by a free   
agent is understood an agent that is    
able to act without restraint1 or       
spontaneously4 ,the word 'free1'        
therefore1 bears a very different       
meaning when applied exclusively to the 
,will1 and when applied more generally  
to the living organism4 ,for we may     
properly say that a man1 or an animal1  
is free when he1 or it1 is at liberty to
 act in accordance with desire4         
,touching the fact of freedom in this   
sense there is1 of course1 no question4 
,we have not to consider the possible   
freedom of man1 but the possible freedom
 of ,will2 we have not to contemplate   
whether a man may be free to do what he 
wills1 but whether he can be free to    
will what he wills4 ,such being the     
question1 we have to consider it in     

relation to the three philosophical     
theories already stated--,materialism1  
,spiritualism1 and ,monism4  ,for the   
theory of ,materialism the present      
question has no existence4 ,if this     
announcement appears startling1 it can  
only be because no materialist has ever 
taken the trouble to formulate his own  
theory with distinctness4 ,for1 as      
previously shown1 ,materialism          
necessarily involves the doctrine of    
conscious automatism2 but1 if so1 the   
,will is concluded not to be an agent at
 all1 and therefore it becomes idle to  
discuss whether1 in any impossible      
exercise of its agency1 it is free or   
subject to restraint4 ,the most that in 
this connexion could logically stand to 
be considered by the advocates of       
,materialism would be whether or not the
 adventitious and inefficacious feelings
 of subjectivity which are associated   
with cerebral activity are determinate  
or free2 but this would probably be     
regarded on all hands as a somewhat     

useless topic of discussion1 and        
certainly in any case would have no     
reference to the question of free       
agency4 ,the point to be clearly        
understood is that1 according to the    
materialistic theory1 a motor is        
distinct from a motive1 although in some
 unaccountable manner the motor is able 
to cause the motive4 ,but the motive1   
when thus caused1 is not supposed to    
exert any causal influence on bodily    
action2 it is supposed to begin and end 
as a motive1 or never itself to become a
 motor4 ,in other words1 as before      
stated1 the ,will is not supposed to be 
an agent2 and1 therefore1 to this theory
 the doctrine of free-will and of       
determinism are alike irrelevant4 ,we   
need not wait to prove that this        
important fact is habitually overlooked 
by materialists themselves1 or that     
whenever a materialist espouses the     
cause of determinism1 he is thereby and 
for the time being vacating his position
 as a materialist2 for if1 according to 

his theory1 the ,will is not an agent1  
he is merely impugning his own doctrines
 by consenting to discuss the conditions
 of its agency4  ,the theory of         
,spiritualism and the theory of ,monism 
agree in holding that the ,will is an   
agent2 and1 therefore1 to both of these 
theories the question whether the ,will 
is a free agent is a real question4     
,here1 then1 it devolves upon us to     
consider carefully the logical status of
 the rival doctrines of so-called       
,liberty and ,necessity4 ,for           
convenience of arrangement in what      
follows1 we may best begin with the     
doctrine of ,necessity1 or ,determinism4
     ,,chapter ,,vi4  ,,the ,,will ,,in 
,,relation ,,to ,,monism4   ,we have now
 seen that1 according to ,materialism1  
the ,will is not an agent1 while        
according both to ,spiritualism and to  
,monism the ,will is an agent4 ,touching
 the further question1 whether the ,will
 is a free agent1 we have seen that     
while the question does not exist for   

,materialism1 it appears to require a   
negative answer both from ,spiritualism 
and from ,monism4 ,for1 as regards its  
relation to ,spiritualism1 when once the
 ground is cleared of certain errors of 
statement and fallacies of reasoning1 we
 appear to find that unless the will is 
held to be motiveless--which would be to
 destroy not only the doctrine of moral 
responsibility1 but likewise that of    
universal causation--it must be regarded
 as subject to law1 or as determined in 
its action by the nature of its past    
history and present circumstances4      
,lastly1 the theory of ,monism appears  
likewise to deny the possibility of     
freedom as an attribute of ,will2 for1  
according to this theory1 mental        
processes are one and the same with     
physical processes1 and hence it does   
not appear that the doctrine of         
determinism could well be taught in a   
manner more emphatic4  ,thus far1 then1 
the doctrine of determinism is seen to  
be victorious over the doctrine of      

freedom all along the line4 ,by         
,materialism the question of freedom is 
excluded ab initio2 by ,spiritualism and
 by ,monism1 so far as yet seen1 it can 
be logically answered only in the       
negative4 ,from which it follows that   
the sense of moral responsibility is of 
the nature of a vast illusion1 the      
historical genesis of which admits of   
being easily traced1 and the authority  
of which is thus destroyed4 ,although it
 may still serve to supply motives to   
conduct1 it seems that it can do so only
 in the way that belongs to             
superstition--that ,conscience1 as ,i   
have before said1 is the bogey of       
mankind1 and that belief in its         
authority is like belief in witchcraft1 
destined to dwindle and to fade before  
the advance of a better or more complete
 knowledge of natural causation4  ,but  
the discussion must not end here4       
,hitherto ,i have presented the case    
,liberty versus ,necessity with all the 
impartiality of which ,i am capable2 but

 ,i have done so without travelling an  
inch beyond those limits of discussion  
within which the question has been      
debated by previous writers4 ,i believe1
 indeed1 that ,i have pointed out       
several important oversights which have 
been made on both sides of the question2
 but in doing this ,i have not gone     
further than the philosophical basis    
upon which the question has been        
hitherto argued4 ,my object1 however1 in
 publishing these papers is not that of 
destructive criticism2 and what ,i have 
done in this direction has been done    
only in order to prepare the way for    
what is now to follow4 ,having shown1 as
 it appears to me conclusively1 that    
upon both the rival theories of         
,materialism and ,spiritualism--the     
doctrine of ,liberty1 and therefore of  
,moral ,responsibility--must logically  
fall1 ,i now hope to show that this     
doctrine admits of being re-established 
on a basis furnished by the theory of   
,monism4  ,it often happens that an     

elaborate structure of argument1 which  
is perfectly sound and complete upon the
 basis furnished by a given hypothesis1 
admits of being wholly disintegrated    
when the fundamental hypothesis is shown
 to be either provisional or untrue4    
,and such1 ,i believe1 is the case with 
the issue now before us4 ,for the issue 
,liberty versus ,necessity has hitherto 
been argued on the common assumption    
that natural causation is not merely the
 most ultimate principle which the human
 mind can reach2 but also a principle   
which is1 in some way or another1       
external to that mind4 ,it has been     
taken for granted by both sides in the  
controversy that if our volitions can be
 proved to depend upon natural          
causation1 as rigid in its sequences    
within the sphere of a human mind as    
within that of a calculating machine1   
there must be an end of the controversy2
 seeing that our volitions would be thus
 proved to be rigidly determined by     
those same principles of fixed order1 or

 'natural law1' which are external to1  
or independent of1 the human mind--quite
 as much as they are external to1 or    
independent of1 the calculating machine4
 ,now1 it is this assumption which ,i   
challenge4 ,the theory of ,monism       
entitles one to deny that when we have  
driven the question down to the granite 
bed of natural causation1 nothing more  
remains to be done2 according to this   
theory it still remains to be asked1    
,what is the nature of this natural     
causation8 ,is it indeed the ultimate   
datum of experience1 below which the    
human mind cannot go8 ,and is it indeed 
so far external to1 or independent of1  
the human mind1 that the latter stands  
to it in the relation of a slave to a   
master--coerced as to action by the     
conditions which that master has laid   
down8  ,now these questions are all     
virtually answered in the affirmative by
 the dualistic theory of ,spiritualism4 
,for the ,will is here regarded as an   
agent bound to act in accordance with   

those conditions of external necessity  
which dualism recognizes as natural     
causation4 ,its internal causation thus 
becomes but the reflex of external2 and 
the reflection becomes known internally 
as the consciousness of motive4 ,hence1 
the ,will cannot be philosophically     
liberated from the toils of this        
external necessity1 so long as dualism  
recognizes that necessity as existing   
independently of the ,will1 and thus    
imposing its conditions on volitional   
activity4 ,but the theory of ,monism1 by
 identifying external with internal     
causation--or physical processes with   
psychical processes--philosophically    
saves the doctrine of freedom1 and with 
it the doctrine of moral responsibility4
 ,moreover1 it does so without relying  
upon any precarious appeal to the direct
 testimony of consciousness itself4 ,as 
this view of the subject is one by no   
means easy of apprehension1 ,i will     
endeavour to unfold it part by part4    
,to begin with1 ,monism excludes the    

possibility of volition being determined
 by cerebration4 ,let us suppose1 for   
example1 that a sequence of ideas1 ,a1  
,b1 ,c1 ,d1 occurs in the mind1 which on
 its obverse or cerebral aspect may be  
represented by the sequence a1 b1 c1 d4 
,here the parallelism is not due1 as    
supposed by ,materialism1 to a          
determining ,ab1 b determining ,bc1 c42 
it is due to ,aa determining ,bb1 ,bb   
determining ,cc1 c4--the two apparently 
diverse causal sequences being really   
but one causal sequence4 ,if the        
determinist should rejoin that a causal 
sequence of some kind is all that he    
demands--that the ,will is equally      
proved to be unfree1 whether it be bound
 by the causal sequence a1 b1 c1 d1 or  
by the causal sequence ,aa1 ,bb1 ,cc1   
,dd--,i answer that this is a point     
which we have to consider by-and-by4    
,meanwhile ,i am only endeavouring to   
make clear the essential distinction    
between the philosophical theories of   
,monism and ,materialism4 ,and the      

effect of this distinction is to show   
that1 for the purposes of clear         
analysis1 we may wholly neglect either  
side of the double reality4 ,if we      
happen to be engaged on any             
physiological inquiry1 we may altogether
 neglect the processes of ideation with 
which any process of cerebration may be 
concerned2 while1 if we happen to be    
engaged upon any psychological inquiry1 
we may similarly neglect the processes  
of cerebration with which any process of
 ideation may be concerned4 ,seeing that
 each is equally an index of a common   
sequence1 it can make no difference     
which of them we take as our guide1     
although for purposes of practical      
inquiry it is of course expedient to    
take the cerebral index when we are     
dealing with the objective side of the  
problem1 and the mental index when      
dealing with the subjective4 ,in the    
following pages1 therefore1 ,i shall    
altogether neglect the cerebral index4  
,the inquiry on which we are engaged    

belongs to the region of mind1 and1     
therefore1 after what has just been     
said1 it will be apparent that ,i am    
entitled to adopt the standpoint of a   
spiritualist1 to the extent of fastening
 attention only upon the mental side of 
the problem4 ,for although the theory of
 ,monism teaches1 as against            
,spiritualism1 that no one of the mental
 sequences could take place without a   
corresponding physical sequence1 the    
theory also teaches the converse        
proposition2 and therefore it makes no  
difference which of the two phenomenal  
sequences is taken as our index of the  
ontological4  ,now1 it clearly makes a  
great difference whether the mental     
changes concerned in volition are       
regarded as effects or as causes4       
,according to ,materialism1 the mental  
changes are the effects of cerebral     
changes1 which were themselves the      
effects of precedent cerebral changes4  
,according to ,spiritualism1 these      
mental changes are the causes1 not only 

of the cerebral changes1 but also of one
 another4 ,according to ,monism1 the    
mental changes may be regarded as the   
causes of the cerebral1 or vice versa1  
seeing that in neither case are we      
stating a real truth--the real truth    
being that it is only a cerebro-mental  
change which can cause any change either
 of cerebration or of mentation4 ,now it
 is evident that if the mental processes
 were always the effects of cerebral    
processes 7,materialism71 there could be
 no further question with regard to     
,liberty and ,necessity2 while1 if the  
mental processes are the causes both of 
the cerebral processes and of one       
another 7,spiritualism71 the question   
before us becomes raised to a higher    
level4 ,the causality in question being 
now regarded as purely mental1 the will 
is no longer regarded as a passive slave
 of the brain1 and the only thing to be 
considered is whether freedom is        
compatible with causation of a purely   
mental kind4 ,now1 at an earlier stage  

of our enquiry ,i have argued that it is
 not2 but this argument was based       
entirely upon spiritualistic premises1  
or upon the assumption that the         
principle of causality is everywhere    
external to1 or independent of1 the     
human mind--under which assumption ,i   
cannot see that it makes much difference
 whether the coercion comes from the    
brain alone1 or from the whole general  
system of things external to the human  
mind4 ,and here it is that ,i think the 
theory of ,monism comes to the rescue4  
,for1 if physical and mental processes  
are everywhere consubstantial1 or       
identical in kind1 it can make no       
difference whether we regard their      
sequences as objective or ejective1     
physical or spiritual4 ,hence1 we are   
free to regard all causation as of a    
character essentially psychical4 ,but1  
if so1 it must be self-contained as     
psychical2 it cannot be in any way      
determined by anything from without1    
seeing that outside itself there is     

nothing in the ,universe4 ,now1 if this 
is true of the ,world-eject1 it must    
also be true of the ,man-eject1 as well 
as of the ,man-subject1 or ,ego4 ,if all
 causation is psychical1 that portion of
 it which belongs to1 or is manifested  
by1 my own personality is not laid upon 
me by anything from without2 it is      
merely the expression of my own         
psychical activity1 as this is taking   
place within the circumscribed area of  
my own personality4 ,and this activity  
is spontaneous1 in the sense that it is 
not coerced from without4 ,all the      
sequences which that activity displays  
within this region are self-determined1 
in the sense that they are determined by
 the self1 and not by any agency        
external to it4 ,the only influence     
which any external agency can here      
exert1 is that of insisting that bodily 
action--the physical outcome of my      
psychical processes--shall be in        
accordance with the conditions imposed  
by the internal system of causation2 but

 this does not influence in any degree  
those mental processes which do not     
express themselves in bodily action4    
,hence1 it may be perfectly true that my
 bodily action in the past might have   
been different from what it actually    
was2 for as this action was the outcome 
of my mentation at the time 7according  
to the spiritual index1 which is now our
 guide71 and as this mentation was not  
coerced from without1 it might very well
 have been different from what it was4  
,each of the mental sequences at that   
time was a result of those preceding and
 a cause of those succeeding2 but behind
 all this play of mental causation there
 all the while stood that ,self1 which  
was at once the condition of its        
occurrence1 and the ,first ,cause of its
 action4 ,it is not true that that ,self
 was nothing more than the result of all
 this play of mental causation2 it can  
only have been the ,first ,cause of it4 
,for1 otherwise1 the mental causation   
must have been the cause of that        

causation1 which is absurd4 ,who or     
,what it was that originally caused this
 ,first ,cause is1 of course1 another   
question1 which ,i shall presently hope 
to show is not merely unanswerable1 but 
unmeaning4 ,as a matter of fact1        
however1 we know that this ,self is     
here1 and that it can thus be proved to 
be a substance1 standing under the whole
 of that more superficial display of    
mental causation which it is able to    
look upon introspectively--and this     
almost as impersonally as if it were    
regarding the display as narrated by    
another mind4 ,i say1 then1 that the    
theory of ,monism entitles us to regard 
this ,self as the fons et origo of our  
mental causation1 and thus restores to  
us the doctrine of ,liberty with its    
attendant consequence of ,moral         
,responsibility4  ,it may help to       
elucidate this matter if we regard it   
from another point of view4 ,according  
to ,hobbes1 ',liberty is the absence of 
all impediments to action that are not  

contained in the nature and intrinsical 
qualities of the agent4' ,now1 if we    
accept this definition1 it is easy to   
show that the theory of ,monism is      
really at one with the doctrine of      
,liberty4 ,for1 in the first place1     
according to the theory of ,monism1 the 
neurosis of the brain could not be what 
it is without the psychosis of the mind4
 ,consequently1 as above shown1 it would
 be equally incorrect to say that the   
neurosis governs the psychosis1 as it   
would be to say that the psychosis      
governs the neurosis4 ,but1 if so1 the  
,will is free in accordance with        
,hobbes' definition of freedom4         
,suppose1 for example1 that on seeing a 
bone ,i think of ,professor ,flower1    
then remember that a long time ago ,i   
lent his book on ,osteology to a friend1
 and forthwith resolve to ask my friend 
what has become of it2 here my ultimate 
volition would be unfree if it were the 
effect of physical processes going on in
 my brain4 ,but the volition might be   

free if each of these mental processes  
were the result of the preceding one1   
seeing that there may then have been 'an
 absence of all impediments' to the     
occurrence of these processes4  ,of     
course it will be objected--as ,i have  
myself urged in the preceding           
chapter--that causal action of any kind 
is incompatible with freedom of         
volition--that if there be any such     
causal action1 even though it be wholly 
restricted within the sphere of mind1   
the ,will is really compelled to will as
 it does will1 is determined to         
determine as it does determine1 and     
hence that its apparent freedom is      
illusory4 ,hobbes' definition1 it may be
 urged1 when applied to the case of the 
,will1 is equivocal4 ,no doubt a man is 
free as to his action1 if there be an   
'absence of all impediments' to his     
action--or1 in other words1 if he is    
able to act as he wills to act4 ,but it 
does not follow that he is free as to   
his will1 even though there be an       

absence of all impediments to his       
willing as he wills to will4 ,for here  
the very question is as to whether there
 are any impediments to his willing     
otherwise than he does will4 ,the fact  
that he wills to will as he does will   
proves that there are no impediments to 
his willing in that direction2 but is   
there a similar absence of impediments  
to his willing to will in any other     
direction8 ,if so1 we are still within  
the lines of determinism4 ,thus ,hobbes'
 definition of freedom really applies   
only to freedom of bodily action2 not to
 freedom of volition1 seeing that if my 
will is caused ,i could not have willed 
to will otherwise than ,i did will4     
,now1 the answer which ,monism supplies 
to this objection is that the will      
itself is here the ultimate agent1 and  
therefore an agent which must be        
identified with the principle of        
causality4 ,in other words1 the very    
reason why we feel that ,hobbes'        
definition of liberty1 while perfectly  

valid as regards bodily action1 seems to
 lack something when applied to         
volition1 is because volition belongs to
 the sphere of mind--belongs1 therefore1
 to that sphere which the theory of     
,monism regards as identical with       
causality itself4 ,although it is true  
that volitions are caused by motives1   
yet it is the mind which conditions the 
motives1 and therefore its own          
volitions4 ,it is not true that the mind
 is always the passive slave of causes1 
known to it as motives4 ,the human mind 
is itself a causal agent1 having the    
same kind of priority within the        
microcosm as the ,world-eject has in the
 macrocosm4 ,therefore its motives are  
in large part matters of its own        
creation4 ,in the intricate workings of 
its own internal machinery innumerable  
patterns of thought are turned out1 some
 of which it selects as good1 while     
others it rejects as bad2 but no one of 
which could have come into being at all 
without this causal agency of the mind  

itself4  ,it will probably be objected  
that even though all this were granted1 
we cannot thus save the doctrine of     
moral responsibility4 ,for it may appear
 that the liberty which is thus accorded
 to the ,will is nothing better than    
liberty to will at random1 as argued in 
my previous essay4 ,but here we must    
observe that although we are thus shown 
free to will at random1 it does not     
follow that we are likewise free to act 
in accordance with our volitions4 ,and  
this is a most important distinction1   
which libertarians have hitherto failed 
to notice4 ,if we are free to will in   
any direction1 it follows1 indeed1 that 
we are free to will at random2 but it   
follows also1 and for this very reason1 
that we are free to will the impossible4
 ,true1 when we will what is known to be
 impossible of execution1 we call the   
act an act of desire2 but it is clearly 
the same in kind as an act of will1 and 
differs only in not admitting of being  
translated into an act of body4         

,therefore ,i say that the restriction  
which is imposed upon us by the         
conditions of causality1 whether        
external or internal1 is not any        
restriction as to willing1 but merely as
 to doing4 ,it is not in the subjective1
 but in the objective world that we     
encounter the 'bondage of necessity4'   
,now1 the knowledge that we are thus    
restricted as to bodily action imposes  
that kind of restraint upon volition    
which is termed rational4 ,there is     
nothing in the nature of things to      
prevent our willing anything that we    
wish2 but there is something in the     
nature of things to prevent our doing   
everything that we will2 and as the     
practical object of our volition is that
 of determining bodily action1 we find  
it expedient to will only such things as
 we believe that we can do4 ,to this    
extent1 therefore1 the ,will is         
bound--namely1 by the executive capacity
 of the body4 ,but1 strictly speaking1  
this is not a binding of the ,will qua  

,will4 ,even in such cases1 as ,st4     
,paul says1 to will may be present with 
us1 but how to perform that which is    
good we find not4 ,i say then that      
although the ,will is free to will      
whatever it wills1 nevertheless it would
 fail in its essential use or object did
 it refuse to will in accordance with   
the conditions which are imposed upon   
its executive capacity4 ,again1 to quote
 ,st4 ,paul1 the ,will might say1 ,all  
things for me are lawful2 but all things
 are not expedient4 ,now1 this          
consideration of expediency is one of   
constant and far-reaching importance4   
,for not only1 as already observed1 does
 it lead to volition on the one hand as 
rational2 but it also leads to volition 
on the other hand as moral4 ,let us take
 the two points separately4  ,do we say 
that a man is not free to conduct a     
scientific research1 because in         
conducting it he must employ the needful
 apparatus8 ,or do we say that a man is 
not free to marry1 because in order to  

do so he must go through a marriage     
ceremony8 ,obviously1 to say such things
 would sound very like talking nonsense4
 ,it is true that in neither case is a  
man free to gain his object without     
adopting the means which are seen to be 
necessary under the system of external  
causation in which he finds himself2 but
 this does not mean that he is not free 
to do as he wills1 unless it so happens 
that he wills to do the impossible4     
,thus1 within the limits that are set by
 the conditions of causation1 a man is  
understood to be free to act as he wills
 so long as he is not 'impeded' by some 
of those conditions4 ,to say that he is 
not free because he cannot get beyond   
those conditions would be absurd1 since1
 apart from these conditions1 action of 
any kind would be a priori impossible1  
and the man would have1 as his only     
alternative1 no-action4  ,hence1 in     
doing we must conform to the law of     
causation--which1 indeed1 is all that   
can be meant by doing--and if in willing

 what we do we must also conform to the 
law of causation1 where is the          
difference with respect to freedom8     
,such restraint as there may be is here 
a restraint upon bodily action2 not at  
all upon the mental action which we call
 volition4 ,the ,will may will in any   
way that it wills to will2 but the body 
cannot act in every way that the ,will  
may will it to act2 therefore the ,will 
finds it expedient to will only in such 
ways as the body can act--i4 e4 to      
conform in its action to the external   
system of causation4 ,if this condition 
of all action is held to be compatible  
with freedom in the one case1 so in     
consistency must it be held in the      
other4 ,equally in either case the agent
 can only be properly said to be unfree1
 if he be subject to causal restraint   
from without4 ,and in neither case does 
the universal condition of acting under 
the law of causation constitute bondage1
 in any other sense than that of        
furnishing the agent with his conditions

 to acting in any way at all4           
,therefore1 unless it be said that a man
 is not free to do as he wills because  
he wills to do the impossible1 it cannot
 be denied that he is free to will as he
 wills because he wills according to    
law4 ,for no action of any kind is      
possible contrary to law--a general fact
 which goes to constitute an argument a 
posteriori for the rationality of the   
,world-eject--and if volition           
constituted an exception to this general
 statement1 it could only do so by      
becoming no-action4 ,now1 it is by thus 
willing according to law--or with due   
reference to those external conditions  
of causality with which the executive   
capacity has to do--that volition is    
rendered rational4 ,the restraint laid  
upon volition is not laid upon it as    
volition1 but only in respect of        
execution4 ,a man may will to marry as  
long and as hard as he chooses2 but only
 if he further wills to take the        
necessary means can his volition become 

rational2 it is irrational if he wills  
to marry1 and at the same time wills not
 to go through the marriage ceremony4   
,but although irrational1 it is none the
 less free4 ,considered merely as an act
 of volition it is equally free1 whether
 it be rational or irrational4  ,and1   
similarly1 it is equally free whether it
 be moral or immoral4 ,the objection    
that an uncaused volition cannot be a   
responsible volition depends for its    
validity on the meaning which we attach 
to the term 'uncaused4' ,if it be meant 
that the volition arises without any    
regard at all to the surrounding        
conditions of life1 and is carried into 
effect without the agent being able to  
control it by means of any other        
voluntary act2 then1 indeed1 whatever   
else such an agent may be1 he certainly 
is not moral4 ,but if it be meant that  
among a number of uncompleted volitions 
drawing in different directions--and all
 'uncaused' in the sense of belonging   
immediately to the ,ego--one of them    

gains an advantage by a conscious       
reference of the mind to it as good or  
evil1 then the agent who is capable of  
giving this advantage to that member of 
the system may properly be called moral4
 ,the man who willed to marry1 and yet  
willed not to go through the marriage   
ceremony1 was1 as we have seen1         
irrational4 ,similarly1 if any agent    
wills an action without being able to   
consider any of the consequences which  
it may involve as either moral or       
immoral1 such an agent is what we must  
properly call unmoral4 ,even in such an 
agent1 however1 the ,will may be free2  
only it would act without reference to  
any moral environment1 just as the      
lunatic above supposed might endeavour  
to act without reference to any social  
environment4  ,let us look at the whole 
matter in yet another light4 ,we have   
repeatedly seen that the question of    
free-will1 and therefore of moral       
responsibility1 depends upon the        
question as to whether a man's action in

 the past might have been other than it 
was1 notwithstanding that all the       
conditions under which he was placed    
remained the same4 ,now1 to this        
question only one answer can be given by
 a dualistic theory of things1 whether  
materialistic or spiritualistic4 ,for it
 belongs to the essence of a dualistic  
theory to regard the principle of       
causation as a principle external to1   
and independent of1 the human mind2     
consequently1 all the conditions of     
mental causation being given1 a certain 
result in the way of volition is        
necessarily bound to ensue--or1 in other
 words1 at any given time in a man's    
mental history1 his action cannot have  
been other than it was4 ,but now1       
according to the monistic theory1 all   
causation has a psychical basis--being  
but the objective expression to us of   
the psychical activity of the           
,world-eject4 ,consequently1 according  
to this theory1 the course of even      
strictly physical causation is          

inevitable or necessary only in so far  
as the psychical activity of the        
,world-eject is held to be uniform1 or  
consistent within itself4 ,and forasmuch
 as all our knowledge of physical       
causation is necessarily empirical1 we  
have but very inadequate means of       
judging how far this empirical index is 
a true gauge of the reality4 ,we can1   
indeed1 predict an eclipse centuries in 
advance2 but we can only do so on the   
supposition that such and such physical 
conditions remain constant1 and we have 
no right to affirm that such must be the
 case4 ,our knowledge of physical       
causation1 being but empirical1 is      
probably but a very inadequate          
translation of the psychical activity of
 the ,world-eject2 and hence1 not only  
have we no right to predict a future    
eclipse with certainty1 but we have not 
so much as the right to affirm that even
 a past eclipse must have taken place of
 necessity4 ,for we have no right to    
affirm that at any one period of cosmic 

history the action of the ,world-eject  
must have been what it was1 or could not
 have been other than it was4 ,our      
knowledge of the obverse aspect of this 
action 7in the course of physical       
causation7 is1 as ,i have said1 purely  
empirical2 and this is merely another   
way of saying that although we do know  
what the action of the ,world-eject has 
been at such and such a period of cosmic
 history1 we can have no means of       
knowing what else it might have been4   
,for anything that we can tell to the   
contrary1 the whole history of the solar
 system1 for example1 might have been   
quite different from what it has been2  
the course which it actually has run may
 have been but one out of an innumerable
 number of possible alternatives1 any   
other of which might just as well have  
been adopted by the ,world-eject4  ,now1
 if this is true of natural causation in
 the case of the macrocosm1 it would    
appear to be equally so of natural      
causation in the case of the microcosm4 

,indeed1 prediction in the case of human
 activity is so much less certain than  
in the case of cosmic activity1 that the
 attribute of free-will is generally    
ascribed to the former1 while rarely    
suggested as possibly belonging to the  
latter4 ,and similarly as regards past  
action4 ,if we are unable to say that at
 any period in the past history of the  
solar system the ,world-eject might not 
have deflected the whole stream of      
events into some other channel1 how can 
we be able to say that at any given     
period of his past history the          
,man-eject could not have performed an  
analogous act8 ,obviously1 the only     
reason why we are not accustomed to     
entertain this supposition in either    
case1 is because our judgements are     
beset with the assumption that the      
principle of causality is prior to that 
of mind--something of the nature of     
,fate superior even to the gods4 ,and1  
no less obviously1 if once we see any   
reason to regard the principle of       

causality as merely co-extensive with   
that of mind1 the whole question as     
between ,necessity and ,free-will       
lapses2 there is nothing to show that a 
man's action in the past might not have 
been other than it was4 ,the only       
outward restraint placed upon the       
exercise of his ,will is then seen to be
 imposed by the conditions of its       
executive capacity1 and this restraint  
it is that constitutes man a rational   
agent4 ,on the other hand1 the structure
 of conscience--however we may suppose  
this to have been formed--imposes that  
further and inward restraint upon his   
,will1 which constitutes man a moral    
agent4 ,but neither of these restraints 
can properly be said to constitute      
bondage in the sense required by        
,necessitarianism1 because neither of   
them requires that the man's ,will must 
will as it does will2 they require      
merely that his ,will should act in     
certain ways if it is to accomplish     
certain results2 and to this extent only

 is it subject to law1 or to the        
incidence of those external influences  
which help to shape our motives4  ,but  
if this is so1 is it not obvious that   
the sense of moral responsibility is    
rationally justified8 ,this sense goes  
upon the supposition that a man's       
conduct in the past might have been     
different from what it was4 ,clearly1   
therefore1 no question of moral         
responsibility can ever obtain in cases 
where the general system of external    
causation1 or natural law1 rendered an  
alternative line of action physically   
impossible4 ,the question of moral      
responsibility can only obtain in cases 
where two or more lines of conduct were 
alike possible1 so far as the external  
system of causation is concerned--or    
where the ,will was equally free to     
choose between two or more courses of   
bodily action4 ,in other words1 the     
question of moral responsibility has    
nothing to do with the only kind of     
bondage to which1 according to our      

present point of view1 the ,will is     
subject--namely the bondage of being    
rationally obliged to will only what is 
capable of performance4 ,the question of
 moral responsibility has only to do    
with the system of causation which is   
inherent in the mind itself2 not with   
the system that is external to the mind4
 ,and as the theory of ,monism          
identifies the mind with this its own   
inherent system of causation--or regards
 a man's ,will as the originator of a   
particular portion of general           
causality--it follows from the theory   
that a man is justly liable to moral    
praise or blame as the case may be3 the 
moral sense no longer appears as a      
gigantic illusion3 conscience is        
justified at the bar of reason4  ,it    
appears to me impossible that any valid 
exception can be taken to the above     
reasoning1 if once the premiss is       
granted--namely1 that the principle of  
,causality admits of being regarded as  
identical with that of ,volition4 ,for  

if ,cause is but another name for       
,will--whether the ,will be subjective  
or ejective--it follows that my will is 
a first cause1 which is determined by   
other causes only in so far as the      
executive capacity of my body is so     
determined4 ,as the whole stress of any 
objection to the present argument must  
thus be brought to bear upon the        
validity of this its fundamental        
premiss1 a few words may now be said to 
show that the premiss is not wholly     
gratuitous4 ,of course the reason why at
 first sight it is apt to appear1 not   
only gratuitous1 but even grotesque1 is 
because in these days of physical       
science the minds of most of us are     
dominated by the unthinking persuasion  
that the principle of causality is the  
most ultimate principle which our minds 
can reach4 ,most of us accept this      
persuasion as almost of the nature of an
 axiom1 and hence the mere suggestion   
that our own volitions are really       
uncaused appears to us of the nature of 

a self-evident absurdity4 ,a little     
thought1 however1 is enough to show that
 the only ground of reason which this   
strong prepossession can rest upon1 is  
the assumption that the principle of    
causality is logically prior to that of 
mind4 ,therefore it is the validity of  
this assumption that we have here to    
investigate4  ,in the first place1 then1
 the assumption is ipso facto           
irrational4 ,for it is evident that in  
order to make the assumption there must 
already be a mind to make it4 ,in other 
words1 the very conception of the       
principle of causality implies a        
thinking substance wherein that         
conception arises1 and therefore1 as a  
mere matter of formal statement1 it is  
impossible to assign logical priority to
 this conception over the thing whereby 
it is conceived4  ,in the next place1   
when we carefully analyze the nature of 
this conception itself1 we find that it 
arises immediately out of our conception
 of ,being as ,being4 ,this is shown by 

the idea of equivalency between cause   
and effect1 which is an essential       
feature of the conception of causality  
as such4 ,in other words1 the statement 
of any causal relation is merely a      
statement of the fact that both the     
matter and the energy concerned in the  
event were of a permanent nature and    
unalterable amount4 ,therefore1 if the  
ultimate ,reality is mental1 ,causation 
must be ontologically identical with    
,volition4 ,and that the ultimate       
,reality is either mental1 or something 
greater1 seems to be proved by the      
consideration that if it be supposed    
anything less1 there must be an end of  
the conception of equivalency as between
 cause and effect1 and so of the        
conception of causality itself2 for1    
clearly1 if my mind has been caused by  
anything less than itself1 there is an  
end of any possible equivalency between 
the activity of that thing as a cause1  
and the occurrence of my mind as an     
effect#ac4  ,lastly1 the conception of  

causality essentially involves the idea 
of finality as existing somewhere4 ,here
 ,i cannot do better than quote some    
extracts from ,canon ,mozley's essay on 
',the ,principle of ,causation1' as he  
manages very tersely to convey the gist 
of previous philosophizing upon this    
subject4       ',he 7,clarke7 brings out
 simply at bottom the meaning and       
significance of an idea in the human    
mind1 that there is implied in      the 
very idea itself of cause1 firstly1 that
 it causes something      else2 and     
secondly1 that it is uncaused itself4444
 ,an infinite      series of causes does
 not make a cause2 444 an infinite      
succession      of causes rests1 by the 
very hypothesis1 upon no cause2 each    
particular one rests on the one which   
follows it1 but the whole      rests    
upon nothing4444 ,if from one cause we  
have to go back to      another1 that   
which we go back from is not the cause1 
but that      which we go back to is4   
,the very idea of cause1 as ,i have     

said1      implies a stop2 and wherever 
we stop is the cause4444 ,a true cause  
is a ,first ,cause4444 ,the atheistic   
idea thus does not correspond to        
the idea of reason4 ,the atheist appears
 to acknowledge the      necessity of a 
cause1 and appears to provide for it2   
but when we      come to his scheme it  
fails exactly in that part of the idea  
which      clenches it1 and which is    
essential to its integrity2 it fails in 
providing a stop2 444 ,one might say to 
him1 ,why do you give      yourself the 
trouble to supply causation at all8 ,you
 do so because      you consider        
yourself obliged in reason to do it1 but
 if you supply      causation at all1   
why not furnish such a cause as reason  
has      impressed upon you1 and which  
is inherent in your mind--a cause       
which stands still1 an original cause8  
,if you never intended to      supply   
this1 it must have been because you     
thought a real cause was      not       
wanted2 but if you thought a cause not  

wanted1 why not have      said from the 
first that causes were not wanted1 and  
said from the      first that events    
could take place without causes8'  ,or1 
to quote a more recent authority1 and   
one speaking from the side of physical  
science1 ,prof4 ,huxley writes3--       
',the student of nature who starts from 
the axiom of the      universality of   
the law of causation1 cannot refuse to  
admit an      eternal existence2 if he  
admits the conservation of energy1 he   
cannot deny the possibility of an       
eternal energy2 if he admits the        
existence of immaterial phenomena in the
 form of consciousness1 he      must    
admit the possibility1 at any rate1 of  
an eternal series of      such          
phenomena2 and1 if his studies have not 
been barren of the      best fruit of   
the investigation of nature1 he will    
have enough      sense to see that1 when
 ,spinoza says1 ,per ,deum intelligo ens
      absolute infinitum1 hoc est       
substantiam constantem infinitis        

attributis1 the ,god so conceived is one
 that only a very great      fool would 
deny1 even in his heart4 ,physical      
science is as little      ,atheistic as 
it is ,materialistic#ad4'  ,now1 if it  
thus belongs to the essence of our idea 
of causation that finality must be      
reached somewhere1 ,i do not know where 
this is so likely to be reached as at   
that principle wherein the idea itself  
takes its rise--viz4 ,mind4 ,but1 if so1
 the statement that any particular acts 
of mind are uncaused ceases to present  
any character of self-evident absurdity4
  ,and the argument need not end here4  
,for ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer has shown   
that our idea of causation1 not merely  
requires a mind for its occurrence1 but 
that in every mind where it does occur  
it has been directly formed out of      
experiences of effort in acts of        
volition4 ,so that whether we analyze   
the idea of cause as we actually        
discover it in our own minds1 or        
investigate the history of its genesis1 

we alike find1 as we might have         
antecedently expected1 that it is       
dependent on our more ultimate idea of  
mind as mind2 the conception of         
causality is not1 as a matter of fact1  
original or primal1 but derivative or   
secondary4 ,therefore1 if this          
conception necessarily involves the     
postulation of a first cause1 there can 
be no doubt that such a cause can only  
be conceived as of the nature of mind4  
,from which it follows that each        
individual mind requires to be          
regarded--if it is regarded at all--as  
of the nature of a first cause4  ,from  
this1 however1 it does not follow that  
each individual mind requires to be     
regarded as wholly independent of all   
other causes1 or as never subject to any
 causal influence which may be exercised
 by other minds4 ,although each mind    
presents the feature of finality or     
spontaneity1 this does not hinder that  
it also presents the feature of relation
 to other minds1 which1 therefore1 are  

able to act upon it in numberless ways4 
,now1 whether these minds are the minds 
of other men1 of other intelligent      
beings1 or of the whole ,world-eject1   
the causal activity which is exerted    
upon my mind expresses itself in that   
mind as a consciousness of motives4 ,but
 although these motives may help to     
determine my volitions1 there is no     
reason to suppose that they are         
themselves the volitions1 or that       
without them my mind would cease to be  
itself a causal agent4 ,on the contrary1
 if this were supposed1 the supposition 
would amount to destroying the causal   
agency of my own mind1 which1 as we have
 just seen1 must either be original or  
not at all4  ,the way1 therefore1 that  
the matter stands is this4 ,in so far as
 the microcosm is a circumscribed system
 of being--a thinking substance1 a      
personality--it is of the nature of a   
first cause1 free to act in any         
direction as to its thinking and        
willing1 even though its thinking should

 be irrational as to truth1 and its     
willing impossible as to execution4 ,but
 in so far as the microcosm enters into 
relation with the macrocosm1 the system 
of external causation which it          
encounters determines the character of  
its volitions4 ,for although these      
volitions are themselves of the nature  
of first causes1 it is no contradiction 
to say that they are--at all events in  
large measure--determined by other and  
external causes4 ,this is no            
contradiction because1 although they are
 thus determined1 it does not follow    
that they are thus determined           
necessarily1 and this makes all the     
difference between the theory of will as
 bond or free4 ,in any stream of        
secondary causation each member of the  
series is understood to determine the   
next member of necessity2 and it is     
because this notion is imported into    
psychology that the theory of           
determinism regards it as axiomatic     
that1 if our volitions are in any way   

caused at all1 they can only be caused  
by way of necessity2 and hence that     
under the operation of any given set of 
motives the action of the will can only 
take place in the direction of the      
resultant4 ,but any such axiom is valid 
only within the region of second causes4
 ,on the hypothesis that volitions are  
first causes1 the axiom is irrelevant to
 them2 for although it may be true that 
they are determined by causes from      
without1 it may not be true that they   
are thus determined of necessity3 their 
intrinsic character as themselves first 
causes1 although not isolating them from
 any possible contact with other causes1
 nevertheless does protect them from    
being necessarily coerced by these      
causes1 and therefore from becoming but 
the mere effects of them4 ,such         
influence1 or determination1 as is      
exerted upon the ,will by these external
 causes is exerted only because any     
individual mind is not itself a         
macrocosm1 but a microcosm in relation  

to a macrocosm4 ,if it were itself a    
macrocosm1 standing out of relation to  
all other being1 its prime causation    
would1 of course1 be wholly uninfluenced
 by any other causation2 its volitions  
would then be concerned only with the   
determination of its own thoughts in a  
constant stream of purely subjective    
contemplation1 such as that which the   
,hindoo philosophy attributes to ,god4  
,but as the human mind discovers itself 
as existing in close and complex        
relations with an external world of an  
orderly character1 the human mind finds 
that it is1 as before said1 expedient to
 adapt the course of its own causal     
activity so as to bring it into harmony 
with the external order4 ,for1 although 
its own causal activity is primal1 it by
 no means follows that on this account  
it is almighty2 hence1 even although it 
be primal1 it is nevertheless under the 
necessity of adopting means in order to 
secure its ends--or1 in other words1 of 
adjusting its volitions 7if they are to 

be practically efficient7 to the        
conditions which are imposed upon its   
activity by the orderly system of the   
external world4 ,which is merely another
 way of stating the conclusion          
previously reached--viz4 that the only  
necessity which can be proved to govern 
our volitions is the necessity which is 
imposed by our own considerations of    
reason and morality4 ,although we find  
that it is expedient to adapt our own   
causal activity to that larger system of
 causal activity by which we are        
surrounded--seeing that we must do so   
necessarily if we are to act at all--it 
by no means follows that we are bound to
 will what is expedient4 ,in other      
words1 the necessity laid upon us by the
 system of external causation is a      
necessity to adopt means for the        
attainment of ends2 not a necessity to  
will the ends4 ,and although in many    
cases this distinction may appear to be 
practically unmeaning--seeing that no   
man wills what he knows to be impossible

 of execution1 and therefore that to say
 he is necessarily prevented from doing 
a certain thing seems practically       
equivalent to saying that he is         
necessarily prevented from willing that 
thing--in all cases where any question  
of moral responsibility can possibly    
obtain1 the distinction is one of       
fundamental importance4 ,for1 as already
 shown1 any question of moral           
responsibility can only obtain where two
 or more lines of action are alike      
possible1 and therefore where no        
necessity is laid upon the man in       
respect of carrying out his volitions1  
in whichever direction they may         
eventually proceed4 ,although in any    
event he is necessarily bound to adopt  
means in order to secure his ends1 the  
moral quality of his choice has         
reference only to the ends which he     
chooses2 not at all to the fact that he 
has to employ means for the purpose of  
attaining them4 ,and even though his    
choice be influenced by his physical and

 social environment--as it must be if it
 be either rational on the one hand or  
moral on the other--it does not follow  
that this influence is of a kind to     
neutralize or destroy the causal nature 
of his own volition4 ,for the influence 
which is thus exerted cannot be exerted 
necessarily1 unless we suppose that the 
,will is not a first cause1 which is the
 possibility now under consideration4   
,if the ,will is a first cause1 the     
influences brought to bear upon it by   
its relation to other causes--and in    
virtue of which it is constituted1 not  
only a cause primal1 but also a cause   
rational and moral--these influences    
differ toto coelo from those which are  
exercised by any members in a series of 
secondary causes upon the next          
succeeding causes4 ,and the difference  
consists in the absence of necessary or 
unconditional sequence in the one case1 
and its presence in the other4 ,however 
strong the determining influence of a   
motive may be1 if the ,will is a first  

cause1 the motive must belong to a      
different order of causal relation from 
a motor2 for1 no matter how strong the  
determining influence may be1 ex        
hypothesi it can never attain to the    
strength of necessity2 the ,will must   
ever remain free to overcome such       
influence by an adequate exercise of its
 own power of spontaneous action1 or of 
supplying de novo an additional access  
of strength to some other motive4 ,of   
course1 as a general rule1 the ,will    
allows itself to be influenced by       
motives supplied immediately by its     
relations with the external world2 but  
this is so only because the thinking    
substance well knows that it is         
expedient so to fall in with the general
 stream of external causation4 ,hence1  
as a general rule1 it is only in cases  
where the stream of external causation  
is drawing the will in different        
directions that the causal activity of  
the ,will itself is called into play4   
,or rather1 ,i should say1 it is only in

 such cases that we become conscious of 
the fact4 ,in the case of every         
voluntary movement the primal activity  
of ,will must be concerned 7and this    
even in the case of the lower animals72 
but as the vast majority of such        
movements are performed by way of       
response to frequently recurring        
circumstances1 the response which       
experience has shown to be most         
expedient is given1 as it were1         
automatically1 or without the occurrence
 of any adverse motive4 ,but in cases   
where motives are drawing in different  
directions1 we become conscious of an   
effort of ,will in choosing one or other
 line of conduct1 and1 according to our 
present hypothesis1 this consciousness  
of effort is an expression of the work  
which the ,will is doing in the way of  
spontaneous causation4  ,thus1 upon the 
whole1 if we identify the principle of  
causation with the principle of mind--as
 we are bound to do by the theory of    
,monism--we thereby draw a great and    

fundamental distinction between         
causation as this occurs in the external
 world1 and as it occurs within the     
limits of our own subjectivity4 ,and the
 distinction consists in the            
unconditional nature of a causal        
sequence in the external world1 as      
against the conditional nature of it in 
the other case2 the condition to the    
effective operation of a motive--as     
distinguished from a motor--is the      
acquiescence of the first cause upon    
which that motive is operating4  ,to the
 foregoing argument it may be objected  
that by expressly regarding the human   
mind as a first cause of its own        
volitions1 ,i imply that that mind can  
itself have had no cause1 which appears 
to be self-evidently absurd4 ,but here  
again the absurdity only arises from our
 inveterate habit of regarding the      
principle of causation as logically     
prior to that of mind4 ,if we expressly 
refuse to do this1 there is nothing     
absurd in supposing the principle of    

mind wherever it occurs1 as itself      
uncaused4 ,for if1 as we are now        
supposing1 this principle is identical  
with that of causation1 to say that any 
mind is caused would be to say that a   
cause is the cause of itself1 which     
would be really absurd4 ,under the      
present point of view1 therefore1 it    
would be a meaningless question to ask  
for the cause of a human mind1 since1 ex
 hypothesi1 a human mind is a part of   
the self-existing substance1 although   
not on this account self-existing as to 
its individual personality4 ,as argued  
in a previous chapter1 the personality  
appears to arise on account of          
circumscription1 or the isolation of a  
constituent part of the ,world-eject4   
,therefore1 although it may be          
reasonable to ask for a cause of this   
circumscription--or of the              
personality--it is not reasonable to ask
 for a cause of the substance which is  
thus circumscribed1 or of the quality of
 spontaneity which that substance       

exhibits4  ,i will now state the whole  
case in another way4 ,when we regard the
 facts of volition from the stand-point 
of psychology1 the only theory of them  
which is open to us is1 as we have      
before seen1 that of determinism4       
,moreover1 within these limits that     
theory is perfectly true4 ,psychology1  
as such1 cannot recognize any principle 
more ultimate than natural causation1   
seeing that1 like any other of her      
sisters in the family of sciences1 her  
whole work and duty are confined to the 
investigation of this principle4 ,but1  
just as in the case of all the other    
sciences1 when her investigations have  
been pushed to the point where they     
encounter the problem of explaining this
 principle itself1 her investigations   
must necessarily cease2 this principle  
is for all the sciences the ultimate    
datum1 behind which they cannot go      
without ceasing to be sciences4 ,but it 
does not follow that because the area of
 science is limited by that of          

causation1 therefore we are precluded   
from asking any questions as to the     
nature of this ultimate datum4 ,of      
course any questions which we may thus  
ask cannot possibly be answered by      
science2 they are questions of          
philosophy1 in the consideration of     
which science1 from her very nature and 
essential limitation of her office1 can 
have no voice4 ,now1 if on taking up the
 principle of causation where this is   
left by science--viz4 as the ultimate or
 unanalyzable datum of experience1 upon 
which all her investigations are        
founded1 and by which they are all      
limited--philosophy finds any reason to 
surmise that it is resolvable into the  
principle of mind1 philosophy is thus   
able to suggest that any distinction    
between mental processes as determinate 
or free1 is really a meaningless        
distinction4 ,for1 according to this    
suggestion1 the issue is no longer as to
 whether these processes are caused or  
uncaused2 the very idea of cause has    

been abolished as one which belongs only
 to that lower level of inquiry with    
which science1 or sensuous experience1  
is concerned4 ,here1 no doubt1 the      
question is a thoroughly real one1 and1 
as shown in previous chapters1 can only 
be answered in the way of determinism4  
,but so soon as we ascend to the        
philosophical theory of ,monism1 and so 
transcend the conditions of sensuous    
experience1 the question whether        
volitions are caused or uncaused        
becomes1 as ,i have said1 a meaningless 
question1 or a question the terms of    
which are not correctly stated4 ,if it  
be the case that all causality is of a  
nature psychical1 volition and causation
 are one and the same thing1 differing  
only in relation to our modes of        
apprehension4 ,it would therefore be    
equally meaningless to say that either  
is the cause of the other--just as it   
would be equally meaningless to say that
 neurosis is the cause of psychosis1 or 
that psychosis is the cause of neurosis4

 ,or thus1 if volition and causation are
 one and the same thing1 the only reason
 why they ever appear diverse is because
 the one is known ontologically1 while  
the other is known phenomenally4 ,were  
it possible that the orbit of my own    
personality could be widened so as to   
include within my own subjectivity the  
whole universe of causality1 ,i should  
find--according to ,monism--that all    
causation would become transformed into 
volition4 ,hence1 the only reason why   
there now appears to be so great an     
antithesis between these two principles1
 is because the volition which is going 
on outside of my own consciousness can  
only be known to me objectively1--or at 
most ejectively1--on which account the  
principle of causality appears to me    
phenomenally as the most ultimate1 or   
most unanalyzable1 principle in the     
phenomenal universe4  ,upon the whole1  
then1 ,i conclude that this is the      
teaching of ,monism4 ,if we view the    
facts of human volition relatively1 or  

within the four corners of psychological
 science1 there is no escape from the   
conclusion that they are determined with
 all the rigour which belongs to natural
 causation in general4 ,for every       
sequence of mental changes and every    
sequence of cerebral changes1 although  
phenomenally so diverse1 are taken by   
this theory to be ontologically         
identical2 and therefore the sequence of
 mental changes must be determined with 
the same degree of 'necessity' as is    
that of the cerebral changes4 ,in short1
 mental causation is taken to be but the
 obverse aspect of physical causation1  
and1 as previously remarked1 it is      
impossible that the doctrine of         
determinism could be taught in a manner 
more emphatic4 ,but1 on the other hand1 
the theory of ,monism is bound to go    
further than this4 ,from the very fact  
of its having gone so far as to identify
 all physical processes with psychical  
processes1 it cannot refuse to take the 
further and final step of identifying   

the most ultimate known principle of the
 one with the most ultimate known       
principle of the other2 it is bound to  
recognize in natural causation the      
phenomenal aspect of that which is known
 ontologically as volition4 ,but if     
these two principles are thus regarded  
as identical1 it clearly becomes as     
unmeaning to ask whether the one is the 
cause of the other1 as it would be to   
ask whether the one wills the other4    
,for1 ex hypothesi1 the two things being
 one thing1 or but different modes of   
viewing the same thing1 it becomes mere 
nonsense to speak of either determining 
the other2 they are both but different  
expressions of the same ultimate fact1  
namely the fact of ,being as ,being4    
,if this result should be deemed        
unsatisfactory on account of its        
vagueness1 let it be remembered that    
nothing is gained on the side of        
clearness by the converse               
supposition--viz4 that priority should  
be assigned to the principle of         

causality4 ,for1 if we say it is        
inconceivable that anything should come 
into existence without a cause--not even
 excepting the principle of mind        
itself--then the question immediately   
arises--,if all volition is caused1 what
 is the cause of volition8 ,what caused 
this cause8 ,and so on till we arrive at
 the question1 ,what caused the         
principle of causality8 which is absurd4
 ,so that whether we regard mind as     
prior to cause1 or cause as prior to    
mind1 or neither as prior to the other1 
we arrive at precisely the same         
difficulty4 ,and the difficulty is a    
hopeless one1 because it concerns the   
ultimate question of ,being as ,being1  
or the final mystery of things4  ,or1 to
 state the matter in another way4 ,an   
explanation means the reference of      
observed effects to known causes1 or the
 inclusion of previously unknown causes 
among causes better known4 ,hence it is 
obvious1 from the very meaning of what  
we call an explanation1 that at the base

 of all possible explanations there must
 lie a great ,inexplicable1 which1 just 
because more ultimate than any of our   
possible explanations1 does not itself  
require to be explained4 ,to suppose    
that it does require to be explained1   
would be to suppose1 that there is      
something still more ultimate into      
which1 if known1 this ,inexplicable     
could be merged4 ,hence1 unless we      
postulate an infinite series of possible
 explanations1 there must be a basal    
mystery somewhere1 which1 in virtue of  
its constituting the ground of all      
possible explanations1 cannot be1 and   
does not require to be1 itself          
explained4 ,what is this basal mystery8 
,materialism supposes it to be lodged in
 ,matter to the exclusion of ,mind1     
while ,idealism in its extreme forms    
takes the converse view4 ,theism        
supposes that it is an intelligent      
,person1 who is held--and logically     
enough--not to be able to give any      
explanation of his own existence2 he is1

 as it is said1 self-existent1 and1 if  
asked to give any account of his being1 
would only be able to restate the fact  
of his being in the words1 ',i am that  
,i am4' ,lastly1 ,pantheism1 or ,monism1
 supposes the ultimate mystery to be    
lodged in the universe as a whole4 ,now1
 in the present connexion the question  
before us is simply this--,are we to    
regard the principle of causality or the
 principle of mind as the ultimate      
mystery8 ,and to this question ,i answer
 that to me it appears most reasonable  
to assign priority to mind4 ,for1 on the
 one hand1 our only knowledge of        
causation is empirical1 while even as   
such it is only possible in the same way
 as our knowledge of objective existence
 in general is possible--namely1 by way 
of inference from our own mental        
modifications1 which therefore must     
necessarily have priority so far as we  
are ourselves concerned4 ,next1 on the  
other hand1 even if we were to grant    
that the principle of causality is the  

prius1 or the ultimate and inexplicable 
mystery1 ,i cannot see that it is really
 available to explain the fact of       
personality4 ,to me it appears that1    
within the range of human observation1  
this is the fact that most wears the    
appearance of finality1 or of that      
unanalyzable and inexplicable nature    
which we are bound to believe must      
belong to the ultimate mystery of       
,being4 ,but1 be this as it may1 the    
speculative difficulty of assigning     
priority to mind is certainly no greater
 than that of assigning it to causality2
 and this1 as above remarked1 is a      
sufficient answer to the question before
 us4 ,according to ,monism1 however1    
there is no need to assign priority to  
either principle1 seeing that one is but
 a phenomenal expression of the other4  
,only one further question remains to be
 considered4 ,from what ,i have just    
said on the subject of ,personality1 it 
will be apparent that the theory of     
,monism is in conflict with that of     

,theism only in so far as personality   
appears to imply limitation4 ,this is a 
point which ,i have previously          
considered in these pages 7,chapter iv1 
p4 #aji71 with the result of appearing  
to show that the conflict is one which  
would probably vanish could we rise     
above the necessary limitations of human
 thought4 ,therefore1 it here seems     
worth while to ask1 ,what can be said by
 the philosophical theory of ,monism to 
the old theological dilemma touching    
free-will and predestination8 ,or1 even 
apart from any question of ,theism1 what
 position does ,monism suppose the      
psychical activity of man to hold in    
relation to that of the universe8 ,of   
course the latter statement of the      
question is included in the former2 and1
 therefore1 we may present it thus2--,if
 the human will is free1 and the theory 
of ,theism substantially true1 how are  
we to reconcile the fact with the       
theory8  ,according to the theory of    
,theism as sanctioned by ,monism1 what  

we apprehend as natural causation is the
 obverse of a part of a summum          
genus--i4e4 the part falling within     
human observation whose whole is the    
,absolute ,volition4 ,this ,volition1   
being absolute1 can nowhere meet with   
restraint2 it is therefore absolutely   
free1 and can never contradict itself4  
,thus1 those circumscribed portions of  
it which we know as human minds--and    
which1 on account of being so           
circumscribed1 are free within          
themselves--do not in their freedom     
conflict with the ,absolute ,volition4  
,the ,absolute ,volition and the        
,relative ,volition are always in       
unison4 ,it is not that the ,absolute   
,volition unconditionally determines the
 ,relative ,volition--else the ,relative
 ,volition would not be free2 but it is 
that the ,absolute ,volition invariably 
assents to the ,relative ,volition as to
 the activity of an integral part of    
itself4 ,this will be at once evident if
 we consider that our only idea of      

determination--i4e4 causation--is1 upon 
the theistic theory1 derived from our   
observing the consistency of the ,divine
 ,will1 whether as revealed subjectively
 in the causal operations of our own    
minds1 or objectively in the causal     
operations of ,nature4 ,therefore1 the  
idea of causation as between the        
,absolute ,volition and the ,relative   
,volition is an idea destitute of       
meaning4 ,one ,relative ,volition may   
act causally on another4 ,relative      
,volition1 because each is wholly       
external to each4 ,but all ,relative    
,volitions are constituent parts of the 
,absolute ,volition1 which1 therefore1  
cannot act causally on them1 though it  
always acts substantially with them4    
,or1 otherwise phrased1 if the subject  
is a constituent part of its own        
,world-eject--the volition of which is  
always self-consistent--it follows that 
the volition of the subject must always 
be coincident with that of its          
,world-eject2 and this without being    

determined in any other sense than the  
smaller size of a part can be said to be
 determined by the larger size of its   
whole3 i4e4 the determination--if we    
choose so to call it--is not a causal   
one1 but arises immediately from the    
inherent nature of the case4 ,the       
,absolute ,volition within itself is    
free2 the ,relative ,volition within    
itself is free2 but there can be no     
conflict between these two freedoms4    
,for1 if there were a conflict1 it must 
be caused2 but where is the cause of    
this conflict to come from8 ,not from   
the ,absolute ,volition1 which is       
everywhere self-consistent2 not from the
 ,relative ,volition1 which is wholly   
contained within the ,absolute4 ,thus1  
regarded from within its own system1 the
 ,relative ,volition is free2 while1    
regarded from the system of its         
,world-eject1 the ,relative ,volition is
 predestined4 ,but the freedom is not   
incompatible with the predestination1   
nor the predestination with the freedom4

 ,they stand to each other in the       
relation of complementary truths1 the   
apparent contradiction of which arises  
only from the apparently fundamental    
antithesis between mind and cause which 
it is the privilege of ,monism to       
abolish4  ,,footnotes3  ,footnote #ac3  
',whatsoever is first of all things must
 necessarily contain it1 and actually   
have1 at least1 all the perfections that
 can ever after exist2 nor can it ever  
give to another any perfection that it  
hath not actually in itself1 or at least
 in a higher degree' 7,locke74 ,to this 
argument ,mill answers1 ',how vastly    
nobler and more precious1 for instance1 
are the vegetables and animals than the 
soil and manure out of which1 and by the
 properties of which1 they are raised   
up6 ,but this stricture is not worthy of
 ,mill4 ,the soil and manure do not     
constitute the whole cause of the plants
 and animals4 ,we must trace these and  
many other con-causes 7conditions7 back 
and back till we come to 'whatsoever is 

first of all things'3 it is merely      
childish to choose some few of the      
conditions1 and arbitrarily to regard   
them as alone the efficient causes4     
,footnote #ad3 ,collected ,essays1 vol4 
ix4 ',evolution and ,ethics1' p4 #adj4  
99       99       99       99       99  
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---------------------------             
,transcriber's note3 ,in this text this 
,h#b,o represents a subscript #b        
----------------------------------------
---------------------------         99  
99       99       99       99  ,oxford  
,,horace ,,hart1 ,,printer ,,to ,,the   
,,university